# "Chariots on Fire" - IFV SOPs



## ballz

A great article by Maj Cole Petersen which makes one wonder if we need to rethink our mechanized tactics.


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## Infanteer

I think that guy is on to something.


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## dapaterson

I particularly like 



> "hybrid enemy" (which, in fancy buzzword talk, appears to mean anyone with more capability than flipflops and an AK-47)


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## FJAG

A link to the article he quotes is here:

https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf

And some comments on Reddit

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/580s3u/lessons_learned_from_the_russoukrainian_war_pdf/

 :cheers:


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## Infanteer

..and here. Sign up is free.

https://www.tjomo.com/article/17/Wrong_Technology_for_the_Wrong_Tactics_The_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle/


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## Fabius

How to actually best employ the LAV in genenal and specifically on the offensive is an interesting question and I will admit to misgivings about both the currently espoused method in which we treat it like an IFV or even worse an HAPC and also the thought of relegating it to a Zulu harbour.  Obviously my misgivings on the first point are due to doubts about the survivability of the vehicle and its associated infantry section during a battle run onto an enemy defensive position, the doubts about the wisdom of the second point are I think largely due to the severe lack of integral firepower within the current dismounted infantry construct (admittedly this is maybe starting to change… we will see how much).

I think as an interesting comparison for what the offensive doctrine could look like is to look at the doctrine the US Army has developed for the Striker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalions.  Some of this doctrine is found in the US Army pam ATP-3-21.21 SBCT Infantry Battalion dated March 2016, so really quite recent.  (This pam is open source material available via google or various other means)

Overall the takeaway from the SBCT doctrine is I believe that despite the comparative abundance of Brigade, Division and Corp level combat support enablers present in the US Army supporting an SBCT, they firmly do not believe that the Striker Infantry Battalions with their infantry carrier vehicles with 50 cals and 40mm AGLs, 120mm SP mortars and 105mm MGS and dismounted ATGMs have the weight of armour and/or firepower to allow them to act as armoured infantry and utilize what I think I would define as armoured firepower conveying shock action in the same method as their Combined Arms Battalions do.
This is borne out by several specific statements within the above mentioned pam. 

 Firstly, “The Striker vehicle should be used to either provide direct fires on the enemy in support of the infantry or capitalize on the platforms speed and mobility if a covered and concealed axis of attack is identified that the enemy cannot effect. The battalion commander should not assume risk and utilize the striker vehicle as a fighting platform to close the distance on the enemy if exposed to enemy fires” pg 4-4.   To me that statement when paired with the following one “Soldiers should dismount their vehicles before the maximum effective range of the most likely enemy direct fire weapons system on the last know point of enemy detection.” pg 4-12 para 4-67 clearly indicates that the US Army does not believe using the LAV as we do in our combat teams is a great idea due to issues of survivability against peer level direct fire capabilities. Rather they use the vehicles to get their dismounts close but under cover and not exposed to enemy direct fire and or observation and the dismounts take it the rest of the way onto the objective.

However the following two statements also indicate to me that they do not view the relegation of the platform to a zulu hide as the ideal solution either.  “ The Striker Infantry Battalion uses a frontal attack with its infantry while the ICV, MGS and mortars provide support by fire” pg 4-4 and then  “Where possible the SBCT attacking unit uses dismounted avenues of approach with cover and concealment that avoid strong enemy defensive positions. The striker vehicles remain behind their infantry and support their movement by occupying a support by fire position. The unit uses obscurants to conceal its movement with cover and concealment are not available” pg 4-27 Para 4-163.  I think the pam is fairly clear in that they intent to use the RWS stations they do have and the MGS to support the attack but not in an intimate support role like we have adopted. The pam does however indicate that the support by fire position needs to be adopted by a covered and concealed route and that the position cannot engage before the attacking dismounts have come in contact due to concerns about survivability and the impact of losing any of the infantry carrier vehicles.

Given that perspective does the presence of a 25m gun on our LAVs and the added armour and firepower of a squadron of MBTs reduce the risk to our infantry battalions sufficiently to allow us to employ the LAV in the manner of an IFV or HAPC in a heavy armoured brigade context? Good question…

It may be interesting to see if the presence of the 30mm RWS on the 2nd Cavalry Regiments Strikers changes any of the US Army doctrine as another comparison point.


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## Infanteer

Fabius said:
			
		

> However the following two statements also indicate to me that they do not view the relegation of the platform to a zulu hide as the ideal solution either.



...nor should we, if the situation dictates another useful role for the empty carriers.  However, the SBCT doesn't possess main battle tanks, so they need to rely on Stryker-based fires to support the infantry.  If we've got tanks in a firebase, do we need to clutter it up with 25mm fire as well?

The baseline should be dismount in the attack position and then move carriers to a zulu harbour.  If the situation dictates augmenting the firebase or suitable positions for screening a flank or acting as cut-off, then by all means employ some or all of the empty carriers in that fashion.  The commander must weigh the risk of not employing the vehicles in this manner against the risk of losing a vehicle or two, which essentially knocks out the section it was carrying for future tasks as well.


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## ballz

The conversation about whether we should be driving up 50m in front of EN trenches to dismount as brought up by a very astute Adjt (now OC) in our Battalion and my conclusion from that was that there is a very dogmatic belief among most of our officers that the DS solution to all problems is dismounting as close to the trenches as possible. I'm glad to know there are more and more people starting to question this...

I know we were only using WES gear, but for me Maj Petersen's arguments were confirmed on Maple Resolve in the summer... I really didn't ever feel comfortable with any LAVs exposed to any kind of line of site. And it wasn't long after that queezy feeling in my stomach were our WES systems telling us we were being bracketed.


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## Haligonian

The temptation to use the guns is almost unavoidable.

I remain by my stance that a heavy APC would be a great way to go for forces that are designed to fight in conjunction with a MBT.  Perhaps most importantly is that the section carrier is equipped with weapons that are more for self defence, this will keep us from wanting to put them in the line of fire constantly.  The bn equipped with these carriers could still have some kind of mounted direct fire platform but it should be in a bn direct fire support organization rather than part of an infantry section.


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## ballz

Haligonian said:
			
		

> The temptation to use the guns is almost unavoidable.
> 
> I remain by my stance that a heavy APC would be a great way to go for forces that are designed to fight in conjunction with a MBT.  Perhaps most importantly is that the section carrier is equipped with weapons that are more for self defence, this will keep us from wanting to put them in the line of fire constantly.  The bn equipped with these carriers could still have some kind of mounted direct fire platform but it should be in a bn direct fire support organization rather than part of an infantry section.



But, as the author states (probably pretty accurately), we've got what we've got and so we need to learn to use them in the most effective way possible.

We can still use the 25mm cannon without driving it up onto the objective full of troops, keeping the risk lower for both the vehicles and the personnel.


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## Kirkhill

ballz said:
			
		

> But, as the author states (probably pretty accurately), we've got what we've got and so we need to learn to use them in the most effective way possible.
> 
> We can still use the 25mm cannon without driving it up onto the objective full of troops, keeping the risk lower for both the vehicles and the personnel.



What is the range of the 25mm when fired at high elevation and indirectly controlled?


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## Haligonian

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> What is the range of the 25mm when fired at high elevation and indirectly controlled?



It's max range is upwards of 24,000 meters.  We don't shoot it indirectly so I doubt anyone could tell you what its max effective would be in such a role.  Having said that it is not designed in any way to be employed in such a manner.  It's FCS would be useless and at a shell size of 25mm I'm not sure what you could achieve with it firing indirectly....


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## ballz

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> What is the range of the 25mm when fired at high elevation and indirectly controlled?



Not really tracking the follow-on of your question... You didn't think I was inferring we use it for indirect fire, did you?


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## Kirkhill

Actually, I was, ballz.

My thinking is an extension of how the Vickers Guns were used by the Brigade MG Battalions in WW2 and also how the Bofors 40mm of the Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments were used when "bouncing the Rhine" (as described by George Blackburn).  Both were used in sustained fire missions along fixed lines to supply suppressive fire.  Essentially doing the work of mortars.

In the absence of mortars I have often wondered why consideration hasn't been given to massing platoon and company 25mms in defilade and using them to cover the advance of troops on the ground.

Also, given the development of the XM25 with 25mm counter-battery airburst computer rounds, and the extension of the capability to everything from 20mm AAA to 84 mm CG-84s why consideration isn't given to upgrading the guns to firing computer controlled rounds.

Just sayin'.  If I were a youngster with the opportunity at Wainwright I would be looking for an opportunity to try something other than dogma.


Edit:   Some examples of the rounds I am thinking about



> Known as ‘programmable ammunition’, this new technology makes it possible for any larger gun to fire shells that can be programmed to explode with pinpoint accuracy, either before, above or inside a target. Adaptable to several weapon platforms, including 40 mm grenade launchers, 30 mm guns, 120 mm tank ammunition and M-72 rockets, this makes the technology ideal for dealing with a number of different threats, including drones.


  http://soldiersystems.net/2017/09/14/dsei-nammo-introduces-programmable-ammunition/



> As technologies evolve, weaponry needs to keep pace
> and offer cutting-edge capabilities. Programmable
> ammo is just one innovation that is set to revolutionise
> the battlefield for dismounted infantry.
> Built with future requirements in mind, the Carl-Gustaf M4
> is compatible with intelligent sighting systems, and
> prepared for programmable ammo, ensuring your
> forces have advanced technology at their fingertips.


  https://saab.com/globalassets/commercial/land/weapon-systems/support-weapons/carl-gustaf-m4/image-download/carl-gustaf-m4_8pg_brochure_d6.pdf



> XM25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement (CDTE)
> The XM25 is a next-generation, semi-automatic weapon designed for effectiveness against enemies protected by walls, dug into foxholes or hidden in hard-to-reach places.
> 
> The XM25 provides the soldier with a 300 percent to 500 percent increase in hit probability to defeat point, area and defilade targets out to 500 meters. The weapon features revolutionary high-explosive, airburst ammunition programmed by the weapon's target acquisition/fire control system (TA/FC).


  https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/armament-systems/cdte/

I could also cite examples in 30 mm, 35 mm, 40 mm and 57 mm.


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## MJP

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Just sayin'.  If I were a youngster with the opportunity at Wainwright I would be looking for an opportunity to try something other than dogma.



We did it in Afghanistan to test capability and it doesn't work well.  Wind really pushes the rounds around and and it certainly didn't feel like a good beaten zone like a C6 or .50.  

Granted it certainly wasn't done with any kind of scientific rigor but it felt off compared a series of well sited purpose made MG posns.


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## dapaterson

If manufacturer claims held up under scrutiny, we'd have an entirely different military...


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## Infanteer

Problem with the concept (if I recall my ballistics correctly - AGI please correct me!) is that the 25mm Bushmaster has no recoil and is stabilized to the point that there isn't a beaten zone, reducing its value in creating a cone or oval of fire when fired indirectly.


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## MedCorps

ballz said:
			
		

> The conversation about whether we should be driving up 50m in front of EN trenches to dismount as brought up by a very astute Adjt (now OC) in our Battalion and my conclusion from that was that there is a very dogmatic belief among most of our officers that the DS solution to all problems is dismounting as close to the trenches as possible. I'm glad to know there are more and more people starting to question this...



This would be an interesting war fighter study. Take a coy of experienced infantry dug in, take a coy of experienced mech inf conduct an attack using WES (or something better) where you role up right on the position and dismount. Repeat multiple times where you hold the terrain and weather as a constant, but flip up the defenders / attackers. Come up with a constant number range with respect to casualties / kills (both pers and LAVs). Be aware that you might need to do it quite a few times (I think over 30 to develop parametric numbers) before you can find a constant range emerge. If I was to guess I bet by 10-20 times you would have a sound range, even if you had to use a non-parametric data set. Once you have a number range you trust then repeat using different tactics to see if you can beat the constant for the 50 m dismount. 

Only if we have companies of guys sitting around with nothing better to do but advance the art and science of warfare... assuming that this tactic is important to reinforce / dismiss in our doctrine. 

MC


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## Infanteer

MedCorps said:
			
		

> This would be an interesting war fighter study. Take a coy of experienced infantry dug in, take a coy of experienced mech inf conduct an attack using WES (or something better) where you role up right on the position and dismount. Repeat multiple times where you hold the terrain and weather as a constant, but flip up the defenders / attackers. Come up with a constant number range with respect to casualties / kills (both pers and LAVs). Be aware that you might need to do it quite a few times (I think over 30 to develop parametric numbers) before you can find a constant range emerge. If I was to guess I bet by 10-20 times you would have a sound range, even if you had to use a non-parametric data set. Once you have a number range you trust then repeat using different tactics to see if you can beat the constant for the 50 m dismount.
> 
> Only if we have companies of guys sitting around with nothing better to do but advance the art and science of warfare... assuming that this tactic is important to reinforce / dismiss in our doctrine.
> 
> MC



There is scientific rigor to this which lends a lot of credibility to the outcome, but I've seen enough iterations unfold as you described while an OCT on Maple Resolve to feel quite confident in the outcome....


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## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> This would be an interesting war fighter study. Take a coy of experienced infantry dug in, take a coy of experienced mech inf conduct an attack using WES (or something better) where you role up right on the position and dismount. Repeat multiple times where you hold the terrain and weather as a constant, but flip up the defenders / attackers. Come up with a constant number range with respect to casualties / kills (both pers and LAVs). Be aware that you might need to do it quite a few times (I think over 30 to develop parametric numbers) before you can find a constant range emerge. If I was to guess I bet by 10-20 times you would have a sound range, even if you had to use a non-parametric data set. Once you have a number range you trust then repeat using different tactics to see if you can beat the constant for the 50 m dismount.
> 
> Only if we have companies of guys sitting around with nothing better to do but advance the art and science of warfare... assuming that this tactic is important to reinforce / dismiss in our doctrine.
> 
> MC



the '3 to 1 rule of thumb' suggests you'd need a BGp to attack a dug in Coy. Add a Regt of 155mm into the mix while you're at it.


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## Infanteer

...except there is no historical basis or validity to the "three to one" rule.


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## Kirkhill

Interesting comments from MJP and Infanteer.

But a bit confusing for me.  I get that the Bushmaster has a more stable platform than an MG on a tripod and so the beaten zone is likely to be smaller.  But at the same time it is stated that wind pushes the rounds around which, to my mind, would mean a larger beaten zone.  Also, part of the discussion has to include, surely, the elevation of the weapon (over or under 45 degrees (800 mils for the pedants)) and the number of weapons concurrently employed?


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## Colin Parkinson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...except there is no historical basis or validity to the "three to one" rule.



It's quoted often, any idea where it came from?

 did find this https://books.google.ca/books?id=_gl-6GlO_vUC&pg=PA162&lpg=PA162&dq=3+to+1+to+overcome+a+defended+position&source=bl&ots=UceZs7LIWD&sig=v_1MStbrahnbKgmmDRoVBhlJNGY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiM3OTkrpzaAhXjzVQKHQ2fCokQ6AEITDAD#v=onepage&q=3%20to%201%20to%20overcome%20a%20defended%20position&f=false


and this bit
_It seems the 3:1 rule is a pre WWI Prussian infantry doctrine, those guys did heaps of theory an gaming around dynamic as well as prepared battles and were probably to most thorough and experienced military in Europe at the time. So its c. 1900 military rule of thumb. _

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?746807-Force-Ratios-and-the-3-1-Rule-Debate


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## MedCorps

Infanteer said:
			
		

> There is scientific rigor to this which lends a lot of credibility to the outcome, but I've seen enough iterations unfold as you described while an OCT on Maple Resolve to feel quite confident in the outcome....



The problem is that anecdotes do not make a sound data set. 

Would it not be great to say, "so we used to do this 50m dismount thing, but after a comprehensive war fighter study it turns out that was not such a good idea.. it turns out the best way to assault a prepared coy position with a mech inf coy is to XXX if you want to preserve the maximum amount of combat power post attack."

From the medical standpoint it read, wow... they only created the minimum number of casualties to take that important objectives.  Much nicer to have 30 casualties than 150 like the good old days of the 50 m dismount". 

MC


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## ballz

MedCorps said:
			
		

> This would be an interesting war fighter study. Take a coy of experienced infantry dug in, take a coy of experienced mech inf conduct an attack using WES (or something better) where you role up right on the position and dismount. Repeat multiple times where you hold the terrain and weather as a constant, but flip up the defenders / attackers. Come up with a constant number range with respect to casualties / kills (both pers and LAVs). Be aware that you might need to do it quite a few times (I think over 30 to develop parametric numbers) before you can find a constant range emerge. If I was to guess I bet by 10-20 times you would have a sound range, even if you had to use a non-parametric data set. Once you have a number range you trust then repeat using different tactics to see if you can beat the constant for the 50 m dismount.
> 
> Only if we have companies of guys sitting around with nothing better to do but advance the art and science of warfare... assuming that this tactic is important to reinforce / dismiss in our doctrine.
> 
> MC



These absolutely should be tested, quantitatively, as you suggest. But, like you noted in your last sentence, we have too many other important tasks at hand... like doing IBTS stands for the 4th time this year so that you are "ready" when you get posted out prior to your unit assuming the high-readiness task.


