# The CF Bloated Rank Structure



## PPCLI Guy (17 Oct 2004)

We have had a lot of different discussions on various threads and so I thought that I would dig up the real numbers:

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp04-05/sec3p_e.asp



> ACTUAL 2003â â€œ04
> Officers
> General, Lieutenant-General;Admiral, Vice-Admiral*     11
> Major-General;Rear-Admiral   20
> ...



Some calculations:

Officers to NCM ratio:   1:4.45
Percentage Officers:      22%
Percentage Generals: 0.1%
Percentage Cpls and MCpls: 41%
Percentage Ptes:   16%
Percentage Sr NCOs:   21%

So please, from now on when we throw figures around, lets use these.


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## Infanteer (18 Oct 2004)

I looked through this, it is for the Regular Force only, correct?

That's pretty close to the figures I've been using in my proposals (which were estimates from 2001).   22% (1:4.45) still bothers me though - seems too high; especially when we've talked about flattening the pyramid.   

As well, we have 72 Generals and Admirals (With that neat little caveat which means that this is a low figure) in an Army of 3 Brigades, 2 Fleets, and 1 Air Division.   If things have gotten that inflated up there, how are things in the middle levels (I understand that their are some problems with distribution at the lower levels).


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## Kirkhill (18 Oct 2004)

It occurs to me that if every Corporal/LS in the CF were put in charge of a Corporal's Guard of 3 Privates there is room for an additional 70,000 Privates in the CF, based on Rank structure, bringing us up to a force level of about 130,000.   It seems that it could be construed that there is a surfeit of leaders at all levels, not just the Flag Grade.

That assumes that about half of the Privates/Private(Recruits) are actually recruits and not fully capable of joining a unit and contributing to its operational capacity.


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## PPCLI Guy (18 Oct 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I looked through this, it is for the Regular Force only, correct?



Yup.



> That's pretty close to the figures I've been using in my proposals (which were estimates from 2001).  22% (1:4.45) still bothers me though - seems too high; especially when we've talked about flattening the pyramid.



And has been reduced from 2000 when it was 1:4 - as directed in some report or plan...   



> If things have gotten that inflated up there, how are things in the middle levels (I understand that their are some problems with distribution at the lower levels).



Lets play with the numbers a bit.  Assuming that all OCdts and most 2 Lt / Lt are essentailly un-trained or under training, we end up with a percentage of 16.8%, which is certainly more palatable...

Lets look at the middle or "working" ranks of Capt to Major:  a total of 14.5% of the CF.  Another way of looking at it is that of the Offcier corps, 65% are in the "working ranks".

You know as well as I do that numbers can be manipulated six ways to Sunday though...


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## IPC10 (18 Oct 2004)

More Fun with Numbers.

Reg Force Inf Numbers

Rank		Bn		Ere			Total
CWO		9		24(73%)		33
MWO		55		45(45%)		100
WO		167		231(58%)		398
Sgt		401		264(40%)		665
MCpl		574		117(17%)		691
Cpl/Pte		2622		296(10%)		2918

94% of Inf NCM ERE filled
41% of Inf NCO are on ERE

Regt Demographics
Rank		RCR		PPCLI		R22eR
COL		     12		         7		              8
LCOL		     31		         31		              46
Maj		      75		         75		              90
Capt		     121		        130		              140

Inf Corps shortage of around 101 Inf Capts.

So Officers to NCM ratio:   1: 6.27
Around a 13.75% Officers in the RegF Inf PY's
(Not counting Generals)
Source â â€œ various career managers briefs


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## Kirkhill (18 Oct 2004)

IPC10, What's ERE?

Sorry for the ignorance.


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## PPCLI Guy (18 Oct 2004)

Extra Regimentally Employed ie not in a Bn or RHQ. 

 I will use it in a sentence..

Dave is still frickin ERE!!!


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## Bruce Monkhouse (18 Oct 2004)

..or Dave is still frickin thERE!!![couldn't resist]


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## Franko (18 Oct 2004)

Too much math for a dumb tanker......

