# Defence roles, organization, equipping and HQ (a split thread on everything)



## Kirkhill (31 Jul 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> Absolutely... we need something.
> 
> However, what we need, how many, how we train, and how much we train are completely dependant on whether they are going to be expeditionary.
> 
> That's what I've been trying to say, we need a National discussion on what our expeditionary forces should look like.



Baz - you have identified the central question on these boards in one.

We no longer have a War Department (when we were under British jurisdiction).  We, like every other western nation, have adopted the passive, reactive terminology of Defence.

Expeditions beyond our borders are hard to square with the syllogism of Defence.  Many Canadians can not wrap their head around the concept of "Forward Defence".  For them "the best defence is a good offence" smacks of aggression.

Consequently, to justify "expeditions", we have to find people and things to defend.

The Air Force defends airspace, our own, our neighbour's and our approaches.  The inherent capabilities necessary for that are easily transferrable to expeditions - with a small portion of the home force being allocated forward.  That allocation allows some portion of the force to maintain skills in a contested, operational environment.  The Canadian public is generally tolerant of the force although they have sticker shock over the F35s, not fully understanding how the cost compares to the ongoing cost of supplying the F18 capability (or the CP-140 or any other critter).

The Navy, much like the Air Force has a clearly defined defensive role that can be easily relocated forward.  The difference between a force covering our EEZ and the Approaches, and an expeditionary force, is the presence of mother ships, AKA AORs.

In both cases machines do the work.  Manpower is minimized.  Casualties are few. Work is conducted out of sight of press and cell phones.

The Army is the problem.  Especially an infantry focused army.  Sending troops in harms way to close with and destroy is problematic.

The problem is deep-rooted. That is why all of our expeditionary armies have ultimately been volunteer efforts.  The Zombies are still with us.

My own personal sense is that the Army can only justify itself if it consciously adopts the role of, and commits to, preparing a Home Guard / Militia / Army of National Defence, stiffened by Permanent forces designed to be rapidly deployable internally.  Those  Permanent forces could also be rapidly deployable at sea with the RCN.  How heavy a force that might be would be entirely dependent on the number and size of appropriate hulls the RCN is willing and able to supply and how much gear the Army is willing and able to leave permanently afloat in those hulls.  Note I only said gear, not bodies.  The bodies are easy to get out to a ship, or to a port. The gear is hard.

A side benefit of gear afloat is that it is easy to donate that gear to allies/friends/folks in need in a timely fashion and not put Canadian lives at risk.

Thus my interest in aligning the Permanent Force Canadian Army with CJOC and CANSOFCOM while assigning CADTC to develop an Army of National Defence based upon a Militia.  There are lots of models, all over the world, National Guards and Reserves in the States, Home Guards in Denmark, Sweden and the Baltic countries - that make that system work.

It also drives my sense that somebody should be overseeing the purchase of ordnance so that, for example, the same missiles are used regardless of launch platform - for example the AIM 120 or the ESSM to be employed by GBAD, or the same C4 system used aboard ship being used on shore with a similar mix of weaponry to create a GBAD-LRPRS system that uses few bodies and that can be rapidly deployed at home, at sea, or on a foreign shore.

I know this is not strictly F35 related - but you presented too good an opening for discussion.  Even if we do make the moderators work for their non-existent wages and force a split.


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ... somebody should be overseeing the purchase of ordnance so that, for example, the same missiles are used regardless of launch platform - for example the AIM 120 or the ESSM to be employed by GBAD, or the same C4 system used aboard ship being used on shore with a similar mix of weaponry to create a GBAD-LRPRS system that uses few bodies and that can be rapidly deployed at home, at sea, or on a foreign shore.


We have ADM(Mat) to do all ordnance purchases.  Its procurement mandate is given by the ECSs, and it has little (if any) power to force harmonization across the environmental requirements staffs.  This is not want you want.  You want a central office for all requirements development.  That would imply stealing the force development staffs from each of the environmental stovepipes and concentrating them within CFD.


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## quadrapiper (1 Aug 2015)

MCG said:
			
		

> We have ADM(Mat) to do all ordnance purchases.  Its procurement mandate is given by the ECSs, and it has little (if any) power to force harmonization across the environmental requirements staffs.  This is not want you want.  You want a central office for all requirements development.  That would imply stealing the force development staffs from each of the environmental stovepipes and concentrating them within CFD.


I'd always assumed that, if there were elemental entities for function X, there would also be a purple entity of some sort, whether as clearinghouse, liaison, coordinator/commander, or whatever - if only for bureaucratic balance and empire-building.


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## Infanteer (1 Aug 2015)

Chief Force Development is, technically, that organization but I don't think it works that way.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Aug 2015)

:sorry: ... but what follows is an _opinion _wrapped up in a bit of a history lesson. 

