# Discussion on the C6 Machine Gun



## daftandbarmy (4 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> That being said, as stated above I am a big proponents for adding _some_ 7.62 capability to more consistently hit 300-600.  But getting back to the purpose of the thread, I think if everyone had a battle rifle we'd be less effective.



And there's a good argument for making sure that we have at least one, and preferably two, C6s in each section. The C9 is nice, but it just isn't as big a bully as 'the General'.


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## HItorMiss (4 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And there's a good argument for making sure that we have at least one, and preferably two, C6s in each section. The C9 is nice, but it just isn't as big a bully as 'the General'.


Negative on the C6, there are lighter/better for section use that are 7.62 look at the MK 48s for instance






_edited to provide continuity from another thread_


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## Illegio (4 Jun 2010)

Two C6s would reduce the already poor mobility of your average section even further. Guys have enough to lump around without the entire section being ammo slaves to a pair of GPMGs. Plus, imagine trying to clear a room with that thing? The sharpshooter rifle complements the section and platoon level MGs without placing  additional burden on the rest of the men.

Even the "mini-C6s" like the Mk. 48 Mod 0 don't address the issue, which is ammo, not the gun. Unless someone is advocating the return of the WW2 Wehrmacht-style section where the entire section is basically built around supporting a single GPMG, I would say the issue of GPMGs in the section is a non-starter.


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## Tetragrammaton (4 Jun 2010)

It might be interesting as part of a "long range" section equipped with 7.62 battle rifles, but generally speaking I believe the C6s work best within the Wpns Det.


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## SeanNewman (4 Jun 2010)

But it suffers from the same faults as 7.62 rifles, as well.  I love the C6 too and I have seen enough pen dems to know how useful it is, but at the end of the day you're going to kill your own troops through fatigue doing section-level movement with a C6.

It is damn hard to hold a C6 on target for a long burst even braced in the prone, and as well it's overkill in terms of range.  Yes it can punch through a lot that a C9 can't, but now you're giving someone a lot more weight to be able to shoot 800-1800m when he might not need to.

A C6 is meant to be a stationary weapon not a mobile one-man system like the C9.  With the sharpshooter rifle, weight will be between a C7 and C9 so that rifleman will still be able to get around.


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## vonGarvin (4 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And there's a good argument for making sure that we have at least one, and preferably two, C6s in each section. The C9 is nice, but it just isn't as big a bully as 'the General'.


Actually, each section already has one, if not two C6's per section.  And an M242 Bushmaster 25mm Chain Gun.  Let us not forget that our infantry is mechanised.  (If only one C6 coax, then the pintle mounted MG is a C9)

(Yes, I understand that we remain flexible enough to allow the ten-soldier section to move about the battlespace without its LAV III APC)


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## Big Red (4 Jun 2010)

The Rhodesians and SAs hauled MAG58s at the section level. Mind you they weren't encumbered with soft armour and plates.

Would be nice to have some Mk48s or Lightweight M240Bs in the armoury for the section to draw for dismounted patrolling. The Russians were onto something with the PKM...


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## daftandbarmy (4 Jun 2010)

Big Red said:
			
		

> The Rhodesians and SAs hauled MAG58s at the section level. Mind you they weren't encumbered with soft armour and plates.



And the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines. Be fit enough to get the General up and give it big licks when you need it...


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## vonGarvin (4 Jun 2010)

When the Brits had the FN SLR, the GPMG (aka "MAG 58") was found at the section level.  That was across the army.  


For its role of direct area suppression fire out to 600m, the LMG we have now is more than able to do that job.


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## vonGarvin (5 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> What is great about the modern battle rifles though is that they are close enough to an assault rifle size-wise that you can insert some 7.62 systems to increase the overall effectiveness at section level, where as a C6 is not swappable with a C9 because it is too big for section movement.


The MAG 58 (aka "C6 GPMG") was used by the British Army as a section support weapon to great effect.  Same with the German Army from WW2 and beyond.  Now, they didn't "pepperpot" with them, but rather were support weapons.  
But, for the role of "direct area suppression fire" out to 600m, the C9 is "good enough".


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## George Wallace (5 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Actually, each section already has one, if not two C6's per section.  And an M242 Bushmaster 25mm Chain Gun.  Let us not forget that our infantry is mechanised.  (If only one C6 coax, then the pintle mounted MG is a C9)
> 
> (Yes, I understand that we remain flexible enough to allow the ten-soldier section to move about the battlespace without its LAV III APC)




And there is NO RULE stating that these weapons (Coax and Pintle Mount A/A) CAN NOT be dismounted and used in the Ground Role.


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## vonGarvin (5 Jun 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> And there is NO RULE stating that these weapons (Coax and Pintle Mount A/A) CAN NOT be dismounted and used in the Ground Role.


Well, the coax in the LAV III APC cannot be used in the ground role simply due to its configuration.  The Pintle-mounted MG, however, certainly can.  As for man-packing the M242....unless Jesse "the body" Ventura is in your section, don't even think about it.


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## Nfld Sapper (5 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And there's a good argument for making sure that we have at least one, and preferably two, C6s in each section. The C9 is nice, but it just isn't as big a bully as 'the General'.



I have yet to see C-6 at the Section Lvl for Engineer Sections at least (well for the Reserves not sure how the Regs are....), for us they are a Troop Lvl weapon with one per Troop (at a min).


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## SeanNewman (5 Jun 2010)

I would agree with the pintle but not the coax.  Too much of a PITA to quickly get the coax out, change it back to bipod/butt etc.

Even if your vehicle was disabled in a war-like scenario, unless the vehicle was at risk by anti-armour assets I would consider leaving the pintle on the vehicle for its elevated position but yes it you had to move anywhere it would only be a matter of taking the pin out to dismount it.

As I wrote on the battle rifle thread though, IMO a GPMG is not really meant for the section.  Of course it provides you more punch and more range; those points are obvious, but until they come out with a GPMG that weighs 5-10 pounds less I don't like the idea of losing the rapid mobility and agility of a section and fatiguing the poor guy carrying it advancing to contact.

IMO I think it's much better off in a weapons det type of role where it can be moved a bound at a time and be static when firing.


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## George Wallace (5 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Well, the coax in the LAV III APC cannot be used in the ground role simply due to its configuration.  The Pintle-mounted MG, however, certainly can.  As for man-packing the M242....unless Jesse "the body" Ventura is in your section, don't even think about it.



There is a reason I put the (Coax and Pintle mounted A/A) in brackets.   ;D

As for the Coax, it is nothing more than storing a Butt plate in the tool box or with a tripod/ground mount in the back/or storage bin.  On the tanks, the Coax and A/A were interchanged to reduce wear and overheating during long engagements (When you can see the rounds actually moving up the translucent barrel and flames coming in through the mantlet as air ignites over the hot barrel, this is a necessity.) or during a Prolonged Stoppage.   It was sometimes quicker to change the whole gun, rather than fart around trying to change a barrel in restricted quarters.


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## vonGarvin (5 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> IMO I think it's much better off in a weapons det type of role where it can be moved a bound at a time and be static when firing.


Old-school section tactics used by us, the brits, etc, did just that with the section support weapons.  

But, not matter how it's used, the C9 LMG fills its intended role quite well, where the range of the GPMG allows the platoon to reach out to 800 (light role) and "much further" when it's on the SF kit.


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## Fishbone Jones (5 Jun 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> And there is NO RULE stating that these weapons (Coax and Pintle Mount A/A) CAN NOT be dismounted  and used in the Ground Role.



This has to be :spam:  The rule is 'Death before dismount'. How dare you even think of such a thing! Turn in your crewman ticket right now! ;D


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## vonGarvin (5 Jun 2010)

recceguy said:
			
		

> This has to be :spam:  The rule is 'Death before dismount'. How dare you even think of such a thing! Turn in your crewman ticket right now! ;D


To be fair, I think he was referring to us lowly infantry-types.  ;D


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## SeanNewman (5 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> To be fair, I think he was referring to us lowly infantry-types.  ;D



Either the population is getting dumberer or the Infantry is the coolest trade in the world, because they're batting back wannabe Infanteers with sticks at the recruiting centres.


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## Illegio (5 Jun 2010)

Too many teenagers raised on Call of Duty and Black Hawk Down. There was an infamous letter circulating around battalion a couple of weeks ago from a disgruntled "no-hook" trying to put in his VR. He claimed that with our involvement in TF 1-11 being squashed, the military could not offer him the "adventure of combat," and that the battalion should be structured more like close protection, to hit a couple of the high notes.


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## Tetragrammaton (5 Jun 2010)

If Frank does it, it must be a good idea.
  ;D


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## Franko (5 Jun 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> There is a reason I put the (Coax and Pintle mounted A/A) in brackets.   ;D
> 
> As for the Coax, it is nothing more than storing a Butt plate in the tool box or with a tripod/ground mount in the back/or storage bin.  On the tanks, the Coax and A/A were interchanged to reduce wear and overheating during long engagements (When you can see the rounds actually moving up the translucent barrel and flames coming in through the mantlet as air ignites over the hot barrel, this is a necessity.) or during a Prolonged Stoppage.   It was sometimes quicker to change the whole gun, rather than fart around trying to change a barrel in restricted quarters.



George, your memory must be a bit hazy....the COAX doesn't have sights and does not come with bipod or the replacement butt anymore. Now the AK AK has a spade butt most times as well.

Can they still be used dismounted? Sure, but you'll have to be a bit determined and creative to use it.

Regards


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## KevinB (5 Jun 2010)

The 240H helicopter door gun comes with a pistol grip and butt for dismount options with downed aircraft, to me it would not be that hard to offer for the co-ax - especially if you put a 1913 rail on the top cover, that could give an optical option in-extremis


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## SeanNewman (5 Jun 2010)

The problem with the LAV coax is that it is incredibly tight confines in there.  It's not like a pintle (or helo door gun) where you can basically have a complete system just on a swivel pin that can pop out and carry with you.

A LAV's coax is extremely bare-bones by comparison.


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## Illegio (5 Jun 2010)

Yes... If I recall correctly, it doesn't even have a full pistol grip - just a truncated grip to better allow it to fit within the confines of the turret. Not even a cocking handle either, but rather, a cable with a handle linked to a pin where the cocking handle usually goes. I don't think it would be hard to put a kit together to allow the coax to be used dismounted in extremis, but it would involve replacing or adding the butt, pistol grip, bipod and the barrel at a minimum, to say nothing of proper sights or cocking handles. Done easily enough inside a couple of minutes when you're sitting in a FOB, but during a firefight?


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## 1feral1 (5 Jun 2010)

The MAG-58 coax also has no front sight, although the rear sight mount is present, there is no rear sight  fitted. The EPC* is also absent. No front sling swivel either, or carrying handle.

The flash suppressor is also a different style, as is the gas system from the standard MAG-58 type, and the gas regs are not interchangeable. One cannot put a standard reg on to a coax or flex barrel. 

*Ejection Port Cover

OWDU


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## George Wallace (6 Jun 2010)

Der Panzerkommandant.... said:
			
		

> George, your memory must be a bit hazy....the COAX doesn't have sights and does not come with bipod or the replacement butt anymore. Now the AK AK has a spade butt most times as well.
> 
> Can they still be used dismounted? Sure, but you'll have to be a bit determined and creative to use it.
> 
> Regards



I know it has been a while, but there are still rear sights, and if using BOT, then it is a no brainer.  "Gunner's Determination!"

Bipod is removable, so it can also be added.  It is also not necessary if mounted on an SF Kit.

Spare Butt plate and Pistol Grip can be stored in Wpns Kit/Tool box.   A bolt on scope or sight may alleviate any problems of no front sights on barrels.

As for Cocking handle being replaced by a cable.  What difference does this make.?  The C-5 and some .50 Cal had cables instead of cocking handles, and they worked fine.  Wpn still cocks and fires.


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## SeanNewman (6 Jun 2010)

George,

This issue is that yes technically you can do 10 things to revert a coax to a dismount role ready C6, but no it is not worth the time because it would take far too long to do for what it's worth in a modern battle field.

Further, it must be expected that if you have just had your vehicle killed, you are likely in a hostile area and still under contact so you would be better off firing with your C7 immediately than firing the C6 in 10 minutes.

If you need to get off of the Ambush X and find some cover then something like the pintle is a good idea...the coax is not.

And on the modern battle field, it's not like the vehicle would be lost and the troops then have to do a 100km march to safety; pretty much all other ops would stop and the helos would be inbound.


