# How to destroy young military officers



## GAP (14 Sep 2010)

How to destroy young military officers
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, September 14, 2010 - 10:10 AM
Article Link

Gen. Frederick Kroesen, who commanded a rifle company in World War II, a battalion in Korea, and a brigade and a division in Vietnam, made this interesting comment in the August issue of Army:

    It was in Vietnam that the centralization of control reached its apex, with the White House dictating bombing targets and division and brigade commanders playing "squad leader" in the sky." We reached a condition in which the chain of command was in a state of  dysfunction. I have always maintained that a chain of command must function from the bottom up as well as from the top down -- with every squad leader making squad leader decisions and reporting to his platoon leader, "Here's what I found, here's what I did, and here's why I did it." When squad leaders have someone telling them not only what to do but also how to do it, they stop being leaders, and so do platoon leaders and company commanders. Initiative is stymied, and decision making is replaced by waiting to be told. Combat action becomes tentative, and military action bogs down.

    In Vietnam many low-level commanders were subject to a hornet's nest of helicopters carrying higher commanders calling for information, offering advice, making unwanted decisions and generally interfering with what squad leaders and platoon leaders and company commanders were trying to do. There is no more effective way to destroy the leadership potential of young officers and noncommissioned officers than to deny them opportunities to make decisions appropriate for their assignments.
end of short article


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## OldSolduer (14 Sep 2010)

Good post.

I was writing a book....wait for it ....its a few years away, and I write (rant) a bit on the topic of "micromanagement" especially during the 90's.

My rant was on the oversupervision of TQ3 Candidates and how and NCO had to be present at all times during the day & evening. What crap!

It stifles initiative and troops will not learn to work without supervision.


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## GAP (14 Sep 2010)

I have been on operations where "higher higher" (literally!!) was calling the shots and didn't have a clue......our LT just said "yes sir" and went on to do what needed to be done.....

He got into shit over it, but colonel soon shut up when it was pointed out that we would have been wiped out to a man, if we had listened to him....still gave the LT shit for disobeying orders.......twit!!


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## ArmyRick (14 Sep 2010)

I do remember the QL3, Jim (For those not in the know, Jim was one of my battle school instructors in the 90s). I also recall then Lt Col Lockyer jacking up staff in front of candidates because he felt you guys were not doing the section attack demo properly and the fiasco on the march and shoot.

Now that I have instructed on many QL3 (Dp1 in this age), I can look back at senior leadership like that and know that it was not on.

I beleive infantry soldiers must be developed. There is a time for close supervision (on the ranges live weapons) and their is a time to for the staff to step back and them figure it out (night routine in quarters).


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## PuckChaser (14 Sep 2010)

This mentality still exists... I was micromanaged over chat more times than I can count, from pers living inside the wire that had no clue how my equipment worked. I left a standing offer with my Troop Commander: If you want to run the gear, I'll get you the flight out to MSG and have a cot plus a spot in the shift schedule waiting for you. It was slightly insubordinate, but he got the hint and deflected the constant queries from higher.


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## daftandbarmy (15 Sep 2010)

Unfortunately strategic Corporals are often foiled by their tactical Generals, and thanks to technology it's just going to get worse:

The Rise of the Tactical General 

In The Face of Battle, his masterful history of men at war, John Keegan writes how “the personal bond between leader and follower lies at the root of all explanations of what does and does not happen in battle.”2 In Keegan’s view, the exemplar of this relationship was Henry V, who inspired his “band of brothers” by fighting in their midst during the Battle of Agincourt. 
With the rise of each new generation of communications technology, these connections between soldiers in the field and those who give them orders grew distanced. Generals no longer needed to be on the front lines with their men but operated from command posts that moved further to the rear with each new technological advance. Yet, the very same technologies also pushed a trend “towards centralization of command, and thus towards micromanagement.”3

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/summer_military_singer.aspx


Tactical Generals
Leaders, Technology, and the Perils
of Battlefield Micromanagement*
http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj09/sum09/singer.html


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## Wookilar (16 Sep 2010)

Now, I have seen (and dealt with the ramifications) of micro-management at many levels over the years (a particular Pl Comd while in Kosovo stands out). I'm pretty sure we all have at one time or another.

Since I switched in 2005 however, all of my OC's since then have given me more than enough rope to hang myself. I am not in a Bde anymore, or even a 1st Line unit, but it seems to me that if Base-side and different Schools are willing to let us "younger" leaders have the lead, then I would only hope that 1st Line is doing so as well.

My most previous OC gave me some very good insight into what she saw as being the cause of much of the micromanagement at the Snr Officer level:
In her opinion, those that micromanaged all their subordinates were burned,in some manner, by someone in their Pl when they were young Pl Comds. Some of those that were burned were unable (or unwilling) to learn from it and were forever after more concerned with making sure that they were never burned again than they were with completing the missioon.

I have to say, all of the Snr NCOs I have worked with over the last few years have been exceptional. My guess is that I had a much better partner than they did  ;D (but I'm learning, honest).

All good leaders must have that "faith" in the system and their pers in order to get the job done with the best outcome possible.

