# COIN Explained So a 5th Grader Can Understand It - Almost



## tomahawk6 (27 Apr 2007)

I am not a fan of Lind, Robb and the other 4th generation "experts" way too much theory that is poorly argued and explained. Theory to be applicable needs to be able to be put into practice. For that to occur you have to understand what it is you are trying to accomplish. Ran across this excellant post by Grimm on Blackfive. After reading it I think you may agree with me that COIN is much easier to understand and will translate into real world action. The Gravity Well.

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/04/coin_the_gravit.html









> Yellow nodes: leadership. These people are the core leadership of the organization. "They have denser connections to other leaders" and other main network nodes. They keep everything together as the group's connectors.
> 
> Red nodes: active members. Active members are tightly connected to the leadership nodes (yellow). They, in combination with the yellows, are what people refer to as the "group."
> 
> ...


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## Dare (27 Apr 2007)

Good read. Very interesting concepts, even in the comments. I hadn't thought of using gravity to explain it. I do however think more emphasis must be placed, maybe visualized somehow, on deprogramming. That dimension is what is missing in this gravity well competition. I do like the idea of channeling some natural tendencies/aggressions into more benign groups. I am sure most of this is in action already, just perhaps not common knowledge with this easy to digest explaination.


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## brihard (30 Apr 2007)

That was fascinating, thanks for the read.


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## a_majoor (2 May 2007)

Another luminary is LCol Kilcullen form Australia (you might recognize his name from some discussions in the Infantry thread).

The "New Yorker" did a piece on his theory in the Dec 18, 2006 edition "Knowing the Enemy" by George Packer; LCol Kilcullen's theory is called "disaggregation" abd uses social networks to identify insurgencies and finding the seams to separate terror networks from supporters. This isn't actually new (The Malaysia Emergency used a fairly crude version of the approach, and I have an article on file at home dating back to 2002 which also talks about using social networks), but Kilcullen goes far beyond local and neighbourhood networks and tells us we have to fight at multiple levels from kinetic actions against the terrorists in person to internet propaganda.

This is closly related to the Gravity well theory, and the article is quite illuminating, although full of the obligatory anti administration swipes that left wing publications indulge in (for example there is a constant refrain that these theories will not be implimented until the Administration changes, even though prototypes of these theories existed in the 1990's and no Democratic front runner seems inclined to speak about any sort of pro active strategy for conducting WW IV).

Most good libraries carry the New Yorker, apparently there is no on line archive yet.

Update: the article can be found here: http://www.possibility.com/epowiki/Wiki.jsp?page=KnowingTheEnemy

Thanks to Niner Domestic for the tip


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## 54/102 CEF (11 Oct 2007)

Thread may be old - but there is a new - far expanded Powerpoint on COIN by LCol Kilcullen at 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullencoinbrief26sep07.ppt 

A Powerpoint viewer is required if you don't have the main program - 
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=048dc840-14e1-467d-8dca-19d2a8fd7485&DisplayLang=en

If you can't find this and want it - PM me.

All should read it - I think it makes all the connections we don`t necessarily see.


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## FascistLibertarian (11 Oct 2007)

Kilcullen and Robb are amazing.


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## DBA (11 Oct 2007)

Just by the types and amounts of information being gathered by various intelligence programs you can see that a lot of it is applicable to finding the connections between nodes once some are discovered. To bad The New York times, other news organizations and the Democratic Party are against this type of intelligence gathering even to the extent of exposing covert programs. Not without some reason as tracking associations is in some ways in conflict with freedom of association.


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## a_majoor (1 Jun 2008)

This essay shows the difficulty with what we are dealing with. Even if you agree with the premise, the way it is stated will raise lots of politically  correct opposition or at least make it difficult to gain support to take action, as well as harden the resolve of the Jihadis to work against us. Creating successful disaggregation techniques will be difficult, and may have to focus on other factors, like expanding womans rights in Islamic societies or transferring blame for economic and social stagnation back to the dysfunctional governments of the region rather than trying to take religion head on:

http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2008/05/muslim-reformation.html



> *The Muslim Reformation*
> 
> Let me make it clear from the start, that the following essay focuses on Islam, not on Muslims. I believe that the average Muslim is more or less like you or I ... they want to live in peace and wish for a better life for themselves and their children. In short, they are good people. The topic here is Muslim and Christian foundations and beginnings.
> 
> ...


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## Greymatters (1 Jun 2008)

While there is an overwhelming amount of evidence supporting a violent Islam religion, he's oblivious to, or deliberately ignoring, Christianity's own bloody past.  Once Christians took the reins of power over from Rome they were only too happy to wield the sword along with everyone else... if in doubt take a look at our current response.


