# Battle Procedure and the Operational Planning Process



## pbi (14 Nov 2010)

And another thing.... ;D

Comments on how big a Bde HQ shouldn't, IMHO, be based on looking at the current JTF(A) HQ as a model. Although it is a "Brigade-like" HQ, it is very big (the last one I was involved training with was about 150 or so), and it has a span of control and area of interest MUCH larger than the simple little  "beef and two veg"  manoeuvre Bdes that I learned about in Staff College back in the Cold War days. As an example, when we briefed the structure, role and functions of JTF(A) HQ to our US counterparts in US Army Battle Command Training Programme, their reaction was that the US Army would use a Div HQ, not a Bde HQ, to cover that wide a waterfront.

JTF(A) is way too big to use as a realistic model for a standard Bde HQ structure.

On the other hand, I was also involved in doing some Level 7 training for both 2 CMBG HQ and 1 CMBG HQ (not in connection with Aghanistan). I found that both of these HQs (2 CMBG in particular), were neither established nor manned anything like what they needed to be for modern operations in which much more happens at Bde and Bn than I think we traditionally ever envisioned. Some combat capabilities that we now accept as a standard part of  operations, such as Influence Activity, Fires, Plans and Information Management were either weak or absent in their structures. (No slight intended-both HQs were filled by excellent people doing their best and making things happen)

 In my opinion, it isn't that modern conflict is more complex(-that IMHO is a conceit of our times)-but that we (and by "we" I include the US Army with its "brigade-based" structure") are attempting to do much more at lower levels than we ever envisioned, with the result that staff structures need to reflect that increased demand.

And, sorry, but I don't buy the "RMA" argument that the digitization of information handling, or of C2, has somehow enabled us to cut the number of people we need. The more information that is pouring in to a HQ, the more intelligent, trained and capable human beings you need to make sense out of it so that the Comd (who, let's remember, this is all for...) can avoid drowning or info paralysis.

Cheers


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> Comments on how big a Bde HQ shouldn't, IMHO, be based on looking at the current JTF(A) HQ as a model.



I used numbers for a CMBG.  TFK will by nature be larger as it is both a formation HQ as well as an NSC (US Bdes don't have to deal with things like bringing water in weekly from the Middle East).



> On the other hand, I was also involved in doing some Level 7 training for both 2 CMBG HQ and 1 CMBG HQ (not in connection with Aghanistan). I found that both of these HQs (2 CMBG in particular), were neither established nor manned anything like what they needed to be for modern operations in which much more happens at Bde and Bn than I think we traditionally ever envisioned. Some combat capabilities that we now accept as a standard part of  operations, such as Influence Activity, Fires, Plans and Information Management were either weak or absent in their structures. (No slight intended-both HQs were filled by excellent people doing their best and making things happen)



That is interesting and is probably one good starting point for deciding what we do need.  The question is do these additional tasks require the 50 - 200 % increase in staff sizes that we've seen?



> And, sorry, but I don't buy the "RMA" argument that the digitization of information handling, or of C2, has somehow enabled us to cut the number of people we need. The more information that is pouring in to a HQ, the more intelligent, trained and capable human beings you need to make sense out of it so that the Comd (who, let's remember, this is all for...) can avoid drowning or info paralysis.



While I'm also a disbeliever in RMA voodoo, I'll argue that we don't need more people to handle more information and processes but rather need less information and processes.  I'll have to dig into the sources, but there is some good debate on this if one looks that suggests that up to 60% of the "product" produced by a formation staff is not used by the commander.  Much of the information coming in and the staff processes being conducting (including some of OPP) is largely useless and wasted manhours.  Operational analysis of the wartime performance of various Bde HQs seems to support this.  Perhaps the focus should be on staff discipline - what we need to do with what we got vice what we can do if you give us this.


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## Journeyman (14 Nov 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Much of the information coming in and the staff processes being conducting (including some of OPP) is largely useless and wasted manhours.


_Technoviking_, the planning god, will be along shortly to address the heresy.   ;D


But as taught, it's not necessarily the plan, but the _planning_ (even the discarded bits) that will prepare us for contingencies -- that whole "enemy gets a vote" thing. 

However, to immediately contradict myself on the utility of our large HQ's staff-heavy OPP   I'm not sure what the solution is, in that I agree that the process has become overly cumbersome, defeating any concept of nimbleness. Additionally, after all that effort, there's a tendency to be both wedded to the plan regardless of conditions unfolding, as well as nullifying most efforts at mission command.


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## Old Sweat (14 Nov 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm not sure what the solution is, in that I agree that the process has become overly cumbersome, defeating any concept of nimbleness. Additionally, after all that effort, there's a tendency to be both wedded to the plan regardless of conditions unfolding, as well as nullifying most efforts at mission command.



