# UPDATE FROM AFGHANISTAN



## pbi (14 Oct 2004)

As promised earlier, here is a brief update on the situation:

OVERALL: We are now into the fifth day after the Presidential Election on 09 Oct, which had been anticipated as a Decisive Point for the campaign here (both for Enemy and for Own Troops) The operational situations in both CJTF76 and ISAF's AOOs have remained surprisingly calm, with only a few isolated and ineffective incidents. Voting, including extended voting hours on the 10th due to bad weather in some provinces, was successfully completed throughout the country and at the _in absentia_ locations such as Iran and Pakistan. A high percentage of Afghans (including women) were able to vote-their turnout was impressive despite very bad weather and a high risk of death/injury. (Puts Canadian voters to shame....) Commencing on the 10th, balllot collection began and has now been almost totally completed, again without any major incidents. Counting of ballots is on hold until the investigation team can complete its inquiry into allegations of improper procedures (wrong ink, mishandling of boxes,etc). While the Joint Election Management Board has admitted that there were some failures, the general opinion of international observers is that it was a mostly free and fair election. The failures seem to have been localized and likely will not have a significant effect, although this has yet to be confirmed. Although the 15 candidates running against Hamid Kharzai initially withdrew at the first report of election fraud, the three most important competitors have come back on board in the last two days (the others probably had zero chance of winning and they realized it...).

ENEMY: The various opposing forces (Taleban, HiG and AQ) conducted a campaign of attacks against Coalition, Afghan Govt, ISAF and civil targets during the days leading up to the election. Their activities accelerated during the 7-9 Oct, increasing to about 20-30 incidents/day, then dropped suddenly on 10 Oct. Despite the number of attacks, the enemy's efforts were surprisingly ineffective and friendly casualties/damage were very light. The nightmare scenarios envisioned for E-Day never materialized, although discoveries such as a 10,000 litre gasoline truck rigged as a VBIED and destined for Kandahar city give some indication of what was intended. Many of the attacks were incompetently executed, sometimes without much conviction, and point to an apparent absence of skill and leadership. A number of attacks were pre-empted by friendly forces, and in a few cases the bombers blew themselves up,apparently by mistake, since there was no useful effect. The combined effects of the Pakistani Army offensive with the CJTF76 offensive ops in the AF-PAK border region may have caught the enemy's base areas in a "hammer and anvil" effect, although this remains to be seen. The current AQ terrorist actions in Pakistan may be a reflection of the pressure they are feeling. Opinions on the reason for the current"pause" by the enemy vary, but it cannot be dismissed that he is regrouping and reorganizing, analyzing the results of his recent efforts, and planning the next stage. He is not gone, as shown by an IED attack on a convoy today in the SOUTH which is reported to have caused casualties.

FRIENDLY FORCES: The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are assessed as having acquitted themselves very well and were a vital part of the election security operations. OEF (CJTF76) forces conducted successful offensive operations in the SOUTH and SOUTHEAST, uncovering large numbers of caches, capturing a number of the enemy, wounding and killing others while suffering very light casualties. At the same time they conducted election security ops as well as various SF and air missions. CJTF76 forward operating bases were regularly targeted by mortar and rockets, but with little effect. ISAF forces in KABUL PROVINCE (KMNB) conducted very successful security operations: no major incidents occurred in KABUL despite expectations of a catastrophic attack. ISAF forces in the NORTH AOO had very few incidents, although the German PRT at KUNDUZ wsa struck by rockets and four injured, one seriously. The Canadian elements (Recce Sqn, Inf Coy, Engr Sqn) were very effective and in particular kept the area surroundng Camp Julien much more secure than had been feared at first. The Recce Sqn is highly regarded with ISAF for its capabilities.

FUTURE: Much depends on what course of action the enemy pursues, but it is safe to say that we cannot let our guard down either in ISAF or here in CJTF76. The successful completion of the election process, with the inauguration of the new President, is the next major step, and one which the enemy may still target.

Cheers.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (14 Oct 2004)

Thanks


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## MikeM (14 Oct 2004)

Thanks for the update.;D


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Oct 2004)

pbi,

Thanks a lot for that - I am feeling pretty far out of the loop these days!

Dave


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## pbi (15 Oct 2004)

Reference the IED attack I referred to: it has since been reported that an armoured HMMVW was hit by an IED and destroyed, with two KIA and several WIA. Any deaths are sad, but to have them occur in such a relatively calm period, after such great initial success makes it all the more difficult, but reminds us all that this is not over yet. Cheers.


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## bossi (24 Oct 2004)

I'm sorry to hear about the two French soldiers killed (in a road accident, according to the news).

