# Who lost the Vietnam war and why?



## time expired (28 Mar 2009)

I just finished rereading the long discussion about Gen Haig in WW1
and found very interesting,a shame it just tapered off.However I am
sure we could generate am equally interesting discussion on the
subject of the Vietnam war.
 Mods if you feel this is in the wrong forum please move.
This war has one thing in common with with WW1,the facts are so
clouded by missinformation mainly by the media and the antiwar
movement, that it is very difficult to find any degree of "truth"
about this war.I think the two questions that concern me are should
America have fought the war at all and could it have been won.
                                      Regards


----------



## Kat Stevens (28 Mar 2009)

Casualty counts are not an  indicator of won/lost.  The US were forced to withdraw their forces, and the South was quickly overran.  THERE'S your win indicator.


----------



## exspy (28 Mar 2009)

Time,

In my opinion, the US and its South Vietnamese ally lost the war.  For the US the 'why' is down to the political leadership of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson who wanted victory without cost.  The 'why' for the South Vietnamese was the people not willing to support a corrupt regime no matter what the alternative may have meant.  I don't think it has anything to do with number of casualties, or of troops committed, or of the billions spent, or of superpower realpolitik, but the lack of an American will to fight a sustained all out war and the lack of the support of the South Vietnamese people.

Cheers,
Dan.


----------



## mariomike (29 Mar 2009)

Note: I accidentally removed, rather than modify, my original post.

I mentioned kill ratio:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War_casualties
The dominos did not fall in Asia to Communism. By 1979, American trade with Asia had surpassed trade with Europe. Asian prosperity is the wonder of the 21st century. The Republic of Vietnam is poverty stricken.


----------



## Kat Stevens (29 Mar 2009)

The net result to a nations economy is not an indicator of victory, it is an after effect.  Both Germany and Japan lost a major punchup a few years ago, and later enjoyed very robust economies.  Victory is indicated by driving your enemy from the field, forcing him to disengage, and taking his territory away from him.  Therefore, the US and South Viet Nam, Republic of,were the losers.


----------



## mariomike (29 Mar 2009)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Both Germany and Japan lost a major punchup a few years ago, and later enjoyed very robust economies.



Germany and Japan thrived as American trading partners.
"Although the U.S. was defeated on the battlefield, two decades later Vietnam appears to have surrendered its economic sovereignty to its former wartime enemy."
1995. Michel Chossudovsky. Professor of economics at the University of Ottawa.
Who won the peace?


----------



## Journeyman (29 Mar 2009)

Choose your sources with care. 
In Chossudovsky's world, all evil is directly due to American conspiracies to create:


> permanent "New World Order" wars of conquest serving the interests of Wall Street and the financial community, the US military-industrial complex, Big Oil, and all other corporate interests profiting hugely from a massive scheme harming the public interest...


See Michel Chossudovsky, _America's War On Terrorism, 2nd Ed._, 2005.

In the case of Vietnam, because it did not turn out to be a Marxist workers' paradise (name one communist attempt that has)...then _obviously_ Vietnam "surrendered its economic sovereignty" to the Americans.

 :


----------



## mariomike (29 Mar 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Choose your sources with care.
> In Chossudovsky's world, all evil is directly due to American conspiracies to create:See Michel Chossudovsky, _America's War On Terrorism, 2nd Ed._, 2005.



Thanks. I'll be retiring pretty soon, so I'll add that to my reading list!
I did come across this link titled, "What America won in Vietnam":
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050501/news_mz1e1lipscom.html


----------



## time expired (29 Mar 2009)

I feel the decision to fight the Vietnam War by the US was the right
one.The "Domino Theory" seemed very real in the early 60s,the
Viets were fomenting a communist insurgency in Laos and a little
latter in Cambodia all with the help of their sometime friends,the
Chinese.Both countries had different aims,the Chinese to extend 
the communist influence further into Indo-China and the Viets to
secure supply lines and sanctuaries to support their already well
established insurgency in South Vietnam.Latter in the war the Viets 
even attacked border areas of Thailand and as both Laos and Cambodia
were neutral I feel that SEATO was bound to take some kind of
action even if the US had not acted. Another thing worth mentioning
is the  incredable brutality used by the Viets to subdue anyone who
opposed any of their objectives, what happened in Laos would be
labelled as genocide or at least ethnic cleaning today and is,by the
way ,continuing today under the communist regime in Laos.All of these 
actions were in direct contravention of the Geneva Accords which
was signed at the end of the French Indo-China war.
   Could the US have won militarily its war to keep South Viets
independent?,I feel it could have ,given a less inept political and
sometime military leadership.One just had to look at how totally self-
-defeating the both the strategy and the tactics dictated in a large
part by the Johnson/ McNamara team and a getting along by going 
along,General staff.The granting of  sanctuaries ,micromanaging the
airwar,Marines climbing up and down mountains on the DMZ and Army
troops doing amphibious assaults in the Mekong Delta,B52 bombers
tactical bombing in the South while F105 tactical fighter bombers
were strategic bombing the North,the list goes on and on.I almost
forgot the most damaging strategy,that of gradually increasing the
pressure on the North to force them to negotiate,gradually is the key 
 word here.
    To win ,I feel that a declaration of war,mobilisation of the National
Guard,the elimination of loopholes in the draft system,student 
deferments,would have made the war more acceptable to the US
public.The closing of Haiphong's port, destruction of the Chinese rail
link and a naval blockade of the North plus breaching of the irrigation
dams and quickly, before the formidable air defence system could  have
been built.This would have bought the North quickly to its knees and
to the negotiating table and saved thousands of American and hundreds
of thousands of Viets lives. 
   These are personal views and I am sure will not be accepted by all.
                                       Regards


----------



## Kat Stevens (29 Mar 2009)

mariomike said:
			
		

> Germany and Japan thrived as American trading partners.
> "Although the U.S. was defeated on the battlefield, two decades later Vietnam appears to have surrendered its economic sovereignty to its former wartime enemy."
> 1995. Michel Chossudovsky. Professor of economics at the University of Ottawa.
> Who won the peace?



Who won the peace wasn't the question.  The war was won in the field by the North, and in the villages and cities by the Viet Cong.


