# Doing it the Dutch way in Afghanistan



## kilekaldar (2 Dec 2006)

Doing it the Dutch way in Afghanistan 
GRAEME SMITH 

From Saturday's Globe and Mail

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061201.dutch02/BNStory/Afghanistan/home

TIRIN KOT, AFGHANISTAN — At the age of 23, Nisar Ahmad has seen a lot of fighting. His gang of Barakzai tribesmen was the first militia to reach Kandahar behind a wave of U.S. bombs in 2001, grabbing power in the city as the Taliban fled. The same Barakzai warriors chased the Taliban north into the mountains of Uruzgan province, and spent the past five years hunting around these craggy peaks and rolling valleys alongside U.S. special forces.

Four months ago, the hunt ended. The Dutch military took command of Uruzgan, and immediately told Mr. Ahmad's men to stop their raids and ambushes. His militia of 250 battle-hardened fighters was given a new assignment: guard duty. 

On a recent afternoon, Mr. Ahmad watched his men play soccer in the confines of a Dutch military base known as Kamp Holland, and he seemed pleased with his new, quiet life.

“In the last four months, this province is safer,” he said. “I'll tell you why. When you treat people badly, it comes back at you. When you treat people well,” he said, gesturing at the quiet provincial capital of Tirin Kot, slumbering in the valley below the Dutch base, “this is the result.”

Related to this article

The Dutch went into Uruzgan expecting the same kind of bloody welcome that Canadians have found in Kandahar. But the bloodbath never happened. Is it because they treat the local population better? 

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 The Dutch went into Uruzgan expecting the same kind of bloody welcome that Canadians have found in Kandahar. Both provinces are considered volatile strongholds of the Taliban insurgency. Special forces operating in Uruzgan encountered daily attacks this summer. So the 1,400 Dutch troops that began arriving in early August came prepared for battle.

But the bloodbath never happened. This past week, the first four-month rotation of Dutch troops started to leave Uruzgan after having completed 400 patrols, established two forward bases and started the slow work of building roads, bridges, schools, and clinics — all without a single soldier killed in action, and just two injuries from hostile forces.

There have been just seven ambushes and 18 roadside bombs in four months; Canadian troops have suffered worse in a single week.

The success is fragile, Dutch commanders caution, and might be partly the result of luck, insurgents focusing on battles elsewhere or the cautious pace of their arrival. But the early results in Uruzgan also suggest that something these commanders call the “Dutch philosophy” is worth a hard look. It's a strategy focused on supporting the local government rather than killing its supposed enemies, talking with the Taliban instead of fighting them, and treading carefully with an understanding of how little any foreigner knows about this untamed country.

Since NATO inherited control from the Americans, the Dutch have been trying to rein in the U.S. Special Forces that still operate two camps in northern Uruzgan, and they've restrained their own troops from any major offensives.

“If there's a good reason to kick ass, fine,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Nico Tak, 43, the Provincial Reconstruction Team commander. “Do you know whose ass you're going to kick? What are you basing that on? A telephone call? Human intelligence?”

In the first months after the Canadians' arrival in Kandahar, commanders sent convoys to the furthest corners of the province. These wide-ranging trips were described as a way of asserting the Canadians' presence, and sometimes resulted in gun battles.

By contrast, the Dutch have moved with extreme caution. Only about 15 kilometres north of Kamp Holland lies the entrance to the Balochi Valley, the scene of many battles between insurgents and pro-government forces, and a zone where foreign troops expected to sustain regular attacks. Rather than pushing in, the Dutch sent a delegation to a village near the mouth of the valley and asked whether they're willing to negotiate.

The elders seemed frightened but willing, so Lieutenant-Colonel Piet Van der Sar, the battle group commander, flew in by helicopter for a meeting. “We spread a rumour up the valley, that we're trying to come in without fighting,” he said.

The tactic worked, he said. Listening to the radio frequencies often used by insurgents, the Dutch interpreters heard locals discussing the new type of foreigner that was replacing the U.S. troops. “They said, ‘Those Dutch aren't here to fight, they're here to talk,' ” Lt.-Col. Van der Sar said.

The talks include not only village elders, but also the Taliban themselves. It's a subject the Dutch are reluctant to discuss in detail, as the idea of negotiating with terrorists remains a subject of debate among NATO allies. In a PowerPoint briefing for a visiting reporter, Lt.-Col. Tak moved quickly past a slide titled “Talking to the Dark Side.”

