# Top UK Gen says get out of Iraq - fast



## MarkOttawa (12 Oct 2006)

An interview with the UK Chief of The General Staff:
http://www.windsorleadershiptrust.org.uk/en/1/rdannatt.html
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=410175&in_page_id=1770

The story (it's long, but...shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act):
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=410163&in_page_id=1770&ico=Homepage&icl=TabModule&icc=NEWS&ct=5



> The head of the Army is calling for British troops to withdraw from Iraq "soon" or risk catastophic consequences for both Iraq and British society.
> 
> In a devastating broadside at Tony Blair's foreign policy, General Sir Richard Dannatt stated explicitly that the continuing presence of British troops "exacerbates the security problems" in Iraq.
> 
> ...


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## Infanteer (12 Oct 2006)

The General makes a good point - it seems we've worn out our welcome in Iraq.  However, this is definitely a "falling on your sword" type of thing and is probably not going to be appreciated at Whitehall.


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## Cloud Cover (12 Oct 2006)

I suspect this most unusual step has been taken after exhausting all internal avenues.


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## tomahawk6 (12 Oct 2006)

While I agree with some points the General made, particularly with regard to the attack on British values by the Muslim minority. I greatly admire the British Army and RM, but the policy that the Brit's have pursued in Basra have been the subject of severe criticism by me.

The Brits made a deal with the pro-Iranian elements that essentially let the Sadr militia run the city without British interference. This deal was made to avoid casualties. This deal blew up last fall I think it was, when 2 British soldiers were captured by the pro-militia police and the Brits had to go in hard to rescue their men. Meanwhile British officers lectured us about how their methods were far better than the US approach in the Sunni triangle. Then they sent the Black Watch north during Falluja to help out. After IED attacks killed five troops the kinder gentler approach went by the way. You dont survive in the Triangle if you dont take it to the bad guys. Anyway lets say I am a bit disappointed with the senior leadership of the British Army in Iraq and now Afghanistan.


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## pbi (12 Oct 2006)

Here is the CBC.ca link:

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/10/12/dannatt-blair.html

Very interesting. I'm sure that this is the very last thing that Blair was hoping for: it will be very difficult to explain away what the CGS has to say. Blair's political enemies will be all over this. But although I am a great fan of forthright military leaders (a la Gen Hillier), I think that Gen Dannat may actually have gone too far here: he appears to be undermining the Govt. The best place to challenge the government like this is probably in private first. Then, if one really believes that he has done his very best to change an intolerably bad situation, but has failed, one could go public and then resign. I don't think there is a place for a CDS/CGS who loses that argument, if he really believes he is right and the Govt is so utterly wrong. The trust is gone.

Interesting to note that this pessimistic assessment of Iraq is somewhat in the same vein as that of the Comd of ISAF, another UK general. While not urginmg withdrawal, IIRC he has been very blunt about the current situation and the chances of success if the expectations of the Afghan people are not met soon. Brit generals seem to be more prepared to make these sort of sober, "less than gung-ho" assessments, than perhaps their US or Cdn peers might be. Although, I recall seeing coverage of Gens Pace and Abizaid testifying recently in front of Congress (?) and making some pretty frank comments about the situation in Iraq.

Cheers


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## GAP (12 Oct 2006)

I would place bets he's gone by Monday...


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## probum non poenitet (13 Oct 2006)

GAP said:
			
		

> I would place bets he's gone by Monday...



Knew a Brit who said the old slang was "being awarded the DCM ... Don't Come Monday"

(as opposed to the Distinguished Conduct Medal)


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## a_majoor (13 Oct 2006)

While it is good to make a frank assessment and give your views, soldiers in Western nations are ultimately subordinate to the government of the day. The General could/should say his piece in a private briefing, and if he felt strongly enough then hand in his resignation to say it again in public.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

Tomahawk6 - sooner or later you are going to have to try amd make friends with somebody. Or else kill them all.  Machiavelli has his uses as well.  Unfortunately his way takes time and bad things happen along the way.

As to the General speaking out and being fired, speaking out and resigning or resigning and speaking out - 6 and half a dozen.  There have been rumours for a couple of weeks that the Army has been calling to move all its chips to Afghanistan.  Coupled with the politicians claiming that 16 Bde would go in and not fire a shot, then denying ISAF a QRF because of a fit of pique when the other NATO types wouldn't ante up I think the Army has just about run out of patience.  (We don't need to go into equipment shortages and Regimental realignment).


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## Pikepusher (13 Oct 2006)

Behold a phenomenon only rarely seen in the CF: an officer to whom Truth is not what he thinks the boss wants to hear, Duty is not to himself, and Valour is more than a risk to the other two.

Any bets on Gen Dannatt being rewarded with the Brit equivalent of being made an ambassador, deputy minister, head of an international commission, or $1,000 a day consultant when he retires?


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## MarkOttawa (13 Oct 2006)

Update: The General clarifies but does not retract.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2402604,00.html

Brit military support him
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2402666,00.html

on web forum, _ARRSE_.
http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=48836.html

Mark
Ottawa


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## tomahawk6 (13 Oct 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Tomahawk6 - sooner or later you are going to have to try amd make friends with somebody. Or else kill them all.  Machiavelli has his uses as well.  Unfortunately his way takes time and bad things happen along the way.
> 
> As to the General speaking out and being fired, speaking out and resigning or resigning and speaking out - 6 and half a dozen.  There have been rumours for a couple of weeks that the Army has been calling to move all its chips to Afghanistan.  Coupled with the politicians claiming that 16 Bde would go in and not fire a shot, then denying ISAF a QRF because of a fit of pique when the other NATO types wouldn't ante up I think the Army has just about run out of patience.  (We don't need to go into equipment shortages and Regimental realignment).



How do you make friends with terrorists without sacrificing your beliefs ? Any deal that allows anti-government forces to flourish is a loss for our efforts to stablize Afghanistan. Besides its not up to a NATO commander to cut a side deal with the enemy, it is the province of the Karzai government.


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## Infanteer (13 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> How do you make friends with terrorists without sacrificing your beliefs ? Any deal that allows anti-government forces to flourish is a loss for our efforts to stablize Afghanistan. Besides its not up to a NATO commander to cut a side deal with the enemy, it is the province of the Karzai government.



Whoa, since when did the Shi'ites of Basra become terrorists?


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

Well, the ARRSE thread reflects discussions I've had with serving British officers and with Canadians who have served in Iraq (including my brother).  Generally, my impression is that the British Army feels it was sold a bill of goods in Iraq and that American policy there has been disasterously wrong from the outset (or, at least, from the post-invasion phase).  Moreover, there have been accusations within the UK that the "brass" (a term I despise, but it will suffice) has failed to stand up for the Army recently, particularly in light of misplaced civilian prosecutions for use of force in operational theatres, irrational lawsuits from Iraqi "civilians", human rights complaints, cutbacks and amalgamation - on and on.

It is a feeling that I find I share: I'm hardly prone to anti-Americanism, but I feel pretty strongly that the US has made grievous tactical and strategic errors in Iraq from the outset that have exacerbated the _global_ problem.  The Brits feel that they've been merely along for the ride and that their advice (remembering that they occupied Iraq for many years) has been discounted or deliberately ignored - and I've heard this from a variety of sources at a variety of rank levels.

While I may not agree with Dannatt's speaking out while serving (a very public resignation followed by a diatribe in the press would be the normal route), I find it very hard to disagree with what he's saying.  Judging by the initial reaction, his soldiers feel the same way, which may be all that counts in his mind.

Flame away...

Teddy


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## GAP (13 Oct 2006)

TR...I keep having the same feeling about Iraq that I (and most others had) of V.N.. It is largely being dictated to by the White House and their political mandate. The 1990 Gulf War was successful until stopped simply because the politicians handed it over to the generals and stood back ( if only so that they wouldn't get splashed if something fell into the doo-doo). The Second Gulf War was successful until "victory" was achieved, and then little fingers started dabbling where they did not belong.

If the US wants any semblence of success in Iraq, they need to rethink their approach, if it is not too late, which I happen to think it is.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

GAP: that's my feeling too.  +1

It may well be too late to attain any rational political goals, particularly the naive and utopian ones presented by the White House.  The question is:  what to do next?

For the British, increasingly engaged in Afghanistan, the question becomes one of focus.  If you believe, as I do (and as apparently the CGS does) that Iraq has diverted resources from the "real" fight, the answer becomes quite clear.  The UK is operating on a shoe-string in Helmand, partially because they have so much invested in S. Iraq, to little or no end.  If I've read Gen Dannatt correctly, he's arguing that over time, British resources need to be focused where they can have the most impact on _terrorism_ and on a theatre that is winnable.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> How do you make friends with terrorists without sacrificing your beliefs ? Any deal that allows anti-government forces to flourish is a loss for our efforts to stablize Afghanistan. Besides its not up to a NATO commander to cut a side deal with the enemy, it is the province of the Karzai government.



The short answer to the beliefs part of your statement is that your beliefs are your beliefs.  The other guy has his beliefs as well.  Mutually you can stand on principle and slaughter each other all day every day.  Or you can say Insh'Allah and find a pragmatic compromise. Me, a Presbyterian, I ended up marrying a Catholic (and a Liberal - She is coming around on the Liberal side of things but she is still a Catholic).

Despite the existence of Muslim fanatics I choose to believe that most Muslims, like most Christians I know and most of every other type of person I have met, most of the time are apathetic compromisers that pragmatically want a quiet life.  They will get aroused when they are brought face to face with a rabble rouser at the mosque.  They may even donate to the cause through tithes, alms, taxes or charitable donations.  But few will actually take the road of Jihad - unless it gets personal.  Even us Brits didn't get too exercised about WW2 until 1940 when Germany started killing Brits in France and then in London.  You lot felt the same until December 7th, 1941 and September 11th, 2001.

America may have been built on principle, although I find most Americans to be pretty pragmatic in daily life. Britain pretty much foreswore principle in favour of pragmatism in its institutions. In the interest of the peace that permits prosperity the abiding domestic principle is that no (or very few) cause is worth disrupting the public peace.  Better to have a show of hands, accept the rule of the majority and get on with life.  You can be right and dead.  That doesn't help the kids and pay the bills and those are the driving interests of most people.

That is the problem I have with our own Liberals, NDPers, Activists and Supreme Court judges.  They all seem to think that there are right answers to every question.  There may be. Trouble is nobody can agree on what those are.  Perhaps that is why these groups gain their grass-roots support overwhelmingly from the young and the well-heeled.  Their bills are paid and most of them don't have kids to worry about. I am talking about rank-and-file here. The Liberal leadership understands pragmatism to a fault.

