# Future Naval platforms, systems, & fleet composition



## blacktriangle

Following Underway's suggestion to start a separate thread as to not derail the Submarine replacement topic...

So my question is: If naval warfare broke out between the West and one of our peer adversaries in 2021, what would the key lessons learned be? How would these lessons influence future operations, platforms & systems design, & fleet compositions? What about sustainment?

What impact will other domains (including cyber & space) have on naval operations? What about disruptive technologies?

Interested to hear what others think.


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## CBH99

I am by no means an expert on naval warfare - not in the slightest.

However, to touch on a topic that was recently brought up in regards to this - one solid lesson that I think will be learned by every western nation is the current costs of both ships and payloads do NOT allow for extended engagements, or perhaps even repeat engagements.  This is a lesson I think even the US will very quickly wake up to.

If every missile you fire is a few millions dollars - and that cost can range depending on the type of munition fired - and each ship is expending missiles for self-defense, engaging enemy aircraft, anti-ship missiles towards enemy surface assets, and land-attack missiles, etc etc - how many 'reloads' does each ship get before the ammunition stocks are simply empty?  

While everybody wants companies like Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, etc etc to be profitable - and they do deserve to earn a profit if they are selling a system that is effective and in demand - I believe western countries will take a hard look at the cost to produce these munitions vs. the cost of purchasing, and pressure these companies to lower their prices.  

Otherwise, the cost of naval warfare is just too high.  Literally.  It's too expensive to replace all the high-tech stuff with more high-tech stuff.


0.02


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## Halifax Tar

CBH99 said:


> I am by no means an expert on naval warfare - not in the slightest.
> 
> However, to touch on a topic that was recently brought up in regards to this - one solid lesson that I think will be learned by every western nation is the current costs of both ships and payloads do NOT allow for extended engagements, or perhaps even repeat engagements.  This is a lesson I think even the US will very quickly wake up to.
> 
> If every missile you fire is a few millions dollars - and that cost can range depending on the type of munition fired - and each ship is expending missiles for self-defense, engaging enemy aircraft, anti-ship missiles towards enemy surface assets, and land-attack missiles, etc etc - how many 'reloads' does each ship get before the ammunition stocks are simply empty?
> 
> While everybody wants companies like Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, etc etc to be profitable - and they do deserve to earn a profit if they are selling a system that is effective and in demand - I believe western countries will take a hard look at the cost to produce these munitions vs. the cost of purchasing, and pressure these companies to lower their prices.
> 
> Otherwise, the cost of naval warfare is just too high.  Literally.  It's too expensive to replace all the high-tech stuff with more high-tech stuff.
> 
> 
> 0.02


This is a point I have argued for years.  We don't think past the first salvo. 

I see a return to gun/torpedo heavy platforms if we are in a protracted years long conflict like WW2.  Shells are cheaper, easier and faster to produce than missiles. 

Its not just the cost its the time line in manufacturing and replenishing stocks as they are consumed in the process.  

Canada doesnt really have many reloads, and the US and our Allies will be busy supporting their fleets with their remaining stock so I don't see this going well for us, from a material replenishment standpoint.  

We've only touched on ammunition, the other part that scares me is our ability to replenish parts and forward sustainment as our strat lift capabilities, while valiant and doing yeomen's work, will be stretched thin; even more than they are now.


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## Czech_pivo

Sounds like those old WWII Bofors we took off the Kingston class might just become our most valuable weapon with readily available supplies after a 3-4 week shooting war.....


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## YZT580

From a bystander's point of view:  what you start with is what you are going to end with minus casualties.  What ever weapons that you think you will need had better be mounted and equipped to fire at the start.  IMHO whatever shooting war we are involved in will be fast and brutal and I would doubt that there will be time for re-loads.  Prime targets will be oilers, munitions carriers and all other supply ships and I would suggest they will be targeted before the destroyers and frigates which vessels, having to defend their supply lines will deplete their arsenal leaving them as defenseless for the second round.  The victor will be the one with the largest magazine.


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## rmc_wannabe

Speaking from a Cyber/Tech position, Naval Warfare is a wet dream for exploitation; mainly because its not something that has been factored in when most of a fleet was built/refitted. I'm not an expert on Naval Communications, however, I have my concerns writ large with the way the CAF handles Cyber at the moment. 

Fire Control Systems, SONAR, GPS, SOTM, etc. are juicy targets for Cyber Operators that can jam, manipulate, or influence systems that keep the ship fighting and floating. 

My prediction would be that any PvP conflict with say, China, would see Western ships go dead in the water before the first shot is fired.


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## Underway

Halifax Tar said:


> This is a point I have argued for years.  We don't think past the first salvo.
> 
> I see a return to gun/torpedo heavy platforms if we are in a protracted years long conflict like WW2.  Shells are cheaper, easier and faster to produce than missiles.
> 
> Its not just the cost its the time line in manufacturing and replenishing stocks as they are consumed in the process.
> 
> Canada doesnt really have many reloads, and the US and our Allies will be busy supporting their fleets with their remaining stock so I don't see this going well for us, from a material replenishment standpoint.
> 
> We've only touched on ammunition, the other part that scares me is our ability to replenish parts and forward sustainment as our strat lift capabilities, while valiant and doing yeomen's work, will be stretched thin; even more than they are now.



It's called a "come-as-you-are war".  During the later Cold War years it was expected that any non-nuclear conflict with the USSR would use up stocks of modern equipment at a prodigious rate, leading to industry having to produce cheaper less capable equipment faster to replace losses.  The expensive good equipment that would be leftover from the first engagements would need to be husbanded and used carefully.

This takes its cues from the "Fleet in being" theory.  Where just having a naval force is a strategic asset.  Even without fighting, you have an effect on the enemy.  WW1 is an example of this, where neither Germany or the UK wanted to risk their fleet.  If either of them suffered a loss they wouldn't have been able to replace them fast enough to deal with the enemy battle line.

This leads to a naval conflict where likely the first shots are either a surprise attack (aka Pearl Harbour) as the strategic advantage gained could be massive or an accidental conflict where a few ships get damaged/sunk and the two sides retreat to protect their Fleet in Being.

That being said the most likely naval conflicts are going to be between flashpoint countries.  Turkey and Russia, Pakistan and India, Iran and Saudi Arabia.  And given the nature of those countries unless climate change forces a fight (India vs Pakistan) over water they will be skirmishes.


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## Underway

rmc_wannabe said:


> Speaking from a Cyber/Tech position, Naval Warfare is a wet dream for exploitation; mainly because its not something that has been factored in when most of a fleet was built/refitted. I'm not an expert on Naval Communications, however, I have my concerns writ large with the way the CAF handles Cyber at the moment.
> 
> Fire Control Systems, SONAR, GPS, SOTM, etc. are juicy targets for Cyber Operators that can jam, manipulate, or influence systems that keep the ship fighting and floating.
> 
> My prediction would be that any PvP conflict with say, China, would see Western ships go dead in the water before the first shot is fired.


In most cases, this would require physical access to the ship and its systems.  Given that almost all the equipment that requires EM security is tempest tested or are mounted in tempest tested racks I'm not concerned about remote access.  And of course physical security is pretty good so there's that.

However, ECM and other forms of EM warfare are definitely something that is concerning and should be trained for.  It's a battlespace like any other and command of it will separate the winners from the losers for sure.

I don't think Canada spends as much time here as it should.  Similar to the armies failure to understand how to properly use PsiOps and CIMIC in Afghanistan, EM warfare is not well understood by most sailors, and I think that despite the concerns over ammunition, this battlespace doesn't need to rearm.  It has unlimited ammunition so to speak and can cripple your opponent.


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## Blackadder1916

reveng said:


> . . .  If naval warfare broke out between the West and one of our peer adversaries in 2021 . . .



 Having acquired the almost obligatory copy of Mahan over several decades ago, it has sat on my bookshelf (along with the Clausewitz) undisturbed other than an initial read.  That would probably be the average professional study of naval warfare by someone who spent most of his uniformed career focused on field force units.  So, with that limited point of view, how would "naval warfare" break out without it being adjunct to a wider conflict?  After a quick google search of the topic (_I didn't want to feel like an naval ignoramus_), in one of the articles I found (what was to my limited understanding) a very astute thought. * War at sea, as **Julian Corbett** once quipped, matters only as much as it can affect events on the land.*

Underway, as he posted above, likely puts it in proper perspective with ". . . the most likely naval conflicts are going to be between flashpoint countries. Turkey and Russia, Pakistan and India, Iran and Saudi Arabia. And given the nature of those countries unless climate change forces a fight (India vs Pakistan) over water they will be skirmishes".


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## blacktriangle

Underway said:


> In most cases, this would require physical access to the ship and its systems.  Given that almost all the equipment that requires EM security is tempest tested or are mounted in tempest tested racks I'm not concerned about remote access.  And of course physical security is pretty good so there's that.
> 
> However, ECM and other forms of EM warfare are definitely something that is concerning and should be trained for.  It's a battlespace like any other and command of it will separate the winners from the losers for sure.
> 
> I don't think Canada spends as much time here as it should.  Similar to the armies failure to understand how to properly use PsiOps and CIMIC in Afghanistan, EM warfare is not well understood by most sailors, and I think that despite the concerns over ammunition, this battlespace doesn't need to rearm.  It has unlimited ammunition so to speak and can cripple your opponent.


