# Split Post - Waffen SS.



## chaos75 (11 Jan 2005)

If your looking for some insightful commentary on the Iraq War and the state of the world to come, I suggest you read 'Future Tense' by Gywne Dyer.  The ideas of Pax Americana along with all the historical reference is very interesting to say the least.  As for Scott Taylor, he like everyone else is entitled to his opinions, and no one is forced to read his material if you dont want.  

On a personal note, the Waffen SS were some of the best fighting formations to ever walk the battlefield, and while a very small portion of their group was involved with the camps, their actions in battle cannot be questioned.  For a fantastic read on this subject from a German point of view (in lieu of a biased Western or Soviet view), try 'Grenadiers' by Kurt 'Panzer' Meyer.  A great read for any military enthusiast, especially tankers and infanteers.

Just some thoughts.


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## Michael Dorosh (12 Jan 2005)

Ok, since the original post had little to do with Scott Taylor, I thought I would move it here.  Hopefully this isn't too disruptful.  Chaos, if you want to repost your comments on Dyer and Taylor in the original thread, please do so.  I will PM you in a moment in case you are reading this.

I don't want to drag the othrer thread off topic, and did want to comment on your Waffen SS comments.  While they were indeed good soldiers, to a large degree, bear in mind that early in the war, they were not considered great at their craft, and by 1944 there were many low-grade divisions on the order of battle (which incidentally were responsible for the lion's share of atrocities, due to the nature of their employment, ie as anti-partisan forces in Yugoslavia or Warsaw, etc.)

I think modern militaries do look to their better divisions for historical lessons; certainly Canada benefited from some of the tough experiences the Germans learned in winter warfare against the Soviet Union, as their lessons were passed down.

On the whole, I'd have preferred they never existed, naturally, and even the good formations were guilty of excesses which Canadian or other western soldiers did not tolerate.  The Hitlerjugend murders stand out.  While Canadian soldiers may not have been angels, they were not taught race hatred nor were they encouraged to abuse prisoners.  It may have happened, on occasion, but was not systemic, or even expected, as may have been the case in units of the Waffen SS.


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## chaos75 (12 Jan 2005)

I was not commenting about the actions of a very small number of troops which were employed in camp operations, or in the death squads.  I was referring to the military actions of the main SS divisions, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 12th divisions.  While the Waffen SS started small due to original design as a personal protection force for Hitler, as it grew, it went on to be one of the most recognized organizations for its fighting skills on the eastern front.  Like you I would prefer that attrocities are never committed in any conflict, however people find it hard to seperate the fighting men from those who were involved in those types of activites.  I certainly have no respect for a small number of Canadian soldiers and their actions in places like Somalia, or some US soldiers who are in Iraq.  But I certainly respect the majority on both sides who are soldiers and not criminals.  As an enthusiat of military history, I like to take an unbiased look at conflicts, and respect the battles for what they were on both sides.  That is why I can appreciate battles such as the fall of western Europe, the defeat of Rommel in Africa, the hard fought battles of the Italian campaign, the attrition warfare in Stalingrad.  Thanks for you comments.


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## larry Strong (15 Apr 2005)

chaos75 said:
			
		

> I was not commenting about the actions of a very small number of troops which were employed in camp operations, or in the death squads.   I was referring to the military actions of the main SS divisions, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 12th divisions.



Sorry, but even the main line SS divisions that you have quoted above were guilty of excessive war crimes, Especially more so if you go into the histories of the "Waffen-Grenadier/Gebrigs-Division der SS", the ethnic ones, Their histories are rife with atrocities, As much as I agree that they were good soldiers in a battle situation, the SS atrocities were by no means confined to the "Totenkopf" guards of the camps.


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## Michael Dorosh (15 Apr 2005)

This was my problem with the film DOWNFALL ("der Untergang" in German) - currently playing in art houses.   Brigadeführer Mohnke is portrayed as this steelyjawed military professional fighting it out in downtown Berlin.   An audience who didn't know about him would see a good looking guy in a cool uniform acting like a soldier.   I realize the movie wasn't about the Holocaust, or the first years of the war, but in reality, Mohnke is described as a drooling lunatic, nutty even by SS standards. He commited one of the very first Waffen SS atrocities by killing British soldiers at Wormhout in 1940, and in June 1944 was responsible for the murders of several unarmed Canadian prisoners in cold blood.   Naturally, the movie is not about that, but it is a bit painful to see.   I can understand the other criticisms of the film in appearing too "sympathetic" to the other German characters.   Hard to feel the proper amount of satisfaction at seeing Fegelein get gunned down when you don't see the atrocities he commited with the Florian Geyer, and all that is presented is how much he loves his wife and sister-in-law.   (And even that doesn't seem to have been strictly true, I am under the impression the marriage was a highly political move for the savvy and handsome Fegelein).


