# The Victor Davis Hanson Thread



## Infanteer (26 Dec 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> VDH is, as usual, nothing more than a Bushvik parrot. Since no one in academia takes his works on the ancient Greeks seriously, I suppose he's got to eat somehow.



Is his work dismissed?

The thing I find about his writing is that it is hit and miss.  It is either top notch and really gets you thinking or it is silly, narrowly focused analysis that is right out of 'er.


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## Britney Spears (26 Dec 2005)

Well, it seems that his theories about the phalanx formation are not generally accepted by most  experts. I don't remember the specifics, It's been a while since I did that course, maybe I'll get back to you on that. It is possible that everyone just hates him because of his politics.


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## Britney Spears (27 Dec 2005)

Here's some cross posting from an ancient history board:



> His insane premise in Soul of Battle is that agrarian, democratic farmer-soldiers when properly led can kick the crap out of the most militant cultures in the world since they are fighting for democracy, freedom and apparently apple pie.
> 
> The statement itself is a tautology. What does properly led mean? If it means that they are led well enough to beat the enemy then of course they will win. That is true of fire ants. If someone learned how to lead fire ants properly they would, by defintion, be able to beat any army.
> 
> ...



I personally find his enitrely western-centric view of ancient warfare to be completely unrealistic. His assertion in _The Western Way of War_ that the Greeks INVENTED the pitched battle is pantently false, as there are plenty of sources, including biblical ones, that portray the Sumerians and Assyrians, the spiritual ancestors of the Persians, fighting very bloody pitched battles. His model for Phalanx warfare during the Persian Wars is at best,  conjecture, since his sources (Herodotus and Polybius) don't really give _any_ real tactical details of phalanx combat, and as I understand very few people in the field share his interpretations. The general conclusion that democratic societies produce superior warriors is easily disproven in the ancient context. 

I _think_ I've got most of those titles straight, I can't really claim to be much more of an amature when it comes to the ancient Mediteranean (Talk to me about medieval Chinese or Mongol battles any time), but a lot of Hanson's conclusions seem pretty suspect ( agenda driven and overly simplistic to suit his layman audience perhaps) even to me, and his far-right political leanings don't help either.

Maybe a_majoor can clarify further, since he's apparently a big fan of VDH.....


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## Infanteer (27 Dec 2005)

Yeah, I agree with much of what you said when it comes to the shodiness of some of his connections.  As I said, it is hit in miss with his work; for example, I thought he was very keen in pointing out some background points to victory in his case studies in Carnage and Culture but I found the grand scheme of linking it all together to be pretty tenuous.

VDH's view of a cultural approach to warfare is rooted in John Keegan's work.  Like any other complex phenomonon, their paradigm does well to explain much, but it does not address all.  Pick up John Lind's book Battle - he takes a serious crack at the VDH/Keegan constuct.  You might like it; he uses some ancient Chinese discussions as firepower to deconstuct the notion of "Western Shock Battle".


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## a_majoor (28 Dec 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Here's some cross posting from an ancient history board:
> 
> I personally find his enitrely western-centric view of ancient warfare to be completely unrealistic. His assertion in _The Western Way of War_ that the Greeks INVENTED the pitched battle is pantently false, as there are plenty of sources, including biblical ones, that portray the Sumerians and Assyrians, the spiritual ancestors of the Persians, fighting very bloody pitched battles. His model for Phalanx warfare during the Persian Wars is at best,  conjecture, since his sources (Herodotus and Polybius) don't really give _any_ real tactical details of phalanx combat, and as I understand very few people in the field share his interpretations. The general conclusion that democratic societies produce superior warriors is easily disproven in the ancient context.
> 
> ...



Yes I am, and in the spirit of the holiday season, I will attempt to help out here  ;D

Dr Hanson's arguments about the roots of western warfare have evolved, drawing from sources as varied as the ancient historians, archeological evidence, reconstruction on the lines of the German historian Max Delbruk and so on. The short summary of his argument is the ancient Greeks evolved the system of democracy through the idea of property rights; each farmer owned his own land, and because the amount of labour the farmer, his family and personal servants or slaves could invest was finite, each farmer in the district was able to have a farm roughly the same size and productivity as his neighbours. Since each farmer was economically at the same level as his peers, each had an equal vote in the assembly, and each had an equally compelling reason to turn out with his peers to defend the district from raiders and others who would seek to plunder or despoil the farms. This is the genisis of the Greek Phalanx. Other cultures had also derived the idea of fighting in close order, but the reason behind this was different, mostly as a counter to the chariot "cavalry" of the ancient Egyptian or Mesopotamian armies.

