# Warfare in the Digital Age - Not just a deployed problem



## Kirkhill (23 Jan 2018)

Found on Facebook by Mark Bossi



> Radio Silence – A Lesson in Mission Command
> Contributor: Will has 6 years of hands on infantry leadership experience
> While practising radio silence on a recent exercise I realised just how reliant I had become on technology. It had made me lazy and more controlling than I would like to admit.
> 
> ...



https://wavellroom.com/2017/12/14/radio-silence-a-lesson-in-mission-command/


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## Oldgateboatdriver (23 Jan 2018)

Great article. Thanks for that.

Basically, that soldier has discovered the greatest wish of Canadian Naval officers with regards to American use of tactical radios: Can you you guys just shut the hell up!!!!


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## daftandbarmy (23 Jan 2018)

Good article.

In NI we only broke radio silence for contacts, riots or other nastiness, as every patrol in the BGp was on an all informed net. If someone needed help, they got it .... within seconds in some cases. This was critical to allow swift reaction to cut off escape routes, and deal with casualties, quickly.

Having said that, it always took a week or so during the first part of the tour (minimize, out!) to break people of their previous 'radio reliant' bad habits and redevelop their skills and confidence in sound BP, and proper delegation and trust.


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## Colin Parkinson (24 Jan 2018)

The usage of radio and likelihood of being visited by Soviet Artillery, was drilled into us early on, I guess lessons relearned.


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## Kirkhill (24 Jan 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The usage of radio and likelihood of being visited by Soviet Artillery, was drilled into us early on, I guess lessons relearned.



And the uninitiated amongst us junior subbies laughed at pictures of Soviet tank commanders on exercise communicating with flags....


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## SeaKingTacco (24 Jan 2018)

I spent the first few years of my career in the Army, basically living in fear of a BM21 strike turning my grid square upside down, because someone got chatty on the radio.

I won't say we had awesome radio discipline back in the day, but it was better than it is now and we used to do a lot more via dispatch rider and SOPs/timings/initiative.


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## Colin Parkinson (25 Jan 2018)

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-drones-artillery-ukrainian-forces/28994516.html

Snip: Electronic Warfare Capability

In eastern Ukraine, Hodges said, there are about 35,000-40,000 Russia-backed fighters, and around 4,000-5,000 are actual Russian military officers or commanders.

He said many of the tanks and vehicles operated by both Ukrainian and Russia-backed forces are now covered with reactive armor, a specialized type of plating designed to protect against rocket-propelled grenades and weapons other than small arms.

He also said Russia-backed commanders have honed tactics that include using drones, artillery, and electronic warfare. That's allowed Russians forces, for example, to eliminate Ukrainian mortars and artillery units. He said one Ukrainian unit that was using a U.S.-supplied radar was taken out by Russian rocket fire with surprising speed.

“The [Russian] electronic warfare capability; again that’s something we never had to worry with that in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Ukrainians live in this environment,” he said. “So you cannot speak on a radio or any device that’s not secure because it’s going to be jammed or intercepted or worse, it’s going to be found and then it’s going to be hit.”

“Certainly we have the capability to show everybody what Russia is specifically doing in the Donbas, that would be helpful to keep pressure on Russia, to live up to what they've said they're going to do,” he said.


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## Kirkhill (25 Jan 2018)

Isn't one answer to the problem the development of a multi-nodal line-of-sight network based on individual vehicles constantly receiving from and retransmitting to neighbours?

FM, Microwave and Laser comms and swarm technology?


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## Colin Parkinson (25 Jan 2018)

Field telephones and comm wire again...


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## Kirkhill (25 Jan 2018)

And a gracious Good Morning to you.....


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## PuckChaser (25 Jan 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Isn't one answer to the problem the development of a multi-nodal line-of-sight network based on individual vehicles constantly receiving from and retransmitting to neighbours?
> 
> FM, Microwave and Laser comms and swarm technology?



Mesh network vehicle systems would just be easier targets as they constantly transmit to maintain network connectivity. Microwave comms are useless in maneuver warfare, antennae need to be set up and pointed. 