----------



## Journeyman (29 Mar 2009)

mariomike said:
			
		

> > See Michel Chossudovsky, America's War On Terrorism, 2nd Ed., 2005.
> 
> 
> Thanks. I'll be retiring pretty soon, so I'll add that to my reading list!


OK, so there's no doubt in the mind of you, or anyone else here.....I actively recommend NOT reading this piece of crap! I meant "see Chossudovsky" _only_ as the source of the tripe quoted above. 

Let me say that again, in another way, in order to reinforce: Chossudovsky's books are considered academically valid ONLY by those who hold the same point of view. If you're looking for a logical debate, backed up by references that can be verified.....this is NOT what you want to be reading.

OK, enough beating around the bush.....if you believe that "globalization" is the great evil, and that it is solely the responsibility of some US conspiracy, then, a) nothing is likely to convince you otherwise, and b) Chossudovsky is somehow brilliant.

If you're a fan of "fact" and/or "reality".....avoid this book.

Subtle enough?


----------



## mariomike (29 Mar 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> OK, so there's no doubt in the mind of you, or anyone else here.....I actively recommend NOT reading this piece of crap!
> Subtle enough?



Five by Five! Thanks for the clarification. I misunderstood. It's off my list of books to read. I look forward to catching up on my reading and following the debates. I am here to learn.


----------



## forcerecon85 (29 Mar 2009)

The Vietnam War is my passion. The US won all major battles. Other than the occasional SF or firebase that was overran, when the US made contact, they walked away from it. Here's the but: Since it was an insurgency kill ratios don't matter, you can't win by attrition. The real battle was for public support in the villages and there was some progress with the whole "killing them with kindness" strategy. Public support was lost in Vietnam in different ways. Establishing free fire zones, randomly shelling possible places the enemy could be without having eyes on target, calling arty in at anything that looked suspicious, killing people who happened to be wearing black pyjamas fleeing from US forces didn't help and the list goes on.

In 1967 though the North Vietnamese Army started playing a bigger role. After the 1968 Tet Offencive it was a political win for the North and Viet Cong, even more so after Cronkite said the war was un-winnable. On the battlefield however 38,000 Viet Cong were killed and that was their last major operation and the NVA took full control afterwards. Adding another nail in the coffin so to speak was making US Army SF focus on recon instead of taking care of and training the Montanyards. After Tet 1968 the whole strategy was to train the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to fight for themselves, the whole "Vietnamazation" idea and the US would provide support and wind down their involvement. 1972 brought on the North's offencive in which it was destroyed by US air power. After 1973 there were no US combat units in Vietnam, just support, air and sea. shortly afterwards air power stopped. The North discovered this and rolled right over the South without much resistance and Saigon fell in 1975.

The way I see it the US won all the battles but the overall objective was to stop Communism in the South. It was merely delayed, the US left and the North was free to do as it pleased. In the end the US lost the war since they held the South up, walked away and let them fall on their own. The US won the US portion, but I don't think a country can consider a war a victory if as soon as they leave everything falls apart. This is all my $.02 though.


----------



## JimMorrison19 (29 Mar 2009)

time expired said:
			
		

> I feel the decision to fight the Vietnam War by the US was the right
> one.The "Domino Theory" seemed very real in the early 60s,the
> Viets were fomenting a communist insurgency in Laos and a little
> latter in Cambodia all with the help of their sometime friends,the
> ...



Your views are definitely shared. I recently finished Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era, and it possesses many of the same opinions when it comes to how the war could have been won, and has changed my outlook on the war from nothing. I think it's a very interesting read for pretty much anyone... speaks a lot of obscene careerism, over-inflated numbers of high-ranking officers, and generally poor war-fighting methods of the US Army as well as the issues of blame for the war's failure. I feel a lot different about my own aspirations for the CF after reading it. The Amazon reviews of the book suggest it should be read cautiously and I'm sure someone will agree on that, but it raises questions regardless.


----------



## a_majoor (30 Mar 2009)

Of course, many more factors can be dragged kicking and screaming into the argument.  

1. The Johnson Administration was determined to implement the very expensive "Great Society" program, so funds for military expenditures were relatively limited. The Administration was also constrained from full mobilization and a Declaration of War since their primary interest lay in domestic politics, and a _real_ war would detract from the "War on Poverty"

2. They were also leery of engaging in "a ground war in Asia" after the inconclusive results of Korea. In particular, the United States was less than eager to have the Chinese take the field, something they feared might happen if American Forces encroached on North Vietnamese territory or US airpower was deployed against targets near the Chinese border.

3. The US Army was full of career officers who's experience was in "Big Wars" like WWII and the major fighting in Korea. This wasn't the place to learn the skill sets required for "Small Wars". The Moro rebellion and the "Banana Wars" were too far in the past and in any event created too small a cadre of experienced officers and NCO's to pass on the institutional knowledge in a Big War environment.

4. The American "Grand Strategy" called for containment rather than entering the Dragon's den and Bear's cave to slay the monsters within. This necessarily precluded invasions of Eastern Europe and North Viet Nam, since American resources were insufficient to go on the offensive on a regional or global scale, but sufficient to stand watch over the Iron and Bamboo curtains.

End result: the United States withdrew from Viet Nam and allowed their ally to be destroyed, but were successful in the global Grand Strategy of containment.


----------



## Invicta (5 Apr 2009)

The US lost because they tried to prop up a corrupt dictatorship.


----------



## 1feral1 (5 Apr 2009)

Invicta said:
			
		

> The US lost because they tried to prop up a corrupt dictatorship.



Oh really?

What makes you think that?

You should not forget that The Philippines, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia also fought there, with Australia alone sending over 50,000 troops.

Yes the Regime was corrupt, but don't forget in that neck of the woods, no matter who was in power, corruption is a away of life, and still is.

To win and prosecute a war effectively, the hearts and minds of the people at home must be won, and that was not done. It was politics which ended it, on the force and military side> The US and its allies had the fire power and logistics to win. The heart and backbone was not there by the majority of the US population. 

Australia never lost a battle - ever, but lost around 600 of its Sons fighting for this cause.


OWDU


----------



## Journeyman (5 Apr 2009)

Overwatch Downunder said:
			
		

> > The US lost because they tried to prop up a corrupt dictatorship.
> 
> 
> Oh really?
> ...



