# Destroyer Replacement Program



## cameron

Hello all

I've just downloaded an exerpt of the Fall copy of Canadian Naval Review.  Haven't had time to read it yet, just browse through it.  One thing caught my eye though, in an article on procurement of future ships there is an editor's note that the SCSC has since been replaced by the Destroyer Replacement Program.  I haven't heard of this anywhere else, can any of you give me any more info on this Destroyer Replacement Program or sources where I can find such info, thanks.


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## navymich

There is a bit of information starting at  this post and a few others following it.  Haven't seen a whole lot else around about it yet.


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## NCS_Eng

I was in error when I posted in the sub thread about the DRP coming up _alongside_ the SCSC program. I've done a little digging through DGMFD and the CID and it looks like DRP has swallowed SCSC whole. It’s still quite a confusing project, as some of the documentation looks like it was lifted right from SCSC, while others are new for the Destroyer program, yet still make reference to the SCSC SOR... _It looks to me_ like someone in DGMFD has broken off a part of the SCSC program and said "This is a high priority, and the SCSC is too ambitious.. lets break off the requirement for 4 ships to replace the destroyers and move them to the forefront". Again, that’s just a guess, but it looks like that’s what happened. Since the DRP entry in CID looks like it's built on top of the old SCSC project, it looks like we won't be seeing SC squared for a long while.

Reading the staff check, it looks like they evaluated all the same options that the CADRE program looked at a decade ago, A) "Trump the-Trumps" (Extend again) the 280s. B) Buy/lease off-the-shelf a completed ship C) Buy into an ongoing project (And the Australian Air Defence Destroyer was the heavy favourite) D) Build brand new in Canada. They are listed here in order of recommendation, from least recommended (A) to most (D)

The Staff check (and keep in mind this is as 'solid' as water) recommends option D for a whole host of reasons I won't go into here.

If you've got acess to the DWAN there is a some information to be had in the Capability Investment Database (search for Destroyer Replacement), including the Initial ID and the Staff Check (where most of my info is from)

This friday (23 Nov 07) The Maritime Capability Development Board is meeting and one of their agenda items is an update on the DRP. The minutes should be posted on the DWAN sometime next week.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

NCS_Eng said:
			
		

> I was in error when I posted in the sub thread about the DRP coming up _alongside_ the SCSC program. I've done a little digging through DGMFD and the CID and it looks like DRP has swallowed SCSC whole. It’s still quite a confusing project, as some of the documentation looks like it was lifted right from SCSC, while others are new for the Destroyer program, yet still make reference to the SCSC SOR... _It looks to me_ like someone in DGMFD has broken off a part of the SCSC program and said "This is a high priority, and the SCSC is too ambitious.. lets break off the requirement for 4 ships to replace the destroyers and move them to the forefront". Again, that’s just a guess, but it looks like that’s what happened. Since the DRP entry in CID looks like it's built on top of the old SCSC project, it looks like we won't be seeing SC squared for a long while.
> 
> Reading the staff check, it looks like they evaluated all the same options that the CADRE program looked at a decade ago, A) "Trump the-Trumps" (Extend again) the 280s. B) Buy/lease off-the-shelf a completed ship C) Buy into an ongoing project (And the Australian Air Defence Destroyer was the heavy favourite) D) Build brand new in Canada. They are listed here in order of recommendation, from least recommended (A) to most (D)
> 
> The Staff check (and keep in mind this is as 'solid' as water) recommends option D for a whole host of reasons I won't go into here.
> 
> If you've got acess to the DWAN there is a some information to be had in the Capability Investment Database (search for Destroyer Replacement), including the Initial ID and the Staff Check (where most of my info is from)
> 
> This friday (23 Nov 07) The Maritime Capability Development Board is meeting and one of their agenda items is an update on the DRP. The minutes should be posted on the DWAN sometime next week.



I wonder how long we can extend the life of the 280s till we get a replacement...we've already had to retire and sink one of them (Huron). this could take up to ten years till we see any new hulls.


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## ringo

Seawaves magazine gives 2010 decommission date for DDH Algonquin along with AOR Preserver, Provider to
decommission 2011.
IMHO the AOR replacements will build followed by Arctic Patrol Ships then DRP's.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

ringo said:
			
		

> Seawaves magazine gives 2010 decommission date for DDH Algonquin along with AOR Preserver, Provider to
> decommission 2011.
> IMHO the AOR replacements will build followed by Arctic Patrol Ships then DRP's.



Provider was decommissioned years ago, you must mean Protecteur? The JSS are supposed to be ready in 2014 I think, which is the replacement for the AOR.


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## cameron

Thanks guys, re: NCS_Eng i'm not surprised that option D was chosen, and I suspect that some of those "whole host of reason" were political.  However, while i'm all for supporting Canadian industry, with one 280 already scrapped and the remaining three due to be retired very soon, the Navy need new AAW capabilities yesterday, especially considering the theatres it's now operating in and the very real potential threats in those theatres.  

I would have thought that the logic behind DRP superceding SCSC would have been to get this urgent capability need to the Navy ASAP.  Which is why I think option C is the best option, and it would still allow Canadian industries to benefit.

P.S.  I think the Canadian Navy is doing a great job right now safeguarding the world's sea lanes and showing the flag,  keep it up. :cdnsalute:


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## Sub_Guy

Building new and in Canada is a good option, but I wonder if we would ever look at something off the shelf but built in Canada.   Many navies do this, and instead of building from the ground up it could save us some cashola.

The new Aussie destroyer is a Spanish F100, but will be built in Australia with some modifications (Vegemite storage rooms)


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## Kirkhill

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> .....with some modifications (Vegemite storage rooms)



I thought the Vegemite was kept with the POL.  ???


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## Cloud Cover

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> The new Aussie destroyer is a Spanish F100, but will be built in Australia with some modifications (Vegemite storage rooms)



I was down in Adelaide this past September. On the whole, my impression was that the RAN was not altogether happy about this political choice of base platform for their top pennant class of surface warface ships.   What they really wanted was a vessel nearly on par with the Burke class, with extreme modernization for less crew numbers. What they got was a smaller, less capable ship with same crew size + a lot of new features and capabilities tailored for Aussie industrial requirements [= lots of trouble=never-ending revisions and upgrades] all of which were below the mark for what the RAN spec'd in order to fulfill the role assigned by the government.

Still, the Aussies continue to build and grow capabilities befitting a middle power, while the Canadian Navy flounders in a sea of questionable designs, and no cutting of steel.


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## Eye In The Sky

ringo said:
			
		

> Seawaves magazine gives 2010 decommission date for DDH Algonquin along with AOR Preserver, Provider to
> decommission 2011.
> *IMHO the AOR replacements will build followed by Arctic Patrol Ships* then DRP's.



According to the ADM-MAT Material Group Project website, that is correct.  The delivery of the 1st JSS is 2012 with project complete in 2016, and the delivery of the 1st AOPS is 2013 with the project complete in 2019.

ADM Mat Material Group Project website:   http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/site/projects_e.asp

JSS Project Schedule:   http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/dgmpd/jss/JSS_Project_Schedule_e.asp

AOPS Project Schedule:  http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/dgmpd/aops/schedule_e.asp

Taken with the usual 'if all goes according to plan' comment, of course.


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## canuck101

We can always hope they chose the modified version of the Arleigh Burke Class Aegis destroyer. It would ofcourse be a heavy ship at over 7370 tonnes but the core crew and air crew combined comes to 230. The DDG's that we have now are 5100 tonnes and a full crew of 280.


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## geo

Over the years, Canada has trashed pert much all of it's expertise in Warship design and construction.
Irving yards were dismantled after the Frigate program.... what capabilities they had developed were promptly - flushed down the pipes.  To decide on designing and building a new class of ships from scratch (again) is a recippe for disaster.

Unless there is foreward momentum (and not a full stop), there is no point in moving forward with "option D"

IMHO


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## NCS_Eng

I'd just like to further clear up some misconceptions. Option C, which is to buy into an existing program includes those "Canadian" ships being built in Canada.

Furthermore the option of getting Burkes comes up every time a Destroyer replacement project is created, and this one is no different. It was evaluated along with a number of other ship classes for Option B and C, and came out in the top 5. As 5th. This refers _only_ to the Flight IIa ships, with Flight I and II having far too large a manning level.

It was noted as being very big, very expensive and would incur heavy Canadianization costs. The other Finalists were the aforementioned Australian vessel, the German F124, Spanish F100 (there were enough differences between the Spanish version and the Australian version to warrant a separate inclusion) and the Netherlands Provincien class.

I'd also like to point out that I'm giving only the smallest view into a 40 page document which is only itself simply a "Here are some options" paper. The paper also looked into some of the real world issues with buying from other countries (and thats why you won't see any ship classes from China or Russia, for instance)


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## Ex-Dragoon

I say go German F124 stretched...


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## Cloud Cover

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I say go German F124 stretched...



What are the damage control, living quarters and sustained heavy use characteristics of this class? Can they take a beating? It seems to me that, unlike the Germans, we are now likely to put our ships in harms way more often, over longer periods of time, and travel longer distances while working them through evolution after evolution [probably with smaller crews, I might add].  

And most importantly, is the saur kraut and schnitzel locker big enough to hold real food?


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## cameron

If ringo is correct then the Canadian Navy wouldn't have any area air defence capability after the 280's are scrapped for another two or three decade.  That is way too bloody long!!!  I agree with whiskey601 the Australian solution may not be perfect but at least it's a lot better than what we're doing right now.  Option C is not without its drawbacks sure, but let's be realistic, in this world you will hardly ever have a perfect choice in anything, especially not when it comes to procuring new and expensive military technology, and warships by virtue of being both a weapons platform and a floating military base have always been beset by more complex issues than most other military items.

Option C is NOT PERFECT but IT'S THE BEST OPTION.  This capability is one of our most urgently needed, along with tanks and heavy lift choppers and strategic airlift.  we may not be fighting a war on the high seas right now, but as I said in a related post a few months back, let's not make the same mistake as the British in 1982 and assume that because we aren't fighting one today we won't have to fight one tomorrow or the day after.


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## Kirkhill

NCS_ENG, whiskey and Ex-D:

Is the 6000 tonne Danish Absalon C&C ship a viable option as a platform?  Disregarding systems fit as I assume you will be modifying that regardless of what hull/machinery/controls you will be buying.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> NCS_ENG, whiskey and Ex-D:
> 
> Is the 6000 tonne Danish Absalon C&C ship a viable option as a platform?  Disregarding systems fit as I assume you will be modifying that regardless of what hull/machinery/controls you will be buying.



I toured the Absalon when she was here in 2005 or 06...nice ship.


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## Bane

I know that this has been covered in other threads, but it is worthwhile to note here also.  Option 'D' would work well if ship procurment wouldn't be so contract based. Having a permenent yard, even of modest size, to produce a continuous but low volume of hulls is not to much to ask from one of the top 10 economies in the world, and the one with the most coastline.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> NCS_ENG, whiskey and Ex-D:
> 
> Is the 6000 tonne Danish Absalon C&C ship a viable option as a platform?  Disregarding systems fit as I assume you will be modifying that regardless of what hull/machinery/controls you will be buying.



I am not a big Absalon class fan for major combat roles, so I will bow out of this tangent.

A couple of links:
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60993.0.html

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28146.0.html


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## Kirkhill

I think you answered my question anyway Ex-D.  I take it that she is built to civ-mil specs rather than to Mil Std.

Despite what I have said in the past about applications for civ-mil for Domestic vessels or support roles I fully understand your position wrt a Destroyer or a Frigate.  Cheers.


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## Sub_Guy

The vessels mentioned in this thread are all decent and they are available now.  What are things going to look like in a decade?  It takes too long to get hulls in the water, by the time the last CPF hit the water there was quite a bit outdated technology on board.  We could make a decision on what we want now, but 10 years from now we could be sitting with new outdated ships. 

 Next year the Halifax will be 20 years old.......


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## axeman

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> What are the damage control, living quarters and sustained heavy use characteristics of this class? Can they take a beating? It seems to me that, unlike the Germans, we are now likely to put our ships in harms way more often, over longer periods of time, and travel longer distances while working them through evolution after evolution [probably with smaller crews, I might add].
> 
> And most importantly, is the saur kraut and schnitzel locker big enough to hold real food?



the German Frigate is a well laid out plan  I spent just under a week on this spring . decent sized berths , fair sized work spaces  a large sized beer holder.  some negatives but on the whole a fairly decent ship although like others have mentioned its also 10 yrs old at this time . if we could remake the HFX class useing what knowledge we have gained between now and then we could coe upo with a fairly good platform


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## geo

Dolphin,
"as an example"
Start building a basic ship design with delivery of one or two every other year for a period of 10 years.
Put in new technology as the new stuff becomes available - so the last one produced would be a Mk 5 with all the current bells and whistles.  As the older ships come up for refits (eg TRUMP) you put in the new gear that the new ships are getting.


