# Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)



## army

Re: They also wrote one about Dieppe





Posted by Brad Sallows from Burnaby BC Canada on April 26, 1999 at 17:38:00:


In Reply to: They also wrote one about Dieppe posted by Michael A. Dorosh on April 23, 1999 at 19:45:25:



I don‘t think any amphibious operation could compare to Dieppe
in terms of what was learned about assaulting a heavily fortified
shore none of the other operations went up against shoreline
fortifications of the same magnitude as those in France.  There
would not have been the same emphasis on development of specialized
armour without Dieppe the Americans, with no such experience,
almost had to be forced to employ duplex drive tanks.  Similarly,
all the initial assaults in the Mediterranean were relative cakewalks
and it was Dieppe that taught the lessons about employing and 
coordinating firepower and establishing decent communications.
Imagine if, after having strolled ashore against the Italians in
Sicily and learned relatively no hard lessons, the Allies had 
undertaken a 3-division by sea and 2 division by air assault
directly against a channel port in 1943, without benefit of 
prolonged bombardment, specialized armour and engineers, decent
communications and air/naval fire coordination.  Does anyone think
the results would‘ve been any different than Dieppe?


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## army

Dieppe Cemetery amp The Vimy Memorial





Posted by Michael O‘Leary from Meaford Canada on May 28, 2000 at 13:25:52:



Earlier this month I had the opportunity to vist both Dieppe and the Vimy Monument. I have added pages to my website  http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/index.htm  displaying photographs I took at the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery at Dieppe as well as the Vimy Memorial. Some of my observations from this visit follow:

DIEPPE

The Dieppe Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery holds over 700 graves, not all from the Dieppe raid. Some are earlier and some are later wartime casualties. When these cemeteries were established, many isolated remains were exhumed and moved to the Commission Cemeteries for control and ongoing maintenance. 

The Cemetery is very simply laid out with a stone wall along the road and hedges bordering the other three sides. A small stone structure houses the visitors‘ ledger. A central stone altar rests inside the gates in the wall. A stone cross with a bronze sword on one side overlooks the rows of graves. Some or all of these items are found in each and every one of the Commission‘s Cemeteries. The white headstones lie in simple rows, either back to back in a double line, or spaced in a single line of graves to fill a minimum amount of space for the number interred. Around the edges of the Cemetery are other small groups of headstones. The Cemetery is well-tended, with close-cropped grass and flowers along the base of each row of headstones. One section was cordoned off from our wanderings among the rows, the grass had been recently reseeded.

During our visit to the Cemetery we conducted a brief ceremony to lay a wreath at the stone altar. Following this each member was left to view the Cemetery alone, during which time all signed the visitors‘ registry.

Each Canadian headstone is adorned by an engraved, stylized, maple leaf those of British soldiers have their Regimental, Corps or Service crest. Below is the soldier‘s name, rank and regiment. At the bottom of the gravestone is a simple inscription as requested by the family whenever it was possible to do so. Some headstones, too many, are simple inscribed "A Soldier of the Second World War A Canadian Regiment 19 August 1942" and "Known Unto God." 

The simplicity of the monuments, the rows of white gravestones and the carefully tended gardening strikes an awe of respect into each observer. Within the boundaries of the Cemetery a quiet hush covers all, as each participant is left to his or her own thoughts of the men who died fighting to preserve the way of life our grandparents treasured and ensuring it remained for ourselves to enjoy. I would hope that if I fell in service to my country I might be laid in as peaceful a place, where sixty years later the view remains peaceful farmers‘ fields and cows still wander nearby.


VIMY

Vimy Memorial park is nearly all forested now. In 1917 it would have been denuded of trees, and precious few blades of grass would have been seen. Reforested to minimize the effects of erosion, the ground is now carpeted by a rich blanket of thick green grass. Most sections of the park are out-of-bounds to visitors and one glance, to the initiated, shows why. Other than the reforestation, the ground has not been altered since the battle. Every inch of the park still retains the shape of each shell-hole and collapsed trench-line, to the extent where no level spot can be seen on either side of the roads. This preservation extends into the fields around the monument except where they needed space to support the construction.

I have walked impact areas on Canadian bases which have seen forty or more years of artillery training, and even though Gunner‘s eyes are invariably attracted to the same targets, I have never seen an area as shattered and reshaped by high explosive as the fields around the Vimy Memorial. It is hard to imagine walking easily across them now, with a grassy surface, good footwear and no heavy pack. To consider what strength, physical and psychological, that it would have taken an infantry soldier of 1917 to cross that terrain is barely conceivable. And then to imagine four men bearing a stretcher loaded with one of their mates over it is even more incredible.

But the grounds are not restricted just because of their treacherous footing. It is estimated that there is one piece of unexploded munition in those woods for every square metre of ground. With that in mind, one understands why the grass-cutting in most of the park is executed by herds of sheep.

We walk slowly along the roads from the restored trenches to the Monument itself.  Again, we are taken by the impact of its simple design as seen from a distance.  This marks the highlight of the trip for many, for few Canadian soldiers have not read of the battle of Vimy Ridge and of the Monument itself. But to stand upon its stones is a very great thing that cannot be adequately described with mere words. 

First we walked around the main pylons of the monument on its limestone base. At the foot of the solitary erect statue on the main wall of the base, a female figure representing Canada Mourning, we lay our wreath and observed a few minutes silence for the soldiers who fell fighting for this ground. 

Quietly, in ones and twos, we spread out to see the many impressive details of the monument. I will not attempt to describe every aspect of the site, as I could not do it justice and some aspects such as the visages of the statues are well conveyed in available photographs. In general, the statuary represents the great loss and grief of war, this is not a monument to glorify conflict, rather it serves as a solemn reminder of the terrible things mankind has wrought upon his brother.

On the two pylons, in French and English, is the inscription: "To the valour of their countrymen in the Great War and in memory of their sixty thousand dead this monument is raised by the people of Canada."

Around the base of the Monument are inscribed 11,825 names of Canadian soldiers who died in the First World War and have no known graves. Walking along these walls of names is utterly overwhelming, seeing each soldier so remembered for all time, his sacrifice not forgotten as long as the people of Canada visit this place and maintain this stone work of art.

The Vimy memorial is stained and shows its age. The surface, surprisingly to me, is not the smooth surface of dressed stone, but is rough in texture, deliberately prepared to be so. In retrospect this coarse finish on the stone is probably more fitting to the somber purpose of the Monument. 

Any Canadian that travels to Europe should visit Vimy Ridge. They should walk these grounds and quietly thank those who sacrificed themselves in the first of two great wars of the Twentieth Century to defend and maintain the principles and tenets of western society. No photo or collection of words, no matter how nicely narrated, can replicate the power, the intensity and the impact of standing on Hill 145 and trying to visualize what powers and what love for their fellow man it must take to make men willing to achieve such a feat of arms.


Lest WeForget.






The Regimental Rogue


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## LakeSup

http://www.lewrockwell.com/ryan/ryan31.html

This is an interesting article about the fact that Canada was really a more war supporting nation than the US (esp British wars) but that that changed after Dieppe.  Some interesting ideas on what things would be like if Dieppe hadn't occurred.


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## wildman0101

dieppe happened...deal with it
every thing after the fact is just conjecture (guessing)
just ym .002 worth
lest we forget..
                       scoty b


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## ronnychoi

Brigadier General Commack lives across from my Gramma in Manitoba. He stormed Dieppe. He is really wise.


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## Yrys

What is a wise person for you, ronnychoi ?


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## ronnychoi

Someone who has been around the world and seen many cultures.. Who has an optimistic outlook on life. You can't be wise unless you approach most all things and events with good humour.

Thats just my interpretation.


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## JesseWZ

From what I understand many valuable lessons for D-day were learned from Dieppe. Things like terrain of the landing zone, bombardment, defense emplacement softening etc. If Dieppe didn't happen its my humble opinion that Normandy would have been a tougher fight. 
Just my random loose changes worth.
Edit: Grammatical Error


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## villecour

You are right Jesse. lessons, very valuable ones were learnt at Dieppe and without them, things could have gone terribly bad in Normandy.


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## Donut

There's a book floating around, written by a fellow named Christopher Chreighton (sp?).  I believe the title is "Op JB".

It presents as a factual account, but is often billed as fiction.  In it, the author claims to have worked for a very secretive relation of British SOE, and he claims that he was in fact a double agent, who was tasked to leak the plans for Dieppe to the German intelligence (anyone who's read some WWII history will be familiar with the truly crappy rep that German Int had in WWII).

The objective of the op was to allow the landing to be defeated, and thereby convince the German Command that the Atlantic Wall was sufficiently defended, and didn't need any further reinforcing.

The book then goes on to talk about a river-borne infiltration and exfiltrartion of Berlin as the Red Army closed up to the Rhine, spiriting away the German Exchequer, who had access to huge amounts of money deposited in Switzerland.

Even if it's a work of fiction, it's not a bad read.  If a true account, then a phenomenal record of some of the most daring ops conducted in WWII.

Interesting theory, anyway.

DF


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## ronnychoi

Yeah, I'll read it. Its hard to find good books. I personally like the books that are written in the first person about thier lives and the the things they learned.

"Eat your weakest man" by Rui Amaral was a fun read.


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## LakeSup

I think you need to read the article to get the point.  The point is that before WW2, if you asked an American which country was more likely to go to war, the answer would be Canada.  That is a far cry from what you would hear today if you asked that question on a FoxNews e mail poll.  The fact is that Canada supported British wars in very strong numbers and and english Canadian was far more likely to join up than an American.
Just a warning, though.  The Lew Rockwell site is conservative/libertarian and very good on economic matters but it is virulently anti-neocon.


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## nowhere_man

ParaMedTech said:
			
		

> The objective of the op was to allow the landing to be defeated, and thereby convince the German Command that the Atlantic Wall was sufficiently defended, and didn't need any further reinforcing.
> 
> DF



But the Germans did move units to the wall after Dieppe, They took units off the Eastern front.


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## a_majoor

One of the real lessons of Dieppe is that corporate memory is a valuable resource. Much of what happened at Dieppe happened at Gallipoli during the First World War, and if those lessos had been remembered; the outcome of OP JUBILEE would have been rather different.

My opinion, anyway


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## Michael OLeary

Alternatively, one lesson from Gallipoli was the difficulty of supporting a landing force across a beach (no dock, port facilities, etc.).  One of the objectives of the Dieppe raid was to prove whether or not it was possible to capture, intact, a usuable port facility which could support a landing force.  Unfortunately, those attributes which make a port possible, such as headlands, harbour and approaches, also made it clearly defensible for the Germans and emphasized the costs of trying to plan an invasion around this support approach.  Results - improved 'across the beach' support for follow-on operations: better landing craft, purpose-built fire support ships, DUKWs in Africa and Italy; PLUTO and MULBERRY by Normandy, etc.   Who might have expected it, operational logistic planning helping to shape invasion strategy and tactics.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Dieppe is an interesting study, made somewhat difficult in Canada due to the emotional part. 

To me, the big "lesson" has to do with the conception of the plan.  While the planners were quite enthusiastic, the Navy was much more cool.  They would not risk a captial ship (cruiser or above) to support the landings due to the risk in the Channel to air attack.  This should have been a show-stopper.  Planning went ahead.  Combined Operations wanted an operation, and the Canadians were looking for a battle after two years or so of relative inactivity.  The aim of an operation shouldn't necessarily be to conduct an operation.

If an operation is not important enough for one service to commit critical resources and the higher command does not see it as important enough to countermand that decision then it should be a red flag to the planners. 

