# Why Arabs Lose Wars



## Blindspot

Che said:
			
		

> Although I've always maintained if you could raise an entire unit of Arab soldiers on modern training, tactics and equipment you would find they'd be an awe inspiring fighting force, it's an interesting thought experiment but realistically would probably create more politicall fallout than the CF can handle.



After reading this post from Che, I recalled an interesting article I read where the author would likely say the above statement would not be possible. I thought this might make for an interesting discussion in of itself. 

Here is the article:
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_17/articles/deatkine_arabs1.html

Here is Che's original post:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/21612/post-112205.html#msg112205


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## 48Highlander

This isn't something that's limited to Arab forces.  Basically, the main problems as the author lists them are secrecy, over-centrilazation, no concern for the well being of soldiers, and lack of initiative/leadership.  These things have nothing to do with the arab religion.  They are caused by poverty, and a dictatorial style of government.  The Russian and Chinese armed forces had very similar problems during the last few decades, and in some ways still do.  Only a democratic country would be foolish enough to arm and train 700,000 people, and then tell them to think for themselves


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## pbi

Interesting piece (I can hear the PC whiners now: "Racism!, Racism!"). Reminds of two things I've seen.

First, on my serial at USMC C&SC Quantico in 1997-98, there were five Arabic officers (amongst 24 foreign students in a body of about 200). Although each was from a different country, their performance was equally bad, as particularly exemplified during the final CPX, in which tey did nothing except sit, talk, smoke and drink coffee. Of course, they all graduated.....

Second, in Cyprus in 1991 I attended a luncheon given for the Greek Mayor of Nicosia. A very interesting fellow (excellent English spreaker) he told us of recent conference of  Middle Eastern mayors he had just attended. When they were discussing responses to disasters, the Mayor of Cairo reportedly stated that he made a habit of not showing up at any incident with less than 200 casualties.

These would tend to support some of the contentions in the Atkine article. He makes an additional good point when he mentions the hideous effect the Russians had on the already dysfunctional Arabic C2 culture-you can see this effect lingering on almost wherever the Russians went, along with piles of their rusted, broken, discarded equipment. Cheers.


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## winchable

The key words I've noticed in that article were "leadership" the author definetly takes aim at the political leadership of Arab countries. Which is something I support. Arab leaders are awful and with some very bright exceptions, always have been, and it seems (if the article is taken as true which it shall be) that this has been passed downhill and the officers of the Arab armies emulate said trait.

The author also appears to be using Arab as a political and cultural term, not a racial term, so I assume he uses "Arab" for lack of a better descriptor.

But I think there are some things which we can take from the article and use to support my argument. Most notably is the story of the Egyptians marching a parade of soldiers to block the sand from hitting the other soldiers.
A small example I know, but it is a fine example of just what you can do with a well motivated group of Arabs. Now if we were to put this kind of dedication of the NCO towards another task, imagine the results. Officers aside, my statement doesn't need much refinement.

My statement was that you would train them on "modern training, tactics and equipment" the authors argument is based on current systems of training in predominately Arab countries, which are quite obviously antiquated.

So I would like to refine my statement somewhat, with a proper introduction into Modern Tactics, training (Which presumably encourages free thought and outside the box thinking) you could raise a very successful modern Arab regiment, largely due to their intense loyalty and passion if rightly motivated.

This is unlikely to happen however and the authors sentiments will ring true for a long time to come:


> Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion that the Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political, warfare



Which is true, if you can motivate them into small groups(presumably for your own cause) they will fight a successful insurgency. The only one I can think off the top of my head which is a good example is the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. What was notable about that was A)Once they had defeated the Ottomans, and a modern parliamentary style of system was thrust upon them, it was entirely incompatible with the extremely diverse Arab culture (an argument which is still true today) as a result the infighting led to colonisation and B)It is a good example of what properly (by your definition) motivated Arab warriors can do against a larger force.

Kind of lost it there sorry.
This whole argument I'm making actually disgusts me because it's turning Arabs into tools to defeat our enemies, which is...conflicting for obvious reasons.


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## QORvanweert

Che said:
			
		

> The key words I've noticed in that article were "leadership" the author definitely takes aim at the political leadership of Arab countries. Which is something I support. Arab leaders are awful and with some very bright exceptions, always have been, and it seems (if the article is taken as true which it shall be) that this has been passed downhill and the officers of the Arab armies emulate said trait.


