# Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense



## ballz

Good day all,

I wanted to find a way to pass on everything I had surmised over the last 2 years. The LAV Captain is a position that is shrouded in a bit of mystery. It's treated as an Ops Capt in garrison (a good tangent is why this is wrong, in my opinion) and how to utilize him/her in the field outside of a combat team's advance-to-contact is a little up in the air.

For your reading pleasure, and any and all commentary / feedback / discussion generated from this is very much appreciated. I am particularly interested here what some of the tankers have to say.

I submitted the article to the Inf Corps Newsletter in 3 parts due to its length. I'm also posting it in 3 parts due to the topics covered, to keep the threads organized.


----------



## Infanteer

A few notes on defence.

1.  On reserves, check Land Ops at 7-58 to 7-60.  The reserve preserves a commander's freedom of action through initial uncommitment.  That doesn't mean you do not assign it potential tasks - to put it another way, if you have an element that is outside of your main and supporting efforts and is given a series of "Be prepared to" tasks, then you've constituted a reserve.  Conversely, if you put a unit in depth and give it a "block" task, then it isn't really a reserve, as by executing his task to block, that subordinate isn't really giving you freedom of action.

In fact, counter-moves (reinforcement/blocking/counterattack) is the likely probable task of reserves in the defence.  Historically, good defensive schemes put a large proportion of their strength in depth reserves which were tasked with counter-moves.  A good example that I recently ran into was Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli.  His division held a sector in which he placed two of his regiments up, retaining a third in reserve.  As well, he took one of three battalions from each of the frontline regiments into the reserve as well: in total, five of his nine battalions were reserves. 

2.  On reserves.  Sometimes, I don't think we really put thought into what constitutes our reserve - we just designate one to check the box, even if it doesn't make sense.  I'm personally not convinced a platoon needs a reserve.  In many (most?) cases, a company probably doesn't need one either.  What does a company commander have that can preserve his freedom of action?  Can an 8-man section really do much for him?  If the nature of the task and terrain allows a company commander to keep a 1/2 platoon or greater out of the battle, then I think he has something workable.  I think its entirely suitable for a battalion commander to carve off parts of his companies to form a central reserve, and for the company commanders to have none.

3.  My personal belief is that the Canadian Army doesn't "do" defensive exercises too well as it isn't in our "genetic structure." Over the last 100 years, we spent the First World War attacking Germans on the Western Front, spent the Second World War attacking Germans in Italy and NW Europe, maintained a war of patrols with an unmechanized foe in Korea, and spent the Cold War in Europe preparing to fight a form of mobile defence.  From my reading on 4 CMBG, we likely achieved a degree of sophistication in mechanized defence there, but that's about state of the art for us.  

Our theory and our operational approach pales into anything you could find in reading about the Gustav, Gothic, or Siegfried Lines.  Look at the typical battalion defensive exercise.  The battalion goes out, puts three companies on line, and then digs a fairly linear position.  Brigade defensive schemes I've observed on exercises aren't much more sophisticated.  The general concept is that we wait (and hope) the enemy bangs into our obstacles and gets destroyed by our fires while trying to breach them...how is it we always breach enemy obstacles but they really get hung up on ours?  There is no depth, no understanding of the immediate and deliberate counterattack, and no designation of battlespace into zones/sectors to fight a phased battle.  Find an officer who can put a brigade in an elastic defence.

Anyone who wants to really understand the defence needs to read Lossberg's Memoirs (now in English!).  He essentially invented the modern system of defence in depth that is still predominant today - he was the guy who patched things up in Arras after the Canadian Corps blew a hole open at Vimy.


----------



## Old Sweat

Interesting points, Infanteer.

Having developed as a junior officer in an environment that practiced defensive operations in nuclear warfare, I was reared in the world according to CAMT 1-8. It was pretty much big hand, little map, so I was fascinated by a brigade study group on the employment of the reserve conducted by Brigadier Norman Wilson-Smith, the commander 3 CIBG in Gagetown. Don't ask me to recite it; it was more than half a century ago. However it was pretty close to what Infanteer posted, at least in principle. Modify to add: What impressed me most was the lack of resources for reserve tasks, especially in forward units and formations. 

Historically Canadian defensive doctrine in both world wars, Korea and, for whatever it is worth, Afghanistan seems to have been to get on a piece of ground, prepare an artillery defensive fire plan and stack the enemy like cordwood by hitting them with tons of HE as they try to push us off. The nuclear era was a break from this, and the battle was built around the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, but good, steady infantry stuff was emphasized. However we were supposed to be able to prepare a defensive position in response to a developing threat in a matter of hours, not days. Fortunately we never had to see if it worked.


----------



## ballz

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A few notes on defence.
> 
> 1.  On reserves, check Land Ops at 7-58 to 7-60.  The reserve preserves a commander's freedom of action through initial uncommitment.  That doesn't mean you do not assign it potential tasks - to put it another way, if you have an element that is outside of your main and supporting efforts and is given a series of "Be prepared to" tasks, then you've constituted a reserve.  Conversely, if you put a unit in depth and give it a "block" task, then it isn't really a reserve, as by executing his task to block, that subordinate isn't really giving you freedom of action.
> 
> In fact, counter-moves (reinforcement/blocking/counterattack) is the likely probable task of reserves in the defence.  Historically, good defensive schemes put a large proportion of their strength in depth reserves which were tasked with counter-moves.  A good example that I recently ran into was Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli.  His division held a sector in which he placed two of his regiments up, retaining a third in reserve.  As well, he took one of three battalions from each of the frontline regiments into the reserve as well: in total, five of his nine battalions were reserves.



I like the idea of a very robust counter-moves plan / force in the defensive... the way I conceptualize it, the dug-in positions are really only obstacles, albeit live ones. The counter moves should ultimately destroy the enemy, not a last stand of the poor guys in the trench. This seems lost on nearly everyone around me, who thinks counter-moves are just there to "sweep through and resume the advance" after the enemy is attrited to 50% by the dismounted force.

However, in saying that, if our main effort is in our counter-moves... then does that not by definition mean it's not the reserve? Maybe I'm worried too much about semantics on this point. The mixing up of lingo for reserves was a point of contention for other reasons on this exercise for a whole host of other reasons. The mixing up of lingo with direct fire plan / counter-moves / counterattack was more prominent and pretty amateur, in my opinion.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  On reserves 2.  Sometimes, I don't think we really put thought into what constitutes our reserve - we just designate one to check the box, even if it doesn't make sense.  I'm personally not convinced a platoon needs a reserve.  In many (most?) cases, a company probably doesn't need one either.  What does a company commander have that can preserve his freedom of action?  Can an 8-man section really do much for him?  If the nature of the task and terrain allows a company commander to keep a 1/2 platoon or greater out of the battle, then I think he has something workable.  I think its entirely suitable for a battalion commander to carve off parts of his companies to form a central reserve, and for the company commanders to have none.



Agreed.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Our theory and our operational approach pales into anything you could find in reading about the Gustav, Gothic, or Siegfried Lines.  Look at the typical battalion defensive exercise.  The battalion goes out, puts three companies on line, and then digs a fairly linear position.  Brigade defensive schemes I've observed on exercises aren't much more sophisticated.  The general concept is that we wait (and hope) the enemy bangs into our obstacles and gets destroyed by our fires while trying to breach them...how is it we always breach enemy obstacles but they really get hung up on ours?  There is no depth, no understanding of the immediate and deliberate counterattack, and no designation of battlespace into zones/sectors to fight a phased battle.



Yes, it's amazing how well your plans work when you write your own MEL.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Find an officer who can put a brigade in an elastic defence.



Never even heard of it to be honest...



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Anyone who wants to really understand the defence needs to read Lossberg's Memoirs (now in English!).  He essentially invented the modern system of defence in depth that is still predominant today - he was the guy who patched things up in Arras after the Canadian Corps blew a hole open at Vimy.



Look forward to picking that up and I have a few others in mind to share it with.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Considering the State of our army, would not German WWII defensive tactics be a worthwhile study area, they were operating with threadbare resources and overwhelming opposing forces. We would hopefully have the benefit of air superiority and a non insane leadership.


----------



## Infanteer

Yes.  The Western Front of WWI was a bit of an anomaly as both sides had deep enough pools of formations that the could squeeze many units in depth onto small frontages.

Italy in 1943-45 presents a different case.  Here, the Germans were fighting a defensive campaign on a secondary (and by 1944, a tertiary) front.  Add to that the fact that there manpower pool was already starting to dry up, and you see a lot of creative "defence on the cheap" in that campaign.  Senger, who commanded the German Corps that defended at Cassino, states in his memoirs that his battalions were severely below strength at the time, and he was covering 30+ km of frontage with about 3,600 infantrymen from his three infantry divisions (about 1,200 per division, or 200 per battalion).  An interesting tactical problem, and not one unfamiliar to what we could find ourselves in today.


----------



## Haligonian

ballz said:
			
		

> I like the idea of a very robust counter-moves plan / force in the defensive... the way I conceptualize it, the dug-in positions are really only obstacles, albeit live ones. The counter moves should ultimately destroy the enemy, not a last stand of the poor guys in the trench. This seems lost on nearly everyone around me, who thinks counter-moves are just there to "sweep through and resume the advance" after the enemy is attrited to 50% by the dismounted force.
> 
> However, in saying that, if our main effort is in our counter-moves... then does that not by definition mean it's not the reserve? Maybe I'm worried too much about semantics on this point. The mixing up of lingo for reserves was a point of contention for other reasons on this exercise for a whole host of other reasons. The mixing up of lingo with direct fire plan / counter-moves / counterattack was more prominent and pretty amateur, in my opinion.



Another good book on this that will concur with your perspective is Attack:  A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics.  https://www.amazon.com/Attack-Blitzkrieg-Tactics-F-Miksche/dp/1436703174  Despite it's name it's actually a study on how to defeat a combined arms offensive.  There are a couple papers out there available on Google as well on Kursk that you might find helpful.

