# Short-service Army



## canuck101

I just read a interesting article in the Ottawa Citizen talking about short service terms.  The article is written by a journalist who talked to John English a retired Lt. Col who spent 37 years in the military.  To summarize the article he says that we should move all the generals into the field so the can connect with the troops and command from the front. 

  Troops and officers would not serve 20 or 30 years and would be  replaced with a short-service force where the longest period most soldiers would be in uniform would be around five years.  He says that the majority of the cost of the 13 billion dollar budget goes to salaries and benefits.  There would still be a small hand picked officer corp and the best non-commissioned officers would handle training.

The article came from the Tug Of War Series.


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## NavyGrunt

could you explain the proposal a little better- Im not catching what your laying down.Sorry if Im just slow.... :-\


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## ark

Aaron White said:
			
		

> could you explain the proposal a little better- Im not catching what your laying down.Sorry if Im just slow.... :-\



I think he is referring to this article

http://www.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/soundoff/story.html?id=134bf61c-f187-4104-96b0-22f26c674265


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## NavyGrunt

Okay I've read the article and I'm not denying his credentials but that idea is ridiculous. We would never be able to fight again. We'd be a country with outa  standing military? You can learn everything about combat in 5 years? Is there a place in the world where this is being done? This is a man of extremes- comparing Canadian soldiers to Nazi germans because of the actions of a few? I wouldnt give this much thought- however Im surre someone will jump in and tell me how stupid I am..... :


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## Jungle

canuck101 said:
			
		

> There would still be a small hand picked officer corp and the best non-commissioned officers would handle training.


How does someone become one the "best non-commissioned officers" in 5 years ??? It takes +/-10 years to make Sgt (in the RegF) then you can start looking at who is good and who stops progressing.
That system is the best way to de-professionnalize the Army.


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## devil39

Jungle said:
			
		

> How does someone become one the "best non-commissioned officers" in 5 years ??? It takes +/-10 years to make Sgt (in the RegF) then you can start looking at who is good and who stops progressing.
> That system is the best way to de-professionnalize the Army.



I tend to agree.   This would seem to make our current level of professionalism much harder to achieve.   I am usually a big fan of what LCol English has to say.

Off the top of my head, the only way I could see this working would be to run some sort of "up or out" system, where the member gets a new and longer contract with each promotion.   Promotion to Cpl for the top 30% gets another BE.   Promotion to MCpl within the next 3 years gets an IE, etc.   (I haven't done the math so don't pick me apart for my numbers!)   I don't really like this set up, but in might work.

You would want to give Pte soldiers released at the end of the initial tour an opportunity to sign up for another contract as a Pte, space permitting.

With Officers, Capt would be promoted more on ability than time and would result in another contract.   Real potential for Major could get you an IE.

A shortage of money can certainly lead one into considering some desperate measures.

Why mess with what works I ask?


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## pbi

What rubbish, Jack English...what unmitigated rubbish! This interview, if it quotes him correctly, proves beyond any shadow of doubt that just because you have a bunch of time in (YEARS AGO.....) and have written some books, is no guarantee whatsoever of wisdom, common sense, or the ability to exert enough self-control to restrain oneself from making silly, ill-considered commentary in order to attract attention.

Almost every paragraph is an overflowing crock of ****.   I could do a line-by-line, but anybody who has spent any time at all in the military will do the same thing themselves as they read it. You could blindfold somebody and have them point to any spot in the article and they would have about an 80% chance of hitting utter nonsense every time. IMHO,almost nothing in his list of ideas for "reform" would work.

I have no idea what he imagines he is basing his analysis on: as Jungle, Aaron, canuck and others have so astutely pointed out, this inane concept, if applied, would destroy us a professional army, and scupper one of the very few things we have going for us: the high quality and experience of our people, especially our WOs/NCOs. 

Note how the article refers to the unhappy generals: Ooooh-those big bad generals with the big hats with all the brass and the big sunglasses, who call everybody "Son". "Everybody" knows_ they _ don't know anything, right? If the generals are against it, well.... it can only be because its really a good idea, right? Notice they don't reflect the comments of any WOs/NCOs in here, or anybody at the "working level",since these people would blow this idea out of the water.

If Jack English is serious, he has lost my respect and I seriously question his judgement. Cheers.


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## Infanteer

Weird.   I consider English's writing to be some of the best out there.   I find it ironic, considering the fact that most of his writing concerns increasing the level of professionalization of the Army, that he advocates eliminating any notion of professionalism what so ever.

Maybe I can give him credit for thinking outside of the box, but I think he's forgotten what the hell the box looked like in the first place.   Maybe he's going senile in his old age, with the potential of turning a fine career and a solid literary background into a "frothing from the mouth, get the generals" David Hackworth type.



> He has questioned generals and admirals who jump to lucrative defence industry jobs soon after they retire. He dubbed the 1996 mission to Zaire as an "amateurish Canadian attempt to lead a multinational UN relief expedition."



So, this is a reason to eliminate a the professional nature of our Forces?



> The largest cost to the military, making up half of the $13-billion defence budget, are the salaries and benefits paid to those in uniform. Despite complaints about salaries, soldiers make a decent wage, with corporals earning around $48,000 a year. Add a pension and the bill is substantial. Money that should be going to defend the country is set aside for payroll, notes Lt.-Col. English.



Umm, last I checked, wars were fought by people.   Battle is most heavily influenced by the human dynamic (see my sig line quote).   What does he advocate doing, replacing us with cheap robots?

Of course pay is going to be the highest portion of the budget; it is humans that fight wars.



> "We're spending $13 billion every year and it's the same old thing. India has a $13-billion budget and gets about the fifth biggest navy in the world and one of the largest armies. Of course it comes down to this business of personnel-related costs."



The same Army that got rolled over by the Chinese?   Comparing the military forces (and defence budgets) of Canada and India is a pretty weak analogy.



> His solution is a short-service army. Up to 50,000 men and women would volunteer for an 18-month stint -- six months for training, one year serving overseas. The hitch could be for two or three years but no longer than that. After the short service soldier could serve part-time in the militia. A hand-picked officer corps would run the force and the best non-commissioned officers would handle training.



And any notion of corporate knowledge and the profession of arms would go where?



> The military would have to accept that the citizen soldier is not perfect. He or she would be a reflection of Canadian society. For defending the country and serving on overseas operations, six months training would be fine, says Lt.-Col. English.



Funny, considering he spent the first half of his book The Canadian Army in Normandy arguing against this very idea; amateurism.



Maybe his next book should be titled Lament for Col English: Canadian Military Thought Goes AWOL.


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## pbi

Infanteer: well said. You've taken the time to do the line-by-line that I was too lazy (or PO'd) to do. You have exposed some of the more ridiculous aspects of what he has said. I still have to wonder if he was actually serious with this drivel, or was just trying to get a rise out of The Establishment (ie: NDHQ).

"50,000 volunteers.....?" Ummm, right.  We work hard to get people now, with what we pay them. And why the hell should a Cpl make any less than a firefighter or police constable? It has taken years to get CF pay scales to the level they are at now, and Jacky boy would have us roll back the clock. Perhaps we should pay him the same royalties he would have gotten 30 years ago, and see how he likes that... (Oooops--sorry--that was petty.. > )

Cheers.


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## RCD

Read between the lines guys.His logic does make sense in the long run
When we had the (Forces Reduction Plan) offer to us.
 iIt was intended to weed out the 20 plus year's people.
what we got was a shock of reality.instead the ones who took it the plan where the middle ones(5to20
) ,the backbone of the forces an offer to the combat trades only once, to many took it.
If youthink of Student Summer Employment Plan where the top 3rd was only kept.
Yes this can be done.


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## Infanteer

Sure it can be done, it's done all over the world.  It's called a conscript army.

It's almost universally recognized that professional capability and time/experience are one and the same.


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## Lance Wiebe

As most others have pointed out, this is an inane idea, unworkable in either the short term or the long term.   Unless, of course, we go back to the '30's, where the reg force's only reason for existance was to train the reserves.   Even then, the idea has flaws.

One has to wonder where this idiotic idea came from?   It's almost like advocating a conscript army like Norway's, but without the conscription.   Wierd.


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## Roy1

The responses to this article are a tad discouraging. It seems that thinking outside of the box is in short supply in Canada. 

The Canadian military is on a one way trip to oblivion. And its going to require a hell of a lot more than money to save it. 

OK, a lot of you don't like some of the specifics of Jack English's proposals. But the essence of what he says is correct. The CF is WAY too top heavy and the army is increasingly only a second echelon force. It cannot deploy anywhere on its own and it is incapable of sustaining anything more than a battlegroup overseas. The CF is composed of 22% officers. The equivalent in the US Marine Corps is less than 12%! 