The motivation of the Classical Greeks for fighting was also different, rather than fighting for plunder, the Classical Greeks were usually fighting each other in a dispute over land or water rights, and *as farmers*, needed to resolve the issue as quickly and economically as possible. The two armies would march into position, do the ritual sacrifices to the Gods and listen to the speeches of their generals, don armour and put the question to the test of arms. The battle was also the war, and the decision was made on the spot, allowing the surviving farmers to go back to their fields. Indeed, the Classical Phalanx was all there was to Greek armies, the use of light troops and cavalry was excluded by convention, tactics and equipment (light troops and missile cavalry was unable to make a dent against close packed troops in heavy armour, lessons learned again and again in later ages), until they were exposed to foreign practice in the Persian wars. Later, many of the conventions and restraints that had been put on warfare went out the window in the Pelloponessian Wars, and Greek, Hellenistic and later Roman warfare evolved to become far more destructive than anything seen before. Certainly few other ancient civilizations were able to handle these armies, and only when the parent civilization decayed and the organizing principles were lost or corrupted were they defeated in the field.

The check sum to this argument was the Mycenean civilization. These people lived in Greece, spoke almost the same language and worshipped the same Gods, yet were organized in a "palace culture" civilization. Only the lords and their personal retainers were equipped in full armour, and they engaged in celebratory combat for the purpose of gaining plunder and personal glory. When you read the Iliad, it is a series of individual duels which form the core of each battle scene, rather than the organization and manoeuvre of formed bodies of troops. (The mass of Infantry retainers probably formed small shield walls for their lords to fall back behind and re-arm, and probably hoped to make names for themselves by displays of bravery if opponents tried to storm the shield wall and steal the stripped armour and other spoils of  battle). Archeological evidence supports this interpretation of Mycenean warfare.

Hanson's assertations are not about pitched battle per se, but rather the idea that for the Greeks, victory should be decided by shock action, as well as the idea that forces should stand and fight, rather than run away. Both the battle of Salamis and Thermopylae were rude shocks to the "Great King" and his forces, the usual response was for forces to melt away when faced by overwhelming odds. Since the Greeks were peers fighting for their own property and alongside their own neighbours and friends, they had far greater motivation than the enslaved soldiers and sailors of the Persian Empire (even a Satrap was reffered to as "my slave" in correspondence from Xerxes or Darius).

As Infanteer says, some of his constructs are very tenuous (the continuous liniage of the Western Way of War from the Classical Greeks to modern times is a very weak argument in my view), but the idea that democracies and free market economies provide the basis of powerful, flexible and almost unbeatable armies is well established in history.

I cannot claim knowledge of ancient Chinese warfare, and only limited knowledge of the Mongols, so a one to one comparison isn't possible by me in this forum.


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## Britney Spears (28 Dec 2005)

> Dr Hanson's arguments about the roots of western warfare have evolved, drawing from sources as varied as the ancient historians, archeological evidence, reconstruction on the lines of the German historian Max Delbruk and so on. The short summary of his argument is the ancient Greeks evolved the system of democracy through the idea of property rights; each farmer owned his own land, and because the amount of labour the farmer, his family and personal servants or slaves could invest was finite, each farmer in the district was able to have a farm roughly the same size and productivity as his neighbours. Since each farmer was economically at the same level as his peers, each had an equal vote in the assembly, and each had an equally compelling reason to turn out with his peers to defend the district from raiders and others who would seek to plunder or despoil the farms. This is the genisis of the Greek Phalanx. Other cultures had also derived the idea of fighting in close order, but the reason behind this was different, mostly as a counter to the chariot "cavalry" of the ancient Egyptian or Mesopotamian armies.



