# Is the US on the brink of a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan?



## Old Sweat (20 Mar 2012)

This is the second time in two days I have come across the theory that states in simplified terms that the Koran burning and the shooting of civilians indicate that lower ranking members of the US military understand that the war cannot be won. The acts are an indication of a break down in discipline and the other person to put the theory forward hinted she would not be surprised to see an outbreak in fraggings. She also claimed it was a result of too long a period of occupation. At lot of what they claim is poppycock, but it may sound attractive to some. The piece, which was published in the Toronto Star, is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

U.S. on brink of humiliating defeat in Afghanistan

Published On Mon Mar 19 2012 


By Richard GwynColumnist


In a powerful column for the London-based Independent, veteran Middle East journalist Robert Fisk argues that the media’s coverage of the killing by an American soldier of 16 Afghan civilians, mostly women and children, “has been curiously lobotomized.”

Fisk makes an important point. Overwhelmingly, the stories attribute the terrible deed to variations on “an act of madness,” “brain-damage,” “trauma,” by a deranged, overstressed soldier.

In itself, that interpretation is pretty obviously correct. The suspect, Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, was doing his fourth battlefield tour in Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier he had suffered a brain trauma; very recently, he witnessed a colleague lose his leg to a roadside bomb.

Yet the interpretation is incomplete, and too convenient. Fisk refers to a briefing to GIs three weeks ago by the top American commander, Gen. John Allen. The trigger for his talk was the killing of two American soldiers by an Afghan working with them as retribution for the burning at a U.S. base of some copies of the Qur’an (in fact, unintentionally so).

Allen told his men, “Now is not the time for revenge,” urging them instead to “look deep inside your souls, remember your mission, remember your mission.”

Fisk, who is almost unrelievedly critical of all U.S. actions in the Middle East, was far too harsh in his condemnation of Allen’s somewhat inept plea to his soldiers not to exact revenge “now.” And he’s too dismissive of the effect on any soldier of repeated, life-threatening, stress.

But he has identified correctly what is surely the single most important aspect of the present war in Afghanistan.

This is that the American soldiers themselves now know that the war has become pointless, just as an earlier generation of GIs knew when the war in Vietnam became pointless.

Pointless, that is, in the sense that it can no longer be won except in the minimalist sense that — unlike in Vietnam — it might still, just, somehow, not be lost too humiliatingly.

In almost all wars there is a tilting point at which the soldiers involved, regardless of which side they are on, limit their actions to “not being the last soldier to die.” (A deeply depressing exception to this rule was the way German soldiers fought ferociously long after it was obvious Adolf Hitler had lost World War II.)

The effect of this realization is that the “discipline” Gen. Allen tried to invoke unravels. Instead, the terrible truth about the behaviour Sgt. Bales is accused of is that more events like it are certain to happen. No less so, other Afghans who have worked for the Americans and become friends with them, will shoot them in the back.

Once wars become pointless, they become exercises in insanity. All the reasons concocted to justify their continuation — not abandoning liberal-minded Afghans (women especially) to the savage rule of fundamentalist extremists; gaining time to train enough Afghans to look after their own security; preserving American military honour — are now just empty rhetoric.

The only rhetoric that has any meaning anymore is a description of how best to get out as quickly as possible.

To suppose that the consequences of a hasty withdrawal won’t be unpleasant would be an exercise in self-delusion. The U.S. may be about to turn isolationist. Does anyone suppose the world will be better policed by China and Russia, or by no one? The slaughter in Syria (for which the U.S. is blameless) may become the standard way of life in the Middle East, as it already is in many Arab countries.

But perpetuating a pointless war imposes a fearful moral cost on the nation responsible.

Moreover, the potential positive consequences of ending it can be critical. The action does cauterize the wound. The U.S. did recover — politically, militarily, morally — from its defeat in Vietnam. To recover from Afghanistan, though, it will first have to go through the valley of humiliation.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Mar 2012)

Our society, and especially American society, has changed.

We, your generation and mine, Old Sweat, and the two that have followed us, were raised on a myth of our own (American, anyway) invincibility, based in our technological _know how_, our industrial prowess and our own, innate, _superiority_ over the "Lesser breeds without the Law." It worked against Germany and Japan, even against China in Korea. We did "win" the Cold War, in two phases: first, we stood up the Russians, drew a "line in the sand," that we called a _tripwire strategy_ and relied upon the technological superiority of our nuclear weapons; then, second, we relied upon the strength of our free economic system to, finally, expose the inherent, internal and fatal contradictions in the USSR's _command economy_ and bring the whole thing crashing down.

But wars of "national liberation" were different - as the British learned in Palestine, Africa and Cyprus, as the French were taught (but never appeared to learn) in Indo China and Algeria and as the Americans were also taught (did they learn anything?) in Viet Nam.

The Middle East and West Asia pose their own dilemma: we romanticized the region after T.E. Lawrence, failing to grasp its complex but deeply flawed cultures. Starting with Ike's overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh's Iranian government in 1953, and on until today, we have assumed that the North Africans, Arabs, Persians and West Asians are rather like us. We were and are wrong: they do not share many of our cultural values, they do not even agree, fundamentally, with our conception of fundamental, inalienable human rights. Their _fundamentals_ are quite different; the cultural divide is wide and deep. They don't want our "values" because our values are alien to their culture. We are interlopers, generally unwelcome interlopers, in and defilers of their _"ummah"_.

I also think that we, the American led West, as a society, have a defined "attention span." We expect crises, we are not afraid to face them, but we expect them to be resolved fairly expeditiously. Viet Nam dragged on and on, so did Iraq, so did Afghanistan - our attention span was exhausted and, since we were not involved, as a "nation in arms," as we were in 1939-45 for example, it was easy, too easy to lose focus, especially when there was, and is, a _reasonable_ domestic opposition to whatever war we are fighting.

It all adds up, I think, to uncertainty - which is a good principle in quantum mechanics but less so in the conduct of war.



Edit: typo


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## GAP (20 Mar 2012)

ER....I was going to add my comments, but then I reread your post, and I think that pretty much sums it up. I really don't think the US, Canada, Australia, et al get it.


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## OldSolduer (20 Mar 2012)

ER I like your reference to "attention span".

Everyone, politicians included, expect a short sweet simple solution - like on any episode of CSI where the bad guys are arrested just prior to the last commercial. If they don't get the short sweet simple solution, they find something else.....


OH SHINY STUFF over there !!!  ;D


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## tomahawk6 (20 Mar 2012)

Afghanistan is a perfect example of how political meddling can ruin a military operation. By using the Northern Alliance to topple the taliban with a bit of help from the USAF,CIA and SF we achieved our goal with minimal footprint. Nation building was a huge mistake. Putting 70,000 troops into Afghanistan was an even bigger mistake. The politicians[both US and Afghan] couldnt resist the impulse to meddle by dictating the ROE and then a COIN strategy ,which we never had the forces to implement. We have spent our blood and treasure on a noble if flawed undertaking and our feelings are hurt when the Afghans dont seem to appreciate our effort.Our worst failure was to support Karzai. He looked grand in his colorful capes,but he lacked the steel to wage a war to the death against the Taliban.In the end we fight the taliban in the field and the spineless Karzai. He attempts to pander to the taliban at our expense and yet in the end to the taliban he is dead man or will be should they get their hands on him.


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## vonGarvin (20 Mar 2012)

On a more philosophical note, I think that we, the west, attempt to conduct war as though it were some sort of business.  It's not.  War is, by its nature, a clash of societies, only one of which can triumph.  If one attempts to wage war without acknowledging this fact, then that side will not win that war.  

Look at Afghanistan and how we are conducting that war, and then look back in time to the Second World War.

Today, we are told to respect Afghans and their culture, learn their language, and live life as they do, (to some extent).

In 1939-1945, the message was clear: this is a war for survival, and we will do whatever it takes to triumph, because they, _the Germans_ are evil and they must be subdued.  That is why we bombed their cities to dust.  That is why our entire economies geared for war.  It wasn't a matter of sending off an expeditionary force to do battle.  It was our society engaging theirs.  

If I were President of the USA on 11 September, 2001, things would have been much different.  Once OBL had been confirmed to be behind the attacks of 9/11, and once he had been confirmed to be at Tarnak Farms, I would have ordered his compound to be destroyed by a single ~10kt nuclear bomb.  It would have guaranteed that he was dead, and though it would have spared the nearby city of Kandahar, the message would be clear: if you attack us on our homes like this, we will unleash hell on you.

If one wishes to wage war, it's a very grave decision, but in the end, if the answer is "yes" to war, then it must be total.  Just as one cannot be "sort of" pregnant, you cannot have your army at war and your country at peace.  It just doesn't work.

My  :2c:


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## dapaterson (20 Mar 2012)

All military missions are driven by political considerations.

Tactical military success is irrelevant if it does not achieve your strategic aims.  If those strategic aims are ill-conceived or poorly considered, military prowess does not matter.

I seem to recall that the first principle of war (Canadian doctrine) is "Selection and maintenance of the aim".   Lacking a clearly enunciated political aim for the end-state in Afghanistan, how do you measure success?

I concur with ERC's observations about the West's ignorance of the rest of the world.  Foolish expectations that a Jeffersonian democracy would arise and take hold in a matter of weeks or months have clearly shown the intellectual vacuum into which forces were launched.  (Inded, one could observe that the Jeffersonian democracy of the USA has had many problems and stumbles along the way - the period of 1861 to 1865 shows that widespread bloodshed can occur in such a state).



(And note that the words "Operational Level" and "Operational Art" do not appear here.  Neither does the tooth fairy or the easter bunny - two other things that don't exist)


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## Journeyman (20 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (And note that the words "Operational Level" and "Operational Art" do not appear here.  Neither does the tooth fairy or the easter bunny - two other things that don't exist)


Oh man, that's harsh.......just harsh.


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## OldSolduer (20 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "Selection and maintenance of the aim".



We have ADHD. We can set aims all we want, but there is shiny stuff everywhere.....seriously, Western society appears to me to not have the stomach for a fight.


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## Remius (20 Mar 2012)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> If I were President of the USA on 11 September, 2001, things would have been much different.  Once OBL had been confirmed to be behind the attacks of 9/11, and once he had been confirmed to be at Tarnak Farms, I would have ordered his compound to be destroyed by a single ~10kt nuclear bomb.  It would have guaranteed that he was dead, and though it would have spared the nearby city of Kandahar, the message would be clear: if you attack us on our homes like this, we will unleash hell on you.
> 
> 
> My  :2c:



This is something I have postulated at various times much to the horror of friends and family.  A low yield Nuke on teh compound would have sent a very serious message and solved the problem.  It would have shaken up several countries like Iran, North Korea and Venezuela that the US is not to messed with.  And it would have been a message they would have heeded.  Yes there would have been critics but likely the same ones we are hearing from now.  Given the events of 9/11 and the shock the world felt it would have been hard for any country to be overly critical.

Like Iran now.  As soon as one boat fires on an american ship or tries to close the strait I would bomb that Navy into oblivion to ensure they can never do that again.  Screw the nation building there.  If they tried to rebuild their fleet to act up again: Rinse and repeat.


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## tomahawk6 (20 Mar 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> We have ADHD. We can set aims all we want, but there is shiny stuff everywhere.....seriously, Western society appears to me to not have the stomach for a fight.



Our troops have done everything we have asked of them to include fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Our weakness is our political correctness.