As for the idea of short enlistments: The Israeli army operates on the basis of three (compulsory) enlistments. NCOs are picked from the ranks after a year or two (as are officers for that matter). The French Foreign Legion operates on the basis of five year enlistments with NCOs picked from the ranks after only a few years. Obviously experienced NCOs receive incentives to reenlist. 

Surely there is SOMETHING that Canada can learn from others.


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## Brad Sallows

One bad idea doesn't necessarily invalidate his earlier work.  English wouldn't be the first historian to have a solid body of work behind him and then take an odd turn.


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## T.I.M.

For a quick fact check, Canada spends $13 billion _Canadian_ on the military, India spends $13 billion _American_ - actually over $14 billion these days - which is nearly $18 billion Canadian.

Still, that isn't to say Canada spends all its money wisely, but I find the Indian comparison a little strange given the vast differences between the two nations in everything from society to strategic situation.   Usually people compare Canada to Australia for these kind of things, since we're almost sister countries similar concerns and history.


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## Armymedic

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sure it can be done, it's done all over the world. It's called a conscript army.
> 
> It's almost universally recognized that professional capability and time/experience are one and the same.



When I read this article, I imagine a much more defined example of this kind of army he speaks of....


The Red Army, of the former USSR.

need I say more?


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## Booya McNasty

I do like the idea of an 18 month contract.

Have it for the kids who want to make a few bucks out of highschool, see the world, etc.  We already have a contract that is similar right now - it's for the reserves when they go on tour.  I think the 18 month contract would work for some missions, Bosnia or Cypress for example, but it would be disasterous for others Rwanda or Afghanistan.

I also like what he says about cutting the crap from NDHQ.

For the record, I disagree with just about everything else he says.  Interesting article though.


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## Infanteer

> The responses to this article are a tad discouraging. It seems that thinking outside of the box is in short supply in Canada.



Like I said, there is "thinking outside of the box" (ie: interesting approaches to further professionalizing our Army) and there is "forgetting what the box looks like" (ie: destroying the professional Army in an attempt to lower personal costs).

If you're trying to label the Army.ca members here as unoriginal and dogmatic, I think you've neglected to read a majority of the good posts here in the last year or so.



> The Canadian military is on a one way trip to oblivion. And its going to require a hell of a lot more than money to save it.



They've been saying the same thing forever - "A Canadian submarine catches fire, this military if finished".  However, we seem to keep on doing our job with what we have.

You just seem to be regurgitating things that guys like David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein like to say.  Here is an idea, why don't you thing "outside of the box" and give us something more substantial then "the military is on a one way trip to oblivion" and (this is the key) provide an idea for a solution.



> OK, a lot of you don't like some of the specifics of Jack English's proposals. But the essence of what he says is correct. The CF is WAY too top heavy and the army is increasingly only a second echelon force. It cannot deploy anywhere on its own and it is incapable of sustaining anything more than a battlegroup overseas. The CF is composed of 22% officers. The equivalent in the US Marine Corps is less than 12%!



...and this is different from when?  We've always required our big-brother Army (whether it be British or American) to move us,sustain us, and command us from the our first forray into the expeditionary world in South Africa.  If we haven't been rendered irrelevant in the last 100 years or so, why would this all the sudden spell our doom.

As for the officer percentage, I agree with you; I've argued that point many times on this page - but you have to really develop a plan for a proposal like that.  Simply cutting the Officer Corps from 25% to 12% would most likely leave the CF headless and really incapable.  Institutional change and transformation is also required.



> As for the idea of short enlistments: The Israeli army operates on the basis of three (compulsory) enlistments. NCOs are picked from the ranks after a year or two (as are officers for that matter). The French Foreign Legion operates on the basis of five year enlistments with NCOs picked from the ranks after only a few years. Obviously experienced NCOs receive incentives to reenlist.
> 
> Surely there is SOMETHING that Canada can learn from others.



Neither of these examples are really relevent for the CF.  The Israeli system is compulsory - we don't have the guaranteed influx of short term conscripts.  The FFL is a special case all together, and usually relies on foreigners with other reasons for serving.

The professional nature of the Canadian military demands that we aim for career soldiers.  As such, we should build our notion of career progression, NCO development, and Officer selection around the notion of the professional career.  This is a concept English has apparently thrown out the door, much to the consternation of his earlier (excellent) writing.

If you want to read an excellent thread of selection from the Canadian perspective, check this one out:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18201.0.html


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## SeaKingTacco

Pretty much everything about this proposal is a bad idea.   We have enough trouble as it is attracting recruits- how much more trouble would we have if we suddenly said to the Canadian public: 

"Join the CF.   We will give you only three short months of training, send you to manage a really complex situation in (insert third world country of your choice here) for 6 months, led by officers and NCOs with only marginally more experience then you, bring you back to Canada for 6 months and then have you repeat the experience someplace else. In the meantime, 1/3 of your platoon/troop/ship/sqn mates have changed out as they are released from the military and you get a new draft of barely trained mates to look after, because YOU are now one of the experienced soldiers.   At the end of three years, 90% of you will be tossed back on the street without a second thought.   Thanks from a grateful nation."

Look, if people just want a quick look at the military and not sign up for life- they can under our current system.   Just do a BE and move along. I don't see what gutting our Snr NCO corps and experienced Capts/Majs is going to do to help the situation.

As for that other old chestnut about disfunctional NDHQ- Maybe NDHQ could be greatly improved.   Or maybe not. It is the standard thing to trot out when someone thinks there is something wrong with the CF "we have to fix NDHQ!".   Fine.   How?   Please- post detailed plans on how you would restructure ADM (MAT), ADM HR Mil, the VCDS group, Medgroup, the DCDS group, etc, etc WITHOUT downloading more work onto the line units.   I'm not saying that it can't be done, but if we are going to offer criticism, offer a fix. 

Cheers


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## Infanteer

> How?  Please- post detailed plans on how you would restructure ADM (MAT), ADM HR Mil, the VCDS group, Medgroup, the DCDS group, etc, etc WITHOUT downloading more work onto the line units.  I'm not saying that it can't be done, but if we are going to offer criticism, offer a fix.



Good point Tacco.  As I mentioned earlier, "If you ain't part of the solution, you're part of the problem..." or something to that effect.  We should strive to make all of our criticism "constructive".


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## Jungle

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It is the standard thing to trot out when someone thinks there is something wrong with the CF "we have to fix NDHQ!".   Fine.   How?


We could start by shutting down the manned but unfunded project offices. Start manning project offices when funds are allocated. That way we could rotate people in and out of NDHQ by reallocating resources from one project office to another, and reduce the number of staff.


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## Infanteer

As well, I've heard a good suggestion to limit "tours" to NDHQ at 3 out of every 5 years and 5 out of every 10 - something like this would help to get a little fresh air into the place.


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## CBH99

I too find it odd that he would compare Canada's military to India's military, especially considering the huge difference in terms of both situation and capabilities.

Do you think you'd find a small platoon of highly trained, highly equipped Indian soldiers sneaking their way down the side of a mountain in Afghanistan, wearing night vision goggles and being under the protective umbrella of LAV 3s and Coyotes?  Or vehicles with similar capabilities?  Not really. Sure, you could field a larger Army, and military in general with the $13B in the DND budget - but not if your going after the outstanding quality our forces possess.  Sure, DND wastes a fair share of money, but the CF/DND still manage to produce world class forces in terms of professionalism and equipment...can anybody say the same for India?

Cheers


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## SeaKingTacco

> We could start by shutting down the manned but unfunded project offices. Start manning project offices when funds are allocated. That way we could rotate people in and out of NDHQ by reallocating resources from one project office to another, and reduce the number of staff



Fair enough, but who does the paperwork writing the Statement of Requirement (SOR)?   That is all done before money is allocated- otherwise you don't know what piece of kit you are going to buy (or what capability) at what price.   For example, the MHP SOR runs several hundred pages...

Procurement definitely needs to get faster in the CF, but I'm not convinced allocating staff to a project after a billion or so is allocated to the project is the right way to go.


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## Jungle

Maybe we need more control over those project offices. For example: in 1993, the then CLS visited us in Petawawa and gave us the opportunity to ask questions. Someone inquired about the (still to be determined) new helmet, because we had tried it on for size in 1988, and had heard nothing since... he told us they were still looking for the perfect helmet... The CLS told us he had asked the PMO what was so special about the CDN head that they couldn't find a helmet that filled our requirement. We finally received our helmets a few years later (a total of 9 years after we tried it on for size... imagine if the CLS had not put pressure on this ???).
What I'm trying to say is that some people build careers around those offices. By opening PMOs in due time for proper planning, and then supervising them properly to avoid them dragging their feet, we could probably be more effective with less staff. This way we could likely get the JSS in less than 10 years...


