# Airborne Operations



## Chilme (15 Oct 2010)

I'm asking this question just to get some outside feedback.  

In the modern battlefield, tactically how relevant is static line jumping?  Does the CF ever use it outside of training?  When was the last time the CF static line dropped soldiers into battle?


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## daftandbarmy (15 Oct 2010)

Tactically relevant? Probably not. Strategically relevant? Absolutely. 

Having the capability of emplaning in one country and dropping into another to chop up some evil doers, who have decided to start zapping your nationals, is a good incentive for the potentially bad guys to behave themselves. 

It worked at Kolwezi. It worked in Sierra Leone (well done 1 PARA!). It kind of worked in Grenada and Panama. It COULD HAVE worked in Rwanada... if it wasn't all messed up by the UN of course.

Now, going up against fully AAA-ed up first world ground force would probably be a non-starter these days without some serious back up. But there's nothing like the possibility of an Airborne Brigade full of fanatics dropping unannounced into your backyard at midnight to keep you spread out and looking up.


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## HItorMiss (15 Oct 2010)

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/21/terrorism.afghanistan7

Rangers Static line jump onto Kandahar Airfield and Mullah Omar compound. The relevance is there and no a Ranger Bn is not Special Ops persay more like really elite Infantry so essentially like our old CAR. They dropped a large element onto the airfield to seize it. Wether Canada has the political will to do something like that is totally another story however.


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## Infanteer (15 Oct 2010)

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Wether Canada has the political will to do something like that is totally another story however.



Political will is one thing.  Strategically relevant for how long is another.  How long could we realistically sustain an airdropped force?


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## HItorMiss (16 Oct 2010)

Obviously it depends on the context of the Operation, alone we can't, should we do it in an allied construct it is possible, IF we blended all of the Jump Coys into one and dropped them.


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## Infanteer (16 Oct 2010)

Don't get me wrong, I all for airborne delivery (I like Slim's policy of everyone gets qualified) but I've seen convincing arguments that parachuting as a whole is an ability largely relegated to precision insertion for SOF.  In the context of conventional forces, helicopters are likely the method of choice.


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## HItorMiss (16 Oct 2010)

As the above examples state it is not just for SOF. I am not sure it is a capability Canada really can say they have but it "could" be done. I am neither for nor against it really to me it's just another way to get to work but it does provide a interesting flexibility into an otherwise perhaps non per missable to helo environment.

Another tool n the tool box so to speak  ;D


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## Infanteer (16 Oct 2010)

I fully concur with you.  However, when it comes to the resource crunch, I'd take LAVs and CH-47s over parachutes.  Some tools are just handier than others....


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## Swingline1984 (16 Oct 2010)

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> As the above examples state it is not just for SOF. I am not sure it is a capability Canada really can say they have but it "could" be done. I am neither for nor against it really to me it's just another way to get to work but it does provide a interesting flexibility into an otherwise perhaps non per missable to helo environment.
> 
> Another tool n the tool box so to speak  ;D



As a casual jumper and support trade I'm not up on my tactics.  What exactly would a "non per missable to helo environment [sic]" be?  From my perspective (and limited experience of thundering in like a bag of potatoes) anywhere RW couldn't land I don't think I'd want to be dropped.


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## Jungle (16 Oct 2010)

Swingline1984 said:
			
		

> What exactly would a "non per missable to helo environment [sic]" be?  From my perspective (and limited experience of thundering in like a bag of potatoes) anywhere RW couldn't land I don't think I'd want to be dropped.



The biggest limitation to airmobile ops is the helicopter's limited range.


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## Swingline1984 (16 Oct 2010)

Jungle said:
			
		

> The biggest limitation to airmobile ops is the helicopter's limited range.



I had never thought of that.  Thanks.

*edited for grammar.


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## ArmyRick (16 Oct 2010)

I was sure I read some where one of the task of The Canadian Airborne Regiment was to be prepared to parachute into our great white north to deter or slow down a soviet threat.

