# Tecnology and it's impact on war a historical perspective



## 3rd Herd (9 Jan 2006)

"Don Quixote his own judgment on gunpowder: "Blessed be those happy ages that were strangers to the dreadful fury of these devilish instruments of artillery, whose inventor I am satisfied is now in hell, receiving the reward of his cursed invention."  

I have opened this thread in response to intrest shown and to prevent digression in the Dresden Firestorm thread. Currently there seems to be some difference of perspectives on the merits of technological superiority verses mundane quantises on the other thread. Which, seem to revolve around "the effectiveness of the Allied use and production of the Sherman tank series" and the debate over "the German ability to have won or at least prolonged the war had Hitler's ego  not over ruled the common sense expressed by some of his generals" This later statement in regard to German tank development.

 "In early 1944, the US Army faced a critical decision regarding its armored forces: should it retain the M4 Sherman as its primary tank or accelerate production of the new M26 Pershing heavy tank? Although many armored commanders favored the Pershing, the tank debate continued until Lt Gen George S. Patton, the Army’s leading tank "expert," entered the fray. Patton favored the smaller (and supposedly more mobile) Sherman, noting that "tanks were not supposed to fight other tanks, but bypass them if possible, and attack enemy objectives in the rear." Ultimately, senior Allied commanders—including Gen Dwight Eisenhower—backed Patton and decided to increase production of the Sherman. It remains one of the most disastrous choices of World War II—arguably, a decision that lengthened the war and became a literal death sentence for thousands of tank" 
Source:http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/cooper.html

"Guderian fought for the decision not to stop the production of Panzer IV. Though many Russian tanks outclassed this model now, the Panzer IV was far more reliable than the Panzer V Panther and Panzer VI Tiger. The soldiers could handle it in their sleep and it was available and produced in great numbers."
Source: Muth Jörg Military Historian, University of Potsdam / Germany

A few cavets for this thread
1) where posiible cite material sources, except in the case of general   
    knowledge
2) interenet sourcing allowed as I figure it could be hazardous searching 
   the stacks of A-stan U at the moment
3) in order not to break Mike B's bank account of band width select only  
    as much necessary to justify your argument. If you provide the link we 
    can all review the article /document in question.

To quote 2Bravo "let the babbling begin"


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## TangoTwoBravo (11 Jan 2006)

I'm pulling together some notes on this topic, but I wanted to refine the question a little.  What follows is me thinking aloud on the internet (AKA babbling).

The US element is interesting as it also pulls in some UK issues as well.  Is the question whether the M26 should have been put into mass production earlier or is it could the M26 have been put into production earlier?  The M26 certainly had two big advantages over the standard M4 Sherman in US inventories in protection and firepower.  Its 4 to 4.5 inches of frontal armour may well have stopped the 75mm on the Mark IVH and J at all but point blank range, as well as the Pak 40.  I believe that it would have also forced Panthers and Tigers to be closer to get frontal kills.  The 90mm gun could certainly deal with the Mark IVH at practical battle ranges and had a much greater chance of penetrating the Panther frontally (although gun/armour penetration stats are always open to some doubt).

A 1976 Rand study of US armor development (Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States, Rand 1976) cites several reasons for the US Army's slow pace of "heavy" tank development (the M26 was originally designated a Medium tank, and given the Heavy designation for morale purposes).  First was the Army Ground Forces' desire for reliable and familiar equipment.  Major changes in design were undesirable because they reduced the number of tanks coming off the line, and perhaps this is the crux of this thread (pg 97).  Heavier tanks were also disliked because they could not be transported in as great numbers on available ships and ground transporters (I've heard this argument recently...)  They were considered less mobile in pursuit and they encouraged tank crews to "go gallivantin' off chasing enemy tanks."  

This last point raises the issue of doctrine's impact on weapon development.  US Army doctrine envisioned tanks as conducting pursuits and exploitation, not going around hunting enemy tanks.  The destruction of other tanks was the realm of Tank Destroyers, which reduced the impetus to arm US tanks with tank-killing guns.  Its hard to get something (like a tank with a good gun) if you don't want it in the first place...A British lessons learned report from 1943 makes some interesting observations (Macksey, Tank Force, Ballantine 1970, page 129): "Only when the bulk of hostile tanks have been destroyed will armoured formations attain such freedom and mobility as will enable them to inflict a decisive blow against the enemy's main forces...Cruiser tanks have, in recent operations, supported infantry formations and infantry tanks have, on at least one important occasion, carried out work in a role normally allotted to cruisers."  

