# Army doctrine and its Implementation



## Infanteer (26 Jun 2021)

Found an interesting self-assessment.

_"Our tactical methods are thorough and methodical but slow and cumbersome. In consequence our troops fight well in defence and our set-piece attacks are usually successful, but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation we seldom reap the full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, we over-insure administratively, we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our training makes us more so."_

Does this describe the Canadian Army today?


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> Found an interesting self-assessment.
> 
> _"Our tactical methods are thorough and methodical but slow and cumbersome. In consequence our troops fight well in defence and our set-piece attacks are usually successful, but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation we seldom reap the full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, we over-insure administratively, we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our training makes us more so."_
> 
> Does this describe the Canadian Army today?


I would say that our Canadian Army Ancenstry.ca test would find some commonality with that DNA strand.


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## FJAG (27 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> Found an interesting self-assessment.
> 
> _"Our tactical methods are thorough and methodical but slow and cumbersome. In consequence our troops fight well in defence and our set-piece attacks are usually successful, but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation we seldom reap the full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, we over-insure administratively, we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our training makes us more so."_
> 
> Does this describe the Canadian Army today?



Not sure what era this comes from. My guess would be WW2 as we were too full of self-congratulation in earlier eras to voice that opinion out loud even when it was true.

You undoubtedly have a much better understanding of where we stand based on where you're employed but anecdotally, sitting on the outside, I would have to agree.

A managed readiness plan that takes us three years for a given unit or brigade to become "ready" and a system of predeployment training that takes some six months to go through and requires a "test" exercise at the end shows that we are very risk averse in general (albeit this is couched in language of resource availability which is a problem in its own right).

A system of managed equipment holdings shows that our equipment acquisition and maintenance processes are below par and keeps us responding in an agile manner to new threats or opportunities.

I'll just mention "moribund recruiting and training system" and move on.

Our limited operational taskings within the national defence strategy confined to battle group deployments and the building block system by which they are formed shows that we have limited capacity and limited capability and must accordingly set our aims low.

All of that is at a strategic level so I would think it logical that the attitudes we hold nationally must have some impact--both in capability and mental attitudes--at the tactical level as well.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (27 Jun 2021)

Just had another thought.  

Arnhem is on my mind.  I wonder what would have happened if Guderian had been in charge of XXX Corps instead of Horrocks?   Or, dare I say it?  Patton?


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## Brad Sallows (28 Jun 2021)

> I wonder what would have happened if Guderian had been in charge of XXX Corps instead of Horrocks?   Or, dare I say it?  Patton?



About the same thing, unless you swapped all the British soldiers in XXX Corps out for Germans or Americans.


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## Kirkhill (28 Jun 2021)

Brad Sallows said:


> About the same thing, unless you swapped all the British soldiers in XXX Corps out for Germans or Americans.


Damned tea breaks.


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## Infanteer (28 Jun 2021)

I split off the chatter about Reserve exercises from long ago.

This quote is from the 15th Army Group Director of Military Training (DMT), supported by General Alexander, in 1943.

Can't help thinking, as T2B said, that some of this DNA has come through in the modern Canadian Army.


_In consequence our troops fight well in defence - _not even sure if this is the case; as a commonwealth military we've traditionally relied on supremacy of fires and a superb coordination of fires ability, but we've denuded our modern force structure of any of this.
_our set-piece attacks are usually successful, - _we focus on the set-piece attack.  Even our platoon quick attacks, which should be 2-3 minutes, are 30-45 minute affairs.  Combat Team "hasty attacks" aren't much better.
_but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation we seldom reap the full benefit of them. _- We are, due to said DNA, an Army of horizontal lines rather than vertical thrusts when it comes to control measures.  Our tactics aim to advance a line, as opposed to thrust deep to disrupt, and create an impetus to stop and reorg as part of a mobile battle.
_We are too flank-conscious, _- see above.
_we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our training makes us more so _- see above, our training tends to be canned and bounded by training objectives and a master events list.  We hold live fire as the penultimate form of activity, which is by nature an activity focused on symmetry and letting fires, as opposed to manoeuvre, win the battle.


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## TangoTwoBravo (28 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> I split off the chatter about Reserve exercises from long ago.
> 
> This quote is from the 15th Army Group Director of Military Training (DMT), supported by General Alexander, in 1943.
> 
> ...


Something that struck me comparing WW2 methods was that the British Army thought in lines while Germans/Soviets thought in arrows. We still have some of that methodical way of thinking. We say that accept risk but we really hate it!


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## Infanteer (28 Jun 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Something that struck me comparing WW2 methods was that the British Army thought in lines while Germans/Soviets thought in arrows. We still have some of that methodical way of thinking. We say that accept risk but we really hate it!


This is a good read on the subject.






						A Bias for Action: The German 7th Panzer Division in France & Russia 1940-1941
					






					calhoun.nps.edu
				




See the definition of a thrust line on page 12.

How much of our training focuses on driving past the enemy as opposed to ploughing right into him?


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## TangoTwoBravo (28 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> This is a good read on the subject.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Bypassing the enemy platoon would mean that we do not exercise the BTS. The Cbt Tm attack is our new Trooping of the
Colours.

I am exaggerating, of course, but heaven forbid we avoid an attack or an deliberate crossing/ beach in training.


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## Weinie (28 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> I split off the chatter about Reserve exercises from long ago.
> 
> This quote is from the 15th Army Group Director of Military Training (DMT), supported by General Alexander, in 1943.
> 
> ...


Interesting conversation. I have learned a lot here.

Do WW II observations make sense in a current/future climate where perception/information drives policy/action and potentially outcomes? I am not disputing your tactical and operational arguments. Would a WW III senior Commander in 2043 make the same observations about doctrine and how we fought?


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## Infanteer (28 Jun 2021)

Weinie said:


> Do WW II observations make sense in a current/future climate where perception/information drives policy/action and potentially outcomes? I am not disputing your tactical and operational arguments. Would a WW III senior Commander in 2043 make the same observations about doctrine and how we fought?


Of course they do, because perception/information drove policy/action and potential outcomes back in the Second World War as well.

See, as notable examples:
The London Blitz
Doolittle Raid
Operation TORCH
Operation U-GO


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## FJAG (29 Jun 2021)

Infanteer said:


> This is a good read on the subject.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


A tremendous read. Thanks for this.

Almost as important note page 6. On the second day of the attack, the division awarded its first Iron Cross 1st Class to a lieutenant of the division's recce detachment.

We could learn from that too.

🍻


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## Haligonian (13 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> I split off the chatter about Reserve exercises from long ago.
> 
> This quote is from the 15th Army Group Director of Military Training (DMT), supported by General Alexander, in 1943.
> 
> ...


I'm not convinced we fight well in the defence.  The thread over in the Cbt Arms form covers this pretty well. I know we are working on it more often now, however, I think we have an underlying cultural preference for offensive ops which is informed by a history that saw us on the offence more often than the defence. I think our understanding of the defence is largely focused on the servicing of a KZ which is our equivalent to the hasty attack in the defence. I am skeptical that we understand how dynamic and prolonged the defensive battle could be because we focus on preparing for a single direct fire engagement.  I'm also not convinced we are particularly good at coordinating those direct fires necessary to be successful in that KZ nor how we shape conditions, and survive, the events prior to those in the KZ.

The set piece attack comment is an interesting one. I agree that our hasty attacks take longer than perhaps they could and that we try to squeeze a lot of analysis into a hasty attack.  The Inf school proforma for the pl attack, and the Tactics school's for the Cbt Tm attack actually include an estimate into them. This is probably a good indicator of over thinking it. Despite this, the fact that the hasty attack is the assessment tool for the CA probably has some benefits in enabling the right mindset for enabling the seizing and retaining the initiative through hasty offensive ops.  It's just a matter of finding the ways to accelerate the decision and being comfortable with less coordinated attacks that are the inevitable result of reduced time devoted to mounting.

As noted above, the comfort with the risk to force and mission entailed in doing legitimately hasty operations is probably something we're not comfortable with.  Training in a peace time environment is unlikely to provide the incentives to really push us to accept the risk to achieve the disproportionate results which are associated with reduced mounting time to achieve surprise, and focusing more on attacking deep to disrupt and dislocate. Hence we focus on achieving security by being excessively flank conscious and attacking in a series of bite sized activities that are inevitably slower and therefore reduce surprise.

I just pulled the old BG BTS pub and there is a BTS for bypass and infiltrate. So we don't really have a good excuse for training hasty attacks as a knee jerk reaction. It is a cultural and "same as last year" approach.


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## Old Sweat (14 Jul 2021)

Here is a bit of background on why we fought the way we did in the attack and exploitation. The short answer is three words: the Germany Army. The Germans has the hasty counter-attack, and offensive action in their DNA. It was natural for them to immediately strike back with whatever they could muster, with an aim of their assault catching the enemy disorganized, short of ammunition, and milling about on the objective. In fact, this attack succeeded admirably against the Soviets, but was less successful against the Anglo-Canadians. See Marc Milner's Stopping the Panzers for a discussion. 

The Germans often held forward positions with light forces, saving most of their combat power for the counter-stroke. By 1944 we had figured this out, and often attacked with light forces, following on with the majority of, say, a company who arrived on the objective fresh and with lots of ammunition to repel the counter-attack. 

For whatever it is worth, I learned this, especislly the hasty reorg and preparation to repel the counter-stroke, as a teen aged recruit in the RCA Depot in 1958. Maybe it still exists in our collective mind set.


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## Infanteer (14 Jul 2021)

This doesn't invalidate the tactic of elastic defence/defence in depth with rapid counterattack (which still, I contend, has the best track record in modern war).  The German tactical defence failed in 1944/45 not because of the counterattack, but because allied air supremacy prevented German air and artillery from supporting the counterattack by suppressing the preponderance of allied fires.


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

I think our army's current preference for offensive operations and possible neglect of defensive operations comes from a number of sources.  The combat team quick attack was our bastion of tactical professionalism in the 90s. You don't need a big enemy force and you can bring in as many enablers as you want. It is a nice, tidy package. The operational frame of the Gulf War was also there - we didn't really participate but our allies conducted offensive operations. While our Afghan campaign saw us defend localities, our combat operations were usually offensive in nature. 

I think, though, that during the Cold War comfort zone was the defence. The operational frame was an area defence in Germany. Countermoves were our thing. I think we are trying to achieve a balance in the contemporary army. 

Regardless, I think the typical Canadian army officer prefers deliberate operations with minimal risk. They might say that they accept risk and they might brag about how fast they conduct a combat team quick attack in training, but what I see is a preference for a methodical approach against a well-defined enemy. As a tank troop leader on Combat Team Commander Courses I found that infantry officers often wanted to make the map into a series of battle positions for offensive operations. They would them move us, like chess pieces, from BP to BP up the trace. I see that less now, but I also see us wanting to turn even a "hasty attack" into an attack from out of contact against a foe with over 75% definition.

I have been reading Simond's directives early in the Normandy campaign, as related in John English's Failure in High Command. Simonds wrote: "_an attack without adequate reconnaissance and preparation will not succeed...the attack must be carefully organized...the well planned infantry attack with ample fire support may penetrate such a position with comparative ease, but the first penetration will stir up a hornet's nest_."

I think that Simonds is the father of the post-war Canadian army. When you conduct an attack with 80% knowledge of the enemy, plenty of fire support, overwhelming local superiority (four tank troops against a single enemy tank), good control measures and with an eye to defending against the counterattack you can feel your doctrinal ancestor nodding approvingly from the back of your turret.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think our army's current preference for offensive operations and possible neglect of defensive operations comes from a number of sources.  The combat team quick attack was our bastion of tactical professionalism in the 90s. You don't need a big enemy force and you can bring in as many enablers as you want. It is a nice, tidy package. The operational frame of the Gulf War was also there - we didn't really participate but our allies conducted offensive operations. While our Afghan campaign saw us defend localities, our combat operations were usually offensive in nature.
> 
> I think, though, that during the Cold War comfort zone was the defence. The operational frame was an area defence in Germany. Countermoves were our thing. I think we are trying to achieve a balance in the contemporary army.
> 
> ...



General Tal seemed like a switched on guy, except for his ignoring the 'less glamourous' Infantry. Have we learned/ adopted anything from him and his successors regarding armoured warfare doctrine?


"Tal was the creator of the Israeli armored doctrine that led to the Israeli successes in the Sinai surprise attack of the Six-Day War. In 1964, General Tal took over the Israeli armored corps and organized it into the leading element of the Israeli Defense Forces, characterized by high mobility and relentless assault. He re-trained all Israeli gunners to hit targets beyond 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi).[5] In open terrain, such long distance gunnery proved vital to the survival of the Israeli armored corps in subsequent wars. Israel's Arab opponents, especially Egypt and Syria, normally fired their Soviet-made tank guns from a distance of between 200 to 500 metres (220 to 550 yd), and quite often tank units advanced to within 100 metres (110 yd) of their targets before firing their main guns. This gave the Israelis an opportunity to exploit this weakness in Arab military doctrine. Its mobility is considered comparable to the German Blitzkrieg and many hold it to be an evolution of that tactic. Tal's transformation and success in 1967 led the IDF to expand the role of armor. *However, this resulted in reduced attention to other less glamorous, but essential aspects of the army, such as the infantry. Following the 1973 surprise attack, this excessive focus on fast striking offensive armor left the IDF temporarily without adequate defensive capability*. Only in latter stages of the war (with the aid of a US $1.1 billion airlift, Operation Nickel Grass) did the armor break out and show its potential; General Avraham Adan's armor broke through the Egyptian lines, crossed the Suez Canal and enveloped the Egyptian 3rd Army near Suez. While the IDF has become a more balanced force since 1973, *Tal's development of armored doctrine has been very important to the IDF and has influenced armored doctrines in other parts of the world.*"









						Israel Tal - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

b00161400 said:


> .....
> 
> The set piece attack comment is an interesting one. I agree that our hasty attacks take longer than perhaps they could and that we try to squeeze a lot of analysis into a hasty attack. * The Inf school proforma for the pl attack, and the Tactics school's for the Cbt Tm attack actually include an estimate into them. This is probably a good indicator of over thinking it*. Despite this, the fact that the hasty attack is the assessment tool for the CA probably has some benefits in enabling the right mindset for enabling the seizing and retaining the initiative through hasty offensive ops.  It's just a matter of finding the ways to accelerate the decision and being comfortable with less coordinated attacks that are the inevitable result of reduced time devoted to mounting.
> 
> ...



