# Generals, Generalship and History; split from Re: The Somme



## jimmy742 (23 Jun 2006)

A Haig apologist I see. I understand it's become fashionable lately. 

Allow me to relate what my grandfather ( He was at the Somme, Arras etc...) said to me once in one of the very few times he discussed the war. "We were getting killed by the stupidity of our own senior officers and it was just a matter of time before your turn came up."

He served in the Vandoos so his opinion may have been slightly clouded. 


(Edited by Moderator to insert new title)


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## Michael Dorosh (23 Jun 2006)

jimmy742 said:
			
		

> A Haig apologist I see. I understand it's become fashionable lately.



I don't think Haig had much to apologize for, frankly. All the generals were stupid in the sense that they were working in conditions which hadn't existed before. That they were weren't wizards or magicians should not have been a surprise; tragically, their learning curve involved the loss of millions of lives. Blame the politicians and even society as a whole for cheering the start of the war and enthusiastically sending young men like your grandfather off to fight in it. I don't know if Haig was smart or stupid, I do know he wasn't a criminal. And that a fair number of those generals the soldiers thought so little of were killed in action, trying to do the best job they could under appalling conditions. Glad I wasn't alive then.


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## xavier (25 Jun 2006)

Hi all:

I read somewhere that the generals who led their men faced the most rapid change in history. It's too bad I can't remember where. In a space of 30 years, militaries had completely changed. A soldier from 1914 had more in common with his 1855 counterpart than with a 1916-18 soldier.  The authour was pointing out that it's real easy for us to criticize from hindsight and that the changes were so profound that no general let alone society had time to properly assimilate those revolutionary transformations. 
I'm one of those that's deeply critical of Haig. After the first week, he should've called it off  when he received the preliminary casualty list. Then called together his subordinates and 'brainstorm'  an alternative approach in order not to squander their men(or more precisely reevaluate everything from logistics to strategy) 

Interestingly the French are celebrating the 90th of Verdun as well. What another bloodbath that was.

P.S. Osprey has created a mini  website about the Somme in prepartion for its forthcoming booklet on the battle. For an amateur like myself, it's very helpful to learn more about the realities of what Haig and his subordinates faced as well as the battle itself

xavier


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## Red 6 (25 Jun 2006)

It's tough to accurately put ourselves into the mindset of World War I commanders. On the one hand, you can't help but ask how anyone could've coped with all the advances in warfare that took place in the decades leading up to the 1st World War. But, it wasn't the first industrial age war. It's my understanding that the European armies didn't give full weight to the lessons of the Civil War. I'm not sure I could come up with an alternative to what amounted to a slaughter on the Western Front. But, you can't help but be appalled at the death toll. That the German Army was able to roll up the allied front in the Spring 1918 offensive after almost four years of combat doesn't say a lot for the strategic level of leadership on the allied side.

As an amateur historian focused ont he Pacific World War II theater, I've been involved in dialogues and debates whether this or that island campaign was necessary in the big picture. Peleliu is the camapign that comes to mind, as well as Iwo Jima. One of my buddies has written, "If we had looked at every Pacific campaign with the critical eye of posterity knowing what sort of casaulties were in store, we probably would've stayed in Hawaii. That's what some people think anyway."


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## Michael Dorosh (25 Jun 2006)

Red 6 said:
			
		

> It's tough to accurately put ourselves into the mindset of World War I commanders.



Especially if your entire historical knowledge comes from 32 page pamplets published by Osprey...


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## jimmy742 (26 Jun 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> I don't think Haig had much to apologize for, frankly. All the generals were stupid in the sense that they were working in conditions which hadn't existed before. That they were weren't wizards or magicians should not have been a surprise; tragically, their learning curve involved the loss of millions of lives. Blame the politicians and even society as a whole for cheering the start of the war and enthusiastically sending young men like your grandfather off to fight in it. I don't know if Haig was smart or stupid, I do know he wasn't a criminal. And that a fair number of those generals the soldiers thought so little of were killed in action, trying to do the best job they could under appalling conditions. Glad I wasn't alive then.



Thank you for your reply. I do agree with you to a point. As an aside, he never spoke English again after 1918 and refused to leave Quebec for the rest of his years.

Perhaps one of the issues was the mind set of the British officer class who regarded the British or Commonwealth enlisted man as little more than part of "the herd". Haig was a Cavalry officer of the "truest and bluest" type and I suspect the plight of the men under his command mattered very little to him. I think Stalin's famous quote regarding statistics applies here.  I'm not sure if there are any recorded instances of whole bataillons or regiments bleeting like sheep while marching to the trenches like the French did at Verdun but I wouldn't be surprised.

There is a close parallel between the attitudes that prevailed among General officers at Verdun prior to Petain taking charge and how Haig and his subordinates behaved during the Somme, imo. The French learned after Chemin des Dames and Verdun, Haig gave us Passchendaele.


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## Scott (26 Jun 2006)

Mike,

This:


			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Fair enough; how would you, personally, have relieved the pressure on Verdun, then?



and this:


			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Especially if your entire historical knowledge comes from 32 page pamplets published by Osprey...



Sure seem to contradict this:


			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Is the point of the forum to come on board and boast about one's achievements and belittle others for their lack of knowledge, or to learn about things?
> 
> I tend to do both. Guess what I was just doing?   Thanks to you and GAP for the info.



