# Modest Proposal from an Immodest Source - MLI



## Kirkhill

Currently the RCN operates the following fleet of “capital” ships (very broadly defined):

4x SSK (complement of 48 for a total of 192, displacing 2400 tons with a range of 19,000 km)
2x AOR (complement of 365 for a total of 730, displacing 24,000 tons with a range of 14,000 km)
3x DDH (complement of 280 for a total of 840, displacing 5100 tons with a range of 8,300 km)
12x FFH (complement of 225 for a total of 2700, displacing 5000 tons with a range of 17,600 km)
12x MCDV (complement of 31 for a total of 372, displacing 1000 tons with a range of 9,200 km)

Total Hulls = 33
Total Tonnage = 145,000
Total Sea Berths = 4835
Total Crew = 4835 (including air dets)
Free Berths = 0
Total Medium Helicopter Landing Spots = 17
Total Medium Helicopter Berths = 24

Alternate Fleet Composition:

4x SSK (complement of 48 for a total of 192, displacing 2400 tons with a range of 19,000 km)
4x JLSS (complement of 150 for a total of 600, displacing 28,000 tons with a range of 18,000 km) (HNLMS  Karel Doorman)
4x CLS (complement of 100 for a total of 400, displacing 6300 tons with a range of 17,000 km) (HDMS Absalon)
8x AAD (complement of 101 for a total of 808, displacing 6600 tons with a range of 17,000 km) (HDMS Iver Huitfeldt)
16x OPV (Complement of 57 for a total of 912, displacing 3700 tons with a range of 9,200 km) (HNLMS Holland)
8x AOPS (complement of 45 for a total of 360, displacing 5900 tons with a range of 12,500 km) (new design)

Total Hulls = 44
Total Tonnage = 305,000
Total Sea Berths = 5624
Total Crew = 3272 (excluding air dets)
Free Berths = 2352 (~4000 austere)
Total Medium Helicopter Landing Spots = 40
Total Medium Helicopter Berths = 60

Total Crew Requirements (Current)    = 4835 (including air dets)
Total Crew Requirements (Projected) = 3272 (including air dets)
Crewing difference                                 = 1563
Air Det allowance for existing vessels = 400
Recovered PYs                                        = 1163

Proposal:
Allocate the recovered PYs to a Marine Light Infantry regiment of 2 battalions.
This would increase the infantry available to government by approximately 25% while maintaining the number of sea going trades.
The MLI would be available for boarding parties, anti-piracy patrols, NEO , raiding and conventional Light Infantry taskings.

Note: In my opinion the Holland class OPV is at least as capable a platform as the old St-Laurent class DDEs that sailed the North Atlantic for some 30 years.


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## Monsoon

Why would the Navy need eight area air defence destroyers if it only has eight of every other kind of task group combattant (including supply vessels) to shield? Why would we replace our twelve frigates with four older and less capable frigates? I expect you reckon that much of what the frigates do now can be replaced by a well-armed OPV, but that's not going to be the case with a crew of 57, which will pretty much limit the ship to one-shift, day time only evolutions: no 24-hour boarding ops from that platform.

And more to the point: where does the underlying assumption that CF operations are limited by the number of infantry battalions available come from?


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## SeR

Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada? With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.


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## PuckChaser

SeR said:
			
		

> Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada? With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.



Considering if it was something we actually needed, you could easily train existing Infantry to accomplish that mission, quite easily I'd expect.


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## Pat in Halifax

I started this as the first response and while composing it, three responses came in!
I was going to leave this one alone as there is another thread in here where people chose their 'dream' Navy. I am going to guess that you are of Scandinavian ancestry (and that is NOT an insult) based on the origins of the platforms listed. I must say, it is an intersting read as it actually meets the Navy's requirements as laid out in CFDS (Canada First Defence Strategy) which is the document being referred to for the basis of operational requirements for AOPS, JSS and CSC. I also find it necessary to say (and yes, I am familiar with the experiments by the USN, French Navy, Royal Navy to name a few) the initial ideas for crew reduction have been a little heavy handed. As an example, the USN conducted an experiment with one of their Flt II ABs. The normal crew complement of Flt I was about 360. They dropped it to 230 and were fine...until about day 6 or 7. After about 15 months, they ended up with a crew number of 336 (I think that was it-It was between 335-340 anyway). They also lost some second line maintenance capability which you may say gets done via an ISSC alongside. That is great until you lose all 4 (for example) generators 1000 miles from the closest land (This has happened with at least 2 Halifax class that I am aware of). You must maintain that capability-If you don't need it, that's great but when you do....
I have often thought about the OPV idea for the Navy too as many of our operations centre around environmental/sovereignty/fisheries/drug interdiction patrols almost within the littoral environment. I even thought "Why not build 25 more of those CCG Hero class PVs and throw a 25 mm RWS on their fo'c'sle". I can only assume that there is a strategic reason for this not being done.
I think we should have more submarines though and I suspect that our next submarine procurement in 15-20 years may indeed focus on this.
Finally, what the hell (pardon my language) do we need Marine Light Infantry Regiments for? We used to have a Landing Party with the premise that we may have to secure a jetty at a hostile location before bringing the ship alongside, but it was determined that in the Navy's current mandate, this eventuality was highly unlikely.
It is obvious you put some thought into this and there are some very good ideas. Unfortunately, the 'grown ups' will not hear of it. I remember years ago after the second or third stall of JSS, we had (then) CMS on board (I think it was STJ) briefing the Chiefs and POs. He said that the PM and PD Teams were going back to the drawing board and should have a preliminary JSS design in 18-20 months (This was 2005 by the way). The Cox'n proclaimed that in that room at that time, he had the required corporate knowledge and that if we kept the coffee coming and locked the door, we would provide a design exactly tailored to the Navy's needs by 0700 the next day. I still wonder why the CMS didn't take him up on his offer!
I will be interested to see who else may chime in here as I KNOW there are some on this site working on these projects.

Pat


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## Kirkhill

Thanks to all of you.
More reaction than I expected. 



> I am going to guess that you are of Scandinavian ancestry (and that is NOT an insult) based on the origins of the platforms listed


. 
Pat

Pat: 
You are not the first to speculate on my ancestry.  Many others have, much to the disadvantage of my mother.  ;D
To be clear, I am Scots-English with known ties to Holland and Flanders and likely ties to Danes, Vikings and other assorted northerners.

The only thing that ties me to my choices is a parsimony common to Scots and Dutch.  The reason that these vessels figure in my calculations is:
a)	They do things differently to the RN and the USN
b)	They are in the water (exceptions Karel Doormann – step-sisters Rotterdam and Johan de Witt are in the water - and the AOPS) 
c)	They have publicly published prices that suggest the capital cost of the entire fleet (exclusive of submarines) is on the order of 10 BCAD or about 1/3 of the total project budget to recapitalize the RCN’s surface fleet.  That should leave about 20 BCAD for project management, infrastructure, training aids and In Service Support.