By all means slaughter those that are attacking you as the Brit commanders did.  But is doesn't hurt to stop from time to time, as one of them did, and say "had enough yet? We can keep this up for a long, long time." Or invite some members of the attackers to break off, to go home, to come over.  Or to invite the locals to take control of their own situation and demonstrate that you will allow them to show themselves worthy of trust.  Yes, that entails risk - more bodies or retaking old ground.  But those are unavoidable risks.  If those risks weren't involved then the job would be left to CIDA and the diplomats and there would be no need for the soldiers.  Putting on the uniform is not about killing.  It is about taking the risk of dying.  Killing is what is done to reduce that risk, although not always the personal risk.

Sooner or later a deal has to be made. 

You are quite right it is not up to the local NATO commander to make that deal. It is up to the government of the day, Karzai's government.  But it was Karzai's government that opted for the platoon house strategy to demonstrate presence.  It is Karzai's government that has an amnesty programme for the Taliban to wean the support from the leadership.  It is Karzai's government that has willingly turned a blind eye to crime and injustice in order to reduce the temperature and allow discussion to occur.  The pragmatic over the principled.   Stop the killing long enough to debate the principles and then decide whether those principles justify standing on ceremony and reverting to the gun.

Personally I think Karzai is doing about as good a job as can be expected under the circumstances.  The jury is still out on his fellow pragmatist next door in Islamabad.  While Karzai is pragmatically inclined to work with "Us" Musharraf seem pragmatically inclined to work against "Us".

Cheers sir.


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## tomahawk6 (13 Oct 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Well, the ARRSE thread reflects discussions I've had with serving British officers and with Canadians who have served in Iraq (including my brother).  Generally, my impression is that the British Army feels it was sold a bill of goods in Iraq and that American policy there has been disasterously wrong from the outset (or, at least, from the post-invasion phase).  Moreover, there have been accusations within the UK that the "brass" (a term I despise, but it will suffice) has failed to stand up for the Army recently, particularly in light of misplaced civilian prosecutions for use of force in operational theatres, irrational lawsuits from Iraqi "civilians", human rights complaints, cutbacks and amalgamation - on and on.
> 
> It is a feeling that I find I share: I'm hardly prone to anti-Americanism, but I feel pretty strongly that the US has made grievous tactical and strategic errors in Iraq from the outset that have exacerbated the _global_ problem.  The Brits feel that they've been merely along for the ride and that their advice (remembering that they occupied Iraq for many years) has been discounted or deliberately ignored - and I've heard this from a variety of sources at a variety of rank levels.
> 
> ...



I am a bit pressed for time at the moment but I will respond later this evening. Great topic.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

After reading ARRSE I am bothered about one thing here.

The General may consider the Army his constituency but it is not his Army. It is the Government's Army (not Her Majesty's although everybody owes Her their primary allegiance).

When some of the troops start saying that they have to stand behind the General, even if he is fired, that has to be managed very carefully.  It can quickly move towards "incitement to mutiny".  Even mass resignations could be seen in that light.


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## cplcaldwell (13 Oct 2006)

From CBC.ca. Shared under the Fair Dealings Provisions of the Copyright Act, RSC.

My emphasis added....



> *British army chief clarifies controversial remarks on Iraq*
> *Last Updated: Friday, October 13, 2006 | 10:39 AM ET
> CBC News *
> 
> ...



Remainder of article at This Link. Read the whole link farther down you'll see "The (Daily Mail) newspaper declined to release a full text of the (original) interview...."._My parenthesis added for clarity.._ 

Hmm... senior soldier misquoted by press.... now that's never happened before has it!

Should I now say..."Tinfoil anyone??"


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

You have to take ARRSE with a grain of salt.  The bulk of the squaddies posting there loathe Blair and tend to spout off a lot.  To them, Dannatt's statements have been the first time someone has "stood up" for their interests in quite some time, for reasons I mentioned above.

cplcaldwell:  things aren't quite that simple.  The BBC is reporting his statement differently.  I suspect that Downing Street is engaging in a huge damage control effort, with Blair saying he agrees with "everything" the CGS said yesterday...  Hmmm.


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## warrickdll (13 Oct 2006)

GAP said:
			
		

> TR...I keep having the same feeling about Iraq that I (and most others had) of V.N.. ...



There was always something wrong with the US plan - but their limited troop numbers did not have to lead to chaos. 

All those Iraqi soldiers walking home along the roads immediately after the US invasion should have been stopped and informed that they were all now proud members of the New Iraqi Army and handed there first paycheque.

Considering that the UK was their partner in the invasion, I am surprised that they didn't learn from the British experience in Vietnam.


The correct course of action now for the coalition in Iraq is difficult to judge without really knowing what the long-term goals of the coalition are. If stability in Iraq were all that is needed, then I would say Iraq is as stable as it's going to be at the moment. 

The coalition should use the current stability of the Iraqi government, and the situation in Afghanistan, and the situation in Korea, as reasons for leaving (or at least leaving in large numbers).


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## cplcaldwell (13 Oct 2006)

*TR* quite right, have edited post to reflect your last. Perhaps I am engaging in premature conspiracy theorising


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

> Considering that the UK was their partner in the invasion, I am surprised that they didn't learn from the British experience in *Vietnam.*



???


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## warrickdll (13 Oct 2006)

Don't be so quick to judge. The Brits found themselves in Vietnam in 45 without enough troops on the ground - and made the correct choice when presented limited options.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

Oh, I'm not judging.  You just had me confused because there was no context.  You have to admit that your analogy is fairly obscure to the uninitiated.


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## warrickdll (13 Oct 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Oh, I'm not judging.  You just had me confused because there was no context.  You have to admit that your analogy is fairly obscure to the uninitiated.



GAP's Vietnam reference had me thinking back to previous discussions while seeing the news reports - all those, now unemployed, Iraqi soldiers who were the enemy the day before, were the perfect people to be placed in a constabulary role.

Obscurity noted. 

But the past is the past. Now (with no actual personal knowledge), I am not seeing an advantage for the US in having their forces so heavily involved in the fighting in Iraq. I say - draw down, and set up a couple of isolated bases (isolated from the population) and let the Iraqi situation wobble to some sort of equilibrium. The Americans may end up being allies (against Iranian influence) of many of the factions they are currently fighting against.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

Further to Iterator's point - in addition to moving the US forces to isolated bases put them on the borders to seal the country.  Let the locals deal with the cities - however they choose to organize them.

Don't put the US where the people are (cities and border crossings).  Put them where they are not supposed to be (deserts, mountains and the borders between the crossings).  And by all means leave a division or two in camps as a strategic reserve to discourage activity from the neighbours.


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## Big Red (13 Oct 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Whoa, since when did the Shi'ites of Basra become terrorists?



Mahdi & Badr are just as if not more destabilizing than the insurgents.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (13 Oct 2006)

Big Red said:
			
		

> Mahdi & Badr are just as if not more destabilizing than the insurgents.



What, you don't like death squads run by Shiite political parties torturing then killing 50-100 people per week?


Matthew.  :blotto:


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

And why are they torturing and killing people?  Just to make the Americans and Brits look bad on CNN?  Or perhaps its because it is the only way they can think of to try and keep the locals in line?

The locals didn't want the CTs in Malaya, the Mau-Mau in Kenya, the Vietcong in Vietnam and they don't want the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Badr & Sadr in Iraq.  However, as well as fearing being terrorized by the terrorists they equally fear being caught in the cross-fire.  

If the fight goes on too long then they would just as soon the elephants went to trample the grass someplace else.  If there is only one elephant left in their neck of the woods then they might be able to figure out how to live with it no matter how mean, nasty, ornery and vicious it is.  At least for a while.....then they get to thinking that somebody really ought to do something about the elephant and discussions start all over again.


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## Infanteer (13 Oct 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Generally, my impression is that the British Army feels it was sold a bill of goods in Iraq and that American policy there has been disasterously wrong from the outset (or, at least, from the post-invasion phase)....
> 
> It is a feeling that I find I share: I'm hardly prone to anti-Americanism, but I feel pretty strongly that the US has made grievous tactical and strategic errors in Iraq from the outset that have exacerbated the _global_ problem.  The Brits feel that they've been merely along for the ride and that their advice (remembering that they occupied Iraq for many years) has been discounted or deliberately ignored - and I've heard this from a variety of sources at a variety of rank levels.



I find myself agreeing with this assertion.  Thomas E Ricks' _"Fiasco"_, Gordon and Trainor's _"Cobra II"_, Woodward's books (the most recent one "State of Denial" being just released) support this notion - not only are opponents to the Bush Administration saying so, but senior military officials, government officials, and our allies.  This is all buffeted by the recent CIA NIE that had almost nothing good to say.

I think Ricks' has it right when he points out that Iraq has been nothing but a series of lost opportunities due to bad strategy, starting from the pre-invasion politicking.  Flimsy intelligence was allowed to be used for making important strategic decisions (although, to be fair, almost everybody believed Saddam had WMD because he made the point of pretending he did for his own reasons).  As well, strategy from the beginning was marred by infighting and ideology taking the place of pragmatic advice by statesman (Colin Powell knew what he was doing) and Generals alike (Shinseki was right after all).  Even after the case for terrorist links (which was shoddy from the start) and WMD (which probably caught most offguard), the third rationale of liberation was pissed away with Abu Gharaib and heavy-handed tactics (such as those by 4ID that are documented in the official USMC history of the campaign).  Little to no Phase IV planning (such as disbanding the only two institutions that held the state together) and refusal to acknowledge what was happening on the ground (surrendering the initiative to opposing forces) only added to the problems.

Even when our American and British allies performed superbly on the tactical level, their efforts would be for naught due to continual strategic mismanagement.  No amount of Petraeus' with the 101st in Mosul or McMaster's 3rd Cav in Tel Afar would make up for bad strategy.  So yeah, I think the Brits can probably feel like they were sold a bill of goods that it WRT liberating Iraq.

I will make no illusion about the fact that I supported the invasion from the start - one can search back to my posts from 2003 to see so.  I never bought into the anti-American, left-wing boo-hiss anti-imperialism line, which many did.  However, I now believe that we've lost any chance to salvage what could have been with Iraq.  The consistant and grinding casualties in country indicates to me that a good portion of the people their simply want us to leave.  If this means we pull out of the cities and let them fight their civil war, then so be it.  As the British CGS said, let's focus on where we can - in Afghanistan, where the original perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks lie, hiding in Quetta, Peshawar and the NWF Provinces.



			
				Iterator said:
			
		

> But the past is the past. Now (with no actual personal knowledge), I am not seeing an advantage for the US in having their forces so heavily involved in the fighting in Iraq. I say - draw down, and set up a couple of isolated bases (isolated from the population) and let the Iraqi situation wobble to some sort of equilibrium. The Americans may end up being allies (against Iranian influence) of many of the factions they are currently fighting against.