Destroying an attacking tank with tank destroyers and anti-tank guns is one thing.  Destroying tanks held in depth when you are attacking is another matter.  The British report seems to support the idea of a tank that has the anti-tank firepower and mobility of a "cruiser tank" combined with the protection of an "infantry" tank.  Today we call this design a Main Battle Tank, and in 1943/44 the term "Captial tank" was bandied about as well.  The M26 and Centurion can be considered early MBTs along these lines, as well as the Panther, T34 and JSIII.

While the T20 Heavy tank was terminated in 1943, General Marshall did order limited production on the T23 in that year (Rand study).  This tank became the M26 of which limited numbers were rushed to the ETO in time for the end of war (post Battle of the Bulge but in time for the Rhine).  The M26 went through several design modifications during this period, including major transmission and weapon system changes before going into further production in Nov 1944.  If several of the eleven plants producing M4s were switched to M26s in 1943, would sufficient numbers have been produced in time for Normandy?  Was the design mature enough?  What impact would this have had on M4 production, which was being used to satisfy US, Commonwealth and Soviet demands for both training new formations and supporting ongoing operations?  I'm going to try and dig a little further and come back to this in the future.

The issue of general officer blockage of heavier designs is somewhat controversial.  My initial reading at least suggests to that heavier tanks were not championed by many senior officers.  It is interesting to note that General Abrams, a World War II tank officer, insisted on a heavier tank in the early 70s despite recommendations made by others for lighter and cheaper designs.  This insistence led in no small part to the M1 tank so appropriately named after him (tangent alert).

Assuming for a moment that the M26 could have been available in numbers by Jan 1944 to equip the Normandy-bound US armored battalions in time to train for the invasion, would it have ended the war sooner and with less casualties?  It is hard to say, and speculative history is just that.  I would say with some confidence that it would have reduced casualties due to its thicker armour and that it could have also knocked out its antagonists with greater frequency that the 75mm Shermans.  I'm not so sure that it would have ended the war any sooner.  Would the break-out of the bocage been any faster?  Would the supply problems of Autumn 1944 that halted the Allies advance been eased?

An alternative question to pose is regarding more timely upgrades to the M4 itself.  The "Jumbo" Sherman of the late-war period had some 4 inches of armour, albeit at the cost of higher weight.  Development of the 76mm version of the M4 began in 1942, but was delayed for doctrinal reasons as well as production facilitation (Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and United States, Rand Institute, 1976).  It may well have been possible to mass produce an up-armoured and up-gunned Sherman in time for OVERLORD.  In the end, the 76mm Sherman arrived in late 44.  The British produced the Firefly variant with the 17 pdr through the efforts of army officers despite opposition from the Ministry of Supply in 1943 (Macksey, Tank Force, Ballantine 1970), showing that rather radical upgrading was possible in time for Normandy, albeit on a scale of 1 in 20 tanks.  The 76mm eventually put on the Sherman was inferior to the 17 pdr, but still superior to the 75mm.  The production of 6,000 M4s with 76mm guns and perhaps even 4 inch frontal armour may have been achievable by early 1944 while still taking advantage of production economies of scale if the call had been made in 1942. 

I'm looking at Soviet and German design/production as well, but I wanted to throw this out for initial discussion.

Cheers,

2B

"We are beginning to  run into the motor car dealer's problem.  Our customers, the fighting man, want only the latest model."  Attributed to US Chief Ordnance officer for tanks, 1942 (Rand).


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## TangoTwoBravo (12 Jan 2006)

Turning to German tank production, German Tanks of World War II (Senger and Etterlinen, Arms and Armour Press, 1969) provides some interesting insights.  Guderian did indeed fight to keep the MkIV in production against the opposition of others "inside the leadership" who wanted to focus on assault guns.  In March 1943 at Hitler's HQ, Guderian urged for the production of the Mk IV at maximum rate.  This became an order to the industry in April of the same year.

