# what  if you were the power to be



## FormerHorseGuard (19 Jul 2005)

after all the complaining about the tanks being retired, here is your chance to state your ideas

rules are 
1) must buy  enough for 3 sqns for RCD, LSH, 12 RBC, plus enough for res training 4 sqn in total
2) pick your method of transport to area of operations, air, sea, land
3) pick your model and state why you  think it would be the best
4) money is unlimited after all this is the internet
5) then think of how you would do it when you look today's Canadian Forces lack of aircraft, lack of ships

this is not an easier thing to balance, do not forget politics, offending other nations, and of course sending all the money  out of Canada for overseas buys. Do not think there is a company in Canada that  could build tanks and make a porfit of it.

so let us see your choices


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## Bomber (19 Jul 2005)

I'll bite

CV 90's, all variants upto and including the CV 90-120.  1500 vehicles total, so you could equip the reg mech inf as well.


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## Bomber (19 Jul 2005)

Put a plant out west this, like they planed with the BV's only this time do it for real and make CV's


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## Infanteer (21 Jul 2005)

I agree with Bomber's plan.  8)


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## Tebo (23 Jul 2005)

100% agree with CV90. Canadian tech exists as well.   Task enough Canadian companies in the contruction of a CV90 like vehicle and do it in house.   Investment in our industry.   Eitherway, there should be much political support once a 'peace enforcment' mission turns into war and the enemy starts killing off Canadian boys sections at a time.

Those unfamiliar with the CV90 may look to this website: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/cv90/.   Let us hope the total occupation and use of our country by a beligerant nation must not occur before we take actions similar to Sweden.


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## Black Watch (23 Jul 2005)

strykers or cv90


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## ChopperHead (29 Jul 2005)

I think the STORMER 30 made in the UK would be great. The Stormer 30 fulfils a variety of military and peacekeeping functions, providing reconnaissance, fire support, escort duties, armour in advance and withdrawal.   The vehicle has tank killing capability and the cannon can defeat the best armoured LAV'S.
Oh I almost forgot to add that they can be loaded into a C-130. 



Kyle


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## ChopperHead (29 Jul 2005)

On another note I dont see what would be wrong with buying Russian equipment Im not sure here But I do belive that russian made vehicles can be bought for alot cheaper then buying from say the US or Britan I supose it may not be the most advaced or anything but hey you get what you pay for.
Im sure we could probably pick up some T-90's to replace the Leo's for probably about what the MGS will cost maybe Im completely out to lunch here but I think Im pretty close. And Personaly I'd rather have a tank beside me rather then a glorified LAV.





Kyle.


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## mover1 (29 Jul 2005)

http://www.sinodefence.com/army/tank/type98.asp

Type 98. Chinese tanks would be the way to go. Logistically it would be the easiest to maintain and cost effective (We could outsource our supply and repairs to WAL-Mart). Parts and spares cost a minimum (Power packs were $4.99 now we can get 3 for $4.37  ) and it has all the good things from all the tanks in the world put unto one huge knockoff product.

Logistically we could supply all three regiments with these vehicles and have one regiments worth in a European or Asian location so we can ship them out to where ever quicker than from Canada.

I think it would be a good buy. But then again what do I know.

Th lack of ships and aircraft. Well thats another story. The navy is already looking at new supply ships and is not very practical to ship a tank by air. A little fore thought, having  a  deployment plan, equipment in a forward location, and an annual deployment excercise.We could have the equipment in theater even before the ground troop finished dagging.

Aside from the phsycological factor are tanks relevant? But that was discussed in anothe thread.


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## Gramps (29 Jul 2005)

I like the Merkava because its a f**king  sports car not a tank.


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## Spr.Earl (29 Jul 2005)

I'd make Light Inf.,with Para's,with LAV's along with Light Armour as what we have now but I would still keep our 109's and tank's ,yes we have the new gun but no gun tractor for it.

Now some mud gunners are going to become Mortar Men!
Big F'n mistake, we will alway's need short and medium range Herbies!!!.

Also make heavy Inf. along with medium Arty (109's).,Eng (AVLB's ,Badger's ) along with the Tank's. 
Look at our past wer did it before.

Two Heavy battle Groups with two Light Battle Groups and both are inter-changeable with in limits.
We can and could do it,if the power's that be thought about it and if they bought some bloody air lift capability or a decent ship.I think we could sustain all 4,two light and two heavy.
Hey thats all we got.
We have the talent in the C.F, but it's up to the CDS now where we go from here.

But I stil believe we stiil need TANK's and TRACKED ARTY!!!