If we could predict or account for every cyber vulnerability, there wouldn't be new CVE popping up all the time. Threat actors have proven their ability to pull off some impressive attacks, especially in the realm of software/firmware supply chain. I also wouldn't rule out the insider threat aspect. 

Definitely agreed regarding the EM space.


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## Colin Parkinson

and China likley has portions of it`s fishing fleet already equipped for ECM warfare and likely a small number equipped with or fitted for Anti-ship missile with the intent of targeting the support fleet. Not to mention mine laying.


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## blacktriangle

Blackadder1916 said:


> Having acquired the almost obligatory copy of Mahan over several decades ago, it has sat on my bookshelf (along with the Clausewitz) undisturbed other than an initial read.  That would probably be the average professional study of naval warfare by someone who spent most of his uniformed career focused on field force units.  So, with that limited point of view, how would "naval warfare" break out without it being adjunct to a wider conflict?  After a quick google search of the topic (_I didn't want to feel like an naval ignoramus_), in one of the articles I found (what was to my limited understanding) a very astute thought. * War at sea, as **Julian Corbett** once quipped, matters only as much as it can affect events on the land.*


Fair point regarding wider conflict & geopolitics.

The discussion arose out of another topic about replacing the submarines (sorry, I should have provided a link for context). I was wondering why we focus so much on surface combatants when submarines carry a much higher ratio of offensive weaponry (and in some navies, include the ability to "affect events on the land") Most certainly any warfare could be multi-domain in nature, and they all have the ability to impact each other.

In fact, events on the land are part of the reason I'm asking these questions. Do we lend too much credibility to adversary A2/AD capabilities? Not enough? Army & Marine forces seek to become more dispersed, and yet modern navies seem to have surface combatants that put a lot of eggs in one basket.


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## Blackadder1916

reveng said:


> . . . arose out of another topic about replacing the submarines . . .



Submarines may be the primary naval offensive platform of the next great sea battles, though the days of great sea battles are likely long past.  In the two major conflicts of the 20th Century, the submarine was the primary naval weapon of one of our adversaries and accounted for most of their victories in the Atlantic.  Though it may not have garnered as much publicity as other elements in the Pacific, American/Allied submarine operations against the Japanese contributed greatly to their defeat.  Likewise, the best historical example of future ship on ship combat may be the sinking of the Belgrano by HMS Conqueror.  One shot, and the Argentines went back home to preserve their fleet.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Not a Navy guy, but my sense is that if two modern peer surface fleets go at each other with MPA support they will both run out of ships and missiles around the same time. 

My impression as the embarked land LO during a fleet on fleet surface warfare exercise was that it was like fighting in a basement. And you don't have to be Alfred Mahan to know you don't want to fight in a basement.


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## CBH99

The original question of why navies focus so much on surface assets, which are armed primarily for defense of the ship & other ships - instead of focusing on submarines which carry weaponry primary for offensive operations, is a very good question indeed.  And a question I absolutely do not have the answer for.


One obvious reason I could see would simply be for presence & deterrence.  

The presence of showing the flag on operations, and being a visible deterrent to possible adversaries.  Lately, this has been in the form of a presence in the Persian Gulf to deter mischief from Iranian ships, off the coast of Africa to ward off pirates, and sailing through the Straight of Taiwan as a political message.

While a submarine may be able to engage these same potential adversaries, and be a far more frightening thought for the adversary because 'you aren't sure if there is a NATO presence here or not' -- it doesn't carry the same political, PR, visible deterrent that a big warship does.

^ And adding to this thought, boarding parties and MH assets are a surface ship kind of thing.  I'm thinking in the context of our recent operations, where deploying a helicopter to an AOI is a lot faster than sailing the ship there.  Being able to deploy boarding teams, as well as the deterrent of having a MH flying around, reinforces the deterrent aspect of a surface asset while also being able to seize contraband, rescue people in distress, arrest individuals if need be, etc etc.


Another reason I can think of - albeit this is a relatively new phenomenon so I'm unsure if this really counts as a contributing factor if looking at your question over the long term - is a modern ship's ability to engage enemy ICBMs.  Having land-based interceptors in Hawaii and Alaska is great, but if you could also have interceptors floating around the oceans & able to possibly engage enemy ICBMs much closer to their launch point, this could be a significant benefit in favour of high-end surface assets.  🤔


Beyond that though, from a warfighting perspective - you ask a very good question.  You'd think focusing on submarines would make a lot of sense.


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## Underway

Submarines have limited conventional power projection capabilities, particularly on a tactical level.  Special forces and cruise missiles are limited in their ability to influence the battlespace in many ways.

Surface fleets have significant power projection capabilities using the full suite of weapons and platforms available.  Missiles, guns, amphib forces, special forces, EW, etc... Carrier aircraft can extend the range of those capabilities by orders of magnitude.  Power projection is how you "influence the events on the land".  As stated by @Blackadder1916 this is the only reason to have a navy, whether that be a defensive or offensive influence.  Surface ships can project power and fight in all five environments (surface, subsurface, air, space, EM) whereas subs are limited in that as well. 

A surface ship can also defend itself even when the enemy knows where it is.  A submarine that is discovered is essentially dead in a war situation because the enemy has already penetrated its defenses.


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## Colin Parkinson

Blackadder1916 said:


> Submarines may be the primary naval offensive platform of the next great sea battles, though the days of great sea battles are likely long past.  In the two major conflicts of the 20th Century, the submarine was the primary naval weapon of one of our adversaries and accounted for most of their victories in the Atlantic.  Though it may not have garnered as much publicity as other elements in the Pacific, American/Allied submarine operations against the Japanese contributed greatly to their defeat.  Likewise, the best historical example of future ship on ship combat may be the sinking of the Belgrano by HMS Conqueror.  One shot, and the Argentines went back home to preserve their fleet.


Mind you had the Belgrano escorts prosecuted their roles more effectively, that shot might not have happened. Had the Belgrano made it to Stanley, the conflict might have ended in a stalemate for both sides.

A mix of subs, surface ships and long range aircraft that can provide ASW and ECM is important. If we pursued modern subs to compliment our CSC's and a new long range patrol aircraft capability, combined with 4 AOR's, the RCN could be quite the force multiplier wherever it went and for any mission. I am also a believer in better arming ships like the AOR's or even the AOP's in the event things go belly up. I like that the CSC are getting a potent gun along with a good mix of missile weapons and torpedo's , along with a likely very good combat suite.


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## stoker dave

Blackadder1916 said:


> One shot, and the Argentines went back home to preserve their fleet.


An anecdote I heard from a Royal Navy officer who was there at the time went as follows:

"We told the Argentinians that we had a nuclear powered submarine patrolling just off the harbour entrance.  Any ship leaving the harbour will be immediately sunk.  

Two weeks later the submarine arrived on station and commenced patrols."

I have no way to know if this is true or not but it makes a good story.


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## JMCanada

Indeed, submarines can't project a significant "amount" of power, but they might blockade a small fleet in port or at least set several surface units locked to an area trying to locate them.

Regarding possible conflicts, considering the increasing assertiveness of Erdogan, I would also mention the possibility of a Turk-greek conflict, even though they both are (till now) NATO members. Algeria- Morocco might be another one.


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## CBH99

Turkey and Greece are still both NATO members.  (I have a feeling I misunderstood what you meant there) - which is what is going to make that conflict so devastating for NATO as an organization.  

Not really from a material perspective, but it will heavily distract NATO from outside threats to focus on internal conflict.  

It would be a huge ‘balloon going up’ for Russia and China to both make some moves while our European allies are distracted and busy with that nonsense.  

Colour me biased, but if that ever escalates for the point of happening — my initial gut reaction is that it will be Turkey’s doing.  🤷🏼‍♂️


0.02


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## Navy_Pete

I think we might have a mix of ships tied up with a lack of crew myself, but I guess we'll save a bunch on fuel, and then we don't have to worry about the ships not meeting even civilian safety requirements when they aren't going to sea.


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## CBH99

Navy_Pete said:


> I think we might have a mix of ships tied up with a lack of crew myself, but I guess we'll save a bunch on fuel, and then we don't have to worry about the ships not meeting even civilian safety requirements when they aren't going to sea.


I’m sure CSC will meet civilian standards once built.  

Crews for all of them though?  You’re probably right on that one.  


I am extremely happy with the decision to select the Type 26, arm it to the teeth, bring us into the Aegis family, etc etc.  Game changer for us.  (As a non-navy guy who doesn’t know the first thing abou operating a warship)

Minus a peer vs peer combat scenario, however, I had wondered if they wouldn’t have made their selection of the lowest crew requirement or automation potential.