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## GGboy

I don't know if this would exactly "fix" NDHQ, but how about separating the military from the civilian side? Set up a Cdn Forces Headquarters AND a Department of National Defence, like the Yanks have a Pentagon and a DoD ...
A lot of the excess fat in the system seems to be in the ADMs offices as opposed to the CF, for instance there are (I'm told) 23 "Level Ones" in DND: that's Lt.-Gen./Vice-Adm. or Asst Deputy Minister level. Only seven of those are in uniform, the rest are bureaucrats. The CDS is a Level 0, or equivalent to the Depty Minister of National Defence.
It might not trim the baggage from our defence budget, but it would sure make it clear where the extra lard is concentrated. Only 42% of DND spending (operational and capital budgets) goes to the army, navy, air force and DCDS ....


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## NavyGrunt

Well I know that the water proof outer shell of my sleeping bag costs 200 bucks....maybe we could start with contractors using us to fund their retirements....


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## T.I.M.

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Sure, DND wastes a fair share of money, but the CF/DND still manage to produce world class forces in terms of professionalism and equipment...can anybody say the same for India?
> 
> Cheers



Well, I don't want to run the Indians down, since I have very little available information on their capabilities.   After all, their army fights continual small unit actions in the mountains of the Kashmir, and the Mirage 2000's, MiG-21s and Su-30s of the Indian Air Force did manage to defeat the USAF's F-15Cs in the majority of the scenarios (I've heard close to 90% from some sources) in the recent Ex Cope India.     :dontpanic:

The point is more that their strategic situation is dramatically different.   Their army is geared to defend their borders from very real threats (China, Pakistan), they have a large (huge!) population with low wages compared to Canada, and they do in fact spend a fair bit more than we do on defence.   It's not really a useful comparison.

Australia is a much closer match.


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## a_majoor

I wonder if the initial idea was to create some sort of "surge" capability; a core of professionals to do the planning and training and the ability to augment the forces with "short timers" when you really needed more than the one battlegroup out in the field. (Maybe I am indulging in some wishful thinking as well).

This could be done through a number of different methods. The YTEP program could be revived, giving recruits a one year contract so they could decide if they liked the army wanted to extend without costing us a fortune; lots more manning and training dollars could flow to the reserve to bring their numbers up to par with the regular force as a minimum (they only cost more when they go on tour), the supplimentry reserve could be tapped to stand up Special Service Force companies or battalions when required....


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## pbi

Sgt Majoor-good to see you here! How is your literary career coming on?

I wasn't going to say any more about this subject (my blood pressure will only take so much...) but suffice it to say that the concept being proposed by Dr English is utterly unsuited for a professional and expeditionary Army, which we are and have been since at least WWI, if not the SA War. It is a concept suited to home-defense armies, which we are not and never really have been, all the recent prattle about "Homeland Defense" to the contrary. Cheers.


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## Edward Campbell

I have read and re-read Jack English's article and, like many here, I cannot quite figure out where he went off the rails.   (_Caveat lector:_ I know Jack English fairly well, we served together/nearby in staff appointments about 30 years ago; I guess we might call ourselves distant friends; I might be biased.)

The army he appears to 'want' is the one we had in WWII â â€œ raised in haste, poorly trained in Canada and then, while waiting for a year or two or even three (for the 1st Division) properly trained and re-trained at battle schools which were the next best thing to combat.     The cadres in the battle schools were the best the British had â â€œ (recent) battle hardened officers and NCOs with reputations as 'quick' thinkers and doers.   That army, eventually, acquitted itself admirably in battle.   English's thesis, with which I agree, is that we did well despite having generated only a very few first rate senior leaders in World War II: all young men with only limited prewar military service.   Most of the Canadian senior leadership, the admirals and generals from the 'regular' navy and army were, at best, second rate â â€œ many were worse.

I think English sees, in our turn of the century forces, a repeat of 1938 â â€œ an old, decrepit, ill equipped, poorly led army; good young men (and women, now) to be sure, but a force which is not prepared to fight at anything above company level.

It seems to me, from afar (a great distance in time) I hasten to point out, that we do have too much deadwood scattered throughout the armed forces in every rank from corporal through to general.   I argued, many years ago, that we were drifting away from a _vocational_ model of soldiering to an _occupational_ one ... soldiering was, I feared twenty-five years ago, becoming a *job*, rather like being a bus driver.   It was the old 1950s/60s recruiting slogan, â Å“A career with a futureâ ? taken to extremes.   I felt then that we placed far, far too much emphasis on the (legitimate) recruiting, training and retention needs of the technical support trades and too little on the needs of the army's combat arms and the navy's 'hard' sea trades â â€œ many of which are very technical.   I was concerned then that our personnel 'business plan' was excluding too many people from small towns and, especially, aboriginal communities; our (commendable) desire to reduce the costs of training and to be more _inclusive_ had unintended consequences â â€œ consequences which I believed and argued, way back when, were detrimental to the army's long term operational needs.

I believe, still, that we need a young army.   I do not mind having a few 60 year old generals but I doubt that anyone from brigade commander on down should be or needs to be too much over 40.*   It was my firm belief then â â€œ and I have read, heard, or seen nothing to change my mind, that an officer is ready to command a ship, regiment, battalion or fighter/bomber squadron after about 10 to 15 years of commissioned service in peacetime â â€œ at the age, for most, of about 35.   I believed then and still do that a young man *can* be ready to command a tank or a rifle section after about two years of good hard training and experience, and that a platoon/troop 2IC (sergeant) should be about 30 â â€œ with about ten years of experience.

I think that Jack English wants a young, fit, decidedly _operationally_ oriented army.   Such an army might want to start with a *series* of two or three year enlistments, each requiring some 'up or out' performance by individuals, so that we have a quality _sieve_ which allows the best and brightest to be retained and moved up through the ranks â â€œ getting the best officers and NCOs to lead the young, _short service_ rank and file.

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* Shades of JFC Fuller's wonderful little diatribe: _Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure_, which he wrote back in the '30s; see: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Fuller/Fuller.asp


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## Infanteer

Welcome aboard Rusty.   Good post, it certainly helps to develop the debate; but I remain unconvinced that killing professionalism is a way to eliminate careerism (which I gathered was the true intent of Mr English's proposal).



> The army he appears to 'want' is the one we had in WWII â â€œ raised in haste, poorly trained in Canada and then, while waiting for a year or two or even three (for the 1st Division) properly trained and re-trained at battle schools which were the next best thing to combat.    The cadres in the battle schools were the best the British had â â€œ (recent) battle hardened officers and NCOs with reputations as 'quick' thinkers and doers.   That army, eventually, acquitted itself admirably in battle.   English's thesis, with which I agree, is that we did well despite having generated only a very few first rate senior leaders in World War II: all young men with only limited prewar military service.   Most of the Canadian senior leadership, the admirals and generals from the 'regular' navy and army were, at best, second rate â â€œ many were worse.



Sure, but I don't think the nature of today's "come-as-you-are" wars will give us the opportunity to be properly trained for a year or two while waiting for the "Second Front" to be reestablished.   As an expeditionary force, we need to have professionals, ready and trained to fight, on hand to be dispatched to the "conflict of the week" if directed by our civilian leaders.



> I think English sees, in our turn of the century forces, a repeat of 1938 â â€œ an old, decrepit, ill equipped, poorly led army; good young men (and women, now) to be sure, but a force which is not prepared to fight at anything above company level.



Ok, in many respects sure.   But I think there is one important caveat.   Our current leadership (both Officer and NCO) has seen non-stop deployment since the end of the Cold War.   Due to overstretch and small resources, there are definite negative aspects of this; however, we cannot ignore the fact that our leadership has an amazing degree of operational experience - some guys have 6 - 8 different tours under their belts.   Granted, none of this has been high-density manoeuvre operations in the face of an organized enemy, but it is still operational experience in a hostile environment (in many circumstances a two-way shooting range).

As opposed to 1938, when we had leadership that promoted amateurism (McNaughton, Crerar) and rested on the laurels of what they did 20 years prior on the Western Front, today's leadership has had constant exposure to the ever changing phenomenon of modern conflict.   As opposed to suffering from the abject amateurism of the 1920's and 30's (and to an extent, 40's), we've got commanders who have commanded troops at various levels in a variety of operational settings.

Sure, we are facing the same problem with underfunding for equipment and training as we did in the 1930's, but I think our leadership is eons ahead in terms of professional experience.   If given the ability to do so, I think our leadership would be more then capable of getting a grip on preparing to fight; the fact that we had a senior officer as 2ic of a formation in Iraq or that we have Officers in American HQs in Afghanistan is a testament to this.



