# Counterinsurgency/COIN Literature & Discussion (merged)



## tomahawk6

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/15/AR2006021502586_pf.html

The story of the success that the 3ACR has had in Tel Afar. Commanded by HR McMaster, hero of DS where as a Captain commanding a troop took on a republican guard unit much greater than his own winning a Silver Star. One of the Army's up and coming commanders.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

"One out of every 10 soldiers received a three-week course in conversational Arabic, so that each small unit would have someone capable of basic exchanges with Iraqis."

do we do this? and if not why not.


----------



## Andy

CFL said:
			
		

> "One out of every 10 soldiers received a three-week course in conversational Arabic, so that each small unit would have someone capable of basic exchanges with Iraqis."
> 
> do we do this? and if not why not.



I know that during pre-deployment training there are classes on basic words and phrases but it is not extensive enough to actually remember anything usefull.  It is definitely not done enough and your best bet is to learn it on your own before going.  I'm pretty sure it is not a concern to CO's of unit's because in any situation they should have a local translator attached to units.  The only problem is how can you trust a local in this type of a situation?  There is only one thing you need to know to speak in any language and that is the sound of your weapon coching and a barrel pointed in there face.  They will get the hint..


----------



## MoRat

I cannot for the life of me understand why we do not put more emphasis on language training. Units know years in advance when they will be deploying. Rather than letting the days slide by, why not take motivated volunteers and provide them with long-term, professional language training? It's not like the CF has no experience with teaching its' members how to learn another language.
There is no doubt that our interpreters in Kandahar may be of questionable loyalty. Since we have the means to address this problem ourselves, I find it baffling that we do not.


----------



## George Wallace

Do you work for a living?  Do you expect the Forces now to run Night School for its' Troops?  Just a couple of questions.

Some times I find it baffling at the conceptions that some people have about the CF.  Like the CF doesn't do anything all day?  I guess they think the same of Firemen, Paramedics, and police in the same way.  If they can't see you actively doing something, like fighting a fire, chasing robbers or shovelling snow in Toronto, then you don't do anything all day.


----------



## Glorified Ape

Andy said:
			
		

> There is only one thing you need to know to speak in any language and that is the sound of your weapon coching and a barrel pointed in there face.  They will get the hint..



I would imagine that that approach is somewhat self-defeating in the long run, since counter insurgency (against a semi-Maoist insurgency anyways) often relies as much on the political socialization of the populous as much as military force.


----------



## KevinB

Glorified Ape said:
			
		

> I would imagine that that approach is somewhat self-defeating in the long run, since counter insurgency (against a semi-Maoist insurgency anyways) often relies as much on the political socialization of the populous as much as military force.


 :

Everyone speaking English with a gun in their Face....  ;D

We (well I am out - but I mean the CF) are not Mother Teressa - if an Infanteer needs to make a point very clearly to a Afghan on a patrol its usually - a stop RFN or I kill you issue.

I know from soldiering with Andy in Afghan (and he has two tours here) that he is not a loose thread fred type -- the poitn as George Wallace made already is WHEN do you find time to do the language training?
 The pre-dep trg is already jam filled and if the unit CO has not alreayd hedged his bet he is deployign odds are the guys will be working weekends during the pre-dep trg if they have not managed to squeeze some in prior to the Warning Order for the tour (out of the Units normal budget)

I'd love to see more language training - but until there are more bodies - its not feasible.


----------



## Glorified Ape

KevinB said:
			
		

> :
> 
> Everyone speaking English with a gun in their Face....  ;D
> 
> We (well I am out - but I mean the CF) are not Mother Teressa - if an Infanteer needs to make a point very clearly to a Afghan on a patrol its usually - a stop RFN or I kill you issue.



I'm not saying that the "gun in the face" approach is wrong or that it isn't often necessary, just that it probably wouldn't serve too well as the sole means of communication between the troops and the populous during a counter-insurgency campaign. 





> I know from soldiering with Andy in Afghan (and he has two tours here) that he is not a loose thread fred type -- the poitn as George Wallace made already is WHEN do you find time to do the language training?
> 
> The pre-dep trg is already jam filled and if the unit CO has not alreayd hedged his bet he is deployign odds are the guys will be working weekends during the pre-dep trg if they have not managed to squeeze some in prior to the Warning Order for the tour (out of the Units normal budget)
> 
> I'd love to see more language training - but until there are more bodies - its not feasible.



Hey, I don't disagree with you, especially considering I have no tour experience by which I would know the time/personnel constraint issues, let alone funding issues, etc. I'm not saying we could pull off the kind of language training that the yanks have, my only point was that a counter-insurgency probably won't do well if brute force (or the threat thereof) is the only tool/communication device. That's not to say it's not an important tool, but I'd wager it needs to be offset with gaining the cooperation of the populous - something that requires communication resources other than the muzzle of a C7/8.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Having soldiers who can interact with the locals (civilians and officials) without needing interpreters are extremely valuable. Take it for what it is worth, but Kaplan's book Imperial Grunts has language ability as a major criticism of US forces today.  Apparently, the US military will be devoting more time to language training. 

I'm no language training expert, but perhaps we could invest some foreign language training into a cross-section of soldiers before they start TMST.  Another option would be to take a three week chunk of TMST and send this cross-section (like 1 man per Tp/Pl) on an intensive course at the expense of other TMST.  We do it for other things.  It is hard, however, to decide what to miss.  I guess its all about priorities.  Perhaps we could take advantage of our veteran soldiers with recent tours under their belts.  With a six week block, the "platoon linguist" could take a week of ranges, a week of first aid, a week of mines/IED/threat training and three weeks of intensive language training.

If we could look a little farther ahead with soldier's tempo (what missions they will go on), we could perhaps devote some resources (especially time) to developing these languages in our soldiers.  

2B


----------



## Journeyman

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Perhaps we could take advantage of our veteran soldiers with recent tours under their belts.



While there may be an issue of qualified local instruction (you could learn Somali in Ottawa's Rideau Centre, but are there many Pashtu speakers in the West Edmonton Mall?)....another factor would be ability to learn another language - - some people are quite simply "tone deaf" when it comes to other languages. These would have to be identified before investing time/effort into supplemental language courses...again, IF you could find the training time in the first place.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Quite true.  There is an Afghan-Canadian community, however, that could be engaged for instructors (as is done for the language training in TMST).  The ability part would require some testing and assessment I suppose.  I figure that time will be the big stumbling block.

"Ask me for anything but time"


----------



## pbi

The message I got, very loud and clear, from US inf tactical leaders (and I'm talking about squad/pl/coy level) in Afghanistan in 2004/05 was that they desperately needed to be able to communicate effectively with the local people in order to be aware of what was going on in their AO, to build trust, and maybe in the long run save lives. They recommended having way more translators (right down to squad, since squads often operated autonomously), and getting useful language training before deployment.

If time is the enemy, then maybe the answer is that we have to make a draconian decision: we will designate certain people to start language training as soon as we get the WngO for a deployment. (Well, actually, probably before that, unless the timeliness of WngOs has improved...) As was suggested, these could be experienced soldiers who don't need quite as much refresher training. Their job will not be as  a driver gunner, or sig op, or cook: it will be as a soldier-translator. I would argue that in a place like Afghanistan that function could be equally as important (if not moreso...) than those listed.

We could also consider (as the US Marine Corps is now initiating) standing language training as part of training during one's career, based on what languages are most likely to be used on ops. (At Quantico, the USMC has begun with Arabic, and will add Chinese).

Cheers


----------



## Journeyman

pbi said:
			
		

> We could also consider (as the US Marine Corps is now initiating) standing language training as part of training during one's career, based on what languages are most likely to be used on ops. (At Quantico, the USMC has begun with Arabic, and will add Chinese).



The range of languages need not be too broad, given our deployment track record. We seldom have one-off deployments, unless the withdrawal is based more on political expediency than the on-ground situation (Somalia comes to mind). The Canadian Army went into Cyprus in 1964 with a 4-month mandate; there's _still_ a Canadian flag flying out in front of UNFICYP HQ! CF troops could have gotten much use out of Greek or Turkish language skills. I suspect any language training relevant to Afghanistan will have utility for several more years - - if only because it's _not_ Iraq.


----------



## Journeyman

pbi said:
			
		

> ...and getting useful language training before deployment.



Further, see  http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/16fort.html

10th Mountain Division, primarily 3rd Bde, deploys to A'stan next month. The Div commander, "Maj. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley, and other officers spoke of the heightened language and cultural training they had instituted to meet the new challenges in a conflict against militant Islam."

Some soldiers had been assigned " an intensive course in Pashto, the major language in Afghanistan, as their sole duty for 47 weeks."


----------



## tomahawk6

Perhaps creating a program within the Pres where soldiers would take language training and once qualified would volunteer for deployment with the regular force, would be one way to tackle this problem.


----------



## KevinB

T6 - excellent idea...


----------



## Kirkhill

I find myself a bit confused.

On other threads we have people like GO saying that a primary reason for people not extending past their BE, especially in the Combat Arms, is that they are bored.  That suggests that they have time on their hands.  At the same time we have people here arguing that there is too little time after the WngO has been issued to supply language training.

Surely the secret is not to wait until the WngO is issued to start training troops in other languages.  Especially with folks like Generals Hillier and Leslie talking about being engaged in Afghanistan for 20 years or so, and the US talking about "The Long War" perhaps it might serve to start including language training into the standing syllabus.  EG rather than having troops sitting around at Borden after BMQs (a problem as I understand from other posts) why not eat up some of that "slack" time in language classes -- always assuming instructors can be found.  

A side benefit is that the troops might learn more than "Halt", "2 Beers", and "Where's the washroom?" or suitable military equivalents.

Of course, maybe there isn't all this free time available.  Maybe the boredom referred to is not due to too much time being available but due to the training being uninteresting.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill - its both.

The units have zero budget for trg until a WO is generated these days -- then its all a flurry of activity....

Maybe IF the army managed itself better - it would work -- but despite the fact a unit be able it is slated to go they cant start training (at leats funded trg) until the WO is dropped to them...

Several of the Sr Officers can expound better on this than I.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kevin:

I guess the good news is that your observation suggests that given a cadre of good professional leaders, it is possible to field a unit for Afghanistan by putting new recruits through a few months of basic individual training, followed by another few months of collective training and they are good to go for six months in Afghanistan.  ( I know it ain't that simple - see comments on SITREP Militia Units).  It does make for some interesting thoughts about shorter contracts, recruits for combat arms, building leadership skills in long service soldiers and preserving skills and capabilities by transferring "seasoned" short-service soldiers into the reserves.

OT - apologies - just that everything seems to relate to everything else.

As to the no training until WngO  ??? :


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill -- IMHO  ;D  It would/shoudl take a year for a troop to join and go over.

I am no longer current with the training system - but Basic/GMT & Battleschool is / was around 6 months - then add in getting to a Bn and doing work up trg and the rest.


 Obviously with a cadre of exceedingly high instructors and above avg candidates this can/could be shortened - but the fact of the matter is the CF no longer has this cadre (outside DHTC for weapons etc)...


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

To me, an ideal 1st Basic Engagement for a young soldier would look a little like this:

    a.   Year 1 - Joins his Regt as a recruit and is trained with a cohort of other new recruits (a depot style but at the unit).  He would belong to a sub-unit or unit that is in the Reconstitution phase, that is they just got back from a tour.  In that year he takes all of his DP1 training and gets some PCF courses added in (type and number depending on branch).  For the Cpls to WOs they will be teaching but at least they will be at home and not on task to some school.  

    b.  Year 2 - Goes through an intensive Training year with his sub-unit and/or unit, ending in a CMTC serial

    c.  Year 3 - Goes on deployment with his sub-unit (including pre-deployment training)

He'd be with the same bunch through these three years.  By the time they go on deployment they should either be a highly cohesive team or be ready to kill each other.  If we have some foresight as a system we should be able to predict which line of operation the task force will be deployed to.  We could then inject some foreign language training throughout the two years of lead-in.  The year at the Regt tends to fill up, but a couple of month-long blocks could be found.  If you do not have foresight as a system then you will always be too late and catching up.

You could pick a few key "world" languages and split your group up (Farsi, Spanish, Arabic, French etc) so that you at least have a few guys who could carry out a conversation.  You could identify those with linguistic talent in the first year and develop them further.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## commando gunner

What? You mean that all the money spent on second official language training is not proving operationally valuable? Fancy that.... 

