# A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War



## TcDohl (20 Oct 2009)

*http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/712556--ex-top-soldier-hillier-fought-taliban-tories*



> OTTAWA – Canada's former top soldier waged war on many fronts during his long march to the post of Chief of Defence Staff.
> 
> But the most intense were the counter-insurgencies waged on Parliament Hill against Conservative officials who wanted him silenced and bureaucrats who tried to stifle his ambitious agenda to rebuild the military.
> 
> ...


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## Edward Campbell (20 Oct 2009)

Gen. (ret’d) Rick Hillier’s memoir, _A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War_, is being released this week according to this article reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the CBC web site:

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/19/hillier-memoir.html


> Hillier wanted Canadians in safer Kabul: memoir
> 
> Monday, October 19, 2009
> 
> ...




Several copies of his memoirs will have been provided to various reviewers so that interest can be created in advance of its general release date.

A point to remember: this is Rick Hillier’s memoir, it’s his account of what happened and why and not everyone, including many people serving today, will have seen everything in quite the same way.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Oct 2009)

The media are going to have a field day with this. Hillier's views were not universally popular but he was a reliable source of "newsworthy" sound bites - the fodder for TV journalism.

Consider this clip from CTV news, especially the reporter's take and the video of O'Connor's farewell.


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## observor 69 (20 Oct 2009)

Put my name on my local library's book reserve list this morning. 
I'm number 2 of 2. Yippee!  ;D


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## MarkOttawa (20 Oct 2009)

From Norman Spector's _Globe and Mail_ blog:

Canada’s orphan war 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs/spector-vision/canadas-orphan-war/article1330399/



> Victory has a thousand fathers — so the expression goes —and defeat is an orphan. So it’s not entirely surprising that in his memoirs to be published next week,
> http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/books/A-SOLDIER-FIRST-General-Rick-Hillier/9781554684915-item.html?pt=yxm2dq55dyee0t55cnmxtymdSyo9VndNlDQ4SANQTOjpTIX%2f954%3d&pticket=2wappazcuatr1qm4lfed1d55vAkV31NrF%2f8v6CgcFLyjFsTH4fY%3d
> Rick Hillier disputes the commonly-held view that he was the driving force behind the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Kandahar, the most dangerous part of Afghanistan.
> 
> ...



Plus Mr Spector's...

THE COLUMN I’M GLAD I DIDN’T WRITE
http://www.members.shaw.ca/nspector4/TWO.htm



> Missing the most important point
> 
> Hillier refuses to stay silent (Martin)
> http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=2121691



Mark
Ottawa


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## Old Sweat (20 Oct 2009)

I had ordered a copy from Amazon.ca and received it last Thursday. It is an easy read and I finished it at noon Friday without sitting up all night or missing the crosswords and sudoku in the Citizen ahd the National Post. It is fairly lengthy at 509 pages, with 190 pages devoted to his tour as CDS and the first 13 pages about his selection for the job.

He probably is most critical of two groups: the leadership of the Armour School when he was on Phase 4 (somehow 63 candidates were loaded on the phase and the armoured community decided to only pass enough to fill the available slots in the units. Don't get me going on it, as I was the Chief Instructor of the Artillery School at the time and it was not a pretty sight as two thirds of the course were failed, most for no good reason.); and most of the senior public service who deliberately scuppered or delayed programs for turf reasons. This delay probably cost some troops their lives, a matter which was of little consequence to the bureaucrats.


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## GAP (20 Oct 2009)

Some of the articles out there....

Don Martin: Hillier defied PMO, bureaucrats, biography recalls
Posted: October 19, 2009, 6:48 PM by Ron Nurwisah Don Martin, Canadian politics, afghanistan
Article Link

OTTAWA -- Befuddled by a straight shooter who was hogging the spotlight, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s staff finally tried to gag and hide Rick Hillier from public view.

It didn’t work, of course.

Retired chief of defence staff Hillier’s soon-to-be-released autobiography A Soldier First, published by HarperCollins, fell into my hands recently and, as expected, he pulls no punches in needling those huddled inside the parliamentary bubble.

He spits out the sock they tried to stuff into his mouth, rages against an unwieldy federal bureaucracy, reveals private showdowns with former defence minister Gordon O’Connor and twice dismisses Liberal MP Denis Coderre’s politics as “dumber than dirt.” Ouch.

