# Police arrest Toronto man on suspicion of spying for P.R. China



## The Bread Guy (1 Dec 2013)

_A reminder:  none of this has been proven in court at this point._​From MSM:


> Canadian police have arrested a Toronto man suspected of seeking to give China classified information about Canadian shipbuilding procurement policies, security officials said on Sunday.
> 
> Jennifer Strachan, a chief superintendent with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, told a news conference that Canadian citizen Qing Quentin Huang, 53, faced two charges of attempting to communicate with a foreign entity.
> 
> ...



From the Mounties:


> This morning, the RCMP along with partners from the Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police detailed circumstances that led to the arrest of 53 year old Qing Quentin Huang of Toronto.   Mr. Huang has been charged under the Security of Information Act with two counts of attempt to communicate to a foreign entity information that the Government of Canada is taking measures to safeguard.
> 
> On Thursday, November 28, 2013, the RCMP was informed that Mr Huang was taking steps to pass sensitive information to authorities from the People’s Republic of China.  The information relates to certain elements of the Government of Canada National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy which includes patrol ships, frigates, naval auxiliary vessels, science research vessels and ice breakers.  “In these types of cases, sharing of information may give a foreign entity a tactical, military or competitive advantage by knowing the specifications of vessels responsible for defending Canadian waters and Canadian sovereignty,” stated RCMP Chief Superintendent Jennifer Strachan, the Criminal Operations Officer for the Province of Ontario.
> 
> ...


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## George Wallace (1 Dec 2013)

This type of Industrial Espionage has done in just one of two too many Canadian companies, not to mention the National Security concerns.


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## MilEME09 (1 Dec 2013)

Apparently he walked into the Chinese embassy in Ottawa on Thursday and offered to sell the data


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## marinemech (1 Dec 2013)

Don't people/family members who have access to this type of data, have to pass a DND security screening?


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## ModlrMike (1 Dec 2013)

Apparently it's Harper's fault; a Conservative false flag operation; and we don't need ships anyways.  :facepalm:

CBC.ca


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## The Bread Guy (24 Apr 2017)

A bump with the latest ...


> A naval engineer accused of trying to spy for Beijing is asking a federal judge for full access to information about Canadian Security Intelligence Service wiretaps of the Chinese Embassy.
> 
> Qing Quentin Huang says federal secrecy has placed him in an "impossible position" as he prepares to defend against espionage charges.
> 
> ...


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## The Bread Guy (25 Oct 2020)

Another bump with the latest:  2 x charges stayed ....


> *Prosecutors stay charges against Qing Quentin Huang in probe of naval leaks to China*
> Colin Freeze, _Globe & Mail_, 18 Sept 2020
> 
> Federal prosecutors have stayed two of four criminal charges against an engineer accused of offering secrets about the Royal Canadian Navy to China.
> ...


More at link, or in attached in case link doesn't work (shared under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Canada's _Copyright Act_)


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## The Bread Guy (21 Jan 2022)

More on this case, now that the appeal window seems closed ...


> “I’m willing to be of paramount service to the Chinese government,” disgruntled naval engineer Qing Quentin Huang said during one of two calls to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, unaware the line had been wiretapped by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
> 
> Those phone calls in November 2013 led the RCMP to arrest Huang in Burlington, Ont., for allegedly attempting to spy for China. At the time, the Mounties told the public his actions were “a threat to Canada.”
> 
> ...


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## Czech_pivo (21 Jan 2022)

The Bread Guy said:


> More on this case, now that the appeal window seems closed ...


Hmmm, wonder if it's justified to consider charging the Federal Prosecutors with dereliction of duty or something similar.


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## The Bread Guy (21 Jan 2022)

Czech_pivo said:


> Hmmm, wonder if it's justified to consider charging the Federal Prosecutors with dereliction of duty or something similar.


Well, if it was _their fault alone_ that things dragged out as long as it did, _maaaaaybe_.  

