# All Arms Light Forces



## McG (2 Mar 2005)

Zipper said:
			
		

> Ok. Now I am REALLY confused. What the hell do you guys consider light?



According to the Light Forces Working Group light forces are principally foot borne forces optimized for military operations in complex environment, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform. This definition was addopted in Nov 04 when the then proposed definition (A dismounted infantry-based force optimized for complex terrain and designed for rapid strategic deployability, operational and tactical agility, and combat power, which achieves high levels of lethality and protection through interoperability with coalition forces and the exploitation of technology) was rejected.

How well do people feel that the light battalions have done in developing/sustaining light doctrines & capabilities?   What about the other arms which are not formally established to have light capabilities but which must still step-up to the plate if called?


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## PPCLI Guy (2 Mar 2005)

I've been out of a light battalion for too long too offer anything up to date.  I will say however that it seems a shame that we. as ever, have backed into this, and downloaded the doctrine (vice TTP) development to the shop floor.

Dave


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## DELTADOG13 (2 Mar 2005)

So far what I've read about the ongoing debate on Light Forces is this. We can't firm up doctrine, TTP's or how the non-infantry trades will attach on to those designated Light units. There is loads of working groups and the like but no real consensus on what to do.

My spin on this is to dedicate a battalion from one of the regiments to start developing the TTP's with dedicated units from the artillery, engineers and CSS units. So everyone can have some input. When that is accomplished all the light battalions and those support units should come together and fine tune everything. We did it for LAV units it shouldn't be that hard as the basis for light doctrine has been around for ever. My two cents.


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## Jungle (2 Mar 2005)

As I mentionned before: it will be nearly impossible for the LIBs to develop as long as they are part of the CMBGs. They should either be grouped in a new formation or remain as independant units under LFHQ.
An example of the kind of problems the LIBs run into: while I was the UEO in a LIB, we had planned an EX where the Batt would deploy by air (Para Coy would jump in, secure an APOE, where the rest of the Batt would be airlanded) to carry out a NEO. During the final week of preps for the EX, the Bde Comd imposed a defensive scenario on our CO... it had a big impact on the EX.


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## KevinB (2 Mar 2005)

> principally foot borne forces



 Well that does kind of rule out intergrating other trades...

I doubt the gunners want to start dragging guns again  

 I think when the SW portion of CABC (opps) CPC gets on line we will get get firmer direction (I hope)


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## Zipper (2 Mar 2005)

What do other forces do? The US Mountain Div? The British Light Div's? There must be examples of this that we can adapt to our needs?

I stayed away from the Airborne units (82nd, 1st Para.) considering we barely have any now.


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## Kirkhill (3 Mar 2005)

The question is how light is light?

Rangers are light and are "footborne" with some light jeeps - but have been issued Strykers for their latest Afghanistan deployment.

Brit Paras are light but use Landrovers and the little Supacat 6x6 runabout to get around.

The Royal Marines are light but use Landrovers and the Bv206 and the BVS10 Viking (a 7 meter 10 tonne vehicle) as well as the Pinzgauer truck which weighs in at 4 tonnes.

Other armies define light other ways.

As far as I can see it has a lot to do with the available transport to support the force strategically, operationally and tactically.  The common feature from this vantage point is that all the Light forces are air portable, either by fixed or rotary wing.  And that is true of the Royal Marines as well.


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## Infanteer (3 Mar 2005)

I believe that "Light" doctrine is something that should be considered an All-Arms, Joint capability.  A few tasks that come off the top of my head that underline the Joint nature of this concept (as opposed to an Infantry-centric one):

-  Airmobile delivery of Light Artillery to a remote area in order to support combat in difficult terrain.
-  An amphibious insertion of a Light Infantry/Engineer task force to clear a beach and secure it for rapid follow on of heavier forces.
-  Airborne drop of a High Readiness Light Company (composed of Infantry, Engineer, Artillery, CS and CSS assets) to secure an airhead for a follow on Battlegroup.
-  The Weasel has been mentioned before as a suitable "Light" armoured vehicle that is versatile enough to allow the Armoured Corps to provide a that extra "umph" to Light Forces if required.

These are just a few I whipped up - shoot 'em down if you don't agree, but I think these are capabilities that have real "cred" with our allies and that we should look at when shopping for Light Force capability.

As well, I think Light Forces need to be built to address Operations in Difficult and Adverse Terrain.  Medium and Heavy Forces are great where terrain allows mechanized assets to wheel/track in extra firepower, protection, and mobility but when you get into Jungles, Mountains, certain Urban environments and Temperate Forests the capability of Light Forces becomes apparent.  As well, I feel that the "Close Contact" nature of Light Force employment makes it more suited for tasks in which the indirect nature of Medium/Heavy force firepower is a liability (eg - fighting insurgents, etc).