Some 3,000 Mk IVs were produced in 1943, with a further 3,000 plus in 1944 and early 1945.  This compares to roughly 1,000 Mk IVs produced in 1942.  Over 2,500 Mk IIIs were produced in 1942 as well.  It is interesting to consider the issue of having two medium tanks (Mk III and Mk IV) in development and production in the pre-war and early war years.  Concentration on the Mk IV may well have paid dividends if pursued earlier than 1943.

Looking at Hitler's involvement, there is an interesting memo originating from his direction to the Army High Command dated 14 Nov 1941:  "the Fuhrer sees it necessary, having regard to our over-stretched and limited production capacity, to restrict the tank program regarding the various models and to determine the future types...The Fuhrer demands a simplification and a limiting of the programme so that mass production can be more easily introduced...The Fuhrer proposes the following four basic types: fast tanks (recce), medium tanks along the lines of the Mk IV, Heavy tanks and Super Heavy tanks.   The Fuhrer wishes to take decisions personally..."

Thus while he intended to focus efforts and simplify, by having four basic types he still diluted design, testing and production.  German design post-1941 was also influenced by being involved in fighting against the Russian T34s.  Being caught short forced the Germans to improvise and create ad-hoc designs and incremental upgrades to near-obsolescent vehicles to try to cope with this threat.  It also forced designs to be put into action too early (like the Panther).

Looking at the Tiger and Panther, the source relates that two Panthers could be built with the same man hours as one Tiger.  This suggests that the 600 Tiger Is built in 1944 could have "exchanged" for some 1,200 Panthers.  Whether this would have actually been possible is another question, but the Panther was a more capable tank by 1944 than the Tiger.  Even a one for one exchange may have been beneficial.

If one was to second-guess German decisions, mass production of the Mk IV (and not Mk III) early in the war and exclusive focus on the Panther and Mk IVH from 1943 may well have been beneficial.  Easy to say from my comfy study...

I would argue that the Germans (and pretty much everybody else) generally had to live with design/production decisions made two years previously.  The Soviets were basically two years ahead of the Germans with the T34 and KV1 designs, and while the Germans then surpassed them in 1943/44 the turning point of the war had already been reached.  For the Germans, 1940 was probably the critical year.  Focus on the Mk IV at the expense of the Mk III to include a capable dual purpose gun may well have been possible.  This could have resulted in potentially large numbers of MkIV F2 equivalents available in late 1941 or early 42 and the increased mass production of the Mk IVH possibly taking place earlier.  This, of course, is easier said than done for an Army trying to both expand and fight current operations.  The same dilemma was faced by US planners in 1941/42. 

While arms and armour will develop during a conflict, there are obvious advantages to entering the fray with the best kit available.  The advanced design of the T34 allowed Soviet planners to focus on producing a proven winner during their darkest time of the war, while still able to pursue upgrades in the future.  Other nations were sometimes caught flat-footed with tank designs and forced to play catch-up while the war was in progress, such as the Germans in 1941/42 and the western Allies pretty much throughout the war.

Cheers,

2B


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## a_majoor (12 Jan 2006)

As is so often the case, doctrine drives technology most of the time, and only really radical changes in technology such as the change from sail to steam allow technology to drive doctrine. Occasionally, changes in organization or culture trancend technology. _Carnage and Culture_ by Victor Davis Hanson is an interesting introduction to the thesis, and _The Soul of Battle _ by the same author covers this with three detailed case studies where armies of roughly equal size, shape and technology meet, but the "democratic army" not only prevails but decisively defeats the opposition. Finding these break points is the fun part.

The Gemans had the Mk III and Mk IV tanks for reasons fairly similar to the British divide between Cruiser and Infantry tanks, or the American decision to have medium tanks and tank destroyers. When introduced, the Mk III had a relatively long barreled 50mm cannon to deal with enemy tanks, while the Mk IV had a short barreled 75mm cannon to provide fire support to the Infantry. The longevity of the Mk IV was mostly an accident, the wide turret ring needed for the short barreled 75 made for a very roomy hull that could not only take progressively more powerful long barreled 75mm cannons, but also lent itself to assault guns, flackpanzers and various other models. If the Mk IV had a small hull like the Mk III, it could never have taken the modifications and upgrades.

