# Our surreal Afghan mission



## observor 69 (31 Dec 2006)

Toronto Star Dec 31, 2006

Our surreal Afghan mission
 TheStar.com - opinion - Our surreal Afghan mission 
After a year of living dangerously for Canada's badly stretched troops, the military campaign has taken on an `Alice in Kandahar' quality, writes Hugh Graham

Toronto Star


Canada's past year in Afghanistan has been like a bad dream. Not a disaster, but nightmarish in the sense of running like mad and not moving. 

Right near its base in Kandahar, Canada has declared victory over the Taliban again and again in the same place and now we're in Operation Falcon's Summit to take the same area yet again. 

Reconstruction is constantly announced but it's difficult to measure in a region that's notoriously undeveloped and where things are constantly being destroyed by war. It's been like a year with Alice in Wonderland. 

Back in 2005, the Martin government rightly realized that conditions didn't call for peacekeeping, because we were taking sides with the Karzai government against the resurgent Taliban. 

So the Liberals defined the mission in terms of "the three block war" where reconstruction security and offensive combat are carried out simultaneously "block to block."

In rural areas, it's called the "ink-spot" strategy where secured and rebuilt areas are supposed to spread outward to link up to one another. With a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) attached to our combat troops to a present total of 2,500, it was thought to be cheap, efficient and relatively humane.

In Kandahar, in the south, where the Taliban have returned in droves since their defeat in 2002, we're using this strategy to secure an area of desert and river valley between the U.S. mission to the east and the British mission to the west and down as far as the border with Pakistan. 

An early objective was Panjwai, only 30 kilometres southwest of our base at Kandahar. For the Taliban, its labyrinthine villages have made it perfect for attacks on Kandahar and the ring road highway that opens the route to the main cities of Herat and Kabul.

As Canada geared up between February and mid-May, troops were harassed by occasional bombings.

In May, the British and Americans launched Operation Mountain Thrust. Canada's part was to secure Panjwai and move onward. 

In July, our troops took Panjwai a couple of times, only to find that the Taliban kept coming back. In August, after NATO took full control from the Americans, Canada launched Operation Medusa with U.S. and British support and took Panjwai again, killing 72 Taliban. By mid-September we had killed more than 1,000 Taliban fighters in two battles. It was hailed as a decisive victory. 

But 1,000 Taliban slipped away from Panjwai to Farrah in western Afghanistan – even past the British in Helmand Province. 

The fact is, the British couldn't supply the funds and troop numbers necessary to expand their own "ink-spots" against the Taliban. 

And neither Canada nor Britain has been able to secure the crucial artery of Highway 1 that the Taliban must have used to get to Farrah so quickly.

Worse, Taliban were trickling back to Panjwai; or, if they were local, digging up the guns they had buried after the battle. Using tactics imported from Iraq, they've accelerated a campaign of roadside and suicide bombing. 

Except for securing the highway to the frontier town of Spin Boldak, we are nowhere near the Pakistan border where they hide out. 

Now, Canadian and NATO forces have trapped the Taliban around the village of Howz-e-Madad, south of Panjwai. But the new offensive, stressing persuasion and defection over combat, promises little that will be decisive in the long term. After all, we are still in Panjwai. 

Our casualties, since our mission began in 2002, stand at 44, three quarters of them incurred this year. And we haven't even secured Highway 1. 

And how do you score reconstruction? 

Our defence department, the Canadian International Development Agency and the ministry for international development tout soldiers and police trained, fighters demobilized, weapons decommissioned, numbers of children, especially girls, being educated, schools and roads built, irrigation canals repaired, wells dug, displaced persons accommodated, small loans distributed, town councils empowered, Shuras consulted, and tribes encouraged to defect.

But the numbers are meaningless since it's impossible to measure them against simultaneous destruction and the immeasurable destitution of the country. 

Meanwhile, the strategic website Stratfor reminds us that Canada lacks the funds to buy off the warlords and opium traffickers who fund the Taliban. 

Attempts to destroy the opium crops have been futile. Moreover, they don't make much sense because the opium growers have nothing else to live on, so if their crops are destroyed, they go over to the Taliban. 

Part of our mission is to help the government in Kabul become clean and efficient and to extend services to the south. 

We have a team called "Argus" to help Kabul do this. But it's not nearly enough to convince the Pashtun tribesmen who make up the local Taliban that Canada isn't supporting a foreign-backed corrupt government against their traditionalist, nationalist aspirations in what is to them a civil war. 

We must also prove to these tribesmen – indeed, to the world – that our effort is not part of America's ill-conceived "search and destroy" war on terror.

Militarily, 2006 has been a stalemate. This is a victory for the Taliban, who have all the time in the world; for us, time and money and an exasperated home front are a ticking clock.

As for 2007, we must get far beyond Panjwai and help the British destroy Taliban supply lines all the way down to Pakistan. 

Already, despite a rise in terror attacks around Kandahar, Canada is celebrating a fall in combat casualties. But that is so only because the Taliban's fighting season is over. 

In winter the rebels hibernate in the mountains of Pakistan and in the spring they will launch a new offensive in which they are sure to try new tactics to break the stalemate. 

Recently, Canada brought in Leopard tanks to make places like Panjwai less defensible by the Taliban. But those weapons will work only if the Taliban fight the same kind of war next year.

Here at home, Liberal leader Stéphane Dion advocates more reconstruction and less combat and even Prime Minister Stephen Harper has hinted that this level of combat might not be sustainable. 

The alternative? Abandon the south for a less ambitious mission of consolidation in safer areas in the north, co-ordinating our decision with NAT0 and replacing combat with reconstruction and negotiation. 

Local, tribal Taliban may or may not bargain.

More important, the commanders and ideologues who recruit out of the madrassas in Pakistan will certainly not negotiate. 

Commander-in-chief Mullah Omar is a zealot. His field commander, Jalauddin Haqqani, is more "moderate," having in the past opened dialogue with Kabul. Still, he remains a protector of Al Qaeda and is well-funded with Saudi money. 

Canada's direct adversary, Dadullah Akhund, is rumoured to be considering a ministerial post in Kabul. But the one-legged Akhund is pathologically violent, considers Canadians crusaders and was once demoted by Mullah Omar for exterminating hundreds of Shiite Muslims. 

To compare those Taliban to the IRA and other guerrilla groups who have negotiated in the past is a mistake. The Taliban are theocrats and in theocracy there's no compromise. 

Four initiatives present the possibility of a new starting point: 


Defang the opium trade and empower its farmers by buying their crop and selling it to pharmaceutical companies.