Lt.-Col. Tak said that while nobody under his command talks directly with the insurgents, he works closely with the provincial governor who does make contact with the Taliban.

“Talking to the Taliban is essential,” Lt.-Col. Tak said.

Perhaps 98 per cent of the insurgents in Uruzgan are people originally from this province, the commander said. The number of hardcore Taliban is often exaggerated, he added: Arabs, Pakistanis and even Chechens are fighting against the government, he said, but they're a tiny minority compared with those Taliban members who joined the movement simply because it was the most powerful faction in the mid-1990s.

“If you indicate that you're willing to talk with them, it's surprising what you get,” he said.

“What do you get?” he was asked.

“A response, sometimes,” Lt.-Col. Tak said. “But you have to indicate — and this takes months — you have to show in everything that you do and say, that you are genuinely trying to understand their conflict.”

The Dutch commanders seem well schooled in the complexities of Afghanistan, easily discussing the mujahedeen factions, schools of Islam and sub-tribal clans that dominate the political landscape.

“I'm in the business of killing people and breaking things. But I can use my brain.” Lt.-Col. Tak said.

Many of the differences in the Dutch approach are subtle, the commanders say. The Canadians and Americans establish forward operating bases (FOBs) in unstable areas, often building them into fortresses of giant sandbags and razor wire, and using them as a launching point for operations. The Dutch prefer to build mud-walled compounds they call “multi-functional qalas,” using the Pashto name for house, designed with a traditional-style guest room for visitors.

The soldiers living in these qalas are expected to visit every household in their own area, measuring 12 to 30 square kilometres, and monitor their needs.

Besides helping the local residents with the basics of survival, the Dutch are trying to serve as honest brokers for villagers whose relatives were captured by coalition forces. If a suspected Taliban fighter is arrested by U.S. soldiers, Dutch commanders will try to find basic information about the detainee, to ease his family's worry.

Dutch forces also say they're trying to protect villagers from the predations of corrupt or undisciplined Afghan soldiers and police, by watching them closely for bad behaviour and keeping them off the front lines. Even in convoys, they said, Afghan National Army units have been moved from the front of the column into the safer middle.

“You have to teach them [Afghan forces] not to be a pain in the ass for the population,” Lt.-Col. Van der Sar said


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## Scoobie Newbie (2 Dec 2006)

So the Dutch have left KAF.  Wow who would have thought.


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## HItorMiss (2 Dec 2006)

Not with out our Nyala they didn't


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## MikeM (2 Dec 2006)

Quite the interesting article. From my dealings with the dutch thus far they have been far from that busy. They babysat one of our FOBs while we were on Medusa, didn't do any patrolling or make too many efforts in our area..

Edit: Further to my last, ref: dutch building mud compounds and not sandbagging/using razor wire.. thats complete crap, they added more of that stuff than we did!


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## pbi (2 Dec 2006)

This article drips the same kind of sanctimonious rubbish that we Canadians have been far too often guilty of slinging at the Americans in the past. You know: that sort of holier-than-thou "we understand the goodness of human nature not like you murderous warmongers, etc etc". So, my first comment on this piece is that maybe now that we know what it feels like to recive this kind of Pollyanna nonsense, we'll get off our high moral pedestal and stop doing it to others.

My second observation is that while the description of the Dutch activities may be accurate, it is certainly a very narrow and wrong description of the Canadian approach, quite badly slanted to build up the Dutch at the expense of the Canadians. Much good work and intelligent approach by the Canadians is completely ignored: I wonder what, for example, our CIMIC and PRT folks would have to say in response. It's easy to sound good in front of an ignorant audience who can't challenge what you are saying. In fact, the author is actually describing a Dutch PRT and comparing to the Cdn BG: a case of apples vs oranges. Why didn't he compare the two PRTs?

Third, Uruzgan is not Kandahar. The situation facing the Dutch is quite different. The offensive operations in Kandahar were needed for different reasons than those which shape the situation where the Dutch are. Not the least of the reasons was the need to break the stranglehold that was being constructed around Kandahar. Kandahar is a much more important symbolic and military objective for the Taleban than Uruzgan is.

Finally, the article is quite selective. He says nothing about the Dutch SP Arty bty that has been happily thumping the s***t out of baddies, sometimes in sp of Canadians.  Maybe they weren't around that day.

