# EX Cougar Salvo 2012



## VIChris (9 May 2012)

Public Affairs' view of events of the past week in Boise Idaho at the Orchard Training Area/ MATES and Gowen field, where members of 39 CBG trained alongside members of the Arizona National Guard. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fhVFS1ddC4

http://www.flickr.com/photos/lfwapao/6981047422/in/set-72157629899932711/

http://www.ktvb.com/news/local/Canadian-Arizona-troops-take-advantage-of-Idaho-training-facility-150303025.html

It was an interesting week, with some very poignant lessons learned. Anyone else have some photos to add?


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## VIChris (9 May 2012)

And then there's this, haha:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDCdGuU97wA


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## Nfld Sapper (9 May 2012)

Canadian National Guard  ???


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## Edward Campbell (9 May 2012)

VIChris said:
			
		

> Public Affairs' view of events of the past week in Boise Idaho at the Orchard Training Area/ MATES and Gowen field, where members of 39 CBG trained alongside members of the Arizona National Guard.
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fhVFS1ddC4
> 
> ...




_Poignant_ lessons were learned? That's so sad ...


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## VIChris (9 May 2012)

Sad? How's that?


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## dapaterson (9 May 2012)

poign·ant/ˈpoinyənt/
Adjective:	
Evoking a keen sense of sadness or regret: "a poignant reminder".


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## VIChris (9 May 2012)

Fair, was thinking more along the lines of: 

"b : designed to make an impression" as per Merriam-Webster 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/poignant


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## Bzzliteyr (9 May 2012)

Any cool stories to bring back?


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## VIChris (10 May 2012)

A few personal firsts for me: 

First time with a .50 cal. Our American friends brought a couple of M2s up for us to try. There's a pop up target range there, and we punched out as far as 1100m, nearly twice as far as I've shot anything before.

I saw rattlesnakes and tumbleweed up close in the wild. 

The best bit of training for me was the Warrior Road that they built there. It's 35km of dusty single track with various obstacles, IED sites and villages used for convoy ops training. I had two runs through it and it really helped put a lot of lecture points into perspective as everything ramped up with multiple IED strikes, enemy fire, casualties, coordinating an LZ etc. For a weekend warrior like myself, it was a real eye opener.

Being with the SSE our primary focus was support to the task force. I'm sure the combat arms types who were there will have more exciting experiences to share. The rest of mine involved siphoning bad fuel and pulling driveshafts etc. Though even the repairs where made a bit more interesting, as we were working right with the Americans, and on some of their gear.


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## Bzzliteyr (10 May 2012)

Anything negative heard?


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## VIChris (10 May 2012)

Check PMs.


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## Strike (10 May 2012)

VIChris said:
			
		

> Check PMs.



Oh, now that's not fair!

Seriously though, given it was a reserve Ex, and you talked about the pretty big lessons learned (I will argue they are probably still only in the 'lessons identified' stage) it would be nice to share them with the class so we can all learn from them as well.


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## Bzzliteyr (10 May 2012)

I could see his/her concern.  At the low rank we are always wondering what we might say that could get us in trouble...


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## Fishbone Jones (10 May 2012)

What about all the people that were rumoured lost, or worse, forgotten in the field without rations, shelter or comms? Any truth to the story of people getting sick because an Infantry Sgt mistook a diesel can for a new green water jerry and filled it with water? How was the messing? Heard tell many troops went without food on many occasions.

It would be great if someone could shed some light on the "Lessons Reidentifed, Once Again" for Reserve Ex's.


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## Strike (10 May 2012)

Bzzliteyr said:
			
		

> I could see his/her concern.  At the low rank we are always wondering what we might say that could get us in trouble...



I'm looking at the big picture stuff myself.

For example, were members properly briefed about the Ex/working with U.S. military prior to the Ex?

Did you feel you were otherwise properly prepared?  Why? Why not?

The trick with the whole lessons learned process is not to complain about who messed up and where, but to identify a problem (that is usually systemic) and offer up a solution.