To me, that seems like a fairly reasonable COA.  Of course, I said that years ago:



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As well, getting tangled up in the populations of Iraq leads to another issue that I believe affects attitudes - the fact that American soldiers in Iraq do draw Jihadis out like a magnet.   However valid some may feel the theory of engaging Jihadi forces in Iraq rather then in America is, I am sure that the citizens of Iraq do not appreciate the fact that their houses, markets, and mosques are being used as a battleground by US and Jihadi fighters.   Sticking combat soldiers in cities seems to be burning more bridges than they're building.
> 
> I often wonder if a strategy of "sitting back" in the ensuing scrum would have been a more effective way to go about things.   Leave the Tigris and Euphrates floodplain and move to the uninhabited desert of the West.   Let Iraq iron out itself - they can come to their own conclusions on how to rule themselves.   Someone was keen to point out that the people of Iraq were an ancient and complex civilization while we Westerners were living in huts and worshipping trees.   Offer help if asked and don't pick sides and don't put your military forces in someone else's fight.   Use Special Operations Forces to make forays into any Jihadi elements that can be identified and wipe them out quietly and effectively....
> 
> The occupants of the Middle East are a tough and proud people; they will recognize and respect the strength of Western and American might and resolve to undermine the threat of terrorism at it's center of gravity - the unstable geopolitical region of the Middle East.   However, I do not believe they will respect us if we use the might and resolve to attempt to rebuild Iraq in our image.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I will make no illusion about the fact that I supported the invasion from the start - one can search back to my posts from 2003 to see so.  I never bought into the anti-American, left-wing boo-hiss anti-imperialism line, which many did.  However, I now believe that we've lost any chance to salvage what could have been with Iraq.  The consistant and grinding casualties in country indicates to me that a good portion of the people their simply want us to leave.  If this means we pull out of the cities and let them fight their civil war, then so be it.  As the British CGS said, let's focus on where we can - in Afghanistan, where the original perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks lie, hiding in Quetta, Peshawar and the NWF Provinces.



And there is always the possibility that one outcome of all of this will be that the average Iraqi says "What? You were serious about withdrawing and leaving us to Badr, Sadr et al? Hang on.  Don't go running away just yet.  We need to have another little meeting amongst ourselves."


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## Infanteer (13 Oct 2006)

Big Red said:
			
		

> Mahdi & Badr are just as if not more destabilizing than the insurgents.



Aren't the Mahdi and Badr insurgents as well?  And of course they are destabilizing, just as Ansar al-Sunnah and the host of Sunni organizations are.  But does that make them terrorists?  I am willing to guarantee most insurgents don't really give a shit about bin Laden, al-Qaeda, or the War on Terror - sure you got the hardcores like the now departed Zarqawi, but they were a small part of the insurgency.  Stick a Syrian army unit outside of a major American city as an occupying force (because events turned the US from liberator to occupier) and see how well it is recieved when it comes to do a cordon and search....

Here's another good discussion on the topic of insurgent/terrorist:

http://lightfighter.net/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/5131022531/m/1211092552?r=5081092552#5081092552


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

The Jewish Agency, Hagganah and Palmach were insurgents.
IZL and the Stern Gang were terrorists.  >


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## big bad john (13 Oct 2006)

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/WereGoingToSeeThisThroughGeneralDannattOnIraq.htm

We’re going to see this through: General Dannatt on Iraq
13 Oct 06 
The professional head of the Army, General Richard Dannatt, has issued a statement today, 13 October 2006, concerning the British military presence in Iraq.


General Richard Dannatt 
[MOD]
The statement, issued to the Press Association, follows a newspaper interview which focused on whether the presence of British troops is exacerbating the security situation in Iraq. 

In the statement General Dannatt said: 
"We have been in Southern Iraq for three and a half years and we have made significant progress, with two of the four provinces now handed over to Iraqi control and our responsibilities are much reduced in one other province. The point that I'm trying to make is the mere fact that we are still in some places exacerbates violence from those who want to destabilise Iraqi democracy. 

"Currently Operation Sinbad is trying to make Basra better and a lot of British soldiers are doing a really good job. In that regard, their presence is helping but there are other parts where our mere presence does exacerbate and violence results. 

"But that is not a reason for us to leave. I am on record publicly saying we're standing shoulder to shoulder with the Americans. I am on the record from a speech three weeks ago saying that I'm planning force packages in Iraq through 2007 in to 2008. I'm a soldier - we don't do surrender, we don't pull down white flags. We will remain in southern Iraq until the job is done – we're going to see this through."


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## warrickdll (13 Oct 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... To me, that seems like a fairly reasonable COA.  Of course, I said that years ago: ...



Sure... but you lacked brevity. 


So if so many _wise_ people agree that the US' best bet is to do what it can behind the scenes to help out, but keep its forces out of the cities (while still threatening Syria and Iran - and supporting the Kurds), then why aren't they moving to do that now?

Does the US leadership see this playing out differently? Or can we assume the worst, that after all those "We will not Cut and Run" and "Stay the course" statements, the US government has painted itself into a political corner? Is the US government unwilling to change course even if it is still possible to arrive at the desired destination?


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

Iterator said:
			
		

> Sure... but you lacked brevity.
> 
> 
> So if so many _wise_ people agree that the US' best bet is to do what it can behind the scenes to help out, but keep its forces out of the cities (while still threatening Syria and Iran - and supporting the Kurds), then why aren't they moving to do that now?
> ...



Perhaps because if they do quit the towns and head for the border - and the anticipated blood bath breaks out - the next chorus from CNN will be "You're there. Their dying.  Do something. It's all GW's fault."

Militarily it might make sense.  It might even play well within some Iraqi quarters although I have noted that Sunnis that were allowing their brethren to kill Americans are quick to ask for the Americans to come back when Kurdish troops or Shiite police show up in the neighbourhood.  Likewise Badr when Sadr is in the neighbourhood or Sadr when the Kurds are around.  But it sure wouldn't play well on CNN and at the ballot box.

And after all it is the guy stuffing the ballot box that is paying the bill.


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## Brad Sallows (13 Oct 2006)

>If this means we pull out of the cities and let them fight their civil war, then so be it.

I suppose we should have done that in the Balkans.  One can predict that Hussein and every other strongman holding together a fractious group of peoples in a federation must eventually die or be deposed and that the transition may not be orderly.  Should others ever intervene?  Should others intervene before the civil war has a chance to properly start so that it can be throttled down to a low intensity?  Is intervention easier to sell if the strongman is brutal and has an unhealthy yen for unconventional weapons?  All interesting questions.  Does it matter if the civil war takes place in a major oil producing country?

Hopefully the US has learned its lesson - don't intervene.  The likelihood of successful execution of the intentions, let alone the plan, is small.  The US will be blamed for failing to intervene, of course, but it will be harder to lay the bill for wrongful deaths at the White House door.


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## MarkOttawa (13 Oct 2006)

Brad Sallows: Well put.  The problem the US has--both domestically and in the rest of the world--is that they are supposed to solve all problems (e.g. NoKo) and then are blamed when they try and fail.  Frankly, if I were an American, I would be tempted towards extreme isolationism.

Somalia (1992, did not work), B-H, Kosovo, Indonesian and Pakistani disasters---imagine the rest of the world doing it.  Darfur?

Iran and NoKo are unlikely to be able to hit the US with a decent missile for some time whilst others will be at risk.  Let them deal with it, the US having made clear to Tehran and Pyongyang that if you do anything to America you're toast.  Regardless of what anyone else thinks.  National interest and only that.

Saddam should have been gotten rid of--sanctions were getting ever closer to being lifted (remember all those dead Iraqi babies)--and everyone did think the WMD were real.  But the US was not directly threatened.  Just trying, ineffectively in the aftermath, to do good.   So if not the US (and UK) then leave it 
to the Israelis; who soon will have to use nukes.

What I am trying to say is that the US certainly makes mistakes, under any administration.  But if their public, because of administration failures combined with a deserved feeling that the world basically hates them whatever they do, decides the game is not worth the candle, then many people in the world will be at much greater risk--and are unprepared militarily to defend their interests.

While we Canadians, thanks to geography, are essentially immune to the consequences of the stupidities our governments and populace may engage in.

Mark
Ottawa


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

And another plus to you Mark.

Here's an interesting "what if" though.

How might Iraq have gone if the US had left its heavies at home?  

Suppose, that like Afghanistan, Iraq had been strategically inaccessible to massed heavy forces.  To get the job done the US would have been forced to work with local forces (Kurds, Shiites, Seculars, Royalists...) and create an internal alliance.  They had footholds. Kurdistan and Basra were no fly zones and there were bases in Kuwait and Kurdistan as well as Jordan and Saudi.   As we have seen the deserts and borders are hard to secure against infiltration.  They had a criminal element that could be bought.  They had access to strategic air power.  The ability to fly in light and special forces and support them.  They even had a couple of options for a government in exile like Karzai.  It would have taken time and perhaps not been as newsworthy as the massive invasion but perhaps newsworthiness isn't all its cracked up to be.

If Afghanistan is winnable because of a relatively light footprint (compared to Iraq) and an invitation from a local, would Iraq have worked better? Wouild it be a successful Iranian strategy?

I know that is not what we are now, and we may never be able to get back there.

People aren't complaining about too much effort in Afghanistan, they are complaining about too little.

Is a strategy similar to Afghanistan more workable/acceptable?  

Heavy air power.
Special Forces as spotters and trainers to support indigenous forces in the take-down phase
One Division, perhaps two on the ground with some international involvement - primarily to keep local militias in line.
Special Forces as Trainers and on Secondment to the Afghan National Government to build the security forces, including local militias.
Logistical support 
Financial aid.

And let them decide whether they want a majlis, a loya jirga or capital punishment (against some contracted pre-existing conditions for initial support)

The issue is to make the other guy go away so that another local can step in.  Not to put yourself in the face of the locals.  IMHO.

The Americans, (Brits, Canadians and Aussies) for that matter have demonstrated that they are willing to spend some money and some lives (volunteers that want to be there) in pursuit of "noble" goals.  They apparently have their limits however.


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## tomahawk6 (13 Oct 2006)

I have to agree that perhaps the time has come for the Brits to leave Iraq. The pro-Iranian militias pretty much run Basra and the central government cannot allow that situation to continue. I dont see where the Brits have the will to do what needs to be done in Iraq. Perhaps I am wrong.

The Brits want to blame the US for perceived failures which are entirely unfair and myopic. The coalition success in taking down Saddam's forces was historic. The occupation of Iraq transitioning to an elected government is also phenominal. We have had to create a police force [twice] and train up an Army all in only 3 years. How long did it take us to do the same in Germany or Japan ? Some pundits have criticised the decision not to use the existing police and army. They ignore the fact that the police and army were sunni dominated which was the whole point of the invasion. If we want a represenative government then the new army and police need to reflect that new reality. 