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## Infanteer

MedCorps said:
			
		

> The problem is that anecdotes do not make a sound data set.
> 
> Would it not be great to say, "so we used to do this 50m dismount thing, but after a comprehensive war fighter study it turns out that was not such a good idea.. it turns out the best way to assault a prepared coy position with a mech inf coy is to XXX if you want to preserve the maximum amount of combat power post attack."
> 
> From the medical standpoint it read, wow... they only created the minimum number of casualties to take that important objectives.  Much nicer to have 30 casualties than 150 like the good old days of the 50 m dismount".
> 
> MC



...of course it could be useful: I was being somewhat facetious as I believe experience and historical research has given me enough of an idea to know the outcome.  I'm a big believer on OA, and have seen a few popular conceptions burst by proper analysis of battlefield events.

I'd offer, however, that the experiment you described would have difficulty achieving the desired data set as each iteration would quickly introduce new dependent variables.  After every iteration, the attacker and defender will learn a bit and start to alter their tactics ever so slightly based on the ground and the increasing knowledge of what the defender's position looks like.  Even if you swap out new companies for each iteration, your outcome will be exposed to other variables such as commander ability, etc, etc.


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## TangoTwoBravo

There is plenty of useful work for the 25mm cannons firing directly in a defence or offence. They are not suited for indirect fire.

In the defence, as long as you site them so that they are not seeing farther than their effective range (as per doctrine) they can destroy BMPs/BTRs allowing the panzers to kill enemy tanks. Ideally we should have TUA and some form of ALAWS (Javelin/Spike/etc) on a scale of four per company, but the 25mm can do some good work firing directly.


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## Infanteer

Colin P said:
			
		

> It's quoted often, any idea where it came from?



It's probably something drawn from a Lanchester Law.  Problem is that better modelling has shown the problems in the Lanchester equations.

Whenever someone says "you don't have 3 to 1," just ask "3 to 1 what?  People?  Bullets?  Tanks?  Artillery?"


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## daftandbarmy

A bit dated, though topical:


The Ghosts of Omdurman


"What could American soldiers, well satisfied with their superb blitzkrieg through Kuwait and Iraq, possibly learn from Omdurman? ...Simply this-yesterday's solutions, no matter how dramatically executed, rarely address tomorrow's problems."


http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a512304.pdf


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## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It's probably something drawn from a Lanchester Law.  Problem is that better modelling has shown the problems in the Lanchester equations.
> 
> Whenever someone says "you don't have 3 to 1," just ask "3 to 1 what?  People?  Bullets?  Tanks?  Artillery?"



One to fix, one to strike, and one in reserve (of course).


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## Infanteer

So, 3 to 1 in verbs then?  8)


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## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So, 3 to 1 in verbs then?  8)



Well, in that context, "reserve" is a noun.


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## Infanteer

I was thinking "*to be* in reserve."   :Tin-Foil-Hat:


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## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It's probably something drawn from a Lanchester Law.  Problem is that better modelling has shown the problems in the Lanchester equations.
> 
> Whenever someone says "you don't have 3 to 1," just ask "3 to 1 what?  People?  Bullets?  Tanks?  Artillery?"



Well, if you really want to make a statement of intent, it's usually Infantry of course. With bay'nets fixed....


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## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It's probably something drawn from a Lanchester Law.  Problem is that better modelling has shown the problems in the Lanchester equations.
> 
> Whenever someone says "you don't have 3 to 1," just ask "3 to 1 what?  People?  Bullets?  Tanks?  Artillery?"



I did a TDG with my guys the other day and I went bold with my response and pursued a withdrawing en despite force ratios that would not be seen as favorable from the perspective 3:1.  My guys were very concerned about this and were citing the 3:1 rule.  It gave me pause to think but I wanted to make them think about the importance of being bold and opportunistic, and dare I say, dislocating the enemy which makes their strength less relevant.  It's interesting to note as well that I don't think you could find anything in our doctrine explicitly stating that 3:1 should be used, although it's implied in diagrams etc.

Certainly numbers do count.  The question is how much bigger the attacker should be in any particular scenario.  Could 3:1 be a good rule of thumb for the majority of cases, particularly where it is estimated that the enemy is likely to stand and fight?


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## a_majoor

The 3:1 ratio has been around seemingly forever, and is often considered the "minimum" required to successfully prosecute an attack. As a handwave, I think it probably became "conventional wisdom" in the early part of the last century when formations were converting from being "square" to being "triangular" (i.e going from 4 platoons/company to 3 platoons/company; 4 companies/battalion to 3 companies/battalion etc.).

On the other hand, there was a thread here some time ago where Australian experiments were conducted using much greater ratios of firebase to assault. I can't remember if the overall force ratio was still 3:1, but the experiments were almost like WWI era "Bite and Hold" tactics, with the majority of the company forming a firebase and an assaulting force as as small as a reinforced section was actually going in after very limited objectives. Since this was urban combat, I'm not sure how applicable that would be to this argument overall. It also reminds me of some long ago threads where the arguments revolved around the differentiation between mounted infantry, mechanized infantry or going for even more highly coordinated _Panzergrenadier_ type units with the dismounts operating in close coordination with the vehicles (vehicles being essentially mobile fire bases).

Based on some of the comments here, it would almost seem the best weapon for a LAV would actually be a breach loading mortar, allowing it to fire from behind cover or concealment, and providing a useful weight of fire for the advancing infantry (not to mention providing the ability to screen with smoke, provide plunging fire into trenches, between buildings or on rooftop positions). Properly equipped infantry would have man portable ATGM's, and tank support to deal with armour threats and direct fire targets.


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## Colin Parkinson

That might invoke capbadge crossing......

We should have right now at least 2 batteries of 120mm mortars mounted in LAV's. That would be a easy add. You could use the breech loaded mortar as used by the Weisel.


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## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The 3:1 ratio has been around seemingly forever, and is often considered the "minimum" required to successfully prosecute an attack. As a handwave, I think it probably became "conventional wisdom" in the early part of the last century when formations were converting from being "square" to being "triangular" (i.e going from 4 platoons/company to 3 platoons/company; 4 companies/battalion to 3 companies/battalion etc.).
> 
> On the other hand, there was a thread here some time ago where Australian experiments were conducted using much greater ratios of firebase to assault. I can't remember if the overall force ratio was still 3:1, but the experiments were almost like WWI era "Bite and Hold" tactics, with the majority of the company forming a firebase and an assaulting force as as small as a reinforced section was actually going in after very limited objectives. Since this was urban combat, I'm not sure how applicable that would be to this argument overall. It also reminds me of some long ago threads where the arguments revolved around the differentiation between mounted infantry, mechanized infantry or going for even more highly coordinated _Panzergrenadier_ type units with the dismounts operating in close coordination with the vehicles (vehicles being essentially mobile fire bases).
> 
> Based on some of the comments here, it would almost seem the best weapon for a LAV would actually be a breach loading mortar, allowing it to fire from behind cover or concealment, and providing a useful weight of fire for the advancing infantry (not to mention providing the ability to screen with smoke, provide plunging fire into trenches, between buildings or on rooftop positions). Properly equipped infantry would have man portable ATGM's, and tank support to deal with armour threats and direct fire targets.



One Falklands War AAR I attended suggested that between five and seven (attackers) to one (defender) was more likely the right solution, which was apparently achieved through concentration of collective force at specific times and places. 

2 PARA clearly wasn't paying attention at Goose Green, of course, but they've always been a bunch of cowboys.  ;D


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## Haligonian

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The 3:1 ratio has been around seemingly forever, and is often considered the "minimum" required to successfully prosecute an attack. As a handwave, I think it probably became "conventional wisdom" in the early part of the last century when formations were converting from being "square" to being "triangular" (i.e going from 4 platoons/company to 3 platoons/company; 4 companies/battalion to 3 companies/battalion etc.).
> 
> On the other hand, there was a thread here some time ago where Australian experiments were conducted using much greater ratios of firebase to assault. I can't remember if the overall force ratio was still 3:1, but the experiments were almost like WWI era "Bite and Hold" tactics, with the majority of the company forming a firebase and an assaulting force as as small as a reinforced section was actually going in after very limited objectives. Since this was urban combat, I'm not sure how applicable that would be to this argument overall. It also reminds me of some long ago threads where the arguments revolved around the differentiation between mounted infantry, mechanized infantry or going for even more highly coordinated _Panzergrenadier_ type units with the dismounts operating in close coordination with the vehicles (vehicles being essentially mobile fire bases).
> 
> Based on some of the comments here, it would almost seem the best weapon for a LAV would actually be a breach loading mortar, allowing it to fire from behind cover or concealment, and providing a useful weight of fire for the advancing infantry (not to mention providing the ability to screen with smoke, provide plunging fire into trenches, between buildings or on rooftop positions). Properly equipped infantry would have man portable ATGM's, and tank support to deal with armour threats and direct fire targets.



That was Killcullen referring to a number of Coy attacks he did wearing Miles while an instructor at the School of Infantry in Britain.  He experienced something similar later on a two way range on operations in East Timor.  Brendan McBreen (USMC) noted something similar in a Gazette article (Suppression is the Critical Infantry Task) based on a number of Miles section attacks.  Most important is the experience of Rommel as laid out in Infantry Attacks where he used most of his force in support by fire to allow for a small assault element to penetrate and then be exploited by the remainder of the force. 



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> One Falklands War AAR I attended suggested that between five and seven (attackers) to one (defender) was more likely the right solution, which was apparently achieved through concentration of collective force at specific times and places.
> 
> 2 PARA clearly wasn't paying attention at Goose Green, of course, but they've always been a bunch of cowboys.  ;D



This is part of the problem.  Is it 5 - 7 people on the assault, in the firebase, or split between them?  Does this apply when we're talking about tanks and other AFV's as well?  How does fires assets effect this ratio?


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## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> This is part of the problem.  Is it 5 - 7 people on the assault, in the firebase, or split between them?  Does this apply when we're talking about tanks and other AFV's as well?  How does fires assets effect this ratio?



In the 'gutter fight' that is the lot of the Infantry, fire bases can become assault sections at any time (and vice versa) because, if you really have to 'take that hill', failure is not an option during the assault. So dividing it into neat little silos like 'fire base' and 'assault troops' is meaningless.


----------



## Haligonian

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In the 'gutter fight' that is the lot of the Infantry, fire bases can become assault sections at any time (and vice versa) because, if you really have to 'take that hill', failure is not an option during the assault. So dividing it into neat little silos like 'fire base' and 'assault troops' is meaningless.



My point is that saying we need a ratio of 5-7 attackers to every one defender doesn't really help me plan to best employ my force when I have a variety of assets to use and different ways of employing them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> My point is that saying we need a ratio of 5-7 attackers to every one defender doesn't really help me plan to best employ my force when I have a variety of assets to use and different ways of employing them.



Well, if it's Parachute Regiment troops, you can plan on 1:3 at least then


----------



## Haligonian

A good blog here that discusses qualitative assessments of history that of course includes military history.  Specifically this thread discusses the 3-1 rule and for the most part debunks it.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/tag/3-1-rule/


----------



## pbi

ballz said:
			
		

> Not really tracking the follow-on of your question... You didn't think I was inferring we use it for indirect fire, did you?



You might want to ask the Canadians who fought in Italy about that one. The Germans taught them all about the deadly effects of plunging HMG fire, from guns which were very difficult to spot because they were dug down in defilade. 25mm falling on unprotected troops, HQ or CSS units, or gunners in battery positions, would probably still have the same effect it did back then.

If I recall correctly, this is why the FN MAG and the C6 were originally fitted with mortar sights, but you don't strictly need those sights to do IF with an HMG. Back in the days of the AVGP, I can recall training for IF in the defence, by marking inside the turret rings and adjusting onto identifiable features. I'm not a LAV guy but I bet a smart MCpl could figure it out.


----------



## pbi

Thucydides said:
			
		

> On the other hand, there was a thread here some time ago where Australian experiments were conducted using much greater ratios of firebase to assault. I can't remember if the overall force ratio was still 3:1, but the experiments were almost like WWI era "Bite and Hold" tactics, with the majority of the company forming a firebase and an assaulting force as as small as a reinforced section was actually going in after very limited objectives. ...



Rommel talks about doing something very much like this, in his book "Infantry Attacks". He describes his experiences in a Jager regiment in WWI. In particular, he relates an assault on a very strong Italian alpine position at Cimolais, which he achieved with his battalion against a dug-in and well-prepared enemy battalion. He did it by massing his machine guns (and some light mountain guns) to concentrate on a single key part of the Italian position. Once that was broken, he was able to use it to unlock the rest of the Italian position and drive them out.

One point he makes is that his LMGs were firing at their extreme range, and at first he thought they might not do much good. What he found was that the psychological effect of the rounds cracking overhead and smacking into the dirt still suppressed the enemy.

He didn't have three to one in a textbook sense, but he assessed that he didn't need it. He struck at the weak point, and then the odds began to change in his favour, so that it was never 1:1 at the point of assault.


----------



## ballz

pbi said:
			
		

> You might want to ask the Canadians who fought in Italy about that one. The Germans taught them all about the deadly effects of plunging HMG fire, from guns which were very difficult to spot because they were dug down in defilade. 25mm falling on unprotected troops, HQ or CSS units, or gunners in battery positions, would probably still have the same effect it did back then.
> 
> If I recall correctly, this is why the FN MAG and the C6 were originally fitted with mortar sights, but you don't strictly need those sights to do IF with an HMG. Back in the days of the AVGP, I can recall training for IF in the defence, by marking inside the turret rings and adjusting onto identifiable features. I'm not a LAV guy but I bet a smart MCpl could figure it out.



Not doubting the ability to use machine guns in such a way, we have an SF kit for a reason. For the 25mm, I just don't think the physics are on the side of using it indirectly with much success with what we currently have. It would definitely require different ammo (low-velocity), etc. The cannon has a muzzle of velocity of ~1100m/s, the trajectory is pretty darn flat as a result. Those rounds are well outside of an infantry company's fight before they come back down. The AVGP had a heavier round coming out at less than half that speed, so the trajectory wouldn't even be comparable.

Anyway, my point about "other ways" was more along the lines of using them in a fire base or multiple firing positions, for cut-offs, etc.


----------



## tomahawk6

Good read.I guess the difference would be the terrain.If you are in a high threat environment from enemy ATW speed and overwatch are essential.LAV's would be fine in a low threat environment.Most of my experience is light infantry with mobility from helicopter or parachute then you are footmobile.I read the reports of Israeli armor having a tough go the last war they had.I think in the next war they will use attack helos with their armor to suppress the infantry and ATW threat I know I would.They have an aversion to casualties which might preclude infantry moving ahead of the armor. If there is a follow on to Bradley I wonder if we took an Abrams and made it a squad carrier with something like a 25mm gun and maybe eternally mounted anti tank missiles ? We know that would fit into a C17.


----------



## tomahawk6

After reading about namer it looks great but its based on the Merkava which we don't have, namer is 60t and the Abrams is 70t but if you remove the 120mm gun I would like an Abrams version better.We have spares for that.I don't think you would need more than 250 abrams IFV's.Just a guess.


----------



## Infanteer

I wonder how significant the redesign would be to mount the engine in the front.


----------



## Jarnhamar

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> After reading about namer it looks great



Agreed.


----------



## Haligonian

Namer is one of the finest systems going.  I actually wrote a paper for my masters on the requirement for a HAPC over the continued use of IFVs.


----------



## a_majoor

While the Namer is nice, I would suggest that when you are coming to the dismount point you need some bone crushing firepower to suppress the enemy and assist the dismounts.

That being the case, the Merkava 1 is actually much better. It has room for a dismount section in the back, carries a 105mm to deal with bunkers, hard points and AFV's which might have been missed (a 105mm at point blank range will ruin anyone's day). It also has a 60mm breech loading mortar, two or 3x7.62mm GPMG's and often a .50 HMG mounted over the barrel of the main gun. The ability to provide massive fire support to the dismounting infantry also provides more freedom for the commander to deploy tanks, artillery and ATGM's outside of the direct assault. While no solution is 100%, a heavily armoured battle taxi like the Namer or Achzarit gets you there, but provides limited help at the actual dismount or assault.


----------



## Jarnhamar

[quote author=Haligonian] .  I actually wrote a paper for my masters on the requirement for a HAPC over the continued use of IFVs. 
[/quote]

Crap deleted a post instead of editing. 

Basically asked how come?


----------



## GR66

No arguments on the tactical benefits of the Namer or Merkava I on the battlefield (although my understanding of the Merkava's troop carrying capability is that it's designed/meant for taking troops on board for short tactical advances rather than acting as a true APC), but are they practical for an expeditionary army like Canada's?

At 60+ tons we can only deliver one at a time on a C-17, so realistically we're looking at deployment by ship in order to deliver any meaningful sized force.  Then being a heavy tracked vehicle we'd need tank transporters/trains to move them from the (possibly distant) safe port to the front.

I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?

I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.

Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:
			
		

> . . .
> I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?
> 
> I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.
> 
> Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.



That truly is the question.

At the moment we are involved in a trip wire tasking to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics. The Russians have heavy mech forces capabilities and therefore our force there should be capable of defending against any Russian activities up to and including heavy mech forces. Under the old rule of "you don't bring a knife to a gun fight" anything less would not be a credible deterrent.

This reminds me of a rather interesting seminar I attended in Germany shortly after the Baltic states became Partners for Peace but before full NATO membership. One of our guest speakers was a young Russian diplomat who had been thrown in as a substitute for the Russian ambassador at the last minute. During question period he was asked as to what Russia's response would be to the Baltics being given full NATO membership. His terse response was "The tanks will role."  :threat: To say the least, we were somewhat taken aback by this blatant statement.

