# Col. Stogran re MGS vs Tanks Decision



## Kirkhill (19 Feb 2005)

http://www.hfxnews.ca/news.aspx?storyID=29778

Friday, February 18, 2005
Stogran: cash crunch must stop   
By Chris Lambie

  
  
Col. Pat Stogran says troops are suffering. 

Canada is â Å“watering downâ ? its infantry for lack of cash, says the man who commanded Canada's first official combat mission in 50 years.

Col. Pat Stogran, who led this country's 850-member battalion for six months in Afghanistan three years ago, spoke in Halifax yesterday at a seminar organized by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

â Å“You have to have highly trained soldiers. We cannot continue to dismantle our army to the lowest common denominator because of fiscal problems, and send troops off to make a meaningful contribution,â ? Stogran told an audience of students, academics and military personnel.

Canadian success in Afghani-stan was largely because of senior troops who received their training during the Cold War, Stogran said.

Fears the future

â Å“We had a surge capacity. I fear for 10 years from now. Where are we going to be?â ? he said. â Å“Because our centre of gravity in the Canadian Forces is the training of our troops.â ?

The military is expecting a modest infusion of an extra $750-million in next weeks federal budget, but not enough to meet its massive operating shortfall or buy new ships and transport planes. 

Stogran was highly critical of Ottawa's â Å“unconscionableâ ? plan to phase out Leopard tanks and replace them with the lighter armoured Stryker mobile gun system.

â Å“There's no way you can bolt as much protection on to eight wheels,â ? he said. â Å“So we're killing people.â ?

Stogran also slammed a military phenomenon he dubbed â Å“management over manoeuvre.â ?

â Å“I've got to say that the most demoralizing thing that has ever happened to me â â€ at the risk of being completely disloyal here â â€ was being posted to our National Defence headquarters after Afghanistan,â ? he said. 

â Å“In the Canadian Forces now we have come to the point where managing what little resources we have is a far higher career determinant than manoeuvring in the face of an enemy.â ?

Raise eyebrows

In what's sure to raise a few sailors' eyebrows, Stogran told the crowd Canada should be re-thinking its â Å“blue waterâ ? navy.

â Å“These are fiscally constrained times,â ? he said. 

clambie@hfxnews.ca




He has got a pair.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Feb 2005)

Sounds like he's about to retire.


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## Cloud Cover (19 Feb 2005)

As long as  the CAF remains "fiscally constrained" , he's probably right on all points... even the blue water part. :-\


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Feb 2005)

Isn't it just the CF now?


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## Gunner (19 Feb 2005)

I would liked to have read/heard the speech as you are only getting one person's (the reporters) version of it and you lose the context it was presented.


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## George Wallace (19 Feb 2005)

I like him already.

Gw


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## Cloud Cover (19 Feb 2005)

CFL said:
			
		

> Isn't it just the CF now?



The way I read the NDA, it's the Canadian Armed Forces. CF is a PC short form that I intend to start avoiding wherever possible. [anyway, I know that you already know that!!]


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## Slim (19 Feb 2005)

That took guts to say...They'll probably get him for that (the Libs) but it needed to be said! What a soldier!

I would like to see the whole speech though. Could someone post it if they have access to it please?

Slim


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Feb 2005)

I told you I bet he retires in 6 months.


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## Kirkhill (19 Feb 2005)

On the other hand what kind of message would it send if he got his Brigade?


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## FredDaHead (19 Feb 2005)

One thing that bugs me lately with the land element officer speaking out about the budget, is that they basically say "give craploads of money for the Army, but cut the Navy and Air Force, we don't need them now."

Sure, buying ships and planes costs money, but if we don't have them, we'll have to keep relying on other countries to get around, which will probably end up just as costly--economically and politically--in the long run.

I do think it's good that an officer is saying the CAF need more money, but...


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## Ex-Dragoon (19 Feb 2005)

Agreed FredG he should stick in his own lanes when it comes to his opinion of the Air Force and the Navy


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## Sapper6 (19 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Agreed FredG he should stick in his own lanes when it comes to his opinion of the Air Force and the Navy



Even our new CDS, Gen Hillier has come out and said that a viable 21st Century force must be Joint and that the Army must have both the Navy and Air Force to project force.  However, just like the Army is "transforming" I suspect that the Navy and Air Force may be asked to focus on different areas.  IMHO, we need the JSS and a C-17 like aircraft to do what has to be done.

