# Joint Force Arsenal



## Kirkhill (21 Aug 2022)

I'm starting this thread because I am finding it difficult to keep discussions within the narrow confines of the threads on this board.   I have become a serial violator of silos as I invariably find that everything is connected to everything else.  In my cluttered mind this is becoming more apparent as weapons become more capable, at lower prices and become less platform dependent.  The weapons become more capable, more precise, have longer ranges and are less dependent on launch platforms.

Moore's Law is catching up to us.  The cost of smart weapons is dropping.  The quality of weapons being provided at scale and at cost by a host of technically competent countries is increasing - countries that have a lot more security incentives to keep trying to do things differently.

The movement is spreading.



> Col. Arnaud Goujon, chief of plans at the French army headquarters, said the service is looking to add loitering munitions to its inventory later in the year.
> 
> “You need something that is different than a mortar or an artillery shell,” Goujon said. “I*f it is the same price of a mortar round that goes about three kilometers away and flies for 15 minutes, then it’s interesting,” he said. If it costs 10 times as much as a mortar or an artillery round with the same range, then it’s less interesting, he added.
> 
> ...








						Loitering Munitions Proliferate As Tech Changes Battlefield
					

Loitering Munitions Proliferate As Tech Changes Battlefield




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				




Often other forces are buying 80% solutions at 20% of the cost.  Nobody will confuse a Bayraktar for a Reaper, or a Stugna for a Javelin, but the lower cost solutions improve capabilities and make their owners that much harder to defeat.

An example might be the 155mm Excalibur round.  At a cost of about 125,000 USD it has a range of 25 to 40 km (expanding to 70 km in the foreseeable future) with a wiki CEP of 4m.   An alternate choice for the  gunners is the M1156 Precision Guided Munitions Kit, a fuzing assembly that also steers the round off its ballistic course.  The kit reduces the CEP of the dumb round from 250m to 50m.  This is not the 5m of the Excalibur but it heads in the right direction - and at a cost of < 10,000 USD.    And the Excalibur had its origins in 1992, 30 years ago.  The M1156 development started circa 2006, 16 years ago.  There are 7 of Moore's generations between the Excalibur and the M1156.  There have been 8 generations since.

Although some nations focus on safety and security and ensuring the integrity of the supply chain other nations, with different incentives, are more inclined to exploit the opportunities inherent in Moore's observation and let innovation drive their strategy and demand a more flexible supply chain.  Korea, Poland, Turkey and Israel immediately come to mind.  And Ukraine for that matter.

Is there any reason to think that an M1156 type kit cannot achieve Excalibur type results in the short term?


The other reason for starting this thread is the tendency to platform independence and the increasing tendency to remote autonomy that accompanies the move to uninhabited systems.

The armies of the world have spent a century searching for the ultimate All Terrain Vehicle.  I suggest that the ultimate ATV is an aircraft.  I further suggest that an aircraft is any man-made thing that flies, whether ballistic or self-powered; dumb, guided or autonomous; inhabited or uninhabited; rotary wing or fixed wing; IC, Jet, Rocket, Ramjet or Electrically powered.

The fact that the sailors, soldiers and aviators of Navies, Armies and Air Forces are now all launching variants of the same aircraft from watercraft, landcraft and aircraft is, I believe, part of the underlying tension amongst the services.  They are competing to survive in an environment where their traditional domains are melding into the multi-domain universe.  And they are doing this at a time where the pool of potential candidates for their services is both shrinking and morphing.  All nations of the OECD are struggling with the impact of the 1972 Club of Rome report, which counselled reducing the size of families, and the related impacts of the birth control pill and access to abortions.  There are simply fewer young people available.

Those that are are not the physically strong farm boys, steel workers and miners of the past.  They are physically challenged information workers, project managers, students and gamers.

The good news is that these people are well suited to exploit Moore's Law.

The bad news is that the aircraft they might interact with can be launched from fixed positions on land and at sea, from landcraft, seacraft - both on the surface and under the surface, and from aircraft.  And the operator may never leave her cat adorned cubicle with its Keurig and it Link16 connection.


From Rimpac -



> The four unmanned surface vehicles that the Navy brought to the exercise carried specialized payloads for anti-submarine warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, domain awareness and communications capability, he said. “So that’s all kind of new.”
> 
> Two of the USVs were designed and built as unmanned vessels: the Sea Hunter — originally developed by the Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency — and the Sea Hawk — developed through the Office of Naval Research. The other two — Nomad and Ranger — were previously manned vessels that have been retrofitted with autonomous technology through the Ghost Fleet Overlord program.
> 
> ...



Nomad and Ranger are unmanned versions of the Anticostis operated by the RCN in the 1990s





HMCS Anticosti.






						Unmanned Systems Make a Splash During RIMPAC
					

Unmanned Systems Make a Splash During RIMPAC




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				




These vessels, with their container carrying capacity, can be launch pads for the SM6  and other missiles.









						U.S. Navy deploys SM-6 missile on USV Ranger for tests - Naval Post- Naval News and Information
					

According to a video released by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy deployed four-pack of containerized SM-6 launchers on an unmanned surface vessel "Ranger" for tests.




					navalpost.com
				




Sea Hawk and Sea Hunter, with ISR suites, including Towed Arrays, are contributing to the AAW and ASW pictures.





These seacraft, with their ability to relocate and hold position autonomously are drawing on the experiences of these 1970s projects:  the SWATH T-AGOS  and Bras D'or.  Both of which relied on towed arrays and minimal manning.

And are headed towards









						Towed array sonar integrated with Royal Navy experimental autonomous submarine | Navy Lookout
					






					www.navylookout.com
				





On the Command and Control front, from the Rimpac article



> ... the partner commanders did not have direct access to the unmanned platforms and their classified operating technology but rather gave mission orders to U.S. service members controlling the platforms. However, the international participants had access to all the sensor data just as they would from any shared platform, according to Daley.
> 
> *Command and control worked as expected during the exercise, but there was an incident with one of the manned ships that required transferring USV control from afloat to ashore*, he said.
> 
> “That was a tremendous effort on the part of the command structure,” he said. “We were postured to do it, and it was good from a data-collection standpoint, which helps further develop the concept of operations and the concept of employment for real-world operations.”



Command and Control was transferred from the "local" commander at sea to the "remote" commander on shore.  Could more emphasis, more reliance, be placed on the "remote" structure?  At what risk?

From the same article,



> And it wasn’t just the USVs that caught people’s attention during the exercise. The MQ-9B, the next generation of the MQ-9A Reaper, was also getting a workout during the exercise.
> 
> “It seems like a pretty capable platform for the [Defense Department] as a whole,” Brown said. “The endurance it has, the payloads it can carry, it can do [anti-submarine warfare], it has radars onboard that can collect signals, and the fact that it can be flown from anywhere is pretty amazing. So, I think that this bravo model is an advancement.”
> 
> ...



So ASW prosecuted by Sea Hunters and Reapers from cubicles.

And when you leave people out of the equation - you don't need decks, space in the engine room for maintenance, or even to worry about not being awash.  You can sail at snorkel depth.


I'm tying this to some postings I consider related




Kirkhill said:


> In a dollars and cents discussion would buying and operating the MQ-9A in that role be more or lest costly than "drone-carriers"?
> 
> Looking at the Loyal Wingman type programmes now
> 
> ...





Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 72634
> 
> 
> 
> ...





Kirkhill said:


> Progress - 155mm Ramjet projectiles tested in Norway in April of this year.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



With all of these synergies, with all of this consolidation, is the right starting point for the discussion on Force 2025/2030 an infantry-centric medium force?


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## FJAG (21 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Moore's Law is catching up to us. The cost of smart weapons is dropping. The quality of weapons being provided at scale and at cost by a host of technically competent countries is increasing - countries that have a lot more security incentives to keep trying to do things differently.
> 
> The movement is spreading.


One thing that impressed me was that back in 2004 when Canada went to Kabul it recognized the need for both UAVs and counterfire radars and was fortunately poised through a fluke in DLR of being quickly able to acquire Sperwer and ARTHUR. Even better was that after we came back in 2005 the Artillery School set up a small troop to literally start "playing with model airplanes" so that by the time we went to Kandahar we had an Skylark MUAV in hand and were well on the way to getting LCMR and more importantly had a handle on the basic organization and doctrine needed to use these things. Meanwhile the RCAF had glommed onto the Sperwer.

We really need an experimentation group, hard wired into DLR, the CTC and whatever agency the Army currently has working on future vision, that can "play" with this new kit, not just to help select the most appropriate equipment but to work on the organizational and doctrinal structures.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (21 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> One thing that impressed me was that back in 2004 when Canada went to Kabul it recognized the need for both UAVs and counterfire radars and was fortunately poised through a fluke in DLR of being quickly able to acquire Sperwer and ARTHUR. Even better was that after we came back in 2005 the Artillery School set up a small troop to literally start "playing with model airplanes" so that by the time we went to Kandahar we had an Skylark MUAV in hand and were well on the way to getting LCMR and more importantly had a handle on the basic organization and doctrine needed to use these things. Meanwhile the RCAF had glommed onto the Sperwer.
> 
> We really need an experimentation group, hard wired into DLR, the CTC and whatever agency the Army currently has working on future vision, that can "play" with this new kit, not just to help select the most appropriate equipment but to work on the organizational and doctrinal structures.
> 
> 🍻



How about,  rather than a group hired to play full time everybody was allowed to play some of the time?


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## FJAG (21 Aug 2022)

🤷‍♂️


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## OldSolduer (21 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> How about,  rather than a group hired to play full time everybody was allowed to play some of the time?


Calian will enter this chat eventually but I really like where you guys are going with this. If I as a sect/pl/coy commander had an aerial view of the ground ahead....and the bad guys that were there....the job is so much easier. 

As long as the UAVs are armed....


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## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

OldSolduer said:


> Calian will enter this chat eventually but I really like where you guys are going with this. If I as a sect/pl/coy commander had an aerial view of the ground ahead....and the bad guys that were there....the job is so much easier.
> 
> As long as the UAVs are armed....


IMHO section/team UAS shouldn’t be armed. 
  I don’t think a Platoon or Coy UAS should be armed either. 

I may be swayed by a Bn/Reg’t Armed system - but quite honestly having worked with team UAS, they are a much better ISR tool than a target prosecution. 
1) Small Drones don’t have a lot of weight capacity - I’d rather use that for comms and detection abilities. 
2) Top down viewing from smaller systems can be very disorienting for long time use - larger stabilized platforms less so.   Getting decent IFF and then coordinating an attack run isn’t ideal on a small UAS.  

3) Armed UAS on ground support operations should be a 3 man team — pilot, analyst, ground SME - three person checks to ensure proper weapon release on legitimate target. 

4) If I see a target via my team UAS, I can either avoid it, or engage it depending on my mission profile.   If I engage, I have the choice of integral assets or phone a friend (so as to no disclose my position). 

5) Payload see #1 - I don’t want to drop a note to the bad guys - I want to hit them with appropriate ordnance to neutralize them.  A small team/section UAS can’t carry much more than a Frag grenade - and will do so at the degradation of the comms and EO/IO sensors.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> IMHO section/team UAS shouldn’t be armed.



Sounds right.



KevinB said:


> I don’t think a Platoon or Coy UAS should be armed either.



I can agree on the Platoon level but I think things get greyer at the Company level - especially if the Company is more of a Combat Team with integral support normally found at Battalion.  I happen to favour that construct for the Canadian Army Reserves simply because of the great distances and small populations involved.  The Combat Team offers more local training opportunities in my opinion.  The quality of training might be spotty but that is better than no skills at all.

At the Company level I like the idea of the 81mm mortars (common European practice) augmented by similarly sized Loitering Attack Munitions and Quad Copters.  Essentially, these would be Reg Force Battalion assets but in the Reserve Force they would be permanently detached to support local Companies.



KevinB said:


> I may be swayed by a Bn/Reg’t Armed system - but quite honestly having worked with team UAS, they are a much better ISR tool than a target prosecution.
> 1) Small Drones don’t have a lot of weight capacity - I’d rather use that for comms and detection abilities.



Seen - my view is that anything smaller than 120mm diameter is better as an ISR asset.



KevinB said:


> 2) Top down viewing from smaller systems can be very disorienting for long time use - larger stabilized platforms less so.   Getting decent IFF and then coordinating an attack run isn’t ideal on a small UAS.



This is easily resolved.  Don't.  Go with the "natural" slant view.  It keeps the UAS out of range of counter fire.  Exploits the optics and, as you not is less disorienting.  The operator is now the equivalent of a FOO in a Windmill or Church Steeple observing the Polders.



KevinB said:


> 3) Armed UAS on ground support operations should be a 3 man team — pilot, analyst, ground SME - three person checks to ensure proper weapon release on legitimate target.



Sounds good.   About the same as a mortar team.  Or an MG team.  Or a vehicle crew.



KevinB said:


> 4) If I see a target via my team UAS, I can either avoid it, or engage it depending on my mission profile.   If I engage, I have the choice of integral assets or phone a friend (so as to no disclose my position).



Again, sounds good.



KevinB said:


> 5) Payload see #1 - I don’t want to drop a note to the bad guys - I want to hit them with appropriate ordnance to neutralize them.  A small team/section UAS can’t carry much more than a Frag grenade - and will do so at the degradation of the comms and EO/IO sensors.



Again, sounds good.

But what if the Bad Guys come visiting?  I would want something on hand to make them reconsider before they knock on my front door.  And my phone-a-friend could be on another line.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

But I don't really want to get involved in the details of the Section in this thread.

Nor do I want to keep this an army-centric discussion.

I want to consider how much can be done with technology without putting Sections in the field.

There are now multitudes of effectors that can be triggered by a remotely operated solenoid.

Equally there are now multitudes of sensors whose outputs can be observed remotely.

Also there are now multiple multi-node communications systems that connect the above.

And there is a phantasmagoria of computing power at large in the world.

With 7 Billion brains with eyes and fingers attached.


Time to let science-fiction have its day... for a bit.


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## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Sounds right.
> 
> 
> 
> I can agree on the Platoon level but I think things get greyer at the Company level - especially if the Company is more of a Combat Team with integral support normally found at Battalion.  I happen to favour that construct for the Canadian Army Reserves simply because of the great distances and small populations involved.  The Combat Team offers more local training opportunities in my opinion.  The quality of training might be spotty but that is better than no skills at all.


