# Arctic Sovereignty Submarine



## DrewMC36

I'll freely admit that I am not remotely close to being an expert in Arctic Sovereignty or submarines, but a silent and small submarine would be a perfect fit for the role of a stealthy patrol vehicle in the north.

 So here is my choice for a submarine that could fill the need to not only replace our current aging submarines: the German Type 212 class and the Italian Todaro class (a joint project). 

*Propulsion:*
To get to point A to point B you have the diesel engine, in the need of silent the submarine uses 11 fuel cells and a electric engine.

*Armament:*
6 forward facing torpedo tubes, a retractable 30mm auto-cannon is being considered, and short range missiles are being developed for the torpedo tubes.

*General characteristics of the 212:*
Displacement:	1,450 tonnes surfaced
1,830 tonnes submerged

Length:	56 m (183.7 ft)
57.2 m (187.66 ft) (2nd batch)

Beam:	7 m (22.96 ft)

Draft:	6 m (19.68 ft)

Propulsion:	1 MTU 16V 396 diesel-engine[1]
9 HDW/Siemens PEM fuel cells, 30-40 kW each (U31)
2 HDW/Siemens PEM fuel cells each with 120 kW (U32, U33, U34)
1 Siemens Permasyn electric motor 1700 kW, driving a single seven-bladed skewback propeller

Speed:	20 knots (37 km/h) submerged, 12 knots surfaced[2]

Range:	
8,000 nm (14'800 km, or 9'196 miles) at 8 knots (15 km/h) surfaced
3 weeks without snorkeling, 12 weeks overall

Test depth:	over 700 m (2,296 ft)[3]

Complement:	5 officers, 22 men

Armament:	6 x 533 mm torpedo tubes (in 2 forward pointing groups of 3) with 12 DM2A4, A184 Mod.3, BlackShark torpedoes, IDAS missiles and 24 external naval mines (optional)


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## Lex Parsimoniae

Genrerally a bigger submarine is needed to operate near/under ice.  To paraphrase Stalin, size has a quality all its own.  The ability (and reserve buoyancy) to break through ice when needed, especially in an emergency, is important.  In addition, a 212/214 would require significant changes to operate near/under ice:
- Hull, casing and fin strengthening;
- Enhanced sensor outfit to include ice detection and avoidance sonar, upward looking
echo sounders and underwater imagery capability;
- Full inertial navigation system capability;
- Augmented capability to cope with excessive condensation;
- Augmented environmental system(s) to meet current pollution regulations; and
- Enhanced communications capability.


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## DrewMC36

Thanks for the reply and the info!


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## GK .Dundas

One of the reasons SNN 's are favored for Arctic work by the Canadian Navy wasn't so much that you could spend weeks submerged under the Arctic ice cap but  because you can move them from one coast to the other in a short period of time . 
The reason in the eighties the Navy was  willing to give up 6 City class frigates in favor of the SSN option was the ability of a SNN to make a high speed run from say  Esquimalt to Halifax in 10 days thru the North west Passage  as opposed to 6 weeks via the Panama Canal.
As it turned out we got neither the SSN 's or the extra 6 Frigates.


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## drunknsubmrnr

> Full inertial navigation system capability



They probably already have that. The Oberons did and that was a long time ago.



> Augmented capability to cope with excessive condensation



They probably don't need more of that. Sea temps in the Arctic are pretty close to deep ocean temps already. If the boats can operate below the thermocline now, they'd be able to operate in the Arctic.

They might need a whacking great battery to power electric heaters. If you aren't snorting every so often, the boat will get really cold. Those sweaters aren't as warm under those conditions as you'd hope.



> Augmented environmental system(s) to meet current pollution regulations



It would be pretty difficult to design an SSK that could contain it's grey and black water between port visits. It was hard enough on an Oberon to keep it three days, and that's with another era's standards for washing. An Oberon was a lot bigger than a Type 214 as well.



> Enhanced communications capability



Good enough to operate beneath the ice? That does sound enhanced. Does anyone have systems that good?

Good points on the hull and sensors. There would still be a transit issue unless the boats were based in the Arctic though.


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## Edward Campbell

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> One of the reasons SNN 's are favored for Arctic work by the Canadian Navy wasn't so much that you could spend weeks submerged under the Arctic ice cap but  because you can move them from one coast to the other in a short period of time .
> The reason in the eighties the Navy was  willing to give up 6 City class frigates in favor of the SSN option was the ability of a SNN to make a high speed run from say  Esquimalt to Halifax in 10 days thru the North west Passage  as opposed to 6 weeks via the Panama Canal.
> As it turned out we got neither the SSN 's or the extra 6 Frigates.




Not to mention that the numbers/cost _quesstimates_ in the Beatty _white paper_ - drafted, mainly, by a gang of _experts_ (cronies) from Toronto with limited DND input - were wildly unrealistic, usually by a factor of 100% or more.


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> They probably already have that. The Oberons did and that was a long time ago.


Something like the Mk 49 Ring Laser Gyro Inertial Navigation System that are currently fitted to CF submarines.  The Oberons never had more than a very rudimentary gyro-compass with basic PK.  That isn’t sufficient to navigate dived on for long periods.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> They probably don't need more of that. Sea temps in the Arctic are pretty close to deep ocean temps already. If the boats can operate below the thermocline now, they'd be able to operate in the Arctic.


 The temperature of the near-surface sea (let's call that the area between Safe Depth and Periscope Depth for argument's sake) varies mainly with latitude.  The polar seas (high latitude) can be as cold as -2 degrees Celsius (noting that sea water, with an average salinity of 35 psu, freezes at -1.95 degrees Celsius).  Submarines don’t operate for long periods beneath the thermocline (in open oceans) and thus don’t have to cope with the extensive condensation that results as the SM cools down.  I’ve operated up north aboard two classes of SM and that was the universal experience.  Kindly provide your northern water experience.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> It would be pretty difficult to design an SSK that could contain it's grey and black water between port visits.


Be that as it may, the  Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act currently applies out to 100 nautical miles and prohibits any discharge of waste (zero discharge) except untreated sewage.  



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> . It was hard enough on an Oberon to keep it three days, and that's with another era's standards for washing.  An Oberon was a lot bigger than a Type 214 as well.


Type 214 = Displacement: 1,690 t (surfaced), 1,860 t (submerged)
Oberon = Displacement: 2,030 t (surfaced), 2,410 t (submerged)

An Oberon is roughly 30% larger than a 214 (which can be built larger) but has 250% the crew.  Any guesses as to which has a greater black/grey water endurance?



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Good enough to operate beneath the ice? That does sound enhanced. Does anyone have systems that good?


Yes.  However, operating above 60N brings with it challenges even with standard UHF and HF.


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## drunknsubmrnr

> The Oberons never had more than a very rudimentary gyro-compass with basic PK.  That isn’t sufficient to navigate dived on for long periods.



The Oberons had a WSN-5, same as the TRUMPs (and frequently IMREQed by said TRUMPs). It was the basis for a very capable SINS. It had a few issues with updates, but overall it wasn't bad. 



> Submarines don’t operate for long periods beneath the thermocline (in open oceans) and thus don’t have to cope with the extensive condensation that results as the SM cools down.



Odd....I could have sworn we did that for several days at a time in a couple of exercises between Newfoundland and Iceland. Temp below the thermocline was almost always 3-4 C, and we didn't have that many problems with condensation. The problems we did have were running opened up where the condensation would form on the comms and FC gear. Running opened up is unlikely to happen a whole lot for various reasons.