"Actually include an estimate in them",   

When you are fighting are you thinking?  What happens when the other guy doesn't give you time to think?  When there are no slo-mo cameras and no time-outs?

Does "milling" need to be introduced/emphasised in training?  (A boxing match emphasising offense - no defense, no time for thinking, just punching until one puncher runs out of steam).

I think we tend to work towards strategic goals.  Other fighters fight to win - they can't afford to lose.


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

And no sooner had  I finished that  than D&B reminds of the need for balance.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Jul 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> "Actually include an estimate in them",
> 
> When you are fighting are you thinking?  What happens when the other guy doesn't give you time to think?  When there are no slo-mo cameras and no time-outs?
> 
> ...



Dude... you should have seen their faces when I suggested this to my bosses a few years ago.

At least I have a good idea how the Cro-Magnons must have looked at the Neanderthals now


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> General Tal seemed like a switched on guy, except for his ignoring the 'less glamourous' Infantry. Have we learned/ adopted anything from him and his successors regarding armoured warfare doctrine?
> 
> 
> "Tal was the creator of the Israeli armored doctrine that led to the Israeli successes in the Sinai surprise attack of the Six-Day War. In 1964, General Tal took over the Israeli armored corps and organized it into the leading element of the Israeli Defense Forces, characterized by high mobility and relentless assault. He re-trained all Israeli gunners to hit targets beyond 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi).[5] In open terrain, such long distance gunnery proved vital to the survival of the Israeli armored corps in subsequent wars. Israel's Arab opponents, especially Egypt and Syria, normally fired their Soviet-made tank guns from a distance of between 200 to 500 metres (220 to 550 yd), and quite often tank units advanced to within 100 metres (110 yd) of their targets before firing their main guns. This gave the Israelis an opportunity to exploit this weakness in Arab military doctrine. Its mobility is considered comparable to the German Blitzkrieg and many hold it to be an evolution of that tactic. Tal's transformation and success in 1967 led the IDF to expand the role of armor. *However, this resulted in reduced attention to other less glamorous, but essential aspects of the army, such as the infantry. Following the 1973 surprise attack, this excessive focus on fast striking offensive armor left the IDF temporarily without adequate defensive capability*. Only in latter stages of the war (with the aid of a US $1.1 billion airlift, Operation Nickel Grass) did the armor break out and show its potential; General Avraham Adan's armor broke through the Egyptian lines, crossed the Suez Canal and enveloped the Egyptian 3rd Army near Suez. While the IDF has become a more balanced force since 1973, *Tal's development of armored doctrine has been very important to the IDF and has influenced armored doctrines in other parts of the world.*"
> ...


The Israelis certainly emphasized armour to the exclusion of infantry and artillery after their triumphant Six Day War, along with a belief that their air force could tip the scales. They did well enough defensively on the Golan during the 1973 war, relying on gunnery and doggedness to prevail in a war of attrition. Where their imbalance really hurt them, though, was in the Sinai. They sent armoured brigades in essentially unsupported counter-attacks against prepared Egyptians with Saggers. Their air support was also neutralized by the SAM belts near the Canal.

The 1973 war certainly had an impact on US Army doctrine, with the 1976 Active Defence doctrine drawn from observations of that conflict. The head of the XM1 program went to Israel immediately after the war, and other big US Army programs that came to fruition in the 1980s were influenced by the study of that war.

For Canada, I don't think we can ever complain about an over-emphasis on having too many tanks...

Regarding Israeli influence on Canadian doctrine - when I was a student at the Armour School circa 1990/91 there were certainly references to Israeli experience. While our gunnery practices were evolved from our British roots, the Israeli focus on gunnery was certainly hammered home to me as a student in Gunnery Squadron.


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## Haligonian (14 Jul 2021)

Old Sweat said:


> Here is a bit of background on why we fought the way we did in the attack and exploitation. The short answer is three words: the Germany Army. The Germans has the hasty counter-attack, and offensive action in their DNA. It was natural for them to immediately strike back with whatever they could muster, with an aim of their assault catching the enemy disorganized, short of ammunition, and milling about on the objective. In fact, this attack succeeded admirably against the Soviets, but was less successful against the Anglo-Canadians. See Marc Milner's Stopping the Panzers for a discussion.
> 
> The Germans often held forward positions with light forces, saving most of their combat power for the counter-stroke. By 1944 we had figured this out, and often attacked with light forces, following on with the majority of, say, a company who arrived on the objective fresh and with lots of ammunition to repel the counter-attack.
> 
> For whatever it is worth, I learned this, especislly the hasty reorg and preparation to repel the counter-stroke, as a teen aged recruit in the RCA Depot in 1958. Maybe it still exists in our collective mind set.


This is a good point and I had considered as part of my original post.  If a systematic series of limited attacks is part of a larger approach that is based on an understanding of an enemy who habitually counter attacks then that is fine that that is going to be a great way to attrite the enemy.  Hopefully that attrition is largely one sided.

The problem is, that's all we do.  We never establish a training scenario where the opposite is required, a bold deep penetration where we need to maintain the momentum of the advance and sequence a series of attacks through the previous.  Hell, the idea of "maintaining momentum" in the Canadian Army is largely understood at the section, platoon, and Company level where it largely refers to ignoring casualties to continue onto the objective before dealing with them.

This goes back to a larger question of training for "the" war or "a" war.  I wonder if our version of "a" war is actually just NW Europe in '44, or what we thought Cold War gone hot might have looked like, with some new aged enablers tacked on. In that light there probably isn't such a thing as just training for "a" war as every training event requires a scenario which shapes and incentivizes the response of the training audience.  Add in the requirement to hit specific BTS, and cultural preferences for particular types of operations and it surprising that we ever do anything different.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think our army's current preference for offensive operations and possible neglect of defensive operations comes from a number of sources.  The combat team quick attack was our bastion of tactical professionalism in the 90s. You don't need a big enemy force and you can bring in as many enablers as you want. It is a nice, tidy package. The operational frame of the Gulf War was also there - we didn't really participate but our allies conducted offensive operations. While our Afghan campaign saw us defend localities, our combat operations were usually offensive in nature.
> 
> I think, though, that during the Cold War comfort zone was the defence. The operational frame was an area defence in Germany. Countermoves were our thing. I think we are trying to achieve a balance in the contemporary army.
> 
> ...


Agreed. It's even deeper (or perhaps more shallow?) than receive approval from one's doctrinal ancestor. Our perceptions of what was a successful attack, or what is required for a successful attack is shaped by approval of who is doing the validation.  Combine that with a focus on live fire over force on force and we get a cycle of commanders telling subordinates what right looks like absent any real feedback and thus the story continues.

Your post reminded me of something I wrote about last night and was linked to my original post. How do we know when we're doing a deliberate attack versus a hasty attack? Or when we should do a hasty attack versus a deliberate one? There are, of course, no defined times at each level of command of what makes a hasty attack and what makes a deliberate one. Nor is there a doctrinal check list of indicators that would imply a commander should look to do a deliberate attack. A quick look at the definitions see them being tied to a focus on preparation versus speed in the exploitation of the opportunity of an unprepared enemy.  We could probably dig deeper on this but one thing I take away is that it is always going to be advantageous to try to squeeze as much preparation into the time with which we'd consider an attack to be "hasty." Also we want to always be gaining more from our preparation time than the enemy is gaining from his.  This is why planning activities like IPB prior to crossing LD can be a force multiplier. Or, having recce screen the advance and provide them sufficient time and space to actually develop an objective can be effective. 



Kirkhill said:


> "Actually include an estimate in them",
> 
> When you are fighting are you thinking?  What happens when the other guy doesn't give you time to think?  When there are no slo-mo cameras and no time-outs?
> 
> ...


Between rounds fighters and their coaches think.  They also think during the fight.  I think you need to watch Floyd Mayweather fight.  The best boxer in a generation might contend with your statement on boxing emphasizing offense.


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

Milling isn't a Mayweather fight.





__ https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=471961500002764
			




The other end of the training spectrum for Brits - The Eton Wall Game
A goal scored every ten years or so.


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

Re-reading a couple of these posts the concern about open flanks stands out.

My first thought was of Ypres and the misery entailed holding that salient with its open flanks for three years.

The other thought was of all the WWI attacks that failed because flanking forces failed to keep up exposing attacking forces to enfilade fire from defilade.

And the resulting four year long version of the Wall Game.   A constant grind.


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

b00161400 said:


> This is a good point and I had considered as part of my original post.  If a systematic series of limited attacks is part of a larger approach that is based on an understanding of an enemy who habitually counter attacks then that is fine that that is going to be a great way to attrite the enemy.  Hopefully that attrition is largely one sided.
> 
> The problem is, that's all we do.  We never establish a training scenario where the opposite is required, a bold deep penetration where we need to maintain the momentum of the advance and sequence a series of attacks through the previous.  Hell, the idea of "maintaining momentum" in the Canadian Army is largely understood at the section, platoon, and Company level where it largely refers to ignoring casualties to continue onto the objective before dealing with them.
> 
> ...


Doctrine will offer us some guidance on the difference between a hasty and deliberate attack without really answering your question! A hasty attack is done with the resources at hand. A deliberate attack has much more preparation. A hasty attack would be undertaken against a vulnerable enemy that can be quickly defeated by immediate offensive action (taken from my US manuals from the late 90s). A deliberate attack would be used when the enemy defence is too strong to be defeated by a hasty attack (and hopefully not after a failed hasty attack). To me the answer lies in how much you know, or think you know, about the enemy position when you issue orders out of contact. 

If you have UAV imagery of the enemy position, have assigned nick-names to those positions, have assigned tasks accordingly to your subordinates, have regrouped accordingly, are using recce assets to confirm what you already think you know (recce push) and have planned all this out of contact then I think you are conducting a deliberate attack. If you are sending your firebase to a position that you have selected from your map study then you are probably conducting a deliberate attack. 

If your firebase is your element that first came into contact with the enemy, has lit them up/won the firefight and has provided you most of your information on the enemy then you are probably conducting a hasty attack. 

I find that we want to turn our hasty attack into a deliberate attack. Its not wrong to want more information as long as you have the time to obtain it.


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## FJAG (14 Jul 2021)

b00161400 said:


> ... The problem is, that's all we do. We never establish a training scenario where the opposite is required, a bold deep penetration where we need to maintain the momentum of the advance and sequence a series of attacks through the previous. Hell, the idea of "maintaining momentum" in the Canadian Army is largely understood at the section, platoon, and Company level where it largely refers to ignoring casualties to continue onto the objective before dealing with them. ...



I wonder how much of that problem is the size of our training areas. We barely have room for a deliberate attack or positional defence and counter attack much less for rear guard or advance guard operations. By passing and sweeping aside flank guards and spoiling attacks are simply not possible in the space available. Not to mention that this type of exercise engaged much of the force in merely riding around in their tanks and APCs for a considerable period of time rather than practicing their skills.

That wouldn't prevent us from doing these types of scenarios in CPX or CAX formats but then I ask myself where would we use this type of operation. The only recent one which comes to my mind was 1 PPCLIs operations in western Kandahar/Maiwand/Eastern Helmand in 2006. In fact that operation included much of what we're discussing albeit in an asymmetric warfare situation.

During our Cold War era those types of operation were never really part of our tool bag either. Most offensive phases were aimed more to advance to contact, counterattacking or establishing hasty blocking positions. We did talk about consolidation and continuing the advance but never, to my recollection, did we discuss bypass and penetrate.

I do sometimes wonder whether our "exercising our doctrine" merely consists of setting exercise problems that we're familiar and comfortable with rather than any reasoned analysis of what we might need to do and how best to do it. That might very well be a problem in that being an agile, multi-purpose force we already have too many discordant scenarios to deal with.

🍻


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Re-reading a couple of these posts the concern about open flanks stands out.
> 
> My first thought was of Ypres and the misery entailed holding that salient with its open flanks for three years.
> 
> ...


Our British Army ancestry makes us think in lines instead of arrows. Nobody wants to sit in a salient, but you also have to take risks. Similarly, flank protection is essential but you need to take a risk.

The Cobra breakout in late July 1944 shows the tension between boldness and security with regards to flank protection. Bradley did not neglect his flanks - he directed the adjacent Corps' to keep up the pressure to support the breakthrough. Bradley had considered a mopping-up and consolidation phase which he discarded for a pursuit/exploitation. He had sufficient flank protection to stop the German Mortain counterattack, although this was still a dangerous moment when the rampaging US forces to the South could have been cut off.