Paging @dimsum @SupersonicMax @FJAG 
   I've been a A-UAS observer and support recipient - I have concerns of loitering munitions - and Armed UAS at certain levels - due to Friendly Fire potentials - but the CAF (and NATO) do have UAS class standards that would regulate the arming of UAS.
   Pretty sure the RCAF has control of Armed UAS/RPAS   - not sure how the FCSS and Artillery Fire Planning will work with loitering munitions - but it seems to be to be a bit of an issue.



Kirkhill said:


> At the Company level I like the idea of the 81mm mortars (common European practice) augmented by similarly sized Loitering Attack Munitions and Quad Copters.  Essentially, these would be Reg Force Battalion assets but in the Reserve Force they would be permanently detached to support local Companies.


The whole local loitering munition concerns me.  
 I started as a Gunner remember...

 I see the value in Direct Support Mortar and Arty -- what I don't see the value in is locally fired loitering munitions -- firing something in advance "in case" seems to be a poor use of resources.   I love smart munitions, but my big concern with locally fired loitering munitions is:
 1) firing them in advance will disclose their position - in the case of a 120mm Det - they now need to beat feet to another location...
 2) firing them during contact has no purpose - as I want to be bringing all assets to bear.

When you get further back and at Bde and higher level - I am willing to give more consideration to loitering munitions - but really only a fan at Div+.




Kirkhill said:


> The operator is now the equivalent of a FOO in a Windmill or Church Steeple observing the Polders.


Yes that to me is exactly the best use of local UAS 


Kirkhill said:


> But what if the Bad Guys come visiting?  I would want something on hand to make them reconsider before they knock on my front door.  And my phone-a-friend could be on another line.


A Team sized UAS can carry a frag grenade at best -- 
   I'd rather be using it to coordinate either my exfil, and/or fire support.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

A but of fibre to the Switchblade launch site would resolve ne need for the det to beat feet.

And don't you like a B52 circling over your head, attendant on your every whim?


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## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> A but of fibre to the Switchblade launch site would resolve ne need for the det to beat feet.


All I see in the SB is a lot of unneeded weight - it's a Kamikaze drone, which all loitering munitions are, they are lost assets once fired.


Kirkhill said:


> And don't you like a B52 circling over your head, attendant on your every whim?


GWOT gave a lot of bad habits, like Aircraft doing Artillery's job.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> All I see in the SB is a lot of unneeded weight - it's a Kamikaze drone, which all loitering munitions are, they are lost assets once fired.



You mean like a hand grenade?



KevinB said:


> GWOT gave a lot of bad habits, like Aircraft doing Artillery's job.











						RAF Second Tactical Air Force - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Ninth Air Force - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






Flying Artillery?


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## FJAG (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> All I see in the SB is a lot of unneeded weight - it's a Kamikaze drone, which all loitering munitions are, they are lost assets once fired.
> 
> GWOT gave a lot of bad habits, like Aircraft doing Artillery's job.


Aircraft can play a major role if there is no enemy air defence or it can be mostly suppressed. Unfortunately that's not always possible and Ukraine is teaching a lesson of what happens vis a vis air support when air defence remains active.

I see a wide variety of ground launched precision systems which, IMHO, are really an extension of non-line of sight artillery. Terminally guided perhaps but launched out of view of the enemy. These will persist in a hostile AD environment until such time as the AD environment itself matures to the point where it can jam or defeat these munitions. The advantage of the dumb, gun-launched round is it's pretty much guaranteed to get to its target once launched. The key is to keep ones options open through a variety of systems whereby one can fall back on the simple stuff once the high tech stuff fails, is expended or is defeated.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> Aircraft can play a major role if there is no enemy air defence or it can be mostly suppressed. Unfortunately that's not always possible and Ukraine is teaching a lesson of what happens vis a vis air support when air defence remains active.
> 
> I see a wide variety of ground launched precision systems which, IMHO, are really an extension of non-line of sight artillery. Terminally guided perhaps but launched out of view of the enemy. These will persist in a hostile AD environment until such time as the AD environment itself matures to the point where it can jam or defeat these munitions. The advantage of the dumb, gun-launched round is it's pretty much guaranteed to get to its target once launched. The key is to keep ones options open through a variety of systems whereby one can fall back on the simple stuff once the high tech stuff fails, is expended or is defeated.
> 
> 🍻


I consider the Air Force to be an extension of Non Line Of Sight artillery.

And missiles are uninhabited aircraft.


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## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> You mean like a hand grenade?
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Airspace isn’t something that Platoons or Companies or even Battalions control.  

All of the theory behind loitering munitions seem to ignore the fact that there will be rockets, tube arty and potentially AC using that air space. 

I’ve been too a number events that industry players are crowing about capabilities— but when you ask them who controls the munitions they generally don’t have a solid grasp — until you get to the bigger players with their much larger systems that are designed to be used by Div+ level arty.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

Black Hornets are competing for that space, as are 60 and 81 mm mortar rounds.

And your favourite Stinger missiles.

I think the Stingers in the hands of Platoons might be considered by some a greater risk than a LAM launched on demand, kept under control throughout its flighted, aborted when necessary and safely recovered when possible.

Unlike the Fire and Forget Stinger.  Or the 81mm mortar round.

I shot an arrow into the air
And it lands I know not where


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## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Black Hornets are competing for that space, as are 60 and 81 mm mortar rounds.
> 
> And your favourite Stinger missiles.
> 
> ...


Stinger teams here are plugged into the ADAM Cell in the BCT HQ.
   The weapon state of those are controlled based on what is going on in the airspace.
The Mortars and Tube arty will be check fired for friendly air as well.

 Could that sort of system work for loitering munitions at lower levels -- sure,  but you basically need to crash those munitions to clear the air space..


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## FJAG (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> I consider the Air Force to be an extension of Non Line Of Sight artillery.
> 
> And missiles are uninhabited aircraft.


The Air Force on the other hands considers itself to be primarily air defence with an occasional foray into supporting the ground forces with things that go bang when the environment is secure enough for them to do so.

Joint is hard.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> Stinger teams here are plugged into the ADAM Cell in the BCT HQ.
> The weapon state of those are controlled based on what is going on in the airspace.
> The Mortars and Tube arty will be check fired for friendly air as well.
> 
> Could that sort of system work for loitering munitions at lower levels -- sure,  *but you basically need to crash those munitions to clear the air space..*



Advantage the UVision Hero series adopted by the USMC then.









						HERO Loitering Munitions Extend the Range of the Combat Team in the Air, Sea and on Land | Defense | News
					

At FIDAE 2022, UVision will present multi-domain loitering weapon systems, enabling combat forces to increase lethality and operational flexibility through multi-dimensional collaboration.




					www.oceannews.com
				






> HERO Systems provide modern frontline forces with an independent precision weapon of increased lethality and operational flexibility. This is facilitated by a combination of extended fire-power and advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) capabilities that until recently, could only be achieved by complex coordination between different units and echelons.
> 
> Enhancing multi-dimensional collaboration and optimizing operational warfare, the UVision HERO series of loitering munitions uniquely enables combat forces to transfer control over munitions between operators of different units and teams – including dismounted units (infantry and Special Forces), mechanized forces, naval forces, and aerial assets - across air, land and sea domains, while the munition is in mid-air.
> 
> ...