Could that still not be a major role in airborne operations? Have a force that can be rapidly deployed to the North? Thoughts?


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## Humphrey Bogart (16 Oct 2010)

Thanks ArmyRick you beat me to it  :warstory:

The strategic abilities afforded by Airborne forces is a great one; however, it would be damn near impossible for Canada to deploy Airborne forces at the strategic level given our current capability.  The current capability of 3 Light Infantry Jump Coy is simply the CF and more so the Army maintaining a capability.  I would argue that in the present way our Airborne forces are structured we would not realistically be able to respond to a whole lot.

Given this fact; do I see a capability for airborne forces in the future.  Absolutely! though it is not for insertion into foreign lands.  One of the major policy objectives of the Canada First Defence Strategy is Northern Sovereignty.  As of right now if a major international incident i.e. an large aircraft (Airbus 380, Boeing 747) were to crash in the North, Canada would have no ability to respond.  The Canadian Airborne Regiment was the only ability we had to do that and we have lost that.  As of right now the CF has no credible way of being able to respond to a crisis in the North and this is where I believe renewed focus on an Airborne capability should be placed.

If we are to argue for a renewed airborne capability in the future I believe we should target our arguments towards Northern sovereignty, and go from there.  The argument that airborne forces will be jumping into foreign lands, as much as we soldiers would like to see that, simply will not fly.


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## Chilme (16 Oct 2010)

My initial question was focused on the relevance on static line jumping.   In my mind, I would think it is more relevant and a better use of resources to train troops on High Altitude jumping vs the static line jump.

Your thoughts?


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## vonGarvin (16 Oct 2010)

Stymiest:
I think that response to a major aviation disaster in the North would fall to SAR, not a jump company.

Chilme:
I'm not sure of the difference between high-altitude jumping vice static line; however, that, to me, appears to be a difference between method of transportation.  If we are to use parachute-delivered forces in any role (combat, sovereignty, SAR, etc), then certainly there needs to be a needs analysis to determine possible methods of delivery.  I'm fairly certain that someone has done that.  In any event, "they" have determined that a parachute-delivery option, via static line, is still viable.  It may not be a consideration for combat operations in foreign lands; however, that does not negate its worth.


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## ArmyRick (16 Oct 2010)

I have spoken alot on other threads about a marine force (based more on the smaller Royal marines and not so much the USMC). What about creating a new unit based on an infantry battle group and similar to the CAR. Make it a truly light infantry unit and have trained to do real amphibious operations (not just a company paddling its way in ten assault boats but use at least rigid raiders and LCVP), airborne operations and airmobile operations. 

I would base this unit on a similar orbat to a Royal Marine commando (there pretty slim size units but pack a nasty bite). The foreseeable task for these guys
1. To protect our North and be able to deploy by parachute or assault landing craft (a realistic scenario in summer months). They would also become arctic ops SME
2. To train in mountain operations and become SME
3. To conduct annual training in Belize or Panama and develop Jungle Fighting skills
4. To be prepared to conduct operations in Canada's rugged enviroment (There is probably 75% of our country that we can not use AFV on).
5. To be prepared to conduct operations in foreign rugged enviroments (Afghanistan Mountains or Sierra Leone Jungles)
6. To react to a major disaster anywhere in the world, primarily Canada's north 

I would make this unit with combined companies (3 platoons of infantry, heavy weapons troop (mounted in Viking ATV, airlift and parachute dropable) and a reduced engineer troop). I would have 5 of these companies for the unit. The idea would be not to deploy the unit as a whole but rather make it a force generator. The companies would be very well suited for operating in remote regions of canada or they could be used as a force multiplier overseas.

It sounds alot like the Canadian Airborne Regiment? Kind of what I thought. When we created the 3 Light Infantry Battalions, we did not use them as such. I have served a tour in Bosnia with 3RCR (we re-roled to mech prior to deployment). My point on keepin 3LIB is we can't realistically do it. The LIB were in reality "infantry battalions on the cheap". 