For example, as recceguy mentioned, people forgotten in the field.  The suggestion to remedy that would be that everyone must have at least 2 x IMPs with them, do a radio check prior to leaving/being left, and the CP should have them check in every hour.  If there is no reply then send someone out to find them.

This is the stuff I'm interested in, especially for those reservists who frequent this site and could learn a couple of things that they can bring with them on their next Ex.  Remember, they might not have access to KMS to read the AAR.


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## Bzzliteyr (10 May 2012)

KMS?  AAR?  Is it wrong that I don't know what you're talking about?


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## Strike (10 May 2012)

Bzzliteyr said:
			
		

> KMS?  AAR?  Is it wrong that I don't know what you're talking about?



Knowledge Management System, which is where After Action Reports go.


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## Bzzliteyr (10 May 2012)

Okay, I had stumbled across that site once waaay back when I used to argue about kit improvements and our lack of reactions to the AAR process.

Good to know.  Have a link?


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## noneck (10 May 2012)

A few negatives:

-More ammo should have been evenly distributed prior to the Culminating Event (Dog and Pony for CFLC and EXECUTREK). For the Pl attacks, only 3 liners of 4B1T 7.62 were provided for each Pl to conduct 2 attacks. Each Pl had 2 GPMG's!!! Over 35 liners of 7.62 were returned unopened from the PLS drop at range 26 for A Coy alone. 

-Support element seemed more interested in playing with the AZNG than supporting the PTA. Food was crap and on more than one occasion for my Coy, 3 hayboxes were delivered for 85 troops to have dinner, as a result the SNCO's and Officers did not eat. Water was not available on the Pl Attk and Coy Attk ranges (Both a Support element and CQ Fuc%up).

-Terrain caused quite a few injuries for the troops, medics on hand at the ranges did not have the ability to provide proper meds or treatment, citing that they were only Cpl's MCpl's or such. When we returned to camp, one lad (who had a hip injury) was turned away from the MIR as they were going to dinner, when he returned later he was told to see his civvy doc when he got home.....not good enough! Besides what good is someone that can't treat injuries when we are conducting live fire training!!

-Troops were pissed off that the smoker was pop and chips no beer permitted citing US drinking rules being 21. Sorry i don't buy this as we enforce drinking rules in Canada (19 in BC) without issue.  Besides it is insulting to trust troops on live fire attacks, but not with two 2 beers!! We have rules in place to deal with any issues "Big boys rules".

Positives-

-Ranges were outstanding and well set up by 3VP

-The troops busted their asses and really rose to the occasion, which for most who were very junior was their first live fire attack experience.

-Terrain was challenging, while relatively rolling it was full of lava rock.

Cheers Noneck


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## Nfld Sapper (10 May 2012)

noneck, my 2cents about drinking is their mess their rules....but those 21+ "should have" been able to drink......


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## dapaterson (10 May 2012)

noneck said:
			
		

> A few negatives:
> 
> -Support element seemed more interested in playing with the AZNG than supporting the PTA. Food was crap and on more than one occasion for my Coy, 3 hayboxes were delivered for 85 troops to have dinner, as a result the SNCO's and Officers did not eat. Water was not available on the Pl Attk and Coy Attk ranges (Both a Support element and CQ Fuc%up).



I'll challenge this one.  Were the support troops really tasked as an NSE to the troops in the field, or were they part fo the PTA, performing CSS specific BTS?  Usually we do a bastardized system where we expect the CSS to perform their training and also provide support.  There should be CSS elements being trained as part of the PTA, plus CSS elements to support the exercise.

As for hayboxes:  That's likely a chain of command screwup.  The CSS folks delivered the rations they were instructed to deliver.  If companies fail to co-ord their requirements with higher you can end up with shortages.  In theory, the daily pers reports are used to determine quantities of food & water to push forward.  If companies can't be bothered to keep higher informed of how many pers they have (or to inform higher if they have additional folks present) food can run short.  There's also a significant C2 failing if such a problem recurs.

No water at the ranges?  CQ problem.  If the CQ requested water and didn't receive it, then it's a CSS problem.  If the CQ didn't bring any jerrycans from Canada (not unheard of on such exercises) the CQ needs some remedial jerry can PT - I'm thinking a fully loaded BFT while carrying an additional full jerrycan in each hand might help him or her remember them in the future.