There were lots of amphibious landings during the course of the war before Normandy to learn tactical lessons.  The requirement for fire support was known.  That being said, it did quash any thoughts of trying to seize a port intact.  It did cool the enthusiasm in US quarters for a 1943 invasion, and that is probably important.

Still, I believe that the AVRE was a direct result of the Dieppe raid.  The tanks did better than most think at getting ashore and off the beach.  It was the concrete barriers where the town met the esplanade that halted them.  The sappers were on foot and killed.  I believe that a Canadian engineer Captain conceived the AVRE in the weeks following the raid.  

The raid is also a good object lesson that relying on complete tactical suprise of the enemy for success is a huge gamble.  Reading the detailed plan for the attack, the Germans seem to have been assumed away.

Turning to the blog in question, I find the reasoning a bit hard to follow.  I would not ascribe Canadian sentiments towards "war" and the US in the post-war period to Dieppe.  I would venture that Canada in WWI had a strong connection to England, and this continued into WWII.  This faded over time, and there had never been a similar strong emotional connection to the US.  

Speculative history is fun, but it is a rather dubious discipline.


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## Echo9

for those who are interested, there's actually a series of books entitled "What if..." that are about counterfactual histories, written by some of the world's top military historians.  Examples include Alexander being killed early on in his conquests, the greeks losing at Thermopylae, the German spring offensive of 1918 being successful, Hitler attacking the mid-east for its oil instead of Russia, Chang Kai Shek being victorious over Mao (at different times).  And then there's the American revolution, where there's about 12 different points where it would have turned out differently.

I think that the more interesting what if wrt Dieppe is what might have happened if it was successful....


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## Old Sweat

I agree with Red Five. Canada has never been a hot bed of military ardour in peacetime. Look at the level of peacetime military spending compared to darn near everyone else in the period between the two world wars of the last century.

As for the planning for Dieppe, if it proved nothing else, it showed that an invasion was too important to be left to the like of Mountbatten and his staff and that a Supreme Commander with undivided authority and the complete backing of the Briitsh and American service chiefs was needed.

It is also interesting to see how Montgomery managed to hide his responsibility for the early planning for the raid.


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## JesseWZ

Alternate History is a personal favourite of mine. I especially enjoy Harry Turtledove. He's a little far out in some cases but his books on the US civil war are quite good.


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## DVessey

Ditto what other people have said so far. We learned/relearned a lot of important lessons at Dieppe.

Midway through the article, the author makes the statement:
"The gradual pull-away of Canada from the U.K. orbit would have proceeded anyway, so Canadian war enthusiasm would have been slowly detached from the British Commonwealth and transferred, in part, to the United States’ battles"
Which I don't agree with at all.

Even before the war, Canada was trying to get some more independence (read: Borden signing Versailles indepedantly, Treaty of Westminister). MacKenzie even waited a week after Britain before declaring war. I don't see why we would have shifted more towards the US. We were trying to be more independent, not look for a new imperial master.

Again, my two cents.


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## Aerobicrunner

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Who might have expected it, operational logistic planning helping to shape invasion strategy and tactics.


Just a slight diversion because it sure helped at Vimy Ridge.
Quote from Valour Remembered - Canada and the First World War (p11):
"Canadian commanders , however, had learned well the bitter lessons of assault by vulnerable infantry.  This time the prepartation was elaborate and the planning thorough.  Engineers dug great tunnels into the Ridge; roads and light railways were built; signals and supplies were ready.  The operation was to be supported by a large concentration of heavy guns and howitzers, and full artillery.  The men two were fully prepared.  The area was simulated behind the lines and troops practiced their roles until every man was familiar witht he ground and the tactics expected of him."


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## Groucho

The raid on Dieppe was planned then cancelled after a period of time the whole thing was started up again. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Divison was added after planning was underway. Many people say it was too big for a commando raid but too small for an invasion force. At the last moment the heavy naval support of battleships and the heavy bomber raid where cancelled. It is one of the great what ifs of WW2 . What if they had held the port intacted there was no follow up troops to re-enforce the beach head . This should not take away for the bravery and fighting spirit of the troops that take part. The hand of fate was not kind to the units that saw action. It is proudly wore as a battle honour as any victory is . It is one of the many events that has shape the modern Canadian Forces and the country of Canada. Both would be poorer if it did not happen!


Just my 2 cents on the issue.


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## GUNS

I was in the Honor Guard for the 30Th anniversary of the Dieppe Raid. It was wonderful to see the looks of appreciation and thanks  from the towns people of Dieppe. Even though Dieppe was a disaster for the Canadians, in later years it was a godsent for the people of France


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## 3rd Herd

ParaMedTech said:
			
		

> It presents as a factual account, but is often billed as fiction.  In it, the author claims to have worked for a very secretive relation of British SOE, and he claims that he was in fact a double agent, who was tasked to leak the plans for Dieppe to the German intelligence (anyone who's read some WWII history will be familiar with the truly crappy rep that German Int had in WWII).
> 
> The objective of the op was to allow the landing to be defeated, and thereby convince the German Command that the Atlantic Wall was sufficiently defended, and didn't need any further reinforcing.
> 
> 
> DF



Well Para Med tech here is some reading for you:  London Calling North Pole  by Hermann J. Giskes , It is just one of a series of works that proved beyond a wildest doubt that German intelligence had most of the resistance and SOE operations well penetrated. Also in this genre is Cookridge, E.H in Set Europe Ablaze . Yes they had the information but it is what the higher ups chose to do with it is another story. For D-day for example in  Invasion! They're Coming!: The German Account of the D-Day Landings and the 80 Days' Battle for France  by Paul Carell there are several quite excellent examples of German penetration of allied plans. Keith Macksey's Partisans provides a continental view of German successes and failures. A relatively recent published book by Jean Overton Fuller, titled The German Penetration of SOE  is worth the read. Interestingly though the one resistance organization the Germans did have problems with was the Communist controlled ones. 

As for the Eastern Front  most anything by Glantz, Le Tessier, Belvor and Seaton can clear up the situation as all have examined this area. There is a reexamination of the wonder star of German intelligence, General Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's chief of eastern front intelligence is starting to occur now too as more archival material is seeing the light of day.

as for Dieppe there are several theories floating around around several universities as earlier stated more material is now available to examine.

Edit to add:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/38082.0.html


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## a_majoor

Groucho said:
			
		

> The raid on Dieppe was planned then cancelled after a period of time the whole thing was started up again. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Divison was added after planning was underway. Many people say it was too big for a commando raid but too small for an invasion force. At the last moment the heavy naval support of battleships and the heavy bomber raid where cancelled. It is one of the great what ifs of WW2 . What if they had held the port intacted there was no follow up troops to re-enforce the beach head . This should not take away for the bravery and fighting spirit of the troops that take part. The hand of fate was not kind to the units that saw action. It is proudly wore as a battle honour as any victory is . It is one of the many events that has shape the modern Canadian Forces and the country of Canada. Both would be poorer if it did not happen!
> 
> 
> Just my 2 cents on the issue.



There was never a follow up because Dieppe was designed as a "raid". What exactly they were raiding may be open to question; a book called "Green Beach" suggests the aim was to capture a radar station and bring parts and maybe the operators back for investigation; as stated earlier there were questions as to the utility of capturing a port to support an invasion force and so on.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Out of curiousity who liberated Dieppe in 1944?


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## Haletown

same unit   . . . .2 CID


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## Ex-Dragoon

Thanks


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## Haletown

as it was reported at the time  . . . .

http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-2359-13810/conflict_war/dieppe/clip5


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## TangoTwoBravo

Groucho said:
			
		

> What if they had held the port intacted there was no follow up troops to re-enforce the beach head .



The plan for the raid had units pushing inland for a ways before withdrawing that day.  It was all very optimistic, and the aim of the raid was questionable in and of itself.

The Germans also learned some lessons.  The chert beach had not been mined, as they were not very concerned about tanks landing and doubted that they could cross the pebbles in any case.  The Churchills came as a nasty suprise.  The rather primitive bobbin trackways that allowed fifteen odd tanks to cross the beach demonstrated that antitank defences were a requirement.  The Normandy beaches would indeed by mined. 

Again, I find the article has some questionable paths of logic.  I think he is trying to make some link to Iraq (a defeat quells a nation's warrior spirit or something like that).  Even before Dieppe the Canadian government was not enthusiastic about committing ground forces.  The memories of WWI casualty lists and the ensuing conscription crisis were quite fresh in 1939 and haunted the PM throughout.  I believe that the PM wanted to make providing aircrew training the centrepiece of Canada's war effort (shades of later limited involvement in wars).  I find it hard to believe that postwar policy decisions were based on memories of Dieppe.  Canada seemingly sits secure behind its oceans with a huge neighbour to the south as a guarantee against foreign aggression.  I'm not saying I agree with this view, but I think that it does predominate in some quarters.  

I expect that the US will, on the whole, will be reluctant to engage in foreign campaigns for some time as a result of Iraq.  Their position in the world will prevent complete isolationism as will memories of 9/11, but I think that it will still be hard to get support for a new war any time soon barring some major event.  The same dynamic was seen post-Vietnam, and I would argue that it took the Iran hostage crisis to shake them out of their funk.  That the Cold War heated up at the same time ensured that it was not a passing moment.  

Going back to Dieppe, I had the privilege to visit there on a battlefield study.  The view from the German defences is chilling.  The locals received us warmly despite the passage of time.


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## The Bread Guy

From the PMO


> Prime Minister Stephen Harper today announced that His Excellency, the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, will attend ceremonies in Dieppe, France, from August 19 to 20, to mark the 70th Anniversary of the Dieppe Raid.
> The Governor General will join the Honourable Steven Blaney, Minister of Veterans Affairs, who will lead an official delegation to France from August 17 to 21, which includes Veterans who participated in the Dieppe Raid.
> 
> While in France, the Governor General, Minister Blaney and the Canadian delegation will attend a number of commemorative ceremonies including the Government of Canada’s signature event at Canada Memorial Square on August 19 and a ceremony at the Pourville Memorial on August 20.
> 
> In addition to the ceremonies taking place in France, there will also be a ceremony at the National War Memorial in Ottawa, as well as a number of events in communities across the country.
> 
> The raid on Dieppe, France, on August 19, 1942, was a pivotal moment in the Second World War. With virtually all of continental Europe under German occupation, the Allied forces faced a well-entrenched enemy. A method had to be found to create a foothold on the continent, and the raid on Dieppe offered invaluable lessons for the successful D-Day invasion in 1944, saving countless lives in that momentous offensive.
> 
> The Dieppe Raid was particularly devastating to the Canadian military. Of the nearly 5,000 Canadians who embarked on the operation, less than half returned to England, many of whom were wounded. There were 1,946 prisoners of war and 913 who lost their lives.
> 
> The Canadians who fought in the Dieppe Raid sacrificed much in their efforts to help bring freedom and democracy to the people of France and Europe. Their task was a difficult and costly one, but their effort was not in vain.
> 
> Lest we forget.