Somehow our deployment in the Baltics right now makes me think of "C" Force and how effective it was in deterring the Japanese attack on Hong Kong in 1941.

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

Totally different situation.  C Force never had GBA+ training.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Totally different situation.  C Force never had GBA+ training.



Neither have the Russians. ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While the Namer is nice, I would suggest that when you are coming to the dismount point you need some bone crushing firepower to suppress the enemy and assist the dismounts.
> 
> That being the case, the Merkava 1 is actually much better. It has room for a dismount section in the back, carries a 105mm to deal with bunkers, hard points and AFV's which might have been missed (a 105mm at point blank range will ruin anyone's day). It also has a 60mm breech loading mortar, two or 3x7.62mm GPMG's and often a .50 HMG mounted over the barrel of the main gun. The ability to provide massive fire support to the dismounting infantry also provides more freedom for the commander to deploy tanks, artillery and ATGM's outside of the direct assault. While no solution is 100%, a heavily armoured battle taxi like the Namer or Achzarit gets you there, but provides limited help at the actual dismount or assault.



I talked to an Israeli Officer once upon a time who mentioned that the space in the back of the Merkava is actually for ammo. The Golan Heights defensive battle during the '73 war convinced them they needed more on board storage for bullets.

The other key determining factor for Israeli armour is survivability of the crew, within the context of a defensive battle for national survival, hence the reason the Namur is so huge and the Merkava has the engine in the front etc.

I think this topic has been done to death in other sections of this forum but, as seen on comments on another page, if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ... if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.



Exactly.  Never fight a war in Gagetown.  Clearly, we should just use New Brunswick as a buffer to absorb the enemy before they reach Quebec.


----------



## Haligonian

GR66 said:
			
		

> Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.



This is it.

I honestly argued the paper from the reverse perspective though by starting at the tactical level and assuming we wanted the ability to operate in conventional mechanized operations as part of the main force.  The argument sounds something like this (without reviewing the paper):  LAV is too light and is likely to result in massive casualties as sections are destroyed while mounted so we need something with tank like protection to accompany tanks.  It should also have tank like mobility.  The IFV as a concept puts an infantry carrier in the wrong place on the battlefield by virtue of its armament.  People are going to fight the vehicles and they will be subsequently destroyed as any light vehicle involved in the direct fire fight will be.  Even if the section is mounted at the time the section is likely to become irrelevant as they will have lost their tpt to keep up with the mobile fight.  We do combined arms, so, we should let tanks worry about the mounted combat and allow infantry to focus on the dismounted.  As part of this the trg requirements to keep mechanized infantry competent in crew skills while also maintaining dismounted skill sets (and now, potentially, a full suite of cbt sp skills as well) is too large and results in us being not sufficiently good at either.  I also traced the IFV development lineage to show that it is a concept uniquely suited to the Cold War defence of western Europe scenario where an opportunity to put additional kinetic energy penetrators and ATGMs on the battlefield to deal with the mass of the Warsaw Pact was a decisive factor over any specific operational requirement of the infantry.


----------



## Haligonian

GR66 said:
			
		

> No arguments on the tactical benefits of the Namer or Merkava I on the battlefield (although my understanding of the Merkava's troop carrying capability is that it's designed/meant for taking troops on board for short tactical advances rather than acting as a true APC), but are they practical for an expeditionary army like Canada's?
> 
> At 60+ tons we can only deliver one at a time on a C-17, so realistically we're looking at deployment by ship in order to deliver any meaningful sized force.  Then being a heavy tracked vehicle we'd need tank transporters/trains to move them from the (possibly distant) safe port to the front.
> 
> I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?
> 
> I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.
> 
> Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.



I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> This is it.
> 
> I honestly argued the paper from the reverse perspective though by starting at the tactical level and assuming we wanted the ability to operate in conventional mechanized operations as part of the main force.  The argument sounds something like this (without reviewing the paper):  LAV is too light and is likely to result in massive casualties as sections are destroyed while mounted so we need something with tank like protection to accompany tanks.  It should also have tank like mobility.  The IFV as a concept puts an infantry carrier in the wrong place on the battlefield by virtue of its armament.  People are going to fight the vehicles and they will be subsequently destroyed as any light vehicle involved in the direct fire fight will be.  Even if the section is mounted at the time the section is likely to become irrelevant as they will have lost their tpt to keep up with the mobile fight.  We do combined arms, so, we should let tanks worry about the mounted combat and allow infantry to focus on the dismounted.  As part of this the trg requirements to keep mechanized infantry competent in crew skills while also maintaining dismounted skill sets (and now, potentially, a full suite of cbt sp skills as well) is too large and results in us being not sufficiently good at either.  I also traced the IFV development lineage to show that it is a concept uniquely suited to the Cold War defence of western Europe scenario where an opportunity to put additional kinetic energy penetrators and ATGMs on the battlefield to deal with the mass of the Warsaw Pact was a decisive factor over any specific operational requirement of the infantry.



The IFV concept, developed by those pesky Russians (and copied by the Germans with the Marder), reflects an atavistic 'fight to the death' philosophy - connected to national survival - that we in the Western World just don't get.

Regardless, if the Infantry can't keep up with the tanks, you're doing the enemy's job for them and we won't have any tanks left. Or much Infantry either.


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!



The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.
> 
> Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....



Gets me back to my days as the Unit Emplaning Officer for 2 RCHA as part of the ACE Mobile Force (L) and working around the edges of the ill fated CAST Brigade Group. We couldn't do it then with much lighter forces.

Makes one wonder why the Navy isn't investing in RORO LMSRs. Now that would be a Navy Reserve function well worth having.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4600&tid=500&ct=4

Note the ships ability to support humanitarian missions. Should make it desirable for even a Liberal government. ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## GR66

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!
> 
> Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.



This is the point I take issue with.  What military sense does it make to design your force structure to suit the kind of deployments you'd LIKE to make?  I guess it's OK when Canada's involvement in an operation has as much to do with showing political support for a particular operation rather than contribution our being a truly essential part of the military force.  What happens though when an enemy inevitably does something which requires a response which doesn't allow for a leisurely deployment to a safe disembarkation point in a mature theater?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....



This  :nod:


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.
> 
> Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....



Because, in Canada, we don't actually have a Defence Policy, so much as we have a Defence Theatre Policy.

It is all, literally, for show....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The LAV 3 is likely the heaviest vehicle to succeed in places like Mali and generally well suited for that style of warfare, the French who been in Africa for centuries, have a whole series of light wheeled armour for those conflicts. They also have heavy armour and IFV's for fighting more traditional warfare. I have always been an advocate for Canada to have a light and heavy brigade and the proper equipment for both. We have zero idea where we will be fighting next and have always been since 1870 a expeditionary force, with a semi-permanent overseas deployment in the Cold war.


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I talked to an Israeli Officer once upon a time who mentioned that the space in the back of the Merkava is actually for ammo. The Golan Heights defensive battle during the '73 war convinced them they needed more on board storage for bullets.
> 
> The other key determining factor for Israeli armour is survivability of the crew, within the context of a defensive battle for national survival, hence the reason the Namur is so huge and the Merkava has the engine in the front etc.
> 
> I think this topic has been done to death in other sections of this forum but, as seen on comments on another page, if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.



Fully agree. The Merkava 1 can carry up to _80_ rounds of 105mm ammunition if the rear is used as the ammo stowage area, but it can also be cleared of the ammo racks for an 8 man section or several litter born casualties. The Merkava is actually a very extreme example, but a similar philosophy can be found in a CV9040 (shooting in the attack with a 40mm canon overcomes everything below a MBT), or the German PUMA with the "C" up armour package (roughly equal to a Leopard 1) or the new German Lynx, which improves on the PUMA concept.

But as noted, the true answer lies in discovering "what is the purpose of the Canadian Forces", which will involve a full court press on all the DIME (Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic) fronts. Direct assault on a heavily defended position is a possibility, and HAPC's are the tool to use in that situation, but is assaulting dug in need peer enemies likely? Do we have the manpower and resources to support such actions? If I was looking into a crystal ball, I'd actually say we should be looking very seriously at naval warfare, with secondary considerations for amphibious operations, cyber and space in support of the Navy. Troops splashing ashore will need very different tools than 60 ton HAPC's, and deployments to failed states and countering insurgent movements also need different tools.

Should we really be looking at the USMC's new Amphibious Combat Vehicle?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Perhaps a specialist squadron within the Tank units for HPC's and Assault vehicles. After all with the size of our Combat troops, we will not need many. Perhaps a Namer type vehicle based on the Leopard II chassis, I suspect it would sell well and limit the logistical chain.


----------



## a_majoor

The big problem with "specialist" groupings is our entire force is essentially the size of most "specialized" forces in other militaries. We are already at the point that  we consume a large percentage of our resources maintaining "boutique" capabilities. A fairly easy to understand example is replacing over 1400+ M-113's with a hodge podge of incomparable LAV variants (Bison, Coyote, LAVIII and now LAV 6) and making up the deficit with T-LAV's, G-wagons and now TAPV's. While initially more expensive, the unit costs and O&M savings of buying 1400 LAV 3 chassis to do all of those things would have saved tons of money, training and other resources over the years....

The big problem with the LAV as we have it now is it is not very flexible, and as noted in the article which kicked off the thread, not being used in ways which are conducive to success. Even the evolution to bigger and heavier LAV 6.0 simply restricts mobility and reduces the ability of the commander to use speed  or manoeuvre to displace the enemy as an alternative to direct assault. Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.

I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.


----------



## FJAG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> . . . Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.
> 
> I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.



None of us do although that doesn't stop us from developing our own favourite tables of organization and equipment at the drop of the hat.

I agree that "barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding", we won't change in any meaningful way. Afghanistan was a huge event for us and, while not catastrophic and while it brought about some significant changes, it failed entirely in bringing about the complete rebuilding that we so desperately need.

I don't blame politicians for this. They're not experts in the military nor even in external affairs. I blame the military leadership which so far has failed entirely in coming forward with any viable alternatives to put before the politicians to restructure and equip the Forces for future roles (whether within existing budgets or expanded ones) What should be clearly obvious is that we have no continental enemies (We haven't fought with the US since 1814 [or that squabble in the 1860s]) so we should be configured for expeditionary expeditions on other continents with our most likely enemies and in cooperation with our most likely allies. We aren't and haven't been for many decades notwithstanding that we have operated in an allied environment. 

I've said it before and will say it again: The CF needs to be rebuilt from the ground up (and not just fine tuned) before the next catastrophic event.

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The chances of the military being fundamentally changed for the better without a major conflict driving that change is almost zero. A change for the worst is quite possible. Going back to the LAV, my armchairing tells me that the LAV 3 is really the biggest and heaviest a wheeled AFV can practical be. Anything heavier needs to be tracked. The IFV idea has hit a wall, to make them tough enough to survive and take on all but MBT's, you must sacrifice troop carrying ability. One option is to go with a common chassis with a mix of HPC and IFV's (and SPG) working together to support the tanks. Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores. Literally you could build the HPC,IFV,SPG all on the Leo II chassis, this gives you lots of room, power to work with, plus logistics is eased. 

The light Brigade is all based around the LAV 3, sacrificing some protection for speed, range and mobility. SPG's would be automatic 120mm mortars, IFV version would be what we have now and a Styker type LAV for troops and kit. alos perhaps some armed with the 90mm Cockerill gun to provide a means to give DF support verses hardpoints. Perhaps fit out IFV versions with ATGM's as well.  

Both brigades have different tasks and training focuses. A prolonged deployment may for a temporary change in training for one group to support the other.


----------



## a_majoor

> Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores.



I'm a bit unclear, here. Are you talking about having something like "escort" IFV's to help shepherd and shoot in the HAPC's? While in technical terms this isn't very difficult (A platoon of LAV 6.0 in a company sized unit of Stryker's or turret less LAV hulls) there may be a few organizational and operational issues.

I'm starting to think IFV's of the LAV variety should not be in Combat Teams at all, but be the main mounts of "Cavalry" or "Mounted Rifles" type units. They would have the speed and mobility to turn flanks, set up blocks or do a multitude of other tasks while the "heavy" unit rumbles forward with tanks and HAPC's. The "Cavalry" would need a portion of the force armed with ATGM's and mortars, but going back to the 1980's era Mechanized Infantry Battalion, we could arrange for a mounted Mortar Troop and a Mounted ATGM Troop in the "Support Squadron". The on board firepower of IFV's should suffice for flanking, screening and similar roles. and the addition of organic mortars and ATGM's in direct support (not to mention the flexibility offered by modern weapons with their much greater range, precision and ability to accept off board sensor information) should allow the commander to shape his battle or break contact if he is engaged on unfavourable terms. Obviously, different models could be used as well, but this would provide for a real role taking advantage of the LAV's performance and firepower attributes, as opposed to hugely expensive and vulnerable not quite battle taxies.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Yes "escort" or in the support squadron/platoon. what I am seeing is that the size of the vehicle grows in order to support a full section and a useful turret, add in the weight and mobility penalty that comes with it, having some dedicated IFV's with minimal troop room makes for a smaller, lighter vehicle, meaning less internal volume to protect. The HPC sacrifice firepower for internal volume while maintaining protection and mobility and keeping size manageable. the IFV's means the tanks don't have to necessarily dedicate themselves to HPC protection.


----------



## dapaterson

The way things are unfolding with Saudia Arabia, the CAF may just end up with a heck of a lot more LAVs... and a big bump in defence spending to pay for them to boot...


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The way things are unfolding with Saudia Arabia, the CAF may just end up with a heck of a lot more LAVs... and a big bump in defence spending to pay for them to boot...



That's exactly how the UK managed to upgrade to Chally 2 

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/iran-sues-mod-firm-over-the-shahs-tanks-9101713.html


----------



## Haligonian

A concept to take a look at here might be the UK's STRIKE Brigade.

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201709_newsbrief_37.4_owen_final.pdf

You can find more on it here.

https://uklandpower.com/
https://wavellroom.com/

The Brits are looking at what the French achieved in Mali as a potential base for a new Brigade construct that is supposed to be "an enabler for Division maneuver" while at the same time being able to perform in dispersed son of Mali type operations.  In a lot of ways it seems like a bit of a Frankenstein monster that is to make the best of a bad situation.  The use of the tracked AJAX in conjunction with the forthcoming wheeled mech infantry combat vehicle seems odd for a concept that is hanging it's hat on the ability of its wheeled fleet to force project rapidly.  The AJAX is being seen as both a reconnaissance platform and potentially a medium tank which is concerning. The doctrine for the concept/formation is not yet defined so in some ways it is probably whatever you want it to be.  As the author of the article notes, infantry mass has been key in most modern conflicts and this structure gives them protected mobility.  The question is whether increased mobility will be able to compensate for reduced protection when fighting a peer opponent.

A more aggressive new approach is what some folks in the US is proposing as the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Strike Group (RSSG).  An interesting take but well out of our means.  Some want the British Strike to be similar to this but in a lot of ways they are quite different.  The Strike Bde will contain a large amount of infantry while the RSSG uses cbt vehs to strike or to enable strike via its impressive array of organic fires.  They won't be doing much assaulting or digging.  You can read on the RSSG here, http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/rsggeneralpublic.pdf

Either way our allies are looking at new organisations to fight while we're still dismounting on the objective with a light vehicle in a square cbt tm construct.  It maybe time to accept that maybe we shouldn't be operating as part of the cutting edge against peer adversary.  We could likely create a formation tailored to follow and support heavier formations or to operate on the flanks as a security organisation.  Has this been discussed before....  :


----------



## Infanteer

Sticking with the theme of the thread, the French experience in Mali was based upon a fleet of aging vehicles that were pushed to the max.  However, the weight classes of these vehicles is telling:
AMX-10RC: 15 metric tons (mton - 33k lbs)
ERC-90: 8.3 mton (18k lbs)
VAB: 13.8 mton (30k lbs)

The real pig was their new VBCI, which tips the scales at 25.6 mton (56k lbs).

So, you have a true middle weight force that was able to project into Africa and, for all intents and purposes, run a successful expeditionary operation on a shoestring.  It was a perfect middle-weight force, with enough capability to overpower an irregular foe, yet not so heavy that it stresses sustainment, taxes local infrastructure, and slows deployment time down due to movement capacity.  However, with the VBCI and the Jaguar (replacement for the AMX-10RC and ERC-90), the French force will go from a 30k lbs force to a 55k lbs force.  Implications for deployability and sustainability should be evident.

In the meantime Canada's mid-weight force got heavier, with the LAV III (16.9 mton - 37k lbs - weighing more than any of the French legacy vehicles) upgraded to the LAV 6.0, coming it at a whopping 28 mton (62k lbs).  The US Stryker, which was supposed to deliver (but failed) global rapid deployability, weights in at 18 mton (39k lbs).  The British Strike project is in the worst shape as it is built around the Ajax, which comes in at 38 - 42 mton (83k - 92k lbs), but at least it has tracks.

At the other end of the spectrum, the HAPC's discussed in the original article come in, for the Israeli Namer, at 60 mton (132k lbs) and for the Russian T-15, 48 mton (105k lbs - Russian vehicles have always been smaller).  So, the LAV 6.0's 62k lbs is only half of the Namer and 60% of the T-15, and how much of that weight is dedicated to a 25mm manned turret?

