# SORD 05-06



## Matt_Fisher (7 Jul 2004)

Anybody read this report or its abridged version on the Maple Laugh?

Army, Maple Leaf, 07 July 2004, Vol. 7 No. 25

Armée, La feuille d'érable, Le 07 juillet 2004, Vol. 7 No. 25

Army Transformation to begin affectingmore units, branches
By Paul Mooney 

Army Transformation will affect an increasing number of soldiers and units over the next two years as the medium-weight, knowledge-based force takes shape. 

Defence and international policy reviews are underway and the Army continues to experience funding pressures. Senior commanders say, however, that the Army is moving in the right direction and transformation must continue. 

Colonel Mike Kampman, Director of Land Strategic Planning, said recently that the senior leadership of the Army recognizes that change is difficult, disruptive and causes uncertainty. 

â Å“But this is absolutely essential,â ? he said. â Å“It is being done for the future relevance and capability of the Army. So everything that has been introduced in the last year and a bitâ â€in terms of movement of vehicles and so onâ â€is about to become bigger. The Transformation agenda will expand to include more and more parts of the Armyâ â€more branches and more units will be affected.â ? 

Plans for Fiscal Year 05-06 and beyond are contained in the annual Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD) released in late May. (See below). The SORD is the first step in a process which sets out the Army's operations and spending plans. Area commanders and their staffs are now being consulted about the plan and their input will help shape the final draft of the directives, which will be issued in December. While the SORD may be modified after the consultations with Area Commanders, it represents the overall intent of the Army's senior leadership.

Soldiers will begin to see more of the ways transformation will affect units next year. For example, plans include the creation of a single Long-Range Anti-Armour Weapon company (LAV TOW Under Armour) within the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), manned by personnel from Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry battalions. In FY 06-07, they will be joined by air defence soldiers as ADATS (later MMEV) becomes part of the Army's medium-range direct fire â Å“System of systemsâ ?. Armour soldiers from LdSH (RC) will man the planned Mobile Gun System, the third platform in the direct fire system, when that vehicle is integrated into the field force. Soldiers from branches that have not normally served together will be working together in the same unit with new, powerful capabilityâ â€the real face of Army Transformation. 

Col Kampman explained that the elimination of mortar and pioneer platoons was done in order to base the force generation of those capabilities in branches where those skills were part of their core business, as well as to reallocate resources to new capability. That transformation is continuing with the concentration of the long-range anti-armour capability, the TOW capability, in Western Canada. 

â Å“That means the anti-armour platoons in Infantry battalions are about to disappear,â ? he said. â Å“It is not, however, a net loss to the infantry. We're taking all of those people and resources and reinvesting them back in the rifle companiesâ â€we're reinforcing the rifle companies.â ? 

Col Kampman said he knows people are impatient for orders and want to get on with it. But it will take time to work through some of the complex planning involved and do it right.â Å“

A lot of the detail about many of the changes will be coming out in directives over the coming months,â ? he said. â Å“Up to now we've been dealing a lot with the infantry and armour. Now we're about to really tackle the artillery and engineer branches. The other one that is looming is the Army Support Review and its impact on the logistics and EME branches.â ?

SORD 05-06 

The 2005-2006 Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD), was released at the end of May. The commander is now consulting the areacommanders and their staffs; a final plan will be drafted later this year to include their input. The SORD includes:

Combat Capability 

The development of the Medium Direct Fire System of systems will continue with the concentration of medium direct fire platforms in the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), (LdSH(RC))including: 

The creation of a single Long Range Anti-Armour Weapon (LRAAW) company (LAV Tow Under Armour) within the LdSH(RC) structure manned by personnel from Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry battalions. 

The elimination of anti-armour platoons in the infantry battalions with personnel not required to establish the LRAAW company being reinvested back into the rifle companies. 

The reassignment of select positions in the LdSH(RC) RHQ from armour to infantry and artillery in order to establish the appropriate combination of direct fire expertise in the C2 structure. 

The planning for the integration of an ADATS (later MMEV) battery into the LdSH(RC) structure with implementation expected to begin in FY 06-07.

Reconnaissance-Surveillance. As components of the ISTAR system, RECCE and surveillance structures will evolve, including:

The elimination of the assault troops in the three Regular Force armoured regiments. 

The conversion of the LdSH(RC) RECCE squadron to the same Transitional Surveillance Squadron structure as the Coyote squadrons in RCD and 12 RBC. 

The development of new structures for Coyote squadrons in accordance with the evolution of the ISTAR capability.

The completion of the conversion of Regular Force infantry RECCE platoons from Coyote to LUVW (C&R). 

The completion of the conversion of Reserve Armoured Corps units to LUVW (C&R) to include the removal of AVGP Cougar from service. 

The establishment of a tactical unmanned air vehicule (Spewer) sub-unit. 

Ground-based Air Defence. The transformation of GBAD will progress pending ministerial approval and DND direction, including:

The removal of 35mm gun/Skyguard from service. 

The removal of Javelin MANPADS from service and the assignment of Reserve air defence elements to new roles based on LFRR planning and consultation. 

The continuation of ADATS involvement in direct fire system of systems trials, slated for this fall, with the expectation of implementation of ADATS integration into the direct fire unit commencing in FY 06-07. 

Indirect Fire. The transformation of the indirect fire capability will continue in FY 05-06, including: 

The elimination of the last mortar platoon structure in the Infantry with complete responsibility for mortar force generation transferred to the artillery. 

The completion of the artillery branch restructure plan, including the development of structures for target acquisition, observation, fire support co-ordination and close support, with select implementation in FY 05-06 and the expectation of full implementation in FY 06-07. 

Engineer Capabilities. The transformation of Engineer capabilities in 05-06 will include: 

The establishment of a single Armoured Engineer Squadron in 1 CER with the concentration of all AEVs and AVLBs. 

The completion of plans for intimate and close support capability force generation, with an expectation of restructure implementation starting in FY 06-07. 

The completion of plans for general support capability force generation. 

Command Support. The development of Command Support in 05-06 will include: 

The completion of plans for Command Support capability force generation with select implementation of 05-06 and full implementation starting in 06-07. 

Combat Service Support. Combat Service Support transformation in 05-06 will include: 

The completion of restructure planning resulting from the Army Support Review with select implementation in 05-06 and the expectation of full implementation in 06-07. 

Institutional Capability

The Army will continue to develop and improve institutional capability including:

Further development of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), the Army's state-of-the art training facility at Wainwright, Alta

The evolution of LFC Command and Control. 

The Army Support Review will lead to select implementation of improvements to Garrison Support with the expectation of full implementationin 06-07.

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Seems kinda interesting in regard to moving all the different MOC's around.  Gotta wonder if TOW will be retasked to armour as mortars and pioneers were to infantry?

The same goes with armoured reserves all being recce. now and the only reg. force units using LUVW for recce. are the Reg. Force Infantry.  Replace the black beret with a green one for the reserve armoured units?


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## JasonH (7 Jul 2004)

Interesting read, but shouldn't this go under "News" ?