My idea would see this unit be created and used ONLY as true light infantry force. I can see some people saying there would be some cross over with CSOR?

CSOR is special ops and this unit would be responsible for conventional operations in adverse terrain.

Thoughts? Idea? Rotten Tomatoes chucked at my head?


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## Humphrey Bogart (16 Oct 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Stymiest:
> I think that response to a major aviation disaster in the North would fall to SAR, not a jump company.



Yes because a mass casualty scenario on the scale of Swiss Air is something that a few SARTECH's is capable of dealing with.  I am not saying this should be a renewed Airborne units primary focus, I am just thinking that the only way we could possibly sell this to the government would be to focus on Northern Sovereignty.


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## Swingline1984 (16 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> My initial question was focused on the relevance on static line jumping.   In my mind, I would think it is more relevant and a better use of resources to train troops on High Altitude jumping vs the static line jump.
> 
> Your thoughts?



Can you expand on this line of thinking?  What exactly is the answer you are looking for?  When you say "static line" are you aware of static square, or are you limiting yourself to thinking along the lines of mass round chute jumps from 1000ft?  Don't forget most jumpers in the CF are qualified "basic", which is a low tech way to train a large group to fall out of aircraft and land quickly (potentially under fire).  This would seem to be more relevant than training everyone for free fall which has a lot more nuance and room for error (keeping in mind static square also uses a steerable chute and I don't think the CF is doing it right now, any CFLAWC guys out there?).  I know PSP monitors the basic course for injuries etc, is this your real angle?  You don't like the rate of speed at which dudes hit the ground?  Most injuries on landing are due to individuals messing up their drills or being unfit.  I know guys that have hit tarmac and walked away clean.  Feet and knees together.


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## DCRabbit (16 Oct 2010)

This country will never pay for Airbourne capability, IMO.. and if any word got out that the CAR was being reformed, the left would scream so loudly that any gov't that wanted re-election would drop it like a hot potato. This country just refuses to adequately fund it's military. It's been like that since I've been alive.. (born in '67) and I don't see it ever happening.


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## Journeyman (16 Oct 2010)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> Yes because a mass casualty scenario on the scale of Swiss Air is something that a few SARTECH's is capable of dealing with.


Ah, hence that expression, "stay in your lane."

SAR has the lead for MAJAID (Major Air Disaster). While the planning basis is a major air disaster response for high Arctic crashes, it was actually last used for Swissair off Halifax. 

The plan sees pre-loaded pallets of tents/medical eqpt/etc dropped in and SAR Techs from across Canada jumping in. Additional support personnel are slated to come from CFLAWC as required, primarily for non-medical tasks like creating/running the camp until the crash site is evacuated.


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## ArmyRick (16 Oct 2010)

If we were to stand up a new regiment (similar to CAR) I would reccomend we really go on a psy ops campaign with the public. Remember it was one of the Harper government's defence ideas when he first came to power.


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## Infanteer (16 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Thoughts? Idea? Rotten Tomatoes chucked at my head?



Are these not capabilities that a plain ole' Infantry battalion can do?  I've certainly done  few.  Are these skillsets enough to justify a separate unit?  

Would this unit be of any use on expeditionary operations?  It could only reasonably generate a company to deploy, meaning that despite their SME status, the line battalions would pick up the load of operating in those specfic environments.

I'll admit my bias is towards the "Slim Philosophy" that infantry is better off generalized than specialized.  We're better off using the resources to  reinvest in the line battalions and working out more effective ways to work cadres into battalions who are skilled in those unique environments as opposed to sequestering it off into a small corner of the Army with this "uber-battalion".


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## ArmyRick (16 Oct 2010)

Sound in theory, but what is the reality in current Infantry battalions? I mean when not preparing/deployed/returned from A-Stan. How much training time gets gobbled up on LAV training?

