# 220 Reservists Needed for TF 03-06



## COBRA-6 (27 Aug 2005)

Was given this link by a friend of mine, looks like LFCA will deploy 220 Reservists as part of TF 03-06, which includes the D&S Pl at Mirage. The flyer is being distributed at EX SG 05 right now, to ensure wide distribution.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfca/ExstalwartGuardian/documents/brochre.doc


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## Spr.Earl (27 Aug 2005)

Mike_R23A I can't down load it!
As I have only word pad.
Win 98.


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## MG34 (27 Aug 2005)

To be blunt I doubt many will be picked up for the Task Force,Camp Mirage D&S sure,but considering that not many are LAV Gunner,Driver or Crew Comd qualified I cannot see many billets in the task force being filled other than CIMIC and such jobs.


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## MJP (27 Aug 2005)

I agree with MG34...we aren't seeing that much RES augmentation for TF1-06 within the Rifle coys and the Bn itself(if at all).  It is too easy for a Bn to top up the deploying units with troops from within an organization that aren't deploying.  Most I have no doubt as MG34 said will be LO, CIMIC drivers....and what not within the deployed NCE and NSE.


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## Lost_Warrior (27 Aug 2005)

Anyone know if someone from Quebec can deploy with LFCA?  Im in the 34th brigade, but pretty much suck at french.  If I were to be deployed with the R22R or 12RBC, I would be lost....


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## Haggis (27 Aug 2005)

Lost_Warrior said:
			
		

> Anyone know if someone from Quebec can deploy with LFCA?



If LCFA cannot fill it's Reserve requirements from within, vacancies may be made available to the other LF Areas.   Likely it'll be short notice.

For anyone who can't open the document, the personnel bill looks like this:

"¢	Maj - 3, from all 3 Brigades. (Any MOC)
"¢	Capt - 18, Various MOC's
"¢	CWO/MWO - 2/2 
"¢	WO/ Sgt - 2/15, Combat Arms
"¢	MCpl - 24, Combat Arms
"¢	CPl/ Pte - 154, Various MOC's

*MG34:*
Likely you are correct that the only formed unit will be the D&S Pl.   The remaining numbers don't support the formation of anything else familiar in our usual BG ORBATS (2 CWO??)

If anyone on a current Class B is considering applying, ensure you read through the freshly amended ADM (HR-Mil) Instruction 20-04.   There is a new provision to protect your Class B job (under certain circumstances) should you deploy.


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## COBRA-6 (28 Aug 2005)

I for one am interested to see how these positions break down, hopefully once everyone's back from Stalwart Guardian someone who knows first hand will be able to fill us in...


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## McG (28 Aug 2005)

I'm surprised there seems to be so much clarity this far out.



			
				MJP said:
			
		

> I agree with MG34...we aren't seeing that much RES augmentation for TF1-06 within the Rifle coys and the Bn itself(if at all).


Life would be easier if that were the same in the Fd Tp.


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

MCG said:
			
		

> Life would be easier if that were the same in the Fd Tp.



If you have augmentees who can't cut the mustard the solution is simple. Screen them out during pre-deployment training.


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## McG (28 Aug 2005)

Haggis said:
			
		

> If you have augmentees who can't cut the mustard the solution is simple. Screen them out during pre-deployment training.


It is not a problem with the individuals (which we will meet Monday), but that we are desperatly short on certain skills that are not taught to reservists (like LAV driver).  By committing to 20% R043 in the Fd Sect, we cannot fill skill shortfalls with other reg force pers.


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

MCG said:
			
		

> By committing to 20% R043 in the Fd Sect, we cannot fill skill shortfalls with other reg force pers.



Seen.  Misunderstood a bit (only one coffee so far...) 

That's the problem with the Reserve "Train to Need" approach.  There is an expectation that any skills a Reservist needs beyond ELOC/MLOC will be taught during pre-deployment training.  It's not fair to the deploying Reg F unit (who have to now expend more time/energy on delta training) or the Res F units (who don't have the budgeted time/resources/money to close the delta).


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## c4th (28 Aug 2005)

Haggis said:
			
		

> That's the problem with the Reserve "Train to Need" approach.



As soon as Director Army Training and the Director of the Reserves, among others, realize that 200+ reservists are going to be NEEDED on a per task force basis and that they will NEED certain skill sets and core training, and the deploying RegF units NEED to commit their short term trg resources to theatre specific predeployment training then maybe there will be a realization that where ever possible reserves NEED trg parity with the RegF.

IMO the "Train-to-Need" approach is a sell out and has knee capped the reserves.


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

c4th said:
			
		

> As soon as Director Army Training and the Director of the Reserves, among others, realize that 200+ reservists are going to be NEEDED on a per task force basis and that they will NEED certain skill sets and core training, and the deploying RegF units NEED to commit their short term trg resources to theatre specific predeployment training then maybe there will be a realization that where ever possible reserves NEED trg parity with the RegF.



So far that hasn't happened.  Almost 3 years ago now, all the Reserve Infantry Sgts and WOs (18 soldiers) for Op PALLADIUM Roto 13 were expected to be Small Arms Instructor qualified upon arrival for pre-deployment training.  Only one was, an ex Reg F Sgt.

That course isn't offered to the Army Reserve.  Yes, some vacancies may occur on occasion, but what Reserve CO can afford the $10K price tag for one Sgt/WO?  That's the price of an average weekend ex for a mid-sized unit.


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## Fishbone Jones (28 Aug 2005)

Possibly part of the problem is that the Reg Force, or someone putting it together, missed the boat on certain things. Like taking nothing but Infantry Reservists and training them up to do things like the Light Vehicle Patrol tasking. They had to train Infantry Reservists to drive Iltis, teach the Infantry Reservists to Crew Command, teach them all tactics and movements of the vehicles, etc.   Instead of giving the task to the Armoured Recce Reservists that already had the skill sets required. I think a lot of time and money was wasted, and still is, on that particular tasking that wasn't/ isn't warranted.


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Possibly part of the problem is that the Reg Force, or someone putting it together, missed the boat on certain things. Like taking nothing but Infantry Reservists and training them up to do things like the Light Vehicle Patrol tasking. They had to train Infantry Reservists to drive Iltis, teach the Infantry Reservists to Crew Command, teach them all tactics and movements of the vehicles, etc.   Instead of giving the task to the Armoured Recce Reservists that already had the skill sets required. I think a lot of time and money was wasted, and still is, on that particular tasking that wasn't/ isn't warranted.



Roto 12, which was a Composite Reserve Company (as opposed to Roto 13's Composite Reserve *Infantry* Company) had it's own set of problems, mostly with basic soldier skills. Thier 2 VP training cadre was 100% Infantry and they were able to overcome that.

Roto 13 had all it's Iltis drivers trained prior to reporting to the BG, but didn't see their Iltises (Iltii?) until a few days before Storming Bear almost three months later.  This caused some problems to be identified during validation which, thanks to a good handover from Roto 12, we were able to deal with early in the tour.

Once in theatre, we found there was little requirement for Crew Commanding, tactics and movements of the vehicles, etc.   "Survival Driving" was the name of the game.

IMO spending a week driving an Iltis in downtown Montreal in February would have been more beneficial training for a winter tour of an LPV Company. ;D


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## BITTER PPLCI CPL (28 Aug 2005)

Don't worry I'm not going to cut anybody down like I did, thats over and done with! I definitly agree with Haggis is last post. I was part of enemy force for D coy's work up for Roto 12 and most of the Ccoy 2VP NCO's were instructing and advising. There has to be a better screening or "selection" process. And definitly the senior NCO's need to be small arms qualified, thats just common sense! The one thing I don't agree with is the LAV training, we already have soldiers qualified and we already work with these vehicles on a regular basis. I do agree if there are position's that are needed to be filled and there are Res. member's ready then augment, however, LAV gunner, driver and CC should be for Reg members specifically. OK, send the blast of shit if you must!  ​


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

Considering we in the 2nd (with all our dinosaurs) barely do enough LAV training I highly doubt there is a reservist out there that would get the course as a reservist and enough training afterward to be effective.  Not a slam just the nature of the beast.


