# Small Arms and Combat Marksmanship



## Infanteer (24 Dec 2010)

Wonderbread said:
			
		

> "Shoot less, aim more" seems to be the latest catchphrase.
> 
> I think that advice reflects  the realization that the insurgent strategy has been to instigate the coalition into heavy-handed responses that alienate us from the populace, then use their relative speed and mobility to zip away while taking few casualties themselves.



...and the fact that the best-trained armies in the world generally have poor marksmanship and fire control.  Just watch the youtube videos of Canadian, Brit and American soldiers in TICs to see what I mean.

I think some section level training should be conducted with 1 mag.


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## Kat Stevens (24 Dec 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and the fact that the best-trained armies in the world generally have poor marksmanship and fire control.  Just watch the youtube videos of Canadian, Brit and American soldiers in TICs to see what I mean.
> 
> I think some section level training should be conducted with 1 mag.



We've all been taught that "win the firefight"  means to pour enough fire down on the enemy to keep him small in his hole.  Not every round finds meat, so what's the answer?  Volume of fire to suppress, or aimed pick off shots?  Not trying to be flippant, genuinely curious about alternatives to current (well, past in my case) wisdom.


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## HItorMiss (24 Dec 2010)

Well that depends IMO

Regular Infantry unit trained to the common denominator, with the avg shooting budget they receive volume over accuracy for sure is my thought. It does work in fact has worked for a while now you use volume to pin them maneuver to kill. That being said many of us now understand that once you win the fire fight and start to maneuver your volume slackens and then they start shooting back and thus you revert back to win the fire fight...

Every meter in a sustained TIC takes a significant amount of time and ammo. I don't think any Infantry Bn in the CF, US Army of Brit Army will ever have the proper budget in rounds to achieve any better though and again it does work. Most effective probably not but then again nothing is ever perfect.


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## Fusaki (24 Dec 2010)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> We've all been taught that "win the firefight"  means to pour enough fire down on the enemy to keep him small in his hole.  Not every round finds meat, so what's the answer?  Volume of fire to suppress, or aimed pick off shots?  Not trying to be flippant, genuinely curious about alternatives to current (well, past in my case) wisdom.



At the risk of sounding like a LF/basicload fanboy, I can relate a discussion on that forum that tackled this issue.

Basically, the point was made that the concept of "volume of fire" was overrated.  Often, a high volume of fire doesn't actually pin anyone down, but only results in the badguy slipping out the backdoor to move to another position.

Suppression is better achieved by actually killing bad guys.  The logic is, when a badguy sees his buddy's head get blown off, it has a dramatic effect on his own willingness to expose himself.  If, at some point, he thinks that due to a lack of volume of fire it's safe to poke his own head up, we'll be there waiting -covering our arcs - ready to reinforce the message.

I think this concept can be compared to the effect of sniper fire.  Snipers don't pin down enemies by volume of fire - they do it by making examples of people.  Rifle sections can use this method to cut weight, increase mobility, minimize collateral damage, and - theoretically - actually kill more bad guys, instead of simply pouring lead downrange until the insurgent slips away unscathed.


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## HItorMiss (24 Dec 2010)

How many rounds a year do you fire WB?

And really how accurate are you and your section mates? I am not bashing you persay I simply making a point NO conventional unit is going to achieve that level of ability not in m opinion. And I'm not just slamming the CF here I mean ANY conventional unit it simply is not achieveable. I will the CF as a prime example though the Avg Reg F unit gets just enough ammo to do a  PWT and if they are going overseas they get enough for the live fire events wherein again it teaches volume vice pint point accuracy. It is all well and good to say well we could etc etc but the reality is no you can't there isn't enough time ammo or money to do it.

My 2 silvers of opinion anyway


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## Infanteer (24 Dec 2010)

You guys are all on the money, in my opinion anyways.

Poor reaction in combat - which is shooting too many rounds in an ineffective manner - is the result of two factors.  The first is a poor understanding of suppression, mistaking volume of fire to be the critical piece (when it's not).  The second is a reinforcement of this poor conception through training conditioning with some of our drills and approaches.

There are a series of articles, which I've posted before, in one of the Royal United Services Institute's periodicals by a former Infantry Officer.  They are great and, to my knowledge, there isn't much more out there that looks at the problems they seek to address.  I strongly encourage everyone to read them (they are all quite short).

The Real Role of Small Arms in Battle

Shock Effect in Dismounted Combat

Manoeuvre and Weapons Effect on the Battlefield

Highlights of the articles are as follows:

1.  Combat rarely results in one side being "wiped out" - *defeat* is thus, in almost all cases, a psychological condition when one side ceases to fight.

2.  *Suppression* is the ability of weapons to prevent the enemy from shooting or moving _while the weapons effects are in effect_.  *Neutralization* is the ability of weapons to prevent the enemy from shooting or moving _for some time after a suppressive effect_.  So, shooting a few rounds that keeps an enemy's head down is "suppressive fire".  Having the enemy cry because his buddy's head is a fine pink mist is a "neutralization effect" from suppressive fire.

3.  *Shock* is a state where the enemy is rendered incapable of fighting due to being numb, lifeless, inactive or irrational behaviour.  So, in the above case of a neutralized enemy, he is clearly in a state of shock.  So is a guy who is "shell-shocked" from being near the impact of an HE weapon.  the important thing to note is that shock is transitory in nature - it can and does usually wear off.  If nobody does anything to the guy crying over his dead buddy, he may collect his wits and pop his head back up to shoot at you.  He may also run away or simply give up - he is then defeated (as defined in paragraph 1).

4.  From the first article, individual accuracy goes out the window when a soldier moves from a static range to a field firing environment - adding "move" to shoot really reduces the ability of a rifle to kill the enemy.  This increases exponentially when the enemy starts firing back.  This means that individual weapons do little to *suppress * and *neutralize*, thus giving minimal *shock* and minimal contribution to enemy *defeat*.  If this is true, and the tests seem to suggest it to be so, then these two factors combine to really pop a lot of myths surrounding the battle rifle and its true role on the battlefield - it is likely useful for personal defence and close-in fighting.  If this is true, consider the consequences for rifle procurement; note that Storr's analysis points to the uselessness of the C-9 Minimi (which the USMC replaced with the IAR) - it is a machine gun that is employed as a rifle; so it ignores the strengths of a crew-served weapon and its nature as a machine gun makes it a poor individual weapon.

5.  The second article makes some interesting assertions about the value of HE.  HE is better than bullets at producing shock effects.

6.  The third article fits maneuver into all of this - principally to exploit the value of shock.  Of note, the author found that the USMC reported that experienced units would rarely expend more than 4 magazines in 8 hour TICs.  Maybe the Tacvest guys had it right?  ;D

7.  From this, a few observations come to mind:

a.  Most small arms fire is inaccurate and ineffective.  The real suppressors and killers are crew served weapons and HE (read - C6, Mortar, 40mm grenades, 25mm HEI-T)

b.  Simply sitting and plicking away rounds at the bad guy is likely to achieve nothing; moving is required to exploit any effects of fire.

c.  The PWT-3 "Run-Down" is a stupid test - it encourages soldiers to run and shoot when they clearly are not in a position to suppress, let alone kill, the enemy.  "Shooting and moving" is best reserved for the 0-100m fight where the rifle becomes useful.  Anything past that is "any necessary, well-aimed fire to support a crew-served weapon."

d.  Section Battle Drill 3 is crucial, and there should probably be more communicating and less shooting during it.  In most field training I've observed, soldiers will pour down fire despite this drill not being complete.  This tendency needs to be eliminated.

e.  Training aids like the pop-up targets need a variable to simulate being "suppressed", "neutralized" and "shocked".  This will help condition soldiers to realistic enemy reactions to fire.  Unfortunately, simulating the effects of enemy suppression, neutralization and shock on our own soldiers is very hard, if not impossible, to do.

f.  Finally, we should consider organization of small arms within units.  If support weapons are battle winners, we should have more - perhaps at the section level.  If the C9 Minimi's machine gun characteristics detract from its employment as a rifle, perhaps we should eliminate it.  If the battle rifle is useful from 0-100m and limited from 100-300m, perhaps we should consider something along the lines of an effective short range carbine.  If any of this looks shockingly familiar to our old form of organization - perhaps there is a reason for it as it came from fighting Germans.

Anyways, this has little to do with the AWG, so I'll see to a split-off soon.


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## Fishbone Jones (25 Dec 2010)

So, are we to assume that the GRIT that is was ingrained during training, is to be ignored? Or is it overridden by orders before the mission? Or perhaps, under fire, the fire discipline falls away and everyone just plays wack-a-mole? I don't know, I'm asking.

Perhaps, PERHAPS, more trigger time on the range, improving marksmanship, will provide a better confidence for pers to take single, aimed shots? 

Suppression has it's place, but IMHO, the decision to lay down that kind of fire is best left to, at minimum, the Section Cmdr. Or possibly a wpn det NCO who finds himself out of comms with his higher (C6, C9 etc)

The individual rifleman should be discouraged from dumping mag after mag, over a wall, at an unseen enemy.


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## McG (25 Dec 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  *Shock* is a state where the enemy is rendered incapable of fighting due to being numb, lifeless, inactive or irrational behaviour.  So, in the above case of a neutralized enemy, he is clearly in a state of shock.


A shocked enemy will be neutralized, but I can imagine that a neutralized enemy may not be in shock. 