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## Infanteer (15 Apr 2005)

I think Max Hastings has a point when he writes in Armageddon that, coming from our Western concept of war, we could not comprehend the barbarity of the mindset that 4 years of fighting on the Eastern Front (and serving under totalitarian regime) created a different standards of reality for combat soldiers in both the Soviet and German armies.  Sure, we may bring in "playing by the rules" as a benchmark for a effective military formation, but this simply did not exist for soldiers of the SS (or for many Wehrmacht soldiers either) or to those in the Soviet Army.  I'm sure we would have faced the same atrocities had we been fighting 3rd Guards Tank Army in Normandy.

As I said above, this is intimately tied to the nature of the state these units served - it does not excuse their actions (the victors write the history books), but I think it does cause us to consider why they could do it (fairly systemically) and we wouldn't.


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## Michael Dorosh (15 Apr 2005)

No doubt.  

Getting back to their "skill" - Was the SS model particularly effective, even in the best divisions?  ISTM they routinely suffered high casualties as a result of their aggressiveness in conventional battles.  Haven't studied their actions in depth, but even against average formations (as Third and Second Canadian divisions certainly were in June and July 1944) they didn't seem to achieve much that was out of the ordinary.  Even the classic breakthrough they achieved in the Bulge was shut down relatively early and done in the face of very green opposition.  They never got Bastogne and even the vaunted KG Peiper was stopped cold (albeit partially due to lack of fuel).

Their biggest victories in the west seem to have been against outclassed enemies - surrounded paratroops at Arnhem, the 106th Division in the bulge, etc.


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## Kat Stevens (15 Apr 2005)

From what I've read (admittedly not all that much these past few years), by late '44 the SS were filled largely with unwilling conscripts, or convicts.  If that's not the case, please enlighten me.  As to their fighting skills, early on they had the advantage of tons of close air support.  By '44, the Luftwaffe was a largely toothless tiger,  making Blitzkrieg warfare impossible.  If, again, I'm wrong, please enlighten, but be gentle, I've been drinking...

CHIMO,  Kat


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## Gunnar (15 Apr 2005)

I would expect any of the great victories acheived by the Waffen SS would have been in the early parts of the war, when fanatical SS diehards, fresh out of the Junkerschulen did insane things for the glory of the Fuhrer.   This would have tapered off quite a bit as the war progressed and casualties mounted...


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## larry Strong (15 Apr 2005)

Yes, the lack of fuel had a lot to do with it, Also after what the 4th or 5th day the allied air force was back up in the air, which stopped most if not all day light movement, patton had shifted his forces by that time and the northern front Brit and American had coalesced and started their movements also.


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## larry Strong (15 Apr 2005)

Tsk Tsk Tsk Drinking and posting, not always a good combo ;D definetly by the last years it made a big diff.


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## Infanteer (15 Apr 2005)

Gunnar said:
			
		

> I would expect any of the great victories acheived by the Waffen SS would have been in the early parts of the war, when fanatical SS diehards, fresh out of the Junkerschulen did insane things for the glory of the Fuhrer.



That most certainly wasn't the case - in the earlier parts of the war the Waffen SS was still growing - I remember one quote (I think it was from English's On Infantry) about a French unit routing the SS in the Battle for France in 1940.



			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Getting back to their "skill" - Was the SS model particularly effective, even in the best divisions?  ISTM they routinely suffered high casualties as a result of their aggressiveness in conventional battles.  Haven't studied their actions in depth, but even against average formations (as Third and Second Canadian divisions certainly were in June and July 1944) they didn't seem to achieve much that was out of the ordinary.  Even the classic breakthrough they achieved in the Bulge was shut down relatively early and done in the face of very green opposition.  They never got Bastogne and even the vaunted KG Peiper was stopped cold (albeit partially due to lack of fuel).
> 
> Their biggest victories in the west seem to have been against outclassed enemies - surrounded paratroops at Arnhem, the 106th Division in the bulge, etc.



I feel it is hard to take any German Army or SS units in the Western Front in 1944 and measure it as "optimal".  Most of these Divisions in the West seemed to be refitting or recuperating from punishing Soviet counteroffensives following Kursk.  As you've said, different time periods in the war meant different levels of capability.  The Germans still managed to maintain a solid cadre of hardened veterans for fighting in the West, and I read of more tactical engagements where a grand allied offensive is blunted then where the Allies utterly destroyed German cohesion and managed to affect a true breakthrough.  I guess the examples you quote above don't quite reflect tactical capability, but more capability on the operational level - all the tactics in the world won't help you if you are thrown into Mortain and then allowed to be encircled.