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## Matt_Fisher (7 Jul 2004)

My apologies if this should have been posted in the News forum.  If the moderator so wishes, please move this topic.

The more I read this the more my eyebrows get raised.  This plan seems more like a Liberal inspired "shell game" of moving troops around while reducing the force and expenditures and capabilities.

TOWS to LdSH (RC).  I can see how having an anti-armour capability may improve the capabilities here, but what's going to provide anti-armour support for the infantry units?  Also, if I'm doing my math correctly, each infantry battalion is supposed to have a TOW platoon.  9 infantry battalions should equal approximately 9 TOW platoons.  What's happening with the 5-6 other TOW platoons that are not going to the Strathconas?   What will happen when 2 or 5 brigade units deploy?  Will the Strathconas be expected to constantly chopping a TOW platoon for battlegroup deployments?  Talk about crazy optempo for the TOW gunners. If that's the case, then why not keep the TOWS where they are or if it's considered more applicable to have them in the armoured corps, move the TOWS to the respective brigade's armoured regiment.

The "reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies"  seems to be another case of DND robbing Peter to pay Paul to make up for personnel shortages that are not being addressed in a meaningful way.  Improve and streamline the recruiting process and invest more resources into the training establishment to ensure that the CFs have the soldiers/sailors/airmen necessary to do the job tasked with.

As far as the reserve armoured units losing the Cougar, does anyone know if the order of LUVW (C&R) variants will be increased, or will units be expected to pool equipment?

If the Javelin is removed, what will the CFs use for short-range air defence?  The same with the Skyguard?  While it may not seem likely that the CFs will encounter a situation where Allied air supremecy is challenged, the threat of UAVs has greatly increased over the last decade.  

It just seems that while the CFs are tyring to modernise and become a force more suited to network-centric warfare and is moving away from the 4CMBG fighting against the Sovet 8th Shock Army in Germany, the manner in which they're doing it is limiting their capabilities even more by reducing capabilities such as TOW, mortars, and pioneers.  The units that they're making these roles responsible for are not receiving additional resources.  The CERs haven't received an additional Squadron/Company for the pioneer taskings.  The Artillery hasn't received additional batteries for the mortars, and we're reducing our TOW platoons from 9 to 3 or 4?

I'm not a big opponent of the rationale of putting these jobs where it seems better suited to their core business (Engineers/Pioneers and Mortars/Artillery and TOWS/Armour), but the reduction of the troops needed to do the jobs is disgusting.


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## McG (8 Jul 2004)

The Army is considering only producing 33 LAV TUA.  We currently have about 73 M113 TUA.  It is expected that the rifle companies will get a MRAAW to make up for this change.


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## Matt_Fisher (8 Jul 2004)

Any idea on the MRAAW will come into service and what the procurement state is?

This is again one of these "never neverland" projects that NDHQ is muttering quietly about in terms of future capabilities, but little is being done to actually bring it into service.

From what I've heard the most likely candidates are the US Javelin and the Israeli Gill-Spike, but that's just conjecture and nothing official  

MRAAW is not even showing up on the radar screen on the Defence Planning & Management's procurement site.

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/annex/ct04_e.asp

It seems that for the next 5-10 years that the infantry will not have any anti-armour capability other than Eryx and Carl Gustav if the TOW platoons are removed.


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## MJP (8 Jul 2004)

> reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies


Gotta love that... take away assets from battalion, turn them into brigade assets that may or may not always be there for a Bn CO to call on and call the reintroduction of the soldiers that use to be in combat support "reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies".      




> From what I've heard the most likely candidates are the US Javelin and the Israeli Gill-Spike, but that's just conjecture and nothing official


Those are the only two of heard that seem to be in the running.   We'll see like you said if they plan on giving it to us anytime in the next few years.


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## devil39 (8 Jul 2004)

My understanding of the reinforcing of the Rifle Coy issue is that the LAV and Light bn rifle coys are well understrength.   Orbats have not evolved at the same rate as equipment and tactics and thus there is a significant delta between current orbats and the desired orbats.

These people (or PYs) have to come from somewhere unless the CF is authorized an expansion of its current numbers.   PYs have been taken in part from the infantry in the past to create CMTC and the command and support bns if I am not mistaken (from Pnr and Mors I believe).   At least this time we may see some of the PYs coming back to the infantry.

A Lav coy should have in the neighbourhood of 155 all ranks vice the current 125ish.

A light coy is gearing towards the 140ish range vice the current 107-121 range.

I will trade the Bn level TOW platoons for larger rifle coys equipped with US Javelin or Spike/Gill any day.


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## Matt_Fisher (8 Jul 2004)

Devil, while I agree that right now pers. may be better used in rifle companies, the places from which they're grabbed is setting a bad precedent, and we've got to remember that MRAAW (Gill-Spike/Javelin) are years away from acquisition and fielding.

Expanding the strength of the CFs is not the issue here.  The Forces are well under their authorised strength now.

What I'd like to see is how the forces plan to increase the efficiency of the recruiting training processes to fill the gaps that exist now.


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## MJP (9 Jul 2004)

Yea what Matt said..... 

While greater numbers in any the rifle coy is great, the ability for that Coy to have attachments that will enhance its capabilities(TUA, Pioneers, Mortars) is slim considering they are all either gone or brigade assets.  There is even scuttlebutt of the sniper cells becoming brigade assets.  

Overall for what it's worth it may work out and when a Bn/Coy/Pl needs support it will get it.  But whats happens at brigade level if tasks outstrip assets.  Choices will have to be made and assets doled out leaving someone short.  Before at the Bn level a CO could have some indirect(81mm mortar), direct(TUA for tank/bunkers) fire capabilities, to protect his troops till the armoured/arty was available he now has nothing in his hip pocket.



> I will trade the Bn level TOW platoons for larger rifle coys equipped with US Javelin or Spike/Gill any day


Except we don't have them and won't anytime soon.  No one can tell me that 60mm mortars are great for indirect fire.  They serve the purpose but the bipods themselves are old and starting to go and the rounds themselves don't pack the punch a 81 would.  Not to mention that with the loss of the advance mortar course, the ability to properly and safely use these weapons in the indirect role is deteriorating.


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## devil39 (9 Jul 2004)

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> Devil, while I agree that right now pers. may be better used in rifle companies, the places from which they're grabbed is setting a bad precedent, and we've got to remember that MRAAW (Gill-Spike/Javelin) are years away from acquisition and fielding.
> 
> Expanding the strength of the CFs is not the issue here.   The Forces are well under their authorised strength now.
> 
> What I'd like to see is how the forces plan to increase the efficiency of the recruiting training processes to fill the gaps that exist now.



Matt, this however is not an issue about recruiting.   The current authorized strength of these rifle coys has nothing to do with how we are recruiting or how we are processing the recruits.   This is the PML( preferred manning list?), this is the allowable manning level.   In order to put more troops in a rifle coy, we have to steal the people from somewhere else.   Any time we start up a new organization we have to take the people (PYs or Person Years) from somewhere, and this has to be at the expense of an existing unit unless the CF is allowed to increase its manning level to accommodate for this new organization.   

