# A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea



## Jason Jarvis (30 Jun 2003)

William Johnstone, _A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea_ (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).


It has been almost fifty years since the end of the Korean War.

For those Canadians who still care about our country‘s military history, it has become a cliche to refer to the Korean War as our "forgotten" war. Coming as it did only five years after the end of the Second World War, and ending 25 years after the First World War, it failed to earn much space in the nation‘s collective conscience.

Caught flat-footed by the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, Parliament initially responded by sending three destroyers and a transport squadron to help the UN forces fighting in the region. UN and American pressure, along with public opinion, forced the government‘s hand, and in early August it was announced that a new, "Special Force" three battalion brigade group, the 25th Brigade, would be recruited for service in Korea. Recruting centres were swamped with applicants -- mostly Second World War veterans -- and by December 1950 the first unit, 2 PPCLI, was on its way to the Far East. Joined by the rest of the 25th Brigade shortly after its battle at Kap‘yong, the Canadians joined 1st Commonwealth Division in July 1951, where they remained until the end of the war. It was eventually decided that Canadian soldiers would only spend a year in theatre, and the Special Force volunteers in the 2nd battalions (RCR, PPCLI, R22R) were followed by the professional soldiers of the 1st battalions, who in turn were replaced for the last few months of fighting by the remainder of the Special Force volunteers in the 3rd battalions. Canadian casualites numbered 309 killed and 1202 wounded, out of a total of 21 940 soldiers who served in the Far East.

The past five years have seen several books published on Canada‘s role in the Korean War. The two most well-known are David Bercuson‘s _Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War_ and Ted Barris‘ _Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War, 1950-1953_, both published in 1999. Bercuson‘s work is more typical military history fare, while Barris‘ work is a popular history. Read together, the two complement each other very well. They were joined in 2002 by Brent Byron Watson‘s _Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953_, another military historical analysis of Canada‘s role in the war.

As the 50th anniversary of the end of the Korean War approaches, it is perhaps appropriate that the most controversial analysis of the Canadian Army in Korea has been published. Where William Johnstone departs from previous analyses is in his contention that



> ... the officers of the Special Force units exhibited greater professionalism in their approach to operations than the regulars of the 1st battalions, a difference encapsulated in the "active defence" of the former and the "inactive defence" of the latter. Although up to half of the Special Force enlistees had seen army service during the Second World War, it was the combat experience and leadership of the 2nd battalions‘ officers and NCOs -- men who demonstrated a clear understanding of the profession of arms -- that gave these units their operational superiority.... Far from being "slapped together" and rushed off to war, the 25th Brigade was, in fact, the best-prepared and most combat-ready force Canada has ever fielded at the outset of a conflict.


These are fighting words indeed, but to Johnstone‘s credit he backs them up. Throughout this meticulously researched work, he systematically compares and contrasts the approach to war-fighting of the Special Force volunteers and Active Force professionals. Time and again, the volunteers come out on top.

Johnstone is especially effusive in his praise for the first brigade commander, Brigadier John Rockingham, "one of the most dynamic brigade commanders the Canadian Army has ever produced." Under Rockingham‘s leadership,



> the Canadian brigade exhibited a thorough approach to all its operations, most notably in its appreciation for the old adage, "Time spent in recconnaissance is never wasted." ... By their continual use of recce patrols roaming to the far side of no man‘s land, the 2nd battalions were able to build up a reasonable picture of the enemy‘s dispositions and routines, knowledge that was essential to planning both offensive and defensive operations.... Their vigorous patrol program also gave Rockingham‘s men a familiarity with the ground over which they had to operate and the confidence that they were more than a match for their Chinese opponents "by night or by day."


This is in stark contrast to the activities of the professionals in the 1st battalions:



> The complete absence of recce patrols from the 1st battalions‘ task tables, on the other hand, is nothing short of astounding. The regulars‘ failure to reconnoitre forward of their standing patrol positions gave their ambushes little chance of intercepting the Chinese.... their large fighting patrols were normally sent into no man‘s land with little knowledge of enemy strength, the type of ground they had to cover, or the existence of old wire obstacles or minefields.... Perhaps the most serious consequence of the 1st battalions‘ inactivity, however, was its psychological impact on the men.... In the case of the Canadian 1st battalions, the "sit tight" mentality ... produced a perceptible fear of the enemies abilities and an overreliance on the divisional artillery to protect them from serious attack.


What were the reasons behind the difference in performance of the 2nd and 1st battalions?