The idea proposed in the book is that the defence should be oriented on destroying the enemy through the use of c-atk at all levels.  Units would create defended localities with all around defense on terrain difficult for mechanized forces.  These would be arrayed in depth and en elements would be allowed to penetrate between them.  Mobile forces would then c-atk from these localities and between them.  Some enemy forces will undoubtedly get through, however, their follow on forces (lighter mechanized or inf formations) and their sustainment will have a very hard time getting through and will need to commit costly and time consuming clearance ops or attempt to infiltrate at which time c-atks could be launched.  Jim Storr hints at an idea like this in his book discussing a bn in the defence organization that would see only a third of a unit committed to stationary defence while the remainder were ready to c-atk.

As for the reserve being the main effort, I think that is fine.  The main effort should be that unit/activity which will achieve the mission.  They are on the decisive action.  If your reserve is to BPT to c-atk (in the case of a destruction task) or block (in the case of the block) task, then they are being decisive.  What makes them the reserve is the fact they aren't committed.  They're prepared to be, but they aren't yet.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Wasn't that the idea behind the "boxes" in North Africa? As I recall they did not do as well as hoped.


----------



## George Wallace

.....or the Maginot Line?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  On reserves 2.  Sometimes, I don't think we really put thought into what constitutes our reserve - we just designate one to check the box, even if it doesn't make sense.  I'm personally not convinced a platoon needs a reserve.  In many (most?) cases, a company probably doesn't need one either.  What does a company commander have that can preserve his freedom of action?  Can an 8-man section really do much for him?  If the nature of the task and terrain allows a company commander to keep a 1/2 platoon or greater out of the battle, then I think he has something workable.  I think its entirely suitable for a battalion commander to carve off parts of his companies to form a central reserve, and for the company commanders to have none.



'Reserves' are often favoured on TEWTs by those Officers at the BGp level who think they have a future at the Corps level


----------



## ballz

George Wallace said:
			
		

> .....or the Maginot Line?



I'm not sure I see how the example is relevant considering they never actually had any countermoves mobilized and ready to complete any CM tasks...



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Wasn't that the idea behind the "boxes" in North Africa? As I recall they did not do as well as hoped.



I'll admit I haven't studied history enough, but I'm interested to hear / read about this. I'm not exactly sure what you are referring to?


On that note, it's probably important to point out that no strategy / tactic / plan will work 100% of the time. Even the soundest tactics, and most well laid plans, the most prepared positions, and executed on point... can really only increase the odds in our favour, but never to the point of guaranteed success. Any tactic can lose to ingenuity, bold/aggressive manoeuvres, weather, terrain, etc... or just sheer dumb luck.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ballz said:
			
		

> I'm not sure I see how the example is relevant considering they never actually had any countermoves mobilized and ready to complete any CM tasks...
> 
> I'll admit I haven't studied history enough, but I'm interested to hear / read about this. I'm not exactly sure what you are referring to?
> 
> 
> On that note, it's probably important to point out that no strategy / tactic / plan will work 100% of the time. Even the soundest tactics, and most well laid plans, the most prepared positions, and executed on point... can really only increase the odds in our favour, but never to the point of guaranteed success. Any tactic can lose to ingenuity, bold/aggressive manoeuvres, weather, terrain, etc... or just sheer dumb luck.



Bir Hachim... a well deserved BZ pour La Legion Etranger!

http://www.desertrats.org.uk/battles1942.htm


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Coming in late - missed this in Dec! 

Does a BG that has a "countermoves force" in fact, have a reserve by doing so? We can tie ourselves in knots with terminology, but it can be a useful thought exercise.

Both Land Ops 2008 and BG in Ops 2012 offer that the defence is a single battle conducted in two stages: covering force battle and main defence battle including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and counterattacking). The countermoves is indeed part of the main defensive battle. It used to be its own stage. 

Land Ops suggests that the main functions of reserves in the defence are to reinforce, block, counterattack, replace other units, and protect flanks and rear areas. It also offers that reserves in the defence are commonly used for counter-moves (reinforcement, blocking and counterattack) and spoiling attacks.

BG in Ops talks about the countermoves plan in some more detail, adding that the BG depth is part of it. Of interest, it adds that reinforcing and blocking are conducted with all or part of uncommitted, depth or reserve elements. It also recommends that once committed, the reserve becomes the decisive action. 

So what does all this mean? 

While we think of tanks as the countermoves force we should also consider infantry, sappers and mobile AT systems as possible parts of the countermoves force for the blocking and reinforcing tasks. Tanks can certainly block and reinforce, but they do counterattacking really well. Splitting the tanks up and tying them to defended localities can work, but it can also lead to defeat in detail in piecemeal fashion. 

If a BG has two companies up , one in depth and a tank squadron as the countermoves then it has a powerful reserve for some situations, but it might not be appropriate for all possible reserve tasks. If the BG plan here hinges on the "countermoves" doing a dramatic mission task verb to the enemy main body then perhaps you need a second reserve, or at least have a scalable reserve to deal with those annoying things that the enemy does when he forgets the script. You might be doctrinally correct to have that single reserve, but you are taking a risk and the composition of your reserve is actually limiting your own freedom of action if the enemy does something not in accordance with the DST.  The enemy might just do something unfair with the intention of drawing out the reserve, so its nice to have options. You could, of course, reallocate forces from the other sub-units on the fly to keep the reserve intact for the decisive moment. Its easier said that done and virtually impossible once troops are in contact. 

Maybe you have two companies up, a company in reserve _and_ a tank squadron in reserve? One reserve, the tank squadron, is earmarked with the task to destroy the XXX MRR in KZ PANTERA (but you are not sure in which exact area since the enemy has something to say). You call those guys "the countermoves" to let everybody know that while they are not "committed" you definitely have something in mind. The other subunit in reserve is just told to be in reserve. Perhaps the infantry company and tank squadron both come into action from reserve at the same time and both in classic countermoves roles? The infantry from reserve in a countermove block role "blocks/fixes/contains" the now identified enemy while the tank squadron destroys with a counterattack role? Its pretty much how you conduct a mobile defence. 

You can, of course, take that too far. If you have too much in reserve then perhaps your defence turns into a meeting engagement. Doctrine offers that the size and composition of the reserve will vary with what you know about the enemy and the level of uncertainty. Its why we do estimates and try to avoid cookie-cutter solutions (even if they can work a lot of the time). 

Cheers


----------



## Haligonian

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Coming in late - missed this in Dec!
> 
> Does a BG that has a "countermoves force" in fact, have a reserve by doing so? We can tie ourselves in knots with terminology, but it can be a useful thought exercise.
> 
> Both Land Ops 2008 and BG in Ops 2012 offer that the defence is a single battle conducted in two stages: covering force battle and main defence battle including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and counterattacking). The countermoves is indeed part of the main defensive battle. It used to be its own stage.
> 
> Land Ops suggests that the main functions of reserves in the defence are to reinforce, block, counterattack, replace other units, and protect flanks and rear areas. It also offers that reserves in the defence are commonly used for counter-moves (reinforcement, blocking and counterattack) and spoiling attacks.
> 
> BG in Ops talks about the countermoves plan in some more detail, adding that the BG depth is part of it. Of interest, it adds that reinforcing and blocking are conducted with all or part of uncommitted, depth or reserve elements. It also recommends that once committed, the reserve becomes the decisive action.
> 
> So what does all this mean?
> 
> While we think of tanks as the countermoves force we should also consider infantry, sappers and mobile AT systems as possible parts of the countermoves force for the blocking and reinforcing tasks. Tanks can certainly block and reinforce, but they do counterattacking really well. Splitting the tanks up and tying them to defended localities can work, but it can also lead to defeat in detail in piecemeal fashion.
> 
> If a BG has two companies up , one in depth and a tank squadron as the countermoves then it has a powerful reserve for some situations, but it might not be appropriate for all possible reserve tasks. If the BG plan here hinges on the "countermoves" doing a dramatic mission task verb to the enemy main body then perhaps you need a second reserve, or at least have a scalable reserve to deal with those annoying things that the enemy does when he forgets the script. You might be doctrinally correct to have that single reserve, but you are taking a risk and the composition of your reserve is actually limiting your own freedom of action if the enemy does something not in accordance with the DST.  The enemy might just do something unfair with the intention of drawing out the reserve, so its nice to have options. You could, of course, reallocate forces from the other sub-units on the fly to keep the reserve intact for the decisive moment. Its easier said that done and virtually impossible once troops are in contact.
> 
> Maybe you have two companies up, a company in reserve _and_ a tank squadron in reserve? One reserve, the tank squadron, is earmarked with the task to destroy the XXX MRR in KZ PANTERA (but you are not sure in which exact area since the enemy has something to say). You call those guys "the countermoves" to let everybody know that while they are not "committed" you definitely have something in mind. The other subunit in reserve is just told to be in reserve. Perhaps the infantry company and tank squadron both come into action from reserve at the same time and both in classic countermoves roles? The infantry from reserve in a countermove block role "blocks/fixes/contains" the now identified enemy while the tank squadron destroys with a counterattack role? Its pretty much how you conduct a mobile defence.
> 
> You can, of course, take that too far. If you have too much in reserve then perhaps your defence turns into a meeting engagement. Doctrine offers that the size and composition of the reserve will vary with what you know about the enemy and the level of uncertainty. Its why we do estimates and try to avoid cookie-cutter solutions (even if they can work a lot of the time).
> 
> Cheers



I think this also raises the question of depth elements and how they are employed.  As you noted Land Ops states that depth has a c-moves role.  They should be first employed in the block, and reinforcing tasks and perhaps even c-atking depending on the en you face.  I've seen other situations where the depth is employed takes the primary role in the BG patrolling plan on behalf of the coy.  The other perspective is that the depth fights from a BP similar to forward platoons/coys/bns in the expectation that the enemy will penetrate through or around forward BPs.  This could even be part of a deliberate plan to allow penetration to a certain area where the en will be even more vulnerable to c-atk and destruction.  One book I read described it as a one way valve.  The en would be allowed to penetrate, at a cost, but he wouldn't be able to withdraw and his sustainment (and potentially follow on infantry) wouldn't be able to follow.  When the time was right the c-atk would be launched.