We, the Canadian Forces, only ever got close to being well organized once in our history. While I'm no fan of Paul Hellyer and I'm certainly not here to support him, he, and his team, got the organization right on 1 Oct 68:

     1. A _unified_ (joint) Canadian Forces HQ in Ottawa;

     2. Several functional, _unified_ (joint) commands ~

         Maritime Command which had naval fleets and organic air/aviation units, too;

         Mobile Command which had army brigade groups and a tactical air group with both rotary and fixed wing aircraft squadrons, including squadrons of CF-5 fighter/bombers;

         Air Defence Command ~ a single service command consisting of fighter/interceptor squadrons, radar chains and a spohisticated command and control structure; 
  
         Air Transport Command ~ also a single service command;

         Materiel Command ~ a _joint_ command providing third and forth line support to the CF;

         Training Command ~ a _joint_ command providing training, including flying training to the CF. Almost all schools belonged to Training Command; and

         The Canadian Forces Communications System ~ a joint _agency_, patterened after the US Defence Communications Agency, providing _strategic_ (fixed) communications support to the CF.

All of Mr Hellyer's changes, _integration_ (the single service and single uniform and _integrated_ personnel branches) and _unification_ (CFHQ and the _joint_ commands) was driven by economics. The 1950s had been a shock to the CF. Prime Minister St Laurent had made rebuilding and reorienting the CF one of his priorities: there were new ships (a new aircraft carrier (_Bonaventure_) and new destroyers (the _St Laurent_ class and their follow-ons), new tanks and plans for a new, _mechanized_ army, and the RCAF entered the jet age with the fabled F-86 and the CF-100 _Canuck_. But there were problems: the costs of modern military hardware were escalating (_inflating_) at a horrendous rate. The USA, in particular, had adopted an _industrial strategy_ that had a very large, very profitable aerospace and defence sector. Canada could and did produce good, solid home -made equipment but in the marketplace the Americans would damned near give away airplanes, tanks and radios before they would see allies buy Canadian (or British) gear. The CF-105 brought things to a head: it was, simply, unaffordable for Canada, alone, and none, not one would ever have been sold outside Canada ~ the Americans promised that. Prime Minister Pearson was commited to finishing M St Laurent's grand plan, but it would have to be done with a shrinking defence budget which meant that major savings would have to be found in the _superstructure_; Mr Hellyer promised (and delivered) some of those savings and, in the process, gave the CF a good enough ~ not quite right, but good enough ~ organization.

It wasn't to last.

There were problems: given the shrinking budgets both the Navy (Maritime Command) and the Army (Mobile Command) _failed_ to follow trough on _unification_. In each case the air component, which smart, young commanders all agreed was vital to victory in battle, was given short shrift when it wasn't ignored all together. It was a _failure in leadership_ by senior, battle tested admirals and generals; it wasn't Minister Hellyer's fault, the blame rests with men like O'Brien, Porter, Timbrell and Boyle, in the Navy and Allard, Anderson, Turcot, Milroy and Waters in the Army. They were not bad officers, just terribly, terribly parochial, short sighted and narrow minded, much like most humans everywhere.

At the same time the Air Force felt a bit hard done by: Air Defence and Air Transport commands were perceived to be a bit _junior_ and some air force generals were, honestly, dismayed at the second class status afforded to _aviation_ in the navy and army. In 1975 we got Air Command, there were lots of excuses but it was, mainly, an exercise in self aggrandisement for a few very senior air force generals. The organization of the CF has gone, steadily, down hill since 1975, nothing done since then has done anything to make a significant improvement.

There was one addition to Mr Hellyer's structure that did make some sense: in 1972 Minister James Richardson (acting on a recommendation from Minister Donald Macdonald) _integrated_ CFHQ and the Headquarters of the Department of National Defence (the Deputy Minister _et al_) into a single National Defence Headquarters, a Ministry of Defence structure such as all our allies have. This reorganization eventually spelled the end of Materiel Command as it was merged with the existing ADM(Mat) organization. It might have been better to have retained Materiel Command but to have given it (and Communications Command) a civilian "commander" (in effect that's what ADM(Mat) was when I served, back in the 1980s and '90s).

We, sailors, soldiers and airmen have _known_, since the 1940s that _joint_ works. In 1968 we, the CF, were set on a _joint_ path, but _failures in leadership_, careerism, jealousy and short sightedness put us back into single service stovepipes. It's time, _in my opinion_, to go "back to the future."


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## Baz (1 Aug 2015)

Well said.

I would also make it very much like '68, except:
- get rid of Material Command (ie ADM(Mat)) as we now have PWGSC; make the individual commands their own force generators
- merge air defence and air transport commands into one; but put Maritime Air and Tactical Air where they belong.  However, keep airworthiness and air order maintenance in the merged Air "Command"
- get rid of the Canadian Forces Communications Command (ie ADM(IM)) as we now have Shared Services Canada, but create a Joint Cyber Command, responsible for Defense Information Security and Deployed Comms

... and get rid of a bunch more Level 1s...


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

We actually have the nucleus of a reformed Material Command in the CANOSCOM remnants found in CJOC.  I think I would merge Material Command and Air Transport Command into a single Support Command to do the whole national level S&T function.


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## Kirkhill (1 Aug 2015)

I can see the direction and understand it.