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## MJP (28 Aug 2005)

BITTER PPCLI CPL said:
			
		

> The one thing I don't agree with is the LAV training, we already have soldiers qualified and we already work with these vehicles on a regular basis. I do agree if there are position's that are needed to be filled and there are Res. member's ready then augment, however, LAV gunner, driver and CC should be for Reg members specifically. OK, send the blast of shit if you must!  ​



Blast of shite?....heck it just common sense not to waste the limited training time and money on people that may only use it for a short period of time and don't have a need for it within their parent unit.   Not to mention the considerable skill fade involved if one does not get into the turret or the drivers seat in a long time.   IMHO as its being done right now, the courses involved should stay with Reg Force members.


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## George Wallace (28 Aug 2005)

Well....I do agree with you up to a point.  There are now many Ex Regs now in the Reserves who have those qualifications, so that would make exceptions to your rule.  As always, our tendency to generalize, can cause some consternation.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

that's why I said getting the course as a reservist GW.  I'm not sure you realize how quick the skill fade is especially without having a vehicle in your amouries you could jump in and refresh on.  So I guess it would all depend on how long he was out of the reg force.


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## George Wallace (28 Aug 2005)

Oh....I whole heartedly agree with you.  Skill fade is a constant concern.  I have a hard time everytime I get back to using TCCS.  Too much eating out of Aluminium Mess Tins doesn't help either.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

lol


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## cbt arms sub tech (28 Aug 2005)

So, this forum makes you think, whats the future of reservists in Canada's Army, who really knows about all this 3 War Block theory, if reservists can't get course's for LAV's, Coyote's, G-Wagon....If you have a full time job, an cannot work summers in Wainwright or Gagetown, do reservists have a role in overseas operations?

Operational experience makes some of our leaders trully leaders I believe in the field, from learning from there experiences, that being said, Ex-Reg's are a true asset to the reserve culture!  Just a thought as I would be really interested in hearing from the regular force members on this force, not trying to cause a mess of nasty comments, but reality of the reserve world?

Thoughts!


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

Without out the assists of having LAV's and Coyote's in your stable on a regular basis to train on and with there is little sense having reservists take these slots.  These are big complicated machines.  Very complex.  There is no doubt that a reservist could take the course and do well but without the equipment to train with later on the skills would fade to 0 and that course would have been a waste.  The LUVW not so much as you pretty much just drive it but considering they didn't replace Iltis with LUVW 1 for 1 there is little chances a reservist would benefit from having this course without a vehicle to use back at his unit.  That said if he were employed as a driver overseas with a LUVW as say a CIMIC driver then he probably would get the course.  Its not long and not complicated like the LAV family.


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## cbt arms sub tech (28 Aug 2005)

Great feedback CFL, any feedback for a reservist, that would like operational experience, although works full time, so I don't have the opportunity to take courses in Gagetown or Wainwright....I'm interested in getting G-Wagon or an HLVW course...As I'm a supply tech for a combat arms unit in LFWA!


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## George Wallace (28 Aug 2005)

CFL

There is one way it could be done, but that involves the Government doing something we all know they won't do, and that is to spend some money.   The Reserves could get the courses, and then have continuation training at their Armouries, not on the LAV or Coyote, but on Simulators.   Before every Gun Camp, all crews are run through the Sims to reconfirm their skills at the Reg Force Units.   The problem lies in the lack of Simulators and Operators, even in the Reg World.   It is not likely that we will see the Gov't spring for the cash to outfit the Reserves, if it can't even keep the equip it has up and running.


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## George Wallace (28 Aug 2005)

cbt arms sub tech said:
			
		

> Great feedback CFL, any feedback for a reservist, that would like operational experience, although works full time, so I don't have the opportunity to take courses in Gagetown or Wainwright....I'm interested in getting G-Wagon or an HLVW course...As I'm a supply tech for a combat arms unit in LFWA!



There was a Reserve MSE Op Crse run in Edmonton this Summer on all of those Crses.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

"The problem lies in the lack of Simulators and Operators, even in the Reg World."

"It is not likely that we will see the Gov't spring for the cash to outfit the Reserves," not to mention the cash strapped Regs.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (28 Aug 2005)

To stir the pot a little:

I have pointed out in previous threads on operations that there is little requirement for the Reserve Force to "augment" the Regular Force on operations.  Contrary to popular belief, we have enough Regular Force riflemen, black hats and gunners for operational rotations.  There are very specific areas where Reserve augmentation is required - largely because of imposed force structure limitations (CIMIC, for instance).

I honestly believe that there is no value added in forming, preparing, training and deploying P Res sub-units (or sub-sub units) for operations - particularly infantry.  The enormous problems in bringing a Reserve company (for instance) to the level to which it can be considered deployable far outweigh any perceived advantages - even without addressing the disparity in individual qualifications.  I know for Palladium 11 and 12, Reserve companies were mandated for purely political reasons, rather than any real operational consideration.

There is great danger in "advertisements" such as we've seen posted here.  They create false expectations, give a false idea as to what is really required for augmentation (I'm willing to wager that more than three senior officers are required, for instance) and reflect a "political" mandate to include Reservists rather than a true operational requirement.

My 2 cents, as always...

Cheers,

TR


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> To stir the pot a little:


That's a pretty big spoon you're using, there Teddy!  ;D

Oddly enough, I agree with you in general terms.  There are enough Reg F bayonets to fill the deployments, but at what cost to the long term "health" of the Army?  We need time for the Reg F to regenerate, train and improve in terms of everything from continuation training to Professional Development and to ensure the "Quality of Life" for members and their familes isn't damaged in the long term.



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I have pointed out in previous threads on operations that there is little requirement for the Reserve Force to "augment" the Regular Force on operations.



The idea to deploy Reservists on Palladium Rotos 11 to 14 was quite probably politically influenced but I'd think the motives were more towards relieving the pers tempo burden (as described above) on the Reg F than to create a "deployable Army Reserve".  For that we need money, legislation and a heck of a lot more political will than we have today.



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I honestly believe that there is no value added in forming, preparing, training and deploying P Res sub-units (or sub-sub units) for operations - particularly infantry.  The enormous problems in bringing a Reserve company (for instance) to the level to which it can be considered deployable far outweigh any perceived advantages - even without addressing the disparity in individual qualifications.



Despite the motives and the hurdles, several hundred members of the Army Reserve from Pte to LCol  now have recent operational experience and have brought that back to the Armoury floor.  How can that not help the Army Reserve to improve?  Is not that a fair Return on Investment?



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> There is great danger in "advertisements" such as we've seen posted here.   They create false expectations...and reflect a "political" mandate to include Reservists rather than a true operational requirement.



Quite right.  To entitle it "Task Force 03-06 AFGHANISTAN *WANTS* YOU"   Would be more appropriate.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

When they only send 2 companies over at a time that leaves plenty of time for regeneration.


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## Haggis (28 Aug 2005)

CFL said:
			
		

> When they only send 2 companies over at a time that leaves plenty of time for regeneration.



True....now. 

We all know that each Reg F battalion has four Rifle Companies.   Only three are manned and they aren't close to 100%.   That's 27 Rifle Companies.

Look back 18 months or so.   Three for ATHENA 0, one for PALLADIUM 13 and one for HALO 0. Two had just returned from PALLADIUM 12, Three more were preparing for ATHENA 1.   Almost 50% of the Reg F infantry companies were either on, training for or coming off the existing ops.   Regiments "borrowed" from between battalions to flesh out those companies to 100%, leaving precious litte behind in terms of manpower and equipment.   We couldn't sustain that so the CDS implemented the "operational pause".