						Unmanned Aerial Loitering Systems for Various Missions
					

Check out our unmanned Systems: long-range flight capabilities, specialized for various missions, and can carry up to 30 kg warhead.




					uvisionuav.com
				




Parachute recovery.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> The Air Force on the other hands considers itself to be primarily air defence with an occasional foray into supporting the ground forces with things that go bang when the environment is secure enough for them to do so.
> 
> Joint is hard.
> 
> 🍻



The Air Force - Knights of the Air.


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## FJAG (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> Airspace isn’t something that Platoons or Companies or even Battalions control.
> 
> All of the theory behind loitering munitions seem to ignore the fact that there will be rockets, tube arty and potentially AC using that air space.


If the things that are flying around the front battlespace are unmanned the Airspace coordination isn't a big issue and folks should be happy to leave things to the "big sky, little bullet" system of non-management. Its once you start operating manned aircraft in shared space that things become interesting. One should note, however, that the maximum ordinate for artillery can be pretty damn high which means that manned (or even very expensive unmanned systems) need to be watched for.


KevinB said:


> I’ve been too a number events that industry players are crowing about capabilities— but when you ask them who controls the munitions they generally don’t have a solid grasp — until you get to the bigger players with their much larger systems that are designed to be used by Div+ level arty.


I find this to be the biggest issue when we discuss how all these guided systems will be distributed and used throughout the bde/division. It's not so much the launchers - that's principally a range issue - but its the question of who controls these things vis a vis target acquisition and engagement. And that can change dramatically as between reconnaissance/cavalry forces and line infantry. 

Why I keep seeing much of this as an artillery function, I don't do it so much from a rice bowl viewpoint, but by virtue of the fact that artillery is already the prime integrator of supporting fires on the battlefield. It increased the number of the FOO parties, their establishments and the skill levels required by its members to cater to a better simultaneous management of both guns and air resources. I see loitering munitions (the bigger ones) as a capability that falls between those traditional guns and traditional close air support. In many ways, the loitering munitions are just a more survivable Predator which became a workhorse for us in Afghanistan.

There's a big difference in fighting the deep battle and the close one. We need to be configured for both and become good at it.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

While we are sorting out the Admin other people are figuring out how to fight with all these new assets.

Does anyone remember the instructions to "hug the barrage"?

Currie decided the risk from friendly fire was less than the risk from enemy fire.


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## GR66 (22 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> If the things that are flying around the front battlespace are unmanned the Airspace coordination isn't a big issue and folks should be happy to leave things to the "big sky, little bullet" system of non-management. Its once you start operating manned aircraft in shared space that things become interesting. One should note, however, that the maximum ordinate for artillery can be pretty damn high which means that manned (or even very expensive unmanned systems) need to be watched for.
> 
> I find this to be the biggest issue when we discuss how all these guided systems will be distributed and used throughout the bde/division. It's not so much the launchers - that's principally a range issue - but its the question of who controls these things vis a vis target acquisition and engagement. And that can change dramatically as between reconnaissance/cavalry forces and line infantry.
> 
> ...


The way I view it is based on whether the munition is launched with a target already identified or is launched with the purpose of finding a target.

The first to me is an artillery role.  Precision munitions launched from beyond LOS as supporting fires.  In the case of a loitering munition vice a N-LOS missile it can still be an artillery tool when the supported unit can't provide _exact _targeting info for a threat but can at least identify with clarity through the FOO a specific location where the threat is known to be.  In that case a loitering munition might be the appropriate munition as it can fly to the location provided and then obtain the final target lock itself to complete the attack.

If the loitering munitions are to be used to search an area to see if there are targets in the area (and to attack them if required) then I see this as a Cavalry/Recce role.  Larger, longer range/endurance loitering munitions and or armed UAVs are more Intel assets an echelon up.


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## dimsum (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> While we are sorting out the Admin other people are figuring out how to fight with all these new assets.
> 
> Does anyone remember the instructions to "hug the barrage"?
> 
> Currie decided the risk from friendly fire was less than the risk from enemy fire.


Some call it "admin", some call it "flight safety".

UAS, etc will be flying around manned aircraft.  Horizontal and vertical separation is necessary.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

dimsum said:


> Some call it "admin", some call it "flight safety".
> 
> UAS, etc will be flying around manned aircraft.  Horizontal and vertical separation is necessary.


Respectfully  the Ukrainians appear to have a management system in place.  It seems to involve keeping aircraft out of areas where the skies are contested.

Mortars, shells, rockets, missiles, uavs all seem to have priority.


----------



## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Respectfully  the Ukrainians appear to have a management system in place.  It seems to involve keeping aircraft out of areas where the skies are contested.
> 
> Mortars, shells, rockets, missiles, uavs all seem to have priority.


Ukraine doesn’t have a significant Air Force. 
   So it’s not a good comparison


----------



## dapaterson (22 Aug 2022)

Deconflicting airspace needs big brained people to avoid catastrophic failure.

Unless you want to accidentally down your own a/c.


----------



## KevinB (22 Aug 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Deconflicting airspace needs big brained people to avoid catastrophic failure.
> 
> Unless you want to accidentally down your own a/c.


Russia entered the chat…


----------



## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> Ukraine doesn’t have a significant Air Force.
> So it’s not a good comparison



Which is it Kevin?

A proper country should rely on their air force like you did in Afghanistan?  Or should they properly rely on their artillery? 

I'm sorta confused.

Personally I lean more towards protecting the guys on the ground with whatever tools can be brought to the fight.  And these days I am of the opinion that Ground Launched weapons bring an awful lot to the fight.  In particular 24/7, all weather availability.

Once there are boots on the ground the air space overhead should belong to them...

No flyboys without an invite


----------



## FJAG (22 Aug 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Deconflicting airspace needs big brained people to avoid catastrophic failure.


That's the nicest thing that you've ever said about gunners.

😁


----------



## dapaterson (22 Aug 2022)

AD gunners.

Not mud gunners.


----------



## FJAG (22 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Once there are boots on the ground the air space overhead should belong to them...
> 
> No flyboys without an invite


Well, No.

Here's the US Joint Policy on it. Basically they are the specialists in this. 



> https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_52.pdf



NATO tries but ...



> https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/624144/doctrine_nato_airspace_control_ajp_3_3_5.pdf



Happy reading.

🍻


----------



## dimsum (23 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Once there are boots on the ground the air space overhead should belong to them...


To a certain altitude, sure.

It makes zero sense blocking off everything from ground to space.  Without getting into details, there are good reasons to have air support (and other stuff) hanging out either beside, or above, the fight as it's going on.


----------



## KevinB (23 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Which is it Kevin?
> 
> A proper country should rely on their air force like you did in Afghanistan?  Or should they properly rely on their artillery?



Let’s be honest the Air Force in Afghanistan was operating as Artillery.  They didn’t have a real job and thus made one for themselves.

COIN operations can’t be used as a template for conventional operations or planning.   The Taliban didn’t have higher formations and strategic depth (in the sense of actual formed units).  So deep strike missions didn’t occur (albeit we should have blasted a lot of Pakistan). 






