# How capable is the RCN?



## EnchantedEng (13 Aug 2020)

I came across this article which partly talks about the Turkish maritime capability and some issues in the region: https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/08/13/turkey-is-up-against-some-formidable-navies-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/

If I am not mistaken, Op Reassurance places the RCN frigates not too far from Turkey and the said issues.

I wonder how our frigates will fare, if say, were to get into a one time scuffle with one of Turkey's Corvettes or Frigates? 

In the same line of thinking, how ready would the RCN be for a potential state of war?


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## daftandbarmy (13 Aug 2020)

EnchantedEng said:
			
		

> I came across this article which partly talks about the Turkish maritime capability and some issues in the region: https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/08/13/turkey-is-up-against-some-formidable-navies-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/
> 
> If I am not mistaken, Op Reassurance places the RCN frigates not too far from Turkey and the said issues.
> 
> ...



Given that all three countries are 'NATO Allies', I assume that this is a moot point. 

Regardless, AFAIK, all navies are 'ready, aye, ready' when they are deployed on any kind of operation, and few will fight alone.


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## Halifax Tar (13 Aug 2020)

EnchantedEng said:
			
		

> I came across this article which partly talks about the Turkish maritime capability and some issues in the region: https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/08/13/turkey-is-up-against-some-formidable-navies-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/
> 
> If I am not mistaken, Op Reassurance places the RCN frigates not too far from Turkey and the said issues.
> 
> ...



We operate with the Turkish Navy in NATO battle groups and in its its front an back yards on Op Reassurance.  

I have full confidence in our operators that in a 1 on 1 stand up fight we would come out on top.  My only worry would be the serviceability of various equipment systems at any given time. 

The RCN is as ready as we can be for a war.


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## Underway (13 Aug 2020)

EnchantedEng said:
			
		

> I came across this article which partly talks about the Turkish maritime capability and some issues in the region: https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/08/13/turkey-is-up-against-some-formidable-navies-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/
> 
> If I am not mistaken, Op Reassurance places the RCN frigates not too far from Turkey and the said issues.
> 
> ...



Our sailors are head and shoulders above the Turks, particularly the senior officers and technicians.  That's important.  Turkey has some very new and good ships and some very old and terrible ones as well.  Assuming sea room to fight and no supporting cast I would take our frigates over theirs any day of the week.  But naval battles are not fought that way. And mutual destruction is a thing.


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## NavyShooter (13 Aug 2020)

Our ships are more capable than they ever have been.  

ESSM RIM-162
Harpoons
57mm Bofors
CIWS

Plus the sensor integration and fleet interoperability with our allies...yes...our ships are quite capable.

Are there more deadly/better armed ships?  Yup.  Ours are pretty good too though.

NS


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## daftandbarmy (13 Aug 2020)

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Our ships are more capable than they ever have been.
> 
> ESSM RIM-162
> Harpoons
> ...



I think we've got some really well trained boarding party folks too, which wasn't always the case. 

I have no idea how they'd stack up against the opposition but I'm sure, knowing some of the trainers, they'd be hard to ignore if required


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## Halifax Tar (13 Aug 2020)

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Our ships are more capable than they ever have been.
> 
> ESSM RIM-162
> Harpoons
> ...



When they work, and when they have constant supply lines. 



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I think we've got some really well trained boarding party folks too, which wasn't always the case.
> 
> I have no idea how they'd stack up against the opposition but I'm sure, knowing some of the trainers, they'd be hard to ignore if required



Ya, I have deployed with them twice and I cannot support your dissertations.


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## CBH99 (13 Aug 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Ya, I have deployed with them twice and I cannot support your dissertations.




RCN boarding teams aren't up to snuff, Halifax??  (I always like to listen to you guys who actually deploy in these specific environments, always learn something)


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## Halifax Tar (13 Aug 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> RCN boarding teams aren't up to snuff, Halifax??  (I always like to listen to you guys who actually deploy in these specific environments, always learn something)



I am referring to NTOG.  They are talented, no doubt.  But no real usage now.  They have essentially become an outstanding training group for a skill we aren't utilizing.  I would fold them into SOF proper and let that empire contribute, as required, to Naval Ops.


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## CBH99 (13 Aug 2020)

Boarding ships is a skill we aren't using?

Is that because we are focusing less on Somali coast / Persian Gulf operations, and more on NATO groups?