Now look ahead 9 months.... Two for ARCHER, one for ATHENA, one coming back from ATHENA, two coming back from ARCHER.   Two more preparing for ARCHER, one for ATHENA.   We're already up to nine committed companies again!   Should something else come up (as it usually does around election time) the numbers are getting pretty low.

Now, as I said, the goal of this (IMO) is not to produce a deployable Army Reserve.  But if we can toss 220 Reservists  into the mix on each roto, it gives a break to the Reg F soldiers and allows sufficient numbers of Reg F to train for and be available for the next "no notice" BG sized Roto 0 (i.e. Haiti, Sudan, Somewherestan, Toronto...).


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## Jarnhamar (28 Aug 2005)

I think for the amount of work,  effort and administrative trouble involved in raising a reserve company to operate overseas it's more efficient for the reserves to just augment the regular force as individuals.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

"We all know that each Reg F battalion has four Rifle Companies."

Since when.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Aug 2005)

"borrowing" is the same name as "plug in play" which is the new catch word for the military.


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## Gunner (28 Aug 2005)

I am going to disagree with my good colleague Teddy and support Haggis' position.  

Throw yourself back a few years and the army was caught in a continuing deployment cycle of sending soldiers into Bosnia.  These were not small contingents and, indeed, after Balkans rationalization, our contribution was almost 1400 soldiers on Roto 6.  The army was weary, soldiers were weary of going to Bosnia and many did not want to go back to Bosnia.  In effect the army was suffering from Bosnia fatigue.  This is what the soldiers told the generals, and the generals had to come up with a plan.  This became much more important as more people were leaving the army (and more were broken) than were being recruited and filling out the units (more on this in a second).

LFWA spearheaded the the development of a Composite Reserve Infantry Company.  This was simply a reintroduction of deployment of Reserve sub-units that had successfully deployed to Cyprus in the early 90s with 1 and 2 RCHA.  Everyone recognized the risk in Bosnia was steadily decreasing and unconventional approaches could be applied to fulfill the government mandate.  There was much staff work involved in making the Reserves a LAV III equipped company because that was what was in theatre at the time.  Saner heads prevailed and the Op PALLADIUM TO&E was changed to reflect 2 x LAVIII Coys and 1 x LPV Coy.  The army was moving forward with a Reserve Coy to address the limited number of coys that were available.  As well, DND/CF were pushing government to reduce and get out of Bosnia as it was killing the army.

LFWA in 2001 was recovering from 3 back to back major troop rotations to Kosovo (Kinetic Roto 0 and Palladium Roto 6, Roto 6 (+) and Roto 7) as well as the bow wave of change initiatives were being felt.  Introduction of LAVIII/TCCCS and all of the required training requirements to move infantry units from a 70s Germany mindset to one of "being able to fight a 21st century" vehicle and communication system.  The units were feeling the effects of all of this, and we were down to 6 line companys in the 3 Infantry units.  The IRF(L) under 3 PPCLI required 3 coys but there were only 2 resident in the Bn.  There wasn't too much worry about this, as the IRF(L) had never deployed!

So Comd LFWA has 6 infantry coys, all are exhausted from recent deployments, 3 infantry coys only existed on paper.  The Comd knows that Roto 11 and 12 are just around the corner and he can just barely fill the TO&E with the resources he has but will require significant augmentation from the Reserves (as occurred on Roto 6 and 7).  Anyway, the CRIC comes into the picture as a means of addressing all of these shortfalls.  The idea, as articulated in other threads, is each CBG in LFWA will provide 1 x Pl ready for Coy training by 1 PPCLI.  The OC was bought on board early to integrate into 1 PPCLI.  The senior leadership of the CRIC was personally selected by Comd LFWA based on recommendations by CBG Comds and DComd.  Large individual training bills are formed (OC Cbt Tm Comd Qual, Pl Comds Ph IV Qual, Sr NCOS would have SAIC, etc),  This training was put in place in 2000 with a view to facilitating indiv and coll trg in the Fall and winter months and this coy was to show up on 1 May 02 ready to undergo coll trg as a coy.  This, of course, didn't quite happen but that is another story.

Sep 11 occurs and the IRF(L), which never deploys anywhere, is suddenly faced with a deployment on an actual "warfightng mission" and they subsequently deploy in Jan 02 with 2 of the 6 infantry coys in LFWA, and it is soon followed by a third coy from 2 PPCLI.  Now we have lost 3 coys of our original 6.  1PPCLI is left alone so it can provide the 2 LAVIII Coys for Roto 11 and 1 RCHA has to provide a Bty.  The CRIC shows up and 1 PPCLI trains what they are given.  Large Res augmentation ensues for Roto 11 (one of the largest since 2 PPCLI in 1992).  The TO&E is cut in late June 02 and a LAV III Coy and Arty Bty are taken off.  LPV coy continues to deploy and be employed successfully in Bihac. 

Roto 12, even bigger problems for LFWA.  3 Coys off to Op APOLLO and will not be back until Aug 02, 1 coy deploying in Oct 02 on Roto 11 with the CRIC.  Comd asks CBC Comds at Area Council if they can provide a Cbt Arms Coy but they say they can't.  LFWA looks to send LPV coy to LFCA or LFAA.  Army Comd directs LFWA to mount the Coy and directs LFCA/LFAA to provide a cbt Arms Coy.  LFWA needs this Coy as we can't send the Op APOLLO folks back to Bosnia....  and there really isn't anything else in the cupboards (possibly rerolling arty to infantry but Comd not enthusiastic about this).  A very composite coy shows up for 2 PPCLI, much less trg than Roto 11 and while most of the leadership is inf (except the OC - ex Strathcona) and most of the soldiers are various cbt arms.  Once again, very large percentage of contingent is Reserve (IIRC even more than Roto 11) and it may be the largest deployment of Reservist since 1992 and well above the normal 20 per cent cap.

Roto 11 and Roto 12 are both successful and many lessons are learned on forming CRIC or CRCs.  Was it a smooth process?  Not at all.  But was the aim achieved in that it provided LFWA and the Army operational flexibility?  You better believe it did.  LFWA would have "imploded" if it hadn't been for those 2 Reserve Coys and unfortunately the key shortfalls in deployments, the CSS, were not as successful in dealing with shortages. 

Anyway, this has been very long and it is not my intent to preach.  Can the Reserves deploy Coys?  Sure they can given the right amount of time and resources and Reg F assistance (training wise and key personal in certain areas).  It has been proven in Cyprus and in Bosnia.  Do you want to deploy a coy to Afghanistan?  Maybe, maybe not.  With it still being an exciting theatre and the large allowances and tax free status for deploying now, it is a severe morale issue if the Reg F doesn't deploy.  Having said that, the Army has to be very careful not to "rob Peter to pay Paul" by riping coys out of one organization in an effort to prop up another Bn so they can deploy overseas.  Now, I am well aware this is the basis of the TF concept and plug and play (having lived it on Roto 2).  1 PPCLI and 1 Svc Bn will deploy shorty and  there will be a large number of members who just arrived back from Roto 2 in Feb 05.  Are we going back into the back to back rotations and will we develop "Afghanistan Fatigue" in the future?  We will once eveyrone gets overseas again or until a newer and more exciting mission comes along.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Aug 2005)

> This, of course, didn't quite happen but that is another story.



Good post...  However, by leaving a tantalizing hint, as you did (above), you've left out a huge amount of the administrative and operational angst that led to the deployment of the CRIC for Roto 11, angst that (IMHO) was so severe as to preclude the deployment of formed sub-units for overseas operations.  As you stated, LFWA did not sustain even the deployment of two back to back companies - Roto 12 had to be sourced nationally, with all the attendent headaches for all concerned - as you know better than I.