Is it irony/tragedy that when Monty did try a bold breakthrough penetration in Market Garden it failed? I guess there is never only one right answer or correct method.


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

Bradley-Patton vs Montgomery-Simonds

On the other hand the Brits did have O'Connor  as well as Stirling and the LRDG.

NW Europe was very much a linear war.

N. Africa and the Burma campaigns were more thrusting wars.

But Canada was only engaged in NW Europe.

As to the right answer?  The enemy's vote, right?  That is the value of milling in training.  You need to keep fighting even when you are losing and there is no time to think.


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> "Actually include an estimate in them",
> 
> When you are fighting are you thinking?  What happens when the other guy doesn't give you time to think?  When there are no slo-mo cameras and no time-outs?
> 
> ...


There is a time to plan and a time to act, but I don't think that having "milling" sessions will accomplish anything for our decision-making training beyond injuring people. I get the idea of "being able to take a hit", but I fail to see how that translate to planning. 

I taught tactical planning for three years. They key to shorting your _decision action_ cycle is not to remove decision-making and go straight to action. Some folks want to do that. It can work if the situation is exactly as you think it is and your availability heuristics are indeed aligned with the situation. People like that are also very susceptible to deception. Drills at low level have their place (when your entire command is in the kill zone), but we still need to think. The art is being able to tell quickly which factors matter and focusing your decision-making analysis on those factors. Training and experience help. 

Time is the key consideration. Is the time you are taking to make your plan accruing to your benefit or to your enemy's?  Taking four hours to come up with a plan to destroy a rear-guard platoon may well hand victory to your opponent even if you defeat the platoon. On the other hand, blundering into a kill zone can also cause you to fail to succeed in your aim when your command gets neutralized by the anti-armour ambush and you have to take even more time reorganizing.

Regarding your last line, I would say that in Afghanistan we fought to win the fight we were in. Our opponent worked towards a strategic goal.


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## CBH99 (14 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There is a time to plan and a time to act, but I don't think that having "milling" sessions will accomplish anything for our decision-making training beyond injuring people. I get the idea of "being able to take a hit", but I fail to see how that translate to planning.
> 
> I taught tactical planning for three years. They key to shorting your _decision action_ cycle is not to remove decision-making and go straight to action. Some folks want to do that. It can work if the situation is exactly as you think it is and your availability heuristics are indeed aligned with the situation. People like that are also very susceptible to deception. Drills at low level have their place (when your entire command is in the kill zone), but we still need to think. The art is being able to tell quickly which factors matter and focusing your decision-making analysis on those factors. Training and experience help.
> 
> ...


I always enjoying reading the posts here on the site when we are discussing a specific topic, as I learn a lot from folks who know their stuff in elements & professions I've only been exposed to via Hollywood.  And your posts are no exception TTB, always enjoy reading your commentary on stuff like this


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## Kirkhill (14 Jul 2021)

And thus the enjoyment of these discussions.

There is less of science and more of art in the discussion.  The Russians tried to reduce the fight to numbers but as often as not intangibles decided fights.

I agree fully that when the opportunity presents itself it is appropriate to take a breath and think.  On the other hand you may have to just keep acting if the other guy is acting while you are thinking.

And I don't know if there is a right answer.


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## Brad Sallows (14 Jul 2021)

> Is it irony/tragedy that when Monty did try a bold breakthrough penetration in Market Garden it failed?



I wouldn't call a thread of armour crawling up a highway a bold breakthrough penetration.  His proposal to push forty-odd divisions over the Rhine might have qualified, but was never tried.


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jul 2021)

b00161400 said:


> I'm not convinced we fight well in the defence.  The thread over in the Cbt Arms form covers this pretty well. I know we are working on it more often now, however, I think we have an underlying cultural preference for offensive ops which is informed by a history that saw us on the offence more often than the defence. I think our understanding of the defence is largely focused on the servicing of a KZ which is our equivalent to the hasty attack in the defence. I am skeptical that we understand how dynamic and prolonged the defensive battle could be because we focus on preparing for a single direct fire engagement.  I'm also not convinced we are particularly good at coordinating those direct fires necessary to be successful in that KZ nor how we shape conditions, and survive, the events prior to those in the KZ.
> 
> The set piece attack comment is an interesting one. I agree that our hasty attacks take longer than perhaps they could and that we try to squeeze a lot of analysis into a hasty attack.  The Inf school proforma for the pl attack, and the Tactics school's for the Cbt Tm attack actually include an estimate into them. This is probably a good indicator of over thinking it. Despite this, the fact that the hasty attack is the assessment tool for the CA probably has some benefits in enabling the right mindset for enabling the seizing and retaining the initiative through hasty offensive ops.  It's just a matter of finding the ways to accelerate the decision and being comfortable with less coordinated attacks that are the inevitable result of reduced time devoted to mounting.
> 
> ...


Coming back to your very thought-provoking post - I am trying to imagine the School's reaction to the bypassing of the isolated enemy platoon by the Cbt Tm. I wonder sometimes if the Cbt Tm Quick Attack has become an end in and of itself. Certainly our live fire exercises are heavily if not entirely scripted with walk throughs and rehearsals before going live. Such tactics as there are are baked into the range. 

What are your thoughts on the line between hasty attack and deliberate attack?


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## daftandbarmy (15 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Coming back to your very thought-provoking post - I am trying to imagine the School's reaction to the bypassing of the isolated enemy platoon by the Cbt Tm. I wonder sometimes if the Cbt Tm Quick Attack has become an end in and of itself. Certainly our live fire exercises are heavily if not entirely scripted with walk throughs and rehearsals before going live. Such tactics as there are are baked into the range.
> 
> What are your thoughts on the line between hasty attack and deliberate attack?



I have talked about tactics with several members of my regiment who, as Officers or SNCOs, led platoons in action in WW2 as well as various actions in the middle east and the Falklands War.

No one ever led a platoon 'hasty attack' as far as I could figure out. They were all usually engaged as part of larger deliberate attacks. 

They had some 'mopping up' type work to do from time to time, which was the closest thing to a hasty attack that I could identify, but it seemed to be mostly just forming an extended line and clearing the woods (or whatever) with some flank protection.


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I have talked about tactics with several members of my regiment who, as Officers or SNCOs, led platoons in action in WW2 as well as various actions in the middle east and the Falklands War.
> 
> No one ever led a platoon 'hasty attack' as far as I could figure out. They were all usually engaged as part of larger deliberate attacks.
> 
> They had some 'mopping up' type work to do from time to time, which was the closest thing to a hasty attack that I could identify, but it seemed to be mostly just forming an extended line and clearing the woods (or whatever) with some flank protection.


My reading of the Falklands War also indicates that the vast majority of the actions were battalion-level deliberate attacks, with the battalion attacks around Stanley forming part of a Brigade plan in terms of sequencing/axis of attack.

The Goose Green battle shows a contrast between the theory and practice in terms of time. LCol Jones' plan had *six phases* with the objective secured four hours after the LD had been secured and the firebase established. A fourteen hour battle ensued. When the plan and timetable became unhinged the CO came up and spent *an hour* considering the situation. Interestingly he would reject suggestions on the net from company commanders: "_Don't tell me how to run my battle_." It seems he then tried to conduct a flanking manoeuvre with his Tac to break the deadlock and was killed.

One of the company commander recounts: "At daybreak the enemy could sit in bunkers and engage us at a range of 900-1400 metres...The ground was very similar to Salisbury Plain and we found ourselves groveling at the base of a hill.._.Here we fought and groveled for nearly seven hours_."

To be fair, fire support was extremely limited and the Paras were not attacking at the force ratios suggested by Staff Colleges. Still, the battle shows that what happens to speed and elan when people are actually getting killed. There is also a command study in there somewhere.


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## Kirkhill (15 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> My reading of the Falklands War also indicates that the vast majority of the actions were battalion-level deliberate attacks, with the battalion attacks around Stanley forming part of a Brigade plan in terms of sequencing/axis of attack.
> 
> The Goose Green battle shows a contrast between the theory and practice in terms of time. LCol Jones' plan had *six phases* with the objective secured four hours after the LD had been secured and the firebase established. A fourteen hour battle ensued. When the plan and timetable became unhinged the CO came up and spent *an hour* considering the situation. Interestingly he would reject suggestions on the net from company commanders: "_Don't tell me how to run my battle_." It seems he then tried to conduct a flanking manoeuvre with his Tac to break the deadlock and was killed.
> 
> ...



I think you bring out one of the answers to the question "can you think while you are fighting?"

The chain of command.

A Platoon Commander needs to be thinking (wrapped up in his OODA) while his Section Commanders are engaging the enemy.  Not engaging the enemy personally.

Likewise "H" did a dis-service to his battalion with his own personal attack.  His job was not just to supervise his coy commanders as they implemented his 6 phase battle plan.  It was to Observe the battle, Orient his plan to the actual battle, Decide how to fix the plan and then Act by changing instructions to his coy commanders.    His job was to think while this OC's were fighting.  Their job was to think while the Pl Commanders were fighting.


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## Infanteer (15 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> What are your thoughts on the line between hasty attack and deliberate attack?


I thought your previous definition was pretty good.  Hasty attack is done with the resources on hand, may be in response to enemy fire, or you may "have the drop" on him.  Deliberate attack is pre-planned and resourced.

I don't think there is an issue with "preference" for either one in our doctrine or our training; we need to practice both.  It's *how* we practice them that can be problematic.  The standard approach - indeed, the accepted norm - is to slam into the enemy, almost always into an obstacle.  I've never seen a "bypass," a "penetrate and exploit," or an "attack from the rear."  "Exploitation" in training generally means reorganizing and/or passing the next element through to hit the next enemy square on.  For a "manoeuvrist" army, we certainly seem to prefer surfaces over gaps.


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Jul 2021)

Subsequent attacks in the Falklands War were also deliberate affairs, although fire support was noticeably improved. There was up to a week for planning, and battalion COs nested their plans within a Brigade and indeed Division scheme of manouevre. All attacks took place a night. The actions unfolded as follows:

  a.  42 Cdo at Mount Harriet: Noisy deception plan ahead of flanking attack. Eight hours of fighting results in the position taken at a loss of 2 KIA and 17 WIA against 25 KIA for the defending Argentinians and 300 prisoners.

 b. 3 Para at Mount Longdon: Frontal attack (options somewhat limited by higher Scheme of Manoeuvre) with eight hours of fighting resulting in the position taken at a loss of 17 KIA and 40 WIA against Argentinian losses of 50 KIA and 50 prisoners.

c.  45 Cdo at Two Sisters: Position taken at a loss of 4 KIA and six hours of fighting, along with the CO altering the SoM somewhat after first contact. A platoon commander is awarded the MC for leading a bayonet charge at a decisive moment. He realized that they were running low on ammunition and that staying in place would lead to failure. 

d.  Scots Guards at Tumbledown: Deception plan combined with flank attack. Position taken after seven hour fight (eleven hours after crossing the LD) at a cost of 9 KIA.

e.  2 Para at Wireless Ridge: Plan was changed after orders had been issued based on new information gained after battles of previous night (Mount Longdon had direct observation on Wireless). Flank attack well supported by indirect fire and light tanks. Position is taken at the cost of 3 KIA.

These battles show how slow things can be, especially in a dismounted fight across difficult terrain. All of the attacks were deliberate with considerable planning. Plans were also adjusted on new information, which takes a certain amount of courage to do. Platoons and companies fought as part of a higher plan, although of course much of the success of these battles needs to be pinned on the quality of the individual soldiers and junior leadership of the British forces.


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> I thought your previous definition was pretty good.  Hasty attack is done with the resources on hand, may be in response to enemy fire, or you may "have the drop" on him.  Deliberate attack is pre-planned and resourced.
> 
> I don't think there is an issue with "preference" for either one in our doctrine or our training; we need to practice both.  It's *how* we practice them that can be problematic.  The standard approach - indeed, the accepted norm - is to slam into the enemy, almost always into an obstacle.  I've never seen a "bypass," a "penetrate and exploit," or an "attack from the rear."  "Exploitation" in training generally means reorganizing and/or passing the next element through to hit the next enemy square on.  For a "manoeuvrist" army, we certainly seem to prefer surfaces over gaps.


There is a danger that in our drive to exercise TTPs and BTS we constrain decision-making and train ourselves to be rather unthinking. I get making sure that a platoon commander or company commander can plan and lead an attack through an obstacle. Once we've shown that we can do that, however, subsequent training should have options to penetrate, bypass etc. 

It can be worse at higher levels where we have decided that the _sine qua non_ of formation training is the deliberate river crossing. So we have exercises where SoMs are forced to result in a river crossing when there was no real requirement in the first place. "Why are we crossing the river to attack that enemy battalion when there are already friendly forces on the other side of the river? OK...We'll shut up and colour."


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## FJAG (15 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> ... I don't think there is an issue with "preference" for either one in our doctrine or our training; we need to practice both.  It's *how* we practice them that can be problematic.  The standard approach - indeed, the accepted norm - is to slam into the enemy, almost always into an obstacle.  I've never seen a "bypass," a "penetrate and exploit," or an "attack from the rear."  "Exploitation" in training generally means reorganizing and/or passing the next element through to hit the next enemy square on.  For a "manoeuvrist" army, we certainly seem to prefer surfaces over gaps.


Okay. You've accurately described my experiences in the '70s and '80s and I expect they were also true in the '90s.

That leaves me with several questions:

1. Was it any different in Afghanistan?

2. Why do we train this way?

3. Do we need to do something about that and, if so, what?





TangoTwoBravo said:


> Subsequent attacks in the Falklands War were also deliberate affairs, although fire support was noticeably improved.