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## Humphrey Bogart (13 Aug 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am referring to NTOG.  They are talented, no doubt.  But no real usage now.  They have essentially become an outstanding training group for a skill we aren't utilizing.  I would fold them into SOF proper and let that empire contribute, as required, to Naval Ops.



I disagree, if anything what should happen is NST and the Regular Boarding Parties should be rolled up and done anyway with. They serve no real purpose at all.

Just because something isn't being used atm doesn't mean you do away with it.  Rather, NTOG should look for expanded roles and capabilities so they can provide more value.


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## Lumber (13 Aug 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Boarding ships is a skill we aren't using?
> 
> Is that because we are focusing less on Somali coast / Persian Gulf operations, and more on NATO groups?



Essential, yes.


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## Humphrey Bogart (13 Aug 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> Essential, yes.



But you could make the same arguments for any number of CAF capabilities.  Clearance Divers aren't really doing EOD because Afghanistan ended, so we should get rid of that.  

NTOG gives the Navy a far better VBSS capability than it previously had, for what is really pennies in the overall budget and also pennies in terms of man power.


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## Lumber (13 Aug 2020)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> But you could make the same arguments for any number of CAF capabilities.  Clearance Divers aren't really doing EOD because Afghanistan ended, so we should get rid of that.
> 
> NTOG gives the Navy a far better VBSS capability than it previously had, for what is really pennies in the overall budget and also pennies in terms of man power.



I think you quoted the wrong person? 

I was just answering the question "why arent we using NTOG as much" and it's simply to do with they nature of OP REASSURANCE and OP PROJECTION.


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## FSTO (14 Aug 2020)

So when I joined back in the last century, the first CPF had not been accepted from the builder yet.  But:

We had 3 AOR's available
3 serviceable SSK's
4 280's being TRUMPed to become AAWD Command and Control ships

On the downside the Mackenzies, IRE's, St Laurents, Nipigon and Annapolis were at best missile sponges.
NLBP was a joke (we were still saddled with whalers and MWB)
The reserves has the Pigs.

As I reach the twilight years; here is where we stand

The good
FFH's with the Cyclones are very capable for ASW, close in AAW and ASuW (reloads are an issue).
Naval Boarding is light years ahead of what I experienced in 90's and the 00ts you youngsters here have no idea how bad it was back then.
If we could get the SSK's out of the yard they are still very capable and dangerous. (no replacement on the horizon though  ???)

The not so good
MCDV's - what can I say, they are what they are.
AOPS - Personal opinion only; they are what they are, a remote supply vessel with limited sovereignty/patrol capability.

The bad (but is there light on the horizon?)
1 AOR, ONE BLOODY AOR AND ITS TAKEN 25 YEARS TO GET TO THIS POINT? WHAT A COLOSSAL UTTER FUBAR'D SCREWED UP PROCESS! (Granted 2 more are building but it should never have come to this)
15 CSC (with C3? AAWD? Will we even get 15? 10? 5?)
Recruiting, Training, Refresher Training, Regenerative Training, Retention. All are issues that will be/are biting us in the arse.  


Thats my assessment of the status of the RCN today. We've advanced but we've also slipped.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Aug 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> So when I joined back in the last century, the first CPF had not been accepted from the builder yet.  But:
> 
> We had 3 AOR's available
> 3 serviceable SSK's
> ...



But hey... 'Morale Patches', right?


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## FSTO (14 Aug 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But hey... 'Morale Patches', right?



Undoubtedly the most stupiderest thing going.


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## Halifax Tar (14 Aug 2020)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I disagree, if anything what should happen is NST and the Regular Boarding Parties should be rolled up and done anyway with. They serve no real purpose at all.
> 
> Just because something isn't being used atm doesn't mean you do away with it.  Rather, NTOG should look for expanded roles and capabilities so they can provide more value.



I don't disagree with your first point.  The NST was established to try and take some strain off of ships company's and their duty watches while on deployment(s).  I think its a good idea but with our limited manning and monies I don't think its unreasonable to ask ships to fill the required foreign port duty watches when required.  

If you want to expand NTOG it needs to leave the RCN and join SOF or become its own trade.  Right now they are essentially expensive and manpower draining alongside FP groups. 



			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> But you could make the same arguments for any number of CAF capabilities.  Clearance Divers aren't really doing EOD because Afghanistan ended, so we should get rid of that.
> 
> NTOG gives the Navy a far better VBSS capability than it previously had, for what is really pennies in the overall budget and also pennies in terms of man power.



Just a couple of points, and I cant believe I am going to stick up for divers lol.  I know FDU(A) gets called out weekly for some sort of UXO that is reported to authorities. 

