# Army Reserve taking the budget hit? - National Post



## gwp

Canada’s army reserve units are facing deep budget cuts that appear to fly in the face of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s explicit direction to stay away from front-line reductions.

Across the country, despite public assurances to the contrary from military leaders, reserve budgets have been slashed between about 16 to almost 25 per cent from last year.

Worse, it appears that most of the $330-million supposedly destined for 19,000 part-time reserve soldiers is in fact still going to reservists working full-time on what are called Class B contracts in various headquarters in such places as Ottawa, Kingston and Edmonton.

True reservists are part-time soldiers and, with units located in more than 100 towns and cities from coast to coast, they remain the military’s most visceral and enduring connection to civilian Canada. .... see more in link.  

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/02/15/christie-blatchford-reserve-budgets-slashed-by-almost-25-per-cent-despite-harpers-order-to-avoid-front-line-reductions/


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## Pandora114

Wrong "Reserve" budget buddy..

The First Nation Reserves budgets are what need to be slashed..not the DND one..

Damnit...


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## Jarnhamar

The reserves could save a lot of money if they sat down and took a look at where they are bleeding money.  Meal claims, TD, top heavy weekend ex's.


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## Bird_Gunner45

With the reserves main task of the future (at least for the arty) being force generating individuals to augment regular force units, than perhaps the CF needs to consider disbanding certain units or formations IOT focus on pushing resources to meet this goal.  The scarce resources available would be better if they were pushed to a few larger units, with less high ranks, with a focus on individual training and low level collective training.  Reserve Bde Exes in the southern US, for starters, could be cut with little impact to the initial task, IMHO.


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## PuckChaser

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> The reserves could save a lot of money if they sat down and took a look at where they are bleeding money.  Meal claims, TD, top heavy weekend ex's.



Absolutely. Seems more exercises are training officers than to train soldiers. A unit that has 50 people doesn't need 15 Cl A officers.


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## Nfld Sapper

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Reserve Bde Exes in the southern US, for starters, could be cut with little impact to the initial task, IMHO.



Well for some Bde's (like 36 and 37) these exercises are the culmination of the previous years training cycle...so cutting them IMHO would impact them..... also who wants to do section attacks in the snow.... ;D


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## Bird_Gunner45

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Well for some Bde's (like 36 and 37) these exercises are the culmination of the previous years training cycle...so cutting them IMHO would impact them..... also who wants to do section attacks in the snow.... ;D



Roger, but I guess my question is "why" do 36 and 37 bde's NEED to have a Bde level training cycle? For the arty units in LFAA (5 Div, whatever it is now), their primary task is to augment 4 AD and the RCAS W Battery (1 and 3 Fd).  As we know that none of the reserve brigades will ever deploy, what is the requirement to train them to ELOC/MLOC 4-6? once again, for arty (as I can't speak for the other arms) the task is to provide "odds and sods" for HALO, MRR, SUAS, and individual augmentation for W Battery.  Reserve Arty officers, to deploy, have to re-do their 1.2 and get the mounted FOO course (if for guns) or will have to get the STA Tp Comd course/AD Tp Comd course for the other tasks.  We could save on just providing the higher level augmentation to regular force exercises in this case, than having them train on their own.


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## Jarnhamar

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Absolutely. Seems more exercises are training officers than to train soldiers.



The amount of leadership on a reserve ex should be proportionate with how many troops are attending in my opinion (if saving money is a key issue).



> A unit that has 50 people doesn't need 15 Cl A officers.


I agree. In a reserve unit I was with we had 2 or 3 platoon commanders per platoon who would just switch back and forth for everything.   
I also find the reserves have a big clerk to troop ratio that could be scaled back.


I don't think cutting class b positions and filling them with more reg force RSS positions is a better idea mind you.


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## Harris

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> The reserves could save a lot of money if they sat down and took a look at where they are bleeding money.  Meal claims, TD, top heavy weekend ex's.



Can you give some examples of how these items are bleeding reserve money?  This is a serious question.  Speaking from my own unit experience, I don't see this.


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## Harris

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Roger, but I guess my question is "why" do 36 and 37 bde's NEED to have a Bde level training cycle?


If they don't then how do we train Company commanders, CSMs etc... to be able to become future COs and RSMs?  They need to get that experience somewhere.  It's hard enough as it is to get pers ready for succession now.  I can't imagine how we do it without opportunities like those you mention.


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## brihard

Harris said:
			
		

> If they don't then how do we train Company commanders, CSMs etc... to be able to become future COs and RSMs?  They need to get that experience somewhere.  It's hard enough as it is to get pers ready for succession now.  I can't imagine how we do it without opportunities like those you mention.



Speaking purely hypothetically- what is the actual number of primary reserve company and battalion commanders the Canadian Forces actually need, and what sort of reserve structure would allow this number to be met while reducing overhead?

I would contend that our numbers of battalion and company commanders should be proportionate to our actual ability to force generate troops. Again, hypothetically, why does every single reserve regiment need a battalion command element? If a reserve CBG struggled to force generate a territorial battalion group that is less than three understrengthed companies large, why does that CBG have eight reserve infantry LCols as commanding officers?

I know this all ends up inevitably leading back to a conversation about the flaws of the regimental structure as applied to the reserves, etc etc. There are many arguments in both directions. But I would like to see someone justify the institutional NEED (as opposed to want) to have as many 'battalion commanders' and 'company commanders' we have, notwithstanding the actual sizes of the organizations they command.

I'm not foolish enough to believe that an organization as geographically dispersed as the PRes could be effective commanded as efficiently with a command team as slim as that of a regular battalion. But I definitely also don't think that our numbers of senior officers and senior NCOs realistically reflect the need for same.


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## Jarnhamar

Harris said:
			
		

> Can you give some examples of how these items are bleeding reserve money?  This is a serious question.  Speaking from my own unit experience, I don't see this.


Sure NP. 
A no hook private earning more in a month than a class B MCpl due to meal claims.
A unit weekend ex with 7 "troops", 5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff.
Ex's where senior members go on ex to hang out in a tent and talk about RV86.
Sending RSS staff on ex just to hang around.  (which means field pay)

I have a few more examples but they would border on airing dirty laundry so I'll fire off a PM.


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## noneck

OZ which units are going on EX with numbers like that?

I fully agree with some of the posts here concerning Bn Comd staff and PRes infantry units. I know that for many this will be considered heresy.....but I think we need to re-org our MO Infantry Bn's into Coy sized organizations and have one Bn staff for every 3-4 infantry Coy's in a PRes CBG. We could start saving money there!


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## McG

There are ways to organize the PRes that are both more efficient and more effective than our current model.  I have advocated some of these changes in the reserve role and structure thread.  But, getting back to the article …





			
				gwp said:
			
		

> Army Reserve taking the budget hit?