Assuming you're following the perspective that your depth is primarily tasked with blocking and reinforcing, and patrolling, do they prepare a BP or are they in a centralized hide somewhere?

Speaking of tying ourselves in knots with terminology.  Can the reserve be the main effort?  The reserve can obviously become the main effort once committed, just as any other sub unit can, but can it be the main effort from the outset.  We can get around this by doing as you suggest by having a reserve and a designated c-movs force which is the main effort.


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> The idea proposed in the book is that the defence should be oriented on destroying the enemy through the use of c-atk at all levels.  Units would create defended localities with all around defense on terrain difficult for mechanized forces.



Milch is simply giving a description of the system Lossberg "created" and the General Staff codified in the First World War.  Wynne, a British official historian, figured it out after the war and his book should be on every professional's shelf.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Bir Hachim... a well deserved BZ pour La Legion Etranger!
> 
> http://www.desertrats.org.uk/battles1942.htm



"Jock Columns" worked differently.  They broke apart forces and attempted to force German formations around hard points into areas where they could be hit by fires.  The concept failed to concentrate a mobile counterattack, the key element to the defence in depth.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Just reading about the Operations to reach and cross the Rhine. The allies manged to confuse the Germans as to what was the main thrusts and the Germans hesitated to use their reserves allowing the allies to achieve some of their goals with minimal opposition. What was interesting is how one German commander, fed in his reserve piecemeal, minimizing their effect and resulting in no benefit and no reserve in the end. Also apparent is that the Germans were forced to take units out of the indepth defenses, to bolster the areas being attacked, leaving them unable to respond to another thrust. A situation I think we would find ourselves in.

I think Canada would do well to conduct an defense exercise against a large American force with little idea how the attacks will go. Have the US armour do a number of probing attacks, and let them decide from their recce where to attack. The results will be painful and humbling, but might save lives later.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> Just reading about the Operations to reach and cross the Rhine. The allies manged to confuse the Germans as to what was the main thrusts and the Germans hesitated to use their reserves allowing the allies to achieve some of their goals with minimal opposition. What was interesting is how one German commander, fed in his reserve piecemeal, minimizing their effect and resulting in no benefit and no reserve in the end. Also apparent is that the Germans were forced to take units out of the indepth defenses, to bolster the areas being attacked, leaving them unable to respond to another thrust. A situation I think we would find ourselves in.
> 
> I think Canada would do well to conduct an defense exercise against a large American force with little idea how the attacks will go. Have the US armour do a number of probing attacks, and let them decide from their recce where to attack. The results will be painful and humbling, but might save lives later.



An endorsement of Eisenhower's much criticized (by Monty and Patton) broad front strategy.


----------



## Infanteer

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Does a BG that has a "countermoves force" in fact, have a reserve by doing so? We can tie ourselves in knots with terminology, but it can be a useful thought exercise.





			
				Haligonian said:
			
		

> I think this also raises the question of depth elements and how they are employed.



Words have meaning, and I think clarity is important.

A reserve is an uncommitted force that allows the commander to retain some freedom of action.  A commander without a reserve is limited to coordinating the fights of his/her subordinates, but has little to actually influence them.

Depth, as I conceive it, is rearward position that allows for some sort of mutual support of forward positions or elements.  The element in depth, in being able to provide mutual support, is somewhat vulnerable to enemy actions. A depth position may be suitable for a reserve, but the commander risks having his reserve unexpectedly committed through enemy actions (to include fires).  A key tenet of the defence in depth is that formation reserves are out of the range of enemy artillery, so as to prevent interference with the commitment of the reserve.  With modern rocket artillery systems featuring greatly extended range, this is harder to do in the modern battlefield, but there are still ways to achieve this.



> Speaking of tying ourselves in knots with terminology.  Can the reserve be the main effort?  The reserve can obviously become the main effort once committed, just as any other sub unit can, but can it be the main effort from the outset.  We can get around this by doing as you suggest by having a reserve and a designated c-movs force which is the main effort.



I would say no.  A properly constituted reserve probably isn't siting on the point of the main effort.  If it was, I'd question the defensive layout.  Example:

The Brigade is defending the crossing site, and for various reasons has to defend forward (there are three ways to defend a crossing site - forward, on, or behind).  The main effort is on the hills that overlooking the bridgehead area called the "O1 line" in some doctrine, the line of features from which a position can be hit with direct fire.  The Brigade Commander states that the main effort is on the ABC hill features, and that the 1st Battalion is on his main effort.  He has an Armour heavy Combat Team maintained as his reserve.  As the battle progresses, the mission has not changed, but the 1st Battalion takes a beating.  The reserve is committed to the ABC hill features to reinforce.  The sound choice is for the reserve to now fall under the 1st Battalion Commander (as the man on the spot).  While the reserve element is now on the point of main effort, neither the unit or its initial location were part of that main effort.

...or another version, the 1st Battalion's defence at the ABC hill features goes well, and the enemy Division's attack culminates.  The Brigade Commander decides to commit his reserve to counterattack and regain the initiative.  The counterattack goes in at Junction XYZ to the east of the hill features.  The Brigade Commander shifts his main effort to the Armoured Combat Team on Junction XYZ, so everyone in the Brigade knows where support needs to go.  At this point, I'd argue that the Armoured Combat Team is no longer a reserve, as it has been committed.  The Brigade Commander reforms his reserve out of two companies of the 2nd Battalion, which had been providing depth from the near side of the crossing site.

To wit, if the reserve element approaches the geographic point of main effort and assumes the role, it no longer has reserve status.


----------



## Ostrozac

Colin P said:
			
		

> I think Canada would do well to conduct an defense exercise against a large American force with little idea how the attacks will go. Have the US armour do a number of probing attacks, and let them decide from their recce where to attack. The results will be painful and humbling, but might save lives later.



A Canadian Brigade with minimal antitank weapons, no tactical air defence, no mortars, and towed artillery against a US Armored Brigade Combat Team? The Canadian brigade would be fixed in place and cut to pieces faster than you can say Republican Guard.

You can list a lot of the lessons of modern mechanized warfare without having an expensive exercise. But those lessons aren't popular, because they imply that we need to buy more modern equipment, spend money to train with it, and that previous decisions to divist entire categories of kit were serious errors.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As I recall, it was one of those expensive exercise in Germany where an entire infantry battalion was deemed annihilated, by attempting to keep up and attack objectives using 3/4 trucks to move sections in. At which point the government bought M113 finally. An exceedingly embarrassing result showing what the potentiel costs will be of a major conflict with a peer/near peer army might be enough to scare and embarrass the government.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> A Canadian Brigade with minimal antitank weapons, no tactical air defence, no mortars, and towed artillery against a US Armored Brigade Combat Team? The Canadian brigade would be fixed in place and cut to pieces faster than you can say Republican Guard.
> 
> You can list a lot of the lessons of modern mechanized warfare without having an expensive exercise. But those lessons aren't popular, because they imply that we need to buy more modern equipment, spend money to train with it, and that previous decisions to divist entire categories of kit were serious errors.



You could make it even more interesting and make it a National Guard Armored Brigade Combat Team like this one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30th_Armored_Brigade_Combat_Team#Current_organization

I'm not entirely sure but I think that this brigade alone probably have as many tanks as the entire Canadian Army. They certainly have more Infantry Fighting Vehicles, self propelled howitzers, and self propelled 120 mm mortars.







 ;D


----------



## Infanteer

That's an old organization of an ABCT.  The updated version has even more tanks:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team#/media/File:ABCT.png

There are 6 companies of tanks in each ABCT, and the US Army has 10 Active Duty and 5 NG ABCTs.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's an old organization of an ABCT.  The updated version has even more tanks:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team#/media/File:ABCT.png
> 
> There are 6 companies of tanks in each ABCT, and the US Army has 10 Active Duty and 5 NG ABCTs.



You're right. The diagram is an older one but I'm not sure that all NG ABCTs have gone to the full establishment yet (if ever - incidentally I note the diagram mentions 4 company combined arms battalions but the text discusses 3 coys) For example the 30th ABCT in North Carolina only has two manouvre battalions with a total of four tank and four Bradly companies while the 155th in Mississippi and the 1st ABCT 34 ID in Minnesota each has two mechanized combined arms bns with a total of 4 tank and 4 Bradley companies and a straight infantry bn (I think the Inf bns are not mechanized). The 116th Cavalry BCT from the Idaho/Oregon/Montana NGs has two Cavalry combined arms battalions (of two tank and two Bradley companies each). The 81st ABCT in Washington has become a Stryker brigade.

My quick review of Active Army ABCTs seems to show 3 bns of 2 + 2 Coys each.

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

ballz said:
			
		

> Good day all,
> 
> I wanted to find a way to pass on everything I had surmised over the last 2 years. The LAV Captain is a position that is shrouded in a bit of mystery. It's treated as an Ops Capt in garrison (a good tangent is why this is wrong, in my opinion) and how to utilize him/her in the field outside of a combat team's advance-to-contact is a little up in the air.
> 
> For your reading pleasure, and any and all commentary / feedback / discussion generated from this is very much appreciated. I am particularly interested here what some of the tankers have to say.
> 
> I submitted the article to the Inf Corps Newsletter in 3 parts due to its length. I'm also posting it in 3 parts due to the topics covered, to keep the threads organized.



I'm still astonished that our doctrine has gigantic 'non-Marder/BMP type' APCs rolling up onto the objective before the troops dismount, especially given the number of RPGs in even 'third world' armies.


----------



## ballz

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I'm still astonished that our doctrine has gigantic 'non-Marder/BMP type' APCs rolling up onto the objective before the troops dismount, especially given the number of RPGs in even 'third world' armies.