Rational Argument 101: Don't get feathers ruffled because he didn't mention the allies....then summarily dismiss that alliance and blame defeat solely upon the US population.

Had the civie population behind the all-powerful, never-defeated Aussie army been any more staunch than the US people, I'm sure the Americans would have been more than happy to continue feeding in the logistics to support the inevitably victorious Aussie army.


Oh, and perhaps the US heart/backbone was not there _because_ of the perception of a corrupt regime being propped up. You dismissively say such corruption is just fine because it's just "a way of life" -- I guess not everyone is as liberal and accepting of other cultures as you obviously are, and tend to judge other societies by more univerally recognized standards.


----------



## 1feral1 (5 Apr 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Rational Argument 101: Don't get feathers ruffled because he didn't mention the allies....then summarily dismiss that alliance and blame defeat solely upon the US population.



My point being many people think it was only a US war.

However, the US were the major contributor and its public had the loudest anti-war voice and a overly biased media to back it up.

Your view was not the point I was trying to make.

EDIT: Adding an Australian view of the Viet Nam War....

WRT the Vietnam War.  

Two countries were created shortly after World War II – South Vietnam and North Vietnam.  South Vietnam had the beginnings of democracy and a staunchly pro-west, pro-growth outlook.  It was on its way to being an Asian tiger like the others taking off at the time - Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.  

North Vietnam fell under the control of Soviet-backed communists and thereafter didn’t have a flicker of democracy.  Innocent South Vietnam was then invaded by North Vietnam.  America, at the request of the South Vietnamese government and South Vietnamese public opinion, went over to help tens of millions resist tyranny.  The Western left, however, wanted America to lose.

After being worn down internally America eventually withdrew.  Not long after the US left, surprise, surprise North Vietnam 'invaded' and South Vietnam fell under the control of Stalinist North Vietnam.

One million people were immediately imprisoned without charge.  About 165,000 were killed in re-education camps.  Food shortages were soon everywhere.  Vietnam got itself into a war with China and then with Cambodia where other communists were murdering one third of its population.  Things were so bad that a couple of million brave Vietnamese jumped into leaking little boats and paddled as far from Vietnam as they could get.  Good old America took in almost a million refugees followed by Australia and Canada at around 140,000 each.  Lets never forgot however the countless unknown who drowned at sea.  

Behind the South Vietnamese, the Australians did the most to encourage American engagement in Vietnam.  While the Vietnam War was being fought hundreds of millions of poor people across South-East Asia were living in turmoil.  The American intervention in Vietnam gave South-East Asia the breathing space it needed to get on its feet.  Today American inspired democratic capitalism has won in South-East Asia and on Australia’s doorstep hundreds of millions of people have become our partners and friends.


Regards,

OWDU


----------



## tomahawk6 (5 Apr 2009)

The last US combat brigades were withdrawn in Aug 1972. The South Vietnamese government didnt fall until 1975 a year after Congress cut off funding. My guess is that had Congress continued to fund the Vietnamese war effort the South may well have held out.

We see a parallel today. The democrats while anti-war didnt cut off funding for the GWOT because they didnt want to be seen as the losers they were in 1975. I think if we had left our advisors,airpower and naval forces in place the ARVN could have defeated the communists. Today in Iraq we are drawing down our forces and letting the government takeover their own security with us as backup. Lessons learned.


----------



## Hardrations (5 Apr 2009)

A bit facetious, but I remember some one saying on Exercies as we ate American C rations. That no wonder they lost in Vietnam feeding these to the troops.  :


----------



## tomahawk6 (5 Apr 2009)

Actually the most sought after and enjoyed rations were LRRP rations - freeze dried entree's. 
Certain C ration items were popular chicken and noodles,beans and franks but the deserts were awesome.


----------



## Hardrations (5 Apr 2009)

Hi Tomahawk6. I should have stated that this happened in 72/73 in Germany. I really don't remember any thing good about them then, but you did get those free cigarettes in them. Which were popular to give to the locals. I also remember in 71 in Norway on a Northern Defence of NATO Ex. that we were told to pile all left over hard rations in piles by nationality, so as the locals could go through them and take what they wanted. So you had American, British and Canadian. The choice seem to be 1st Cdn. 2nd British 3rd American. Mind in those days Canadian hard rations were brand name items with the brand name lable on them. The Norwegion hard rations were something that came in a waxed box the size and shape of a 509 radio Battery and were donkey years old. Getting off subject here, aren't we?


----------



## tomahawk6 (5 Apr 2009)

C rations were sort of timeless  ;D


----------



## GAP (5 Apr 2009)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> C rations were sort of timeless  ;D



Survived the better part of 24 months on them.....our C rations had a 1943 date on them....


----------



## JBG (5 Apr 2009)

exspy said:
			
		

> Time,
> 
> In my opinion, the US and its South Vietnamese ally lost the war.  For the US the 'why' is down to the political leadership of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson who wanted victory without cost.....I don't think it has anything to do with number of casualties, or of troops committed, or of the billions spent, or of superpower realpolitik, but the lack of an American will to fight a sustained all out war and the lack of the support of the South Vietnamese people.


I think that close on the heels of the Korean and WW II the American people had little appetite for involvement in another war. Thus, it was difficult to sell them on the total war effort needed to actually win. Tax increases, rationing and other measures to put the economy on a wartime footing were out of the question.



			
				exspy said:
			
		

> The 'why' for the South Vietnamese was the people not willing to support a corrupt regime no matter what the alternative may have meant.


I thought that at the time but since then I no longer believe it. The number of fleeing "boat people" belie the belief that the South Vietnamese people had no preference.


----------



## Journeyman (7 Apr 2009)

Overwatch Downunder said:
			
		

> Your view was not the point I was trying to make.


Apparently. 
My "view" is simply that if one is taking part in a debate, at least _try_ and use rational argument. I wasn't making any point within the discussion, merely trying to raise the quality bar. 

Your addition merely confirms that you disagree with "my view." Wherever you got that "addition," (which you clearly cut & pasted, without attributing the source for anyone else to judge), it is just as lacking as your original post.