My head hurts  :crybaby:

Regards


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Oct 2004)

Cpl to Pte ratios are meaningless - a Corporal is a private soldier with a pay raise.  I'd suggest the ratio of Sgts to Junior NCMs (ie section leaders to section members) would be more meaningfull.  I would expect almost a 1 to 1 ratio of privates to corporals; it would mean retention has been better than if we have as many recruits as corporals.


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## Kirkhill (18 Oct 2004)

> Extra Regimentally Employed ie not in a Bn or RHQ.
> 
> I will use it in a sentence..
> 
> Dave is still frickin ERE!!!



Thanks.  And Condolences.....


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## PPCLI Guy (18 Oct 2004)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Cpl to Pte ratios are meaningless - a Corporal is a private soldier with a pay raise.   I'd suggest the ratio of Sgts to Junior NCMs (ie section leaders to section members) would be more meaningfull.   I would expect almost a 1 to 1 ratio of privates to corporals; it would mean retention has been better than if we have as many recruits as corporals.



Sgts to Mcpl and Below = 1:5


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## tabernac (18 Oct 2004)

> As well, we have 72 Generals and Admirals (With that neat little caveat which means that this is a low figure) in an Army of 3 Brigades, 2 Fleets, and 1 Air Division.



If we have 72 Generals and Admirals, where are they? Do we need them there? And when they retire do they have to be replaced?


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Oct 2004)

cheeky_monkey said:
			
		

> If we have 72 Generals and Admirals, where are they? Do we need them there? And when they retire do they have to be replaced?



This has been discussed before.  Many occupy positions equivalent to senior Civil Service positions, so arguably they need the rank.  Many are in scientific, research, public relations and other types of jobs and not in command positions (obviously, given our low number of formations, as pointed out by Infanteer).  Scaling back the military would mean scaling back the equivalent senior civil service jobs - good luck getting that to happen short of a Depression.


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## Infanteer (18 Oct 2004)

Not good enough for me.  Deriving a requirement of senior officers to senior civil service positions is following an administrative, function-based outlook, as opposed to what we should be seeking to define our requirements by; an output-based, productive outlook in which requirement would be determined by the output of fighting power.  Unless they were to make up an infantry section, those positions should be cut.


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Oct 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Not good enough for me.  Deriving a requirement of senior officers to senior civil service positions is following an administrative, function-based outlook,



Well, duh.   ;D


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## Infanteer (18 Oct 2004)

> Well, duh.



Unfortunately, that is what I said too.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (18 Oct 2004)

Infanteer, based on our current size of the CF, what do you think upper ranks should look like?



Matthew.


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## PPCLI Guy (18 Oct 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Not good enough for me.   Deriving a requirement of senior officers to senior civil service positions is following an administrative, function-based outlook, as opposed to what we should be seeking to define our requirements by; an output-based, productive outlook in which requirement would be determined by the output of fighting power.   Unless they were to make up an infantry section, those positions should be cut.



OK - fair enough.  Lets talk about output=combat power.

Why do we have MFRCs (the one in Toronto is basically the most expensive day care in NATO)?
Why do we have PMQs?
Should DRDC get more than $200M of the defence budget?
Why are we getting a pay raise?
What about maternity/paternity leave?
What do Cadets have to do with combat power?
Can we afford Skyhawks / Ceremonial Guard / those acrobatic aircraft whose name I can't remember right now?
What does DHH have to do with combat power?
And SAR (not CSAR)?
What does the Army mascot have to do with combat power?
Do we really need all of those Reserve Units for the generation of combat power?

The point I am making (and I personally think that we do not need many of the items above) is that there may well be second and third order effects to a narrow perspective of "combat power" as our output.  I firmly believe that you are on the right track, and I do not support many of the activities above precisely because they have no direct relationship to our "output".  I do however think that if we go down that route we will a) have a shitestorm on our hands, and b) dissolve into hopeless infighting as we protect our respective ricebowls.

So where an I going with this?  Sure, focus on the output, but do it for the right reason, and not just to flatten the hierarchy, and then be prepared to live with the outcome.  Finally, the government has yet to define what "combat power" they want us to have...

