# Is the SECDEF incompetent?...MGen Eaton would suggest so



## devil39 (30 Mar 2006)

Ever since the legs were cut out from under Shinseki the issue of the SecDef influence has been an issue.

Great article from a recently retired 2 star that suggests that the current transition issues in Iraq do not lie at the feet of the soldiers currently engaged.

New York Times
March 19, 2006



A Top-Down Review For The Pentagon



By Paul D. Eaton



Fox Island, Wash.--DURING World War II, American soldiers en route to Britain before D-Day were given a pamphlet on how to behave while awaiting the invasion. The most important quote in it was this: "It is impolite to criticize your host; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies."


By that rule, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead our armed forces. First, his failure to build coalitions with our allies from what he dismissively called "old Europe" has imposed far greater demands and risks on our soldiers in Iraq than necessary. Second, he alienated his allies in our own military, ignoring the advice of seasoned officers and denying subordinates any chance for input.
In sum, he has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically, and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld must step down.


In the five years Mr. Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon, I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership.


I thought we had a glimmer of hope last November when Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, faced off with Mr. Rumsfeld on the question of how our soldiers should react if they witnessed illegal treatment of prisoners by Iraqi authorities. (General Pace's view was that our soldiers should intervene, while Mr. Rumsfeld's position was that they should simply report the incident to superiors.)


Unfortunately, the general subsequently backed down and supported the secretary's call to have the rules clarified, giving the impression that our senior man in uniform is just as intimidated by Secretary Rumsfeld as was his predecessor, Gen. Richard Myers.


Mr. Rumsfeld has put the Pentagon at the mercy of his ego, his cold warrior's view of the world and his unrealistic confidence in technology to replace manpower. As a result, the Army finds itself severely undermanned — cut to 10 active divisions but asked by the administration to support a foreign policy that requires at least 12 or 14.


Only Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff when President Bush was elected, had the courage to challenge the downsizing plans. So Mr. Rumsfeld retaliated by naming General Shinseki's successor more than a year before his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his authority. The rest of the senior brass got the message, and nobody has complained since.


Now the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review shows that Mr. Rumsfeld also fails to understand the nature of protracted counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and the demands it places on ground forces. The document, amazingly, does not call for enlarging the Army; rather, it increases only our Special Operations forces, by a token 15 percent, maybe 1,500 troops.


Mr. Rumsfeld has also failed in terms of operations in Iraq. He rejected the so-called Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and sent just enough tech-enhanced troops to complete what we called Phase III of the war — ground combat against the uniformed Iraqis. He ignored competent advisers like Gen. Anthony Zinni and others who predicted that the Iraqi Army and security forces might melt away after the state apparatus self-destructed, leading to chaos.


It is all too clear that General Shinseki was right: several hundred thousand men would have made a big difference then, as we began Phase IV, or country reconstruction. There was never a question that we would make quick work of the Iraqi Army.


The true professional always looks to the "What's next?" phase. Unfortunately, the supreme commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, either didn't heed that rule or succumbed to Secretary Rumsfeld's bullying. We won't know which until some bright historian writes the true story of Mr. Rumsfeld and the generals he took to war, an Iraq version of the Vietnam War classic "Dereliction of Duty" by H. R. McMaster.


Last, you don't expect a secretary of defense to be criticized for tactical ineptness. Normally, tactics are the domain of the soldier on the ground. But in this case we all felt what L. Paul Bremer, the former viceroy in Iraq, has called the "8,000-mile screwdriver" reaching from the Pentagon. Commanders in the field had their discretionary financing for things like rebuilding hospitals and providing police uniforms randomly cut; money to pay Iraqi construction firms to build barracks was withheld; contracts we made for purchasing military equipment for the new Iraqi Army were rewritten back in Washington.


Donald Rumsfeld demands more than loyalty. He wants fealty. And he has hired men who give it. Consider the new secretary of the Army, Francis Harvey, who when faced with the compelling need to increase the service's size has refused to do so. He is instead relying on the shell game of hiring civilians to do jobs that had previously been done by soldiers, and thus keeping the force strength static on paper. This tactic may help for a bit, but it will likely fall apart in the next budget cycle, with those positions swiftly eliminated.


So, what to do?


First, President Bush should accept the offer to resign that Mr. Rumsfeld says he has tendered more than once, and hire a man who will listen to and support the magnificent soldiers on the ground. Perhaps a proven Democrat like Senator Joseph Lieberman could repair fissures that have arisen both between parties and between uniformed men and the Pentagon big shots.


More vital in the longer term, Congress must assert itself. Too much power has shifted to the executive branch, not just in terms of waging war but also in planning the military of the future. Congress should remember it still has the power of the purse; it should call our generals, colonels, captains and sergeants to testify frequently, so that their opinions and needs are known to the men they lead. Then when they are asked if they have enough troops — and no soldier has ever had enough of anything, more is always better — the reply is public.


Our most important, and sometimes most severe, judges are our subordinates. That is a fact I discovered early in my military career. It is, unfortunately, a lesson Donald Rumsfeld seems incapable of learning.