I hold that the Germans failed operationally on the Western Front because they were really fighting with their hands behind their back - I believe the Western Allies never had to face more then a quarter of the German Armies fighting strength.  That being said, the reason they had their hands tied behind their back was because they were busy getting beat at their own game on the Eastern Front - the Soviets, quite frankly, had mastered the operational art by 1943-44 and were well on their way to destroying the German Machine, Army by Army.

This should not reflect poorly upon the soldiers of Western Democracies - but I feel it falls back on Hastings point that I was talking about earlier; the German and Soviet soldiers approached the war with a completely different psyche the democracies.  The totalitarians pushed their soldiers through inculcating hatred and loathing, lack of commitment was usually met with death, and failure was not an option.  Quite simply, it was a war of extermination.  Now compare this to a draftee (or a volunteer) from the West who gets decent pay and chow and just wants to defeat the German and go home.  He knows that his death, unlike the Soviet or German, doesn't mean the destruction of his home and his family, so he is mainly looking to stay alive.  You just won't get the same tactical ferocity out of a soldier with that psyche.

I don't think that we in the west have approached this level before - I'd be willing to bet that the Americans were close in the Pacific in WWII and perhaps to a certain limited extent in the civil war.  The only other time I would say we did approach this level was the bush wars between Colonial Canada (and America) and the Native Warriors; where raids and destruction were a commonplace.  Hastings' book does a real good job at discussing this whole topic.

Whatever one's opinion is, I personally feel that one can not simply compare fighting in the Eastern and Western Fronts; the two were completely different in nature, personality, ferocity, and scope.  Hastings is keen to note that many soldiers on the Western Front never developed intense hatred for the "Boche" and in general, were reciprocitated by German's who were more apt to surrender - sure, the East Front tended to creep into certain units like the 12th SS, but I would argue that was the exception and not the rule.  Look at the Eastern Front, where no quarter was given (it was probably better to die in battle then to become a POW) and the brutality of the German occupation was matched only by the Soviet hordes who swept into East Prussia and Pomerania.  The smallest Russian offensive into Europe, the invasion of Romania in late 44, cost the Soviets 200,000 casualties and over 2,000 tanks - more then the Commonwealth forces took in the entire Western European campaign.

Anyways, if one is really interested in researching the Waffen SS at its "peak", the literature to look at would probably be George Nipe's looks at the actions of the SS between Stalingrad and Kursk.  

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0764311867/ref=pd_sim_b_3/104-5532402-6336758?%5Fencoding=UTF8&v=glance

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0921991355/qid=1113611009/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-5532402-6336758?v=glance&s=books

Glantz's books are definitely worth the read - it is from the Soviet side, but he really does a good job conveying the "feel" of the conflicts.  Take your pick, Col Glantz has covered the Ostfront in many different books.

From my understanding of WWII, the Western powers possessed no Operational talent on the level of the German or Soviet Armies.  I remained convinced that the Western Allies greatest contribution was on the material fronts and with the air campaign, despite all the nay-sayers, pounding an industrial power to dust has an effect on production and after 1942, there was never more then 10-20% of the Luftwaffe on the East Front.  The Allies could have stayed on Britain and the Soviets would have rolled all the way to the Channel.

There's a little historical rambling for y'all.

Infanteer


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## larry Strong (15 Apr 2005)

Nice Post, One must no forget Hitler's interfering and "no retreat" orders, that made trying to fight a battle by" regular means impossible.


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## Infanteer (15 Apr 2005)

Can you imagine if Churchill or Roosevelt tried telling their soldiers that they couldn't retreat and that they must hold the line at all costs, including their deaths....


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## Michael Dorosh (15 Apr 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Can you imagine if Churchill or Roosevelt tried telling their soldiers that they couldn't retreat and that they must hold the line at all costs, including their deaths....



Bataan....



Excellent summary, Infanteer, and matches closely what I've seen other learned posters posting on other boards I frequent.  I can't suggest anything you're incorrect about from my own limited understanding.


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## Acorn (16 Apr 2005)

A couple of points, and forgive me for not footnoting as I'm typing from memory. All references to "SS" refer to "Waffen SS" unless otherwise defined.

1. Infanteer's summary of the difference between the East and West Fronts faced by the Germans is good, but doesn't, IMO, explain the SS. I do agree that Glanz is worth reading. He's one of the few Western writers who has done extensive primary research of Soviet documents.

2. The SS recruited good "material," which more stringent physical standards than the Heer, however they were still a politicized force, with the notions of racial superiority deeply ingrained. 

3. SS training was not as high quality as that of the long-established trg methods of the Heer. In fact, due to a shortage of well trained officers and senior NCOs the Heer was often "pirated" in favour of the SS, including involuntary transfers.

4. The reputation of the SS as "elite" is mainly based on the actions on the Eastern Front, where they were clearly in a "fight or die" position. However, and examination of their tactics and operations shows an inferior level of skill to their Heer counterparts.