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## NCS_Eng

geo said:
			
		

> Dolphin,
> "as an example"
> Start building a basic ship design with delivery of one or two every other year for a period of 10 years.
> Put in new technology as the new stuff becomes available - so the last one produced would be a Mk 5 with all the current bells and whistles.  As the older ships come up for refits (eg TRUMP) you put in the new gear that the new ships are getting.



What you've just described is (was) the SCSC project. Except rather than upgrading every new ship with the latest technology, the ships would have been built in flights of 4ish and then upgraded for the next flight.

Also some of you are seriously downplaying the difficulty and risks involved with trying to buy into another ship building program. Its not as simple as going to warships R Us and saying "I'd like four F124s please"... the negotiations with the IP holders could take years and there would be questions of who was authorized to do maintenance, not to mention the cost of Canadianizing (and the time it would take in our already overloaded shops). There were some solid reasons the staff check went with Option D, and not all of them were political. Furthermore the biggest timesink as far the capital procurement goes is our very very broken process, and that won't change regardless of what option we use.

Lets be honest here for a second; if we really really wanted to get some new hulls, _tomorrow_, the only real option would be leasing Arleigh Burkes, which we could do relatively cheaply, and quickly (within a few years anyway) but we would not be allowed to even think about doing any type of maintenance outside a US yard. Relying on another country to schedule and perform required maintenance on "our" ships is unacceptable to anyone in the naval community and that's been the dealbreaker for years.

There is no magic process that will have any option C or D ships out any sooner than the mid to late 'teens, and since we expect our ships to have a 40 year life span +, I'd rather do it right than do it quickly.

One final point, there has been no official decisions made about the final disposition of the 280s so anything you have read about Ship X being decomissioned in year X is pure Rumint.


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## kratz

Bane said:
			
		

> I know that this has been covered in other threads, but it is worthwhile to note here also.  Option 'D' would work well if ship procurment wouldn't be so contract based. Having a permenent yard, even of modest size, to produce a continuous but low volume of hulls is not to much to ask from one of the top 10 economies in the world, and the one with the most coastline.



Agreed. The problem is the military is seen as a public service and companies will want to compete for contracts. We have seen this problem with the service contracts with the subs.


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## Sub_Guy

I do realize you can't just go to a store and pick these things up.   It has been said numerous times, that our feast or famine way of doing things when it comes to shipbuilding is bad for all involved.

It will be interesting to see what happens with JSS, Felex, and APOS in the years to come, it would be nice to keep some yards working


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## NCS_Eng

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> I do realize you can't just go to a store and pick these things up.   It has been said numerous times, that our feast or famine way of doing things when it comes to shipbuilding is bad for all involved.
> 
> It will be interesting to see what happens with JSS, Felex, and APOS in the years to come, it would be nice to keep some yards working



Yeah, everyone involved hates the feast/famine way of doing it, and SCSC was such a step in the right direction... maybe the 24B $ pricetag scared off the government (the DRP has a very tentative budget of around 8B)


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## NavyShooter

I think regardless which way we go, we need to get something DONE SOON.

The lead times on building warships is waaay too long to sit around with our thumbs up our butts waiting....it's not like we can hop the production line like we did with the C-17's....

NS


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## IN HOC SIGNO

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> I think regardless which way we go, we need to get something DONE SOON.
> 
> The lead times on building warships is waaay too long to sit around with our thumbs up our butts waiting....it's not like we can hop the production line like we did with the C-17's....
> 
> NS



then we have to do something about our recruiting, attrition, and retention.....that's going to be a huge challenge...in order to sail them.


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## geo

There is / will be no quick fix.
IMHO It's gotta be a complete institutional remake
If we have no ships we need no sailors......

..... In some respects, having a green or blue CDS will have this result for the navy....  I don't want to say that the Head navy guy is not pressing his point with the CDS but, from my perspective, you guys aren't going anywhere at this time.


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## Ex-Dragoon

I think most of us realized a long time ago that if it was not green related in the Navy, or the boys in green could use it then in most cases it would be of lower priority.


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## cameron

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> I think regardless which way we go, we need to get something DONE SOON.
> 
> The lead times on building warships is waaay too long to sit around with our thumbs up our butts waiting....it's not like we can hop the production line like we did with the C-17's....
> 
> NS



+1


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## a_majoor

As a somewhat out of the box solution, would it not be possible to do the "Atlantic Conveyor" thing to container ships today?

Container ships are fairly large and fast (for merchantmen), and it seems to me that the upper deck could be given over to an impromptu flight deck, while various containers would be used either to house weapons, equipment or ammunition, or serve as pedestals for things like a CIWS (ok, not a container, but a base the same size and shape). Other containers would serve as bases for sensors, and rows of empty containers would line the hull to serve as improvised armour protection and provide a certain amount of reserve bouyancy (at least enough to row clear of the thing when it is hit).

There is no question about range, and accommodations would probably not be too out of line (remember, ISO's are 20' shipping containers with some wiring and a window, and bunkers and line houses are a few steps down from that.

From a distance, the "Canadian Conveyor" would even resemble a container ship, until it unmasks the electronic sensors or launches a helicopter. While not a real warship, it could be used to fill in some gaps while we are waiting.


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## Ex-Dragoon

A container ship does not have the DC facilitiesthat a destroyer generally has, not to mention would have a massive RCS that radar homing missiles would love . Accepting second rate equipment in Navy is about the same as its in the Army. You don't paint a ship grey and call it a destroyer because you want it to be, its a destroyer (insert other type of ship) _because_ that is its role or function.

Now a merchant cruiser designed to _support_ not replace warships in times of hostilities might have a function in the 21st century.


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## Kirkhill

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Now a merchant cruiser designed to _support_ not replace warships in times of hostilities might have a function in the 21st century.



Would you like to flesh out that idea a little more?


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## geo

Considering how long we have waited before deciding on the replacement of Provideur / Preserver / Protector, methinks that our navy will paint itself into a corner & we will probably have no alternative but to purchase one or more commercial grade supply ships to "fill the gap".  The alternative is what?...
1 keeping the old ships in use.
2 do without
3 mooch off our allies
4 ?   "warning - fresh paint"


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## cameron

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Would you like to flesh out that idea a little more?



I too find the idea intriguing Ex-Dragoon, would like to hear it in greater detail.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Work in progress. I am sailing but will add more when I get a chance:

Ex Dragoons Idea for a 21st century merchant cruiser

Take one container vessel out of trade, put empty containers in the holds/act as armour

On Upper decks install containerized ops room/separate container for sensors/ew equipment, countermeasures, palletized ESSM fwd/aft (8-16 missiles per pallet), mid ships install palletized RAM/Phalanx for Close in defence, 25mm/40 mm guns (1 focsle, 1 aft, 1 midships port/stbd).

Crude flight deck could be built aft using containers for a light helicopter. Containers could be used to store spares, armaments and fuel.  


 As you can see it would have very little ASuW capbility, ASW might be provided by the helicopter and AAW night help protect it and a couple its consorts. If we ever sail in a convoy system though, it would be a realitively cheap way to help protect several more ships plus add to the envelope of protection the ESSM would provide.


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## geo

> Temporary Carriers
> 
> Such was the need to transport and operate aircraft in the Falklands, the Ministry of Defence requisitioned many merchant ships. Whilst some were converted to hospital ships or troop carriers several were converted into basic aircraft carriers. The container ship Atlantic Convoyer was one such vessel. She had been laid up on the River Mersey but she and her sister ship Atlantic Causeway were taken to Devonport where they were hurriedly converted into 'harrier carriers'. However, the Atlantic Convoyer was one of the more unfortunate participants of the war. On May 25th she was struck by an exocet missile and was immediately evacuated as fire spread through the ship. Together with her loss was the destruction of 3 Chinook and six Wessex helicopters and the tragic deaths of 12 men, including several from the merchant navy. Other Royal Navy ships had some aircraft capability including the helicopter support ship RFA Engadine and the Assault ships Fearless and Intrepid ,which at one point during the campaign both successfully landed Sea Harriers on their helicopter flight decks.
> 
> http://www.btinternet.com/~warship/Feature/falk.htm



The problem with all commercial grade ships being press ganged into Navy service is that - they are commercial grade & not Milspec.
As was figured out the hard way with the Atlantic Convoyer, once hit by an Exocet missile, it's fate was sealed..........without milspec damage controls, the ship was just one big coffin.


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## Delicron

I was looking around on some stuff about Ex-Dragoon's idea for a container ship based support ship and I stumbled across this interesting tidbit on the Canadian National Research Council website.  It's dated late 2005, but I believe it holds some relevance here.  It mainly talks about repealing the Jones Act which (apparently) prevents the sale of Canadian made commercial sea going vessels to American commercial interests.  But why I think this is of interest here is of an interesting little proposal at the end, and forgive me if this has already been talked about:

QUOTE:

_The greatest potential market for Canadian shipyards remains the US domestic market, which has a very large demand for new workboats of all types, including tugs, towboats, barges, ferries and patrol craft. With Canadian labour rates at about 60% of their US counterparts, shipyards on both the east and west coasts could be extremely competitive. The problem at present is of course access to this market. As discussed previously, Canadian negotiators at NAFTA relinquished all rights to this potential market. What is needed is a viable strategy to gain access to this huge market, but it is obvious that something must be traded off for this access.
_
*The paper's recommended approach is to trade all future Canadian warship-building requirements to the USA, in exchange for a relaxation of the Jones Act for Canadian commercial shipbuilders.*

_This would appear to be a win-win situation. At present Canada has no military shipbuilding capability. Further, our demand is so low as to make the periodic resurrection of this capability economically impractical. As our military capabilities and our total maritime defense are so intrinsically intertwined with those of the USA, it seems to make great sense in terms of commonality and compatibility to purchase all our future warship requirements from US builders who have a very large maritime defense industry complex. In contrast, the small number and capacity of Canadian commercial shipyards represent a very limited threat to US commercial builders, but access to that market would provide significant opportunities for our shipyards._

http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/clusters/ocean/trm/section3a_iii_e.html

I thought this would interesting food for thought, and a pretty strong endorsement for the production of a new series of Arleigh Burke type craft using American shipyards.  The insistence on a made in Canada approach for some of these ships seems shortsighted (hopefully I'm correct in this assumption, as it's only a general impression I got from reading this thread).  Myself, I would throw in for this type of production as it may cut down wait times and planning costs, despite some of the intangible "Canadianization" costs.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Although folks in the TASER thread aren't happy with Senator Kenny I think this is a good article and exactly what is needed in Canada

    

Published: 2007-12-04
Boosting shipbuilding makes sense 


By COLIN KENNY 


The Canadian government is going to require well over a hundred new ships over the next quarter century to take care of some critical assignments overseas and along Canada’s coasts.

We need a national strategy to ensure that we have a viable shipbuilding industry. Formulating that strategy is going to be essential to Canadians’ maritime security and vital to Canada’s economy. Parliament should legislate a plan and develop institutional support for this strategy.

There are good reasons for the government to continue to build the ships it needs in Canada. But it must come up with a system that is less hit-and-miss than what we have now to ensure that we retain the resources to build those ships.

In the past, the federal government’s need for new ships has never been sufficient to guarantee anything more than sporadic employment at shipyards in Atlantic Canada, Quebec and British Columbia. 

That has created a stuttering industry, with shipyards and their employees never sure whether it was worth it to develop their skills and devote their lives toward the end of building first-class ships.

We need a shipbuilding industry that hums rather than stutters. By my count, Canada is going to need something like 133 new vessels of a significant size over the next 25 years, plus refits.

The Department of National Defence is probably going to need at least 45 ships, including the modernization of 12 frigates and their future replacement, as well as four new destroyers, eight Arctic/offshore patrol vessels, and refits for four submarines.

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans is going to require at least 83 vessels, including nine icebreakers, 15 medium endurance and offshore patrol vessels, and 42 Search and Rescue lifeboats. Transport Canada will need three Marine Atlantic ferries.

That represents a lot of champagne bottles bursting over new bows. There is enough critical mass to restore Canadian shipyards in both Eastern and Western Canada to viable, continuous operations.