Splitting Air Assets effectively into Fixed Wing Trucks (IMO an aircraft that plans on launching Beyond Visual Range is more of a truck than a fighter) and Rotary Wing Trucks makes sense.

My problem is with the Maritime - Mobile Command split.  I don't see that working for ensuring that the RCN has the platforms to move the Army.  The RCN doesn't need the Army to conduct its vision of Expeditionary Ops, and frankly it doesn't seem particularly interested in Domestic Ops.  On the other hand the RCN (and the Air Force) are critical to the Army for any Ops.  

It can't get where it needs to be and hold in place without the other two Commands/Branches/Services/Thingamyjigs.

That is why I think that a CJOC for all things operational makes sense.  Force Generation should be the raison d'etre for the Institutional Elements, Recruiting, Training and Reserves/Militia.

MCG - The only problem I would have with that solution is that if you went that route I would expect Support Command to also be supplying Ships, Helicopters and Trucks. Essentially, everything "B".


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> MCG - The only problem I would have with that solution is that if you went that route I would expect Support Command to also be supplying Ships, Helicopters and Trucks. Essentially, everything "B".


It would only go that far if one were deliberately trying to situate the estimate to some stupid extreme.

Your support command is your lifeline into theatre, you national level maintenance, and your depots.  All the tactical support remains under control of whoever uses it.


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## Kirkhill (1 Aug 2015)

Ok

I'll suck back on the Tactical B Trucks and the Helos.

How about the transport ships and the trucks to move to the docks?


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> How about the transport ships and the trucks to move to the docks?


We have that already, along with the inland shipping to get things where they need to be.  It is overseen by CJOC now.  Mostly, it is contracted.


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

Have a look at the CMSG and 4 CFMSU here:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-support/cfjosg.page


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## Retired AF Guy (1 Aug 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> [c]reate a Joint Cyber Command, responsible for Defense Information Security and Deployed Comms



Wouldn't some of that be overlapping with CSE?


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## Kirkhill (1 Aug 2015)

MCG said:
			
		

> We have that already, along with the inland shipping to get things where they need to be.  It is overseen by CJOC now.  Mostly, it is contracted.



The thing I am stumbling over is that some/most of the Air Transport fleet is, like Tactical B Trucks and Helos, a Tactical Asset, or at least a Tactical Enabler.   Those aircraft (Hercs and C17s) are expected to operate at least some of the time from dirt strips and in the face of enemy fire.

What is the difference between a trucker on a dirt strip and a Herc driver on the same strip (or a Hook driver?).  They certainly are not in the same game as the civvy trucker in Canada or even a Polaris driver on some unnamed airfield in the Middle East getting a glass of orange juice between flights at the Hilton.

And with respect to shipping (boats on the water), if it is acceptable to charter boats instead of owning a vehicular transport, then why is it not acceptable to charter 767s and 777s to move troops to tarmac airfields for furtherance by the tactical transports.

In the same vein, if it is deemed appropriate to possess transport craft that are limited to tarmac fields well out of the AO, why is it not appropriate to possess ships for similar types of operations?

Finally, if Support/Transport is going to operate Air Transport, including Tactical Air Transport, why would they not be the responsible command for Amphibious Transport Ships?

That would leave the RCAF responsible for fighters and LRPs and the RCN responsible for the CSCs (even the AOPS might be considered as more of a Support asset than a Combat asset) and subs.

I am not trying to be obtuse here, although I am probably giving a fair impression, and I have some sympathy for a purple transport command, if only to bust some stovepipes.  But I keep bumping into the question of where to set the limits once you start down that trail.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Aug 2015)

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> Wouldn't some of that be overlapping with CSE?




CSEC are big boys; there's no need to worry about them; they are very able to ensure there is no overlap.


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## McG (1 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill,
I think one of the things you are stumbling on is an idea that commands are going to own all the toys in their sandbox.  You don't like the idea of a Maritime Command and Mobile Command because the Navy won't think about the Army's needs when selecting ships, and you don't know what to do with an aircraft that can fit both tactical and strategic roles.

With any possible CAF structure, there will be assets that must work together but do not permanently reside under a common commander.  How do you deal with this?  Put force development outside the commands; stick it all in CFD as an option.  This will ensure a whole force or joint perspective is taken when defining and prioritizing requirements.  And when it comes to employment, you attach assets from commanders who need them but do not normally have them.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The thing I am stumbling over is that some/most of the Air Transport fleet is, like Tactical B Trucks and Helos, a Tactical Asset, or at least a Tactical Enabler.   Those aircraft (Hercs and C17s) are expected to operate at least some of the time from dirt strips and in the face of enemy fire.
> 
> What is the difference between a trucker on a dirt strip and a Herc driver on the same strip (or a Hook driver?).  They certainly are not in the same game as the civvy trucker in Canada or even a Polaris driver on some unnamed airfield in the Middle East getting a glass of orange juice between flights at the Hilton.


What is the difference between the MLVW and the Herc?  The MLVW moves things within theatre.  The Herc most likely moves things into and out of theatre.  If a operation requires intra-theatre airlift, then attach assets to the theatre command to fill the role (either temporarily or indefinitely).