One final thought - why are 72 positions out of 62.021 so emotive?  I am sure that we have more than 72 pers that are not fit enough to be seen in public, let alone do the BFT or EXPRES test.  I am sure that we have waaay more than 72 Social Workers or Padres - in fact I am sure that we, the CF, pay for at least ten times as many child care workers as that.

Just some thoughts...


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## pbi (18 Oct 2004)

The imbalance must be at NDHQ. Take a look at LFWA, for example. There are probably around 5,000 RegF and about 3600 Res soldiers, plus a large number of civ empl-let's say 1,000. So call it 9,000 uniforms and 1,000 civvies. In that mix there are:

Two BGens (Area Comd, Area DComd(Res))

Seven Colonels (COS, ACOS(Res), Comd 1 CMBG, Comd 1 ASG, three Res CBG Comds)

That's seven  for 9,000 uniforms, or one to 1285. (approx).

That doesn't seem too bad to me. When you consider that only five are actually commanders, the ratio is better still.

I also agree with the observation that distinguishing between Cpls and Ptes when doing these calculations is false. A Cpl is an NCM, but not really an NCO, although perforce we use them as Sect 2ICs if we have to. In truth, they are  more qualified Ptes-closer to what USA calls a "Spec". Cheers.


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## tabernac (19 Oct 2004)

> This has been discussed before.   Many occupy positions equivalent to senior Civil Service positions, so arguably they need the rank.   Many are in scientific, research, public relations and other types of jobs and not in command positions (obviously, given our low number of formations, as pointed out by Infanteer).   Scaling back the military would mean scaling back the equivalent senior civil service jobs - good luck getting that to happen short of a Depression.


 
Thanks  for clarifying that, I should have done a search.

One thing I did notice when I visited the HR site for DND, was that they are cutting back on all the Senior ranks(at least it appears that way).


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## GGboy (19 Oct 2004)

While I'm the last person to defend the number of generals in the CF, it was explained to me (by a Brigadier, no less) that there are a number of positions that require a certain rank of general to fill. Deputy Commander of Norad for one example, or deputy C.O. of the U.S. Army's III Corps for another ...


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

PPCLI Guy, most of the relevent stuff you bring up is related to my conception of Fighting Power (as Van Crevald proposes), which along with equipment would make up the combat power of a unit or the Army as a whole.



> Why do we have MFRCs (the one in Toronto is basically the most expensive day care in NATO)?


Many of the functions of an MFRC should be handled by the Regiment; perhaps a bureaucracy like the MFRC indicates a further slide towards a occupational outlook by the Army (we are a Federal department) as opposed to 

Anyways, military initiatives to support the families of soldiers would fall under the category of Maintenance of Combat Efficiency - perhaps as a psychological measure; soldiers need to know their home is in good order so they are not distracted with regards to the mission.



> Why do we have PMQs?


See above.



> Should DRDC get more than $200M of the defence budget?


What's that?



> Why are we getting a pay raise?


Goes under the Pay aspect of Fighting Power; professional _condotierri_ like us need to be suitably compensated if we are to dedicate our lives to the profession of arms.



> What about maternity/paternity leave?


This would go under the aspect of Leave, although ultimately, the needs of a fighting force must take precedence over one's personal preferences.



> What do Cadets have to do with combat power?


Nothing, that's why I disagree with the concept.



> Can we afford Skyhawks / Ceremonial Guard / those acrobatic aircraft whose name I can't remember right now?


If recruiting wants to pay for, then sure; except Ceremonial Guard, which could be classified under Social Status of Armed Force.



> What does DHH have to do with combat power?


What is that?



> And SAR (not CSAR)?


Should be a Coast Guard duty.  It is inappropriate for a military focus on rescuing hikers and not it's own pilots.



> What does the Army mascot have to do with combat power?


We have a mascot?



> Do we really need all of those Reserve Units for the generation of combat power?


Not if we want them for an Industrial Age, 1940'ish, mobilization.