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## mariomike (20 Mar 2012)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> In 1939-1945, the message was clear: this is a war for survival, and we will do whatever it takes to triumph, because they, _the Germans_ are evil and they must be subdued.  That is why we bombed their cities to dust.  That is why our entire economies geared for war.  It wasn't a matter of sending off an expeditionary force to do battle.  It was our society engaging theirs.



Interesting to note that RCAF night bomber crews were usually briefed on the economic importance of their targets. But, late in the war, high ranking officers were personally briefing aircrews on their _political _importance: "Never again will any future German government be able to say that the country was fairly well intact but still undefeated."


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## dapaterson (20 Mar 2012)

One further comment on Mr Gwyn's piece.  He is a typical Canadian journalist, in ascribing problems solely to the Americans.  NATO and its members (Canada included) carry equal weight of any blame for failure.


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## Journeyman (20 Mar 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> This is the second time in two days I have come across the theory that states...that lower ranking members of the US military understand that the war cannot be won.


It sounds like it's an increasingly common perception, we have "pundit circular reporting" based on all hearing the same talk, or your friends have been reading "Stratfor."   


In a somewhat lengthy analysis Stratfor's George Freedman states, amongst several other things, the following:


> *Afghanistan and the Long War*
> March 19, 2012 | 2235 GMT
> By George Freedman
> 
> ...


So, while I'm not seeing fragging any time soon, the "attention span" is spent.


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## Robert0288 (20 Mar 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Nation building was a huge mistake.



Our problem is that even though we called it nation building, it was more forced culture change.  You cannot force liberal democratic values on a society which has no history of it.  The only way this would have even been remotely possible is if on day 2 of the invasion is the "re-education" of the next generation of afghani leaders.  Basically a copy of the residental school program that Canada had, and we all know how history treated that one.  As a western society we do not have the stomac for the systematic re-education and cultural genocide needed to bring in the core values that are needed for a democracy.

Otherwise we will just a repeat of what happened in egypt where the muslim brotherhood won the election as best case, or what I fear Iraq is going to turn into within the next 4 years and have a new saddam and we end up with gulf war 3.


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## OldSolduer (20 Mar 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Our troops have done everything we have asked of them to include fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Our weakness is our political correctness.



Agreed. 

I should have clarified my earlier statement.


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## Journeyman (20 Mar 2012)

Crantor said:
			
		

> It would have shaken up several countries like Iran, North Korea and Venezuela that the US is not to messed with.  And it would have been a message they would have heeded.


Unfortunately, I'm not sufficiently expert on Iranian, North Korean, _and_ Venezuelan cultures to know what they would heed and what they would take as demanding vengeance.


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## Haggis (20 Mar 2012)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Just as one cannot be "sort of" pregnant, you cannot have your army at war and your country at peace.  It just doesn't work.



Although I cannot claim ownership to this statement, I agree with it. "The Canadian Forces are at war.  Canada ia at the mall."


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## dapaterson (20 Mar 2012)

Haggis said:
			
		

> "The Canadian Forces are at war.  Canada ia at the mall."



Bull.  The CF was never at war.  Three thousand of 52K trained Reg F and 20K trained Res F does not equal "at war".  It's less than 5% of your force deployed.  Even if you add the next roto and prior roto to the count you're still at 12.5%  of the CF - or one in eight.


Let's not overstate what we did - a mid level economy produced a light Bde's worth of effect on the ground. Hardly grounds to claim we were "at war".


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## OldSolduer (20 Mar 2012)

Haggis said:
			
		

> "The Canadian Forces are at war.  Canada ia at the mall."



This is funny, and yes I will admit I got a good laugh from it. 

On further reflection though...its true.


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## aesop081 (20 Mar 2012)

"Selection and maintenance of the aim" is not the only principle of war we didn't deliver on.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Mar 2012)

Robert0288 said:
			
		

> Our problem is that even though we called it nation building, it was more forced culture change.  You cannot force liberal democratic values on a society which has no history of it.  The only way this would have even been remotely possible is if on day 2 of the invasion is the "re-education" of the next generation of afghani leaders.  Basically a copy of the residental school program that Canada had, and we all know how history treated that one.  As a western society we do not have the stomac for the systematic re-education and cultural genocide needed to bring in the core values that are needed for a democracy.
> 
> Otherwise we will just a repeat of what happened in egypt where the muslim brotherhood won the election as best case, or what I fear Iraq is going to turn into within the next 4 years and have a new saddam and we end up with gulf war 3.




Even then I think you are underestimating the time it takes for a culture to change itself. It happens, of course, but it is, generally a long, slow, process.

We like to point to Germany and Japan and to suggest that, in 1945 to, say, 1955, we changed them ... but that's a historical fallacy. Germany and Japan were both highly _enlightened_ cultures, albeit of vastly different traditions, in which ideas like "rule of law" were well founded and easily replanted; ditto representative democracy, independent judiciary and so on. There was nothing, for example, in the Japanese cultural or religious traditions that suggested that the emperor, divine though he might be, needed to have exclusive political power.

Consider China: the names have changed but the current government of China looks remarkably like its imperial predecessors - the Standing Committee of the Politburo is very, very like an imperial household in almost any of the dynasties going back 3,000 years. The Chinese Communist Party has simply grafted a new branch on to an ancient tree.

But not all of the world is like that. While some cultures, the Anglo-American one, for example, accept, even welcome constant, gradual social, religious and political evolution others find it harder to manage. The role of religion in culture matters - it is not always the most important factor but it is rarely unimportant. In islam, for example, one finds a religion which is rooted, firmly, in 8th century Arabia; it accepts the societal norms of that day as being good and, even, suitable for our day; it suggests to its adherents the the _Quran_ provides all the social, economic and political guidance that is necessary - consequently change is very difficult because the base of 8th century Arab culture and a culturally attuned religion reinforce one another. Although the Christian Church did (still does) dabble in politics, sometimes with some success, it was easy for Europeans, especially Northern Europeans to reshape the religin to suit their social and political aspirations.

Cultures can and do change - but they do so from within. Sometimes they change in response to outside influence and interference but only a people can change their own culture; we cannot do it for them or to them.


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## ArmyRick (20 Mar 2012)

I will get char broiled for my comments but here goes...

Before we can effectively enable something to happen overseas, we need to sort out our own priorities. My issues with how this country is not running
-Over regulated and over controlled laws
-Our economy is in the dumps and we base it on the wrong things
-Certain companies and corporations get bail outs and blind eyes to the overall negligence
-Canadians as a whole, have developed too much on an entitlement society
-Politicians rarely represent their people's interest (But they didn't in 1867 either, so no change I guess)
-Agricultural handling/operation/management is a mess (I am directly involved in agriculutre, i speak from expirience)
-This is more religous view but its how I feel, too many people literally "worship" money or are obsessed with making more or exploiting what they can (I feel Canadians have become more greedy and less compromising in the last 10 years or so)
-Aboriginal handling is a nightmare (ignoring them is not on but throwing money at them and wishing the problem away doesn't work either)
-Health (Sick care?) system is a mess

Basically, I feel we need to sort out our own issues at home before we get carried away with sorting out forein nations. No, I am not a hippy but I am not a total right winger either. I beleive in shades of gray in most cases (rarely is something black or white).

I have specifics solutions or suggestions for agriculture but not everything else. Let those who know the other areas best, come up with the solutions.


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## ballz (20 Mar 2012)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> it suggests to its adherents the the _Quran_ provides all the social, economic and political guidance that is necessary



Don't forget scientific... kinda hard to change anyone's mind when they won't believe it even if they witness it with their own eyes (aka... the Qu'ran teaches that salt and fresh water don't mix, and Muslims are taught that the Qu'ran is the highest form of scientific evidence... that's a tough one to crack).

I agree with you fully that cultures have to change within... in many cases "outside influence and interference" might only strengthen it's resolve to stay the same... I do not know if this is the case of Afghanistan or not obviously.


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## jollyjacktar (20 Mar 2012)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Even then I think you are underestimating the time it takes for a culture to change itself. It happens, of course, but it is, generally a long, slow, process.
> 
> In islam, for example, one finds a religion which is rooted, firmly, in 8th century Arabia; it accepts the societal norms of that day as being good and, even, suitable for our day; it suggests directs to its adherents the the _Quran_ provides all the social, economic and political guidance that is necessary - consequently change is very difficult because the base of 8th century Arab culture and a culturally attuned religion reinforce one another. Although the Christian Church did (still does) dabble in politics, sometimes with some success, it was easy for Europeans, especially Northern Europeans to reshape the religin to suit their social and political aspirations.
> 
> Cultures can and do change - but they do so from within. Sometimes they change in response to outside influence and interference but only a people can change their own culture; we cannot do it for them or to them.  (yellow and strikeout mine-jj)


And therein lies the problem.  As was explained to me the Archangel Gabriel came to the Prophet Mohammed and gave him word for word exactly how Allah (God) wished people to conduct their lives in all matters, physical, moral, spiritually etc etc.  Seeing as this is the direct word from God, how can they change?  Unless God makes an attempt to modify his last instructions, which would be a problem as the Prophet is believed to be THE Prophet it would be blasphemy to make any changes or suggest ad hoc things need to change.  Everything that they base their lives on would be shaken to the core, much as I expect the creation of Christianity was to everyday life 2000 years ago (and it's subsequent changes and turmoils since then).   We here in the West have not lived as closely to our religion(s) as they do in Islam for many hundreds of years now and perhaps we cannot appreciate just how big a part of everyday life such observance plays in it.

I'm not sure what would happen if all the Muslims had their feet swept out from under them all once.  Would be ugly to say the least.  I don't have a dog in that fight so to speak and so I cannot even begin to suggest what or how or who could change things to bring it into the 21st Century and beyond.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Mar 2012)

The Technoviking may have to help us here - he studied philosophy - but this is a problem that bedeviled the early Christians. They used Aristotle, I think as their guide and he posited (I think, yet again) that a god who (which?) is all powerful must be perfect and need never amend his words or deeds. Now, clearly, the Greek gods were imperfect, and Greek mythology let them be so, but the Christian god was (is, if you wish) "all powerful and ever living" and so (s)he (it?) also need never change a single thing ~ hence predestination, John Calvin and all that.

We, the West, had a long period, several centuries, of intelectual and, indeed, physical strife while we rediscovered ancient philosophy and science (the renaissance) and rethought our religious doctrine (the reformation) and social systems (the enlightenment); a lot of heated debates took place, a lot of books were written and a few wars were fought before we got the basics settled and none of that prevented two world wars, which might be described, in many ways, as European _civil wars_.

The Islamic world, for the most part, didn't need a renaissance but it may be due, after over 1,200 years, for a reformation and that might lead to an enlightenment.


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## vonGarvin (20 Mar 2012)

It's true that the church (eg: the Latin Church, aka "Roman Catholic" church) used and continues to refer to Aristotle for a variety of reasons.  Though no person could sum up his influence in a single post on the internet, he also was a major influence on Jewish and Islamic religions as well.  

Now, to put into perspective, Aristotle predates Jesus of Nazareth by over 300 years.  He was Alexander the Great's instructor, and he came just after Plato and Socrates.  He didn't just talk about divinity, but about physics and metaphysics.  He talked ethics, he talked science, and he talked this and that.






(This is a photo of a statue of Aristotle in Thessaloniki, Greece, that I took last September)​
But I would offer that the main reason why the Roman Catholic Church refers to him even now is his views on natural law theory.  (EG: there is a natural order of things, or how things ought to be).  

Anyway, I could go on and on, but I will give one assignment: read Nicomachean Ethics.  ("Ethics" is a term he helped to develop, and he furthered Socrates' work by taking it from the theoretical to the practical).