This seems like a pretty wide generalization. Ancient Greek cities, with the exception of Athens, were monarchies. Hoplites became hoplites by way of being rich enough to be able to afford their own kit. Attributing our ideas of equality and voting assemblies to states that we today know pretty much nothing about, aside from their names, seems to be a stretch. What about the Spartans? NONE of the Spartans were farmers.




> The motivation of the Classical Greeks for fighting was also different, rather than fighting for plunder, the Classical Greeks were usually fighting each other in a dispute over land or water rights, and as farmers, needed to resolve the issue as quickly and economically as possible. The two armies would march into position, do the ritual sacrifices to the Gods and listen to the speeches of their generals, don armour and put the question to the test of arms. The battle was also the war, and the decision was made on the spot, allowing the surviving farmers to go back to their fields. Indeed, the Classical Phalanx was all there was to Greek armies, the use of light troops and cavalry was excluded by convention, tactics and equipment (light troops and missile cavalry was unable to make a dent against close packed troops in heavy armour, lessons learned again and again in later ages), until they were exposed to foreign practice in the Persian wars. Later, many of the conventions and restraints that had been put on warfare went out the window in the Pelloponessian Wars, and Greek, Hellenistic and later Roman warfare evolved to become far more destructive than anything seen before. Certainly few other ancient civilizations were able to handle these armies, and only when the parent civilization decayed and the organizing principles were lost or corrupted were they defeated in the field.



As you say, this is a bit of a stretch.



> The check sum to this argument was the Mycenean civilization. These people lived in Greece, spoke almost the same language and worshipped the same Gods, yet were organized in a "palace culture" civilization. Only the lords and their personal retainers were equipped in full armour, and they engaged in celebratory combat for the purpose of gaining plunder and personal glory. When you read the Iliad, it is a series of individual duels which form the core of each battle scene, rather than the organization and manoeuvre of formed bodies of troops. (The mass of Infantry retainers probably formed small shield walls for their lords to fall back behind and re-arm, and probably hoped to make names for themselves by displays of bravery if opponents tried to storm the shield wall and steal the stripped armour and other spoils of  battle). Archeological evidence supports this interpretation of Mycenean warfare.



Not sure what the relevence of this part is, but in any case, very little is actually known for certain about Homeric warfare. The Illiad is not much of a field manual. 



> Hanson's assertations are not about pitched battle per se, but rather the idea that for the Greeks, victory should be decided by shock action, as well as the idea that forces should stand and fight, rather than run away. Both the battle of Salamis and Thermopylae were rude shocks to the "Great King" and his forces, the usual response was for forces to melt away when faced by overwhelming odds. Since the Greeks were peers fighting for their own property and alongside their own neighbours and friends, they had far greater motivation than the enslaved soldiers and sailors of the Persian Empire (even a Satrap was reffered to as "my slave" in correspondence from Xerxes or Darius).



That pretty much sums up my case against him. Claiming that the Greeks won the Persian wars soley because they were "free" is nice for the casual reader, but serious scholars generally know that history never produces such nice, neat conclusions. The Persian defeat at Salamis, rather than being due to unmotivated Persian(that is, Egyptian and Phonoecian) sailors, could easily be attributed to OVERmotivated Persians rushing to attack the Greek fleet en mass, and getting themselves trapped and packed in the narrow strait(Herodotus supports this), or any of 20 other reasons that have nothing to do with the Greeks or Democracy. It seems Hanson is simply cherry picking the evidence to support his claims.


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## Infanteer (28 Dec 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Ancient Greek cities, with the exception of Athens, were monarchies.



Just a bit of historical correction here; this isn't true - or at least not according to my Classical History professor.  He said Athens just had better publicity then the other _polies_ that had democracy.


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## Britney Spears (28 Dec 2005)

Assuming you're not talking about the other members of the Delian League....

Not absolute monarchies, to be certain, but neither does it bear much resemblance to modern liberal democracy. As I understand, most Greek Polis(including Sparta, I think) had some kind of assembly of aristocrats who wielded more power than the king, sometimes they chose the king outright. This is the same kind of system that the pre-Republic Romans, Carthagenians, and most of the Mediteranean world had, IIRC.


