# Preserving Army Fleets



## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

Underway said:


> So more 155mm weapons, and that SIDAM 25 will be really useful vs drones and helicopters.  Ukraine is beginning to amass some serious artillery.  Double down on what they are good at I suppose!


Makes one chuckle a bit about Canada's fetish in avoiding mixed fleets because of their maintenance complexity. Here we have a nation using equipment and weapons, in the middle of a war, coming from numerous countries of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact and from numerous decades going back to seventy some odd years.

It never ceases to amaze me how one can overcome obstacles when one needs to or has to.


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> Makes one chuckle a bit about Canada's fetish in avoiding mixed fleets because of their maintenance complexity. Here we have a nation using equipment and weapons, in the middle of a war, coming from numerous countries of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact and from numerous decades going back to seventy some odd years.
> 
> It never ceases to amaze me how one can overcome obstacles when one needs to or has to.


What a nation does in a war of survival vs how a nation sustains an affordable parce time army are very different. The donated lines of supply are also a significant factor to making this feasible. There will be costs to this though. Likely higher equipment attrition due to not having the right parts & qualifications at the time and place of need. Potentially longer lines of support between fighting units & higher echelons if repair.

Also, the platforms within these donated mixed fleets are a still concentrated in larger quantities than the CA owns across all its Bdes. So they will still be easier to concentrate support than with Canadian micro-fleets.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> Makes one chuckle a bit about Canada's fetish in avoiding mixed fleets because of their maintenance complexity. Here we have a nation using equipment and weapons, in the middle of a war, coming from numerous countries of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact and from numerous decades going back to seventy some odd years.
> 
> It never ceases to amaze me how one can overcome obstacles when one needs to or has to.




__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1518247524162805767

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517841336648491009


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## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> What a nation does in a war of survival vs how a nation sustains an affordable parce time army are very different. The donated lines of supply are also a significant factor to making this feasible. There will be costs to this though. Likely higher equipment attrition due to not having the right parts & qualifications at the time and place of need. Potentially longer lines of support between fighting units & higher echelons if repair.
> 
> Also, the platforms within these donated mixed fleets are a still concentrated in larger quantities than the CA owns across all its Bdes. So they will still be easier to concentrate support than with Canadian micro-fleets.


Of course there is a price to pay, but, if you divest older but serviceable equipment then you have nothing; if you retain older but serviceable equipment then you still have something even if its attrition rates are higher. A simple example is our TLAV fleet. 1960's era M113 fleets remain in operation in many countries and still provide useable service. Once again ours will be up on the market once the ACSV project delivers.

I know, I know, I'm fighting a rear-guard action against the bean counters and those who like to see fresh fleets every few generations, but, I favour mass, even if some of that mass is vintage, and even if it costs something to maintain it.

🍻


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

Those Ukrainian mixed fleets will probably be shot out or destroyed on the battlefield long before maintenance ever becomes an issue.


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## dapaterson (24 Apr 2022)

Mixed fleets that do not need long term sustainment are radically different from fleets that need lifecycle management, and the associated costs and complexity they bring, which pulls more personnel (an expensive asset, whether in or out of uniform) into managing spares, conducting maintenance, ammunition storage and acquisition...

EDIT: What Infanteer said.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Those Ukrainian mixed fleets will probably be shot out or destroyed on the battlefield long before maintenance ever becomes an issue.


Long term sustainable maintenance isn't a concern in war time. It's about keeping it working right now to kill the enemy.


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Those Ukrainian mixed fleets will probably be shot out or destroyed on the battlefield long before maintenance ever becomes an issue.


Or they get towed to Poland for depot level refurb.

We are currently in planning to move most of our depots and depot level refurbishment facilities out of Germany to Poland for several reasons.


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## rmc_wannabe (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Long term sustainable maintenance isn't a concern in war time. It's about keeping it working right now to kill the enemy.


Another flaw of our procurement system IMHO. 

Sustainability and maintenence costs don't factor in when you just need something to get rounds on target faster than the enemy. "Top of the line later" doesn't trump "Ok-ish today"

Doesn't matter if it's a Tesla or a 1988 Mercury Topaz, when you need to get from Point A to Point B, the platform is irrelevant.


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## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Or they get towed to Poland for depot level refurb.
> 
> We are currently in planning to move most of our depots and depot level refurbishment facilities out of Germany to Poland for several reasons.


Let me guess - labour costs are halved?

😉


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> Interesting figures 90 howitzers and 72 prime movers.
> 
> I saw a train of the better part of a Paladin battalion moving in Poland so that's probably the 18.
> 
> ...



When you think about it, the Ukrainians are disinclined to cede territory along the Line of Contact.  They have dug in and expect to hold their positions regardless of what the Russian artillery and air force throw at them.  The artillery would reasonably be expected to operate in the same environment and dig in and go static.

Tanks, and SPHs and MRLSs would stay agile and be able to move laterally to counter penetration threats as well as to launch their own counters if the circumstances present.   The basic Linebacker role.


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## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Mixed fleets that do not need long term sustainment are radically different from fleets that need lifecycle management, and the associated costs and complexity they bring, which pulls more personnel (an expensive asset, whether in or out of uniform) into managing spares, conducting maintenance, ammunition storage and acquisition...
> 
> EDIT: What Infanteer said.


I, and we all, appreciate that. But it's a philosophical difference (and I'm not striving to make this another shared fleet debate)

The issue is does the Army want to: a) equip two of three brigades pretty well? or does it want or b) equip two of three brigades well and another 2 brigades less well?

When the Army decide that a given in-service fleet should be replaced, it already has an existing lifecycle management structure in place for that including a parts system and trained personnel to maintain it. It's the new system that requires adding a new lifecycle management structure.

While older systems generally become more maintenance intensive over time, repurposing an old fleet from active to reserve status means it will have much reduced usage which provides a lower rate of deterioration and more time for maintenance. If one built in an active/reserve lifecycle to the acquisition of any equipment it would ensure that at the end of its active usefulness the equipment would still have a measure of useful reserve lifetime.

The Army don't think like that, however. It use the hell out of gear and then dispose of it to eliminate associated maintenance costs. Worse yet, every time that the Army buy new equipment it not only dispose of the old but generally buys less of the new than it had of the old putting the system into a slow death spiral.

Many countries have a "hand-me-down" approach to ensure that the various parts of their armies have equipment when needed. Canada seems content to have an army that has over half of its personnel unequipped or underequipped with major weapon and vehicle systems. It's not rocket science to establish supply and maintenance systems that can support such fleets. Yes there is a cost to that, but its a cost that results in a more extensive defence capability.

Well. I'm off to rebuild my front step. Using ice melt last winter damaged some of the concrete blocks ... which is good because I can keep the half which are still serviceable.

😉


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

What should the Army "hand me down" to the reserves?  An LSVW?  The Coyote?


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> When the Army decide that a given in-service fleet should be replaced, it already has an existing lifecycle management structure in place for that including a parts system and trained personnel to maintain it. It's the new system that requires adding a new lifecycle management structure.


Most of that structure is repurposed to look after the new fleet.  The new fleet needs LCMMs, supply managers, and shelf space at the depots. There is an opportunity cost to keeping our garbage.


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## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> Likely higher equipment attrition due to not having the right parts & qualifications at the time and place of need.



M777 maintainer YouTube videos in 3..2..1..


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> What should the Army "hand me down" to the reserves?  An LSVW?  The Coyote?


We already had LSVW, reg force then took most back, rest were condemned due to mold. Coyote could be given to the reserves, yes, and other platforms.

Before you ask well who will maintain them? reserve service battalions have a Cadre of reg force techs for a reason, who are then augmented by class A types. We have all the means to do it, just not the will to make it happen.

The biggest thing that can make an initiative fail, is if those who need to execute it believe it will not work.


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> We already had LSVW, reg force then took most back, rest were condemned due to mold. Coyote could be given to the reserves, yes, and other platforms.
> 
> Before you ask well who will maintain them? reserve service battalions have a Cadre of reg force techs for a reason, who are then augmented by class A types. We have all the means to do it, just not the will to make it happen.


All the reserve service battalions with a cadre of reg force techs in the world can't make a platform work if its beyond its service life and does not have a parts supply chain because the original manufacturer quit making them a decade ago.  See the "bathtub curve."


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

rmc_wannabe said:


> Another flaw of our procurement system IMHO.
> 
> Sustainability and maintenence costs don't factor in when you just need something to get rounds on target faster than the enemy. "Top of the line later" doesn't trump "Ok-ish today"
> 
> Doesn't matter if it's a Tesla or a 1988 Mercury Topaz, when you need to get from Point A to Point B, the platform is irrelevant.



Which goes to FJAG's point that sometimes it is appropriate to hang on to old kit.

I agree with him on the M109s.  I wouldn't agree on Centurions, Leo 1s, Blowpipes and Javelins.  I would agree on the Oerlikon 35s, Tow Under Amour but agree with chucking the ADATS.

Edit - I would have definitely kept the M113s and would keep the Bisons without all the paraphernalia.  I might even keep the Coyotes without their turrets.  Bisons and Turretless Coyotes would supply 300 to 400 transports for low threat environments.

Ca depends.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> All the reserve service battalions with a cadre of reg force techs in the world can't make a platform work if its beyond its service life and does not have a parts supply chain because the original manufacturer quit making them a decade ago.  See the "bathtub curve."




Here is my Green Standard for a "Reserve" vehicle









						Green Goddess - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






The truck was built in 1956.  900 were still in service in 2004 when the fleet was sold off.  Many were bought by fire brigades in third world countries.  It was last used by the British Army in 2002.

Simple, storable, maintainable and functional after 50 years largely sitting in warehouses and depots.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> All the reserve service battalions with a cadre of reg force techs in the world can't make a platform work if its beyond its service life and does not have a parts supply chain because the original manufacturer quit making them a decade ago.  See the "bathtub curve."


Yes systems still need to be supported, it's useless to keep equipment we do not have parts, but look at the C3, we didn't have parts, but we had a need and found companies who are now making new barrels, etc... for us. If we need it, industry can find a way, if we wanted to sustain the Coyote, I would place money the GDLS would find a way if we asked.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> What should the Army "hand me down" to the reserves?  An LSVW?  The Coyote?



The M113s.  The Bisons.  Gut them of all the fancy gadgets and swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.

They would still have provided useful (amphibious, all-terrain) transport in low threat environments.  And been air portable.

Wouldacouldashoulda.

Face it.  The real reason the Army didn't want to do it was because the storage costs would have detracted from the funds available to buy new kit for the Regs.

The Reserves need their own advocates.  And their own budget.


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Face it.  The real reason the Army didn't want to do it was because the storage costs would have detracted from the funds available to buy new kit for the Regs.



Is that the reason?  Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.

Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.


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## Halifax Tar (24 Apr 2022)

I think the CAF fails to realize that industry will inform you when you've reached extreme obsolescence.

We're just really bad as country at seeing it coming and acting before hand. 

Look at our last Protecteur class AORs.  At the end we were using eBay and Florida scrap yards to keep those old gals going.  

In a perfect word we would have set replacement dates and the process for replacement would begin at the delivery of the last piece of current equipment.


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.


Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.



MilEME09 said:


> Yes systems still need to be supported, it's useless to keep equipment we do not have parts, but look at the C3, we didn't have parts, but we had a need and found companies who are now making new barrels, etc... for us. If we need it, industry can find a way, if we wanted to sustain the Coyote, I would place money the GDLS would find a way if we asked.


We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Is that the reason?  Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.
> 
> Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.



In this instance I will cite the absence of evidence as evidence of absence.  It conforms to a long standing pattern of money NOT being spent on reserve capabilities and PYs being allocated to support of Regular activities at the expense of reserves.  And further, the tendency of the Army to cut Reserve spending, everything from dedicated vehicles, to parade days and transferring workable kit from the reserves to the regs. 

I can tell you without hesitation that a functioning 50 year old pickup truck would make section more functional than a section with no transport at all.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Is that the reason?  Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.
> 
> Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.


Okay, let's give some examples, USAF B-52, upgraded, rebuilt a hand ful of times, well past its service life, still a useful peace of kit, ditto for F15, and 16. On the ground side the M1 and leopard 2 are 1980s vintage. Still going strong after many upgrades and rebuilds. C3 howitzer fleet is 60s vintage, we are still making parts to keep them going.


Old fleets can still work and kill, we lack the will to make it work, and the leaders who are happy with good enough rather then having the latest and greatest. This current conflict has shown our forces would last weeks in a high Intensity fight. We have no spares, our two tiered training of reg and reserve is only going to bite us in the ass. As long as we continue with the status quo, our forces will never be ready for a major conflict.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.
> 
> 
> We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.


Would it be custom parts though? If we gave the Coyote to GD and said strip it and rebuild it, pretty sure it could be modernized with parts currently readily available.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.



No,  I don't.  I do know that we have rationalized the elimination of dam near everything to the point we have dam near nothing.  Just ask the Ukrainians.  I wouldn't be surprised if they start donating used Russian kit to us after this is all over.



McG said:


> We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.



And there we can agree.  It does come down to money.  And we could always do with supplying you folks more of it.

But I am with FJAG when I say that, in my personal opinion, the money that is allocated to DND could be apportioned differently to greater effect by better utilizing the authorized Reserve PYs and structure and revisiting the Command and Institutional structures.

As an example.   We have apparently joined the Brits and Yanks in operationalizing trainers.  You apparently have done a very good job training Ukrainians to train regulars, reserves, territorials, volunteers and Special Forces.  How about applying some of those skills at home with your own citizens?


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## dapaterson (24 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> In this instance I will cite the absence of evidence as evidence of absence.  It conforms to a long standing pattern of money NOT being spent on reserve capabilities and PYs being allocated to support of Regular activities at the expense of reserves.  And further, the tendency of the Army to cut Reserve spending, everything from dedicated vehicles, to parade days and transferring workable kit from the reserves to the regs.
> 
> I can tell you without hesitation that a functioning 50 year old pickup truck would make section more functional than a section with no transport at all.


As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F.  When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Okay, let's give some examples, USAF B-52, upgraded, rebuilt a hand ful of times, well past its service life, still a useful peace of kit, ditto for F15, and 16. On the ground side the M1 and leopard 2 are 1980s vintage. Still going strong after many upgrades and rebuilds. C3 howitzer fleet is 60s vintage, we are still making parts to keep them going.
> 
> 
> Old fleets can still work and kill, we lack the will to make it work, and the leaders who are happy with good enough rather then having the latest and greatest. This current conflict has shown our forces would last weeks in a high Intensity fight. We have no spares, our two tiered training of reg and reserve is only going to bite us in the ass. As long as we continue with the status quo, our forces will never be ready for a major conflict.




I'll add to that with this article from this week






						The Future of SOCOM’s ‘Killer Egg’
					

The Future of SOCOM’s ‘Killer Egg’




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				






> “*There is no definitive plan to end the service life of the Little Bird*,” he said. “The H-6 platform was officially introduced in 1966. While the majority of these aircraft were eventually phased out of service, ARSOA identified a significant utility in keeping the airframe in service. With continued maintenance and upgrades, there is currently no service life end in sight.”
> 
> These upgrades consist of a “zero-time” aircraft primary structure, he noted.
> 
> “Zero-time refers to the amount of time on the aircraft at upgrade,” Slinker said. “As with many military vehicles, ‘new’ doesn’t always mean new. For example, previous iterations of upgrades to the H-6 platform required modifications to an airframe that may have been 40-plus years old. Zero-time means the structure of the aircraft will be ‘brand new’ off the line with no flight time logged.”





> The pricey aviation items that often eat up Special Operations Command’s budget are on the other side of the spectrum with the Little Bird, he noted, including CV-22 Ospreys and MH-47G Chinooks.
> 
> “That’s just a monstrously different order of magnitude,” Aboulafia said. “Even *if you wanted full up, replacement Little Birds, … you’re talking about maybe $5 million an aircraft … as opposed to the $70-something-million for a CV-22*.”
> 
> ...


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## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> The M113s.  The Bisons.  Gut them of all the fancy gadgets and swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.



What are the Res F infantry platoons supposed to do with them?  Are all the skills preceding "learn to get in and out of box" mastered and routinely confirmed?

All the discussions of Res F should at least start with the BTS and an accurate number of available training days, and see whether anyone can actually progress to the point of learning (and retaining knowledge of) mounted drills in the time available.  If no-one's estimate ever gets that far, no-one needs to worry about Res F APC fleets.