So quick to jump on certain Staff members when they slip yet you don't seem to want to follow the same rules.

What was that old saying about people in glass houses and stones?

Maybe I misread what you said, if so I wish you'd clarify.


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## Michael Dorosh (26 Jun 2006)

Xavier posted a pretty strong position on Haig while at the same time ignoring that more recent research has been done on him - to wit 


> I read somewhere that the generals who led their men faced the most rapid change in history. It's too bad I can't remember where.


 and later 



> I'm one of those that's deeply critical of Haig. After the first week, he should've called it off  when he received the preliminary casualty list. Then called together his subordinates and 'brainstorm'  an alternative approach in order not to squander their men(or more precisely reevaluate everything from logistics to strategy)



  And finally, 





> Osprey has created a mini website about the Somme in prepartion for its forthcoming booklet on the battle. For an amateur like myself, it's very helpful to learn more about the realities of what Haig and his subordinates faced as well as the battle itself



I found it, and still find it, odd that such a strong opinion could possibly be formed despite using a widely acknowledged poor source (Osprey is a set of primers). If Xavier is keen on learning about the Somme, he would be wise to take up Captain O'Leary on our book recommendation from page one. I only presume Xavier's reading into the matter has been superficial based on past postings about Osprey in other threads, as well as the conclusion he presents here, which is at odds with Corrigan.

Has this clarified my position?  Not to jump on Xavier; he is a keen student and has asked many questions both here and at my own forum. Yet I think in this instance, he has formed an opinion not on what has been discussed here, but on a set of primers of little historical worth - IMO and probably of most scholars. I was perhaps a bit hasty in choosing my words and intended them to be humorous but I see it did not come out that way. Should have added a smiley.

Basically, I'm telling Xavier you won't get th' smarts we gots here by reading 32 page primers, nor will a true understanding of Haig's career be garnered from television specials and the like. As visual entertainment, TV is king, but I wouldn't use a television broadcast in a "serious" discussion of any topic. Still, I've asked a friend to tape the special on the Somme - thanks for the tip on that program Red 6, et al.


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## Michael Dorosh (26 Jun 2006)

> Mike,
> 
> This:
> 
> ...



Incidentally, what was the problem with this?  It's a fair question. Captain O'Leary stated a page ago (or perhaps another WWI thread) how odd it is that those critics of Haig and leaders in the First World War (Lyn MacDonald, et al) generally have no alternate suggestions as to what could have been done differently.

I find that a salient question, don't you?

Anyway, let me know which rule I may have 'slipped up on' as it is quite possible I am misreading you in return. Thanks.


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## Scott (26 Jun 2006)

I guess it was the way in which I saw it written. Someone comes here, posts once and your question looked as though it was meant to draw fire.

This is the post in question:


			
				Bill DD said:
			
		

> This is my first post since joining 10 minutes ago, I have just watch a programme on UK TV in Nottingham showing 'The Royal Newfoundland Regiment' and their heroic advance on the Somme - everyone a hero - led by incompetents.



I believe some gentle herding could have been a bit more effective than the way you posted your question. It seemed belittling to me seeing as the person here admitted that it was his first post and seemed to have gathered his information from a television program, maybe he even formed this opinion from there? The post seemed to be more of an overall, generalized comment. Maybe a comment on the information offered in the program?

Regardless, until, Bill returns to clarify or expand on what he said we are both in the dark. I just did not wish to see a new member leave due to a seemingly short tempered reply. Once again, the line between a troll and a witty reply is razor thin.

Thank you for clarifying on both matters.


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## Michael Dorosh (26 Jun 2006)

Scott - I just noticed the quoted portion - I highlighted the wrong portions - I meant to respond to the cricism of Haig, not the fact he had watched a television show. Good catch on your part - 

Bill DD - no, I wasn't trying to belittle your source (though I am sincere in my comments that TV isn't a great medium to draw on), rather, I meant to say that it is well and good to criticize Haig and British generals, but in order to do so, it is probably wise to have some idea of how they could have avoided doing what they did.

Doing nothing on the Somme was not an option. The French mutinies of 1917 several months later are evidence of weakening morale and resolve. The casualties at Verdun point to physical decline of the French Armies. Something HAD to be done by the British. Would be interested on your opinion of what could have been differently. Like I said, I'm glad I wasn't making decisions like that at that time.

I do think Haig would have been wise to let division commanders use more leeway in actual tactics - several divisions took objectives for low cost at the Somme (relatively speaking - even a WW I victory was usually costly in human lives). But I do wonder if part of the problem was not simply the slowness with which information was disseminated - a successful division attack in the sector of one corps might never be absorbed as "lessons learned" on a neighbouring corps for several weeks or even months. Was Haig a victim of that? I don't know enough about him to say, but these are possibilities worth discussing.

Welcome to army.ca , by the way.


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## xavier (26 Jun 2006)

Michael:
No worries, I'm just the example du jour of a keen but naive student of military history   I admit I should shut up, read more and then modestly articulate a position. 
However, my views aren't formed by Osprey. While they're a helpful primer, I do try to try to read more substantial books on the historical eras that interest me. I concede that because I'm not a soldier and have zero combat experience, I don't always understand the significace of why a logistics delay or communications breakdown caused this situation and led to defeat.   Actually I avoid watching TV specials on this or that battle or personality. I find them worse than superficial and rather annoying concentrating on the dramatic rather than explaining the historicla vent or placing the battle/era/personality in context

With respect to Haig, the one major criticism I have (and it's an identical one with Joffre) is how come he stayed so far away from the front? Wouldn't it have been more effective to be some 50 km or so? Thus he would be far enough to see the evolution of the battle's conduct while close enough to issue contemporeanous orders especially since communications broke down as soon as the shelling started?