CFL,

You may be right.  Col Stogran may have spoken out one too many times.  We'll see...

S6


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Feb 2005)

Sapper6 I hope not.  I love shit disturbers.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (19 Feb 2005)

Frederik G said:
			
		

> One thing that bugs me lately with the land element officer speaking out about the budget, is that they basically say "give craploads of money for the Army, but cut the Navy and Air Force, we don't need them now."
> 
> Sure, buying ships and planes costs money, but if we don't have them, we'll have to keep relying on other countries to get around, which will probably end up just as costly--economically and politically--in the long run.
> 
> I do think it's good that an officer is saying the CAF need more money, but...



In fairness to the land forces guys, I don't blame them.   In the positions they are being putting into they are far more likely to be killed by enemy attacks due to inadequate equipment than the other services.   That does not excuse rust out, but in particular in the failed nation states world that we live, the army is the pointy tip of the spear while both the air force and navy have the added security of distance.

Bottom Line:   I'd rather rent strategic airlift and keep the tanks we have than buy the strategic airlift and go with MGS/MMEV/TUA cluster____.   They may have been suitable for a cold war, fighting opposing armour, defensive positions only battle, but in an urban area where it is likely the undeclared enemy combatant *WILL* be successful with the first phase of their attack and score hits with the weapons at their disposal, you have to ensure survivability first, then an ability to respond at close quarters.   MMEV, TUA and MGS are three sitting ducks waiting for those first incoming shots and with two versions you still have an extremely limited abilty to respond after the fact.   

No offence intended to anyone from the other services....I just think NDHQ is setting up a force structure that with one well-planned ambush in place like Afghanistan could get 100's of guys killed in less than an hour, and they deserve better than that.




Matthew.


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## TCBF (19 Feb 2005)

My Coyote and I flew from Edmonton to Gander to Ramstein in a USAF C5B Galaxy and from Ramstein to Kandahar in a C17.  Without my Coyote, I flew from Kandahar to Diego Garcia in a C5B, and from DG to Kuala Lumpur to Guam to Hawaii to Edmonton on a Malasia Airways charter.  

If we want to go where our allies want us to, this is fine.  If we want to go somewhere on our own - perhaps we can't.  So, what does Canada want, and what sacrifices are Canadians willing to make to supply it?

If the answers remain "They Don't Know", and "None", then C17s, and C130Js will exist in Canada only as screen savers or wallpaper in Air Command HQ.  This is fine, since we all know that if someone hands us our butts on a plate in some third world paradise, the guvmint won't let us go anywhere on our shiny new airplanes anyway.  UNLESS....we go where the USA will back us up.

Note to the easily offended:  My "wallpaper" is a photo of the Avro Arrow RL 201 rollout.

Tom


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## jc5778 (19 Feb 2005)

I was under Col. Stogran's command in Afghanistan and let me just say this...He is for the troops.  He's pretty hardcore (for officer's anyway) He knows the real problems we land types face, fiscally, and as for what CFL said about him retiring.  I doubt it.  Since Op Apollo, he's golden. Destined for great pointy-head things if he stays.  While overseas we thought he was a little crazy.  However upon reflection, for us 031's, he knows what we want. When we received our C-in-C award, he told us that the US invasion force for Iraq, had "penciled" us (3VP Battlegroup) in as an attacking force, just-in-case we could make it.  His time on the international stage has obviously impressed upon somebody in the US.  Is that good???  Time will tell. :warstory:


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## DBA (19 Feb 2005)

I think having combat experienced people at NDHQ is a good thing. The administrative side can get too involved with itself and lose sight of the reason they exist in the first place. By this I don't mean workers there aren't hard working professionals but that rules and procedures accumulate that hinder achieving all they are capable of. People get evaluated on the result in reference to some rules and internal organizational structure and not what they contribute to the end product. Rules get added that improve the administrative accountability with no regard to the effect they have operationally like delaying procurement so it's not responsive to changing needs. A few people with more operationally based outlooks on the army side can't hurt. It's hard to tell however if the problem isn't one level up in the political realm with rules forced down the line along with a bunch of no's to requests from below.


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## Gobsmacked (20 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Col. Pat Stogran, who led this country's 850-member battalion for six months in Afghanistan three years ago, spoke in Halifax yesterday at a seminar organized by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.
> 
> Stogran was highly critical of Ottawa's â Å“*unconscionable*â ? plan to phase out Leopard tanks and replace them with the lighter armoured Stryker mobile gun system.
> â Å“There's no way you can bolt as much protection on to eight wheels,â ? he said. â Å“So we're killing people.â ?
> ...



