# "Does literacy REALLY matter to the Afghan Army?"



## The Bread Guy (23 Sep 2009)

Interesting question posed in the US Army/USMC COIN Centre Blog here:


> On the surface you would say “of course it does,” but what if your countrymen are 75% illiterate and what if your fellow soldiers are 90% illiterate? Then what do you do? Can a force possessing this level of reading skill or the gross lack thereof be trained in anything but basic infantry skills?
> 
> If we are going to equip, train, and fight alongside the Afghanistan National Army, -- then how can they operate for the long term as an Army if they cannot read? The enemy has shown that they can operate without this “critical” skill. How? Their tactics are in small groups, usually attacking on very familiar ground, with weapons that are man-portable and simple to operate.
> 
> The Afghan Army must instead operate complex weapons, weapons-systems and equipment that in most regards becomes somewhat difficult or impossible to operate without the skill of reading. They must take the fight to the enemy, the Taliban, wherever they may be throughout Afghanistan. How do you get there with your 500 man unit, how do you plan, how do you coordinate, and which road do you take if most of your force cannot read? Do you disagree? ....


_(More on link)_

To me, more literacy=better army.  However, this isn't going to be easy to do.  For example, which language or languages do troops need to be literate in?


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## Edward Campbell (23 Sep 2009)

I heard, recently, about the extraordinary frustration that our _mentors_ face as they try to explain e.g. mortars and logistics to people who are illiterate and innumerate, too.

One anecdote involved vehicles that have computerized diagnostics. The _locals_, who are illiterate and innumerate, see only meaningless _squiggles_ on a computer screen - many vehicles are, perforce, rendered permanently useless as soon as they stop working because no one can "maintain" them.

Can you imagine explaining mortars to someone who has no concept of numbers?


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## Old Sweat (23 Sep 2009)

It might be fruitful to plumb the experience of others who have trained tribal and/or illiterate societies. A number of our allies have recent experience in this field, while there still may be some Canadian veterans about who served on our training teams in Africa in the sixties. No slur is intended, but the Ghurkas are not a first world society and they seem to be able to develop technical skills. Is there a parallel? The Taliban also seem capable of hitting our positions with mortar and rocket fire, so if they can do it, why not our allies?

I sat in on a discussion re our artillery OMLT training the Afghan D30 battery in our AO. As I recall the major discussion was about the challenges of combining NATO and Soviet systems, especially as the latter uses a 6000 mil circle. The battery must have reached some sort of acceptable standard, as it was shown supporting M Coy in the last episode of the Discovery Channel series.


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## Edward Campbell (23 Sep 2009)

The results from some of those African _safaris_ in the '60s were mixed. East African missions, were, I think realtivelty successful; West Africa, well, not so much.

An anecdote: the _trainers_ used to gather, every few weeks, at the team leader's villa in the capital. Each trainer would tell his _tale of woe_ about why everything he tried went pear shaped after which all the others would raise their glasses and shout _*"WAWA!"*_ which means West Africa Wins Again!

Some of the Ghanaian and Nigerian officers were quite good - quite a few were British and Canadian trained. One fellow I recall fairly well passed the staff college at Camberly whereas almost all African officers who went to Camberly (and the few who went to Shrivenham) and the very few who went, I think to Kingston (is that correct? did a handful of Africans go to Kingston on the "real" (one or two year) staff college courses?) received an "attended" grade which meant they would have been bounced had they not been "foreign aid" students.

Many of the Ghanaian and Nigerian NCOs were good, too: basically literate and numerate and willing, indeed happy to learn.

The biggest problem was corruption - which was endemic and all pervasive, including in the military. Little got done because, over and over again, the training aids were stolen or people left their units - deserted - because they had to go home to help their families.

But they were not illiterate. The national public education systems were in place and working in the 1960s. They may not have been as good as ours, in Canada, and they were underfunded and so on, but they were producing basically literate and numerate citizens. I'm not sure that West Africa's, any of Africa's, education systems are as good, today, as they were 40 or 50 years ago.


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## Old Sweat (23 Sep 2009)

In response to your question re staff training in Canada, we had four guest students on my staff course in Kingston 1970-1971. The breakdown was two from Ghana and one each from Kenya and Tanzania. I really wonder just how well they did on the course. 

As I see it, the bravery and intelligence of the men we are working with in Afghanistan is not in doubt. The challenge is more a combination of low levels of education and a culture that does not include western concepts such as coordination and adherence to timings and schedules. Of the two, perhaps the cultural gap is of the greater importance.


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## Edward Campbell (23 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ...
> As I see it, the bravery and intelligence of the men we are working with in Afghanistan is not in doubt. The challenge is more a combination of low levels of education and a culture that does not include western concepts such as coordination and adherence to timings and schedules. Of the two, perhaps *the cultural gap is of the greater importance*.




