# DND may be shopping for new subs, sources say



## GAP

DND may be shopping for new subs, sources say
By MURRAY BREWSTER  The Canadian Press Wednesday, October 10, 2007 – Page A9 
Article Link

OTTAWA -- The Defence Minister's office recently requested a briefing on how long it would take to introduce new submarines - a move that could set the stage for the replacement of the military's troubled Victoria-class boats, defence sources have told The Canadian Press.

At the same time, a key refit contract involving the compressed-air system aboard HMCS Victoria has been put on hold, which would leave the warship unable to fire torpedoes.

Both actions raise questions about the future of the four glitch-plagued submarines that were purchased from Britain in 1998 under the former Liberal government and have yet to reach full operational status.

In the briefing, which was reportedly delivered by senior officials last week to Ward Elcock, Defence Minister Peter MacKay's new deputy, the government was told it would take six years to bring new submarines completely up to snuff, starting from the moment of contract signing.

A second defence source said a more conservative estimate of the timeline would be up to eight years.

A spokesman for Mr. MacKay declined to give details of the briefing.

"The minister has no comment on the substance of briefings, which are often sensitive in nature," press secretary Jay Paxton said. "The minister does view these subs as an important strategic asset for Canada."

The Harper government has been casting around for ways to bolster the country's sovereignty over the Arctic. The issue of the Far North is expected to figure prominently in next week's Throne Speech.
More on link


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## Colin Parkinson

Is the 212/214 production line in Germany still running?


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## geo

At a time when the CF is looking to replace it's Destroyers, Oilers & Supply ships + upgrade it's Frigates, is this the time to look at new subs?

This has the makings of another Feast & Famine...

Short term scramble to build a ton of ships followed by.... NOTHING.


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## COBRA-6

Inquiries into AIP subs is not surprising with the CPC's focus on the arctic...


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## Sea Dragon

Geo; I shudder at the thought of feast or famine.  However, might this not be the time to start asking the questions, at least?  If it's 8 years (then add in further fudge factors), then starting the intellectual ball rolling might be a sign that ongoing procurement is a possibility.  Of course, that may just be wishful thinking.


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## geo

Thinking about this,
the CF was poking around the used MBTs some 2 years before we got together with the Dutch for their Leo2 A4s

It's a staff check...


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## Ex-Dragoon

Better to get the leg work done now then wait til later.


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## geo

these stories sometimes start when someone high up asks the question

"what would it take to get / do.........................."
and then the staff weenies go to work running around to fill the possibly silly muse


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## Navy_Blue

I am speaking with a limited view, time wise and experience.  I'm in the phase of my course where we are tracing and crawling in every nook and cranny on the Boat.  I also worked in a limited manner maintaining Windsor through the summer as well.  

In my opinion we have max 10 years of service life on the Vic's regardless of how much time they spend on the lift.  If we were to start looking at mothballing 1 possibly 2 boats you might squeak another 2 years.  I think I could find a few in the MSE world that would think that is optimistic too.  From the people I have met in the MOG allot are optimistic and feel the Vic's could  be (are) good boats. 

I agree with Ex.  Get the mind numbing paper work out of the way.  In that time we should have 4 or 5 years of sailing time on at least 2 boats and the makings of an experienced Sub community again.  Vic's can act as inshore patrol and training platforms and our people can get back to sneaking up on the yanks and scaring the crap out of them  ;D.  I would love to see us get a Type 214.  Could be very cool and from an electrical point of view amazing.

From a political perspective the Conservatives can't loose.  "Yeah we tried our best. really we did!  Those darn Liberals got us in quite a mess.  I think we owe it to our sailors and our country to get the best equipment possible."  At that point we have an election, the Liberals (god help us if its NDP) win and cancel the contract  :warstory:

Anyways that's my 2 cents

Cheers


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Sea Dragon said:
			
		

> Geo; I shudder at the thought of feast or famine.  However, might this not be the time to start asking the questions, at least?  If it's 8 years (then add in further fudge factors), then starting the intellectual ball rolling might be a sign that ongoing procurement is a possibility.  Of course, that may just be wishful thinking.



When I joined the Navy in 1977 I remember being in a big briefing on the CPF program for all of us junior officers....it was very rudimentary at that stage and not called the CPF but those ships did not start down the slipways until the early nineties! It takes a long time to develop these programs with the way we do business...so better start planning now.


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## Sub_Guy

Does anyone think with the possibility of another election on the horizon that the Conservatives could be thinking of terminating the sub program to try to earn votes?  Which could push them into a majority?

Terminate the current program or downsize it, and try to get boats that are capable of patrolling the arctic...


The Upholders are good boats, almost a decade of negative press coverage is burned into the minds of many, and there is no way of getting rid of the negativity associated with the submarines.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> Does anyone think with the possibility of another election on the horizon that the Conservatives could be thinking of terminating the sub program to try to earn votes?  Which could push them into a majority?
> 
> Terminate the current program or downsize it, and try to get boats that are capable of patrolling the arctic...
> 
> 
> The Upholders are good boats, almost a decade of negative press coverage is burned into the minds of many, and there is no way of getting rid of the negativity associated with the submarines.



I don't think your average Canadian who lives in Ontario even knows we have a Navy never mind submarines. this isn't a burning issue in the GTA where they need to win...nor in Quebec where they also need to win. My read would be that they are looking to the future and whether to cut our losses now. As someone else mentioned this will be a staff check to check out feasibility.


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## eerickso

Laid down Launched Commissioned 
Italy S526 Salvatore Todaro July 3, 1999 November 6, 2003 March 29, 2006 
Italy S527 Sciré May 27, 2000 December 18, 2004 February 19, 2007 

From Wikipedia, according to this we could have submariners sailing in four years?

This is my take:
The conventional diesel electric submarine is the Swiss mechanical watch of the submarine business. Should we just keep on our path of idiocy?

Submerged for 3 weeks without snorkeling. Hmmm this sounds good to me?


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## geo

While submarines are nice, new ones even better..... the Canadian Navy is in dire need of other basic staples.

Protecteur & Preserver are pert well clapped out and need to be replaced.
A new RORO cargo ship would also be essential - get us off our dependency for old Soviet cargo ships (MV Kate anyone)
Our tribal class DDHs are also pert well clapped out and need to be replaced.

Soooo..... how many subs do you want with your order?


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## eerickso

Four and then the only thing left to worry about are the destroyers. Other businesses manage to transport material without being held ransom? We dont have any DDHs.


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## TCBF

My prediction:  No new subs during a minority government.


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## Command-Sense-Act 105

Replace subs with "anything"...


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## eerickso

I think Harper wants to give Dion a throne speech he can choke on!!! ;D


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## Stoker

Cut our losses and send the crews back to the fleet, we can use them.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Stoker said:
			
		

> Cut our losses and send the crews back to the fleet, we can use them.



And lose our subsurface capability? Not a smart plan



> Four and then the only thing left to worry about are the destroyers. Other businesses manage to transport material without being held ransom? We dont have any DDHs.


What do you call the 280s? look at their ball caps sometime in the dockyard


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## aesop081

Stoker said:
			
		

> Cut our losses and send the crews back to the fleet, we can use them.



or better yet, keep the subs and the crews, so that i can train against real submarines on a regular basis and not have to wait for the USN. Its win-win...the Canadian Navy can use the subs and so can the AF.


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## eerickso

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> And lose our subsurface capability? Not a smart plan
> What do you call the 280s? look at their ball caps sometime in the dockyard



I do and I only see DDG


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## SeaDog

Cut our losses?  Not exactly forward thinking when every other major naval player has been investing more time, more energy and more money at increasing submarine capabillity.  The last year alone has seen an unprecedented amount of submarine hulls hitting the water - and not just from the big players...quite a few smaller navies that were hitherto disregarded due to their lack of submarine capability.  It's a dynamic and changing international environment at the moment with regards to naval power and force projection.  I'm not saying the way we are running are program at the moment is the correct way - but to abandon a submarine capability would be handicapping ourselves.  They are an integral part of any modern navy.  Furthermore, it is not a skill set where in the future if you decide you need it you can just slap a few hulls together and ask for volunteers.  On a lighter note, most of the boys in boats haven't set foot on a skimmer in years...let alone on a frigate.  In short of scullery over on the surface side?


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## Stoker

Really what have we gotten out of these subs so far? Have they ever been fully operational?  I agree that we need to maintain this capability, however how much real use are we going to get out of these platforms? I say get rid of 2,strip them for parts and start the groundwork to acquire something newer such as the German built boats. That way we can maintain the "skill set" and make the transition to the newer boats.


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## Sub_Guy

leftcoaster said:
			
		

> I do and I only see DDG



Yeah I noticed that, they switched a few years back from DDH to DDG.....  When I was on the Iroquois it was DDH, but I see the happy people wearing Algonquin hats which are DDG...  

Either way getting rid of the subsurface capability is a real bad idea, we were once a proud ASW nation, and it seems that many are more than willing to let this go to the wayside.  We can't afford to do that, because one of the biggest threats to naval units is the subsurface threat.   That and good buckets for cleaning stations. 

What have we gotten out of these subs?  Not much.  Have they ever been fully operational? I don't think so. I forget which sub went overseas this year, but that was a pretty big milestone for the sub community.

Getting rid of two and stripping them for parts might not be a bad idea, if we can get two fully operational that would be decent.  I think the decision to get these boats was rushed and not well thought out, but thats easy to say after the fact.   Most who have sailed on them do agree that they are good boats, and they have the potential to be near the top of the heap when it comes to conventional submarines.


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## aesop081

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> What have we gotten out of these subs?  Not much.  Have they ever been fully operational? I don't think so. I forget which sub went overseas this year, but that was a pretty big milestone for the sub community.



Corner Brook


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## Cdn Blackshirt

If the feds are going to justify a new submarine purchase, they better be planning on at least assembling them here.

That being said, as previously stated, unless we're buying nukes which can escort a task group into unfriendly waters (which isn't going to happen), then I remain of the belief that funds are better spent on a combination of sea floor sonar systems and a combination of fixed, rotary wing aircraft and surface vessels for coastal surveillance and defence.

I cannot be convinced that using a submarine to look for fisheries violations or someone illegally dumping bilge water is good use of said asset.


Matthew.


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## aesop081

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> I cannot be convinced that using a submarine to look for fisheries violations or someone illegally dumping bilge water is good use of said asset.



I agree.  Besides, that is one of my jobs  ;D

Submarines are a force multiplier in the sense that they cause an enemy fleet to expend a disproportionate amount of resources to counter. A single submarine known, or suspected, to be operating in an area is enough to cause a fleet to stay home (Falklands ring any bells). If the relatively small Canadian Navy is to "punch above its weight" it can ill afford to find itself without submarines. This is true both at home and abroad.

ASW is one of those difficult skills to get and even more difficult to maintain. Those skills perish very quickly. Depending on the USN to give us some time with their subs to carry out our training means we have to play by their rules, on their terms, when they feel like letting us do it. Mk39 EMATT and Mk30 sleds can only provide so much in terms of training.  This may seem a minor use for having our own submarines but with the worldwide proliferation of subs, we cannot discount the need for proper training of our ASW forces. Having our own subs makes sense.


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## redleafjumper

Given the increased interest in the Arctic by several countries and the resistance of even our 'friends' to recognize our northern borders an enhanced submarine capability makes a lot of sense.  There will, however, be a real need to build the infrastructure to support a strong naval presence in three oceans, as well as our power projection capability.  That means with more submarines we will also need more surface vessels, aircraft and support.  There will be a cost to this capability, but it is certainly prudent to look into it.

Cheers,


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## aesop081

redleafjumper said:
			
		

> There will, however, be a real need to build the infrastructure to support a strong naval presence in three oceans, as well as our power projection capability.  That means with more submarines we will also need more surface vessels, aircraft and support.  There will be a cost to this capability, but it is certainly prudent to look into it.



Absolutely. Thats the trouble with having done thing "on the cheap" all these years, we need everything at once to deal with new realities.


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## a_majoor

First read this: Far Distant Ships.

WRT buying "off the shelf", one of the factors which drove the purchase of the Upholder class subs is they have a much greater range than any other diesel electric boats, an important consideration given the size of our own coastlines and the deployment distances to get to other parts of the world. Upholders are essentially nuclear subs without the reactors.

This puts us between a rock and a hard place. We can buy subs with considerably shorter ranges, we can try rebuilding the Upholders or we can attempt to design and build our own (a very difficult proposition, and the Australians could tell you, look up Collins class submarines). We would be taking just as big a risk by not having subs as well. Politically, a nuclear boat is simply not in the cards (something to do with the "n" word), and a multi billion dollar program won't go over very well either. We live in _interesting_ times.


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## warrickdll

a_majoor said:
			
		

> ...
> ...Politically, a nuclear boat is simply not in the cards (something to do with the "n" word)...
> ...



I think that the Global Warming “issue” has caused a shift in the popularity of nuclear power. Tie in the non-use of fossil fuel, especially in the sensitive arctic environment, with sovereignty - and this might actually have some public support.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

It would be an interesting trial balloon. Take the old Tory White paper plan off the shelf from the 80s and blow the dust off it I say. It called for a fleet of 12 Nuke boats if I remember rightly. One of the reasons the Mulroney Tories were interested in acquiring the boats was Arctic sovereignty....it's deja vu all over again!


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## Navy_Blue

They worry about crossing the pond if they have any issues with the battery.  If they were required to float the load on the surface and run the DG's the whole trip they wouldn't make it.  Its range is very dependant on its condition.   

The upholders where conceived to stay in the North Sea around the UK and listen and wait.   Diesels are quite, cheap and easy to run and have small crews.  Just add the crew and fuel costs on fictitiously running all 4 Vic's and you might scratch the operating budget of a CPF (maintenance cost at this point is another storey).  Conceivably any future boats i.e. type 214's would be cheap to run dependant on what AIP running costs are.  These boats are cost effective for a small navy.   

Most people I have met in the Sonar community have expressed that most nuke boats are noisy when compared to a Diesel.
Nuke boats are effectively underwater steamboats and steam is loud.

I hate to quote a hippy but "NO MORE NUKES....NO MORE NUKES!!!"  ;D at least not in our navy.


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## aesop081

a_majoor said:
			
		

> First read this: Far Distant Ships.



Ahh yes, Ruxted.....the answer to everything  :


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## Colin Parkinson

a_majoor said:
			
		

> First read this: Far Distant Ships.
> 
> WRT buying "off the shelf", one of the factors which drove the purchase of the Upholder class subs is they have a much greater range than any other diesel electric boats, an important consideration given the size of our own coastlines and the deployment distances to get to other parts of the world. Upholders are essentially nuclear subs without the reactors.
> 
> This puts us between a rock and a hard place. We can buy subs with considerably shorter ranges, we can try rebuilding the Upholders or we can attempt to design and build our own (a very difficult proposition, and the Australians could tell you, look up Collins class submarines). We would be taking just as big a risk by not having subs as well. Politically, a nuclear boat is simply not in the cards (something to do with the "n" word), and a multi billion dollar program won't go over very well either. We live in _interesting_ times.



I was reading the Specs on the 214 and on paper the differances in range was not that much from the Upholder class.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/type_212/index.html


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## Ex-Dragoon

> then I remain of the belief that funds are better spent on a combination of sea floor sonar systems and a combination of fixed, rotary wing aircraft and surface vessels for coastal surveillance and defence.



I guess myself and others have wasted our time then in your eyes trying to convince doubters the absolute necessity of subs in naval warfare. All I can say CB is thank god you are not in procurement. It has been shown inumerable times how valuable submarines are and how much of a necessity they are in todays navies. Have we used them in combat yet, No.  should we also get rid of our SM2s, our sea sparrow missiles, torpedoes and harpoons?


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I guess myself and others have wasted our time then in your eyes trying to convince doubters the absolute necessity of subs in naval warfare. All I can say CB is thank god you are not in procurement. It has been shown inumerable times how valuable submarines are and how much of a necessity they are in todays navies. Have we used them in combat yet, No.  should we also get rid of our SM2s, our sea sparrow missiles, torpedoes and harpoons?



Well it's madness for a country our size with the coastline and territorial limit that we have not to have submarines. The fact that we are only budgeted for four is mind-boggling but indicative of the fact that we have lived under the US Defence umbrella for so long that we believe a. we don't have a threat or b. our friends will look after it for us.


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## Ex-Dragoon

IN HOC SIGNO said:
			
		

> Well it's madness for a country our size with the coastline and territorial limit that we have not to have submarines. The fact that we are only budgeted for four is mind-boggling but indicative of the fact that we have lived under the US Defence umbrella for so long that we believe a. we don't have a threat or b. our friends will look after it for us.



Agreed maybe some day these nay sayers will realize its an all or nothing prospect.


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## eerickso

Even if we gave the MPAs a harpoon capability,  how are they going to stop this?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIPjz6z_Ze0

You can fit a pretty impressive weapon system on a ship! If you think Subs are expensive, then you don't know much about AWW.


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## Colin Parkinson

Finally a Sub we can afford and the manpower requirements are minamal, not to mention a short learning curve.

http://www.theday.com/re.aspx?re=a193cebe-6fd7-4224-9309-4f05ff28c252


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## aesop081

leftcoaster said:
			
		

> Even if we gave the MPAs a harpoon capability,  how are they going to stop this?
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIPjz6z_Ze0



I guess you dont know much about how we do our buisness


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## Sub_Guy

If I think subs are expensive then I don't know much about AWW?


