# Troops Leaving Bosnia-Article



## Bruce Monkhouse (2 Nov 2004)

I know most of you probably know this but, here is an article on it.....

Cdn troops leaving Bosnia

By JOHN WARD
      
   
OTTAWA (CP) - After 13 years, 25 deaths, hundreds of millions of dollars and more than 40,000 individual tours of duty, Canada is clearing out its military camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina and reducing its presence there to a handful of soldiers. 

The last Canadian camp should be closed and packed by the end of November, about two weeks ahead of schedule. 

"The fact that the Bosnia mission for Canada is getting smaller . . . should not allow it to be diminished in importance," Lt.-Col. David Laderoute, who will command the remnant left after the withdrawal, said in a phone interview Monday. 

"The very fact that we are able to draw down our forces in Bosnia highlights that fact that this has been a very successful mission." 

The fighting is long over. Local authorities are tentatively taking over the policing and security work done by outside soldiers over the years. The work ahead is the slog of rebuilding an economy and infrastructure. 

Laderoute's 83 people will mostly handle staff jobs with the multinational force. It's a reduction of about 95 per cent from the late 1990s, when 1,800 Canadians patrolled much of the northwest of the region, keeping the peace and supporting humanitarian aid missions. 

Operations in the region defined the Canadian military for more than a decade. The 40,000 tours of duty recorded there since February 1992 - many soldiers went two, three or even four times - was the equivalent of sending over the entire army. Twice. 

The Canadians built a sprawling support base around a former agricultural college outside a town called Velika Kladusa, in the northwest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

At its height, it was a bustling supply and maintenance centre housing hundreds of soldiers, engineers and supply staff. Surrounded by heaps of barbed wire and protected by guard towers, it held tonnes of supplies and equipment and dozens of vehicles, ranging from little Iltis jeeps to armoured personnel carriers, buses, pickups and bulky tractor-trailers. 

It supported other bases in the country and provided the overall Canadian headquarters for the region. 

Now, it's being dismantled by a team of 268 soldiers under Lt.-Col. Richard Prefontaine. 

His people are shipping home more than 270 vehicles, eight helicopters and 279 cargo containers holding more than 1,450 tonnes of equipment and supplies. 

They're not only packing, they're also cleaning up the grounds. 

"We also have to bring the sites to what they were before and give them back to the owners," he said. "We have to do this and respect very severe regulations. We are using the Canadian regulations for the environment in order to make sure Canada is returning the sites in the same way we would in Canada." 

Canada went into the former Yugoslavia as United Nations peacekeepers in February 1992, as civil war raged. They chafed in their camps, handcuffed by UN rules which allowed little room for intervention in the fighting. 

In 1993 they did fight a bloody skirmish with Croat troops in an area called the Medak pocket, but that was the exception, not the rule. 

In 1996, after the signing of peace accords in Dayton, Ohio, NATO replaced the ineffectual UN mission with a 60,000-member force that came with tanks, artillery and a robust set of rules that brooked no opposition. 

The NATO force shrank over the years as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region as a whole began to rebuild. By last summer, it was down to about 7,000 soldiers and Canada, there from the outset, prepared to withdraw all but a token force.


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## NavyGrunt (2 Nov 2004)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Canada went into the former Yugoslavia as United Nations peacekeepers in February 1992, as civil war raged. They chafed in their camps, handcuffed by UN rules which allowed little room for intervention in the fighting.
> 
> In 1993 they did fight a bloody skirmish with Croat troops in an area called the Medak pocket, but that was the exception, not the rule.
> 
> In 1996, after the signing of peace accords in Dayton, Ohio, NATO replaced the *ineffectual UN mission * with a 60,000-member force that came with tanks, artillery and a robust set of rules that brooked no opposition.



Hmm.....I never realized they botched this as well....


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## Fruss (2 Nov 2004)

> The NATO force shrank over the years as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region as a whole began to rebuild. By last summer, it was down to about 7,000 soldiers and Canada, there from the outset, prepared to



I think we're missing a part and the link is not there..    Can you try to finish it please?  I haven't fully read it yet..

Cheers

Frank


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## 63 Delta (2 Nov 2004)

Does anyone know what the 25 deaths were from? Were they all combat? Or were they a mix of accidents and suicides?


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## ImanIdiot (2 Nov 2004)

I think they were largely due to mines.


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## ArmyRick (2 Nov 2004)

mostly vehicle accidents, during the war (UNPROFOR days) some mine deaths and some guys getting nailed by bullets and shrapnel. Most of the tours since '96 have been fairly dull and uneventfull. Its funny listening to fellow reservist tell their war stories of doing what really amounts to make work jobs...


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## Scoobie Newbie (2 Nov 2004)

Lets just hope that Muslim extremists don't roll in now that we are gone.


