# William S. Lind, FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War



## Zarathustra (13 Jul 2005)

Hello, this is my first post. I'm not (yet) a member of the Canadian Forces.

I recently found online this new book from William S. Lind. It's not a real U.S. Marine Corps doctrinal manual, it's only inspired by them. It covers Fourth Generation War, state militaries vs non-state opponents. The book is still a draft. Currently available is draft 3, dated June 10 2005. It's a 41 page Word document, quick to read. 

I found the book interesting to read but having no military experience I can't really comment on it or even recommend it. Surely because of the author some of you will be curious about it and spend 1-2 evenings reading it. I bring it to your attention hoping someone with Afghanistan or similar experience will give feedback on it. 


http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_7_06_05.htm
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc



> "All over the world, state militaries, including our own, find themselves fighting non-state opponents. This kind of war, which we call Fourth Generation war, is a very difficult challenge. Almost always, state militaries have vast superiority over their non-state opponents in most of what we call "combat power:" technology, weapons, techniques, training, etc. Despite these superiorities, more often than not, state militaries end up losing.
> 
> America's greatest military theorist, Air Force Colonel John Boyd, used to say,
> â Å“When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost. So I realized there is something more to it.â ?
> ...


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## Infanteer (13 Jul 2005)

Thanks for posting that, Zarathustra.

Lind has mentioned the "Manual" he's been writing for some time in his articles - he get active input from Marines returning from Iraq, so there should be some good stuff in there.


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## Matt_Fisher (13 Jul 2005)

Another extremely well written, concise and poignant article by Bill Lind.


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## ArmyRick (15 Jul 2005)

Interesting Articles...


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## MDE (12 Aug 2006)

:skull: I am not a member of the CF, though I respect you for your past and future achievements, in spite of your country's politics.   I am a member of another military force and have worked with the PPCLI in Afghanistan back in early 2002.  They were great -- I wish I could remember the commander's name at the time.  I respect the hell out of him. 

Anyway, do not be led astray by the whole concept of "4GW."  It is a re-discovery of things we have always known, but neglected to teach our younger officers and soldiers and failed to apply to the current war going on throughout the world.  What is actually meant by "4GW" is Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Insurgency or Guerrilla Warfare (GW).  There is an excellent discussion blog called globalguerrilas.typepad.com that has various discussions about this stuff.  Some of a post of mine on that site:

FYI: COIN=counter-insurgency; SOF=Special Operations Forces; SF=Special Forces; 

""The "4GW" crap really needs to stop. There are very successful tried and true concepts for Counter-insurgency (COIN), Guerrilla Warfare (GW) and Counter-Geurrilla Operations (CGO), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/ Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategies and campaigns. They were all written (by western authors) prior to 1963. The Asians had their library pretty much compete by WW2 (started 1500 years ago)by Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and other lesser names. The British had theirs written by TE Lawrence, though they they conventionally rejected the precepts from his articles, journals and his "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" until the 1950s and later when they were confronted by major problems in the colonies (a great example is Malaya). Even Saddam Hussein had his COIN and UW/GW manuals.

Most notably for the Americans is the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940, as well as the other side of the coin (no punintended) as the conduct of UW/Insurgency/COIN was all-encompassingly recorded in the various 31-series manuals by US Special Forces from 1951 through 1963. It was a direct out-growth of the CIA and USSF split from the dissolution of the OSS after WW2. And that institutional knowledge came from the multi-cultural application of those theories by the British SOE and America's OSS in France with the Maquis resistiance, the SOE in Yugoslavia and by Detachment 101 in Burma.

The current UW manual (though classified) accounts for these various concepts without re-writing the doctrine for each (don't bother reading the old one -- it was a political document that was forced on the SF community by a 1990's politically-correct distaste for all things unconvetional and, therefore, dirty). Now, that being said, all the realistic and useful concepts from "4GW" are already accounted for by the publications. COL Hammes' publications are nothing more than re-discovery by the conventional military and political leadership of things already taught by a few in the military school houses and neglected by most in practice.

I am reminded of a quotation:
"There is nothing new under the sun, but lots of old things we don't know" -Ambrose Bierce, in "The Devil's Dictionary"

This is not the first time we have re-created the wheel with this. In the late 1960s and 1970s California Gov. Ronald Reagan commissioned Raymond Momboisse to research and write a paper to instruct and familiarize state officials in the seeds of social discontent and the actions, conditions and other indicators of disenfranchisement shifting toward discontent toward unrest and, eventually, upheaval and rebellion. This was in response to the explosive growth of the various California university system-based student revolutionary movements such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (which later split in 1973-74 into the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Weather Underground (aka the Weathermen) -- remember Patty Hearst?). The result of Momboisse's work was the seminal "Blueprint of Revolution." This is (in my opinion) a landmark book and seems to be a big secret. It is also hard to get a hold of, unfortunately. Read this book to understand the social dynamic of unconventional or asymetrical warfare (lately known as 4GW). As far as what to do about it from the all perspectives of national power (military, political, economic and information) our current (dated but still relevant) IDAD doctrine covers it.