But while he will undoubtedly flesh out his recollections during the book promotion tour to come, Gen. Hillier’s observations about the Afghanistan detainees caught my attention because he insists the government was kept in the loop about prisoner torture allegations.
More on link

 When Hillier was pushed, he pushed back
When he was pushed, he pushed back
Article Link

OTTAWA–Canada's former top soldier waged war on many fronts during his long march to the post of chief of defence staff – but the most intense were the counterinsurgencies on Parliament Hill.

Gen. Rick Hillier has for the first time revealed his battle against Conservative officials who wanted him silenced and bureaucrats who tried to stifle his ambitious agenda to rebuild the military.
More on link

Article Link
 Hillier's fiercest foe was PM's office
Former defence chief recounts in new book his biggest battle of Afghanistan was the one with Ottawa

TTAWA–Officials in the Prime Minister's Office ordered the military to hide the return to Canada of the first female soldier killed in combat because they didn't want her flag-draped coffin seen on the news, according to former chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier.

In a new autobiography, the popular former top soldier recounts the battles he waged against all-controlling officials in Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government. Meddling in the hero's welcome that the Canadian Forces had planned for the repatriation of Capt. Nichola Goddard was Hillier's "line in the sand."
More on link

Politics could use a man like Hillier
 By Don Martin, Canwest News ServiceOctober 19, 2009 
Article Link

Befuddled by a galling straight shooter hogging the spotlight, Prime Minister Stephen Harper's staff finally tried to gag and hide Rick Hillier from public view.

Didn't work, of course.

Retired chief of defence staff Hillier's soon-to-be-released autobiography, A Soldier First, fell into my hands recently and, as expected, he pulls no punches in needling those huddled inside the parliamentary bubble.

He spits out the sock they tried to stuff into his mouth, rages against a foot-dragging federal bureaucracy, reveals private showdowns with former defence minister Gordon O'Connor and twice dismisses Liberal MP Denis Coderre's politics as "dumber than dirt." Ouch.
More on link


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## The Bread Guy (20 Oct 2009)

Just ordered a copy for myself and a few for gifts (including to some local libraries) via Amazon.ca...


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## dapaterson (20 Oct 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> He probably is most critical of two groups: the leadership of the Armour School when he was on Phase 4 (somehow 63 candidates were loaded on the phase and the armoured community decided to only pass enough to fill the available slots in the units. Don't get me going on it, as I was the Chief Instructor of the Artillery School at the time and it was not a pretty sight as two thirds of the course were failed, most for no good reason.); ...



The Armour school has been a dysfunctional mess for years.  One friend was psoted there for a stretch in the late 80s / early 90s; at that point, the PERs for Capts posted to the school were ranked based on the number of students they failed over the course of the year.


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## vonGarvin (20 Oct 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> This delay probably* cost some troops their lives*, a matter which was of little consequence to the bureaucrats.


I wonder if there were a way to make those bureaucrats responsible for their actions...

Anyway, this book is on my wish list.


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## Colin Parkinson (20 Oct 2009)

Will have to make a request for the local library to buy a copy.


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## leroi (20 Oct 2009)

I'm ordering my copy today plus one for our library.

-Looking forward to reading it!


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## Dennis Ruhl (20 Oct 2009)

Hilliar's last hurrah?  Hilliar sure had a lot of misunderstandings with a lot of people while seems to think he kept everything squared away.  If I were Gordon O'Connor and could have gotten away with it, I would have sacked him.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Oct 2009)

The Minister of National Defence cannot sack the CDS. The CDS, like the Deputy Minister, is appointed by the Prime Minister and serves at his (or her) pleasure.

Ministers do not hire and fire Associate or Assistant Deputy Ministers either, the Clerk of the Privy Council has the greatest say in that process.

Ministers can, if the PM's chief of staff approves, sign cheques for PR firms in _la belle province_ and things like that.


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## Dennis Ruhl (20 Oct 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The Minister of National Defence cannot sack the CDS. The CDS, like the Deputy Minister, is appointed by the Prime Minister and serves at his (or her) pleasure.



Thank you.


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## MarkOttawa (20 Oct 2009)

E.R. Campbell:



> Ministers can, if the PM's chief of staff approves, sign cheques for PR firms in la belle province and things like that.



_Touch_, er, _é_, eh?

Mark
Ottawa


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## George Wallace (20 Oct 2009)

Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.