Kirkhill said:


> I'm sorta confused.
> 
> Personally I lean more towards protecting the guys on the ground with whatever tools can be brought to the fight.  And these days I am of the opinion that Ground Launched weapons bring an awful lot to the fight.  In particular 24/7, all weather availability.
> 
> ...


Except Bde’s and below (and really Divs too as much as Canada doesn’t acknowledge it) are maneuver units. They aren’t conducting deep strikes and aren’t party to the target lists being worked on by Air and Higher assets.


----------



## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2022)

dimsum said:


> To a certain altitude, sure.
> 
> It makes zero sense blocking off everything from ground to space.  Without getting into details, there are good reasons to have air support (and other stuff) hanging out either beside, or above, the fight as it's going on.



Hanging out in the vicinity is one thing.  Releasing ordnance is another.

I was too cavalier with my flyboys comment.


----------



## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> Let’s be honest the Air Force in Afghanistan was operating as Artillery.



Since at least 1941 the US Army has been fighting with the US Air Force about the supply of aerial Artillery. 

The USAAC and the USAAF were no fans of Close Air Support and neither is the USAF.   The US Army had to fight to keep the 9th Air Force in tactical support in Europe.  The Army wanted fixed wing CAS in 1947 but the USAF said if it flew it was theirs.  Even if they didn't want to do the job.  The Army has been begging and pleading for aerial artillery ever since.  Fling wings delivered them a reprieve but it was really only the AirLand Battle that saw the USAF commit to the CAS role with the Warthog.  And they have been trying to back out of that ever since.




KevinB said:


> They didn’t have a real job and thus made one for themselves.



They had a real job.  And the requirement fit their capabilities.  The theater demanded occasional rounds over a very wide area of operations.  And the skies were apparently generally clear - it being a desert and all.

There was very little demand for weight of fire.  Even the guns were used in Troops and not Regiments.



KevinB said:


> COIN operations can’t be used as a template for conventional operations or planning.   The Taliban didn’t have higher formations and strategic depth (in the sense of actual formed units).  So deep strike missions didn’t occur (albeit we should have blasted a lot of Pakistan).



Agreed.  

But.

Even in a general Peer to Peer war not everybody is going to be fighting at the schwerpunkt.   The fight is going to be dispersed and will include small unit operations such as are found in the COIN conflict.  Tito's partisans and the SBS and SOE were as much a part of WW2 as the Canadian 1st Division.

Likewise for the Airborne Divisions - even when they experienced casualty rates similar to Bomber Command.



KevinB said:


> Except Bde’s and below (and really Divs too as much as Canada doesn’t acknowledge it) are maneuver units. They aren’t conducting deep strikes and aren’t party to the target lists being worked on by Air and Higher assets.



Here we are getting to the nub of the problem.

In the Sandbox Divisional Areas of Operation were vast.  It was necessary to disperse assets.  That required freeing up subordinate units and granting then responsibility and authority (autonomy) to act independently.  It also required granting them budget (people, kit and consummables) to be able to act on their own recognizance. 

The Division was more of an Administrative entity as it focus on operations in support of strategic objectives.

This was the exact opposite of the Mailed Fist of the Armoured Corps of the Cold War.  That took the exact same troops and formed them into a solid mass for battering holes.

Historically both jobs were handled by Cavalry. 

They could disperse in sections for recce and screen.
They could form Troops and Squadrons for rapid movement as formed bodies for reaction.
They could form Regiments and Divisions for the stirrup to stirrup charge of the Wedge or the Pig Head to use mass, speed and shock to batter a hole.

They ability to switch from one fight to another was the critical issue.  

It isn't a matter of one battle being the real one.  All battles are real.  And if the enemy discovers incompetence in one area it will exploit that to its advantage.

The Division has to be a generalist organization and it has to have an array of tools available to it.  Even if it only employs its elements as Companies and Battalions.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (23 Aug 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Deconflicting airspace needs big brained people to avoid catastrophic failure.
> 
> Unless you want to accidentally down your own a/c.


Airspace Control is not rocket science. It is important and cannot be ignored, but the principles are fairly straight forward.

Generally, Airspace should be be restricted as little as possible and will be done on a volume/time based system.


----------



## dapaterson (23 Aug 2022)

Well, ok, I'll amend "big brained" to read "smarter than infantry or armoured".


----------



## SeaKingTacco (23 Aug 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Well, ok, I'll amend "big brained" to read "smarter than infantry or armoured".


We have had Artillery personnel do the airspace control work, in conjunction with Air Force Reps, because Artillery has been historically the biggest land force user of the airspace over the battlefield. It probably still makes sense to generally assign that function to the Artillery.


----------



## Good2Golf (23 Aug 2022)

dimsum said:


> To a certain altitude, sure.
> 
> It makes zero sense blocking off everything from ground to space.  Without getting into details, there are good reasons to have air support (and other stuff) hanging out either beside, or above, the fight as it's going on.


Coordinating Altitude (CA) and Coordinating Level (CL) high-five each other and join the chat...


----------



## FJAG (23 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> Let’s be honest the Air Force in Afghanistan was operating as Artillery. They didn’t have a real job and thus made one for themselves.
> 
> COIN operations can’t be used as a template for conventional operations or planning. The Taliban didn’t have higher formations and strategic depth (in the sense of actual formed units). So deep strike missions didn’t occur (albeit we should have blasted a lot of Pakistan).


I think that there is a caveat there. In 2002 the Taliban did have formed formations and the use of the air resources by the ODAs and others that went in to work with the Northern Alliance was inspired if not outright brilliant. With time the US Army and the Brits were replacing its mortars only concept with some light artillery. Effectively they continued to default to air power. Canada's M777s were certainly appreciated by both the Brits and the US SOF when deployed in support of them on several occasions. Our FOOs were very fond of the Predators followed in no particular order by the M777s and A10s. Our guns had to frequently leave the FOBs for austere desert gun positions for specific ops simply because of the vastness of the country and range issues.



Kirkhill said:


> The Division has to be a generalist organization and it has to have an array of tools available to it. Even if it only employs its elements as Companies and Battalions.


The question here is how we use the term "generalist". Divisions really aren't generalists hence armoured, infantry, airborne, airmobile and now penetration and heavy divisions. On one level, divisions can be quite specialized while admittedly they are aggregates of various combat and sustainment entities. If one uses aggregation as the trigger for specialization then and infantry battalion with rifles, recce, mortars, anti-armour and CSS is a generalist organization too. But it isn't. Just like a division a battalion has effectors - companies while divisions have BCTs - and enablers - combat support and combat service support companies while divisions have cavalry, artillery engineers and CSS battalions and brigades.

I think that your problem starts with this.


Kirkhill said:


> In the Sandbox Divisional Areas of Operation were vast. It was necessary to disperse assets. That required freeing up subordinate units and granting then responsibility and authority (autonomy) to act independently. It also required granting them budget (people, kit and consummables) to be able to act on their own recognizance.
> 
> The Division was more of an Administrative entity as it focus on operations in support of strategic objectives.


Firstly, there were no divisions in Afghanistan, they were Task Forces staffed by elements from various divisional headquarters which were specifically organized to meet certain tasks. Secondly, they did not grant "autonomy" to the subordinate brigades and units. Giving a subordinate element responsibility and authority for an AO does not equate to granting autonomy. Senior TF HQs stayed very involved in their subordinates operations as well as resource management. They were much more than mere Administrative entities.

