# Last Round: Red Caps, Paras and the battle of Majar



## Petard (1 Dec 2007)

This book is a narrative on the events immediately before and during the battle that occurred in Majar al-Kabir Iraq, 24 June 2003, written by Mark Nicol. I think it is an interesting read on leadership, the dangers of complacency,  and downfalls of unit aloofness. 

To those unfamiliar with the story, 6 soldiers in the British Royal Military Police (Red Caps) were killed in the local police station during what appeared to be a spontaneous uprising by the locals. This happened while unbeknown to the RMP's a platoon from 1 Para was also patrolling in the town and came under attack. The Patrol from the Para's were able to shoot their way out, but barely so, and the QRF was unable to get into the town to effect any kind of help; a Chinook carrying part of the QRF came under heavy fire and there were many casualties on board. There were awards of bravery granted to members of the Para's, but none to any of the RMP's.   

It looks like the author did extensive research in trying to get the story of the possible causes and details to this event, he even goes so far as it give the kit list the soldiers were issued, but does not reach anything  conclusive, he more implies the causes. This is not surprising when it comes to the actual events that occurred when the 6 British Military Policeman were massacred since none of them survived, and the locals that witnessed it (or possibly even participated) would no doubt have very conflicting and biased opinions on what occurred, but the author certainly pulls back from making any clear indication what he believes was the principal causes. Instead he lays out as much of the evidence as possible and, although he indicates the RMP’s might’ve had a chance had they been more aggressive, I think he pretty much leaves it up to the reader to  reach a conclusion.

One of the possible implied causes was that a great deal of complacency had crept into all the units involved, there seemed to be an “end-Ex” mentality after the cessation of hostilities with Iraqi main forces. Even when there had been a riot 2 days earlier in the same town over the perception the soldiers were there to disarm them,  the “Toms” had been caught literally with their pants down doing “Tan Ops (sun tanning on top of a building instead of patrolling),  there didn't seem to be that much change in the units posture. The units remained unaware of the escalation in the threat, and although some soldiers after the fact said they suspected something was up, not much changed other than a badly communicated message to the locals, that although they would not stop patrolling they were not going to try to disarm them; the book indicates this is what probably caused the mob to be easily incited by local leaders (with various agendas) to attack and keep some degree of respect and autonomy. 

There was also the leadership of the 1 Para CO, L Col Beckett, who ultimately bears the responsibility for the units that were under his command, and who's “softly, softly” approach (similar to his manner) to minimize disturbing the locals jarred badly with the temperament of his Para’s, but also helped foster the complacency. One of the results is the minimal amount of ammunition that was available to the soldiers, there is sense in the Command levels that they had enough to do this type of low-key peace keeping, yet the Para’s patrol nearly ran out of ammunition trying to fight their way out and even the QRF had to scramble to get enough; hence the title of the book. He also did nothing to improve the communications situation in their AO, such as using RRB’s instead relying on controlled use of satellite phones which themselves were unreliable in the complex terrain of the towns and villages.  

Making things worse was the OC of the RMP Company, Major Parry-Jones, who epitomized this complacency by describing the situation as Rosie, just before he rotated back to the UK, well before his unit did and left a young inexperienced Lt in charge. Parry-jones perhaps was most critical of all since he did not keep Beckett informed about the lack of cooperation between the RMP’s and the Para’s, even though they were operating in the same area; he gives a good indication of just how “out of ‘er” he was when he states that the Para’s operated as a cordon while the RMPs conducted liaison with the local police, when in reality they weren't even aware of each others presence, nor did they make much effort to find out.

Finally I would say it was the inability to rise above the units disrespect for each other, and realize they needed to cooperate to be effective, that also contributed to the 6 deaths. The RMP’s certainly could’ve been more proactive in letting the Para’s know what they were doing and when, and the Para’s Op staff should’ve worked out better coordination with the RMP’s in acting as a cordon for them.

I think the author does a disservice to the RMP’s by not emphasizing more what, IMO, was an outstanding act of bravery; never mind all the **** ups about the bad comm’s and lack of cooperation, on that day they could’ve ran early on and maybe survived, but they didn’t, they stood their post, and they lost their lives doing so; that deserves a lot more respect than was given them.


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## tomahawk6 (1 Dec 2007)

Definitely a lack of communication between the paras and MP's coupled with not enough ammunition. Complacency and negligence is a definite killer. Of course the Iraqi's werent taking prisoners either. The Brits never did retaliate. Brave men put into an impossible situation.


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## daftandbarmy (20 Dec 2007)

Any word on the role of the Bde Comd in enforcing this type of complacency? The CO may have been reamed out at some point for being too aggressive resulting in this kind of slack appraoch. I've seen this happen before: Bde Comd vs. Bn Comd, guess who wins? it 'aint pretty but it happens.


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## Kirkhill (21 Dec 2007)

D&B, are you suggesting that the "real" Army still finds the Maroon Machine overly aggressive for their taste?


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## daftandbarmy (21 Dec 2007)

You bet they do, with good reason. 

In my experience we weren't 'better' or 'more skilled' than the rest of the army, just more committed to getting the job done at all levels. This wasn't what I would call 'aggression' more like mission focus and fierce pride in accomplishement. Call it a Type A regimental personality if you like. 