Hillier says PMO was one of his toughest foes 

LINK

20/10/2009 6:02:34 PM

CTV.ca News Staff 
Canada's former top soldier, who took on the Taliban while at the helm of the nation's military, says in his new book that the Prime Minister's Office was one of his toughest adversaries. 


Former chief of defence staff Rick Hillier fires a salvo of tough criticism at Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his inner circle in "A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War." 

The book is set for official release on Oct. 24, but CTV's Ottawa Bureau Chief Robert Fife obtained an early copy of the provocative new memoir. 

"General Rick Hillier is a straight-talking general who has had the loyalty of his soldiers, and when Prime Minister Harper and his gang came in he didn't get along with them and that was no secret, everyone in Ottawa knew that," Fife told CTV's Canada AM. 

Hillier didn't favour Kandahar deployment

In the blunt autobiography Hillier denies he was responsible for getting Canadian soldiers involved in volatile southern Afghanistan, where the highest number of casualties have occurred. 

He writes in the book that he wanted Canadian troops to stay in the much safer Kabul area where they were originally deployed, but the decision to send troops to the dangerous southern Kandahar region was made before he became military leader in 2004. 

"It had already been largely decided that the Canadian presence in Afghanistan was shifting to the southern half of the country," Hillier writes. 

"Even before I returned from commanding (the International Security Assistance Force in the fall of 2004), NATO had announced its intentions to expand the ISAF mission beyond Kabul in 2006, and planning was already well on its way for a move into Kandahar province by the time I landed back in Canada that fall." 

He suggests it was then prime minister Paul Martin's decision-making that resulted in Canada's costly commitment in the south. To-date, 131 Canadian troops have died in Afghanistan. 

Hillier also has tough criticism for NATO, saying the military alliance is rife with infighting and political posturing and needs serious emergency medical attention if it is to survive. 

He said it was "embarrassing" that the secretary general of the powerful military alliance had to beg for troop and equipment commitments from individual countries. 

Hillier warns NATO is a "corpse" that needs serious attention if it is to be revived. 

Repatriation controversy 

He also sheds light on his strained relationship with former defence minister Gordon O'Connor and what he paints as businesslike relations with Harper. 

Hillier also gives his side of what was a tense standoff over the repatriation of Canada's first female casualty in Afghanistan. He writes that he was ordered by the PMO to hide the return of the body of Capt. Nichola Goddard, because the PMO didn't want the event covered extensively by the media. 

In the book, he calls it a "line in the sand" moment and recalls telling then-defence minister Gordon O'Connor that it wasn't an option. 

But Fife points out it wasn't that black and white. 

"There's another side to that if you read the book. He did bar the media, and if he was as tough as he said he was, he could have said 'I'm not going to do this I'm going to let the media on.'" 

In the end, it was the outraged public response by Goddard's family that resulted in a reversal of the policy. Harper eventually explained his intention was to give families the power to decide themselves whether news crews could cover the return of their relatives' flag-draped coffins to CFB Trenton.


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## GAP (23 Oct 2009)

More fun....

 Feds wanted day-to-day control of Afghan mission: Hillier
Article Link
The Canadian Press Thursday Oct. 22, 2009 

OTTAWA — The Conservative government considered taking day-to-day control of the mission in Kandahar away from the military and giving the authority to direct troops in the field to Canada's ambassador in Kabul.

The startling revelation comes from former chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier, whose provocative new memoir is making waves in Ottawa for its scathing criticism of the bureaucracy and NATO.

Hillier also weighed in on the raging political controversy over the alleged torture of prisoners in Afghan jails by stating he "doesn't recall" seeing written warnings filed by a diplomat in spring 2006, nearly a year before the Conservative government admitted there was a problem.

In his memoir "A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War," the retired general makes brief reference to a proposal that would have usurped his control over the military, but expanded on it in a lengthy interview Thursday with The Canadian Press.

He said he first heard about the proposal from one of his ground commanders in Afghanistan, who telephoned him in Ottawa in late 2007 and he immediately set about nixing the idea.

"They could have talked all they wanted, it was simply not going to happen," the retired general said. 
More on link

Hebert: Hillier book ensures mission's end
Article Link

MONTREAL—In what may be a case of unintended consequences, Rick Hillier, who once was the most effective promoter of Canada's military mission in Kandahar, has likely hammered the last nail in its political coffin.