Paul D. Eaton, a retired Army major general, was in charge of training the Iraqi military from 2003 to 2004.


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## pbi (30 Mar 2006)

devil39:

Good to see you back on these means (obviously too much time on your hands again...). 

The disconnect between those who conceived the operation at the policy/strategy level, and those who had to execute at the operational and tactical levels, was clearly demonstrated by a senior USMC officer I heard speak last year. He described commencing the operation in Iraq  in a senior "3" position, conducting "major combat operations", then being appointed as a unit CO. Upon taking command for the "post major combat ops phase", he realized that his "3" self had never developed any plans for his "CO self" for anything after the big fight stopped. This was because there had been very little institutional focus on what would come after Saddam's statue was toppled.

I will also be very interested to hear the "insider reports" and analyses by senior officers as they retire. Discounting some of the usual axe-grinding and vengeance, my guess is that we will see confirmation of a major rift between "warriors" who saw the dangers, warned of them, but tried to make it work, and the politicos and "group thinkers" who knew all too well which side their bread was buttered on, and said nothing.

Cheers.


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## tomahawk6 (30 Mar 2006)

To begin with Eaton is a twit. A sorry excuse for a general officer. Before he had the training job in Iraq he was CG Ft Benning, where his performance was lackluster. I couldnt believe he was selected for the job.After his son graduated from Ranger School his son told him that some of the Ranger instructors actually yelled at students. This led to a purge by Eaton of the Ranger dept. He sacked the CSM of the Ranger training Brigade and several other NCO's. Not one officer was targeted by Eaton for punishment. Ranger Instructors could no longer make students do push ups for infractions.

Rangers Caught in the PC Crossfire

Hackworth: 
May 29, 2003

quote:
Rangers have always been my favorite soldiers. My admiration for them probably started at age 10 when I watched Spencer Tracy in the movie Northwest Passage – or perhaps it was the daring deeds of Darby’s Rangers in Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. For sure, seeing Rangers in action in Korea and Vietnam was the clincher. And once I was hooked, I’ve remained one of their biggest fans. 

Since the Korean War, the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., has been training individual Rangers at the conventional Army’s most demanding course. Upon completion, these proud Ranger graduates have always infused the rest of the Army with the high standards of professionalism required to prepare men for battle and to make it through the horror of combat. 

Ranger training has never been easy. Darby set the standard in 1942 while forging the first U.S. Ranger battalion. “We trained from early morning till late at night, seven days a week,” he wrote. Ironman physical conditioning, speed marches, difficult obstacles and exacting discipline were just part of the drill. And there was always that infamous in-your-face stress created by the Ranger Instructors (RI) and designed to weed out those who would fall apart in a firefight. 

About half of Darby’s highly motivated initial volunteers didn’t make it. In the years since, this 50-percent attrition mark has continued to be the norm. 

While the rest of the U.S. Army has lowered its standards to the point where seasoned war vets find today’s combat training a joke and the crusty salts who fought at Anzio, Osan and Dak To refer to what passes for most training as “an invitation to get killed,” Rangers have fought lowering the training bar and have consistently turned out hardened studs whom commanders in the field would fight to get. 

That is until Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, the guy who runs Fort Benning today, was told by a few recent Ranger graduates that they were turned off by Ranger School because some of their RIs were meanies and actually yelled and cursed at them and even made them do pushups when they goofed up. Others complained in writing that they'd been sleep-deprived and that the training was too difficult. 

For the record, the RIs – hardened vets who know what it takes to win and walk away alive – were merely following the battle-tested Darby practices of creating maximum stress, teaching attention to detail and passing on the proven tactics and techniques that have worked so splendidly for our Rangers in a bunch of bad scraps. 

But serving Rangers say Eaton went ballistic. He assembled the RIs and gave these tough, dedicated warriors – most with 12 to 15 years of service – a tongue-lashing they’ll never forget. About the time this general-officer temper tantrum occurred, an investigation was launched. Magnificent soldiers such as Command Sgt. Maj. Bobby Lane, a combat Ranger with 23 years of superior service, were relieved, and other equally fine soldiers’ careers went down the toilet. 

Why? Because clueless Generation Xers with a few months in the Army ratted out these heroes to a general who then overreacted. 

The effect? 

* RIs are now no longer allowed to swear in the presence of a student. Nor can they raise their voices or use pushups as punishment. Students wear sneakers instead of boots and are coddled as if they were at a Boy Scout Jamboree instead of preparing for a kill-or-be-killed rendezvous on a hillside in Afghanistan or a patch of desert in Iraq. 

* When an RI complained to his boss that today's training environment is like “walking on eggshells,” the colonel – who caved for those potential stars flickering in the breeze along with the rest of the Ranger colonels who didn't come to their fine Ris’ defense – said, “Good, that's the way I want it.” 

* When Ranger students were recently caught writing “obscene graffiti” on a Ranger vehicle, RIs asked their colonel to boot the guilty from the school. The colonel passed. Could he be afraid of the students complaining again to Eaton? 