Well if it cheers you up, our *political* leaders aren't that much better either .... I believe that any group of soldiers can be motivated into becoming a very effective fighting force and this ability has nothing to do with nationality. The strength of ideology is far stronger, to believe in an inherent genetic gift is a huge mistake. in my opinion at least. If anything, I think that their upbringing(Arabs) is what makes them so susceptible to being tools of ideology.


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## Spr.Earl

Hmmm, this can be debated if we look at history.


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## Kirkhill

In support of Che's position I think that consideration of the record of some of the following forces might be interesting:

The Arab Legion
The Trans-Jordanian Field Force
The Firqats of Oman (tribal militias essentially that were organized in company sized forces)
The Senussis (spelling?)

All of these Arab forces from the colonial period and early post-colonial period were well thought of by the westerners they served with.   The problem is not with the Arab on the ground.

As to Sapper Earl's suggestion you look to history... Mohammed's followers didn't spread the word selling flowers and doing Hare Krishna chants.  And Saladin's armies were pretty capable as well.


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## Kirkhill

Point taken S_Baker.  You're right.  I was wrong.  However his armies included Arabs. I don't know the ratio of Kurds to Arabs to other types of Muslimns.


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## Infanteer

> As to Sapper Earl's suggestion you look to history... Mohammed's followers didn't spread the word selling flowers and doing Hare Krishna chants.   And Saladin's armies were pretty capable as well.



I think the important distinction is to discern the difference between the Warrior cultures that did the Islamic societies of the Middle East so well (horse culture of the Turks, Janissaries, Mamelukes) and the lens of the professional fighting force that we are trying to view them through now.

PBI's example is great in underlying this fact.   In that most Prussian of professional pursuits, a CPX, the soldiers from Arab societies were quite poor at it.   I remember reading an article in which an Officer from an African country, who was a student on a US Company Commander's Course, nearly failed because each attack was a head-on disaster - flanking attacks were not in his psyche.

In essence, when societies that attempt to pick up a style of fighting that the west seems to have done so well with, they do poorly.   I think it is because they are attempting to graft a full time, professional force drawn from society on a culture that isn't set up to deal with it - think of the social triggers that are part of this ideal; relatively free and open society, solid professional grounding, social mobility within the Army (ie: promotion).

Thinking that any culture can pick up a way of fighting that is so different then the way they've done it (well) for centuries is like thinking you could take some tribal Bedouin man and throw him into a GAP store to make a 9-5 living.


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## QORvanweert

In John Keegans 'On War', he mentions during the excerpt of the seige of Constantinople that the Janissaries employed were infact so called 'Christian' kids taken from the Balkans and trained. I can't prove this unless you read the story, but, if this were true then wouldn't that suggest a link to Europe?


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## winchable

I've been contemplating this topic a bit as of late and I agree with Infanteer quite a bit but thought I'd add something.

Traditionally the Arab peoples are divided, tribes etc. While the actual layout of the land was a big sweeping borderless thing, the people occupying it shared commonalities but for the most part, despite whatever empire came along, have been made up of smaller (sometimes larger) pockets of people.

Now, not claiming to be an expert on warfare, it would mke sense to me that any fighting force imposed (adopted) on or by the Arab peoples that requires large sweeping uniformity etc. Would not last long and would not neccessarily be as successful as a force that was successful in other regions.
So, following this logic (which I hope I'm getting across) the ideal Arab fighting force woud be made up of small but tight groups of fighters.
So the most successful Arab army wouldn't be a large one made of battalions which were responsible to a single command, rather they would be largely autonomous guerilla style forces attempting victory with many, many smaller victories rather than large battles and offensives.
So hit and run tactics are ideal providing that the many smaller forces recognise a common goal which would override the relatively liberal autonomy each individual force is given.
Though I should add this might not be what has happened historically in all cases.

It actually pains me to admit that this is a result of the fragmentation of the people (TE Lawrence, whos philosophy I share regarding the Arabian peninsular was quite critical of the Arab peoples lack of larger unity) and goes against my idealistic pursuit of a unified Arabian peninsular.

Just snowballing ideas there.


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## Blindspot

Che said:
			
		

> So, following this logic (which I hope I'm getting across) the ideal Arab fighting force woud be made up of small but tight groups of fighters.
> So the most successful Arab army wouldn't be a large one made of battalions which were responsible to a single command, rather they would be largely autonomous guerilla style forces attempting victory with many, many smaller victories rather than large battles and offensives.
> So hit and run tactics are ideal providing that the many smaller forces recognise a common goal which would override the relatively liberal autonomy each individual force is given.