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## dglad (3 Nov 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Lets just hope that Muslim extremists don't roll in now that we are gone.



To clarify:

a) we are not gone.  There remain 83 Canadian soldiers in Bosnia, doing a variety of tasks ranging from staff positions in HQ, to LOT (Liaison and Observation Team) functions out in the Bosnian community (currently, Bihac), to various other tasks related to maintaining situational awareness, some of which are quite hazardous

b) it is true that tours here are relatively "uneventful".  As I said in the article, that should be considered a GOOD thing.  It means that most of the military objectives have been achieved in this theatre.  The role of the military force in Bosnia is now to maintain the "safe and secure environment", while the broader international community attempts to rebuild the civil institutions of the state.  There is very little overt violence in theatre these days (although there is some).  However, a majority of Bosnians, in a recent poll conducted on behalf of the EU, firmly believe that if the current international military presence is eliminated, the country will spiral back into ethically-driven violence.

c) Bosnia does remain one of the most heavily mined countries in the world.  About 4% of its land-mass is mined, and exactly WHICH 4% is known only approximately.  Having said that, because of the rigorous (and repetitive) mine awareness trg conducted in-theatre, mine strikes have been essentially eliminated among NATO soldiers.  However, civilian mine casualties are all too common.  About two weeks ago, two boys, 11 and 12, were killed in a mine-strike in SE Bosnia.

d) The greatest threat to the safety of any soldier over here are the horrific roads and the truly, amazingly bad driving of some Bosnians, coupled with the unexpected presence of huge trucks, herds of sheep, tractors hauling unsafe, oversized loads, horse-drawn carts and Bosnian pedestrians (who seem to enjoy wearing dark clothes and walking along narrow roads at night).

e) A rise in extremist elements (of many stripes) is a genuine and present concern.

Overall, the draw-down of Cdn tps should be considered good.  It's important for us to not just start missions, but also, eventually, bring them to a close, in a way that means we never have to go back.


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## Scoobie Newbie (3 Nov 2004)

a.  Right.  The point I make is that there will be no eyes on any potential trouble makers.
b.  If all we are doing is babysitting then its time to pass off the baton
c.  Good for us.  Not so much for those that have to live there
d.  Those drivers make Quebec drivers look like old folk Sunday drivers
e.  My point

Should have ended a lot sooner.


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## dglad (3 Nov 2004)

While I understand your point, I have to take exception to the term "babysitting".  As I said, the potential for renewed conflict in Bosnia is very real.  The presence of NATO forces, including Canadians, is they key element in preventing violence from recurring.  This is, in fact, a valid and important role for military forces in the modern security environment.  And, given the investment of 40000 individual rotations and 25 lives, Canada has an enduring interest in making sure the situation here doesn't fall apart before Bosnia becomes a functioning state.  I would suggest using a term like "babysitting" denegrates the very real and vital job being done here by all 7000 NATO soldiers, and not just the 83 Canadians remaining in-theatre.


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## dutchie (3 Nov 2004)

When I was in Bosnia on Roto 6, I asked a Bosnian what he thought would happen if Nato 'left today'. His response, without hesitation, was "war tomorrow".

Having said that, I am a little surprised that attitude still prevails.

Oh, and CFL, that Bosnian was fond of wearing tracksuits (if you remember)....with no t-shirt underneath!


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## Scoobie Newbie (4 Nov 2004)

I hate to cite movies but I found the movie Behind Enemy Lines with Owen Wilson shoot down over Bosnia by Serbs (if I remember correctly).  I found that is showed the military (balaclaves and such) and the sniper (track suit) very similar to the Bosnia we have dealt with.


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2004)

Baby sitting in Bosnia. That is very much what we did. I have spent three post war tours in Bosnia and during my last one as a MOST operator I really understood what they were all about. Do the Bosnians in the old canadian AOR want us to leave? Hell no. We were very good for the economy. I know that one of our departure principles is not to leave a huge vacum (economocaly or in a security sense), too bad.
How many millions, no billions of international dollars have been spent trying to help one little nation when their are countries that are far worse off then Bosnia ever was and we don't spend a dime on them ?
While we are at it, lets talk about soldiers building new schools, new offices, etc.... CIDA writes the money off and guess what ? Most soldier projects are FAILURES ! I have seen it with my own eyes in 03-04. 
Projects in terms of rebuilding should be left to the experts who know what they are doing (some of the prominent NGOs are actually switched on in these regards!)
Handing out HA ? spare me. Bosnians got a liittle too complacent with our "hand outs" and I had to deal with Bosnians showing up at the gate and demanding NATO fix their houses, give them money to start a new business, etc...
NATO role was to PROVIDE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIROMENT ! We did just that long time ago.
If they do start fighting again, hey we can't be very where and solve all the world's problems.
 I think CF combat arms troops are best used in Implementation stage of new security mandates. When a mission becomes stable get the other NATO nations to do the routine stuff such as patrolling, hand out mustovi, etc. Nuff said
ArmyRick OUT !


