# Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher



## GR66 (19 Mar 2021)

This also got me to thinking...could you also develop a cheap, Carl G type round that could use the same launch unit.  A single launcher that can fill multiple roles.


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## FJAG (19 Mar 2021)

GR66 said:


> This also got me to thinking...could you also develop a cheap, Carl G type round that could use the same launch unit.  A single launcher that can fill multiple roles.


It's not so much the weapon system but the target acquisition/command and control system that makes it effective.

a) do you really want to be humping around anti air rounds in the event that you may need it?; or

b) do you want to let the platoon let fly against whatever aircraft crosses their front?

Air defence is substantially more efficient if coordinated weapon systems that form part of a specialized, integrated network are deployed throughout the region to provide total coverage.

🍻


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Mar 2021)

Currently we have zero air defense, unless you count power points documents. Even 1 partial effective layer is 100% better than what we have now. Start with Manpads, buy a lot of trainers, get them out to the troops and stand up reserve AD troops as well, get them out in the field to practice the craft and force commanders to operate under the restrictions of a partial AD cover. It will drive home the need for more systems. 
The other options is to do the classic wait till people die or land into a theatre where it is badly needed and have people learn those skills on the two way range against people who want to kill them and really hope the other side miss.


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## dapaterson (19 Mar 2021)

AD is all about sensor to shooter.  Just shooter doesn't give you much of anything.


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## SeaKingTacco (19 Mar 2021)

dapaterson said:


> AD is all about sensor to shooter.  Just shooter doesn't give you much of anything.


Arguably, airspace coordination and control is even more important, but it is poorly understood amongst the Army leadership.


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Mar 2021)

Currently we have neither, at least with manpads, our opponents might exercise a modicum of caution, otherwise we are just the turkeys in a turkey shoot.


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## FJAG (19 Mar 2021)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Currently we have zero air defense, unless you count power points documents. Even 1 partial effective layer is 100% better than what we have now. Start with Manpads, buy a lot of trainers, get them out to the troops and stand up reserve AD troops as well, get them out in the field to practice the craft and force commanders to operate under the restrictions of a partial AD cover. It will drive home the need for more systems.
> The other options is to do the classic wait till people die or land into a theatre where it is badly needed and have people learn those skills on the two way range against people who want to kill them and really hope the other side miss.


I have no problem with manpads as long as they are part of an integrated air defence system the way that Javelins were a few decades ago. By all means let's start with air defence batteries in hybrid reg/res air defence batteries and layer them into the bigger systems if and when we get them.

My preference though, rather than pure manpads, is an inexpensive low level systems like the Avenger which deliver both a gun and missile solution so can provide an inexpensive anti UAV response. Avenger is old and proven and while not top of the line technology is available, is still being fielded in the US, and would easily work as a training aid for units until a better system can be fielded.

I tend to go with hybrid batteries for the following reasons:

a) air defence command and control is complex and needs the experience and training of full-timers (just as right now air space control centres are reg f components of 4th Regt RCA (GS) - (which previously as 4th AD Regt contained both ASCCs and AD batteries - and provided expertise with a healthy reg f component within res f AD regts and batteries);

b) if air defence C&C cells are reg f then they can support reg f exercises even without (or with minimal) reserve f shooter participation to provide the air defence input into those exercises;

🍻


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## blacktriangle (19 Mar 2021)

SeaKingTacco said:


> Arguably, airspace coordination and control is even more important, but it is poorly understood amongst the Army leadership.


It would appear that the ASCC capability is being modernized, perhaps that is a good sign?

Everyone always wants to talk missiles and guns, few seem interested in talking sensors, C2, or defensive ECM...


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## SeaKingTacco (19 Mar 2021)

reveng said:


> It would appear that the ASCC capability is being modernized, perhaps that is a good sign?
> 
> Everyone always wants to talk missiles and guns, few seem interested in talking sensors, C2, or defensive ECM...


No, everything you mention is important. I think soft kill options have to be examined along with hard kill options. It is a much more complex problem than it was during the cold war.