By your definitions "Destroyed" as we define it doctrinally would be a state of shock that requires external support ("reconstitution") for recovery.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> If the battle rifle is useful from 0-100m and limited from 100-300m, perhaps we should consider something along the lines of an effective short range carbine.


Alternately, maybe the focus should be on marksmanship if fewer but more precise shots at the 200 - 400m  range are able to effectively suppress, "shock" , neutralize or destroy an enemy.  If we assume that the average conventional force cannot achieve the marksmanship required to even suppress an enemy (some here have already gone beyond the assumption to state this as an unvarying fact), then we should develop our training and drills to encourage persistence in aimed precision shooting in the face of high-volume low-accuracy return fire .... the challenge becomes maintaining that persistence even if one or two "lucky bullets" hit members of the section. 



			
				BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> ... NO conventional unit is going to achieve that level of ability not in m opinion. And I'm not just slamming the CF here I mean ANY conventional unit it simply is not achieveable.


We could use a word other than "conventional" if that becomes a limiting factor in the actual capability.   rly:
If the CF decides that better marksmanship is the critical path to a more survivable and more lethal Army, then the label of "conventional" should not be an impediment.  The cost of bullets is not great in comparison to other consumables that we burn through, and if the will exists to train better shooters then we will train better shooters.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> The real suppressors and killers are crew served weapons and HE (read - C6, Mortar, 40mm grenades, 25mm HEI-T)


If this really is the case and developments in TTPs have rendered KE projectiles less effective than in 1914, then maybe we should be giving more consideration to weapons such as 40 mm grenade rifles and 25 mm air-bursting munition rifles.

... as far as the C6 goes as an effective killer & suppresser, I suppose it matters if the weapon were in the light role as opposed to mounted in the SF kit?


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## a_majoor (25 Dec 2010)

I recall an Infantry Journal piece about the Rwandan rebel forces which made that point very well. The Rwandan section was composed of 3 teams, two teams of "riflemen" and a support team with an RPK and an RPG. In general terms, the support team used their firepower to pin the enemy while the rifle teams flanked the position and used aimed fire to kill the enemy. If the enemy was well dug in, the RPG could be employed to persuade them to leave.

An alternative might be along the lines of this (from 2005):


> The 42nd Infantry Division has deployed to Iraq with what leaders term a powerful, yet subtle, combat-multiplier - the sniper-trained Soldiers of the division's 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment, and their newly-issued M-14 rifles.


Of course the training bill for such units would be very high, which may explain the mania for uber weapons and systems which substitute weapons effects for marksmanship (SPIW, ACR, CAWS, "duplex" rounds, OCIW and the XM-25). Oddly, I can't see spending tens of thousands of dollars per weapon as having any great economic advantage over high intensity training....

Weapons that deliver HE to the target provide both physical and mental "shock" to the target, something the Germans realized back in WWI, substituting pioneer troops with grenades, mortars and flamethrowers for riflemen and bayonets to attack the enemy. The French realized firepower was important, and attempted to deliver it down to the platoon and even squad level with automatic rifles. Unfortunately, the chosen instrument turned out to be the Chauchat, which was somewhat less than reliable...


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## ArmyRick (25 Dec 2010)

Looking at the three articles Infanteer posted links to, here are my thoughts.

1. GRIT still very much has a place in our training and on operations. It will take a section commander and the members of the section to better understand their role in locating the enemy and to begin winning the fire fight. I agree, that its the platoon support weapons that will deliver the best suppression and possibly destruction.
2. I wonder what the shock effect of the C6 in the SF role would be? I do knew that MGs are great suppression weapons. The beaten zone becomes much tighter with tripod than just yee haw fring from the hip or with a bipod on the ground. A 20 round burst at 300-500m distance on a SF kit, putting the burst right into an enemy window , I think would be very unnerving. Thoughts?
3. Instead on trying to drag around light field guns, why not use the 84mm to its full potential? Their are several types of HE rounds availible for it and the weapon is very acurate. A good crew could easily get at least one round off every 5 seconds (in 30 seconds, 6 x 84mm HEDP pounding your position would probably qualify as shock effect)
4. Shock action and shock effect, WE REALLY need the 60mm mortars to remain in service.
5. I was surprised to find out the very poor suppression results of the LMG (I already knew the LMG has serious acuracy issues but I did not know it was that bad).
6. When possible, have tanks around. I can not imagine shock action quite like 120mm canister or HE round blasting an enemy into the next 3 life times. In adverse terrain (Heavily wooded or mountainous), I see 84mm Carl G, 60mm Mortar, C6 (with SF?) and 66mm M72s being the shock action and suppression weapons.


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## HItorMiss (25 Dec 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> We could use a word other than "conventional" if that becomes a limiting factor in the actual capability.   rly:
> If the CF decides that better marksmanship is the critical path to a more survivable and more lethal Army, then the label of "conventional" should not be an impediment.  The cost of bullets is not great in comparison to other consumables that we burn through, and if the will exists to train better shooters then we will train better shooters.




I use the Term conventional to illustrate BIG Army. And no I do not believe BIG ARMY has the time resources nor dedication to train better shooters. We all know Armies train to the lowest common denominator and this is the limiting factor. no Bn or Regt has the time or ammo budget to train to a high enough standard it just wont happen BUT what can happen is what Infanteer points out it can train to properly employ the suppression methods he illustrates above.

I am not saying it's hopeless just that a proper approach to the suppression method is a much more viable and feasible solution.


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## Infanteer (25 Dec 2010)

Armyrick:

1.  Absolutely, and I had my NCOs work on it with the guys frequently.  One analyst I was speaking to indicated that by far the most prevalent and successful method of target indication was tracer.

2.  Probably better - a newer, lightweight tripod for the #2 to carry could be useful in some scenarios.

3/4/5/6.  Yes, yes, agreed and yes.  We have a pretty good system of weapons in place - we could probably benefit with experimentation with various combinations at certain echelons (ie: 1xC6 per section and get rid of C9?).  Has anyone heard how the USMC M-32 is working out?  Seems like a useful "HE emitter".


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## a_majoor (27 Dec 2010)

I've had a few occasions to run the gun det and employ the C-6 either by itself or in conjunction with a section's C-9's (the classical grouping of 2X C9 in a trench close to the C-6) on exercise, and it does work as advertised with MILES. For Rick, the effectiveness of tight bursts at long ranges was brought home to me one ex when I used a C-6 on the SF kit to break an attack on the other side of the position (we were set up in a bowl shaped KZ). The counter attack had a nice easy time of ejecting what was left of the attackers and the Umpires had to do a great deal of "God Gunning" to reset everyone.

Frankly, most people really do not know how to use a machine gun effectively (and to tell you the truth, I don't practice enough to claim to be an expert), and inertia or lazyness get in the way as well. I always advocate bringing the SF kit along wherever you go and mounting the gun whenever you use it, but am met with an uncomprehending stare or "we don't need to do that" most of the time. Yet considering this doubles the effective range of the weapon, provides a nice tight group (conserving ammunition) and allows you to rapidly transition to defense once you have reached your limit of exploitation there should be no reason to ever leave the SF kit behind.

I am curious as to the effectiveness of using the grenadiers en mass to volley M-203 rounds on a target, since this might be quicker and easier than waiting for the Carl-G to come into action. For that matter, I have seen less and less of the Carl-G over the years, even though it is still in service. I totally agree it is a fantastic system, and HEDP provides most of what you need against infantry, buildings, bunkers and light vehicles up to M-113/LAV class. The platoon only needs two natures of ammunition (HEDP and HEAT/RAP) to deal with the vast majority of targets.


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## Kiwi99 (27 Dec 2010)

The reason that so much ammo is being fired is NOT because our soldiers are bad shots (they get on a range once or twice a year).  The simple fact of the matter is that locating the enemy is not as easy as it is on the fields of Wainwright or any other training area.  IMO, locating the enemy is the single hardest thing in a contact with the enemy.  And that is why we shoot so much, we just can;t see the crafty little buggers.  We know the general area the fire is coming from, and it is into that area that we fire.  Even veh with thermal etc have a hard time in the middle of the day with the heat and the heat shimmer.  I would say that 7 out of every 10 enemy killed by small arms fire was not killed by a deliberate aimed shot.  More than likely it was from a round fired in his general direction that found its way home.

The other point made by another poster was the fact that the firefight has to be won over and over again.  I agree 110%.  The enemy is smart, and he knows that if our fire is slacking it is because we are probably maneuvering against him.  So he jumps up and has another go.  Seeing his buddies head blown off won't faze him much.  Remember, he has Allah protecting him and if he dies it is Allahs will.  

Tracer is the best indicator.  Once the dust etc is in the air, and people are shooting back, it can be hard to motivate a sane person to stick their head up to be guided onto the target.  And if you are the one doing the indicating, can you even see the target yourself, or are you simply shooting into the same general area as everyone else.

Suppression?  155mm suppresses.  JDAMs suppress.  But the enemy is constantly moving around the batttlespace, looking for ways to flan or get in behind you.  So, suppression with small arms, MG etc is not really suppressing.  Against a trench of Krasnovians it works well.  A bunch of dudes in un-matching shoes with numerous walls, ditches, buildings, grapefields and trees to run around it...not so much.

I do agree, marksmanship is vital.  Do we practice enough? NO.