> Why would we replace our twelve frigates with four older and less capable frigates?


HT

Hamiltongs: 
I assume that you think that the Karel Doormans I refer to are the older generation of Dutch Frigates. If so you are mistaken. If not then I am.
The Karel Doorman I am referring to is the latest iteration of the Rotterdam-Bay Class ships from Damen. 

The frigate replacements I am considering are the Danish vessels Absalon, the frigate with a cargo deck, and the Iver Huitfeldt, the same frigate but with twice the engines and minus the cargo deck and fitted for anti-air warfare.  12 Halifax for 4 Absalons and 8 Iver Huitfeldts.




> Why would the Navy need eight area air defence destroyers if it only has eight of every other kind of task group combattant (including supply vessels) to shield?


HT

My thinking is that the AOPS (and probably the subs) will be staying at home in near Canadian waters.  As will the majority of the OPV fleet.  I was reckoning on 4 distant water task groups of which 2 would be at sea at any one time.  Normally only one would be on expedition.

A distant water task group would comprise: a Karel Doorman JLSS, acting as AOR; an Absalon CLS,made up by yours truly – Command Logistics Ship; a pair of Iver Huitfeldts for AAW and 4 OPVs for screening and littoral warfare.  

I assumed that a 3700 tonne hull could also accommodate a sonar or a VDS if the need switched to ASW.  I also assumed the use of StanFlex weapons systems to permit the conversion of platforms to suit threat changes.

The rationale for the task group is that it could split into two elements: a forward element comprising the CLS, an AAW ship and a pair of OPVs; a rear element of the JLSS, an AAW ship and a pair of OPVs.

Thus the 8 AAWs.



> I expect you reckon that much of what the frigates do now can be replaced by a well-armed OPV, but that's not going to be the case with a crew of 57, which will pretty much limit the ship to one-shift, day time only evolutions: no 24-hour boarding ops from that platform.


HT

One of the distinctions of all the vessels described is that like the RN’s T45s and the AOPS they all have a capacity to carry troops or Mounties.

The Holland OPVs carry 40 OGDs each. The Huitfeldts carry 64 OGDs.  The Absalons carry 70.  The Doormans carry 150.  Together the Task Group would carry 4x40 + 2x64 + 1x70 + 1x150 for a total of 508 additional personnel.  Those could be soldiers, airmen, sailors or Mounties.



> I also find it necessary to say (and yes, I am familiar with the experiments by the USN, French Navy, Royal Navy to name a few) the initial ideas for crew reduction have been a little heavy handed. As an example, the USN conducted an experiment with one of their Flt II ABs. The normal crew complement of Flt I was about 360. They dropped it to 230 and were fine...until about day 6 or 7. After about 15 months, they ended up with a crew number of 336 (I think that was it-It was between 335-340 anyway). They also lost some second line maintenance capability which you may say gets done via an ISSC alongside. That is great until you lose all 4 (for example) generators 1000 miles from the closest land (This has happened with at least 2 Halifax class that I am aware of). You must maintain that capability-If you don't need it, that's great but when you do....



Pat:
I take your point about large crews but I would counter with two points:
a)	Would you rather have more people in one hull or would you rather sail in company?
b)	The Danes and the Dutch are already sailing operationally with “light” crews and many of the new designs out of France seem to be equally light.



> I have often thought about the OPV idea for the Navy too as many of our operations centre around environmental/sovereignty/fisheries/drug interdiction patrols almost within the littoral environment. I even thought "Why not build 25 more of those CCG Hero class PVs and throw a 25 mm RWS on their fo'c'sle". I can only assume that there is a strategic reason for this not being done.



The reason I opted for the larger Hollands is because I reckoned they would be more suitable for expeditionary work, they could more easily accommodate an ASW capability, they could support a medium to medium heavy helicopter and they could accommodate an additional body of personnel



> I think we should have more submarines though and I suspect that our next submarine procurement in 15-20 years may indeed focus on this.



No argument.
I intentionally left the subs out of the discussion because they are not in the current budget plans.

And now to the crux of the matter:



> Finally, what the hell (pardon my language) do we need Marine Light Infantry Regiments for? We used to have a Landing Party with the premise that we may have to secure a jetty at a hostile location before bringing the ship alongside, but it was determined that in the Navy's current mandate, this eventuality was highly unlikely.





> And more to the point: where does the underlying assumption that CF operations are limited by the number of infantry battalions available come from?





> Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada?





> With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.





> Considering if it was something we actually needed, you could easily train existing Infantry to accomplish that mission, quite easily I'd expect.



Is there a need for Marine Light Infantry?

Short form: No.

On the other hand there is a need for Light Infantry in particular and Infantry in general.  Finding an additional 1200 PYs would increase the Infantry branch by some 25% (4800 to 6000).

The RCN presents an opportunity to “do more with less”.   The merchant world as well as other navies are demonstrating that.  For the CF at large it presents an “opportunity”.

Could infanteers be trained to operate from ships? Yes.  But then you would have passengers and not sailors when things went pear shaped.

I also wanted to keep the PYs within the RCN and not transfer them to the Army to avoid that battle.

I am betting that people who enjoy being at sea, and I don’t think all infanteers enjoy sea duty, and that people that sign up for boarding parties, could be convinced to take on some extra training to handle “infantry” tasks on the high seas and in the littorals. Essentially becoming Marines.  Sailors first. Infanteers second.

With respect to the training – the army has the ability to run the courses for light troops, even if they were supplied by the RCN.  

It is precisely because of the financial situation that I took a look to see what was possible if minima were assumed as opposed to optima.

And now, over to you..... :warstory:


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## SeR

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> On the other hand there is a need for Light Infantry in particular and Infantry in general.



Is this just an assumption or do you actually know for a fact that the CF really needs more infantry. What I've heard is that it is far from being "in demand" at this point in time.


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## Kirkhill

My understanding is that the infantry is having difficulty manning its current 9 battalions and that there is continual discussion about the benefits of reducing to 6 battalions.  And that is assuming the authorized strength and before considering retention.


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## PuckChaser

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I am betting that people who enjoy being at sea, and I don’t think all infanteers enjoy sea duty, and that people that sign up for boarding parties, could be convinced to take on some extra training to handle “infantry” tasks on the high seas and in the littorals. Essentially becoming Marines.  Sailors first. Infanteers second.
> 
> With respect to the training – the army has the ability to run the courses for light troops, even if they were supplied by the RCN.



You're still not justifying the need for the RCN to have its own infantry, other than it would be cool. Yes, the CF in a perfect world needs more infantry pers, but they are needed in Battalions, not posted to ships. The army has enough of a backlog conducting its training, with budgets being slashed, without tossing in a marginally useful trade. You already have sailors first, "infanteer" second pers, thats your boarding party. If they're not up to tasks, then perhaps their training needs to be revisited, not just make a new trade.