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## The Bread Guy

More on the Dieppe raid:





> New research suggests the real intent of the historic raid on Dieppe in 1942 was to steal a machine that would help crack top-secret German codes.
> 
> Military historian David O’Keefe spent 15 years searching through the once-classified and ultra-secret war files and says the real purpose behind the Dieppe operation—which cost hundreds of Canadian soldiers their lives — was to capture advanced coding technology from the German headquarters near the French beach.
> 
> (....)
> 
> Bletchley Park, located just north of London, was the centre of British code-breaking in the Second World War. Scientists and mathematicians would intercept and crack enemy radio messages by breaking into ciphers and codes used to keep top-secret information private.
> 
> For the Allies, the Bletchley Park operation was crucial to move supplies and win the Battle of the Atlantic.
> 
> According to O’Keefe’s research, British naval officers used Operation Jubilee to target the German-made Enigma code machine, an electro-mechanical piece of equipment that used a series of rotors for the encryption and decryption of secret messages.
> 
> Unlocking such a device, says O’Keefe, would mean knowing enemy intentions — information that could potentially reveal German intent, capabilities, hopes, and fears.
> 
> “It’s like reading your opposition’s e-mail or, better yet, reading your opposition’s poker hand and knowing exactly how to play or use your forces,” says O’Keefe. “The Allies relied on this in almost every decision they made in the Second World War." ....


globalnews.ca, 9 Aug 12


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## Old Sweat

I will wait and see on this one. However, it does not seem logical to lay on a divisional size raid with large air and naval forces just for this. In the past there have been claims that the aim of the raid was to provoke a huge air battle or to gain information about radar or . . . It seems to me that the raid was planned for a military purpose and the rest of the stuff was added by various organizations who saw an opportunity. 

However stranger things have happened - the raid on St Nazaire for example. The aim of this raid was to disable the large dry dock, which was the only one on the Atlantic Coast which could hold a major German warship. This, it was felt, could prevent the Germans from trying a repeat of the Bismark sortie.

The wikipedia entry gives a general overview:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid


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## Edward Campbell

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I will wait and see on this one. However, it does not seem logical to lay on a divisional size raid with large air and naval forces just for this. In the past there have been claims that the aim of the raid was to provoke a huge air battle or to gain information about radar or . . . It seems to me that the raid was planned for a military purpose and the rest of the stuff was added by various organizations who saw an opportunity.
> 
> However stranger things have happened - the raid on St Nazaire for example. The aim of this raid was to disable the large dry dock, which was the only one on the Atlantic Coast which could hold a major German warship. This, it was felt, could prevent the Germans from trying a repeat of the Bismark sortie.
> 
> The wikipedia entry gives a general overview:
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid




My understanding, from what I've read over the years, is that the Bletchley Park (and other) people had *secondary* objectives in the raid, important but secondary, added on, as suggested, but that, as Old Sweat suggests, the main objective was to test amphibious operations.

My sense is that the various _special people_, often rather odd civilians, were "minded" by some small teams of quite bloody military folks and that small, apparently _pinprick_ raids were their normal mode of operations.

Regarding _Enigma_: the 'fuel' for Bletchley Park was provided by carelessly preserved hard copies of 'clear' (decoded) German message traffic; the Brits could, apparently, decode the addressees on the _Enigma_ message traffic and they were, occasionally, able to guess that some small signal centres _might_ be a bit careless about the timely (almost immediate) destruction of _Enigma_ decodes. Hence small raids to steal decoded traffic, with sabotage (actually much like 21st century terrorism) attacks as a cover.

There is a wonderfully informative museum and reading room at Bletchley - well worth a trip when you are in England.


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## gordjenkins

On page 16 of the current Macleans magazine of August 20 2012, the article states the real reason for the raid had a real " _vital mission" -" to steal highly valuable inteligence material from a German naval headquarters in the town (Dieppe")" _ 
Simple question - Yes or No?


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## Michael OLeary

From what I have read (and I stand to be corrected), the main objective of the Dieppe raid was basically a proof of concept; to see if it was possible to capture and hold (for a brief period within the scope of operations for Dieppe) a channel port because at the time the technology to support a major landing across open beaches did not exist. There were included operations such as a raid on a radar station (if I recall correctly) but that was not the main objective.


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## dapaterson

Historians love to think that They and They alone are smart enough to discover Previously Undiscovered Secrets!

In this case, yes, there is evidence that there were intelligence objectives included in the raid.  But it is a tremendous stretch to say that the raid was a cover for intelligence gathering activities, when most available evidence suggests the plans for the raid came first, with the intelligence gathering objectives second.


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## Old Sweat

Mods, 

There is a discussion of this theory here. At Dapaterson says, historians love to discover "secrets" but this is more of a "Shot in the Dark."

Perhaps we could move some of the stuff from the visit to Dieppe referenced below thread to here.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/107000/post-1163813.html#msg1163813


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## Old Sweat

This very interesting piece from today's National Post include a frank discussion on a challenge that plagued most armies in the early years of the war - the dead wood that accumulated in the officers' mess in peace time and rose to the top by seniority. I had heard comments re the CO of the RHLI and route marches from other sources. The article is reproduced under the Fair Dealin provision of the Copyright Act.

Arthur Kelly on Dieppe: A battle doomed to fail for all the wrong reasons

Special to National Post | Aug 17, 2012 6:20 AM ET 


The Second World War has a day of infamy, ones signifying the end of fighting in Europe and Asia, and of course June 6, 1944, D-Day, the most recognized of all. For Canadians, there’s another meaningful date, Aug. 19, 1942, a day seemingly without end, for its tragic unfolding remains a source of bewilderment and controversy. Even 70 years later, the true nature of the Dieppe Raid remains a mystery to most.

“Difficult to visualize as a whole,” was the German assessment of the Allied plan of attack. Not so the casualties, graphically preserved on film and in photos. Mounds of dead stretched over 15 km of French coast from Puys to Pourville, a total exceeding 4,000, including 907 Canadians killed. Unrelentingly cruel, the raid confirmed the worst-held fears of one its most able participants: Captain Denis Whitaker of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) had been an eyewitness to failed leadership, conduct he could neither forgive nor forget. “The defeat cleared out all the dead weight,” he told me at his Oakville, Ont., home during a meeting in 1989. “It was the best thing that ever happed to the regiment.”

A platoon commander at Dieppe, Whitaker is the most prominent of those few Canadians who penetrated inside the town. Like all the other soldiers landed at the beach, he immediately went to ground under machine gun and mortar fire, but he got up and led the charge inside the casino, assisting in its capture. By day’s end, he was the only RHLI officer to return to England unscathed, the others either dead, wounded or taken prisoner. The performance of some, in his opinion, was disgraceful: “They went to ground and didn’t get up.”

I was present at Whitaker’s home on July 11, 1982, when he, a retired brigadier-general then, discussed Dieppe with another RHLI veteran, one decorated for valour at the 1945 battle of the Goch-Calcar Road. “We would have done a lot better at Dieppe with you and the others,” he commented thoughtfully. “We would have at least got off the beach.”

What a sore spot for this gifted soldier, one of Canada’s finest field commanders of the Second World War. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, Whitaker led the RHLI after D-Day, successfully guiding it to war’s end. The regiment more closely resembled a social club, however, when Whitaker joined it in 1936. “The officers had no real training,” he explained. “They simply played soldier on weekends. The CO, Colonel Bob Labatt, was a stockbroker.”

Whitaker despised Labatt, holding him responsible for the regiment’s lack of discipline and combat readiness. Morale was poor among the troops as well. He recalled an incident prior to Dieppe, when the regiment conducted an 11-mile march before passing a reviewing stand. Labatt was nowhere to be seen, until he arrived by car out of sight of the dignitaries, just in time to lead the soldiers onto the parade ground. “This kind of behaviour destroys morale,” said Whitaker. “It sets a terrible example.”

At Dieppe, Labatt dashed a few meters from the water’s edge to a sea wall and here he remained, declaring the position battalion headquarters. Others joined him such as Major Dick McLaren, one of the longest serving members of the regiment. At the most critical juncture of the battle, when the troops should have been directed off the beach, Labatt and McLaren fidgeted with a damaged radio set, desperately trying to contact Major General John Roberts onboard the command ship.

“When I got to the wall,” recalled Whitaker, “I knelt down behind it to catch my breath and figure out what to do next. A German fired at me with a machine gun, the bullets passing underneath my stomach and in front of my head. I got out of there in a hurry and on to my objective. I shouted, ‘We can’t stay here because they’re going to mortar the hell out of this beach.’”

Well fortified, Dieppe was a horrific testing round for green troops. “The place is in the shape of a saucer,” noted Whitaker, who died in 2001. “Christ, they were firing at us from behind as well as the front and both sides.”

In the face of such murderous fire, Labatt and his officers had but one task before them, to press the attack forward. Failure to do so would result in the regiment’s annihilation, as well as their own, which is exactly what happened. It was a necessary evil in the mind of Whitaker and others. “Once the society guys were gone,” Bob Wight of Toronto told me in 1989, “there was a second group of officers comprised of real leaders.”

Wight, now deceased, was among the latter group, and the contrast between it and the first couldn’t have been greater. Even in their 70s and 80s when I knew them, these post-Dieppe veterans remained every inch the soldier, exuding courage, resoluteness and professionalism. My personal contact with McLaren, who along with Labatt, was taken prisoner at Dieppe, proved embarrassing and sad: Embarrassing to hear him admit he didn’t know what he was supposed to do on the raid; and sad to think of this otherwise decent man thrown into a situation for which he was completely unprepared.

What remains to be answered is if there was another element at play shaping events. The late Brigadier General Forbes West of Toronto thought so, identifying a political reason for the raid’s launch. “I feel that from the day planning began, it was intended to be a failure,” he revealed to me in his home 23 years ago. “Perhaps not as costly a failure, but a failure nevertheless. The British were being pressed by the Russians and Americans to open a second front, so we were put in with the firm intention of being destroyed. Men at the Chiefs of Staff level would consider 4,000 casualties a small price to pay for convincing the Russians and Americans an invasion would be a disaster.”

Public expectations were high for 1942 with many certain that the Western allies would open a second front against the Germans in Western Europe while the Soviets continued to battle the Nazis in the east. As spring gave way to summer, and the prospect of action grew dimmer, protests erupted. A July 26 rally in Trafalgar Square drew 60,000, the voices ever more shrill on the issue. Varsity Stadium in Toronto hosted a crowd of 14,000 demanding a cross-Channel invasion to help the hard-pressed Russians. On Aug. 2 The New York Times wrote that “the two words most deeply engraved on the minds of the Americans and British peoples at this moment are: Second Front.”

The British War Cabinet vehemently opposed such a move. Churchill himself preferred to secure Britain’s Mediterranean and Far East interests. Against a mounting backdrop of pressure, the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division under the command of Major General Roberts was presented a plan.

“I don’t know who the hell dreamt it up,” remarked Whitaker, “but they didn’t know anything about fighting a war. It was terrible planning, just awful, absolutely ridiculous. They had company objectives that you wouldn’t give to a battalion.”

Whitaker spoke knowingly of the “fog of war,” of not distinguishing what lay 20 feet away in a combat situation. A fog of a different sort descended over 5,000 Canadian soldiers on Aug. 18, 1942. Without prior warning they were hastily assembled, and then transported to the coast. Weapons were issued on-board ship, Sten guns in oily packaging. The raid, cancelled early in July, was now on again, but there had been no training for it since. One reassuring fact sustained the soldiers in the tension-filled hours prior to attack: The German defences would be pulverized by saturation bombardment making for a quick exit from the beaches. But the bombardment never occurred, as the British had opted to maintain “tactical surprise” and not alert the Germans to the pending attack until it began when men hit the beaches. This change in plan was withheld from the soldiers. Unmolested, the Germans commenced machine gun and mortar fire before the landing craft reached shore, killing all but two members of the RHLI’s 17 Platoon before they had hit the beach.

“The battle as far as we were concerned was really nothing but a massacre,” said West, a major in the Royal Regiment of Canada, destroyed at Puys, site of a flanking assault in support of the main thrust at Dieppe. “I remember going in with the second wave with the commanding officer. There was no sound of firing, so I said to him, ‘They must have got through the first line of defences.’ And he replied, ‘The hell they did, they’re all dead.’ When we landed there wasn’t anybody standing, everybody was just strewn on the beach.”