Dogma is.. dogmatic.

At the same time I posted these articles, I posted the one by Maj Cole Petersen addressing exactly that, so that specific discussion was being had here if you are interested.. https://army.ca/forums/threads/127041.0.html


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> A Canadian Brigade with minimal antitank weapons, no tactical air defence, no mortars, and towed artillery against a US Armored Brigade Combat Team? The Canadian brigade would be fixed in place and cut to pieces faster than you can say Republican Guard.
> 
> You can list a lot of the lessons of modern mechanized warfare without having an expensive exercise. But those lessons aren't popular, because they imply that we need to buy more modern equipment, spend money to train with it, and that previous decisions to divist entire categories of kit were serious errors.



These threads have been very interesting to read if only to reinforce my view that the Canadian Army of 2018 is much like the British Army of 1890, very good at defeating enemies armed with "sharpened bits of fruit and sticks" but not much else.

As well, we seem to have used latest engagements/wars as a form of confirmation bias.


----------



## Ostrozac

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> These threads have been very interesting to read if only to reinforce my view that the Canadian Army of 2018 is much like the British Army of 1890, very good at defeating enemies armed with "sharpened bits of fruit and sticks" but not much else.
> 
> As well, we seem to have used latest engagements/wars as a form of confirmation bias.



I agree. If we intended to build a pure Counter-Insurgency army optimized for fighting poorly equipped people over extended campaigns in the world's hinterlands, we'd actually be pretty well equipped. We have leadership with Afghanistan experience, logistics and C4I systems optimized for FOBs and firebases, and plenty of overmatch for fighting an enemy using 1960's technology. In that kind of a war, self-propelled artillery, surface to air missiles, and modern anti tank missiles would indeed be expensive overkill. I think that a Canadian brigade would be comfortable conducting an operation similar to the ongoing French operation in Mali.

But instead, we have declared a national interest in conventional operations in Europe on the forward edge of NATO facing Russia. And for that task we are shockingly ill-equipped.


----------



## Kirkhill

You might want to leave the BMPs out of it.  Even Soviet dogma didn't call for "dismount on the objective".   IIRC the expectation was that we would be huddled under our SKOP kits enjoying the attentions of the Div Arty Group and every other gun and rocket in range while the Tanks and BMPs advanced on our positions behind a screen of dismounted infantry.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I agree. If we intended to build a pure Counter-Insurgency army optimized for fighting poorly equipped people over extended campaigns in the world's hinterlands, we'd actually be pretty well equipped. We have leadership with Afghanistan experience, logistics and C4I systems optimized for FOBs and firebases, and plenty of overmatch for fighting an enemy using 1960's technology. In that kind of a war, self-propelled artillery, surface to air missiles, and modern anti tank missiles would indeed be expensive overkill. I think that a Canadian brigade would be comfortable conducting an operation similar to the ongoing French operation in Mali.
> 
> But instead, we have declared a national interest in conventional operations in Europe on the forward edge of NATO facing Russia. And for that task we are shockingly ill-equipped.



You and I are pretty much of the same mind.  Look at what we are making huge investments in:  SOF, C4ISR, Int Collection Capability.  Our kit: TAPV, LAV 6.0, towed howitzers, Utility Helicopters, etc.  All great for chasing down Brigands and Bandits, not so great for fighting Armoured Divisions or even other Mechanized Infantry Divisions.

I would even say calling our Brigades Mechanized could almost be considered a stretch.

We've got a great little colonial army without any colonies to fight wars in.


----------



## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Milch is simply giving a description of the system Lossberg "created" and the General Staff codified in the First World War.  Wynne, a British official historian, figured it out after the war and his book should be on every professional's shelf.



Perhaps unsurprisingly I had a hard time finding that for a reasonable price on Amazon.de!  I got it on Amazon.ca and it'll be waiting for me on HLTA.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Words have meaning, and I think clarity is important.
> 
> A reserve is an uncommitted force that allows the commander to retain some freedom of action.  A commander without a reserve is limited to coordinating the fights of his/her subordinates, but has little to actually influence them.
> 
> Depth, as I conceive it, is rearward position that allows for some sort of mutual support of forward positions or elements.  The element in depth, in being able to provide mutual support, is somewhat vulnerable to enemy actions. A depth position may be suitable for a reserve, but the commander risks having his reserve unexpectedly committed through enemy actions (to include fires).  A key tenet of the defence in depth is that formation reserves are out of the range of enemy artillery, so as to prevent interference with the commitment of the reserve.  With modern rocket artillery systems featuring greatly extended range, this is harder to do in the modern battlefield, but there are still ways to achieve this.



This makes sense to me as well and how I've envisioned it for most of my time.  Interestingly, it doesn't exactly jive with BG in Ops.  BG in Ops puts a lot of emphasis on depth elements conducting blocking and reinforcing tasks.  A depth element who is able to provide mutual support to forward posns is significantly less likely to be well positioned to reinforce or block a penetration that isn't along its currently sited BP.  

As I think this through it seems to me that block is the actual task of a depth BP and they need to be sited along the avenue approach that the enemy is expected to take after having bypassed or penetrated lead BPs.  The lowest level at which this could happen would be Bn/BG as Coys and platoons are too small and their depth should be focussed on providing mutual sp to forward posns.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I would say no.  A properly constituted reserve probably isn't siting on the point of the main effort.  If it was, I'd question the defensive layout.  Example:
> 
> The Brigade is defending the crossing site, and for various reasons has to defend forward (there are three ways to defend a crossing site - forward, on, or behind).  The main effort is on the hills that overlooking the bridgehead area called the "O1 line" in some doctrine, the line of features from which a position can be hit with direct fire.  The Brigade Commander states that the main effort is on the ABC hill features, and that the 1st Battalion is on his main effort.  He has an Armour heavy Combat Team maintained as his reserve.  As the battle progresses, the mission has not changed, but the 1st Battalion takes a beating.  The reserve is committed to the ABC hill features to reinforce.  The sound choice is for the reserve to now fall under the 1st Battalion Commander (as the man on the spot).  While the reserve element is now on the point of main effort, neither the unit or its initial location were part of that main effort.
> 
> ...or another version, the 1st Battalion's defence at the ABC hill features goes well, and the enemy Division's attack culminates.  The Brigade Commander decides to commit his reserve to counterattack and regain the initiative.  The counterattack goes in at Junction XYZ to the east of the hill features.  The Brigade Commander shifts his main effort to the Armoured Combat Team on Junction XYZ, so everyone in the Brigade knows where support needs to go.  At this point, I'd argue that the Armoured Combat Team is no longer a reserve, as it has been committed.  The Brigade Commander reforms his reserve out of two companies of the 2nd Battalion, which had been providing depth from the near side of the crossing site.
> 
> To wit, if the reserve element approaches the geographic point of main effort and assumes the role, it no longer has reserve status.



Agreed.  Seems reasonable.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

It would odd to designate your reserve as the main effort from the outset, but it might become your main effort or be put on your main effort once committed. 

Returning to terminology for a minute, the terms countermoves and reserve can be confusing. I think that we can confuse ourselves from time to time by calling a sub-unit "the countermoves force" or giving it the task of "countermoves." Lets look at a Battle Group executing a Block task with two companies up, one in depth (maybe a company minus) and a tank squadron combat team in reserve (I didn't say it was going to be imaginative...) The CO is indeed treating his tank squadron combat team as a reserve. He might use it to reinforce a threated sub-unit. He might use it block the decisive enemy penetration to meet his mission. His plan, though, does not hinge on any one task. The main effort here is likely the company on what the CO determines to be the VG for the block task. 

Lets consider the same force now has the task of Destroying an enemy brigade in a given KZ ( the CO deduces that he needs to destroy two battalions).  The CO might give three companies Contain or Block tasks to keep the enemy in the KZ perhaps with some BPT Fix or Support by Fire tasks against certain enemy battalions. He then gives his tank squadron the task to Destroy two battalions in KZ PANTERA. He calls them his Countermoves force and his BG SoM calls for the tank squadron to destroy the enemy brigade with a counterattack (perhaps with several options) once it has two battalions contained in the KZ and they are fixed by indirect fire and his TUA platoon. This tank squadron, to me, is not a reserve even when it has not yet been committed because the CO's plan hinges on it executing that Destroy task. Any unforeseen enemy activity will result in the CO having to juggle on the fly, maybe with everything in contact. In this case, I think that the CO needs a reserve in addition to his Countermoves force. Maybe that reserve is the third company, giving more work to the other two but giving the CO some flexibility. Maybe its just a platoon? Maybe its a Sqn of Sappers? I would also offer in this example that the tank squadron is the main effort throughout, or at least it is on the main effort. 

Regarding Bir Hacheim and Jock Columns, at the Battle of Gazala in 1942 the British 8th Army was trying to find a way to cope with superior Axis combined arms forces (even the Italians had better combined arms doctrine and organization at this point). Jock Columns were used by the Motor Companies in the Armoured Divisions, which were different than the infantry divisions. British divisions were not well organized in 1942, with combined arms really happening at Corps level instead of Division or lower. At Gazala the British (with their Commonwealth and French allies) tried to use Boxes and minefields. Each Box had an infantry brigade in them, usually with some artillery. The frontages of the desert war meant that the Boxes did not have mutual support. British armoured divisions were intended to be used to destroy axis forces that would have been fixed by the boxes. The British armour, though was tied to the Boxes but held at higher command - an unhappy compromise.

At Gazala, two of the Boxes did well. The French (in an old fort) on the far south astride a supply route held out for days. Another Box held by a British brigade also astride a supply route almost caused the defeat of Rommel. Rommel's tanks and infantry could crash through the open desert but his supplies needed some routes. British armour counterattacks were late and uncoordinated. This gave Rommel time and space to destroy the stubborn British Box (150th Brigade) and open a supply route. The rest of the British 8th Army were distant spectators in their Boxes. The rout at Gazala led to the the fall of Tobruk and another disaster at Mersa Matruh. Mutual support is not just a laundry list exam item. It actually matters!