I'm certainly not going to refute its tripe line by line, but using the first paragraph as an example:


> Two countries were created shortly after World War II – South Vietnam and North Vietnam.  South Vietnam had the beginnings of democracy and a staunchly pro-west, pro-growth outlook.  It was on its way to being an Asian tiger like the others taking off at the time - Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.


  
Two countries were _not_ created shortly after World War II. The division of northern and southern Vietnam was a "_provisional_ military demarcation line" -- Article 6 of the 1954 Geneva Accord's Final Declaration specifically states that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." The temporary demarcation was to be eliminated with the July 1956 elections, dismissed by Diem.
George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, _The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam._ Delta Books, 1967. 

South Vietnam barely pretended to be democratic. Ngo Dinh Diem's referendum, defeating Bao Dai, saw him win 98% of the vote (133% in Saigon!). As near as I can find, his domestic policy was limited to defeating the northern communists; no mention of "pro-growth outlook" -- oh, and protecting his nepotistic, authoritarian regime from several coups, bad publicity from those self-immolating Buddhist monks, and finally the '63 assassination by his own Generals.
Robert McMahon (ed.) _Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 3rd Ed._ Houghton-Mifflin, 2003.

Vietnam was an "Asian tiger," taking off economically in the 1950s?? Give me a break. Its economy was in tatters following many years of war (national and international) and its domestic production was still overwhelmingly agrarian.
Robert Schultzinger, _A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975._ Oxford University Press 1997.


Opinions are fine; _informed_ opinions are even nicer.


----------



## mediocre1 (7 Apr 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Apparently.
> My "view" is simply that if one is taking part in a debate, at least _try_ and use rational argument. I wasn't making any point within the discussion, merely trying to raise the quality bar.
> 
> Your addition merely confirms that you disagree with "my view." Wherever you got that "addition," (which you clearly cut & pasted, without attributing the source for anyone else to judge), it is just as lacking as your original post.
> ...



Your style and your slant are similar to Leftist journalists who attempt to justify the fall of Vietnam due an 'authoritarian regime'. They are exactly similar to active measures campaign waged by journalists working for communist regimes like Cuba and the Old Soviet Union. They're empty.


----------



## Kat Stevens (7 Apr 2009)

mediocre1 said:
			
		

> Your style and your slant are similar to Leftist journalists who attempt to justify the fall of Vietnam due an 'authoritarian regime'. They are exactly similar to active measures campaign waged by journalists working for communist regimes like Cuba and the Old Soviet Union. They're empty.



Ah, JM, you've been outed at last, you old pinko commie infiltrator, you.


----------



## TimBit (7 Apr 2009)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Ah, JM, you've been outed at last, you old pinko commie infiltrator, you.



With a name like _Journeyman_ we all should have known  

Anyone ever seen that movie "The Commies are coming"? Yep, sure sounds like that kind of paranoia...


----------



## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2009)

Journeyman may indeed be a closet commie, but I might have added wild eyed to the description.

I am old enough to remember the pre-Vietnam war era. As I recall it, the regime in the South was at best erratic, plagued with 'daily changing' personalities including the wife of one of the main players who referred to the Bhuddist monks who used to burn themselves alive on busy streets as something like cigarette lighters. All this was a major distraction as the country careened into chaos caused by a growing Viet Cong insurrection on top of the looting of the national treasury by all and sundry. In short, Journeyman's description is quite accurate.


----------



## mediocre1 (7 Apr 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Journeyman may indeed be a closet commie, but I might have added wild eyed to the description.
> 
> I am old enough to remember the pre-Vietnam war era. As I recall it, the regime in the South was at best erratic, plagued with 'daily changing' personalities including the wife of one of the main players who referred to the Bhuddist monks who used to burn themselves alive on busy streets as something like cigarette lighters. All this was a major distraction as the country careened into chaos caused by a growing Viet Cong insurrection on top of the looting of the national treasury by all and sundry. In short, Journeyman's description is quite accurate.



His so called 'barely pretended democracy' or his 'authoritarian regime is far more likeable among the South Vietnamese Army and the majority of Vietham than communist totalitarianism. In fact it is not 'barely pretended'. It's an exaggeration. Vietnam during those times was a full-blown democracy before the coup which legitimated itself through  another set of elections. Sometimes one has  to be perspicacious to be able to read betweeen the lines. As intituive as John Nash of the NSA. Where then has he gone? Into hiding?Waitinig for reply.


----------



## Michael OLeary (7 Apr 2009)

mediocre1 said:
			
		

> In fact it is not 'barely pretended'. It's an exaggeration. Vietnam during those times was a full-blown democracy before the coup which legitimated itself through  another set of elections.



Elections = Democracy.  That proves everything.

Then again, elections in North Korea are held every five years.


----------



## TimBit (7 Apr 2009)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Elections = Democracy.  That proves everything.
> 
> Then again, elections in North Korea are held every five years.



ANd in Iran, our heathen enemy. And in the USSR, the great devious bear. Gee, Hitler even held plebiscites from time to time.

As you said, elections don't make a democracy. Democracy is about shared commitment to institutions and values that are democratic, for example not meddling in electoral processes, free party-registration processes, legally appointed executives of the State, a sovereign representative and active body i.e. parliament. Did it have all that?

On top of that, I'm amused at that comment:



			
				mediocre1 said:
			
		

> his 'authoritarian regime is far more likeable among the South Vietnamese Army and the majority of Vietham than communist totalitarianism.



If the north vietnamese regime was so despicable to its own citizens, how is it that they managed to find waves upon waves of people to go and fight the americans off, as well as people in South Vietnam to help them out, and how is it that South Vietnam never managed to find enough people to protect that wonderful regime of theirs?


----------



## dapaterson (7 Apr 2009)

I guess it would be pointless to point out that only a tiny minority of Vietnamese identified as Christians - the overwhelming majority identified as Buddist. (Another issue to consider when discussing the government in the South - the Catholic influence).


The title of this thread is very revealing (the contents, not so much).  In traditional "big wars" it's easy to say who won, and who lost; though even that depends on when you ask the question.  In 1942, Germany had won the land war in Europe; by 1945, not so much.

In "small wars", as we see today in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question is less "who won" or "who lost" than "What do we mean by win and lose?"  What is the strategic outcome sought in those conflicts?  Those desired outcomes may well differ for different actors; it's entirely possible that, depending on your definitional framework, no one loses or no one wins.