Also sorry to hear about the Norwegians casualties - the suicide/grenade attack on Chicken Street reminds me of an incident when we were there - a younger guy got himself in quite a bit of trouble by going shopping there ... "military tourism" - guys seem to get stupider near the end of their tour ... I remember one guy telling me "he had to get a picture of himself inside a Soviet tank" ... even though our duties had nothing to do with that, and we'd never been near one as part of our duties ...


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

bossi said:
			
		

> I'm sorry to hear about the two French soldiers killed (in a road accident, according to the news).
> 
> Also sorry to hear about the Norwegians casualties - the suicide/grenade attack on Chicken Street reminds me of an incident when we were there - a younger guy got himself in quite a bit of trouble by going shopping there ... "military tourism" - guys seem to get stupider near the end of their tour ... I remember one guy telling me "he had to get a picture of himself inside a Soviet tank" ... even though our duties had nothing to do with that, and we'd never been near one as part of our duties ...



 This incident in Chicken Street was, sadly, to be expected. Thank God no more died, and that none of them were Canadian. 

These ISAF people were shopping downtown, and although they had left "sentries", these sentries did not or could not stop the attack. It is far, far too early for the military tourism that some people seem determined to engage in. This is why I was so angry about that stupid, thoughtless article written by Worthington in which he chastised the Canadian chain of command for making our "poor soldiers" wear full kevlar/IBA outside camp and not authorising "shopping trips".(that article and the *very* poor one about the "_thousands_" of FROG missiles in a "_secret_" cache have destroyed most of what little credibility he had left in my mind...)

 The fact of the matter is that although we came through Election Day OK, that can largely be credited to a high level of security, readiness and vigilance that deterred the enemy: he has publicly admitted as much. Now, although things have been fairly quiet since 09 Oct, it is NOT the time to "go Cyprus", as much as some people would like to. We have a long road ahead of us, and the Canadian Contingent arriving next will be confronted with the Parliamentary Elections in the early part of their tour. We Canadians are only in this country for six months at a time: surely we can suck it up and deal with the realities of this place for that long. US Army (including the guys in combat on the AFPAK frontier) are here for a year. If they can do it, we can do it for half the time. Let's pray that there are no more of these. Cheers.


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## bossi (24 Oct 2004)

Amen, bro - especially if our guys are going to do a PRT, they're going to need their heads screwed on even straighter than before ...


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

bossi said:
			
		

> Amen, bro - especially if our guys are going to do a PRT, they're going to need their heads screwed on even straighter than before ...



Right you are. And, depending on the location and the circumstances, the PRT may be much more "on its own" than the Canadian contingent in Camp Julien is, with a full brigade (plus) a few  minutes away. Afghanistan remains an interesting place. Cheers.


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## bossi (24 Oct 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> Right you are. And, depending on the location and the circumstances, the PRT may be much more "on its own" than the Canadian contingent in Camp Julien is, with a full brigade (plus) a few   minutes away. Afghanistan remains an interesting place. Cheers.



I'd never forgive myself if I didn't respond (... since too many "self-acclaimed experts from ivory towers" seem oblivious to the reality of what's actually on the ground ...).

More so for the PRTs than the Kabul-centric ISAF/KMNB, it will be vital (i.e. lives will depend on it ...) that the PRT fight smarter, not harder.  In lieu of a bde only minutes away, a PRT has to rely on their immediate neighbours - thus, the battle for hearts and minds becomes "vital ground".

I'm praying that the ivory gods are reading case studies of the SAS in Malaya, or Green Berets and the Montignards, vice planning from rote with obsolete conventional warfare doctrine ...

And, yes - I am NOT objective on this topic.  My former counterparts in the US Army came under SOCOM.
Sadly, however, I've encountered overwhelming lack of imagination from Canadian "middle managers" ...
(and, yes - I do use the word "managers" advisedly ... must ... control ... fist ... of ... death ...)


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

My thoughts exactly. Although I believe that the ForcePo part of the PRT should err on the side of strength, and we should harden all key facilities against indirect/VBIED attack, the real key to security is not hiding behind wire and HESCO but instead operating a very active program to dominate the area by day and by night, with foot patrols, vehicle patrols, mobile OPs (incl Coyote), CIMIC teams and solid contact with the local community, especially the leaders. We also need a pretty robust QRF with a combat engineer element. (In other words-pretty well what we do now, but probably over a wider area).

 Now, another vital element is of course tactical aviation, and I would definitely have included it in the list, except for the embarassing fact that we have saddled ourselves with a UH that is almost useless in the temperatures/elevations that are encountered here in the hot periods. If we wanted aviation that would be useful all year round, somebody else would have to provide it. Still, we shoul explore that because I would not want to be without dedicated CASEVAC capability, or all the other great force multiplication that a UH can provide. Cheers.