Haven't followed the case in detail, but I _suspect_ a lot of different players & processes made things take longer than if it was a case not involving intelligence-derived evidence.


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## lenaitch (21 Jan 2022)

Our criminal justice system is not well geared (to be generous) for dealing with prosecutions that rely on security intelligence derived evidence.


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## MilEME09 (21 Jan 2022)

So a spy went free? Maybe that's a good thing, CSIS can just track him and potentially manipulate false information to China. This dies highlight major problems in our system though


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## Colin Parkinson (21 Jan 2022)

Hopefully China adopts our procurement process, that should slow down their fleet buildup considerably.


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## ModlrMike (21 Jan 2022)

lenaitch said:


> Our criminal justice system is not well geared (to be generous) for dealing with prosecutions that rely on security intelligence derived evidence.


As someone in the comments section proposed, maybe it's time to form a special section of the court that can deal with security sensitive evidence.


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## Kat Stevens (21 Jan 2022)

It's time we stopped using the term "criminal justice", it doesn't apply. Criminal law, I'd buy, but justice and the law have very little to do with each other.


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## Fishbone Jones (21 Jan 2022)

I'm surprised the government hasn't slapped a security classification on it and made the whole thing secret from everyone. Like they have with most other ChiCom breeches of our security.


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## lenaitch (21 Jan 2022)

ModlrMike said:


> As someone in the comments section proposed, maybe it's time to form a special section of the court that can deal with security sensitive evidence.


They would have to craft a system that satisfies the Charter.


Fishbone Jones said:


> I'm surprised the government hasn't slapped a security classification on it and made the whole thing secret from everyone. Like they have with most other ChiCom breeches of our security.


[/QUOTE]
From what I understand, this fellow was a Canadian citizen, so I'm not sure the existing security certificate process would apply, although I'm not fully conversant with it.


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## brihard (21 Jan 2022)

I cna probably shed some light on how and why this went the way it did. I've read through the various past decisions on this one and have been following it, not super closely of late, but I was keeping an eye because it's a very interesting case. This was only, to the best of my knowledge, the second criminal case that went to trial under the Security of Information Act - the first being Jeffrey Delisle.



Czech_pivo said:


> Hmmm, wonder if it's justified to consider charging the Federal Prosecutors with dereliction of duty or something similar.



No, far from it. The system wasn't set up to succeed on this, for reasons I'll explain.



Fishbone Jones said:


> I'm surprised the government hasn't slapped a security classification on it and made the whole thing secret from everyone. Like they have with most other ChiCom breeches of our security.



Principle of open courts. Once something is going through prosecution, though there are limited provisions for publication bans, most info has to be public, with some exceptions that I'll explain.



ModlrMike said:


> As someone in the comments section proposed, maybe it's time to form a special section of the court that can deal with security sensitive evidence.



There's a system and process for this. It ain't pretty.

In a nutshell, what has happened here is that the _Jordan_ Supreme Court decision has crashed into S.38 of the Canada Evidence Act. _Jordan_ was the decision that established time limits beyond which a delay is presumptively unreasonable. A trial in provincial court has 18 months from when charges are laid to be concluded in court. A prosecution in provincial superior court has 30 months. There are allowances for delays caused by defense, for exigent circumstances - but the underlying principle is that there must be justice without unreasonable delay.

The _Canada Evidence Act_ is the law that governs how evidence works in judicial proceedings. It includes sections that allow for certain privileges to be maintained- section 37, for instance, allows for certain sensitive police techniques, undercover operations, etc. Section 39 establishes cabinet confidence. Section 38 deals with information that is privileged for reasons of national security or international relations, such as domestic intelligence information, intelligence information shared by foreign partner agencies, etc.

There is a presumption of open courts in Canada, and of all evidence being public unless it's exempted  such as under the grounds listed above. Those exemptions aren't automatic- crown has to assert the privileges, and various mechanisms exist to test that in a secure manner that preserves the right to a fair trial.