In a much-publicized autobiographical book, the former chief of defence staff Hillier turns his guns on the political and bureaucratic masters of the mission, leaving few of the many non-military Canadian figures associated with the undertaking completely unscathed.

At a time when the mission is increasingly becoming a political liability in Canada, the former general goes out of his way to divest himself of most of the unsolicited credit he has accumulated over the years for presumably masterminding the operation.

On this score, Hillier's book likely marks the official opening of a lengthy blame season, as prospects for a positive outcome to Canada's lethal engagement in Afghanistan continue to dim in tandem with public support for the mission.

While he is not the first to take issue with the management of the Kandahar mission, Hillier brings more inside knowledge of the operation to the fore than the average informed commentator. For the general public, he, rather than any past or present politician, was the real face of the mission. 
More on link


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## Dennis Ruhl (23 Oct 2009)

The ambassador directing troops in the field?  Nobody could be that stupid.  Methinks that Hillier could be exagerating somewhat.  If he isn't, that is really scary.

I think that Hillier broke the cardinal rule that the CDS should be seen and not heard.  Why he developed himself into a public figure and chose to publically spar with his political masters is an interesting question.  Not to be misunderstood, I do think that Hillier was a good general.


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## Teflon (23 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The ambassador directing troops in the field?  Nobody could be that stupid.  Methinks that Hillier could be exagerating somewhat.  If he isn't, that is really scary.
> 
> I think that Hillier broke the cardinal rule that the CDS should be seen and not heard.  Why he developed himself into a public figure and chose to publically spar with his political masters is an interesting question.  Not to be misunderstood, I do think that Hillier was a good general.



You would have prefered that he acted like the meak little yes man?  If ANY of the past/present political leaders had done even a half ass job of presenting the CF's role, countering the "Peacekeeper Myth" and looked after the forces interests then he wouldn't of had to do it himself.  But that is just my opinion, Hillier did what had to be done as CDS.

If the cardinal rule is that the CDS should be seen and not heard then I have a figure 11 Tgt we can use to fill the posn, we can even attach a blinking landing light on it so that it can be seen and not heard even in low light conditions.


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## Rheostatic (23 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The ambassador directing troops in the field?  Nobody could be that stupid.  Methinks that Hillier could be exagerating somewhat.  If he isn't, that is really scary.


 More likely the media are exaggerating, given the tone of the articles linked above.


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## Old Sweat (23 Oct 2009)

In my opinion Hillier makes it clear in his memoirs that the idea of giving command to fall under civilian jurisdiction originated in the public service and not with the Conservatives. On page 422 he states

"As the mission in Afghanistan began heating up in 2007, various folks around Ottawa became very focused on our actions there and wanted command of Canadian Forces units on the ground to fall under civilian jurisdiction." He then calls them "field marshal wannabes" and calls their understanding of what command entailed "superficial." General Hillier ends the paragraph with "The civil service had no say in the matter [conduct of military operations]."


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## dapaterson (23 Oct 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> He then calls them "field marshal wannabes" and calls their understanding of what command entailed "superficial."



Hmm.  Gen Hillier stood up CANADACOM, CEFCOM, CANOSCOM and CANSOFCOM.

"Pot, this is kettle.  Black, over."


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## bran (23 Oct 2009)

Keep troops in Kandahar, ignore politicians: Hillier

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/rickhillier/article/714756--keep-troops-in-kandahar-ignore-politicians-hillier


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## OldSolduer (23 Oct 2009)

The idea of an ambassador "calling the shots" is not far fetched. If I remember correctly, the US Ambassador to Vietnam had quite a bit of say in what went on there.


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## Edward Campbell (23 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The ambassador directing troops in the field?  Nobody could be that stupid.  Methinks that Hillier could be exagerating somewhat.  If he isn't, that is really scary.
> ...




But that's precisely what two American Presidents (Kennedy and Johnson) wanted done in Vietnam. It resulted in years and years of conflict between DOD and State, the NSC and the White House, proper, and, internally, between DOD/JCS and MAC(V). It was destructive of the (necessary) process of selecting and maintaining the AIM.



			
				Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> ...
> I think that Hillier broke the cardinal rule that the CDS should be seen and not heard.  Why he developed himself into a public figure and chose to publically spar with his political masters is an interesting question.  Not to be misunderstood, I do think that Hillier was a good general.