I am not talking about specialist (If you train them for Mountain, Arctic, airborne, amphibious, airmobile, how is that specializing?). Maybe specialist in the terms of of Light Infantry skills in adverse terrain.

One advantage the old CAR had was they were not pre-occupied in anyway with Mech ops. They were a dedicated LI force besides parachuting, they also dealt a fair bit with mountain ops and they did some amphibious ops stuff as well (mind you with extremely limited CF resources, it was mostly assault boat trg).

Lets be realistic, each infantry battalion only has so much time to dedicate towards Mountain, Arctic, Parachute, Helicopter training and then also squeeze in the annual PCF cycle for LAV courses, recce, driver, etc, etc. I beleive that yes Mech battalions can perform Light Infantry skills but on a limited basis.

As far as personnel? Right now because we are over bourne on Infantry, we have had the recruiting stream for that trade turned off for a year now. 

Whats wrong with exploiting the situation and adding something like 500-800 more infantry Pers to the CF? I know they are a dozen reasons why not but there are a dozens why we can do it.


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## George Wallace (16 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Whats wrong with exploiting the situation and adding something like 500-800 more infantry Pers to the CF? I know they are a dozen reasons why not but there are a dozens why we can do it.



"The people" is the easy part.  Building the Infrastructure to house and feed them is a major problem, not to mention the expense and time consuming procurement process required to equip them.


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## vonGarvin (16 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I beleive that yes Mech battalions can perform Light Infantry skills but on a limited basis.


What are "light infantry" skill sets?


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## Kat Stevens (16 Oct 2010)

Static line vs free fall?  I think it would be quite obvious.  With a mass drop, static line delivery all open at the same altitude (relatively) with a reasonable space between jumpers, and a reasonable chance of them all landing near each other.  Imagine the fun and frolic of 400 sky pilots all plummeting through the air from 15000 feet all higgeldy-piggeldy.  Pure chaos.


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## Infanteer (16 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Lets be realistic, each infantry battalion only has so much time to dedicate towards Mountain, Arctic, Parachute, Helicopter training and then also squeeze in the annual PCF cycle for LAV courses, recce, driver, etc, etc. I beleive that yes Mech battalions can perform Light Infantry skills but on a limited basis.



I'll echo Technoviking.  What are light infantry skillsets?  I'd venture to call these simply "infantry things".

"Mech skills" - or, more simply, shooting a cannon and oiling up a big bus - do not occupy as much time as one would think.  Again, the unique aspects of mechanization only requires a cadre to keep drivers and gunners up to speed.  Any properly led, cohesive force can operate in complex geography.  Understanding that there is technical know-how for all these operations, entire units are not required to be 100% trained in these aspects to be effective - a cadre of experts in each functional area should do.

When I commanded a platoon I had, amongst my NCOs, an advanced gunnery instructor, a pioneer, an recce/mountain ops guy, an urban ops instructor and a mortar/tow guy.  Quite the wide range of skills, I could lean on them to prepare us for anything.  Other platoons had CBRN, para instructors, advanced winter warfare, etc, etc.  We should never discount the corporate memory and skills contained in a rifle battalion, even if it is - at the time - configured as a mechanized unit.

Give your leaders (especially the NCOs) a good balance of skills and they'll bring a unit up to speed pretty quickly.  We're smarter than "mountain infantry" or "mech infantry".  My opinion anyways.


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## Edward Campbell (16 Oct 2010)

I don't know about "skill sets" but when, back over 40 years ago, we migrated from _motorized_ to _mechanized_ forces we had to develop new "mind sets." There was more than just new skills involved; we had to think somewhat differently - in garrison and in the field. The 'track" itself became a fairly central focus for each section and detachment and platoon and even company commander - it, simultaneously, simplified and complicated our lives, it opened new tactical opportunities and closed off old ones.

Maybe there is a unique "light" mindset, too.
  