There are two language paths that need to be followed, 2nd Ol in order to increase promotion/per scores and then the operationally useful ones.  For the average guy there really is not time for both -even if the facility was offered on a wider basis as suggested earlier in this topic- and guess which one makes a career difference....


----------



## Journeyman

2Bravo said:
			
		

> He'd be with the same bunch through these three years.



Except that this ignores the reality, pointed out in other threads, that we no longer send cohesive units anywhere any more. 

Deployments are "based on" a battalion, but that may be only two companies, which may be amalgamated from the whole battalion. The rest of the battle group will be "plug & play" from across the CF. While everyone knows the theories of building unit cohesion, we certainly haven't been practicing them during the past decade's rotations


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The sub-units can certainly be cohesive and have been together for more than the immediate pre-deployment period.  There will always be individuals coming and going, but a critical mass for a deploying sub-unit is within the realm of the possible even with our current force generation model.


----------



## Chimo

Perhaps when we are all qualified BBB in our official second language we can start to worry about learning a useful language.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Chimo are actual serious.  Because if you are, tell me how being up on French will better us in Afganistan.


----------



## Chimo

CFL you hit my point exactly.  ;D


----------



## Haggis

CFL said:
			
		

> Chimo are actual serious.  Because if you are, tell me how being up on French will better us in Afganistan.



Mastery of French is mandated by the Commisioner of Official Languages.  French language training is wll funded.  Mastery of French is a stepping stone to promoton.

Pashtun, Dari and Arabic are not.

Which will save more lives?

Which will get more votes?

Rant ends.


----------



## devil39

A very incisive parable that outlines the requirements of counter-insurgency.... in six paragraphs.

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/six_easy_paragraphs.htm

This is certainly a topic worth thinking of and worth getting our minds around.  Whether we are fighting counter-insurgency or conducting nation-building in failed and failing states, I believe the requirements will be much the same.

http://www.d-n-i.net/ is a very good source for 4GW info and along with http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ are some of the greatest sources of progressive counterinsurgency thought.

I will copy the parable here with all due acknowledgement to William Christie and d-n-i.net



> The Theory of Counterinsurgency in Six Easy Paragraphs
> 
> By William Christie
> 
> January 31, 2006
> 
> Special to Defense and the National Interest
> 
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> A neighbor and I were discussing my previous commentary, Still Looking Out From the Forest of Iraq: At Iran.
> 
> “I know the media’s all hot about Iran,” he said. “But I’m a lot more worried about Iraq.”
> 
> “You’re not alone,” I said. “Even when the military officers I correspond with talk about Iran, their minds are still on Iraq.”
> 
> “I don’t know who to believe,” he said. “If you listen to the press, it’s all bad and the military and government are selling you a bill of goods. If you listen to the military and government, we’re winning and the press is only looking for the bad.”
> 
> “They might both be right,” I said. “In counterinsurgency you can win all the battles and still lose the war.”
> 
> He asked me to explain that, and I said I’d try and put a few thoughts down on paper.
> 
> “Wait a minute,” he said. “I know you writers like to write. How about something short.”
> 
> “That’s a tall order,” I said. “It’s a subject that doesn’t led itself to short.”
> 
> “I have a job and a wife and kids I like to spent time with,” he replied. “I need short. And how about something I can relate to?”
> 
> So here is a theory of counterinsurgency. In six paragraphs and the form of a parable. Set in the rural South, where we both live.
> 
> The house next door to you is sold, and the people who move in are white supremacist skinheads. You discover that they’ve started up a methamphetamine lab in their basement. You think about calling your County Sheriff’s Department, but you’re not so sure. The cops strike you as generally overweight and none too swift. The only time you ever see them is in the mall, two cruisers parked side by side, the deputies gossiping and waiting for the next radio call instead of being on patrol. You’re afraid that if you tell them about your neighbors the news will leak out and you’ll get your house burned down one night. After all, you have a wife and kids and a mortgage.
> 
> But one day the SWAT team shows up to serve a warrant and kicks down the neighbor’s door and drags them off to jail. You’re incredibly pleased and highly relieved. You vow that the next time the Department is doing some charity work you’ll write a check. And you tell one of the deputies that if he sees you out in the yard to stop and you’ll let him know what’s going on in the neighborhood.
> 
> Now let’s shift that scenario to a slightly alternate universe where the Bill of Rights doesn’t apply. The Sheriff’s Department gets the word that someone in the neighborhood is cooking meth. They don’t know who, but since no one in the neighborhood is telling them anything they think everyone might be white supremacists. So one night they kick down your door looking for the meth lab. They point guns at your kids and your wife and scare them half to death. While searching your home they break your furniture and throw your belongings everywhere. And they slap you around trying to get you to tell them where the meth lab is. By now you’ve forgotten all about your scary neighbors—you just want to get even with those cops.
> 
> Even worse, let’s say that the cops find out exactly where the meth lab is. But they’re afraid of the neighborhood, and they don’t want to get shot at taking down the lab. So they call in a fighter bomber and drop a 500 lb guided bomb on your neighbor’s house. That takes care of the meth lab, but it also blows down one wall of your house, breaks every window, and destroys the car you need to get to work every day. You don’t know what you’re going to do.
> 
> A couple of nights later, another neighbor comes to your door and says he’s making a bomb to blow up the next patrol car that comes down the road. And would you help him dig the hole for $100?
> 
> You’d probably do it for nothing, wouldn’t you?
> 
> 
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> William Christie is a former Marine Corps infantry officer who left the Corps as a First Lieutenant in 1987. He is the author of 5 novels, including most recently The Blood We Shed, currently in hardcover from ibooks. And Threat Level, which will be published in October by Pinnacle Books/Kensington Press. He can be reached at christieauthor@yahoo.com.


----------



## zipperhead_cop

Guess he should have dropped the dime in the first place.  Then he could have avoided all that other crap.


----------



## devil39

Yup.  But it is all about context.  It is a parable you see...



> You think about calling your County Sheriff’s Department, but you’re not so sure. The cops strike you as generally overweight and none too swift. The only time you ever see them is in the mall, two cruisers parked side by side, the deputies gossiping and waiting for the next radio call instead of being on patrol. You’re afraid that if you tell them about your neighbors the news will leak out and you’ll get your house burned down one night. After all, you have a wife and kids and a mortgage.



I come from a cop family so I wouldn't buy that stereotype.  But many would.  That is part of the problem isn't it?


----------



## m410

When the meth lab or jihadis move next door, DO SOMETHING (like call the cops or deal with it yourself) or risk your family's safety.


----------



## teddy49

I think you're missing the point.  I think he's trying to get people to visualize Buford T Justice and his idiot son when he's talking about the deputies.  And to be honest, from what I've seen of the US Military in Iraq, that's about the best analogy I can think of.  As they tear through Iraq hunting for the Bandit and the Snowma...I mean Zarqawi and Al Quaeda.  It's certainly a lot more complicated than that, but from the from the perspective of Ahmed and Sunnah Q. Iraqi, that's pretty much how it looks.

I've said it before and I'll say it again here.  The US's biggest impediment to getting a handle on this thing, is their force protection policies.  As long as they live inside a fort, separated from the people of Iraq in who's interest they're supposed to be working, and are only annoying visitors to their patrol areas, they'll never get anywhere with it.  How can you give a tip on the bad guys to the security forces, if every time you come with in 10 meters of them, they threaten to shoot you.  I certainly don't know all the answers, but I do know that the first part of the solution is to move out of the forts, to somewhere that's accessible, in the community.  I'm thinking like Platoon Houses dispersed around the company patrol area.  Then the platoon lives in that neighborhood.  Get's to know the people who live there.  Maybe buys it's food and sundry items at the local markets.  Conducts visible, but not threatening foot patrols in those areas.  Kind of like a cop on the beat.  When the people on the street feel safe enough around you to call you, Lieutenant Bloggins, or Mister John instead of "the Americans" then you'll start to get info on the bad guys.  But as long as you're just the alien looking guys who drive around town, in alien looking vehicles, pointing guns at everyone you see, it's not gonna happen.

That'll never happen, because it will mean more casualties, do to higher vulnerabilities.  In the short term, significantly more casualties.  But last time I checked, you didn't fight wars to prevent friendly casualties, you fought it to win.  This war is more than a contest of combat power, it's a battle for hearts and minds.  But you don't make friends by kicking people in the teeth repeatedly, and then wondering why they don't like you.

Again, I don't have all the answers, but I think for anything to happen, there has to be a move in this direction and away from living in forts festooning yourself in equipment that makes you look inhuman, and pointing guns at all the brown people you see.

Just my $0.02


----------



## m410

Well Teddy, that's getting at the crux of the issue.  And it's a lesson that Americans and others have learned and forgotten from past counterinsurgencies.  Its best example was the Vietnam War USMC Combined Action Platoon.  Apparently the Combined Action Program exists in some form in Iraq, but I imagine, like in Vietnam, at too small a scale.  Google has more.

Iraq may be harder to template with CAP because it is more urban, but what about Afghanistan?  While Canadian forces are prideful for getting in amongst the locals, do we live amongst them, arm and train local militias, and provide a secure environment where they can rat out the bad guys, provide their own local security, and deny a haven to our mutual enemies?  We seem to be working primarily with the Afghan National Army, which means a centralized organization which can't provide Jafar the Villager the immediate protection he needs to tell the Taliban to take a hike back to Pakistan.

Do we have the guts to put sections and platoons out in the wind for weeks and months at a time?


----------



## GAP

> Do we have the guts to put sections and platoons out in the wind for weeks and months at a time?



Good Point. Great idea, but just a minute...that's my son/daughter and I want them to be reasonably safe. The Canadian public, with their present mindset, would never stand for the potential lifethreat. Look at the response to IED's going off, and you want to put my Johnny/Jenny out among those people where anybody can get at them?? No Way!!  

So what do we do? We attend shureas, we help, we maintain non threatening contact, etc. More importantly, we let the Afghan Army/Police become the front person. That's who _Jafar the Villager _ is going to have to deal with long after we have gone home. One thing that helps the population visualize the authority lines, would be for the Police/Army to be consistently uniformed. Let them form an "Identity", cure the "roadblock corruption" mentioned about the police. There is no lack of stamina and guts to confront the Taliban as seen in the initial 'Good Friday' firefight, it just has to be co-ordinated with their allies and visually identified to the populace. 

Hearts and minds. The parable kinda said it all, we just have to adapt it :-*


----------



## pbi

You guys should get out more. Living and operating "beyond the wire", including platoon and coy-size FOBs is exactly how LCol Ian Hope, CO of the PPCLI BG, has been doing business. He (and his soldiers) understand perfectly the type of war they are in. And,by the way, that's pretty much the way US forces in OEF have been operating, as well.

Cheers


----------



## Journeyman

devil39 said:
			
		

> A very incisive parable that outlines the requirements of counter-insurgency.... in six paragraphs.



You know Devil39.....if you're not careful, people may start to think you're more than just another pretty face


----------



## Centurian1985

Are our troops conducting house-to-house searches for weapons as well?


----------



## m410

pbi said:
			
		

> You guys should get out more. Living and operating "beyond the wire", including platoon and coy-size FOBs is exactly how LCol Ian Hope, CO of the PPCLI BG, has been doing business. He (and his soldiers) understand perfectly the type of war they are in. And,by the way, that's pretty much the way US forces in OEF have been operating, as well.
> 
> Cheers


I admit I'm not there yet, and I know LCol Hope doesn't have his BG lined up in rows of cots in hard quarters at Kandahar Airfield.  I have seen the Outside the Wire CTV embed report with C Coy, which shows a company FOB (and is presented as a novel idea).  But a company FOB in one village is still hugely different from a Combined Action Program of section level semi-permanently augmenting local militia in dozens of villages.  Is CAP in its Vietnam form untenable in Afghanistan?  Was it a stupid idea, now and then?  Is platoon and company the more effective size?  Are we the wrong people for CAP?  Have we got another way to solve the problem of Taliban observers in shuras who note what people say and then come back once the infidels are gone?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

In my opinion, section-sized "houses" are probably too small.  In-theatre we have platoon-houses and company level FOBs.  The troops work closely with ANA and ANP out in the rhubarb.  Perhaps I'm too close to make an unbiased call, but we have the right troops.


----------



## geo

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> Are our troops conducting house-to-house searches for weapons as well?



Ummm.... yeah - what do you think VP does while in theatre?