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## SeR

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> My understanding is that the infantry is having difficulty manning its current 9 battalions and that there is continual discussion about the benefits of reducing to 6 battalions.  And that is assuming the authorized strength and before considering retention.



If that's the case, then how would it help to add two more battalions and put them with the Navy?


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## Infanteer

Don't get so hung up on the infantry bit - does this proposal better fit the RCN's roles and missions?  One respondant has looked at that so far.


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## McG

The use of any freed PYs is really a seperate discussion if they are invested into another existing capability or used to create something new.  The question here is the structure of the fleet and meeting the CFDS.


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## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> You're still not justifying the need for the RCN to have its own infantry, other than it would be cool. Yes, the CF in a perfect world needs more infantry pers, but they are needed in Battalions, not posted to ships. The army has enough of a backlog conducting its training, with budgets being slashed, without tossing in a marginally useful trade. You already have sailors first, "infanteer" second pers, thats your boarding party. If they're not up to tasks, then perhaps their training needs to be revisited, not just make a new trade.



Its not so much a matter of the cool factor.  Its more a matter of coming at the issue from two sides.  How many hulls can we put in the water with the available dollars and how many sailors do we need to crew them.

My proposal suggests that more hulls than we currently have can be put in the water with fewer crew than we currently employ.

Is this the right mix of hulls and capabilities?  I don't know.

Are the crewing assumptions correct?  I don't know.

I believe that we you can do things differently than the way you are.  In my opinion that is evidenced by the fact that other navies are doing things differently.


I also know that there are manning limits on the CF and all Services and in that environment that which Peter doesn't use Paul will.    That is the principal reason for the MLI suggestion.   I didn't want to get into a discussion about reducing the size of the RCN.  I guess I screwed the pooch on that one.


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## Monsoon

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Its not so much a matter of the cool factor.  Its more a matter of coming at the issue from two sides.  How many hulls can we put in the water with the available dollars and how many sailors do we need to crew them.


"Naval output" isn't measured in tonnes or any other unit of hulls-in-the-water; it's about what the various complementary hulls do to operate in concert.



> My proposal suggests that more hulls than we currently have can be put in the water with fewer crew than we currently employ.
> 
> Is this the right mix of hulls and capabilities?  I don't know.


I would suggest "no". Your model jettisons the balanced task group concept in exchange for (1) a lot of light infantry transport with supporting elements, (2) some domestic patrol capability, and (3) a couple of submarines, for some reason.



> I believe that we you can do things differently than the way you are.  In my opinion that is evidenced by the fact that other navies are doing things differently.


Doing "what" differently? No one inside the Navy is going to suggest that we don't have as much room for process improvement and general transformation as any other element/branch, but the form of transformation you propose is to have us stop doing the various things that navies do in exchange for becoming a very expensive light infantry transport service to enable unopposed marine landings.*



> I also know that there are manning limits on the CF and all Services and in that environment that which Peter doesn't use Paul will.    That is the principal reason for the MLI suggestion.   I didn't want to get into a discussion about reducing the size of the RCN.  I guess I screwed the pooch on that one.


No one is going to be blind to what's actually going on when you go looking for efficiencies in the RCN to support a significant increase in the size of Infantry branch, even if we go to the pretence of calling them the RCN's units. The Navy has leaned forward pretty significantly to reduce shipboard manning (some would say too far forward), but some of the platforms you mention are comically undermanned. I don't blame you for that - those are the boiler-plate crew sizes for those classes of ship - but it's worth considering that perhaps the enthusiasm to "do things differently" may have got the better of our Scandinavian friends, who's governments have a notably phlegmatic attitude towards defence spending. Maybe that sort of crewing can support ops for a couple of weeks, but I sure wouldn't want to be on that 57-man frigate at the tail end of a six-month deployment.


* Why "unopposed"? Because I don't see any allowance in your model for naval shore bombardment or offensive air support.


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## Kirkhill

To flesh out the discussion on capabilities

Current Naval Task Group:

3x Halifax FFH
	1x SMART-S
	1x SQS-510
	1x CH-124/CH-148
	8X HARPOON
	1X 57mm

1x Iroquois DDH
	1X LW-08
	1X DA-08
	2X SQS-510
	2X CH-124/CH-148
	29X Mk41 VLS Cells (Standard SM2)
	1x 76mm

1x Protecteur AOR
	3x CH-124/CH-148
	14,000 tons fuel
	400 tons aviation fuel
	1000 tons dry cargo
	1250 tons ammunition

Alternate Naval Task Group:

4x Holland OPV
	1x Thales Integrated Sensor and Communications Systems mast module
		Sea Master 400 APAR
		Sea Watcher 100 APAR
		Gatekeeper EO/IR
	1x NH-90/CH-148
	1x 76mm

2x Iver Huitfeldt FFG
	1x SMART-L
	1x APAR
	1x Atlas ASO-94 Hull Mounted Sonar
	1x AW101/CH-148
	32x Mk41 VLS Cells (Standard SM2)
	16x HARPOON
	2x 76mm	

1x Absalon CLS
	1x SMART-S
	1x Atlas ASO-94 Hull Mounted Sonar
	2x AW101/CH-148
	16x HARPOON
	1x Mk45 5”

1x Karel Doorman JLSS
	1x Thales Integrated Sensor and Communications Systems mast module
		Sea Master 400 APAR
		Sea Watcher 100 APAR
		Gatekeeper EO/IR
	1x 1060 m2 Hangar for 6x NH-90/CH-148 (2x CH-147)
	1x 2500m2 Flight Deck for 2x CH-147
	8000 m3 of fuel
	1000 m3 of aviation fuel
	450 m3 of potable water
	400 tonnes of ammunition
        1x Role 3 Hospital 
        125 Pax 
        1x 2350 m2 RoRo space for 2000x L-M of Vehicle Transport (5000 Tons)

I won't attempt to make a comment on the qualitative capabilities of the two task groups but quantitatively the capabilities appear to be in at least the same ball park if not weighted in favour of the Alternative Task Group.

With respect to crewing:

Are there not a variety of options available for crewing?
For DomOps and Near Waters light crews.
For Extended Operations some alternatives currently employed
      Swapping entire crews by air (USN LCS)
      3 Divisions with 2 onboard at any one time (NoCGV Svalbard)
      Using some/all of the additional cabins for additional watches 

With respect to weaponry:

Using the Danish Stanflex model SR76s can be upgraded to Mk45 5"s for expedition or down graded to 25-35mm for DomOps
Equally the sonar suites can be enhanced by adding a Towed Array module.

I don't envision Canada ever doing forcible entry anywhere at anytime.  We just don't have the budget or the political will for it.

I do see Canada needing to create sanctuaries and forward operating bases, either for NEOs or to support ongoing security operations.