5. The first three SS divisions were a large cut above the remainder, and those after the 10th were generally poor (even 12th SS was not truly a quality formation, though it had several good leaders and equipment far better than that of it's opponents). Even so, as mentioned in a previous post, the French routed the 3rd SS Totenkopf in 1940. this was largely due to the training deficiencies outlined above.

Acorn


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## Gunner (16 Apr 2005)

I sent the following PM to Infanteer but afterwards thought I may as well post it...

==================

Nice post on the waffen SS.  I think you brought up some very good points.  

a. If you want to view the western and eastern fronts from a German history point of view (which one they felt was "more" important), my doctrine professor brought up the fact that the western front (1944 -end) campaign is nicely contained in 1 volume of official german history (the WW2 volume was published ~2003).  The Eastern Front history is still being written and is slated to consist of somewhere around 6 or 7 volumes detailing the campaigns of 41-45 (I believe they were only around 1943).  Obviously the timeframe is a factor in the number of volumes but the point was a large effort remains focussed on the main effort of the war (eastern front).

b.  I think the eastern front remained the main effort of the war for a variety of reasons not the least of which was ideological which played heavy in Nazi thinking even if it was illogical from strategic or operational reasoning (never mind common sense).

c.  I concur with your comments about the allies on their materiel and air power being the main contributions to the war against Germany.  I will reiterate my argument that the air war against Germany never achieved success until 1944 when daylight bombers, protected by long range fighters, were able to strategically bomb the German heartland with relative impunity.

d.  The tactical air battle was a different story all together and I believe it defined one of the key differences between the two fronts.  The complete air supremacy achieved by the allies allowed them to concentrate on the deep battle and kept the Germans from being able to react to allied moves (in their OODA Loop so to speak).  The results of Eastern Generals moving to the Western Front often had dire consequences as they had some difficulty operating in this environment.  Certainly the "battle of the bulge" would not have been as successful for the Germans had the weather not cooperated the first few days.

e.  Waffen SS.  I haven't done as much reading on Hitler's Super Soldiers as I should have.  Often they lacked military skill and many were promoted to fast due to their political connections and the rapid expansion of the SS when the Nazi's were concerned over the loyalty of the army.  Due to their position within the party structure they were given logisitical and equipment priorities over the regular units.  In addition they usually reported outside the army chain of command (opcon vice opcom to army formations).  They have certainly created a myth for themselves as soldiers who were above and beyond the average.  I wonder how much is truth and how much is actually propaganda used to instill hatred of the enemy (ie The US took the ridge after a hard fight and heavey casualties against Hitler's crack troops).  I mean alot of the SS were foriegn volunteers (Viking Division) and conscripts from the Hitler Youth.  Maybe we are caught up in German propaganda 60 some years after the event.  Don't we all admire trim, fit young soldiers who are dedicated to a cause and are supposed to exemplify the elite of their country as well as the financial backing of their government?

Cheers,


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## larry Strong (16 Apr 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> I sent the following PM to Infanteer but afterwards thought I may as well post it...
> 
> ==================
> 
> ...



Damn, I knew I should not have steped into this. You dogs are going to make me crack the books instead of flying off the cuff. In all honesty I am more used to talking to the unwashed masses as opposed to educated people (please dont talk this as a slag). I think it will be refreshing. Before I get going, as I am a bit of a computer neophyte, could some one PM me on how to do multiple different quotes in one post, and is there a way to print 1 specfic post?

*"....Often they lacked military skill and many were promoted to fast due to their political connections ...."   * This was only really valid at the start of the war, during the Polish Campaign the "Verfugung-division" was not even allowed to fight as a cohesive unit._ Standarte Deutschland _ and the Artillery _Standarte_ were brigaded with army units, _Standarte Germania _ was attached to the 14 Army in East Prussia, and _Liebstandarte_ was deployed seperatly in Silesia. _Standarte der Fuhrer _ which belonged to _Liebstandarte_ did not even participate. And yes, none of the units that did take part performed outstandingly, their casualties being disproportionate to their achivements, the result in the armies view of unskilled leadership, and they had some justification there. And in Himmler's eyes, of a failure by the army to provide fire support. As the war progressed, they gained military skills, to the point that they were used as "Fire Brigades" and generally resulted in a sigh of relief from the troops in an area, when they heard that the Div's or Kampfgruppe's were coming to help them, and for the most part gained rank progression on ability. Now I am talking here about the classic Divisions, the actual SS-Panzer-Divisions. Once the war started there were not that many "political" appointments, (the only 2 I can think of without doing major reaserch wouuld be "Sepp Dietrich and Theodore Eicke OC 3 Div "Totenkopf" however he died in action 26.2.43). And don't forget about Paul Hausser, sometimes called "Papa hausser" who served as Inspector general of the SS-Verfugung-struppe from 19936 to 1939, was an ex-army General, who in fact acheived a great deal, and the military showing of the Waffen-SS probably owed more to him than any other individual 