I think Journeyman has hit upon a key to our command structure here. When I was at staff college getting the magic PSC forty years ago, for all the talk about plans not surviving contact with the enemy, there was an atmosphere of "if your plan was any good, you shouldn't have to change it." As I wrote about a certain senior Canadian commander in Normandy, he seemed to believe "no enemy could survive contact with his plan."


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2010)

I'll have to dig for it but there is a good article from the British Army Review that points to one of the problems being that formation orders are now written by committee when they should be written by 1 staff officer or at max 2.  End result is everybody throws their annex and/or paragraph in and numerous briefs and coords must take place.  End result is you get the 100% solution that is irrelevant because of friendly or enemy action as opposed to the 80% solution that gets the Comd's subordinates pointed in the right direction with the right information and coordination in a timely manner.

From this, I guess time from flash to bang for Battle Procedure is a key, if not the key, metric in this.  Do larger HQs mean faster BP?  Lots of organizational theory suggests not.


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## McG (14 Nov 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> Comments on how big a Bde HQ shouldn't, IMHO, be based on looking at the current JTF(A) HQ as a model.





			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I used numbers for a CMBG.


... and I wasn't looking at JTF(A) either.  

In the end, I don't think the brigade HQs are the places for fixing the "too much HQ problem."  I am sure there are efficiencies that could be achieved in the brigade HQs, but the real clean-up needs to happen outside the field force in the various intermediate level HQs of the institutional structure.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'll have to dig into the sources, but there is some good debate on this if one looks that suggests that up to 60% of the "product" produced by a formation staff is not used by the commander.


Sometimes I wonder if the "product" is even used beyond the cell that creates it.  After answering the same questions for the third time in the third format for a third section of the next higher HQ, one wants to ask: "Don't you guys talk to eachother?  We've already told you this."


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## CombatDoc (14 Nov 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> From this, I guess time from flash to bang for Battle Procedure is a key, if not the key, metric in this.  Do larger HQs mean faster BP?  Lots of organizational theory suggests not.


Not to mention the flash to bang for PowerPoint presentations, another key HQ metric.  One could argue that larger HQs mean larger, more polished PP meetings.


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## McG (14 Nov 2010)

CombatDoc said:
			
		

> Not to mention the flash to bang for PowerPoint presentations, another key HQ metric.  One could argue that larger HQs mean larger, more polished PP meetings.


Too bad the same cannot be said of the clear, concise and sufficiently detailed briefing note.


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## pbi (19 Nov 2010)

> From this, I guess time from flash to bang for Battle Procedure is a key, if not the key, metric in this.  Do larger HQs mean faster BP?  Lots of organizational theory suggests not.



I tend to agree with the old German idea that a small, hard-working staff is better than a bloated staff that typically produces lots of fire and smoke but not much useful energy. A key ingredient is a kick-*** COS who is not reduced to being an office manager, but again in the German tradition has the ear of the Comd, and  the seniority and experience to orchestrate the "G's" and keep the machine focused. A HQ is a unit and it needs leadership.

That said, we need to take a first principles look at just what a HQ is supposed to be able to do these days, under what conditions, and for how long at a stretch. I'm not sure how directly relevant the study of Cdn HQs in WWII might really be, other than perhaps for some background perspective: I suggest we look at UK and US Bde-level experience in OIF and in Afgh.

I am encouraged to see the rise of the one-page, "landscape page" FRAG O accompanied by a simple graphic: this is eminently practical and IMHO is the way to go for most things once the "framework" or "backbone" OP O is on the street. It certainly cuts down your turnaround time and lets you respond better to the changes that are going to happen. It reminds me of the overlay OP O, which we reluctantly took out of AOC curriculum because, you know, Battleview is so.....great, right? (I was part of that decision, so _mea culpa_).

I also agree fully that the target for the axe needs to be above Bde (try the .COMS), but, before we swing any axe at any HQ, we need that common sense first-principles review, so that we don't follow the fine Canadian military traditions of either:

a) going to far in the opposite trend; or

b) throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Cheers


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## Infanteer (20 Nov 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> That said, we need to take a first principles look at just what a HQ is supposed to be able to do these days, under what conditions, and for how long at a stretch. I'm not sure how directly relevant the study of Cdn HQs in WWII might really be, other than perhaps for some background perspective: I suggest we look at UK and US Bde-level experience in OIF and in Afgh.



The quote in my sigline is from an article by J.P. Storr looking at UK Bdes in Gulf 1 and 2 was one of my principle sources.  You can read it here:

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/068.pdf

His conclusions aren't very flattering.