I believe, and I was heavily involved in the early stages, that the initial CRIC idea was almost entirely politically motivated.  Gunner alludes to some of the major reasons why it was so attractive, but the fact of the matter is that 1 PPCLI was warned for PALLADIUM long before the Reserve Company idea was floated.  Yes, the Regular Force was suffering from Bosnia fatigue, yes they didn't _want_ to go, but ultimately (I believe) that's not why the Reserves were tasked with the company.  C Coy 1 PPCLI was stood down for the deployment, as was Combat Support Coy.  Reroling units was not considered.  Use of another sub-unit from outside the Area was not considered.  Again, the CRIC was floated long before APOLLO (and the attendant chaos) came along.

Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".  There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.  Did these people get valuable experience?  Sure, you do every time you deploy.  Was the concept effective in reducing the burden on the Regular battalions?  I would argue no, not in the end.  After all, the "operational pause" was initiated _after_ the CRIC deployments. 

I would argue that PALLADIUM "proved" nothing.  Anything can be accomplished with effort, time and money and the CIRCs were hugely expensive in all three.  They took over a year to force generate and required an inordinate amount of individual catch-up training and predeployment preparation.   The companies deployed into a benign theatre in which even the Reserve company leadership had substantial experience, yet the mounting "bill" was extensive and the administrative angst was out of all proportion to the operational effect.  I hope that the same concept is never considered for Afghanistan, unless the Army or Afghanistan significantly changes.

FWIW, Gunner and I worked these operations together and have developed different perspectives over the years.  What he says is entirely correct as far as it goes.  He believes it was all worth it...I'm a touch more cynical  ;D

Pot stirred!


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## Britney Spears (29 Aug 2005)

> Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".  There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.



Mmmm, it seems this was the overriding impetus behind the CRIC deployments, even more so that the "formed reserve subunit" stuff. Do you think that reserve leaders can be adequately developed if they were individual augmentees? Is there any precedent for this? I'm aware of individual augmentees at the pte/cpl level, which by all accounts worked reasonably well in the past.


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## Gunner (29 Aug 2005)

> Good post...   However, by leaving a tantalizing hint, as you did (above), you've left out a huge amount of the administrative and operational angst that led to the deployment of the CRIC for Roto 11, angst that (IMHO) was so severe as to preclude the deployment of formed sub-units for overseas operations.   As you stated, LFWA did not sustain even the deployment of two back to back companies - Roto 12 had to be sourced nationally, with all the attendent headaches for all concerned - as you know better than I.



I lived for a year with the angst of raising Reserve Coys (you know very well what it is like trying to move a rock by yourself), it was not an easy process to say the least. Having said that, I believe we can do it better and if the right approach is taken, it can work.   We don't direct, plan and coordinate future events as well as we should have and we don't hold people responsible for implementing the Comds direction (Col Blimp....).    LFWA CBGs stated they couldn't mount the second company and I think we made the right decision at the time.   As the names began to come in for Roto 12, we could have mounted more of the CRC than we did.   Hindsight is 20/20 as always.   Don't forget, it wasn't just the Regs that had Bosnia fatigue, it was also the Reserves.   



> I believe, and I was heavily involved in the early stages, that the initial CRIC idea was almost entirely politically motivated.   Gunner alludes to some of the major reasons why it was so attractive, but the fact of the matter is that 1 PPCLI was warned for PALLADIUM long before the Reserve Company idea was floated.   Yes, the Regular Force was suffering from Bosnia fatigue, yes they didn't want to go, but ultimately (I believe) that's not why the Reserves were tasked with the company.   C Coy 1 PPCLI was stood down for the deployment, as was Combat Support Coy.   Reroling units was not considered.   Use of another sub-unit from outside the Area was not considered.   Again, the CRIC was floated long before APOLLO (and the attendant chaos) came along.



It was very much Comd LFWA driven and he was correct given his view of Op PALLADIUM.   Don't forget the TO&E for Op PALLADIUM included 3 Coys, plus a Bty, Engr Sqn, Recce Sqn, etc.   Had the TO&E not changed and Op APOLLO did not happen, we still would have been hard pressed to mount the two rotations.   You will recall the level of augmentation required for Roto 6 and 7.   Had the CRIC not been formed, LFWA would not been able to do Apollo, Roto 11 and Roto 12 without significant risk (Op APOLLO guys coming back in Aug 02 and leaving again for Bosnia in Feb 03 - I believe some still did on the CSS side).   Bosnia was rather benign (certainly by Roto 11...) coupled with Bosnia fatigue, manning shortages in the Reg F, etc i think using a CRIC was the right idea.   Our approach for Roto 11 was wrong (in my opinion) as we tried to leave too much trg to the Reserve CBGs without enough redundancy.   We took a different approach to Roto 12 and, in essence, accepted the fact that they would not show up with any coll trg completed.



> Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference".   There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.   Did these people get valuable experience?   Sure, you do every time you deploy.   Was the concept effective in reducing the burden on the Regular battalions?   I would argue no, not in the end.   After all, the "operational pause" was initiated after the CRIC deployments.


   

There was a burden on the Regular bns but, certainly for 2 PPCLI, the coy that was on op waivers trained the CRC, and I would leave it up to Devil 39 to state how much of a burden it was.   The Reserves can deploy, in the correct theatre and role, at the sub-unit level, if required.   It has been proven numerous times, is it worth the time and money?   Yes and no.    It fufills a function and role.   Certainly it does not necessarily have to be a recurring event.   Having said that, the longer we are in a theatre of operations, the more we should look to the reserves to fill roles in those missions (goes back to fatigue and keeping regulars focused on short notice deployments).



> I would argue that PALLADIUM "proved" nothing.   Anything can be accomplished with effort, time and money and the CIRCs were hugely expensive in all three.   They took over a year to force generate and required an inordinate amount of individual catch-up training and predeployment preparation.    The companies deployed into a benign theatre in which even the Reserve company leadership had substantial experience, yet the mounting "bill" was extensive and the administrative angst was out of all proportion to the operational effect.   I hope that the same concept is never considered for Afghanistan, unless the Army or Afghanistan significantly changes.



The difference between a Regular and a Reservists is effort, time and money.   If you want to bring up the "standard" required, you have to put the money into it...that is supposedly the rationale behind the Reserves.   I'm sure you will agree that it can take a inordinate amount of individual training and predeployment preparation to deploy a Regular Force guy.   Something the establishment of CEFCOM will hopefully sort out.



> FWIW, Gunner and I worked these operations together and have developed different perspectives over the years.   What he says is entirely correct as far as it goes.   He believes it was all worth it...I'm a touch more cynical



Pot half empty...Pot half full!   I'm trying to be an optimist to stave off the depression.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Aug 2005)

Brit:

Ahhh, you've hit the problem on the head.   There are plenty of augmentation roles for senior Reservists, but virtually none in command roles.   To have a Reserve Pl WO in a Regular Force platoon would (under the current structure anyway) be _very_ politically unpalatable, not to mention detrimental to unit cohesion.   The system for individual augmentees does work reasonably well, but I cannot see it in command roles anytime soon.   Problem?   You bet.

What's the solution?   Well, until the Reserve Force is resourced sufficiently to enable the activation of sub-units on relatively short notice without the attendant training gaps and massive administrative issues, I just can't see it happening unless directed for political reasons.   At the platoon level, though, it is more that do-able, particularly for less intense theatres.   I suspect that that's where the future for P Res unit deployment lies, at least in the short to mid-term...


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## Gunner (29 Aug 2005)

> Mmmm, it seems this was the overriding impetus behind the CRIC deployments, even more so that the "formed reserve subunit" stuff. Do you think that reserve leaders can be adequately developed if they were individual augmentees? Is there any precedent for this? I'm aware of individual augmentees at the pte/cpl level, which by all accounts worked reasonably well in the past.



Britney, I would argue that the Reserves will always have difficulty providing Sr Offrs/Sr NCOs/WOs that have the level of experience required to fill key jobs for a deployment.   Experience comes with time, the Reserves don't get enough of it.   A bit of a catch 22 situation don't you think?   