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## ArmyRick (27 Dec 2010)

Thucydides, 

Disagree. A volley of all 6 of a platoons 40mm fired at same time and somehow hitting the same target (unlikely scenario) will still not compare to 84mm HEDP round. There are several other rounds availible such as ASM (anti-structure munition), HE, ADM (Area defence munition) and MT (multi-target). All have slightly different effects.

I know you referred to use of C6 with MILES but for the effects we are talking about here, MILES gear will not demonstrate the physical effects of a tight 20 round beaten zone hammering at the enemy (psycholoigical effects to the enemy).

Kiwi, some good points. The motivation of the enemy can strongly play into it. If some dude is willing to blow himself up for a cause, he would probably more than willing get shot. However, as you said, where would that sense of no fear and religion go if said insurgent was 3 feet away from his buddy when his head explodes into a large bloody mist (maybe reality would set in? Maybe he isn't the least bit fazed?).

The somalians were known for chewing some sort of drug (Can't remember what it was again, I wasn't there, its what I read) and apparently this stuff made them pretty loopy and willing to fight and die. Another factor to consider about enemy motivation.

Locating the enemy. A damn tough thing to do. Especially if you throw in dirt, trees, dust and facing the sun. I agree with you on this Kiwi, its one thing to locate the enemy in Canada when its some dude firing a burst from a dug out in the snow bank or on a lone grassy knoll 300m away in Wainwright or Gagetown. Quite another when the enemy has had time to pick the ground he will engage you from and has thought out his withdrawal route.

There is a story in the latest copy of the legion about a platoon from 3RCR coming under contact that is deescribed much in the way Kiwi has spoken. I reccomend everybody read it.


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## REDinstaller (27 Dec 2010)

The drug is Khat, many spellings. Illegal here in Canada, but some busts have been made.


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## Fusaki (27 Dec 2010)

Kiwi99 said:
			
		

> The reason that so much ammo is being fired is NOT because our soldiers are bad shots (they get on a range once or twice a year).  The simple fact of the matter is that locating the enemy is not as easy as it is on the fields of Wainwright or any other training area.  IMO, locating the enemy is the single hardest thing in a contact with the enemy.  And that is why we shoot so much, we just can;t see the crafty little buggers.  We know the general area the fire is coming from, and it is into that area that we fire.  Even veh with thermal etc have a hard time in the middle of the day with the heat and the heat shimmer.  I would say that 7 out of every 10 enemy killed by small arms fire was not killed by a deliberate aimed shot.  More than likely it was from a round fired in his general direction that found its way home.



We need to be careful here that we don't blur the line between _spec fire_ and simply _shooting in the direction of the enemy._  While I agree that a significant amount of shock, suppression, and neutralization we produce is the result of careful speculative fire against possible or likely enemy positions, I think that very little can be accounted for by rounds that have been "fired in their general direction and found their way home."

I don't want to speak for Infanteer, but I think he's suggesting that the soldiers in the youtube videos he mentions are doing less spec fire and more just shooting in the general direction of the enemy.  I hate to be critical of the actions of guys under fire (under the stress of combat, I have, at times, performed poorly myself), but I tend to agree.  Under stress, and especially at the beginning of the tour, guys tend to shoot without any real round accountability and often have very little effect on the enemy.  In time, they acclimatize to the stress of the two-way range, can think more clearly, and engage in more and more spec fire in what they believe to be likely enemy positions.

Training can overcome this, and I think it synthesizes the points Bulletmagnet and myself have made above.  I suggested that we should aim more and shoot less, he suggested that a certain volume of fire is required for suppression.  I believe that well aimed spec fire can strike a balance between the two.  It saves ammo by putting volume of fire in the specific places where it'll have the most effect.



> The motivation of the enemy can strongly play into it. If some dude is willing to blow himself up for a cause, he would probably more than willing get shot. However, as you said, where would that sense of no fear and religion go if said insurgent was 3 feet away from his buddy when his head explodes into a large bloody mist (maybe reality would set in? Maybe he isn't the least bit fazed?).



I think that reality would, in fact, set in.  I don't think the mindset of guys who become suicide bombers represents the mindset of 90% of the other guys we exchange small arms fire with.  In Kilcullen's _The Accidental Guerrilla_ he describes how most of the "insurgents" are not religious fanatics, but in fact are regular Afghans who get drawn into nearby firefights out for the sake of tribal honour and Pashtun cultural norms.  These guys will fight, but I don't think they want to die like hardcore religious extremists do.


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## a_majoor (28 Dec 2010)

Since I have never had occasion to fire at people with a GPMG with 4B1T, I will have to go with my observations using MILES. The effect can only be compounded when it it real rounds coming downrange.

As for the blast of 40mm, I was thinking of this as a thought experiment, since I have seen the 84 less and less over the years, and of course we only carry 2 natures of 84mm anyway. Whatever other natures are available only matters to me if I happen to run into a Swedish platoon...

It is possible to gather all the grenadiers quickly, so I would be curious as to what the actual effect would be.


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## ArmyRick (28 Dec 2010)

We are now using more than HEAT and HEDP in our system and the 84 has been used in A-stan.


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## Fusaki (28 Dec 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> We are now using more than HEAT and HEDP in our system and the 84 has been used in A-stan.



But to what extent?

When I was over, the 84 was really only used on the defensive.  Dismounted soldiers can only carry so much ammo for the thing, not to mention the weight of the weapon itself.  Moreover, there really wasn't much the 84 could do that 25mm could not.

I admit, though, my experience is dated.  Maybe things are different today: new kinds of ammo, less LAV support, etc...

Without LAV support, it's obvious you'll need _something_ with the capability to dig out those who are dug in.  Maybe, in the current theatre, thermobaric M72 warheads will fill that gap at a fraction of the weight.


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## vonGarvin (28 Dec 2010)

I have nothing to add at this point; however, I find this discussion very interesting and informative.  I would simply "mark" this thread; however, I hate the flood of emails to let me know that there is a post.

So, to stay on target (somewhat), I will disagree from this earlier assertion:


> c.  The PWT-3 "Run-Down" is a stupid test - it encourages soldiers to run and shoot when they clearly are not in a position to suppress, let alone kill, the enemy.  "Shooting and moving" is best reserved for the 0-100m fight where the rifle becomes useful.  Anything past that is "any necessary, well-aimed fire to support a crew-served weapon."


Allow me to explain.
First of all, it's a test, not a teaching tool, and if done correctly (eg: following all the work up applications, scored properly, with coaches when required, etc), it assesses, accurately, marksmanship from 300 m in to 10 (?).  Now, in our conventional ranges, there is no method to induce the stress of combat, so instead of that, artificial stressors are introduced.
During the run-down, your breathing increases and you have the stress of making shots within a time limit.  This assesses the shooter's ability to control his or her breathing, as well as to make "naturally aimed" shots at all ranges out to 300m.  (OK, not ALL ranges, I mean, we don't fire at 246.5 metres for example, but I think you all understand what I mean...).  As well, due to the ammo distribution, we are forced stoppages.  Yes, it is the empty mag stoppage, and a good shot will count his or her rounds and know when it's coming; however, suffice it to say that stoppages are programmed into the test.
So, this test is not designed for combat marksmanship, but rather for "stressed musketry", I suppose, which in turn makes one a better shot in combat, or so the theory goes.  In other words, if one's aim is instinctively following the marksmanship principles, then one will score higher on the PWT 3.  And if one aims instinctively, even under the artificial stress of the PWT, then one can induce that that same shooter's marksmanship should be better under the very real stress of combat.

(I hope that this made sense.  It _is_ the holidays, after all)

And having said all that, I wholeheartedly agree that the 100m + fight is best suited for the crew-served weapons.  As I've often said, half-jokingly to candidates in the past, riflemen are "glorified bodyguards" for the crew-served weapons.


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## McG (28 Dec 2010)

Wonderbread said:
			
		

> We need to be careful here that we don't blur the line between _spec fire_ and simply _shooting in the direction of the enemy._  While I agree that a significant amount of shock, suppression, and neutralization we produce is the result of careful speculative fire against possible or likely enemy positions, I think that very little can be accounted for by rounds that have been "fired in their general direction and found their way home."


Spec fire is shooting at "things" when contact has not been established with an enemy in order to elicit a response that would indicate an enemy is present.  The Vietnam "mad-minute" was a form of spec fire.  The term "spec fire" implies a certain ignorance of the target area, and the conditions under which to appropriately use of such fire would be very limited in an environment that is full of non-combatants.

I think Kiwi99 has appropriately described what he wanted to describe.


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## Fusaki (29 Dec 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> Spec fire is shooting at "things" when contact has not been established with an enemy in order to elicit a response that would indicate an enemy is present.  The Vietnam "mad-minute" was a form of spec fire.  The term "spec fire" implies a certain ignorance of the target area, and the conditions under which to appropriately use of such fire would be very limited in an environment that is full of non-combatants.



Semantics aside, my point is that there is a big difference between rounds fired at _likely enemy positions_ and rounds fired _in the general direction of the enemy._  It's tough to quantify this sort of thing, but I believe that the former accounts for a significant portion of the effects we have on the enemy, and the latter is usually a waste of ammo.

In MSG Paul Howe's _Leadership and Training for the Fight,_ he recounts his experience as a Delta Force Operator fighting his way across Mogadishu to reach a downed Blackhawk in Oct '93.  One of his lessons learned is the importance of putting aimed fire into windows,  dark corners, and other likely enemy positions.  Reaching back, I've read of similar lessons learned in an article on the Rhodesian Light Infantry.  I'll see if I can dig that one up.  Drawing on my own experience as a LAV Gunner in Kandahar, I think it's likely that for every Taliban that we're sure we got, there were probably a few more that met their end not by being directly observed, but by being too close to what looked to us like a good firing position.


