# St Jean, needs changes?



## ArmyRick (18 Jun 2005)

I searched and i didn't find if there was athread out there for this one. So here goes. I am an NCO who went through Cornwallis. Yes, I am a half dinosaur (give me ten more years and I will be a full fledge dino). I train SQ candidates (Because I am stirring the hornets nest, I won't go into specifics).

The quality of training and leadership in St Jean is not effective in my opinion. Why ?

All too often I have seen the products coming from St Jean not being properly trainined. No, its not one or two troops either. Its alot of them. I see poor weapons handling (I knew C7 rifles inside out when I left wally world), incorrect drill movements (Come on this is a biggie of BMQ?) and hear horror stories of poor leadership (over and over again).
(1) A troop lost peice of kit in more than a week before graduating and while trying to submit a lost stolen report, they are frequently blown off by the course staff and told they can solve the problem at they're next training center. This is a huge head ache and a ugly problem for the staff at these schools to deal with baggage from some where else. It is the responsibility of the instructor/leader of the troop at THAT TIME! Some of the items are ID cards (a biggie), ground sheets, combat boots, canteen bottles, set of combats (all these are seperate troops by the way).

(2) In -40 'C weather, telling troops to climb into an arctic tent and turn off the stoves and lanterns.

(3) LOG NCO teaching troops small arms lessons and they pick up their bad habits.

The worst thing is that St Jean will be soon starting the enhanced BMQ (BMQ and SQ). I fear for the standard of trg for the CF. As I have said before, the CF is it's own worst enemy at times.

Opinions and input ???


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## Gouki (18 Jun 2005)

I'll have to show this to my father (WO w/26 yrs in) he isn't fond of St. Jean for reasons similar to yours..

I've been waiting to see some opinions on St. Jean and the late Cornwallis to be truthful I hope this topic gets somewhere.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (18 Jun 2005)

Quote,
_It is the responsibility of the instructor/leader of the troop at THAT TIME! Some of the items are ID cards (a biggie), _ 

...well this happened to me in 1978 in Cornwallis, someone decided they needed my wallet more than I did and I arrived in Petawawa without an ID card.  I think sometimes its so much easier to wax poeticlly about the "way it used to be" but we forget that things were that way then too.


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## mbhabfan (18 Jun 2005)

off topic a bit but when will St. Jean be offering the new course BMQ-SQ combined?


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## a23trucker (18 Jun 2005)

Good post....
We should all strive to improve the level of instruction that is going on these days.....

I have no personal knowledge of St Jean, but I've seen the level of instruction going down for years now.
...budget cuts...trying to do more with less....fewer training aids....less equipment....and a generation of instructors who didn't have the benefit of these items when they were taught.....they can all result in a lesser product. 
I think that we've lost a so much now so that even an infusion of money/equipment will be too little to bring us back to where we should be without a concentrated effort....

ps.  

" (3) LOG NCO teaching troops small arms lessons and they pick up *their bad habits*."

I take offence.....instructors passing on bad habits can come from any trade including cbt arms....let's concentrate on eliminating bad instruction no matter where it comes from....

Cheers
AM


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## Jungle (18 Jun 2005)

a23trucker said:
			
		

> " (3) LOG NCO teaching troops small arms lessons and they pick up *their bad habits*."
> I take offence.....instructors passing on bad habits can come from any trade including cbt arms....let's concentrate on eliminating bad instruction no matter where it comes from....


Hmmm... didn't we have a post recently where an Infantryman said he didn't do the C6 I.A. as per the book, and in which he suggested things were like that across the Army ?? The C6 is not taught on Basic TRG... so where do they pick up those bad habits ??


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## Gunner98 (18 Jun 2005)

I was the last 'B' Coy OC at CFRS Cornwallis. Mike B's Dad was the Chief Trg Offr.  As the course had shrunk from 20+, to 12, to 9, to 8 weeks, we witnessed not so much a poor level instruction as a less time to practice drills.  Once the training shifted to strictly Saint Jean, the philosophy on training failures also changed to let the Battle School sort them out.

There are approx. 1000 Saint Jean grads facing basic skills fade in Borden waiting for their next level of training (QL3, Comms etc.)

The actual time spent perfecting drills from enrolment until arrival at units is minimal.  

Dinosaurs like us are comparing 9 week wonders to 22+ week of drills, drills, drills.  Sorting out kit issues is a pain on a Base that caters to more than Basic Training.  The days of 19 platoons of strictly recruits at Cornwallis are distant memories.  It is hard to fix something that has fallen so far away from the original standard.  

The CDS has more than hinted at the old Depot concept returning with civies arriving at units for Basic and QL3, that may be the only way to set a better standard for training and molding of the young people with new millennium attitudes that walk into the recruiting centres today.


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## ArmyRick (18 Jun 2005)

"The CDS has more than hinted at the old Depot concept returning with civies arriving at units for Basic and QL3, that may be the only way to set a better standard for training and molding of the young people with new millennium attitudes that walk into the recruiting centres today."

Good. I think the idea of a platoon starting together and going through both basic and SQ (combat arms, DP1) together is good.

Trucker, I will be blunt. IMHO. You may take all the offence you want. The infantry NCO who is a poor small arms instructor is the exception not the norm and I have dealt with several LOG NCOs who performed basic soldiering skills poorly with the old excuses I hate such as...
"I'm a trucker/bin rat/cook, I don't do this sh*t" or
"I'm a cook, what do I ever need a C7 for?"

I am sorry to bruise feelings, but if you have been in your trade a while, then you know some of your bretheren are giving LOG guys that do drive the body a bad name. 

I even worked with a great LOG officer who was typically disgusted by the lower NCMs of his branch.

Going back to St Jean, some where when people join the forces, they need to have all their admin sorted out. If St Jean can't handle it, then give the resources and do it at the training centers (do from the ground up)..


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## Gunner98 (18 Jun 2005)

My last platoon at Cornwallis became my first troop at the old RCA Battle School in Shilo.  Taking the same guys from recruit day one to QL3 grads was rewarding and they were soldiers of which, I and my instructors were proud.

Just in time clothing delivery through a civilian contractor sucks as compared to being able to march the soldier over to Supply section and sorting out then and there.


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## a23trucker (19 Jun 2005)

Gunner:
"As the course had shrunk from 20+, to 12, to 9, to 8 weeks, we witnessed not so much a poor level instruction as a less time to practice drills." ........maybe time is the answer.....

Rick:
"several LOG NCOs who performed basic soldiering skills poorly with the old excuses I hate such as...
"I'm a trucker/bin rat/cook, I don't do this sh*t" or "I'm a cook, what do I ever need a C7 for?""

I agree that we run into these poor soldiers.
I don't stand for this and please *correct* any pers that you run into with this opinion!
CSS still have to be soldiers first, this is even more important in the era of the non-contiguous battle fd.
I'm quite proud to say that many of my soldiers have topped the PLQ and other leadership crses....

Cheers
AM


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## GO!!! (19 Jun 2005)

Jungle said:
			
		

> Hmmm... didn't we have a post recently where an Infantryman said he didn't do the C6 I.A. as per the book, and in which he suggested things were like that across the Army ?? The C6 is not taught on Basic TRG... so where do they pick up those bad habits ??



Probably at their armouries on a Tuesday night - because all of our wpns drills are taught as per the book - every time. Foot drill - well, thats another story.... ;D


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## pbi (23 Jun 2005)

> Trucker, I will be blunt. IMHO. You may take all the offence you want. The infantry NCO who is a poor small arms instructor is the exception not the norm and I have dealt with several LOG NCOs who performed basic soldiering skills poorly with the old excuses I hate such as...
> "I'm a trucker/bin rat/cook, I don't do this sh*t" or
> "I'm a cook, what do I ever need a C7 for?"


I have seen these people too, but I have also had the pleasure of working with some CSS soldiers who were just that: soldiers. (I include some very fine MAs in this). We have cooks, EME techs, drivers and supply techs who are every bit as much of a credit to the Army as their Cbt A brethren. The piss-poor "job-ism" attitude is, IMHO, a result of our screwed up purple system that for nearly 40 years now has been teaching these folks that they are busdrivers/cooks/clerks first and soldiers second (if at all...) Then the larger CF world provides them ample opportunity to foster this bad attitude, especially as people with this view rise up the ranks. Change the system: admit that Unification has done terrible damage and let's get ourselves to a system focused on operational readiness, with all support training tightly under the control of the CLS, and everybody with a healthy strong service identity. The operational need is for jointness, not Unification.

Cheers.


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## a_majoor (23 Jun 2005)

Having instructed at "the Mega" in summer 2000 (incremental instructor on the BOTC), I can attest to the lack of resources. Imaging having a 20 man section all to yourself (no 2I/C) or working a 40 man platoon with a staff of 4 (Pl Comd, 2I/C One and Two section commander).

For most periods of instruction, there is less than one minute per candidate to offer extra help, correction etc. (One section commander teaches drill, for example, while the other prowls around correcting). The amount of training aids was "just" the required amount, so if there was a admin screw-up, broken part etc., you were SOL. The distances between classes, drill hall, mess etc. made going from class to class a challenge (especially since they seemed to take perverse pleasure in scheduling classes at opposite ends of the complex.) Finally, there was very little time for admin (we fought for admin periods to deal with screw-ups), and of course, little opportunity. With no section 2I/C, the idea of having the MCpl take the candidate to the payy office, supply section etc. was just that; an idea.