I never had to worry about my guys sending in false reports and plate checks from the sauna (as I saw happen with a famous and not to be named Guards regiment) or being chased out of a tough ghetto area in downtown Belfast by a bunch of rock-throwing children (as I saw happen to an unamed county regiment), or have dozens of soldiers casevaced from an exercise with hypothermia because they didn't look after themselves properly (as I saw happen to an equally famous country regiment). God help me if I ever even considered not getting the job 'done right' as my signaller would have kicked my ass.

If the Paras were slacking off in Iraq like that, my guess is that someone lowered the boom on the CO from above.


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## Kirkhill (21 Dec 2007)

Ancient Tale (related second hand).

When the Parachute Regiment was formed the Guards were mighty miffed by the declaration that this bunch of "thugs and hoodlums" were being called elite.  The Guards response was to determine that if there was going to be an elite then they needed to be part of it.  Consequently during the post war down-sizing the 1st Battalion was redesignated 1st (Guards) The Parachute Regiment.  That lasted a little while until the whole idea was dropped and the Guards opted for a Pathfinder association and an SAS squadron association. (You know this better than I do D&B).

Anyway, one of the internal rumours as to why the Guards dropped the Parachute association was the belief that if called upon to do Public Duties at the Palace the Paras would promptly role up in 4 tonners, drop off sandbags and barbed wire, set up the MGs, post sentries and organize a brew up.  Just not the done thing donchano.

The tale was relayed by my father, a "hooligan" in Sugar Company, 1 Bn the Parachute Regiment, 1946-1947.  He had to put up with a Brigadier (Bols I believe) that insisted that ORs greet Officers with a cheery "Hi-de-Hi, Sir" along with their salute, to which the officers were to reply "Ho-de-Ho".  His effort to adapt to the "egalitarian" ethic of the Paras.  By the way, when Dad went up before the review board for officer candidacy (his father was a Captain in the Devons and his mother a Major in the QARNC) the questions were all about his father, his father's income and how he expected to be able to pay his tailor and the CO's mess bills.

The Brits do somethings well........but.....


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## daftandbarmy (21 Dec 2007)

Classic story. Excellent. My best regards to your father! 

True story from Sandhurst.

OCdts have to choose three regiments. I chose 'Parachute Regiment' three times. They didn't appreciate the joke, so I had to pick a couple of others too and go for interviews with the regimental reps at Sandhurst. So, I picked the Queen's Own Highlanders and The Light Division (LI and RGJ). 

I went to the Paarchute Regiment briefing. 75 other guys were there. They gave us a no nonsense presentation on the training and selection process, the high personal and professional standards expected of officers in that regiment ,and reminded us that the pass rate for P Company was around 30 to 40%. Very professional, no nonsense, a bit daunting. Reminded me alot of how the Canadian Infantry conducted itself actually.

I went to the QOH interview. Arranged around a large oak table were about 6 overweight senior officers with red noses. We had a darned good chat and then I left. Nice people, I just had no idea what made them special or why I should join them vs. a couple of dozen other choices

Then I went to the LD interview. One on one, with a very severe RGJ Major. He grilled me about my intentions and I answered as best as I could. He then asked me "Do you have a private income?". I thought about this for a minute and said cheerfully "Yes sir, the army pays me every month!". He looked at me like I was something he had just found on the bottom of his shoe then let me know that it was just about impossible to survive in the LD without extra cash from mummy and daddy.

As a result of that experience I resubmitted my form with 'Parachute Regiment' on it. Only two of us out of the 75 made it to the Regiment after P Coy.


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## Kirkhill (21 Dec 2007)

Good Christ.

I was kind of expecting that things might have changed in the last 60 years (well in your case I'm guessing it was more like 40 years between Dad's interview and yours) but I guess not.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Dec 2007)

...and don't even think about get me started about the cavalry!


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## Petard (27 Dec 2007)

Which might explain something, the CO of the para's at the time of the incident came from the cavalry, not sure which unit (I've since loaned my book on). Ok sarcasm aside, the book left me with the impression that there were some serious leadership problems going on amongst the senior ranks and not just CO 1 Para. Some officers actions certainly exacerbated the problem in that area, the lack of coordination being the most prominent indicator. Others, like the one OC's convoluted statement to the locals in Majar about patrolling that left them thinking they were still there to disarm them, didn't foster good communications at any level nor an accurate int picture.

WRT the aggressiveness of the Para's, I don't know for sure if efforts were being deliberately made to keep the Para's on a short leash or not, but the book does give some kind of sense that there was widespread complacency going 'round, that even after the battle had begun took a bit to shake.
Beside the "tan ops", there are two instances that I can recall the book mentioning that seem to indicate this. One was the QRF spending vital time "bombing-up" with more ammo before actually departing; why in the hell weren't they all ready? The other instance was people standing about, and others too eager to take pictures/video, when the damaged QRF Chinook came back loaded with casualties. There were some that pitched in, but others that needed a swift kick in the arse to remind them it wasn't end-ex time or an opportunity to get great footage for their fave video site.


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## daftandbarmy (31 Dec 2007)

OK. I admit that even the 'famous Paras' can slack off at times and that may have been a factor here. Never in my day though! (The older I get etc etc)


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