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## pbi (8 Nov 2004)

> I think CF combat arms troops are best used in Implementation stage of new security mandates. When a mission becomes stable get the other NATO nations to do the routine stuff such as patrolling, hand out mustovi, etc. Nuff said



I agree fully. The sooner we get out of this business the better: let us do what we do best, and let the GOs/IOs/NGOs do what they do best, with overwatch from us if needed. Cheers.
'


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## aesop081 (8 Nov 2004)

521 said:
			
		

> Does anyone know what the 25 deaths were from? Were they all combat? Or were they a mix of accidents and suicides?




My freind Chris Holopina was killed there in a vehicule accident in 96 and another freind, Gilles Desmarais, electrocuted.


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## Gunner (8 Nov 2004)

I knew Chris Holopina when he was a Reservist in the early 90s.  He was a good man and will be remembered.


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## Acorn (8 Nov 2004)

Ex-Yugo (that's Bosnia and Croatia) deaths were a combination of KIA by direct fire (i.e. Dan Gunther) and combat-related (i.e. Mark Isfeld - mine strike) to vehicle accidents, other accidents and health problems. 

Acorn


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## dglad (21 Nov 2004)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> NATO role was to PROVIDE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIROMENT ! We did just that long time ago.
> If they do start fighting again, hey we can't be very where and solve all the world's problems.
> I think CF combat arms troops are best used in Implementation stage of new security mandates. When a mission becomes stable get the other NATO nations to do the routine stuff such as patrolling, hand out mustovi, etc. Nuff said
> ArmyRick OUT !



And if we leave, the SASE remains?  Or does the place just sink back into a muck of escalating ethnic tension, leading eventually to violence and even to full-blown conflict?  That doesn't sound, to me, like much of a pay-off to the Canadian lives and energy expended in the Balkans over the past decade-plus.  We really don't want to be back in Bosnia in another 10 years, doing it all over again.  We've been down that road...remember Haiti?

The attitude above is much what the US brought to Iraq.  As I said elsewhere, you win the shooting war, you're half-way there.  NGOs, etc. certainly have a role, and that role should incrementally grow over time, displacing that of combat forces.  But, sorry, the reality of the modern security environment is that war-fighting and nation (re)building are a continuum, not discrete activities.  And, no, of course Canada can't be "everywhere", which is why we need to pick and choose where we do want to be.  Like it or not, we've invested heavily in Bosnia, but the return on that investment isn't fully realized yet.  Or, to answer pbi, we're still doing overwatch, and may be for some time yet.


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## aesop081 (21 Nov 2004)

IMHO, 

The ethnic divisions that have ripped the FRY appart are very deeply rooted and no amount of western involvement will solve that.  I beleive that wether we pull out now or 10 years from now will not change much.  Maybe its time to cut our losses.

Bosnia is not worth any one freind i have lost............

( Sounds harsh but i base my opinion on my experiences in the FRY)


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## ArmyRick (21 Nov 2004)

Why should the CF be the ones looking after Bosnia? I don't think we will ever realize the money invested there? 
I talked to god knoes how many local leaders who can't think forward overe.
Perfect example is the Town of Bos Grahavo threatening to start a big riot if NATO didn't come and solve their flag problem. 
The leader myself and another MOST operator talked to was so full of B*LLsh*t and did nothing but talk in circles.
Nothing happened and we didn't have to do anything. Lots of talk and other crap. 
Like I said I have been their three times too many. If Bosnia must be watched, then let members of the EU deal with it.
If we leave will it remain SASE ? No, it would becaome a criminal war lord haven. But if EU nations look after it I beleive SASE will remain.
CF troops (IMO) are better to use in a higher intensity, roto 0-3 security missions and implementation missions. I also think CF troops would perform well in combat if they go along side with UK or USA, maybe teaming up with Australia and New Zealand.
I stand by what I have said, we have spent more than enough dollars on Bosnia...


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## Infanteer (21 Nov 2004)

I think it is important that we were in Bosnia.

Peace and security in Europe is one of our fundamental national interests.  Conflagration in the Balkans is antithetical to this, as the events of 1914-1918 proved.

Sure, civilizational faultlines and very old hatreds like these mean that further conflict is not a matter of if but when, but I think that Canada has been very smart to contribute are meager resources to staving off the "when" for as long as possible.  I'd rather see Canadian soldiers putting it on the line in the Balkans, where efforts serve to further our immediate and important security concerns (see the peace and security in Europe thing), then to see them dieing in the middle of Africa where, despite the human tragedy, affects upon our well being are minimal at best.