This is why we have lost Mortars, Pnrs and now TOW.   Mortars and Pnrs were by some considered somewhat of a duplication of effort, tasks that could be carried out by Arty and Engrs respectively.   We know this is not exactly true, however it is a workable solution in the meantime.   The PYs are freed up to be applied to whatever is the priority   

These PYs go to setting up CMTC, Comd and Sp bn orgs, etc.   And now we may see some PYs come back to the infantry to increase the authorized manning levels of the rifle coys.   This is not something that we can do on our own unless we wish to reduce to zero strength one of the rifle coys in each Bn.   

Right now a LAV coy of 125ish is all we are authorized.   When we dip underneath that by any significant margin this is a problem of the training system.   To be truly effective 125 man LAV coys is not going to cut it.   I believe this is well understood at the higher levels of the Army.

I think if we really needed US Javelin or Spike/Gill (ie a shooting war with enemy tanks present) we could get them rather quickly.   In my opinion TOW is junk compared to the capability and man portability of the newer generation of anti tank wpns such as Javelin or Gill.   Once we get Javelin/Spike-Gill, the TOW should go the way of the Dodo unless they come up with a 8km, wireless and fire and forget version of Tow compatible with the existing launchers.


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## McG (9 Jul 2004)

As I understand it, the decision to reduce to 33 TUA will be dependant on the decision to acquire a MRAAW (and not just in hopes of a decision to acquire MRAAW).   So it may be a while before anything is set in stone.

The way the Army looks at this is that it has 77 TUA, but at any given time (over the last decade) it only has up to 4 crews deployed on Ops.   This identifies the TUA crews as being a resource that can be reduced to achieve better PY efficiency.   If the government ever wants to deploy full brigades, this decision will come to haunt us.   If we continue on with only one battle group deployed at a time, we might get by.

BTW: Have any Comd Sp Bn actually been established?


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## MJP (9 Jul 2004)

> Right now a LAV coy of 125ish is all we are authorized.  When we dip underneath that by any significant margin this is a problem of the training system.  To be truly effective 125 man LAV coys is not going to cut it.  I believe this is well understood at the higher levels of the Army.



Not to hijack the thread but where do they plan on putting the extra twenty five people or so for a LAV Coy?  The only truly understrenght part of a LAV Pl is it's weapons det, which really only consists of 2 men, including the commander.  So we add two more people to it and we now have four full LAVs with ten men in each including crews.  That accounts for 6 of the twenty five so we (theoretically) have 19 more bodies to be put in spots.  When we get MRAAW I can see some of these 19 fulfilling roles using this weapons system like a mini AT unit within the Coy(or at least a Coy WPNs det), But where do they ride? The Coy CP variants don't have space for them or are they planning on adding more LAVs to a Coy?


Has anyone read this article?  I thought is was well done for a HS student and presents a slightly different look at reorganization.
http://www.ccs21.org/articles/mar04/Proposed%20Force%20Structure.pdf


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## McG (9 Jul 2004)

Maybe it will be one more guy in every rifle section?


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## MJP (9 Jul 2004)

No room each Mech section has ten pers;
1 Sect Comd
1 Sect 2IC(second in command)
1 LAV driver
1 LAV gunner
2 C9 gunners
4 C7 rifleman

Pl HQ
1 Pl Comd
1 Pl WO
1 Lav Sgt
1 Pl Signaller
1 Wpns Det Comd
1 C6 gunner
1 Lav Gunner
1 Lav Driver=
room for two more people.



Now we all know that more people can fit into any vehicle, I'm sure anyone with any sort of TI has seen M113s and AVGPs packed full of troops.  But the safety aspect of some training now a days it's getting harder to get waivers to put one or two extra troops in the back of a LAV(let along safety staff for live fires).


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## McG (9 Jul 2004)

MJP said:
			
		

> Now we all know that more people can fit into any vehicle, I'm sure anyone with any sort of TI has seen M113s and AVGPs packed full of troops.  But the safety aspect of some training now a days it's getting harder to get waivers to put one or two extra troops in the back of a LAV(let along safety staff for live fires).


Most of my LAV experience has been in the turret, but I've known the sardine feeling in the back of a 113 on a few occasions.  I can't help but think we are putting fewer people into the back of a much roomier vehicle.

Ah, well . . . just thinking aloud.


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## The_Falcon (9 Jul 2004)

I read this too on the DND site, what struck as rather odd (I am surprised it was not mentioned yet) was while the TUA was being moved to LdSH(RC) the troops using them would be taken from the PPCLI (1/2/3).  I find this rather perplexing, they are taking TUA away from the Infantry regiments, giving it to an armour regiment but manning it with some of the very same soldiers from an Infantry regiment that just lost the capability. ??? Am I the only one completely baffelled by this? It reminds of the scam were a conman asks for change for a $20 bill and winds up swindling the owner to the tune of $40. Guess who we are in this game.


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## McG (9 Jul 2004)

The Armoured do not have soldiers that are trained & experienced on the TUA.  It makes sense that infantry soldiers man the TUA Coy (or would it be Sqn?) and gradually be replaced by armoured soldiers.

A lot of soldiers recommend using armoured to crew the LAV III.  If we did go to an Army in which the infantry did not fight thier own vehicles, would it still make sense for the infantry crew TUA?  (However, I always thought armoured soldiers would be posted in to infantry battalions)


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## The_Falcon (9 Jul 2004)

I acknowledge the fact that armour soldiers may not be trained on TUA, but would it make a little more sense to train them first, then send them the TUA vehicles.  Rather than the infantry battalions losing firepower and manpower at the same time


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## McG (9 Jul 2004)

It would take a few years for the corporate knowledge to be passed.  Not going through a period of "mixed" crews would result in corporate knowledge being lost.

But, I don't know if it is planned that the armoured will eventually crew TUA.


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## Troopasaurus (9 Jul 2004)

Just a little note about the javelin, the US Army Technology has this quote on their site. 
"In September 2003, Canada requested the Foreign Military Sale of 200 launchers and 840 missiles."

so maybe they might be in service sooner than expected?
( http://www.army-technology.com/projects/javelin/ )


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## Lance Wiebe (9 Jul 2004)

There is nothing good in this shell game.  Nothing at all.

The ugly truth is that the Infantry Battalions simply ran our of people. There was no way to keep nine Battalions fully manned in their rifle companies, plus have their AT and Mortar and Pioneer platoons. Something had to change, so instead of giving the Infantry the numbers of personnel they needed, they simply cut positions.  

In my opinion, removing the mortars, especially, was criminal insanity.