Wook


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## Arctic Acorn (19 Sep 2010)

I can't help but wonder if the way we structure our deployments (6 months, more rarely longer now in specifc appointments), and Managed Readiness Plan is a contributing factor. On my last tour I was with a Battle Group. Almost all of the senior positions were filled by folks who are recently promoted and put into those positions, who after the deployment soon moved to other assignments. Of course they all did the best jobs they could. That said, it must been in their mind that this was very likely their one chance to command a TF, BG, Coy, etc on operations, and that CEFCOM had the TF under a micoscope. That's a fair bit of pressure. 

Also, with the way the MRP is run most task forces have some pretty diverse elements attached to it, from all over the country. Taking the BG again as an example, an infantry battalion never deploys with all three of its companies; you always have one from another Bn (or regiment) attached in. Start adding all the other enablers, and you wind up with quite a mixed bag. I'm sure it's a little easier to achieve some level of cohesion when the majority of these troops are drawn from a single base (Pet, Edmonton, Valcartier), but I'm not convinced it's enough. Now that the more senior commands have been a year, does a TF Commander now have much of an opportunity influence and develop the second rotation of his deployment during pre-deployment training back at home?

Mission Command is all well and good as a concept, but when you only get one shot in a position on a deployment, working with other folks drawn from across different units who don't normally work together, I don't know if we give folks enough time to develop that level of trust to let your sub-unit commanders act independantly (but within your intent), especially when all the tools to micromanage are so readily available. 

CAVEAT: I deployed as a reservist with the BG, working in the BG HQ. It wasn't my first tour, but my first working at that level. I don't think I'm straying from my arcs too much here, but I'd welcome any differering views.


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## REDinstaller (19 Sep 2010)

The new command tools of Battleview, Blue PA and Satcom have also erroded the ability of Pl and Sects to conduct a boots on the ground battle. Why does Comd CEFCOM need to have a live feed from theater? Doesn't he have a capable Contingent and BG Comd to conduct operations.


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## daftandbarmy (19 Sep 2010)

Another example of how to destory young officers...

Canadian Army Officer Training in War
By:  Brigadier General C.L. Kirkby (Ret’d) ca. 1980

1.	After an upbringing in The Permanent Force, service in World War II and during the Korean War (minus combat experience, which is an acknowledged factor), and a normal career in the regular army, I am left with the paraphrased impression that the average Canadian officer carries a sergeant-major’s pacestick in his knapsack; as I consider it an officer’s duty to look up and ahead, rather than down and backwards, this strikes me as a Bad Thing.
2.	I have no doubt that the colonial mind lingers, hopefully not inextinguishably, in Canada and particularly in the defence establishment and this plays it part, but in war and peace Canadian officer training somehow fails all along the line to teach that the thin end of the telescope goes to the eye and that officers of every rank are paid to Think Big (or at least comprehensively), not small.
3.	Let just one continuing lacuna in operational thinking and training suffice as an example:  never or hardly ever has a clear, precise, governing context provided the kind of authoritative envelope within which that essential but rare characteristic – disciplined initiative – can develop and operate.
4.	To base a training system two ranks up, as is a necessity in any army with a clear, dispassionate view of war requirements, a primary factor is confidence:  the confidence of superiors in their own competence; the confidence of superiors in the capacity of their students.  Maybe the first is too much to expect in war, but it shouldn’t be in peace; and the second can to a large extent be imposed by the system, which can also, to a very large degree, ensure its foundations.  On reflection it was probably the lack of this kind of confidence which made the Canadian officer training system so defective in wartime, at least in my experience of it.
5.	After a few weeks in the Horse Palace on the grounds of the Canadian National Exhibition in Toronto and two months of quite conscientious basic training in Orillia, I was sent on a brilliantly conducted and administered assistant instructor’s course in Brockville, a tour de force as far as I could see, on the warrant officer, promoted to Major, who ran it.  He was a mercenary soldier in his element, passing on the knowledge and skill of a lifetime with dedication, precision and complete success.
6.	But what was I, on graduation two or three months later, in the middle of a long was, doing training officers?  Where were the experienced regimental NCOs who should have been there, whether or not they had combat experience at that point?  What I was doing was exemplifying the deliberate degradation of candidates which formed the official attitude of the place.  “I’ll break your ‘earts before you break mine” was the reiterated ultimate of the commander’s communication with the assembled cadets.  “Treat cadets like dirt”, I was ordered regularly:  I didn’t, nor did many of the other assistant instructors, but we were in defiance of the party line.  
7.	The contract between the assistant instructor’s course and the officer training course probably sprang from the fact that the promoted warrant officers who commanded both were confident in teaching NCOs and not teaching officers.  Officers and NCOs function at different levels:  to deliberately place the training and initial orientation of wartime officers in the hands of mercenary NCOs, whatever rank was thrust upon them, was a fundamental mistake, a psychological blunder which still echoes in the Army and in the most sympathetic public perception of it.
8.	Quite suddenly and most fortunately I found myself in the British officer training system.  Whatever I must then have been, however callow, however unpromising, however foreign, I was, to every element of that system, automatically a gentleman, a potential officer to be given every skill time allowed but above all to be made confidant and, subtly, an immediate colleague in the officer corps.  Misdemeanors, while bringing swift punishment, were made to seem a source of disappointment than of vindictive contempt; incomprehension and minor errors were made to seem a failure to use one’s capacity rather than inherent stupidity.  NCOs did NCOs’ work and were obviously amongst the best available:  they knew their place, did their work thoroughly and well while remaining in it and, by doing so, taught cadets the rudiments of their relative positions.  Officers were experienced, comradely and sympathetic, fellows in an honourable estate, encouraging cadets to enter it rather than eyeing them as suspicious and unworthy interlopers.  After nine months in such an environment, I was ready and eager to command soldiers in action:  a thoroughly well considered and carefully conducted system made me so.
9.	What would have been my attitude as a graduate of the Canadian system?  I can’t say and I would offer many good officers insult if I said “awful”, but I can only think it was despite the system that they were good.  On my first morning back as a “Sandhurst Officer”, (a Canadian term at the time), I was sat down in the commandant’s office, given coffee, congratulated, welcomed and assured of the earliest posting to a unit in action.  When I and three companions were shown out by the Adjutant, a large platoon of “Canadian officers”, (another term in use), was brought to attention, acknowledged by the commandant and marched back to the mess.  Our relationship can be imagined.  They loathed the army, were bored stiff by it, couldn’t wait for the war to end so they could escape it and showed no sign of any desire to command.  The system had insulted them:  having seen it in action at Brockville, I wasn’t surprised.
10.	What has periodically bothered me since is that I still hear echoes of that military failure.  While having no connection with RMC and many reservations concerning it, it does seem to provide to the cadets an officer’s environment.  But what they seem to find in the schools in the summer – when they get to soldiering, not academics, is something like my memories of Brockville.  
11.	Now when I hear someone actually considering the training of officers in a new, long war, my experience suddenly bothers me again.  If this hasty and partial paper does nothing else but alert responsible people to the fact that not everything in the Canadian war performance was good and to be perpetuated, it will be useful.  If it can indicate that in the rapid expansion of an officer corps, it is the proper ethos which must be inculcated before all else, I will be delighted, and, of course, if it implies clearly that officer ethos is an essential element of success in war, to be understood, cultivated and sustained, what more could I expect?