It is certainly the hardest to overcome.

In my, decidedly limited, experience with the third world, education is relatively easy to implement because it is always welcome. Cultural change, however, is always hard to implement, usually because our cultural values are unwelcome, even frightening - and consider our own, ongoing "child rape" discussion, for example.


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## Journeyman (23 Sep 2009)

Small steps, combined with a cultural chicken/egg problem.

Should we be concerned with literacy? Yes; at the school-age target audience. With literacy, they can learn that there are other options out their beyond their traditional clan-/shura-based solutions. Opinions are always better when they are informed opinions; as such, I have more faith in Afghanistan's _next_ generation.

Mentoring and arms supplies both exemplify a recurring problem with Western COIN efforts -- trying to force the square-pegs of Afghan reality into the round-holes of our staff-college templates and weapons' acquisition systems. As noted, our computer-diagnostics, ballistic software, et al, does not translate well to an under-literate society. 

Agreed, literacy=better army; however, at this stage we should aim at 'a good army' not necessarily a 'better army.' Focus on improving the abilities of their small-scale fighting; that's key to COIN anyway. Providing advice on Bde+ staff duties (when their current abilities are realistically limited to Coy-level fights), and the proper employment of XCAS F-15Es (when they'll never own them; that's what LOs are for) is wasting time, and creating mutual frustrations. Sure, the Afghans aren't likely to change a catalytic converter on a modern vehicle, but you should see how they jury-rig their Nissan 'battle wagons'!

As for experience with other semi-literate armies, such as the Vietnam-era SF with the Montagnards, the effort was on the low-level battle; there was no attempt to impose the "benefits" of spending a year at Carlisle, or teach them how to maintain UH-1 Hueys. Leadership/supervision was almost uniformly retained by the advisors. In the case of the Gurkas (which I hesitate to cite, since they're a different model), the officers and technical/logistic NCOs tended to remain British throughout most of their history. Perhaps this is a more proper role for western armies, rather than bemoaning the Afghan inability to understand IPB and the JOPP?




ps - notice I did _not_ respond to:





> Can you imagine explaining mortars to someone who has no concept of numbers?


...with, "like The RCR, many of whom cannot get beyond, '1, 2-3, 1' "   >


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## TCBF (23 Sep 2009)

- I would say that the ANP need literacy more than the ANA, at the moment. But, the literacy will come as today's children leave school and become police officers and soldiers.  With their present op tempo and wastage rates, there is no way most of the current members of the ANA or ANP will become highly literate.

As one person pointed out to me "Just look at the problems WE have teaching our members French!" So, imagine what the ANA and ANP are up against.

There was a reason that this place was once run by the top one-half of one per-cent of the country.  Once they started overthrowing each other, the long, slow train wreck began.  Now, the expatriate Afghan elite diaspora like to sound off in fifteen-second sound bites on how "The West" does not understand Afghanistan. Well, this 'Westerner' understands that Afghanistan is where it is today because the Afghan elites did not understand their OWN country - which is why many of them cannot return to it and live.


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## Journeyman (23 Sep 2009)

ps.....
For a _much_ better written version of several of my COIN thoughts, I recommend Ann Marlowe's The Picture Awaits: The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency from the journal, _World Affairs_. 

The link was provided through the Small Wars Journal


> *The Picture Awaits: The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency*
> Ann Marlowe
> 
> At the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, *counterinsurgency theory was about as popular in American military circles as tank warfare is today*. An early study by the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division during its first deployment to Iraq reported “a collective cognitive dissonance on the part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people’s war, even when they were fighting it.” There was a reason for this. Eager to forget the most painful experience in its history, *the army had all but banished counterinsurgency from the lexicon of American military affairs * after Vietnam. As a result, the army relied on a flawed strategy in Iraq for a period that lasted, according to author Thomas Ricks, at least “twenty months or more.”


Even now, there remain many steps to take between "talking the talk and walking the walk." Everyone routinely says "hearts & minds," but there's still, too often, a heavy reliance on "kinetic diplomacy."


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## dapaterson (23 Sep 2009)

"Kinetic Diplomacy" is the best phrase I've heard all day.  Because we've adopted a Fordian outlook in the military, where everything we do must be mass-produced and immediately quantifiable, input into an Excel spreadsheet to be graphed, then cut-and-paste into the Commander's 7:30am Powerpoint update, we adopt metrics that are easy.  If we've fired 2794 rounds of 5.56mm in the AO today, we've obviously cleared 1.3% more enemy than yesterday when we fired merely 2758 rounds.  Those are figures a commander can wrap his head around, not mushy things like "continued efforts at governance reform" (eg told the chief of police to take smaller bribes).

We reap what we sow - we've told our generals to get MBAs, so they adopt those cultural norms - bullet points over analysis and understanding.