Anyways, we could peck the issue to death.  I am not implying that administrative functions need to be eliminated, only that these functions must ultimately be subordinated to the output of combat power.  I fear that the bureaucratic process has led to self-sustaining growth of administrative functions that exist not for the sake of the Forces, but for the sake of the bureaucratic administration.  I'll use a quote from before by Van Crevald to emphasis my outlook:

_Above all, an organization should ever keep in mind the purpose for which it was created; this involves striking a balance between productive (output-related) and administrative (function-related) tasks, the latter to be adequate but limited to the minimum possible.  Under no circumstances should function-related tasks be allowed to equal, much less exceed, the output-related ones in importance.  This should be reflected in the organization's doctrine and structure."_



> One final thought - why are 72 positions out of 62.021 so emotive?  I am sure that we have more than 72 pers that are not fit enough to be seen in public, let alone do the BFT or EXPRES test.  I am sure that we have waaay more than 72 Social Workers or Padres - in fact I am sure that we, the CF, pay for at least ten times as many child care workers as that.



Because these prestige and responsibility behind these positions usually means that for each General, there is a some sort of department, complete with pers on ERE, civilian staff, budget, diffusion of command to the NDHQ bureaucracy, etc, etc.  It is not that a position of General represents one person; it is that the position, with its inherent roles and responsibilities, implies a large amount of resources for that General to administer - ultimately I feel this leads to bloated inefficiency and a loss of combat power.  Does this make sense?

Like I said before, 3 Brigades, 2 Fleets, and 1 Air Division don't really need 72 Generals to administer.  "Too many Chiefs and not enough Braves", or something to that effect.  Anyways, that is my concern with the numbers.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> The imbalance must be at NDHQ.



That's been my general conception all along.  Any look at reforming the Officer Corps must not only look to reducing the ratio, but to distributing them properly.  CBG Comds).



> I also agree with the observation that distinguishing between Cpls and Ptes when doing these calculations is false. A Cpl is an NCM, but not really an NCO, although perforce we use them as Sect 2ICs if we have to. In truth, they are more qualified Ptes-closer to what USA calls a "Spec". Cheers.



Yup.


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## Kirkhill (19 Oct 2004)

> Quote
> And SAR (not CSAR)?
> Should be a Coast Guard duty.  It is inappropriate for a military focus on rescuing hikers and not it's own pilots.



I thought the reason the Air Force and CF wanted this job was two-fold - firstly it kept the CF in the Public Eye, a not inconsiderable benefit I would think, and secondly and more importantly it gave their pilots an opportunity to work in real world, hazardous situations where decisions have consequences - the crews are not just running "safe" exercises.

Many of the points raised have similar dualities associated with them.  MFRC. You suggest handling that in the Regiments, what about those folks that will spend their entire career never being near a fighting element?

You may argue that, like the "surplus" Generals, they should not be allowed, but much of the support necessary to maintain the force is supplied by people who have spent a lifetime at becoming proficient at one aspect of maintaining the system or fulfilling the need.  Is someone that spent 2 years with an F-echelon element  some 20 years ago that much more clued in to the needs of F-echelon just because of the time-in?  Should he/she sacrifice their building of necessary maintenance and support skills by constantly breaking their career focus and sending them back to F-echelon?

As to the notion of "surplus" Generals.  There is a need for those people that represent you to the outside world to have rank.  The need for operational forces to have rank is clear.  It establishes command and control responsibilities.  But rank also denotes something else.  It denotes trust.  In the words of my parchment "Her Majesty......reposing especial TRUST in you...".  Rank indicates to the rest of the world that you are trusted.  And the greater the rank then the greater the amount of Trust the "system" (in this case embodied by Her Majesty but actually being the sum of you,  your army and your government) reposed in the holder.

Brigade Commanders have (or should have) a downward, operational focus. Same goes for Area, CLS and CDS.  However if they are to do their jobs they need other people they trust to get you the things you need.  People to argue your case.  The people they are arguing with need to know that they are trusted to speak on behalf of CDS and the CF.  They most obvious indicator of that trust is Rank.