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## FormerHorseGuard (19 Mar 2021)

There was total force unit, called 1AD, ( I am sure there were others but this unit I was apart of for a short while). They had a huge budget to pay  reserve force troops, they were on many exercises with the Reg Force at Petawawa and other places.  Big issue was the training area was almost to small to train on for range safety.  Personnel were always busy but equipment costs were high and demand was high for training. Now they converted to mud gunners, cheaper toys and tools, and loss of assets , skills and hard to replace when everyone is now doing something else or left the army. Starting back at page 1 of the training manual.


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## blacktriangle (19 Mar 2021)

SeaKingTacco said:


> No, everything you mention is important. I think soft kill options have to be examined along with hard kill options. It is a much more complex problem than it was during the cold war.


Yes, and I assume most of the CA corporate knowledge as it relates to AD has since moved on to industry or well-deserved retirements. Perhaps time to call in some RCN/RCAF advisors...

And it would also be nice if some capabilities could be lean enough to deploy with light forces & SOF... you know, in case anyone fires rockets et al. at their camp?


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## FJAG (19 Mar 2021)

FormerHorseGuard said:


> There was total force unit, called 1AD, ( I am sure there were others but this unit I was apart of for a short while).


1 AD Regt in Pembroke (now 42 Fd Regt) supported Central Region while 18 AD Regt (redesignated 20 Ind Fd Bty) in Lethbridge supported the west and 58 AD Bty in Val Bel-Air (part of 6 Fd Regt RCA and now returned as a Fd bty) supported Quebec were all total force units while 4 AD Regt in the Maritimes was fully reg f.



reveng said:


> Yes, and I assume most of the CA corporate knowledge as it relates to AD has since moved on to industry or well-deserved retirements. Perhaps time to call in some RCN/RCAF advisors...
> 
> And it would also be nice if some capabilities could be lean enough to deploy with light forces & SOF... you know, in case anyone fires rockets et al. at their camp?


The AD became "unequipped" (except for their ASCC components) around 2005/6 around the same time that the RCA ejected the M109s. The PYs were phased over to radars and UAVs as part of the rediscovery that artillery surveillance and target acquisition resources (which had previously died out except for a dozen folks at the School of Artillery) was needed when people shot mortars and rockets at you. M777s replaced the M109s in much smaller numbers. Res AD units reverted to Fd arty. 4 AD Regt converted to general support and gradually changed over to medium radars and tactical UAVs while keeping the ASCCs.

There are still some Air Defenders in the system who could be scraped together to form a core of skills. And of course 4 AD Regt's ASCCs offer some key command and control elements. 

The artillery has struggled, just as the army as a whole has, with PY limitations and lost skills as resource allocations change. I think we have been particularly bad at keeping equipment and skills alive by refusing to transfer capabilities to the reserves. Most often this is because the few reg f PYs needed to provide ongoing leadership and expertise to the reserves and the few dollars needed to maintain this older equipment is simply not made available. I know that attempts were made to save some of this equipment but they were rejected. The Army's mantra is that we simply cannot afford the costs of maintaining older equipment so -- divest, divest, divest. Unfortunately that means capabilities are lost and corporate knowledge dies out with the old veterans. We couldn't be stupider if we had a deliberate plan to be stupid.

😡


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Mar 2021)

Which is why I advocate getting Manpads with lot's of training versions. Push it out to the Reserves, you need a crewcab, one NCO per detachment (say 5 personal per detachment) a TSM and Officer to command up to 3 detachments. They start learning the basics of the trade, from siting, camouflage, fieldcraft, supporting other elements. Once they got the basics down (borrow the SOP's from allied forces that have such toys), then integrate into the command structure using RCN and RCAF personal. If you do it right, it will become the "Fun,cool troop" who get to go on jaunts with infantry units, onboard the Kingstons and AOP's, set up to guard airports , infrastructure. Work with the RCAF in wargame to conduct simulated attacks on each other. Get sent overseas to work with allied AD networks.

You can start the above with minimal up front investment in equipment and PY's and will give the Reserves a mission once their 105's die with no replacement, which is highly likely. I agree with what you say we need FJAG, but the hard reality is that there will be little to no money spent on this and all we (Canada) do is talk and talk about it. At least this gives you the basic building blocks and people with some skills to add the more complicated layer to in the future if people finally wake up to the threat. Eventually these troops could be upgraded to something like this in a light armoured vehicle, along with dismountable units.