> 26. Timeliness. Much of this criticism would not affect operational effectiveness directly – it would simply keep excessive numbers of staff officers busy. However, the critical impact was that on important occasions the relevant orders were released too late. For example, 5 fragmentary orders regarding initial operations were released by the Divisional HQ on 21 March, the day after operations started. Operations to enter Basrah are another example. A fragmentary order warning of the possibility of entering Basrah was released by HQ 1st Armoured Division on 2 April. On 5 April the (battalion) battlegroups (BGs) of 7th Armoured Brigade received warning of an orders group, to be held on 7 April, concerning operations to occupy Basrah not before 8 April. Basrah fell on the morning of 6 April; 7th Armoured Brigade rushed out an operation order dated 0600hrs that day which acknowledged that some of the events in the order may already have taken place. They had. The Divisional HQ rushed out a fragmentary order, which said very little of substance, dated 0815hrs. Thus neither the Division nor the Brigade had a contingency plan, in the shape of an order, to cover a contingency which had been discussed in February. However, both HQs clearly thought that one was required. Either the order was unnecessary, or it was too late. In those circumstances, it seems that short contingency plans written on perhaps 2nd or 3rd April would have been sufficient.  Similarly, the Divisional HQ released its orders for Phase 4 – peace support operations – on 21 April, 15 days after Basrah fell. In the interim battlegroups were largely left to their own devices, and there was a lack of clarity of responsibility between, for example, the CO of in-place BG in Basrah, the commander and the staff of 7th Armoured Brigade, and the divisional artillery commander, who had been appointed to oversee military governance. Such criticisms are not unique to the British Army: a member of the HQ of 1st Marine Division commented that ‘The planning cycle was way behind the execution being conducted by the forward commanders. Div HQ was still producing lengthy OPLANS and FRAGOs that were too late for the commanders, as they had already stepped off.’



I'm with you on your other points.


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## pbi (20 Nov 2010)

Our last UK Exchange O at the College knew JP Storr: "Jim Storr The History Bore" was, (I think), the nickname he used. Storr is well known for challenging commonly held opinions and smashing sacred idols, especially newly created ones that tend to recycle well-established common sense dressed up as the latest snake oil. I have a couple of his other articles somewhere.

I'm reminded of every overseas deployment I ever went on, either for operations or for NATO exercises. If we'd waited for the OpO before making our plans, we'd never have gottten there.  One of the things we try to teach at the AOC (with varying degrees of sucess) is the concept of "collaborative planning", in which the lead HQ pulls up planners (as distinct from LOs) from its subordinate HQs as early as possible and involves them in the planning process. Done well, this can result it much more realistic plans, and a significantly reduced "flash to bang" in battle procdure, as the subordinate HQs are much more in the info loop. By the time the OpO is issued, it's almost a formality, and there should be few surprises for the subordinate HQs.

Unfortunately, we see the opposite HQ staff mentality too often, the one that says "knowledge is power", and nothing gets released until it almost of historical interest only.

Cheers


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## Infanteer (20 Nov 2010)

Colloaberative planning sounds good, but I'd view it as a luxary in that we can use it for deliberate operations without really being pre-empted; much of our Afghan Ops fit this mold.

However, there comes a point where 1 or 2 guys got to sit down with the Comd, get his intent, and rip off the 80% solution in quick time.  Giving Divisions and Brigades 16-24 hours for OPP is unrealistic against any enemy with skill - Patton gave Divs 12.  This gives Bdes 8 and BGs at no more than 5.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Nov 2010)

Good old fashioned _battle procedure_ - remember that? the whole process by which a commander does his reconnaissance, makes his appreciation, etc, etc, etc _ad infinitum_ - provides a solid foundation for _collaborative planning_ through the *timely* issuing of _guidance_ and, as soon as is humanly possible, warning orders. Warning orders can always be retracted or modified as the situation dictates - but only if they are issued in a *timely* manner. Delay - to avoid embarrassment? to avoid a blast of shit? - is unforgivable.


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## Infanteer (21 Nov 2010)

I've separated the discussion on OPP and BP from the "senior ranks" discussion.

Battle procedure is still effective and one can never go wrong with the 1/3-2/3 rule.

The problem I see is what we put into Battle Procedure.  Having sat through (to some extent) OPP in both Canadian and American formations (Bde/Reg) one of the biggest issues from a time perspective is briefs and "coords".  Info Briefs and Decision Briefs along with the various coord instructions involved add lots of time to Battle Procedure.  If we are going to get BP to an aggressive time for flash to bang, minimizing or doing away with some of these is a step.  Another issue is orders - see the link I provided above for a good example.  Formation orders for many things are junk, plain and simple.  When the mission statement is a paragraph instead of a sentence and the concept of operations reads like a graduate thesis, you know you've got a problem.  As PBI indicated, a shit-hot COS can eliminate this - but if we are putting future shit-hot COS' through a system of mediocrity, are we really setting them up for success?

