# The Spitfire and the Battle of Britain



## DavidAkin (6 Nov 2007)

The latest edition of _BBC History Magazine_ takes some contrary looks  at the Spitfire and at The Battle of Britain in its "Battle of Britain Special" edition.

There's some interesting reading by authors who wish to blow up some of the conventional thinking about that battle.

I was intrigued to hear the inside story of how the British political and military powers nearly missed out on the Spitfire -- and thought for the longest time that the Bristol Beaufighter would be the mainstay of Fighter Command. Researcher Leo McKinstry reviews some archives of the time and charts how the groupthink of certain military and political leaders had to be overcome before the Spitfire would be taken up as the key weapon in the Battle of Britain.

There is also an article that suggests it was the Royal Navy and not the RAF that won the Battle of Britain (!). 

It's a bit tough to find this magazine in Canada but for a decent snapshot of both these pieces, check out the podcast put out by the magazine:
http://www.bbchistorymagazine.com/podcast/historypodcastnovember.mp3


----------



## ExSarge (7 Nov 2007)

> Researcher Leo McKinstry reviews some archives of the time and charts how the groupthink of certain military and political leaders had to be overcome before the Spitfire would be taken up as the key weapon in the Battle of Britain.
> 
> There is also an article that suggests it was the Royal Navy and not the RAF that won the Battle of Britain (!).



David,

I would argue that the key weapon in the Battle of Britain was not the Spitfire or for that matter any other aircraft. Rather it was the chain of radar station and the command and control network that was developed to manage the information gathered from these sites. Without the ability to gain these early warnings the limited resources of Fighter Command would have been overwhelmed. 

A for key aircraft, well I suspect that proponents of the Hurricane will argue that as the most numerous type fielded (by the British)  that it deserves the title of Key Weapon.
Finally I would agree that the Royal Navy stopped the German invasion of Britain. Without command of the sea there was never any hope of a successful outcome. As Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty said when asked if the French might invade during the Napoleonic wars. “I do not say the French won’t come. I only say they won’t come by sea!”


----------



## Old Sweat (7 Nov 2007)

David,

I agree with ExSarge's point about the Royal Navy. 

Stephen Bungay, who wrote a comprehensive history of the battle - The Most Dangerous Enemy (Aurum Press, 2000), notes that the most remarkable thing about the Battle of Britian is that it took place at all. There was a strong faction in the British cabinet and government lead by the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax that was in favour of making peace with Germany in 1940. Moreover Churchill was still considered a bit of a maverick by much of the establishment who regarded his becoming Prime Minister instead of Halifax as a disaster. He writes in a footnote on page 9 that "In his Five Days in London (Yale University Press, 1999) John Luckacs argues that the crucial period was in fact the five days from 24-28 May during which Churchill fought Halifax for domination of the Cabinet and just managed to pull it off."

How different the history of the 20th Century would have been if Halifax and his cohorts had prevailed!


----------



## Colin Parkinson (7 Nov 2007)

Of course the Hurricane and the Spit hold nothing against the dreaded Buoltan-Paul Defiant  ;D

Right up their with the Fairy battle.


----------



## geo (7 Nov 2007)

At a time when Britain was losing battles in Europe, the Middle East & the Far East, they needed heroes & that, my friends, is what the RAF gave us.  Were they really heroes? It's up for debate but, you know the answer if you ask a flyer.

The Germans weren't into using drop tanks on their aircraft - so range was always a problem for them and the Spitfires & Hurricanes had home field advantage.

The RAF had their Beaufighter.... and the Germans had their ME110.  Both aircraft had their problems, though the 110 came into it's own as a night fighter.

My tip of the hat goes to the Network of Radars & coastal defense.


----------



## Flip (7 Nov 2007)

> I was intrigued to hear the inside story of how the British political and military powers nearly missed out on the Spitfire




I tip my hat to the old lady who finanaced the development of the Merlin Engine.
The government didn't want to pay for it and it could have died on the drawing board.
I'll try to to look up her name.......
Without the Merlin - no Spits, Hurricanes, Mustangs, Lancs etc. etc.


----------



## geo (7 Nov 2007)

(Merlin engines found their way under the hood in Centurion tanks)


----------



## 3rd Herd (7 Nov 2007)

geo said:
			
		

> The RAF had their Beaufighter.... and the Germans had their ME110.  Both aircraft had their problems, though the 110 came into it's own as a night fighter.
> 
> My tip of the hat goes to the Network of Radars & coastal defense.



Agreeing with the radar station bunch as to one of the key factors for the successful conclusion of the Battle of Britian I will however disagree with geo vis via the ME 110 and the Beaufighter.

"Beaufighters were used in many theaters of war and for varied duties, performing particularly well in the Western Desert thanks to their long range. Coastal Command of the RAF received several torpedo-carrying versions which were responsible for sinking a great deal of enemy shipping. The last and most numerous was the superb Mk X, which could carry a large torpedo or bombs and rocket projectiles, and claimed among its victories several German submarines." Further it is noted for, "carrying out the last operational sortie of the European war, a strike against German shipping in the Skagerrak"

"The Beaufighter IF was soon bearing the brunt of the action against German night bombers,....."During its operational career it had played a prime role in defeating the Luftwaffe's night "blitz" of 1940-1941", Serving with distinction in the Pacific until the capitulation of Japan. "To the Japanese, the Beaufighter became known as "The Whispering Death" (not be confused with "Whistling Death F4U Corsair) which gives some idea of the speed at which one could suddenly appear, strike and turn for home."

"The Beaufighter may have been the product of improvisation, but it was a remarkably successful one." From the American point of view, "The British Bristol Beaufighter filled the need for an effective night fighter in the U.S. Army Air Forces until an American aircraft could be produced." Continuing, "The 414th, 415th, 416th and 417th Night Fighter Squadrons received more than 100 "reverse Lend-Lease" Beaufighters.(National Museum USAF)

For the RCAF the Beaufighter is described as "With a speed of 330 mph, air intercept radar and a one-two punch of cannons and machine guns (or torpedoes or rocket projectiles when engaged in anti-surface duties), the Bristol Beaufighter was one of the Second World War's most formidable night fighters, as well as being the backbone of Coastal Command's anti-shipping war."(Bristol BEAUFIGHTER)  In fact ["Moose" Fumerton] with "two crash landings and a bullet wound to emerge from World War II as Canada's top-scoring night-fighter ace, credited with destroying 14 enemy aircraft and damaging a 15th." "Fumerton gave the RCAF its first night victory on Sept. 1, 1941, as he and Sgt. Pat Bing, who became his long-time navigator, were on a practice flight near the coast of northeast England in their twin-engined Bristol Beaufighter. They were diverted to intercept a German Junkers 88 bomber flying in from the North Sea."

Source:
Bristol Beaufighter 
http://www.aviation-history.com/bristol/beaufite.html

National Museum of the USAF
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=492

Bristol BEAUFIGHTER
http://www.rcaf.com/aircraft/fighters/beaufighter/index.php?name=beaufighter

Robert Fumerton, 93: Distinguished fighting ace
http://www.thestar.com/Obituary/AtoG/article/108225

Suggested Readings:

Brown, Atholl Sutherland Silently into the Midst of Things177 Squadron Royal Air Force in Burma, 1943-1945: History and Personal Narratives Victoria, BC.