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## Kirkhill

Some links:

Holland Brochure PDF
Damen OPV Brochure PDF
Holland OPV video

Iver Huitfeldt
Iver Huitfeldt

Absolon
Absolon

Karel Doorman
Karel Doorman
Karel Doorman

Thales Integrated Mast for Doorman and Hollands


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## jollyjacktar

Speaking as a (mostly) Tanker Wanker, while the Dutch JSS is interesting, I'm not too keen on it's liquid cargo capacity.  I prefer the idea of a proper replenishment ship which will have the capacity to do it right.  If you try to do too much, you might end up doing not enough at the end of the day.

If we'd not been burned so deeply over the Upholders we might have snapped up a Bay Class when they were being sold for a give away price.  That way we could do it proper there as well.  We do need the lift capability that an Amphibian brings to the table if nothing else for at least humanitarian missions such as Haiti or New Orleans.

Your proposal is interesting nevertheless, Kirkhill.


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## Kirkhill

Just looking again at this concept  and noticing that you can crew two AEGIR 18s (57 PYs) for less than one Dutch JLSS Crew (150 PYs).  Maybe, rather than 4 JLSS the solution is some a pair of JLSS and 3 AEGIRs.

Also, with respect to paying for these extra hulls, rather than creating an MLI, or transferring out the PYs from the Navy to the Army the better plan is to convert operating costs (salaries) into capital costs (hulls) and ops and maintenance (fuel and service).

I found this 1998 study by a USCG team evaluating European design practices with particular reference to manning practices and cost control processes.  It looked pretty interesting to me.  It also seemed to have particular relevance to the AOPS contract award discussion.

Design phases:

Feasibility - Navy
Concept - Navy

Decide what is possible and affordable

Hire competent, experienced yard

Preliminary Design - Yard
Contract Design - Yard

Decide what is buildable and affordable

Award Construction Contract

Detailed Design - Yard

Build


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## Kirkhill

And to turn this back closer to the original thought there is this:

Coastal Riverine Force







In keeping with the Naval Landing Parties that Pat referred to, this draws the Navy in closer to the shore and perhaps allows the Army to focus on dryland work.  

Again, I am not presuming to know what is the best use of dollars and people available.  I am tabling some notions on how those limited resources might be used.

Ultimately my aim is to better understand the options that might be supplied to the government within the resource envelope available.   A key driver in my outlook is my ongoing belief that all conflict demands person to person interaction, not weapon to object.  Weapon to object is a support function and benefits from technology.  Technology means that fewer people can monitor more objects over larger areas and control more weapons.

What technology can't do is replace the individual in direct contact with another individual.  And I am firmly of the opinion that our nation's influence is directly proportional to the number of those individuals that we can field.   Consequently I am looking at means of using the available resources to free up people from "support" roles to "interactive" roles.


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## Fabius

The modest proposal is I think a good point of departure for a discussion of what Canada needs and wants the RCN to do.  As was already indicated the configuration of the fleet in the proposal more closely aligns the RCN to what the CFDS has stated the requirements are.  I am honestly not very confident that the current plans Canada has for revitalising the RCN in terms of hulls will actually create a well balanced fleet adaptable to the array of missions we will likely see in the next 40 years. 

 	The international trend seems to be to be placing a significant amount of importance to the ability to operate in the littoral regions. This littoral capability is important I believe for Canada. If we are to play a significant role in responding to natural disasters such as Katrina, Haiti, the Tsunami in Japan, piracy in internationally critical sea lanes, naval embargoes etc as well as the more familiar Cold War mission sets like ASW, Sea Denial I think the RCN will need a fleet more in line with what Kirkhill has proposed than what we seem to be drifting towards.

	The original concept for the JSS is looking like it is becoming more and more strictly an AOR and that it will not offer the amphibious capability that we will actually require.  I do not think Canada has a requirement for an actual opposed landing capability but we definitely need something more robust than what we currently have.  The ability to carry and land large equipment, vehicles and personnel over a beach and provide the C2 for the whole operation is definitely of value.  Haiti is a perfect example of how valuable such a capability could be. 

	Interestingly the Army is I think getting better at conducting routine exercises with the RCAF so as to ensure that both elements know each others capabilities and requirements.  I do not see the same level of cooperation between the Army and the RCN although I think that is due to the fact that with the current capabilities of the RCN there is not much scope for cooperation, ie naval gun fire support, amphibious landing, airmobile ops etc etc.


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## quadrapiper

On the interoperability/joint note, would there be something to be said for formalizing some sort of capability (even just as a set of SOPs) to transport and land  (relatively) small parties of Army personnel via RCN platforms, whether the final approach is RHIB- or helicopter-borne? Not thinking opposed landings so much as relief or the like.


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## Monsoon

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> On the interoperability/joint note, would there be something to be said for formalizing some sort of capability (even just as a set of SOPs) to transport and land  (relatively) small parties of Army personnel via RCN platforms, whether the final approach is RHIB- or helicopter-borne? Not thinking opposed landings so much as relief or the like.


There is actually, within the RCN's Warfare Centre, a "keeper of the amphibious capability" who does exactly that. I would argue that Fabius' comment that there isn't much cross-training between the RCN and the CA for landings isn't strictly true: a couple of trial runs were conducted a few years back and the lessons learned captured. Unopposed landings ain't rocket scientology, and as a matter of course the Army would probably prefer to fly into secured area as readily as be transported by ship; it just isn't something that needs to be trained for constantly. And, as he pointed out, we don't have the physical plant to do opposed landings with any credibility. Until opposed landings becomes something that Canada envisions doing unilaterally (where we wouldn't be able to rely on our allies to provide the platforms), it probably isn't going to happen.

Littoral ops are another story, and are indeed getting a fair amount of strat-level attention within the RCN. That being said, littoral ops can be done with existing platforms (the direction the US took in trying to design a Littoral Combat Ship unique to the purpose was arguably a failure); what's missing is a concrete CONOPS.


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## Pat in Halifax

There's a thread on here somewhere about that. The vessel was USS Gunston Hall with landings done in Virginia I believe. There was a good size RCN TG attached too.
Other than that, I have no other info though I was on one of the frigates; STJ or HAL. I am sure some on here both in blue and green must have been part of that.


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## winnipegoo7

Kirkhill, 

I've sailed with the Danes. Their crews weren't large enough for them to conduct exercises 24 hours a day like Canadian ship can. 

When asked how they could possibly go to war like that, they said that the war plan was to double the ship's crew to enable 24 hour operations.

Just my 2 cents.


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## Kirkhill

winnipegoo7 said:
			
		

> Kirkhill,
> 
> I've sailed with the Danes. Their crews weren't large enough for them to conduct exercises 24 hours a day like Canadian ship can.
> 
> When asked how they could possibly go to war like that, they said that the war plan was to double the ship's crew to enable 24 hour operations.
> 
> Just my 2 cents.