In theory, troops are self-sufficient for 24 hours; CQs for the next 24 hours, and the Admin company carries the next 24 hours for the Bn.

Unfortunately, on Reserve exercises I have known, CQs deploy with empty trucks and expect to be magically filled once they arrive.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (10 May 2012)

Like a visit from the "Vern Fairy"?


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## VIChris (10 May 2012)

dapaterson, you hit it on the head with the bastardized training. It wasn't uncommon for our guys to be called off a training event to go provide support to the task force, or for us to do 35 hour days so some of the troops could get to participate in a certain event by covering their shifts etc. The pace was hectic and sporadic., but that appears to be part of the fun of being a techie. 

During the dry smoker, I was ferrying troops around, and helping with a recovery until 2 in the morning. Though I would have liked a beer or two, I would have settled for simply being there to put my feet up. We were bitten by meal issues too. I had to buy my own chow after hours a few times when the MREs ran out. 

I can't pin down the exact source of the issue, so I won't speculate here.


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## noneck (10 May 2012)

The question asked concerned the negatives around the exercise....I can only comment on the negatives as seen from the rifle company point of view.

I had heard much of the same reasons as to why things went wrong....great but they still went wrong and troops suffered. If you have a rifle company of 85 persons why would you send out food for 35? 

Noneck


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## Dissident (10 May 2012)

I did not attend, I did however get some feedback from my platoon mates.

What I gather from what was said (this is MY interpretation) was that 39 CBG does not know how to employ us. This has been a systemic issue which has been identified from before my swearing in.

(all this is from a MCpl with 9 years in, with basically no SA above the platoon level)

Root causes:
-Continuously evolving command relationship between the MP trade/units and the CBG(s?)
-TTP/BTS not firmed up/amended to reflect our new operational roles
-Lack of formal/informal interaction between officers/HQs?

Solutions:
-New MP doctrine needs to be firmed up/written before the corporate knowledge from Afg is lost.
-Invite one or two officers from (39) CBG(s) as observers on our exercises, such as Red Thunder and Golden Coyote. Col Brown seems like the obvious choice to me right now, but I think we should also make efforts to reach out to cbt arm COs to come and check us out on occasion.


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## dapaterson (10 May 2012)

noneck said:
			
		

> The question asked concerned the negatives around the exercise....I can only comment on the negatives as seen from the rifle company point of view.
> 
> I had heard much of the same reasons as to why things went wrong....great but they still went wrong and troops suffered. If you have a rifle company of 85 persons why would you send out food for 35?
> 
> Noneck



Having been in Log Ops, if I don't know there are 85 people somewhere and the last info I have is that there were 35, I'll send out food for 35.  If the folks o nthe ground don't take action to correct that info, tomorrow will see food for 35 again.

I've also seen plans that say "Half on haybox, half on IMP", only to have someone decide to change it to 100% haybox, but never informing the kitchen - or telling the kitchen when the hayboxes were being picked up.

Note:  I'm not saying any of this is acceptable; I'm saying that there are obvious planning and comms breakdowns.  Those have to be addressed, or else it's Groundhog Day all over again.

(I'd be curious to know whether or not there was a daily log brief or not; most of those issues are the sort of thing that should be resolved there)


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## daftandbarmy (10 May 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Having been in Log Ops, if I don't know there are 85 people somewhere and the last info I have is that there were 35, I'll send out food for 35.  If the folks o nthe ground don't take action to correct that info, tomorrow will see food for 35 again.
> 
> I've also seen plans that say "Half on haybox, half on IMP", only to have someone decide to change it to 100% haybox, but never informing the kitchen - or telling the kitchen when the hayboxes were being picked up.
> 
> ...