The cost of operating and maintaining a submarine fleet is much more expensive than the weapon systems on our surface ships

That specific clip was of a missile going up in the sky, sure it might take down an Aircraft, but the real blow will come from the deep my friend, and by the time you get your Emerg "T" Bearing XXX.... out on the radio, you will probably be seconds from a real bad day.


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## Navy_Blue

Another article in the paper today folks.  

2007-11-08, Canada
Future of subs up in the air

Prime minister, top officials debating whether to scrap, upgrade or buy new
By MURRAY BREWSTER The Canadian Press
Thu. Nov 8 - 6:17 AM

OTTAWA — A wide-ranging discussion about the future of Canada’s troubled submarine fleet is taking place at the highest levels of the Conservative government, say political and defence sources.

The Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister’s Office are examining whether to “scrap them altogether, upgrade the existing boats or buy new,” said a political source.

http://www.thechronicleherald.ca/Search/977352.html

Where there is smoke theres fire  ;D


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## karl28

I sure hope that the Gov doesn't  scrap the Subs . I may only be a Civilian but even I think there valuable assets to have .  
 It would be nice to upgrade the ones that we have and than have a plan to buy new  replacements for  them with  in a   5-10 year time frame .


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## IN HOC SIGNO

I'd love to be a fly on the wall at that discussion. I wonder what alternatives they are discussing? Clearly if they are really concerned about the Arctic they would be discussing Nuke boats. We would have to borrow or buy those from the US methinks....or maybe the Brits have some used ones eh?  ;D


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## guns_and_roses

In modern times is it possible to have a navy like the germans had in ww2? Based on subs?  If i had the power id base our Navy on Carrier groups and subs.


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## Sub_Guy

Nuke boats would be nice, but in my opinion either the Type 212 or Gotland.... AIP is the way to go.

I wonder how Joe Public would react if the the PC party turfed the Victoria Class?  There has been nothing but bad press about these boats

We have not had a real operational submarine program since 98/99 it is coming up on a decade now, and if it takes 6-8 years to get new boats online (6-8 years from contract announcement?) it could be close to another decade before we have full operational capability when it comes to subsurface.   There is a lot of experience that will be lost, heck there is a lot of experience that has been lost since the O-boats, from where I sit it is scary time to be involved in the submarine program.


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## geo

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> I wonder how Joe Public would react if the the PC party turfed the Victoria Class?  There has been nothing but bad press about these boats



A little bit like SAS and the DeHavilland Bombardier Q400. Many accidents that they blame on the plane & manufacturer.  They ground the aircraft and announce they will sell off their fleet.  Subsequently, the European Air Safety Agency researches and proves the problems are maintenance issues... (remind me not to fly SAS)

Not saying that we didn't look after our boats, from the moment that they became our boats.... but the Brits didn't do a great job when they mothballed them... then we took forever hemming and hawing before making the deal... The boats were rusting away and what O boat experience we had was getting older (or going out the door) while everyone waited.

How will Joe Public react?... Predictably.  How will the Gov't present it?... Predictably. It was the Liberal's fault - curse Stephane Dion!


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## MarkOttawa

Why we do not need submarines:

1) We face no naval threat off our coasts for which subs are needed.

2) Surveillance and sovereignty protection are much better done by surface ships, aircraft, UAVs and satellite.

3) Subs are not suited for fisheries protection; our Navy is the only one in the world--as far as I know--that uses this truly silly justification.

4) Providing diesel-electric subs for the USN to train against is not a key Canadian defence interest, however much the Navy likes the link.

5) We seem to be getting along fine now--and have for several years--with no effective submarine fleet.

In any event, whatever may think of the need for subs, this acquisition has been a disaster and is sucking money that could be better used elsewhere--e.g. amphibious ships and vessels with real sea-going capabilities unlike the MCDVs.

By 2012 we might actually have all four subs in service. At which time all of them will already be at least twenty years old.

It would indeed be a shame if the subs were "scrapped" but a sensible decision. Though basing such a decision on Arctic relevance would be politics run mad. What would arctic-capable subs of our own actually do? No good for general surveillance. Torpedo underwater intruders in peacetime whose secret passages pose no legal threat to our sovereignty claims in northern waters?

Mark
Ottawa


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## geo

Ouch!

(good rant Mark!)


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## Sub_Guy

Why we don't need an army

1. The only way an army is going to get to our country is via air or sea (need for submarines there)

2. We face no real threat over land from an enemy force (and if we did they would coming from the air or sea)

3. Shovel your own driveway

I could sit here and make a list for everything we don't need and back it up with silly reasons.   The ocean is much like the air (3 Dimensional) , patrolling on the surface is great, but what about the sub surface?  The submarine is an invaluable asset, go ask Argentina what they think about the subsurface threat....   

Should we get rid of our CF-18's too?  Because they patrol the skies and we face no real threat from the skies right?  (See New Zealand)

But I am sure someone will be thinking "what about the Russian bombers, those are a threat"   They are even less of a threat than a SSBN hanging out in our backyard. 

Good rant though.


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## IN HOC SIGNO

Question for you Mark.....why do you think that the Chinese think building a submarine capability is important? 
http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/200471823.aspx


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## aesop081

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> 1) We face no naval threat off our coasts for which subs are needed.



How about the foreign subs that transit through our waters ?  Furthermore, can you categoricaly say that we will not face such a threat 10 years or more from now ?



> 2) Surveillance and sovereignty protection are much better done by surface ships, aircraft, UAVs and satellite.



Maritime surveillance is best done 3-dimesionaly. Above, on and below the surface.



> 3) Subs are not suited for fisheries protection; our Navy is the only one in the world--as far as I know--that uses this truly silly justification.



I'll give you that one.  But just like we can use the CP-140 for that in peacetime, we can use the subs for other things.



> 4) Providing diesel-electric subs for the USN to train against is not a key Canadian defence interest, however much the Navy likes the link.



How about providing D/E submarines for the training of Canadian ASW forces ? 



> 5) We seem to be getting along fine now--and have for several years--with no effective submarine fleet.



How would you know ?



> No good for general surveillance.



Oh...please explain  :




> Torpedo underwater intruders in peacetime whose secret passages pose no legal threat to our sovereignty claims in northern waters?



Best way to track a sub is with another sub.  Again, can you categoricaly say that we will not have to respond to underwater challenges in our waters in the future ?  If you can i would like to have the same crystal ball you have.  Right now you just sound like :

Mark
from Ottawa and here to help

 :


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## CougarKing

> Question for you Mark.....why do you think that the Chinese think building a submarine capability is important?



IN HOC SIGNO,

To answer your question on Chinese subs:

The PLAN/Chinese Navy needs submarines partially to blockade Taiwan and as a way to assert their claim over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea without the luxury of large carrier battle groups. Their having so many _Ming, Song_ and _Romeo _ Class SSKs left over from the Cold War, as well as newer types like the _Han, Yuan_ and _Kilo_ Class subs, means that their naval doctrine might have been based on the Soviet Navy as well before the Moscow-Bejing schism that was in full swing by the end of the 1960s. So far the _Han_ class is the only Hunter-Killer (like Fast-Attack SSBNs of the USN) SSN the PLAN has, though it is noisy and anything but fast.

Furthermore, the Chinese also maintain a marginal SSBN capability with their _Xia_ Class sub- and that newer _Jin_ Class SSBN spotted on Google Earth- to supplement the missile brigades of the PLA Second Artillery whose mission is to give the CCP leaders the option to strike back. The "No Strike First" nuclear missile policy advocated by Mao still remains the doctrine of the PLA Second Artillery's units; you will see that policy stated in any Sinologist's books about the PLA which even mention China's strategic missile forces, such as those by David Shambaugh.

BTW, the article link you provided misspelled the Chinese sub class name, featured in the article, as the "Yaun" when they mean "Yuan". That name is the Mandarin name for rule of that dynasty of Mongol rulers who occupied China for about a 100 years; Kublai Kahn, one of the Yuan Emperors, was supposedly the grandson of Genghis Kahn. Some analysts have speculated that the _Yuan_ may have been based in part on the _Kilo_ Class SSKs the PLAN already has a few of.

Here's a _Jin_ Class SSBN overhead picture, btw, as well as the link to the article describing it:

http://blogs.abcnews.com/scienceandsociety/2007/07/the-jin-class-s.html


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## Greymatters

MarkOttawa and DolphinHunter, both are good reads. ('Shovel your own driveway' - ha! love it)

However, as much as I believe that subs are not 'invaluable', I agree with DolphinHunter that they are key to any true demonstration of soveriegnty.  There's no sense flying the flag on the surface with frigate and airframes when US and Russian subs can cruise through our waters whenever they feel like it.  Sure, Joe Civi doesnt know its happening (except for the occasional news story), and we can pretened we dont know the subs are going through our waters where we claim soveriegnty, but it only means that our allies laugh behind their hands at us.  Not the best of reasons for keeping a sub, but national dignity is as good a reason as any. 

"5) We seem to be getting along fine now--and have for several years--with no effective submarine fleet."

For shame! Isnt this the same argument the government has been throwing at the military for the last 20 years?   _"We seem to be getting along fine without (fill in the blank - tanks, new fighters, new ships, NVD's, ammo for training, courses for troops, new heavy airlift, helicopters that can airlift more than 8 people, etc.)" _  And look where that got us?  A list of stuff we need thats a mile long, and a treasury board moaning about it.  We can cut corners on a lot of things and get away with it, but the CF must be able to operate in all four battlespaces to be effective.


----------



## IN HOC SIGNO

CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> The PLAN/Chinese Navy needs submarines partially to blockade Taiwan and as a way to assert their claim over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea without the luxury of large carrier battle groups. Their having so many Ming Class and Romeo Class SSKs left over from the Cold War, as well as newer types like the Han, Kilo and Yuan Class subs, means that their naval doctrine might have been based on the Soviet Navy as well before the Moscow-Bejing schism of that was in full swing by the end of the 1960s.



The point is that there are plenty of nations in the world that think that submarines are an important asset. They are a force multiplier as you alluded...they don't have carrier battle groups so they have to have something to level the playing field. For us they are an important part of having a blue water navy.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

It is sad to see there are some people out there that do not see the necessity or _understand_ of the submarine in naval warfare. :

Well said to IHS, Greymatter, Cdn Aviator and Dolphin Hunter. Very well put.


----------



## Navy_Blue

Our fleet east and west today is like a three legged dog.  The tankers are hurting, the 280's are tired, the CPF's are just starting FELEX and our subs well we know what they are like.  If we loose our Sub (yes Sub  :warstory we might as well strap on the wheels and let the Navy drag its arse around.  Its an interesting time to be in the mix.  Its a make or brake time for us.


----------



## GAP

MacKay says scrapping sub program not on the table
Updated Fri. Nov. 9 2007 10:39 AM ET The Canadian Press
Article Link

ANTIGONISH, N.S. -- Defence Minister Peter MacKay says Ottawa isn't considering scrapping Canada's troubled submarine fleet.

MacKay was responding to a report that suggested the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office are weighing the future of the sub program, with options ranging from scraping them altogether to buying new boats.

The defence minister says he wants to see the four submarines operational as soon as possible, calling them "good vessels'' to enforce Arctic sovereignty and protect Canada's coastline.

The four Victoria-class submarines, which Canada bought used from Britain in 1998, have come under criticism for delays, mounting costs, their limited Arctic capabilities and the perception they're "lemons.''

But despite those setbacks, and the fact that only one of the subs is fully operation, MacKay insists the program has his full support.

He's asked for recommendations on how to proceed with the program, but says that's due to financial and legal considerations regarding the bidding process and not because the future of the subs were in doubt.
More on link


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

I was re reading the argument Mark was making and the subsequent points made thereafter and I was wondering if anyone else sees the irony of the two air force guys making the argument for submarines to the ex CCG guy that I would have hoped knew better.


----------



## Greymatters

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I was re reading the argument Mark was making and the subsequent points made thereafter and I was wondering if anyone else sees the irony of the two air force guys making the argument for submarines to the ex CCG guy that I would have hoped knew better.



Everybody has an off day...


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

I would concur but those were well thought out points


----------



## a_majoor

In one sense this is a good idea; given the long lead time to procure items like subs, ships, aircraft etc. doing our shopping now means something will actually be ready in ten years when we are doing an evaluation on the Victoria class subs ("Should I stay or should I go?")

Some other reasons come to mind:

Canada has different needs than most operators. For political reasons as well as economic ones we are very unlikely to get nuclear submarines, but we still need to patrol the longest coastline in the world, have some sort of under ice capability and _in extremis_ be able to deploy over globe spanning distances to get where the action is. Overall, this would mean a larger, faster and more capable boat than is offered by the major Western powers. The modern U boats and their counterparts from Sweden etc. are optimised for their conditions (i.e. the North and Baltic seas), shorter cruises and easy access to shore facilities. Imagine our subs off the coast of Timor or in the Arabian sea, or generally operating out of the Indian Ocean (which may well be the Oceanic strategy of choice for WW IV) and you begion to see the problem.

Given these scenarios, we would want an extensively modified boat if it were to come from a foreign design, or perhaps be willing to start the R&D NOW to create the boat we want/need. This also gives us time to work on other peculiar problems like how to track things under the ice, or integrate diesel fuel cells (SOFC) or other advanced technologies into the design.

Even if we decide we are willing to forego under ice capabilities or glob spanning range, contracting out for a submairne will probably still take time, no one is building subs in a modular fashion like the type XXI anymore


----------



## Neill McKay

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Imagine our subs off the coast of Timor or in the Arabian sea, or generally operating out of the Indian Ocean (which may well be the Oceanic strategy of choice for WW IV) and you begion to see the problem.



This raises a question I'd never thought about before: will the JSS have any capacity as a sub tender?  (And what, if anything, does a sub tender need apart from the usual facilities of an AOR-type vessel?)


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Sub tenders are fading away, even the USN is giving up on the concept. To meet our aspirations of a player on the world stage though we need to go AIP for our subs if we want to deploy them around the world. And as Neill points out we might have to keep an out dated concept in operation to suit our naval needs.


----------



## MarkOttawa

A response to my points at "The Torch" from Cmdre (ret'd) Eric Lehre:

More on the submarine debate 
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/11/more-on-submarine-debate.html



> While the Brewster article [Mark] posted was not able to quote me more fully, I did outline that the current questioning of the submarine capability involved two sides. One side likely questioned the expense of submarines given the rising costs of other more immediate government and DND concerns - whatever they may be. On the other side are those who point out it may not be a particularly astute time to eliminate submarines given that nuclear submarines have always been and will continue to be the vehicle of choice for those seeking to move relatively quickly though the Arctic seas. Given the rush to lay claim to arctic offshore areas in pursuit of oil, the odds are this will be even more important. In addition, AIP submarines will surely join nuclear submarines in this and no one predicts the complete elimination of the arctic ice cover anytime soon.
> 
> Moreover, the Fall 2007 Issue of the Canadian Naval Review contains an interesting article by Captain Webster on Arctic waterspace management. Therein he makes the case that with submarines of any kind you participate in the western world's effort to manage submarine movements in a process akin to air control. Canada can thus exert considerable pressure on others to cooperate with us in the management of submarine movements in the waters off our Arctic simply by operating our current submarines on the borders of the ice edge.
> 
> Those who might not initially cooperate are soon driven to do so because of fears of underwater collision and because cooperation just makes sense. Nations who do not have submarines are not invited to participate in this sensitive work. They are asked nothing and told nothing. This is no exception to this rule.



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

JSS are not designed to support subs. Maybe a small freighter could be taken out of trade and modified to be a sub tender.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Anyone who wants Canada to have it's own Nuke subs has not looked at the subject much. Even Britain went with a US design and uses US Infrastructure to maintain the reactors. Conventional subs are being bought in large quantities right now and represent a threat to any navy that operates on the ocean. Did we buy the right subs for us? I think they were the right sub when offered, but suffered from neglect at the dock and lost some of their advantages. We should have looked at the U-214 class as the yard was building new subs with AIP capability, something that would have extended our reach under the ice. Subs are a force multiplier's and a area denial weapon, even when not being used. They could patrol the entrances to Arctic waters challenging US subs and letting them know that we know where they are, the US respects those that challenge them and would be more willing to compromise on the waterway use issue.


----------



## a_majoor

Colin P said:
			
		

> Anyone who wants Canada to have it's own Nuke subs has not looked at the subject much.



If you look back to the 1980's when nuclear submarines were openly contemplated by the Canadian Navy, you will see that it was political and economic, rather than operational requirements which scuttled the project. Both British and French designs were being seriously looked at, as well as some oddball ideas like the SSn, which used a _very_ small reactor to charge the batteries, sort of like a diesel electric sub but without the diesel.......

The Americans were not inclined to cooperate (they felt our being able to operate under the ice would strengthen our claim to the NW passage), and Soviet subs were seen as *the* problem (the inherent strength of double hulls and potential plusses like liquid metal cooled reactors, 40 knot sprint speeds  and titanium hulls with improbable crush depths were all the rage in naval journals of the day), so _something_ had to be done. 

Strangely enough, many of the same factors are still in play, from Canada's operational requirements that suggest nuclear energy as one potential solution to the same casts of players and potential opponents (Russian nuclear submarines with double hulls, high pressure nuclear reactors, fast sprint speeds and improbable crush depths.....now dual purpose boats with torpedo launched cruise missiles).

I only point out that some sort of nuclear option makes sense in a strictly operational terms, costs and politics will always drive the process of what we get and only a very weird set of circumstances would allow the Canadian Navy to have their own nuclear boats.


----------



## CougarKing

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> It is sad to see there are some people out there that do not see the necessity or _understand_ of the submarine in naval warfare. :



A World War II-era USN submarine skipper once said: to submariners, there are only two kinds of ships: "other submarines and targets" (Please correct me if I said this quote wrong). 