With all due respect to the many brilliant privates, sergeants, captains, colonels (and even dumb civilians) on this board.  Bill Graham and Paul Martin are a whole lot less likely to take the CF seriously if CDS send Private Bloggins over to argue the case for the CF.  Likewise a US Four Star is going to listen more carefully to a Canadian Three Leaf than a Canadian Captain even if the Canadian force under his control is only a Company.

I can understand the frustration at seeing all these "hangers on" but I honestly don't see a reasonable alternative. In a world where communication is as important as it ever was, but where there are many more paths to manage and many more decisions to be taken (largely resulting from a societal tendency to specialize to handle the complexities of many arcane areas) it needs bodies. Those bodies need Responsibility, Authority and Budget to conduct there tasks.  The system needs to demonstrate to all and sundry that these bodies are trusted.  And in the military system the measure of the level of trust is the rank.


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

> Because these prestige and responsibility behind these positions usually means that for each General, there is a some sort of department, complete with pers on ERE, civilian staff, budget, diffusion of command to the NDHQ bureaucracy, etc, etc.  It is not that a position of General represents one person; it is that the position, with its inherent roles and responsibilities, implies a large amount of resources for that General to administer - ultimately I feel this leads to bloated inefficiency and a loss of combat power.  Does this make sense?



I am not so sure that is necessarily correct.  I would prefer to believe (as well as being an optimist, I am also a little naive) that the function or output necessitated the directorate, and the positions were created to fulfill that, rather than vice versa.



> I can understand the frustration at seeing all these "hangers on" but I honestly don't see a reasonable alternative. In a world where communication is as important as it ever was, but where there are many more paths to manage and many more decisions to be taken (largely resulting from a societal tendency to specialize to handle the complexities of many arcane areas) it needs bodies. Those bodies need Responsibility, Authority and Budget to conduct there tasks.  The system needs to demonstrate to all and sundry that these bodies are trusted.  And in the military system the measure of the level of trust is the rank.



There have been a number of allusions to the fact that our Senior Officers have increasing levels of both operational and command experience.  It is only in the most recent incarnations of Army Council for instance that the members have predominantly been prior Bde Comds.  Gens Hillier, Macdonald, Lessard, Leslie, Beare et al all have operational or senior command/staff experience, much of it with our Allies.  Gen Hillier would not have been acceptable to NATO as a 3 star Comd  in ISAF without his experience with 3 Div (I think I have the Div right).  This suggests that you need a critical mass of Generals in order to get that level of experience - and once you do, your Allies listen when you talk, and your commanders have real operational and command experience to bring to our own domestic table.


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

> I would prefer to believe (as well as being an optimist, I am also a little naive) that the function or output necessitated the directorate, and the positions were created to fulfill that, rather than vice versa.



I don't know.  I just can't see how 72 Generals/Admirals = the Force we can field today.  Something is askew.

Perhaps we need to do some more digging; I remember seeing a list that showed all the positions that General Officers held, is something like that available?  Maybe an explanation of each position would help instead of us just generalizing about a number.


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## Kirkhill (19 Oct 2004)

Great idea Infanteer


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

PS: Kirkhill, I agree with you that we should have positions not directly related to our own operational forces that may require a high ranking position (eg: Deputy Commander of NORAD).  However, that real fancy caveat in the figures PPCLI Guy gave us does not include these guys.  I am making the assumption that the 72 that are shown deal with our own Forces.


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Perhaps we need to do some more digging; I remember seeing a list that showed all the positions that General Officers held, is something like that available?   Maybe an explanation of each position would help instead of us just generalizing about a number.



Here ya go.

Edited out link.  Info was available on the net, but had phone #s etc.  I will post a scrubbed down list

82 total.   10 overseas, 1 in Privy Council Office, 7 are Reservists, one chaplain, one lawyer.