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## Infanteer (29 Dec 2010)

Kiwi99 said:
			
		

> I would say that 7 out of every 10 enemy killed by small arms fire was not killed by a deliberate aimed shot.  More than likely it was from a round fired in his general direction that found its way home.



Do we have any proof for this - there is no way to show this is even close to being true so we'll have to treat this as speculation.

As for other points:

1.  100% agree on the hard to detect and repeatedly win the firefight.  A smart enemy has TTPs like ours which teach a guy to shift fire positions.  This should be made more clear in the section battle drills; essentially, the win the firefight and approach are done together.

2.  There should be no semantics about spec fire - it is fire at potential enemy positions before contact is made.  The distinction between "shooting in the general direction of the enemy" and "shooting anywhere because you don't know where the enemy is" can be made, but I'm not sure it should as neither is likely to suppress or kill.  Shooting at a known enemy position can be effective if you know he's still there.

3.  Shooting when you don't have a target is a waste of ammo, or just throwing rounds done range without taking up a site picture (I've seen footage of both by Brits, Americans and Canadians) is a waste of ammo.  The other problem I have is with shooting like this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go

What are we expecting to hit when we wrap off 5-10 rounds like this?  Even if this soldier has an enemy/enemy position identified, one or at most two shots are all that are likely to be hit - this is another practice that has to be stamped out.

4.


			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> So, this test is not designed for combat marksmanship, but rather for "stressed musketry", I suppose, which in turn makes one a better shot in combat, or so the theory goes.



Why would we want to condition bad habits (cracking 6-8 rounds off that are not likely to hit a real enemy or firing on automatic) for the sake of "stressed musketry"?  There are other ways to induce stress.  "Marksmanship" should be aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits.


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## HItorMiss (29 Dec 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  Shooting when you don't have a target is a waste of ammo, or just throwing rounds done range without taking up a site picture (I've seen footage of both by Brits, Americans and Canadians) is a waste of ammo.  The other problem I have is with shooting like this:
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go
> 
> What are we expecting to hit when we wrap off 5-10 rounds like this?  Even if this soldier has an enemy/enemy position identified, one or at most two shots are all that are likely to be hit - this is another practice that has to be stamped out.




Infanteer there is an actual shooting drill for firing that fast with relative accuracy, called rhythm drills. I am not saying that guy is doing it only that there is a system for it and when taught and practiced and done properly can be very effective for quick rounds in a relatively accurate area for killing and suppression.  Certainly better then the current drill of double tap 2 rounds in the general direction of the contact.... IMO of course


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## Fusaki (29 Dec 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The distinction between "shooting in the general direction of the enemy" and "shooting anywhere because you don't know where the enemy is" can be made, but I'm not sure it should as neither is likely to suppress or kill.  Shooting at a known enemy position can be effective if you know he's still there.



But "known enemy positions" just don't come around very often.  90% of the time there's some level of guesswork involved.

"is that hotspot a head or a rock?" 

"was that dust kicked up by muzzle blast or just a stray round?"

"was that movement in the grape row or are my eyes just playing tricks on me?"

There's a lot of grey area between "There's a badguy and I just blew him in half" and "I can't ******* see a thing so I'm just going to start shooting."  Between those two extremes there's a spot where you're killing and suppressing the enemy, but you're never really sure exactly when and where.  That's what I mean in the difference between shooting at possible enemy positions, and the kind of shooting we see in the youtube video you linked.


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## vonGarvin (30 Dec 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Why would we want to condition bad habits (cracking 6-8 rounds off that are not likely to hit a real enemy or firing on automatic) for the sake of "stressed musketry"?  There are other ways to induce stress.  "Marksmanship" should be aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits.


The PWT only tests individual skills, vice collective skills.  I know this sounds mundane and all, but it's simply a controlled test that can be done en masse with controlled parameters.  In other words, whether it's done in BC, NL or in Afghanistan, it's the same test with the same standard.  And all it does is test the shooter's ability to hit a man-sized target in a variety of conditions from 300 metres and in.  So, in that sense, it indeed is "aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits": or at lease one habit: automatic application of the marksmanship principles.  That's all.

Having said that, the PWT is only a gateway and not the "be all, end all" for battle preparation (as some think that it is).  And remember, the targets on the PWT are popping up in a known location, are quite visible, etc.  And it only tests ability to shoot.  The next step is to teach _when_ and _how_ to shoot.  And with that comes further collective training, with proper fire control, etc.



			
				BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Infanteer there is an actual shooting drill for firing that fast with relative accuracy, called rhythm drills. I am not saying that guy is doing it only that there is a system for it and when taught and practiced and done properly can be very effective for quick rounds in a relatively accurate area for killing and suppression.  Certainly better then the current drill of double tap 2 rounds in the general direction of the contact.... IMO of course



The "double tap" has more to do with psychology of the soldier than in killing of the enemy.  It is simply a method for the soldier to "take control of his own destiny", as it were, or breaking the seal in terms of shooting.  But it shouldn't be confused with any type of shooting meant to kill or suppress an enemy.


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## TangoTwoBravo (31 Dec 2010)

I'm not an infantryman, but this is an interesting thread and I'd like to contribute. My experience in Afghanistan is now over four years out of date, but I recall observing that long firefights occured when the enemy was in good cover. When we was moving in the open he was quickly taken down by all manner of direct fire weapons, so I'm not sure that marksmanship is the issue. 

I've been reading some WW2 stuff, and a British manual from 1944 offers the following on small unit infantry tactics: "remember that if the enemy is dug-in, covering fire seldom kills him; it merely makes him keep his head down so that he is unable to shoot back." Dug-in enemy being able to absorb prodigious amounts of small arms fire without lasting harm is not a new problem (I'l pick 1900 as the kick-off), and I don't think that marksmanship alone is going to resolve the issue.

Before I went to Kandahar I thought of "find, fix, strike" in terms of finding the enemy by advancing to contact, fixing him with a firebase and indirect fire and then striking him with an assault (combined arms or not). What I observed, though, was fixing with infantry fire and striking with artillery/CAS. This brings me back to the WW2 doctrine I was reading. US, German and British doctrine all stressed the importance of the assault. If our enemy stands about in the open then we can certainly kill him with direct fire alone. If he takes sensible precautions to ensure his surviviability in the face of our firepower, though, we need to be willing to press home the assault if we want to achieve decisive combat results with infantry weapons. Having said that, there is a certain sense in using weapons for which the enemy has little counter (tank fire, artillery, CAS) rather than expose ourselves to casualties in a fair fight at close range. Its easy to sit back here and urge people in the field to assault _a la Grandmaison_, but its rather different out in the grape fields.


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## Edward Campbell (31 Dec 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ...
> I've been reading some WW2 stuff, and a British manual from 1944 offers the following on small unit infantry tactics: "remember that if the enemy is dug-in, covering fire seldom kills him; it merely makes him keep his head down so that he is unable to shoot back." Dug-in enemy being able to absorb prodigious amounts of small arms fire without lasting harm is not a new problem (I'l pick 1900 as the kick-off), and I don't think that marksmanship alone is going to resolve the issue.
> ...




That was certainly how I recall the Canadian Army being trained _circa_ 1960. I think the 1939-45 experience was validated in Korea and we had, by 1960, no reason to believe anything else.


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## Old Sweat (31 Dec 2010)

I have also followed this debate with a lot of interest, but up to now have managed to stay in my lane. For the past 100 years plus, the battlefield has been a very empty place. That doesn't mean that there are not lots of troops in a relatively small area. Rather it means that anyone who exposes himself stands a pretty good chance of paying the price. A couple of things come to mind, one is that modern infantry small arms can produce a tremendous volume of fire, incoming and outgoing. In the early eighties I read a piece by a British officer who had been seconded to a local army in the Gulf which had been fighting Marxist rebels. The rebels carried AK47s while the locals used FNs. The difference in the amount of fire each side could produce did not work in the locals' favour.

The second thing is a throw away remark by a classmate's father-in-law who had been a FOO in Normandy until he was wounded in Operation Tractable. He claimed to have never seen a German soldier while actually FOOing. He was on the receiving end of lots of fire and he saw plenty of corpses and prisoners, but nary an infantry soldier actually fighting did he see.

As for using artillery and air to destroy the enemy, why not? If it saves Canadian lives in the process, all the better. We used that tactic in the Second World War at least to soften up him up before the assault, and while critics have carped about it since then, it worked and it worked well. Maybe the circumstances have changed and we can now cause sufficient casualties with fire support to tip the balance before the assault. It appears to work in the war, and maybe it will work in a war. On the other hand, and I would appreciate some input from those who may have been there, what about the assaults in August and September by the 1 PPCLI and 1 RCR battle groups?


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## Haligonian (1 Jan 2011)

With regards to the 84 mm my platoon carried it on all clearance ops that we conducted. We carried 5 rounds.  3x HEDP and 2x airburst. I never had the chance to fire the airburst ammo in combat but I was assured by the pl I RiP'd with that it quickly will cause the enemy to break contact when used. I fired it on the range and the effects I saw there made me believe it would be highly effective. We also considered employing it in the defence at my COP.  We took contact from the same grapewall twice and were going to place the 84 with the airburst with the range preset on the round, instead we destroyed the grapewall. The issue with the 84 of course is weight. On sect sized ptrls, which is the majority of operations currently, there just isn't the man power to lug that thing around with ammo. In addition, I know that my platoon during 1-07 took the 84 on almost all operations and employed the HEDP on several occasions with good effect.