> Be that as it may, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act currently applies out to 100 nautical miles and prohibits any discharge of waste (zero discharge) except untreated sewage.



So somebody's going to need an exemption or one whacking big ECP.



> An Oberon is roughly 30% larger than a 214 (which can be built larger) but has 250% the crew.  Any guesses as to which has a greater black/grey water endurance?



A Type 214 can't be built larger. If it's significantly altered, it won't be a Type 214 any more, just like a Type 214 isn't a Type 212.

Do you actually have the tank layouts and sizes for a Type 214?


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> The Oberons had a WSN-5, same as the TRUMPs (and frequently IMREQed by said TRUMPs). It was the basis for a very capable SINS. It had a few issues with updates, but overall it wasn't bad.


The WSN-5 was the basis for SINS.  Just not aboard CF Oberons which (post-SOUP) were fitted with the Attitude and Heading Reference components only.  The position displayed on the unit (in the AMS) was simply a PK – nothing more.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Odd....I could have sworn we did that for several days at a time in a couple of exercises between Newfoundland and Iceland. Temp below the thermocline was almost always 3-4 C, and we didn't have that many problems with condensation.


Hmmm…how’d you deal with the CO build-up after being deep “for several days at a time”?



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> So somebody's going to need an exemption or one whacking big ECP.


We can't protect the northern environment by polluting it.  Oily-water separators, trash compactors, etc aren't exactly large ECs.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> A Type 214 can't be built larger. If it's significantly altered, it won't be a Type 214 any more, just like a Type 214 isn't a Type 212.


The Type 214 is available in different configurations, much like the Type 209 before it (Type 209/1100, Type 209/1200, Type 209/1300, Type 209/1400 and Type 209/1500).  



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Do you actually have the tank layouts and sizes for a Type 214?


Try the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems website: 214


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## drunknsubmrnr

> The WSN-5 was the basis for SINS.  Just not aboard CF Oberons which (post-SOUP) were fitted with the Attitude and Heading Reference components only.  The position displayed on the unit (in the AMS) was simply a PK – nothing more.



The WSN-5 was still used as the system gyro. True, not all of the outputs were used as they are on a TRUMP, but they won't be used on a Type 214 as well. That position fed by the WSN-5 was still just as accurate as if the rest of the system was using the full set of nav outputs from the gyro. 

There was also a position readout over the chart table.



> Hmmm…how’d you deal with the CO build-up after being deep “for several days at a time”?



CO wasn't a problem. I don't even know how you'd get CO unless you were either snorting (not possible below PD) or had a fire.

If you meant CO2, we used the CO2 absorption canisters in the fore and after-ends. And got splitting headaches.



> Oily-water separators, trash compactors, etc aren't exactly large ECs.



Those are standard equipment, although oily-water separators don't work quite as well as one would hope for pollution control. What are you going to do with the trash once it's been compacted? Store it on the boat for weeks at a time?



> The Type 214 is available in different configurations, much like the Type 209 before it (Type 209/1100, Type 209/1200, Type 209/1300, Type 209/1400 and Type 209/1500).



I agree. However, they couldn't stretch the 209 any farther without turning it into another boat, the TR 1700.



> Try the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems website



Thanks! It doesn't have the tank sizes though.

I will concede that a smaller crew will generally allow for longer endurance on the same tank sizes, with the reservation that modern crews will probably use significantly more tankage on a per capita basis. A bird-bath once a week (whether we needed it or not) is unlikely to make it in the 21st century.


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> The WSN-5 was still used as the system gyro. True, not all of the outputs were used as they are on a TRUMP, but they won't be used on a Type 214 as well. That position fed by the WSN-5 was still just as accurate as if the rest of the system was using the full set of nav outputs from the gyro.


The Oberon class WSN-501 Inertial Monitoring Units only measured movement in 2 dimensions (vice 3 dimensions aboard the IRO class) and could not be used for navigation.  My point was that an INS is required to operate near/under ice.  I stand by that statement.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> There was also a position readout over the chart table.


Which boat and what year?



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> CO wasn't a problem.


Please describe the atmosphere monitoring program that was in use aboard the Oberons.  Who did it, when, and what gasses? 



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> I don't even know how you'd get CO unless you were either snorting (not possible below PD) or had a fire.


CO is the dived endurance problem aboard SSKs.  Check the following out of your local library – it is Canadian and has an excellent section on submarines:  “Air quality in airplane cabins and similar enclosed spaces” by‎ Martin B. Hocking and Diana Hocking (2005).



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> If you meant CO2…


I didn’t.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Those are standard equipment, although oily-water separators don't work quite as well as one would hope for pollution control.


Zero discharge is the requirement north of 60.  That requires slightly higher standards than currently fitted equipment.  Happily, it's readily available as a COTS insertion.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> What are you going to do with the trash once it's been compacted? Store it on the boat for weeks at a time?


Yes.  It’s done already (minus the compacting) aboard the VCS when they’re up north.


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## drunknsubmrnr

> The Oberon class WSN-501 Inertial Monitoring Units only measured movement in 2 dimensions (vice 3 dimensions aboard the IRO class) and could not be used for navigation.  My point was that an INS is required to operate near/under ice.  I stand by that statement.



No, the unit only *reported* movement in 2 dimensions. It *measured* movement in all 3. That's why the actual gyro units were frequently IMREQ'ed by TRUMPs. I agree that an INS is required for under-ice operations, but the Oberon "iron gyro" system was good enough for that, and had been around since at least 1985. You don't need a laser gyro, although I'm sure it would be nice to have one.



> Which boat and what year?



I installed Okanagans remote in 1996. IIRC OJ already had hers at the time, and Onondaga got hers as part of her last refit.



> Please describe the atmosphere monitoring program that was in use aboard the Oberons.  Who did it, when, and what gasses?



The Doc used a Draeger kit every four hours or so. O2, CO2 and a bunch of others.

Are you playing "Who's qualified?".



> CO is the dived endurance problem aboard SSKs.  Check the following out of your local library – it is Canadian and has an excellent section on submarines:  “Air quality in airplane cabins and similar enclosed spaces” by‎ Martin B. Hocking and Diana Hocking (2005).



It's on Google Books. And doesn't appear to support your assertion that CO is the dived endurance problem. 

CO2 and O2 are far larger problems. Thats why they have had solutions provided. If CO goes above standards, you either live with the exceeded standards or snort to ventilate.



> Zero discharge is the requirement north of 60.  That requires slightly higher standards than currently fitted equipment.  Happily, it's readily available as a COTS insertion.



That's a workable solution for short trips north of 60. It's not so good for long patrols.


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## a_majoor

Just an interesting note; "Skate" class SSN's with displacements of only 2250 tons were quite capable of operating under the ice, with the Skate surfacing at the North Pole in 1959. 

Most of the problems have been solvd already, and we only lack the political will to build our own SSN (or even order them offshore). The Skipjack class design seems eminently suitable for our needs (especially combining the small size and hull form with modern equipment). Lashing together some sort of AIP solution foer a submarine "might" work, but with the exception of fuel cells (Solid Oxide Fuel Cells in particular, which can run directly on hydrocarbon fuels), most of the AIP solutions seem to far too complex to be considered a reliable solution to the under ice problem.


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## Zoomie

Wow - you guys are speaking in forked tongues.  Fascinating discussion.


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> I agree that an INS is required for under-ice operations.