----------



## zipperhead_cop

So Teddy, to get this straight:  Because the people in a given country have a poor image of the occupying force, the onus is on that force to change their SOP's and get killed at the same rate as the indigent population in order to win the "hearts and minds".  Hope the only time you spend at NDHQ is polishing the floors.  
If we are to take the "parable" at face value, you are going to be the one who is the "sheriff", so you are saying that you PERSONALLY are in favor of reduced personal security for your platoon and yourself, so that soldiers getting killed leaves a favourable impression on the locals?  You don't happen to be wearing a green headband right now, are you?  ???
Besides, in A'stan aren't we there in order to allow the local force to get it's own collective shyte together so they can take over?  How extended should soldiers be into harms way to achieve their goals?  Ambushes and IED's are one thing, but at such time as the procedures start to appear easily attacked, I think we will see a much higher mortality rate.


----------



## m410

Teddy never said the Americans should "seek out more casualties in order to win hearts and minds".

He said, basically, "be more accessible in order to win hearts and minds."  The _byproduct_ of this is increased vulnerability.  The paradox of this approach is that it (may) actually decrease your vulnerability because it denies the enemy his support network.


----------



## zipperhead_cop

Six of one...
Maybe one of the guys that has been on one of these ops can explain why it is so important to have the locals in love with you.  There are obvious reasons, less aggravation, less stress etc.  But is it really necessary in order to secure the area?  If it is just Intel that is needed, my experience (all in Canada) has been that the rats will seek you out and give info regardless of what else is going on for their own gain.  Isn't that what the HumInt guys are there for?  Aren't the uniformed soldiers there for area security and aggressive patrols?  I stand to be put back in my lane, but I would like to know one way or the other.  If we are just there in order to help the Afghan police/soldiers get their act together, then why must we be so chummy?  I bet Lt. Trevor Greene would have a different opinion on relaxing on personal safety in the interest of "looking like a nice guy".  

Smile, hand out candy and water bottles, watch your ass, get back here with all yer parts.


----------



## devil39

Zipperhead_cop,

Some insight that I would recommend on the subject of counter-insurgency in the links below.  Most counterinsurgency doctrines and experience suggests that you cannot win an insurgency by brute military force.  One must be concerned with winning "hearts and minds", separating the insurgent from the population, legitimacy, and a whole host of other issues. 

Steven Metz
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/metz1.pdf

Lind and 4th Generation War (4GW)
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc

This quote from Andrew Krepinevich in his article "How to Win In Iraq" from _Foreign Affairs_ Sep/Oct 2005 pretty much sums up the need to win the hearts and minds of the local population in a counterinsurgency war.  It is all about centres of gravity.  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508-p0/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html



> CENTERS OF GRAVITY
> 
> In conventional warfare, the enemy's military forces and capital city are often considered its centers of gravity, meaning that losing either would spell defeat. In the Iraq war, for example, the coalition concentrated on destroying Saddam's Republican Guard and capturing Baghdad. But the centers of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare are completely different, and focusing efforts on defeating the enemy's military forces through traditional forms of combat is a mistake.
> 
> The current fight has three centers of gravity: the Iraqi people, the American people, and the American soldier. The insurgents have recognized this, making them their primary targets. For the United States, the key to securing each one is winning "hearts and minds." The Iraqi people must believe that their government offers them a better life than the insurgents do, and they must think that the government will prevail. If they have doubts on either score, they will withhold their support. The American people must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice, in lives and treasure, and think that progress is being made. If the insurgents manage to erode their will, Washington will be forced to abandon the infant regime in Baghdad before it is capable of standing on its own. Finally, the American soldier must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice and think that there is progress toward victory. Unlike in Vietnam, the United States is waging war with an all-volunteer military, which gives the American soldier (or marine) a "vote" in the conflict. With over 150,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers must rotate back into those war zones at a high rate. If confidence in the war wanes, veterans will vote with their feet by refusing to reenlist and prospective new recruits will avoid signing up in the first place. If this occurs, the United States will be unable to sustain anything approaching its current effort in Iraq. A precipitous reduction in U.S. forces could further undermine the resolve of both the American and the Iraqi people. At present, U.S. Army and Marine Corps reenlistment rates are strong. Army recruiting, however, is down substantially.
> 
> The insurgents have a clear advantage when it comes to this fight: they only need to win one of the centers of gravity to succeed, whereas the United States must secure all three. Making matters even more complicated for the coalition, a Catch-22 governs the fight against the insurgency: efforts designed to secure one center of gravity may undermine the prospects of securing the others. For example, increased U.S. troop deployments to Iraq -- which require that greater resources be spent and troops be rotated in and out more frequently -- might increase security for the Iraqi people but erode support for the war among the U.S. public and the military. This risk is especially great given the nature of the current U.S. operations against the insurgents. They put too great an emphasis on destroying insurgent forces and minimizing U.S. casualties and too little on providing enduring security to the Iraqi people; too much effort into sweeping maneuvers with no enduring presence and too little into the effective coordination of security and reconstruction efforts; and too high a priority on quickly fielding large numbers of Iraqi security forces and too low a priority on ensuring their effectiveness.
> 
> The key to securing the centers of gravity in the current war is to recognize that U.S. forces have overwhelming advantages in terms of combat power and mobility but a key disadvantage in terms of intelligence. If they know who the insurgents are and where they are, they can quickly suppress the insurgency. The Iraqi people are the best source of this intelligence. But U.S. forces and their allies can only gain this knowledge by winning locals' hearts and minds -- that is, by convincing them that the insurgents' defeat is in their interest and that they can share intelligence about them without fear of insurgent reprisals.


----------



## GO!!!

teddy49,

First, the hypocrisy of someone who makes his living off of the Force Protection policies of the US military and civilians in Iraq criticisng those same policies is not lost on me.

Second, this is not WWII. Doddering Generals are no longer permitted to feed thousands into the meat grinders in pursuit of victory. Casualties are not something that should be "sucked up" or seen as acceptable. The idea that the US should accept "much higher" casualty rates in any term is ludicrous. No commander in his right mind would even consider it, and rightly so. More casualties will sour the voting public against this war even more than it already is, and hamper the effort by reducing the amount of resources available. 

Third, Comparing the US mission in Iraq to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is a big stretch. At last count, the US mission to Iraq is fifty times the size, and has a far greater urban component, as well as accessibility to the foreigners who have been proven to be doing (at least) a large portion of the fighting, and most of the funding.

Fourth, as has been alluded to here, the most effective tool in the box right now is intelligence. If the bad guys can be fixed, they can be killed, and nothing provides a disincentive to fight against us like watching terrorists be dragged out of houses in the middle of the night for a long trip to Cuba. Keep the number of troops high, train up the IP and Iraqi Army, and act decisively on reliable int, while paying handsomely for more.


----------



## pbi

zipperhead cop: Having spent six months in the HQ of the US forces running OEF, and having had the great privelege to  travel out to the Bde AOs to speak at length to a number of the USA/USMC Inf junior leaders who were actually out on the ground making OEF happen, I can only second devil39's post. (And devil 39 has led fighting troops on the ground in that country, as part of OEF, so he has far more credibility than I do...)The US forces, at all levels, understood very clearly, the importance of a good relationship with the people amongst whom they were operating. They were divided on the idea of "winnning hearts and minds", but they were unanimous on the need to win trust. HUMINT is a very big key to success in these types of ops, just as I suspect it is in police work. The amount and quality of HUMINT, and the willingness of people to give it, is IMHO (and I think, not just IMHO...) directly related to the quality of the relationship you enjoy with the locals. I have a hard time imagining any real success by a force that cuts itself off from the people.

I would be very cautious about trying to draw too close a parallel between operations in Afghanistan and your experience as a municipal police officer, or even the collective experience of your entire PD. Police agencies in this country start out much further ahead than the Coalition does: police are the recognized, legitimate and (more or less) trusted agents of a public order that most of us have agreed to and support. There is a long-standing belief amongst most people (most, I said...) that there is a reasonable chance that if you turn to the police, you will receive fair and effective response. And, with the exception of a relatively small group of hard core sh*tbirds, most citizens do not believe that they will be killed or their homes destroyed if they call 911.

Still, with all of those advantages, IMHO progressive police services in Canada place a high premium on their good relations with the community, their communty presence, and the willingness of all citizens, not just scumbags, to come forward with info. Isn't there great value in the old traditional foot patrol that works a neighbourhood over a long period, gets to know and trust the people, and can hear/see/smell/check all kinds of things that some guy rolling by in a cruiser (once in eight hours) with the windows up and the radio on will never even notice? Don't police services in Canada express great frustration that certain communities do not trust them, and will not share information with them?

IMHO if you can't win the trust, you can't win the fight.

Cheers


----------



## teddy49

Ok where to start?

Zipperhead_Cop.  I gather from you're profile that you are a member of Windsor's finest.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  Allow me to stretch the analogy a little further.  Would you like to roll through the streets of Windsor in a no smaller than 3 vehicle convoy, armed with C-7s and C-8s and C-9s, while tucked behind armour with a gunner on top with a fifty or C-6 mounted?  Would you like patrolling to mean that you never got out of the vehicle between leaving the police station and returning to it unless there was some kind of drama, like one of your vehicles was blown up?  Would you like the situation in Windsor to degrade to the point where you had too?  Or would you rather be able to stop at Timmy's for lunch and a Double Double and be able to talk to the citizens you meet in a courteous and professional manner.  Or conduct a traffic stop instead of a VBIED Magnet...I mean Vehicle Control Point.  Would you like all the hotels and government buildings in Windsor to be surrounded by 3 meter concrete blast walls, razor wire, and armed guys who make 3-4 times what you do?  How would you feel about having another group of guys, who work for a private company, but are contracted to the Mayor's office running around with C-6s, C-8s, C-9s, up armoured suburbans, who were above the law.  They could shoot anyone they thought was a threat, or who got inside their bubble, and you had to deal with the aftermath.  Would you like Windsor to be a place where you launched 3 or 4 rounds at citizen's vehicles, because they were in your way and even though you didn't have an emergency to go to, if you'd slowed down anymore, you'd be vulnerable to attack?  Would you like the media both locally and worldwide, to complain about everything that you did in Windsor and accuse you of things you didn't do.  This is life in Bagdad, today.  Put yourself in a citizen's shoes.  If this was life in Windsor, why would they possibly have anything at all to do with you.



			
				zipperhead_cop said:
			
		

> So Teddy, to get this straight:  Because the people in a given country have a poor image of the occupying force, the onus is on that force to change their SOP's and get killed at the same rate as the indigent population in order to win the "hearts and minds".



To answer this go here and scroll down to number 184

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2066rank.html

Then scroll up and take a look at the countries that are above #184.  The US mil would love to have their death rate go this low.



			
				zipperhead_cop said:
			
		

> Six of one...
> Maybe one of the guys that has been on one of these ops can explain why it is so important to have the locals in love with you.  There are obvious reasons, less aggravation, less stress etc.  But is it really necessary in order to secure the area?  If it is just Intel that is needed, my experience (all in Canada) has been that the rats will seek you out and give info regardless of what else is going on for their own gain.  Isn't that what the HumInt guys are there for?  Aren't the uniformed soldiers there for area security and aggressive patrols?  I stand to be put back in my lane, but I would like to know one way or the other.



I think your mistake here, comparing profit motivated common criminal behaviour, with personally motivated political behaviour.  And I will be the first to admit that here in Iraq, there's a significant amount of overlap.  But while the snitch will sell out his buddies to avoid jail or for a payout,  my experience (all in Iraq) is that it takes a lot more for an insurgent to sell out his.  For him to do that, voluntarily, he needs to believe that you're the good guys.  Otherwise why would he talk to you in the first place.  Sure maybe you could get some info out of him with threats of sodomy sessions with his new cell mate Abu Bakr, but with jails that are full of insurgents already, as well as a not insignificant number of wrongly accused people who provide a significant population of recruits for the villains, threatening suspects with prison, likely means that you will just reunite them with their friends.  Threatening them with death, when they were likely planning to be martyrs anyway is similarly unfruitful.  So the question remains, how do you get them to talk to you if at best they think they'll get killed if they try to talk to you and at worst think of you as infidel occupiers.  If you have an answer, other than a hearts and minds campaign, please I'd be very keen to hear it.  As well when thinking about the greed motive, keep in mind the money that's on Bin Laden's and Zarqawi's heads.  Last time I checked, no one had turned them in.