Launch a diplomatic offensive to stop parts of Pakistan from providing the Taliban with a base. 


Get more NATO countries to share the burden of combat with Canada. 


Recognize that combat and reconstruction are more lethal and expensive than we thought. They are also mutually dependent and their balance can only be determined by the constantly changing situation on the ground, not by armchair debates at home. 

If we can face all this with realism, we may have a chance of moving forward and wakening from the bad dream of yet more operations in Panjwai.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Graham is a Toronto writer who has written extensively on Afghanistan and Iraq.


----------



## zipperhead_cop (31 Dec 2006)

More 5th column tripe from a guy that has already demonstrated is lack of support for the CF.  Hopefully he gets his soon.


----------



## observor 69 (31 Dec 2006)

I was thinking of putting " Let's see a reasoned rebuttal of this column " but nah that isn't necessary!


----------



## zipperhead_cop (31 Dec 2006)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> I was thinking of putting " Let's see a reasoned rebuttal of this column " but nah that isn't necessary!



I'm five minutes from my rack after a midnight shift, so somebody else will have to shred it.


----------



## rmacqueen (31 Dec 2006)

Could he have puckered up any more for the Liberals?  No wonder it is known as the Toronto *RED* Star by many respectable journalists (the few that there are)


----------



## Edward Campbell (31 Dec 2006)

With a couple of exceptions, it is a reasonably fair and balanced critique.

I’m not convinced that our, Canadian military leadership is fully caught up in the _ink blot_ analogue.  My reading – and that’s all it is – is that our military leaders recognize that they cannot, with anything like the available resources, go and _spread_ security across the countryside.  The Taliban - and their affiliated or allied _or whatever_ fighters or militias or bands of thugs – are tough, resourceful and committed to their own victory, even if _victory_ is defined as simply _staying in the game_ in the hope we will, sooner rather than later, give up and go home.

Equally, I’m not convinced that our military leaders have _”declared victory over the Taliban again and again in the same place.”_  Some of our political _leaders_ and many in the _commentariat_, including several who really ought to know better, have done that but I don’t recall hearing much of that from senior officers in theatre.  Maybe I’ve just been doing too much selective listening.

Is this not accurate?



> In July, our troops took Panjwai a couple of times, only to find that the Taliban kept coming back. In August, after NATO took full control from the Americans, Canada launched Operation Medusa with U.S. and British support and took Panjwai again, killing 72 Taliban. By mid-September we had killed more than 1,000 Taliban fighters in two battles. It was hailed as a decisive victory.
> 
> But 1,000 Taliban slipped away from Panjwai to Farrah in western Afghanistan – even past the British in Helmand Province.”



We may not like what we see in the rear-view mirror but that doesn’t mean it’s not accurate – the _decisive victory_ was hailed, I think, by the now well established _cheering section_.  I think it is now established that many, many _fighters_ (who may or may have been hard-core Taliban) did slip away – to somewhere and past someone.  The implicit critique – that Britain and Canada do not have enough soldiers on the ground to take and hold a large area and provide pretty good security for the people therein – seems solid enough, to me.

I think _reconstruction_ and _development_ are both poorly understood and poorly managed by the entire Canadian establishment – government, NGOs and _commentariat_, alike.  _*Re*construction_ – with the emphasis on ‘re’ -  ought, probably, to be a _largely_ military operation, for the time being.  Construction, proper, and real development cannot begin in the South and West until real security has been provided – which may be a long time coming if neither Britain nor Canada can provide many, many more troops to take the battle to the Taliban and its allies – maybe all the way into Pakistan.

In my personal opinion Canada should be funding groups like Care Canada to do more and more of their good work in the already secure North and West of Afghanistan – where it is safe enough – and we should be mounting a major PR campaign, in Canada, to trumpet every success – no matter how small.  Military reconstruction in Kandahar should get equally splashy PR treatment.  We need  to keep a few Christie Blatchford types embedded with the combat forces to win that particular _battle_ here at home but we need to get the government’s press agents to bombard the media with releases, including video, of successful reconstruction in Kandahar, too.  I say we need government flacks to do that because I think the so called mainstream media are disinclined to cover it, live, because it does not produce good enough headlines in a system which has the motto: “if it bleeds it leads.”  Canadian casualties are news; Canadian accomplishments are not.

I think he’s on to something here:



> We must also prove to these tribesmen – indeed, to the world – that our effort is not part of America's ill-conceived "search and destroy" war on terror.



See Ruxted’s ‘More than a hammer’ at: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/35-More-than-a-hammer.html  It sounds like Graham is repeating: _”… Canadians need to work with the traditional tribal systems to strengthen the country. This method was initially successful with the tribal leaders of the loya jirga. Reforms to Afghan society are best taken over time - strong democratic traditions cannot be created overnight. While the elections held in 2004 and 2005 were remarkable accomplishments – one can wonder if ‘we’ … pushed too hard for that singular goal and in doing so forced other important aspects of Afghan culture to the wayside.

The clan is the basic building block of Afghan culture. In pushing so fast to democratize the country we isolated powerful forces that should have been (and had been) our allies in ousting the Taliban. Forces for leadership in the community where ignored and shunted aside in order to create a version of republican democracy.

Removing the Taliban left a large spiritual and leadership gap that could and should have been replaced by tribal elders …”_

It seems pretty clear to me that the Taliban _et al_ do have _lines_ – maybe not traditional ‘supply lines’ – stretching all the way to Pakistan and it seems equally clear that we – the ‘we’ in the South of Afghanistan to need to disrupt those lines.

With regard to his four proposed initiatives:

1.	Defang the opium trade and empower its farmers by buying their crop and selling it to pharmaceutical companies.

*Agreed* – economics, local economics, is just as vital to the 3D process as military operations.  We can and should win this one with relative ease.  The Americans’ ‘war on drugs’ crusade is wrong headed.  We need to tell them to _butt out_ of Kandahar.

2.	Launch a diplomatic offensive to stop parts of Pakistan from providing the Taliban with a base.

_*Agreed*_ – we, the West, do need Pakistan, for now, but we would do well to remind Musharraf that his long term goal – integrating Pakistan into the West – requires him to get onside.  The risks to Musharraf and to Pakistan’s political integrity are enormous but someone must take them.  There are good reasons we have called Afghanistan the ‘cockpit’ for centuries; it’s geo-strategic position is vital and we must _persuade_ all its neighbours (including China and Iran) to act _constructively_ (in our sense of that word) in the region.
  