Glad we now agree.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> The Doc used a Draeger kit every four hours or so. O2, CO2 and a bunch of others.


The OKA PA was awake 24/7?  Impressive.  However CANSSOs mandated the NAV COMMs to do the readings and they checked for CO, CO2, and O2.    



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> It's on Google Books. And doesn't appear to support your assertion that CO is the dived endurance problem.


You read pages 378-383?



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> CO2 and O2 are far larger problems. Thats why they have had solutions provided. If CO goes above standards, you either live with the exceeded standards or snort to ventilate.


CO2 and O2 are easily managed and hence aren’t an issue.  If you read the section on submarines from Prof Hocking then you'll know why CO is hard to manage for an SSK.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> That's a workable solution for short trips north of 60. It's not so good for long patrols.


If you say so.  At least one submariner who has operated up north disagrees.


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## drunknsubmrnr

> The OKA PA was awake 24/7?  Impressive.  However CANSSOs mandated the NAV COMMs to do the readings and they checked for CO, CO2, and O2.



OJ. And Doc was checking for a lot more than just those three, especially after OK's Freon leak. Maybe the NAVCOMM's were checking as well, but they were aft of the CR. I rarely went that far back.



> You read pages 378-383?



That's the last page of the article and the references. Are you sure you're working off the same edition as is on Google Books?

http://books.google.ca/books?id=KzXPJ-p75QIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Air+quality+in+airplane+cabins+and+similar+enclosed+spaces&source=bl&ots=g4-jsWMzL5&sig=i8_IHQrSHA4OXBCppyC0Su1U4eg&hl=en&ei=2r11TM-hCY6msQPmov2gDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=submarine&f=false

In any case, section 4.2.3 is the section on CO, and it's one paragraph long. Hardly a case for a major problem.



> If you say so.  At least one submariner who has operated up north disagrees.



And that submariner was on station in a SPA north of 60 for how long?


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> OJ.





			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Odd....I could have sworn we did that for several days at a time in a couple of exercises between Newfoundland and Iceland. Temp below the thermocline was almost always 3-4 C, and we didn't have that many problems with condensation.


One of these two statements is wrong – your choice as to which one you'd like to "correct".



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> And Doc was checking for a lot more than just those three, especially after OK's Freon leak.


Freon leaks were quite common – hence why the Outside Wrecker’s staff had Freon detectors and made daily rounds.  



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> Maybe the NAV COMM's were checking as well, but they were aft of the CR. I rarely went that far back.


They did the whole SM.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> That's the last page of the article and the references. Are you sure you're working off the same edition as is on Google Books?


I wasn’t using Google Books – I own a copy – but when I enter your link I get “no preview available for this page” and the footnotes.  If you have only looked at the Google Books entry then you might want to wind your neck in.



			
				drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> And that submariner was on station in a SPA north of 60 for how long?


Which time?

Anyways - this is getting somewhat pointless.   Feel free to respond and have the last word.


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## drunknsubmrnr

> One of these two statements is wrong – your choice as to which one you'd like to "correct".



They're both correct.



> Freon leaks were quite common – hence why the Outside Wrecker’s staff had Freon detectors and made daily rounds.



And why the NWT's checked for Otto leaks etc. Wonderful, you get your sig on your Atmospheric Monitoring qual.



> They did the whole SM.



If you say so. I never saw one taking readings in the AS. I did see the fore-endies taking them in the FTR.



> If you have only looked at the Google Books entry then you might want to wind your neck in.



The Google books entry is online. I'll even attach a screenshot. 

In any case, it has one paragraph on CO out of that entire chapter, and that's only in conjunction with snorting. Please point out how that makes CO "the dived endurance problem aboard SSKs".



> Which time?



Any time under the AWPA rules.


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## Navy_Blue

CO is a product of combustion.  Therefore CO is only an issue in the event of an engine run on after a SNORT.  When we are dived we do everything in our power not to burn anything  ;D.  We have several facilities to deal with lack of O2 and excess CO2.  Your biggest limitation to an SSK’s dived endurance is the battery.  

As far as the environmental issues.  I would refer you both to the EMS policy for subs and if you read them you will notice they have been superseded by different orders and have concessions for submarines in several cases.    

As far as the origional statment ref 212 armliment.  It would rock having a mast mounted 30mm!!!


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## Lex Parsimoniae

Navy_Blue said:
			
		

> CO is a product of combustion.  Therefore CO is only an issue in the event of an engine run on after a SNORT.  When we are dived we do everything in our power not to burn anything  ;D.  We have several facilities to deal with lack of O2 and excess CO2.  Your biggest limitation to an SSK’s dived endurance is the battery.


Seriously?  You claim to be an ETECH aboard WSR and don't know where the CO aboard submarines comes from?  Hint: The machinery you would maintain as an electrician.  

Kindly explain why the Virginia class operates carbon monoxide burners if CO only results from engine run-ons.

FYI - Carbon monoxide is formed by the incomplete burning of carbon.  The wiki definition notes that "Carbon monoxide is a product of incomplete combustion of organic matter with insufficient oxygen supply to enable complete oxidation to carbon dioxide."  Any cooking equipment or rotating machinery used aboard submarines?  Anything aft of 56 that might offgas carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and unburned hydrocarbons even after shut-down?  Is the ambient O2 percentage ever below 21%?  Ambient pressure ever drop below 1000 millibar?


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## drunknsubmrnr

A properly running diesel doesn't produce that much CO. You need to have an extreme event such as an engine run-on to produce large quantities of CO.

The small amount of CO that's produced as part of a normal diesel engine combustion doesn't affect SSK ops because the air is exchanged as the boat is snorting. If the boat isn't snorting, there's no major source of CO. The most you might see would be from crew smoking, and that tends to be damped out as CO2 rises anyway.

The US SSN's need a CO burner because they have a diesel, they have crews that smoke, and the burner also gets rid of battery H2.


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## Lex Parsimoniae

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> A properly running diesel doesn't produce that much CO. You need to have an extreme event such as an engine run-on to produce large quantities of CO.
> 
> The small amount of CO that's produced as part of a normal diesel engine combustion doesn't affect SSK ops because the air is exchanged as the boat is snorting. If the boat isn't snorting, there's no major source of CO. The most you might see would be from crew smoking, and that tends to be damped out as CO2 rises anyway.
> 
> The US SSN's need a CO burner because they have a diesel, they have crews that smoke, and the burner also gets rid of battery H2.


 :


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## Oldgateboatdriver

I know where the CO in my submarine came from: Red Deer, Alberta.


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## GK .Dundas

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I know where the CO in my submarine came from: Red Deer, Alberta.


 give him a hand  ladies and gentlemen ,he'll be here all week!


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## schering

I thought the operational speed of a diesel submarine is about 5kn when running on batteries and 2 kn when running on AIP. I also thought that because of this inherent speed limitation diesel submarines (with or without AIP) are most useful to perform ambushes near naval choke points and enemy ports. If that is correct, then that's not what Canada would need "arctic submarines" for. We would need submarines with enough speed and endurance to patrol very large tracts of ocean and impose national power over multiple threaths. Ergo, SSNs are more appropriate.

Another consideration: where would these diesel submarines be resupplied? There are no reliable Canadian ports as of yet near the areas of operation.