Now the, GO!!!  Firstly I don't see the hypocrisy that you speak of.  But I'm not going to get into a pissing match about who has the moral high ground in the GWOT.  Secondly, if it's hypocritical of me to do what I do and protect the people I protect, while understanding and publicly acknowledging that I don't think it has to be this way then I guess the shoe fits.  Sorry for thinking that my presence here, might actually help these people and do some small part to help them forge better lives for themselves.  I didn't realize that was hypocritical.  I'll be honest I don't think that's going to happen in Iraq anymore, for the reason's I stated in my first post.  Perhaps, then I should quit my job.  Would that mean I wasn't a hypocrite anymore.  The clients I work for, (an NGO, not the army)would still be here, and would still believe in their mission, but because I think there's a better way for Uncle Sugar to be doing their part of the mission, I'm a hypocrite.  Sorry, I said earlier that I wasn't going to get into a pissing match about moral high ground.  I guess I'm a liar too.

For your second point, I understand that this isn't WWII.  And I don't think Iraq is a meat grinder either.  Remember the total number of casualties here is still lower than the first 20 minutes of D-day.  In fact I would argue that the way they are doing things now is analogous to Haig's solution to the western front.  Where as troop dispersal and force decentralization might be a more Curry-like way of looking at things.  Perhaps you disagree.  Hindsight is 20/20 and I don't want to rag on the Yanks to much, but if they'd tried a lower key approach from the beginning, perhaps they wouldn't be in the boat they're in now.  Where to switch tactics would definitely lead to higher casualties.

For your third point, I never mentioned word one in my post about Afghanistan.  The sum total of my experience with insurgency is in Iraq.  Perhaps I should have stated that I was only speaking to my firsthand knowledge of Iraq.  The challenges I feel that face our guys in Afghanistan, of which again, I have no first hand knowledge, would be the subject of another post, if not another thread.  But suffice to say, I don't think that has nearly as much to do with Coalition tactics as it does with the intransigence and independent spirit of the Afghan people.  But this post was strictly from my experience in Iraq and I think only applies to Iraq.

To your forth point, I think that's what my entire first post was about.  The best way to gather intelligence.  Always menacing every local you see, isn't going to help you win the intel war, when the locals are the only source of it.  I don't care how many satellites, camera equipped predators, or Coyote recce vehicles you have.

Now in Iraq, the battle for hearts and minds is complicated by the competition.  With so many different factions, Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Secular Shia's and Sunni's, all vying for power, in what they see as a vacuum, while simultaneously preparing for the civil war, that many are convinced is now inevitable, it means it's an uphill battle for anyone.  There are no simple answers to the situation, but what is for certain, is that in Iraq, the current solution, isn't working.


----------



## DG-41

> I would be very cautious about trying to draw too close a parallel between operations in Afghanistan and your experience as a municipal police officer, or even the collective experience of your entire PD. Police agencies in this country start out much further ahead than the Coalition does: police are the recognized, legitimate and (more or less) trusted agents of a public order that most of us have agreed to and support. There is a long-standing belief amongst most people (most, I said...) that there is a reasonable chance that if you turn to the police, you will receive fair and effective response. And, with the exception of a relatively small group of hard core sh*tbirds, most citizens do not believe that they will be killed or their homes destroyed if they call 911.



Zulu Charlie,

The RCR RSS Sgt with the Scottish spent time in Haiti working alongside the local constabulary. He has been acting as the urban warfare SME for unit training, and his observations about Haiti have been very useful and amplify what pbi is saying here.

Once your paperwork is done, I'm sure you'll have a chance to talk with him.

DG


----------



## GAP

> the battle for hearts and minds is complicated by the competition



In Iraq and AStan there is literally a thousand years of previous, sometimes successful competition. I am not qualified to speak from personal experience about either, but (but that won't stop me from forming an opinion) it seems that Afghan people have seen so much strife in the past 30 years, they are more willing to adopt a "wait & see" attitude. It would seem IMHO that the previous regime there did much of the work of distancing the people, that they are more inclined to give this approach a look-see. 

Probably, AStan will be more of a generational thing.  The Kabul government needs to keep a steady, even hand on its' governance for a long time, while expanding into the rest of the countryside. There's going to be some real battles there, some physical, but most political. These warlords are not going to give up their turf easily, and they are not without influence.


----------



## Journeyman

GAP said:
			
		

> Probably, AStan will be more of a generational thing.



At the risk of being lumped in with the "stating the obvious" herd.....traditionally, any major changes of the sort contemplated in A'stan and Iraq will take a generation change to take hold. Even when change is dramatically imposed upon a society, the familiarity with the old way, and "memories" (whether true or merely wistful thinking) will hang on for quite some time.

The thing for Canadian society, and indeed amongst all nations of the "coalitions of the willing," is to truly take this on-board, with all its ramifications, rather than have it be merely a news sound-bite


----------



## zipperhead_cop

teddy49 said:
			
		

> Ok where to start?
> 
> Zipperhead_Cop.  I gather from you're profile that you are a member of Windsor's finest.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  Allow me to stretch the analogy a little further.  Would you like to roll through the streets of Windsor in a no smaller than 3 vehicle convoy, armed with C-7s and C-8s and C-9s, while tucked behind armour with a gunner on top with a fifty or C-6 mounted?  Would you like patrolling to mean that you never got out of the vehicle between leaving the police station and returning to it unless there was some kind of drama, like one of your vehicles was blown up?  Would you like the situation in Windsor to degrade to the point where you had too?  Or would you rather be able to stop at Timmy's for lunch and a Double Double and be able to talk to the citizens you meet in a courteous and professional manner.  Or conduct a traffic stop instead of a VBIED Magnet...I mean Vehicle Control Point.  Would you like all the hotels and government buildings in Windsor to be surrounded by 3 meter concrete blast walls, razor wire, and armed guys who make 3-4 times what you do?  How would you feel about having another group of guys, who work for a private company, but are contracted to the Mayor's office running around with C-6s, C-8s, C-9s, up armoured suburbans, who were above the law.  They could shoot anyone they thought was a threat, or who got inside their bubble, and you had to deal with the aftermath.  Would you like Windsor to be a place where you launched 3 or 4 rounds at citizen's vehicles, because they were in your way and even though you didn't have an emergency to go to, if you'd slowed down anymore, you'd be vulnerable to attack?  Would you like the media both locally and worldwide, to complain about everything that you did in Windsor and accuse you of things you didn't do.  This is life in Bagdad, today.  Put yourself in a citizen's shoes.  If this was life in Windsor, why would they possibly have anything at all to do with you.



I think that would be a laugh riot, except I would be one of the Mayors guys.  Unlimited 20 mm down Drouillard Road until it's a parking lot.  Meadowbrook next.  10-8, no report. :

Okay, if it seemed like I wanted soldiers to be faceless death machines, it was inadvertent.  I realize that contact with the public is necessary.  I just wanted to hear if increased contact which will certainly lead to more deaths will be WORTH it for what is gained back.  And I wasn't comparing policing to being in theater.  I know that is not even worth comparing.  My comparison was with people who are coming forward with info for some sort of gain.  If everyone is motivated by a desire to help their community, then great.  But is there a chance that little Jimmy Jihad is ratting out the house with the weapons cache because he works for a competing faction, and that is taking a player out of the game?  Sure, there are a bunch of weapons gone, but have you made some other goon more powerful?  Again, I am not criticizing what anyone does.  I am asking for more info.  
I have every belief that Iraq is a total cluster hump.  However, it isn't our cluster hump, and I am speaking specifically to A'stan.  Since it looks like we may be there for a bit, then maybe it is a good idea to get chummy and take some risks.  But if the population are a bunch of two faced MOFO's, who will take whatever handouts they can get, then sucker you into an ambush first chance, then maybe we should play our cards a little closer.  I support the mission in Afghanistan, and think it has an excellent chance of success.  It just scares me to hear people making judgements that could lead to great "suggestions" like soldiers should go have sleep overs in villages, or have "Lend your webbing and vest to a kid Day".  Risk is necessary.  Granted.  But how much is needed to be effective?



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Isn't there great value in the old traditional foot patrol that works a neighbourhood over a long period, gets to know and trust the people, and can hear/see/smell/check all kinds of things that some guy rolling by in a cruiser (once in eight hours) with the windows up and the radio on will never even notice? Don't police services in Canada express great frustration that certain communities do not trust them, and will not share information with them?



Not looking to create a police hijack, however when you work a district long enough, you get to know it.  Yes, you are in a car, and are still effective.  Police car windows amazingly can be rolled down too.  Foot patrol is great when the bad guys are.......on foot.  Foot patrol vs car, foot patrol vs bike, foot patrol vs roller blades gets tedious pretty fast.  We use it in the downtown core mostly.  I'm not sure what you are referring to about "certain communities", but if you are referring to the GTA, those "communities" made their bed and now are getting to sleep in them.  Frustration only stems from still caring.  I believe TPS got over that several years ago.  
I reiterate:  Not comparing police vs soldiers.  Comparing police informants vs terrorist informants.



			
				teddy49 said:
			
		

> To answer this go here and scroll down to number 184
> 
> http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2066rank.html
> 
> Then scroll up and take a look at the countries that are above #184.  The US mil would love to have their death rate go this low.



Okay, I am kind of stupid with numbers.  I don't get what you are saying with this.   ???


----------



## pbi

Zipperheadcop:



> I just wanted to hear if increased contact which will certainly lead to more deaths will be WORTH it for what is gained bac



In the long run, lack of increased contact IMHO will lead to even more deaths because it will contribute to inability to influence the situation, loss of initiative, and thus make life much easier for the enemy to do whatever he feels like. AFAIK, if we don't embrace some risk in the short term, we may not have a long term to worry about. And I am saying that with the full knowledge that those soldiers taking that risk are from my Regt, led by people some of whom I know very well. I do not want them to be hurt or killed, but I believe they all understand that risk is part of the fight. 



> Comparing police informants vs terrorist informants.



I think your emphasis on "informants" may be a bit misplaced: it is not just those types we need to influence: it is also all those other villagers, townspeople, farmers, etc who see and hear all kinds of things, and who can provide shelter and support to AQ/TB/HiG and friends. They will not make any decision that places their own lives at risk unless they see a very good reason to do so, and trust that someboy has their interest at heart. Otherwise why would they bother?



> I'm not sure what you are referring to about "certain communities", but if you are referring to the GTA, those "communities" made their bed and now are getting to sleep in them.  Frustration only stems from still caring.  I believe TPS got over that several years ago



And I won't delve further into the policing discussion, either, except to say that, no, I am not just talking about TPS: I include Calgary and Winnipeg, both of whom have faced similar issues while I lived in those cities. If, as you say, TPS stopped caring about its relationship with parts of the community, then perhaps that is actually TPS own problem, not the community. But, whatever.

Cheers


----------



## teddy49

zipperhead_cop said:
			
		

> Okay, I am kind of stupid with numbers.  I don't get what you are saying with this.   ???



In you're earlier post, you talked about having the American's dying at the same rate that Iraqi's are.  That link is to the CIA world factbook ranking of countries gross death rate per 1000 people.  The lower your countries death rate, the higher it's number.  Iraq is 184th with 5.37 deaths/1000.  Canada is 119th with 7.80 deaths/1000.  Sierra Leone, which hasn't been in the news lately, is 6th with 23.03 deaths/1000 people.  The United States is 107th with 8.26 deaths/1000.  So for American soldiers to be dying at the rate of the Iraqi people, would actually mean that they were safer than in their own country.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I figure that you have to focus on the population.  An insurgency comes from the population and is supported (willingly or unwillingly) by that population, even if there is foreign content or influence in the enemy forces.  You must win the population over or each year you will face a new crop of insurgents.  As pbi mentions, this entails some risk, but I think you have to take these risks.  An effective counter-insugency campaign might be one that kills or captures very few insurgents, but at the same time prevents the creation of new ones while isolating the rest from the population (morally if not physically).  Better yet would be insurgents deciding to go back to their previous lives because they see the original cause of their greivance removed or reduced to the level that they no longer wish to risk their lives for its sake.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## zipperhead_cop

Okay, I get it.  Well, not the death rate thing, that still doesn't make sense.  Thanks to all for the int gathering chat.  There was no intention to suggest that I felt that people were not doing a good job, or that Humint wasn't important.  I just don't like unnecessary death, as I'm sure is the case with all of us.  Good luck and Godspeed for all the guys who are actually doing it.