3.	Get more NATO countries to share the burden of combat with Canada.

*Nonsense* – see Ruxted again at:  http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/32-About-Turn!-Time-to-Revise-Canadas-Foreign-Policy.html and http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/33-About-Turn!-Time-to-Revise-Canadas-Foreign-Policy-Part-2.html  NATO is no longer the _cornerstone_ of our foreign policy nor, I suggest, of victory in Afghanistan.  We need to persuade selected nations, possessing ‘the world’s most capable militaries’ (see: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/37-Changing-the-Guard.html ), to join the fight.  Some may be NATO members, others not.  It may be necessary to reshape ISAF so that the forces in the South and East have considerable independence from NATO politicians and bureaucrats in Berlin, Brussels and Kabul.

4.	Recognize that combat and reconstruction are more lethal and expensive than we thought. They are also mutually dependent and their balance can only be determined by the constantly changing situation on the ground, not by armchair debates at home.

*Agreed* – but, as I mentioned above, let us integrate ‘development’ into a major _domestic_ PR campaign aimed at securing Canadian support for a mission which is, demonstrably, in our national interest and which is, equally demonstrably, helping to restore our position as a leader amongst the nations.  Those two foreign policy aims are sound and we, Canada and all Canadians, need to get behind them.



Edit: typo - "Maybe I’ve just been doing too much ..."


----------



## KevinB (31 Dec 2006)

Excellent posting Edward (as usual I may add)


----------



## Journeyman (31 Dec 2006)

> Hugh Graham
> Toronto Star
> 
> *But the numbers are meaningless since it's impossible to measure them....*


Absoulutely correct in this type of conflict, yet that doesn't stop him from using them. Both sides of the debate continue to bandy them about because statistics can seem_ real _ to a non-discerning audience; of course that doesn't stop them from being equally meaningless.




> *--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hugh Graham is a Toronto writer who has written extensively on Afghanistan and Iraq. *


Napoleon's pack mule participated extensively in every one of the Second Republic's military campaigns; that did not endow him with any particular expertise in those campaigns. Pick your experts cautiously.


----------



## GAP (31 Dec 2006)

Excellent read on the article and the general situation Edward. 

The one thing that bothered me at the time, and I do believe it was the area commanders who spouted it, was our claim of victory and the vision of the Taliban being on the run after operation Medusa. Having played in similar killing fields, I didn't believe it then and I don't now. Until the safe areas of the Taliban are challenged, we will accomplish little except win skirmishes, and temporary possession of small areas. 

The Afghans have to step up to the plate, not play both ends against the middle either through fear or greed.


----------



## Infanteer (31 Dec 2006)

+1 to Edward's assessment.  The article was fairly well done, IMHO, but I think the author is reading the tea leaves a bit different then others.


----------



## observor 69 (31 Dec 2006)

Thanks for the well written review Edward, agreement with three out of four main points isn't bad!   
 I must admit when I read these kind of articles I am only interested in the main points the writer is trying to make. One of them can be summed up in " If you aren't winning your loosing." Canadians attention span and Taliban patience work against us.

Last night I was watching CPAC and caught The Standing Committee on National Defence meeting for October 18, 2006. The Hon. Gordon O'Connor and Gen R.J. Hillier were appearing. I was really annoyed by the partisan questions asked by the opposition MP's, in particular Ujjal Dosanjh, in order to gain political points. As Hugh Graham's article makes clear this is an Operation with no single simplistic answer. But rather than recognize the multiple aspects of the mission Dosanjh kept repeating the same question to O'Connor, "Why are most of our resources being spent on fighting rather than development?" O'Connor was not good at dealing with this style of attack, his answers were rigid and formal. Hillier had to carefully construct his responses to not contradict O'Connor.  I have heard rumblings in the media that O'Connor might be moved in the next cabinet shuffle.


----------



## Kirkhill (31 Dec 2006)

> 2.   Launch a diplomatic offensive to stop parts of Pakistan from providing the Taliban with a base.
> 
> Agreed – we, the West, do need Pakistan, for now, but we would do well to remind Musharraf that his long term goal – integrating Pakistan into the West – requires him to get onside.  The risks to Musharraf and to Pakistan’s political integrity are enormous but someone must take them.  There are good reasons we have called Afghanistan the ‘cockpit’ for centuries; it’s geo-strategic position is vital and we must persuade all its neighbours (including China and Iran) to act constructively (in our sense of that word) in the region.



Like you Edward I agree with 3 out of 4.  

My problem with this one though is conflating Pakistan with Pashtun tribalism.  

Islamabad and Kabul share a common problem.  There are areas of the land that they claim where the residents don't recognize their Dominion over their affairs.  Afghanistan is the better placed of the two because it at least has a historical provenance and parts of the country have figured out systems of working together.  Unfortunately the north has come to one set of compromises while the south (which doesn't recognize Kabul in any case) has developed another.

Pakistan, the new kid on the block, has a bigger problem in that it is made up of peoples that have no love for each other - and unlike Iraq this can't be laid at the feet of the Brits - the Brits wanted to handover India complete.  It was Jinna that insisted on a separate muslim/moghul state that essentially reinstated the muslim empire over hindu India.  The Moghuls claim the land of five rivers, the Punjab, but the Punjab is also the home of the Sikhs that were formed in rebellion against the Moghuls.  The Moghuls claim Kashmir and Sind and Baluchistan as well as Afghanistan and Pakhtia, against the protestations of locals everywhere.  The only linking philosophy they can utilize to bolster their claims IS Islam, and their particular version of it.

What I am trying to say is that we are spending too much time worrying about Pakistan and the Moghuls when it comes to dealing with the Pashtuns.  If the purpose of war is to separate followers from leaders then we already have an ace in the hole.  The Pashtun are separate from the Moghuls.  The next stage of the process is to draw the Pashtun over the border (metaphorically speaking) and demonstrate that they will get a better deal in Afghanistan than in Pakistan.  So far the Moghuls in the Pakistani security service have been making the better offers and backing leaders useful to them.  It seems to me that we have to find more Pashtun leaders (like Karzai) but in places like Quetta (essentially an open city I believe - ie it may be dominated by the Taliban Pashtun but I don't believe that Pakistan controls it) and empower them to make suitable deals.  

The very Nationalism that Canada fears, and the right of self-determination, is the same thing the Moghuls of Pakistan fear. If Afghanistan is successful with the Pashtun then the Durand Line will disappear and Pakistan will lose its mountains as the Pashtun vote to join Afghanistan.  If they lose the mountains to the Pashtun then Kashmir and Baluchistan would likely not be far behind leaving them trying to hold on to Sind and the Punjab (also known in some circles as Khalistan I believe).

