# Fleet Managment: Army plan for pre-positioning eqpt



## bossi (5 Jul 2004)

Ironically, we used to have a "forward base" in Germany which met this purpose for deployments in that direction ... (but, it's been said we can thank ADM Fowler for unnecessarily closing it, and ham-stringing our Army in the process)

*Army plans to stockpile gear at ports*
Equipment overhaul: Move would cut response times for overseas missions
a journalist, CanWest News Service 
Monday, July 05, 2004

OTTAWA - In an effort to better respond to an overseas crisis, the Canadian army will reduce the amount of equipment at its bases and instead stockpile gear and armoured vehicles for up to 2,000 soldiers at ports on the east and possibly west coasts.

As part of a major overhaul of how it handles its equipment, the army is in discussions to locate the equipment stash in Montreal or Halifax and possibly Vancouver. A similar stockpile to train up to 2,000 soldiers will be set up in Wainright, Alta., while enough transport trucks needed to help out in a domestic emergency will be located at installations across the country, such as Canadian Forces Base Petawawa in Ontario and CFB Edmonton in Alberta.

The positioning of equipment at the ports, already prepackaged for shipment, is part of the army's new plan to cut down on the time it takes to reach foreign war zones.

"Our experience, especially over the last five years, is that it's not the soldiers who have the readiness problem," said Col. Mike Kampman, the army's director of strategic planning. "It's the equipment."

Such delays, in everything from painting armoured vehicles to ensuring weapons were operating properly, slowed down the speed with which the army was able to respond to the first mission in Afghanistan, dubbed Operation Apollo, he noted.

Army and navy officers, as well as other defence officials, are in discussions about where the equipment stockpile should be located. The navy is keen on Halifax because of the easy access to its vessels.

The army is interested in Montreal because of its rail links and port facilities. But a potential drawback with that location is the need for icebreakers in the winter to open up the waterways so transport ships can get to the army supplies, Col. Kampman acknowledged.

The navy has also raised the possibility of putting a stockpile in Vancouver to deal with operations in the Pacific region, he said. "If an East Timor mission comes up again, you would like to project out of Vancouver as opposed to projecting out of Halifax or Montreal," Col. Kampman said.

If needed, warehouses could be leased to store the gear. Security arrangements would also have to be made for the storage depots.

Whatever the decision about the location of the stockpile, the equipment should be in place by late next year in time for the Canadian military to assume its duties as a NATO quick response force.

In addition, a stockpile of similar equipment will be sent to Canadian Forces Base Wainright so it could be used at a high-tech training centre being built there. Soldiers would train on that gear, identical to the equipment they would use overseas, and then ship out for their mission.

The stockpiling plan means equipment at bases across the country will be reduced somewhat.

One hurdle to get over is the expected resistance from troops to using or trusting equipment and vehicles that are not located right in their units. "There's this kind of mindset in the army that your unit owns the vehicle," Col. Kampman explained.

One way around that is to ensure the stockpiled vehicles and gear are in top shape and ready for action overseas. "We've got to build that trust and the only way you can do that is to focus maintenance resources on those stocks, to make sure they're ready to go when they need them," Col. Kampman said.

The army will also ensure that there are enough vehicles, mainly trucks, located at every base in the country to handle a domestic emergency. While armoured vehicles are not seen as being required in most situations, there would be the need for transport equipment to handle everything from moving medical supplies to the evacuation of communities in the event of an ice storm or large-scale forest fire.

Col. Kampman noted in many cases, the army does not need specialized military transport to deal with a domestic emergency. That job could be handled by commercial trucks that could be purchased by the army.

(Ottawa Citizen)


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## Bruce Monkhouse (5 Jul 2004)

This sounds like a cluster-[you know] waiting to happen.
Lets see I sign for my Artillery piece in Buttland and hope the *keeners* who scored the storing job actually test fired it in ???Vancouver/Halifax???.