Just my own thoughts.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (31 Jul 2005)

OK, I'll bite:


Cease the DFS unit _experiment_ now
Cancel all work on MGS
Retire ADATS.  Sell all but nine systems.  Remaining nine for air defence only.
Reconfigure all regular armoured regiments with 2 x sabre sqns, 1 x LRAAW (TOW) sqn and 1 x Coyote sqn
Purchase 90 x CV-90s - off the shelf - as an _interim_ vehicle
TOW to the Armour Corps.  Infantry PYs to be used to round out rifle companies.  Look at reactivating the 4th coy in each bn.
Return mortars to the infantry and look at 120mm rather than 81mm
Return pioneers to the infantry
Javelin for the infantry
VBL (or similar) for recce units (armour reserve and infantry)
M777 for the gunners - all the gunners.  Retire the LG1 and C3
Invest in the US future rapid effects vehicle to replace CV 90
Lease (with a maint package) 6 x C-17s
Replace the Hercs - one for one
Retain a smaller number of Griffons as utility aircraft.  Sell what's left.
1 x sqn of Predator UAVs (aside from those in the guns)
1 x sqn of medium lift helicopters (Chinook, Stallion, etc.)
1 x sqn of attack aviation (AH-1Z, AH-64D, Tiger, etc.)
SOG - 3 x light infantry bns, SF bn (JTF-2), support battalion, deployable (separate) HQ
Buy enough ammunition so that each soldier in the Army - the whole Army - fires a personal weapon and (if applicable) his/her weapon system live every year

OK, I'll stop - I'm making all this up on the fly and am getting light-headed...  You asked!   ;D


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## FormerHorseGuard (1 Aug 2005)

that  last one makes some sense........do not pass it up to Ottawa. it would take 3 generals, and a whole pile of full colonels and some half colonels plus a full mess hall staff making donuts and coffee for 6 months to a year to supply  them with the food and treats for their meetings and  a whole pile of clerks to type up the reports and make copies to supply  the rest of the NDHQ staffers in planning and purchassing, plus various SSO arty, armour, Inf and airforce. Only to have them say no way this is too simple and maybe too cost effective. Bits of it might pass but the cabinet minister would kill it...not his ideas


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## Fishbone Jones (1 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Return pioneers to the infantry



TR,
Return assault troops to the armoured?


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Aug 2005)

That was a given!


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## Unknown Factor (1 Aug 2005)

recceguy said:
			
		

> TR,
> Return assault troops to the armoured?



Why does it always come back to this? - I love you guys but in order for the machine to work a certain reality must be accepted, the past is the past, the future is now - we have to re-configure the whole army so that the machine works.

An Army as small as ours can't be held back by a command structure that is organized to command a virtual Army simular to that of the US.  Potentially every single change that is made has merit but until Officer Training requires an officer to train within all branches of the Cbt Arms the utilization and flexability of the combat team will never be totally utilized (and this includes Lt. Forces).  Every TF Comd, Brigade Comd and plug/play Comd I've worked for undoubtably knows his stuff but regardless of which branch he represented always favored his own flavor.  I personally would like to see a Officer Command qual within the Army, one which requires service and study of all Cbt Arms, because without it none of this is ever going to work as staff studying is proving to be not as effective. - Cheers!


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Aug 2005)

You do know that this happens, don't you?  Virtually all officer training about the troop leader/platoon commander level requires a fairly substantial knowledge of the other arms and services.  The Combat Team Commander's course actually assesses on the officer's ability to effectively employ all the sub-units under his command.  Moreover, joint staff training (at the Maj level) requires a fairly detailed knowledge of both the AF and Navy.  I'm never (hopefully) going to dismount on the objective, but I sure as hell know what happens there (not that we do that anymore, mind you).

Did you read my original wish list (or, for that matter, the question which prompted it)?  The question was armour-related and was answered in that vein - although I expanded a bit to include some infantry-related points.  Frankly, I don't see your point or where your problem is.  Because I like having an assault troop in Recce Sqn?  So what?  How does that reflect my knowledge of how the rest of the Army works? 

My point is that the "reconfiguration" in its current form is broken and that the "solutions" being offered are not financially or operationally effective.  If you have ideas to the contrary, lets hear 'em.


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## Unknown Factor (1 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> You do know that this happens, don't you?   Virtually all officer training about the troop leader/platoon commander level requires a fairly substantial knowledge of the other arms and services.   The Combat Team Commander's course actually assesses on the officer's ability to effectively employ all the sub-units under his command.