*"....Due to their position within the party structure they were given logisitical and equipment priorities over the regular units....."* This only really happen later on in the war, in fact at the start of the war they were equiped with mostly Checzkoslovakian weapons, and Himmler had to use creative book-keeping to find bodies to fill his ranks as the Heer had first priority to conscripts for the duration of the war, thus the formation of the 3. SS Panzer-Division "Totenkopf' formed by transfering Concentration camp guards into the division and the formation of the 4. SS-Polizei-Panzer-Grenadier-Division which was formed from _policemen_ transfered outright from the beat, this went on to the conscription and enticing of what were called "Volks Deutcsh" people of German extraction in the occupied countries, this was followed by a plethora of foreign division,s most of which barely reached Bde strength and whose combat value is/was debateable


*".....In addition they usually reported outside the army chain of command....."* Only in so far as supply and training went, in the field they were subordinate to the next higher command

*"...I mean alot of the SS were foriegn volunteers (Viking Division) and conscripts from the Hitler Youth...."   * As far as the SS Division_"Wiking"_ is concerned, half of it's strenght composed not of   SS men, nor even of Germans but of volunteer recruits from the occupied Sacandnavian nations of Europe, Despite their emotive titles, however, it should be recalled that they always contained large numbers of Germans. None the less it went on, along with the "Classic" W-SS divisions to gain a respectful reputation among their army comrades for steadiness in the face of grim conditions and high casualties. Yes some of the HJ would have probably transfer in to the SS but most would have been conscripted into the Heer, untill the formation of the _12. SS-Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend"_ 

* "...I wonder how much is truth and how much is actually propaganda used to instill hatred of the enemy (ie The US took the ridge after a hard fight and heavey casualties against Hitler's crack troops)...."* Give me a day or two and I can come up with some examples of Regt sized uniits holding off Soviet sized   Corps and mulitple division sized units-getting a little late at night here, and a couple too many glasses of wine :blotto:. Not only that but I have a ton of books by the computer and Duffer my Taliban Kitty is pissed he cant sleep near the monitor :. Damn I have a headache now


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Apr 2005)

Excellent points Larry - but bear in mind (unless you have taken this into account) that a Russian Corps was often the equivalent of a German Division, an Army the equivalent of a German Corps, etc. etc.  Unless you were using German descriptions to match the numbers up evenly....

Otherwise, a fine discussion.


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## jmacleod (16 Apr 2005)

For a perspective on the 12th Adolf Hitler Youth SS Panzer Division, read Halifax author and
screenwriter (The Sound and the Silence) A.T. Tony Foster's Book, "A Meeting of Generals"
which defines the careers of Tony's father, late Major General Harry Foster RMC Graduate
and SS General Kurt Meyer, commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division in Normandy, who was
tried by the Canadian Army for the murder of Canadian POW's by his young SS troops. MGen
Foster was the President of the GCM which tried Meyer - a senior Prosecutor was Major Clarence
Campbell, who went on to head the NHL. I know that author Foster spent a great deal of time
and effort in research and interviews, including many in Germany. British author Max Hastings
(new book is "Warriors" I understand) rates the book highly Foster's book is also a compelling
and highly detailed perspective of the pre-war and wartime Canadian Army, a history relatively
and sadly unknown to the average Canadian. MGen Foster had opinions on Canada's wartime
leaders, including most of his contemporaries, which are most interesting for those concerned
with the history of the Canadian Army particularly in Europe, World War II. MacLeod


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## Old Sweat (16 Apr 2005)

This is all extremely interesting and I am impressed my the level of the discussion. If I can add a couple of points. The first is that the German army considered that most Waffen SS divisions were not as of a high standard tactically as their Wehrmacht counterparts in Normandy. There were exceptions, notably 12 SS Panzer Division, but in the case of the Hitler Youth division that may have been because of Kurt Meyer's unique ability to read a battle and show up at exactly the right place at exactly the right time. 

Second, there has been a double standard applied to Normandy for far too long. The Germans, including 12 SS, did some very tactically unsound things on occasion that would have been trumpeted far and wide as examples of Allied tactical incompetence had a British, Canadian or American formation done the same. Instead, these lapses are often explained away or obsfucated with references to the differences in casualty rates.  

An example - at about 1230 on 8 August 1944 12 SS Panzer Division launched a deliberate counter-attack up the Caen-Falaise Road in an effort to regain the key terrain around Point 122, The operation, which included a battlegroup made up of a battalion of panzer grenadiers and another of tanks as well as the divisional panzerjager battalion and the escort companies of both the division and 1 SS Panzer Corps as well as seven Tigers from 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion was defeated with heavy losses. It was in this battle that SS-Captain Michael Wittmann of the heavy tank battalion was killed, probably by A Squadron of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment. More important, the failure of this operation doomed the German hold on the ground south of Caen. 

