# The Unexpected War - by Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein



## Edward Campbell (29 Oct 2007)

In his book “The Utility of Force”1 Gen (Ret’d) Sir Rupert Smith discusses a ‘new model’ of conflict which he describes as _War amongst the people_. Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan understand what he means because they are fighting it right now – it is one of the ways Afghanistan differs from, say, Bosnia.

In their new book “The unexpected war”2 Janice Stein and Eugene Lang describe what we might call _*war amongst the bureaucrats*_. Stein and Lang make a case, albeit a very weak one, that Gen Rick Hillier has, almost single-handedly, set civilian control of the military back to the middle ages and overturned the ‘normal’ interdepartmental relationships – especially between Foreign Affairs and National Defence.  In fact they show us something quite different:

1.	Colossal and continuous ministerial *disengagement* from their portfolios;
2.	A dysfunctional Foreign Affairs Department – unable to lead the government on policy matters;
3.	Deep seated and long standing institutional mistrust of DND’s _management_ by the Privy Council Office  and the Finance Department; 
4.	A completely useless Canadian International Development Agency; and
5.	Government*s* (the plural matters) which understand little and care less about the military and war.

It seems pretty clear that we are hearing Lang’s voice when he and Stein tell us about the day-to-day workings of the offices of the Ministers of National Defence when John McCallum and Bill Graham were the ministers – he was, after the (political) chief of staff to both. What he tells us, directly, is that `officials`- military and civilian – did not bombard ministers with options re: Afghanistan. What he tells us, less directly, is that ministers never asked any questions. Now and again, when discussing ministers whom Lang did not serve, Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew, for example, the Lang/Sten book is more direct and admits that ministers ignored their major departmental responsibilities – being focussed almost exclusively on the political optics of situations.

There is ample evidence in “The unexpected war” that Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs is doing more harm than good.

Former Prime Minister Martin is cited3 as being frustrated with Foreign Affairs inability to be anything other than (as another official described it) an “articulate critic” of the work of others.

The decline and fall of what was, once, regarded as one of the finest foreign services on earth began in the late ‘60s. Pierre Trudeau saw in the old External Affairs Department all that he thought was wrong with official Ottawa; he saw an elitist _Anglo_ enclave, out of touch with the aspirations of most Canadians. He was right: it was an elite collection within the bureaucracy. He was right: it was an _Anglo_ bastion – not quite as _Anglo_ as either the Privy Council Office or the Finance Ministry, but it was hard to find a very senior official who had not been to Oxford, Cambridge or the London School of Economics. He was right: it cared little about the views of Canadians in Truro, Toronto or Tofino. He set his new Clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Pitfield, who was, amongst other things, a formidable centralizer, the task of making over External Affairs.  Pitfield succeeded and, in the process, destroyed the department.

Along came Mulroney who mistrusted the bureaucracy – he thought they were all Liberal partisans. In fact the striped pants set in External Affairs were hoping that Mulroney would restore them to their previous pride of place – as an _Anglo_ elite in Ottawa. No such luck – the destruction of the department proceeded apace.

One of Trudeau’s _initiatives_ of which  Mulroney approved was the _ Francization_ of External Affairs. Initially the _Oxbridge_ set fought back by creating CIDA as, essentially, a Québecois bureaucracy – mostly French speaking Canadians, serving in Québec and being allowed to spend Canadian taxpayers’ money on tied aid projects which bought goods and services in Québec.

In a Feb 07 report,4 a Senate Committee recommended that CIDA should be disbanded if it could not be massively reformed.

Lang and Stein cite generals (Canadian and allied) and corporals and officials in Ottawa who, almost universally, back up the Senate Committee. CIDA is, to be kind, part of the problem in Afghanistan. As a start Prime Minister Harper should withdraw CIDA, 100%, from Afghanistan and reassign all the CIDA money earmarked for Afghanistan to Foreign Affairs (65%) and DND (35%). Those two departments should be instructed to spend 100% of the available money – putting Canadian flags on every project.

What is clear from “The unexpected war” is that successive governments – Chrétien’s, Martin’s and Harper’s – have been grossly ill-informed about their own national defences.  Successive governments have followed Chrétien’s dictum5 that Canada’s soldiers are _”... always there like boy scouts and Canadians love it. They think its a nice way to be around the world."_

That’s the bottom line for Lang and Stein, too. Afghanistan is not a baby blue beret/boy scout type mission and they want us out and back doing business Chrétien’s way.

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1.	London, 2006  
2.	Toronto, 2007
3.	Lang, Stein p. 280
4.	http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=2f822f67-091e-4f17-8e30-2478888a28d3&k=29690
5.	http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/1999/09/13/timor990913.html


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## Kirkhill (29 Oct 2007)

Dr. Stein continues to bemuse me.  Mr. Lang is understandable.  He is a loyal toady: a particularly rare breed of toady.  But Dr. Stein....

I am convinced I recall her being interviewed by Peter Mansbridge, while touting this book, and declaring with a big smile that of course we are needed and wanted there and that if we pulled out things would rapidly return to the status quo ante.

Maybe it is just my failing memory.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Nov 2007)

See this comment, here: *"Canadian officials, in off-the-record interviews, acknowledged that the nation-building and aid efforts run by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military efforts led by General Rick Hillier are poorly co-ordinated and that top officials are increasingly at odds with one another."*

This is why our *3D* strategy is not doing as well as it should.

Re: Kirkhill's comments about Lang and Stein: it looks, to me, as if Stein wrote the chapters which explain Afghanistan and counterinsurgency and which assessed and heaped scorn on the two non-military "Ds" (Diplomacy and Development). Lang seems responsible for the Ottawa based 'insider' gossip and political toadying.


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## dapaterson (9 Jan 2008)

An interesting review has been posted to:

http://lrc.reviewcanada.ca/index.php?page=alice-in-afghanistan

Titled "Alice in Afghanistan, it gives Robert Fowler a pulpit to discuss the issue.  Well worth a read (as is the book itself, flawed and partisan thought it may be).


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## Edward Campbell (11 Mar 2008)

This article, extracts reproduced here under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, indicates that _The Unexpected war_ will be analyzed on _Global_ tonight:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080311.wtaylor11/BNStory/Entertainment/columnists


> Well down the road to war, it's time to look back
> 
> KATE TAYLOR
> 
> ...



I continue to believe that Canada is, most emphatically, *not* at war; not even the Government of Canada is “at war,” in fact I suspect not even DND would regard itself as being “at war” - and that may be part of our problem.


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## old medic (11 Mar 2008)

> this is the microscopic - what both a political aide in the first documentary and a doctor in the second refer to as the pointy end of the stick.



The Globe and Mail is my favourite radio station.


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