Everybody is "taking the budget hit."  This is not unique to the reserves; everyone is seeing cuts.  The title implies the PRes are taking a disproportionate hit, but that conclusion would require a comparing reserve brigade cuts to the being made against Reg F brigade operating budgets.  With the facts given, we cannot say that the reserves are taking more or less than their share of the hit.


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## Fishbone Jones

MCG said:
			
		

> Everybody is "taking the budget hit."  This is not unique to the reserves; everyone is seeing cuts.  The title implies the PRes are taking a disproportionate hit, but that conclusion would require a comparing reserve brigade cuts to the being made against Reg F brigade operating budgets.  With the facts given, we cannot say that the reserves are taking more or less than their share of the hit.



It's journalism 101. Blood sells.


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## McG

To be fair, the thread title with its implied conclusion is not the title printed over the article.

Within the first few sentances, Christie Blatchford does refer to an issue that I think many of us would be interested to see the numbers on: are operational units and formations (of all components) taking a disproportionate hit in comparison with institutional HQs and bureaucracy?  But again, we can't tell from what is written.


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## Harris

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Sure NP.
> A no hook private earning more in a month than a class B MCpl due to meal claims.
> A unit weekend ex with 7 "troops", 5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff.
> Ex's where senior members go on ex to hang out in a tent and talk about RV86.
> Sending RSS staff on ex just to hang around.  (which means field pay)
> 
> I have a few more examples but they would border on airing dirty laundry so I'll fire off a PM.



Wow!  Then I see your points.  All I can say is that not all units are like that.  Mine is definitely not.  Normally It is the Company Commander down, with any additional support as needed depending on the Ex.   No support needed, no additional pers.  The CO and RSM may visit for part of the day to check on trg, but not always.


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## Haggis

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> A unit weekend ex with 7 "troops", 5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff.



Since you were, quite obviously, involved with this unit, where were the troops?  Did the "5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff" show up for the exercise expecting more than 7 troops to show up?  How many of these leaders were already deployed as part of the advance party and were also expecting more than 7 troops to show up?

So, rather than questioning the officers, WOs and NCOs who showed up to lead and execute the training,  the better approach would be to ask the question of why did *only 7 troops * show up?


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## fake penguin

Just released about a few months ago. To answer your question Haggis. I seen troops be all gung ho at the start then their interest wonder. The army is just not for some people. My hearts not it anymore, i think the army will always have its long time troops and its short time troops. I'll still read about the army and visit this site but for me i'am done with it. Maybe no one is doing anything wrong, just that only a few have it in them to stay on for a long time.


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## Bird_Gunner45

Harris said:
			
		

> If they don't then how do we train Company commanders, CSMs etc... to be able to become future COs and RSMs?  They need to get that experience somewhere.  It's hard enough as it is to get pers ready for succession now.  I can't imagine how we do it without opportunities like those you mention.



This goes back to the initial question- if the reserves role now is to force generate people, than what higher training does a Coy Commander of a Reserve unit require aside from perhaps a reserve Combat team commander course? The Major will not likely lead troops on operation as an Inf Coy commander.  In A-Stan, the reserve OCs were all of units like the CIMIC or PSYOPS (I'm sure there''s exceptions...), so that higher level training had little value on operations.  If the job is to force generate for the Reg force, than focus on Coy commander DOWN, not up


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## brihard

Haggis said:
			
		

> Since you were, quite obviously, involved with this unit, where were the troops?  Did the "5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff" show up for the exercise expecting more than 7 troops to show up?  How many of these leaders were already deployed as part of the advance party and were also expecting more than 7 troops to show up?
> 
> So, rather than questioning the officers, WOs and NCOs who showed up to lead and execute the training,  the better approach would be to ask the question of why did *only 7 troops * show up?



I think you're reading what he posted differently from how he intended... I don't see him saying those people didn't have a reason to be present, but rather that in its totality, the package we're looking at here can fairly be described as poor bang:buck ratio within the scope of what the reserves are supposed to do. And I'm sure we're also all picking up that there's a bit of hyperbole present in presenting a genuine but rare 'worst case' for reserve attendance as somehow the norm. However this also isn't a set of circumstances unique to any one unit; I'm sure we've all seen smaller reserve regiments occasionally have abysmal attendance on one exercise or another.

The context of the discussion being money poorly spent, I think the example he cites remains valid, irrespective of what circumstances led to it being the case. And of course 'anecdote' doesn't pluralize to 'data', and one really bad showing isn't something I think any of us would generalize across a unit or the people therein.


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## brihard

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This goes back to the initial question- if the reserves role now is to force generate people, than what higher training does a Coy Commander of a Reserve unit require aside from perhaps a reserve Combat team commander course? The Major will not likely lead troops on operation as an Inf Coy commander.  In A-Stan, the reserve OCs were all of units like the CIMIC or PSYOPS (I'm sure there''s exceptions...), so that higher level training had little value on operations.  If the job is to force generate for the Reg force, than focus on Coy commander DOWN, not up



Musing more on the points that I myself initiated earlier- one thing does come to mind. While I agree that generally speaking Coy down is the appropriate focus, at the end of the day the reserves DO need a chain of command all the way up. That chain of command will inevitably come into closer contact with their regular forces peers, and I can see merit in having reserve leadership with the training, and consequently more of the credibility and, hopefully the balls to fight to protect our organization and what we offer within the scope of the larger CF. On those grounds I'm certainly not going to argue against the need to have some higher command, though I still think we're 'command overweight' below the CBG level. What I don't have visibility over is how those brigade commanders are selected, and whether the size of the pool of COs we have now is necessary to achieve brigade Comds of sufficient quality and experience to be worthwhile. Way the hell above my pay grade.


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## Jarnhamar

Haggis said:
			
		

> So, rather than questioning the officers, WOs and NCOs who showed up to lead and execute the training,  the better approach would be to ask the question of why did *only 7 troops * show up?



This kind  situation has happened at at least 4 units that I know of but as Brihard said, I'm using a very worst case scenario with the numbers. 

In my own experience I would say the primary answer to your question of why only 7 soldiers are showing up is that their immediate leadership, MCpls and Sgts, didn't really care. They were signing in for the weekend so who cares if troops show up or not?  I found the difference between a soldier attending an ex could be something as little as the section commander saying 'c'mon man I need you out on this ex'.


Using my example I can't decide if a solution is for the COC to tell extra leadership to go home OR if that would actually be unfair since they're doing their part by clearing their schedule and showing up for the ex.   If we're discussing ways to save money (and keep a regiment open) I'd lean towards the former.  But then that would of course likely push the very same leadership out the door.

I know as a section commander I would have tripled my efforts to get troops out on ex if there was a SOP that I could not attend a weekend ex if my section wasn't attending as well.