----------



## geo (7 Nov 2007)

3rd,
My "complaint" if you will about the Beaufighter was with it's initial use as a fighter.... as an air superiority fighter during dailight operations, the plane was just too darned big.

The Beaufighter's main claim to fame would be that it was *coming off the production lines at almost exactly the same time as the first British airborne radar sets*. With the four 20 mm cannons mounted in the lower fuselage, the nose could accommodate the radar antennas, and the general roominess of the fuselage enabled the AI equipment to be fitted easily. Even loaded down to an even heavier 20,000 lb (9 t), the plane was still fast enough to catch the even slower German bombers. By early 1941, *it was an effective counter to Luftwaffe night raids.*

In it's maritime role, agreed - Great big stable platform from which to shoot things from
As a ground attack role, agreed - great big stable platform from which to shoot from


----------



## jimb (8 Nov 2007)

Even IF the German airforce had been able to defeat the RAF in the summer of 1940, the main problem facing them was the utter LACK of proper landing craft  and  suitable vessels to land armoured units on the beaches of southern England. 

Any one who takes the time to LOOK at the German "invasion craft " sitting in French costal ports at that time , will see that the vast majority of them were shallow draft  CANAL boats and barges. I base this on RAF low level photo recce pictures. These vessels  were NOT the right stuff to complete a sucessful invasion over the Channel, which has some of the worst sea and weather conditions to be found anywhere in the world. 

In addition, the German army had NEVER conducted a large scale assault across any water obstacle   bigger than a river, before. The German navy had NO  vessels that could deliver large scale amounts of artillery, or armour in a  beach landing plan. The German army had no ready force of  trained amphibious landing troops, or any way to deliver them to a landing area. 

Sealion was a "threat of  potential invasiion " NOT an actual chance of an invasion by the Germans.  That is why it never happened.

And I agree with those that point to the RN as the most likely force to defeat any German invasion armada, but I would also point at the RAFs Bomber Command, who would have been "on call " to attack the slow moving barges in the Channel. Imagine a 500 bomber sortie, in daylight, concentrating on the troop ships and their supply tenders ?  How many of those ships would even be able to get to their landing beaches. never mind get  the troops ashore ?  FAILURE. 

Jim B. Toronto.


----------



## geo (8 Nov 2007)

jimb...
something like the Elizabethan fleet of fireships, bringing death and destruction to the enemy.


----------



## Old Sweat (8 Nov 2007)

Jim B

Excellent points. The Germans had no idea of the challenges of amphibious operations and no reference data to fall back on. In terms of capability, they had not advanced far beyond the invasion fleet assembled by William the Conqueror in 1066. (If anyone is interested take a look at the shipping in the Bayeux Tapestry.) Furthermore they also were deficient in airborne forces to sieze or screen their bridgehead.

Many, many years ago C.S. Forester, the author of the Hornblower series, wrote a story about the failure of the German invasion and the subsequent defeat of the Germans after a long, hard struggle. He concluded that historians were agreed that if instead of mounting a hastily-assembled invasion, the Luftwaffe had been turned loose on Britain, the Germans would have overwhelmed the RAF and bombed the UK into submission.


----------



## vonGarvin (8 Nov 2007)

jimb said:
			
		

> Even IF the German airforce had been able to defeat the RAF in the summer of 1940, the main problem facing them was the utter LACK of proper landing craft  and  suitable vessels to land armoured units on the beaches of southern England.
> Any one who takes the time to LOOK at the German "invasion craft " sitting in French costal ports at that time , will see that the vast majority of them were shallow draft  CANAL boats and barges. I base this on RAF low level photo recce pictures. These vessels  were NOT the right stuff to complete a sucessful invasion over the Channel, which has some of the worst sea and weather conditions to be found anywhere in the world.
> In addition, the German army had NEVER conducted a large scale assault across any water obstacle   bigger than a river, before. The German navy had NO  vessels that could deliver large scale amounts of artillery, or armour in a  beach landing plan. The German army had no ready force of  trained amphibious landing troops, or any way to deliver them to a landing area.
> Sealion was a "threat of  potential invasiion " NOT an actual chance of an invasion by the Germans.  That is why it never happened.
> And I agree with those that point to the RN as the most likely force to defeat any German invasion armada, but I would also point at the RAFs Bomber Command, who would have been "on call " to attack the slow moving barges in the Channel. Imagine a 500 bomber sortie, in daylight, concentrating on the troop ships and their supply tenders ?  How many of those ships would even be able to get to their landing beaches. never mind get  the troops ashore ?  FAILURE.


Jim B.
I disagree with your assessment.  In spite of lack of experience (etc) in the conduct of amphibious operations, the Wehrmacht was able to successfully invade, through a combination of Airborne and amphibious forces, the island of Crete.  Yes, they took great losses (as well as the wrong lessons: yes the Fallschirmjaeger took heavy losses, but without their contribution, the invasion could not have succeeded).  As for the invasion of England, the main reason why it never took place was due to a total lack of centralised planning: the Luftwaffe had one plan, the Kriegsmarine another, and the Heer yet a third!
IF (and this is one huge "if") the Germans had started planning properly say in early June 1940, they could have kicked off a successful invasion by September.  Their "flimsy barges" would have made it through in enough numbers to secure the beachheads and link up with the Fallschirmjaeger.  As for the Royal Navy, do you really think that they would have ventured into the claustrophic Channel with the Luftwaffe tearing them apart?  Sure, they did just that in 1944, but this was 1940, no US Air Force to assist, and the RAF was in no position to offer effective cover.

Once they landed, how would England fight?  Most of its equipment was in Belgium, and the single fully equipped division, the 1st Canadian, was a relative newcomer comprised of but three regular battalions, and the rest were barely trained civilians who had joined a few months earlier.  

Of course, I'm saying this, now, some 60+ years after the fact, so.....


----------



## jimb (8 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat :

As we know now, the ability of the British aircraft industry, to "out build the german ability to shoot the RAF down " would have  been a factor in any question of future  tactics. They were able to replace equipment loses with rebuilds or new airframes, from the factories. 

Do you suggest that the germans would have been able to  subdue the RAF eventually , thru fighter versus fighter engagements ?  I disagree. 

JIm B.


----------



## vonGarvin (8 Nov 2007)

jimb said:
			
		

> Do you suggest that the germans would have been able to  subdue the RAF eventually , thru fighter versus fighter engagements ?  I disagree.


I agree with you on this one.  The Germans were causing great damage to the RAF's capability to keep fighters in the air, but not through fighter vs fighter engagements, but by striking the fighter-building industry.  Of course, over time, the industries out of reach of the Luftwaffe would have been able to make up for it, but the Germans only needed a limited "window" in order to have sufficient air superiority to mount an invasion, using log rafts, river barges, or whatever.  With the Luftwaffe overhead, keeping the RN out of the Channel, they could have pulled it off.  Having said that, there were too many competing personalities within the Wehrmacht to do so.


----------



## Old Sweat (8 Nov 2007)

First, I don't believe the Germans could have landed and maintained an invasion force in the UK in the summer of 1940. I could go on for pages, but basically they did not have either the knowledge or the equipment to pull it off. They also could not attain air superiority, let alone domination, to cover a landing and the subsequent build up and maintenance. The Royal Navy was a fleet in being and given that the RAF would have provided air cover, could have interdicted the sea lanes. 