Even closer to the present, the former USSR saw tanks as primarily exploitation forces, the independent tank battalion of the Motor Rifle Regiment trailed rather than led into battle; once the MRR had fixed the enemy and created the breach, the tankers were to pour through and race into the rear area, where the mobility and firepower would vastly overmatch the CSS and admin troops. Taking ground would happen when the NATO fighting formations collapsed after their support echelons were defeated. This explains a lot about Soviet era tank design.

In the modern world, there is really only a few "percentage points" of difference between Western "Generation Three" tanks, or their Russian counterparts. The next big thing in tank warfare will probably be the introduction of long range, reliable and (relatively) inexpensive fire and forget type ammunition, which will change the shape of armoured units and armoured warfare (see: The Mounted Close Combat Battalion by Colonel John F. Kalb and Christopher T. Mayer, Armor July-August 1997, http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/ja97/4mccb.pdf)

The logistics train is the key to this all, looking from aspects as diverse as production (how many tanks can you build per given input), crews (how many troops do you have? how many can you train for these jobs in the time alloted? how many support troops do you need for each fighting troop? [Only the Starship Troopers have a tooth to tail ratio greater than one, and I am sure there are plenty of support troops who never figured in the story....]), what volume of consumables can your side produce, transport to the theater, transport to the front, etc. etc. Technological changes in Logistics (allowing more output per unit input in economics terms) are probably the greatest driver of changes to the way war is conducted, such as Napoleon's troops getting "canned" rations rather than having to forage, or moving from horse drawn wagons to trucks.


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## TangoTwoBravo (12 Jan 2006)

The Rand Study above has an interesting statement on weapons development:  "In weapons acquisition, doctrine is the chief determinant of what to produce; the urgency of the perceived threat influences the resources committed; and economic and technological capabilities shape the choice between quality and quantity (Rand 4)."  This makes a useful lens with which to study tank development.

With regards to the US interwar period, the US Army had chosen not to form an Armor Branch at the end of the First World War and had considered tanks to be infantry-support (Rand 5).  Tanks were not necessarily ignored, but tank doctrine was focused on infantry support.  There was little urgency of a perceived threat.  As a result of both doctrine and the perceived threat, tank design and production had little urgency and relatively few resources devoted to it.  In 1937, $ 60,000 was alloted to tank R&D out of a total R&D budget of $ 1,350,000.  Ten times as much was spent on artillery R&D than on tanks.  When the urgency of the threat was realized in 1940, doctrine was practically non-existant which meant that it was hard to harness the economic and technological capabilties available.  The doctrine that did evolve had the split between tank destroyer and tanks with results on subsequent tank armament.  It can also be argued that the relative paucity of previous R&D meant that there were not really any mature designs to draw from in a hurry once the war began.

The Soviets developed doctrine in the 20s and 30s that envisoned tanks for conducing both a breakthrough phase as well as an exploitation phase.  This is not all that different from theories in the West at the time, and there was some argument over Cavalry and heavy tanks.  Nevertheless, the mass production of tanks was seen as vital and considerable effort was expended on the production of a wide variety of designs.  While certain designs were intended for infantry support, there does not appear to have been a doctrinal restraint on tank armament.  Strategically, a future conflict was anticipated that would require large forces including mechanized forces, which gave a certain urgency to efforts.  The centrally controlled economy, however inefficient as a whole, did allow for the allocation of resources to tank production and research (at the expense, of course, of other areas of development).  When certain western innovations were acquired (the American designed Christie tank suspension) and combined with Soviet experience and production techniques gained in the 20s and early 30s the T34 was born as perhaps the world's first main battle tank.


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## a_majoor (12 Jan 2006)

Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky and his group developed "Deep Battle" theory, which in turn called for a technological leap not only in tank design (solved through the purchase of the Christie design and its evolution through the BT (Fast Tank) series of designs), but also on the industrial infrastructure of the USSR. Although Tukhachevsky was a proponent of wide scale mechanization, as well as airborn forces to strike deep into the rear areas of the enemy, he was woefully ignorant of economics and production technology; believing, for example, that tractor factories could effortlessly convert their output from tractors into tanks. My readings of "Deep Battle" theory have (as yet) not come across any comprehensive discussion of "Deep Battle" logistics in an operational or even tactical sense, which is somewhat strange since the idea hinges on a series of coordinated blows across the breadth and depth of the enemy battlespace. Revolutionary zeal was obviously much stronger in the 1920s and 30s, I guess.