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## The Anti-Royal (20 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (And note that the words "Operational Level" and "Operational Art" do not appear here.  Neither does the tooth fairy or the easter bunny - two other things that don't exist)



And upon what, good sir, do you base that assertion?


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## frank1515 (20 Mar 2012)

Read parts the Nicomachean Ethics in my Political Philosophy class.  Recommend whoever decides to read this massive work, do so with a notion that it is a translated work, and the terms used by Aristotle may have a completely different meaning back then as to how these terms are used today. Like TV said, he helped developed and shape the definition of the word "Ethic" and was not the only one to do so.

Words like "ethics" "good" "justice" and "morality" have different meanings to different philosophers, and therefore, different meanings all together in 2012.

Anyways, food for thought.


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## Kalatzi (20 Mar 2012)

Is the US on the brink of a humiliating defeat in Vietnam Afghanistan? 

I respectfully say No. 

Many of us will recall the images of Choppers lifting off the roof of the US Embassy. This time I think things are different. 

I do not sense the virulent anti-miltary biases that plagued western  societies at that time. I think that most people feel that the military did as well as it could in trying to attain unachievable goals.  Hence no humiliation. More about that in a minute. 

I've long wondered when we were going to start hearing the military "F" word again. BTW that word is "Frag" The military has retained its professionalism and most of its morale. 

One of the quotes that stood out in Bob Woodwards book "The Commanders" on GW1, involved Dick Cheney  and Colin Powell. I don't recall the speaker but the quote was "If we screw up this time, the military is finished as a force in our society"

Hence no humiliation. 

What about our allies? Most of them are of a similar mind. Hence no humiliation. 

What of our foes? OBL's main strategy, in my opinion  was to draw the West into morale sapping, resource draining war of attrition with the Muslim world.  This campaign is not ending well. 

It is also having a debilitating effect on western societies finances and allocation of resources

I also feel that one of the main beneficiaries of our involvement is China. 

Hopefully lessons can be learned and resources reallocated for the next campaign.  

Reinforce success, not failure. 

I note with interest I have seen no mention "The Abrams - Weinberger - Powell Doctrine" . It may be time for it to be amended. Other are better qualified to speak on this than  I. 

Finally, my favourite author is Barbara Tuchmann, "The guns of August", "The march of folly", of which the last chapter deals with Vietnam. If she were still with us I think she might find a good market for an amended  version with this as its subject. 

We may be on the brink of a defeat in this campaign.  We live in interesting times. Best wishes to our friends, confusion to our enemies.


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## Zartan (20 Mar 2012)

Humiliating? No. The Americans have demonstrated a remarkable capability for rationalizing, if not forgetting, defeat. To the rest of the world, the hypothetical "humiliation" already happened (Iraq). No one will be shocked to see what happens to Afghanistan when the Americans inevitably lead. Nation building is something we don't seem to respect. The Americans, depending upon how one defines it, have proven in the past to be rather capable at it, when they choose to be. They rebuilt Germany and Japan - more relevantly, they turned Italy and Saudi Arabia into developed countries in a shockingly short time. However, if there ever was a tough nut to crack, it was Afghanistan, and to do it at war, no less... simply a bold move. Nation building at it's very essence: were it not for the sense of nationalism that permeates them, there is otherwise no reason for Afghanistan to exist. There was certainly no infrastructure or economy to support a state. It would have to be built, from the ground up: educating the population, developing the economy, fixing infrastructure, and where I think we have screwed up the very most: a stable, Afghan sort of government. With this in mind, the mission was one that could only last decades, regardless of whether the spearpoint was economics or the military. We have made a lot of bad decisions since we arrived there. Generally, I think we were a (temporary) force for good. As it stands, I foresee the west leaving in a few years time, and everything that has been done will collapse. Afghanistan will go back to the way it was one hundred years ago, and again be forgotten. But that's just what I think.

As an aside, the Philosopher who ruined Islamic civilization was Al-Ghazali (math is satanic!)


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## dapaterson (20 Mar 2012)

The Anti-Royal said:
			
		

> And upon what, good sir, do you base that assertion?



The assertion that the tooth fairy and easter bunny don't exist?

Or the assertion that the "operational" level of warfare is an unnecessary distraction in military planning, invented by American doctrine writers looking to create full employment for staff officers to disastrous effect, contributing to modern staff churn, producing little of value but serving to delay direction to subordinates and lengthening the OODA loop?


To paraphrase a military historian and analyst, the complexity of modern warfare is largely self-inflicted by oversized staffs.  As always, the Germans put it best: Je grösser die Stäbe, desto schlecter die Führung.


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## Robert0288 (20 Mar 2012)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Even then I think you are underestimating the time it takes for a culture to change itself. It happens, of course, but it is, generally a long, slow, process.
> 
> We like to point to Germany and Japan and to suggest that, in 1945 to, say, 1955, we changed them ... but that's a historical fallacy. Germany and Japan were both highly _enlightened_ cultures, albeit of vastly different traditions, in which ideas like "rule of law" were well founded and easily replanted; ditto representative democracy, independent judiciary and so on. There was nothing, for example, in the Japanese cultural or religious traditions that suggested that the emperor, divine though he might be, needed to have exclusive political power.
> 
> ...




Germany and Japan are both good examples.  However after the end of WW2 what did we do to Germany?  It was split into 2 parts, and was occupied by all of NATO and the Warsaw pact from 1945/46 until 1989.  Mind you I wasn’t in Germany during any of that time, but I can’t help but to think that occupation (can’t think of a better word for it) by large foreign armies for almost 50 years didn’t have an impact on either east or west Germany’s social or politics views.

Japan after their surrender was dependent on US money to rebuild and in addition the US built multiple bases and staged troops of the Japanese home islands for years. 

On your last point that we cannot change culture from the outside.  If you take a look at historical counterinsurgency that actually worked, you pretty much had to destroy the native population/culture or use ‘terror’ to intimidate the local population.  Before I go any farther I have to state plainly that I DO NOT ADVOCATE THIS (before the rage pms show up).  Take a look at the Boer War.  That was won because we isolated the insurgents from their support network.  Mind you that to isolate the support network, the local civilian populace was rounded up, put into camps and subsequently many died.

When Kenghis Khan was faced with an insurgency or even disrespect he massacred entire villages leaving only a few to tell the tale.  The end result was a quelling of unrest everywhere.

History is full of successful methods of counterinsurgency, just none that can be easily applied to a western democracy.

Just a general question to throw out; but has there ever been a case of ‘successful’ nation building by a western democracy while there are ongoing insurgency actions?


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## GAP (20 Mar 2012)

Exposure to western values and social fashion/images is probably doing more to put a strain on Muslim dictates than anything else. 

The younger generations see the freedom, fashion, etc, etc. and wonder why not me too.....this is causing all kinds of conflicts between generations....


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## Old Sweat (20 Mar 2012)

_Germany and Japan are both good examples.  However after the end of WW2 what did we do to Germany?  It was split into 2 parts, and was occupied by all of NATO and the Warsaw pact from 1945/46 until 1989.  Mind you I wasn't in Germany during any of that time, but I can't help but to think that occupation (can't think of a better word for it) by large foreign armies for almost 50 years didn't have an impact on either east or west Germany's social or politics views._

Not quite. After the end of the Second World War Germany was split into four zones of occupation - Soviet, American, British and French. While the Soviets set up the German Democratic Republic which essentially was a "me too" puppet, the other powers allowed the Germans to reestablish their sovereignty in the 50s. NATO came as a counter to the Soviets in 1949 and many of its nations had foreign NATO forces stationed on their own territory. As a further indication that West Germany was not occupied, there was a blanket status of forces agreement and we were subject to German civil and criminal law, although this was often waived.

Now, you are on much firmer ground where you note that the most effective ways of controlling an uprising are so distasteful to western sensibilities that we end up more or less deluding ourselves. With the benefit of hindsight, we might better have considered the Taliban a hostile state and waged war against them on what we deemed hostile territory. Again, we could not because of our ethical compass. 

With the fear of setting Kirkhill off, maybe the Duke of Cumberland had it right in 1746.


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## Remius (20 Mar 2012)

The Romans did.


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## Colin Parkinson (20 Mar 2012)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The Technoviking may have to help us here - he studied philosophy - but this is a problem that bedeviled the early Christians. They used Aristotle, I think as their guide and he posited (I think, yet again) that a god who (which?) is all powerful must be perfect and need never amend his words or deeds. Now, clearly, the Greek gods were imperfect, and Greek mythology let them be so, but the Christian god was (is, if you wish) "all powerful and ever living" and so (s)he (it?) also need never change a single thing ~ hence predestination, John Calvin and all that.
> 
> We, the West, had a long period, several centuries, of intelectual and, indeed, physical strife while we rediscovered ancient philosophy and science (the renaissance) and rethought our religious doctrine (the reformation) and social systems (the enlightenment); a lot of heated debates took place, a lot of books were written and a few wars were fought before we got the basics settled and none of that prevented two world wars, which might be described, in many ways, as European _civil wars_.
> 
> The Islamic world, for the most part, didn't need a renaissance but it may be due, after over 1,200 years, for a reformation and that might lead to an enlightenment.



Not being a bible reader, but I do recall God being remorseful about flooding the place and saying he/it would not do that again, which would show that God can act on a whim and repent, which would make us very much in his likeness.


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## The Anti-Royal (20 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The assertion that the tooth fairy and easter bunny don't exist?
> 
> Or the assertion that the "operational" level of warfare is an unnecessary distraction in military planning, invented by American doctrine writers looking to create full employment for staff officers to disastrous effect, contributing to modern staff churn, producing little of value but serving to delay direction to subordinates and lengthening the OODA loop?
> 
> ...



I haven't decided if you're trying to be funny or if you really don't understand the concepts and, therefore, consider them valueless.  Maybe it's a combination of both.

You've offered the following opinions:

a.  the operational level of war and the operational art do not exist; and

b.  they are American inventions, mere excuses for keeping the under-employed busy, and are the enemies of efficient decision-making.

The absence of evidence behind these two statements doesn't lend any weight to your argument, and reminds me of something I heard a long time ago.

"It's not much of a cheese shop, is it?"

"Finest in the district, squire."

"Explain the logic underlying that conclusion."

"Well, it's so clean, sir."

"It's certainly uncontaminated by cheese."

What qualifications and experience do you hold, or research have you done, that lead you to hold those opinions on the matter?  I'm keen to know.

I suggest reading a couple of books that may disabuse you of the notion that the operational level of war wasn't around before the big, bloated Yanks dreamed it up.  They're both little-known works, unfortunately - _Vom Krieg_, and _The Art of War_ by Baron de Jomini.

Next time, try stringing facts together in a logical fashion to formulate a conclusion.  It's fun.

Then again, you're probably a lot smarter than me because you quote from the original German.

P.S.  There's a spelling error in your citation.


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## dapaterson (20 Mar 2012)

Imagine - opinions expressed on an internet message board without a long, detailed, footnoted collection of arguments.


How about this, instead: the "operational level" is a theoretical construct of limited utility.  Most adherents and practicioners, if challenged, are able to say "It's between strategy and tactics" but not to provide any genuine description nor support for why this construct is superior to a two level model of strategy and tactics.


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## exabedtech (20 Mar 2012)

Not a humiliating defeat, but a defeat nonetheless.  
As has been stated already by others, a victory could have been declared soon after the Taliban were removed.  Anything we did after that was as pointless in that we have no ability to sustain it after we leave.  Why not?  Because the hate us.  
Could always try supporting them to the tune of billions for the next 40 years and see if that helps, but then it hasn't exactly done wonders for Pakistan.