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## Spartan (19 Oct 2004)

Is it just me or - while looking at that list in terms of title alone - I'm not sure about their responsibilities etc,
that there could be a lot of simplification and realignment of general responsibilities?
for example - difference between Director  Generral of the Reserves & cadets AND the Chief of reserves and caadets
or SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR  and the DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR PERSONEL 
or PROJECT MANAGER - LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE  and Director General of the Reserves AND the Chief / 2ic of Reserves

the list could go on... to me its not making sense. Anyone?


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

OK - here is the cropped list.  The first ones are deployed with allies - remainder in order of rank.

LGen CHIEF OF STAFF OF NATO's HQ SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC 	
MGen ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS NATO IMS CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN PERMANENT 	
MGen DIRECTOR OPERATIONS NORAD HEADQUARTERS 	
RAdm LIAISON OFFICER TO NORTHCOM  NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND 	
RAdm DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS & STRATEGIC PLANNING FOREIGN & DEFENCE POLICY SECRETARIAT PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE 	
RAdm COMMANDER - CANADIAN DEFENCE LIAISON STAFF (WASHINGTON) 	
BGen COMMANDER SHIRBRIG 	
BGen COMMANDER CANADIAN DEFENCE LIAISON STAFF (LONDON)  	
BGen VICE COMMANDER  CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS CENTER 	
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER CONAR SENIOR CANADIAN OFFICER CONUS NORAD REGION 	
BGen DIRECTOR OF STAFF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 	

Gen CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF - 	
VAdm VICE-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF 	
VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC 	
VAdm ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (HUMAN RESOURCES-MILITARY) 	
VAdm CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF 	
VAdm DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF 	
LGen CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF 	
LGen DEPUTY COMMANDER NORAD HEADQUARTERS 	
LGen CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF - 	
LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES 	
MGen - CHIEF OF STAFF  ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (HUMAN RESOURCES-MILITARY)
MGen COMMANDER 1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION 	
MGen ACTING CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF - 	
MGen ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF  	
MGen DIRECTOR GENERAL STRATEGIC PLANNING -NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS 	
MGen PROJECT MANAGER - LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE - 	
MGen J2/DIRECTOR GENERAL INTELLIGENCE  	
MGen DIRECTOR GENERAL FINANCE - 	
MGen COMMANDER CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY 	
MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY 	
MGen CANADIAN FORCES BASE/AREA SUPPORT UNIT KINGSTON  (ATL)	
MGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SYSTEM 	
MGen COMMANDER DIRECTOR GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES OTTAWA, ON K1A 0K6	
MGen JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL 	
RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCES PACIFIC 	
RAdm CHIEF OF STAFF - ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (INFORMATION MANAGEMENT) - 	
RAdm DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY - 	
RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS 	
RAdm CHIEF OF STAFF JOINT FORCE GENERATION 	
RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS - 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT - 	
BGen COMMANDER  LAND FORCE WESTERN AREA  	
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA - RESERVES - 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND STAFF 	
BGen CHAPLAIN GENERAL - 	
BGen A1 PERSONNEL 	
BGen CHIEF OF STAFF J3  	
BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR PERSONEL 	
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA HEADQUARTERS 	
BGen A3 OPERATIONS 1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 	
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER LAND FORCES WESTERN AREA HQ 	
BGen COMMANDANT CANADIAN FORCES 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL REALTY POLICY AND PLANS/J3 ENGINEERS - 	
BGen SURGEON GENERAL 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIC DIRECTION - 	
BGen J4 MATERIAL/DIRECTOR GENERAL LOGISTICS - 	
BGen COMMANDANT -ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA 	
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE CENTRAL AREA HEADQUARTERS 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL - AEROSPACE EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF 	
BGen A4 -1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION 	
BGen J2 INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND CSE/DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDERLAND FORCES ATLANTIC AREA HEADQUARTERS 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVES AND CADETS - 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 	
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE ATLANTIC AREA  	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY CAREERS 	
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND RESERVE - 	
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SYSTEM 	
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER - LAND FORCES CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS	
Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET PACIFIC 	
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY AND PLANNING - 	
Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS 	
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL MARITIME PERSONNEL AND READINESS 	
Comm ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF 	
Comm CHIEF OF FINANCE 	
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL - MARITIME EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 

Why are the Airforce staff principles (A1, A3 and A4) BGens?  The Army gets away with Cols...