There's no easy solution because we've paid lip service to near-peer EW environment for years, and our own (Canada) EW systems are woefully inadequate to compete in that same near-peer environment.


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## chrisf (26 Jan 2018)

That was part of the concept behind the FOCA component of TCCCS... fibre optic network between vehicles in the defensive...

Pretty limiting to mobility though and unlike field wire, pretty expensive/harder to replace or repair if you had to abandon.

I figure lack of hand in hamd with micromanagement, a lack.of planning/contingencies is one of the biggest problems with improved communications...

All the way from tactical communications down to every day communications... "I'll meet you at..." has been replaced with "just text me"


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## Colin Parkinson (26 Jan 2018)

Field telephones and wire would be a cheap and easy fix. plus they are robust and last a long time.


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## Blackadder1916 (26 Jan 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Field telephones and wire would be a cheap and easy fix. plus they are robust and last a long time.



And they can be used to give a jolt to someone's genitals.   :tsktsk:


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## Kirkhill (26 Jan 2018)

I freely acknowledge that I know nothing about comms and radios.  But I am confused.

Many ships, aircraft and vehicles are now equipped with Radar Warning Receivers that are activated by the impingement of Radio Frequency beams  - and I believe that includes microwave frequencies.

Equally, I could say the same for Laser Warning Receivers.  And I could add EO/IR systems.

If I can detect incoming energy from all these sources can't I detect the presence or absence of the energy (a binary proposition) and use that as the basis of a communication system.    If my Laser Warning Receiver started going  Buzz-Buzz-Buzz  Buuuuuzzzz-Buuuuuzzzz-Buuuuuzzz Buzz-Buzz-Buzz repeating, might I not infer somebody was trying to tell me something?

And while we are at it, like my USB cable which also transmits power, couldn't those same beams transmit energy?



> Free-space optics (FSO), also called free-space photonics (FSP), refers to the transmission of modulated visible or infrared ( IR ) beams through the atmosphere to obtain broadband communications. Most frequently, laser beams are used, although non-lasing sources such as light-emitting diodes ( LED s) or IR-emitting diodes (IREDs) will serve the purpose.
> 
> The theory of FSO is essentially the same as that for fiber optic transmission. The difference is that the energy beam is collimated and sent through clear air or space from the source to the destination, rather than guided through an optical fiber. If the energy source does not produce a sufficiently parallel beam to travel the required distance, collimation can be done with lenses. At the source, the visible or IR energy is modulated with the data to be transmitted. At the destination, the beam is intercepted by a photodetector, the data is extracted from the visible or IR beam (demodulated), and the resulting signal is amplified and sent to the hardware.
> 
> ...



http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/free-space-optics-FSO



> Laser-Powered Devices: High-concentration PV cell enables high-wattage laser power transmission
> 02/17/2015
> 
> A high-performance, high-voltage VMJ photovoltaic cell enables high-wattage transmission of power via laser light for applications including remote powering of small UAVs and remote sensing.
> ...



http://www.laserfocusworld.com/articles/print/volume-51/issue-02/features/laser-powered-devices-high-concentration-pv-cell-enables-high-wattage-laser-power-transmission.html


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## garb811 (28 Jan 2018)

And if this doesn't drive a point home about the info our ever connected personal devices, fitness trackers etc etc are leaking, nothing will.  EMCON is a lot broader than just switching off our military stuff.

Fitness and social media company Strava releases activity heat map. Excellent for locating military bases


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## PPCLI Guy (28 Jan 2018)

garb811 said:
			
		

> And if this doesn't drive a point home about the info our ever connected personal devices, fitness trackers etc etc are leaking, nothing will.  EMCON is a lot broader than just switching off our military stuff.
> 
> Fitness and social media company Strava releases activity heat map. Excellent for locating military bases



Wow.  Just wow.


