# Scorpion, AVGP Cougar, other light AFV alternatives and Cold War tanks of Canada (From: TAPV thread)



## Colin Parkinson (7 Apr 2015)

Canada was not the only country that went with a system like the Cougar, Australia did the same with the Saladin turret and the Scorpion turret on M113. The French built purpose designed armoured cars with large calibre guns and of course the Saladin by the brits.


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## GK .Dundas (7 Apr 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Canada was not the only country that went with a system like the Cougar, Australia did the same with the Saladin turret and the Scorpion turret on M113. The French built purpose designed armoured cars with large calibre guns and of course the Saladin by the brits.


 I always wondered what would have happened and we gone thru with the Scorpion purchase in 74 and the the Leo C I purchase . would we have formed light armour regiments  or cascaded some down to the reserves . 
 As I recall it was at roughly the same time the reserve armor regiments were getting the Lynx to work with .


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## Eland2 (7 Apr 2015)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> I always wondered what would have happened and we gone thru with the Scorpion purchase in 74 and the the Leo C I purchase . would we have formed light armour regiments  or cascaded some down to the reserves .
> As I recall it was at roughly the same time the reserve armor regiments were getting the Lynx to work with .



That would have been an interesting scenario. I suspect that the Scorpions would have been used mainly for recce, possibly airfield defence and flank screening, in the same way that the British used theirs. 

I agree that they could have been deployed in sabre-type units and used to provide fire support for assault troops - in effect light armoured cavalry. Although doctrinally speaking, the Canadian Army at that time wasn't configured to employ such units so new ones would have needed to be created, or perhaps formed as specialized squadrons within existing armoured regiments.

When I was serving in an armoured recce unit about 36 years ago, I remember asking one of the troop officers why he didn't think Canada would get the Scorpion instead of the Cougar. His answer was that the balance of payments with the UK was too high at the time, although I think the real answer was that the military wanted to gain a fire-support/recce capability within a family of wheeled vehicles to save on operational and maintenance costs, and the government wanted the vehicles to be mostly built in Canada using mostly Canadian-derived components. 

Even if GM Diesel Canada, the original builders of the AVGP series of vehicles could have built Scorpions under licence from Alvis, they didn't seem to be set up for, or have any experience in building tracked weapons platforms.

If they had been so equipped, it's possible that the wheeled AVGP programme would have been abandoned and the army would have gotten Scorpions and Spartan APCs (also based on the Scorpion platform) instead, and possibly repair/recovery, CP, and ambulance variants.


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## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2015)

I graduated from Staff College in 1971 and was posted to DG Plans in CFHQ. As I recall the White Paper on Defence, "Defence in the Seventies" announced the land force was going to go to a light recce role in Europe. The plan was to buy the Scorpion but it foundered because the Brits would not allow us to manufacture the 76mm ammunition and, maybe, spares in Canada.

At the time we had two squadrons of Centurions in CFE and a third in Gagetown, plus a bunch in stores. The third squadron and the war reserve tanks were kept in CFE and I think we had a plan to flyover a third squadron in time of crisis.

I am not armour and I am recalling events of 46 years ago, so I may have details wrong, but my memory is pretty good.


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## GK .Dundas (7 Apr 2015)

I seem to recall reading somewhere that the Treasury Board supposeably cancelled the project rough 24 hours before it was due to be signed  over some niggling  little detail. This left the Brits furious


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## TCBF (8 Apr 2015)

- Scorpion et al would have been a nightmare. As it was, we were effectively cut off for Cougar turret parts when England went on strike (again), or so were told... then, in 1980, all of these turret parts started showing up with the stuff marked "ROC - Iran Only".
The Brits weren't on strike, they merely valued their Iranian customers over their Canadian customers. Once Iran deposed the Shah, all of those parts became available to us. Sure felt nice to be so highly valued by our former colonial masters.