IMO the assault is paid lip service to currently in theatre. This is for two reasons: 1. The enemy rarely sticks around for an assault or even a firefight really. 2. We use CAS/CCA/Arty/Armed UAV in place of an actual assault. The one prolonged TIC my coy found itself in lasted for 1 hour - 1 hour and a half I believe (to some of you this probably would not qualify as "prolonged", however, it did present the possiblity of maneouver vs a 1 min shoot and scoot where that opportunity is absent). As far as I know the platoon manoeuvered little to none and made no attempt to assault the enemy. What they did do was call in attack choppers (Kiowa's) and employed alot of 40mm HE and 40mm red smoke for marking enemy posns to the choppers. This, I believe, represented how most TIC's were dealt with during my tour.

Having said all this we must continue to train for the assault and perhaps should start employing it more in theatre vice constantly relying on higher assets to destroy or break contact with the enemy. Its my belief that breaking contact is all these assets achieve, during a tic, most of the time anyway. During the above example the helo's were on station for almost the entire TIC and to my knowledge did not kill a single INS. The enemy knows the strengths and weaknesses of our platforms and the limitations on our use of them and picks their ground wisely. In the above example the platoon and the enemy were firing N-S and S-N respectively.  Each side was using E-W grape rows and walls as cover.  How effective would it have been to place a section to the E or W of the enemy firing straight down those grape rows? In addition this may have a much larger psychological effect on the enemy than some impersonal helicopter flying over head spitting out .50 cal rounds whenever it gets a glimpse of red smoke.


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## a_majoor (3 Jan 2011)

I'm thinking of other historical examples, and WWI comes to mind.

The Germans routinely assaulted positions (even in 1914-15, before the development of _Sturmtruppen_) using a heavy proportion of high explosives delivered by artillery, mortars and grenades to cover the advance. Marksmanship wasn't a deciding factor, and as the war progressed, it was steadily replaced by increasing volumes of HE, machine gun fire and special weapons like flamethrowers. Of course, this also made German defenses very difficult to assault, given the attackers were advancing into a wall of fire. (Oversimplification, but stressing the point about firepower)

Pre war, the British Army trained in classical musketry, and riflemen were trained to identify targets and engage then with aimed fire at what today would be considered ridiculously long ranges (if anyone has a copy of "On Infantry", the actual figures are in there). Given open field conditions were no longer in effect even in 1914, marksmanship was little help to the BEF. The AEF received their training from the French, who had shifted towards a more German "firepower" based philosophy as the war progressed (although prewar French thought had been trending in that direction, with the introduction of automatic "Chauchat" rifles down to squad level. If the Chauchat had been a workable weapon, things might have gone a bit differently).

Fast forward a century, and many of these lessons still seem to be applicable. The enemy is either elusive or dug in, so opportunities to take accurate rifle shots are rare. HE firepower works both to stop the enemy from shooting at us and to prosecute the enemy. Stressing marksmanship is still worthwhile, in order to identify targets and minimize ammunition expenditure, but to think marksmanship alone would win the battle would be to suggest the battle devolves into "sniper duels", where soldiers patiently hide and wait for a target to identify itself.


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## vonGarvin (3 Jan 2011)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Pre war, the British Army trained in classical musketry, and riflemen were trained to identify targets and engage then with aimed fire at what today would be considered ridiculously long ranges (if anyone has a copy of "On Infantry", the actual figures are in there). Given open field conditions were no longer in effect even in 1914, marksmanship was little help to the BEF.


Disagree on the notion that marksmanship "...was of little help" for the British.

Consider this snippet:


> The attacks began along a much narrower front on 31 October when German cavalry drove a smaller British cavalry unit from its position on the Messines Ridge at the southern end of the salient.  Shortly thereafter, German forces engaged General Douglas Haig's First Corps further to the north, but a ferocious British counterattack repelled the Germans.  *Thanks to superior British rifle fire*, they were able to hold this sector.  *The British rifles were so fast and deadly that the Germans mistakenly believed they were facing British machine guns.*



This is from here

Anway, I think that it is highly illogical to consider musketry to not be of worth.  The inability to hit that which you wish to hit suggests to me that we may as well revert to clubs.  Though rifle fire alone will not win a war, and the entire toolbox of "things" all contributes, but musketry, combined with effective fire control suggests, to me, that musketry, though not sufficient, is necessary.


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## a_majoor (3 Jan 2011)

That one battle might be the exception that proves the rule. British tactics after that point began devolving towards increasingly massive artillery barrages, and the substitution of technology like gas and tanks. Down in the trenches, British Empire troops reorganized the platoon around a Lewis gun and rifle grenadiers, with the riflemen acting as ammunition load bearers and escorts for the more powerful weapons.

Now that I think about it, "Men against Fire" suggested some of the same factors in WWII, claiming that most of the platoon fire was concentrated on the automatic or crew served weapons. The argument is a bit different, suggesting that soldiers with the powerful weapons felt they could influence the battle and crew served weapons had a powerful morale effect, each man encouraging the other to stay in the fight. Riflemen were thought to take cover but not expose themselves to fire their weapons, believing they could not influence the battle. (SLA Marshal's historiography has come under fire, so the actual percentages he quoted in "Men against Fire" may be questionable. The basic argument makes sense, however)

I am not suggesting that marksmanship is irrelevant; using the principles to identify targets (even if for the other weapons systems) and to conserve ammunition makes a great deal of sense.


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## vonGarvin (3 Jan 2011)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Now that I think about it, "Men against Fire" suggested some of the same factors in WWII, claiming that *most of the platoon fire was concentrated on the automatic or crew served weapons*. The argument is a bit different, suggesting that soldiers with the powerful weapons felt they could influence the battle and crew served weapons had a powerful morale effect, each man encouraging the other to stay in the fight.


This part is key, I believe.  Of course, marksmanship with rifles isn't the "be all-end all" for war fighting, and one must be careful *not* to over-emphasise the rifleman's contribution to the fight.  
I believe personally that this over-emphasisation led to the demise of the support platoons in the Canadian Infantry.  Infantry should, in my opinion, be considered as a set of capabilities, not just the number of riflemen.  Anyway, that's another thread.

Having said all this, we do have the tools to train our riflemen to be better shooters.   We just need to really hone in on that, I believe.


Edit: the word in yellow, those simple three letters, are VITAL to my argument.  Many thanks to OS for pointing that out.  :cheers:


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## Old Sweat (3 Jan 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> This part is key, I believe.  Of course, marksmanship with rifles isn't the "be all-end all" for war fighting, and one must be careful to over-emphasise the rifleman's contribution to the fight.
> I believe personally that this over-emphasisation led to the demise of the support platoons in the Canadian Infantry.  Infantry should, in my opinion, be considered as a set of capabilities, not just the number of riflemen.  Anyway, that's another thread.
> 
> Having said all this, we do have the tools to train our riflemen to be better shooters.   We just need to really hone in on that, I believe.


Could you run this argument by me again? Did you mean "careful *not* to over-emphasise?"


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## vonGarvin (3 Jan 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Could you run this argument by me again? Did you mean "careful *not* to over-emphasise?"


Yes, I did mean that.  I've edited the post.  Thank you!


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## Haligonian (4 Jan 2011)

This debate raises some questions about the Squad Designated Marksman program.  At the end of the tour each Coy had to conduct a post operational report (POR) on equipment, tactics, and everything you can imagine. Upon completing it we sat down together with the officer in charge of compiling these reports and forwarding them to Ottawa for future action. The issue of having a squad designated marksmen came up and initially many people thought it was a good idea. As did other coy's apparently.  One of the Coy's NCO's then spoke up who is sniper qualified and expressed that training one soldier in the section and giving him a special site, or weapon like a C3, would be a waste of time and money, as our current weapons should be able to reach out to the ranges that designated marksmen shoot for and all riflemen should be able to accomplish this with the right training. For the most part everyone thought this to be a good point and what went into the report finally was that riflemen need more time at the range.

This discussion and the articles posted by Infanteer would imply that we were all wrong, and that the squad designated marksman program is a waste of effort as getting rifleman to shoot accurately and reliably out past 100m is a fools errand. The same could be said also about the marine corps entire marksmanship philosophy. In the Dec 2010 issue of the Marine Corps gazette Maj Barger argues that the Corps must continue practicing their high standards of marksmanship.  The Corps puts the resources into having all personnel shoot past 300m with iron sights.  Their Fundamental Rifle Marksmanship (FRM) course that all Marines must complete has them shooting at 500 yards (457 meters). He does admit that the FRM does not try to emulate battle conditions (thereby implying that performance would decrease in actual combat) but he insists that the FRM along with more advanced training (for cbt arms/infanteers) is key to allowing marines to put down accurate rifle fire over long distances.

Part of me is sceptical that rifle fire is ineffective past 100m (due to the rifleMAN, not the rifle).  There is no doubt that crew served weapons and HE are more effective at creating shock and suppressing the enemy but our allies have invested significant resources into the belief that riflemen can have a significant impact on the battle well past 100m. I wonder if the research that Dr. Storr cites would have had different findings if they had used a Marine squad? Doesn't it seem odd that this is even a debate?  Shouldn't we have this figured out by now after having fought with rifles and machine guns for over 100 years now?