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## Good2Golf (1 Jun 2008)

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> Thread may be old - but there is a new - far expanded Powerpoint on COIN by LCol Kilcullen at
> 
> http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullencoinbrief26sep07.ppt
> 
> ...



Kilcullen's work is most definitely something that folks should at least consider reading.  His analysis of the factors at play in assessing and dealing with insurgency is very well laid out.


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## tomahawk6 (1 Jun 2008)

Ignoring Kilcullen's influence on US COIN operations would be a very serious mistake. This in a nutshell explains current COIN operations in Iraq.The following comments were made on June 26, 2007 .



> When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.
> 
> The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return


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## a_majoor (2 Jun 2008)

Expanding a bit on the "disaggregation" theme, supporting the Rule of Law is also a powerful antidote to extremism:

http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2008/06/muslim-tug-o-war.html



> *Muslim Tug-O-War*
> 
> Malasian Islam offers up a good news/bad news situation. While the Malasian courts back a fairly liberal constitution, the government pushes back. What's shaping up is the classic stand off between Muslim purists and those who want to enter the 21st century and join the rest of us.
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (25 Sep 2008)

A lot of COIN is a numbers game. "We" have far more than enough troops in Afghanistan to make substantial gains, but it is distributed in an inefficient manner:

http://outsidethewire.com/blog/insurgency/how-not-to-fight-a-counter-insurgency.html



> *How Not to Fight a Counter Insurgency*
> Written by JD Johannes
> Tuesday, 23 September 2008
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (16 Oct 2008)

Information and sensor technology which can extract data with high efficiency. If you substitute "patrol" for "sensor" then you may have an extremely efficient way to develop local intelligence and apply effects in COIN without breaking the bank in terms of manpower and logistics:

http://www.popsci.com/gregory-mone/article/2008-10/information-wrangler



> *The Information Wrangler*
> He develops new ways to get the most information with the least effort
> By Gregory Mone Posted 10.14.2008 at 4:36 pm Comments
> 
> ...


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## OldSolduer (16 Oct 2008)

If a fifth grader and I can understand it (I'm pretty simple at the best of times) then you can be guaranteed that no politician or journalist/media person will be able to.


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## a_majoor (26 Apr 2010)

Social media as an adjunct to conventional operations. This might fall under the category of Info Ops or PSYOPS, but as noted, real power is ultimatly needed to capitalize on any gains:

http://www.rferl.org/content/in_the_news_gedmin_usatoday_democracytweet/2022135.html



> *'Democracy Isn't Just A Tweet Away' - Gedmin In 'USA Today'*
> April 23, 2010
> 
> In a column for "USA Today", RFE/RL President Jeffrey Gedmin writes about the limits of social networking technology in bringing about revolutions, and warns that advances in digital technology have also afforded authoritarian regimes new ways of monitoring and silencing dissent.
> ...


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## SeanNewman (26 Apr 2010)

I have never been a fan of the concepts of 4th Gen (or 5th Gen) warfare.  I like the analogy above but it doesn't demonstrate two opposing forces.

The base way I ever had COIN visualized to me was a tug-of-war on a bell curve with the big blob of general population being shifted back and forth.  Legitimate gov't and NATO on one side, "insurgents" on the other.  The Russians did so much trying to kill the insurgents that eventually that whole blob shifter over so much that (almost) the entire population became the enemy.


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## vonGarvin (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> The base way I ever had COIN visualized to me was a tug-of-war on a bell curve with the big blob of general population being shifted back and forth.  Legitimate gov't and NATO on one side, "insurgents" on the other.  The Russians did so much trying to kill the insurgents that eventually that whole blob shifter over so much that (almost) the entire population became the enemy.


I'm not sure that the analogy of the Russians is either accurate or relevant.  Yes, there was opposition, but let us not forget that it was a proxy war of the Cold War: US money vs Soviet armour.  I find it ironic that some of the Soviet aims were similar to ours: education for women and girls, equal rights, and so forth.  Anyway, Afghan rebels did not cause the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan and ergo cause the fall of the Soviet Union.  It was us, the West, that beat them at the big game of economics.  We outspent them to the point that if they were to keep up, their whole economy would have collapsed.  Gorbachov knew this, and the first step was to draw down and withdraw from Afghanistan.  Then the events followed in the East Bloc: eg: Hungary, CSSR and eventually the GDR all started mini-revolts (arguably all started in Danzig..er..."Gdansk" in the early 1980s.  So, du to "us" outspending "them", "They" fell.