Crete was an entirely different matter, and it was predicated on German command of the skies. Even so, the airborne invasion nearly failed. 

Do you suggest that the germans would have been able to  subdue the RAF eventually , thru fighter versus fighter engagements ?  I disagree.  

I do not accept that they could have subdued the RAF through fighter versus fighter engagements. My point was that Forester was gently ribbing the pundits that were claiming the Germans should have invaded England, rather than fight the Battle of Britain in the air.


----------



## jimb (8 Nov 2007)

Mortarman :

How well was Crete defended and by whom ?  I don't think that the two can be compared, really. 

I do agree with your point about a complete lack of overall planning and control on the german side, re an invasion of Great Britain. Think about how long the Allies took to get their plan  ( Overlord ) shaped up, ( 2 years )  and of course there was the   need for the building of thousands of landing craft and the huge number of special vehicles (AVRES and duplex drive  Shermans ) to give  the 1944  landings  a more than 50/50 chance of sucess. 

The Royal Navy.................Of course they would have "ventured into the Channel " To defeat an invasion force ? They would have pulled out Lord Nelson's HMS Victory from dry dock, if they thought it  would have been the ship that would have "turned the tide ".  Every last man and ship would have been used. 

Jim B.


----------



## geo (8 Nov 2007)

Note that during the Battle of Britain, the RAF had home field advantage... 

able to gass up and load up from friendly local air stations

Damaged aircraft could be recovered & fixed VS complete loss by the Germans

Pilots who had their planes shot out from under them could, if not injured, get back into the fight within days VS complete loss by the Germans.


----------



## vonGarvin (8 Nov 2007)

jimb said:
			
		

> Mortarman :
> 
> How well was Crete defended and by whom ?  I don't think that the two can be compared, really.
> 
> ...


Of course the Royal Navy would have ventured into the channel, and that Royal Navy would have become the Royal Glass-bottom-boat-tour Navy, because that's where it would have ended up: at the bottom of the channel.  During the war, we saw the ascendence of the airplane over the Battleship: the Bismarck was sunk due to "obselete" aircraft delivering wave after wave of punishment.  Given that both sides (Luftwaffe and RAF) would have been about equal range from the fight, and given that the Luftwaffe outnumbered the RAF, the Luftwaffe would have won that battle.  

The comparison to plan the invasion of a well-defended coast (France 1944) vs a virtually undefended coase (England, 1940) are not the same.  Had the Germans believed that they would have knocked out France by June 1940, they would have started planning for the invasion of England much sooner.  As it was, by 22 June 1940, Hitler's eyes were already turning to the East.  Had he put his own personal pressure on the planning of the invasion of England by say July 1940, it is my estimation that the Germans could have mounted an invasion by September of that year.  Of course, there is no real way this could have happened, given the situation at the time: all eyes were on Russia.

"What if" the Germans invaded?  Before answering that, let's look at Crete.  The defences numbered some 9000 Greeks and maybe 25000 Commonwealth troops.  The Germans were outnumbered, but key was the seizure of an airfield to fly in reinforcements.  And the Allies had forewarning of the attack (through ULTRA intercepts).

So, suppose its 3 September, 1940.  The UK has been at war for exactly one year.  The RAF is down, but certainly not out.  Axis forces dominate the channel from Cherbourg to Dunkirk.  Anti shipping mines have been laid across both ends of the channel, and the stage is set, even though not all of Hitler's conditions for invasion have been met.

Initially the church bells sound out that the invasion is coming.  German Fallschirmjaeger land across the south of England, near the channel.  They are in a blocking role, to provide early warning and buy time for the invasion force to consolidate and build up.

UK based RADAR picks up a massive invasion fleet crossing the channel.  The RN responds and begins to head south from Scapa Flow.  They are picked up by German scout planes and harrassed the entire way down, taking hits along the way.  RN minesweepers are harrassed by the Luftwaffe as well, as they attempt to break open a lane for the RN.  

The first wave lands against modest opposition and they begin to link up beachheads.  The RN is getting closer, and the Luftwaffe, and what's left of the Kriegsmarine, attempt to block their efforts.  I BELIEVE that the Luftwaffe would get through as the RN got closer.  Yes, the RN would press the issue, but I believe, for the reasons stated above (equal range to the battlefield, etc) that the numerically stronger Luftwaffe would win the day, providing effective top cover for the invasion fleet. 

As for the ground battle, given that the Wehrmacht would be able to reinforce relatively effectively (especially once the RN has been chased from the Channel), they would be able to build up to a point where they would have the superiority in numbers to carry the day.

But, as I stated, this was impossible for the Wehrmacht to do given the competing personalities and Hitler's real aim of destroying the USSR.


----------



## Old Sweat (8 Nov 2007)

MR

This is where we differ. I don't believe the Germans could have put together a successful invasion in the time available in 1940, even if the RAF had been defeated. For all intents and purposes the army especially would have been a collection of type 4 officers - hardworking and ill-informed - as regards amphibious operations. You rather blithely assume that they could have towed barges and light shipping across the channel and continued to do so. However, to maintain the tonnage of passengers and cargo to conquer the British Isles without a port was surely beyond the capacity of the available bottoms.

This is a most interesting discussion, I admit, and much both more fun and less useful than many.

OS


----------



## vonGarvin (8 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> MR
> 
> This is where we differ. I don't believe the Germans could have put together a successful invasion in the time available in 1940, even if the RAF had been defeated. For all intents and purposes the army especially would have been a collection of type 4 officers - hardworking and ill-informed - as regards amphibious operations. You rather blithely assume that they could have towed barges and light shipping across the channel and continued to do so. However, to maintain the tonnage of passengers and cargo to conquer the British Isles without a port was surely beyond the capacity of the available bottoms.
> 
> ...


OS 
(I admit, when I saw "MR", I thought you were calling me "mister") ;D
Getting a port would probably have been a priorty; however, I must agree that they could not have successfully invaded for the simple reason that they couldn't plan it. They could have, given proper guidance, etc from higher; however, the cards were already set for the USSR.  At most, from "Adlertag" forward, the Germans hoped to force the Brits to the bargaining table.  I do believe, however, that we are giving the UK too much credit in terms of what they would have had on the ground to oppose the Germans.  The BEF was a shallow army: 300 000 men wide, but one man deep in reality.  Their capability to take on all the landings would have been severely limited, and even with the slow movers, etc, the Germans could have got enough through.  Perhaps the build up would have taken much longer than it took for us in 1944, but in the end, they  could have done it, IMHO.

But, I also agree, and maybe the "what if" of Sealion could be moved?


----------



## geo (8 Nov 2007)

Let's not forget that the Brit gov't at the time had certain reservations on their own ability to withstand the German tidal wave.

After Dunkirk, the only "fully equipped" division in the UK was the 1st Cdn division.  From what I understand, they were being moved back and forth all over the countryside to make them appear to be much larger than they actually were.