Even though the conditions today are different from both World Wars, maritime commerce or transportation is still very important and a submarine has been proven as a viable weapon that can disrupt an aggressor nation's shipping lanes. Note how German U-boats, first under the Kaiser and then under Hitler, nearly starved Great Britain out by attacking the convoys; people also overlook the fact that the Pacific War was also won as much by USN submarine crews who decimated Japan's merchant fleet and even much of the IJN's surface fleet, as by the carrier pilots and the Marines/GIs in island-hopping campaigns. Such was the impact of the submarine on both these island nations, who rely so much on maritime trade, that both the RN and later the JMSDF later developed a substantial ASW capability during the Cold War (because they feared waves of Soviet subs let loose on the shipping lanes if war came) and onwards. With this history recap in mind, is it true that the hint of a presence of an enemy sub in a modern war will be enough to tie down even up to a whole battle group of surface ships conducting ASW or at least make them steam on course very cautiously, or in zig-zag patterns?  All these points are just to reinforce/reiterate the previous justfications for our having subs, even though other larger nations' sub capabilities have evolved to the point of being able to carry SLBMs, other land attack munitions as well as insert covert operations teams into enemy territory undetected, which shows just how versatile and adaptable platforms submarines can be when it comes to finding new uses for them.

Nowadays, the convenience of air travel and air transportation of goods, etc., is so prevalent that this makes some people in fact forget or fail to realize the important fact that a lot of commerce still runs on freighters, tankers and other merchant vessels.

a_majoor,

BTW, in your last reply mentioning boats that did 40 knots or more, did you mean one of those _Alfa_ Class submarines that go up to 43 knots?


----------



## a_majoor

Yes. The _ALPHA_ scared the Bjeezus out of Western navies and inspired a flurry of advanced weapons programs like the Mk 48 ADCAP and the Seawolf class submarine in an effort to deal with them, not to mention a flurry of Tom Clancey novels as well  .

The _ALPHA_ was a very interesting boat, but in real life it turned into a titanium pumpkin, and of the seven that were built, none seem to be in service anymore. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfa_class_submarine


----------



## Navy_Blue

Regardless of weather I expect it to work or not.  The JSS according to the SOR shall be capable of supporting the Victoria Class underway.  Anyone I have talked to doesn't think it can happen.  Possibly if fitted right in a sheltered area and in calm weather the JSS or Tanker could.   At sea underway would be risky in terms of safety and environment.


----------



## NCS_Eng

Just as an FYI for those keeping tabs on this thread, I was recently in Ottawa for the Navy's annual C4ISR Conference, and during a presentation by DGMFD/DMRS 9 (The Sub Project guys) they addressed the issue of buying a new sub class as ludicrous, and that all cost projections done show that it would bankrupt the Navy (They put a _very_ rough dollar figure at 4b for the initial acquisition and and an additional 6b in service support). I expect this is the information that was passed to the government for their report so I don't think we will be seeing anything else on the subject.

The Victoria class isn't going anywhere. Also of intrest to this thread is that the Victoria class service life extension program (SLEP) has no funding and isn't guaranteed to happen (unofficially 50/50).

Also offtopic but also interesting, apparently the Destroyer replacement program is now officially back on the books (IE we are no longer putting all our eggs in the SCSC basket). Its now known as DRP (Destroyer Replacement Program) and its brand new (only official as of July 07).


----------



## Spencer100

NCS_Eng said:
			
		

> Also offtopic but also interesting, apparently the Destroyer replacement program is now officially back on the books (IE we are no longer putting all our eggs in the SCSC basket). Its now known as DRP (Destroyer Replacement Program) and its brand new (only official as of July 07).



That is very interesting.  How would DRP effect the SCSC? We would not run two programs would we?  

Mod: I guess this should be a new thread.


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## newfin

If this DRP news is true then that is the most interesting bit of news in a while.  I never did like the idea of 1 hull for 2 different purposes.  And I wish that we would build something proven for a change.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

newfin said:
			
		

> If this DRP news is true then that is the most interesting bit of news in a while.  I never did like the idea of 1 hull for 2 different purposes.  And I wish that we would build something proven for a change.



Halifax class frigates were not proven either but they have more then adequately proven their worth and are a well regarded class throughout the world.


----------



## NCS_Eng

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Halifax class frigates were not proven either but they have more then adequately proven their worth and are a well regarded class throughout the world.



Absolutely. There is enough experience left in Canada in regards to shipbuilding and designing that we don't have to look off the shelf.

The DRP is still very much a paper project, and given its relative newness and lack of traction in Ottawa it is likely to stay that way for a while. The big challenge will be to sell this project to the politicians, given the other high profile (and funded) ships like JSS and the new patrol ships. The CADRE project (the old new destroyer program) remained unfunded and unloved for the decade or so it was on the books, and I really don't know if the current climate has changed enough to warrant bringing it back.

The other big challenge will be staffing the project if it ever moves past the initial stages. The Navy is looking at running JSS, the new Patrol ships, HCM and DRP on around 450 people. For comparisons sake, the Halifax Class project in the 80s had a staff of 450, and that was ONE project. Interesting times ahead for the navy.


----------



## a_majoor

NCS_Eng said:
			
		

> The other big challenge will be staffing the project if it ever moves past the initial stages. The Navy is looking at running JSS, the new Patrol ships, HCM and DRP on around 450 people. For comparisons sake, the Halifax Class project in the 80s had a staff of 450, and that was ONE project. Interesting times ahead for the navy.



When you consider that much smaller staffs worked on much larger or equally challenging projects in WW II (often incorporating entirely new generations of technology) using only _paper and pens_ and getting projects out the door and in service in a few years or less it seems astonishing that so much horsepower is being expended today with theoretically more educated personnel supported by advanced IT equipment (in WW II, "computer" was a job description, not a piece of machinery or electronics) to do one project over a decade or more.


----------



## NCS_Eng

a_majoor said:
			
		

> When you consider that much smaller staffs worked on much larger or equally challenging projects in WW II (often incorporating entirely new generations of technology) using only _paper and pens_ and getting projects out the door and in service in a few years or less it seems astonishing that so much horsepower is being expended today with theoretically more educated personnel supported by advanced IT equipment (in WW II, "computer" was a job description, not a piece of machinery or electronics) to do one project over a decade or more.



I take it you've never worked in a PMO before?


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## Edward Campbell

NCS_Eng said:
			
		

> I take it you've never worked in a PMO before?



Too true!

Gen. Eisenhower and his staff didn't have to calculate regional _benefits_ and _offsets_ for the South Downs, Normandy and Pas de Calais.


----------



## cameron

I agree with Ex-Dragoon and Navy_Blue, considering how long the acquisition and work up to full operational process can take, the sooner we get the ball rolling the better.  I for one am rooting for the Navy getting the 212/214 or Skorpene.


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## a_majoor

A long neglected article in the Canadian Defense Quarterly proposed a long range conventional sub built around the design principles of the Italian "Foca" class midget submarine. Basically, the hull is made up of a series of donut shaped segments joined together something like a stack of tires laid on their sides. Each "donut" is quite strong in compression (useful when diving) and also serves as a container for fuel or oxygen (high pressure air, since LOX is pretty tricky stuff), allowing the use of fairly conventional engines in AIP mode. The use of these donut shaped sections also provides some of the same benefits of stand off space that Soviet era double hull construction offered.

While Foca's are quite small, scaling up vastly increases the amount of fuel or air that can be carried, while the construction is relatively simple compared to more conventional. Conventional submarines built this way can have quite long ranges running submerged using AIP.  There are no electronic copies I can find, but here is the reference:


1990:01319 Alternative submarines -- minitruders and green nukes Cdr (rtd) Richard Compton-Hall RN Canadian Defence Quarterly

Offers advice to the Canadian government on submarine types and capabilities best suited to Canada's maritime needs.

Category Codes: J12, A2.02
Keywords: SUBMARINE
Geographical Index: CANADA


----------



## T.S.Rea

Although I must stress that it is entirely speculation, but one month earlier I had engaged in one of my once every couple of decades or so exercises in offering my advice/opinions on national defence strategy to the government (in this case sent to the PMO).  As it pertained to submarines,

Arctic Class Submarines [‘Hecla’ Class(?), 10-12 Units]

Roles:
Submarine Systems Development, Coastal & Arctic Sovereignty Patrols, Survey & Scientific Research, ASW-ASuW-Mine Warfare

Displacement:
700-1000 tons,  Advanced Steels or Aluminum Alloys or Alternate Hybrids, Multiple Pressure Hull Zones (actually selection of materials and hull design could evolve through series production, and may permit somewhat unique units in the class); diving depth of up to 500 Metres (could very throughout the class due to technical, budgetary, or cost-benefit considerations)

Complement:  
14-25 (through automation and/or restriction of systems based on their manning requirements).

Safety:
Multiple Escape Trunks (integrated with pressure hull arrangements), Mutual SSAR Capable, Distributed Power Supply & Access, primary propulsion driven Air-Water Jets for ice boring, cutting, and clearing, back-up ice boring auger

Propulsion:
10MW Ducted Propellers and Steering Vents, retractable Hydroplanes; Isotope and/or Aluminum-Air (atmospheric and/or compressed) Fuel Cells, NiMH/Li Ion Batteries, Stationary Hydro Power Regeneration, Long Range Transit Auxiliary Fuel Cell Pods; 2-10 Knots Cruise Speed, 10-25 Knots Long Range Snorkelling (Transit Pods), 30-40 Knots Dash Speed.

Weapons Outfit:
4x4 Missile/Torpedo and/or 2-4 UUV Canisters; abeam aft, diagonally inclined, launchable in either direction. (Early boats would emphasize Arctic surveillance and survey functions and have no armament installed as commissioned, weapons being installed on a limited scale as the class matures).

Program Notes:
     Small coastal submarines suitable for all three ocean fleets, supplementing and succeeding the 'Victoria' class submarines (adding 4 units for Arctic deployment, replacing on a 1-1 basis, adding 4 further units).
     A long term program producing one minimum sized boat about ever 3 years at a average cost of ~$150-200 million/year, although likely requiring assorted start-up infrastructure costs in the range of $500-1000 million; Canada already has an established but limited industrial/technological skills base in the submaritime field, which this program would further consolidate and enhance without entrenching a big boat infrastructure.
     Program strategy to follow the MCDV model of platform construction without overemphasis on immediate or complete outfit of advanced systems and subsequent project budgetary inflation, with some emphasis towards the build up of hull numbers.
     The small size of these boats would allow them to extend their Arctic patrol endurance for prolonged periods year round from nearby shore depots, air transport, and any SOE frigates and auxiliaries operating in or dispatched to the area.  Submarines deployed to the Arctic in winter or far under the prevailing icepack would by necessity operate in pairs, given the time and distance from rescue and assistance beyond mutual support from the other boat.
     Icebreaking air-water jets would draw large quantities of compressive power from the primary propulsion outfit at little displacement penalty; a pair of mechanical ice augers could provide emergency provision of air to boats under the ice.  The boats could temporarily surface and/or dock/anchor anywhere in stable ice of substantial thickness, and even continue operations as UUV/UAV control stations while concealed and protected by the ice.
     Isotope power cells could provide low levels of electrical energy for continuous and emergency power.  Although likely having a very low power to weight ratio, the energy required of them need only be sufficient to maintain basic life support & critical systems power, with any practical and affordable additional power being available for the chemical storage batteries or low speed (1-3 Knots) propulsion. [Microelectronically captured energy from selected (surplus or bred) radioisotopes heavily encased in solid inert multiple cell units].
     NiMH and Li Ion batteries would multiply available battery power on a reduced margin of total displacement over conventional lead-acid cells; lithium cells have a extremely small but statistically significant tendency to corrode and catch fire, but remedial safety monitoring and fault isolating that is not economically feasible for most commercial uses could mitigate the problem.  Any battery system could and should be tested and monitored on limited trials with Victoria class boats,  quite possibly on HMCS Chicoutimi with due respect for the fatal incident that occurred on this boat.
     It might be possible to develop a grade of aluminum 'fuel' that can be operated at low power levels from oxygen extracted from seawater.
     Power sources and ice clearing equipment could be trialled and/or retrofitted on a limited scale on all Victoria class submarines, even though they have limited hull life remaining and an unfortunate history of maintenance issues and should be retired as soon as practical.
     The small size of these boats would limit their capabilities as autonomous ocean range vessels, but it is high unlikely they would be deployed globally outside of a major naval task force; larger 2000+ ton vessels could be built within 2-3 years under an emergency global war shipbuilding program.
     Canada has an overcapacity of hydro-electric aluminum smelters, the economics of aluminum fuel cells are in the same range as conventional fossil fuels, the aluminum is not effectively volatile and would require no special infrastructure beyond straight-forward handling and loading equipment, and the aluminum can be recycled and regenerated through modest hydro-electric and similar energy sources in remote areas that can not feasibly transmit that energy to major population areas.



My submission may only have triggered the renewed interest by pointing out that submarine operations in the constricted waterways of the Arctic archipelago only require a U-boat sized vessel to be effective, and that it is not particularly vital from a sovreignty standpoint that the vessels even need to be armed initially (PM-mapping the seabed?).  The Class 5 patrol vessels would make good patrol corsair tenders for small submarines like this as well, but although I have come to like the idea of a vessel in this class as a big hull substitute for some numbers of a patrol corvettes, it did not originate from anything I suggested.

Even if the document initiated a discussion, it may have little to no resemblance to where their discussions went to.  They likely chose to restrict the conclusions of their discussions because no decision would have been made regardless.  Even I could not say with any certainty whether or not the boats are a sound design approach without thorough detail research by multiple engineering disciplines.

Furthermore, the timing of my submission may have been entirely coincidental with the announcement a month later, since the impetous could have come from many sources.

Finally, I would advise against flooding the PMO or MND with 'ideas'; I had other reasons for engaging in the exercise that have nothing to do with defence strategy proposals.


----------



## TCBF

- I'm sure once we begin conscription again, we should be able to crew all of these boats no problems at all.


----------



## Neill McKay

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Weapons Outfit:
> 4x4 Missile/Torpedo and/or 2-4 UUV Canisters; abeam aft, diagonally inclined, launchable in either direction.



I'm curious as to the need to launch in either direction; do current operating practices for submarines make this desirable?


----------



## T.S.Rea

It isn't really a vital capacity, just one that could have some advantages in terms of operating under the ice.  Normally, torpedo tubes would be oriented forward.  If the vessel is hiding near the  surface under the ice, possibly with an air line poking through, lateral tubes might be blocked.  The same might be true if the sub were on the bottom, since the water is not always deep in some areas, particularly where big SSN's would generally never try to go.  Vertical orientation is not practical, the fish would be too long and might experience dangerous bending stresses will being launched at speed.  Diagonal orientation allows launch up or down, also allows launch of torpedos with a minimum of installed launch energy and/or launch rearwards merely by ejecting the weapons out backwards with a modest impulse (the weapons would be orientated forward, wire guidance and similar considerations would not be difficult to accomodate for dual directional launching).

Sixteen torpedos might be a large load out, but a UUV of any useful size might take up the space of four weapons.  This is needlessly to say, a paper submarine, so nothing is definitely set, and might not be until the third or fourth boat assuming it went anywhere.  I don't think it is critically vital to rush to arm the vessels (not like they are going out to immediately hunt and kill nuclear boats), but the exercise of mapping the seafloor, conducting surveillance, and developing tactics in the confined waters of the Arctic archipelago would implicitly go a long way towards establishing our sovreignty over the region.

The Kriegsmarine came close to winning the war with similar sized boats, can't see any reason why it would be critical to build larger ones.  Nothing prevents building a few of the latter vessels to a larger displacement for a greater patrol range once the core design and its technology has matured.  We have a modest small submarine technology industry in Canada, it might be to great a jump to build more than the smallest practical size of vessel, and even then it might require some help from the Europeans and elsewhere.


----------



## TCBF

- If it isn't armed, you are not exercising sovereignty.  

- We can SOSUS the heck out of the waters in and around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as well, but unless we back it up with a big fist, it would be meaningless.

- The neutral Swedes never had any problems dropping depth charges on intruding submarines.  Should we take a page out of their book?  Be carefull...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> The Kriegsmarine came close to winning the war with similar sized boats, can't see any reason why it would be critical to build larger ones.  Nothing prevents building a few of the latter vessels to a larger displacement for a greater patrol range once the core design and its technology has matured.  We have a modest small submarine technology industry in Canada, it might be to great a jump to build more than the smallest practical size of vessel, and even then it might require some help from the Europeans and elsewhere.



Yikes.  I think you may have under-estimated the developmental costs of a uniquely Canadian Submarine by at least a factor of 10- I'm thinking $5-10 billion might be more realistic.  That's before you even build one boat.  Our homegrown submarine industry is indeed modest.  Trying this on our own would be like Bombardier deciding it can go into the Stealth fighter business tomorrow.  Would a better use of scarce defence dollars not be buying AIP Kokums or Type 212s to eventually replace the Victoria class?


----------



## Infanteer

As a side note, the Kriegsmarine never came close to winning anything with their U-Boats.  It was more psychological than anything, with tonnage sunk never pushing over 2% of total Allied shipping for any given month, even in the "Happy Times."  Read this and this; his argument is pretty solid as he goes over EVERY U-boat sortie and EVERY ship sunk during the war.

Not sure how it pertains to this thread, but don't use German U-Boats as an argument for an effective naval strategy....