Aukinlek at 1st Alamein tried to remedy the defects of the British organization by pushing the artillery down to give British infantry some hitting power (they really had nothing to offer in the Desert at this stage). They held on by the skin of their teeth, but this was also not a happy solution. Tank infantry cooperation was practically non-existant at this stage of the war, and perhaps hit its low point at Ruseiwat Ridge when an entire NZ brigade was captured by fairly light German armoured forces in a counterattack as a British tank brigade lay in harbour nearby.

I guess the point is that strongpoints or boxes can sometimes work if they dominate routes and you actually have a viable countermoves plan. St Vith and Bastogne at the Battle of the Bulge come to mind. Otherwise they can simply be potted plants that can be isolated and dealth with at the leisure of the attacker.


----------



## Infanteer

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Returning to terminology for a minute, the terms countermoves and reserve can be confusing.



Your two examples are illustrative.  If the original plan hinges on it, its probably not a reserve, as the reserve gives you something to deal with a change to the plan!


----------



## ballz

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Your two examples are illustrative.  If the original plan hinges on it, its probably not a reserve, as the reserve gives you something to deal with a change to the plan!



This is exactly what I mean when I say I can't reconcile what is stated in our doctrine with the terminology it uses.

IMO, the countermoves is going to be the most lethal part of the defensive. More importantly, it's going to be absolutely vital to ensure the enemy doesn't just bypass you or your KZ's. Without it, you're just a bunch of people sitting in a hole waiting to die, with no influence into how  the enemy attacks you and no ability to get a step ahead of them and attack them when vulnerable.

Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

ballz said:
			
		

> This is exactly what I mean when I say I can't reconcile what is stated in our doctrine with the terminology it uses.
> 
> IMO, the countermoves is going to be the most lethal part of the defensive. More importantly, it's going to be absolutely vital to ensure the enemy doesn't just bypass you or your KZ's. Without it, you're just a bunch of people sitting in a hole waiting to die, with no influence into how  the enemy attacks you and no ability to get a step ahead of them and attack them when vulnerable.
> 
> Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.



The countermoves might be the most lethal part of the defensive, or it might not. The defence might not even be all that lethal and still be successful. If you are tasked to Block and you are using a true Area Defence you might not even have any tanks attached to you. Maybe all you have is a reserve that could block or reinforce. 

BG in Ops states that there is a covering force battle and then a main defensive battle including countermoves. The countermoves are part of the main defensive battle - they could occur near the start of the MDB (unlikely but possible), the middle or at the conclusion. BG in Ops is not prescriptive on that. You don't tend to conduct your decisive counterattack until the enemy is culminated, though, so its natural to see most countermoves actions towards the end of the MDB.

The covering force battle is defining the enemy, maybe shaping him and shielding the main defence from premature disclosure. It might also be buying time for preparations. The reserve might be used during the covering force battle, but that means something went really sideways for you or the enemy! 

A covering force combat team fighting a delay or guard battle is probably in constant motion, but they are not the countermoves. Now, you might decide to fight your main defensive battle as a mobile defence (or have no choice). Then you will likely have two or three mobile elements fixing the enemy to allow the "countermoves" to strike. 

I don't like being static as a tanker, but don't throw away the area defence as an infantryman. If you are conducting a Block (because the higher scheme is depending on it) and have some good terrain then perhaps its the best bet. A mobile defence against an enemy with superior mobility might be a disaster! A mobile defence can also turn into a meeting engagement.


----------



## Infanteer

ballz said:
			
		

> Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.



As T2B alluded to, you are confusing the covering force fight with the countermoves fight.  A covering force - as a security element - won't seek decision, nor will it force the enemy to culminate (Theoretically, it could, if you had an enemy tripping over its own feet).  Go to 7-109 - 7-110 of Land Ops for the definition of screen, guard, cover as different degrees of a security element.


----------



## ballz

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As T2B alluded to, you are confusing the covering force fight with the countermoves fight.



With all due respect, I'm not. I know the difference between the covering force battle and the countermoves doing their thing within the main defensive stage.

Let me be more clear... BG in Ops states there are 2 stages of the defence... (Page 7- 6)
1) Covering force stage
2) Main defensive stage including the countermoves

Within "Conduct of the main defensive stage," (Page 7-13) it refers to the "countermoves stage," (7-15) and it discusses in a manner that implies that it's the last stage as opposed to occurring congruent to the fight occurring in the static, occupied BPs. It also explicitly states that the primary task of reserves is to CATK along with a whole host of other things I don't agree with (or don't understand at least), but I digress.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The countermoves are part of the main defensive battle - they could occur near the start of the MDB (unlikely but possible), the middle or at the conclusion.



I disagree that it is unlikely you would use countermoves near the start of the MDB. After the covering force crosses the battle handover line, the enemy is still going to be trying to find the path of least resistance, the weak spot, to exploit. If you aren't employing countermoves to preemptively reinforce against or block the enemy based on your sense assets, you're going to be too late. I feel like the countermoves have to be occurring, or at least prepared to occur based on what choices the enemy makes, from beginning to end, completely congruent (and not subsequent) to the fight in the occupied BPs. Hence why it's better described as a supporting plan than as a stage.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> BG in Ops is not prescriptive on that. You don't tend to conduct your decisive counterattack until the enemy is culminated, though, so its natural to see most countermoves actions towards the end of the MDB.



When I read it, it seems pretty prescriptive, albeit it is referring to the formation countermove plan. It describes having depth elements providing blocks/reinforces, committing the entire reserve at once to conduct a big final CATK, etc. I just don't see it as correct to describe the countermoves as a stage like the publication does. We wouldn't describe any of the other supporting plans as a stage, would we? Because they are all happening simultaneously.

I also question if CATKs 1. have to be decisive. and 2. have to be "sweeping through and resuming the offense." If I identify 6 likely FB positions, and 6 likely attack positions, that's 12x CATK tasks I'm going to put on my countermoves matrix. I may repel numerous attempts at attacks simply by deploying a small force to CATK by fire when and where the EN is particularly vulnerable and where it will disrupt him the most. This is an offensive mindset, using offensive action in the defensive. In this case, the number of countermoves occurring before a big decisive counterattack far outnumbers the amount of countermoves occuring towards the end.


----------



## Infanteer

I'll offer the following carrots to munch on:

1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.

2.  If you have "12 different counterattack tasks on your countermoves matrix," (to paraphrase your next statement) then you're probably mishandling your reserve.  The last thing you want to do is fritter it away piece meal reacting to every enemy action considered a threat.  "Firebase positions and attack positions" are things you deal with through your direct and indirect fire plans, not by committing your reserve.

3.  The way you frame your argument seems to argue that an area defence (as portrayed in Land Ops) is too reactive in blocking/reinforcing and waiting for the big counterattack at the end.  If I read it right, you are arguing for "using offensive action in the defence" and that constant counter-movement (for lack of a better term) would be implicit in an "offensive defence."  Are you just indicating a preference for mobile defence over area defence?  While preference is fine, means and circumstances may not give you the choice.  However, the scenario you appear to describe is common, especially in theatres with a low density of forces - just look up some German defensive battles on the Eastern Front.  However, in these cases both tactical and operational reserves are still maintained as the defender conducts his mobile defence.

4.  The primary reason I would argue that you wish to avoid committing your reserve early (in either a mobile or an area defence) is that you tip your hand.  This goes back to Old Dead Carl and the very reason we find ourselves on the defence in the first place.  We are on the defence because something is preventing us from going to the offence.  That something is probably a correlation of forces, or we'd probably just take to the offence ourselves.  _The defensive concept is parrying a blow, the characteristic, awaiting the blow, the object, preservation._  I need the enemy to wear himself down, commit his reserve, limit his freedom of action, and in doing so culminate so I can then act to take the initiative.  This is when I introduce my reserve, for if I introduce it earlier, I'm probably doing what the enemy is looking for - he'll then commit his reserve to run my committed forces over and achieve breakthrough/breakout.  In all higher level exercises I've been exposed to, we try to get the defending enemy to commit his reserves so we can destroy them and take advantage of the loss of freedom of action he now faces.  If he commits them early, so much the better. 

In the end, I'll again offer my opinion that the Canadian doctrine is a bit simplistic due to our institutional unfamiliarity with sustained defensive operations and the relatively low level that it concerns itself with.  It's not in our heritage or collective memory.  If you want a good synopsis of the state of the art with all the nuances of different defensive approaches, here's a good read.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Wasn't the Cold War plans, all about defense and being able to defend, retreat, defend and slowly reduce and absorb the Soviet assault?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

BG in Ops and Land Ops both have the defence in two stages: covering force and main defensive including countermoves. It also goes to say that the transition from one stage to another is seldom distinct. Countermoves are part of the main defensive stage. They are also a supporting plan. BG in Ops elaborates how the BG might participate in the formation countermoves stage, either as the formation countermoves force or supporting the formation countermoves. The BG will have its own countermoves as part of its main defensive stage. The formation will have its own countermoves, which would usually happen after any BG level actions. The Brigade commander, for instance, would most likely hold his own countermoves force (perhaps an Armoured Battle Group) until he deems the enemy that he is concerned with is culminated.  

A BG countermoves plan may focus on reinforcement and blocking. It might focus on counterattacking. It might have the possibility of all three. The timing will always be variable. Reinforcing may happen early in the main defensive stage, or it may not. The CO will read the battle and decide accordingly. There is, of course, tension between going too early and going too late. That is why we have wargames and Decision Support Templates. I suppose I might err on the side of early with reinforcement, but you could be playing into the enemy's hands by jumping at the first attack and throwing everything in. 