Truly, as I noted on the following thread:
http://army.ca/forums/index.php?PHPSESSID=701d56d8e5acb65871067b00f69a6f39&topic=26047.0;all

Project File No 300000731-300
_'*MGS SOR* (Mobile Gun System - Statement of Operational Requirements)'_ Highliights
[One of the few SOR to be written to Exactly fit a piece of equipment - and if thats not enough, due to well known problems - such as Autoloader, well lets reassess so that it still fits.]


_4.1.3 *Essential Criteria Achievable*:  The stipulation of an essential criterion presumes that it is achievable at reasonable cost.  However, *should any essential criterion subsequently be determined to be impractical for technical* or budgetary *reasons, that criterion will be reassessed*._
[WTF??  - I've never heard of this type of wishy-washy criteria before, ie. if it still don't work thats OK - we'll make it 'Non-Essential'.  For most any other material acquisition program out there - if it does not meet Essential criteria it is Not acceptable - I guess this Basic Tennant just does not apply to the MGS.  Basically, meaning that *the MGS SOR is essentially Worthless* as any part of it can be ignored/rewritten to ensure the MGS is acceptable.
Not a very stong assertion for a piece of equipment that is supposed to be the cornerstone of the DFS 'system of systems'.  ]

And confirmed by Lance who pointed out:
_"the true definition of 'Essential Criteria' is given by the PWGSC.  And there are no caveats to that definition.  To add caveats, obviously negates the 'essential' part from the 'criteria' part."_

As Mathew  Commented:
_"P.S.  The part about essential requirements being deemed unessential if the vehicle can't qualify is truly frightening.  I cannot believe the NDHQ would allow such a thing.  To me that reeks of economic interests outweighing the safety of our men in uniform and that is truly unforgiveable."_
While Franko noted:
_"methinks it's a done deal and the politicians don't give a darn until the body bags come home."_
This opinion has repeatedly been confirmed by the Rank and File on this site - hopefully serving officers will follow Col Stograns example and 'step up to the plate'.

[Guantlets Down]

The WishyWashy _"*Essential Criteria Achievable*"_ Should be setting off RED ALARM bells in serving personnel, especially officers (who are supposed to abide by a certain Above Board CODE OF CONDUCT) and armour personnel (both serving and retired).
I've looked at many other SORs through ATI requests, and Not One has ever been this Accommodating that would allow failure of All Essential requirements and still allow Acceptance of a piece of $@#%. 

The fact that a Seriously Flawed SOR has actually been _"Approved"_ by NDHQ 
seemingly indicates an Astounding Lack of Ethics in the Officer Corps. 
Truly, Not Worthy!

As noted in the 60th anniversary of 'The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps - an illustrated history',
the following are a few of the Important Values as espoused by LCol Worthy himself while commander of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle School at Camp Borden:
_4 - When you comment on anything "I want your honest opinion, and not what you think I (or other Senior Officers/Politicians) would like to hear.  In other words, do not become a 'yes man' with me_ (or HQ)_.
6 - The following are my pet aversions, which annoy me greatly: c) Stupidity; d) Officers who fail to look after their men; f) Deception."_
In Peacetime, as opposed to Wartime, Officers who believe in the preceeding Values have a Moral Compunction to speak up and express their objections - especially when the future welfare of their men is involved.  Or has 'Leading by Example' fallen into some twisted abberation?

Officers should have a Moral/Ehtical Dutyl to speak out against a Fundamentally Flawed piece of equipment, Silence is a major symptom of Point 6-d).
Meanwhile, those who argue in favour of the Flawed MGS are symptomatic of Points 6-c) & 6-f).
Or have all the officers out there decided to become yes-men and roll-over and play dead? 
Or possibly looking forward to positions with GDLS-C ?? 