To close, the Dutch should be very proud of any success they achieve. But hopefully they aren't so naive (as the author apparently is) as to think that if the Taleban wants to drive NATO out of the South, the Dutch will somehow be spared because they are "nice guys". Passively sitting in camps usually doesn't do much to dominate the enemy's decision cycle.

Cheers


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## vonGarvin (2 Dec 2006)

pbi:
I was about to post the same kind of response you did, but you beat me to it.  Especially when you say that "Uruzgan is not Kandahar".  Heck, the Afghan mentioned in the article tells how they "rode into Khandahar" after the US bombs and took over.  Until four months ago, they did ambushes, etc, but now they don't.  Does this mean that the Dutch are doing those patrols now?  I mean, the ambushes, etc. must have had SOME effect, no?

Tripe, that's what that article is.


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## Armymedic (2 Dec 2006)

My comment to G&M:



> *You (A M, from Ontario, Canada) wrote:* I love seeing only one side of a comparison. The Dutch process does sound interesting and is worthy of merit, but without several accurate and pertinent details. Details which are omitted make this article an insult to our soldiers. I quote 'The same Barakzai warriors chased the Taliban north into the mountains of Uruzgan province, and spent the past five years hunting around these craggy peaks and rolling valleys alongside U.S. Special Forces.' 2 major omissions in explanation are that: 1. In Afghanistan, tribal law and rules still apply. The Dutch inherited an area of operations (AOR) where the local tribes have fought the Taliban. 2. The Taliban have been repeatedly defeated in that area, have few, if any fighters that area, unlike the Canadian AOR. Further, there has been very little western rebuilding in the Dutch AOR, so any and all projects are received well, and protected by the locals. Final, because there is little to no reporting of the efforts of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) does not mean that their successes over the last year are less worthy. Perhaps a side by side comparison of all the factors, not just the casualty count, would make for more compelling comparisons.


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## MarkOttawa (4 Dec 2006)

Whilst the Danes are in serious combat:

Nato ambush kills 80 Taliban militants
Fred Attewill and agencies, December 4, Guardian Unlimited 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1963670,00.html



> Up to 80 Taliban fighters have been killed by Nato forces in a four-hour firefight in southern Afghanistan.
> 
> A tip-off from local police allowed up to 150 Danish troops to join Afghan forces in an ambush on the militants in Helmand province early yesterday morning.
> 
> ...



By the way, here is the _Globe's_ headline for Mr Smith's story today:

Afghans bomb, berate British troops: Crowds vent rage after Royal Marines strafe Kandahar while fleeing attack
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20061204.AFGHAN04/TPStory/International

Bloody Brits, eh? Note to Globe headline writers: "strafing" is done from aircraft, not by troops on the ground.

Mark
Ottawa


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## Kirkhill (5 Dec 2006)

Here's the BBC's counter-point to Graeme Smith's report:

Fleeing and "strafing" 

OR



> An MoD spokesman said British vehicles transported the casualties from the scene to a safe location where a helicopter could land after the attack.
> 
> "As they moved from the area of the attack, several civilian vehicles began following them, including one which weaved in front of them in an attempt to block their progress," he said.
> 
> ...




http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6204270.stm



> Three marines hurt in Afghanistan
> 
> Three Royal Marines have been injured in an attack on a convoy in southern Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed.
> The marines, all from the 45 Commando unit based in Arbroath, were injured in a suspected suicide bomb attack in Kandahar city on Sunday.
> ...


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## Jav (5 Dec 2006)

Hi all. I'm new to this forum, although I've lurked from time to time. I'm a Dutchie, and I feel it as my duty to inform you guys that this article is way too positive in my humble opinion. Forgive me when my English is not 100% accurate, but I guess my English is better than your Dutch

First of all I like to thank you canadians for your sacrifices in Afghanistan, just like all the other people that are doing their job down there...but we all know that you are the ones that have been hit particularly hard. I'm sure that your actions and sacrifices in Kandahar province helped save a lot of lives, also in Uruzgan.

There are quite a few incorrect assumptions in the article. For instance, the compound thingy 'multi-functional qalas', it's just not true. Like someone said before, the dutch compounds in Uruzgan are arguably one of the most 'armoured' compounds in the south. We have armoured 'sleep containers/cabins' and from what I know, for example most Americans still sleep in tents. Furthermore the article might give people the impression that there have been very few fights over the recent months.....also incorrect. The Brits and Canadians have had a far worse security situation in Helmand and Kandahar, compared to the Dutch in Uruzgan, but this does not mean that the situation Uruzgan is anywhere near safe. Then again....Uruzgan is a Taliban stronghold (Mullah Omar grew up in Tarin Khowt) and it's one, if not the poorest province of Afghanistan....however, it does not border Pakistan....Kandahar and Helmand do.