I will state this was by far the most difficult environment I have ever taught in (and I include ATC Meaford, Gagetown (RESO 1&2), Petawawa (Leadership Coy) and any number of "local" courses), and only by driving the body for 12+ hr every day could we produce "quality" candidates. I take pride in producing a well trained soldier, and my compatriots in the platoon felt the same, so we sucked back and did what had to be done, but we were also quite burnt out at the end. I can only imagine what it must be like for the full time staff at St Jean who don't get to go home at the end of the summer....

Given the current resource environment, I would have to say the only way to get consistent quality soldiers is to concentrate resources on the training system so that sections have the proper number of staff (Pl Comd, 2I/C, 3X section Comd, 3 X 2I/C and a Driver/ Stmn), and as has been said before, courses are long enough to teach AND PRACTICE drills and skills. Slamming people through the mill at St Jean, or anywhere else for that matter, will never produce a quality soldier. Take the time and effort to do it right in the beginning, and everything else will follow.


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## pbi (23 Jun 2005)

Amajoor: While I'm not certain of the causes, the concern over the quality of the product coming out of the CF Recruit Training Centre has been present for at least 20 years. I know many fine PPCLI officers and NCOs who have been both increment and cadre at the PPCLI BSL/WATC and I have heard over and over again how inadequate the product was coming out of Cornwallis (and later St Jean). When we ran the experimental "direct entry" platoons back about 12-15 years ago (from the street right into Depot) the feeling was that the product was much better, as they were taught to be soldiers from the minute they got their hair cut. I am alarmed to hear of 20 man sections-the quality of instruction must suffer under these circumstances.

Cheers.


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## Bograt (23 Jun 2005)

I completed IAP/BOTP this past April. For those colleagues that know me, they know I am not one for being shy as to what I believe is absolutely absurd in St. Jean.

1. I was on a a Basic Officer course, and never once came in contact with an officer. Our DS were a WO/PO, Sergeant, and 2 MCpls. We were constantly instructed to "act like officers" without ever shown what the expectation was. We walked away from BOTP with "know what not to do" attitude. This is not a good example for new officers.

2. Standards at the school are non existant. The POs are myths. We had bags of hammers fail rifle, drill, PT, CPC, and pass the course without a PRB. Everyone knows these folks were pushed through Grizzly and Leopard because a) they represented trades that we need (ie SIGS), or b) they "reflected" a demographic that needs to be better represented in the CF. This had a demoralizing effect within the serial.

3. We were instructed not to wear our extreme cold weather gloves because we were not in the Arctic. Instead we had to use the old black leather gloves and wool inner liners in minus 37 weather. One Cadet received frost bite on eight of his fingers. There was fear he would need amputation. 

4. The clerks in St. Jean are examples of ineptitude. We were briefed by a Cpl on our pay and insurance who didn't speak English. She began her brief by saying "I don't speak English, don't have any questions...."

It is about numbers. Pushing numbers through the system. I had (and still do have) this idea that being an officer in the CF was important. However, after seeing what St. Jean pushed through I question the minimum standard the CF believes can be officers. 

St. Jean is a bubble. An anomaly within the CF. A training base separated from the rest of the CF, and from reality- devoid of leadership and generally staffed by people for once reason or another were "sent" there. There are some very good people in St. Jean, unfortunately they are the exception, and definitely not the rule.

Everyone knows St. Jean is in desperate need of an overhaul- the staff, the recruits/cadets, general members within the CF, but it continues on its merry way producing numbers for the next stage of training to deal with.

My 2 cents.


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## pbi (23 Jun 2005)

> St. Jean is a bubble. An anomaly within the CF. A training base separated from the rest of the CF, and from reality- devoid of leadership and generally staffed by people for once reason or another were "sent" there. There are some very good people in St. Jean, unfortunately they are the exception, and definitely not the rule.



"Everybody's school" is really "nobody's school". Products of the "CF" training system are IMHO good in spite of the system, not because of it.The Army has never made a secret of the fact that we are not happy with what the purple system spits out, but when we ty to change things to suit operational needs we often get slapped by the turf-defenders.  A few years ago I represented LFCA at a LFDTS conference to make changes to the way we trained Res Inf soldiers. We got into the fact that the recruit course at the time (BMQ?) was of no use to the Army especially in the Reserve. We proposed some changes to make the training meet the needs of hte operators, but were loudly and publicly slapped down because of the sacrosanct nature of the "CF green: recruit course that the Army could not change.

 I suspect the Navy may not be too pleased either, since service on a warship places heavy operational/environmental demands on all members of a ship's company.   The Air Force has been quite happy up to now, IMHO, but if our new CDS "operationalizes" the Air Force with more of an emphasis on an expeditionary capability to sp joint ops, they may begin to find that it is failing them too. The whole CF purple training system is based on an outdated 1960's way of viewing the military through "efficiency expert" eyes, and it works from the false assumption that you can combine the basic training needs of three diverse operational environments and somehow avoid slipping to the lowest common denominator. As I have said before, the foolish attempt by some defenders of Unification and purple-ism to equate the'tri-service" training system to the US Marines is utter nonsense-the results speak for themselves, and that premise indicates that its defenders know little or nothing about the Marines.

Cheers.

[fixed your quote boxes - I.]


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## TangoTwoBravo (23 Jun 2005)

I'd rather see us train a reduced number but with a higher standard.  Our biggest crunch is instructors.  Army courses tend to have Sect Comds and Sect 2ICs (both fully qualified instructors) with an "instructor/student" ratio of around 1:5. The result is a high level of instruction and a high standard at graduation.

I'd much rather see the Army have control of its recruits from day one.  You could either have an Army Recruit Course (basically go to SQ level) and then have seperate schools or have a "Basic" course for each Army MOC that has a core Army curriculum.

For officers, do the DEO candidates still stay in St Jean for their second language training?

2B


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## Bograt (23 Jun 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> For officers, do the DEO candidates still stay in St Jean for their second language training?



Yes, and I am the only exception. I will be continuing SLT in Shearwater while I wait for PFT. I sought a compassionate transfer as a result of the birth of my second child while I was on BOTP. I presented that three months of IAP/BOTP followed by an attached posting to St.Jean for nine months, followed by a six plus month attached posting wait for PFT, followed by a three month PFT posting (total of 21 months attached postings and separation from family) was counter productive to my family's QOL. 

My heart goes out to all my mates still "suffering" on the 4th, 11th and 12th floors of the Mega- where the rooms have carpeting, but not air conditioning.  How many resources are used to get B-A-B. It is startiling. - But that is another thread.

There is nothing nicer than seeing the Mega in your rear view mirror.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2005)

Now, I've made my opinions on our training system clear many times on these threads, but in the interest of conversation, I've cut-and-pasted my thoughts from a previous discussion as they pertain here.   I know some, who have intimate knowledge of CFLRS, debate the validity or reality of some of my proposals, but I'm thowing them up again for the sake of debate (again   ).

Now, don't get me wrong, I'm a full supporter of Unification and Jointness.   However, I believe that Unification is a top-down process, not a bottom-up one.   Hellyer unified the CF because he was frustrated with the inability of the services to give him cohesive advice on National Defence and with the duplication and triplication of certain services.   I believe Hellyer was wrong because he attacked Service-based organizations related to specific identity and culture of each Service in an effort to achieve his required unified Defence team - this was simply not needed (IMHO).

Basic Training is one of these institutions I believe would be better off separated.   This means that their is no "Purple" trades - we can have "Purple" Schools to teach Army, Navy, and Air Force trades, but career patterns and service identity are locked into the Army, etc.   Basic Training is an institution that takes civilians and transforms them into soldiers (or sailors, or airmen).   It is different then "Skills Training" as the main effort is not to teach the soldier skills (any idiot can learn to march... well, almost any idiot) but to inculcate them into the institution of the Service they will belong to.

This is why I've consistently argued (as above) for something similar to USMC Basic or RM Commando Course - it takes basic training to the next step; rather then just spitting out a untrained soldier that can do the basics, it spits out soldiers who are Riflemen first - they've been introduced to high-intensity combat training and are ready to receive their trades training (remember, they are tradesmen second).   Like the RM course, Army recruits are grounded in patrolling, raids, ambushes, convoys, air mobility, defensive, ruck-marching, 3-Block War, Urban Ops, platoon fire and movement and live fire training.   Whatever their trade is, they can be depended upon to act as a rifleman in a pinch - requiring Mechanics and Air Traffic Controllers in Italy or the crew of the HMCS Calgary to kick it up to this level is (IMHO) not a very good use of resources.

The "Purple" branch simply does not work in our modern conflict envioronment where every soldier is required to be a rifleman first (this is clearly stated in the Army Force Employment Plan).   How are we to insist that every soldier be a Rifleman first (with requisite annual training and testing) if they are fired off into a Navy or Air Force billet for a a few years?   Can we have a logisitics Sergeant who spent 15 years on a boat or at CFB Bagotville suddenly chucked into a Land Envioroment and leading a convoy from Kabul to Kandahar?   A recipe for disaster if you ask me.   In order to have an Army support system that is robust enough to handle CS/CSS duties in a modern combat environment, there needs to be specific Army cultural traits that can only be addressed thorugh dropping the "cross-pollination" (for lack of a better term) effect of a "purple" branch.