The VBSS capability sure is a step up.  But its defiantly not pennies on the budget and defiantly not pennies in terms of man power.  Also while we would like to have capabilities is this an actually required capability the RCN should have ?  Or is this more of the CAF just trying to me a jack of all trades instead of a master of a few ?  Give it to SOF!  Its in their wheel house!  

NTOG is an excellent example of a capability dreamed up and put into reality without building the foundation first.  The drain this organization is having on already distressed Naval trades is not to be ignored, these sailors are required to maintain their quals in their home trades and still fall under them for career management its a mess and creates animosity within trades.  

As for budgetary effect seeing as I have supported them for over a year of my life while deployed I can tell you they sure can eat through a budget, fast.  The fact NTOG is years old and still doesn't have a proper scale of issue and the knock on effect that has created with Ships boarding teams means capability and kitting can now vary from ship to ship.

Again push these teams into the SOF empire equip them and man them properly and then use as required for Naval Ops.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (14 Aug 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> So when I joined back in the last century, the first CPF had not been accepted from the builder yet.  But:
> 
> We had 3 AOR's available
> 3 serviceable SSK's
> ...



 :goodpost:   That. Exactly.

I will add that in-between those two state of affairs, there was a period where we had AOR's (OK getting old but still effective), Trumped IRO's for AAW and young effective frigates (the HAL's). In those days, an all Canadian task force of one AOR, one IRO and two HALs was indeed a very powerful naval force compared to most countries in the world. We are unfortunately not there anymore and to get somewhat back there, I sincerely hope that the first four CSC's that come out of ISL are the one optimized for AAW.


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## Halifax Tar (14 Aug 2020)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> :goodpost:   That. Exactly.
> 
> I will add that in-between those two state of affairs, there was a period where we had AOR's (OK getting old but still effective), Trumped IRO's for AAW and young effective frigates (the HAL's). In those days, an all Canadian task force of one AOR, one IRO and two HALs was indeed a very powerful naval force compared to most countries in the world. We are unfortunately not there anymore and to get somewhat back there, I sincerely hope that the first four CSC's that come out of ISL are the one optimized for AAW.



OGB, ya those were the days. 

Wondering about your opinion.  Should we have built another Asterix and used the USNS and RFA examples and went with more civilian crewing on these platforms ?


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## Infanteer (14 Aug 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> If you want to expand NTOG it needs to leave the RCN and join SOF or become its own trade.



Why would we do that?  CANSOFCOM isn't an orphanage for anyone with a C8 and some hands and feet skills, and naval boarding is not a SOF mission.  Maritime counter-terrorism is, but these two are apples and oranges.


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## Donald H (14 Aug 2020)

An even more dangerous situation developing with Turkey because "An injury to one,..............." doesn't apply. As to Canadian or Turkish ships coming out on top? The biggest consideration would likely be 'who shoots first'? Even Argentina was capable of sinking HMS Sheffield.


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## Colin Parkinson (14 Aug 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> OGB, ya those were the days.
> 
> Wondering about your opinion.  Should we have built another Asterix and used the USNS and RFA examples and went with more civilian crewing on these platforms ?



I certainly think so, two Resolve class and two Kingston class AOR's with one of each on both coasts would give the navy huge flexibility and very good way to train Merchant sailors to command levels to take on future roles as ships pilots and the like.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (14 Aug 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> OGB, ya those were the days.
> 
> Wondering about your opinion.  Should we have built another Asterix and used the USNS and RFA examples and went with more civilian crewing on these platforms ?



Sorry I didn't answer sooner ... long work day today.

My answer: Yes! Absolutely. We are in the business of fighting wars, not the gas station / convenience store business. Civilian mariners are a lot more capable than we are at operating ships  that require only engineering and seamanship with a lot less personnel. Similarly, civilian aviators are adequately capable of providing - with a much smaller footprint - an onboard helicopter capability for vertreps. All they need is a small military logistics cell to do the paper work and keep track of goods/finances provided to the fleet. 

That's been my view for a long time. If the American and the Brits can make it work, why not us?

I know the counter argument has always been: "But since we are military, we can put ourselves in more dangerous situations than civilians so we use our AORs quite differently than the US and the UK."  