> It seems to me, from afar (a great distance in time) I hasten to point out, that we do have too much deadwood scattered throughout the armed forces in every rank from corporal through to general.   I argued, many years ago, that we were drifting away from a vocational model of soldiering to an occupational one ... soldiering was, I feared twenty-five years ago, becoming a job, rather like being a bus driver.   It was the old 1950s/60s recruiting slogan, â Å“A career with a futureâ ? taken to extremes.   I felt then that we placed far, far too much emphasis on the (legitimate) recruiting, training and retention needs of the technical support trades and too little on the needs of the army's combat arms and the navy's 'hard' sea trades â â€œ many of which are very technical.   I was concerned then that our personnel 'business plan' was excluding too many people from small towns and, especially, aboriginal communities; our (commendable) desire to reduce the costs of training and to be more inclusive had unintended consequences â â€œ consequences which I believed and argued, way back when, were detrimental to the army's long term operational needs.



I'll agree with this to a certain extent.   Although it is purely semantics, I'd say the movement is from a professional model of soldiering based upon productive output of combat power to an (inefficent and undesirable) occupational model which is based upon functional administration of peacetime management.   In essence we may tend to look inwards when to role of the military demands it looks outwards to be properly prepared to fight.   As well, I wouldn't say this movement is monolithic; different areas of the Forces are experiencing it to different degrees.

I think this may provide a framework with which to work out a better solution then eliminating the notion of professionalism grounded upon time/experience.   Using the basis of a professional model based upon productive output of combat power, promotion and accession should be based upon merit alone.   For senior leaders, this would depend upon a balanced assessment of both command in the field and staff duties.

The purpose of further emphasising merit is to eliminate "the driftwood" as efficiently as possible (Driftwood does not mean someone who has no desire to seek higher positions, but rather is professionally incapable of contributing to the output of combat power).   A combination of objective and subjective evaluation for leaders will be used to determine merit; some of the methods that could be utilized would be:
- results of free-play, force-on-force exercises (can the commander successfully do his job at his level without getting his soldiers wiped out?)
- examinations for promotion (why we got rid of rank examinations, I'll never know)
- character evaluation reports (a modified PER which, rather then relying on checked boxes, is a written evaluation of character with input for superiors, peers, and subordinates).

Whatever the system for promotion and accession is, it has to be focused on the outward-looking objective of producing combat power.   This should help to eliminate careerism to a great extent as focus is not internalized at "how can I make myself look good" but rather externalized at "how can I improve upon the performance of this unit".



> I believe, still, that we need a young army.   I do not mind having a few 60 year old generals but I doubt that anyone from brigade commander on down should be or needs to be too much over 40.*   It was my firm belief then â â€œ and I have read, heard, or seen nothing to change my mind, that an officer is ready to command a ship, regiment, battalion or fighter/bomber squadron after about 10 to 15 years of commissioned service in peacetime â â€œ at the age, for most, of about 35.   I believed then and still do that a young man can be ready to command a tank or a rifle section after about two years of good hard training and experience, and that a platoon/troop 2IC (sergeant) should be about 30 â â€œ with about ten years of experience.



I agree with you here as well.   Although there is nothing wrong with maintain personnel in positions for a period of time, I've argued before that it would good to promote faster.   The British Army seems to do well for itself and it promotes section 2ic's after 3 years and section commanders at 5-6.   The Militia does this as well (although out of necessity).

As well, I've also seen good ideas for a career structure which takes the best officers (determined on merit) out of the conventional career track and accelerates them faster then their peers.   It is in effect the peacetime effort to get the Gavins', the Simmonds', and the Rommels' to senior command at a much quicker pace.   Sure, jumping over their peers and superiors may conflict with our notions of fairness and a good career, but leadership and operational brilliance is an art - some are naturally good at it and some have no hope while many will be able to eventually do it competently if trained right.   As Von Balck said "Not every painter can be a Raphael or a Michelangelo."



> I think that Jack English wants a young, fit, decidedly operationally oriented army.   Such an army might want to start with a series of two or three year enlistments, each requiring some 'up or out' performance by individuals, so that we have a quality sieve which allows the best and brightest to be retained and moved up through the ranks â â€œ getting the best officers and NCOs to lead the young, short service rank and file.



Most of my research and reading has led me to understand that their is no replacement for time/experience in the development of a professional soldier.   The Germans knew full well that they needed a certain amount of time to train a good commander or a decent staff officer; as a result, officer training was barely compromised in WWII, even when the manpower shortages began to be felt.   Unlike the American approach of filling TO&E spots which created an abundance of under-qualified Officers (distributed poorly amongst the various trades), the German's believed in having no officer rather then a poor one - the professional NCO Corps could step in if required.

As such, I believe that Canada, as primarily an expeditionary force, needs to have its core mostly composed of career professionals.   Like the legions of Rome, the state demands the abilities that only a professional force can offer, as the notion of the citizen-soldier, serving when needed, is insufficient to meet the security demands of the international arena.   I do believe there is a place for a certain percentage of "short-service" rank and file; these would be attracted by the Canadian version of the Montgomery GI Bill.   Attracted to a post-secondary education fund in return for three years of good service, this could help to "fill out the ranks" and expose many more Canadians to the Canadian Forces.   Those at the end of a Basic Engagement are free to leave with their (well earned) tuition, while those that wish to stay sign an Immediate engagement contract for another 22 years, for a full 25 year career.

As well, I will strongly debate your idea for an "up-or-out" system.   Most of the literature on the subject seems to indicate that the American experience with the up-or-out system is bad.   It is harmful to morale and, when combined with a poor promotion system (which is not focussed on merit) the process leads to significant increases in "careerism", something we are attempting to get rid of with this debate.

Anyways, welcome to Army.ca and good post,
Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## PPCLI Guy

> The British Army seems to do well for itself and it promotes section 2ic's after 3 years and section commanders at 5-6.  The Militia does this as well (although out of necessity).



Hmmm.  When my CSM in the RGJ asked me if there were any fundamental differences between him and a Canadian CSM, I replied that in the Canadian system, he would still be learning to be a Pl 2ic.  He was 32 years old - and in their system, that is necessary, as it is impossible for an other rank to serve beyond 20 years - unless they commission from the ranks.

We have truly spectacular Sr NCOs - and a lot of that, IMHO is based on the balance that we have established between age and exerience.  Not sure that we should be messing with something that works very well.

Dave


----------



## Infanteer

A delicate balance; can you say that the quality of the British NCO Corps suffered for putting guys through faster?

32 seems a bit young for a CSM though.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A delicate balance; can you say that the quality of the British NCO Corps suffered for putting guys through faster?
> 32 seems a bit young for a CSM though.



I would take a Cdn NCO over his Brit counterpart sight unseen, because on the whole, IM not so HO, we produce better Sr NCOs.  In fact, having served with them, if I were to build a dream team, I would take some of their kit, most of their defence policies, and our Officers, NCOs and troops.


----------



## Infanteer

Interesting.


----------



## Cloud Cover

a_majoor said:
			
		

> This could be done through a number of different methods. The YTEP program could be revived, giving recruits a one year contract so they could decide if they liked the army wanted to extend without costing us a fortune;



YTEP was an experimental program when it was rolled out in the early 1980's designed primarily to recruit young men and women from non-traditional regions with devastating high unemployment. I was one of the recruits in YTEP 1, and was asked to stay on. Many others were forced to remuster into other trades if they wanted to stay in. All in all, I believe 20-25 000 people went through the system in 3 years, and most stayed on for much longer. That gives you some idea of how hard it was to find a job in those days, and surely that is not the case in today's red hot job market, with the exception  of traditional regional disparities. 

Does anybody have any primary source knowledge of how the YTEP model evolved over time, and how that program might be implemented today? In particular, it seems to me that the CF did not dream that program up over night, think of all the planning that must have went into making it happen, and could it be made to work again, and what kind of lead time would be required?


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Interesting.



OK, Now I am really worried.  A one word post from Infanteer!


----------



## pbi

Infanteer: your response to Rusty, once again, laid out most concisely and eloquently exactly what I felt, but  could not have expressed nearly so well as you. PPCLI Guy thanks for poking that sometimes irritating balloon of "Brit-o-philia" that occasionally gets a bit too big in our Army: we have a silly tendency to assume that other armies must automatically do everything better than we do. We are becoming masters of the self-putdown.