I'll reread the beginning of the thread and check out Capt O'Leary's post.
Thanks! 

xavier


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## mdh (27 Jun 2006)

> Captain O'Leary stated a page ago (or perhaps another WWI thread) how odd it is that those critics of Haig and leaders in the First World War (Lyn MacDonald, et al) generally have no alternate suggestions as to what could have been done differently.



Keep in mind that Haig's reputation was first undermined by its participants.  Siegfreid Sassoon's superb "Memoirs of an Infantry Officer" and Robert Graves' equally poignant "Goodbye to all that" created a literary sensation during the inter-war years for their respective frankness and outspokeness about the carnage of WWI.  

There is a Canadian memoir in the same vein - "Generals Die in Bed" by Charles Harrison which I haven't read but whose title presages a direct condemnation of the "chateau generalship" that many felt typified Haig's leadership style.

(It's interesting to note that this view continued to echoe through popular culture with the production of Oh What a Lovely War in the 1960s, and more recenlyt Black Adder Goes Forth.) 

This hasn't stopped successive historians from attempting to rehabilitate Haig as a battlefield commander - one of the more (relatively) recent ones being John Terraine's biography of Haig published in 1990 (which I'm trying to track down).

Even the esteemed John Keegan remains agnostic on the subject of alternatives - concluding, IIRC, that revised tactical doctrine would have made little difference in the overall direction of the war.  The only WWI leader who seemed to offer some original strategic thinking was Churchill whose Gallipoli adventure promised, at least initially, the prospect of outflanking the deadlocked western front.

cheers, mdh


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## xavier (27 Jun 2006)

Mdh:
Churchill? I say this with surprise because Keegan is quite scathing. Keegan assessed that Churchill was a strategic romantic . Implicitly Keegan lashes out at Churchill's Boy's adventures sense of strategy. I've always regarded Churchill's sense of strategy as rather imaginative but he often failed to think through important details like logistics

xavier


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## mdh (27 Jun 2006)

> Churchill? I say this with surprise because Keegan is quite scathing. Keegan assessed that Churchill was a strategic romantic . Implicitly Keegan lashes out at Churchill's Boy's adventures sense of strategy. I've always regarded Churchill's sense of strategy as rather imaginative but he often failed to think through important details like logistics



Xavier

I think you might be overstating Keegan's assessment of Churchill (mind I'm going by what he's written in his history of World War One.) In fact Keegan is far more critical of Haig than Churchill. But the interesting thing about clever revisionist history is the level of cleverness; it rarely changes the analysis and perceptions of the original participants who, more often than not, got it right in the first place.

In any case Haig is tough guy to defend. As Keegan notes he managed to conduct the Somme offensive with an almost casual Edwardian serenity that many interpreted as callousness.  Haig seemed to possess a kind of supercilious piety and aristocratic insularity that later became symbolic for interwar intellectuals - especially those of a leftish persuasion. (Read Vera Brittain's Testament of Youth as a good example). (More demagogic marxists insisted that Haig's attitude was merely consistent with his class assumptions, in that 55,000 casualties were rather unfortunate, but that's what the working class was for.) 

However Keegan really doesn't believe that WWI generals could have achieved much more even with inspired leadership. Europeans had invented fantastic technologies of defence, but offensive technology hadn't caught up. It's ironic that Churchill ruined his early political career after the Gallipoli fiasco while Haig managed to hang on after the Somme.

In this sense I think we should give some credit to Churchill for having tried an alternative strategy (which severely damaged his reputation at the time);an alternative never seems to have crossed Haig's mind.

cheers, mdh


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## ExSarge (28 Jun 2006)

Red 6 said:
			
		

> It seems to me the many/most of the innovations in World War I were either at the tactical level, or technical in nature. Tanks, chemical agents, that sort of thing, were introduced and employed, but it seems to me that they didn't alter how missions were carried out at the operational level. The basic way offensives were carried out doesn't seem to have changed much during the course of the war, at least on the allied side.




This is perhaps the start of a new thread. Failure, or perceived failure of the leaders and staffs to adapt to the changing circumstances. I think the case can be made that the lack a systematic staff training prior to the war led to this. Leaders who were trained and spent their carears using 19 century tactics found it hard to adapts to the technical innovation's that required changes. Overly simplistic perhaps but I think it has some merit.


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## mdh (28 Jun 2006)

> Leaders who were trained and spent their carears using 19 century tactics found it hard to adapts to the technical innovation's that required changes. Overly simplistic perhaps but I think it has some merit.



I don't think it's overly simplistic. The armies that went to war in August 1914 were for all intents and purposes 19th century armies. It's easy to forget that the high water mark of Victorianism, the Diamond Jubilee, had only taken place 17 years before. That's fewer years than Expo 86 in BC just as a point of comparison. 