As an aside, one of the more interesting anecdotes I saw was one on the Indian Army (again from Storr, this time in his book).  A large Army of some 30-ish Divisions, the Indian Army shares the same heritage that we do (re: British).  However, they never had the NATO/US influence on their C2 over the last 50 years.  An Indian Army Division today has almost the exact same Divisional Staff as a British Division in the Second World War (this can be extrapolated to Brigades and Battalions as well), meaning that a Bde had between 10-15 on the staff and a Div between 20-30 (compared to the 70-150 man monsters we see today).  Yet it was producing decisions four times faster then the "norm" for a modern NATO Division.  This is an Army that has been extremely active in the last 50 years, so it isn't a case of an obsolete force.  Storr compared the modern Indian Army Division as on par to a 1980s NATO one (ie: prior to digitization).  Although less capable in what it can do, it is illuminating in pointing out that all this information and extra staff doesn't appear to have added any substance to the formation it serves.

In Canada, there is heavy influence by the American way of doing things.  I'm observing an interesting debate elsewhere on how the American Army is the best at the doing the American Way of Doing things, but that there is some contention from observers both inside and out on whether this approach is as effective as it appears.  This is a system of large, high ranking staffs, reams of information flowing through high technology, and complex C2 models backed by veritable tomes for doctrine.  This system uses as a metric of success the defeat of the Iraqi Army, twice.  Comment I saw was that it was 4th rate in 1991 and 10th rate in 2003.

Anyways, it is interesting to see.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Nov 2010)

I think the difference in the speed (timeliness) of decision making (Indian (old British) vs NATO (American)) Infanteer highlights is, as he suggests, a function of a modern (Post Second World War) trend in American decision making and American _management_, in general: CYA (Cover Your Ass). CYA is, above all, a time consuming process

I find it interesting, but not proof of anything, that Robert S McNamara went back to Detroit (after being one of the many _industrial academics_ who helped modernize American defence _productivity_ in the 1940s) mightily impressed by the military's analysis and decision making processes which he found to be quick, accurate and ruthlessly focused on results. He, adapting some of those methods, then helped to revolutionize the American automotive industry. But when he went back to Washington, 15 years later, as Secretary of Defence, he brought with him and imposed civilian decision making processes that were, already, being found wanting. It appears, to me that some (much? most?) of the CYA got embedded in US and, therefore, NATO C2 during and just after McNamara. Sadly, it is still there, and here, I suspect.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Nov 2010)

I think that we can make BP faster by being ruthless about what we make decisions about.  Some annexes seem to be written for the sake of completeness instead of for a _bonefide_ reason. The mission and intent bit have gotten a little out of control as well. The CONOPS approval process will, most likely, further strangle BP over the next generation. I'm not a big fan of backbriefs, unless perhaps you are doing an Op with lots of interconnected moving parts. 

As an aside, I really don't like the one-page landscape orders that have taken over the army.  A wall of Font 8 text written out of normal reading order with lots of references to read some other annex doesn't represent progess for me. A nice 8 page BG Op Order in Font 10 with lots of blank space in the margins presented in the normal sequence (including the G&T within the doc and not an annex) with text actually written about something that came out of the estimate instead of cut and pasted from the higher Op Order is what I like.


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## vonGarvin (21 Nov 2010)

For me, orders are about passing information.  If the medium for that passage is verbose and unreadable, then it's ineffective.  It seems that we've forgotten the ABCs of military writing:
Accuracy
Brevity
Clarity


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2010)

You lot know that I like playing with words.  That's because words have generally accepted meanings, even if they are only temporary.  Those meanings drive conversations and ideas.

Is there any merit to the notion of replacing the word "planning" with the word "gaming"?

To "plan" suggests reviewing the "known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns" then come up with an NFL playbook suitable for every conceivable situation.  But as Journeyman says the real benefit of the planning process is that it allows the operator that is going to have to implement the plan the opportunity to evaluate all the available resources, become familiar with them and how they might be used in different situations.

"Gaming" accomplishes the same thing but doesn't impose the expectation of a final and unchangeable plan. On the down side it also has unfortunated connotations when you are taking about real people and their lives.


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## PPCLI Guy (21 Nov 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> I tend to agree with the old German idea that a small, hard-working staff is better than a bloated staff that typically produces lots of fire and smoke but not much useful energy.



I could not agree more.  I frequently tell anyone that will listen that the headquarters where I work is about to get a lot better due to the impending cuts to bloat.  The other staff don't seem to agree...



> A key ingredient is a kick-*** COS who is not reduced to being an office manager, but again in the German tradition has the ear of the Comd, and  the seniority and experience to orchestrate the "G's" and keep the machine focused. A HQ is a unit and it needs leadership.



Again, I agree.  I have now seen, up close, two Comds (both Engrs by the way) that have fully empowered their COS to run the formation that they command.  This enables quick decision-making, but is contingent on a COS that both has the trust of the Comd, and fully understands the Comd's vision and intent.



> I am encouraged to see the rise of the one-page, "landscape page" FRAG O accompanied by a simple graphic: this is eminently practical and IMHO is the way to go for most things once the "framework" or "backbone" OP O is on the street. It certainly cuts down your turnaround time and lets you respond better to the changes that are going to happen.