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## GK .Dundas (8 Apr 2015)

The story behind  the adoption of and the cancellation of the Scorpion . 
http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/last-minute-cancellation-canada-and-the-scorpion-by-frank-maas/


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## Fishbone Jones (9 Apr 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I graduated from Staff College in 1971 and was posted to DG Plans in CFHQ. As I recall the White Paper on Defence, "Defence in the Seventies" announced the land force was going to go to a light recce role in Europe. The plan was to buy the Scorpion but it foundered because the Brits would not allow us to manufacture the 76mm ammunition and, maybe, spares in Canada.
> 
> At the time we had two squadrons of Centurions in CFE and a third in Gagetown, plus a bunch in stores. The third squadron and the war reserve tanks were kept in CFE and I think we had a plan to flyover a third squadron in time of crisis.
> 
> I am not armour and I am recalling events of 46 years ago, so I may have details wrong, but my memory is pretty good.



OS,
I was there on Centurions at the time. If we had a spare Sqn and war reserve Centurions in CFE, it was the best kept secret in NATO. I don't recall anyone ever talking about them or where they could have been. I'm pretty sure we would have had a maintenance crew, from the Regiment, to do periodic maintenance also, but we didn't.

Perhaps my memory is not as good as yours. Being a young single Cpl, and the DM hovering over 3DM\CAD, I may have missed a couple of years :blotto:


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## Old Sweat (9 Apr 2015)

recceguy said:
			
		

> OS,
> I was there on Centurions at the time. If we had a spare Sqn and war reserve Centurions in CFE, it was the best kept secret in NATO. I don't recall anyone ever talking about them or where they could have been. I'm pretty sure we would have had a maintenance crew, from the Regiment, to do periodic maintenance also, but we didn't.
> 
> Perhaps my memory is not as good as yours. Being a young single Cpl, and the DM hovering over 3DM\CAD, I may have missed a couple of years :blotto:



Thinking back to my time in HQ 4 CIBG in the mid-sixties, we had something like 75 Centurions in Europe. The armoured regiment had three squadrons plus the ones in RHQ and the rest (about a squadrons worth) were in storage in a Brit Depot to be fed into the Canadian component of the British armoured delivery system in wartime. (I was responsible for keeping an eye on operational equipment, both issued and in the replacement system, and monitored the upgrading of the Centurions to Mk XV or something akin.)

With the move south, they were moved somewhere, and were available along with the ones made surplus by the regiment's downsizing for issue in time of crisis. Leaping ahead to the late-80s, FMC came up with a plan for a division in Europe including two armoured regiments, each of about 32 Leopards using the tanks for the 4 CMBG regiment and the replacement ones in reserve.

Sorry I can't be more specific, but that's how I recall at least part of the issue.


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## Fishbone Jones (9 Apr 2015)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Thinking back to my time in HQ 4 CIBG in the mid-sixties, we had something like 75 Centurions in Europe. The armoured regiment had three squadrons plus the ones in RHQ and the rest (about a squadrons worth) were in storage in a Brit Depot to be fed into the Canadian component of the British armoured delivery system in wartime. (I was responsible for keeping an eye on operational equipment, both issued and in the replacement system, and monitored the upgrading of the Centurions to Mk XV or something akin.)
> 
> With the move south, they were moved somewhere, and were available along with the ones made surplus by the regiment's downsizing for issue in time of crisis. Leaping ahead to the late-80s, FMC came up with a plan for a division in Europe including two armoured regiments, each of about 32 Leopards using the tanks for the 4 CMBG regiment and the replacement ones in reserve.
> 
> Sorry I can't be more specific, but that's how I recall at least part of the issue.



Thanks OS, I learned something new today. 40 some odd years after the fact, but new to me anyway.


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## George Wallace (9 Apr 2015)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Thanks OS, I learned something new today. 40 some odd years after the fact, but new to me anyway.



Not necessarily your memory, but the access to information you may have had at the time.  Even our most well known "historians" have made errors in their written publications, so the faulty memories of us paisans who were there shouldn't be faulted.   ;D


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## Eland2 (9 Apr 2015)

Given the history of Canada's ill-fated attempt to acquire the Scorpion, it's a wonder we even managed to get the Scorpion turrets for the Cougar WFSV programme. It was also interesting to learn that General JA Dextraze ultimately put the kibosh on the Scorpion project so the army could keep its existing Centurions just a little longer. I get the feeling now that if it wasn't for him digging in his heels, Canada might not have any tanks at all today.