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## JMCanada

CBH99 said:


> Turkey and Greece are still both NATO members.  (I have a feeling I misunderstood what you meant there) - which is what is going to make that conflict so devastating for NATO as an organization.
> 
> Not really from a material perspective, but it will heavily distract NATO from outside threats to focus on internal conflict.
> 
> It would be a huge ‘balloon going up’ for Russia and China to both make some moves while our European allies are distracted and busy with that nonsense.
> 
> Colour me biased, but if that ever escalates for the point of happening — my initial gut reaction is that it will be Turkey’s doing.  🤷🏼‍♂️



Fully agree, I wouldn't say  you're biased.
And yes... I meant both are still NATO members, what may have also prevented the conflict between them.


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## Underway

Russia also prevents conflict between them.  Turkey can't take their eye off the Russians for a minute.  Not to mention the Turks have the mess that is Syria on their other border.  They are in an interesting spot geopolitically.


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## CBH99

They are also a mess internally as well, and I think it would be quite probably that an adversary / potential adversary could stir things up internally.  Mass protests, labour strikes, the violence that comes from protests and riots, etc.

As capable as they are on paper, and as decent as some of their kit is - I'm not sure they could manifest that investment into a sizeable or reliable force if they had to truly mobilize.


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## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> Having acquired the almost obligatory copy of Mahan over several decades ago, it has sat on my bookshelf (along with the Clausewitz) undisturbed other than an initial read.  That would probably be the average professional study of naval warfare by someone who spent most of his uniformed career focused on field force units.  So, with that limited point of view, how would "naval warfare" break out without it being adjunct to a wider conflict?  After a quick google search of the topic (_I didn't want to feel like an naval ignoramus_), in one of the articles I found (what was to my limited understanding) a very astute thought. * War at sea, as **Julian Corbett** once quipped, matters only as much as it can affect events on the land.*
> 
> Underway, as he posted above, likely puts it in proper perspective with ". . . the most likely naval conflicts are going to be between flashpoint countries. Turkey and Russia, Pakistan and India, Iran and Saudi Arabia. And given the nature of those countries unless climate change forces a fight (India vs Pakistan) over water they will be skirmishes".


Unless some one wants to start a gray war on trade and promote a bit of buccaneering on the high seas.

Crews dispatched to their lifeboat.  Prize cargoes captured.  Hulls sunk.  Nike's don't make it to market.

Events on land are influenced.  Stocks and jobs are affected.  But no violence has occurred.


Do you go to war or not?  Or do you let that nest of pirates continue to bankrupt you?


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## Spencer100

Kirkhill said:


> Unless some one wants to start a gray war on trade and promote a bit of buccaneering on the high seas.
> 
> Crews dispatched to their lifeboat.  Prize cargoes captured.  Hulls sunk.  Nike's don't make it to market.
> 
> Events on land are influenced.  Stocks and jobs are affected.  But no violence has occurred.
> 
> 
> Do you go to war or not?  Or do you let that nest of pirates continue to bankrupt you?


Just issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal.  Problem solved  









						Letter of marque - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org


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## Kirkhill

Egggzackly.


But you can't go blaming the French (entirely) - Francis Drake and John Hawkins operated under letters of marque as did all of William of Orange's sailors and the Sallee Rovers.

All of which peeved the Portuguese and the Spanish  who had the written authority of the UN of the day to manage the world's trade.  Of course the Secretary-General of the day was Pope Alexander VI, Rodrigo Borgia of Valencia, Spain.


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## Navy_Pete

CBH99 said:


> I’m sure CSC will meet civilian standards once built.
> 
> Crews for all of them though?  You’re probably right on that one.
> 
> 
> I am extremely happy with the decision to select the Type 26, arm it to the teeth, bring us into the Aegis family, etc etc.  Game changer for us.  (As a non-navy guy who doesn’t know the first thing abou operating a warship)
> 
> Minus a peer vs peer combat scenario, however, I had wondered if they wouldn’t have made their selection of the lowest crew requirement or automation potential.


Meeting standards at build isn't an issue (and we'll significantly exceed civilian standards). It's maintaining them that's the issue (see the current fleet for ref).


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## blacktriangle

Navy_Pete said:


> Meeting standards at build isn't an issue (and we'll significantly exceed civilian standards). It's maintaining them that's the issue (see the current fleet for ref).


As you alluded to upthread, there's also the issue of crewing the vessels...which was actually part of the reason I started this thread.

Where do you all see uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels fitting in? Also, would there be any place for smaller, optionally-crewed vessels that could help extend sensor & weapons coverage, or perhaps embark NTOG or SOF assets?


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## CBH99

I see the use of uncrewed surface vessels expanding, and becoming significantly more prevalant over the next 20yrs - if not sooner.

The US Navy has tested engaging targets several hundred kilometers away using the SM-6 - in which a ship that was closer to the target locked it up on radar, and another ship (which was a few hundred km away) fired the weapon and hit it.  

In a wartime scenario, I could see several uncrewed surface vessels with decent radar systems that could detect, track, and feed the info to a shooter vessel, which could possibly remain passive/silent.

So your idea of using uncrewed vessels to extend both weapons & sensor coverage is already a idea the US Navy has thought about, developed the appropriate systems for, and has tested.  I HOPE that somewhere, in some lab or some program, the US Navy is doubling down on efforts to make that capability a robust, reliable, and readily available.

*I was looking for the specific article on google to link, but couldn't find it as easily as I thought.  Will post it here once I find it.




As for uncrewed subsurface?  I'm no expert at all (nor am I on surface assets either) -- but I could see uncrewed submarines being used to 'engage' deep undersea cables, roam about regions suspected of being mined, etc.  

As for optionally crewed?  No idea.  But SOF does have access to their own little 'mini subs' that usually deploy from a larger submarine/mothership for the purposes of insertion/extraction.  Is that what you meant?


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## blacktriangle

CBH99 said:


> I HOPE that somewhere, in some lab or some program, the US Navy is doubling down on efforts to make that capability a robust, reliable, and readily available.


One of the relevant DARPA programs is called NOMARS 

As for the rest of your post, I definitely agree that things such as CEC make sense. Especially in terms of making things more resistant to enemy EW action.

I'm still wondering if putting so much emphasis on large, costly, and complicated surface combatants is the correct way to go long term. I think CSC would be great if in the water today, but that's not the case. I really do wonder what our adversaries will be fielding by the time we have those constructed and operational. At some point will it make sense to look at at the capabilities found in a modern high-end surface combatant, and spread them out between multiple smaller uncrewed & lightly crewed vessels? Less capable on their own, but the loss of one would also be far less costly. Perhaps these could be supported by "motherships" for service & sustainment purposes.

So, should we be planning to disperse capabilities more than we currently do?

Edited for clarity.


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## Colin Parkinson

You can have roving unmanned patrol craft out to the edge of your economic zone doing passive listening for subs, science/meteorological work. they can motor or drift as required. A lot of that work to design and build them can be done right here, right now and further Canada's technology industry. It can be done for the RCN through a COVID relief fund.


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## blacktriangle

Colin Parkinson said:


> You can have roving unmanned patrol craft out to the edge of your economic zone doing passive listening for subs, science/meteorological work. they can motor or drift as required. A lot of that work to design and build them can be done right here, right now and further Canada's technology industry. It can be done for the RCN through a COVID relief fund.


Good point.

Does anyone know if the possibility of producing unmanned vessels has been explored for future inclusion into the NSS?


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## Underway

reveng said:


> I'm still wondering if putting so much emphasis on large, costly, and complicated surface combatants makes sense going forward. I think CSC would be great if in the water today, but that's not the case. I really do wonder what our adversaries will be fielding by the time we have those constructed and operational. At some point it will make sense to look at at the capabilities found in a modern high-end surface combatant, and spread them out between multiple smaller uncrewed & lightly crewed vessels. Less capable on their own, but the loss of one would also be far less costly. Perhaps these could be supported by "motherships" for service & sustainment purposes.
> 
> So, should we be planning to disperse capabilities more than we currently do?


That's not a bad idea of a defensive posture or limited area for fighting.

However, if small dispersed ships were the way to go why is China, Japan, UK, France, US etc... all building larger ships with more capability in them.  They are all introducing new carriers or carrier programs into their fleets as well.  They are building bigger better submarines.

Because these vessels do the job and project the power.  Small dispersed ships are a nice idea but don't pull the weight when the chips are down.  There are massive disadvantages to them.  They are not good in the high seas, they have limited sensor capabilities, they have limited ranges and time on station.  This is why you see small ships in places like the Baltic (Sweeden and their Visby class) or the Black Sea ( the ever-growing number of over gunned Russian Corvettes and missile boats).

It's also why the LCS program failed at its heart and is being replaced with frigates.  It was designed with the idea that quantity has its own quality.  Well apparently quality is important as well, and the LCS actually showed that they were less flexible than blue water destroyers in most circumstances.

USV's can mitigate some of these disadvantages but in the process create their own sets of negatives.  Complete lack of flexibility, limited sensors, no kinetic effects etc...