I have no 'inside' knowledge on the Huang case, this is from reading through all of the decisions on CanLII some time back. The Huang case originated out of a CSIS wiretap of the Chinese embassy. While they were listening to the embassy for other reasons we don't get to know about. Huang calls the embassy up and offers up information on the shipbuilding program (at the 'Secret' level if I remember right).

CSIS is, quite reasonably, concerned about this. They sent an advisory letter to the RCMP - the Mounties carry the national security mandate. CSIS advisory letters will contain minimal information, but will point the police to what CSIS believes is a security threat that could warrant criminal investigation and prosecution.

The Mounties investigated, and Mr. Huang ended up charged under the Security of Information Act. Eventually, through the disclosure process, CSIS reluctantly coughed up a _heavily _redacted version of the affidavit they had submitted to get their original wiretap on the Chinese embassy. In criminal investigations that rely on wiretap info, it's very normal for defence to challenge the legality of the warrant permitting the interception of private communication, and to challenge the legal admissibility into evidence of the intercepted communications themselves. So, defence went after the CSIS warrant, and applied to have the rest of it unsealed.

The CSIS warrant had been redacted under S.38 of the _Canada Evidence Act_ - national security and international relations (in this case, I believe, both). When Crown asserts a S.38 privilege, there's a process established for testing that privilege and whether the vetting will be uncovered.  This process happens in _federal_ court, and the trial judge in _provincial_ court is blind to it. They only get what comes out the other end. That process is basically this:

1. Crown asserts a privilege. The security cleared federal court judge reviews the material (generally with the assistance of a neutral lawyer, security cleared, who functions as _amicus curiae_). The judge has to determine whether there is in fact potential harm to national security or international relations.

2. If the judge is satisfied, defence then needs to argue - without necessarily knowing what the redacted content is, mind you - that the material could be relevant to the defence. This is a very low threshold, and there must be deference to the defence in this.

3. If the judge determines that yes there is risk to those interests, and that also yes the material is relevant, how then can the public interest in security be balanced with the accused' right to a fair trial? The federal court judge has super broad discretion here- they can order just about anything appropriate. 

In the _Ribic_ case, the material in question was testimony from a could CAF Intelligence Operators- Ribic was a Serb-Canadian who went home to Serbia, and took several peacekeepers hostage including a Canadian, andused them as human shields at, I believe a munitions site. In this case, the judge allowed the evidence of the CAF members to be entered as testimony transcript only, with their names redacted. The jduge could also do things like order the the lawyer but not the accused be able to view certain material, they could order material fully disclosed, they could order it fully redacted- whatever they think is appropriate. 

The last step after that is the Attorney General can exercise ministerial discretion to overrule the federal court judge and order some evidence remain undisclosed. It's presumed that the Attorney General has more fulsome knowledge of the national security imperatives than the judge.

Once all of this is done, the evidence, in its resultant form (maybe just as redacted, maybe some or all redactions lifted) gets admitted for the trial. The trial court judge can then exercise _their_ discretion as to whether they think the accused can still get a fair trial- again, the trial judge never gets to peek under the black boxes.

In _Huang_, this process dragged out for years. Ultimately, the court ruled that more of the CSIS warrant would be uncovered. Global Affairs protested, saying this would harm international relations - I infer from this that the CSIS warrant relied on foreign intelligence that, if aired in open court, would hurt our intelligence sharing with a foreign partner. The Attorney general 'Noped' this, and exercised ministerial authority to keep the black boxes on the CSIS warrant.

Further legal wrangling ensued at the trial court level, but ultimately Huang's lawyers brought a successful _Jordan_ application, and the case was stayed due to unreasonable delay. The case had been moving through the system for eight years.