The Falklands was a footslogging campaign against a dug in enemy on mostly open, exposed ground. That's generally not conducive to anything but deliberate attacks. From what I understand both sides had some light armoured forces - Scorpions and Scimitars for the Brits, Panhard AML 90s for the Argentines - and, for the Brits, these were helpful and sped things up where the terrain permitted.

🍻


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## quadrapiper (15 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> Okay. You've accurately described my experiences in the '70s and '80s and I expect they were also true in the '90s.
> 
> That leaves me with several questions:
> 
> ...


Watching the comments re: training, how much of the answer is "more time in the field" instead of just enough time for the platoon, company, or battalion to check the box saying "executed an attack as a unit?"


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> Okay. You've accurately described my experiences in the '70s and '80s and I expect they were also true in the '90s.
> 
> That leaves me with several questions:
> 
> ...


Regarding Afghanistan, during my second tour (Feb to Aug 06) most fights were essentially chance encounters, but there were certainly deliberate operations. I am not sure if bypass and penetration really apply in that kind of war - it was COIN after all.

I would say that firefights took a long time. Whereas in training you have a firebase and then assault with roughly 2/3rd of your force, in 2006 it was more along the lines of gain a fire position to define the enemy (who would have initially engaged from their own fire positions upon the arrival of CAF/ANA to the area) and then hammer him. Ammunition expenditure was considerable. The matter was usually settled by artillery or an airstrike, after which the enemy would melt away. 

In Garmser I recall two JDAMs being dropped on a single compound held by some tenacious (and ultimately vaporized) defenders. That was part of a two-day engagement, albeit with many pauses along the way. 

You fight the war you are in, not necessarily the war you thought you would be in.  You fight it with the methods and equipment you have, adapted as possible to the situation.


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## Infanteer (15 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> My reading of the Falklands War also indicates that the vast majority of the actions were battalion-level deliberate attacks, with the battalion attacks around Stanley forming part of a Brigade plan in terms of sequencing/axis of attack.


Every Army officer should read Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's Not Mentioned in Despatches.  It is the single best battlefield analysis I have read to date and breaks down a unit level battle to its component parts.

The author shows conclusively that the CO overplanned the attack, tried to overcontrol the attack, and just plain executed a clumsy action.  He was rude and dismissive of his subordinates, and when his bad attack stalled and was in danger of failing, he acted stupidly and was shot and killed.  For his actions, he was awarded the Victoria Cross....

Fortunately, his DCO was a far better officer and was able to rescue the situation, reorient the battalion, and carry the day.

There were 6 unit level engagements in the Falklands War; Goose Green (2 Para), Mount Harriet (42 Cdo), Mt Longdon (3 Para), Two Sisters (45 Cdo), Mt Tumbledown (Scots Guards), and Wireless Ridge (2 Para).  The first was a lone attack driven by political imperative (as all acts of war must be), the middle three where part of the break-in battle at Stanley by 3 Cdo Bde, while the last two were executed as a breakthough to Stanley itself (I believe this was commanded by 5 Bde - can't check my sources now).

All of these attacks were conducted at essentially 1:1 odds, which puts paid to the silly myth of "must attack at 3:1" that we continue to hang on to.  Suppression and, ultimately, shock are the key and history shows that small assaulting elements are successful against a larger enemy who is in shock.  There is some clever deception and manoeuvre in these attacks, and they are all worth pulling apart.  One featured the British stepping into a minefield, which forced some hasty reaction on the fly.

MGen Thompson, Comd 3 Cdo Bde, said that after Goose Green, all attacks were conducted at night because they did not have enough artillery systems to adequately suppress the Argentine prepared positions.  This goes to show that manoeuvre and firepower is not a dichotomous relationship, and the ability to mass accurate fires quickly on the fly is essential to support good manoeuvre.  The German break through at Sedan in 1940 was supported by essentially every German bomber in theatre.

The Argentines also fought well; even poorly led conscripts fight well from hardened positions with sited crew-served weapons.  None of those battles were walk-overs.  The Argentines were dreadfully led though, and while they were capable of defence, they lacked the leadership to challenge the British through aggressive patrolling and countermoves.  This should be part of our calculus in the attack; what's the enemy likely to do?

The Battle for Stanley is instructive in a few regards.  The first night's attack on Stanley at Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, and Two Sisters was essentially a broad front attack by a Brigade - all three objectives were hit almost simultaneously.  Thompson has been asked over the years as to why he didn't conduct a "pencil attack" to break through the crust of the Argentine defensive position with one unit and push other units through the breach.  He said that when you look at the ground, Mt Longdon in the North was simply too dominant of a feature to be ignored.

His concept was to attack "three up" and to figure out where he best opportunity to exploit was the next day.  These attacks were all "silent" - conducted at night with little preparatory fire - because he did not have enough artillery ammunition or guns to properly suppress/shock the Argentine positions.  The fighting took longer than expected (further proof that the Argentines weren't terrible), and so exploitation wasn't possible and the Brits had to re-cock to conduct further engagements the following night.

Finally, these were all deliberate attacks; 3 Cdo Bde had a week to conduct reconnaissance from its positions at Mount Kent/Bluff Cove.  Thompson wanted to attack earlier, but was told by his boss to wait until 5 UK Bde got established.  This was a good example of inter-service politics - there was no chance the British Army was going to let the entire ground fight be conducted by a Marine Brigade.

The so what out of all of this?

1. Ground always provides options and limitations.
2. Small units (companies and platoons) win engagements through aggressive patrolling and closing with the enemy after suppressing/shocking him through fires.
3. Larger units (battalions and brigades) win battles by figuring out how to shock the enemy and exploit the opportunities presented by small unit engagements.  These commanders have to understand how engagements are unfolding, recognize what is happening vis-a-vis the enemy, and be capable of adjusting the plan on the fly.  They must not try to control the battle, and they must be comfortable with the uncertainty involved in "fighting on the fly."


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## Kirkhill (15 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> I thought your previous definition was pretty good.  Hasty attack is done with the resources on hand, may be in response to enemy fire, or you may "have the drop" on him.  Deliberate attack is pre-planned and resourced.
> 
> I don't think there is an issue with "preference" for either one in our doctrine or our training; we need to practice both.  It's *how* we practice them that can be problematic.  The standard approach - indeed, the accepted norm - is to slam into the enemy, almost always into an obstacle.  I've never seen a "bypass," a "penetrate and exploit," or an "attack from the rear."  "Exploitation" in training generally means reorganizing and/or passing the next element through to hit the next enemy square on.  For a "manoeuvrist" army, we certainly seem to prefer surfaces over gaps.



Way back in the 70's a buddy of mine, since deceased, picked up the sobriquet C.E. during his Phase 3 training at Gagetown.  It followed him the rest of his life.

Conducting section attacks down Shirley Road Scotty decided to flank the enemy position and led his section on a 2 hour march/crawl to come at the objective from a rear flank.

DS was more bemused than amused.

C.E. stands for "Corps Envelopment"


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> Every Army officer should read Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's Not Mentioned in Despatches.  It is the single best battlefield analysis I have read to date and breaks down a unit level battle to its component parts.
> 
> The author shows conclusively that the CO overplanned the attack, tried to overcontrol the attack, and just plain executed a clumsy action.  He was rude and dismissive of his subordinates, and when his bad attack stalled and was in danger of failing, he acted stupidly and was shot and killed.  For his actions, he was awarded the Victoria Cross....
> 
> ...


Great post. I think that the Falklands War can be plumbed for insights into war between "near peers." Sure its a little dated and in a very specific area of the world, but it was a real war between real people and not a CAX against an imaginary enemy. 

I recently read Goose Green by Fremont-Barnes. There are very revealing vignettes, primarily from the company commanders, regarding LCol Jones' command style and conduct of the battle. On the one hand, command is not a committee and not all helpful suggestions are actually helpful. On the other, when things get all fouled up perhaps it is the time to get some new perspectives. It is interesting, though, that when he came forward to assess the hold-up he took an hour before issuing direction (which was essentially to carry on with the plan). I compare that with colleagues who try to conduct the combat estimate for a quick attack in less than five minutes. I am not saying that either is wrong, but when actual lives are on the line perhaps we take a little more time to plan? 

There are some examples of COs in the war adjusting their plans as their battles progress, achieving a "fingertip feel" for the battle without being the forward-most troop in the battalion. Lieutenants should be the ones leading the charge over the last 10 yards.  

I have attended courses in the US and been on operations with Argentinian officers - very professional fellows with some fascinating operational experience (including six-month deployments to Antarctica) . I am still friends with severaI of them. I would have liked to have asked them what their army took from the war in terms of lessons. I sensed, however, that the Falklands War was a sensitive subject for them and not one that I would bring up. I value friendship on a current operation more than insights into a past one. Its unfortunate, and perhaps linked to unpleasant memories of the junta? My read of the battles is that Argentinians troops and their officers could indeed be brave, stubborn defenders. They didn't really seem to counter-attack, relying on prepared positions and artillery. 

Perhaps our force ratio calculators are set for _Verrieres Ridge_ against some of the best the Germans had to offer? Is overestimating your opponent worse than underestimating him?


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## daftandbarmy (15 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Subsequent attacks in the Falklands War were also deliberate affairs, although fire support was noticeably improved. There was up to a week for planning, and battalion COs nested their plans within a Brigade and indeed Division scheme of manouevre. All attacks took place a night. The actions unfolded as follows:
> 
> a.  42 Cdo at Mount Harriet: Noisy deception plan ahead of flanking attack. Eight hours of fighting results in the position taken at a loss of 2 KIA and 17 WIA against 25 KIA for the defending Argentinians and 300 prisoners.
> 
> ...



And the artillery, naval and air support, as well as the direct fire from the Blues and Royals' CVRT.

Everyone I knew who was there, some of them at these battles, were pretty clear that where fire support flagged, so did the attack.

After the Goose Green 'near miss', saved by heroic actions at the lowest levels but imperilled by a frigate that went U/S mid-fire plan and not enough mortar and arty ammo, they didn't mess around with anything too fancy. Two up, one back, FOO/FAC with the boss, good recces beforehand etc.

Following that war it was a real 'back to basics' experience for the British combat arms, with good results.


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## GR66 (15 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> And the artillery, naval and air support, as well as the direct fire from the Blues and Royals' CVRT.
> 
> Everyone I knew who was there, some of them at these battles, were pretty clear that where fire support flagged, so did the attack.
> 
> ...


This comment could equally belong in the Force 2025 thread, but reading this and the comments up thread discussing our WWII doctrine it sure seems to stand out how much our current weakness in indirect fires capabilities cause us serious issues if we ever get in a serious fight.


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## Brad Sallows (15 Jul 2021)

If time isn't a limiting factor, I'd expect most offensive actions to be deliberate, planned to minimize casualties and use of resources.  To learn proper lessons, you'd need to study situations where time was insufficient.


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## dapaterson (15 Jul 2021)

Brad Sallows said:


> If time isn't a limiting factor, I'd expect most offensive actions to be deliberate, planned to minimize casualties and use of resources.  To learn proper lessons, you'd need to study situations where time was insufficient.



Cough Lavoie vs Fraser cough


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## Brad Sallows (15 Jul 2021)

I wish I knew what that meant.


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## dapaterson (15 Jul 2021)

Op Medusa






						Operation Medusa: The Battle For Panjwai - Legion Magazine
					

PHOTOS: DND; CHARLES COMPANY; ADAM DAY A Canadian soldier ducks as a helicopter lifts off during Operation Medusa. Inset top: across the Arghandab River, the area around the white school burns as the Canadians attack. Inset bottom: the town of Bazaar-e-Panjwai with Mar Ghar in the background...




					legionmagazine.com


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## Haligonian (15 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> Okay. You've accurately described my experiences in the '70s and '80s and I expect they were also true in the '90s.
> 
> That leaves me with several questions:
> 
> ...


In defence of our training construct it is meant to demonstrate that commanders can coordinate combined arms.  A hasty attack necessitating a breach is a good vehicle for this.  Again, the problem isn't the hasty attack, it's that it has such a dominant role in the CA.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Coming back to your very thought-provoking post - I am trying to imagine the School's reaction to the bypassing of the isolated enemy platoon by the Cbt Tm. I wonder sometimes if the Cbt Tm Quick Attack has become an end in and of itself. Certainly our live fire exercises are heavily if not entirely scripted with walk throughs and rehearsals before going live. Such tactics as there are are baked into the range.
> 
> What are your thoughts on the line between hasty attack and deliberate attack?



Your previous post was pretty good. The purpose of the original question was to come up with some practical indicators that you're executing one or the other.  You mentioned a few.  Here's what I'm thinking:

1. Deliberate attack you are planning out of contact less your recce elements.
2. Deliberate attack uses significantly more information.  You likely have recce elements in perpetual contact with the enemy providing composition and disposition which can be regularly updated and confirmed prior to execution.
3. Deliberate attack likely has more regrouping and this has been done out of contact. There will also be additional enablers made available. 
4. A deliberate attack will have rehearsals.
5. The deliberate attack is necessitated when a hasty attack would fail or would otherwise be overly costly.

Another question that I think about is what are the indicators that tells a commander that he should be stopping to move into battle procedure for a deliberate attack. This of course is dependent on the capabilities of the friendly and enemy forces but I'd say a failed hasty attack is one of the primary followed by the presence of significant obstacles and mutually supporting posns that cannot be neutralized with the forces at hand.