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## medicineman (19 Sep 2010)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> Why does Comd CEFCOM need to have a live feed from theater? Doesn't he have a capable Contingent and BG Comd to conduct operations.



LCF?  Something to munch popcorn by?  Closest to battle he's going to get?

MM


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## Old Sweat (19 Sep 2010)

Re Kip Kirby's comment here

*But what was I, on graduation two or three months later, in the middle of a long was, doing training officers?  Where were the experienced regimental NCOs who should have been there, whether or not they had combat experience at that point?  What I was doing was exemplifying the deliberate degradation of candidates which formed the official attitude of the place.  “I’ll break your ‘earts before you break mine” was the reiterated ultimate of the commander’s communication with the assembled cadets.  “Treat cadets like dirt”, I was ordered regularly:  I didn’t, nor did many of the other assistant instructors, but we were in defiance of the party line. *  

The Brockville Officer Cadet School has not been treated kindly by history. The commandant indeed was an over-promoted oaf. George Blackburn, Jack English and I, among others, have had a go at him. However, Brockville was not the only place in Canada that trained officer candidates, and he was eventually replaced. 

A few months after my Normandy book appeared, Bill, a senior member of the Faculty of Education at the University of Toronto, appeared at our door. He had supervised my wife when she was seconded to the faculty from the Toronto Board of Education to train student teachers. He had read Jack Granatstein's review in the Globe and Mail and had picked up a copy because a. he recognized my name, and b. he had some interest because of his prior military service and because he was the son of a veteran with a distinguished record in the Great War. The purpose of his visit was to tell me that his father had been posted in to the Brockville establishment as chief instructor with specific instructions to keep the commandant from doing too much harm while the army figured out how to retire him.


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## bdave (19 Sep 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Another example of how to destory young officers...
> 
> Canadian Army Officer Training in War
> By:  Brigadier General C.L. Kirkby (Ret’d) ca. 1980
> ...



Can someone explain this to me? I'm not quite sure I get it.


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## OldSolduer (19 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Can someone explain this to me? I'm not quite sure I get it.



Officers are supposed to look forward....ie to the next phase of the battle and the planning and prep. NCOs take care of the details ie the dress, equipment to be used, ammo, rations, water, POL, Medical etc. Quite often officers concern themselves with small minute things rather than taking care of the big picture stuff.


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## bdave (19 Sep 2010)

Awesome, thanks.


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## TangoTwoBravo (19 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Can someone explain this to me? I'm not quite sure I get it.



The part you bolded about a Sergeant-Major's pacestick in every officer's knapsack is also a clever reversal on Napoleon's remark that "every Corporal has a field marshall's baton in his knapsack."  The author was remarking that Canadian officer training has, sometimes, turned our officer's into officers who want to emulate NCOs.  There are many similarities between officer and NCO leadership, but there are differences as well.  

I can remember reading this article when I was a subbie in the reserves and that aspect resonated with me to some degree.  The author then compares the Canadian method with the British method of a more collegial officer training system.


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## bdave (19 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The part you bolded about a Sergeant-Major's pacestick in every officer's knapsack is also a clever reversal on Napoleon's remark that "every Corporal has a field marshall's baton in his knapsack."  The author was remarking that Canadian officer training has, sometimes, turned our officer's into officers who want to emulate NCOs.  *There are many similarities between officer and NCO leadership, but there are differences as well.    *



Can you outline them?