[Guantlets Up]

Col Stogran is truy a soldiers officer - WORTHY!     :tank:

As are those who have dared to question DND direction to replace the tank with the MGS
 (or point out 'Transformational' alternatives - such as LCol Summerfield's turreted mortar alternative) through the Armour Bulletin or the CAJ.
Even though DND blindly likes to keep pointing out that _"The MGS is not a replacement *or substitute* for a main battle tank"_.  
(Maybe if they say it enough times nobody will realize they have substituted the MGS as a replacement for the Leopard tank - as the Direct Fire Support Vehicle [DFSV]   :blotto: - a term first coined in the early 70s when they tried to replace the Centurion tank with the lightweight Scorpion tank. )
Hopefully, Gen Hillier will prove himself likewise and withdraw his misdirected MGS support  :-\


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## Edward Campbell (20 Feb 2005)

Like most others, I did not hear/read Colonel Pat Stogran's remarks, but I don't think his reported comments are overly controversial, much less _political_; they are, in fact, about the norm for most military officers of his age, education and experience.

When we said _joint operations_ most of my air force colleagues had visions of fighter/bombers swooping down to destroy bridges and rail crossings, with great displays of airmanship, bravery and precision before formations of transports dropped paratroopers who mopped up, securing the great air force victory.

My naval friends saw, in their dreams, destroyers and frigates flushing out ballistic missile submarines, aided, to be sure by carefully _targeted_ long range air patrol sorties and supported, always, by fighters flying CAP, up above.   Or they imagined stately amphibious flotillas sailing towards a beach where, after suitable naval _preparation_ troops were put ashore â â€œ more mopping up.

Most soldiers, like Colonel Stogran, have similarly myopic views: _joint_ usually means something like _â ?all the others are there to support *me, Me, ME!â ?*_ ... not surprising, really.

For a variety of good and valid reasons we, Canada, do not have to consider the whole range of military power: strategic, operational, tactical.   We have only one service with anything like a _strategic_ capability.   Our navy, like all _blue water_ navies can _*project power*_ wherever we can send it, for as long as we can sustain it.   The *power* we project can be enhanced if the naval force has _organic_ (to a _joint task force_) air and even land forces ... but even a fully _joint_ force is only _strategic_ if it is based on a naval force â â€œ neither the army nor the air force can *project power* in the proper sense of that term because neither can _stand to_ on anything like a full time basis without being on the ground, at which time the power is no longer being _projected_, it has already been applied.   The situation is no longer _strategic_. it has devolved through the _operational_ 'down' to the _tactical_ level.

If we, Canada, want a _strategic_ voice in the world â â€œ and I have argued that we, Canada, as one of the world's 'top ten' countries, now, and destined to remain in the top 10% throughout the next century, must have a such a _strategic_ presence - then we must have a navy: a real, blue water navy.   To argue that the army's temporary problems must be solved by shelving the only service which 'works' right now is militarily irresponsible â â€œ which means it's about par for the course in Ottawa.

That doesn't mean that the army's problems are not serious, nor does it mean that the army should not be accorded some priority for whatever 'new' funding *might* materialize; it does mean that we must, at the very least, _maintain_ the navy and prevent further erosion of the air force while we try to rebuild the army.

We need _joint_ forces â â€œ almost everything above ship, battalion/regiment and squadron can, indeed *should* be _joint_ â â€œ which means that all elements must be able to provide their components.

Robbing Peter to pay Paul is poor theology, worse economics and unsound military planning.   I hope that's not what Colonel Stogran advocated ... if he did then he is wrong.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (20 Feb 2005)

Rusty Old Joint said:
			
		

> Like most others, I did not hear/read Colonel Pat Stogran's remarks, but I don't think his reported comments are overly controversial, much less _political_; they are, in fact, about the norm for most military officers of his age, education and experience.
> 
> When we said _joint operations_ most of my air force colleagues had visions of fighter/bombers swooping down to destroy bridges and rail crossings, with great displays of airmanship, bravery and precision before formations of transports dropped paratroopers who mopped up, securing the great air force victory.
> 
> ...



The problem is that in the new "Liberal Party of Canada" reality, we don't have enough money to pay Peter and Paul and therefore have to decide which one provides us with the greatest ROI and be realistic about reducing one of their hours.   'Unsound' is trying to provide $24 billion worth of military services with a $12 billion budget.   We've already tried that experiment for the last XXX years and it's not working.   You cut back to a set of equipment and responsibilities you can manage and maintain within your budget, then if the government wants you to do something else, you cost it out and bill them for it.

I would add, if Bill Graham only does one thing, he needs to pull the costs for foreign operations out of the Defence Budget and put them into the Foreign Affairs Budget and guarantee specific funding for regular operation (including sovereignty patrols), training and procurement at known levels.   The fact that planners need to figure out what procurement plans are going to have to be deferred this year because the government has decided to send troops overseas is about the most absurd thing I can possibly imagine.