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## vonGarvin (4 Jan 2011)

Haligonian.
The designated marksman may be a product of the current war, but there is some merit.  As your sniper said, issuing him with a C3 would be a waste.  Instead, it's not so much marskmanship that's the issue, it's the external and terminal ballistics that are at issue, two things beyond the scope of the firer's ability to affect, no matter the training.

So, the idea is that one person per section is the "marksman".  He carries a rifle that allows him to participate in all section rifleman tasks (section fire out to 300m).  However, due to the fact that his weapon fires perhaps a 7.62mm, combined with his marksmanship training, he can hit individual targets out to 500m?  600m?

Your NCO is correct in that the C7 can shoot out to 600m, but only in massed fires.  Even if we trained all our people properly (as per the CFOSP), the furthest they can be expect to hit a man-sized target is only 300m.  So, your NCO wasn't 100% correct.  Yes, with specialised training, all riflemen could hit out to 500-600m reliably; however, we cannot train all firers to that standard.

Now, marksman or no-marksman, rifle training is still a must, for all the right reasons.  One thing to remember about the PWT, and I cannot stress this enough, is that it is only a gateway to individual and collective field firing.  Too often do people see it as the final check: it's not.  As Infanteer stated earlier, it doesn't teach when to shoot in a tactical situation.  That's true, it doesn't.  All it does is assess one person's ability to fire up to 300m in a variety of positions, with measurable and universally applicable stressors and standards.  Once a soldier passes that, then it's time to move out into the field ranges to do some real work up.


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## Old Sweat (4 Jan 2011)

There must be some logic behind the designated marksman concept. What is the expected frequency of an enemy appearing in the 300-500 metre window, and remaining in view until it can be acquirred, indicated and engaged by the designated marksman? Heresy time: maybe the answer is the XM25 instead of a 7.62 rifle.


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## vonGarvin (4 Jan 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> There must be some logic behind the designated marksman concept. What is the expected frequency of an enemy appearing in the 300-500 metre window, and remaining in view until it can be acquirred, indicated and engaged by the designated marksman? Heresy time: maybe the answer is the XM25 instead of a 7.62 rifle.


Not heresy at all.  
The reason that 7.62 is bantered about is because it already exists in our toolkit as a munition, and all we would need is a rifle.  Having said that, if we went the XM25 route, just look how long it is taking us to acquire a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher: seven years and counting.
Of note, the concept has been proven, but given our assets available, we have mis-employed snipers to conduct the "marksman-like" task at subunit level and below.  So, instead of elevating a rifleman up to the skillsets required for a marksman, we have lowered snipers to the skillset required.


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## quadrapiper (4 Jan 2011)

Speaking to Afghanistan, and hopefully not too far out of my lane - also, what about the occasional reports of Taliban engaging from beyond Canadian (or US) effective range; not snipers, per se, but using arms that out-range the C7, M16, or M4? Is that a situation where the ability to fight fire with fire is necessary, or one where crew-served weapons are a more effective counter?


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## a_majoor (4 Jan 2011)

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Speaking to Afghanistan, and hopefully not too far out of my lane - also, what about the occasional reports of Taliban engaging from beyond Canadian (or US) effective range; not snipers, per se, but using arms that out-range the C7, M16, or M4? Is that a situation where the ability to fight fire with fire is necessary, or one where crew-served weapons are a more effective counter?



This is one of the arguments for a designated marksman/7.62mm battle rifle (or some new intermediate round like 6.5mm). A DM armed with a more powerful rifle can, in theory, engage a fleeting target like a Taliban fighter at 300+ m faster than the C-6 can be brought into action. In another thread I argued for this point for that very reason. Of course, since a section can volley fire on a target at up to 600m, all is not lost without a DM or C-6.

OTOH, nasty people with rifles generally move in groups, so even if a DM is answering fire initially, opening up with the C-6 or C-9's, M-203's and calling on mortars or artillery is probably the smart thing to do, to ensure his friends are not going to join the party. The ability of the DM to rapidly locate and indicate the target (or even a non DM rifleman) brings all the other assets into play that much faster.

As an even farther aside, Infidel-6 has posted on various "hot" 5.56m rounds which do have greater terminal effects out to 300m and beyond (Although we need to keep this in perspective. Even a hot 5.56 is not going to have the same effect on a target at 400m as a 7.62mm round).

So the pros to extensive marksmanship training (for all) is to be able to rapidly engage fleeting targets, but more importantly, to rapidly bring all assets to bear. This second skill-set is independent of the weapons system, a "battle" of longbowmen in 1500 needed this just as much as a platoon of Infantry in 2010


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## Haligonian (4 Jan 2011)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is one of the arguments for a designated marksman/7.62mm battle rifle (or some new intermediate round like 6.5mm). A DM armed with a more powerful rifle can, in theory, engage a fleeting target like a Taliban fighter at 300+ m faster than the C-6 can be brought into action. In another thread I argued for this point for that very reason. Of course, since a section can volley fire on a target at up to 600m, all is not lost without a DM or C-6.



Seems like a fairly narrow set of circumstances to justify beginning an entire program that costs millions of dollars. Adding a C6 to the section would reduce the time required for it to get into action to nothing.

4.5 years in the army and I hadn't heard that the C9/Minimi was terribly inaccurate. Can anyone tell me why its so bad?  Too light to handle the recoil? Design flaw? How does issuing short heavy barrel's overseas effect their accuracy?


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## vonGarvin (4 Jan 2011)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> 4.5 years in the army and I hadn't heard that the C9/Minimi was terribly inaccurate. Can anyone tell me why its so bad?  Too light to handle the recoil? Design flaw? How does issuing short heavy barrel's overseas effect their accuracy?


It's not that they are inaccurate.  It's just that they are meant as area weapons, given their characteristics.  As for the short barrelled C9, given the internal ballistics, I would offer that it has a lower muzzle velocity.  This would adversely affect its accuracy at longer ranges.


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## TangoTwoBravo (4 Jan 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Disagree on the notion that marksmanship "...was of little help" for the British.
> 
> Consider this snippet:
> This is from here
> ...



Bear in mind that the British in 1914 were trained to employ a high volume of fire - the emphasis was on rate of fire. The Germans were advancing and thus not ensconced in hard cover. If the Taliban advance in the open they will get cut down just like those Germans.

Continuing on a history tangent, here are a couple of observations from before the Great War based on South Africa and the Russo-Japanese War:

   a.  "Invisibility has become an essential condition. It is the dominant fact of the whole war." - French Report on the Russo-Japanese War

   b.  "It was not yet realized that the defender, occupying ingeniously constructed trenches and useing smokeless powder, is practically invulnerable to both gun and rifle" - Col Henderson reporting on the Boer War.

Facing an opponent who cannot be dislodged by small arms alone is not a new problem.


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## Kiwi99 (4 Jan 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> On the other hand, and I would appreciate some input from those who may have been there, what about the assaults in August and September by the 1 PPCLI and 1 RCR battle groups?



I was crew commanding my LAV as part of 9Pl on Aug 03 2006 as part of the assault on the White School.  (I will hasten to add that a certain 'brass' type paid little attention to the results of that one, hence what happened to Charles Coy on 03 Sept).

Locating the enemy was the hardest thing.  Even with all the optics available to me and my gunner, we did not see a single enemy until we made it up to the school itself and were engaging enemy from 20-25m with the cannon (awesome results).  Their prepared positions allowed them to shoot and scoot while concealed.  Signature from an RPG launch would be engaged but muzzle flashes did not exist.  We shot where we saw the dismounts shooting, or we shot in the direction from where rounds where striking the car.  HUMINT and other sources say we whacked a lot of dudes that day, but it was nothing more than luck.  But I guess over 500 rounds of 25mm and almost 2500 rounds of 7.62mm will have some result.


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## Infanteer (5 Jan 2011)

Excellent discussion and I commend all for the good input on the various topics.  Some thoughts/clarification:

1.  The notion of marksmanship that I first mentioned is starting to get a little clouded.  I was not referring to the ability to see a target or not or if it is a suspected or confirmed enemy position, which is where the conversation went.  My critique was against two things that seem to happen often, despite the amount of time Western armies dedicate to training.  The first is something like this:

http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/20100902214645.aspx

Obviously, he isn't going to hit anything and is wasting ammo.  

The second type is rapidly putting rounds down range in a manner that is ineffective - the famous Kesterson video has a good example at the 58 second mark:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2r3C0PJ1LM

This video (despite the lame music) also has some example at the 1:10 mark and beyond:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-wHaPl7Ibo

I don't know how people expect to hit something by taking up a hasty sight picture and loosing off 5-10 rounds.  The rifle is not meant to create a beaten zone.

Undoubtably, this phenomenon likely occurs due to the stress of battle.  Remember the one note from the Storr article which pointed out that seasoned Marine squads would only expend 3-4 mags after long TICs - once soldiers (and leaders) become more accustomed to battles and recognize when they are taking effective or ineffective fire, they can get into the right zone (to take a page from Grossman) and start acting effectively.  So, if we know this happens, we should try our best to "train it out" of guys in training - this likely means evaluating training to make sure we are not conditioning bad drills that lead to wasted shots and higher ammo consumption (hence my mentioning of the run down).