The Moghuls of Islamabad and the ISI are the enemy as are Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership.  However I don't think they exert as much control as either we or they might hope.  Terror has never struck me as a long term control strategy and that seems to be all that they can find.


----------



## Infanteer (31 Dec 2006)

So, is Pashtunistan a (the) way to victory in Afghanistan?


----------



## Kirkhill (31 Dec 2006)

I think it might be.

Edit - And while I am thinking about it Baluchistan would destabilize not just Pakistan but also Iran.  If it were to come to some sort of confederation with Oman, Pashtunistan and Afghanistan that would effectively tie up Iran AND discomfit China and Russia.  It would also find favour with India and possibly the Sikhs.

Interesting bookends for 1947.  Much of the modern political crisis can be traced to Clement Atlee and the creation of the Jewish State of Israel at one end of the Islamic Arc and the Muslim State of Pakistan at the other end.  Neither one has enjoyed whole-hearted support from either its inhabitants or its neighbours.


----------



## Edward Campbell (1 Jan 2007)

I am not persuaded that returning to the Victorian habit of breaking up old empires and creating new states and principalities is the right answer to much of anything.

But: It may be that _Pashtunistan_ is, indeed, the answer to Central Asia’s prayers.  If so then let the Central Asians decide that for themselves and implement the changes in their own, accustomed (usually violent) ways.

For our part let us redefine our strategic aim.

As a start we might decide on what the aim ought not to be.  We should not be making war “on” anything much, especially not _terror_ – see my rants on why the ‘global war on terror’ is a dumb idea here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22129/post-502928.html#msg502928 and working backwards.  I’ll only repeat one point: terrorism is not our enemy.  Terrorism is a tactic – one we, including Canadians, have used as recently as World War II; when Churchill said _”Set Europe Ablaze!”_ he was, explicitly, ordering allied special forces, including many, many brave, decorated Canadians, to adopt terrorist methods, to engage in terrorism, to become terrorists.  We should be making war on some terrorists – the ones who have declared us to be their enemies.

I think the government of Canada has managed, despite itself, to state our strategic aims fairly clearly and succinctly at: http://www.international.gc.ca/department/mandate/sppf-en.asp 

1.	Projecting Canada to the World: Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad
2.	Serving Canadians Abroad: Enabling Canadians to Participate in the World
3.	Interpreting the World for Canadians: Understanding Canada's Interests
4.	Serving Government Abroad: Enabling Canada's Network Abroad
5.	Forging an Innovative Organization: Linking People, Priorities and Partners

Strategic Priority 1 is expanded upon, with special emphasis on Afghanistan, at: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current_discussions/afghan-en.asp by saying, _” Canada is in Afghanistan to defend our national interests, [and] to ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs …”_

Those are worthy aims.

As I have said before and as the Department of Foreign Affairs affirms, one key elements is to define our _national interests_.  The Department does so in, essentially, economic or business terms; perhaps a “what’s good for Nortel is good for Canada” approach is what the Department has in mind.  I have chosen to define Canada’s national interests in two words: peace and prosperity.  Peace is more than the absence of war and prosperity is more than a chicken in every Canadian pot, but the two are, clearly I think, intertwined – one follows the other and they one tends to reinforce the other.

One of the ways to promote and protect _peace_ is to forswear aggression.  We can, and in my view should, adopt an essentially *defensive* posture in world affairs, something akin to what Walter Russell Mead, in _Special Providence_ (see: http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%205-7.htm ) as a _Jeffersonian_ approach.  This would be in direct contrast to and a repudiation of the Bush administration’s radically populist _Jacksonian_ (same source) approach.  Such an approach affirms, _inter alia_, that we should not and *cannot* spread our political system to a world which is unprepared to receive it.  It implicitly affirms that our socio-economic and political system is _’right’_ for us and that we will not change and will not be forced to change that system except as we, ourselves, freely decide.  It also affirms, and also implicitly, that our socio-economic and political system is rooted in our culture, our history, in short in our _civilization_.  Those unfortunate enough to have not shared our common culture, history and civilization will have to find their own way, by their own methods, to share in the global system which we have created – ‘we’ refers broadly about the West and, particularly, to the Anglo-American _slice_ of that West.

A *defensive* posture is _*morally*_ more consistent with traditional, liberal Anglo-American values than is the offensive, radically conservative Bush administration posture.  As such it will be easier to convince a _coalition_ of nations, including the post-Bush USA, to participate actively in _defensive_ military operations against the common foe.

Who is the foe?

Here is what British PM Tony Blair has to say in the Jan/feb 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs at: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106-p10/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html 



> For this ideology, we are the enemy. But "we" are not the West. "We" are as much Muslim as Christian, Jew, or Hindu. "We" are all those who believe in religious tolerance, in openness to others, in democracy, in liberty, and in human rights administered by secular courts.
> 
> This is not a clash between civilizations; it is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace the modern world and those who reject its existence -- between optimism and hope, on the one hand, and pessimism and fear, on the other.
> 
> In any struggle, the first challenge is to accurately perceive the nature of what is being fought over, and here we have a long way to go. It is almost incredible to me that so much Western opinion appears to buy the idea that the emergence of this global terrorism is somehow our fault.



(It is, by now, almost _de rigueur_ for leaders to say ”this is not a _Clash of Civilizations_” even though Samuel Huntignton’s article (also in Foreign Affairs) of that same name still provides the best explanation for what we see in the world, today.  Sadly, political correctness prevents us from telling the Muslim world, including Muslims in Canada, that their religion has been hijacked by several bands of radicals and is being used, today, as a weapon of war.  This idea that the hijack of Islam is not a problem is, in my opinion, a dangerous delusion.  Muslims, all over the world, need to be challenged to regain control over their religion or face the consequences of being _conscripted_, against their own will, into the enemy’s forces.)

The key in Blair’s assessment of the strategic problem facing us is in recognizing that we are fighting a war which has a major ideological component – greater, by far, than the ideological battle of capitalism vs Marxist communism in the ‘50s and ‘60s or even of Western liberalism vs Nazi barbarism in the ‘30s and ‘40s.

It may be true that the ideology of radical Islam is not shared, much less supported by anything other than a tiny rump of the global Muslim community – just as the German-American Bund of the ‘30s and ‘40s was hardly representative of the views of millions and millions of loyal, hard working *Americans* of German ethnicity.  The problem, for Muslim Canadians, is that they cannot seem to manage to sympathize with the aspirations of their fellow Muslims around the world while, simultaneously, denouncing the aims and acts of radical Islamic movements – including those, like Hamas, Hezbollah and even the Taliban which, probably, represent the will _democratic_ will of their peoples.