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## PPCLI Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> Everybody is "taking the budget hit."  This is not unique to the reserves; everyone is seeing cuts.  The title implies the PRes are taking a disproportionate hit, but that conclusion would require a comparing reserve brigade cuts to the being made against Reg F brigade operating budgets.  With the facts given, we cannot say that the reserves are taking more or less than their share of the hit.



That is the real question.  In the Army of the West, I have heard that 1 CMBG took a 50% cut to its O+M budget for next Fiscal Year, while its sister CBGs took cuts below 10%.  

The reality is that the manner in which the cuts are coming (brutal, but very incrementally) leads organisations into the inevitable shaving of the ice cube, vice a redesign of the force.


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## brihard

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> This kind  situation has happened at at least 4 units that I know of but as Brihard said, I'm using a very worst case scenario with the numbers.
> 
> In my own experience I would say the primary answer to your question of why only 7 soldiers are showing up is that their immediate leadership, MCpls and Sgts, didn't really care. They were signing in for the weekend so who cares if troops show up or not?  I found the difference between a soldier attending an ex could be something as little as the section commander saying 'c'mon man I need you out on this ex'.
> 
> 
> Using my example I can't decide if a solution is for the COC to tell extra leadership to go home OR if that would actually be unfair since they're doing their part by clearing their schedule and showing up for the ex.   If we're discussing ways to save money (and keep a regiment open) I'd lean towards the former.  But then that would of course likely push the very same leadership out the door.
> 
> I know as a section commander I would have tripled my efforts to get troops out on ex if there was a SOP that I could not attend a weekend ex if my section wasn't attending as well.



Interesting point raised by this one, too... When we run an ex, there's quite a bit of close-to-fixed cost. The cost of the bus. Paying for blue rockets. The Cl A necessary for the advance party (which will likely not scale up very much as a larger PTA attends). So on the one hand this sort of mitigates in favour of collectivising training in larger numbers; not necessarily the brigade exercises many troops loathe (with good reason), but within two or three local regiments, in order to take advantage of economies of scale. On the other hand reserve units can be so damned clannish that sheer stubbornness can make it harder to work with other regiments even when it's to mutual advantage.


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## Fishbone Jones

This is a leadership failure. Plain and simple. Before leaving, the advance party should have a minimum forecast. 

At D-30 min, the leadership should have cancelled the Ex and recalled the deployed pers.

Brigade should be doing a massive shit dump on the upper echelon of this unit and make them eat the cost for failure to plan and execute a simple weekend exercise.

If it happens twice with the same crew, pink slips should be handed out.

To paraphrase Colin Powell:

"Leadership is engaging your lower ranks. The day your soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you've stopped leading them. When they stop talking to you, bringing you their problems, it's because they have lost confidence that you can solve their problems, or they feel that you don't care. Both cases are a failure of leadership.

If this were a litmus test most CO's would fail. One, they build so many barriers to upwards communication that the very idea of someone lower in the hierarchy looking up to the leader for help is absolutely ludicrous. Two, the corporate culture they foster often defines asking for help as a weakness or failure, so people cover up their problems, and the organization suffers accordingly. Real leaders make themselves accessable and available. They show concern for the efforts and challenges faced by their underlings, even as they demand high standards. Accordingly, they are more likely to create an environment where problem analysis replaces blame."



_ edit: grammar_


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## Haggis

Brihard said:
			
		

> The context of the discussion being money poorly spent, I think the example he cites remains valid, irrespective of what circumstances led to it being the case. And of course 'anecdote' doesn't pluralize to 'data', and one really bad showing isn't something I think any of us would generalize across a unit or the people therein.



I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually _saved_ money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.


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## dapaterson

"A failure of followership" is an interesting concept.  Almost Boylian in its Orwellian nature.

Though I must say, having read the original article, anyone who goes to the wingnuts at Reserves 2000 for comment clearly knows now of what they speak.


Here's a brief thought exercise:  There are currently 51 Reserve Infantry "battalions" in the primary Reserve.  Assume a battalion is a modest 600 people.  That makes 30 600 infantrymen in the Army Reserves, according to the thought exercise.  But the Army Reserve has a parade strength, in total, of about 19 000.  Including all the other combat arms, combat support, and combat service support.  Somehow, the math doesn't work

It's clear that we have too many HQs in the Reserves - 19k sounds like 5-6 brigades, maximum, to me - and 5-6 brigades maps to 15-18 infantry Bns - in other words, if we culled 2/3 of the current Infantry Bn HQs we'd be at about the right level.  So, for example, put the RMR, Black Watch and CGG under a single command team in Montreal.  Put the SD&G, Brockville Rifles and PWOR under a single command team long the St Lawrence River.  Put both of those composite Infantry battalions under a single Brigade group. Lather, rinse, repeat across the nation.


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## brihard

Haggis said:
			
		

> I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually _saved_ money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.



I'm not overlooking anything. We'd probably both be asking the same hard question of our troops in those circumstances, all the way up and down the chain. I'm right with you on that one. My regiment has in the past couple years had to cancel an exercise due to an atrocious attendance forecast the Thursday prior- particularly in a unit with the effective strength of mine, that occasioned some insistence on getting answers.

You've piqued my curiosity regarding money being saved in OZ's instance- do you mean 'saved' as in through achieving economy, and greater returns in training value being achieved for what was spent, or simply money 'saved' through not being spent (on that given weekend, at least) on the Class A pay and CLDA/FOA that would have been payable?


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## Fishbone Jones

Haggis said:
			
		

> I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually _saved_ money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.



Failure of leadership is a defined known. Please explain what a "failure of followership" is.

As it stands, it sounds like exactly what it is. 

A failure of leadership, where that 'leadership is trying to download the responsibility of their failure to the subordinates to make it followership''.

Take responsibility and ensure the welfare of your subordinates.

Is that too difficult a concept to engender with your leadership?


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## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "A failure of followership" is an interesting concept.  Almost Boylian in its Orwellian nature.



In this context, other words for "followership" would be "duty", "responsibility" and "loyalty".

We both know how much effort it takes to simply plan an exercise.  To do so and have only 7 troops come out from a unit of, say 150 on paper, is hugely demoralizing for the planners/leadership.   There is a duty on the part of the leadership to plan such training, but also a duty of the followers to come out and participate.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's clear that we have too many HQs in the Reserves - 19k sounds like 5-6 brigades, maximum, to me - and 5-6 brigades maps to 15-18 infantry Bns - in other words, if we culled 2/3 of the current Infantry Bn HQs we'd be at about the right level.  So, for example, put the RMR, Black Watch and CGG under a single command team in Montreal.  Put the SD&G, Brockville Rifles and PWOR under a single command team long the St Lawrence River.  Put both of those composite Infantry battalions under a single Brigade group. Lather, rinse, repeat across the nation.