I think the sad reality is that we don't practise this stuff enough before we do it 'for real' i.e., during a major exercise in a foreign country working with people we've never met for the first time. Trying to feed a thousand troops at once only once per year is probably going to mean big troubles. We therefore need a big reality check at the command level on what we can do right out of the gate, and a progressive program designed to gradually increase scope and performance so that we can be successful. You know, like we learned in all our training on how to do training correctly   ;D


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## VIChris (10 May 2012)

I like where this discussion is going. It's certainly helping me frame my thoughts for our in house AAR. Thanks for the insights into the AAR process.


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## armyvern (10 May 2012)

VIChris said:
			
		

> I like where this discussion is going. It's certainly helping me frame my thoughts for our in house AAR. Thanks for the insights into the AAR process.



Well, we are here to help; we're_ not _from Ottawa.  8)


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## PMedMoe (10 May 2012)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Well, we are here to help; we're_ not _from Ottawa.  8)



 :goodpost:


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## dapaterson (10 May 2012)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Well, we are here to help; we're_ not _ from Ottawa.  8)



Well, some of us are...


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## armyvern (10 May 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Well, some of us are...



You are _special_.  ;D


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## 392 (11 May 2012)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> noneck, my 2cents about drinking is their mess their rules....but those 21+ "should have" been able to drink......



And IIRC, their rules are no alcohol in the field....21 or not


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## Bruce Monkhouse (11 May 2012)

The rumours that floated all the way back to Ontario suggested that rule depended on how high you were in the food chain,....................just sayin'.


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## daftandbarmy (11 May 2012)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> The rumours that floated all the way back to Ontario suggested that rule depended on how high you were in the food chain,....................just sayin'.



I love the internet. Bad news about dubious leadership transmitted instantly to the world.  :nod:


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## VIChris (12 May 2012)

From my point of view, there were two big issues I saw that caused grief all down the line. We had a very decentralized infrastructure, and people in critical points were being shuffled on a regular basis. To me, that looks like a recipe for messages to get missed, or delivered to the wrong people due to a lack of continuity, or literally being at the wrong place at the wrong time. 

To add to the confusion, we had troops being pulled from their regular jobs to fill in for other trades. Balls will be dropped when this goes on. However, I see no reason why we can't cross train to some degree. Perhaps in training though, this should be done as a supervised activity, and not a stop-gap measure where incidents may be caused as a result of folks not knowing the job they're tasked with.

It was mentioned, and I'll second it from this experience, any time you leave your compound, you should have food and water with you. Not just in case meal plans get goofed, but if your truck breaks down, or you get lost out of comms reach, you gotta eat. In my lowly opinion, that's an individual issue. Now of course getting IMPs/ MREs to the troops is higher level problem.

I've heard some troops grumbling that they were left in the field too. To a certain extent, that's a troop level problem as well, at least in trades where you're heading out in twos or threes. It is imperative that you sign in and out of your CP, give an ETR, and have a backup plan if you can't make it back or your pickup doesn't arrive. I heard a couple dudes griping about being left out too long on location, even though they had essentially bummed a ride to that spot, and didn't tell their CoC they had moved. Sorry friends, your bus ain't coming. 

I know for the guys in the combat arms who become essentially numbers in a company, this is impossible, and I can't offer a solution. Do we push more radios out to the smaller units? Enforce more frequent head counts? I' not sure as I don't operate in that part of the world.


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## Alphabet (12 May 2012)

VIChris said:
			
		

> From my point of view, there were two big issues I saw that caused grief all down the line. We had a very decentralized infrastructure, and people in critical points were being shuffled on a regular basis. To me, that looks like a recipe for messages to get missed, or delivered to the wrong people due to a lack of continuity, or literally being at the wrong place at the wrong time.



I can corroborate this. I had a drastically different viewpoint from most of you, being just GD ("Range Support Staff") and I, too, noticed that improvements could be made regarding communication. Too often was my section moved to a part of the field only to find out we weren't needed any longer, or set up targets/mod tents only to discover they were needed elsewhere or not at all.
Rations were an issue for us, as well. Nearly every meal besides breakfast was a problem - rations weren't given to us or there wouldn't be enough or would arrive to us several hours late. The sergeant in charge of us apologized maybe 5 times about this issue, even though he was doing everything in his power to fix the problem.