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And with respect to shipping (boats on the water), if it is acceptable to charter boats instead of owning a vehicular transport, then why is it not acceptable to charter 767s and 777s to move troops to tarmac airfields for furtherance by the tactical transports.


It has been done .... Though I do not know that the aircraft were Boeing products or something else.  But this is a tangent.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In the same vein, if it is deemed appropriate to possess transport craft that are limited to tarmac fields well out of the AO, why is it not appropriate to possess ships for similar types of operations?


That is also a tangent.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Finally, if Support/Transport is going to operate Air Transport, including Tactical Air Transport, why would they not be the responsible command for Amphibious Transport Ships?


No.  Assault ships who deliver forces to theatre but then remain to support and/or participate in the operation would be assets to the theatre commander.  An AOR or JSS that sails with and supports the fleet in the day to day is an asset of the fleet commander.  If the CAF owned (as you hypothesize above) a cargo ship with a primary role to deliver goods between a Canadian port and an SPOD, then that could be a support command asset.


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## GR66 (3 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> My own personal sense is that the Army can only justify itself if it consciously adopts the role of, and commits to, preparing a Home Guard / Militia / Army of National Defence, stiffened by Permanent forces designed to be rapidly deployable internally.  Those  Permanent forces could also be rapidly deployable at sea with the RCN.  How heavy a force that might be would be entirely dependent on the number and size of appropriate hulls the RCN is willing and able to supply and how much gear the Army is willing and able to leave permanently afloat in those hulls.  Note I only said gear, not bodies.  The bodies are easy to get out to a ship, or to a port. The gear is hard.
> 
> ...



Your parts about the Air Force and Navy make sense to me, but I'm not really sold on your vision of the army.  While a Home Guard/Militia focused military may have some political appeal (feeding off the "Militia Myth"), does it really make much military sense for Canada?  Unlike some other militia-focused armies, is there a realistic threat of invasion of our sovereign territory which would require a "Home Guard" designed to be rapidly deployable internally?  If instead of home defense we're viewing the Militia as a base for expansion of the small permanent force, do we have the equipment to be able to realistically expand our military into a larger force?  

Same with the concept of sea-basing of equipment...does it make military/economic sense for Canada to pre-position equipment at sea in expectation of possible deployment?  Has rapid maritime deployment been an urgent requirement for the CF in recent history?  Can the expense of amphibious capable ships sailing with war stocks waiting to be married to deploying troops be justified when our combat arms are lacking in basic military capabilities (GBAD, integral close air support, mortar platoons, pioneers, etc.)?

I agree that having a clear role defined for the army that can be clearly communicated to the public in order to gain the economic support of the electorate would be a good thing.  I'm just not convinced that the vision you've laid out makes sense to me personally.


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## Navy_Pete (3 Aug 2015)

MCG said:
			
		

> Kirkhill,
> I think one of the things you are stumbling on is an idea that commands are going to own all the toys in their sandbox.  You don't like the idea of a Maritime Command and Mobile Command because the Navy won't think about the Army's needs when selecting ships, and you don't know what to do with an aircraft that can fit both tactical and strategic roles.



Maybe to expand a bit on this in how we are organized; right now there are separate requirements sections for each element, which are manned by the operators, and then the actual material support is done (with some exceptions) at ADM(Mat), but with the SMEs vice the elements.  For example, all small boats in the CAF are slowly being passed to DGMEPM, FF turnout gear used by the RCN falls under DGAEPM, and some of the other common equipment falls under DGLEPM.  Other items like meters and normal test equipment falls under QETE.

Neither the requirements or support lines are responsible for the actual employment of the assets, which is managed by the operational HQs.  

That took me a while to wrap my head around it, but once I did the joint commands made a lot more sense.  They really don't need to care about the long term requirements for the future, how things work or how they are going to get fixed, only what capabilities they have at their disposal and how they can use them together.  As long as you have SMEs from different elements that understand how their part works involved, it can work pretty well.

One thing that helped side is that all the LCMMs and requirement people are now in the same building, so it has made working together a lot easier.  This is particularly important for support a ship, where you have systems on board from all the different elements, so doing platform level LCMM work got much easier, when you can walk up a few floors to talk to the person, and work together on requirements for common equipment.


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> Maybe to expand a bit on this in how we are organized; right now there are separate requirements sections for each element, which are manned by the operators, and then the actual material support is done (with some exceptions) at ADM(Mat), but with the SMEs vice the elements.  For example, all small boats in the CAF are slowly being passed to DGMEPM, FF turnout gear used by the RCN falls under DGAEPM, and some of the other common equipment falls under DGLEPM.  Other items like meters and normal test equipment falls under QETE.
> 
> Neither the requirements or support lines are responsible for the actual employment of the assets, which is managed by the operational HQs.
> 
> ...



Navy_Pete, good to hear that general consolidation of life-cycle managers and in-service support teams is working out.

Now the challenge will be to align/consolidate force development activities to reduce the stove-piping and increase the coherence of the overall Departmental/CAF capability acquisition effort.