Moreover the common military experience of Victorian soldiers was war on the cheap; a hasty expedition here and there against insolent tribesmen. Haig himself (B.1861) was a product of the Victorian ethos and participated in the punitive expedition against Mahdi forces in Sudan (along with Churchill). Rank was almost always commensurate with one's social station, and inspired (or in many cases uninspired) amateurism was practically doctrine in the British Army of the period.

The Boer War (whose protracted course and near systemic incompetence caused a political scandal) overturned some of those assumptions, but not enough to make a difference in 1914.

Again in reference to Keegan, he refers to Haig as a "cavalry" general of the very conventional sort.  WWI was also their high water mark.  As Keegan notes in his introduction to an excellent series of essays called "Churchill's Generals", all of the leading British generals of the 1939-45 war who assumed positions of command and influence were infantry officers.  

cheers, mdh


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## Michael Dorosh (28 Jun 2006)

mdh said:
			
		

> Again in reference to Keegan, he refers to Haig as a "cavalry" general of the very conventional sort.  WWI was also their high water mark.  As Keegan notes in his introduction to an excellent series of essays called "Churchill's Generals", all of the leading British generals of the 1939-45 war who assumed positions of command and influence were infantry officers.



And Canada's tended to be Gunners - Crerar, Simonds, Roberts, Matthews etc....


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## ExSarge (28 Jun 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> And Canada's tended to be Gunners - Crerar, Simonds, Roberts, Matthews etc....



You forgot the best (Gunner that is) of the lot. McNaughton.

Interesting points though. Britian pushed forward, or more to the point, they pushed themselves forward those officers who had seen the horror, carnage and waste of the front line in WWI. Canada promoted the Gunners. The original "scientific" soldiers. 

The above is not intended to reflect on the relative merits of either group, only to high light an interesting, well to me anyway, point.


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## Michael Dorosh (28 Jun 2006)

ExSarge said:
			
		

> You forgot the best (Gunner that is) of the lot. McNaughton.
> 
> Interesting points though. Britian pushed forward, or more to the point, they pushed themselves forward those officers who had seen the horror, carnage and waste of the front line in WWI. Canada promoted the Gunners. The original "scientific" soldiers.
> 
> The above is not intended to reflect on the relative merits of either group, only to high light an interesting, well to me anyway, point.



Well, comparing McNaughton the scientist gunner to, say, the profane and blustering Vokes seems like apples and oranges. Competent, to be sure (though critics of his Moro River campaign would disagree, and I think Granatstein argues convincingly that he was unsuited to command an Armoured Division but did anyway due to a mixup between Foulkes and Vokes), but one of the few infantrymen to gain high command in the war.  Hoffmeister did too, but he was a militiaman and eventually commanded an armoured division (successfully). Keller was another example of a less than adequate commander that came from the infantry.


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## xavier (28 Jun 2006)

Michael:
Thanks. I remember reading Keegan rather scathing assesement of Haig. I was  quite taken aback because it's the section of the book where you immediately sense Keegan's disgust whereas in rest of the book, he maintains a certain historian's detachment.
Here's a blog post  referring to a new book by Christopher Duffy on the  German perspective of the Somme.
According to the conclusions. 
1) The Germans suffered heavy casualities and regarded it as a defeat
2) The German respected the British military's growing professionalism.

Of course this raises a related question: if the Germans were indeed 'defeated'  in the Western Front; why it didn't affect them on the Eastern front. After all, the Germans and Austrians were still conducting successfull attacks against the Russians? 
A tangential question:  Did the British/Commonwealth learn from Somme experience that ensuring that men aren't pointless killed to attain some general objective? Pétain and the French generals appear to have it. Or is my question inaccurate?

Thanks!

xavier


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## ExSarge (29 Jun 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Well, comparing McNaughton the scientist gunner to, say, the profane and blustering Vokes seems like apples and oranges. Competent, to be sure (though critics of his Moro River campaign would disagree, and I think Granatstein argues convincingly that he was unsuited to command an Armoured Division but did anyway due to a mixup between Foulkes and Vokes), but one of the few infantrymen to gain high command in the war.  Hoffmeister did too, but he was a militiaman and eventually commanded an armoured division (successfully). Keller was another example of a less than adequate commander that came from the infantry.




Mike,

Not comparing them as such, just commenting on the number of them that reached positions of high comand in the Canadian Army. I do not have your expertise in this field but from my reading I would regard Hoffmeister as the best division commander of the bunch.


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2006)

Vokes was a sapper, as was Burns  who followed Crerar in command of 1 Canadian Corps in Italy. When he was relieved, Burns was replaced by Foulkes, an infantryman. Thus, corps command was not the exclusive purview of gunners.


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## Michael Dorosh (29 Jun 2006)

ExSarge said:
			
		

> Mike,
> 
> Not comparing them as such,



No, I was. ;D


> just commenting on the number of them that reached positions of high comand in the Canadian Army. I do not have your expertise in this field but from my reading I would regard Hoffmeister as the best division commander of the bunch.



Yes, I think Hoffmeister was the best also.  I was trying to point out the number of infantrymen in command positions was low - but Old Sweat has corrected me on Vokes - he commanded the Patricias early in the war but I was wrong about his prewar vocation - Engineers.