I think Hillier changed the cardinal rule from our politically familiar British model to a publicly more familiar American one. I may, probably do, prefer the British model, and that is likely a function of age, but faced with the realities of our steady decline in public respect during the *decadess of darkness* that extended, fairly steadily, from around 1965 to around 2000 I'm not sure he had any other choice. He needed the Canadian public, broadly, to get behind the CF because without that sort of public support political leaders – Pearson, Trudeau, Clark, Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin, Harper (all cut from the same cloth) – were not going to change anything.

American admirals and generals _spar_ openly, in a very democratically healthy way, with their political masters. That model can work and those sparring sessions can educate the public and convince the public to get behind one _faction_ or the other.


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## HItorMiss (23 Oct 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hmm.  Gen Hillier stood up CANADACOM, CEFCOM, CANOSCOM and *CANSOFCOM*.
> 
> "Pot, this is kettle.  Black, over."



Well at least one of them was a pretty good idea, SOF organisations should not be under the control of conventional commanders. When there was just one kid in town it was easy put them under the direct control of the VCDS and no worries. With 4 groups it requires it's own command structure IMO of course.


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## dapaterson (23 Oct 2009)

The OLD DCDS did well enough; splitting up made things worse from a C2 perspective, not better.

And while there may be a need for some distinct C2 for SOF to enable its force generation, if they are always off playing in their own sandbox conventional commanders do not learn how to properly employ them, removing some of their utility - if you don't know what they can and cannot do, you won't use them, so they can be marginalized.

The proper C2 relationship for SOF is a debate that will never end; in this context I'll just say that we only need CANSOFCOM if we need the other three commands.  As we don't need them, we don't need CANSOFCOM.


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## Old Sweat (23 Oct 2009)

It's a little off the point, but even back in the DCDS days the special operations community was a separate entity  from the rest of the CF. And that dated back to the earliest days of the capability becoming operational.


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## HItorMiss (23 Oct 2009)

Da this is really getting off topic and perhaps into new thread range however

The way around the marginalisation (as you call it ) is by posting SOF officers into command postions outside of the SOF community (as is currently the practice) that way you have CLS members and other commands who are experienced in the use a capabilities of the SOF community.

I think your argument is valid in and of itself only if you don't look at the solutions apparent. Most of our Allies have there own commands for SOF and they are doing just fine I believe the model we are following is proven and will work.


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## Kirkhill (24 Oct 2009)

While this topic is off topic I would note that Templer, the chap usually credited with solving the Malayan problem, although trained as a soldier and having achieved the rank of Field Marshal, acted in Malaya as the civilian authority.   He was appointed to the task in the role of High Commissioner - a civilian bureaucrat.


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## Edward Campbell (24 Oct 2009)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> While this topic is off topic I would note that Templer, the chap usually credited with solving the Malayan problem, although trained as a soldier and having achieved the rank of Field Marshal, acted in Malaya as the civilian authority.   He was appointed to the task in the role of High Commissioner - a civilian bureaucrat.




Quite true but although the word gets tossed around, carelessly, about American commanders of _unified_ commands (CENTCOM, etc), Templer was the modern world's only *Proconsul* having both military _imperium_ and _tribunician_ power over everything in Malaya - British and Malay, civil and military, private and public. That was why he was able to use some of his draconian measures - he had powers about which e.g. Paul Bremner must have had wet dreams.

Additionally, Templer had energy, intelligence and ability. He also had the full support of his political masters in London and the emerging political elite in Malaya.


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## leroi (24 Oct 2009)

I'm on page 170 and was up most of the night reading.

I went to a popular bookstore downtown Guelph to purchase the book (wanted it right away so didn't end up ordering it) and wanted to relate this short account of what I call "the Hillier effect":

****​*
Me:* "Do you have the new Rick Hillier book?"
*
Clerk:*  points to it and comments, "Just came in ... he's an amazing guy isn't he? I give him credit for standing up to our politicians the way he did and advocating for his soldiers. Newfoundlanders are the most patriotic of all the Canadian military."
*
Me:*  "Yup, I love the guy for standing up for what he believes in and find it quite refreshing."

*Store owner* (ambles over from the books he's been shelving to enter the conversation), "Yes but, don't forget, our military is not supposed to be quite so outspoken. I'm totally against this mission in Afghanistan, it's not winnable but Canadians have to learn to support the troops wherever the governments sends them and that's what I like about Hillier--but the mission itself is a waste of time."