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## Armymedic (5 Jul 2004)

I like the plan to have prepositioned stores, as it is the only way to ensure the rapid reaction capability of any force. 82 nd Airborne has a complete brigade on perm standby ready for airborne deployment. Here are a couple things I would do instead...

Adequately kit out the training center in Wainwright, but continue with 1/3 or 1/2 strength of vehicles for training at the brigades, not a complete removal of all armoured/cbt vehicles away from the brigades. My reasoning is that only working on those same vehicle can you get good and really know the quirks of each veh type. Particularly useful for the actual drvivers and veh techs...

Preposition the one brigade worth of vehicle in a central location with adequate amount of railcars for complete immediate transport somewhere in Western ON, or Man (Shilo comes to mind). This allows a larger albiet cheaper storage area then Longe Point. Problem then is the 2-3 day rail transit to get those veh to port, and pers to load, unload the train and load the ships. But then that will guarentee servicablity of the vehs onto the ship.

In this way the military still only has to purchase equipment to fill the 4 reg force brigades (1 stand by, 1 Wainwright, and 2 split amoungst the 3 brigades, and Gagetown.)


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## ags281 (5 Jul 2004)

bossi said:
			
		

> *Army plans to stockpile gear at ports*
> Equipment overhaul: Move would cut response times for overseas missions
> a journalist, CanWest News Service
> Monday, July 05, 2004
> ...



I can think of something else ironic here. Anybody else notice that they're talking about leasing warehouses in Vancouver? Let's see... if Chilliwack were still around, they could have had equipment stored in Vancouver without leasing, plus security would also be "free" as it would be covered by already existing base security.

Additionally, the equipment would be available for training the people on the base. Any force wanted on standby for deployment could have been posted to Chilliwack and actually be training on the exact same equipment that they would deploy with. 

Sadly, this all would have made too much sense. Aparently a warehouse is more desirable than a functional base. I can see it now: 

_"OTTAWA - In an effort to cut costs and response times, DND has announced that all equipment will be placed in warehouses. This will allow all bases to be closed at significant savings to the department, while creating a large pool of equipment to be permanently available for rapid deployment. A block of office towers will be leased in Ottawa's downtown core to house all the displaced administrative staff. This deployment strategy will also be applied to members of the combat trades, who will also be on standby for rapid deployment by being "stockpiled" in hotels beside the warehouses."_   :

Ok, so I'm just ranting, but hopefully someone can take this plan for equipment on the West Coast, compare the practicality to if we actually still had a base there, make a very thick and heavy report out of the findings, then use said report to smack each and every Liberal MP who was in parliament when Chilliwack was closed repeatedly upside the head. (Anyone care to guess where I weigh in on the closing of CFB Chilliwack discussion?   ;D)


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## McG (5 Jul 2004)

Sadly, this is not new information.   It is being called "fleet management."   A battalion can expect to keep enough equipment for a Coy and everyone will have to share it.   Annually, the brigade going into high readiness will go to Wainwright and exercise at the battalion and brigade levels.   

ags281,
We do have a base on the West coast.   CFB Esquimalt is even closer to the water that Chilliwack was.   Nobody will be allowed to use the operational stocks (it would reduce readiness).   Every now and again, a tech will go run things up, drive them around, and operate all parts to ensure they still work and to keep the seals wet.   That will be it.

I don't think this is the right way to go, but our government is not about to buy enough equipment for everyone to be at 100% for training, provide vehicles for the CMTC, and fill operational stocks.


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## Kirkhill (6 Jul 2004)

Reference the discussion on prepositioning in Vancouver/Esquimalt -  isn't there some concern out here about earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, that kind of thing?

How does that square with prepositioning out here?  Chilliwack might beat the tsunamis, it would be a toss-up on the earthquakes but a real bugger in the event Mt. Baker blows.

Or maybe we don't really need to worry about that stuff.


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## Bert (6 Jul 2004)

I think the idea has great merit and I'm surprised it has not been active.