We were attacked, we did the right thing by going over and kicking their asses.  Should have left the next day.  This hearts and minds crap makes me sick.  Every misplaced bomb, every wrongly kicked in door breeds a new crop of fighters.  Yes, we've done many a great things for those people, but to say that is in any way the reason we fought there is foolishness.  If we cared about human rights, we'd have been in Africa for the past few decades and would still be there.

Are we there to support the Karzai government?  He's been pretty careful to put us down at every opportunity, but even he knows that the day after we leave, his days are numbered.


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## Kalatzi (20 Mar 2012)

Sad to say not just his. 

The public will certainly not be privy to it, unless events start to happen. 

I only hope that contingency plans are afoot to get as many of  our Afghan allies out and settled, if needed. 

That said, I don't think it's a given that the Taliban will simply overrun the place and send things back to normal. 

If we think of the Afghan Security forces as a revitalized Northern Alliance, from the first campaign, supported with Western Air and other assets ...

Failing that that support a side(s) in the developing civil war.


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## tomahawk6 (20 Mar 2012)

Karzai's comments today were not very helpful when he called US troops "demons".


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## exabedtech (20 Mar 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Karzai's comments today were not very helpful when he called US troops "demons".



What option does he have?  Distancing himself from NATO in general and the US in particular will be essential to his survival.  Expect his rhetoric to reach new heights over the few few months while he negotiates for cash behind the scenes.

He knows, just as we know, that this one is lost and its time to plan for what is to come.


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## armyvern (20 Mar 2012)

Good gawd. Can I post an _opinion_ in this thread still? 

Note: I have no staff college experience and will not write big words as if I do for that means nothing; so, if that invalidates my opinion just let me know now and I'll avoid wasting my time.


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## tomahawk6 (20 Mar 2012)

Actually the war is not lost however,there may be another less intrusive way for us to acheive our aims. The way forward IMO is going back to using special ops and air power to attrit the taliban. Buy help where we can. Afghanistan is a feudal society perhaps we should take advantage of that.


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## dogger1936 (21 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Tactical military success is irrelevant if it does not achieve your strategic aims.  If those strategic aims are ill-conceived or poorly considered, military prowess does not matter.
> 
> I seem to recall that the first principle of war (Canadian doctrine) is "Selection and maintenance of the aim".   Lacking a clearly enunciated political aim for the end-state in Afghanistan, how do you measure success?



Bang on.

It's something we lacked huge. Aside from go out get in TIC secure a place then retreat out of it due to the inability to hold ground; it never seemed like there was any aim outside of the small missions to deny ground etc. Yeah sure we killed a ton of Taliban; it didn't seem to slow them down a bit.

I've thought about it quite a bit and your quote above nails it. We lacked any form of aim after the initial invasion. Minus catch phrases like support the Karsai government...things never changed from what I seen so how come our aim didn't. 

It was clear in 07 things were not gonna slow down IRT Taliban support by locals or their supply of soldiers(did anyone meet anyone out in the countryside who hated the Taliban more than us? I didn't)

Aside from some battle hardened troops what did our nation get out of over a decade of fighting. Looks like defeat to me anyway.


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## exabedtech (21 Mar 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Actually the war is not lost however,there may be another less intrusive way for us to acheive our aims. The way forward IMO is going back to using special ops and air power to attrit the taliban. Buy help where we can. Afghanistan is a feudal society perhaps we should take advantage of that.



Step one might be to clearly define those aims.  If you can't sum it up into something under 7 or 8 words, then you simply do not have a clear objective.  
'Destroy the Taliban' sounds kinda nice, but if you miss with one bomb, you just pissed off enough people to generate dozens/hundreds of new taliban recruits.  Bombs have a way of making enemies more easily than they make friends.


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## Journeyman (21 Mar 2012)

exabedtech said:
			
		

> Step one might be to clearly define those aims.  If you can't sum it up into something under 7 or 8 words, then you simply do not have a clear objective.
> 'Destroy the Taliban' sounds kinda nice, but if you miss with one bomb, you just pissed off enough people to generate dozens/hundreds of new taliban recruits.  Bombs have a way of making enemies more easily than they make friends.


OK; I think it's a great game-show you've suggested, so you're the first contestant.

While not being distracted by Vanna White, to say nothing of those IEDs or KAF having Timmies,......you have  7 or 8 words to sum-up a Canadian-style mission in Afghanistan; try to include "destroy the Taliban" and "don't miss with one bomb."      GO!! *


Oh, and because you're a first-time contestant, those 7-8 words can all be in the same language. Now giddy-up.

I look forward to the wisdom from the 'cheering-section'   :



* Not a reference to Jordan.


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## armyvern (21 Mar 2012)

*Every* strike, annihilate forever *only* the Taliban.

Edited to add:
Not even limited to mere "bombs"!! Where the hell is my bonus round prize at?


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## Infanteer (21 Mar 2012)

The Anti-Royal said:
			
		

> What qualifications and experience do you hold, or research have you done, that lead you to hold those opinions on the matter?  I'm keen to know.
> 
> I suggest reading a couple of books that may disabuse you of the notion that the operational level of war wasn't around before the big, bloated Yanks dreamed it up.  They're both little-known works, unfortunately - _Vom Krieg_, and _The Art of War_ by Baron de Jomini.



Actually, Dapaterson is probably quite accurate with regards to the idea of the operational level of war - it is a new, and probably useless, concept from Leavenworth.  See here for a superb explanation.  Hew Strachan, a bit of a contemporary giant on the subject, also writes about it in numerous articles.  A good, contemporary example is "Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal the Operational Level of War" in _Survival_, 52:5, pp 157-182.

A simple challenge is to define strategy and to define tactics and then explain what "an operational HQ" or someone "working on the operational level" actually does.  Chances are, he is doing tactics or strategy.

You make reference to Clausewitz and Jomini with regards to an "operational level of war", but neither author dealt with that concept.  Please indicate specifically where Clausewitz spoke of an operational level of war, as I am quite familiar with his works.

However, Dapaterson is wrong with regards to the non-existance of the operational art.  The operational art is the mechanism that links engagements to meet strategy.  The existance of the operational art does not imply there is an operational level, as operational activities exist within the realm of tactics.


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## a_majoor (22 Mar 2012)

It is always easy to see how things could have/should have been done in hindsight.

Had I been Generalissimo, the center of effort would have been the schools and getting as many Afghan children/young adults educated as possible, using western methodology. If we assume a start date of 2005 (when Canadian forces moved back into Kandahar) then the presumptive end date would be 2015, when we would start graduating large cadres of educated people into Afghan society who could make changes internally.

What screwed up the American military effort was the fact they arrived with an announced end date. Taliban propaganda had a field day with this ("They have the watches, we have the time"), and of course who was going to stick their neck out to support the US/ISAF effort if you knew your protectors were going to leave by a certain date. Better to keep your head down and wait. Militarily, the Americans were doing the right thing; bottling up the Great Sangin Valley in Helmand Province really slowed down the Taliban logistics pipeline, and allowed allied (British and Canadian) forces to focus their efforts in smaller AO's. If there was an understanding the US (and allied) forces were to stay for the long term, allied with an intensive "tache d'huile" effort in the secured zones, then we would have seen something that could be viewed as a victory, or at least creating a stable society which would be able to resist the Taliban and similar movements.


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## Kalatzi (22 Mar 2012)

I think this is an interesting anecdote, that may have some bearing. 

Courtesy of Carl Prine, reproduced under the fair dealings of the copyright act. 

By Carl Prine Thursday, March 22nd, 2012 9:21 am
 Posted in On History, On War

I got a note yesterday from one of my favorite soldiers – U.S. Army Gen. (ret.) Volney F. Warner.

For those youngsters out there who don’t know their history, Warner is one of the great heroes of the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  He won’t tell you this, so I will:  Two Silver Stars, a Distinguished Flying Cross and three Bronze Stars with Valor, plus several other valor and service   awards of the highest order.

He entered our war in Southeast Asia early.  He became a Province Senior Advisor in South Vietnam in 1963.  When he returned to the U.S. in 1965 he was the Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs.

He later commanded a brigade in Vietnam, the 9th Infantry Division, XVIII Airborne Corps and REDCOM, the forerunner to SOCOM.

His sons and granddaughters also became highly respected heroes of this nation.  In fact, the Warner clan might be one of this democracy’s great martial dynasties, even if they don’t think in those terms because they’re perhaps some of the most decent and humble people you’ll likely meet.

GEN Warner was reading the blog the other day and noticed me talking about the excellent dissertation, and later book, by U.S. Army Col. Gregory Daddis and we got to talking about how one measures progress or failure in a murky COIN war because GEN Warner appears in the book just as surely as he was a central figure in the conflict.

I asked him if I could reprint part of the back-and-forth we had because he talks about an event few people seem to remember – long weeks of closed, highly secret discussions by representatives of America’s national security agencies to come up with some sort of metrics to chart the war in Vietnam.

I suspect that if might inform our ongoing debate over metrics in Afghanistan, too.

Let me set the stage:  In October of 1967, Warner was serving under Amb. William Lenhart.  Lenhart had replaced Bob Komer as Presidential Advisor when “Blowtorch” sojourned to Saigon to head pacification operations as GEN William Westmoreland’s deputy.   The U.S. had become entrenched deeper in the war and Lyndon Johnson, under increasing pressure from the various media,  wanted to know when and if we were winning.

I’ll let GEN Warner take it from here…

*****

Volney F. Warner in his own words

During my assignment among the mighty at the White House of the 1960s we pacification staffers occasionally received Presidential guidance and directives.

On one such occasion, a Vietnam expert was selected from each arm of government:  State, USAID, CIA,  Pentagon, etc.

We sequestered at the Agencies’ Vint Hill Farms,  and we were tasked to come up with a Dow Jones Index suitable to measure progress in Vietnam.

Correspondent Apple  caused this by continually referring to the glass half full. However the President wanted a more precise, less liquid metric. I was the Palace representative for the group.

NSC Rules: No phones. No private automobiles. No external communication of any type. No telling where you are or what your mission. No liquor. Stay at it until you get it right. By order of!!!

We screamed. We verbally sparred. We almost came to blows. Two weeks went by with nothing to report other than sleepless nights and verbal bruising.

For example, we contrived equations such as corn/pig distribution numbers plus body count minus US casualties plus hamlet evaluation survey scores with K as an independent variable to represent all other unidentified variance.

We tried Chi-squared analysis of variance distributions.

We did regression analysis.

Those mathematicians among us had a ball educating us finger-counting word-mongers.

Finally, in desperation, after three weeks of argumentation without positive result, we entreated our CIA senior supervisor to let us return to the world. He relented and got an OK from the Palace to send White House sedans for our pick up and departure.

Just as in the real Vietnam: We tried everything. Nothing worked. So we just gave up and went home!"


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## dogger1936 (25 Mar 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> It is always easy to see how things could have/should have been done in hindsight.
> 
> Had I been Generalissimo, the center of effort would have been the schools and getting as many Afghan children/young adults educated as possible, using western methodology. If we assume a start date of 2005 (when Canadian forces moved back into Kandahar) then the presumptive end date would be 2015, when we would start graduating large cadres of educated people into Afghan society who could make changes internally.



We couldn't hold onto COP's. How do you figure we could have kept schools running that would have not been a. demolished upon construction b. Turned into a Taliban madrassa c. Taliban would have just told everyone not to go or they die

While education is important we couldn't even get security figured out.