I don't know about the non-LFWA CRICs/CRC but the two coys we put out the door were not 100% Reserve.   On Roto 11, the CSM and CQ were from 1 PPCLI and they provided very good "backbone" for the Coy.   It places alot of responsibility on them and can cause trouble in terms of where their loyalites lie.   I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.


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## Britney Spears (29 Aug 2005)

> There are plenty of augmentation roles for senior Reservists, but virtually none in command roles.  To have a Reserve Pl WO in a Regular Force platoon would (under the current structure anyway) be very politically unpalatable, not to mention detrimental to unit cohesion.  The system for individual augmentees does work reasonably well, but I cannot see it in command roles anytime soon.  Problem?  You bet.



That's what I thought. My personal impression was that the two CRIC rotations were almost a case of the tail wagging the dog. Basically there was a need to develop a core of reserve SrNCOs and officers, but it was impossible to do this on an individual basis, so the CRIC was created for this purpose. The other 100 reservists were just there for the ride.



> Britney, I would argue that the Reserves will always have difficulty providing Sr Offrs/Sr NCOs/WOs that have the level of experience required to fill key jobs for a deployment.  Experience comes with time, the Reserves don't get enough of it.  A bit of a catch 22 situation don't you think?



Sound's about right.



> What's the solution?  Well, until the Reserve Force is resourced sufficiently to enable the activation of sub-units on relatively short notice without the attendant training gaps and massive administrative issues, I just can't see it happening unless directed for political reasons.  At the platoon level, though, it is more that do-able, particularly for less intense theatres.  I suspect that that's where the future for P Res unit deployment lies, at least in the short to mid-term...





> I don't know about the non-LFWA CRICs/CRC but the two coys we put out the door were not 100% Reserve.  On Roto 11, the CSM and CQ were from 1 PPCLI and they provided very good "backbone" for the Coy.  It places alot of responsibility on them and can cause trouble in terms of where their loyalites lie.  I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.



So, given all of the above, is this the final verdict from the two CRIC rotations, then? That reserve platoons are good, but bigger than that, bad? We never did hear too much about that reserve BG for Roto 15, did we? 


I'm sure I'm being very simplistic about al of this,  intuitive problem solving for me usually doesn't extend much beyond "pull the charging handle back, lift the feed cover".  It helps to be informed when fishing for lucrative jobs in the future.........


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## Haggis (29 Aug 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.



The CSM on Roto 12 was 2VP.   Last time I spoke to him he was the QMSI.   The OC was ex-Reg F.

Roto 13 was the first full Reserve Coy, althought I've heard it said that the OC, 2IC, CSM and CQ were regarded as "Reserve ringers" having had either previous deployments or extensive Class B experience.   It did take a tremendous amount of staff work and effort to mount and deploy.   I would say that most of the "obstacles" encountered during the mounting were outside the RCD and surmountable and in many cases personality driven rather than systemic.

Ghost778, I have to agree and disagree.   Yes, it was a lot of work but the leadership of that coy learned as much during the mounting phase is during the deployment.   You, having two tours, could clearly see the difference from the soldier perspective between rotos.

Remember that Roto 13 "CRIC" (I hate that term...) walked into an Armoured BG which was not structured or equipped to sustain a rifle company of any kind.   That company was built completely from scratch in terms of personnel and more so in equipment and infrastructure.   That is something Rotos 11 and 12 didn't have to contend with.  Try as the did, the RCD simply were not scaled to support an Infantry Company everything from weapons to NVGs to consumables had to come from outside the Regiment.

One of the "strengths" of having a Reg F CSM or CQ was said to be the "old boy net".   That didn't work for Roto 13.   The Reserve Coy was just as much an outsider in the RCD Old Boys net as Bravo Coy, 1RCR (the LAV Coy).     That being said, C Coy, RCD BG was treated no better or worse than Bravo Coy by the RSM and CO.  In fact the CO and RSM were quick to include C Coy in every facet of BG and regimental life.


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## George Wallace (29 Aug 2005)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Roto 13 was the first full Reserve Coy, althought I've heard it said that the OC, 2IC, CSM and CQ were regarded as "Reserve ringers" having had either previous deployments or extensive Class B experience.   It did take a tremendous amount of staff work and effort to mount and deploy.   I would say that most of the "obstacles" encountered during the mounting were surmountable and in many cases personality driven rather than systemic.
> 
> Ghost778, I have to agree and disagree.   Yes, it was a lot of work but the leadership of that coy learned as much during the mounting phase is during the deployment.   You, having two tours, could clearly see the difference from the soldier perspective between rotos.
> 
> Remember that Roto 13 "CRIC" (I hate that term...) walked into an Armoured BG which was not structured or equipped to sustain a rifle company of any kind.   That company was built completely from scratch in terms of personnel and more so in equipment and infrastructure.   That is something Rotos 11 and 12 didn't have to contend with.


  Utter rubbish!




> One of the "strengths" of having a Reg F CSM or CQ was said to be the "old boy net".   That didn't work for Roto 13.   The Reserve Coy was just as much an outsider in the RCD Old Boys net as Bravo Coy, 1RCR (the LAV Coy).     That being said, C Coy, RCD BG was treated no better or worse than Bravo Coy by the RSM and CO.



I suppose that all depends on what perspective you are taking on this ROTO.   I've heard comments to the complete opposite effect about the Reserve Coy.      (Shrug)


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## Jarnhamar (29 Aug 2005)

We never trained with the RCD except for the silly you killed my chickens opfor stands.  On roto 8 I remember advancing up the matawa behind tanks and being fired into company sized objectives (live fire).

Roto 13 was pretty much left to their own accord.


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## enfield (29 Aug 2005)

This is fascinating - I was a rifleman in the Roto 11 CRIC, and its interesting to see Sim of the background that went into the deployment.

I can't comment on Roto 12 or 13, but the 1VP CRIC certainly struck me as a 'one shot' deal, and I'm not sure it validated any ideas on the abilities of the Reserves in general. 

D Coy was excellent given the training provided (In my biased opinion), but was unique. The CSM and QM were Reg, two of three Pl WOs were highly experienced ex-Reg, and several other key NCOs/NCMs were either ex-Reg or were unusually experienced Reservists. 

There was also an effort by most units, and by 1VP/Coy leadership, to select the best available reservists. D Coy was not 'average' or 'normal' for the Reserves. 

That said, I'm not sure there was much difference between the performance of the CRIC vs. Reg F troops in theatre, within the limited range of tasks expected/performed. We could do the expected job, in a mature theatre, as well as the Regs could. 

I don't anything about the admin/planning that went into the CRIC, but on a basic level, I think the CRIC could have been greatly improved with decent pre-pre-deployment training (39 Bde TCCCS course was conducted without actual radios for example) and effective pre-deployment training with the 1VP BG. The gap between Reg and Res skill sets didn't have to be as large as it was.

The P Res can provide excellent 'raw material' for most levels in a Coy, and while short on field experience and formal courses,  I think enthusiasm and outside experiences can make up for it, to a degree.


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## KevinB (29 Aug 2005)

1VP had just gotten off Prarie Ram 02 when the CRIC pers arrived.

IF the Reservists had been inc in the month long Prarie Ram it may have been a better idea...


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## Haggis (29 Aug 2005)

KevinB said:
			
		

> 1VP had just gotten off Prarie Ram 02 when the CRIC pers arrived.
> 
> IF the Reservists had been inc in the month long Prarie Ram it may have been a better idea...



How very true...

... and if Roto 13's C Coy would have been included in BTE 03 they wouldn't have been doing thier own Warfighter during CFB Petawawa's block leave.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Aug 2005)

Part of the problem with having an earlier training window was that a policy was directed whereby all Reserve pers would have ALL the qualifications called for by the TO&E, including all career courses required by their Reg F counterparts.  This was deliberately inserted to prevent Reg F "naysaying". Thus the OC spent May (IIRC) 2001 requalifying Combat Team Commander at CTC (OC Roto 12 avoided this by already being qualifed), while most of the Sr NCOs underwent the Small Arms Instructor Course in Wainwright - both courses generated at considerable trouble for all concerned.  Were they required?  Probably not.  This "requirement" dramatically reduced the leadership's availability for training before the Spring 2002 timeframe, as many of them had civilian jobs that they were already taking huge amounts of time off from.