A couple of supporting fires:

Senior Officer Experience: Our more useless types nothwithstanding, we are now in the process of promoting some Snr Officers who have a number of operational tours behind them at different levels of command, on demanding and complex operations such as Kosovo, OEF, etc. We have in our CLS a man who has spent time as a Deputy Corps Commander in the US Army, as well being the Commander of ISAF (who was well respected by US allies). We have BGens such as BGen Beare who has just returned from mission command in the unique transitional environment of Bosnia 2004, and BGen Natynczyk who is embedded with US Army Forces in Iraq (along with several other Canadian officers) We send our officers and WOs/Senior NCOs as both students and instructors to the training and education centres of our major Allies, with almost universally good results. We are paying far more attention to training standards, to professionalism, and to issues such as ethics and ethos than I can ever recall in 30 years of service. I believe that these are positive trends that will lead us to better things as long as we are not too badly savaged by Treasury Board, and even then we will still go far to improve the human calibre of our leadership, which IMHO is what really matters anyway. 

WO/Senior NCO Promotion: I do believe that we have drifted backwards on this one: I recall that when I took my Junior NCO course in 1975 (taught by P Coy/3 RCR), the Cpls and MCpls who taught us were IMHO far, far too old. By the time I joined the Regular Army in 1982, we had just begun to reverse this trend with DAPS, and IMHO in the following decade produced a good mix between youth/keenness and maturity/experience. However, I fear that we are starting to "age out" again in the Sgt/WO grades. Five-six years is probably adequate on average to produce a well-rounded Section Commander(age 24), and about ten-twelve for a Platoon 2IC(age 30). CQMS a couple of years more, and CSM in at about 20 yrs. (age 38). Soldiers who have maintained a regular PT program and watched their weight  and health are quite capable of being fit for the field at that age.

"Plethora" of NCO Ranks: Whoever claims this needs to get out more. Just count the number of ranks between Pte Recruit (equivalent)and the highest NCO rank in the US, German and Polish armies, then come back and we'll talk. (and I'm NOT talking about US- or Russian- style WOs...) We actually have a very slim, functional set of NCO ranks.

Cheers.


----------



## Lance Wiebe

I agree.  The only ranks that need fixing is the automatic promotions to Cpl and Capt.  Both should be based on merit and requirement, especially seeing as how we see Captains going through their Phase 3!


----------



## pbi

I agree. IIRC, those two "automatic" promotions were brought in shortly after Unification as retention/QOL moves. A mistake, IMHO-no promotion should ever be "automatic" as it cheapens the meaning of the rank. Cheers.


----------



## Roy1

Infanteer said:
			
		

> They've been saying the same thing forever - "A Canadian submarine catches fire, this military if finished".   However, we seem to keep on doing our job with what we have.
> 
> You just seem to be regurgitating things that guys like David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein like to say.   Here is an idea, why don't you thing "outside of the box" and give us something more substantial then "the military is on a one way trip to oblivion" and (this is the key) provide an idea for a solution.



The essential problem is that the capital account has been raided for 10 years to pay for operations. Ya the CF keeps doing what is asked of it, but the future force is being gutted as ageing equipment is not replaced. Its too tiresome to go into the details. Read "Canada Without Armed Forces?" by Doug Bland, Howie Marsh and others.

There is little that can be done at this stage to pull the CF out of the nose dive its in. But if we are going to have a capable force in 20-years then we have to start by totally rethinking every aspect of defence policy. Every program, every institution, our entire approach to defence has to be reviewed and rethought. The review should start with NDHQ!! 

I doubt it will happen, but without it the CF is doomed to reduce to a New Zealand level of capability - ie. limited territorial capability and occasional symbolic presence overseas. That may be in Canada's interest, but no review has ever decided that. The problem is that right now thats happening by inertia rather than as a result of any thought out strategy. Indeed, its happening while we are pretending that we are a major power.


----------



## Infanteer

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> OK, Now I am really worried. A one word post from Infanteer!



I was thinking about a few things....



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> WO/Senior NCO Promotion: I do believe that we have drifted backwards on this one: I recall that when I took my Junior NCO course in 1975 (taught by P Coy/3 RCR), the Cpls and MCpls who taught us were IMHO far, far too old. By the time I joined the Regular Army in 1982, we had just begun to reverse this trend with DAPS, and IMHO in the following decade produced a good mix between youth/keenness and maturity/experience. However, I fear that we are starting to "age out" again in the Sgt/WO grades. Five-six years is probably adequate on average to produce a well-rounded Section Commander(age 24), and about ten-twelve for a Platoon 2IC(age 30). CQMS a couple of years more, and CSM in at about 20 yrs. (age 38). Soldiers who have maintained a regular PT program and watched their weight and health are quite capable of being fit for the field at that age.



Sounds about right to me.   I agree with the "age out" principle and the general amount of time required for each position.



			
				Roy1 said:
			
		

> The essential problem is that the capital account has been raided for 10 years to pay for operations. Ya the CF keeps doing what is asked of it, but the future force is being gutted as ageing equipment is not replaced. Its too tiresome to go into the details. Read "Canada Without Armed Forces?" by Doug Bland, Howie Marsh and others.



Remember, the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1.   We cannot measure the fate of the CF simply by looking at equipment issues - case in point; the Germans were very capable of producing a proficient fighting force under the debilitating restrictions of Versailles in the Weimar years.   Although we have the same problems with many equipment issues as we've always had, I think we've managed to make huge leaps in the overall level of dedication to the mastery of the profession of arms in a "peacetime" Army.



> There is little that can be done at this stage to pull the CF out of the nose dive its in.



I still don't know how you can say we are in a nose-dive.   We made it through the hard "nose-dive" of the 1990's (a very tough time for the Forces) and still performed admirably in Afghanistan and in the GWOT in general.



> But if we are going to have a capable force in 20-years then we have to start by totally rethinking every aspect of defence policy. Every program, every institution, our entire approach to defence has to be reviewed and rethought. The review should start with NDHQ!!



I agree with you here.   This is something we should constantly be doing as an institution, even if something seems to be running well.   One can never rest on one's laurels; in the ever changing security environment constant re-evaluation and constructive criticism in necessary to remain relevent.   We do this well informally and to different degrees at different levels - it is a concept that should be institutionalized. 



> I doubt it will happen, but without it the CF is doomed to reduce to a New Zealand level of capability - ie. limited territorial capability and occasional symbolic presence overseas. That may be in Canada's interest, but no review has ever decided that. The problem is that right now thats happening by inertia rather than as a result of any thought out strategy. Indeed, its happening while we are pretending that we are a major power.



I don't think we've declined to that level.   In 2002 we had just as many troops deployed as we did 10 years before in the dark days of UNPROFOR.   However, you could say we were better equipped then we were then.   We have superior personal equipment, the best series of small arms in the world (although we do some odd things with them coughcough-C-79), uniforms that everybody else is copying, some of the best comms systems, fancy new IFV's (which, like any other piece of kit, cannot do everything, but they do excel at some roles).

Compare that to the guys cruising around Croatia in aging M113's with Vietnam era helmets and uniforms, even less public and government support, no ammo, and poor pay.   I don't know what you're using for a baseline, but I think we have made some great strides in many areas of equipment.   Sure, not everything is perfect and there are glaring deficiencies (MBT, Strategic Lift, etc, etc), but find me an Army in history that had everything right.

Don't lose sight of the forest for the trees, or something like that....


----------



## paracowboy

I gotta agree with Infanteer, pbi, et al. To interject a personal note, I've got about 10 years' service, and I'm just starting to feel like I'm getting the hang of this job. I find myself running to Sgts, WOs, and CSMs for clarification, opinions, and advice on a daily basis. 

Maybe I'm just thick...


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... I believe that Canada, as primarily an expeditionary force, needs to have its core mostly composed of career professionals.   Like the legions of Rome, the state demands the abilities that only a professional force can offer, as the notion of the citizen-soldier, serving when needed, is insufficient to meet the security demands of the international arena.   I do believe there is a place for a certain percentage of "short-service" rank and file; these would be attracted by the Canadian version of the Montgomery GI Bill.   Attracted to a post-secondary education fund in return for three years of good service, this could help to "fill out the ranks" and expose many more Canadians to the Canadian Forces.



I agree and I think that's what English wished he had said.

Re: _semantics_ â â€œ 40+ years ago we were all reading Sam Huntington's new book (it was new then) The Soldier and the State and we were debating the differences between what Huntington reported, accurately we reckoned, about _civil-military_ relations in the US and what we though should be the *proper* form of military professionalism in Canada â â€œ a nation with quite different traditions. certainly   not the three 'strands' (_technicism, populism_ and_professionalism_) Huntignton identified as being the main components of the 'thread' which had run through the American military for 100 years, then.   There was much support for a _vocational_ moel of military professionalism â â€œ where _vocation_ represents a calling rather than a job.   There was a strong sense, nearly a half   century back, that the military profession needed to be less and less like most other professions â â€œ law, accounting, engineering, etc, and more like a _priesthood_ in which one _served_  ...