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## Mojo Magnum (28 Dec 2005)

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Well, it seems that his theories about the phalanx formation are not generally accepted by most  experts. I don't remember the specifics, It's been a while since I did that course, maybe I'll get back to you on that. It is possible that everyone just hates him because of his politics.



I hate to dumb down the conversation, but is this info that I can look forward to studying?  It sounds fascinating, or is this a subject you have pursued on your own?


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## Britney Spears (28 Dec 2005)

> I hate to dumb down the conversation, but is this info that I can look forward to studying?  It sounds fascinating, or is this a subject you have pursued on your own?



Well, my sources are more lectures than books, but there's plenty of them out there. Phalanx warfare(Classical, as opposed to Macedonian) isn't really as well understood as most people think it is. E.g. The classic model of a Phalanx battle depicts the two sides crashing together on shields and essentially going into a shoving match, and this is opften repeated in older history books, but more recent studies involving actual re-enactments seems to disprove this. They found that if you're at the very front and there are 10 or 20 guys behind you all pushing, the lead guy very quickly gets shoved off his feet and over the top of everyone's heads, "crowdsurfing" if you will.  There's also about a dozen(well, three major ones) different theories about how the Phalanx came into being, and they don't all mesh with each other.


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## a_majoor (28 Dec 2005)

The ancient Polis was not a liberal democracy, but it certainly was qualitatively different from either a monarchy or an oligarchy. During the classical period, most of the Polis were limited "Timocracies" (i.e. citizenship was limited by property qualifications, which as a practical matter translated into the ability to purchase the Hoplite panalopy), Athens was a radical democracy since the rowers of the Athenian Navy had won the right to vote (mostly due to the victory at Salamis), hence had a much larger assembly than normal in a city of that size. It is also important to note that Athens had a very small and somwhat ineffective hoplite force relative to the size of the city, since Athens preffered to project their power through the Navy, and adopted a defensive posture (with walls and fortifications) at home.

Sparta is a special case, and may be a holdover of Greek civilization from the "Dark Ages" after the fall of the Mycenean Palace culture. The motivations of the Spartan "Similars" were to keep the Helots in line, and adopting the close order formation of the other Greek Polis was a sensible step, given they were facing "light troops" in the form of rebellious helot mobs.


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## squealiox (30 Dec 2005)

Haven't read VDH (though i might, as i hear his earlier stuff is pretty good), but the American Conservative has an interesting review on his latest:


> December 19, 2005 Issue
> Copyright © 2005 The American Conservative
> 
> It’s All Greek to Victor Davis Hanson
> ...


http://www.amconmag.com/2005/2005_12_19/review1.html



incidentally, the reviewer, Gary Brecher, writes a column about warfare under the name of "The War Nerd" for another magazine. http://www.exile.ru/archive/by_author/gary_brecher.html
not sure whether to love or hate it, but it sure is one of the funniest things on the net. 


> Ames asked me to write a column on how all the wars are going, kind of a war reviewer. And I said yes on one condition, that you people don't send me emails telling me liking war is a sign of unhealthiness or some psychoanalytical crap.
> 
> I'm a war nerd. A backseat sergeant. I know what I am. All I have to do is look down at the keyboard and there's my hairy white gut slopping over it, and there's crumbs between the keys from the fake homemade soft'n'chewy big cookies in the vending machine downstairs. I mean they made me pay for the last keyboard because I spilled Diet Coke all over it. Diet Coke, the most fattening drink in the world. Every web pig in the world is swimming in it, farting off the side of the swivel chair, aroma-free carbonation farts, or at least you hope they are.
> 
> So I'm unhealthy. No shit, Sigmund. I live in Fresno which is a death sentence already, and I do about fifteen hours a day at this desk. 6 or 7 hours entering civilian numbers for the paycheck and the rest surfing the war news. I like war. So do you or you wouldn't still be reading. So shut up or leave.


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## a_majoor (30 Dec 2005)

> Now Hanson’s newest project, A War Like No Other, drags one of my heroes, the great Greek military historian Thucydides, into his seedy propaganda campaign. A War Like No Other is Hanson’s retelling of Thucydides’ great story of the Peloponnesian War, the grim 30-year struggle between Athens and Sparta. That’s a pretty conceited project, even for Hanson.