Pray our future enemies will be as weak as the Iraqis. Because down the road, we might not have real Rangers to Lead the Way as they have for the past 250 years. 

Have an opinion on this column??

Eaton's performance in Iraq was poor. Petraus when he took over had to start from scratch and did a wonderful job cleaning up after Eaton's mess. Eaton was way too PC - the perfect Clintonian general. The poor performance of the Iraqi Army he was responsible for training in the end got him sent home. This hit piece is Eaton's way of getting even with Rumsfeld. Eaton was not involved with the planning for OIF and really shouldnt be commenting on that topic. OIF was hamstrung from the start when Turkey stopped us from deploying the 4ID in N. Iraq. We had to use the 173d to do the job that a division task force was supposed to do. None of us involved in the pre-war planning of OIF thought the Iraqi military and security forces would crumble in a mere 3 weeks time. All of a sudden we were in charge of the country. The police and army had melted away. The security apparatus had gone to ground. We were struggling to get the 4ID into the country to help with what was now an occupation. Looting was going on. Huge ammo dumps were unguarded. We were using 1 port to sustain the force and to surge follow on forces. The one port and MSR could not have sustained an invasion force of 400,000 troops. We had almost run out of space in Kuwait for the invasion force we had.
If the Saudi's had let us stage in their territory things would have been much easier. The logistics pretty much dictated the size of the invasion force.


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## 54/102 CEF (31 Mar 2006)

Very good post General 

You forget two rules though

Generals execute missions

Politicians execute generals

read The Rise of the Vulcans by James Mann

See Frontline on PBS Website

Rumsfeld's War and another one about 2003 on how they planned it. Also see the one on the Insurgency

A major departure from both Germany and Japan in post WW2 Occupation was the quick demob of the Iraqui Army. In the other 2 cases the armies were allowed to fade away.............. and get on with their new lives. In the German case there was a Russian Army that was giving out "payback". I understand the Japanese were a bit longer to convince, but before 5 years was out they too had come around - as the Korean War broke out.

Maybe the Kurds should march on Mosul saying cooperate or ................................. (fill in the or) Looking over your shoulder seems to have helped these defeated armies and countries plan their next move. 

The politicians to a man or carbon based bipod - thought they would get a heroes welcome. They did for a brief time.

That's just some of the background.... pm this week if you want my book review on RISE OF THE VULCANS. Its a 12 page synopsis of the book.

The Gen mentions group think - well done. Rummy is doing his job - my way or the highway.

Far from Rumsfeld beling incompetant - I'm sure you'll agree he is, very.


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## tomahawk6 (31 Mar 2006)

I dont like PBS. Too leftist for my taste. In a perfect world the US tax payer would not be footing the bill.
I have my issues with Rumsfeld's vision for transformation and some of the decisions that were made post invasion. But Eaton's diatribe is way off base and is intended to play to the political left who are either soft on islamic terrorism or are in sympathy with them. In my biased opinion Eaton should never have been promoted beyond Colonel. All organizations have that type of officer who lacks spine and who doesnt make a decision without seeing which way the political winds are blowing.


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## 54/102 CEF (31 Mar 2006)

The PBS shows _ I thought were pretty balanced. Gen Shinseki is probably laughing at Sen Carl Levin and Wolfowitz now.

Not thats its a laughing matter - but these two birds get quoted in front of TV, as bold faced idiots - ignoring Shinseki who - I understand, figured out Bosnia.


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## devil39 (31 Mar 2006)

Tomahawk 6,


I have all the time in the world for your opinion, and I appreciate your input here on this issue.   A couple of questions though.... and I am as pro- US military as they come in this line of work.....

Was the SecDef f**king with the flow into theatre?  Most would agree he was.

Could Shinseki's vision of force requirements made a difference?

When it comes to counter insurgency and nation building.... should we not have taken a larger view of the enemy and their infrastructure... like we did in Germany and Japan... and not allowed the politicians (and ideology) to dictate a dismantling of the Iraqi army and  a removal of the top 6 layers of the Bathist civil service infrastructure?.... That strikes me as completely absurd?

My most recent dealings with US officers leads me to believe that Eaton is closer to the mark than you might want to believe.   At least he (as much of a twit as he might be) is  expressing the fundamental disconnect between the strategic requirements asked of  your outstanding troops and the operational and tactical limitations imposed upon them when they try to carry out their duties to the best of their ability.


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## tomahawk6 (1 Apr 2006)

Eaton is expressing his own opinion in this article and trying to make it seem like he is not alone. I will try to go through his article point by point.

Is the SECDEF incompetent ? NO!
Mr Rumsfeld has alot of experience more so than most that come to that job. I will highlight his bio.

Elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Served as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974)

Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977)

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993

Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., a pharmaceutical company

Chaired the bipartisan U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, in 1998, and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, in 2000.

