# The Strategic Reserve Program



## kqm (25 Oct 2012)

Hello Everyone,

The Strategic Reserve Program is a new initiative by The Atlantic Council of Canada, which aims to push the Primary Reserve of the Canadian Forces into the forefront of Canadian public debate.

The Atlantic Council of Canada is currently recruiting writers for the Strategic Reserve Program. If you or any of your friends are presently in the Canadian Reserve, or an expert in this field, and are interested in writing for us, please contact me at kyle.macdonald@atlantic-council.ca. Also, We require a sample publication and an up-to-date CV.

Here is the link to the lunch of our new program: http://atlantic-council.ca/portfolio/introducing-a-new-program-focusing-on-the-canadian-reserve/

Thank you,

Kyle MacDonald


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## Tyson Fox (25 Oct 2012)

Push the Canadian reserve into the forefront for what purpose? To try garner better work legislation for them? I'm curious.


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## kqm (25 Oct 2012)

The objective is to make the challenges, successes, and accomplishments of the Canadian Primary Reserve more visible and familiar to the Canadian public, business leaders, policy makers and politicians. Our aim for this program is to educate these different sectors by the use of publications, interviews, and community outreach.


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## kqm (26 Oct 2012)

Furthermore,

Any input on what you would like the ACC to cover on our Strategic Reserve Program would be most helpful.


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## Fishbone Jones (26 Oct 2012)

kqm said:
			
		

> The objective is to make the challenges, successes, and accomplishments of the Canadian Primary Reserve more visible and familiar to the Canadian public, business leaders, policy makers and politicians. Our aim for this program is to educate these different sectors by the use of publications, interviews, and community outreach.



You mean like the Canadian Forces Liaison Council?

http://www.cflc-clfc.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp

So how do you propose to reinvent the wheel?


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## McG (26 Oct 2012)

Shipwreck said:
			
		

> Push the Canadian reserve into the forefront for what purpose? To try garner better work legislation for them? I'm curious.





			
				kqm said:
			
		

> The objective is to make the challenges, successes, and accomplishments of the Canadian Primary Reserve more visible and familiar to the Canadian public, business leaders, policy makers and politicians. Our aim for this program is to educate these different sectors by the use of publications, interviews, and community outreach.


This sounds like the means to a still unstated end; it is not so much an explination of the purpose.  What goal or end-state are you trying to achieve?


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## kqm (26 Oct 2012)

End-state is to have Canadians more aware and educated on what exactly the Primary Reserve does.


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## The Bread Guy (26 Oct 2012)

kqm said:
			
		

> End-state is to have Canadians more aware and educated on what exactly the Primary Reserve does.


I'm curious - measured how?


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## kqm (16 Nov 2012)

I agree with the argument that The Primary Reserve is the one of the most efficient instrument the Canadian government has at its disposal to protect critical infrastructure, deploy urban search and rescue, and to mobilize troops in the event of a disaster all while reducing costs.

What do you think?

http://atlantic-council.ca/portfolio/oh-sandy/


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## Edward Campbell (16 Nov 2012)

So I presume you, and Kyle MacDonald at the _Atlantic Council of Canada_, have squared the various circles of:

1. How to train reservists on modern, complex systems;

2. How to manage _Terms of Service_ so enough reservists are "ready to roll" whenever and wherever needed; and

3. How to afford to get from here - inadequate, poorly equipped reserves, to there - lots of "ready" reserves who can replace a regular standing army.

As for "mobilizing" the reserves see: 1914, 1939 and 1950.


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## Blackadder1916 (16 Nov 2012)

> Mobilization and Reducing Personal Costs in a Time of Fiscal Restraint.



Do you mean "personal" or "personnel"?  I didn't go to your link to read the article (I've tired of you waving your hand trying to get attention for your work) to see what spelling you used there.  I really can't take seriously the scribblings of someone who can't be bothered to make sure there are no errors (_or won't, or is so poorly educated that he doesn't know the difference_) before asking others for serious comment.  If your arguments there are as weak as your posts here, I'm probably not missing much.