Regarding counterattacks, BG in Ops offers some advice regarding the timing of such attacks. Going too early, as Infanteer noted, can mean a meeting engagement or worse. You might "bite" on the enemy feint and be completely off-balance. Go in too late and you hit the enemy when he is already consolidated and ready for you. Its probably the most important decision that the BG CO (or Bde Comd with his countermoves/reserve) will make. You do want the enemy "off-balance" and fully engaged with something other than the counterattack. This might mean that the original infantry positions and any countermoves blocking forces are themselves decisively engaged.


----------



## MedCorps

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.



I have seen this occur a number of times now on large CAXs / TEWTs including once with the USMC. Either the battle handover line was in the wrong place, there was confusion over where the battle handover line was or the commander launched the countermove too fast. All three situations result in a goat rodeo.  

Although we seldom practice how to gracefully recover from a tactical fumble, this would be one scenario that I would talk though with your team. What happens if the countermoves force is committed too early? How will I know they were committed too early? How will I recover? What are the options to prevent the rodeo? 

Good discussion.  Enjoy following. 

MC


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

MedCorps said:
			
		

> I have seen this occur a number of times now on large CAXs / TEWTs including once with the USMC. Either the battle handover line was in the wrong place, there was confusion over where the battle handover line was or the commander launched the countermove too fast. All three situations result in a goat rodeo.
> 
> Although we seldom practice how to gracefully recover from a tactical fumble, this would be one scenario that I would talk though with your team. What happens if the countermoves force is committed too early? How will I know they were committed too early? How will I recover? What are the options to prevent the rodeo?
> 
> Good discussion.  Enjoy following.
> 
> MC



I was lucky to have two weeks in Fort Knox with my squadron on the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). Its a system of linked tanked simulators. We did a Mobile Defence four times before I got it close to being right (plenty of fumbles on my part). A US Army Colonel was watching us with my Sqn 2IC from the control room. As we trudged into the AAR room yet again he said supportively "The Mobile D - its a tough one! You got this!" The ability to watch your failure on the replay, talk about it, come up with a fix and then try it out was outstanding. We did finally get it. 

Timing is everything with countermoves. And good gunnery. 

The covering force battle can be fairly low-key with just observation forward (unlikely but possible) or be an involved battle with significant combat power withdrawing under pressure/in contact. The battle handover is when everything can come apart.


----------



## ballz

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'll offer the following carrots to munch on:
> 
> 1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.



I agree to an extent, and in saying so I don't think I've ever seen a well-coordinated handover occur in the few opportunities I've had to do this on exercise against a real enemy force, but even if the covering force hands over perfectly to the main defensive area... my understanding of the battle unfolding is that the enemy isn't sending in all of his elements head-first at once to slam into the area defensive. It's coming in waves, probing and defining the position, over the course of days, maybe even weeks, one "failed" attempt after another, before it finally launches into decisive action. So the covering force has been relieved but the enemy is still defining/probing... it's wishful thinking to think we've got enough resources to cover all avenues of approach / bypass routes... therefore, we've got to have something to convince him away from certain routes... this is where I think blocking countermoves come in pre-emptively.

This whole conversation makes me wish we were standing at a whiteboard with a map of Wx and some staedlers!



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  If you have "12 different counterattack tasks on your countermoves matrix," (to paraphrase your next statement) then you're probably mishandling your reserve.  The last thing you want to do is fritter it away piece meal reacting to every enemy action considered a threat.  "Firebase positions and attack positions" are things you deal with through your direct and indirect fire plans, not by committing your reserve.



This, I guess, is where I'm saying I don't think of my countermoves as a reserve, and I really don't like the idea of your "reserve" being tasked with your primary countermoves that _you know are vital to your plan_. This is where my article speaks about a "manouevre force" as opposed to grouping LAVs into direct fire and countermoves. I had 13x LAVs. I didn't need them all for direct fire, in fact with the piece of ground a company has I couldn't possibly use them all (we only had 6x positions to fire from). I had the resources to do both and thinking of the entire fleet as a "manouevre force" would give me the flexibility. I think this could be achieved at higher levels, with more resources like tanks, and would be effective. I mean, there is nothing good for the enemy in being formed up in the attack position, waiting for the obstacle breach to open up, and getting flanked by a troop of tanks... even if it just takes out 4x vehicles in the AP... a small force could really disrupt at a key moment.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  The way you frame your argument seems to argue that an area defence (as portrayed in Land Ops) is too reactive in blocking/reinforcing and waiting for the big counterattack at the end.  If I read it right, you are arguing for "using offensive action in the defence" and that constant counter-movement (for lack of a better term) would be implicit in an "offensive defence."  Are you just indicating a preference for mobile defence over area defence?



No... I mean I probably would prefer the former if I got to choose the terrain as you indicate, that rarely happens. I'm talking about all those things in context of using them in an area defence.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 4.  The primary reason I would argue that you wish to avoid committing your reserve early (in either a mobile or an area defence) is that you tip your hand.  This goes back to Old Dead Carl and the very reason we find ourselves on the defence in the first place.  We are on the defence because something is preventing us from going to the offence.  That something is probably a correlation of forces, or we'd probably just take to the offence ourselves.  _The defensive concept is parrying a blow, the characteristic, awaiting the blow, the object, preservation._  I need the enemy to wear himself down, commit his reserve, limit his freedom of action, and in doing so culminate so I can then act to take the initiative.  This is when I introduce my reserve, for if I introduce it earlier, I'm probably doing what the enemy is looking for - he'll then commit his reserve to run my committed forces over and achieve breakthrough/breakout.  In all higher level exercises I've been exposed to, we try to get the defending enemy to commit his reserves so we can destroy them and take advantage of the loss of freedom of action he now faces.  If he commits them early, so much the better.



I completely agree with all this. I guess this is where I'm getting at with not agreeing with doctrine that I should be relying on my reserve to conduct countermoves. For me, in my planning, countermoves is vital, it's my main effort. I'll take troops out trenches, I'll take vehicles off of positions, I'll dedicate more resources to sensors, etc... to ensure I can fulfill all of my countermoves plan. To me, that is not my reserve, or as you say, I'm already committed to committing my reserve before I even start.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> In the end, I'll again offer my opinion that the Canadian doctrine is a bit simplistic due to our institutional unfamiliarity with sustained defensive operations and the relatively low level that it concerns itself with.  It's not in our heritage or collective memory.  If you want a good synopsis of the state of the art with all the nuances of different defensive approaches, here's a good read.



Definitely lots of reading to be done on this, and hopefully more discussions stirred up. I can't say enough how much this conversation requires a beer, a map, and a whiteboard (or maybe cider and cigars to drive home the "nerdy officer" stereotype).


----------



## ballz

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I was lucky to have two weeks in Fort Knox with my squadron on the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). Its a system of linked tanked simulators. We did a Mobile Defence four times before I got it close to being right (plenty of fumbles on my part). A US Army Colonel was watching us with my Sqn 2IC from the control room. As we trudged into the AAR room yet again he said supportively "The Mobile D - its a tough one! You got this!" The ability to watch your failure on the replay, talk about it, come up with a fix and then try it out was outstanding. We did finally get it.



It's a crime against the Queen that we don't use JCATs more for that kind of stuff. All because of "costs" while we're turning in money left right and centre, unable to spend it.


----------



## Haligonian

I had the opportunity the other day to get out to a Second World War Nazi-Soviet battlefield around the small hamlet of More here in Latvia.  It gave me the opportunity to think on a few of the issues we've discussed here.  The position had very little depth but it did have a small reserve which counter attacked on numerous occasions to regain lost positions

The defence has a few common tasks that are related: depth, c-movs (block, reinforce, c-atk), reserves, and c-penetration.  Over this year this raised a few questions for me.  What does depth actually do?  What do reserves do?  Does the reserve do c-movs or do they need to be separate tasks?  How are all these concepts related?

Doctrinally the reserve does c-movs which makes sense at the Coy lvl and below where your reserve is likely to be reactive.  Above that where you might have a deliberate c-atk planned this makes less sense as your reserve shouldn't have a planned task and in many cases the c-atk will be the decisive act so the reserve would end up being your main effort even before commitment.  If you have to use that reserve to restore a situation in a blocking or reinforcing task that means you lose your main effort in trying to salvage a situation.  This tells me that any echelon that plans to launch a decisive c-atk probably needs a reserve separate from the c-movs force.  So, coys and below most of the time will only need a reserve.  Having said that, if you're a BG or higher and achieving your mission doesn't revolve around launching a decisive c-atk then you probably just need a reserve to block and reinforce as well.  This was noted earlier by Tango2Bravo.

I think depth posns as they are conventionally understood in Canadian doctrine and in practice take part in the direct fire fight.  At least depth sections, platoons, and Coys.  They service KZ's.  They fire between or around forward posns but they also offer a base of fire for local c-atks.  This may in fact be their more important function.  At the Coy level it seems to me that a small reserve that can move rapidly to a penetration, in conjunction with a depth BP that can immediately bring effective fires on to the enemy that has broken into one of the lead platoons would be a good combination.  That depth BP could then be prepared to follow and sp the reserve as required to complete the ejection of the enemy from the lead position.

In writing this it occurred to me that depth may actually be your best sub unit.  As the organisation likely to be least engaged they are the most likely to be thrown around the battlefield on blocking and reinforcing tasks.  If they draw the bulk of the patrols then they will likely find themselves with a multitude of conflicting tasks as they patrol while trying to complete defensive preparations.

Often you'll hear about a counter penetration plan.  I'd suggest this is just a counter moves task as it's a mix of blocking, reinforcing, and local counter atk to retake a lost posn.  As discussed above this could be a combination of both depth and a reserve/c-movs force.  The depth provides support while the reserve/c-movs blocks, reinforces, or c-atks.