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## aesop081 (21 Nov 2004)

Yes , i agree, Canada's role was important but also it is time to use our resources somewhere's else.  We have serve our purpose in Bosnia.  Does anybody remember Cyprus ?  we were there for what ? 27 years ?  Did it acomplish anything ?

Are you saying that the lives of africans are less important because they have less of an impact on canadian daily lives ?  I thought that a basic canadian value was that we attach the same value to ALL human beings.


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## Infanteer (21 Nov 2004)

aesop081 said:
			
		

> Yes , i agree, Canada's role was important but also it is time to use our resources somewhere's else. We have serve our purpose in Bosnia.



I am trying to justify the last 12 years we've spent in the Balkans.   I am also trying to highlight why it is important to disengage (which we are doing) from BiH rather then abruptly pulling out.   I think our troop contribution now is minimal and is no longer a big drag on the commitment/capability gap - perhaps DGlad could confirm this.



> Does anybody remember Cyprus ? we were there for what ? 27 years ? Did it accomplish anything ?



I would consider preventing all out war between to NATO "allies" who composed a very important Southern Front during the Cold War to be an accomplishment.



> Are you saying that the lives of africans are less important because they have less of an impact on canadian daily lives ? I thought that a basic canadian value was that we attach the same value to ALL human beings.



I was waiting for this.

I am in no way trying to argue that any one human life is worth more then another, nor am I trying to say that the savagery that engulfs much of the developing world should be "ignored" or "written off".   However, I do believe in two key fundamentals when determining where to commit our troops:

1) Conflict is a part of the human condition.   Like I said before, in most cases it's not a matter of "if" but a matter of "when".   As such, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that a HESCO-fortified Maple Leaf flag in the middle of a conflagration will make things better.

2) Canada's standing (how it perceives and is perceived by others) gives us a certain outlook on the world and its endless supply of conflicts.   This outlook helps us to define our National Interest and to determine where, when the call is made, to place our chips.   The state, as a self-serving entity (you don't elect governments to take care of France or Bhutan, you elect them to oversee Canada), must define its interests along self-serving goals.   Although we can say and believe that our national value is to _"attach the same value to ALL human beings"_, that is alot harder to define then "a secure and stable European continent" - which has a mcuh more immediate impact on Canada (and it's citizens) as a whole.

When the government wants to send soldiers, at great risk, on foreign operations, it must do its best to ensure that the effort (and lives) expended by these soldiers goes to serving the tangibles.   If we don't apply this (calculating) principle, then our Foreign Policy will have no real focus and we'd end up sending troops willy-nilly to die in far-off places - achieving nothing for the cost because #1 was ignored ("let's stop the war!" - remember, "when" and not "if") and #2 was discarded.

I think Lord Palmerston's dictum applies to here; "States don't have friends, they have interests".


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## Pikache (21 Nov 2004)

Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?

Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?


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## pbi (21 Nov 2004)

RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
			
		

> Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?
> 
> Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?


This is an excellent question that has been the object of much spilled ink over the years. A few reasons I have heard are:

-it's a "cheap" way to stay on the world stage;

-it's a "nice" way to use Armed Forces that you're embarassed about having in the first place and don't really understand;

-it used to be that "the Americans don't do it" (now well OBE);

-it allows some people to avoid taking a moral and political stance on a conflict by claiming that "both sides are equally bad";

-it contributes to world peace and security by preventing conflicts from flaring out of control;

-we have a moral obligation to do it;

-it is something we do very well;

-our Armed Forces can't do anything else; and

-it earns us brownie points with the US by taking on the "odd jobs" so that they don;t have to do them (also OBE IMHO)

Cheers.


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## Infanteer (22 Nov 2004)

RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
			
		

> Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?
> 
> Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?



I'd argue that Peacekeeping tours meet the _Realpolitik_ demands that I mentioned above.   Why do you think Canada contributed 3 battalions to the Balkans at one point (CANBAT 1, CANBAT 2, CANLOGBAT) and yet in terms of real gestures ignored places like Rwanda, the Congo, and Cambodia.   "Peacekeeping" is just an easy "sell" to the Canadian public (for many of the reasons that PBI mentions) because it makes us think we have the moral highground.

"We're refuse to debase politics to a Machiavellian level, we're Canadians and we're better then that.   As such, our military force will be used to Peacekeep."

While it may sound awefully enlightening, I think this is a "feel-good" smokescreen.   Just look at the record of Peacekeeping and Interventions and come to your own conclusions.

- Korea (Ok, before the time of peacekeeping, but along the same mentality of intervention in other peoples conflicts.): Second challenge (After Greece and the Marshall Plan) to the policy of Containment that the US adopted.