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## The_Unabooboo

That might be the top speed of a WW2 sub but now a days even the electric boats are pretty quick.  It's just that a nuke boat can go fast ALL the time since there are no battaries to run out.  There has been some talk of putting a naval base around Hudson Bay, maybe around Churchel MB.  Theres a interesting idea.  A prairie provence with a naval base.  It's probably the farthest north you could put a major instilation like that and keep it supplied with food and fuel year round.


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## a_majoor

Like everything else, you can get what you want if you are willing to make the proper compromises in the design. 

The Type XXI "_Elektroboote_" had long submerged endurance and relatively high submerged speed, but was also a very large submarine for the time in order to increase the battery compartment to 3X the size of the previous Type VII subs. (Type XXI's also had provisions for 4 X 20mm sail mounted anti aircraft cannons).

Using today's battery technologies *might* allow a large submarine the ability to patrol in the arctic the way we want (retrofitting a Victoria class with Lithium-ion batteries perhaps?), or perhaps that is more trouble than it is worth.


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## aesop081

The_Unabooboo said:
			
		

> That might be the top speed of a WW2 sub but now a days even the electric boats are pretty quick.



"Top speed" and "patrol speed" are 2 very different things. Theres a very imprtant difference.



> It's just that a nuke boat can go fast ALL the time since there are no battaries to run out.



Its not because they can, that they should....or do.


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## Oldgateboatdriver

Notwithstanding my little joke above about CO, I am having a hard time with this thread.

First of all, "Submarine" and "Sovereignty" do not belong in the same sentence IMHO. Just like the mere existence of police cars does not deter highway speeders, but parking them in the middle of the divider area does, sovereignty at sea is carried out with visible  assets. Submarines are the opposite: in fact the only time you would want to make them visible would be to send a message; like surfacing in full view of an opponent's coast or facility before hostilities to say" Hi there, see - I can get here anytime I want."

Thus, before I spend 800 to 1200 Million $ of Arctic sovereignty funds on a single submarine, I would much rather purchase 6 to 12 MLRPA like Orions or their replacement and let guys like CDN Aviator go out there with Harpoons under their wings. That would do a hundred times more for our Arctic sovereignty than any type  of submarine.

While the surfacing of US nuclear submarines in the Arctic is a fascinating technical achievement, they were not meant to enforce sovereignty. They were meant to send a message to the USSR: "I can operate under the ice as long as I want and get to you anytime I want". 

And only nuclear submarines can do that. Under ice submarine operations are a lot more hazardous than this thread leads on to believe (its a lot more than a CO issue). When under the ice, you forgo the option of quick, emergency surfacing. Yes: even large nuclear submarines like boomers can not surface anywhere or anytime they want. Ice in the Arctic is not like arena ice: thin and even. It is thick and made of completely uneven thickness going from a bit of slush in an opening (in the process of refreezing) to hundreds of feet deep where a multi decade iceberg born in a shoreborne ice sheet drifted and got caught by the reforming ice sheet in winter. Surfacing submarines have to look for and find proper location before they can attempt to surface. They may not find it in an emergency. Similarly a non-nuclear boat operating under the ice may not make it back from under the ice sheet or to a proper surfacing location by the time they must  surface, and in their case it may not even be for an emergency. 

One of the posts above talks about "multiple threat" in the Arctic. But what are they really? If you look at the Arctic ocean from a globe, instead of a map, you can see it can be accessed from only three locations: Two very narrow passages, between Alaska and Russia on one end and Canada (East or South of Ellesmere Island) and Greenland on the other end; and a larger passage, at the top of the North sea between Norway-the Svalbard Island-Greenland. Thus, between Russia, the US, Canada, Norway and Danemark, we control all the access point and 99.9% of the Arctic coastline. It is a bit of a _Mare Nostrum _ situation and, unless we fight amongst ourselves, nobody else is really a threat out there.

Maybe I should not , but I will dismiss Norway and Danemark as threats to our sovereignty that might require submarines. While the US can pose a submarine threat, for obvious reasons, I will not consider them a threat to Canada. This leaves Russia. It is a credible submarine threat, but one that can only be answered by nuclear submarines, if combat/cold war type underwater games have to be played. Nothing else has the speed and range to play open water games with nuclear submarines. Diesel or AIP submarines will always in the foreseeable future be choke point boats where countering nuclear boats is concerned.

As for the other threats, air or surface, the best counter at this time and in the foreseeable future will always be from the air, both in the surveillance and enforcement modes.

Thus, after this long diatribe, the question remains: What do we need "Arctic Sovereignty" submarines for in our naval arsenal?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Thank you for that, Oldgateboatdriver, you provide a lot of useful food for thought.

I am especially grateful for your cogent analysis of the Arctic approaches.

Based on what you've said, I'm inclined to support the more LRPAs plus some armed icebreakers option.


----------



## aesop081

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> While the US can pose a submarine threat, for obvious reasons, I will not consider them a threat to Canada.



While it is certainly not a military threat, any unauthorized sailing of a submarine, even an allied one, is a political threat. If we consider these waters to be ours, we cant continue to say "oh its just the USN, its ok..." The US has its own agenda in the north and it does not necessarily coincide with ours.

 I understand the problems with using submarines in the north but i also understand the problems with using aircraft to hunt submarines in the north. I see it less as a "which one does the job" than a "what combination of aircraft/ship/sub/undersea sensor is best' question. Aircraft and ships are the visible component of enforcing sovereignty but it must be backed up with other capabilities in order to be truely effective. I hate to use buzzwords but applying sovereignty up there is going to be a "system of systems".


----------



## schering

The_Unabooboo said:
			
		

> That might be the top speed of a WW2 sub but now a days even the electric boats are pretty quick.  It's just that a nuke boat can go fast ALL the time since there are no battaries to run out.



I wrote "operational speed" meaning for a submarine the cruising speed at which it operates silently. 



			
				Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Notwithstanding my little joke above about CO, I am having a hard time with this thread.
> 
> First of all, "Submarine" and "Sovereignty" do not belong in the same sentence IMHO. Just like the mere existence of police cars does not deter highway speeders, but parking them in the middle of the divider area does, sovereignty at sea is carried out with visible  assets. Submarines are the opposite: in fact the only time you would want to make them visible would be to send a message; like surfacing in full view of an opponent's coast or facility before hostilities to say" Hi there, see - I can get here anytime I want."



If "Sovereignty" is a nations's ability to assert exclusive authority over a territory then I don't see how lightly armed ice-breakers can assume the sovereignty role all by themselves. Visibility (hence the Ice-breakers) but also efficient naval deterrence (hence, SSNs) must be present.



			
				Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> While the surfacing of US nuclear submarines in the Arctic is a fascinating technical achievement, they were not meant to enforce sovereignty. They were meant to send a message to the USSR: "I can operate under the ice as long as I want and get to you anytime I want".



It is precisely because of this superiority that we need SSNs ourselves, as the only military asset really capable of preventing other nations from asserting for instance unilateral sovereign claims over the arctic. If Russia decided to act on its claims of sovereignty over the North Pole and started drilling natural gas or whatever else from the sea floor we would not be able to deter them, even with Icebreakers and a few Orions. 



			
				Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> One of the posts above talks about "multiple threat" in the Arctic. But what are they really? If you look at the Arctic ocean from a globe, instead of a map, you can see it can be accessed from only three locations: Two very narrow passages, between Alaska and Russia on one end and Canada (East or South of Ellesmere Island) and Greenland on the other end; and a larger passage, at the top of the North sea between Norway-the Svalbard Island-Greenland. Thus, between Russia, the US, Canada, Norway and Danemark, we control all the access point and 99.9% of the Arctic coastline. It is a bit of a _Mare Nostrum _ situation and, unless we fight amongst ourselves, nobody else is really a threat out there.