Good economic opportunities are vital to the survival of any sovereign state. The Canadian manufacturing sector has taken a huge hit in recent years because of fierce foreign competition and the ascent of the Canadian dollar. A secure shipbuilding industry could play a big part in Canada’s economic future.

Canada is in bad need of ships – new ships and refitted ships. The world is becoming an increasingly volatile place. No country can be absolutely confident that these kinds of needs will be met in foreign shipyards, especially if war were to break out. 

If the Canadian government were to institute a continuous shipbuilding program, there would, of course, have to be safeguards on costs. No country can afford to pay double, or even a 50 per cent premium, for Canadian content on such major purchases.

But Canadian shipyards are no longer out of line on costs. While they can’t compete with developing countries on basic metal-bending, modern shipbuilding requires producing modules that incorporate electronics and other complex components. Canadian shipyards can do this as well as anyone.

To assure reasonable pricing, it wouldn’t be that difficult to set up a regulatory authority, similar to the National Energy Board or the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, to ensure fair pricing. Such an authority could hold hearings to ensure that Canadian taxpayers weren’t getting gouged on contracts. 

How could the Canadian shipping industry be confident that the next government that came along wouldn’t pull the rug out from under a 30-year plan for shipbuilding that was designed in some earlier Parliament?

First, contracts could be signed so major firms would be guaranteed work on a long-term basis, contingent on regular audits. Those contracts should require major shipbuilding yards to subcontract some percentage of that work to smaller yards, to assure broad capacity in the industry.

This plan would have such economic and political benefits that any succeeding government would meddle with it at its peril. 

Essentially, the government would be allowing monopolies in the interests of Canadian security, as it does with pipelines and power companies. This has been a standard model that governments have been using for essential utilities for more than a century.

Profits would still be good if the government created a monopoly structure for shipbuilding, but not as good as they would be if marketplace risk were involved. That’s the trade-off, but it would be a good one for both the industry and Canadians.

Such a grand plan might be of great economic and strategic value to Canadians. It would assure that Canadians will have the navy and coast guard that we need. It would be founded on a regulatory regime that would satisfy the auditor general.

It has become increasingly apparent that the federal government is going to have to pay close attention to ensuring Canada’s economic survival, and Canada’s physical survival. 

The shipbuilding industry would be a good place to start.

Senator Colin Kenny is chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence.


  

© 2007 The Halifax Herald Limited


----------



## geo

> At present Canada has no military shipbuilding capability. Further, our demand is so low as to *make the periodic resurrection of this capability economically impractical*. As our military capabilities and our total maritime defense are so intrinsically intertwined with those of the USA, it seems to make great sense in terms of commonality and compatibility to purchase all our future warship requirements from US builders who have a very large maritime defense industry complex. In contrast, the small number and capacity of Canadian commercial shipyards represent a very limited threat to US commercial builders, but access to that market would provide significant opportunities for our shipyards.



The problem with this statement has to do with the fact that we always go for a "Famine to feast to famine" building program.
If it was known that we would build a new frigate every other year... all the time - and schedule minor refits OR major refits in the middle years, shipyards WOULD prosper, Naval architects and engineers would have a future in Canada.


----------



## Delicron

> The problem with this statement has to do with the fact that we always go for a "Famine to feast to famine" building program.



While this is true, I have to agree with the reports general idea that we trade off our admittedly sporadic Fleet building programs to a military shipbuilding complex that is more robust, and in exchange, give those Naval architects and engineers free reign to build commercial vessels for a market that was previously off limits to them.  I think a healthy commercial ship building industry is just as helpful, or even more so, than betting on Canada's fickle (over subsequent governments) Defense spending programs.


----------



## cameron

Just a thought, to my knowledge most of Canada's military shipbuilding has been for local needs.  Has any thought been given to catering mostly for the foreign market, particularly rapidly modernizing navies like India etc.  Canada will most likely always have a small navy (hopefully not as small as it is at present though), so depending solely on local needs to keep shipyards running and to retain skills is unrealistic.  At the same time however, I find the suggestion of a historically maritime nation such as Canada, with the world's longest coastline spanning three oceans, completely scrapping all military shipbuilding capability unacceptable.

Canada has a history of innovation and ingenuity in the maritime sphere so it's not unfathomable for it to become a major player in the international warship market, from patrol boats to frigates.  Developing this export capacity won't happen overnight but I think the present and future governments should place priority on helping Canadian industry develop this capacity.  British companies like VT make most of their revenue from the export rather than the domestic market.  Canada this route would help to retain skills when the domestic need arises.


----------



## geo

Cameron,
When we built the Frigates, there was an attempt to interest foreign countries in the design.
Attempts were made to interest the gulf states.... didn't work


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

geo said:
			
		

> Cameron,
> When we built the Frigates, there was an attempt to interest foreign countries in the design.
> Attempts were made to interest the gulf states.... didn't work



Because the laFayette came out at the same time and the French offered more incentives and our shipyards wanted all Halifax classes built in Canada...so says one of my XOs who was involved in the CPF project at the time.


----------



## Delicron

> Because the laFayette came out at the same time and the French offered more incentives and our shipyards wanted all Halifax classes built in Canada...so says one of my XOs who was involved in the CPF project at the time.



Seems like a clear case of shooting ourselves in the foot back then.  Licensing production to other shipyards will still give our ship-building industry added side benefit, mainly seeing a lot of engineering muscle come out of Canada.  But looking at the Lafayette vs the Halifax, it looks like the Lafayette is the more modern vessel (and it is, seeing as the last Halifax was commissioned in 1996, and the first Lafayette was that same year).  It would be hard to deny the appeal of the Lafayette, especially when incentives and considerations are taken into account.  These are the difficulties we face when exporting unless we get our act together and produce a competitive product that other countries would consider, and not handcuff them to being made only in Canada.  I'm sure this would offset engineering costs, and then (hopefully) get Canada into the *habit* of producing a regular Destroyer / Frigate replacement program... so we don't have to make it so unusual and scary every time some of our equipment needs to be replaced or refit.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Capability wise Halifax class outshines LaFayette each time, been on exercise with a couple of them and they do not have as good sea handling characteristics and for a supposed stealth vessel, well I won't get into that....


----------



## Delicron

> Capability wise Halifax class outshines LaFayette each time, been on exercise with a couple of them and they do not have as good sea handling characteristics and for a supposed stealth vessel, well I won't get into that.... Wink



And you see... this is where experience comes in handy, you can look at specs, and see how 'cool' it looks with all that stealth design and such, but if in actuality it handles like a drunk pig, and can't properly track targets 50 meters away...then yeah it makes a difference! 

Myself, I can't wait to have the experience that would allow me to say "Yeah, these _'name vessel here'_ are unmitigated crap".


----------



## cameron

Point taken geo but that experience should be a learning one, and like the other guys noted farming out some of the work makes more sense in terms of attracting potential buyers and creating opportunities for Canadian engineers overseas (consultancy etc.).

P.S. Interesting point about the Halifax vs. the Lafayette.  Brings to mind a question i've been meaning to ask for awhile, in exercises how does the Halifax stack up against the RN's type 23's (Please guys I don't want a flame war, just some facts).


----------



## Sub_Guy

I doubt you will find unbiased opinions in here.  Lets be honest if I was on the frenchnavytalk.com website, I am sure I would find that they feel their Frigate is superior to the CPF..


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> I doubt you will find unbiased opinions in here.  Lets be honest if I was on the frenchnavytalk.com website, I am sure I would find that they feel their Frigate is superior to the CPF..



Nice to see how dismissive you are of other peoples experience... :



> P.S. Interesting point about the Halifax vs. the Lafayette.  Brings to mind a question i've been meaning to ask for awhile, in exercises how does the Halifax stack up against the RN's type 23's (Please guys I don't want a flame war, just some facts).


Nice ships...although my preference runs towards F123/F124/F100s


----------



## Sub_Guy

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Nice to see how dismissive you are of other peoples experience... :



The Halifax class is a decent ship, sure some of the technology on board is dated but they right up there with the top Frigates in the world.  I am not dismissing any personal experiences that anyone has had with the Lafayette.  I have never sailed on the Lafayette so I can't say much about what they have, what they do and how they handle.  The Lafayette frigate does appeal to many people, if it didn't it would not be in service around the globe, so its manufacturer must be doing something right.  Overall it can't be that bad of a ship design.

The Radar signature of a Lafayette should be (in theory) smaller than that of the CPF, but as for stealth... Not a chance, leave the stealth to the experts, the Swedish Submariners.


----------



## geo

At the time the Halifax came out, the Canadian press did a real hatchet job on the ship's construction and how some sort of cavitation sound was doubling or trebling it's radar/sonar signature.  Methinks the media had it's fieldday at our expense AND certainly did not help our efforts to sell the Frigates overseas.


----------



## cameron

Typical case of some sectors of the Canadian press doing their best to undermine the CF for the sake of headlines.  Good news is no news seems to be their gospel.


----------



## canuck101

I have a question about the De Zeven Provincien Class guided missile carrying fast frigates. What do you guys think of this ship as a possible replacement for the Tribal class destroyers. It seems to be around the same size as the Tribal class Destroyers.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

canuck101 said:
			
		

> I have a question about the De Zeven Provincien Class guided missile carrying fast frigates. What do you guys think of this ship as a possible replacement for the Tribal class destroyers. It seems to be around the same size as the Tribal class Destroyers.



Nice and capable class btw all frigates are fast frigates by default.


----------



## wolfshadow

Hi all,

New to the board, and finding this topic interesting.

As I am somewhat politically activist, we shall see what Mr. MacKay has to say on the matter.  I just sent the Minister of Natinal Defence an email on the subject of this thread.  If he emails me a response, I'll post it here for the edification of others.

Cheers,

wolfsahdow


----------



## geo

wolfshadow.
welcome to the forum....
There was no real need to rehash the material of this thread for the Minister.  Plenty of political aids lurk here.
If you have something tangible to add to the discussion, feel free to say so... just try to stay in your lane and talk about what you know - VS - what others know.


----------



## wolfshadow

It





			
				geo said:
			
		

> wolfshadow.
> welcome to the forum....
> There was no real need to rehash the material of this thread for the Minister.  Plenty of political aids lurk here.
> If you have something tangible to add to the discussion, feel free to say so... just try to stay in your lane and talk about what you know - VS - what others know.




Geo, 
My email  was not so much of a rehash for the minister as a note from a concerned citizen about the topic.  If he says anything interesting in reply, I'll post it here to inform others.  I was in the middle of checking on the status of the replacement program for my own edification when I ran across this topic.

Thanks for the reply.


----------



## dapaterson

wolfshadow said:
			
		

> As I am somewhat politically activist, we shall see what Mr. MacKay has to say on the matter.  I just sent the Minister of Natinal Defence an email on the subject of this thread.  If he emails me a response, I'll post it here for the edification of others.



Hmm... you realize that the MND will not draft the reply.  Rather, the email will be routed to the Minister's Correspondence Unit (MCU) who will farm it out to either the Navy or ADM(Mat).  They will dust  of the generic "Thank you for your interest in the Canadian Navy" letter, pass it up to the MCU who will ensure it meets tone and formatting requirements, and send a reply to you within 4 to 6 weeks.

The Minister himself will give it only a cursory look - or he may just read the one para summary that's included.

The real fun is when someone writes to say the Navy commander, doesn't like the answer he gets, then writes to the Minister... nine times out of ten, the same staff member will write the second reply...

Of course, no names, no pack drill...  >


----------



## wolfshadow

Oh, I realize that...  He'll prob get a comment from a staffer to the effect of "Some guy wrote in about replacing the Destroyers."

However the more letters that they get about the topic, the more the matter come on their radar screen.

And sometimes the formulaic responses from the ministers office can be interesting.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

You do realize the Navy is currently trying to work on getting the Victorias back in the water, the JSS project under way, FELEX, the conversion of the CPFs to embark the Cyclones, and the new Arctic OPV program started. While we have been told the DRP is important, lets not over extend ourselves.


----------



## wolfshadow

*Ex-Dragoon*: I realize that there is a bunch of stuff on the plate of the navy. And alot of the stuff that we are doing prob. should have been done years ago.   For myself, I'm more worried about the long lead time for major combatant construction.  This become even more of a worry if we are to build them here in Canada.  Not like I think that my one little email to the Minister's office is going to do much, but I think that it would be appropriate for the Government to at least consider and debate the matter of funding them.