----------



## Infanteer

I'm a big fan of Huntington.  I'll have to go back to it, its been a while since I last read it (although I agree with the notion of a "calling").


----------



## pbi

Infanteer: I think you have identified an important point: not all of the "end-of-the-worlders" have sufficient historical perspective to be able to measure (comprehensively) where we are now against where we were 10, 20, or 30 years ago.  I was on the Croatia mission you refer to, and the difference in kit is night and day. The flow of new items to troops on  ops is impressive, whether or not you like each item on its own merits. Our main "old kit" problems in the Army now are in our support vehicle fleet, especially the ML/HL families. Some "old kit" that we had in Croatia like the .50 and the 60mm mor are still doing just fine thanks, but overall we are ahead on comparison. Our level of personal kit is superior to most Americans (Army and Marines) that I see here at Bagram (the better gear may be getting pushed out to the field so perhaps I don't see it all...) We have problems but we are not dead, nor even IMHO dying. The performance of our units on operations proves that beyond any doubt. Cheers.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

> Our level of personal kit is superior to most Americans (Army and Marines) that I see here at Bagram (the better gear may be getting pushed out to the field so perhaps I don't see it all...) We have problems but we are not dead, nor even IMHO dying. The performance of our units on operations proves that beyond any doubt.



So here is the question that is buried underneath all of this nay-saying...why is it that it falls to older more experienced fellas like us to point that out?  What are we doing wrong in our socialisation that makes relatively new soldiers so down on themselves?  Or is it just the relentless bad press and cheap posturing of (mostly) oppostition politiicans talking out their arses?

Or perhaps it is that we are too senior to see how bad it really is???

<Dave wanders away muttering to himself...again>


----------



## a_majoor

Relentless bad press has a lot to do with it, especially since most reporters are like cockroaches: scurry away at the first sign of discomfort, and like to score cheap points (snow shovels, anyone?). They also feel that watching a few hollywood movies gives them the proper background to report on military affairs. How often have you read a Canadian reporter talking about our "fatigues" or "foxholes"?

The socialization process also has a lot to do with it. Basic and advanced training really isn't what it used to be, and so the shock of hitting the field or operations with a unit is that much greater. The fact we don't have large scale exercises like RV on a regular basis also makes the field a pretty alien place for the new guys.

In my "If I were the CDS" rants I always kick the standards of basic training upwards by making Basic resemble a militarized "Outward Bound", and bring back the Infantry Section Commanders Course (ISCC) which relentlessly emphasized decision making under pressure rather than the canned PLQ course of today, which emphasises PowerPoint. (OK, maybe an overstatement, but this is the rant).

In the end, we still come out all right because most of the people who join the Forces are motivated by challenge and adventure, and are willing to do almost anything to get the job done. As long as we still can get and keep those kinds of people, we will still reach the objective.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

> In my "If I were the CDS" rants I always kick the standards of basic training upwards by making Basic resemble a militarized "Outward Bound", and bring back the Infantry Section Commanders Course (ISCC) which relentlessly emphasized decision making under pressure rather than the canned PLQ course of today, which emphasises PowerPoint. (OK, maybe an overstatement, but this is the rant).



You will be pleased to know that we are starting up the PLQ(I), which will look quite a bit like the old ISCC - in fact, there asre supposed to be trial courses being run in all Areas this fall.

As to RVs - I seem to remember spending an awful lot of time sitting around, or in the canteen/mess...  The BTE is a good go, and the jury os still out for CMTC.


----------



## pbi

PPCLI Guy: I think it is a combination of things;

First of all, we DO have problems, some of them (such as the IT backlog) potentially destructive and at any rate difficult to solve. The right road for transformation is another, as is the search for a truly integrated Foreign/Defence policy. We must never deny these problems or we become mindless cheerleaders (YAY! YAY! ITS OK!   EVERYTHING IS GREAT TODAY!, etc). At the same time, we must not demonize these problems such that they induce fatalism and paralysis;

Second, we do not do that great a job (IMHO) at passing clear, simple explanations right down to the bottom in a timely manner. Now, you can say "well-go and look it up on the WWW!" but that does not relieve the CofC   of its responsibility to keep people informed. It is a difficult and frustrating fight: I know we try very hard in our Bde but I am endlessly amazed at how poorly we can do sometimes. The result of all this is that soldiers(esp Res soldiers) may not really know "why things are seen" and go on shithouse rumour instead. A great antidote to this is senior commanders (with their RSMs) getting out and listening to the troops, then giving straight answers;

Third, military commentary in our popular media is not always dominated by the well-informed or current. Rather IMHO we see a plethora of self-designated "military experts" who are sometimes laughably off the mark. We have seen a few examples on this site where members have posted various articles by "respected" or "well known" commentators or journalists that other members have subsequently shown to be largely or completely false or significantly disconnected from current reality. This disinformation rubs off on us; and

Canadians still have a pessimistic, self-deprecating streak a mile deep. We must get rid of this. The best way for soldiers to cure this is to go on a couple of misions and really see other armies up close. They will get a dose of reality and see very quickly that while we have problems, we have lots to be proud of. No excuse to rest on our laurels, but no reason to trash ourselves either.

Cheers.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

pbi said:
			
		

> First of all, we DO have problems, some of them (such as the IT backlog) potentially destructive and at any rate difficult to solve. The right road for transformation is another, as is the search for a truly integrated Foreign/Defence policy. We must never deny these problems or we become mindless cheerleaders (YAY! YAY! ITS OK!   EVERYTHING IS GREAT TODAY!, etc). At the same time, we must not demonize these problems such that they induce fatalism and paralysis;



Yep.  Finding the balance is incredibly difficult - and something that I struggle with every day.  So far I can still shave - but mindless boosterism or abject dejection will be sure signs that it is time to go...



> Second, we do not do that great a job (IMHO) at passing clear, simple explanations right down to the bottom in a timely manner.



Yep.  The AReas had to hector the LS into issuing a Transformation Directive, that translated slides into words.  Even then, it was very big on intent, with no scheme of manoeuvre, and a secret end-state...

Third, military commentary in our popular media is not always dominated by the well-informed or current. Rather IMHO we see a plethora of self-designated "military experts" who are sometimes laughably off the mark. <snip> This disinformation rubs off on us

There must be a way to combat that?  A designated spokesman that has a get ot of jail free card?  More senior pers willing to risk the whack on the pee-pee to tell it like it is?



> Canadians still have a pessimistic, self-deprecating streak a mile deep.



O yeah..



> We must get rid of this. The best way for soldiers to cure this is to go on a couple of misions and really see other armies up close. They will get a dose of reality and see very quickly that while we have problems, we have lots to be proud of. No excuse to rest on our laurels, but no reason to trash ourselves either.



And that is definitely the internal answer - although there are plenty of pers, even on this forum, who have recent operational experience and still self-flagellate.

Sigh.  I'll just keep on keeping on I guess.

Other Dave


----------



## pbi

Sgt Majoor: I have to side with PPCLI Guy on the RV series. The series looked impressive, but it was largely a waste of money, with the greatest expenditure of effort not being in producing good, demanding training but on the monstrous logistical effort involved in concentrating our Army in one place and sustaining it there. Far, far too much time was wasted being reserve pl of reserve cbt tm of reserve BG(=sitting in a hide or a BP doing SFA for hours...). The quality of training was generally not superior in any way to what can be achieved today by a BTE, and there was very little attention paid to actually learning anything. There was NO need to go to all that hideous expense to achieve what good training was actually done Except for Suffield, we do not own a training area that can support this scope of FTX in an intelligent manner. (Combat Teams passing each other on opposing axes is not, IMHO, intelligent use of the trg area: it is over-use). Most of the arguments used to defend it are IMHO spurious or OBE. The series was IMHO, a legacy of the Germany mentality in which huge exercises that looked good on the overlay but were of limited value for the troops were all too common.

We are IMHO far better off where we are now, with the AAR process, proper use of BTS (if and when we do that..), MILES/SIMMUNITION, JANUS, BCT and BTE. We will, I think, be even better off when CMTC comes on line. As for the exercise of higher HQ, that can be done in a far moer demanding, urgent manner than any FTX can affordably achieve, by conducting a FCPX (Field CPX) in which the C2 is stressed by simulation-driven events that can be as complex and demanding as we want, while the human beings in the HQ can be stressed by making their existence as miserable as you like. But through it all, we are not wasting millions of dollars, tank cars full of POL, or tons of scarce ammo sorting out a Comd and his staff. Those scarce resources can be better spent where it will achieve real results: at BG and below.   Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

I do tend to look at RV with rose coloured ballistic lenses, since getting out and doing things is better than not going at all. I was also a young and impressionable soldier, so seeing a Brigade battlegroup advancing in all its glory was an amazing sight! (Not to mention the add-ons like air power and foreign troops)

And to think I am accused of being a cold hearted realist.