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## Kirkhill (6 Jun 2010)

Are all dismounts hasty dismounts in contact?  Or are there also planned dismounts where the section leaves its wagon at a Zulu point and operates entirely on foot for extended periods?

Because if the latter, and assuming the OC gave me permission I would be inclined to strip out whatever systems I could carry that I felt would enable me to do the job assigned.  And, from this discussion, there seems to be a fair number of people that would be happy to see an additional 4 C6s available if contact is made.

As to the subject of dismounting the 25mm and man-packing that (or jeep-porting it) I recall a Swiss system from the 1980s (Diana???) that was based on that exact premise.  It was an early model RWS where the operators screen was attached by cable to the base of the mount with a coax camera so the operator could park the system on the parapet and operate from the comfort of a nice snug trench (Clearances and other IAs and Stoppages excepted).


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## Franko (6 Jun 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I know it has been a while, but there are still rear sights, and if using BOT, then it is a no brainer.  "Gunner's Determination!"
> 
> Bipod is removable, so it can also be added.  It is also not necessary if mounted on an SF Kit.
> 
> ...



George....I've taught a few gunnery courses in the past few years, both tank and 25mm and been on tour with the tanks too.

There are completely NO sights (front blade or rear aperture) on any coax, either mounted in a Coyote or tank. If there are some out there it's because they haven't been turned in for modification yet. I haven't seen any in the past 3 years.

It is a purpose modified weapon and not intended for dismounting. Gone are the days when we could dismount them. The parts are not held at the Sqn level either. You can't even put a bipod on because the front swivel is now gone as well, thereby no way to retain it on the weapon. All the barrels have been modified as well, so gone are the days of ensuring the #1 position on the gas regulator was next to the barrel...they've all been bored out to the #3 size. Some also have the new gas plug retaining system vice the quick release.

Do I agree with whoever made the decision to take them away? Nope.

Could you still use BOT? Sure, but that beaten zone would be HUGE!

Regards


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## Illegio (6 Jun 2010)

Manpacking a 25mm... The thought makes my gorge rise. I suspect you meant it somewhat tongue-in-cheek, but the system (feeder, receiver, and barrel) weighs nearly 250 lbs. Plus ammo, and cranking... what, seven times for each shot? Makes me tired just thinking about it.

As far as dismounting the pintles from the Zulu LAVs... We never did it overseas, even on dismounted patrols away from the LAVs and I personally never heard the idea being fielded. Whatever advantage that might have been gained in firepower was outweighed by the additional weight, awkwardness and relative slowness in bringing the gun into the fight. Since you can't sling a box under the guns we used, you had only a ~30 rd. teaser belt before someone had to bust out a box. The gunner for the platoon C6 that we *did* take out had a "predator pack" that helped a bit, but was prone to causing stoppages.


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## vonGarvin (6 Jun 2010)

Hello Illegio
My point on the dismounted 25mm was entirely tongue in cheek.
Now, as for the pintle-mount, coax, etc, I just raise those points because our infantry in Canada is entirely mechanised: a point many seem to forget.  

Yes, I realise that some rifle companies are "mechanised without vehicles"; however, for operations, they have the LAV III APC with them.  Naturally, the option remains to leave them in a FOB, on base, or whatever, and have those platoons go in helicopters, on foot or whatever.  But my only point is that if the platoons are with LAV III APCs, then in addition to the 6 x LMGs and the 1 (or 2) dismounted GPMGs, there are 4 x 25mm Chain Guns, 4 x 7.62mm Coax MGs and 4 x 7.62/5.56mm Pintle MGs.  (And the MBGDs).  If the LAV III APCs have to be left behind, the options are there to "task tailor" the platoon according to the mission at hand, and with the pintle mounted MGs, if so desire, a very robust weapons section could be formed.

My final point is that I am not thinking "Afghanistan only", but for whatever use and/or task.  Maybe except for domestic operations after ice storms, but, I think you get the picture.


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## Kirkhill (6 Jun 2010)

WRT the Swiss 25 my point wasn't tongue in cheek. Admittedly the Swiss were equipping for a "Home" game, as opposed to playing "Away", some of there Infantry battalions were/are more akin to Maginot Line units where kit was only humped a couple of hundred yards to a prepared firing position. But people have hauled heavier loads over longer distances for suitable effect.  The Royal Navy eventually made a sport out of their Boer War experience with the Earl's Court Gun Run.

Further to TV2s comments it seems to me that it would make for an interesting fire-base to dismount platoon weapons, (4x 25mm, 4x 7.62 Coax, 8-12 C6-C9) and heliport them in to a secure point.

But if I understand the second part of your comment your "dismounted" problem was not the lack of systems to carry but the lack of carrying capacity, which I suspect is the same problem that Marius dealt with.  

And doesn't that bring us full circle?  How can you effectively carry the fight to the enemy? And do you have enough tools in the toolbox to overmatch the enemy in all the environments you oppose him?

If the answer is "yes" then bash on regardless.  If the answer is "no" then: what tools would make your performance more effective?

And one thing I have learned in a multitude of years trying to dodge the situation - everyone is a salesman/politician - whether you like it or not.  The secret to success is being able to effectively argue a business case to support your strongly held belief.


The problem is not a lack of money.  There is never enough of that to go around.  The problem is how to make the case against competing cases.


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## SeanNewman (6 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> ... our infantry in Canada is entirely mechanised...



A very recent fad due to high losses in the Afghan-specific theatre.

Only a few years ago, as you know there were still three entirely light battalions out of nine, which only went mech due to what was going on in A'stan.

I know there is talk of everyone being the same, but it is retarded to give up all light focus.

It was quite embarrassing for 1 RCR's companies in Petawawa to lose all the March-And-Shoot competitions to not only 3 RCR but also to 2 CER.  Such is life when you spend 90% of your time on taking care of a vehicle.


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## Fusaki (6 Jun 2010)

> It was quite embarrassing for 1 RCR's companies in Petawawa to lose all the March-And-Shoot competitions to not only 3 RCR but also to 2 CER.  Such is life when you spend 90% of your time on taking care of a vehicle.



3RCR may have won in the fall '09, but 1RCR _crushed_ the 3rd Bn in 2008.

In any case, what was embarrassing was those losers in Para _Mike_ coming over to 1RCR to get LAV qualified so they could deploy for the _first time_ since 2003.  Sorry guys! The Airborne's loooooonng gone!!!

"Stand Up! Hook Up! Drop Ramp!  Wha?!?!"


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## vonGarvin (6 Jun 2010)

This may end up in another tangent, but here goes.
Force Generation/Force Employment for the structure for 2013 has all battalions being mechanised.  Given that we don't have the suite of vehicles for a truly light capability (outside of CANSOFCOM), it only makes sense to either make our infantry mechanised (with the requisite fleets of armoured vehicles that come with the other combat arm or the combat support arms), or to make our infantry at least motorised (that is, for those who don't know, with enough integral motor transport, or trucks, to lift the unit simultaneously).
But if there is any infantry battalion in Canada, regular or reserve, that cannot maintain a basic level of physical fitness required of the infantry, then that unit's entire chain of command ought to be fired.  And I state here, emphatically, that the myth of the "fat-in-the-track" mech battalions is just that: a myth.  I saw it first hand when this "mech warrior" showed up to 3 RCR, all afraid that they were a collection of leg-shaving professional runners.  After our first run, looking back to see 3/4 of the battalion BEHIND me, it was a bit satisfying.

And the crew maintenance bill on the LAV III APC is much less than that required of the old fleets of M113 APCs.  So, no, I don't buy it.

As for force employment, a 39 soldier infantry platoon, with or without LAV III APCs, is quite the beast.  And given our small army, it makes sense to train up to mech level, and then "cut back" to "other modes of fighting" when required.  This can be best achieved by training.  While the entire company is mechanised, having "specialist-trained" NCOs, WOs and Offrs within the ORBAT as a default would assist for heliborne or other operations.  So, if "whatever" coy of "whatever" battalion of "whatever" regiment is deployed on Operation "INSERTNAMEHERE", and that battalion has to deploy by hovercraft to objective "SUICIDE", then they can call on those specialist trained NCOs, WOs or Offrs as required.

Finally, having all 9 battalions homogenous in nature assists with the force employment concept.  Remembering that we would not fight with 9 battalions side by side, but rather with a max of two battalions at any given time, the remaining are used to replace those deployed.  Right now, we have effectively two battalions overseas in Afghanistan.  If we had a mix of mech and light, well, our light battalions would have had a pretty cushy last four years, marking time whilst our "fat bastards" continued to take the fight to the deserts of Afghanistan.  Or we could have used those light battalions as camp security, or whatever.  (Yes, this is me being sarcastic on that last point).


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## KevinB (6 Jun 2010)

Or of course doing LI missions...


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## vonGarvin (6 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> Or of course doing LI missions...


Exactly my point; however, in our small army with its inherent small budget, we need our oh-too-few troops to be able to "do it all", as it were...


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## c4th (7 Jun 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Further to TV2s comments it seems to me that it would make for an interesting fire-base to dismount platoon weapons, (4x 25mm, 4x 7.62 Coax, 8-12 C6-C9) and heliport them in to a secure point.


Gents, the LAVIII is a weapons platform that includes over and above the 25MM, the coax AND the pintle.  No one in any theatre on any operation or ex that I can think of is going to start dismantling weapons platforms in order to change a dismounted section or platoon’s load.  In my experience gunfighters had guns to bring to the fight.  If we needed more guns we got them from Coy no issue.  In fact, Coy was really good about giving me more guns than I needed, but I could deal with that.  If by chance we didn’t have enough guns they gave us a FOO. 
Aside from swapping out a C6 pintle due to an NS dismounted C6 in an emergency there is no good reason to start stripping LAV’s and dozens of good reasons not to.  I can’t imagine a LAV Capt, LAV Sgt or anyone qualified LAV would consider doing so a good COA.
As for dismounting the 25MM, best suggestion ever.


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## c4th (7 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Right now, we have effectively two battalions overseas in Afghanistan.  If we had a mix of mech and light, well, our light battalions would have had a pretty cushy last four years, marking time whilst our "fat bastards" continued to take the fight to the deserts of Afghanistan.  Or we could have used those light battalions as camp security, or whatever.  (Yes, this is me being sarcastic on that last point).



Yup, probably nothing cushier than being OMLT and PRT.  Are you for real?  Let's just go with you're wrong.


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## Kirkhill (7 Jun 2010)

Trust No One said:
			
		

> .....
> As for dismounting the 25MM, best suggestion ever.



Shoot, and here was me working on a ground mount for a 120 mm.


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Trust No One said:
			
		

> Yup, probably nothing cushier than being OMLT and PRT.  Are you for real?  Let's just go with you're wrong.


Last I saw was LAV III APCs in both OMLT and KPRT (among other vehicles).  And please note that my point was (mostly) sarcastic.  The point I wished to make was:
a) our army is small and 
b) as a result, this requires that all nine battalions be mechanised for the very reason I raised: they would not have been fully employable in our current mission in Afghanistan.

Let's just go with "you missed my point."


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

My argument would be there is more than enough work in Afghan for 3Bn's of LI if the CF would do it.


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## SeanNewman (7 Jun 2010)

Wonderbread said:
			
		

> 3RCR may have won in the fall '09, but 1RCR _crushed_ the 3rd Bn in 2008.



You mean when 3 RCR was either just about to or already deployed to Afghanistan in 2008?  The competition you faced was made up largely of those who couldn't make the cut.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> And I state here, emphatically, that the myth of the "fat-in-the-track" mech battalions is just that: a myth.  I saw it first hand when this "mech warrior" showed up to 3 RCR, all afraid that they were a collection of leg-shaving professional runners.  After our first run, looking back to see 3/4 of the battalion BEHIND me, it was a bit satisfying.



Completely anecdotal since you're a good runner; akin to me saying that since I can out-bench press 3/4 of 1 RCR they're all weak.  

Taken statistically _en masse_, it is essentially impossible for a mech unit to physically out-perform a light unit since they have other things to focus on.  And that's just looking at it from a time perspective that one only has so much time and if you spend some of that time on vehicles you aren't spending it on foot.  It does not speak to personalities that would generally be posted to either one.


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Taken statistically _en masse_, it is essentially impossible for a mech unit to physically out-perform a light unit since they have other things to focus on.
> And that's just looking at it from a time perspective that one only has so much time and if you spend some of that time on vehicles you aren't spending it on foot.
> It does not speak to personalities that would generally be posted to either one.


BS.  Pure and utter BS.