Oh, and as a new member, thanks for the considered responses.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

We all are wolfshadow, especially those of us that work/live/play on said ships. Having the program stood up and SCSC stood down indicates to most of us that the replacement of the 280s has become a higher priority for the Crown.


----------



## geo

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hmm... you realize that the MND will not draft the reply.  Rather, the email will be routed to the Minister's Correspondence Unit (MCU) who will farm it out to either the Navy or ADM(Mat).  They will dust  of the generic "Thank you for your interest in the Canadian Navy" letter, pass it up to the MCU who will ensure it meets tone and formatting requirements, and send a reply to you within 4 to 6 weeks.
> 
> The Minister himself will give it only a cursory look - or he may just read the one para summary that's included.
> 
> The real fun is when someone writes to say the Navy commander, doesn't like the answer he gets, then writes to the Minister... nine times out of ten, the same staff member will write the second reply...
> 
> Of course, no names, no pack drill...  >



Heh.... have been the author of my fair share : >


----------



## dapaterson

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> We all are wolfshadow, especially those of us that work/live/play on said ships. Having the program stood up and SCSC stood down indicates to most of us that the replacement of the 280s has become a higher priority for the Crown.



Ex-Dragoon:  I suspect the price tag associated with SCSC scared people; it would dominate the CF capital plan for a significant length of time.  Cutting it in two (DDHs then FFHs) will raise the overall costs, but spread it over a longer period and  permit the Frigate replacement to start later, freeing capital dollars for other projects (anyone notice the age of the CF-18s?  Or the wear and tear the LAV fleet is currently undergoing?)

I think this is probably a tactical move by the Navy to ensure new platforms in a shorter timeline; pressing forwrad with SCSC would defer the acquisitions significantly.


----------



## IN HOC SIGNO

Militarys are expensive and need to be maintained in a planned and disciplined manner. If Canada wants to keep a viable Armed Forces with well trained and credible people we're going to have to spend the bucks on it. a patchwork plan for the last 30=40 years of equipment acquisition and troop reductions, contracting out and generally using the Department as a political football has left us in the position now where everything needs replacing and we're short of people. As stated in another article I read recently it took about 15 years to destroy the CF from about 1963-78 or so...it'll take twice as long to put us back on our feet. ...and it will take annual budgets of well into the 30 billion dollar annually level. If the Government can muster the political will then we will have a new and improved CF...if not we'll muddle along like we have done for the last 30 years...buying equipment only when absolutely necessary and asking our people to keep fixing stuff with binder twine and duct tape, while our expert technicians depart for greener pastures.


----------



## geo

In hoc...
If you look at the history of Canada and it's military you'll find that the military has pert much always been neglected and any moneyh spent on oit has been grudgingly spent.
When WW1 broke out we had next to nothing but a patchwork of militia units throughout the country & no serious military equipment.... the military was ramped up for the duration.... and brought back down pert much just as quickly.
When WW2 broke out, we had next to nothing but a patchwork of militia units & a miniscule regular force & no serious military equipment... the military was ramped up for the duration and retained for the war in the pacific.  It's only a matter of pure luck that Korea happened within 5 years of WW2 that Canada had something substantial to pony up for the war against North Korea, China & the dastardly communists.

Our military industrial complex was pert much built up for WW2, refreshed for Korea & developed/maintained between 55 and 70.  Everything else has been downhill & on life support.


----------



## IN HOC SIGNO

geo said:
			
		

> In hoc...
> If you look at the history of Canada and it's military you'll find that the military has pert much always been neglected and any moneyh spent on oit has been grudgingly spent.
> When WW1 broke out we had next to nothing but a patchwork of militia units throughout the country & no serious military equipment.... the military was ramped up for the duration.... and brought back down pert much just as quickly.
> When WW2 broke out, we had next to nothing but a patchwork of militia units & a miniscule regular force & no serious military equipment... the military was ramped up for the duration and retained for the war in the pacific.  It's only a matter of pure luck that Korea happened within 5 years of WW2 that Canada had something substantial to pony up for the war against North Korea, China & the dastardly communists.
> 
> Our military industrial complex was pert much built up for WW2, refreshed for Korea & developed/maintained between 55 and 70.  Everything else has been downhill & on life support.



Agreed. I am a bit of a history buff myself and realize that we had glory years during the early part of the Cold War. What we need is the political will to break out of that mold and come up with a more workable plan. The old plan of mobilize and equip Reserves when the balloon goes up is not viable anymore.


----------



## geo

Heh... most wars nowadays are "come as you are" with very little chance for a buildup.

Many rocket scientists at the big puzzle palace have realized that the delta they built into the army's militia (combat arms types) is no longer sustainable.  Troops have to be trained to a closer standard, from the very beginning.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Back a few (early 90's) moons ago when I was in the Reserve's, we used to train 2 nights a week and in Sept-Nov and Jan-May we usually had 2 FTXs a month.  I believe now the normal standard is 32 training days per reservist funding to the unit CO to train his people.  THAT would be the first action to take IMHO to correct the delta that exists now.  You have to resource, fund and staff the issue properly and that requires more of the almighty training $.

But if the powers that be did that, wouldn't they be accused of a "Bush-like military buildup" by the NDP?   ;D


----------



## a_majoor

A thought occurred to me ( ) regarding future warships. If even second rate nations like Iran can field weapons like supersonic anti ship missiles and Skvall supercavitating rocket torpedoes, then sleek "greyhound of the seas" warship designs are pretty much a dead end. Even with exotic hull forms, hydrofoils, lifting bodies and so on, no ship as we understand it will be able to move fast enough to evade an attack by modern weapons. Adding ECM, decoys and weapons like CIWS increases cost and weight (especially up top), things which are critical in a compact warship.

Rather than layering on more and more defenses and electronics, why not build the same capabilities as a Halifax class frigate into a vastly larger hull? If you think of a modern container ship or pure car carrier, there is a giant hull powered by an 11,000KW diesel capable of doing 20+ knots. Cutting down the hull and lowering the freeboard (since we are not carrying 400+ cars) still gives us a ship displacing @ 20,000 tons with considerable room for weapons, helicopters, UAV's, turbine powerplants for dash speed, ASW sonars and hydrophones etc. The key here is most of the hull is still empty space.

Double hull construction with a spacing measured in meters, critical components in widely separated, isolated and shock mounted compartments and maybe even filling the dead spaces with a non flammable foam would provide the ship with the ability to absorb a tremendous amount of battle damage *if and when* mines, torpedoes or missiles leak through the defenses. As a bonus, the ship would have much better stability and sea keeping than a compact traditional warship, and probably greater endurance as well. 

Operating in littoral waters would be more difficult with a large hull design, but the trade off is the ship can better absorb the punishment that an enemy can deliver compared to a conventional warship. (The tanker wars back in the 1980's are a great example; the USN had an empty supertanker lead the way into the Persian Gulf, and the tanker could hit one or more mines and continue to sail where a warship would be out of action.) The offense is delivered by the high performance weapons the ship carries, the virtue of the ship becomes its seakeeping and endurance, and the ability to fight on even when hit.


----------



## WPA

How about the BAby Burkes that the Aussie turned down looks interesting.
With more automation and the uses of the APAR & L-Band radar would make it a very nice ship. 

The Type 45 might be good to with the change the radar setup. 
Get ride of the high radar structure and use the APAR & L-Band radar and flush mounted MK41 and replace the main gun with the 57mm.
No real need for Canada to have the large gun and increase cost of a new supply and service chains for it.

The navy fleet could look like this:

6 AWW
10 frigates
6 to 8 aopv
3 JSS
2 to 3 LHP enforcer design flat top for amphibs

Any other ideas or options ?


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

There are a lot of associated infrastructure costs with significantly larger warships. A 20 000 ton FFH would need more docking space, more fuel etc. That could have siginficant follow-on effects on thing like JSS design and infrastructure budgets.

wpa, AAW warships are built around their radars/launchers. You can't just change those without a lot of very significant issues later.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Not to mention at 20,000 tons you would have a battlecruiser vice a frigate.


----------



## a_majoor

The extra costs associated with vastly increased size are noted, I wonder if the trade off is worth it? Looking at naval actions since the 1980's, traditional warships have been sunk or taken out of action with rockets, missiles, iron bombs, mines, at least one torpedo, suicide bombers in a small boat and even a Carl Gustave. Lots of nations have a limited capability to try to deny the seaways and littorals with missiles, mines, diesel submarines and torpedoes, as well as taking desperate measures like attacking with bomb dropping aircraft and suicide boats. If the cruiser (since that is indeed what it would be) is big enough to absorb hits like that and stay in action, then perhaps it is worth the associated extra costs.

WRT fuel, I think the large container/car carrier ships that inspired(?) this thought are quite economical to run, otherwise there would be little profit in actually sailing ships of this size in commercial service. The standard has evolved to one almighty diesel engine of 11,000 KW power output running at @ 100 RPM and turning a single propeller for a cruise speed of 20+ knots. Even most warships don't sail much faster on day to day cruises, and extra power for a high speed dash can be supplied with gas turbine engines coupled to the shaft, running generators and powering an electric motor geared to the shaft, or other ways.

Since it seems there will be lots of time before the Destroyer replacement program actually puts something in the water, we can consider a really wide range of options.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Yes but something at 20,000 tons is going to produce a _huge_ radar cross section. You have a target that big and whomever you up against will volley fire missiles at your ship to overwhelm your defences. The bigger the ship, the easier it is to find.

As drunksubmrnr pointed out you would drastically need to rebuild the docks in Halifax and Esquilmalt to accomodate this monster.

WPS look at the German F124 (Sachen), a hell of a lot more affordable then the _Burkes_, _baby Burkes_ and the _Type 45_. BTW having the 5 inch on the Burkes helps us contibute to the NGS role. Why get rid of a weapon that will help us support our troops ashore??


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

The enemy is going to volley-fire whatever they have anyway, because they're going to assume the counterfire is inbound. The size of the target is unlikely to affect that as much as it's armament.

Bigger ships are generally cheaper to build, because it's a lot easier and cheaper to install a pipe or waveguide if it doesn't have to be bent all around other things in the way. They are also generally more survivable than smaller ships, all other things being equal.

I'm not sure that translates into better mission-survivable rates. It's still pretty easy to take out the various fragile bits on and around the ship that control the combat systems. While the ship may be able to float and maybe even move after a hit, it's unlikely to fight.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Volley fire dpends on the threat and the type of platform that is carrying that missile. Its an automatic and almost instinctual assumpton, the bigger the target the more of an HVU it is. We are doing more and more littoral ops these days, using something this big would only be viewed as something that could go to fewer areas and be forced to operate in waters and such and such a depth. The Draught on a 4500 ton frigate compared to a 20,000 ton behemoth are two different kettles of fish. We want to maximize our contributions not limit them.


----------



## WPA

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> There are a lot of associated infrastructure costs with significantly larger warships. A 20 000 ton FFH would need more docking space, more fuel etc. That could have siginficant follow-on effects on thing like JSS design and infrastructure budgets.
> 
> wpa, AAW warships are built around their radars/launchers. You can't just change those without a lot of very significant issues later.



I am trying to follow you here?
I am not proposing a 20 000 ton FFH or AAW.
Maybe Canada should join Germany on the 125 frigate. 
But with 28 000 ton JSS being built and New polar icebreakers planned the naval bases are going to have the be upgraded. So then what the point being made. 

However no one has yet come up with a plan take care of the gap of the old AAW ships being taken out of service and new one designed and built in a shipbuilding industry that can not handle the work load on ships need just for Gov. and not including the commercial use.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Volley fire dpends on the threat and the type of platform that is carrying that missile. Its an automatic and almost instinctual assumpton, the bigger the target the more of an HVU it is.



I agree. I just think the minimum for "All of everything we have" is going to begin at around 5 000 tons, so there isn't any difference between that and 20 000 tons for that purpose.



			
				Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> We are doing more and more littoral ops these days, using something this big would only be viewed as something that could go to fewer areas and be forced to operate in waters and such and such a depth. The Draught on a 4500 ton frigate compared to a 20,000 ton behemoth are two different kettles of fish. We want to maximize our contributions not limit them.



I agree, although the USN seems to think a ship around that size is OK for littoral ops.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

WPA said:
			
		

> I am trying to follow you here?
> I am not proposing a 20 000 ton FFH or AAW.



That was a reply to somebody else.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> Maybe Canada should join Germany on the 125 frigate.



