# Fields Of Fire - Terry Copp



## mdh (8 Feb 2005)

Michael Dorosh,

What did you think of Terry Copp's Fields of Fire? I thought it was a pretty impressive revisionist history of the Normandy campaign, cheers, mdh


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## Michael Dorosh (8 Feb 2005)

mdh said:
			
		

> Michael Dorosh,
> 
> What did you think of Terry Copp's Fields of Fire? I thought it was a pretty impressive revisionist history of the Normandy campaign, cheers, mdh



Copp is a solid researcher.  I don't have an opinion on Fields of Fire but seem to recall many of the other historians in the community, as well as general readerships, share your opinion.  So tell us what parts of the history you feel he did well in revising?  I'd be interested to hear more.


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## mdh (8 Feb 2005)

Hi Michael,

In sum, re-establishing the reputation of First Canadian Army and its leadership during the campaign.   I think all of us have grown used to the notion that the Canadian in Normandy was not the equivalent of its German opposition and that Canadian command was second-rate or lacking in many instances.   Again especially compared to the German. 

I'm doing this off the top of my head here - but I believe that CP Stacey was first in the long lilne of historians who have compared our army to the German and found it wanting. Indeed the concensus has been that without overwhelming firepower - especially in the air - we might not have succeeded.

Copp turns that on its head and although I can't summarize all of his research here I can highlight some examples:

1. Overwhelming firepower? - in fact the beach defenses on June 6 were largely intact when Canadian troops came ashore because naval gunfire had missed most of the targets -most were taken by infantry assault - as for airpower it was overwhelming but wildly inaccurate - leaving most forward troops to deal with armour and strongpoints in the offensive - which of course always favours the defenders. Artillery was formidable but again inaccurate and not always reliable. 

2. Superior German doctrine and leadership? - In fact, mostly unimaginative and predictable - Canadian platoon commanders could always rely on German counterattack and take advantage of it to inflict heavy casualties - losses the Germans could not afford. German troops were a mixed bag while the Canadian army - inexperienced as they were, had a far better grip on tactics than they have been credited with.

3. Strategic/Tactical Blunders? In fact the Canadians made impressive - and in some cases spectacular - progress against entrenched and determined German forces in their sector and almost closed the Falaise Gap - they failed due to factors beyond their control which had little to do with their military capabilities. Again the destruction of the German Army of the West was absolute, decisive, and accomplished within the space of three months -   a record time by the standards of total war.

4. Superior German weapons? Only to a degree - it turned out that the most lethal weapon in Normandy was the mortar.   The Lee Enfield and the Bren were adequate to the task. German tanks were impressive but flawed, ie hard to maintain engines - and of courses not enough of them.

5. Correcting the record - Copp reviews regimental war diaries/letters/testimony with a critical eye and finds a lot facts that have not been taken into consideration or simply distorted by other historians or some of the more self-serving memoirs of the participants.

This is just a quick summary of some things raised by Copp - again it's off the top of my head so forgive some of the inaccuracies.   In all a great read and food for thought, cheers mdh


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## Michael Dorosh (8 Feb 2005)

Interesting - I am at work and will reply in detail later.  But do want to point out - Foulkes was the one who suggested to Stacey that the Canadians weren't a match for the Germans; at the time he commanded 2nd Canadian Div (?)   The exact quote was words to the effect of "we were no match for them."

Makes one wonder how they managed to not only push through to Falaise, but then cross the Seine and send the Germans reeling back to Belgium...

More as I get time - thanks for the response.


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## mdh (8 Feb 2005)

Pretty sure Copp deals with the Foulkes-Stacey critique - including that very quote, cheers, mdh


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## Infanteer (9 Feb 2005)

I guess this would count as "revisionism" if you follow the current line of thought that at the operational level, the Canadians bungled their way in Normandy.   I haven't seen this book, but I am willing to bet that the author aims much of his criticism at Col John English's superb The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: Failure in High Command.   To date, I think English's assessment is the best out there and his premise is backed by excellent and well-rounded citations (including alot of German material/interviews).   I'll have to pick up Copp's book in order to put it on the scale with English's definitive work.

Here are my thoughts (based on what I've seen) on the salient features that mdh pointed out.



			
				mdh said:
			
		

> In sum, re-establishing the reputation of First Canadian Army and its leadership during the campaign.   I think all of us have grown used to the notion that the Canadian in Normandy was not the equivalent of its German opposition and that Canadian command was second-rate or lacking in many instances.   Again especially compared to the German.



No one really disputes the hardiness of the Canadian soldiers or their prowess at the tactical level.  Operational level leadership was not well regarded at all - look at what figures like Monty, Dempsey, etc have to say - English goes into great detail on this.



> I'm doing this off the top of my head here - but I believe that CP Stacey was first in the long lilne of historians who have compared our army to the German and found it wanting. Indeed the concensus has been that without overwhelming firepower - especially in the air - we might not have succeeded.
> Copp turns that on its head and although I can't summarize all of his research here I can highlight some examples:
> 
> 1. Overwhelming firepower? - in fact the beach defences on June 6 were largely intact when Canadian troops came ashore because naval gunfire had missed most of the targets -most were taken by infantry assault - as for airpower it was overwhelming but wildly inaccurate - leaving most forward troops to deal with armour and strongpoints in the offensive - which of course always favours the defenders. Artillery was formidable but again inaccurate and not always reliable.



The beach weren't the "Schwerpunkt" of the German defence until after the Allies had largely cleared them and consolidated the beachhead - remember, Hitler believed Normandy to be a feint while waiting for Patton's "Ghost Army" to cross the Pas de Calais.   While the struggle for the beaches was hard fought (as is any opposed amphibious landing) most of the German strength was in operational/strategic reserve.