This is not a unique thought, but one that has been discussed here before and also in the halls of NDHQ.  That being said, the best time to innovate is during a recesssion and, maybe, this idea's time has come.


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## Haggis

recceguy said:
			
		

> Take responsibility and ensure the welfare of your subordinates.
> 
> Is that too difficult a concept to engender with your leadership?



The welfare of subordinates is not a factor in this discussion.  The duty of the subordinates to attend scheduled training is certainly a factor.  Since our Reserve employment model continues to rely on non-disciplinary coercion to compel attendance at unit training.  The responsibilty for the success of that training, in the whole, is shared (not equally) between the leaders and followers.


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## Haggis

Brihard said:
			
		

> I'm not overlooking anything. We'd probably both be asking the same hard question of our troops in those circumstances, all the way up and down the chain. I'm right with you on that one. My regiment has in the past couple years had to cancel an exercise due to an atrocious attendance forecast the Thursday prior- particularly in a unit with the effective strength of mine, that occasioned some insistence on getting answers.



The wisest COA in the case you describe would be to cancel the exercise, if attendance was forecast to be so low as to make the exercise aim unattainable.  However, if the troops commited to the exercise and then failed to attend, that's a whole different story.



			
				Brihard said:
			
		

> You've piqued my curiosity regarding money being saved in OZ's instance- do you mean 'saved' as in through achieving economy, and greater returns in training value being achieved for what was spent, or simply money 'saved' through not being spent (on that given weekend, at least) on the Class A pay and CLDA/FOA that would have been payable?



I meant "saved" through money not being spent. And it was meant facetiously, as well.


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## Fishbone Jones

Haggis said:
			
		

> In this context, other words for "followership" would be "duty", "responsibility" and "loyalty".
> 
> We both know how much effort it takes to simply plan an exercise.  To do so and have only 7 troops come out from a unit of, say 150 on paper, is hugely demoralizing for the planners/leadership.   There is a duty on the part of the leadership to plan such training, but also a duty of the followers to come out and participate.
> 
> This is not a unique thought, but one that has been discussed here before and also in the halls of NDHQ.  That being said, the best time to innovate is during a recesssion and, maybe, this idea's time has come.



Then you have to go back to my previous post with credit to Colin Powell.

The leadership of this Unit failed.

To try, even remotely, to place the responsibility on the troops, shows your total disconnect with them.

Stop trying to pass the buck and accept responsibility for the failure.

The leadership failed because they could not convince the troops that the exercise would be worth while, active and fun. This was a culmination of  disappointing, useless and non effective exercises that occurred prior.

Your troops had lost interest and confidence in the leadership. They felt you could not provide what was needed.

They had come to the conclusion, quite rightly, that the leadership did not care for their welfare.

They voted with their feet, as Reserve units do.

You failed, they voted. Story ends. Anything else is just blubbering blame gaming.

Take off the skirt, cancel the manicure, grow a moustache and man the fuck up.

Instead of trying to justify the lack of participation, how about getting to the root cause and fixing the problem. 

Fire some useless fucking sacred cows.


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## Haggis

You are, of course correct, recceguy.

My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.

This has strayed off topic enough and I've said my piece.


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## OldSolduer

Haggis said:
			
		

> You are, of course correct, recceguy.
> 
> My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.



There are some good points on both sides of the argument, but I think we all realize things need fixing. 

Our unit is two regiments under one BHQ. Our numbers are about 260 on paper. Our leaders do what they can to get the troops out,however many are cops etc that cannot always be there.

We ruthlessly cull the herd. Don't parade  for a while and you will get the NES letter.  Don't bother to respond or parade? 5f release.

Start issuing some I/CSM or RWs.


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## Fishbone Jones

Haggis said:
			
		

> You are, of course correct, recceguy.
> 
> My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.
> 
> This has strayed off topic enough and I've said my piece.



Please stop with the sarcasm and facetiousness. This won't end, because you've been backed into a corner and decided to toss the discussion aside.

We all know that attendance, whether weekly or exercise, is a percentage of responsibility on everyone's part.

People have jobs, school, exams, family problems, whatever. We understand that.

105 on paper and 7 on ex? You fucked up. Big time. Total circus with clown show fucked up.

To try and portray the lower ranks as the bad guys, for the failure, shows the complete lack of responsibility on the leadership and the full causation for the discussion of this thread.

You can lead a horse to water but you won't stop the pigs from feeding at the trough.


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## MilEME09

My unit is going through the same problem, now we are CSS but the last EX including Adv Party was a total of nine people from our FSG including 1 Major, 1 Sgt, 1 Mcpl, 3 Cpl, and 3 Pte. Fairly proportional however our unit on paper is 160 or so. Major problem when our other FSG maybe turns out 10-15 on an EX putting us at maybe 25 out of 160.  Leaderships been coming down on us for the poor turn out, but we've been telling them the problems for years and nothings done, because the Junior ranks have gotten fed up with our leaderships inability to fix the problems identified.


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## noneck

Thank you Recce Guy!

Jim how many from the 38 Bde Inf Gp are LEO's? I ask because surely they can't be the only dudes holding it together. 

Cheers
Noneck


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## Infanteer

Sounds like there is a need for Reserve terms of service that include mandatory attendance.  Maybe move to an American model of fewer, but more well attended, parade days and exercises.


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## OldSolduer

noneck said:
			
		

> Thank you Recce Guy!
> 
> Jim how many from the 38 Bde Inf Gp are LEO's? I ask because surely they can't be the only dudes holding it together.
> 
> Cheers
> Noneck



We have six, and of the six five are sgt or higher.


----------



## Haggis

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sounds like there is a need for Reserve terms of service that include mandatory attendance.  Maybe move to an American model of fewer, but more well attended, parade days and exercises.



Canada has considered, and discarded, that approach and opted to retain a voluntary attendance model, whererin there are no true penalties for non attendance or non-support by employers.  Even though most provinces and territories have some form of job protection legislaition and the NDA has penalties (albeit very minor) for non attendance by Class A Reservists, neither has yet been used to coerce members to attend or employers to allow it.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sounds like there is a need for Reserve terms of service that include mandatory attendance.  Maybe move to an American model of fewer, but more well attended, parade days and exercises.



I agree.  And while were at it lets push for some legislation to the effect that reservists cannot be penalized or let go from civilian employment because of reserve obligations.  

Funny we haven't heard from the NAVRES or AFRES on this yet.  Would NAVRES and AFRES run things so different that they aren't feeling this cut to reserves as much ?  And if so perhaps there is some organizational/logistical practices the Army Reserve could steal from them.  

Just a shot in the dark...


----------



## Gunplumber

I think more interest should be looked at the "...news that DND’s budget for professional services, which includes consultants and contractors, is up by $475-million while the army’s budget over all has been slashed by 22%." Thats where the money should be cut!