Always nice to see a cool, well reasoned critique of a work. If Hanson's work is conceit, I would be curious to read Gary Brecher's review of "The Peloponnesian War" by Donald Kagan. http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0670032115/104-6259032-0323966?v=glance&n=283155


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## squealiox (30 Dec 2005)

maybe i should have posted the full review, instead of just the link and intro. but brecher (aka war nerd) does go on to raise some interesting points, especially as to why the whole ancient greek parallel with modern warfare is a bit of a stretch.
such as: 


> No ancient army had a problem wiping out the whole male population of sacked cities and divvying up the females for use or sale.
> For better or for worse, modern armies just can’t do that any more. We kill lots of civilians, but if possible we do it from 30,000 feet, and we have to make it seem like we didn’t mean to do it. So when we’re facing urban guerrilla war, we can’t do what the ancients did—wipe out the place, kill every one of ’em.
> That’s why you don’t hear too much about urban guerrillas before the 20th century: before then urban guerrilla warfare as a strategy was civic suicide.


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## Infanteer (30 Dec 2005)

squeeliox said:
			
		

> So when we’re facing urban guerrilla war, we can’t do what the ancients did—wipe out the place, kill every one of ’em.
> That’s why you don’t hear too much about urban guerrillas before the 20th century: before then urban guerrilla warfare as a strategy was civic suicide.



I think that is more a factor of modern lethality than a matter of brutality.  Many modern armies have used brutality and outright destruction against modern urban guerilla's - some have failed (Russia in Chechnya) while others have succeeded (Syria in Hama).  Lethality is the important factor - in the day of melee combat or slow-firing muskets, mass was the key and one couldn't mass troops in a city.  George Washington's insurgency ( ) went to the woods because their tactics were more effective there; whether it be conventional battle or "ranging".  Since the beginning of the 20th century, weapons systems have become so lethal that moving to the field is asking for death - especially if one is underequipped.  Cities provide less-well off fighters a force multiplier.


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## squealiox (31 Dec 2005)

i agree with you about greater lethality pushing lesser-equipped forces off the battlefield. but still, i think a lot of insurgencies around today could probably be ended once and for all simply by complete extermination of the surrounding population, friend and foe alike. sort of like what the romans did to carthage. the means exist, but western armies, at least, don't seeming willing or able to take things that far.


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## Infanteer (31 Dec 2005)

I guess you do raise a valid point - the Carthaginian peace is something we haven't considered in a long time.  I wonder how hardcore the Iraqi Insurgency would be if the US simply put W84's into the middle of all the major cities of Al Anbar province....


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## enfield (31 Dec 2005)

squeeliox said:
			
		

> i think a lot of insurgencies around today could probably be ended once and for all simply by complete extermination of the surrounding population, friend and foe alike. sort of like what the romans did to carthage. the means exist, but western armies, at least, don't seeming willing or able to take things that far.



I believe that's called genocide, and is generally what we fight against. I recall the Germans trying it a few decades back... Mixed results. I'm not entirely sure that killing all Iraqis to save them from Saddam or Islamists quite makes sense. Also, the threshold of pain for societies is also a lot higher than we often think - look at what happened in Germany or Russia in WW2, or to Vietnam between 1950 and 1975. 

I can think of plenty of insurgent campaigns before the 20th century. The Penninsular Campaign in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars invented the term guerrilla. Rome fought a hit and run campaign against Carthage when they couldn't face Hannibal in the field. Alexander was mired in an insurgent campaign in Central Asia for several years, losing more men then he did in all his major battles combined. The colonial struggles of the French in North Africa and SE Asia, the British in Africa, India, and the North-West Frontier, the colonization of the North American west.... The list goes on - this "war nerd" needs to open a history book.


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## a_majoor (31 Dec 2005)

The cultural motivations for war are important here (this is the crux of VDH arguments), so the old solutions (The Romans create a wilderness, and call it peace), are inappropriate for our culture. Certainly if some renagade general were to clear the AOR of all human habitation, he certainly would not be rewarded for his efforts in destroying the insurgency, but rather spending a long time in jail.