Or the Dutch with the LCF. Both use APAR/SMART-L/Mk-41/SM-2, which are the same technologies that we've chosen. Actually, they're pretty much different versions of the same basic design.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> But with 28 000 ton JSS being built and New polar icebreakers planned the naval bases are going to have the be upgraded. So then what the point being made.



There are only 3 JSS planned, and the AOPS are supposed to be smaller than the old steamers. There's not much of an upgrade required. If you replace all of the FFH and DDH with significantly larger ships, and you're going to need a significant infrastructure upgrade.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> However no one has yet come up with a plan take care of the gap of the old AAW ships being taken out of service and new one designed and built in a shipbuilding industry that can not handle the work load on ships need just for Gov. and not including the commercial use.



There are a lot of plans, just no money. With $20 billion in DND funding and $30 billion+ in DND requirements, somebody's going to be disappointed.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Interesting thread.

Thulycides- since we are being creative here, I have an idea for a new armoured vehicle for use in Afghanistan.  It's based on those 400 ton trucks you see at Syncrude.  Something that big should be able to carry a huge amount of guns, missiles and armour.  It's size would make it impervious to any current IED.  The infantry section it would carry, would be so spread out in the vehicle that it would be nearly impossible to hit any one soldier, even if you did manage to get through the armour.  Sure- you would have to completely rebuild the Army's support infrastructure and all of the roads in Afghanistan, but think of how much punishment they could absorb!

Sorry, couldn't resist   

The whole point is to make sure your ship doesn't:

a) get detected in the first place.
b) if it does get detected, get hit.

In that regard, "big" is not your friend!  

Also, If you build a big ship, someone else will just build a bigger missile or torpedo!

Like I said, good thread!


----------



## a_majoor

Say, doesn't the Swedish army use articulated Volvo dump trucks as APC's in a pinch? You could be on to something there   

While 20,000 tons is a pretty big cruiser, I suspect that there are ways to reduce the RCS and other signatures of ships (the DD-21 Zumwalt class Destroyer is one example). I agree with drunknsubmrnr that once a ship is detected, the enemy will attempt to overwhelm it with waves of missiles, torpedoes, manned planes carrying iron bombs and suicide boats, or whatever else they can come up with.

The Falkland Islands war is very instructive, the Argentinians sank or damaged 17 British ships despite the fact the RN had some air cover with the Harriers, advanced SAMs (for the time), gun defenses down to soldiers lined up on the deck of a liner converted to a troop ship and firing small arms, and towards the end, land based Rapier SAM batteries. Many of the ships were struck with iron bombs (not even "smart bombs"), and at least one ship was struck by an EXOCET launched from a trailer pushed to the edge of the island. The Tanker war of the 1980's also demonstrated large, non milspec ships could absorb a great deal of punishment.

20,000 tons is indeed a very large ship, but how do we make our ships survivable in these conditions? Would a 10,000 ton ship do? 7,500? Can a 5,000 ton platform be rearranged to be more survivable?


----------



## cobbler

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The extra costs associated with vastly increased size are noted, I wonder if the trade off is worth it? Looking at naval actions since the 1980's, traditional warships have been sunk or taken out of action with rockets, missiles, iron bombs, mines, at least one torpedo, suicide bombers in a small boat and even a Carl Gustave. Lots of nations have a limited capability to try to deny the seaways and littorals with missiles, mines, diesel submarines and torpedoes, as well as taking desperate measures like attacking with bomb dropping aircraft and suicide boats. If the cruiser (since that is indeed what it would be) is big enough to absorb hits like that and stay in action, then perhaps it is worth the associated extra costs.



Missiles - An FF/DD sized warship is going to be able to hide amongst its chaff/flares and/or NULKA much easier than a 22,000 ton ship, whose countermeasures will not be as effective.
Iron bombs - An FF/DD sized warship will be able to attempt to outmanoeuvre planes dropping dumb bombs, a 22,000 ton monster will never do it. Its also just simply a larger target, with the vitals being just as fragile as on an FF/DD, only so much easier to hit.
Suicide Bombers - This happened _once_ to a western navy, in harbour, unprepared. I don't see how this really compares. 
Torpedoes - Yes the Belgrano was sunk by torps. But she pre-dated WW2. 
Mines - Operating amognst minefields, especially in the littorals, I'd much sooner take my chances in a ship with smaller detection signitures (magnetic, acoustic, etc), that can be both stopped and turned in a pretty small distance than I would in a ship that is by no means discrete and could literally not stop if its life depended on it.

Smaller ships can also far more easily manoeuvre to open up their weapons arcs. Its why they are used to escort the fat ships.
And they are less likely to be detected.

Other negs as far as larger ships are concerned: draught, fighting in the litorals, not only would a larger ship turn slower with its much greater advance and transfer, but It would be far more limited in its navigable water. It won't be able to go as far inland to evade detection or attack, or to take part in Naval Gunfire Support to help the boys ashore.

[quote author=Thucydides]Operating in littoral waters would be more difficult with a large hull design, but the trade off is the ship can better absorb the punishment that an enemy can deliver compared to a conventional warship.[/quote]
It would not just make it difficult, it would make it impossible. Frigates/Destroyers operate pretty much on the size limit for a surface combatant in the littorals.
Absorb more punishment? It IS going to get punishment, much more of it. It would probably get in the way of the assets it should be protecting, and would not contribute effectively in its job as an escort.


----------



## T.S.Rea

Most large ships are lost due to uncontrollable fires on board, and it is a common cause of loss or total constructive loss of smaller vessels as well.

Contrary to the popular belief that HMS Sheffield was lost due to the use of aluminum in the superstructure, it was the loss of the primary fire fighting main that doomed the vessel.  As a cost saving measure no redundancy was built in to the fire fighting equipment, a related practice common amongst aircraft and other platforms of the era.  The vessel was scuttled some days after the attack due to heavy seas and the distance to any safe harbour.

Smaller vessels are more susceptible to being sunk primarily because they can't absorb that much punishment relative to their structural strength.  One torpedo would likely sink any 5000t vessel, a 15-25,000t vessel could survive one and possibly two or three if the ship is structurally strong and has good damage control.

Of course, the specifics of a particular ship loss have to be examined and their is no standard correlation between displacement and weapon hit tolerance.  The IJN lost most of its carriers due to them being set on fire, and the few late war carriers completed actually had concrete poured around their aviation fuel tanks in an attempt to reduce the fire hazard.   The USN heavily damaged or lost carriers were primarily the result of fire, not watertight integrity.  The Bismarck was pounded mercilessly and turned in to a flaming wreck, but ultimately had to be scuttled/torpedoed (there are different accounts on this, but the ship was already a loss due to the fires and massive topside damage).

Most exceptions to this had peculiar causes.  The most obvious, HMS Hood, due to a massive magazine explosion, in part due to its older design and the weaknesses in its deck armour to plunging fire.  Some RN vessels lost at Jutland were due to the volatility of the gun propellants aggravating fires on board, in an indirect sense the inadequacy of firefighting control relative to the hazard.  HMS Prince of Wales was lost to multiple torpedo hits on one side of the ship and an inadequately seasoned crew rushed into war service, IJN Shinano was lost to a similar cause.  The latter's sister ships Musashi and Yamato suffered far greater levels of damage before being lost.

Merchant vessels generally have nothing in their design concerning structural strength beyond seaworthiness and only basic fire and damage control equipment, since that would reduce the deadweight tonnage they are designed to maximize.  This is in fact one of the principal differences between merchant and naval vessels, and although a merchant vessel could be converted to a rough military standard, they have typically been compromises to war priorities and the result is almost always inferior to a purpose built naval ship of a similar displacement.

I would not disagree that a smaller number of larger vessels is not a prudent course, even accepting a number of increased indirect cost elements like shore infrastructure and other items.  Main battle tanks cost a disproportionate amount of money to field, but an army can not operate effectively without at least a few at the sharp end, and no amount of network-centric theorizing changed that in Afghanistan.  However, I have to stop here since this discussion could rapidly evolve into volumes of material on the subject.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Belgrano was lost to pre-WWII torpedoes, so it's not really an example of what would happen with modern weapons.

Modern fish operate by snapping the targets keel with the gas bubble, then smashing the area around the keel with the initial and reflected shock waves. The larger the target, the faster it will sink due to it's own weight pulling the shattered halves apart.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Contrary to the popular belief that HMS Sheffield was lost due to the use of aluminum in the superstructure, it was the loss of the primary fire fighting main that doomed the vessel.  As a cost saving measure no redundancy was built in to the fire fighting equipment, a related practice common amongst aircraft and other platforms of the era.  The vessel was scuttled some days after the attack due to heavy seas and the distance to any safe harbour.



The hit on Sheffield also took out HQ1 as well as rupturing the fire mains in several places. That design could handle a single rupture, but had trouble with multiple ruptures, especially when the people that knew how to fix them had been killed. The CPF and TRUMP designs are pretty much the same as Sheffield in that regard.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Smaller vessels are more susceptible to being sunk primarily because they can't absorb that much punishment relative to their structural strength.  One torpedo would likely sink any 5000t vessel, a 15-25,000t vessel could survive one and possibly two or three if the ship is structurally strong and has good damage control.



The best you could hope for on a 25 000 ton vessel with one modern torpedo hit is just being mission-killed, but it will probably sink faster. It's also not difficult for any submarine to fire multiple weapons. If it was just a matter of hitting it twice, that's not a problem. The upper limit would be around 4 weapons, possibly 6 due to the number of tubes on a modern boat. If we move to external weapons, all of the wepaons could be salvoed pretty quickly.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Merchant vessels generally have nothing in their design concerning structural strength beyond seaworthiness and only basic fire and damage control equipment, since that would reduce the deadweight tonnage they are designed to maximize.  This is in fact one of the principal differences between merchant and naval vessels, and although a merchant vessel could be converted to a rough military standard, they have typically been compromises to war priorities and the result is almost always inferior to a purpose built naval ship of a similar displacement.



I disagree. Merchant standards are different than naval ones, not better or worse with the notable exception of shock resistance and there are ways around that. The merchant standards are generally cheaper because of mass produced components, not inferior standards.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> I would not disagree that a smaller number of larger vessels is not a prudent course, even accepting a number of increased indirect cost elements like shore infrastructure and other items.



The entire strategy needs to be thought through very carefully, starting with the Task Group concept. Do we need it? Can we afford it? If either answer is no, what do we do then?

Once those questions are answered, we can get into specific ship requirements for size etc.







[/quote]


----------



## T.S.Rea

Torpedos will likely remain the most lethal anti-ship weapons for their size, and navies like the USN and Western fleets do not place enough emphasis on defences from them (or at least appear not to on the surface).  Torpedo attack has been rare in the postwar world, however, the most well known of the few the ARA General Belgrano by two 350kg torpedo warheads sinking the 45 year old treaty limited hull never designed with any torpedo resistance given the priority to guns and citadel armour relative to similar Japanese cruisers and the performance of torpedos in that era.

Defence in depth is the only practical solution to dealing with the threat of torpedo attack, a large torpedo tolerant hull being the last line of defence.  The first line of defence would be aircraft (actually satellites if we still have any, but these can't attack the threat platforms), the larger hull being suited to carrying a larger number of them relative to the costs of phased arrays and SAM's and RAM/CIW systems and analogous sub-surface systems.  This being an open forum, however, I don't think it is wise to get into any detail concerning the many dozens of factors and scenarios involved in ASW and torpedo defences.

Theory being nice but not always relevant in the real world, torpedos are vulnerable to counterattack from supercavitating weapons since the typical torpedo is not very fast or difficult to detect and localize.  I doubt these supercavitating rockets will ever achieve much range, but as defensive weapons and limited underwater travel ASW weapons they have some potential even with basic competent guidance.  Again, I could add further here but do not think it prudent.  Nothing exists at present as far as I am aware beyond experimental types, but ten years or so from now might see them come into service as a successor or supplement to ASROC et.al.

Reliance upon or in the absence of anti-torpedo weapons, the tolerance of the hull to torpedos provides the extra layer of defence from them along with the limited developed countermeasures available.  As conceived, the large hull vessel would factor resistance to torpedo attack into it including avoidance of using the keel as a primary strength member.  These ships would not be built large to incorporate a bewildering array of weapons and systems, they would be large to make them damage tolerant as expressed by a large margin of the displacement allocated to that end.  It would be possible to squeeze everything into a hull half the size, but for the cost of a hundred million or so in steel lost anyways to greater reliance on auxilliaries, why would you want to given its vulnerability to relative modest attack for a ship costing over a billion and have further problems during mid-life refits?