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## TCBF (10 Apr 2015)

- We had over 350 Centurians. Original plans called for 850, but we never bought the additional 500. The crunch came in 1970. We lost 3 Brigade and the RCD in Gagetown were no more, to rebadge the Strathconas in Germany to RCD and move south. The FGH parked their tanks in Wainwright then rebadged to Strathconas in Calgary. The Hussars in Petawawa parked their remaining Centurians. One squadron plus was retained in Gagetown and designated the flyover sqn for Lahr, to flush them to three sqns when needed.

- We bought 114 Leopard C1 'gun' tanks (vice AVLB, ARV, Badger, etc) to replace 350 + Centurians.


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## MilEME09 (10 Apr 2015)

To which we then bought 100 Leopard 2's from the Netherlands, 15 from German for spares, and 12 from Switzerland to be converted to support vehicles. That is a total of 127 hulls, how many of those 100 are actually at units right now I have no idea, but it follows the trend of doing more with less, at least with the leopard we pulled off a 1 for 1 if you include the spares.


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## George Wallace (10 Apr 2015)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> To which we then bought 100 Leopard 2's from the Netherlands, 15 from German for spares, and 12 from Switzerland to be converted to support vehicles. That is a total of 127 hulls, how many of those 100 are actually at units right now I have no idea, but it follows the trend of doing more with less, at least with the leopard we pulled off a 1 for 1 if you include the spares.



Just a question on your 1 for 1 statement: are you referring to 1 for 1 replacement of the 128 Leopard 1 C1's that had already been deemed obsolete and retired, or going further back to replacement of the over 300 Centurions?  The trend I have noticed in ALL our procurement and 'Replacement' programs is exactly as you allude to; what is being replaced is being replaced by half the number.  We have seen it in most of our vehicle fleets, our aircraft, and ships.  Eventually the point will come where "Less is not better", no matter how advanced and capable that equipment is.


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## Colin Parkinson (10 Apr 2015)

It's always been something like 1 for 2 or 1 for 3 in every major purchase I have seen, which then makes something like a truck take on a value far greater than it should. For a military soft skinned vehicles need to be considered almost disposable, certain in any real fight you are going to lose a lot of them from breakdown, abandonment, enemy fire, accidents. In fact we should have had continuous replacement for our vehicles based on a maximum 15 year cycle.
AFV's need something similar, except of course the costs are much higher, so a major rebuild program should have been put into place, where you buy more than the bare minimum and then keep some in reserve, as each vehicle reaches age/hours run it goes into the renewal cycle and a replacement is released. This would reduce vehicle downtime, maintain expertise on AFV major repair, maintain part supplies and allow flexibility to deal with unexpected needs like deployments or key vehicle major failures. The LAV would be an excellent candidate for the above.


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## Danjanou (10 Apr 2015)

The downward spiral is evident at least in regards to tanks.  In 1945 we had 14 "Tank" regiments on establishment (in 4 brigades)each with about 50+ Tanks ( Sherman Vcs mainly) per Regiment not including OP tanks light tanks etc. So say 700+ Tanks.

We exchanged this for 350 Centurions, half the number. We exchanged these for 128 Leopard 1s again half the present number and if memory serves if Afghanistan hadn't shown the need for a MBT, the plan was to replace the Leopards with 66 odd wheeled mobile gun systems, againd dwonsizing by half.  :


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## George Wallace (10 Apr 2015)

Once again, the point has to be made; that land vehicles, F and B vehicles, have to move to stay functional.  Idle vehicles mean that seals dry out, rust takes hold, and other problems with POL products degrading happen.   Long term storage of a "War Stock" is expensive and creates delays to 'recondition' and repair the vehicles so that they can be returned to active service.  The current program that the CAF implemented of rotating vehicles from unit/sub-unit to unit/sub-unit adds to the mix of problems of keeping vehicles in good working condition.  I won't even get into the problems in the Supply Chain when we operate 'mixed' fleets.   

We need fleets that can move our troops, and fleets that our troops can fight in; and those fleets have to be kept active.  