So, in the end, we have a criminal justice system that struggles to deal with the timely adjudication of privilege claims over highly sensitive national security information. CSIS warrants don't normally cross over into the criminal realm, and police investigators, from what I've been told, try to steer clear of any information from the intelligence side so as to avoid these pitfalls.

The 'Intelligence to Evidence' dilemma is the focus of some interesting niche study in Canadian legal and national security circles. Leah West, Craig Forcese, and Stephanie Carvin are among some of the names doing a lot of work in that field if anyone is interested in reading further on it. Other countries do this stuff better, and there are learned voices trying to help Canada chart a path forward. So far I've not seen any indication that the federal government has set its sails.

SOIA prosecutions are rare, it may be some time before we next see this tested again. It may be that in the post _Jordan_ Canadian legal environment, some legislative input is needed to help keep certain national security prosecutions viable.


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## Dana381 (22 Jan 2022)

Brihard Thanks for the detailed description. Canada Needs to get this sorted out better. Letting a person get away with espionage is unbelievable. I don't see these events happening less often in the future, if anything They will be happening more often. Lets hope they streamline the evidence dilemma and avoid repeats of this.


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## brihard (22 Jan 2022)

_Jordan_ was a 2016 case, and everyone’s very used to working in the post-Jordan framework now; the need for expeditious action - and for police and the crown to meticulously account for every day of delay - is now part of SOP. Hopefully knowing what they’re dealing with will allow police and prosecutors to deal with these challenges more smoothly and hit the timelines needed. _Jordan_ makes some allowance for exceptionally complex cases, and I don’t think just what that means has been made clear in court yet, at least not in national security cases.


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## lenaitch (22 Jan 2022)

brihard said:


> _Jordan_ was a 2016 case, and everyone’s very used to working in the post-Jordan framework now; the need for expeditious action - and for police and the crown to meticulously account for every day of delay - is now part of SOP. Hopefully knowing what they’re dealing with will allow police and prosecutors to deal with these challenges more smoothly and hit the timelines needed. _Jordan_ makes some allowance for exceptionally complex cases, and I don’t think just what that means has been made clear in court yet, at least not in national security cases.


As you say, the players regularly involved in the criminal justice system are well aware of the pressure imposed by _Jordan_, but the challenge seems to be the rangling of the other players and levels who become involved in SOIA cases.  It may take an appeal court or SCC level ruling to provide some grace because of the additional layers involved.


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## FJAG (22 Jan 2022)

brihard said:


> _Jordan_ makes some allowance for exceptionally complex cases, and I don’t think just what that means has been made clear in court yet, at least not in national security cases.


There are a number of cases that address it but I think this is one of those things that will take years to work out as new situations come along and are either accepted or rejected over time.

There's a good explanation of it on the Justice website.

🍻


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## Dana381 (23 Jan 2022)

So what happens to Qing Quentin Huang now? Can they at least deport him? Hopefully there is something they can do to prevent him from spying again.


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## lenaitch (23 Jan 2022)

Dana381 said:


> So what happens to Qing Quentin Huang now? Can they at least deport him? Hopefully there is something they can do to prevent him from spying again.


As far as I know he is has Canadian citizenship.






						Can My Citizenship Be Revoked? - Canadian Citizenship
					

As of March 28, 2015, it became possible for Canadian Citizenship to be revoked for immigration fraud and terrorism-related charges. Prior to this date, it




					canadian-citizenship.ca


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## lenaitch (23 Jan 2022)

FJAG said:


> There are a number of cases that address it but I think this is one of those things that will take years to work out as new situations come along and are either accepted or rejected over time.
> 
> There's a good explanation of it on the Justice website.
> 
> 🍻


Interesting read.  It would seem, without knowing all the procedural details and timelines, particularly those outside of the justice system,and how expeditiously they proceeded, that this might be worthy of Crown appeal.  At least then everybody would know and, if necessary, re-craft the process to accommodate _Jordan_.