Theres nothing worse than a unit given orders for a quick deployment, running around scrounging
for equipment, loading onto transport, getting over to the location, off-loading and setting all
the stuff up.  In scenarios with little planning, the cluster f**** happens with lost time, efficiency,
gear you wished you had brought, replacements, and parts management.  

With deployable equipment packages, the packing, transport, and parts management is built in
and it saves so much time especially in the last days of preparation and the first few days or weeks
of deployment.


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## Ian_M (6 Jul 2004)

I do know that I am new here, but I am rather confused with this idea.

Prepositioning stocks, wouldn't it just be easier to keep them with the brigades? Or detach battalion sized groups to the west and east coast with all of their equipment, using LFQA instead of LFAA for the east coast (Since the only LFAA regular infantry battalion is 2RCR right now). Plus, with this new maneuver center at Wainwright, aren't we looking at all of a Brigade's assets being siphoned off, either to readiness stocks or to Wainwright, where I'm sure since multiple units being trained up will make considerable use of the equipment all year round, causing more wear and tear.

So, will the government buy more equipment, say trucks for example for domestic emergencies, or will it remain at the current levels and just deploy them in smaller numbers everwhere? I'm sure with the current empasis on domestic operations, that more soft skinned vehicles and trucks are desirable to hold in reserve than heavy armored vehicles. Here's a question though, what happens if somthing bad happens in Ontario, rather far from the west coast and east coast (well not so far from the east) What does Ottawa plan on then, will the use equipment at the training center in Wainwright? Or willl the CMBG in ontario be called in at reduced strength of equipment?


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## Lance Wiebe (6 Jul 2004)

This is one of the worst cr*p I have ever heard.

How sad.

All of our equipment will be either stockpiled, overseas, or in Wainwright.  No armoured vehicles at the units, as the article says, commercial vehicles can be used to move troops in Canada.

So now, we can entice troops to join, and then sit around playing pepper or euchre, because they'll have no equipment to work on or train on.

Deployments will mean two trips to Wainwright first, the first time to take equipment refresher training on vehicles, weapon stations, and comms.  The second time for your deployment training.

Canada does not have enough equipment to do as the US does.  The 3ID may use deployed equipment, but they also have equipment at their home base.

This should sound as a warning to all the way the government is heading.  First, delay expansion of the reserves.  Then place most of our equipment in storage.  Already we have Leopard tanks and CF-18's in "storage", where they are unusable.

Oh man, to have the reins of power for just a couple of years, most of those in NDHQ would be out looking for a new line of work.  Because they are truly incompetent as leaders of our Armed Forces......


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## Armymedic (6 Jul 2004)

Good Idea Lance,
Didn't the Col. heading up the project wear the same capbadge as you?   ;D

I concur on your point about the troops having little else to do, but play cards. I also believe that an "in case of emegerncy, break glass" military will negate us from being one of the most professional, to just average. Its all to conserve the mighty dollar.


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## Lance Wiebe (6 Jul 2004)

Ack!

Don't tell everyone that Kampman was RCD!

Say........

How did you know?


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## Scoobie Newbie (6 Jul 2004)

Hate to tell ya this but for the most part they are playing cards.


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## jrhume (6 Jul 2004)

I suspect that this 'forward deployment' of equipment requires a bigger army than Canada has.   I also imagine that the stored equipment has to be carefully maintained.   The logistics possibilities boggle my mind.   

What's the likelihood that this pre-positioned gear will really be closer to the next place Canadian troops have to deploy?   And what's the difference between carrying gear 8,000 miles as opposed to carrying it 4,000?   If the equipment is airmobile, the difference ought to be minimal.   For ship borne stuff, the time saved could be critical.   Do you have ships?

This sounds to me like one more step in the emasculation of the CF.   The Liberals want to have a 'stealth' military -- one tucked away in storage   -- not out running around shooting nasty guns and wasting precious natural resources.

Don't get me wrong -- pre-positioned equipment is useful.   I just think that the Canadian government is more interested in gradually eliminating the CF than any possible increase in efficiency.   Hope I'm wrong.