In the strange and Byzantine world of post civil war Russia, there were several other "Centers of Excellence", each advocating a different doctrinal position based on experiences derived during WWI, the Civil War or the Russio-Polish war (Depending on where you were and what you did, you could draw many and varied lessons about what was important doctrinally). Supporting all these positions the Red Army had everything from armoured cars mounting powerful 45mm cannons (remember, a 38mm field piece was considered the "ultimate" tank buster right up until 1939), to "tankettes" and wonderful "tanks" from the Leningrad Locomotive Works (approved by Stalin himself, perhaps based on what he though of as important lessons learned as a Commissar in the Russio Polish War) mounting up to five turrets...(imagine the crew Action drill in that!).

Unfortunately, it took the forge of war to burn away all the nonsense. At least the USSR had the luxury of time, space and resources to absorb the blow while discarding the dead ends and converting production to the useful equipment that could support a workable doctrine.

Canada seems to be in the same boat as the 1920 US Army. Although I am sure to receive loud protests, our doctrine is not very well defined, at least not to the point of being able to firmly define the "What and How" of things. Modular mix'n'match formations and concepts like the MMEV are really ideas looking for a home, and a well defined and understood doctrine like AirLand Battle would never allow such things to receive a serious hearing, much less go into production. The "urgent" threat is IEDs and irregular forces, and the resources assigned to the Armed Forces are tiny compared to the immense challenge being presented. We have virtually no industrial base capable of designing and building our own "made to order" equipment, so the primary shaper of the choice between quality and quantity is cultural (unwillingness to take casualties) and economic (how much is just enough?). This model explains why it seems satisfactory to purchase a mere 50 RG-31 "mineproofs" off the shelf, as opposed to deciding why we need APVs, then providing the resources to purchase enough to equip the bulk of the Canadian Forces once it was decided that, yes, APVs allow us to execute important parts of our doctrine.


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## TangoTwoBravo (13 Jan 2006)

Tukhachevsky was one of the first victims of Stalin's great purge (talk about Transformation).  It is interesting that Zhukov, one of the only survivors, was a Cavalryman who had actually had some doctrinal disagreements with the Tukachevsky bunch.  Tukhachevsky also considered the army as divorced from politics (oops).  Zhukov came around to tanks eventually (and did well with them against the Japanese).  Apparently, the surviving Cavalrymen who inherited the army considered the tank people to be "bourgeios" and the mechanized corps were disbanded and maintenance/training effors plummeted.  Nevertheless, tank design contined from the intitial impetous and provided the Red Army with two excellent tanks at just the right time (all from Orgill, "T34", Ballantine, 1971).

Looking at the interaction of doctrine, economy and the perceived threat again, the original specifications that led to the T34 (called the A20) envisioned a 45mm gun (not bad for the time) and some 20mm or armour.  Study of experience from the Spanish Civil War, however, led to some changes.  Apparently, the commander of a BT5 unit of the "International Tank Brigade" (A. Vietrov) gave testimony to the Defence Committe in 1938 regarding the need for better armour to counter the new 37mm anti-tank guns and doubted the effectiveness of the 45mm to deal with heavier tanks.  This shows the benefit of real experience (lessons learned from combat) over theoretical doctrine.  The Committee decided not to accept these recommendations.   Stalin, however, heard the veteran's testimony as well and intervened, leading to the 76mm gun and 30mm of armour.  

The A20 design became the A30 and then the T32 by August 1938 and the design was presented to the Main Military Council.  The Council felt that the T26 had done well enough in Spain and that three T26s could be built for the price of one T32, but Stalin again intervened and a prototype was ordered.  Once again we see the quantity vs quality debate, with quality eventually winning out due to some political "interference".  I don't imagine that many were too keen to cross Stalin in 1938...  Additional development led to more armour and by 1940 the T34 was ready for production.  

Doctrine was not, therefore, uniform, and involved some debate.  Nevertheless, the requirements of the T34 were based on both official doctrine and recent battle experience.  Technology was also a factor, and there were difficulties with the T34 design (their were problems with the original gun and gear box).  Previous work by the tank industry, however, had produced experienced designers and an industrial base to match.  The collapse of the French Army coupled with the Red Army's poor showing in Finland led to a greater sense of urgency in the Soviet Union and in June 1940 the order for 200 models was increased to 600.