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

Those are all platforms that were "zero-timed" - so essentially a new vehicle; akin to the LAV 3 to LAV 6.0.

Apples and oranges from a "hand me down."


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

dapaterson said:


> As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F.  When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.



I'll take that one as read DAP.  But how much of the lack of a Reserve Plan is the lack of Force Wide Plan, or even a stated Intention, that lasts longer than the CDS of the Day?  And how much is the quality of the leadership of the Reserves themselves?  

I am letting my frustrations get the better of me this morning.  This discussion and its variants always bring out the worst in me.  The questions and answers are all rehearsed many times over and the monkey is still chasing the weasel round that mulberry bush.

The one conclusion we all continually draw is that there is no conclusion.  The world will continue as it has.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> What are the Res F infantry platoons supposed to do with them?  Are all the skills preceding "learn to get in and out of box" mastered and routinely confirmed?
> 
> All the discussions of Res F should at least start with the BTS and an accurate number of available training days, and see whether anyone can actually progress to the point of learning (and retaining knowledge of) mounted drills in the time available.  If no-one's estimate ever gets that far, no-one needs to worry about Res F APC fleets.



You previously suggested that Bv206s/NTVs/DAMEs/Bisons should be held in Service Battalions and Transport Companies.  I agree.  Put the M113s and Bisons into warehouses co-located with the Service Battalions.

And the Infantry can get in an out of the back of the box when they need to go somewhere.  Just like they can get in and out of helicopter on the ground, a boat on a beach, an aircraft on a runway or a ship at a dock.

Now, if you're talking about dismounting from an M113 or a Bison in a high threat environment with the enemy shooting at you as you dismount on the objective then my tendency would be to say "Don't do that!"

First things first.  Supply taxis to move troops and their gear where they are needed.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Those are all platforms that were "zero-timed" - so essentially a new vehicle; akin to the LAV 3 to LAV 6.0.
> 
> Apples and oranges from a "hand me down."



Only because they are used after being "zero-timed".   There is nothing to say that an M113A4 TLAV with rubber bands couldn't have been "zero-timed" to its last production configuration, dried out and put into long term storage with a portion of the fleet drawn from stocks for training and operations to keep the fleet refreshed and to reduce skill fade by driver/mechanics.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

West Virginia joins a number of other states in donating M113s from their National Guard armouries to the Ukraine









						Gov. Justice announces West Virginia National Guard to provide Ukraine military with armored vehicles
					

Office of the Governor - Jim Justice




					governor.wv.gov


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Would it be custom parts though? If we gave the Coyote to GD and said strip it and rebuild it, pretty sure it could be modernized with parts currently readily available.





Kirkhill said:


> Only because they are used after being "zero-timed".   There is nothing to say that an M113A4 TLAV with rubber bands couldn't have been "zero-timed" to its last production configuration, dried out and put into long term storage with a portion of the fleet drawn from stocks for training and operations to keep the fleet refreshed and to reduce skill fade by driver/mechanics.


Setting a vehicle fleet life back to day 1 is a major project and costs comparable to buying new vehicles.  What do we do without to finance the re-life of an antiquated fleet? Then what else are we doing without to fund the life cycle costs of keeping the fleet in service?



Kirkhill said:


> You previously suggested that Bv206s/NTVs/DAMEs/Bisons should be held in Service Battalions and Transport Companies. I agree. Put the M113s and Bisons into warehouses co-located with the Service Battalions.


Now you are introducing infrastructure costs to house and store these preserved fleets in a usable condition.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

I think Hellyer bought something like 1100-1300 M113s and Lynxes.

The US still uses them.  There are thousands still in service.



> In the U.S. Army, the M113 series have long been replaced as front-line combat vehicles by the M2 and M3 Bradleys, but large numbers are still used in support roles such as armored ambulance, mortar carrier, engineer vehicle, and command vehicle. The U.S. Army's heavy brigade combat teams are equipped with approximately 6,000 M113s and 4,000 Bradleys.
> 
> The M113's versatility spawned a wide variety of adaptations that live on worldwide and in U.S. service. These variants together currently represent about half of U.S. Army armored vehicles. To date, it is estimated that over 80,000 M113s of all types have been produced and used by over 50 countries worldwide, making it one of the most widely used armored fighting vehicles of all time.[7]
> 
> M113 production was terminated in 2007. The Army initiated the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program to search for a replacement. In 2014, the U.S. Army selected BAE Systems proposal of a turretless variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to replace over 2,800 M113s in service.[8] Thousands of M113s continue to see combat service in the Israel Defense Forces, although as of 2014 the IDF was seeking to gradually replace many of its 6,000 M113s, with Namers.[9]



The Dutch are donating M113s to the Ukrainians along with the Americans.  And their M113s came out of service a decade or so ago.  They have been kept in environmentally controlled warehouses, like our Leos were, for use, sale or donation.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Setting a vehicle fleet life back to day 1 is a major project and costs comparable to buying new vehicles.  What do we do without to finance the re-life of an antiquated fleet? Then what else are we doing without to fund the life cycle costs of keeping the fleet in service?
> 
> 
> Now you are introducing infrastructure costs to house and store these preserved fleets in a usable condition.



Absolutely.  TANSTAAFFL.  It costs money to maintain a defence.  The question is how little can we get away with.
And the cheapest solution is vehicles you don't use and troops you don't pay.  Even with the cost of warehouses and offices.


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## PuckChaser (24 Apr 2022)

There's like 400 threads on CAF vehicles, can we get back on track (pun fully intended)?

- Milnet.ca Staff


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## Infanteer (24 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And the cheapest solution is vehicles you don't use and troops you don't pay.  Even with the cost of warehouses and offices.



Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force.  I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

Are thread splits still possible?


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Warehouse costs about $20 per square foot to build - steel structure upper end.
Bison is 21x8.5 ft or 178 sq ft
178 x $20 = $3560 per vehicle
Assume a 70% loading efficiency and you are looking at about $5000 per vehicle.
Assume 199 Bisons still available and you are now looking at a modest 50,000 sq ft (5000 m2) warehouse costing just about $1,000,000.  Co-locate with a reserve service battalion at something like the Roper Street Armouries in Edmonton and you have minimal cost supervision and training.  You could put all the existing Bisons under cover for 20 years for less than the cost of one new ACSV from GDLSCda.

A similar facility would house all the Coyotes.

Etc.


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## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Most of that structure is repurposed to look after the new fleet.  The new fleet needs LCMMs, supply managers, and shelf space at the depots. There is an opportunity cost to keeping our garbage.


One man's garbage is another's prized possessions. This is why thrift shops exist everywhere.

No one is arguing for "garbage". I was quite precise about talking about equipment that was still serviceable. Hell, our fleet of reserve force 105mm howitzers is about to enter its seventh decade of service. And yes, they do have maintenance issues for a number of reasons. Korea still has some 800 of them which they've modernized and self propelled by mounting them on a truck with new sighting systems.

We already have LCMMs for this gear. Yes we'd need a few more for a new line but that's a handful of people. Shelf space? Give me a break. We can find accommodation for 17,400 administrators in some 28 locations in Ottawa (some of which is half empty) but we can't find a warehouse and some supply folks to stock truck parts?


Infanteer said:


> Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.


We both know that there is no chance in hell of that because the metrics are greatly skewed in favour of disposal over increased capability for the reserve force. Think about the regular force. We disposed of critical kit needed to function operationally, from AD to anti-armour to tanks (at one point) because we assume the capability they bring to the force is either not necessary or will be provided by someone else.

We'd rather spend money on having several thousand Class B chairwarmers in Ottawa than providing equipment that would help the training and retention of Class A reservists because the perception is that they are really not that necessary for the defence effort.

I'm kind of with @Kirkhill on this one. This topic clearly shows the divide that exists between a large portion of the RegF leadership and the Class A reserve community. I'd like to think that the divide is between those that think day-to-day and those that think long term but that in itself is skewing the issue a bit.



Infanteer said:


> Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force.  I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.


And there it is! Let me guess though ... you do spend money on house, life and car insurance.  😉



dapaterson said:


> As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F.  When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.


And here I have to agree (although I reserve on the issue if its truly the "biggest enemy", but an enemy it is, and I'll say that having sat at the big boys table for almost a decade.

At worst, I can say that you don't get to that senior leadership table until you've taken a healthy dose of the "regular force Kool-aid." Even there an unhealthy amount of effort is tilted in favour of the Class B crowd (and during Afghanistan, quite rightly the Class C soldiers). There's a tendency to accept reg force push back on issues without enough critical analysis and most of that analysis comes from the RegF and Class Bs. I'm not saying that these are bad folks but there is a very clear situation where the Class A members and their purpose and needs have a low priority.

At best I can say that at the most senior ResF level is that they have very little authority to initiate or effect change. Most are advisors and not commanders. They generally have little staff, if any, and have come up through a system that does not provide them with the fundamental knowledge to allow them to navigate the highly specialized bureaucratic structures that exist within DND. It does not surprise me at all that reform initiatives, even when started, stagnate. Most of my time on Chief of Reserves Council was being fed briefings at the end of a fire hose with very little requirement that we actually made decisions. At most we offered the various project managers/directors some off-the-cuff feedback.

I'll close by saying this. Most of the people around that table were very smart business men and women who were highly knowledgeable in their day jobs and quite talented (a few were career Class Bs or transferees from the RegF). It disappointed me then and now about how little impact we really had.

Finished with the steps. Off to the model railroad.


----------



## McG (24 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Warehouse costs about $20 per square foot to build - steel structure upper end.
> Bison is 21x8.5 ft or 178 sq ft
> 178 x $20 = $3560 per vehicle
> Assume a 70% loading efficiency and you are looking at about $5000 per vehicle.
> ...


Plus utilities, plus PILT, plus building & vehicle maintenance.
Plus the fleet re-life costs and the continued fleet lifecycle costs.
Plus the pay of the fleets equipment management team (LCMM, supply manager, etc).

You keep waiving your hands to demonstrate how cheap you think this can be, but you have not come around to explaining what you propose give-up to cover the costs.



FJAG said:


> Shelf space? Give me a break. We can find accommodation for 17,400 administrators in some 28 locations in Ottawa (some of which is half empty) but we can't find a warehouse and some supply folks to stock truck parts?


You are wishing away the problem.  The depots are stuffed.  If your proposal is to open a new depot, then from where do we take the funds to pay for a new depot?


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> You are wishing away the problem.  The depots are stuffed.  If your proposal is to open a new depot, then from where do we take the funds to pay for a new depot?


Depots are full(I'm skeptical of that) because we closed 90% of them, we only have 7 CFSD in Edmonton, and our depot in Montreal. Edmonton is tiny, Montreal is larger by far but we have a very reduced storage capacity compared to pre 1990


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Depots are full(I'm skeptical of that) because we closed 90% of them, we only have 7 CFSD in Edmonton, and our depot in Montreal. Edmonton is tiny, Montreal is larger by far but we have a very reduced storage capacity compared to pre 1990


Whinging about impacts of 1990's budget cuts will not create depot space today.  If you want new depots to keep old vehicles, then those depots are new costs that need to be covered from anywhere.

Also, what were the other 90%? That would be 18 depots close.


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Yes systems still need to be supported, it's useless to keep equipment we do not have parts, but look at the C3, we didn't have parts, but we had a need and found companies who are now making new barrels, etc... for us. If we need it, industry can find a way, if we wanted to sustain the Coyote, I would place money the GDLS would find a way if we asked.


Admittedly the C3 was the one piece of kit I think should have been divested.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Plus utilities, plus PILT, plus building & vehicle maintenance.
> Plus the fleet re-life costs and the continued fleet lifecycle costs.
> Plus the pay of the fleets equipment management team (LCMM, supply manager, etc).
> 
> ...



OK.  if we are going to continue playing silly buggers then I would ditch 2 CMBG and Petawawa and retain 1 and 5 Brigades.  I would also ditch all but 2 divisions.  One for operations and the other for training and crisis response.

Does that help?

And dry warehousing in a 10C environment with the lights off, an onsite security system supplied by part timers that are already on the premises, purchased for  cash and self-insured (it is the Government of Canada after all and it is not as if you are going to go out and buy replacements for storage losses) is going to be very low cost.

It is time for me to stop. 

The Mulberry Bush still stands.

Cheers for now.


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## Underway (24 Apr 2022)

So the M113 fleet got a big upgrade a few years back to turn them into TLAV's with an extra road wheel, rubber bands, new power pack, some of them got the old Grizzly Turrets (I'm sure someone will correct my errors in memory on this), .

The LAV ACSV program is going to replace the Bison and TLAV's to consolidate the fleet so arguing about keeping platforms is moot at this point.  We might be better off doing what we did with the Cougars and offloading sending them to Ukraine.  I'm sure the TLAV's will find some use and commonality with the other M113's being sent.

There is literally no vehicle task that TLAV's and Bison used to do that will not be replaced by the ACSV program.  And as such there is no need to retain the older vehicles anymore, and there are huge arguments to simplify the supply chain for the the CAF overall.


----------



## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> Whinging about impacts of 1990's budget cuts will not create depot space today.  If you want new depots to keep old vehicles, then those depots are new costs that need to be covered from anywhere.
> 
> Also, what were the other 90%? That would be 18 depots close.


New depots or expanding current ones is going to become necessary.

Below is the depot that was in Hamilton 


I'd wager its a big bigger then 25 in Montreal. 25 we can't expand because it's in the middle of a city, 7 could but I'd argue we need to diversify our stock locations.


Ask your self this, if the flag went up right now, every PRes and SupRes member was called up, and we were at war. Do we have the equipment holdings to fully equip these forces to a set standard? I bet that answer is no, because our procurement has been about ordering the bare minimum fir decades.


----------



## dapaterson (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> At worst, I can say that you don't get to that senior leadership table until you've taken a healthy dose of the "regular force Kool-aid." Even there an unhealthy amount of effort is tilted in favour of the Class B crowd (and during Afghanistan, quite rightly the Class C soldiers). There's a tendency to accept reg force push back on issues without enough critical analysis and most of that analysis comes from the RegF and Class Bs. I'm not saying that these are bad folks but there is a very clear situation where the Class A members and their purpose and needs have a low priority.
> 
> At best I can say that at the most senior ResF level is that they have very little authority to initiate or effect change. Most are advisors and not commanders. They generally have little staff, if any, and have come up through a system that does not provide them with the fundamental knowledge to allow them to navigate the highly specialized bureaucratic structures that exist within DND. It does not surprise me at all that reform initiatives, even when started, stagnate. Most of my time on Chief of Reserves Council was being fed briefings at the end of a fire hose with very little requirement that we actually made decisions. At most we offered the various project managers/directors some off-the-cuff feedback.
> 
> I'll close by saying this. Most of the people around that table were very smart business men and women who were highly knowledgeable in their day jobs and quite talented (a few were career Class Bs or transferees from the RegF). It disappointed me then and now about how little impact we really had.


Very few make an effort to understand the institution they claim to be leading.  If all they do is show up at meetings and take briefings, they are not leaders of any use.

Again, with Land Force Reserve Restructure, given all but carte blanche to revitalize the institution, they were unable to develop or implement anything resembling a coherent plan other than "Increase recruiting" without planning for foundational things like training or materiel to be in place to support that.

The Whinging Res F voices, enabled by the delusions of the puttering class of Honoraries with vivid dreams of a glorious past that never existed, do themselves a disservice.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (24 Apr 2022)

Putting a portion of a fleet into preservation while you keep using the rest is one thing, and indeed this is done for a variety of reasons. Putting an entire fleet into preservation is another. You need the parts and tooling which will need preservation as well. Can you realistically have a supply of spare parts to keep that fleet going if you bring it back into service? What is the cost of all that, and how does that stack up against the benefit? 

Cascading fleets from the Regular Force to the Reserves to be used on weekends is a whole other matter - now you have an additional fleet to maintain and those OMM costs are going to keep going up as the gear gets older. Tanks without spare parts are monuments about to happen. So again you need to look at the cost and benefits. What is the envisioned role of these Reserve units with cascaded equipment? What is the demand signal saying, and where is that demand signal coming from? 

The calculus for a country at war or between wars of survival might well be different. Israel during the first few decades of its existence would take and keep whatever equipment they could get their hands on. Lacking a tank industry at the time they were reliant on imports that could be cut off for a variety of political reasons. So they were happy to have very mixed fleets because it was better than the alternative. Their reserve units consisted of soldiers who had all served two years full-time and those units had bone fide operational wartime roles. 