Although one torpedo hit would likely result in the mission kill of the vessel, a task force would not have one frigate.  However, a task force built around one or two air capable amphibious ships would have to withdraw since all the eggs have been put into one or two baskets.  The frigate damaged by one to as many as three or four torpedos would have to withdraw, but assuming it is still afloat, the projection force aboard would have some capacity to transfer and rejoin the force at a different point in the operation.  Tirpitz survived a 4 ton charge under the keel, and although never fully corrected the ship was available for service some months later.  Moreover, torpedos do not always function properly such that launching four to six weapons does not mean all of them will reach the target or even explode at an optimal position under the hull, but that still remains a potent level of attack that could sink all but the largest ships.

The principal problem I have with the typical frigate or destroyer is that they get packed with a full array of systems that are so expensive that they become the de facto major surface combatants.  The balance between offense and defence has become skewed out of rational proportion and too reliant on active defences to survive any length of time that warrants the expenditure for what they deliver.  There is little defence in depth.

The large vessel would not be an agile ship, but 5000-10000t ships are not either, and when in close to other vessels its expensive armament will often be of no value given minimum range requirements.  However, a corvette sized vessel with good seakeeping would be better suited to these subsidiary roles, which owing to the presence of the large frigate, would not require a full suite of systems.  The active defences would comprise the modern equivalant of a short range point defence/CIW armament (RAM/Rocket Phalanx) supplemented with various remote weapons like 5.56mm miniguns, 0.50 machineguns, 40mm grenade launchers, 25mm chain guns, the 35mm cannons in storage in Montreal if suitable (?), and similar types, the passive defences focussed around compact citadel pattern protection of the crew stations and the best available PPE.  Supplemental aft deck packages would compromise minehunting equipment that has been bought for the MCDV's and similar forms of towed passive/active arrays and towfish as well as an army 155mm autogun motor carriage and deck mount PGM's designed with this application in mind for later transfer ashore after the beachhead is established.

A full fledged task force requiring the deployment of over half the fleet being the extreme or maximum scenario, the basic frigate-corvette package would provide the most common deployment formation.  In the absence of an embarked projection force, the extra capacity would permit higher endurance on station and some improvement to habitability for long deployments, and as the exception but not the norm mid-deployment crew exchanges to double the length of distant ship deployments.  Although it could be argued that it is not likely that the navy would ever engage in any significant scale of amphibious operation like a generic Falkland Islands scenario, building the fleet to that end would allow it to deploy self sufficient formations approaching that level as part of a larger coalition task force if only to ensure the Dieppe tragedy is not repeated.  The creation of this fleet would take a couple of decades, but it would have a functional role as soon as the first few vessels entered service.

It would prove politically easier to get the funds for building one ship every two years in sub-groups of two to four (ie.keeping contract awards well below the $10B threshold), interspersed with contracts for corvettes and lighter armed patrol ships, arctic patrol corsair/tenders, additional auxilliaries (if only two JSS are built now), and coast guard icebreakers and patrol vessels (which might have some commonality with the naval size equivalents), et.al., as well as the submarines (which might be produced through a different program approach of a government owned agency given the specialized nature of submarine design).

I have no doubt you are well aware of the complexity of this subject matter and that there are a large number of factors not mentioned here, but I have actually thought the matter through in depth over the course of many years.  Their would doubtlessly be specific problems/difficulties I have not foreseen (been on the receiving end of opinions of people who know nothing of what they speak of from any direct experience too many times), but little that subsequent detail rework can not resolve.  Ship design has always been an exercise in compromises to competing demands.  I have no personal biases regarding any of it or anything related at all to career, business, or political posturing.


Quick Estimates (Ice class simple rating by 1st year feet of ice with qualifications, most double bow form)
---------------

12 CPF's, 3-4 AAW DDH  >>>   10 SOE Frigates   [Class 8+]                                                                           $15B

2 AOR/JSS                    >>>   2 JSS, 2 JSS/SOE     [Class ?/8+]                                                                        3

1 Sealift (?)                   >>>   2 Bulk Liquid/Container Sealift  [Class 0+]                                                            1

6-10 AOPV's                  >>>   6 AOPCT (system commonality to corvettes)  [Class 5+]                                        2

4 Diesel Submarines      >>>   10 Arctic/coastal/task force Submarines                                                               6 (8 boats)

12 MCDV                      >>>   10-16 Corvettes/OPV's (No.s depend on CCG, AOPV, et.al. factors)[Class 1+]           3

----------------------

6-9 Icebreakers            >>>   10 Icebreakers, slightly larger-enhanced/commonality to AOPCT [Class 5/8+]           3

80 Various Patrol          >>>   16-20 OPV's/Corvettes (& smaller craft incl. joint NR small h/c) [Class 1+]               3

                                                                                                                                                        ================
                                                                                                                                         Navy Only      30/20=$1.5B/year


Yes, it is a lot of money, little of it allocated since this is not any actual government plan, automation (which does not always produce the savings hyped ahead of time, as per my own experiences with CNC manufacturing) may help manning issues but they will remain a problem, but this is the general framework around my own views on attaining a three ocean fleet with a nominal capacity to project a basic expeditionary force.  However, I think the real problem is the people running the show few of whom appear to have anything but their own immediate interests in mind, and it is not really a question of funding.

It also is not a question of just the navy, but the air force and the army working to integrate a substantial element of their forces into the fold.  Their are workable near term and long term solutions, but if the air force's recent game with pulling a Chinook is any indicator, it will be yet another Dieppe all over again.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Theory being nice but not always relevant in the real world, torpedos are vulnerable to counterattack from supercavitating weapons since the typical torpedo is not very fast or difficult to detect and localize.



You just lost me. Since when are torpedoes not very fast? Or easy to detect and localise outside of an instrumented range? When was the last time (or first) that a torpedo has been intercepted by anything, let alone a "supercavitating weapon"?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> I doubt these supercavitating rockets will ever achieve much range, but as defensive weapons and limited underwater travel ASW weapons they have some potential even with basic competent guidance.



They already do have some potential. However, they're only useful if they're nuclear-tipped to compensate for their lack of guidance. Said guidance is impossible to install because senor signals can't get through their supercavitating gas bubble.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Again, I could add further here but do not think it prudent.  Nothing exists at present as far as I am aware beyond experimental types, but ten years or so from now might see them come into service as a successor or supplement to ASROC et.al.



Or those programs could die just like the rest of the active anti-torpedo defence programs since WWII.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Reliance upon or in the absence of anti-torpedo weapons, the tolerance of the hull to torpedos provides the extra layer of defence from them along with the limited developed countermeasures available.  As conceived, the large hull vessel would factor resistance to torpedo attack into it including avoidance of using the keel as a primary strength member.  These ships would not be built large to incorporate a bewildering array of weapons and systems, they would be large to make them damage tolerant as expressed by a large margin of the displacement allocated to that end.  It would be possible to squeeze everything into a hull half the size, but for the cost of a hundred million or so in steel lost anyways to greater reliance on auxilliaries, why would you want to given its vulnerability to relative modest attack for a ship costing over a billion and have further problems during mid-life refits?



The ship has to be sufficiently rigid to still be able to function as a weapons and sensors platform. Making a ship sufficiently flexible to handle the shock of a torpedo hit would cause problems elsewhere.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Although one torpedo hit would likely result in the mission kill of the vessel, a task force would not have one frigate.



For the CF, a mission-kill is as bad as a sinking, possibly worse. The TG commander would have to detach another frigate or the AOR to tow the damaged frigate to port. That's bad for sustainment, especially since torpedo evasion usually burns up a lot of fuel.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The frigate damaged by one to as many as three or four torpedos would have to withdraw, but assuming it is still afloat, the projection force aboard would have some capacity to transfer and rejoin the force at a different point in the operation.



The projection force aboard wouldn't have any knees left. Shock damage tends to do that.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Tirpitz survived a 4 ton charge under the keel, and although never fully corrected the ship was available for service some months later.



Tirpitz never moved under her own power again after that. She was used as a floating gun battery but moved by tugs. 



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The large vessel would not be an agile ship, but 5000-10000t ships are not either, and when in close to other vessels its expensive armament will often be of no value given minimum range requirements.  However, a corvette sized vessel with good seakeeping would be better suited to these subsidiary roles, which owing to the presence of the large frigate, would not require a full suite of systems.



Corvettes are not only not big enough to have good seakeeping, they're not big enough to carry even a self-defence combat system. They're not really any use to anybody. The smallest ships that can have good seakeeping and a capable self-defence system are frigates. The frigates are barely capable of defending themselves, let alone a bunch of corvettes around them. You need destroyers for that. That's why we have a task group with a destroyer and several frigates.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> It would prove politically easier to get the funds for building one ship every two years in sub-groups of two to four (ie.keeping contract awards well below the $10B threshold), interspersed with contracts for corvettes and lighter armed patrol ships, arctic patrol corsair/tenders, additional auxilliaries (if only two JSS are built now), and coast guard icebreakers and patrol vessels (which might have some commonality with the naval size equivalents), et.al., as well as the submarines (which might be produced through a different program approach of a government owned agency given the specialized nature of submarine design).



What $10B threshold? We're having a tough time even getting refits approved at this point.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> However, I think the real problem is the people running the show few of whom appear to have anything but their own immediate interests in mind, and it is not really a question of funding.



It is definitely a question of funding. I can't speak to the people running the show, but there is just no money right now for a major naval construction program. I wouldn't be at all surprised to see JSS cancelled in favour of more C-17's.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

To add regarding corvettes, for the most part OPVs are fulfilling the roles corvettes once did. Corvettes though are still being built and utilized by several nations. Witness the K130 class that the German Navy has now coming online.


----------



## hugh19

But I would bet the Germans use them for the Baltic and coastal patrols in the North sea.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

sledge said:
			
		

> But I would bet the Germans use them for the Baltic and coastal patrols in the North sea.



I would also bet you will see them in the Med and the Gulf as well.


----------



## T.S.Rea

Launched from 20,000 metres, an 80 knot wire-guided torpedo would take 8 minutes to reach its target, from 5000 metres at 45 knots for a simple torpedo about three and a half minutes.  In an age of long range sensors and weapons that is a very long time, more than enough for a VLS supercavitating depth charge armed vessel to destroy both the torpedos and/or pre-terminal guidance wires and the launching submarine.  There have been unconfirmed reports of Russian SSBN's being armed with such weapons in addition to the advanced prototypes known to exist; this weapon would have little likely purpose other than anti-torpedo defence.  There was reportedly even an unsuccessful Canadian attempt some years back to actually try to covertly buy one of these weapons.

Tirpitz did not conduct short sea trials half a year after the X-submarine attack by being towed to sea by tugs.  The RAF resumed attacks because it was operationally ready again regardless of outstanding distortions and stress damage to the hull.  Being moved around by tugs occurred during a brief period two months before it was finally sunk.

The on-going pattern of presenting exaggerated or simply incorrect arguments while at the same time offering no indication of any position of your own suggests only one thing.  You have an agenda.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> In an age of long range sensors and weapons that is a very long time, more than enough for a VLS supercavitating depth charge armed vessel to destroy both the torpedos and/or pre-terminal guidance wires and the launching submarine.



But, since such a thing does not exist, you might as well have said "phaser" or "photon torpedo".



> The on-going pattern of presenting exaggerated or simply incorrect arguments while at the same time offering no indication of any position of your own suggests only one thing.  You have an agenda.



While I'm sure that Mr. Drunknsubmrnr can speak for himself, I will note that, having read much of what you and he have posted, it is clear that you have not actually ever served on a warship. And it is equally clear to me that he has. Your concept of what constitutes Mission kill from a modern torpedo is, frankly, a fairy tale.  The simple fact of the matter is that a frigate sized vessel will simply cease to be, if actually hit by a modern heavy weight torpedo.  The few survivors might make the life rafts, but their fibias and tibias will be telescoped together.  There will be no damage control to do as the two halves of the former ship sink.

You have a theoretical view of warships and naval warfare.  I have practical experience.  I have well over 500 sea days (not bad for aircrew).  I have carried and dropped actual torpedoes, so I know how they work. I have tracked real submarines, so I make it my business to know as much as I can about how they operate and fight- because it is personal to me.  If I screw up, my colleagues die and my house goes to the bottom of the ocean. I have participated in many damage control exercises and two real fires at sea, so I have some idea how damage control aboard a ship actually works.  In other words, I am what you might call a real expert. You, on the other hand, spout a lot of theory (which is fine- I have no problem with someone coming here and trying out theories- that's how people learn).  But, when you get called on it by the experts, you claim that the expert has an agenda?  I suppose if error correcting is an "agenda", then I guess that I have one as well.  You could show just a bit more grace.