Thanks for that.


----------



## a_majoor

If we want/need Infantry to hit the beaches, then we either need to get real amphibious warfare ships (like an LPD), or a helicopter carriers like the Hyūga that can ferry the troops and equipment ashore.

That would kind of eat any savings from any of the other changes. 

OTOH, given we are in the business of going places, this is probably an option that should be looked at anyway.


----------



## Kirkhill

A couple of further comments:

I take the point about the disadvantages of light crews but the net tendency does seem to be towards smaller core crews with additional personnel, and weapons, embarked when and if necessary, to suit the mission.


Frigates         Crew  Pax
F125		       110	80
T26	               118	72
Nansen	       120	26
FREMM 	       108	37
Absalon	       100	200
Huitfeldt	       101	64

Patrol Vessels
Svalbard	        48	75
AOPS	        45	40					
Holland	        54	40
Thetis	        47	54
BAM	                35	35					
Protector	        35	14
Clyde	        36	22
Rasmussen	18	25

I believe the same logic is applied throughout the fleets.

With respect to the opposed landing scenario:

I guess I am of the opinion that even without amphibious breaching kit light infantry (marine, RCN or Army) can still offer Canadian citizens overseas and their friends and allies, valuable support and assistance.  

A heliborne force embarked on ships is considerably more flexible than an airborne force that has to be landed by fixed wing assets or even by parachute.

1.  The embarked force has staying power that the airborne force doesn't have.  It can exist as an uncommitted threat for an extended period of time.

2.  The embarked heliborne force can threaten a larger geographical area than the air landed force although not as much as the parachute force.
     The larger potential area of operations means that it is more likely possible to find a secure landing site that could be occupied unopposed, potentially even landing strips that could support Hercs if not C17s.

3.  The embarked heliborne force can retire more easily than the airborne force and especially the parachute force.

4.  The embarked force can be supplied with a more extensive arms locker for flexibility and greater weight of ammunition and supplies for endurance in   the field

5.   The naval force gives the embarked force a secure base of operations

6.   The naval force supplies a refuge or sanctuary that would act as the first stage in a civil evacuation conveyor

7.   The naval force supplies a relief base for humanitarian efforts.

None of the above require the transport of main battle tanks or even 17 tonne TAPVs.

After the embarked force has secured a foothold ashore (assuming a two hour flying radius for a CH-148 that could be anywhere up to 400 km inland) then the force on the ground could be resupplied, or even reinforced, by air drop or possibly air landing.

Its all about maximum flexibility with what is available as opposed to assuming that every operation must be prepared for every eventuality.  Scharnhorst was wrong when he said every soldier should carry an axe in case he needs to knock down a door.  

As long as we are not being pressed by external forces to react to their agenda then we get to choose where, when and how we wish to intervene and with what strength.


Edit: to add flying radius duration.


----------



## chowchow1

In regards to the ships, I really cant say anything since I have no idea what any of the mentioned data really means.

As an NCO who has served 11 years in the infantry, I can touch on the Marine Light Infantry force mentioned.

We have 9 infantry battalions, and that is all we need. However, what is to say we cant transform two of these battalions into marine units? We have three light units, which have been very focused lately on arctic operations, and airborne/mountain ops, which is the sort of things that light units should be all about in Canada!

Do we need 6 mechanized battalions? Maybe not, when there aer things they could be better used for. If we were to re-designate two of these units as Marine, and send 1 or 2 PPCLI, and 2 RCR to their respective coasts, then there is the manning right there. Of course this would totally mess with the Brigades.

These units would still be able to function as infantry, much like the Royal Marines do.

My prefered option would be to use some of the reserve units that are stationed in Halifax and Victoria and try to specialize them in establishing beach heads and marine operations.

I really dont see the government coming up with the money to stand up a new unit. Although considering how large our coastline is, it is pretty strange that we dont have Marines.


----------



## Danjanou

chowchow1 said:
			
		

> …..My prefered option would be to use some of the reserve units that are stationed in Halifax and Victoria and try to specialize them in establishing beach heads and marine operations..



If we do go down this road, this does sound like a reasonable proposal, and not just two cities, St John's and/or Vancouver could be added as well and perhaps some inland ports ( Montreal or Toronto). Presuming  an average Militia Bn could  field a company, then 2-4 "Marine" units of company + (150-200) strength may be a idea or at least a test bed for something larger including as suggested a rerolled regular Lt Inf Bn or two.  Basic infantry skills with emphasis on amphibious operations and other skill sets like boarding parties, and/or dockyard defence added in as continuation training. 

Back in the middle 1980's the 1st Bn RNFLDR had more or less become a defacto "Marine" unit as I recall. It seemed outside of the mandatory 1-2 Winter Warfare exercises a  year just about every other FTX involved us playing with the local Naval reserve and getting wet on various parts of the South shore coast in little rubber boats. Just another way to get to work really, but I think someone on the BOR had reading too much regimental history about service about ships of the Provincial marine in Lakes Eire and Huron during the War of 1812.


Oh yeah JM before you wander in here, I'm not speaking from experience. I was not on the raid that seized the USS Tigress and USS Scorpion.  8)


----------



## chowchow1

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Back in the middle 1980's the 1st Bn RNFLDR had more or less become a defacto "Marine" unit as I recall. It seemed outside of the mandatory 1-2 Winter Warfare exercises a  year just about every other FTX involved us playing with the local Naval reserve and getting wet on various parts of the South shore coast in little rubber boats. Just another way to get to work really, but I think someone on the BOR had reading too much regimental history about service about ships of the Provincial marine in Lakes Eire and Huron during the War of 1812.



I have to say, it is pretty strange how little joint training we do. The concept of 'one mission, one team' would hold a lot more weight if we actually did some tri-force exercises! Obviously this would take A LOT of planning, but now that the war is over, this is the sort of stuff we should look at to keep people interested. Being in the Para-Coy I have had the fortune of working with the airforce on a number of occassions, and have been on a few of their bases, and it is always interesting to see how the other guys work.


----------



## dapaterson

As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment?


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment?



I agree that if this is a core military capability for the CF then it should be vested in the Regs.

What is this?

In my mind this is basic "infantry" skills.  

The issue for me is that not all infantry employment has to include carting around 20 tonne vehicles to carry your gear.    The Regs have to be able to deploy off the back of a 3000 tonne Patrol Vessel by CH-148, or by RHIB, as easily as they work with LAVs.  Primarily this means working with what they can carry, perhaps supplemented by light carriers like Quads and Snowmobiles.

The Reserves have to be able to do exactly the same as the Regs but with a little less proficiency.  

Ultimately this comes down to the value to the state of the single armed soldier with black caddies and how does that individual get where the government needs it.