The UK Treasury & Crown jewels had been moed to Canada for safe keeping
English children were being shipped to Canada & Aus for the duration of the war


----------



## Danjanou (8 Nov 2007)

I feel another MR alternate history tale coming on here.  8)


----------



## Signalman150 (8 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat,

Have read yr posts many times and enjoyed them; thoughtful and intelligent.  However, on this one I'm going to have to go with Mortarman.  I've been doing a good deal of research on this for a specific project of mine over the last three years, and I am certain that Germany could successfully have launched an invasion.  My reasons are:

a) that dirty rotter General Billy Mitchell, who proved that Capital Ships were no match for aircraft, (I won't say it was easy, but it was proven already).  The Luftwaffe wouldn't have sunk the whole fleet or anything like that, but it could have disabled a good portion of it (merchant losses in the Channel during the phony war sort of demonstrate this);

b) the state of the British Army three months after Dunkirk. Most of the BEF's equipment was left in France, and Churchill (in his memoirs) says they didn't even have enough rifles left in Britain to arm the soldiers they had (let alone the Home Guard etc).  I have never doubted the spirit of the British, but even THEY need something to fight with.  I believe coastal defence would have been lacking;

c) Part of Britain's success in repelling invasion, was due to specific German Failures; someone mentioned Radar, and had the German's not switched their targets from Radar stations to the Air Bases, the Germans would have had air superiority in nothing flat, (Hurricane and Spitfire notwithstanding).  The Luftwaffe then changed from Air Bases to urban centers, their second major mistake.  It allowed the RAF the respite it needed to do the job.

There were many factors that prevented the invasion: the Luftwaffe's' changing targeting priority, Radar, and of course Sidney Camm and RJ Mitchell, and the "gallant few". But I am convinced that the German's could well have pulled off an invasion had things been only slightly altered.  

I've been seeing a lot of what I'll gently refer to as "revisionist crap" about The Battle of Britain the last few years.  It has less to do with old documents being recently declassified, and more to do with people trying desperately to destroy any sign of nobility or rightness in western history.  

Sorry about that; I'll get off my soap box now.

Cheers,
Sig150


----------



## time expired (8 Nov 2007)

The key factor in the winning of the Battle of Britain was the obstinance
of one man, and his decision to fight it,Winston Churchill.His rhetoric
convinced the British people that they should fight this battle and that
against all expert opinion they had a fighting chance of winning it.
Another key factor was the abysmal German intelligence services,the
other side of the channel could have been the other side of the moon
for all the Germans knew about it.Not understanding the importance
of the British radar,bombing the wrong airfields,were just two examples
of how out of touch their intelligence were.
                                           Regards


----------



## MarkOttawa (8 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat: If I remember Bungay's book correctly
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/67816/post-634735.html#msg634735
http://www.amazon.ca/Most-Dangerous-Enemy-Stephen-Bungay/dp/1854107216/ref=sr_1_2/701-3535795-9036326?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194557983&sr=1-2

his basic (revisionist and I think he's right) argument is that the Luftwaffe really didn't stand a chance .

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Old Sweat (8 Nov 2007)

You are all making excellent points. The key is that the Germans ran out of time in 1940, and the attention shifted to the east. (Not necessarily related.)

Let me hit another track. The British opened No 1 Amphibious Training Centre at Inverary in Scotland in October 1940. Eventually the troops that did the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy trained there. (Landing craft production lagged behind training by the way.) 

What is probably not as well known is that as part of the American partial mobilization of 1940, the US Army opened an amphibious training center in Franklin County, Florida in the panhandle. (The only reason I know that is that last winter we spent some time in a waterfront RV park slap dab in the middle of what had been the training area.) 

The Germans were way behind the curve.

Both armies had two years plus to train and had been thinking about amphibious operations before the war. In Guy Simonds' biography mention is made of the exercise the British army staff college had with the Royal Naval College where they planned an amphibious landing.

Having said all that, the British army was in no stage to fight off a major invasion. Sometimes it is better to be lucky than good.


----------



## Signalman150 (8 Nov 2007)

Amen


----------



## MarkOttawa (8 Nov 2007)

3rd Heard: Burma wasn't quite the Pacific .  RCAF members also flew Beaufighters there:
http://www.burmabeaufighters.com/pages/articles/burmarevisited.php

One of my sisters' father-in-law flew with 177 Squadron, though then with the RAF.  Only joined the RCAF after the war .

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## ExSarge (9 Nov 2007)

I have to echo the comments of a previous poster; this has been a very entertaining thread. However (ya had to know that was coming!) the problem with “what if” history is the shear number of variables.

What if Hitler did not turn his attention to the east?
What if the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority over the channel?
What if an airborne drop seized a bridgehead?
What if the RN was prevented from striking at the invasion fleet?

For every scenario there are countless numbers of possible outcomes. Although it’s an enjoyable intellectual exercise, one that, frankly I enjoy to take part in (especially while sitting in a comfortable pub being served cold beer by attractive waitress) with like minded amateur historians. Lets not loose site of the fact that it’s just an exercise.


----------



## a_majoor (9 Nov 2007)

Amen!

Now to our discussion of "What if Xerxes was defeated at Thermopylae?"


----------



## Colin Parkinson (9 Nov 2007)

I suspect the Germans could have gotten a portion of their forces ashore, but the cost would have been huge, they would alos not have the ability to sustain the force. The RAF sttill had lots of useable bases on the West coast untouched by the Germans, the German troops would have very little in the way of ammo or armour with them and fighting in a very hostile population. I usspect they would be defeated, however the cost would effectivly put the UK out of the war for a couple of years, possibly costing them all of North Africa. Also unclear would be the effect on US support.


----------



## Rocketryan (9 Nov 2007)

Very intresting topic I've been reading. While I don't really have much to add, but you all seem into this discussion so I thought I'd just suggest reading "Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain" by Len Deighton. Its a very good read. Its mostly just pointing out the facts of the battle. It covers alot including the time building up to it, the stages of the battle, German planning on Sea Lion, and about the fighter industry.
Several pages with pictures which help put things in perspective too.


----------



## time expired (10 Nov 2007)

I believe it would be true to say that the key to a successful
invasion would have been Luftwaffe gaining air superiority
over the area of the invasion beaches,and friends they didn't
even come close.the Luftwaffe was from its very beginning
a tactical air force designed to support the army in fulfilling
its aims,nobody in the Nazi leadership seemed to understand
the strategic possibilities of air power.So when called upon to
fight a strategic air campaign against England they were very
illprepared and illequip ed,their bombers were unable to exist
in the air over England without fighter escorts and their fighters
were too short legged to escort the bombers much further north
than the London area.Even in the areas that they appeared to have
some success,the bombing of Fighter Commands 11 Groups 
airfields,for example was an illusion.Hurricane and Spitfire sqns
could have operated from a golf course given a long enough
fairway,all they needed was a bus load of fitters, a truck with a 
radio, a couple of bowsers of fuel and an officer with a Very 
pistol and they were in business.12 and 13 groups airfields
had not been attacked and were intact,aircraft production was
increasing,pilots were beginning to arrive from the Occupied
countries,the Commonwealth and even the USA.Although
the propaganda of the day liked to describe this as a victory 
against tremendous odds I believe the Luftwaffe were doomed
to failure from the very start. 
                                      Regards


----------



## Flip (10 Nov 2007)

> Although the propaganda of the day liked to describe this as a victory
> against tremendous odds I believe the Luftwaffe were doomed
> to failure from the very start.