Before the company was brought together, all admin was conducted at (and by) LFWA HQ.  Your grumpy bear wrote the Coy training plan. 1 PPCLI transferred the bulk of C Coy's stores to what became D Coy before the OC or his staff hit the ground.  The CQ and CSM went with it, partially to ensure that accounts were properly maintained.  1 PPCLI was extraordinarily cooperative and patient throughout this process, which contributed greatly to the deployment.

Enfield:  good to have input from someone who deployed.



> There was also an effort by most units, and by 1VP/Coy leadership, to select the best available reservists. D Coy was not 'average' or 'normal' for the Reserves.



You can say that again!  The Area Commander _personally_ selected the entire leadership (albeit based on resumes and the like) and even section 2ICs received a once-over at the Area level.  Roto 11 was certainly not "average"...


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## KevinB (29 Aug 2005)

Just a minor correction Teddy.

 D Coy acquired the inactive B Coy lines and stores. - C Coy was the Coy that went on Roto 11, A Coy and the Cbt Support Stayed home (but it gave us some good times to pack up Mortars and ship it lock stock and barrel to the Guns... - likewise for the Pioneers).


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Aug 2005)

Righto...  I remembered it as C Coy, but the damned mercury-tainted fish I've been eating has me all confused again... ;D


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## Haggis (29 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> This "requirement" dramatically reduced the leadership's availability for training before the Spring 2002 timeframe, as many of them had civilian jobs that they were already taking huge amounts of time off from.



That's the primary reason why the Roto 13 Coy wasn't part of BTE 03.  All had already committed to a year off, the maximum even the most benevolent employer would likely grant for anything short of "war".  Secondary was funding of the Reserve Coy for an additional six weeks.



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> The Area Commander _personally_ selected the entire leadership.



Rotos 12 and 13 were also far from "average".  OC D Coy on Roto 12 wrote a lengthy article for "The Bulletin" describing the selection process.  Although Roto 13 didn't conduct the same selection due to personnel and resource constraints in Petawawa (something to do with Pet launching two simultaneous Rotos of 1800 and 1200 soldiers respectively), they improvised and weeded out early on,  prior to deployment for pre-training.  In fact for 13, the OC and CSM were given what essentially was a face to face 2 hour "job interview" by the DComd and ARSM. This was after they had been screened in by unit and Bde.

Did some deploy with the Reserve Coys on both Rotos that shouldn't have?  Most certainly!  Can the same be said of the rest of the BG?  Quite probably.  Could it happen again?  The odds are in favour of it.


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## Spr.Earl (30 Aug 2005)

What the end result is;We reservists need Job and Pension protection and DND to give us a time line for us to Volunteer for any Op.

I will give you my own personal experience.
I and another volunteerd for Bosnia over 10 times from 93 but we had no returns but all of a sudden in 95  I had 2 week's to make my mind up, I end up in Dundern under 3 VP with W.O. Este,W.O. Vigau,M.W.O.Day. and M.W.O. Sussie. in 95.I was lucky as in my Civie Job I saved my Over Time untill I got my Class C contract (Reg.Force Pay) all 3 months was Class B pay, a few guy's were in dire straits for money and were choked when they found out they were only getting Pvt1,2, 3 pay on Class C.Due to my time in I got Cpl 4 which was calculated on paid day's in the Militia this is after we learned we passed Selection.
This in 95

We Mo.'s all ended up in differant Coy.'s under our own Reg. Force Snr. Nco's.I ended up in B Coy. with 8 other Sappers from B.C and Alberta.We had too pass all the Infantry criteria or you were R.T.U.'d.
The one good thing was the make up courses,I got my Reg.Force Machine Gunners Course instructed by 2 VP Weaopns Instructors,others got Track,Comms. all with a Reg Force Qualification.
The Shit thing was we had to do all the 2 x 10,1.5,weapons etc. all over again when we hit 1 CER again and then again in Minasotta down in Camp Ripley  :\

I agree with the Reg. Force ethos,all must be up to speed but in order for that to happen we need Legislation to protect the Reservist so he/she can supprot our Reguler Force and not suffer finacaily while trying to serve our country as long as  the Militia are not protected on the Civie side and DND does not give a good heads up for our Militia we can't and won't be able to use our Militia to it's full extent.
This is not even going into making the Militia attending Reg.Force course's like the U.K. or the U.S. aaand making a better Militia.

Oh this is not even metioning the pay grab DND did too those guys'
Not one of those guy's from then are in any more and amongst those Sappers you had a good Section.


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## combat_medic (30 Aug 2005)

To veer the topic back to the subject of reservists in Afghanistan for a moment, I know a lot of questions have been popping up for the people who want to volunteer; ones which I imagine many of you will be better equipped to answer.

1. As far as D&S Pl, for the Res troops that do this (which I understand will be the majority), will this be basically gate guard/$hit jobs for 6 months, or will it include local (foot) patrols, QRF and other tasks?
2. If Res are restricted to gate duty, has anyone considered the possibility of rotating them between Mirage and Kandahar? I imagine the change of scenery alone could add a little interest to what would otherwise be a pretty dull task.
3. The shortages of LAV qualified drivers/gunners has been mentioned. Is the shortage due to lack of instructors? Equipment? My understanding is that the course is only 6 weeks, or so. I also know that on Rotos 6 and 7, many of the Res got AVGP dvr quals in pre-training. While I think a valid point has been made about degredation of skills, and, outside of deployment, most Res will never see a LAV again, but wouldn't it be more useful to have a larger pool of drivers available? Couldn't some of the Res fill this role?
4. In 39 CBG at least, I know there will be a great deal of training this year for the troops planning to deploy to bring their level of training up to their Reg counterparts (up to and including live fire Coy attacks and a lot of the DAG Admin), I imagine this is part of the lessons learned from the Roto 11-13 Res Deployments. So why is it that the Res, even as individual augmentees are not able to fill regular rifle posns, and seem relegated to the crap jobs? Isn't all that pre-pre-training, combined with 6 months full time enough to make up a sufficient amount of the training gap?


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## Teddy Ruxpin (30 Aug 2005)

> 1. As far as D&S Pl, for the Res troops that do this (which I understand will be the majority), will this be basically gate guard/$hit jobs for 6 months, or will it include local (foot) patrols, QRF and other tasks?


  Can't answer this one, and I suspect that OPSEC would intervene as to specific roles anyway.



> 2. If Res are restricted to gate duty, has anyone considered the possibility of rotating them between Mirage and Kandahar? I imagine the change of scenery alone could add a little interest to what would otherwise be a pretty dull task.


  This was done (by section) on ATHENA Roto 2 and IIRC Roto 3.



> 3. .... I also know that on Rotos 6 and 7, many of the Res got AVGP dvr quals in pre-training.


This was because they were individual augmentees and because many PRes pers were already qual on AVGP (armour, for instance).  AVGP is a _much_ simpler vehicle than LAV III.



> While I think a valid point has been made about degredation of skills, and, outside of deployment, most Res will never see a LAV again, but wouldn't it be more useful to have a larger pool of drivers available? Couldn't some of the Res fill this role?


  I doubt that there's sufficient time to conduct Reserve-specific PCF training on LAV III.  We looked at it for Roto 11 and discarded it as an option, partially because of time and cost.  If 1 VP conducts PCF training after their collective cycle is complete and includes Reservists on that course, that would increase the pool.



> 4. In 39 CBG at least, I know there will be a great deal of training this year for the troops planning to deploy to bring their level of training up to their Reg counterparts (up to and including live fire Coy attacks and a lot of the DAG Admin), I imagine this is part of the lessons learned from the Roto 11-13 Res Deployments.