----------



## Danjanou

chowchow1 said:
			
		

> I have to say, it is pretty strange how little joint training we do. The concept of 'one mission, one team' would hold a lot more weight if we actually did some tri-force exercises! Obviously this would take A LOT of planning, but now that the war is over, this is the sort of stuff we should look at to keep people interested. Being in the Para-Coy I have had the fortune of working with the airforce on a number of occassions, and have been on a few of their bases, and it is always interesting to see how the other guys work.



To be honest it was mainly an ad hoc informal arrangement (which usually seem to work out better go figure ). Being an "Army" unit lodged on what was basically a "Navy"(and Comms) centric station (CFS ST John's was (is?) part of MarCom then, and physically located across the street from the local Stone Frigate helped out. Also the personality of the respective CO's willing to think outside the box and support each other. HMCS Cabot had a ship  and needed reasons to go sailing. We needed another way to get to work. We also worked out other deals providing small arms and other assorted training for them and other units in the area. Good practice of our instructors too.

When I first arrived there the relation between the Naval Station Comd and the "Molitia" units he was forced to play landlord for was toxic at best.  His successor changed things for the better. Us acting as OPFOR a couple of years in a row for the annual Base Defence Ex couldn't hurt. Apparently losing ( as in notionally blowed up real good) the tank storage farm south of the city, the naval dock , and the antenna farm near the airport  a major NATO comms between North America and Europe during the Cold War within hours of each other does not look good on one's PER. Following this up having your whole BDF wiped out as an afterthought while they were sitting around drinking coffee in the mess and HQ buildings. We soon started training the Reg BDF in the finer points the next year and things like access to facilities etc improved. 8)



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment?



In an ideal world yes. However do we  have the money and numbers to set up or convert a Regular Bn? I aps don't see "Marine" or amphib etc ops etc as a core skill. As Kirkhill notes  core infantry skills are a reasonably well trained proficient troopie in black cadillac's. Mech, Airbourne, Airmobile, Marine, Mountain trained etc. are just different ways to get to work.


----------



## Infanteer

I'm putting this here as it is the only real place it fits.

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf

Interesting piece on the future direction of naval warfare.  Although it is talking about capabilities that are beyond the scope of the RCN, the general gist of "more surface stand-off capability means smaller, more "concealable" ships with something better than jets" is interesting.  There are numerous "Brown Water vs. Blue Water vs. White Water (Arctic - did I just make that up?)" topics that this paper touches upon that are probably worth discussing.

FWIW, should the RCN look to small surface ships that can fire missiles, launch SSMs or put ashore small raiding parties?  This all has the trappings of the French _Jeune Ecole_ of the 19th century, but maybe technology is making this approach more feasible today?


----------



## Kirkhill

At the risk of being accused of unabashed racking up of milpoints - and of repeating myself - I am going to transfer my comments on the Arctic Sovereignty Submarine thread to this one.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/96172/post-1235182.html#msg1235182



> Ships are mobile islands that allow a nation to create sovereign havens where the government of the day sees fit.
> 
> It doesn't matter the size of the ship or the size of the crew it is still sovereign territory.  Those islands are agents of influence for the government both at home and abroad.  Not all of those islands need to be in high threat environments all the time.  Often vessels are required in places like the Horn of Africa, the Straits of Malacca and the Caribbean where risks are not much more elevated than they would be in Canada's EEZ.
> 
> 
> 
> Jackie Fisher described the Army as just another projectile to be launched by the Navy.
> 
> With that in mind I compiled the following list of projectiles available to Canada, either in the current inventory or at reasonable cost, that can be launched from vessels in the 2000 to 6000 tonne displacement range.  In other words affordable vessels, not Big Honking Ships, although they would be nice.  That range includes River, Rasmussen and Holland class OPVs as well as Absolons and Endurance class support ships.  It also includes FREMMs, MEKOs, Huitfeldts, Nansens, 7 Provinces and many similar vessels.
> 
> The List:
> 
> Air Assets
> 
> CH-147  13 tonnes
> CH-149  11 tonnes
> CH-148    8 tonnes
> CH-146    4 tonnes
> MQ-8C     2 tonnes
> MQ-8B     1 tonne
> ScanEagle  18 kg
> 
> Harpoon ER  700 kg
> SM2              700 kg
> ESSM            300 kg
> Hellfire            50 kg
> Griffin              20 kg
> APKWS II        20 kg
> 
> 76mm                5 kg
> 57mm                2 kg
> 35mm                1 kg
> 25mm              500 g
> 20mm              100 g
> 12.7mm             50 g
> 7.62mm             10 g
> 
> Sea Assets
> 
> LCVP MkV(c)  16 tonnes
> Strb90H         15 tonnes
> LCP                  7 tonnes
> 
> ISE Theseus     9 tonnes
> RMMV                7 tonnes
> ISE Arctic Exp    2 tonnes
> Mk48 ADCAP     2 tonnes
> CAPTOR            1 tonne
> Mk46 Torp        230 kg
> Seaspider ATT  ----
> 
> Land Assets
> 
> Soldiers            100 kg
> 
> Vehicles......
> 
> In addition the islands carry surveillance gear (as do many of the projectiles)
> 
> Dutch OPVs contribute to their Recognized Maritime Picture with the Thales IM-400 Mast with an AESA 3D Volume Search Radar, a Surface Search Radar,  and EO Surveillance, tracking and fire control system.   Sonars are ubiquitous.
> 
> More islands equals a more comprehensive picture and more havens and more launch points.  The minimum requirement is a deck on which a CH-147 can land and refuel and a hull capable of launching a 10 to 20 tonne vessel over the side or off the stern.
> 
> Not all islands need to have all the projectiles all the time.  All islands should travel in company and be appropriately equipped for the threat.
> 
> I am a fan of minimal crewing - ...... (Edit - to eliminate a weak digression that did nothing to serve the argument - Thanks OGBD )
> 
> 
> ....Today I would argue that there is even less call for large complements (than in earlier days).
> 
> A large vessel with a small crew of twenty or so can supply a mobile sovereign haven on which a CH-147 can light and which can man the onboard sensors.
> 
> A similar sized weapons det (Absolon uses about 20 to 25 and the Rheinmetall shorebased Skyshield system uses even fewer) supplies self defence.
> 
> 20 for an Air det to launch and recover the host of helos and UAVs
> 
> 20 for a deck det to launch and recover sea assets and handle RAS duties.
> 
> 20 to supply "hotel" services.
> 
> Beyond that the complement becomes "projectiles".
> 
> I would argue that a large fleet of "value-priced" hulls that require minimal manning and that can be up-gunned and up-manned as national circumstances demand is both more cost effective and useful and than a small fleet of tailored vessels crammed to the gunwales with every available AB the RCN is permitted to hire.
> 
> Those hulls could either be large OPVs that can be upgunned for higher intensity conflicts and/or Frigates that can be degunned for lower intensity "constabulary" work.
> 
> One other point - not all projectiles have to have lethal effect to be effective agents of influence.  Survey work, logistics, humanitarian assistance and maintaining free passage - as well as maintaining law and order - all serve to establish a nation's rights and ability to operate freely broadly.