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## McG (6 Jul 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> All of our equipment will be either stockpiled, overseas, or in Wainwright.  No armoured vehicles at the units, as the article says, commercial vehicles can be used to move troops in Canada.


No.  Only most of our equipment will be in WATC or Op Stock.  There will be enough kit in each unit for a sub-unit to deploy to the field.



			
				Old Guy said:
			
		

> What's the likelihood that this pre-positioned gear will really be closer to the next place Canadian troops have to deploy?  And what's the difference between carrying gear 8,000 miles as opposed to carrying it 4,000?  If the equipment is airmobile, the difference ought to be minimal.  For ship borne stuff, the time saved could be critical.  Do you have ships?


We do not have ships, but we do not have planes to move the kit either.  It will be moved by chartered civilian ships.



			
				Old Guy said:
			
		

> I suspect that this 'forward deployment' of equipment requires a bigger army than Canada has.  I also imagine that the stored equipment has to be carefully maintained.  The logistics possibilities boggle my mind.


Mechanics will be stripped from units that no longer have as much equipment.  Very soon a large number in the EME world will get posting messages that say â Å“Wainwrightâ ?.


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## Lance Wiebe (6 Jul 2004)

I wish that the plan called for a subunit to deploy to the field.  I hear that the plan is to keep 15 of each of the LAV III or Coyote at each Base.

While in theory, it would be enough to send a subunit to the field, in practice, with maintenance issues, the abnormal wear and tear that these vehicles would incur, would all mean that maybe a platoon/troop would make it past range control.

The plan sux.  There is no way around it, no matter what spin is put on it.


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## McG (6 Jul 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> The plan sux.  There is no way around it, no matter what spin is put on it.


I cannot argue with that.

The new priorety for the Army is the collective training on a scale that we have not seen since the Cold War.  Even if we do not have Op Stock sitting at ports, whole fleet management is the only way that CMTC can work.  As it is, most units are short vehicles because those vehicles are overseas.

I think we need the training opportunity that the CMTC will allow for, but I do not know that units will be able to arrive in Wainwright, after almost three years on minimal equipment, ready to train at that level.


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## Yard Ape (14 Jul 2004)

McG said:
			
		

> I think we need the training opportunity that the CMTC will allow for, but I do not know that units will be able to arrive in Wainwright, after almost three years on minimal equipment, ready to train at that level.


It will not work.   Units will not be able to train enough LAV drivers, gunners, or crew commanders in the first two years of ATOF.   Those who are trained will suffer the worst skill fade this country has ever seen.   The same can be said of the Coyote Recce suite.  You can bet that everyone will have to re-learn how to use the radios.   

Blah! :evil:


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## Scoobie Newbie (14 Jul 2004)

I think they are hoping that the simulators make up for it.


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## Infanteer (14 Jul 2004)

> I think they are hoping that the simulators make up for it.



Hopefully our next enemy decides to simulate hostile fire for us....


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## Scoobie Newbie (14 Jul 2004)

don't be shooting the hypothetical thinking messenger.


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## Infanteer (14 Jul 2004)

I'm not.   Simulators, MILES, ATS Range, and TEWTs  can offer much in terms of quality training to our soldiers and leaders.   My remark was a tongue-in-cheek caution that relying on these in lieu of live fire training in order to save money could be a bad choice that puts me and you in a body bag.


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## Yard Ape (14 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> I think they are hoping that the simulators make up for it.


In the case of a LAV-25 turret, you need the vehicle to run the simulator.  Even here simulation has no alternative for training under fleet managment.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (16 Jul 2004)

I personally like the idea but there are a couple of caveats:

1)  We need to have enough gear to spare so that it does not interfere with training.
2)  We need to use the US tried-and-true model of fixed units and could no longer deploy "mix-and-match" groups.
3)  We need the sealift ready to move it on short notice otherwise the whole exercise is a waste of time.

JMHO,



Matthew.