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## Good2Golf (28 Jan 2018)

What are the odds that all units equipped with spread-spectrum frequency-hopping radios actually use them in hopping mode?  Encryption/security of the message aside, for EPM purposes to avoid being DF'd, folks should be hopping.  Even if using GPS-time to key the hop (TOD) for example in HAVE QUICK II, SATURN or SINCGARS, it is next to impossible to DF/intercept/jam a radio that is 30 to 40 dBm below in-band background noise.  Back in the days when HAVE QUICK was coming on line, I was amazed at the whining that would go on about it being "too hard" to set up, and thus guys would use discrete single frequencies which, encrypted or not, would absolutely give EW-savvy enemies a clear shot at DF'ing individual elements and building a pretty decent EOB of the 'lazy force'.

:2c:

G2G


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## Kirkhill (28 Jan 2018)

And on the Tech Solution front:



> 26 JANUARY 2018 NEWS
> 
> DARPA launches programme to improve military communication systems
> 
> ...



http://www.army-technology.com/news/darpa-launches-programme-improve-military-communication-systems/

Pure coincidence ...


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## pbi (28 Jan 2018)

Very interesting stuff. At  CASC we read all the stuff we can get our hands on coming out of Ukraine, because it gives us a steer on how we should be depicting the current operational environment. It is a bit scary to think what the impact on a typical CMBG would be if it was facing a couple (or even just one...)of the new Russian independent Brigade Tactical Groups.I think that the Army is waking up to the fact that some things need to be changed in training.

What is very interesting is to see the "discovery" of things my generation grew up soldiering with: digging in if you stop for more than a few minutes; camouflage, concealment, dispersal, smaller and more mobile protected HQs;  radio silence or very short transmissions, and surviving massive overmatch by enemy fires and armour.

Russia and China never went away: they were just waiting.


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## daftandbarmy (28 Jan 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> Very interesting stuff. At  CASC we read all the stuff we can get our hands on coming out of Ukraine, because it gives us a steer on how we should be depicting the current operational environment. It is a bit scary to think what the impact on a typical CMBG would be if it was facing a couple (or even just one...)of the new Russian independent Brigade Tactical Groups.I think that the Army is waking up to the fact that some things need to be changed in training.
> 
> What is very interesting is to see the "discovery" of things my generation grew up soldiering with: digging in if you stop for more than a few minutes; camouflage, concealment, dispersal, smaller and more mobile protected HQs;  radio silence or very short transmissions, and surviving massive overmatch by enemy fires and armour.
> 
> Russia and China never went away: they were just waiting.



I'm impressed... you didn't mention 'Rocking Horse' or 'Track Mileage' even once


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## a_majoor (14 Apr 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I freely acknowledge that I know nothing about comms and radios.  But I am confused.
> 
> Many ships, aircraft and vehicles are now equipped with Radar Warning Receivers that are activated by the impingement of Radio Frequency beams  - and I believe that includes microwave frequencies.
> 
> ...



A couple of things:

Using warning receivers and the like as communications devices might be a possible last ditch part of the PACE plan, but at least what you are describing is pretty low bandwidth morse code transmissions. As well, the warning receiver is now not being used for its primary purpose: receiving warnings. When your vehicle is brewed up by a beam rider missile while you are trying to send a SITREP, you might not be very appreciative of that backup plan after all....

Receiving energy via laser or microwave beams is quite possible, and in fact has been demonstrated over the years, powering vehicles larger than "quad copters" requires kilowatts or even megawatts of energy. You also generally want your energy to be coming in a steady stream. trying to superimpose a signal over that may be like trying to send a mores code message via ladies lamp, while standing on the deck of a lighthouse with the searchlight right behind you. I suppose there are clever work arounds to all these problems, but clear orders, good training and radio silence are equally valid solutions.


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## Kirkhill (14 Apr 2018)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> A couple of things:
> ...
> Using warning receivers and the like as communications devices might be a possible last ditch part of the PACE plan, but at least what you are describing is pretty low bandwidth morse code transmissions. As well, the warning receiver is now not being used for its primary purpose: receiving warnings. When your vehicle is brewed up by a beam rider missile while you are trying to send a SITREP, you might not be very appreciative of that backup plan after all....
> 
> ...



I wasn't thinking so much of using the actual RWR system as demonstrating that the ability to transmit and receive LOS radio energy at MM wavelength, and equally Laser energy, exists.  Also if it can be done at a slow rate of knots so that morse code can be understood it seems likely, to me at least, that it can be done at a significantly faster rate by digital generation and reception of the signal.