Eaton begins his article with a quote "It is impolite to criticize your host; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies." Then uses the quote as evidence that Rumsfeld is incompetent. Absurd.

quote "his failure to build coalitions with our allies from what he dismissively called "old Europe" is cited to support his claim. It is not the job of the SECDEF to forge coalitions but the Sec of State acting as agent for the President.

Eaton then states  "Second, he alienated his allies in our own military, ignoring the advice of seasoned officers and denying subordinates any chance for input." But offers nothing to substantiate the assertion. Eaton ignored alot of advice during his career. It is not incumbent on the SECDEF to accept any advise given.
But he will accept full responsibility for the decisions he makes as do all leaders. As SECDEF he has no allies only subordinates.

Eaton states " I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership." What Eaton alludes to is that the bureaucracy was resisting transformation. Before 9-11, Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon to change the organization. To make it more responsive, more mobile, more lethal. After 9-11 he had a war to direct even as the organization was being pushed to modernize. Rumsfeld directed in 2003 General Keane to get rid of over 40 general officers that he felt were Clinton generals. Too bad Eaton wasnt one of them.

Rumsfeld is called a bully. However, he does not abide fools. he will listen to well thought out arguments both pro and con, sadly well thought out argument can be hard to find in the puzzle palace. People learned the hard way that if they had to make a presentation to Rummy they better have their ducks in a row.

Eaton claims  "As a result, the Army finds itself severely undermanned — cut to 10 active divisions but asked by the administration to support a foreign policy that requires at least 12 or 14." True statement. Whats the solution when you are launching an invasion of Iraq ? You have no time to stand up 2 new divisions. Congress authorized 30,000 new spaces only after we went into Iraq - not before. The Army Chief of Staff civilianized some slots filled by soldiers to free up slots to fill the combat units. The decision was made to use the 8 NG divisions and 16 some odd seperate brigades to augment the active Army. This was the best solution to the problem. The other issue was money. While Congress authorized more troops they didnt fund the personnel and training account to cover the new troops. They expected money to come out of the operating budget. Rumsfeld and the Army CSA didnt want to have to RIF those 30,000 soldiers at the end of the war like we had to do after Vietnam.

Eaton faults Rumsfeld for replacing Shinseki as Army Chief of Staff. I cant remember a CSA retained for a second 4 year tour. Shinseki knew he was out, I am sure he hoped to be Chairman JCS or SACEUR but it wouldnt have been realistic. I think thats why Shinseki stuck to Rumsfeld as often as he could. Shinseki was no knight in shining armor. Shinseki made 2 decisions that earned him great disdain in the Army. He ticked off the armor community with the Stryker decision. The second decision was the black beret for general wear instead of being the Ranger Regiment's official headgear. He wanted all soldiers to feel special. The Army as a group is very unhappy with the black beret. If a future CSA discontinues its use there will be alot of happy people.

Eaton attacks the QDR for expanding only the SF units instead of more combat troops for the Army. The SF is expected to be the tip of the spear in the war on terror. Its a money issue as I pointed out earlier. My disagreement with Rumsfeld here is his reliance in high tech weapons as the force of the future. He cut the Commanche and Crusader for being relic's of the cold war and yet he has supported the F-22, Osprey and billion dollar warships and subs.

Enough of Eaton and his petty arguments. Those that hate the President and Rummy will use the article as ammunition to slag the war effort. Mistakes were made - no question. The biggest one was the decison for OIF 1 units to leave 50% of their armored vehicles behind just when the insurgency and al sadar was starting up. But Rumsfeld bashing while popular is unwarranted.


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## a_majoor (1 Apr 2006)

About the only thing I will agree with in Eaton's article is the charge that the Pentagon's transformation efforts are far to "techno-centric". While I was at AUSA last year, I could hardly walk through the exhibition downstairs without tripping over something related to the FCS program. I also listened to a briefing by a panel of American general officers who pulled out a brilliant dog and pony show centered on the FCS (although based on the title of the presentation, I had thought it was about organizational change i.e Transitioning to the Modular Force).

If you go back to some earlier posts by myself, Infanteer and Matt_Fisher after AUSA (Oct 2005), there was a heavy emphasis on the "heavy metal army V2.0", but not so much on the other aspects of military forces which would flesh out the other two blocks of the "Three Block War". Items which would be useful for these things were generally sold by second and third tier companies manning very small booths, *and even there, items such as field deployable robotics far outnumbered things like translation services and language cards*.....

Moving slightly out of arc, technology _per se_ isn't the problem. I can think of many technological concepts, programs or devices which would really increase our ability to fight in a Full Spectrum/Three Block environment. Most of these ideas are in support of the idea of reducing the logistics train to increase our mobility. With due apologies to S_Baker, I would rather have the FCS radios and networking gear than the actual machine if it came to a choice.

Rumsfeldt strikes me as one of those "take no prisoners" type personalities, and certainly someone with that drive is needed to transform a huge institution like the US military. If he makes mistakes while doing so, well, I'm sure we all have had lots of projects which didn't turn out the way we thought they would. On the other hand, by actually attempting the transformation, he has ensured that there will be a change in the way things are done, and a new cultural mindset which allows for innovation and flexibility. Sounds a bit like what we are going through. The results are mixed, to say the least, but time will tell.