This is all "back-of-the-napkin" work, but it seems that a family of vehicles in the 9-11 mton range (20k-25k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a agile mid-weight force that could project quickly and have enough of a balance of firepower, protection, and mobility to be of use in a theater with irregular threats or in certain tactical situations in a theater with a regular adversary.  A family of vehicles in the 50-60 mton (110k-132k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a heavy, world-beating force that could possess enough firepower, mobility, and projection to deal with any regular threat.  Instead, most (all?) Western countries are going to vehicles that are in the awkward middle: too heavy to be a true "medium-weight" force and too light to be a true "heavy-force" for close combat.  "Flabby-medium weight" vehicles seem to be the _prise du jour_.

The so what?  Canada has got its 62k lb bohunk, so we need to figure out how to use it as it isn't "medium-weight" and it isn't "heavy."  As Thucydides and Haligonian mentioned above, looking into a new concept would probably be useful.  "Mounted Rifles" (or whatever), which are light-heavyweights that don't accompany the tanks, but have enough firepower, mobility, and protection to hang around the big leagues in a prescribed fashion.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sticking with the theme of the thread, the French experience in Mali was based upon a fleet of aging vehicles that were pushed to the max.  However, the weight classes of these vehicles is telling:
> AMX-10RC: 15 metric tons (mton - 33k lbs)
> ERC-90: 8.3 mton (18k lbs)
> VAB: 13.8 mton (30k lbs)
> 
> The real pig was their new VBCI, which tips the scales at 25.6 mton (56k lbs).
> 
> So, you have a true middle weight force that was able to project into Africa and, for all intents and purposes, run a successful expeditionary operation on a shoestring.  It was a perfect middle-weight force, with enough capability to overpower an irregular foe, yet not so heavy that it stresses sustainment, taxes local infrastructure, and slows deployment time down due to movement capacity.  However, with the VBCI and the Jaguar (replacement for the AMX-10RC and ERC-90), the French force will go from a 30k lbs force to a 55k lbs force.  Implications for deployability and sustainability should be evident.
> 
> In the meantime Canada's mid-weight force got heavier, with the LAV III (16.9 mton - 37k lbs - weighing more than any of the French legacy vehicles) upgraded to the LAV 6.0, coming it at a whopping 28 mton (62k lbs).  The US Stryker, which was supposed to deliver (but failed) global rapid deployability, weights in at 18 mton (39k lbs).  The British Strike project is in the worst shape as it is built around the Ajax, which comes in at 38 - 42 mton (83k - 92k lbs), but at least it has tracks.
> 
> At the other end of the spectrum, the HAPC's discussed in the original article come in, for the Israeli Namer, at 60 mton (132k lbs) and for the Russian T-15, 48 mton (105k lbs - Russian vehicles have always been smaller).  So, the LAV 6.0's 62k lbs is only half of the Namer and 60% of the T-15, and how much of that weight is dedicated to a 25mm manned turret?
> 
> This is all "back-of-the-napkin" work, but it seems that a family of vehicles in the 9-11 mton range (20k-25k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a agile mid-weight force that could project quickly and have enough of a balance of firepower, protection, and mobility to be of use in a theater with irregular threats or in certain tactical situations in a theater with a regular adversary.  A family of vehicles in the 50-60 mton (110k-132k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a heavy, world-beating force that could possess enough firepower, mobility, and projection to deal with any regular threat.  Instead, most (all?) Western countries are going to vehicles that are in the awkward middle: too heavy to be a true "medium-weight" force and too light to be a true "heavy-force" for close combat.  "Flabby-medium weight" vehicles seem to be the _prise du jour_.
> 
> The so what?  Canada has got its 62k lb bohunk, so we need to figure out how to use it as it isn't "medium-weight" and it isn't "heavy."  As Thucydides and Haligonian mentioned above, looking into a new concept would probably be useful.  "Mounted Rifles" (or whatever), which are light-heavyweights that don't accompany the tanks, but have enough firepower, mobility, and protection to hang around the big leagues in a prescribed fashion.



Luckily we have the TAPV to close the dreaded 'tinker toy' gap


----------



## a_majoor

If we are thinking of larger, heavier vehicles (but not _too_ large and heavy) I would put in a word for the USMC's ACV. At @ 30,000 kg it is comparable to the LAV 6.0, but offers the ability to conduct amphibious operations, which is a capability we do not currently possess. The ability to cross rivers, lakes and other water obstacles would seem to be a no brainer (certainly one of the hard won lessons of the Netherlands campaign, and a major weakness during the Cold War, when we would have had to cross a landscape cut with innumerable rivers and canals....).

Why not ask for capabilities that would provide more flexibility and options? The firepower is more comparable to an APC (currently .50 HMG/40mm Grenade launcher), but no doubt a stabilized RWS will eventually be offered. There is no guarantee that we won't be facing water obstacles in some future operation (regardless of where it is or what intensity the operation is at). On a positive note, the hull is large and roomy enough to support innumerable variants if desired, and assuming anyone were to seriously consider this option, we could actually get a buy in with the USMC, get a long production run and have considerable economy of scale savings as well.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

A good discussion.

I think that our LAV III was, either by sheer dumb luck or cagey design, well suited for the operations it was sent on. I'm not sure it needs the turret, but it does make a good package for COIN/Stability Operations. I think that it, or indeed the LAV 6, can work in high intensity operations if we are smart. Infantry should not be leading mounted against a conventional threat. Our doctrine had that in the Cold War - no reason to change it. Our Leopards should be leading the way and we should not be assaulting until the enemy has been well and truly neutralized. Now, I think that M113s with RWS would work well enough for high-intensity operations. I note, though, that the Israelis did indeed adopt vehicles like the Namer due to in part to the vulnerability of the M113s in the Lebanon operations.

The French experience in Mali is truly fascinating. I think that we can get into trouble by talking about "expeditionary operations." Of course we are going to conduct expeditionary operations. That doesn't mean we have to be C130 light. While some vehicles were flown in, even the medium weight French force in 2014 had much of its heavier elements deploy by ship and then overland. While their agility was outstanding, we should not forget that they already had troops in the area. If Canada were to participate in something similar I think that we would find our LAVs, TAPVs and towed artillery quite useful.

We can't protect our infantry against all threats from all aspects. In high-intensity operations we need to worry about protection from artillery etc. In COIN we worry about ambush and IEDs. Its hard to have the perfect vehicle for all threats. I think that LAV IIIs/LAV 6s can work in a high-intensity environment as long as we treat them as infantry carriers first and not as 25mm gun platforms. I was part of some rather dogey combat team exercises with LAVs where the infantry wanted to be assaulting "on line" with the tanks to allow them to maximize their firepower. While it looked impressive on a live fire it bothered me thinking about a real enemy with AT defences and obstacles. Let us do our job so that you survive to do your job!


----------



## Haligonian

Thucydides said:
			
		

> If we are thinking of larger, heavier vehicles (but not _too_ large and heavy) I would put in a word for the USMC's ACV. At @ 30,000 kg it is comparable to the LAV 6.0, but offers the ability to conduct amphibious operations, which is a capability we do not currently possess. The ability to cross rivers, lakes and other water obstacles would seem to be a no brainer (certainly one of the hard won lessons of the Netherlands campaign, and a major weakness during the Cold War, when we would have had to cross a landscape cut with innumerable rivers and canals....).
> 
> Why not ask for capabilities that would provide more flexibility and options? The firepower is more comparable to an APC (currently .50 HMG/40mm Grenade launcher), but no doubt a stabilized RWS will eventually be offered. There is no guarantee that we won't be facing water obstacles in some future operation (regardless of where it is or what intensity the operation is at). On a positive note, the hull is large and roomy enough to support innumerable variants if desired, and assuming anyone were to seriously consider this option, we could actually get a buy in with the USMC, get a long production run and have considerable economy of scale savings as well.



I got a former EWS classmate whose the XO of 2nd Amphib Bn now who just so happens to be coming up to Gagetown in the next couple weeks.  I'll ensure to ask him how things are looking for the ACV now.  I'm sure those dudes are antsy to get themselves a new platform.


----------



## a_majoor

Looking forward to hearing about the USMC's views on the ACV.

As for the post of assaulting "on line" it sounds suspiciously like Cold War era Soviet tactics! Replace Leopards with T-72's and LAV's with BMP's or BTR's and you see the picture.....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> A good discussion.
> 
> I think that our LAV III was, either by sheer dumb luck or cagey design, well suited for the operations it was sent on. I'm not sure it needs the turret, but it does make a good package for COIN/Stability Operations. I think that it, or indeed the LAV 6, can work in high intensity operations if we are smart. Infantry should not be leading mounted against a conventional threat. Our doctrine had that in the Cold War - no reason to change it. Our Leopards should be leading the way and we should not be assaulting until the enemy has been well and truly neutralized. Now, I think that M113s with RWS would work well enough for high-intensity operations. I note, though, that the Israelis did indeed adopt vehicles like the Namer due to in part to the vulnerability of the M113s in the Lebanon operations.
> 
> The French experience in Mali is truly fascinating. I think that we can get into trouble by talking about "expeditionary operations." Of course we are going to conduct expeditionary operations. That doesn't mean we have to be C130 light. While some vehicles were flown in, even the medium weight French force in 2014 had much of its heavier elements deploy by ship and then overland. While their agility was outstanding, we should not forget that they already had troops in the area. If Canada were to participate in something similar I think that we would find our LAVs, TAPVs and towed artillery quite useful.
> 
> We can't protect our infantry against all threats from all aspects. In high-intensity operations we need to worry about protection from artillery etc. In COIN we worry about ambush and IEDs. Its hard to have the perfect vehicle for all threats. I think that LAV IIIs/LAV 6s can work in a high-intensity environment as long as we treat them as infantry carriers first and not as 25mm gun platforms. I was part of some rather dogey combat team exercises with LAVs where the infantry wanted to be assaulting "on line" with the tanks to allow them to maximize their firepower. While it looked impressive on a live fire it bothered me thinking about a real enemy with AT defences and obstacles. Let us do our job so that you survive to do your job!



Watching the video on a French resupply mission in Mali, the benefit of a lighter AFV became apparent when they broke down, they were able to haul it onto a another truck and continue. A LAV 6 is likely to require a tank transporter or similar and those are few and far between and would require the convoy to sit in place till recovery could get there, which of course means the transporter needs protection as well. Africa is much bigger than Afghanistan, every ton of weight will have a multiplying effect on logistics. Not advocating for the C130 silliness (reminds me of the railgauge limits on British WWII tanks).


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> Watching the video on a French resupply mission in Mali, the benefit of a lighter AFV became apparent when they broke down, they were able to haul it onto a another truck and continue. A LAV 6 is likely to require a tank transporter or similar and those are few and far between and would require the convoy to sit in place till recovery could get there, which of course means the transporter needs protection as well. Africa is much bigger than Afghanistan, every ton of weight will have a multiplying effect on logistics. Not advocating for the C130 silliness (reminds me of the railgauge limits on British WWII tanks).



Well, there's an APC apparently on fire in this photo after a car bombing in July, in Mali. Whatever we do it would be nice to have a vehicle that doesn't combust when coming into contact with such devices, let alone 122mm/ 152mm landing fairly nearby:

Mali: Car bombing targeting French troops kills civilians

Attack underscores fragile security situation in the West African nation as it prepares to go to the polls on July 29.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/mali-car-bombing-targeting-french-troops-kills-civilians-180701150834395.html


----------



## Kirkhill

> We can't protect our infantry against all threats from all aspects. In high-intensity operations we need to worry about protection from artillery etc. In COIN we worry about ambush and IEDs. Its hard to have the perfect vehicle for all threats. I think that LAV IIIs/LAV 6s can work in a high-intensity environment as long as we treat them as infantry carriers first and not as 25mm gun platforms. I was part of some rather dogey combat team exercises with LAVs where the infantry wanted to be assaulting "on line" with the tanks to allow them to maximize their firepower. While it looked impressive on a live fire it bothered me thinking about a real enemy with AT defences and obstacles. Let us do our job so that you survive to do your job!



Has there ever been a vehicle that was capable of surviving a targeted hit from all aspects?  What I mean is most vehicles, especially infantry vehicles, when armoured have been armoured against small arms, fragments and blast - 99% of the effective systems on the battlefield.  Beyond that it is just a matter of finding a missile capable of carrying enough energy to defeat the target, or in the case of mines and IEDs waiting for the target to pass over a large package of energy.  Even the heavily armoured targets can be defeated by choosing a different aspect to attack and/or by saturation.

Once you have stipulated that any vehicle is vulnerable then it follows that casualties will occur.  And once you have accepted that casualties will occur then the debate reverts to one of how to get the job done while minimizing casualties with the best available equipment employed in large numbers with the best available TTPs.  Minimizing being the key work.  Not eliminating.

Personally, from what I am reading about the Ukrainian discussions, I would be looking at purchasing whatever is effective at killing artillery and armoured vehicles from the greatest possible distances with the fewest number of own forces put at risk as gunners and missileers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Has there ever been a vehicle that was capable of surviving a targeted hit from all aspects?  What I mean is most vehicles, especially infantry vehicles, when armoured have been armoured against small arms, fragments and blast - 99% of the effective systems on the battlefield.  Beyond that it is just a matter of finding a missile capable of carrying enough energy to defeat the target, or in the case of mines and IEDs waiting for the target to pass over a large package of energy.  Even the heavily armoured targets can be defeated by choosing a different aspect to attack and/or by saturation.
> 
> Once you have stipulated that any vehicle is vulnerable then it follows that casualties will occur.  And once you have accepted that casualties will occur then the debate reverts to one of how to get the job done while minimizing casualties with the best available equipment employed in large numbers with the best available TTPs.  Minimizing being the key work.  Not eliminating.
> 
> Personally, from what I am reading about the Ukrainian discussions, I would be looking at purchasing whatever is effective at killing artillery and armoured vehicles from the greatest possible distances with the fewest number of own forces put at risk as gunners and missileers.



Cough <MLRS> Cough   :nod:


----------



## GR66

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> A good discussion.
> 
> I think that our LAV III was, either by sheer dumb luck or cagey design, well suited for the operations it was sent on. I'm not sure it needs the turret, but it does make a good package for COIN/Stability Operations. I think that it, or indeed the LAV 6, can work in high intensity operations if we are smart. Infantry should not be leading mounted against a conventional threat. Our doctrine had that in the Cold War - no reason to change it. Our Leopards should be leading the way and we should not be assaulting until the enemy has been well and truly neutralized. Now, I think that M113s with RWS would work well enough for high-intensity operations. I note, though, that the Israelis did indeed adopt vehicles like the Namer due to in part to the vulnerability of the M113s in the Lebanon operations.
> 
> The French experience in Mali is truly fascinating. I think that we can get into trouble by talking about "expeditionary operations." Of course we are going to conduct expeditionary operations. That doesn't mean we have to be C130 light. While some vehicles were flown in, even the medium weight French force in 2014 had much of its heavier elements deploy by ship and then overland. While their agility was outstanding, we should not forget that they already had troops in the area. If Canada were to participate in something similar I think that we would find our LAVs, TAPVs and towed artillery quite useful.
> 
> We can't protect our infantry against all threats from all aspects. In high-intensity operations we need to worry about protection from artillery etc. In COIN we worry about ambush and IEDs. Its hard to have the perfect vehicle for all threats. I think that LAV IIIs/LAV 6s can work in a high-intensity environment as long as we treat them as infantry carriers first and not as 25mm gun platforms. I was part of some rather dogey combat team exercises with LAVs where the infantry wanted to be assaulting "on line" with the tanks to allow them to maximize their firepower. While it looked impressive on a live fire it bothered me thinking about a real enemy with AT defences and obstacles. Let us do our job so that you survive to do your job!



The highlighted part makes sense to me.  Even if the "light" portion of a heavy/light mixed force was C-130 air transportable, do we have enough transport capability to move a large enough force in quickly enough to be more than speed bump to an opposing peer enemy?  Even if we did manage to beg/borrow/steal the transport capability, do we have the ability to quickly generate an effective sized combat force in an extremely short period of time to make use of it?

I think for Canada, expeditionary will need to mean deployment by ship.  On the bright side accepting that reality allows you to pick a mix of vehicles that best suit the required roles rather than limiting them to an arbitrary size/weight due to unrealistic transportation constraints.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I see the real logistical constraints being more in country. We generally get 6 months or so lead time for our expeditions, between our allies, rent a BFA, C-17 and RO/RO ships, we can get our advance party there quickly and the main force in time. It will be the constraints within the country that limit our ability to move and deploy.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Cough <MLRS> Cough   :nod:



And I wonder how many 300 kg missiles in 6 round pods could be carried in a single C130?  And do they need trucks or could they be dropped off in fixed positions with remotely operated elevating and traversing systems?

Meanwhile the infantry re-roles as 8-man spotter teams armed with the extended range Javelin (4750 m) and laser designators.


----------



## GR66

I'm curious to know what the experienced members here think.  If Canada were to get a heavy APC to go along with our tanks, are the 60ish ton Namer/Leopard/Abrams type models that have been discussed here the right way to go?

E.R. Campbell has posted on his blog articles suggesting that future battles may be more likely to shift from the plains and woodlands to heavily populated urban centers and Megacities (https://coloneltedcampbell.blog/2018/02/11/future-wars-6/  https://coloneltedcampbell.blog/2018/08/06/urban-warfare-war-in-megacities-getting-it-all-wrong/).