*Me* (foot-in-mouth): "I agree, he really seemed to care about his subordinates and showed integrity by staring down the bureaucrats but I know professors who absolutely hate him." 

(Store owner casts his eyes nervously about just as well-known university professor in browsing mode jumps into the foray, entering the conversation.) 

*Professor:* "Hillier was not good for Canada because he tried to Americanize the Canadian military and Chiefs of Defense Staff should be seen and not heard ... we are a nation of peacekeepers ... still, (grudgingly) I give him credit for standing up for his people."

*Me* (embarrassed): "ahem, well, love him or hate him, the man had an effect on Canada and I daresay his book is going to sell really well." 

(This bookstore is a rather busy hive of activity and by now other customers are on the periphery of the discussion which begins to evolve into questions about the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan and what Harper has in store for the Canadian military next and the following ideas are offered by different interlocutors):

-deployment to Africa
-put a combat mission in Pakistan
-Harper has no plans at all to end the combat mission in Afghanistan--his claims are jiggery-pokery and a ruse
-the Canadian military will be relegated to the back burner


By this point I'm grabbing my book and running out the door so I can hide the huge grin on my face as I contemplate the conversation and wonder how long it will continue.

****​
And I think that is part of Hillier's legacy: He created a dialogue flashpoint, he prompted Canadians to revise and to re-think _their_ relationship to "Canada's Favorite Sons and Daughters!"


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## Fishbone Jones (24 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Hilliar's last hurrah?  Hilliar sure had a lot of misunderstandings with a lot of people while seems to think he kept everything squared away.  If I were Gordon O'Connor and could have gotten away with it, I would have sacked him.



Perhaps if you ever got to the position of a person such as he, and had the remotest chance or opportunity to decide the fate of someone so much above your distinction, you'd possibly would have gained enough moxy and class to be able to, at least, spell his name properly on his pink slip.


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## Kirkhill (24 Oct 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Quite true but although the word gets tossed around, carelessly, about American commanders of _unified_ commands (CENTCOM, etc), Templer was the modern world's only *Proconsul* having both military _imperium_ and _tribunician_ power over everything in Malaya - British and Malay, civil and military, private and public. That was why he was able to use some of his draconian measures - he had powers about which e.g. Paul Bremner must have had wet dreams.
> 
> Additionally, Templer had energy, intelligence and ability. He also had the full support of his political masters in London and the emerging political elite in Malaya.



Not to nit-pick excessively but under our traditions where military authority is subordinated to civil authority any civil authority has dominion over the military authority collocated with it.  The military only assumes authority if the civil authority relinquishes it.

The difficulty for the Yanks/Us is that we don't finesse that locally by putting militarily competent individuals in civil roles and giving them Templer's RAB(Responsibility, Authority, Budget).

The Yanks, with their Madisonian "divide and conquer" ethos insist in maintaining the distinction between the military and the civil even when operating overseas.  Consequently you have State continuing to work at cross purposes with the Pentagon.  Its difficult enough to get politicians to talk to police, let alone soldiers, when they live in the same town let alone when they are independently conducting operations in different time zones..... 

Aside from Optics tell me again why State operates its own private Army (CIA Ops)?  Why not "man up" and just turn the Navy Department Iincluding the USMC) over to State (they have been traditionally aligned) and had the "covert" jobs over to the Marines......Plausible deniability doesn't seem to be an issue when the CIA  leaks so much it might as well be holding seminars on its operations and methods.

The Army is, traditionally, the Nation in Arms force designed primarily for defence of the homeland - although sometimes the borders of the homeland are best defined in the other guys back yard.


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## Dennis Ruhl (24 Oct 2009)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Perhaps if you ever got to the position of a person such as he, and had the remotest chance or opportunity to decide the fate of someone so much above your distinction, you'd possibly would have gained enough moxy and class to be able to, at least, spell his name properly on his pink slip.



But I spelt O'Connor right.  If I were to fire Hillier I believe it would be incumbent upon myself to mispell his name.


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## Nemo888 (24 Oct 2009)

What a shock that special interest are pulling the politicians strings, who then pull our strings. The most powerful special interest to me is global capital free of moral or legal restraint. I prefer a sustainable economy that is self sufficient and uses renewable energy resources. I lived off of solar for 4 years. It was not that hard to do. I sometimes feel that the current economy runs on oil and dead soldiers.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (24 Oct 2009)

What??