Matthew.


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## EODSpr (20 Feb 2005)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> I would add, if Bill Graham only does one thing, he needs to pull the costs for foreign operations out of the Defence Budget and put them into the Foreign Affairs Budget and guarantee specific funding for regular operation (including sovereignty patrols), training and procurement at known levels.   The fact that planners need to figure out what procurement plans are going to have to be deferred this year because the government has decided to send troops overseas is about the most absurd thing I can possibly imagine.
> 
> 
> 
> Matthew.



Here Here, procurement already takes way to long without additional delays due to operations.

E45

Chimo!


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## PPCLI Guy (20 Feb 2005)

Rusty Old Joint said:
			
		

> For a variety of good and valid reasons we, Canada, do not have to consider the whole range of military power: strategic, operational, tactical.   We have only one service with anything like a _strategic_ capability.   Our navy, like all _blue water_ navies can _*project power*_ wherever we can send it, for as long as we can sustain it.   The *power* we project can be enhanced if the naval force has _organic_ (to a _joint task force_) air and even land forces ... but even a fully _joint_ force is only _strategic_ if it is based on a naval force â â€œ neither the army nor the air force can *project power* in the proper sense of that term because neither can _stand to_ on anything like a full time basis without being on the ground, at which time the power is no longer being _projected_, it has already been applied.   The situation is no longer _strategic_. it has devolved through the _operational_ 'down' to the _tactical_ level.



The flip side of projection is protection - which is something that the Army and Air Force do well.  We need to be able to do both - to have the jab and a good guard - and some day, we will develop a roundhouse.

Dave


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## Todd614 (22 Feb 2005)

PPCLI Guy,

I know I'm getting a little off the topic of this thread, but can you elaborate on what you mean by the CF developing "a roundhouse." I'm intrigued...


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## Scoobie Newbie (22 Feb 2005)

He is refering to punching and kicking power.  Ie. punch, jab, kick.  Unless of course your looking for his idea as to what a roundhouse kick would be in the CF ie armour.


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## PPCLI Guy (22 Feb 2005)

Hey, just cus I like analogies, doesn't mean I have to be good at them!

I was thinking that projection gets you in the ring, and protection stops you from being knocked out - so then you need something to knock the other fella out - hence the roundhouse.  That would be power, be it hard or soft (and most likely hard).  A roundhouse could vary from a good ol stonking to a deliberate attack, from a sniper round to a deliberate action, from "sanctions" to a negotiated termination of the conflict.

Dave


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## Slim (22 Feb 2005)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Hey, just cus I like analogies, doesn't mean I have to be good at them!
> 
> I was thinking that projection gets you in the ring, and protection stops you from being knocked out - so then you need something to knock the other fella out - hence the roundhouse.   That would be power, be it hard or soft (and most likely hard).   A roundhouse could vary from a good ol stonking to a deliberate attack, from a sniper round to a deliberate action, from "sanctions" to a negotiated termination of the conflict.
> 
> Dave



The roundhouse could be both tactical and stratigic...

Slim


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## George Wallace (22 Feb 2005)

Thanks for the clarification guys.....I was thinking of that building where the Railroad parked its locomotives.

GW


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## PPCLI Guy (22 Feb 2005)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Thanks for the clarification guys.....I was thinking of that building where the Railroad parked its locomotives.



<Dave shakes head, and wanders off muttering "how come no one gets my little analogies"...>


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## BernDawg (23 Feb 2005)

Don't worry boss some of us have the requisite background in controlled violence to "get" the analogies

Out for now.


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## Zipper (24 Feb 2005)

LOL. Oh man...

That was funny. Good one PPCLI/GW.

I'll agree with all that the Col. is a stand up guy for his comments. What his future could look like regardless of whether he is "golden" or not is still up for question. Gen. Mackenzie was "golden" at one point.

As per this topic. I will say again I agree with all of you in that the MGS is a bad idea. I'll let GW go wild from that point as he has done a great job of screaming it from the mountain tops thoughout this web site.

LONG LIVE TRACK!