----------



## GO!!!

teddy49 said:
			
		

> Now the, GO!!!  Firstly I don't see the hypocrisy that you speak of.  But I'm not going to get into a pissing match about who has the moral high ground in the GWOT.  Secondly, if it's hypocritical of me to do what I do and protect the people I protect, while understanding and publicly acknowledging that I don't think it has to be this way then I guess the shoe fits.  Sorry for thinking that my presence here, might actually help these people and do some small part to help them forge better lives for themselves.  I didn't realize that was hypocritical.  I'll be honest I don't think that's going to happen in Iraq anymore, for the reason's I stated in my first post.  Perhaps, then I should quit my job.  Would that mean I wasn't a hypocrite anymore.  The clients I work for, (an NGO, not the army)would still be here, and would still believe in their mission, but because I think there's a better way for Uncle Sugar to be doing their part of the mission, I'm a hypocrite.  Sorry, I said earlier that I wasn't going to get into a pissing match about moral high ground.  I guess I'm a liar too.


Right, you're a selfless martyr working for minimum wage to help both the Iraqi people and your NGO staff.  Point made.  :

I said it is hypocritical for someone to bash force protection policies and participate in one at the same time. Are you expecting me to believe that you do not use similar ROE in protecting your customers to US troops also in the same geographical area?



> For your second point, I understand that this isn't WWII.  And I don't think Iraq is a meat grinder either.  Remember the total number of casualties here is still lower than the first 20 minutes of D-day.  In fact I would argue that the way they are doing things now is analogous to Haig's solution to the western front.  Where as troop dispersal and force decentralization might be a more Curry-like way of looking at things.  Perhaps you disagree.  Hindsight is 20/20 and I don't want to rag on the Yanks to much, but if they'd tried a lower key approach from the beginning, perhaps they wouldn't be in the boat they're in now.  Where to switch tactics would definitely lead to higher casualties.


You stated in your earlier post that this switch in tactics would "definitely" lead to "much" higher casualties, now you are defending the existing body count in comparison to WWII. While I realise that military operations are inherently dangerous, your implication that the US should accept even higher numbers of casualties in order to make the Iraqi people like them more is ludicrous. Force Protection is job one, hearts and minds is job two. 



> For your third point, I never mentioned word one in my post about Afghanistan.  The sum total of my experience with insurgency is in Iraq.  Perhaps I should have stated that I was only speaking to my firsthand knowledge of Iraq.  The challenges I feel that face our guys in Afghanistan, of which again, I have no first hand knowledge, would be the subject of another post, if not another thread.  But suffice to say, I don't think that has nearly as much to do with Coalition tactics as it does with the intransigence and independent spirit of the Afghan people.  But this post was strictly from my experience in Iraq and I think only applies to Iraq.


I was wrong on this one, thinking you were suggesting that the Coy bases that Canada is using in Afghanistan are the way to go - and they may well be in rural areas to start.


----------



## teddy49

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Are you expecting me to believe that you do not use similar ROE in protecting your customers to US troops also in the same geographical area?



Well in a word yes.  Without breaking any opsec rules, our guys in Baghdad run lo-profile.  That means drive vehicles that don't stick out.  Use local drivers.  Blend in with traffic, not trying to maintain a 100 meter bubble.  Don't drive in  any recognizable formation.  Keep your weapons out of sight.  Cover up all the Junior Commando gear with normal looking clothing.  In short try not to stick out.  So no, we don't point weapons at every person we think may be a threat.

Second, PSD's in Iraq, with the exception of American's on the WPPS contracts because they have diplomatic passports and work for the US State Department, operate under a vastly more restrictive set of ROEs than the Army.  Cause the army has immunity from everyone but the army.  We don't.  The weapons we can use are restricted by the Iraqi Government.  If the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, thinks that we had a bad shoot, at best we can expelled from the country, at worst we could be meeting our 400 new cell mates.  Most of whom would be excused for bearing us some animosity.

Part of my problem I guess is that I have a hard time getting across the level of the disconnect of the Army from the people.  For example, in our compound we have a number of different clients and security companies.  We have almost 2 rifle companies worth of people with guns here.  But the Army unit in charge patrolling this section of Baghdad, doesn't even know we're here.  You'd think we'd at least be a point of interest on their maps.  It's that bad.

I'm not gonna toot our horn, but our neighbors both inside and outside our fort are generally happy to have us here.  We provide security for the neighborhood, constant power to people who would otherwise only get a couple hours a day, if the powerlines in our neighborhood actually transmitted power.  It's not all sunshine and roses, we certainly have challenges maintaining our relations with the locals, but our dealings with them are generally positive.

As it stands, I don't think it's just semantics to say that I don't participate in a force protection policy, I participate in a client protection policy.  There is a difference.  My job is to protect my client in the most effective manner I can, that allows them to still conduct their operations effectively.  This includes forfeiture of my own life.  That's an acknowledgement I made when I signed on the dotted line.  It's also and acknowlegement I made when I joined the CF 12 years ago, too.  I'm not looking to throw my life away, but the deal I made means that the client's life is more important than mine.  I'm not trying to sound noble, but for me there may come a time where death or dismemberment may not only be a risk, but an obligation.  I don't get a pension from this gig, even if I do 20 years here.  I'm not paid when I'm not working.  I don't have a military medical system waiting to provide long term rehabilitative care, should I be injured or maimed.  I don't have a QRF that includes Apaches, Abrams, and Bradleys.  I don't think it's out of line to ask or receive a lucrative pay check for the risks I do take.



			
				GO!!! said:
			
		

> You stated in your earlier post that this switch in tactics would "definitely" lead to "much" higher casualties, now you are defending the existing body count in comparison to WWII. While I realise that military operations are inherently dangerous, your implication that the US should accept even higher numbers of casualties in order to make the Iraqi people like them more is ludicrous.



How the US would win this war without the Iraqi people liking them, is certainly beyond me.  If you can show me how to bring the full combat power of the US military te bear against an enemy that refuses to be fixed and await their destruction, please educate me.  Short of "Kill them all and let God sort 'em out" I can't think of anything.  And since I think that's impossible anyway, I stand by my earlier statements.



			
				GO!!! said:
			
		

> Force Protection is job one, hearts and minds is job two.



Unfortunately I feel that if this attitude is shared by too many of your collegues, then the war is already lost.

My apologies for turning this into a "PSDs are People Too" post.

Edited for clarity.


----------



## zipperhead_cop

In my world, PSD means Police Service Dog.


----------



## Centurian1985

It is mind-boggling how these threads jump around;  we start with devil39 talking about how counter-insurgency and country-building can work at cross-purposes (which I have seen in the past), progress to personal security teams and end up with a police dog... 

I hate to attempt a hijack but Id like to hear more about the life in the compounds that the US troops are apparently unaware of... is that about protecting Canadian or US VIPs, or is it people from some other country?

Can you start that as a new thread, teddy49?


----------



## The Bread Guy

This from the USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Center Blog (highlights mine):


> JP 3-24, released 5 October 2009, “provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. . . .” In so doing, the publication draws heavily from FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Although the introduction to JP 3-24 recognizes that “religious ideologies” are a factor in exciting core grievances, the publication devotes little attention to those factors. Even *the fact that the JP links religion and ideology into “religious ideologies” is problematical. Some would argue the two are distinct because religion is morality-centered and is based upon a sacred text, a commitment to a God or gods, and, quite often, a view of an afterlife. Ideology, on the other hand, more reflects ideas about life and culture and can be somewhat abstract.*
> 
> Sebastian Gorka, military affairs fellow at the Foundation for Defense Democracies, expressed his concern about the publication’s lack of focus on the role of religion in insurgencies. He noted that the joint publication mentions religion only four times, while FM 3-24 mentions the word nineteen times. Considering that religion plays a significant role in on-going insurgencies (although that is currently a subject of debate), the lack of ink devoted to the topic in the joint publication is astounding.
> 
> Gorka further argues that religion is not a core grievance, as JP 3-24 asserts. *What the JP should address, he added, is the strategic question of how religion feeds ideology.* That, he says, it fails to do.
> 
> Religion has been used for hundreds of years to further causes. “In the name of religion” can be quoted for millions of deaths. *As soldiers, how do we gain understanding of the role of religion in our current fights? How do we counter an enemy who may have a religious basis to his struggle against established governments?* These are questions that JP 3-24 does not address.
> 
> _LTC Storm Savage Chief Counterinsurgency Integration US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center_


----------



## ptepaul

Originally posted with a mistake... reposted...


When fighting a counter insurgency campaign one must look at all sources for information.
Che Guevara fought and led a campaign in Cuba during the revolution and his thoughts on fighting are insightful and very useful even today.

Pentagon planners need to read what the enemy reads, must know what the enemy knows and must be willing to apply it.  
They must also read the very manuals they write.

"Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted."

"The great lesson of the guerrillas' invincibility is taking hold among the masses of the dispossessed. The galvanization of the national spirit; the preparation for more difficult tasks, for resistance to more violent repression. Hate as a factor in the struggle, intransigent hatred for the enemy that takes one beyond the natural limitations of a human being and converts one into an effective, violent, selective, cold killing machine. Our soldiers must be like that; a people without hate cannot triumph over a brutal enemy"
Che Guevara (1928 - 1967)

Concepts mean nothing unless you know the history, the ground and the politics.

At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. 
This support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population.
However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. 
Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population’s underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive leadership, or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic services, speak the native (a foreign) language, orchestrate political deals, and get "the word" on the street.
FM 3- 24.2
General David Petraeus
Tactics in Counterinsurgency
US Army

http://mcplpaulfranklin.blogspot.com/2010/12/counterinsurgency-its-easy.html


----------



## Infanteer

Huh?


----------



## ptepaul

It was just trying to say that many times we look too hard at an issue and do not realize that many times we have fought many of these same battles before.

The surge in iraq was a success and I see similar results in Afghan although it is still early.


----------



## kincanucks

And with the New Year a new crop has begun to grow.  Jesus wept!


----------



## Sapplicant

I remember reading an article about you in a magazine. Truly an amazing story Mr. Franklin. Interesting looking blog, too. Happy New Year  :christmas happy:


----------



## George Wallace

Paul

You may want to take a little more care in properly crediting whom you are quoting so as to not make us think that we are looking at a plagiarist.  Where is the separation between your thoughts and the lines that you are quoting?  From where did you get the quote by Che Guevara and is it one para or two?  Where does the quote from FM 3- 24.2 by General David Petraeus begin and end?  What else do you want us to read into what you have to say.......or is this just a means to have people visit your Blog?






Army.ca Conduct Guidelines may also be a good read.


----------



## ptepaul

Tactics in COIN
FMI 3- 24.2 (2009)
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-24-2.pdf


For the Che quote:
Message to the Tricontinental (1967)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1967/04/16.htm


The idea was to simply make a comment that sometimes counter insurgency can be an easy thing... that and to promote discussion on the topic


----------



## GAP

Busy little beaver, eh.....


----------



## Michael OLeary

ptepaul, 

Formatting posts in a forum is different than using word processors or html, and simply pasting your previously formatted text will not maintain layout or presentation. Your posts will be much better presented if you use the formatting tools above the edit window and/or consult this resource:

Basic BB Codes


----------



## brihard

Sapplicant said:
			
		

> I remember reading an article about you in a magazine. Truly an amazing story Mr. Franklin. Interesting looking blog, too. Happy New Year  :christmas happy:



ptepaul is not Paul Franklin, he's just quoting his blog. MCpl Franklin posts here under a different username. Can't recall it off the top of my head.


----------



## Sapplicant

Brihard said:
			
		

> ptepaul is not Paul Franklin, he's just quoting his blog. MCpl Franklin posts here under a different username. Can't recall it off the top of my head.



My bad. Sort of.


----------



## Infanteer

http://www.yougov.polis.cam.ac.uk/frank-ledwidge-changing-fashions-counterinsurgency

A good explanation of Modern COIN and its narrative.  Note the inconsistencies and overlooked history in a lot of what we consider to be essential to modern COIN.  Nobody wants to talk about how force relocation was essential to Malaya.


----------



## Old Sweat

Before reading this, Infanteer, I'll just mention that that point was emphasized by Sir Robert Thompson in a lecture to my staff college course in 1971. He also noted that for a variety of real world reasons, forced relocation was not doable in Vietnam.