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## Spr.Earl (24 Oct 2004)

But alas we have the trained people but not enough to sustain a set task unless we ask our troops both Militia and Reg. "Would you do this for 1 year?"

I know as of a late friends of mine in the Engineers who signed up under the old 20/40 plan are being asked to stay but they are tired of being over seas then coming home and then having to go back in the field to support the infantry,arty or armour on their field Ex.'s because since Bosnia all of a sudden hey we need Engineer support where as before we were a pain in the bum because we messed up your idea of war so to speak because we tried to do or job but now everyone realise's hey we do need them and the guys are tired and now more so because they are deemed as glorified pioneers.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (24 Oct 2004)

Had to wade in with some clarifying notes...

First, the soldiers involved with the bombing yesterday were Icelandic, not Norwegian - which means that they weren't soldiers at all.   Iceland provides the bulk of the air traffic control here and has no army.   Lest anyone think that "shopping" and "military tourism" is restricted to "those idle Europeans" from ISAF, there was one very shaken US Army Major here yesterday afternoon - he was visiting a carpet place quite nearby when the attack occurred.   The incident is still very much under investigation, so any comments on force protection and what did or did not take place are hardly warrented at this stage.   Suffice it to say that any information in the media should be taken with the traditional grain of salt.   PBI is right on when he speaks of Worthington's ridiculous article.

However, with all due respect to PBI and Bossi, there is hardly a "full brigade" down the road from Camp Julien.   With the new AOR, the troops to task is brutal and KMNB has a tough enough time just keeping adequate patrols on the streets of the city, let alone pushing out to the new areas the brigade inherited with the election.   It will be worse when the election support forces depart.   KMNB is necessarily Kabul-centric.   It is the Kabul Multinational Brigade, after all.   Having said this, HQ ISAF has a growing number of PRTs to babysit and are gaining substantial experience in dealing with them.   I'm no big fan of HQ ISAF, but we need to cut them some slack before we start wheeling out criticism about "middle managers" and recommending (possibly obsolete) "unconventional" doctrine from other theatres.


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## dglad (24 Oct 2004)

Thanks, PBI, for the SITREP and others for their comments.  I think the key is that each theatre has to be assessed on its own merits, and we have to be prepared to employ effects that are appropriate, innovative and perhaps even unique to that theatre.  Here in Bosnia, "military tourism" is, in fact, an effect--it has an info ops impact that further tightens the bond between SFOR and the locals, even as SFOR continues to draw down and the transition to EUFOR approaches.  The doctrinal approach has to be flexible, so doctrine doesn't come to equate to dogma (echoes the section attack thread on another forum).  The trouble I find with some of the "managers" in the system is a desire to codify everything into formulaic recipes for success...probably because it's easier that way i.e. trg can be more generic, more rote-based and managing the whole process takes less work.  It's time for them to accept that the global security environment consists of many, many little security environments, which may be woven together by a few common threads but which are, for the most part, unique.

As someone said, we need to fight smarter, not harder.


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## Spr.Earl (24 Oct 2004)

dglad said:
			
		

> "military tourism"


No kidding we had to deal with it back in 97 on Roto 0 SFOR!!


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

> First, the soldiers involved with the bombing yesterday were Icelandic, not Norwegian - which means that they weren't soldiers at all.   Iceland provides the bulk of the air traffic control here and has no army.



Quite right-that was reported here at CJTF76 but has gotten distorted somehow.



> Lest anyone think that "shopping" and "military tourism" is restricted to "those idle Europeans" from ISAF, there was one very shaken US Army Major here yesterday afternoon - he was visiting a carpet place quite nearby when the attack occurred.



Then he was probably US under ISAF (there are a number, as you know...) CJTF76 pers would not normally be allowed to this except possibly in a fairly stable situation like Herat. The sad fact is that this really is, in large part, an ISAF attitudinal problem.



> The incident is still very much under investigation, so any comments on force protection and what did or did not take place are hardly warrented at this stage.   Suffice it to say that any information in the media should be taken with the traditional grain of salt.   PBI is right on when he speaks of Worthington's ridiculous article.



Yes-you are right, and I should remember   my own advice on the details of incidents under investigation. However, the point about the existence of sentries is in open source and is correct, although their actions are not clear yet. (PM if you like...)



> However, with all due respect to PBI and Bossi, there is hardly a "full brigade" down the road from Camp Julien



A slight exaggeration to make a point. Within Kabul, CJ can call on the QRF and other resources of KMNB. The sheer presence of KMNB gives some degree of security. If the Canadians were to be on a PRT in, say, Herat, it would be quite a while before anybody could come to help, other than US fast air.