Granted now few countries are involved most of whom we can trust to behave civilly in the future. But that is only so because the ice still blocks most passages. Once these passages become navigable we do not now know nor can foresee which power (maybe China?) will assert some type of national interest in the region. It could be an interest in free navigation but it could also be an interest in the development of natural resources or, worst, geopolitical (an interest in deterring the US maybe?)  

As for Russia, the perspective of being all of a sudden much closer neighbours than we were in the past justifies in my opinion all by itself increased investment in arctic defense.


----------



## dapaterson

This concept needs a better name.  I'm having visions of the gym at Louis St Laurent, where two MARE officers meet:


MARE #1:  What are you working on?

MARE #2:  I'm working on the ASS project.

MARE #1:  Yes, it needs work.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

One must be careful when discussing Arctic sovereignty issues, as it has multiple aspects:

1- There is the Arctic ocean itself, which is an ocean and thus recognised by all as international waters (if you can get there - or would want to for any reason).

2- Then, there is jurisdiction over the ressources of the Arctic seabed. Here the various countries contiguous to the Arctic coast are working within an international agreement at this time to map the continental shelves to effect a mutually agreed partition based on their findings. This may lead to some hard fought negotiations and long debates but it is not in itself a sovereignty issue any more than the Exclusive Economic Zones of 200 NM surrounding the waters of a country currently granted any sovereignty past the 12 NM national waters of such  countries.

3- Then also, the limited debates within some nations concerning sovereignty over some lands, such as the Danemark/Canada debate over title to Hans Island (lest it votes for Independence from both  )

4- Finally, there is the issue of the status of the North-West Passage (and the North-East one in Russia): On the one side, the US claiming they are international straights and thus, even though acknowledging Canadian sovereignty as appropriate over the waters, subject to the right of free innocent passage (which also exists BTW in the territorial waters of a country not otherwise classified as internal waters). On the other side, Canada claiming the waters within the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters (such as bays, the great lakes and the St-Lawrence estuary) and therefore subjet to the absolute sovereign whim of Canada.

While the submarine use of the Arctic ocean by US submarines is of no political concern to Canada and they are free to use such international waters, the only truly issue that matters to Canada is use by the US without permission of what we claim as internal waters: The waters enclosed within  the Arctic archipelago. 

And there, the US has two problems. Firstly, on the technical side, it would be very daring for a captain to take a submarine through covertly under water as the passage is quite shallow as far as submarine ops are concernend. It would even be reckless if done in winter when ice covered. Secondly, any covert passage would ruin the US claim of the right of innocent passage, which can only be exercised by a submarine running surfaced, while other transits - covert - would neither assist their claim nor qualify as innocent in law.

This is why I am not too worried at this point about US submarine ops, as I very much doubt they use what we consider Canadian waters to carry out their political agenda. They very well may (for all I know) use Canadian waters covertly to take temporary refuge from storms, fix broken equipment quietly or any other such reasons, but such use would be related to military purposes on which, we are on the same side, not political ones relating to our mutual debate over sovereignty of the Arctic.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

schering said:
			
		

> If Russia decided to act on its claims of sovereignty over the North Pole and started drilling natural gas or whatever else from the sea floor we would not be able to deter them, even with Icebreakers and a few Orions.



Good Lord man, have you ever seen a drilling platform? Its the perfect siting duck: I would not waste an Orion, I would send a DASH 8 with someone dropping a small bomb out the door by hand! And BTW the Russians do not have armed icebreakers either.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Also, Shering: bear in mind the Navy is not a constabulary where assertion of authority and deterrence are concerned. We do not deter people from entering our waters in peace because we are not police officers. 

A Canadian submarine "deterring" anyone from entering our waters would normally be performed by firing a torpedo at it. Unless we positively considered the intrusion into Canadian waters to be an act of war of the country whose flag our target flew, we would be the ones declaring war through our action. Just bear that in mind when judging the actions of "military" forces, as opposed to law enforcement ones.


----------



## aesop081

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> A Canadian submarine "deterring" anyone from entering our waters would normally be performed by firing a torpedo at it.



I think you are over-simplifying. What is needed is a clear political message that intrusion in Canadian teritorial waters is not acceptable and the means to act upon it. With such a message and the simple existence of submarines is, in fact, deterence. If it is effective or not, is another matter.

Shooting at intruders ? Why not ? Sweden took Soviet submarines to task on occasion so why should we be any less forceful ?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Sweden took Soviet submarines to task on occasion so why should we be any less forceful ?



Ah! CDN Aviator, you bring back such  memories from a war  that was ... cold.

While I will not admit nor deny anything, there are stories out here that will never be told from those  "_unusual_" times ...


----------



## NavyShooter

The problem with using a submarine for arctic sovereignty patrols is that they do not even meet the first level of the force continuum.

A visible armed presence.

They may be present.

They may be armed.

They are not (generally) visible.

Since a big part of the Arctic patrols is to "show the flag", there are other platforms that would be better suited for that role.

That said, a submarine DOES have a place in the Arctic, and IMO it's to watch other people's subs that come up there to play, but that's not much of a visible presence either.

YMMV, but some extra pidgeon-carriers plus some big ice-breakers would do a much better job for most of the roles.

NS


----------



## a_majoor

The strong suit of submarines is they are effectively invisible.

This puts a level of uncertainty in potential opponents minds, as they won't know for certain if a submarine is there or not, if they are being watched or not, if someone can apply armed force against them or not.

This is actually one of the arguments for BMD, you have no idea which missile(s) might get shot down and therefore which target is going to be missed (sucks if it is the enemy missile silo or airbase launching bombers), so you never know how effective your attack is going to be.

The answer in either case is to bring more resources to overmatch any potential defenses, which means (for all practical purposes) that you are taking resources away from some other task.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Not sure what BMD has to do with establishing a presence in the North....


----------



## a_majoor

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Not sure what BMD has to do with establishing a presence in the North....



Sowing uncertainty has _so_ many uses...


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> The problem with using a submarine for arctic sovereignty patrols is that they do not even meet the first level of the force continuum.
> 
> A visible armed presence.
> 
> They may be present.
> 
> They may be armed.
> 
> They are not (generally) visible.
> 
> Since a big part of the Arctic patrols is to "show the flag", there are other platforms that would be better suited for that role.


Given the limited resources of the Canadian fleet - it is better to have a covert presence that _could be _ anywhere than an overt presence that is clearly not everywhere.  Showing the flag is only a deterrent if you have sufficient sensor coverage and revisit rates to enforce your control of the sea.  

A water space management system is used to ensure the safety of allied submarines throughout the world in a similar manner to air traffic control. One aspect of the system is not publically understood is that this is generally accomplished by temporarily declaring a Notice of Intention for submarine operations on the high seas, thus de facto controlling that area unless other states are willing to risk the safety of their submarines by not notifying the state that established the NOI of their operations.  In times of higher tension, it also serves notice that we have an armed submarine in the area and enter at your peril (akin to the exclusion zone used in the Falklands war).  