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## AmmoTech90 (23 Sep 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> In the case of the Gurkas (which I hesitate to cite, since they're a different model), the officers and technical/logistic NCOs tended to remain British throughout most of their history. Perhaps this is a more proper role for western armies, rather than bemoaning the Afghan inability to understand IPB and the JOPP?



The Gurhka's are still a challenge.  I have a fair bit of experience with them, and there is no doubt they the select some of the brightest soldiers for their ranks.  However there are still communication problems and this is despite a comprehensive education programme in English they have to partake in.  I have run into some Gurkha NCOs who cannot communicate in English and rely on the nod the head and then carry on doing whatever they were doing.
Bringing a non-Gurkha, Nepalese, Commonwealth soldier who spoke English well to translate ended up being the solution.
This is after decades of being integrated with UK forces.  Of course some of their County and Irish regiments are indecipherable too.

Of course


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## Old Sweat (23 Sep 2009)

I was going to raise the Gurhka model as not the way to go, which seems kind of odd, as I mentioned them in the first place. In fact, the same system was used by the Brits with all their native armies, with a very small British cadre and a native command structure to run the unit. This is not what we are up to with our OMLTs and training teams, and we must noot running the Afghans' army for them.

Despite the ardour and courage of the average member of the ANA, we are dealing with relatively technically unsophisticated people. Maybe all we can hope for is to develop a fair-to-middling third world army that does not terrorize and steal from its own people too much. That means simple organizations, weapons and tactics, which perhaps would not seem unfamiliar to a veteran of the wars of the first half of the last century. In terms of operations, that means nothing too fancy, with victory going to the big battalions that have the numbers to overwhelm or outlast the other side. Our job might be no more than to supervise, to advise, to cajole and to fight alongside them as they develop a military corporate memory. 

As for the neat staff college stuff, if we can get the basics embedded in their consciousness, great. I was going to suggest logistics should be our first priority, but I would like to hear from anyone who has first hand experience on the ground.


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## The Bread Guy (24 Mar 2010)

This from _Stars & Stripes_:


> For the first time, recruits coming into the much-maligned Afghan National Police will need to be able to do more than just don a uniform and look the part. They also must be able to read.
> 
> As of March 13, mandatory literacy training has been incorporated into all of NATO’s Afghan security force training programs. The hope is that basic literacy instruction will help reverse sky-high attrition rates that hamper efforts to build a stabile force.
> 
> ...


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## Brasidas (24 Mar 2010)

Is there a substantial pay hike on the way? If you're cutting out 90% of your recruiting base and limiting it to guys who are more in demand on the job market anyway, how are you getting them to actually join?


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## Greymatters (24 Mar 2010)

Brasidas said:
			
		

> Is there a substantial pay hike on the way? If you're cutting out 90% of your recruiting base and limiting it to guys who are more in demand on the job market anyway, how are you getting them to actually join?



They join because they want  to work for the military.  Good pay is just a perk...


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## The Bread Guy (24 Mar 2010)

Brasidas said:
			
		

> Is there a substantial pay hike on the way? If you're cutting out 90% of your recruiting base and limiting it to guys who are more in demand on the job market anyway, how are you getting them to actually join?



The article says the cop recruits will be trained to read/write, so I don't think they'll JUST be recruiting those who are already literate.  A related question, though, would be:  how do you keep them in once they become literate and even more marketable?


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## Brasidas (24 Mar 2010)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> The article says the cop recruits will be trained to read/write, so I don't think they'll JUST be recruiting those who are already literate.  A related question, though, would be:  how do you keep them in once they become literate and even more marketable?



My original read of the article was that new recruits would be required to already be literate, and that existing forces would become so as part of a re-training effort. Going over the article, you're right.

For retention, perhaps a combination of pay incentives and a five year minimum engagement?


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## Greymatters (24 Mar 2010)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> how do you keep them in once they become literate and even more marketable?



More important, what do you do with the ones who fail to become literate?

Although Im interested in your opinion that they become more marketable - marketable for what?


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## SeanNewman (24 Mar 2010)

I think TCBF had the best insight so far on this matter separating the ANP from the ANA.

I do not think it is necessary whatsoever for the ANA to be literate.  If you're talking about a first world modern Army then of course, but there are 50 things more important to an ANA soldier.

The ANP though have many uses for literacy, as even beat cops should be filling in some paperwork for record keeping as well as checking identification / documentation / land claims, etc.


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## The Bread Guy (14 Jul 2010)

Reviving the thread with the latest on this from the Canadian Press:


> lass is in and the students are bright, eager and paying close attention to the teacher.
> 
> But it's not a bunch of Afghan children learning the basics of reading, writing and arithmetic _ it's members of the Afghan National Army.
> 
> ...


Also, it appears they're teaching Dari here.


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