As a historical BTW, most efforts in clearing an insurgency by devastation have been ineffective anyway.


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## enfield (31 Dec 2005)

a_majoor said:
			
		

> ...the old solutions (The Romans create a wilderness, and call it peace), are inappropriate for our culture.



True, to a degree - the modern era has created a spectrum of causes, responses, and levels of force that are appropriate. We still have the "Kill Everything" card in the back pocket, and are more than willing to use it when necessary - Total War. But, thankfully, those moments are rare. 

Pacification by devastation alone has proven ineffective. However, add in colonization, settlement, economic factors and demographics and pacification becomes possible. The white settler nations seem to prove this - not to mention Scotland or Carthage... 

Back to VDH:
I found his work on the cultural characteristics of survival interesting, and a nice counter to Jared Diamond's _Guns, Germs, and Steel _ hypothesis. _Carnage and Culture_ did a good job of attacking a lot of what Diamond said, showing the importance of unique cultural characteristics and the importance of local conditions and human choices. 
I disagree that there is one "Western" way of war, and that this way of war is somehow superior, but there seems to be a grain of truth in there. 

My main complaint with VDH is that he seems to view the world through very black and white lenses, and I'm not sure everything is as neatly divided as he likes to think. For example, a lot of research has shown that Classical Greece was largely an Eastern culture, heavily influenced and controlled by Eastern cultures and powers, and although they evolved into the roots of Western Civilization defining them as a seperate entity from Persia, Asia Minor, Levant and Egypt is incorrect.


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## squealiox (1 Jan 2006)

Enfield said:
			
		

> I believe that's called genocide, and is generally what we fight against. I recall the Germans trying it a few decades back... Mixed results. I'm not entirely sure that killing all Iraqis to save them from Saddam or Islamists quite makes sense.


er, just for the record, i'm not advocating that. just pointing out that world powers in classical times (and more recently too, of course) saw it as an option, but modern democracies do not.


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## a_majoor (24 Jan 2006)

A War Like No Other
by Victor Davis Hanson

http://www.jsharf.com/bookReviews/index.php?bookId=23
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbninquiry.asp?endeca=1&cds2Pid=164&isbn=1400060958



> Why do we still care about the Peloponnesian War, 2500 years after it ended? *Because it became the prototype war for death struggles between ideologies.* With the possible exception of the Punic Wars, the Roman wars of conquest were primarily political and personal matters, only incidentally spreading the idea of Roman Law. By the time of the Empire, the Romans were more civilized, but hardly more idealistic than their enemies.
> 
> It's also the best-documented ancient war. Along with Thucidydes's and Xenophon's contemporaneous accounts, the 4th-Century Athenians never stopped writing about its effects on their society and culture. Numerous classical historians have written accounts of the war, as well. After Troy and the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War was the beginning of western classical education (which meant basic education until Dewey).
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (1 May 2006)

The cultural imperatives that drive war havn't changed much over recorded history, as VDH shows. This is also a good way to look at the real imperatives of CF _Transformation_, 





> In other words, the newfound lethality of the Macedonian phalanx did not change at all the older rules of why men fight, the ingredients for their success or failure, or *how such new technology was rightly or wrongly employed in an unchanging strategic landscape.*



http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson043006.html



> *Passions: A Primordial Landscape*
> Comment on Colin S. Gray's military history arguments for the Historical Society
> by Victor Davis Hanson
> Historically Speaking
> ...



The last part about "many of our institutions that ultimately guide and shape civic society" is indeed frightening, since in Canada, a lot people attempt to use the CF as a sort of social laboratory to experiment on our young men and women, without stopping to consider the nature and  purpose of the Armed Forces. Thankfully, the evidence to date seems to show  the CF as an institution is robust enough to shoulder these changes and still be a combat effective force. This probably has more to do with the deep institutional and social roots of the Armed Forces (going back to the British parentage of the various services; the prototype of the current Regimental system can be seen in Oliver Cromwell's "New Model Army", and the Royal Navy's institutional roots go back to Hawkins and Drake fighting against the Spanish Armada even earlier) than any other factor.