We should not confuse "Sandbox" TFs with what is happening in the US with the refocus on specialized divisions. 

You're right that there will be different scenarios in a peer-to-peer conflict that will require a different way of fighting them. This is why there are different types of divisions and a theatre or corps headquarters which will position and task the appropriate division to meet the various challenges. 

As Canadians we have a natural inclination to want to form all-singing and all-dancing groupings. That gets us back to the 'Jack of all trades, master of none analogy'. Probably the best Swiss Army knife division will be the US Waypoint 2028 Standard Heavy which mixes two ABCTs with one SBCT and, assuming for the moment Canada might actually move towards a deployable division concept, its LAV based CMBGs could probably equate to a lighter version of a Standard Heavy.

🍻


----------



## dimsum (24 Aug 2022)

SeaKingTacco said:


> Airspace Control is not rocket science


No, it's rocket control


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 Aug 2022)

dimsum said:


> No, it's rocket control


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> I think that there is a caveat there. In 2002 the Taliban did have formed formations and the use of the air resources by the ODAs and others that went in to work with the Northern Alliance was inspired if not outright brilliant. With time the US Army and the Brits were replacing its mortars only concept with some light artillery. Effectively they continued to default to air power. Canada's M777s were certainly appreciated by both the Brits and the US SOF when deployed in support of them on several occasions. Our FOOs were very fond of the Predators followed in no particular order by the M777s and A10s. Our guns had to frequently leave the FOBs for austere desert gun positions for specific ops simply because of the vastness of the country and range issues.
> 
> 
> The question here is how we use the term "generalist". Divisions really aren't generalists hence armoured, infantry, airborne, airmobile and now penetration and heavy divisions. On one level, divisions can be quite specialized while admittedly they are aggregates of various combat and sustainment entities. If one uses aggregation as the trigger for specialization then and infantry battalion with rifles, recce, mortars, anti-armour and CSS is a generalist organization too. But it isn't. Just like a division a battalion has effectors - companies while divisions have BCTs - and enablers - combat support and combat service support companies while divisions have cavalry, artillery engineers and CSS battalions and brigades.
> ...



As Canadians, or Americans, we have to adjust to suit the situation.  The Americans had Cold War Divisions.  They worked for the invasion of Iraq.  They didn't work to police Iraq and Afghanistan.  The same people had to be retasked to manage both scenarios.

And then they had to be re-retasked to meet the current perceived threat.

We have smaller numbers - roughly 1/10th.

That means that even with the same effort the Yanks put into their affairs, and manage to produce 10 to 12 divisions

2x Active Penetration Divs 
3x Active Heavy Divs 
6x Lt and Abn Divs

Converting that to Canada, roughly

2x Active Penetration Battalions
3x Active Heavy Battalions
6x Active Lt and Abn Battalions.

Or, effectively, 1 mixed Division.


----------



## FJAG (25 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> As Canadians, or Americans, we have to adjust to suit the situation.  The Americans had Cold War Divisions.  They worked for the invasion of Iraq.  They didn't work to police Iraq and Afghanistan.  The same people had to be retasked to manage both scenarios.
> 
> And then they had to be re-retasked to meet the current perceived threat.
> 
> ...


Sorry. Your 1 in 10 ratio is way off both by divisions and personnel numbers. The Canadian Army is somewhere in the 45,000 range with RegF and ResF combined. The US Army is 485,000 Active alone with another 336k USARNG and 189k USAR for a total of just over 1,000,000 so more like 1/20 to 1/25 ratio.

Its also wrong not to count USARNG divisions and BCTs which are mobilizable entities. In total there are currently 2 Armd Divs, 3 AB Divs and 15 Inf Divs for a total of 20 divisions. One needs to remember that  infantry divisions can hold any of ABCTs, SBCTs or IBCTs so "Infantry Division" is a variable term. (There are a total of 21 ABCTs, 9 SBCTs and 34 IBCTs) On top of that you are leaving out of the mix the 4 corps and 6 Theatre Sustainment Commands that the US has and most importantly the dozens and dozens of army support brigades from artillery, air defence, manoeuvre enhancement, sustainment, military intelligence, engineer etc

All that aside, one only needs to look to the strength of the Canadian Army by itself to determine if it could form a division. Between the RegF and the ResF we do have enough for one moderately equipped one. We do have three RegF brigades as a start although none could be considered having penetration, heavy or airborne battalions (and in fact there is no such thing as a penetration or even heavy battalion in the US doctrine - they are combined arms battalions or Stryker or light (of various sorts) battalions. We have 6 mech bns and 3 light (plus enough tanks for 1.5 armoured regts and 1.5-2 recce regts). We're really short of service support battalions with barely enough to form the sustainment battalions for the brigades but not for the other divisional brigades. We might have enough engineer assets but are short in artillery and air defence and CBRN and MPs and can probably cobble together and aviation brigade (wing) although the absence of attack helicopters makes them incapable of an assault role.

All that said, we would need to go a long way to put together a properly equipped division. Sure, the people are there and much of the equipment but, as you well know, we are embarrassingly short of critical gear needed to make a decent division. Mind you, I'm an aspirational sort of fellow. I think we need to form the structure so that we finally have a roadmap for a proper equipment programme.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (25 Aug 2022)

FJAG

As you well know,  half of the US effort is in Corps, Theatre, Command and Army stuff well beyond the Division.  And it includes all sorts of stuff that we would like to have.

I am a +/- 10% type of guy.

I based my numbers on the US and Canadian  populations.  Roughly 10:1.

I also based them on, roughly, 10 combat arms battalion to a division.

At the end of the day we both agree that the Yanks have decided to provide 10 to 12 Active Divs.  1 Active Div of 10 to 12 battalions is in our grasp if we wanted to put the effort into it.

Stop violently agreeing with me.


----------



## KevinB (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG
> 
> As you well know,  half of the US effort is in Corps, Theatre, Command and Army stuff well beyond the Division.  And it includes all sorts of stuff that we would like to have.
> 
> ...


The Division is a maneuver unit.
   Thus mixing forces inside a Div is generally a bad idea, for then it can no longer act as a Division - but just acts as separate Bde's - and is a PY sink.


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> The Division is a maneuver unit.
> Thus mixing forces inside a Div is generally a bad idea, for then it can no longer act as a Division - but just acts as separate Bde's - and is a PY sink.



The Division is an administrative unit that can maneuver.

Even in the US Divisions have been assembled, disassembled and reassembled according to need.


----------



## KevinB (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> The Division is an administrative unit that can maneuver.
> 
> Even in the US Divisions have been assembled, disassembled and reassembled according to need.


In Peacetime, yes they have - however with the goal towards making a more effective Maneuver Element.
  Corps is really the Admin level.

I always figured the main part of the reason the CAF went with the very large Mini Div CMBG's was the lack of a Real Div.
  IIRC RV92 (I still have a few of the Labatt Blue Rv92 beers) was the last time the CA did anything at Div level, and it required US Army support too...

I don't think there is anything wrong with the robust CBMG Concept - and tailoring them to fit with US and/or UK Divs - and Canada probably would get a decent Bang for its Buck in that setup.