Arguing whether Iraq was necessary is a waste of time and effort. The reality is that we are there and making big progress. Most of the Iraqi provinces are calm. The problem areas remain the Sunni Triangle and the Basra region. When we killed Zarqawi most of the Sunni insurgents were ready to make a deal with the government. It was then that the Iranians told their Iraqi proxies to go after the Sunni's which has caused the sectarian violence we now see. Even Sadr according to reports see that this violence is counter productive and needs to be stopped. The problem is that the radical political leadership may have lost control of the militias.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (13 Oct 2006)

> I have to agree that perhaps the time has come for the Brits to leave Iraq. The pro-Iranian militias pretty much run Basra and the central government cannot allow that situation to continue. I dont see where the Brits have the will to do what needs to be done in Iraq. Perhaps I am wrong.



General Dannatt has raised some pertinent strategic questions and these are strategic issues, only remotely connected with your perception of British success or failure _tactically_ in Basra.  However, I suspect you're quite right, but perhaps not for the reasons you mention.  I can't speak (at all) to the situation in Basra or this or that militia.  However, I suspect that the "lack of will" stems from (1) a lack of a sense of British strategic interest in Iraq; (2) a lack of a sense of partnership in Bush's "coalition"; and (3) the pervading sense that Iraq is - and always has been - the wrong battlefront.

If you have an Army that has the widespread feeling that its government was lured into Iraq under false pretenses (which I believe it was), that the tactics pursued by its major Ally have been wrong-headed from the start (and especially immediately post-invasion), and that the "real" fight is elsewhere (all the while watching the "real" fight sapped of resources by the Iraqi adventure), a lack of will is sure to result.

I'll state it pointblank.  I believe that Iraq has been a _significant_ disaster for the West, that the policies purused by the US immediately after the successful invasion were almost entirely counterproductive - and continue to be - and that the adventure has diverted resources from the actual foe.  The US has lacked political finesse in dealing with the Iraqi situation and we are continuing to pay a strategic price as a result.  These are the issues that are driving the Brits' questioning of the mission and I find it hard to disagree.


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## tomahawk6 (14 Oct 2006)

I disagree completely. Afghanistan was merely the first campaign in the war on terror. Iraq being the second.
If the Brits have no strategic interest in Iraq they shouldnt have gone in in the first place. Bush didnt tell Blair join us in this invasion and we will give you X. Blair joined because he saw that it was important to stand with the US. Canada took a different road. The problem with arrse is if you read it too long you wonder why the Brits even need an Army as the only overseas posting should be in Cyprus [great beaches] or Europe [great beer and skiing]. Frankly with that viewpoint the US might as well go it alone or leave the world to its own devices. I am tired of the hand wringing and carping.


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## Infanteer (14 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The coalition success in taking down Saddam's forces was historic. The occupation of Iraq transitioning to an elected government is also phenominal. We have had to create a police force [twice] and train up an Army all in only 3 years. How long did it take us to do the same in Germany or Japan ? Some pundits have criticised the decision not to use the existing police and army. They ignore the fact that the police and army were sunni dominated which was the whole point of the invasion. If we want a represenative government then the new army and police need to reflect that new reality.



It doesn't mean you throw the baby out with the bathwater.  The fact remains that the insurgency was able to spiral out of control due to a lack of the most basic services for the Iraqi people that the Army and the Ba'ath party provided.  Does the fact that the Army was heavily Sunni mean you disenfranchise 300,000 of them?



> Arguing whether Iraq was necessary is a waste of time and effort.



Well, I think it is valid in trying to put the General's statements in context.  You are right in pointing out that we the collective West are there and that we need to bring things to a close on acceptable terms - however, a realistic look at our past performance and future opportunities should lead us to potential solutions, especially when a thriving, pro-Western stable democracy that the Neocons envisioned doesn't seem to be in the cards.



> The reality is that we are there and making big progress. Most of the Iraqi provinces are calm.



Really?  I remember Abu over at LF saying more and more of the country was No-Go.  As well, casualties have remained at a constant 2 - 2.5 men every day while attacks have escalated IIRC.  Do the metrics not seem to indicate to you that the insurgency is still chugging away?  How does that relate to a notion of progress?  And WRT to progress in Iraq and how it relates to the global situation:

http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments_092606.pdf

Progress?  You state that Iraq is the second front on the war on terror, but is it a front of our own making?  As I highlighted above, the Bush Administration's rationale rested on three legs: terrorist links between Saddam and the global Salafists like Al Qaeda, WMD, and throwing out a dictator.  The first was never seriously considered from the start, the second was proven to be false and the third has been squandered by poor occupation.  What is the rationale now, and does it serve any utility to the general campaign against militant Islam?  I have no doubt that the offensive in Afghanistan is directly linked to Iraq and it's instability - suicide bombers and IEDs were relatively unheard of before 2004-2005; now they are the main offensive weapons of the enemy there.  Any advantage of throwing AQ out of Afghan was surrendered.  Things like these lead to my skepticism.


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## tomahawk6 (14 Oct 2006)

Not sure where you get your information from regarding reconstruction efforts.This is very much under reported by the media. Under Saddam electricity was not a 24/7 event and rare outside Baghdad. You dont wave a magic wand and presto a new power plant is born. It takes years. Here are some examples of reconstruction projects.

http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/recon040606.html

http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/may2006/a050806ms1.html

http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2006/a041006ms2.html

http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/recon040306.html

Feel free to browse other projects.

http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/recon040306.html

http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php?script=pubs/pubs_show.php&id=10&name=Eye%20on%20Iraq



> It doesn't mean you throw the baby out with the bathwater.  The fact remains that the insurgency was able to spiral out of control due to a lack of the most basic services for the Iraqi people that the Army and the Ba'ath party provided.  Does the fact that the Army was heavily Sunni mean you disenfranchise 300,000 of them?



Former soldiers of Saddam's army were able to apply for the new Iraqi Army.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-09-18-iraqi-army_x.htm


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## Edward Campbell (14 Oct 2006)

I wonder how so many of us got it so wrong.  By ‘it’ I mean the invasion of Iraq.

My own _mea culpas_ first:

•	I believed, quite firmly, that Saddam Hussein did have WMDs.  It seemed nonsensical to me that someone with all those resources – and he (his _regime_) did get rich on the oil for food programme, and all those big, bad enemies could do anything but develop (or buy) chemical weapons and the means to mate them to missiles and try to develop and mate nuclear weapons, too.

It seems I was quite wrong.  Hussein either played a great game of bluff – convincing many (most?) intelligence services that he really did have such a programme or those intelligence service and Saddam Hussein were fooled by a bunch of Iraqi scientists and bureaucrats who pretended to be developing WMDs but who, really, lacked the skills and resources for the task.

•	I believed that toppling Hussein would lead to some civil unrest but, at bottom, the Iraqis – and all peoples, regardless of race, colour, creed, etc – want the same sort of thing we do: peace, prosperity, democracy, rule of law, etc.  The fairly sophisticated, secular Iraqi people would, therefore, elect a new government which would help spread democracy throughout the region. 

I don’t think I was 100% wrong, but … 

1.	It is clear that sectarian divisions are far more powerful than I imagined.  It may be true that the Sunni and Shia leaders are using (abusing) their followers - the ones doing the killing and dying – for their own ends but the fact is that millions of _ordinary_ Iraqis are willing to kill and die for their _*beliefs*_.  It’s hard, maybe impossible to have rational political discourse when _irrational_ religious beliefs get in the way, and

2.	Although I still believe it is true that all people are pretty much alike in wanting to decide, for themselves, how they shall organize their own societies and what form of government they shall institute amongst themselves, for themselves, I am coming to the conclusion that liberal democracy can only spring from liberal, _liberally enlightened_ societies.  Similarly I conclude that _conservatively enlightened_ societies (East Asian societies, for example) will develop *conservative democratic* systems, such as we find in Singapore.  It appears to me that Arab/Islamic societies will institute forms of government which conform to their own cultural norms – thus, in a free and fair election Egyptians will vote for the fundamentalist _Muslim Brotherhood_, Algerians will vote for another wing of the same group, and so on. 

•	I believed that the White House/Pentagon policy making and planning apparatus was _balanced_ between radical reformers like Paul Wolfowitz (a man I admire greatly for both his intellect and accomplishments) and much more conservative career civil servants.

It appears that I misunderstand the _balancing_ which does exist in the US government.  The civil service appears to be much more deferential to the wishes of the governing party than is the case in Westminster style democracies such as exist in Canada.  It also appears that I misunderstood the nature of cabinet _management_ of issues in the Bush administration and, therefore, I overestimated the influence of e.g. Colin Powell.

It appears, now, that Stephen Harper, Tony Blair and, probably, John Howard shared similar misapprehensions.

I am pretty certain that had Stephen Harper been PM of Canada in 2003 we (you, actually, I’m waaaay too old) would have been fighting in Iraq, today; had I been PM that would certainly have been the case.  Even though I could not make a good, or even a _so-so_ case for Iraq being a vital _strategic_ issue for Canada I would have declared that solidarity with the USA *is* just that and, on that basis, I would have committed troops.  I have a hunch that was at the centre of Blair and Howard’s reasoning – not 100% of it, but the main, central issue.

Having suggested that ‘we’ (Blair, Bush, Harper, Howard, etc) were wrong then the question is: *what now?*

I think Gen, Dannett is right: tell the Iraqis they are free and independent now; give ‘em a few billion dollars in cash and arms and withdraw.  Get on with the *war on barbarism* which is being fought in Afghanistan, for the moment, and may spill over into Pakistan and then flare up, equally dangerously, in Indonesia and, even worse, in Malaysia and Thailand.

The Taliban and their diverse allies in Afghanistan* are the most important enemy _right now_.  We must send a message to all Islamists (that word again – with my normal _caveats_ about it) that they will not be allowed to subvert sovereign governments and turn them into landlords for enemy terrorist bases.  Securing Afghanistan for the _friendly_ and legitimate Karzai government is a key step.  Once the government’s hold on the country is _reasonably_ firm we should withdraw – Afghanistan for the Afghans.

Notwithstanding the noble aim of spreading liberal democracy to Arabia and the Middle East we must acknowledge that it is not our *right*, much less our duty to tell other people how to govern themselves.  Let us content ourselves with giving people the peace and security which will allow them to decide, for themselves, what forms of government are best for them. We may not like the outcome; we should understand or learn how to deal with it.

We need to affirm, for ourselves, for all our citizens, regardless of race, colour, creed, etc, and for the world the great purposes of the modern, secular, capitalist, liberal, law abiding, democratic West.  We need to propagandize, even proselytize for those great _*beliefs*_ so that Canadians and Australians, Indians, Americans and Brits and so on will all understand why, sometimes, it is necessary to fight to defend those great purposes and beliefs.

We need to rebuild the _Western Alliances_ to affirm some of those same great beliefs.  We must make all democrats our friends and limit our support for tyrants.  We need not, should not seek enemies but we need to be careful in selecting our friends because, once selected, they are entitled to our support – with blood and treasure.