Back on to this topic, what were the strategic outcomes sought by the different combatants?  What did the US want?  What did the South Vietnamese want?  What did the North Vietnamese want?  What did the Viet Cong want?  By assessing those objectives against outcomes we can identify "winners and losers" if that's that we're trying to do.


----------



## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> In "small wars", as we see today in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question is less "who won" or "who lost" than "What do we mean by win and lose?"  What is the strategic outcome sought in those conflicts?  Those desired outcomes may well differ for different actors; it's entirely possible that, depending on your definitional framework, no one loses or no one wins.



And that exercise will be about as useful as trying to pick winners and losers in the War of 1812. And let's not go there today.


----------



## dapaterson (7 Apr 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> And that exercise will be about as useful as trying to pick winners and losers in the War of 1812. And let's not go there today.



But it is, perhaps, the key question for the CF today:  What does "victory" look like in Afghanistan?  Or, in good, simple, Army staff officer terms:  Selection and maintenance of the aim.  What is our aim?  What is our national objective?  Without that clearly defined and understood, we can be in a whole lot of trouble.


----------



## 1feral1 (7 Apr 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Apparently.
> My "view" is simply that if one is taking part in a debate, at least _try_ and use rational argument. I wasn't making any point within the discussion, merely trying to raise the quality bar.



Well, I guess we can agree to disagree then, but I will sum up by saying if the US government had the public behind this war, and if the media also supported it, the outcome may have been different.

My 'addition' used is an Australian view which many agree with in laymans principals.

Regards,

Wes


----------



## time expired (7 Apr 2009)

Given the fact that after "Tet" in 68 the Viet Cong had virtually ceased to
exist and glorious uprising of the down trodden Vietnamese people had also
failed to materialise.Gen. Giap was faced with a disaster.The US political
leadership and Walter Cronkite got him off the hook,Cronkite after a short
fact finding mission declared the war lost and Johnson stopped the bombing
of the north allowing the North to rebuild and rearm.From that point on the
media was almost anti war to a man and any objective reporting about the
war practically ceased.Gen Creighton Abrams,Westmorelands replacement,
got a handle on the war in the south,the Viet Cong were a mere Shadow
of the former strength and the incursion into the "Parrots Beak" area of
Cambodia had shaken the NVA but was portrayed as a widening of a lost
war by the media, with ample support from the lunatic left.This total lack 
of support from the folks back home and the drawdown of US forces put
pay to any remaining desire to fight on the part of the US Army and the 
aim of the average US Soldier was not to be the last man to be killed in 
"the Nam.
         Hope this is not too boring but I am just trying to get this thread
back on track with a couple of not widely reported facts.
                                            Regards


----------



## JBG (8 Apr 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> South Vietnam barely pretended to be democratic. Ngo Dinh Diem's referendum, defeating Bao Dai, saw him win 98% of the vote (133% in Saigon!). As near as I can find, his domestic policy was limited to defeating the northern communists; no mention of "pro-growth outlook" -- oh, and protecting his nepotistic, authoritarian regime from several coups, bad publicity from those self-immolating Buddhist monks, and finally the '63 assassination by his own Generals.


Even if you're 100% right, look at the alternative. The bloodbath that followed the 1975 defeat of the South was worst than the worst nightmares of the ultra-right in the U.S.


----------



## a_majoor (8 Apr 2009)

One of the issues that turned US public opinion against the war was indeed the corrupt and authoritarian nature of the South Vietnamese government. This was especially difficult for the American people to grasp given the idealistic nature of Americans in general and the specific strides made by the Civil Rights movement in the late 1960's. It was difficult to resolve "I have a dream" with spending blood and treasure for a regime which repressed Buddhist monks (but was of course unaware of what lay beyond the DMZ).

As I mentioned earlier, so long as the imperatives of the "Grand Strategy" of containment were fulfilled, then the occasional loss could be tolerated so long as there was no irreparable "breach" of the line.


----------



## time expired (8 Apr 2009)

In 1963 the US was barely involved in the ground war so this constant harping
on Diem`s corrupt gov.is somewhat irrelevant to this discussion.The political
situation did improve in the South,efforts were made to ease the situation of
the peasants, but this was an Asian country and not Ontario.I find it very
revealing that the lefties who say we should not try to force our Western 
democracy on Iraq were calling for the US to do just that in Vietnam.Be that
as it may, the Tet offensive revealed that the South were basically happy with
their situation and were not ready to rise up and welcome their communist
liberators as Gen.Giap had predicted and the result was a massive defeat for
the North.
        The fact that Tet was a huge victory for the US and its allies was lost
in the self defeating media coverage of the battle.Take for instance the occupation of the US embassy in Saigon,it never happened,a small group of
VC sappers entered the garden of the embassy, and because their leader was
killed by the Marine guards on entry,milled around inside the compound until
dispatched by MPs.But that is the stuff of legends and this legend perpetuated
by the US media said the war was lost.Infact the insurgency war had been won
and in 1969 officers noted that in 1967 leaving a fire base one invariably got
into a fight were now(69) one had to go looking for one. 
        Gen.Giap realised his guerrilla war was lost and in 1972 in desperation attacked the South with a conventional force of 14 Divisions.The ARVIN after
a period of confusion concentrated from its counterinsurgency positions all
over the country and with the help of US air power dealt the North another
major defeat driving the NVA back over the DMZ.They did not return until
1975 by which time the US forces had left and President Nixon was unable to
give them any support because the Democratic congress had cut off all 
support for South East Asia.This by the way included Cambodia the result
was the genocide of over 1 million Cambodians.You will not hear anything
about this from the Left.
                Her endeath the lesson.
                                        Regards
PS Johnsons concern with Chinese intervention was missplaced as the
Chinese were Cultually Revolting at the time.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (8 Apr 2009)

I am guessing that your answer to your own question is that the media lost the Vietnam War?

This argument is familiar to the "stab in the back" thesis that the German Army adopted after the First World War. It is compelling, but I am not sure if it tells the whole story. They are different situations, but in both cases we have a poweful army that had battlefield "victories" but a defeat in the war that needed to be explained.