 :2c:

Regards
G2G


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## Edward Campbell (3 Aug 2015)

Some things are best done within a service specific structure: defining the _right_ capabilities required in the next generation of warships, or rifles, or tanks or fighter planes, for example; others are best done in a _joint_ environment: defining force structures and, broadly, the _right mix_ of systems and ensuring that e.g. the air force can provide CAP for the navy and CAS for the army, when required. The _trick_ is to find the _right_ staff mix to:

     1. Define, broadly and at the joint/CF level, the _capabilities_ required;

     2. Translate those _capabilities required_ into specific proposals for combat and support systems;

     3. Allocate (financial and human) resources for the life cycle of each system;

     4. Procure the systems, balancing military operational requirements and national industrial requirements;

     5. Support those systems throughout their (extended) service lives; and

     6. Dispose of the systems.

If I knew how to do that I'd probably be rich and famous ...


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ...If I knew how to do that I'd probably be rich and famous ...



Get KPMG to hire you as a Special Consultant to advise the Government?  

Regards
G2G


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## Edward Campbell (3 Aug 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Get KPMG to hire you as a Special Consultant to advise the Government?
> 
> Regards
> G2G




The operative word was IF. IF anyone could square that circle they would be famous ... most of those who promised, but couldn't, are already rich.  :not-again:


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## Old Sweat (3 Aug 2015)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Some things are best done within a service specific structure: defining the _right_ capabilities required in the next generation of warships, or rifles, or tanks or fighter planes, for example; others are best done in a _joint_ environment: defining force structures and, broadly, the _right mix_ of systems and ensuring that e.g. the air force can provide CAP for the navy and CAS for the army, when required. The _trick_ is to find the _right_ staff mix to:
> 
> 1. Define, broadly and at the joint/CF level, the _capabilities_ required;
> 
> ...



Not trying to be too cynical, but we have extreme difficulty getting past the first two with any sort of sensible result that can then drive the rest, especially the next one. Maybe that is too critical, so then add in a timely manner. One could also note that whining is not an acceptable management technique.


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## Edward Campbell (3 Aug 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Not trying to be too cynical, but we have extreme difficulty getting past the first two with any sort of sensible result that can then drive the rest, especially the next one. Maybe that is too critical, so then add in a timely manner. One could also note that whining is not an acceptable management technique.




My own _personal view_ (coloured by the fact that I've been retired for the better part of a generation) is that the CF, at large, is piss poor to incompetent at 1, 2 and 3. The Government of Canada is weak to impotent at 4, and we, DND and the whole of government are barely acceptable at 5 and 6.


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## MedCorps (3 Aug 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Not trying to be too cynical, but we have extreme difficulty getting past the first two with any sort of sensible result that can then drive the rest, especially the next one. Maybe that is too critical, so then add in a timely manner. One could also note that whining is not an acceptable management technique.



I think we are in the process of getting better at this with the new Joint Capability Based Planning.  

The Chief of Force Development (2-star) has created a number (10-12) mission-based scenario's that he envisions the CAF might become involved in in the next 10-30 years (horizon 3).  These scenario's have been endorsed by the CDS and I am told run by PCO (NSA) and PMO to ensure that these scenarios are acceptable and palatable to the Government in power. The scenarios range from a large domestic disaster to a large war joint fighting scenario and everything in-between. 

These scenarios are then being war gamed (3-4 week sessions) by the Joint Capabilities Planning Team using current capabilities or capabilities that are to be fielded in horizon one. Capability gaps found in the CAF's ability to conduct mission success in the mission-based scenarios are then going to be further war gamed to set the conditions for identifying capability requirements amongst the three services. I am told about about 2/3rd of the scenarios are complete so far with notable gaps identified in some situations.

Cheers, 

MC


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Agree with MC that #1 is getting somewhat better.  

#2 still seems to many to be an ongoing battle over rice and how big each service's bowl is.  

#3 just plain scares the heck out of many folks and it will take courage to trim/constrain other starts so that #3 can be done properly.  

#4 is what it is, and people have to accept that industrial resilience costs but there is a case for it within the Nation's interests.

#5 is doable so long as #3 is set-up properly, then #5 is (or should be) "just follow the agreed plan."

#6 often seems to be a surprise...not just how much to disposal will require, but doing it...when the time comes.  It seems that in some cases, the assets are telling US when they're packing it in (AORs and DDHs for example).


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## Kirkhill (3 Aug 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Agree with MC that #1 is getting somewhat better.
> 
> #2 still seems to many to be an ongoing battle over rice and how big each service's bowl is.
> 
> ...



So, are you saying the CF has "Commitment Issues"?


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So, are you saying the CF has "Commitment Issues"?



I wouldn't limit it just to DND, nor would I limit it to Government...it also applies to industry and private individuals; it is only the scale that makes it seem like a larger issue for the Gov't/DND.  Heck, people buy cars based on a capital acquisition price and usually don't take into account the through-life cycle costs.  If citizens are crappy at that, why should we expect our government to be any better at it?  :nod:

[/cynical view ends]

Regards
G2G


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## Baz (3 Aug 2015)

#2: I've had lots of talks about this, given what I do.