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## Edward Campbell (16 Nov 2012)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Do you mean "personal" or "personnel"?  I didn't go to your link to read the article (I've tired of you waving your hand trying to get attention for your work) to see what spelling you used there.  I really can't take seriously the scribblings of someone who can't be bothered to make sure there are no errors (_or won't, or is so poorly educated that he doesn't know the difference_) before asking others for serious comment.  If your arguments there are as weak as your posts here, I'm probably not missing much.




Ah, now that the threads are merged, I see your point.


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## Infanteer (16 Nov 2012)

kqm said:
			
		

> I agree with the argument that The Primary Reserve is the one of the most efficient instrument the Canadian government has at its disposal to protect critical infrastructure, deploy urban search and rescue, and to mobilize troops in the event of a disaster all while reducing costs.
> 
> What do you think?
> 
> http://atlantic-council.ca/portfolio/oh-sandy/



The problem with this assumption is that a good percentage of reservists, especially the leadership of reserve units, hold civilian employment in government agencies that would be fully mobilized in the case of a natural disaster.  When all the police officers, firefighters, paramedics and local coordinators are called in to do their day job during a crisis, they aren't going to be around to muster the reserves.

I'd be interested in seeing stats on civilian employment in the reserves; this issue was related to me as a real planning problem that was encountered during planning for the G8/G20 summit in Ontario.


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## mariomike (16 Nov 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> When all the police officers, firefighters, paramedics and local coordinators are called in to do their day job during a crisis, they aren't going to be around to muster the reserves.
> 
> I'd be interested in seeing stats on civilian employment in the reserves; <snip>



Regarding TPS:
http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2336&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

"The Service currently has 42 active reservists..."

According to The Toronto Police Association, there are "approximately 2200 civilian and 5250 uniform members of the Toronto Police Service."


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## Nemo888 (16 Nov 2012)

With our current  government using our troops for domestic operations is very attractive. In many other countries the possible drawbacks of this are staggeringly obvious. Think decades into the future and tread carefully when legislating.


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## Journeyman (16 Nov 2012)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> Think decades into the future and tread carefully when legislating.


Well, that was oblique enough to be meaningless. _What_ should our legislators be considering decades into the future, and to what end will that consideration inform their debates?


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## Blackadder1916 (17 Nov 2012)

mariomike said:
			
		

> "The Service currently has 42 active reservists..."
> 
> According to The Toronto Police Association, there are "approximately 2200 civilian and 5250 uniform members of the Toronto Police Service."


While I don't automatically subscribe to Infanteer's supposition that a large percentage of PRes leadership are in the civilian emergency services, it is not the "42" out of "5250" (less than a paltry 1%) that should be considered, but how many of that 42 would be significant players (but not indispensible, no one is) if reserves were called-out during a disaster (the example of G8/G20 was not a "disaster", well at least not in the sense of hurricane, flood, snow storm . . .).  I would assume (based on long past experience) that those most with the personal traits to be police or emergency service types would have successful reserve military careers and would eventually reach senior positions.  But, it was also my experience that because of the very nature of those military organizations (built-in leadership redundancy) it wouldn't (well, shouldn't) be an issue.


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## Infanteer (17 Nov 2012)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> but how many of that 42 would be significant players (but not indispensible, no one is) if reserves were called-out during a disaster (the example of G8/G20 was not a "disaster", well at least not in the sense of hurricane, flood, snow storm . .



As I said, it'd be interested to see the stats (they should be easy to find or determine with some good G1 work).  G8/G20 was not a disaster but, as you evidently missed the point, most provincial government agencies were mobilized for it and, as it was explained, building a reserve formation was harder than anticipated because of the amount of reservists committed to the operation with their civilian employment.

Considering that, in the case of a disaster, one of the LFA IRUs could have more people, equipment, and command support infrastructure on the ground in the first few days, I don't think the Reserves should be regarded as some massive manpower pool for disaster relief.


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## Journeyman (17 Nov 2012)

At one point in my life as a Reserve unit's 'Reg Force guy', the civilian emergency services troops (police/fire) tended to be the Res unit's Sgt/WO/Capts....so yes, some critical line serials.



Edit: clarity....or at least,_ less_ confusion.


