# CounterInsurgency At The Company Level



## tomahawk6 (15 Aug 2006)

Ran across this pdf article by Australian Reserve LTC David Kilcullen currently assigned to the US Dept of State  CounterTerrorism Coordinator as Chief Strategist. Excellant article. Some excerpts:

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf



> But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into
> action – at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a
> language you don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos?
> How does counterinsurgency actually happen?





> Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: you are
> not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply, to link the theory
> with the techniques and procedures you already know.


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## Centurian1985 (16 Aug 2006)

Some very good tips that I employed in previous deployments, but rarely used by other Canadians; would like to hear from current members with Afghan experience whether we have improved.


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## TangoTwoBravo (16 Aug 2006)

Improved from what?  What was our last counter-insurgency?  What was our last war for that matter?

I took a quick read.  Too soon for me to judge.  Some of it jives, some of it runs counter to my own observations/thoughts.


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## Centurian1985 (16 Aug 2006)

Although labelled 'counter-insurgency' a lot of this material is directly transferable to 'counter-intelligence' and 'peace enforcement' operations, where although there is no declared state of war between local and occupying forces, there are numerous incidents of violence between elements, and a high level of political and propoganda conflict between opposing elements. E.g. East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Somnalia, etc.


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## eeyore063 (18 Aug 2006)

I think this was a really great read. The first 2 pages contain lessons that anyone deploying in theater should take to heart. Whether or not we want to classify the Afghanistan mission as a Counter-insurgency war I think is just semantics. 


> here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations.


In my opinion this would define the current situation in Afghanistan. 


> Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of their agenda - counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided. So you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them.


This is apparent in Afghanistan where you have interest by the TB, HiG, AQ, NATO, and the rest of the international community. TB and AQ goals are not necessarily the same, with each side working towards a different goal. The international community and NATO may not have the same idea of how to go about creating a stable state in Afghanistan. And the US may not manoeuvre in the same direction as NATO. 
Anyways that is jsut my 2 cents on the subject. Take it for what it is.
In some of the research I was doing I found another good text on Insurbency warfare here is the link:
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/PFD.htm


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