At levels where there is a planned c-atk then as part of the c-movs plan both the reserve and the c-atk force need to be included, with the reserve conducting primarily blocking and reinforcing and c-movs conducting the decisive c-atk.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I had the opportunity the other day to get out to a Second World War Nazi-Soviet battlefield around the small hamlet of More here in Latvia.  It gave me the opportunity to think on a few of the issues we've discussed here.  The position had very little depth but it did have a small reserve which counter attacked on numerous occasions to regain lost positions
> 
> The defence has a few common tasks that are related: depth, c-movs (block, reinforce, c-atk), reserves, and c-penetration.  Over this year this raised a few questions for me.  What does depth actually do?  What do reserves do?  Does the reserve do c-movs or do they need to be separate tasks?  How are all these concepts related?
> 
> Doctrinally the reserve does c-movs which makes sense at the Coy lvl and below where your reserve is likely to be reactive.  Above that where you might have a deliberate c-atk planned this makes less sense as your reserve shouldn't have a planned task and in many cases the c-atk will be the decisive act so the reserve would end up being your main effort even before commitment.  If you have to use that reserve to restore a situation in a blocking or reinforcing task that means you lose your main effort in trying to salvage a situation.  This tells me that any echelon that plans to launch a decisive c-atk probably needs a reserve separate from the c-movs force.  So, coys and below most of the time will only need a reserve.  Having said that, if you're a BG or higher and achieving your mission doesn't revolve around launching a decisive c-atk then you probably just need a reserve to block and reinforce as well.  This was noted earlier by Tango2Bravo.
> 
> I think depth posns as they are conventionally understood in Canadian doctrine and in practice take part in the direct fire fight.  At least depth sections, platoons, and Coys.  They service KZ's.  They fire between or around forward posns but they also offer a base of fire for local c-atks.  This may in fact be their more important function.  At the Coy level it seems to me that a small reserve that can move rapidly to a penetration, in conjunction with a depth BP that can immediately bring effective fires on to the enemy that has broken into one of the lead platoons would be a good combination.  That depth BP could then be prepared to follow and sp the reserve as required to complete the ejection of the enemy from the lead position.
> 
> In writing this it occurred to me that depth may actually be your best sub unit.  As the organisation likely to be least engaged they are the most likely to be thrown around the battlefield on blocking and reinforcing tasks.  If they draw the bulk of the patrols then they will likely find themselves with a multitude of conflicting tasks as they patrol while trying to complete defensive preparations.
> 
> Often you'll hear about a counter penetration plan.  I'd suggest this is just a counter moves task as it's a mix of blocking, reinforcing, and local counter atk to retake a lost posn.  As discussed above this could be a combination of both depth and a reserve/c-movs force.  The depth provides support while the reserve/c-movs blocks, reinforces, or c-atks.
> 
> At levels where there is a planned c-atk then as part of the c-movs plan both the reserve and the c-atk force need to be included, with the reserve conducting primarily blocking and reinforcing and c-movs conducting the decisive c-atk.



A wise Gunner (yes, there are a few) once explained to me that if you can't move because of the enemy's artillery fire on our MLD, you are depth. If you can, you are counter-move/attack.


----------



## Haligonian

This Cbt Tm in Ops Pam I'm reviewing explicitly states that depth should be included in the counter moves plan.  I'm pretty sure that's the only place I've seen that.

I think a depth sub unit as part of a BG could quickly find themselves overwhelmed with the number of tasks given if the expectation that they do everything that a c-movs force has to do along with preparing a BP and conducting patrolling.  It'd be great to find a good historical vignette on this....


----------



## Old Sweat

I remember attending a 3 CIBG officers study group on the counterattack in Gagetown circa 1963-1964. The brigadier made the point that a forward battalion would be unable to counterattack within its own area, but might be able to block an advance. Even the brigade group could only mount a viable counterattack with a battle group and only then if the mission had been previously detailed in orders and the unit had time to plan and practice it. Anything else could require the commitment of troops from a formation not yet in contact.

This seems to fly in the face of the lessons of history, but he was trying to make a point about the limitations of a brigade group.

There is an example in my history of The Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Shortly after D Day in Normandy the battalion had advanced and occupied its final objective of Putot on 7 June. Incidentally, it was the first Allied unit to capture its final objective. Now the division had been training for the invasion and move forward to its objectives for several months, but had not spent much, if any, time practicing the defence. Things went amiss when it was attacked by 2nd Battalion, 26 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and things went all to crap. The situation was only restored by a counterattack by the Canadian Scottish supported by the 1st Hussars and concentrated artillery fire.   

We tend to downplay this battle, preferring to follow the successful advance and defence of the Regina Rifles a few klicks away, when they defeated a counterattack by a battalion of 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by 12 SS Panzer Regiment.


----------



## Kirkhill

It seems to me that the only secure position is one in which the flanks are secure.  Which, unless you are dealing with WW1 conditions and have millions of men available to cover a linear front of hundreds of miles (and an enemy willing to recognize neutral territory as off limits), means the only viable formation is a circular one.

The consequence of a circular formation is that it circumscribes, contains and limits the force to the manpower within the perimeter.  The force can be outflanked and reduced.  So it always seems to come down to: "When do you choose to fight?"   and "How".

Sooner or later you are going to be in the position of deciding what to do with the last man at your disposal (your reserve).  Will you order him to die in place (depth)? To charge (counter-attack)? Or to surrender? Or to hang on hoping for things to improve?

World War 1 had lots of support in depth.  It took four years to thin out the lines.


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> This Cbt Tm in Ops Pam I'm reviewing explicitly states that depth should be included in the counter moves plan.  I'm pretty sure that's the only place I've seen that.
> 
> I think a depth sub unit as part of a BG could quickly find themselves overwhelmed with the number of tasks given if the expectation that they do everything that a c-movs force has to do along with preparing a BP and conducting patrolling.  It'd be great to find a good historical vignette on this....



Is depth out of enemy artillery range, or is it just behind the guys on the FEBA?

If its the former (which I think is probably a better use of the term) than a combat team as part of a battle group will never be in depth.  Just look at the range of common artillery systems.  Depth is a Battalion or Brigade task within a Brigade or Divisional context.

If depth is just "behind the guys in front," then I guess a Combat Team could be in depth.


----------



## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Is depth out of enemy artillery range, or is it just behind the guys on the FEBA?
> 
> If its the former (which I think is probably a better use of the term) than a combat team as part of a battle group will never be in depth.  Just look at the range of common artillery systems.  Depth is a Battalion or Brigade task within a Brigade or Divisional context.
> 
> If depth is just "behind the guys in front," then I guess a Combat Team could be in depth.



As per our doctrine and practice we try to have depth at every level.  Depth trenches, sects, platoons, coys, and on.  So some depth is out of artillery range but a lot of it isn't.  The depth BG might be out tube artillery range but almost defiantly not out of rocket range.  The depth Bde might be out of range of both, but all of this depends on the frontage and depth of the defensive sector.  

All our doctrine talks about our concept of depth being about absorbing the momentum of the enemy's attack, and I don't necessarily see anything wrong with this concept.  Infantry Battalion in Battle had a more holistic approach which described depth as the cumulative effect of all defensive measures in the battalion area (pg 11-3-2).  This means it would include positional depth (the elements behind the ones expected to first make contact), use of covering forces, enganging the enemy with fires early, direct fires out to max effective range, and reserves.  I don't see the concept linked to the enemy's indirect fire, however, at some level (probably Bde and beyond, maybe BG) a Comd is looking to position his reserve, and maybe his depth element outside arty range, but most commanders will not have this luxury.


----------



## Infanteer

All of that sounds about right to me.  I'd argue that at the lowest echelons of combat (company, battalion) you're probably going want to position elements in depth to mask them somehow from enemy direct fires.  If I'm a Bn CO, I'll pop a company in front in a series of strongpoints, and have the other companies in depth.  By being in depth, they can afford to wait before unmasking their fires as the enemy starts hitting the forward elements, helping to "absorb the momentum of the enemy's attack."


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The need will likely come far faster than we can rearm the ships. The one thing Canada does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts. Hell even the Brits with their experience and resources failed to prepare for the Falklands, Had the Arges waited a bit long the RN would have had even less resources.


----------



## dimsum

Colin P said:
			
		

> The one thing Canada every country does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts.



At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line.  

We all know how that turned out.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Dimsum said:
			
		

> At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line.
> 
> We all know how that turned out.



Unfortunately, the French didn't think that may be the Germans might do hook through Netherlands/Belgium to outflank the Maginot Line.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Retired AF Guy: In fact the French thought the Maginot Line would force the Germans to do the northern hook (as in WW I with Schlieffen Plan, though not including the Netherlands in the end).  And in 1939 the German General Staff's plan did involve doing just that; the French--and British--had anticipated that and the BEF and the best of French army were stationed in NE France, prepared to march into Belgium as soon as the Germans attacked (which they did in May 1940).

The Germans actually planned to execute the northern attack. Orders to execute it were repeatedly cancelled by Hitler in November and December and into January 1940, mainly because of bad weather. Then a light plane carrying a German officer with the plans crashed in Belgian territory and the Germans had to assume the allies had the plan. 

So Hitler went back to the drawing board (he never really liked the initial planning) and adopted the Manstein Plan (_Sichelschnitt_) for the main Panzer attack to be switched to the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg and the south of Belgium with the aim of outflanking and cutting off the French and British troops in northeast France, who were expected to move into Belgium thus increasing their vulnerability to being cut off.

All worked out a treat for the Germans. And the 1939 plan might well have been stopped or at least not led to any great war-winning breakthrough. Excuse the potted hiistory.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml

1) 
	

	
	
		
		

		
			





2) 
	

	
	
		
		

		
		
	


	




Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Infanteer

Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.



A couple of decades of a continuous succession weak and ineffective national governments beforehand didn't help much either... 

...but that's probably not really within a LAV Captain's arcs.


----------



## Haligonian

Spent some time over the last few days reviewing Jim Storr's new book again and discussing the issues with another person who enjoys this stuff. He has enlightened me on some of his conclusions based on his historical research.  Some of the stuff we've talked about:

1.  From a coy perspective four rifle sections provide the framework, the positional elements, of the defence.  The are what would have been called in WW 2 the Main Line of Resistance.  These sections with an automatic weapon, spread out as much as 500m ground allowing, give a coy a frontage of (no more) than 2000 meters.  Probably closer to 1500.  These sections can defeat an infantry attack.  On top of that framework layer on anti armour weapons and indirect fire and you have the start of defeating a combined arms attack.

