# Command and control of the Honest John Battery in Germany



## Colin Parkinson (7 Jan 2015)

Looking for information on the Canadian Honest John battery that was nuke capable in Germany. When they were deployed and what was the command structure for authorizing the use of Tactical Nukes. As I recall Canada had the control at the Brigade level?


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## Old Sweat (7 Jan 2015)

This is forcing me to think back to the mid-60s when I was in HQ 4 CIBG, although about 15-17 years ago I was interviewed by DHH about this issue, or at least nuclear fire planning and release procedures.

The Canadian brigade group, while along with its supporting organization, Canadian Base Units Europe, formed an independent formation titled Canadian Army National Force Europe (CANFE) commanded by a brigadier who also commanded 4 CIBG. The Honest John battery, 1 SSM Bty RCA, was part of the brigade group. For tactical purposes the Canadian Government had allotted CANFE to Northern Army Group commanded by a British General, who in turn gave us to 1 (BR) Corps. For tactical purposes, we were part of 2 (BR) Div along with 6 and 12 Brigades. 

Both artillery units - a RCHA regiment and 1 SSM Bty - operated as part of the divisional artillery and were based in Fort Prince of Wales (Fort POW.) There was another artillery unit in Fort POW, the 69th USA Missile Detachment (69 Msl Det,) which was the custodial unit for 1 SSM and 50 Missile Regiment, RA (50 Msl Regt,) the British nuclear delivery unit in 2 Div. In the field 1 SSM supported 4 CIBG exclusively and we also got an 8-in battery from 50 Msl Regt. For an operation the commander 4 CIBG would get a planning allocation of nuclear warheads - not very many, but that's another story - for both the HJ and 8-in. 

The commander's appreciation was built around the use of these weapons and a major obstacle such as the Weser River and/or a minefield. The defensive layout was based on selecting nuclear killing zones and a number of combat team battle positions to be occupied to support whichever killing zone the enemy's advance appeared to be headed towards. I won't bore you with the HJ battle procedure but the battery selected a number of launcher positions from which to shoot depending upon whichever killing zone and nuclear yield was selected.

The President of the United States controlled the warheads and 69 Msl Det held the warheads that might be authorized for 1 SSM and 50 Msl Regt. When and if the President released the nukes, authority was granted to SACEUR, who in turn could authorize the Comd NORTHAG to use the nukes allotted to him. He could pass authority down to his four corps commanders, one each British, Belgian, Dutch and German. The Corps Commander, I think, retained authority, but as the situation warranted the Comd 4 CIBG could issue orders to the CO 1 SSM to prepare to fire a rocket fitted with a certain yield of warhead. He also would send a request up the chain of command to division, where the commander could either support or refuse the request, If refused, the SSM Bty stood down. If supported, the battle procedure continued. If the Corps Commander refused the request, same same. If he supported it, approval came down the chain of command and, on a separate net, the 69th was directed to arm and release the warhead to 1 SSM.

At HQ 4 CIBG the executive order was issued to 1 SSM and a nuclear strike warning was transmitted on the brigade command net. When the launcher actually fired the rocket, this was reported to brigade HQ and a "dazzle" warning with a TOT was issued to alert the troops to don eye protection, take cover, face away, etc.

We don't need, I think, to get into post-strike counter-attacks and the rest, but I hope this helps. As I said, it was a long time ago. The account is generally correct but may have minor errors in detail.     

Modify to add: I think the nuclear request/approval stuff went up and down the gunner net or a special gunner nuclear net using a system of One Time Pads to enconde/decode the message.


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## Colin Parkinson (7 Jan 2015)

thanks, mind if  post your post completely into a thread on tanknet?


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## Old Sweat (7 Jan 2015)

Okay, with the provision that my knowledge is nearly 50 years old. You could mention that I am a gunner and was a trained nuclear target analyst, that is recommends the best combination of nuclear delivery system, warhead yield and height of burst to achieve the commander's aim. It is the one military qualification I have that I am really, really glad I never got to use.