----------



## brihard

I need to point out that a very 'worst case' portrait of army reserve is being painted here. Many regiments - particularly in the cities - have pretty good attendance. Often times such issues as there are have more to do with exercises scheduled during exams and the like.

My regiment parades a three (over strength) platoon rifle coy, and most people show up most parades, with two platoons normally out on ex- and at any given time we have a lot of people tasked out or on/teaching courses. And we sent about 90 to Kandahar all in. I wouldn't say we indicate need for legislative change.

Usual caveat - 'anecdote' doesn't pluralize to 'data'.


----------



## Eaglelord17

Quick way to save money would be to reduce the number of senior positions. The two Reserve units in my city both add up to about maybe 2-3 platoons if everyone were to show up. For the one unit there is maybe 20-40 people that show up on average (maybe 70 total on paper) yet that unit has 3 Majors, 1 LCol, a MWO, and I can't really say exactly what else there is as that is the other unit not my own. It just is crazy to have so many higher ups for so few worker ranks. I think what is needed is a major restucturing in that keep the names and such of the Regiment the same but change how they are organized internally. Make it so for an Arty Reserve 'Regiment' (as an example) it is a battery at max so there top commander for their Regiment would be a Major who maybe reports to a LCol who commands several such units. I know for my unit as a Service Battalion we are just a CSS company out of the whole unit. Our unit almost parades the same as the other unit (in the city) yet our O.C. is a Captain and our highest NCM is a Warrant so it is not as though it is impossible. The overall command is a LCol who is actually in charge of 350 Reservists. If this model is able to work for the Service Battalions why couldn't it work for the other units.
Just my  :2c:


----------



## Monsoon

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Funny we haven't heard from the NAVRES or AFRES on this yet.  Would NAVRES and AFRES run things so different that they aren't feeling this cut to reserves as much ?  And if so perhaps there is some organizational/logistical practices the Army Reserve could steal from them.


Frankly, NAVRES is pretty flush at the moment. That's not likely to last indefinitely, but we benefit from the fact that the Reg F RCN is under its funded strength and that reserve pay is an easy discretionary to dial up (in the same way that it seems the Army is finding it an easy discretionary to dial down now that it's over its funded Reg F strength). I don't think that the situation in the militia has much to do with any decision MND has made - he's just an easy target politically for the advocates to go after in the hopes he'll intervene directly.


----------



## Haggis

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Funny we haven't heard from the NAVRES or AFRES on this yet.



Unlike the Army Reserve, the NAVRES and Air Reserve have real world operational missions and platforms from which to execute those missions.  We do not.  Maybe having one would help the problem inasmuch as the leaders and soldiers would see more worth in their training and be more motivated to succeed?



			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Would NAVRES and AFRES run things so different that they aren't feeling this cut to reserves as much ?  And if so perhaps there is some organizational/logistical practices the Army Reserve could steal from them.



The employment models for both vary so greatly from the Army Reserve as to make such a comparison useless.  The second difference is scale.  The third is span of control.  There are more Army Reserve soldiers in LFCA than there are all ranks in the Air Reserve. There are more Army Reserve units in LFWA than there are Naval Reserve Divisions in Canada.  There are some things they do better than we do and some they don't.  We need to mine that field and dig up the best practises from all.


----------



## noneck

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> We have six, and of the six five are sgt or higher.



Yeah that would do it! We are quite Emergency Services heavy in BC as well, with cops, firemen and other peace officers such as sheriffs and BSO's rounding it out. Fortunately most are senior enough on the job that they are in non rotating shift positions. As you point out, the majority of our folks in these jobs are in SNCO/senior officers slots.....including the Bde Comd and Bde CWO.

Cheers
Noneck


----------



## MilEME09

I think to some degree the reg force vs reserve mentality factors into this as well, here in 41 we constant get push back from LFWA saying what we cant do (which as a tech is apparently anything involving my job) So part of the drop in attendance is in part because we cant seem to be able to do the jobs we are trained for. From my experience interacting with NAVRES guys they seem content because they always have rotations to Kingston class ships. Army Reserves really have nothing in comparison, we have no foreign bases or anything that a reservist could go on to get some kind of experience, its sit at our armouries and listen to the same lectures year after year.


----------



## 54/102 CEF

One of the previous posters noted the primary role is indiv augmentation to a full time force that gets deployed intermittently (to typically take part) in a coalition setting.

That's the Reg Force reality - they can't plan where they go and its all based on projecting outwards from whatever Army DIV (someone should stop joking around) - Bde - Area. 

Deduction - You can't augment what you can't plan for.

You can ramp up training so that the deployed units have a slice of reserves and these troops will gain rich experience augmenting a pretty thinly manned Reg Force - then the deployment runs down and we start all over again.

Potshots at training up to Company Commander not with standing - I'm sure anyone who does their bit and crawls across the finish line at AOC has demonstrated an outlier stickwithitness that would serve all well when called up - but even if just to serve locally its unparalled training. 

The grey beards who have done all leadership training in their arms and services alike have nothing to feel sheepish about. These are all can do guys and girls.

Where the vast majority get pinched is before Mcpl and trying to get to be a stable Capt so you have a civvy fall back. This will never change - ie the turmoil of the volunteer non-coerced soldier / Officer who is dragged away from his or her Regiment to a civvy job for family and economic means first - with the Reserves being a generally fond second.

In short - I see the Reserves as a sieve that many fall through because - they can't count on the cash when they need it in tech schools / specialty courses or post grade high school University headed education. Many survivers do - scabbing up Class B here and their in a patchwork until they get their Trades papers or Degree and then move on.

But many don't because the whole thing is based on indiv augmentation which = walking around in a pitch black room.

I think the answer lies in listening to the population of troops below Mcpl who is the center of gravity. What I read in the recent Reserve Forces Survey suggests to me the hierarchy can't focus on the bottom and they too are trying their best to lead ahead through a thick fog.

That leaves one avenue of advance open - Political Will. 

In a future conflict I don't see NAVRES or Air Res contributing too much. The main effort is the Army. And the Army will suddenly need MORE SIR Please?

Where will more come from? The more is currently a weak centre of gravity as the population as we all (I will share in the blast of flames to come) suggest in this thread is not viable. eg: lets go to 18 Bn of Res Infantry - same probably translates across all MOC.

So when the Army Commander reads out his wish list to the flinty eyed money men of DND it should say - we want to train EVERY reservist with the full range of skills to get to pre Combat leader student level.

That means no more "can't train the stay at home troops as the trainers are deployed"

Fixing what seems to be the problem suggests a fully staffed corps of trainers from the Reg Force.

Every reservist will get trained or they won't advance and the manning for enough troops to fill this implied list of trained troops would significantly expand.

After about 5 years we should annually be completing training of somewhere up to 5000 fully capable troops that can step into a pre Afghan training cycle with ease.