Infanteer said:


> The so what out of all of this?
> 
> 1. Ground always provides options and limitations.
> 2. Small units (companies and platoons) win engagements through aggressive patrolling and closing with the enemy after suppressing/shocking him through fires.
> 3. Larger units (battalions and brigades) win battles by figuring out how to shock the enemy and exploit the opportunities presented by small unit engagements.  These commanders have to understand how engagements are unfolding, recognize what is happening vis-a-vis the enemy, and be capable of adjusting the plan on the fly.  They must not try to control the battle, and they must be comfortable with the uncertainty involved in "fighting on the fly."


If Battalions and Brigades need fight on the fly and be prepared to exploit chaotic lower level battles then it implies that a flexible base plan with a few potential conplans would be much better than a detailed tightly coupled plan (preaching to the choir here, I know). I get the sense, however, that at these levels we often seek highly synchronized, choreographed plans that are easily disrupted.  Probably a product of doing highly choreographed live fire attacks as sub unit commanders.



Brad Sallows said:


> If time isn't a limiting factor, I'd expect most offensive actions to be deliberate, planned to minimize casualties and use of resources.  To learn proper lessons, you'd need to study situations where time was insufficient.


It will be rare that time will not be a limiting factor. A competent defender will use every moment to improve their defenses and move fresh forces into the area.  If fresh forces aren't available then they will seek allies and partners to bring theirs to bear.

This goes back to what I and Tango mentioned a few posts back. The question, which is probably unanswerable, is who benefits most from the time taken by the attacker for preparation and at what point do the returns begin to diminish.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (16 Jul 2021)

I am going to stick with the theme of time in terms of planning and execution for a minute. The first Gulf War offers, at a high level, a somewhat modern view. Although the ground war was over very quickly, there was tension regarding time and execution between CENTCOM and VII Corps (3rd Army is the rather silent middle man in the drama) regarding the timeline to achieve VII Corps task to "destroy the Republican Guard."

A key aspect of Gen Franks' plan the destruction of the RG was that his VII Corps would hit the RG as a "tight fist." Hitting an enemy Corps with your own Corps of five heavy divisions as a "tight fist" requires synchronization, which in turn requires time. It also shows a rather deliberate approach to the battle. At least three times during the war Comd CENTCOM called Comd 3rd Army directing him to "light a fire" under Gen Franks regarding his progress and considered relieving him. There was the pressure of time at the strategic level with the possibility of a ceasefire being imposed before the mission was completed. 

The actual engagements were usually concluded quite quickly. At the Battle of the 73rd Easting against the _Tawakalna_ RG Division, for example, a Troop (company equivalent mix of M1s and M3 Bradleys) of 2nd ACR destroyed over a battalion of tanks in a defensive position that included infantry in under 24 minutes. It could certainly be considered a hasty attack - the Troop Commander assaulted enemy positions frontally with no losses to his own command, going three km past the limit of exploitation as he not want to halt in the middle of an enemy position because of an Easting. In the same wider battle that day, the Div Cav from the adjacent 3rd Armored Div equipped with Bradleys fought a tough 75 minute battle with the loss of four Bradleys and 2 KIA. That engagement was only settled by the arrival of 4-34 Armor with tanks. All in all, the battle took six hours to conclude - this was a multiple formation engagement. 

As part of the Battle of Medina Ridge (from the eponymous Republican Guard division that was holding it), a US brigade of three tank battalions destroyed a brigade equivalent (over 60 tanks destroyed and 40 APC plus supporting vehicles) that were in defensive positions in 40 minutes. They did so line-abreast with 200 rounds of 120mm tank fire. I guess that's a hasty attack by fire? The wider engagement, of course, took more time to conclude. 

Not all engagements were so quick and many were chaotic due to visibility and intermingling of units. Following the battle against the Medina Division, 1st Cav Div (really a Heavy Division) was to pass through 1st Armored Division. A realigning unit moved into an unsecured area and was caught in a tough fight in darkness that also resulted in fratricide. This caused the FPOL to be delayed to the morning, something like an eight hour delay.

So while engagements could be short, setting all this up took time. As Gen Franks at VII Corps synchronized his divisions in a mobile battle with 24 hr tempo, General Powell had told Gen Schwarzkopf that he was "on the ceiling about VII Corps" and that it was "very hard to justify VII Corps' actions to anyone in Washington." Pressure rolled downhill. So I don't know if you ever have enough time?

What does all this mean? I think we can see a bit of the Western way of war. We are concerned about casualties. We like to mass. Neither of these are bad! Several Div commanders went with sequential engagements to allow them to mass all of their fire support. Some would always ensure that they had AH screening their advance. Some stopped leading with their Cav units that did not have integral tanks. When we have situations were our forces are virtually invincible (M1s fighting frontally) we can do things quite quickly once in the fight. Setting these situations up, however, and preventing fratricide take deliberate planning and synchronization, which also takes some time. This does not mean lengthy orders, but rather sensible control measures and sound schemes of manouevre that can be executed on the ground. 

Going back to force ratio calculators, how does all this square up? I think pre-war calculators would have worked out very different results.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Jul 2021)

b00161400 said:


> I get the sense, however, that at these levels we often seek highly synchronized, choreographed plans that are easily disrupted.  Probably a product of doing highly choreographed live fire attacks as sub unit commanders.



I recall a quote from the one time CIGS, Field Marshall Sir John Dill I believe, who said:

"The aim is to surprise the enemy, not amaze him.'

That has stuck with me through all these years, and served me (and my troops) well in various situations


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## Infanteer (16 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Going back to force ratio calculators, how does all this square up? I think pre-war calculators would have worked out very different results.


I always challenge a force ratio calculator with the question "ratio of what?"

Troop numbers?  AFV numbers?  Artillery numbers?

How does a force ratio calculator account for surprise?  There are studies showing that forces outnumbered 3:1 have plowed through their adversary when they have surprise (as a result of shock).  T.N. Dupuy writes about this extensively in his book Understanding War and his model of battlefield effectiveness.


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## daftandbarmy (16 Jul 2021)

dapaterson said:


> Cough Lavoie vs Fraser cough



Oh great, now you've gone and done it


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## markppcli (20 Jul 2021)

As a more modern discussion point than the Falklands or Afghanistan.


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## FJAG (21 Jul 2021)

markppcli said:


> As a more modern discussion point than the Falklands or Afghanistan.


I suggest we take up a collection and hire Karber to present a mandatory lecture to Trudeau and the MND and maybe a few other folks in Ottawa. 

A very good and informative lecture and if you have any more questions about whether or not the Canadian Army is configured for a peer conflict ... watch the video again.

🍻


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## GR66 (21 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> I suggest we take up a collection and hire Karber to present a mandatory lecture to Trudeau and the MND and maybe a few other folks in Ottawa.
> 
> A very good and informative lecture and if you have any more questions about whether or not the Canadian Army is configured for a peer conflict ... watch the video again.
> 
> 🍻


Agree 100%.  Well worth the time to watch this video.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Jul 2021)

I imagine most Canadian officers and Sr NCOs have either attended a Karber presentation, watched this or a similar video or read his paper written circa 2015. His work has had a lot of impact on training in the US and NATO. It was certainly part of our 2017 ARRCADE FUSION for a Corps/Div level warfighting exercise set in the Baltics. Some of it is "admiring the problem", but it is a useful counterpoint to Western experience of the last two decades of fighting COIN. Much of what he talks about relates to equipment and there are elements of his talk in the Force 2025 thread. The tension between the requirements of COIN and the requirements for peer conventional war is real, and is also nothing new. The US Army used a renewed Cold War as a way to get out of their post-Vietnam funk. The Russians (and Chinese) offer a similar foil today. Regarding modernity, even Karber links his study to the US Army study of the 1973 Yom Kippur War that was referred to earlier in this thread. 

Warfighting against Russia would be incredibly bloody. I think this is known. Conventional combat can see battalions wiped out very quickly - the Gulf War showed this, as did WW2. I think that much of our warfighting doctrine is still set in the Cold War. US and NATO equipment spending and capability development has been primarily aimed at the COIN problem, but our doctrinal and indeed training comfort zone is heavy metal warfighting. We've strayed (using the royal NATO We), as Karber points out, in our peer combined arms capabilities over the past twenty years. 

Looking at doctrine and implementation, I have certainly experienced the tension on operations and in training. Like most of my coursemates, I went on the Combat Team Commander's Course with two tours of Afghanistan as a Captain. When faced with a defined enemy platoon position we knew what the course wanted us to and dutifully went about it. Of course, we would offer that against such a defined position with the air supremacy that the training scenario offered we would simply drop two or three JDAMs. Why throw away lives? DARK21 will be by in 15 minutes with a load of 2000 lb JDAMs. Other courses face similar cognitive dissonance challenges. Do you make the air situation contested? OK, but then we are not training our officers to employ the means they would have had available in the war that we were actually sending them. On the other hand, Karber is absolutely right that dropping JDAMs in support of a combat team attack would not be an option against the Russians. 

Dissonance between doctrine, past experience and the current experience faced by tactical/operational decision-makers is nothing new. Reading BGen Thompson's account of the Falklands War, he speaks of the Div wanting a "narrow thrust assault", while he favoured a more deliberate approach. He recounts "the battle was not being fought on the plains of North Germany by armoured units, so talk of narrow thrusts and swift follow-up to maintain momentum was academic." 

How adaptable are we?


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## Colin Parkinson (21 Jul 2021)

GR66 said:


> Agree 100%.  Well worth the time to watch this video.


Made me happy I am not a Frontline solider anymore, back in the day the ability to hide and dig in for protection was much higher.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Dissonance between doctrine, past experience and the current experience faced by tactical/operational decision-makers is nothing new. Reading BGen Thompson's account of the Falklands War, he speaks of the Div wanting a "narrow thrust assault", while he favoured a more deliberate approach. He recounts "the battle was not being fought on the plains of North Germany by armoured units, so talk of narrow thrusts and swift follow-up to maintain momentum was academic."
> *
> How adaptable are we?*



Based on the training I did in the 80s & 90s (including the Cbt Tm Comd's Course, like you but years before), which looks alot like the training we're doing today, we may find that we are adaptable *despite *our training .....


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Based on the training I did in the 80s & 90s (including the Cbt Tm Comd's Course, like you but years before), which looks alot like the training we're doing today, we may find that we are adaptable *despite *our training .....


I think we have developed our mostly implicit understanding of how we fight before we are on the Combat Team Commander's Course.  I think that "Phase Training/DP1", service as a junior officer in a unit and the Army Operations Course are the formative experiences. In the Cold War those three things were mostly aligned, putting aside that they were never really put into practice on operations.  Since then there has been some dissonance between what is emphasized on courses (and major exercises) and what occurs on operations. I suppose it is just the "A War" vs "The War" debate, except that what people really mean by "A War" is a conventional fight in a 1989 mindset.


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## FJAG (21 Jul 2021)

I would think it would be very difficult to teach a combat team commander's course these days. When I took mine we were deep into and mostly equipped for Cold War and learned and practiced how we would fight in Germany - everything fit together.

I'm not even sure how one designs such a course these days. Do you teach everything from COIN to peer warfare? Do you play notional or real establishments? It must be frustrating for both DS and students. I'm not sure what type of mind set we are creating in future leaders.

Having learned the 1970s and 1980s Cold War model I do know one thing - it's no more useful for a modern peer war than the 2000s Afghan experience is. Both require heavy adapting.

🍻


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> I would think it would be very difficult to teach a combat team commander's course these days. When I took mine we were deep into and mostly equipped for Cold War and learned and practiced how we would fight in Germany - everything fit together.
> 
> I'm not even sure how one designs such a course these days. Do you teach everything from COIN to peer warfare? Do you play notional or real establishments? It must be frustrating for both DS and students. I'm not sure what type of mind set we are creating in future leaders.
> 
> ...


I don't know. Let's say Col Evil, a Bde Comd in V Corps was frozen in 1989 and revived today. For peer conflict I am not sure all that much has changed. The major combat systems have evolved, but the big ones from 1989 are still there (M1, Bradley, AH64, MLRS, M109/Paladin). GPS is certainly more widespread now, but it was coming of age then. UAVs are more prevalent today, but they were in use in 1989. Loitering munitions are certainly new I suppose. For all the talk about the ability of massed fires to destroy battalions in the open, that existed in 1989. The so-called "Reconnaissance Strike Complex" might be tighter today, but it was there before. Perhaps Col Evil would not be surprised to be told that he would "operate with contested airspace above him" etc etc. He might be a little put-off by tactical digital HQs.  

Things have evolved on the conventional side and perhaps I am glossing over some areas, but I don't think its been a true revolution. 

As for courses, AOC covers the spectrum. The centre of mass, at least when I was DS circa 2015 to 2017, was conventional operations. There was, however, a stability operation and a domestic operation. Our TO&Es were grounded in reality but given a little boost. So we had Javelins in the infantry companies and TUA in the BG/Bde depending on the Tutorial. The Armoured Regiment had four Sqns of tanks etc. Certainly not the fantasy of Corps 86, but neither an exact copy of the army of the moment. The mind-set I tried to create was that of relentless excellence in tactical planning at the BG and CMBG level. Planning for anything. Based on feedback from operations as well as personal observations I am very happy with the results.


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## Kirkhill (22 Jul 2021)

I think the 1989 Reconnaissance Strike Complex was known as an Armored Cavalry Regiment???  

And I am pretty sure we were told to expect to be dodging Mig 21s and Su 24s and suchlike because our air forces would be busy on deep strikes.