Tony Blair (same source) gets to that issue as follows:



> Some people believe that terrorist attacks are caused entirely by the West's suppression of Muslims. Some people seriously believe that if we only got out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the attacks would stop. And, in some ways most perniciously, many look at Israel and think we pay too great a price for supporting it and sympathize with those who condemn it.
> 
> If we recognized this struggle for what it truly is, we would at least be on the first steps of the path to winning it. But a vast part of Western opinion is not remotely near this point yet.
> 
> This ideology has to be taken on -- and taken on everywhere. Islamist terrorism will not be defeated until we confront not just the methods of the extremists but also their ideas. I do not mean just telling them that terrorist activity is wrong. I mean telling them that their attitude toward the United States is absurd, that their concept of governance is prefeudal, that their positions on women and other faiths are reactionary. We must reject not just their barbaric acts but also their false sense of grievance against the West, their attempt to persuade us that it is others and not they themselves who are responsible for their violence.



He goes on, in the same article, to say:



> This is a battle of values and for progress, and therefore it is one that must be won. If we want to secure our way of life, there is no alternative but to fight for it. That means standing up for our values, not just in our own countries but the world over. We need to construct a global alliance for these global values and act through it. Inactivity is just as much a policy, with its own results. It is simply the wrong one.



Activity, action, is not incompatible with a traditionally liberal, *defensive* policy posture.  It simply means that we take all actions necessary to *protect* and *promote* our vital interests, which are reflections of our culture and values, but we stop short of trying to impose our culture, values and socio-economic and political system on others – just as well (strenuously) resist all attempts to impose alien values on us.

All that to say, maybe _Pashtunistan_ is the right thing for Central Asia; if so: let the Central Asians arrange it.  We should look after our vital interests and then go home.


----------



## Kirkhill (1 Jan 2007)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> I am not persuaded that returning to the Victorian habit of breaking up old empires and creating new states and principalities is the right answer to much of anything.



Here is the crux of the matter Edward.  For I am being persuaded that ALL empires do more to overawe competitors than subjects.  The British Empire may very well have been more of an issue with the French, Germans, Russians, Spanish and US empires than it ever was for the "subject" peoples.  Britain (and possibly other empires) had more trouble with those subjects that were displaced from their own local empires than with the common folks that inhabited the spaces.  They were used to a hierarchy and just as Ottawa is remote from the daily lives of most Canadians so the seat of empire was remote from most subjects regardless if it was located in the Ganges, Kabul, Persepolis, Baghdad, Damascus, Istanbul, or London.

For most people life is about them, their family, their friends and their local, physical community and their local leaders. Tax collectors come and go but the locals live on.  That seems to be the lessons that archaeology and genetics are demonstrating more and more.  The world is not a place of lost civilizations and armies obliterating what has gone before.  The world is a place of permanent communities where new influences constantly wash over them but ultimately the community survives.  Even when raiders do as they did in the Orkneys and obliterate all the males (and probably the older men and women as well as the children) they kept the young breedable women and established themselves in the old community with the women that were of that community.  Communities can adopt technologies, languages, culture, and even men, and still be fundamentally the same community.

Where do I go from there?  My contention is that there is no difference between a state and an empire.  Both are agglomerations of communities with a central tax-collector and a central policeman.  Both state and empire serve the needs of communities generally by controlling everybody else's behaviour.  Just like me, my community's behaviour does not need to be controlled because I and we are doing things the right way.



> But: It may be that _Pashtunistan_ is, indeed, the answer to Central Asia’s prayers.  If so then let the Central Asians decide that for themselves and implement the changes in their own, accustomed (usually violent) ways.



And here is where I stand.  I believe that the answer to order is to devise a system whereby local communities can order themselves into regional empires.  Those empires may just be two neighbouring communities or they may be hemispheric in scope but the secret to them is the voluntary nature of them.  With voluntary empires comes the need for constant change as communities opt to leave one empire that no longer serves its needs and opts to join, or even create, a new empire that better serves it.  Perhaps that is part of the international community's problem - we don't have a mechanism that allows for that level of self-determination at the civic level - the level that I believe is the natural, organic level organization.  Like colonies in a petrie dish.

The other problem is who controls the spaces between the colonies.  That is what boundaries were supposed to do but the boundaries themselves have become the focus of conflict.



> For our part let us redefine our strategic aim.
> 
> As a start we might decide on what the aim ought not to be.  We should not be making war “on” anything much, especially not _terror_ – see my rants on why the ‘global war on terror’ is a dumb idea here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22129/post-502928.html#msg502928 and working backwards.  I’ll only repeat one point: terrorism is not our enemy.  Terrorism is a tactic – one we, including Canadians, have used as recently as World War II; when Churchill said _”Set Europe Ablaze!”_ he was, explicitly, ordering allied special forces, including many, many brave, decorated Canadians, to adopt terrorist methods, to engage in terrorism, to become terrorists.  We should be making war on some terrorists – the ones who have declared us to be their enemies.
> 
> ...



Agreed entirely



> As I have said before and as the Department of Foreign Affairs affirms, one key elements is to define our _national interests_.  The Department does so in, essentially, economic or business terms; perhaps a “what’s good for Nortel is good for Canada” approach is what the Department has in mind.  I have chosen to define Canada’s national interests in two words: peace and prosperity.  Peace is more than the absence of war and prosperity is more than a chicken in every Canadian pot, but the two are, clearly I think, intertwined – one follows the other and they one tends to reinforce the other.



Agreed




> One of the ways to promote and protect _peace_ is to forswear aggression.  We can, and in my view should, adopt an essentially *defensive* posture in world affairs, something akin to what Walter Russell Mead, in _Special Providence_ (see: http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%205-7.htm ) as a _Jeffersonian_ approach.  This would be in direct contrast to and a repudiation of the Bush administration’s radically populist _Jacksonian_ (same source) approach.  Such an approach affirms, _inter alia_, that we should not and *cannot* spread our political system to a world which is unprepared to receive it.  It implicitly affirms that our socio-economic and political system is _’right’_ for us and that we will not change and will not be forced to change that system except as we, ourselves, freely decide.  It also affirms, and also implicitly, that our socio-economic and political system is rooted in our culture, our history, in short in our _civilization_.  Those unfortunate enough to have not shared our common culture, history and civilization will have to find their own way, by their own methods, to share in the global system which we have created – ‘we’ refers broadly about the West and, particularly, to the Anglo-American _slice_ of that West.
> 
> A *defensive* posture is _*morally*_ more consistent with traditional, liberal Anglo-American values than is the offensive, radically conservative Bush administration posture.  As such it will be easier to convince a _coalition_ of nations, including the post-Bush USA, to participate actively in _defensive_ military operations against the common foe.