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## blacktriangle (19 Mar 2021)

Colin - 

I think the biggest issues are weapon system/platform agnostic. If you deploy MANPADS and forgo the idea of establishing a holistic IADS, your adversary will simply work around this leaving your forces with no net gains. IMO, at least. 

I think back to the the operational functions (I apologize if these are no longer used) - Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain. You are focused on Act/Shield (perhaps a learned officer type can help me out here) but have overlooked the importance of Command & Sense. I would argue that these two functions should be in place before anything else...


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Mar 2021)

Currently our AD is at the same level as our forces were at at the beginning of WWII, the only effective AD we have is the leopard II ability to engage Attack Helicopters. Nothing in my idea precludes working on command and control, in fact I will argue that my idea will force the army to get off it's arse and actually do something for real and not more tokenism. Sorry but until I see some sort of ability to actually engage and destroy hostile flying devices, it's all a large circle jerk. I am sure there are people in the army that want to move this ahead, but it's all theoretical until you can reach out and kill something. The army has had ample time since ADATS to think about command and control of AD assets and clearly if your worried that we don't have that at the moment, then they have utterly failed at protecting their forces from real and evolving threats. Maybe we should frame AD as a means to protect and improve diversity and inclusion in the forces?

Sorry for the rant but I find our responses to this threat an utter failure of command and leadership, which is why I push bottom up solutions, because I seen more bottom up solutions work than top down.


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## Weinie (19 Mar 2021)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Currently our AD is at the same level as our forces were at at the beginning of WWII, the only effective AD we have is the leopard II ability to engage Attack Helicopters. Nothing in my idea precludes working on command and control, in fact I will argue that my idea will force the army to get off it's arse and actually do something for real and not more tokenism. Sorry but until I see some sort of ability to actually engage and destroy hostile flying devices, it's all a large circle jerk. I am sure there are people in the army that want to move this ahead, but it's all theoretical until you can reach out and kill something. The army has had ample time since ADATS to think about command and control of AD assets and clearly if your worried that we don't have that at the moment, then they have utterly failed at protecting their forces from real and evolving threats. Maybe we should frame AD as a means to protect and improve diversity and inclusion in the forces?
> 
> Sorry for the rant but I find our responses to this threat an utter failure of command and leadership, which is why I push bottom up solutions, because I seen more bottom up solutions work than top down.


There is a* real *Revolution in Military Affairs happening, as we speak. Many traditional platforms, notwithstanding history, pundits, or futurists, are already obsolete.

The advances in weaponry, that we are aware/apprised of, are mind-boggling. Just in the last 12 months, when speaking of known weapons systems that are coming on-line, defy my comprehension of warfare. Imagine what the next 36 months will do.


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## blacktriangle (19 Mar 2021)

Weinie said:


> There is a* real *Revolution in Military Affairs happening, as we speak. Many traditional platforms, notwithstanding history, pundits, or futurists, are already obsolete.
> 
> The advances in weaponry, that we are aware/apprised of, are mind-boggling. Just in the last 12 months, the weapons systems that are coming on-line, defy my comprehension of warfare. Imagine what the next 36 months will do.


I'm looking at you, CSC.


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## CBH99 (19 Mar 2021)

reveng said:


> Colin -
> 
> I think the biggest issues are weapon system/platform agnostic. If you deploy MANPADS and forgo the idea of establishing a holistic IADS, your adversary will simply work around this leaving your forces with no net gains. IMO, at least.
> 
> I think back to the the operational functions (I apologize if these are no longer used) - Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain. You are focused on Act/Shield (perhaps a learned officer type can help me out here) but have overlooked the importance of Command & Sense. I would argue that these two functions should be in place before anything else...


I agree with both of you.  I think Colin is looking at this from a practical system & practical use perspective -- whereas you are perhaps looking at this from a larger IADS perspective?

However, in the practical & useful sense of the capability, I have to go with Colin on this one, big time.  Otherwise we end up with the same capability that we did in Afghanistan where we bought into Iron Dome for the radar capability, but didn't bother to buy into the engagement capability.  So we can sense incoming threats, but we just can't do anything about it... not entirely useless, but not entirely helpful either.

