# CF-5's: Air Assets owned by Mobile Command?



## Black Watch (21 Feb 2007)

As the CF-5's sqns were under the orders of Mobile Command, were the pilotes members of that command?


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## MP 811 (21 Feb 2007)

I dont think so.  I believe the pilots were air command, but the aircraft were assigned a mobile command role...


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## peaches (22 Feb 2007)

CF5's were AirComd, assigned to 10 TAG with the TACHEL squadrons....


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## Black Watch (22 Feb 2007)

I'm a bit confused, as I read a book in witch the author wrote  





> that Mobile Comand was in charge of all tactical air squadrons, including tactical fighters.


 Doesn't say anything about pilots


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## Zoomie (22 Feb 2007)

Not too confusing....  Operational command of 10 TAG would have been by LFC.  The aircrew and aircraft would always have remained under the auspices of the Airforce.

The same issue exists today with our Aurora and Sea-King fleet.  They are regulated, crewed and funded through the Airforce, yet are at the behest of the swabbies.


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## exspy (22 Feb 2007)

Gentlemen,

After integration in 1964 but before unification in 1968 the three services still existed as seperate entities.  With the formation of the new CF functional commands during this interim period all of the field forces of the Army, the flying units of the Air Force and the ships of the Navy were assigned to one of the six new commands.  Most if not all of the Navy's ships were assigned to Maritime Command and most if not all of the Army's field forces were assigned to Mobile Command.  The Air Force however, was divided up between Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Training and Materiel Commands.  There was no overall headquarters responsible for what had previously been Air Force units until the formation of Air Command in 1975.  As such then, the tactical air units (both fixed and rotary wing) were assigned lock, stock and barrel (and pilots) to Mobile Command.  The CF-5 pilots of the era even wore the Mobile Command shoulder patch on their Air Force blue uniforms and flight suits.

During this same period former Navy Air Branch pilots could, and did, find themselves assigned to Mobile Command aviation units flying in rotary and fixed wing aircraft.  One of the first CO's of one of the tactical helicopter squadrons in 1971 was a former naval Commander.  Some of the Navy's jet pilots also found themselves in 1 CAD flying CF-104 Starfighters.  This was part of the goal of unification, that is the end of loyalty to individual Services which would hopefully see the end of the internecine Service battles for money.  However the battles over ships, tanks and jets continued.  Plus sa change, plus sa meme chose.


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## Black Watch (22 Feb 2007)

> Plus sa change, plus sa meme chose.


Indeed


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## AJFitzpatrick (23 Feb 2007)

So who's an aviator and who's a pilot?  ;D 







--Yes, I know it is only an American tradition --


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## Edward Campbell (2 Jun 2007)

exspy said:
			
		

> Gentlemen,
> 
> After integration in 1964 but before unification in 1968 the three services still existed as seperate entities.  With the formation of the new CF functional commands during this interim period all of the field forces of the Army, the flying units of the Air Force and the ships of the Navy were assigned to one of the six new commands.  Most if not all of the Navy's ships were assigned to Maritime Command and most if not all of the Army's field forces were assigned to Mobile Command.  The Air Force however, was divided up between Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Training and Materiel Commands.  There was no overall headquarters responsible for what had previously been Air Force units until the formation of Air Command in 1975.  As such then, the tactical air units (both fixed and rotary wing) were assigned lock, stock and barrel (and pilots) to Mobile Command.  The CF-5 pilots of the era even wore the Mobile Command shoulder patch on their Air Force blue uniforms and flight suits.
> 
> During this same period former Navy Air Branch pilots could, and did, find themselves assigned to Mobile Command aviation units flying in rotary and fixed wing aircraft.  One of the first CO's of one of the tactical helicopter squadrons in 1971 was a former naval Commander.  Some of the Navy's jet pilots also found themselves in 1 CAD flying CF-104 Starfighters.  This was part of the goal of unification, that is the end of loyalty to individual Services which would hopefully see the end of the internecine Service battles for money.  However the battles over ships, tanks and jets continued.  Plus sa change, plus sa meme chose.



To continue the history lesson a bit ...