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## Dennis Ruhl (24 Oct 2009)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> I sometimes feel that the current economy runs on oil and dead soldiers.



Oil - yes.  Dead soldiers - no.  The US could obtain all its oil from Canada at a fraction the cost of fighting wars.  Whatever oil they get from Iraq, they still have to pay for.  I'm not sure what Hillier had to say about it.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2009)

This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, is another bit of nonsense from Jefferey Simpson:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/battle-of-the-book-rick-hillier-and-how-we-got-into-afghanistan/article1350090/


> Battle of the book: Rick Hillier and how we got into Afghanistan
> *Canada's next military role goes missing in action*
> 
> Jeffrey Simpson
> ...




Here’s why Simpson is spouting *nonsense*:

•	Rick Hillier has a big brain and a *Big* personality and a *BIG* ego to go with them;

•	That makes him about _average_ in Ottawa;

•	All the key players at the tables – Martin, Graham, McCallum and Himmelfarb have *bigger* brains and equally big or even larger egos;

•	Hillier’s personality was a huge plus inside the CF, it actually was a *negative* in the rest of _official Ottawa_ where it was perceived to be a threat to the established order of things;

•	At the top table, where the *decisions* were being made, Rick Hillier was guest, not one of the ‘regulars;’

•	It is almost certainly true that Hillier _”was the driving intellectual force convincing the Martin government”_ that Canada needed to do something big, bold and _valuable_ to rescue our military reputation and to give effect to Paul Martin’s _vision_, as he articulated it in his Foreward to “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.” But that was, still is, because the top levels of the bureaucracy in PCO, DFAIT and DND – where _strategy_ is supposed to be developed – were almost totally devoid of _visions_. All the _vision_ there, at the top of government, resided in Finance; thus

•	It is impossible to believe that this is *’Hillier’s War’* as so many in the Toronto _commentariat_ would have us believe. It is _Chrétiens’ War_ and *Martin’s War* and, indeed, even *Harper’s War* or McCallum’s War or Graham’s war or MacKay’s War but it is *not* Hillier’s War.

Simpson goes father off his track when he says, _”if Canada can't or shouldn't work with NATO or the UN, that leaves the U.S. military and ... independent solo missions of unspecified kinds.”_ That, too, is nonsense. _Coalitions_, supported by (mainly) the US, is the new order of the day. NATO has provided a solid framework of standardization upon which any coalition can build and NATO might still provide a sort of _official_ fig leaf behind which the UNSC can protect its diplomatic modesty, but all we need is:

1.	A UNSC _mandate_;

2.	A coalition _coordinator_ – which might even be Canada;

3.	A coalition ‘leader’ – which, for now, will most likely be the USA but could be e.g. France, India or Britain or even <gasp> China depending on the theatre and the politics therein; and

4.	A fairly small _combined_ and _joint_ staff team to plan (quickly), coordinate and control the deployment and operations of the coalition force.

Simpson is right that Hillier has ‘failed’ to predict where we are headed next. Once again: not Hillier’s job, that’s why we elect and hire all those big brains and bigger egos in Ottawa.


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## Journeyman (4 Nov 2009)

> *Mr. Lang and Prof. Stein's book is the best outsider's account of how Canada got into Afghanistan*, although Mr. Lang was an insider for some of that time. Other officials with knowledge of the inside debates have argued that the authors didn't get everything right. They probably didn't. But *no one looking for greater insight should turn to Mr. Hillier's book*.


How dismissive. Unlike Simpson, I've found quite a few insights in Hillier's book. 

But then, I didn't wade in assuming that the Lang & Stein book was the be all/end all, thus feeling a Pavlovian need to trash anything contradictory.


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## The Bread Guy (4 Nov 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> But then, I didn't wade in assuming that the Lang & Stein book was the be all/end all, thus feeling *a Pavlovian need to trash anything contradictory*.


How unlike other MSM, right?  :

Just received my copy - starting to read tonight.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2009)

Hillier, like Harper, is sort of _terra incognita_ for the Toronto intelligentsia. They grew up in comfortable world in which Toronto had displaced Montreal as the centre of the little, frozen, Canadian universe and the _regions_ hewed wood and drew water, fish and oil as required to _serve_ Toronto.

Trudeau and Chrétien, despite being _Québecois_, were _pur laine_ Toronto Liberals because they drank the Toronto Liberal kool-aid and did their level best to "Keep Québec in its Place" - that being in Canada and in second place in Canada, too. Now power is shifting away from Toronto and its Québec based lackeys and towards the West. This is hard for the intelligentsia to comprehend.