The training is NOT at the level of their regular counterparts, particularly after Cbt Team live is complete.  I would be surprised (and will certainly stand corrected) if 39 CBG is conducting Level IV live fire training.  Such training is typically well beyond their mandate and 39 CBG does not normally possess the requisite level of expertise to conduct the ranges, etc..



> So why is it that the Res, even as individual augmentees are not able to fill regular rifle posns, and seem relegated to the crap jobs?


  I'm not sure that they are relegated to the "crap" jobs.  Rotos 11 - 14 included a significant Reserve sub-unit presence, as already discussed, while Roto 15 was virtually 100% PRes (I won't get into that!).  D&S isn't a crap job, but instead reflects the operational reality on the ground.  I cannot, in the current climate, see a Canadian Res sub-unit conducting offensive operations in Afghanistan.



> Isn't all that pre-pre-training, combined with 6 months full time enough to make up a sufficient amount of the training gap?


Short answer, no.  The record shows that the pre-pre-training conducted locally is haphazard at best and dangerously lacking at worst. It works at platoon level, but only just.  Furthermore, there isn't really sufficient time to build the skill sets required for operations in a dangerous theatre in the weeks available before deployment (once leave, gateway training and TMST are factored in).  Afghanistan isn't Bosnia, where there was sufficient operational flexibility to accept some risk, or Mirage, where the threat level is considerably lower.


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## George Wallace (30 Aug 2005)

I think that one of the major hurdles for the Reserves, even Armd Reservists, to becoming LAV III drivers, is the necessity to have an 'Air Brake Crse'.   I noticed this summer that the Reserve MSE Op Crse (run in Edmonton) were getting qualified on HLVW, so it proves that Reservists can get this qualification.   As we see fewer and fewer AVGP, Bison and Coyotes being produced, it only seem logical (I know - no logic here) that more LAV III and LAV III variants are going to enter the system, so why not start now with some D & M Crses geared in that direction.


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## Fishbone Jones (30 Aug 2005)

C'mon George. Your thinking logically and constructively, instead of beating the Reserves over the head the Reg stick and saying "You'll never be good enough". Haven't you been listening?   Your already morphing ;D


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## George Wallace (30 Aug 2005)

Damn it Dave....I'm trying....I will try to slow it down a bit


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## Teddy Ruxpin (30 Aug 2005)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I think that one of the major hurdles for the Reserves, even Armd Reservists, to becoming LAV III drivers, is the necessity to have an 'Air Brake Crse'.   I noticed this summer that the Reserve MSE Op Crse (run in Edmonton) were getting qualified on HLVW, so it proves that Reservists can get this qualification.   As we see fewer and fewer AVGP, Bison and Coyotes being produced, it only seem logical (I know - no logic here) that more LAV III and LAV III variants are going to enter the system, so why not start now with some D & M Crses geared in that direction.



I couldn't agree more.  "Train to need" has been killing us (and is almost entirely driven by resource considerations).  My point was that LAV III training wasn't practical in a pre-deployment context.  As for a steady state, it makes sense to me.


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## Haggis (30 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I'm not sure that they are relegated to the "crap" jobs.   Rotos 11 - 14 included a significant Reserve sub-unit presence, as already discussed, while Roto 15 was virtually 100% PRes (I won't get into that!).   D&S isn't a crap job, but instead reflects the operational reality on the ground.   I cannot, in the current climate, see a Canadian Res sub-unit conducting offensive operations in Afghanistan.



Bear, I'm inclined to agree with you.  D&S (or Force Protection) is IMO a viable option for PRes troops.  This was discussed at length in another thread ("Force protection a good job for Reserves?" http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28456.0.html)

Dropping a Reserve sub unit intentionally into offensive ops with the current level of pre-deployment training is not prudent.  However they should still be trained for such a contingency in case trouble comes looking for them.



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> The record shows that the pre-pre-training conducted locally is haphazard at best and dangerously lacking at worst. It works at platoon level, but only just.   Furthermore, there isn't really sufficient time to build the skill sets required for operations in a dangerous theatre in the weeks available before deployment (once leave, gateway training and TMST are factored in).



Locally conducted pre-training to the Pl level *must* be centralized and under the deploying Reserve sub-unit control (with Reg F assistance and mentoring such as Roto 12)  Roto 13 (the last BG sized roto) showed that three CBGs cannot reach a common standard training their platoons independently.  Centralized training was conducted by the Coy over the March break preceding deployment (and partly used as a selection tool) with standardization and validation during the first three weeks in Petawawa.  *IF *  this was already done and validated, it's conceivable that the Reserve sub-unit could arrive at the mounting base for pre deployment trg with sufficient skills to start at Level III in a Level IV context.  But that would put an additional strain on the force generating CBGs and ATCs.


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## combat_medic (30 Aug 2005)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Bear, I'm inclined to agree with you.  D&S (or Force Protection) is IMO a viable option for PRes troops.


But knowing you're going to spend 6 months straight guarding a gate, I doubt the Res will be able to find enough troops who actually WANT to fill a task like that. Viable or not, The Res has the choice whether or not to go, and if they aren't able to do even a modicum of their job (infantry, armour, or whatever), I seriously doubt they will be able to fill the posns. I understand that going over as a formed unit is not viable for Afghanistan, so why not go back to the previous incarnations of individual augmentees with every Pl rotating around D&S duties?



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> three CBGs cannot reach a common standard training their platoons independently.



Couldn't this be resolved by the presence of a few Reg Inf NCOs (who, to the best of my knowledge are already filling CBG posns) supervising this training and enforcing some kind of national standard - one which is set by the Regs? Couldn't the individual standards cells fill this role as well?

George - excellent point about the "train to need". Not to mention, aren't there g-wagons in operation in Afghanistan? Surely the Dvr crse for that is significantly shorter and easier to run, both locally and in pre-training. If G-wagons are being used for local patrols (and if this is not the case, please correct me), surely the Res could backfill these posns, leaving the Regs free to take the LAV crses. 

Just throwing some stuff out there. I just foresee a lot of reservists coming back from a full tour sitting on a gate and never being willing to go anywhere again.


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## Haggis (30 Aug 2005)

combat_medic said:
			
		

> I doubt the Res will be able to find enough troops who actually WANT to fill a task like that.


They have for the last 2 rotos.



			
				combat_medic said:
			
		

> Couldn't this be resolved by the presence of a few Reg Inf NCOs (who, to the best of my knowledge are already filling CBG posns) supervising this training and enforcing some kind of national standard - one which is set by the Regs? Couldn't the individual standards cells fill this role as well?



Quite true.  That happened on Roto 12 where C Coy 2VP trained and validated the CRC in WarFighter.

As I said in an earlier post, Roto 13 was the victim of competing priorities with Op ATHENA Roto 0.  Therefore they only had mentors for one week during their live fire validation.  Despite that, they passed and deployed.  They had more than enough WF ability to sum up the locals if things got rough in Bihac or VK...but not in Kandahar.



			
				combat_medic said:
			
		

> I just foresee a lot of reservists coming back from a full tour sitting on a gate and never being willing to go anywhere again.



As Teddy Ruxpin said, the D&S/FP troops are rotated.  A Sgt from my Regiment did almost 3 full months at Julien on Roto 3 after starting his tour at Mirage.  Gate is gate, yes, but  change is as good as a rest.


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## Britney Spears (30 Aug 2005)

> But knowing you're going to spend 6 months straight guarding a gate, I doubt the Res will be able to find enough troops who actually WANT to fill a task like that. Viable or not, The Res has the choice whether or not to go, and if they aren't able to do even a modicum of their job (infantry, armour, or whatever), I seriously doubt they will be able to fill the posns. I understand that going over as a formed unit is not viable for Afghanistan, so why not go back to the previous incarnations of individual augmentees with every Pl rotating around D&S duties?