Is such a large and heavy vehicle well suited for this type of warfare, or is something smaller, but still heavily protected (and not yet in existence?) a better option?

The premise for increased urban combat seems to make sense to my civilian mind.  Non-peer enemies would be wise to retreat to the relative safety of urban areas in order to reduce the technological advantages held by Western military forces.  I'm guessing that even peer enemies like Russia and China are unlikely to choose to engage Western military forces head to head on near even terms.  I think it would be much more likely that they would aim to secure more limited objectives very quickly with localized superiority of forces and then leave the West facing the prospect of driving them out of the territories they have seized.  It would make sense for them to do so from urban areas where Western air power has reduced effectiveness and the prospect of heavy casualties (both military and civilian) may deter a military response.

Do you agree with this vision of where future warfare is increasingly likely to take place?  What type(s) of vehicles and weapons would be most suited to this type of warfare and how does that differ from more conventional thinking on maneuver warfare and long range precision weapons?  Is Canada currently prepared/equipped to be able to operate in this type of environment?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Speaking of heavy IFV's

https://s33.postimg.cc/hspyjdgf3/35adceb2-9cc4-43b2-a128-967150e0338e.jpg


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The downside of that approach is people have seen the result both in Fallujah, Iraq recently and Syria. It only works till the West or the Russians have had enough and then they slowly destroy your city, or quickly if it's the Russians.


----------



## a_majoor

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And I wonder how many 300 kg missiles in 6 round pods could be carried in a single C130?  And do they need trucks or could they be dropped off in fixed positions with remotely operated elevating and traversing systems?
> 
> Meanwhile the infantry re-roles as 8-man spotter teams armed with the extended range Javelin (4750 m) and laser designators.



We can go even better. FOG-M missiles from the Spike family can have ranges far exceeding the Javelin and there is a Brazilian FOG-M with a range of 60km. At this point, we can have a small team in a light vehicle capable of acting as drones/ long range precision artillery. And MLRS type weapons have also shrunk in size to the point they could be carried in the land beds of fairly small cargo trucks. If I remember correctly, the South Africans actually did something like this once they started capturing 122mm Multiple Rocket Launchers from Soviet supplied forces in Angola, reverse engineering the rockets and launchers and then fitting them under a tarp in ordinary cargo trucks to fool enemy observers (right up to the point they rolled back the tarps and elevated the rocket launcher tubes....)



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> I'm curious to know what the experienced members here think.  If Canada were to get a heavy APC to go along with our tanks, are the 60ish ton Namer/Leopard/Abrams type models that have been discussed here the right way to go?
> 
> E.R. Campbell has posted on his blog articles suggesting that future battles may be more likely to shift from the plains and woodlands to heavily populated urban centers and Megacities (https://coloneltedcampbell.blog/2018/02/11/future-wars-6/  https://coloneltedcampbell.blog/2018/08/06/urban-warfare-war-in-megacities-getting-it-all-wrong/).
> 
> Is such a large and heavy vehicle well suited for this type of warfare, or is something smaller, but still heavily protected (and not yet in existence?) a better option?
> 
> The premise for increased urban combat seems to make sense to my civilian mind.  Non-peer enemies would be wise to retreat to the relative safety of urban areas in order to reduce the technological advantages held by Western military forces.  I'm guessing that even peer enemies like Russia and China are unlikely to choose to engage Western military forces head to head on near even terms.  I think it would be much more likely that they would aim to secure more limited objectives very quickly with localized superiority of forces and then leave the West facing the prospect of driving them out of the territories they have seized.  It would make sense for them to do so from urban areas where Western air power has reduced effectiveness and the prospect of heavy casualties (both military and civilian) may deter a military response.
> 
> Do you agree with this vision of where future warfare is increasingly likely to take place?  What type(s) of vehicles and weapons would be most suited to this type of warfare and how does that differ from more conventional thinking on maneuver warfare and long range precision weapons?  Is Canada currently prepared/equipped to be able to operate in this type of environment?



This discussion has taken place in other threads. I recall making proposals in "Future Armour" which included tanks with "cleft" turrets capable of very high angle elevation to shoot at targets on rooftops, and ACHZARIT type infantry support vehicles with multiple RWS carrying .50 HMGs or 40mm automatic grenade launchers to supply heavy firepower in confined areas (also with high elevation/depression arcs). I have also advocated in other forums for ACHZARIT type vehicles mounting an armoured "box" with several Javelin type fire and forget missiles as a means of taking out hard targets that suddenly appear (the crew commander can essentially "shoot from the hip" at these sorts of unexpected targets).

My thought is urban combat really goes to two extremes: either you have lots of both "heavies" as well as "funnies" (armoured engineering and engineering support vehicles) to push through what is essentially a very close range obstacle course, or you need lots of light infantry (possibly with air insertion capabilities) to slip through the rubble, and use helicopters to insert quickly in unexpected areas to define "your" turf and isolate areas. Ideally you havre both, but realistically you need to choose. Frankly, as an expeditionary force, the light/airmobile option may actually make more sense: you can get into theatre more quickly and even "self deploy" to a certain extent, and large numbers of infantry provide means to engage at all levels from COIN to major combat (so long as the Infantry remember to stay in complex terrain where they retain the advantage).

Here is a picture of a scale model of an ACHZARIT, which shows the three weapons mounts: imagine the two "wing" 7.62 GPMG's are also RWS mounts (perhaps also fitted with a dozer blade) and you get an idea of what an urban Infantry Support Vehicle might look like.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The Russians use mine clearing charges to deal with Urban fighting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdn0gTQu84Y


----------



## GR66

What impact do Active Protection Systems (e.g. Trophy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trophy_(countermeasure)) have on the requirement to have heavily armoured APCs?  

If systems like this are truly effective counter measures to RPGs and ATGM's then is it possible to "downgrade" from a 60-ton Namer-sized Heavy APC to something lighter like the Puma (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puma_(IFV)) or CV90 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_Vehicle_90), or even much lighter like the BvS10 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BvS_10)?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

problem is that any system will eventually be defeated, heavy armour still buys you a lot and for take out a major urban area, you need all the help you can get https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLCVi6PVNdY


----------



## a_majoor

My major issue with active protection systems is what happens to the dismounted Infantry in the area when to discharges? If I know or suspected the oncoming HAPC's had an APS, I'd instruct my section commanders and tank hunting teams to use their anti armour weapons when they see the infantry dismounting.

I might not kill them, but they will be suppressed as the APS rounds are blasting overhead, breaking up any momentum the attack might generate. An ACHZARET spitting out fire from its 3 on board machine guns and 60mm mortar would be working to suppress the enemy instead, and a hypothetical Merkava 1 used as an HIFV would be hammering potential fire positions with 105mm HE as well. This is in line with the Australian experience described in another thread, where up to 2/3 of a company was used as a firebase to literally smother the enemy with fire while slamming assault groups moved in. In this instance, I don't need 2/3 of the company as a fire base since I'm bringing my own firepower to the party.

The ACHZARIT might actually be the "sweet spot" for this sort of thinking, it weighs in at @ 40,000kg, actually just a bit above things like the USMC ACV or the LAV 6.0, and has a very low profile. A purpose built vehicle would have a better internal layout, and could likely be brought into the 30,000 kg range with more modern materials, engines and other systems (consider rebuilt M-1 tanks shed almost 2 tons by replacing the 80 era wiring harness and electronics, which is pretty unbelievable).

For additional protection, I could include perforated steel shields as spaced armour, and network the vehicles to external sensors like micro UAV's to identify targets faster. An APS might be useful on the approach when I'm in range of enemy ATGM's, but I'd switch it off once I closing in to where I plan to do a dismount. Since most of the systems I'm describing are MOTS, and the hull is essentially a big steel box, this is actually a system Canada could design and build on its own.


----------



## blacktriangle

Great article by Maj Peterson. 

Ref APS and dismounts - I'd be deactivating the systems once on the obj and the ramps drop. The dismounts would pick up some of the slack in terms of defending the vehicles anyways. If I recall correctly, some of the APS are fairly smart and can be programmed to activate certain "zones" while deactivating others. 

 :2c:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> problem is that any system will eventually be defeated, heavy armour still buys you a lot and for take out a major urban area, you need all the help you can get https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLCVi6PVNdY



And that means artillery. Lots and lots of artillery.

If there's one thing the decades long focus on the 'Current Operating Environment' has done to limit our effectiveness during a major conflict, it's probably the lack of effort on building and maintain overpowering indirect fire support.... from artillery.


----------



## GR66

Very interesting discussion.

I'm curious how effective Active Protection Systems like Trophy are in a heavily urbanized environment.  The videos I've seen of the system in action are typically in fairly open areas with the incoming missiles/RPGs coming from relatively long range with a fairly clear line of site.  I wonder how effective they are in a dense urban landscape where an RPG might be launched from 10's of meters rather than 100's of meters.

I'm thinking that whatever vehicle chassis is used for an APC a 120mm Mortar equipped turret with its excellent elevation could be a very good option for urban warfare (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMOS).  I'd imagine it would be excellent in the direct fire role and with the high trajectory in the indirect fire role it may be more effective than artillery rounds in a city.  

Are there any good options for anti-tank weapons in an urban fight other than your own tanks?  From what I've read, most ATGMs have a minimum range in the ballpark of 100m-200m.  Is that enough if you're fighting in a city?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> Very interesting discussion.
> 
> I'm curious how effective Active Protection Systems like Trophy are in a heavily urbanized environment.  The videos I've seen of the system in action are typically in fairly open areas with the incoming missiles/RPGs coming from relatively long range with a fairly clear line of site.  I wonder how effective they are in a dense urban landscape where an RPG might be launched from 10's of meters rather than 100's of meters.
> 
> I'm thinking that whatever vehicle chassis is used for an APC a 120mm Mortar equipped turret with its excellent elevation could be a very good option for urban warfare (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMOS).  I'd imagine it would be excellent in the direct fire role and with the high trajectory in the indirect fire role it may be more effective than artillery rounds in a city.
> 
> Are there any good options for anti-tank weapons in an urban fight other than your own tanks?  From what I've read, most ATGMs have a minimum range in the ballpark of 100m-200m.  Is that enough if you're fighting in a city?



Dismounted infantry is the best proven 'APS' for armour in urban settings, isn't it?


----------



## Haligonian

The saga continues....  We did PD today on cbt tm ops and I and the CO and a few OCs began discussing where to dismount.  Most people thought that the best bet was getting as close to the objective as possible before dismounting.  I am apparently not a very persuasive speaker!  Anyway, just sent this article out... again.


----------



## blacktriangle

We reward bureaucrats, not tacticians.


----------



## Kirkhill

Haligonian said:
			
		

> The saga continues....  We did PD today on cbt tm ops and I and the CO and a few OCs began discussing where to dismount.  Most people thought that the best bet was getting as close to the objective as possible before dismounting.  I am apparently not a very persuasive speaker!  Anyway, just sent this article out... again.



I'm reminded of:

Prep for Battle
Advance to Contact
React to *EFFECTIVE* enemy fire.....

The debate became what was Effective enemy fire, how many casualties were necessary to determine if the fire was effective, and who decided if the fire was effective.  Then decisions on Dash Down Crawl Observe Sights Fire were made.

So when somebody says "as close as possible" are they going to make that decision based on an appreciation of what the enemy's capabilities are and dismount out of range?  Or, are they going to wait until they lose their first section?  Can the Platoon continue having sustained 25% casualties at the first contact?  Or does the OC order the Platoon to press on because the CO is only down 2% of his strength?


----------



## Infanteer

Looks effective to me....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm reminded of:
> 
> Prep for Battle
> Advance to Contact
> React to *EFFECTIVE* enemy fire.....
> 
> The debate became what was Effective enemy fire, how many casualties were necessary to determine if the fire was effective, and who decided if the fire was effective.  Then decisions on Dash Down Crawl Observe Sights Fire were made.
> 
> So when somebody says "as close as possible" are they going to make that decision based on an appreciation of what the enemy's capabilities are and dismount out of range?  Or, are they going to wait until they lose their first section?  Can the Platoon continue having sustained 25% casualties at the first contact?  Or does the OC order the Platoon to press on because the CO is only down 2% of his strength?



Safety is on the objective.


----------



## Haligonian

To play the devil's advocate, the argument is that the biggest killer of infantry on the battlefield is IDF (mortars and arty) and MGs.  Most people want to move through these weapons effects as quickly as possible and the LAVs armour is sufficient for dealing with MG and IDF (outside DPICM like munitions) weapons.  If there are unsuppressed anti armour weapons then there are probably unsuppressed MGs and mortars and dismounted infantry are going to get chewed up by these en route to the objective.  Vehicles now moving at the speed of dismounted infantry are now better targets for anti armour weapons as well.


----------



## Infanteer

Look at the threats.  Enemy artillery (tube and rocket) will hit us if we mass before the attack in observable areas - this is where being mounted helps.  Other than that, the enemy artillery won't chase around dismounted soldiers with fire missions.  As our attack commences, the enemy's artillery is probably going to shift to counter-battery fire, or trying to disrupt our depth and reserves.

As we close into and out of the attack position, the enemy will largely have three systems to hit us with: mortars, direct fire from missiles and guns, and direct fire from small arms and machine guns.  Yes, being buttoned up in a APC can mitigate the threat from machine guns, but so can moving behind a main battle tank.  Direct fire anti-tank systems and enemy tanks will brew our vehicles up, passengers and all.  Mortar fire will be (and always was) problematic.  However, when you weigh the chance of a mortar round catching a section moving on foot behind a tank to that of an anti-tank guided missile or recoilless rifle smacking a 35 ton armoured vehicle moving at about 10-15km (because that's all you can really do buttoned up), I'd offer that the latter probably has a better chance of being catastrophic.  You can't reduce risk to nil, but you can mitigate it by "not having all your eggs in one light armoured basket."

This is where the Company Commander earns his money.  The attack position is, according to Land Ops, "the last position held by the assaulting force before crossing the LD...not under direct fire or observation and not a known or likely adversary artillery target."  The commander has to select a good attack position, one where the bigger danger to his or her force transitions from indirect fires to direct fires.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You may also have an enemy that uses armoured VBIED along with DF and IDF fires to disrupt your attack.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, the answer is, "it depends"???  ;D

In which case, as suggested, it is up to the OC to earn his keep by paying his money and taking his chances.  And then, in the words of the USMC, improvise-adapt-overcome.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So, the answer is, "it depends"???  ;D
> 
> In which case, as suggested, it is up to the OC to earn his keep by paying his money and taking his chances.  And then, in the words of the USMC, improvise-adapt-overcome.



Especially if you're with Ariel Sharon at Abu-Ageila....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Abu-Ageila_(1967)


----------



## Kat Stevens

Good thing nobody uses mines anymore.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Look at the threats.  Enemy artillery (tube and rocket) will hit us if we mass before the attack in observable areas - this is where being mounted helps.  Other than that, the enemy artillery won't chase around dismounted soldiers with fire missions.



That is quite an assumption. A dismounted company advancing on an objective is a wonderful artillery/mortar target.

Now, I agree with pretty much the rest of your post, but we should not be assaulting the position if he has ATGMs still able to fire. You can't reduce the risk to zero, but why launch the assault if you haven't truly neutralized the position? 

And sometimes we should ask - "why are we assaulting the position in the first place?" The combat team quick attack has become our new Trooping of the Colours.


----------



## Infanteer

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> That is quite an assumption. A dismounted company advancing on an objective is a wonderful artillery/mortar target.



First off, a dismounted company makes a great target if its all gobbed up at a debussing point and advances on line, but that's another discussion.

As for artillery, I am indeed making an assumption, but I based it on the fact that the Percentage of Incapacitation and Risk Estimation Distance for artillery systems are larger than that of mortar systems.  If the defensive fire is being planned in bands, the FPF for artillery systems striking our attacking forces will likely be passed before or as we get within assaulting distances - hence my statement that the primary indirect threat for assaulting force (fighting the last 300 meters) would be mortars rather than artillery.

But, we're probably splitting hairs here.  The infantry section isn't going to be happy with either a 152mm round or a 82mm mortar round falling on its head.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> but we should not be assaulting the position if he has ATGMs still able to fire. You can't reduce the risk to zero, but why launch the assault if you haven't truly neutralized the position?



Can a position ever be 100% neutralized?  Suppression and neutralization are temporal effects, the former much more so than the latter.  Even if we assume we get a good, steady base of fire to support an attack, ensuring 100% of the enemy is suppressed or neutralized is probably impossible.  In most force on force engagements (operational and training) that I've observed, the hardest part of the fight is identifying the enemy's locations.  Some positions won't unmask until the attacker closes, some positions will displace and move elsewhere, and some will get over the effects of fires and pop up an inopportune moments.

So, to answer "why launch the assault if you haven't truly neutralized the position" I'd answer that it is hard, maybe even impossible, to ever truly do so: the assault must commence with the assumption that something will pop up.



> And sometimes we should ask - "why are we assaulting the position in the first place?" The combat team quick attack has become our new Trooping of the Colours.



Yes - we're prisoners of our own training environment.  The quick attack is a nice tool to evaluate quick battlefield decision making, but it seems to be the gold standard in assessing Performance Objectives for every level of manoeuvre command.


----------



## Kirkhill

A curious, and I hope not inappropriate question, but when running exercises are they ever allowed to play out to extinction?

Or are they stopped when one side gets behind on points?