I am quite aware that this "happens", as I am quite aware that not one of them are actually integrated within the "others" Cbt Unit for any length of time.  To say that one has to have substantial knowledge is without quarel, mind you knowledge does not transpire to proper utilization of those within your command either.  Mind you I am not picking on the Armoured here, I am picking on every Cbt Arms trade including my own.  I am mearly saying that what an officer is capable of accomphishing "virtually" - (such as JANUS) does not transpire within the context of operations, mainly due to the fact that every soldier, regardless of rank - when placed under preasure will almost always refer back to the basics, meaning that even the 'Major' with all of his knowledge will not utilize the neccesary course of action but rather the safer one, the one that he knows.

So to get back to what I was saying, in my opinion if the Army is going to become more integrated within the Cbt Arms it would only seem prudent that they develop Officers towards command of all elements rather than with a specific Cbt Arms trade.  This by no stretch of the imagination suggests that Officer training in Canada in insufficent but rather too late to be developing leaders for Combined Arms.  As well and good that most peoples intentions are, they will always take care of their own, remove the trade and I'll give you a leader.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Aug 2005)

I'll admit that I'm confused as to (1) what brought this discussion on and (2) how you can generalize so dramatically, given that we haven't conducted real combat team operations in a very long time (OK, never).  If you have experience to the contrary, that's fine - so do I.

I'll restate my position; my post was designed to address the original question - which had an armour slant.  Want me to pontificate about the infantry?  I can - ad nauseum - but would quickly be put in my place by those with far more detailed knowledge about the subject. 

Frankly, you're expecting an awful lot.  Essentially what you're saying is that an officer - particularly a senior officer - should have an _intimate_ knowledge of all the combat arms and be interchangable between the various arms. "A jack of all trades, but master of none".  I would suggest that such a proposal isn't very realistic given the training time required - soldiers are already complaining that the officers don't spend enough time within units.  Moreover, the level of knowledge required may well be unattainable (by us normal humans anyway).

Again, we have digressed from the point of the thread quite dramatically - and I fail to see what prompted it (perhaps the reference to assault troops? or the fact that I think TOW should belong in armoured regiments?).  I stand by my little "pulled out of my a*s" list in the absence of a proposal to the contrary.


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## Unknown Factor (1 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Again, we have digressed from the point of the thread quite dramatically - and I fail to see what prompted it (perhaps the reference to assault troops? or the fact that I think TOW should belong in armoured regiments?).   I stand by my little "pulled out of my a*s" list in the absence of a proposal to the contrary.



I agree, and perhaps this is not he place to discuss the intracacies of leadership, my point is that you can buy and restructure the entire Army but without addressing the lack of functionality within command the bun fight will continue as to who runs or gets what.  So though it is great to want new equipment and try to place specific requirements I'm only stating that all to often we ignore the common difficulty within the Army and that is to actually have commanders that *do employ* all elements under their command correctly.  But you got to admit you are dressing up 'old ideas' in new clothes.  Oh and please, I clearly stated that I am concerned with all Cbt Arms, I am not picking a side.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Aug 2005)

> But you got to admit you are dressing up 'old ideas' in new clothes.



Ahhh, that's better.

Yes, my ideas are - to an extent - old ones.  However, I'm going by the adage "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".  Moreover, I should think that provision of attack aviation, medium lift, new guns, UAVs, 4th rifle companies, a Special Operations group, leasing of aircraft, etc., etc.. is hardly "old think", although others have said the same thing before.

If you're looking for a complete restructure as was attempted with the DFS Regiment, I don't feel that we have such a significant problem with Army structure that the abandonment of current battalion-level institutions is required.  In fact, I often think that we're engaging in restructure initiatives just to be seen to be doing something, rather than attempt to find real solutions to tactical problems.  The DFS Regiment (IMHO) is a perfect example - unusable in any rational tactical sense.  I've personally seen no evidence that the traditional structures (battalions, regiments, etc.) are incapable of operating in the current tactical enviornment - _if properly resourced and trained_.  The Brits seem to do pretty well.  Again, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.  In Canada, we often attempt to "fix" things by rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic rather than address the underlying problem - the provision of adequate resources.  Sort that out and I suspect you'll find that the Army functions pretty well.

Cheers,

TR


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## Old Sweat (1 Aug 2005)

TR,

As a long-retired officer, I have rerained from dabbling in force structures, organizations and tactics. However, the last sentence of your above post summed the whole thing up. IMHO it is an exercise in futility to design forces or produce wish lists or theorize on better ways of doing things, if these solutions can not fit within any realistic resource envelope. Indeed, to fiddle for the sake of fiddling or to embrace untested concepts without a lot of serious thought and testing is worse than counter-productive. 

As the Chief of the General Staff of the Canadian Army put it in 1927, when faced with a proposal to mechanize the army, "I am strong on sympathy, but short on cash." That surely has to be the motto of the Canadian peace time soldier.