The foresight shown by the Spanish Civil War veteran regarding protection against the 37mm and the need for a bigger gun to deal with enemy tanks would pay dividends in 1941.  The Soviet tank industrial base was large enough and given sufficient resources to produce a rather revolutionary tank.  It is one thing to want a bigger tank cannon.  Its another matter entirely to mass produce one and the Russians gained a couple of years here on the rest of the world.   It took the Germans until mid-42 to get anything like the T34 (the MkIVF2) and the Western Allies never really got there until the end of the war.


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## 3rd Herd (13 Jan 2006)

2Bravo
Pre 1940 US Tank Doctirne:

The US Armored Corps lost it's battle in the 1920 National Defence Act where they failed to provide justification and rational for a sperate organization on par with the Army and Navy. There was a perceived view that "tanks were slower than foot soldiers" and that "the Army's Chief of Ordnance Gen. Crozier wrote: "the most important weapon with which nations go to war is the infantryman's rifle.". Further evidence of this asspect was the almost court matarial of Dwight D Esisenhower for his writings in the 1920 Infantry Journal advocating the development of a  tank dotrine. "MG Charles S. Farnsworth, who told young Eisenhower that his ideas  were wrong and dangerous. Farnsworth added that if he published  anything further incompatible with “solid Infantry doctrine,” he would be hauled before a court-martial. (Morgan)

 Next we have the Navy preoocupation with Japan as early as  "war planning in the 1920s was dominated by the Navy's focus on Japan. In a war with Japan, the Army's role was subordinate to that of  the Navy, and it followed then that "industrial mobilization" would focus  on ship construction and -- after the late 1920s -- the manufacture of airplanes. ( Hone)  

Althought the Navy's preoccupation with was at odds with the new spirit of "ioslationism' given the 1928 Pact of Paris in which the United States stated it would limit its armed forces to those nesseccary for home land defense. Further to the detrement of tank doctrine development was the announcment in 1931 by the Chief of Army Plans Divison who advised the Army Chief of Staff  that the " that the defense of frontiers was precisely the cardinal task for which the Army had been organized, equipped, and trained."(Army Historical Series). 

In 1940 political and military leaders of the United States started gearing up for war.  Mr. K.T. Keller of the Chrysler Corporation was approached and over a weekend discussion secured an agreement with the United States government to manufacture and produce a wide range of war related equipment. Relevant to this discussion was the production of tanks initially the Grant and Stuart series. The Grant to provide artillery with a bow mounted 75mm. gun and the Stuart light tank to fill the role of a fast scout. The Grant series did not perform as well as expected given the limited traverse of the main gun. In addition the Germans had proven the concept of blitzkrieg using an armored force to open and exploit a break through. Chrysler was given the blue prints for a new tank the M4 Sherman.(Problems in Tank Production)

Mr. K. T. Keller in his 1948 apperance before the Industrial College of the Armed forces states that one of the major obstacles in tank production in the 1940 period was the "countries coming part in a war which was still undefined" And once this was defined machinerary need to produce tanks was on at a level of 1/3 of what had been ordered in February of 1941.(Problems in Tank Production)

 next the M4 verseres M26
Sources:

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY 
HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY, Center of Military History, Washington  
DC, 1989

Hone Dr. Thomas C. FIGHTING ON OUR OWN GROUND THE WAR OF   PRODUCTION, 1920-1942

Morgan Thomas ,LTC  USA-Ret. The Making of a General: Ike, the Tank, and the Interwar Years

Problems in Tank Production, 17 March 1948, The Industrial College of 
The Armed Forces, Washington DC.


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## a_majoor (14 Jan 2006)

Speaking in more general terms again, technology's impact in war is often overstated.

From a technological perspective, the tanks the Frech Army fielded in 1940 were much better than most German designs (better guns and protection), and the French had more tanks as well. The French Air Force was fielding a new generation of airplanes which were generally equal or superior to their German counterparts, and most other French equipment was of comparable quality. The Germans used what they had _differently_ from the French, and the organizational and tactical differences were driven by German doctrine. The end result was a humiliating defeat for the French.