Because it seems to me that the difference between an exercise and the real world is that in the real world, regardless of the initial plan, the fight continues until "safety is found on the objective" (a debatable point but understood) or until there is no one left to complete the mission.  The evidence for that is the number of Privates winning VCs to complete missions after their battalions have been "neutralized" physically or psychologically and have given up the fight.  Often the difference is that at some point somebody decides that the situation has evolved enough that a different approach is possible or necessary.


----------



## blacktriangle

If we assume that SOMETHING will always "pop up", don't we owe it to our soldiers to give them the best possible chance of surviving it?

Should we really be assaulting ANYTHING with a LAV? If we want to use our vehicles like landing craft onto a fortified beach, I think we need to go heavy. You will never fully eliminate the risk but at least you can manage it. 

Many (not directed at the posters here) forget why we have used AVGP, Bison/Coyote. and finally LAV-3/6. It's purely $$$ and politics. 

Since there's no HAPC/HIFV coming, that means it's time to look for alternatives. That means not teaching the same tactics our grandfathers learned when our numbers, technology, and willingness to accept casualties were vastly different. It also means failing units in Wainwright and holding promotions back until people are willing to re-visit the topic. 

Anyways, just  :2c: from someone who wishes we could minimize the risk to our 20 year old Ptes on politically motivated missions.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I recall circa 2002 that some LAV battalions wanted to assault with their LAVs "on-line" with the tanks. I was not comfortable with this. Let the tanks breach obstacles and assault the position while the infantry vehicles move up well behind to dismount wherever they feel is best. I feel this way regardless of the level of armour protection on the infantry carriers. 

The assault tanks should be well in front of the infantry, rolling through and around the enemy position and hammering it along the way. They also destroy any enemy vehicles that were out of sight/reverse slope. The intimate support tanks are there to handle the enemy hero who "pops up."


----------



## Colin Parkinson

In Syria, in the urban environment, you see the tanks moving up with overwatch, both drone and DF/IDF weapons. They didn't seem to use artillery provided smoke, possibly as it would work both ways and provide a chance for VBIED to move up on them. The BMP's are close, delivering infantry to nearby protection and then going back for more troops and supplies. After they conduct that mission, unloaded they are used for fire support, but with some causalities. It is a very deliberate slow moving assault. 
In open ground, ISIS used DF supported armoured VBIEDs to attack prepared positions, if there is some success with reaching the position and detonating, the assault would be following on it's heels with fast moving wheeled APC's and then using ISIS fairly good light infantry skills to overwhelm the defenders who are recovering from the VBIED blasts. In essences a faster version of the tunneled mines and assaults of WWI. The Syrians seem to use tanks and dismounted infantry slow bounding to one source of cover to another when assaulting over open ground. Likely as their enemy does not have VT rounds, or coordinated artillery. 

I am guessing that for our current ops, a good recce followed heavy short bombardment by multiple rocket launchers and 155's to disorient the defenders while the assault is taking place during the bombardment. Perhaps 1-2 batteries reserved to conduct quick pin point bombardments on areas of defending fire without interrupting the main barrage. of course getting hung up on a minefield 1/2 there would not be good.... The other minor problem is you do not have the artillery resources to do such an assault.


----------



## Haligonian

While thinking on this, and swapping PMs with Infanteer I think the real question here isn't whether or not we should dismount on or short of the objective but what assumptions we want to build in to our people as part of foundational training.  Anyone can agree on extreme cases for dismounting short of the objective or on/past the objective so it's really about what "instincts" we want to build into our infantry commanders.

Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army.  The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same.  They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action.  Essentially a training aid.  As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate.  This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.

Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work.  The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.

So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force?  I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective.  Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped.  Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression.  Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower.  The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range.  

I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not.  The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry.  If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective.  LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs.  So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> While thinking on this, and swapping PMs with Infanteer I think the real question here isn't whether or not we should dismount on or short of the objective but what assumptions we want to build in to our people as part of foundational training.  Anyone can agree on extreme cases for dismounting short of the objective or on/past the objective so it's really about what "instincts" we want to build into our infantry commanders.
> 
> Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army.  The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same.  They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action.  Essentially a training aid.  As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate.  This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.
> 
> Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work.  The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.
> 
> So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force?  I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective.  Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped.  Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression.  Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower.  The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range.
> 
> I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not.  The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry.  If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective.  LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs.  So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.



Good points.

It's called DOCTRINE...but we usually interpret that as DOGMA unfortunately.... and punish those who think outside the 'policy prison'.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> ....
> 
> I am guessing that for our current ops, a good recce followed heavy short bombardment by multiple rocket launchers and 155's to disorient the defenders while the assault is taking place during the bombardment. Perhaps 1-2 batteries reserved to conduct quick pin point bombardments on areas of defending fire without interrupting the main barrage. of course getting hung up on a minefield 1/2 there would not be good.... The other minor problem is you do not have the artillery resources to do such an assault.



Your prescription sounds an awful lot like what we were told to expect from the Red Army.  And the the remedy was to be the same as the Germans (WW1) - dig deep and stay low until the armour rolled over the top allowing the opportunity to tackle the infantry behind.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I am a product of that era, but I am not sure how else to suppress hidden ATGM teams. It would hard to be able to stay focused on a target with an ATGM with Air bursts happening around you. Don't have to kill the ATGM (which would be nice) but suppressing their ability to engage.


----------



## blacktriangle

That's assuming enemy ATGM positions are even manned in the future.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

true, but for the next 25 years you can assume the majority will be.


----------



## Kirkhill

Manned ATGM positions are not a given, even now.

The NLOS containerised system was cancelled by the US






https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM501_Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System

But is well on its way to being perfected by the Israelis with their Spike NLOS system






The remote launch missile system is also well developed for NASAMs with their dispersed Multiple Missile Launchers for Air Defence.






And the US is proceeding with their own MML systems 






15 assorted missiles in a box that could be dropped anywhere in the battlefield.

Take the 25 km range of the Spike NLOS and add that to a 20 km range precision guided mortar launched from a vehicle mounted automated turret an I suggest that the rules of the game might be changing a bit faster that 25 years.

If the FOO accompanying your company can call up missiles from unmanned caches and precision stonks from mortars without exposing themselves, or your position, then it makes it harder for the enemy to find anything to neutralize or attack.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The majority of the systems used in the latest conflicts are basically 25 year old+ systems that have been evolutionary upgraded. Canada is just re-introducing those systems, we behind even Hezbollah in that regard. It's highly unlikely that even if the unmanned ATGM's go into production, they will be exported. So only a threat for peer to peer and then they would be in short supply. A near peer fight is likely against experienced crews firing wire guided ATGM.


----------



## blacktriangle

I think you'd be surprised what a few good engineers can do with some $$$ and operator input. 

However, the point I'm trying to drive home is that we need to be more careful in the assumptions we make.


----------



## Kirkhill

A couple of highly informative videos

One on how a Swedish Armoured Infantry Battalion conducts business





One on how the Canadian Mechanized Infantry operates  (Nov2020)






Edit - have lost track of the number of times the narrator said "However" when describing the Canadian Orbat.  I don't recall it being said once in the Swedish Video.  Presumably "That is not allowed".


----------



## OldSolduer

reveng said:


> I think you'd be surprised what a few good engineers can do with some high explosives $$$ and operator input.


FTFY


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> A couple of highly informative videos
> 
> One on how a Swedish Armoured Infantry Battalion conducts business
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> One on how the Canadian Mechanized Infantry operates  (Nov2020)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Edit - have lost track of the number of times the narrator said "However" when describing the Canadian Orbat.  I don't recall it being said once in the Swedish Video.  Presumably "That is not allowed".


As usual your post got me thinking and researching. Must admit I haven't often looked at the Swedes but all things considered they meet my definition of what an army should look like.

Sweden has a little more than a quarter of our population, a third of our GDP, and has less than half of our defence budget. While their Air Force has about our fighter strength it has a much smaller aviation capability and, for obvious reasons, Sweden has a smaller navy. On the other hand it's army can muster twice the equipped armoured and mechanized brigades than Canada can because its regular force is oriented towards leading and training a large and well equipped reserve force and a small pool of conscripts. Having a vibrant defence industry doesn't hurt either.

Was anyone else left with the impression that the Swedes have doctrine for the organization of their battalions while Canada's infantry battalions seem to operate on regimental quiffs. 

🍻


----------



## medic5

7.2 billion as of 2019, though it is much higher today. Do they not pay their soldiers or something? Perhaps they have less than one GOFO per thousand soldiers? Or maybe their procurement doesn't involve wringing hands for decades then purchasing "interim jets" that really just complicate things for the worse? 

I really like Battle Order's videos, his graphics always look nice and I appreciate his breakdowns of foreign militaries, particularly eastern ones. This one about Japan's new units is great considering the geopolitical climate.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> ...
> 
> Was anyone else left with the impression that the Swedes have doctrine for the organization of their battalions while Canada's infantry battalions seem to operate on regimental quiffs.
> 
> 🍻


This really stuck out to me in the videos as well.  Without a clear doctrine how can you organize your force?  How can you equip it?

There are literally hundreds of interesting ideas that come out of this site but none of those individual pieces really matter if you can't put them together into a cohesive package where they each contribute to a unified overall objective.

The government of the day decides where and when the CF may be told to fight, but the CF leadership has failed by not clearly defining HOW the CF will fight.  

Maybe a logical first step would be to group all three Reg Force Brigades into a single Division.  Make them symmetrical in organization.  Follow a common training plan.  Clarify the doctrine.  Focus procurement on the equipment that strengthens your ability to achieve the goals laid out in the doctrine.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> As usual your post got me thinking and researching. Must admit I haven't often looked at the Swedes but all things considered they meet my definition of what an army should look like.
> 
> Sweden has a little more than a quarter of our population, a third of our GDP, and has less than half of our defence budget. While their Air Force has about our fighter strength it has a much smaller aviation capability and, for obvious reasons, Sweden has a smaller navy. On the other hand it's army can muster twice the equipped armoured and mechanized brigades than Canada can because its regular force is oriented towards leading and training a large and well equipped reserve force and a small pool of conscripts. Having a vibrant defence industry doesn't hurt either.
> 
> Was anyone else left with the impression that the Swedes have doctrine for the organization of their battalions while Canada's infantry battalions seem to operate on regimental quiffs.
> 
> 🍻



Like Israel, or a neutral country like Switzerland, they need all that 'defence stuff' becasue they're in the path of any number of possible invaders. It's easier to convince (a largely homogeneous Scandinavian culture) that they need to unite around some key defence needs. 

They also have their own defence industry and need to show their wares off in a good light to attract buyers. It's not cheap, though.

Us? We've got Oceans on three sides and the world's biggest (friendly) superpower next door. I'm often amazed that we continue to maintain the levels of investment and commitment to defence that we do now, even if it looks a little weak to us from time to time.


----------



## FSTO

GR66 said:


> This really stuck out to me in the videos as well.  Without a clear doctrine how can you organize your force?  How can you equip it?
> 
> There are literally hundreds of interesting ideas that come out of this site but none of those individual pieces really matter if you can't put them together into a cohesive package where they each contribute to a unified overall objective.
> 
> The government of the day decides where and when the CF may be told to fight, but the CF leadership has failed by not clearly defining HOW the CF will fight.
> 
> Maybe a logical first step would be to group all three Reg Force Brigades into a single Division.  Make them symmetrical in organization.  Follow a common training plan.  Clarify the doctrine.  Focus procurement on the equipment that strengthens your ability to achieve the goals laid out in the doctrine.


Are you out of your mind!!!! Common doctrine......or any doctrine at all? Madness I tell you, MADNESS!!!!


----------



## Kirkhill

The things that stood out for me was the emphasis on the vehicles and automation vs manpower. (IFVs support tanks, Infantry supports IFVs)

When you first went to Afghanistan the Order of the Day was "Fill the Seats".   Four LAVs resulted in a 40 man platoon and no mortars, pioneers, ATs etc.  Likewise the Armoured Corps works from their 4 vehicle troop, 19 vehicle sqn upwards.

Where we get one squadron out of 19 Leos the Swedes get two companies out of 22.

Where we get three companies out of 47 LAVs the Swedes get two companies of 11 CV90s, 4 CV90 Recce, 4 CV90 AA, 8 CV90 Mor-120 and a few more necessary odds and sods out of virtually the same number

Equally we get 28 dismounts (when Treasury permits) while the Swedes make do with 19 (3x6 + 1 NCO dedicated to the ground fight (while there is also an NCO dedicated to the Vehicles)

Meanwhile the Swedes have all the toys at the Section level -

FNC - 5.56
DMR- 7.62
2x LMG - 5.56
1x GPMG - 7.62

M203 - 40mm
CG - 84mm (with full suite of ammo types)
AT-4 - Disposable AT
N-LAW - Disposable AT(H)
Anti-Tank Mines

And for mortars

With 32 operators they man 8 vehicles with two 120mm tubes each and 54 rounds on board.   Automated Fire Control System.

The also have been able to find 12 bodies to operate 4x 40mm SPAAGs with onboard radars.

It isn't the money we lack.  It's the decisions.



And WRT home defence.  Every civil servant used to be expected to defend his desk and was armed accordingly.  Likewise for people in the utilities sector.  Privately employed citizens were called back to the colours for five weeks refreshers every few years.   The Home Guard, separate from all of the above, trained to defend their local vital points and infrastructure - with real weapons. 

Everybody got basic training.


----------



## Underway

Some thread necromancy in light of further lessons learned in Ukraine and the Armenian/Azerbijhan conflict.

The original discussion revolved around the proper use of LAV's in an environment that has a proliferation of ATGM.  Essentially using them as direct fire support for an infantry advance onto a position instead of driving up / past a position.  However as we have tanks attached to our IFV's in the case of a CMBG then this may not be needed either.  

Given the prevalence of precision-guided indirect fires or UAV launched munitions, it seems as if the IFV even in a support role may have some difficulty.

What if IFV weapon systems were changed to engage low-flying UAVs properly.  Have the targeting systems available to dual role the IFV turret mount properly  (instead of its current ground-focused systems), and instead of a dual launch ATGM in the turret have a dual launch Stinger or equivalent.

For larger UAV's one would rely upon the traditional GBAD systems.  This would have twofold impacts, first is that LAVs would no longer be required to directly support the infantry on their advance to the objective and still leave that role up to tanks.  The second is that the local area would become a no go zone for enemy tactical UAVs.


----------



## Underway

Taking this another step, (and copying the Namor HAPC) an integral indirect fire capability like a mortar might be more useful (or a switchblade launching system for example) instead of an autocannon.  Either to lay down smoke, illumination or fires on an enemy position in support of the dismounts without exposing the IFV to ATGM return fire.


----------



## Prairie canuck

Underway said:


> Some thread necromancy in light of further lessons learned in Ukraine and the Armenian/Azerbijhan conflict.
> 
> The original discussion revolved around the proper use of LAV's in an environment that has a proliferation of ATGM.  Essentially using them as direct fire support for an infantry advance onto a position instead of driving up / past a position.  However as we have tanks attached to our IFV's in the case of a CMBG then this may not be needed either.
> 
> Given the prevalence of precision-guided indirect fires or UAV launched munitions, it seems as if the IFV even in a support role may have some difficulty.
> 
> What if IFV weapon systems were changed to engage low-flying UAVs properly.  Have the targeting systems available to dual role the IFV turret mount properly  (instead of its current ground-focused systems), and instead of a dual launch ATGM in the turret have a dual launch Stinger or equivalent.
> 
> For larger UAV's one would rely upon the traditional GBAD systems.  This would have twofold impacts, first is that LAVs would no longer be required to directly support the infantry on their advance to the objective and still leave that role up to tanks.  The second is that the local area would become a no go zone for enemy tactical UAVs.


Would you not have your own small UAVs to scout ahead? One controlled from every second LAV which then feeds the dismounts/tanks the info?


----------



## Underway

Prairie canuck said:


> Would you not have your own small UAVs to scout ahead? One controlled from every second LAV which then feeds the dismounts/tanks the info?


Never said you wouldn't.  But that doesn't have to be an organic sensor to a LAV company, that could be a higher level sensor.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> What if IFV weapon systems were changed to engage low-flying UAVs properly. Have the targeting systems available to dual role the IFV turret mount properly (instead of its current ground-focused systems), and instead of a dual launch ATGM in the turret have a dual launch Stinger or equivalent


There definitely needs to be a rethink of how to arm all natures of fighting vehicles for all of anti-personnel, anti-armour and anti-air.

Back in the last century, when we worried about air defence, we had everything from pintle mounted machine guns on our M113s, M109s and M548s manned against air attack (minimally effective as they'd be - the hope was put up a thick enough curtain of bullets and maybe you could get yourself a Flogger). Non-tracked batteries put folks with C2s up as air sentries in the trucks cargo decks. Blowpipes and later Javelins and ADATs rounded out the brigade-level area protection. The LAVs still have air sentry hatches.

One of the things I tend to think about in this new airspace environment is economy of effort. If we fire off a Stinger (which is a traditional and expensive air defense system) or equivalent every time we see a mini UAV then pretty soon the enemy will issue and deploy mini UAVs for no other purpose than to strip us of our heavier air defence systems. They're costly and difficult to resupply (not every country has rich uncles like Ukraine to keep them in stock).

I'm not saying we shouldn't engage mini or tactical UAVs but I'm saying what we need is a widely available, low-cost, yet effective weapon system so that the heavier stuff can be saved for the Bayraktars, Havocs and Fullbacks.