First of all: Tell that to the British RFA's that went down to fight the Falkland wars. They were right in the middle of the friggin action, civilian crew and all. Second how much of how we used our AORs is simply a factor of the fact that we (the RCN) are the ones crewing them as opposed to actually fulfilling an operational requirement that we cannot do without. As far as I am concerned, we can run the "command team accommodation" duties put on the AOR's from any other type of command ship, be it a Destroyer or something else we could acquire if we weren't stuck having to crew and operate the AOR's - such as a multipurpose helicopter/landing/humanitarian vessel (rings a bell with anyone?).


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## FSTO (15 Aug 2020)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I know the counter argument has always been: "But since we are military, we can put ourselves in more dangerous situations than civilians so we use our AORs quite differently than the US and the UK."



I'm sure glad we never had a shooting war with that sort of attitude. Putting our AOR's in harms way for no apparent gain is nothing to base a strategy on.

If I had a magic wand we'd have 4 to 6 Astrix class AOR's (operated by civilians) and 4 Mistrals for HDAR/Sea Control Ops.


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## Underway (15 Aug 2020)

I find it intersting that the East Coast sailors are talking about how NTOG doesn't really do its job.  NTOG since its formation has been much more active with the West Coast fleet in drug busts and boarding actions. I agree that some criticisms are valid.  It does take sailors away from their trades. And despite their best efforts NTOG is a friction point on the ships during deployment when they are not boarding people.

If NTOG value is an issue its that it idea may have missed the timing for when it would have been truely valuable.  With the return to great power competition some anti-terrorism drug interdiction missions are on the back burner.

As for NST, when they showed up on my deployment they were professional and excellently trained for their job.  Took it much more serious then the ships company did.  And they allowed the ships company to properly relax as it took all those FP spots out of the dutywatch rotation.  There were also friction points but that was more due to sorting out CoC issues with their IC and not something that really was a criticism of the concept.


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## Humphrey Bogart (15 Aug 2020)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Why would we do that?  CANSOFCOM isn't an orphanage for anyone with a C8 and some hands and feet skills, and naval boarding is not a SOF mission.  Maritime counter-terrorism is, but these two are apples and oranges.



Infanteer with the money answer as always!  Certain Navy  folk seem to have this idea that anyone with a rifle should be someone elses job. 

They also don't understand the difference between what NTOG does and Maritime Counter-Terrorism.  Using JTF-2 for boarding actions against wooden Dhows is a colossal waste of a pretty scarce resource. 



			
				Underway said:
			
		

> I find it intersting that the East Coast sailors are talking about how NTOG doesn't really do its job.  NTOG since its formation has been much more active with the West Coast fleet in drug busts and boarding actions. I agree that some criticisms are valid.  It does take sailors away from their trades. And despite their best efforts NTOG is a friction point on the ships during deployment when they are not boarding people.



A lot of this is just whinging though.  It's the classic Riders, Day Workers, Shift Workers gripes that never go away. 

"NTOG doesn't stand watches" ... "NTOG takes up too much space" ... "NTOG doesn't do anything" blahblahblah



> If NTOG value is an issue its that it idea may have missed the timing for when it would have been truely valuable.  With the return to great power competition some anti-terrorism drug interdiction missions are on the back burner.



I think people forget why NTOG was created. My understanding is the way the RCN treated NBP in the 90s and 00s was borderline negligent and we should be thankful that no incidents occurred where someone was killed due to inadequate training.  

As things can always go South quickly:

https://youtu.be/Woz2VraNRKY

This new way is far better and is the way of the future. The RCN is just playing catchup to every other Navy who already has this capability.

I also think the unit can potentially be used for other tasks as well.  They already have been used for SFCB but they could also be attached to a CJTF, they could be used to guard a Controlled Access Zone or provide enhanced force protection.  



> As for NST, when they showed up on my deployment they were professional and excellently trained for their job.  Took it much more serious then the ships company did.  And they allowed the ships company to properly relax as it took all those FP spots out of the dutywatch rotation.  There were also friction points but that was more due to sorting out CoC issues with their IC and not something that really was a criticism of the concept.


  

I don't doubt they take it more seriously or are better at it  than the Ship's Company.  That's not a hard metric to really beat though.  I find the way the RCN conceptualizes FP strange.  It's heavy on legalese, leaves COs with limited options and I don't find the levels particularly useful.  

There is little flexibility in it and a lot of the time, it's a meaningless manpower suck that simply fulfills a checklist rather than analyzing what the actual threats are and allocating resources accordingly.  

What I would optimally like to see is NTOG assume FP duties if there is a threat that is actually warranted. You've got the personnel there so use them.  NTOG should also develop a designated marksman and crew-served weapon capability that could also be utilized for enhanced FP which I believe is in the early stages of development atm.  