(Tried unsuccessfully to quote Infidel-6's quote)


> My argument would be there is more than enough work in Afghan for 3Bn's of LI if the CF would do it.


Agreed; however, once they get a LAV III APC, then they need all that training, individual and collective, to be able to fight with those things.


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

I'm suggest a REAL LI role -- as in walking over the hill and through the dale...

 LAV's cannot climb trees  ;D


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I'm suggest a REAL LI role -- as in walking over the hill and through the dale...
> 
> LAV's cannot climb trees  ;D


 :-X  Don't give DLR any ideas!

(PS: I agree, from a force employment model; however, we would have 3 x Li and 6 x Mech Bns, and from a force generation point of view, it's nearly not manageable.  That's the problem of a small army)


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## PPCLI Guy (7 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Taken statistically _en masse_, it is essentially impossible for a mech unit to physically out-perform a light unit since they have other things to focus on.  And that's just looking at it from a time perspective that one only has so much time and if you spend some of that time on vehicles you aren't spending it on foot.  It does not speak to personalities that would generally be posted to either one.



How many years have you served in a Mech Bn?


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> You mean when 3 RCR was either just about to or already deployed to Afghanistan in 2008?  The competition you faced was made up largely of those who couldn't make the cut.


And in 09 where was 1 RCR?  Oh, right, work up training for 1-10.  But then again, 3 RCR won the ironman in 08 with the main body deployed, so...

Anyway, back on topic.

Yeah, the C6.


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

While I wait on the Merx soliciation for LAV Tree Climber...

 I appreciate the Force Generation concerns - however Canada does not have enough LAVIII's to equip 6 Bn's with LAV's let alone 9 and operationally delpoyed vehicles.
  Secondly with 3 armored units and 3 Arty units - why is the 3 BN's an issue with LI?


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I appreciate the Force Generation concerns - however Canada does not have enough LAVIII's to equip 6 Bn's with LAV's let alone 9 and operationally delpoyed vehicles.
> Secondly with 3 armored units and 3 Arty units - why is the 3 BN's an issue with LI?


Another point with which I agree.  In order to train as we fight, I argue that our companies all have in training what they would use in theatre.  

As for the 3:1 ratio of armour and Arty (and Engr), the main reason is that infantry deploy in battalion sizes, while those other folks deploy in sqn/bty sizes

(Or so the theory goes)

Personally, I see nothing wrong with going with 6 mech and 3 light units of infantry.  I would argue that those mech units be put into two brigades, and the light units put into a light brigade to allow for higher than unit level training.  A good model would be the Dutch army, which has two mech and one airmob brigade.  Remember, the Dutch Army at one time had an entire corps of regular troops during the cold war, and have since gone down to three brigades.

The mech brigades could house all the heavy units, and the light brigade could house the light/airmob/jump/whatever units.  Send all the Tac Hel airlift stuff to that brigade, and put all the tanks into the mech brigades.

That's force generation.

For force employment, as Infidel-6 points out, the OMLT could EASILY become a Li-Inf task.  In fact, I would argue that it would be ideally Li-Inf.  And for all you armchair quarterbacks out there, Li-Inf does not mean "I walk, therefore I'm light", it means "Any mode of non-integral transport", so RG-31, CC-130, Helicopters, whatever.  LAV III APC?  No, because they are not integral to the task required of that unit-type.


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

I always forget the Engineers  ;D

 Regimental affiliations and blind stupidity always get in the way of logical force organization...


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I always forget the Engineers  ;D
> 
> Regimental affiliations and blind stupidity always get in the way of logical force organization...


(I smell a thread split coming, but anyway...)
I agree to a point.  Perhaps not blind stupidity, but perhaps blind adherence to nice and neat looking ORBATs.  

But, suppose for argument's sake that 1 CMBG became 1 CLBG (Canadian Light Brigade Group).  All three bns could then have one jump coy/bn (given our reluctance to have a "parachute" battalion), though it would make better sense to have a parachute battalion.  For argument's sake, 2 PPCLI out there in Shilo.  That leaves 1 and 3 VP
in Edmonton to be "light".  I would stack those Chinooks up there in Edmonton for them.
The only part I am not sure how it could be done but it's the whole "DFS" element.  You know, mech brigades have tanks, light brigades have....?


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## Illegio (7 Jun 2010)

If you wanna make 2VP a jump battalion... Well, let's just say I won't argue.  Might do something for the abysmal retention rate, too.


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

I'd argue for the central area to go Light - the wide open prarie screams to the Tanker and LAV guy alike.

 that and walking for miles in Sufield sucks ass.  Pet is a much nicer trg area to walk in, and the DZ's are not bad (not as nice as a whole plain though...)

Regimental Loyalty and elitism forces me to move the PPCLI central then, plus unless you renaming the Regiment to the PPCMI - it only makes sense to keep the Light role with what is on the hat badge...


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I'd argue for the central area to go Light - the wide open prarie screams to the Tanker and LAV guy alike.
> 
> that and walking for miles in Sufield sucks ass.  Pet is a much nicer trg area to walk in, and the DZ's are not bad (not as nice as a whole plain though...)
> 
> Regimental Loyalty and elitism forces me to move the PPCLI central then, plus unless you renaming the Regiment to the PPCMI - it only makes sense to keep the Light role with what is on the hat badge...


I used PPCLI for argument's sake only; however, 2 or 5 Bde's could ramp up to be light, leaving the ironically named PPCLI to be part of the mech.  But, no
matter who's mech, what of the bde-level DFS regiment?  106mm recoilless on jeeps?  ;D


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## Old Sweat (7 Jun 2010)

We are wandering a bit here. Geography sucks. If we lived in a country the size of the UK or the Netherlands, we could actually develop quite a nice and logical force structure for our three brigades. Here, with distance, climate and low population density, no matter what we adopt, it will founder on the three shoals of money, location and cap badges.

Let me, as a perplexed outsider, ask a question re light (and motorized) versus mechanized infantry. It seems to me that the Brits deployed considerable light and motorized infantry in both Iraq and Afghanistan, based on the prevailing thought of the anglosphere armies. The MOD was then criticized for deploying unprotected troops in areas with a high level of danger from IEDs without proper mobility and protection. Would we not face the same challenge with the same likely result? Remember the crap storm over the Iltis and the G Wagon.

A vehicle, armoured (preferably) or not, provides a means of closing with the enemy much quicker and with less tired troops at far end walking. The troops in the vehicles can also bring a lot more stuff to kill the bad guys with. What am I missing in this equation?


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## Nfld Sapper (7 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I always forget the Engineers  ;D
> 
> Regimental affiliations and blind stupidity always get in the way of logical force organization...



You won't when you need to cross a gap, clear a minefield or, clear a route for ya  

 ;D


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## vonGarvin (7 Jun 2010)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> A vehicle, armoured (preferably) or not, provides a means of closing with the enemy much quicker and with less tired troops at far end walking. The troops in the vehicles can also bring a lot more stuff to kill the bad guys with. What am I missing in this equation?


You are missing nothing.  The thing that Infidel-6 is talking about, is the roles that Light Infantry could bring to the table.  They could conceivably be in armoured vehicles, but of course, if they are in APCs, then they are mech, and they have to learn to fight with them and not see them as battlefield transport.  But not being tied TO and E wise to any vehicle at all, they could on various missions use alternate means of transport, such as helicopters, or whatever, without having to leave stewards behind for their integral vehicles (read: APCs).
The other equation is the whole COIN fight, where we aren't really fighting massed defenders (all the time, anyway).


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## Nfld Sapper (7 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Another point with which I agree.  In order to train as we fight, I argue that our companies all have in training what they would use in theatre.
> 
> As for the 3:1 ratio of armour and Arty (and Engr), the main reason is that infantry deploy in battalion sizes, while those other folks deploy in sqn/bty sizes
> 
> (Or so the theory goes)



And smaller too Techo.... I think for EROC we deploy a Field Section (or is it a Troop  ???) only (EROC guys can correct me)


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## Kirkhill (7 Jun 2010)

As he see's the tail and starts snapping again......

I still like the idea of the GIBs being organised separately from the Crew, whether a coy/bn or pl/coy.  As has been said many times before with a small army compromises are necessary.

GIBs and CCVs/LAVs/CH147s/CC130s/Trucks/RHIBs.....


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## PPCLI Guy (7 Jun 2010)

I know that the whole 9 Bns all organized the same seems counter-intuitive with only 6 Bns worth of LAVs, but there is actually some reasoning behind that decision.  The main idea is that FE will be easier if we FG 9 BGs with the same ORBAT.  As to what we are supposed to be doing with the "third companies", TAPV is supposed to provide 3 coys worth of vehicles to fill that role.  Until that time, I am confident that most COs will just train 3 LAV Coys - its not like each Bn has two Coys worth of LAVs even now....

So, unless there is a substantial change of heart come, say, June, then we are likely to be continuing down the road towards 9 common Bns - note that I did not say equal  ;D


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

I shall Solve the Problem

Add another Regiment, but lets skip the Regimental the downturn and make it a BN sized one - we shall call it Not The Canadian Airborne Regiment.
 For fun we shall post all the LI Jump PY's there.

Then we have 10 Inf Bn's

 Make 5 Light and 5 Mech.

You can project 1 of each at a time with a decent interval.


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## Old Sweat (7 Jun 2010)

Find the py's for CLS to do that very thing, without stripping the rest of the army. 

Your solution still does not fix the issue, as we would have one airborne, four light and five mechanized battalions. Is that really an ideal mix? To maintain an airborne capability for home defence, which was why our airborne forces were created post war in the first place, it means the unit could not be deployed outside Canada. So now we are back to square one, with one less mechanized battalion.

Another solution might be to concentrate all the LAVs in LAV regiments, and have them separate from the nine infantry battalions. I can think of a few reasons not to, including that seven troops are not enough to field a rifle section that is viable over time. When we went to war in 1939, in accordance with British practice, our sections were seven men. The experience on the BEF over the winter of 1939-1940 resulted in the restoration of the ten man section, even before the Germans attacked in May 1940.

It seems to me that we have wrestled with this bugbear more than a few times in the past. I don't think we have a solution in sight that won't lead to more problems.


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## KevinB (7 Jun 2010)

Sorry it was more sarcasm, I know there will never be a Cdn Para Bn again.

 I would however think it may be worthwhile to round out the Inf BN's to 10, with 5 LAV, and 5 NON LAV.

Non regimentally I would suggest adding a 4th BN to The RCR regular force strength, maybe the PPCLI Ligght only, and a LI BN each from The RCR, and the R22eR


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## SeanNewman (7 Jun 2010)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> How many years have you served in a Mech Bn?



Touchee.  All of my battalion time has been at 3 RCR.

That being said, enough time to see 1 RCR handily beaten by 3 RCR at every PT-based competition in the last while.


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## Old Sweat (7 Jun 2010)

I sensed some sarcasm, but being old and slow, I figured I'd provide all you small arms aces with an easy target.

I am now going to have a drink and leave the fine points of infantry organization to the pros.


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## Fusaki (7 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Touchee.  All of my battalion time has been at 3 RCR.
> 
> That being said, enough time to see 1 RCR handily beaten by 3 RCR at every PT-based competition in the last while.



Just don't forget that 1RCR has deployed over twice as often  as 3RCR over the past 10 years.  We've been pretty busy with, you know, the war and stuff.  ;D


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## SeanNewman (7 Jun 2010)

Wonderbread said:
			
		

> Just don't forget that 1RCR has deployed over twice as often  as 3RCR over the past 10 years.  We've been pretty busy with, you know, the war and stuff.  ;D



Statistically perhaps more, but also do not forget that 3 RCR was gutted in 2006 to form CSOR, and they "took" most of the people I served with as a platoon commander.  After that it took a few years to regenerate.

Without CSOR it was looking very likely that 3 RCR would have provided the light coy to TF 3-06.

(Walks away in shame).


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## aesop081 (7 Jun 2010)

:argument:


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## HItorMiss (7 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Statistically perhaps more, but also do not forget that 3 RCR was gutted in 2006 to form CSOR, and they "took" most of the people I served with as a platoon commander.  After that it took a few years to regenerate.
> 
> Without CSOR it was looking very likely that 3 RCR would have provided the *light coy * to TF 3-06.
> 
> (Walks away in shame).




BWAHAHAHAHAHAHA Light Coy.....BWAHAHAHAHAHAHA

Thank god they didn't it was a huge asset that 2 VP was Mech cause the light role lasted all of about 5 mins then they got LAVed up!