Reg Force wins and Res Force wins.

I'm sure the money can be found and the shortfall sold as politically relevant for who ever is in Government.


----------



## dapaterson

I suspect the next year or two will see some changes in attitudes towards Reserve CSS soldiers.  Smart Reg F bases will realize that employing Reserve techs, even in the limited manner that class A permits, will enhance their throughput - and if it's "skills maintenance" funding paying the bill, it's free to the base.

I know in Ottawa, for example, the local Svc Bn can send Sup Techs to the base to assist in kitting out new recruits, and work is under way to get Veh Techs and Wpn techs doing some work as well.  It requires leadership engagement, and abandoning the "us vs them" mentality, but very positive things can be accomplished.

In fact, I recall seeing stats from a few years ago that showed that the two Army Reserve units with the most parading soldiers were the Svc Bns in Quebec City and Montreal - they supported the local CBGs and relieved pressure from the Reg F support units - a win/win for everyone.  All it takes is command engagement and a bit of common sense.  (And a desire to give soldiers more than IBTS, WHMIS and ethics lectures).


----------



## Monsoon

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> In a future conflict I don't see NAVRES or Air Res contributing too much.


 :


----------



## Journeyman

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> In a future conflict I don't see NAVRES or Air Res contributing too much.
> 
> 
> 
> :
Click to expand...

Well, that certainly was an eloquently expressed counter-argument.


----------



## brihard

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> :



I'm actually curious- what's the NAVRES contribution like on operational cruises for the frigates, destroyers, replenishment ships and subs? I don't know much about NAVRES tasks above the level of the MCDVs.


----------



## dapaterson

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> In a future conflict I don't see NAVRES or Air Res contributing too much. The main effort is the Army. And the Army will suddenly need MORE SIR Please?



As a purple person who bleeds green, I'll have to disagree here.

There is no Air Res - that Reserve has been committed.  I can argue how & why (over beers is preferable) - but the Air Res is already contributing.

As for the NAVRES, they are beginning a fundamental transformation, as the RCN abandons platforms specific to components and moves to Reg and Res both crewing the same vessels.  My initial, off the top of my head thought is that I'd like to see more class A sailors in the RCNVR - which would require more money, as I don't think the RCN can afford to roll back the size of their full-time Reserve.  But they will contribute to future conflict, and increasing the size of the base they have to draw on would increase their capabilities.


----------



## Monsoon

Journeyman said:
			
		

> : Well, that certainly was an eloquently expressed counter-argument.


If I felt compelled to justify the existence of my formation, I'd certainly try to do it without denigrating the value of my peers in the other service branches.



			
				Brihard said:
			
		

> I'm actually curious- what's the NAVRES contribution like on operational cruises for the frigates, destroyers, replenishment ships and subs? I don't know much about NAVRES tasks above the level of the MCDVs.


Generally individual augmentation at the junior NCM-level, but not too much of that at present as the Reg F is pressed for sea days in the heavies to do their own FG with the Halifax class in refit. The RCN has tended to be very platform-specific in its career approach (moving from, say, the tankers to the frigates is regarded as significant career disruption), and that's meant that NAVRES has been all about the Kingston class. The RCN's trying become like most of our allies and develop a less rigid FG model, so there's starting to be a bit more cross-manning (Reg F and reserve alike). If you want to know what NAVRES was doing to support ops from 2003 to 2011, the Kingston class was taking up the domestic tasks and Reg F FG work that the heavies were less available for during the heavier rotation periods. And of course hundreds deployed abroad as individual augmentees.

Unfortunately, unlike my learned colleague above, I'm far too ignorant to be able to discern what the country's future defence requirements will be, so I'm inclined to guess that it would be a good idea to keep us around.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Admiral Sir Staveley, First Sea Lord Royal Navy (IIRC): "Navies are expensive, but a damn sight cheaper than not having them around when you need them".

Best argument I've ever heard for making sure you got Regular and Reserve seamen available to you at all time.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There is no Air Res - that Reserve has been committed.



That message has been ttransimitted many times over the past couple of years.

And, as we know, any Reserve that is committed should be immediately reconstituted.  The question within the Air Reserve, given their unique demographics (the majority are older ex Reg F members and very Class B heavy) and hard to acquires skill sets, is "how?".


----------



## Sf2

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> One of the previous posters noted the primary role is indiv augmentation to a full time force that gets deployed intermittently (to typically take part) in a coalition setting.
> 
> That's the Reg Force reality - they can't plan where they go and its all based on projecting outwards from whatever Army DIV (someone should stop joking around) - Bde - Area.
> 
> Deduction - You can't augment what you can't plan for.
> 
> You can ramp up training so that the deployed units have a slice of reserves and these troops will gain rich experience augmenting a pretty thinly manned Reg Force - then the deployment runs down and we start all over again.
> 
> Potshots at training up to Company Commander not with standing - I'm sure anyone who does their bit and crawls across the finish line at AOC has demonstrated an outlier stickwithitness that would serve all well when called up - but even if just to serve locally its unparalled training.
> 
> The grey beards who have done all leadership training in their arms and services alike have nothing to feel sheepish about. These are all can do guys and girls.
> 
> Where the vast majority get pinched is before Mcpl and trying to get to be a stable Capt so you have a civvy fall back. This will never change - ie the turmoil of the volunteer non-coerced soldier / Officer who is dragged away from his or her Regiment to a civvy job for family and economic means first - with the Reserves being a generally fond second.
> 
> In short - I see the Reserves as a sieve that many fall through because - they can't count on the cash when they need it in tech schools / specialty courses or post grade high school University headed education. Many survivers do - scabbing up Class B here and their in a patchwork until they get their Trades papers or Degree and then move on.
> 
> But many don't because the whole thing is based on indiv augmentation which = walking around in a pitch black room.
> 
> I think the answer lies in listening to the population of troops below Mcpl who is the center of gravity. What I read in the recent Reserve Forces Survey suggests to me the hierarchy can't focus on the bottom and they too are trying their best to lead ahead through a thick fog.
> 
> That leaves one avenue of advance open - Political Will.
> 
> In a future conflict I don't see NAVRES or Air Res contributing too much. The main effort is the Army. And the Army will suddenly need MORE SIR Please?
> 
> Where will more come from? The more is currently a weak centre of gravity as the population as we all (I will share in the blast of flames to come) suggest in this thread is not viable. eg: lets go to 18 Bn of Res Infantry - same probably translates across all MOC.
> 
> So when the Army Commander reads out his wish list to the flinty eyed money men of DND it should say - we want to train EVERY reservist with the full range of skills to get to pre Combat leader student level.
> 
> That means no more "can't train the stay at home troops as the trainers are deployed"
> 
> Fixing what seems to be the problem suggests a fully staffed corps of trainers from the Reg Force.
> 
> Every reservist will get trained or they won't advance and the manning for enough troops to fill this implied list of trained troops would significantly expand.
> 
> After about 5 years we should annually be completing training of somewhere up to 5000 fully capable troops that can step into a pre Afghan training cycle with ease.
> 
> Reg Force wins and Res Force wins.
> 
> I'm sure the money can be found and the shortfall sold as politically relevant for who ever is in Government.