Ukraine, I imagine, is not too worried about life-cycle costs right now. 

Perhaps some envision the Reserves whipping a random pile of equipment into shape like B.A. Baracus before defeating the enemy each week?

Anyhoo.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Perhaps some envision the Reserves whipping a random pile of equipment into shape like B.A. Baracus before defeating the enemy each week?
> 
> Anyhoo.


No,I imagine an army that stops buying equipment that can't be taken into battle, MILCOT, MSVS, etc.... why are we wasting money in kit that cannot be used on the battlefield? A near peer war isn't going to wait 6 months for work up training, if we were serious about having a reserve force that mattered, we would do everything to reduce the training delta between reg and reserve, and part of that is training on the same kit, kit that we can put in a C17, fly to Latvia with 1 VP, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, or who ever and immediately  be able to use it.


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force.  I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.


Everyone should read this post.

The fact is the Canadian Army is an expeditionary Army.
  Due to the fact you guys live above us, you don't really need to worry about foreign invasion.   So the concern about having equipment to mobile in case of invasion isn't a concern, like that of European nations.

Due to this, CAF units that are deployed should have top of the line kit - and while some cascading to reserves could be looked at, in all reality the likelihood of reserve forces being deployed is extremely slim.


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## McG (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> kit that we can put in a C17


This deployment criteria is entirely inconsistent with the fleets that you are asking to keep. We are not going to deploy companies much less BGs or Bdes with LAV, TLAV, or Coyote via C17.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

McG said:


> This deployment criteria is entirely inconsistent with the fleets that you are asking to keep. We are not going to deploy companies much less BGs or Bdes with LAV, TLAV, or Coyote via C17.


With how few C17s we have  we aren't deploying anything via C17, our navy has no ships to transport. In reality our military can't get any where without an ally or civilian assistance.

I was using C17 as an example for this scenario of a common fleet, if that is what you are honing in on, you have misses the point I'm trying to make


----------



## dapaterson (24 Apr 2022)

Per unit cost of SMP vs MilCOTS is prohibitive.  That bifurcation of fleets is imperfect, but avoids significant reduction in the quantity of equipment we are able to acquire within budgets.


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## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

Underway said:


> There is literally no vehicle task that TLAV's and Bison used to do that will not be replaced by the ACSV program.  And as such there is no need to retain the older vehicles anymore, and there are huge arguments to simplify the supply chain for the the CAF overall.


Just a thought. In Afghanistan no one had thought about buying gun tractors for the M777s - not til around 2008 or so. (actually that's only partially true - some people thought about it but no one did anything) So they pried some 10 tonners out of someone's cold grasping hands and sent those over. But those had no room for the detachments by the time you stuffed them full of ammo and defensive stores because no one had ammo trucks for the artillery - those were all in Kandahar with the NSE. So they thought about using Nyalas for that but they ended up distributing those among the light infantry and the PRT ... so they gave everyone TLAVs. Worked like charm.

I'm just guessing here, but while one or the other versions of the ACSV would do the job, I betcha there ain't no armoured gun det carriers in the ACSV allotment. 'Cause we're not at war now and a 10 tonner is just fine. I'm wondering what they're using in Latvia right about now?



dapaterson said:


> Very few make an effort to understand the institution they claim to be leading.  If all they do is show up at meetings and take briefings, they are not leaders of any use.
> 
> Again, with Land Force Reserve Restructure, given all but carte blanche to revitalize the institution, they were unable to develop or implement anything resembling a coherent plan other than "Increase recruiting" without planning for foundational things like training or materiel to be in place to support that.


All very true. I was providing advice to the ill-fated RFEP (which was mostly run by retired RegF guys) but never heard anything being discussed about LFRR because it was an Army and not Chief Res issue. I would dearly loved to have been involved at the time.



dapaterson said:


> The Whinging Res F voices, enabled by the delusions of the puttering class of Honoraries with vivid dreams of a glorious past that never existed, do themselves a disservice.


It's kind of funny having sat on multiple sides of the equation. There's plenty of whinging coming from everyone although in each of their eyes its the other guy whinging about what to them is a perfectly rationale position.

Bureaucracies have little trouble burying or destroying programs they do not favour. With respect to the reserve force that has been a successful process for seven decades. Regardless of who stands on what side, I have only to look across the border to see what could be. It too has its warts but simply put it provides a potential capability that can be called on when needed - and its been called on many times. At my most cynical I have the view that the present position the Army is in is because if the government found out it could put the same number of people on peacetime deployments as it does today but would have twice the force to put into the field in an emergency but for a lower year to year pay envelope it might rethink the force ratio. Keeping the reserves ineffective protects many rice bowls.

🍻


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> Let me guess - labour costs are halved?
> 
> 😉


Close to current front, and a financial penalty to the Germans for their lackluster support for the Ukrainian war effort.


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## GR66 (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Everyone should read this post.
> 
> The fact is the Canadian Army is an expeditionary Army.
> Due to the fact you guys live above us, you don't really need to worry about foreign invasion.   So the concern about having equipment to mobile in case of invasion isn't a concern, like that of European nations.
> ...


I guess this is really what it comes down to isn't it?

Is there any intention or expectation of mobilizing Reserve units for expeditionary deployments in formed units?  If they are only to be used as augmentees for the Reg Force units (or to fulfill certain, specific support roles like convoy escort, etc.) then what specific roles do we expect them to fulfill?  Drivers and Gunners or just guys in back?  Tankers or just Recce?  Replacement gun crews for existing howitzers or additional complete gun batteries?

Having a clear and official decision on that will allow for the proper organization and equipping of the Reserves to meet those specific requirements.  Right now to my understanding current defence policy doesn't really address the potential issue of a major conflict and the potential for wide scale mobilization of the Reserves.  As a result the role and equipping of the Reserves remains up for debate.


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> Bureaucracies have little trouble burying or destroying programs they do not favour. With respect to the reserve force that has been a successful process for seven decades. Regardless of who stands on what side, I have only to look across the border to see what could be. It too has its warts but simply put it provides a potential capability that can be called on when needed - and its been called on many times. At my most cynical I have the view that the present position the Army is in is because if the government found out it could put the same number of people on peacetime deployments as it does today but would have twice the force to put into the field in an emergency but for a lower year to year pay envelope it might rethink the force ratio. Keeping the reserves ineffective protects many rice bowls.
> 
> 🍻


TBH, unless the entire Res employment model is changed and proper legislation to both encourage employers and protect members, the PRes is unemployable in its majority.  

There needs to be a major culture shift in Canada as a whole to make the PRes effective - blame sits at a lot of feet. 

If the Senior PRes leaders where willing to sacrifice units for the good of the entire organization, it might give both the Cdn Gov and the Reg Army the reason to support it more.


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## Underway (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> I'm just guessing here, but while one or the other versions of the ACSV would do the job, I betcha there ain't no armoured gun det carriers in the ACSV allotment. 'Cause we're not at war now and a 10 tonner is just fine. I'm wondering what they're using in Latvia right about now?


Two trucks per M777.  One to tow the gun and carry the gunners, one for the ammo.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> If the Senior PRes leaders where willing to sacrifice units for the good of the entire organization, it might give both the Cdn Gov and the Reg Army the reason to support it more.


I think its going to require a senior leader to tell the units to shut up and deal with the change. IMO every ARes brigade should only have a single unit of each type. Heck the argument could be made of using a battlegroup model fir PRes CBGs, a single LCol, and a bunch of companies underneath them. More realistic then companies commanded by LCols.


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## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> You previously suggested that Bv206s/NTVs/DAMEs/Bisons should be held in Service Battalions and Transport Companies.  I agree.  Put the M113s and Bisons into warehouses co-located with the Service Battalions.



IF Canada decided to have armoured personnel transport, primarily for use as taxis (operational moves, and moves up to but not into contact), then I would rather see them grouped into independent transport units and given over to Res F (train drivers and maintainers).

But that's a long way short of APCs integrated into Res F infantry units, which is where I was thinking the "hand-me-downs" discussion was going.


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## dapaterson (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> . More realistic then companies commanded by LCols.


With some units having fewer than 80 all ranks, with 2/5 either releasing or not yet complete their basic occupational training, calling them companies is optimistic.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

dapaterson said:


> With some units having fewer than 80 all ranks, with 2/5 either releasing or not yet complete their basic occupational training, calling them companies is optimistic.


Being in a unit where 1/3 of my platoon is releasing, transferring, or CTing, I'd agree


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## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> Is there any intention or expectation of mobilizing Reserve units for expeditionary deployments in formed units?



Intention - some people dream; expectation - not reasonably.

Canada's Res F provides augmentees and CTs and dom ops wallahs.  The augmentees need time to work up, regardless whether or not the units they are sent to also need time to work up.

Simple arithmetic comparison: how long would it take for Canada's Res F to provide a division of people trained to adequately function as a division, and how long would it take "industry" to tool up to provide the kit.  If the former time is longer than the latter, kit stockpiles are not needed for "mobilization".


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Intention - some people dream; expectation - not reasonably.
> 
> Canada's Res F provides augmentees and CTs and dom ops wallahs.  The augmentees need time to work up, regardless whether or not the units they are sent to also need time to work up.
> 
> Simple arithmetic comparison: how long would it take for Canada's Res F to provide a division of people trained to adequately function as a division, and how long would it take "industry" to tool up to provide the kit.  If the former time is longer than the latter, kit stockpiles are not needed for "mobilization".


Or because of our limited PYs we should adopt a stance Similar to the US or UK and deploy reserve units every few years as a way to maintain readiness and build experience in the reserve force.


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Everyone should read this post.
> 
> The fact is the Canadian Army is an expeditionary Army.
> Due to the fact you guys live above us, you don't really need to worry about foreign invasion.   So the concern about having equipment to mobile in case of invasion isn't a concern, like that of European nations.
> ...



So Kev,

Just to be clear.  You and Uncle Sam are happy with Canada freeloading on the domestic front.  Have I got that right?

Just in case I haven't - 

A single ACSV with parts, costs $5,500,000.  And I am willing to bet that the CP versions of which the CAF seems so fond cost considerably more than that.  It also requires annual maintenance and repairs resulting from training accidents AND it requires a climate controlled warehouse. 

Subtract one ACSV from the production order and build the Reserves 5x 50,000 square foot warehouses. Sacrifice 4 ACSVs and every Regional Brigade Service Battalion could have its own 50,000 square foot warehouse for storing stuff that might come in handy.

And old kit doesn't need spares.  If it breaks it breaks.  In the mean time it has bought some time to build newer gear more appropriate to the new era or it will be replaced by newer gear that gets handed down in turn.  And it has lived out its life usefully.

And that is the alternative to my silly buggers solution of disbanding 2 CMBG to find money for storing kit against the day that Just In Time fails.


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## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> Similar to the US or UK



Canada has never had that kind of international profile.  The least sniff of something that looked like "colonial/imperial" military adventurism and the politicians who had the temerity to undertake it would be submerged under waves of ankle-biting malcontents.


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## TangoTwoBravo (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> New depots or expanding current ones is going to become necessary.
> 
> Below is the depot that was in Hamilton
> View attachment 70320
> ...


I think that photo is actually of the Highbury Complex in London Ontario. It began in 1941 as a vehicle reception depot - I think a link between industry and the army. It changed forms and roles over the years, initially as a Ordnance Depot and ending as CFB London Base Maint and Supply when I was a young Reservist. My point is that it was part of a massive wartime expansion. That wartime expansion contracted; Highbury was repurposed for a time but eventually it was downscaled and then closed. 

Perhaps it is time for the Militia to consolidate within means and requirements as well?


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> I think its going to require a senior leader to tell the units to shut up and deal with the change. IMO every ARes brigade should only have a single unit of each type. Heck the argument could be made of using a battlegroup model fir PRes CBGs, a single LCol, and a bunch of companies underneath them. More realistic then companies commanded by LCols.


The only way I see fixing the mess is to force amalgamation.   
  There is zero sense in having PRes formations if there isn’t equipment to supply them or infrastructure to support.  

Thus they are adopted/absorbed by Reg Force units. 
   The Regular Regimental HQ’s can finally do something beyond the annual yearbook


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Thus they are adopted/absorbed by Reg Force units.
> The Regular Regimental HQ’s can finally do something beyond the annual yearbook


We do great BBQs too! 

Seriously though our structure needs to be torn down and rebuilt, until a realistic model. If units could be successful in the 50s and 60s with remote coys and platoons everywhere. In the modern age of technology we should be just fine.


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## KevinB (24 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> We do great BBQs too!
> 
> Seriously though our structure needs to be torn down and rebuilt, until a realistic model. If units could be successful in the 50s and 60s with remote coys and platoons everywhere. In the modern age of technology we should be just fine.


Where there is a will, there is a way.  

Somewhere someone misplaced the Will.


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## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Where there is a will, there is a way.
> 
> Somewhere someone misplaced the Will.


Remember that one box in the CQ your CSM said to never open? It's in there


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## MJP (24 Apr 2022)

Just so it is clear we have 2+2 supply depots in the CAF.  Edmonton and Montreal being "CAF" centric however both Esquimalt and Halifax function as 3rd line depots albeit focused primarily on Naval items. 


McG said:


> Plus utilities, plus PILT, plus building & vehicle maintenance.
> Plus the fleet re-life costs and the continued fleet lifecycle costs.
> Plus the pay of the fleets equipment management team (LCMM, supply manager, etc).
> 
> ...


They are and they aren't. In many cases they are full of material from fleets that are no longer used but people like to hold onto the parts & material just in case. In many cases it is because people have lost visibility on the material in the depots and no one is "managing" it. That is improving under a concerted effort to remove dormant stock from the depots and has yielded some substantial gains but there is still much more to do in that realm. 

The largest constraint is bulk space for large items as by their very nature they are hard to store in a way that can maximize avail horizontal and vertical space. A great recent example of space usage is HQSS which IMHO will never be used properly or in large numbers till we do something like Afghan again that needs semi permanent solutions.  

Aside from the small tangent on supply depots you are bang on on the real costs!  Having seen what happens when someone builds infrastructure without a real plan (TAPV Barns anyone) I don't think this is a route we want to go down.


MilEME09 said:


> Depots are full(I'm skeptical of that) because we closed 90% of them, we only have 7 CFSD in Edmonton, and our depot in Montreal. Edmonton is tiny, Montreal is larger by far but we have a very reduced storage capacity compared to pre 1990


90% is a gross exaggeration and yes the aggregate of space avail is lower but we also got out of the business of buying 20 years of parts right off the hopper in the 90s so the need for space was greatly reduced.  I won't say that more modern methods like JIT work the best because things like JIT are not what we need but we also don't need a life cycles worth of spares sitting around. 

Edmonton is far from "tiny" but has lots of room to expand unlike Montreal which as you point out is constrained by the city that grew up around it.  If needed and quite frankly there are few viable scenarios I envision where new depots become a requirements Edmonton can expand and be like Montreal which is a collection of buildings rather than one building (TBF Edmonton already has a number of outbuildings). 


MilEME09 said:


> New depots or expanding current ones is going to become necessary.
> 
> Below is the depot that was in Hamilton
> View attachment 70320
> ...


TB2 got to it before me but before careful that you are actually comparing apples to apples as that was not a pure supply depot and had a variety of functions over the years.  Downsview in Toronto and #5 in Moncton would have been better examples.


----------



## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Perhaps it is time for the Militia to consolidate within means and requirements as well?


It's long, long overdue.

The reason there is so much resistance to that is that every time there is a consolidation, it comes accompanied by a personnel reduction as well.

Back in Toronto, I joined the 7th Toronto Regiment RCA which had just been consolidated from 29th Fd Regt, 42 Medium Regt and 1 Locating Regiment. The three units combined could pretty much fill the parade square at University Armoury but it was demolished in 1963, the land handed over to the City to build a new law complex and the units distributed across the city. The combined regiment was moved to an old three story warehouse on Richmond Street for a few years while they finished building Moss Park Armoury.

Guess what. By the time we moved into Moss Park we could barely field a hundred folks. (a hundred and fifty with the band which was enormous 😁)

When one amalgamates/consolidates three units one needs to aggregate the authorized positions and provide the core resources to actually house and train that amalgamated unit and not look at the amalgamation as a force reduction and infrastructure reduction opportunity. This is why Reserves 2000 and all those honorary colonels fight so hard to retain units. (plus there's the CO/RSM multiple majors and CSM rice bowl thing too)

Amalgamation is an absolute necessity. No question. The current system is archaic and not fit for purpose.