Mortars that belong to the Infantry Battalion are mortars that are in DIRECT support of the battalion, and the Battalion commander makes his plans accordingly, siting the mortars where they will best support his mission. Artillery assets are a Brigade/Division/Corps asset, and while at one time or another MAY be placed in direct support, they, at other times MAY NOT be in direct support. How is a Battalion commander supposed to rely on something he may or may not have? The other issue is speed. The Battalion, and Company commanders and even platoons and sections can call in fire missions to the mortar platoon, knowing that they will have round on the ground very quickly. Not too upset the gunners too much, but ever call in a Artillery fire mission? How long before effective fire was in place?

The bottom line is that every single thing on the battlefield is there for one purpose, and that is to support the Infantry. That includes armour, air support, artillery, you name it. When a Battalion commander screams for fire support, and can't get it because the Artillery are changing locations, or are supporting someone else at the time, well, I can understand him being upset.

Aside from all that, the Artillery can't even man every position they have, and they got more shoved on to them.

Another thing, why are we getting out of the air defense game? ADATS role being changed, and new ammunitions being provided for direct fire support and NLOS, Javelins trashed, 35mm trashed, are we now counting on the CF-18's to protect all of us now? What is going on? 

It seems to me to be another way to cut capabilities, numbers and expense at the pointy end, so the fat end can enjoy themselves more.


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## Brad Sallows (9 Jul 2004)

Taking the resources out of the battalions is its own issue, but you're selling short the flexibility of artillery if you think all the guns in a brigade would be on the move at the same time, incapable of delivering timely fire, or incapable of reaching everywhere they need to in a brigade's AOR.

If we lose the "plug-n-play" concept, fail to conduct all-arms training events at least at the battle group level, or the capabilities quietly disappear after being shuffled to other arms due to parochialism or budget shaving, then it is indeed a poor shell game.  Otherwise, we should expect to increase flexibility within our shortfall of resources.  Better to have one full sub-unit in the "ready" phase of ATOF at all times than six or nine or twelve half-manned platoons scattered around the map.  The concept should be evaluated critically independently of whether we make a balls-up (or not) of the implementation.

There are two concerns to address:

1) We set out to deploy a brigade group.  (How likely is that?)

2) We set out to deploy a battle group.  Does it matter if the battle group has an integral mortar platoon, or a battery of mortars/guns courtesy of the artillery branch (or a field engineer troop vice pioneer platoon, etc)?


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## Lance Wiebe (9 Jul 2004)

Well, no, I'm not selling the Artillery short.  I'm being realistic.  The Gunners have to prioritise the targets, what is of concern to the platoon commander may not be of a high enough priority for the Artillery to switch targets, or to stop a battery on the move to provide fire.  I have quite a bit of respect for the mud gunners, but it is still a slow process to unlimber and get ready to fire a battery mission.  Mortars in the Battalion will always be quicker to lay down fire.

But what about the other point?

Exactly just how many mortar platoons do the Artillery have manned?

Exactly.  That's why it's a shell game.  Give all indirect fire support to the Artillery, but don't give them any extra warm bodies to fulfill that role.

And the Infantry Battalions are still woefully undermanned.


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## Brad Sallows (9 Jul 2004)

You can niggle the "what if it's not there" question to death.  What if the battalion mortars are already fully engaged on behalf of another platoon? (etc).

I didn't know the artillery habitually moved everything at once.

If the artillery can't provide a mortar battery, but could provide a battery of 105s instead as part of the battle group (ie. under the battle group commander), would that be good enough?


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## devil39 (9 Jul 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> Well, no, I'm not selling the Artillery short.   I'm being realistic.   The Gunners have to prioritise the targets, what is of concern to the platoon commander may not be of a high enough priority for the Artillery to switch targets, or to stop a battery on the move to provide fire.   I have quite a bit of respect for the mud gunners, but it is still a slow process to unlimber and get ready to fire a battery mission.   Mortars in the Battalion will always be quicker to lay down fire.
> 
> But what about the other point?
> 
> ...





As an infantryman, I know we are undermanned.   But there are many conflicting priorities across the Army and the CF.   

As an ex-R021 Artilleryman and an Adv Mortarman, I know the Gunners can man the mortars when required on short notice, and I know I can trust them.   I think they might even start responding to "Cranks" left/right, and up/down from an observer in relation to the line GT.   

A Gunner Mor Pl deployed on APOLLO and did a great job.   What we really miss is the MFC party along with the FOO party at the Coy level.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

What it means is that if we ever get into the shit hardcore, Infantry soldiers will die as a result of not having the ability of close fire support (mortars), close anti Armour support (TOW), and close engineering support (Pioneers).   Although there is some duplication of abilities it is integral to the Inf BN to have these assists at there immediate disposal so as not to rely on Brigade and Division for said assets.   Sure these new units may not be all deployed at the same time but what if they were.   Why should I suffer stuck in a minefield waiting for the engineers to come later then sooner when a perfectly good pioneer det is up close and personal with the BN?   If there are no jobs for the artillery and armored (there by giving them infantry assets to prove their existence), then they might as well combine the 4 cmbt arms into one force that eat, sleep and work together at the same base in the same barracks etc.   Abolish the differences and have one fighting force.   We all go on ex together, share the same messes and begin a new history.   No more colours, no more battle honors etc.   Stripping the Inf Bn's of there close support is no answer.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> What it means is that if we ever get into the crap hardcore, Infantry soldiers will die as a result of not having the ability of close fire support (mortars), close anti armour support (TOW), and close engineering support (Pioneers).   Although there is some duplication of abilities it is integral to the Inf BN to have these assests at there immediate disposal so as not to rely on Brigade and Division for said assets.   Sure these new units may not be all deployed at the same time but what if they were.   Why should I suffer stuck in a minefield whating for the engineers to come later then sooner when a perfectly good pioneer det is up close and personal with the BN?   If there are no jobs for the artillery and armoured (there by giving them infantry assets to prove their existnece), then they might as well combine the 4 cmbt arms into one force that eat, sleep and work together at the same base in the same barracks etc.   Abolsih the differences and have one fighting force.   We all go on ex together, share the same messes and begin a new history.   No more colours, no more battle honours etc.   Stripping the Inf Bn's of there close support is no answer.



Wrong CFL.   The mortars will be there, it is just that they will be manned by 021 vice 031.   They will be a BG asset not a Bde asset, just like APOLLO.   

TOW.   Give me US Javelin/Spike/Gill and you can garbage the wire guided, obsolete TOW missile.

Pnrs.   Give me a section of Engrs at the Coy level (been done before on real Ops) and the Coy is as well taken care of as with Pnrs.

The close support is still there, it is just not manned by O31, or in the case of TOW it is being replaced by a far more capable system, and with far more   systems.

I agree that the current system is not ideal, but we are not at risk deploying at the Bn /BG level.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

The point I think your missing is that although the assists will be there, the deployment of said assets will potentially take sufficiently longer then having the assists at your immediate disposal.   This delay will no doubt cause major problems.   Its not as if the engineers, artillery, and armored are up-ing their ranks and equipment.   Therefore they may not be where the Infantry need them which is up front with them.   The mortars in Afghanistan were manned by 031.   The TOW system is obsolete and a man packable as well as vehicle mounted laser guided system would be great, however time and money does and will always be a major factor.   I don't believe we should plan for best case scenario, and having the aforementioned assists at the BN level I strongly feel is integral to the unit running as efficiently as possible.