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## Yard Ape (18 Jul 2004)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> 1)   We need to have enough gear to spare so that it does not interfere with training.


If we had that much equipment, there would be no need for this fleet managment plan.


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## Kirkhill (3 Jan 2005)

> Eventually the Army will have a suite of kit for a battlegroup pre-positioned at Longue Pointe depot in Montreal, our primary SPOE (Sea Port of Embarkation)



pbi, is this in anticipation of Global Warming or are we only anticipating expeditions after the ice goes out?

Why not Halifax (Shearwater) as a staging ground?


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## George Wallace (3 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> pbi, is this in anticipation of Global Warming or are we only anticipating expeditions after the ice goes out?
> 
> Why not Halifax (Shearwater) as a staging ground?



Facilities exist at Longue Point.   They do no exist at Halifax or Shearwater.   Nor do they exist in Vancouver or Esquimault.   


Gw


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## Kirkhill (3 Jan 2005)

Gotcha George, thanks.

Though I am still left wondering if the facilities wouldn't be better placed at Shearwater, or Esquimalt (especially given an Asian/Mideast orientation).


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## Inch (3 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Gotcha George, thanks.
> 
> Though I am still left wondering if the facilities wouldn't be better placed at Shearwater, or Esquimalt (especially given an Asian/Mideast orientation).



Not to mention the fact that neither Esquimalt nor Halifax freeze in the winter. There's lots of ground here in Shearwater with quick access to the harbour, there's even a jetty just down the hill on the Shearwater side of the harbour. Once we get the MHP buildings under way, that'll open up old hangars, even if it's a temporary measure until more permanent facilities can be built.


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## pbi (3 Jan 2005)

I have often wondered the same thing, having taken part in a few deployments/redeployments over the years in which we were "racing the ice" at Montreal with our cargo vessels. I understand that the facilities exist at Montreal, but do major port facilities not also exist at Halifax and Vancouver (rhetorical question)? I agree with the idea that we need to think more about a Pacific regional deployment, and that maybe we should have dedicated (or leased) facilities there. Further, I have heard that the location of CFB Gagetown was chosen back in the 1950s partly because it was not too far from the port of St John, but was connected by rail links to the rest of Canada. However, to the best of my knowledge we have never staged out of St Johns so perhaps this  concept was never really applied. Cheers.


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## George Wallace (4 Jan 2005)

I tend to agree that the ice free ports of Halifax and St John are probably a better choice, but so far most of the deployments have been from Petawawa.   Facilities would have to be built in both these cities and those in the West to house pre-positioned equipment.   Currently they exist at Long Point, and Petawawa is a short road/rail move.   I am currently against any such plan to pre-position equipment in Long Point or anywhere in the country along with the movement of equipment to Wainwright without a major equipment purchase.   It necessitates the robbing of all three Bdes to fill these two agendas and valuable training and maintenance is being lost.   

From previous experience, the rotation of War Reserve Stock has been very maintenance heavy.   Equipment coming out of War Stock was usually in a very sad state of repair, necessitating many man hours to get it operational.   

A Ready Bde Gp in Gagetown would be a more favourable option in my opinion.   Build up the waterfront and Airport in St John and it would probably work.

GW


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## pbi (4 Jan 2005)

> I tend to agree that the ice free ports of Halifax and St John are probably a better choice, but so far most of the deployments have been from Petawawa



But what about the deployments out of 1 CMBG and 5ieme GBC? Surely these were not staged out of Petawawa? I have deployed a few times from 1 CMBG and can never recall having anything to do with Pet on any of them. Cheers.


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## George Wallace (4 Jan 2005)

Sorry......Should have specified "equipment".........I know it is being shuffled around a lot.....We sent stuff off to Afghanistan, then more to 5 Bde so they could train to replace us........and then we had none....... 

GW


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## KevinB (4 Jan 2005)

I guess no one at NDHQ studied what happend to the majority of the stuff they shipped the Israelis prior to some of their 60-70 fracas's.
 The artillery was toast - the seals and other stuff in the recupirator/recoil system where dried out.  Tracks where seized and engine pooched.