I particulalry like the German 35mm MANTIS system which has a programable air burst round (AHEAD) . Unfortunately the round is part of a complex integrated modular system which would be a. expensive, and b. impractical to deploy with ordinary IFVs. I could, however, see it with something like M-SHORAD where the 50 cal and the Hellfire components are replaced by a 35mm gun firing AHEAD (single shot or small bursts) connected to the vehicles sensors. I'd leave the four shot Stinger pod in place for the bigger targets. The lasers sound promising for that as well.

To what extent we could put a MANTIS-like 35mm dual purpose gun on an IFV and data link it to a nearby M-SHORAD's sensors for target acquisition and ammunition programming is an open question but strikes me within the realm of probable. It should be a priority because a round that costs less than $100 is far more cost effective than a missile costing tens of thousands per shot and will keep the all aspects air defence battle operating much longer.

🍻


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> There definitely needs to be a rethink of how to arm all natures of fighting vehicles for all of anti-personnel, anti-armour and anti-air.
> 
> Back in the last century, when we worried about air defence, we had everything from pintle mounted machine guns on our M113s, M109s and M548s manned against air attack (minimally effective as they'd be - the hope was put up a thick enough curtain of bullets and maybe you could get yourself a Flogger). Non-tracked batteries put folks with C2s up as air sentries in the trucks cargo decks. Blowpipes and later Javelins and ADATs rounded out the brigade-level area protection. The LAVs still have air sentry hatches.
> 
> One of the things I tend to think about in this new airspace environment is economy of effort. If we fire off a Stinger (which is a traditional and expensive air defense system) or equivalent every time we see a mini UAV then pretty soon the enemy will issue and deploy mini UAVs for no other purpose than to strip us of our heavier air defence systems. They're costly and difficult to resupply (not every country has rich uncles like Ukraine to keep them in stock).
> 
> I'm not saying we shouldn't engage mini or tactical UAVs but I'm saying what we need is a widely available, low-cost, yet effective weapon system so that the heavier stuff can be saved for the Bayraktars, Havocs and Fullbacks.
> 
> I particulalry like the German 35mm MANTIS system which has a programable air burst round (AHEAD) . Unfortunately the round is part of a complex integrated modular system which would be a. expensive, and b. impractical to deploy with ordinary IFVs. I could, however, see it with something like M-SHORAD where the 50 cal and the Hellfire components are replaced by a 35mm gun firing AHEAD (single shot or small bursts) connected to the vehicles sensors. I'd leave the four shot Stinger pod in place for the bigger targets. The lasers sound promising for that as well.
> 
> To what extent we could put a MANTIS-like 35mm dual purpose gun on an IFV and data link it to a nearby M-SHORAD's sensors for target acquisition and ammunition programming is an open question but strikes me within the realm of probable. It should be a priority because a round that costs less than $100 is far more cost effective than a missile costing tens of thousands per shot and will keep the all aspects air defence battle operating much longer.
> 
> 🍻


Even the Russians have powerful directed EW for UAV's, however something like the CV90 40mm bofors would be a good start, even with EOIR air search/ targeting capability.  That's enough for mini UAV's which would easily be in range of such a weapon (30-35mm have good fragmentation options as well).

As far as Stingers you wouldn't waste them on a Class 1 UAV even if they could target them (I don't think they can).   Point is that IFV's with some SHORAD integrated into the turret might be very useful.  The area GBAD would be provided by Air Defence Artillery Units.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> There definitely needs to be a rethink of how to arm all natures of fighting vehicles for all of anti-personnel, anti-armour and anti-air.
> 
> Back in the last century, when we worried about air defence, we had everything from pintle mounted machine guns on our M113s, M109s and M548s manned against air attack (minimally effective as they'd be - the hope was put up a thick enough curtain of bullets and maybe you could get yourself a Flogger). Non-tracked batteries put folks with C2s up as air sentries in the trucks cargo decks. Blowpipes and later Javelins and ADATs rounded out the brigade-level area protection. The LAVs still have air sentry hatches.
> 
> One of the things I tend to think about in this new airspace environment is economy of effort. If we fire off a Stinger (which is a traditional and expensive air defense system) or equivalent every time we see a mini UAV then pretty soon the enemy will issue and deploy mini UAVs for no other purpose than to strip us of our heavier air defence systems. They're costly and difficult to resupply (not every country has rich uncles like Ukraine to keep them in stock).
> 
> I'm not saying we shouldn't engage mini or tactical UAVs but I'm saying what we need is a widely available, low-cost, yet effective weapon system so that the heavier stuff can be saved for the Bayraktars, Havocs and Fullbacks.
> 
> I particulalry like the German 35mm MANTIS system which has a programable air burst round (AHEAD) . Unfortunately the round is part of a complex integrated modular system which would be a. expensive, and b. impractical to deploy with ordinary IFVs. I could, however, see it with something like M-SHORAD where the 50 cal and the Hellfire components are replaced by a 35mm gun firing AHEAD (single shot or small bursts) connected to the vehicles sensors. I'd leave the four shot Stinger pod in place for the bigger targets. The lasers sound promising for that as well.
> 
> To what extent we could put a MANTIS-like 35mm dual purpose gun on an IFV and data link it to a nearby M-SHORAD's sensors for target acquisition and ammunition programming is an open question but strikes me within the realm of probable. It should be a priority because a round that costs less than $100 is far more cost effective than a missile costing tens of thousands per shot and will keep the all aspects air defence battle operating much longer.
> 
> 🍻


The XM-914 30mm on the IM-SHORAD has airburst ammunition.

SHORAD Air-Defense Stryker at AUSA - Overt Defense


> SHORAD Air-Defense Stryker at AUSA​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> By LEIGH N in AFV, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, ARMY, ARMY, AVIATION, COMPANIES, DAILY NEWS, DEFENSE, DRONE, GROUND VEHICLES, MISSILES, NEWS, TECHNOLOGY, USA October 23, 2019
> 
> Tweet
> Share
> Pin
> 0SHARES
> General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) have publicly debuted their Stryker A1 IM-SHORAD (Initial-Maneuver Short-Range Air-Defense) prototype at the AUSA (Association of the United States Army) trade show in Washington DC. It is the first of nine prototypes to be delivered to the Army for testing with five already constructed and one already in Army hands. 144 SHORAD platforms are eventually to be acquired with the first entering service next year.
> The SHORAD features four integrated weapons systems in its turret – officially the Reconfigurable Integrated Weapons Platform (RIWP) – which is operated remotely from within the body of the vehicle. The missile and gun systems are guided onto aerial targets by an integral 360-degree radar – the Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radar (MMHR) from Leonardo DRS.
> For both anti-tank and anti-helicopter, the platform mounts a two-round launcher firing the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire with radar seeker. A four-round Stinger launcher (capable of being reloaded from within the SHORAD unlike the Hellfire) will be equipped with upgraded FIM-92J Stingers fitted with proximity fuses designed for counter-UAS (unmanned aerial systems) but also useful against both low-level fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.
> The SHORAD’s gun is the XM914 30mm equipped with a range of ammunition including airburst and will be equally capable of engaging ground or air threats. Finally for close-in defense, a 7.62x51mm medium machine gun can engage infantry targets threatening the vehicle.
> Mobile air-defense is a capability that has stagnated within the US Army during 20 years of counter-insurgency and special operations based warfare with the Army relying upon the Avenger HMMWV Stinger platform, dismounted Stingers and the short-lived M6 Linebacker air-defense variant of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. BAE Systems offered an upgraded Linebacker known as the M-SHORAD (Mobile Short-Range Air-Defense) in 2017 although the Army decided upon the Stryker-based SHORAD platform.
> 
> The SHORAD’s gun is the XM914 30mm equipped with a range of ammunition including airburst and will be equally capable of engaging ground or air threats.



The same RiWP weapon station could be used on a LAV chassis with different weapon configurations.  30mm/7.62mm/Stinger/Hellfire (IM-Shorad configuration) for the AD version, 30mm/7.62mm/TOW/Javelin for an AT version, etc.


----------



## Underway

I was thinking of this as an option, but I'm not entirely sure that it would still be able to carry the same number of troops in the back.  This is a pretty dedicated GBAD vehicle and not so much the IFV vehicle I was thinking about.  But its right down the alley.


----------



## GR66

Agree on the need for AD to take out enemy aerial units and of course a good idea to take a look at the LAV and how we use it, but in looking at what's going on in Ukraine probably the thing that would have the greatest impact on our combat effectiveness would be to greatly expand our IDF capabilities...mortars, guns, rockets, loitering munitions.  Artillery (again) is proving the huge impact it has on the battle space.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The XM-914 30mm on the IM-SHORAD has airburst ammunition.


If you have a reference to that I'd be interested in seeing it.

My understanding is that the 30mm XM1198 High Explosive Dual Purpose Self Destruct (HEDP-SD) round developed for the XM 914 is still just a contact function dual purpose anti-armour / anti-personnel round but with a self destruct function to keep it from raining down onto the ground.

The 35mm AHEAD round, on the other hand, is a true airburst function with a fuze that is set with data as it passes the muzzle of the gun to cause it to fragment at an intercept point with the aircraft.






🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> If you have a reference to that I'd be interested in seeing it.
> 
> My understanding is that the 30mm XM1198 High Explosive Dual Purpose Self Destruct (HEDP-SD) round developed for the XM 914 is still just a contact function dual purpose anti-armour / anti-personnel round but with a self destruct function to keep it from raining down onto the ground.
> 
> The 35mm AHEAD round, on the other hand, is a true airburst function with a fuze that is set with data as it passes the muzzle of the gun to cause it to fragment at an intercept point with the aircraft.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


My understanding is that the new proximity round for the XM-914 intended for use on by the IM-SHORAD and planned for release this year is the XM1211 High Explosive Proximity (HEP) round.

Here's an article from the US Army Acquisition Support Center that discusses the round.

Edited to add:  I saw another article that mentioned in passing that the round has an onboard proximity sensor but I haven't been able to find any more detailed descriptions yet of how the round works.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> My understanding is that the new proximity round for the XM-914 intended for use on by the IM-SHORAD and planned for release this year is the XM1211 High Explosive Proximity (HEP) round.
> 
> Here's an article from the US Army Acquisition Support Center that discusses the round.
> 
> Edited to add:  I saw another article that mentioned in passing that the round has an onboard proximity sensor but I haven't been able to find any more detailed descriptions yet of how the round works.


Interesting. And that's a new one on me albeit that Northrup got a development contract for it a couple of years ago. I haven't seen much on it but did dig up this test video.






Clearly a different solution if it uses a true proximity fuze but equally effective.

I expect it has the same issue as MANTIS in that it needs a complex sensor system with a data link to get the gun onto a predicted target location. I note the video was posted Feb 22, 2022 (although I think it might have come out at their 2021 Bushmaster Users' conference) so am somewhat surprised at the how experimental it still looks.

🍻


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> Interesting. And that's a new one on me albeit that Northrup got a development contract for it a couple of years ago. I haven't seen much on it but did dig up this test video.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clearly a different solution if it uses a true proximity fuze but equally effective.
> 
> I expect it has the same issue as MANTIS in that it needs a complex sensor system with a data link to get the gun onto a predicted target location. I note the video was posted Feb 22, 2022 (although I think it might have come out at their 2021 Bushmaster Users' conference) so am somewhat surprised at the how experimental it still looks.
> 
> 🍻


Best way for cannon-based AA is to use a backup proximity fuse.  The primary method should be a calculated (timed) pattern of detonations based on fire control solution of the target's movement,  creating a larger cloud of shrapnel that the target flies into/can't avoid.

AHEAD is just the best-advertised example, but other options exist.

The issue is twofold on a IFV platform.  First is active sensors needed.  An EOIR option IMHO would be better for survivability purposes.  The second how much space does all of that take up in the IFV, and would it limit dismounts.  Otherwise we're just designing a gun truck here, and we just swapped out dismounts for GBAD, which isn't really the point I was trying to make.


----------



## GR66

Underway said:


> Best way for cannon-based AA is to use a backup proximity fuse.  The primary method should be a calculated (timed) pattern of detonations based on fire control solution of the target's movement,  creating a larger cloud of shrapnel that the target flies into/can't avoid.
> 
> AHEAD is just the best-advertised example, but other options exist.
> 
> The issue is twofold on a IFV platform.  First is active sensors needed.  An EOIR option IMHO would be better for survivability purposes.  The second how much space does all of that take up in the IFV, and would it limit dismounts.  Otherwise we're just designing a gun truck here, and we just swapped out dismounts for GBAD, which isn't really the point I was trying to make.


Are these really just duct tape solutions to cover the fact that we don't have the dedicated support capabilities that we require?

If we had a proper dedicated SHORAD capability we wouldn't have to fit an AD weapon on our troop carriers.  If we had vehicle mounted 120mm mortar platoons and the proper complement of artillery  we wouldn't need a mortar on our troop carriers, etc.


----------



## Underway

GR66 said:


> Are these really just duct tape solutions to cover the fact that we don't have the dedicated support capabilities that we require?
> 
> If we had a proper dedicated SHORAD capability we wouldn't have to fit an AD weapon on our troop carriers.  If we had vehicle mounted 120mm mortar platoons and the proper complement of artillery  we wouldn't need a mortar on our troop carriers, etc.


I'm not proposing a solution for SHORAD for Canada.  That's another thread, and specifically, a proper SHORAD needs to be integrated together with sensors and effectors.

What I'm proposing is that IFV may not be properly armed _across the entire spectrum of IFV's.  _If IFV's can use their weapons in the support of the infantry without getting themselves killed, then perhaps the IFV need to become A3PC's (Anti Aircraft Armoured Personnelle Carriers - I just invented that acronym) instead.


----------



## Infanteer

The last thing we should be doing is trying to make an IFV into an AD platform.  The crew is trying to do one thing (move the infantry to the appropriate debussing point and supporting them with fires) and shouldn't try to do another thing (scan, identify, and engage aerial threats).

What this discussion does highlight, in relevance to the original thread topic, is that there are times when the infantry should be mounted, as the protected mobility of the LAV provides an advantage to doing so, and there are times when the infantry should be dismounted, as the vulnerability of the LAV (or any armoured vehicle really) means that the right approach is dispersion, a key survivability tactic of the infantry, and not relying upon armour, which will fail and likely result in the destruction of the entire section.

What does the threat of both larger and smaller armed UAS mean for the mechanized infantry?  I'd argue that the threat is similar to Second World War strafing attacks by ground attack aircraft; if you are sitting at either the front or the rear, you are vulnerable.  Much of the UAS footage we are seeing from Ukraine is targeting stationary platforms, with no overhead cam or concealment.  The "so whats?"

Between engagements, mechanized infantry have a tremendous advantage due to the ability for rapid movement under protected mobility.  They can exploit tactical success.  If the carrier is moving, out of contact, I suspect it is relatively safe from many UAS unless they are armed with a sophisticated missile.
When halted during the advance, the infantry should dismount, as halted things can get struck, even behind the FEBA.
When halted during the mounting prior to an attack and closer to the FEBA, the infantry may stay mounted if the threat of artillery fires is greater than the UAS threat, but it should attempt to seek some sort of overhead concealment at the very least.
If overhead concealment is not possible, and the wait is extended, it may be prudent to dismount infantry and find a decent protected position or (if even longer) dig a quick shell scrape. Dispersion makes the carrier/section less vulnerable and less of a target.
An effective AD platform, specifically targeting UAS, using weapons discussed above, would be a handy TACOM attachment to a combat team, as it can provide an umbrella to the force, protecting them from both (1) UAS precision strikes and (2) artillery strikes cued by UAS observation.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Are these really just duct tape solutions to cover the fact that we don't have the dedicated support capabilities that we require?
> 
> If we had a proper dedicated SHORAD capability we wouldn't have to fit an AD weapon on our troop carriers.  If we had vehicle mounted 120mm mortar platoons and the proper complement of artillery  we wouldn't need a mortar on our troop carriers, etc.





Underway said:


> I'm not proposing a solution for SHORAD for Canada.  That's another thread, and specifically, a proper SHORAD needs to be integrated together with sensors and effectors.
> 
> What I'm proposing is that IFV may not be properly armed _across the entire spectrum of IFV's.  _If IFV's can use their weapons in the support of the infantry without getting themselves killed, then perhaps the IFV need to become A3PC's (Anti Aircraft Armoured Personnelle Carriers - I just invented that acronym) instead.


I think the question is what does one need out of a vehicle. 

A 30-40mm cannon could have a secondary duty as an Anti Aircraft system.  
 ATGM systems like Javelin or Hellfire could also be used for limited AA (Anti helicopter) or use a Stinger in place of a Anti Armor missile.  

 Any of those uses however requires a robust and extremely secure network to get targeting data to the FCS of the vehicle — as I don’t think (based on previous comments) that the Artillery or Air Force will be happy with Infantry having GBAD assets integral without control from higher.  

WRT the integral Mortar idea - a 60mm integral mortar isn’t replacing a 81-120mm Mortar platoon - it’s simply a supplementary item to assist in the final push on the objective.  

 IMHO the entire concept of the IFV/APC needs to be relooked at, but understanding Indirect Fire is still the #1 killer.  Don’t spend too much time on outliers.  

No one vehicle will be able to offer everything in all theaters.


----------



## Kirkhill

Are you back to discussing the need for one vehicle to do everything?  Carry troops, kill troops, kill vehicles, kill tanks, kill  RAM, UAVs, helicopters, and Fixed Wing?