As much as the Luftwaffe suffered for lack of planning and foresight,
the RAF excersised remarkable foresight and planning.

Hermann Goering had no idea how the air defenses were organized or how they worked.
The British people had no idea how close they came to not having the tools needed
to protect their island.

The course of the war could so easily have been altered by a myriad of variables.
Some of them political.  Some technical. What it came down to was that time was
on Britain's side. And the Luftwaffe got stalled.

The Battle of Britain was still a very sharp turning point.


----------



## Brad Sallows (10 Nov 2007)

I would not credit the RN with winning the "Battle of Britain", which was an air battle.  The RN did, however, win "Operation Seelowe" by essentially discouraging the KM from bothering to mount a serious planning effort (instead passing the buck to Goering's shop).  Some have speculated that had the river barges ever taken to the Channel, it would not have taken many destroyers and lesser vessels at high speed to swamp the barges with wakes.  Regardless, there were a *lot* of lesser naval vessels in the UK, and had they got in among the invasion fleet it would have been all over even if the issue could only be decided by gunfire.  It might not have been necessary to risk the RN battle line at all.  And the RAF would not have had to defeat enemy anti-shipping attacks by killing them to a man; for the span of only a few hours it would only have been necessary to break up the German formations to render the attacks ineffective.

No matter how weak the land forces in Britain may have been, I can't conceive why so many people accept that so many other and better-mounted amphibious operations were difficult and risky, but a shoestring operation by the KM should have pushed over the UK like a stalk of wheat, as if nothing that could happen after T-Tag - like supplying the army - would matter.  (Hint: remember Market-Garden; the air force didn't want to risk certain options because they knew there would have to be some aircraft left to supply the landing force).

If there is to be a revised credit for the greatest contributor to victory in the BoB, my first candidates would be the bombers which goaded Hitler into shifting his attacks from the British fighter force to British cities.


----------



## vonGarvin (12 Nov 2007)

time expired said:
			
		

> I believe it would be true to say that the key to a successful invasion would have been Luftwaffe gaining air superiority over the area of the invasion beaches,and friends they didn't even come close.  *The Luftwaffe was from its very beginning a tactical air force designed to support the army in fulfilling its aims*,nobody in the Nazi leadership seemed to understand the strategic possibilities of air power.


What I put in bold is the KEY point.  The Luftwaffe had, as you said, no chance, barring a miracle (meteor shower destroys RAF: Film at 11). So the key then is to put the Luftwaffe back into a tactical fight.  Just as the Luftwaffe was outnumbered over France and Flanders in May, they were nevertheless able to get LOCAL air superiority with their TACTICAL air force.  That would have been key.  

So, key to any invasion would have been to subordinate ALL forces under one commander (not going to happen).  That due especially to the personalities involved.

The Germans were able to pull off some pretty good victories against "all odds" in that first year of the war, so why would gaining and maintaining a beachhead be beyond the realm of possibility?  I mean, the BEF had lost much of its heavy artillery and motor transport in Belgium, right?  1st Cdn Div is running to and fro, but it can only do so much.  

I don't know what the long-term effects would have been, but the UK certainly had one advantage: ULTRA.  Still, I don't know if it would have been enough to stop the Germans from gaining a beachhead and seizing a port.  Look at some of their other "stunning" victories they pulled off, and it was from innovative use of initiative and new ideas.  Eben Emael was supposed to be THE fortress.  The Germans took it in minutes by the very clever use of Paratroopers.

So, given the nut of cracking a port for follow on forces, I'm fairly certain that some young General somewhere would have come up with some smashing plan to take it.  

As for the tactical battle over the channel, I think that the Luftwaffe would have been able to fend off the RAF and the RN long enough to cause them both to back off enough to allow a first wave (mostly infantry, I imagine) followed by the heavier "stuff".

Remember, key here is that the entire coast of the UK was not manned to the same extent as the German "Festung Europa" we faced off against in 1944.  The landing would have been opposed, naturally, but not to the same extent that we faced.  In fact, maybe the Germans would have tried a different approach?  Seize the "far bank" of the channel from the other side?  Fallschirmjaeger, instead of dropping inland in blocking positions, instead drop around the landing sites, eliminating opposition (with Luftwaffe support, on the coast, well within range of fighters AND bombers, instead of deeper inland), and allowing the sea borne force to land unopposed?

Maybe I WILL try a "what if", but you'll all have to suspend belief with my first "what if", and that would be that the General Staff was united and Hitler actually wanted to take the UK out of the war by force.


----------



## Old Sweat (12 Nov 2007)

David,

You also have to accept, against the experience of virtually every Allied amphibious landing of the war, that the German plan would have gone off without a hitch. And this would have happened in the absence of any joint doctrine, command and control arrangements, specialized trained naval forces, rehersals and . . . 

Hope is not a principle of war.


----------



## vonGarvin (12 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> David,
> 
> You also have to accept, against the experience of virtually every Allied amphibious landing of the war, that the German plan would have gone off without a hitch. And this would have happened in the absence of any joint doctrine, command and control arrangements, specialized trained naval forces, rehearsals and . . .



You're right in the key area: JOINT is key, and the German forces were more like four arms going off in four directions (Army, Navy, Airforce and Waffen-SS).  THAT is why it would never have happened, and why it didn't happen.  If one person rose up and said "I'm in Charge" and Hitler said "I second that motion, and carried", then it would have been pulled off.  Not because of German competence or incompetence, but because of British weakness at the time.  The coast wasn't really that well defended, there were scarcely enough reserves to conduct counter moves.  And I am NOT saying that the Germans would have won, but simply that the first stage, the landings, could have been done successfully, and those forces could have been kept in supply and reinforced, and as early as September 1940.
Had they waited much longer, the British forces had time to build up a much more effective defence.

Though the landings would have been a goon show, consider this.  Look at the situation on the West Front in January 1940.  Suppose we were sitting in a cafe somewhere in February 1940, and I were to say to you that that the Germans had a plan to invade Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France and that ALL of them would be under COMPLETE German control in 6 months, you would have called me mad.  And I would have been.  NOBODY could have foreseen the complete and utter success of the Wehrmacht in 1940.  

Now, the western Allies liked to have EVERY condition for success set prior to launching.  Well, maybe not every condition, but...
The Russians weren't so keen on making everything just right, and the Germans were somewhere in the middle.  At Kursk, they overprepared.  Crete was run on a shoestring, but somehow pulled that one off. 

All I am saying is that the Germans would not have had everything "just right" prior to launching, but they didn't launch because they lacked a personality to give the whole system a kick start in the right direction.  And to maintain focus.