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## gun runner (19 Sep 2010)

They taught me to pay close attention to the details I put into the OpOrder,but after giving said orders to my senior NCM,s, let them run the show and help when and where needed.I was not to grab the bull by the horns and steal my NCM's thunder.As wierd as this felt to me(I was used to being the doer-not the sayer) I have gotten used to it..so far.I still have the urge to grab the bull by the horns,sometimes. My CO says the urge is hard to beat back,but it will happen with more experience,and I have to have trust in my senior NCM's to get the job done and let me as an officer prep the next phase.


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## OldSolduer (19 Sep 2010)

I'll give this a shot bdave:

NCOs are concerned with the 5 Ds - Dress, Deportment, Drill, Duties and Discipline. The only time an officer should be involved with discipline is when it comes to charging a soldier under the National Defence Act.
While officers commanding troops are responsible for those troops, the NCOs under his command are responsible for the troops assigned to them.
Officers, IMO should stay away from the 5 Ds . My two cents.


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## gun runner (19 Sep 2010)

Sir, you hit that one right on the money! Ubique.


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## bdave (19 Sep 2010)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I'll give this a shot bdave:
> 
> NCOs are concerned with the 5 Ds - Dress, Deportment, Drill, Duties and Discipline. The only time an officer should be involved with discipline is when it comes to charging a soldier under the National Defence Act.
> While officers commanding troops are responsible for those troops, the NCOs under his command are responsible for the troops assigned to them.
> Officers, IMO should stay away from the 5 Ds . My two cents.



So then how does an officer lead exactly, other than making decisions/giving orders in the field?

That was a good post, gun runner, and is actually what I thought an officer was supposed to do: lead by example. As in, doing it yourself and making sure everyone does it as well.


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## Arctic Acorn (19 Sep 2010)

I've always found that the best officers lead largely by working _through _ their NCOs and more junior officers. It's like the saying, 'when you're up to your ass in alligators its hard to remember your mission is to drain the swamp...'

By allowing the NCOs to wrestle those alligators for you, it allows you to plan ahead and keep an eye out for unexpected changes to the situation, and ensure the task is being done within your bosses intent. It requires a lot of coordination, communications, and most importanty, trust between you and your NCOs.

In other arenas, you'll have your own reptiles to contend with...everybody gets to wrassle!


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## OldSolduer (19 Sep 2010)

It sort of goes like this. There are 17 steps of battle procedure (or is it 15 now??)
Anyways, officer receives orders from his superior. Officer translates orders, plans, issues his own orders to his subordinates. Subordinates are given tasks to perform. As an example, an Infantry Pl Comd may be tasked with conducting a fighting patrol. One of the tasks is route planning, which he may delegate to an NCO. Another task may be to ensure that the platoon is rehearsed on certain actions prior to orders, and that is the job of the Platoon Warrant Officer - Second in Command. 
No matter what is delegated, *the officer tasked is still responsible for the conduct of the mission, whether it succeeds or fails. * One of the strengths of the Canadian Army is the officer-NCO relationship. Good officers listen to their NCOs, whether it be command of a Brigade Group or a Platoon Commander and all in between. Good officers may not always take the advice offered, but they listen and consider the NCO point of view.


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## OldSolduer (19 Sep 2010)

0tto Destruct said:
			
		

> I've always found that the best officers lead largely by working _through _ their NCOs and more junior officers. It's like the saying, 'when you're up to your *** in alligators its hard to remember your mission is to drain the swamp...'
> 
> By allowing the NCOs to wrestle those alligators for you, it allows you to plan ahead and keep an eye out for unexpected changes to the situation, and ensure the task is being done within your bosses intent. It requires a lot of coordination, communications, and most importanty, trust between you and your NCOs.
> 
> In other arenas, you'll have your own reptiles to contend with...everybody gets to wrassle!



You hit this nail hard! Well said!


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## Arctic Acorn (19 Sep 2010)

High praise, Jim. Thanks. 

I've fortunately seen this issue from both sides. As a Senior NCO who spent a couple of years as a Pl WO on the Class A side of things, I was always of the opinion that if my Pl Comd had to stray into the 5Ds that was on me. I _have _ to own those, and ensure the Sect Comds felt the same way. If he wanted to micromanage against my advice there wasn't much I could do about it, but if he found anything wrong there certainly was...  >

Since I was tempted to the dark side last year, it's been a bit of a process turning off that muscle memory (my Pl WO is very understanding, and fortunately a friend). Its much better now though...you can hardly see the lobotomy scars!


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## TangoTwoBravo (19 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Can you outline them?



Lots of good posts since you asked, but I will add my own observations!

In general, NCOs practice a more "hands-on" method of leadership than officers.  That doesn't mean that officers are remote from the men, but simply that the officer in a given element should be allowing his NCOs to be the main interface with soldiers.  The officer needs to know his men and will certainly speak with them, but his orders and direction should flow through his NCOs.

An officer shouldn't be yelling at troops (except to be heard over noise in a battle etc) or sorting them out for errors.  That is the domain of the NCO.  I'm not saying that NCOs go around yelling at people, but I haven't raised my voice at a soldier in twenty years (except to heard in the turret etc).  I may well speak directly to a problem soldier as part of admin or disciplinary action, but rest assured that the encounter was put in motion by the SSM and this is not the first chat that the soldier has had.