During the weather of near-Biblical proportions, a few buddies of mine who were tasked to the engineers that day were left out in the field without their kit. The engineers left, saying they'd be back in 10 minutes (taking the kit with them) but never returned. And that was when the storm hit. Long story short, they took an LS to try and make it back to Snake River but met up with some medics partway there who took care of them. For various reasons a WO jacked them the hell up but that's being seen by their chain of command, so everything should be fine.

Overall though, I felt it was a good experience. But CS being my first ex, I didn't really know what to expect in the first place, therefore no expectations were missed or fufilled...


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## VIChris (12 May 2012)

I heard the story of those three guys today. The medics said they were pretty lucky to have found them when they did.


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## armyvern (12 May 2012)

VIChris said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> It was mentioned, and I'll second it from this experience, any time you leave your compound, you should have food and water with you. Not just in case meal plans get goofed, but if your truck breaks down, or you get lost out of comms reach, you gotta eat. In my lowly opinion, that's an individual issue. Now of course getting IMPs/ MREs to the troops is higher level problem


.

Leadership problem. IMPs and (untainted by POL diesel) water must be available for things like this; and, if it isn't then the troops shouldn't be sent out. I use the word "sent" purposefully. Ptes and Cpls do not "put themselves" out in the midst of nowhere to stand a duty guarding anything etc by themselves. If troops are venturing out of camp without said items, that is a leadership failure too. We call it the basics and apparently a refresher course on such by the leadership should occur if that's how it _actually_ went down.



> I've heard some troops grumbling that they were left in the field too. To a certain extent, that's a troop level problem as well, at least in trades where you're heading out in twos or threes. It is imperative that you sign in and out of your CP, give an ETR, and have a backup plan if you can't make it back or your pickup doesn't arrive. I heard a couple dudes griping about being left out too long on location, even though they had essentially bummed a ride to that spot, and didn't tell their CoC they had moved. Sorry friends, your bus ain't coming.
> ...



I heard the same thing; also not a troop problem ... refer to my "duty" comment. Leadership does up Camp Routine Orders, Duty shifts to guard ammo, locations, timings etc ... The onus is on that leadership to brief those pers, feed and water those pers, know where those pers are, initiate radio checks and a physical contact with them if they experience a radio silence ... and most of all - to pick them the fuck up where they dropped them off and and replace them at *shift* end - and to check* immediately *when radio silence is being experienced. It certainly isn't leaderships job to forget they've placed someone somewhere ... Full stop.

Perhaps this was a different crew of "lost" troops than the 3 brought up earlier.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (12 May 2012)

...and to add my 2 cents to what Vern just said,.......those are the friggin' BASICS of deployment.  If this stuff actually happened at this BASIC level I would shudder to think what would happen if they needed to conduct an in-depth 'lives could be at stake" type of deployment.

Hearing stories like this takes me back to the 80's when we just considered the reserves as some kind of glee club................


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## VIChris (12 May 2012)

Fair points, all. I understand where the onus lies, but I believe that if these things aren't available, there's nothing wrong with standing up and saying "hey, if I'm going out this is what I need." 

Bruce, I've read that some WW2 troops were essentially lost 90% of the time, making their own way across Europe looking for something to shoot. Maybe it was a result of this type of event? It's been said that reservists and conscripts won two world wars and tied Korea.


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## Kat Stevens (12 May 2012)

The ghosts of those who planned D Day must surely be wailing in torment at this.  It's like every time is the first time, 50 first dates, army style.


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## willy (12 May 2012)

A bunch of problems came to light on this ex.  That said, what I told my troops and what I'll say here now is that this was not, by far, the worst ex I've ever been on.  In my experience, every time we try to run a bde-level ex we experience similar teething issues.  I've seen worse, and in the Reg F as well.

The GD situation was noted.  It was my troops that helped rescue the lost souls at range 28, and the details of that situation were forwarded up.

The ration situation was also noted and forwarded higher.  I agree that this was a major issue in terms of overall dissatisfaction with the ex.  

Again, I know there were problems, and I'm not defending anything, I'm just saying that I've seen worse.  We worked through a lot of problems, and I was impressed by our ability to do so (maybe if not our ability to plan).