It would be true then to say that such a force would be required to fight in terrain that is most advantageous to that style of warfare, ie. urban, mountainous, etc. To fight a cohesive, modern, western division, for example, elsewhere would not be to the advantage of groups of smaller, autonomous units. Also this would suggest, I would imagine, a defensive posture rather than offensive.

This also brings to mind the degree of resolve to achieve the greater political objective. Is it within the Arab psyche to do anything it takes to achieve victory? We see everyday in the news acts that the West considers barabaric and beyond its desire to perpetrate. I believe it was Bill Maher who got into a lot of trouble for suggesting that compared to the Islamic terrorist, the western powers were cowards. In other words, the west is afraid to do what it really needs to do to win.


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## winchable

> It would be true then to say that such a force would be required to fight in terrain that is most advantageous to that style of warfare, ie. urban, mountainous, etc. To fight a cohesive, modern, western division, for example, elsewhere would not be to the advantage of groups of smaller, autonomous units. Also this would suggest, I would imagine, a defensive posture rather than offensive


.

Yes, keeping with the tradition of guerilla warfare it would be neccessary that they would fight on their own kind of turf and within their own communities almost.
Guerillas *have* to fight in the territories they know to give them the added advantage over a presumably larger force.

However they would need to adopt a very, very offensive posture. An almost incessant number of small attacks on a larger force would presumably be the equivalent of a large offensive no?
Guerilla warfare has it's strengths in it's unpredictability I believe. Hit and runs of supply convoys (See Arab Revolt in ww1 and the current Iraq situation) have been effective in guerilla warfare over the centuries.
But you are correct in assuming that the fight would have to be on home turf as a key strength to guerilla warfare is what the guerillas lack in firepower they make up for with absolute familiarity with the terrain.
In some ways it is a defensive posture that relies on attrition of the offensive movement and then moving to an offensive.



> Is it within the Arab psyche to do anything it takes to achieve victory?


 
I would say historically yes, we are proud to the point where it is a flaw and I believe would rather go down in a hail of gunfire or shrapnel than say "Right then you've got it."
I think Kissingers goal when mediating between the Israelis and Egyptians was to make it seem like the Egyptians won because he knew that they would choose death over defeat and that would have been a step in the wrong direction. And I'm pretty sure it worked because they were still celebrating that victory recently, in fact I believe Nasser was assasinated in a parade to commemorate said "victory"

Ah what the hell do I know.


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## winchable

Also I've noticed I've completely revamped my original idea of an Arab force fighting on modern tactics and training.


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## Blindspot

QORvanweert said:
			
		

> In John Keegans 'On War', he mentions during the excerpt of the seige of Constantinople that the Janissaries employed were infact so called 'Christian' kids taken from the Balkans and trained. I can't prove this unless you read the story, but, if this were true then wouldn't that suggest a link to Europe?



The system of Devsirme would likely suggest that link be nullified. These youth were taken at a very young age and had all ties to their origins severerd. They became the "property" of the sultan and converted to Islam. However, the Ottoman Empire consisted of a multitude of ethnicities.


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## Blindspot

Che said:
			
		

> However they would need to adopt a very, very offensive posture. An almost incessant number of small attacks on a larger force would presumably be the equivalent of a large offensive no?



Upon reflection, I would agree. Perhaps I meant defensive goal; protecting territory using offensive tactics. Makes sense.


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## winchable

A somewhat apt analogy might be a thousand wasps bringing down a pitbull isntead another pitbull fighting that pitbull.


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## Kirkhill

Che, are you factoring in the differences amongst different groups of Arabs, even those that are all Sunni.  For example those of the Hejaz, and the wandering tribes like the Bedu.  It seems to me that the strongest proponents of Wahabism, the traditionalists or Salafis seem to be either the Bedu or the newly resettled tribes such as those in Fallujah and Ramadi and the cities of the deserts below the Kurdish foothills and mountains.

Have these historically nomadic tribes adjusted to settled life and the imposition of borders which restrict their ability to roam?

It seems to this outsider that like most other peoples the Arabs, not to mention the Muslimns at large have a number of sub-cultures.  The Arabs of the Maghreb, and of the Hejaz as well as those of Oman and the Gulf States seem to have a different outlook than do the Arabs of Najd and the Yemen.