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## Weinie

Underway said:


> That's not a bad idea of a defensive posture or limited area for fighting.  Sweeden for example does this with many corvettes and other stealthy type craft, that disperse and hide.
> 
> However if small dispersed ships were the way to go why is China, Japan, UK, France, US etc... all building larger ships with more capability in them.  They are all introducing new carriers or carrier programs into their fleets as well.  They are building bigger better submarines.
> 
> Because these vessels do the job and project the power.  Small dispersed ships are a nice idea, but don't pull the weight when the chips are down.  There are massive disadvantages to them.  They are not good in the high seas, they have limited sensor capabilities, they have limited ranges and time on station.  This is why you see small ships in places like the Baltic (Sweeden and their Visby class) or the Black Sea ( the ever-growing number of overgunned Russian Corvettes and missile boats).
> 
> It's also why the LCS program failed at its heart and is being replaced with frigates.  It was designed with the idea that quantity has its own quality.  Well apparently quality is important as well, and the LCS actually showed that they were less flexible than blue water destroyers in most circumstances.


How about putting an unmanned, nuclear powered, SSBN off the coast (but within range) of every potential flashpoint , and having several more at sea, to project forward when needed.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

LCS failed because of unrealistic expectations, a littoral ship that is also deep sea. Plus it was supposed to be able to perform unicorn levels of magic and other stuff. What they needed was a fast gunboat for areas you don't want to risk a big ship. 

Unmanned vessels and platforms can do routine patrolling and sensing, along with dangerous jobs like mine hunting and decoy work.


----------



## Underway

Weinie said:


> How about putting an unmanned, nuclear powered, SSBN off the coast (but within range) of every potential flashpoint , and having several more at sea, to project forward when needed.


Never happen. Just asking for a nuclear disaster or a boarding by any group that wants to steal nuclear tech. There is no such thing as an unmonitored nuclear reactor.  The reason people are in the loop is that ships break _all the time_.  And in the weirdest most unpredictable ways.

If you are going uncrewed then it better be a disposable platform, because any actor on the high seas could board a ship and take it.  The British consider unmanned USV's and UUV's that are not tethered "navigational hazards".  Which means target practice.  They've done it before.

China has fished US UUV's out of the water with nets and stolen the tech.  



Colin Parkinson said:


> Unmanned vessels and platforms can do routine patrolling and sensing, along with dangerous jobs like mine hunting and decoy work.



Sure.  Good work for those sorts of things.  Just a more mobile persistent sonobuoy works.  They already are critical in minehunting and decoys.

But an actual full combat platform?  No.  We're a long way away from that.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I thinking more in the sensing role and data gathering on ocean conditions which helps our subs and surface fleet hunt for any suspicious underwater activity


----------



## CBH99

Underway said:


> Small dispersed ships are a nice idea but do not hold up when the chips are down



Just imagining a good scrap in the SCS, and was thinking that perhaps that may be the difference between the chips being down or not?

Im thinking uncreated small vessels with decent radars & sensors that can detect and track a target, and feed that info to a bigger ship for the shoot.  

I think that was the point & concept the US Navy was trying to confirm when they intercepted a target in similar conditions?


Having quite a few of them dispersed in a combat zone could/would complicate things for the enemy.  And if they attack that ship not knowing it’s a small unscrewed vessel at first, would give our side those openings & moments that get us closer to a victory?

(Or am I just talking nonsense?)


----------



## dapaterson

Uninhabited vehicles of any type assume information warfare dominance and broad spectrum availability for communications.

Or you can run DRMIS...


----------



## Underway

Well, maritime patrol aircraft are small vessels with a very good radar/sensor, which detects and tracks targets and can feed that to a ship for the shoot.  Or they can take a shot themselves.  Hawkeye aircraft is another good example.  Aircraft are much better at this sort of this than a surface vessel and we've been doing this for as long as aircraft have existed.


----------



## Underway

An excellent analysis of hypersonic weapons.  Very good quality video, with a particular focus on naval vulnerabilities to such weapons.

Of particular interest to me was the targeting and terminal phase issues that hypersonics have.  Navies already have the ability to shoot down these missiles based on the current science.  The strategic impact of hypersonic speeds to push naval combat away from shorelines is very interesting (see his nice math example comparing subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic missiles targeting a task group).


----------



## GR66

Underway said:


> Well, maritime patrol aircraft are small vessels with a very good radar/sensor, which detects and tracks targets and can feed that to a ship for the shoot.  Or they can take a shot themselves.  Hawkeye aircraft is another good example.  Aircraft are much better at this sort of this than a surface vessel and we've been doing this for as long as aircraft have existed.


My thoughts exactly.  You could add other platforms like the F-35 or glider UUVs to the detection chain as well.

In relation to the question of fewer, large ships vs a greater number of smaller (unmanned?) ships I was listening to an interesting podcast episode in RUSI's Western Way of War series.  It focuses more on the role of carriers in the age of area denial systems and how they could revert to their early role as a strategic "raiding" platform rather than as an area dominance platform as the guest puts it.

That got me to thinking about a Canadian context where we don't have carriers.  A large surface task group (like a carrier task group) increases its risk of being located, targeted and attrited/eliminated the longer it remains within the offensive zone of operations.  The podcast guest discusses the concept of using the carriers as raiders to pop into gaps in the enemy's defensive screen to conduct strategic raids like Taranto, Pearl Harbour or Truk.

How could a similar strategy be used by a navy without carriers?  In a China scenario, what if you used your major surface combatants (like the CSC) to create a perimeter around the theatre from which you could strike any forces that move out of the core defensive zone attempting to conduct offensive operations.  That way you're engaging them as far as possible outside their land-based support.  

Meanwhile you use your network of cheaper detection assets (MPA's, UAVs, F-35's, UUVs, EW aircraft, etc.) to identify gaps in their perimeter.  You then send in smaller, faster, stealthier surface ships into these gaps to conduct quick "raids" on strategic targets (enemy task groups, supply convoys, atoll airfields, etc.).  The raiders would then dash back to the cover of the surface task group or allied air forces.  Something like the 45-know LCS with the flight deck replaced with VLS tubes with long range ground-attack or naval strike missiles might fit the role.

It would definitely be more of a "long war" strategy rather than a quick force-on-force meeting engagement, but maybe it's time the West started thinking that way?


----------



## Uzlu

Underway said:


> There is no such thing as an unmonitored nuclear reactor.


How about unattended?  "The SLOWPOKE-2 nuclear reactor is the only type of nuclear reactor licensed in Canada for unattended operation in automatic mode."


----------



## FJAG

I've always thought that one should buy a fleet of old cheap cargo vessels and convert a large part of their cargo bays to missile launch tubes/pods filled with whatever strike missile of the day is in vogue and then have them cruise around doing minor cargo runs for years on end in the South and East China Seas and the Sea of Japan - kind of like the old Q Ships. They'd be lost amongst the massive clutter of genuine cargo traffic. Put a good fast lifeboat on board and the crew could abandon ship, scuttle it and sail away after firing.

For every billion dollars saved on an expensive platform and large crew, you could buy five hundred missiles.

Deterrence isn't based on how shiny your boat is; it's based on letting the other guy understand that you can bite back hard if provoked.


----------



## CBH99

Underway said:


> An excellent analysis of hypersonic weapons.  Very good quality video, with a particular focus on naval vulnerabilities to such weapons.
> 
> Of particular interest to me was the targeting and terminal phase issues that hypersonics have.  Navies already have the ability to shoot down these missiles based on the current science.  The strategic impact of hypersonic speeds to push naval combat away from shorelines is very interesting (see his nice math example comparing subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic missiles targeting a task group).


Curious from a practical perspective from someone who is quite experienced in naval operations - 

How likely or practical is it that friendly ships, even if equipped with updated tech, could intercept hypersonic missiles in a combat scenario?  (Multiple ships vs multiple ships)

I know ICBMs have been intercepted in various tests in their terminal phase.  I couldn’t find any examples of hypersonic naval missiles being intercepted.  

As for the topic of this thread, I think we all that hypersonic weapons will be an absolute game changer.  Unless energy weapons start packing a lot more punch AND sensor systems improve... yikes 😬


----------



## Underway

CBH99 said:


> Curious from a practical perspective from someone who is quite experienced in naval operations -
> 
> How likely or practical is it that friendly ships, even if equipped with updated tech, could intercept hypersonic missiles in a combat scenario?  (Multiple ships vs multiple ships)
> 
> I know ICBMs have been intercepted in various tests in their terminal phase.  I couldn’t find any examples of hypersonic naval missiles being intercepted.
> 
> As for the topic of this thread, I think we all that hypersonic weapons will be an absolute game changer.  Unless energy weapons start packing a lot more punch AND sensor systems improve... yikes 😬



It depends on when and where they go super/subsonic.  If you are shooting a hypersonic at a naval task group then at some point the missile has to stop being hypersonic, come down from 50,000 feet and then sprint to the target.  At that point is where the task group can treat it like any other supersonic missile attack, though with an odd attack profile (not a lot of missiles drop down from 50,000 feet).  At least that's my interpretation.

What is hard is tracking a missile that is hypersonic.  As it gets covered in plasma from its high speed, its radar profile changes.  Plasma may make the missile more stealthy though I haven't seen any data on this (theory only).  The missile's speed makes it very hard to track, not detect mind you. It's still a big fast-moving target at 50,000 feet with a plasma ball IR signature. However, because of its speed, many current radars and CMS can't filter the information from the noise and get a track plotted.  This is likely one of the reasons Canada chose the SPY 7 with Aegis for CSC and perhaps one of the reasons why the APAR was not selected.