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## Strike (12 May 2012)

Willy - The trick will be if the higher ups actually read the after action report from this Ex prior to the next one so that this stuff does not happen again.


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## LineJumper (12 May 2012)

Is 24/48/78(day 3 is special) no longer taught to troops? I personally learned that in army cadets so many moons ago. I believe it follows simple daily survivial, but correct me if I'm wrong... Kinda folllows the trick me once my fault, trick me twice...... Food water and ammo some, more important than others. I suppose I'm curious as to why troops got hungry, and why they 'actually' got hungry. I'm simply a Lineman, I generaly am provided with sustenance regardless of kitchen ownership, yet it has been an ex or 2 since I tried the fine vittles of a flying kitchen. Is 72 not much time for each troop WRT food?(72hrs). Thank you for any input.


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## Redeye (13 May 2012)

Strike said:
			
		

> The suggestion to remedy that would be that everyone must have at least 2 x IMPs with them, do a radio check prior to leaving/being left, and the CP should have them check in every hour.  If there is no reply then send someone out to find them.



It's funny, because I could swear that's basically an SOP and has been for a long time. Groundhog Day...


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## Strike (13 May 2012)

Redeye said:
			
		

> It's funny, because I could swear that's basically an SOP and has been for a long time. Groundhog Day...



And it takes an RCAF PAO tp point it out too.


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## Rifleman62 (13 May 2012)

Strike: 





> ... The trick will be if the higher ups actually read the after action report from this Ex prior to the next one so that this stuff does not happen again.



It is not all in the higher ups basket, although the Bde Comd is responsible. It is the Bde staff, led by the COS who put the exercise together (visualized/coord/plan/write/execute). 

By the same token, unit "staff", senior unit members receive the  Bde's plan, and should be able to visualize the good/not so good and the gaps.

Gaps are not just a Held Up Drill.

I have seen many lessons learned, learned again, and again and again over 45 years. 

Part of the problem is new staff, with different experiences/agendas are posted in every couple of years. Part of the problem, especially the infantry (speaking of 38 CBG) is, the Infantry have not run a Coy HQ CP, either on FTX or CPX, for decades. Push/pull, reports & returns, they have no clue. 

Several FTXs, the CQMS distributed ammo directly to the troops at Pl level, along with everything else, in situ.


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## PPCLI Guy (13 May 2012)

Capt. Happy said:
			
		

> And IIRC, their rules are no alcohol in the field....21 or not



Not in my Army.  Alcohol consumption is a command decision.  I served in a Battalion where the CO flat out refused to issue "two beer per man".  It was all or nothing.  We have an NDA for a reason.

We have an Army that has proved its ability, again and again, to stand toe to toe with a wily (if completely unsophisticated) enemy.  Who are we to say that those folks can't handle a few beers?

In the words of Joda, "there is no try.  There is do, or not do".  If I am ever in charge, I will say "there is no two cans.  There is either drink, or not drink."


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## OldSolduer (14 May 2012)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not in my army. There is either drink, or not drink."




And I'll drink to that!


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## noneck (14 May 2012)

What a common sense approach!!!! Big boys rules.....you get out of hand you get warned, fail to heed and spend the night in the digger with action to follow. Get wrecked and then are unable to perform duties the next morning action to follow!


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## 392 (14 May 2012)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not in my Army.  Alcohol consumption is a command decision.  I served in a Battalion where the CO flat out refused to issue "two beer per man".  It was all or nothing.  We have an NDA for a reason.
> 
> We have an Army that has proved its ability, again and again, to stand toe to toe with a wily (if completely unsophisticated) enemy.  Who are we to say that those folks can't handle a few beers?
> 
> In the words of Joda, "there is no try.  There is do, or not do".  If I am ever in charge, I will say "there is no two cans.  There is either drink, or not drink."



I'm fully on board with that  :cheers: , but I would hazard to guess that one of the caveats to our soldiers training on a US establishment was adherence to their alcohol in the field rules (this is based purely on previous experience training on US bases; I was not part of this ex in any way, shape or form).