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## devil39 (14 Apr 2006)

The hits keep coming on Rumsfeld.  First Eaton, then Anthony Zinni, and now this from MGEN Batiste:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/12/AR2006041201114_2.html


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## tomahawk6 (14 Apr 2006)

Unfortunately some of these attacks on Rumsfeld are politically motivated. This is an election year. In 2004 alot of retired 3 and 4 stars virtually campaigned against the President, the worst of the group was Wes Clark. There is a mixture of sour grapes amongst many of Rumsfeld's detractors.


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## devil39 (14 Apr 2006)

Sure enough Tomahawk... but when MGENs are turning down their third star and an important position in Iraq because they don't want to serve under Rumsfeld?


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## buckahed (14 Apr 2006)

The  Clinton generals don't get along with Rumsfield? Gee, thats a real surprise. Clinton picked democrat generals, Bush and Rummie houscleaned them and picked republican generals. And the politics of the Pentagon grind on.....
(Anybody else old enough to remember the Carter generals claiming the Reagan build up was a disaster?)

Serious question though, lots of people talk about whether the Iraqi army should have been disbanded and seem to generally  agree that it was a mistake. How so?  By the time the US took Baghdad, most of the Iraqi army had melted away and gone home. They had captured very few of the hard core B'aathists, Bremer announcing the disbandment of the Iraqi army was just formalizing what had already happened.


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## 54/102 CEF (14 Apr 2006)

Not demobilising the Army of Iraq would probably (we`ll never know) have created a buffer for local opinion to transition to the post Saddam world.

It happened in South Vietnam in 1945 - Brits and Japs worked to quell local insurgents led by forces under Ho Chi Minh - thats the parallel to today.

In Germany the recent stuff I read was that the Germans didn`t think they were beat - but when the mail stopped from their relatives in the Russian sector the thought was better to line up with the US than the squinty easterners.

In Japan same story - MacArthur`s reforms got side tracked by Korea - Japanese industry said whats the big deal? 

Decide for yourselves by reading Promised Land - Crusader State 1997 by ex Arty Sgt Walter McDougall 

Anyone have a library card?


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## Michael Dorosh (14 Apr 2006)

devil39 said:
			
		

> Fox Island, Wash.--DURING World War II, American soldiers en route to Britain before D-Day were given a pamphlet on how to behave while awaiting the invasion. The most important quote in it was this: "It is impolite to criticize your host; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies."
> 
> By that rule, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead our armed forces. First, his failure to build coalitions with our allies from what he dismissively called "old Europe" has imposed far greater demands and risks on our soldiers in Iraq than necessary.



That rule applied in 1944, though - the US Army was in no position to criticize British Commonwealth forces after their lacklustre performance in Tunisia and again at Sicily and Anzio. The US and Brits were roughly equal in terms of quality, and the US had yet to really prove themselves as anything outstanding - which I believe they did in Normandy and beyond.

The situation is different today, though - the US military is the one taking the fight to the enemy, with a little - sometimes damn little - help from allies in and outside of Europe.  Is Rumsfeld really off base in comparing US military involvement in SW Asia to that of other nations and finding the others - especially "old Europe" - wanting?


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## scoutfinch (14 Apr 2006)

Here is another General to add to the list -- Major General Charles Swannack.   

From CNN:http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/13/iraq.rumsfeld/index.html

So that makes Zinni, Eaton, Newbold and now Swannack.  And those are only the ones that have spoken out... makes me wonder how many are muttering under their breath or from behind clenched teeth?


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## devil39 (14 Apr 2006)

buckahed said:
			
		

> Serious question though, lots of people talk about whether the Iraqi army should have been disbanded and seem to generally  agree that it was a mistake. How so?  By the time the US took Baghdad, most of the Iraqi army had melted away and gone home. They had captured very few of the hard core B'aathists, Bremer announcing the disbandment of the Iraqi army was just formalizing what had already happened.



buckahed,

A review of counterinsurgency and nation building theories, doctrine, or history, would lead one to believe that it is much easier to operate through the mechanism of the existing state for reasons of legitimacy, lessening the appearances of occupation, etc.  Check out Steven Metz, William S. Lind, Thompson on Malaya, Cordesman and Krepinevich on Iraq....etc.

My understanding from reading and discussing with US officers who were on the ground was that there were plenty of Iraqis prepared to work in an Iraqi army, and that in the absence of strategic direction, local arrangements had been made.  Strategic (both late and foolish) direction demanded that the Iraqi Army be disbanded and the top 4 (or was it 6) layers of the Iraqi civil service be purged.

my 2 cents

Not to mention that there were not enough troops to ensure a rapid transition to stability in many peoples estimation......


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## m410 (14 Apr 2006)

devil39 said:
			
		

> Strategic (both late and foolish) direction demanded that the Iraqi Army be disbanded and the top 4 (or was it 6) layers of the Iraqi civil service be purged.