Don't take from this that an officer sits back.  Combat arms officers must lead from the front and by example.  Lieutenants, Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels must be present at the face of battle, if only to share the risks and therefore encourage their men (and some Captains, although I rely on them to run the CP and keep the show in order).  There is a time and a place for officers to place themselves at the decisive point.  It is a judgement call between getting caught in the weeds and staying in touch with the battle.  Officers aren't simply planners or managers of violence.  They must lead their soldiers to do and suffer things that they would otherwise not be inclined to do.  Canadian officers get to do so with the benefit of a professional NCO corps.


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## Blackadder1916 (19 Sep 2010)

In a short thread from 2004 that was titled "Officer/NCM differences", there was, surprisingly, only one post that was of any worth.  The last paragraph of that post is particularly applicable to the current discussion.



			
				Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> *It‘s one of those issues that‘s difficult to explain to someone that hasn‘t experienced it. And, unfortunately, the Hollywood stereotypres don‘t help one bit.*
> 
> Consider this brief comparison (it doesn‘t cover every possibility):
> 
> ...


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## OldSolduer (19 Sep 2010)

That describes the officer/NCO relationship very well.


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## Haggis (19 Sep 2010)

The officer gives the direction and allots the time and resources for a job.  This may include either actual resources or the authority to gather those resources from elsewhere

The NCO gets the job done.


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## bdave (19 Sep 2010)

Awesome, thanks.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (20 Sep 2010)

Bdave, you asked what the similarities in our young officer's training and NCO's training are. 

Here is my take on it. 

The most unfortunate similarity is that the basic leadership curriculum for officer cadets is only a slightly more demanding version of the junior leadership course given to Corporals to turn them in Master-Corporal/Sergeants. They are given tasks to plan and carry out with a group of their peers where they act like a section/platoon leader.

This is fine and they learn exactly what they should expect their own platoon leaders to do. But the training sort of stops there and in my mind, should not. They should then be taken to the next step and told: now that you know this - you should forget about it because you have leaders to do all this for you in the field, called NCO's, and they will know how to do this a hundred times better than you. We will now teach you "How to Be a Leader of NCO's", because as an officer, they are the ones you need to impress and lead properly - then stand out of the way and let them do their magic while caring for the welfare of everyone under your charge.

And that is it: The job of an officer is to lead his NCO's and you do not lead them the way you lead the NCM's. A young officer's job is to lead and impress his NCO by example and learn all he/she can from him/her. The officer that impresses his NCO by always being turned out properly, setting high standards for himself, making the NCO's job as easy as possible, is always willing to take good advice of his NCO, standing back from the tasks being performed so as to be able to think alternate plans, taking things in stride, is present and always visible at the most demanding moments of any task or action, such officer will gain the confidence of his charges and they will look out for him and protect him from the consequences of the mistakes he will certainly make as a JO from time to time.


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## Wookilar (20 Sep 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> The most unfortunate similarity is that the basic leadership curriculum for officer cadets is only a slightly more demanding version of the junior leadership course given to Corporals to turn them in Master-Corporal/Sergeants.



I have to disagree with this part (however I certainly agree with the rest).
Calling any part of what is now called BMOQ "slightly more demanding" than a JLC, particular Mod 6, is a bit of an overstatement. The training has improved over the last 5 years (or so I am lead to believe), it no way compares to JLC, no matter how close the lesson plans are for the individual classes.

Common Army Phase, now, there is a different story...or should I say, it should be a different story. I did CAP two years ago and actually approached my course staff about individuals on my course. My concern was so great that I spoke with the OC about it (whether it is/was appropriate for a candidate to do this while on a course is another debate). The fact that every one  I spoke with listened to my concerns was a bit disconcerting in itself. I was expecting to be treated, well.... like a candidate  . In the 2 CAP courses that went through at the same time, there were no failures due to PO checks (a couple medicals). None.

Now, I may not be the best thing since sliced bread, but there were certainly people on my course that were either not ready for that level of mental/physical training, or it was not the right job for them. I know for a fact that more than a few of the individuals I was concerned about have since had repeated difficulty in further Phase training. I know 4 have been released. Their weaknesses were blatantly obvious for all to see, but they passed, and struggled, for 2 more years, in the end accomplishing nothing.

I do not know where the pressure is from. As someone on the ground floor I certainly do not have all the information.

But as far as officer training being more challenging.....yes, it should be....but I do not think that it really is at the very important early stages.

Wook


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## bdave (20 Sep 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> This is fine and they learn exactly what they should expect their own platoon leaders to do. But the training sort of stops there and in my mind, should not. They should then be taken to the next step and told: now that you know this - you should forget about it because you have leaders to do all this for you in the field, called NCO's, and they will know how to do this a hundred times better than you. We will now teach you "How to Be a Leader of NCO's", because as an officer, they are the ones you need to impress and lead properly - then stand out of the way and let them do their magic while caring for the welfare of everyone under your charge.
> 
> And that is it: The job of an officer is to lead his NCO's and you do not lead them the way you lead the NCM's. A young officer's job is to lead and impress his NCO by example and learn all he/she can from him/her. The officer that impresses his NCO by always being turned out properly, setting high standards for himself, making the NCO's job as easy as possible, is always willing to take good advice of his NCO, standing back from the tasks being performed so as to be able to think alternate plans, taking things in stride, is present and always visible at the most demanding moments of any task or action, such officer will gain the confidence of his charges and they will look out for him and protect him from the consequences of the mistakes he will certainly make as a JO from time to time.