Another big problem is the continued lack of emphasis in the conventional military concerning these topics. The institutional ignorance is what allows for things like "4GW" to take hold without realizing that we already "knew" this stuff. The US Army Infantry is the proponent agency for COIN doctrine development and enforcement. Yet, they do not teach it anywhere. SOF teaches it, specifically, SF teaches it. I can not speak for the Marines, but the Army infantry does not teach it to their officers. The infantry seems to enjoy keeping their officers educated at the FM 7-8, 7-7J, 7-10 and -20 levels (infantry light and mechanized tactics at the squad, platoon, company and battalion). The next level of schooling is at ILE (formerly known as Command and Gen Staff College or CGSC), and they barely even mention that UW, COIN or anything besides division-level operations exist.""

Hope this helps.


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## Infanteer (12 Aug 2006)

MDE said:
			
		

> I wish I could remember the commander's name at the time.  I respect the hell out of him.



Col Pat Stogran?



> Anyway, do not be led astray by the whole concept of "4GW."  It is a re-discovery of things we have always known, but neglected to teach our younger officers and soldiers and failed to apply to the current war going on throughout the world.



4GW gets rightfully hammered for some of its weaker theoretical foundations.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632

I think you are right sir, in that much of what is "new" is old.  However, I find 4GW helpful in the fact that it:

1)  Identifies some new trends (ie: Globalization, which like 4GW is not "new" either) that affect an old principle
2)  Serves as a model for discourse on what is a very relevent topic

The trick is to view it as a model of thinking rather than "The Way".  If taken in the latter sense, it gets viewed as a panacea (like Lind's "3GW") leading to one-sided approaches and illogical foundations for doctrine.



> There is an excellent discussion blog called globalguerrilas.typepad.com that has various discussions about this stuff.  Some of a post of mine on that site:



I've found the Global Guerrilla's site to be a fairly good one, thanks for reminding me of it.  I used some of its material in the Islamic Insurgency thread.  Incidentally enough, the author of that blog is big on "4GW". 



> "The "4GW" crap really needs to stop. There are very successful tried and true concepts for Counter-insurgency (COIN), Guerrilla Warfare (GW) and Counter-Geurrilla Operations (CGO), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/ Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategies and campaigns. They were all written (by western authors) prior to 1963. The Asians had their library pretty much compete by WW2 (started 1500 years ago)by Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and other lesser names. The British had theirs written by TE Lawrence, though they they conventionally rejected the precepts from his articles, journals and his "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" until the 1950s and later when they were confronted by major problems in the colonies (a great example is Malaya). Even Saddam Hussein had his COIN and UW/GW manuals.



What I found more compelling was what Martin van Crevald pointed out in his book The Transformation of War is that since WWII, no conventional military force has successfully beat a guerilla foe.  He points out that Malaya, often touted as the success, is a piss-poor example as it was fought by an ethnic minority for a cause that had no popular support amongst the local Malay population.  Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Algeria.  British General Sir Rupert Smith has written a new book which describes his thoughts of how war is changing from Interstate Industrial War to a "War Amongst the Peoples".  His observations, which begin with the bold statement "War no longer exists", like 4GW, are useful for providing fuel for thought on how conflict works.



> Another big problem is the continued lack of emphasis in the conventional military concerning these topics. The institutional ignorance is what allows for things like "4GW" to take hold without realizing that we already "knew" this stuff. The US Army Infantry is the proponent agency for COIN doctrine development and enforcement. Yet, they do not teach it anywhere. SOF teaches it, specifically, SF teaches it. I can not speak for the Marines, but the Army infantry does not teach it to their officers. The infantry seems to enjoy keeping their officers educated at the FM 7-8, 7-7J, 7-10 and -20 levels (infantry light and mechanized tactics at the squad, platoon, company and battalion). The next level of schooling is at ILE (formerly known as Command and Gen Staff College or CGSC), and they barely even mention that UW, COIN or anything besides division-level operations exist."



Probably a cultural thing within conventional military forces.

Anyways, thanks for the insights and welcome to Army.ca!   :cheers:


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## tomahawk6 (12 Aug 2006)

I really really hate Lind as a "defense analyst". An oxymoron for a democrat if you ask me. I crossed swords with him before on Hack's site.


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## Infanteer (12 Aug 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I really really hate Lind as a "defense analyst".



I think he's got good things to say -at times-, but I'm not keen on the way he hawks his theories like a used car salesmen.

Got a link T6?