As for airpower, one only has to read accounts of German soldiers and commanders about the debilitating effects of the Allied Air Superiority presented.   German doctrine relied upon massing a mobile, armoured counter-punch in an operational reserve to deliver a counterattack at the right time - read some of Glantz's work on the Eastern Front battles to see how effective this could be if done right (9th Army's defence under Model of the Ryzev Salient is a good example).   It's hard to do this when your armoured forces are forced to travel at night and cannot mass together to be used in a concentrated "punch".   To discount Allied Airpower is foolish.

Finally, to disregard the importance of Canadian Artillery is foolhardy as well.   Canadian gunners were the last remaining vestiges of professionalism from the hard-hitting Canadian Corps of WWI - the rest of the Army had dissolved into Militia circus-acts during the interwar period.   My reading of Normandy left me with the impression that anytime the Germans managed to regain the initiative and either attempt a counter-attack or counter-offensive, the quick and efficient artillery of the Canadians could quickly be poured on to shatter what efforts the Germans could muster.

If Copp is so eager to deny firepower as the key to Canadian (and Allied) success, what does he suppose was the true reason for victory at Normandy?   It certainly wasn't maneuver based at dislocating the enemy with rapid spearheads.   As unimaginative as the Allied bludgeon at Normandy may seem, there was no denying it was decisive and it worked.



> 2. Superior German doctrine and leadership? - In fact, mostly unimaginative and predictable - Canadian platoon commanders could always rely on German counterattack and take advantage of it to inflict heavy casualties - losses the Germans could not afford. German troops were a mixed bag while the Canadian army - inexperienced as they were, had a far better grip on tactics than they have been credited with.



Sure, German troops on a whole were a mixed bag - there were many Static and Garrison units at the Atlantic Wall, and many of these were understrength and recuperating from beatings on the Eastern Front.   Remember, this is June 1944 and much of the cream-of-the-crop of the German Forces has been shattered on the Eastern Front.   As well, as Normandy is raging, the Germans have a bigger problem when Bagration kicks off and an entire *Army Group* is suddenly wiped off the map.   An Army or two in France isn't going to gather attention of the entire Wehrmacht.

As well, remember that the German units that the Canadian's fought were primarily of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, which had two SS Panzer Divisions, the 1st (LSSAH) and the 12 (Hitlerjugend).   I am unsure of how Copp asserts that these formations were full of "unimaginative" and "predictable" leaders.   The 12th SS was formed around a cadre of leaders (Officers and NCO's) from the 1st SS that had years of combat experience on the Eastern Front and this leadership was given a recruit pool of young men who had been indoctrinated for years in a paramilitary organization (HJ).   The 1st SS was about the same.

Sure, the German counter-attack was predictable - it was just as predictable as the synchronized Canadian artillery barrage followed by an Infantry attack backed by tanks.   This synchronized approach by Canadian commanders with little to no real operational talent leads to most histories tagging a good lot of the Canadian generals as "unimaginative" and "predictable".   Warring states will get a good measure on each-others doctrine after a few scrapes and figure it out.   It is how that knowledge is exploited that counts.

My own personal opinion is that after four years of total war, while sustaining huge losses on the Eastern Front and having their country systematically flattened from the West, the fact that the Germans were able to organize a cohesive defence at Normandy that held up for months a superbly equipped Allied Army that had trained for 4 years for the event, and when beaten, managed to pull back in fairly good order and to set up yet another cohesive defence on the Rhine Frontier which demanded more months of bloody fighting, and doing this while facing successive losses and encroachment on the Eastern Front, should allow us to give the German doctrine and leadership a little more credit then Copp seems prepared to give.   See Martin Van Crevald's Fighting Power for more on this.



> 3. Strategic/Tactical Blunders? In fact the Canadians made impressive - and in some cases spectacular - progress against entrenched and determined German forces in their sector and almost closed the Falaise Gap - they failed due to factors beyond their control which had little to do with their military capabilities. Again the destruction of the German Army of the West was absolute, decisive, and accomplished within the space of three months -   a record time by the standards of total war.



Tactically, yes - the Canadians were able to overcome a tenacious German defence.   But inept command was unable to to turn these tough won tactical victories into operational success.   In reading English's survey of Normandy, the record seems to indicate that the initial plan had the Canadian's being primed as the breakout spearhead of the Allied Army Group that was to bring a quick end to Germany.   As a breakout vanished in the teeth of a 2-month German defence, the Canadian formations slowly lost their lustre to the higher commanders for being the "Shock Army" that the WWI Canadian Corps was.   By the time Crerar and 1st Canadian Army showed up, things got even more muddled and the "breakout" was transferred from Monty's Army to Bradley's, who threw Patton into the "Cobra Offensive" after shattering the German's at Mortain.

I'm not seeing "impressive and spectacular" in the fact that, as English points out, Canada's Army moved from being a spearhead of the Allied Army Group to occupying the Left Flank and clearing out Holland.

As well, I don't see how the German Army of the West was "absolutely and decisively" defeated - sure, in terms of the Battle for France.   But the German's succeeded in withdrawing a chunk of their shattered forces from Falaise, moving to the Rhine, and sustaining a cohesive front for another 8 months, inflicting numerous nasty surprises on the Western Allies (Market Garden, Ardennes).   How much pressure were the Allies fortunate to have off of them due to the fact that the Soviets had millions of soldiers battering through the Eastern Front (and their is the ultimate strategic blunder)?



> 4. Superior German weapons? Only to a degree - it turned out that the most lethal weapon in Normandy was the mortar.   The Lee Enfield and the Bren were adequate to the task. German tanks were impressive but flawed, ie hard to maintain engines - and of courses not enough of them.