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## Ludoc (14 Apr 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I wasn't thinking so much of using the actual RWR system as demonstrating that the ability to transmit and receive LOS radio energy at MM wavelength, and equally Laser energy, exists.  Also if it can be done at a slow rate of knots so that morse code can be understood it seems likely, to me at least, that it can be done at a significantly faster rate by digital generation and reception of the signal.



Systems to do this already exist. The civilian telecom industry uses lasers to push data around built up areas. We use technologies like HCLOS to push data around the tactical battle space.


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## Kirkhill (14 Apr 2018)

Ludoc said:
			
		

> Systems to do this already exist. The civilian telecom industry uses lasers to push data around built up areas. We use technologies like HCLOS to push data around the tactical battle space.



I continue to live up to my unofficial motto: "A day late and a dollar short"    ;D

Thanks Ludoc.


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## garb811 (1 Jan 2019)

I don't think much in this article will come as a surprise to some on the board. I do find it a nice, concise, open source summary of some of their capabilities and impacts.

Signaling strength: Russia’s real Syria success is electronic warfare against the US



> It is not a secret that for Moscow, Syria has become the “ultimate testing ground” for its weapons. Russian forces have been particularly successful at using electronic warfare (E.W.) technology to interfere with operations of the United States and its allies on the territory of the Arab republic.
> 
> In a speech last month at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation’s 2018 GEOINT Symposium, General Raymond Thomas, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, said Syria has become “the most aggressive E.W. environment on the planet.”
> 
> ...



More at the article link.


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## garb811 (19 Dec 2019)

New article out in the New York Times about what companies are able to do with the data provided by having location sharing turned on for apps on your smartphone...  First article in what is a multi-part series over the next few days.

Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy 


> Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet, dozens of companies — largely unregulated, little scrutinized — are logging the movements of tens of millions of people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic data files. The Times Privacy Project obtained one such file, by far the largest and most sensitive ever to be reviewed by journalists. It holds more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million Americans as they moved through several major cities, including Washington, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.
> 
> Each piece of information in this file represents the precise location of a single smartphone over a period of several months in 2016 and 2017. The data was provided to Times Opinion by sources who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to share it and could face severe penalties for doing so. The sources of the information said they had grown alarmed about how it might be abused and urgently wanted to inform the public and lawmakers.
> ...
> ...


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## brihard (23 Dec 2019)

This one's scary. While it uses tracking the location of the President' entourage as an example, this applies universally. Truncated due to post length restrictions; more at link.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/opinion/location-data-national-security.html



> Opinion THE PRIVACY PROJECT
> How to Track President Trump
> By Stuart A. Thompson and Charlie Warzel
> DEC. 20, 2019
> ...


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## Eaglelord17 (24 Dec 2019)

Our military (and pretty much everyone) severely underestimates the danger cellphones and other technology represents to us.

We have a technology ADDICTED society which cannot stay off their phones and needs to have them on them 24/7. The dangers are pretty simple, your fighting a war, your platoon is out doing maneuvers, all it takes is one person with a cellphone for the enemy to know your exact movements. Look at the case where the fitbit was able to map out secret US bases in Iraq for example because people were running around the parameter of the base and the device traced the path.

That doesn't even include all the information people send instantly to each other which can be intercepted, the ability to hack into mics or cameras to listen in or see whats happening, and the psychological warfare they can choose to play on your soldiers by intimidating your family and loved ones. Imagine something as simple as the enemy sending messages to your significant other saying you had just been killed, or captured, and because its a warzone your not really able to respond quickly. How much resources could quickly be spent trying to verify your status or peoples time wasted over essentially nuisance complaints, coupled with the morale killing effect this would have.


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## Jarnhamar (24 Dec 2019)

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Our military (and pretty much everyone) severely underestimates the danger cellphones and other technology represents to us.



Underestimates it or doesn't care? 

Canadian unit deploys to the field under orders that no cell phones will be brought to the field by anyone (except for one duty cell).

Chain of command realises they can't function without cell phone so begin sending orders and messages over text here and there. 