I think that the North Vietnamese had much more _will_ to win that war. We can blame the media for the loss of will in the US and thus their defeat, but perhaps that will was never really there?


----------



## Michael OLeary (8 Apr 2009)

mediocre1,

You posts are amounting to nothing more than spam on these forums.  If your posting style doesn't gain a noticeable measure of useful contribution very soon, you will find yourself subjected to the warning system as described in the Conduct Guidelines you agreed to adhere to on joining these forums.

Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## time expired (8 Apr 2009)

I beg to differ ,the WW1 German Army was convincingly defeated in the field
the US Army never was.Even Col.Moore`s 1/7 Cav.battle at LZ X-Ray oft
described as a defeat,230 US soldiers died and they found 450 NVA dead
on the field of battle,given that the NVA did  their best to remove their dead it is probable that the NVA losses were much higher. The NVA could not afford too
many victories of this nature.
  Another point , the will of the people counts for very little in brutal communist dictatorship,Ho Chi Min was not a cute little oriental gentleman merely
concerned with uniting his people as he was so often portraid in the Western media ,he was dictator in every sense of the word,controlling the thoughts
and the actions of his people and whose major concern was the extension of
his own personal power.The brutal nature of his regime was well illustrated
by its actions in the invasion of Laos and Cambodia,the genocidal murders
commited by his forces in these countries is well documented,if one cares to look.We have sent people to the international courts in the Den Hag for less.
 That is the problem in a democracy, the will of the people is important to
the successful conduct of a war and we have no mechanism to ensure that
our media acts in a responsible way and report the wars,or anything else
for that matter,in an accurate,honest way.
  Did the media loose the war?,my answer is no,but their left pandering
and inaccurate reporting was a contributing factor.The real villians remain
the timid,one could almost say cowardly, Democratic government of Lyndon
Bains Johnson and the Democratic dominated Congress under President
Nixon who stabbed their erstwhile allies in the back.
 I have enough vitriol left to add Jane Fonda to my responsible list,may
her soul rot in hell.
                    Regards


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (8 Apr 2009)

time expired said:
			
		

> I beg to differ ,the WW1 German Army was convincingly defeated in the field
> the US Army never was.Even Col.Moore`s 1/7 Cav.battle at LZ X-Ray oft
> described as a defeat,230 US soldiers died and they found 450 NVA dead
> on the field of battle,given that the NVA did  their best to remove their dead it is probable that the NVA losses were much higher. The NVA could not afford too
> ...



I would argue that the North Vietnamese could afford those victories, while it appears that the US could not. Loss ratios have little meaning on their own, except of course to those involved. If a general has to sacrifice 100 of his soldiers to kill one enemy soldier what matters is whether he is willing to do so and whether his oppoent is able to bear the loss of that one. 

I believe that war is utlimately a test of wills, and that in this case the North Vietnamese had a deeper reservoir of will to draw upon. Now, if North Vietnam had tried to invade, say, South Dakota instead of South Vietnam then the US would have probably had the advantage in the national will area.

At the risk of further derailing this thread (is that possible?), I introduced the German stab-in-the-back theory merely to give an example of a defeated army looking for some domestic reason for their defeat. A German officer in late 1918 could look to some major recent victories. I am not agreeing with their theory, but I have read that many of the time did ascribe to it.


----------



## Journeyman (8 Apr 2009)

_~sigh~_
OK, for those who actually read and think about what is posted here.....I apologize for taking up bandwidth with the obvious.

Otherwise...note that I haven't yet provided _any_ personal view on this topic. I've merely posted academic source material in response to 'rant masquerading as fact.' Please....feel free to read, contemplate, broaden horizons, and/or inform your opinions -- pro or con. I _beg_ you, provide rational counter-argument.

And if you need a term to bandy about.....it's not comm-you-nist......it's litt-er-ate.

It's nothing to be afraid of


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse (9 Apr 2009)

Folks,
most of mediocre1's posts are now binned along with the responses. Maybe we can now carry on with a worthy discussion.
Thanks.


----------



## observor 69 (9 Apr 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> _~sigh~_
> OK, for those who actually read and think about what is posted here.....I apologize for taking up bandwidth with the obvious.
> 
> Otherwise...note that I haven't yet provided _any_ personal view on this topic. I've merely posted academic source material in response to 'rant masquerading as fact.' Please....feel free to read, contemplate, broaden horizons, and/or inform your opinions -- pro or con. I _beg_ you, provide rational counter-argument.
> ...



Shootin' down opinionators is almost too easy isn't it JM ! 
Blowing smoke off his six shooters!! ;D


----------



## a_majoor (9 Apr 2009)

Just as a side note, while we know today that the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" has effectively dislocated tha ability of the Chinese government or PLA to take effective action, this was not so clear in the 1960's. As well, the American law makers and generals of the Viet Nam war era were conditioned by both "Big War" theory and practice (WWII) and fear of the Chinese "hordes" from Korea. It is hard to be a rational actor when dreams of leading battalions and brigades are dancing in the heads of some while dark fears of losing yet another Asian nation (Americans were incensed when China was "lost" in 1947 and also by the aftermath of the Korean War) drive parts of the political process. Gradual disengagement and "Vietnamization" of the war effort was an acceptable compromise on the political end.

Remember all politics is local, so finding a compelling reason to spend blood and treasure on foreign wars is vitally important in the Liberal Democratic West. This lesson seemingly isn't absorbed by the political class, hence the difficulties in sustaining long term operations such as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan; one can imagine that the public approval span of a mission to Darfur will be measured in months....


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (9 Apr 2009)

I am NOT a student of the Vietnam war, but I have read some books that gave me somewhat conflicting views of what went wrong from the US perspective. One view is Harry Summers' from On Strategy  that that US was fairly successful in fighting the counter-insurgency aspect but failed to counter North Vietnam's conventional threat (it has been fifteen years since I read that book, so _caveat emptor _ on my synopsis).  Another can be found in the more recent Learning How to Eat Soup with a Knife  by John Nagl. It has been a couple of years since I read that one, but I recall that he outlines the US Army's initial strategy in Vietnam was to prepare the South Vietnamese to repell a conventional North Vietnamese threat instead of being organized to counter an insurgency. I am not sure where I fall on this one, but it is hard to deny that the North Vietnamese conquered South Vietnam with conventional forces - which to me is the elephant in the room when reading the Nagl book. My somewhat limited readings of the French conflict in Indo-China also shows Viet Minh _regiments_ manoeuvring against French forces.