- Suez (The original Peacekeeping Mission): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Paris and London into parking lots over the issue.

- Golan Heights (yep, we're still there too): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Haifa and Tel Aviv into parking lots if the IDF marched into Damascus and Cairo?

- Cyprus: As I said before, staving off a war between the two allies who made up NATO's "Southern Front".

- The Balkans: As I said before, a stable and secure Europe.

- Somalia: A little more difficult to define, I think this one was executed with in a manner of "chasing" a new outlook on security with the post-Cold War "peace dividend" on the mind.   We got away from the two principles I mentioned earlier; as a result, the mission was an unmitigated disaster (both for Canada and for the US/UN forces in general).

- East Timor: Were we really concerned for the Timorese?   Or were we concerned about the stability of a Muslim state of about 200,000,000 people that was right next door to our Allies in the Southern Pacific, Australia (yes, they have their own interests).

- Afghanistan (Op Athena): That's a no-brainer.

Of course, you're going to find outliers (Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia as mentioned above) which may not have so obvious of a purpose, but these missions are usually the ones that are launched to satisfy intense public outcry, and these are the missions that are folded up as soon as the media (and the public) loses interest and finds something else to watch.

Peacekeeping, then, is merely an "extention of politics by other means" (Didn't someone say that already?).   As such, the politics of Peacekeeping are informed not so much by idealism and notions of "the value of human life" and "a belief that civilization was worth it" - although elements will exist; look at Llyod Axworthy (and his failure).   Rather, these commitments are determined by self-serving, calculated decisions - and, for the sake of you and me - it's how they should be.


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## dglad (22 Nov 2004)

Indeed, Canada's ongoing commitment to the Balkans is small, and quite specialized.  Having a BG here today would be inappropriate given the security situation.  Having the ~85 pers we do have, contributing what they do contribute, is a worthwhile and appropriate investment.

I think Infanteer summed up our reasons for involving ourselves in these type of ops very well.  I would only add that I disagree that the tension in the Balkans is necessarily GOING to flare up again, regardless of what we do.  One could have said the same thing about 18th century Germany or 19th century Italy.  There was no way a contemporary could have imagined these diverse and acrimonious groups of city-states ever forging stable, lasting nations from themselves.  However, the world evolves.  Some of the older Bosnians remember the bitter conflicts in the region during WW2; many in their mid-20's and up remember, of course, the war in the 90's.  However, a new generation of Bosnian citizens is growing up in a region that is relatively peaceful; they are well connected to the outside world through the mass media and the Internet, and it is by no means certain that they will share the same visceral ethnic divides that affect the older generations.  Of course, this implies that it may be necessary to maintain a SASE in Bosnia for many years yet, until things are irreversibly on track to peace and prosperity.  Maybe the implication of this is that rebuilding a nation, following a devastating war, is something that does, literally, take years, even generations.  

Now, does Canada have to be part of the entire process?  Perhaps not.  That would depend on the prevalent Canadian strategic interests...and, frankly, contributing to stability in Europe is a key and enduring Canadian strategic interest.  The US is clearly our major trading partner, but the EU is beginning to apply itself to the world stage in a bigger way, and the government has decided that a trans-Atlantic (and, probably, a trans-Pacific) political, economic and military alignment for Canada is of increasing strategic importance.  (This is perhaps something someone better versed in current Canadian foreign policy than I could commment on; I sense that we're trying to shift from a mainly north-south strategic axis to one aligned more east-west.)  Moreover, at the operational and tactical levels, working with the EU military force replacing SFOR in the relatively benign environment of Bosnia is allowing us to establish joint systematics and processes against the day we may have to work with EU forces in more hostile environment.

As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources.  Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations.  Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever.  It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.


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## pbi (22 Nov 2004)

> Peacekeeping, then, is merely an "extention of politics by other means" (Didn't someone say that already?).  As such, the politics of Peacekeeping are informed not so much by idealism and notions of "the value of human life" and "a belief that civilization was worth it" - although elements will exist; look at Llyod Axworthy (and his failure).  Rather, these commitments are determined by self-serving, calculated decisions - and, for the sake of you and me - it's how they should be.





> As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources.  Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations.  Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever.  It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.



I agree wholeheartedly with both of these summations. Peacekeeping, or peace support, or peace enforcement, or Chapter VII, or WTF we call it at the moment, involves the deployment of Canadian soldiers into harm's way, with a greater or lesser degree of potential that they will get into combat, but never the certainty that they won't. Therefore, such operations should only be undertaken when we can clearly articulate a  national interest sufficient to the risk of Canadian blood and treasure. Now, it is not impossible nor perhaps even difficult to identify and articulate these: both dglad and Infanteer have done so. A national interest can be as simple as peace and stability (before you dismiss that, try living with war and instability for a while...), or it can be more  complex as both posters have suggested. But, whatever it is, it must resonate with our national interests or it borders on the pointless and a soldier might rightly ask what his life was being risked for.