Harper and Hiller represent a real threat to their little universe; they are outsiders - from the West, from Newfoundland, from the military, from the Blue Tories, - barbarians at the gate and all that.

Take a moment to consider that Graham's, Lang's, McCallum's and Simpson's universe is collapsing right before their eyes. And they fear that _Prince Michael_ cannot save them.


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## dapaterson (4 Nov 2009)

I would point out that Gen (ret'd) Hillier did overstep his boundaries and at least once should have been subject to a very public termination.  (Being a public advocate for changes to Canadian immigration policy is well outside any left and right of arcs for the CDS and interference with matters that properly belongs in Parliament).

He was not helped by weak central staff in DND/CF who were unwilling to support their commander by pointing out obvious flaws and problems in his sometimes grandiose ideas - the ongoing failure that is the dot COMs was noted and observed by many prior to their implementation - better staff would have forced the plan to be better developed or to have had proper mitigation strategies in place, but ultimately Gen (ret'd) Hillier must wear that failure.

Was he successful in many domains?  Yes.  Was he ego-driven to an extent that is surprising even in the black had community?  Yes.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I would point out that Gen (ret'd) Hillier did overstep his boundaries and at least once should have been subject to a very public termination.  (Being a public advocate for changes to Canadian immigration policy is well outside any left and right of arcs for the CDS and interference with matters that properly belongs in Parliament).
> 
> He was not helped by weak central staff in DND/CF who were unwilling to support their commander by pointing out obvious flaws and problems in his sometimes grandiose ideas - the ongoing failure that is the dot COMs was noted and observed by many prior to their implementation - better staff would have forced the plan to be better developed or to have had proper mitigation strategies in place, but ultimately Gen (ret'd) Hillier must wear that failure.
> 
> Was he successful in many domains?  Yes.  Was he ego-driven to an extent that is surprising even in the black had community?  Yes.




I agree, partially, on your first point. But, as I have said before, I think Gen (ret’d) Hillier adopted an American model of _being_ CDS and that model was _accepted_ by the prime ministers, ministers and top level bureaucrats – not welcomed, not liked, just accepted, tolerated. That model comes with considerable ‘freedom’ of expression. Serving US admirals and generals routinely periodically address social and economic issues – even very delicate ones like race relations, housing and education. Hillier stretched the limits in Canada but they didn’t seem to break. Opposition parliamentarians _coulda_ or _shoulda_ hauled him in front of a committee but they didn’t – presumably because they, too, drank the Hillier kool-aid.

On your second point: I was long retired so I cannot comment on how ell or poorly Hillier was advised. That being said I continue to believe that the current C2 superstructure is too large and too cumbersome with too many overlaps.

(A former VCDS of my acquaintance actually welcomed one of the steady stream of 10% cuts to HQs that occurred in the 1990s because he wanted to do some housecleaning to make fewer people work _smarter_ and more _effectively_ (but he failed, thanks to inertia one level up).)

I do agree that he was successful in most of the things to which he turned his hand – HQ organization being an exception in my (amateur) opinion. In being so successful he raised expectations within the CF and within the country as a whole. To date the CF and the country have risen to the challenges. Time will tell if both can sustain that.


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## dapaterson (4 Nov 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I agree, partially, on your first point. But, as I have said before, I think Gen (ret’d) Hillier adopted an American model of _being_ CDS and that model was _accepted_ by the prime ministers, ministers and top level bureaucrats – not welcomed, not liked, just accepted, tolerated. That model comes with considerable ‘freedom’ of expression. Serving US admirals and generals routinely periodically address social and economic issues – even very delicate ones like race relations, housing and education. Hillier stretched the limits in Canada but they didn’t seem to break. Opposition parliamentarians _coulda_ or _shoulda_ hauled him in front of a committee but they didn’t – presumably because they, too, drank the Hillier kool-aid.



I suspect Hillier's kevlar coating was in part due to most politicians not wanting to confront a popular figure.

And one minor correction:  it was Flavor-Aid, not Kool-Aid.


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## kratz (26 Jan 2010)

For those interested in such things, I have received word  Gen (ret'd) Hillier will be at the Borden CANEX this Friday, 29 January 2010 for a book signing at 10:00am.


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