SNCOs see this, roll their eyes and sneak out their cell phones.

Soldiers see officers and NCOs on their cell phones sneaking messages so turn theirs on. 

One hapless new private pulls his cell phone out and starts texting, probably in a secure area, and doesn't understand why he's getting in shit since everyone else is doing it.


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## Brash (24 Dec 2019)

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Underestimates it or doesn't care?
> 
> Canadian unit deploys to the field under orders that no cell phones will be brought to the field by anyone (except for one duty cell).
> 
> ...



Mobile devices do not need to be actively sending texts in order to broadcast.
They don't even need to be out of airplane/RF-secure mode, or even "on", in order to pose a danger.  
(holding down a button until the screen goes black does not necessarily mean the device is completely powered down)

Train as you fight.
*Don't* bring devices to the field, *charge* those that do- even and especially the officers and SNCOs.


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## PuckChaser (25 Dec 2019)

Brashendeavours said:
			
		

> Mobile devices do not need to be actively sending texts in order to broadcast.
> They don't even need to be out of airplane/RF-secure mode, or even "on", in order to pose a danger.
> (holding down a button until the screen goes black does not necessarily mean the device is completely powered down)
> 
> ...


You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.

I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.


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## Infanteer (25 Dec 2019)

Puckchaser's right - this is akin to telling troops 20 years ago to not bring a book or a deck of cards.  I had platoon warrants collect mobile devices in an ammo can to be stored with the CQ when the tactical scenario warranted it, but other than that, troops were free to bring them to kill time when they had it.


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## FJAG (25 Dec 2019)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.
> 
> I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.



No you don't need to meet them in the middle. Maybe I'm showing my age again but we didn't have cell phones etc so when we went into the field for a month or more we were able to survive quite well without messaging people with pictures of our RP-4s or IMPs. 

Military life is about both discipline and self-discipline. Training them how to let go of their umbilical cords by leaving these devices at home is part and parcel to their security training. Can you really trust your unit's security to the good will of an 18 year old to not use his cellphone and to disconnect it's battery? If he's not supposed to use it why take it along at all?

 :stirpot:


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## Brash (25 Dec 2019)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.
> 
> I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.



You absolutely do not need to meet them in the middle. This minimizes the threat perception by the troops, and encourages skirting of the directives.

Your scenario of realizing consequences to the troops involves physically observing when someone brings out a mobile to text, as an indication that this text will compromise your position to an enemy, and penalizing that specific behaviour (bringing out a phone). 
This is a woefully simplistic representation of authentic adversary capability, and would not serve to encourage compliance or harden defensive posture in any effective manner.

If the enemy we’re fighting only has capabilities against SMS texts, apparently we’re only preparing to engage with DPRK circa 2005.

One specific counterpoint, what your example fails to catch are the other mobiles that the troops “safely” have in their barracks box/ammo can at CQ, that are collecting movements/position by dead-reckoning, mic recordings, and are waiting to be beacon this information at an opportune time to an adversary. This is only one example.


The majority of troops do not possess a sufficiently technical background to understand the most complex and dangerous threats. We have no more time to create concrete training examples illustrating the threats posed at the bleeding edge of the state of the art of cybersecurity, than we do to teach cybersecurity professionals practical examples involving ballistics, medicine, dentistry, aircraft, tanks, ships...etc.

Like I said, zero tolerance, or you’re only enabling the adversary.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (25 Dec 2019)

Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.

..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".


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## daftandbarmy (25 Dec 2019)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.
> 
> ..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".



Speaking as a reservist, with absolutely zero faith in our radios, if we didn't have our phones we couldn't communicate at all in the field.

But I get the whole EMCON thing in operational conditions. We (OK, much smarter and better trained people than me) used it extensively against the IRA, and other paramilitary organizations, in Northern Ireland and the sigs warfare units were of critical importance in tracking the bad guys and helping to take them out precisely because they used cell phones.


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## PPCLI Guy (25 Dec 2019)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.
> 
> ..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".



So here is the problem.  You are all acting as if there is a finite difference between peace and war. Your heads are deliberately in the sand. We maybe on Exercise. The enemy is already at war, and actively collects on is every day. This is real. It is a thing.  We can't wish it away, despite every effort of our current government.  