The coalition proved the Iraqi Army was totally incompetent during the invasion.  Why keep a bunch of loser generals who already proved their incompetence?  And both the upper military and upper civil service echelons were heavily implicit in a psychopathic regime.  Yes, there were opportunity costs in disbanding both groups but the alternative of keeping them on was worse.


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## tomahawk6 (14 Apr 2006)

The arguments that we didnt have enough troops and should have hired the Baath Party to run the country while we constituted a new government are both absurd and ignore the timeline of OIF. We did not want the Baathists running Iraq for the same reason that we didnt want Nazi's to run post war Germany. To make matters worse we might have seen armed opposition from the Kurds and Shia. Turkey blocked us from deploying a division size TF in N. Iraq which enabled the political/security leadership to escape and slowed down the consolidation of the country. Another limiting factor was logisitcs. We had one port to flow the troops and supplies into Iraq and Kuwait being a small country did not offer us the ability to base 300,000 troops, in fact we were pushing it at 130,000 or so. Finally even if we could have put in 300,000 troops the appearance of so many western troops might have galvanized an even larger opposition. The smaller foot print helped us in Afghanistan and we thought to replicate the same approach in Iraq.


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## devil39 (15 Apr 2006)

The US had 61 Divisions in Germany at VE Day 1945.....  perhaps they didn't need any other security assistance?  In the end they governed through much of the existing civil apparatus regardless.  A thorough de-Nazification proved impractical.

In Japan the US governed almost completely through the existing Japanese governmental structure....they didn't have as many troops in Japan post war.  The Emperor was retained as was much of the civil administration.

Some good and fairly recent books cover the US experience in "Nation-building" from the Rand Corp.  Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, 2005 and America's Role In Nation Building: From Germany To Iraq, 2003.  

Among the lessons learned from Japan ....."Co-opting existing institutions can facilitate nation-building better than building new ones from scratch" (Rand: America's Role, p 51).

Smaller footprints are nice if we manage to create stability in what the Rand 2005 study would suggest is the "Golden Hour".  

"This golden hour is a time frame of several weeks to several months, during which external intervention may enjoy some popular support and international legitimacy, and when potential spoilers may have insufficient time to organize.  Key tasks include rapidly deploying international military and police forces, vetting and deploying indigenous police and other security forces, and establishing at least a temporary rule of law." (xii)   

The suggestion in this study is that this was not achieved in Iraq.  This was not the fault of the operational level commanders.  Jay Garner was never given the authority to appropriately plan for Ph IV of OIF in my estimation.  I only base this on my readings and discussion with US officers who were involved with the OIF Ph III and OIF Ph IV transition period.


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## tomahawk6 (15 Apr 2006)

Reconstruction was too important to be left to a retired has been like Garner. The administration wanted a diplomat. For the same reason a White House staffer was put on Franks' staff for OIF. Anyway here is another view of the comments made by these retired officers.

http://biglizards.net/blog/archives/2006/04/grumbles_from_t.html


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## buckahed (15 Apr 2006)

How can you compare Germany and Japan to Iraq?  Both were culturaly homogenous non-tribal societies.
 Allowing Sunni Baathists to retain control of the military and bureaucracy would have been a complete disaster. The Kurds and Shia would never accept that.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (15 Apr 2006)

http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2006/04/14/1534818-ap.html

Bush says he won't fire Rumsfeld
    
WASHINGTON (AP) - President George W. Bush rebuffed recommendations from a growing number of retired generals Friday that he replace U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. 
"He has my full support," said Bush. 
Bush said Rumsfeld's stewardship at the Pentagon is crucial for the United States. 

"Earlier today, I spoke with Don Rumsfeld about ongoing military operations in the global war on terror," Bush said. 
"I reiterated my strong support for his leadership during this historic and challenging time for our nation." 
Bush's strong endorsement, conveyed in a statement released by the White House while Bush was at Camp David, Md., for the weekend, appeared designed to blunt a rising clamour from within the ranks of retired commanders for Rumsfeld's ouster. 

Six retired generals have called for Rumsfeld to resign, accusing him of mishandling the Iraq war, ignoring advice of field commanders and having an arrogant management style. 

Rumsfeld has rejected all such calls, while noting Bush had twice turned down his offers to resign. 
Meanwhile, in an interview aired Friday on Al-Arabiya television, Rumsfeld said he intends to continue serving. 
"The fact that two or three or four retired people have different views, I respect their views," Rumsfeld said. 

"But obviously if, out of thousands and thousands of admirals and generals, if every time two or three people disagreed we changed the secretary of defence of the United States, it would be like a merry-go-round." 
A senior administration official said Bush considered a formal statement was warranted given the "type of voices" engaged in the most recent criticism of Rumsfeld. The official spoke on condition of anonymity. 
Similar statements are not likely to be forthcoming for other officials whose jobs are viewed to be in potential trouble, such as Treasury Secretary John Snow, the official said. 