_____
Edit: changed "_motorized_ to _mechanized_ infantry" to "_motorized_ to _mechanized_ *forces*" because mechanization changed more than just the infantry mindset.


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## ArmyRick (16 Oct 2010)

OK, maybe the term "light infantry" skillsets is not what we are looking for. I would learn more along the line to routinely operate in adverse terrain.
-Mountain
-Arctic
-Parachute capability
-Helicopter (more so on planning proper loading, troops knowing how to sight and set up LZ, fast roping, rappelling, etc, etc)
-Amphibious capability (This goes hand and hand with with proper kit not just some more assault boats) again on this simply riding on the boats/landing craft would not be the skill, it would fall on leaders to be able to properly plan and implement said plan
-Limited capability to operate in Jungle (I say limited for now because the CF at this time does not have a demand for said capability).

Before we go critising other armies, lets get this straight, there is a reason our British and American counter parts have extensive training in adverse terrain/enviroments.

I look at the royal marines as a damn good example. They will operate for several weeks in Norway doing arctic ops. Then it would be nothing for that same commando to spend two months in the spring down in Belize, training to operate in the jungle environment. I am looking at something similar.

To the one officer with all those skill sets within his platoon, you got lucky. My last platoon I had consisted of NCOs with small arms instructor, LAV (and some LAV crew commander), and 2 of us had CQCI (For basic skills we had mortarman, TOW, pioneers, machine gunners, signallers, etc, etc). What skill sets you get amongst your instructors is pure luck of the draw.

I am talking about a battalion size unit, who would take the skills largely taught at CFALWC and employ them in an routine training and operational use (domestic and expeditionary). There would be a need to take those capabilities needed for dismounted infantry operations in adverse terrain and magnify them.

I have spent some considerable time in a mech battalion and a limited amount of time in a LIB (when we officially had them). There is some difference. Don't get me wrong, our guys are probably the most flexible grunts in the world. I am just suggesting exploiting an oppurtunity. I do know alot of my fellow infantry brethren think the same way.  

Thats my opinion and I stand by it. For now.


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## Humphrey Bogart (16 Oct 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Ah, hence that expression, "stay in your lane."
> 
> SAR has the lead for MAJAID (Major Air Disaster). While the planning basis is a major air disaster response for high Arctic crashes, it was actually last used for Swissair off Halifax.
> 
> The plan sees pre-loaded pallets of tents/medical eqpt/etc dropped in and SAR Techs from across Canada jumping in. Additional support personnel are slated to come from CFLAWC as required, primarily for non-medical tasks like creating/running the camp until the crash site is evacuated.



I don't really think its talking out of my lane, I just don't the sort of plan you talked about could be accomplished without the operation becoming an embarrassment for Canada.  Swiss Air occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia, comparing the sort of operation required there as opposed to lets say Baffin Island is like comparing apples and oranges.  

I am not claiming to be some sort of expert on this sort of thing but to me it makes far more sense to have a dedicated unit with one chain of command that could be used for this sort of thing, rather then slapping together a mishmash of different elements and units in a vein attempt to try to get the job done.  Would it not make more sense to have a dedicated Parachute unit that could be used for this sort of scenario... one equipped with engineers, medics, etc... 

SARTEC would obviously take the lead because this is inevitably their bread and butter; however, a Canadian Airborne Unit could secure the crash site and do all the other tasks as well as also help with SAR.


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## Swingline1984 (16 Oct 2010)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> I don't really think its talking out of my lane...
> 
> I am not claiming to be some sort of expert on this sort of thing...



Ummmmmmmm?


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## Journeyman (16 Oct 2010)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> Would it not make more sense to have a dedicated Parachute unit that could be used for this sort of scenario...


No.
You are clutching at straws, trying to find employment for a dedicated parachute unit. Even a quick survey of airline crashes will show that survivor numbers tend to be in the single digit -- usually between 0 and 1. The people who get paid large amounts of money to contingency plan figure there is no requirement for more general duty-type soldiers than are readily available at CFLAWC -- which is conveniently co-located with CC-130s.