If the BTE series of exercises can be sustained with the modern training methodology that PPCLI Guy and PBI pointed out, then we will have a fantastic platform to build and grow from.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

a_majoor said:
			
		

> If the BTE series of exercises can be sustained with the modern training methodology that PPCLI Guy and PBI pointed out, then we will have a fantastic platform to build and grow from.



For BTE 03, we had 12 live F18 and 12 live F16 missions - as well as more ammo than you can shake a stick at ($14M).  If we an keep up the bar that high (although future iterations will be WES, not live, then we are laughing.


----------



## pbi

> so seeing a Brigade battlegroup advancing in all its glory was an amazing sight! (Not to mention the add-ons like air power and foreign troops)



When people defend the RV series, this is one of the most common reasons that get trotted out. My response would be that if we consider our scarce resources, and then group our training objectives in terms of priority for those resources, seeing masses of vehicles lumber over the landscape would be a "Could Do". In reality, soldiers in action will rarely ever see much more than what's in the same gridsquare (if that). The real value for tactical trainng lies at BG and below: actually training with a tank troop or an engineer section.

You're right: we have the tools in hand to make our training truly excellent, if we are willing to take our time (ie: not 50 BTS but 5...) and accept mistakes. Cheers.


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## 735_winnipeg

i kinda like the idea of our military being part compulsory service like in israel and part conscription like in russia.  this is just my thoughts when i'm bored or playing command & conquer.  for the compulsory part, i would like to see young people sign up to join the military when they finish or about to finish high school and are not working or going to post-secondary schools.  they can serve their country for 2-3 years and keep them out of trouble.  this, in my thinking, would produce career officers and senior NCOs if they decide to stay and would also fill in any gaps in the trades that they find interesting as a career choice later on.  as for the conscription part, i would like to see the the homeless, jobless and criminals get dragged into boot camps so that the military can have the needed people to fill in the mundane manual labour jobs.  think about it, the homeless get food and shelter plus minimum wage for their service.  the criminals can have a clean record in exchange for doing military service, plus i would think that some of them could be straightened out into normal people again.  i think.  the jobless could have a job during their service, depending on how long they stay and some of them could apply to be officers and NCOs because some might have diplomas and degrees.

from what i see in today's CF, we need more money and more people to apply in the CF.  i once heard that the CF will get more money from the government if the CF can get a LOT of people to join.  the above scenario COULD fill that latter part if worst comes to worst.  that's just my thoughts.


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## pbi

735: Unfortunately (or fortunately, however you look at it...) conscription in this country has such a loaded history (especially in Quebec) that it is almost a guaranteed non-starter except in some replay of WWII (if we had enough time to organize it...) Remember that one of the few times Canadian soldiers have ever fired on Canadian citizens happened because of disputes over conscription in WWI. Cheers.


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## a_majoor

I couldn't disagree more.

Short answer, If the soldiers around you _*DIDN'T*_ want to be there, would you trust them with your lives?

Long answer, the homeless, unemployed and criminal elements have exhibited undesirable traits for the military, either through some sort of mental illness (most homeless people, sad to say), unsuitable education/skill sets (chronic unemployed), or inability to live within the rules (criminals). Unless you are willing to do some really horrific things like Soviet style mine clearing battalions, (who were force marched in front of Guards regiments to detonate mines with their bodies), or Iranian style "human wave" attacks to force defenders to expend ammunition prior to the "real" military units advance, there are no uses for these people in a modern military environment. An Infantry corporal has to be instructed how to program a manpack radio, and the amount of technical knowledge just increases from there.

I think 735_Winnipeg is really thinking of some sort of "National Service" plan which scoops up high school graduates and gives them a sort of forced socialization in military values and virtues for one basic engagement. Once again, I am not convinced simply because so much of what we think of as morale is based on will; if you didn't want to be there, you won't have the will to succeed (or even make the attempt). In the summers I am tasked to do recruit training in Meaford, I am always disgusted by the whining recruits "Mom" pushed into the reserve to learn how to grow up. They hate being theere, don't try, often infect the wavering troops with their negative attitudes (Instructors cannot "live" with their charges, so for 16 hours a day, the candidates can stew in their own juices), and can only be described as "half assed" soldiers at the end. My patience is gone by then since these clowns have eaten up 80% of my time and effort which should have gone to instruct and mold the motivated ones. End of Rant


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## pbi

Sgt A Majoor: I agree with your assessment. I think sometimes people incorrectly extrapolate from the European experience to Canada. IMHO if you really looked into it, you would find that peacetime conscription was brought into these European countries not so much to build up civic virtues, but to provide masses of manpower in a hurry for the land wars that have been a feature of European history for the last millenium. I also bet that you will find that in many of these countries compulsory service is not popular and probably produces a rather mediocre soldier who may be useful for Home Defence and not much else. (An exception would be the UK National Servicemen who fought the Malaysian Emergency). Most European countries are forced to use their Marines, Legion, Airborne, or SF for anything serious because those ares the only places they can be guaranteed to get quality troops. France, in particular, is in the process of professionalizing its Army. IMHO we cannot afford an Army of lukewarm timeservers who are there only because they have to be. Cheers.


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## PPCLI Guy

> IMHO we cannot afford an Army of lukewarm timeservers who are there only because they have to be.



Amen.  And I think you will find that in our not so distant pat that this was frequently the case.


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## bossi

pbi said:
			
		

> IMHO we cannot afford an Army of lukewarm timeservers who are there only because they have to be. Cheers.



I swear you're going to make me have a stroke ... 
I don't think I can figure out a way of saying what I want to say without making even more enemies in high places.
However, I'll explode if I don't get this off my chest:
How about, instead of screwing over guys who've just returned from operational tours, we get rid of some deadwood who have NEVER volunteered for anything except buying a round at happy hour?
(i.e. the ones who "have never seen a paysheet they didn't sign" and are only sticking around to pad their pensions)
Worse, the system is not only letting these frauds survive, they're letting them give advice (and screwing over) guys with real operational experience.

To recap:  Let's get rid of some drunken, vindictive, careerist frauds and let some others have a chance to percolate upwards.


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## Storm

Breathe bossi, breathe.   

I think pbi was referring to the potential situation in a conscript force, not any currently serving members.

735_Winnipeg: the saying that "professionals are predictable, it's the amateurs that are dangerous" isn't necessarily referring to the enemy, if you catch my drift. Especially in the current global situation, sacrificing quality for quantity is totally the wrong direction to be headed IMO. A few highly trained and dedicated people can do a job that thousands of others who don't give a crap, don't know how or both can't.


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## Infanteer

I had to dig to find this (man, I was on a _Wehrmacht_ high at the time), but here is another article along the same vein (but in the American context) by Charles Moskos.

http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun05/moskos.pdf

There is something to be said for targeting the university graduate pool for recruits, even if it means shorter contract times.


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## FormerHorseGuard

some of the pros and cons here are very valid, some are just down right scary.

US Forces do they not have a promotion or get out system?
I read about in some books but not exactly  sure how it works.  

US Forces used short term soldiers in a small war in the 60s to 70s found out that  it did not work, you need the leadership, knowledge and the guts of a career soldier to fight a war. 
You use to be able to take a person off the street and train in less a year and ship that  person out by the boatload and have them fight in a war and win it.

Todays equipment and tools of war take longer then a year to learn how to turn it on or off. Some of the systems are so complex they take years to build.  Do you trust some one who is going to be around  up to 3 years to operate such a system with the skill level to make work and  operate required to save lives and to take lives.

It use to take days to make a combat ready aircraft,  20 to 25 hours a pilot was flying on their own.  within a year they were in combat flying real missions.  how many hours does it take now before a pilot is ready  to strap in to a Cf 18 or C130 and fly a real mission? 

Short time NCOs would be the death of the ground forces.  You can throw a young 2Lt into leading a platoon, but he / she needs the knowledge of the NCO to learn from.  We cannot turn out a Sgt or WO in a few years to keep up with the ones they get rid of in the short term army plan.

For that  matter a young army  cook or supply tech needs more then a couple years to learn the trade. EME would never get out of the shop without techs who have seen , done it and faked it to get  equipment ready  to move for a mission. they need the knowledge only  time will give them.

in my  simple thoughts i do not see a short term service working for Canada.