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## Kilo_302 (7 Jan 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> This is forcing me to think back to the mid-60s when I was in HQ 4 CIBG, although about 15-17 years ago I was interviewed by DHH about this issue, or at least nuclear fire planning and release procedures.
> 
> The Canadian brigade group, while along with its supporting organization, Canadian Base Units Europe, formed an independent formation titled Canadian Army National Force Europe (CANFE) commanded by a brigadier who also commanded 4 CIBG. The Honest John battery, 1 SSM Bty RCA, was part of the brigade group. For tactical purposes the Canadian Government had allotted CANFE to Northern Army Group commanded by a British General, who in turn gave us to 1 (BR) Corps. For tactical purposes, we were part of 2 (BR) Div along with 6 and 12 Brigades.
> 
> ...



Curious, how soon after the beginning of hostilities (or the detection of Soviet formations) did your unit anticipate having to resort to nuclear warheads? Was there much use for conventional warheads? Finally, how long would the process you described above take? I would imagine drills would have been run and timed.


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## Old Sweat (7 Jan 2015)

The scenarios we practiced saw a period of increasing tension until NATO would have been ordered into concentration areas away from our bases. This procedure, like everything else I will discuss, had been planned and practiced over and over. We were not sure if the Warsaw Pact (WP) might not initiate hostilities with nuclear strikes in depth, in which case NATO strategic forces probably would have retaliated. In our case we believed we might be able to hold the WP for several days before tactical weapons were used, if nukes had not been used before. 

While there was talk of a conventional warhead for the Honest John, I don't think any were ever deployed. The Brits also at this time did not have HE rounds for their towed 8-in howitzers which were employed in single gun nuclear fire units.

For whatever it is worth, 1 SSM Bty RCA was widely considered by ourselves and our Allies to be the best nuclear delivery unit in NATO.

The ground battle in 4 CIBG was based on forcing the WP to concentrate in order to break our defences; this created a nuclear target and the battle procedure to fire a nuke would have taken several hours. This was dependent on several factors but the SSM Bty would have recced and prepared several launcher positions. The bty would have to draw a warhead once nuclear release was given and the mission authorized it, transport it to a concealed position, mate it to a rocket, and marry up with and load it on a launcher. The launcher section would then occupy a launcher position, receive fire orders from the troop command post and fire at the designated time. This was followed by a rapid move back into a concealed position.

The battery, like the rest of 4 CIBG, spent a considerable amount of time in the field. The gunners and sappers probably spent the most time, perhaps a quarter to a third of the year, in the weeds as they had to practice their own craft as well as work as part of an all arms team. Yes, drills were practiced and teams got very good at what they did.


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## Retired AF Guy (7 Jan 2015)

Might want to check out *Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal* by _John Clearwater_ or *The Honest John in Canadian Service* by _John Davidson_


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## Old Sweat (7 Jan 2015)

Clearwater's book is not very accurate. I can vouch for John Davidson, whom I know well, as a good source and a good officer.


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## FJAG (7 Jan 2015)

Just a small add-on to Old Sweat's comments. 

We were still taught nuclear target analysis as part of our Advanced Artillery Officer training in the early seventies although by then the HJ's were mothballed as we were still part of larger force structure that had nukes. 

One principle that still stands out in my mind is that, like tanks, one didn't penny parcel out nukes; they were to be employed in deliberate fire plans to pulse a designated massed killing zone or zones and would principally constitute the beginning of a counter attack which would follow to exploit the resultant destruction and confusion.

The art of the process was to determine the appropriate yields and delivery systems available to match target concentrations with a further consideration as to the direction, nature, etc of fall-out drift and yet further determinations as to where our own counter attacking forces would be able to manoeuvre and under what protective measures.

And yes; it seemed as surreal then as it sounds today.

 :subbies:


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## Old Sweat (8 Jan 2015)

It wasn't all that surreal to those of us serving in Germany under the threat. Most of the troops realized the odds of coming home if war started were not very good, but there was the prospect of the wives and children being evacuated to Canada. There was an op plan to do just that using the return airlift that was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the brigade before and after the balloon went up. Since there were probably 12,000 dependents, it was a daunting task. Control of it fell to the CBUE movements organization using the DND school teachers to help look after the  folks.