I am having trouble here.  

When you talk about "offensive, radically conservative Bush administration posture"  are you talking about the export of democracy or are you talking about "offensive action" and "agressive patrolling" which are part and parcel of any good "defensive plan".  Also what are you to make of situations where we make like the old time empires and establish locally sanctioned trade centres (like Calcutta, Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai and Jakarta) that attract the envy of other locals.  Do our interests lie in supporting OUR locals or in making peace, restoring order, between warring locals, or in abandoning the trade?  If the locals are engaging in nasty practices like head-hunting and burning Liberals without trial are we to engage or disengage in the name of values or commerce?  

I am of the persuasion that if you make the decision to trade with the world then you accept ALL that comes with it.  You can't pick and choose how you will be involved because the rest of the world will demand you take positions.  Much like you can't be a little bit pregnant you can't be a little bit involved we can't limit ourselves strictly to involvement with our allies.  Having said that we can minimize risks by firming up alliances with like-minded communities.



> Who is the foe?
> 
> Here is what British PM Tony Blair has to say in the Jan/feb 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs at: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106-p10/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html
> 
> ...



Agreed entirely again



> All that to say, maybe _Pashtunistan_ is the right thing for Central Asia; if so: let the Central Asians arrange it.



Again agreed



> We should look after our vital interests and then go home.


  

Here we disagree because I believe that tending vital interests, as Arthur described, is akin to gardening and that just as a garden will revert to a patch of weeds if not tended then vital interests will not flourish if not constantly nurtured.  Our vital interests demand that we CAN'T go home.  We may be able to draw down.  We may be able to meet our requirements by maintaining a reserve, in theater or out of theater.  But we will likely always be tied to Afghanistan as we were to Japan, Korea, Germany and France.  I recall a parable (I think it is oriental) that says that if you save a man's life you become responsible for it forever.  That is the situation we find ourselves in in Afghanistan and the Americans find themselves in in Iraq.

In addition, even if we could draw down or withdraw then we would have the question of involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia-Congo-Sierra Leone), Zimbabwe, Indian borders, Eurabia, the Stans,  Korea.....

I agree we have to be selective as we will never have enough to do everything but the more we have the more we can afford to do and the more we can afford to do the more we have.  Sucking back into splendid Jeffersonian isolation, or the isolation of the "Little Englanders",  as much as it appeals to certain segments of the Canadian population, is not a realistic option.

Cheers, Chris.


----------



## Edward Campbell (1 Jan 2007)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...
> When you talk about "offensive, radically conservative Bush administration posture"  are you talking about the export of democracy or are you talking about "offensive action" and "agressive patrolling" which are part and parcel of any good "defensive plan".


 
I am referring to the export of democracy which I maintain is a damned silly, even stupid idea.

Democracy cannot be exported to anywhere which does not have the necessary _cultural infrastructure_ which includes, especially, a firm respect for the ideas and practical rule of law.  Voting and majority rule, etc, are the external attributes of democracy – much loved by those who think the Athenian _agora_ was something more than the ‘rule’ of a privileged mob.

Germany had this cultural infrstructure – dating from the same time frame (500 AD) as these ideas developed in much of Northern Europe.  Japan had the requisite _firm base_ of institutions, too – from about the same time (the Asuka period), having imported T’ang Dynasty ideas of governance from China.  This explains why, post World War II, despite the ravages of dictatorships, democratic constitutions were imposed with relative ease.

  





			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...
> Here we disagree because I believe that tending vital interests, as Arthur described, is akin to gardening and that just as a garden will revert to a patch of weeds if not tended then vital interests will not flourish if not constantly nurtured.  Our vital interests demand that we CAN'T go home.  We may be able to draw down.  We may be able to meet our requirements by maintaining a reserve, in theater or out of theater.  But we will likely always be tied to Afghanistan as we were to Japan, Korea, Germany and France.  I recall a parable (I think it is oriental) that says that if you save a man's life you become responsible for it forever.  That is the situation we find ourselves in in Afghanistan and the Americans find themselves in in Iraq.
> ...



I don’t think we’re as far apart as it appears.  I favour _tending the garden_ to the minimum degree necessary to protect our vital interests and then _drawing back_ as far as we can without threatening our vital interests.

As far as being _tied_ to Afghanistan for the long term: I think not.  I think China and India will both, maybe _competitively_, maybe _cooperatively_, engage in Afghanistan and, for China, anyway, foreign influences will not be welcome.  I think we will welcome Chinese and Indian engagement in Central Asia because we will have plenty of problems in Iran, maybe even Turkey and throughout the Arab Middle East and spreading into North Africa, too – some exacerbated (not caused) by the Bush administration’s misadventures in Iraq.


----------



## Kirkhill (1 Jan 2007)

> I am referring to the export of democracy which I maintain is a damned silly, even stupid idea.



On that, as on much else, we agree.

On the long term tie to Afghanistan - I disagree on these grounds.  Our involvement doesn't have to be military for the longterm.  It can morph into training schools, Afghan officers at Gagetown, professional association between lawyers, doctors and engineers, and ultimately Bank of Nova Scotia outlets in Panjwayi.  This is the type of end state that I am thinking about.  Brunei, Kuwait, Jordan or Oman more than Japan and Germany.  

As to India and China in Afghanistan - I can certainly see the territory continuing to be contested ground.  Although ultimately stability is usually in everybody's best interest it may not be if the stable state acts against your interests.  So both China and India want to see Central Asia stable they both want it on their terms.

When it comes to picking sides in that fight I am afraid that I find it easier to support Delhi over Beijing.  This is partly out of "sentimental" reasons but also out of a sense that India is closer to us in governance and culturally as a result of their pragmatic democracy.

China continues to bother me.  In part it is because of the autocratic tendency of it governance, no matter how pragmatic, that is coupled with a population that is still influenced by the fascism of Mao and his cultural revolution.  There are too many believers that can be swayed by a persuasive autocrat and I believe that that presents a longterm risk of unpredictability.