By acquiring a capable MANPAD system & pushing it to the reserve force - we do acquire a very useful and effective capability which would be an absolute game changer for our forces, for a minimal financial investment.  Easily purchased, easily trained, easily deployable, and useful everywhere.  I'd say it's a fantastic investment and idea.


For a larger and more capable IADS, such as that would be found in a coalition environment, the focus on proper C2 may be more appropriate, as that system would include layers of different radars and weapon systems all working together.

For a simple MANPAD system that could sense & engage hostile helicopters, drones, and low flying targets -- getting a good system, getting the troops trained on it and having the system absorbed into our capabilities -- would absolutely be a significant capability boost, without needing to overthink it.


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Mar 2021)

Weinie said:


> There is a* real *Revolution in Military Affairs happening, as we speak. Many traditional platforms, notwithstanding history, pundits, or futurists, are already obsolete.
> 
> The advances in weaponry, that we are aware/apprised of, are mind-boggling. Just in the last 12 months, when speaking of known weapons systems that are coming on-line, defy my comprehension of warfare. Imagine what the next 36 months will do.


Problem is that you can paralyze yourself into inaction by waiting for the next big thing. Most of these ideas we saw in the  Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict are not that new, but it did showcase how effective they can be. Much of the actual destruction was caused by artillery, which is another utter failure point of our High Command (It's a long list).
Armenia had a somewhat robust AD system in regards to actual systems, but did a terrible job at locating and using them. That sort of stuff comes down to training and practice. There are tons of lessons to be learned. Problem is people talk about (in a metaphoric sense) the university level stuff, while our forces aren't even at the Grade 1 level yet. You need to get started on basics before you can do advanced stuff.
I add that armed UAV 's in Syria wrecked havoc till properly manned AD systems were introduced.

The sad bit is that we had the technology and the desire to have a robust AD system, but we did what Canada does best......


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## Weinie (19 Mar 2021)

CBH99 said:


> I agree with both of you.  I think Colin is looking at this from a practical system & practical use perspective -- whereas you are perhaps looking at this from a larger IADS perspective?
> 
> However, in the practical & useful sense of the capability, I have to go with Colin on this one, big time.  Otherwise we end up with the same capability that we did in Afghanistan where we bought into Iron Dome for the radar capability, but didn't bother to buy into the engagement capability.  So we can sense incoming threats, but we just can't do anything about it... not entirely useless, but not entirely helpful either.
> 
> ...


You folks are much more informed in this realm than I am. But I can imagine a scenario where successive, loitering AI enabled drones/UAV's completely overwhelm any GBAD/IADS system deployed. And then, the games begin.


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## GR66 (19 Mar 2021)

Determining where MANPADS fit into the overall AD system is obviously an important conversation.  My initial comment however was more about the logistical side of things.  

We need an advanced ATGM and Javelin fits the bill.  We need an AD missile and Stinger fits the bill.  We're a country though with a limited budget however so maybe there is an opportunity here to simplify our logistics with a single launcher.  

AT teams can use the Javelin launch unit with Javelin missiles.  Since Javelin missiles cost around $100k it would be a huge bonus if the same launcher could also be used to launch a less advanced projectile in the $3k/round range (similar to a Carl-G round) for use against light vehicles, bunkers, etc.

AD teams could use the Javelin launch unit with Stinger missiles.

Kongsberg's Protector RWS (among others) can mount the Javelin launcher which we could use for both AT and AD roles.  This could be used on our Reserve Armoured (AT) and Artillery (AD) units on the TAPV again leveraging equipment commonality.

Our Reg Force LAV units could use the same turret as the IM-SHORAD on the Stryker vehicle...which again uses the Stinger missile.

Standardize.  Keep it simple.  Have multiple munitions that can be used from the same launcher.  If there is a major armoured threat but we have air superiority then your AD units could take up the AT role.  If the air threat is dominant the AT units can augment the AD units.  You run out of one type of ammo and the launcher doesn't become useless.  Your launch unit is damaged and you can use one from another unit/role when required.