Yes, only to a degree.   While tactically daunting, many of the famous German tanks (Tiger II, Panther) suffered from serious design problems.   As well, they weren't present in significant enough numbers to have an effect at the operational level.   However, it wasn't so much the quality of the actual weapon systems that mattered, rather it was the way that various systems were incorporated into a cohesive combined arms structure.   The Germans, with their _Kampfgruppen_, were quite effective at this while the Canadians were notorious, especially with regards to Armour/Infantry cooperation, for acting in a "Branch Pure" mindset.



> 5. Correcting the record - Copp reviews regimental war diaries/letters/testimony with a critical eye and finds a lot facts that have not been taken into consideration or simply distorted by other historians or some of the more self-serving memoirs of the participants.



I'm going to have to take a look at Copp's book, because it doesn't sound very convincing.   I think you're right with you initial assessment on "revisionism" - it seems he is eager to blow the "rah, rah Canadian" trumpet and, in an effort to do so, eagerly glosses over realities that have been steadily documented since the end of the War up to English's latest coverage of the battle.

Honestly, should we have expected a dramatic and decisive victory for the Canadians?   They were green units, with most of the formations having never actually been in combat.   They were thrown up against a foe that dedicated to the battle a reformed core of Armoured formations that had years of experience in fighting on the Eastern Front.   Our operational level commanders were immature in the art of command due to a combination of the neglect that the military faced in the interwar years and the Militia politics that was the centrepiece of Army activity during peacetime.   These are all documented - English spends the entire first half of his book looking at the lead up to the campaign in an effort to point out the sources of our operationally poor showing.

If anything, this should be a testament to the average Canadian soldier and the junior commanders who led them into fire.   Despite bungling Generals, doctrine unsuited for combined arms maneuver operations, and little real experience they were able to dig in their heels and go toe-to-toe with a tenacious German defence.   Our soldiers were determined and persistent and, in the end, triumphed.   It is the soldiers who won Normandy for us, not the Generals.   The problem is that when the Generals aren't helping to win the victories, the soldiers pay in unneeded blood.   There is no dishonour in pointing out the blemishes of our nations performance at Normandy.   If anything, it is important as a "lessons learned" exercise so that in the future, we will be prepared and we won't force the soldier to bear an unequal burden of the battle in order to achieve victory.


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## mdh (9 Feb 2005)

Hi Infanteer,

Impressive list of counterpoints - I read the book well over a year ago, and I have to say that prior to its publication I would have made almost the identical arguments you did. IIRC Copp addresses almost all these issues - on some he makes a compelling case - others are less compelling. And yes he does take aim at John English's work - along with several others including popular historians like Max Hasting's whose work (Das Reich and Overlord) have perpetuated what he (Copps) would call the status quo interpretation of the campaign and the Canadian role, cheers, mdh


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## Infanteer (9 Feb 2005)

Well its settled then, I'll have to give Copp a gander.


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## Infanteer (15 Feb 2005)

Well, I got the book in the mail today (had a few Chapters gift cards burning a hole in my pocket).  Looks fairly well done.  Maybe I'll read it along side English again and compare the two, since they seem to aim for the opposite thesis.


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## mdh (16 Feb 2005)

Look forward to the critique, cheers, mdh


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## Brad Sallows (16 Feb 2005)

The German "cohesive defence" lasted from 6 June to 27 July - a little under two months.  The Allied Armies had certainly not trained for the event for 4 years; much else happened between June 1940 and June 1944 and a number of the divisions in Normandy spent time elsewhere.  The Germans were defending on ground they'd known for four years with the advantage of flanks secure on coastlines.  I can't bring myself to describe the subsequent rout as "pull back in fairly good order", after which the Allied armies were stopped by their own logistical limitations, not German strength or fighting prowess.


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## Infanteer (16 Feb 2005)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> The German "cohesive defence" lasted from 6 June to 27 July - a little under two months.



VE Day - May 8, 1945.



> The Allied Armies had certainly not trained for the event for 4 years; much else happened between June 1940 and June 1944 and a number of the divisions in Normandy spent time elsewhere.



I think I referred to the Canadians in particular (which Copp's book focusing on) - if I didn't that was my fault.   I was making reference to the Canadian units of II Canadian Corps which had no fighting experience to that date (short of the disaster at Dieppe).   I Corps, the "D-Day Dodgers" were still fighting tough battle in Italy.



> The Germans were defending on ground they'd known for four years with the advantage of flanks secure on coastlines.   I can't bring myself to describe the subsequent rout as "pull back in fairly good order", after which the Allied armies were stopped by their own logistical limitations, not German strength or fighting prowess.



I was referring to "pulled back in fairly good order" in a strategic sense.   After losing at the Low Countries, despite having the Maginot Line and the Sea as flanks, the Allies were completely exhausted and could not offer up any real resistance besides retreat to the British Isles.   I look at this and hold it up to the fact that the Germans where just as decisively defeated (although not destroyed) at Normandy, but were able to secure a defence upon the Rhine, repel numerous attempt to pierce it (Hurtgen Forest, Market Garden) and were even "cohesive" enough to organize and launch a large scale counter-attack both in the West (which had no chance in hell of doing anything - but the fact that the capability was still there indicates something) and in the East (in a smaller scale to relieve Vienna and Budapest) - all the while fighting with most of their Forces on the Eastern Front.