The key alliance – the _*Anglosphere*_ should be informal, unwritten and un-ratified but firm all the same.  It should include America, Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand and Singapore, to start.  Fiji, Jamaica and Malaysia should be _cadet_ members.  NATO and a Pacific equivalent need to be rebuilt as _hemispheric_ military alliances – secured by American strength – willing and able do the United Nations’ bidding in their hemispheric areas of influence.

For Canada, specifically, we need to:

•	Affirm our _national *values*_ to the nation and the world;

•	Affirm our position as a _charter member_ of the Anglosphere – paradoxically that means increasing our (and especially Québec’s) position in the seriously funny and useless _Francophonie_;

•	Affirm our position as a _*leading* middle power_; and

•	Rebuild our armed forces and our foreign service so that we can put muscle, money and _mouth_ in motion in the world community – to protect and promote our own interests.

---------

* I am convinced that there is more to the *enemy* in Afghanistan than _just_ the Taliban and I am equally convinced that not all of the Taliban are armed revolutionaries.


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## Infanteer (14 Oct 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> It seems I was quite wrong.  Hussein either played a great game of bluff – convincing many (most?) intelligence services that he really did have such a programme or those intelligence service and Saddam Hussein were fooled by a bunch of Iraqi scientists and bureaucrats who pretended to be developing WMDs but who, really, lacked the skills and resources for the task.



Saddam was playing a great bluff - Trainor and Gordon's look into US investigations and debriefings of top Ba'athist officials and generals confirms this.  They pointed out that many Iraqi generals were surprised when, in the middle of the US "march up" to Baghdad, he revealed to his top Generals that he didn't have any WMD's to lob at the Americans.  The indication is that he was playing this charade to spread confusion among Western policy makers (which he succeeded in doing) but, more importantly, to keep the Shi'ites in line.

In fact, the evidence suggests that Hussein knew that once the Americans rolled over the sandberms on the Kuwaiti border that it was all over.  In knowing so, he planned the insurgency far in advance of any US spear-rattling.  As Malcolm Nance points out over at LF (the link also contains good excerpts from his upcoming book).

http://lightfighter.net/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/5131022531/m/1211092552?r=5081092552#5081092552



> Originally posted by Abu Buckwheat:
> 
> 
> > When did the insurgency start in Iraq? Prior to OIF forces crossing the LOD.
> ...



It would only be later that the Ba'athist Fedayeen would be displaced as the prime movers of the insurgency by the hardcore Qu'ran-thumpers (this Frontline documentary gives interesting perspectives into this aspect of the Insurgency).



> I believed that toppling Hussein would lead to some civil unrest but, at bottom, the Iraqis – and all peoples, regardless of race, colour, creed, etc – want the same sort of thing we do: peace, prosperity, democracy, rule of law, etc.  The fairly sophisticated, secular Iraqi people would, therefore, elect a new government which would help spread democracy throughout the region.
> 
> I don’t think I was 100% wrong, but …
> 
> 1.	It is clear that sectarian divisions are far more powerful than I imagined.




I remember reading a statement somewhere by a top American general who stated that the US strategy underestimated the strength of the tribal societies within Iraq.  Actions which a secular people may view as acceptable in rebuilding a state were infact counterproductive in tribal Iraqi society.  I wish I could remember where I read that.

Of course, the global situation and the general discourse of the "War on Terror" made it easier for outside forces to crank up their PR machine and convince the Iraqis that the West was in reality a consortium of zionist-crusaders bent on destroying Islam.  That didn't help our cause at all.



> I believed that the White House/Pentagon policy making and planning apparatus was _balanced_ between radical reformers like Paul Wolfowitz (a man I admire greatly for both his intellect and accomplishments) and much more conservative career civil servants.
> 
> It appears that I misunderstand the _balancing_ which does exist in the US government.  The civil service appears to be much more deferential to the wishes of the governing party than is the case in Westminster style democracies such as exist in Canada.  It also appears that I misunderstood the nature of cabinet _management_ of issues in the Bush administration and, therefore, I overestimated the influence of e.g. Colin Powell.



I admire him as I admire Chretien or Trudeau - he may be a smart political player but I still think he's a dunderhead.  At this point, I believe President Bush, who I see to be a genuine and sincere man, was simply (as the Economist pointed out) out of his league.  Guys like Wolfowitz, whom I like to describe as aggressive-Wilsonians with the conviction that inside every A-rab is an American waiting to get out, where able to bring the President into their world view and bludgeon out more pragmatic thinkers like Powell (read about how these guys fought against the State Department and handled the execution of the CPA).  The myopic fixation on Iraq seems almost obsessive - immediately after 9/11, despite the fact that we knew exactly where bin Laden was and who was hosting him, they were pointing to Iraq and the need to take Saddam down (although he had nothing to do with it).   You can see this in the writing of political commentators like Kagan and Krauthammer; that Pax Americana and its absolute military and economic preponderance will be a panacea for all the world's downtrodden and that nothing will be able to resist its progress.  It's interesting going through all my pre-9/11 Poli Sci readings....



> * I am convinced that there is more to the *enemy* in Afghanistan than _just_ the Taliban and I am equally convinced that not all of the Taliban are armed revolutionaries.



AFAIK, you are correct - I've always understood that there was 3 main forces opposing us in Afghanistan. 

1)  There is the remnents of the Taliban and their Pashtun allies (apparently headquartered in Quetta) who still hold Mullah Mohammed Omar as Emir.

2)  Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the chief warlords from the anti-Soviet Jihad (who recieved the lions share of the funding from the ISI) who heads his Hizb-i-Islami and, after being evicted from Iran, joined forces with AQ.

3)  Finally, there is the remenents of the Al-Qaeda 55 Brigade, the "Arab Afghans" (who weren't Arab and, in large part, weren't Arabs either) who come to Afghanistan to bring Jihad to the infidel.  These are the hiers of the anti-Soviet Jihad and the guys who most likely brought all the new tactics and techniques from Iraq - it is my understanding that these are the most dangerous and well-trained foes in Southern Afghanstan.  Part of the global Salafi movement, it is these fellows who are our number 1 enemy there.

Of course, the fact that history seems to show that Afghan society is, by nature, somewhat xenophobic to the multitude of armies that have tromped through it over the millennia also adds to our difficulties in pacifying the region to support the Karzai government.


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## Kirkhill (14 Oct 2006)

I agree with tomahawk6 that Iraq was the opening of a second front.  However it is not a second front on the GWOT or on Barbarism.  It is a second front on the war on Tehran.  This is a war that the US has been involved in since well before 1979. It became involved openly with the installation of the Shah in the 1950s and covertly in the 1930s trying to wrest the place from Russian and British influence.

If we don't see the war in this light Tehran certainly does. 

This does not make this a war of America's creation however.  The Tehran culture has been actively engaged against all comers since at least 4000 BC when it was centred east of the Zagros mountains in Susa and its principle competitor was west of the mountains on the Mesopotamian plain in Ur.  The names of the empires and the centres of power may have shifted slightly over the next 6 millennia but at heart there has always been a struggle between Elam and Mesopotamia, Persian and Arab, Zoraster and Islam, Iran and Iraq. From their point of view everybody else is a bit player in that central drama.

The Islamic arc stretched the array of potential allies/enemies from Morocco (and southern Europe) to India (and the far east).  At various times the east has divided from the west along the fault line of the Zagros.  Damascus vs Persepolis. Athens vs Persepolis. Cairo vs Persepolis. Ur vs Susa.  At other times attempts have been made to bridge the gap.  Baghdad was built as a new city on the faultline.

All of this is to say that the locals have a long memory of a war unending.  They have come to accomodate this war over the millenia by adhering to family, clan, tribe, honour and  blood.  

Nobel Laureate Ebadi is a female Iranian who used to be a judge under the Shah, supported his overthrow, was persecuted and removed from her position under Khomeini and has become a darling of the left for her courage in speaking out against her persecutors.  I found it interesting to read the other day that one of her principle complaints against the regime was that, unlike progressive countries like Morocco and Algiers, Iran only values women at one quarter the value of a man when calculating blood money.  To this westerner it is interesting to note that while she calls for equality for women she apparently has no issue with setting a fixed price on the value of a life.  A price that can be charged in lieu of punishment in order to prevent family feuds.

Their world view is not ours.

Churchill said of the Germans that they were either at your feet or at your neck.  In other words they saw themselves as either master or slave.  Equality was a hard concept for them to grasp.  I think the same thing can be said of these ancient cultures of the middle east. It is all about the pecking order.  Tehran sees itself not as the master it rightfully should be.  It can't conceive itself as being welcomed as an equal.  Therefore it must be a slave and it doesn't like that position.  It is doing everything it can to re-establish itself as master of the universe.  To that end it is calling in its allies wherever it can find them and it is finding in high concentrations close to home and in lower concentrations farther from home.  There are no places it cannot find allies.

 At home it has the Pasdaran and the religious police.  Farther afield it has Hezbollah, Badr and Sadr and the Taliban.  Distantly it has Al Qaeda and its various clones.  And finally it has access to all those who actively oppose the entity that prevents them from achieving their destiny as universal master, the United States, as well as access to all those that are willing to be bought and those that are willing to ignore the situation in return for a quiet life.

Ideology (sunni/shia, communist/capitalist, islam/christianity) has less to do with this issue than Tehran's focus on removing itself from its perceived position of an unwilling slave.  They will make a deal with anybody in order to achieve their end-state.  They will even make deals with their ancient enemies (Iraq, and Sunni Arabs, European Christians) if it discomfits their greatest modern enemy, America.

Seen from that perspective the invasion of Afghanistan was just a matter of the US getting way too close on the eastern flank.  When America advanced from its beach heads in Kuwait, Kurdistan and Jordan into Iraq then the western flank was threatened.  There is only one remaining step for the Americans, as Tehran sees it.  Once Afghanistan and Iraq are secured they are next on the list.  They have to convince the Americans to back off and deny them the consolidation of their efforts in both locations.  To achieve this they will make deals with the devil himself.

Meanwhile America and the West stand on principle: failing to make deals with unsavoury individuals, tribes, countries and NGOs/Supra-National entities because it is "not the done thing".  If it wasn't for the fact that it's America you could almost hear echoes of "It's not cricket".  This reduces the options.  It also increases expectations.

It reduces the number of players that can be exploited to achieve their ends.  It also allows the public to delude itself that allies must be good guys who really have America's interests at heart and given half a chance would live just like Americans.  It ain't so.