2.  That being said, it is hard to get around the stressors of combat - as Haligonian correctly surmised, the rifle isn't much of a decisive factor on the battlefield due to the the "rifleMAN" and not the "rifle".  This doesn't excuse poor marksmanship training, and we still need to train to avoid the things I listed above (if anything, to avoid wasting rounds) - I don't disagree with Technoviking at all when we still need top notch individual rifle skills, especially at the 0-100m fight where the rifle will be more of a factor.

The real point is that we need to recognize the limitations of the individual rifleman.  He isn't going to kill much when he's doing things properly, taking aimed shots at known or suspected enemy - but he still contributes to the fight, and his key ability is to move that rifle onto the enemy when he has to.  He isn't going to kill anything if he's just rattling rounds off for the sake of shooting back.  I've spoken to some Marines about their facination with Marksmanship - apparently there is some contention in the USMC as the "Mafia" that controls the doctrine/school system and some pointy end guys don't agree on what's important.  500m with an iron sight seems like a waste of time and effort to me.

3.  On the ineffectiveness of the C9, I've never heard of any real complaints either, but have we ever really objectively tested the thing?  After reading that test results show it scored poorly in the section context, I thought for a bit on the weapon; it's a machinegun, but we employ it like a rifle.  Why don't we just give the guy a rifle (which the USMC did)?

4.  Moving on, some have discussed the nature of firefights in Afghanistan and the "shoot and scoot" tactics of the enemy.  The salient points that I think that have fallen out of the contributions are:

It is very hard to locate the enemy (he moves, like we do);
The firefight must be constantly won and re-won; and
the insurgent's primary TTP is to shoot and get out of dodge when our firepower comes on line; I haven't seen very many cases of "hold to the last" since 2006 - the good ones learned and know things like CAS response times, etc, etc
  
The two "so what's" that come out of this to me are maneuver and cut-off.  To the first point, there is certainly nothing wrong with using CAS/Air/Arty to pound the enemy, but we must remember that it isn't an end in itself (shock only lasts for a while) and that firepower is only good if supports maneuver; some of the historical examples provided here show how hard it is to kill people in strong defensive postions and Afghanistan is one big defensive position.  Aggresive maneuver will undoubtably be better than stopping and waiting for enablers to stack up.  As to the second point, much of what I've seen (AARs/Lessons Learned/Reports/Etc) show that cut-offs are effective killers.  I tried cut-offs lots both in work-up and in theater, but it always seemed like they weren't out when the enemy decided to make an appearance.  It was frustrating, but its something we must continue to try to get better at.  A good "play-book" of getting various types of cut-offs into play at various phases of the battle is a must have and a must rehearse.

5.  Finally, we need to recognize what is unique to our collective experience and what is generally applicable.  We fight and low-quality insurgent with minimal equipment in a dense, rural floodplain.  Some Americans I speak to recount battles in the rugged mountains of RC East that show some similarities but some vast differences in the way the enemy fights.  We need to be concious of this; the Korengal Valley and the grapefields of Panjwayi are two different fights.

Anyways, my 2 cents.


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## Haligonian (6 Jan 2011)

A few more 'so what's', at least further questions, are to be taken from this discussion I believe.

If the rifle is not decisive in battle until within 100m then how should we be equipping and organizing our sects and platoons in order to take into consideration this fact? We could consider placing a C6 with each section, and forming a support and assault group. Perhaps it wouldn't be necessary to to add a C6 to the section but simply group the C9's together as a support group perhaps with the two M203 gunners. Is the C9 even worth keeping considering what the research has shown?  I think what I would like to see happen is placing a C6 with the sect, ditch the M203's, and acquire something along the lines of the M 32 MGL. The MGL would give the section the ability to inflict a level of shock on the enemy by delivering HE 40mm grenades in rapid succession. The sect would be broken into assault and support groupings with the C6 number 1 and 2, MGL gunner and likely the sect 2IC in the support group.  The asslt group would entail the sect comd and the remaining riflemen.  At the pl level the C6 could be removed as I think it would be redundant with there now being 3 C6's within the platoon.  This would free up men for the bearing of more 84mm and mortar ammunition, and allowing for more flexibility on which natures are to be brought, thereby giving the platoon more potential to bring shock action down onto the enemy. The question would be how does the pl comd hastily regroup the sects machine guns and MGL's into a single pl firebase if he wishes to employ them all for assaulting an objective? That would require solid drills and strong communication which can only be arrived at by training I would suggest.

I think this would restore manoeuvre to the section and considerably increase its firepower. It obviously would require some tinkering with doctrine and TTP's but other than acquiring the MGL, nothing major.
Sorry if this has been beaten to a dead horse on the form but I thought it was important to mention. 

(Edited for spelling.)


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## vonGarvin (6 Jan 2011)

Those are good points, Haligonian, but as a reminder, grouping of the section by weapons is up to the commanders.  For example, if the commander decides to group his C9s and M203s as you say, then he can do so.  Retaining flexibility is key.  In any event, to stay closer to the topic (re: marksmanship), we shouldn't sluff off the requirement to hit within 100m.  Consider the close terrain in which many of our guys are fighting.  From my perspective, it comes down to applying the training regime we have in place.
For those unaware, we have elementary application of fire to start for the new shooter.  Here they learn the basics of holding, aiming and firing, and get a type of coaching focussing on the holding and firing.  Then comes the advanced application of fire, where the coaching focusses on the aiming.  From there, to the PWT and then the various field firing (individual and collective).  But the ability to hit that at which you are aiming is a losable skill.


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## Haligonian (6 Jan 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Those are good points, Haligonian, but as a reminder, grouping of the section by weapons is up to the commanders.  For example, if the commander decides to group his C9s and M203s as you say, then he can do so.  Retaining flexibility is key.  In any event, to stay closer to the topic (re: marksmanship), we shouldn't sluff off the requirement to hit within 100m.  Consider the close terrain in which many of our guys are fighting.  From my perspective, it comes down to applying the training regime we have in place.
> For those unaware, we have elementary application of fire to start for the new shooter.  Here they learn the basics of holding, aiming and firing, and get a type of coaching focussing on the holding and firing.  Then comes the advanced application of fire, where the coaching focusses on the aiming.  From there, to the PWT and then the various field firing (individual and collective).  But the ability to hit that at which you are aiming is a losable skill.



From this I take it that you would advocate following the CFOSP? In my experience the operational units are skipping the PWT's 1 and 2 along with their subordinate applications and going directly to PWT 3 in order to tick the box.  I get the feeling that the general consensus is that the applications and PWT 1 and 2 are for support trades and not for the infantry.  What's your thoughts on this and does it really matter if you do the previous applications if everyone is passing PWT 3 anyway?

What sort of further training should we be conducting in order to further hone our battle shot at the 100 m distance?


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## PuckChaser (6 Jan 2011)

I believe you don't need to fire PWT1 again if you passed PWT2 the previous year to qualify on the weapon. Hence to get troops deployed if they already have PWT2 they just skip to PWT3. If people are just jumping ahead without being able to fire a group at 100m, thats another issue.


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## vonGarvin (6 Jan 2011)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> From this I take it that you would advocate following the CFOSP? In my experience the operational units are skipping the PWT's 1 and 2 along with their subordinate applications and going directly to PWT 3 in order to tick the box.  I get the feeling that the general consensus is that the applications and PWT 1 and 2 are for support trades and not for the infantry.  What's your thoughts on this and does it really matter if you do the previous applications if everyone is passing PWT 3 anyway?
> 
> What sort of further training should we be conducting in order to further hone our battle shot at the 100 m distance?


Yes, following the CFOSP is, IMHO, a necessity.  If they pass PWT 3 anyway, I would offer that they are relying on their previous experience.  If they fail to get perfect on it, then there is room for improvement, and given that our job is life and death....

Further training?  Just lots of individual and collective field firing.  Lots of good stuff.  The imagination is the limit.


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## a_majoor (7 Jan 2011)

As an aside, many units and courses often "shoot" PWT-1 on the SAT to conserve ammunition and training funds. I'm sure there are other "shenanigans" out there WRT rifle training on ranges. I recall hearing about an interesting conversation in 31 CBG where the ammunition usage was compared to claims that all units had 90% or whatever shoot and qualify on the CFOSP. Rumor has it the usage was far short of what would have been needed for the number of shooters claimed.

On a more serious note, ammunition allocations and training time is so restricted there is little ability to put people through proper CFOSP training, particularly once you go past rifles. When was the last time you ever saw people actually zeroing C-6 or C-9's? Firing groupings on the corners of a 4' screen?

IF we are only willing to spend the bre minimum of time and resources to teaching and training marksmanship (or shooting in general), then the people trying to sell us on XM-25's, CASW and other area effect wonder weapons might actually be making sense.


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## kilekaldar (13 Jan 2011)

If I can add to the noise on this topic, I'd like to comment as a non-combat trade soldier who was attached to a Rifle Coy, patrolled with them in Zhari and was involved in numorous TICs.

From what I saw time and again the Infantry was mainly there as bait to get the enemy to reveal themselves. Due to the nature of fighting insurgents, it was vitually impossible to find the Taliban until they pulled out weapons and starting shooting. 
Even then we rarely ever SAW them, muzzle flashes and a face poping up for a second were the occasional exception. Engagements where mostly from 300m to 600m, with the enemy making exellent use of the cover and concealment of the mudwalls, wadis and vegetation. 
So how do you aim at a target you rarely see but is pouring fire at you? We typically used the sound of enemy gunfire to get a rough range and bearing to the target and retuned fire at that.
Echo location with the Mark 1 eardrum not being the most precise instrument most fire from the infantry was SUPPRESIVE in nature. 