But again once the hypersonic "drops out of warp" it has to try and detect the task group and then attack it at supersonic/subsonic speeds.  So it can be tracked at that point by any number of sensors.  This means normal defenses kick in to defend the task group.

There is also a reason that you haven't seen any naval hypersonics intercepted.  Because currently there are no operational naval hypersonics.  The Russians are the closest with hypersonic testing being done this month.


----------



## blacktriangle

CBH99 said:


> Unless *energy weapons* start packing a lot more punch AND sensor systems improve... yikes 😬


It will be interesting to see what happens with DEW. I saw somewhere that the USN plans to tie HELIOS into AEGIS. I wonder if eventually we'll see some form of optical phased array capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously, at varying power output levels? I suppose if you could supplement conventional defences, you may be able to free up some extra VLS cells for other mission sets. It would also ease resupply burdens, and I'm sure lower the cost per engagement. In addition to HELs, High power microwave technologies are also interesting.

Also something I've been wondering - will we see more nuclear powered surface combatants in the future?


----------



## Pelorus

reveng said:


> Also something I've been wondering - will we see more nuclear powered surface combatants in the future?



It's possible, but a nuclear plant certainly adds a huge host of operational headaches when you're dealing with a small platform. Even more so if the navy considering it is not already deep into the nuclear propulsion game.

Without doing the math that I don't know how to do, I would guess that a beefed up power generation system (which we're already seeing with newer vessels using electric propulsion) combined with an adequate energy storage solution like large capacitor banks or something similar would meet the 80-90% solution of the power requirements of DEW without necessitating a nuclear plant.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> That's not a bad idea of a defensive posture or limited area for fighting.
> 
> However, if small dispersed ships were the way to go why is China, Japan, UK, France, US etc... all building larger ships with more capability in them.  They are all introducing new carriers or carrier programs into their fleets as well.  They are building bigger better submarines.
> 
> Because these vessels do the job and project the power.  Small dispersed ships are a nice idea but don't pull the weight when the chips are down.  There are massive disadvantages to them.  They are not good in the high seas, they have limited sensor capabilities, they have limited ranges and time on station.  This is why you see small ships in places like the Baltic (Sweeden and their Visby class) or the Black Sea ( the ever-growing number of over gunned Russian Corvettes and missile boats).
> 
> It's also why the LCS program failed at its heart and is being replaced with frigates.  It was designed with the idea that quantity has its own quality.  Well apparently quality is important as well, and the LCS actually showed that they were less flexible than blue water destroyers in most circumstances.
> 
> USV's can mitigate some of these disadvantages but in the process create their own sets of negatives.  Complete lack of flexibility, limited sensors, no kinetic effects etc...




I'll take it as read that you need good sized hulls for an expeditionary force.  But the PLA(N) seems to me to be only starting to find its way out to blue water.

By my count (based on wiki) the PLA(N) comprises

some 241 launch platforms for the 230 km C-801, 803, YJ-83 series SSMs - these consist of
      123 missile boats in the 170 to 520 ton range (Orca displacement)
        72 corvettes in the 1500 ton range (Kingston displacement)
        46 frigates in the 2000 to 4200 ton range  (the largest being comparable in size to the Halifax)

some 36 MCMVs in the 400 to 1200 ton range

some 62 light amphibious transports suitable for crossing the Straits of Taiwan - consisting of
        33 in the 800 to 2000 ton range (Kingston)
        49 in the 4170 to 4800 ton range (Halifax)

I would suggest that that equals some 339 surface targets for the Taiwanese to manage.

On the Blue Water end of things

42 Destroyers in the 4800 to 7200 ton range (similar in displacement to the Type 26 - Ivar Huitfeldt generation)
  8 Cruisers in the 13,000 ton range (larger than the 9600 ton Ticonderogas)
  8 LPDs in the 25,000 ton range (San Diego - Bay Class)
  3 LPHs in the 40,000 ton range (America LHA)
  2 CVs in the 60,000 ton range (QE II Class)

They also have some 40 subs of which 7 are boomers,  12 are nuclear attack subs and 22 are conventional.

I believe that the PLA(N) can keep the USN away from Beijing.  The US can't invade.
I believe that the light amphibious fleet was no threat to Taiwan.  It is problematic for the Phillipines and Vietnam et al.
I believe that the Blue Water fleet presents a current threat to Taiwan - but it still only adds 63 targets to the previous 339 bringing the total up to about 400.
I believe that the Blue Water fleet gives China the opportunity to fly the flag anywhere on the high seas.  Exactly the same way the Brits are currently.
I don't believe that that fleet can, in any way, challenge the US Navy for dominance.

It can frustrate the USN and US diplomacy.   It can't defeat the USN.

So the question becomes, in my mind, how important is it to challenge China on the 9 Dash.  Is the effort to defeat or frustrate China?  Or is the primary focus to prevent the locals losing their ability to act independently of China?

Now what type of fleet is needed?


Edit - Taiwan is 400 km long and the Taiwan Straits are 180 km wide.


----------



## Underway

It's important to challenge China on the 9 Dash because beyond that it threatens the deep sea resupply route to Japan.  Japan can with USN help escort any resources it needs around Indonesia and outside the first island chain to Japan, avoiding the S China Sea entirely.  This means China needs a way to challenge out to the second island chain (which includes Guam) otherwise it can't neutralize Japan easily.

Secondly, China is trying to secure its own supply lines.  Trends are showing the US will slowly withdraw from the Middle East as the US is able to produce all the domestic fuel it needs (thanks to fracking).  This means China needs a way to protect its own fuel supply from the middle east, and that route goes past India.

Thirdly China is building bases to protect its string of pearls investments.  Djubuti is one place.  They are also looking at a base on the Atlantic coast.

China wants a credible blue water force to do all this.  And blue water forces project power.  That's the real definition of a blue water navy IMHO.  The ability to project power anywhere in the globe.

That means carriers and long range submarines.  Because airpower and submarines are how you actually sink enemy fleets.  Airpower is also how to project power ashore sustainably.


----------



## Kirkhill

Chinese arsenal ships in the future?









						Chinese Power Projection; A Role for Arsenal Ships? » Wavell Room
					

A paper exploring the concept of Arsenal Ships and where they may sit within future Chinese maritime power projection ambition.




					wavellroom.com
				




Why not convert a low-freeboard tanker?  Ditch the superstructure and create an optionally manned vessel that can be piloted from the ship's life boat.

Although probably better to go with 50 or so LUSVs









						Update on the U.S. Navy’s MUSV and LUSV Programs - Naval News
					

The U.S. Navy’s future approach to capitalizing on the advancing technological progress of robotics, computers, software and hardware is building and fielding small and large unmanned systems. These unmanned systems will go into harm’s away, perform laborious dangerous mundane tasks, execute...




					www.navalnews.com


----------



## AirDet

CBH99 said:


> They are also a mess internally as well, and I think it would be quite probably that an adversary / potential adversary could stir things up internally.  Mass protests, labour strikes, the violence that comes from protests and riots, etc.
> 
> As capable as they are on paper, and as decent as some of their kit is - I'm not sure they could manifest that investment into a sizeable or reliable force if they had to truly mobilize.


Are you kidding me? the Turkish military has a standing 430000+ regular force with a further 400000 in reserve troops. 3200 MBTs, 1200 Artillery, and 4000+ APCs. Since 2014 they have been improving their mobility. If Turkey can't mount a sizeable or reliable force then nobody can.


----------



## daftandbarmy

AirDet said:


> Are you kidding me? the Turkish military has a standing 430000+ regular force with a further 400000 in reserve troops. 3200 MBTs, 1200 Artillery, and 4000+ APCs. Since 2014 they have been improving their mobility. If Turkey can't mount a sizeable or reliable force then nobody can.


----------



## CBH99

daftandbarmy said:


>


Haha okay he _is_ right, but that meme just made it so much better 😅



AirDet said:


> Are you kidding me? the Turkish military has a standing 430000+ regular force with a further 400000 in reserve troops. 3200 MBTs, 1200 Artillery, and 4000+ APCs. Since 2014 they have been improving their mobility. If Turkey can't mount a sizeable or reliable force then nobody can.


You aren’t wrong.  BUT, I’m not so sure I’m wrong either.  

Looking at Turkey, it is absolutely a regional military powerhouse.  Largest fleet of F-16’s outside of USAF, and like you listed - a large military with ample kit & equipment.  



If the gloves came off & things got serious, I’m sure Turkey could mount a sizeable & formidable force.  But how reliable is it really?

Let’s not forget, even now, Turkey has resorted to hiring ‘local freedom fighters & militia groups’ to conduct operations along the Iraqi side of the border, supported by artillery inside Turkey.  

How many of those MBT’s are modern, serviceable, and effective?  And how many of them are relics?  

Turkey is currently sanctioned by the US for it’s adoption of the S-300 system, and part of those sanctions is a restriction on spare parts for it’s F-16 fleet.  (Along with closed doors on manufacturing parts for the F-35, among others.)