Danjanou

The day will come when we are left with one Jedi and a Light Sabre.


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## Bzzliteyr (10 Apr 2015)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Once again, the point has to be made; that land vehicles, F and B vehicles, have to move to stay functional.  Idle vehicles mean that seals dry out, rust takes hold, and other problems with POL products degrading happen.   Long term storage of a "War Stock" is expensive and creates delays to 'recondition' and repair the vehicles so that they can be returned to active service.  The current program that the CAF implemented of rotating vehicles from unit/sub-unit to unit/sub-unit adds to the mix of problems of keeping vehicles in good working condition.  I won't even get into the problems in the Supply Chain when we operate 'mixed' fleets.
> 
> We need fleets that can move our troops, and fleets that our troops can fight in; and those fleets have to be kept active.
> 
> ...



But no batteries for that light sabre because the civilian contractor we hired to deliver them is on strike.


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## Danjanou (10 Apr 2015)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Danjanou
> 
> The day will come when we are left with one Jedi and a Light Sabre.



And follwoing my logic along the way the 66 MGS would have been replaced with 30 of these bad boys  ;D


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## Eland2 (10 Apr 2015)

Danjanou said:
			
		

> The downward spiral is evident at least in regards to tanks.  In 1945 we had 14 "Tank" regiments on establishment (in 4 brigades)each with about 50+ Tanks ( Sherman Vcs mainly) per Regiment not including OP tanks light tanks etc. So say 700+ Tanks.
> 
> We exchanged this for 350 Centurions, half the number. We exchanged these for 128 Leopard 1s again half the present number and if memory serves if Afghanistan hadn't shown the need for a MBT, the plan was to replace the Leopards with 66 odd wheeled mobile gun systems, againd dwonsizing by half.  :



Then again, you could look at it this way. Given the Leopard 2's better armour, bigger gun, better fire control system, higher speed and greater maneuverability compared to the Centurion, you could argue that one Leopard 2 in the field is worth about two or three Centurions. 

Buying the MGS would have been a huge mistake, and I'm glad we didn't go down that road. Mind you, the US Army have had some success using the MGS, but as a purely infantry fire support platform, and not as a substitute for a tank. Knowing the way our army has tended to operate due to being underfunded and underequipped, I'd say the temptation to try to use the MGS as an ersatz tank would have been tremendous, with disastrous results if any attempt had been made to try to shoehorn the vehicle into the roles tanks usually take on in real combat situations.

Notwithstanding my comment about Leopards versus Centurions, there's something to be said for numbers and quantity over pure quality. The Russians have known this for a long time, and their armoured doctrine reflects it. Back in the days of the Iron Curtain, the Russians fielded thousands of mostly mediocre tanks that had not much more than big guns and thick frontal armour, with the idea of overwhelming NATO forces with sheer numbers. 

While most of those tanks would ultimately have gotten taken out by tactical nukes, anti-tank missiles and NATO tanks, many of them would have gotten through. The Canadian Army, with the 54-odd tanks it had stationed in Lahr at the time, would probably have ended up being a Hong Kong kind of sacrifice if they had been expected to hold their positions even against the remnants of Warsaw Pact forces that had managed to push their way through.

In other words, when you have greater numbers, you can accept higher losses and still be able to get something done. When you maintain a much smaller force with the goal of containing costs, you lose that flexibility.

I would say 120-odd Leopard 2's we have now are a good start - enough to keep a training establishment functional and provide some combat capability on a limited scale. I wouldn't consider that number sufficient to participate in a major war beyond a purely peripheral role. This is just my personal opinion, of course.


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## Nfld Sapper (10 Apr 2015)

Danjanou said:
			
		

> And follwoing my logic along the way the 66 MGS would have been repalced with 30 of these bad boys  ;D



The Vespa 150 TAP is a Vespa scooter modified for use with paratroops (Troupes Aéro Portées, or TAP). Introduced in 1956 and updated in 1959, it was produced by Ateliers de Construction de Motocycles et Automobiles (ACMA), the licensed assembler of Vespas in France at the time. Modifications from the civilian Vespa included a reinforced frame and a three inch recoilless rifle mounted to the scooter.