LtCol (then Major) Wayne Eyre used a diagram in an Article about Light Force intergration (found here) which shows that there is a clear area where the employment of Light Forces is desired.  The article argues for the intergration of Light and Mechanized capabilities within the Brigade Group, but as Jungle alluded to, I am sure a good argument could be made for giving the Light Forces their own "home Formation" as a center of Light Force doctrine, training, and administration.  Perhaps that is a direction that this thread can explore.


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## TangoTwoBravo (3 Mar 2005)

My impression right now is that the Army is actually taking a farily well-thought out approach to the development of our Light Forces.  There is a "working group" that is looking ten to fifteen years down the road in terms of roles, doctines, structures and equipment.  I know that at least one of the Battalions also runs a working group that includes representatives from the different arms in order to prepare for the Army level one (I attended one of the meetings as an armoured rep).  I think that we are moving away from having "Mech battalions on light scales" to having actual Light Forces and I think that this idea holds great promise.

The infantry, of course, will be the dominant arm in a Light Force but the other arms can and should have a role to play.  It may mean having to work with less equipment (which the other arms do not always like to do).  That being said, heavy forces can be integrated with light forces very effectively in urban environments.

What we really need are CH-47s or some other medium/heavy lift capability.  I believe that our focus should be on airmobility.

Cheers,

2B


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## Slim (3 Mar 2005)

> What we really need are CH-47s or some other medium/heavy lift capability.  I believe that our focus should be on airmobility.



Hey Gents

My understanding of a "light" strategy still involves some sort of battlefield delivery system, whether that means a fleet of helicopters or trucks, there is still a requirement for tpt assets. I don't know that we as an armed force could move ahead with a light strategy unless we first come to terms with that issue...

Slim


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## rw4th (3 Mar 2005)

> According to the Light Forces Working Group light forces are principally foot borne forces optimized for military operations in complex environment, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform.


This sounds so vague as to suggest that they really don't know what the hell to do with the light units. Has the working group actually outlined the types of operations that light units should be able to perform?



			
				Jungle said:
			
		

> As I mentionned before: it will be nearly impossible for the LIBs to develop as long as they are part of the CMBGs. They should either be grouped in a new formation or remain as independant units under LFHQ.



This does seem to be a major part of the problem. I also believe the US "Light" units, like the 10th Mountain Infantry and 101st, have organic support assets who train to operate within the "light" unit's particular doctrine.



> During the final week of preps for the EX, the Bde Comd imposed a defensive scenario on our CO... it had a big impact on the EX.


This actually sounds like it might have been political.


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## Kirkhill (3 Mar 2005)

Agree with you Slim,

Which is why I propose looking at the transport platforms that are available to us, rotary, fixed wing and wheeled/tracked and look at them as an entity and evaluate price and capability of the package.

In our current situation we can start by looking at the transport available or likely (C130s, FWSAR-C27J/C295, CH149s, CH148s, CH146s - upgraded or not, together with Light/Medium Support Vehicles and Light Recce Vehicles, M109 replacement) and see what is possible.   If what is possible is not sufficient then start moving up the scale to determine what we have to do - Starting with buying CH-147s if we want to be able to deploy armoured, amphibious, oversnow vehicles like the BvS10 Viking to our own backyard.


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## McG (3 Mar 2005)

I think we are missing one important factor in the light force definition:



> not tied to any one platform


I believe that this applies to both the platforms that the light force is inserted with and the platform that the light force operates out of after insertion.

The light forces need a structure and doctrine that will allow them to operate out of LSVW, BV206, Supacats, LOSV & tobbagin, mules, or nothing.  We must be able to insert them by air, sea, or land.  Once inserted, they manoeuvre and fight dismounted with all or most integral vehicles operating in support roles (DFS, wpns tractor, CSS).  

I think this means an organization that is flexible enough to incorporate vehicles without any significant reorganization and a doctrine that includes guidelines for the employment of progressively heavier types of vehicles within the structure (but at no point after insertion does any vehicle become essential to the structure's functioning).

The only exception to my zero dependance on vehicles rule would be a light cavalry element.  However, this means that the light force would require the flexibility to operate with or without its light cavalry support (depending on terrain and the ability to insert vehicles).

I agree with 2Bravo that the Army is taking a well though out approach to developing the light doctrine but I am sceptical that it will be successfully practiced without a light formation.  It is not the light battalions that I worry about.  It is all the other elements of the Bde that traditionally see supporting the medium force as their priority, but which would be called on to for a deployed light BG.


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## Infanteer (3 Mar 2005)

McG is right, Light Forces will be most flexible when not tied to any one platform.