Also, given the disposition of UK forces in September 1940, the defence of the UK was hastily arranged and certainly not thorough.  The landings would not have been "Omaha-beach-esque", but rather more like what happened in Norway or Crete.  Heck, if nothing else, Crete  illustrates what could have happened in the UK if there were a novel plan and an aggressive commander.
So, I maintain that the Germans could have seized a port, and kept it supplied.  As for US reaction, they didn't come when France was overrun, so why would they come if the UK were overrun?  (Not that I'm saying that the UK would have been overrun)


----------



## Old Sweat (12 Nov 2007)

To now "quisle"* a bit, the state of the ground forces in the UK at the time was pathetic, and it didn't improve all that much for another year or two. The number of formations did increase, as did their training, but the troops were short of all sorts of equipment well into 1942. Canadian Military Headquarters submitted a report to Ottawa dated 19 September 1941 on the state of the army in the UK on 31 August; it is scarey reading. A few examples in the Canadian Corps will suffice (read - equipment, holdings, establishment): Bren Guns, 2241, 2961; 2-in Mortar, 234, 466; Universal Carriers, 528, 770; Infantry Tanks, 45, 192; 25-pdr Fd Gun, 187, 256; 2-pdr ATk Gun, 96, 198; 40mm LAA gun, 20, 137. This is a year after the invasion was planned to take place. At this time the coprs consisted of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 3rd Infantry Division which was arriving in the UK. The last formation would not have been operationally ready for a few months, because the equipment state in Canada was even worse and it required a period of training.

* I used my status as a senior citizen to create the verb 'to quisle" for to abandon one's position and go over to the other side. The word was coined in dishonour of Quisling, the Norwegian who earned his nation's undying hatred by heading the puppet government after the German conquest.


----------



## vonGarvin (12 Nov 2007)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> * I used my status as a senior citizen to create the verb 'to quisle" for to abandon one's position and go over to the other side. The word was coined in dishonour of Quisling, the Norwegian who earned his nation's undying hatred by heading the puppet government after the German conquest.



And thus a new word is born!  LOL


----------



## observor 69 (12 Nov 2007)

Ref "what if " history I saw this one last night "WHEN HITLER INVADED BRITAIN."

http://www.offthetelly.co.uk/reviews/2004/hitler.htm

The above linked review is right on the money, show had some good ideas but it failed on others.


----------



## Old Sweat (12 Nov 2007)

I also saw the show and was a little let down.

Now, let me throw something really odd into the equation. I quoted figures from a Canadian Military Headquarters report of 19 September 1941 in my previous post. In the Summer of 1940 the only mobile reserve in the UK was 7 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General AGL McNaughton, consisting of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 1st British Armoured Division, a New Zealand Brigade (+) and elements of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which were beginning to arrive. None of the formations had any anti-aircraft guns and the 2nd Division as well as the Corps Troops had little to one operational equipment.

On 30 August 1940 McNaughton headed a Canadian team which attended a meeting at the War Office to discuss the above and the equipment state in general. The following was the British position:

a. "equipment will be placed where it is most needed" and large consignments to the Middle East were necessary.

b. No Bofor guns were available in England except for ADGB (Air Defence of Great Britain); all others were going to Haifa and Alexandria.

c. The whole output of Boys Atk Rifles is going to the Middle East until 15 September. Then two brigades - one for Iceland and one for West Africa - had to be equipped before the 2nd Division could receive its 25% training scale. 

d. The situation re field guns was even worse.

If the situation in the UK was that dire, why was the War Office giving priority to overseas theatres? What did they know, or were they gambling, or did they have to make difficult decisions? By the way, Churchill acted as his own Minister of Defence at the time.


----------



## FascistLibertarian (13 Nov 2007)

> Remember, key here is that the entire coast of the UK was not manned to the same extent as the German "Festung Europa" we faced off against in 1944.  The l(anding would have been opposed, naturally, but not to the same extent that we faced.  In fact, maybe the Germans would have tried a different approach?  Seize the "far bank" of the channel from the other side?  Fallschirmjaeger, instead of dropping inland in blocking positions, instead drop around the landing sites, eliminating opposition (with Luftwaffe support, on the coast, well within range of fighters AND bombers, instead of deeper inland), and allowing the sea borne force to land unopposed?



How many places could the Germans have landed? Does anyone have any idea what the ranges of the invasion barges?



> During the war, we saw the ascendence of the airplane over the Battleship: the Bismarck was sunk due to "obselete" aircraft delivering wave after wave of punishment.  Given that both sides (Luftwaffe and RAF) would have been about equal range from the fight, and given that the Luftwaffe outnumbered the RAF, the Luftwaffe would have won that battle.



The problem I have with this statement is that no battleship had ever been sunk by aircraft when out of port in 1940. Wasnt until the two British battleships got sunk by the Japanese that people really realised how vunerable the battleships were.

And the Germans were practising landings, I know this because they carried out landings on Dieppe and figured that you couldnt land tanks there because it was a rock and not sand beach (hence the Canadian tanks were a suprise).


----------



## vonGarvin (13 Nov 2007)

FascistLibertarian said:
			
		

> The problem I have with this statement is that no battleship had ever been sunk by aircraft when out of port in 1940. Wasnt until the two British battleships got sunk by the Japanese that people really realised how vunerable the battleships were.


On 11-12 November, 1940 (eg: 67 years and one day ago from today), the RN attacked the Italian Fleet, in port, at Taranto.  The conventional wisdom at the time suggested that such attacks could only occur in deeper water.  At least for torpedo attacks.  The Germans may have resorted to dive bomber attacks on ships that would be approaching the invasion force.  I believe it was the Soviet Battleship MARAT that was sunk in this manner, by Hans Ulrich Rudel, but I'm not certain.

Now, throw this into the mix.  Assume that the Germans (for some reason) decide to focus on the UK and not the USSR throughout 1940/41.  _WHAT IF _ the Germans waited until spring, 1941 to hit the UK?  _WHAT IF _ the Bismarck (and Prinz Eugen, naturally), headed out to the Jutland instead of the North Atlantic to intercept an RN counter-invasion force?  I am of the opinion that nothing like that would have happened due to many factors, not the least of which was the opinion in Germany that the UK was finished as a threat to German expansion to the East.


----------



## Old Sweat (13 Nov 2007)

Never being loathe to join a rush up a blind alley, I believe the first major fleet units sunk at sea by aircraft were the Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. They feel prey to a combination of torpedo and level bombing attacks by a large number of trained Japanese aircrew based in Vietnam. Did the Germans have crews trained in the use of these disciplines against capital ships in mid-1940? Remember, the target is moving which complicates hitting what is a small target given the inaccuracy of delivery in those days. Presumably the Stuka would have improved things, but again the target was moving and a ship could apply concentrated AA fire.


----------



## old medic (13 Nov 2007)

> Remember, the target is moving which complicates hitting what is a small target given the inaccuracy of delivery in those days. Presumably the Stuka would have improved things, but again the target was moving and a ship could apply concentrated AA fire.



I believe the purpose of navy dive bombers was to hit moving ships on the deck, where there was no armour belt. 
The dive was to provide the accuracy and limit the AA exposure.  The ship couldn't concentrate AA fire if the torpedo
planes were attacking at the same time.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dive_bomber


> The first recorded use of dive bombing was an ad-hoc solution by RAF pilots during World War I. During 1917 and 1918 they practiced the technique at the Orford Ness Bombing Range, but the aircraft of the day were generally too frail to be able to withstand the acceleration generated when pulling out of the dive after releasing the bombload. Only a few years later, U.S. Marines nevertheless put the system to use in Haiti and Nicaragua.
> 
> As planes grew in strength and load capability, the technique became more valuable. By the early 1930s, the technique was clearly favored in tactical doctrine, notably against targets that would otherwise be too small to hit with level bombers. While the USAAC concentrated on mass attacks by very large bombers, the U.S. Navy ordered the first custom dive bomber aircraft, the Curtiss F8C Hell-Diver biplane (not to be confused with the single-winged Douglas SBD or later SB2C Helldiver).
> 
> In the early 1930s, Ernst Udet visited the U.S. and was able to purchase four F8C's and ship them to Germany. There they caused a minor revolution. The dive bombing technique would allow a much smaller Luftwaffe to operate effectively in the tactical role, and this was all they were interested in. Soon they had sent out contracts for their own dive bomber designs, resulting in the gull-winged Junkers Ju 87 Stuka (a contraction of Sturzkampfflugzeug, literally "diving warplane").