Or am I totally off track here?


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## winchable

Nope you're on track I think I tried to take that into account and that would be a gamble you'd have to take if you were in reality trying to raise such a force. That kind of shows up in the idea of many small moderately autonomous forces with a common goal, the goal would be fairly simple as anything more complicated would bring out those many schisms which divide a peoples.
Arabs and Muslims are anything but monolithic.

The heart of Arabia (look around the countries bordering Saudi Arabia) is still operating with undefined borders however and it is my belief that the tribal spirit still lives on even if only a little.
It would take a good leader to incite said spirit etc. etc. we've all heard me rant before.

Of course I wouldn't base a big gamble on something as subjective as spirit and I wouldn't expect anyone else to.

But My mind wanders to the World War 1 Arab revolt once again, bit of a gamble, many gambles, payoff was good too.


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## Infanteer

I think when looking at links between culture, war, and doctrine it is important to appreciate the different levels.

There seems to be a macro-cultural level.  This is what authors like John Keegan and Victor Davis Hanson love to focus on.  Looking at it from this level looks at big picture things (geography, climate, religion) - Western shock vs Central Asian and Arabian skirmish.

There is also a micro-cultural level - this is what Kirkhill is referring to, local differences within the cultural monolith (which is never truly monolithic).  Looking at it from this level forces one to consider more temporal, finer details (tribalism, state, ideology) -   Although both modern, professional Western armies, why did the French opt for methodical battle while the Germans strive for decisive operational battle?

As with almost everything, I think any answers are going to be a mixture of both of these concepts.


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## Matt_Fisher

I don't know if anyone has ever read this book or not, but considering the subject, I'd highly recommend it after leafing through a copy:

Arabs At War: Military Effectiveness, 1948â â€œ1991
by Kenneth Pollack

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0803287836/qid=1099324273/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-8289334-4384133?v=glance&s=books


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## winchable

The Egyptians were actually African not "christian", however after the Islamic conquest Arabia began exporting massive numbers of people, Arab people.
The Coptic point is only partially true, there was a coptic church in Egypt was one of the oldest around(churches in Arabia stretched right back to Jesus himself, as did the coptics) but the great majority of Christians in egypt were under the rule of byzantine lineage where the Coptics were unto themselves.

Quite right the majority of the Islamic world is not Arab, the Majority of the Arab world is however Muslim and all Arabs are..Arab.
I wouldn'y jump to the Bin Laden, Umayyid comparison either.

Bin Laden is attacking a western world which has bestowed a great many liberties and freedoms upon its citizens.
However the Umayyid conquest of North Africa and Andalusia (Modern Spain) was against a much less benevolent empire.
The Muslim political system bestowed more rights on Christians and Jews than they had ever had under Byzantine rule, charged lower taxes and tributes and protected the indigenous population much more than the previous rulers have. Contemporary sources at the time will verify that the majority of Egyptians were welcoming of the Muslim Caliph in place of any previous empire as with Spain. Do I deny that there were exceptions? Of course not, I would be glad to point you to examples of Big bad Muslim conquerors as well, but you'll find the population of North Africa and Andalusia were warm towards the Caliph (While most Arabia at the time actually wasn't, which is partly why they left Syria.
In Spain it was a very similar situation to North Africa.
IE The indigenous population found themselves under better rule than they had under the previous empire (though it would pale in comparison to todays standards yes yes yes)

But you're right about the assumption that the majority of the Islamic world is Arab when it is in fact a majority south-east Asian.
But Arabs are traditionally quite divided and are often too hot headed to see themselves as brothers, Islam went along way to improve and unite that, but it still exists very much today. Combine this tribal family first attitude with ideas of nationalism and war, you find the present situation can be traced back to pre-Islamic Arabia.


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## Acorn

The original Egyptians can be called African, as they rose in that continent. However, the majority of today's Egyptians are more Arab than Maghreb Arabs or Sudanese. It is generally accepted that Arabs are the majority in North Africa, the Levant and Iraq, as well as the Arabian Peninsula.

The core of Islam may be benevolent, however its implementation wasn't always so. This is especially true in Africa, where the people were generally a commodity for trade by Arab slavers.