You just filled my Buzzword Bingo card.  Thanks!!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I suspect the next year or two will see some changes in attitudes towards Reserve CSS soldiers.  Smart Reg F bases will realize that employing Reserve techs, even in the limited manner that class A permits, will enhance their throughput - and if it's "skills maintenance" funding paying the bill, it's free to the base.
> 
> I know in Ottawa, for example, the local Svc Bn can send Sup Techs to the base to assist in kitting out new recruits, and work is under way to get Veh Techs and Wpn techs doing some work as well.  It requires leadership engagement, and abandoning the "us vs them" mentality, but very positive things can be accomplished.
> 
> In fact, I recall seeing stats from a few years ago that showed that the two Army Reserve units with the most parading soldiers were the Svc Bns in Quebec City and Montreal - they supported the local CBGs and relieved pressure from the Reg F support units - a win/win for everyone.  All it takes is command engagement and a bit of common sense.  (And a desire to give soldiers more than IBTS, WHMIS and ethics lectures).



As I been saying for a long time, a clear meaningful task, with equipment to complete that task is what will draw people to the Reserves. A wandering ever changing objective/plan for the Reserves and minimal or non-existent equipment is going to kill recruitment.


----------



## Smirnoff123

I would think it would hurt retention more than recruitment.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:
			
		

> In fact, I recall seeing stats from a few years ago that showed that the two Army Reserve units with the most parading soldiers were the Svc Bns in Quebec City and Montreal - they supported the local CBGs and relieved pressure from the Reg F support units - a win/win for everyone.  All it takes is command engagement and a bit of common sense.  (And a desire to give soldiers more than IBTS, WHMIS and ethics lectures).



I heard the same, My unit is doing something similar in Calgary as 41 SVC BN takes over CSS operations for southern Alberta, we hope by actually having work to do our ranks will start showing up more, and will allow us to recruit more. I mean if a new recruit comes in wanting to be a vehicle techbut see's we never do vehicle stuff we aren't going to keep him long. This should be a good move that all reserve service battalions should be doing in my opinion, supporting the reservists in their brigade so long as the will from leadership is there to get us what we need to carry out our jobs. As one of five weapon techs in Calgary I'm sure i'll have plenty of work coming.


----------



## ArmyRick

I have been on both sides of the fence (Regular force and reserve). Its too easy to take pot shots and swipes at the reserves.

One comment being made about how much reservist waste on travel claims, etc. Guess what? A moot point, reg force get same benefits (TD, LDA, travel, etc). Point done.

If we eliminate it for the reserves, then so long reg force, you lose same expense coverage. Ya, I thought so, no one is gonna support that.

Here is my recommendations that I would make to immediately save CF money (I'll hit reserves first)
P RES
1. There is a lot of Class B protection going on and people being employed that the CF does not really need employed, SLASH, time to be ruthless and put the institution first. As far as being people justifying their existence on Class B, stop. The army only needs so many people, end story.
2. Once NCM are clearly not within RSM succession planning (WO and up), there should be a mechanism to say good bye and not let them hang on to the bitter end. This sense of entitlement to serve IMO fails to meet the concept of putting CF first. 
3. Ditto with officers and CO succession
4. Make releases a quicker and more expedient process, it is easier to release a Reg F soldier than a P Res soldier. I am talking voluntary not the 5F or 5D or 3B.
5. Terms of service in the P Res seems like a sort of good idea but I can not see it working. There is way too many liability issues and legal issues that come up.
6. Lets gut the reserves and make fewer regiments! Really? I know it seems like a logical step but first off communities are likely to become very upset with losing their local military identification. BTW, most units I know, only have a marginal retention problem, the recruiting problem is bigger. My regiment is receiving 15 new positions this year. Thats after clearing up a boat load of NES and releases off the books. I realize that money is an issue to train and retain reservist, but no worries, I have a solution for that.

Reg F cost savings
1. Same as above. If you have people clearly not in succession plan and serving until the new CRA, stop. How many 58 year old Corporals and 59 year old Captains do we really need? This is not helping regular force recruitment. Spare me the horse shat about loyalty and all that, CF needs comes first.
2. Make new terms of service for untrained members. Fail to finish your DP1 or QL3 in a certain amount of time, good bye. CF comes first.
3. Reduce 3rd Battalions to nil strength and place on supplementary order of battle. If I hear protest, consider this. 12 man platoons tromping through the training area or 2-3 guys dismounting from a LAV section is NO different than the reserve company that deploys with 75 troops. By the money saved with reducing the third battalions to the history pages, we can pay for a expansion of the P Res.


----------



## OldSolduer

38 CBG has tactically grouped the Sask Infantry, Winnipeg Infantry and the Guns. One LCol  and one CWO per grouping. The Sask Dragons and FGH are still unit commands as is 38 Svc Bn. The Engineers will comeon line in April.

The LSSR because of Geography retain their command as do the Signals dudes.


----------



## charlesm

I think one of the big issues with the reserves is that they are considered discretionary budget. Which means it is one of a few budgets that DND can cut. IE DND has been told to reduce budget by 5%, but it is not laying off Soldiers/sailors or airmen. Thereby other budgets have to make up for that. Also because we still have base costs and there is not a lot of wriggle room in those to reduce budgets.

I also agree that our regimental system needs to be reviewed. We should be reinforcing success and not failure. Those units that are strong should get a larger ARE while others might not.

Also it would be nice to know how many Army Class "B" personnel are not in a Reserve Unit. They are in CBG HQ, Area HQ, Ottawa, Rangers etc. I would guess that less than 25% are in PRES units.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

charlesm said:
			
		

> I think one of the big issues with the reserves is that they are considered discretionary budget. Which means it is one of a few budgets that DND can cut. IE DND has been told to reduce budget by 5%, but it is not laying off Soldiers/sailors or airmen. Thereby other budgets have to make up for that. Also because we still have base costs and there is not a lot of wriggle room in those to reduce budgets.



Not true.  You are in an LFWA unit.  In order to meet the cost reductions for next Fiscal Year, almost all of the cuts were absorbed from 1 CMBG and 1 ASG.  The CBGs were more or less completely protected. 



> I also agree that our regimental system needs to be reviewed. We should be reinforcing success and not failure. Those units that are strong should get a larger ARE while others might not.



That is not a review.  A review would have one Infantry unit in Vancouver, and one in Victoria.