Just my  :2c:


----------



## a_majoor

Well, here is an idea for running under "battery power" while submerged under the ice (or anywhere else):

http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/cold-fission



> *Cold Fission*
> Liquid semiconductors could yield a better nuclear battery
> 
> By Samuel K. Moore  /  February 2007
> 
> What if you could make a miniature, superefficient nuclear power plant that’s simple to build and doesn’t get much hotter than a kitchen oven? That could be the result of an innovation being developed by scientists at Global Technologies, in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
> 
> GTI’s president, Francis Tsang, and colleagues are working on a nuclear voltaic cell consisting, basically, of a semiconductor and an amount of radioactive material [see photo, ”Innovator”]. The semiconductor sits between two conductors to form a Schottky diode, and it is bombarded by particles from uranium, plutonium, or some less dangerous radioactive material.
> 
> Radiation has essentially the same effect on a semiconductor that light has on a typical solar cell. In a solar cell, the impact of a photon with the semiconductor crystal creates an electron and a positively charged particle called a hole. Because the cell’s semiconductor has been doped with chemical impurities, it has a natural polarization that draws the electron to one electrode and the hole toward the other, thereby producing current.
> 
> If a nuclear version of a solar cell sounds like one of the old atomic battery concepts from the 1950s, it is, but with a potentially all-new twist.
> 
> Some of those early concepts sought to harvest semiconductor energy from alpha radiation (positively charged helium nuclei) or beta radiation (electrons). Although they offered the hope of efficient batteries that would last for decades, they were limited by what seemed to be insurmountable problems associated with their radiation sources.
> 
> ”Beta cells are restricted to low-energy beta, and they can’t use alpha,” says Jake Blanchard, a professor of engineering physics at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, who develops MEMS-based radioisotope batteries [see ”The Daintiest Dynamos,” IEEE Spectrum, September 2004]. Alpha particles and other high-energy radiation ”will trash the semiconductor by displacing the atoms,” Blanchard says. That has kept this class of nuclear battery from housing enough radioactive material to produce more than mere milliwatts of power.
> 
> Tsang, a former U.S. Energy Department researcher, was well aware of the beta cell’s problems. ”Shoot a bullet into a block of ice, and the ice will shatter and can’t go back into its original form,” Tsang says. ”But if you shoot a bullet into water, the water repairs itself.” So he began experiments replacing solid semiconductors with molten selenium and molten sulfur, both of which become semiconductors in their liquid state and melt at less than 300 °C. Because liquids don’t suffer any structural damage, Tsang’s nuclear battery could run on much more powerful radiation than a beta cell, and therefore generate more electricity.
> 
> A liquid nuclear diode could catch energetic alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and even the new atoms left over from the fission of larger atoms, Tsang says. Fissile fragments could be a particularly good source of energy. In the fission of U-235, for example, the fragments carry 85 percent of the energy released. Because the fragments are heavy, as they plow through the semiconductor they ”make a shower of electron-hole pairs along the path,” he says.
> 
> Tsang’s idea is not widely known, and for now, that’s the way he likes it. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office posted GTI’s key patent application only in November. Tsang has not published data in a peer-reviewed journal (though some of the experiments were replicated at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, in California), and he would reveal no hard numbers for this article.
> 
> The University of Wisconsin’s Blanchard, reserving final judgment until he sees published data, thinks the concept of a liquid nuclear battery is a good one. ”It’s a clever idea,” he says. ”It’s not totally crazy.”
> 
> At the moment, GTI’s battery is far from useful, not having quite reached 1 percent efficiency. Its development has gone far enough, however, to make an impression at the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The agency gave Tsang’s company funds to support its Liquid Electronics Advanced Power System (LEAPS) program: first, US $1.4 million to prove the concept by producing current in a test cell, with a provision that would have allowed for additional funding of up to $26.6 million for over four and a half years. With submarine power plants in mind, DARPA wanted GTI to run full speed toward proving that a reactor of the 100- to 1000-kilowatt scale could be built.
> 
> But in October, Tsang’s group rejected the additional work, figuring that the effort envisioned by DARPA would overwhelm GTI’s resources. Tsang says GTI ultimately will make more progress by going after small-scale power sources first. So for now, nuclear reactors will have to take a backseat to nuclear batteries.


----------



## AlexanderM

I'm posting here as suggested, discussing the proposed new Type 216 submarine.

Application for lurking up north comes to mind.  Move at 4 knots and listen.  Could be used a limited amount under ice, as long as batteries are charged to get back out?  So boat would charge batteries with snorkel, then use to get into position, then lurk for a couple days, then use batteries to move on.  Still moving at 100 miles per day, 2800 miles in 4 weeks, at 4 knots.  Wouldn't be helpful to partol up north?

In my mind, it's purpose would be to keep an eye mainly on what the Russians, and others, are doing.

I read in the discussion that a larger submarine is needed in the north, well these seem to be quite large, around 300' (89 meters) and 4000 tons.  At least this is the claim from this site, which is anything but official.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264

To be honest, I don't know where they come up with the 4000 tons.  BTW, if you go to the above site, not using the link, there are quite a few cutaway views of the inside of the sub.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Thank you for keeping the threads straight AM.

To answer your question bluntly: Would Type 216's be helpful to patrol up North? Yes, but only marginally more so than any classic diesel/electric boat.

You see, to understand Northern issue, I have always felt that it is more important to look at it by using a globe instead of a map.

When you do this, you realize that the Arctic ocean is actually an extremely large body of open water (OK, iced over most of the year, but still). Slow loitering submarines, whether diesel or AIP, are not good at hunting fast preys in open waters. That is why, for instance, these open waters games were played by nuclear boats during the cold war.

Slow loitering boats were used and still are today for choke point surveillance. Such choke points force any intruder to come to the waiting loitering boat, which is usually of a quieter type than the "nuke" prey.

For this strategy to work, however, there has to be a reason fro the "prey" to want to go through the choke point.

In the cold war, the advertised soviet strategy was to come into the North Atlantic in strength with submarines, to disrupt the sea lanes of communications and prevent North American reinforcements and materiel to make it to Europe. (Hello, Mr. Doenitz? Yes, could we borrow your plan.). Thus, the soviets had to come through either the G.I.U.K. gap or through one of the two gaps between the tip of the Labrador peninsula and Greenland. Choke point defensive strategy worked in that scenario, and the submarines did not have to go under the ice. Being a little South of the ice cap sufficed.

The real question, under today's situation, is: What threat would we be guarding against with such submarines? If the threat is open water warfare (against the Russians, the Chinese or (god forbids) the Americans) in the Arctic ocean, then classic subs, whether diesel or AIP, would be of little to no use: Only nuke boats can play such games.

If the idea is to prevent access TO the Arctic ocean, then the appropriate choke point under Canadian control is the same that we watched during the cold war but with the threat coming from the opposite direction. If the idea is to protect traffic in the Northwest passage when it is free of ice, then IMHO, the best approach with slow loitering boats, is to have sosus like nets at the entry of all the various passages that could lead into the actual NW passage and to keep the boats closer to the actual traffic lanes so that they can quickly (for them) redeploy towards the threat and intercept it, say 2/3 of the way down in the passage they elected to use. Again here, little to be gained from having an AIP boat as opposed to a purely diesel/electric one.

  Just my 2C worth.


----------



## AlexanderM

The north used to be a way to a destination but soon it will be the destination.  The resources there are now the issue, and those resources are stationary.  There will be rigs, etc, to be guarded, and to keep a watchful eye on.  Extremely quiet subs might be a good fit.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.ise.bc.ca/auv.html
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk60.htm
http://www.materiel.forces.gc.ca/en/aops.page

How about:

AOPS as tender
ISE's Arctic Explorer as an underice recce force
Captors laid in a field when and if an active barrier is required.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> The north used to be a way to a destination but soon it will be the destination.  The resources there are now the issue, and those resources are stationary.  There will be rigs, etc, to be guarded, and to keep a watchful eye on.  Extremely quiet subs might be a good fit.



