# What If?



## Sapplicant (2 Feb 2011)

A good friend passed along a copy of a book titled "What If? Strategic Alternatives of WWII".

Here is a handful of the many 'what ifs' posed:

What if Hitler had recognized that the Western powers would fight?
"" the germans had launched their main attack through Belgium instead of the Ardennes?
"" Hitler had striven to make allies of the Soviet People?
"" the allies had chosen the Ljubljana Gap instead of Anvil?
"" the Germans had detected that Operation Fortitude was a ruse?
"" the U.S. Navy had fully rearmed in the 1930s and had truly been prepared to fight a two ocean war?
"" the British had not devoted a major part of their war effort to strategic bombing?


I've finished the first few chapters, and the book seems legit. The authors appear to have done their research, and have included various footnotes. I'd suggest it to anyone with an interest in Military History. A good imagination would probably help as well, since it is a book of suppositions.


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## Journeyman (2 Feb 2011)

I'm sorry, but I read this book about a decade ago, and was completely underwhelmed. 

Because you posted this, I went to the bookcase to refresh my memory -- oh right......

It's as though the contributors were told that straw-clutching "what ifs" were more important, intellectualy, than "realistic options given the actual conditions." Added to this is the editors' apparent belief that these hypothetically changed perceptions automatically equal a changed tipping point.

Of the cases presented, the only one that remotely resonated was the Allies devoting their air campaign to strategic bombing -- and that's likely because Staff College made me read too much about 'Bomber' Harris.


Sorry Sapplicant, but my cynical nature would rather have people read to understand what _actually_ happened, then think about _why_ it happened, and only _then_ start to think about "what if..."


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## Sapplicant (2 Feb 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> my cynical nature would rather have people read to understand what _actually_ happened, then think about _why_ it happened, and only _then_ start to think about "what if..."



Nothing to be sorry about JM, you're definitely entitled to you opinions. To be honest, the one I quoted is a damned good one, at that. In reality, it's merely a book of assumptions and educated guesses. Not everyone is going to be completely enthralled by such things. If only your opinions of me were that good...


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## Journeyman (2 Feb 2011)

PM..and MilPoints... sent.

Reading -- good


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## Sapplicant (2 Feb 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> PM..and MilPoints... sent.
> 
> Reading -- good


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## pitdroid (27 May 2011)

A mistake that Hitler made was to attack the Soviet Union, they were somewhat allies to the Germans. Attacking them caused the Germans wars in the east, the west and the south.


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## mariomike (27 May 2011)

One of the questions asked:
"What if the British had not devoted a major part of their war effort to strategic bombing?"

"Assessment of the Campaign":
http://www.rafbombercommand.com/bc_assessment.html

One third of all Bomber Command aircrew were Canadians. 

"Bomber Command hoped to keep the loss rate to 3 percent per mission or operation. The statistics work like this. If your probability of ‘loss’ is 3 percent per mission, then you have a 97 percent chance of surviving that mission. This doesn’t sound too bad, but if you are to survive a tour of 30 missions, you must survive the first one, and the second one, and the third one, and so on... The probability of surviving all 30 is (0.97)30 x 100 = 40 percent. Your chance of not surviving the 30 missions is therefore a frightening 60 percent. Another interesting statistic is the expected lifetime of a crew or aircraft, measured in individual missions or operations. If the probability of loss is ‘p’ percent, then, mathematically, on average, a crew could expect to survive (100 – p)/p operations. It is thus understandable that 6 Group would worry about an average loss rate per mission of 5 percent, since this meant that crews would last only 19 missions, on average, and the individual survival probability then drops to 21 percent under those circumstances.":
http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo7/no1/book-livre-03-eng.asp#n1
"Their war was never recognized officially as a campaign, and no medal was ever struck to honour the participants."

"Your losses mounted through those years, years in which your chance of survival through one spell of operational duty was negligible; through two periods, mathematically nil.":
http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Harris_Final_Order.htm


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## a_majoor (27 May 2011)

Perhaps equally entertaining and probably writen to a higher standard is "The Collected What If?", edited by Robert Cowley.

It covers a vast swath of history, and looks not only at war, but also such things as elections, simple changes of mind and even the role of the humble potato in history ("What if Pizzarro had not found Potatoes in Peru? by William H McNeill). Worth reading.


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## Michael OLeary (27 May 2011)

An interesting look at the bombing campaign can also be found in:

*Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History*
Jurgen Brauer & Hubert Van Tuyll
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0-226-07164-2



> Chapter 6. The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II
> 
> A Strategic Bombing Production Function
> Bombing German War Production
> ...


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## mariomike (27 May 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> An interesting look at the bombing campaign can also be found in:
> 
> *Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History*
> Jurgen Brauer & Hubert Van Tuyll
> ...



"Chapter 6. The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II"

I read it online today. An American book which relies heavily on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey: "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea, its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy’s greatest naval threat – the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority made possible the success of the Allied invasion in Normandy (June 6, 1944). It brought the economy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy’s front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces. It brought home to the German people the full impact of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will be lasting."