Oh yah, ditch the .50 cal and go with a C6 for FP.  .50 cal is complete overkill, way higher chance of collateral damage in an actual FP scenario.  It also has a rate of fire that is about half what a C6 is so you get about half the rounds landing in your beaten zone that you would with a C6.  That's kind of a big deal in a small boat attack scenario when you might be bobbing around in the water and accuracy becomes a problem. 

.50 cal also isn't portable.  Single 2 person C6 team in the hangar would be able to move rapidly to any part of the upper deck and could be held in the FPO's back pocket for use as required.  

Sure, if there is a requirement, crew .50 cals but very often there is little need and it isn't a very flexible solution.


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## Colin Parkinson (15 Aug 2020)

When arming the CCG comes up, I think a couple of .50cals on the CCG ships so they can support dedicated boarding parties provided by the navy or RCMP would be the way to go. To protect the party on the transit and to provide authority.


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## Navy_Pete (15 Aug 2020)

I think it's pretty hard for NTOG to do the job they applied and trained for when we don't have the ROEs or mission parameters for them to do boardings. Not their fault they aren't being used, and the guys we had were really good about pitching in where they could with repairs and maintenance when we needed it. It was frustrating to have them take up valuable bunk space and not do boardings, but I blamed the big giant heads and not the operators (who were all really good guys that were really frustrated to sit around twiddling their thumbs as we putted around ignoring legitimate targets). My  :2c: is they shouldn't be part of the mission team without the ROEs and intentions, as that particular scenario lead to a few popping smoke and going back to their trade, or hanging up the uniform.


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## FSTO (16 Aug 2020)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I think people forget why NTOG was created. My understanding is the way the RCN treated NBP in the 90s and 00s was borderline negligent and we should be thankful that no incidents occurred where someone was killed due to inadequate training.
> 
> As things can always go South quickly:
> 
> ...


I was there during OP APOLLO and to tell you the truth we had no idea what the hell we would do if there was an actual firefight on board a suspect vessel. When I got to CFFSE Sea Div in 04 I tried to get authority to use Sim Ammo for training but was shot down. The genesis for NTOG was when CFFSE had a visit from a couple of lads dressed in MEC outdoor gear, scruffy beards and wearing Oakley. I invited them to watch our NBP "Training". After they stopped laughing, I asked if they would be so kind as to write an assessment to send up the chain to RCN HQ. The rest is history. 



			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I also think the unit can potentially be used for other tasks as well.  They already have been used for SFCB but they could also be attached to a CJTF, they could be used to guard a Controlled Access Zone or provide enhanced force protection.


  
Back to OP APOLLO. We in Algonquin had White and Blue NBParties. Since Alg could only sail for a couple of weeks before needing a rest, one team would be the on watch NBP while the other team was with its departments (In my case the DeckO standing bridge watch). After the port visit the other team would be the on call boarding team and the other group would return to their departments. It worked very well during the deployments and neither team got burnt out.
We were very busy intercepting go fasts and dhows during that OP.


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## Grimey (16 Aug 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> I was there during OP APOLLO and to tell you the truth we had no idea what the hell we would do if there was an actual firefight on board a suspect vessel. When I got to CFFSE Sea Div in 04 I tried to get authority to use Sim Ammo for training but was shot down. The genesis for NTOG was when CFFSE had a visit from a couple of lads dressed in MEC outdoor gear, scruffy beards and wearing Oakley. I invited them to watch our NBP "Training". After they stopped laughing, I asked if they would be so kind as to write an assessment to send up the chain to RCN HQ. The rest is history.
> 
> 
> Back to OP APOLLO. We in Algonquin had White and Blue NBParties. Since Alg could only sail for a couple of weeks before needing a rest, one team would be the on watch NBP while the other team was with its departments (In my case the DeckO standing bridge watch). After the port visit the other team would be the on call boarding team and the other group would return to their departments. It worked very well during the deployments and neither team got burnt out.
> We were very busy intercepting go fasts and dhows during that OP.



FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!


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## Pelorus (16 Aug 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> If I had a magic wand we'd have 4 to 6 Astrix class AOR's (operated by civilians) and *4 Mistrals for HDAR/Sea Control Ops*.