Shot through the leg, West was taken prisoner. During his time in captivity he reflected on the raid’s evolution: “I came to the conclusion that the attack was meant to be a disaster. First you have a frontal assault, which is not very good practice. It’s to be supported with heavy bombing; capital ships and paratroopers, and then each of these are taken away leaving just infantry to attack a fortress with rifle and bayonets. I’m absolutely certain it was intended to be a failure.”

Having been selected for a suicide mission once before in 1940, it’s easy to imagine the Canadians being chosen again two years later. Major General Churchill Mann, deputy military force commander at Dieppe, later revealed the true intent of a British plan involving Canadian forces: “On May 26, 1940,” he wrote, “the war cabinet considered that a sacrifice of a good part of the Canadians might bring the United States into the war as an ally. We at HQ1 Canadian Headquarters commenced arrangements to embark about half the divisions, using passenger-ship lifeboats to land over open beaches without any support at all at Gravelines. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed and this operation was cancelled.”

As the guns fell silent at Dieppe, so too did public calls for a second front. The shift in attitude was total, seemingly on cue, like this Hamilton Spectator editorial: “This raid should sober the judgment of amateur strategists and silence the irresponsible clamor for a second front. That action will no doubt be taken when our military leaders deem the hour to be ripe for it. Meanwhile, the direction of the war should be wholly entrusted to their care.”

The brutality of Aug. 19, 1942 is contrasted by the kindness bestowed upon the raid since, namely its designation as “a rehearsal” for D-Day. The lessons supposedly learned from the disastrous attack are easily refuted, yet are routinely used as justification for the raid. On this subject West was particularly succinct: “Since the time of the Roman legions, it’s been known that there is no possibility of dislodging a well-entrenched enemy without superior fire power. I don’t know of any lessons we learned at Dieppe.”

Cannon fodder is a term typically associated with the trench warfare of 1914-18, not the conflict of 1939-45. That’s what the Canadians were, however. Why were Canadians selected for such a dubious honour?

Whitaker identified the reason, poor leadership in the first contingents to Britain. The lack of initiative on the beaches of Dieppe was just as evident at the command centre, a problem well understood by the venerable Forbes West: “You have a Major General like Roberts surrounded by Mountbatten, Montgomery and God knows who else, and they say, ‘You don’t mind if we don’t bomb the town do you?’ It would take a man with a tremendous amount of guts to respond, ‘No, if we don’t have any bombardment I personally will not command.’ Roberts didn’t have it in him to say, ‘Look Montgomery, you don’t know sheep s–t from dates and we won’t go.’”


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## gordjenkins

Has anyone an opinion that Dieppe Raid real reason 
was to gain Ultra /Enigma secrets 
-per recent 
-this weeks article in Macleans magazine??


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## mariomike

Topic: "Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)":
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/107000.0

Dieppe may rate its own mega-thread:
http://www.google.com/cse?cx=001303416948774225061%3Aqhcx9pz3dku&ie=UTF-8&q=dieppe&sa=Search&siteurl=www.google.com%2Fcse%2Fhome%3Fcx%3D001303416948774225061%3Aqhcx9pz3dku&ref=&ss=1896j875596j6#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=dieppe


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## exspy

*This very interesting piece from today's National Post include a frank discussion on a challenge that plagued most armies in the early years of the war - the dead wood that accumulated in the officers' mess in peace time and rose to the top by seniority. I had heard comments re the CO of the RHLI and route marches from other sources.
*
It appears that the lesson from Dieppe that is so clearly illustrated from this story did not permeate the rest of the Canadian Army in England.  The same thing happened with the 1st Infantry Division in Sicily and the 3rd Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions in Normandy.  Lots of unit and formation commanders were replaced within the first months, if not weeks, of active combat. 

I would hold McNaughton and Crerar responsible for this.  It was their duty to prepare the Canadian Army for war, and they had plenty of time to do it.  Montgomery held many exercises in England preparing his forces for the invasion which should have shown up the deficiencies in the Canadian Army's leadership, but these deficiencies appear to have been passed over.

I'm sure these exact problems also occurred in other armies during the War, but with four years to prepare for combat in Sicily and more for Normandy, I don't see how there can be an excuse for keeping the incompetent in command.

Cheers,
Dan.


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## Old Sweat

Dan M said:
			
		

> *This very interesting piece from today's National Post include a frank discussion on a challenge that plagued most armies in the early years of the war - the dead wood that accumulated in the officers' mess in peace time and rose to the top by seniority. I had heard comments re the CO of the RHLI and route marches from other sources.
> *
> It appears that the lesson from Dieppe that is so clearly illustrated from this story did not permeate the rest of the Canadian Army in England.  The same thing happened with the 1st Infantry Division in Sicily and the 3rd Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions in Normandy.  Lots of unit and formation commanders were replaced within the first months, if not weeks, of active combat.
> 
> I would hold McNaughton and Crerar responsible for this.  It was their duty to prepare the Canadian Army for war, and they had plenty of time to do it.  Montgomery held many exercises in England preparing his forces for the invasion which should have shown up the deficiencies in the Canadian Army's leadership, but these deficiencies appear to have been passed over.
> 
> I'm sure these exact problems also occurred in other armies during the War, but with four years to prepare for combat in Sicily and more for Normandy, I don't see how there can be an excuse for keeping the incompetent in command.
> 
> Cheers,
> Dan.



There was a wholesale clearing of deadwood in England, including several division commanders, but there is only so much one can do in training. The difficulty came because the army did not see early action, unlike in the First World War. In that war the four divisions were introduced to battle one after the other over a period of a bit less than two years and there was time to develop formation commanders and to sort out the staff work. 

In the case of the Canadian Army in Normandy, none of the original three division commanders was all that good. Keller of the 3rd Division was wounded in Totalize before he might have been sacked and Kitching of the 4th Armoured was relieved once the Falaise Gap was closed. The only thing, in my opinion, that saved Foulkes of the 2nd Division from the same fate was the relief of Burns, the commander of the 1st Canadian Corps, in Italy, whom he replaced. As for the nine brigade commanders, one was fired for refusing to continue to serve under Keller's command and at least two were wounded and one was killed in action. Another, a regular signals officer, was discreetly kicked upstairs and posted to a staff job in Canada after the Normandy campaign. (My sequences may be a bit out, as I am writing this from memory.) Still, it was not a very flattering picture of our selection and training of senior commanders in the long years waiting for action.


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## George Wallace

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> There was a wholesale clearing of deadwood in England, including several division commanders, but there is only so much one can do in training. The difficulty came because the army did not see early action, unlike in the First World War. In that war the four divisions were introduced to battle one after the other over a period of a bit less than two years and there was time to develop formation commanders and to sort out the staff work.
> 
> In the case of the Canadian Army in Normandy, none of the original three division commanders was all that good. Keller of the 3rd Division was wounded in Totalize before he might have been sacked and Kitching of the 4th Armoured was relieved once the Falaise Gap was closed. The only thing, in my opinion, that saved Foulkes of the 2nd Division from the same fate was the relief of Burns, the commander of the 1st Canadian Corps, in Italy, whom he replaced. As for the nine brigade commanders, one was fired for refusing to continue to serve under Keller's command and at least two were wounded and one was killed in action. Another, a regular signals officer, was discreetly kicked upstairs and posted to a staff job in Canada after the Normandy campaign. (My sequences may be a bit out, as I am writing this from memory.) Still, it was not a very flattering picture of our selection and training of senior commanders in the long years waiting for action.



Were a lot of those firings/sackings/transfers not more due to the interference/micromanaging of these commands by Simmons?


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## TangoTwoBravo

Action has a tendency to reveal weaknesses in a host of aspects, with the capability of leadership being one of the big ones. I think that the Canadian Army in WW2 figured that since Canada had done so well in WW1 that it would simply carry over. Our tiny Permanent Force between the wars, however, was not larg enough to generate the right base of officers. I think that it was also too focused on technical aspects.

Canada, and I believe that McNaughton was heavily involved in this, was also insistent on committing troops en masse and not in smaller groups. This meant that the majority of Canadian troops were green even in 1944. The Dieppe raid was seized upon by the Canadians in part to see some action. 

I wonder if the Canadian Army's performance in Normandy would have been different if a Division had been committed to the North African campaign. I think that participation in Torch could have been realistic. The US Army learned its own weaknesses in that campaign. A Canadian division committed to North Africa in 1942 could have been pulled back to England in mid 1943 and then its veterans would have been ready for the Normandy campaign.


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## Oldgateboatdriver

If anyone wishes to refresh memory on this, I have always found that, while incomplte on each individual, J.L. Granastein's book "The Generals - the Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War" presented a good summary of who did what, where, when and how it ended up for them.


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## Old Sweat

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Were a lot of those firings/sackings/transfers not more due to the interference/micromanaging of these commands by Simmons?



The original round of firings was done in 1942 based on the recommendations of Montgomery, who had been invited to take a look at the army by Crerar with that aim in mind. Simonds removed several commanders in early 1944 so he could fill positions with people such as Kitching, Booth and Wyman he brought back from Italy. In action Simonds was at first reluctant to fire people such as Keller, and was supported in this regard by Crerar. One source reported that on his deathbed Simonds said that he still was concerned that he had erred in replacing the commander of 9 Brigade and not Keller. He later fired Kitching, who was a close friend, and might have axed Booth had he not been killed in action during Operation Tractable.

By the way, Roberts was not sacked as a result of Dieppe. He was replaced in command of the 2nd Division for his poor performance on a later major exercise in the UK. I suspect he might have been under the gun because of the raid, and the exercise settled the matter, but that is just my opinion. 

I second Oldgateboatdriver's recommendation re "The Generals."


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## Old Sweat

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Action has a tendency to reveal weaknesses in a host of aspects, with the capability of leadership being one of the big ones. I think that the Canadian Army in WW2 figured that since Canada had done so well in WW1 that it would simply carry over. Our tiny Permanent Force between the wars, however, was not larg enough to generate the right base of officers. I think that it was also too focused on technical aspects.
> 
> I think you are right on both counts here. A senior German general opined that our population was too small to develop the number of potential senior officers required for a major war.
> Canada, and I believe that McNaughton was heavily involved in this, was also insistent on committing troops en masse and not in smaller groups. This meant that the majority of Canadian troops were green even in 1944. The Dieppe raid was seized upon by the Canadians in part to see some action.
> 
> Mackzenzie King was reluctant to commit troops to North Africa because of the potential adverse political reaction from not using troops to defend the UK.
> 
> I wonder if the Canadian Army's performance in Normandy would have been different if a Division had been committed to the North African campaign. I think that participation in Torch could have been realistic. The US Army learned its own weaknesses in that campaign. A Canadian division committed to North Africa in 1942 could have been pulled back to England in mid 1943 and then its veterans would have been ready for the Normandy campaign.
> 
> 
> I think the original plan was to bring the 1st Division and 1st Armoured Brigade back to the UK after Sicily for just that purpose. However this did not happen.
> 
> While there certainly were instances where we could have done better in Normandy, in my opinion our performance was not as bad compared to the Americans and the British as has been claimed. Again, in my opinion much of the criticism started when the perfromance of Montgomery and the British Army began to be questioned in the seventies, and much of it was an attempt to shift attention away from them.


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## a_majoor

I watched the documentary "Dieppe Uncovered", which is committed to the thesis of the raid being the cover for an intelligence operation aimed at 4 wheel "Enigma" devices. There were certainly a lot of moving parts for this (as revealed in recently declassified archival material). OTOH there was a book many years ago called "Green Beach" which claimed the purpose of the raid was to serve as cover for the capture of a German radar installation, and of course the usual reasons such as a dress rehersal for D-Day have been raised over the years.