Example: Gunfire snapping past us from the East, there's a wadi lined with trees and heavy brush in that direction, we think that's where they are shooting from. The platoon turns and fires into the wadi. This all happens in a the space of a few seconds.

The fire fight would continue, our guys engaging with C7, M203, C9, m72, Carl G, Mortars and C6, of these I've only heard the C6 getting kills on the rare idiot who exposed himself. Used in small numbers the Carl Gs firing rate was too slow and the Mortars wildly innacurate to be much help.

From there the FOO tech would start to spool up a fire mission over the radio, get the control sation to take a look with a UAV, and if we got lucky the enemy would stay in that one spot long enough to drop 155mm HE on them, or if they were really dumb they would try to slug it out until we finally got an airstrike in. I rarely saw the enemy continue to put up a serious fight after the bombs started dropping. When enemy casualties occured it was nornmally from the Artillery and Air Force.

More often then not the enemy would do a Mexican Unload on us for a few minutes, then use the wadi network to run to a new fire position, avoiding the artillery and airstrikes from being delivered effectively. They knew what to expect from us just like we knew what they would do.

So how do you train for this? Do better ranges help you was you return fire at a target you cannot see? Do you change your weapons loads? 
We tried forming a fire platoon that was heavy with support weapons, large numbers of Carl Gs, C6 and Mortars and it was very effective if the enemy CHOSE to attack them while they were already set-up, otherwise by the time the fire platoon manouevered into position, loaded and engaged the enemy was already repositioning using the conceilment of the wadis. 

So would more crew served weapons help? Only if the enemy sticks around long enough for those weapons to be brought to bear and held still to take the punishement. 
Is there something that you can fire while dismounted, requires no setup time, powerfull enough to blast through mud walls or could fire over them, but still have a high rate of fire to be effective?

I'm not sure, it's not my area and I can only speak as to what I saw directly. In that I can say that marksmanship was not an issue, we had several snipers with us who had no better luck then the riflemen. What seemed to work repeatedly was layered effects; the infantry returnings high volumes of fire with multiple weapon systems, preventing the enemy from exposing themselves long enough to shoot at our guys accurately, and the rapid arrival of fire support from the artillery and air force to finish the contact.


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## vonGarvin (13 Jan 2011)

kile:
did your platoon ever use manoeuvre on the enemy?  Or did they just fire on him?


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## Haligonian (20 Jan 2011)

New article to fuel the debate here folks.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_1/CAJ_vol13.1_full_e.pdf

Some key points from the article:

1.  The author identifies what he sees as a gap in the sections capability to engage targets 500-600m. He also emphasises the need for the capability to be precise vs. suppressive. (I believe he really means capable of hitting point targets instead of area targets.) He states that the ability to bring precise effects to fleeting targets is now more important that to be able to suppress the enemy.

2.  He reviews some of the characteristics of the C7, it's sight, and its ammunition then goes into detail of the capabilities of the weapons system at 600m, concluding that the rifle, and optic are more than capable of engaging targets out to that distance, however, the C77 Ball ammunition is not.

3. To cover this capability gap he sees 3 options. More snipers, sharp shooters (he prefers the term sharp shooter over marksman as marksman refers to a generic CF skill), or raising the marsmanship standard across the CF/Infantry.

4. Options 1 and 3 he sees as not realistic due to resource and time constraints. He believes that sharpshooters should be trained at a level of 2.5 per section. (He also considered 1 for the pl wpns det but this would not cover the sects capability gap.) He believes training sharpshooters would be fairly cheap and proposes a two week course based off of Sniper PO's.  The Sniper Cell at the Inf school would generate the course and it would be run by the 4 area training centers.

5. In his conclusion he advocates the CF adopts sect sharpshooters using whatever weapon is chosen as the Short Range Sniper Weapon by the Small Arms Replacement Project.  He claims that marksmanship standards through the CF must be raised in general.


I'm not sure I'm sold on the sect sharpshooter idea. I'm not convinced we can reliably get that many personnel up to a standard where they are firing out to 600m reliably.  Also the greater importance of delivering precise fire versus area/suppressive fire is something I'm not sure about. How often are INS popping shots at patrols while surrounded by civilians? I don't believe its very common in Afghanistan, maybe in Iraq or against the Palistinnians? I have a hard time imagining a sharpshooter who is under contact being able to reliably deliver that one shot one kill in a non combatant rich environment while being shot at.


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## Towards_the_gap (20 Jan 2011)

How do you train 2.5 sharpshooters?




On the last summer roto, ''marksman'' were used to good effect. Sure they may not have accounted for alot of kills, however terry taliban, hiding in an orchard, sees a dude with a gun with a FOGB scope on it climb onto a roof to provide overwatch for a shura/patrol/CIMIC handshake patrol, and then thinks twice about lighting us up. The marksman rifle was often either only a C7CT or AR-10 borrowed from the sniper det, given to a senior rifleman. Remember it's not always about the punchups, convincing the other dude that he will only get a 7.62 spanking if he starts something works just as well in COIN.


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## Haligonian (20 Jan 2011)

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> How do you train 2.5 sharpshooters?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The 2.5 shooters is used to attain an average at higher levels as I understand it.  So yes it doesn't make sense at sect level because you can't half train someone or train half a person, but at pl level it means the pl has 10 shooters/gunners/drivers/crew commanders. Then at coy level you'd have about 40, meaning pl WO's and the CSM can juggle guys with qualifications around once leave hits or attrition or whatever.  We try to attain this with the necessary qualifications.

Great point on the psychological effect a "sniper" can have on the enemy.  I'll point out, however, that this article was aiming to have the sharpshooter in order to cover a capability gap within the section and not so much have a psychological effect on the enemy.


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## a_majoor (21 Jan 2011)

After reading this, a few thoughts come to mind:

There is a need for rapid suppressive fire to fix or destroy an elusive enemy. Has anyone considered shoot through rifle grenades? They can even be fixed to the weapon while on patrol, so the first round downrange will be the grenade itself (might want to watch that "double tap", though). Rifle grenades come in all sizes, so it is possible to have even bigger warheads than a 40mm grenade from an M-203, if desired.

Some of what is being discussed in terms of enemy tactics is distressingly familiar from reading accounts of battles in the Viet Nam war. The French  and Americans seemed determined to only move in the open, while the "Popular Force" and NVA moved and set up in concealed positions, with predictable results. If we know the enemy is using the wadi system to infiltrate and exfiltrate, then rather than trying to shoot them out of the wadi with rifle fire (about as possible as shooting people out of trenches in 1915) we should be down there rooting them out. Since this is now a trench fight, short range weapons with high volumes of fire (like shotguns or SMG/PDWs) are the order of the day. A support platoon or team in overwatch can deal with people jumping out of the wadi to flee. Other tactical problems will need different solutions.


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## Fishbone Jones (21 Jan 2011)

Flame throwers.  ;D Long range, high tech flamethrowers


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## vonGarvin (21 Jan 2011)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Flame throwers.  ;D Long range, high tech flamethrowers



Don't laugh: they exist


9A52  is one example (aka "Smerch", or BM-30)

The RPO-80 is similar to the RPG-7, apparently, but with shorter range.  "Thermobaric" is the way to go ;D


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## George Wallace (21 Jan 2011)

Thermobaric is very scary stuff.


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## Illegio (21 Jan 2011)

> The RPO-80 is similar to the RPG-7, apparently, but with shorter range.



RPO-A



> I'm not sure I'm sold on the sect sharpshooter idea. I'm not convinced we can reliably get that many personnel up to a standard where they are firing out to 600m reliably.  Also the greater importance of delivering precise fire versus area/suppressive fire is something I'm not sure about. How often are INS popping shots at patrols while surrounded by civilians? I don't believe its very common in Afghanistan, maybe in Iraq or against the Palistinnians? I have a hard time imagining a sharpshooter who is under contact being able to reliably deliver that one shot one kill in a non combatant rich environment while being shot at.



I disagree. The skill required to shoot accurately and reliably out to 600m is only a product of time, training, and ammunition. It's only a question of what the military is willing to commit to train and maintain people to this standard. To look at the Basic Sniper course, I'd estimate that perhaps a quarter or a third of the course is dedicated to range time - the rest is observations, judging distance, and stalking. To pull the relevant elements from that course - shooting and JD - and tailor it to a sharpshooter program would require two, three weeks? Ideally, a minimum of one solid day of shooting a month to maintain those skills, but, well, even the snipers don't get out that much.

As far as the sharpshooters' relevancy goes, I believe it is as much about improving the flexibility of the section at a fundamental level as it is about tailoring the section to the current conflict. We won't always be in Afghanistan, after all.


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## Infanteer (2 Feb 2011)

http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca/netpub/server.np?find&catalog=photos&template=detail_eng.np&field=itemid&op=matches&value=8575&site=combatcamera

Here's another example of marksmanship (or lack thereof) that made this year's Army Calendar....


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## a_majoor (3 Feb 2011)

Here I am teaching my last ever course (BMQ, where by God, they WILL learn the principles of marksmanship), only to have "pray and spray" immortalized in a calendar...


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