Looking at the diagram of "capability suitability", Light Forces have the ability to deploy (and be useful) across the spectrum of terrain/theaters.

They are least suitable in a Desert/Plains environment - their are exceptions such as the 101st Air Assault into Iraq for the "Left Hook" in the first Gulf War - but for the most part these are only "extras" that are backed up with mechanized/armoured formations.

They are equally useful in Mixed (Open), Mixed (Closed) and Woods environments.   This is where Light Forces can "pony up" with Light Wheeled Vehicles and Light Armoured Vehicles (The Weasel and the new BVS10 that the Royal Marines are using come to mind).

Light Forces are most applicable to Dense Forests, Mountains, and Jungles.   This is where transport will largely be by Heliborne insertion or throwing on the ruck and yomping through the bushes.

Conclusions:

- Airborne capability is essential across environments from Desert (US drop into Northern Iraq) to Jungle/Mountain (pending a suitable DZ can be found - Rangers in Afghanistan).   I believe that all soldiers in a "Light Formation" should be Jump qualified.

- Airmobility capability is also essential across environments.   All "Light soldiers" should be "Air Assault" qualified and work intimately with helicopters (which we need and which the new CDS seems determined to get).

- A small and light vehicle fleet can be kept on hand for when the situation warrants it (working with Mech Forces, Peace Support Ops, etc, etc).

- The ability to do the job on foot must be seen as inevitable; this means high fitness that sees Ruckmarching as a "Light" Task, the ability of "Light Artillery" units to leave their guns and hump mortar tubes if situation renders larger guns useless, and the ability of Support to leave vehicles behind and operate with other means such as ATV's, local porters, or donkeys (don't laugh, the 1/6 BLT used donkeys in combat in Afghanistan; its in the Small Wars Manuel).

Perhaps this is another argument for putting all the Light Battalions and Light Support Units (Engineers, Artillery, CS, CSS, and perhaps Armour?) into a single Formation - that Brigade can both have an integral Helicopter unit (with Tac Transport not far away) dedicated to working with and supporting Light Force capability and it can maintain a pool of vehicles if the Light Forces decide to drive to work.


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## Kirkhill (3 Mar 2005)

I can agree with your formulation of what it would take to do a "Light" task, but I will still argue that there exists the option of configuring the section (definitely), the platoon (most likely) and the company (probably) in such a fashion that it can be melded with what ever transport the government supplies.  And if that is the case then they can also meld with an armoured transport and keep up with a Cavalry force.

The tactics, training and procedures, and fitness levels, for all Infanteers would be the same.  Refresher training for particular transport may or may not be necessary.

The only difference amongst the Infantry battalions is that 3 battalions would be populated by guys with jump wings tacked on.


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## Infanteer (3 Mar 2005)

Kirkhill,

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27675.0.html

I disagree with your idea on the fact that there is fundamental differences between the Mech Battle and the Light Battle.


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## McG (3 Mar 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I can agree with your formulation of what it would take to do a "Light" task, but I will still argue that there exists the option of configuring the section (definitely), the platoon (most likely) and the company (probably) in such a fashion that it can be melded with what ever transport the government supplies. And if that is the case then they can also meld with an armoured transport and keep up with a Cavalry force.


Yes, an APC could be used as the means to insert light forces and it could even remain with the force during the conduct of the operation.  However, the best dual-role force structure would fall short in light operations when compared to a structure optimised for light ops.

I think our progress on light forces should be going in the opposite direction.  We need to support elements that are optimized for light ops.


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## Zipper (3 Mar 2005)

Ok. If I understand this well enough, I have to ask what are the chances of us moving towards this idea? 

Not that I do not agree with much that is said here. But with the demise of the Airborne and a fat chance of them coming back for political reasons (as well as coming close to amphibian operations), I wonder if we will not be more likely to mimic either of the units I mentioned before? You folks always seem to use either the airborne or marines as a comparison. Great forces yes, but likely for us? Nope. I think the closest we'll get is a few helicopters to ferry them around, and then it will be up to light vehicles and humping it. 

Now to ask. Do we still have any kind of support mechanism left over from the ol' SSF days? Or could we either once again make SSF possible, or re-task 2 brigade to fill this role? I do not know how feasible either option is, but its worth looking at since it did have the built in support at hand.

As for someones comment about having a all arms force. I agree to a point. However with the direction that we're headed now, all formations will rotate around Infantry. Everything else is just support. That is unless 2B writes a glowing article and the cavalry actually becomes a reality.


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## PPCLI Guy (3 Mar 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> McG is right, Light Forces will be most flexible when not tied to any one platform.
> Looking at the diagram of "capability suitability", Light Forces have the ability to deploy (and be useful) across the spectrum of terrain/theaters.