I tend to agree with the initial assessment; the raid came first and others (perhaps several others) included themselves in the raid for their own reasons. It is in fact quite possible for both hypothesis (capture German Naval intelligence and German radar technology) to be true, given the scale and size of the raid, and the presence of the US Rangers might hint at yet another "add on" mission.


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## Old Sweat

I agree with the points Thuc made. Without reading the documents Prof O'Keefe cites and putting them in context I really can't come to a conclusion. It may well be that this intelligence requirement influenced the decision to assault the town by a frontal landing instead of coming in from the flanks. That is, however, quite different from being the reason behind the choice of Dieppe. 

There is one factor that suggests to me that the desire to capture the code machine influenced the plan, as did the plan to sieze some radar equipment inland from Green Beach. The ground plan and the choice of objectives seem to me to have been designed by a committee without due consideration of military considerations in a number of instances. Two Canadian infantry brigades were virtually destroyed in a morning because of a thoroughly bad estimate and plan conceived by enthusiastic amateurs who had never really mounted anything larger than a battalion landing up to that time.  That in itself hints that getting into the naval HQ was not the overriding aim, because there probably were better ways to do it.

There probably is a lesson there for the proponents of large headquarters and targeting committees and decisions based on PowerPoint and all the rest: *STOP!!*


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## TangoTwoBravo

The Canadians were involved because they wanted action. Combined Operations wanted to do _something_. They wanted to see if they could take a port and hold it. For the Canadians the raid was an answer looking for a question. The Royal Navy's refusal to risk cruisers in the channel to support the landings should have cancelled the mission. This also shows that the raid was not really a priority for anyone outside Combinded Operations and the enthusiastic 2nd Division aching for action.

The tactical plan was wildly optimistic. Going through the various objectives I was struck that the planners seemed to discount the German defenders. They figured that surprise would allow the attackers to simply overwhelm the defenders. The plan was, however, very detailed. The Canadians knew about the condition of the beach and outfitted the lead tanks of each wave with a bobbin system to overcome it. They knew about the concrete walls blocking the exits and had sappers tasked the deal with them. Unfortunately the sappers were on foot and were unable to get through the storm of fire. The tactical planners were, therefore, working very hard but without practicality. 

I am extremely skeptical about the secret squirrel explanations for the raid. Commandos could have pulled that off on their own.


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## R.C.

An excellent documentary aired yesterday on the History channel called Dieppe Uncovered. Recently declassified documents reveal intelligence-gathering to be the primary objective behind the landing at Dieppe...specifically, a four-rotor Enigma machine recently developed by the Germans, which was to replace the old three-rotor Enigma. British intel had found that German Naval intelligence was housed in a building not far from the port at Dieppe.

The documentary puts to rest the theories that Dieppe was some sort of trial run for later operations, or simply an attempt at seizing a port, or an attempt to establish a second front in continental Europe at the request of the Russians.

Definitely worth a watch, if you get a chance.

http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=274917

Apologies to those who had already mentioned this documentary -- I did not realize I had not scrolled all the way down to the bottom of the page and inadvertently missed the last few posts.  :yellow:


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## Old Sweat

Many of us watched the documentary, but do not accept the premise behind it, as a read of this thread will show. There were too many other factors involved ranging from the Green Beach theory from the book by James Lessor through the claim that the raid was designed to lure the Luftwaffe into a massive air battle (which it won, by the way) and included an attempt by the British to show the Americans a second front was impossible and a demonstration to draw Germans away from the Eastern Front. It merely could have been because Combined Operations Command had been created to conduct raids and it had to keep carrying them out, at lesst in its own corporate mind, or it would lose influence. The Enigma issue may have played a part, but it is unlikely it drove the operation, other than perhaps in the choice of the site. 

What I am saying is there would have been a large raid in the summer of 1942, whether the target was Dieppe or someplace else. In fact the place selected was limited by too many factors to list, but the range of the RAF fighters and the vulnerability of the navy including its amphibious element ranked high among them.


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## Fishbone Jones

The Germans went to great length to protect those machines. I'd have to guess that in the event of a full scale attack, like Dieppe, a machine that close to the front would've been bundled into a fast car and driven at speed as far as possible from the action.

I don't believe the action, as close as it was, would've required any coded messages of signifigance. The machine would have been idle for the taking. I don't think the Germans would've been willing to take that chance.

Just my  :2c:


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## Edward Campbell

recceguy said:
			
		

> The Germans went to great length to protect those machines. I'd have to guess that in the event of a full scale attack, like Dieppe, a machine that close to the front would've been bundled into a fast car and driven at speed as far as possible from the action.
> 
> I don't believe the action, as close as it was, would've required any coded messages of signifigance. The machine would have been idle for the taking. I don't think the Germans would've been willing to take that chance.
> 
> Just my  :2c:




Oddly the machines, _per se_ were not the holy grail. The Brits had them (one? a few? several?) since before the war started. What the folks a Bletchley Park, Dilly Knox, Alan Turing, _et al_, needed was decoded traffic which they could use to "reverse engineer" the key settings.

My guess is that the Germans must have known (or strongly suspected) that the _Enigma_ machine, itself, was in allied hands, courtesy of the Poles who had captured one in 1939 and, later, through other losses. These machines were, after al, carefully guarded. But I'm also guessing that the Germans were overconfident in the technology and, seriously, underestimated the skill-sets and _synergies_ found at Bletchley Park.






A three rotor _Enigma_ machine






     
	

	
	
		
		

		
		
	


	



Alan Turing                                            Dilwin "Dilly" Knox


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## R.C.

British intelligence, as noted by Prof. O'Keefe in the documentary listed above, had suspected they'd be able to land their hands on a four-rotor Enigma machine at Dieppe. The allies, with assistance of Turing et. al., had been very successful in obtaining information coded using the three-rotor Enigma machine, but the Germans had begun replacing those machines with four-rotor machines, effectively leaving Bletchley Park blind (in terms of their ability to decode messages). A four-rotor machine was obtained some time later however.

The three-rotors are nicely visible in the photo posted above. Each rotor had 26 selection points, exponentially increasing the decoding difficulty.


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## Old Sweat

I just watched the program again and had also done some research. The point of contention is whether the raid would have been carried out or not if the enigma machine had not been changed.

Here is a time line I constructed from my research and the program:

1 Feb. Germans adopt four rotor machine for U Boats.

4 Apr. Combined Operations Command planners discuss a list of seven potential targets and Captain Hughes-Hallett selects Dieppe. 

5 Apr. Topographical Analysis Committee issues analysis of Dieppe. Note: the possibility exists that this team had collected data on several potential targets - perhaps even the seven candidates noted above - as part of the planning process by Combined Operations.

14 Apr. Chiefs of Staff Committee accept Dieppe as tactically feasible.

16 Apr. Two outline plans considered. One is for an attack on the flanks and the other for a frontal with subsidiary assaults on the flanks. The latter plan is accepted. The record of the discussion is sketchy, however according to the Canadian official history, the British Army opted for the frontal, while the Combined Operations staff had reservations about it and preferred the flank assaults. While Hughes-Hallett was not at the meeting, this suggests the capture of the enigma et al was not being considered.

And the rest of the battle procedure carried on down the route to Dieppe.

The plan to sieze the 'booty' in the harbour and the naval headquarters was overly complicated and every thing had to work exactly as designed and be completed on time for it to succeed. Leaving that aside, it is my contention that there would have been a raid in the summer of 1942 even if the Germans had not introduced the four rotor enigma. Professor O'Keefe has done an impressive job researching the primary source material and building his case from it. The fact still remains that we cannot say there would not have been a raid in any case.

Edit: Additional material on 16 Apr added in yellow.


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## exspy

Very interesting points have been made about the reasons for the Dieppe raid in this thread.  From what I've read here, and from the interpretations of the evidence that have been cited, I would have to agree with the theory that there is no secret to Dieppe.  It was simply a raid organized by Combined Operations for their own ends using Canadian troops who were available because of theirs.  It does not seem that either the British Army, the RAF or the RN had the least little interest in it.  Radar and Ultra notwithstanding, the raid would have occurred somewhere on the coast of France during the summer of '42, badly planned, with huge casualties.

Mountbatten's folly, I should think.

Cheers,
Dan.


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## charlesm

I was in Dieppe 3 weeks ago and the town had lots of information on Operation Jubliee. They had kiosks setup where each unit came ashore with a story about each unit. Had a lot of canadian flags flying. It was very nice to see.

But when you are on the beaches lookinng at the town and you see the cliff's on either side, I have to wonder who really thought this through?


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## a_majoor

In the end, a lot of this theorizing has more to do with the human tendency to look for patterns in large amounts of material, and for survivors to try to answer the question of "why"?

No one likes to believe that they have carried out a difficult task or made a great sacrifice for nothing, and Dieppe certainly would seem to have been a very pointless expenditure of blood and treasure. I will not attempt to argue for reasons why or why not (since I am totally unqualified to do so anyway), but stories like "Dieppe Uncovered", "Green Beach" and so on are attempts to rationalize the disaster by assigning it a greater purpose.

I don't believe (like many people here) that these operations were the prime factors behind the Dieppe raid, although I can accept that once the plan was in motion, clever and ambitious people such as the ones depicted in the documentary quickly siezed on it as a means to carry out plans of their own. With a divisional sized force in play, it would be quite easy to slip in one or even several commando units to carry out secondary actions under the cover of the raid, and so there is no reason not to believe that the attempted raids on Naval HQ and the radar station were not planned and partially executed under cover of the larger mission.

Professor O'Keefe has done a marvelous job of uncovering new material and filling in many blank spots about the raid, and we should all give thanks and wish him well regardless if we agree or disagree with his conclusions.


----------



## PanaEng

:goodpost:





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> In the end, a lot of this theorizing has more to do with the human tendency to look for patterns in large amounts of material, and for survivors to try to answer the question of "why"?
> 
> No one likes to believe that they have carried out a difficult task or made a great sacrifice for nothing, and Dieppe certainly would seem to have been a very pointless expenditure of blood and treasure. I will not attempt to argue for reasons why or why not (since I am totally unqualified to do so anyway), but stories like "Dieppe Uncovered", "Green Beach" and so on are attempts to rationalize the disaster by assigning it a greater purpose.
> 
> I don't believe (like many people here) that these operations were the prime factors behind the Dieppe raid, although I can accept that once the plan was in motion, clever and ambitious people such as the ones depicted in the documentary quickly siezed on it as a means to carry out plans of their own. With a divisional sized force in play, it would be quite easy to slip in one or even several commando units to carry out secondary actions under the cover of the raid, and so there is no reason not to believe that the attempted raids on Naval HQ and the radar station were not planned and partially executed under cover of the larger mission.
> 
> Professor O'Keefe has done a marvelous job of uncovering new material and filling in many blank spots about the raid, and we should all give thanks and wish him well regardless if we agree or disagree with his conclusions.