Doing this doesn't eliminate the ability of the CF to unify "Purple" schools around common skill sets - if certain equipment or techniques are utilized Forces wide (catering, medical, admin) then unify the school for the Army, Navy, and Airforce to send their recruits to (after being inducted properly in a Service-based basic training environmentI am unsure of official definitions, but I see a difference between "unified" and "joint".   Unified is a blending of Service institutions while joint is an interlocking of Service capabilities.   The U.S. is not a Unified Service, but it is farther down the Joint road then us in many respects (The same could be said about the UK and the Aussies).

Another call for support of Unified Basic Training is that all service personel need to gain the fundamentals in how do defend themselves and protect their units/ships/bases from enemy threats.   However, Force Protection does not necessitate the need for a common training curriculum.   As I mentioned above, I am in favour of the Army handling its own Basic Training in order to allow it, in a two phase process (Rifleman First, Tradesman Second), to kick "Ground Operations" training up to a higher level - a higher level that would be a waste both for the Naval/Air Force Recruit (teaching them a skill they will most likely never need) and the Army (having to dedicate extra NCO's and Officers to train them).

The Navy and the Air Force have their own specific Force Protection requirements.   This can be taught in Navy/Air Force specific courses that can tailor training to what they need.   Perimeter security, Shore Party, Small Craft Patrols (in order to prevent attacks similar to the one on the USS Cole), etc, etc.   Perhaps the Army can loan out a few NCO's to their schools as "SME - Tactics" to oversee their training.   As well, some proposals which may be valid would require specialists (either a specific MOC or an additional qualification for tradesmen) for Navy/Air Force Force Protection (RAF Regiment/USMC Security Teams) - these would either be their own unit or attached out to deployed units and bases/dockyards.

Sure, this may not be as efficient as the lowest common denominator approach we have now, but I think it will prove to be more effective in producing soldiers, sailors, and airmen ready for the specifics of their service (in Navy/Airforce case, it may be less on the general stuff and more on technical trades training).   Edward Campbell once told me that efficiency (of the kind Hellyer threw on us) doesn't always equal increased effectiveness.   This is one case where I think his observation sticks.

As I said earlier, I believe unification should be a top-down endeavour and not a bottom-up one.   We need unified regional commands to oversee joint forces to ensure a cohesive employment of National Defence assets.   It is essential to "unify" operational procedures and doctrine to ensure this (and perhaps career patterns - see my proposal on "Operational" and "Tactical" Officer MOC's), but we don't need "unified" force structures to do so.   It is important for the Lieutenant Colonel and the Commander in the Command/Staff element to be on the same page because they are both doing the same task (administering a unified defence structure).   It isn't so important for the Rifleman and Naval Electronic Technician (Acoustic) to be (and I argue that it is infact inefficient to demand that they both be), because one will fight the Land Battle and the other will fight as part of the Ship. 

Forces will not be unified at the lowest levels - we do not expect Army soldiers to fill in jobs in the ships company or vice versa.   Within the Army however, the demand is there (every soldier a Rifleman first) - hence my argument above.   Sending Recruits to different recruiting programs/centers (thus de-unifying basic training) will not degrade jointness - this is a principle that is reinforced in the Force Generation/Employment process.

I would venture that senior NCO positions (MWO/CWO/both grades of CPO) would have to be semi-unified, as they can be expected to fill on as "top enlisted" NCO of a mix-force (TF RSM?).

Officers can be exposed to the top-down unification as Lts and Captains (within a military education).   As Platoon and Company Commanders, they will command Army pure (and most likely MOC pure) units.   Once they've been elevated to Major, the path to unified command should start - we do this fairly well (better then the US, or so the literature seems to point out) with a common Command and Staff College and War College (CFC).   By the time they hit General, they should almost be indistinguishable.


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## Gun Shy (23 Jun 2005)

In the late 80's and early 's Cornwallis was much of the same. Weapons Cadre filled with instructors that could or should be near troops as a section commander. For Instance a Steward teaching periods of Weapon. When it was time to go on the Range, several soldiers in a platoon of 100 men were very shaky on drills and close to being dangerous. Some  platoons had a squads as big as 35-40 per squad. Drill was usually given by individual squad memebers to their squad or if space was limited combining two squads. One instructor teaching and the other assisting.


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## pbi (23 Jun 2005)

Infanteer: I don''t see what is so unrealistic about your concepts. Quite the opposite: IMHO it was (and is...) Unification that is "unrealistic". It has no basis in operational requirements, contributes nothing to operational capability in and of itself, and creates a false image of "jointness" that in fact does not even exist. Since we designed and imposed the system on ourselves, we have the power to change it, such that its insidious and destructive aspects are removed or neutralized. While there may be some ego problems with our current govt party in completely dismantling Unification (since they birthed the ugly beast...) there is little stopping us from changing it from within until the term "Unification" exists only as a label. I'm exaggerating a bit, but you get the point. We have to admit that it was not well thought out, it is a relic of outdated thinking, and it is unresponsive since great chunks of it do not respond to either an operational commander or a force generator. Nobody is interested in copying it. If and when it dies, very few people will cry at the funeral.

Cheers.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2005)

Agree, as I said above, Unification to me seems to be a top-down, strategic affair that should end at the operational level (this is where its cousin, Jointness should come in).  It should be used in order to override the feudal arrangement of Service-based competition and Service-based approaches to National Defence.  Why this requires an Infantry Soldier, an Avionics Tech, and a Bosun to receive common training is beyond me.

Unification does have its uses; a few that I can think of are:
- A National Chain-of-Command with a professional Military Chief (The CDS)
- A National Staff and Planning Capability that ensures a cohesive and joint Defence team (The Land, Naval, and Maritime Staff should be relegated to training, careers and tactical doctrine, essentially part of CDS's staff)
- A higher loyalty to this National (as opposed to Service-based) C-of-C (this means that senior Officers begin to blur in their training and orientation)
- Unified National Commands to overlook Joint Forces - these should be along territorial/functional lines and not service based ones (ie: Western Command as opposed to LFWA, etc)

Purple trades, "lowest-common denominator" training, and cross-pollination should not be in this list.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## FSTO (23 Jun 2005)

Man, do I have a lot to say on this subject.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2005)

Let's hear it then!


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## Chainsaw (23 Jun 2005)

Hmmmm, this is beginning to worry me. I'm hoping to do my BMQ in the fall, and I really don't want to recieve subpar training.

One of you spoke of "Enhanced BMQ" which combines BMQ and SQ into one. Do you have an estimate on when that will be put into place?

Also, does the quality of training improve at the moment when entering SQ or MOC training? 

Thanks,


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## ZipperHead (23 Jun 2005)

IMO the death of the military can be attributed to the attitude I have heard from certain people (think bars, not chevrons here....) when I bring up the "soldier first, tradesman second" argument (imagine that, something that EVERYBODY here seems to agree on :): "If we do that, a lot of people won't want to join!!!!" Well, tough shit, I say. I think we have people NOT joining (even as tradesmen) because they see how inherently lame our military has become. I would rather have 10 hardcore soldiers who happen to turn wrenches, flip eggs, file PER's, lance boils, than 100 civvies in uniform who can't handle a weapon or man the front gate because they are scared.

I have worked with a guy (teaching SQ) who went through leadership trg with the navy, then came to the Army..... what a fiasco. His attitude was like death (too many examples, but one that sticks in my mind is his insistence that we should all be on a first name basis (regardless of rank), like the navy and the air force. "I say, Pete, do me a solid and charge that MG nest...."), and I would like to think that the soldiers he "taught" came out OK in spite of him (this individual was a section 2ic, with a hard core 3PPCLI section commander to keep the soldiers on the straight and narrow).

I think a lot of the problems with St Jean can be attributed to the fact that nobody wants to go there to be an instructor, unless Quebec is your home province (I won't get into a language/race/Quebec bashing situation here...). When I went in for my career manglers interview, after being told I was here (Gagetown) for another year (or more), I switched to plan B, and asked for a French course. The CWO (being french) decided to see if I was bluffing (saying I wanted to get language trg just to sound like I want to develop myself professionally....) by asking if I'd go to Quebec on completion of SLT. I said "sure, I'd go to Valcartier (to the 12e RBC) or to St Jean....". "You'd go to St Jean!?!?!?!?" And off and running on a recruitment spiel on how great St Jean is, and how I'd love it, and how there's more English spoken there than most Anglophones think. And on and on and on...... Anyway, any guesses on where my #3 posting preference is now????? And not by my choice (other than being stupid enough to say I'd go there ON COMPLETION of SLT). I only know of a few people who have worked at St Jean, and my confidence in the system isn't particularly brought up any appreciable amount with this knowledge. Let me just say that drive and dedication aren't strong suits on these individuals.......

In some perverse way, I would actually like to go to St Jean to be an instructor, but after my stint in this part of the trg system, I am going to be good and burnt out. And, if I leave here the same rank as I arrived (ie. not demoted) I'd be surprised, as my attitude ruffles feathers here (in the, let's all say it loudly now,*COMBAT* Training Center), let alone in the lovely world where teaching sensitivity and memo writing seems to take priority over weapons handling and the responsibility that comes with being a soldier........ As much as the professional in me doesn't want me to say this, but let someone else dash their will to live on the rocks that is (are?) the CFRS. 