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## Blackadder1916 (17 Nov 2012)

I can't speak to how reservists were employed during G8/20 and how closely their summit-related tasks were associated with the primary roles of existing reserve units or even if reserve units were used as organizational structures for that operation.  However if my experience with the Reserves (including a short period as a CO) was any indication, the employment of reservists was probably on an ad hoc basis and the table of organization (including quals of line serials) did not resemble existing units.  That may be fine for a pre-planned operation, but my premise of "built-in leadership redundency" is based on my belief that during a "disaster" reserve units should be employed in the same fashion as would Reg F units.

If the sky should fall (or the mayor of Toronto suddenly needed XXX physically fit bodies to immediately shovel snow off Nathan Phillips Square), the CO of 1 Royal Regiment of Regular Snowshovellers would not likely be told to provide the names of XXX pers of varying ranks and quals, he would be told what needed to be done (i.e. provide a pl/coy/bn to do X or just do x, y and z) and any shortfalls within the tasked unit/sub-unit would be made up by attachments from other sub-units/units or just as likely the tasks would attempted with the pers available at deployment.  There would be no questions about leadership gaps because a number of Sgts/WOs/Capts/Majs were on leave/course/tasking and unable to rejoin the unit before deployment.  It would be expected that the next in line would step in.  Why then should a reserve unit be crippled because a number of its members are emergency service workers?

Yes, I know it's not the same thing (or not quite the same thing) because there is a greater depth of qualification and experience (and available bodies) in Reg F units than PRes units.  But if we follow the OP's premise (_I still haven't read the latest article he is flogging - see my other post that explains_) that the reserves are an excellent resource for this sort of domestic response, then we should also assume that reserve units would have been already tasked with responding to domestic disasters within their capabilities and have prepared somewhat for the eventuality that not everyone can show up for the party.


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## a_majoor (17 Nov 2012)

Yet another turn of the Karmic wheel. I did a paper back in 1998 for the Military History Colloquium at Laurier proposing a Territorial Defense role for the PRes, but the calculations for a typical Infantry Regiment came up with a parade strength of @ 350 all ranks. (Rather than Territorial Defense Battalions I actually proposed that the units themselves be organically capable of performing these sorts of tasks).

While many of the attendees loved the idea (some were indeed PRes officers who were understandably excited by the idea of working with a demi battalion), the cruncher was in the numbers. To have a unit that could provide a useful number of "boots on the ground" would involve bulking up current units to two or three times their current effective strengths (or possibly even more, depending on how many people actually parade). The personell costs across the CF would be astounding, and that is even before the training and equipping bill came in. O&M costs also need to be considered.

Now you have not actually spelled out what it is you feel the PRes should actually do, which leads to the question, what makes you think the Canadian public will support the balooning of the Defense budget to support such an expansion? If you can actually answer that question then I'm sure you will find lots of supporters to help you sell a Defense budget that is $50 billion/year (or more).

I am really curious to see your answer.


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## mariomike (17 Nov 2012)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> While I don't automatically subscribe to Infanteer's supposition that a large percentage of PRes leadership are in the civilian emergency services, it is not the "42" out of "5250" (less than a paltry 1%) that should be considered, but how many of that 42 would be significant players (but not indispensible, no one is) if reserves were called-out during a disaster (the example of G8/G20 was not a "disaster", well at least not in the sense of hurricane, flood, snow storm . . .).



Not sure how many are significant players in the reserves, but I believe that would be 42 out of 7,700 TPS members.

"The Toronto Police Service employs approximately 7,700 members, 30% of whom are civilians.":
http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/careers/civ_job_categories.php

As far as the 851 City Paramedics are concerned, my guess from having worked there is that the ratio would be similar to TPS.


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## Haggis (17 Nov 2012)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> I can't speak to how reservists were employed during G8/20 and how closely their summit-related tasks were associated with the primary roles of existing reserve units or even if reserve units were used as organizational structures for that operation.  However if my experience with the Reserves (including a short period as a CO) was any indication, the employment of reservists was probably on an ad hoc basis and the table of organization (including quals of line serials) did not resemble existing units.  That may be fine for a pre-planned operation, but my premise of "built-in leadership redundency" is based on my belief that during a "disaster" reserve units should be employed in the same fashion as would Reg F units.



Reservists were employed in organzied Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG), based on the three Brigade Groups (CBG) in Ontario.  For example, to form 33 TBG troops were drawn from units in 33 CBG.


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