I'm a big fan of hybrid units where one CO and his command team is responsible for some 600 folks, both RegF and ResF, like 4 AD was. I frankly don't care if there is a QOR reserve company in greens, a 48 Highlanders reserve company in kilts and an RCR regular company in scarlet tunics on parade and if each company resides at different armouries day-to-day. Hell, the battalion can have one honourary colonel and three honourary lieutenant-colonels (one for each company) as long as it gets proper training, proper equipment and a role.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> I'm a big fan of hybrid units where one CO and his command team is responsible for some 600 folks, both RegF and ResF, like 4 AD was. I frankly don't care if there is a QOR reserve company in greens, a 48 Highlanders reserve company in kilts and an RCR regular company in scarlet tunics on parade and if each company resides at different armouries day-to-day. Hell, the battalion can have one honourary colonel and three honourary lieutenant-colonels (one for each company) as long as it gets proper training, proper equipment and a role.
> 
> 🍻



This has been tried before, with limited success.

The only way to make it work, IMHO, is to nuke the unneeded regiments leaving only a handful of 'winners'.

The political fallout would be unsustainable though...


----------



## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

Underway said:


> Two trucks per M777.  One to tow the gun and carry the gunners, one for the ammo.


There are multiple ways of doing it. But it needs to be planned and programed into fleet purchases. There's been a fall down on that for some time. Underestimating the vehicle requirements for moving war levels of artillery ammunitions (and even ammunition expenditure rates) is a continuing problem and was to a large degree a problem in Afghanistan with its relatively low amounts used. Low for a war; yet too high for the CAF supply system.

There was once an MLVW gun tractor version and then the MSVS MILCOT gun tractor, for the 105mm fleets,. The former is long gone and the latter has many limitations and IMHO is not fit for operations or the M777. 

The way the TLAV became employed was really just an example of how old and superseded equipment is sometimes exactly what one needs to fill an operational role.

🍻


----------



## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> This has been tried before, with limited success.
> 
> The only way to make it work, IMHO, is to nuke the unneeded regiments leaving only a handful of 'winners'.
> 
> The political fallout would be unsustainable though...


I really do get the point of why US Army units are numbered (have a nickname) and are displayed on the standard Army uniform by a small enameled badge pinned on the chest or velcro'd on a shoulder. It makes postings so easy and parades so much more "uniform". OTOH they give out medals and other doodads by the gross to make them more colourful.

🍻


----------



## rmc_wannabe (24 Apr 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> This has been tried before, with limited success.
> 
> The only way to make it work, IMHO, is to nuke the unneeded regiments leaving only a handful of 'winners'.
> 
> The political fallout would be unsustainable though...


I think the Regimental Association Mafias are more militant than anyone at DND on this regard.

The British Army has reformed and amalgamated hundreds of regiments over the last 300 years, with some of those regiments having histories that pre-date the Restoration. How is it prudent to retain a Platoon+ "Regiment" with all the overhead and budget required, simply because that unit fought at The Gully or Ancre Heights decades ago? Why is it always the RA or the local Legion that yells louder than the unit members; who would rather the tools and funding to make some history themselves?

Tradition is valuable, but not at the expense of efficiency. In some cases, much like our P Res, it's taking advice from the dead at the expense of the living.


----------



## Brad Sallows (24 Apr 2022)

> If units could be successful in the 50s and 60s with remote coys and platoons everywhere. In the modern age of technology we should be just fine.



Has anyone compared a typical year "then" to a typical year "now" in terms of requirements that have been added or removed?  I'd be surprised if everything hasn't become more complex, which, if time to learn and practice hasn't increased, means aspirations must be dialed down.


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Has anyone compared a typical year "then" to a typical year "now" in terms of requirements that have been added or removed?  I'd be surprised if everything hasn't become more complex, which, if time to learn and practice hasn't increased, means aspirations must be dialed down.



My guess is that the current training system is more effective than 'the olden days', with the result that we have a regular supply of excellent Junior Officers and NCOs upon whose shoulders the majority of unit training rests.

Given the right lead time, and support and guidance, you can still run some pretty good weekend/ Gun Camp type training with the resources we have now.

Where Bde and Unit senior leadership lacks interest/ skill in running good training, there's not much you can do to address that. 

If it was up to me I'd fire the ba&tards, but day dreaming only goes so far


----------



## MilEME09 (24 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Has anyone compared a typical year "then" to a typical year "now" in terms of requirements that have been added or removed?  I'd be surprised if everything hasn't become more complex, which, if time to learn and practice hasn't increased, means aspirations must be dialed down.


I meant more in terms of command and control over large geographic areas for a single command structure.


----------



## GR66 (24 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> It's long, long overdue.
> 
> The reason there is so much resistance to that is that every time there is a consolidation, it comes accompanied by a personnel reduction as well.
> 
> ...


I can't help but think that amalgamation and focus of the new units would be helped if there was a specific plan behind the amalgamations beyond a crunching of numbers.  For example, the STAR system could be taken a step further than it is currently.  Instead of The Toronto Scottish Regiment having a Mission Task of generating a Direct Fire Support Platoon they would specifically become the Direct Fire Support Platoon of Q Company, 3 RCR.  

As a mission-tasked sub-sub unit they may have an authorized strength of 2 x DFS Platoons, a Recruit Platoon and a HQ/Admin Platoon.  You'd know how many personnel the unit would need and exactly where it fits into the Reg Force ORBAT.  If it's assessed that the Tor Scots don't have the strength to fulfill that role by themselves then perhaps they need to be amalgamated with the Royal Regiment of Canada to create a viable unit.  Chain of command for the Mission Tasked Reserve units would run through their parent Battalion/Regiment.

Of course there may remain a need for Reserve forces that are not directly mission-tasked to support the Reg Force.  These could be amalgamated into Territorial Battalions with units amalgamated as required to generate viable Companies.  The required support equipment for these Territorial Battalions could be centralized with support of the Reserve Service Battalions and possibly designated Transport Companies.


----------



## Blackadder1916 (24 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Simple arithmetic comparison: how long would it take for Canada's Res F to provide a division of people trained to adequately function as a division, and *how long would it take "industry" to tool up to provide the kit*.  If the former time is longer than the latter, kit stockpiles are not needed for "mobilization".



I asked a similar question over three decades ago.  At the time posted to NDHQ, among my responsibilities was equipping medical facilities.  With the 1987 Defence White Paper there were numerous projects on the books for expansion both overseas and in Canada.  Among the several of which I was involved was one that proposed to acquire the equipment that would be needed to expand CF hospitals in the event of mobilization.  It wasn't a major dollar amount, just a few million, but like many (most?) projects that sprung forth from the White Paper not a lot of staff work had been completed.  In the case of this particular project, we were informed that due to slippage in a couple of other projects, the funding was available to quickly move it forward.  My director at the time was pleased because completion would have been a measure of success.  Once I got into the staffing, one of the things that got my attention was "mobilization" and what timeline did we have to follow to expand existing medical facilities.  The war plans were not readily available in the Surg Gen branch, but I did get access.  Since they were classified back then, I won't provide any details.  However, after contacting "industry" (there were only a limited number of Canadian manufacturers), it was glaringly obvious that expansion could be accomplished without having to warehouse equipment that (in retrospect) could have sat there for decades before being disposed of, unused.  My director was not happy with my recommendation that the project be shelved.


----------



## FJAG (24 Apr 2022)

rmc_wannabe said:


> Tradition is valuable, but not at the expense of efficiency. In some cases, much like our P Res, it's taking advice from the dead at the expense of the living


Agreed. The system should first be designed to create efficient soldiers and units. Tradition is great but not at the expense of efficiency. Maybe that's why six of the battalions in the regular force should get new names and weaken their mafias.  😉 



Brad Sallows said:


> Has anyone compared a typical year "then" to a typical year "now" in terms of requirements that have been added or removed? I'd be surprised if everything hasn't become more complex, which, if time to learn and practice hasn't increased, means aspirations must be dialed down.


Yes. My memory is that good. It's not greatly different. There was less training then but there was less to master.

There will always be a tension as between the needs of the CAF, the soldier, his family and his civilian employer. One needs to very carefully balance those needs in what I call a covenant (partly established in legislation and regulations) to allow for a balanced life. 

Where we fall down now is we do not train reservists adequately up front. If we instituted a training system that trains reservist up to RegF standards to the DP1 and 2 levels while they are young students with lots of time in the summers and a need for cash we'd solve a large part of the problem. Adding in good senior NCOs and trained officers from the RegF would provide the stability needed, good examples and mentoring, and the ability to deal with administration and the logistics of running a unit.

Let's face it, notwithstanding the fact that various above brigade level headquarters bleed the units dry of officers and Senior NCMs, we have more enough to staff the 30 or so ResF units and three or four brigade headquarters that would remain under amalgamation. The existing RegF staff from 10 brigade headquarters and the RSS staff from some 135 ResF units would do that even before you cut back on a few div HQs.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows (25 Apr 2022)

> while they are young students with lots of time in the summers



We should stop relying on post-secondary students so that schedules can be organized around what would suit the other 75% or so of the potential recruiting pool.


----------



## MilEME09 (25 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> We should stop relying on post-secondary students so that schedules can be organized around what would suit the other 75% or so of the potential recruiting pool.


I've made this point many times that, while i get it summer works best for the student demographic. It doesn't for anyone else, Summer is the busiest in the civi world too. So why can't we run a serial or two in the winter for various trades courses? this would cater to shift workers, and those already established in their careers that can more easily take time off Oct - Mar


----------



## FJAG (25 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> I've made this point many times that, while i get it summer works best for the student demographic. It doesn't for anyone else, Summer is the busiest in the civi world too. So why can't we run a serial or two in the winter for various trades courses? this would cater to shift workers, and those already established in their careers that can more easily take time off Oct - Mar


No reason why we shouldn't. I just want to bulk up on the most available materiel while it has time and needs cash. Once they're trained and get jobs and families we should lay off the demands and simply focus on maintaining skills and advancing collective training.

I'm very bullish on trades, especially maintainers, and think we should exploit the hell out of putting people through community colleges with tuitions in winter, paid military trade conversion training in the summers, and maybe a year of Class B wrench bending to get experience and a resume in exchange for a few years of obligatory reserve service.

🍻


----------



## Underway (25 Apr 2022)

Blackadder1916 said:


> I asked a similar question over three decades ago.  At the time posted to NDHQ, among my responsibilities was equipping medical facilities.  With the 1987 Defence White Paper there were numerous projects on the books for expansion both overseas and in Canada.  Among the several of which I was involved was one that proposed to acquire the equipment that would be needed to expand CF hospitals in the event of mobilization.  It wasn't a major dollar amount, just a few million, but like many (most?) projects that sprung forth from the White Paper not a lot of staff work had been completed.  In the case of this particular project, we were informed that due to slippage in a couple of other projects, the funding was available to quickly move it forward.  My director at the time was pleased because completion would have been a measure of success.  Once I got into the staffing, one of the things that got my attention was "mobilization" and what timeline did we have to follow to expand existing medical facilities.  The war plans were not readily available in the Surg Gen branch, but I did get access.  Since they were classified back then, I won't provide any details.  However, after contacting "industry" (there were only a limited number of Canadian manufacturers), it was glaringly obvious that expansion could be accomplished without having to warehouse equipment that (in retrospect) could have sat there for decades before being disposed of, unused.  My director was not happy with my recommendation that the project be shelved.


Now ask the same question of industry but tell them they can only source North American resources/supply lines to get it done.  Wasn't really an issue in 1987 as globalization was truly starting to ramp up.  But today with COVID we've seen what can happen with only a few shocks.

I suspect the answer would be the same, but the timeline for the industry would be stretched further out.  Secure supply lines are again becoming something to think about on a grand scale.


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## KevinB (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So Kev,
> 
> Just to be clear.  You and Uncle Sam are happy with Canada freeloading on the domestic front.  Have I got that right?


It is simply reality - when you look at the Geographic footprint of the Americas, the best defense if a robust Navy and Air Force supported by a Missile Defense Screen.   



Kirkhill said:


> Just in case I haven't -
> 
> A single ACSV with parts, costs $5,500,000.  And I am willing to bet that the CP versions of which the CAF seems so fond cost considerably more than that.  It also requires annual maintenance and repairs resulting from training accidents AND it requires a climate controlled warehouse.
> 
> Subtract one ACSV from the production order and build the Reserves 5x 50,000 square foot warehouses. Sacrifice 4 ACSVs and every Regional Brigade Service Battalion could have its own 50,000 square foot warehouse for storing stuff that might come in handy.


Different pots of money - but I would agree that one needs significant Regional Storage and spares.


Kirkhill said:


> And old kit doesn't need spares.  If it breaks it breaks.


Everything needs spares, or why have it.


Kirkhill said:


> In the mean time it has bought some time to build newer gear more appropriate to the new era or it will be replaced by newer gear that gets handed down in turn.  And it has lived out its life usefully.
> 
> And that is the alternative to my silly buggers solution of disbanding 2 CMBG to find money for storing kit against the day that Just In Time fails.


The issue I see isn't solely an equipment issue for the PRes.   It's organizational, and training/support.


----------



## KevinB (25 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> We should stop relying on post-secondary students so that schedules can be organized around what would suit the other 75% or so of the potential recruiting pool.


I would separate the PRes.
   The High School and University crowd will give you 6 ish years of Summer Employment - the HS Summer break being shorter - but you can do a lot with 6 summers of employment.
   Realistically there is a significant drop in Reserve retention after education and they join the "Real" world. 

Having an "Active" Primary Reserve which can be guaranteed employment for 2,4,6,12 months, take Regular Force Courses, and transfer seamlessly into the Regular Army, that has 2 weekend/month, and a 2 month summer "activation" phase each year.

 Then an "InActive" Secondary Reserve, where it is 1 weekend a month, 1 ( +more optional for courses etc)  week during summer, once primary trade training has been completed.


----------



## Underway (25 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> It is simply reality - when you look at the Geographic footprint of the Americas, the best defense if a robust Navy and Air Force supported by a Missile Defense Screen.


I agree.  

The US shifted rapidly to have a bigger Navy after they finished killing all the First Nations (internal "threat").  Mahan's _On Sea Power_ was written in order to convince the US to invest more in the Navy and it worked. This was because it showed that the US didn't need a Royal Navy defeating investment, it just needed enough to deny sea control to the Royal Navy within continental limits.

Canada's defence goals are in order of priority: Defence of Canada, Defence of North America, Contribute Internationally OR Strong at Home, Secure in North America, Engaged with the World.  Oh, wait those are exactly the same things and have been stable since the 1950s.

If we were to invest the way our national defence strategy has stated since post WW2 then we should be investing in resources that are optimized for all three but weighted to Canada and North American defence.  Classic COA analysis.  The best COA's based on most likely threats would put things like NORAD, BMD, airforce and navy primacy above the army.  The army primacy comes when the Contribute Internationally actually tie into threatening Canada itself (keep the fight there so it doesn't come here sort of thinking).

Now to not derail the thread let's tie that back into preserving fleets.

If the army isn't the primary resource hog for the CAF, then there is no reason to preserve fleets.  It would be far better to have GDLS constantly build/upgrade with new LAVs.  Just keep replacing old LAV with new ones in the fleet and then divesting the older ones as necessary.  I would rather the money that would go into inspection, care and feeding of a bunch of "classic cars" go into new/upgraded LAV's than hanging onto war stock like we are the US or Soviets.


----------



## rmc_wannabe (25 Apr 2022)

I brought this up in the F-35 thread, but I think this applies to the CA as well. 

Essentially, we buy a luxury car for top money and expect it to last and be top of the line for 30-40 years. A 1982 Lincoln Continental, even if well maintained, is no longer a luxury car. Heck, even an iPhone from 15 Years ago is archaic by 2022 standards.  Technology now shifts at a rate of 5-10 years, depending on the industry. We do very poorly at life cycling to keep up with technology.

In 30-40 years time, we might not have diesel to fuel vehicles, as well as the various armaments and sensors associated with platforms will be vastly different than what we currently have on the shelf. Additionally, the spare parts and tooling for the platforms are usually depleted and not sustained because, well, the vendor and manufacturers move on and its no longer profitable to keep LSVW parts in production.