I know at the time 3 RCR would not have been able to transition that fast. As I have always said Mech can go light you just take away the fighting platform BUT Light can't go mech since they haven't a clue how to use the fighting system.

And I have been both.

This tangent has nothing to do with the MG discussion though.

Mk48 thats the way to go not really significantly heavier then the C9 and gives you more punch and range being 7.62 but thats just my 2cents.


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## SeanNewman (7 Jun 2010)

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> ...As I have always said Mech can go light you just take away the fighting platform BUT Light can't go mech since they haven't a clue how to use the fighting system...



I would agree that the Mech combination is better overall.  For example, say an average Mech unit can pull off a 90% at Mech but even though they're not the best at Light can still pull it off at 60%.  Take those Light guys at 90% light and they'd be able to pull off a 25% at most even if given a crash course (obviously "scores" just meant as generalizations).

I really like Techno's concept though that they should be in their own brigade if it's going to happen.

And now for the last thing I'll say not C6 related: The best of both worlds IMO is Armour guys manning the vehicles and Infantry pouring out of the back.  Then you get 90% at both because both will get to focus on what they do.


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## vonGarvin (8 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> And now for the last thing I'll say not C6 related: The best of both worlds IMO is Armour guys manning the vehicles and Infantry pouring out of the back.  Then you get 90% at both because both will get to focus on what they do.


I couldn't disagree more.  If you take 3 of 10 persons from the section and make them armour crewmen, then you won't get "60%" going sans VBL.  And the LAV III APC is an infantry vehicle, not armour.  Just because the outer hull of the vehicle is made of high hardened steel, and just because there is a turret, does not make it a tank (or tank "light").  Its employment on the field of battle is different from using a Coyote or a Leo.  Just as I wouldn't advocate putting an infantry crew in a FOO variant of the LAV III APC, neither would I put an armoured crew in a LAV III APC.


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## KevinB (8 Jun 2010)

Calvary Crewman...

  Make the LAV crews a specific trade.

Win-Win.

Its a fact with training hours (and total hours) being finite, plus training dollars, that you cannot train to do the job to the fullest, and that requires compromises.
  To me the best method is to seperate the crews and go from there.


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## PPCLI Guy (8 Jun 2010)

The mechanized infantry section is organic - the LAV is much a "member" of the section as a C9 gunner.  The section manoeuvres, fights, and lives as an entity that happens to include the LAV.  Much as you wouldn't want to outsource organic indirect fire or engineer support in a Battalion, nor do you want to outsource an organic part of the infantry section.


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## KevinB (8 Jun 2010)

In your belief, but nothing says it is in fact so.
 I honestly think both the Zulu Vehicles and the Dismounts would work better if seperated at birth.


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## Fusaki (8 Jun 2010)

Another problem with having "Cavalry Crewman" as a separate trade is the redundancy of qualifications we need within the section.

In a mechanized section, you _need_ to have at _at least_ two LAV drivers, two gunners, and two crew commanders.  Guys get sick, go on leave, get wounded, and killed and there needs to be alternate crewmen within the section who know the team and can fill positions on short notice.

Also, turrets need often need to be manned for weeks on end.  As the section rotates it's members through 2-man sentry shifts, it's important that at least one of those guys is a qualified gunner, if at all possible.


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## KevinB (8 Jun 2010)

I disagree.
  The Crewman can spell each other for leave etc.  and have an overage like should be done with a deployed section.  It does not take a Gunner/CC qualified soldier to look thru the sights etc. nor a driver to move it -- a few hour class on emergency procedure will make the people somewhat familiar and able to move and shoot it in-extremis.


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## Teflon (8 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I disagree.
> The Crewman can spell each other for leave etc.  and have an overage like should be done with a deployed section.  It does not take a Gunner/CC qualified soldier to look thru the sights etc. nor a driver to move it -- a few hour class on emergency procedure will make the people somewhat familiar and able to move and shoot it in-extremis.



Your right in insinuating that it doesn’t take a genius to use the turret or move the LAV but based on my not so limited LAV time it does take a moderate level of experience to do either effectively.


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## Fusaki (8 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I disagree.
> The Crewman can spell each other for leave etc.  and have an overage like should be done with a deployed section.  It does not take a Gunner/CC qualified soldier to look thru the sights etc. nor a driver to move it -- a few hour class on emergency procedure will make the people somewhat familiar and able to move and shoot it in-extremis.



I don't think that's good enough.

If you're thinking of a mechanized infantry section simply as light infantry riding around in 21 tonnes of armour, you're only using fraction of its potential.

By thinking of mechanized infantry section as a single organism, you facilitate greater synergy between the IFV and the dismounts.

A young Pte should ideally start off as a C9 gunner, then become a LAV driver or gunner, then dismount as the 3ic, then back in the turret as the 2ic Crew Commander, then dismount again as the Sect Comd.  This career progression of back and forth between dismount and crew creates the _synergy_ required for a mechanized infantry section to fight as a single organism.


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## KevinB (8 Jun 2010)

I'm somewhat familiar with the LAV unit, however I disagree that it is the best way to make Infanteers.  Despite protestations to the contrary, sticking troops in the LAV really does hurt their light skills.  

 Teflon - I agree with you that it takes time and experience to use the LAV to its potential, which is why I want to make a dedicated crew trade.  

 Wonderbread, a troop should never start with the LMG, and the fact that you think so reinforces my assertion that a LAV unit errodes core Inf skills.  Pte Snuffy gets a C7, Pte with a few years or a young Cpl gets the C9, why waste firepower on inexperience.


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## Fusaki (8 Jun 2010)

> Wonderbread, a troop should never start with the LMG, and the fact that you think so reinforces my assertion that a LAV unit errodes core Inf skills.  Pte Snuffy gets a C7, Pte with a few years or a young Cpl gets the C9, *why waste firepower on inexperience*.



Certainly not because it's cock, or because "that's what I carried as a new Pte."

In my opinion, the C9 should go to the new guy _because_ of the experience it requires.  As a C9 gunner, your sole job is the application of fire from the best position possible.  Right out of battleschool it gets guys thinking of enfilade and defilade, and how far to stand from the window to cover the street, and thinking about where the majority of the dismounted section's fire needs to be directed.

These are fundamental things that every infanteer needs to be thinking about, and as a C9 gunner a young Pte is given a chance to focus on these before he starts getting tasked to carry the radio, search PWs, or drive a LAV.  It gives the more experienced guys a chance to give the C9 gunner a quick check and say "No dude, cover here, not there" and then move onto other things.

If you put your CPL as a C9 gunner and he gets hit, the PTE who picks up the gun will lack experience at a time and place when he needs it most.  If your new guy PTE gets hit carrying the C9, everyone else can pick it up and be familiar with what needs to be done.

There's a method to my mayhem.


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## Teflon (8 Jun 2010)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> Teflon - I agree with you that it takes time and experience to use the LAV to its potential, which is why I want to make a dedicated crew trade.



I actually use to subscribe to the same line of thought that it should be a dedicated crew trade until I was moved out of mortars and started operating in a LAV section (1st as a section comd dismounting out the back then as a crew comd and LAV Sgt) With the whole section familiar with operating out of a LAV and the majority of them qualified in a crew seat they are far better to operate in conjunction with each other. It would be awesome if we where a big enough military to have units that specialize in only one type, but alas we are not and must settle for having our limited number of infantry units be more general purpose so that may be used to conduct mech or light tasks.


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## Nfld Sapper (8 Jun 2010)

I give the C-9 to the guy who scores lowest on the PWT Shoot..... then I am fairly certain he could hit something

 ;D


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## vonGarvin (8 Jun 2010)

I could not agree more with Infidel-6 re: machine guns and newbies.  When Pte Bloggins shows up to the battalion, he should be given his rifle and told to STFU.  Only when the member demonstrates the requisite skills and experience should that member be made a LMG gunner.
I could not disagree more re: LAV III APC manning. As stated, the LAV III APC is an infantry vehicle.  As an aside, I conducted a standards visit years ago to many infantry units.  I was there on fact-finding on continuation training on the LAV III APC.  One of the battalions (no names, no pack drills), stated that they didn't train much on the LAV III APC, but focused instead on "infantry skills".  My question was, what are infantry skills?  Would that include walking with packs?  Field craft?  Machine gunning?  Digging Trenches?  Musketry?  Battle craft?  The answer is "yes" to all of those, naturally.  
But as stated elsewhere, the LAV III APC section includes ten soldiers, 2 x LMGs, 2 x 40mm Grenade Launchers, 8 rifles, a 7.62mm coax, a 25mm Chain gun, etc and ten soldiers.  More importantly, the skillsets required to fight a section/platoon/coy/combat team that is mechanised is different from fighting  a Light Infantry section/platoon/coy/combat team.  In order for the infantry to fully understand that integral asset that is the LAV III APC, the infantry must use it, fight it, drive it, maintain it and, if necessary, make sweet love to it.  
This, of course, implies the bloody obvious (to me, anyway): we need dedicated Light Infantry units.  As stated elsewhere, "Light Infantry" is not simply leaving the LAV III APC parked; instead, it's a different skillset that must be practised and trained in order to achieve a level of mastery.


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## SeanNewman (8 Jun 2010)

[/promise to start talking about the C6]

There is nothing saying that you can't have Armour cap badge guys in the section anymore than you can't have a Sigs-badged guy as your radio man.

You don't need 1,000 Infantry guys to make a battle group, so why do you need 8-10 Infantry guys to make a section?

Even if they were organic, so what?  Are platoon medics not organic?  They focus on their job and do what they do best, and they do it better than an Infantry guy could the same way a guy who did nothing but drive or fire the gun would do it better if that's all they did.

The role of the Armour and the focus can still be on tanks, but that doesn't mean they can't do other things, the same way an Infanteer can fill other roles (like Planner for example).

IMO, every time you stick an Infanteer behind a steering wheel you're taking time away from him that he could be ruck sacking or occupying a patrol base.


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## Fusaki (8 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I could not agree more with Infidel-6 re: machine guns and newbies.  When Pte Bloggins shows up to the battalion, he should be given his rifle and told to STFU.  Only when the member demonstrates the requisite skills and experience should that member be made a LMG gunner.



How does a guy demonstrate requisite skills without actually _doing_ it?

The only way to get good LMG gunners is to give guys LMGs.  Take young PTEs, give them C9s, and tell them not to STFU, but do just the _opposite_: ask questions, take initiative, and _think_ about the best way to employ that weapons system.  We're not dropping dudes right out of battleschool into the Panj.  We're giving room in _training_ to _learn_ the trade and to _make_ mistakes, so when they're LAV drivers and Gunners they'll know what the dismounts are doing, and when they're CPLs they'll have the experience to _develop_ the skills of those around them.

By "saving" the LMGs for the CPLs you only ensure that guys get that experience later in their careers.  You end up with PTEs overseas who can't think beyond "follow the ruck in front of you" and who aren't confident in employing the majority of the dismounted section's firepower.  The C9s are _too important_ to save for the more senior guys, who's attention should not only be on themselves and their weapons, but also on the less experienced guys in the section.


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## vonGarvin (8 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> [/promise to start talking about the C6]
> 
> There is nothing saying that you can't have Armour cap badge guys in the section anymore than you can't have a Sigs-badged guy as your radio man.


Platoon and Coy signallers are infantrymen.  The Coy Sig Op is a LCIS tech (or whatever the nom du jour is for jimmies).



			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> You don't need 1,000 Infantry guys to make a battle group, so why do you need 8-10 Infantry guys to make a section?


  I won't dignify that with a response.



			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> Even if they were organic, so what?  Are platoon medics not organic?  They focus on their job and do what they do best, and they do it better than an Infantry guy could the same way a guy who did nothing but drive or fire the gun would do it better if that's all they did.


The term is integral, and no, medics are not integral, or organic, or whatever.  They are attached under a command relationship to the coy, and thence to the platoon.  Their job is that specific that it takes more than an OSS to do it.  And Section drivers do more than "just drive", and gunners do more than "just gun".  Hell, I would no more advocate putting an armoured crewman into a LAV III APC than I would advocate putting an infantryman who has the Turret Operator Course into a Coyote in an Armd Recce Sqn.


			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> The role of the Armour and the focus can still be on tanks, but that doesn't mean they can't do other things, the same way an Infanteer can fill other roles (like Planner for example).
> 
> IMO, every time you stick an Infanteer behind a steering wheel you're taking time away from him that he could be ruck sacking or occupying a patrol base.