Turkey has senior military commanders & police commanders, as well as large groups of soldiers, police officers, judges, even teachers, detained on _suspicion_ of being loyal/supportive to someone Ergodan doesn’t like.  


How much of their force doesn’t show up, abandon their posts, or disappear into Europe if they gloves do come off?  How much of that force would be loyal to their leadership, if their former commanders are imprisoned on _suspicions_?

 How much support does Ergodan have in eastern Turkey, where he has (not too long ago relatively speaking) ordered airstrikes on his own villages?


Perhaps I should have worded my post differently.  Turkey may be a regional powerhouse, absolutely.  I don’t know how much of that force would mount up & be reliable for prolonged operations, depending on the circumstances.  


0.02  🤷🏼‍♂️


----------



## Czech_pivo

I 


CBH99 said:


> Haha okay he _is_ right, but that meme just made it so much better 😅
> 
> 
> You aren’t wrong.  BUT, I’m not so sure I’m wrong either.
> 
> Looking at Turkey, it is absolutely a regional military powerhouse.  Largest fleet of F-16’s outside of USAF, and like you listed - a large military with ample kit & equipment.
> 
> 
> 
> If the gloves came off & things got serious, I’m sure Turkey could mount a sizeable & formidable force.  But how reliable is it really?
> 
> Let’s not forget, even now, Turkey has resorted to hiring ‘local freedom fighters & militia groups’ to conduct operations along the Iraqi side of the border, supported by artillery inside Turkey.
> 
> How many of those MBT’s are modern, serviceable, and effective?  And how many of them are relics?
> 
> Turkey is currently sanctioned by the US for it’s adoption of the S-300 system, and part of those sanctions is a restriction on spare parts for it’s F-16 fleet.  (Along with closed doors on manufacturing parts for the F-35, among others.)
> 
> Turkey has senior military commanders & police commanders, as well as large groups of soldiers, police officers, judges, even teachers, detained on _suspicion_ of being loyal/supportive to someone Ergodan doesn’t like.
> 
> 
> How much of their force doesn’t show up, abandon their posts, or disappear into Europe if they gloves do come off?  How much of that force would be loyal to their leadership, if their former commanders are imprisoned on _suspicions_?
> 
> How much support does Ergodan have in eastern Turkey, where he has (not too long ago relatively speaking) ordered airstrikes on his own villages?
> 
> 
> Perhaps I should have worded my post differently.  Turkey may be a regional powerhouse, absolutely.  I don’t know how much of that force would mount up & be reliable for prolonged operations, depending on the circumstances.
> 
> 
> 0.02  🤷🏼‍♂️


I have to go back in time and look at what the Brits and the French thought back in 1915/16 and I'm sure there are alot of parallels to today.  In the end you never know with Turkey if you'll be facing their 'A' team or a bunch of 3rd stringers.


----------



## AirDet

The MBTs are a combination of Leopard 2A4 (~400) and the remainder are Sabra M60s (light weight but very modern, reactive armour, 120 smooth bore, and advanced EO/IR, etc made in 2007). So as far as tanks go they aren't to be messed with. They also have a large airforce but mostly older F16s.


----------



## daftandbarmy

AirDet said:


> The MBTs are a combination of Leopard 2A4 (~400) and the remainder are Sabra M60s (light weight but very modern, reactive armour, 120 smooth bore, and advanced EO/IR, etc made in 2007). So as far as tanks go they aren't to be messed with. They also have a large airforce but mostly older F16s.



And they're spending wayyy more $ on defence:

Turkey announces ambitious defence spending increase in draft economic plan​
The Turkish Presidency of Strategy and Budget released the draft medium-term economic programme (MTEP) for the country, covering proposed expenditure for the 2022–24 period, on 6 September.

According to the proposal documents published in the Turkish Official Gazette, spending for the country's Ministry of National Defence (MND) will rise to TRY80.439 billion (USD9.69 billion) in 2022, up from the proposed TRY65.893 billion for the year proposed in the 2021–23 MTEP. Overall, MND spending will account for 5.05% of government expenditure under the new proposals.






						Turkey announces ambitious defence spending increase in draft economic plan
					

The Turkish Presidency of Strategy and Budget released the draft medium-term economic programme (MTEP) for the country, covering proposed expenditure for the 2022–24...



					www.janes.com


----------



## Underway

They need to.  Prepping for the day when they leave NATO and have to deal with their "frenemy" Russia.  The return of the Ottomans indeed.

Now back to your regularly scheduled discussion on future naval platforms.


----------



## Czech_pivo

I know that we try to attend and work with our partners around the world in as many joint naval operations as possible - snippet below as an example of a current one in south-east asia - _"from Nov. 21 to 30 in the waters around Japan, a bilateral naval exercise between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy will take place, along with two multilateral exercises. The first multilateral drill will include the JMSDF, U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the German Navy, while the second involves the JMSDF, U.S. Navy, RAN and the Royal Canadian Navy. A total of 20 JMSDF ships and 40 JMSDF aircraft, 10 U.S. Navy ships, two RAN ships,* a single RCN ship* and a single German Navy ship will take part in these drills."









						U.S. and Japanese Ships Hold Anti-Submarine Warfare Drills in the South China Sea - USNI News
					

KUALA LUMPUR – Japanese and U.S. fleets met this week for a first-ever anti-submarine warfare exercise in the South China Sea, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force said today. Helicopter destroyer JS Kaga (DDH-184) and destroyer JS Murasame (DD101) with their embarked SH-60J helicopters, an...




					news.usni.org
				



_
The question that I have is this, how often has the RCN hold these types of drills/operations where we have 3 or 4 of our Halifax's actually out at the sametime working jointly together?  I seems that from all that I have recently read over the last maybe 5-8yrs is that we only ever have a single Halifax attending one of these exercises.  I'm sure that it helps immensely with our integrating a single ship into someone's much larger task force but how does it help us and our crews in being to coordinate and work multiple Halifax's together.  I mean, could we even be able to effectively run a 3 or 4 ship Halifax only task force when none of these ships will have ever all worked together at once?  I fully realised that with only 12 ships that the chances of actually having 3 (let alone 4) Halifax's operational and at the same location would be a Christmas miracle but how can our ships actually work with each other when 3 or 4 of them are never available to actually do so.  Also, please don't provide examples of when a Kingston or two have joined up with a Halifax because from a potential combat training perspective it has no bearing.


----------



## KevinB

Czech_pivo said:


> ctually out at the sametime working jointly together?  I seems that from all that I have recently read over the last maybe 5-8yrs is that we only ever have a single Halifax attending one of these exercises.  I'm sure that it helps immensely with our integrating a single ship into someone's much larger task force but how does it help us and our crews in being to coordinate and work multiple Halifax's together.  I mean, could we even be able to effectively run a 3 or 4 ship Halifax only task force when none of these ships will have ever all worked together at once?  I fully realised that with only 12 ships that the chances of actually having 3 (let alone 4) Halifax's operational and at the same location would be a Christmas miracle but how can our ships actually work with each other when 3 or 4 of them are never available to actually do so.  Also, please don't provide examples of when a Kingston or two have joined up with a Halifax because from a potential combat training perspective it has no bearing.


If you can work with a coalition - you can work with yourselves.
  But the RCN has some significant gaps - so it needs to work with/in a coalition, so working solely inside a RCN TF is fairly irrelevant at this point.


----------



## Swampbuggy

Last year, participating in JOINT WARRIOR 2020, the RCN had HALIFAX, VDQ, TORONTO and ASTERIX at sea together. They played the opposing force to the RN QE strike force in the exercise, IIRC.


----------



## Underway

I'll keep my comments to future capability as we can discuss the current fleet on any number of other threads.

The RCN stated goal in Leadmark 2050 is to have an RCN task group of 4 CSC and a JSS with six Cyclones buzzing around.  Add in the Submarine and MPA assets for flavour.

This is a change from 3 CSC in the original TG organization.  The reasons for the change from 3 to 4 was as I understand them listed below.

The future fleet will have no AAW specialized ship in the TG organization.  The old TG was a AAW Destroyer, 2 GP Frigates and a AOR.  That was the starting point for developing the new TG.  However, even though the new CSC would be more capable in AAW than the IRO class modern missiles are also more capable and are likely to come at ships in higher numbers.
Position, Detection, Action.  It's often the case that one ship detects a threat and the rest of the TG does not.  The detecting ship may not be in a position to engage the threat (wrong weapons or wrong place).  This is why cooperative engagement capability was invented and LINK is so important.  A four-ship TG ensures that there will be at least one ship in position to have effectors that can engage, and likely two ships can engage.
Change in Threat.  The original TG was envisioned to be multifunctional but at its core, it was a submarine-hunting specialist group.  The AOR kept them at sea, the frigates hunted and the destroyer ran the show and provided air cover against long-range threats or submarine-launched missiles that could get at them out into the mid Atlantic.  A torpedo was the most common peer threat.  That has changed. ASM and aircraft are the most likely threat as they have proliferated much more widely than submarines.
Change in RCN Focus.  With the change in threat has come a change in RCN missions.  No longer content with patrolling the oceans looking for submarines the RCN has in the last 20 years has responded to great power competition (annexation of Crimea, SCS friction), revolutions (Libya), wars (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon), counter-terrorism, and counter-drug operations.  The as the missions changed the threats changed and the tactics need to change along with the ships.  This means four CSC to optimize the TG for all these varied missions.
And so ends my thesis...  lol


----------



## Underway

I think it was @Edward Campbell who asked about "drone carriers" in one of the threads. In order to not sidetrack it, here is an article about the Russians using an LHD for drone specific warfare.  This is what Canada should be doing/looking at.