What needs to happen is changing our lifecycle management for platforms. We need to buy "good enough" kit, in solid numbers to support both Reg F and P Res, and have a plan to replace at least a third of the fleet in 5-10 years time. Over a 30 year period, you have replaced the entire fleet, gradually, with minimal impacts form inflation and defense industry gouging. 

To continually swapping a full fleet every 40 years, when we're done and broken with the kit leaves us vulnerable to these capability gaps recurring every time.


----------



## Spencer100 (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Warehouse costs about $20 per square foot to build - steel structure upper end.
> Bison is 21x8.5 ft or 178 sq ft
> 178 x $20 = $3560 per vehicle
> Assume a 70% loading efficiency and you are looking at about $5000 per vehicle.
> ...


You missed a zero on the warehouse cost to build.  It's in the 200.00 per foot now.  I just got quotes.


----------



## Underway (25 Apr 2022)

rmc_wannabe said:


> What needs to happen is changing our lifecycle management for platforms. We need to buy "good enough" kit, in solid numbers to support both Reg F and P Res, and have a plan to replace at least a third of the fleet in 5-10 years time. Over a 30 year period, you have replaced the entire fleet, gradually, with minimal impacts form inflation and defense industry gouging.


The NSPS plan, where you just have a continuous build and never do a midlife refit.  

And now that looks like what they are doing for GDLS for the LAV fleet.  Upgrade to LAV 6 complete.  Now do the ACSV program.  Then there will be something new concocted for the SHORAD issue and on and on.  Gotta keep the money flowing into London.  Swing ridings there.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (25 Apr 2022)

One of the lessons of this current war is that AFV's and trucks are very expendable, so you will need a good supply of them. The war stock of AFV's does not need instantly mobile, you could have semi stripped hulls outside, properly preserved, with the engines, weapons, FCS, stored away in a smaller warehouse. If you combine this with a NSPS like AFV manufacturing ability, then as you renew the fleet and mothball the older generation, excess old mothballed AFV's are disposed of, either put together for sale or sold to another country as is. In fact create agreements to sell older stuff to friendly nations, so they become stable customers and you have a system to renew, store and dispose of AFV's. This also gives a cushion when the government of the day decides to "gift" your combat capability as well. So you can do the same with artillery, ATGM's, etc.


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## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Spencer100 said:


> You missed a zero on the warehouse cost to build.  It's in the 200.00 per foot now.  I just got quotes.



Wow! 4 years difference. 

Price of steel?

So the cost of a 50,000 sq ft (5000 m2) insulated shed for storing 200 Bisons is now 2x new ACSVs or about $10,000,000?









						How Much Does a 10000 Sq Ft Steel Building Warehouse Cost?
					

Constructing a 10000 sq ft steel building warehouse requires detailed planning to determine and justify the high cost of the investment. Learn more.




					www.alliedbuildings.com


----------



## Underway (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So the cost of a 50,000 sq ft (5000 m2) insulated shed for storing 200 Bisons is now 2x new ACSVs or about $10,000,000?


ACSV program for 360 of them is ~$2.3 billion.  But that's spares, training etc... cycle cost so not sure where you get the $10 million is double from.


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## GR66 (25 Apr 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> One of the lessons of this current war is that AFV's and trucks are very expendable, so you will need a good supply of them. The war stock of AFV's does not need instantly mobile, you could have semi stripped hulls outside, properly preserved, with the engines, weapons, FCS, stored away in a smaller warehouse. If you combine this with a NSPS like AFV manufacturing ability, then as you renew the fleet and mothball the older generation, excess old mothballed AFV's are disposed of, either put together for sale or sold to another country as is. In fact create agreements to sell older stuff to friendly nations, so they become stable customers and you have a system to renew, store and dispose of AFV's. This also gives a cushion when the government of the day decides to "gift" your combat capability as well. So you can do the same with artillery, ATGM's, etc.


If we were to consolidate to 6 Infantry Battalions (4 x LAV and 2 x Light) then we'd have 2 x Battalions of LAV spares for war stocks.  Equip the two Light Battalions with the Arctic Mobility program vehicle and secure at least one additional Battalion's worth for Reserve Transport Companies (ideally one Battalion worth per Division)


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## MilEME09 (25 Apr 2022)

rmc_wannabe said:


> I brought this up in the F-35 thread, but I think this applies to the CA as well.
> 
> Essentially, we buy a luxury car for top money and expect it to last and be top of the line for 30-40 years. A 1982 Lincoln Continental, even if well maintained, is no longer a luxury car. Heck, even an iPhone from 15 Years ago is archaic by 2022 standards.  Technology now shifts at a rate of 5-10 years, depending on the industry. We do very poorly at life cycling to keep up with technology.
> 
> ...


Why not just stick with an item and upgrade it every 10 years? Technology changes yes, but I'd argue we have reached the Aprex of tank and armoured vehicles design. So why not create a platform, from the start that would make upgrading the tech easy, so that we just continually upgrade, and build new hulls as needed.


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

2,300,000,000 / 360 = 6,400,000 CAD

4,900,000 USD  Unit Cost of a Stryker in 2012 from United States Department of Defense, _Program Acquisition Costs By Weapon System_, Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense, 2012, pp. 3–6. per Wikipedia

So, on my napkin,  allowing 5,000,000 CAD for a single ACSV without parts and infrastructure but allowing for project management.

2x 5,000,000 CAD = 10,000,000 CAD

At 200 CAD/sq ft that would buy 50,000 sq ft of warehousing or enough to park 280 Bisons at 178 sq ft per Bison (21 ft long by 8.5 ft wide).

But 280 Bisons in 50,000 sq ft means metal to metal parking so to allow for the necessary open space (I was allowing 30%) then 199 Bisons in the 50,000 sq ft instead.

So, rough and ready, even at Spencer's $200/sq ft level, the cost of constructing a simple long term storage barn for 200 Bisons is similar to my estimated new cost of 2 ACSVs

And wrt the actual cost,

Just checked in with an old boss who is still in the business of building new warehouses and his expectation for a Calgary warehouse would be something in the 85-125 $/sqft range.  Assuming that the government already owned the land.

About 100 CAD per sq ft in Calgary. 







						Altus Group | 2022 Canadian Cost Guide
					

Your guide to better understanding Canadian real estate development and infrastructure construction costs




					info.altusgroup.com


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Why not just stick with an item and upgrade it every 10 years? Technology changes yes, but I'd argue we have reached the Aprex of tank and armoured vehicles design. So why not create a platform, from the start that would make upgrading the tech easy, so that we just continually upgrade, and build new hulls as needed.



Or better yet?  Buy an existing used recent model and start using some of the fleet immediately?


----------



## Colin Parkinson (25 Apr 2022)

It will be 10 -20 years before some of the nifty material technology gets to production scale, at which point you will see a major technology change in AFV's. Even then a lot of it will work as add on's and applique armour.


----------



## Brad Sallows (25 Apr 2022)

> The High School and University crowd will give you 6 ish years of Summer Employment - the HS Summer break being shorter - but you can do a lot with 6 summers of employment.



4, if you get them in HS.  Post-HS summer (Jul/Aug) is just long enough to deliver what SYEP did - GMT and a milcon.

From people doing four years of post-secondary, only count on 3 more summers.  At the end of the graduating year, they'll be going to job fairs and employers will want them right away and they'll be low on the pole for choosing vacation.

There can of course be two schedule models - one focused on people with May-Aug availability, and one focused on everyone else.  The "everyone else" program would work better with permanent schools staffed by Reg F members - it'd be hard to get Res F instructors for the same reason the "everyone else" program exists in the first place.


----------



## Brad Sallows (25 Apr 2022)

> Technology now shifts at a rate of 5-10 years



Yes, but there aren't a lot of bleeding edge manufacturers of high-end kit.  The M-1/Challenger/Leo2 generation of tanks (for example) was a substantial improvement over M-60/Chieftain/Leo1.  Since then, incremental improvements.  Getting stuck into good chassis/frames/hulls capable of several lifetime upgrades of various suites is the lane to be in, for a country with small fleets.


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## Spencer100 (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> 2,300,000,000 / 360 = 6,400,000 CAD
> 
> 4,900,000 USD  Unit Cost of a Stryker in 2012 from United States Department of Defense, _Program Acquisition Costs By Weapon System_, Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense, 2012, pp. 3–6. per Wikipedia
> 
> ...


I was including the land.


----------



## my72jeep (25 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Or they get towed to Poland for depot level refurb.
> 
> We are currently in planning to move most of our depots and depot level refurbishment facilities out of Germany to Poland for several reasons.


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Spencer100 said:


> I was including the land.




In any event we are looking at something like the cost of 1 or 2 new armoured vehicles to store 200 old armoured vehicles.  And the 360 new armoured vehicles need their own storage as well.  So the project has already had to sacrifice 5 to 10 new vehicles in the project to build new garages.  Add another 20% of Garage Space to retain the old fleet.

Here is Canada's Original Sin.

National Defence Act - Part I, Section 11.



> Materiel​Delivery of materiel for sale or disposal
> 
> *11* The Governor in Council may authorize the Minister to deliver to any department or agency of the Government of Canada, for sale or disposal to any countries or international welfare organizations and on any terms that the Governor in Council may determine, any materiel that has not been declared surplus and is not immediately required for the use of the Canadian Forces or for any other purpose under this Act.
> 
> ...




Right after describing:
the Title of the Act (Sect. 1),
the Definitions used in the Act (Sect. 2),
the formation of the department, (Sect.3),
the Minister  (Sect. 4-6),
the Deputy Minister (Sect. 7-8) and
the JAG (Sect. 9-10)

The first order of business, Sect. 11, is how to dispose of the CAF's materiel.

Even before describing the Regulations that govern hiring, employing and using the CAF, before describing the Regulations that govern acquiring new materiel, the Act addresses getting rid of kit, surplus or not.

Only a Scottish lawyer could have written this thing.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So Kev,
> 
> Just to be clear.  You and Uncle Sam are happy with Canada freeloading on the domestic front.  Have I got that right?
> 
> ...


"Old kit" absolutely needs spare parts. Vehicles without spare parts quickly become useless. 

There needs to be a payoff to keeping old equipment on our books - and I am not seeing in your proposals. I can understand keeping small arms that are in good condition in long-term storage if they use the same ammunition natures as the systems that replace them.

Vehicles? No thanks. We need a capability, and a capability is more than a collection of vehicles.


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

TangoTwoBravo said:


> "Old kit" absolutely needs spare parts. Vehicles without spare parts quickly become useless.
> 
> There needs to be a payoff to keeping old equipment on our books - and I am not seeing in your proposals. I can understand keeping small arms that are in good condition in long-term storage if they use the same ammunition natures as the systems that replace them.
> 
> Vehicles? No thanks. We need a capability, and a capability is more than a collection of vehicles.



If you want the Reserves to be capable, even if it is just to take the load off of you while you do other things, don't they need equipment, like vehicles?

I'm sure that you guys already have enough vehicles now.  You might want different, or better vehicles or vehicles with different kit, and old vehicles likely won't meet your needs.

But they meet the needs of other armies in other situations and they could allow the reserves to conduct additional tasks when you are otherwise engaged.

I'll consider myself schooled on the need for spare parts.  

I could counter though that there are spare parts in the system.  That it is possible to start cannibalizing a reserve fleet.  That the usage rate of a reserve fleet can be set against the ability to maintain it.  That a reserve fleet, after 10 to 15 years is likely to be joined in storage by another newer reserve fleet allowing the older fleet to self-divest on exercises or operations - vis the Ukrainians.


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## Blackadder1916 (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> The first order of business, Sect. 11, is how to dispose of *the CAF's materiel*.
> 
> Even before describing the Regulations that govern hiring, employing and using the *CAF,* before describing the Regulations that govern acquiring new materiel, the Act addresses getting rid of kit, surplus or not.
> 
> Only as Scottish lawyer could have written this thing.



No, that section of the NDA is not discussing "the CAF", it is discussing the "Department of National Defence".  In addition to the organization of the Department, who's who in the zoo and what the minister can do, it also outlines authority by which the "Department" can do what it does with stuff.

Everything else that follows in the NDA deals with the "Canadian Armed Forces".  There is mention in Part II of the Act about material for the CAF which comes after the organization, employing, etc.

It's a natural division of responsibilities and discussion.  You don't get a military until there is a government department responsible for it, so that comes first in the act.


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Blackadder1916 said:


> No, that section of the NDA is not discussing "the CAF", it is discussing the "Department of National Defence".  In addition to the organization of the Department, who's who in the zoo and what the minister can do, it also outlines authority by which the "Department" can do what it does with stuff.
> 
> Everything else that follows in the NDA deals with the "Canadian Armed Forces".  There is mention in Part II of the Act about material for the CAF which comes after the organization, employing, etc.
> 
> It's a natural division of responsibilities and discussion.  You don't get a military until there is a government department responsible for it, so that comes first in the act.



Again I will accept the schooling.

I suggest the fact remains that the Department of National Defence, which is authorized to raise and equip the CF, has as its first item of business the disposal of Materiel.


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## Brad Sallows (25 Apr 2022)

> If you want the Reserves to be capable, even if it is just to take the load off of you while you do other things, don't they need equipment, like vehicles?



Again, figure out how long it takes to prepare a division, starting with reservists and recruits.  That much time is available to acquire uniforms, small arms, support weapons, trucks, guns, APCs, tanks, ammunition, etc.  Maybe that's not enough time to acquire 900 or so APCs and tanks, but in the meantime it's still an infantry division with good operational mobility.  And most of the kit can be new and up to date, not partly worn or outdated.  It's not as if no country has done that before...


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## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Again, figure out how long it takes to prepare a division, starting with reservists and recruits.  That much time is available to acquire uniforms, small arms, support weapons, trucks, guns, APCs, tanks, ammunition, etc.  Maybe that's not enough time to acquire 900 or so APCs and tanks, but in the meantime it's still an infantry division with good operational mobility.  And most of the kit can be new and up to date, not partly worn or outdated.  It's not as if no country has done that before...



No arguments Brad.  

I'm just taken with the variety of kit being thrown into the breach in Ukraine and the amount of stored gear there is lying around in other countries.  Many of them are still providing for its future on operations.  Brit MRAPs and stored AS90s.  Dutch M113 AIFVs. Italian SIDAMs etc.

The US still storing and upgrading and using M113s.  The Israelis.  The Norwegians.

I'm just curious about our decision making process and how it has led us to different conclusions.


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## Colin Parkinson (25 Apr 2022)

and shipping those M113's to the Ukraine to be used in combat. Your loss rate of AFV's and other vehicles from combat and wear and tear is going to be eye watering, even with good tires.


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## Blackadder1916 (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Again I will accept the schooling.
> 
> I suggest the fact remains that the Department of National Defence, which is authorized to raise and equip the CF, has as its first item of business the disposal of Materiel.



I was going to be flippant and remark that it is more difficult to get rid of stuff that it is to acquire new stuff, but I'll amend my thought and say that sometimes it may be "as difficult" to get rid of stuff as it is to acquire.

The purpose of that section in the NDA that you seemingly hold in great disdain because it talks about getting rid of stuff provides the department (and the CAF) with a loophole to accomplish defense (and diplomatic, humanitarian, etc) objectives that could be stymied by other legislation.  Every department of government, just as it has to acquire stuff through PWGSC, also has to get rid off stuff through the same department.  The Surplus Crown Assets Act is the governing legislation.

It's through that section of the act that Canada has been able on numerous occasions (for decades and decades) to sidestep the red tape that would entangle any transfer of military owned equipment to other countries and NGOs.  I suppose the latest use of that section was the transfer of equipment to Ukraine.


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## Brad Sallows (25 Apr 2022)

> I'm just curious about our decision making process and how it has led us to different conclusions.



Money, money, money.  As a reservist working out of the HQ building across from Jericho Park, I was aware that space was tight.  Gee, I naively thought, perhaps we should move into the old BHosp building - stores and office space to spare, and a nice ramp for access to loading doors.  No, that and everything else not used on the property were torn down as soon as not needed anymore in order to save money (costs of upkeep).


