# After Action Report of 6th Fd. Co.,R.C.E. on the D. Day Assault



## Spr.Earl (16 Jun 2004)

6 CDN FIELD COMPANY R.C.E.

17 JUNE 1944		

CRE,
3 Cdn Inf Div

REPORT ON ASSAULT

1.	As requested in your R-6 of 12 June the following is requisite report -

(a)	General

	For the assault this company was split, one pl being sub-allocated through the two forward bns of infantry to provide assault teams. The other two platoons each had one route to clear, up to a point inland, after which the bde route forward was common, and was cleared by the two platoons together.

(b)	D - Day

	The crossing of the Channel was only fair, those personnel in L.C.I.(L)s and L.C.T.s were quite seasick, while those who made the run in L.C.A.s stated that it was one of the roughest trips in their experience.   1 ½ sections of No. 2 platoon landed at 0740 hrs with â Å“Bâ ? Coy   of the R.Wpg Rif on Mike Red beach. Here they found the obstacle clearance teams were late as were the AVREs.   Landing craft sustained casualties, and as they left the craft. Personnel came under heavy fire from the beach defenses. â Å“Bâ ? Coy attained their first objective after heavy fighting but had many casualties. In this phase No. 2 Pl lost 10 out of 18, either killed or seriously wounded technically without performing their role as â Å“assault pioneersâ ?
	At the same time, on Nan Green beach, the remaining 2 ½ sections of #2 Pl, landed with the assault Coys of Regina Rif, divided as follows: 1 ½ sections with â Å“Aâ ? Coy, 1 section with â Å“Bâ ? Coy. On their beach the obstacle clearance teams were again late, and severe craft casualties were sustained, resulting in some elements of the Coys (and hence the Sprs) not reaching shore as a fighting entity at all. As on Mike sector, the assault was met by very heavy fire from the beach defenses, both LMG and 88mm. The later causing further craft casualties. â Å“Aâ ? Coy with its assault teams, made a frontal attack on the defenses E of the mouth of the SEULLES R, and sustained heavy casualties, including 12 killed and wounded in the Spr teams, before attaining its immediate objective. Of the Spr casualties, at least two were men who were wounded, but also drowned in the rising tide, not being able to move up the beach. â Å“Bâ ? Coy flanking the main defenses, took its first objective with comparative ease, and here there were no Spr casualties up to the moment. 
	This seems a suitable place to register the conviction that in any future assault landings, the so called â Å“assault teamsâ ? of sappers should be eliminated. They cannot gain the objective under the covering fire of the inf alone, and if tanks are provided for close support, then these can themselves deal with the strong points direct. It was rather painfully impressed on this unit that while sustaining 22 casualties in one pl on the beach alone, this price was paid without the assault teams once being employed as such.

 #1 Pl recce party of Pl officer, L/Sgt and dvr with 5 cwt landed on Mike Red at 1030 hrs being some 2 hrs. The beach was still under mortar fire, but they made their recce of exits and prepared for pl landing at approx 1200 hrs (also late). As Pl landed, one section pushed forward reconnoitering route as laid down, while two sections, one each at M-1 and M-2 commenced route clearance. Bulldozers and tipper lorries landed on Mike sector at about 1430 hrs and were guided forward to Pl.

 #3 Pl had recce party composed as for #1 Pl, plus two sections scheduled to land at H + 75 mins. Actually they landed at approx 1000 hrs and pushed straight through COURSEULLES for REVIERS. Of the two remaining sections who were scheduled to land at H + 105 mins, but who were actually landed shortly after the recce party, one section stayed on the beach to help AVREs with beach exits, while the other followed the clearance sections to REVIERS. The route having been cleared to this village, the two clearance parties proceeded back to rd junc 970843 and cleared lateral route to where it joined with 8 CIB route at rd junc 987813. The whole of #3 Pl then cleared route to where   #1 and #3 routes joined S of PORT DE REVIERS, and then cleared the single bde route through AMBLIE to LE FRESNE-CAMILLY. The recce section reached the S outskirts of LE FRESNE-CAMILLY at about 2230 hrs, atwhich time 7 CIB retired to the vicinity of AMBLIE for the night.