We deserve our fate, as a country and as a force. We need to accept that there are bad guys, and they 're doing bad things, no matter how nice we are   

Bah.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (25 Dec 2019)

And you think this is new??


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## PPCLI Guy (25 Dec 2019)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> And you think this is new??



And you think this is the answer?  



			
				Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.
> 
> ..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".




To ignore the problem?


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## Bruce Monkhouse (25 Dec 2019)

No, to set followable rules   Sometimes it's no phones or contact and sometimes it isn't.   Sorry but when the kiddies come back to the same bivouac every night for a month straight, and it's splashed across Esprit de Corps/etc,  I don't think Sam texting his wife will destroy the planet.
You make it absolute under all circumstances and you'll get what you fear.


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## Brash (25 Dec 2019)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> No, to set followable rules   Sometimes it's no phones or contact and sometimes it isn't.   Sorry but when the kiddies come back to the same bivouac every night for a month straight, and it's splashed across Esprit de Corps/etc,  I don't think Sam texting his wife will destroy the planet.
> You make it absolute under all circumstances and you'll get what you fear.



Again....texting isn’t the problem...not sure how many ways people have to mention this before it sinks in.

Your assessment of the threat surface (Sam texting his wife) and impact (destroying the planet), is childish and willfully dismissive of the issues at stake here.

As other posters have mentioned, you (and a great majority of pers), can have your heads in the sand and pretend to be “on exercise”, but others countries are already at war, with us.


Social pushback against the regulations, and resulting social pressure, should have zero impact on decisions regarding regulations which enable and enhance personnel security and mission success. Agree/disagree?


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## OldSolduer (25 Dec 2019)

It can’t be ignored. The prevalence of smartphones and other electronic devices in a theatre of operations is an issue. 
We had discussed the possibility of ordering troops to leave their phones at home on weekend exercises and we also discussed the possibility of having the CQ or Pl WOs collecting them and securing them. 
I don’t know exactly why this wasn’t done but I had heard that a higher authority kiboshed it. I might be in error on this.


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## Infanteer (25 Dec 2019)

For all the black and white thinkers out there, let me give you a scenario.  Company deploys to the field for 3 weeks.  First two weeks are a series of ranges and stand training.  Troops come into the bivouac after training, and are on their own to clean kit, prepare for the next event, etc, etc.  I put no restraints on personal electronic devices.  There is no reason to police devices up.  Telling a troop that he can't have his phone and you'll charge him if he brings it out when he's sitting in a ten man tent in Wainwright in an administrative posture isn't worth the leadership capital, in my view.

Last week is a force on force training exercise.  Troops are "in the box" - cammed up, proper field discipline, etc.  No personal electronic devices (if they brought them, CQ will hold onto them), and everyone follows the designated EMCON status of the scenario with our tactical radios.  Train as you fight.

So, like I said before, like everything else, there is a time and a place to enforce zero tolerance.

The real challenge is on deployments.  My soldiers in Afghanistan had their phones, and listened to music and played games on them when they weren't on duty, but they weren't connected to anything and the nature of the threat meant that the EMCON of these things wasn't an issue: at least I was never told it was - this was some time ago before these things became as ubiquitous as they are now.  Now-a-days, you get a situation where everything transmits, and your SF Group's jogging watches show you were every ODA in Syria is located.  

So, if you're a BG deployed to a Eastern European country with an adversary operating on the border, you have to factor other things in, even when troops are in an administrative posture.


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## Weinie (26 Dec 2019)

It is not just the troops you have to worry about. What about the local kid who takes a photo of you when you have just moved into your forward loc'n/hide? What are you going to do about that?


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## OldSolduer (26 Dec 2019)

Weinie said:
			
		

> It is not just the troops you have to worry about. What about the local kid who takes a photo of you when you have just moved into your forward loc'n/hide? What are you going to do about that?



A very good point. Several SOF Ops have been compromised by locals who do what locals do - wander in the area.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Dec 2019)

Brashendeavours said:
			
		

> Again....texting isn’t the problem...not sure how many ways people have to mention this before it sinks in.