But your analogy is correct, I believe in the big bell curve being pushed and pulled from two sides.  It's simplistic, but it's so true.


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## SeanNewman (26 Apr 2010)

Yes I wasn't talking about the Russians in the sense of us vs them but them involved in a COIN fighting an insurgency.

Just like us now, really.  Yes we are doing business differently, but that just means we are pulling the rope in a different manner than the Russians.

At the end of the day it's still the "official" government side (and whoever is supporting them) one one side of the rope and the insurgency (and whoever is supporting them) on the other side of the rope; each trying to pull the bell curve to their side.

Linking this to the propaganda thread, that is how the insurgents say they're winning.  All they have to do is keep it generally in the middle, even if it flows a bit back and forth.

The biggest point about COIN is that you will never defeat the insurgents by yourself; you need to get the people on your side so they fight the insurgents for you.

I had a BMOQ-L candidate ask me a good question when I gave the COIN lecture to this course: "Is there ever an example of an insurgency actually winning and taking over as a legitimate government?".

My response: "Well yes, actually...perhaps you have heard of a little country called the United States of America".


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## vonGarvin (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> My response: "Well yes, actually...perhaps you have heard of a little country called the United States of America".


To which he just stared blankly and shook his head no, no doubt ;D


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## aesop081 (26 Apr 2010)

edit : Nevermind, misunderstood the post.


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> I had a BMOQ-L candidate ask me a good question when I gave the COIN lecture to this course: "Is there ever an example of an insurgency actually winning and taking over as a legitimate government?".
> 
> My response: "Well yes, actually...perhaps you have heard of a little country called the United States of America".



Unless I have totally misread the candidate's question, I believe that there are plenty of insurgencies that were successful and formed a government (China, Vietnam, Algeria, Rhodesia, etc).


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## dapaterson (26 Apr 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Unless I have totally misread the candidate's question, I believe that there are plenty of insurgencies that were successful and formed a government (China, Vietnam, Algeria, Rhodesia, etc).



In Vietnam, the VC were largely defeated; upon the US withdrawal and subsequent suspension of arms transfers the NVA was able to invade.  Not an insurgency, but an invasion and annexation.


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## SeanNewman (26 Apr 2010)

CDN Aviator,

The question was asked at the end of two-hours worth of academic lecture giving definitions of what an insurgency is, etc.

The two examples used are Ireland and Afghanistan.

T2B,

There certainly are many, but you can only teach a student so much on a limited schedule when they are also learning how to do a section attack and 10-man tent routine, all while half-asleep because they were up half the night preparing for an inspection ;D

I mentioned the US because it by far the most-known example of a successul insurgency that most people don't think about when they hear that word because they immediately skip to the stereotype of the guy from the middle east with a suicide vest.

Mr Patterson,

As per above, this was an intro to insurgency/COIN to these poor candidates and I was more than happy to have had them interested enough to even ask questions.


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## dapaterson (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Mr Paterson,
> 
> As per above, this was an intro to insurgency/COIN to these poor candidates and I was more than happy to have had them interested enough to even ask questions.



Yes, good that people are interested and asking Qs (and not standing in the back of the class to stay awake), but things are rarely as simple as we make them out to be, and are rarely as complex as we make them out to be, either.


Besides, I understood your comment about the USA to be an example of a successful insurgency - displacing the British - 1776 and all that, not a discussion of the North Vietnamese Army invading the South.


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## 40below (26 Apr 2010)

It's a fascinating discussion but I think it depends how you define "insurgency." I'm sure a few of you can, but leaving aside the American example and whether we really want to be arguing that once every 235 years the blue team gets to win one, I can't really think of any outside Northern Ireland and Algeria that couldn't also be classified (or dismissed) as a proxy war between forces armed and supported by opposing superpowers and their 'military advisors.'


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto,

Don't get me wrong - I like your example.  I'm just surprised that the candidate couldn't think of any successful insurgencies.

Dapaterson,

I believe that the establisment of North Vietnam can certainly be seen as a successful insurgency.  First against the Japanese and then against the French.  When the French finally lost they were, by then, facing a fairly conventional force, but it grew out of an insurgency.  They did establish a functioning government and set upon the path that was ultimately successful in unifying all of Vietnam under their rule.


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## Danjanou (26 Apr 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Unless I have totally misread the candidate's question, I believe that there are plenty of insurgencies that were successful and formed a government (China, Vietnam, Algeria, Rhodesia, etc).