It's already being done. Also, one of the recurring trends  in these threads is that there's no _requirement_ for individual reserve augmentees. there's a number of reg cpls on this very forum who whine inccesantly because they "don't get to go on tours while reservists do".  If there were so many reg NCOs and officers lying around, there's more than enough reg Ptes and Cpls, or that's what they say, anyway.

Besides, I imagine being "on the gate" in Afghanistan is a bit more interesting than doing *anything* in  Bosnia. I'd do it in a heartbeat.


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## c4th (30 Aug 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> ....there's no _requirement_ for individual reserve augmentees.



For now.  Since we are talking about 03-06 here and neither 01-06 nor as far as I know 02-06 have stood to yet, I think it may be too early to count the soldiers before they hatch.

When we had two CANBATs in the Balkans there was plenty of need for reserve augmentees, and once SFOR rolled out the need diminished until most of our soldiers had three or four tours and were near able to vote.

SFOR is not ISAF nor is it the PRT.  Just as it was folly to draw many parallels between Cypruis and UNPROFOR, it would equally foolish to compare FY with Afganistan.  When Cyprus closed in '93 there had been a couple of PRes sub and sub-sub units, but no one sugested that would be a good idea in rotos 0-4 in Croatia.  Afganistan is probably farther along the PRes road with D&S Pl's than any other mission to date.  For those who want to pound sand and kick doors there are ways of getting there sooner, but if you want to do it in your tam-o-shanterns it may be a few years yet.


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## Haggis (30 Aug 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> .... one of the recurring trends   in these threads is that there's no _requirement_ for individual reserve augmentees. there's a number of reg cpls on this very forum who whine inccesantly because they "don't get to go on tours while reservists do".



Who can blame them?  Hopefully that's why the chose the Reg F as a career.

There are many reasons why an otherwise willing member doesn't get to go on every tour they want to: a lingering medical problem, family difficulties, career progression, an upcoming priority posting or maybe they haven't been back long enough from the last go around.  These and any other myriad of things can DAG someone *RED* for this tour, whether they want to go or not. (I have a friend who came back from a tour and immediately tried to get on the next one so he wouldn't have to deal with a serious family illness at home.)  I say kudos to them for wanting to go but sometimes the Army says "take a break, soldier" and it's for your own good.



			
				Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Besides, I imagine being "on the gate" in Afghanistan is a bit more interesting than doing *anything* in   Bosnia.



Remember when 10-12 years ago Bosnia was "where it's at"?  It's quiet now but it had a Roto 0 a couple of times.  During the past three years it was a great place for Reserve sub-units to cut their teeth and gain operational experience at levels both unheard of and unthinkable just a few years prior.

I doubt Afghanistan will be as forcibly calmed down as Bosnia by the time it reaches "mature theatre" status and "Ghan fatigue" sets in.  As in Bosnia, the Reg F will eventually have to draw down and leave Afghanistan partly to the Reserves while they move on to the next Roto 0 hot spot.   By then sufficient mumbers of Reservists will have gained the operational experience to function effectively and safely in this AO.


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## Britney Spears (30 Aug 2005)

> There are many reasons why an otherwise willing member doesn't get to go on every tour they want to: a lingering medical problem, family difficulties, career progression, an upcoming priority posting or maybe they haven't been back long enough from the last go around.  These and any other myriad of things can DAG someone RED for this tour, whether they want to go or not. (I have a friend who came back from a tour and immediately tried to get on the next one so he wouldn't have to deal with a serious family illness at home.)  I say kudos to them for wanting to go but sometimes the Army says "take a break, soldier" and it's for your own good.



Which sort of ties in to the demographic end of things, the tired guys are most often the senior NCOs and officers who have families, not so much the 18 yr old ptes. 



> Remember when 10-12 years ago Bosnia was "where it's at"?



Well, I DID pay more attention to it at the time than most other 10 year olds, so......yes, of course I remember. 



> I doubt Afghanistan will be as forcibly calmed down as Bosnia by the time it reaches "mature theatre" status and "Ghan fatigue" sets in.  As in Bosnia, the Reg F will eventually have to draw down and leave Afghanistan partly to the Reserves while they move on to the next Roto 0 hot spot.   By then sufficient mumbers of Reservists will have gained the operational experience to function effectively and safely in this AO.



But will D&S experience translate into door kicking experience?


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## Haggis (30 Aug 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> But will D&S experience translate into door kicking experience?



Everybody has to start somewhere....

The Reserves on Roto 9 and 10 in Bosnia did nothing but gate and limited QRF for thier entire tour.  I don't know too much about Roto 11's adventures but by Rotos 12 and 13 they were conducting company ops with other elements of their respective BGs and the local Police and TSU (BosnaSWAT) guys.

As an aside, an LPV platoon on Roto 13 (C Coy, 1 Pl  based on 31 CBG troops) actually spent a week teaching Bosnian regulars NATO TTPs so that they could move on to form thier own composite company.

All that progress in 1/2 the time it takes to pay off a new car loan.


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Aug 2005)

xxx


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## Teddy Ruxpin (31 Aug 2005)

> All that progress in 1/2 the time it takes to pay off a new car loan.



I'm not sure that the gains made during the latter Bosnia rotations reflects any progress on the force generation and operational side at all.  Instead, it reflects a theatre that had - really - been benign for several years and was becoming increasingly stable.  After all, each Reserve rotation into Bosnia, by the very nature of the timings, were generated by new groups of Reservists.

It may well be that D&S is the "new" teeth cutting mission for the Reserve Force on operations.  The fact of the matter remains that we're using PRes soldiers almost entirely for political reasons at present, as the numbers of bayonets tasked does not have a sufficient enough impact on the managed readiness system to alleviate pressure on Regular Force sub-units.  I don't regard D&S as the crap job.  Rather it is an accurate reflection of the capabilities of what can be force generated from the Reserves in the time available.  As c4th aptly pointed out, we're not quite at the stage where Highlanders will be doing heliborne operations along the Pakistani border...


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## mdh (31 Aug 2005)

> The fact of the matter remains that we're using PRes soldiers almost entirely for political reasons at present, as the numbers of bayonets tasked does not have a sufficient enough impact on the managed readiness system to alleviate pressure on Regular Force sub-units.


 
TR,

Sorry, just a point of clarification because I'm the in-house thicky - are you suggesting that reservists are being deployed _only_ for political reasons and that they aren't really capable of participating in operations as formed units?

Or are you suggesting that they do have a legitimate role as augmentees, but simply aren't having the desired impact on the managed readiness system in terms of force generation that you would like to see?

Or all of the above?

I'm trying to get a handle on what your conclusion and recommendations would be...

Cheers, mdh


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Sep 2005)

> Sorry, just a point of clarification because I'm the in-house thicky - are you suggesting that reservists are being deployed _only_ for political reasons and that they aren't really capable of participating in operations as formed units?



Well, I'm suggesting that recent formed sub-unit deployments (ie: Reserve companies and the "Reserve" rotations into OP BRONZE) have been deployed largely for political reasons, as I indicated above.   While there were other reasons for the deployments, I believe that they were directed largely for "political" rather than hard operational reasons.



> Or are you suggesting that they do have a legitimate role as augmentees, but simply aren't having the desired impact on the managed readiness system in terms of force generation that you would like to see?


  

Reservists certainly have a role as individual augmentees,   but I believe that the Reserve Force is not structured and resourced to provide sub-unit level augmentation without an inordinate amount of additional training and preparation.  The effort required to deploy a Res sub-unit (IMHO) exceeds the limited gains made in terms of reducing the strain on the force generation system.

_(Edited to simplify my answer...and clean up some grammer)_


Cheers,

TR


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## mdh (1 Sep 2005)

TR,

Good post and food for thought as we're supposed to be working on various "task force" projects in my reserve neck of the woods - and as usual scarce resources have been an issue in terms of our future deployment readiness.

cheers, mdh


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