I agree with this statement. The main issue isn't texting but a general lack of broader awareness of the technology and the threat (a la PPCLI guy’s comments).

Noise and light discipline? Radio silence? etc etc, we know what to do, why we have to do it and how to enforce it.

Digital data discipline (DDD)? Not so much I would say...

Informed people make better choices, especially if they are backed up by a consistently applied policy and well administered system of drills and discipline like anything else in the military (or any other human system).




_Necessary staff edit_


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## Jarnhamar (26 Dec 2019)

[quote author=Infanteer]

Last week is a force on force training exercise.  Troops are "in the box" - cammed up, proper field discipline, etc.  No personal electronic devices (if they brought them, CQ will hold onto them), and everyone follows the designated EMCON status of the scenario with our tactical radios.  Train as you fight.

So, like I said before, like everything else, there is a time and a place to enforce zero tolerance.
[/quote]

I see this as the major point of contention.

When we try to do the _no personal electronic devices because of EMCON_ for a week or two (or 4 days) we fail.

1. Troops sneak cell phones to the field anyways.
2. Leadership sneak cell phones to the field anyways.
3. We're so reliant on cell phone comms that we end up saying screw it and use cell phones to send work messages anyways just to get shit done. 


Seeing how the int dudes were able to identify units and track them across Wainwright because of everyone using Tinder was an awesome eye opener.




Not sure if it's controlled info or not but I can't help but wonderwhat kind of electronic signature our new vests give off with their PDAs downloading and uploading info. Maps. Text messages. GPS locations.


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## Jarnhamar (26 Dec 2019)

Brashendeavours said:
			
		

> Mobile devices do not need to be actively sending texts in order to broadcast.



Cellphones can even be manipulated to hotmic, send/receive info etc.. if they're powered down and the battery removed.
 :Tin-Foil-Hat:



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> * No you don't need to meet them in the middle. * Maybe I'm showing my age again but we didn't have cell phones etc so when we went into the field for a month or more we were able to survive quite well without messaging people with pictures of our RP-4s or IMPs.



I feel the same way you do but I think the reality is we lose that battle and I think Puckchaser is right. 

People are legitimately addicted to electronics, social media and their phones.
Too aggressive of a no cell policy and soldiers will find ways not to deploy on exercise. Not very professional but it's the reality of what we deal with today.

I've had 2 officer cadets quit over having their cell phone temporarily taken away. One recoursed and the other VR.

Had a student on a weapons det course try to quit after I took his cell away (after he pulled it out to watch a video during practice).  


Meeting soldiers half way with this stuff feels alien but it's (now) a balancing act.


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## Kirkhill (26 Dec 2019)

Is the army having to face what the navy has been facing for decades?  I'm thinking of all those trawlers sprouting antennae that spend their time "fishing" in the shadow of allied ships.


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## FJAG (26 Dec 2019)

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> ...
> I feel the same way you do but I think the reality is we lose that battle and I think Puckchaser is right.
> 
> People are legitimately addicted to electronics, social media and their phones.
> ...



I don't doubt what you are saying about the addiction. My family is all around me for XMas and all of them (except Kathy and I) constantly have their cellphones in hand and are surfing or texting in the midst of whatever else we are doing. It's multitasking gone mad. The irony is that I've been on the bleeding edge of technology my entire working life but on the day I retired I uncoupled myself from my watch and my phone. (Still addicted to my computer for writing though.

The trouble with what you say is that it doesn't make me feel any more comfortable with any balancing act. Can you really trust "addicted" people to see it your way when the chips are down? Or will their addiction put them and your unit at risk? Remember that addicts will always put their needs ahead of yours.

That's one of the main reason I would strongly advocate for a zero tolerance policy on exercise so that you can weed out those who will subvert or defy security. I wouldn't be worried about people who would quit over this issue. Anyone who puts their social media addiction ahead of their unit's security you don't want anyway. Best to weed them out before they become a real risk instead of just a theoretical one.

Incidentally. Good luck with that whole marijuana thing.