Russian Navy Project 23900 LHD to Carry Drones - Naval News


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> I think it was @Edward Campbell who asked about "drone carriers" in one of the threads. In order to not sidetrack it, here is an article about the Russians using an LHD for drone specific warfare.  This is what Canada should be doing/looking at.
> 
> Russian Navy Project 23900 LHD to Carry Drones - Naval News


Hmm Black Sea Fleet Flagship to be, with 900 Marines in it, with the drone to remove low signature vessels in advance of Amphibious Operations...
   Seems just like a defensive stability force totally


----------



## Czech_pivo

Underway said:


> I'll keep my comments to future capability as we can discuss the current fleet on any number of other threads.
> 
> The RCN stated goal in Leadmark 2050 is to have an RCN task group of 4 CSC and a JSS with six Cyclones buzzing around.  Add in the Submarine and MPA assets for flavour.
> 
> This is a change from 3 CSC in the original TG organization.  The reasons for the change from 3 to 4 was as I understand them listed below.
> 
> The future fleet will have no AAW specialized ship in the TG organization.  The old TG was a AAW Destroyer, 2 GP Frigates and a AOR.  That was the starting point for developing the new TG.  However, even though the new CSC would be more capable in AAW than the IRO class modern missiles are also more capable and are likely to come at ships in higher numbers.
> Position, Detection, Action.  It's often the case that one ship detects a threat and the rest of the TG does not.  The detecting ship may not be in a position to engage the threat (wrong weapons or wrong place).  This is why cooperative engagement capability was invented and LINK is so important.  A four-ship TG ensures that there will be at least one ship in position to have effectors that can engage, and likely two ships can engage.
> Change in Threat.  The original TG was envisioned to be multifunctional but at its core, it was a submarine-hunting specialist group.  The AOR kept them at sea, the frigates hunted and the destroyer ran the show and provided air cover against long-range threats or submarine-launched missiles that could get at them out into the mid Atlantic.  A torpedo was the most common peer threat.  That has changed. ASM and aircraft are the most likely threat as they have proliferated much more widely than submarines.
> Change in RCN Focus.  With the change in threat has come a change in RCN missions.  No longer content with patrolling the oceans looking for submarines the RCN has in the last 20 years has responded to great power competition (annexation of Crimea, SCS friction), revolutions (Libya), wars (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon), counter-terrorism, and counter-drug operations.  The as the missions changed the threats changed and the tactics need to change along with the ships.  This means four CSC to optimize the TG for all these varied missions.
> And so ends my thesis...  lol


A couple of questions.

1) The RCN stated goal in Leadmark 2050 is to have an RCN task group of 4 CSC and a JSS with six Cyclones buzzing around.  Add in the Submarine and MPA assets for flavour.

Considering that the above TG will come from one of our two coasts, will we be able to actually field 6 Cyclones at once in a TG? That will constitute about 40% of our entire fleet of Cyclones on one of our coasts, for the CSC’s it would be either 50% or higher, depending which coast gets 8 and which gets 7 CSC’s. Is this realistic?
Assumes that we will be operating subs by the time that we’ll have 4 CSC’s operational on one coast.

2) A torpedo was the most common peer threat.  That has changed. ASM and aircraft are the most likely threat as they have proliferated much more widely than submarines.
- Does this hold true for the Pacific as well as the Atlantic?

3) Change in RCN Focus.  With the change in threat has come a change in RCN missions.  No longer content with patrolling the oceans looking for submarines the RCN has in the last 20 years has responded to great power competition
- This assumes that we’ll be Atlantic focused again in our threat assessment. Do We need to start thinking about our other main ocean, the Pacific, where there will be the need to hunt and kill (potentially) CPC subs. 

Looking forward to you’re learned/experienced comments.


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## Underway

Czech_pivo said:


> A couple of questions.
> 
> 1) The RCN stated goal in Leadmark 2050 is to have an RCN task group of 4 CSC and a JSS with six Cyclones buzzing around.  Add in the Submarine and MPA assets for flavour.
> 
> Considering that the above TG will come from one of our two coasts, will we be able to actually field 6 Cyclones at once in a TG? That will constitute about 40% of our entire fleet of Cyclones on one of our coasts, for the CSC’s it would be either 50% or higher, depending which coast gets 8 and which gets 7 CSC’s. Is this realistic?
> Assumes that we will be operating subs by the time that we’ll have 4 CSC’s operational on one coast.
> 
> 2) A torpedo was the most common peer threat.  That has changed. ASM and aircraft are the most likely threat as they have proliferated much more widely than submarines.
> - Does this hold true for the Pacific as well as the Atlantic?
> 
> 3) Change in RCN Focus.  With the change in threat has come a change in RCN missions.  No longer content with patrolling the oceans looking for submarines the RCN has in the last 20 years has responded to great power competition
> - This assumes that we’ll be Atlantic focused again in our threat assessment. Do We need to start thinking about our other main ocean, the Pacific, where there will be the need to hunt and kill (potentially) CPC subs.
> 
> Looking forward to you’re learned/experienced comments.


 1) There's a trick.  TG don't always come from a single coast.  They are often combined using assets from both coasts.  See post 9-11 operations in the Indian Ocean as an example and the first Gulf War.  TG's as need are often cobbled together from available assets.  That being said, the ideal is a TG on each coast available.

2) Most coastal countries and many insurgent/rebel groups have access to missiles, whether they be even AT versions all the way up to modern Anit Ship missiles.  But rebels and many countries don't have access to submarines.  If they do have access to submarines they also have many many more aircraft and missiles than submarines.  ASM are more widely proliferated by a long stretch.  Even submarines shoot missiles now.

3) Yes but again missiles are more prolific and the battlespace can no longer be evenly divided by ships that hunt submarines and ships that shoot down aircraft.  All ships need to be able to defend themselves from aircraft/missiles.  There is no "safe ocean" where the submarines are outside the range of aircraft or missiles anymore.

My 2 cents anyways.


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## Underway

This one is for you @Colin Parkinson and @Kirkhill.

Sea Air Space 2022
Constellation Class Frigate stuff... I did not notice that it had a 57mm.  That explains how they were able to get 32VLS onto it.  A 127mm likely would have taken the weight/space for those extra missiles.

MSI Defence Platforms at 00:04:30
This gun may very well be on the CSC as the counter UAS system.  For small UAS it seems like a good solution.  For anything B.2 sized or larger then you step up to the 127mm or missile systems.

Here's what you both came for... Containerized Missile Systems at 00:07:55
I was wondering when LMC and BAE would do their own Containerized Missile Systems, and with basically a truck pulled Mk41 VLS you can now launch SM family missiles from shore, or Tomahawks, or whatever else you can cram in there.  AOPS is now the most dangerous ship in the fleet... 

Then some stuff about NSM on helicopters.. yawn!


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## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> This one is for you @Colin Parkinson and @Kirkhill.
> 
> Sea Air Space 2022
> Constellation Class Frigate stuff... I did not notice that it had a 57mm.  That explains how they were able to get 32VLS onto it.  A 127mm likely would have taken the weight/space for those extra missiles.
> 
> MSI Defence Platforms at 00:04:30
> This gun may very well be on the CSC as the counter UAS system.  For small UAS it seems like a good solution.  For anything B.2 sized or larger then you step up to the 127mm or missile systems.
> 
> Here's what you both came for... Containerized Missile Systems at 00:07:55
> I was wondering when LMC and BAE would do their own Containerized Missile Systems, and with basically a truck pulled Mk41 VLS you can now launch SM family missiles from shore, or Tomahawks, or whatever else you can cram in there.  AOPS is now the most dangerous ship in the fleet...
> 
> Then some stuff about NSM on helicopters.. yawn!



There is a God!  And apparently her name is LockMart!

About time.

Now if you can get the RCN, the RCAF and the RRCA to sit down at one table and sort this out in a hurry, that would be noice!


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## Colin Parkinson

Underway said:


> This one is for you @Colin Parkinson and @Kirkhill.
> 
> Sea Air Space 2022
> Constellation Class Frigate stuff... I did not notice that it had a 57mm.  That explains how they were able to get 32VLS onto it.  A 127mm likely would have taken the weight/space for those extra missiles.
> 
> MSI Defence Platforms at 00:04:30
> This gun may very well be on the CSC as the counter UAS system.  For small UAS it seems like a good solution.  For anything B.2 sized or larger then you step up to the 127mm or missile systems.
> 
> Here's what you both came for... Containerized Missile Systems at 00:07:55
> I was wondering when LMC and BAE would do their own Containerized Missile Systems, and with basically a truck pulled Mk41 VLS you can now launch SM family missiles from shore, or Tomahawks, or whatever else you can cram in there.  AOPS is now the most dangerous ship in the fleet...
> 
> Then some stuff about NSM on helicopters.. yawn!