----------



## KevinB (1 Jan 2007)

For one I dont trust the Chinese further than I have a rifle on them...
  Having seen a LOT of Chinese NEW weapons in Afghanistan to beleive they have anything but our WORST interest at heart -- from small arms to surface to air missiles.

If anything the Iraq fiasco will force the Sunni countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria) to deal with Shia Iran - from waht I have seen in Iraq so far they are much more intent on killing each other than killing us.

  I for one think that the more they kill each other, and thus dont focus on us is a good thing -- and then eventually the world will accept that it may be time to make a global effort to solve those issues -- either by overwhelming force and unleash the fury of the the militaries onto the populaces that oppose us, and conqueor them once and for all.

In neither Afghanistan or Iraq have the western nations unleashed their military forces to past the 1/4 capability mark.  Sometimes a Bremen firebombing or Hiroshima is necessary to remove the will to fight of the enemy.

Islamic countries respect power -- so far we have shown them what they preceive as weakness and lack of resolve.

We still need to keep an eye on North Korea as well.


----------



## Edward Campbell (1 Jan 2007)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...
> As to India and China in Afghanistan - I can certainly see the territory continuing to be contested ground.  Although ultimately stability is usually in everybody's best interest it may not be if the stable state acts against your interests.  So both China and India want to see Central Asia stable they both want it on their terms.
> 
> When it comes to picking sides in that fight I am afraid that I find it easier to support Delhi over Beijing.  This is partly out of "sentimental" reasons but also out of a sense that India is closer to us in governance and culturally as a result of their pragmatic democracy.
> ...



I’m just starting to think about the implications of China and/vs India in Central Asia.

China is *not* stable – the _red dynasty_* is stable enough but my own readings suggest that *no* modern** dictatorship has succeeded and China is still a dictatorship trying, with considerable difficulty, to build the _institutions/cultural infrastructure_ which will allow a functioning (almost certainly conservative) democracy to take hold and, consequently, allow China to make the step to great power status.

The Chinese economy is still hot, Hot, *HOT* – capitalism is alive and well, but there are serious problems which could cause a collapse unless very sound management is exercised at all levels – national, provincial and local.

(I spent New Year’s Eve with, _inter alia_ Wei Jingsheng (see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wei_Jingsheng ) discussing ‘whither China’ between gulps of champagne.  He has considerable influence in America – remarkably for a man who is really out of touch with 21st century China, in my opinion and in that of many, many Chinese who _commute_ fairly regularly between Ottawa, Washington, London, New York, Toronto, Chicago, Dallas, etc, etc and Beijing and Shanghai.  He and I agreed to disagree on issues like a potential war with Taiwan – he says it will happen soon; I think he is totally and wilfully misreading and misrepresenting the situation, in large measure to placate his sponsors in America who want, even _need_ a Chinese *enemy*.  On the other hand he has some ideas about how to make China a democracy which demand thoughtful attention.)***

India already has the cultural infrastructure but is struggling to discard 50 years of wrong-headed Soviet influence and create a successful capitalist society.  

I’m sure Infidel-6 is quite correct when he says that China wishes us no good in Afghanistan.  They do not want us to fail, exactly – they have their own problems with militant Islam in, especially, Xinjiang and they worry about the neighbouring _Stans_, including Afghanistan.  They do not want us to succeed too quickly or too easily.  They are not ready, yet, to _manage_ Central Asia.

I share your view that, subject to China’s actions, we will stay socially and economically (but not, I hope, militarily) engaged in Afghanistan for some long time to come.


----------
* Thanks, Echo-9 for that descriptor

** From, say, 1648 to the present?

*** I added this parenthetical comment to emphasize how hard it is to get the _straight good_ on China.  There are all manner of opinions, expert opinions, wild assed guesses, scientific wild assed guesses and pure propaganda floating around out there - all given roughly equal weight by a largely ignorant _mainstream media_.  Mr. Wei is much quoted by several _factions_ in America and China but I'm afraid he is both disconnected from 21st century China and propagating _ideas_ which serve to validate his experiences.


Edit: added third footnote - _*** I added this parenthetical comment ..._


----------



## Kirkhill (1 Jan 2007)

Not that far apart at all it seems.

Here's something that perhaps could be addressed:



> The other problem is who controls the spaces between the colonies.  That is what boundaries were supposed to do but the boundaries themselves have become the focus of conflict.



One of the other aspects of empire or state is the control of the spaces between the communities.  This seems to be the heart of insurgency control.   The Persians, Romans and General Wade did it with roads and the Victorians did it with railroads.  The Normans did it by creating forests as royal preserves, policing them with foresters and denying the locals the opportunity to live off the land by establishing poaching laws.  The Westphalian solution was to decide fixed borders and limited empires/states.  But as noted those borders have been the source of contention both between states and by people supposedly subject to the state.

Is there a better solution to be found at sea?  The international has been and is successfully dealing with seafaring insurgents for millenia.  We call them pirates.  We don't solve the problems of pirates by dividing up the seas into national spheres of influence but by limiting national spheres of influence and then _jointly policing_ the spaces in between. This is done to control piracy, slavery, drugs, weapons, pollution, commercial exploitation. Is this a better model than the Westphalian state?  We currently do some of this on a small scale with the US in disputed waters.  Perhaps would could extend the concept to land with joint jurisdiction of Hans Island with Denmark?

Perhaps this deserves a different thread - under the "wouldn't it be luvverly" theme.


----------



## Edward Campbell (2 Jan 2007)

The other alternative is that we all go back and reread Thomas P Barnett's _The Pentagon's New Map_.

His _Leviathan Force_ will find and kill the _pirates_ in his 'disconnected* gap' while his _System Administrator Force_ will conduct new style peace*keeping* (with the emphasis on 'keep' as in their being some 'peace to keep.'

He posits that the USA will lead both forces.  If he's right - and it's a really big *IF* - then Canada† will want to participate in both forces so we will need the sort of military described in Ruxted's latest offering at: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/37-Changing-the-Guard.html :

•	We will need to maintain ‘one of the world’s most capable militaries” to join in selected‡ operations undertaken by the _Leviathan Force_; and

•	We will want to have a support ‘formation’ to hep the less capable nations do the low intensity peacekeeping in their regions.


----------
* Disconnected from the globalized, capitalist ‘core’

† And Australia, Britain, Denmark, India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Singapore, too

‡ Selected by Canada against the criteria that participation -

a. promotes or protects our vital national interests,
b. provides an opportunity for Canada to advance its position as a global leader, or
c. is _required_ because we agree there is a ‘Responsibility to Protect’


----------



## Kirkhill (2 Jan 2007)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> The other alternative is that we all go back and reread Thomas P Barnett's _The Pentagon's New Map_.