The CF (Canadian Government) is deafly afraid of a spiral program; their worry comes from "scope creep."  Unfortuantely, these systems are too complex to get the requirement right.  There needs to be a better try, fix, try, fix system in place...

DRDCs need to be better involved.  They are where the big brains figure things out.

We need to encourage feedback of good ideas into Canadian Industry.  The fleets try, DRDC thinks, and the good things are passed to industry to implement for us and to sell to others.

Some of this used to exist...


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## Kirkhill (3 Aug 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> #2: I've had lots of talks about this, given what I do.
> 
> The CF (Canadian Government) is deafly afraid of a spiral program; their worry comes from "scope creep."  Unfortuantely, these systems are too complex to get the requirement right.  There needs to be a better try, fix, try, fix system in place...
> 
> ...



My daily life as well Baz.  On a much lesser scale.

As G2G says the problem is not limited to officialdom.

People come to our company every day and ask us to solve a problem for a fixed price at a single meeting.  We then spend a bunch of time trying to divest them of the notion and convince them that we are not trying to gouge them.

I work on the basis of ever reducing circles coupled with ever changing realities - which is why I am so cynical with regards to planning, life-cycle costs and accountants.

The real world is defined by Harold MacMillan's "Events" and Harold Wilson's "Weeks".

It is countered by "Pugh's Wheel", "Boyd's Loop" and "Continuous Improvement".  As much as accountants would like it to be so, there is no certitude. There is no exactitude.  Budgets are made to be missed.

Events - well, markets change just like enemies capabilities change.  Plants that were designed to separate fish oil from fish meal, in order to sell oil discover that the market swings away from oil toward meal and they have to refocus on the meal only to have the market swing back to the oil but now with an emphasis on quality because it is going to a different end user - people are eating it rather than burning it.

The plant fundamentally hasn't changed in a hundred years but, like grandpa's axe, everthing has been replaced, renewed, adapted, locally modified and had modern controls overlaid on it while management philosophies move from Ford to Bell to Ford to Toyota to the acronym of the day.

Like ERC said if I knew the answers I'd have been rich a while ago (and Consultants would be out of business  > )

This is how progress is made


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## Old Sweat (3 Aug 2015)

Was it this process or a previous one or something similar or what that in the previous decade:

a. declared there was no place for tanks in the Canadian Army;

b. ditto for mortars, pioneers, air defence anti-armour and was headed that way with field branch artillery; and

c. caused a epidemic of bureaucratic obesity with a dysfunctional maze (I won't use the word 'system') of self-licking ice cream cones disguised as headquarters?

Having said that, I don't think very many countries, if any, do the major systems procurement very well.


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## Kirkhill (3 Aug 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Was it this process or a previous one or something similar or what that in the previous decade:
> 
> a. declared there was no place for tanks in the Canadian Army;
> 
> ...



The hardest thing in any process is the first principle all of us were taught:

Selection and MAINTENANCE of the aim.


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The hardest thing in any process is the first principle all of us were taught:
> 
> Selection and MAINTENANCE of the aim.



The nuance being selection by whom or what body?  

Each successive individual involved who has selected their own aim would tell you how they maintained their focus on that aim...  :nod:

As CLS, Hillier had come to grips with the tank disappearing as part of the transition to a medium mech-focused Army.  Once he was CDS, however, all bets were off....and Hillier wasn't an exception to that way of doing business.


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## Kirkhill (3 Aug 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> The nuance being selection by whom or what body?
> 
> Each successive individual involved who has selected their own aim would tell you how they maintained their focus on that aim...  :nod:
> 
> As CLS, Hillier had come to grips with the tank disappearing as part of the transition to a medium mech-focused Army.  Once he was CDS, however, all bets were off....and Hillier wasn't an exception to that way of doing business.



There's that continuity thing again.  It's hard enough when the Commander changes.  Its hard enough when circumstances change.  Its hard enough when the Commander changes his mind.  When all of those things happen concurrently - and the Commander only has 12 to 24 months to actually influence the situation - confusion will occur.

By contrast, Trident Seafoods has had the same commander at the wheel  since 1973 (Chuck Bundrant).   

American Seafoods has been directed by Kjell Inge Rokke (Aker, STX, Vaers) since 1988

There is benefit in the long tenure of Samuel Pepys and the slow turnover on the old Navy Board.


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## Humphrey Bogart (3 Aug 2015)

Want to keep people in jobs for longer, get rid of half the officer corps.  We will never do it though so the madness will continue.

The Irving group of companies have had the same three brothers in charge since old KC passed on.  That's the type of continuity the CF can only dream of.


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## Baz (3 Aug 2015)

I've been doing the same job, with different nuances, since 2006, and before that from 1996-02.  Does that mean I'm special :-?


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## Humphrey Bogart (3 Aug 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> I've been doing the same job, with different nuances, since 2006, and before that from 1996-02.  Does that mean I'm special :-?



Strategic ASSet   ;D

I suppose that's better than me... I'm just a pain in the .....


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> I've been doing the same job, with different nuances, since 2006, and before that from 1996-02.  Does that mean I'm special :-?