As Van Crevald points out (and which Copp guns for in the first Chapter of his book):

_"the German Army compensated by developing a high degree of fighting power that enabled it, even though actually inferior in numbers of both men and machines, to defeat France in six weeks, though four months were required for a crushingly superior Allied Force to drive it out again.   In Russia a strongly outnumbered Wehrmacht needed only five months to reach the gates of Moscow; to drive it back to its starting line took an (by then immeasurably superior) opponent fully two-and-a-half years....

For here the historian is confronted with an army that, depending on the particular front and category of arms one cares to select, was outnumbered three, five, even seven to one.   Yet it did not run.   It did not disintergrate.   It did not frag its officers.   Instead, it doggedly fought on.   It fought on even though Hitler's war was never at any time really popular in Germany.   It fought on even though its homeland was being bombed to smithereens behind its back.   It fought on even though many of its generals - and numerous subsequent historians as well - regarded its commander in chief as little better than a raving lunatic....Yet for all this, its units, even when down to 20 percent of their original size, continued to exist and resist - an unrivalled achievement for any army."

Martin Van Crevald, Fighting Power; pg 5_

Although this may seem to put things in more of a glowing light than I would care for, it does raise some salient points.   I believe that any advantages that German organization had when it battled its opponents was directly based on its Interwar approach to professionalism.   Whereas France resigned itself to a doctrine of complacency, Britain went back to a "Strategic Empire" mindset, Canada dithered with Militia politics, and the US reverted to complete isolationism (and its traditional penchant for obliterating its wartime armed forces), and Russia wrestled with internal strife, the Germans under Seekt were actively furthering the professional capabilities of the German Forces (despite the constrictions of Versailles).   While Hart and Fuller were marginalized, Maginot was the buzz, and Tukachevski was purged and executed Guderian and crew were putting their concepts to work, even if in the form of cardboard tanks and other half-measures.

This isn't some mythical property of the Germans, and I don't doubt that any nation could achieve a high degree of "Fighting Power" if they properly prepared for it.   The German's of 1944 were still exhibiting the effects of this Interwar Investment, and I believe that the Allies were reaping the harvest of refusing to keep up.   This is as relevent today in our current defence debate as it was then - building and planning around a structure that will not exist in Wartime means one has to build from scratch under fire - an expensive proposition in both blood and energy.

On a side note, this argument seems to be focussing around what happened After the Battle of Normandy - since we all agree on the fact that it was a decisive defeat for the Germans.   The other book I got in the mail with Copp was Max Hastings' Armageddon: The Battle For Germany, 1944-1945 (Hastings is another author that Copp guns for in his book).   Perhaps I'll read it along with Copp and see if there are any links. 

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Feb 2005)

The Canadian divisions did indeed train for four years, though English may have been correct in his assessment of that "training".   Actually, 3rd Div arrived in the UK in 1941, and the 2nd in August 1940.   4th Div arrived in UK in 1942, but was mobilized as early as May 1940, originally as an infantry division.

Montgomery also took a dim view of Canadian "training" in the UK - too much emphasis on battle drill, not enough on the phases of war - attack, defend, obstacle passage, relief in place, etc.

The German retreat after August 1944 was not really good order - as Brad points out, if the Allies had pursued north of Antwerp during the critical month of September instead of beating their heads against the Channel Ports (which they never managed to take), there would have been no way the Scheldt (south Beveland and Breskens) could have held out the way it did in October.

I disagree the Allies were hamstrung by ill preparedness.  Their artillery doctrine was the best in the world by 1944, and their equipment more than equal to the task of pushing back a beaten army.  They simply failed to plan correctly for the enormous wastage of infantry, and possibly failed to better co-ordinate heavy bomber support (the last is arguable).  But, because no one had fought a war like the Second World War before, we can probably forgive them for basing their reinforcement estimates on North African desert experience.


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## Infanteer (16 Feb 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Montgomery also took a dim view of Canadian "training" in the UK - too much emphasis on battle drill, not enough on the phases of war - attack, defend, obstacle passage, relief in place, etc.



Alot of the opinion of Montgomery's views seem to rotate around whether one views Monty as an excellent commander or a twit.   I haven't seen many historical commanders with such an ongoing controversy on performance like him.



> The German retreat after August 1944 was not really good order - as Brad points out, if the Allies had pursued north of Antwerp during the critical month of September instead of beating their heads against the Channel Ports (which they never managed to take), there would have been no way the Scheldt (south Beveland and Breskens) could have held out the way it did in October.



So German incompetence in getting pinned in Normandy was offset by Allied incompetence to exploit the opportunity.   Although this statement risks devolving into a useless "What If?" game, I think that the fact that the Germans were able to recover from a decisive victory and the Allies were unable to really exploit should account for something.



> I disagree the Allies were hamstrung by ill preparedness.   Their artillery doctrine was the best in the world by 1944, and their equipment more than equal to the task of pushing back a beaten army.   They simply failed to plan correctly for the enormous wastage of infantry, and possibly failed to better co-ordinate heavy bomber support (the last is arguable).   But, because no one had fought a war like the Second World War before, we can probably forgive them for basing their reinforcement estimates on North African desert experience.



Well, artillery (or bombers) don't win wars - and the usual criticism seems to focus on the fact that operationally and up, the Allies would give into the tactic of "enormous wastage" of infantry against a numerically inferior foe - to me, "wasting lives" (which today would be you and me) spells out that one has surrendered "out-thinking" the enemy and is somewhat tacitly admitting inferiority in professional capability (Van Crevald looks at the way manpower is managed to bolster his claim of "Fighting Power").   If this is truly the case, then I think there is good grounds for the criticism, such as English's book, on the approach that operatonal level leadership took in Normandy (or in any other battle).


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Alot of the opinion of Montgomery's views seem to rotate around whether one views Monty as an excellent commander or a twit.   I haven't seen many historical commanders with such an ongoing controversy on performance like him.