Which version of Mk 38 mount do we have on the AOP's? Do you see an eventual switch to 30mm or suspect Canada will retain the 25mm? 

The Constellation-class frigate reminds me very much as an modernized Halifax Class, do you agree?


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## Underway

Colin Parkinson said:


> Which version of Mk 38 mount do we have on the AOP's? Do you see an eventual switch to 30mm or suspect Canada will retain the 25mm?
> 
> The Constellation-class frigate reminds me very much as an modernized Halifax Class, do you agree?


I do not know which Mod it is, likely 3 given the EO/IR requirements.

Constellation class is if a Burke had a baby with an HFX.  It's a classic frigate design but has stolen a lot of the Burke style (with the radars, and the mast). It is going to do some good work for the USN. They have been missing proper frigates for decades and this is long overdue.


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## dimsum

Underway said:


> They have been missing proper frigates for decades and this is long overdue.


Given that frigates (in general) and destroyers (in general) are getting closer together in terms of size and armament, why do you think the USN is missing proper frigates?  What will the Constellation-class do that the Arleighs aren't doing (or are unsuitable for)?


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## FSTO

dimsum said:


> Given that frigates (in general) and destroyers (in general) are getting closer together in terms of size and armament, why do you think the USN is missing proper frigates?  What will the Constellation-class do that the Arleighs aren't doing (or are unsuitable for)?


The USN got rid of the OHP's and put all their eggs (frigate wise) in the LCS fiasco. The Burkes are more of a cruiser than a destroyer and should be more tied with the Carrier battle group as the AAW platform. The Burkes are too much ship for the frigate role (shitty little job ships) which calls for a lighter and somewhat cheaper ship to do the presence, ASW role. 
IMO of course.


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## Underway

dimsum said:


> Given that frigates (in general) and destroyers (in general) are getting closer together in terms of size and armament, why do you think the USN is missing proper frigates?  What will the Constellation-class do that the Arleighs aren't doing (or are unsuitable for)?


Basically what @FSTO stated.  Burkes are designed for AAW and are not good ASW platforms and to big in the littorals.  Frigates can bridge that gap quite a bit.  They can do a lot of jobs that the Burkes should not do because they are smaller and cheaper but big enough to do most of those tasks.


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## Navy_Pete

Underway said:


> Basically what @FSTO stated.  Burkes are designed for AAW and are not good ASW platforms and to big in the littorals.  Frigates can bridge that gap quite a bit.  They can do a lot of jobs that the Burkes should not do because they are smaller and cheaper but big enough to do most of those tasks.


Burkes are crazy to do a cross pol on though; was weird realizing as a ph6 I knew more about their plant then their Engineering Officer (their tech knowledge is on the NCM side) but 4 LM2500s at 25,000 horsepower a piece is pretty awesome when you aren't paying for the fuel.

Also a massive crew; we could sail 2 CPFs for one Burke (or 3, with our crazy skeleton crew concept).


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## Prairie canuck

Vard Marine (Vancouver) has been contracted in the design and build in Chile of 4 smaller, 8000t, amphibious dock vessels. Something to consider?
Vard Marine Announces a new contract for the design of an Amphibious and Military Sea Transport Ship for the Chilean Navy Escotillón IV Program - Vard Marine


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## Dale Denton

Prairie canuck said:


> Vard Marine (Vancouver) has been contracted in the design and build in Chile of 4 smaller, 8000t, amphibious dock vessels. Something to consider?
> Vard Marine Announces a new contract for the design of an Amphibious and Military Sea Transport Ship for the Chilean Navy Escotillón IV Program - Vard Marine



We should realise we could've used these for the floods in Vancouver, transporting stuff to UKR, HADR anywhere, etc...

Its based on a VARD 7 Series 313.
VARD 7 313 - Vard Marine



> PERFORMANCE Speed 20.0 kn max Range 8,000 NM @ 16 kn Endurance 30 days





> TRANSPORT CAPACITIES Ro-ro deck 1,400 m2 15,000 ft2 470 lane-meters 1,540 lane-feet Cargo hold 2 x 550 m3 2 x 19,400 ft3 Flight deck 2 x medium lift helicopter 1,080 m2 11,600 ft2 Hangar 4 x medium lift helicopter 400 m2 4,300 ft2 RHIB (davit launched) 2 x 11 m 2 x 36’ Landing craft (davit launched) 2 x 15 m 2 x 50’





> FACILITIES Medical 145 m2 1,560 ft2 Configurable operational 200 m2 2,150 ft2 space


https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/VARD-7-313.pdf


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## Prairie canuck

Dale Denton said:


> We should realise we could've used these for the floods in Vancouver, transporting stuff to UKR, HADR anywhere, etc...
> 
> Its based on a VARD 7 Series 313.
> VARD 7 313 - Vard Marine
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/VARD-7-313.pdf


Not sure how these ships would have been useful to flood response, but yes to transport and HADR.
_I get the impression that the ones for Chile will have a well deck to launch some AAV-7s it is acquiring from the US._

These smallish LPDs would provide a much needed capability.
Besides the obvious transport ability they may be able to relieve a frigate or 2 from offshore patrols and likely do well with piracy/drug patrols given they would have 2 helicopters aboard. With 4 it does give options depending on the size of deployments. Why send a big honkin ship when you only need 1 or 2 smaller ships. Maybe ice strengthen the hulls a bit. Nice step up from Kingston class on their way to the new CSCs...
Throwing a bunch of "green" tech at it wouldn't hurt the sales pamphlet either.

Can Someone introduce Vard and Davie....


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## Navy_Pete

Prairie canuck said:


> Not sure how these ships would have been useful to flood response, but yes to transport and HADR.
> _I get the impression that the ones for Chile will have a well deck to launch some AAV-7s it is acquiring from the US._
> 
> These smallish LPDs would provide a much needed capability.
> Besides the obvious transport ability they may be able to relieve a frigate or 2 from offshore patrols and likely do well with piracy/drug patrols given they would have 2 helicopters aboard. With 4 it does give options depending on the size of deployments. Why send a big honkin ship when you only need 1 or 2 smaller ships. Maybe ice strengthen the hulls a bit. Nice step up from Kingston class on their way to the new CSCs...
> Throwing a bunch of "green" tech at it wouldn't hurt the sales pamphlet either.
> 
> Can Someone introduce Vard and Davie....


You want a piracy/drug patrol boat with ice strengthening and two helo that can carry up to 300 riders and a RORO deck? Go big or go home I guess (it's only marginally shorter than a frigate), never know when you might get arctic narco pirates.

If Davie wants work, they should probably get up to the same quality standard as the NSS yards. I've seen all 3 yards and Davie is still 3rd place.


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## suffolkowner

Navy_Pete said:


> If Davie wants work, they should probably get up to the same quality standard as the NSS yards. I've seen all 3 yards and Davie is still 3rd place.


Maybe why that contract for the third yard hasn't been announced yet?


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## Prairie canuck

Navy_Pete said:


> You want a piracy/drug patrol boat with ice strengthening and two helo that can carry up to 300 riders and a RORO deck? Go big or go home I guess (it's only marginally shorter than a frigate), never know when you might get arctic narco pirates.
> 
> If Davie wants work, they should probably get up to the same quality standard as the NSS yards. I've seen all 3 yards and Davie is still 3rd place.


Of course it's primary purpose is transport. Adding other duty options for it when it's not "transporting" may make the sales pitch more convincing as opposed to continuing to fail with a sales pitch for the Big Honkin Ship that will sit in Halifax looking for something substantial to move or a disaster to rush off to. And, there is discussion in other threads about obtaining an OPV.
Similar idea to the Absalon but focused more on the transport side. And the hull would be ice strengthened not ice breaking.


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## Prairie canuck

Smaller more numerous landing ships is the future of the marines
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R46374.pdf


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## GR66

An interesting opinion piece on the US Naval Institute website arguing the advantages of more numerous, longer range Anti-Surface Missiles with smaller warheads over heavier missiles.

It's not specifically mentioned in the article, but I'm guessing that a missile with a smaller warhead could potentially be faster, more maneuverable and more difficult to hit than a larger missile (depending on the method of propulsion and trade-offs between size and range, etc.).


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## GR66

Canadian Company Cellula Robotics Ltd. working on a prototype XLUUV for the Royal Australian Navy with the first hull expected 4th quarter of this year.

The press release describes the project as "delivering our concept of an underwater loyal-wingman to the Royal Australian Navy".

Looks like a project on which the RCN could benefit from partnering with the Aussies.


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## Underway

GR66 said:


> Canadian Company Cellula Robotics Ltd. working on a prototype XLUUV for the Royal Australian Navy with the first hull expected 4th quarter of this year.
> 
> The press release describes the project as "delivering our concept of an underwater loyal-wingman to the Royal Australian Navy".
> 
> Looks like a project on which the RCN could benefit from partnering with the Aussies.


The website points to the fact that DRDC funded their initial prototype for a long-range UUV (Solus-LR).  Good news story as not all DRDC projects make it to industry.


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