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As a side note, the Kriegsmarine never came close to winning anything with their U-Boats.  It was more *psychological * than anything, with tonnage sunk never pushing over 2% of total Allied shipping for any given month, even in the "Happy Times."  Read this and this; his argument is pretty solid as he goes over EVERY U-boat sortie and EVERY ship sunk during the war.
> 
> Not sure how it pertains to this thread, but don't use German U-Boats as an argument for an effective naval strategy....



Had the psychological aspect been exploited, then the U-Boot campaign could have been more effective, but that dog don't hunt.  Take, however, the 1982 example of one boat sinking the General Belgrano in the South Atlantic.  It sent the Argie fleet packing, freeing up the lanes for the UK force to sail south, relatively unimpeded.


----------



## Infanteer

Submarines now and submarines then are two different things.  Considering the US or Russia can park 1 submarine off the coast of a country and effectively destroy a society in minutes means we are dealing with a new phenomenon in sub-surface power.


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Submarines now and submarines then are two different things.  Considering the US or Russia can park 1 submarine off the coast of a country and effectively destroy a society in minutes means we are dealing with a new phenomenon in sub-surface power.


Good point; however, if we are talking using nukes, that's a different ball of beans (pardon the mixing of metaphors: it was deliberate)


----------



## T.S.Rea

The analogy with U-boats was just off the cuff, so I would read too much into it in as far as the potential or the actual effect of them.

The preference for aluminum is a product not only of the low volatility and high power density of them, but also that it was viable back in the early 1980's when the concept originated.  There already is some use of them for large back-up power supplies in some office buildings, hydrogen fuel cells have been struggling for many years to reach a critical level of viability.  I haven't looked recently, don't know where they are right now, and don't know what the current status of submarine AIP programs are exclusive of industrial hype, so my inclination is to the safer and more certain outcome.  Might also give the country a lead in the consumer technology, since its been cited often as a candidate for cellphones and laptops.

Admittedly, my cost estimate is probably quite low, part of the reason for buiding smaller boats than the original 1980's concept of 2500 ton sized vessels and retaining the Upholders for a while, and as was stated, latter boats could be made larger when the outcome is more certain given the many well known time and cost risks.  Small boats might have some advantages in the littorals of the Arctic and elsewhere as well.  Its a start point with the shortest route to an initial operating capacity.


----------



## TCBF

- If we really want to save money, make them Unmanned Underwater Vehicles.  We don't have the crews for them anyways.


----------



## Neill McKay

TCBF said:
			
		

> - If it isn't armed, you are not exercising sovereignty.



I disagree; sovereignty can be asserted by other means.  It can be enough just to use the land or water for whatever purpose.

As an example, Canada is hanging on to Machias Sea Island with a staffed lighthouse (the only one left in the Maritimes I believe), not with a garrison.


----------



## a_majoor

Neill McKay said:
			
		

> I disagree; sovereignty can be asserted by other means.  It can be enough just to use the land or water for whatever purpose.
> 
> As an example, Canada is hanging on to Machias Sea Island with a staffed lighthouse (the only one left in the Maritimes I believe), not with a garrison.



But the lighthouse crew ultimately depends on the State being able to send it's armed power. One of the big questions explored in another thread is how will we be able to maintain our sovereignty in the hight arctic without a realistic ability to project power there?

Up until the 1950's the question was effectively moot, no one cared since no one get there in force or operate there effectively. After the 1950's the question took on a great deal of importance since several States could flout our claims with impunity by sailing unmolested through the hight arctic with their nuclear submarines. Since many of these submarines had the power to effectively level our society, this should have had a very high priority, but since it was also in the interest of the United States to look after the problem, we did not press our claims very aggressively in return for their help. In any event, it was still very difficult to move large quantities of manpower or operate in the high arctic. Today, the shared interests have evaporated with the passing of the USSR, while we are now in competition with several nations over the potential resources thought to be available in the high arctic. It is also much easier than ever before to move and operate in the high arctic, with or without Global Warming.

Given all these factors, _any_ future Canadian military program or formation should be considered with the ability to operate in the Arctic in mind. WRT submarines this really means either going nuclear (which has advantages for deploying naval forces in far flung theaters like the Arabian sea) or some sort of exotic AIP or energy storage solution. Either way will be an expensive and long drawn out process. 

Given our rather strange set of naval circumstances (needs to operate in the Arctic and littoral regions, needs the ability to deploy globally, has a very small manpower and technical base to work with), catalogue shopping will only get us an 80% solution. We need to decide *which* 80% is the most important, since I don't think we have the political will or resources to go it alone.


----------



## T.S.Rea

The discussion here may be going off topic a bit, but that is a little unavoidable since a decision about submarines would have to factor in the whole of the naval and general military strategy involved.

I agree entirely with the notion that any ships built should have an intrinsic Arctic capability at at least a minimum fundamental level.  I have been shifting in my views towards a small submarine, because the core fleet unit would be huge by the common standard we go by today.  I am sure it will raise some eyebrows, but the 10 SOE (Sovreignty-Ocean-Expeditionary) Frigates would displace around 15,000 tons light and 25,000 tons deep load on a double ended ice and sea bowed hull driven by 25kbhp direct drive and 20MW electrical drive propulsion (ie. 25 knots) and incorporate hangar space for up to eight medium sized aircraft as well as a proportionate amount of the equipment of an expeditionary land force.

To have any reasonable capacity to navigate freely in the Arctic, the ship has to be big to be able to drive through the ice with any reasonable amount of endurance.  I would not think it necessary to deploy these ships to the Arctic any more than the navy has been up there recently, but if the fleet has at its core a significant projection capacity to do so, then it would enjoy a significant force in being factor as well as its actual force capacity.

Consider as well that any expeditionary naval force would require a substantial amount of basic tonnage just to even begin contemplating expeditionary operations, and that any such task force would have to have several dozen aircraft deployed with it.  It would not be necessary to equip every ship with big phased arrays and big sonars, but these would have to be bought for some ships regardless of the size of the frigates that get built.  At first glance, these big hulls might lead one to assume that the ships would be hideously expensive, but the actual hull itself is only one cost component of the whole package.  The ten frigates would share a common hull with 3-4 auxilliaries (although the AOR's are probable too far along for this), and would form the backbone of the fleet.  The navy acquired a sealift ship recently, one more might be useful, but apart from looking at the capacity for offloading without port facilities, these would be commercial grade vessels.  

The other component of the fleet would be a force of corvettes, improved Kingston's with more range and better seakeeping on 25 knots top speed, assuming much of the light patrol duties given the cost of operating the SOE frigates.  The Class 5 APV would be treated as just slower big hull corvettes to support the regular corvettes and submarines. 

It is this fleet structure that drove the submarines down in size, but they could still be quite expensive even with a less demanding set of requirements.  

I would not have a clue as to where the government is going in the long term, but I would not be surprised it is the naval strategy that is holding up the so-called 'Canada First' defence policy, since we are talking about many tens of billions of dollars even though it would be spent over the course of two or three decades.  Big dollars, but any useful level of engagement is going to cost a lot of money, so why not a basic but complete capacity?


----------



## aesop081

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> and incorporate hangar space for up to eight medium sized aircraft as well as a proportionate amount of the equipment of an expeditionary land force.



You used the term "frigate". I'm sorry but right from the start, "frigate" was no longer suitable as a type of vessel for what you propose. The Current Halifax-class Frigates are big for that type of ship. What you propose would likely be the size of a Tarawa / Iwo Jima / Wasp - class warship.


----------



## T.S.Rea

'Frigate' (defined):
1. a fast naval vessel of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, generally having a lofty ship rig and heavily armed on one or two decks.  
2. any of various types of modern naval vessels ranging in size from a destroyer escort to a cruiser, frequently armed with guided missiles and used for aircraft carrier escort duty, shore bombardment, and miscellaneous combat functions.  
3.A warship, usually of 4,000 to 9,000 displacement tons, that is larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser, used primarily for escort duty. 
4.A high-speed, medium-sized sailing war vessel of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. 
5.Archaic A fast, light vessel, such as a sailboat. 
6.1585, from M.Fr. frégate, from It. fregata, like many ship names, of unknown origin. Originally a small, swift vessel, the word was applied to progressively larger types over the years, but since 1943 used mainly of escort ships.
7. a medium size square-rigged warship of the 18th and 19th centuries  
8. a United States warship larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser  
9. a major naval sailing vessel, but less powerful than a ship of the line

The term does not really have a specific meaning, any more than 'destroyer' does given the 14,000t Zumwalt or the original 200-300t vessels.  In terms of hull size, closer to a San Antonio LPD, but not as voluminous and more heavily built, nor having a well deck but having the capacity to offload equipment to shore, not with the accomodation of a LPD since the number of troops would be smaller and not kept aboard for more than a week and usually far less, having a 125m flight deck over top the hangar bays but not overhung nor intended to park aircraft and elevators replaced by two 25t cranes on a track along the edge of the flight deck.

The vessel may seem a radical departure from convention, but the same could be said of ironclads, dreadnoughts, or any other type of ship that has emerged through the evolution of technology over time.


----------



## Neill McKay

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> 'Frigate' (defined):
> 2. any of various types of modern naval vessels ranging in size from a destroyer escort to a cruiser, frequently armed with guided missiles and used for aircraft carrier escort duty, shore bombardment, and miscellaneous combat functions.
> 
> 3.A warship, usually of 4,000 to 9,000 displacement tons, that is larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser, used primarily for escort duty.
> 
> 8. a United States warship larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser



None of these squares with my sense of what a frigate is, and has been since WWII (except that the tonnage range in 3. isn't too far off, when one considers the size of a CPF).  Agreed that the definition of any warship type is a matter for each navy to decide, but by and large a frigate is usually the next size down from a destroyer.  I'd suggest that anything big enough to carry eight (manned) aircraft is outside of the frigate range in any navy.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> At first glance, these big hulls might lead one to assume that the ships would be hideously expensive, but the actual hull itself is only one cost component of the whole package.  The ten frigates would share a common hull with 3-4 auxilliaries (although the AOR's are probable too far along for this), and would form the backbone of the fleet.  The navy acquired a sealift ship recently, one more might be useful, but apart from looking at the capacity for offloading without port facilities, these would be commercial grade vessels.


No.  In fact, you cannot effectively share a common hull design between platforms of radically different employment.  Frigate and destroyer hull designs are optimized for speed.  AOR/JSS hulls are optimized for volume.  I would not enjoy sailing on a frigate where the hull was based on that of an AOR.  Conversely, an AOR built on a frigate hull would be a waste of money, as you could not carry enough payload to be useful to the fleet- in effect, it would be a "self-licking ice cream cone".  I dimly remember a thread that exists on this very subject that is maybe a year or two old where some very knowledgeable Mar Eng types weighed in.

While I agree with your earlier post that the terms frigate and destroyer aren't terribly descriptive anymore,  I think that it can be widely agreed that any vessel displacing 20,000-25,000 tonnes is well beyond the frigate class.  If you think this is semantics, it is not for two or three reasons.  Firstly, the price of a warship is pretty much directly related to it's size.  All things being equal, 10 ships of his size would bankrupt Canada.  Secondly, the dockyards on both coasts would have to be gutted and rebuilt to accommodate and maintain ships of such massive size.  Finally, in Canada, what you call a warship matters a great deal.  The Frigate program of the 1980s-90s was called that for a reason.  Even though City Class frigates of around 6000 tonnes replaced older destroyers of 3500 tonnes, the name frigate had to be used to get it by Cabinet- Destroyer was thought to be too aggressive.  There is no way, even in this relatively defence friendly climate, that you would sell a 250,000 tonne naval building program to Cabinet.

Finally, another comment on your submarine proposal.  Your manning figures are wildly low, IMHO.  A crew of 14-25 is not really feasible for anything more than a few days.  Using even a figure of 25 on a really highly automated submarine, one watch would look something like this (apologies to the submariners in advance- I'm going to get the terms wrong) :

1 Officer of the watch
1 quartermaster
1 helmsman
1 signalman
3 sensor operators
3 Mar Engineers
2 Combat System Engineers
12 per watch

You need a minimum of 2 watches for 24.  Add the Captain for 25.  You still need someone to cook.   The torpedoes and decoys won't load themselves.  The boat won't clean itself.  Ideally, if your operators are one-in-two, your engineers are one-in-three watch rotation, because their is always stuff to fix (unless you intend to go home every time something breaks).  Three officers is really inadequate to run the boat and also deal with all of the message traffic and other stuff that happens day to day, so really 4 would be better.  We haven't even considered damage control or what happens if someone gets sick/injured and cannot stand watch.

Really, I think the minimum crew would have to be in the 30-40 range.  Even then, sleep would be at a premium, even during peacetime sailing.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Out of curiousity TS what is your background?


----------



## T.S.Rea

If you could find the earlier post concerning the engineering issues related to AOR/frigate hull design, I would appreciate it. 

Their obviously would be major differences in the internal form of an auxilliary versus a combatant vessel, since the former would carry larger liquid and bulk loads and have a much greater range between light and deep load conditions, different metacentric heights and other balance and buoyancy figures as just a start of a long list of functional differences.  It might have been more prudent to state a common machinery plant and a host of ship service equipment shared in common with both vessels, but their would be obvious differences between the two.  The AOR program is probably too far along that it would matter regardless.  Nonetheless, the latter would have a substantial fuel load in order to gain some independence from auxilliary support, and although it is not always appropriate to make direct comparisons with unrelated ships from different eras built with different sets of requirements, the reasoning follows something similar to the American Sangemon class CVE oiler conversions or any of a number of warships designed with very long range endurance.  A margin of that fuel load would in fact be counterbalanced with floodable spaces so that the vessel trim and effective draught could be adjusted as the ship is underway, as well as providing a substantial damage control capacity with the ability to pump large quantities of liquid from one space to another.  Deep load condition would in practice be the tonnage of a frigate departing for a global deployment and still thousands of miles away from the operational area.

The price of steel has been going up for the last few years, but it still does not constitute a large part of the end cost.  Actually, a lot of the hull cost is driven by the degree to which the steel is processed into its end form for integration into the hull, but the form I had in made would be constructed with a lot of flat sections and two dimensional curvatures which would simply the manufacturing process and offer the potential of some stealthiness by virtue of its oblique faceted shape above the waterline.  These construction techniques have been employed by some shipyards in Europe and elsewhere to successfully reduce production costs.

The term frigate has been used owing to the general similarity of the purpose of frigates of the sailing era as the lead projection force of the fleet more than to the modern one of an ocean escort and surface strike unit.  I am not speaking of fast vessels with a high level of maneouverability, but ships with a lot of stamina that can get to distant sea areas quickly with the endurance to conduct operations once there.  The interception of merchant and other types of vessels, one type of the operation the Halifax's have engaged in in recent years, would be conducted by corvettes (a limited number of which would be armed) under the protection and support of the frigates.  A more closer comparison would be to the San Antonio class LPD with a number of shifts in capabilities that reflect a different set of intended priorities.

The price tag of one of these ships is about 700-1000 million, and although in terms of building such ships in Canada there would be a completely different set of cost factors, they would apply to any type of naval ship built in Canada.  Characteristics they would share in common would be a 16 cell Mk41 VLS (with space left for more if required later), two RAM or similar CIWS systems, more hangar space but less effective flight deck parking area for a similar number of aircraft (stealth/ice and cold/top weight considerations), baseline 3D/volume and surface radars, ECM, SCM, and related electronics, similar magazine capacity, and similar level of propulsion machinery (might be necessary to economize more on electric drive, which is a contingency for laser/EM weapon refits in the distant future) and ship service capacity and at the same level as a common destroyer type.  Differences would include no well deck, half as much troop lift capacity accomodated only periodically for short periods of time (some CA/AF bases would have superstructure mock-ups for proper training prior to adequate levels of exercises at sea prior to operational deployment when they arrive), much less vehicle and container stowage that would load/offload in direct paths abeam through various straightforward arrangements without need for complex elevator arrangements, a through path flight deck to aid in the launch and recovery of fixed wing aircraft and UAV's, significantly greater sonar capabilities, significantly greater radar capabilities in a proportion of the units, greater aircraft support even though they would embark only the aircraft needed for a particular deployment, heavier construction for greater damage tolerance and longer hull life.  (Note:  it is difficult to be brief in some descriptions here, since this is beginning to drag on).

Compared to a larger number of helicopter/guided missile ships of the form of recent history (I have seen some references to as many as 18, although not all with full armaments) with similar amounts of machinery and electronics and weaponry, I don't think the cost would be much different for either.  The problem is, the SCSC does little to assert Arctic sovereignty, has little if any capacity for expeditionary operations beyond supplementing the escort service to other navies, and will cost the same ten to twenty billion dollars in the end.  

This post is getting too long, you are probably right concerning manning requirements for the submarines (I was thinking more along the lines of 3 watches of four with two officers, a heavy reliance on automation, and a more limited patrol duration than common types).  In the end, it might make more sense to abandon self sufficiency and opt for four to six Type 212 AIP's to start replacing the Victoria's a few years down the road from now.  The aluminum powered boats originated some years ago when the defence budget was larger, their were lots of Soviet submarines prowling the Arctic and Atlantic, the specified displacement and crew was larger, and hydrogen fuel cells were no where close to as developed as they are now even if they still could benefit from further development, although I would still be inclined to test both internal and external aluminum fuel cells aboard the Chicoutimi as well as isotope power for life support and emergency communications systems and lithium ion batteries under real operating conditions if only to get hard test results prior to making a decision on Type 212's and possible design options for them.  It would be rather arrogant to assume to have expert knowledge of every aspect of military science.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

There is no SCSC program its now the DEstroyer Replacement Program.