An additional comment would be that not all vessels have to be manned and not all weapons under command need to be on board.  Unmanned semi-submersibles acting as "floating arsenals/magazines" sailing in company are a viable option.  That would leave the manned surface vessels primarily operating as tenders commanding and supporting all of the unmanned vessels and aircraft sailing in company.


----------



## a_majoor

Being in one of those transitional periods in history is always interesting (in the Chinese sense).

When the Romans finally cleared the Med of all their enemies the transitioned their fleet from the large galleys (like the quinquereme or "five") to small Liburnians (generally with single banks of oars) which were better suited for anti piracy operations and coastal patrols. Thousands of years later, the British finally settled the Napolionic wars and discovered their "Ships of the Line" were no longer very useful for supressing the slave trade, coastal patrols and other duties the RN needed to undertake. The fleet transitioned to Frigates through the mid century before "new" technology like ironclad construction, steam propulsion and rifled cannons began to make an impact. Today, with the Cold war over, the need for mighty fighting platforms like CVN's has drastically diminished, although like Ships of the Line they still hold a magical attraction to many people.

Canada has an interesting conundrum: we have very long coastlines (which suggest we should have a lot of ships), but also sail in some of the roughest seas in the world (which suggests we need large ships) and also project forces around the world (which also is done better with large ships). Add the need to patrol and operate in the arctic (which need specialized ships) and our Naval planners have a very intricate balancing act, especially given the budget and resources they have to operate with.

Even suggesting out of the box solutions is only a partial measure; we still have to absorb the R&D costs without much hope of defraying the costs through sales to foreign navies (few navies have similar needs, except perhaps Australia). What to do?

Edit to add: An interesting read and still rather relavent today: http://www.scribd.com/doc/30892578/Alternative-Submarines


----------



## Stoker

Perhaps a significant number of cheaply built coastal patrol ships to patrol the coastline and if they find something then larger more capable ships take over bases out of Halifax and Esquimalt. The other force would be a mixed frigate and AOR combination to take care of overseas commitments, alternate one coast per year. Build HF wave surface radar installations along the coast in conjunction with unmanned drones.  The coastline would be well protected and a capable force for overseas. The Coastal patrol boats could be crewed by reservists, while the others regular force.


----------



## Kirkhill

Chief - I'm right with right up until the last sentence.

I think the Coastal Force needs to be a reg force entity as well (or perhaps even Coast Guard, as suggested by OGBD?).  In peace time those ships could be "undergunned and undermanned" with reservists picking up the slack when and if an appropriate crisis level is achieved and identified by the government of the day.

I believe that given current manning practices (using the latest in unmanned enginerooms for example) even large patrol ships could be manned by tight crews in local waters.  That would leave more of the existing bodies available for what I would characterize as JUSTIFIABLE overmanning for ships in distant waters and ships sailing in harms way.


----------



## Stoker

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Chief - I'm right with right up until the last sentence.
> 
> I think the Coastal Force needs to be a reg force entity as well (or perhaps even Coast Guard, as suggested by OGBD?).  In peace time those ships could be "undergunned and undermanned" with reservists picking up the slack when and if an appropriate crisis level is achieved and identified by the government of the day.
> 
> I believe that given current manning practices (using the latest in unmanned enginerooms for example) even large patrol ships could be manned by tight crews in local waters.  That would leave more of the existing bodies available for what I would characterize as JUSTIFIABLE overmanning for ships in distant waters and ships sailing in harms way.



To use the Coast Guard as a force similar to the US Coast Guard if I assume that's what you mean will be a big shift for the Coast Guard that exists now. Perhaps a mixed reg/res crewing model can work as what the AOPs are and the rest of the Navy are moving towards. Small crews can be done, but the capability that you won't have and what the navy will accept is two different things. I would love to see the reserves in a regular operational role as they have proven they are capable of doing.


----------



## Kirkhill

I yield to the man with experience.... No worries here if you think the reserves can maintain a stable manning level.

And I take your point on the Coast Guard vis a vis an armed service.  I guess I was reckoning that much of the patrol work does NOT require armed intervention beyond a small arms equipped team (perhaps with a helicopter in overwatch - manned or unmanned).  That would mean that an RCN or RCMP team could launch from a Coast Guard platform without putting an unarmed platform at risk.  With a common platform and the STANFLEX model then unarmed Coast Guard patrol ships (with a leavening of RCN manned armed vessels) could be armed and manned by RCN reservists if the threat level increased.

As an aside - 

On the Look Cool front, and outside the box, there is this 2010 concept from DCNS - a 3000 ton - submersible frigate with a crew of 27.

39 knot transit speed on the surface and divable with AIP








http://en.dcnsgroup.com/innovation-technology/smx-25/
http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/smx-25-dcns-devoile-son-concept-de-sous-marin-de-surface
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMX-25

Large ship, small crew, rapid transit for long coast lines and stealth...... Of course there are drawbacks: the source for one. ;D


----------



## Stoker

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I yield to the man with experience.... No worries here if you think the reserves can maintain a stable manning level.
> 
> And I take your point on the Coast Guard vis a vis an armed service.  I guess I was reckoning that much of the patrol work does NOT require armed intervention beyond a small arms equipped team (perhaps with a helicopter in overwatch - manned or unmanned).  That would mean that an RCN or RCMP team could launch from a Coast Guard platform without putting an unarmed platform at risk.  With a common platform and the STANFLEX model then unarmed Coast Guard patrol ships (with a leavening of RCN manned armed vessels) could be armed and manned by RCN reservists if the threat level increased.
> 
> As an aside -
> 
> On the Look Cool front, and outside the box, there is this 2010 concept from DCNS - a 3000 ton - submersible frigate with a crew of 27.
> 
> 39 knot transit speed on the surface and divable with AIP
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://en.dcnsgroup.com/innovation-technology/smx-25/
> http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/smx-25-dcns-devoile-son-concept-de-sous-marin-de-surface
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMX-25
> 
> Large ship, small crew, rapid transit for long coast lines and stealth...... Of course there are drawbacks: the source for one. ;D



Pretty Slick. I would love to see something like the Armidale Class patrol ships, compliment of about 25 pers, manning with something like that wouldn't be a problem. I do understand the point of a RCN boarding team to deploy from a Coast Guard ship, sort of like taking Coast Guard boarding teams on the KINGSTON Class during OP Caribbe.


----------



## dimsum

Chief Stoker said:
			
		

> Pretty Slick. I would love to see something like the Armidale Class patrol ships, compliment of about 25 pers, manning with something like that wouldn't be a problem. I do understand the point of a RCN boarding team to deploy from a Coast Guard ship, sort of like taking Coast Guard boarding teams on the KINGSTON Class during OP Caribbe.