----------



## vonGarvin (13 Nov 2007)

Though not sunk by aircraft attack, the Bismarck was certainly wounded enough by them to be finished off by....the Germans (it was scuttled, though certainly would have sunk without further help, but I digress).  That of course was in May, 1941.  

Though not trained in the use of Dive Bombers to attack ships, they were _relatively _ slow moving targets, and the Marat was indeed sunk by Hans Ulrich Rudel using a Ju-87 in 1941.  Necessity being the mother of invention, and not having an effective surface fleet anywhere near the capabilities of the RN, the Germans would have had to resort to air attacks, level and dive.  Though I'm pretty sure that they would have resorted to dive bombers, given their increased accuracy over level bombers.  And the survivability of the Fairey Swordfish facing off against the Bismarck at speeds of less than 100 knots gives credibility to _some _ aircraft getting through.


Remember, the RN was built "for the high seas".  Only under a LOT of air cover could it venture near shore.  I am just stating that the RN moving into the Channel would have had to at least contend with wave after wave of Luftwaffe attacks, especially if it entered the channel from the East, where on a good day one side of the channel could see the other.  Given the shorter range to their bases, the Luftwaffe bombers would have had a much better air cover than they "enjoyed" over the UK.  And the RAF would not have had "home field advantage" that they had over the UK, when shot-down pilots could bail out, make their way back to the aerodrome and fly another day.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (13 Nov 2007)

Speculative history is fun if not very rigorous.

I would add to this, however, that the Norwegian foray had severely depleted the Kreigsmarine (in terms of damage and sinkings).  That campaign was a very near-run thing and the Narvik episode showed what could happen when the RN (both light units and the _Warspite_) came to grips with surface units.

The naval covering force given Overlord was truly impressive, and the Germans could not have even come close to matching that against a much more formidable threat.

To give some credence to the possibility of success, however, we can look to the Japanese Malaya campaign where a rather small joint Japanese force (ie a mix of naval, air and ground units) used the sea and mobility to hustle the British forces into a pen and utlimately surrender.   Now, the Japanese had uncontested control of the sea and pretty much the air.  The Germans could not have realistically achieved those two conditions for a channel attack.  Unlike Malaya in 1941, the Home Fleet would have come down under the cover of the RAF and with its own aircraft carriers in 1940.    

The Germans did get the _Scharnhorst_ and_ Gneiseneau _ through the channel later in the war, but that was a different proposition than gambling an invasion force in barges.  Barges!  I think that it was Churchill who lamented mid-war that everything seemed to hinge on these things calls LSTs.  The requirement for specialized equipment, organization and training for a successful amphibious operation was highlighted throughout the war.  What worked in 1066 would not have necessarily worked in 1940.  Could some Germans have reached the shore?  Sure.  Would enough have made it take the island?  Very doubtful.  Would the follow-on forces have been able to make it as well in the face of the RAF and RN and without the benefit of surprise?  Very doubtful again.  A few well-handled destroyer squadrons could make a mess of a barge fleet.  If the barges go over at night then the Luftwaffe can't do too much to help and the RN destroyers have a field day.  If they go in daylight then they go with all the joy of a daylight opposed crossing of the English Channel.

Now, take away the RAF and the situation changes.  Hence the saying about so many owing so much to so few.

Looking at Dieppe, the Germans did determine that the beach was impassible to tanks due to their own trials.  That does not mean that they were practicing a beach landing.  They could have simply driven one tank across the beach and said, "OK, that sucked."  As a further aside the Canadians were also aware of this and took measures to deal with the chert (the lead tank of each three had a bobbin that deployed a chespaling carpet.  A surprising amount of tanks actually got across the beach.  It was the concrete barriers to the town that stopped the tanks.  The bonus of the chert was that the Germans didn't put AT mines on the beach.  Anyhoo.


----------



## time expired (13 Nov 2007)

I still cling to my contention that air superiority was a prerequisite for
an invasion to have had any chance of success.Someone bought up the
fact that the Luftwaffe managed to achieve local air superiority during
the Battle of France,this was against an air defence system without any
sort of central control agency.This cannot can be compared to the very
efficient British system, which would have denied the Germans any chance
of the success they had over a disintergrating France.
Given the range of the German fighters,the limit of effective German
bombing,one must look at the landing beaches available to the Wehrmacht,
the Thames estuary or the white cliffs of Dover a daunting prospect given
that the RAF would at least have control of the air part of the day.A sky
full of JU 52 carrying paras would have caused a major increase in the
number of aces in the RAF.
I have not even included the sea conditions in the channel or the Royal Navy
in this scenario,but IMHO without intervention of the space invaders Operation
Sea Lion was just not on.
                            Regards


----------



## vonGarvin (13 Nov 2007)

The RAF was part of that air defence system in France.  Even with ULTRA (giving the Brits forewarning of the invasion), there was not enough ground forces to fend off the Germans.  And to say that the RAF would have destroyed the ground forces/invasion fleet, well, even with total air supremacy in 1944, the Wehrmacht was able to function for weeks against overwhelming odds.  In the end, airpower, though necessary, isn't sufficient to win wars/battles.  
Also, the ranges to the beaches wasn't as far as one would think, and the beaches were in some cases "land-able".  As well, the Germans were innovative when coming up with battle plans, perhaps seizing a port through a strategem involving paratroops, etc.

As well, someone mentioned the Sandhurst wargame of 1974.  I read a review of it online.  There were some "fallacies" (IMHO)  For example, even as the forces are invading, the Luftwaffe is still hitting London (instead of prepping the beaches: the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, designed to support the army, not reduce cities to rubble)
I would LOVE to get my hands on the OOB for August, 1940 and game this using both an intuitive system, and perhaps even see "how it goes".  
For starters, though, I would have to inject myself as the ueberfuehrer, and forget for a moment that nothing like this could have been mounted not due to lack of resources, but rather due to incompetence in the German high command

Anyway, back to the drawing board


----------



## a_majoor (14 Nov 2007)

Hey now, we are still waiting for further installments of Pandora in a Bottle! 

You are not allowed to play in *this time-line* until that other story gets done!


Signed;
_The Director of Alternative Universes and Privileged Frames of Reference_.


----------



## Flip (14 Nov 2007)

> The Director of Alternative Universes and Privileged Frames of Reference.


 :rofl:

I'd like something like that on a bumper sticker.... ;D

Even if there were no plans to invade the British Isles,
which effectively there weren't, the issue remains.

What use would those islands be without the RAF?
The seige if Britain would be the next chapter and
the outcome would be significantly different from
the real world course.