Speaking from a political point of view, they will never move the recruit school out of Quebec (barring secession, of course....) so many of the issues that come part and parcel with it being there will remain. *IF* they decide to have different branch (or even strictly field force) recruiting depots (we could only wish....), so many problems that we (in the army) encounter would be minimised so much. Not having to retrain people, having a much higher minimal standard, allowing people to actually be soldiers first, and not have to focus on training people in pre-deployment trg BASIC soldier skills, thereby reducing spool up times for deployments (without having to being scared shit-less any time you see a purple trade with a weapon pointed even remotely in your direction.... if the firing pin is it, of course  : ). We can only dream.......


Al


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## ZipperHead (23 Jun 2005)

> One of you spoke of "Enhanced BMQ" which combines BMQ and SQ into one. Do you have an estimate on when that will be put into place?



I suspect "enhanced" is NDHQ speak for "reduced time frame, and even lesser quality". Sorry for being cynical, but training time gets cut so much, it won't be long before you do in-clearance and out-clearance on the same day for the majority of courses....

Al


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## Gunner98 (24 Jun 2005)

Those instructors (from my Coy in Cornwallis at closure time) that moved to Saint Jean to continue their instructional duties were downtrodden after the first serials of trg.  Say what you want about the last days in Cornwallis but history, tradition, and most of all the isolation of the Annapolis Valley provided alot of focus for the recruits.

The soldiers first attitude for all can't be created in a purple school setting in 9 weeks.


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## FSTO (24 Jun 2005)

I went to Chilliwack in 89 for BOTC. Great course, our platoon was all Navy MARS and Air Force Pilots so we were operationally focused. Graduated in Dec 89, went home for Christmas and then sent to St. Jean for SLT. We were all pumped to get on with our training that we thought that 6 months in the Mega would be a snap. Boy was I wrong, right from the start we were treated like crap, the teachers didn't really care about teaching us and the staff were a bunch of tin pot dictators who loved to put the screws to a bunch of anglo officers. By the time I left there they had sucked the drive out of all of us. After about 2 months at Venture (the Naval Officers Training Centre), the school CO sat our class down and asked what the f*** our problem was. Insubordination and bad attitudes was the norm. Make a long story short is that we got fixed up and pointed in the right direction. The Navy has learned its lesson and Junior Officers out of BOTC are sent to Esquimalt for SLT so that they are in a Naval environment and can keep an eye on what they have joined the Navy for.

After 15 yrs and now at Fleet School, the quality of sailor that we get out of St Jean is pretty poor. I blame CFRC for not vetting them at the front door and St. Jean for not instilling the proper discipline. Cut backs in personnel and FRP (remember that fiasco?), touchy feely recruiting campaigns and an unwillingness to use QR&O's and CFAO's to charge and throw out the rotten ones result in Fleet School and Battle School(?) having to clean up the mess.
The Navy that I am in does not use first names when talking between ranks and I actively discourage it when I hear it. 
Now that Force Protection is the norm for all the ships, I have been advocating more small arms refresher (presently it is once every 2 years) training for the sailors. It has taken awhile but we are becoming more familiar with our weapons so that I am only nervous instead of terrified when I am around an OS carrying a C7.


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## pbi (24 Jun 2005)

> The Navy has learned its lesson and Junior Officers out of BOTC are sent to Esquimalt for SLT so that they are in a Naval environment and can keep an eye on what they have joined the Navy for.



Well said. BZ.

Cheers.


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## Horse_Soldier (24 Jun 2005)

Maybe the only thing I can add to all that was said is that the Megastructure in St-Jean (which I not so fondly think of as the Megahorror) is probably the worst possible training environment one could imagine, especially for recruits, and that will have a real effect on the quality of training.


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## Bograt (24 Jun 2005)

pbi said:
			
		

> Well said. BZ.
> 
> Cheers.



Almost. In my serial, all the squids (MARS, and Engineers) were told they would be doing SLT in either BC or Shearwater. They all received their posting messages, however, the engineers had their posting messages revoked and they were told they were staying in St. Jean.

The Chief Warrent of standards gave our end of course debrief. I was extremely blunt with him. In the auditorium with three platoons present I said "Chief, lets cut right to the heart of the matter. There is a complete and utter void of leadership at this institution. The only time we saw officers was when they were telling us to keep 5 meter spacing and wear leather combat cloves in the field. They did this while they were in the warmth of their trucks, sipping Timmies. Officer's ridiculed us for being substandard and without drive- but they also refused to deal with those of us who should not be here. Their impotence to enforce standards is the reason why the perceived quality is so low. For those of us who may not had any previous knowledge of the military, St. Jean was a piss poor introduction- entirely due to their leadership."

My Sergeant was listening outside the auditorium. A lot of senior NCOs bought me beer after I commissioned.


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## childs56 (24 Jun 2005)

The system is broke and we all know it. How do we fix it is the problem. Seems every thing in our military that is broken takes years to fix. The real problems lie with the people in charge. They have allowed the changes from one extreme to the other. Deep down inside they know that what they are doing is wrong. Yet they allow it to go on. Why is that. Well as we have a military so small it is what one would call job protection. If so and so scratch my back i will scratch their's. The reality of it is that although some high ranking officer in Ottawa or else where has now attained the necessary criteria for the next rank or their position as CEO of a company. it is the soldiers sailors and airmen that have to suffer for their costly and sometimes irreversible mistakes. We have all seen the vehicles we have purchased over the years, the aircraft we have got rid of, the ones we bought, the ships we had and the ones we got. We can say pros and cons of them all. What was the true reason behind each and every decision to buy and build them. A political one. With a military as small as ours we cannot afford to allow General so and so to make the right decision. Because he has his own personal vested intrest at heart. (this is not in all cases but in the vast majority). So now we go onto the training system we now have. How have we allowed our military to go down the tubes and scrape the bottom of the barrel for the standards and the training for new recruits.   For one thing as previously stated the purple training that has taken effect is one of many, the fact that we have been so complacent for so many years, with little more then the army deploying into hostile situations, and even then isolated situations of soldiers being under fire and intense operations. So we grew a false sense of security and how we should grow our new military due to the ability to lower the COST as we have seen less of a threat through out the times. Then we got the other trades complaining about the standards, and how they should be lower due to the fact that they themselves should not be subjected to the level that an infantry was, or an infanterr to the level that a sailor needs. Some genius started to put together a battle plan,(whoops wrong term) influenced more by the saving of MONEY they could attain and the friends they would make. so they came up with the new standards of training, what they did in effect is lower the level of the members of the CF as opposed to the CAF. Such things as removing intense training of weapons and replacing with intense levels of sharp, and how to treat others nicely. The eroding of discipline training such as drill and its benefits of following commands in instinct and reaction. The part of discipline that a soldier sailor and airmen learned from cleaning their own floor, using the rudimentary of supplies. but attaining the level of perfection demanded of a well trained and disciplined outfit. One where you could literally eat off the floor. one where the brass was polished and you were proud of the toilets you just scrubbed, god hope any one that left it un flushed or worse. One may ask why is this type of training important, to learn how to work as a team, to allow members to adjust to following orders, allow themselves to become comfortable with the equipment they may will and shall use for their carrier. We got caught with our pants down numerous times due to the lessoning of this training. The very instinct of a member of a military less then 60 000. The ships now deploy guards with weapons in foreign ports, well at least some ports. I have heard officers comment on whether they should or not as they were uncomfortable with the members and their weapons skills. The airforce has members whom still believe in the old addage of i will never deploy into a hostile environment and if i do i will have the infantry to guard me.these same people haven't been to the field since they joined some 20 odd years ago. Support trades in the army are just starting to wake up due to the levels the US army realizing their training to be inadequate for convoy operations. I think the higher ups are getting scared as to what and how we can deploy and use our whole Battle group system. The only members of that group that can work under fire and do it safely up until a short time ago was the CBT Arms. I feel the new CDS will be changing these around. I have a good sense about what his visions are and how we will change our system back to how it was not some 10-15 years ago. where they had standards and they stick to them. The plan for Jan 2006 will hopefully go ahead and have us form a tri service support system like we have not seen the likes of. This shall require the whole military to conform to a standard of training as intense as ever before and in some areas where we have never done before.   Hopefully the recruit and leadership   schools take head of the changes soon and re implement the way we need to train. 
 Just in restating yes the system is broken, we need to fix it before we go to far and it is irreversible.


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## pbi (24 Jun 2005)

Good post CTD. I am glad to see that despite all your disappointment and frustrations, you have some faith in the CDS. If lack of leadership got us where we are, then only leadership will get us out. I also have faith in the CDS, although I do not know him at all. However, when I arrived in Aug 04 at the HQ of US Combined Joint Task Force 76 in Bagram, Afgh, the US DComd there said to me: "when Gen Hillier and the Canadians were running ISAF, at least we knew it had a backbone".  Political buttering up? Maybe, but that US Gen had no need to win points with me: I was a nobody. I saw it as professional recognition for the CDS (then CLS), and I think it is a hopeful sign for us. What we have missed for so long (probably since JADex) is that vital spark in the military system: leadership.

Cheers.


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## 2 Cdo (24 Jun 2005)

A lot of valid points on the failure that our recruit training system has become! I just have one question, how many of you serving members are out there rocking the boat with AAR's and memos pointing out this disaster to the chain of command? Personally I have fired off several memos through the chain to try and address the problem (my career has pretty much stagnated at this point ;D).