As for the concept of estblishing a "counterweight" to the influence of the US, this has a pretty lengthy history in our post-WWII foreign policy and is usually referred to as the "Third Option" concept. This term was, IIRC, first used by Mitchell Sharp when he completed a course of action analysis(COAA) for Trudeau to determine a "way ahead" for our foreign policy. The "Third Option" postulated that rather than complete isolation from the US, or complete integration and dependence, we could pursue a COA in which we would forge strong politico-economic relations outside the poweful North-South axis, in order to counterbalance the power of the US. We ciould argue from now until the cows come home about the efficacy or realism of this, but like it or not it has to  a certain extent informed our foreign policy development over the decades since. It has been taken to extremes by some (arguably PET himself, and to a degree Chretien) and played down by others (Mulroney) but it has been there. Martin seems inclined not to over-emphasize it, as he pursues a cautious COA of fence-mending with the US (wisely, IMHO...). Cheers.


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## aesop081 (22 Nov 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I am trying to justify the last 12 years we've spent in the Balkans.   I am also trying to highlight why it is important to disengage (which we are doing) from BiH rather then abruptly pulling out.   I think our troop contribution now is minimal and is no longer a big drag on the commitment/capability gap - perhaps DGlad could confirm this.
> 
> I was waiting for this.
> 
> ...



Infanteer,

Thank you very much for the clarification, i now see exactly where you are coming from.


BTW......Clauswitz said "War is a continuation of political intercourse interspersed with the use of other means"


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## Edward Campbell (22 Nov 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> - Suez (The original Peacekeeping Mission): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Paris and London into parking lots over the issue.



One of my favourite nits need picking: I suggest that United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan which was established in 1948, without Lester Pearson's help, was the original peacekeeping mission. (See:   http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html )   The myth that Canada is somehow or other the _pioneer_ of peacekeeping is built on a lie - a little white lie, to be sure, but a lie all   the same.   Pearson deserves much credit for stick-handling the 1956 resolution through the UN - diplomatic skill and skulduggery of   the first order - but he certainly didn't _invent peacekeeping_ by any sensible definition of either word.


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## aesop081 (22 Nov 2004)

the "pearson-era" peacekeping ( sorry ROJ) has died a long and hardous death due to the inability of the UN to resolve the conflict once the fighting has started.  Better for canada to concentrate its limited  resources on short-term assistance missions than get bogged down in inefectual long-term endevours.

Infanteer:

Yes i agree that in Cyprus we stopped a major war between to allies but i somewhat doubt that it was for benevolent reasons ( NATO southern flank !!) but did we realy acheive anything ?  It's been how long now and there still exists the need for UN troops.  The whole idea of peackeeping is to create the conditions for a peacefull resolution of the conflict followed by the withdrawl of the UN force isn't it ?


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## pbi (22 Nov 2004)

Actually, I would say that the first "peacekeeping" mission in the 20th Century was the International Plebiscite force that the Allies deployed into Silesia (a state of eastern Germany, bordering Poland) in the 1920s to supervise the execution of an internationally conducted plebiscite to decide the political future of Silesia. The force was composed mainly of French troops and had the mission of keeping the ethnic Poles     ( covertly supported by Warsaw) and the ethnic Germans (covertly supported by the Reichsheer) from killing each other until the vote could take place. It was a supposedly neutral force put in place to separate two parties with political claims, supported by established governments, who had been engaging in low-intensity combat operations and terrorism against each other. I think that predates  UNMOGIP by about 20 years or so. Cheers.


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## Infanteer (22 Nov 2004)

dglad said:
			
		

> I would only add that I disagree that the tension in the Balkans is necessarily GOING to flare up again, regardless of what we do. One could have said the same thing about 18th century Germany or 19th century Italy. There was no way a contemporary could have imagined these diverse and acrimonious groups of city-states ever forging stable, lasting nations from themselves. However, the world evolves.



I should state that my "Fundamental Concept 1" (the will to war) doesn't necessarily mean that the enduring conflicts in the region will always contain the same actors.   Whether the fighting looks inward (intrastate) or outward (interstate), the fighting will always be there.   I found it ironic that you'd bring up Germany and Italy - two countries that we spent 6 years fighting with in the biggest conflagration the world has seen to date.   A few points come out of this analysis:

1)   It wasn't that long ago that Germany was divided along ideological lines and the sole existence for our Army was to prepare to turn it into sand if the Warsaw Pact was to cross into the Fulda Gap.