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## The Bread Guy (14 May 2012)

Just for shiggles, here's the U.S. military Info-machine's version of events - highlights mine:





> Plane load after plane load of troops and equipment land on the airstrip at Gowen Air Field in preparation for a joint combat support mission.
> 
> Operation Cougar Salvo 12 hosted nearly 900 U.S. and Canadian service members who traveled more than 1,000 miles with approximately 160 tactical vehicles April 23 to May 5.
> 
> ...


Brace yourselves for Western Defender 13, I guess?


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## VIChris (15 May 2012)

Is it wrong to be hopeful? Though this wasn't the best training experience for me personally, I think the concept of multi-national training is fantastic. I'd like to think we can build on the high points of this EX and make it even better in the future. As much as we all love to bag on Wainwright, I think it will be a better location for an event of this size.


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## LordOsborne (15 May 2012)

Just my 2 cents from the Recce side: 

 Overall I thought the ex wasn't too bad, at least from our perspective. We got a chance to work our way up from single vehicle live-fire to patrol level to troop level live. The MPRC (range #1) was an excellent training tool for our guys, especially the younger guys who hadn't experienced a reactive target range for vehicles. There was a bit of a learning curve, as the arcs were a bit confusing, and the targetry didn't always go down when hit (programming issue, i'm told). We weren't allowed to fire on the move, which was a bit of a downer, but I believe that was the standing range safety rule. Still, it was good training for the gunners and crew commanders. I wish we could have done more off-roading to give the drivers more of a challenge, but we were pretty limited by environmental factors, as well as range safety issues. 

 I'm glad we had the chance to use the VBS2 simulator at Mates. I think we had almost universal praise for the system (when it didn't crash), and it gave the troops a chance to do scenario-based training they wouldn't normally get. It was especially useful for the first-time crew commanders in my troop. I know that the system has its disadvantages, but I really hope we get these simulators pushed down to Brigade or (ideally) unit level. I know I would definitely put them to good use. 

 During the culminating ex (Aka "The Culminator"), we weren't really employed to the best of our abilities (on my run through. I hear the afternoon iteration went better). I get the feeling that not everyone knows the capabilities of what recce can do, especially when acting in support of other combat arms units. Granted, our role in the attack as flank security / direct fire support could have been MUCH better served by a more substantial armoured vehicle with a much more potent weapon system.. but I'll leave my g-wagon criticisms for another time and place. I know that the range safety shackles were pretty tight, and especially since this was 39CBG's first time going to lvl 4 live, the pucker factor was up there. Although it's always a bit 'lame' to have to restrict your tactics to conform with safety for a given range or scenario, I'm very happy that nobody was injured seriously and nobody got shot. This bodes well for future training of this level, hopefully the future leadership can pull off something similar and more ambitious next time around. 

 Also, WRT the food / water issues; I know Recce is a different beast than the infantry, but every time we left Gowen Field for the Orchard Trg Ctr, each vehicle had a full jerry of water and 1-2 MREs per man, depending on what our RQ passed down to us. We didn't have any major haybox issues aside from minor gripes (raw potatoes... in Idaho, no less  :blotto. 


Some criticisms:

- Ammunition was inconsistent. More than a few times we were issued with 7.62mm _sans _tracer. During the Culminator, my gunner had exactly 5 tracer rounds for 3 boxes. Would have been much better to have more tracer to go around for everyone. We managed to secure some 21mm inserts for the M72 for our guys to practice with, only to find that there were no M72 tubes anywhere. Somewhere, someone forgot to bring them, i guess. All of our insert ammo went unused. 

- I'm sure it's been noted before, but our comms gear sucks. When it works, it's actually somewhat decent, but when it doesn't, it's incredibly frustrating. We were really lucky to have a dedicated signaller attached to Recce Squadron, and we kept him busy trying to resolve the nonstop problems with our NAUs and CI boxes going down. Throughout the ex, I only had half the vehicles in my troop with working comms. 