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## dogger1936 (25 Mar 2012)

Personally I think we stretched out resources mush too thin. We should have picked specific areas and isolated them. Cordon an area, clear it, issue id and deny entry to anyone without ID and search. THEN we could have pumped money into the local mosque, built schools, and protected the population from Taliban influence. We also could have had positive interactions with the townspeople. Instead of the 2007-2008 war where the only time most civilians seen us was when we were attacking the Taliban in their villages and then turning around and leaving the next day.

I think Canada`s biggest failure was not admitting we did not have the manpower to control the area given to us. 300-400 actual troops for zhari-panjuai didnt allow us any ability to spread out for more than a week sojourn into a village before returning to our COP`s and FOB`s allowing the Taliban to move in and exploit the maneuver damage we caused each village; and to help fix the place in our absence.

We could have been successful I believe if we focused all our resources into Panjuai proper. We could have made it a modern town with highly educated people; and prevented taliban influence and attack. We could have built on the law and security and had it maybe to a point where we could have moved into other nearby villages and with the example of panjuai and it`s local support; did the same thing.

Instead we went into a huge area with minute amounts of combat troops and daily fought the enemy who were living in the villages providing law and security and government and in some cases schooling as well. We were the guys coming into their villages causing problems from yet another copy paste orders format froma previous tour.

Canada failed in Panjuai from what I seen. The combat troops did what we could with what we had.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Mar 2012)

dogger1936 said:
			
		

> Personally I think we stretched out resources mush too thin. We should have picked specific areas and isolated them. Cordon an area, clear it, issue id and deny entry to anyone without ID and search. THEN we could have pumped money into the local mosque, built schools, and protected the population from Taliban influence. We also could have had positive interactions with the townspeople. Instead of the 2007-2008 war where the only time most civilians seen us was when we were attacking the Taliban in their villages and then turning around and leaving the next day.
> 
> I think Canada`s biggest failure was not admitting we did not have the manpower to control the area given to us. 300-400 actual troops for zhari-panjuai didnt allow us any ability to spread out for more than a week sojourn into a village before returning to our COP`s and FOB`s allowing the Taliban to move in and exploit the maneuver damage we caused each village; and to help fix the place in our absence.
> 
> ...




I would suggest that the Canadian Army, and through it the Government of Canada, knew full well that our resources were limited and inadequate.

I would guess that we, the Government of Canada and the Canadian Army, communicated our concerns to ISAF and NATO and, still guessing, that we suggested that more troops, from other countries, were required.

We all know that no other troops showed up until too late.

Too little, too late ... but Canada didn't fail, not in battle and no on its own, we were part of a much broader failure.


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## a_majoor (25 Mar 2012)

Dogger, you are describing exactly the sort of "tache d'huile" effort that "should" have been done. I believe we did have the sort of resources to do this, although from a political/domestic politics viewpoint, it would not seem very dramatic or successful. Our NATO partners and the opposition would be constantly after the Govenment and military saying "what, that's all?" rather than watching and waiting for the results. (Remember, in my estimation we would still be there until 2015 as a minimum...)

This is a bit like the process of childbirth. You don't get faster results by putting nine women on the project.


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## dogger1936 (25 Mar 2012)

E.R I hope thats the case. I hope sometime in the future some of our leaders came forward and said with 300 people we cannot deny the enemy anything for any extended period of time, defeat them, or make progress at all. We were not sparta.

With our manpower thucydides I believed when I was there that it was the only way forward. All our missions seemed like pointless repeats of past tours; down to the fact of having a different Callsign from the previous year not omitted from time to time.

The mission as a whole left the few troops we had isolated within the evil Hesco walls of the invaders while the Taliban paraded through the streets and lived all around us farming in their downtime.

At first I thought there was a bigger picture to it all that I was missing. What was I doing there? What purpose was my mission? What I learned was a lot of catch phrases like "disrupt, deny" added into a statement about the govt of Afghanistan really were nothing but catch phrases. We couldn't deny anything. We could only disrupt for a day. Sure we could kill a few but in reality how much did it help? It didn't aside from keeping us alive in situations.

I believe if we had a obtainable goal we could have achieved something on a small scale. Our mission to clear Taliban out of a Taliban stronghold (where it started!) where everyone was Taliban was a 100% failure.

Maybe if we did section off a small no Taliban zone we could have made the rest of the area want our help. 

The fact was I never seen 1 person in that AOR want our help or wanted us there.


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## Kalatzi (25 Mar 2012)

A book that I found very interesting is "The Savage War" By Murray Brewster. 

I feel that the author paints a very positive picture of the troops. 

The writing style is good and can be biting, reserves most of his criticism for the bureaucrats, and politicians.

The line that sticks in my mind is his description of the Canadian involvement as Ä Broadway Musical Spectacular without a choreographer".


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## blacktriangle (25 Mar 2012)

Did anyone honestly think we could "win" in Afghanistan? Even if we could all agree on what definition constitutes a "win"?


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## Sythen (25 Mar 2012)

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Did anyone honestly think we could "win" in Afghanistan? Even if we could all agree on what definition constitutes a "win"?



Yes, before my tour I believed the Afghan people wanted peace and stability. After my tour, I knew they didn't care so I stopped believing.


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## Infanteer (26 Mar 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Had I been Generalissimo, the center of effort would have been the schools and getting as many Afghan children/young adults educated as possible, using western methodology. If we assume a start date of 2005 (when Canadian forces moved back into Kandahar) then the presumptive end date would be 2015, when we would start graduating large cadres of educated people into Afghan society who could make changes internally.



Assuming that we can change a society in 10 years through an education program in an active warzone is as silly as thinking elections mean the country is a functioning liberal democratic state.

The fact that military strategy and tactics are mixed up with schools and elections shows the damage that FM 3-24 has wrought in our thinking of counter-insurgency/pacification/putting down revolt.  The bayonet exists to provide security and nothing more - if you or your host nation can't do anything with that security (stability and all that jazz) then you have problems outside the military realm (ie - you've backed the wrong horse).


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## Infanteer (26 Mar 2012)

dogger1936 said:
			
		

> We could have been successful I believe if we focused all our resources into Panjuai proper. We could have made it a modern town with highly educated people; and prevented taliban influence and attack. We could have built on the law and security and had it maybe to a point where we could have moved into other nearby villages and with the example of panjuai and it`s local support; did the same thing.



What you are describing is Canada's part of the campaign circa 2009-2011.  Once TFK was augmented with U.S. units and other U.S. formations took control of other districts in Kandahar Province, the Canadian AOR shrunk to Panjwayi/Dand and, by 2010, Panjwayi alone.  What's more, the size of the land-owners (the BG) increased tremendously - by 2010, the Battlegroup was responsible for Panjwayi and had 5 Infantry Companies and a Tank Squadron.

Was it any more effective?  The jury is still out, but I've seen some promising tactical assessments.  One item that bears some research was the Canadian effort to partition Panjwayi off through obstacles to control movement.  I think it was generally regarded as effective and supports my suspicion that the key to any COIN effort is population control (which FM 3-24 ignores and any serious talk of Afghanistan has missed).


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## Infanteer (26 Mar 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Dogger, you are describing exactly the sort of "tache d'huile" effort that "should" have been done.



The 'tache d'huile' concept was useful for pacifying rural tribesmen in the 1800s for colonial expansion, but its limitations beyond that are acknowledged in current literature on the subject.  The same with the 'clear, hold, build' mantra, which fell out of writing concerned with countering revolutionary communist insurgency.

The situation now is a bit different - as we are not colonial occupiers in the sense that the local administration is nominally independent of us, nor are we dealing with communist revolutionary insurgencies.  Blindly applying old mantras for today's insurgencies is not really going to give you an effective solution to the problem.


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## Redeye (26 Mar 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The 'tache d'huile' concept was useful for pacifying rural tribesmen in the 1800s for colonial expansion, but its limitations beyond that are acknowledged in current literature on the subject.  The same with the 'clear, hold, build' mantra, which fell out of writing concerned with countering revolutionary communist insurgency.
> 
> The situation now is a bit different - as we are not colonial occupiers in the sense that the local administration is nominally independent of us, nor are we dealing with communist revolutionary insurgencies.  Blindly applying old mantras for today's insurgencies is not really going to give you an effective solution to the problem.



It worked in Algeria somewhat well too - but with a lot more emphasis on population control measures that are indeed lacking in US doctrine (which, I am told, is receiving a thorough and long overdue overhaul, but how much of an impact that has I don't really know, and I'm not really going to say I have a lot of faith in). 3-24.2 gets a little more into those measures, but it very rapidly starts to read like The Infantry Section And Platoon In Battle and there's definitely a disconnect between the development/political efforts necessary to succeed in COIN and the military aspect of clear-hold-build. At the high level, there's a good framework for solving the problems, but translating that into actual efforts is not so simple.

During a recent District Stability Framework course I was involved with here, it was impossible not to notice that there's a deep mutual distrust and even contempt between ISAF and the various aid agencies which were involved. If those folks can't all get on the same page, it's hard to see how much benefit there could be in engaging locals in a lot of cases. There is also in Afghanistan the problem of a major external support factor that there is no easy way to address. Watching any ANA COIN course go off the rails as soon as Pakistan is mentioned is an experience. It's also telling that more educated Afghans will point out that it's simply easier for them to blame outsiders for all their problems rather than taking any responsibility for themselves. However, my sample space is interpreters I work with, and some ANA officers who are keen to make the country work, so it has its limitations.

Thucydides and I agree that education would make a huge difference here, but it's not as simple as building schools. It's hard to find qualified teachers, and the rural populace still doesn't see a value in much education in many (but by no means all) cases. As far as development goes, I've heard stories of projects going nowhere because of the way they were described to locals. A USAID person here told us about in Helmand Province how they had set up a workshop/school for women to learn sewing and that sort of thing, with the idea that it could become self-sustaining through generating economic activity. A couple years later, it had never been opened or used, and they asked around and learned that when it was pitched as a way to "empower women" and create "economic independence" (I think that was the term, at least), that immediately made people shun it. It wasn't a cultural fit to suggest such a thing.

There's also, of course, pandemic corruption. It makes sense, in theory, to enable locals to start businesses and do the work of building infrastructure and that sort of thing, but often the money is invested and promptly disappears, sometimes (like in the case of a road project in Helmand again) things actually get worse - a small narrow road was set to be improved to allow farmers to get more produce to market instead of it wilting in the fields, the money allocated, the work started - and huge gravel piles and excavations were abandoned when the contractors absconded with the money, leaving the road now completely impassable until arrangements could be made to try to finish it. Efforts through Shafafiyet to attack corruption make for interesting reading, but they have a long way to go to deal with problems. But in a country with so little basis for economic growth (other than a massive narcotics trade) it's hard to figure out how things will be sustainable, especially as we go through transitions over the next few years.

It's a very different viewpoint than you'd find outside of Kabul, I'm sure. I wasn't ever down south so I don't have a good frame of reference to compare, but it definitely seems like the difference in POVs is huge reading accounts of those who were there against what I can glean where I am in Kabul.


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Mar 2012)

Perhaps some of the things that we think the locals will love can simply fuel the insurgency? My reading indicates that the strife that precipiated the Soviet invasion came out of resistance to "modernization" measures being proposed by foreign-educated Kabul elites. The traditional rural power structures were challenged and reacted. By the same token, making the empowerment of women a plank of our platform could lead to more trouble. I don't think that a lack education or employment opportunities for girls is what fuels the insurgency. 

If we cannot answer "why" there is an insurgency then I don't think we can answer how to defeat it.