Also recommended: "No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945"

When one reads about the economics of the Battle of Berlin, Harris seemed like a gambler doubling up on every throw:
"It will be seen that the enemy has irretrievably lost 1,000,000 man years.  This represents no less than 36 per cent of the industrial effort that would have been put out by these towns if they had remained unmolested. ... Expressing these losses in another way, 2,400,000,000 man-hours have been lost for an expenditure of 116,500 tons of bombs claimed dropped, and this amounts to an average return for every ton of bombs dropped of 20,500 lost man-hours, or rather more than one quarter of the time spent in building a Lancaster. ... This being so, a Lancaster has only to go to a German city once to wipe off its own capital cost, and the results of all subsequent sorties will be clear profit." -- Air Staff Intelligence Report, February 19, 1944

The electronic aids, such as _Oboe_ which had ensured victory in the Battle of the Ruhr, were not available over Berlin. 

Political as well as economic reasons were explained at aircrew briefings:
"As far as Dresden goes,  that was the first time that the commander of the station came and gave us a political reason for the raid.  It only happened just prior to take off on the Dresden raid.  He came to explain to us that the Nazis had convinced the German people that at the end of WW1 their armed forces had remained still on foreign soil and basically undefeated and that they had been betrayed by politicians at home.  He then pointed to the cord running across the map to Dresden and said, 'Never again will any future German government be able to say that the country was fairly well intact but still undefeated."
"Battlefields in the Air: Canadians in the Allied Bomber Command":
http://books.google.ca/books?id=NH1wx1cF7x0C&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=%22as+far+as+dresden+goes,+that+was+the+first+time%22&source=bl&ots=q1gGWXGC0B&sig=ae-2awJd0ApK7O3eSXuUWPsnqU0&hl=en&ei=LzvgTfr-KufY0QGBrJG_Cg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22as%20far%20as%20dresden%20goes%2C%20that%20was%20the%20first%20time%22&f=false

The briefing notes went on to say, "...and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."

Perhaps most significant of all, in a 1971 interview, Albert Speer stated that strategic bombing created "an armaments emergency in Germany which ruled out a major program to develop the atomic bomb."
"Bomber Harris" by Dudley Saward ( 1984 ) page 308.


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## mariomike (29 May 2011)

pitdroid said:
			
		

> A mistake that Hitler made was to attack the Soviet Union, they were somewhat allies to the Germans. Attacking them caused the Germans wars in the east, the west and the south.



He must have been hoping to cause a disaster for the Allies similar to the one that followed the Bolshevik's negotiated peace with Germany in 1917. 
The importance of keeping Russia in the war was important to Churchill. From 1942 onwards, Stalin was perfectly clear that only by opening a second front in northern Europe could the Allies make a real impact on the war in the east. Churchill knew if forced into a D-Day in 1943, Anglo-American casualties would likely be enormous.

One mistake that was Hitler's personal decision was to abandon Luftwaffe night-fighter operations against British bombers as they marshalled over England. Hitler considered that only bombers shot down over Germany were of value in convincing his people they were being defended. It was the greatest missed opportunity of the bomber war.


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## Old Sweat (29 May 2011)

mariomike said:
			
		

> He must have been hoping to cause a disaster for the Allies similar to the one that followed the Bolshevik's negotiated peace with Germany in 1917.
> The importance of keeping Russia in the war was important to Churchill. From 1942 onwards, Stalin was perfectly clear that only by opening a second front in northern Europe could the Allies make a real impact on the war in the east. Churchill knew if forced into a D-Day in 1943, Anglo-American casualties would likely be enormous.



You have lost me there. Germany had a non-agression pact with the USSR and both countries had invaded Poland in September 1939. It was true that the pact was not worth the paper it was written on, as Hitler deomonstrated by his 1941 invasion. However Stalin did not want war at that time and it has been suggested that his lack of response to signs of the pending German invasion was because of a desire to not provide Hitler an excuse. I cannot see any advantages for Germany in invading the USSR in the summer of 1941, especially given their confused and overly ambitious war aims.


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## mariomike (29 May 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> You have lost me there. Germany had a non-agression pact with the USSR and both countries had invaded Poland in September 1939. It was true that the pact was not worth the paper it was written on, as Hitler deomonstrated by his 1941 invasion. However Stalin did not want war at that time and it has been suggested that his lack of response to signs of the pending German invasion was because of a desire to not provide Hitler an excuse. I cannot see any advantages for Germany in invading the USSR in the summer of 1941, especially given their confused and overly ambitious war aims.



Thank-you for the correction, O.S. I should delete my first sentence:
"He must have been hoping to cause a disaster for the Allies similar to the one that followed the Bolshevik's negotiated peace with Germany in 1917."

I believe the rest of my post to be correct.