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Jul 2021)

An example of doctrine being implemented very painfully in practice is the Israeli experience of Systemic Operational Design (SOD) in the 2006 Lebanon War. There are many reasons why the Israelis were not successful, but fuzzy new doctrine that was not understood by the people trying to execute it was one of them. "We were caught unprepared" is a good read on the subject. The father of SOD proclaimed that it "was not intended for ordinary mortals." Unfortunately, wars are fought by ordinary mortals at 0300 hrs without the time or inclination to read French post-modernist philosophy (apparently SOD was informed by post-modern French philosophy). Whether or not it could be understood was also moot as Hezbollah proved a little more resilient. 

While this was part of what compelled Mattis to reject EBO, others doubled down as true believers are wont to do. 

When someone tries to sell me on the virtues of _design_ I back away very slowly.


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Jul 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> I think the 1989 Reconnaissance Strike Complex was known as an Armored Cavalry Regiment???
> 
> And I am pretty sure we were told to expect to be dodging Mig 21s and Su 24s and suchlike because our air forces would be busy on deep strikes.


It was the Soviet conception of a system of sensors, C2 and strike assets with a high level of automation and speed.


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## Kirkhill (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> It was the Soviet conception of a system of sensors, C2 and strike assets with a high level of automation and speed.


Thank you.


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## blacktriangle (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> As for courses, AOC covers the spectrum. The centre of mass, at least when I was DS circa 2015 to 2017, was conventional operations. There was, however, a stability operation and a domestic operation. Our TO&Es were grounded in reality but given a little boost. So we had Javelins in the infantry companies and TUA in the BG/Bde depending on the Tutorial. The Armoured Regiment had four Sqns of tanks etc. Certainly not the fantasy of Corps 86, but neither an exact copy of the army of the moment. The mind-set I tried to create was that of relentless excellence in tactical planning at the BG and CMBG level. Planning for anything. Based on feedback from operations as well as personal observations I am very happy with the results.


If you are able, can you explain the rationale behind "boosted" TO&Es in tutorials? Just curious - thanks!


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Jul 2021)

blacktriangle said:


> If you are able, can you explain the rationale behind "boosted" TO&Es in tutorials? Just curious - thanks!


You consider what would realistically be added to a Canadian BG or CMBG in a war setting. It allows the students to plan with systems that they could realistically have in that situation. You can take that too far - the old Corps 86 would be too far. Adding Javelins to infantry battalions sent to a conventional conflict, though, is realistic in my view. AOC's TO&Es are absolutely based in doctrine with real equipment: Leopard 2s, LAVs, M777s etc.


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## FJAG (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> An example of doctrine being implemented very painfully in practice is the Israeli experience of Systemic Operational Design (SOD) in the 2006 Lebanon War. There are many reasons why the Israelis were not successful, but fuzzy new doctrine that was not understood by the people trying to execute it was one of them. "We were caught unprepared" is a good read on the subject. The father of SOD proclaimed that it "was not intended for ordinary mortals." Unfortunately, wars are fought by ordinary mortals at 0300 hrs without the time or inclination to read French post-modernist philosophy (apparently SOD was informed by post-modern French philosophy). Whether or not it could be understood was also moot as Hezbollah proved a little more resilient.
> 
> While this was part of what compelled Mattis to reject EBO, others doubled down as true believers are wont to do.
> 
> When someone tries to sell me on the virtues of _design_ I back away very slowly.


Mercifully at that time I was into legal and computer stuff and mercifully ignored (actually never heard of) SOD. 

Just looked at an abstract on SOD from Leavenworth in 2005. 

🍻


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## Kirkhill (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> You consider what would realistically be added to a Canadian BG or CMBG in a war setting. It allows the students to plan with systems that they could realistically have in that situation. You can take that too far - the old Corps 86 would be too far. Adding Javelins to infantry battalions sent to a conventional conflict, though, is realistic in my view. AOC's TO&Es are absolutely based in doctrine with real equipment: Leopard 2s, LAVs, M777s etc.



So the staff recognize the need for systems that will be necessary for the current forces to operate on the contemporary battlefield and trust that the politicians will buy them, the logisticians will supply them, the maintainers will prepare them, the soldiers will operate them and the commanders will know how to employ them to their greatest effect?

And  I know the problem is not with the instructional staff, at least not in the procurement realm, but should instruction be based on hope?

On the other hand at least effort is being expended to assist the commanders to employ systems that they might find themselves allocated. 

Someone upthread made comment about CQs dropping off C16s and wondering what the field commander would do with them, seemingly suggesting that the arrival would come as a surprise to the commander rather than as part of a briefed plan.   This was in response to my suggestion that the arms locker concept can be met by keeping the locker in the CQ, or even at Battalion.  Now I begin to suspect that the combat commanders must become sufficiently flexible as to incorporate whatever weapons system they find the supply system has decided to deliver today.

Oh, look!  ATGMs!  Christmas!

Sorry T2B.  My cynicism makes me sarcastic and sometimes I give it free rein. 



TangoTwoBravo said:


> It was the Soviet conception of a system of sensors, C2 and strike assets with a high level of automation and speed.



Thanks for giving me the provenance.  I wasn't aware of that.

My thoughts on the Reconnaissance Strike Complex were prompted by the currently deployment of the Deep Strike Brigade which to me looks like a Divisional Support Brigade combining the old Divisional Recce Regiment with the Divisional Artillery.  That in turn reminded me of the US Armored Cavalry construct of Corps Regiments, and Divisional Squadrons (and, if memory serves, Army Divisions), which were permanently integrated, at the sub-unit level, combined arms teams of scouts, infantry, tanks and artillery thereby attempting to shorten the decision making loop as much as possible through training and familiarity.


I appreciate that the analogy is poor but it does seem that there is some sympathy for the revival of the US style Armored Cavalry construct as an attempt to balance penny-packeting of tanks to meet screening requirements while maintaining useful masses to launch thrusts.

Edit to add that the Cavalry combined arms team also include air assets.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jul 2021)

Well, thank goodness the Yanks are coming out with their new Army doctrine soon so we can follow along, as per SOP 


New US Army doctrine coming summer 2022​
The Army is expected to release its new doctrine, one that describes how the service will operate in the future across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace, in summer 2022, Lt. Gen. D. Scott McKean, the director of the Army Futures and Concepts Center under Army Futures Command, told Defense News in a March 15 virtual event.

The doctrine cements the Army’s developing warfighting concept it has coined Multidomain Operations — or MDO — that addresses the Army’s role in potential conflict with near-peer adversaries in a time of great power competition — namely with China and Russia.
That means the field manual, which currently addresses unified land operations, will transform into a field manual addressing operations across all domains for the first time in the Army’s history.

The service has come out with versions of its MDO concept as it moves to craft its doctrine over the past several years. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville told Defense News in an interview last fall that getting the concept into doctrine form would take several more years, but he stressed that the service was not waiting for the concept to become doctrine before moving out on transforming the force with MDO as the guiding light.

McKean stressed that even as doctrine, multidomain operations will evolve as needed.
When the document comes out “will everything in the concept be in there? No, not everything is ready yet,” McKean said. The Army will continue to wargame and conduct experiments even after the doctrine’s initial publication.

But, “what you will see in the immediate term is investment in force structure changes, whether we need to change an organization to be better able to employ the technologies that we are developing as we look at the doctrine and how we might fight differently,” McKean said. “We can look at the command-and-control aspects and echelons of command, you know, where things are led from. And so lots of work in this field, it’s constant but everything is feeding it and the relationships are allowing it to move out at a really good pace.”

McKean noted that the Combined Arms Center, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is now in direct support of Army Futures Command and that relationship has allowed him and the center’s commander to become directly involved in the process. Both the CAC’s commander and McKean sit in on each other’s meetings related to the effort.









						New US Army doctrine coming summer 2022
					

The Army is getting closer to publishing its doctrine that -- for the first time -- addresses operating across all domains from land, air and sea to cyber and space.




					www.defensenews.com


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Jul 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> So the staff recognize the need for systems that will be necessary for the current forces to operate on the contemporary battlefield and trust that the politicians will buy them, the logisticians will supply them, the maintainers will prepare them, the soldiers will operate them and the commanders will know how to employ them to their greatest effect?
> 
> And  I know the problem is not with the instructional staff, at least not in the procurement realm, but should instruction be based on hope?
> 
> ...


I think you are blending your equipment comments from the Force 2025 thread. Everyone needs to understand how to employ the weapons they have - the level and nature of that understanding change depending on the level. The soldier who will be firing the weapon needs to intimately understand its employment to include the hands-on stuff. That person needs a course or PO from a course that has the actual system. The company commander and battalion commander need to now its capabilities and how to best employ at at their level. I was entirely comfortable with our course including ALAWS (Javelin) in our training orbat. 

The interwar German army did not start to consider how to employ armour after they started acquiring tanks. They began before that. You can take that idea too far, but making the assumption that the army will acquire a man-portable system for which they already had a project is a safer bet than assuming we would acquire MLRS or attack helicopters on a six-month horizon. We did not have Canadian air defence, for instance in our training orbats. As the Canadian Army rebuilds its GBAD we may see that changed to allow officers to wrap their heads around it. 

The old Soviet Reconnaissance Strike Complex is a typical Soviet term that makes the simple sound complex (and sexy - is that complexy?) Linking sensors with shooters and a decision-maker has been a thing since indirect fire came about. The automated part, though, is interesting as is the integration into one unit. If we are separating the "manouevre" HQ that owns the terrain from the decision-making on a fires unit using its own sensors to find and kill things then we need to make sure that we very clear targeting direction as well as iron-clad control measures. We have control measures that make such things possible, but in my view the strike assets that would be used in such circumstances would be rather valuable and the Comd would want some control. Anyhoo.

I am a graduate of the US Army Cavalry Leader's Course. Their ACRs and Div Cav Sqns were tied to Corps and Divisions in the security role. ACRs were completely self-contained while the Div Cav only required tube artillery support (but had their own mortars in the Troops and had OH58Ds at Sqn level). In the old construct they did not have Brigade recce, as Div was fighting the battle and brigades were essentially close combat bulldogs attacking things as directed by the Div. The move to BCTs has placed traditional US Army Cavalry in a no-man's land. If the Div and Corps become more important then perhaps more traditional Cavalry will come back.


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, thank goodness the Yanks are coming out with their new Army doctrine soon so we can follow along, as per SOP
> 
> 
> New US Army doctrine coming summer 2022​
> ...


It is a big change, including an apparent shift back to Div and Corps level operations vs the BCT focus of the recent past. The formation of Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) to counter Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) at theatre level is interesting. 

Canada has been talking about Pan-Domain operations, although of course our requirements and capabilities are a little different. While the US military is seized with countering A2AD, I am not sure that Canada would be the one making the penetration of those defences? We still have to think how and where we would, or would not, nest with that. If we are going to work with the US Army (or US military in general), we need to understand how they would operate. While I suppose we could work with any of the five proposed MDTFs, the Arctic one is something that we should absolutely understand how we might fit in. 

Regarding allied doctrine, one of my colleagues suggested that Canada is destined to be the minor partner in an alliance, using the ancient Roman use of allies as an example. Do we want to be allies that speak the same doctrinal language as the major partner and be integrated into their plans, or foreign auxiliaries that do not speak their doctrinal language and get employed as such? 

Having said that, culture eats strategy (and doctrine) for breakfast.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> It is a big change, including an apparent shift back to Div and Corps level operations vs the BCT focus of the recent past. The formation of Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) to counter Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) at theatre level is interesting.
> 
> Canada has been talking about Pan-Domain operations, although of course our requirements and capabilities are a little different. While the US military is seized with countering A2AD, I am not sure that Canada would be the one making the penetration of those defences? We still have to think how and where we would, or would not, nest with that. If we are going to work with the US Army (or US military in general), we need to understand how they would operate. While I suppose we could work with any of the five proposed MDTFs, the Arctic one is something that we should absolutely understand how we might fit in.
> 
> ...



I think we should be like a modern version of the Swiss of old, of course, which coincidentally is another confederated state 


The Swiss Pikemen​
_"The Swiss are well-armed and very free." - Niccolo Machiavelli_


"According to medieval sources, these guys were so badass that they could move at a dead-run while maintaining perfect shoulder-to-shoulder formation, attack in any direction, defend against attack from any side, and sprint through forests, over trenches, and up hills in order to plow into their enemies with a five-pike-deep wall of pointy deathiness."






						The Swiss Pikemen — Badass of the Week
					






					www.badassoftheweek.com


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## OldSolduer (22 Jul 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I think we should be like a modern version of the Swiss of old, of course, which coincidentally is another confederated state
> 
> "According to medieval sources, these guys were so badass that they could move at a dead-run while maintaining perfect shoulder-to-shoulder formation, attack in any direction, defend against attack from any side, and sprint through forests, over trenches, and up hills in order to plow into their enemies with a five-pike-deep wall of pointy deathiness."


Well maybe THEY can defend themselves against a man armed with a banana.


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## FJAG (22 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> ... Regarding allied doctrine, one of my colleagues suggested that Canada is destined to be the minor partner in an alliance, using the ancient Roman use of allies as an example. Do we want to be allies that speak the same doctrinal language as the major partner and be integrated into their plans, or foreign auxiliaries that do not speak their doctrinal language and get employed as such?
> 
> Having said that, culture eats strategy (and doctrine) for breakfast.


Just so happens I'm rereading the McCullough "Masters of Rome" series. It's notable that Rome's Latin and Italian allies equipped and organized and trained their legions in exactly the same way as the Romans did at any given time in history. That created a cohesive central core of whatever force was brought together. 