> With the new AOR, the troops to task is brutal and KMNB has a tough enough time just keeping adequate patrols on the streets of the city, let alone pushing out to the new areas the brigade inherited with the election.   It will be worse when the election support forces depart.   KMNB is necessarily Kabul-centric.   It is the Kabul Multinational Brigade, after all.



The ESF issue is ack. Perhaps we should not discuss it in too much detail, but suffice it to say that somebody (maybe ANA/ANP) will have to do the job out in Surobi-there is no question of abandoning it for reasons I am sure you appreciate.



> I'm no big fan of HQ ISAF, but we need to cut them some slack before we start wheeling out criticism about "middle managers" and recommending (possibly obsolete) "unconventional" doctrine from other theatres.



The PRTs in ISAF NORTH probably function as well as they do in spite of ISAF rather than because of it. The support for them is mostly generated on   national chains (UK, NL, GE). They are also operating in an area that is generally fairly stable (although not without its threats, as the rocket attack on the GE PRT at Kunduz showed...) The PRTs that we are (IMHO) likely to choose between will not be up in ISAF NORTH, so we will be dealing with different circumstances. No doubt there are things we can learn from the UK and NZ, but I bthink we have the right balance of skills, attitude, capability and corporate experience to do a good job. Cheers.


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

dglad said:
			
		

> Thanks, PBI, for the SITREP and others for their comments. I think the key is that each theatre has to be assessed on its own merits, and we have to be prepared to employ effects that are appropriate, innovative and perhaps even unique to that theatre. Here in Bosnia, "military tourism" is, in fact, an effect--it has an info ops impact that further tightens the bond between SFOR and the locals, even as SFOR continues to draw down and the transition to EUFOR approaches. The doctrinal approach has to be flexible, so doctrine doesn't come to equate to dogma (echoes the section attack thread on another forum). The trouble I find with some of the "managers" in the system is a desire to codify everything into formulaic recipes for success...probably because it's easier that way i.e. trg can be more generic, more rote-based and managing the whole process takes less work. It's time for them to accept that the global security environment consists of many, many little security environments, which may be woven together by a few common threads but which are, for the most part, unique.
> 
> As someone said, we need to fight smarter, not harder.



Quite right dglad and I'm not trying to slag Bosnia. The time/situation are right there. But not here-not yet. Cheers.


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## Spr.Earl (24 Oct 2004)

Just a reminder Gents,OPSEC.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (24 Oct 2004)

Spr. Earl.

Ack.  However, be aware that all of the discussion above is in the public domain, including ISAF's current force disposition, etc..  The deployment, with timings, of ISAF's election support forces were announced publicly by SACEUR.  We're not exactly talking future ops and I'm quite certain that most of the posters with detailed knowledge of the situation here know where to draw the line.

PBI:  Quite right on most points.  Your point on US pers with ISAF is well-taken, but CFC-A is an "interesting" group as well - as you are doubtless better aware than I!  LOL


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## bossi (24 Oct 2004)

And, clarification from my corner, too:



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I'm no big fan of HQ ISAF, but we need to cut them some slack before we start wheeling out criticism about "middle managers" and recommending (possibly obsolete) "unconventional" doctrine from other theatres.



I wasn't slagging ISAF HQ, nor any staff in Afghanistan - I was referring to ... Disneyland on the Rideau.

And, while I'm at it - I have to thank dg for a Sunday sermon worth repeating (chuckle!)   BZ



			
				dglad said:
			
		

> I think the key is that each theatre has to be assessed on its own merits, and we have to be prepared to employ effects that are appropriate, innovative and perhaps even unique to that theatre. Here in Bosnia, "military tourism" is, in fact, an effect--it has an info ops impact that further tightens the bond between SFOR and the locals, even as SFOR continues to draw down and the transition to EUFOR approaches. The doctrinal approach has to be flexible, so doctrine doesn't come to equate to dogma (echoes the section attack thread on another forum). The trouble I find with some of the "managers" in the system is a desire to codify everything into formulaic recipes for success...probably because it's easier that way i.e. trg can be more generic, more rote-based and managing the whole process takes less work. It's time for them to accept that the global security environment consists of many, many little security environments, which may be woven together by a few common threads but which are, for the most part, unique.
> 
> As someone said, we need to fight smarter, not harder.



P.S. (almost forgot - cute username, Teddy - made me chuckle at the days when we used to replace the authentic Teddy Ruxpin cassette with the infamous song ... which I can't repeat here ... and then howl with laughter as the wee bear sang "... I really hate your ... guts, I'd like to kick you in the ...")


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## pbi (24 Oct 2004)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> PBI: Quite right on most points. Your point on US pers with ISAF is well-taken, but CFC-A is an "interesting" group as well - as you are doubtless better aware than I! LOL



Yes-you're right-they are that. Cheers.


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