I just have to say if more people address this through the chain of command, and ASK for feedback, maybe WE can implement change for the better! Remember it is ultimately our job as NCO's and officers to look after the welfare of our troops and their welfare is best served by training them to the HIGHEST standards!


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## a_majoor (24 Jun 2005)

I have been an avid memo writer on this subject on every course I have ever taught. What is disheartening is the dull "thud" when it hits the desk and no changes ever come from them. I taught at ATC Meaford in 1997, and reported on the serious problems there at the time. In 2001 I couldn't dodge the bullet and was there again; exactly the same issues were present.

Although I left a bit early due to a family emergency, I have it from several eye witness that at the end of the course, the Commander LFCA and several staff, and the CO ATC and his staff had a session with the remaining instructors. All my witness agree that not one person from LFCA or ATC took any notes during the session. Hearing there are 15 man sections with only one section commander/instructor again this year is a clear indication that nothing has changed since 1997.....

If there are not enough section commanders, 2I/Cs and Dvr Stmn to have a properly constituted platoon staff, then the only possible answer is to CUT BACK RECRUITING so the staff can handle the intake, and grow incrementally from there. I would rather graduate 60 trained soldiers at the end of the summer than have 200 figure 11s filling positions at the units this September, after taking integration and retraining into account, you will probably get just as much out of plan A (60 trained soldiers) as plan B (200 untrained soldiers).


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## childs56 (24 Jun 2005)

you can do all the memo writing and AAR's you want, the reality is  the OC wants to gain his next rank so he himself is not going to rock the boat. He may have the best of intentions of changing the system once he gets a higher rank, but the leadership seems to have a way to ensure that you loose the intrest of such.  What we need to do is face reality of all our short commings and i think we have hit on more then a few important ones during this forum pretty well. Look at them, see how to improve the system and then get on with it.


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## SeaKingTacco (24 Jun 2005)

Interesting topic.  I have no direct experience with St Jean, being a 1980s product of a very tough Chilliwack course, but I have no reason to doubt any of the problem areas that are being exposed here.

I noticed that MCpls are training officers at St Jean.  The year before I started Artillery Trg (1988) at the School in Gagetown, MBdrs trained the OCdts in order to make up for a lack of Snr NCO instructors.  It was, by all accounts, a disaster.  Apparently, all that most of the MBdrs could focus on was getting revenge for real or imagined ill-treatment they had suffered at the hands of an officer in the past and really stuck it to the OCdts.  The experiment, to my knowledge has never been repeated.  My point is not to slag MCpls.  Rather, I believe that, in general, the minimum rank to instruct officers should probably be a Sgt, if not WO.  I remember that the vast majority of my Officer training Chilliwack was done either by Officers (Captains) or very Senior WOs.  They had the maturity (in general), the experience, and provided an excellent example to us students. I left there with an excellent idea of what a good officer should look like and have spent the rest of my career trying to be that officer.

I wonder if it would be helpful of those enough on this board and elsewhere who care about the quality of our recruit training (both officer and NCM) to at least volunteer to work a serial in St Jean as incremental staff.  While I wouldn't want to be posted to St Jean (a location issue, vice job issue, although I hate the Mega) maybe if I did one serial on TD for 3 months, I could at least say that I turned out one good serial of officers and would have first-hand knowledge of the problems happening there.  I know that I can't change the basic problem of lack of resources, a poor TS, a crappy environment for training (the Mega)- but at least I could temporarily help alleviate an instructor shortage.  If enough of us did that, we might make a difference.

Anyone else up for it?

Cheers


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## aesop081 (24 Jun 2005)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Interesting topic.   I have no direct experience with St Jean, being a 1980s product of a very tough Chilliwack course, but I have no reason to doubt any of the problem areas that are being exposed here.
> 
> I noticed that MCpls are training officers at St Jean.   The year before I started Artillery Trg (1988) at the School in Gagetown, MBdrs trained the OCdts in order to make up for a lack of Snr NCO instructors.   It was, by all accounts, a disaster.   Apparently, all that most of the MBdrs could focus on was getting revenge for real or imagined ill-treatment they had suffered at the hands of an officer in the past and really stuck it to the OCdts.   The experiment, to my knowledge has never been repeated.   My point is not to slag MCpls.   Rather, I believe that, in general, the minimum rank to instruct officers should probably be a Sgt, if not WO.   I remember that the vast majority of my Officer training Chilliwack was done either by Officers (Captains) or very Senior WOs.   They had the maturity (in general), the experience, and provided an excellent example to us students. I left there with an excellent idea of what a good officer should look like and have spent the rest of my career trying to be that officer.
> 
> ...



Sign me up...i'de rather be part of the solution than part of the problem.  I have been trought St-Jean in 93 for recruit training so i would not want to be posted there but i would not mind going there on TD to do a few serials now and then.


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## TCBF (24 Jun 2005)

" I would rather graduate 60 trained soldiers at the end of the summer than have 200 figure 11s filling positions at the units this September, after taking integration and retraining into account, you will probably get just as much out of plan A (60 trained soldiers) as plan B (200 untrained soldiers).'

- Interesting subject.  Ratios should differ depending on the subject being taught, as per the TP.  At CFRS Cornwallis, whatever came off the 707 at CFB Greenwood, the train station behind CFRS HQ, and the bus/taxi/mom on the highway was your platoon.  The shacks could hold 160 - four squads of 40.

A MCpl per Squad (times four), and a Trg Sgt and Pl Comd (Sgt or WO) per Pl.    

You had ten weeks - make it happen.

At CFLRS St-Jean, the Rct Pls were limited to 60 - the max capacity of the Trg Theatres.  You could have two squads of 30, or four of 15, but three of 20 was common.  Design of the Mega was not conducive to teaching recruits and getting a pl to bond.  You had eight weeks - make it happen.

In both cases, 'Hands on' classes were taught by Trg Cadres to the proper class ratio.

A loss of standards was caused by;

1.  Shoddy recruiting practices.
2.  Poor MHR policy - a DND problem.
3.  Weak-kneed and lily-livered administration of the standards at Coy and School level.

and,

4.  Poor course design and 'false economy', teaching too much too fast.  We are not just teaching skills - we are inculcating them with our military CULTURE.

Tom


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## aesop081 (24 Jun 2005)

TCBF said:
			
		

> At CFLRS St-Jean, the Rct Pls were limited to 60 - the max capacity of the Trg Theatres.   You could have two squads of 30, or four of 15, but three of 20 was common.   Design of the Mega was not conducive to teaching recruits and getting a pl to bond.   You had eight weeks - make it happen.



My recruit course ( 9308) was the last 10 week course run in St-Jean.   The platoon after ours was the first 8-week course. I understand that BMQ has gone back to 10 weeks, is that correct ?


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## TCBF (24 Jun 2005)

That was the plan when I left Mar 99, but I left in Mar 99.  Anyone else?

Tom


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## -rb (24 Jun 2005)

A bit different direction here but nonetheless applies directly to this thread...
What is a new recruit supposed to do with the training he is given while at St. Jean? Bad leadership is obvious to most and not easily hidden, what I'm questioning is if the serious lack of training standards are indeed the case at St Jean, how can a recruit go about improving their experience while on course? Or for that matter, is that even possible to do?

On this board among the many threads there are many differing views on the whole training process...It seems that on one side of the coin you have people saying that everything you need to know (initially) you will be taught on BMQ, while on the other side, many who've experienced St Jean are saying that the instruction is less than desirable due to inadequate leadership/experience and motivation etc. 

IMHO, being the so called 'Grey Man' and going with the flow is fine if you know that the training you're being offered is directly applicable to the CF environment upon which you will eventually be employed. In my view BMQ should be both challenging and motivating enough to want to excel...I guess it concerns me that if the deficiencies within St Jean are readily visible to even the new recruits (am i correct on this?), I can't help but think that I'd be looking for a higher standard to align myself with, obviously being new I may not know exactly what that is, maybe even just a nagging thought in the back of my head.

Is all lost and should one just say f*ck it, get through it, and know things will improve as they progress through the training cycle from civie to trained soldier (regradless of MOC)?...they'll at least know that after St Jean, their SQ, MOC training and eventually OJT once in batallion will make up for what BMQ was lacking?

The comments here have been great to read from an *inexperienced* members point of view, they haven't disheartened me at all, in fact quite the opposite. It's nice to see that there are those out there who want more and expect more from new recruits coming in. I  want to make sure and I'd like to think that the 110% I put in to what I'll be doing everyday is going to directly benefit the team members I'll eventually be working with. I hate the thought of showing up for SQ after BMQ and being thought of as a shitpump, not because I didn't learn what I was taught, but because it was never taught in the way it should have been.

just my thoughts, hope it's not too much of a divergence from the threads current direction.
cheers,
ryan.


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## Gunner98 (25 Jun 2005)

The challenge of meeting the expectations of recruits drawn from across Canada with equally diverse skills and abilities is not really the intent of recruit training.  The goal is to bring all recruits to the same standard, beginning with the lowest common denominator.  When one recruit has a university degree and another bumbled his way through high school, when one is 19 and the other is 49, when one is a hunter and the other has never touched a weapon, one is a allstar athlete and the other a computer geek - it is hard to find that lowest common denominator. 