Point taken.


----------



## Edward Campbell (3 Mar 2007)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is a column from today’s _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070303.DOUG03/TPStory/International/columnists 


> Who will step in when America's Globocops stop policing?
> 
> PARIS -- I still think I have a T-shirt from the early nineties which shows a senior member of the Bush family, done up in Arnold Schwarzenegger garb, below the word "Globocop." Not very clever, but enduringly popular. Whether you support or abhor the view that the United States is, or should be, the "world's policeman," it has long been a phrase that can only really be applied to America.
> 
> ...



If, as Saunders reports, for the Europeans this (the beginning of America’s withdrawal from _unilateralism_) was _”almost universally portrayed by diplomats and editorialists as a complete capitulation to the "European approach," which is based less on tough justice and more on compromise with one's moral opponents”_ then the Euros are dumber than they look.

What this (the first stirrings of _neo-isolationism_, if you like) really is a return to the _Nixon doctrine_ of America first.

I refer Army.ca members to Walter Russell Mead’s _Special providence_.  To use Mead’s analogue, America is shifting from a populist, _Jacksonian_, to a more cautious, _Jeffersonian_ view of its place in the world.  (Which is why I resurrected this thread.)

(It is important not to glamorize the _Nixon doctrine_.  President Nixon presided over two significant disasters in American policy: America’s defeat (no other word, I’m afraid) in Viet Nam and the subordination of Breton Woods to transitory political issues.  The latter, arguably, did mote lasting harm than the former – although, I believe that the full effects of America’s defeat in Viet Nam may not be felt until they are magnified by the impact of another defeat in Iraq.)

Saunders is right to raise the caution flag re: Russian assertiveness – but I believe he has the wrong target.  The Russians may, in their own self interests should, try to act a regional spoilers, here and there, but Russia remains a declining power; it is the Chinese who are on the rise.  China’s current rise –there have been others – will not be smooth, neither were the rises (and falls) of Rome, the Mughals, the Spanish, the Brits and the Americans.  There will be crises and setbacks as China stumbles its way to the top.

What about Canada?

I will reiterate what I have been harping on in these threads: crises = opportunity, but only for those who are ready and willing to seize them.  Canada is neither.

We have, over the past _decade of darkness_, to be sure, but beginning in earnest around 1970, been conducting an exercise in *unilateral disarmament*.  Regardless of the dangers – and they were real in ‘69/’70 when that _dumbkopf_ Trudeau began his campaign to convince Canadians to renounce the St Laurent/Pearson world view, and they were real again in 1995 when Chrétien emasculated an already weak military – Canadians, not just politicians and not just Québecers, have renounced the idea of being *ready* to exploit opportunities because they are, broadly and deeply, not *willing* to be leaders because leading implies risk taking and we, Canadians, are unwilling to risk our entitlements.  Canadian debates about foreign policy and _grand strategy_ always remind me of Kissinger’s description of academic feuds.  They are so bitter, he opined, because the stakes are so low!  So it is with Canada: we forswear the gains (in every sector of our lives/society) which leading will bring because of the short term pain our ‘free’ health care (or other _sacred trust_ social programmes) *might* risk because some resources might have to be shared with our strategic priorities.

Canada could, at a modest cost, (2% of our $1 Trillion and growing GCP, year after year after year) play important leadership roles in the world – in areas which the US is vacating.  Specifically:

In revitalizing the United Nations’ *political* machinery for crisis management.   Although (see just below) the UN cannot manage military interventions beyond some Chapter VI peacekeeping missions, it is uniquely well suited to manage the political processes necessary to allow peacemaking and subsequent peacekeeping missions to succeed.  The decline in American _influence_ directly benefits the UN, Canada can and should help the UN to exploit its _potential_ gains by helping the UN to reform its political tools.

In revitalizing _international_ peacekeeping.  With, in most cases, the UN doing the political work there is still a need for international peacekeeping.  In some instances the UN can and should manage these operations but in *most* cases these operations are likely to be beyond the administrative, logistical and *command* capabilities of that organization.  It is highly unlikely that the UN can ever be reformed in the ways necessary to give it the administrative, logistical and *command* capabilities required – by its very nature and by its own rules the UN is condemned to administrative ineptitude, institutionalized corruption and operational paralysis.  What is needed is a series of _coalitions of the willing_, each custom tailored for a specific crisis.  NATO is, right now, the framework of choice for forming these coalitions but NATO has some increasingly evident problems.  It is too large and, for that reason, deep – possibly permanent – fissures have developed amongst the Europeans and between the European factions and the North Americans.  A small, less formal – more flexible, ‘organization’ is required to ‘steer’ coalition building.  Canada should be part of that small ‘organization.’

NATO is not dead and it should not be allowed to die.  It has unique strength and virtues which can be shared with coalitions.  But, the NATO monopoly should be challenged.  Everything always works better when it is challenged by competition.  There should be a smaller, looser competitor to NATO.  It already exists, in part, in the ABCA (*A*ustralia, *B*ritain, *C*anada, *A*merica) related fora.  These groups – most of which include New Zealand, too – are small, loose/flexible, _nimble_ and are (were, anyway when I was involved) able to ‘lead’ NATO in areas like standardization – especially procedural standardization.  (I think I can safely say that 85% of what NATO did in C3I standardization in the ‘80s and ‘90s was done in ABCA and then brought to NATO as, essentially, a _fait accompli_.)  The ABCA is, however, too small – it would benefit from some new blood: Singapore is almost a member, now, I think – I’m pretty sure they monitor ABCA work very closely.  India should be drawn, slowly but surely, into the group.  Ditto NATO members Denmark, Netherlands and Norway.  That would produce a military G-10 of sophisticated, democratic, _militarily capable_ nations – see Ruxted and the UN’s own discussion of _militarily capable_.

The goal?

To give real, positive effect to the UN’s _raison d’être_: _“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small ... to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained ... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”_  These are laudable, even noble goals which the UN has, consistently, failed to accomplish.  Canada could, should help to rectify that litany of failure – if we are willing to face the challenge and embrace the opportunities.

Prime Minister Harper talks and talks and talks about Canada being a leader – are Canadians listening?  If they are, do they believe?  If they believe will they pay the price?

In my view: no. No and NO.


----------



## pbi (1 Oct 2010)

What a fascinating discourse. Great to see good minds at work: this is really (IMHO) the strength of Army.ca. BZ.

Cheers


----------