----------



## gordjenkins

One  final question raised by recent CBC documentary on Dieppe Raid 

-   who is this Prof David O'Keefe? - he seems to be an expert in revealing "secrets" and "reasons for"previous Canadian Military disasters "The Secret War Files: The Battle of The Mace -The Battle of the Mace was the last battle of the Normandy Campaign taking place over three days from August 19th to 21st, 1944." http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=251045







Tend to agree -if there was a German Navy latest 4 wheel Enigma machine at all in Dieppe- that this was an "add on" to "siezing Freya airborne radar set " etc. (Why would Germans have latest Navy Enigma machine anyway in a remote fishing village right opposite UKcoasts of Dover. Plus why not send in small Commando 
Unit to seize -either of above - if either of above were there in first place??)

ps
note 4th wheel -not 3 -on attached German Navy Enigma machine


----------



## Edward Campbell

gordjenkins said:
			
		

> One  final question raised by recent CBC documentary on Dieppe Raid
> 
> -   who is this Prof David O'Keefe? - he seems to be an expert in revealing "secrets" and "reasons for"previous Canadian Military disasters "The Secret War Files: The Battle of The Mace -The Battle of the Mace was the last battle of the Normandy Campaign taking place over three days from August 19th to 21st, 1944." http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=251045
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Tend to agree -if there was a German Navy latest 4 wheel Enigma machine at all in Dieppe- that this was an "add on" to "siezing Freya airborne radar set " etc. (Why would Germans have latest Navy Enigma machine anyway in a remote fishing village right opposite UKcoasts of Dover. Plus why not send in small Commando
> Unit to seize -either of above - if either of above were there in first place??)
> 
> ps
> note 4th wheel -not 3 -on attached German Navy Enigma machine




This is from a self congratulatory publicity 'blurb' from _Random House_, announcing that it is publishing _"the remarkable ultra-secret story behind the greatest raid of the Second World War,"_ so take it with a small grain of salt.



> *About David O'Keefe*: David R. O'Keefe is an award-winning historian, documentarian and professor at prestigious Marianopolis College in Westmount, Quebec. O'Keefe served with the Royal Highland Regiment (The Black Watch of Canada) in Montreal, and worked as a Signals Intelligence specialist for the Directorate of History and Heritage (DND) that produced the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War. His publications include influential articles in Canadian Defence Quarterly, the Journal of Canadian Military History, and the Canadian Army Journal, to name but a few. He has served as a historian for History Television in Canada, appeared on CBC Radio, Global Television, UKTV Network in Great Britain, and has numerous television documentaries and publications to his credit.



Marioanopolis College, where Prof O'Keefe teaches, self-describes itself as:



> For more than a century, Marianopolis College has provided a student-friendly environment where motivated young people achieve their goals, grow as global citizens and succeed at university and beyond.
> 
> Established in 1908 by the Congrégation de Notre-Dame, Marianopolis began as a university-degree-granting institution for women. In 1969, following educational changes in Quebec, Marianopolis phased out its university-degree programs and admitted its first students to a CEGEP-equivalent program. Also that year, Marianopolis began accepting male students.
> 
> Marianopolis College’s track record is one of change, development and growth from its earliest days to the present. Initially called Notre Dame Ladies College, a bilingual school and the first institution of higher learning for English Catholic women in Quebec, it was renamed Marguerite Bourgeoys College in 1926. During World War II, its English sector’s curriculum was named Marianopolis and reorganized along the lines of English-language universities to include programs in general science and honours chemistry.
> 
> Today, Marianopolis is recognized as one of the top pre-university colleges in Quebec, with a culturally diverse student body of about 2,000 students culled from the top graduates from high schools, public and private, English and French, from across the province and abroad.
> 
> Thanks to the College’s strong academics, small size and diverse activities beyond the classroom, students discover new interests, network with industry leaders and participate in endeavours that provide them with an advantage when they apply to the world’s leading universities. Almost all Marianopolis graduates attend university, a majority in their top choice of program.


----------



## exspy

> In 1969...Marianopolis phased out its university-degree programs and admitted its first students to a CEGEP-equivalent program.



So he's a high school teacher (or would be in any other province).  How does that qualify him to use the title Professor?  No mention of him having obtained a PhD.

Still, he's written and published more than I have, so I really shouldn't carp about his academic qualifications.

Cheers,
Dan, Professor Extremus en Minutiae


----------



## gordjenkins

Tend to agree with Dan - 
-Mountbatten -and remember Montgommery was involved in planning also- but got out at last minute.
As for High School CGEP teacher theory that raid was for Navy Enigma machine - check out his CGEP at 
http://www.marianopolis.edu/
this theory is ludicrous!
And it is being legitimized by special presentation at War Museum Ottawa during Remembrance Day week
as "THE reason   -"Dieppe Uncovered" -sponsored by Veterans affairs Canadaon 6 Nov if you care to attend.


----------



## GAP

Not sure if this has been posted already, but an interesting theory....

Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe? New book raises questions on an infamous World War Two battle
http://boxscorenews.com/were-allied-soldiers-betrayed-at-dieppe-new-book-raises-questions-on-an-in-p55752-68.htm

Stryker-Indigo Media - NEW YORK (April 16, 2013) - New and troubling accusations surrounding the controversial 1942 Battle of Dieppe are being raised, pointing a damning finger at American and British news organizations, including "Time" and "Life" magazines, accusing them of leaking pre-raid information to the Germans resulting in the deaths, woundings, and capture of over 4,300 American, British and Canadian soldiers.

In their first major book release in almost nine years, best-selling Canadian authors George and Darril Fosty, in their new book "Where Brave Men Fall: The Battle of Dieppe and the Allied Espionage War Against Hitler, 1939-1942", explore the controversial 1942 Battle of Dieppe looking at pre-raid advertisements, in what the authors claim, were part of a complex campaign initiated at the highest levels of American and British political and military circles designed to tip off the Germans prior to the August 1942 raid and thus ensuring the raid's failure. The revelations, stunning in detail and scope, are the latest accusations to surface concerning the battle.
 much more on link


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Link to the modern Dieppe
https://maps.google.ca/maps?q=Dieppe,+France&hl=en&ll=49.927411,1.067648&spn=0.044866,0.111494&sll=49.257735,-123.123904&sspn=0.131082,0.21801&oq=dieppe&t=h&hnear=Dieppe,+Seine-Maritime,+Upper+Normandy,+France&z=14

Coded messages in radio programs was common, however this means that the Germans had a very robust intelligence service network that was not unraveled, possibly based on bitter IRA types?. I don't really buy the deliberate leaking. A successful raid would have far more effect on forcing the Germans to double their defense efforts, than a failed one. There are many other ways for the Germans to figure what was the likely attack location.


----------



## Old Sweat

Now the Dieppe raid was originally titled Operation RUTTER and was planned for early July. On 7 July it was cancelled and three days later resurrected as Operation JUBILEE to be executed on 19 August. Given the technology of the time, was it possible to design ads and contract with publications to insert them in less than six weeks? Had similar adds appeared in late June or early July?


----------



## cupper

There were similar coincidences with D-Day as well. The one that stands out is the crossword puzzle that had answers which were codenames for the operation and various targets.


----------



## mariomike

Colin P said:
			
		

> Coded messages in radio programs was common, <snip>



An example was, "Nous allons rendre visite a Maginot ce soir."

Andre Maginot, the French Minister of War who gave his name to the famous "Line", had been born in Revigny.

Bomber Command had "visited" Revigny on the nights of 12/13 and 14/15 July, 1944. Both raids had been failures with 17 Lancasters shot down.

Broadcast by the BBC during the afternoon of 18 July, it was a warning, given as one of the conditions for the continued bombing of French railway centres.

That night, 24 more of the Lancasters sent to Revigny were shot down. 22 per cent of the force.

The question is, if French officials knew that an attack was heading for Revigny that night, did the Luftwaffe also know?


----------



## lmac99

Hi folks,
Recently, I've been reading a lot about the Dieppe Raid, and while most articles and books I've come across state that it was a total failure, many say that it was valuable and lessons learned during this raid were applied during D-Day...

I was wondering if there is any evidence of the Allies directly changing strategies due to the outcome of Dieppe, or if saying that 'we learned a lot' is just easier to digest. For the info I have found regarding the lessons learned, most of it seems like common sense that shouldn't need to be learned, such as the need for surprise and air support. Are there any good books that you could recommend that focus on strategies learned during Dieppe and later applied on D-Day?
Thanks!


----------



## larry Strong

New research suggests the real intent of the historic raid on Dieppe in 1942 was to steal a "Ultra" machine that would help crack top-secret German codes with the release of once-classified and ultra-secret war files.

http://globalnews.ca/news/274605/breaking-german-codes-real-reason-for-1942-dieppe-raid-historian/ 

http://www.canadashistory.ca/Community/Community-Features/Articles/A-New-Look-at-WW2-Dieppe-Raid


Cheers
Larry


----------



## Chispa

First thank U too the Mods for unlocking the thread, we must remember way too many camps, and vigorously debated since the needless aftermath.:brit poppy: 




			
				lmac99 said:
			
		

> Hi folks,
> Recently, I've been reading a lot about the Dieppe Raid, and while most articles and books I've come across state that it was a total failure, many say that it was valuable and lessons learned during this raid were applied during D-Day...
> 
> I was wondering if there is any evidence of the Allies directly changing strategies due to the outcome of Dieppe, or if saying that 'we learned a lot' is just easier to digest. For the info I have found regarding the lessons learned, most of it seems like common sense that shouldn't need to be learned, such as the need for surprise and air support. Are there any good books that you could recommend that focus on strategies learned during Dieppe and later applied on D-Day?
> Thanks!




If you read that much on Dieppe your head must be spinning, considering the vast amount of historians/authors, questionable narratives, suggestions. As posted by Mr. Larry Strong; have you read One Day in August by Cdn and very Black Watch military historian David R. O'keefe? It's on special at Indigo hard cover for $10.00, regular price $31. great stocking stuffer: https://www.chapters.indigo.ca/en-ca/books/product/9780345807694-item.html?mkwid=sglCNn6VL_dc&pcrid=44154474422&pkw=&pmt=&s_campaign=goo-Shopping_Books&gclid=CNSCo7HiwdACFZZMDQodHyoONA


Although some have been critical of the findings, It's considered by many the benchmark in the Deippe saga; David O'Keefe rewrites history, the Prof., humbly replied; "there are still many questions need answering, I believe this is just the tip of the iceberg."

*The Dieppe Raid and the Question of German Foreknowledge Captain S.W. Roskill, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 109  (Feb 1, 1964): 27.
*
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071846409419700


*Ross Munro’s anecdote while in the landing craft with eight others:* “Even before we put to sea some had ominous feeling about what was ahead of them at the other side.”

*Mountbatten:* “I felt that even if the Germans knew that an operation had been planned against Dieppe and then abandoned, that the very last thing they'd ever imagine is we would be so stupid as to lay on the same operation again.”

*David O’Keefe:* Ian Fleming's Commandos, X Platoon from the Royal Marine Commando (later No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and No 30 Assault Unit) who made their debut at the core of the Dieppe Raid on August 19th 1942. Notice how young and youthful they were before the raid in the first two photos leading up to Dieppe and their "official" debut as 30AU in Torch two months later. The final photos show the strain of three years of war which tends to make one grow up fast. Perhaps too fast. Photos courtesy of Paul McGrath pictured prominently in all and Commando Veterans Archive.

Fallow link for all photos: https://www.facebook.com/1382094788690080/photos/pcb.1829681473931407/1829652913934263/?type=3&theater


*Thursday, August 16, 2012: British Intelligence Told Germans in Advance of Dieppe Raid: By Donald Sensing. *

On 19 August 1942, a force of 4,963 Canadian troops, accompanied by just over a thousand British soldiers, 50 US Rangers and 15 Frenchmen, conducted the catastrophe of Operation Jubilee. According to O’Keefe’s research, British naval officers used Operation Jubilee to target the German-made Enigma code machine, an electro-mechanical piece of equipment that used a series of rotors for the encryption and decryption of secret messages. ... 

While the British were successful breaking into the three-rotor Enigma machines, everything changed on February 1, 1942, when the Germans introduced the four-rotor Enigma device — instantly blacking out Bletchley Park.