> Also it would be nice to know how many Army Class "B" personnel are not in a Reserve Unit. They are in CBG HQ, Area HQ, Ottawa, Rangers etc. I would guess that less than 25% are in PRES units.



 As to Cl Bs, as you well know they have been drastically reduced at Area, but increased at unit and CBG level.  Moreover, as a CWO, you will no doubt recall when units ran quite efficiently with 4-5 x RSS and 1-2 Cl B.  The growth over the last few years has been unwarranted.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> 38 CBG has tactically grouped the Sask Infantry, Winnipeg Infantry and the Guns. One LCol  and one CWO per grouping. The Sask Dragons and FGH are still unit commands as is 38 Svc Bn. The Engineers will comeon line in April.
> 
> The LSSR because of Geography retain their command as do the Signals dudes.



And I understand that the Tac Grouping concept is working quite well.

Just to confirm though, I knew that the Camerons and Rifles were grouped in Winnipeg. Did they group the Sask infantry units too e.g. Reginas and Sask LI?


----------



## OldSolduer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And I understand that the Tac Grouping concept is working quite well.
> 
> Just to confirm though, I knew that the Camerons and Rifles were grouped in Winnipeg. Did they group the Sask infantry units too e.g. Reginas and Sask LI?



The N Sask R and the RRR are grouped under one CO.


----------



## Harris

Are the groupings due to unit size, or lack of succession?  Or both?  How are the budgets handled?  Do the CO/RSM have to submit pay/TD claims depending on task?


----------



## OldSolduer

Harris said:
			
		

> Are the groupings due to unit size, or lack of succession?  Or both?



A bit of both actually.

Our tac gping strength is 260 on paper. Our NES list is  minimal and will be reduced further. 

At first it was contentious, now we are all used to it and realize it's the way to go for now, until each Regiment gets large enough to sustain succession and have healthy units.


----------



## MilEME09

If I remember correctly Fort Garry Horse have a tac grouping with Combat engineers until they are large enough to be on their own. Effective way of creating new units in my opinion, but building up that active personal takes time, which seems to be the one thing the reserves have plenty of. I know my unit has been told to get to 80% active strength within 5 years, an impossible goal since it requires us to recuit about 40 people in 5 years, as a service Battalion we just cant those kind of numbers through the door.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If I remember correctly Fort Garry Horse have a tac grouping with Combat engineers until they are large enough to be on their own.



If I am not mistaken 38 CER has been stood up as Lt Col Paul Davies is supposed to have assumed command.....


----------



## Shrek1985

This is a fascinating discussion, but unless I missed it and my reading and comprehension is so poor, can someone explain to me just how the PM can layout in black and white what he wants cut, and it doesn't happen?

Now As I understand it, the CIC for the forces is actually the GG, right? I have no idea what that means vis-a-vis the PM, but the CF absorbed decades of micromanagement from Ottawa according to Granatstien's books and never effectively fought back. For the first time in decades we have a government that SEEMS to me to be interested in empowering the forces, giving us back our names and traditions, ect and now "someone" has grown a spine?

Here is my take; The PM said cut the bloated HQs and massive civilian staff population, something rumoured for some time. That is what I get from the articles I have read.

That got as far as HQ and the civies that infest DND and stopped there.


----------



## dapaterson

Shrek1985 said:
			
		

> Here is my take; The PM said cut the bloated HQs and massive civilian staff population, something rumoured for some time. That is what I get from the articles I have read.
> 
> That got as far as HQ and the civies that infest DND and stopped there.



Please.  Your ignorance is showing.  The CF HQs are dominated by the military.  If those HQs are to be cut, and are not, it is the fault of the military leadership.

Do we need the three ECSes, all re-writing policies that reflect the CF policies, but adding environmental slants?  No.  Do we need large standing formation HQs with Ops Rooms and staffs watching screens where nothing happens?  No.  Do we need double-hatted formation HQs that also provide geographic coverage, that conflict with other formations that also provide geographic coverage (LFAA/MARLANT)? No.  

All those needless HQs are preserved out of military desire, not military neccessity.   Military leadership needs to start cutting their HQs to the minimum military requirement.

In 1997 the CF was ordered by the Minister to reduce the CF to no more than 65 General/Flag officers.  The Reg F alone is more than 50% over that target, and there are a number of full-time Res F General/Flag officers as well.  Culling that herd is a needed first step to right-sizing HQs.

Blaming the civilian bogeyman is a convenient excuse for military inaction.


(Or, look at it another way: DND is cutting civilian positions and terminating some employees.  How many military personnel have been released following these cutbacks?  The answer is none.)


----------



## MilEME09

Not to say the CF isn't top heavy (it is) but when the buddget cuts were announced CTV did a little investigating, they found over $2.2 Billion in civilian contracts in the Ottawa area alone, something tells me that there is fat to trim. The greatest problem though is the place that needs to get trimmed is the group who decides what to trim and no one will trim their own job.


----------



## Halifax Tar

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The greatest problem though is the place that needs to get trimmed is the group who decides what to trim and no one will trim their own job.



Same reason the CF, PS, RCMP ect ect ect experience budget cuts and "benefit adjustments" while our MPs and Senators share none of the burden!  Its simple self preservation and advancement.


----------



## Halifax Tar

dapaterson said:
			
		

> In 1997 the CF was ordered by the Minister to reduce the CF to no more than 65 General/Flag officers.  The Reg F alone is more than 50% over that target, and there are a number of full-time Res F General/Flag officers as well.  Culling that herd is a needed first step to right-sizing HQs.



113 - Gen/FO/Admirals ect

366 - Col/Capt(N) 

Countem up for yourself on the CMP senior appointments site.


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## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Not to say the CF isn't top heavy (it is) but when the buddget cuts were announced CTV did a little investigating, they found over $2.2 Billion in civilian contracts in the Ottawa area alone, something tells me that there is fat to trim. The greatest problem though is the place that needs to get trimmed is the group who decides what to trim and no one will trim their own job.



(1) Just because a contract is paid in Ottawa doesn't mean that the services are delivered in Ottawa.  For example, Calian curerntly holds a contract to provide medical professionals at CF clinics nationwide.  That contract is managed out of Ottawa.

(2) Some things are contracts that you may not think of as contracts.  The Military Family Resource Centres, for example, are not part of DND/CF, but rather are independte charitable organizations; the CF funds to support them are paid out... get this... as contracts.  Out of Ottawa.

(3) In other cases,  contracts are used to acquire, on a short-term basis, skills that are not resident in the military or public service (and not economical to develop and maintain).

(4) When members are posted from location to locaiton, we use contracted transportation and contracted administration - paid out of Ottawa.

Not to say that some contracting can't be done away with - but one needs to be very careful.  And "Ottawa" pays a lot of contractors outside the National Capital Region...


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