The reason the Brits find themselves at odds with the Yanks is that the Brit bureaucratic establishment, including the Army, has a five century history of accepting realpolitik over ideology.  The Brits have been playing one against the other since Burlingham and Walsingham honed their skills fencing with the Spanish and the French on behalf of Elizabeth I.  Note I do not include British politicians in this because by and large they have had a nasty tendency to be ideologically motivated.  This has been particularly true of the left (Whigs, Reformers, Liberals, Labour). Most of Britain's small wars have been initiated by the left. Conservatives have launched wars but usually wars of self-interest and not wars of ideology.  This has/had left a schism characterized by Labour's support for Israel while the Establishment was widely seen to be Arabists.   Tony Blair is following along in a well worn path.  So for that matter is General Dannett.  (By the way I agree with those that say that General Dannett said the right things, and was right to say them when and how he did but he should have immediately tendered his resignation.  It isn't his army and for good or for ill the politicians get to say if the army will be used, confined to barracks or disbanded.)

This war is a long war.  From Tehran's point of view, and from the view of the locals it is a lot longer than any of us in the west give credence. We dismiss much of the war as ancient tribal feuds. 

If, however, we are serious about engaging Tehran then we have to be patient, devious and a damsight more ruthless  than we have been.  That means working out of sight of the media.  

US involvement in the Phillipines and Chad, Jordan, Kurdistan and the Gulf States seem to be much better models for success.  Afghanistan seems to be about as active a theater as western democracies will tolerate.  Iraq is a step too far.

An invasion of Tehran is not in the cards - however nibbling round the edges, making life miserable, isolating them, supporting locals who oppose the regime and tribes that regularly cross those unsecurable borders - all of which can be done without moving Cory Lidle, O.J. Simpson, the Stanley Cup playoffs and the Academy Awards off the front page.

Wars can be fought.  The deaths of volunteers are acceptable.  Just don't raise my taxes, call out the National Guard or interfere with the World Series and the Final Four.

The good news in all of this is that in 6000 years of fighting Tehran has made a bunch of enemies and those that fear her most are those that live closest.  As we get closer to Tehran and Susa the more likely we are to find allies (even if only allies of convenience) in the Sunnis, the Kurds, the Baluchis and even the Mesopotamians.  Not all the Shi'ite locals in Iraq are best pleased at having Persians interfere in their affairs by sponsoring thugs like the Badr and Sadr militias.   Somehow or other though those locals have got to find  the courage to do their own fighting and dying and not be content to leave it up to foreigners to do the dying for them.  That may be a challenge when the key to survival for the average citizen has been just to keep your head down, make money than is stolen and have more children than die and trust to the fates that whoever is in charge won't make life too miserable.


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## tomahawk6 (14 Oct 2006)

Many good points Edward. However, alot more is known now due to captured audio tapes and documents.
No military plan is perfect and sometimes there are unintended consequences. The President made the decision to go into Iraq and had the full support of Congress and the deployment began to Kuwait. Alot of critics didnt like post-OIF plans. But few had any alternatives. The only vehicle we could have used other than the CPA was military governors like we did in WW2. Once the regime fell it was incumbent on the US to provide for governing the country. As I said no plan is perfect,but given the geopolitical currents we have done well. Iraq is a battleground now between Iran and the US. A pullout will assure an Iranian entry into the country, we dont want that. As the Iraqi Army is able to provide security of the population centers US forces will redeploy along the border areas providing a defense shield as the Iraqi military continues to expand in size and capability.

http://powerlineblog.com/archives/013258.php

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/550kmbzd.asp

More documents.

http://70.168.46.200/

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp


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## Kirkhill (15 Oct 2006)

> Wars can be fought.  The deaths of volunteers are acceptable.  Just don't raise my taxes, call out the National Guard or interfere with the World Series and the Final Four.



Oh, and I forgot one other point.  Make sure that you don't make anybody angry enough that they blame me and decide they want to kill me.  Aside from that ..... Carry on.


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## tomahawk6 (15 Oct 2006)

Agreed. One of the absurd claims by the American left is that Iraq is creating more jihadists. They dont make the same claim though in Afghanistan. Essentially the charge is camoflauge for opposition to Iraq. We certainly have killed alot of bad guys that might have been busy at work elsewhere. I believe that the best defense is a good offense. History will show in time whether our efforts in Iraq helped to change the status quo in the middle east or not. If Iran ends up dominating the region that will be bad. Perhaps the US could have used Saddam as a buffer as we did in the 80's. Had we done so, the left would have raised the old argument that we support dictators.The vagaries of history I suppose.


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## Edward Campbell (17 Oct 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> I wonder how so many of us got it so wrong.  By ‘it’ I mean the invasion of Iraq.
> 
> My own _mea culpas_ first:
> 
> ...



It appears I was not alone.

Here - reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act -  is a column, from today's (17 Oct 096)  _National Post_ by _resident hawk_ Jonathan Kay:

http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/columnists/story.html?id=a136eb68-224f-4dfd-9762-b62d9915f4b5 


> Confessions of a misguided hawk
> 
> Jonathan Kay
> National Post
> ...



Now, unlike Kay, I have little of the _”milk of human kindness”_ so my third concern centred on how policy is made rather than the welfare of the Iraqi people.

A couple of further points:

•	It is a bit late in the day to apologize to the people of the region and depart with the hope that all will come out in the wash.  While I think it is time to depart – from _Arabia_ – I expect the whole place to disintegrate into a long, bloody, painful series of revolts, revolutions, civil wars and internecine regional wars.  The *pain* will be felt by all the Arabs and by all in the West who need Arab oil; that means, especially, but not only Europe and Japan – oil is a fungible commodity.  I do not equate the ‘pain’ of high oil prices with the destruction of one’s home and the killing of one’s family, rather I highlight the fact that the coming violence and instability, (is *chaos* the wrong word?) which will, I believe, occupy _Arabia_ for a generation or so, will have impacts around the world.

(Parenthetically, the situation will be _interesting_ for e.g. oil-rich but non-EU member Norway and for oil hungry China.)

•	The United States’ _credibility_ has been damaged – even amongst its best friends and closest, traditional allies.  This is not a good thing.  We are, for the next decade or so, still in a _unipolar_ world.  The pole may now be _wobbling_.  My fear is that the experiences of Viet Nam in the late 20th century and the Middle East in the 21st will cause America to withdraw, as it did in the early 20th century, back into _isolationism_ and further _protectionism_, and to suffer the same malady as Britain did in the 1920s and ‘30s and decide that a robust, active, responsible foreign policy is too much to bear.


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## tomahawk6 (17 Oct 2006)

I am not ready to write off Iraq as a failure,to do so would cheapen the sacrifice of so many. For their sake we need to see Iraq through to some type of successful conclusion. The only way we can lose in my opinion is if we quit,like we did in Vietnam. The enemy cannot defeat us on the battlefield. Their only hope like Vietnam is to persuade us to quit. We dont have the huge anti-war movement that forced us to quit. I think most americans want victory. People must realize that each time you quit you embolden the enemy. At some point the enemy is on our doorstep and we either surrender or fight and the price will be far higher. We have a chance to stop radical islam on a critical front. A victory in Iraq will be huge but it wont happen quick enough for some.

By the way another translation of captured documents.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1720464/posts


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## Kirkhill (17 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I am not ready to write off Iraq as a failure,to do so would cheapen the sacrifice of so many. For their sake we need to see Iraq through to some type of successful conclusion. The only way we can lose in my opinion is if we quit,like we did in Vietnam. The enemy cannot defeat us on the battlefield. Their only hope like Vietnam is to persuade us to quit. We dont have the huge anti-war movement that forced us to quit. I think most americans want victory. People must realize that each time you quit you embolden the enemy. At some point the enemy is on our doorstep and we either surrender or fight and the price will be far higher. We have a chance to stop radical islam on a critical front. A victory in Iraq will be huge but it wont happen quick enough for some.



Essentially I agree.  Iraq is screwed up.  Some really poor decisions have been made.  The intelligence that was available and that indicated an intolerable level of risk has apparently turned out to have been either incorrect or else facts on the ground changed between the time the evidence was gathered and the time it could be confirmed by physical inspection.  (There are still too many anomalies - such as abandoned NBC suits and barrels discovered around a lake of oil in the Basra area when the Brits first moved in there and various unidentified convoys).

Unlike Tomahawk6 I don't think the answer was to disband the Army and the Police and start from scratch.  My preferred solution has always been to accept the existing structures (Federal, Regional and Tribal creating Regiments and Militias from the under-represented) but hold the leadership of those formations accountable to their new masters.  Occasionally that may mean putting down a local mutiny/insurrection and changing out the head man until you can find someone that accepts central authority and can bring his followers on-side.

I also think that the US and its allies would have been better putting its conventional forces onto the borders and into the wastelands and leaving the cities up to the locals with advisors in place.   You might still have had to deal with Najaf, Amarah, Fallujah, Tal Afar etc but not on a  day-to-day in your face environment. 

Having said that I don't think that we can back out now (and I am talking about the West here).  Just as the US can't retire to the borders and allow the cities to become bloodbaths, similarly it can withdraw from the country and allow not only the same thing to occur but likely have Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey having a 3-way struggle for the "vacant" ground.  For the average American soldier it has now become a case of "We're here because we're here because we're here because we're here".  And they will have to stay there and figure out how to get the job done because as Afghanistan and Vietnam both demonstrate to the Russians and Americans  - failure is not an option.  The political consequences are too damaging and I don't want to see a world where that kind of failure has occured.

Some of you are fed up hearing about the Malayan success.  Rightly so.  The reason for that is that there are so few other examples of how to get the job of nation building done successfully.

Before the Brits of the post-war period figured out Malaya they had retreated from Vietnam after they tried to re-secure the place for the French, handed off Indonesia to the Dutch who promptly lost it, lost control of Palestine which promptly dissolved into the ongoing 60 year war with the neighbours, lost control of India and Pakistan with another 60 year war ongoing (both incidences replete with ethnic cleansing, riotous behaviour and insurrection), handing over Greece to the Americans........................  Even in Malaya the first 5 years or so were miserable until a plan was put in place that was then worked assiduously for the next 7 years or so.  Even at the end of that period with tolerable stability Malaya had to arm itself and have its security guaranteed against its neighbours and Singapore was hived off as a separate entity.  Internally a strong police force is necessary to maintain order and there are still ethnic tensions amongst the various tribes, races and religions.  Like every other nation it is work in progress.  

If Iraq achieves the level of stability of Malaya, or even Canada or the US, I am convinced that there will still be those calling it a puppet regime in charge of a failed state because people will still be dying, the poor will still exist and some members of society will still be "Souviening" (copyright cpook 2006) waiting for the day when "The South Will Rise Again".

I do think that General Dannet is right to push to get the Brits reassigned to the Eastern Flank of this war so as to reengage all his troops in theater under one command and one support train.  The Army has problems with the UK politicians that need to be addressed and this is one way to do it.   Also there is the question of "approach'.  I am a great believer that most plans can be made to work, but only if there are more believers than unbelievers and if the plan is broadly adhered to while maintaining the focus.  To me it makes sense to have Iraq continue under an American plan with a Brit "Corporal's Guard" to demonstrate solidarity while the Brits/Canada/Aus/NZ/NATO take on Afghanistan with needed US backing.