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## brihard (23 Jan 2022)

Dana381 said:


> So what happens to Qing Quentin Huang now? Can they at least deport him? Hopefully there is something they can do to prevent him from spying again.



Well, obviously his security clearance is gone forever, and he won't be getting any employment that's likely to expose him to sensitive information. I wouldn't see him as much of an espionage threat anymore, unless Dominos Pizza is holding national security secrets. This isn't really something you ever get a second chance at.



lenaitch said:


> Interesting read.  It would seem, without knowing all the procedural details and timelines, particularly those outside of the justice system,and how expeditiously they proceeded, that this might be worthy of Crown appeal.  At least then everybody would know and, if necessary, re-craft the process to accommodate _Jordan_.



Here's the unreasonable delay application decision for Huang. 2021 ONSC 8372 (CanLII) | R. v. Huang | CanLII. The judge even granted nearly 8 months grace on the delay due to COVID. 

_Huang_ had some of everything... Applications to challenge the admissibility of wiretap evidence; national security redactions and S.38 hearings; CSIS in the mix and all the complications that brings... If you wanted to create a criminal file with the specific intent of causing crown to bash their head off a keyboard til they go fetal and cry, I can't imagine a better way than basing the entire thing on a CSIS wiretap with (drawing inference here) foreign intelligence information as part of the grounds. It's not even like there was anything done inappropriately or deceptively by police that would let crown simply say "You screwed up, we can't win- we're staying this". They had what appears to be a clean, legitimate, and prosecutable case, but with a super ugly origin story. They had to prosecute this case.

I'm at the limit of my ability to knowledgably nerd out on the law on this. I look forward to seeing a post mortem by those better versed in the national security law on this.


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## dapaterson (23 Jan 2022)

The post-mortem will be classified, I'm sure... and may well include "As we planned, the Chinese intelligence services are freaking out, trying to figure out what else we know, are tracking, and have not revealed"  and "Roll a few more vehicles that are obviously unmarked surveillance cars past those folks' homes to try to spook them".


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## brihard (23 Jan 2022)

dapaterson said:


> The post-mortem will be classified, I'm sure... and may well include "As we planned, the Chinese intelligence services are freaking out, trying to figure out what else we know, are tracking, and have not revealed"  and "Roll a few more vehicles that are obviously unmarked surveillance cars past those folks' homes to try to spook them".


I don’t mean internal- I mean from the legal academics in the NatSec field.


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## Good2Golf (23 Jan 2022)

This cowboy wouldn’t be surprised if he’s forgiven and hired back into a position requiring a security clearance, because…he built back better(TM)…


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## Dana381 (23 Jan 2022)

lenaitch said:


> As far as I know he is has Canadian citizenship.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



If he wasn't born in Canada I'm sure they could "find" a lie somewhere on his immigration application.  Why is espionage not a reason for citizenship revocation.

 The citizenship oath;

I swear (or affirm)
That I will be faithful
And bear true allegiance
To Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second
Queen of Canada
Her Heirs and Successors
_*And that I will faithfully observe*_
*The laws of Canada*
Including the Constitution
Which recognizes and affirms
The Aboriginal and treaty rights of
First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples
And fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen.

By the wording of the oath they should be able to turf you for any broken laws.


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## ModlrMike (23 Jan 2022)

Didn't someone say "a Canadian is a Canadian"?


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## lenaitch (23 Jan 2022)

Dana381 said:


> If he wasn't born in Canada I'm sure they could "find" a lie somewhere on his immigration application.  Why is espionage not a reason for citizenship revocation.
> 
> The citizenship oath;
> 
> ...


The oath is one thing, but it's not legislation.  Besides, this guy has been convicted of nothing.  I suspect a fine toothed comb has been deployed on his application.

Some feel that we should be able to turf any non-natural citizen for any transgression, great or small.  Others, and the prevailing attitude, is that once the decision has been made, we accepted the person as our problem, with some exceptions.


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