Edit to add. I have just read the paper and I tend to agree with it. To succeed in "COIN" if by that one means crushing the resistance or insurgency requires a degree of active repression that would be completely acceptable today. In the case of the 1899-1902 Boer War, the British ultimately prevailed because the C-in-C, Lord Kitchener, appreciated that if you get the enemy by their b.lls. their hearts and minds will come along automatically. In doing so, the British forces literally locked up the Boer and native rural populations on the two Boer republics. I don't have the exact figures with me, but well over 25,000 Boer internees and roughly the same number of natives died in these camps because of incompetence on the part of the captors as well as ignorance of basic public health. Most of the deaths were women and children as the men were on commando. These exceeded by a factor or three or four the Boer losses in combat.

I also feel the following from Lawrence is more than moot: Lawrence’s eleventh precept: ‘The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones.’


----------



## PPCLI Guy

I agree with much of what is said in this article, especially the wilful omission of relocation and thinly-disguised "Gulagery".  I took a great course whilst doing my Masters on "nation-building", instructed by the newly-arrived-from-theatre EA to Petraeus.  I will dig up some of the texts and share them with you Infanteer - they shed some light on the importance of controlling the populace, and a number of examples of failed methods for doing so...

My favourite dude from Florence has this to say about "newly acquired States" (or in our case, newly invaded / liberated):

"There are three methods whereby it may be held.  The first is to *destroy it*; the second to *go there and reside there in person*; the third, to *suffer it to live on under its own laws*, subjecting it to a tribute, and entrusting its government to a few inhabitants who will keep it friendly for you.

Sounds a whole bunch to me like the evolution of the Coalition strategy in AStan...


----------



## mdh

An excellent piece, thanks for posting the link.  I especially liked the reference to  T.E. Lawrence  and how he would be perceived today as a lecturing military authority.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Excellent.

I know guys who spent many tours, and years, in Malaya (the conflict lasted 1948-60). They confirmed that it was highly unique, and couldn't be done successfully today in a 'human rights' dominated environment. They thought the US was crazy trying to directly transfer Malayan lessons to Vietnam. Same goes for Northern Ireland.

Now, if you were able to train and support an indigenous proxy force - say, the ANA - to do what is 'required' on their own, with their human rights standards at play, you might be on to something. But hey, who cares about ethics when victory is at stake!


----------



## Old Sweat

In the late sixties I read a very funny novel called _Roman Go Home_ about the last years of the Roman Empire in Britain. It had all the usual players of the time including the British Peoples Liberation Army which was supported from off shore by the Saxons, and the ex-pat Romans who had married Britains and put down roots. The results were predictable with the useful idiots who had opposed the Romans at the beck and call of their Saxon advisers along with the ex-pats being liquidated and the Saxons moving in to provide stability.

The point I guess it made, and I read all the contemporary writers on the subject at the time, is that if there is a popular appreciation that the regime's time has come, it matters not what the masters try. The issue is what comes next. Arab Spring, anyone?

Edit: Reference to Amazon.UK http://www.amazon.co.uk/Roman-Go-Home-Adam-Fergusson/dp/000221718X


----------



## Edward Campbell

ff topic:   :sorry:

Odd, I was thinking something the same as Old Sweat because I am deeply immersed in the 13th century right now - Henry III and Simon de Montfort and all that.

The point is that an _insurgency_ is any threat to the established order - we choose to counter some insurgencies and we either support or conduct others, e.g. Libya.

All insurgencies are political, only some violently so. Some insurgencies, like de Montfort's rebellion, look rather like conventional wars; others, like the Viet Minh vs the French _morph_ from small bands of guerrillas into conventional operations; still others, like Algeria, can be fought and won by guerrillas. (We can argue that the only _conventional_ battle in Algeria was in short-lived 'revolt' of the French regulars which de Gaulle defeated by the simple expedient of going over the heads of the generals and appealing, directly, to the conscripts and asking them to stay in their barracks, as they did. De Gaulle won, mostly, because he understood the power of the portable radio ...) Still others never develop into (much) violence at all.

Sorry for the sidetrack.


----------



## Infanteer

Bing West wrote an interesting review of two documentaries on the tactical side of Afghanistan -_Restrepo_ and _Armadillo_ - in the Sep/Oct edition of _Foreign Affairs_.  The article was titled, incidentally, _Groundhog War: The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan._  While West's commentary is interesting, one part was, I felt, worth adding to this thread on the "COIN Narrative" as it spells how this narrative may indeed play out.



> U.S. President Barack Obama has pledged to steadily withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan and end the U.S. combat mission by 2014.  *Regardless of how the war turns out, the military lessons learned will be negative*; the conflict has dragged on far too long to be considered a strategic success.  Unlike in the years after World War II, the generals of this day will not gain in historical stature.  The popularity of the idea of counterinsurgency as nation building reached its zenith when Iraq was stabilized in 2008.  At the time, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency warriorintellectuals were in vogue.  As happened to their predecessors after the Vietnam War, however, *their concepts of war fighting will come to be rejected by the younger generation of company-grade officers who had to execute a flawed doctrine.*  No matter their skills and good intentions, foreign troops cannot persuade the people of another nation to reject insurgents in their midst.  The people must convince themselves -- and be willing to sacrifice for that conviction.



The emphasis is mine.  It shall be interesting to see if the military profession sees a reversal on the old saying _"Thank God, the war is over. We can get back to real soldiering"_, but with the "real soldiering" being a rejection of "nation-building" exercises (which COIN can be lumped with) and a focus on limited engagements akin to the Powell Doctrine.  The arms-length intervention in Libya certainly seems to be a portent of this.


----------



## Greymatters

The original link no longer works.  A cached copy of the page is available here:

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QHHRN9ipGAYJ:www.yougov.polis.cam.ac.uk/frank-ledwidge-changing-fashions-counterinsurgency+frank+ledwidge+%2Bfashions+counterinsurgency&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca


----------



## daftandbarmy

The End of Counterinsurgency and the Scalable Force

June 5, 2012 | 0901 GMT 

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/end-counterinsurgency-and-scalable-force?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120605&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=9a04c3c138c44c658e5328b501d7d88a

By George Friedman

The U.S. military for years has debated the utility of counterinsurgency operations. Drawing from a sentiment that harkens back to the Vietnam War, many within the military have long opposed counterinsurgency operations. Others see counterinsurgency as the unavoidable future of U.S. warfare. The debate is between those who believe the purpose of a conventional military force is to defeat another conventional military force and those who believe conventional military conflicts increasingly will be replaced by conflicts more akin to recent counterinsurgency operations. In such conflicts, the purpose of a counterinsurgency is to transform an occupied society in order to undermine the insurgents.

Understanding this debate requires the understanding that counterinsurgency is not a type of warfare; it is one strategy by which a disproportionately powerful conventional force approaches asymmetric warfare. As its name implies, it is a response to an insurgency, a type of asymmetric conflict undertaken by small units with close links to the occupied population to defeat a larger conventional force. Insurgents typically are highly motivated -- otherwise they collapse easily -- and usually possess superior intelligence to a foreign occupational force. Small units operating with superior intelligence are able to evade more powerful conventional forces and can strike such forces at their own discretion. Insurgents are not expected to defeat the occupying force through direct military force. Rather, the assumption is that the occupying force has less interest in the outcome of the war than the insurgents and that over time, the inability to defeat the insurgency will compel the occupying force to withdraw.

According to counterinsurgency theory, the strength of an insurgency lies in the relationship between insurgents and the general population. The relationship provides a logistical base and an intelligence apparatus. It also provides sanctuary by allowing the insurgents to blend into the population and disappear under pressure. Counterinsurgency argues that severing this relationship is essential. The means for this consist of offering the population economic incentives, making deals with the traditional leadership and protecting the population from the insurgents, who might conduct retributive attacks for collaborating with the occupying force.

The weakness of counterinsurgency is the assumption that the population would turn against the insurgents for economic incentives or that the counterinsurgents can protect the population from the insurgents. Some values, such as nationalism and religion, are very real among many populations, and the occupying force's ability to alter these values is dubious, no matter how helpful, sincere and sympathetic the occupying force is. Moreover, protecting the population from insurgents is difficult. In many cases, insurgents are the husbands, brothers and sons of civilians. The population may want the economic benefits offered by the occupying force, but that does not mean citizens will betray or ostracize their friends and relatives. In the end, it is a specious assumption that a mass of foreigners can do more than intimidate a population. The degree to which they can intimidate them is doubtful as well.

An Alternative to Counterinsurgency?

There is of course another dimension of asymmetric warfare, which encapsulates guerrilla warfare and special operations warfare. This is warfare by which highly trained light infantry forces are deployed on a clearly defined mission but are not dependent on the local population. Instead, these forces avoid the general population, operating on their own supplies or supplies obtained with minimal contact with the population. Notably, either side could adopt these tactics. What is most important in considering guerrilla warfare from the perspective of the counterinsurgent is that it is not merely a tactic for the insurgent; it is also a potential alternative to counterinsurgency itself. 

Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the U.S. military is not very good at counterinsurgency. One could argue that the United States should improve its counterinsurgency capabilities, but there is little evidence that it could master such capabilities. There is, however, another form of light infantry warfare to consider, and it is a form of warfare the United States is good at. The alternative does not seek to win over the population but is designed to achieve very definable military objectives, from the destruction of facilities to harassing, engaging and possibly destroying enemy forces, including insurgents.

Special Operations Forces are highly useful for meeting these objectives, but we should also include other types of forces. The U.S. Marine Corps is one such example. Rather than occupying territory, and certainly rather than trying to change public opinion, these forces have a conventional mission carried out in relatively small unit operations. Their goal is to assert military force in highly defined if limited missions designed to bypass the population and strike at the opposition's capabilities. This is exemplified best in counterterrorist operations or the assault on specific facilities. These operations are cheap and do not require occupation. More important, these operations are designed to terminate without incurring political cost -- the bane of prolonged counterinsurgency operations. The alternative to counterinsurgency is to avoid occupational warfare by rigorously defining more limited missions.

To illustrate these operations, consider what we regard as a major emerging threat: Non-state actors potentially acquiring land-based anti-ship missiles. Globalism brings with it intensified maritime trade. Meanwhile, we have seen the dissemination of many weapons to non-state actors. It is easy to imagine that the next stage of diffusion would be mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles. A guerrilla group or insurgency, armed with such weapons, could take advantage of land cover for mobility but strike at naval vessels. In fact, we have already seen several instances where groups employ this strategy. Hezbollah did so in operations against Israel in 2006. Pirates off the coast of Africa are a non-state threat to maritime shipping, though they have yet to use such weapons. Likewise, we see this potential in suicide boat bombs launched from the coast of Yemen.

The world is filled with chokepoints, where the ocean narrows and constricts the flow of ships into corridors within range of land-based anti-ship systems. Some chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Gibraltar, are natural, while others, such as the Panama and Suez canals, are man-made, and they are vulnerable to weapons far less sophisticated than anti-ship missiles. These chokepoints, as well as other critical coastal waters, represent the vulnerabilities of the global economic system to state and non-state actors. Occupying them is the logical next step up from piracy.

Providing naval escorts to protect commercial vessels would not solve the problem. The escorts would not be in a position to attack the land-based attackers, whose location would be unknown. Airstrikes are possible, but as we have learned in places like Kosovo, camouflage is an effective counter to airstrikes despite its shortcomings.

These are the circumstances under which scalable, self-contained units would be needed. U.S. Marines, who have forces of sufficient scale to engage attackers in relatively larger areas, are particularly well suited for such missions. Special operations teams would be useful against identified and static hard targets, but amphibious light infantry in various sized units would provide the ability to search, identify and destroy attackers who are constantly moving or redeploying. Because these would be land-sea operations, cooperation between naval forces and ground forces would be critical. These clearly are Marine missions, and potentially urgent ones.

This is one mission among many that can be imagined for smaller-unit operations against non-state actors in a hybrid war scenario, which would avoid the obvious pitfalls of counterinsurgency. Most of all, it would provide boots on the ground distinguishing between targets, camouflage and innocent victims and still be able to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles and other assets.

The issue is not between peer-to-peer conflict and counterinsurgency. While increasingly rare, peer-to-peer conflict still represents the existential threat to any country. But the real problem is matching the force to the mission without committing to occupation -- or worse still, the social transformation of the country.