OK - now we can have a reasoned discussion.  In response to the question about ORBATS, this is not the best way to review an ORBAT - get on teh DNet and havea look at the NDHQ ORBAT...


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

Looks like one big bureaucracy.  How come, as PBI pointed out, a field unit can run itself with a minimal amount of top dogs but NDHQ requires a glut.  It seems that a General can no longer say "I am commander of 1st Divison" or "I am the Army Staff Operations Officer".  Now it is "I am the DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY".

Here are a few that stood out as confusing:

LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES

MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY (So, Generals are CEO's now?)

BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR (What the hell is this?)

RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS (Aren't the Areas responsible for the Reserves?)

VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC (Why do we have this guy when we also have RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS and Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS???)

This big list has only further confirmed my suspicions that we are unwieldy and top heavy.  However, I have a feeling that somehow all these positions are justified within the paradigm of a large, centralized headquarters in Ottawa.  Paring down these numbers requires transformational change in how we as an institution view the role, orientation, responsibly, and organization of higher Headquarters and commands.


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

> Here are a few that stood out as confusing:
> 
> LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES



Ya got me there...



> MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY (So, Generals are CEO's now?)



Don't even get me started...



> BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR (What the heck is this?)



Air Force Equivalent to Dir Gen Land Res (DGLRes)



> RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS (Aren't the Areas responsible for the Reserves?)



Nope.  VCDS is.  Reserves includes the Naval Res, Air Res, Rgrs, Jr Rgrs, Cadets and Militia.  Area Comds are just responsible for Milita (and Cadets - this is new and evolving)



> VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC (Why do we have this guy when we also have RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS and Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS???)



Ummmm?



> This big list has only further confirmed my suspicions that we are unwieldy and top heavy.  However, I have a feeling that somehow all these positions are justified within the paradigm of a large, centralized headquarters in Ottawa.


  

Yep.  Army sucked it up, closed St Hubert, scaled down Land Staff, and made do.  Air Force stayed in Winnipeg in shiny new building and got bigger.  Navy is split between Right and Left coasts, and so have twice the infrastructure.



> Paring down these numbers requires transformational change in how we as an institution view the role, orientation, responsibly, and organization of higher Headquarters and commands.



Yup


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

> Yup



Thanks, it's good to know I'm not alone (or crazy).


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## Bruce Monkhouse (19 Oct 2004)

LGen CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -
MGen ACTING CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -

Explanation?


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

General Hillier, the Chief of the Land Staff, is currently the Commander of ISAF in Kabul, so someone has to wear his other hat (and MGen Leslie is probably one of the best candidates to do so, IMHO).


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## Bruce Monkhouse (19 Oct 2004)

Thanks,  So this person would be like a "General Floater" than.


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> General Hillier, the Chief of the Land Staff, is currently the Commander of ISAF in Kabul, so someone has to wear his other hat (and MGen Leslie is probably one of the best candidates to do so, IMHO).



Gen Hillier is back.  The Acting (MGen Caron) will revert to Assistant.  MGen Leslie is on ATL doing his doctorate - for now.  BGen Benjamin is now Director General Land Staff (COS of the Army - the guy that runs the place day to day)


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## Infanteer (19 Oct 2004)

Doh!!!  I should have read the fine print on the bios....


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## Pikache (19 Oct 2004)

I'm wondering what the heck do all those colonels/captains (N) do?


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Oct 2004)

RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
			
		

> I'm wondering what the heck do all those colonels/captains (N) do?



Follow the link - they all have bios and a list of appts there.


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## tabernac (22 Oct 2004)

> MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER   CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY (So, Generals are CEO's now?)



They need to feel special (e.g. bigger, better, more).


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## Cliffy433 (26 Oct 2004)

Ummm... can anyone on here tell me the difference between: Vice-CDS and Deputy-CDS?

