# US Marines looking at new strategy for sustained COIN ops - NDM



## Kirkhill (23 Sep 2005)

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/oct/uf-marines_probing.htm


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## Sig_Des (23 Sep 2005)

Interesting article, and shows possible routes for reorganisation of the USMC.



> The Marine Corps, meanwhile, is recognizing that its traditional doctrine of being the "9-11 force" that shows up in an emergency and then hands over long-term deployment duties the Army may have to be revised.



Do you think this means that the Marines may move away from their MEU concept, or possibly scale it back? Historically, except maybe in Vietnam, the marines have always been a 9-11 force of assault troops that would go in until a larger and more long-term goaled force could take over.


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## Kirkhill (23 Sep 2005)

I think that the MEU, valuable as it is, it was also a convincing reason for the USMC to continue to exist in a "peaceful" environment.  The Marines have always fought for existence.  

Just like Airborne troops, Amphibious troops are perceived as expensive to maintain, can be very expensive to equip and are rarely used.  The Marines, like the Light Infantry in the army have long fought to justify their existence as the prospect of another Guadal, Normandy or Inchon faded.   On the other hand there was ample evidence to suggest that a battalion sized force in the right place at the right time could damp many fires before they got a hold.

Situation now has changed. The Marines no longer need to justify their existence.  Every body in uniform has a job for the foreseeable future if they want it.  Essentially the issue now is not so much putting out spot fires, although some capability there needs to be maintained, but manning a fireline around a wildfire.  

I think they may continue to organize and deploy MEUs,  that may even be their desired "Unit of Action" or unit of deployment.  But the training and reconstitution cycle and the manner in which they integrate with larger Marine formations as well as Army formations will no doubt change.  Their MEU is broadly comparable already to the new army transformational model although that seems to fall somewhere between a MEU (reinforced battalion or Battle Group) and a MEB (reinforce brigade or Brigade Group).


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## Infanteer (23 Sep 2005)

Yes, precisely.  The article makes note that the Marines are looking to rotational cycles as opposed to "in-and-out"; this doesn't change the fact that the MAGTF is an effective warfighting organization.  Really though, what's old is new, as the Marines seem to be ready to dust off the Small Wars Manual in order to prepare for long occupation type missions like they practiced before WWII.


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## Sig_Des (23 Sep 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Really though, what's old is new, as the Marines seem to be ready to dust off the Small Wars Manual in order to prepare for long occupation type missions like they practiced before WWII.



I'll agree with that. That would seem to be whats implied by their returning to the use of the term "small wars" or what's also referred to as the "Banana wars" by some marines. Cuba, Nicaragua, etc.

But the reason that the marines had always fought for their independance, specifically after WWII, was to avoid just being swallowed into the US Army as a specialized battalion or regiment. Their moving to specialize into "irregular" warfare may be a way of keeping their independance, while being a effective fighting force. Will be interesting to see how this develops


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## Infanteer (23 Sep 2005)

Sig_Des said:
			
		

> But the reason that the marines had always fought for their independance, specifically after WWII, was to avoid just being swallowed into the US Army as a specialized battalion or regiment. Their moving to specialize into "irregular" warfare may be a way of keeping their independance, while being a effective fighting force. Will be interesting to see how this develops



You could be on the right track there.  Much of the literature covering USMC history deals with the constant attempts to reinvent itself in order to maintain more relevence than simply "an extention of the Army".


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## Kirkhill (23 Sep 2005)

So the Marines moved to small wars to keep their independence from the Army which didn't want to do COIN.

Now the army is doing small wars in a Joint environment.

What's the next step in the dance?


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## Infanteer (23 Sep 2005)

Space - the final frontier....


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## Sig_Des (23 Sep 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> What's the next step in the dance?



LOL..space...if anyone would do it, it'd be the USMC....

The next dance manoevre, methinks, is to distinguish themselves into a specialty that the US government will see as useful, and decide that it's not worth integrating into the rest of the US armed forces...I don't think the threat of an integration is as serious a threat to the Marines as it was in the late 1800s or 1940s, but it's still something that I think they keep in mind in the Corp's command.


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## ghazise (24 Sep 2005)

First off, the Small Wars Manual has never been dusty,

But having the Marine Corps specifically train for large scale counter-insurgency training, will give us a niche role in long-term sustained operations against an enemy we expect to be present for a long time.

The MEU's are standing units, that after every deployment rotate out and in a battalion/units from within the Regiment, while MEB's are not, with only command staff manning the units and are organized specifically for conflicts.

The USMC in respects to TO&E, especially in the reserves has changed alot since the end of OIF 1, the active duty LAR bn are each adding a line company of LAV's, while 4th LAR (reserve), has converted two tank co, to LAV co, the remaing tank co, were converted to Anti-Terrorism (Light Infantry), giving the Reserves 1 tank bn,  also, Arty Batteries and AD Batteries were also converted to Anti-Terrorism Units, and on the Active duty side they are adding two Infantry Battalions.


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## Kirkhill (24 Sep 2005)

Always good to get it from the horse's mouth 2Ft.  

I think you mentioned previously that there was some thought of converting the 7th to a complete LAV regt.   Is that going anywhere?


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## ghazise (24 Sep 2005)

"I think you mentioned previously that there was some thought of converting the 7th to a complete LAV regt.     Is that going anywhere?"

I never said that nor have I ever heard that .   The Marine Corps doesn't use LAV's for APC, we use the AAV, and hopefully the EFV for transport.   Now at 29 Palms (home of the 7th Marines) there is 3rd LAR up there which will be expanding by a Line Co.   As soon as you designate an entire Regiment as a Mech Regiment they loose their flexibility across the spectrum of warfare.

Our LAR Bn though a quasi mechanized infantry units, are extremely flexible units, through survellience, indirect fire support, Anti-Tank, Armoured Recon, Electronic Warface, Command and Control, Direct-fire support, infantry support, very flexible, very valuable units, that's probably a good reason why Marine Corps leadership is expanding that capability.


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## Kirkhill (24 Sep 2005)

> I never said that nor have I ever heard that



Sorry.


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## Kirkhill (24 Sep 2005)

Perhaps this is what I was recalling - From OIF: Lessons Learnedttp

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_learned.doc



> Topic: Light Armored Regiment And Battalion Organic to the Marine Division
> 
> Discussion: During OIF, nimble, hard-hitting LAR units proved themselves highly versatile and employable across the spectrum:
> - In advance guard, screening, covering force missions
> ...


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## ghazise (24 Sep 2005)

Essentially, if you enmass all three LAR Bn, you have theoritically a LAR Regiment, I don't think re-equipping 7th Marines as LAR Regiment is neccessary, now with FAC capabilities, Marine Corps wide these capabilities are trying to be added, and right now we are trying to improve our mortor and anti-tank capabilities within the LAR Bn, but an assualt gun on LAV I or II chassis is not a good idea.   

But that was a good summary of OIF 1.


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## Kirkhill (24 Sep 2005)

> an assualt gun on LAV I or II chassis is not a good idea.



There seems to be a wide body of opinion questioning whether it is a good idea on a LAV III chassis either. - Or even necessary.

Cheers.


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