Scale and Mission

The type of government that Afghanistan has is not a matter of national interest to the United States. What is of national interest is that terrorist attacks are not planned, practiced or launched from Afghanistan. Neither occupation nor transformation of the social structure is necessary to achieve this mission. What is necessary will vary in every conflict, but the key in each conflict is to contain the commitment to the smallest level possible. There are three reasons for this. First, doing so defines the mission in such a way that it can be attained. This imposes realism on the mission. Moreover, minimizing commitment avoids the scenario in which prudent withdrawal is deemed politically unacceptable. Last, it avoids the consequences of attempting to transform an entire country.

Military intervention should be a rare occurrence; when it does occur, it should be scaled to the size of the mission. In the chokepoint scenario addressed above, the goal is not to defeat an insurgency; an insurgency cannot be defeated without occupying and transforming the occupied society. The goal is to prevent the use of land based missiles against ships. Missions to destroy capabilities are politically defensible and avoid occupational warfare. They are effective counters to insurgents without turning into counterinsurgencies.

These missions require a light force readily transportable by multiple means to a target area. They should be capable of using force from the squad level to larger levels if necessary. Forces deployed must be able to return as needed and remain in theater without needing to be on the ground, taking casualties and engaging in warfare against non-essential targets and inevitably against civilians. In other words, the mission should not incur unnecessary political costs.

The key is to recognize the failure of counterinsurgency, that warfare is conducted on varying scales of size and that any force must be able to adapt to the mission, ideally operating without large onshore facilities and without moving to occupation.

The current debate over counterinsurgency opens the door to a careful consideration of not only the scalability of forces but also the imperative that the mission includes occupation only in the most extreme cases. Occupation leads to resistance, resistance leads to counterattacks and counterattacks lead to counterinsurgencies. Agile insertion of forces, normally from the sea, could beget disciplined strategic and operational planning and war termination strategies. Wars are easier to end when all that is required is for ships to sail away.

Not all wars can be handled this way, but wars that can't need to be considered very carefully. The record for these wars does not instill optimism.


----------



## brihard

Frankly I don't see anything new or innovative in here.

If we look at a conflict as 'end state driven', a couple major options come out:

1. Control/influence of internal conditions within a nation state IOT preclude the emergence or continuation of an asymetrical insurgent threat
2. Asymetrical proactive/reciprocal targeted operations against identified threats that suppress 'symptoms', i.e., the country's still right out of 'er, but if we kill the people who are a threat to us, the rest we can choose not to care about'.

Which of these is the case is of course a matter of national interest. I would contend that seldom is it only one or the other. In a counterinsurgency, we call the shooting of bad people's faces 'force protection' or 'direct action' (example, Afghanistan). In a conflict where we limit our military involvement to quick raids or strikes, we will still be using political or diplomatic pressure to try to adjust the conditions on the ground internally (e.g., Yemen).

If we accept that any interaction between states is political, and that war is politics by other means, we sort of get an X/Y graph of 'how much politicking' we do plotted against 'how much military belligerence' we do. A straight up war such as the Gulf War or the Falklands would be much of smashing, relatively little of jaw-jaw. Afghanistan has a great deal of both. Many countries that have insurgent threats within receive extremely little of either from us, perhaps the rare SOF raid and a couple of entities on a 'terrorist organizations' list. And in countries with an insurgent problem but considerable political alignment of us we'll see lots of civil engagement but a light (rare SOF action, officially acknowledged advisory or training) military presence (e.g., Jamaica, arguably Pakistan).

So in the article, this cat's not actually arguing anything new. It's a rehash of the 'slip in, shoot face, exfil' approach to asymetrical threats. Threats are precisely identified and precisely targeted, however in order to be so they will almost always be proximate threats, not ultimate ones. You'll bring the fever down, but not do much to touch the underlying condition, as it were. It's a tactically offensive, strategically defensive approach. Suited for some isntances, quite short sighted in others.

I'm not saying that 'counterinsurgency' (I use the term monolithically for simplicity - pick your chosen flavour of COIN) is going to be the way to tackle every threat. There's always a cost benefit analysis. And he's right when he says that populations may not be on side with us, but that's part of the mission analysis that goes into any operation.

Given an insurgent threat, *not* partaking in counterinsurgency is to consciously decide that it is a greater risk to attempt to engage the threat directly on the human terrain than to not. And that may well be the correct assessment. But to present this choice as if it's new doesn't convince me. We've chosen not to intervene in any number of instances.

As for 'scalable, quickly deliverable forces'- please. That's already the case. Be it a Marine MEU, two helicopters full of SEALs, or a Ranger company, any light fast in/fast out footprint that can be conceived of as useful already exist in some form in the US military. There's no 'leading change' to be achieved on this one.

I see no reason to believe that counterinsurgency is in any way likely to be over, because I think insurgencies will remain capable of presenting sufficient threat as to merit boots on the ground in serious numbers. If for no better reason than to engage an enemy on their ground rather than ours, and to limit the harm to those of us who volunteer to do something about it rather than our own civilian populations.


----------



## AIC_2K5

+1 Brihard...interesting points.

I don't think he's suggested anything revolutionary. If anything, he's just trying to plug a role for the Marines in a time of declining defense budgets.


----------



## a_majoor

This is not new by any means, but there is one aspect that hasn't been touched upon by the author. How many times do you play "whack a mole" with the bad guys in the same area before it becomes more cost effective to actually get to the roots of the problem?

This is not to say that getting at the roots of the problem is going to be an easy exercise (or even a military issue), but essentially reacting to problems all the time and playing strategic defense might not always be the best means of addressing the problem.


----------



## m2austin

Well said Brihard.

President Obama has been criticized for his overuse of this "whack a mole" strategy which also eliminates the need to take prisoners for Guantanamo. Last thing you need is a perception that your forces take no prisoners.

See <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all">this New York Times article</a> for more details.


----------



## daftandbarmy

A good counter argument...


No matter what Gentile and others wish, counterinsurgency just isn't going away

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/06/no_matter_what_gentile_and_others_wish_counterinsurgency_just_isnt_going_away

By Col. Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.)
Director, Best Defense office of Market Garden studies

Even as the war in Afghanistan continues to boil, the defense intellectual crowd has wandered into an unnecessary and counterproductive debate about whether the United States can avoid being involved in future counterinsurgency wars. "Unnecessary and counterproductive" is an appropriate description of a largely contrived argument that distracts brainpower from focusing on the real issue -- the changing nature of warfare in the emerging century.

Of course the U.S. is going to be involved in counterinsurgency in the future, just as we will be involved in all kinds of wars, period. Insurgency is one of the oldest forms of warfare -- an uprising against a government. But the terms under which rebellions are put down are changing fast. Until very recently, the Westphalian attitude of the times reinforced the authority of governments to suppress internal rebellions without too much regard to sensitivities or legal restraints; both the American revolution and Napoleon's war on the Iberian Peninsula, for example, featured insurgencies that were brutally suppressed by regular forces, but there was no thought of holding commanders -- much less governments -- responsible for brutal reprisals.

All that is changing as the world is changing. Nuremburg mattered a lot. The WWII Germans felt no need for a counterinsurgency doctrine -- their reaction to resistance in occupied countries was just to round up hostages and shoot them -- but after the war some commanders were held to account despite the argument that they were only obeying orders, a legal landmark. Punishing commanders for massacres was not only simple justice, but an indication that civilians were no longer just an incidental backdrop to a war. Rather individuals began to be regarded as having rights that continued even during warfare, and even when they rise against their rulers. That principle of the universality of human rights in war is a historic change that is now considered applicable even in modern struggles against the medieval brutalities of al Qaeda or the Taliban. In the 21st century, international law is struggling to replace the Westphalian compact as the new firebreak against indiscriminate barbarism.

This is the nub of the challenge of counterinsurgency (or COIN, as it is known by its unfortunate acronym). People may rise in rebellion against their government, or against the government of a conquering power, but the government's reaction can no longer be to slaughter them wholesale -- as is happening now in Syria -- for two reasons. First, sanctions to punish indiscriminate killing are spreading and increasingly effective, as the Syrian leadership will eventually learn. This is the emergence of the new sensibility of human rights, which will accompany widespread political changes in the new century (as we are seeing today in the Arab world). Second, and more practically, killing alone doesn't work against a determined opposition -- never has, in fact. Insurgency, which stems from political dissatisfaction, ultimately requires a political solution, so the greatest part of any successful COIN campaign requires political solutions that address the fundamental issue that started the insurgency in the first place, while security forces -- both military and, increasingly, police -- try to contain violence and drive it down to tolerable levels.

All this can frustrate soldiers when they get tasked to fight insurgents under restrictive rules of engagement and with little backing from the political class. An American military that in the 1990s trained for violent high-tech short wars has been understandably frustrated to find itself bogged down in an inconclusive, decades-long war that its political leadership has either misunderstood or backed away from. The "COIN is dead" school of military thought is a reaction to that frustration -- and to the damage that our protracted focus on counterinsurgency has done to other, essential military capabilities -- but it is wrongheaded for a number of reasons.

First, insurgencies aren't going away, and the United States will fight more of them. For a variety of reasons, populations and individuals today are more empowered than ever before, and governments are under more pressure to meet the expectations of their people. Political dissatisfaction, mass migration, widespread armaments, and crime are producing an international landscape that will challenge weak governments for decades, and often insurgencies will be supported by outside powers hostile to the United States or our friends. Aggression by insurgency is an old strategy that will recur.

Second, because they're hard doesn't mean we can't win them. In fact, insurgencies are more unsuccessful than otherwise. When states react to insurgencies wisely, insurgents are usually defeated. Colombia is in the process of defeating an insurgency that was threatening its survival a decade ago. The once-inevitable revolution in El Salvador is long over. The government of Iraq is consolidating power and looks to be on a success curve. In all cases, political reforms marched hand with increasing military and police capabilities and the collapse of the insurgency's outside sponsor. One significant point for military planners is the degree to which military power must be blended with the state's police and other civil powers, which until recently was contrary to U.S. military tradition and practice. Nothing changes tradition and practice, though, like hard lessons in the field.

Thirdly, American military (and political) planners and doctrine-writers must understand that the U.S. is not, and never will be, the primary COIN force -- our best course will always be to work "by, with, and through" the host country in the lead, with Americans playing a supporting role. This is a profound change for soldiers who are trained to take charge of dangerous situations. Even in Afghanistan and Iraq, where U.S. forces faced the worst-case COIN scenario possible -- the absence of a government to support -- ultimate success has not been, and will not be, possible until the local government shoulders the load. We were far too slow to understand this in these two theaters, and too slow to plan and resource local leaders once we did understand it.

Finally, wars are never fought the same way twice, though armies invariably prepare for the last one. The American military faces a daunting challenge -- to correctly draw lessons out of a decade of experience in two wars that will prepare them for the next one, without falling into the last-war trap that a decade of war has prepared for us.   Additionally, the military services know they will be the ones on the ground compensating for weaknesses in the other branches of government. Getting this right in the manuals will be very tough, and may challenge deeply-held Service beliefs and organizational imperatives; a noted COIN authority is fond of reminding his friends "counterinsurgency is more intellectual than a bayonet charge."  That is certainly true -- but no reason to walk away from it.


----------



## Nemo888

Maybe a good time to revisit what we thought about COIN. A great story that starts with a walt and just gets more interesting.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/06/how_to_kill_a_rational_peasant.html

HOW TO KILL A RATIONAL PEASANT

Adam Curtis | 14:46 UK time, Saturday, 16 June 2012

AMERICA'S DANGEROUS LOVE AFFAIR WITH COUNTERINSURGENCY

At the beginning of this year one of the weirdest characters ever to become involved in the present Afghan war died. He was called Jack Idema and he was a brilliant con-man. For a moment, during the early part of the war, Idema persuaded all the major TV networks and scores of journalists that he was some kind of special forces super-hero who was using all kinds of "black ops" to track down and arrest the terrorists.

In reality, before 2001, Idema had been running a hotel for pets in North Carolina called The Ultimate Pet Resort. He had been in prison for fraud, and had tried to con journalists before about being some kind of super-spy. But September 11th gave him his chance - and he turned up in Kabul dressed like this.



And everyone believed him and his stories. In the process Idema brilliantly exposed the emptiness and fakery of much of the TV and newspaper reporting of the war on terror.

He told the journalists and the TV presenters all kinds of lies and fantasies. He even became the central, heroic figure in a book called The Hunt for Bin Laden.



Then Idema charged journalists fortunes for what he said was an "al qaeda" video of a "a training camp" - where strangely many of the terrorists spoke in english, and allegedly you could hear Idema's voice on the soundtrack. Few of the journalists did anything to really check if any of what he was saying was true.