Acorn


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## Ex-Dragoon

Don't forget folks that the slavery was practiced here in North AMerica up until the 1860s so before we condemn Arab slavers we ourselves have a lot to atone for.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

QUOTE,
Don't forget folks that the slavery was practiced here in North AMerica up until the 1860s so before we condemn Arab slavers we ourselves have a lot to atone for.

I hate this way of thinking, its sad, I will repeat it as often as I need too....I have never had a slave, my kids have never had a slave, my parents have never had a slave.....I need not atone for slavery!


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## Ex-Dragoon

Nor have I Bruce, but my point is we point fingers at the Arabs yet forget we have done some nasty things as well.


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## Acorn

Slavery was banned in Canada at the same time as the rest of the British Empire, long before the 1860s. Dodgy moral equivalency anyway.

Acorn


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## Ex-Dragoon

Was referring to North America not just Canada and the British Empire.   :

We had slaves and  so did the Arabs either way its wrong, but you can't point at one aspect of the slave trade without taking responsibility as well. Geez that should have been fairly obvious folks.


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## Infanteer

Acorn is right, dodgy moral equivalence.

Just as we cannot rest on our laurels, we cannot continue to be culpable for the misdeeds of centuries ago.  Here and now is what is important.


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## Ex-Dragoon

No whats done in the past is done but S_Baker brought up the ALgerian slave markets (which were closed by the French in the 1830s), so I felt the slave trade here in North America was a fair comparison.


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## Infanteer

Oh, Ok.

I thought we were referring to the current African Slave Trade.


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## Kirkhill

I am of the "what's done is done" school and put those fingers of blame away.  Every culture, every nation, every race, on every continent  - without exception - has been turned into slaves and has kept slaves.  

Old habits die hard in some places - but die they must and die they will.


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## winchable

Precisely, and I question why the Major felt it neccessary to bring it up other than as a cute little historical anecdote to move peoples focus from the bigger picture.


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## winchable

Actually it's mAlik,
Meem, Alif Lam Kaaf, Meaning: Provider and owner.
Malik without the Alif is King.

I am familiar with the slavery that occurred during the Muslim Imperial days. I wouldn't say slavery is good, however relative to the slavery most of us are familiar with and relative to the slavery that was occuring at the time, it was different and notable in the sense that slaves were more a part of the family and had the opportunity to move up in the society (Re:Mamluks, also from the same root as Malik)

And yes Major I am very much a Western Muslim and make no attempt to hide it. However you brought up an historical anecdote about Slavery (which was common occurence everywhere at the time) which was designed to detract from the larger picture that is the Muslim empire RELATIVE to the byzantines or any other empire at the time was leaps and bounds ahead of them in terms of treatment of their subjects etc.
You brought up the Jizyah or pole tax. The Jizyah, although was only for non-Muslims, was not given to anyone who could not afford it AND was a damn sight lower than anything that had been previously imposed.

IF we're going to compare these empires to the enlightened states of today then yes we're going to be disgusted.


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## winchable

By the way Maj you have to get online more often this is the most drawn out debate yet!


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## Kirkhill

> Anyway...enough about this topic.



Thank you.  Starting to disturb my sleep.

Cheers.


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## winchable

> I do think it is silly to say that slaves were like part of the family...that is just wrong.  How about freedom of choice



Fair enough, one last thing though.

Mawali--->Clients.
Arab tribes would Absorb slaves as Mawali or "Clients" and the clients would eventually be freed of their slave status, allowed to own land and enter marriage etc.

Of course they didn't have freedom of choice, but once again...relative to the other forms of slavery (chattle etc.) Most slaves were taken in times of war as prisoner and then adopted, I can point you at the texts if you like. The slave "market" developed a little later on, and of course went on to produce the modern conept of chattle slavery.
Of course if we're going to go through history with a fine tooth comb and say how much better it would have been if these people hadn't enslaved these or this war hadn't been fought over this stupid reason I could do that all night because there's a plethora of examples.

Anyhow, yeah this has nothing to do with why Arabs lose wars.
PM me with more before we make this thread hurt more peoples head.


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## Acorn

I'd be one to continue this [Arab culture and history] discussion, but understand that it's drifted somewhat off the plot for the topic.

Perhaps a new subject under Political or Off Topic min fadlak?

Ma issalame,

Acorn


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## winchable

Ask and ye shall recieve...well as long as it's within reason.


http://army.ca/forums/threads/22700.0.html


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## kruger

Why Arabs lose wars?
Too much waving shoes around in crowds and screaming Allah Akbar and too little sophisticated planning, intelligence and tactics. Funny bunch those Arabs though. Thirteenth century mentality + twentieth century Eastern European technology (AK series rifles) + no regard for human life and radicalism = self-erradication.