The invasion of Europe from the south might have been 
only show going and they might never have acheived the
victory they had in the timeframe ending in '45.

Western Europe might now speak Russian as a first
language!   

Just a few idle thoughts....


----------



## a_majoor (14 Nov 2007)

The biggest problem with alternative history is that the calculus changes very rapidly once you change multiple starting conditions (or go very far into the past, see http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/64004/post-608893.html#msg608893).

For the Germans to have invaded the UK with any measure of success would have required a lot of changes to the set-up conditions, many which date long before the beginning of the Second World War (German infatuation with Manouevre Warfare can be dated to the late 1917 early 1918 period of WWI as Sturmtruppen tactics were developed. From this came the idea of using airpower as a tactical force multiplier rather than a strategic asset. Both technological and _institutional_ factors prevented the development of a German "P-51 Mustang" analogue). Similar changes can be made about the political institutions of National Socialist Germany, the personalities and interactions of the German General Staff and subordinate formations, German industry and logistics and so on.

Similar arguments can be made for the UK as well. It was not a "done deal" that Churchill would become Prime Minister after Chamberlain, and various factors could have influenced the fighting ability of the Home Guard, 1rst Canadian Division and other formations available to defend the UK. For that matter, the British also had a home grown Fascist movement, who may well have welcomed the imposition of National Socialist rule in the UK (or bitterly opposed it as well).

There is also the unqualifiable influence of chance. The weather could have helped or frustrated possible landings. Germany always had limited resources, a train crash might have upset the logistical balance preventing the flow of fuel or munitions to the Luftwaffe for a critical period, and so on.



You can see why the activities of the _Directorate of Alternative Universes and Privilaged Frames of Reference _ are so important. Remember to mention the crucial work we do next time you speak to your elected representatives.  ;D


----------



## time expired (14 Nov 2007)

MR,
    The RAF in France was not part of any air defence system simply 
because no such system existed,the RAF flew standing patrols in the
faint hope that the Luftwaffe bombers would fly into areas that they
were patrolling.This generally did not happen, instead they were
ambushed by superior numbers of fighters and on return to their
bases found the ruins of there support echelons.There was very little
coordination with the French,who also had no air defence system,
and there were cases of French air bases refusing to refuel RAF aircraft
and French civilians actually hindering RAF personal trying to service
their aircraft on ad hoc airfields.I sometimes wonder why we spent
so much blood and national treasure to defend and liberate this
country.
     This thread was started as a discussion of the chances of a German 
invasion given the situation as it existed in 1940 but seems to have
degenerated into an alternative history forum,interesting but not
very relevent to discussion at hand,and I will stick to my guns and
maintain that,given the defeat of the Luftwaffe,the lack of preparedness
of the Wehrmacht and the disinterest of the Kreigsmarine,Operation
Sea Lion was definitely "not good to go".
    Another point not mentioned, is the intense and largely ignored
work done by Bomber Command in the attacks on the ports of 
departure of the German invasion fleet. They apparently did some
good work,night bombing of seacoasts was much easier the finding
targets on the mainland.
                              Regards


----------



## vonGarvin (14 Nov 2007)

time expired said:
			
		

> This thread was started as a discussion of the chances of a German
> invasion given the situation as it existed in 1940 but seems to have
> degenerated into an alternative history forum,interesting but not
> very relevent to discussion at hand...


I would argue that any discussion of "what would have happened if..." is the same as a "what if..".  I mean, the Wehrmacht did NOT attempt an invasion of the UK.  Would it have succeeded?  Well, the only way to go down that route is to say "what if.."
For example
"What if the Wehrmacht seriously planned to invade the UK?  How would the preparations have been different?  Could they have pulled it off?"
That is the jist of this discussion.  Now, I maintain that even mounting an invasion was impossible.  Period.  Now, inject the first diversion, that is, somehow make Hitler really really want the UK occupied.  Now what?  
Some would say "the Germans would have had no chance."  I say "Poppy cock".  Here's why: in war there are so many variables that there is no "certain thing".  To illustrate, suppose that for some reason you and I are sitting in an internet chat room in February, 1940.  We are talking about the Sitzkrieg, and what the prospects are for the Germans.  I say to you "The Germans will invade through Belgium and Holland, and in *ten days *will have the entire BEF backed up against the channel, along with a large French force.  Then, one month after that, France will surrender.  Six weeks is all they need."  You would have called me a noob and told me to quit trolling.  There was NO WAY that Germany, with its inferior quality and number of tanks, and its inferior number of planes, could even pull ANYTHING like that off.  As for Belgium, Eben Emael will stop any invading force long enough to allow reinforcements to come up. And the Maginot Line is IMPREGNABLE.
See what I mean?  Innovation is a concept of war that is hard to factor.  Could the Germans have seized a port in some sort of Trojan Horse operation?  Maybe.  And if they did, imagine ship after ship unloading tank after tank.  Yes, the RAF comes in, but guess what, the Luftwaffe is ready.  And so on and so forth.
So, never say never.


----------



## Old Sweat (15 Dec 2007)

I know that this thread has been resting peacefully for nearly a month, but at the risk of ruining a certain participant's homecoming by tying him to his computer instead of enjoying his family, here is some new material. It, which is based on solid research several years ago, suggests that Sea Lion and even an attempt to bounce an airborne invasion, were non starters. This material is taken from The Most Dangerous Enemy, A History of the Battle of Britain by Stephen Bungay.

First - the airborne option. As early as 18 June General Milch proposed to Goering that the Germans carry out an airborne operation to capture the airfields in south-east England and supply them by air. Goering refused because it was far too risky and he only had one airborne division available.

Second - regarding the German's ability to attack the Royal Navy. According to the order of battle of the Luftwaffe in June 1940, there were only 22 JU 88 bombers trained in maritime attack as well as 29 obsolete torpedo bombers. Moreover their heaviest bombs were incapable of piercing the deck armour of British battleships. 

The author assesses Sea Lion as a desperate gamble wich depended upon complete cooperation between the three services, the complete neutralization of the RAF and the RN and benign weather. He notes that the landing barges which were towed in pairs at a top speed of three knots could not withstand more than a force 2 sea state, an unlikely situation in late September which was the planned assault window.


----------



## vonGarvin (16 Dec 2007)

wait out ;D

(You're right: family time)


----------



## dfuller52 (21 Nov 2008)

I think you are referring to Dame Fanny Lucy Houston (1857–1936), who was quite a character. Here's an extract from her entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. This episode is featured in the Leslie Howard movie _Spitfire_.

"As part of her longing to see Britain supreme everywhere she donated £100,000 to enable a British team to compete for the Schneider aviation trophy (1931) and gave large gifts to the Navy League."

http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34015



			
				Flip said:
			
		

> I tip my hat to the old lady who finanaced the development of the Merlin Engine.
> The government didn't want to pay for it and it could have died on the drawing board.
> I'll try to to look up her name.......
> Without the Merlin - no Spits, Hurricanes, Mustangs, Lancs etc. etc.


----------



## Spr.Earl (18 Dec 2008)

It was the young men were the tipping point along with the Hurricane and then the Spit.
The hurricane had already been produced in great number's where as the Spit was just getting into production and took more time to build than the Hurricane due to it's design.


----------