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2006)

Mike,

The infantry did not do that badly in terms of divisional command. Offhand, besides Hoffmeister, I can think of Foulkes, Keller, Spry, Kitching and Blackader (at least in an acting capacity for several weeks in Normandy after Keller was wounded). All but Hoffmeister and the last two were permanent force, and it is important to remember that the regular infantry was about the same size as the artillery - seven rifle companies divided among three battalions compared to eight batteries (three field, one medium, one anti-aircraft and three coastal). All arms were grossly understrength and the infantry was established with only one officer platoon commander per company.


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## Michael Dorosh (29 Jun 2006)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Mike,
> 
> The infantry did not do that badly in terms of divisional command. Offhand, besides Hoffmeister, I can think of Foulkes, Keller, Spry, Kitching and Blackader (at least in an acting capacity for several weeks in Normandy after Keller was wounded). All but Hoffmeister and the last two were permanent force, and it is important to remember that the regular infantry was about the same size as the artillery - seven rifle companies divided among three battalions compared to eight batteries (three field, one medium, one anti-aircraft and three coastal). All arms were grossly understrength and the infantry was established with only one officer platoon commander per company.



I thought Keller was yeller.... Copp talks about the suitability of artillery officers as division commanders and argues in The Brigade that since doctrine was based on artillery they were more than capable of doing the job. I can't remember if he argues against the "suitability" of infantry officers to command infantry divisions or not... My question given the path this thread has taken, is - how much did their prewar vocation really matter? I guess the formation commanders had plenty of time in the UK to learn new crafts - don't we judge them by how much they learned in battle rather than what they did before the war in any event?


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## ExSarge (29 Jun 2006)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> I thought Keller was yeller....




I've been madly searching for my source without success, I'm sure I read somewhere a claim that Keller(?) was found in a drunken funk prior to an attack? 




			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> don't we judge them by how much they learned in battle rather than what they did before the war in any event?



Exactly so! It's immaterial whether an officer was Militia or Regular, or what their "trade". The only yardstick they can be judged by is their performance under the stress of combat. Currie is an excellent example of that. If they knew in 1914 what we know now, he would have been lucky not to have gone to jail.


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2006)

Commanders shoud certainly be judged on their performance in battle, not on their previous empolyment or their cap badge. Unfortunately a number of writers have criticized the Second World War Canadian army because of the number of gunners that rose to high command. In my opinion the conditions in the prewar army were such that no one could have been considered properly trained or developed by the standards of either the Cold War or today's small wars.

I have heard a number of less than glowing stories about Keller, but never about him cowering in a drunken funk before a battle. Ex Sarge, you may be confusing him with Brigadier Leslie Booth of 4 Armoured Brigade, who was discovered passed out drunk on the floor of his tank by his divisional commander during Operation Totalize.


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## ExSarge (29 Jun 2006)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I have heard a number of less than glowing stories about Keller, but never about him cowering in a drunken funk before a battle. Ex Sarge, you may be confusing him with Brigadier Leslie Booth of 4 Armoured Brigade, who was discovered passed out drunk on the floor of his tank by his divisional commander during Operation Totalize.




You are right, I am confusing him with Booth. My apologies. 

I concur with the request to the DS. This thread has wandered away from the original premise and should be split off.


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2006)

I once came across a statement in an American book that one third of all divisional commanders were incompetent. A look at the Canadian experience in the Second World War - but probably not the First, were only Turner and perhaps Watson were sub par - might bear that out. Certainly the performance of Keller, Foulkes and Kitching in Normandy was not very good and Spry was relieved for failure in the Rhineland (he may have been ill or burned out, or both). We already have been reminded on one historian's assessment of Vokes in command of 4 Div. 

Is anyone aware of any analysis of Stacey's statement in The Victory Campaign on the standard of Canadian commanders at the brigade and unit level? The attrition of brigade commanders in Normandy because of battle casualties was rather high, a point Stacey did not make. I can think of at least three who were killed or wounded - Lett, Wyman and Booth - and Blackader moved up after Keller was hit. That is a significant part of the 14 individuals at the two levels cited in the official history. I can off hand only recall three battalion commanders who were sacked for cause in Normandy, while the number of killed and wounded was very high.

(I will be off thiis means for the next few days as I am having a triple bypass tomorrow morning, but plan to continue this discussion in the middle of next week.)


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## Michael Dorosh (29 Jun 2006)

First off, good luck with the surgery - YIKES.

I find it interesting that Simonds had a rule about six month tour of duties as a battalion commander (according to Copp in The Brigade) - were there similar limits for brigade and division commanders? I could understand not being able to do that due to limited manpower resources as far as experienced senior commanders, but is it fair to think the bde and div comdrs were just as likely to get stressed out as a battalion commander?


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2006)

I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.


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## Michael Dorosh (29 Jun 2006)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.



MacLauchlan of the Calgary Highlanders was also relieved in Oct 1944, as both Bercuson and Copp discuss. I don't recall immediately if the "rule" was the reason though I think that is why Copp brings up the subject to begin with. MacLauchlan was not well respected in the battalion - War Diary to the contrary - and was seen as "nervous" and was rumoured to wear a US steel helmet because it offered more protection, in addition to digging deep bunkers. His successor, Ross Ellis, is reported to have worn his balmoral habitually and toured front line slits often. Bercuson is diplomatic about it, and rightly points out that MacLauchlan was not brilliant but he did get the battalion through Normandy, and did well enough at Clair Tizon to get the DSO. How much was really his doing, I can't say. The battalion, from what I recall, kind of blundered forward in the dark and managed to infiltrate a German defensive line - they actually encountered a field hospital before meeting German troops.  At any rate, MacLauchlan is described as worn out by Oct and his replacement was a surprise to the battalion. He was also "old" - being in his 40s.  Tommy Thompson of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders in the Rhineland was a LCol at the age of 23...