If your Infanteer (sic) is behind a steering wheel, then the other nine members of his section are in that vehicle, unless they are fighting through the objective.  If they are ruck sacking (which is just a method of walking with kit), then the LAV III APC is parked somewhere else.  If that driver is an armd crewman, then he or she is back with the LAV III APC, and the section is now 7 persons, instead of 10.
And the role of Armour is actually focusing on Armd Recce more than tanks these days.  But as for roles such as Planner, Ops O, etc, those are staff positions that can be filled by anyone with the proper training (eg: the AOC).  If you suggest that just anyone can be an infantryman or an infantry officer, then you are sadly mistaken.


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## Kirkhill (8 Jun 2010)

TV2, wasn't there some Rockpainting Mortar Guy on these boards a couple of years back that took a position more in line with that of I-6? Or was that Captain Scarlett I was thinking about?

Although I do think the discussion at that time revolved around having a LAV crew section within the Platoon.   Or was it a LAV crew platoon within the Company.

It's so hard to keep track anymore.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Jun 2010)

And for those of you who wish to develop a closer relationship with other GPMG lovers there is, of course, the Facebook page:

A general purpose machine gun (GPMG) in concept is a multi-purpose weapon, a machine gun intended to fill the role of either a light machine gun or medium machine gun, while at the same time being man-portable. However, performance in either role may be inferior to a weapon specifically designed for that role. In modern practice, they are air-cooled medium machine guns firing rifle cartridges such as the 7.62x51mm NATO. They are generally operated from a stationary prone position from either a bipod or tripod, or mounted on a vehicle, as they are usually too powerful and heavy to be fired effectively on foot from an unsupported standing position or on the move, although the British Royal Marine Commandos, British Army Parachute Regiment, first line combat battalions such as the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and SAS are known to do this with devastating effect.

The term GPMG (or "Gimpy" in British Army slang), which comes from the Belgian-French name Mitrailleuse d'Appui General or General Purpose Machine guns (GPMG), became popular for describing medium machine guns used in multiple roles. The original Belgian-French term Mitrailleuse a Gaz is also known to be used. The mediums fired rifle caliber ammunition, but had some concessions for more extended firing and more general usage. This generally included both bipod and tripod/pintle mounting options and quick-change barrels. The first medium machine gun used as a GPMG traces back to World War I, where aircooled medium machine guns were used in many different roles, typically with larger magazines on aircraft, tanks, and ships, and in lighter configurations by infantry on bipods or tripods.


http://www.facebook.com/pages/GPMG/110851185611241


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## SeanNewman (8 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> ... I would advocate putting an infantryman who ....If your *Infanteer* (sic) is behind a steering wheel...



Not C6 related, but I know where you're coming from with the above quote, and the reason I am writing "Infanteer" is that it was straight from Director Infantry's mouth as of last month's Ex Bayonet Infantry Conference.  

He said "Infantryman" and then corrected himself and said that "Infanteer" is now more appropriate (to paraphrase).  One would imagine it's in the same league as "Salesman" or "Spokesman".


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## vonGarvin (8 Jun 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> TV2, wasn't there some Rockpainting Mortar Guy on these boards a couple of years back that took a position more in line with that of I-6? Or was that Captain Scarlett I was thinking about?
> 
> Although I do think the discussion at that time revolved around having a LAV crew section within the Platoon.   Or was it a LAV crew platoon within the Company.
> 
> It's so hard to keep track anymore.


It was CaptainMortarRockScarlettViking dude.   ;D Anyway, the idea was to have a platoon in the company that was dedicated LAV crewman, all infantrymen, who could be given "other" roles (eg: fire sp) if the LAVs were to be left back for whatever reason.


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## vonGarvin (8 Jun 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Not C6 related, but I know where you're coming from with the above quote, and the reason I am writing "Infanteer" is that it was straight from Director Infantry's mouth as of last month's Ex Bayonet Infantry Conference.
> 
> He said "Infantryman" and then corrected himself and said that "Infanteer" is now more appropriate (to paraphrase).  One would imagine it's in the same league as "Salesman" or "Spokesman".


As an aside, "Infanteer" is a very Canadian term.  Not found in other armies or nations, as a matter of fact.  I'm not sure of its origin.


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## SeanNewman (8 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> As an aside, "Infanteer" is a very Canadian term.  Not found in other armies or nations, as a matter of fact.  I'm not sure of its origin.



Last I checked, we didn't need another country's permission* to do what we wanted ;-)

_*Disclaimer* Does not include service under the UN, NATO, ISAF, NORAD, or English Canada. _


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## MikeL (8 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Platoon and Coy signallers are infantrymen.  The Coy Sig Op is a LCIS tech (or whatever the nom du jour is for jimmies).



In a Infantry Battalion LCIS Techs don't leave Sigs Pl. Sig Ops are the ones employed in the Rifle Coy HQs.  There is 1x Sig Op MCpl and 2x Pte/Cpl Sig Ops. The OC's dismounted Signaller is a Infantryman, but he isn't the only one in the Coy HQ out humping a radio(Coy Sig Ops do it as well).  Also, in the past Sig Ops have been employed as Platoon Signallers in a Rifle Coy, ie TF 1-08 PRT Force Protection Coy.  Even Sig Ops in BN HQ/Sigs Pl can go out on Ops, etc and hump a radio.  Plus the CO has a Sig Op as his Signaller in 9TAC.


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## REDinstaller (8 Jun 2010)

And most LCIS techs would only hump a man pack back to the CQ to return it after repair. And now back to our regularly scheduled post.

Has any one else had the Spade grip fall off the E-LAV/TLAV RWS mount when firing the armament?

I had one E-LAV last year in Edm where the screws backed out after a couple thousand rounds. It shouldn't happen, but there it was dangling in the wind.


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## Fishbone Jones (9 Jun 2010)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> And most LCIS techs would only hump a man pack back to the CQ to return it after repair. And now back to our regularly scheduled post.
> 
> Has any one else had the Spade grip fall off the E-LAV/TLAV RWS mount when firing the armament?
> 
> I had one E-LAV last year in Edm where the screws backed out after a couple thousand rounds. It shouldn't happen, but there it was dangling in the wind.



Thread locker, a la Locktite? Should be ok with the blue stuff.


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## REDinstaller (9 Jun 2010)

You would of thought it would be there in the first place, but the screws are so short that maybe they should have the heads that accommodate lock wire.


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## a_majoor (6 Jul 2010)

Very interestng thread, although i recognize many of the arguments thrashed about in other threads (especi the mech infantry vs light arguments op

Going to machine guns (and support weapons in general), the primary disadvantage to light infantry has always been manpacking enough firepower and ammunition to do the job and cover contingencies. Current technology makes light infantry far more powerful than ever, and you could possibly push some current ideas to lighten the load even more; Mk 48 GPMG's to replace the C-6, Ultimax 100 LMGs to replace the C-9 and issuing the Javelin ATGM to replace the Carl-G and provide pretty potent DF firpower at the platoon and Coy level.

The only problem with that line of argument is a motor battalion or a Mech Infantry battalion can carry _even more_ firepower and ammunition (even without the Gucci kit) plus lots of additional goodies that even the strongest backs in the light BN would not have access to (things like the ITAS thermal sight, for example). "The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles" explicitly calls for a hybrid "motor battalion" to address that problem, and no matter how far in the future we project, that divide will remain (until we all become Starship Troopers).


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## SeanNewman (6 Jul 2010)

The 50 cals on the horizon that weigh half of what they do now have the potential to being some life back to light Inf.


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## dangerboy (6 Jul 2010)

With the 50 it is not just the weight of the actual weapon that is a killer, it is the weight of the ammo.


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## vonGarvin (6 Jul 2010)

You beat me to the punch, Dangerboy.  In fact, four belt boxes of .50 ammo has the same weight as the .50 with barrel and tripod.  That's only 420 rounds.


As for the whole "Light Infantry" discussion, I think it's moot.  We tried having "Light Infantry" in Afghanistan.  We ended up making the infantry mechanised.

Of course, it's necessary to retain the ability to conduct airmobile and dismounted operations, but as we saw, the light infantry didn't have the firepower, mobility or protection of mechanised forces.  This does NOT mean that "Light Infantry" is dead as a concept, but I would offer that our army is too small to dick around with a multitude of infantry-types.  I would rather see us really grip the Chinooks that are coming and have an airmobile brigade than have mechanised infantry without vehicles, which is the current concept.


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## OldSolduer (6 Jul 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> The 50 cals on the horizon that weigh half of what they do now have the potential to being some life back to light Inf.



Dangerboy got it right. 
In 1979 we did a live fire coy attack and we humped the .50s 3k there and back. It wasn't "light" by any means.


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## Kirkhill (6 Jul 2010)

Here's a question (as the tangent beckons):

Who is more valuable in Afghanistan - 500 disciplined individuals armed to the teeth with everything they can carry OR 500 unarmed disciplined individuals equipped with radios and able to bring down the wrath of God at 5 seconds notice?


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## vonGarvin (6 Jul 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Here's a question (as the tangent beckons):
> 
> Who is more valuable in Afghanistan - 500 disciplined individuals armed to the teeth with everything they can carry OR 500 unarmed disciplined individuals equipped with radios and able to bring down the wrath of God at 5 seconds notice?


Answer: 500 undisciplined staff officer armed to the teeth with powerpoint presentations ready to brief the various generals on how to win the war.

EDIT TO ADD: Unfortunately, the "wrath of God" takes much longer than the proverbial 5 seconds, so I would offer a majority of column "A", supported by column "B"


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## Kirkhill (6 Jul 2010)

Sorry, 

Forgot to include reference to number of pinheads dancing on an angel.


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## TangoTwoBravo (6 Jul 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Here's a question (as the tangent beckons):
> 
> Who is more valuable in Afghanistan - 500 disciplined individuals armed to the teeth with everything they can carry OR 500 unarmed disciplined individuals equipped with radios and able to bring down the wrath of God at 5 seconds notice?



How precise is that wrath?  Will it reliably punch a hole through the centre of the guy trying to kill me without destroying the area around him?  What the heck responds in 5 seconds?  

If you are saying that I have a max of 500 soldiers and I could have either 500 riflemen _or_ 500 FOO/FACs without other weapons then I would take the 500 riflemen.  If, however, I had a max of 500 soldiers and I could tailor the composition then there would probably by ten or twelve FOO/FACs in there in support of the force of riflemen (and other trades).


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## Infanteer (6 Jul 2010)

Interesting thread - how did I miss this one?  

1.  A lot of the arguments are justifiably pointed out as being "too Afghan-centric" however I also sense a bit of "Assault-centric" arguments as well, which base views of infantry organization and employment strictly on a combined arms attack on a prepared conventional foe.  Even in a war against a "near-peer" foe, it would be a stretch to assume that an infantry platoon or company would spend the whole time attacking fixed positions - so why focus on that for organization.  There are numerous tasks that could be expected and the flexibility of bayonets having some sort of armoured fighting vehicle (the variant is debatable) for a variety of tasks and being able to leave it behind if desired is probably prefered..

1.  Whoever mentioned ammo nailed it WRT C-6 use - I'd give every section a mortar too, if they could pack the ammo to make them useful.  Rifle Platoons have access to enough C-6s to be felt on the battlefield; no sense burdening a Section with them; they can (and do) get pushed to sections (with or without extra troops) when required - smart leadership will decide when to do so.

2.  Opinion seems split on dividing crew and bayonets.  I used to think we should split until I was a Rifle Platoon Comd.  The LAV is a tool - albeit a big tool - but a tool none the less.  A good commander should view it along the same lines as vector binos or a ATGM system - use the tool to give you the best advantage.  Crew tasks were interchangeable within the section.  Just because a guy was the "Driver" did not mean he was always driving.  I frequently rotated my drivers (and gunners and, at times, crew commanders) throughout the tour.  For most operations, drivers/gunners were out on dismounted OP/ambushes and conducting patrols.  Would you want to have armoured guys filling those spots when the vehicle is not required?  Would you want to strip a commander of 12 pers to accomplish his mission if the vehicles weren't required.  LAV driving and gunning isn't rocket science and the troops build up pretty good collective expertise in living and fighting with the vehicle.  No point in separating that.  To those who'd argue that it is a millstone that interferes with more traditional "bayonet" training I say BS - both in garrison and on operations, properly instituted maintenance routines take relatively little time from the section to ensure the vehicle is good to go.  The mumbo-jumbo about fitness and march-and-shoot competition has nothing to do with the cost of time and energy to have integral transport assets.