Maybe we should look at it from the North Vietnamese perspective. They had one long-term goal: unite Vietnam under their rule. This was an active, aggressive and _offensive _ goal. To achieve this they employed a variety of means, ranging from insurgents in South Vietnam to regular units engaged in fairly conventional force on force conflict. They had the advantage of exterior lines in that they could manouevre forces in relative safety from the outside and thus pick and choose the time and place of their battles. Interior lines are often touted as an advantage, but I would rather be able to encircle from the outside than be encircled on the inside. Their bases were fairly secure (bombing and incursions aside) and they could retreat to lick their wounds and re-organize. They could wear down the US in a series of battles. They also had a direct stake in the outcome, whereas the US was more remote. What of the South Vietnamese in all this? 

Perhaps one way to look at the VC was as _partisans_ who operated in support of the regular NVA as opposed to classic insurgents. What works against Huks in the Philippines or ethnic Chinese guerrillas in Malaya may not translate directly into another theatre.


----------



## time expired (9 Apr 2009)

A couple of comments to the points raised above,the will of the people
in a communist dictatorship is largely irrelevant, the will of the Great
Leader is what counts,and Ho Chi Minh seem to have that in spades.
He wanted to unite Vietnam under his control and did not seem to care
how many Vietnamese,Laotians,Cambodians or Americans had to die to 
fulfill that aim.A more accurate indication of the will of the people was
the refusal of the South Vietnamese to follow Gen.Giap`s call to rise up
against their government in support of the Tet Offensive,even better was
the huge numbers of  deserters from the NVA and what remained of the
Viet Cong after Tet.
    The NVA could only sustain the level of loss due their ability to run to
the safety of their Cambodian sanctuaries refit and rearm with new cannon
fodder coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.This was the major mistake of
the US gov. in my mind,allowing these sanctuaries to exist and not blocking
the trail with ground troops,air power alone was incapable of doing the job.
    The US Army initially sought to create an South Vietnam army in its own
image, it performed,on the whole,poorly it did not get the massive arty.or
air support given the US Army felt itself 2nd. class on top of this it was
poorly led.After Tet the ARVIN basically went into training camp for a 
couple of years,Gen.Abrams groomed them to take over the counter-
insurgency role while the  ever smaller US Forces kept the NVA from 
crossing the DMZ in any strength.This led to the ARVIN being poorly placed
to tackle the conventional attack by the NVA in 1972 however once they
had concentrated and with massive US air support they drove the NVA
back across the DMZ.
  As I opened this thread I mentioned the similarity between WW1 and this
more recent war insofar as it is very difficult to get at the facts of the
war through the curtain of myth and missinformation spread by the mass
media.This has shown up in some of the postings on this thread just as it did 
on the Haig thread.I guess preconceived ideas can not changed by mere
facts.To all those to this comment does NOT apply,please disregard.
                              Regards


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (9 Apr 2009)

You might not like how that will was created and sustained, or that it may well have been concentrated in a small group of leaders, but that doesn't change that the North Vietnamese had the will to endure and the US apparently did not. The South Vietnamese not rising up during Tet doesn't necessarily mean that they had the will to fight.

So, should the ARVN have been organized and trained to fight a conventional battle against the NVA or a COIN fight against the VC? The Easter offensive you mention suggests that perhaps the ARVN should have indeed been a conventional force all along. Should the US have invaded the North as some have suggested?


----------



## tomahawk6 (11 Apr 2009)

http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/99/vietnamwar.html

The Vietnam War:
Winnable After All
Editorial
December 1999

by: Mackubin T. Owens

P>Several years ago the editor of a conservative public policy journal asked me to write an essay discussing whether or not the US could have won the war in Vietnam. I was happy to oblige. Based on my own experience and subsequent study of the conflict, I believed that not only could the US have won, it had won militarily by 1972. 

US-ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) military successes against the North Vietnamese in 1968-1971 largely had stabilized political and economic conditions in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). These military successes improved political and economic conditions, helping to solidify the attachment of the rural population to the South Vietnamese government. Although much remained to be accomplished, the overall performance of ARVN forces during the Easter Offensive of 1972 indicated that “Vietnamization” was working. I argued that had the United States continued to provide air and naval support, the RVN would have survived as a political entity. 

But despite his sympathy with my point of view, the editor chose to kill my piece. He contended that I had not provided enough hard evidence to support my argument against the entrenched conventional wisdom: that the Vietnamese communists were too determined, the South Vietnamese too corrupt, and the Americans incapable of fighting the kind of war that would have been necessary to prevail. 

Now an important new book provides the evidence I lacked. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam by the military historian Lewis Sorley persuasively refutes the conventional wisdom concerning the Vietnam War. Building on his excellent biographies of Army generals Creighton Abrams and Harold Johnson, Mr. Sorley examines the largely neglected later years of the conflict. He concludes that the war in Vietnam “was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the US Congress.” Mr. Sorley rectifies an imbalance in the treatment of the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, the specter of Robert McNamara has led analysts to over-emphasize the early years of the war, making rational debate about the Vietnam War as a whole difficult if not impossible. All too often, the history of the war has been derailed over the question of when Mr. McNamara turned against the war and why he didn’t make his views known earlier. But as William Colby observed in a review of Mr. McNamara’s disgraceful memoir, In retrospect, by limiting serious consideration of the military situation in Vietnam to the period before mid-1968, historians leave Americans with a record “similar to what we would know if histories of World War II stopped before Stalingrad, Operation Torch in North Africa and Guadalcanal in the Pacific.” Those studies that examine the period after Tet 1968 emphasize the diplomatic attempts to extricate the US from the conflict, treating the military effort as nothing more than a holding action. 

But to truly understand the Vietnam War, it is absolutely imperative to come to grips with the years after 1968. A new team was in place. Gen. Abrams succeeded Gen. William Westmoreland as commander US Military Assistance Command--Vietnam (USMACV) shortly after the Tet offensive. He joined Ellsworth Bunker, who had assumed the post of US ambassador to the Saigon government the previous spring. Mr. Colby, a career CIA officer soon arrived to coordinate the pacification. 