When we were reorganized the _functional_ commands were, as exspy notes:

1. Maritime Command

2. Mobile Command

3. Air Defence Command

4. Air Transport Command

5. Materiel Command

6. Training Command

Maritime and Mobile Commands were fully _unified_ in that they had _organic_ air/aviation formations.  These air assets were not _attached_, they were integral.  10 TAG (7 and 8 Tactical Air Wings) were part and parcel of Mobile Command - they had one and only one commander: Commander FMC.  D/Comd FMC was an Air Force MGen - I cannot remember (and I'm too lazy to go look) if D/Comd MARCOM was air.

As exspy said, The initial structure of the CF was a compromise: the basic structure of the largest commands was _unified_ but the rest was simply a rebadging of the preexisting RCAF organization:

RCAF Air Defence Command => CF Air Defence Command

RCAF Air Transport Command => CF Air Transport Command

RCAF Air Training Command => CF Training Command

RCAF Air Materiel Command => CF materiel Command

RCAF Maritime Air Command => __ Maritime Air Group

RCAF ______ ______ (Command?) => 10 Tactical Air Group

Canadian Army Western, Central, Eastern and Atlantic Commands disappear

RCN Atlantic Fleet => MARLANT

RCN Pacific Fleet => MARPAC

There was no *Air Command*.

The Air Force set about fighting long and hard to destroy _unification_ and create the structure we have now - one which I regard, after 35+ years of experience, as monumentally stupid. (And yes, I remember all about Fredrick's mule.)

Given the budgetary problems facing DND in 1960 I'm not sure Pearson/Hellyer had much choice but to look at _unification_ as a cost saving measure.  The US forces were _unified_ (by Eisenhower) in the '50s; it did produce some savings.  The problem was that Hellyer got sidetracked and decided to _integrate_ rather than _unify_ - and there is a big difference in meaning - but that's another issue.  Despite Mr. Hellyer and (Group Capt (Ret'd) Bill Lee, his principle advisor) admirals and generals managed to get two _unified_ commands and a sensible supporting structure; the air force couldn't tolerate it's (perceived) _lower_ status and demanded and finally got its own _equal_ and completely unnecessary and wasteful 'command' in 75.


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## Old Sweat (2 Jun 2007)

I agree completely with Edward's comments; that's how I remember it, except that CANFE - the Canadian Army National Force Europe consisting of 4 CIBG and CBUE (Canadian Base Units Europe) along with some odds and sods - and, I think, 1 Air Div, remained outside the functional commands initially. In 1966 CANFE became part of FMC.

The alternate to integration was the creation of a fourth "service" to run logisitics; the medical word had already integrated and the army provided dental support to all three services. Integration could and should have worked, but it was hijacked as Edward said. That was not necessarily a giant light blue plot; rather there were a number of relatively junior theorists who had Hellyer's ear. Thus, the organizational model for the commands, the bases and the control of individual training was based on the RCAF model as it was deemed to be the most managerially sound. That none of these theorists could think beyond static bases generating air sorties led to all sorts of disasters.


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## Neill McKay (4 Jun 2007)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Given the budgetary problems facing DND in 1960 I'm not sure Pearson/Hellyer had much choice but to look at _unification_ as a cost saving measure.  The US forces were _unified_ (by Eisenhower) in the '50s; it did produce some savings.  The problem was that Hellyer got sidetracked and decided to _integrate_ rather than _unify_ - and there is a big difference in meaning - but that's another issue.



I think you've got unification and integration reversed.  Most authors refer to the earlier organization changes (aiming to eliminate duplication and so on) as integration, and the elimination of the separate service identities as unification.


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## Old Sweat (4 Jun 2007)

Edward was correct in that the deputy commander of FMC was an air force major general. This led to the suggestion amongst the army members of the HQ that the first step to be taken if the commander became a casualty would be to shoot the deputy commander.


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## Edward Campbell (5 Jun 2007)

Neill McKay said:
			
		

> I think you've got unification and integration reversed.  Most authors refer to the earlier organization changes (aiming to eliminate duplication and so on) as integration, and the elimination of the separate service identities as unification.



That's because most authors don't understand that _integration_ and _unification_ have, and had in 1960, definitions in the military lexicon.  Between the (US) National Security Act (1947) and the (US) Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1968) the term _integration_ came to mean merging or _'purple suiting'_* people into common organizations - which is one of the things Hellyer did.  In the same period, beginning in 1947, _unification_ came to be equated with _'jointness'_ - which (see above) is another of the things Hellyer did.