Sangemon class oiler....I have looked and find nothing on them, could you mean another class?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> It would be rather arrogant to assume to have expert knowledge of every aspect of military science.



Amen.  I have been doing this more than 20 years and am still reminded daily about how much I don't know.


----------



## T.S.Rea

A typo, Sangamon Class CVE-26-29, converted oiler that had, if memory serves me right, an unrefueled range in excess of 12,000nm even though it was not exploited because its escorts did not have similar endurance.

My background, had serious health problems in my early twenties and almost died in hospital once, so I never joined the military; might have become an officer in the Dragoons actually.

After some years pursuing a professional accounting career I got sick of it, and have enjoyed working in a number of hands on trades since.

Devised and built a mechanical gearing device for armour, but it has greater non-military uses, and my machine tooling skills still need some work since it is not a trade I have been in and needs more time on the mill/lathe.


----------



## a_majoor

WRT submarine crews, the ALPHA class submarine (Project 705 (Лира/Lyra)) was perhaps the most automated submarine ever created and it had a crew of 31 (27 officers, 4 petty officers). Tom Clancy aside, the ALPHA seems to have been designed for short cruises, protecting the Soviet littorals against the incursion of American naval forces. More general purpose submarines in the Soviet/Russian fleet had much larger crews; the Project 971 Щука-Б (Shchuka-B, Pike, NATO reporting name Akula) has a crew of 51 (25 officers, 26 enlisted). This can be considered the "lower" bound for a general purpose SSN. Comparable American SSN's have more than double the crew.

Even assuming our sailors are able and wiling to operate under very austere conditions for long cruises, looking at historical designs would suggest capable nuclear submarines have a minimum size of @ 3500 tons submerged. The only reason I am going nuclear here is that the twin requirements of under ice operations and global deployment for Canadian ships would be difficult to meet with conventional submarines.

About the only sort of warships I could see sharing a common hull might be an arsenal ship, an LPD/LHD and an AOR, but considering the vast differences in equipment fit, this seems to be a rather pointless exercise.


----------



## T.S.Rea

My understanding of the Alpha's is that they were designed as interceptors to protect the ballistic missile boats in the Barents and Kara Seas, so they were never too far from base.  Soviet practices also did not put too great a premium on lives, so the small crew of 31 would probably have been an unacceptably low number by Western standards.  They did not last very long in service, which considering the high up front capital cost of a titanium hull and dense liquid metal cooled reactors, they probably were an overly tight design that was just unsustainable in the end.

Although the Type 212 AIP's reportedly have an output of only 240kW/320shp on fuel cells, thats still enough to make a couple of knots underwater, and they require a crew of only 27.  How much of this are hard numbers or stretching the truth I don't know, nor does it really indicate how well they will perform twenty years from now.  They still have a diesel and the theoretical prospect of employing lithium batteries in place of the tried and true lead acid cells.

I suppose the only real way to make a decision on this would be to use the Chicoutimi as a trials ship.  She still needs a reconditioning refit, so it might be an opportunity to accept the extra cost to remove one of her diesels and ballast the difference so the extra space could be used to trial a fairly large combination(s) of aluminum fuel cells and lithium batteries under stringent safety precautions.  Might also be possibly to test a similar external combination in a ballasted/neutral buoyancy enclosure aft of the sail.  At this point, I don't think it is too critical whether there are three or four boats in active patrol service with the navy, and besides, the ship would still be capable of operational use.

I remember quite well the 1980's flirtation with trying to develop a fleet of nuclear boats, the aluminum boats actually slightly preceding it by a year or so and being driven by the same strategic requirement of Arctic sovereignty and ASW in the North Atlantic and the Pacific.  The program never really got off the ground then, and for whatever the cause DND seems to have even greater difficulty executing programs and projects today than they did then.  The defense budget was a little bigger back then as well.


----------



## STONEY

Same old story.  Not enough money and nobody with any vision of the future.  Seems like enerytime we finaly get a capilibiity its too late. Remember when we led the world in several fields of naval technology, well thats  history now and we've become late followers instead of leaders in any field.  Seems that a major requirement for NDHQ is that you become brain dead and  a yes man with no ideas of your own.

Cheers


----------



## aesop081

STONEY said:
			
		

> Same old story.  Not enough money and nobody with any vision of the future.  Seems like enerytime we finaly get a capilibiity its too late. Remember when we led the world in several fields of naval technology, well thats  history now and we've become late followers instead of leaders in any field.  Seems that a major requirement for NDHQ is that you become brain dead and  a yes man with no ideas of your own.
> 
> Cheers



Nice broad brush  :

Regards


----------



## T.S.Rea

Ya, easy to be cynical.  I've dropped in and out over the years, been more concerned of late with the growing list of privates, corporals, and sergeants.  Just doesn't sit easy with me, and I'm no bleeding heart either.


----------



## Neill McKay

Thucydides said:
			
		

> WRT submarine crews, the ALPHA class submarine (Project 705 (Лира/Lyra)) was perhaps the most automated submarine ever created and it had a crew of 31 (27 officers, 4 petty officers).



Any idea why so few NCMs?



> Tom Clancy aside, the ALPHA seems to have been designed for short cruises, protecting the Soviet littorals against the incursion of American naval forces. More general purpose submarines in the Soviet/Russian fleet had much larger crews; the Project 971 Щука-Б (Shchuka-B, Pike, NATO reporting name Akula) has a crew of 51 (25 officers, 26 enlisted).



Even that's a huge officer/NCM ratio.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

The Russian Navy prefers for their officers to do jobs normally done in Western militaries by junior and senior enlisted.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

STONEY said:
			
		

> Same old story.  Not enough money and nobody with any vision of the future.  Seems like enerytime we finaly get a capilibiity its too late. Remember when we led the world in several fields of naval technology, well thats  history now and we've become late followers instead of leaders in any field.  Seems that a major requirement for NDHQ is that you become brain dead and  a yes man with no ideas of your own.
> 
> Cheers



Nice to see that you have faith in the present generation. You basically gave up on them before they get a chance to get anything started :


----------



## JasonSkald

Neill McKay said:
			
		

> Any idea why so few NCMs?



As I recall, it's because of conscription - enlisted men were out as soon as their term was up, and thus did not acquire the technical skills needed for these jobs. Thus, officers (consisting of volunteers and longer-term conscripts) had to fulfill technical positions that in Western armies would be fulfilled by NCOs.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Has anyone actually looked at a chart?

The approaches to the NW Passage are ~4500 nm from Halifax. That's a 9000 nm round trip. At 7.5 knots likely SOA, you're looking at 50 days to get there and back. As large as the Victorias are, they're limited to about 45 days endurance unless you want to get really uncomfortable. That means at best they'll just be able to get to the general area and then they'll have to leave.

Realistically you might be able to achieve a NW Passage sovereignty patrol on a Collins type displacement(~3000 tons), but it might need to be even larger. A smaller boat isn't going to even reach the patrol area, let alone actually perform once they get there.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> As I recall, it's because of conscription - enlisted men were out as soon as their term was up, and thus did not acquire the technical skills needed for these jobs. Thus, officers (consisting of volunteers and longer-term conscripts) had to fulfill technical positions that in Western armies would be fulfilled by NCOs.



I guess you missed Reply#113


----------



## JasonSkald

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I guess you missed Reply#113



I did not miss it - you mentioned that the Russian's preferred to use officers for those positions, without explaining why. I was simply trying to convey the rationale behind the Russian use of these officers.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

JasonSkald said:
			
		

> I did not miss it - you mentioned that the Russian's preferred to use officers for those positions, without explaining why. I was simply trying to convey the rationale behind the Russian use of these officers.



Actually it has more to do with reliability issues. The Russian Navy has always seen enlisted as menial labourers, any sort of techiical or operational procedures are done by officers.


----------



## Neill McKay

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Has anyone actually looked at a chart?
> 
> The approaches to the NW Passage are ~4500 nm from Halifax. That's a 9000 nm round trip. At 7.5 knots likely SOA, you're looking at 50 days to get there and back. As large as the Victorias are, they're limited to about 45 days endurance unless you want to get really uncomfortable. That means at best they'll just be able to get to the general area and then they'll have to leave.
> 
> Realistically you might be able to achieve a NW Passage sovereignty patrol on a Collins type displacement(~3000 tons), but it might need to be even larger. A smaller boat isn't going to even reach the patrol area, let alone actually perform once they get there.



Could you not just RAS at some point along way?


----------



## aesop081

Neill McKay said:
			
		

> Could you not just RAS at some point along way?



Your answer lies in a question......

"What is a submarine's best asset ?"


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Neill McKay said:
			
		

> Could you not just RAS at some point along way?



Not really, no. It's unsafe to haul the fuel lines around on the casing while you're underway. For that matter, it's unsafe to be on the casing while you're underway.

Going into a port to refuel would work, but you'd still have a crew fatigue problem. Those boats are just too small to allow an endurance significantly longer than 45 days. Even with a 45 day patrol, you're normally looking at a port visit around the 21 day mark.


----------



## T.S.Rea

Definitely would not be easy to support a small submarine in the NW Passage, but the same would apply to any submarine apart from nuclear (although nuclear would require much greater support farther south, and I can't see it happening).  As far as I can recall, one of the Victoria's was present during last years Arctic exercise, and probably got refueled at least once from the auxilliary present, although the boat probably came along for the ride just as a dry run to see what problems could be present to do even that.

The emphasis on ice eroding/surfacing and boring methods, isotope energy (despite the weight/cost of it for very small amounts of energy), a drogue prop generator system, the bases to be developed at Resolute and Nanissivik, the submarine tender function that could be incorporated into the planned APV's, the lower stores support of a small crew, potential energy generation in the region for the aluminum or hydrogen/oxygen, a small refueling station at Iqaluit and possibly near Goose Bay as well, mutual submarine search and rescue and two boat patrols, and a number of other factors could provide enough critical mass of support to station the boats there (ie. four of the ten-twelve suggested).  I would even suggest that little effort should be expended initially on the question of arming the boats beyond leaving space for it, not because it would not be required at some point, but that it could slow the development of simply building a boat that can operate under all these demanding factors.  HMS Terror and Erebus were lost due to tragic underestimation of the difficulties of functioning in that environment, but their presence was a pivotal event in establishing our sovereignty over the region today, and we need to reassert that sovereignty as soon as possible or it will slowly erode away due to inaction.

I think it would be imperative to conduct realistic tests of any prospective propulsion system, since you would need some hard numbers to make any responsible decision about investing a substantial amount of money in them.  And as Neil pointed out, the amount of crew support needed to properly operate the vessel and man the communications and sensors, as well as the degree of automation that is safely feasible for things like the Mk48 torpedo and a lengthy list of other basic equipment, would have to be examined in depth and verified to any degree that that is possible.

It will not be easy, and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, and that is not in any way to even hint at critiquing the competence of the people selected to do this work.  A major challenge for the people involved, but their is a lot at stake.


----------



## TCBF

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> ... and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, ...



- No.  The deciding factor will be that without conscription THERE WILL BE NO ONE TO MAN THE BOATS.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

TCBF said:
			
		

> - No.  The deciding factor will be that without conscription THERE WILL BE NO ONE TO MAN THE BOATS.



So can we impose conscription on anybody holding a Liberal party membership and send them to sea in some surplus Kilo class boats, with an instruction manual of course (in Russian)  ;D


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Maybe we should try and get the Vics up and running before we give them a new task in the high Arctic....


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> As far as I can recall, one of the Victoria's was present during last years Arctic exercise, and probably got refueled at least once from the auxilliary present, although the boat probably came along for the ride just as a dry run to see what problems could be present to do even that.



She was only up there for 10 days, and it was the Southern Arctic. The entrances to the NW Passage are considerably farther north.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The emphasis on ice eroding/surfacing and boring methods, isotope energy (despite the weight/cost of it for very small amounts of energy), a drogue prop generator system, the bases to be developed at Resolute and Nanissivik, the submarine tender function that could be incorporated into the planned APV's, the lower stores support of a small crew, potential energy generation in the region for the aluminum or hydrogen/oxygen, a small refueling station at Iqaluit and possibly near Goose Bay as well, mutual submarine search and rescue and two boat patrols, and a number of other factors could provide enough critical mass of support to station the boats there (ie. four of the ten-twelve suggested).



Even if money was found for all of that (and we're talking about more than the Naval budget), who would man them? You're talking about actually basing them up there. That means sending crews and their families. That's a lot of infrastructure and cost for a marginal capability.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> I would even suggest that little effort should be expended initially on the question of arming the boats beyond leaving space for it, not because it would not be required at some point, but that it could slow the development of simply building a boat that can operate under all these demanding factors.  HMS Terror and Erebus were lost due to tragic underestimation of the difficulties of functioning in that environment, but their presence was a pivotal event in establishing our sovereignty over the region today, and we need to reassert that sovereignty as soon as possible or it will slowly erode away due to inaction.



There are a lot better ways of establishing sovereignty than using submarines.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> It will not be easy, and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, and that is not in any way to even hint at critiquing the competence of the people selected to do this work.  A major challenge for the people involved, but their is a lot at stake.



The deciding factor will be the lack of money.


----------



## Neill McKay

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Your answer lies in a question......
> 
> "What is a submarine's best asset ?"



Yes, true enough.  On the other hand, might there be something to be said for making a statement along the lines of "we have a submarine in the neighbourhood, and it may or may not be in any particular part of the area over the next month"?  I understand the US Navy makes a certain amount of public fuss over their submarine deployments -- shortly before the submarine disappears under the waves for the duration of the patrol.


----------



## T.S.Rea

The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.

Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.

As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.  If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying.  I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency.  The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round.  Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.

Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?

It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.
> 
> Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.
> 
> As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.  If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying.  I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency.  The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round.  Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.
> 
> Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?
> 
> It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap.



Careful how you word your posts you make it sound like the CO and crew of said patrol frigate were cowards.


----------



## T.S.Rea

'Timidly' would be a poor choice of wording.  What was meant by it is the very obvious fact that the frigate's hull was never designed for grinding through ice, and probably would get ripped open very easily.  The sonar would been readily prone to damage as well.  Moreover, free ice floes are dangerous to navigate near because they can rollover at any time, and many are much larger than the ship itself.  It would have been reckless to not slowly dodge these hazards along the way, avoiding almost all contact with the ice.  As for the landing party, the ships were never designed for transporting any significant force over the distances involved and then disembark them in a very hostile environment.   These problems are part of the fundamental origin of what I have termed an SOE 'Frigate' (which in that regard, HMCS Montreal (?) would be termed an sO Frigate).  Projecting into the Arctic shares most of the problems of projecting an expeditionary force anywhere.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Unless you are an SSN or SSBN chances are you are not going to operate in the deepest recesses of the Arctic. While AIP has its advantages, I would submit that the poor mans nuke boat is not a safe alternative for the crews in this case.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.



The Lancaster Sound operation was in 2006. The 2007 exercise was in the Hudson Strait, well to the South of the NW Passage.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.



There isn't a set requirement for sovereignty, you just need to be doing more than the other claimants. If they're not doing anything, landing a few people in a RHIB is more than enough.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.



Agreed.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying.



The CF has struggled for years to man the boats we have, and that's with a lot more to entice submariners than a port visit to Thule. Even if you could find the submariners, what are you going to do with their families? Do you think they're going to want to move to the Arctic?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency.



Wouldn't that work out better with surface ships? There's not a whole lot of civilian demand for submarine qualifications.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round.



If surface ships can't do it, why does it need to be done? Submarine operations don't mean a thing for sovereignty purposes.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.



Why?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?



Definitely. Probably more. You've mentioned developing new propulsion technologies, new weapons, new UUV's, new methods of carrying weapons and UUV's, new hulls, we'll need the infrastructure to support the boats, etc. All that for four little boats, only one of which will be available for patrol.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap.



What value? There aren't any resources up there worth committing that kind of budget to protecting.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Oh I don't know, let say oil, gold, diamonds, other minerals not to mention transportation routes, fisheries, sovereignty is a case of show or lose it, we are in danger of screwing ourselves out of a huge chunk of our country.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Colin P said:
			
		

> Oh I don't know, let say oil, gold, diamonds, other minerals not to mention transportation routes, fisheries, sovereignty is a case of show or lose it, we are in danger of screwing ourselves out of a huge chunk of our country.



Sovereignty is only a case of "show it or lose it" if someone else tries to claim the area. Otherwise, there's no requirement for that large of a commitment. We have very few disputes in that area, and most of the ones we do have are with the US. No matter how large a force commitment we make we'll never be able to face them down, and none of the other disputes require a major show of force. There's nothing there worth a major commitment on anyone else' part either, so it's unlikely they'll just take the disputed land.


----------



## T.S.Rea

My mistake concerning Lancaster 2006/2007.

I can understand the argument concerning the cost of Arctic/coastal/task force boats, however, IMHO it follows the same train of thinking as dispensing completely with tanks in favour of armoured cars.  Don't need a huge fleet of them, just a basic effective force.  Spending more would than necessary diminishes the creation of wealth needed to fight full-fledged conflicts.

Got other priorities right now, so take care for the time being.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Sovereignty is only a case of "show it or lose it" if someone else tries to claim the area. Otherwise, there's no requirement for that large of a commitment. We have very few disputes in that area, and most of the ones we do have are with the US. No matter how large a force commitment we make we'll never be able to face them down, and none of the other disputes require a major show of force. There's nothing there worth a major commitment on anyone else' part either, so it's unlikely they'll just take the disputed land.