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## Infanteer (26 Mar 2012)

As I typed this, Tango2Bravo premtped me.  His post says it all.  There are, when you boil it down 4 essential problems in Afghanistan.  These problems won't necessarily lead to a 'humiliating defeat', but they very likely won't make progress possible.

1.  A constitution that centralized state power in a state that has traditionally seen power devolved to the lowest levels of tribal governance.  This essentially 'redistributed' powers in the Afghan state to the victors of a civil war, the Northern Alliance.  We, in typically Western fashion, have created a power structure in Afghanistan completely antithetical to the way the people have viewed their relationship with the state for the last 2 centuries;

2.  Seeing the feasibility of the state as it currently exists is nil, the Afghan government has read the writing on the wall - note Karzai's planned exit date coincides with NATOs exit.  In the meantime, what has transpired is a bit of a farce, with an international military force driving the counter-insurgency effort and the government of the nation critiquing its actions every month.  The most basic idea of COIN should be the flag test, coined by a smart SF Col over on the SWC, which argues that by going to a nation's capital and looking for the highest flag pole, one can identify who has the lead in COIN - everyone else is doing FID.  Instead, when it comes to strategy, we see an ISAF cart driving a Kabul horse.

3.  International do-gooders have not helped.  In becoming a 'cause celebre', a tremendous amount of money has flowed into Afghanistan from governments and NGOs.  The problem is that there is no accountability or oversight and the unclass material from CJIATF Shafafiyet points to the glaringly obvious problem that the billions of dollars pumped into the country fuel the conflict - it is simply uneconomical for most of the regional players to want peace at this point; and

4.  All this is overlayed with a military strategy driven by the tactics of clear, hold, build.  The problem with this is that the Pashtun are infamously polite and notoriously xenophobic.  If centralized Kabul governance gets Pashtun tribal society in a tizzy (as it has in the past - see 1978 and 1929) how is enforcing centralized Kabul governance by putting a western soldier and his heavy armoured vehicle in every village on the AfPak border going to help things?  

Notice all these problems are concerned with policy and strategy.  No amount of good tactics, regardless of what contemporary pop-centric COIN tells you, will fix this.

On the subject of tactics, the whole bit of this lone U.S. soldier killing 17 Afghans that started the current round of teeth gnashing will have no real strategic effects, despite what some pundits trumpet.  It is a small event that, like Haditha that everyone in Iraq soon forgot about, will just be another blip in the narrative of this war.


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## tomahawk6 (26 Mar 2012)

I am an avid reader of mil blogs and one of my favorites is Captain's Journal. In one blog dated 4 MAR he reviews a book review by COL Gian Gentile now a Professor at West Point.,of Westmoreland,The General That Lost Vietnam.Gentile brings to the review his combat experience. Colonel Gentile doesnt care for the Army's infatuation with COIN.I wanted to add COL Gentile's page at West Point.

http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/NamePages/Gentile/Gentile.html

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2012/03/04/the-better-war/



> Gentile uses the occasion of a new book to give us insights into Vietnam, extending his lessons into Iraq and Afghanistan.  The book is Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley.  Gentile begins his review thusly.
> 
> DID GENERAL Westmoreland lose Vietnam? The answer is no. But he did lose the war over the memory of the Vietnam War. He lost it to military historian Lewis Sorley, among others. In his recent biography of William C. Westmoreland, Sorley posits what might be called “the better-war thesis”—that a better war leading to American victory was available to the United States if only the right general had been in charge. The problem, however, is that this so-called better war exists mostly in the minds of misguided historians and agenda-driven pundits.
> 
> ...


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## Infanteer (26 Mar 2012)

Col Gentile is known as the heel of contemporary COIN and has had many well publicized battles with John Nagl on the utility of FM 3-24.  I must say (if it is not evident) that I find Gentile's arguments to be, most of the time, more convincing.

Col Gentile posts at the Small Wars Journal and is currently working on a book on Westmoreland and Abrams; obviously, he will have some different conclusions than Sorely.


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## dogger1936 (26 Mar 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> What you are describing is Canada's part of the campaign circa 2009-2011.  Once TFK was augmented with U.S. units and other U.S. formations took control of other districts in Kandahar Province, the Canadian AOR shrunk to Panjwayi/Dand and, by 2010, Panjwayi alone.  What's more, the size of the land-owners (the BG) increased tremendously - by 2010, the Battlegroup was responsible for Panjwayi and had 5 Infantry Companies and a Tank Squadron.
> 
> Was it any more effective?  The jury is still out, but I've seen some promising tactical assessments.  One item that bears some research was the Canadian effort to partition Panjwayi off through obstacles to control movement.  I think it was generally regarded as effective and supports my suspicion that the key to any COIN effort is population control (which FM 3-24 ignores and any serious talk of Afghanistan has missed).



Excellent to hear. My last trip was in 09 and we were still on the river run with 300. Great to hear things changed; and really glad to hear the idea of population control was tossed around in the later days. Heck know's we brought it up and war gamed it in the bunk some nights of what "we would do".

IRT the population control we thought it was important as when we would go into a village we had no way of knowing a guy was local or not. A few times our terps would tip us off that this guy is talking weird and not from around here. A ID with a data base would have allowed us to see who wasn't from the village and note and track peoples movements. Would have been good for BDA ident from a int perspective to see what families were causing us the most issues or villages etc.


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## Redeye (27 Mar 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As I typed this, Tango2Bravo premtped me.  His post says it all.  There are, when you boil it down 4 essential problems in Afghanistan.  These problems won't necessarily lead to a 'humiliating defeat', but they very likely won't make progress possible.
> 
> 1.  A constitution that centralized state power in a state that has traditionally seen power devolved to the lowest levels of tribal governance.  This essentially 'redistributed' powers in the Afghan state to the victors of a civil war, the Northern Alliance.  We, in typically Western fashion, have created a power structure in Afghanistan completely antithetical to the way the people have viewed their relationship with the state for the last 2 centuries;
> 
> ...



Well enunciated on basically all parts. We failed to come up with an overarching strategy for developing governance that fit the context. And by throwing money at problem areas, we encouraged more problems. For all that COIN principles, at a high level, make sense, there's no real unity of effort, and no understanding of the environment to make it work effectively. And there's no willingness to develop those things, it seems like.


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Every day the Taliban are dying in Afghanistan and not over here is a victory for us.




> And by throwing money at problem areas, we encouraged more problems



That's what shot us in the foot. They realized if they create problems then we will pay them to fix it.


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## Redeye (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Every day the Taliban are dying in Afghanistan and not over here is a victory for us.



You can kill almost an infinite number of them and accomplish absolutely nothing. It's not quite that simple. Nor is there any particular threat that the Taliban would be dying over here, though there might be in the case of the various other organizations here that will scramble for power in the vacuum that might well ensue.


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Kill enough of them and their command/training structure and you're left with an enemy with vastly reduced capabilities and skills.   The backyard bandits while not eliminated outright will be content with targeting our troops over there and not be putting together plots to blow shit up over here.

TV nailed it. We won WW2 by leveling cities and giving them a panoramic view of hell with front row seats.


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## Infanteer (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Every day the Taliban are dying in Afghanistan and not over here is a victory for us.



The Taliban have never been involved "over here".  Time to hit the history books.


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## aesop081 (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> We won WW2 by leveling cities and giving them a panoramic view of hell with front row seats.



So we should have carpet-bombed Afghanistan ?


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## jollyjacktar (28 Mar 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> So we should have carpet-bombed Afghanistan ?


Personally I say "No".  That is one solution however.  Maybe better to ask, would that have been effective and worth the blowback?


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The Taliban have never been involved "over here".  Time to hit the history books.



And you think now that we kicked that hornets nest they'll let bygones be bygones?




			
				CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> So we should have carpet-bombed Afghanistan ?


Did we carpet bomb Germany? Or did we pound them until they said okay enough your dicks bigger you win.  

In Afghanistan we can't engage a guy digging on the side of the road at 3 am burying something suspicious because we don't have PID. An American pilot I was speaking with 2 weeks ago told me a story how a bunch of insurgents laid down on top of their gats for 3 hours while pilots circled them. Pilots couldn't engage because they didn't have PID on weapons. Once they were bingo fuel and left the insurgents got up and hit a COP down the road.

That's no way to fight a war.

Are we going to try and win the hearts and minds of Iranians next?


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## Kalatzi (28 Mar 2012)

This migt be an interesting reply to Grimadus

First reproduced under the faiir dealing provision of the copyright act
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/03/28/irregular-math/#more-69992

Irregular Math
Seth Jones, a counter-insurgency expert now at the Rand Corp., and before that at the Pentagon, testifying at a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing on Tuesday:

Us: “Today in Afghanistan we have about 432,000 counterinsurgency forces, we’ve spent over $100 billion per year…and deployed a range of sophisticated platforms and systems.”

Them: “The Taliban and its allies, on the other hand, have deployed between 20,000 and 40,000 forces…and had revenues of between $100 million and $200 million per year.”

Bottom Line: Personnel “ratio of nearly 11-to-1 in favor of counterinsurgents” and financial “ratio of about 500-to-1 in favor of counterinsurgents….Yet the Taliban’s ability to utilize limited resources and sustain a prolonged insurgency, I do think, highlights some of the challenges we face on irregular warfare.”
Read more: http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/03/28/irregular-math/#more-69992#ixzz1qRAyd2Qi

Summary - If these force ratios haven't worked out what will. 

I dont't think Carpet bombing a stone age people back to the sand age is going to work very well. 

My second point may be a bit more interesting. I looked up Dragon''s Teeth

This from Wiki ;
Cadmus was the bringer of literacy and civilization, killed the sacred dragon that guarded the spring of Ares. The goddess Athena told him to sow the teeth, from which sprang a group of ferocious warriors called the spartoi. He threw a precious jewel into the midst of the warriors, who turned on each other in an attempt to seize the stone for themselves. The five survivors joined with Cadmus to found the city of Thebes"

Perhaps the West needs to inject a Precious stone into the Taliban mix.


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## aesop081 (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Did we carpet bomb Germany? Or did we pound them until they said okay enough your dicks bigger you win.



Go explain that to Hamburg or Dresden........


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Go explain that to Hamburg or Dresden........



I mistook your reference. I thought you implied indiscriminate bombing of the country as a whole which doesn't serve a purpose. Wiping out a city that's a hotbed for the enemy I do agree with, or with your examples, when it's time to stop dicking around and and finish the fight.


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## dapaterson (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> I mistook your reference. I thought you implied indiscriminate bombing of the country as a whole which doesn't serve a purpose. Wiping out a city that's a hotbed for the enemy I do agree with, or with your examples, when it's time to stop dicking around and and finish the fight.



So, by that logic, the Taliban could destroy Pembroke, since we send troops from 2 CMBG to fight them.


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, by that logic, the Taliban could destroy Pembroke, since we send troops from 2 CMBG to fight them.



Do you think the Taliban would destroy Pembroke if they had the chance?  Regardless of it's proximity to 2CMBG?


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Before I get a pile on and start having people proving my argument is wrong because I didn't use spell check all I'm saying is this;

The topic was of this thread was _ Is the US on the brink of a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan?_

I said no because the Taliban have indicated fairly well that they have no objections to butchering us. Us "Infidels" existing offends them and their religious doctrine.  I fully believe that if given the chance and resources they would happily come over here and try to shit in our cereal (then cut our heads off and dance around).  To me, every day that all this violence is going on in Afghanistan and not North America is a victory.

One series of attacks (DC sniper) paralyzed the eastern seaboard. Our society government and citizens aren't prepared to deal with terror attacks on our soil and I'll bet my picture of me kissing Emma Watson  if it DID happen (terror attacks here) even the peeps over at rabble.ca would be screaming to launch the B52s.