Resources up there are already being exploited and they are not much of an issue. People have a generally good idea which country's water they are using, they are not really challenged from that point of view and there are no threats to these facilities, from a defense point of view: The resources that "terrorists" or "state actors" would have to deploy to attack a single resource exploitation location in the Arctic make it not worth the effort. Besides, those location are fixed points on the surface and thus, easy to defend from the air.

Take a page from the suggestion of Kirkhill just above, which I agree with.

In the end, the best defense in the Arctic will come from knowing the full picture and being able to deploy the appropriate weapons to face any threat. That means a system of systems providing intel and accurate info to a single command center that will then be able to quickly deploy the appropriate weapon system. In such a scenario, cheap remotely controlled weapons that lie in wait in numerous dispersed locations coupled to good and also remote controlled or self controlled but remotely reporting surveillance, detection and classification systems will be the key. You will have to integrate the picture from satellites, maritime patrol aircrafts, surface ships, autonomous underwater systems, fixed underwater systems in a central location and, from there, respond with the appropriate weapons system, either already deployed (like a captor mine) or to be deployed (like a fighter/bomber jet).

The beauty is that this centralized command post can be anywhere: Halifax, Esquimalt or even Ottawa (gods forbid).


----------



## AlexanderM

It would just be great to have some big new boats, for those of us who think that it's cool. 

The AIP systems really have to develop to the point where they are producing sustained power above 1MW before they will be really useful, then the sub could cruise at a decent speed.  In the case of Isreal, they want the Dolphin class to be a second strike weapon, in case they get hit, so the AIP works for them as they just want the subs to be silent and undetectable.  In which case they can hit back with their nuclear armed missles.

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/14/the-german-u-boat-reborn/


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Don't get me wrong. I have nothing against submarines - quite the opposite. I'd rather (personal opinion here) have 12 SCSC's and 7 to 8 large long range subs than 15 SCSC's but no subs, or very few subs.

It's just when people brandy them as the "must-have" Arctic piece of hardware that I get annoyed. 

While I would love to see Canada get more boats, and think that we need more boats, my view is that the Arctic ought not to be their primary area of operation. As far as I am concerned, we need them in the Pacific, where we should have the most of them.

I have also mentioned in another thread that I would love to see us pair up with Australia and get onboard their Collins class replacement program. Imagine the benefits of being part of a program that would let us have a boat right off the bat that is compatible with US systems and be common to our most natural primary ally in the Pacific: Australia. Moreover, it would create a larger class, with all the appertaining costs benefits for all participants.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just checked the moon cycle to verify that the moon was neither full nor blue.  Apparently OGBD and I agree on both the subs and the arctic.

 ;D

(How are we doing with OPVs and BHS's?).


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

If you look at this old thread of mine below, you will have an idea where I stand on BHS.


http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/95737/post-960731.html#msg960731

As for AOPS, I think I have made it clear in the past that my view id: Give the "A" to the Coastguard then buy real "OPS" for the Navy.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> If you look at this old thread of mine below, you will have an idea where I stand on BHS.
> 
> 
> http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/95737/post-960731.html#msg960731
> 
> As for AOPS, I think I have made it clear in the past that my view id: Give the "A" to the Coastguard then buy real "OPS" for the Navy.




ff topic: but ...

It has always struck me that _constabulary_ functions ought to be as limited as possible. In an ideal world, or just an ideal Canada, only a handful of government agencies would have firearms: the military and police, obviously, some prison guards and some of the customs/border services folks too. Those armed folks are then, the _armed services_ while all the others, including others who wear uniforms, are the _civil service_.

If we want icebreakers then I agree that the CCG is the better organization, but if we want armed icebrakers then maybe they need to be in the RCN or the RCMP Marine Division.

Sorry for the sidetrack, but I'm interested in the views of members.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

That's allright, ERC.

Perhaps this thread should be expanded some and renamed "Arctic Sovereignty - Naval Considerations".

My biggest beef here is that I have never been able to understand why people insist on the combination of "Icebreaker" with "weapons".

If the passage is open for shipping, then its open for real warships too. If there is too much ice, then the few merchant ships capable of operating in such conditions or the icebreakers of other nations will all be just as slow as your own icebreakers. Short story here: You are not going to catch up to them with your own icebreakers. So how do we deal with them, if they are armed? You send aircrafts after them. We are the only nation (except perhaps the US with Alaska) that has ready access to airstrips along the length of the passage so as to carry out effective patrol of it from the air.

If you absolutely insist that there are circumstances where an armed icebreaker would be required, you can still achieve this with the icebreakers under coastguard control. Just build them so that containerized weapons systems can quickly be strapped on and a naval detachment them added to the crew of the icebreaker. I would be willing to bet that the weapon containers would sit in harbour for the whole life of the icebreakers they are meant to provide weapons for.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Thanks, OGBD. That makes sense to me.

</highjack>


----------



## Kirkhill

I don't entirely disagree with OGBD on the Arctic Patrol issue.  I agree with the both the vessels with the containerized systems and the minimal requirement for "weapons" in the arctic.   I do question whether it is as easy as he seems to suggest  to add an RCN det to a Coast Guard crew and take the vessel into harm's way.  It might work if the Coast Guard crew were replaced whole and entire by an RCN crew.  Perhaps the vessels could have permanent CCG crews and RCNR crews as well with the RCNR supplying 25% of the AOPS's sea duty crews to keep their hands in.

I would like to pick up on the Tangent a bit more perhaps - and possibly drive a split to another thread (or a displacement to an existing thread):

Ships are mobile islands that allow a nation to create sovereign havens where the government of the day sees fit.

It doesn't matter the size of the ship or the size of the crew it is still sovereign territory.  Those islands are agents of influence for the government both at home and abroad.  Not all of those islands need to be in high threat environments all the time.  Often vessels are required in places like the Horn of Africa, the Straits of Malacca and the Caribbean where risks are not much more elevated than they would be in Canada's EEZ.   



Jackie Fisher described the Army as just another projectile to be launched by the Navy.

With that in mind I compiled the following list of projectiles available to Canada, either in the current inventory or at reasonable cost, that can be launched from vessels in the 2000 to 6000 tonne displacement range.  In other words affordable vessels, not Big Honking Ships, although they would be nice.  That range includes River, Rasmussen and Holland class OPVs as well as Absolons and Endurance class support ships.  It also includes FREMMs, MEKOs, Huitfeldts, Nansens, 7 Provinces and many similar vessels.

The List:

Air Assets

CH-147  13 tonnes
CH-149  11 tonnes
CH-148    8 tonnes
CH-146    4 tonnes
MQ-8C     2 tonnes
MQ-8B     1 tonne
ScanEagle  18 kg

Harpoon ER  700 kg
SM2              700 kg
ESSM            300 kg
Hellfire            50 kg
Griffin              20 kg
APKWS II        20 kg

76mm                5 kg
57mm                2 kg
35mm                1 kg
25mm              500 g
20mm              100 g
12.7mm             50 g
7.62mm             10 g

Sea Assets

LCVP MkV(c)  16 tonnes
Strb90H         15 tonnes
LCP                  7 tonnes

ISE Theseus     9 tonnes
RMMV                7 tonnes
ISE Arctic Exp    2 tonnes
Mk48 ADCAP     2 tonnes
CAPTOR            1 tonne
Mk46 Torp        230 kg
Seaspider ATT  ----

Land Assets

Soldiers            100 kg

Vehicles......