 :stirpot:


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## Haligonian (29 Dec 2019)

It seems like the general consensus is that cell phones and social media are a threat. I would suggest that we need to see them more as a tool and a reality of our culture and operating environment. We can't just turn back time and make them go away. We need to understand their strengths and weaknesses, operationalize them and ultimately, weaponize them.

1. Most of the discussion here has focused on the threat that phones and social media pose, particularly the ability to target or collect intel on our units through geo location. Totally valid but lets not forget this is a two way street. 

a. The enemy uses these things too which makes them vulnerable as well. As an example the US and the UK have targeted and struck, kinetically, ISIS recruiters through their social media accounts.  See the case of Junaid Hussain. 

b. It's also, as our enemies have taught us, a weapon of influence. We've had influence activity doctrine for years but we now have a technology infinitely more persuasive than loud speakers and leaflets. We should also be looking at social media ROE for our soldiers and unleashing them. We have soldiers who have more followers than the CDS or the Army Commander. Shouldn't we be using these guys?

c. We've also have some folks on the internet who are using these tools to embarrass our enemies, which is great. Bellingcat is an interesting group that has been keeping tabs on what the Russians are doing in Syria and Ukraine via open source intel, social media, and geo location. They disproved much of the Kremlin's initial claims to be striking ISIS in Syria when they were in fact attacking the opposition. They also managed to identify, the unit, the crew, the specific Buk missile launcher, and it's location inside Ukraine that brought down flight MH17. A great book on this is LikeWar by P.W. Singer. https://www.bellingcat.com/ 

2. I think we need to be looking more at a combination of flooding the spectrum and conventional EMCON approaches. The likelihood of us being able to shut down a sufficient amount of our emissions to conceal ourselves is low, especially as we bring on technology which the default setting is to transmit.  We need to gain a greater understanding of what our own electronic order of battle looks like to an enemy and then figure out where we want to be noisy and where we want to be quiet to deceive the enemy.

3. As some of you have noted, cell phones are a reality in the CAF. This is partly due to poor discipline but also due to us not having a robust comms suite. When you're rolling out to the training area just what is your contingency comms, hell, what is your alternate? Do you want to be commanding a BG via cell phone? No. But if its your emergency form of communication then that might work. We discussed this in Latvia. The idea that cell phones are going to be immediately shut down upon some kind of conflict in the world is unlikely.  Both sides will be looking to exploit the cell phone towers for their purposes either to influence the population and opposing forces (think Ukrainian forces getting texts from the Russians) or to use them for C2 purposes.  Either way, it seems reasonable that cell phone usage could be possible. The compromised nature of those communications would need to be accounted for.

4. I know not all of this is relevant to a rifle coy dug in in Eastern Europe.  When I was a rifle coy comd, dug in in Eastern Europe 2 years ago I ordered my guys not to bring their phones to the field. Having said that my point is that conflict is on going with the Russians, Chinese, and other groups in the information domain which is probably more relevant currently than an envisioned RAND scenario where the Russians go full Eastern Front on the Baltics and seize them in 96 hours.  Even in the event of open hostilities in the Baltics it is likely well short of that scenario and you can bet that social media will play an important role. Telling our soldiers to leave there phones in the shacks for full on tactical exercises is probably the right move, but we also need to be thinking how we can use their social media presence to collect intelligence and to influence.


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## dimsum (12 Jan 2020)

Bets on how many people get charged for taking their phone/tablet/laptop?



> As America's adversaries become more sophisticated, U.S. combat troops heading to the war zone may have to get used to leaving behind their phones, laptops and even personal gaming devices, military experts say.
> 
> The Pentagon doesn't have a blanket policy barring service members from taking electronic devices on deployment, but combat commanders are beginning to prohibit them when going into the unknown.
> 
> ...



https://taskandpurpose.com/us-troops-deploy-without-smartphones?utm_content=bufferf9afd&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer&fbclid=IwAR2x6yFgjVB8gKgtjeVtSwlevNMFmatOuqNPS-oyR92-FFJlQHjmJACuZKs


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## Infanteer (12 Jan 2020)

This is the military sound thing to do.  The electronic signature from these organizations will likely plummet.


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