Rubbish.   His strengths were as a trainer of troops - his competency at command is irrelevant.



> So German incompetence in getting pinned in Normandy was offset by Allied incompetence to exploit the opportunity.   Although this statement risks devolving into a useless "What If?" game, I think that the fact that the Germans were able to recover from a decisive victory and the Allies were unable to really exploit should account for something.



What were we talking about again?   I think this is exactly what I was saying.



> Well, artillery (or bombers) don't win wars



What percentage of casualties in wW II was inflicted by artillery?   I think you may be wrong here.   Artillery was crucial in Normandy - you've read Blackburn, I hope. 



> - and the usual criticism seems to focus on the fact that operationally and up, the Allies would give into the tactic of "enormous wastage" of infantry against a numerically inferior foe -



Rubbish again.   I said no such thing.   What I said was that what infantry casualties WERE suffered were not anticipated - mostly because there was no way to do so.   Casualty rates were in excess even of WW I infantry battle wastage, much less the western desert.



> to me, "wasting lives" (which today would be you and me) spells out that one has surrendered "out-thinking" the enemy and is somewhat tacitly admitting inferiority in professional capability (Van Crevald looks at the way manpower is managed to bolster his claim of "Fighting Power").   If this is truly the case, then I think there is good grounds for the criticism, such as English's book, on the approach that operatonal level leadership took in Normandy (or in any other battle).



War is a costly business.   To make an omelette you have to break some eggs.   Insert your own cliche here....the Canadian Army wasn't brilliant in Normandy , nor were they completely poor.   My point is that we can excuse them for how bad they were without laying the blame at interwar unpreparedness, as you attempted to do.   It isn't remotely true.   What could the Black Watch have done, or done differently, in 1935 to prevent the debacle at Verrierres Ridge in July 1944?  If you can't answer that, you have no case.


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## Brad Sallows (16 Feb 2005)

>VE Day - May 8, 1945.

Copp's book is about the fighting in Normandy, and I figured since you took note of the hiatus between the Normandy defence and the West Wall defence you would acknowledge the collapse in the west for what it was.

>I was making reference to the Canadian units of II Canadian Corps

Most of the elements which were subsequently part of the Canadian corps and army in northwest Europe were still in a defensive posture in Britain through the winter of '42-'43 and had only started to develop and participate in training schemes to prepare for campaigns on the continent from summer '42 onward.  There was ample preparation time to be sure, but the 2nd through 5th divisions and other elements such as 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade didn't exactly arrive in Britain formed and start training for invasion in the summer of 1940.

>I was referring to "pulled back in fairly good order" in a strategic sense.

I still can't determine from what evidence you make that characterization. The German forces withdrawing before the Allied landings in southern France were making a good job of it, but the German armies in Normandy effectively ran.  A sizeable prisoner bag was taken post-Falaise - an outcome rarely mentioned alongside the usual boasts about the Allied failure to bag them in the Falaise pocket itself - and the Germans were glad of the breathing space to scratch together new defences.  Had the Allies the means to deliver sufficient fuel to the leading formations, I can not see exactly where the Germans should have stopped them.  There has been plenty of counterfactual discussion about what the Allies might have done differently to squeeze out a few more miles, but I have yet to encounter the suggestion that the Germans were in much of a position to bring influence to bear.  It is clear to me from German descriptions of the situation they had no forces on hand to organize a defence quickly and needed time.

>On a side note, this argument seems to be focussing around what happened After the Battle of Normandy

What is "after"?  In my view, the battle includes the pursuit.  Whatever price the Allies paid to break the German line, the benefits reaped include everything achieved right up until the Allies could no longer sustain the drive.  Monty's concept, to which the Allied high and political command consented, saw the Allies facing a German defence in good order along the Seine at D+90.  In the actual event, at D+90 the German army was on the run with the Allies well past the Seine.  I frankly hold no respect for authors who chastise Allied commanders for slow advances (compared to the intended phase lines and objectives) up to the point of the Falaise battle and then ignore everything after that as if it bore no relation to the campaign.

For the Allies to have done better would have required them to adopt, for at least one course of action, the assumption that the German army in northwest France would break and run for the German border.  Perhaps, in view of the usual German performance through the spring of 1944, the planners can be forgiven for failing to make that rather bold assumption.


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## Infanteer (16 Feb 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Rubbish.   His strengths were as a trainer of troops - his competency at command is irrelevant.



Which I agree with.   I'm only commenting on what I perceive from the general "Monty" debate.



> What were we talking about again?   I think this is exactly what I was saying.



Ok, we agree (I guess)?



> What percentage of casualties in WW II was inflicted by artillery?   I think you may be wrong here.   Artillery was crucial in Normandy - you've read Blackburn, I hope.



If you're going to measure deceive success by an absolute number of casualties, then I believe your taking the wrong approach.   Look at all the dominance that Artillery had when it ruled the field in WWI; what decisiveness did that achieve?   Read the Van Crevald quote again - the reason many people regard German capability is that they maintained "Fighting Power" even when reduced to 50-20% of their original strength - numbers were irrelevant with regards to functional capability.

And no, I've yet to read Blackburn - I've assumed it is more of a memoir, is it not (my mistake if it isn't)?



> Rubbish again.   I said no such thing.   What I said was that what infantry casualties WERE suffered were not anticipated - mostly because there was no way to do so.   Casualty rates were in excess even of WW I infantry battle wastage, much less the western desert.