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## a_majoor (19 May 2006)

VDH offers prescriptions for American Foreign policy in the future. The quick summary: "look more to our own interests, rather than try to please anyone else".

http://article.nationalreview.com/



> *Anti-Anti-Americanism*
> Dealing with the crazy world after Iraq.
> 
> By Victor Davis Hanson
> ...


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## a_majoor (27 Dec 2008)

VDH summarizes 2008:

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/25/EDGL14UQOL.DTL



> *2008 - Our 'that was then, this is now' year*
> 
> Victor Davis Hanson, Tribune Media Services
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (11 Mar 2010)

VDH on challenges to the Western way of War:

http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2009&month=11



> *The Future of Western War*
> 
> VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, the Wayne and Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History at Hillsdale College, is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a professor of classics emeritus at California State University, Fresno. He earned his B.A. at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University. He is a columnist for National Review Online and for Tribune Media Services, and has published in several journals and newspapers, including Commentary, the Claremont Review of Books, The New Criterion, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Dr. Hanson has written or edited numerous books, including The Soul of Battle, Carnage and Culture, and A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (13 Apr 2010)

VDH on the American recession. His observations about the breakdown of regulation and compliance bode ill, especially since California seems to have become the preview of what the Obama Administration wants for the entire nation.

http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/a-tour-through-recession-america/?singlepage=true



> *A Tour Through Recession America*
> 
> The last seven days I tried to jot down what I saw in some slices of America in recession — and much of its seems at odds with our general government narrative.
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (16 May 2010)

Does this explain the world view of the president and the administration?

http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/america-101/



> *America 101 With Dean Obama*
> 
> Posted By Victor Davis Hanson On May 15, 2010 @ 1:42 pm In Uncategorized | 10 Comments
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (4 Apr 2011)

Without comment:

http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/kingdom-of-lies/?singlepage=true



> *Kingdom of Lies*
> 
> Posted By Victor Davis Hanson On April 3, 2011 @ 10:12 am In Uncategorized | 73 Comments
> 
> ...


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## a_majoor (9 Dec 2014)

VDH offers a dark view of what the near future may bring:

http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/12/06/4273844_victor-davis-hanson-a-large-war.html?rh=1



> *Victor Davis Hanson: A large war is looming*
> By Victor DavisHanson
> FresnoDecember 6, 2014
> 
> ...


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## MilEME09 (9 Dec 2014)

I agree that the conditions are right however the nuclear aspect when it comes to Russia and china is big, IF and i do mean a big if the west can deploy an effective missile shield that could stop a nuclear tipped missile with near 100% accuracy it would be a game changer. If the nuclear equation was gone a long conventional war is guarantied


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## Retired AF Guy (9 Dec 2014)

I must say VDH is a lot more pessimistic then Paul Robinson was in yesterdays National Post which, is re-produced here under the usual caveats of the Copyright Act.



> Paul Robinson: Don’t panic — the world is not becoming more dangerous
> 
> Paul Robinson, National Post | December 8, 2014 7:23 AM ET
> 
> ...



 Article Link


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## Edward Campbell (10 Dec 2014)

I'm not so sure that a great many of us are not confusing, or, at least, mixing "danger" and "fear."

I'm inclined to the view that _circa_ 1900 France's very legitimate fear of Germany translated into a danger that France and Russia in trying to encircle Germany could and ultimately would provoke a great war. Germany's aims, in Europe and globally, were comprehensible but they were only likely to be met at the expense of French and, to a lesser degree, Russian _interests_. The French were afraid, and I repeat that they had reason to be afraid: Germany was big, powerful and willing to flex its political, economic and military muscle.

We ended the "war to end all wars" with an aborted "peace process" that eschewed peace in favour of punishment and, by French diplomatic and political error piled upon error, guaranteed a second, even worse war. Once again French fear coupled with British confusion and American isolationism combined to turn a reasonable, well founded fear into a real danger.

_I *don't* believe_ that the world is all that dangerous for us - the sophisticated, rich, US led West and Asia, but _I do believe_ that we are afraid of the strange, foreign, almost medieval _Islamist_ 'world' and I fear that we will, yet again, turn our fears, however valid they may be, into a real danger that does not and need not exist.


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