It is the lack of a specific platform, or perhaps the *choice * of a number of platforms, that is the true strength of Light Forces.



> - Airborne capability is essential across environments from Desert (US drop into Northern Iraq) to Jungle/Mountain (pending a suitable DZ can be found - Rangers in Afghanistan).   I believe that all soldiers in a "Light Formation" should be Jump qualified.


   

Admirable in theory - difficult to sustain. We have a significant indiv trg bill right now with the 5000 new tps - qualifying that many pers para (with PI, JM, rigger etc) would be very problematic



> - Airmobility capability is also essential across environments.   All "Light soldiers" should be "Air Assault" qualified and work intimately with helicopters (which we need and which the new CDS seems determined to get).



But just to be clear, there is a HUGE difference between airmobile and air assault - and with the platforms that we are considering purchasing, only the former is an option.



> - The ability to do the job on foot must be seen as inevitable; this means high fitness that sees Ruckmarching as a "Light" Task,



Amen to that



> the 1/6 BLT used donkeys in combat in Afghanistan


; 

Ummm - sounds like a really small sandwich...

Dave


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## McG (4 Mar 2005)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> It is the lack of a specific platform, or perhaps the *choice * of a number of platforms, that is the true strength of Light Forces.


I'd say it is both the choice and the lack of dependency.


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## eyre (4 Mar 2005)

Great discussion here.   I have been involved in both the Light Forces Working Group when it was a grassroots infantry initiative and after the Army took it over.   I was involved in drafting the initial cut of the definition in the first post that has since gone through the mill several times by the staff in Kingston.   A key part of this definition regarding platforms has been addressed by MCG and Dave.   The intent is not to define light forces in terms of any one platform (i.e. LAV unit) or insertion method (para unit, etc), but to give them the inherent flexibility to use whatever vehicle or insertion method the task calls for.   One task they could be in trucks, the next on helicopters, and then on foot.   It is what they do on the ground that is vital.

The other key part of the definition is 'optimized for military operations in complex environments.'     Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects.   High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges.   Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â â€œ counter-insurgency â â€œ a task that has historically fallen to light forces.

As a bit of a SITREP, light forces development is being guided by the Army's Combat Development process, and is in fact, I think, one of the first initiatives to be put through the process.   Those interested in tracking it can find the LFWG on the DLSC site on the DIN (I don't have the address now as I'm at home).   

The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training.   Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must. 

The three critical shortfalls, as I see it, that we have in light forces now are firstly training (see above paragraph â â€œ we're not there yet and Dave touched on some of the problems), firepower, and transport.   Quick hits for firepower involve some of the new inf weapons systems on the books, adopting the new light rifle coy structure with a weapons platoon, enhancing our sniper capability, and better integrating non-integral fires (close air, etc).   We need to get light direct fire support back at the unit level as well.   A quick hit for transport is a light patrol vehicle, perhaps based on the special ops variant of the G-Wagon (but this could be problematic in a high-density IED environment).   We have to fix our helicopter situation, but this will not be a quick hit.

On the subject of donkeys, by coincidence currently elements of B Coy, 3 PPCLI, are undergoing mule training at the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre.   Don't laugh, it might be useful some day.


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## TangoTwoBravo (4 Mar 2005)

I spend two weeks at the USMC Mountain Wafare Training Centre with a Marine "Wpns Company" and they practiced moving mortars, Mk19s and .50s with pack animals.  I think that its a pretty handy skill to have resident in the light forces.

2B


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## Zipper (6 Mar 2005)

Learning to use all forms of transport shouldn't be that hard. From walking to mule, to bicycle, to truck. Whats the big deal?

If we're going all arms, then hand your morter to the guy from the arty who has been attached. If you need armed jeeps, then attach some armd recce guys. As long as they all have the proper infantry training, whats the big deal?

If it just the name, then like changing the single arms Armoured name to Cavalry, you can chance the single arms infantry name to Marine or Ranger, or Commando. 

Whatever. 

As long as we have the capabilities, then all the rest just falls into place.

What I see right now is the commitment to take the plunge. Just do it. How hard is it to look at all the worlds light forces and steal their TTP's and adapt them?


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## McG (6 Mar 2005)

Zipper said:
			
		

> Learning to use all forms of transport shouldn't be that hard. From walking to mule, to bicycle, to truck. Whats the big deal?


It is about more than just knowing.  It also goes to force structure.  Not only should the light infantry force structure be optimized for light operations, but the force structure of all attached elements should be optimized as well.  This means dedicated light cavalry, dedicated light engineers, dedicated light artillery, dedicated light CSS, etc.


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## Zipper (6 Mar 2005)

I guess that is another argument FOR all arms eh?


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