According to files, British naval intelligence believed that in order to crack the four-rotor Enigma machine, a pinch raid was necessary. A successful pinch would mean secretly stealing parts of the machine, code books and setting sheets.

This may well be, with the other objectives listed above being also true, but of lesser strategic importance. It doesn't change the fact that the SIS blew the secrecy of the whole show…….

Three months later a similarly accurate-but-late message was sent warning of a commando raid against the French port of St. Nazaire, where the destroyer Campbelltown, loaded with explosives, was remotely crashed into the only drydock along that coast large enough to handle German U-boats.

The SIS was given permission to send just such a too-late-but-true message to the Germans about the Dieppe raid. The message was to be sent Monday evening the 18th of August, about 12 hours after the Allied forces had landed.

The SIS was not told that the landing was postponed until Tuesday. The Germans received the message Monday evening, alerted their forces at Dieppe and were waiting before dawn on the 19th.

Lovell writes that a director of Britain's Special Operation, Executive told him that the SIS operation escaped being closed down by the thinnest of margins, surviving only when a Briton pointed out that the doubled agent's standing with the Abwehr could not possibly be higher, and that the Germans would now believe anything he told them.

Claiming to have very highly-placed sources deep within General Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters, the agent became deeply involved in deception operations covering Operation Overlord, the invasion of France in 1944. Most important was to deceive the Germans of the place and time of the invasion. I'll let Lovell finish the story (click for larger image): http://senseofevents.blogspot.ca/2012/08/british-intelligence-told-germans-in.html



C.U.


----------



## Old Sweat

To me, wearing my cynic's badge, is that the main lesson of Dieppe was the Combined Operations Command had outlived its usefulness. There certainly was a place for it in the dear days of 1940 and 1941, but by mid-1942 the initiative was shifting to the Allies.

Dieppe was planned as a divisional raid, with two brigades (including their headquarters) landing, completing fairly challenging tactical tasks and withdrawing in one day. It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid. The Combined Operations planners were enthusiastic amateurs who seemed to have been wildly optimistic. For example, it should have been obvious it would have been difficult to achieve surprise with staggered H-Hours. As a gunner, I can't avoid adding that the fire plan was a farce.

After Dieppe the planning for the return to Europe fell under the purview of an organization titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and this organization developed the initial concept of operations and outline plan for D Day.


----------



## Chispa

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> To me, wearing my cynic's badge, is that the main lesson of Dieppe was the Combined Operations Command had outlived its usefulness. There certainly was a place for it in the dear days of 1940 and 1941, but by mid-1942 the initiative was shifting to the Allies.
> 
> Dieppe was planned as a divisional raid, with two brigades (including their headquarters) landing, completing fairly challenging tactical tasks and withdrawing in one day. It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid. The Combined Operations planners were enthusiastic amateurs who seemed to have been wildly optimistic. For example, it should have been obvious it would have been difficult to achieve surprise with staggered H-Hours. As a gunner, I can't avoid adding that the fire plan was a farce.
> 
> After Dieppe the planning for the return to Europe fell under the purview of an organization titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and this organization developed the initial concept of operations and outline plan for D Day.




Many support that narrative, COC in the top 5 of lessons learned, the "planners" were biting on more then they could chew.  


*CBC Digital Archives 1942: Carnage on the beaches of Dieppe LISTEN 00:00 14:35*

"We have suffered heavy losses, and I saw our men die," says CBC Radio's Robert Bowman, just returned from the bloody beaches of Dieppe. The grim reality of what happened in France yeserday is just setting in: hundreds of Canadians killed, untold numbers taken prisoner. Reading from grimy notes taken during his eight hours ashore, Bowman does not use words like "failure" or "disaster." Instead, he lauds the bravery of the troops, and the lessons learned from the assault.

http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/1942-carnage-on-the-beaches-of-dieppe

*Just elaborating on COC:* Arising from the armistice concluded by France with Germany in June 1940 and the evacuation of British forces from the Continent, a small organisation was established to take command of subsequent raiding operations against enemy territory and to provide advice on combined assaults. From this emerged a distinct Combined Operations Headquarters, staffed by all three services, but independent of all of them and under the command of a Director of Combined Operations. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, was appointed first director in July 1940; he was succeeded in October 1941 by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten with the title Adviser on Combined Operations. In March 1942 this title was altered to Chief of Combined Operations; it was also decided that the Chief of Combined Operations should attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff as a full member whenever major issues were in question and, as previously, when his own combined operations or any special matters in which he was concerned were under consideration.

From the establishment of a Combined Training Centre in August 1940 at Inveraray, Argyllshire, the Combined Operations Command expanded rapidly both within the United Kingdom and overseas, notably in the Middle East and India. In 1942 it sent a permanent representative to the Joint Staffs Mission in Washington and in the same year a Combined Operations Experimental Establishment was set up at Appledore, Devon. This establishment was much involved in the investigation of problems likely to be encountered on the beaches in connection with an invasion of Europe, particularly as regards the landing of armoured vehicles, stores, supplies, etc. Following the successful invasion of Normandy in 1944, a similar establishment was set up in India to carry out the developments and trials necessary in the very different conditions in the Far East.

From its formation, Combined Operations Headquarters maintained a close, though sometimes strained, contact on the naval side with the Admiralty, which set up a number of combined operations branches within its own departments, particularly in relation to operations, materials and personnel. Raiding forces, such as commandos, came under the command of Combined Operations Headquarters, except when they were employed as part of larger operations. Throughout the war Combined Operations Headquarters played a key role in the development of offensive operations against the enemy. This was notably the case in the raid on Dieppe in August 1942 and the preparation and planning of the North Africa and Sicily campaigns in 1942 to 1943, the invasion of Europe in 1944 and similarly, through its directorate in India, in operations in the Far East.

Following the war it was the Admiralty view that Combined Operations Headquarters should cease to be an independent organisation and should be replaced by a joint Combined Operational Planning Staff within the Chiefs of Staff organisation. In 1947, however, it was decided that Combined Operations Headquarters should continue to be responsible for policy, training and technique in amphibious warfare under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff; at the same time the title of chief of combined operations was changed to Chief of Combined Operations Staff and responsibility for Combined Operations estimates was transferred from the Service ministries to the newly-established Ministry of Defence. On 1 April 1948 Combined Operations Headquarters was placed under the administration of that ministry and in 1951 it was re-named Amphibious Warfare Headquarters.

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C5760


*According too sources:* British Combined Operations formed spring of 1940 "to coordinate commando raids along the German-occupied coast of Europe utilizing the integrated support of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. In its seven years of existence, it had four commanders. The first lasted only about a month. Its second, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, lasted about a year before resigning in October 1941 due to an administrative reorganization that he saw diminish his independence."


*COMBINED OPERATIONS THE OFFICIAL STORY OF THE COMMANDOS 
by LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN: Published 1943. *

Free download of book on PDF: https://archive.org/details/combinedoperatio006231mbp


“Too large to be a symbol, too small to be a success.” — Lord Haw Haw, German propagandist commenting on the Dieppe raid.

Illusive Winston Churchill’s explanation; the supposed raid was in fact a “reconnaissance in force.”

Montgomery: “To assault and capture a port quickly, both troops and tanks would have to go in over the main beaches confronting the town, relying on heavy bombardment and surprise to neutralise the defences.” 

The British records show the raid party for Dieppe given 16 objects, one mainly being, Pinch secret documents from German Div., H.Q., at Arques-La Bataille.

Adding more:

After humiliated in June, retreating, rescued on mass from Dunkirk, France, it dawned on the British High Brass returning would require new techniques, equipment, etc., for amphibious landings. Their goal, efficiently combining air, land and sea force operations, hence styled combined operations. They first created a task force overseeing labelled as Directorate for Combined Operations (DCO), authorised on July 1940. 

Prior of Op Rutter scuttled on 6th July, British Chiefs of Staff approved Mountbatten’s recommendation; if the raid was cancelled it would be rejuvenated. In B. Loring Villa’s 1989 Unauthorized Action: Once Op. Rutter cancelled, Winston Churchill, British Chiefs of staff never authorised, re-launching or renamed the operation. Without their knowledge, Admiral Mountbatten took “unauthorised action,” revising the raid incognito.




> It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid.



I've heard it styled as a small-invasion, that argument is questionable considering the definition, size of force involved in a "raid" is not relevant, the action taken is. Post aftermath Churchill used it to his advantage, all smoke and mirrors, owing prior to the incident Russia and American were busting his bollocks concerning opening a second front. Churchill stated after Dieppe: With so much fight amongst use, now we can concentrate on fighting Germans.

IMO, mini or small does not apply to the word invasion, however if that small force conquers' ground per say 300 conquistadors, that is certainly a small mini-invasion force.


*Invasion Vs Raid.*

*Invasion:* A military action consisting of armed forces of one geopolitical entity entering territory controlled by another such entity, generally with the objective of conquering territory or altering the established government. (figuratively) The entry of a large group into a new area.

*Raid:* Mission which has a specific purpose and is not normally intended to capture and hold terrain, but instead finish with the raiding force quickly retreating to a previous defended position prior to enemy forces being able to respond in a co-ordinated manner or formulate a counter-attack. A raiding group may consist of combatants specially trained in this tactic, such as commandos, or as a special mission assigned to any general troops. Raids are often a standard tactic in irregular warfare, employed by warriors, guerrilla fighters, or other irregular military forces.

During the Second World War, the British set up the Combined Operations Headquarters organised harassing raids against the Germans in Europe. The first operation conducted by a "commando" formation, known as Operation Ambassador, took place in July 1940, but it was a small-scale operation that resulted in negligible success. The next major raid was Operation Claymore, which was launched in March 1941 against the Lofoten Islands.[19] Throughout the war there were many other operations of varied size, ranging from small scale operations like those undertaken by Z Special Unit against the Japanese in the Pacific, such as Project Opossum,[20] to Operation Chariot – a raid on Saint-Nazaire – and the Dieppe Raid, which was a large scale raid employing about 6,000 soldiers, over 200 ships and 74 squadrons of aircraft intended to take and hold Dieppe sufficiently to cause sufficient destruction to the port.[21] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_(military)


COC was only authorised for small with provisions for large scale raids. Prime war role of the COC, a center for experimentation, innovations, planning in development of equipment and techniques essential too carrying out successful amphibious operations.



C.U.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> New research suggests the real intent of the historic raid on Dieppe in 1942 was to steal a "Ultra" machine that would help crack top-secret German codes with the release of once-classified and ultra-secret war files.
> 
> http://globalnews.ca/news/274605/breaking-german-codes-real-reason-for-1942-dieppe-raid-historian/
> 
> http://www.canadashistory.ca/Community/Community-Features/Articles/A-New-Look-at-WW2-Dieppe-Raid
> 
> 
> Cheers
> Larry



I'm about a third of the way through Terence Robertson's "_The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe_."  This was published in 1962 and goes into a lot of the details about about the Dieppe operation from the planning stages to the actual operation and its aftermath. Right now I'm just at the chapter leading up to the attack.

Robertson had access to a lot of the planning documentation and was able to interview some of the senior personnel actually involved in the planning of the operation. And he mentions there was a lot of politics involved, including the fact that the Canadians were envious of their fellow Commonwealth allies who were in operations around the world, and the pressure on the Western allies from Russia to open a second front and relieve pressure on the Soviet Union. 

So, while I find the idea that Op RUTTER/JUBILEE was a cover to capture an Engima machine to be pretty far fetched, Robertson does state there were a lot of shady characters wondering around and no one was quite sure who or what they were up to. He does state that there were at least three secret operations within the overall Dieppe raid. 