 Now how are we hiring to maintain this stuff?

and my biggest pet peeve with CMTC - Wainwright is SMALL...  You cant even have a decent mech BN ex there...
Let alone LIVE FIRE a 25mm on a battle run


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## pbi (4 Jan 2005)

I have to agree with Kevin B here, through years of bitter experience. "Everybody's truck" is "nobody's truck". A couple of examples are:

1 PPCLI AVGP Fleet: Left standing uncovered for months and months while the battalions went overseas, went on block leave, or did non-AVGP things, these vehicles suffered dried and cracked seals, gaskets and weatherstripping, occluded optics and extensive weathering. Left out in the cold, in their later years they frequently would not start in the winter. And, mind you, these were vehicles that were assigned to companies, in a battalion with a dedicated Maint Pl;   and

Horror Tales of Kit Tasked To Other Units/Bdes: It was SOP to get this stuff back in shyte order, with 5ieme GBC being the worst offender, IMHO. I can remember when I was OC Admin 1 PP we got stuff   back from 2PP that was in such wretched shape that we took photos and sent them to Bde. (Of course, I'm quite sure that 2PP got its own share of junk, too);

I understand what we are trying to achieve in WFM, but I wonder what the results will be. Also, how do you teach a soldier to take pride in, and care of, kit he nevers even sees for most of the year? My suggestion would be:

a) a beastly big maint/QM org at CMTC, like a USARNG MATES;

b) hideous and exemplary punishment for "dumping and running", including but not limited to rtn the unit to CMTC or disciplinary action against CO and officers responsible; and

c) instilling in all ranks the need to take care of all gear, all the time, regardless of who gave it to you or for what.

Without these things, or something with similar effect, I think that I know all too well what will be the eventual fate of the WFM fleets. Cheers.


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## George Wallace (4 Jan 2005)

Pbi

Exactly!

GW


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## ArmyRick (4 Jan 2005)

pbi, In ref to 2 VP (my old stompin grounds) with shyte kit, are refering to the 2 times we borrowed Grizzlies in the 90s (since we were M113 at the time) in preparation for our tours?


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## pbi (4 Jan 2005)

I can't recall the exact reason now, and I only recall lending them once to 2PP, but that sounds like it could have been a good reason. Cheers.


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## Bartok5 (4 Jan 2005)

Those here who have "nay sayed" pretty much have it right.  To get the entire picture of just how dire our situation is however, you have to couple "Whole Fleet Management" with the "Managed Readiness Cycle".  See my post in the "Is ATOF Broken" thread for a bit of insight.

The bottom line is that we as an institution have finally reached a point of "damage control" absurdity where the "bean counters" are now running the ship.  It is tantamount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.....

The "bean counters" are now controlling how we will deploy, AND how we distribute the kit.  The former is an utter recipe for disaster.  The latter simply ensures that those who deploy will not have had the requisite "hands-on" training to avoid the debacle.

One can only hope that this is the bottom of the "cycle" with an upswing to follow.  If not, I seriously fear for the institution - at least as I know it.  When the "numbers men" are permitted to run all critical aspects of the ship, you just know that you are in a world of hurt......


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## PPCLI Guy (2 Mar 2005)

Good thread - surprised that I missed it.

In the absence of any new kit (LAVs etc) do any of the "nay sayers" have a counter proposal?

Dave


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## jmacleod (2 Mar 2005)

The Fleet Management Plan was put forward by the new CDS, General Hillier. Bossi is right, the
Canadian Army was well positioned with an excellent FMP in Germany until ADM Fowler (of Somalia
intrigue) came on the scene. My company proposed an Unsolicted Proposal (USP) to DND and
PW&GSC to position the facility at CFB Gagetown (not Montreal PQ) with airborne logistical
support from the Frederiction Airport, and shipborne support from Saint John NB - one of our
great deep water ports - not even a reply from DND (a surprise actually) and no political support
from the Liberal MP in Saint John NB - if the plan evolves it will be focused on Montreal and Dorval
which is actually fairly stupid - my rant for today - Regards, MacLeod


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## JasonH (3 Mar 2005)

Not sure if this has been asked but why not build another forword base on allied soil (Like Germany) again?