Cut back oin the SSO  positions,  cut back on the Generals who command nothing but an office or a force on paper.  Take some of the SNR NCOs and put them back in the units where they are needed and belong to teach and lead by example.  NDHQ needs less staff in all departments.


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## SeaKingTacco

> Cut back oin the SSO  positions,  cut back on the Generals who command nothing but an office or a force on paper.  Take some of the SNR NCOs and put them back in the units where they are needed and belong to teach and lead by example.  NDHQ needs less staff in all departments.



Just to play devil's advocate for a second, if we do what you suggest, who runs all of the project offices to buy all of the new kit that we all seem to desperately need, like, yesterday?


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## Trinity

bossi said:
			
		

> How about, instead of screwing over guys who've just returned from operational tours, we get rid of some deadwood who have NEVER volunteered for anything except buying a round at happy hour?
> (i.e. the ones who "have never seen a paysheet they didn't sign" and are only sticking around to pad their pensions)
> Worse, the system is not only letting these frauds survive, they're letting them give advice (and screwing over) guys with real operational experience.
> 
> To recap:  Let's get rid of some drunken, vindictive, careerist frauds and let some others have a chance to percolate upwards.



But Bossi...  
Sounds like you're taking away my retirement!!!    ;D

Um.. too bad I came into this thread 5 pages in.  
What I wanted to say has to do with 5 pages back and this thread has really changed from its original topic.. and i mean huge.
Its no longer supporting or hating the original topic but another argument of different problems in the CF.


The original idea sounds like what Israel does, but Israel has the entire country as service people.  When ever they need to
do an offensive they can simply call up who ever from their civilian life for whatever periods of time.  

Sounds like what English is saying is similar.  Calling up people to augment 70% of the positions with a few career army people
in the leadership positions.

My fear....  if we call up people for a small period of time, abuse them on a few tours and then set them free they will be more 
susceptible to PTSD and other stress illness because they lose their peer group of soldiers.  This is still a problem today in the Israeli army
(or so I was recently taught) (watched a video with a LCol of their army talk about re-integration of short term soldiers)

So, simply from a mental health stand point, this will cause more casualties on the homefront trying to re-adjust without the proper
support systems, peers, and understanding from the general public.

(like Bossi.. I had to get that off my chest..  sorry)


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## Jungle

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> US Forces used short term soldiers in a small war in the 60s to 70s found out that   it did not work, you need the leadership, knowledge and the guts of a career soldier to fight a war.


A short-term Soldier can have the guts to win a war, if he believes in it; for example: if his country is directly attacked, if his family is in danger. But it is difficult to convince a conscript, or an ordinary citizen, to go fight a war thousands of miles away, if he is not directly threatened.


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## Monsoon

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> US Forces do they not have a promotion or get out system?
> I read about in some books but not exactly  sure how it works.


The problem with the "up or out" system is that it encourages promotion of people beyond their competence.  Being a large organization, the US Army depends on a great deal on having a lot experienced officers to maintain the corporate memory.  Threatening people to get promoted or get released really only holds the military itself hostage and forces it to promote people who are only capable at their current rank into the next one higher.  This to say nothing of the perfectly capable people who get released because they don't look to be on the "fast track"...


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## Bert

I wasn't able to find the article on the canada.com site or a reference while searching so my understanding
of the article is limited.  However, I feel it is likely possible the reporter took alot out-of-context.

The idea of making a majority of the members only undertake short term contracts (I'm referring to the CF
in general and not just the army or the combat arms) is unworkable.  Unless the CF wants to augment
the military with sizable versatile civilian support, there is no way to develop the skills, knowledge, and experience to
install, maintain, and repair operational equipment.  The NCM QL3 in some MOCs takes 2 years, OJT, rotation,
and courses leading to QL4/5 takes a few more years.  By the time the member is useful in MOC and non-MOC
circumstances, PUFF, off he goes. This applies to the officer cadre too.  Doesn't make sense.  

As said before, the experiences of some countries may show citizen-like militaries work well.  Hard to say
how effective they would outside of their own country.  Within the Canadian context of versatile international 
deployability, the watering down of a professional cadre would work against us.


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## Trinity

Bert...

it would have to be a two system army for this to work

People to plug in and play with / abuse for a few years...

and people who stay long term, take up leadership positions and grow


I don't agree or disagree.  But thats how I think it would work if 
they tried to implement this.  And it would then be like the stupid
reg vs res  or  res vs cic  attitudes we experience.


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## a_majoor

The one possible positive point about a conscript or draftee army is that people were socialized to a military standard from all walks of life. Of course, the primary value set has to be military, not just social engineering for the heck of it. From Chaos Manor

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/mail442.html



> Subj: Army Recruiting: Making the Best of Bad High Schools
> 
> http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20061201.aspx
> 
> =...*ecause so many high schools, especially in large cities, do such a terrible job of getting students through high school, the army has found that, by taking a close look at applicants who did not graduate, they can get good people that the high schools missed, or just screwed up on.=
> 
> Join the Army, learn to read?
> 
> Maybe 4 years of compulsory militia service *instead* of current High School? 8-\
> 
> Rod Montgomery==monty@sprintmail.com
> 
> I have always been in favor of universal male conscription to military service, along the Swiss model: if you can be trusted to be a citizen you should have the privilege of being armed with a modern military weapon -- and it is a privilege that cannot be refused. Refuse the privilege and get a US passport valid for all countries but the US.
> 
> Won't happen, of course.
> 
> The value of universal military service is not so much the militia, though, as the social conditioning. I was brought up in the Old South. My attitude toward blacks -- we called them Negroes, which was the polite term -- was more or less paternalistic. That was how all of my social class regarded them. I never knew any black people socially, nor was I likely to. The Army changed that, and forcibly; for which I am more than grateful. Basic training with randomly assigned companies not based on social class or race or anything else is excellent socialization for young men. I don't know how it works for women, or that it is necessary. I stubbornly continue to believe that sexual bimorphism extends to more than just height.
> *


*

*


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## daftandbarmy

Intersting concepts. Kipling wrote about a simiular approach in "The Army of a Dream". Not too dissimilar from how many conscript armies operate. If we're fighting assymetric conflicts from now on, we'll need to think more assymetrically.

http://greatwarfiction.wordpress.com/2006/11/05/kiplings-military-utopia/

Kipling’s Military Utopia

A character in Kipling’s Boer War story The Captive calls that conflict “a dress-parade for Armageddon, ” and Kipling, like many others, considered it in some ways an unimpressive one. British military failures caused a great deal of national soul-searching and opinion-mongering in the war’s aftermath; notable literary products were books (like Mason’s The Four Feathers) that dealt with problems of courage and manliness, and future-war narratives imagining Britain’s response to an invasion.
One of Kipling’s responses to the question was an odder one; a short story (in two parts) called The Army of a Dream (collected in Traffics and Discoveries). Its narrator takes a seat in his Club smoking-room, and finds it “entirely natural” that he should be talking to “Boy Bayley”, whom he had last met twenty years before during the South African War (so setting this story in the 1920s, whereas Traffics and Discoveries was published in 1904).
Bayley tells him about the modern Army, and takes him to the barracks, where he meets several old friends. Together (This is one of Kipling’s polyvocal stories, with a whole community of narrators – is there any writer more dialogical than Kipling?) they describe not just an Army, but an entirely militarised nation:
All boys begin physical drill to music in the Board Schools when they’re six; squad-drill, one hour a week, when they’re eight; company drill when they’re ten, for an hour and a half each week. Between ten and twelve they get battalion drill of a sort. They take the rifle at twelve and record their first target-score at thirteen. That’s what the Code says. But it’s worked very loosely so long as a boy comes up to the standard of his age.
Once they become men, all citizens join territorial units which give them regular training. Fierce inter-unit rivalry keeps standards and morale immensely high, and military culture pervades all aspects of life. What happens to those who don’t want to be involved with the army?


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## a_majoor

In the former USSR (and many communist nations, National Socialist Germany and many other nations) the system described by Kipling was partially or fully implemented, although probably not with the happy results described. 

Switzerland has universal male conscription, and it seems (from anecdotal reports, I'm afraid) this is used as a form of socialization as well as a form of screening: people who are NCO and officer material in the Swiss military are also marked as up and comers in Swiss society, and this apparently gets reflected in hiring, promotions at work etc.

Most draftee armies which I am aware of do not meet either of these extremes, and I would venture to say that the underlying culture and political situation of the parent nation has much more to do with the successful/unsuccessful outcomes of their military forces than anything else. The Swiss know that their neutrality must be guarded; the Israelis know what will happen if they ever lose a war; an attempt to impose a draft on the Canadian Forces would run up against the "Militia Myth" and regional divisions, and so on.


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