On the same note we are "fighting the war in Afghanistan" the wrong way. If we really wanted to install a democracy over there we'd need to flatten the place first and rebuild it- other wise we're trying to put a fire out by smothering it with money.


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## Remius (28 Mar 2012)

The only reason I would pile on to you is because you are using DA iconography in your profile when your name is clearly BT.  ;D


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## aesop081 (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Wiping out a city that's a hotbed for the enemy I do agree with,



Except for the fact that it didn't work in Germany. Bombing entire cities into oblivion did not cause the population there to stop supporting the regime. 



			
				Grimaldus said:
			
		

> If we really wanted to install a democracy over there we'd need to flatten the place first and rebuild it-



So your answer to me is "Yes, we should have flattened the place" ?


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Crantor said:
			
		

> The only reason I would pile on to you is because you are using DA iconography in your profile when your name is clearly BT.  ;D


Damnit!


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Except for the fact that it didn't work in Germany. Bombing entire cities into oblivion did not cause the population there to stop supporting the regime.


Germany surrendered in the end. It may not have caused the population to cease supporting the regime but I guarantee that Hamburg's and Dresden's contribution to the war effort was considerably less.



> So your answer to me is "Yes, we should have flattened the place" ?


I'm not sure what place you're referring to specifically however to try and paraphrase (I think)  if the town of Deh Ravod was constantly being used by insurgents to attack NATO I would tell the town to either help us stop the attacks or police themselves and if it continued to happen I'd send out a pretty eviction notice and then bull doze the town.
Yup it'll turn people against us but sooner or later people would realize we're not backing down and we have the capability to flatten the whole country so maybe they would change their tune. Or, start living in tents. Sold by tent companies belonging to Halliburton, naturally.


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## aesop081 (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Yup it'll turn people against us but sooner or later people would realize we're not backing down and we have the capability to flatten the whole country so maybe they would change their tune.



The what ? After we leave, what happens ?

Do we want to force people into and garrison Afghanistan for ever or do we convince them that our way is better so we can have a stable-ish country that doesn't need 200 rotos of Canadians ?


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## Infanteer (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> I said no because the Taliban have indicated fairly well that they have no objections to butchering us. Us "Infidels" existing offends them and their religious doctrine.  I fully believe that if given the chance and resources they would happily come over here and try to crap in our cereal (then cut our heads off and dance around).  To me, every day that all this violence is going on in Afghanistan and not North America is a victory.



Go back and read my post on the four issues in Afghanistan - nowhere was "conflict with Christianity" or "global Caliphate" on that list.  Again, you are confusing the Taliban and current Afghan resistance with transnational Salafist terrorism.  Two completely different groups/concepts/motives/phenomenon.  Blaming the Afghan insurgency on "western religion" and "freedom" is a shallow cop out when in reality, foreign military presence and conflict with the central government is the real fuel to the fire.  All insurgency is local.

The reference to bombing Germany flat is no good either.  The bombing of Germany was done to attack their wartime production and the willpower of the people to support its government.  In Afghanistan, we've knocked off the regime and are now de facto occupiers on behalf of the client government.  There is no wartime production and no regime support to attack with such tactics.


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## Sythen (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> I'm not sure what place you're referring to specifically however to try and paraphrase (I think)  if the town of Deh Ravod was constantly being used by insurgents to attack NATO I would tell the town to either help us stop the attacks or police themselves and if it continued to happen I'd send out a pretty eviction notice and then bull doze the town.
> Yup it'll turn people against us but sooner or later people would realize we're not backing down and we have the capability to flatten the whole country so maybe they would change their tune. Or, start living in tents. Sold by tent companies belonging to Halliburton, naturally.



Just an anecdote which I can't back up with any real proof, so you will just need to take my word. While in Afghanistan, the insurgents always hit us from certain areas.. One particular attack on the COP killed two ANA soldiers. The next day we went to the elder of that town, and the ANA commander told him that if we were attacked from his town again he would kill the elder and his whole family. We never got hit from there again.

We can threaten anyone all we want, the locals know we won't do anything except throw money at them. The ANA however had nothing against killing the locals and the elder knew it. Maybe if we weren't seen as pussies and put our foot down now and then, things would change.


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## jollyjacktar (28 Mar 2012)

Sythen said:
			
		

> We can threaten anyone all we want, the locals know we won't do anything except throw money at them. The ANA however had nothing against killing the locals and the elder knew it. Maybe if we weren't seen as pussies and put our foot down now and then, things would change.


When that PAN AM jet was hijacked 30 or so years ago and stood on the tarmac while the Palestinian gunmen held hostages and killed some, the Yanks dithered.  My Dad said that if they were to send in a jet or two, take out the whole aircraft, hijackers, hostages and all with a statement to the effect that they will not negotiate with terrorists etc.  That, that would be the end of any such act as there would be nothing to be gained.  He said of course that it would be political suicide to do such a thing, but that was the language the terrorists would understand.

When the Russians were victim of hostage takings in the mid 80's in Beirut.  They sent a Spetsnaz wet team in to deal with exterminate the relatives of the hostage takers.  The surviving Russian hostages were swiftly returned, and no one screwed with the Russians in Lebanon after.  Pussies, they aren't.


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> The what ? After we leave, what happens ?


Well having seen the light (see what I did there?) they join NATO and rebuild their country into a beautiful paradise.



> Do we want to force people into and garrison Afghanistan for ever or do we convince them that our way is better so we can have a stable-ish country that doesn't need 200 rotos of Canadians ?


How are we doing on convincing them that our way is better so far?  If winning their hearts and minds worked I'd be all for it. It's not working.
We can;
-Leave now, have our local allies butchered and wait for them to start trying to get some pay back.
-Garrison them like the Russians and feed men money and material into that grinder until they assimilate into something we want OR make it so costly for us we revert to option #1
-Keep pouring men money and material into the hearts and minds thing we got going on which hasn't been all that successful yet.
-Work out a deal with the Taliban which puts them in power and we try and put a spin on it to make it look like we're all friends again.

I don't have a right answer.  What about you CDN Aviator, what do YOU think we should do?



> Go back and read my post on the four issues in Afghanistan - nowhere was "conflict with Christianity" or "global Caliphate" on that list.  Again, you are confusing the Taliban and current Afghan resistance with transnational Salafist terrorism.  Two completely different groups/concepts/motives/phenomenon.  Blaming the Afghan insurgency on "western religion" and "freedom" is a shallow cop out when in reality, foreign military presence and conflict with the central government is the real fuel to the fire.  All insurgency is local.


It may not be on your list but I think it's definitely an issue. 
We're the big bad western christian infidels. I'd blame the insurgency on us being in their country AND them believing our lifestyle is an affront to their religion and we should die for it.  When you say the insurgency is local do you mean to that region including Pakistan?



> The reference to bombing Germany flat is no good either.  The bombing of Germany was done to attack their wartime production and the willpower of the people to support its government.  In Afghanistan, we've knocked off the regime and are now de facto occupiers on behalf of the client government.  There is no wartime production and no regime support to attack with such tactics.


The client government (and police and army) being where some of the dudes from the old regime are hiding out- but ya I see where you're going with that.




			
				Sythen said:
			
		

> Just an anecdote which I can't back up with any real proof, so you will just need to take my word. While in Afghanistan, the insurgents always hit us from certain areas.. One particular attack on the COP killed two ANA soldiers. The next day we went to the elder of that town, and the ANA commander told him that if we were attacked from his town again he would kill the elder and his whole family. We never got hit from there again.
> 
> We can threaten anyone all we want, the locals know we won't do anything except throw money at them. The ANA however had nothing against killing the locals and the elder knew it. Maybe if we weren't seen as pussies and put our foot down now and then, things would change.



No one likes to admit that that tactic can work.


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## aesop081 (28 Mar 2012)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> If winning their hearts and minds worked I'd be all for it. It's not working.



It's not working because we've gone into it half-assed. We failed at "selection and maintenance of the aim" and we also failed " concentration of force". We tried to do this on the cheap and not have the results to prove it.




> I don't have a right answer.



Neither do i, but IMHO, flattening the place achieves only short-term military aims. It does nothing to achieve long-term political aims and settle it once and for all.



> What about you CDN Aviator, what do YOU think we should do?



Invest a much larger force than what we went with. We went over there on the discount plan. We needed to go big, very big, right from the start. We needed to be and stay in more places. There was not enough done on the non-military front and i don't think we ever really understood the cultural dynamics of the place and how we could influence it.

[/armchairing]


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## Journeyman (28 Mar 2012)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> When the Russians were victim of hostage takings in the mid 80's in Beirut.  They sent a Spetsnaz wet team in to deal with exterminate the relatives of the hostage takers.  The surviving Russian hostages were swiftly returned, and no one screwed with the Russians in Lebanon after.


Do you have a source for this?

Google just keeps directing me to a site called "Godlike Productions: UFOs, Conspiracy Theorists, Lunatic Fringe."  :


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## Tow Tripod (28 Mar 2012)

Would I lose any sleep if all NATO forces withdrew tomorrow? Nope ,not a wink! So long as there is air presence either aircraft or drones to destroy any illegal gatherings. Historians can decide if the war in Afghanistan was worth it. Right now I'm very skeptical. OBL is dead. We (the West) have tried to rebuild a society that is trapped in the 13th century. Karzia is corrupt as a days long. So where do we go from here?


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## jollyjacktar (28 Mar 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Do you have a source for this?
> 
> Google just keeps directing me to a site called "Godlike Productions: UFOs, Conspiracy Theorists, Lunatic Fringe."  :


My source is a Sgt I worked for who was in Beirut at the Cdn embassy with the security detail at the time of the incident.  My wife was also in the city for a period during that time frame.  She told me that everyone knew who was responsible for any bad shit that was going down so identifying the guilty bastards was fairly simple.  

The Russians were given ransom demands, which they flatly refused to honour.  The terrorists then delivered the body of one of the staff members to the entrance of the Embassy to show they meant business.  The Russians responded in kind spades as I mentioned earlier.  I'm sorry, I cannot quote you bible and verse per se.


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## OldSolduer (28 Mar 2012)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> When the Russians were victim of hostage takings in the mid 80's in Beirut.  They sent a Spetsnaz wet team in to deal with exterminate the relatives of the hostage takers.  The surviving Russian hostages were swiftly returned, and no one screwed with the Russians in Lebanon after.  Pussies, they aren't.



I read similar things elsewhere.....however I think our Russian friends may never tell us if that was true.

I can't recall too many Russian diplomats being kidnapped.


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## Infanteer (28 Mar 2012)

Of course, 1 search of google reveals that Wikipedia talks about all of this Soviet stuff.  There is a citation to a book as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_Group


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> It's not working because we've gone into it half-assed. We failed at "selection and maintenance of the aim" and we also failed " concentration of force". We tried to do this on the cheap and not have the results to prove it.


Much of that is over my head . I'm really only concerned with 3 things.  Where am I going, what weapons do I have, when do I shoot.  considering it took us 2 months to (officially) zero our weapons after being there it stuck me as a little half assed at my level.  I think the idea to establish a democracy there was failed from the beginning. When we started complaining about sexual and physical abuse of Afghan civilians and got told to not worry about it, it's their country I knew democracy went the way of the dinosaurs.



> Neither do i, but IMHO, flattening the place achieves only short-term military aims. It does nothing to achieve long-term political aims and settle it once and for all.


I didn't suggest carper bombing the place merely not tying a hand behind our backs when we fight with hearts and minds rope.