Far from constituting a mere holding action, the approach followed by the new team constituted a positive strategy for ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. Ambassador Bunker, Gen. Abrams, and Mr. Colby “brought different values to their tasks, operated from a different understanding of the nature of the war, and applied different measures of merit and different tactics. They employed diminishing resources in manpower, materiel, money, and time as they raced to render the South Vietnamese capable of defending themselves before the last American forces were withdrawn. They went about that task with sincerity, intelligence, decency, and absolute professionalism, and in the process they came very close to achieving the goal of a viable nation and a lasting peace.” 

Mr. Sorley focuses less on the shortcomings of Robert McNamara than on those of Gen. Westmoreland, whose tactics, the author claims, squandered four years of public and congressional support for the war. Gen. Westmoreland’s operational strategy emphasized the attrition of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in a “war of the big battalions:” multi-battalion, and sometimes even multi-division sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy the enemy. Such “search and destroy” operations were usually unsuccessful, since the enemy could usually avoid battle unless it was advantageous for him to accept it. But they were also costly to the American soldiers who conducted them and the Vietnamese civilians who were in the area. 

Gen. Abrams’ approach emphasized not the destruction of enemy forces per se but protection of the South Vietnamese population by controlling key areas. He then concentrated on attacking the enemy’s “logistics nose” (as opposed to a “logistics tail”): since the North Vietnamese lacked heavy transport within South Vietnam, they had to preposition supplies forward of their sanctuaries preparatory to launching an offensive. Fighting was still heavy, as exemplified by two major actions in South Vietnam’s Ashau Valley during the first half of 1969: the 9th Marine Regiment’s Operation DEWEY CANYON and the 101st Airborne Division’s epic battle for “Hamburger Hill.” But now NVA offensive timetables were being disrupted by preemptive allied attacks, buying more time for Vietnamization. 

In addition, rather than ignoring the insurgency and pushing the South Vietnamese aside as Gen. Westmoreland had done, Gen. Abrams followed a policy of “one war,” integrating all aspects of the struggle against the communists. The result, says Mr. Sorley was “a better war” in which the United States and South Vietnamese essentially achieved the military and political conditions necessary for South Vietnam’s survival as a viable political entity. 

The defenders of the conventional wisdom will reply that Mr. Sorley’s argument is refuted by the fact that South Vietnam did fall to the North Vietnamese communists. They will repeat the claim that the South Vietnamese lacked the leadership, skill, character, and endurance of their adversaries. Mr. Sorley acknowledges the shortcomings of the South Vietnamese and agrees that the US would have had to provide continued air, naval, and intelligence support. But, he contends, the real cause of US defeat was that the Nixon administration and Congress threw away the successes achieved by US and South Vietnamese arms. 

The proof lay in the 1972 Easter Offensive. This was the biggest offensive push of the war, greater in magnitude than either the 1968 Tet offensive or the final assault of 1975. The US provided massive air and naval support and there were inevitable failures on the part of some ARVN units, but all in all, the South Vietnamese fought well. Then, having blunted the communist thrust, they recaptured territory that had been lost to Hanoi. Finally, so effective was the eleven-day “Christmas bombing” campaign (LINEBACKER II) later that year that the British counterinsurgency expert, Sir Robert Thompson exclaimed, “you had won the war. It was over.” Three years later, despite the heroic performance of some ARVN units, South Vietnam collapsed against a much weaker, cobbled-together NVA offensive. What happened to cause this reversal? 

First, the Nixon administration, in its rush to extricate the country from Vietnam, forced the government of RVN to accept a cease-fire that permitted NVA forces to remain in the south. Then in an act that still shames the United States to this day, Congress cut off military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. Finally, President Nixon resigned over Watergate and his successor, constrained by congressional action, defaulted on promises to respond with force to North Vietnamese violations of the peace terms. Mr. Sorley describes in detail the logistical and operational consequences for the ARVN of our having starved them of promised support for three years. 

Mr. Sorley has provided an major challenge to the conventional wisdom. Accordingly, we can expect A Better War to be attacked, or more probably, ignored by those who have a vested interest in portraying the Vietnam War as uniquely brutal and unjust, a conflict the United States deserved to lose to a more virtuous enemy; and those who fought it as either victims or brutal savages. 

I have a bumper sticker on my car that reads: “I don’t know what happened. When I left, we were winning!” A Better War demonstrates that such a sentiment is not as farfetched as the conventional wisdom would have it. 


Mackubin Thomas Owens is professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College in Newport, RI and an adjunct fellow at the Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland University. He was director of legislative affairs for the nuclear weapons programs of the Department of Energy from 1985 to 1987.


----------



## time expired (11 Apr 2009)

Well folks thanks to Tomahawk6 "the fat lady has sung". This post sums
up completely the impression I formed from reading all the books that I
could get my hands on concerning this war.Why the interest in this war?,
one that Canadians had no involvement,because the US defeat was also 
a defeat for the entire western world and damaged the militaries of most
of these western countries.The idea that military power supporting our
economical power was the basis that ensured our continuing prosperity
seemed to become somehow immoral.Has this made us more secure,I think
not,all kinds of groups in the world,Arab terrorists,Somali pirates ,Taliban to 
name just a few seem ready to challenge us, safe in the knowledge that
even if we decide to react militarily it will very limited and after absorbing
a few casualties our home support will disappear an we will negotiate and
pull out.This weakness seems to have its roots in the lost war in Vietnam
and bodes ill for the future of our Western democratic way of life.
                                       Regards


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (10 May 2009)

Limited wars do not seem to have truly positive outcomes.  The real enemy was North Vietnam but was not directly attacked, other than by bombing, for fear of awakening China.  There was an endless supply of soldiers streaming south to continue the war.  Time was simply on the side of North Vietnam.  They had 30 years of war and could wait 30 more.  The US was fighting for the staus quo while their enemy was fighting for victory.  Time simply ran out for the US.

In 2011 time is running out for Canada.  You don't suppose anyone told the Taliban that all they have to do is wait.  There are ways to win civil wars and insurrections but they don't involve winning hearts and minds and playing fair.


----------