Joshua Bolten took over from retiring Andy Card on Friday as White House chief of staff and several administration personnel changes are widely anticipated, perhaps as early as next week. 
The timing of Bush's statement on Rumsfeld seemed designed to tamp down speculation, particularly in Sunday newspapers and on weekend television news shows, that Rumsfeld might be on his way out. 
Bush's statement also appeared directed at criticism from some of the retired generals that Bush ignored military recommendations from his commanders on missions in Iraq and in the broader war on terrorism. 

"I have seen firsthand how Don relies upon our military commanders in the field and at the Pentagon to make decisions about how to best complete these missions," Bush said. 
"Secretary Rumsfeld's energetic and steady leadership is exactly what is needed at this period. 
"He has my full support and deepest appreciation." 

One of those calling for Rumsfeld's replacement, retired general John Batiste, called the recent series of critical statements "absolutely coincidental" earlier Friday and said he did not know of any co-ordinated effort to discredit the defence secretary. 
"I have not talked to the other generals," Batiste, interviewed from Rochester, N.Y., said on a television show. 
Nevertheless, he said he thinks the clamour for Rumsfeld to step down is "happening for a reason." 

Batiste said he retired, rather than accept a promotion to lieutenant general, because he could not accept Rumsfeld's management style. 
Separately, Batiste told interviewers on a television show, he had served under a defence secretary "who didn't understand leadership, who was abusive, who was arrogant and who didn't build a strong team." 

Also calling for Rumsfeld to resign were retired army major general John Riggs, retired marine general Anthony Zinni, retired army major general Charles Swannack, retired army major general Paul Eaton, and retired marine lieutenant general Gregory Newbold.


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## Nemo888 (15 Apr 2006)

hmmmm,... Sounds like scapegoat time. Looks like Rummy might take one for the team  

This time Iraq was a total fiasco. Thank God we didn't sign up.


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## tomahawk6 (15 Apr 2006)

Another good article on this drama. Rumsfeld is a symbol of our war effort and as a result if he was forced out it would be cause for celebration by our enemies. I think Rummy will be in the saddle til the end of the administration.

http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2006/04/generals-revolt.html


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## Centurian1985 (16 Apr 2006)

Tomahawk, dont take this the wrong way, but i find some of yoru comments to be contrdictory and, sadly, delusional.  

First, Rummy and the Bush family are so tight, the only way they would use Rummy as a scapegoat is if he was proven to be a (insert horrible crime), and even then theyd fight to the wall for him.

Second, you mention earlier that it would have been crazy to hire the Baathists to control the government and military while the elections were going on....?????  Im confused, thats exactly what happened! IT IS like the Nazis running Germany after the war. (Which by the way if you would read your history you would know that many leading Nazi industrialsts WERE running Germany after the war, and many of them were excused from prosecution at Nurmeberg for 'national security reasons').

Third, the Kurds were not a problem, they were in line with US demands; thats why the Turks were so cheesed off! (They hate the Kurds!)

Fourth, MIGHT HAVE GALVANZIED A GREATER OPPOSITION? Holy cow, is this date right?  Are you one of those who believe that the Iraqi resistance is against the wall?  Sounds like someone is believing too much national political propoganda!

With respect, I think some of your facts are in error!


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## pbi (17 Apr 2006)

I saw this on MSN Newsweek this morning. As Tomahawk rightly points out, we have to take media filtering and biases into account, but check this out:
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/12335719/site/newsweek/

An extract:



> The Revolt of the Retired Generals has created considerable discomfort in the E-Ring of the Pentagon and at the White House. President George W. Bush felt compelled last week to issue a written statement expressing his "full support" for the SecDef. For now, Bush has no intention of firing Rumsfeld. "He likes him," says a close friend of the president's, who requested anonymity in discussing such a sensitive matter. "He's not blind. He knows Rumsfeld sticks his foot in it." Adds a senior Bush aide, who declined to be named discussing the president's sentiments: "I haven't seen any evidence that their personal rapport is at all diminishing. They see each other often and talk often." Rumsfeld says he has twice offered his resignation to Bush, who has declined it.
> 
> The old generals can be quite biting about Rumsfeld; retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni wrote an op-ed calling the secretary of Defense "incompetent strategically, operationally, and tactically." But their criticisms are probably best understood as "the first salvos in the war over 'Who Lost Iraq'," says Douglas Macgregor, a retired U.S. Army colonel whose book "Breaking the Phalanx" was influential in inspiring the military's blitzkrieg assault on Baghdad. "Yes, Rumsfeld should go," says Macgregor. "But a lot of the generals should be fired, too. They share the blame for the mess we are in."
> 
> ...



Interesting to see the prominence of Marines in this.

Cheers


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## tomahawk6 (17 Apr 2006)

LA Times article.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich15apr15,0,4080791.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions


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## Centurian1985 (17 Apr 2006)

PBI, nice article.  

Very oft repeated line at the end, and very true, but you cant win the fight if you are hamstrung by the people ordering you to the fight (isnt that what this site is al about?)