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## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Blackadder1916 said:


> I was going to be flippant and remark that it is more difficult to get rid of stuff that it is to acquire new stuff, but I'll amend my thought and say that sometimes it may be "as difficult" to get rid of stuff as it is to acquire.
> 
> The purpose of that section in the NDA that you seemingly hold in great disdain because it talks about getting rid of stuff provides the department (and the CAF) with a loophole to accomplish defense (and diplomatic, humanitarian, etc) objectives that could be stymied by other legislation.  Every department of government, just as it has to acquire stuff through PWGSC, also has to get rid off stuff through the same department.  The Surplus Crown Assets Act is the governing legislation.
> 
> It's through that section of the act that Canada has been able on numerous occasions (for decades and decades) to sidestep the red tape that would entangle any transfer of military owned equipment to other countries and NGOs.  I suppose the latest use of that section was the transfer of equipment to Ukraine.




I'm not disdainful of its inclusion.  I can see its very real value.  I just find it jarring that it precedes all other considerations of the Act.


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## Kirkhill (25 Apr 2022)

Brad Sallows said:


> Money, money, money.  As a reservist working out of the HQ building across from Jericho Park, I was aware that space was tight.  Gee, I naively thought, perhaps we should move into the old BHosp building - stores and office space to spare, and a nice ramp for access to loading doors.  No, that and everything else not used on the property were torn down as soon as not needed anymore in order to save money (costs of upkeep).



And that, in my uninformed opinion, isn't incongruent with Sect 11.  It is as if the working assumption is that there is a whole bunch of surplus that the government can profit by its removal.

Written in the aftermath of WW2?  Lots of bodies, real estate, trucks and guns to re-integrate into society?


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## MilEME09 (25 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And that, in my uninformed opinion, isn't incongruent with Sect 11.  It is as if the working assumption is that there is a whole bunch of surplus that the government can profit by its removal.
> 
> Written in the aftermath of WW2?  Lots of bodies, real estate, trucks and guns to re-integrate into society?


I mean if you raise your guns right, they don't become Assault guns right?


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## FJAG (26 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> I would separate the PRes.
> The High School and University crowd will give you 6 ish years of Summer Employment - the HS Summer break being shorter - but you can do a lot with 6 summers of employment.


I only care about their summer employment "window" to the extent that it builds their knowledge and training. After that they can go semi active so long as they are there when you need to mobilize them for whatever. If I get two summers out of the majority of the  reservists followed by four years sedentary standby with his unit at one weekend per month and two to three weeks summer exercise for four years I'd consider that a win.



Underway said:


> If the army isn't the primary resource hog for the CAF, then there is no reason to preserve fleets. It would be far better to have GDLS constantly build/upgrade with new LAVs. Just keep replacing old LAV with new ones in the fleet and then divesting the older ones as necessary. I would rather the money that would go into inspection, care and feeding of a bunch of "classic cars" go into new/upgraded LAV's than hanging onto war stock like we are the US or Soviets.


I actually agree fully with this but essentially this is a manner of hanging on to "classic cars".

As you continuously build/upgrade you are essentially introducing improved models while still retaining older models. That will, in practical terms, create two fleets which vary in size during the build/upgrade process. The newer models will go to the priority units/missions and the older ones will move into secondary tasks and lower priority units and tasks. What is and what isn't a priority unit or task may very well vary over time based on how serviceable/useful older equipment is.



Underway said:


> Gotta keep the money flowing into London. Swing ridings there.


Yeah but much more importantly, one of our few major equipment industrial centres.

🍻


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## Underway (26 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> I actually agree fully with this but essentially this is a manner of hanging on to "classic cars".
> 
> As you continuously build/upgrade you are essentially introducing improved models while still retaining older models. That will, in practical terms, create two fleets which vary in size during the build/upgrade process. The newer models will go to the priority units/missions and the older ones will move into secondary tasks and lower priority units and tasks. What is and what isn't a priority unit or task may very well vary over time based on how serviceable/useful older equipment is.


It depends on how you introduce the replacement.  I think the LAV 6 upgrade is instructional here.

You do the replacement in batches, say there are 400 to fix up you take 40 at a time and each unit gets its new stuff in order (and of course a few vehicles to the schools for training).  There is still a large commonality between the versions, and you are really only dealing with a single legacy system while you swap it out for the new one.

The difference is that you aren't just building 400 new LAV 6 and keeping 400 LAV 3.  As the LAV 6 come online you reduce the LAV 3 stock (mainly because they are being upgraded but you get the point).

This should be the same with the ACSV's.  When the Ambulances are built you don't keep the Bison Ambs around.  You divest them.

When the ACSV's are done being built then there should be a SHORAD LAV 6 built or 120mm mortar version or whatever.

Then you go back and build LAV 7 and do the full replacement run again.  Or keep building LAV 6 and sell/donate the old ones off to someone else.

There will always be minor differences as the line goes on but I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing as long as the majority of the systems are the same.


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## KevinB (26 Apr 2022)

US pledges $391 million for Euro allies to buy American to backfill weapons donations to Ukraine
					

Fifteen European allies will get nearly $400 million in new U.S. grants to buy American military hardware to backfill weapons they’ve donated to Ukraine from their own stockpiles, the State Department announced Monday.




					www.defensenews.com
				




Just saying


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## Kirkhill (26 Apr 2022)

Underway said:


> It depends on how you introduce the replacement.  I think the LAV 6 upgrade is instructional here.
> 
> You do the replacement in batches, say there are 400 to fix up you take 40 at a time and each unit gets its new stuff in order (and of course a few vehicles to the schools for training).  There is still a large commonality between the versions, and you are really only dealing with a single legacy system while you swap it out for the new one.
> 
> ...



I think the difference is that you are talking about sustaining a fleet of 400 in service.  That is enough for a small number of  regular force battlegroups.

The alternative being discussed is building a fleet of 1200 with three blocks of 400 units.  One in service and two older generations in storage.

And that relates to the whole question of do we want a mobilization base, do we want to utilize the reserves, what do we want the reserves to do, what do the regs want the reserves to do, what do the reserves want to do, what does command want the reserves to do.

Do we want reserves at all?

I think if the government were willing to fund the reserves with top of the line kit to serve alongside the regs when the balloon went up then none of the Class A types would object.  I suspicion the objections would come from the regs and the treasury.

The reason we are discussing keeping second hand kit at all is that the reserves are begging for crumbs - they are asking for a real job and they are asking for real kit to do that job.  They are willing to accept ancient kit because ancient kit is better than no kit.  They can still learn basic soldiering and respond to rudimentary tasks,  and they will be better prepared so that the training time to convert them to top of the line gear will be reduced.

What they are not asking for is a full time career in the army.  They are asking for the opportunity to help when they can.  And each individual has different definitions of what they can offer.  

Other countries manage those voluntary hours much better than we do.

And not a lot of regs seem to see the volunteers as anything but a useless competitor for salaries and equipment.


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## FJAG (26 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And that relates to the whole question of do we want a mobilization base, do we want to utilize the reserves, what do we want the reserves to do, what do the regs want the reserves to do, what do the reserves want to do, what does command want the reserves to do.
> 
> Do we want reserves at all?


IMHO the answer is a resounding yes.

The issue is what roles each fills. The key is you need to define the force structure you want for the missions that you intend to participate in.

If all you want is light battalion to send on UN missions then by all means have a full-time force of three light battalions to rotate through. You really do not need much of a headquarters above the battalions and few enablers beyond the ones in the battalions.

If on the other hand you want to keep a rifle battalion in Latvia and preposition a brigade there in case of a war then you'll need a brigade at home which has maybe four full-time rifle battalions but its artillery air defence and armour primarily reservists together with at least one more reserve brigade.

You pay full dollar for the people you need every day and a heavily discounted dollar for the people you only need when necessary. Equipment, on the other hand, needs to be paid for up front whether used every day or kept in reserve.

Sometimes I get the feeling that in Canada the government says "we'll give you, DND, a pay envelope for 100,000 military and civilian PYs and 20,000 reservists - go figure out what to do with it and then let us know."

🍻


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## Kirkhill (26 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> IMHO the answer is a resounding yes.
> 
> The issue is what roles each fills. The key is you need to define the force structure you want for the missions that you intend to participate in.
> 
> ...



I know your answer FJAG.   And I am in complete agreement with you.  We disagree on how those reserves would be organized, trained and tasked and how their taskings would be weighted but we agree on the value of a reserve.

Our mutual problem is that our DND/CAF community does not, in my opinion, demonstrate through its words and deeds, as similar sense of the need or value.

And 40 years of drum banging doesn't seem to have changed much.


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## FJAG (26 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> I know your answer FJAG.   And I am in complete agreement with you.  We disagree on how those reserves would be organized, trained and tasked and how their taskings would be weighted but we agree on the value of a reserve.
> 
> Our mutual problem is that our DND/CAF community does not, in my opinion, demonstrate through its words and deeds, as similar sense of the need or value.
> 
> And 40 years of drum banging doesn't seem to have changed much.


It's really strange isn't it. The concept is viable and a clear money saver. One can honestly debate the quantities and ratios and roles; but the concept? It's like the Army got itself stuck in the 1960s model of 'forces in being' when the cash was good and can't figure out how to get itself out of that rut. It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.


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## GR66 (26 Apr 2022)

Personally I'm of the opinion that in a potential peer conflict between NATO and Russia or China we will not require a mass mobilization of additional Canadian Brigade Groups for the conflict.  NATO's European members plus the US have enough forces/reserves/population to overmatch Russia and any Pacific conflict against China will be more of an air/sea conflict than something requiring Canadian Brigade Groups.

So I'd say that the key role for the Army Reserve would be to a) provide those capabilities/enablers that are required in wartime that are not typically required in peacetime (e.g. Mission Task roles like Mortar/Direct Fire/Pioneer Platoons, additional IDF platforms, AD, etc.) and b) provide the "depth" to sustain our Reg Force Brigades when they are deployed.

The problem that's been identified is that under the current system the Reserves don't have the capability of maintaining the vehicles used by our Mech Battalions and training burden to be proficient in the Mech forces is difficult even for the Reg Force due to limited training time, never mind for a part-time Reservist.

So could something like this possibly work?


The LAV Battalions are concentrated in 1 & 5 Brigades with 2 Brigade becoming the Light Brigade.
Instead of completely disbanding the 3rd Mech Battalions in 1/5 Brigades you instead keep the maintainers and post one additional LAV Company with each of the Regiments 1st and 2nd Battalions.
This additional Company would focus on training troops in the vehicle operation elements of the Mechanized Infantry role (vehicle commanders/drivers/gunners only...no "guys in back").  Troops could rotate through the vehicle Company to master their skills then rotate back into one of the three line companies of the Battalion.
The Vehicle Company could then also host dismounted infantry Platoons mission tasked from Reserve Infantry units to provide "guys in back" to give them experience in operating from the same vehicles that the Reg Force is using.
Individual Reservists who have the time available could (after completing their regular vehicle driver/turret/commander qualification courses) could have short-term postings to the Vehicle Company to maintain their currency in the vehicle skills.

What would this system give us?


2 x Battalions of vehicle spares available as replacements for losses in a conflict (maintained centrally with the Reg Force Battalions by Reg Force maintainers).
Increased training opportunities within the Battalion concentrating on vehicle skills.
A pool of Reserve Infantry that are familiar with mounted operations making it easier for them to augment Reg Force Mechanized units.
A smaller pool of Reservists trained as vehicle drivers/gunners/commanders to augment the Reg Force.
A clear employment role for Reserve units as each would be Mission Tasked (either for a specific CS role or to generate dismounted troops to augment a Reg Force Battalion).
Free up Reg Force Infantry PYs for schools, filling out the Reg Force, etc. (only 2 Companies worth of vehicle crews and maintainers retained from the 3rd Battalions of the Mech Regiments...the rest of the PYs fed back into the system).
Reduction in the Command overhead of the Reserve units as each of the Mission Tasked units (CS or GIB augmentee Platoons) would fall under the command of their parent Reg Force Battalion.

I'm sure that like any change there would be challenges and trade-offs, but on the surface at least it would appear to check a number of boxes.


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## Kirkhill (26 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> It's really strange isn't it. The concept is viable and a clear money saver. One can honestly debate the quantities and ratios and roles; but the concept? It's like the Army got itself stuck in the 1960s model of 'forces in being' when the cash was good and can't figure out how to get itself out of that rut. It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.




As a kid back in Britain I watched with my parents a TV show on ancient history.  It was called All Our Yesterday's.   It was about The Second World War.  20 years previous.  Ancient history to a kid.  But the last of that generation, my parents' generation, is just dying off now.

The Canadian Army really only found purpose and stability with the Cold War and Louis St-Laurent.   Prior to Korea and the Berlin Crisis it was raised from the Militia on an as needed basis.  1950 is only 72 years ago.  Some folks around here remember that year.   

The Institution is young.  It is less than one lifetime old.  I suggest the Institution feels insecure and fragile and feels the need to fight to justify its existence.

And the worst thing that could happen to the Institution is that the Militia revives and becomes a viable component of National Defence-Public Safety-Emergency Preparedness.   Any success in any of those fields would cut into the Institution's rationale for existing.

That, in my opinion, would be consistent with a tendency to respond to any question with "You don't need to do that.  We can do that if needed.  But it is never needed."

Sorry if I offend anybody on this site.  It's not personal.  It's my considered opinion after 40 years of observation.

Institutions have personalities all their own.


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## quadrapiper (26 Apr 2022)

FJAG said:


> It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.


"...by which we mean headquarters staff in division strength."


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## KevinB (26 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> As a kid back in Britain I watched with my parents a TV show on ancient history.  It was called All Our Yesterday's.   It was about The Second World War.  20 years previous.  Ancient history to a kid.  But the last of that generation, my parents' generation, is just dying off now.
> 
> The Canadian Army really only found purpose and stability with the Cold War and Louis St-Laurent.   Prior to Korea and the Berlin Crisis it was raised from the Militia on an as needed basis.  1950 is only 72 years ago.  Some folks around here remember that year.
> 
> ...


Frankly the PRes has given the Regular Army good reason to discount it for a lot of things.
   Vehicle VOR rates are generally insanely high in reserve units, and those aren't even A vehicles.
   Utterly erratic attendance, questionable skill levels of senior personnel etc.
   That isn't even digging into the fact there militia is nearly an inside down pyramid for rank structure - does it really take a LCol to manage a platoon Minus?  

Then factor in the fact that the equipment one needs to be proficient with has increased exponentially in the past 50 years.

  Honestly I think the Militia is it's biggest enemy -- if it wants to be a real part of the Army - it needs to do a lot of soul searching and figure out how it can restructure to make a reasonable contribution.


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## FJAG (26 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> Frankly the PRes has given the Regular Army good reason to discount it for a lot of things.
> Vehicle VOR rates are generally insanely high in reserve units, and those aren't even A vehicles.
> Utterly erratic attendance, questionable skill levels of senior personnel etc.
> That isn't even digging into the fact there militia is nearly an inside down pyramid for rank structure - does it really take a LCol to manage a platoon Minus?
> ...


Kevin, Kevin, Kevin.

The PRes is what the CAF leadership makes it or let's it be.

Everything that is wrong with the PRes is fixable - IF - the CAF wants to fix it - and there is a lot that needs fixing. However, the PRes is exactly what the CAF wants, a cheap manpower pool to fluff out the Class B cubicles in Ottawa and, much to the Army's surprise, a worthwhile pool of augmentation manpower in times when rotations get heavy like in Afghanistan. It doesn't want more because to get more would take an effort and require transferring more resources from the day-to-day activities to the in-case-of-emergency-break-glass capabilities.

It was made abundantly clear to me when I provided advice to the Reserve Force Employment Project back in the early '00s that the CAF was then looking for a reserve employment structure that brought more reservists into the day-to-day activities of the CAF. (You might recall the 'limited liability reservist' v 'unlimited liability reservist' class fiasco)

The Navy was particulalry hot on this as the expected manning levels of the then fairly new MCDVs wasn't being met. In the halls of Ottawa, the Class B was becoming the darling reservist; Class A were tolerated as a source of Class Bs but otherwise considered useless; and the operational Class C hadn't quite become a major thing at that time. The headshed was aiming for a multipurpose reservist that would serve full-time, be posted, deployed etc as the CAF considered necessary during their contract term.

It's still a 'what have you done for me today?' relationship and not a 'what can you do for the country tomorrow?' one.

🍻


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## Infanteer (27 Apr 2022)

I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"


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## MilEME09 (27 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"


Yeah at this point it could be merged with the Pres thread. It started as what to do with vehicles, and while a logical progression, we all know the army isn't going to fix the PRes.