Wholeheartedly concur.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Nov 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is there any merit to the notion of replacing the word "planning" with the word "gaming"?
> 
> To "plan" suggests reviewing the "known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns" then come up with an NFL playbook suitable for every conceivable situation.  But as Journeyman says the real benefit of the planning process is that it allows the operator that is going to have to implement the plan the opportunity to evaluate all the available resources, become familiar with them and how they might be used in different situations.



Well, wargaming is a critical part of the operational planning process. If its done right you two or three fleshed-out COAs. You use one, but you then have one or two that could be used as CONPLANs.

I know that you are fond of your football vs rugby metaphor, but I am not sure that it really fits.

I've seen overlay orders used effectively. The COAs that were not used were handed out to the subordinate units, and when one was used all that was needed was for the HQ to designate who had what part to play.


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## Kirkhill (22 Nov 2010)

in





			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ....
> 
> I know that you are fond of your football vs rugby metaphor, but I am not sure that it really fits.
> 
> ......



Darn.  I'll now have to go and find another one.  .

And I can see how the "overlay" system can be made to work but it always seems to me to be rather stultifying.  In a rapidly changing environment, where you don't have time to huddle up and review tactics, I don't believe that it works.

I info'd Infanteer about an article in last months Harvard Business Review comparing Navy/Air Force types as CEOs vs Army/Marine types as CEOs.  Basically it came to the conclusion that Air Force/Navy managers were "Process Oriented " managers whose career training drove them to religiously adhere to check lists in order to eliminate risks insofar as possible because the results of failure were so catastrophic in both lives and treasure.  If one mistake is made, and the flight deck incident aboard the USS Ticonderoga was cited as an example then hundreds die and hunrdeds of millions of dollars are lost, or inadvertently innocents can die.

By contrast the army and marine types were trained to accept risks and act on the balance of probabilities.  Their battlefield generally was more complex as there were more individual moving parts but conversely the loss of one part didn't materially affect the outcome.  They were trained not to eliminate risk, but to manage risk.

The Playbook system strikes me as Process Management and might be applicable for a raid or another short tem task.  But the longer the engagement continues, and the faster the pace of the engagement, then the less effective the playbook system becomes, in my opinion.  In a protracted campaign the opportunities to huddle up will become fewer and farther between.  That would seem to be particularly true if you want to get inside the OODA loop of a flat and amorphous enemy organization that makes decisions only one or two levels removed from the battlefield.

Harvard Business Review link


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Nov 2010)

Its a planning process. Its not a management system. To me, the trick is not to cut steps out of the process but to shorten the time spent on the steps. If time is short maybe you don't wargame everything but rather on a couple of steps that you determine are critical (which is a wargaming method). Now, if we are simply following the OPP/MDMP process and putting in checkmarks without any real thinking then yes, we are getting too focused on the process. If the Op Order doesn't come out in time then process has trumped product. Again, I don't see an issue with the process as long as we do a time estimate and stick to it. 

I don't see overlay orders as stultifying - what are you basing your impression on? They are simply graphical representations of what you want done. I don't walk around with a playbook, but when you think about it we do have a number of basic plays that we execute. When I say "right flanking" people can visualize what is going to happen and they don't need very much more to make it work. When I say "defile drill" they know what to do. They adapt these to the situation, but they have a start point. Having these basic plays/drills means that we get things done quickly.


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## Kirkhill (22 Nov 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> .....
> I don't walk around with a playbook, but when you think about it we do have a number of basic plays that we execute. When I say "right flanking" people can visualize what is going to happen and they don't need very much more to make it work. When I say "defile drill" they know what to do. They adapt these to the situation, but they have a start point. Having these basic plays/drills means that we get things done quickly.



And that is precisely why I prefer "Rugby" to "Football".  One inculcates a tendency to look to the sidelines for guidance.  The other tendency is to focus on the developing play with a constant awareness of the goal, the ball, teammates positions and anticipated actions, opposition positions and anticipated actions - coupled with rapid decision making at the lowest possible level.


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Nov 2010)

Many sports analogies work nicely in isolation, but we are not playing a sport. There are no sidelines. There are no coaches.

The willingness of commanders (at all levels) to use initiative springs from the prevailing command climate, not what sport they played in college.


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## vonGarvin (22 Nov 2010)

I would offer that "sidelines" represent "limitations" and coaches = chain of command.  Yes, I'm being serious.  If for one person the rugby (league or union?) analogy works, then I can see it.

War has gone from NFL football (only one person in motion, set "plays") to CFL football (more in motion, wider and longer limits, but still very similar to the previous version) to a more dynamic version, in which our opponents are playing Rugby while in some cases, we try to play NFL football and call ourselves "progressive" and "cutting edge".

Anyway, I think the main thing here is simple: passage of information.  You need a plan, lest you set out in chaos and expect good results, but it must be flexible enough to "call an audible".