This plan would of course also involve reorienting the majority of the Canadian Army to be a primarily amphibious operations force to fill those Mistrals, right?  :stirpot:


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## Colin Parkinson (16 Aug 2020)

The Van Doos did do so operational exercises from the French ones. We almost got the two built for Russia, I really wish we had, the time was right with our 280's dying and crew complements being roughly the same. I think we would find them highly useful ships for a lot of stuff we do and give us new opportunities as well. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI


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## Navy_Pete (16 Aug 2020)

Grimey said:
			
		

> FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!



The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.

Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake. 

In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.


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## Grimey (17 Aug 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.
> 
> Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake.
> 
> In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.



For Op Apollo on ALG, we had no embarked helairdet and left with no certified flight deck (we used a RN Sea King for that once in theatre.). We had full REMAR for MSE and were allocated a handful of training bunks.  HUR only had a skeleton crew at that time and threw bodies at us, along with the school.  

The NBP equipment was incredibly basic.  Blue nomex coveralls and oil skin ball caps.  We tried buying jungle boots in Guam at the PX.  That didn’t work out.  The sea boots at the time were the first generation that replaced the ankle cripplers.  Non breathable with an insulated liner.  Great for the GOO in July and August.  This was 18 years ago, I’m assuming the kit has improved somewhat since then.


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## SeaKingTacco (17 Aug 2020)

Grimey said:
			
		

> For Op Apollo on ALG, we had no embarked helairdet and left with no certified flight deck (we used a RN Sea King for that once in theatre.). We had full REMAR for MSE and were allocated a handful of training bunks.  HUR only had a skeleton crew at that time and threw bodies at us, along with the school.
> 
> The NBP equipment was incredibly basic.  Blue nomex coveralls and oil skin ball caps.  We tried buying jungle boots in Guam at the PX.  That didn’t work out.  The sea boots at the time were the first generation that replaced the ankle cripplers.  Non breathable with an insulated liner.  Great for the GOO in July and August.  This was 18 years ago, I’m assuming the kit has improved somewhat since then.



I remember that day on ALG with the RN Sea King. A bunch of us aircrew got RHIB’d over from OTT to help with safety and to act as hoisting dummies for the Brits. I then got my only flight in an RN Sea King, when they returned us to OTTat the end of the evolution.


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## FSTO (17 Aug 2020)

Grimey said:
			
		

> FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!



Those were they days weren't they?


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## FSTO (17 Aug 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.
> 
> Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake.
> 
> In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.



Doesn't quite mesh with the drive to minimum man the ships! That was one of the failings of the CPFs that there was zero room for training bunks.
I wonder what sort of extra room the CSC's will have for training bunks, riders, etc? Or will that just be another lesson relearned.


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## Weinie (17 Aug 2020)

According to the link below, complement of 157 with room for 208.

https://www.baesystems.com/en-uk/product/global-combat-ship


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## Weinie (17 Aug 2020)

Question, not being familiar with Halifax/Esquimalt.

With the CSC coming in at 50 feet longer and 15 feet wider than the Halifax class, will this cause berthing concerns in either of these two locations?


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## SeaKingTacco (17 Aug 2020)

Weinie said:
			
		

> Question, not being familiar with Halifax/Esquimalt.
> 
> With the CSC coming in at 50 feet longer and 15 feet wider than the Halifax class, will this cause berthing concerns in either of these two locations?



Yes. There is already a multi-multi million dollar project in Esquimalt to rebuild and replace jetties. Not too sure about Halifax.


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2020)

As I recall, jetties on both coasts are being rebuilt and replaced; and the capital ship projects (JSS, AOPS, CSC) are contributing to those construction projects.


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## daftandbarmy (17 Aug 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Yes. There is already a multi-multi million dollar project in Esquimalt to rebuild and replace jetties. Not too sure about Halifax.



I've paddled my U-Boat around inside Esquimalt harbour a few times (I know, I know, keep your Spinach tin closed, Popeye  ) and a couple of times it looked like my toy box when I was a kid... with all the ships jammed into one corner and all the red lego blocks (the buildings) in the other.

I have no idea how they operate a modern Navy out of a base that looks like a scene from a 'Master and Commander' episode


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## Navy_Pete (17 Aug 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Doesn't quite mesh with the drive to minimum man the ships! That was one of the failings of the CPFs that there was zero room for training bunks.
> I wonder what sort of extra room the CSC's will have for training bunks, riders, etc? Or will that just be another lesson relearned.