On the other hand, auxiliary troops such as cavalry, slingers and archers were generally equipped, organized and trained in whichever manner the supplying country was familiar with. They were directed by Roman leaders to conform to the tactical plan but were led by and fought under their own leadership in their own styles.

There's a lesson in that somewhere.


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## Infanteer (23 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> There's a lesson in that somewhere.


Don't march through the Teutoburg forest?


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## SeaKingTacco (23 Jul 2021)

Infanteer said:


> Don't march through the Teutoburg forest?


Well played, Sir.


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## Old Sweat (23 Jul 2021)

We used to refer to the statue that makes the spot as "Herman the German" back in the 60s. I used it in a resection for a battery survey scheme once, along with two or three church steeples in nearby villages. That was nearby for us; Herman was a long way off, and my BRO crew (yours truly, Sgt Simmoins, Gnr McNeil, and Gnr Wood) did it so we could say we did without our noses growing.


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## TangoTwoBravo (30 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> An example of doctrine being implemented very painfully in practice is the Israeli experience of Systemic Operational Design (SOD) in the 2006 Lebanon War. There are many reasons why the Israelis were not successful, but fuzzy new doctrine that was not understood by the people trying to execute it was one of them. "We were caught unprepared" is a good read on the subject. The father of SOD proclaimed that it "was not intended for ordinary mortals." Unfortunately, wars are fought by ordinary mortals at 0300 hrs without the time or inclination to read French post-modernist philosophy (apparently SOD was informed by post-modern French philosophy). Whether or not it could be understood was also moot as Hezbollah proved a little more resilient.
> 
> While this was part of what compelled Mattis to reject EBO, others doubled down as true believers are wont to do.
> 
> When someone tries to sell me on the virtues of _design_ I back away very slowly.


Here is a little tidbit from a Canadian Army Journal article regarding Design (specifically the use of semiotic squares 🧐) and the Canadian Military: "_the design team must must have a thorough understanding of paradigms, as well as a familiarity with the sociological/philosophical notions of ontology, epistemology and methodology (the rules, principles and procedures nested within the implicit ontological and epistemological choices of the home paradigm.)"_


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## SeaKingTacco (30 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Here is a little tidbit from a Canadian Army Journal article regarding Design (specifically the use of semiotic squares 🧐) and the Canadian Military: "_the design team must must have a thorough understanding of paradigms, as well as a familiarity with the sociological/philosophical notions of ontology, epistemology and methodology (the rules, principles and procedures nested within the implicit ontological and epistemological choices of the home paradigm.)"_


What. the. ?


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## TangoTwoBravo (30 Jul 2021)

SeaKingTacco said:


> What. the. ?


Yup. 

To be fair, though, I suppose this thread is kind of a venture in epistemology - we are talking about our knowledge and beliefs about warfighting. I prefer plain language, though, as the point of communicating is, well, to communicate!


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## Brad Sallows (30 Jul 2021)

Well, in for a penny...

"The Design team must have a thorough understanding of Politics and the English Language, and apply its ideas always and everywhere."


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## OldSolduer (30 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Yup.
> 
> To be fair, though, I suppose this thread is kind of a venture in epistemology - we are talking about our knowledge and beliefs about warfighting. I prefer plain language, though, as the point of communicating is, well, to communicate!


ABC
Accurate, Brief, Clear

That statement fails badly. Not yours, the original one.


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## TangoTwoBravo (31 Jul 2021)

OldSolduer said:


> ABC
> Accurate, Brief, Clear
> 
> That statement fails badly. Not yours, the original one.


Indeed - imagine using that phrase with "ontology etc" at a unit? Talk about losing your audience. Maybe that was the point?

Part of what makes me wary of the design-community is their tendency to use flowery language, perhaps in an effort to make their sales pitch. It would also be helpful if they had some real-world successes. The same article refers to "planners" in contrast to "designers." I don't think a military "planner" needs a Philosophy degree to participate in campaign design. A planner does need an understanding of how their military/alliance fights and how their opponent fights along with a deep understanding of the situation. I am all for proper "framing" of the problem, but we don't need to become _designers_ to do so.


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## SeaKingTacco (31 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Indeed - imagine using that phrase with "ontology etc" at a unit? Talk about losing your audience. Maybe that was the point?
> 
> Part of what makes me wary of the design-community is their tendency to use flowery language, perhaps in an effort to make their sales pitch. It would also be helpful if they had some real-world successes. The same article refers to "planners" in contrast to "designers." I don't think a military "planner" needs a Philosophy degree to participate in campaign design. A planner does need an understanding of how their military/alliance fights and how their opponent fights along with a deep understanding of the situation. I am all for proper "framing" of the problem, but we don't need to become _designers_ to do so.


Everyone has a plan or a “design”, right up until they get punched in the face.

At that point, you have had a simple, robust and easily adapted concept of operations or you are lost.


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## FJAG (31 Jul 2021)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Here is a little tidbit from a Canadian Army Journal article regarding Design (specifically the use of semiotic squares 🧐) and the Canadian Military: "_the design team must must have a thorough understanding of paradigms, as well as a familiarity with the sociological/philosophical notions of ontology, epistemology and methodology (the rules, principles and procedures nested within the implicit ontological and epistemological choices of the home paradigm.)"_


So, I finally found the article and read it. Actually not as obtuse as it looked at first blush but not so sure it develops a design methodology any better than what was used in the past. It strikes me that the issue isn't so much the process in use (or suggested) but the thorough understanding of the inputs needed by the team in order to do the suggested, or any other, analysis.

Does make me wonder why the author, with all his education and experience, retired as a major after 22 years of service in the army (not that there's anything wrong with that 😉).

For those in the know; have we adopted this process other than as a staff college experiment?


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## daftandbarmy (31 Jul 2021)

FJAG said:


> So, I finally found the article and read it. Actually not as obtuse as it looked at first blush but not so sure it develops a design methodology any better than what was used in the past. It strikes me that the issue isn't so much the process in use (or suggested) but the thorough understanding of the inputs needed by the team in order to do the suggested, or any other, analysis.
> 
> Does make me wonder why the author, with all his education and experience, retired as a major after 22 years of service in the army (not that there's anything wrong with that 😉).
> 
> For those in the know; have we adopted this process other than as a staff college experiment?


From over 20 years of doing this stuff I've learned that it's not rocket science but there are various vested interests out there who want to make you think so.

Any military organization is already really good at this stuff. Anyone here ever mark a map, make a model, draft up a prototype and mess around with it until it gets better, use hand gestures to describe an activity (I'm looking at you, aircrew) scrawl on a flipchart, update an ops room board with grease pencil/pixels or, as I have done occasionally draw right on the side of an APC/Tank?, they just don't know it, sadly. 

We're in good company though. Most of the planet has had the visual learning aspects of life beaten out of them over the years by the education system, prevailing corporate culture etc:

Design Thinking: 5 Things I Learned from Putting Pulp on Paper​
*“Design is not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works.”

Steve Jobs*

To paraphrase Tim Brown, IDEO founder and a globally recognized thought leader on the subject “d_esign thinking can be described as a discipline that uses the designer’s sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with a) what is technologically feasible, and b) what a viable business strategy can convert into customer value and market opportunity.” _In other words, it’s ‘Design _Doing_’: engaging people, pictures, prototypes, and other practical, team based learning approaches to solve tricky business problems.

Berlineaton employs Design Thinking principles and methods in all of our practice areas. My area, the Continuous Improvement practice, tends to use it more often in connection with the business process improvement work that forms the core of our offerings to clients. Over many years of delivering these types of projects I have noticed that the more client teams engage their largely latent, yet powerful, visual learning strengths, the more enduring and effective are the project results.

Recently, we have had the opportunity to work with one of Canada’s largest forest companies, and their pulp division, to help them prepare for a large information system implementation program. Working closely with a cross enterprise Design Team, using big flipchart wall charts and sticky notes, we mapped out and redesigned the full span of their corporate processes from ‘Chip truck to China’. During this experience we introduced them to a variety of process mapping and other visual and team oriented activities to help develop a redesigned and improved business process, as well as a guiding vision, mission, values and goals.

The results have been inspiring. For them, because they have worked diligently to develop a strong, shared understanding of the future and how to get there from here using simple but effective tools they’ve never been exposed to before. For us, because this client took to our somewhat unorthodox approach to problem solving like the proverbial duck takes to water.

Why is it that these simple visual tools can be so powerful in helping people solve complex business issues? How can they be utilized more often to crack tough problems? Here are five things that struck me as important takeaways from the experience of helping my clients put ‘pulp on paper’:

1. *Design thinking and visual problem solving skills come naturally to just about everyone*

Ever seen or heard of cave drawings? That’s at least how old design thinking approaches are: about 40,000 years. That’s not to say that humans weren’t solving problems visually in other ways within the three million year period before that, and I’m sure that the Neanderthals were probably explaining themselves to their peers by drawing in the dirt with sticks just like we do now, there just isn’t a lot of evidence right now to support that theory. Regardless, design thinking principles are deeply, naturally embedded within the human condition. If you don’t think that you have those skills, just check out your last doodle.

What I have learned is that anyone can draw and given 1) the right opportunity and creative freedoms, and 2) some simple tools, just about every one of the thousands of clients we have engaged with over the past 20 years shows a natural affinity for explaining themselves using drawings or visual cues of one kind or another. We should leverage that innate skill more often to solve tough issues.

2. *To get the best out of Design Thinking we must overcome the fear of ridicule*

Here’s a bold statement for you about our prevailing workplace culture based on years of observation: those who try to solve problems using simple drawings are often thought of as simpletons.

Sadly, the modern workplace encourages us to try to impress our colleagues by demonstrating great feats of complexity, presented in a polished and professional manner, to prove how much smarter we are than everyone else. PowerPoint, an invaluable visual learning tool, has come to be derided by many largely as a result of many of us who try to pack a thesis load of information onto each slide. Because of this unintended connection between perfection and design thinking, many are afraid to engage in explaining themselves visually for fear of ridicule by their colleagues. Conversely, some of the most important ideas conveyed during many of our projects could literally be described as enhanced stick man drawings. Facilitated the right way, it’s the ideas that become the most important output, not the drawing itself.

What I have learned is that the atmosphere you establish for any continuous improvement effort is even more important than the more technical tools and resources provided for solving problems. If you can do your work within an open and judgement free environment, you will always get better results with a Design Thinking approach. Conversely, overly critical work environments can crush the visual, and other kinds of, creative juices out of any team.

3. *Walls and windows are more important than tables and chairs*

As I have described in a related article ‘Spaced Out: Put the Room Back into Meetings’ bad meeting rooms can kill creativity, fast. When deploying a Design Thinking approach it’s important to ensure 1) enough room to move about freely, as well as sufficient wall space for flipchart maps, and 2) natural light. In my experience this is one of the toughest paradigms to overcome when working with new clients who don’t really ‘get’ us yet. The prevailing workplace culture is one that reflects workplace based command and control relationships developed in the Industrial Age. In most meeting rooms this culture shows up in the form of a giant table in the middle of a dark, windowless room featuring high backed wheeled chairs, or, as I like to call them, straightjacket chairs.

I have learned that, to get the best out a Design Thinking approach, it’s critically important to get rid of the big tables and chairs, put a lot of flipchart maps on the walls, then, looking outwards versus inwards, doodle your way to business improvement.

4. *Apply the Rule of Threes*

Another paradigm inflicted upon us from the Industrial Age is the perception that it is really, really important to get something right first time, or don’t even bother trying (see above re: ridicule). Because you are deploying highly creative approached to problem solving during Design Thinking activities, I find it’s more important to plan to redesign three times.  

First, draw out what the current process looks like, literally, from the point of view of you, your staff, your clients and other key stakeholders. Then develop Redesign Version 1. I call this ‘Status Quo Plus’ because, although it’s usually a step in the right direction, it’s not usually a big enough improvement to achieve client goals. Challenge yourself to do even more during Redesign Version 2: the ‘Evolutionary’ redesign and, following that, on to Version 3: The ‘Revolutionary’ redesign. During this process you will find that the Design Team gradually become better at describing future, possibly unknown, improvements and how those could play out within the business successfully. Concurrently, you will have designed a step by step approach to implementing your future vision from the current reality to the Revolutionary future.

5. *Have some serious fun*

Unhappy people don’t tend to be too creative. As a result, I believe that it’s important to have some fun to get the best out of Design Thinking projects. There are a myriad of things that you can do to introduce some kind of fun during what can be long and tiring Design Team meetings. It helps if the activities are aligned to project deliverables in some way, but it’s not critical: design a brave new world using giant sized Lego blocks, act out your future vision in small teams, or design a coat of arms to brand your project.

The most important part about having some serious fun is to provide a break, of course, but to also formally introduce one of our most basic human bonding behaviours to a potentially arduous and dry, really valuable, project.










						Design Thinking: 5 Things I Learned from Putting Pulp on Paper
					

“Design is not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works.




					www.linkedin.com


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## Kirkhill (6 Dec 2021)

From the Wavell Room - Its time to democratise doctrine.

Short form seems to be that it takes too long to chisel stone tablets.  Its like the difference between the OED and the Academie Francaise.  One accepts new words, and new definitions for old words, readily.