2.  Depth positions primary role is counter attack to re-establish the MLR.  If they can also have direct fire into the KZ then that is gravy but there will be a conflict with placing them where they are protected from direct fire and allowing them to service the KZ.  They're direct fire will probably be more important ONTO the forward positions.  They are dug in and so should be somewhere they could prevent or limit penetration.  Their tasks sound something like:  BPT CLEAR front right/front left BP. BPT CLEAR neighboring pl/coy BP. BLOCK en penetration...  The c-atk task could potentially be SEIZE or DESTROY I suppose. Depth starting with a platoon's depth section needs to be outside the footprint of an arty battery to ensure it isn't suppressed or neutralized with the lead sections. I won't go into detail on whether elements in depth (particularly at Coy and below levels) are reserves tonight, but I no longer think that it would be totally unreasonable to see them that way and some of our allies do describe them as reserves.  That is discussed earlier in this thread.

3.  The focus on counter attack makes for a much more resilient and flexible defence which is optimized for surprise and shock.  If we say depth = counter attack we now have a situation with a Bn with 8 sections in positional defence and 19 in the counter attack role controlled by pl, coy, and the Bn comd.  This raises the question of how does one echelon these counter attack forces?  You don't want a bunch of piecemeal attacks going in and being defeated in detail.

4.  We need to be thinking about outposts.  This was a common practice in both World Wars and if we want to deceive the enemy as to the location of our MDA then outposts are even more important to an army like ours.  It will be clear to an enemy fighting us when they've reached the MDA as the types of forces they're fighting will change.  They'll go from Coyotes/TAPVs to infantry, LAVs, and tanks.  Outposts provided from the infantry battalions will help the covering force in breaking clean and then engage the enemy and deceive him as to the location of the MDA.  They then make their way back to the MDA after delaying the enemy.  They are likely sections drawn from the depth of rifle coy's or the Bn's depth rifle coy.


----------



## Haligonian

Thoughts continued.

5.  There is a significant battle to be fought in the covering force area that I think sometimes gets paid short shrift.  Covering forces are there to deceive the enemy as to the location of the MDA as well as delaying and attriting the enemy.  They will also provide information to the protected force in terms of where the enemy's main effort lies and the composition and disposition of their forces.  The enemy will know that they will fight a security force prior to the MDA and will either try to penetrate it with their own reconnaissance forces without fighting or they'll use a heavier reconnaissance and security force to push off the covering force.  The attacker will also lead with an advanced guard behind their security element to protect the main body, defeat any minor opposition and prevent delay via deployment of the main body.  The defender wants to prevent an attack on the MDA by anything less than the main body meaning the attacker should arrive at the MDA will little information on its composition and disposition, likely forcing them to conduct probing attacks to gain information and thereby dissolving some of their combat power.  Even better if they commit their main body prior to the MDA.  Ideally, the attacker meets the MDA under conditions of uncertainty and executes a hasty attack into a deliberate defence.  

So, the covering force area sees the collision of two forces each trying to determine the purpose of the other in order to best establish conditions for the others defeat.  As the defender you're looking to delay the attacker as much as possible and disrupt his combat power with the early commitment of his main body being the best outcome.  You'd also want to provide sufficient depth to force him to do things like displace his artillery which might provide gaps in his coverage and additional opportunities to strike.  Early commitment of CS assets like engineers would also be optimal, allowing for attrition against mission critical equipment prior to the MDA. Fighting will cause bunching, concentration of forces, which will provide targets for fires. One of the defenders challenges will be to 
determine when elements are allowed to break contact.  This is just as much for the covering force as it is in the MDA.  Trying to assess when you've achieved what you wanted in conjunction with trying to preserve your combat power (your soldiers lives) will be a balance. It seems to me that prior to contact you would want to have visualized what the indicators are for things like the attacker committing his main body and opportunities to attrit the reconnaissance elements and the advanced guard as well as having a specific goal to be accomplished within the covering force area.  The obvious one being to achieve a certain amount of delay or attrition but it could include other objectives for destruction of other specific systems or effects on the enemy's march formation and security.


----------



## Haligonian

An interesting read back from a SBCT at NTC.  I pulled it from twitter so that's why the flow is a little weird.

I talk a lot about leveraging the SBCTs strength so I want to provide an example from a defense. I started drawing this out about a year before execution, with the goal to get an adversary to waste their S-O from SOSRA and misjudge PLC 
In my mind it was Army combatives. Pull them into our guard, transition to mount, slides our knees into their arm pits and sit back on their chest and feed them their teeth. First, we showed our defense to be in a position about 3 km behind where it was 
We did this overtly. They planned their Suppression and obscurarion against positions we would not be in. Over the P.O.D. we cached Missiles (roughly 150) forward where we would actually fight from. The positions weren’t well prepared, they were just good ground 
to fire Javelins from. We also rehearsed the displacement and occupation over P.O.D knowing that we had about 23 minutes to displace from our atk pos to occupy our primary BP. We did a lot of analysis on what triggers they would use to initiate SOSRA. 
We determined a PL that they would cross and initiate and we planned on being on the move by then. It was crucial to be tied into the shadow feed and BCT S2 chat because our plan hinged on that trigger. 
During execution, it wasn’t perfect. We were a few minutes late on the read and for a few minutes it looked like a 40 strykers racing across the central corridor. Our lead PLT was destroyed and we immediately committed our reserve. 
But the suppression was off, so was obscurarion... and all of a sudden they were pulled into our guard. DF advantage was ceded and Jav fire was massed as 8 platoons put 150 missiles into an enemy within 2km that couldn’t deploy and thought we would be 4-5 km away. 
We essentially had them by the collar, hooked the knee, and rolled up into the mount. Massing BN mortar fire and javelins on a confused enemy. Then the knees went into the armpits. AH-64 on station in ABF. Javs - mortars - artillery - AAA wrecking the EA. 8
Teeth fed. A MIP squeezed through and made a dash for the BSA and was mopped up by the BCT Reserve. They employed NPCHEM, Red Air, there was nothing that could turn it back, just reinforcing failure at that point. At the end, there was a BRDM left and nothing else 
It’s easy to say ‘leverage strengths, mitigate weaknesses’ but this is what I think it looks like in application. All we did was waste their artillery and forced them to hit LC for LD. Yet that’s all we needed.


----------



## Infanteer

Tough to read through the US Army jargon and the analogies to MMA.  What does stand out is that the plan hinged on firing 150 Javelins.  At 100k a missile, that's a 15million dollar engagement.  Hard to train for that.


----------



## Haligonian

It’s an expensive way to fight but I don’t know about training as those missiles are simulated.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Even fighting a proxy army, you can now expect them to have ATGM's, The LAV's aren't going to be able sit still or stay close in to the fight.


----------



## CBH99

Sounds like the command team had a pretty solid grasp of defense in depth, using the terrain to their advantage, etc etc.

150 Javelins, mortars, AH-64 Apache's overhead, etc etc.  2 of those 3 things don't even exist in our inventories....and as solid as the new Carl G is, it isn't the same as a top-attack ATGM like the Javelin.



Similar scenario to us, all we could do it rain down artillery & mortars, and hope for a few solid shots with an 84mm.  The rest are toys we don't have.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> An interesting read back from a SBCT at NTC.  I pulled it from twitter so that's why the flow is a little weird.
> 
> I talk a lot about leveraging the SBCTs strength so I want to provide an example from a defense. I started drawing this out about a year before execution, with the goal to get an adversary to waste their S-O from SOSRA and misjudge PLC
> In my mind it was Army combatives. Pull them into our guard, transition to mount, slides our knees into their arm pits and sit back on their chest and feed them their teeth. First, we showed our defense to be in a position about 3 km behind where it was
> We did this overtly. They planned their Suppression and obscurarion against positions we would not be in. Over the P.O.D. we cached Missiles (roughly 150) forward where we would actually fight from. The positions weren’t well prepared, they were just good ground
> to fire Javelins from. We also rehearsed the displacement and occupation over P.O.D knowing that we had about 23 minutes to displace from our atk pos to occupy our primary BP. We did a lot of analysis on what triggers they would use to initiate SOSRA.
> We determined a PL that they would cross and initiate and we planned on being on the move by then. It was crucial to be tied into the shadow feed and BCT S2 chat because our plan hinged on that trigger.
> During execution, it wasn’t perfect. We were a few minutes late on the read and for a few minutes it looked like a 40 strykers racing across the central corridor. Our lead PLT was destroyed and we immediately committed our reserve.
> But the suppression was off, so was obscurarion... and all of a sudden they were pulled into our guard. DF advantage was ceded and Jav fire was massed as 8 platoons put 150 missiles into an enemy within 2km that couldn’t deploy and thought we would be 4-5 km away.
> We essentially had them by the collar, hooked the knee, and rolled up into the mount. Massing BN mortar fire and javelins on a confused enemy. Then the knees went into the armpits. AH-64 on station in ABF. Javs - mortars - artillery - AAA wrecking the EA. 8
> Teeth fed. A MIP squeezed through and made a dash for the BSA and was mopped up by the BCT Reserve. They employed NPCHEM, Red Air, there was nothing that could turn it back, just reinforcing failure at that point. At the end, there was a BRDM left and nothing else
> It’s easy to say ‘leverage strengths, mitigate weaknesses’ but this is what I think it looks like in application. All we did was waste their artillery and forced them to hit LC for LD. Yet that’s all we needed.



Target on....

I hate it when people use sports analogies to describe battles, simulated or otherwise. It makes me think that their intellectual grasp of various complex aspects of modern warfare stalled at about the Grade 11 Phys Ed level.

Tangent off...


----------