In addition the islands carry surveillance gear (as do many of the projectiles)

Dutch OPVs contribute to their Recognized Maritime Picture with the Thales IM-400 Mast with an AESA 3D Volume Search Radar, a Surface Search Radar,  and EO Surveillance, tracking and fire control system.   Sonars are ubiquitous.

More islands equals a more comprehensive picture and more havens and more launch points.  The minimum requirement is a deck on which a CH-147 can land and refuel and a hull capable of launching a 10 to 20 tonne vessel over the side or off the stern.

Not all islands need to have all the projectiles all the time.  All islands should travel in company and be appropriately equipped for the threat.

I am a fan of minimal crewing -  

Ships crews run on the order of 20 to 25 drivers and engineers.

Everybody else is either a projectile or else manning projectile launchers.

Interestingly enough that 20 to 25 number applied to the days of sail as well.  Another comparison I just did to get a sense of historical crewing patterns and the difference between the RN and the merchant Navy was between HMS Victory and the Cutty Sark.

HMS Victory carried a spread of 37 sails with all studding and staysails set.

Cutty Sark carried 65 sails, including staysails, studding sails, skysails and moonrakers.

At Trafalgar Victory carried a complement of 820 and was undermanned.

Cutty Sark conventionally carried a crew of 26 to 28 including carpenter, sailmaker, cook, steward and apprentices.

Victory did not need her full complement to sail her.   The majority or her complement were, to put it in the harshest terms, passengers.

The passengers included the Admiral and his 6 man staff that directed the fleet, the Captain and his 30 commissioned officers and midshipmen that fought the ship and 146 Royal Marines.

The vast majority of the Victory's complement were there to serve her 100 guns.  Each of the guns and carronades required a crew of 6 men (average) and in addition there were the Gunner and his mates, the petty officers and powder monkeys supervising, maintaining and distributing the 35 tonnes of powder she carried.

Victory's large complement (carried in a 3500 tonne displacement vessel - approximately the same as a Holland OPV)  was essentially a small sailing crew transporting a regiment of guns and a company of marines.

The RN put the gun crews to work aloft and on sailing duties because "the devil finds work for idle hands" but they weren't needed for the ship.

Today I would argue that there is even less call for large complements.

A large vessel with a small crew of twenty or so can supply a mobile sovereign haven on which a CH-147 can light and which can man the onboard sensors.

A similar sized weapons det (Absolon uses about 20 to 25 and the Rheinmetall shorebased Skyshield system uses even fewer) supplies self defence.

20 for an Air det to launch and recover the host of helos and UAVs 

20 for a deck det to launch and recover sea assets and handle RAS duties.

20 to supply "hotel" services.

Beyond that the complement becomes "projectiles".

I would argue that a large fleet of "value-priced" hulls that require minimal manning and that can be up-gunned and up-manned as national circumstances demand is both more cost effective and useful and than a small fleet of tailored vessels crammed to the gunwales with every available AB the RCN is permitted to hire.

Those hulls could either be large OPVs that can be upgunned for higher intensity conflicts and/or Frigates that can be degunned for lower intensity "constabulary" work.

One other point - not all projectiles have to have lethal effect to be effective agents of influence.  Survey work, logistics, humanitarian assistance and maintaining free passage - as well as maintaining law and order - all serve to establish a nation's rights and ability to operate freely broadly.


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## Oldgateboatdriver

I wont disclose exact numbers here. Because they vary and because there are security issues with everything we say.

However, about 15 seaman, 5 or 6 officers and 15 engineers are all that are dedicated to "driving the ship" on a current HAL. So everybody else already is "dedicated to the various weapons systems" (and I include here the electrical and electronics techs as well as the weapons techs and systems operators of all sorts.).

By the way, your equation between the VICTORY, a ship already in its 40th year and getting old at Trafalgar, and Cutty Sark, a different type of merchant ship altogether and younger by almost a hundred year, is foible at best. It's like comparing a pre-Dreadnaught battleship with a WWII Battleship. Also, you fail to take into account the differences between a warship and a merchant ship, which holds true even today: Even from a seamanship point of view, a warship needs more personnel. The Cutty Sark (which probably had thinner and lighter ropes, lighter more efficient steel blocks and steam winches) did not need to have the manning  required to operate every sail at once and in a hurry - a warship like VICTORY did. Just that aspect requires a huge difference in crewing. 

Nowadays, the difference in crewing is smaller, but it still exists and requires a warship to have a larger number of engineers and deck hands than a merchant ship just so you can maintain primary/secondary and tertiary propulsion/navigation and direction when in action.


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## Jacky Tar

Let's not also forget that another reason for having the large numbers of crew we have (compared to a merchant vessel) is damage control. Firefighting, flood control, contamination control, casualty clearing.

There's also the little issue of maintenance while at sea, too... a *lot* of man-hours there. I have a REMAR of 11 pers in the shop (not counting the Snr ET as I work for him, not other way around), and all too often I'm under that. Even if I have every warm body the REMAR calls for, I could easily employ 3 or 4 more.


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## Colin Parkinson

Debate on a news article about a future sub purchase, apparently the 216 class are shown with vertical launch tubes and a poster on the thread claims this is a weapon we don't have and don't need. As I recall the recently planned upgrades for the ships include vertical launch tubes, but I can't recall the weapon type. Does this poster have a point?


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## Cdn Blackshirt

Just my two cents, but I think unless you're going to SSN's, an SSK is the wrong asset for the job.

Since I don't think we're going to SSN's any time soon, I have an alternate thought that would allow us to re-allocate funding away from creating an "Arctic SSK" that's not ideal.

Why not create the equivalent of historical forts at the major routes of ingress/egress (choke points)?

Visible presence.  

Flag waving.

Wired into fixed sonar under the ice (and should there be undersurface torpedo tubes, so be it).

Co-located with some type of docking facilities (Coast Guard Ice Breakers) and airport facilities (SAR assets).

Specifically, if you placed one "fort" at the primary Western Approach, and one at the primary Eastern Approach, you could use those locations as rendezvous points where commercial traffic meet to be escorted by Canadian Coast Guard Ice Breakers.

In terms of a 'Sovereignty Statement', if that is the objective of having an arctic sovereignty submarine, I think that alternative structure does an exponentially better job for much less money.

I would add that you could build a series of hi-res colour webcams at those choke points that would accessible by anyone including Canadian school children so they can see the what 'Our Arctic' looks like, and see our Coast Guard (and potentially our Navy) in action.

I'll now don the traditional blindfold, light my cigarette and await the firing squad I'm sure will follow.

Sorry if this is a complete hi-jack, but this is just my opinion on a potentially better way to meet the objectives of the Arctic Sovereignty Submarine which is the thread topic.


Cheers all, Matthew.  

P.S.  In principle I'm okay with the concept of the AOPS as a flag waving tool, but I don't like how compromised it appears to be.  If it's role is provide a military show of strength to supplement existing Coast Guard Ships, then ice-harden it, and arm it properly.  If you're not going to do that, I don't believe it to be worth the money.  I'd much rather see it cancelled it and funds re-allocated to the Coast Guard for heavy ice breaker(s) for the escort role mentioned above (or for the facilities themselves).


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