CBS did a special programme about the tapes fronted by Dan Rather, called "Heart of Darkness". They did check on the tapes - the producers went to some of the new breed of "terror experts" that were spawning after 2001. CBS's press office said that they "showed the tapes to three former British Special Forces officers, who verified the tactics being practiced in the video were consistent with those of Al Qaeda".

The BBC did a report that showed the tapes. And they travelled to the village where they had been recorded - and found an old man who said, yes there had been Arabs there.

But much later a number of journalists did investigate Jack Idema properly - and the consensus now is that the tapes are probably fakes.

Here is the original BBC news report

But then Jack Idema started to believe his own stories. He set up his own militia group that he called Task Force Sabre Seven - and he and his men went and arrested Afghans they were convinced were terrorists. And then he locked them up in his own private prison.

Things got out of hand in June 2004 when Idema arrested the Afghan Supreme Court judge, Maulawi Siddiqullah, because he believed he might be involved with terrorists. The judge later described what it was like in Idema's prison:

"The first night, around midnight, I heard the screams of four people. They then poured very cold water on me. I tried to keep myself from screaming, but coudn't. Then they played loud, strange music. Then they prevented me from going to the bathroom; a terrible situation. I was hooded for twelve days."

In July Afghan police raided Idema's house in Kabul and found what was described as a private torture chamber. Eight hooded men, including the judge, were incarcerated there, and three of them were hanging by their feet from the ceiling, with their heads hooded.

Idema and two others were put on trial - and sentenced to ten years in an Afghan jail. And all the journalists puffed a lot about how persuasive he had been.

Here is Idema during the trial - still trying to persuade the journalists that he is what he said he was. And how he is being set up by dark sinister forces.

But what is also interesting about Jack Idema is that in a strange way he may have been ahead of his time.

Because at the moment that Idema was entering his Afghan prison, a group of very senior US military men, led by a General called David Petraeus, were sitting down in a military staff college in Kansas and beginning to write a study that would completely transform the tactics of the US army in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

What General Petraeus and his team did was to go back into the past and exhume a theory of warfare that had been discredited by the US military who thought it was long buried and forgotten. It was called Counterinsurgency.

And out of that would allegedly come the same kind of arms-length, privatised interrogation and torture methods that Idema was indulging in.

I thought I would tell the history of how Counterinsurgency was invented, why it was discredited in America, and how it returned in 2007 to dominate and brutalise the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a fascinating and weird story that is far odder than anything Jack Idema could have dreamt up - it involves Mao Zedong, John F Kennedy, French fascists, the attempted assassination of Charles De Gaulle, and strange Potemkin-style villages in Vietnam where women get pregnant for no discernible reason.

The theory of Counterinsurgency also had a terrible logic built into it that repeatedly led, from the 1950s onwards, to horror - torture, assassination and mass killing on a far wider scale than anything Jack Idema ever did in his house in Kabul.



The British military (and their associated wonks) like to think that it was Britain's colonial independence struggles in places like Malaya in the 1950s that gave birth to the idea of Counterinsurgency. But the Petraus team in 2006 thought differently. In the foreword to their study, called "FM 3-24 - Counterinsurgency" they point to an enigmatic and long-forgotten French military officer and thinker as their biggest inspiration. They say:

Of the many books that were influential in the writing of FM 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula's 'Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice'.

David Galula is an absolutely fascinating figure.

He turns up everywhere in the second half of the 20th century in the wrong place at the right time - like revolutionary China and the Greek civil war in the 1940s, Indo-China in the early 50s, and above all in the French struggle in Algeria in the late 1950s.

In Algeria Galula conducted radical experiments in what was called "revolutionary warfare" - and in these experiments lie the key to understanding the strange revolutionary roots of the theory of Counterinsurgency - and why it could so easily go wrong and lead to horror.

David Galula was born in 1919 in one of the most important colonies of the French Empire - Tunisia. His family were rich merchants and in the 1930s Galula went to study at the prestigious St Cyr military college in France and rose rapidly.

Then, in 1946, Galula was sent to China as the assistant to the French Charge d'Affairs in Beijing. He arrived in the midst of the civil war being fought between the communists led by Mao Zedong and the Koumintang nationalists. A year later Galula went on a trip by himself into the interior and was captured by the communists and held for a week.

Although he was anti-communist, Galula was fascinated by the way the communists behaved towards the local people because it was different from any other troops he had seen. He began to study their tactics which were based on a theory of revolutionary guerrilla war that had been developed by Mao himself.

What Galula realised was that Mao had invented a completely new idea of how to fight a war. Put simply - there was no conventional army any longer, the new army were the millions of people the insurgents moved among. And there were no conventional victories any longer, victory instead was inside the heads of the millions of individuals that the insurgents lived among. If they could persuade the people to believe in their cause and to help them - then the conventional forces would always be surrounded - and would be defeated no matter how many traditional battles they won.

Mao explained the theory in a famous phrase:

"The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea"

Here is a picture of David Galula



Galula became convinced that if western armies were going to fight against these new revolutionary ideas they were going to have to change radically. And the way to do it, Galula decided, was to behave exactly the same as Mao's revolutionaries - to swim among the people.

Over the next eight years Galula moved around the world observing the bitter wars of liberation being fought in Greece, Malaya and in Indo China - and he saw how the French army was catastrophically defeated by the communist revolutionary army in Vietnam.

And in 1956 he volunteered to go and serve in Algeria where France was fighting a war against the guerrilla army of the National Liberation Front. Galula found that other officers had been thinking along the same lines - and he was allowed to go and set up what was called "An Experimental Operational Zone".

In a book Galula wrote about his Algerian experiment, that was going to become the bible of the Counterinsurgency movement, he said:

"I felt I had learned enough about insurgencies, and I wanted to test certain theories I had formed on counterinsurgency warfare."

Galula took a village that was in the centre of the insurgency and sent his men to live and work there among the population. The aim was to persuade the people of the village to turn away from the insurgents and thus rob them of their power. The way to do this, Galula said, was through psychological tactics - both by making the villagers feel that they would be safer with the French, but also through indoctrination into a new and modern way of thinking about the world.

If his soldiers and civilian advisers could do this, Galula believed, then the villagers would realise that the real way forward to a better life was not through the insurgents and their vicious tactics, but through the European vision of a new, modern democratic community created amid the harsh mountains of Algeria.

It was a highly idealistic vision - and in 1960 the BBC made a documentary about one of these experiments. It was a "protected village" high up in the Aures Mountains. Galula does not appear - but it is the area in which he was working and is clearly modelled on Galula's theories.

The reporter is the brilliant James Mossman. He was deeply involved in reporting the new wars of liberation that were breaking out round the world - and was no natural supporter of the colonial powers. But he portrays the experiment sympathetically:

"How deeply can the officers influence the minds of the young Algerians by these methods? The officers in charge of the new 'protected villages' make no secret of the fact that this is what they are trying to do. What started as a predominantly military-security operation has blossomed into a fully-blown social experiment"

But at the end Mossman states bluntly "It's all too late"

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/06/how_to_kill_a_rational_peasant.html
,...... More at the link.


----------



## Wookilar

Sidebar:

Keith "Jack" Idema was an interesting character, that's for sure. Funny where he keeps popping up over the years. I met Keith back in....'94(? or so) through his paintball company, Idema Combat Systems. Made awesome gear. He also got into a fistfight in the dealer's area of that particular tournament lol and threatened to sue just about anyone that witnessed.

The American's love their conspiracy theories though and there is still the occasional whisper on the internet that he was working for US forces in A'stan doing their dirty work. Bollocks as far as I know (not that I know much about it really).

Sidebar ends:

Very interesting about Galula. Going to have to do some book searching. I would like to see how his original theories compare to our COIN now.

Wook


----------



## The Bread Guy

Further sidebar:  If you manage to get a copy of _"Battle of Algiers"_, mentioned in the BBC piece, be sure to watch the interviews with director Gillo Potecorvo years after the film was made - while romanticizing the rebels in the flick, he wondered later why the anti-French forces squandered their chance to make things better for Algerians in general.


----------



## a_majoor

Second sidebar, David Gulala was influenced by Hubert Lyautey, who in turn formalized the _tache d'huile_ strategy developed by Joseph Gallieni. French counterinsurgency theory follows a continuous line of development from the colonial period of the 1870's (where Gallieni gained his experience in battling colonial insurgencies and guerrilla forces).

Of course the French got into trouble in Indochina and Algeria by forgetting or failing to apply these principles (read Bernard Fall's "Street without Joy" and "Hell in a very small place") to see how far away the French had drifted from tache d'huile...


----------



## Infanteer

It wasn't so much a failure of French implementation.  We in the west seem so eager to look at ourselves when faced with failure.  The strategy of Lyautey failed in the 1950s because it was a colonial model of pacification that wasn't designed to function in an environment with nationalism and revolutionary cadre mobilization.  It was an 19th century tool faced with a 20th century problem.  The neo-classical COIN crowd has trouble accepting this and it is one of the areas where Kilcullen is right to point

There is some interesting literature on the evolution of insurgency that points to the revolutionary cadre and revolutionary ideology being the catalyst for such a dramatic change from pre and post 1918 insurgencies.  Most insurgencies prior to that were reactionary by nature.


----------



## a_majoor

Agreed to a point. The real message of revolutionary warfare is "we will change everything for the better", so the countermessage needs to negate that (saying the insurgents won't carry out their promises isn't going to work, you cannot prove a negative).

The virtue of tache d'huile _done well_ is there is a demonstrable improvement in the cleared areas, rather than the nebulous promises of the revolutionary cadres. Probably the key improvement that could be made is using modern communications technologies (internet, social media) and have the people living in the cleared areas simply talking to their friends and relatives outside the zone. Nothing can counter propaganda better than facts, and the established fact of the cleared zone will draw many people to the demonstrated "good government and order" rather than the promise of some revolutionary future.

There are a lot of external factors that need to be managed, of course. If the reason life is good in the zone is because *we* are the effective governing body as opposed to the corrupt national government, then we have simply created a Potemkin villiage. Managing expectations, timelines and resources will be difficult, and preventing impatience or expediency from leading to the sort of abuses and atrocities like rogue militias or death squads and torture will take a huge amount of effort, most of it outside the military sphere.


----------



## Redeye

Wookilar said:
			
		

> Sidebar ends:
> 
> Very interesting about Galula. Going to have to do some book searching. I would like to see how his original theories compare to our COIN now.
> 
> Wook



He's one of the more interesting "professional development" reads I've done working in the field in Afghanistan. I didn't realize we had a thread on COIN but there's some good discussion here. As Thuc enunciates above, and the newest iterations of COIN theory suggest, the whole idea is to sever bonds between the insurgency and the population while strengthening the bonds between the government and the population, so that legitimacy will be conferred upon them. That doesn't mean you can get rid of the insurgency or their ideas entirely, but you can start removing their freedom of movement within the population and start to deny them some of the natural advantages they use - knowledge of the environment, internal and external support, and you can even start to attack their objection and ideological roots potentially.

One of the more interesting discussions taking place a lot with respect to the rewrites of 3-24, 3-24.2, and AJP 3.4.4 (of which apparently there are some drafts floating around is the notion of who, in fact, the counterinsurgents are. It can be argued that the US expertise with COIN in Afghanistan, for example, can't be assessed because they haven't really done it, and can't - only GIRoA/ANSF can - we can only provide support to them doing so. That's what the framework that underpins all the NATO COIN courses actually say, after all. It's actually a pretty neat (and simple) model - and it's something that we now have being taught to basically all ANA soldiers and a good chunk of the ANP, to give them an idea of what insurgency is and how to get around it.

There's a lot written on the topic, but I'm not sure it's anything other than, as suggested above, groups like USMC trying to define a niche in the field (which they have a pretty solid advocate for working at the Pentagon as I understand it, he used to work here at CTC-A), or reworkings of ideas by guys like Galula. What does seem clear though is that the ideas of COIN aren't going away, but they're going to be constantly redefined depending on how they're bought into, and a lot of the basic principles are useful both in places like Afghanistan, but also in future theatres, because at a high level the ideas contained in the theory are fairly universal.

Anyhow, interesting to see this thread come back to life, and since I've sort of been living a life centered around this stuff (with a lot of frustration, particularly since at the higher levels, the ANA doesn't buy into it!), I'm looking forward to seeing what else comes.


----------