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## Unknown Factor (1 Aug 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> In fact, I often think that we're engaging in restructure initiatives just to be seen to be doing something, rather than attempt to find real solutions to tactical problems.



I believe this is a point we both agree on.   Further more the structuring and employment of a DFS Regt (IMHO) is exactlly that a perfect example.   But a lot of these ideas, rarely incorporate (if at all) the restructuring of Comd, and I am talking in the sense that an Inf Officer does not have a clue when it comes to armour capabilities outside of the 'known' and the same can be said for all.   But I would also argue that just because a capability may be 'new' to this Army, does not make it so.   Not one person in command has employed a Battle Group at the level that is suggested by the equipment on the 'wish list'.   I just wish that along with all the wish lists someone, like yourself, will openly admit that in order for any of this to work the whole process of leading at command level will have to change. What is so difficult that Officers are so unwilling to accept, that your training is not sufficent for what you propose and without accepting to change or improve this equipment will never be put to its full potential.   I would suspect that though the budget may have passed and equipment will be forth comming it will not alter much else other than moral, as leadership and field training will continue to be overlooked due to time, quality of life and unwillingness to accept inadequacy.

 - "Pride is a dangerous trait and proven more often than not will lead to disaster, because nothing has happened does not give credit to the contrary." 

I personally belive that if they want restructuring to work and implementation of new capabilities they improve the ability of an officer to command regardless of structure.  But, though I harbor a great respect for those who's command I have followed, I've yet to seen one who would be capable of what the Army is proposing and no matter how much change the ranks are told to go through to compensate, the problems will always be within the command structure.


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## ArmyRick (1 Aug 2005)

Getting topic back on thread, I would purchase the following
-Black Hawks and Chinooks (I beleive we need these more than new armored vehicle)
-If MGS fails and the US scrap it, then pick up the latest demo version of the XM8 by United Defense (120mm sounds fairly good).
-Pick up the general dynamics LTV with protected weapon station for light recce (can be built in Canada)
-Cheers

I would not pick up the CV90 (even though it is a great vehicle) because we have invested so much in LAVIII already. As the original post said, politics will play a part in procurement.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (1 Aug 2005)

> that your training is not sufficent for what you propose



Veering off-topic again, I find myself wondering what leads you to such a sweeping conclusion.

There are only a couple of nations that have operated at the BG level in combat operations - and we are not one of them.  Actual operations are the only "test" of the system.  Thus far, I have seen little indication that the training of officers at the Major/LCol level is deficient to the extent that command of a square battle group (which is still our doctrine and which is still what we train to) is beyond the "typical" unit commander.  Our training still mirrors (to a decent extent) that of our major allies in this regard - although as I said earlier, resource constraints have gutted our live-fire and collective training at all levels.  _That's about to be fixed - in a big way - at CMTC._  Then we shall see...

I'm having trouble seeing where you feel the training is deficient - live fire combined arms exercises aside - or where your argument is going without specific examples.  All combat arms officers receive fairly extensive training in command of combined arms groupings and are expected to be fully familiar with the traits of all the weapons systems under their command.  Senior officers - even in this resource-constrained setting - will also have a passing (albeit often - _but not always these days_ - theoretical) knowledge of the employment of UAVs, attack aviation, divisional level artillery, SF, air assault, etc..  So, given that, what would you change?

Frankly, I still have some faith in our training but neither you nor I can "win" this argument unless the concept is tested during actual operations.

We're off topic again, and I hate doing this (going off topic, that is) - I suspect we'll have to agree to disagree and leave it at that.


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## a_majoor (1 Aug 2005)

Back on topic and looking at time lines (and resurrecting an older thread, to save some time  )

Make the SEV prototype the basline vehicle for the ENTIRE CF fleet. This is an armoured hull with hybrid diesel electric drive and electric motors in the wheel hubs. The lower hull is armoured and mine resistant, providing protection for the utility and logistics fleet, while the hybrid drive provides fuel economy and electrical power for various uses (powering sensors, tools and accessories or weapons systems like turret drives). Everything from G-wagons, mud recce vehicles,  MLVWs, LAVs and so on could be built from variations of the SEV hull. We could start with SEV lower hull and wheel assemblies to create the MLVW replacement, then build on that experience to replace other elements of the fleet, ideally without any pause in the assembly line production of components (which would otherwise increase the costs).

The primary problem with deployment is the size of the logistics train, if all vehicles had common power systems, high fuel economy, wheels, lower hulls etc, then the size of the logistics train shrinks, and the entire force package is much easier to transport. For more details see: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27679/post-188549.html#msg188549


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