3.  I've asked, on these forums and in other venues, for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them.  Will someone lay it out for me, as it seems to be lobbed out as a reason for keeping a certain force structure.  While deployed, my platoon conducted over 130 patrols, with the lions share being without any vehicle support.  My battalion conducted, at various levels, numerous airmobile operations both training and live.  We operated in built up agricultural areas, complex urbanized terrain, and extremely "hilly" areas (although I wouldn't say it was quite mountain ops - but a few of our NCOs did the Shah-i-Kot thing in 2002, so it isn't much of a stretch to see us doing it), which included laying up for extended periods in traditional patrol bases.  We also conducted armoured breaches when we had to.  We're running out of "Light Infantry Missions" here.  If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years.  The last unit, AFAIK, to routinely use airborne operations where the Rhodesians, and that was more due to a lack of airmobile lift for their Fire Force units.  Strategic airborne insertion, as we've seen the US do in the last few years, is - properly - in the domain of CANSOFCOM.  The object is to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that.  Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.  So, unless anyone can explain "Light Infantry Missions" to me, let's get on with things.

In the end, I'm a fan of William Slim's generalist approach - there is an infantry battalion and that's it.  If you want it to fall out of planes, drive a truck or fight an armoured vehicle then so be it.  If this means that Infantry COs and their RSMs shall maintain a certain percentage of MOI/AGIC/Para/etc/etc qualified leaders, then so be it.  The trend above points to the most important aspect of a fighting organization - it's leadership that counts.


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## Kirkhill (6 Jul 2010)

With Infanteer on Slim's generalists.

The reason for the question was _reductio ad absurdum _, taking an argument to its logical absurdity to see where the path leads.  The point is, IMHO, how much faith do you put in your support?  The more faith you have the less you need to carry.  The less you need to carry the longer you can operate effectively. Part of the answer, of course, lies in how much faith does your support deserve.  If the support precisely incapacitates the target instantaneously then it may warrant a high degree of faith.  If, however, it shows up an hour late, after the target has departed, and plasters the local city centre and your section into the bargain, it might be considered less than useful.

Scots folk story time again - it has been a while since one of those.

From Killiecrankie in 1689 to Culloden in 1746 the Highlanders, waving big swords around, regularly beat the government lobsterbacks with muskets and bayonets.

It was only when the government troops changed tactics that they started winning.  The problem was they couldn't shoot down the Highlanders fast enough as they closed.  They Highlanders crossed the gap too fast.   The muskets couldn't pump the bullets downrange fast enough and they also created a smokescreen that the Higlanders could exploit.   The government troop found themselves confronted by bearded chappie in skirt, with sword and shield and him with only a bayonet.  The bayonet would be trapped in the shield and the sword would be trapped in their spinal column.

The solution was to train the government troops to ignore the man to their front and kill the man to their right by slipping the bayonet under the raised sword arm of bearded chap trying to kill their mate on their right.  

Meanwhile, they would have to take it on faith that their mate on their left was going to perform the same service for them with precise and timely support.

Last man had to trust in the wall, or the gunners, or the overlapping troops in the rear to protect his flank.


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## KevinB (6 Jul 2010)

Interesting enough both the Danish and the Norwegians have come off with the requirment for the Squad/Section Lightweight 7.62mm LMG  based off Afghan Light Operations.


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## SeanNewman (6 Jul 2010)

Dangerboy and Technoviking,

You both belong back in the 70s with your precious mortars, mentioning how much 50 cal ammo weighs  

What you meant to write (of course) is how much current gen 50 cal brass ammo weighs.

Just like the 50 cal itself weighing less, all sorts of efforts and progress are being made on the next gen ammo as well.

[Tongue in cheek] Now how about that CASW section attack!


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## ArmyRick (6 Jul 2010)

I once had the joy of humping a box of 50 ammo that fell off the Coy weapons det tobbaggan for a live fire raid in Shilo (snowshoes) and beleive me, 50 ammo is not pleasant to hump.

Since we have to remain flexible for combat operations in Afghanistan, Canada or any other place (I foresee us battling insurgency or well armed war lords for the next while) than maybe thinking about the structure of the platoon as a whole is a good idea.

I like the idea of binning weapons det and making it "Support Weapons or stand off combat Section" and the three sections become "Assault or Close combat sections"
 I would assign 2 x C6 and 2 x 7.62mm Marksman weapons to the section

SGT (Gun controller)
4 x Troops (Pte or CPL) manning 2 x C6s

MCPL and PTE with 7.62mm Rifles (HK417 maybe?)

For ops without LAVs, I would use the LAV crew (this section in my empire would have its own LAV) to help hump the extra 7.62mm and additional security.

How is this? Or I am about to pelted with "dinosaur comments" and have rotten tomatoes hurled at my skull?


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## SeanNewman (6 Jul 2010)

ArmyRick,

There's nothing dinosaurish at all.  We've all humped our share of kit, my comment above was simply a jab at Technoviking because I always tease him about fighting the last war (which for him is against Cronje).

Ammunition has been in brass casings long enough and well within our lifetimes that will change.

Even if we didn't change ammo types, I think you are exactly right with the weapons det or heavy weapons platoon, and this can still be done in a light(ish) context.  Remember, "light" only means that the vehicle doesn't take part in the fight, so whatever you want to lug that kit around in that takes if off of a soldier's back is brilliant.  It can be anything from an ML to a jeep to a Gator to an AHSVS.

And while I often take a ribbing for this, the absolute best vehicle I have ever seen for humping a few hundred pounds is an ATV with a trailer.  I can not for the life of me figure out why we don't have light(ish) Recce Platoons mounted on dirtbikes with ATVs with trailers in support.  What does the rest of the non-military world use to go just about everywhere offroad?  A dirtbike or an ATV.  

At 3 RCR a few years ago we benefited from having a small pool of ATVs sent to us, and they were an absolute gem to haul kit around in.  Not even just tactically, but administratively for things like hauling the heavy automated targets through the field to build complex ranges.


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## a_majoor (8 Jul 2010)

The The Rise, Fall, & Rebirth Of The 'Emma Gees' should be everyone's source material when discussing machine guns. Part two, in particular has lots of lessons for the dismounted use of MG's (in today's context the pintle mounted GPMG's would be teamed up with the dismounted troops C-9's), but if you read carefully, you also see the flexibility of a mech company. Although they have M-113 tracked carriers with some mobility and protection, the best use of the weapons systems turns out ot be dismounted and dug in, with a few tracks as a "fire brigade" to rush extra firepower into the threatened spots.

The scenario does not explicitly call for this, and except for the magical intervention of "the Old One" and "Sgt West", the solution would have been much different (as would the outcome); the company commander simply had not considered the abilities of the weapons systems in the dismounted role. While there is no one to one correspondence between the M-113 and the LAV, some of the same principles could apply (although dismounting the 25mm chain gun is not one of them!).

This is not to say the same happy outcome would take place if we switched out the M-113's for LAVs in the story. There is a danger which I think I-6 is actually talking about; the section could be conditioned to becoming too dependent on the LAV, and fight as dismounted dragoons tied to the firepower of the vehicle. Remove the vehicle and they have nothing.


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## dangerboy (8 Jul 2010)

I agree with Thucydides that the article about the "Emma Gees" is invaluable aid.  On the IPSWQ course I gave each student a copy of it and to a man they all said it was an excellent document. Then of course they wondered why the employment of MGs was no taught on the course.  It was one of the main points on their course critique, I had no good answer why it is not.  Hopefully the candidates I had will bring the document back to their home units and they will pass it around.  This way we don't lose all our machine gun knowledge.


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## SeanNewman (8 Jul 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... the section could *will* be conditioned to becoming too dependent on the LAV, and fight as dismounted dragoons tied to the firepower of the vehicle....



This relates to the light/mech thread too, but I have witnessed this quite a bit in terms of how much exposure to light fighting a leader has when they make their mech plan.

It's not about light vs mech, but on some ops that begged for the use of light infantry would get pushed higher, but when it got to the level of command that had only ever been mech, he forced the lower elements to change their plan to still be attached at the hip to the LAVs.


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## KevinB (8 Jul 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> This relates to the light/mech thread too, but I have witnessed this quite a bit in terms of how much exposure to light fighting a leader has when they make their mech plan.
> 
> It's not about light vs mech, but on some ops that begged for the use of light infantry would get pushed higher, but when it got to the level of command that had only ever been mech, he forced the lower elements to change their plan to still be attached at the hip to the LAVs.



Preach it brother.

 I saw it in Afghanistan, with not just the Canadians, and I saw it in Iraq with US forces, that missions that should have been light, got jacked up by adding vehicles that where not suited to the terrain or missions where scrubbed since the commander did not feel like being light.


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## Infanteer (8 Jul 2010)

That's a function of leadership, not unit organization.  There are other cases where "mech" guys, even tankers, are more than willing to get rid of vehicles and where "light guys" employ heavy assets if the job warrants it -  remember the SF guys with the tanks in Northern Iraq in 2003?  Bottom line is a poor estimate is not dependant on how many miles the guy has put in a turret.


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## Kirkhill (8 Jul 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's a function of leadership, not unit organization.  There are other cases where "mech" guys, even tankers, are more than willing to get rid of vehicles and where "light guys" employ heavy assets if the job warrants it -  remember the SF guys with the tanks in Northern Iraq in 2003?  Bottom line is a poor estimate is not dependant on how many miles the guy has put in a turret.



But don't people tend to default to their comfort zone?  When tasked don't they tend to reduce the uncertainties by conforming to those things that have worked for them in the past?  A new Platoon Leader has a different perspective than a retiring Brigade Commander.  The Platoon Leader hasn't tried anything before therefore all risks are equal.  Also his gamble only impacts 30 people.  The Brigade Commander has 3000 on his conscience and a career of successes and failures behind him/her. Isn't the BC going to default to what he knows?

Doesn't  it make some kind of sense to at least have a Mech Champion and a Light Champion on equal footing within the Battalion structure to ensure that the Battalion trains for both roles, and can operate in both roles?  That assumes that you want the flexibility of a "bipolar" battalion.

PS (not minimizing the load that the Platoon Leader has on his plate - as I trust you know).


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## a_majoor (8 Jul 2010)

The question then becomes "how do you condition the leadership/troops?".

A LAV battalion currently is conditioned alost by default; they get the LAVs every so often so much of their training is dismounted due to circumstances. There is also a fairly large pool of "light" or "sort-of" light troops who rotate in and out on a regular basis who bring their perspectives to the table.

I'm not sure how you could have co-equal "Mech" and "Light" champions at the HQ to decide what is best. The Light guy would be "outvoted" much of the time simply due to the sheer number of mechanized and motorized assets who would be part of the Mech tribe. Think about what would happen when the Light champion started adding Engineer, Armoured, Artillery, Logistics and other supporting arms to the plan. They are all Mech, and unless the serious plan is to transport all the dismounts on the back deck of the tanks, most of them would:

a) bring their vehicles and vehicle support to the table, and
b) suggest the Light force find a way to keep up.

Like it or not, I think Light forces might be forced into niche roles for the foreseeable future (SOF, heliborn forces to launch raids, secure high priority targets or deceive the enemy, Marine working the littorals etc.).


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## SeanNewman (8 Jul 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But don't people tend to default to their comfort zone?



I think that is a bang-on assessment and quite brilliant in its simplicity.

And we're all guilty of it until we can say that we've worn every uniform and cap badge, really.


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## KevinB (9 Jul 2010)

Sounds like Journeyman should be CDS


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## Kirkhill (9 Jul 2010)

> The question then becomes "how do you condition the leadership/troops?".
> 
> A LAV battalion currently is conditioned alost by default; they get the LAVs every so often so much of their training is dismounted due to circumstances. There is also a fairly large pool of "light" or "sort-of" light troops who rotate in and out on a regular basis who bring their perspectives to the table.
> 
> ...



If the LAV/Lt issue is being decided by consensual indecision then that surely is a problem with leadership at large and battalion leadership in particular.  It seems to be indicative of a lack of a plan.

As to the Light and LAV Champions: how about this for a thought?

Take the LAVs from the Companies (stop screaming and hear me out for a second)
Assign whatever LAVs are allotted to Combat Support Company
Designate OC Combat Support Company as OC (Heavy)
Create a comparable OC (Light) responsible for the Rifles.
Remove Recce from Combat Support Company (if that isn’t already the practice) and place it directly under the CO at HQ.
OC (Light) and OC (Heavy) are responsible for fighting their corners.
CO is responsible for deciding who wins today, whether it is a training or operational issue.