One was the operation where soldiers of the South Saskatchewan Reg. were to escort a scientist to a German radar station at Pourville and recover parts of the radar and bring them back to the UK. And if they couldn't make it back - shoot the scientist! This part of the operation is detailed in James Leasor's book "_ Green Beach_";

A second operation was by a Field Security team to capture the German divisional HQ and grab any documentation, codes, POW's, etc that they could find; and,

The third operation was to liberate any French resistance members held in the local prison and possibly bring some of them back to the UK.

Now, besides these three secret missions, Robertson does mentions other groups being involved in the operation, but unfortunately, doesn't provide any footnotes/endnotes to his sources.

For example, the observation by US Army Ranger, Lt Robert Flanagan who, prior to embarkation ended up in the wrong place, and observed several groups who included, "Royal Marines","Sudetan Germans" and a group, lead by a Russian individual who were disguised as Canadian soldiers. Their mission??

So, yes, its possible that there was a group/unit that was tasked with capturing an Engima machine, but to say that the whole operation was a disguise for capturing that machine is pure conjecture.


----------



## Chispa

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> I'm about a third of the way through Terence Robertson's "_The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe_."  This was published in 1962 and goes into a lot of the details about about the Dieppe operation from the planning stages to the actual operation and its aftermath. Right now I'm just at the chapter leading up to the attack.
> 
> Robertson had access to a lot of the planning documentation and was able to interview some of the senior personnel actually involved in the planning of the operation. And he mentions there was a lot of politics involved, including the fact that the Canadians were envious of their fellow Commonwealth allies who were in operations around the world, and the pressure on the Western allies from Russia to open a second front and relieve pressure on the Soviet Union.



Robertson is questionable, been decades believe like U stated, provides not much on documents, sources, without footnotes just like many traditionalist; per say AT WHATEVER COST by R.W. THOMPSON Published 1956. Free PDF download: https://archive.org/details/atwhatevercost006210mbp

*CBC Digital Archives.*

*Review of Dieppe book ‘The Shame and the Glory.’ Wallace Rayburn dissects Terrence Robertson's controversial account of Dieppe.*
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/dieppe-review-of-the-shame-and-the-glory

*Dieppe: Review of 'The Shame and the Glory.' October 2, 1962 06:25* http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1791228371




> One was the operation where soldiers of the South Saskatchewan Reg. were to escort a scientist to a German radar station at Pourville and recover parts of the radar and bring them back to the UK. And if they couldn't make it back - shoot the scientist! This part of the operation is detailed in James Leasor's book "_ Green Beach_";



*First-hand reports from the invasion of Dieppe: Canadian newsmen back from the beaches of Dieppe describe their ordeal ashore. *http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/dieppe-first-hand-reports

*Source See Dieppe Raid Wiki:* However, despite the assault resuming, the South Saskatchewan’s and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, who had landed beside them, were unable to reach their target.[9] While the Camerons did manage to penetrate further inland than any other troops that day, they were also soon forced back as German reinforcements rushed to the scene.[12] Both battalions suffered more losses as they withdrew; only 341 men were able to reach the landing craft and embark, and the rest were left to surrender. For his part in the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt was awarded the Victoria Cross.[23] 

One of the objectives of the Dieppe Raid was to discover the importance and performance capability of a German radar station on the cliff-top to the east of the town of Pourville. To achieve this, RAF Flight Sergeant Jack Nissenthall, a radar specialist, was attached to the South Saskatchewan Regiment. He was to attempt to enter the radar station and learn its secrets, accompanied by a small unit of 11 men of the Saskatchewans as bodyguards. Nissenthall volunteered for the mission fully aware that, due to the highly sensitive nature of his knowledge of Allied radar technology, his Saskatchewan bodyguard unit were under orders to kill him if necessary to prevent him being captured. He also carried a cyanide pill as a last resort. Atkin 1980, p. 136. 

Note some accounts claim 10, and more then one radar specialist.




> For example, the observation by US Army Ranger, Lt Robert Flanagan who, prior to embarkation ended up in the wrong place, and observed several groups who included, "Royal Marines","Sudetan Germans" and a group, lead by a Russian individual who were disguised as Canadian soldiers. Their mission??



Read: At Whatever Cost provides a comprehensive account on ca 50 US Rangers, count how many were attached too Canadian Regiments, etc, so a group of 10-15? True many separate incognito missions in Dieppe, or just one mission, that's the definition of a "raid."  Now which one would be of the greatest impotence if U consider that Intel dropped at an alarming rate once the 4 rotor was in use...



> So, yes, its possible that there was a group/unit that was tasked with capturing an Engima machine, but to say that the whole operation was a disguise for capturing that machine is pure conjecture.



Life Magazine 31 Aug 1942. Street Fighting In Dieppe by Montreal Newsman Wallace Reyburn,  London correspondent for the Montreal Standard; endured six hours ashore with the South Saskatchewan Regiment anecdote.   

https://books.google.ca/books?id=iU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA35&ots=dCPn85eiOm&dq=The%20British%20were%20going%20to%20have%20a%20cup%20of%20tea%20at%20German%20HQ%20at%20Dieppe&pg=PA35#v=onepage&q&f=false


*Author Terence Robertson says that only three Canadian newspaper reporters were allowed to go on the raid:* Fred Griffin of the Toronto Star, Ross Munro of Canadian Press and Wallace Reyburn of the Montreal Star. Because of military censorship, debriefings and other delays, the Canadian reporters were unable to file their stories for 29 hours after the operation had ended, creating a news vacuum that the Germans exploited.
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/german-veterans-remember-defending-dieppe


*The Information Front:* The Canadian Army and News Management during the ... By Timothy Balzer claims: Wallace Reyburn was the only reporter to get ashore; p. 197.

*Allies at Dieppe:* 4 Commando and the US Rangers By Will Fowler… In Operation Jubilee attached to No. 4 Commando war correspondent A.B. Austin of the Daily Herald accompanying on Orange Beach landing…With extensive news coverage from journalist aboard the warships offshore and at port to conduct interviews when the troops returned. The Canadian Army public relations staff had requested that five US correspondents in the UK invited to cover the operation. Quentin Reynolds of Collier’s Magazine; Drew Middleton of Associated Press;  Ross Munro of Canadian Press: Fred Griffin of the Toronto Daily Star; & Wallace Reyburn of the weekly Montreal Standard, and filing for the British press known as Fleet Street consisting of ten national newspapers……..

•  Though they longed for liberation, the local French population of Dieppe were told not to assist the Allies and thereby incur the wrath of the occupying Germans. The RAF dropped leaflets and the BBC broadcast messages in French saying, "This is a raid and not an invasion."

•  Hitler was said to be so pleased with the "perfect discipline and calm" of the Dieppe citizens that he gave the mayor millions of francs for reconstruction, and released hundreds of French PoWs captured in 1940.(Source: Will Fowler, The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day)

Immediately following the raid, the German propaganda machine went into high gear. Their initial stories claimed that the attack was a full-blown invasion, and that it had been successfully repelled.


The London Gazette Publication date: 2 October 1942 Supplement: 35729 Page: 4323
https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/35729/supplement/4323


*Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies: Review of Mark Zuehlke’s Tragedy at Dieppe: Operation Jubilee, August 19, 1942 by Mike Bechthold.*

Any serious study of the Dieppe raid will start with Stacey’s chapters in volume 1 of the official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Six Years of War (1955), which remain an excellent introduction to the topic, and T. Murray Hunter’s short monograph Canada at Dieppe (1982) offers a succinct and balanced narrative of the raid. Terence Robertson’s Dieppe: The Shame and the Glory (1962) is another traditional account which offers a good balance. 

Controversy and Dieppe have gone hand-in-hand and there are a number of books that approach this from different angles. Brian Loring Villa contends that Lord Louis Mountbatten ordered the raid to take place without any reference to higher command (Churchill). This is a difficult case to prove and is based on the non-existence of a direct order or telegram from Churchill authorising the remounting of Operation Jubilee. Villa’s argument does not convince many historians, but his painstaking analysis of the planning for the raid remains unsurpassed. Brereton Greenhous has written a short book on Dieppe which presents an uncompromisingly critical interpretation of the raid. Greenhous argues that the plans for Rutter and Jubilee were fatally flawed, inexperienced Canadian troops did not fight well, and no worthwhile lessons were learned. He concludes that only gross German incompetence could have resulted in the success of the Dieppe operation.

Two other essential books on the raid are Denis and Shelagh Whitaker’s Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph (1992) and Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle (1992). Denis Whitaker was a captain in the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in 1942. He landed on the main beach at Dieppe, fought his way through the casino and into the town and managed to find his way back to England unwounded. His book, a collaboration with his wife, documents this experience but also offers a balanced appraisal of the raid which seeks to understand and justify the cost. Particular care is given to linking the failures at Dieppe to the successes at D-Day. Franks, an accomplished air historian, provides a narrative look at the air battle over Dieppe. It is unique as the only monograph to focus on the air to air battles over Dieppe.

One might conclude from reading Zuehlke’s book that there is nothing new to learning about the Dieppe Raid but nothing could be further from the truth. The Autumn 2012 issue of Canadian Military History focussed on Dieppe and presented a number of innovative, cutting-edge interpretations of the Raid. David Hall (King’s College London) examined the German perspective of the raid and showed how its outcome was used for propaganda purposes and how it influenced the German’s high command’s perception of their success in the war. Ross Mahoney (doctoral candidate, University of Birmingham) contextualised the air battle of Dieppe and emphasised how it grew out of the existing RAF doctrine for amphibious air support operations. Béatrice Richard (Collège militaire royal de Saint Jean) examined how the Dieppe raid was viewed in Quebec and fed into the myth that soldiers from that province had suffered a disproportionate number of casualties. These articles have little in common other than a focus on Dieppe but they show how an examination of various military, political, strategic and social issues can enrich our understanding of Canada and the Second World War.

Another new area of study was revealed last fall in the documentary “Dieppe Uncovered” which premiered on History Television on the 70th anniversary of the raid. Historian David O’Keefe argues that the real reason behind the Dieppe raid was to provide cover for an intelligence mission or “pinch operation” to get German naval code books related to the new German four-rotor Enigma machine. The “Ultra” secret – the Allied codename for intelligence gathered from reading Enigma traffic – was closely held by the Allies and not officially acknowledged until the early 1970s. It is not surprising that the role of a secret unit tasked with capturing German intelligence material was also kept out of the history books. O’Keefe is one of the first historians to shed light on the role of a special commando outfit, known as 30 Assault Unit, at Dieppe. The documentary examines the role of Ian Fleming, the legendary author of the James Bond novels, in coordinating the actions of this commando force at Dieppe. Like the operation in general, 30 Assault Unit did not succeed in its mission, but the revelation of this mission by O’Keefe greatly enriches our understanding of the raid and shows that new secrets can be revealed even 70 years later.

There are a number of minor problems with Zuehlke’s book which detract the reader. The 25-pounder guns of Roberts’ 1st Field Regiment, RCA are identified as “24-pounders” (p.65) and Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the air commander for the operation, is mid-identified as “Vice Air-Marshal Trafford.” (p.185). Another problem with the book is the nature of the index which appears to have been compiled using a key word search rather than by an informed eye. For example, if you are looking to read about the actions of the Royal Regiment of Canada on Blue Beach you will find no entry in the index under the regiment, but rather, you need to search for “Blue Beach.” This error is repeated for numerous topics.

http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/review-of-mark-zuehlkes-tragedy-at-dieppe-operation-jubilee-august-19-1942-by-mike-bechthold/



C.U.


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