There _may_ be a role to justify re-inventing a Canadian Plane-leaving Regiment; SAR isn't it.


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## daftandbarmy (16 Oct 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> No.
> You are clutching at straws, trying to find employment for a dedicated parachute unit. Even a quick survey of airline crashes will show that survivor numbers tend to be in the single digit -- usually between 0 and 1. The people who get paid large amounts of money to contingency plan figure there is no requirement for more general duty-type soldiers than are readily available at CFLAWC -- which is conveniently co-located with CC-130s.
> 
> There _may_ be a role to justify re-inventing a Canadian Plane-leaving Regiment; SAR isn't it.




But, but, but what about fighting Fear? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vnzz6WznsE8&feature=related


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## Kirkhill (16 Oct 2010)

It seems that three things are guaranteed to generate a fight round here:
Army/Navy/Air Force
Regs/Reserve
Light/Mech.  ;D

Somebody - a nameless Infanteer - suggested that Infanteering wasn't worth doing unless he had a vehicle to carry all his toys along.  Fair enough - I disagree but I don't know much.  On the other hand I think a bunch of others disagree as well.

BUT....

Vehicles come in many forms - LAVs, CCVs, Gators, Boats, Helos, Ships, Aircraft: all capable of transporting toys and troops.

Quick questions:

What is necessary to maintain a credible force that can operate both With and Without the LAVs?

What is necessary to generate Multiples of Company Combat Teams capable of operating in a variety of environments?

Standing on a wall, standing in a crowd, or debussing from the nearest available Marne Taxi seems to be less relevant to the duties of the Infanteer than learning how to Find, Fix and "neutralize", employ Fire and Movement and learning how to exploit any and all available resources - man made and natural - in the accomplishment of the mission.

So how do you propose to supply a permanently deployed garrison of Dragoons and still maintain ArmyRick's Quick Reaction Force of Infanteers ready to operate in Combat Team strength?

And fit the result inside the magic number of 5394 authorized deployable Infanteers.


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## Michael OLeary (16 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Thoughts? Idea? Rotten Tomatoes chucked at my head?



My first thought ran along the lines of this standard response to those who would "solve" our aircraft requirement issues with ideas extracted from thin air. I'm sure you can edit from "air" to "airborne" (or whatever label you prefer for this secret son of CAR) as appropriate:



			
				Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> The following is recovered from a number of old threads and posted here for reference:
> 
> If you want to start proposing new aircraft programs, start with these points:
> 
> ...



Simply put, prove we need it, prove we can afford it.


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## Old Sweat (17 Oct 2010)

Being (a) well past my best before date, and (b) not an infanteer, I have avoided entering this debate. Re the SAR capability, Journeyman has addressed that, and we can usefully drop it from the discussion.

Now, defence of Canada and/or sovereignty operations. For a number of years I was the J3 staff officer responsible for land operations in the Canus area of operations (essentially North America) and the associated operations plan - the Canus Land Op. A bit of background, both the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and, a quarter of a century later, the Canadian Airborne Regiment were created to defend Canadian territory from enemy invasion. The former grew out of the near hysteria in policy circles in the early days of the Pacific War, while the latter was justified for defence of Canada tasks, but also took over the UN Standby role.

What was the threat? Following the Second World War, there were fears that the USSR might invade the northern regions of North America to build staging bases for its strategic bombing fleet. I am not sure how valid a threat that was at the time, which saw the three existing infantry battalions in the regular army converted to an airborne role along with a battery taken from 1 RCHA and other forces. This airborne role - eventually for a "jump company" in three Canada based battalions - continued on the books for decades in response to a threat that became less and less plausible. By 1990 or so, the threat of a hostile incursion into the north, or anywhere else for that matter, only remained on the books for purposes of helping to justify the force structure. 