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## Journeyman (22 Nov 2010)

Sports analogies are just that -- analogies. The similarites are only in _certain_ aspects, which allow for _very rough comparisons_; try not to get too wrapped up over them.



Now David, I no longer comment here on Catholicism.....so please feel free to avoid _ever_ including Rugby League (  :  ) in any discussion of real rugby -- you know, the kind that men, and right-thinking women, play.


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## vonGarvin (22 Nov 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Sports analogies are just that -- analogies. The similarites are only in _certain_ aspects, which allow for _very rough comparisons_; try not to get too wrapped up over them.
> 
> 
> 
> Now David, I no longer comment here on Catholicism.....so please feel free to avoid _ever_ including Rugby League (  :  ) in any discussion of real rugby -- you know, the kind that men, and right-thinking women, play.


I think we have a deal.  To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure of the difference, so I'll educate myself.  Rugby Union it is!  ;D

EDIT TO ADD: Just reading up on Rugby Union on Wikipedia (I know, I know), but I found this line interesting:



> A player who has been replaced may not rejoin play unless he was temporarily replaced to have bleeding controlled


 I have to admit, I love it: bleeding is in the rules!


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## daftandbarmy (22 Nov 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I don't see overlay orders as stultifying - what are you basing your impression on? They are simply graphical representations of what you want done. I don't walk around with a playbook, but when you think about it we do have a number of basic plays that we execute. When I say "right flanking" people can visualize what is going to happen and they don't need very much more to make it work. When I say "defile drill" they know what to do. They adapt these to the situation, but they have a start point. Having these basic plays/drills means that we get things done quickly.



I think you've nailed it here: write orders if neccessary, but don't write up exhaustive tombes all the time as a matter of course. Good drills executed by trusted and well supported subordinates, at any level, can take care of most of what needs to be done on operations. 

It's absurd that we treat every recce patrol as if they're doing a solo invasion of occupied Europe. It might be important in training, to teach improtant lessons, but shouldn't be done slavishly all the time as a matter of course.


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## a_majoor (22 Nov 2010)

From my rather less elevated position, it seems that over the years the full blown OPP process, orders, overlays and annexes have been pushed farther and farther down the chain. For section commanders and platoon commanders, orders can be as simple as "You and you; follow me!"

Frag O's and briefings can also work in fast moving situations, and "Chinese parliaments" make for a fairly quick and efficient means of sorting through options and determining COS's (including Branches and Sequels). Once you get above platoon level, then a more formal process becomes beneficial, but even then, it should be short and to the point. The Soviet Army had these things reduced to drills even at Regimental level for a reason, while the NATO headquarters were fiddling about, the Regimental march column was moving into line and advancing under the fire of the RAG, messy but well inside the enemy OODA loop.

Makes you wonder about the future, when high energy weapons like lasers, railguns or hypersonic cruise missiles can reduce the "flash to bang" time by orders of magnitude. The current process will not be able to deal with either the use of these weapons or being on the receiving end.


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## pbi (23 Nov 2010)

I think a full blown OPP cycle, with all the bells, whistles and briefs, will be most productive for drawing up the framework OP O, or for a subsequent major deliberate Op. It is in fact a very good system, if taught and practiced properly, and one of the great things about it is its infinite adaptability in the hands of people who understand it and aren't afraid to make modifications. If you develop your branches and sequels well, you probably have at least chance of being able to deal with sudden changes, but in the end I think that down in 9Tac, the 3 shop and the 3-5 shop it will all be about very abbreviated OPP, quick estimates and FRAG O's. Which is fine.

That said, on one of my theatre visits  the JTFA 3-5 told me they were frequently running 6-9 OPP cycles _concurrently_. (!)

OPP most definitely doesn't replace either battle procedure or the estimate, and anybody who says they do is OTFL. OPP occurs as _*part*_ of formation battle procedure, and the estimate (both the Comander's and all the various "G" crews") are at the heart of OPP. OPP, after all, is really just the estimate on steroids.

I certainly agree that both NATO and the US have a fixation on very big HQs with numerous GOFOs and O-6's doing jobs that could probably be done a couple of ranks lower (I worked for  NATO's ISAF VI HQ, and inside US CJTF76 in 2004-05). Some of this seems to have rubbed off on us.

All that said, I still think that we need to be careful, regardless of what the Indians (or others with Div- and Corps- based armies) may do. We have been Brigade-Group-based for a long time, and the US went that way a few years ago. A Bde HQ under this concept has to have tools and horsepower that once upon a time might have resided at Div or elsewhere.

Cheers


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## pbi (23 Nov 2010)

> The Soviet Army had these things reduced to drills even at Regimental level for a reason, while the NATO headquarters were fiddling about, the Regimental march column was moving into line and advancing under the fire of the RAG, messy but well inside the enemy OODA loop.