2)   The examples of Germany and Italy have a little different pretext for the violence.   I think that the intercine conflict in those two areas, based mainly upon dynastic causes, is much more inert then the type of conflict we've seen time and time again in the Balkans (one grounded in old, ethno-religious hatreds bred by nationalist mythologies - Kosovo Polje, the Christian Schism, etc, etc).   Balkan "will's to war" seem much more dynamic - hence why I have a little more faith in Germany and Italy then I do in the Dayton Accords.

3)   As well, the fact that the state seems stable today shouldn't necessarily mean that it will be stable tommorrow.   How serious do you think I would have been taken if you and I were sitting in Sarajevo in 1984 watching the Winter Olympics and I told you "It appears that this country will collapse dramitically into a seething pool of ethnic violence and genocide in the next decade".   I probably would have been laughed off the stage.   _C'est la vie_

4)   The rule that "Democracies don't Fight Democracies" seems to be gathering credibility.   However, I'd challenge this with two caveats:   A) if Democracies aren't busy fighting eachother, they are sure busy fighting others and B) (Real) Democracies haven't really been around long enough for me to support this idea 100% - we've been so preoccupied with staring down other ideologies (absolutism, fascism, and communism) that maybe they haven't had the time to waste each other.   As you say, "The World Evolves" - and we can't afford to be caught flat-footed.




> As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources. Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations. Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever. It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.



Agree 100%.



			
				aesop081 said:
			
		

> BTW......Clauswitz said "War is a continuation of political intercourse interspersed with the use of other means"



Who was Clausewitz?

(If you couldn't tell by now, I was being facetious)



			
				aesop081 said:
			
		

> Infanteer:
> Yes i agree that in Cyprus we stopped a major war between to allies but i somewhat doubt that it was for benevolent reasons ( NATO southern flank !!) but did we realy acheive anything ?



Well, I guess that the fact that NATO didn't fall apart due a a struggle between its members in the Mediterranean or the fact that Cyprus (or a good portion of it at least) has joined the EU, indicating that it wants to be apart of normative European affairs means that the mission achieved something.

---

As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".

I think that outlooks (like a typically Canadian one) which see "Peacekeeping" (and attitudes favouring it) as some sort of representation of the notion of human progress put too much stock in human nature.


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## pbi (22 Nov 2004)

> As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".



I think there is more to this summation than many people, Canadians among them, would be willing to admit. In the end, peace support operations are the application of military force to achieve a political goal. Cheers.


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## Edward Campbell (23 Nov 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> Actually, I would say that the first "peacekeeping" mission in the 20th Century was the International Plebiscite force that the Allies deployed into Silesia (a state of eastern Germany, bordering Poland) in the 1920s to supervise the execution of an internationally conducted plebiscite to decide the political future of Silesia. The force was composed mainly of French troops and had the mission of keeping the ethnic Poles        ( covertly supported by Warsaw) and the ethnic Germans (covertly supported by the Reichsheer) from killing each other until the vote could take place. It was a supposedly neutral force put in place to separate two parties with political claims, supported by established governments, who had been engaging in low-intensity combat operations and terrorism against each other. I think that predates   UNMOGIP by about 20 years or so. Cheers.



Even better!



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".
> 
> I think that outlooks (like a typically Canadian one) which see "Peacekeeping" (and attitudes favouring it) as some sort of representation of the notion of human progress put too much stock in human nature.



I remember, probably not as clearly as I might wish, when we got the first Canadian Army Manual of (for?) Training entitled â Å“Keeping the Peace, Part 1.â ?   I remember, I hope, that the book stressed military operations required to restore and then keep the peace.   After reading Lewis Mackenzie's contribution in today's _National Post_ (See: http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/comment/story.html?id=3752006c-b17d-4efc-b0ea-442cb7be4fd6 ), I think I recall that the army, in the 1960s or thereabouts, was clear in its own mind that military _peacekeeping_ was a job for tough, superbly disciplined, well trained and adequately equipped soldiers and that what Mackenzie calls _social work_ was a job for civilians â â€œ including NGOs.

If I remember correctly both Secretary of State for External Affairs Mike Pearson and Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General 'Fin' Clark laid considerable stress on the fact â â€œ they took it as gospel â â€œ that only well trained professional soldiers would make first rate _peacekeepers_ because the problems facing _peacekeepers_ (as opposed to _nation-builders_) were to be military â â€œ low intensity, perhaps, but military, all the same.

I believe that a _clique_ of external affairs bureaucrats, aided (actively) by our national _â ?commentariatâ ?_ waged a highly successful disinformation campaign â â€œ throughout the '70s, especially â â€œ which aimed to make _social work_ style _peacekeeping_ into Canada's national military pastime in the hearts and minds of Canadians.

I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Don Denne of 3RCR; I, too, cringe, every time I hear the term _peacekeeper_.   I think a perfectly legitimate military concept â â€œ keeping the peace â â€œ has been debased by people who want Canada to have brigades of uniformed social workers.