It is beginning to make more sense now. I always figured you had to lead NCOs AND NCMs.
Awesome stuff, guys.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (20 Sep 2010)

Wookilar, please don't get me wrong: I am not talking about the complete BMOQ, only the actual leadership lessons and practical exercise phase. The overall BMOQ is quite demanding on the young officer cadets, and rightly so (especially after the great dip in standards of the "decade of darkness"  -My own opinion here).


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## TangoTwoBravo (20 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> It is beginning to make more sense now. I always figured you had to lead NCOs AND NCMs.
> Awesome stuff, guys.



Careful.  You lead both.


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## bdave (20 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Careful.  You lead both.



Now I'm just confused. Am I not supposed to use chain of command? Give orders to NCOs who pass them on to the NCMs?
Unless giving a direct order to an NCM ("I need you to do this/go there").


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## Oldgateboatdriver (20 Sep 2010)

Don't be. But also do not mix apples and oranges: Chain of command and the leadership by junior officers, while intertwined are not the same concept.

The posts above are correct: Officers lead both NCO's and NCM's. This leadership of the NCM's, however, is generally (and unless specific circumstances warrant otherwise) carried out through the NCO's. They are your "foremen" that get the job done according to your directives and leadership so that you are free to concentrate on thinking the situation through and helping the achievement of the objective, while taking care of your people's welfare (earlier I called them your charge).

If you re-read the last paragraph of my post above, you will see that it is ALL of your people that I am talking about: They all see you and your interaction with your NCO's and they respect your leadership over them IF they see you leading the NCO's properly and caring for the welfare of ALL of them.


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## Blackadder1916 (20 Sep 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> . . .
> 
> The most unfortunate similarity is that the basic leadership curriculum for officer cadets is only a slightly more demanding version of the junior leadership course given to Corporals to turn them in Master-Corporal/Sergeants. They are given tasks to plan and carry out with a group of their peers where they act like a section/platoon leader.
> 
> ...



I would also disagree with you on this point.  My experience with "leadership" training goes back a few more decades than Wookilar's and included being a student on both JLC and BOTC as well as being staff on JLC.  Yes, there were great similarities in the content of the leadership POs (including the small party tasks), but why shouldn't it be so - leadership is leadership regardless of the level at which it is practised.  In most cases, (whether on an NCO's first leadership course or an officer's basic course) it is the first time that an individual is exposed to a theoretical or practical study of the principles of leadership.  And in my dimming memory, there was much more discussion (both directed and spontaneous) on BOTC of the theory and application, especially as regards to dealing with Snr NCOs.  Even the interaction with the non-commissioned DS on BOTC becomes the first practical exposure to the junior officer/Snr NCO dynamic.

However, "learning to be a leader" doesn't stop with the formal training.  I can't speak for the experience of naval officers; I've never served in that element and thus have no experience with the traditional relationships of newly joined officers and petty officers.  In the army, however, it is that first posting as a subaltern in which he probably learns (and is expected to learn) his greatest lessons in leadership.  There are no formal "POs" for this schooling, its instructors are the other officers in the unit (whether they realize it or not) and the Snr NCOs and WOs that the young officer encounters.  That is where he attends the class called "How to Be a Leader of NCO's".


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## Arctic Acorn (20 Sep 2010)

You are responsible for and lead both NCOs and NCMs. The nuance is that you have to work through your NCOs as best you can, and you have to trust them to do the right thing. They translate your intent and end-state into tasks which are then completed. They lead their sections, you lead everyone through the NCOs. It's still on your shoulders. Pragmatically, it's a lot easier to work with a few folks with the experience and their knowledge of their sections, then to do it all yourself. Otherwise, there's no one to provide overall supervision, look ahead, plan, and all that other good stuff. 

Anyone else miss the old green uniforms? At the very least, concepts like this could be summed up pretty neatly with the whole, 'Officers wear their rank on their shoulders because they bear the responsibility for the actions of their solders; NCMs wear their rank on thier sleeves bacause they're the muscle that accomplish tasks...' thing.


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## Arctic Acorn (20 Sep 2010)

Blackadder: Extremely well said, and highlights why mentorship is so important.

I think sometimes people forget that military courses are designed to prepare you "for the first day on the job", be it as a vechicle tech, Int Op, infantry platoon commander, what have you. There are still whole universes of skills and lessons to develop in those positions after your name goes up on the door.


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## Pusser (20 Sep 2010)

Not to be nitpicky or anything, but officers DO lead both NCMs and NCOs, because they're part of the same group.  All NCOs are NCMs (although the converse is not true).

Now, to add my voice to those of others, the training and education of officers in leadership does not stop at BOTC.  It is an ongoing and neverending process for which the entire organization bears responsibility.  I learned more from my petty officers (both good and bad examples) than I ever did from any course.


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## TangoTwoBravo (20 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Now I'm just confused. Am I not supposed to use chain of command? Give orders to NCOs who pass them on to the NCMs?
> Unless giving a direct order to an NCM ("I need you to do this/go there").