Some of what you are saying is broadly useful and even interesting, but most of it is just book learning theories unsupported by practical experience.


----------



## T.S.Rea

My concern with Drunknsubmrnr has been with the process of taking individual comments and dismissing them out of hand, often with information which is simply wrong as if to have an unstated purpose behind it.  This is an informal forum which does not have an explicit objective in itself, so why would one care to go to the effort of systematically countering opinions which are nothing more than that as if only his are some sort of last word on the matter.  Yes, I have never been in the navy, and certainly would respect the direct experience of those whom have, including not only yourself but Drunknsubmrnr himself as well, provided they have any substance to them.

(Some of the specific matters you mentioned are a little out of context to the original remarks, but that really is not the issue in this post).

That said, having experience at some particular task or subsidiary part of a task does not make anyone a definitive expert at it (myself included).  As an example, some years ago I worked as a cement finisher for a few years, learned much of what there is to know about the trade in a small fraction of the time most people require because I already had a great deal of 'book knowledge' of concrete and developed skills in a vaguely parallel line of work.

I would not consider myself to be an expert cement finisher relative to many people I had worked with during those years, since many had decades of experience.  At the same time, however, I learned to put theory to practice and developed the means to inexpensively form concrete into complex architectural mouldings that go way beyond anything these experienced hands could ever hope to construct.  At the other end of the scale, I had a structural (concrete) engineer with a couple of decades of experience inquire about a small mould that I had ready for any scrap concrete on the job remark that my method would not work well, mentioning a couple of reasons of which he was wrong about and which I had used several dozen times previously and already knew worked.

Do I consider myself an expert about concrete? No, but I knew a lot of people who thought they were.

Do I care that much about concrete? No, had my fill of the stuff, only worked the trade because of the money and the vague appeal of possibly building my own home one day.

My greatest accomplishment will probably be a geared CVT originally meant to serve as a tank transmission and steering mechanism, something often referred to by experts in this field as 'impossible'.  The experts forgot to tell me.  Of course, constructing a fully refined version of the device for use in cars (or helicopters and turbines for that matter) will take a couple of decades to complete, since I have to teach myself with regard to a few advanced technical disciplines to progress beyond the basic prototype and I am not in any hurry.  I am not likely to ever 
benefit from the device, and find no appeal to the very large sum of money the thing would be worth relative to the dangers and other unwelcome consequences that would result from getting it patented and available for licensed production.  The world is not going to be radically changed in the end, nor am I worried the sky is falling that I need to delude myself that it is my purpose in life to save it.

Does this make me an expert on transmissions? No, I actually have to replace the transmission on my van due to a leaking shaft seal probably caused by bearing damage in the final drive assembly and will require the assistance of my brother to help me because I do not know that much about the particular components involved.  If this were my own transmission, it probably would not require replacement and would be much easier to change if it did on top of saving me a couple hundred dollars every year in gasoline, but I still have to work with the entrenched archaic design at hand because it will fail eventually.

I have worked for a few companies that do things a particular way because thats they only way they ever have done things, and despite knowing it is a dated method from direct experience elsewhere, the usual response is apathy.  People often become dulled by years of servitude to a particular process and resistant to change from the conditioned train of thinking.  I actually left a company slightly larger than DND not to long ago controlled by technocrats who regularly displayed an hypocrisy towards those beneath them that often lead to outright lying to me and my equals; many others also were looking elsewhere, I was not as trapped in the job as most.

The statement 'I have no problem with someone coming here and trying out theories- that's how people learn' very aptly sums up my interest in this forum as well.  It is not as if anything will accrue to me directly from participating in it, nor do I have anything to prove by it.  I also have concern with the well being of the helicopter crewman and the security of his house not only directly, but also that he and his colleagues and their house are in my country as well.

I merely take exception to arguments made on facts that are incorrect as if experience in a particular occupation provides a justification for dismissing anything to the contrary and accuracy be damned.


----------



## Kirkhill

T.S. Rea,

I am someone who has a personal interest in matters military, which has led me over the years to spend an inordinate amount of time, as an amateur, studying all the literature that I could/can get my hands on.  

I found this forum about 5 years ago and took it as an opportunity to talk to folks that actually worked with the kit and the tactics in the actual environment.  I had a rough intro - ask George Wallace and he can tell you all about it.  I learned that it is much more acceptable to ask if your hypothesis has merit than to present your hypothesis as divinely inspired.  Also people are quite willing to listen if you have got other non-military experience that might be applicable to the discussions.  Finally, the essence of debate is argument and if your individual assumptions can not withstand being tested individually then your whole case is weakened.  You must be able to support your assumptions.

PS to George - I credit our early battles with making me both a better communicator and a better manager.  Many thanks to you for that.

Cheers.


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## SeaKingTacco

T.S. Rea-

I will amplify what Kirkhill said (BTW, he is a member of this forum that I have learned much from, both in terms of argument style and looking at old problems in a new way.  In short, he has earned my respect). 

I will stipulate that you are a smart guy.  I will also stipulate that your heart is in the right place when you advocate for new and better ways of doing things naval. You have some ideas that I have never even thought of before.  And outsiders can actually sometimes see things that those of us working close to a problem cannot see.  Unfortunately, some of your premises are so fatally flawed that they also fatally weaken your conclusions.  Consider for a moment that when I pick apart your argument, I am actually helping you to improve it.  I do not usually stoop to personal attacks, unless the other guy goes there first.  If you feel that I have personally attacked you, I apologize. That was not my intent.  In my books you are welcome to try your ideas out here, just keep in mind what Kirkhill advised you about tone when presenting a hypothesis.  Nobody likes a "know-it-all", especially one who is getting basic facts wrong.


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## drunknsubmrnr

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Launched from 20,000 metres, an 80 knot wire-guided torpedo would take 8 minutes to reach its target, from 5000 metres at 45 knots for a simple torpedo about three and a half minutes.  In an age of long range sensors and weapons that is a very long time, more than enough for a VLS supercavitating depth charge armed vessel to destroy both the torpedos and/or pre-terminal guidance wires and the launching submarine.  There have been unconfirmed reports of Russian SSBN's being armed with such weapons in addition to the advanced prototypes known to exist; this weapon would have little likely purpose other than anti-torpedo defence.  There was reportedly even an unsuccessful Canadian attempt some years back to actually try to covertly buy one of these weapons.



Generally you'll see torpedoes fired at very short ranges. There isn't a whole lot of time for counterfire of any type, supercavitating or otherwise.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Tirpitz did not conduct short sea trials half a year after the X-submarine attack by being towed to sea by tugs.



No, but she had to be towed back. At that point, the Germans gave up on the battleship plan and went to floating battery. The shock damage to the machinery was simply too difficult to repair with the resources they had.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The RAF resumed attacks because it was operationally ready again regardless of outstanding distortions and stress damage to the hull.  Being moved around by tugs occurred during a brief period two months before it was finally sunk.



I think you're confusing what the RAF thought the Germans were doing and what the Germans actually were doing. It came out after the war that the Tirpitz was going to be converted to a floating battery after the X-craft attack. 



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The on-going pattern of presenting exaggerated or simply incorrect arguments while at the same time offering no indication of any position of your own suggests only one thing.  You have an agenda.



If I've offended, my apologies. I haven't been pushing an agenda, I've simply pointed out some flaws. Your ideas are certainly worth looking at, and thank you for posting them.


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## a_majoor

Since I floated the battlecruiser idea, I should weigh in as well.

I am not a sailor, but rather an Infantryman, so my interest in ships is mostly theoretical. The "Big Honking Ship" is probably the only naval vessel that I could ever have direct contact or experience with (assuming they build one really soon  ), surface combatants and submarines would be off in the distance making sure me and by buddies actually arrive.

The 20,000 ton hull was based on the observation that large vessels have taken damage and continued to sail during the tanker war, along with the corresponding observation of smaller surface combatants getting taken out of action with one hit from an iron bomb or anti ship missile or even smaller weapons. Soviet era submarines were also reputed to be hard to kill due to their double hull construction with spacing measured in metres. This write up of an event during the Falkland Islands war is illuminating:



> Marine David Combes, who was normally the ships steward on Endurance now placed his name in naval history books by firing his Carl Gustav 84 mm anti tank weapon at the Guerrico.  The Royal Marines watched as the 10lb projectile staggered across the waves and then, on it's last legs, smashed into Guerrico's hull just above the waterline, sending up a column of white water.  They then heard a loud rumble come from inside the ship. Below decks Argentine damage control parties struggled to stop the flow of water that was now coming though the hole.
> 
> The explosion killed one Argentine sailor and wounded several others. It also destroyed many electrical cables, including the ones used to power the 100 mm gun's traverse mechanism making the gun useless at this close range. The aft 40 mm was still working until Marines Parsons and Chubb cut down the Argentine gun crew with their LMG. Alfonso was having a hard time trying to manoeuvre the big ship quickly inside the small bay. He knew he had to get out of the bay quickly. As the ship came about, Sergeant Major Leach lying on a table up stairs in Shackleton House, took his time and fired 15 shots into the bridge with his sniper rifle. This caused panic and confusion as officers and sailors trying to steer the ship had to take cover. With the ship turned,  Alfonso steered the ship out of the bay, but she had to run the gauntlet of fire from the Royal Marines again before getting out of range. Marine Combes let go another 84 mm at the frigate that smashed into the hull below the Exocets. The Marines also managed to hit Guerrico at least twice with 66 mm rockets. Corporal Peters was severely wounded in the arm while standing to fire his 66 mm. The rifle shot had come from one of the Argentine Marines in the buildings near Shackleton House.



So a large hull using lots of spacing and widely separated and isolated modules seemed to be one way to save the ship and keep it in action even if the inevitable leak through happened. The only other way a battlecruiser would be viable would be to go to WWII era design and install a nice thick armour belt. The ship would be much more compact, but I can't see that really overcoming the objections that people with experience in these matters have raised.

I floated a thought experiment, and it sank. I'm sure I'll think of something else...........................


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## DONT_PANIC

> So a large hull using lots of spacing and widely separated and isolated modules seemed to be one way to save the ship and keep it in action even if the inevitable leak through happened. The only other way a battlecruiser would be viable would be to go to WWII era design and install a nice thick armour belt. The ship would be much more compact, but I can't see that really overcoming the objections that people with experience in these matters have raised.


The trouble with heavily armoured battleships is that they are still vulnerable to torpedoes, which strike below the waterline of the ship.  When submarine scares hit the Royal Navy in the early 1900s, there were a nubmer of attempts to "torpedo proof" ships.  The attempt ended with the "torpedo proof" battleship (already paid off) being sunk on the first shot in the middle of the harbour.  I think that I had found that ianecdote n a more recent book on Sir Jacky Fisher.  If anyone really cares, I can dig up a citation.


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## T.S.Rea

As per posts three/four up:

It was tone that I was talking issue with.  Often the remarks I have made have numerous underlying assumptions being made concerning them, and regardless of that there would remain some basic weaknesses or deficiencies as applied in practice.  Despite the degree of care taken to review something over and over again in search of showstoppers, there can remain a particular problem which was never anticipated at all.  It is the fatal flaws that I look for most of all, since obviously could means nothing if you can't.

You would have to read through some of my own remarks carefully (assuming one has the time to go to this trouble), since often innocuous looking remarks are a very condensed summary of a larger issue.  In many cases, it really is not the case for doing something a particular way because of one advantage, but that if it is being done that way to meet several other basic demands, that there are is an advantage to be had to improving something else in the process.

I consciously try to avoid viewing things in black and white, and if it is perceived that I 'know it all', then the perception is far from the reality.

Actually, there were a number of points raised by drunknsubmrnr that gave me pause to re-evaluate certain aspects of my own opinions.  I was aware of the issues, but that should not be a reason to not scrutinize them yet again.



Reply to subsequent post by drunknsubmrnr:

My apologies, looking for a more constructive discussion in the future.

The discussion of anti-torpedo weapons were hypothetically in the future, there obviously being no such equipment available now.  Relative to analogous long range and close-in anti-air defences there is more time to react, but I find it unlikely they would be availabe for CF service for ten or even twenty years in the future, and possibly never.  Apart from countermeasures, that leaves only passive means as a defence against the rare but still dangerous prospect of torpedo attack.