</rant> - another one


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## dglad (23 Nov 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I should state that my "Fundamental Concept 1" (the will to war) doesn't necessarily mean that the enduring conflicts in the region will always contain the same actors.   Whether the fighting looks inward (intrastate) or outward (interstate), the fighting will always be there.   I found it ironic that you'd bring up Germany and Italy - two countries that we spent 6 years fighting with in the biggest conflagration the world has seen to date.



Not the same Germany and Italy, though.   I used these two only to make the point that someone looking at those regions in the 18th or 19th centuries respectively would have laughed at the thought of them some day being stable, unified states--the obverse of your point about telling a Sarajevo-ite in 1984 that their country would fall apart.   The point either way is that the world and its regions, nations, etc. evolve.   Therefore, writing off an area because it will "never be stable" is an unfortunate generalization..



> 2)   The examples of Germany and Italy have a little different pretext for the violence.   I think that the intercine conflict in those two areas, based mainly upon dynastic causes, is much more inert then the type of conflict we've seen time and time again in the Balkans (one grounded in old, ethno-religious hatreds bred by nationalist mythologies - Kosovo Polje, the Christian Schism, etc, etc).   Balkan "will's to war" seem much more dynamic - hence why I have a little more faith in Germany and Italy then I do in the Dayton Accords.



Perhaps.   However, I don't necessarily buy your supposition that dynastic tension is generally more "inert" than tension based on other causes (a point which could make for some fascinating debate on its own).   I hasten to add, however, that I'm not suggesting that Germany and Italy are about to collapse into anarchy because e.g. of a sudden resurgence of rivalry between Florence and Naples.   I used these two only to illustrate a particular point, and don't really want to morph into a debate about the future of these two countries!



> 3)   As well, the fact that the state seems stable today shouldn't necessarily mean that it will be stable tommorrow.   How serious do you think I would have been taken if you and I were sitting in Sarajevo in 1984 watching the Winter Olympics and I told you "It appears that this country will collapse dramitically into a seething pool of ethnic violence and genocide in the next decade".   I probably would have been laughed off the stage.   _C'est la vie_



And the reverse is true, which is my precise point, per above.   



> 4)   The rule that "Democracies don't Fight Democracies" seems to be gathering credibility.   However, I'd challenge this with two caveats:   A) if Democracies aren't busy fighting eachother, they are sure busy fighting others and B) (Real) Democracies haven't really been around long enough for me to support this idea 100% - we've been so preoccupied with staring down other ideologies (absolutism, fascism, and communism) that maybe they haven't had the time to waste each other.   As you say, "The World Evolves" - and we can't afford to be caught flat-footed.



Agree completely here.   I get a little worried when I hear things touted as truisms such as "Democracies don't fight democracies".   They might very well, if they get the chance and the reasons are there and compelling enough.




> Who was Clausewitz?



A dead German guy.   And that is a truism...you can't have a decent military argument (especially if it involves manoeuvre warfare) without invoking, at some point, at least one dead German guy.   (Hitler doesn't count, though...as soon as you bring him into it, you lose the argument, per some Internet Law whose name I forget).


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## Infanteer (23 Nov 2004)

DGlad,

Agree with all points in your analysis.   I think the important corollary from the last few posts on this thread (relating to our continued presence in Bosnia) is that, as you said, the world evolves.   The dynamic nature of human societies makes for certain types of catalysts that can move the evolution at a pace faster then we can keep up with (The breakdown of the FYR is a good example).

That being said, nothing stays the same and we can never rest on our laurels.  Conversely, we shouldn't resign ourselves to some deterministic fatalism.  Although Machiavelli compared _fortuna_ to a wild and uncontrollable river, he believed that smart policies could "direct" fate in an advantageous manner just as dikes, levies, and sandbags on the Red River attempt to divert the river where we wish it to go.

Saying that we should pull completely out of Bosnia now because future conflict is a forgone conclusion (now I have to look back and make sure I didn't say that, although I'm sure I have in the past   ) is about as smart as saying we may as well pull out because they have free markets and a democracy, so they're on the road to utopia.   As usual, the answer lies somewhere in the middle of the road - where exactly to be determined in a rational calculation of interests.

Thus, in a place like the Balkans, which I've argued holds a great deal of strategic bearing for the interests of Canada, their remains the justification to maintain our vigilance.



> A dead German guy.   And that is a truism...you can't have a decent military argument (especially if it involves manoeuvre warfare) without invoking, at some point, at least one dead German guy.   (Hitler doesn't count, though...as soon as you bring him into it, you lose the argument, per some Internet Law whose name I forget).



LOL   

Hitler was an Austrian, so the Law still stands I guess....


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