Toss Rhodesia/Zimbabwe into the same category as South Vietnam, the Insurgents failed to win a military victory. The present result was more due to political posturing, an inept UN/Commonwealth monitored election and of course a fair deal of intimidation at the polling station. the Rhodesian Defence Froces had battled the ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front insurgents and their various backers to a standstill by 1978-79.

For purer examples of the insurgents winning by mainly military means try that favourite Canadian vacation spot Cuba. Fidel did it in 1959, and the guy he replaced former Sgt Batista pulled it on his predecessor Machado if memory serves. Stretching it a bit the locals took the place from the Spanish in 1898, mind they had a bit of help from a certain soon to be US President.  8)


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Apr 2010)

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Toss Rhodesia/Zimbabwe into the same category as South Vietnam, the Insurgents failed to win a military victory. The present result was more due to political posturing, an inept UN/Commonwealth monitored election and of course a fair deal of intimidation at the polling station. the Rhodesian Defence Froces had battled the ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front insurgents and their various backers to a standstill by 1978-79.
> 
> For purer examples of the insurgents winning by mainly military means try that favourite Canadian vacation spot Cuba. Fidel did it in 1959, and the guy he replaced former Sgt Batista pulled it on his predecessor Machado if memory serves. Stretching it a bit the locals took the place from the Spanish in 1898, mind they had a bit of help from a certain soon to be US President.  8)



Cuba is a great example, but at the end of the day the Rhodesian insurgents were in power as the government.  It matters not that the Rhodesian government battled the insurgents to a standstill on the battlefield.


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Apr 2010)

I think that insurgencies spring from grievances among the population.  A successful counter-insurgency is not just about winning a popularily contest or having a majority of the people prefer the government.  If a certain proportion of the population has a grievance that they don't think can be resolved through law then you can have an insugency.  I believe that a successful counter-insurgency resolves the grievance to some degree in order to undercut the support of the insurgency.  I believe that viewing the military and political components of a counter-insurgency campaign as separate endevours is a mistake.  The military effort must support the political effort.

The Huks in the Philippines were basically tenant farmers who worked hard but lived very poor.  The Huk insurgency was eventually defeated through a number of innovative means, many of which were indeed military, but the Huk insurgent fighters were isolated once the Huks were given the land they had been working (it had been owned by the Church IIRC).  

The Malayan insurgency certainly had some outside influence, but the basic grievance was that ethnic Chinese were not part of the political process.  The British adopted a number of very innovative tactics, but once again the insurgency collapsed when the ethnic Chinese were brought into the policical process in a comprehensive manner. 

If the insurgent's grievance doesn't resonate with a large enough chunk of the population then they are in for a hard slog from the beginning (Oman).  I'm not sure what "a large enough chunk of the population is."  I do think, though, the percentage is not necessarily as important as the concentration of dissent.  A national percentage of 5% may not be very much, but if it is concentrated in one region then you have  a problem.

I think this is why the national liberation movements circa 1940s to 70s were so hard to fight.  If the grievance is that the population does not want foreigners to run the country (European colonialism) it is pretty hard to resolve that grievance without handing power over.  I think that the British were generally more graceful about this process, while the European colonial powers generally went down the hard way.


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## SeanNewman (26 Apr 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I'm just surprised that the candidate couldn't think of any successful insurgencies.



Oh my goodness Sir, by the time you see a young officer at your end they have already come through no less than five filters to ensure the rotten peaches don't make it.

You should see some of the short bus superstars that never graduate.

I can't even imagine working in St Jean let alone a Recruiting Centre, but by the time they get to BMOQ-L one has to remind themself that these guys were civilians four months ago.


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## a_majoor (26 Apr 2010)

One feature of insurgencies which seems to be glossed over a lot is the role of outside parties. We see lots of insurgencies snuffed out because they simply cannot grow powerful enough to defeat the established power of the State. The various South American ones in the 60's and 70's, the Tiananmen Square protests in China and various democratic revolutions in the late 90's early 00's (Orange, Cedar,  Green, etc) all faltered or fizzled because they did not have a powerful sponsor or safe area to support them or fall back onto.

Conversely I can't think of one successful insurgency which did not have an external sponsor and a safe area (or areas) to provide supplies and places of refuge to rest and regroup. Even the American Revolution had the sponsorship of France and a continental wilderness so vast that it made the force to space ratio ridiculous for the British. (I am always ready to be corrected, though)

The article simply takes this old truth and shows how it operates in the Internet age; the power of the State can follow you into virtual space, and unless you have some sponsor who provides the extra strength or logistical support, your insurgency will falter or fizzle. The Internet is *not* a "safe" area to retreat into for rest and resupply. Sadly, theorists who claimed the Internet would make things different made the same mistake of the "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella" in underestimating how rapidly the State could adapt, and how great the overmatch in resources between the insurgents and the State really is.