Minimum manning is relative to your operational posture and the number of concurrent things you want to do. For a standard readiness ship where you are only thinking of doing a single evolution or dealing with a single DC event (resulting from something other then enemy action) you need less people.  If you want to be at action stations (with helo available), be able to do force protection and respond to several DC events at once (like fires/floods from a missile hit) you need a lot of bodies.

The big rise in core crew to HR is in the combat department (as you don't need most of the ops room on a 1 in 2 for the average SR ops), but then you bolt on the secret squirrels, full air det, NTOG, Command staff, Legal, etc. it adds up. Even with minimum manning on the core crew, all these mission add on pers add up. Because of the small size of our fleet, we need to maximize all sea days, so unless you are at your last sea position for your trade, everyone is always training for the next job as well, so it's a big challenge to figure it all out when you are also trying to keep a 25+ year old ship going from A to B.

Min manning also depends on a lot more remote monitoring and control, but that also requires a lot more special skills and maintenance, which is generally expensive. IPMS is okay, but didn't actually automate anything we weren't already doing other then adding some cameras. And as soon as you get a serious glitch, the manning requirements skyrocket, so it's always good to have enough trained people to be able to limp into a safe port manually if you need to. If the ships never went to sea without ever having a fully functional IPMS you'd never have a ship at sea; that generally means you need more then the min manning levels to operate normally. It's all those things that look good on paper that fall apart when you hit reality.

Not to be doom and gloom, but the min manning assumptions usually have a lot of Pollyannish levels of optimism built in, but those don't normally get re-evaluated when you have equipment issues unless it's a major fault affecting something specific, and not the cumulative result of numerous minor faults that eat up a lot of time collectively. That's where it's useful to do the roll-up supersystem level risk assessments and see if the NAVORD min crew still makes sense, but don't think that would get any traction. Usually workable as there are extras built in, but if the design assumptions for a new ship make it truly minimum manning it could be tough.  Would be curious to see what the Type 26 assumptions are, and if they allow for system/capability degradation over the life of the class.

Personally think they should build ships to carry an extra 25% crew (at least) then the standard HR intent allows (or at least size the hotel services for them at the start). You can always add in more bunks and life rafts, but unless you allocate space for food, water and size hotel services at the start, it's virtually impossible to get more afterwards. It was easy with the 280s to sail with 50 empty bunks but you can't just suddenly make space to store 25% more food, water, process sewage etc.  Historically we always try and do everything at once and can't see that mindset changing, and think it's just stupid to think we won't immediately fill up every extra bunk with people (especially if the crew is smaller then what we are used to on a frigate).


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## NavyShooter (17 Aug 2020)

Back in the 90's, I was on CHA and we took her to the Sound Range overnight.  We went to 'minimum' manning overnight, and we only brought enough personnel to safely get the ship to the bouys, then landed most of them, spent the night, brought them back, and came back alongside after our sound trials were done.  I stayed onboard since as a SONAR Tech, I was 'critical' manning.  We barely had a steaming watch aboard overnight - we moved the ship out with 90 personnel, and the number that sticks in my mind is that we kept about 30 onboard overnight.  (Several RHIB rides to land/embark crew.)  


The number 90 is about the 'minimum' you can get a Halifax Class ship off the wall with - but there's no sustainment, no depth of field in personnel, no multiple watches, that's enough to sail to the Basin, or to the bouys, and back.  


When we went to Libya in 2011, we had 254 personnel onboard, and that doesn't include 'new' attachments such as NTOG or teams to operate UAV's and such.  


NS


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## Underway (18 Aug 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Yes. There is already a multi-multi million dollar project in Esquimalt to rebuild and replace jetties. Not too sure about Halifax.



AOPS was driving that jetty creation on the East Coast (NJ), aside from NF they are long enough to handle CSC, and CSC will only stick out a little bit from one.  Getting two in that camber could happen but there is no way that a tug would fit between them given the new beam.

The one CSC driven replacement I can completely confirm on the West Coast is the ammo jetty.  It's not deep or long enough to take the JSS or CSC.  Need to ammo by barge, which adds its own complications (mostly increased time).  A and B jetty replacement were in the cards a long time ago and I'm not sure if AOPS or CSC were the driving factors.  Those types of projects have many years lead time, and I think the jetties were just needing modern upgrades.  



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I have no idea how they operate a modern Navy out of a base that looks like a scene from a 'Master and Commander' episode



Exactly what we want the Chinese to think...