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## Dogboy (24 Feb 2005)

the Big problem is not what is going to work or what is needid but the fact that the MGS. is more P.C. then a Tank will ever be 
the pitcher of a army which is without track is more PC to the people who really mater (the ones in power)
they seem less threatening and kinder and so on 
thats the big problem


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## Scoobie Newbie (24 Feb 2005)

Well if a battlegroup comes home in body bags because we lack the sificiant firepower to stop a bunch of rebels what do you think the PC meter will read.  Tanks have proven themselves in both the standard battle arena (see wide open spaces) and the urban war (see rolling pill boxes).


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## Dogboy (24 Feb 2005)

you know that and I know that and most of the CF know that but do you thing some pencil pusher in ottowa knows that?


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## jc5778 (25 Feb 2005)

When was the last time we deployed tanks into an operation.....
anyone...... Kosovo, u say?, just for vehicle check points no? 

Why should we keep something that we never use?  Now as we pretty much all agree the MGS doesn't really help does it?  First hit capability is somewhere below 50% (I think) The armour is pretty much non-existent on a modern battlefield, my LAV is no better.  Are we going in to a place like Fallujah tomorrow?  Ever?  No, we WILL NEVER see the combat that the American's see.  It's sad but true.  We could not sustain any type of engagement like what happens in Iraq.  We have a couple die in the last 3 years and the reaction from the public is huge.  Imagine sending a company's worth home?  My point, as I strayed, is why should we keep armour if we are never going to use it?  Would that not constitute a big waste of money?  Popular idea in Ottawa, yes, howeverwhy not spend it on training, kit GOOD equipment etc.  Just my .02$ ;D


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## George Wallace (25 Feb 2005)

What kind of attitude is that?

If I don't fight for a 'strong' Army, I will see it disintergrate.   If I held your attitude, I'd just as well roll over and die.   Where will this all stop?

Let the public say that we don't need Tanks and M109's and Badgers and such.   Next, if we aren't going to do any fighting, as you say, let's take all the rifles away from our Infantry.   They won't need them, because they won't have to do any fighting in places like the Americans.   We can save a Hell of a lot of money.   We can send them on Peacekeeping Missions dressed just like they were on a ceremonial parade....Give 'em empty holsters, no one will know the difference.

Right!

GW


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## Scoobie Newbie (25 Feb 2005)

Any shit hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.  If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.


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## big bad john (25 Feb 2005)

CFL said:
			
		

> Any shit hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.   If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.



Words that ring loud,clear and true!!!


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## Ex-Dragoon (25 Feb 2005)

> Quote from: CFL on Today at 11:33:35
> Any crap hole can turn into a Falluja at the drop of the hat.  If your not ready equipment wise, tactic wise, and training wise we are dead.
> 
> 
> Words that ring loud,clear and true!!!



Which is why I think the idea of niche roles for the CF is dangerous as well.


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## big bad john (25 Feb 2005)

As I have said before in the forum, emulate 3 Commando Brigade.


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## Kirkhill (25 Feb 2005)

BBJ

AFAIK 3 Cdo RM doesn't include any heavy armour.  Isn't that right?

I believe your armoured assets include:

armoured versions of the Bv206 (recently acquired and issued at the rate necessary to equip one out of four cbt tms in a Commando, the other three being 2 foot and 1 Landrover)
1 Squadron of Scimitar Light Tanks (8 tonnes of aluminium with a 30mm gun) usually supplied from the Household Cavalry Regiment as a Brigade asset

4 Challenger IIs were just recently incorporated into an Allied landing exercise on the Georgia coast - but this seems to have been the first time in many years.

Perhaps you can clarify for me your apparent comfort with going into situations that, to quote CFL "can turn into a Fallujah at the drop of a hat" when  3RM Cdo Bde may or may not have heavy armoured support.  And if you do it is not integral to your force structure and likely only to be available in "penny-packets"?

Just curious Sir


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## big bad john (25 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> BBJ
> 
> AFAIK 3 Cdo RM doesn't include any heavy armour.   Isn't that right?
> 
> ...



To start with, the new Vikings are not armoured BV206s.  They are the next generation of vehicle.  Yes they have much more armour.  The rest of the assets are as described.  

Marines are in Iraq and Afghanistan right now without really any armoured assets to speak of.  There are more ways than "blunt" force to gain an objective.  Armoured and Mechanized unit do have their place.  But I don't think that with the money provided the Canadian Forces right now, that it would be an affordable niche option.  