Torpedo resistance is not the reason for a large hull vessel, it is something that could be exploited to advantage since the hull would have to be large simply to conduct operations at distances of many thousands of miles from port and project any significant size of force on to the land or alternately to conduct sea control operations in distant waters that would require auxilliary support in most instances regardless. 

Like body armour it would not be impervious to attack, but relative to the value of everything else, worth the moderate trouble of putting it into practice.  Most loss of life on a warship occurs when the vessel is sunk quickly, casualties almost always being lower if the ship can be kept afloat.  The large ship may still have to be scuttled, it may divert resources away from the task group, it may have to be beached somewhere for later salvage, or it could limp back to home port only for it to be decided that it is not worth repair, but those are financial and strategic 
decisions to be made long after the fact.  With the smaller vessel it is forgone conclusion that it is a complete loss to a torpedo attack.

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Tirpitz was heavily damaged by the x-boats.  Lifted a foot or two up, the ends of the ship whipped back and forth like a gigantic tuning fork, it certainly did suffer massive damage to its engineering plant and stress fractures and damage throughout the hull.  It was never fully repaired, not the least of reasons was its isolation in a fiord above the Arctic circle far from any accessible major shipyard that could repair the ship.

The brief sea trials half a year later to test the part of the machinery plant that was repaired appears to have prompted a renewal of air attacks, since it would have been apparent that the ship was no longer completely out of action even if the RAF did not know the ship was barely functional.

The disagreement is one of degree.  It was a loss as a combat ship for the rest of its service, but it was not sunk in the x-boat attack and could have been repaired if it was practical and a priority.


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## drunknsubmrnr

No apologies necessary. We're all trying to find the right way to go about things, and the 'Net doesn't transmit a lot of subleties.

The problems behind active anti-torpedo defence are mainly rooted in sound transmission speeds through water. For one thing the speed of sound in water is variable, leading to the situation where sound doesn't travel in a straight line in water. You need to saturate an area with sensors in order to calculate exactly what the sound path would be, and where an incoming torpedo or interceptor is. For another thing, the speed of sound in water is a lot slower than in air, leading to a very slow active update rate, which makes interception difficult. 

For both reasons, I'd say a torpedo interception system would be at least an order of magnitude more difficult to come up with than Aegis, and even more expensive than that.

I agree with you that a large vessel is the way to go here. It would be both more damage resistant and possibly even remove the need for an AOR.

For the Tirpitz, I agree with you that we're just discussing degree of damage. It may be that Gneisenau's damage by the RAF may have influenced their decision in not repairing the ship. Knowing that even if you get him back he may just be bombed out in dry dock would tend to put a crimp on any plans to do so.


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## Bane

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> The problems behind active anti-torpedo defence are mainly rooted in sound transmission speeds through water. For one thing the speed of sound in water is variable, leading to the situation where sound doesn't travel in a straight line in water. You need to saturate an area with sensors in order to calculate exactly what the sound path would be, and where an incoming torpedo or interceptor is. For another thing, the speed of sound in water is a lot slower than in air, leading to a very slow active update rate, which makes interception difficult.
> For both reasons, I'd say a torpedo interception system would be at least an order of magnitude more difficult to come up with than Aegis, and even more expensive than that.




Stop.
In fresh water, sound travels at about 1427 m/s at 5 °C 
In air at 0 °C at sea level the speed is about 331.3 m/s 
The more dense the material, the FASTER sounds travels...this is why you stick your ear to the track to hear a train in the distance; the vibrations travel faster and further.  Because of that your 'update rate', whatever that is, would be way better. 
Also...
The speed of sound in water very consistant at a given tempurature and salination.  You may have issues with currents (at very long range) and waves as background noise but that is a different issue.  Also, you need massive tempurature changes to make any significant change in the speed, on the order of which would never be found in nature on the ranges you are talking about. 

I don't know what the hell Aegis is but i'm going to assume that you are wrong about that too.


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## drunknsubmrnr

Bane said:
			
		

> In fresh water, sound travels at about 1427 m/s at 5 °C
> In air at 0 °C at sea level the speed is about 331.3 m/s



My bad...it's the speed of sound in water vs the speed of light in air.

Aegis is a naval radar-based misile/aircraft defence system. Basically the same as what TS Rea described, but it works against missiles/aircraft rather than torpedoes. The speed of sound in water is a LOT less than that of light in air, implying it takes a lot longer for a signal to get to the target and return. That round-trip frequency is the "update rate". The update rate affects not only your appreciation of where the target is, but also where you can predict it will be. The slower the update rate, the larger the error in the target position. The larger the error in target position, the less accurate the interception. OK?



			
				Bane said:
			
		

> The speed of sound in water very consistant at a given tempurature and salination.



Quite true. However, temperature and salinity are sufficiently variable to grossly distort the predicted sound path unless a LOT of samples are taken. If you can't predict the sound path, you can't predict the target position.



			
				Bane said:
			
		

> You may have issues with currents (at very long range) and waves as background noise but that is a different issue.



Actually, the current issue is usually found with changes in salinity due to fresh water mixing with salt. There are currents which are significantly warmer or colder than their surroundings, but they're not as bad.



			
				Bane said:
			
		

> Also, you need massive tempurature changes to make any significant change in the speed, on the order of which would never be found in nature on the ranges you are talking about.



You're thinking 2D only. Torpedoes work in 3D....Seawater temps change a lot over just a couple of hundred metres.


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## T.S.Rea

Targeting would be the great problem with intercepting a torpedo, since it would have to get in quite close to cripple the weapon if not destroy it at short range or else it would likely keep coming.  Off board acoustics, blue 459nm wavelength active sensing, and other possible sensor types all would have problems operating effectively under real conditions at sea with the further complication of relatively simple active countermeasures that could be employed on the torpedo.  And once you start to use multiple methods of targeting and homing, reliability will drop since everything depends on an extended chain of events all working perfectly, and cost will go up because of the this as well. 

Realistically, I can't see even a remote chance this being considered in Canada, only the USN would have the resources for something of this nature, which given the rarity in the last several decades of torpedo attack would not likely see anything enter service for a long time to come.   Supercavitating weapons would more likely see initial service as a shallow water INS depth charge against submarines in situations where homing torpedos would be difficult to use (or not fast enough in some situations without active homing), their value likely being borderline given the cost of adding another weapon type to the arsenal relative to possible improvements to the lighter outfit of small torpedos.  Off hand, I would not know what the specific limitations of acoustic homing torpedos in shallow waters actually are at present since the information would be heavily classified, but it is not difficult to recognize that there are limitations.  As to how effective a SC weapon would be as a close in defence would all depend on the specifics of the systems involved, and even that would not be very easy or inexpensive or else such defensive measures would probably already be in place.

The theoretical possibility would likely have to be driven by an actual increase in torpedo attacks, since you would have to ask yourself if it would not make more sense to be spending limited defence dollars on more immediate priorities across the range of military needs.  Trying to mitigate some of the damage they can cause probably would be the only realistic option in the near term.  The active layer of defence may or may not come at a later date depending on the priority over the cost.  Passive defence might also have a limited indirect effect of discouraging torpedo attack, since the risk works both ways and it is not reasonable to assume many would want to attrite themselves outside of overwhelmingly greater reasons for it (may be why they have been rare recently?).

How difficult from theory to practice for various levels of capability would be difficult to make a reasonable guess without a full technical study, could easily be fall somewhere between anti-air defences and intercepting a ballistic missile in practice.  Although it has become increasingly more commonplace in recent times to put a premium on lives, I always have used that standard since I might have been in the service and implicitly put myself in that situation by default.  Even neglecting the ethics, it just makes more plain military sense as well.


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## drunknsubmrnr

I did think of a situation where supercavitating projectiles could make a short-term difference. There's a USN program call RApid MIneClearing System (RAMICS) that fires supercavitating projectiles at mines. There's also a requirement for something that will discern the difference between a possible submarine contact and a definite submarine contact. That's usually done by dropping something on the contact and seeing if it does anything. Maybe an enlarged version of RAMICS could do that.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> How difficult from theory to practice for various levels of capability would be difficult to make a reasonable guess without a full technical study, could easily be fall somewhere between anti-air defences and intercepting a ballistic missile in practice.  Although it has become increasingly more commonplace in recent times to put a premium on lives, I always have used that standard since I might have been in the service and implicitly put myself in that situation by default.  Even neglecting the ethics, it just makes more plain military sense as well.



I agree with your point on ethics. 

Incidentally, missile defence is generally easier than air defence. Did you intend it to read that way?


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## SeaKingTacco

> The speed of sound in water very consistant at a given tempurature and salination.  You may have issues with currents (at very long range) and waves as background noise but that is a different issue.  Also, you need massive tempurature changes to make any significant change in the speed, on the order of which would never be found in nature on the ranges you are talking about.



Bane,  you have absolutely no experience with active sonar against a submarine target, do you?  I assure you, it is no where near as simple as you think to determine the ray path of sound through water.  It is as much art as it is science.   The speed of sound in water, in real life, is affected primarily by salinity, temperature and depth of water.  It can be further influenced by factors such as the type of bottom environment and even what kind of weather is happening.  There are rules of thumb that help Sonar Operators get the right depth for the sonar to find and track a submarine, but one can never know the depth of his target with any certainty.  Only bearing and range.

It should also be pointed out that sound energy is very quickly attenuated in water, giving very short ranges (relatively speaking).  Unless you are willing to pour massive amounts of sonar energy into the water (and kill every whale within 50NM), there are limits to what can be done with sonar.

I for one would not hold out much hope for an active torpedo defence system.  I feel the money is better spent on quieting the platform.  And good tactics.  And lots of helos with aggressive crews.


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## a_majoor

Supercavitating weapons are still something of an unknown. The Shkval was reputed to have been developed as a last ditch point defense weapon for Soviet era SSBN's, allowing the commander to fire at the oncoming American/NATO torpedo and either destroying the torpedo, causing the launching submarine to cut the torpedo loose and attempt to escape, or (best case) hit the enemy submarine.

It has now appeared in other navies, and seems to have been adopted as a means for diesel electric submarines to perform entry denial, or at least seem a lot scarier than they already are. Certainly the idea of dodging a torpedo moving at 300kph or more is on the very outside edge of possibility, and in theory, a supercavitating projectile can move at supersonic speeds under water. (New Scientist magazine, 22 July 2000). To date, no one seems to have solved issues like guidance or increasing range.

A torpedo defense based on these weapons would probably resemble an "inverted" air defense system, with a volley of small Shkval type torpedoes being launched in the direction of the incoming, and the CIWS firing down into the water with supercavitating bullets. It would look pretty spectacular ("Rocket Torpedoes Away!!!!), but given accurate location of the incoming is so difficult, I think the end result would be a very expensive system with a very low Pk.


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## T.S.Rea

There probably would be merit to the cost of working on various types of SC projectiles regardless of applying it to a full size weapon.  I don't recall off hand having heard of the RAMICs projectile before, but it makes obvious sense given the tedious task of otherwise putting demolition charges on mines.  The same thing gets done with 0.50 calibre machineguns, there was even a development project long ago to mount several of the machineguns on an armoured vehicle to sweep a path in front of it to clear a lane through minefields (I think it was cancelled primarily because of the cost of all the bullets and some minor technical issues relative to the more destructive method of using line charges or plows).  Improving the design simplicity and the efficiency of the laminar flow of the SC bubble on less expensive smaller delivery bodies with more immediate uses would open up a lot of other potential applications and make it easier to develop less expensive full size SC weapons.  As you mentioned, the intermediate stage of sensor/probing packages to rapidly confirm a submarine target would be one such application that would avoid expending much heavier and expensive weaponry on it and conserve a limited arsenal by avoiding killing marine life or anything thing else that could be mistaken for a submarine when there is little time for the debating society to hold a session and render its full report of recommendations before the sitting of the upper and lower houses of the board of governors (a reaction would probably confirm whatever it might be, a non-reaction might allow subsequent investigation but might not disqualify it as a threat depending on what is actually being used to interrogate the possible target).  A further use of smaller SC delivery bodies could also be to rapidly deploy stand-off countermeasures to act like the equivalent of a smokescreen/flare/chaff cloud under the surface over a broad volume of water.


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## drunknsubmrnr

Thucydides said:
			
		

> To date, no one seems to have solved issues like guidance or increasing range.



To their credit, the Soviets did get around the guidance issue. They tipped the torpedo with a nuclear warhead. Raised Pk to very near 2.0.


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