Is it rubbish?   Should the Allies have tolerated such high casualties by facing an Army that was preoccupied with a massive Russian Offensive, bombed and wasted after 4 years of Total War and that was by 1944, as Copp points out in the book, varied in regards to unit quality?   This is what I'm getting at.   There has to be something beyond "secure flanks and familiar ground" about German organization and experience that contributed to this.



> War is a costly business.   To make an omelette you have to break some eggs.   Insert your own cliche here....



Ok, I'm sure the Generals of WWI were saying the same thing at the Somme.



> the Canadian Army wasn't brilliant in Normandy , nor were they completely poor.   My point is that we can excuse them for how bad they were without laying the blame at interwar unpreparedness, as you attempted to do.   It isn't remotely true.   What could the Black Watch have done, or done differently, in 1935 to prevent the debacle at Verrierres Ridge in July 1944?   If you can't answer that, you have no case.



Again, I think it is all in preparedness.   Since were looking at Verrierres Ridge, going off memory the two problems seemed to a have been a complete lack of inter-arms coordination and an inability to translate operational orders into tactical success (time for orders, coordination).   Reading these problems, I can see the same trends affecting the outcome at Le Mansil Patry, among others.

By failing to prepare in 1935, Canada's unit and formation doctrine and experience was mineralized and unprepared (as Monty's criticism seemed to indicate).   Forgetting all that the Canadian Corps of Currie in WWI had achieved through mastering the combined-arms approach to winning battles, they played Militia politics and let the McNaughton clique basically stagnate any development of all-arms capability (with small exceptions like the Simmonds/Burns debates) at the alter of some sort of Douhet-esque form of "The Guns will always get through".   The Canadian Army that went into Normandy brought this institutional baggage with it, and as a result, Verrierres Ridge, Le Mensil Patry, the failure to exploit Falaise, etc were to come about.

Conversely, the German Army was actively working on its unit and formation level tactical and doctrinal thought (even with an "underground Staff College" to get around Versailles) and maintaining an institutional mindset of "two levels up" and "operational decisiveness".   Reflecting on the success of the WWI _Stossegruppe_ experience, they worked with and refined their inter-arms coordination and developed air power when they were forbidden to have an Air Force.   They ensured that their organizations and their professional culture were fresh and focussed on the battles they were preparing for - the result was the successes of '39, '40, '41, and '42 - and the ability to, in the face of decisive and smashing defeat in the face of overwhelmingly superior forces, maintain the ability to fight for '43, '44, and '45.   As I said, this has to count for something, and I think its roots are in Interwar approaches and preparedness (on a professional, rather then a resource, level).

If anything can be said, it is that Dandourand's "fire-proof house" permitted the Canadians to fight the Germans on the ground of our choosing.   As well, the Germans displayed the usual complete lack of any strategic thought what-so-ever, a trait they seemed to have possessed since Moltke the Elder and Bismarck stepped down.   Strategic blunders like Stalingrad, Kursk, and North Africa are Verrierres Ridge on a grand scale.   However, I feel these strategic shortcomings were not in the realm of military capability but more concerned with the domain of higher order civil-military planning of ways and means which, thankfully for the world, was in the hands of criminals, party hacks,   and ideological twits.


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## Infanteer (16 Feb 2005)

Brad,

Good points on the "post-battle" or "post-Falaise" aspects of the campaign, I will readily admit that the majority of the stuff that I've reviewed is, as you pointed out, more focused on the battle as opposed to the pursuit.   I'm sure a more detailed study of the Western Theater from Falaise to Market Garden will be a good way to round out ideas on the Battle of Normandy (puts that on list of things to do).

Interestingly enough, Hastings has the following to say in his Intro to his book Armageddon, which is a follow on to his first work Overlord:

_"I concluded Overlord:

- The battles in Holland and along the German border so often seem to belong to a different age from those of Normandy that it is startling to reflect that Arnhem was fought less than a month after Falaise; that within weeks of suffering one of the greatest catastrophes of modern history, the Germans found the strength...to prolong the war until May 1945.   If this phenomenon reveals the same staggering qualities in Hitler's armies which had cause the Allies such grief in Normandy, it is also another story. -

The early part of this book is that story.   The starting point was a desire to satisfy my own curiosity about why the German war did not end in 19944, given the Allies' overwhelming superiority.   It is often asserted that in the west they had to overcome a succession of great rivers and difficult natural features to break into Hitler's heartland.   Yet the Germans' 1940 blitzkrieg easily surmounted such obstacles.   In 1944-45, the Allies were masters of armoured and air forces greater than the Nazis ever possessed."

Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945; pp xi-xii_

The book should be interesting.


As well, the logistical hamstring of the pursuit makes sense.   It seems that the Allies were just as poor as the Germans in a strategic sense in supporting operational victory with proper logistics.   I am assuming the comment on "usual German performance in the Spring of 1944" refers to the Eastern Front?

Anyways, I still maintain that adopting the position that the "Allies Landed in 1944 and won the war from there" fails to recognize the fact that a German Army could essentially fist-fight for almost 1 year against Western Allies who were armed with a bat, all the while having one arm and leg being chewed up by the Russian bear and taking a shin-kick in Italy.   This is why I maintain the position that I do (along with many historians) - it doesn't discredit the fact that Allied Forces were strong and capable (especially when they got experienced), only that it underlines that the German Army must have been doing something right to avoid an all out institutional collapse in the face of overwhelming defeat that was witnessed in France and (very nearly) in Britain.

Regardless, I'm going to read the books and see what they have to say.


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## Brad Sallows (16 Feb 2005)

>It seems that the Allies were just as poor as the Germans in a strategic sense in supporting operational victory with proper logistics.  I am assuming the comment on "usual German performance in the Spring of 1944" refers to the Eastern Front?