Sadly Mr. Hellyer and his staff and his opponents/detractors put too much of their _effort_ on _integration_ and too little on _unification_.

There are situations in which some levels of _integration_ make good organizational and military sense.  I'm not always sure if we went too far (the _integrated_ Canadian Forces Communication Command and the C&E Branch, for example, vs. the _unified_ US Defence Communication Agency – *old* terms and organizations, I understand, but I'm an old fellow and I really, really cannot fathom the current IT/Comms organizations on either side of the border!) or not far enough (I think our _*integrated*_ Canadian Forces Logistics System/Logistics Branch (as it existed _circa_ 1990, anyway) was/is better than the _*unified*_ US Defence Logistics Agency/Defence Transportation Agency combo).  The experiments are still going on – the US is, for example, just now stepping, gingerly, into the _unification_ of medical services: merging Walter Reed (Army) and Bethesda (Navy) medical centres.  During the last major dinner night I attended a very nice young colonel tried to explain how the IT/Comms are organized in DND/CF.  Leaving aside the difficulty of sketching an org chart on the margins of a menu and the inherent unsuitability of a wine laden dinner table (and a fine dinner it was, too!) for such a task, all I came away with was that the DND/CF is still experimenting with organizations because the costs of IT/Comms are spiralling out of control – shades of DND in 1963 when Mr. Hellyer became MND!

(Just as a reminder: Mr. Hellyer didn't bring _integration_/_unification_ to us out of the blue.  Defence budgets were under severe stress, primarily because then, as now, people fail to understand that _*defence* inflation_ – measured _systemicaly_, warship by warship, fighter by fighter, rifle by rifle, and person by person as a percentage of the nationa's treasury – is higher, much higher, even, in some cases, an order of magnitude higher than the general inflation rate. (See: e.g. http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521867481&ss=fro )  By 1963 the rapidly inflating costs of just maintaining, much less continuing to enhance, our military establishment threatened to break the budget.  Diefenbaker didn't scrap the _Arrow_ because he hated the plane or AV Roe or whatever; he did so because his admirals and generals and some of his air marshals and his senior bureaucrats told him that developing that plane – maybe any plane, no matter how _great_ or 'near great' or just pretty good – would consume the entire defence budget, the ongoing to project to re-equip the army (M113 APCs, for example) would die.  HMCS Bonaventure wasn't sold off because she wasn't a very useful ship for North Atlantic ASW operations – we couldn't afford her, plain and simple.  The litany goes on and on but the problem remains, in 2007 – see my comments elsewhere re: why doubling the defence budget by 2030 means disarming Canada.)

Back to the subject at hand: words matter.  I believe that Hellyer, Lee (his primary advisor) _et al_ went to Washington and were carefully and thoroughly briefed on _unification_ (which the US recommended) and _integration_ (which the US opposed – based one their own (limited) experiments); I also believe they came home with the message thoroughly mixed.  The alternative is that they understood the US briefings and acted in opposition to the best available military/organizational advice – I'm prepared to believe that Hellyer and Bill Lee, especially, had large enough egos to propose _integration_ as the centrepiece of the Hellyer's reorganization but I'm more inclined to believe simple confusion - I've sat through enough Pentagon organizational briefings!

In any event:

1. We have a _unified_ national command structure but we have, consistently, failed to _unify_ the CF – although Canada Command and Expeditionary Command (or whatever they are called) are major steps in the right direction; and

2.We have a (largely) _integrated_ force with several 'purple suited' branches, but we do not have a fully _integrated_ force à la the USMC.

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*A (largely) US term referring to mixing sailors, soliers and air-force personnel in single units


Edit: typo - "... and too little on _unifications_."


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## Neill McKay (5 Jun 2007)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> That's because most authors don't understand that _integration_ and _unification_ have, and had in 1960, definitions in the military lexicon.  Between the (US) National Security Act (1947) and the (US) Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1968) the term _integration_ came to mean merging or _'purple suiting'_* people into common organizations - which is one of the things Hellyer did.



Then I would suggest that the community of Canadian military historians seems not to have adopted the US definitions of these terms.  Two peoples separated by a common language, and all that.


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## Avro_Arrow_1976 (6 Jun 2007)

Read the following CFTO:

B-GA-400-000/FP-000 pages13-17. It is the current version of the Canadian Aerospace doctrine and provides good answers to your questions.


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