Ref Rummy, everyone in government knew he was calling the shots during the Iraqi attack, and he was just as much to blame for the bungles that happened.  The war was won by US soldiers who used their tools to the highest standard capable, the failure to secure the country afterwards was due to Rumfield believing that the Iraqi's would rise up and overthrow the Baath party (as he was led to believe by the ex-patriot Iraqi community) in support of US troops.

Of note, Karzai said the same thing when the US went into Afghnaistan, and he was right, so the US is currently 50-50 for believing ex-patriot communties over the past 5 years.


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## pbi (18 Apr 2006)

Tomahawk: thanks for that. When I read things like:



> In one sense, the unedifying spectacle of disenchanted generals publicly attacking their erstwhile boss does serve a useful purpose. It reveals the dirty little secret that the Pentagon has attempted to conceal ever since Vietnam: At the upper echelons of the national security establishment, relations between soldiers and civilians are mired in dysfunction.



it makes me wonder if tension between senior military leaders and politicians is something that just can't be avoided, particularly in a democracy, but even in states like Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union.

As Canadians, we often tend to view the US military's situation through very rose-coloured glasses. My exposure to US forces over the years, and listening to US officers talk has made me wonder if maybe we actually share alot of similar problems, differeniated only by scale.

Cheers


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## tomahawk6 (18 Apr 2006)

Pbi I think we do have alot of the same problem's. I don't think the issues are limited to the military but are seen in government and in industry.


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## 54/102 CEF (25 Apr 2006)

Buck Sgt says the Soapbox Six don`t know what they are talking about

http://americancitizensoldier.blogspot.com/      Read "Demigods and Generals"


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## Blue Max (26 Apr 2006)

According to this story the average soldier with the help of the internet has more say and a faster response as to what the guys in theater need. 

This also apparently includes ideas of leadership, of which the opinions of the now infamous six retired generals that where heralded by the media as speaking out for all soldiers, have been panned widely by most soldiers that use an internal military internet to exchange idea's.

_Six Generals Shot Down By The Internet  

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20060425.aspx

April 25, 2006: The recent flap over six retired American generals publicly calling for the Secretary of Defense to resign, also brought out opinions, via the Internet, from lower ranking troops (active duty, reservists and retired.) The mass media ran with the six generals, but got shot down by the troops and their blogs, message board postings and emails. It wasn't just a matter of the "troop media" being more powerful. No, what the troops had going for them was a more convincing reality. Unlike the six generals, many of the Internet troops were in Iraq, or had recently been there. Their opinions were not as eloquent as those of the generals, but they were also more convincing. Added to that was the complaint from many of the troops that, according to the American constitution, it's the civilians (in the person of the Secretary of Defense) that can dismiss soldiers from service, not the other way around. While the six generals were only expressing their opinions (which only active duty troops are restricted from doing, because of the different military legal system they operate under), it rubbed a lot of people (military and civilian) the wrong way because of the constitutional angle. 

Naturally, the details of this media battle didn't get a lot of coverage in the mass media. Makes sense. Who wants to discuss a defeat, by a bunch of amateurs no less. But the mass media has been missing an even larger story about the military and the Internet. 

The military has become a lot more responsive to "what the troops want" in the last decade, since the Internet became widely available. What happened was simple. The troops got on line, found each other and have been sharing opinions and experiences, getting to know each other, and doing it all very quickly. The most striking example of this is how it has changed the speed with which new weapons and equipment get into service. Troops have always bought superior commercial equipment, usually from camping and hunting suppliers. And a lot more of that gear has been available in the last decade. Because the word now gets around so quickly via the net, useful new gear is quickly purchased by thousands of troops. After September 11, 2001, with a war on, having the best gear was seen by more troops as a matter of life and death. This quickly got back to politicians, journalists and the military bureaucrats responsible for buying gear for the troops. The quality of the "official issue" gear skyrocketed like never before because of the Internet pressure. 

But the troops also exchanged information on tactics and techniques, as well as anything else they knew that could help keep them alive in combat. This alarmed the Department of Defense, which put some restrictions on active duty bloggers. The troops did not fight back, as, once reminded, they understood that, in public forums, anyone could read what they were saying, including the enemy. So a lot of this information continued to be exchanged email and private message boards. The military got into the act by establishing official message boards, for military personnel only, where useful information could be discussed and exchanged. All this rapid information sharing has had an enormous impact on the effectiveness of the troops, something that has largely gone unnoticed by the mass media.

The brass have not tried to discourage all this communication, because the officers use it as well, for the same reasons as the troops. Most junior officers grew up with the Internet, and many of the older ones were using the Internet before it became popularized in the 1990s. Even the generals of today, have experience with PCs when they were young, so have no trouble getting into this new form of communication. The military is eagerly building a "battlefield Internet" for use during combat, and parts of this are up and running and heavily used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

This is all uncharted territory. There's never been an army before where all the troops were so well connected with each other. So far, the benefits have outweighed any liabilities. But no one is sure where it will go next, and the public is largely unaware of the impact, because the mass media has not grasped nature and extent of the changes._


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