Baz, if that means designing and implementing a capable ASW system that GDC couldn't, then yes, you're at least a little bit 'special.'


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## Baz (3 Aug 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Baz, if that means designing and implementing a capable ASW system that GDC couldn't, then yes, you're at least a little bit 'special.'



G2G, you know that is a little bit disengenious; thanks however.

We had some things on our side:
- direct access to the crews during the entire development cycles
- the ability to do it in spirals, each one adding more capability
- being allowed to take operational risk; the biggest of which was supportability

From all accounts, what ASP does it does it well.  However, is a transitional tool into Cyclone, not a replacement thereof.

I did also have (alot of) help.  Also learned alot


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## Good2Golf (3 Aug 2015)

Baz said:
			
		

> From all accounts, what ASP does it does it well.  However, is a transitional tool into Cyclone, not a replacement thereof.



Hopefully the capability post-transition will reflect the time and effort (and modest resources) spent on ASP!  :nod:

Cheers
G2G


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## McG (3 Aug 2015)

MedCorps said:
			
		

> The Chief of Force Development (2-star) has created a number (10-12) mission-based scenario's that he envisions the CAF might become involved in in the next 10-30 years (horizon 3).  These scenario's have been endorsed by the CDS and I am told run by PCO (NSA) and PMO to ensure that these scenarios are acceptable and palatable to the Government in power. The scenarios range from a large domestic disaster to a large war joint fighting scenario and everything in-between.
> 
> These scenarios are then being war gamed (3-4 week sessions) by the Joint Capabilities Planning Team using current capabilities or capabilities that are to be fielded in horizon one. Capability gaps found in the CAF's ability to conduct mission success in the mission-based scenarios are then going to be further war gamed to set the conditions for identifying capability requirements amongst the three services. I am told about about 2/3rd of the scenarios are complete so far with notable gaps identified in some situations.


And, do the ECSs use these or invent their own scenarios for their own force development? 

Unfortunately, sometimes ...





			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Kirkhill said:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


... I suspect each level of command selects its own aim and would tell you how it maintains focus on that aim.


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## OldSolduer (4 Aug 2015)

The CAF has Institutional ADHD. If it's shiny, we want it. If it's drab and boring, we do only what is minimally necessary.......Lets go for ice cream.....


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## MedCorps (4 Aug 2015)

MCG said:
			
		

> And, do the ECSs use these or invent their own scenarios for their own force development?



That is a good question / observation. All of the ECSs (including RCN, CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM, CFINTCOM, Cyber, Space, etc) have membership on the Joint Capability Planning Team. The scenarios are avaiable to the ECSs.  Do they taken them back and use them? Unsure.  I know of at least one who does outside of the CFD process. It is a fairly new concept with the first missions being approved in late 2013 and the remainer in 2014.  

I would also suspect (but do not know for sure) that it will be harder and harder to get by the most senior joint program boards if you are not on board with the CDS / GoC approved planning scenarios. 

MC


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## McG (6 Aug 2015)

There have been VCDS planning scenarios around for a number of years and the Army at least built its own unconnected FD planning references.  I have not seen anything to suggest harmonization, but I hope you are right.



			
				Baz said:
			
		

> - merge air defence and air transport commands into one; but put Maritime Air and Tactical Air where they belong.  However, keep airworthiness and air order maintenance in the merged Air "Command"


I meant to touch on this earlier but did not get back to it.
Could you not manage these functions directly under the national HQ as opposed to creating a command to manage a responsibility across other commands?  Could DGAEPM do both these, or is there more to airworthiness than the technical?


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## McG (8 Aug 2015)

Going back to the earlier discussion with ERC and BAZ, I tinkered with the ideas and plugged it into a unified HQ structure that I previously drew-up.  It is a leaner looking organization.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (8 Aug 2015)

I would make just one small change to your charts MCG.

I would have a dotted line from the CDS to the MND. It's not a reporting/responsibility relationship (or at least ought never to be). I would then put a straight reporting line up from the CDS to the GG-in-council (meaning the PM and all ministers, otherwise known as "HM's government"). It may sound like a technicality but it is not. The MND cannot give us marching orders, only the government can.


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## Edward Campbell (8 Aug 2015)

Mine would look a bit different ...


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## McG (13 Aug 2015)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Mine would look a bit different ...


Like your proposal, I had previously drawn my HQ over joint regional commands (and a few other force options below) but switched it to the cloud to keep discussion on the HQ.  

I see you have three environmental chiefs of staff (Naval, General and Air) in your CFHQ with no command responsibility.  I envisioned force development (DOTMLPF) as the role in the structure that I drew, but you have placed your ECSs higher in the structure.  What do they do; is it more than I describe? 

Why have you chosen the military side as opposed to the civilian side for Public Affairs?


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## McG (13 Aug 2015)

And as reference for those who need it, here attached is how NDHQ is currently drawn.