Personally, I have "gone in" with this type of force (i.e. Commando or Light Fighter) in Kuwait and Iraq 1, The South Atlantic, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia and a few others.  Heavy support is nice and can be necessary.  This is always "on call", sometimes as you need it, and sometimes with a lot less that you would like.  But at the end of the day you still have to complete your objectives.  It is easier to say that do, but you get on and do it.


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## Zipper (25 Feb 2005)

So whats the consensus? MGS piece of crap? Tanks not going to happen anytime soon crybaby? Turn our forces into a look alike light force similiar to 3 Cdo (RM)?

I think I agree for the most part. If we could turn one (or two) of our Bde's into something similiar to that, and have a 3rd (yeah right) in a heavier role as suuport, we may actually have something.


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## Kirkhill (25 Feb 2005)

Thanks BBJ

Zipper, oh to heck with it.... 

Cheers.


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## RV (1 Mar 2005)

Just another rant about the MGS...

While on my 6a two years we did a tour of the plant in London.  The tour guys there tried to convince us that the vehicle was "everything and then some", firing on the move etc etc.  They never answered my one and only question of "what ammunition will it be capable of firing".  They avoided the question and talked about the autoloader, and that the gun was a 105 and showed us propaganda of their vehicle driving and firing, although never from over the side.

Big deal.

After reading in the news a number of reviews, seeing the company propaganda films, and having also talked to the troops I know doing the trials etc I have come up to a new nickname, should the powers that be ever buy this P.O.S.



~~~~Cougar Mk. II~~~~


Its just like a cougar but bigger....


A question for all those Infantry guys who ask the question about "why keep something we will never use" (making the presumption that it also means why buy something we will 'never' use).


Which would you rather know has your back while you go house clearing, advancing to contact, trench clearing etc..  A fully functioning battle tank that can distinguish targets and paste them from a distance and then follow you over marginal terrain, keeping thier heads down, or, a vehicle you know has a spotty record even before the battle starts which may or not may not even make to the FEBA let alone survive long once it gets there.  While it is your job to ferret out the pockets of resistance, you need fire support that can suppress the enemy long enough to get you into position, (even a LAV cannot yet teleport despite all the fancy toys it has).  The MGS is a sitting duck, even more so than a tank because it is Lightly Armoured.  While a trained and capable infantry troop with a hand held missile can take out a tank, any idiot with a gasoline bomb or a readily available .50 cal. can dispatch light armour.

Any army soldier is or should be well aware of the limitations of each platform, I think perhaps some sober thought needs to go into planning this "army of the future" and stop brainwashing our troops into thinking that a modern 'urban' combat environment will become anything other than heavy marginal terrain very quickly(what happens to buildings when you play with explosives, and WWII vets can attest to the results).  Imagine the MGS going over rubble....not.  It will be the PBI's of the world slogging rubble and other obstacles out of the way so the MGS can move forward to get blown up.

If we buy the MGS it should be used strictly as close support for mopping up operations in well controlled territory where its security from fire can be controlled.


When it comes to the 'Cougar Mk. II', my money is on the tank.

DR-V.


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## Zipper (1 Mar 2005)

Agreed with you on all counts RV. 

I am still wondering how you can have an auto loader with various types of ammo and be able to change them up fast enough to engage multiple targets? I think it is called HESH, HESH, and HESH.



			
				RV said:
			
		

> Any army soldier is or should be well aware of the limitations of each platform, I think perhaps some sober thought needs to go into planning this "army of the future" and stop brainwashing our troops into thinking that a modern 'urban' combat environment will become anything other than heavy marginal terrain very quickly(what happens to buildings when you play with explosives, and WWII vets can attest to the results). Imagine the MGS going over rubble....not. It will be the PBI's of the world slogging rubble and other obstacles out of the way so the MGS can move forward to get blown up.
> 
> If we buy the MGS it should be used strictly as close support for mopping up operations in well controlled territory where its security from fire can be controlled.



You got it. They are not brain-washing anymore. They have come right out and said that we will no longer be doing any operations that are are beyond the capabilities with which we are equipped. In other words, operations in well controlled territory (no hard targets). We'll just be worrying about the guy with the shoulder mounted RPG and ATGM is all.


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## RV (4 Mar 2005)

Hey Zipper,

What you said reminds of something that still makes my skin crawl...

warning...   :warstory: helmets on...