> Invest a much larger force than what we went with. We went over there on the discount plan. We needed to go big, very big, right from the start. We needed to be and stay in more places. There was not enough done on the non-military front and i don't think we ever really understood the cultural dynamics of the place and how we could influence it.



A wise lesson learned but not addressing what to do with the current situation. Trying to add them to our facebook friends list seems like the most economical option.


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## Jarnhamar (28 Mar 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I read similar things elsewhere.....however I think our Russian friends may never tell us if that was true.
> 
> I can't recall too many Russian diplomats being kidnapped.






> By the time Alpha was on-site, word had spread that one of the hostages had already been killed. Through a network of supporting KGB operatives, members of the task-force were able to successfully identify each of the perpetrators involved in the crisis, and once discovered, began to take the individual relatives of the extremists hostage. Following the standard Soviet policy of "no negotiation with terrorists," the hostages belonging to Alpha Group* had some of their body parts cut off and sent directly to the Sunni militants. The warning was quite clear*: more would follow unless the remaining hostages were released immediately. The show of force worked, and for a period of twenty years



It may make me an asshole but I support something like this 100%.


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## Journeyman (28 Mar 2012)

I asked for a source only because I've heard the story for years, but have not seen any credible documentation. Even in the book cited by Wikipedia, which I have, Barry Davies' narrative is mostly third-person -- he's just passing along a story he's heard too.

I don't doubt that Spetznaz Alpha _was_ involved, I've just never had any luck finding the whole story.

It's pretty much an urban legend, with the details changing from the Russians killing all the relatives, killing one, or chopping off body parts and sending them to the stand-off.

:dunno:


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## Nemo888 (29 Mar 2012)

If we were serious about winning we would have invaded the right country. Not fall for the feint of our enemy who wanteed Afghanistan to be the graveyard of yet another empire while he retired to his lovely walled casawith his favourite wives next door.


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## stealthylizard (29 Mar 2012)

What do we know of the history of Afghanistan.  A whole lot of people jump to the idea they have always been a culture living in the 8th century. There is also the idea that it is a "graveyard of empires".  

Prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was fairly progressive compared to what it is today, at least in the major urban areas.  Girls went to school, women held jobs, they were even allowed to drive.  I have a few friends that were quite amazed by the place, when they visited as drug tourists back in the late 60's.  Kabul was full of flashing neon lights, there was an active night life, women were out everywhere dressed in western style fashions.  The Taliban came into power after the Soviets left, and that all changed.

Afghanistan has been "ruled" over its history quite a few times by various nations.  It was always the land gateway between east and west in that region, and has seen a lot of conflict.  Some nations that tried, obviously failed, most notably, the Soviets, and the Brits, but the Sikhs have had a long history of being in control of Afghanistan, same with the Mongols, and Buddhism has had a heavy influence on pre-Taliban Afghanistan.  It is not a graveyard of empires because a few countries couldn't conquer it.



Is the US on the brink of a humiliating defeat?  Politically humiliating, for sure.  The most technological advanced fighting forces in the world have come together, and we cannot "win" against a backwards stone aged culture.  Yes our hands are tied, but nonetheless, some can see that as humiliating.  It isn't the military's fault, we work within our limitations.  We aren't the ones who will be humiliated.  The other side of the question is, can we win?  When someone can accurately define what a win is, that can be answered.  My biggest problem is what do we do about it?  If we leave in the next couple years, there is a very strong likelihood, we may be back doing this all again in 30-40 years.  But how long do we stay, to try to ensure that doesn't happen, and their culture normalizes again?  30-40 years?  Screwed if we do, screwed if we don't.  I concur that the western civilian population for the most part has ADD/HD.  

I will leave the tactical strategies for the experts to argue over, like mini-nukes, carpet bombing, forcing them into concentration camps, etc.

I am at a loss for an explanation, when people ask me, WHY I was there.  I can tell them my personal reasons for wanting to be there, but as far as being able to give them the official reason post 2005, I have no idea.  I don't know what my mission was.  I don't what the goal was.  I was there because I wanted to be there and I have no regrets about being there.


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## Edward Campbell (29 Mar 2012)

Successive governments of Canada, Liberal and Conservative, gave our reasons for being there ... usually on the DFAIT web site (there were precious few Afghanistan debates in the House of Commons and those few provided more heat than light); currently our "reasons" are:

_"(1) investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programming in education and health;
 (2) advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, through the provision of up to 950 CF trainers, support personnel, and approximately 45 Canadian civilian police to help train Afghan National Security Forces;
 (3) promoting regional diplomacy; and
 (4) helping deliver humanitarian assistance."_

You will recognize that those are "tasks," not a "mission," _per se_.

I'm working from memory, but several years ago the governments of the day (Jean Chrétien and, later, Paul Martin) were a bit more clear and we had three goals:

1. To safeguard Canada by helping to defeat _al Qaeda_ (which had explicitly stated that Canada was a target for a future terrorist attack) and deny it its base in Afghanistan;

2. To enhance Canada's international reputation - to "punch above our weight" again - by doing a full and fair share in the poorly conceived "global war on terror;" and

3. To help put Afghanistan on the road to recovery and help make it able to look after itself.

Those are more credible _strategic_ missions and, in so far as DND and the CF are concerned, I suggest we, working with allies, were successful in 1, and, unilaterally, completely successful in 2; and, again as part of an allied effort, partially successful in 3.


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## Jungle (29 Mar 2012)

Thank you Mr Campbell.

I read a lot of comments here that seem to come from people who look at Afg with "6-month goggles".
We never went there to defeat the taliban; we met our original goals as stated above (nos 1 and 2), then stayed to help the ANSF stand up and eventually take over their own security (no 3).

Changing Afghan society/ culture cannot be done by westerners in a handful of years; it will be done by Afghans and take decades/generations. I don't know if it will be successful, but I think we helped put them on the right path.

On my last tout there I spent 8 months with the ANA; I found that individually they are aware that many changes need to be made, that they need to modernize their society. But collectively, they are afraid to come out and say it. They will need some strong leadership at the national level to provoke the social/cultural changes that are needed, and Karzai is not that leader.


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## The Bread Guy (29 Mar 2012)

Jungle said:
			
		

> I read a lot of comments here that seem to come from people who look at Afg with "6-month goggles".


I'll take that one step further, and suggest some of the decision makers have likely been doing the same thing.


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## GAP (29 Mar 2012)

Jungle said:
			
		

> Changing Afghan society/ culture cannot be done by westerners in a handful of years; it will be done by Afghans and take decades/generations. I don't know if it will be successful, but I think we helped put them on the right path.
> 
> On my last tout there I spent 8 months with the ANA; I found that individually they are aware that many changes need to be made, that they need to modernize their society. But collectively, they are afraid to come out and say it. They will need some strong leadership at the national level to provoke the social/cultural changes that are needed, and Karzai is not that leader.



Paradoxically, the Taliban were.........with the wrong focus. They cajoled and forced the people to change, unfortunately to something the people did not want and that did not fit into much else in the world community.

I have read many articles where the Afghans au pine about the swift justice the Taliban met out, and other comments that they (the people) wanted some aspects of a strong leader. 

What's happening now seems to be a race to get as much as you can, then when NATO leaves, you leave too, with what you have gained. I am sure we will find many of the elite making a new life for themselves in some country once they no longer have the support of NATO in Afghanistan....


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## jollyjacktar (29 Mar 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I read similar things elsewhere.....however I think our Russian friends may never tell us if that was true.
> 
> I can't recall too many Russian diplomats being kidnapped.


Yves, just said they were embassy staff.  He did not say diplomats as such.  Sorry I cannot corroborate it any, but there were lots of kidnappings in that era it's not beyond comprehension that someone would not try their luck with the Bear.


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## Redeye (29 Mar 2012)

GAP said:
			
		

> What's happening now seems to be a race to get as much as you can, then when NATO leaves, you leave too, with what you have gained. I am sure we will find many of the elite making a new life for themselves in some country once they no longer have the support of NATO in Afghanistan....



That's exactly what it looks like will happen. The Shafafiyet (Transparency) Task Force is working on that - trying to seize ill gotten gains, and use those caught as examples to try to coerce others into actually investing in the country, but despite their high-production-value magazines and campaigning, I'm not sure how much success they're having. The amount of foreign aid money flowing right back out of the country to places like Dubai is estimated to be absolutely staggering. A guy from Shafafiyet told us the estimate of how much cash goes through Kabul International Airport every day, I wish I could remember the number. It was staggering.


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## FoverF (29 Mar 2012)

A public humiliating defeat was the inevitable outcome of western military intervention in Afghanistan from day 1... regardless of the actual outcome on the ground. 

There was never any kind of conceivable outcome that the media and liberal university types would label as a 'victory'. And like it or not, these groups shape the opinions of the western world. If Afghanistan became a box-standard western liberal democracy, with universal rule of law and equal rights for all, they would claim a humiliating defeat for the west because someone in parliament got their nephew a job in the Mazar-e-sharif zoning commission. And those claims would stick. 

It was a no-win situation from the get-go. 

The *realistic* absolute best-case scenario is to have Afghanistan become a reasonably stable autocracy ala it's neighbors in Pakistan and Iran. I would be thrilled, and the world would be a much better place if that happened. The people of Afghanistan would be miles ahead of where they were in 2001, and we will have accomplished everything that we as a nation set out to do. 

But can you see the western media and academia singing the praises of western military intervention if they were successful in creating another semi-hostile dictatorship in the region? 

Look at what happened in Iraq to illuminate my point. The Americans accomplished all of their goals. Hussein is dead. The oil is flowing. There is no threat of the Iraqi government supplying NBCR weapons to anyone in the near or medium term. The Americans have a new client state, and are maintaining pressure on Iran. It took longer, and cost more casualties, than expected, but they accomplished essentially everything they set out to do. 

Now, ask the average Joe on the street in any nation in the world, and the consensus opinion will be that America suffered a humiliating defeat in Iraq.

Consensus opinion doesn't always make it a fact, but it does shape how world events unfold. You can win the big fight, but the judges may see it differently, and give the belt to the other guy. He then goes on to defend that belt, while you wait next to the phone, and whether you won the fight or not doesn't matter any more at that point. 

I'd say the humiliating defeat is inevitable at this time, at least in terms of public opinion and perception. Whether that's what actually happens on the ground, we have yet to see, but I think it will be years before we can say with any confidence.


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## Redeye (29 Mar 2012)

FoverF said:
			
		

> Look at what happened in Iraq to illuminate my point. The Americans accomplished all of their goals. Hussein is dead. The oil is flowing. There is no threat of the Iraqi government supplying NBCR weapons to anyone in the near or medium term. The Americans have a new client state, and are maintaining pressure on Iran. It took longer, and cost more casualties, than expected, but they accomplished essentially everything they set out to do.
> we have yet to see, but I think it will be years before we can say with any confidence.



Iraq's "client state" status will take a long time to ever pay off the cost of the war in the first place, and the whole war arguably made Iran stronger and more influential by inflaming sectarian tension.

Otherwise, though, I think you're somewhat right. No matter what happens, it will likely be viewed as "failure", not because it really was, but because the outcome will be compared to the expectations of Joe Sixpack, and there's no way that it will appear that we've met what was expected from the public's POV. But I don't think we ever could. We could hopefully create a somewhat stable country, with a veneer of democracy, but outside of Kabul it would have to retain most of the trapping of tradition governance in order to be stable. That said, it could well tamp insurgency down just enough to stay a functioning state with ongoing support, and some means of developing an economy that gives people something better to do.


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