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> In Peacetime, yes they have - however with the goal towards making a more effective Maneuver Element.
> Corps is really the Admin level.
> 
> I always figured the main part of the reason the CAF went with the very large Mini Div CMBG's was the lack of a Real Div.
> ...



And I don't think there is anything wrong with Canada organizing 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades under one Divisional Command.  In fact I think that it is made more necessary by the geographic dispersion to ensure that all Brigades and their subordinated Regiments are training to operate with a common standard.  The Division may never take the field as an entity but at least all the components would be interchangeable.

Canada can't afford the Pals Battalions problem of the WWI where entire civilian communities were wiped out in one battle.  We need to be able to mix and match effectively.


----------



## daftandbarmy (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And I don't think there is anything wrong with Canada organizing 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades under one Divisional Command.  In fact I think that it is made more necessary by the geographic dispersion to ensure that all Brigades and their subordinated Regiments are training to operate with a common standard.  The Division may never take the field as an entity but at least all the components would be interchangeable.
> 
> *Canada can't afford the Pals Battalions problem of the WWI where entire civilian communities were wiped out in one battle.  We need to be able to mix and match effectively.*



One good way to make sure that those types of casualties are avoided is less about the way we organize the chess pieces and more about high quality senior leadership, of course.


----------



## KevinB (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And I don't think there is anything wrong with Canada organizing 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades under one Divisional Command.  In fact I think that it is made more necessary by the geographic dispersion to ensure that all Brigades and their subordinated Regiments are training to operate with a common standard.  The Division may never take the field as an entity but at least all the components would be interchangeable.


 So an Admin HQ-- then don't call it a Div, as people expect things with a Div...




Kirkhill said:


> Canada can't afford the Pals Battalions problem of the WWI where entire civilian communities were wiped out in one battle.  We need to be able to mix and match effectively.


The whole reason for the regular force units recruiting from all around these days.
   The PRes however is a local recruiting pool, one selling point for individual augmentation I suppose - but at the end of the day, we use local recruiting in the ARNG - if you really need soldiers, the community is already in threat.


----------



## daftandbarmy (30 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> So an Admin HQ-- then don't call it a Div, as people expect things with a Div...



We've got those... they're called Reserve CBGs.

And, as you know, they are pretty much just very expensive mail boxes and completely ineffective as a 1* type formation HQ.


----------



## FJAG (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> And I don't think there is anything wrong with Canada organizing 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades under one Divisional Command.  In fact I think that it is made more necessary by the geographic dispersion to ensure that all Brigades and their subordinated Regiments are training to operate with a common standard.  The Division may never take the field as an entity but at least all the components would be interchangeable.
> 
> Canada can't afford the Pals Battalions problem of the WWI where entire civilian communities were wiped out in one battle.  We need to be able to mix and match effectively.


Let me start by saying that "division" is a word that can be given various uses and in the army vernacular is either a tactical entity when used properly in war and a mere administrative headquarters when used the way that we currently do.

The point is that one should strive for a tactical purpose for a division the way that the US Army is doing now. There is really no need for a "division" if it is a mere administrative headquarters. You can call it a "district" or "area" or "command" or whatever if all that it is is a temporary gathering together of disparate elements.

The strength of a real "division" is that it contains all the elements necessary to act as a single formation with a particular role. It's strength comes not just from its manoeuvre elements but all the CS and CSS support that it holds to enable the manoeuvre elements to perform their mission whether light or heavy. We really need to get away from this medium weight concept which really only made its debut in the US at the turn of the century and seems to be in the process of being abandoned as impractical.

I favour a divisional structure for the CA too but not by putting all the RegF eggs into one basket for the simple reasons I favour the 30/70 battalion structure - we need to build a larger more capable force by leveraging reservists. All that a unified RegF division does is leave the ResF in the dust. We effectively need two divisions, one that is organized and trained for major peer conflict with the ability to be a deployed headquarters and one an administrative formation which never deploys but manages and trains those forces for the defence of Canada and day-to-day operations in small theatres for OOTW. Continuing on with our present situation, even with all the RegF brigades consolidated but still being "flexible" and "agile" may work for the peacetime role but risks disaster for the wartime one.

The common standard of training issue is a red herring. Doctrine and training comes from the centre of the Army. You do not need a division to enforce that. Besides, what is a common standard when one mixes light and LAV battalions in the same brigade anyway?

The Pals battalions is another red herring. Canada's population was 8 million in WW1 and its army was 650,000 of which 66,000 were killed. Our whole army now, spread across its length is 45,000 give or take a few thousand. Pals battalions are not a problem.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2022)

KevinB said:


> So an Admin HQ-- then don't call it a Div, as people expect things with a Div...



So what do people expect with 6 (UK) Div?  Or 1 (UK)?  Or MND (N)?

Or, for that matter the US 2nd/7th Infantry Divisions that share brigades?


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> Let me start by saying that "division" is a word that can be given various uses and in the army vernacular is either a tactical entity when used properly in war and a mere administrative headquarters when used the way that we currently do.
> 
> The point is that one should strive for a tactical purpose for a division the way that the US Army is doing now. There is really no need for a "division" if it is a mere administrative headquarters. You can call it a "district" or "area" or "command" or whatever if all that it is is a temporary gathering together of disparate elements.
> 
> ...



So you reckon that if all the casualties came from the Vandoos that wouldn't be an issue?  I think we disagree on that.

Common standards?  Doctrine and training?  

The Army of the West lightly oiled their FNs.  The Army of the East heavily oiled them.

The Army of the West rolled their sleeping bags.  The Easterners stuffed them.

Battle drills were taught at Regimental schools.

Some battalions have experimented with 2 man LAV crews. Others are adamant on 3.

And I encourage you to go back and revisit the regimental quiffs that drove the Battle Order people, and yourself, to distraction.









						Maple Fury: Canada's Mechanized Infanteers
					

Check out our video on the organization and equipment of the Canadian Army's Mechanized Infantry Rifle Company. These companies are Canada's heaviest infantry, mounted in infantry fighting vehicle variants of the LAV 6.0. They work in collaboration with Leopard 2 tanks within the context of the...




					www.battleorder.org
				




Some things are silly and inconsequential - others not so much.


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> We've got those... they're called Reserve CBGs.
> 
> And, as you know, they are pretty much just very expensive mail boxes and completely ineffective as a 1* type formation HQ.




1*?

I thought our Brigade Groups were commanded by Colonels?  Or have our Colonels started wearing Maple Leaf Stars?


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## FJAG (30 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So you reckon that if all the casualties came from the Vandoos that wouldn't be an issue?  I think we disagree on that.


C'mon. What are you suggesting - every deployed battalion needs to have a provincial ratio to it. Out of ten battlegroup we sent to Kandahar  three were from Quebec. Should we have added in a percentage of Anglos to help spread the casualties?


Kirkhill said:


> Common standards?  Doctrine and training?
> 
> The Army of the West lightly oiled their FNs.  The Army of the East heavily oiled them.
> 
> ...


These are all inconsequential and frequently turn on the whim of one particular CO or RSM and you'll never iron them all out. We alredy have one doctrine and one central training system for most things. There is no greater advantage to having all of the RegF brigades in one division rather than one army. 