My thought here is that while this looked good in OPFOR manuals, and certainly worked  nicely on the open sandy plains of Poland or the Ukraine, (after, no doubt, endless rehearsals) without a thinking enemy that would probably have had air superiority very quickly, I don't know of one actual conflict in which it was ever tested under fire. (I certainly stand to be corrected here) When the post WWII Russians actually fought anybody (and in this I include the CIS forays into Chechnya, etc), things seemed much more confused, messy, and ineffective.

Anything that relies too much on drills instead of thinking and the use of initiative IMHO runs the risk of being unable to respond to something that suddenly throws a wrench into those nice, neat deployment evolutions from Div into Regt into Bn, etc. I'm not sure that "thinking" and "initiative" were overly encouraged at lower tactical levels in the Soviet Army we all knew and loved.

Cheers


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## a_majoor (23 Nov 2010)

While I agree that reducing things to drills isn't the ideal way to do things, in the much bigger picture, the Red Army would be deploying and crashing against the NATO lines like a series of waves. While the defenders were trying to dig out and reorg, another wave would be slamming into them. The ability of large formations to use their initiative would become seriously compromised, and lower and lower level units would start operating on their own (while yet another MRR was deploying across their front). From my understanding of Soviet military theory, they were far more concerned with paralyzing high level formation headquarters and breaking enemy units into bite sized pieces. When they were not fighting under the conditions they had theorized and trained for, then they were not adaptable enough to make headway (as the historical record suggests).

The super sized headquarters and elaborate planning procedures we are discussing seem to be conterproductive on either end of the conflict spectrum; against a major peer competitor the headquarters would become a smoking hole in the ground, while insurgents can run rings around them (like small furry mammals against dinosaurs). This also ties in somewhat with another historical analogy; the introduction of effective infantry weapons which made peasant armies the match of aristocratic armies. Aristocratic armies relied on highly skilled fighters with a lifetime of training backed by the best weapons and armour technology that could be provided at the time. By the 1500's pikemen, crossbows and firearms had swept aristocratic cavalry from the battlefields of Europe (and threatened to unseat the Samurai in Japan). Killing an aristocrat (or specialist like a longbowman who also needed a lifetime of training) took a generation to replace, while a peasant could be replaced and trained quite quickly.

Our soldiers, with their high tech training and equipment are being met on the battlefield by low tech insurgents armed with IED's, cheap infantry weapons like AK-47s and RPG-7's and communicating via the internet and cellphones. They can meet NATO/ISAF troops with a degree of equality at the tactical level. We need to be able to operate far faster and have a higher degree of knowledge about them in order to retain the advantage at the tactical level, which leads back to creating, using and enforcing a fast moving process to deploy and use assets.


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## vonGarvin (23 Nov 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> They can meet NATO/ISAF troops with a degree of equality at the tactical level.


I cannot disagree more.  Impossible for me to do so.  They had zero equality at the tactical level with us at no time.  Ever.  I couldn't care if their weapons were 'cheap and easy', they were led by dunderheads, and it's only once in a while that Murphy's Law catches up and they get "lucky".

I do agree that there are things we could do better, but I wouldn't hand the insurgents any credit for "running circles" around us.


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## TangoTwoBravo (23 Nov 2010)

I'm not sure that faster planning is the key to defeating an insurgency. I'm also not sure how this ties in with aristocratic armies. Professional armies still held the field when they faced untrained rabbles in open combat long after mounted knights were crashing about. I agree, though, that our massive TOC-Mahals would be a liability in a peer battle. They'd either be found and destroyed or be too slow to keep up with a mobile battle.

Back to the Soviets, some of the literature refers to the Soviets preference for Detailed Control as opposed to the Directive Control favoured by the Germans of old. Detailed Control involves coming up with a plan and making sure that subordinates fully understand their place in the plan. You rehearse the plan until you are certain that your subordinates can execute it. Initiative at low levels is frowned upon because it can upset the plan. 

While the Canadian army professes a manoeuverist approach, I think that our historical happy-place is Detailed Control. What made us different from the Red Army was they thought in terms of arrows punching deep while we thought in lines that moved forward (and obsessed about not out-ranging the guns). I think that in our heart of hearts we still want to prepare for Vimy.

In any case I think that there is a place for both methods. Some situations may well call for a detailed plan that relies on everybody playing their rehearsed part. I think that it is preferable to rely on informed subordinate initiative, but we shouldn't write off the other method.

Back to drills, I see them as a start point. People still need to think, but a simple drill gives some discipline to that thought process under pressure. I think, though, that the value of drills and "plays" starts to diminish as the level of command gets higher. Combat teams have platoon drills and some do involve multiple platoons, but I'm having a hard time thinking of battalion and brigade level drills. Tactical plays such as "right flanking" and "hasty breach" also become fairly meaningless at Brigade level. A company can manouevre much like a platoon on a larger scale, but a battalion less so and a brigade certainly not.