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## Humphrey Bogart (18 Aug 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> Minimum manning is relative to your operational posture and the number of concurrent things you want to do. For a standard readiness ship where you are only thinking of doing a single evolution or dealing with a single DC event (resulting from something other then enemy action) you need less people.  If you want to be at action stations (with helo available), be able to do force protection and respond to several DC events at once (like fires/floods from a missile hit) you need a lot of bodies.
> 
> The big rise in core crew to HR is in the combat department (as you don't need most of the ops room on a 1 in 2 for the average SR ops), but then you bolt on the secret squirrels, full air det, NTOG, Command staff, Legal, etc. it adds up. Even with minimum manning on the core crew, all these mission add on pers add up. Because of the small size of our fleet, we need to maximize all sea days, so unless you are at your last sea position for your trade, everyone is always training for the next job as well, so it's a big challenge to figure it all out when you are also trying to keep a 25+ year old ship going from A to B.
> 
> ...



I think a lot of the issues with bolt on capabilities is the fact that the Ships we presently operate, were never conceptualized to be operating some of the capabilities we are now bringing on and expecting.  When the Halifax Class was designed, there was no thought given to having UAVs, Enhanced Boarding Parties, Special Operations Forces, Secret Squirrels, etc operating on our Ships and as a result we are making due with what we have.  I am confident that the new Type 26 will address all of these issues, particularly with the Flexible Mission Bay, Dedicated UAV Facilities, etc.  The fact it has VLS is also a major leap forward for us.  

We need to be very careful of placing constraints on ourselves based solely on the present limitations of our equipment.  It will not be this way in the future and I think scrapping capabilities simply because they don't presently fit perfectly on our equipment (due to it showing its age) is a mistake.


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## suffolkowner (18 Aug 2020)

So is the CSC going to be cramped or short personnel? Wikipedia has the Halifax class at 225 and the type 26 at 157(up to 208). I'm assuming automation will drive some of those numbers down but also that we will maybe sail at closer to the upper limit?


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## Cloud Cover (18 Aug 2020)

We don’t know because our version of the T26 hasn’t been designed yet. It would be puzzling if the RCN recommends to government to go forward with a ship that doesn’t accommodate extra personnel and have room for systems growth and/or expansion.


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## suffolkowner (18 Aug 2020)

CloudCover said:
			
		

> We don’t know because our version of the T26 hasn’t been designed yet. It would be puzzling if the RCN recommends to government to go forward with a ship that doesn’t accommodate extra personnel and have room for systems growth and/or expansion.



Is it that easy or is their that much flexibility in the design for 25-50 extra personnel


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## Lumber (18 Aug 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> The big rise in core crew to HR is in the combat department (as you don't need most of the ops room on a 1 in 2 for the average SR ops), but then you bolt on the secret squirrels, full air det, NTOG, Command staff, Legal, etc. it adds up.



The navy desperately needs a shake up in how our combat ops department fights. For action station manning, off the top of my head I could get rid of 3 NESOPs, 3 if not 4 SONAROPs, and at least one of the back row. We make work for ourselves and underemploy.


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## Cloud Cover (18 Aug 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> The navy desperately needs a shake up in how our combat ops department fights. For action station manning, off the top of my head I could get rid of 3 NESOPs, 3 if not 4 SONAROPs, and at least one of the back row. We make work for ourselves and underemploy.



Budget 2021 will take care of that!!


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## Navy_Pete (18 Aug 2020)

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> Is it that easy or is their that much flexibility in the design for 25-50 extra personnel



Nope, it's complicated. Even if you double bunk people, you need more water, food, heating/cooling, sewage etc.  Plus there is all the safety things like liferafts, escape routes etc to consider. None of that is a deal breaker, but it's not as simple as dropping a few cots in and calling it a day.

Some of those things can be bolted on, but others require underlying changes to piping, or would not be changeable without a total reconfiguration of the tanking (and everything running in/out of it), and doing things like having water restrictions as the norm (which is usually a non-starter for morale reasons, but people have gotten pretty soft in that respect).

Allowing for it during design makes it really easy. You can do simple things like put in the triple bunks instead of double from the start with the lockers available, have the storage capacity for water/food and sewage for a bigger crew no issue. It all adds extra legs when not in use but means you don't have to do major engineering changes to add it on later. No different then allowing for growth on power demands, stability etc in the original design, as that stuff is also really expensive to change once it's built.


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## stoker dave (19 Aug 2020)

Just for historical perspective, prior to deployment to the Gulf in 1990 (OP FRICTION) there was an immediate requirement to add bunks to all three ships that deployed.  It took some creative work to stuff in all those extra people.


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