As per the pulse FJAG mentions, the timing of each detonation across the front had to be controlled to avoid a massive electromagnetic pulse that would "fry" all the radios and other electronic gear. There also was the possibility to subjecting other warheads in the air to a burst of radiation that would have caused a small sub-critical nuclear reaction, in other words causing the warhead to malfunction and thus being no more than a large mildly radio-active rock.


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## cupper (9 Jan 2015)

Quick question on warhead yield.

Did they use a variable yield warhead (not sure if they had been developed at that time) or were packages held in storage of different yields and whatever yield was called for, that package was delivered to the preparation site?


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## Old Sweat (9 Jan 2015)

I don't know if these were physical warheads or one variable type, and frankly I did not have a need to know as a junior staff officer on the operations staff. I do know there were various yields available for both the HJ and the 8-inch, having worked with the real target analysis pamphlets.


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## FJAG (9 Jan 2015)

I don't have personal knowledge either although yield selection was part of my training. 

I've had a quick look at Wikipedia (my general source for quick and dirty but questionable knowledge) and it describes the fact that the HJ was "originally outfitted with a W7 variable yield nuclear warhead with a yield of up to 20 kilotons of TNT (84 TJ) and later a W31 warhead with three variants was deployed with yields of 2, 10 or 30 kt (8.4, 41.8 or 125.5 TJ) in 1959"

The article on Canada's nuclear weapons says we had W31's but then I don't trust some of the dates in that article (which incidentally cites Clearwater). I joined the regular force artillery in 1969, went to Shilo on 4 Jan 1970. 2 SSM had been disbanded the year before and their launcher/erector systems were still at the base. 1 SSM was disbanded shortly thereafter.

An article in Vanguard (which is more in line with my recollection of the dates involved, states that we deployed the 2KT warhead in Europe which would also indicate we were equipped with the non-variable lowest yield W31. On the other hand I would anticipate in a crisis situation the US would have made other warheads available from in-theatre stocks as needed.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGR-1_Honest_John

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

http://vanguardcanada.com/honest-john-and-the-decade-of-nuclear-artillery/

As an aside, I've also found this article about tactical nuclear warfare development at the time to be interesting

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo11/no1/08-kasurak-eng.asp

 :cheers:


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## The Bread Guy (9 Jan 2015)

OS, FJAG - thanks for the historical details.  Milpoints inbound.


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## vonGarvin (9 Jan 2015)

This thread has been rather illuminating.  Thanks all for your posts.


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## cupper (9 Jan 2015)

Thanks for the info guys. Very interesting, and falls in with my current reading of Richard Rhodes "The Making of the Atomic Bomb"


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## Wolseleydog (10 Jan 2015)

Good thread.  For more on this, see Sean Maloney, “Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War”, 2007.
Also  Matthew Trudgen,  “Do We Want "Buckets of Instant Sunshine”? ~ Canada and Nuclear Weapons 1945-1984” in Canadian Military Journal, 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/08-trudgen-eng.asp

"Nuclear Fire Planning" formed a regular part of the curriculum at CFLCSC (the Army Staff College in Kingston) right up through the 80s.

And wasn't the plan for the emergency repatriation of dependents (and non-essential civilians) that Old Sweat mentions codenamed "MAYFLOWER"?


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## Old Sweat (10 Jan 2015)

Wolseleydog said:
			
		

> "Nuclear Fire Planning" formed a regular part of the curriculum at CFLCSC (the Army Staff College in Kingston) right up through the 80s.
> 
> *The difference between how the subject was approached at the CLFCSC and how the Canadian Army treated it in the 60s was that in the latter case, it was the basis of all tactics and was practiced on darn near every exercise, CPX and TEWT. *
> 
> ...


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## Edward Campbell (11 Jan 2015)

Just to confirm what Old Sweat says:

     1. The nuclear strike, as often as not followed (notionally) by a never beaten 4CMBG chasing the Reds back from when they came,
         did, indeed, feature in almost every field training exercise, CPX and TEWT; and

     2. MAYFLOWER does sound right; it was  serious plan and it was essential to the maintenance of moral. I can recall annual briefings
         for the families of HQ Coy members, from me, a CAE staff officer and one or two others. The aim to was both to inform and reassure.


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