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## Infanteer (24 Nov 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I do agree that there are things we could do better, but I wouldn't hand the insurgents any credit for "running circles" around us.



Agreed.  Afghan insurgents of this variety are not your daddy's muhajideen and are, for the most part, tactically inept.  The only tactical piece for them is whether they can get away before being fixed.


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## Infanteer (24 Nov 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Tactical plays such as "right flanking" and "hasty breach" also become fairly meaningless at Brigade level. A company can manouevre much like a platoon on a larger scale, but a battalion less so and a brigade certainly not.



Absolutely - this goes back to combat not being fractal.  On another discussion on training, it was remarked that moving a formation in combat is difficult and expensive to practice.  No matter how many times you JCATs it, nothing can simulate what happens to a Brigade when it's lead Battle Group has fought to establish a bridgehead and one must pass the next one through.


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## Kirkhill (28 Nov 2010)

I'm going to backtrack a bit here to my comments about "Process Management" versus "Mission Management" and try to stay away from references to the Union game.

It seems to me that the critical  issue is how you transition from "Planning" to "Execution".  It was mentioned by someone that the planning process has great utility as a learning tool.  It allows the planner to get their ducks in a row and figure out what they have and what they might do in a given situation.  Then when they roll over to execution they are well prepared for whatever situation presents itself.  One of the resources they have to hand are well-drilled troops who can be expected to perform in a given manner in most situations.

But this presupposes that the planner is the executor. If the executor is not the planner then the executor doesn't have the benefit of the learning exercise that derived the plan.  Consequently the executor will be encouraged, both by their own inclinations and by external forces, just to work the plan.  The executor then moves from managing the mission, to achieve a specific tactical outcome in the field, to managing the process, to fulfill the requirements of the plan.

"That rifle is filthy."  "But I cleaned the rifle for the 30 minutes you gave us."  "But the rifle is still filthy".   The process was undertaken but the mission was not accomplished.

In the case of the Process Management style identified by the HBR article, it seems to me that the executors do not get the benefit of writing the manuals. They are trained to follow the manuals and why the manuals are important.  In the Misssion Management style the executors are more often than not writing thier own "manuals" on the fly.  

Mission Management would seem to be appropriate for small unit actions while Process Management is critical for planning the invasion of Europe.

Given that most of the actions involved in Counter-Insurgency operations happen quickly at a low level, and the enemy doesn't have a clearly defined "centre of gravity" or "schwerpunkt" at which a large number of resources can be directed, then it seems to me that in the Co-In game that the decision making process should be driven downwards to the lowest possible level.   The need for co-ordination is minimised and the risk of failure by a small unit is small.  No matter what the outcome of a specific misssion the nature of the conflict is such that the you are going to be there a long time and you will get a do-over whether you like it or not.  In that sense it is like cutting the grass and weeding.  The more often you do it the better the appearance of the garden.  But as soon as you stop the grass grows back and the weeds take over.  You just have to keep mowing.


That puts a premium on well trained and intelligent troops capable of being flexible and adapting to the situation as they find it.

Conversely , the invasion of Europe demands narrowly focused, well-drilled troops, that willl execute the plan come what may. They have to be process oriented because it would not be possible to co-ordinate the actions of the mob in a timely fashion to deal with a large number of moving parts concentrated in time and space.

On that basis, I would suggest that there is room for two types of army. One that focuses on training well drilled troops capable of executiong someone else's plan faithfully.  One that focuses on small unit actionsin a more free flowing environment.  That doesn't necessarily mean that you need two different tiypes of people.  All the troops need to be well trained before they can act independently.  And the independent-minded need to be reminded from time to time that there may be a need for them to act in a manner that is not obvious to them.  They need to follow the process even if they don't understand the mission.


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## McG (29 Nov 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> On that basis, I would suggest that there is room for two types of army. One that focuses on training well drilled troops capable of executiong someone else's plan faithfully.  One that focuses on small unit actionsin a more free flowing environment.


There is only room for one type of army.  It must be able to operate on a spectrum of independance vs control that runs between the two extreems that you described, or it must pick a point on that spectrum and get really good at operating from that one spot.


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## daftandbarmy (29 Nov 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> "That rifle is filthy."
> On that basis, I would suggest that there is room for two types of army. One that focuses on training well drilled troops capable of executiong someone else's plan faithfully.  One that focuses on small unit actionsin a more free flowing environment.  That doesn't necessarily mean that you need two different tiypes of people.  All the troops need to be well trained before they can act independently.  And the independent-minded need to be reminded from time to time that there may be a need for them to act in a manner that is not obvious to them.  They need to follow the process even if they don't understand the mission.



We've already got that: they are called, respecitvely, the Regular Force and The Militia  ;D


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## Kirkhill (29 Nov 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We've already got that: they are called, respecitvely, the Regular Force and The Militia  ;D



Buggerye.  ;D


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