# "Where are the Afghan Inglorious Bastards?"



## The Bread Guy (11 Sep 2009)

This, from the US Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Centre blog, authored by a Canadian officer on exchange there.

"I was struck by a comment from an Army officer fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said, “fighting these guys (the Taliban) is like fighting the Marines.” I want to know who is training those guys, and where can we get them because without air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers, they seem to be getting pretty impressive results on the cheap.

There are a few facts and questions that we need to address honestly in an “understanding the environment” way before we can go on. We need to be honest with ourselves before we move forward because platitudes and slogans won’t win the COIN fight.

Here are some hard questions we need to ask:

We learn from Afghan/Pashtun culture that one of the basic tenants of “Pashtun Wali” (way of the Pashtun) is “Badal” (revenge). Logic dictates that if we kill one Afghan, we make 10 enemies. Where are the slighted Afghans that have been grieved by the Taliban who are thirsting for revenge or does this only work against us?

We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan?

These are not hi-tech, complicated solutions, but they could be effective. If we can’t find the Afghan Inglorious Bastards and figure out why criminals without money, air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers can be compared to the Marines, we will never win this fight. We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

_LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center._"


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## GAP (11 Sep 2009)

They are not there.....NATO represents a money tree to the ANA & ANP....and those Afghan Inglorious Bastards are waiting for their payday....

oh...they would like to see change, but in the meantime lets string this out to our advantage attitude is prevalent. Big UN/NATO operations bring cash into the economy like no other, and it does not have to be a subsistence society to recognize the benefits, but it puts everything out of wack.


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## OldSolduer (11 Sep 2009)

Not only that, but one of my favorite organizations, Amnesty International, would be crying for the Basterds heads, along with every other Taliban apologist.


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## COBRA-6 (11 Sep 2009)

IMHO there are plenty of Afghans who would pull the kind of Ops mentioned in the article, if supported. But try staffing up a CONOP of that nature and see how far it goes. All the talk of COIN this and asymetric that aside, we are fighting an unconventional conflict with a conventional mindset. I doubt Les Commandos Tigres Noir had to conduct daily VTC's with HQ's on other continents, or have their Op Plans approved by LEGADs, POLADs, multinational Staffs, etc. 

Not to mention that if all these obstacles were somehow removed, it takes significantly longer than 6 months on the ground to gain the detailed SA and build the personal relationships and trust required to make these kind of Ops happen.

Just my $0.02...


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## Edward Campbell (11 Sep 2009)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Ottawa Citizen_, is more on the topic:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/lacks+human+touch+NATO+adviser/1981722/story.html


> U.S. lacks human touch: NATO adviser
> *Mission at risk because army can't connect with people, military told*
> 
> By David ********, The Ottawa Citizen
> ...




The article seems to suggest that more "inglorious bastards" are not what's most needed.


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