🍻


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## KevinB (31 Aug 2022)

I was in both the Army of the West and East (or is Pet Army Central?) 
  Stuffed sleeping bag in both  

Looking back oil was way too light even in the East


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## Kirkhill (31 Aug 2022)

FJAG said:


> C'mon. What are you suggesting - every deployed battalion needs to have a provincial ratio to it. Out of ten battlegroup we sent to Kandahar  three were from Quebec. Should we have added in a percentage of Anglos to help spread the casualties?
> 
> These are all inconsequential and frequently turn on the whim of one particular CO or RSM and you'll never iron them all out. We alredy have one doctrine and one central training system for most things. There is no greater advantage to having all of the RegF brigades in one division rather than one army.
> 
> 🍻



I believe that putting all the active brigades under one command would iron out a lot of the local interpretations of doctrine.  And with the regular brigades sorted then those practices could be more easily passed on the geographically local reserve soldiers.

As to mixing and matching Regs and Reserves...

A Regular Battalion with 3 rifle coys and a CS coy.  In other words a battalion able to function as an entity tonight.

To that Battalion add 3 Reserve rifle coy combat teams that are expected to field a 4th rifle coy and CS augmentees tonight and replacements in the near future.

Just make the administrative battalion bigger.


----------



## FJAG (31 Aug 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> I believe that putting all the active brigades under one command would iron out a lot of the local interpretations of doctrine.  And with the regular brigades sorted then those practices could be more easily passed on the geographically local reserve soldiers.


Then you'd be arguing for keeping the symmetrical brigades paradigm rather than concentrating on creating a heavy brigade and a light brigade which operate somewhat differently once you get above the rifle section.

Here's a suggestion for if you want to homogenize the organization, put one each of RCR, PPCLI and R22eR in each brigade. 


Kirkhill said:


> As to mixing and matching Regs and Reserves...
> 
> A Regular Battalion with 3 rifle coys and a CS coy.  In other words a battalion able to function as an entity tonight.
> 
> ...


If you take one battalion and make it bigger, it's still one battalion. Shouldn't one of our aims be to take the 15-20,000 reservists we have and create additional units for the Army by making them viable entities?

What exactly is it that you are trying to achieve?


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## Kirkhill (31 Aug 2022)

I'm trying to achieve a ready force that is expandable.

I don't see a problem with a Major General having under her command 4 Brigadiers each of which is responsible for supplying a separate set of capabilities, some of which may be discrete and some of which may overlap.  Exactly the same manner in which the MGen may choose to restructure her troops in the field operationally.  

I believe the current idiom is "mission command".  One person in charge.

With that well defined skeleton in place then the next step is to raise bodies of troops to fit into that structure.  That is best done by troops that will be fighting alongside the reserves.  

Once you have well trained companies then the next step is to form your newly raised companies into battalions/regiments/brigades.  

And personally I see nothing wrong with a Vandoos battalion in 1CMBG


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## Kirkhill (19 Sep 2022)

Jointness is the USMC - it is a mini-army with its own mini-airforce backed by a navy with its own airforce.  And a Navy that is expanding its onshore operations capabilities with Aegis Ashore, fixed missile launchers for the array of missiles it carries at sea, and now mobile launchers for the same array.  All compatible with the fleet's Cooperative Engagement Capability.

Thus it is difficult to stovepipe this discussion 

It ranges from Lessons Learned in Ukraine, to USMC future TOETs and TTPs, to AI and autonomy, to LAW ships and how they might be used, to the 5th Gen Air Domain.

If only somebody had thought to unify the Canadian Armed Forces and put them under a common command structure.









						How the Marine Corps Might Benefit From Closely Watching Ukrainian Tactics - Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization
					

These parallels to Ukraine emerged through Warrior’s discussion with Rep. Rob Wittman, (R-Va), Ranking Member of the SeaPower and Projection Forces Subcommittee




					warriormaven.com


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## markppcli (3 Nov 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Well, ok, I'll amend "big brained" to read "smarter than infantry or armoured".


Huh, and yet we dumb infanteers had twice the pass rate in JTAC as artillery and air control officers.


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## KevinB (4 Nov 2022)

markppcli said:


> Huh, and yet we dumb infanteers had twice the pass rate in JTAC as artillery and air control officers.


To be fair, I’m also sure that Infantry units didn’t send any swinging Dick, like the other two entities do.


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## markppcli (4 Nov 2022)

KevinB said:


> To be fair, I’m also sure that Infantry units didn’t send any swinging Dick, like the other two entities do.


We actually have a selection process now, testing at the BPSO, competitive pre course. The whole deal.


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## daftandbarmy (7 Nov 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Jointness is the USMC - it is a mini-army with its own mini-airforce backed by a navy with its own airforce.  And a Navy that is expanding its onshore operations capabilities with Aegis Ashore, fixed missile launchers for the array of missiles it carries at sea, and now mobile launchers for the same array.  All compatible with the fleet's Cooperative Engagement Capability.
> 
> Thus it is difficult to stovepipe this discussion
> 
> ...



Now if it could only get along well with the other services...


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## Spencer100 (2 Dec 2022)

Expensive torpedoes getting more expensive.









						EXCLUSIVE: Canada to pay double on US torpedo deal first struck in 2014
					

The Canadian government is prepared to pay the US Navy double the amount originally agreed upon in 2014 to acquire torpedo upgrade kits for its Victoria-class submarines.




					tnc.news


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## daftandbarmy (3 Dec 2022)

I would cheer, but it would wake up the kids:


Northrop Grumman unveils B-21 nuclear bomber for U.S. Air Force​
Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N) on Friday rolled out its new B-21 "Raider" jet, the first of a new fleet of long-range stealth nuclear bombers for the United States Air Force.

The B-21 was unveiled during a dramatic ceremony at Northrop's Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, offering members of the public the first look at the new bomber.

The B-21, which carries a similar "flying wing" shape to its predecessor, the B-2, will be able to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons around the world using long-range and mid-air refueling capabilities.

The aircraft were projected to cost approximately $550 million each in 2010 dollars, or about $750 million in today's inflation-adjusted dollars.

The Air Force planned to buy at least 100 of the planes and begin to replace B-1 and B-2 bombers.











						Northrop Grumman unveils B-21 nuclear bomber for U.S. Air Force
					

Northrop Grumman Corp on Friday rolled out its new B-21 "Raider" jet, the first of a new fleet of long-range stealth nuclear bombers for the United States Air Force.




					www.reuters.com


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## FSTO (3 Dec 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> I would cheer, but it would wake up the kids:
> 
> 
> Northrop Grumman unveils B-21 nuclear bomber for U.S. Air Force​
> ...


Why??


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## dapaterson (3 Dec 2022)

This is why I can never be a PAO - I'd have just taken a B52, painted it paisley, added some papier-maché bumps to the fuselage here and there, and claimed that it was the new aircraft.


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## Retired AF Guy (3 Dec 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> I would cheer, but it would wake up the kids:
> 
> 
> Northrop Grumman unveils B-21 nuclear bomber for U.S. Air Force​
> ...



Hmmm, may be its just me, but it just looks just like the B-2?


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## Weinie (3 Dec 2022)

dapaterson said:


> *This is why I can never be a PAO *- I'd have just taken a B52, painted it paisley, added some papier-maché bumps to the fuselage here and there, and claimed that it was the new aircraft.


Nope. You are too cynical to ever be a PAO.


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## dapaterson (3 Dec 2022)




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