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## Weinie (19 Mar 2021)

Colin Parkinson said:


> *Problem is that you can paralyze yourself into inaction by waiting for the next big thing.* Most of these ideas we saw in the  Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict are not that new, but it did showcase how effective they can be. Much of the actual destruction was caused by artillery, which is another utter failure point of our High Command (It's a long list).
> Armenia had a somewhat robust AD system in regards to actual systems, but did a terrible job at locating and using them. That sort of stuff comes down to training and practice. There are tons of lessons to be learned. Problem is people talk about (in a metaphoric sense) the university level stuff, while our forces aren't even at the Grade 1 level yet. You need to get started on basics before you can do advanced stuff.
> I add that armed UAV 's in Syria wrecked havoc till properly manned AD systems were introduced.
> 
> The sad bit is that we had the technology and the desire to have a robust AD system, but we did what Canada does best......


Perhaps the bigger problem is not understanding/accepting what is the next big thing, or introducing the next big thing, such that " I add that armed UAV 's in Syria wrecked havoc till properly manned AD systems were introduced." becomes a footnote.


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## FJAG (19 Mar 2021)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Currently our AD is at the same level as our forces were at at the beginning of WWII, the only effective AD we have is the leopard II ability to engage Attack Helicopters. Nothing in my idea precludes working on command and control, in fact I will argue that my idea will force the army to get off it's arse and actually do something for real and not more tokenism. Sorry but until I see some sort of ability to actually engage and destroy hostile flying devices, it's all a large circle jerk. I am sure there are people in the army that want to move this ahead, but it's all theoretical until you can reach out and kill something. The army has had ample time since ADATS to think about command and control of AD assets and clearly if your worried that we don't have that at the moment, then they have utterly failed at protecting their forces from real and evolving threats. Maybe we should frame AD as a means to protect and improve diversity and inclusion in the forces?
> 
> Sorry for the rant but I find our responses to this threat an utter failure of command and leadership, which is why I push bottom up solutions, because I seen more bottom up solutions work than top down.


We're not a hundred percent dead. 4 Regt (GS) does maintain the ASCC capability and the Medium Range Radar while primarily a counter rocket, gun, mortar system (and a good one) also has aerial surveillance capabilities against a host of aircraft. So we do have some Sense and Command capability while our Act capability is zero.



Weinie said:


> There is a* real *Revolution in Military Affairs happening, as we speak. Many traditional platforms, notwithstanding history, pundits, or futurists, are already obsolete.
> 
> The advances in weaponry, that we are aware/apprised of, are mind-boggling. Just in the last 12 months, when speaking of known weapons systems that are coming on-line, defy my comprehension of warfare. Imagine what the next 36 months will do.


That there is a real revolution happening is crystal clear. That many traditional platforms are obsolete is not so clear. Offensive armoured capabilities are still very necessary, perhaps more so than ever. The primary question is what will those look like in the future? The secondary question is: what do we do in the meantime?

It's really kind of interesting. In WW2, the Germans in six years went from the tiny and lightly armed Panzer I and II to Panthers and Tigers. The next sixty years saw improvements which were more a slow evolution rather than a revolution but essentially we were still working on almost a century old combined arms blitzkrieg concept of warfare. Yes. We're standing on the edge of a new revolution which is highly dependent on electronics. Makes me wonder what EMPish Shield systems are in the mill out there and how resistant much of this stuff will be to it. I'll put money on the fact that there will be a place for the rumbling treads of heavy metal crewed by wetware being covered by high explosive fired from an armoured ground based gun/launcher for quite some time to come.

🍻


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## Weinie (19 Mar 2021)

FJAG said:


> We're not a hundred percent dead. 4 Regt (GS) does maintain the ASCC capability and the Medium Range Radar while primarily a counter rocket, gun, mortar system (and a good one) also has aerial surveillance capabilities against a host of aircraft. So we do have some Sense and Command capability while our Act capability is zero.
> 
> 
> That there is a real revolution happening is crystal clear. That many traditional platforms are obsolete is not so clear. Offensive armoured capabilities are still very necessary, perhaps more so than ever. The primary question is what will those look like in the future? The secondary question is: what do we do in the meantime?
> ...