Also on the rumor radar is that 031 Recce will go the way of the Dodo and the Armored will pick that up as well.   (I don't mean the coyotes either).


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> The point I think your missing is that although the assists will be there, the deployment of said assets will potentially take sufficiently longer then having the assists at your immediate disposal.   This delay will no doubt cause major problems.   Its not as if the engineers, artillery, and armored are up-ing their ranks and equipment.   Therefore they may not be where the Infantry need them which is up front with them.   The mortars in Afghanistan were manned by 031.   The TOW system is obsolete and a man packable as well as vehicle mounted laser guided system would be great, however time and money does and will always be a major factor.   I don't believe we should plan for best case scenario, and having the aforementioned assists at the BN level I strongly feel is integral to the unit running as efficiently as possible.
> 
> Also on the rumor radar is that 031 Recce will go the way of the Dodo and the Armored will pick that up as well.   (I don't mean the coyotes either).



The assets should (and will) be integral to the BG.   There will be no delay when they are an Inf Bn Comd's asset, any more that if they were integral Mor or Pnr Pls.

Any Gunners wish to comment on who manned mortars on APOLLO (less the Pl Comd and WO)?

I do not believe the Infantry will ever lose close Recce.   It is not an Armoured skill set.   It is reasonable that the infantry lose Coyote though.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Well I hope your right about the assests being there when we need them but that is a pretty strong belief in what we have and how its deployed.  I think we as a military esp. Cmbt arms need to think along the lines of worst case.  I would prefer not to rely on other units for my well being if I don't need too.  Whoever thought up this idea of taking these assets away from the BN ought to be neutered.  The units had them for a reason.  As far as the mortars being manned by 031 in Afganistan, I know one of the guys went over to cmnd one of the 81 tubes.


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## MJP (10 Jul 2004)

The Arty manned the mortars on Apollo, 1VP was suppose to send their Mortar Pl but were stood down.  The guy you are talking about CFL, was he advanced mortar qualified?  If so that's probably the reason he went, to fill a position the arty might not have been able to fulfill at that time?  Anyone know?


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Yeah he was advanced qualified.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Well I hope your right about the assests being there when we need them but that is a pretty strong belief in what we have and how its deployed.   I think we as a military esp. Cmbt arms need to think along the lines of worst case.   I would prefer not to rely on other units for my well being if I don't need too.   Whoever thought up this idea of taking these assets away from the BN ought to be neutered.   The units had them for a reason.   As far as the mortars being manned by 031 in Afganistan, I know one of the guys went over to cmnd one of the 81 tubes.



We will have a command relationship at Bn/BG level that will ensure the support will be there for us.   It cannot work any other way.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

So your saying that if all the TOW assists are on the left flank of an asymmetrical battlefield and I'm far off on the right that they will magically appear.  You never know what can happen.  Bad roads, rail delays, ship sinking with all the kit.  No one can 100 % say that the support will be there when we need it.  The battle field is 360 degrees and lightning quick.  There is NO WAY anyone can guarantee anything once the shit hits the fan so I would prefer to have the assets at the disposal of the CO and not some general who may feel they are better deployed else where.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

There are a lot of things that the army needs.   New pistols (perferably the same kind across all branches).   New NVG's, new anti armor cabablities, new light/medium vehicle lift.   Lighter Karl G.   Gortex rainsuits (yeah I know the JTF and airforce have them).   More troops (of better calibre).   Airlift (both fixed wing and work horse helicopter), sea lift etc.   A change in tactics.   We all know this, its not new but I'm in rant mode.  I've got no problem inforcing the will of our gov't but give me all the tools possible to achieve the goals put out for us .


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> So your saying that if all the TOW assists are on the left flank of an asymmetrical battlefield and I'm far off on the right that they will magically appear.   You never know what can happen.   Bad roads, rail delays, ship sinking with all the kit.   No one can 100 % say that the support will be there when we need it.   The battle field is 360 degrees and lightning quick.   There is NO WAY anyone can guarantee anything once the crap hits the fan so I would prefer to have the assets at the disposal of the CO and not some general who may feel they are better deployed else where.



Nope.   

With TOW I'm saying we should have a system soon that will be 5 times as man portable, 5 times as user friendly, and at least twice as effective, with an equivalent range.   And it will be embedded in the Infantry Coy, not just a couple in overwatch.   

Mors and Engrs will likely be at the disposal of the CO.   The new TOW Coy may or may not.   It is quite conceivable that a Pl of the new TOW Coy would be cut to the Inf CO to do with as he sees fit, or it may come with some limitations in the Command relationship.   That is for the CO to discuss with the Bde Comd.   It happens all the time with other assets.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Well the anti armor units you speak of are well into the future (you know us we have to trial everything even if it has been war tested).  Your optimism is great with regard to having assists at the CO's disposal but I don't.  The only way this will be remedied is when good men die because of a lack of support.  On a smaller scale your explanation is great on paper but in a BN for example they propose a grandiose thing like having pioneers intermixed within the coy but will train on occasion and stood up for Ex but it never happens as people are away on tasking etc.  Great on paper not conceivable in reality.  Time will tell and I hope you are right.  Here is a recent history lesson.  Somalia -read Black Hawk down.  If the Rangers had immediate armored support there probably wouldn't have been the same trouble.  They didn't and had to call back.  Granted the situation is different but I think still relevant.


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## Lance Wiebe (10 Jul 2004)

Part of the problem that seems to be getting overlooked is the numbers.  

The LdSh are the only armour unit presently committed to receiving TOQ and ADATS.  The other armour units will not be receiving them under the present plans.  What this means, that instead of a TOW platoon in a deployed BG, you will have a TOW section.  For armour, presently it is planned to send two of the MGS (when and if we get them), and if the risk warrants, one ADATS.  The LdSH are, under current plans, to deploy some people with every single BG that deploys.  No, this is not BS or rumour, check out the plans.  The Straths are the only unit scheduled to receive the MGS.  Period.

The RCD and the 12 RBC will remain recce only, and will not be equipped with MGS, TOW or ADATS.  And what all this means is that on every single deployment, elements of tow seperate armour units will be with the BG, albeit with different tasks.

For those optomistic enough to believe in the new plans, that's a good thing.  One should believe in the wisdom of those placed in positions of command, right?

For those that will miss the capability of having a TOW and mortar and pioneer platoon, well, what more can I say?  The new plan sux, and it is the soldiers once again getting it.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

just so I'm on the same page here, does what your saying mean that if the RCR or R22nd need TOW, they will be Patricia's coming out of the LFWA woth there TUA's?


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Oh and nobody has yet to explain to me why this new change in policy which does greatly to neuter the effectivness of the Infantry.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Oh and nobody has yet to explain to me why this new change in policy which does greatly to neuter the effectivness of the Infantry.