Meyer had misread the approaches in his estimate and that night the remnants of his counter-attack force was forced to withdraw in some disorder from the blocking position they had occupied by the advance of 10 Canadian Infantry Brigade. All this seems to have escaped the notice of the fans of the German forces in Normandy, and this is not the only occasion. Another, again using 12 SS as an example, was the counter-attacks by that division against 3rd Canadian Infantry Division along the Bayeux-Caen railway on 8 June. There was some local success at Putot-en-Bessin, but every other attack failed miserably and the Canadians regained Putot later on the same day. One could argue that the Hitler Youth failed in their most important operation of the war - the defeat of the bridgehead - primarily because of faulty battle procedure and inept all arms cooperation.

If this sounds like a rant, I apologize, but I have just spent a few years working on a book on the First Canadian Army operations south of Caen in August 1944 and was struck by the apparent double standard.


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Apr 2005)

I thought it was beyond dispute that Ekins of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry (?) "got" Wittman...otherwise, excellent post.

I think Denis Whitaker got a bit carried away with trying to claim Canadian credit for Wittman; just as we've been trying for years to falsely claim Rittmeister Frieherr von Richtofen as a Canadian "kill", which he wasn't.


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## Old Sweat (16 Apr 2005)

Trooper Joe Elkins, the gunner of a Firefly of 1st Northmaptonshire Yeomanry, 33 British Armoured Brigade, knocked out three Tigers within a very short period on 8 August 1944. That is beyond dispute as there were a number of British witnesses. During the same engagement two other units claimed to have destroyed Tigers. These were 141st Regiment Royal Armoured Corps, also of 33 Brigade, and the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment.

The situation is somewhat murky, but if you have read Agte's Michael Wittmann and the Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte (sp?), you may have noticed some discrepancies between the accounts by the various surviving membetrs of 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion and the British account. In particular, the British witnesses all agree that the second Tiger exploded immediately after it was hit. As Wittmann's Tiger (007) had its turret blown off by an internal explosion of its ammunition, this has been used to tie the two together. However, the German accounts, which were collected shortly after the engagement, agree that 007 was stationary and out of action for a considerable period before it was destroyed by an explosion.

Also, the Brits were certain that there were only three Tigers and all three were destroyed by Elkins. However the German accounts, including sketch maps reproduced in Agte, agree that seven Tigers took part in the attack and five were destroyed.

There is a basic principle of combat self-preservation and that is to engage the most dangerous target first. This usually would be the one closest to your own position. In the case of the Yeomanry, the three destroyed Tigers were within 600-800 yards of them. However, the other two knocked out tanks, including Wittmann's, were 1200-1500 yards away, but within 500 yards of the hamlet of Gaumesnil where A Squadron of the Sherbrookes was deployed. One of these Tigers, the one with its turret bearing number 007 and lying to its right rear, was adjacent to where the remains of Wittmann and his crew were discovered many years after the war by a road crew.

It is also not generally known that there were serious accuracy problems with the 17-pounder and a technical bulletin produced by the Brigadier, Royal Armoured Corps at Headquarters First Canadian Army later that year stated that a hit on a standard target with 17-pounder ammunition could not be guaranteed at ranges over 800 yards.

The whole durn thing is complicated by two further issues. First, a French civilian examined 007 in March 1945 and did not find any evidence that the tank had been hit by hostile ground fire. The only damage he could locate was a large hole on the rear deck that he decided had been made by an aerial rocket. He may have been led to this conclusion by the presence of an unexploded rocket in the area. I have examined the air force records for that day and the only tanks (three in total) were all south of Falaise, 20 miles away.

The other issue is the lack of a written Canadian record such as an operations log. This may be because the headquarters half-track was destroyed by the Allied bombing of our own troops later that afternoon. The intelligence sergeant was killed and all the records such as logs, etc were destroyed.

Mike, the issue will be debated for years and no one can make a conclusive claim at this time. In my opinion, however, the preponderance of evidence points to a Sherman Firefly of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment having knocked out Tiger 007 and probably killing Wittmann and his crew.

This whole subject takes up several thousand words in an appendix to my book, so I can only skim over the subject here. Sorry that I can not be more precise with chapter and verse. One last thing, it was sheer luck that brought Wittmann into the sights of a Canadian tank; he just as easily might have taken another route and fallen prey to someone else. Also, the matter of who got him is less important that the fact that the counter-attack failed at considerable loss to the Germans, including five Tigers and between 10 and 20 Mk IVs, as well as probably at least 100 infantry.