You lead your whole Troop.  Most of the time your orders will indeed flow through your chain of command, but you must think of the whole Troop. 

I don't see my NCOs as foremen, as I am not a factory manager.  You won't always be the lead vehicle (and you generally shouldn't be), but as a Troop Leader you are out with the Troop doing the task.  Your radio orders are heard by pretty much everyone (less the drivers usually).  Your presence and leadership can inspire the whole Troop or make them hate coming to work.  The MCpls, Sgts and WO in your Troop can certainly make a huge difference here, but my point is that you lead your whole Troop and not just your NCOs.

All that being said, you aren't the one going around giving direction/supervision to each and every soldier.  The NCOs in your Troop will handle 99% of that.  When you do see something wrong you take corrective measures through your NCOs (unless it is a safety thing where you need to act right then and there).


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## bdave (21 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> You won't always be the lead vehicle (and you generally shouldn't be), but as a Troop Leader you are out with the Troop doing the task.



Why is this?


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Why is this?



Are you asking why are you not the lead vehicle or why you should be out doing the task?

Assuming that you are asking why you would not be the lead vehicle, as the Troop Leader you are in command of the whole Troop and need to be thinking widely.  If you are the lead vehicle in column or on a route recce, you will be focused in the details of navigation.  As a tank troop leader, your usual place in column is second in the order of march, with the Bravo callsign leading.  You still navigate and are up front (but in front), but the Sgt can focus on nav while you look after radio traffic from higher and keep your mind on the whole troop battle space.  It also reduces the chance that the troop leader is the first casualty.  Having said that, in tank tactics the troop leader's fire team can and often does take the lead bound.  There might even be times when you are the first vehicle through a danger area (perhaps the troop has to take a risk to satisfy the mission).  With Troop WO in the other fire team if you are in the lead fire team and become a casualty he can take over.

As an OC I am not the lead vehicle, but I am usually tucked in just behind the lead troop while the BC has the rear bound (with tanks - in recce he is in the CP).  

My point in that as a combat arms officer in a regiment you need to lead from the front while avoiding micro-managing your troops.  You don't sit back in a CP, but neither are you individually telling each Trooper what to do.  You need to show that you are not afraid of work on the hangar floor while avoiding getting in the MCpl's way.  Don't stress too much, though, as your WO will help you with all this if you let him.


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## bdave (21 Sep 2010)

Yes, it was concerning lead vehicle. I should have been more clear.

Thanks.


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## OldSolduer (21 Sep 2010)

bdave said:
			
		

> Yes, it was concerning lead vehicle. I should have been more clear.
> 
> Thanks.



One thing you may learn is the ABCs of military correspondence:

A - Accuracy;
B - Brevity - be breif; and
C - Clarity - be clear

Sadly, some have  missed this lesson entirely, while some slept through other parts.


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## bdave (21 Sep 2010)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> One thing you may learn is the ABCs of military correspondence:
> 
> A - Accuracy;
> B - Brevity - be breif; and
> ...



Noted.


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## Redeye (21 Sep 2010)

This has been a fascinating thread, and has given me several good ways of articulating what little I can claim to know to others I might now find myself in a position of trying to give a little bit of mentoring to.  I was fortunate being in the reserve that even an as officer cadet I was thrown almost directly into the breech without any formal training, with a number of excellent senior NCOs to guide me.

One thing that sticks with me actually was something Journeyman told me when he was my OC years ago - well - more something he told all the officers - "you must be seen to be seen to be leading".  That said, I was generally pulled back by NCOs if I ever got too stuck in to a task where I was not needed, and that was important to start learning the role I was supposed to be playing.  I found this worked well, because when I leveraged the NCO's skills instead of trying to direct everything I generally got far better results, and that seems to be the experience of other posters, and generally of any sort of leadership, including what I see in my civilian work experience.

I've now come to a new unit as a platoon commander, and not knowing anyone am now realizing why it's so important to leverage NCO's knowledge of the troops and the unit - to make sure that we're using the skills of everyone as much as possible.  I've always taken that Napoleonic view as well about the field marshal's baton in every rucksack and I believe it's important to harness the skills in all of them, especially the leadership potential.  I'm trying to spot who future section commanders, and future officers are where I can just by trying to watch interactions, and developing the same sort of "prospecting" in them is important too.

Definitely have to remember the "drain the swamp" analogy, that's good....


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## Arctic Acorn (21 Sep 2010)

Redeye said:
			
		

> Definitely have to remember the "drain the swamp" analogy, that's good....



Take it...I stole it, so why not you.  :nod:


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## OldSolduer (21 Sep 2010)

One thing we tend to do in the CF is "drain the lake". What I mean is that when a member (or a few members) stray outside their "arcs of fire" is we set blanket rules for the majority who do not stray.
Instead of disciplining members who stray, we set restrictive measures that hamper the rest of us.


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## Good2Golf (21 Sep 2010)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> One thing we tend to do in the CF is "drain the lake". What I mean is that when a member (or a few members) stray outside their "arcs of fire" is we set blanket rules for the majority who do not stray.
> Instead of disciplining members who stray, we set restrictive measures that hamper the rest of us.