Actually there are several disputes involving several countries, and it's not just land, it is the control of the waterways and of the mineral rights of the seabed beneath them. I will agree that nuke subs are not likely the answer for our problems and there are better more cost effective ways to exert control including:
expanded bases in the north, along with more patrols and exercises
expanding the Rangers
Naval reserves with small patrol boats stationed in Tuk and the eastern Arctic for seasonal use. 
Seabed sensor net on the west and east entrances, along with surface radar
A ice class II patrol vessel 
Likely UAV flights in the future 

AIP tech is moving along and we may be able in the future allow a limited movement in the arctic with our subs, however I do expect that Hunter AUV's will be the way of the future to exert undersea control of the arctic waterways, along with smart mines, if things start getting messy.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Colin P said:
			
		

> Actually there are several disputes involving several countries



Agreed. However, there's no reason that they'd rise to the level of armed disputes. There's just not enough resources up there to bother fighting a war over, which means it's unlikely to rise beyond sending a patrol vessel around once in a while.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> it's not just land, it is the control of the waterways and of the mineral rights of the seabed beneath them.



Not really. The dispute is whether the NW Passage is an international strait or not. If it is an international strait, we can regulate passage but not deny it. If it isn't an international strait, we can deny passage. In either case, we own the seabed rights in our EEZ and that's not disputed by anyone.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> there are better more cost effective ways to exert control including:
> expanded bases in the north, along with more patrols and exercises
> expanding the Rangers



Agreed.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Naval reserves with small patrol boats stationed in Tuk and the eastern Arctic for seasonal use.



That's not realistically going to happen. We have p[roblems manning the MCDV's as it is, and that's with the incentive of visiting good ports. A highlight of a port visit to Thule 2 months into a 4 month patrol is not going to make the crews happy campers.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Seabed sensor net on the west and east entrances, along with surface radar
> 
> 
> 
> Colin P said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That's also unlikely to happen. Those sensors cost a lot, and would need a lot of maintenance. There's also an issue with a very low signal to noise ratio in ice conditions. That's going to require a lot of very expensive development to fix. None of those issues are insurmountable with enough money, but is it really worth it?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Colin P said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A ice class II patrol vessel
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the intention is for year-round access, we probably need more than one.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Colin P said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Likely UAV flights in the future
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Agreed. This is probably the most cost-effective way.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Colin P said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> AIP tech is moving along and we may be able in the future allow a limited movement in the arctic with our subs, however I do expect that Hunter AUV's will be the way of the future to exert undersea control of the arctic waterways, along with smart mines, if things start getting messy.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Why would we need submarines and smart mines at all? If the NW Passage situation gets that bad, we'll be fighting the US. That's not a fight we can win.
> 
> Click to expand...
Click to expand...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Everyone focuses on the US issue, but frankly I think that if we do nothing you will see quite a few other countries in the area, including China, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Korea, Russia. The movement of goods and fisheries will be 2 big issues, as this is a sub thread I won’t get into a how I think Canada could maintain patrol boats up there.

Dragging ourselves back to topic, a few quotes from others on Tanknet re AIP



> What I've read so far:
> 
> CCD seems to be a quite sound approach and cost-effective solution, as it retains the standard diesel engines and uses normal diesel fuel, plus stored oxygen and an inert gas like argon. This would make a refit of existing conventional diesel submarines relatively easy. Thyssen Nordseewerke TNSW and RDM (for the Moray class submarine) offered solutions, which however found no takers. A drawback seems to be the higher noise level for high underwater speeds when the diesel has to take over.
> 
> Stirling is the oldest AIP technology (diesel fuel and liquid oxygen), with the least power output and the highest noise level.
> 
> MESMA uses a steam-turbine system, which burns ethanol and liquid oxygen to create the steam needed to drive a turbo-electric generator. It provides the highest power output of all AIP systems. The very high pressure-firing allows exhaust carbon dioxide to be expelled at any depth without an exhaust compressor, and very deep diving depths of up to 600m can be achieved. However, the efficiency grade is quite low, and therefore the oxygen consumption is correspondingly higher. Quieter than the diesel powered AIPs, but noisier than fuel cell AIPs.
> 
> Fuel cell technology is offered by HDW and Siemens in Germany (U212/U214) and uses hydrogen and liquid oxygen and seems to be the most advanced and quietest technology currently available. The problems are the inherent danger of using hydrogen, therefore storing it in several metal hydride tanks, and the cost to produce it.
> 
> The Canadian Ballard fuel cell technology uses methanol which can be stored in a single tank. The necessary hydrogen is extracted from the methanol using a so-called 'reformer'. The advantage is that ethanol is a renewable resource and that it apparently holds 40 percent more hydrogen atoms than a similar volume of metal hydride. The disadvantage is the added complexity of the 'reformer' and a compressor for carbon dioxide exhaust disposal, otherwise limiting the diving depth of the submarine.





> The Siemens fuel cells in the HDW designed fuel cell boats, as was already stated, use hydrogen stored in metal-hydride form. United Technologies is developing a fuel cell under contract to the Spanish Navy, for their S-80 class, that uses ethanol and a reformer to generate the hydrogen.






> The reformer has been designed in Spain and seems to be working fine, UT is contracted to design an new fuel cell design. The fuel used is bioethanol, safer than conventional ethanol and also produced from plant waste. They claims it is also less toxic than standard sthanol....


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Nobody's going to try "freedom of navigation" games unless the USN is backing them, and most of the other countries don't have territorial claims. The AOPV's are enough to enforce sovereignty claims against the rest.

AIP is more of a marketing concept than anything else. The only time you're likely to need it is if you're planning to take on the USN, you're planning to operate in the Baltic, or if you want to peck the edges of the icecap. It won't allow operations more than ~150 nm under the ice.


----------



## a_majoor

As a slight aside, the one fuel cell technology that hasn't been mentioned is "Solid Oxide Fuel Cells" (SOFC) which can convert hydrocarbon fuels directly into electricity without any intervening steps like "reformulation" or hydrogen extraction. SOFC's also respond well to being pressurized for higher power density, which means the hot exhaust gasses can be used to run a turbocharger, with the side benefit of also turning a high speed alternator.

It is thought that compound SOFC systems can achieve efficiencies approaching 60% or more, far beyond diesel or external combustion technology, and using common hydrocarbon fuels makes logistics far simpler than carrying hydrogen, methanol, LOX or other exotica for AIP usage.


----------



## CougarKing

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As a side note, the Kriegsmarine never came close to winning anything with their U-Boats.  It was more psychological than anything, with tonnage sunk never pushing over 2% of total Allied shipping for any given month, even in the "Happy Times."  Read this and this; his argument is pretty solid as he goes over EVERY U-boat sortie and EVERY ship sunk during the war.
> 
> Not sure how it pertains to this thread, but don't use German U-Boats as an argument for an effective naval strategy....



Infanteer,

What about the USN sub campaign in the Pacific during World War II? Wasn't that a more effective sub campaign that effectively destroyed Imperial Japan's merchant fleet as well as sinking a number of their capital ships (the two IJN carriers sunk by USN subs during the Battle of the Philippine Sea/the Marianas campaign certainly illustrate how decisive they can be)?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The US sub fleet was helped by Japan’s poor war planning, their merchant fleet was barely up to the task as was their ability to replace losses. In fact when the British re-entered Malaysia, they found that almost all of the raw material produced during the occupation still sitting at the docks and warehouses, much to their delight I might add.


----------



## TCBF

Colin P said:
			
		

> The US sub fleet was helped by Japan’s poor war planning, their merchant fleet was barely up to the task as was their ability to replace losses. In fact when the British re-entered Malaysia, they found that almost all of the raw material produced during the occupation still sitting at the docks and warehouses, much to their delight I might add.



- Now THAT is a fascinating tidbit.  Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere fails due to lack of an effective merchant marine program.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Colin P said:
			
		

> The US sub fleet was helped by Japan’s poor war planning, their merchant fleet was barely up to the task as was their ability to replace losses. In fact when the British re-entered Malaysia, they found that almost all of the raw material produced during the occupation still sitting at the docks and warehouses, much to their delight I might add.



As a historical aside, H.P. Wilmot's The Second World War in the East  gives an interesting comparison between the Japanese and their UK/US foes.  Japan (apparently) had a total of 49 tankers going into the conflict, while the US had 389 and UK 425.   Now, the US and UK may also have had greater needs, but it doesn't look like Japan had much in the way of spare capacity.  I have read that they pushed production for IJN warships at the expense of less glamorous merchant shipping.  Guns vs Butter is an old debate, but if you ignore CSS it eventually catches up with you.

Back to the discussion at hand...


----------



## Infanteer

CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> Infanteer,
> 
> What about the USN sub campaign in the Pacific during World War II? Wasn't that a more effective sub campaign that effectively destroyed Imperial Japan's merchant fleet as well as sinking a number of their capital ships (the two IJN carriers sunk by USN subs during the Battle of the Philippine Sea/the Marianas campaign certainly illustrate how decisive they can be)?



Read this....


----------



## T.S.Rea

I realize this thread is a little more informal than some of the material I have elaborated with, and it is easy for me to see that I am a little more out of place in that regard than virtually everyone else.  I could bore most to tears with  opinions that go back decades on this thread topic.

The posts show an obvious awareness of the topic, as per the actual events in the Atlantic as opposed to the role of centimetric radar and service entry delays of vessels that could have reversed the outcome, or the stark contrast of resources, tactics, and strategies in the Pacific creating equally contrasted results, so I need not be concerned with the role of a submarine.  The growth of this thread in nine days serves to show an interest in the topic, but it probably does not warrant the amount of my free time given to it beyond a little more dscussion here.  Forums like this offer some opportunity to exchange views, but in the end it is all conjecture short of a tiny residual that sometimes carrries forward.

Strategic demands always far outpace the rate at which forces can be adjusted to counter them.  The Soviet threat and the USSR vanished in a matter of a few years through a combination of fiscal bankruptcy and the passing on of the generation that had been literally bled white during the 'Great Patriotic War'.  More recently, the strategic situation changed within an hour or so, just as it had sixty years earlier (the effect on Canada was indirect but nonetheless on a major scale).  Strategic changes can and often do take on a nature that would otherwise seem improbable before the fact, especially if only a cursory examination of them is made beforehand.  We have had forces in Afghanistan for five years now and have lost 82 and many more seriously wounded to date with a commitment to stay for another 3-4 years.  If you had suggested that would be the case on September 10, 2001, you would have been viewed as a complete nutjob, and the government of the day was more than happy to continue to allow the armed forces to disintegrate indefinitely in order to maintain its hold on power through the electorate.  Being declared the government by vote does not automatically give it sovereign authority over the land in fact.

If you do not think the minimum effective defence of the north is not important, then you have not done more than a cursory examination of the dangers that lie ahead and the relative ease that they can be countered and forestalled indefinitely.  Submarines provide a very potent capacity to deny control over a sea area out of all proportion to their cost and the damage they can actually inflict making them good deterence assets when applied on a limited scale, but building them even in wartime would take years, so what you have in place to assert sovereignty within a few days or weeks will largely be all that you are going to have when it is put to the test.

If not four Arctic submarines, why then four Victoria's?  Or twelve ocean frigates?  Or Afghanistan?  Why not just a part-time militia trained as social workers and armed with an emergency supply of vaseline as like millions of Canadians would advocate?  Capitulation is another option as well, or the phased version of it advocated by many in the military so we can concentrate even more power in the hands of the few who know whats best for all of us.  What do we need any freedom for if central planning will provide everything we need more efficiently?  

Our sovereign rights are viewed with such insignificance that even a California company has claimed oil and mineral rights in the Arctic, claims that would primarily pertain to ocean areas adjacent to Canadian (and Danish) territory.  If Canada can develop effective basic forces to defend its own soil, then it will have the forces it needs to ensure an effective role in defence of international stability that also impacts directly on its own safety and security as well.  Global wars are driven by the polarizing effect of one or two powers being left to act alone in international affairs, and a middle power like Canada needs the modest capacity at the level of a basic naval task force for which a few additional submarines would be essential ASW assets if it is to have any significant effect.

The irony is that if this small submarine squadron is successful it will never be put to the test.  In the process, we will have affirmed our sovereignty and gained possession of the technology to ensure it indefinitely.  The vast amount of information to be gained on the topography, currents, tides, and ice conditions on the outer shores as long as Italy or the geology and wildlife present in the inland waterways greater in area than France would have value in being able to decide what could or should not be done in terms of future use of this vast reserve.  A half billion dollars was spent on a satellite with a few years service life to provide grainy periodic real time pictures only of the surface and nobody questions that investment, these boats could provide vastly greater amounts of information and maintain surveillance and sovereignty assurance over the region for a longer period of time.  The fairweather arctic patrol ships are another half answer typical of institutional thinking and will no more assert sovereignty than CCGS Amundsen and other ships are doing right now.  Repeatedly making three quarters of the mortgage payment will lead to foreclosure.

It has been the history of countries for thousands of years that becoming complacent and comfortable with ignoring the basic defence of the soil leads to their end virtually without exception.  We had a basic strategy in place for decades up to recent times that made reasonable use of scarce resources to hold the line given the threats of the day, but I see nothing comparable today beyond DND's affinity to the Iron Triangle and the status quo of career interests at home that appear to be at expense of the defence of the soil regardless of the window dressing provided. Through the Arctic, not also the Arctic.  Ignoring the primacy of the defence of the soil also will make gaining domestic political support for planning very short lived, and when the Victoria's are gone in fifteen years short of a distinct Arctic submarine design they will not be replaced as will many of the armed forces' remaining assets.  The end of the country could follow some decades beyond that before the bicentennial year, just like the end of the USSR and the dozens of countries that have vanished in the last century due to an insufficient critical mass of sovereign power.

There is a lot on the internet and elsewhere concerning fuel cells, but IMHO at least 95% or more of it is hype and much of the rest is theoretical at best.  This is not to suggest that the research is not important, since decades from now there may not be much liquid petrolia that is economical to extract, whereas the amount of natural gas reserves are much greater and it may be economically essential in the distant future to employ more efficient means of energy extraction if only to reduce the collective effort diverted to basic living so we have more time for other concerns.

To take one example, there are numerous references to generating hydrogen from aluminum/gallium combinations and using it for so-called green cars.  Notwithstanding the fact that it completely ignores the energy needed to generate the metal as well as the fact the gallium is as expensive as silver, it does serve to demonstrate the strong electropositive energy capacity of aluminum by even a simple laboratory demonstration, not to mention the much lower energy content in hydrogen-oxygen bonding.  Aluminum is recycled on a large scale because of the electricity cost of smelting fresh material from the source oxide ore.

Aluminum fuel cells have been employed on various test platforms, and it is not a question of making it work, but a question of economics.  There is some development needed to improve on the performance, but that development has been slowed by the lack of a unique developed market for it and a lower cost efficiency relative to existing markets that it could offer a substitute to.  It will always be easier simply to pull 'ancient solar fuel' out of the ground, but a submarine requires the air to consume it that is scarce below the surface.  If the energy cost is higher for the tonnage, then the minimum size should be sought and the bulk of the tonnage required applied to another platform to provide energy economy by size.

The thing to bear in mind is that experimental electric vehicles do not compare directly with use in a submarine.  Aluminum fuel cells can be located outside the pressure hull, whereas a diesel engine can not.  Lead acid cells are heavy, whereas aluminum fuel cells would consume less of the available displacement margin.  Ships are more efficient transport vehicles relative to trucks, planes, and trains, submarines are even more efficient than surface ships.  Apples and broccoli may be good for you, but they are good for you for much different specific reasons.

It would not be a cakewalk to develop the propulsion system for a submarine, but it does not require large engineering concerns to develop workably sized proton exchange membranes and similar new technologies.  Not to denigrate some of these large multinational companies, but a large part of their motivation has to do with acquiring monopolistic control over future technologies.  Other companies and militaries will not go near such development as well because it conflicts with their own interests; don't hold your breathe waiting for the nuclear submarine group to find alternate forms of propulsion, since they will not undermine their own future cash flows or perceived dominance at sea.  A crude aluminum fuel cell can be made with little more than a piece of foil and some common household alkalis; good luck with the hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell and the nuclear reactor for the car, eh.  We have a few submarines to take the technology to sea under realistic conditions to provide reasonable cost estimates and the opportunity for design refinements that are scaleable to a full submarine.

Mention of the Type 212 AIP was made in an earlier post primarily to underscore the state today of more difficult technologies and of the reduced complements of the latest generation of boats.  I can't offer any definite numbers here because the data has not been developed to an applicable form or it is restricted or classified for obvious reasons.  The Type 212 AIP 'Sans Hydrogene' would offer a last resort fall back position, but it has serious dangers and deficiencies associated with it.  The volatile oxygen offers the always present dangers of another Kursk and the score of British high-test peroxide torpedo explosions nor is the power available anything more than a minimum.  Aluminum is a much denser, powerful, and safer fuel that does not need large quantities of oxidant to work.  It likely will be an important technology in the future as volumetrically oriented armoured vehicles reach obsolesence around the 2050 timeframe as well, and a new form of prime mover will be required to work with more expendable component hardened vehicles.  With aluminum expertise in eastern Quebec, aerospace expertise to the west, and small submarine expertise on both coasts, there would be enough to consider a clean sheet of paper as one of a range of options.

Detailed empirical estimates can be off by wide margins, but by lengthy calculations made long ago there was the potential evident for a propulsion system that could rival nuclear boats.  Don't ask for them now, the basic numbers were lost a long time ago during the long periods of sovereignty abrogation of previous governments, nor would I have full confidence in them since too many assumptions would have had to have been made in the process.  In the real world, unforeseen problems can greatly reduce the end effect, but even with greatly degraded performance levels they would still be more than adequate.