And I will put money on the fact that any real "war" that happens in the next decade (no proxie crap) will be fought in a realm (with a determined outcome)  that will be decided well before any deployment of heavy metal is possible and/or required.


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## childs56 (26 Mar 2021)

Back a few years ago the Navy on the west coast asked if the Local Reserve Artillery unit could put together a Air Defense troop to support their operations. The intent that the Navy would pay for the equipment and training costs. While the Reserves supply the troops.  It was a good thought. that is as far as it went due to the limited ability of the Field Artillery old boys club to wrap their mind around a operational Reserve unit. How dare they try to take away our guns.  
The idea was simple to run manpacks on the frigates and smaller vessels as a harbor protection/ along with being able to deploy a small rotating detachment aboard two to three ships at a time for patrols in hotspots.  The idea fell to the wayside because the COC in the Reserves did not want a New Air defense unit because they did not want to loose being Field Artillery.  Instead they pissed away what could have been a awesome tasking for the Reserve unit. One that was viable., made sense and provided a good solid structure for the future. 
There was some head scratching as to why a Navy ship needed a man pad air defense weapon because they had a big radar, a few missiles and that nice gun. Those systems work well but do not work very well for smaller targets and the one target that does get in close. 
It disappeared and not discussed afterwards. At the time the Navy was pretty disappointed about the whole thing. This was a time when they were trying to bring their base defense force in full force. Were looking for other outside the box thinking.   

I agree man pads and the Avenger turrets would be a awesome level assets to units. They can can be cheap to train and very effective for AD along with anti armour.


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## GK .Dundas (27 Mar 2021)

Jesus wept!
seriously ?
I sometimes wonder at how someone that stupid can actually reach a command postion.


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## Kirkhill (27 Mar 2021)

While you're debating what air defence looks like..... here's what the air threat looks like circa Dec 2020.

The video shows a synthetic run .... and then a real run with real drones through real trees.  Targets a couple of hundred bucks a piece?  What price the Anti-Drone Missiles?  How effective are line of sight weapons?





__





						Science | AAAS
					






					www.sciencemag.org


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## FJAG (27 Mar 2021)

childs56 said:


> Back a few years ago the Navy on the west coast asked if the Local Reserve Artillery unit could put together a Air Defense troop to support their operations. The intent that the Navy would pay for the equipment and training costs. While the Reserves supply the troops.  It was a good thought. that is as far as it went due to the limited ability of the Field Artillery old boys club to wrap their mind around a operational Reserve unit. How dare they try to take away our guns.
> The idea was simple to run manpacks on the frigates and smaller vessels as a harbor protection/ along with being able to deploy a small rotating detachment aboard two to three ships at a time for patrols in hotspots.  The idea fell to the wayside because the COC in the Reserves did not want a New Air defense unit because they did not want to loose being Field Artillery.  Instead they pissed away what could have been a awesome tasking for the Reserve unit. One that was viable., made sense and provided a good solid structure for the future.
> There was some head scratching as to why a Navy ship needed a man pad air defense weapon because they had a big radar, a few missiles and that nice gun. Those systems work well but do not work very well for smaller targets and the one target that does get in close.
> It disappeared and not discussed afterwards. At the time the Navy was pretty disappointed about the whole thing. This was a time when they were trying to bring their base defense force in full force. Were looking for other outside the box thinking.
> ...



The key element of your case is the term "a few years ago". Those years matter as in the early 2000s the Army did have an air defence arm including two reserve regiments and an additional battery. These were total force units with a significant number of reg f members. More importantly, there was an infrastructure behind that including the requisite training needed at the school of artillery. 

When that capability was stupidly stood down across the board for financial reasons in the latter part of that decade, the whole infrastructure more or less collapsed with all the Reg F folks going to what is essentially surveillance and target acquisition (and a little bit of air space coordination) and the reservists going back to gun batteries.

Afghanistan caused a major restructuring within the artillery which would have made it pretty close to impossible to train and sustain a single air defence battery, especially one far away on the West Coast. I'm not so sure as to whether the folks that put the kibosh to this initiative was the reserve force CoC or the Army in general but, notwithstanding that this could have been a good opportunity, it undoubtedly was seen as much more challenging then the artillery could handle.