To my mind, given the government's concern for Arctic sovereignty, the published plan to build a northern training centre along with the Rangers, the northern operations force (I am not up on the correct name) based on 38 CBG and periodic exercises involving troops from across the CF fills the bill.

If there is a legitimate need for a parachute/amphibious delivered force other than the already existing capabilities of CANSOFCOM, in my opinion it is not in conducting defence of Canada operations. In fact I do not see very much justification for one anywhere else in the world, but I (along with the highly qualified and priced punditry) have been notoriously poor at predicting the future.


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## daftandbarmy (17 Oct 2010)

The main reason to have an airborne brigade deployable at short notice is for potential NEO ops that can turn ugly. 5 AB Bde in the UK had 2 X Abn bns plus 2 x Air Landing Bns, plus 1 x SAS Tp, Scimitar armd recce sqn, maint, comms etc etc. The aim was to be able to:
a) go to a 3rd world country
b) secure an airfield (and the footprint... my God, the footprint) by airborne assault
c) steal (oops, I mean borrow) a bunch ov vehicles and extract in country nationals, including the conduct of hostage rescue as required

3 Cdo Bde had a similar mandate, and we practises joint ops a few times, with the Marines landing to secure a port facility or other site that we could evacuate from.

We called it 'SPE' ops: Services Protected Evacuation, and we had about 100 contingency plans drawn up for various benighted little countries where UK nationals were labouring away, bless 'em all.

We weren't as big or as fast as the 82nd AB Div, but we could deploy a full brigade group by SHERC within 18 hours, with the LPBG (Lead Parachute Bn Gp) going 'wheels up' within about 8 hours - lead Coy in 6. We planned for 105mm sp by P + 30 minutes, and we had 81mm Mor sp in action by P + 15 minutes, so I was happy with that. As LPBG, if we weren't able to secured the airfield control tower and a decent sized footprint (to deter SA7 attack) within a reasonable amount of time, the Bde Comd was on our ass because we had a few dozen chalks stacked up on their way in.

If the probability of our nationals (maybe not the Lebanese ones?) getting nabbed and chopped up by the locals in the 3rd world is low, then we really couldn't justify it. Eneryone in the whole world LOVES Candians and wouldn't wish us any harm because we're just nice, good guy peacekeepers, right?  : So we probably shouldn't have this, or a similar, capability... I guess?


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## Old Sweat (17 Oct 2010)

Actually, we were aware of the NEO requirement and one of the last tasks I had in J3 Plans was to write the NEO plan for Haiti. It may well be that there was a generic plan for NEO prepared later that could be used as a framework for other areas. Certainly we were aware of the requirement for short notice NEO; much of the challenge was that DFAIT lived with their collective heads in the sky and were reluctant to take the possibility seriously.

The challenge in Canada is that we are a very long way from anywhere and are not, at least at present, blessed with a lot of troops and a lot of air and sea lift. Frankly I am not sure that another battalion, light or not, is really going to change that. Again, and I have no information one way or the other, this may fall into the CANSOFCOM realm these days.


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## KevinB (16 Nov 2010)

CANSOFCOM  :nod:

 Realistically large scale jumps are a thing of the past -- baring the jump into Iraq by the 173rd Abn Bde.

 Given the CF force structure a Abn Regt or Para Bn is not going to happen again.

NEO taskings requiring the Abn insertion to secure an airfield will go to CANSOFCOM and perhaps backstopped by the LIB P Coy's.

 But how many C-17's does the CF have, and aerial refueling capability?

 There is a huge logistics footprint required to have a round the clock/round the world jump capability.


Freefalling requires a great deal more skill than dope on the rope -- and outside CSOR/JTF-2 and other SOF assets the skills are not able to be maintained beyond a handful of guys.  Besides for seizing an airfield fast nothing puts down folks quick like a low level static drop on the tarmac (ouch).


But while its cool to watch -- Canada does not have the budget to do it.


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