As I have stated before I am all in favour of returning to the Depot concept, where you go to one place - Bn, Regt, Sqn and spend your first year learning to meet that unit's standard.

Being one talented lamb amongst a flock of varied sheep will never be challenging.  Guess what; that is what it is like most of your career.  Every soldier and officer struggles with being one of the flock or giving "110%" and being accused of being a careerist.  Daring to be different is never easy but rising to be the CDS or CF CWO by he age of 48 or 49 probably was not a smooth ride.

The US Army cliche applies: "Be all that you can be" This is an individual thing - you will always have a choice to make - popular or unpopular - one more beer, one more km, one more hill, one more course, one more year.

Your career will be filled with what you put in to fulfill your own personal, realistic goals.  Serving in the military is a lifestyle choice and not a job.


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## GerryCan (25 Jun 2005)

aesop081 said:
			
		

> My recruit course ( 9308) was the last 10 week course run in St-Jean.   The platoon after ours was the first 8-week course. I understand that BMQ has gone back to 10 weeks, is that correct ?



That is correct, atleast it was in 2001 when i went through the wonderful mega.

I honestly believe it could stand to be a little longer as it seems that the whole course is spent running around through that god-forsaken building missing timings, thus getting half-ass lectures from instructors who refuse to take time out of their own schedule to make sure the proper training is given to the course.

I left that place with a few bad habits, habits that were reinforced on a daily basis by non-army instructors. I didn't realize how out to lunch that 10 weeks really was until I landed in Meaford and cringed everytime our Battle School Instructors tried to rid us all of some of the ridiculous things we were taught.

On the note of leadership in St Jean - When we did our field ex in Farnham as mentioned by someone else, our instructors sat in trucks or drove around in ML's while we did our Nav Ex. God forbid they go out in the cold and perform the nav ex with the students, give pointers to the troops in the best possible way of reaching your destination and be able to properly assess each individual recruit in their performance in what is one of the most important things in soldiering. Perhaps 'Lead by Example' has been forgotten by some. Who knows, maybe it was just the serial i was on, but it was a 2 and a half month Gong Show, one which I would never do again.

I honestly don't profess to know the changes that need to be made to raise the standard, I wish I did, but It probably isn't as hard as it looks. For one: the whole tri-service crap is right out of er, but I think we all know that. I too am for the Depot training, not necessarily by sending all recruits to respective units, but have a drawn out standard for cbt arms, or perhaps just the army would be a start.


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## brin11 (25 Jun 2005)

I went through Cornwallis in 1988.  I had a Navy Master Seaman as a squad NCO.  He was an excellent instructor, taught us drill, military knowledge, etc.  We didn't have him for weapons training (C1 at the time) and wish I had as the weapons instructor wasn't that great.  During the week in the field at Granville he was as much involved as the infantry guys that were NCO's for the other squads.  All in all, there are hammers in all three branches and I feel it is the individual that counts as far as quality of instruction.  He gave his all, took the time to know without a doubt what he was teaching and brought as good a squad through as the others, in my opinion.  I haven't done basic training the depot way but I still believe I got good bang for my buck in Cornwallis being trained with all three elements.  It doesn't have to be lowest common denominator if it's set up correctly and a training standard adhered to.


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## GerryCan (25 Jun 2005)

Good point, I didn't look at it in that sense. I may have recieved the shortest straw in St Jean and thus painted everyone with the same brush.


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## Glorified Ape (25 Jun 2005)

Just my 2 cents, but I think much of the problem at St. Jean is in the upper tiers of the school. I just finished BOTC and am on SLT now and I can say without a doubt that our platoon staff were stellar - knowledgeable, competent, enthusiastic, dedicated and fair. There seem to have been some changes at St. Jean since last year when I did my IAP, though our staff then were excellent too (1 Mcpl, 1 Sgt, and another Sgt. as platoon commander - times were tight, it would seem). The primary and gleaming problem I saw wasn't with the instructing staff but with upper management. 

Maybe it was a misperception, but it seems like there's a substantial amount of disdain felt by the higher-ups towards the trainees. What little we DID hear from the senior school leadership consisted primarily of malicious, inconsistent directives which our staff had to contend with, temper-tantrum speeches aimed at doing little more than insulting everyone in the room (I missed out on this, happily), and a spectacular PRB fiasco wherein injured personnel were jerked about for a few days (after receiving their temper tantrum speech), thrown back into the field with new platoons, given field PRB's, then sent back to St. Jean to graduate with their original platoons after a day or two, with the exception of one guy who had the gusto (and a destroyed knee) to voice dissent at his PRB - he got a full recourse and a stint on PAT platoon - after all, can't have the administration's gleaming errors pointed out to them, can we? 

Now, understandably there were some MIR commandos that probably deserved to get sent back into the field as an object lesson but there were also quite a few people with legitimate problems - heat stroke & severe dehydration, infected feet, stress fractures, etc, not to mention the people that just wanted to get some Second Skin or other minor 1st aid materials and return the same day but got sent all the way back to St. Jean because the Farnham MIR couldn't handle the volume. To add insult to injury, they lowered the distances between tasking sites, the # of work hours/day, and added scheduled eating times, all in response (apparently) to the injury rate of our course (20 MIRs on one day from my platoon of 57, not sure of the rate for the other pltns on the course) - all this after having shit all over anyone who visited the MIR for any reason (incidentally, I didn't MIR). Make up your mind - either it's the workload or they're weak - pick one and stick with it.

I have a great deal of respect and appreciation for the instructional staff at St. Jean but very little for the senior admin/leadership (with exceptions). It seems all they achieved was to make the staff's jobs harder and inspire nothing more than abject hatred in the trainees. On the flipside, though, they did serve as examples of how NOT to be (with exceptions, again). The inconsistencies in standards and training, I think, have less to do with the standards cell or poor instructors than with shifting, often conflicting, whimsical directives handed down by the senior administration, seemingly monthly changes in the training plans given to the staff, and a structure/work environment (for the staff, not the students) that's inconsistent and changes form more often than I change my underwear.  I feel sorry for the staff, I really do.


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## Gunner98 (26 Jun 2005)

I should have said before I went through Cornwallis as an Officer Cadet with 137 other OCdts in the summer of 1983 (Chilliwack and Borden were full for the summer as well).  I was fortunate enough to return to CFRS Cornwallis to be the last OC B Coy in 1993.

When were went through training we had recruit staff who enjoyed giving it to the new officers.  CFRS has 19 platoons in house that summer plus 500 or so Sea-puppies.  The only difference between the Pte and the OCdt was the white backing we wore behind our tri-service cap badge when we finally earned after drill/week 4. All but a few of us OCdt were confined to Base from day one until the day after graduation.  The only time we left camp was to go to Granville.

The changes between 1983 and 1993 were substantial - profanity spoken by staff toward recruits was no longer tolerated.  The rifle PT was gone and the endless pushups only happened in the gym where they belonged.

From what I am reading in a few posts the Saint Jean staff could not have been loyal to their superiors for the changes in policies and procedures to be anything but seamless.  For a student to feel sorry for an instructors indicates to me that too much information was being shared.

PRB used to take place at week 4 when recourses were sent back to the platoon scheduled one month behind.  I can remember one recruit who spent an entire year falling back at week four.  He was a determined one, he finally made it almost 1 year to the day he began.  PATs were abundant but treated with respect.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (26 Jun 2005)

Quote,
_From what I am reading in a few posts the Saint Jean staff could not have been loyal to their superiors for the changes in policies and procedures to be anything but seamless.  For a student to feel sorry for an instructors indicates to me that too much information was being shared._

...sorry, but I must point out something. Before one can make that assumption, one must acknowledge the difference between now and back when you and I did Cornwallis.......and it is the very thing you are reading right now.
For better or worse, the kids nowadays "know" way too much before they embark on this great adventure......


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## Glorified Ape (26 Jun 2005)

Gunner98 said:
			
		

> From what I am reading in a few posts the Saint Jean staff could not have been loyal to their superiors for the changes in policies and procedures to be anything but seamless.   For a student to feel sorry for an instructors indicates to me that too much information was being shared.
> 
> PRB used to take place at week 4 when recourses were sent back to the platoon scheduled one month behind.   I can remember one recruit who spent an entire year falling back at week four.   He was a determined one, he finally made it almost 1 year to the day he began.   PATs were abundant but treated with respect.



No information was shared - it's not hard to notice that the staff are being dicked around by their superiors, especially when you have half a dozen UTPNCMs in the platoon who've got an eye for it from their experiences in the ranks. Our staff stayed true to the mantra: "gripes go up the chain of command, not down" (if they even griped at all, which I'm sure they didn't). 

One of the primary dickings that the senior levels decided to hand down was that whole PRB fiasco where upper management decided it was a good idea to micromanage the platoons with drawn out PRB proceedings instead of trusting their subordinate platoon commanders' recommendations and not getting a firm grasp of the situation before they went off half-cocked (the little temper-tantrum speach being a prime example, much of which contradicted the SHARP guidelines we're told to adhere to like nuns). The entire thing was absolutely pointless and a waste of time, materials, and funds - not to mention insulting to the professional competency of the platoon commanders. 

I may be wrong here - it wouldn't be surprising since I just passed the 1 year in mark - most of which was spent at civi U. All I know is that from what they teach us about proper leadership, etc. it didn't seem like much of it was being adhered to by anyone involved but the staff.