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Apr 2005)

The answer is simple, I need to buy a copy of your book.  Autographed, naturally.  Can you PM me ordering info?


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## Old Sweat (16 Apr 2005)

Wilco, tomorrow after I rtu from the local militaria show. After a nice bottle of wine tonight I need my beauty sleep. You should see how many typos I made entering this.


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## Gunner (16 Apr 2005)

Old Sweat, I enjoyed your posts.

Larry, thanks for the comments:



> "....Often they lacked military skill and many were promoted to fast due to their political connections ...."   This was only really valid at the start of the war, during the Polish Campaign the "Verfugung-division" was not even allowed to fight as a cohesive unit. Standarte Deutschland and the Artillery Standarte were brigaded with army units, Standarte Germania was attached to the 14 Army in East Prussia, and Liebstandarte was deployed seperatly in Silesia. Standarte der Fuhrer which belonged to Liebstandarte did not even participate. And yes, none of the units that did take part performed outstandingly, their casualties being disproportionate to their achivements, the result in the armies view of unskilled leadership, and they had some justification there. And in Himmler's eyes, of a failure by the army to provide fire support. As the war progressed, they gained military skills, to the point that they were used as "Fire Brigades" and generally resulted in a sigh of relief from the troops in an area, when they heard that the Div's or Kampfgruppe's were coming to help them, and for the most part gained rank progression on ability. Now I am talking here about the classic Divisions, the actual SS-Panzer-Divisions. Once the war started there were not that many "political" appointments, (the only 2 I can think of without doing major reaserch wouuld be "Sepp Dietrich and Theodore Eicke OC 3 Div "Totenkopf" however he died in action 26.2.43). And don't forget about Paul Hausser, sometimes called "Papa hausser" who served as Inspector general of the SS-Verfugung-struppe from 19936 to 1939, was an ex-army General, who in fact acheived a great deal, and the military showing of the Waffen-SS probably owed more to him than any other individual



Larry, I think you took my term "political" to mean "patronage" appointments not dissimilar to the Canadian Senate.   The Waffen-SS had no military justification for its existence as it offered no new specialisations not already developed by the German Army (which most consider to be the one of the best in the world in 1939). Although many Waffen-SS units fought well at the front, their reason for existing was essentally political - they initially offered an example of blood sacrifice by the Nazi Party and later a heavily armed counterweight to the politically conservative army officer corps, which was the source of the most serious threats to the Nazi Party's hold on power. 

"In SS-V Service, 1939: 35,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1940: 50,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1941: 150,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1942: 230,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1943: 450,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1944: 600,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, 1945: 830,000+ 
In Waffen-SS Service, Total: 1,000,000+ 
Waffen-SS Desertions, 1939-1945: ?? 
Waffen-SS KIA/MIA, 1939-1945: 250,000 
Waffen-SS WIA, 1939-1945: 400,00 
Waffen-SS Casualties, 1939-1945: 650,000+ " to quote feldgrau.com

I suppose the question could be asked if the rapid expansion of the SS, while sustaining significant casualties, could have been accomplished without the promotion of politically reliable officers or did the level of combat provide enough trained war veterans to guide the conscripts.



> "....Due to their position within the party structure they were given logisitical and equipment priorities over the regular units....." This only really happen later on in the war, in fact at the start of the war they were equiped with mostly Checzkoslovakian weapons, and Himmler had to use creative book-keeping to find bodies to fill his ranks as the Heer had first priority to conscripts for the duration of the war, thus the formation of the 3. SS Panzer-Division "Totenkopf' formed by transfering Concentration camp guards into the division and the formation of the 4. SS-Polizei-Panzer-Grenadier-Division which was formed from policemen transfered outright from the beat, this went on to the conscription and enticing of what were called "Volks Deutcsh" people of German extraction in the occupied countries, this was followed by a plethora of foreign division,s most of which barely reached Bde strength and whose combat value is/was debateable



We know very well the level of motorization within the German Army was fairly limited (correct me if I'm wrong but up towards 90% of German Artillery was horse drawn until the end of the war) you have to ask yourself what, at the beginning of the war, was the rationale for three unproven Waffen-SS divisions to be motorized with equipment, even if it was from czech stocks?   Yet many (most) of the army's far more capable divisions, remained footborne?   I have to put it down to political interference in the army.   Secondly, the Waffen-SS seems to have gotten priority over the army to expand its armoured element in 1942-44.