- There was a vehicle roll-over simulator somewhere in the training area. I say "somewhere" because I didn't even know it existed until we saw the PAO's slideshow video at the "smoker". I asked my leadership why we didn't get to go and use the facility, and they said they didn't know it existed either. It would have been *extremely *valuable training for my guys to have experienced. Especially given the top-heavy nature of our vehicle, rollovers are a constant danger, and it's quite _poignant _ (  )that we missed the opportunity to get some excellent training.


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## GAP (15 May 2012)

good critique....thanks


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## PuckChaser (15 May 2012)

PatrickO said:
			
		

> - I'm sure it's been noted before, but our comms gear sucks. When it works, it's actually somewhat decent, but when it doesn't, it's incredibly frustrating. We were really lucky to have a dedicated signaller attached to Recce Squadron, and we kept him busy trying to resolve the nonstop problems with our NAUs and CI boxes going down. Throughout the ex, I only had half the vehicles in my troop with working comms.



Just off the top of my head, do you idle the GWagons when you're observing or stationary over 1000 RPM? I've noticed TCCCS being super touchy with power, it likes a lot of it. Keep in mind the NAU is basically a 386 computer, so its slow, old and prone to failure. Its on the way out. Sounds like with all those problems, you need a signaller at your unit to have things checked out before you deploy. I've only ever seen failures like you describe when the equipment starts to overheat or its been a while since the software was flashed.

Good learning experience on troubleshooting the equipment for your signaller though!  >


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## LordOsborne (15 May 2012)

We don't idle them when stationary, as a general rule. More noise = easier to detect. For short halts, the vehicles stay running. Also, if a vehicle has been on radio watch for a while, we run the engine for ~20 minutes every 2 hours or so to recharge the batteries. I've seen G-wagons run their radios all night long without turning on the engine once, but their batteries are usually too depleted to start up the engine, and the vehicle will require a boost.

 I saw some really oddball glitches on my vehicle during the ex:

- The rear CI box identified both radios as amplified (A1, A2) even though only one radio had an amp, while the front CI box showed them correctly (a1,A2). 

- If you made the rear CI box the master, it would 'clone' its settings to the front CI box, so that the front one would also show both radios as amplified. 

- Halfway through the ex, one of my radios could no longer Tx, and anything it received was static. Also, it could barely receive signal from radio checks done within arms reach. 

- I suspect this problem was more to do with the G-wagon, but every time the engine was turned on, the radio system reset. If you keep the master power ON, the radios are supposed to stay operational when the motor is started. For some reason, my vehicle reset every time. Maybe it was an electrical fault, but we couldn't find a fix for it, so it got written up.


 The signaller got a chance to flash a few NAUs and CI boxes, which was good. Any word if they're going to replace the CIs? There's _got _to be a faster way to change radio channels than the existing method. I need to stop before I start ranting and taking this thread off topic  :facepalm:


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## TN2IC (15 May 2012)

CI boxes hurt my head....


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## Bzzliteyr (18 May 2012)

Con 3,2,1 or 3,1,2 (in most cases) then 3 then choose the channel. You can do it in about 5 secs if you know what freqs are in what channels.


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## PuckChaser (18 May 2012)

PatrickO said:
			
		

> The signaller got a chance to flash a few NAUs and CI boxes, which was good. Any word if they're going to replace the CIs? There's _got _to be a faster way to change radio channels than the existing method. I need to stop before I start ranting and taking this thread off topic  :facepalm:



Your first 2 problems are normally solved by NAU flash, I've seen them before. 3rd sounds like a bad antenna or amplifier or a loose connection.  4th issue is common, seen it happen with the Bison as well, have to be careful with this one as if you have keymat in the radio it can zeroize your radio for you. 

CIs are on the way out, I've heard they will be replaced with something similar to the CIS box that you find in Bisons or Coyotes that is programmable via laptop. The NAU is also getting a massive overhaul as well and I've heard outright removal, but I don't have much SA on that.


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## Bzzliteyr (18 May 2012)

I heard the Brits had adopted our system and decided to put the "A" and "B" selector right on the IC toggle switch. What a novel idea. The CI is not touch friendly at all and with a lack of backlight it's near impossible to use without a headlamp.


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