They sound very similar...


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## Edward Campbell (26 Oct 2004)

True story.

Many, many years ago I stormed into my boss's office â â€œ he was a RAdm â â€œ in quite high dungeon about the doings of some idiot one star out in the boonies.

The boss chuckled and said, â Å“OK, [Rusty], agreed; dumb as a bag of hammers but, did he really do any harm?â ?

â Å“No,â ? I replied, then â Å“come to think of it, I don't think *they* do anything, harmful or not.â ?

â Å“Exactly,â ? said the Admiral.   â Å“Don't forget,â ? he said, â Å“promotion boards aren't perfect;after all you're still waiting, no?   Sometimes they really drop a clanger, Brigadier So-and-so is a case in point â â€œ now that he's got one star we discover he's a bungling incompetent â â€œ so we put him in the harmless HQ, the one which doesn't do anything.â ?

I left happy, well happier, anyway ...

Back in my day, when the earth was still cooling the VCDS was the 'general manager' and the CDS's real, working deputy.   The DCDS was the head of the (embryonic) joint staff â â€œ responsible for plans and operations.


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## Kirkhill (26 Oct 2004)

Re Vice CDS and   Deputy CDS think in terms of G2 and G3.

One is responsible for policy and adm as well as being second in line to the throne while the other is responsible for operations.  The Vice appears to handle discipline, policy and relations with the Civil Service while the DCDS is responsible for Joint Forces and Liason Officers on international postings etc..

That may be an incorrect appreciation but it is what I have gleaned from looking at wiring diagrams.  Somebody else can correct me but it looks as if both gents have ample opportunity to earn their pay.

Cheers.


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## PPCLI Guy (26 Oct 2004)

Hmmm.   VCDS = G1/G4 and comptroller - thomk of the "institutional CF
DCDS =G3, think deployable and deployed CF.   All overseas missions are under the aegis of DCDS (not sure about routine naval ops...).

If there is a domestic op, then the Area Comd, once he has generated the Forces, gets chopped to DCDS (and does not take operational direction from the CLS).


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## Kirkhill (26 Oct 2004)

Thanks for clearing that up.  

I just don't happen to believe that beating on Generals will solve the CF's problems.


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## Cliffy433 (27 Oct 2004)

Thanks for the info all... I guess I was just being too lazy to look up the info myself and asked a question based on the "sameness" of title.  It would make sense to break it up the way it was explained... no overlap at all really.  Next time I'll read first...


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## The_Falcon (22 Dec 2004)

Anyway I got bored so I decided to find the answers to some questions posted earlier by Infanteer . Infanteer found the site ( http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dsa/engraph/home_e.asp) that lists all senior officer and CWO/CPO appointments.  I counted 80 flag officers, a lot of assistant/deputy/vice chief of something or other.  A few things I noted, we have someone in the position of Surgeon General (Brig-Gen).  A person would think they would be in charge of the medical branch but no, we have a person with title of "COMMANDER DIRECTOR GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES - CANADIAN FORCES MEDICAL GROUP HQ" this person a Maj-Gen.  Another one I liked "SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES" a Lt-Gen.  They used to post Col appointments, but I guess it his hard to justify to the public why a Col has to be an" Executive deputy assistant...".  However it only lists the most senior of CWO/CPO postions (48 to be exact).


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## Armymedic (22 Dec 2004)

I can answer for this:



> A few things I noted, we have someone in the position of Surgeon General (Brig-Gen).  A person would think they would be in charge of the medical branch but no, we have a person with title of "COMMANDER DIRECTOR GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES - CANADIAN FORCES MEDICAL GROUP HQ" this person a Maj-Gen



The Surg Gen office is responsible only for medical care and reports to DGHS, where as DGHS office is responsible for all force health protection, provision of dental and medical care, and mental health and reports to the DCDS. BTW there is a Dental General who is a full Col who answers to the DGHS as well.


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## Steel Badger (23 Dec 2004)

New life to a tired post!!!



What is the most Bloated (ie girthfull) rank?


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