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## Gunner98 (26 Jun 2005)

I confess perhaps I made a few hasty deductions.  Having spent 7.5 yrs in instructional roles at CF schools, the trainer/trainees and the staff/support pers live by two very divergent sets of rules unless you have strong senior leaders who are leading by example.  I would offer that when the staff dress and act like the trainers it is easier for the trainees to make sense of the system, its rules and procedures.


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Jun 2005)

I served at Meaford for three years and part of my duties was to track attrition rates.   We'd lose a significant number in the first half of the QL3 Infantry course, mainly to Voluntary Release and Medical.   These were people who went through St-Jean and then got to Meaford for QL3 but were immediately unable or unwilling to make it through (even before the field phase).   

I worked on the support side (Training Officer), but my impression was that the instructional staff at Meaford did an outstanding job of training soldiers who could join their units at a high standard.   While we tracked attrition it never factored into the decision on whether a candidate passed or failed (the standard was all that mattered).   If we added four weeks or so to the course we probably could have taken the candidates off the street and brought them through to the end of QL3 at the same level.   The instructional staff took a personal interest in the quality of solider, because (in my belief) either they or their friends at the Regiments would have the candidates as soldiers in their sections/crews/detachments.   This meant that they assumed an even greater level of responsibility.   Combine that with a dedicated Standards staff to keep things on an even keel and a training staff to juggle resources and you have a good school.

We were not perfect, of course, and we took a good hard look at our training.   I attended almost every Regular and Reserve course AAR between 1999 and 2002.   Lessons were learned/re-learned and we sought ways to improve.   I always left an AAR with a list of my own screw-ups to fix.   The Course Training Plan was our bible for resources.   The key "resource" was instructors.   We were manned at roughly 50%, so the other half came from the units.   It was usually a struggle, but we always got them for Regular Force courses (the Army can order the instructors to go, pointe finale, even if the source unit doesn't want to let them go).

For the Reserves it was not always so.   If they aren't there to be tasked or don't want to go you are stuck.   You can't just wave your magic tasking wand and conjure up instructors either.   Money was never a problem, and even ammunition I could get.   Instructors were another issue.   For my first two summers the ratios of students to staff were enforced and this would occupy a huge amount of staff and command effort across the Area.   If the Springfield Rifles had 24 QL3 candidates but only enough staff provided for 18, their extra 6 candidates would be cut if other units could not make up the difference with extra instructors.   This was tough for the units and young reserve soldiers who had passed their QL2 and were awaiting QL3.   It was good, however, for the instructors and the soldiers that did get vacancies.   The summer of 1997 was indeed remembered as a bad one and the staff (supported by Area) wanted to avoid another one.   In 2001 the emphasis was put on building up the reserve units.   This was good for the units, I suppose, but hard on the instructors.   We did train a lot more soldiers that summer, but of course it was at a cost (primarily staff burnout).

I think that it runs in cycles (huge summer, huge problems, next few summers are cut back, units want more soldiers, huge summer, etc).   In the good'ol days before deployments the Regular Force brigades could be tasked wholesale to run summer reserve training to make up the instructional shortfall.   That has been much harder to do of late.   It is a huge problem for smaller units.   If you are understrength you won't tend to have the instructors available to teach enough students to grow.   It can turn into a death spiral for a unit.

In any case, I was always impressed with the results of QL3 training at Meaford, Regular or Reserve.   Perhaps I am seeing this through rose-coloured optics.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. Editted for spelling errors I could find.


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## ArmyRick (26 Jun 2005)

2Bravo, you should see what ARC 05 is shaping up. In Skills coy, we have been runing back to back SQ and BIQ courses, and now we also have to fill in for the ARC courses who units are short instructors. Interesting. IMHO, if your unit can not muster the instructors, you shouldn't get the candidates..

I am releived to see that alot of people have realized that St Jean has a whole hockey sack of problems. IMO, they should leave air force BMQ at St Jean, Army BMQ/SQ at Gagetown, Valcartier, Meaford and Wainwright. Maybe Navy could be done at Halifax and Esquimalt. This whole one large center of excellence with very little quality (it becomes a puppy mill) is not in the best interest of the CF. 

My father joined the RCHA in 1960 and di all his training at Shilo (basic and trades training). He said the quality was excellent. I have talked to guys who did the whole 6 months at the RCR or PPCLI battleschools (Recruit to trained infantryman in six months) and again the quality was higher.

Maybe what was old should be new again?


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## Gunner98 (26 Jun 2005)

Army Rick said - "IMHO, if your unit can not muster the instructors, you shouldn't get the candidates."

As Trg O at the RCA BSL in Shilo for four years in the 90's, I had the same belief.  The counter-argument was if you don't have a succession plan that includes new recruits and leaership crse grads, many Res unit's would cease to exist.  As many Res unit's have high-powered Senates who are also senior community leaders, the end result is always going to be courses cancelled at the last minute, taskings shuffled and wait to see who gets of the bus for both taskings and students spots.

History and stats have never played a big role in rational summer training plans.


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## TCBF (26 Jun 2005)

How many Canadians in positions of influence today did the SSEP programs in the early 70s?

Would they recommend it for the youth of today?

Why are all of our long-course summer programs officer oriented?

Why can't we have long course programs for the Other Ranks in the summer?  This might capture a lot of the University summer job crowd, assuming we didn't drive them away with boring and irrelevant training conducted by mouth-breathing instructors.

Tom
(SSEP 1971, Camp Wainwright)


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## pbi (27 Jun 2005)

TCBF said:
			
		

> How many Canadians in positions of influence today did the SSEP programs in the early 70s?
> 
> Would they recommend it for the youth of today?
> 
> ...



On your first question, IMHO it depends on who you mean by people "in positions of influence". If you mean the PM and friends, probably not. But, influence in any country is wielded by many different people in different ways. Not all of those with influence are in Ottawa, or even in politics.   I would also be very interested to see who has been through SSEP, YTEP, Katimavik (Military Option), Bold Eagle or conventional service with the Reg or Res. I would bet that the total number of Canadians since the '70s is probably in the tens of thousands. Of that number, there are bound to be leaders in many walks of life. I am often surprised at how many Canadians will mention that they have done a stint of service somewhere in their lives, and how positively they speak of it. It is not a majority of Canadians (obviously), but I bet it is much wider than we think.

On your third question, I remember as a Res NCO and WO in the 70s and early 80s asking myself pretty much the same questions. Most of the courses for NCOs were short and cursory as compared to officer training. As almost all NCO courses were delivered via the NCM equivalent of MITCP, the training disparity between officers and NCOs could   be quite large, thus IMHO overturning the "normal" or "correct" relationship between the two gps. There are some changes underway: PLQ (for example) is fairly lengthy, while officer trg is now generally being offered in two week blocks (not all courses yet, but this seems to be coming along).

On your final observation, the "University summer job crowd" have been the backbone of Res recruiting for decades (at least since I joined in 1974). I have found that in the Res, unlike the RegF, it is not at all uncommon to find NCMs, NCOs and WOs who have degrees. I am not so sure that the assumption you are making applies as clearly in the Res.

Cheers.


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## TCBF (27 Jun 2005)

"On your final observation, the "University summer job crowd" have been the backbone of Res recruiting for decades (at least since I joined in 1974). I have found that in the Res, unlike the RegF, it is not at all uncommon to find NCMs, NCOs and WOs who have degrees. I am not so sure that the assumption you are making applies as clearly in the Res."

- My intent was to recommend long courses to attract university NCM students and NCO instructors, as well as the officers the current program attracts.  The comment on the quality of instruction and instructors was not intended to be component specific.

Tom


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## Island Ryhno (27 Jun 2005)

I was in St. Jean in 2001, here are my observations: 1)Too much info and not enough time to teach it. 2) The building itself is more akin to a prison than a "center of excellence" 3) Non Combat arms instructors; in my plt there was a Infantry Sgt (my sec cmdr) who got bumped due to an injury, he was replaced by a bin rat Mcpl, also an Armoured Mcpl and an Airforce Mcpl. The guys in the sections without the combat arms instructors didn't do so much as a pushup outside the gym and they didn't get shit one on one time! 3) The non combat arms instructors seemed to just want to screw you at any opportunity, i.e. a green recruit in the washroom having a piss says "excuse me" or something stupid to a PO, the PO then starts jacking him up right there in the bathroom for talking..wtf. At least when the combat arms guys jacked you up it was because they were trying to teach you something important. 4) All the support staff are french, with very little concern that you are english, I.E. during an admin presentation.."don't ask questions, I don't speak english very well" 5) The non instructors roaming about seem to think that you're just there to take their own personal stuff, I.E. the cooks giving ravenous troops are grilling (pardon the pun) about wanting seconds or some such.6) The town of St.Jean wants nothing to do with the troops, it's like going into "Silent Hill" the way you get treated, ahh at least there was Montreal 7) And finally, this was the big one, It seemed like no one wanted to be there, it was like everyone there had been sentenced to some friggin gulag or something. Now that is motivation for the troops, this is what you have to look forward to. 

I had to leave the basic course because my dad got diagnosed with terminal cancer while I was on course. I'm going today to reapply for the reg force 011 and I pray daily that this new BMQ in Borden deal will come through, because it cannot be any worse than St.Jean; can it?