Read my earlier posts on PYs etc.   There are only so many people allowed in the CF.   As we create new organizations the people have to come from somewhere.   We can survive with Mortars manned by Gunners and Engineer sections attached to Rifle Coys vice Pioneers.

As far as being "neutered" or left without support, see the link below.   Chapter 4, Annex A, Table 4A.1 Command Relationships.     It comes down to assigning and tasking of elements and comd relationships.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/300-003/B-GL-300-003/FP-000/B-GL-300-003-FP-000.pdf


The infantry is not going to be sent out on the battlefield without appropriate support.   Talk to some people who were on recent operations wrt to Mor and Pnr support.   

Again this is not the ideal solution from the infantry point of view, however it will work.   

We must be diligent at the higher levels in the development of orbats for operations.   We must be diligent in our marry up drills and get to know our supporting arms comds (Arty, Engr, Armd), advisors and soldiers.   These are extremely professional people who will invariably go the extra distance to ensure the infantry are not left in the lurch.   Read the Comd relationship matrix and note that when they are cut to us, they are our asset, to do with as we see fit dependent on the limitations of the comd relationship.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

You still haven't told me why the change is necessary.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

and your link doesn't appear to be working.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> and your link doesn't appear to be working.



Change is necessary because the structure of the battlefield, technology available, doctrine, tactics, etc change.

Someone has to fly UAVs, whose orbat do they come out of?   

Someone has to manage, link, coordinate, and make sense of new situational awareness technology and command and control equipment and technology.   Whose orbat do they come out of?

Someone has to man the new CMTC organization.   Someone has to man the Area Training Centres, including the det in Shilo, which will mean 2PPCLI guys will not have to deploy as instructors to Wainwright as often.   The list can go on.


The link works for me.   It is Adobe Acrobat and takes a little bit of time to open up.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.   I'll try that link again.   I'm sure the instructors will appreciate not having to go to Wainwright but how does that factor into anything you have said.   Not being a smart ass, just trying to grasp what your telling me here.   The guys they pull out of TOW, Mortars and Pioneers will be absorbed into the Infantry companies but it will not make a significant difference.   The guys filling the roles in the Artillery will be moving from long guns to 81's so they won't be flying UAV's or making sense of new information.   The Anti Armor role will still be filled by our 031 for the time being and by the sounds of it will have to support the whole Army proper as no other TOW coy's are being raised in the other area's.   As for where do these people come from to fill these new technological roles.   Your guess is as good as mine but I doubt it will be from the CMBT arms.   More people is the answer (as we all know) not throwing out the baby with the bath water.   Why did the Infantry have these support elements in the past?   I realize we have to evolve and grow but this new way of thinking is not the answer unless we are only going to do domestic defense force or Bosnia/Cypress type of missions.   You seem knowledgeable but I think you optimism is misplaced.   An example of why we have redundant capabilities is as follows.   During an ex in Edmonton where we did FIBUA training through the barracks that were about to be torn down (forget the name).   The Engineer section attached to us died before they even got into the building.   This didn't stop our advance mind you because the individuals within the pioneer section picked up were they left off and carried through with the clearing of the building.   All the intentions of what your saying are great in the perfect world but the world and battlefield are far from it.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.   I'll try that link again.   I'm sure the instructors will appreciate not having to go to Wainwright but how does that factor into anything you have said.   Not being a smart ***, just trying to grasp what your telling me here.   The guys they pull out of TOW, Mortars and Pioneers will be absorbed into the Infantry companies but it will not make a significant difference.   The guys filling the roles in the Artillery will be moving from long guns to 81's so they won't be flying UAV's or making sense of new information.   The Anti Armor role will still be filled by our 031 for the time being and by the sounds of it will have to support the whole Army proper as no other TOW coy's are being raised in the other area's.   As for where do these people come from to fill these new technological roles.   Your guess is as good as mine but I doubt it will be from the CMBT arms.   More people is the answer (as we all know) not throwing out the baby with the bath water.   Why did the Infantry have these support elements in the past?   I realize we have to evolve and grow but this new way of thinking is not the answer unless we are only going to do domestic defense force or Bosnia/Cypress type of missions.   You seem knowledgeable but I think you optimism is misplaced.   An example of why we have redundant capabilities is as follows.   During an ex in Edmonton where we did FIBUA training through the barracks that were about to be torn down (forget the name).   The Engineer section attached to us died before they even got into the building.   This didn't stop our advance mind you because the individuals within the pioneer section picked up were they left off and carried through with the clearing of the building.   All the intentions of what your saying are great in the perfect world but the world and battlefield are far from it.



It isn't the individual soldier who is moved to the new position, only his authorized position.   

As an example an infantry battalion loses a certain number of positions, ie the Mor Platoon.   Those soldiers stay in the infantry in the same battalion, and normal attrition will bring the Bn down to its new (and smaller) size.   The battalion that was authorized 600 pers are now authorized 560 pers.   Those 40 positions (PYs or Person Years), not the people, are given to another organization allowing them to expand their organization.   As an end result the infantry becomes smaller, other organizations become bigger, the overall size of the CF remains the same.   The infantrymen who were in Mor Pl are now in other platoons in the battalion.

Arty gets double hatted with mortars as a secondary task.

Engineers get double hatted with Pnr type tasks as a secondary task.   Any task that would have had 1 section of Engrs and 1 section of Pnrs should now receive 2 sections of Engrs if the tactical estimate supports it.   This will happen, I have seen it in practice.   

Infantry bns were downsized and lost capabilities (Mor, Pnr, and now TOW), and these authorized positions went to creating CMTC, expanding ATCs, etc.   These capabilities (Mor, Pnr, and TOW) are still required and will be performed, however not with infantry troops, but rather with double hatted Arty and Engr troops.   This isn't a problem unless we decide to deploy a Division which is not an expected task.   If that was the case we would have time to reconstitute these orgs.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

You may have the time to reconsititure these organizations but you don't have time to make up the shortfalls created by cancelling the courses such as mortars and pioneers for the individual 031.  Here is a novel idea.  Keep the troops where they are and increase the allotement of numbers to these new postions which will be filled by new incoming people.  I am aware that there are retention and recruitment problems but decrease the size of the military isn't the answer.  We need to up the numbers back to 70,000 or so.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

P.S.  that link stilll hasn't opened after 20 mins.


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## devil39 (10 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> P.S.   that link stilll hasn't opened after 20 mins.



Try going to 

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/main-acceuil.asp

followed by Publications, Command 300-003.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2004)

Thanks


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## Infanteer (13 Jul 2004)

> If there are no jobs for the artillery and armored (there by giving them infantry assets to prove their existence), then they might as well combine the 4 cmbt arms into one force that eat, sleep and work together at the same base in the same barracks etc.   Abolish the differences and have one fighting force.   We all go on ex together, share the same messes and begin a new history.   No more colours, no more battle honors etc.   Stripping the Inf Bn's of there close support is no answer.



I personally like this suggestion.   I, along with others here, constantly trumpet the mantra of "soldier first" and "every soldier is a rifleman".   I detest regimental parochialism and how it inhibits the efficiency of our combat power and organization.