Vespa 150 TAP
The 150 TAP's mounted M20 75 mm recoilless rifle, a U.S.-made light anti-armour cannon, was very light in comparison to a standard 75 mm cannon but was still able to penetrate 100 mm of armour by HEAT warhead. The recoil is counteracted by venting propellant gases out the rear of the weapon which eliminated the need for a mechanical recoil system or heavy mounts, enabling the weapon to be fired from the Vespa frame.
The scooters would be parachute-dropped in pairs, accompanied by a two-man team. The gun was carried on one scooter, while the ammunition was loaded on the other. Due to the lack of any kind of aiming devices the recoilless rifle was never designed to be fired from the scooter; the gun was mounted on a tripod, which was also carried by the scooter, before being fired.
The "Bazooka Vespa" was relatively cheap: Vespas cost roughly US$500 at the time, and the M20s were plentiful. Five hundred Vespa TAP scooters were produced.

Cool....


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## George Wallace (10 Apr 2015)

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Then again, you could look at it this way. Given the Leopard 2's better armour, bigger gun, better fire control system, higher speed and greater maneuverability compared to the Centurion, you could argue that one Leopard 2 in the field is worth about two or three Centurions.



I guess the same logic was likely used to say one breach loading rifle could take out two or three muskets.  Although true, those types of logical leaps are flawed.



			
				Eland2 said:
			
		

> Notwithstanding my comment about Leopards versus Centurions, there's something to be said for numbers and quantity over pure quality. The Russians have known this for a long time, and their armoured doctrine reflects it. Back in the days of the Iron Curtain, the Russians fielded thousands of mostly mediocre tanks that had not much more than big guns and thick frontal armour, with the idea of overwhelming NATO forces with sheer numbers.
> 
> While most of those tanks would ultimately have gotten taken out by tactical nukes, anti-tank missiles and NATO tanks, many of them would have gotten through. The Canadian Army, with the 54-odd tanks it had stationed in Lahr at the time, would probably have ended up being a Hong Kong kind of sacrifice if they had been expected to hold their positions even against the remnants of Warsaw Pact forces that had managed to push their way through.



4 CMBG was tasked as a Corps Reserve, to fill any gaps that may develop; and there would have been many.  They figure that the Warsaw Pact armies would have overrun the Allied border units before they had any time to drive out of their hangars, and that the Spetsnaz would already be across the Rhine taking out French nuclear capabilities.   It would have been mass chaos and an ugly brawl.


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## TCBF (10 Apr 2015)

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Then again, you could look at it this way. Given the Leopard 2's better armour, bigger gun, better fire control system, higher speed and greater maneuverability compared to the Centurion, you could argue that one Leopard 2 in the field is worth about two or three Centurions.
> 
> ...
> 
> I would say 120-odd Leopard 2's we have now are a good start - enough to keep a training establishment functional and provide some combat capability on a limited scale. I wouldn't consider that number sufficient to participate in a major war beyond a purely peripheral role. This is just my personal opinion, of course.



- The 'modern weapon is as good a three of the old ones' theory is only relevant if competing adversary weapons are also built at a one to three replacement.  

- We don't have 120 leopard 2 MBTs.


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## Retired AF Guy (11 Apr 2015)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> 4 CMBG was tasked as a Corps Reserve, to fill any gaps that may develop; and there would have been many.  They figure that the Warsaw Pact armies would have overrun the Allied border units before they had any time to drive out of their hangars, and that the Spetsnaz would already be across the Rhine taking out French nuclear capabilities.   It would have been mass chaos and an ugly brawl.



You're talking about the so-called "Bolt from the Blue" where the Warsaw Pact get the call from Moscow, they jump in their tanks/APC's and head west. Actually, this was the least likely scenario; in reality, any conflict between East and West would have encompassed weeks, if not months, of increasing tension prior to onset of hostilities, which would have allowed both sides to bring their forces up to combat readiness status.