----------



## FJAG (27 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"


In fairness, it really started with a theme of Sharing Army Equipment with the Reserves which was then countered with Hoarding Preserving Army Fleets.  

I'm not sure how you can separate the two topics. In any modern army, soldiers and their equipment (or lack of it) are interconnected. 

But you're right; this thread may have run its course unless someone can come up with a viable way that we can equip and properly train both the RegF and the ResF from the limited stocks that we have.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (27 Apr 2022)

Nah! It's time to put a bow on it!

Monkeys and weasels still running.


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## Underway (27 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"


They always do.  Wait out for the Army Organization discussion to rear its head.

I think that we to discuss Preserving Fleets in the current context of how the Army _actually _works not in a fantasy land of how it will never work.

The PRes as currently constructed can't use "Preserved Fleets" effectively.  The question is can we mobilize industry as fast or faster than we can mobilize people.  Because the only time we would ever need a preserved fleet is in case of mobilization. Given it takes 6 months to train a soldier will GDLS or the various other companies in Canada be able to build vehicles to equip the mobilized formations?

Or better yet will we be able to buy equipment from elsewhere and train upon them in time.  The US has more equipment than it will ever use.  Canada could easily just buy what it needs from US reserve stocks and quickly digest it into newly mobilized units.

In my mind, a Preserved Fleet is an exercise in _keeping up with the Jones'_ instead of properly analyzing the Canadian Army reality and applying our own situation and circumstances. 
The other argument against preserved fleets for PRes is this question. How many vehicles do we have surplus already in the CA?  TAPV's, LAV's, G Wagons, MILCOTS etc...  I suspect that there is some surplus.  Can the PRes when mobilized just jump into those vehicles?  I mean they aren't that big, their current role is to provide for specialized skill sets (mortar, heavy weapons, CIMIC,) in platoons or to fill out Ref F formations.

We might already have enough _active_ vehicles to equip the extra pers the PRes would provide for their assigned tasks.  How many PRes formations will be doing stuff that doesn't require more than a Milcot or GWagon?  Base security?  Light Infantry? LOC policing?  Rear echelon engineering tasks like fixing bridges or removing UXO's, POW guards, and the plethora of other things that are required.

If the ball really goes up then there are a million civilian vehicles you can get that will be able to take a green paint job and a maple leaf on the side to do many of those tasks just fine.


----------



## Dale Denton (27 Apr 2022)

Basically every popular thread bleeds into other, new threads with people saying the same thing. We know the problems, we have a couple great solutions, but no decision-maker in gov't cares. 

I've read interesting takes that circle many thread over and over:

Leveraging and sustaining defence industry tie-ins
An army and RCAF NSS
PRes sustainment and reorg
Everything reorg
Vehicle fleet commonality and extended variants
Missing capabilities (the list goes on)
As an outsider, is the lack of capability perhaps due to us having so many projects at the same time, many of which are delayed? Would we have started new projects but haven't since procurement staff are busy on the pistol project, they can't staff a Mortar project? Is the tasking of procurement staff/attention a larger part of our grand procurement woes? If we pushed every current project out the door we'd have space to  started much needed new ones is the thinking.

---------------------

Does this come down to us needing an outspoken Hillier 2.0 or a high-ranking whistleblower giving media some great headlines?
"Defenseless against drones"
"If the Taliban could take out so many of our LAVs, imagine what Russia could do"
"Topgun era jets"
"X would allow troops on the ground to be further away from the fight"
"If we cared about the safety of citizens in the north as much as we do Toronto or Calgary we'd have a much bigger presence in the arctic"

Insert any oversimplification to show the state of the CAF.


----------



## daftandbarmy (28 Apr 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> Basically every popular thread bleeds into other, new threads with people saying the same thing. We know the problems, we have a couple great solutions, but no decision-maker in gov't cares.
> 
> I've read interesting takes that circle many thread over and over:
> 
> ...




Based on past performance, it seems we'll require a pile of dead soldiers before any big changes are made.


----------



## IKnowNothing (28 Apr 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> As an outsider, is the lack of capability perhaps due to us having so many projects at the same time, many of which are delayed? Would we have started new projects but haven't since procurement staff are busy on the pistol project, they can't staff a Mortar project? Is the tasking of procurement staff/attention a larger part of our grand procurement woes? If we pushed every current project out the door we'd have space to  started much needed new ones is the thinking.


Pistol boondoggle aside, the thing I don't understand is why an ACSV type accelerated process can't be used to fill gaps.  Can GDLS not be left on their own to find partners for proposals to fill a suite of vehicles including Direct FIre/ AT, SP Mortar, and Shorad?


----------



## Underway (28 Apr 2022)

IKnowNothing said:


> Pistol boondoggle aside, the thing I don't understand is why an ACSV type accelerated process can't be used to fill gaps.  Can GDLS not be left on their own to find partners for proposals to fill a suite of vehicles including Direct FIre/ AT, SP Mortar, and Shorad?


They of course can accelerate, but the plan _I think _is to ensure continuous build and retain the jobs over time.  _I expect _that there will be a follow on contract for other vehicle types as the ASCV project moves towards a close.  SHORAD is its own project as is a number of other projects.  Army 2025 review is reaching its own culmination and combined with the direction from Cabinet to rework SSE given the change in the security situation I expect that GDLS will have work after those reviews and projects have been completed or as a result of the same projects.


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

> In 1989, France and Canada signed a joint venture to co-produce the ERYX missile.



Back in those ancient days the Eryx was introduced as the SRAAW(H)  or Short Range Anti-Armour Weapon (Heavy).  Short Range because of its 600 m range and Heavy because of its ability to take out a Heavy Target, a Medium Tank.  Its current analog would be the disposable NLAW capable of taking out Medium Tanks at 800 m from enclosed spaces. (minimal signature).

What is forgotten is that Eryx was to be part of a suite of Direct Fired weapons that started with the M72 LAW, the CG-84 (MRAAW (L)??), the MRAAW (H) and the LRAAW (H).

LRAAW (H) was to replace the TOW.  Hellfire had been introduced in 1984.
MRAAW (H) was to fill in a blank - It was supposed to be a Milan/BILL type project but there was a new kid on the block - the Javelin

Concurrently the Brits were experimenting with Merlin, an 81mm mortar launched autonomous ATGM. 
The Swedes introduced their 120mm version, the Strix, designed in 1983, trialled in 1988 and adopted by the Swedes in 1994

The Canadian response to this wealth of solutions - none of the above.   We had Leo 1s and the best anti-tank system was another tank.


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

By the way, that Strix round?  Apparently that is one of the 10,000 AT rounds shipped to Ukraine by Sweden from their stocks.


Video from Ukraine’s 54th Mechanized Brigade showing 120mm mortar strikes on Russian vehicles.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1509240875452407812


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

Apparently it seems the 128th Mountain might also be using the Strix round in the Severodonetsk salient.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517505799416913921


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -


Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar.  And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.


----------



## daftandbarmy (28 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -
> 
> 
> Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar.  And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.



Don't forget 'bad driving'


----------



## Underway (28 Apr 2022)

So bring it back to Preserving Fleets... I'm sure you can make a war stock argument.  Or perhaps you are selling the idea of preserving old vehicles in a low oxygen environment?


----------



## Brad Sallows (28 Apr 2022)

Army fleet management in Canada would be finding that happy thing, which I can only hope is more common than a unicorn: a chassis which can with incremental changes serve for 30 or 40 years, during which clapped-out earlier pieces are withdrawn and new ones with incremental upgrades added, which serves as the basis for a revolutionary re-design every 30 or 40 years, and which is required in sufficient numbers to keep the manufacturers going in Canada.


----------



## IKnowNothing (28 Apr 2022)

Underway said:


> They of course can accelerate, but the plan _I think _is to ensure continuous build and retain the jobs over time.  _I expect _that there will be a follow on contract for other vehicle types as the ASCV project moves towards a close.  SHORAD is its own project as is a number of other projects.  Army 2025 review is reaching its own culmination and combined with the direction from Cabinet to rework SSE given the change in the security situation I expect that GDLS will have work after those reviews and projects have been completed or as a result of the same projects.


My apologies, the "acceleration"  aspect was only one part of the ACSV process that I think should be duplicated for any LAV/GDLS/future common chassis project, the other being amalgamation. ACSV replaced two vehicles and encompassed 8 variants/ roles under the roof of one project.   LAV UP delivered 5.  The post I quoted mentioned the issue being procurement having too much on their plate.  My though was that one way to help with that would be to make use of that "family" approach and replace 3 projects (mortar, direct fire, shorad) with one.


----------



## Underway (28 Apr 2022)

IKnowNothing said:


> My apologies, the "acceleration"  aspect was only one part of the ACSV process that I think should be duplicated for any LAV/GDLS/future common chassis project, the other being amalgamation. ACSV replaced two vehicles and encompassed 8 variants/ roles under the roof of one project.   LAV UP delivered 5.  The post I quoted mentioned the issue being procurement having too much on their plate.  My though was that one way to help with that would be to make use of that "family" approach and replace 3 projects (mortar, direct fire, shorad) with one.


Totally agree though the problem with this particular one is the SHORAD, ATGM/direct fire I know for sure are different projects on the books right now.  Not sure if mortar is under a project at all, I would have to check.

SHORAD will likely want to deliver a family of systems, as will the direct fire/ATGM project.  So perhaps a SHORAD LAV and Direct fire LAV could be part of that family along with dismounted options etc...  The ASCV program is likely going to last long enough to get us to the finish line on this one.

What will be interesting is what GDLS brings to CANSEC this year.  They know what projects the Army is looking at and tailor their offerings well ahead of time.  This is exactly what they did with ASCV and was working on the project, developing options well before the Army asked them what they had.  Whatever they bring will either be showing off the ASCV variants to the military audience (here's what we are building for you) or a tell on what we could predict for the future build at GDLS (Oh nice SHORAD LAV system you have there).


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

Back to Preserving Fleets then - at Underway's suggestion   


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/udtwz6


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

No idea if this is true but it has comedic value if nothing else.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/udxsyu

Edit- Sorry! Wrong thread.  Getting confused.


----------



## Infanteer (28 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -
> 
> Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar.  And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.



So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack.  So nothing different than 1944?


----------



## OldSolduer (28 Apr 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> No idea if this is true but it has comedic value if nothing else.
> 
> 
> __
> ...


This is a very Russian thing. Seriously. 

It was not uncommon to have the NKVD follow the troops and execute anyone who retreated.


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack.  So nothing different than 1944?



Well.... maaaybe.  If you discount the precision of the weapons, the cost per kill, the price of the targets and the number of targets.   And we forget about the distribution of the weapons.  

Now we are talking about a battalion having 24-48 AT Gunners, the Mortar Platoon having 8 tubes capable of launching tank killing rounds, the CO and the OCs having their own private air forces with LAMs and UAVs.  And everybody and his brother having an NLAW and a couple of AT4s in their slits with them....


Aside from that, exactly the same.  Compared to what we had in the early 80s I would cheerfully take on a Warsaw Pact Tank Regiment with an infantry battalion.   Without having to worry about the availability of the Guns, Helos and Fast Air.


----------



## KevinB (29 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack.  So nothing different than 1944?


I’d argue that the main differences are the lack of ability to camouflage ones vehicle, and the ability to be precision targeted at range. 

ISR assets have made detection extremely easy - and precision munitions have made the K Kill exponentially more likely (especially on Russian AFV’s). 

Then factor in a Tank’s range band, versus Anti-Tank systems.   Before the tank only really needed to be concerned about Arty out ranging then. 

If I am in a small team doing an SR, it’s significantly easier for me to mask my 4-6 man team position visually as well in the EO spectrums than vehicles.  Granted I am now fixed in that position and redeployment will lead me to be vulnerable to radar, thermal and other detection methods.


----------



## MilEME09 (29 Apr 2022)

KevinB said:


> If I am in a small team doing an SR, it’s significantly easier for me to mask my 4-6 man team position visually as well in the EO spectrums than vehicles.  Granted I am now fixed in that position and redeployment will lead me to be vulnerable to radar, thermal and other detection methods.


Not to mention command Launch units that can be tethered to the weapon from a distance. So your team could be behind the hill, with the weapon camouflaged on top, nothing to see on thermal.

Technology forces tactics to change, great example, our doctrine used to be to move convoys of supplies at night because it was safer, modern sensors make that irrelevant. All that kit is expensive though, so we have less of them.


----------



## Dale Denton (29 Apr 2022)

Interesting points made in this thread. Here's what i've learned.

So I take it we are in the 'future' of warfare earlier than we thought and the state of the CAF has slid further into mediocrity?

The backbone of our military fleet is 10 years behind the curve _at best. _We haven't been closer to WW3, and if it broke out tomorrow we would be completely destroyed?

LAVs quickly detected and taken out by cheap and plentiful projectiles. Enemy UAVs watching our every move and engaging us with impunity. Our submarines sitting at the bottom of the ocean since they weren't able to detect enemy subs, our tanks and equipment sunk in the civilian-contracted transport, our CPFs can't make it to the fight since our only AOR is on the other side of the globe, artillery crews dead from counter-battery fire. What other nightmares am I missing?

Edit: So at what point do we donate the bulk of our outdated equipment to UKR and replace with a fleets/stocks of sustainable, modern and capable vehicles based on a common-hull? Give GDLS money to design a LAV 7.0 or spend the money to licence-build BOXER hulls?


----------



## Kirkhill (29 Apr 2022)

Infanteer said:


> So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack.  So nothing different than 1944?











						The US needs a new approach to producing weapons. Just look at Ukraine.
					

Thomas G. Mahnken argues it is imperative for the United States and its allies to both increase their munitions capacity and adopt innovative approaches to munitions production.




					www.defensenews.com
				












						If You Miss the First Time, Try Firing Another 300,000 Rounds | Robert Higgs
					

According to      the educated guess of military researcher John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org, U.S. forces have expended      at least 250,000 small-caliber bullets for every insurgent killed      in the present wars. That's a lot of misses, for which the people      of Iraq and...




					www.independent.org
				






Another dimension to the problem - supply 
There may not be the demand for producing artillery shells at the rates of WW2 (produced in their millions of rounds per year per type), or even Aircraft ,  but there is the demand for production of precision weapons at the rates similar to those of aircraft and tanks in WW2.



> American industry provided almost two-thirds of all the Allied military equipment produced during the war: *297,000 aircraft, 193,000 artillery pieces, 86,000 tanks and two million army trucks*. In four years, American industrial production, already the world's largest, doubled in size.











						War Production | The War | Ken Burns | PBS
					





					www.pbs.org
				





The Commonwealth and Empire produced another 173,000 Aircraft (144,000 in Britain alone).



			http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=117:wartime-production-by-the-commonwealth-during-wwii&catid=48:production-statistics&Itemid=61
		










						Military production during World War II - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




So the requirement is the ability to sustain a production rate of complex goods in the $10,000 to $10,000,000 range at the rate of 1,000 to 100,000 units per year while at the same time producing billions of rounds of small arms ammunition.

The impact on logistics may the greatest change.  Specifically the reduction in the need to transport lots of heavy artillery rounds.  Instead there is a need to transport fewer munitions but those munitions will be bulkier - more equivalent to transporting aircraft in WW2 than 25 pdr shells.


----------



## Infanteer (29 Apr 2022)

The War Department - The U.S. Army in World War II Series - U.S. Army Center of Military History
		


A good start to reading.  It is hard to fight a regular, conventional conflict on peacetime mobilization scales.


----------



## Kirkhill (29 Apr 2022)

What our Aussie cousins have been up to - in addition to buying into nuclear submarine programmes.

It starts with building their own PGM-Missile factory in lock-step with the US and the UK.









						Australia to produce its own guided missiles as part of billion-dollar defence manufacturing plan
					

Australia will move to produce its own guided missiles under a $1 billion plan to establish a new weapons facility with a global arms manufacturer.




					www.abc.net.au
				





It was preceded by the Loyal Wingman - Ghost Bat LCAAT project









						Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




the MQ-4C - Triton (Global Hawk) project






						MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System | Royal Australian Air Force
					

The Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is a high altitude long endurance (HALE) aircraft that will be used for maritime patrol and other surveillance roles.




					www.airforce.gov.au
				




and the Wedgetail AEWC project









						Boeing 737 AEW&C - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				





And is leading into Hypersonic Missile projectss









						Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. say they will develop hypersonic missiles
					

The announcement comes amid growing concern by the U.S. and its allies about China's growing military assertiveness and Washington's concern of Russia using the weapons in Ukraine.




					www.npr.org
				












						Australia approves $2.6 billion missiles upgrade to counter China
					

Australia will spend $2.6 billion (3.5 billion Australian dollars) to upgrade its defensive missiles as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region becomes more challenging due to China's assertiveness, the country's defense minister said Tuesday.




					www.cnn.com
				






The Brits, the Swedes and the Norwegians have developed a lot of the systems that the Ukrainians are finding particularly effective.