We have a Light Infantry battalion.   It requires A in Grunts, B in Gunners on the tubes, C in Assault Pioneers from the Sappers, and D in Jimmies, Medics and other support types.   Make them all organic to the unit as it requires and give them the same cap badge and colours.   Hell, call them the PPCLI if they want to.   Do the same for a mech regiment.   A in dismounts, B in crewmen, C in gunners, D in assault pioneers and E in support types.   Call it the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) and every soldier within it a Strat.

If we had a tougher basic course like the RM Commando Course it wouldn't matter where they came from, because a common SOLDIER training would lend to universal respect.   I always figured the "Well, they didn't do the 10 week BIQ so they are not as good as us" attitude was simple tunnel vision.


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## Scoobie Newbie (13 Jul 2004)

I'm not familiar enough with it but is the U.S. Marines model feasible?  I think if we went to one common unit though, a new one should be made so as not to have resentment towards an existing unit.  Ie. if we all became Patricia's then the RCR, R22nd etc would reaise a stink.  By forming a new unit or stand up a former unit ie. Blackwatch would do well to avoid this hostility.


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## RCA (13 Jul 2004)

1 RCHA supplied the mortar platoon in sp of 3 PPCLI on Op Apollo


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## Brad Sallows (13 Jul 2004)

To reiterate what I have tried to stress before in this (ongoing) discussion: there are two situations which must be treated separately.

1) The Canadian Army deploying dribs and drabs of task-organized elements around the world today.

2) The Canadian Army mobilizing formations (say, a brigade or division or more) for a Really Big War tomorrow.

What follows is heavily condensed; misconceptions are my own.

When the idea was floated several years ago, it seemed clear that the movement of capabilities out of the infantry into other arms was a temporary measure that was dreamed up along with ATOF and other initiatives designed to maximize use of available resources.  (That idea may in some circles be evolving to more permanent status.  Change happens; machine gun platoons are no longer deemed necessary, for example.)  We didn't have enough line infantry and were not employing gunners and troopers as frequently as riflemen and sappers.  By calling on gunners and troopers to fill combat support roles we balance the personnel optempo load a little more evenly and by shuffling the former infantry combat support PYs we beef up the number of 031 positions which actually have a name beside the number on the printout.

The process for generating Roto 0 of OP SOMETHINGOROTHER is not simply to send an infantry battalion and see what happens.  An estimate is done which generates tasks.  Tasks suggest required forces, subject to restraints.  In situation (1) above, the only reason the CO will not have the assets is if the estimate determined they were unnecessary or could not be employed.  It will not matter if they were integral or had to be attached.  For example, if guidance for a UN operation states "no anti-armour, or you don't go", then it will not matter whether we have integral anti-armour or LdSH anti-armour.

But what happens in situation (2), you ask?  What happens when there is only a brigade anti-armour squadron and brigade close support regiment to be shared?  The short answer is: if we are going into a full-blown war and - my assumption - sparing almost no expense for manning and scales of issue, why would you assume we would not or could not revisit our doctrinal organization and re-introduce some of the things we took out?


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## Infanteer (13 Jul 2004)

I'm seeing two different yet concurrent arguments in this discussion.

1)   Arguments surrounding the decision to remove the responsibility for mortars, pioneers, and anti-armour away from the Infantry and to the other combat arms.   This decision is related to operational tempo and manpower issues Mr Sallows and Devil seem to be focused on this.   I could care less who mans the systems, as long as they are competent.   Like I mentioned above, I think this is more important then guarding regimental or corps turf.

2)   An argument against removing organic support from the Infantry battalions up to the Brigade level.   This is CFL's concern and I am inclined to agree with him.   As much as all these neat ideas are formed around estimates, tasks, and forces, I would caution that our units must be in shape to deploy on combat operations.   With this in mind, I feel moving supporting elements up to Brigade is a step in the wrong direction as the last 200 years of warfare has shown that firpower has led to increased lethality and diffusion of modern units, requiring combined arms formations to be formed at the lowest level possible (I see the company/battalion as the ideal level today).   By basing our Infantry Battalions and Armoured Regiments strictly around their fighting sub-units (Rifle Company and Armoured Squadron) without their organic support, we seem to be moving to a more industrial form of organization that went the way of the dodo in WWII when unwieldly American Divisions with seperate arm sub-units had to be broken down into RCT's to match pace with the German Kampfgruppe.

Sorry if that seemed a bit academic, but I wanted to sift this thread into the two arguements I was reading into and give my take on both.


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## Scoobie Newbie (13 Jul 2004)

The problem with reintroducing organizations that no longer exist IE Mortar pl is that it will take time to get new people up to speed with the equipment and the skills (time which we may not have) vs having an experienced platoon already established that can go at a moments notice and draw other qualified guys from the BN to make up any shortfalls.

By taking troops from cmbt support roles to shore up the rifle companies is a band aid solution at best (and the cheap band aids at that).   Pioneers had maybe 6 usable guys, TOW has maybe 12, same with Mortars.   (I speak for 2VP here).   However I went into cmbt support HQ as the OC's gunner and 2 guys from mortars came over to fill other roles in HQ.   Others went to sigs etc.   The rifle coy's got relatively few people.

As I've said (and we all know this) we need more guys of good caliber to do the job longer then what is averaged now.   The roles that have been lost are still required IMO unlike machine gun platoon (although there is talk of adding more C6's to the rifle companies, and having a direct fire support element within CMBT SP).

This article will go round and round and I hope the troops IE. me aren't neglected if we ever go into it again hardcore.


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## Scoobie Newbie (13 Jul 2004)

Anyone want to comment on the Marines and how they work vs how it is applicable to us.


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## Infanteer (14 Jul 2004)

I don't need to tell everyone here again of how I am a big fan of the Marines (both British and American) and their mentality on what it means to be a Marine first, tradesmen second.   Sure there is infighting and pride among branches in the USMC; I've seen some of it first hand on other boards.   However, they all look to the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor as their true calling, putting that over crossed rifles or anything else.   I think this is central to the ability of institutions like this to instill the "warrior mindset" within _all_ of its soldiers.   I think it would do wonders if the CF adopted the principle of "Soldier First, Tradesmen Second".   Everyone comes out of a challenging and demanding basic training course, akin to the RM Commando Course at Lympstone, that works everyone up to platoon live fire and instills into everybody an excellence within the field, which should be required of every soldier.   From there, the graduate goes onto a short trades indoc into the trade that he wishes to pursue (General Rifleman, Mech Dismount, Crewman, Mortarman, Assault Pioneer, etc).   I would like to see all soldiers to do a Basic Engagement in the one of the combat arms before moving onto a trade role required by his or her regiment; this would further reduce the gulf in skills (and reduce animosity) between frontline grunts and support guys.