🍻


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## Colin Parkinson (27 Mar 2021)

If you can't sustain a Troop of AD gunners with the entire Reserve Artillery, then we have utterly failed.


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## FJAG (27 Mar 2021)

Colin Parkinson said:


> If you can't sustain a Troop of AD gunners with the entire Reserve Artillery, then we have utterly failed.



Well, its really not that simple but yeah, we have utterly failed, IMHO. Not because we can't sustain a single troop but because we can't sustain a critical capability across the entire Army.

I don't want to get shirty about the whole thing but we could easily continue on doing what we're doing with eight infantry battalions rather than nine so that those eight could operate under a decent air defence umbrella. With 561 Reg F PYs and four or five res f arty regt's you could create several sizeable hybrid regf/resf air defence and rocket launcher regiments. But hey, that's just me.

🍻


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## childs56 (28 Mar 2021)

FJAG said:


> The key element of your case is the term "a few years ago". Those years matter as in the early 2000s the Army did have an air defence arm including two reserve regiments and an additional battery. These were total force units with a significant number of reg f members. More importantly, there was an infrastructure behind that including the requisite training needed at the school of artillery.
> 
> When that capability was stupidly stood down across the board for financial reasons in the latter part of that decade, the whole infrastructure more or less collapsed with all the Reg F folks going to what is essentially surveillance and target acquisition (and a little bit of air space coordination) and the reservists going back to gun batteries.
> 
> ...


The key in the whole process was the Navy was going to pay for the training and equipment, not the Army. That was around when the Army was standing down the AD units. Which I think made a few people bitter about the idea of a full on Reserve unit taking over what they felt was their role, especially when the Army choose to not support the role anymore said it was not needed.


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## brihard (28 Mar 2021)

FJAG said:


> Well, its really not that simple but yeah, we have utterly failed, IMHO. Not because we can't sustain a single troop but because we can't sustain a critical capability across the entire Army.
> 
> I don't want to get shirty about the whole thing but we could easily continue on doing what we're doing with eight infantry battalions rather than nine so that those eight could operate under a decent air defence umbrella. With 561 Reg F PYs and four or five res f arty regt's you could create several sizeable hybrid regf/resf air defence and rocket launcher regiments. But hey, that's just me.
> 
> 🍻


Without a decent air defense umbrella, you don’t get to keep nine infantry battalions for very long...


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## FJAG (29 Mar 2021)

brihard said:


> Without a decent air defense umbrella, you don’t get to keep nine infantry battalions for very long...



You see that's exactly the way I think about it. And the same goes for mortars and anti-armour and numerous other key combat elements.

I can well understand a senior leadership mentality that says we have a budget issue and we need to cut back. And I can even see an attitude that says there are certain skills we do not need many of in a peacetime environment and we should realign the full time force accordingly.

What I simply cannot fathom is a military that refuses to turn necessary capabilities into a proper, less expensive reserve status that can be called up when needed. Instead it ashcans the equipment, disperses the people and completely trashes the capability so that it would take years and hundreds of millions or even billions to revive it.

To my way of thinking that crosses the border to criminal stupidity.

🍻


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## Colin Parkinson (13 Apr 2021)

Meanwhile back in the 90's when we at least had something.....


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## CBH99 (13 Apr 2021)

GR66 said:


> Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).
> 
> This could have potential for the CF.  In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are also found mounted on various Remote Weapon Stations.  This could see both an ATGM and short range GBAD solution for both dismounted troops and light vehicles (TAPV?) using a single launch unit.


Simple solution that would drastically enhance both of those capabilities.  Let's hope.


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## BdaDug (25 Jul 2022)

Isn't the (or maybe just one of) the fundamental problems that CAF have allowed "niche" capabilities to degrade because political/DND leadership only planned to fight as part of a coalition force where more capable partners (cough, USA) would provide the niceties like AAW?  Is there clear direction now that Canada intends to provide land forces capable of operating self-sufficiently?


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## daftandbarmy (26 Jul 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Meanwhile back in the 90's when we at least had something.....



I know a Royal Marine who used one of those during the Falklands War, based at San Carlos water.

He said they probably took them out of service because the British were too cheap to award a VC to every AD gunner that had to stand and deliver, head on, during an air attack


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