Johnstone believes that the Special Force volunteers "combined a willingness to fight with sufficient combat experience to understand what was required to succeed in battle. Rockingham, who candidly admitted to being ‘not particularly keen about soldiering when there is no fighting involved,‘ also provided his men with the drive and forward leadership he had demonstrated during the Second World War, _a style that was all too rare in the Canadian army._" (my emphasis)

The 1st battalions, led by Brig. M.P. Bogert, suffered from a "dugout mindset," which was the result "of the poor battlefield leadership provided by their officers and not, as some historians [Bercuson and Watson] have argued, the product of inadequate weapons and training. Given their additional Bren guns, the regulars were, if anything, slightly better equipped than the Special Force battalions, and their unwillingness to patrol as actively as either the Australians or Rockingham‘s men must be seen as a failing of their senior officers."

Johnstone is quick to point out, however, that this attitude was *not indicative* of the entire army: "At the very least, [Brig. Jean] Allard‘s ability to recognize the brigade‘s deficiencies and take the necessary corrective action with the 3rd battalions -- as well as the performance of those Active Force officers who were good enough to serve under Rockingham‘s watchful eye -- shows that the regular army did contain a number of efficient combat officers."

In his efforts to rehabilitate the reputation of the Special Force volunteers, Johnstone _seems_ to go out of his way to highlight the disdain shown by the professionals towards the volunteers. For instance, the day after arriving in the 25th Brigade‘s rear area, the officers of 1 RCR held a mess dinner in formal dress uniforms, and the battalion war diary notes that even when they were in the line, there was "Mess Dinner in the Officer‘s Mess. All officers of the battalion attended wearing No. 1 Dress (Blues). Every Wednesday this will be occurring." There are also many comments about saluting and even polishing the bases of grenades. This seems a little much to me; his analysis alone is excellent and leads the reader to this conclusion by itself.

When I finished reading this book I felt a great sense of pride at the way Canadian soldiers conducted themselves in what was a truly dirty little war. After the thousand-bomber raids, massive tank battles and the dropping of atomic bombs in the Second World War, Korea‘s massed artillery and trench warfare seem more than a little anachronistic.

When I started the book, my first reaction was, "Oh come on, the professionals couldn‘t have done that bad." Now that I‘m done, I have to say that yes, they were, and that amazes me. But should it? Having read _Tarnished Brass_, _Tested Mettle_ and other recent exposes on today‘s army, I guess I shouldn‘t be too surprised that these things happened then -- or now.

I‘d be more than a little suprised if a few current and retired officers aren‘t insulted by Johnstone‘s argument. Unfortunately, not being a serving member of the CF, I‘ve no idea how today‘s army conducts itself while on operations (other than what I‘ve read in the above books). Academics are famous for saying things were X when the guys on the ground claim they were Y, and the the benefit of hindsight isn‘t always what it‘s cracked up to be. However, drawing as he has on the latest British, Australian and American research, I believe that Johnstone has stated his case very well and it deserves consideration.

Johnstone‘s closing comments should also serve as a warning to current political and military leaders -- both those who decide where our soldiers go, and those who lead them in theatre. As our troops prepare to deploy to Afghanistan, our officers would do well to take a page from Rockingham‘s book. While Korea didn‘t teach anyone anything new, it did ram home the importance of fundamentals -- and what happens to those who ignore them.



> Nonetheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the performance of the 1st battalions reflected the tendency of a peacetime force to adopt a garrison mentality, one geared more to military appearance and routine administration than to operations. With their emphasis on spit and polish, formal mess dinners, and smartly mounted bridge guards, the officers of the army‘s regular battalions seem to have forgotten the purpose of their profession.... If nothing else, the 25th Brigade‘s experience in Korea demonstrates that when an officer‘s motivation is suspect, his unit‘s operations are unlikely to succeed.


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## rolandstrong (30 Jun 2003)

I will read that one. Its a local piece (for me) too.


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## Danjanou (30 Jun 2003)

Jason, this looks like an excellent read. I‘ve seen some other sources that back up the idea that the second battalions were switched on too.


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## Jason Jarvis (1 Jul 2003)

It *is* a great read. A little dry and detached, maybe, but it is written by an "official" historian, so this shouldn‘t come as too much of a surprise. I highly recommend Ted Barris‘ _Deadlock in Korea_ if you want a taste of the "human" aspect of the war.

I liked it because it‘s a real meat ‘n‘ potatoes book -- well-researched, convincingly argued, and controversial. This is the type of book that should make it‘s way around every officer‘s mess in the country. Johnstone raises some excellent points, and his observations about the 25th Brigade are just as applicable today as they were fifty years ago.

Say what you will about "academic" military histories -- this book‘s actually worth the paper on which it‘s printed.

Highly recommended.


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