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## George Wallace (11 Apr 2015)

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> You're talking about the so-called "Bolt from the Blue" where the Warsaw Pact get the call from Moscow, they jump in their tanks/APC's and head west. Actually, this was the least likely scenario; in reality, any conflict between East and West would have encompassed weeks, if not months, of increasing tension prior to onset of hostilities, which would have allowed both sides to bring their forces up to combat readiness status.



It wasn't until after the Wall came down that the actual Troop Strengths and Combat Readiness was full known.  Hindsight is great, but at the time all the COA's had to be thought out.  If the balloon had gone up, it would have been one hell of a mess no matter what scenario would unfold.


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## Fishbone Jones (11 Apr 2015)

We were told we would have between 11-18 minutes of life after crossing the LD and firing the main gun.

That gave us a reason to overindulge in the beer that was there ;D


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## TCBF (12 Apr 2015)

recceguy said:
			
		

> We were told we would have between 11-18 minutes of life after crossing the LD and firing the main gun.
> 
> That gave us a reason to overindulge in the beer that was there ;D



- I always loved those "x amount of minutes to live" urban military legends. Not too many peer reviewed papers backing them up, sadly.

- I thought that "Red Army" by Ralph Peters was the more likely outcome of a Heavy Metal war on the Central Front. It was a good book to read in CFE and got passed around a lot.


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## Eland2 (12 Apr 2015)

TCBF said:
			
		

> - I always loved those "x amount of minutes to live" urban military legends. Not too many peer reviewed papers backing them up, sadly.
> 
> - I thought that "Red Army" by Ralph Peters was the more likely outcome of a Heavy Metal war on the Central Front. It was a good book to read in CFE and got passed around a lot.



I've not read _Red Army_, but I have read a similar book by former British Army officer Kenneth Macksey called _First Clash_, which details the likely actions 4 CMBG would have to take in the first 48 hours of a Warsaw Pact advance on western Europe. Macksey concluded that in a best-case scenario, 4 CMBG would have been forced to engage in a series of tactical withdrawals to well within French territory.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (12 Apr 2015)

Then Eland2, you must get your hands on _Red Army_. It is almost a "must read" book.

Peters wrote it completely from a soviet perspective. For once, you are not on the comfortable NATO side, but on the soviet one, looking at the campaign from their perspective and interpreting the situation as it develops from their leadership's point of view, and seeing how their officers would react to various problems.

It is very educational.


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## Kirkhill (12 Apr 2015)

For the Trifecta (along with Red Army and First Clash) I would offer Hackett's "Third World War: August 1985".

And as counter-point to Peters' "Red Army" I suggest Victor Suvorov's "The Liberators - My Life in the Soviet Army" - written by a serving Soviet officer that defected and that served during the 1968 Liberation of Prague.


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## Eland2 (12 Apr 2015)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Then Eland2, you must get your hands on _Red Army_. It is almost a "must read" book.
> 
> Peters wrote it completely from a soviet perspective. For once, you are not on the comfortable NATO side, but on the soviet one, looking at the campaign from their perspective and interpreting the situation as it develops from their leadership's point of view, and seeing how their officers would react to various problems.
> 
> It is very educational.



Thanks for the recommendation, I'll go look it up and get a copy. 

My own take on how the Warsaw Pact forces would have viewed a campaign from their perspective, is that they would have had significant difficulties along the way. I'm not referring to the opposition they would have experienced from NATO forces. I'm thinking more along the lines of the problems posed by leading millions of mediocre troops, most of whom are conscripts with little to no motivation to fight hard or be emotionally or mentally invested in the business of soldiering. 

Then there is the problem of supply. Throughout their history, Russia and its Warsaw Pact client states were notorious for having persistent supply-chain problems in both the military and civilian spheres. This, I think, is why they chose to hang their hopes on building an armoured force so large that it would be capable of overwhelming NATO defences in a one-shot deployment, and thereby minimize the need to maintain extensive repair and replacement resources. Or extensive logistical support, for that matter.

Finally, the bigger problem that WP forces faced was one of political reliability. It's well known that the Poles, the Czechs and Hungarians (and East Germans to a lesser extent) were fairly reluctant adherents of Communism. As such, there was always the risk that substantial portions of their armies might have defected to the NATO side if an attack had been launched.