I would elaborate on my qualifications to make such calculations, but the details would present as boisterous, and that is not in my nature.  It would be beside the point as well, since this is not about me.  I have never had the time, money, or reason to tinker with such an applied electrochemical device (and have bigger priorities than such a things), but others have built forms of them for other uses, and as a matter of intuitive insight I am of the opinion that it is the only practical proposition.

In the end it comes down to the people currently engaged in the exercise; the money will come if they do the job right.  Reduced to a brochure reading exercise while exhorting phantom sub recon game theory, the project will come to nothing.


----------



## geo

TSR... I see that yiou still have a blank profile.
Would be nice to have a bit of your backtground.......


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> If not four Arctic submarines, why then four Victoria's?  Or twelve ocean frigates?  Or Afghanistan?  Why not just a part-time militia trained as social workers and armed with an emergency supply of vaseline as like millions of Canadians would advocate?  Capitulation is another option as well, or the phased version of it advocated by many in the military so we can concentrate even more power in the hands of the few who know whats best for all of us.  What do we need any freedom for if central planning will provide everything we need more efficiently?



That's a nice sentiment, but it doesn't actually mean anything in terms of what's funded and what isn't. The reality is that the CF is only funded at ~50-70% of it's minimum requirements, so some requirements are just not going to be me. If we fund the boats you're proposing, we aren't going to fund something else. 

Why should we fund the boats over other competing demands?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Our sovereign rights are viewed with such insignificance that even a California company has claimed oil and mineral rights in the Arctic, claims that would primarily pertain to ocean areas adjacent to Canadian (and Danish) territory.



So? I can claim large swathes of Californian territory. It doesn't mean anything.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> If Canada can develop effective basic forces to defend its own soil, then it will have the forces it needs to ensure an effective role in defence of international stability that also impacts directly on its own safety and security as well.  Global wars are driven by the polarizing effect of one or two powers being left to act alone in international affairs, and a middle power like Canada needs the modest capacity at the level of a basic naval task force for which a few additional submarines would be essential ASW assets if it is to have any significant effect.



Again, why should these capabilities be funded when others are not?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> It has been the history of countries for thousands of years that becoming complacent and comfortable with ignoring the basic defence of the soil leads to their end virtually without exception.



It's also been the history of countries that they all end without exception, no matter what they do.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> We have a few submarines to take the technology to sea under realistic conditions to provide reasonable cost estimates and the opportunity for design refinements that are scaleable to a full submarine.



Do you have any idea of the costs behind your proposal?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Detailed empirical estimates can be off by wide margins, but by lengthy calculations made long ago there was the potential evident for a propulsion system that could rival nuclear boats.  Don't ask for them now, the basic numbers were lost a long time ago during the long periods of sovereignty abrogation of previous governments, nor would I have full confidence in them since too many assumptions would have had to have been made in the process.  In the real world, unforeseen problems can greatly reduce the end effect, but even with greatly degraded performance levels they would still be more than adequate.



Even if everything you said is correct and the cost of the technology was free, it would cost billions to practically apply it. Why would we spend that on submarines over other competing issues?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> In the end it comes down to the people currently engaged in the exercise; the money will come if they do the job right.  Reduced to a brochure reading exercise while exhorting phantom sub recon game theory, the project will come to nothing.



The money for a submarine capability may come if people can convince the politicians to fund it. That's done on a policy level far removed from the technical level. Put another way, the technical issues and opportunities you've mentioned are irrelevant until and unless the politicians can be convinced to fund a submarine program.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well if the Germans can resupply a sub in the Indian ocean, it might be possible for us as well  

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NuBMk0wzmt8&feature=related


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

So would we buy and build a new resupply sub? There must be a reason why other nations that operate conventional subs (and lots of them) have not done so.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It was a bit of a poke at people who inferred that it could not be done. What the Germans did there with the equipment they had is amazing, for us I could see one of Subs being resupplied by a Coast Guard ship in a small inlet, in fact I suspect the crew would find the challenge of a Northern patrol pretty exciting, doing something different and difficult generally attracts the types that man subs.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

You could resupply a boat in a small inlet, but not in a war patrol. The Germans tried that too, and the results were pretty poor. Better than the "Milch Cows", but they still took a lot of casualties.

We haven't been able to man the boats on an all-volunteer basis in decades, and thats with extra pay, hotels ashore and good ports. Somehow I don't think extra-long patrols with port visits to Nanisivik and Iqaluit are going to inspire a rush of volunteers.


----------



## CougarKing

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> So would we buy and build a new resupply sub? There must be a reason why other nations that operate conventional subs (and lots of them) have not done so.



Isnt the whole point of building those "Milch Cow" boats in WW2 mainly to extend the range/crew endurance of those German U-boats? Would it be safe to assume that the diesel subs of today, regardless of class, have developed to have longer ranges and endurance periods? That might be the reason why many of these diesel boat operators did not need long-range supply subs. 

Or obviously having a surface ship for a sub tender may negate that too, especially when that navy has not experienced any inherent danger to its tenders if it had them.


----------



## Springroll

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> We haven't been able to man the boats on an all-volunteer basis in decades, and thats with extra pay, hotels ashore and good ports. Somehow I don't think extra-long patrols with port visits to Nanisivik and Iqaluit are going to inspire a rush of volunteers.



I know of a bunch of OS's that want to go sub's, but due to the LS and above req, it prevents them from doing so. 
Plus, by the time they get to LS and can apply, they won't because by going subs it will definitely stall their career progression.


----------



## WPA

There is a great need for submarines in Canada. This need is greater than new AAW ships as the the Combination of the JSS and Halifax ship can fill this need with the right equipment on international duties for the temp. period. 

The Allies the EU and US disregard Canada`s lands and waters as stating the Northern passage is a international route. This is false because they are comparing apples to water melons other so cal passages.
Then there is the explosion of country buy and building subs. 
Then there are countries and international companies that want to use North west passage for their own needs that would be against Canada wishes.
  
Canada need 12 submarines at least 4 on each coast and the new planed deep see port in the north. 

Canada already has allot of technology that could be used in the build a sub.

different types of pr oven fuel cells
light weight batteries
LCD lighting the strong long last and lower energy consumers
high tech lightweight workstation etc.



What Canada lacks if the experience to build a sub.

1) Canada and Australia could work to gather for the next submarine roughly 3000 to 4000 tons. 
We share many of the same needs of operation. 

long range, climate, etc. 

However the second point needs to be done to allow the first point to be completed. 

2) Canada should buy 6 U214 sub that are power by Canadian fuel cells. 
when Germany sell subs they also build on of the subs and transfers the tech to the purchasing Country. 
This is not a bad thing as Canada would get 2 of the 6 subs quickly and we gain the needed skill and Canadian company to produce the parts needed to build subs.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> There is a great need for submarines in Canada. This need is greater than new AAW ships as the the Combination of the JSS and Halifax ship can fill this need with the right equipment on international duties for the temp. period.



WPA Really?
a) You do not use a glorified AOR as TG platform. We use destroyers because at least they can defend themselves to some degree. Using a frigate as a command and control platform is possible but its lacking in so many degrees and involves OPSEC so I will not mention them here.
b) Even with the new ESSM coming online, you are only extending the air defence so far (12-20 nm). Guess what sunshine, if you don't have a ship with Standards with you , you will not be able to take out the aircraft carrying those missiles that will blow your ships out of the water.

WPA I dare say you really don't understand naval warfare.


----------



## hugh19

I concur with you Exdragoon.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> Isnt the whole point of building those "Milch Cow" boats in WW2 mainly to extend the range/crew endurance of those German U-boats?



Yes. 



			
				CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> Would it be safe to assume that the diesel subs of today, regardless of class, have developed to have longer ranges and endurance periods? That might be the reason why many of these diesel boat operators did not need long-range supply subs.



Not really. The only long range SSK boats I know of that are around now are the Collins. The rest are short-range boats intended for coastal patrol.

The nations that ran long-range boats in WWII either gave up the requirement or developed nuclear submarines for the role. 



			
				CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> Or obviously having a surface ship for a sub tender may negate that too, especially when that navy has not experienced any inherent danger to its tenders if it had them.



Tenders can work, but they're probably the most expensive option available to us.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

You could probably use a small freighter modifed to be a sub tender but doing so we would be one of the few nations to do so. The worlds navies seem to be getting out of the tender business.


----------



## CougarKing

ExDragoon and Drunknsubmariner,

Thanks for the replies.


----------



## STONEY

Everyone seems to forget the Japanese, they have large long range diesel boats with the latest technology & sensors including AIP in the latest versions.  Yes i realize they never export but they still exist.

Cheers


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

The Japanese build pretty large boats, and they should be long-ranged according to the size. But when's the last time you saw one deploy out of the local Japanese area?

They might just be really good at staying covert, or they might not actually leave Japanese waters much.


----------



## WPA

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> WPA Really?
> a) You do not use a glorified AOR as TG platform. We use destroyers because at least they can defend themselves to some degree. Using a frigate as a command and control platform is possible but its lacking in so many degrees and involves OPSEC so I will not mention them here.
> b) Even with the new ESSM coming online, you are only extending the air defence so far (12-20 nm). Guess what sunshine, if you don't have a ship with Standards with you , you will not be able to take out the aircraft carrying those missiles that will blow your ships out of the water.
> 
> WPA I dare say you really don't understand naval warfare.



EX Dragoon thanks for your reply. 
I never said i full understand naval warfare. 

However i do understand  the optics of budgets, the taxpayers of Canada limit to defence spending and lack of ship building and time lines and equipment gaps.
Not to mention the sometimes the Military need for high end priced Bing Bing narrow view of military procurements and the politicans of the last 17 years messed thing up so bad that Canada has one of the worst records to new equipment procurement records for western countries. 

What i proposed was a stop gap because Canada can not afford to bring the CF up to a creditable standard for at least 2 or 3 decades. The naval needs alone it too much. What about the other two branches.
The Current AAW would almost be useless and make no sense to refit do to age and cost and most likely out of service before the second JSS is completed.  

The JSS should be fitted with the L-band and APAR radar first designed for the Halifax frigate second batch that was to be ten meters larger to handle the upgrades planed now. However the Liberal gov. had no foresight  and got us in this mess.  The JSS is a big target in the first place. There for it should have the high level of defence area and Command and Control needed for the naval task force. The JSS should have 6 to 8 MK41 units built for the standard missile and the light with modern MK58 launch for the ESSM  the could be place more easily in different location on the ship. I hope that the MK58 would replace the Mk48 launchers on the HCFs. This would allow the the HCF to carry more ESSM in a smaller foot print in space and weight. The HCF will be able to do it job as sub hunter and task force escort ship at large area more effectively with the radar and missile loads on the JSS.  

Let face it. I would rather have a better mix of the different types of ship in the fleet but there needs to be a stop gap option while the naval force are being refit with a new AAW and frigates. I am sure the naval planners can work out the details better. The benefit of the stop gap options is that the naval force can study equipment and systems on Canadian ship for future designs of the new AAW and Frigates that meet Canada's needs.

However it looks to be that the shipbuilding is as follows:

3-4  JSS
HCF refit 
AOPV
New Polar Heavy icebreaker
submarines 
AAW 
Frigates


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

WPA said:
			
		

> EX Dragoon thanks for your reply.
> I never said i full understand naval warfare.
> 
> However i do understand  the optics of budgets, the taxpayers of Canada limit to defence spending and lack of ship building and time lines and equipment gaps.
> Not to mention the sometimes the Military need for high end priced Bing Bing narrow view of military procurements and the politicans of the last 17 years messed thing up so bad that Canada has one of the worst records to new equipment procurement records for western countries.
> 
> What i proposed was a stop gap because Canada can not afford to bring the CF up to a creditable standard for at least 2 or 3 decades. The naval needs alone it too much. What about the other two branches.
> The Current AAW would almost be useless and make no sense to refit do to age and cost and most likely out of service before the second JSS is completed.
> 
> The JSS should be fitted with the L-band and APAR radar first designed for the Halifax frigate second batch that was to be ten meters larger to handle the upgrades planed now. However the Liberal gov. had no foresight  and got us in this mess.  The JSS is a big target in the first place. There for it should have the high level of defence area and Command and Control needed for the naval task force. The JSS should have 6 to 8 MK41 units built for the standard missile and the light with modern MK58 launch for the ESSM  the could be place more easily in different location on the ship. I hope that the MK58 would replace the Mk48 launchers on the HCFs. This would allow the the HCF to carry more ESSM in a smaller foot print in space and weight. The HCF will be able to do it job as sub hunter and task force escort ship at large area more effectively with the radar and missile loads on the JSS.
> 
> Let face it. I would rather have a better mix of the different types of ship in the fleet but there needs to be a stop gap option while the naval force are being refit with a new AAW and frigates. I am sure the naval planners can work out the details better. The benefit of the stop gap options is that the naval force can study equipment and systems on Canadian ship for future designs of the new AAW and Frigates that meet Canada's needs.
> 
> However it looks to be that the shipbuilding is as follows:
> 
> 3-4  JSS
> HCF refit
> AOPV
> New Polar Heavy icebreaker
> submarines
> AAW
> Frigates



Sorry while I know your heart is in the right place, you just prove you need to do more research on all aspects of naval warfare.

You don't use your AOR as the primary air defence platform for your fleet, excuse my but I don't know a sailor that has a warm and comfy feeling being on a ship with all that fuel and ammo being able to fire SM2s and ESSMs. CIWS, Goalkeeper all is good. RAM maybe. So much can go wrong with missiles though its scary.

You decide to not give the fleet an AAW capability and you lose it. We did not have a submarine capability for less then a decade and we lost so much, that we will be playing catch up for the next dozen years. You start taking away key capabilities like AAW, ASW and ASuW away and in on seruiousness we may as well remain tied up because we are not doing the military any favours, nor our allies and most important of all the Canadian people.


----------



## WPA

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Sorry while I know your heart is in the right place, you just prove you need to do more research on all aspects of naval warfare.
> 
> You don't use your AOR as the primary air defence platform for your fleet, excuse my but I don't know a sailor that has a warm and comfy feeling being on a ship with all that fuel and ammo being able to fire SM2s and ESSMs. CIWS, Goalkeeper all is good. RAM maybe. So much can go wrong with missiles though its scary.
> 
> You decide to not give the fleet an AAW capability and you lose it. We did not have a submarine capability for less then a decade and we lost so much, that we will be playing catch up for the next dozen years. You start taking away key capabilities like AAW, ASW and ASuW away and in on seruiousness we may as well remain tied up because we are not doing the military any favours, nor our allies and most important of all the Canadian people.



Thank you your reply as you patient in your responses.

As i said i would rather have a new AAW ship built before the old one are gone and give the fleet an AAW capability. 
However, what is done is done. The problem is the age of the old ship and lack of fore sight of the Liberal Gov. (90's) did not move ahead with the larger version of the HCF or begin the new design work on a AAW ship. 
Then what, you will still loose the skill. with out a new AAW ship. 
What do you do ?

The JSS proposal as i said was a stop gap move so the navy does not lose the key AAW capability and the ASW and ASuW capability is maintained by HCF. 
The JSS is going to be 28000 to 30000 tons a ship of this size you will be able to in install Mk41 or the new MK57 (DDX) and Mk58 for ESSM safely on the top of the fore structure. Other ship have installed the launchers.
The us design the LPD 17 to have a MK41 launcher in stalled and the ship large loads of fuel, missile, munition of all sizes on the same ship. 

The other proposal that some navies have done is  do major fit with adding a hull section and redesign of the fore structure for the radar and missile launcher.
The problem is the expansive to do an will have unforeseen problem. Hull 5,8,9,10 should be used as this a the younger hulls in the fleet and would make it reasonable for the conversion while the other ship go through the regular refit program. 

This would get use the AAW ship fast then a new build. it also reduce the fleet size. this migh not be a bad thing if the reports are true that there are manning problem already. 

Is there any other solution that out there that is sell able to the Gov and the Taxpayers?


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Again the JSS is a purpose built AOR the San Antonio has fuel for its Air Group vehicles and itself. Have you ever taken a tour abord any AOR to get an idea what kind of spaces you are talking about for refuelling.

You do realize the JSS will be fitted with navigational radars. To be an AAW platform you need specialized Air Search radars and that changes things such as top weight. As was said in another post AAW plaforms are built around the sensors and the launchers.

Psst btw we refer to the Halifax class as the CPF, your using the HCF is confusing to some.