It seems likely to me that any such "rule" was, as you suggest, invoked only when prudent. In MacLauchlan's case, it was probably thought wise to do so. The Calgary Highlanders were often being asked to lead the brigade given the poor luck of the Black Watch and IIRC problems in keeping French language regiments like R de Mais up to strength.


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## ExSarge (4 Jul 2006)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.





It would appear that this rule was followed only for those commanders who's performance did not measure up. It's unlikely based on Simmonds command style, but the "rule" may of been a way for relieved officers to save face. 



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I once came across a statement in an American book that one third of all divisional commanders were incompetent.



For the most part the Canadian army was learning as it went. From Private to Army Commander the experience the level simply was not there. Perhaps if regiments/battalions had been assigned to the British for a combat baptism in North Africa in 1940 the overall performance in Italy and north west Europe may have been better? At the least the process of sorting the wheat from the chaff may have been accomplished much earlier. Those that were incompetent or unsuitable for combat command relieved and replaced by others. It's interesting to speculate what might have occurred if Rockingham or Hoffmiester or others like them had held higher commands earlier in the war.


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## Michael Dorosh (4 Jul 2006)

ExSarge said:
			
		

> For the most part the Canadian army was learning as it went. From Private to Army Commander the experience the level simply was not there. Perhaps if regiments/battalions had been assigned to the British for a combat baptism in North Africa in 1940 the overall performance in Italy and north west Europe may have been better?



But they did that with several hundred individuals - officers and warrant officers. Strome Galloway was one; he commanded a company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers in Tunisia before landing in Sicily with the RCR.  These guys did tours of duty in North Africa and then came back to the Canadian Army to fight in Sicily or Normandy with their own battalions, bringing combat experience with them.


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## reccecrewman (4 Jul 2006)

> That the German Army was able to roll up the allied front in the Spring 1918 offensive after almost four years of combat doesn't say a lot for the strategic level of leadership on the allied side.



They didn't roll up the allied front at all.........  The attempted a breakthrough that sputtered out and failed for reasons I already stated in another post.  Infantry only move so fast, no cavalry or tanks, supply lines that were too long and out of support range of their guns.
Secondly, did your 32 page pamphlet mention that the Germans were also able to move some 60 first rate Divisions from the Russian front after their collapse to use in the Micheal offensive of 1918?  That the allies held the line is more of a wonder than your statement.



> The French learned after Chemin des Dames and Verdun, Haig gave us Passchendaele.



The French were REACTING to a German offensive that was designed to bleed them white and break their will to fight and thus knock them out of the war.  After Verdun, the French were in no shape to undertake an offensive - therefore it was only the British who could take offensive action.  Haig's reasons for Passchendaele were quite legitimate.  First, the Germans occupied the best ground there, it was high and dry while the BEF was stuck in the mud in Flanders.  Secondly, Ostend & Zeebrugge were targets for the Somme offensive.  These were strategic sub bases for the German Navy and their capture would relieve alot of pressure off the British supply lines across the channel.  Third, the offensive took pressure off the French Army who suffered nearly 500,000 casualties at Verdun.  While people want to crucify Haig for the Somme, how about Falkenhayn deciding to launch the Battle of Verdun?  The German's suffered over 400,000 casualties and what did they gain? Ft. Douamont & Ft. Vaux, both of which were re-captured by French forces in counterattacks.
Fourth - Had the British captured these two ports, the entire German front would have shifted, because the rail centres for reserves and reinforcements would have been in British hands.

Passchendaele broke the back of the German Army........... from that point on, it was just a matter of time until they conceded defeat.  So by you saying "Haig gave us Passchendaele" you're also inadvertently saying "Haig won us the war". Which he did.    Consider this; Haig attacks on July 1, gets casualty reports and calls the whole operation off. So, 60,000 casualties for NOTHING gained.  Meanwhile, the German Army accepts the Russian surrender a few months later and shifts those 60 plus Divisions to the Western Front.  NOW, they procede with their Micheal offensive with one BIG difference.  The 400,000 casualties they suffered at the hands of the BEF in the Somme offensive, are now on hand to take part in the Micheal offensive.  I shudder to think what the result would have been.

Regards


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## xavier (4 Jul 2006)

Recceguy:
I agree with you about Falkenhayn. If we wanted to break the French, there were more effective means. Using more stormtroopers to infiltrate  the trenches knock them off balance and break their spirit.  I guess it shows the gulf between our mentality and theirs but I've always been surprised that the Germans and Austrians didn't pass on their tactical experiences with Italians to use against the French and British.
I've always been sympathetic towards the poilous mutinying after Verdun. 

xavier


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## Infanteer (4 Jul 2006)

reccecrewman said:
			
		

> Passchendaele broke the back of the German Army........... from that point on, it was just a matter of time until they conceded defeat.



Did it?  They seemed quite capable of rolling up the Eastern Front and launching 3 large scale offensives after Passchendaele concluded.  Doesn't strike me as a broken army.  I'm no buff, but the failure at Second Marne or the Black Day of Amiens (go Canada!) would be better days to pick as "back-breakers".