~~~The scene, its 1994 driving through some small town heading towards Visoko~~~

It is my first day in country (B-H) and I, "R-V the REMF", volunteers to C/C a vehicle from Split up to Visoko because I don't want to ride in a crappy old bus with many other sweaty/stinky army guys who also just got off the plane and I was a young keen kind of guy (now I am just older and keen).   That combined with a one night stay in a Primosten hotel convinced me it was the thing to do..   :threat:    

It is a beautiful day for driving, the sun is out, the landscape is pretty, and I have the security of an armoured vehicle all around me.   My driver is a seasoned RCD guy, whose last name currently escapes me but his first name is Dave which is coincidentally amusing because so is mine.   As we go along we get in the mountains and at the entrance to one particular town, a while after going over Pacman I think, the road is going downhill into a sharp left then to the right almost like a switchback type of road.   On the left side of the turn is one of those monuments to accident victims and probably others, dug into the hillside and at the bottom of the hill it takes a hard right into the town and the road becomes wide enough for a column of Grizzlies without weapons.   We are the last vehicle in the packet and I am looking down into the town as we approach it with its narrow alleys between 3-4 story buildings and deserted streets and thinking to myself 'what a great place this would be to ambush an armoured column'.   It would be so simple and I am daydreaming of how I would do it with a simple, 'knock out the first and last vehicle and then slaughter the rest' type of attack.   I am not paying as much attention as I should be since I am playing out my mental battlefield, marvelling at my cleverness.   I just finish this 'battle' as we enter the town, passing the first building and my driver pipes up with "holy bleeeep do you see that?" I say "no, what?, where?"   He says   " look left at the kid with the RPG in that window", I look back and to the left and indeed there is a kid, probably 12 or 14 years old with an RPG on his shoulder waving as we go by.   My next thought is along the lines of "uh-oh this is going to suck" along with some colorful language as I drop down inside the hatch, banging my head in the process.   The kid just kept waving as we went by and happily did not fire the RPG at us.

I am glad the story worked out like it did and to me it has become something I snicker at for my reaction and banging my head on the hatch, but it does remind me that what we do can be dangerous and you need to remain vigilant and prepared.

I am sure that many of you have more harrowing tales than that one, but I just like to tell that story.

Cheers,

R-V



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Agreed with you on all counts RV.
> 
> <snip>We'll just be worrying about the guy with the shoulder mounted RPG and ATGM is all.


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## Zipper (4 Mar 2005)

Nice. One of those situations that loosens the bladder, and makes you thank God for the fact that that kid wasn't on the opposite side.

But it proves my point well.

Once again after reading the Armoured bulletin and some other articles. I wish we could keep the Leo's in operation and build them into our future capabilities instead of moth-balling them and losing that asset.

But then I'm not the one making the decisions.


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## RV (4 Mar 2005)

While I agree that having heavy C/S is a good idea, I am not sure that the C2 is the way to go based strictly on its age and the cost of maintaining (which is actually my favorite thing to work on; I chose this trade -FCS-during POET because someone said I get to work on tanks).

What we really need is for the government to take a DND policy statement and work with it and get back to warfighting capability even if we don't use it; after all it is better to have and not need than to need and not have.   It is up to the government to decide how to employ military forces and it is their responsibility to equip them.   Too bad it is those same military forces that suffer from their decisions; Ross rifle, compressed-paper soled boots, LSVW, etc etc...   the list is long and sad.

It has seemed to me that over the past 20 years that I have been around DND makes a policy statement and the government says "yeah, great idea" and then says "here's a biscuit and you can have rest of the the money in a few years"...sound familiar.   When "a few years" arrives, the government is once again too poor to implement and they ask for a policy review.   In the reading I have done this has been somewhat of a "modus operandi" for Canadian governments since confederation to show the Canadian people and the world we mean business every few years but then nothing gets done about it.

I am hopeful that the new power brokers for DND can get the job done for a change.   But, like our back pay, I will beleive it exists when the money is in the bank.

 ^-^

Cheers,

R-V




			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Nice. One of those situations that loosens the bladder, and makes you thank God for the fact that that kid wasn't on the opposite side.
> 
> But it proves my point well.
> 
> ...


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## Zipper (4 Mar 2005)

Well put RV. 

I too am hopeful that things will change for the better. Reading all the online bullitens and journals is encouraging even though I personally do not agree with all the directions that we are taking. If you read the light forces as well as the light vs medium threads, there are quite a few good ideas being put forth. Of course, only the ideas that come down from NDHQ and official bodies of, count. But oh well.


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