Evidence for this argument is partly supported by the fact that in the mid to late 1980s, Erich Honecker in East Germany was forced to open up the borders and allow people to travel more freely, even to non-Communist countries, in order to stave off the risk of open revolt that neither the East German government nor its Soviet backers had the wherewithal to contain. I've even come across one account where the Poles were said to have come close to militarily attacking their Russian occupiers over some dispute. That dispute ended with the Russians backing down rather than see the already-fragile Warsaw Pact alliance jeopardized.


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## MilEME09 (13 Apr 2015)

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Thanks for the recommendation, I'll go look it up and get a copy.
> 
> My own take on how the Warsaw Pact forces would have viewed a campaign from their perspective, is that they would have had significant difficulties along the way. I'm not referring to the opposition they would have experienced from NATO forces. I'm thinking more along the lines of the problems posed by leading millions of mediocre troops, most of whom are conscripts with little to no motivation to fight hard or be emotionally or mentally invested in the business of soldiering.
> 
> ...



If you've ever played the game Wargame: European Escalation, a similar scenario played out where during the 1980 workers strikes in poland. In the scenario the strikes spread to Czechoslovakia and the country's fractured with parts of both nations armies rebelling against the red army. The Czech's call for NATO's help, but NATO forces don't reach Poland in time. Loosing Czech though would prove to be a crippling blow to the Warsaw pact.

If you ask me we still should be gearing out vehicles to fight russian/Chinese designs, rather then insurgents with RPG's and IED's


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## TCBF (14 Apr 2015)

Eland2 said:
			
		

> I've not read _Red Army_, but I have read a similar book by former British Army officer Kenneth Macksey called _First Clash_, which details the likely actions 4 CMBG would have to take in the first 48 hours of a Warsaw Pact advance on western Europe. Macksey concluded that in a best-case scenario, 4 CMBG would have been forced to engage in a series of tactical withdrawals to well within French territory.



- We joked in CFE that the most realistic part about "First Clash" was the story location: north of CFB Baden-Sollingen. In fact, at the end he did have one of the Cdn leaders feel that we they been hustled back, and perhaps did not accomplish as much as they had hoped.

- We put too much stock in the 'poor morale' of GSFG and the lesser commies. Fact is, they would have done their duty and they had a robust system of military discipline to keep everyone pointed west. Once on the ground in the FRG and moving towards the Rhine, their morale would have gotten better by the kilometer, whilst ours would have gotten worse.

- Our sustainability had issues as well. We had an ocean to cross. 130 Soviet attack submarines (in 1990) and the anti-ship missile carrying Bears and Blinders of the AV-MF would make for a short war.


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## Eland2 (14 Apr 2015)

TCBF said:
			
		

> - We joked in CFE that the most realistic part about "First Clash" was the story location: north of CFB Baden-Sollingen. In fact, at the end he did have one of the Cdn leaders feel that we they been hustled back, and perhaps did not accomplish as much as they had hoped.
> 
> - We put too much stock in the 'poor morale' of GSFG and the lesser commies. Fact is, they would have done their duty and they had a robust system of military discipline to keep everyone pointed west. Once on the ground in the FRG and moving towards the Rhine, their morale would have gotten better by the kilometer, whilst ours would have gotten worse.



Yes, they did have a robust form of military discipline. Commanders were authorized to shoot any backsliders, and any that survived such an encounter or didn't get shot ended up in the punishment battalions like the ones that were seen in the battle for Stalingrad in the Second World War.



> - Our sustainability had issues as well. We had an ocean to cross. 130 Soviet attack submarines (in 1990) and the anti-ship missile carrying Bears and Blinders of the AV-MF would make for a short war.



3,500 miles is a long stretch for any logistical train. A train that was too long proved to be Hitler's undoing when he foolishly attacked Stalingrad.

I think one of the saving graces for NATO was that it had extensive stocks of materiel prepositioned in various places to help compensate for the distance between North America and Europe. The problem, of course, was that if the materiel storage locations were overrun or nuked, NATO would quickly find itself in a 'game over' kind of situation and forced to choose between conducting tactical and strategic nuclear strikes or surrendering.


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