So long as there are festering grievances, the seeds for insurgency will exist and sprout like weeds, but unless something prevents or interferes with the ability of the State to suppress the insurgency, then the State can act like a homeowner applying "Rounduptm" on the lawn.


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## a_majoor (9 May 2010)

Interesting take on Ralph Peters in this rebuttal. I have always admired his work as being well grounded and forward thinking, he has either slipped off the rails a bit or may be seeing something we are not (maybe the drug issue?).

http://canadiancincinnatus.typepad.com/my_weblog/2010/05/ralph-peters-is-wrong-about-afghanistan-and-general-mcchrystal-is-right.html



> *Ralph Peters is wrong about Afghanistan and General McChrystal is right*
> 
> I have the greatest respect for the New York Post columnist and former US Army intelligence officer, Ralph Peters. Normally he is spot on. But in this article he errs in his analysis. For instance, Peters says:
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (14 May 2010)

The other side of the coin. Winning is quite possible, if we only have the wit and will to do so.

http://canadiancincinnatus.typepad.com/my_weblog/2010/05/ralph-peters-is-right-about-afghanistan-this-time.html



> *Ralph Peters is right about Afghanistan (this time)*
> 
> Last week, I disagreed with Ralph Peters’ New York Post column lambasting General McCrystal’s Afghan strategy. This time I think he is right on the money when he states that it is a mistake for the US to try and erect a modern nation state in Afghanistan out of a bunch of independent tribes.
> 
> ...


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## SeanNewman (14 May 2010)

That is _sort of_ the concept to some extent now (or at least as of 09 before the US starting taking everything over).

As opposed to the metaphorical whack-a-mole, we decided to limit the amount of places we concentrated on, and stayed with only a handful of places (if that).  Then, with one "model village" that was almost entirely one tribe, we (through an Afghan filter) started pouring in the resources there under the auspices that we would be in this together against the bad guys.

As long as they kept the desirable behaviour, money kept going for what *they* wanted.  Then that message was reported heavily using as many ways to pass the message that we could, stating "If you want your village to benefit like _____, then this is what you have to do...".  

Tying this back to the article, again what's important here is that this one chunk of a district was one tribe, and they were a bit ticked off that they didn't have any official representation as a district leader.


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## a_majoor (25 Jul 2010)

Cultural factors that we can exploit. While Jihad may not be a fashion accessory as the author implies, mockery and disdain at its lack of value might serve to drive wedges between the jihadis and their support base:

http://volokh.com/2010/07/24/will-jihad-jump-the-shark/



> *Will jihad jump the shark?*
> Stewart Baker • July 24, 2010 5:06 pm
> 
> We’ve seen a rash of homegrown Islamist terrorists in recent years, and there has been a lot of agonizing about why.  One explanation that I haven’t seen elsewhere still strikes me as plausible: The attraction that adolescents and the disaffected feel toward groups that their parents and teachers fear.  If you’re feeling marginalized, after all, why not choose the margin?  And while you’re at it, why not choose a marginalized group that inspires fear and unease on the part of mainstream society?  At least then you’ll get a kind of respect.
> ...


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## a_majoor (9 Dec 2010)

Good news/bad news kind of post. The ability to use social media to track people is obviously something we would like to exploit (and forcing _them_ off socila media in order to hide might also be a big benefit in fracturing their networks and communications); but the ease of which a careless or inattentive soldier could leak information this way is a bit unsettling:

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/geotags-and-social-networking.htm



> Adam Savage, of  “MythBusters,” took a photo of his vehicle using his smartphone. He then posted the photo to his Twitter account including the phrase “off to work.”
> 
> • Since the photo was taken by his smartphone, the image contained metadata reveling the exact geographical location the photo was
> taken.
> ...


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## a_majoor (12 Mar 2011)

DARPA works on social networking. I suspect there are plenty of real world applications outside the military....:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/nerds-no-more-darpa-trains-troops-to-be-popular/#



> *Nerds No More: Darpa Trains Troops to Be Popular*By Noah Shachtman  March 10, 2011  |  4:59 pm  |  Categories: DarpaWatch
> 
> The Pentagon’s biggest geeks are getting ready to turn you into the ultimate social animal.
> 
> ...



[/snark] I suspect the real reson the computer-video training simulation approach was chosen is simply to ensure a consistent reaction at all times (not depending on the whims of the actor)


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