Jim, sadly very true, particularly in the 90's (a.k.a. Decade of Darkness) -- punish the masses for the faults of a few.  It also reminds me of the desire by many officers to "Lead by managing" vice "Manage through leadership."

bdave, the "Command Team" relationship (between officer and NCO) is, at its best, a deep and respectful, mutual understanding between the Commander (officer at whichever level of command we are discussing, Unit, Company, Platoon, Section, etc...) and the Senior NCO (for that same tactical level) as to what the mission from higher entails, and the approach that will be undertaken by the formation towards the mission's accomplishment.  The officer should concentrate on the context of the mission and how it fits within the higher echelon's scheme of manoeuvre while the NCO will concentrate on the details of guidance and supervision that the soldiers require to ensure the actual execution of the mission can be successfully achieved.  The officer and NCO should also understand aspects of each others' responsibilities, but experience will guide them in not interfering with each other's primary responsibilities.  In the end, failure rests on the shoulders of the officer, but that does not excuse them from seeking the advice and counsel of their NCO.

Regards
G2G


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## Redeye (21 Sep 2010)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> In the end, failure rests on the shoulders of the officer, but that does not excuse them from seeking the advice and counsel of their NCO.



A key lesson is to seek that advice and counsel, because it is probably the best insurance against failure the young officer can obtain, that was a key thing I've learned.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Sep 2010)

Redeye said:
			
		

> A key lesson is to seek that advice and counsel, because it is probably the best insurance against failure the young officer can obtain, that was a key thing I've learned.



An excellent point, and it brings me to a point that perhaps relates back to the thread title.  Junior officers should not be afraid of failure.  There are limits, of course, but more senior officers should accept that junior officers will make mistakes or do things differently than they would have.  If we want to encourage mission command and the use of initiative, we need to let go sometimes and let the junior officers do their thing.  It might not be the way that we would have done it (regarding a task/mission), but I would rather have four subalterns who have initiative and drive but make the odd mistake than four subalterns who are afraid of making decisions and seek perfection.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (21 Sep 2010)

T2B endorses an excellent point, and adds one that truly ought to be the rule.

Even as Captain, with an XO and Heads of Department in every field, I must confess that I rarely made a final decision without sneaking behind these officers' back a "reality check" with the Coxn, CERA, Buffer or other senior CPO as appropriate. It has saved us all (me especially) from some pretty stupid calls on more than a few occasions.


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## Redeye (21 Sep 2010)

Agreed, I would get paralyzed by trying to perfect something and wind up screwing up worse than just making a decision and getting on with the show.  At the Infantry School when I was an OCdt I failed a patrol because I spent too much time trying to make the perfect plan, then too much time trying to sneak through the woods.  The DS told me "next time be bold, and be bold early" - wise words.  An adequate decision made in time is better than the perfect decision too late.

I think we learn by making some mistakes, or at least talking through what could be done better, and the AAR process is very good at making the most of these sorts of situations WRT to training, as are tactical decision games my current CO is a fan of - in a limited time, come up with a plan for a tactical problem, and discuss - they can teach a lot quickly.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> An excellent point, and it brings me to a point that perhaps relates back to the thread title.  Junior officers should not be afraid of failure.  There are limits, of course, but more senior officers should accept that junior officers will make mistakes or do things differently than they would have.  If we want to encourage mission command and the use of initiative, we need to let go sometimes and let the junior officers do their thing.  It might not be the way that we would have done it (regarding a task/mission), but I would rather have four subalterns who have initiative and drive but make the odd mistake than four subalterns who are afraid of making decisions and seek perfection.


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## bdave (21 Sep 2010)

This stuff is gold  ;D


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## Arctic Acorn (21 Sep 2010)

Redeye said:
			
		

> An adequate decision made in time is better than the perfect decision too late.



Many versions of  that one. Who was it that said, "An acceptable plan executed with speed and agression right now is better than a perfect plan executed too late."? 

On mistakes, a former boss I used to work for used to say, "Make mistakes. There's lots of new and interesting mistakes to be made out there, and every one is a learning opportunity...just don't let me catch you making the same one twice!"

He was a pretty eccentric cat, and because of this he had a lot of detractors, but I really looked up to the guy.


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## Pusser (21 Sep 2010)

One of the more famous PER quotes:

"This man never makes the same mistake twice, but all of them once."

My usual comment to the folks that dither is, "a poor plan well-executed is better than the best plan, poorly executed."


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## ArmyRick (22 Sep 2010)

It drives me mental when people go into the endless loop of looking for a "perfect" answer or solution.

As another good officer I worked with recently said "Lets go for the 80% solution".

There rarely is a perfect plan or answer to any problem and the sooner military leaders embrace that, the sooner they will succeed. Look at some of the battles fought in the falklands war, there were commanders making bold and what we might call reckless decisions. Yes they caused casualties but in the end, they got the missions done and in an aggressive manner.


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## aesop081 (22 Sep 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As another good officer I worked with recently said "Lets go for the 80% solution".



As a TACNAV once said to me : Perfect is the enemy of good enough.


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## Good2Golf (22 Sep 2010)

:nod:



> Don't aim for perfection.  The better is the enemy of the good.



COL John R. Moore, USMC (Ret).


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## daftandbarmy (22 Sep 2010)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> :nod:
> 
> COL John R. Moore, USMC (Ret).



I see your General Moore, and raise you a General Patton:

A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week. 

George S. Patton
US general (1885 - 1945) 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/34219.html


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