 Coy HQ landed at about 1500 hrs and moved up the Bde route with the pls engaged on route clearance, and when the Bde moved back at nightfall, the company, less #2 Pl moved back to REVIERS, to a Coy Assembly Area where a defensive posn was taken up at about 0130 hrs D+1.

(c)	D + 1

	Conforming to the 7 CIB plan, route clearance was continued at 0600 hrs, starting from LE FRESNE-CAMILLY, through CAMILLY, BRAY to BRETTEVILLE, which was reached by clearance pls at about 1400 hrs. #3 Pl then went into rest, in preparation for scheduled patrol to prepare brs on the VIEIL ODON, while #1 Pl cleared lateral route towards LA VILLENEUVE, but could not progress beyond outskirts of BRETTEVILLE due to fire from vicinity og CARPIQUET.
	At about 1700 hrs Coy HQ augmented by 4 second tide vehs and 27 reinforcements moved to new coy assy areas in the vicinity of NEUF MER.
	The patrol to VIEIL ODON being cancelled, #3 Pl sent two sections to R. Wpg Rif to assist the remaining members of #2 Pl in laying minefield. This field was sited beyond cover of Inf fire, and was given inadequate covering party. As a result they were outflanked and surprised by the ENEMY in an attack which developed into a major attack on R Wpg Rif posn and withdrew, leaving about 400-500 Mk V mines and losing four men who were cut off from the line of withdrawal.
	During the evening 5 vehs scheduled to land at H + 4 hrs arrived at Coy AREA.

(d)	D + 2

 	At 0230 hrs, #1 Pl went to R Wpg Rif prepared to lay minefield. At first light the bn was very heavily attacked, so the pl returned to the company area without laying mines.
	At   1200 hrs 4 vehs scheduled for H + 9 hrs arrived. Coy tpt now totaled 19 vehs incl â Å“Nâ ? Sec plus 3 tipper lorries plus 2 - D7s, 1 - d4 and 2 John trailers.
	At 1300 hrs, it was decided to move Coy back to vicinity of CAMILLY, to get away from danger of C.B. fire on S.P. guns in Coy area.
	During the morning, #2 pl Comd endeavored to recce minefield area for Regina Rifle but due to heavy mortar fire, no mines were laid. #2 Pl's last two remaining NCOs were wounded during this time. 
	At about 1930 hrs a tank attack threatened about 1000x to our left and it was decided to withdraw the Coy to the vicinity of REVIERS for the night. This was done.

(e)	D + 3

At 1000 hrs the Coy moved back to previous area at CAMILLY. OC attended 7 Bde Comds â Å“Oâ ? Gp at which it was ruled that Inf Bns   would lay their own protective minefields.
	#3 Pl sent out a 1 section and established a type â Å“Aâ ? water point   at PIERREPONT. This water point was supplied by Patterson type Stellar filter trailer and has a capacity of   2000 g.p.h.
 	Two 88 mm guns were destroyed.

(f) 	D + 4

	One section was sent out at 0830 hrs to de-louse new Div HQ area at CAMILLY. Nothing was found.
	One D7 and one D4 were employed in digging in Div HQ Ops room.
	The other D7 cleared rubble and debris in BRETTEVILLE and dug graves for Regina Rif.
	HQ officer and NCOs from #3 Pl carried out route recce of 7 CIB area.
	#2 Pl allocated reinforcements personnel - made new promotions and set about re-organization of the pl after having sustained a total of 28 evacuated casualties out of 50 personnel landed on D - day.
	One 88 mm gun at M.R. 951796 was destroyed.

	On the whole, the situation was very quiet on both D + 3 and D + 4, with the Company remaining in support of 7 C.I.B. which was carrying out a holding task on the Bde objective.

2.	Forwarded as requested.

(T.R. Murphy) Major
OC. 6 Cdn Field Coy R.C.E.
TRM/jlr


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