Or  are we considering the fleet in its entirety?

All vehicles, regardless, of their purpose, are going to be under threat from RAM, from Loitering Munitions and from Micro and Mini UAVs.  All vehicles then, like all ships, are going to need point defences to counter attacking munitions at very short ranges by means of obscurants, decoys, EW, DEW and kinetics.  That means the C-RAM system needs to be full spectrum, low volume, light weight and cheap.  This point defence system needs to be limited to one system per vehicle on account of cost and the need to get the job done without interfering with the vehicles primary function.  That suggests a single turret mounted system rather than a multitude of fixed sensors.  It also suggests a highly autonomous solution with all aspect sensors, rapid slew to cue capability and the ability to depress below the horizontal while elevating as close to the vertical as possible. And it needs lots of ammunition.

It has to be compatible with any vehicle for the 7 tonne JLTV class, through the AFV/IFV/APC fleet to the CS and CSS fleets.

And it has to be able to manage dismounted troops as well. It should be expected that it will work in packets of 4 or so vehicles working in conjunction.  

And, did I mention that it needs to be light, effective, not interfere with the vehicle's primary function..... and be cheap.

Once that is done then you can start building the fleet with dedicated functional platforms for  multi layer AD, multi layer AT, Assault, Troop Carrying, CS and CSS capabilities.

I don't think we can rely on being able to cluster a large number of vehicles under a  single, tight umbrella.  To deal with dispersal you are going to need lots of small umbrellas.  Ideally one per vehicles but at least one or two per packet.

At the one per vehicle level the effectors are EW/Laser (DEW)/ small calibre, very high Rate of Fire machine guns - something like a 5.56 gatling gun or chain gun.

At the packet level you are up to the auto-cannon level (20-50 mm) that operate in the 2-5 km  max range bracket.  At that level you may also be adding VSHORAD missiles in the MANPAD range.

What do you need for defence if: ou are operating as
individual vehicles,
packets of dispersed vehicles with constantly changing compositions,
platoons and troops of fixed compositions and platforms
independent companies, squadrons and batteries
independent battalions and regiments
independent brigade groups
an independent divisions
all of the above but operating in an allied context

Seems to me you have a lot of work ahead of yourselves,  Especiallly for an "Army" that struggles to field 18 infantry companies, 3 tank squadrons and 6 gun batteries.

Edit: Dam! I wish I could type faster.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> The last thing we should be doing is trying to make an IFV into an AD platform.  The crew is trying to do one thing (move the infantry to the appropriate debussing point and supporting them with fires) and shouldn't try to do another thing (scan, identify, and engage aerial threats).
> 
> What this discussion does highlight, in relevance to the original thread topic, is that there are times when the infantry should be mounted, as the protected mobility of the LAV provides an advantage to doing so, and there are times when the infantry should be dismounted, as the vulnerability of the LAV (or any armoured vehicle really) means that the right approach is dispersion, a key survivability tactic of the infantry, and not relying upon armour, which will fail and likely result in the destruction of the entire section.
> 
> What does the threat of both larger and smaller armed UAS mean for the mechanized infantry?  I'd argue that the threat is similar to Second World War strafing attacks by ground attack aircraft; if you are sitting at either the front or the rear, you are vulnerable.  Much of the UAS footage we are seeing from Ukraine is targeting stationary platforms, with no overhead cam or concealment.  The "so whats?"
> 
> Between engagements, mechanized infantry have a tremendous advantage due to the ability for rapid movement under protected mobility.  They can exploit tactical success.  If the carrier is moving, out of contact, I suspect it is relatively safe from many UAS unless they are armed with a sophisticated missile.
> When halted during the advance, the infantry should dismount, as halted things can get struck, even behind the FEBA.
> When halted during the mounting prior to an attack and closer to the FEBA, the infantry may stay dismounted if the threat of artillery fires is greater than the UAS threat, but it should attempt to seek some sort of overhead concealment at the very least.
> If overhead concealment is not possible, and the wait is extended, it may be prudent to dismount infantry and find a decent protected position or (if even longer) dig a quick shell scrape. Dispersion makes the carrier/section less vulnerable and less of a target.
> An effective AD platform, specifically targeting UAS, using weapons discussed above, would be a handy TACOM attachment to a combat team, as it can provide an umbrella to the force, protecting them from both (1) UAS precision strikes and (2) artillery strikes cued by UAS observation.



The only point I would raise infanteer, is that near-peer battles are still not the linear battles of yesteryear.  Troop densities are a lot lower and there are many more ways to infiiltrate the enemy lines both with effectors and sensors.  That means that it is not just the infantry and the armoured vehicles that are a risk frrom troopies with ATGMs,  Off Route Mines, Loitering Munitions and UASs and RAM Munitions.  As the Ukrainians are demonstrating an effective strategy is to target the soft centre and go for the logistics, command and artillery assets.  They are the ones most  likely to need their own defence.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> The only point I would raise infanteer, is that near-peer battles are still not the linear battles of yesteryear.  Troop densities are a lot lower and there are many more ways to infiiltrate the enemy lines both with effectors and sensors.



I'm not sure the battles of yesteryear were as linear as historical maps suggest and that infiltration opportunities were as plentiful then as they are now and I don't think "logistics, command and artillery assets" are any more vulnerable now than they were in the past.  One only has to look at the troop density/KM on the Eastern Front of the Second World War to get a sense that there is a lot of space "in-between" and to understand that infiltration and exploitation aren't simply about finding gaps and getting around the surfaces, as the Russians found out the hard way in northern/northeastern Ukraine.


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## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think the question is what does one need out of a vehicle.
> 
> A 30-40mm cannon could have a secondary duty as an Anti Aircraft system.
> ATGM systems like Javelin or Hellfire could also be used for limited AA (Anti helicopter) or use a Stinger in place of a Anti Armor missile.
> 
> Any of those uses however requires a robust and extremely secure network to get targeting data to the FCS of the vehicle — as I don’t think (based on previous comments) that the Artillery or Air Force will be happy with Infantry having GBAD assets integral without control from higher.
> 
> WRT the integral Mortar idea - a 60mm integral mortar isn’t replacing a 81-120mm Mortar platoon - it’s simply a supplementary item to assist in the final push on the objective.
> 
> IMHO the entire concept of the IFV/APC needs to be relooked at, but understanding Indirect Fire is still the #1 killer.  Don’t spend too much time on outliers.
> 
> No one vehicle will be able to offer everything in all theaters.



WRT the 60mm mortar - many AFVs have multiple 76mm mortars just now - for screening purposes 




Challenger carries them on the turret, left and right of the main armament.

They do the same job as these MASS systems mounted on the CPFs (also from Rheinmetall)



A starting point for all vehicles could be something like this  with an M3 HMG but additional accoustic an EO/IR sensors.











						PROTECTOR RWS
					

The PROTECTOR RWS is the world’s most fielded Remote Weapon System with more than 20,000 units delivered and in use by customers around the globe




					www.kongsberg.com
				




Or, if you wanted to added more potential kill shots against light targets and dismounted troops then perhaps something like this?









						XM214 Microgun - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


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## Infanteer

The Merkava does one better, with an actual mortar.  Not sure this is a viable option on a IFV though.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> I'm not sure the battles of yesteryear were as linear as historical maps suggest and that infiltration opportunities were as plentiful then as they are now and I don't think "logistics, command and artillery assets" are any more vulnerable now than they were in the past.  One only has to look at the troop density/KM on the Eastern Front of the Second World War to get a sense that there is a lot of space "in-between" and to understand that infiltration and exploitation aren't simply about finding gaps and getting around the surfaces, as the Russians found out the hard way in northern/northeastern Ukraine.



Fair comment.  But if infiltration was possible in the well defined linear front of WWI and the more amorphous fronts of WWII then it is at least as easy to "get to" the assets in the "rear" now as it was then.  

We seem to spend a lot of time considering the assault and protecting the assaulters.  We seem to spend less time considering the requirements of the defence.  The first thing that draws my eye is that while it may be true that "he who defends everything holds nothing" it seems to be equally true that he who defends most wins.  Fortunately, the defender still has many advantages, some of which play to the benefits of industrialization, automation and "low-skilled" operators.

Assaulters are in a different league.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> The Merkava does one better, with an actual mortar.  Not sure this is a viable option on a IFV though.



Cute.  But isn't that just a low cost alternative to its main armament?    

It is not going to be particularly effective against a squad in close, a fast moving ATGM or a Swarm.  On the other hand they do have the Trophy system for that.

Can we combine something like Trophy with a small calibre, light weight RWS cheaply?


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## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Interesting. And that's a new one on me albeit that Northrup got a development contract for it a couple of years ago. I haven't seen much on it but did dig up this test video.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clearly a different solution if it uses a true proximity fuze but equally effective.
> 
> I expect it has the same issue as MANTIS in that it needs a complex sensor system with a data link to get the gun onto a predicted target location. I note the video was posted Feb 22, 2022 (although I think it might have come out at their 2021 Bushmaster Users' conference) so am somewhat surprised at the how experimental it still looks.
> 
> 🍻



And interestingly enough, not an AFV, IFV or APC in sight.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Fair comment.  But if infiltration was possible in the well defined linear front of WWI and the more amorphous fronts of WWII then it is at least as easy to "get to" the assets in the "rear" now as it was then.
> 
> We seem to spend a lot of time considering the assault and protecting the assaulters.  We seem to spend less time considering the requirements of the defence.  The first thing that draws my eye is that while it may be true that "he who defends everything holds nothing" it seems to be equally true that he who defends most wins.  Fortunately, the defender still has many advantages, some of which play to the benefits of industrialization, automation and "low-skilled" operators.
> 
> Assaulters are in a different league.



Yes, but in the context of this thread, on the defence the infantry should be dismounted anyways, so the topic at hand isn't really an issue.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Yes, but in the context of this thread, on the defence the infantry should be dismounted anyways, so the topic at hand isn't really an issue.



But how much preparation do you have to prepare a hasty defence, or for that matter a hasty attack?  At what point do you sense a change in the situation that suggests the change from a mounted course of action to a dismounted course of action?

Do you want to make good time and accept risks?
Or do you want to minimize risks and accept a slow pace?
Are you going to push out advance, rear and flank guards and adjust to the terrain or highball it down the middle of the road?









						Ukraine war: Drone footage shows Russian tank column retreat after artillery ambush
					

Drone footage shows a Russian tank column coming under fire on the outskirts of Kyiv.  A Russian tank commander was killed in the attack in the town of Brovary, the Ukrainian military claimed.  The footage, taken from a Ukrainian drone, shows three Russian tanks in the village of Skybyn before...




					ca.movies.yahoo.com
				




Other examples?  
Column moving widely spaced on a two lane highway in open fields with hedgerows being plinked apart with precision.
Vehicles bunched up for a river crossing.
Generals being chased out of HQs by artillery raids.
Helicopters and Generals being destroyed by 20 strikes on the same parking lot.
Batteries being forced to disperse into two gun sections because 6  gun batteries are too tempting a target?

I seems to me the TAPV with RWS and 4 dismounts -  4 to 6 of them to every company/battery  in the field would make a useful security det.  In other words every company or battery - guns, rockets or AD, trucks, helos, maintenance or command, should have its own, or should be able to field its own, "infantry/CRAM" platoon to be able to protect the sub-unit while on the move and also, while static and performing its primary function.

Lots of opportunities for Reserve Infantry and Cavalry tasks - VP defence and LOC security.  Lots of reasons for all arms to  maintain General Duties soldiers on their rolls.  Soldiers that can be learning their primary trade at the same time they are providing security.

Or do we anticipate drawing Chariots of Fire, with their assaulters, from the assault force to disperse around the rear as security forces?

It seems to me that if the Chariot is primarily intended to be an Assault vehicle then that will demand one set of characteristicss   On the other hand a General Duties/Utility/Security vehicle will have different needs.  I doubt we can afford to use assault vehicles throughout the entire rear area and if we try we would end up with one vehicle that is a less than ideal assault vehicle and both too few in number and too expensive, not to mention over equipped to be a utility vehicle.

Perhaps something like this for the rear security vehicle instead of, or in addition to, the TAPV?






						Mowag Piranha Kdo Pz 6x6 gl  - Radschützenpanzer - Radfahrzeuge | militärfahrzeuge.ch
					






					militaerfahrzeuge.ch
				




With that out of the way - 4 to 8 of them in every security platoon? - with that out of the way then what do you require for an Assault Vehicle?


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## TangoTwoBravo

Looking through existing Canadian doctrine (based on WW2 and also received lessons from the 1973 War), I find the following:

   a.  tanks lead in open country

   b.  dismounted infantry lead in close country

   c.   mounted infantry seldom lead

I don't think that much has fundamentally changed. If you lead with LAVs with sections on board you are going to get taken out by tanks and ATGMs. If you hang about in a crowded assembly area within artillery range you are going to get hit. This is true now and was true before. As Infanteer points out, against some threats you stay mounted and against others you dismount and disperse.

I think that infantry should be as generalist as possible. Having one unit of infantry for rear-area security and another for close combat is, to me, needless specialization.  Our Kandahar experience, of course, was different. Over there, the soldiers in the convoy were a million times more important than the convoy itself. Having a trucker captured would have been a disaster of the greatest magnitude. So we dedicated organizations to convoy escort and force protection. Made sense in that context. 

In general war the calculus changes. Artillery, CPs and logistical elements all must be ready to rely on their own means to defend themselves. People will be lost. Convoys will be ambushed. War is bad.  There are situations, though, where it may well be appropriate to dedicate combat elements to rear area security. That decision should be based on the estimate of the situation with an emphasis on the threat. A company of infantry guarding the BSA is not doing something else. Opportunity cost. 

Regarding UAS, as a young Armour Lieutenant in 1991 seeking overhead cover whenever halted was hammered into us due to the expected air threat (we were still in a Cold War mindset).  UAS have certainly increased the chances of having vehicle groupings detected and hit along with a potential shortening of the loop from sensor to shooter, but the possibility existed before. CUAS and winning the artillery duel are important, but for the infantry platoon and company I think that the answer is to avoid bunching up, minimize time spent in assembly areas and get overhead cover when you do halt. 

Anyhoo.


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## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Looking through existing Canadian doctrine (based on WW2 and also received lessons from the 1973 War), I find the following:
> 
> a.  tanks lead in open country
> 
> b.  dismounted infantry lead in close country
> 
> c.   mounted infantry seldom lead
> 
> I don't think that much has fundamentally changed. If you lead with LAVs with sections on board you are going to get taken out by tanks and ATGMs. If you hang about in a crowded assembly area within artillery range you are going to get hit. This is true now and was true before. As Infanteer points out, against some threats you stay mounted and against others you dismount and disperse.



Some things never change.  For good reason.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> *I think that infantry should be as generalist as possible. Having one unit of infantry for rear-area security and another for close combat is, to me, needless specialization*.



I also agree with that.  I wasn't arguing for specialization.  What I was suggesting was that some duties require a greater array of skills than others.  Fighting tanks and laying guns requires greater skills than securing guns and tanks  Ideally any CUAS system would require minimal skills so that the system could be managed by all trades.  Conversely an Assault force of Infantry, I believe, requires a greater array of skils than infanteers securing BMAs, VPs and LOCs.  

From there I make the suggestion that  it might be possible to employ less accomplished soldiers in rear area security roles until they get "blooded" and learn to survive in their new environment and while they are picking up skills that will make them useful replacements for casualties in front line units.

I'm not thinking of having an Offensive Team, a Defensive Team and Specialist Teams.  Far from it.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Our Kandahar experience, of course, was different. Over there, the soldiers in the convoy were a million times more important than the convoy itself. Having a trucker captured would have been a disaster of the greatest magnitude. So we dedicated organizations to convoy escort and force protection. Made sense in that context.
> 
> In general war the calculus changes. Artillery, CPs and logistical elements all must be ready to rely on their own means to defend themselves. People will be lost. Convoys will be ambushed. War is bad.  There are situations, though, where it may well be appropriate to dedicate combat elements to rear area security. That decision should be based on the estimate of the situation with an emphasis on the threat. A company of infantry guarding the BSA is not doing something else. Opportunity cost.



I agree with you.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Regarding UAS, as a young Armour Lieutenant in 1991 seeking overhead cover whenever halted was hammered into us due to the expected air threat (we were still in a Cold War mindset).  UAS have certainly increased the chances of having vehicle groupings detected and hit along with a potential shortening of the loop from sensor to shooter, but the possibility existed before. CUAS and winning the artillery duel are important, but for the infantry platoon and company I think that the answer is to avoid bunching up, minimize time spent in assembly areas and get overhead cover when you do halt.
> 
> Anyhoo.



And some things never change.  For good reason.

But what happens when spacing moves from 5 m to 20 m because of PRRs?   Or the effective range of the section increases to 800 m against all targets?  But sections can see other sections moving 10 km away?  And the battalion can see and strike at 40 km?

I agree entirely that some verities are timeless, as Infanteers DuPuy would have it.  But  I would suggest that in the eternal game of Rock-Paper-Scissors that the weighting of the elements is constantly changing.  Somethings get easier and other things get harder.


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## Kirkhill

... Or, I guess to put it another way, there may be nothing wrong with the doctrine, which would be a good thing, but the implementation of  it in terms of  equipment, tactics, training and procedures, that have to constantly shift.  Often at the commander's whim?


----------