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## tomahawk6 (12 Aug 2006)

http://www.sftt.org/

In fact Lind has an article this week. First pic is him. Hackworth started soldiers for the truth which initially was a good idea. He acted like an ombudsman. Over time he got very political- read anti-Bush.
He attracted more left wing voices  and any chance they got to stick it to the administration they took it.
In fact look at the last line in his article "Collapse of the Flanks". He must have forgotten that the military doesnt decide to withdraw troops the President does.



> Let us hope that, unlike von Paulus, our commanders know when to get out, regardless of orders from a leader who will not recognize reality.


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## Centurian1985 (13 Aug 2006)

MDE said:
			
		

> Anyway, do not be led astray by the whole concept of "4GW."  It is a re-discovery of things we have always known, but neglected to teach our younger officers and soldiers and failed to apply to the current war going on throughout the world.  What is actually meant by "4GW" is Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Insurgency or Guerrilla Warfare (GW).  There is an excellent discussion blog called globalguerrilas.typepad.com that has various discussions about this stuff.  Some of a post of mine on that site:
> "There is nothing new under the sun, but lots of old things we don't know" -Ambrose Bierce, in "The Devil's Dictionary"



+1; Glad someone else did the homework. i wanted to do a rebuttal but had no evidence to back up my belief that this '4GW' is just a new name for an old technique.


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## TangoTwoBravo (13 Aug 2006)

Guess I'm all about 2nd generation warfare.  Maybe I'll write a book called "Blow the **** out of'em:  The Case for Firepower-based Conflict Resolution."  It will be a companion to my other planned book "Results-based Ethics: A Primer."


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## pmririshman (13 Aug 2006)

The best critique of 4GW I have read was in the winter 2006 issue of the "Canadian Army Journal". It was written by Vincent J. Curtis, a reserve infantry officer from Ontario. Curtis writes “The term “Fourth Generation Warfare” is an uninformative slogan” and “(t)he usefulness of 4GW as an analytical tool for military thinkers and planners is ... non-existent.” It's a thought provoking article unlike most of what Lind writes. 

The article can be read here: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_4/CAJ_vol8.4_07_e.pdf


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## Centurian1985 (14 Aug 2006)

Excellent summary - wish I had had it when one of my former bosses was going on about '4GW' being the war-fighting concept of the future...


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## Zarathustra (15 Aug 2006)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> It will be a companion to my other planned book "Results-based Ethics: A Primer."



*lol* That looks interesting. 


Back to 4GW, I think Lind links it to the decline of the state, as presented by Van Creveld a few years ago. That's where Lind sees the difference with previous small wars / guerrilla / insurrection / etc. But anyway, if there's really a difference, it seems very academic and has minimal impact on how to win those wars.  The advices Lind gives appear to me very similar to what previous authors wrote about counter-insurgency operations.


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## Kalatzi (16 Aug 2006)

Something I find interesting though, and not in a good way ...
I understand that not 4GW  theory is not getting a lot of traction in the militaries for a variety of reasons fair enough. 
Oon the Other hand -  there are anecdotal references that this is the strartegy that group i call the NME are trying to follow.  

Soo, If one knows waht there trying to do ...

And with the internet being an open medium, and people like Friend Lind happily dissecting and/or pointing out potential achilllles heels ... 

WWII this wouldnt have happened. I'm all in favour of free speech, but then yelling fire in a theatre isn't free speech. 

One sometimes wishes for self-censorship

Hey that might even apply to me


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## Centurian1985 (16 Aug 2006)

Kalatzi said:
			
		

> Something I find interesting though, and not in a good way ...
> I understand that *not 4GW  theory *  is not getting a lot of traction in the militaries for a variety of reasons fair enough.
> Oon the Other hand -  *there are anecdotal references that this is the strartegy that group i call the NME are trying to follow*.
> Soo, If one knows waht there trying to do ...
> ...



I'm sorry but even disregarding the grammar, that post doesn't make much sense - I've highlighted what I found incomprehensible. 

There are several basic faults I find with Lind - i.e. first, treating all warfare as unchanged up to 1634.  What about calvary as manoeuvre forces ? What about innovations in ranged weapons such as longbows and catapults that first allowed for enemy casualties without close engagement? Why are the French and Germans credited with 'skirmishing' in WWI when the British invented this with the Green Jackets back in the Napoleonic Wars?  Why are guerrilla tactics treated as modern fourth generation when the Mahdi in Sudan used manoeuvre forces and guerrilla tactics to beat British forts and infantry defence squares back in the late 1800's?  Lind's claims of 'four generations' completely ignores the fact that such tactics were originally used by other forces in previous battles of history.  It is also in complete contradiction to theories of generational warfare based on levels of technology that emphasize the longbow, gun, cannon, battleship, machine gun, tank, submarine, airplane, and missiles as generations of battle, and to which tactics and strategies are closely tied in ever increasing ranges of projection in power.


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