> ".....In addition they usually reported outside the army chain of command....." Only in so far as supply and training went, in the field they were subordinate to the next higher command



In the field it came under the direct tactical control of the OKW, however strategic control remained within the hands of the SS. Source:

http://www.feldgrau.com/ss.html



> "...I mean alot of the SS were foriegn volunteers (Viking Division) and conscripts from the Hitler Youth...."   As far as the SS Division"Wiking" is concerned, half of it's strenght composed not of   SS men, nor even of Germans but of volunteer recruits from the occupied Sacandnavian nations of Europe, Despite their emotive titles, however, it should be recalled that they always contained large numbers of Germans. None the less it went on, along with the "Classic" W-SS divisions to gain a respectful reputation among their army comrades for steadiness in the face of grim conditions and high casualties. Yes some of the HJ would have probably transfer in to the SS but most would have been conscripted into the Heer, untill the formation of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend"



The Waffen-SS as a whole was a mixed bag, but within it there were some very good formations, almost all of which were raised of Germans. My feeling is that as they received preferential allocation of manpower, they ought to have been good formations. Early in the war the Waffen-SS consisted entirely of volunteers, whereas the Army was largely of conscripts and reservists. When the German Waffen-SS expanded later in the war and began to use conscripts, these were all of the prime military age groups. The Army also had to absorb many older or unfit men the Waffen-SS never even considered. 

Note - I cut and pasted some of the above comments from feldgrau.net in support of some of my original comments.


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## larry Strong (16 Apr 2005)

Glad to see I am not the only one that likes a good vino. Interesting read, for some reason I always though Wittmann was killed in an air raid, not sure why I thought that?

Micheal thanks for the response on my post   , And you are right about the size of Soviet units, Thouugh the '45 TOE for a Soviet rifle Div called for 12000 men +/- they rarely exceeded 4-6000, and the German units were the same if not worse.


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## larry Strong (16 Apr 2005)

Hi Gunner 

Eww plagiarism, I change some of the words around ;D. However you are basically right. What it boiled down to was "Empire Building", remember Goering was in it also, without looking it up he had approx 15 FJ Divs of assorted strenghts and abilities (wrong word here but I can't think of another one) and around 21 Luft field Divs of once again various.....though they tended to be wiped out in their first engagement.

Was it worth it, Personally I don't think so, they would have been better to put them under a central system.

Well Pizza should be ready for pick up. Yum Greek with anchovies ;D


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## Michael Dorosh (16 Apr 2005)

larry Strong said:
			
		

> Hi Gunner
> 
> Eww plagiarism, I change some of the words around ;D. However you are basically right. What it boiled down to was "Empire Building", remember Goering was in it also, without looking it up he had approx 15 FJ Divs of assorted strenghts and abilities (wrong word here but I can't think of another one) and around 21 Luft field Divs of once again various.....though they tended to be wiped out in their first engagement.
> 
> ...



The Luftwaffe felddivisionen were another waste of motorization - how many panzergrenadier companies could have been outfitted with the trucks wasted on the LW divisions - many of whom, if I understand it correctly, were basically security units.  (Not to imply the LW FD were motorized, but headquarters elements - as in all German divisions - were).


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## Gunner (16 Apr 2005)

> Eww plagiarism, I change some of the words around .



HA!  How do you think I got through university!   Besides, its not plagarism if you reference it!


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## oyaguy (17 Apr 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> HA!  How do you think I got through university!   Besides, its not plagarism if you reference it!



Actually, it is.  Does this mean you have to give your degree back?


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## Cloud Cover (12 Mar 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> The answer is simple, I need to buy a copy of your book.  Autographed, naturally.  Can you PM me ordering info?



And a fine work it is!! I am almost finished reading the book. BZ Old Sweat.

I just finished reading the section in the book about Wittman, did a search here for more information and presto!! Who do I get? None other than the author.   

Sorry to dig up an old thread, but hey, this one is a real gem. 

Like Paul Harvey says:

"And now you know the rest of the story."


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## Michael Dorosh (12 Mar 2006)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Sorry to dig up an old thread, but hey, this one is a real gem.



Since you bring it up, I too ordered the book several months ago and consider it the best operational history ever written as far as Canadian military history goes.  Old Sweat describes in excellent detail what Granatstein was talking about in The Generals in his analysis of Canadian staff officers, and gives great discussion on things like operational planning, staff work, as well as the tactical side of things, plus an inside look into the Germans and Poles.  An entire chapter on Wittman was the icing on the cake.  One book like this is worth any ten books by a hack like Zuehlke - written by a professional officer but still easily grasped by a layperson.  Can't recommend this highly enough, or purchase the next book on TRACTABLE fast enough.


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## Cloud Cover (12 Mar 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> ...the next book on TRACTABLE fast enough.



details? when is this due for publication?


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## Spr.Earl (17 Mar 2006)

My family knew a Norwegian who was in the SS as Motorised Infantry.
He spent 5 yrs in jail when he went back home to Norway.
I asked him why did he join?
He ws against Communisim,he fought on the Russian front and then the Baltic State's.


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