Take a hypothetical tasking:  Any task.
CO issues Wng O and tasks Recce Pl
OC (Lt) and OC (Hvy) are tasked with preparing two separate plans for the CO’s consideration.
CO picks one OR CO directs DCO to grip OC’s Lt and Hvy and come up with a workable plan using both.

This puts CO in the same position as a Brigade Commander who mixes and matches resources available to suit the mission (or to reject the mission in the absence of necessary resources).

The secret to success for the CO AND the Brigade Commander is to ensure that he/she maintains as many options as possible and that means training for as many eventualities as possible.  If they want the Rifles to act as Dragoons and Dragoons only then by all means permanently attach LAVs at the lowest possible level.  If they want the Rifles to be incompetent in mounted ops then put the LAVs into the Bn Park and leave them there.  If they want Rifles and LAVs to know each other then they will balance the two extremes and ensure that they regularly work together, have permanent liaisons and will train in various fighting configurations.

Just as a Brigade Commander used to mix and match his tank squadrons and infantry companies, sometimes creating Tank Heavy Combat Teams and other times Infantry Heavy Combat Teams, so could the Battalion CO.

Why couldn’t some of the training be dedicated to assigning different Rifle manning levels to the LAVs?
2 Rifles / LAV, 4 Rifles / LAV, 7 Rifles / LAV, or at the other end of the spectrum, 4 LAVs / Pl or 8 LAVs / Coy or 14 LAVs / Coy.

The secret to effectiveness would be how often the troops work together.  If the LAVs are in Support Company but train with the Rifles one week out of two are they more or less likely to be effective as a team than if the LAVs are held at Section level but only get onto Shirley Road once every 6 months?

I don’t accept that the effectiveness of a unit is a function of whose empire is biggest, or even where the administrative divisions are.  Effectiveness is a function of the training conducted and that, like managing the dividing lines between empires, is the function of the CO.

It is also a function of Politicians being willing to understand the need for spending money on bullets, gas, tires and clutches for effective training to occur.

I can’t remember any more.  Is it “Concentration of Forces” then “Economy of Effort” or the other way round?

There are always going to be more jobs for you lot to undertake than you have numbers to take them on.  If you always default to “I need all available support for every job” and “Unless I have all available support then I can’t do the job” then you are going to leave major chunks of the battlefield to the enemy to exploit.  If you haven’t built up a history of developing comfort zones by taking controlled risks at times of your own choosing then you are likely to find yourself forced into taking uncomfortable and uncontrolled risks at a time and place of the enemy’s (or worse, the Politicians') choosing.


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Jul 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If the LAV/Lt issue is being decided by consensual indecision then that surely is a problem with leadership at large and battalion leadership in particular.  It seems to be indicative of a lack of a plan.
> 
> As to the Light and LAV Champions: how about this for a thought?
> 
> ...



Where are you getting that there is a lack of a plan?  What is this plan for?  What are you basing this on?  I think that infantry officers are capable of conducting an estimate and employing their resources appropriately without having a dichotomy in the battalion officers.  There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so.

So, under your plan there would be a company commander with nine rifle platoons and another company commander with some 50 LAV IIIs?


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Where are you getting that there is a lack of a plan?  What is this plan for?  What are you basing this on?  I think that infantry officers are capable of conducting an estimate and employing their resources appropriately without having a dichotomy in the battalion officers.  There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so.



Thank you.

I just don't see this light/mech dichotomy that people speak to.  When we speak of LAVs, we speak of resources.  Lump them in with helicopters, tanks, UAVs and the numerous other options available to an OC or a CO on today's battlefield.  Implying that one's background puts in such a huge bias that it overrides his ability to conduct effective planning is a pretty big statement when used to argue for completely overhauling a battalion.

As well, people seem to assume that if a battalion has LAVs then all it does is goes to the field to play Blitzkrieg.  On the last four major exercises I did, every one contained a significant "LAV-less" component and three had large aviation elements.  COs, in designing training, are smart enough to know that the infantry needs to be well-rounded.

No one has yet to respond to my RFIs on "Light Infantry Missions" or "Light Infantry Tasks".  Training is the answer here, not creating specialty companies to do task "X" (even if we had the resources and manning to do so).


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## Kirkhill (9 Jul 2010)

Oh well. Here I go again.  In for  a penny, in for a pound.
Perhaps I misconstrued what Thucydides was saying but I inferred from his statement that LAV allocation issue had largely been determined by default.   I understand that there is a defined distribution of resources.  If I remember correctly the manning levels were established early on in the Kandahar deployment when Hillier was CDS.

However I also have inferred from reading many of the threads round about here that:
A – not all battalions at home have a full suite of LAVs with which to train
B – not all platoons in the field are manned at full strength throughout the tour due to leaves etc
C - not all missions require a full slate of all resources every time
D – that some missions are inhibited by the inclusion of some resources that might be inappropriate to the task
E – that the limited force available to the CF to conduct the tasks assigned really has to maintain a MaxFlex stance.

I’m criticizing nobody.  I’m commenting ... and opening myself for criticism.

I’m sure that the Infantry, and for that matter, the Armoured, Arty and Engrs are quite capable of making effective appreciations and allocating resources appropriately.

And as to the organization, OC (Lt) would be responsible for the training of the 3 Rifle Companies of 9 Platoons under their existing commanders.  The OC (Hvy) would be responsible for whatever LAVs, ATGMs and (given TV2 gets lucky) Mortars that the Battalion is assigned, as well as being responsible for coordinating the actions of any other assigned resources, like tanks.
For me, looking at the situation that seems to be described round about here, you seem to be facing a continuous spectrum of tasks across an infinitely variable geography.  Some tasks seem to require a whole battalion to move on its wheels and maneuver continuously.  The Yanks run to Baghdad comes to mind. 

Some tasks require heavy forces operating out of a fixed base.  Some tasks require low man-power patrols out of a fixed base.  Some tasks require large numbers of bodies operating in environments where wheels and armour cannot go or are not available.
In all cases the troops on the ground are supported but not all missions are supported the same way.

Wouldn’t it be an effective training tool to treat the LAVs as just another tool in the support kit bag that the CO can use to train his troops to be able to effectively use?

For instance:  
A helicopter substitute for a simple relocation
A tank substitute for a direct support 
An arty/mortar/MG substitute for coordinating indirect fires.

And yep, I know that helicopters fly, tanks have tracks and guns fire shells for miles.
I am also planning on sleeping at a Holiday Inn Express in the next week or two.


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## SeanNewman (9 Jul 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ...There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so...



Yes in theory, not always so in practice.

Reference OC putting forth his dismounted coy-level ConOp, having the BG CoC take over the plan and make it a BG operation (at company level), but it's now...you guessed it...mechanized!  I saw this on multiple occasions.

And the very rare occasion where the OC was allowed to make his approach dismounted, it was under the conditions that he had to marry up with the LAVs immediately once Ph2 got started for fear that (god forbid) a soldier would have to (gasp) not be tied to a LAV for 12 hours.


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## KevinB (9 Jul 2010)

Extended Mountain Operations.
  Unless you got a big block and tackle - I'm guessing the LAV ain't the sort of item you want to bring up...
Airmobile Ops - Airborne Ops.

 Way back when regular Inf units used to practise layback patrols and troops actually knew how to nav with a map and compass.

 Specific items that are optimized for Light Operations are not usually carried by LAV units 

Secondly while EVERY other country is looking into a LW 7.62mm LMG, the CF seems to wondering where the SF kit is for the C6.
  So yeah given every other Army I go see is looking for similar items, and the CF is playing ostrich, yeah I think there is a gap better Light and Mech.

I'm pretty sure I am seeing the Forest and the Trees, but I think the CF is stuck in a copse.


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Jul 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Yes in theory, not always so in practice.
> 
> Reference OC putting forth his dismounted coy-level ConOp, having the BG CoC take over the plan and make it a BG operation (at company level), but it's now...you guessed it...mechanized!  I saw this on multiple occasions.
> 
> And the very rare occasion where the OC was allowed to make his approach dismounted, it was under the conditions that he had to marry up with the LAVs immediately once Ph2 got started for fear that (god forbid) a soldier would have to (gasp) not be tied to a LAV for 12 hours.



Why would it always be so in practice?  Should you always park the LAVs?

Just because a CO over-ruled an OC doesn't establish anything beyond the command dynamics of that situation.

I've seen LAV companies/platoons leave their LAVs both in training and on operations.  Sometimes it was for short periods (use the LAVs to get fairly close and then go in on foot), while in others it was for much longer periods to include mountains.


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## KevinB (11 Jul 2010)

My other specific LI role is the METT teams for the ANA.
  Now how does a LAV element teach dismounted infantry, and better yet, how does it keep morale up with the ANA, when they get in a Ford Ranger, 5 Ton, or they walk, and you get in a LAV.


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## ArmyRick (11 Jul 2010)

That applies to leadership (mentorship?) by example IMO. 

Reading an earlier post by Kirkhill, I do not agree with rigid or set in stone ORBATs. I beleive we should (our senior leadership) do a generic combat estimate of most likely conflicts we could be involved with, draft up a very general ORBAT and then customize to the mission.

Its the mission requirements that dictate what you do, how you do it and what you do it with.

I remember one company attack we did many years ago using grizzlies. The dismounts left early in the morning and humped about 5-6 KM to the line of departure and than just prior to the attack, the grizziles moved up into a fire base position and used their MGs to suppress while we moved in. naturally it was an exercise so of course we magically won and saved the day.

My point is this, our OC, did NOT just do something because "its the way its done". He did an estimate and figured out what would most likely lead to mission success. 

Bottom line, you must do your combat estimate as best you can, look at all your COAs and enemy COAs (most dangerous/most likely being key) and figure out what will lead to success.

Maybe you use LAVs, maybe you don't. Maybe you use some LAVs, or extra LAVs. Mission requirements dictate what you do. Thats what they teach on Infantry DP1.1 and 1.2 as well 3B. Some people forget it or are not familiar with it.

* Important note for the above statement, when I say grizzlies, I do not mean Ursus Arctos Horribilus, the big brown furry bears, I am refering to the AVGPs


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## Infanteer (11 Jul 2010)

KevinB said:
			
		

> Extended Mountain Operations.
> Unless you got a big block and tackle - I'm guessing the LAV ain't the sort of item you want to bring up...





> Airmobile Ops





> Airborne Ops.





> Way back when regular Inf units used to practise layback patrols and troops actually knew how to nav with a map and compass.





			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> My other specific LI role is the METT teams for the ANA.
> Now how does a LAV element teach dismounted infantry, and better yet, how does it keep morale up with the ANA, when they get in a Ford Ranger, 5 Ton, or they walk, and you get in a LAV.



This is pretty much the list I came up with, and I addressed all of those in my original post.  Most of those do not require much specialized training, only a core of knowledge within a unit.  I argue that these knowledge levels are possible to maintain with a proper training cycle and do not require specialized organizations.

As for the OMLT, it has its own vehicles, which may or may not include LAVs.  The OMLT uses its vehicles to move with the ANA who now have a mix of Rangers and Armoured Humvees.  I don't know how a LAV would interfere with the training and mentoring requirement?  I've worked with mentored and unmentored ANA and ANP and if we drove somewhere we drove somewhere - I just had to take the mobility of their vehicles into account when route planning.

You'll get a kick out of the fact that the current OMLT is manned by an Armoured Unit....  



> I'm pretty sure I am seeing the Forest and the Trees, but I think the CF is stuck in a copse.



I don't think you and I are looking at the same patch of trees, my friend.


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## SeanNewman (11 Jul 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Why would it always be so in practice?  Should you always park the LAVs?



No, of course not.  Parking the LAVs out of spite should get that commander a code red from his troops who had to hump the extra weight for nothing.

What bothers me is not the LAVs (which are great), but the opinion of some that it is absolutely impossible and too risky to do anything without them.  

To achieve surprise there it either has to be done with a nighttime dismounted approach where you get lucky or airmobile; any vehicle approach will result in hours of "stand to" time.

The sad part is that the way we conducted business for so long meant that the LAVs became self-important almost like manifest destiny.  Instead of living with the people, we went from FOB to Op to patrol to FOB to op, covering lots of terrain that did nothing but get us glued to the roads/bypass routes or driving through farmers' fields and p!ssing them off.  But since we were covering such long distances we were forced to drive and become IED targets.

That's not the fault of the LAV though, but the way we moved around the battlespace.

It would be very stupid of a modern commander to state that he had no purpose for LAVs, but they must be a tool no different than helicopters or a breaching kit.  You use them when the mission calls for it; you don't make the vehicles the mission.