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## Edward Campbell (14 Aug 2015)

MCG said:
			
		

> Like your proposal, I had previously drawn my HQ over joint regional commands (and a few other force options below) but switched it to the cloud to keep discussion on the HQ.
> 
> I see you have three environmental chiefs of staff (Naval, General and Air) in your CFHQ with no command responsibility.  I envisioned force development (DOTMLPF) as the role in the structure that I drew, but you have placed your ECSs higher in the structure.  What do they do; is it more than I describe?
> 
> Why have you chosen the military side as opposed to the civilian side for Public Affairs?




Sorry, MCG, I was away for a couple of days, not dodging your good questions ...

It seems to me that if you have a fully functional _joint_ structure then there is no need, indeed no role for commanders of the RCN, CA and RCAF. But I still see a need for professional heads of service to deal with single service doctrine, training and requirements. I am conscious that we need a _higher_ (in the pecking order) _joint_ doctrine and requirements staff and I see there being a ACOS Plans on the Joint Staff (under the COS O&I (Ops & Int)) (Plans really means, mostly, joint doctrine and joint requirements) and I would expect that COS O&I, who is chief of the joint staff (ops supremacy and all that) would pass joint doctrine and requirements to the VCDS (the "general manager" of DND) who would, in his/her turn, direct the single service doctrine and requirements folks (through the service chiefs who report to him/her) to develop their single service doctrine and requirements in such a way as to take full account of the joint staff's _direction_. I appreciate this is a wee bit cumbersome but HQs can afford a bit of that. I'm looking for clarity in the chain of _command_, I'll accept a few "dotted lines" on the _control_ (staff) side of the C2 superstructure.

As to public affairs. I'm afraid I'm  :deadhorse: again ...

I would like to see a _triad_ in the public affairs/communications/public information business:

     The MND has a _public relations_ staff which aims to tell Canadians what a great job the government of the day is doing at National Defence. This is, broadly, a _partisan_ function with a high _political_ content.

     The DM has a _communications_ staff that tells Canadians, especially Canadian _opinion makers_ about defence policy. There is a fair bit of advocacy here ... in essence government departments have to lobby the _political centre_
     (PCO, Finance and TB) to get the resources they need and they use _opinion leaders_, including in the media, to "sell" their programmes to PCO and cabinet. We might wish things were different but they aren't ~ at least they
     weren't in the 1990s, when I served, or in the early 2000s when I dealt, extensively with governments in my second career dealing with technical standards.

     The CDS needs, in my opinion, a _public information_ staff that does not do advocacy. Rather it _informs_: it tells Canadians what the CF is doing, where and, to some degree how.

The three are not isolated, one from the other. Lets consider the "war" against IS**. In my model the MND's staff (maybe following the PMO) would announce, to much fanfare, that the CF is sending fighters to bomb IS**. The press release might even take a swipe at one or more opposition parties for being _wishy-washy_ in dealing with terrorists. The DM's _communications_ staff would have their own press briefing, explaining how they, based on information from the CF, PCO and Foreign Affairs, after receiving general guidance from the government, presented cabinet with a range of military (hard power) options, including costs and risks. Cabinet, in its wisdom, chose the bomber option. The DM's _communications_ staff would explain that the mission's costs will come out of DND's hide for the first 90s days but, the official would say, DND will go to the policy _centre_ (PCO, Finance and TB) seeking more resources if the mission lasts longer than 90 days. The CDS' _public information_ office woulds, in turn, explain that the CF is deploying _n_ CF-18s from 4_nn_ squadron and _n_ pilots and _nnn_ support personnnel, mostly from _n_ Wing in __base__, all under the command of Col _Howsyourfather_. The _cycle_ is _partisan spin_, advocacy/policy explanation, and _information_ ... repeat as necessary.


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## McG (16 Aug 2015)

Based on that description, I think our two line diagrams are aesthetically but not fundamentally different.  Your COS O&I is my DCDS.  Your service chiefs and my environmental FD cheifs are again essentially the same.  I have split your COS A&L into a J1 and J4 function (probably for familiarity) but under the VCDS because I see these as part of that general management function at the national level; I see that fit being even more appropriate if one is considering the creation of a support command to execute the day-to-day delivery of the relate services.


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## McG (13 May 2016)

In the US, the Senate Armed Services Committee is looking at Goldwater Nichols reforms that could eventually see the elimination of service component commands within the various combatant commands.  If it goes ahead, this experiment would be interesting to watch.  I suspect it would validate many proposals for the CAF that can be found on this site.



> [The SASC proposal] also orders the Pentagon to “conduct a pilot program on an alternative organizational structure at one combatant command.” The secretary would pick a command of his or her choice and “replace the service component commands with joint task forces focused on operational military missions” in order to see how that would operate.


http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/05/12/sasc-ndaa-swerves-hard-goldwater-nichols-reforms-mccain/84311626/


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## McG (29 Jul 2016)

E.R. Campbell,
I think the discussions linked below would benefit from some of your perspective:
http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/canadian-approach-to-defence/forum_topics/do-you-have-any-comments-or-feedback-concerning-the-current-canadian-approach-to-defence1

and

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/defence-capabilities-future-force/forum_topics/should-the-size-structure-and-composition-for-the-canadian-armed-forces-change-from-what-it-is-today1


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