Back in 2004 or so, when doing a GLD we passed by the Irish Ship LE Niamh, a Roisin-class OPV who was doing some sort of goodwill tour to Toronto, etc.  With the same (or similar) crew, it was like what an MCDV could (or should) have become.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%89_Niamh_(P52)

The Armidales are pretty nice as well, and their home ports of Cairns and Darwin aren't too bad.  Nothing like Fleet Base East (Sydney) and West (Perth) though; the RAN has a good stranglehold on desirable properties in Australia


----------



## Stoker

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Back in 2004 or so, when doing a GLD we passed by the Irish Ship LE Niamh, a Roisin-class OPV who was doing some sort of goodwill tour to Toronto, etc.  With the same (or similar) crew, it was like what an MCDV could (or should) have become.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%89_Niamh_(P52)
> 
> The Armidales are pretty nice as well, and their home ports of Cairns and Darwin aren't too bad.  Nothing like Fleet Base East (Sydney) and West (Perth) though; the RAN has a good stranglehold on desirable properties in Australia



I was on that trip, lovely ship. She was in Quebec city for the Naval Gathering a few years ago and had a pretty good tour. I started in the Engine room and ended up in the mess drinking Jamesons from a full pint glass.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Super modern and James Bond capable surface craft are not required to run successful amphibious operations. 

The war in the Falkland Islands was won with the humble RO-RO (Roll On, Roll Off) ferry e.g.,: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Norland

Also, on three deployments to arctic Norway we traveled, and deployed into major exercises, courtesy of the ships from:   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DFDS_Seaways

All supported by a cracker jack surface/ sub-surface deep water naval fleet, with adequate air cover, of course.  :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Super modern and James Bond capable surface craft are not required to run successful amphibious operations.
> 
> The war in the Falkland Islands was won with the humble RO-RO (Roll On, Roll Off) ferry e.g.,: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Norland
> 
> Also, on three deployments to arctic Norway we traveled, and deployed into major exercises, courtesy of the ships from:   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DFDS_Seaways
> 
> All supported by a cracker jack surface/ sub-surface deep water naval fleet, with adequate air cover, of course.  :nod:



Point taken on the JBCSC (Acronym of the Day) - but they do look cool and they do a lot of stuff with out using up a lot of sailors.

But if we take a step back from the JBCSC and look at the near-time horizon and our peers, we see a tendency to put ships in the water that can carry packets of troops (or extra sailors) when and as the situation requires.  Given that tendency it leaves open the question as to whether a BHS is required or whether or not a flotilla of Absalon "Frigates" (70 PAX std, 300 PAX overload) can achieve the same effect.    If heavy gear is required then, as you suggest, a simple RoRo or 3 would suffice.

It seems to my landlubbers eye that a number of small ships has benefits over a single large ship.  Something to do with Surprise, Concentration of Forces (on the objective) and Economy of Effort perhaps.  Maybe some Mutual Support with a bit of Redundancy thrown in for good measure.

Rather than ships being the pieces of the puzzle, I want them to be the board.  I don't want them to be Knights or Bishops.  I want them to be the black and white squares which permit the Knights and Bishops and Pawns to be moved wherever the King  requires.  The board can be set up anywhere, at any time, and can constantly change in shape.  It permits the Land Forces to manoeuvre by air (helo) to any unprotected area and establish a bridgehead that can be reinforced over time and held, forcing the "other guy" to come to us. 

And I know it isn't a game......


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Tugs on this coast are run with 2-5 man crews. Same with Fishing boats. Patrol craft would need be speedy but sea kindly, always a tough balance. Use a lot of modern materials to keep maintenance from being an issue. Please, please arm them. Design them to be able to be fitted with fairly fancy guns and small ship to ship missiles (Hellfires perhaps?) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iYXBvCrzbHo

But fit them for now with something like the 35mm chain gun or 20mm and .50cal. run them with a mix of Reg and reservist crew. If a few of the projects destined for Prince Rupert move ahead, open a reservist station at Seal Cove, contract Coast Guard to provide support services. A patrol vessel could be stationed there in the summer and patrol that portion of the coast and Haida Gwaii. Since we have a territory dispute up there anyways a good way to show we still believe it's our waters.


----------



## a_majoor

DARPA wants to give the USN robotic help to maintain cntrol of the seas with ever fewer ships (we have certainly come a long way from President Reagan's "600 ship navy"). Since we have a similar issue with declining resources compared to our current and possible future tasks, this may well be an approach for our Navy to look at as well:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/09/hydra-darpa/



> DARPA’s Plan to Flood the Sea With Drones, Carrying More Drones
> BY ALLEN MCDUFFEE09.13.136:30 AM
> 
> DARPA, the Pentagon’s research agency, has recently revealed its plans to boost the Navy’s response to threats in international waters by developing submerged unmanned platforms that can be deployed at a moment’s notice.
> 
> Hydra, named after the serpent-like creature with many heads in Greek mythology, would create an undersea network of unmanned payloads and platforms to increase the capability and speed the response to threats like piracy, the rising number of ungoverned states, and sophisticated defenses at a time when the Pentagon is forced to make budget cuts. According to DARPA, the Hydra system ”represents a cost effective way to add undersea capacity that can be tailored to support each mission” that would still allow the Navy to conduct special operations and contingency missions. In other words, the decreasing number of naval vessels can only be in one place at a time.
> 
> “The climate of budget austerity runs up against an uncertain security environment that includes natural disasters, piracy, ungoverned states, and the proliferation of sophisticated defense technologies,” said Scott Littlefield, DARPA program manager, in a statement. “An unmanned technology infrastructure staged below the oceans’ surface could relieve some of that resource strain and expand military capabilities in this increasingly challenging space.”
> 
> The Hydra system is intended to be delivered in international waters by ships, submarines or aircraft with the integrative capability of communicating with manned and unmanned platforms for air, surface, and water operations.
> 
> Unlike the Upward Falling Payloads (UFPs) program DARPA announced in January that would submerge massive waterproof containers intended to store weapons, drones and supplies for years at a time, Hydra is a highly mobile platform that can be deployed for a few weeks or months in relatively shallow international waters.
> 
> “By separating capabilities from the platforms that deliver them, Hydra would enable naval forces to deliver those capabilities much faster and more cost-effectively wherever needed,” said Littlefield. “It is envisioned to work across air, underwater, and surface operations, enabling all three to perform their missions better.”
> 
> Proposals are due October 22, but it may well 2018 before Hydra lands in the ocean.


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## jollyjacktar

I can see the allure of this.  Drones/robots don't need pensions, salary, vacation, benefits of any sort.  Don't sleep, eat or get tired.  Won't have a fit of conscience and rat you out to Wikkileaks. Perfect. 
Next step, "Skynet".


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## UnwiseCritic

1984 is taking awhile to get here...


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