History of WWI tends to revolve around the Western Front; just finished reading Robert Citano's The German Way of War which took a refreshing look at the big picture.


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## reccecrewman (4 Jul 2006)

> I've always been surprised that the Germans and Austrians didn't pass on their tactical experiences with Italians to use against the French and British.



What?    OK, you lost me. What exact tactical experiences are you referring to?  I can't htink of a single valuable lesson the Central Powers learned in the Alps that could be effectively used against the French & British on the Western Front.  It's apples and oranges you're comparing.  First of all, the Italian Front was nothing but mountains, second, the Italians were second rate when compared to British & French troops, and third, the Austrians never actually defeated Italy.  They won most battles against them, but the Italians never signed an armistice with the Central Powers.



> If we wanted to break the French, there were more effective means



This was actually the most effective way of bleeding the French, and it very nearly succeeded.  Verdun was a symbol of all that the French held near and dear and they would bleed themselves to death defending it.  The interesting thing about the French Army mutinies of 1917, is that the Germans somehow never detected it!  It is one of the greatest kept secrets of the Great War.  Had the Germans known the state of the French Armies and concentrated on them, the war could have taken a completely different turn, however, the BEF saved the French bacon by launching the Somme offensive and keeping German pressure off the French.  Gen. Sir Arthur Currie, the Commander of the Canadian Corps, only learned of the French Army's mutiny when Haig pulled him aside and told him after the armistice had been signed with Germany.  At the time, in November 1917, when the Canadian Corps was returned to the Ypres salient and given the task of taking Passchendaele Ridge, Currie wanted to know what the reasoning behind it was and Haig told him, "Someday I will tell you why, but today I cannot".  When Haig told Currie after the war ended, Currie finally understood why his Corps made the sacrifice of 16,000 casualties to take that cursed place.



> I've always been sympathetic towards the poilous mutinying after Verdun



Lastly, I don't sympathize with them for mutiny.  Soldiers don't mutiny. We are not disorganized rabble who decide they don't like the way things are going so we don't play anymore. It don't work that way.  Of all Armies fighting on the Western Front, the French Army SHOULD have been fighting the hardest.  This was THEIR homeland that was being invaded.  The fact that they were content to sit a year out while the British Empire did THEIR fighting for them says much to me about the pride and fighting spirit of the French Army.  The German Army in WWII fought right to the bitter end.  That was THEIR homeland and by JC, they were not going to just roll over.  The French should have had that same fire in their bellies in WWI.


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## reccecrewman (4 Jul 2006)

> Did it?  They seemed quite capable of rolling up the Eastern Front and launching 3 large scale offensives after Passchendaele concluded.



There was no Eastern Front for them to "roll up".  The Russians were in the midst of full blown revolution and wanted an end to the war.  The Russians bowed out and allowed the Germans to send 60+ Divisions to the Western Front.  Passchendaele was the beginning of the end for Germany. 

The British battled the cream of the German Army, alone and unaided, while their French allies did nothing. Opposing forces in Flanders were about equal, the Germans had 86 Divisions, the British 51 (German divisions were smaller than their British counterparts)  The British, attacking in mud, rain and the most deplorable conditions man can imagine and at even odds (3 to 1 is the equation usually required for success when attacking) still managed to rock the German Army to it's very foundations.  The Germans lost 250,000, many of them first rate troops and as such, irreplacable.  So badly mangled was the German Army after Passchendaele, that it had to be extensively reorganized into attack and defence Divisions. (From "The Canadians At Passchendaele")

The Micheal offensive of 1918 was a huge gamble the Germans were taking.  They wanted to try for a decisive victory before the Americans showed up in force, and the offensive was doomed to failure from day 1.  In my opinion, the best thing the Germans could have done in early 1918, was to sue for peace and get themselves the best possible deal, rather than be defeated militarily and be forced to take all impositions the allies inflicted upon them at Versailles.


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## xavier (6 Jul 2006)

Recceman:
Well, precisely because the Alps are  mountains that the Germans and Austrians had to come up with alternative tactics to fight the Italians. The most effective was the infilitration and bypassing the defenses by highly mobile units. The trench systems were as 'insurmountable' an obstacle as the Alps. The stormtrooper recreated the same tactics  but these developed independently.. Consequently, had the Germans and Austrians passed on their tactical experience to their counterparts at the Western front, it's quite possible that the  Germans would've incorportated the storm trooper tactics even earlier and the Allies would've been stymied on how best to counter this tactic. The St Michel offensive highlights the just how close the Allies could've been defeated. Now imagine the same offensive in 1916 or 17.

xavier


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## time expired (11 Jul 2006)