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## DJL (4 Mar 2005)

How about taking a page out of the Americans book, and instead of basing all this kit in Canadian port cities, put it into a large, climate controlled, RO/RO and have it forward based to either Diego Garica or Guam with a small skeleton crew?


I don't know what the logistic foot print would be for a Army battlegroup.....but The United States has eight ex commercial fast transports, with a dispalcement of about 55k tons each, when combined, these eight ships can carry an entire Armoured Division and war stocks (minus fuel) for 2-4 weeks....armed with that, a report I read that stated the three JSS combined could carry one of our battlegroups and a decent grasp of deduction and basic math, I would think that one (maybe two) large RO/ROs could transport an entire Canadian army battlegroup.

I give you the Watson Class Strategic Sealift Ships 


http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/takr/ 



> T-AKR 310 WATSON CLASS STRATEGIC SEALIFT SHIPS, USA
> The Watson Class Strategic Sealift Ships were built for the US Navy by National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, a subsidiary of General Dynamics. The 950ft RO-RO (roll-on, roll-off) vessels are designed to transport US Army tanks, helicopters and other large items of military equipment to any location. With a beam of 106ft, *the ships are the largest vessels that can fit through the Panama Canal*.
> 
> Following the Gulf War, a mobility requirements study for the United States of America Department of Defense resulted in *$2.4bn being budgeted for an additional 19 sealift ships*. Sealift ships are essential to military forces in the deployment of military cargo in both the prepositioning of forces for deterrence or coercion and also in the surge of military intervention. Responsibility for the US Army, Navy and Air Force sealift operations lies with the Military Sealift Command of the US Navy whose headquarters are based in the Washington Navy Yard. The mission of the Strategic Sealift Ships is the deployment of military cargoes to anywhere in the world. The ships carry the US Navy hull designations: T for Military Sealift Command and AKR for fast sealift ship, followed by the hull number.
> ...



2.4 billion (US) for 19 of them, or about 130 million (US) per ship, which is about a 160 million CDN (I'm not sure how to adjust for inflation from the early 90s), and let's for the sake of argument, price them at about 250 million each.....four of these ships would cost us about 1 billion dollars (CDN), which is just under half the 2.1 billion dollars announced for the cost of the three JSS......with my fingers and toes, that would leave 1.1 billion dollars to purchase AORs for the navy........

Put that in your pipe and smoke it


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## McG (12 Aug 2005)

Gaa!  Looks like WFM teething problems will be having people pull their hair out as we get closer to BTE.  It seems that with all the vehicles VMOed to CMTC, 1 CMBG is finding itself without enough (especially LAV III) to fully kit the PTA & STA.  And, units that are short are still being told to cough-up vehicles.

I'm sure solutions will be found in the short time left.  Just hope that not too much hair loss occurs before those solutions are found.




			
				PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> In the absence of any new kit (LAVs etc) do any of the "nay sayers" have a counter proposal?


I would have used the AVGP fleet to build the CMTC OPFOR.  This would not eliminate WFM, but it would reduce the number of LAV III & Bison that had to be stripped from operational units.  One could even put Stromia in AVGP and Tartan in M113A3.


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## Scoobie Newbie (12 Aug 2005)

"It seems that with all the vehicles VMOed to CMTC, 1 CMBG is finding itself without enough"

This lowly Cpl could have told anyone listening that.  I say that writing on the wall the day they striped our coy's LAV's.


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## McG (13 Aug 2005)

CFL said:
			
		

> This lowly Cpl could have told anyone listening that.


There is a big trg fleet of LAV III sitting in Wainwright.  If some of those vehicles would be made available for training, this might be resolved.


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