----------



## a_majoor

This project seems to have gone off the rails somewhere, but perhaps there is potential in these ideas:

http://www.military.com/Opinions/1,14790,Buff_090705-P2,00.html



> In late autumn 2004, the U.S. Navy and DARPA jointly announced a new submarine design feasibility study, TANGO BRAVO. The name derives from the initials T and B, standing for “Technology Barriers” (or more optimistically, “Technology Breakthroughs.”) That initial announcement was met with a mix of enthusiasm, skepticism, and confusion, depending on who you were and whom you listened to back then.
> 
> Well, enough time has passed for some dust to have settled, some multi-million-dollar contracts to have been awarded, and some clarity in general to have emerged. As stated rather emphatically by senior Navy officers who are now overseeing and managing the project, TANGO BRAVO is not the design of a new class of super-submarine. Rather, the effort consists of a cluster of interrelated feasibility studies, looking “outside the box” at many different aspects of fast-attack sub layout, arming, and manning. There's no guarantee that any particular one of these innovative concept thrusts will pan out in practice, and the timeframe for any payoff -- in terms of new subs actually in commission, in the water -- may be better measured in decades than in years. But this is definitely not bad news: It's simply a reality check on public expectations.
> 
> The driving force behind TANGO BRAVO can be summarized in one word, cost. The latest class of fast-attack sub (SSN), the Virginias, at the present funded building rate of one a year have a price tag around 2.5 billion dollars each. Some experts believe that if this building rate could be doubled, to (say) one Virginia per year by General Dynamics Electric Boat, and one by Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding (who now share the work on each sub in a complicated teaming arrangement), the cost per boat would drop to around $2 billion each. That's still a lot of money, though arguably it's reasonable for what the Navy and America get in undersea peacekeeping and combat power -- the Virginias are truly superb 21st century capital ships.
> 
> But here's where the problem of fleet size comes in, driven by the problem of cost: A modern SSN has a useful hull life of about 33 years. Building at the rate of one a year, eventually the fast-attack component of our Submarine Force would reach a steady state of 33 vessels. By the 2020s, however, China alone could outnumber us with nuclear-powered and diesel subs together by a factor of five, maybe more. That puts us at the danger point where the advantage tilts from individual quality to sheer quantity, especially in enemy home waters -- i.e., WESTPAC.
> 
> If we could build more than one good or great SSN for the same money that currently pays for just one Virginia, our Navy and our country would be better prepared for whatever challenges the future holds. One conceivable way to get a cheaper but capable SSN is to perfect innovative means to make it smaller without sacrificing performance, and perhaps even while enhancing performance. Hence the bold push named TANGO BRAVO.
> 
> TANGO BRAVO feasibility studies are looking at five main areas of technology, every one of which contributes significantly to SSN cost over a sub's useful lifespan, and every one of which could produce very valuable breakthroughs -- genuine upside discontinuities -- in what next-generation American SSNs look like and how they work. It's way too soon to know for sure how much each of these different directions of exploration and experimentation will pan out productively. Tradeoffs will have to be made, and competing new design options will lead to winners and losers in the always-brutal Beltway acquisition game. Above all, there's the chance of technology failure. Some ideas that sound wonderful today or next year may prove to be too expensive or even infeasible in practice. Enticing artists' conceptions of futuristic-looking fast attacks in magazines or brochures are merely that -- artists' conceptions. And implementation of any new prototype models or production designs will be subject to the same familiar bugaboos as ever: deadline delays and budget overruns. (The Virginias, originally, were supposed to go for something like only half their current price in constant dollars. The UK's new Astute-class SSN has suffered nearly crippling delays and overruns due to an atrophying design and engineering expertise base -- a cautionary tale for the U.S.)
> So a bit of healthy disbelief seems advised when TANGO BRAVO's goal is labeled as “the same or better mission capabilities for half the money,” or claims are made that “with concerted effort, an SSN design derived from TANGO BRAVO would be ready for procurement in 2011 or -- under ideal conditions -- even earlier.” On the other hand, we can't afford to not do TANGO BRAVO, or our own expertise base will wither irrecoverably, and we won't have a good follow-on class beyond the Virginias.
> 
> These are the five main technology areas encompassed in legislation and contract language for TANGO BRAVO:
> 
> 1. Shaftless propulsion. The propulsion shaft of current SSN designs is long and rather heavy, causing center-of-gravity (trim) difficulties for naval architects, and the shaft requires a large hole in the stern of the pressure hull. Moving to all-electric propulsion, with the drive motors encased in pods outside the people tank, and with hull penetrations needed only for power cables that don't rotate, is a very attractive alternative. A word of devil's advocacy, though. A commercial ship with a similar arrangement recently suffered a serious fire in one such pod; no one was injured, but the ship was crippled. And this was on the surface with help nearby -- not deeply submerged during battle maneuvers. The tech for submarine use will surely get there, but the point is it isn't there yet and it won't be cheap.
> 
> 2. External weapons stowage. Right now, a lot of pressure-hull volume is taken up by an SSN's torpedo room, including its weapon-handling machinery and the torpedo tubes themselves. Were weapons to be carried outside the hull, the ship could prove to be smaller and cheaper. In fact a greater number of bigger weapons might be deployable on a submarine significantly smaller than today's available SSN classes. If it works, it's a major gain for American taxpayers. But once more, just for argument's sake, let me play devil's advocate. If weapons are stored outside the hull, several new requirements arise. The weapons have to be protected from ambient sea pressure until ready to fire, because riding around for months on end at tens of atmospheres, down deep in corrosive salt water, is more than an Improved Mark 48 ADCAP torpedo or Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile is meant to bear. The weapons, whatever their physical arrangement, need to be enclosed in a streamlined casing of some sort, or else they'd create severe hydrodynamic drag and “singing” that would emit a telltale -- noisy -- acoustic signature and also reduce the ship's maximum speed. (Are we moving toward a double-hull design like long-standing Russian/Soviet practice? If so, are our cost savings quickly evaporating?) Lastly, even if the weapon-rounds themselves are “wooden,” i.e., meant to be free from any maintenance while on board, the hookups for data links and other required preambles to firing, plus the entire complicated firing mechanism itself, could create fatal problems in case of any malfunction that occurs outside the main hull. Today, at least, all these numerous items required to put torpedoes on target, and the supporting equipment that comes with each Tomahawk vertical launch system tube, are accessible to men in the torpedo room in a shirtsleeves environment.
> 
> 3. Hull adaptable sonar array. This is a very promising area, since at present an SSN is equipped with several different sonar complexes each of which makes for awkwardness in ship equipment layout, and also in sonar blind spots. As just one example, the sonar dome within the soft nose of current SSNs makes the bow extremely vulnerable in case of collision or battle damage. (See photos released by the Navy of USS San Francisco's sonar dome while in dry dock after she hit an uncharted seamount.) If sensors could be integrated directly with high-yield steel, all around an SSN's hull, designers would have important new flexibility.
> 
> 4. Ship infrastructure reduction. At present, different auxiliary sub-systems in an SSN are powered by electricity, hydraulics, compressed air, or other sources of energy. The result is a multitude of hardware throughout the internal compartments which calls for several distinct sets of maintenance skills, different stocks of spare parts, and different problems (and solutions) in case of a failure or a mishap. All-electric systems could greatly simplify this profusion of cables, pipes, valves, and operating machinery. The result could be a major saving in space (always at a premium in any submarine design), and in cost. However, traditionalists or conservative engineers and seasoned submariners might (rightly?) feel that using a single system to power every device aboard abandons redundancy and puts too many eggs in one basket.
> 
> 5. Crew size reduction. From the Los Angeles class to the Seawolfs to the Virginias, crew size has dropped only slightly, remaining at well over one hundred men. There's a type of Catch-22 here, since the larger the crew, the more design weight, space, and cost must be allocated toward habitability. If automation could be significantly increased, crew size might substantially shrink -- and along with it, the size and cost of the ship. There's also a possible double-whammy benefit, as a smaller crew means not only a smaller, cheaper ship (provided automation is achieved at moderate unit expense), it means much lower lifetime charges for the entire fitted-out vessel as an integrated weapon system. This is because personnel themselves cost money, not only to train and nurture as they strive to earn their Dolphins and then climb their chosen career ladders, but also in terms of payroll, health benefits, dependent allowances, pension expenses, and so forth. A devil's advocate warning I've often heard from submariners is that over-automation could become an SSN's Achilles' heel. Scuttlebutt has it that newer data displays are non-ergonomic to the point of sometimes being distracting or overwhelming, as it is. When automation extends into the realm of artificial intelligence and expert systems for the control room, we're entering some pretty serious terra incognita. And when physical things break, it takes human experience, improvisation, and often brute strength to repair them. The human body itself is frail (think USS San Francisco again), so crew injuries are another deleterious factor that can't be ignored. If an SSN is too mechanized, and available manpower too small, that SSN may look like a terrific bargain on paper, but prove to be a dreadful flop at sea when it goes in harm's way. Between fixing damage, manually compensating for whatever things have been damaged until they're fixed, and treating wounded guys with healthy guys who can't do two things at once, there won't be adequate people to go around. Mission failures could result, presenting unacceptable threats to national security.
> 
> Nobody said TANGO BRAVO would be easy. This discussion can barely scratch the surface of a topic that will be worked on by some of our country's finest minds, and finest contractors and think tanks, for a long time to come. Hopefully readers have gained a sense of what TANGO BRAVO is so far, what it isn't, what it might be eventually, and what it can never be. By my own estimate, the first TANGO BRAVO submarine won't be built, shaken down, tuned up back in dry dock, and ready for battle before about 2022.
> 
> The one thing we do know, with the highest certainty, is that the TANGO BRAVO feasibility study has such a long-range payoff, in terms of practical undersea platforms in the water and passing stress tests, that the problem of the one-per-year Virginia build rate will haunt us constantly. Unless, that is, we wise up and allocate more money to build two Virginias per annum when Congress first has the option to do so for fiscal year 2007, rather than putting things off to FY 2012 or forever. In a report to Congress dated June 24, 2005, a TANGO BRAVO fast-attack was already being discussed as costing 75 percent as much as a Virginia. That's a heck of a lot of price creep from the 50 percent referred to barely six months earlier! How much further will this creeping go? When the day is done, will TANGO BRAVO cost savings turn out to be completely illusive, with all emphasis placed on the tech benefits, not the money?
> 
> Sea power is the key to global dominance, and to peace-enforcement on favorable terms. Undersea warfare is the key to modern sea power, especially when unmanned vehicles (submerged and airborne) enter the picture. There's a major backlog in SSN construction compared to even minimum national requirements -- our fast-attack fleet is too small and getting smaller, but the worst shortfall won't be manifest until 2015 or later, enabling dangerous complacency right now. If that backlog is allowed to grow, instead of being redressed with immediate urgency, America -- if only by default -- will take a big step toward becoming the latest former superpower.


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## drunknsubmrnr

Tango Bravo is still running, and they're having a lot of success in the external weapon stowage area.

TB is a follow-on to some things that came out of the "Forward PASS" and "Team 2020" projects. I was peripherally involved in Forward PASS while I worked in The Business.


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## WPA

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Again the JSS is a purpose built AOR the San Antonio has fuel for its Air Group vehicles and itself. Have you ever taken a tour abord any AOR to get an idea what kind of spaces you are talking about for refuelling.
> 
> You do realize the JSS will be fitted with navigational radars. To be an AAW platform you need specialized Air Search radars and that changes things such as top weight. As was said in another post AAW plaforms are built around the sensors and the launchers.
> 
> Psst btw we refer to the Halifax class as the CPF, your using the HCF is confusing to some.



From everything i seen on the JSS would make it closer to the San Antonio than the old AOR that we have. It will have a large fuel tanks and ice harden hull which would more like make it more damage proof maybe?

The JSS will have a air wing of 3 to 4 copters
A command and control unit for land operation
1000 meter ro-on ro-off storage space for trucks, lavs,  tanks and etc. 
A Hospital
accommodations for land forces

Like i said for a cost effect stop gap till we get new AWW ships there is no harm in adding a AAW and Task group command centre to the ship so we do not lose this capabilities.
I find hard that a 28000 pound ship,  not build yet would have a problem to have the APAR, L-band and missile launch add to be a top heavy weight problem.

The experience learn would benefit from this stop option would be used in the next AAW and CPF ships for Canada


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## drunknsubmrnr

The LPD-17 has absolutely nothing to do with an AOR. Period. Our current AOR's and JSS have far more in common with each other than anything remotely resembling an LPD.

There's quite a bit of harm in adding AAW and command ship functionality to an AOR. For one thing, the AAW radars have a significant chance of spontaneously igniting fuel as it's passed during a RAS, assuming they don't simply microwave the RAS personnel first.

There's a lot more to adding AAW and command systems to a ship than just top weight. There's the structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in your hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?

Just trying to squeeze these in to a dedicated hull is hard enough. They tried hard with the TRUMPS but the ultimate product is not exactly ideal.

If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them. In any case, we're going to have to learn to live without them. Probably the same for the new subs, to bring this back on topic.


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## Colin Parkinson

> If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them.


Hmmm, I fear that is what the Brits said just before the Falklands. But i do agree that "Multi-tasked" ships rarely achieve the abilities their planners dreamed up and generally at best do all of the jobs somewhat.

I can also see that our manning requirements are going to have to change, even at the expense of damage control and fire fighting.


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## WPA

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> The LPD-17 has absolutely nothing to do with an AOR. Period. Our current AOR's and JSS have far more in common with each other than anything remotely resembling an LPD.
> 
> There's quite a bit of harm in adding AAW and command ship functionality to an AOR. For one thing, the AAW radars have a significant chance of spontaneously igniting fuel as it's passed during a RAS, assuming they don't simply microwave the RAS personnel first.
> 
> There's a lot more to adding AAW and command systems to a ship than just top weight. There's the structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in your hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?
> 
> Just trying to squeeze these in to a dedicated hull is hard enough. They tried hard with the TRUMPS but the ultimate product is not exactly ideal.
> 
> If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them. In any case, we're going to have to learn to live without them. Probably the same for the new subs, to bring this back on topic.



Let Face it

The JSS is part LDP, AOR and Icebreaker as one on the duties is to travel the north west passage to re enforce that It is Part of Canada and not an international shipping passage. 

The JSS is also going to be used to resupply the new artic deep sea port and other bases and comunities. 

Adding the AAW and task force functions for a Ship that need to do a speacial job only re enforce our claim of monitoring the north.

1)With the JSS that is still being selected for which company to do the final design and build the ships is actual the one of the best times to add the these function.

The JSS has the size and space to handle structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in the hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?

The JSS has plans for 1000 to 1500 meter sq lane space trucks, lavs, rg31 tanks etc could be reduce to 1000 meter and the rest for the needed changes to add the AAW and task force duties. 
  

2)TRUMPS was project on ship that some say was not worth the upgrade and building the second batch of CPF large was the right course of action however the Liberials did not use and fore sight in ship building. 
This is still a problem ! 

3) For example the large armoured missile section does not even have to be total flush mounted to the weather deck. Many Naval vesels have Mk41 launcher mounted above the weather deck built Germeny. 
The design could create slope stowage comapartments around the luanchers for all docking, recue, safety, etc equipment and reduce the radar sect of the ship to be more stealthy.    

4)Canada is a nation with three large coast line. We need AAW, Frigates / Corverts, Subs, JSS, AOPV and Large heavy polar icebreaker. Everyone of these ships are important and Cand would just do a constant building program of 3 or 4 ships a year is very do able and affordable.


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## hugh19

OK I think you should face it. YOU DO NOT READ or COMPREHEND, what you are being told


 A resupply ship which is what the JSS is NOT  repeat NOT a LPD, or AAW ship. YOU do not once again repeat DO NOT use your tanker for all the other things you are talking about. They are not landing ships, they are to carry the armies equipment to a working port not land it amphibiously. The AAW ship has to do many things that inhibit its ability to do other tasks. Which I will not get into online.

I have never heard of a MK 41 being above deck. Please prove me wrong, but it is a inside ship system last time I checked. I work on a 280 so I have seen one up close. Adding more crap to the uppers is not a good way to increase stealthiness, but it is a great way to increase top weight.

Though I do agree that a ship building program of a few a year is the best way to go. But you need the political will for that.


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## drunknsubmrnr

WPA said:
			
		

> Let Face it
> 
> The JSS is part LDP, AOR and Icebreaker as one on the duties is to travel the north west passage to re enforce that It is Part of Canada and not an international shipping passage.



How exactly is it going to do this? We send ships through the Strait of Juan de Fuca all the time, and it's still international as far as I know.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> Adding the AAW and task force functions for a Ship that need to do a speacial job only re enforce our claim of monitoring the north.



How?  



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> 1)With the JSS that is still being selected for which company to do the final design and build the ships is actual the one of the best times to add the these function.



Only if they're completely redesigned, setting the project back by years.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> The JSS has the size and space to handle structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in the hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements.



Really? Very interesting. Are you sure about the EMI?



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> has plans for 1000 to 1500 meter sq lane space trucks, lavs, rg31 tanks etc could be reduce to 1000 meter and the rest for the needed changes to add the AAW and task force duties.



Also very interesting. Could you point out exactly how this could be done?  



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> 2)TRUMPS was project on ship that some say was not worth the upgrade and building the second batch of CPF large was the right course of action however the Liberials did not use and fore sight in ship building.
> This is still a problem !



I'm pretty sure the TRUMP and CPF programs lasted through both the Conservatives and Liberals. I don't see how the Liberals alone could be blamed for them.



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> 3) For example the large armoured missile section does not even have to be total flush mounted to the weather deck. Many Naval vesels have Mk41 launcher mounted above the weather deck built Germeny.
> The design could create slope stowage comapartments around the luanchers for all docking, recue, safety, etc equipment and reduce the radar sect of the ship to be more stealthy.



All the Mk 41 manuals I've seen don't recommend that configuration. Are you quite sure of this?



			
				WPA said:
			
		

> 4)Canada is a nation with three large coast line. We need AAW, Frigates / Corverts, Subs, JSS, AOPV and Large heavy polar icebreaker. Everyone of these ships are important and Cand would just do a constant building program of 3 or 4 ships a year is very do able and affordable.



We need them, but I don't see any way we can afford them on the current budget.


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## aussiechangover

if Canada did get newer subs perhaps it would convince me to go back to the dark side, already qualified on Oberon and Collins class. although i do remember the problems we had when Collins was first introduced they were pieces of junk spent more time alongside than at sea completing trials just to get deep dive certificate.  haven't had much to do with the Canadian boats but i'm sure 2 different navies same issues from boats.

funniest thing i ever heard was the boss of ASC saying to the CO of Collins on it's first fast cruise "these things are supposed to go this deep right" which basically caused a look of fear in the control room.


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