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## big_johnson1 (8 Jul 2005)

I'm going to have to back up what Glorified Ape said (since I'm pretty sure I know who you are, and no you won't fight me).. My time at St Jean was not great, but it could have been much worse (the leadership portion seemed like a cut-down version of that taught on the PLQ). Our instructors could not be faulted, other than the occasional threat of firing the CPC, we had an excellent staff that treated everyone fairly, but knew that they were there to teach, not to make friends. Our platoon commander was larger than life, a man that set a brilliant example for the BOTP students in the platoon, by teaching many of the leadership lectures himself and constantly challenging us in debates. He marched in and out of Farnham with a full ruck on his back alongside his troops, and pulled hours that were consistantly longer than ours as recruits would have been. Our Warrant was always there to help with admin issues, and worked hard to make sure that things got straightened out to the best of his ability. Morale was high, pride in the platoon exceptional (2 Platoon! 2 Platoon!). 

Unfortunately, this was all shattered by the fiascos mentioned before. During our training, a good deal of emphasis was put on the OLQs: Officer Like Qualities. Integrity, Loyalty, Conduct, Dedication and Courage. The 10 Principles of Leadership were investigated from several angles. And then the senior ranks of the school conduct themselves in ways that go completely opposite of what had been taught. A speech given to the division included threats from certain high ranking individuals related to performance. Senior ranks literally screaming at trainees because of an administration overload that overwhelmed the Farnham MIR. Tearing 10 (or so, can't remember exact numbers) trainees from the platoon, telling them they're all getting PRBed and recoursed, following a repeat of Leopard (or whatever the hell the name of that ex was). Our staff engaged in a battle with their superiors that could not be seen but could be felt. Again, no info was given to us, but you can tell when the Platoon Commander is pissed off and frustrated. The difference was that he wasn't taking it out on us, so we knew that there were problems upstairs. Also when the staff would tell us something one day, only to have to come back and change what they said a few days later because of instructions from upstairs. Anyone who has been in the ranks before has given an order based on their own judgement, and then a few days later is undermined by their own supervisors. You know what it feels like. Add to this a standards briefing where effort wasn't even made to write down the valid criticisms (although I can understand that one because there was a fair bit of stupid whining).

I guess pointing out deficiencies and general complaints don't do anyone any good unless some sort of solution is proposed, but I can't really think of one. Based on what I've seen though, if more of the instructors were happy to be there and were experts in their field, maybe the troops leaving St Jean would be in better positions to continue with their careers.


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## Glorified Ape (8 Jul 2005)

Ditto, you lumbering oaf. And yes, I WILL fight you.


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## strauss (9 Jul 2005)

I don't know about St.Jean, but I just finished my PLQ in Shilo and I have to say, I feel sorry for the future of the Canadian Forces. People on my course who should not have been there, failing mostly everything and generally bad leaders/soldiers passing. Look out, its all downhill from here.
I also viewed the basic course going at the same time, wow, I don't think it could have gotten any easier. MLVW to the mess (400-500m max), no pushups, no wpns PT, horrid.


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## Scoobie Newbie (10 Jul 2005)

xxx


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## a_majoor (11 Jul 2005)

There is a self sustaining problem in the Reserve training system; garbage in/ garbage out.

We insist on recruiting as many people as possible in order to sustain the "numbers" at the unit and Bde level, without a lot of consideration as to the available resources to actually train these people to a decent standard. Their initial experience of the military is a mad rush to get from class to class, seeing people pass through the system even though they are of questionable ability, harried instructors barely able to give one minute of attention/help to a student duringt a training period....

Two years later, these same people are now back in Meaford/Petawawa etc. attempting to train a new generation of recruits without proper resources. They also do not know how to act as leaders, and even if they "know" what they are doing is wrong, they have little or no reference points to emulate. Their primary duty is to feed the bodies through the mill, rather than the craftsmanship required to create a well trained soldier. (My observations from St Jean are that things are somewhat better there, the training cadre are long service professional NCOs who have a lot more TI and experience than their Reserve counterparts).

Unless and until the training system is matched to available resources, or resources are made available to the training system to cope with the numbers, most of the problems we have identified will not go away. (Mass training at Regimental Depots is essentially a shell game without providing the resources to the Regiments. Same problems, different locations).


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## Jason Bourne (13 Jul 2005)

Having just recently graduated from St. Jean in 2004, I did notice that some of the problems mentioned in the previous posts have been glaringly obvious to most recruits. 

Language Barrier: I realize that the CF is developed as a bi-lingual force and what not however, lets face facts. Most of the recruits that are at St. Jean ARE English. The first 4 weeks of basic were the most fustrating for some people, having never heard a french person their entire life and suddenly exposed to (and not to bash Francos, some of my best friends in the CF are french) biased instructors and staff that insist on speaking a strange mix of french/english to them. Not only did it make for long drawn out classes, some people on my course failed simply because of this. 

PT: Being in a CSS trade now, even for my trade the PT at Basic was simple not there. We had one hardcore PPCLI MCpl (who got promoted to Sgt woo!) who drove the absolute shit out of us each time he went out with us.Fare. Thats it thats all. I can honestly say that I was not prepared for SQ when I left St. Jean.

Weapons Training: When I was in St. Jean they had a 3 strikes your out rule for any PO. This included Weapons. It was my personal opinion that C7 should be drilled into you until you ate, slept and dream C7. The majority of students do not pass C7 on the first try. Alright, fine but you should be doing remedial like theres no tommorow. Second time, you should be gone. And that WAS happening when I was there. Barely 3 months after I leave the policy has changed to: One shall do the Weapons PO until you pass, unlimited amount of retries. Come on guys...this is your bloody personal weapon. I do know one OS who should not have made it past week 5 let alone week 8. Thank god she's left the military.On a side note, I think that this PO should be taught by a Cbt. Arms instructor. In terms of pure experience and expertise (and not bashing any of the purple trades) it this would just seem to make more sense. 

Combining SQ/Basic: Having graduated from SQ at good ol' Meaford, I can honestly say, even though the course staff did have their difficulties with lacks of aids, timngs were off, infighting etc etc, my first good experiences in the military did come from SQ. It was here that the idea of "Soldier First" is drilled into you. I had quite the diverse bunch on my SQ, cooks, infantry, Sig OP, EME and one navy trade and we all graduated. From literally the FIRST step off the bus, there is an instructor in your face, which is what I think should be happening at St. Jean. SQ should be learning NEW things, not rehashing old things (like how to do drill...you'd be amazed...gotta love those left about turns). The staff at St. Jean already have enough on their plates turning hammers into somewhat of a troop, SQ is just gonna kill them. Besides, nothing like a miserable 8 weeks up on "the hill" in Meafod to build charactor ;D

At the Course party in St. Jean I had the privilidge to talk to my section commander who said that, yes, the instructors knew of the problems going on in the school. At the time, there were going to be a general shakeup/house cleaning of the school, bring in some new blood etc etc. I wonder if this has come through yet or not. In the end, the instructors are making do with what they've been given.


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## ROTP Applicant (29 Jul 2005)

GerryCan said:
			
		

> I honestly believe it could stand to be a little longer as it seems that the whole course is spent running around through that god-forsaken building missing timings, thus getting half-*** lectures from instructors who refuse to take time out of their own schedule to make sure the proper training is given to the course.


 
     I just got back from IAP on July 22 and from what the instructors have told us, it is my understanding that BMQ will be extended from 10 to 13 weeks and IAP will be extended to 10 or 11 weeks while BOTP will stay at 5 weeks starting January 2006. 
     We were told that BMQ was extended to allow for more time in the field (i.e. more patrols, learning defensive tactics, etc.). Moreover, IAP will be extended to include more leadership training and one more week in Farnham. The leadership tasking from IAP and BOTP will also be changed; they will no longer be tasks where the OCdt's are slaves building structures that will most likely be never seen again in their CF careers. The tasks will involve a lot more map & compass and will consist of the IC leading the syndicate on a patrol, section attack, etc. Once again this is what our platoon staff has told us and is by far not official information.


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## Shadowhawk (29 Jul 2005)

aesop081 said:
			
		

> My recruit course ( 9308) was the last 10 week course run in St-Jean.   The platoon after ours was the first 8-week course. I understand that BMQ has gone back to 10 weeks, is that correct ?



This was the case when I went through Oct to Dec 04. However, at that time ther was talk of BMQ being increased to 12 weeks. Not sure if that happened or not.

Cheers


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## big_johnson1 (4 Aug 2005)

ROTP Civi U said:
			
		

> We were told that BMQ was extended to allow for more time in the field (i.e. more patrols, learning defensive tactics, etc.). Moreover, IAP will be extended to include more leadership training and one more week in Farnham. The leadership tasking from IAP and BOTP will also be changed; they will no longer be tasks where the OCdt's are slaves building structures that will most likely be never seen again in their CF careers. The tasks will involve a lot more map & compass and will consist of the IC leading the syndicate on a patrol, section attack, etc. Once again this is what our platoon staff has told us and is by far not official information.



This is interesting, but if they want the OCdts to be patrolling or running section attacks then there is a lot of work to be done. CAP covers that for OCdts that need it, why bother with it for the hard Air and Navy trades that will never see it again? By the time they're done revamping the system IAP will be 4 months long and BOTC will be 3


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