The Brits believe, as do the Canadians and the Americans, that they can succeed in Afghanistan.  That alone guarantees a greater chance of success in a shorter term than if they didn't believe in the possibility of success as well as not believing in the plan.

Likewise in Iraq, if you are working two different plans in two different areas but the areas bleed into each other then you are not going to achieve success.  That Unity of Command thing.

PS - by the time the 60s and 70s came around the Brits batting average improved.  Oman and Brunei were successes.  Aden was a failure and the jury is still out on Northern Ireland.  A lot of other problems were handled under the radar.


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## KevinB (17 Oct 2006)

I am not ready to right Iraq off either -- HOWEVER...

I do think that it is the time to consider partitioning the country along ethnic lines.  Yes it goes against a lot of what we in the West stand for -- however we've done it in the recent past in FYR.

Three main ethinic divisions -- plus accounting for an attempt to reballance the country forn economic acess.


I think that this unfortunately needs to be done to stop the ethnic strife - which is being done in the same manner as was done in the Balkans (and notice no one in the UN seem to want to step to thr plate to do PeaceKeeping -- a bunch of those asshole are enjoying the US-Iraq tar-baby).


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## MarkOttawa (17 Oct 2006)

Infidel-6: One might also mention the partition of British India in 1947 (religious grounds), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947.stm

followed eventually by the violent partition of Pakistan itself in 1971 (ethnic grounds). 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/bangladesh1971.htm

The death tolls in the subcontinent were horrendous.

Mark
Ottawa


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## Kirkhill (17 Oct 2006)

In broad strokes I agree with the ethnic partitioning thing, and I believe in fact that all parties on the ground, including the Sunnis, are generally working towards that end.  There are some outstanding issues however:

Who gets the oil?
How will the various territories get along with each other?
Will the minorities/majorities, religious/secular types accept the rule of the majority in their turf?
What happens to Baghdad? (Kind of like the "What happens to Jerusalem?" question).

In an ideal world you might have 3 separate regions with oil revenues divided equitably and with a cosmopolitan capital district for all the secularists.  But Old Man Sadr's Slum has left a really interesting ghetto for his son to exploit and nobody seems to be able to cut a deal on the oil.


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## Kirkhill (17 Oct 2006)

And what Mark said about India and Pakistan.

Remember: those events happened in the good old days when the news came via radio and newsreels to cinemas, when us white folks had just finished slaughtering ourselves by the millions and Indians and Pakistanis, (like everyone else on the other side of the English Channel) weren't real people anyway.


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## Signalman150 (17 Oct 2006)

Mark and Infidel...

...it's not something we're completely unfamiliar with here.  The main reason for the NWT being partitioned, and the creation of the new territory of Nunavut relates to a degree to ethnic differences. 

The problem remains that if you were to partition Iraq into 2 - 3 different countries, in nothing flat we'd be sending in UN peacekeeping forces to keep the individual countries from going to war.  It MIGHT even be worse, because the various ethnic groups would be consolidated.

Just my thoughts.


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## Dare (17 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I am not ready to write off Iraq as a failure,to do so would cheapen the sacrifice of so many. For their sake we need to see Iraq through to some type of successful conclusion. The only way we can lose in my opinion is if we quit,like we did in Vietnam. The enemy cannot defeat us on the battlefield. Their only hope like Vietnam is to persuade us to quit. We dont have the huge anti-war movement that forced us to quit. I think most americans want victory. People must realize that each time you quit you embolden the enemy. At some point the enemy is on our doorstep and we either surrender or fight and the price will be far higher. We have a chance to stop radical islam on a critical front. A victory in Iraq will be huge but it wont happen quick enough for some.


I agree with tomahawk6. I believe that we have to leave Iraq with a base of people capable of fighting off Iranian, Syrian and Turkish advances. That's the only reasonable exit strategy. To leave now would assure a far more brutal occupation and wider war, this could spread to our Nato allies, ensnaring Canada deeper into the conflict. If we fail to plant the seed of hope and responsibility in Afghanistan and Iraq, you can bet there will be someone else who will. I also agree with the US approch on the situation, (dissolving the army). On the other hand something should have been done to make sure those formerly uniformed had something to do with their now abundant free time. The British approch worked well to serve their own beliefs that they were minimizing casualties and creating a peaceful environment, but of course, you dont make deals with the devil and come out unscathed. Of course, eventually the situation must be handed over to the Iraqis, but thats the key point in the debate. Who are the Iraqis? Do we consider those loyal to a foreign power capable of being agents for Iraq? Certainly, the only way to guarentee the power of Iraq stays in Iraq is to leave with a strong police and military. If we leave Iraq now, not only do we surrender a lot of moral authority in Afghanistan (for creating a democratic society), but we embolden terrorists worldwide. I, personally, tire of advocating my position. I am content to let the left and the right and all of the foreign propagandists sell us out, or even til we start losing territory and allies. I feel it will take a more concentrated attack pattern on nations in the West, including some conventional attacks, for us to fight back, as a nation, in ernest. Leadership can bring about a convincing pull but I don't see it happening. I see a defeatist attitude seeping into conservative thought recently, including the general. It really is that. Now, that being said, it's backed by a lot of evidence that we should leave. The problem is the shortsightedness of it. Yes, the insurgency is adapting and getting organized, fueled by terrorists and foreign powers. Yes, casualties continue, but can we imagine the chaos if there is a general retreat without anything to fill the void? How quick it would spill over. The media would also project this pattern onto Afghanistan, effecting our mission there (we left Iraq, we should leave Afghanistan too). Personally, as I said, I'm tired of trying to advocate for people that my fellow canucks have a hard time relating to. Rest assured, if Afghanistan were a province of Canada, in Canada, involving Canadians being subject to strict Shar'ia law.. we'd have a far different reaction. So maybe that's what it will take.


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## Kirkhill (17 Oct 2006)

> Rest assured, if Afghanistan were a province of Canada, in Canada, involving Canadians being subject to strict Shar'ia law.. we'd have a far different reaction. So maybe that's what it will take.



Dare, are you suggesting that Canada should get into the Empire business.  I know the Turks and Caicos want in, and some have suggested adding Haiti but Afghanistan as well?


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## Infanteer (17 Oct 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I am not ready to write off Iraq as a failure,to do so would cheapen the sacrifice of so many. For their sake we need to see Iraq through to some type of successful conclusion. The only way we can lose in my opinion is if we quit,like we did in Vietnam.



I agree with this assertion as well - the notion of being invulnerable on the battlefield is, however, irrelevant IMHO.  That was a given from the day the invasion started and, in winning the will of the Iraqi people (the real aim of the occupation), is not really a factor.

The question remains on how to do so.  A passive, stand back approach?  Partitioning and sending each its own way?  Continue the current course with trying to salvage a viable state?

PS:  Here is a summary by Bing West of the events to date:

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct06/West.pdf

I disagree with part of his first assertion; I believe that the insurgency was much more complex than simply Sunni rejectionism, but other than that, I found his piece to be pretty good.


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## Dare (17 Oct 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Dare, are you suggesting that Canada should get into the Empire business.  I know the Turks and Caicos want in, and some have suggested adding Haiti but Afghanistan as well?


I think that we require a lot more of a concerted effort to pull off what is needed in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Nowhere do I see imperialism being utilized by us or our immediate allies. As I have suggested elsewhere, the reason we are really losing is in the realm of ideas in the short term and medium term. We have a third leg of new internet media that is growing fast, but not in time. A lackluster political leadership unable to sell the grand ideas they attempt to engage in. Frankly, Afghanistan should be a no-brainer to sell to the full spectrum of politics. Women so oppressed as they were (and still are to a large extent). People keep trying to splice up our enemies into little bits and pieces by factionalizing them without contending with the fundamentals of what motivates terrorism. While it is fine to treat it as unconventional warfare trying to win the war block by block, we still need a large overall plan. Would we have let Nazi propaganda be broadcast into Nazi Germany just after we defeated them? Would we allow Nazi rallys during this time? When you hear 10 people yelling at you one thing and one whispering another, which voice are most going to follow, regardless of it's accuracy? 

I think Canada should be in the Peace Making business. Which means we are not acquiring a country as possession, but pacifying it so it causes us and our allies no further harm. Right now we are doing a great job with what limited resources have been applied but we still need more, not less. A retreat in Iraq would put (a *lot*) more momentum on the side of the opposition. The point of this large and vaunted exercise is to put momentum on our side pushing back extremism which is slowly encroaching into the West. It is my opinion that both wars should have been over and done with a long time ago, but the cleverness and adaptability of our enemies should not be overlooked. Nor should the subversives and sympathizers amongst us. It my opinion that the war of words is being lost in the White House by the administration because they are mostly poor public speakers. We have left CNN, CBC, Fox News, and the enemy to frame our product and our intentions. What the backers of the war on terrorism need to do is to be far more effective in communicating the threat. It took 5 years to more officially identify Islamic fascists as the enemy. Many have a hard time accepting that term.Why? Because no one has bothered to explain why they are exactly that. No one has bothered to explain who the enemy is and what they are about. What motivates them? What causes them concern? Too much focus and emphasis has been on the "hating our freedoms" line and such as so forth. It is true, but it does not address the most important question in all things, which is "Why?" It also does not grow much in terms of the identity of the enemy. Most of what I am talking is a critique of our (and our allies) ineffective diplomatic and persuasive abilities. It's not about creating Americans or Canadians or Europeans.. it's about draining a culture of its desire to kill us Americans, Canadians and Europeans.


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## Kirkhill (18 Oct 2006)

Thanks for the clear response and explanation Dare. I have to admit that my question was asked a bit facetiously.


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## Infanteer (21 Oct 2006)

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/view/

Interesting documentary by PBS Frontline.  Basically, it seems to be a 1-hour review of the general points from accounts like _Cobra II_ and _Fiasco_ - it allows you to skip 2000 pages of detailed reading.  

I still think that these accounts do not do enough justice in pointing out Saddam's recognition and planning of the insurgency prior to the invasion; the link above to the excerpts from Malcolm Nance's book go into this.  It does, however, highlight the tactical and strategic errors of the post-invasion occupation that in effect:

A)  Aided Hussein's plan due to an absence of any realistic plan to put the claypot back together again.

B)  Allowed the religious guys moved in at the expense of the Ba'athists.

Irregardless of any claims of "we didn't know at the time", I feel that putting a 25-year old and four of his frat buddies in charge of high level strategic planning is indicitive of the poor and amateurish approach that the administration had towards Iraq.  Although 2003-2004 is a much different time with different conditions on the ground in Iraq than late 2006, I do think that these realities are important in informing us on what sort of expectations we should have over the eventual outcome of the Iraqi State.