There have quite a lot of firefights in the few months that the ISAF 3 is operational in Uruzgan province. (I believe that the Canadians and Brits have been on the ground since early spring??? the Dutch just became operational in August...in other words....the mission has just begun) dozens (estimates: 150-200+) of Taliban have been killed by Dutch grounds forces alone, and  I'm sure the Apaches and F-16s have had their sheer amount of action, especially in Kandahar and Helmand, but also on quite a few occasions in Uruzgan. 

Then there is the question about the low amount of losses in Uruzgan. I believe that a sheer part of that can be contributed to 'enormous amounts of luck', on a number of occasions the fights went on for hours, and it is largely because of the apaches kicking in that all returned alive. The troops speak highly about the birds, and I wouldn't want to know what the outcome would have been without having them above the scene. Like I said, it was really close on quite a few occasions....

Then there is the different 'approach'/tactic. From what I've heard you guys and the Brits went in on full force often looking for a fight to get rid of the major Taliban strongholds (please correct me if im wrong) I think it is true that the Dutch have a somewhat less offensive strategy, maybe partly explaining the lower losses. Then again I'm sure that the Canadians and Brits have a good reason to act the way they do, comparing the Taliban activity. It's true that Dutch want to 'win the hearts and minds' of the ordinary people if possible, but I'm sure thats the whole 'idea' behind ISAF....and wouln't the Canadians and Brits have encountered the amount of Taliban they did, they would do exactely the same.... However it is just not possible to 'reconstruct' when 'Terry or Timmy' is in the house next to it. 

Currently there is quite a lot of critic coming from the troops on the ground, directed to The Hague, where the politicians and generals make the policy. They feel that they are too restricted in their ROE in taking out the Taliban, when they pose a threat to the troops, or Afghan civilians. To put it short: they feel that the policy made back home in the Netherlands, is just not realistic when you see the situation on the ground. They feel that this restricting policy (way more than the canadians and brits) is dangerous for the troops already taking a pretty great risk. They operate in what we call an 'ink spot'?? strategy, start small and when things go relatively well and safe, expand the area of PRT operation. I believe the Brits tried to cover the whole province immediately, but when faced with daily attacks on their compounds they are now having their own form of this ink spot strategy (correct?) I honoustly don't know what the Canadian tactics are.

One last thing: the article states that there haven't been any offensive operations. this is incorrect. Although far from 'Medusa scale' operations (in which the dutch actively participated with air support,howitzers and an infantry company, not only the fighting at FOB Martello), there was for example the Baluchi pass sweep, which also involved Aussies and Yanks.


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## geo (5 Dec 2006)

Jav
Thanks for your sit rep

And there you have it, the press & media barons provide some well balanced stories for the Canadian public to gobble up.........

Sigh - pass the Maalox


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## Good2Golf (14 Dec 2006)

Jav, dank U wel!   

Good to know there is a voice of reason that can give us some "ground truth" as to what is happening in Uruzgan province.  We have had our issues with what many of us soldiers serving or who have served in AFG feel is a slanted view of operations on the part of the Canadian press.  There is much focus on combat operations fighting the Taleban, yet much less coverage of our PRT's efforts as well as other Canadian elements in Kandahar and other regions of Afghanistan -- ironically, this press coverage is no longer the mushy, self-serving reporting that the Canadian press often conducted in an attempt to keep the peacekeeping myth alive.  Seems as though your countrymen's reporters are still in "self-serving" phase.  Hopefully you and your fellow soldiers will be accurately represented if things do heat up in Uruzgan.  Stay safe!

Tot strachts!

G2G


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## TheHead (3 Jun 2007)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> Not with out our Nyala they didn't



I hate bringing a VERY old topic back from the dead. I apologize in advance but I want to refute this idiotic statement.  

The Dutch have left KAF on MANY occasions without our help, get your self righteous head out of your own ass.



ps.... The Nyala is crap.


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## Stewpid (18 Jun 2007)

ps.... The Nyala is crap.
[/quote]

Some SA(Mamba/Nyala) units are going back to the CASPIR (spelling) a four wheel APC first utilized in the 60s and 70's.


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