That's the only thing that separates the infantry, really.  Every other trade is about people manning equipment, where as Infantry is supposed to be about kit supporting the soldier.  Take that away by making us do nothing but man the LAV and we can't say we're better than Armour anymore


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## Kirkhill (11 Jul 2010)

> ...Every other trade is about people manning equipment, where as Infantry is supposed to be about kit supporting the soldier....



The Infanteer is the only government employee hired expressly to go out and meet people whose reactions are at the unpredictable to hostile end of the spectrum.  The old line "close with and destroy" should be replaced with "close with and destroy, if necessary (and you get to decide)".

Meanwhile everybody else (those not carrying a bayonet) are laying back and saying: "Carry on, Lass, we're right behind you."

And that includes everyone from the LMG gunner, the grenadier and the DM chap, through the armour, the guns, the air force and the navy, all the way back to the politicians and the voters.

See the world, meet strange people and drop us a line if they don't kill you  before you kill them., if you have to


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## Kirkhill (11 Jul 2010)

You know, it occurs to me as I post that last, in the bad old days the Crown used to hire a pile of young officers to go out and make those decisions.  They supplied a fighting tail of troopies who DID only have to worry about "Closing and Destroying" if and when the boss said so.  It wasn't their job to sweat the details.  Now everybody is expected to act as if they hold a Commission.  Forget the "Strategic Corporal".  We are now observing the "Commissioned Private".

The difference, in my view, is that when a Lieutenant went into a village with 30 followers the locals could relate to a man, an individual, that commanded and held the respect of 30 other men, individuals.

Now, even though a fire team can deliver more death and destruction, and thus constitute more of a threat than that old platoon ever could,  the authority of the fire team is not as clear, as demonstrable , as the authority  of that old time colonial Lieutenant with his thirty man fighting tail.


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## SeanNewman (11 Jul 2010)

[C6 GPMG]


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## Journeyman (11 Jul 2010)

KevinB said:
			
		

> Sounds like Journeyman should be CDS


Hey, I've always said nice things about you Kev. (But I caught your meaning   8) )  

I'd have to turn it down anyway though; I'm too honest for the politics and parades aren't my strong suit.


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## daftandbarmy (12 Jul 2010)

Thread back on target - Lay!

Here's some recent footage of a GPMG in action care of 'The Scum'. 

Not sure why they took the weapon out of the fight just because the No. 1 was wounded. 'Back in the day' I'd have got a big kick in the nads for trying something like that. Then again, it looks like the gun might have been damaged by the incoming. Ah, armchair QB'ing can be so satisfying...

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/3038479/Heroism-in-Helmand-is-captured-on-video.html


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## aesop081 (12 Jul 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Meanwhile everybody else (those not carrying a bayonet) are laying back and saying: "Carry on, Lass, we're right behind you."
> 
> And that includes everyone from the LMG gunner, the grenadier and the DM chap, through the armour, the guns, the air force and the navy, all the way back to the politicians and the voters.



I'm sorry but that is a load of poo.

Although some tasks i carry out are in direct support of the infantry, my main reason for being ( remember that i am indeed air force) is to search for, identify, track and destroy enemy naval units. My primary job is to be a combatant in every sense of the word, which is why my airplane carries a belly full of offensive weapons.


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## SeanNewman (12 Jul 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> ...my primary job is to be a combatant in every sense of the word, which is why my airplane carries a belly full of offensive weapons.



But you personally are not the "thing" that does the stuff; you man the airplane that has the stuff (as per artillery, tanks, etc).

Infantry is the only combat trade* where it is the person himself who is the fighter, and kit is attached to him to fight as opposed to him being attached to the weapons.

_*Note* "Combat" being the key word here, all sorts of other trades are based on the person such as medic, PAO, JAG, etc._


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## George Wallace (12 Jul 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> But you personally are not the "thing" that does the stuff; you man the airplane that has the stuff (as per artillery, tanks, etc).



 ???

Are you telling us now that the "thing" (C-6) that does the stuff, not the infanteer pulling the trigger, can now do things by itself?  Every wpn system, be it a C-6, a Leopard, a CF - 18, or CDN Avator's Aurora requires an "operator".  We haven't reached "Terminator" status yet.


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## SeanNewman (12 Jul 2010)

They are fundamentally different because the man is the core of the system, and other equipment is attached to him.

Yes he is technically pulling the trigger but that is different than a terminator operator.

Even with nothing but a set of combats an Infanteer can still do something.


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## George Wallace (12 Jul 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Even with nothing but a set of combats an Infanteer can still do something.



Even with nothing but a set of combats an airman/sailor/soldier in any Trade can still do something.  Hell, if naked, they all can.  It boils down to individual skills and Infantrymen have no monopoly on those.


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## KevinB (12 Jul 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Even with nothing but a set of combats an airman/sailor/soldier in any Trade can still do something.  Hell, if naked, they all can.  It boils down to individual skills and Infantrymen have no monopoly on those.



Point is being missed.

 By trade, the Infanteer carries his tools, the other fighting trades are generally carried by theirs.


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## aesop081 (12 Jul 2010)

KevinB said:
			
		

> By trade, the Infanteer carries his tools, the other fighting trades are generally carried by theirs.



100% agree.

That being said, the point of my response to Kirhill seems to have been missed. What i got from his post was that everyone who is not an infanteer exists only to support the infanteer.While this does apply to several missions, some of us have primary missions that do not relate to the infantry in any way.


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## Kirkhill (12 Jul 2010)

Cdn Aviator:

I'll agree with you on that.  Not everybody operates in support of the infanteer at all times.  As you say many missions don't involve the infanteer at all.  They are dangerous and necessary and require skill, and thanks.

That being said there is little in this world that is less predictable than an individual and often the only way to determine if a capable threat is an actual enemy or an actual ally or just a disinterested bystander is to "Advance to Contact" and see what happens.

In your case you can determine if the vessel is obeying the rules of the road and acting in a hostile or non-hostile manner but how do you determine if the people on board are hostile or not?  Somebody has to go on board and check them out.... be it a NBP, Mounties or Coasties, all of whom put themselves at risk.
,
My point is though, that Mounties and Coasties expect most of the people they interact with to be cooperative most of the time.  The non-infantry trades in the Army and much of the infantry, DOES lay back to supply support as the infanteer walks, exposed, up to another individual, whose intentions are unknown, and not knowing whether he is going to be shot or have tea.

I appreciate that you, NBPs, and everyone else that wears a uniform puts themselves in harms way. I am just offering some special pleading on behalf of the pbi that is essentially unarmoured, lacks speed, and is denied distance, cover and concealment when making contact.


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## Trooper Hale (6 Aug 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Hell, if naked, they all can.  It boils down to individual skills and Infantrymen have no monopoly on those.



I'm an Armoured crewman and I do some of my best work half naked inside my vehicle!
While I understand where your coming from, I'd want to stress that in an AFV the vehicle may carry us but we "carry" the weapons. Its not a free ride for us. Every day I've got 3 weapons systems to keep operational (the 25mm and the two Mag 58's) and its a human finger that makes those weapons fire after the human eye has taken in the target.
Apart from that, your spot on and I know what your saying.


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## George Wallace (6 Aug 2010)

I've worked in that same tight turret.   :nod:


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## daftandbarmy (6 Aug 2010)

Digger Hale said:
			
		

> I'm an Armoured crewman and I do some of my best work half naked inside my vehicle!
> While I understand where your coming from, I'd want to stress that in an AFV the vehicle may carry us but we "carry" the weapons. Its not a free ride for us. Every day I've got 3 weapons systems to keep operational (the 25mm and the two Mag 58's) and its a human finger that makes those weapons fire after the human eye has taken in the target.
> Apart from that, your spot on and I know what your saying.



All that and hot coffee too!  ;D


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## REDinstaller (6 Aug 2010)

Or hotdogs from the SSM's carrier. ;D


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## Trooper Hale (8 Aug 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> All that and hot coffee too!  ;D


I'll admit there a definite perks (a Boiling vessel and the fridge jump to mind!).

Back to the MAG58 (or C6) though, here me with mine in Iraq (the picture was used in the newspaper, thus the posing).
We use it as a force multiplier because nothing says "Hi!" to a bloke hiding behind a wall like 7.62. 
Its a fantastic weapon and like daftandbarmy says, is well worth growing some arms to carry. I hope we never need it over here, but if we do its something I wouldnt want to be without.


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## SeanNewman (8 Aug 2010)

Who is the Number 2 on that moustache?


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## daftandbarmy (9 Aug 2010)

Digger Hale said:
			
		

> I'll admit there a definite perks (a Boiling vessel and the fridge jump to mind!).
> 
> Back to the MAG58 (or C6) though, here me with mine in Iraq (the picture was used in the newspaper, thus the posing).
> We use it as a force multiplier because nothing says "Hi!" to a bloke hiding behind a wall like 7.62.
> Its a fantastic weapon and like daftandbarmy says, is well worth growing some arms to carry. I hope we never need it over here, but if we do its something I wouldnt want to be without.



Beauty! The only thing better than 1 x C6 in that picture would be ..... two; you big bullies  ;D


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## Trooper Hale (9 Aug 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Beauty! The only thing better than 1 x C6 in that picture would be ..... two; you big bullies  ;D


Mate! We're Armoured Corps diggers! Just because the AFV isn't here with us doesn't mean we're going to give up our natural desire for bulk firepower. There's a MAG58 in each car! Its just tucked away in the boot. Theres no kill like overkill.

As I hinted earlier, for ease of resupply we never mount a Minimi or C9 on the flex mount in our ASLAV's. Its always a MAG58. For me, it makes sense not to have too many different calibres on the car. 
Our grunts are carrying them at section level in Afghanistan because again, the 7.62 capability is needed. 

My 'stache has grown quite substantially since this photo was taken back in February. I must be one of the few 23 year olds in the world who can wax their mo! Sadly, our troop leader hasnt grown and he still looks like he's 12... :-[


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## Kirkhill (2 May 2012)

Bump

An article by an author that prefers not to have his name mentioned on this means brought to my attention this article:

(Pictures at the link)



> FORWARD OPERATING BASE MEHTAR Lam, Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 2011 -- It all began during an intense 2 1/2-hour firefight with the enemy earlier this year in Afghanistan.
> 
> As members of the 1st Battalion, 133rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division, Iowa National Guard, sat around later at Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam and discussed the engagement, they talked about how three-man teams manning crew-served weapons struggled to stay together over difficult terrain in fluid battles.
> 
> ...



This answers part of the question about how to bring a useful ammo load to the dismounted fight.


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## daftandbarmy (2 May 2012)

In the Paras we carried 400 rounds of link in a bergen carried by the No. 2. While prone, he'd feed it from the bergen over his shoulder into the gun, in the same way you see a hydration tube emerge from a rucksack. The No. 1 carried another 400 rounds so that he could dump his bergen if required for the No. 2 to feed ammo.

This solution sounds pretty gucci though. Nice to see R&D in direct support of the troops.


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## OldSolduer (2 May 2012)

It always seems to be a struggle. How do you carry enough to sustain a C6 in the LR? 


Seems to be  good idea and a good start.


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## GAP (2 May 2012)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In the Paras we carried 400 rounds of link in a bergen carried by the No. 2. While prone, he'd feed it from the bergen over his shoulder into the gun, in the same way you see a hydration tube emerge from a rucksack. The No. 1 carried another 400 rounds so that he could dump his bergen if required for the No. 2 to feed ammo.
> 
> This solution sounds pretty gucci though. Nice to see R&D in direct support of the troops.



Everyone in our patrols carried something extra.....60mm rounds, LAWS, or belts for the M60.....17 lbs extra on top of the ruck has got to suck.....


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## ryanl4ca (2 May 2012)

http://soldiersystems.net/2011/10/18/stuff-like-this-makes-it-hard-to-justify-the-defense-budget/

http://soldiersystems.net/2012/02/03/new-mico-footage/


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## Colin Parkinson (2 May 2012)

Did the tour at Hurricane Butterfly who has the movie Minigun setup, tried it on and it is extremely heavy empty! They said during the making of the movie the Actor was strapped to a pole to prevent him falling down. According to our guide the rotating barrel acted like a gyroscopic and made turning the weapon one way easy and the other way almost impossible.


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## IRepoCans (21 May 2012)

Heh. On the 'Mini-C6' note, its actually not a shorter FN MAG, its just the Mini chambered in 7.62 (older than the Mk.48 too). The real 'mini' C6 is a new model of the M240, M240L.


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