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## Kirkhill (23 Oct 2006)

> Britons overhaul Basra's police
> By David Axe
> THE WASHINGTON TIMES
> October 23, 2006
> ...



http://washingtontimes.com/world/20061022-114249-9502r.htm


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## Edward Campbell (11 Apr 2013)

Part 1 of 2

I'm reviving this old thread because I think this article, a "letter" from Professor (and Colonel Ret'd) Andrew J. Bacevich to Paul Wolfowitz fits rather neatly, after all these years, because it offers an important insight, I think, into the _Bush Doctrine_ which Prof Bacevich has, elsewhere, described as "immoral, illicit, and imprudent." It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Harpers_:

http://harpers.org/archive/2013/03/a-letter-to-paul-wolfowitz/?single=1&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter


> A Letter to Paul Wolfowitz
> _Occasioned by the tenth anniversary of the Iraq war_
> 
> By Andrew J. Bacevich
> ...



End of Part 1


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## Edward Campbell (11 Apr 2013)

Part 2 of 2

Take note, please, of Prof Bacevich's concise summary of what he calls the *Wohlstetter Precepts*.

     "First, liberal internationalism, with its optimistic expectation that the world will embrace a set of common norms to achieve peace, is an illusion. Of course virtually every president since Franklin Roosevelt has paid lip service to that illusion,
     and doing so during the Cold War may even have served a certain purpose. But to indulge it further constitutes sheer folly.

     Second, the system that replaces liberal internationalism must address the ever-present (and growing) danger posed by catastrophic surprise. Remember Pearl Harbor. Now imagine something orders of magnitude worse
     — for instance, a nuclear attack from out of the blue.

     Third, the key to averting or at least minimizing surprise is to act preventively. If shrewdly conceived and skillfully executed, action holds some possibility of safety, whereas inaction reduces that possibility to near zero.
     Eliminate the threat before it materializes. In statecraft, that defines the standard of excellence.

     Fourth, the ultimate in preventive action is dominion. The best insurance against unpleasant surprises is to achieve unquestioned supremacy.

     Lastly, by transforming the very nature of war, information technology — an arena in which the United States has historically enjoyed a clear edge — brings outright supremacy within reach. Of all the products of Albert Wohlstetter’s fertile brain,
     this one impressed you most. The potential implications were dazzling. According to Mao, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Wohlstetter went further. Given the right sort of gun — preferably one that fires very fast
     and very accurately — so, too, does world order."

In his Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medal of Freedom on November 7, 1985, President Ronald Reagan said:

     "Albert Wohlstetter is a brilliant man with enormous strength of character. His intellectual integrity is renowned, and his analytical standards have been increasingly and unceasingly rigorous. He's been a steady hand in an uncertain time.
     His understanding on many levels has been indispensable to the well-being of the free world. In these last 30 years, Albert has been influential in helping to design and deploy our strategic forces -- an awesome task. He's sought
     ways to make our forces safer from attack, less destructive, and thereby less dangerous to us all. Many of the basic concepts and requirements for deterrence in the nuclear age -- analysis on which we've operated -- can be traced
     to this outstanding individual. And his work on the problem of nuclear proliferation gave us the insight we needed to better curb the irresponsible flow of sensitive material and technology.

     "Albert has always argued that in the nuclear age technological advances can, if properly understood and applied, make things better; but his point, and [that of his wife,] Roberta Wohlstetter's, has been a deeper one than that.
     He has shown us that we have to create choices and, then, exercise them. The Wohlstetters have created choices for our society where others saw none. They've taught us that there is an escape from fatalism."

Please note, also, Prof. Bacevich's critique of Paul Wolfowitz' _implementation_ of Albert Wohlstetter's _precepts_:

     "The scale of your ambitions was vastly greater.

     In an instant, you grasped that the attacks provided a fresh opportunity to implement Wohlstetter’s Precepts, and Iraq offered a made-to-order venue. “We cannot wait to act until the threat is imminent,” you said in 2002.
     Toppling Saddam Hussein would validate the alternative to waiting. In Iraq the United States would demonstrate the efficacy of preventive war.

     So even conceding a hat tip to Albert Wohlstetter, the Bush Doctrine was largely your handiwork. The urgency of invading Iraq stemmed from the need to validate that doctrine before the window of opportunity closed.
     What made it necessary to act immediately was not Saddam’s purported WMD program. It was not his nearly nonexistent links to Al Qaeda. It was certainly not the way he abused his own people. No, what drove events was
     the imperative of claiming for the United States prerogatives allowed no other nation.

     I do not doubt the sincerity of your conviction (shared by President Bush) that our country could be counted on to exercise those prerogatives in ways beneficial to all humankind — promoting peace, democracy, and human rights.
     But the proximate aim was to unshackle American power. Saddam Hussein’s demise would serve as an object lesson for all: Here’s what we _can_ do. Here’s what we _will_ do."

I do not share Prof Bacevich's sense of moral outrage at the Iraq war but I think he is, after ten years (and nearly six years after his son (a US Army lieutenant) was killed in action in Iraq), properly assessing Paul Wolfowitz' _contribution_ which was to provide the intellectual foundation for the _Bush Doctrine_. Paul Wolfowitz is a brilliant man, I admire his intellect and his accomplishments - even if they led America down a strategic rabbit hole.


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## KevinB (11 Apr 2013)

Thanks for posting Edward.

Interesting read definitely.


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## Brad Sallows (11 Apr 2013)

1. "First, liberal internationalism, with its optimistic expectation that the world will embrace a set of common norms to achieve peace, is an illusion."

Self-evident.

2. "Second, the system that replaces liberal internationalism must address the ever-present (and growing) danger posed by catastrophic surprise."

What the "system" has to be capable of is reacting without over-reacting (WWI, 9/11).

3. "Third, the key to averting or at least minimizing surprise is to act preventively...Eliminate the threat before it materializes. In statecraft, that defines the standard of excellence.

Nothing new here; Sun-Tzu laid it down over 2000 years ago, but understood that the "standard of excellence" was victory without open warfare.

4. "Fourth, the ultimate in preventive action is dominion."

Almost self-evident, except for the fact that increasing complexity of "systems" makes it progressively easier for smaller rogue elements to fu<k things up.

5. "Lastly, by transforming the very nature of war, information technology — an arena in which the United States has historically enjoyed a clear edge — brings outright supremacy within reach."

Or to generalize and not be blinded by specifics, "strategy of technology", which works.  The cost of maintaining supremacy is arguably cheaper than the cost of war.


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## a_majoor (13 Apr 2013)

An alternative hypothesis has been posted in the book "The Next 100 Years", where the author suggests the United States actually does not "care" if it achieves victory, stalemate or defeate in the Middle East, but simply seeks to prevent stability in the region in order to prevent the formation of any regional Hegemon who can unify or dominate the region.

This is a variation of Halford MacKinderer's "Heartland" dictum; by preventing or denying the ability to dominate the "Heartland" there is no possibility of a Eurasian Superstate forming, hence there will be no Continental power capable of challenging the Oceanic power of the United States and its allies. 

If this is true, the US and the West can fairly confidently "leave" the region now. The growing Shia/Sunni "civil war", collapsing regimes and demographic unbalancing, coupled with the "petrol revolution" that discounts the ME's oil reserves and reduces their economic and political impact on the rest of the world should provide the level of instability that would satisfy this element of the "American Grand Strategy" for decades to come. Should any element show signs of gaining control, it would be a simple matter to supply a small amount of aid to one of the opposing factions and disrupt the entire process again.


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## daftandbarmy (20 Apr 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> An alternative hypothesis has been posted in the book "The Next 100 Years", where the author suggests the United States actually does not "care" if it achieves victory, stalemate or defeate in the Middle East, but simply seeks to prevent stability in the region in order to prevent the formation of any regional Hegemon who can unify or dominate the region.
> 
> This is a variation of Halford MacKinderer's "Heartland" dictum; by preventing or denying the ability to dominate the "Heartland" there is no possibility of a Eurasian Superstate forming, hence there will be no Continental power capable of challenging the Oceanic power of the United States and its allies.



Are you sure that the US (or any modern nation state) is really that smart and capable? If so, that would be a historical first.


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## Journeyman (20 Apr 2013)

I have to agree with D&B on this one.  While I agree that it fits in nicely with MacKinderer's 'musings'.....I think it's more good luck than good planning


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## KevinB (20 Apr 2013)

and it would have been leaked all over the 'net if it had been planned...


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## tomahawk6 (22 Apr 2013)

Getting out of Iraq without leaving behind a viable government and military,would have left the door open to Iranian hegemony.


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## KevinB (22 Apr 2013)

One could argue that is common sense T6, and given that, perhaps not getting rid of the original Iraqi Gov and Army would have been the proper action to take upon taking Iraq.  Adopting a program like the De-Nazification of Germany may have been a much better program, and one that had been a clear prefered option prior.


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## tomahawk6 (22 Apr 2013)

Starting anew was the best solution.It sent the right kind of message to the population.Retaining the old would have tainted the new.


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## Good2Golf (22 Apr 2013)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Starting anew was the best solution.It sent the right kind of message to the population.Retaining the old would have tainted the new.



...except that the majority of Iraqis, no matter their age, was the 'old'...to untaint the new would pretty much require the elimination of anyone capable of walking and talking.

The United States, through Paul Bremer, had made a promise to the mid- and lower-levels of the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi military for moderated support, once Sadam and other high-ranking officials in the Ba'ath Party and the military were removed from power.  Coalition Provisional Authority, Orders #1 and #2, issued by Paul Bremer as the Executive Authority over Iraqi people, reneged on that promise.  In contrasting the pre-war influence with CPAO #1 and #2, many would support the Iraqi people's overall belief that the United States did not behave honourably.

One would be hard pressed to develop a more effective plan to create 100,000's of insurgents overnight.  The rest was pretty much a slug-fest...

 :2c:

G2G


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## KevinB (23 Apr 2013)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> ...except that the majority of Iraqis, no matter their age, was the 'old'...to untaint the new would pretty much require the elimination of anyone capable of walking and talking.
> 
> The United States, through Paul Bremer, had made a promise to the mid- and lower-levels of the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi military for moderated support, once Sadam and other high-ranking officials in the Ba'ath Party and the military were removed from power.  Coalition Provisional Authority, Orders #1 and #2, issued by Paul Bremer as the Executive Authority over Iraqi people, reneged on that promise.  In contrasting the pre-war influence with CPAO #1 and #2, many would support the Iraqi people's overall belief that the United States did not behave honourably.
> 
> ...



YUP.

I mean what else did they expect to have happen?  It was stupid school boy diplomacy at best.

Iraq and the area would have been so much better off with a functioning Army and Police (as well as a government).   

IF the USG was dedicated to the COA they undertook, they should have known it required about x5 the troop numbers they had in theatre.


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