No, it is my way of stating I don't think the Brits (at least) would have accepted that assumption readily after several years of hard fighting.

I don't believe the Allies were poor logistical planners at the strategic or operational levels.  The German collapse in Normandy was unexpected and the Allies advanced much more rapidly than their plans to rebuild infrastructure anticipated.  It should be obvious that if an intact rail net led directly from intact ports in Britain to and through Normandy the war in the west would have ended much more quickly.  Even despite the obstacle of the Channel, the Allies were dumping sufficient tonnage over the beaches and through the working port facilities they did control at least through September but couldn't move it forward quickly enough.


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## Michael Dorosh (17 Feb 2005)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> The German collapse in Normandy was unexpected and the Allies advanced much more rapidly than their plans to rebuild infrastructure anticipated.  It should be obvious that if an intact rail net led directly from intact ports in Britain to and through Normandy the war in the west would have ended much more quickly.  Even despite the obstacle of the Channel, the Allies were dumping sufficient tonnage over the beaches and through the working port facilities they did control at least through September but couldn't move it forward quickly enough.



The end of the fighting in Normandy was expected to take place on D+90, with an assault crossing of the Seine River.  The crossings were done more peacefully, and in advance of that schedule, which I think is perfect evidence of Brad's statement.

The port at Dieppe was put into operation in September 1944, but the tonnage it was able to process was tiny compared to what Antwerp might have handled that same month had it been cleared.  Again, the success of Allied armies in the field ensured that this didn't happen.  Of course, Dieppe was really not much closer to the front than the Mulberries in Normandy.


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## Infanteer (21 May 2005)

Has anyone actually read the book yet?  I read the Introduction and then got on to other books.  Anyways, I was reminded of this book while reading Donald Graves (another respected author of Canadian Military history) in the CMJ - 


http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol4/no3/book2_e.asp



> Fields Of Fire: The Canadians In Normandy
> (The 1998 Joanne Goodman Lectures)
> by Terry Copp
> Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 344 pages, $40.00
> ...



There is an interesting exchange as Terry Copp and LtCol Roman Jarymowycz respond:

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/vol5/no1/letter1_e.asp

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/vol5/no1/letter2_e.asp

To which Graves also responds:

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/vol5/no2/Letter1_e.asp


\


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## Michael Dorosh (21 May 2005)

I just got a copy of Graves' latest book, the history of the SALH - what a magnificent work it is.  I will put up a full review on my website in the next week or two.  

As for the very interesting discussion you link to, Infanteer, I think Copp fails to address a single criticism, and Graves' rebuttal is pat.  Then again, I'm a big Graves fan, and not really one of Copp.


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## Old Sweat (22 May 2005)

Having just recently discovered this thread re Copps's book and having read the debate it provoked on the Canadian army in Normandy, I would like to offer my two cents.  

When considering the Canadian army in the Second World War, one must never loose sight of the fact that it was very much a clone of the British army. Not only did we depend on them for guidance in dress, drill and discipline, but we had marched in lock step in regards to doctrine, equipment organizations and tactics in the years between the wars. Thus, any failure to develop all arms cooperations was not solely the fault of the "McNaughton clique," it flowed directly from the War Office in London. Moreover, as Stacey (not in the official history) observed, there were many in both forces who had not yet accepted that the Canadian army was a separate entity from the British army. 

As for training, Stacey also made the point that the Canadian army trained to British standards and participated on British exercises where it was assessed by British umpires. Furthermore, for the work up to the invasion both the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade were under command of 1 British Corps of Second British Army. Thus, any fault in the direction of these formations training presumably lay with Crocker and Dempsey, the corps and army commanders respectively. 

It had long been my opinion, reinforced by all that I have studied on the campaign, that Canada did not have the poorest army in Normandy. Instead, it had the most honest historian. By the way, this is no way excuses Copp for having equated Stacey's criticisms with the attitude of the CBC towards the Canadian military. 

There are a couple of other points that are moot. General Eberbach, who commanded in turn Panzer Group West, Fifth Panzer Army and Panzergroup Eberbach in Normandy, was critical of the Canadian conduct of operations in that campaign. However, for most of the time in question, First Canadian Army was not yet operational, although Crerar and a portion of his headquarters had been on the ground since mid-June. The Germans had indentified this and assumed that Crerar was commanding the eastern portion of the bridgehead, when this was not the case. Second Canadian Corps did become operational in mid-July with the two D-Day assaulting formations and 2nd Canadian Infantry Division under command, while First Canadian Army did not assume an operational role until 25 July, and then only with 1st British Corps under command. Eberbach, however, was correct in identifying the persistent Canadian tactical fault of attacking with too few troops for the task and for suggesting that Canada had too small a population to develop competent higher commanders without the active patronage of a great power. 

The other point is that Montgomery shuffled the British divisions that had incurred his displeasure to 1st British Corps, which was essentially in a static role. These divisions were the 3rd, 49th and 51st Infantry, which remained relatively static along with 6th Airborne Division, although the 3rd Division was regrouped away in late-July or early-August. Copps did not make this point and in fact, 2nd Canadian Corps was the only formation in First Canadian Army that could actually be used in offensive operations.

IMO Copps had the opportunity to address the mythology of Normandy, but resorted to emotional pleas rather than to reasoned, substantiated arguments.


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## Infanteer (22 May 2005)

Thanks for the input, Old Sweat.

Since it was a part of the original arguement and seems to be the National Meter Stick, what is your opinion on English's The Canadian Army in Normandy?