Rather than have all mortars go to the Artillery Regiments for the sake of regimental "turf", have the Artillery Corps be responsible for all indirect fire trades (Mortarman, Mud Gunner, Bird Gunner, Rocket Artillery, etc.) and post their fully trained soldiers to regimental duties to any regiment that has a sub-unit that requires them; to a Light Infantry outfit (Mortars), a Mech unit (109), or Brigade Artillery (MLRS?).   They would all belong to whatever regiment they were posted to, wearing the cap badge and slip on.   They are a soldier in a fighting unit first, an artilleryman with the Artillery Corps second.   Do this to all the Arms.   

Ideally, I'd like to see four Combat Arms, each with a variety of sub specializations for Ranks within the branch; 

Infantry, which will cover dismounted lightfighters in the light/airmobile/para roles.   Many of the small unit and unconventional warfare will come under this branch.   It is generally recognized that Canada's Light Infantry are among the world's best foot soldiers; we may as well make it doctrine.

Cavalry, an amalgamation of the Mechanized Infantry, Armoured, and Armoured Recce.   I think the German's had it right when the put the Grenadiers and the Panzers under one arm, directed by the "Inspector der Panzertruppe" Heinz Guderien. this branch is responsible for the shock (or what we have left of it in our Army) forces.   All doctrine related to mounted fighting will be under this arm.   Possibility of separating "Crewman" MOC from "Cavalry Dismount".   I've seen a proposal for having Officers trained in both mounted and dismounted roles, interesting concept.

Artillery, the traditional branch of Indirect Fire Support.   It would handle Mortars, Rockets, Field Artillery, Anti-Aircraft, and the emerging NLOS tech (UAV, etc).

Engineers, the branch of mobility and counter mobility.   Handles assault pioneers, construction, bridging, explosives, NBCW and all that other cool jazz that makes the engineers so sexy.

The supporting Branches (Aviation, Administration, Catering, Signals, etc) would all be similar, with trained members of the respective Corps or Branches being sent to fighting Regiments as needed, becoming members of these regiments.   The big thing here is that we are removing the association of a trade from the regimental system.   As I proposed before, I think it would be advantageous to move the regimental affiliation up to the Brigade level, with all soldiers within the Brigade, regardless of trade, being "Fusiliers" (or whatever) and part of that regimental family.   

Anyways, this might be a bit disjointed and confusing, but it has been something I've been playing around with in my head recently.   Maybe I'll write a White Paper.


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## Yard Ape (14 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> just so I'm on the same page here, does what your saying mean that if the RCR or R22nd need TOW, they will be Patricia's coming out of the LFWA woth there TUA's?


That is correct.   Alll the "benifits" of the super-bases will be gone in one nice swoop, becuase brigades will not be able to form at train complete battle groups at home.   2 and 5 brigade will be dependant on 1 brigade troops and assets to form a battle group.   We may start to see future battle groups that do not train as a single unit until after they are in theater.   Right now JSR sends soldiers on every single operation, but I don't necisarily belive we should think that successe is transferable to the Army.



			
				CFL said:
			
		

> You may have the time to reconsititure these organizations but you don't have time to make up the shortfalls created by cancelling the courses such as mortars and pioneers for the individual 031.


You will not have to re-train the infantry in those skills.   When the time comes to reconstitute mortar or Pioneer platoons, these platoons will be manned by gunners & sappers (not infantry).



			
				CFL said:
			
		

> Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.


We have long accepted an Army that had great individual training but a shoddy collective training system.   The CMTC (Canadian Manouvre Training Centre) is supposed to fix that.   However, to make CMTC possible we have to do a lot of stupid things like reduce the saiz of our field force (PYs taken from the Infantry are not going to the Cbt Arms that take over lost rolls) and Whole Fleet Managment (a brigade will only have vehicles for one battle group to train at a time and CMTC will have vehciles for a brigade and an enmy force to take to the field).



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Taking the resources out of the battalions is its own issue, but you're selling short the flexibility of artillery if you think all the guns in a brigade would be on the move at the same time, incapable of delivering timely fire, or incapable of reaching everywhere they need to in a brigade's AOR.


But I think it is fair to say that the guns will not be able to man all the howitzers and mortars at the same quantitiy as when the indirect roll was shared with infantry.   A single deployed battle group will probably never notice the effects.   This could be disasterous if we deploy larger than battle group level.



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> If we lose the "plug-n-play" concept, fail to conduct all-arms training events at least at the battle group level, or the capabilities quietly disappear after being shuffled to other arms due to parochialism or budget shaving, then it is indeed a poor shell game.


Not having all the assets available to all brigades (LdSH Direct fire support Bn) will prohibit all-arms training more than once every 3 years (in WATC when ATOF says it is time).



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> There are two concerns to address:
> 
> 1) We set out to deploy a brigade group.   (How likely is that?)We will no longer be able to deploy a brigade.   I think it is foolish to kill that ability.   I've never needed fire insurance and my house is not likely to burn, so should I do away with it?   How many people thought WW II was likely, or Korea, or the first Gulf War?
> 
> ...



Recent force restructureing and Whole fleet managment are essential for Canada to establish the collective training system it wants.   However, will reaching this goal forever leave our regular army impotent above the "one battle group at a time" level?   I think yes (if Whole Fleet Managment does not do worse).



> The elimination of the assault troops in the three Regular Force armoured regiments.


Here is the same as Mortar, TOW, & Pioneer being stripped from the Infantry.   Like the other assets, this loss will not be replaced by an extra section in every Infantry battalion Recce Pl nor with an extra field troop in every CER.


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## Scoobie Newbie (14 Jul 2004)

I think we as a fighting force or going to be going through some serious blood letting, good or bad.  All these jobs and idea's and no troopies to run them.  


Do you think there will be a permanent enemy force like in California?


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## Yard Ape (14 Jul 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Do you think there will be a permanent enemy force like in California?


From what I hear, yes.


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## Scoobie Newbie (14 Jul 2004)

I can only imagine where they are going to find the troops.

Yard Ape whats your load station in life?


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## Lance Wiebe (14 Jul 2004)

No, I don't think that there will be a permanent enemy force.   I think it will be a 1 Bde tasking to supply en force as required.   They will be the only ones able to man the TOW's and the Leo's.   There will be a permanent staff for evaluation purposes and so on, I think.

It seems to me that 1 Brigade will not be considered a source of more than one BG.   They will have sub-units sent on every single roto to every single mission, and that will take a lot of manpower away, and not allow them to train as units effectively.   As a matter of fact, if we go to more than two locations with BG size deployments, 1 Brigade will really be hurting to send replacements on the next roto, I would think. 

Further, every roto will be spending more time away from home, they will deploy to Wainwright to practice and be assessed before going overseas.   This is not necessarily be a bad thing, but because the BG will not be all coming from one location, it will be necessaryto learn to work together before you go.   It should be something that all are made aware of, though.


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## Scoobie Newbie (14 Jul 2004)

I can see them making all of LFWA troops training tools with no oversea's deployment.


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## Yard Ape (23 Jul 2004)

If the LdSH are going to be a "1 of" asset, will it become a biligual unit to support a plug & play capability?


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