And we debate the merits of LAVs and Tanks.


We should be at least capable of keeping up with Aussie, Brit, Swedish and Norwegian industry.


----------



## KevinB (29 Apr 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> Not to mention command Launch units that can be tethered to the weapon from a distance. So your team could be behind the hill, with the weapon camouflaged on top, nothing to see on thermal.


To be camouflaged against various EO/ED systems the weapon wouldn’t likely have a clear launch window.  As well tethers can be detected by many systems.    That said there is a big difference in the degrees of camouflage needed for different missions etc.  



MilEME09 said:


> Technology forces tactics to change, great example, our doctrine used to be to move convoys of supplies at night because it was safer, modern sensors make that irrelevant.


One always to weigh the advantages and disadvantages.  If your night operations capability is greater than the enemy it still may be very viable.  


MilEME09 said:


> All that kit is expensive though, so we have less of them.


Well you do, we opted for a chaleapee by the trillion method.


----------



## Brad Sallows (29 Apr 2022)

> The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate



The range of threats the AFV/IPC now has to accommodate...

The range of threats the artillery piece now has to accommodate...

The range of threats the unarmoured infantryman now has to accommodate...

...


----------



## daftandbarmy (2 May 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> Interesting points made in this thread. Here's what i've learned.
> 
> So I take it we are in the 'future' of warfare earlier than we thought and the state of the CAF has slid further into mediocrity?
> 
> ...



MM not updated with the latest - mandatory - online learning courses...


----------



## Colin Parkinson (2 May 2022)

Would it be worthwhile to ramp up LAV II and III production to resupply the Ukrainians? They be cheaper than the LAV 6 and likley more field sustainable for them as well.


----------



## KevinB (2 May 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Would it be worthwhile to ramp up LAV II and III production to resupply the Ukrainians? They be cheaper than the LAV 6 and likley more field sustainable for them as well.


Probably not actually cheaper as larger production of common items is usually vastly more economical.  I suspect GDLS has zero interest in building LAV-25 or LAV 3 anymore and would make one pay for it.


----------



## Underway (2 May 2022)

GDLS also produces the Stryker.  Probably would be better to go with that.  Thought the turret is what makes it a LAV frankly.  GDLS-London may not have spare capacity, we will see.  To bad the LAV's destined for Saudi Arabia are already gone, that would have been an amazing turn of events, take their contract and just co-opt it for Ukraine.


----------



## McG (2 May 2022)

I have been to the GDLS plant. They were very proud of the fact that they could (and were) simultaneously building "LAV 1+" for the USMC, LAV III for CA, and Stryker for USA.


----------



## MilEME09 (2 May 2022)

McG said:


> I have been to the GDLS plant. They were very proud of the fact that they could (and were) simultaneously building "LAV 1+" for the USMC, LAV III for CA, and Stryker for USA.


How about we lend lease it? Lend LAV6 to Ukraine, order more any way to keep GD going, and if some survive the war, so be it. Maybe if build some dumbed down LAV 6 hulls as driver trainers so the operational fleet doesn't get as worn down.


----------



## FJAG (2 May 2022)

MilEME09 said:


> How about we lend lease it? Lend LAV6 to Ukraine, order more any way to keep GD going, and if some survive the war, so be it. Maybe if build some dumbed down LAV 6 hulls as driver trainers so the operational fleet doesn't get as worn down.


Ukraine has (had?) a very robust arms industry. Not so sure about how much of a military target or cottage industry that has become.

😁


----------



## Dale Denton (6 May 2022)

We have plenty of things that would do alot for the UKR war effort but we are choosing not to. If we cared more we could use this as an opportunity to show our confidence in Canadian products and the world would view us as less pacifist. 

Genuine question, are we not sending LAVs to UKR because they're outmatched by the modern battlefield? Surely someone in DND or elsewhere in gov't proposed this (and Leslie), so I assume that either it was too provocative at the time (not anymore with PZH2000 donations) or that burned out UA LAVs in the news is a bad look?

-----------------

Post-war, I can see UKR rebuilding domestic capability, at least NATO licenced designs that worked well during the war or integrate with remaining NATO inventories. They'll never be a big GDLS-C customer... NZ spent at least a year trying to offload its old surplus LAV3s rather than upgrade to LAV6s. If our besties won't buy our stuff then shouldn't we move to something modern?


----------



## Dale Denton (6 May 2022)

My lofty idea:

Donate a chunk of our LAV6 fleet (if we should), build new ones (jobs) and build out the variants.

New ATGM add-ons to some of the turrets. Buy some 40MM+ATGM/AA turrets for an interim IFV and testbed for the next APC/IFV in the Medium Cavalry role.

Offer GDLS 30+years of business in Canada if they stay and design something new, or offer the same deal to Rheinmetall for the BOXER. BOXER seems like a great "NATO APC" and it's already in use with many new variants and a common hull.

If GDLS refuses, retool the plant to build GDELS's Eagle in 4x4 and 6x6, which looks like a great domestic solution to the LSVW/G-Wagon/Milcots replacement.


----------



## Underway (6 May 2022)

What is your infatuation with the Boxer?  I mean the thing is fine but so is the LAV 6 family.

Secondly, why would GDLS in London leave?  They build Stykers, LAV's and all sorts of contracts for all over the world (Saudi's, Chile, US etc...).  We aren't the only customer for them.


----------



## KevinB (6 May 2022)

WTF would anyone suggest the Boxer? 
  I fail to see a role for that, that wouldn’t be done better by other vehicles made in North America already.


----------



## FJAG (6 May 2022)

KevinB said:


> WTF would anyone suggest the Boxer?
> I fail to see a role for that, that wouldn’t be done better by other vehicles made in North America already.


The only thing that Boxer offers is the mission module concept and, quite frankly, I think that is a highly overrated feature. I can't speak as to its serviceability and maintainability vis-a-vis the LAV 6.0.

I would like to see the LAV 6.0 upgraded to a modular unmanned configurable RWS at some point.

🍻


----------



## KevinB (6 May 2022)

FJAG said:


> The only thing that Boxer offers is the mission module concept and, quite frankly, I think that is a highly overrated feature. I can't speak as to its serviceability and maintainability vis-a-vis the LAV 6.0.
> 
> I would like to see the LAV 6.0 upgraded to a modular unmanned configurable RWS at some point.
> 
> 🍻


HEMTT A4, has 8x8 mission modularity, in what you want from a cargo vehicle.  
   But the Boxer is no more than a MLVW 6x6 with armor - a lot of its modules seem to have some from the good idea fairy.    It would be a terrible LAV substitute.  

I’m not sold on RWS, it makes sense in some vehicles - but an IFV role ain’t one of them IMLTHO.  
     I’d rather have an optionally manned turret that is quickly reconfigured  - sure it’s bigger, but when one doesn’t need to be buttoned up, one has significantly better local SA than a RWS.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (6 May 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> Interesting points made in this thread. Here's what i've learned.
> 
> So I take it we are in the 'future' of warfare earlier than we thought and the state of the CAF has slid further into mediocrity?
> 
> ...


I take issue with our sub comment, they been retrofitted with some pretty slick gear, you would not want one hunting you.


----------



## FJAG (6 May 2022)

KevinB said:


> HEMTT A4, has 8x8 mission modularity, in what you want from a cargo vehicle.
> But the Boxer is no more than a MLVW 6x6 with armor - a lot of its modules seem to have some from the good idea fairy.    It would be a terrible LAV substitute.


My thought is that it adds some complexity to the design, probably robs some space and will, in all probability never be used.


KevinB said:


> I’m not sold on RWS, it makes sense in some vehicles - but an IFV role ain’t one of them IMLTHO.
> I’d rather have an optionally manned turret that is quickly reconfigured  - sure it’s bigger, but when one doesn’t need to be buttoned up, one has significantly better local SA than a RWS.


I like configurability between weapons stations as well. My thoughts on manned v unmanned turrets has a lot to do with the fact that in Ukraine it appears if a lot of turret hits result in catastrophic explosions within the crew compartment. I'd prefer something that's a bit more blow away and increases the chance of crew survival. Guess we'll see better in the studies coming out of this one.

🍻


----------



## KevinB (6 May 2022)

FJAG said:


> My thought is that it adds some complexity to the design, probably robs some space and will, in all probability never be used.
> 
> I like configurability between weapons stations as well. My thoughts on manned v unmanned turrets has a lot to do with the fact that in Ukraine it appears if a lot of turret hits result in catastrophic explosions within the crew compartment. I'd prefer something that's a bit more blow away and increases the chance of crew survival. Guess we'll see better in the studies coming out of this one.
> 
> 🍻


Acknowledged, but we test stuff  

Hitting a LAV, Bradley etc isn’t going to set the ammo high order like Russian stuff.  

  RWS have some advantages in terms of silhouette, but the XBox’ish controller system and screen isn’t a solid replacement for being able to look around when not buttoned up.  

Rather than a RWS - I’d rather have a UCV 
   That I can use as a loyal wingman or scout.


----------



## FJAG (6 May 2022)

KevinB said:


> Acknowledged, but we test stuff
> 
> Hitting a LAV, Bradley etc isn’t going to set the ammo high order like Russian stuff.
> 
> ...


I've been watching videos on Ripsaw for many years now. I'm quite surprised it hasn't gone into service in some form or other by now.

🍻


----------



## ArmyRick (7 May 2022)

FJAG said:


> I've been watching videos on Ripsaw for many years now. I'm quite surprised it hasn't gone into service in some form or other by now.
> 
> 🍻


Probably because it is out of the box thinking. That scares bureaucrats


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## Underway (7 May 2022)

The robotics, control and AI for traversing complicated ground aren't there yet.  Guaranteed those things get hung up on a pile of terrain that a vehicle with a driver in it would not get hung upon. And its reliability isn't there yet.  When the gun jams after 3 rounds what are you gonna do?

We won't even put autoloaders in tanks yet.


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## IKnowNothing (7 May 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> My lofty idea:
> 
> Donate a chunk of our LAV6 fleet (if we should), build new ones (jobs) and build out the variants.
> 
> ...


If we're looking at lofty fleet ideas involving donating LAV's and Rheinmetall, let's swing for the fences. Adopt the Asymmetric Army proposal and put the heavy brigade in KF41's, grab some of the production for the Aussie order.


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## Underway (7 May 2022)

IKnowNothing said:


> If we're looking at lofty fleet ideas involving donating LAV's and Rheinmetall, let's swing for the fences. Adopt the Asymmetric Army proposal and put the heavy brigade in KF41's, grab some of the production for the Aussie order.


Did the Lynx even win that competition?  I thought they delayed the decision again.

Lets be honest.  If you want to swing for the fences Canada's best choice for a tracked IFV (because we already have a decent wheeled one) is the CV90 MkIV.    

As far as preserving fleets is concerned, I think that we don't need to do that right now.  We're understaffed to the point where if we mobilized the PRes we would probably be just able to backfill what the Regiments already have in stock...


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## KevinB (7 May 2022)

Underway said:


> The robotics, control and AI for traversing complicated ground aren't there yet.  Guaranteed those things get hung up on a pile of terrain that a vehicle with a driver in it would not get hung upon. And its reliability isn't there yet.  When the gun jams after 3 rounds what are you gonna do?
> 
> We won't even put autoloaders in tanks yet.


Admittedly if a M242 Bushmaster goes down in a LAV/Bradley there isn’t much you can do in combat.   It’s going to need to retire clear it in a lot of cases, but reliability rates for those are pretty high - which I suspect is one reason UCV’s have focused on those and ATGM’s.   

I’ve seen some UCV terrain tests, and lately I have more faith in the automated systems than a human driver - as the sensors near the tracks give them a lot better SA of the actual ground.  

The biggest issues on the Army side seem to be major concerns over armed autonomous vehicles ever since Picatinny’s robot swept the crowd with a loaded M240 at the 2006 NDIA FirePower event.   How to ensure one can remain in control of the system and ensure no blue on blue occur. 

I’m afraid of Skynet too, but I do see a huge need for these sorts of systems to augment ground firepower and reduce human exposure.


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## IKnowNothing (7 May 2022)

Underway said:


> Did the Lynx even win that competition?  I thought they delayed the decision again.
> 
> Lets be honest.  If you want to swing for the fences Canada's best choice for a tracked IFV (because we already have a decent wheeled one) is the CV90 MkIV.
> 
> As far as preserving fleets is concerned, I think that we don't need to do that right now.  We're understaffed to the point where if we mobilized the PRes we would probably be just able to backfill what the Regiments already have in stock...



I thought it was a done deal, but looks like that was in error.

"lofty.. swing for the fences" was moreso a combination of the dream that an asymmetric army would translate into an asymmetric  vehicle fleet chosen for their respective roles rather than one LAV fits all,  coupled with the glimmer of hope that sweet sweet Montreal jobs takes it a sliver past a pipe dream.


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## Dale Denton (8 May 2022)

Slovakia offers its fleet of T-72M tanks to Ukraine in exchange for Leopard 2 MBTs​POSTED ON SUNDAY, 08 MAY 2022 17:15



> According to information published by the Polish Defense website “*Defence 24*" on May 7, 2022, during a press conference that was held at the Silacz air force base in Slovakia, Slovak Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad said that Slovakia is ready to donate 30 Soviet-made *T-72M* main battle tanks or BMP tracked armored IFVs (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) to Ukraine in exchange for German-made *Leopard 2* tanks.



Would be an easy way to indirectly assist UKR with our oldest or roughest Leopard 2s and replenish with whatever you will: M1s, Newer used Leo2s, something else.


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## Underway (9 May 2022)

Dale Denton said:


> Slovakia offers its fleet of T-72M tanks to Ukraine in exchange for Leopard 2 MBTs​POSTED ON SUNDAY, 08 MAY 2022 17:15
> 
> 
> 
> Would be an easy way to indirectly assist UKR with our oldest or roughest Leopard 2s and replenish with whatever you will: M1s, Newer used Leo2s, something else.


I would just buy them direct from someone else, and supply them to Slovakia.  Ours have all been upgraded to a 2A_ CAN standard AFAIK, or are in the process of that upgrade.

Slovakia can then do what they like with them.  Upgrade, modify etc...


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## McG (9 May 2022)

Underway said:


> I would just buy them direct from someone else, and supply them to Slovakia.  Ours have all been upgraded to a 2A_ CAN standard AFAIK, or are in the process of that upgrade.


We have three different types of Leopard 2 and no funded plans to make them all common.


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## IKnowNothing (9 May 2022)

McG said:


> We have three different types of Leopard 2 and no funded plans to make them all common.


How does that shake out?
My understanding is
2A4+ CAN - baseline with Canadianized electronics and other "tweaks"
2A4M CAN- above plus greater protection
2A6M CAN- above plus L55 main gun, more angular turret armour


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## Underway (9 May 2022)

McG said:


> We have three different types of Leopard 2 and no funded plans to make them all common.


Hence the 2A_ fill in the blank.  



> My understanding is
> 2A4+ CAN - baseline with Canadianized electronics and other "tweaks"
> 2A4M CAN- above plus greater protection
> 2A6M CAN- above plus L55 main gun, more angular turret armour


Not sure the + is required, they are training tanks...  Here is a good article on the situation with the tanks.

As far as commonality I thought that the life extension program was potentially going to increase commonality, at least for everything but the gun caliber.  It's not uncommon for LEX's to turn into such things.


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## Kirkhill (9 May 2022)

Unmanned Ripsaws but no RWS on LAVs.
UCVs but retaining 3 man crews on LAVs and 4 man crews on Tanks.
Just in Case manning of Guns rather than minimally manning Archers and HIMARS.
Large Sections and Platoons rather than Small Companies.
Trucks for CQs rather than UAVs and ATVs....

We are not using available technology to exploit available man-power.

And I will ignore the opportunity to discuss RCAF/CA co-operation.


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## armrdsoul77 (10 Jul 2022)

In case anyone needs a refresher.


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