						It’s Time to Democratise Doctrine » Wavell Room
					

Doctrine needs to be more like Wikipedia and less like stuffy old pamphlets. It's time to democratise doctrine.




					wavellroom.com
				





It’s Time to Democratise Doctrine
by Steve MaguireDecember 3, 2021

General Erwin Rommel famously said ‘the British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate that their officers do not read it’.  This quote is now routinely (mis)used to demonstrate how British military attitudes to doctrine have changed.

Despite its common use, Rommel’s quote is more interesting because of what it does not say.  It excludes the majority of the Defence workforce; Civil Servants and ‘other ranks’.  Defence needs to think beyond the broadest consumption of doctrine.  It’s time to move from reading doctrine to considering who is writing it.

This article makes the case for greater democratisation of doctrine.  If Defence dares to think differently about exploiting ideas then it can utilise a wider talent pool and create faster feedback loops.  Many modern organisations are more complex than the military and do this already.  The article firstly shows why doctrine needs to be democratised.  It then looks at two organisations that do it already to discuss the positives and negatives of each approach.

What is doctrine, how is it created, and why is it important?

Doctrine is the written record of how a force wishes to operate.  The British Army Doctrine Primer describes it as ‘the fundamental principles that guide how military forces conduct their actions, and provides military professionals with their body of professional knowledge’.

Doctrine is the product of analysis conducted in centralised doctrine centres such as the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre.  It is separated into four levels: philosophy, principles, practices, and procedures.  Each layer has a distinct purpose which deals with everything from nuclear deterrence to foot drill.  In both peace and war, doctrine is at the very heart of the conceptual component of fighting power.

IN BOTH PEACE AND WAR, DOCTRINE IS THE HEART OF THE CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT OF FIGHTING POWER.

The staff who write doctrine are a mix of specialist officers, generalist staff officers, and Civil Servants.  Defence is increasingly assigning higher quality officers to these jobs, however the positions remain rotational.  This means that individual interests, biases, and other undesirable behaviours, drive the character and development of doctrine.  The core problem, however, is less about those who are charged with writing it and more fundamentally about how corporate knowledge is used.

The problem with centralisation

The reliance of centralised teams acting as the primary source of doctrine disregards the vast pool of divergent thought and experience available to Defence.  This centralisation privileges a small cohort of writers who become critical decision-makers.  One analysis of such centres in 2006 concluded that they ‘increasingly appear to lack foundations of professional principles and theory that would help them discriminate the practical from the impractical’.  A senior doctrine writer made similar, albeit less critical, arguments in 2021 by arguing the doctrine had become too complicated to understand.    By implication this means that the practical and the impractical aspects of corporate knowledge are separated.  The net result is the production of thousands of pages of words that few will ever read in full.  Fewer still will fully grasp the interlocking nature, or notice key changes.

Doctrine is organic

Professor Richard Holmes adds ‘doctrine is not just what is taught, or what is published, but what is believed’.  To Holmes, doctrine is alive and evolutionary.  It is more than the written word and includes what practitioners think doctrine says.  This is best described as ‘espoused [or written and recorded] doctrine’ and ‘theory in use [how forces operate in reality]’.  The gap between the written record and how a force operates is often the evolutionary step needed for future success.  To exploit this, feedback loops need to be standardised, accessible to all, and fast enough to maintain the pace of thinking.

To produce effective doctrine it needs to be managed as an organic process.  Darwin observed that ‘it is not the strongest of the species that survives, it is the one that is the most adaptable to change’.  Much like evolution causes organisms to react to survive, the profession of arms needs to be more adaptive to its environment if it is going to keep pace with adversaries.

…THE PROFESSION OF ARMS NEEDS TO BE MORE ADAPTIVE TO ITS ENVIRONMENT IF IT IS GOING TO KEEP PACE WITH ADVERSARIES.

As an example of the need for faster evolution, David Kilcullen offers an assessment based on dragons (state actors) and snakes (insurgent groups).  His model shows some forces evolving to achieve success whilst others, often with significantly more resources, stagnate and cannot win on the battlefield.  The snakes have been able to find effective ways to fight; their doctrine has moved with more speed and determination.  This friction is well understood with some arguing that ‘success tomorrow relies on disruption today’ but feeling unable to act because of the limitations imposed by centralised structures.  The current system loses ideas because of its restrictive nature.

In 2009 Patrick Little, went further and argued that there was hubris in the British Army which was not changing fast enough.  Similar trends have been identified in the Royal Navy with one writer arguing in 2019 that the organisation lived in a ‘post Cold-War fantasy’.  High level space doctrine was released in 2017 but hasn’t been renewed; this is too long given the speed at which the domain is changing and how thinking has developed.  British doctrine doesn’t appear to be meeting the operational challenges deployed forces face.  Can our doctrine really be considered the best in the world?

Indeed, against a backdrop of new thinking, even the ‘successful’ rewrite of counterinsurgency doctrine during operations in Afghanistan has been questioned as achieving little in reality.  Why, for example, has doctrine not evolved faster to consider ‘hybrid’ warfare, uncrewed vehicles, or to review the baseline assumptions about the manoeuvrist approach?  People are asking these questions; doctrine is not.

Practical problems

Defenders of the orthodoxy point to existing processes with lessons learnt reports (et al) measured in months or years.  Doctrine writers argue that change is complex and takes longer to codify than many accept.  It also takes time to disseminate and apply changes.  Given the life and death implications of this decision-making, it is right that there is scrutiny.  On the other hand, the sheer range of open-source professional military education writing shows the appetite for involvement and interest in making it faster.  If Defence dares to think differently about creating corporate knowledge it can exploit this thinking.

In democratising doctrine, there will need to be a clear point of arbitration and established processes to quickly prove or disprove ideas.  This must merge both the art and science of war, be rank agnostic, and be open to a new audience; a stovepiped centralised structure is best placed to do this.  And that means a system that can manage a variety of inputs while still having central controls to stop questionable ideas from being endorsed.  Modern businesses offer models to follow and point to ways in which doctrine could be democratised.

Wikipedia: The extreme of democratised information
Wikipedia is a free to use online encyclopaedia which anyone can edit.  Its strength is the enormous range of contributors and extensive citations.  Its weakness is that anyone can edit information.  Articles are often changed to alter public perceptions known as hot edits or vandalism.  Whilst there are control measures in place for contentious articles, the information held can be as questionable as the intentions of those who write it.

For Defence, uploading doctrine into a similar online system would allow a community of interest easy access and the ability to suggest changes.  Hyperlinking texts would increase understanding when interweaving the multitude of written material together.  This would expand the community of interest while harnessing relevant knowledge.

Having said that, Wikipedia is at the extreme end of democratised information and a fully open source model is unlikely to work for Defence.

The ‘Remote Manifesto’: A model to follow?

GitLab is a successful multinational software company that has no offices.  It works from a document called the Remote Manifesto.  A military reader would understand it as ‘doctrine’.  GitLab codifies their processes and anyone, anywhere, can access it.  All staff are expected to use the latest ‘doctrine’ when conducting their work and to use the latest procedures.  They are also expected to write it and consider suggestions from outside the company.  All of this is done remotely utilising digital teams.

There are dangers in this approach.  From a security perspective not all doctrine can be open to the public.  Yet, a cross-government community of interest could be defined in order to allow input and a broad range of selected contributors.  This could be flexibly opened to experts when required and closed once input was complete.  Technology allows Defence to control who and when access is granted.

If Wikipedia is the extreme of democratised information, GitLab is the pinnacle of how to evolve complex and interlocking ideas with a high level of assurance.  Their ‘doctrine’ evolves daily.  They exploit the future today.  Because of its ability to evolve quickly their staff are culturally inclined to use it.  They both read and write it.  They are empowered and have ownership.  Their employees are involved and engaged in a way which seems incomprehensible to Defence.

Conclusion

Doctrine is both a written record and a living set of ideas.  Defence can do more to exploit it if it can democratise the processes surrounding it.

Centralised writing cells, however well informed, will never be able to capture the wealth of thinking taking place in the Defence community.  As a result, it is likely that battle-winning ideas will meet staff-created barriers (sometimes called ‘complexity”) or worse, be lost.  Democratisation of doctrine would allow Defence to make this process transparent.  Companies such as GitLab have proved that democratised processes can be effective.  Defence needs to think differently about generating corporate knowledge; but does the organisation have the courage to do so?


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## FJAG (7 Dec 2021)

An interesting article. I tried to float the concept of a Wiki-ized knowledge management system for JAG under the JAGs Comprehensive Information Management Project and received a significant amount of pushback based mostly on the ongoing time required to build the system (and we in fact had funding for three paralegals to manage the content). The expressed issues were 1) data input would come primarily from a small number of radical "posters" who thrive on getting their "knowledge" into the system; and would take an inordinate amount of senior management time to separate the wheat that meets "corporate" approval from the chaff that would litter the system with misleading and even false information. 

I had a second thought while reading this article in that I think the author has a relatively limited concept of what doctrine is or should be.

In my research on the state of the Army at the turn of the century I came across an interesting paper published in the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin by LCol Ian Hope titled "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" (it starts at pg 16. (I think I cited this article elsewhere in the forum some time ago)

Ian makes a good argument that:



> Doctrine is the unifying force of a military. It is more than just principles of warfare: it also involves application, which includes method, structures, procedures and even rules. To view doctrine as “a mindset” is to perceive only its conceptual or cognitive quality: doctrine in its proper form must be much more comprehensive. It has cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components. The cognitive elements are dedicated to the articulation of a particular concept of operations relevant to a specific time and which forms the basis for a common understanding of war. The cognitive elements include the army’s attitude to the higher purposes of operations—their relationship with strategy and national policy—and also the army’s philosophy of command and control. The procedural elements of doctrine guide teaching and practice of the operational concept: this is often presented in field service regulations and includes tactics taught and applied. Doctrine also has an organizational component that ensures that army structures are commensurate with the operational approach. Also, doctrine has an element that is material that considers the proper equipping of an army to conduct operations in accordance with the operational concept (making the most of fielded technologies or driving experimentation in new technologies). Finally, doctrine has a moral (including the psychological) component that is concerned with how best to make soldiers fight, the ethical use of force, and army morale. The moral includes the leadership practices in the army. Doctrine then is multifaceted— cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral: the purpose of each facet is to provide standardization and a common high quality to an army. None of the components can stand alone as a complete basis for doctrine. The components must be to some degree integrated—binding them into a more coherent whole. It is the underlying point of this thesis that the best doctrines in history were those which were the most integrative of all of these factors. With this broad definition the relevance of doctrine in history is more easily understood.



Hope then analyses several examples of doctrine-based armies and makes a strong argument that as of the time of the article 2000-2001 that Canada's Army fails to meet the mark:



> Canadian Army doctrine is now predicated upon an understanding of an attrition-manoeuvre dichotomy that leads to explicit acknowledgement of manoeuvre warfare as a superior style of war. This understanding is independent of Canadian strategic imperatives and current operational realities. The doctrine is not derived from an overarching operational concept that focuses planning to achieve specific strategic aims. Therefore the linkage between strategy and doctrine is tenuous. Furthermore, because manoeuvre warfare doctrine is regarded merely as a conceptual tool, and does not serve as comprehensive doctrine for force management, the linkage between it and other components of the Army’s Strategic Planning Process (ASPP) is also tenuous. Manoeuvre warfare cannot be used for doctrine-based force development or doctrine-based operations planning. Its utility to the Canadian Army is limited. The armies studied above were ‘doctrine-based’: in peacetime they used written doctrine as a link between strategic vision, a coherent operational concept, and tactical combat development, and in war as a link between strategic war plans and tactical actions. The Canadian Army in contrast is ‘capabilities-based’.108 Its organization and equipment reflects the stated requirement for the maintenance of a small multi-purpose and combat capable force. The multi-purpose capability rests within the six combat functions (command, information, manoeuvre, firepower, sustainment, and protection), extant within certain army units that can be task-organized any number of ways to suit the requirements of a specific mission. These are tactical level functions, the assumption being that function of echelons higher than brigade will be fulfilled by Allied armies (namely British, US, or within a multinational division structure).109



The last two decades have not generated much progress and if anything have leaned the Army further into being "capabilities-based" rather than "doctrine based". _Close Engagement_ is put forward by the Army as being "nested within Canada's defence policy _Strong, Secure, Engaged _and the CAF Joint concepts" as the "capstone operating concept to guide the development of the Canadian land forces for the next 10-15 years". It is difficult to discern the integrated cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components that are required by a doctrine within _SSE_ right through to _Close Engagement._ One can argue that funding issues so greatly drive the Army's organizational and material components that it will remain "capabilities based" and will never be able to properly develop or integrate the cognitive, procedural or moral components required to form a true "doctrine based" one.

🍻


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## Brad Sallows (7 Dec 2021)

The main problem with developing and maintaining doctrine is that there aren't enough opportunities to test it.


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## daftandbarmy (7 Dec 2021)

Brad Sallows said:


> The main problem with developing and maintaining doctrine is that there aren't enough opportunities to test it.



Good point.

Although I completed several tours in Northern Ireland, with the relevant work up training of course, I never read or saw anything material entitled 'Counter-Insurgency/ Terrorism Doctrine for Northern Ireland'. It was all simply grouped under the title 'Northern Ireland Training', some of which had nothing to do with shooting people.

The 'doctrine' we used was a living thing and, beyond fairly broad strategic and operational direction, changed continually to keep up with a highly adaptive enemy and ever shifting political landscape. It was continually tested and changed if found wanting.

Good leadership was proactive and sensitive to the needs of the moment and flexed and adapted accordingly. Where it reared its ugly head, bad leadership could generally be described as reactive, inflexible/ rule bound and siloed.


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