It seems to me that any criticism of Haig must be presented with a viable alternative. Fully one third of
Frances land mass was occupied including a large portion of its heavy industry therfore the French army
had no political or military alternative to attacking the German armies and Britain as Frances main ally
had no alternative but to surpport her.This was the general strategic situation. Visiting any of the battle
fields drives this home,the german positions are much more solidly built very deep with steel and concrete
overhead cover,  ones  first thought is that this is way Germans do things, everything overengieered but 
there is somthing deeper here, this is an indication that they were here to stay.The allied positions look in comparision , exactly what they were ,jumping off points for the assault
 What are the tactics to fullfil such a strategy, there is but one, the frontal assault.After all one cannot do
flanking movements against a front that stretches from the North sea to the Swiss border ,weak points did not exist. Suprise was also not a factor as the requirement to cut the enemy wire ensured that a prelimanary arty. bombardment had to be used.A word about the British army,the army that fought the 
Somme battle was an all volunteers, Kitcheners New army which had 1 1/2 to2 years of training not
enough to do anything too difficult on the battlefield, and this was not just Haigs opinion.
 Givern these factors and Haigs orders from his political masters,Loyd George,to support the French
defence of Verdun,it is very difficult to see that he had any room to maneaver and in the end he did his duty
as did thousands of other British soldiers on that warm July morning. 
After this battle,and even during its latter stages things began to change the troops, those that survived,
were now more capable and began to use fire and movment tactics,the Lewis machine saw wider use
allowing the advancing troops to more effectiveley deal with enemy machine gun positions and the tank also saw more widespread use. In short they improved,   this took place under the command of Gen. Haig and 
a year and half later under the command this same Gen. Haig the British,Australian and Canadian armies
conducted one of the finest fighting advances in history resulting in the capitulation of Germany.
Gen. Haig was not a great comunicator in fact he was somewhat innarticulate he made little effort to
defend himself against the storm of  critisism and ridicule that swept over him in the aftermath of the 
partly instigated by the aforementioned Loyd George who did his best to absolve himself of any blame
fore the huge losses suffered by the British,quite successfully it seems ,by placing the responsibily squarely
on Haigs shoulders.
   A couple of books that may help one to form ones own opinion
    TO WIN A WAR ---John Terraine
    TOMMY---Richard Holmes


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## xavier (12 Jul 2006)

Time expired:
Has any historian looked at the North Sea to outflank the trenchlines? And land troops in either Antwerp or in Holland?
Actually, there was an alternative but absolutely everyone rejected it and caused the Germans to regard the Austrians with suspicions: a n armistace (which provoked the Sextus affair where Clemenceau published private letters from the AustroHungarians  to broach the subject of peace) 
The war pretty much denegerated into who would hold out the longest before collapsing. The Germans collapsed and that was thanks in part to the effective blockade that the British mounted.

xavier


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## Michael OLeary (12 Jul 2006)

Given the rudimentary capability for assault landing and littoral support as seen in the Mediterranean climate at Gallipoli, trying an even larger invasion as you suggest may not have been practicable.

I would have to see the detailed estimate based on the existing technology and force capabilities at the time to think it viable even in concept.


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## mdh (12 Jul 2006)

> After this battle,and even during its latter stages things began to change the troops, those that survived,
> were now more capable and began to use fire and movment tactics,the Lewis machine saw wider use
> allowing the advancing troops to more effectiveley deal with enemy machine gun positions and the tank also saw more widespread use. In short they improved,



It seems to me that any argument that attempts to rehabilitate Haig or any other WWI general usually boils down to two fundamental points:

1. That Haig was no worse than any other WWI general, and there was no alternative;
2. That valuable lessons were learned that justified the Somme. 


Of course the first point is undeniable at least in one respect; Haig was certainly a man of his time as we all are. But I don't see how that helps rescue his reputation. If all we can say of Haig is that he was a man of his time and there was no alternative, we're not saying much. (As Time Served noted, his style of command didn't endear himself to the rank and file; but a lack of style is no small thing in a commander.)

As to the second point, I 've always found that line of argument slightly sinister because it smells of _post facto _ justification and memoirist apologia. I'm not sure what lessons really had to be learned in 1916 that required a sacrifice on that scale. That the new artillery techniques the British pioneered were less than effective? That sending mass ranks against fortified positions was suicidal? Shouldn't that have been obvious after the first few hours, let alone forcing the campaign to grind on for months? (For Canadians it also reminds me of Mountbatten's justification for the Dieppe debacle, that lessons were learned.)

I think we need to judge the Somme from the original intent of the campaign. And the original intent was to achieve a breakthrough, not just to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun. In the end the case against Haig is also moral one; should any commander have allowed losses to continue on such an extravagant scale? Many of the participants believed it wasn't, and I've yet to read any revisionism that convincingly overturns their verdict.

cheers, mdh


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## time expired (12 Jul 2006)

Mdh and Xavier
One thing seems to have been forgotten,Haig was the theatre commander and as such he was only
responsible for the tactics in his theatre,decisions such as amphibian assault on a neautral country
was a strategic decision,and givern the technology available at the time and the Gallipoli experience
it would have been a very questionable undertaking,this decision had to be taken by someone above
Haigs level.These decisions were taken by politicians namely the prime minister and his cabinet,they
also made the a deal with the French to conduct this attack,and supplied Haig with this half trained
army to conduct the assault,they even decided, again in close consultation with the French,where the
attack should take place,Haig wanted to strike in the Ypres area were if a break through had actually  taken
place he could have possibly out flanked the German line.
 The point I am trying to make is that a great deal of what Haig was latter blamed for was out of his
hands entirely and as someone ealier in this thread has pointed out,Haig was not unpopular during
the war he only become so some time after, particulaly after Loyd George,a left wing populist politco,
had published his memoires blaming Haig for all that went wrong on the Western Front including
the huge losses. The uninformed public swallowed it up, after all wasnt Loyd George one of them,
he came from a working class back ground, and a new historical myth was born and is still alive and
kicking.


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