Rushing new technology into battle does NOT turn the tide in most cases. The French created perhaps the first practical machine gun prior to the Franco Prussian war, yet lost; the Confederate Navy introduced ironclads and submarines with some success late in the Civil War, but were unable to break the Union blocade. The incredible German armour, infantry weapons, jet aircraft and rocket powered missiles did not turn the tide for Germany in 1945, despite the theoretical advantages they could offer. A German infantryman with a MP-44 had a vast increase in the amount of firepower compared to a Commonwealth soldier with a Lee Enfield (or rifle armed soldiers from any Allied nation), but in the end, the logistics chain could not produce enough of these and other weapons to make a difference, and in any case, there was no true doctrine to take advantage of the possibilities "wonder weapons" offered. (The same fate was probably in store for US or British forces if they rushed the M-26 or Centurion into battle in large numbers in 1944)

Most of the late WW II technological innovations were finally integrated in doctrinal and logistical terms in the 1960s (Conflicts like the Suez Crisis, Korea, French Indo-China war etc. often serving as proving grounds for integrating various aspects of new technology). Even today, lessons learned take some time to be incorporated, just think of the percentage of "smart" weapons used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War compared to OIF. (Then consider "smart" bombs were introduced in the late 1960s near the climax of the American phase of the Viet Nam war).


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jan 2006)

Looking at US Doctrine and inter-branch battles, the US Tank Corps was established in 1918 but abolished in 1920.  The Secretary of War (a civilian) wanted a Tank Corps, but General Pershing recommended that tanks be a a part of the infantry.  "Tanks should be recognized as infantry supporting adn accompanying weapons and be organized for association with and combat as part of an infantry command."  Pershing's influence is cited by the Rand study as part of the reason for the abolishment of the Tank Corps (ironic name for the M26 eh?).

Tanks were assigned to the infantry for the next twenty years and apart from some experimental units (Eisenhower and Patton among the participants) not very much was done.  Again, the Rand study attributes this to a fear within the traditional army of the emergence of another independent arm like the air arm.  The role of the tank was to aid the infantry.  There were also anti-military sentiments that did not want a powerful strike force in peacetime.  Costs were also cited as well.  Thus, while the US was an advanced industrial nation this power was not harnessed for tanks due to doctrinal reasons as well, perhaps, as a lack of perceived threat.  

I believe that the M3 "Grant" was always seen as an interim design, as the M4 was itself being designed before the M3 went into production.  The M3 brought the first "dual purpose" tank gun into the Western allies forces which were desperately needed in the desert battles.

I've been thinking on the "urgency of the perceived threat" factor.   I think that his might drive the other two (doctrine and economic/technology) to some degree.  The perceived threat will focus doctrinal efforts and give resources (R&D among them).  A couple of soldiers in an amry might have some great doctrinal ideas, but if the perceived threat is low then the higher level won't be too interested in new doctrine/ideas.

If the threat is perceived in peacetime then you will probably have a higher chance of effective doctrine (and debate), adequate resources and good equipment as a result.  The quality and quantity debate might even give you good numbers of good kit, since you have some time to improve designs and build more.  If the urgency is felt, however, as war starts then it may be a little too late.  The needs of the "now" can trump future needs and there can be a tendency to go with what you have.  The US situation in 1942 had some of these characteristics.  The Allies needed tanks right then and there, both the fight the battles in the desert and build up armies.  This urgency may have led to decisions to emphasize quantity over quality.

French tanks were interesting in that while they had good guns and armour they had one man turrets.  They also had relatively uninspired doctrine that saw tanks as adjuncts to the infantry.

The M1 was conceived and built during a time of peace but also during a time of high perceived threat.  As a result, the US Army found itself with an outstanding tank in relatively large numbers.  Differences in tank technology certainly meant a lot to Iraqi tankers who faced M1s in both wars.

Going back to technology, success for an army is probably based on several factors.  Numbers, relative quality of equipment(technology) , morale, training, doctrine and leadership all have a dynamic influence when comparing two armies about to clash.  Deficiencies in some can be made up in superiority in others.  I'm not sure if I'd "weight" any of the factors.  I'm tempted to give a little more weight to quality of equipment and morale, but I'm sure that others would want numbers and leadership.  Perhaps leadership and morale should be combined.

Cheers,

2B


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