"Bomber Command’s efforts also played a crucial role in Britain’s alliance with Russia. After Russia was attacked by the Germans, Stalin repeatedly demanded that the Allies open a second front in the west to divert German forces. He wanted an invasion launched across the Channel as early as 1942 and accused Churchill of cowardice. Churchill knew it would be up to two years before this was possible, but he argued that the RAF’s bombing of Germany already was a second front and this helped to convince Stalin that the British were committed to attacking Germany. Had he not believed this, Russia might have felt forced to agree a truce with Germany. This would have been extremely dangerous for Britain, for Hitler could then have turned all his military force towards a second attempt at invading Britain itself."

"I am deeply conscious of the giant burden borne by the Russian armies and their unequaled contribution to the common cause. I must emphasize that our bombing of Germany will increase in scale month by month"
6 Apr 1943 Churchill to Stalin.

' The bombers could enable the western Allies to delay agressively, while Russia fought out the huge battles that broke the Wehrmacht, that caused Hitler by June 1944 to deploy 156 divisions in the East against 50 in France and the Low Countries. Neither the Russians nor the Americans could flatly be told that the British proposed to fight no campaign in Europe for years to come. If the Bomber Offensive, fueled by publicity and boosted with American support, and given formidible but not extravagant supplies of aircraft, met with even moderate destructive success, this would be convincing evidence of Britain's commitment to the struggle at a very tolerable cost in British lives. Bomber Commands 56,000 dead would represent, at the end, the lowest possible stake that Britain could have been seen to throw on the tables of Europe, when the Russians were counting their dead in the millions.'

Max Hastings.


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## pitdroid (30 May 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> You have lost me there. Germany had a non-agression pact with the USSR and both countries had invaded Poland in September 1939. It was true that the pact was not worth the paper it was written on, as Hitler deomonstrated by his 1941 invasion. However Stalin did not want war at that time and it has been suggested that his lack of response to signs of the pending German invasion was because of a desire to not provide Hitler an excuse. I cannot see any advantages for Germany in invading the USSR in the summer of 1941, especially given their confused and overly ambitious war aims.



And the Germans sent millions of soldiers to fight in the east, imagine if those soldiers were in Normandy during D-Day. Would the Allies win the battle, and if they lost the battle would they have won the war?


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## vonGarvin (30 May 2011)

If for some bizarre reason Germany were not at war with the Soviet Union in 1944, the Allies would not have even attempted a landing, and would have, IMHO, sued for peace.


But given that from the outset of the Third Reich the main threat was the Soviet Union, you may as well speculate "what if" the sun failed to rise.


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## mariomike (30 May 2011)

pitdroid said:
			
		

> And the Germans sent millions of soldiers to fight in the east, imagine if those soldiers were in Normandy during D-Day. Would the Allies win the battle, and if they lost the battle would they have won the war?



I think whoever won the race to build the Atomic Bomb was going to win the war.


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## vonGarvin (30 May 2011)

mariomike said:
			
		

> I think whoever won the race to build the Atomic Bomb was going to win the war.


A while back, I did my own "alternate history" on a "what if".  As a background, everything that happens at the beginning was true, up to this point:


> The planes encountered a storm front on the way home and were about to go above it to avoid hitting heavy turbelence.  Just as the planes were about to go higher, the lead pilot noted a clear patch a bit farther south.



The planes went higher, and the detonators failed to initiate due to the air pressure and/or freezing.


(PS: the side that got the A Bomb won the war in my little alternate history) ;D


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## a_majoor (30 May 2011)

Most post war analysis of the German atomic program demonstrated they were nowhere near building any usable nuclear technology, and indeed seemed to have wandered down several theoretical dead ends.

Some people claim Werner Heisenberg was deliberately taking the Nazi nuclear program off track, and since most of the leading scientists who had knowledge of nuclear physics had fled Europe prior to the war there was really no one else who could point to the errors and say "excuse me?"

OTOH since this science was in its infancy, there was no basis of knowledge available, the Allies used their immense resources to basically go down _every_ path of the decision tree to discover what worked and what didn't. Remember, the  "Manhattan Project" consumed billions of 1940 dollars, which was an immense sum then. (compound average rate of inflation since 1913 has been 3.37%, with the bulk of the inflation occuring starting in the 1940's).

I doubt the Axis powers individually or collectively could have mustered an atomic bomb, and the USSR certainly did not have the resources either (their ability to read most of the work being done in the United States let them build an atomic weapon with little difficulty and avoided all the branching side paths in 1947).


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## pitdroid (30 May 2011)

Another what if is what if Japan didn't attack America. America would then not be in the war as soon as they were and they wouldn't try to build the Atomic bomb. I think if the Germans didn't attack Russia when they did it would change things, they were clearly going to attack Russia some time but they shouldn't have done it when they were fighting with the British and Allies already.


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## larry Strong (30 May 2011)

pitdroid said:
			
		

> Another what if is what if Japan didn't attack America. America would then not be in the war as soon as they were and they wouldn't try to build the Atomic bomb. I think if the Germans didn't attack Russia when they did it would change things, they were clearly going to attack Russia some time but they shouldn't have done it when they were fighting with the British and Allies already.



There's reason to believe thatin 1941 Stalin would have attacked Germany in the next year or so............


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