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## Old Sweat (22 May 2005)

English did an excellent job dissecting the Canadian army. However, where he erred was in failing to take into account the defence policy and accepted role of both the regular force and the militia in the years between the two world wars. One example is regards selection for staff college. He rightly noted that not many cavalry (the armoured corps did not exist at this time) and infantry officers attended the two colleges - one in the UK and the other in Quetta, however he failed to take into account that selection was by means of competitive examination. The army strictly maintained the merit principle, regarding any deviation from it as something that would have led to a massive outcry. In fact, the number of officers selected from each corps was not out of line with their respective slice of the officer corps, with the exception of the signal corps, which sent a disproportionate number.

As well, the officers selected to command the two divisions in the original Defence Scheme Number Three did not come from the pool of recent staff college graduates. Instead, these gentlemen, all of whom had distinguished combat records in the Great War, came from the ranks of senior officers in both the regular and reserve forces. It was not until 1942-1943 that the younger permanent force officers had progressed high enough in rank to start to command brigades and divisions in meaningful numbers. 

English saw a massive gunner plot behind darn near everything that happened. He based part of this on the comments of the then-retired Colonel James Sutherland-Brown, the author of Defence Scheme Number One, the famous plan to invade the United States in the event of war between that country and the British Empire. S-B was outraged that the 11 infantry and five cavalry divisions that existed on paper were reduced to six divisions in total. As many of the redundant infantry regiments were converted to non-divisional artillery, engineers and CSS units, he blamed it all on the Royal Canadian Artillery Association. English took up this argument and ran with it.

Still, his book is required reading as part of any serious study of the Canadian army in the Second World War. Like any good reference, the reader should treat it as a reasoned opinion, not as the final word.


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## dmsdbo (30 Jul 2005)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It had long been my opinion, reinforced by all that I have studied on the campaign, that Canada did not have the poorest army in Normandy. Instead, it had the most honest historian. By the way, this is no way excuses Copp for having equated Stacey's criticisms with the attitude of the CBC towards the Canadian military.



I find this particular remark to be full of truth.   I have found that through reading works on the Canadian Army in the Second World War, our own historians have tended to be far more critical of our performance than any other country heavily engaged in the conflict.   For some countries, these attitudes are vestiges of past political agendas, and some are actively perpetrated to this day.   For example, mainstream historical works on the American actions in Normandy gloss over the bocage combat, where American Infantry Divisions suffered over 100% replacement rates in infantry companies.   I often find the bumbling actions of such units as the 90th Division ignored, or regarded as a holding action before Cobra could begin.   The "Greatest Generation" mentality triumphs over all.

The British are more open about their mistakes, yet they often offer a triumph that is seen to correct this error (ie Fall of France -> Dunkirk; North African Campaign -> El Alamein (2) ).   Of course, the cult of interest on the German Army has reached such a level that many self-professed experts have gone so far as to place many German units on a different "planet" (so to speak) as their opponents, even when defeated by near-parity numbers in weather and conditions where armour and air advantages were limited.

The Soviet war is still so convuluted and misunderstood that even John Erickson couldn't unravel it all.

Canadians can't always look at ourselves as a failure.   I look to John Keegan, a British historian, who often gives the opinion that even when the Canadian upper command failed, company and platoon level officers and the NCOs and privates under their command performed far more effectively than could have been expected by green troops under such conditions.

I also think that those who are disappointed by the fact that Canadians did not become the shock troops of the Allied Advance ala WW1 must be reminded that the Corps' reputation as such only developed after Vimy.   It took several years (longer than 1st Can Army was in combat) before the experience could be gained.   Furthermore, this was partially achieved by attention to combined arms efficiency and intelligence sharing among all soldiers, actions that were unique in the First World War.   By World War 2, these activities were commonplace, and the Canadians were facing an experienced foe which had revolutionized warfare.

Yet isn't it the Canadian way to point out our flaws?   ^-^  In any case, it is better to be critical than overly-forgiving.


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## Old Sweat (31 Jul 2005)

dmsdbo,

Your comments on the quality of our troops at the sub-unit level and below are well taken. There is, in fact, an independent example that supports the premise that our training system worked well. That is the Canloan program. For those not familiar with the term, at the request of the British army, Canada loaned a significant number of junior infantry (and a few RCOC) officers to the British army prior to D Day. A google search will provide a good overview.

This May I attended a battlefield tour/battlefield study of the Rhineland battle conmducted by 2 British Infantry Brigade. I had a dual role - first I delivered presentations/lectures on the ground about the 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade attack on Moyland Wood and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division operation to capture the Hochwald Gap. Second, I acted as a DS for a syndicate t


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## Old Sweat (31 Jul 2005)

Sorry, my mouse got the better of me. Anyway, the syndicates studied the defence of the Hochwald Gap by a British light infantry company reinforced by a troop of tanks. 

Two of the other presenters were British army veterans, one had commanded a company and the other a platoon. They both stated on several occasions during the tour that the Canloan officers made all the difference in their battalions. In their opinion these officers were of a very high standard and reflected very favourably on our country. They also had many nice things to say about the Canadian army in general, but their recollections of occasion after occasion when individual Canloaners came through in battle made an impression on all concerned.

As these officers were drawn from our training system, it seems to me that we were doing something right. I wish I had throught of the Canloan program when I was writing No Holding Back. I will be sure to bring the matter up in the sequel.


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## MarkOttawa (11 Nov 2007)

An interesting, and provocative, review of Hasting's _Armageddon_
http://www.amazon.ca/Armageddon-Germany-1944-1945-Max-Hastings/dp/0375714227/ref=sr_1_1/701-3535795-9036326?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194804304&sr=1-1

by David Frum:
http://frum.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NGRkNzE3MGE1YWVlZGZmYTE5ZGJhNGRlOWJlYTZiZTY=

Mark
Ottawa


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