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## winchable

> Thirteenth century mentality + twentieth century Eastern European technology (AK series rifles) + no regard for human life and radicalism = self-erradication



Explain yourself


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## Pieman

> Too much waving shoes around in crowds and screaming Allah Akbar and too little sophisticated planning, intelligence and tactics.


Someone saw that Indiana Jones movie one too many times.  : Remember the scene where that huge Arab jumps in front of Indy with the sword, starts spinning it around in a big impressive display, and then Indy pulls out his gun and shoot him. <snicker> I love that scene.
Oops! Getting off topic. 

As far as the comment on Arab tactics being unsophisticated, it would appear the current modern tactics the Arabs are using are pretty effective against the American forces. They are are not winning the war but they are certainly putting up a good fight, and making things pretty difficult to say the least. 

I think one of the most famous sayings about war is 'know your enemy', but I think another equally important message would be 'never underestimate your enemy'....the strategy works in chess games too


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## Acorn

Napalm said:
			
		

> Why Arabs lose wars?
> Too much waving shoes around in crowds and screaming Allah Akbar and too little sophisticated planning, intelligence and tactics. Funny bunch those Arabs though. Thirteenth century mentality + twentieth century Eastern European technology (AK series rifles) + no regard for human life and radicalism = self-erradication.



Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.


Acorn


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## Infanteer

Acorn said:
			
		

> Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.





Don't you love it when people cherry pick through history and leave out the obvious....


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## 48Highlander

Pieman said:
			
		

> As far as the comment on Arab tactics being unsophisticated, it would appear the current modern tactics the Arabs are using are pretty effective against the American forces. They are are not winning the war but they are certainly putting up a good fight, and making things pretty difficult to say the least.



Look at the casualty figures for Americans in Desert Storm 1 and 2.  Then look at the casualty figures for Iraqi's in the same wars.  I don't know about you, but to me the comparison of those figures in no way indicates that Iraqi's "put up a good fight".  Then there's the fact that their military fell apart in 3 days in 1991, and in a few weeks the second time around.  Now if you're refering to the current "resistance" which consists mainly of suicide bombers...well, yeah I suppose you could call that a "good fight"....except that they've killed more Iraqi civilians than coalition soldiers.  Oh wait, I know, you must be talking about Fallujah!  Right, where the number of foreign combatants killed has been only 10 times higher than the number of dead Americans.  Ofcourse, FIBUA combat is supposed to produce 3-5 times as many casualties amongst the attackers....but I guess the Americans just got lucky.

C'mon, admit it, your statement was just plain silly


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## Pieman

> Oh wait, I know, you must be talking about Fallujah!   Right, where the number of foreign combatants killed has been only 10 times higher than the number of dead Americans.   Ofcourse, FIBUA combat is supposed to produce 3-5 times as many casualties amongst the attackers....but I guess the Americans just got lucky.
> 
> C'mon, admit it, your statement was just plain silly



No, I don't think it is silly. Your points comparing the death ratios is well taken. But you are painting a picture that is saying the American and British forces are having a cake walk, easy time there. Don't forget the insurgents there have been pretty good at preventing the Americans establish stability and control, they have been pretty good at destroying oil pipelines, and those civilian casualties were often Iraqis signing up to be police working for the Americans (a.k.a.   The enemy) The goal of their tactics does not appear to be to head off the Americans and push them out, rather just make things too difficult for the Americans to complete their goals.

Like I said, their tactics are certainly not winning the war, but it is foolish to think that their efforts have had little effect on the efforts of the American forces. Their object of their game is to prevent the Americans from estabishing control and stability in Iraq, and given the apparent success they are having doing that, I would say they are putting up a good fight. Last time I checked Iraq did not appear to be too stable or safe. In fact, I don't think I will go there for vacation this year, my wallet might get stolen!


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## kruger

Acorn said:
			
		

> Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.
> 
> 
> Acorn



Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1982-1984, 1991, 2001, 2003 etc. and don't waste our time with half-assed rebuttals.


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## Infanteer

Not that it matters because this shitbird is gone, but if anybody cares to pick up his reigns....

If you're so intent on doing a thorough historical analysis, set the clock back to the Roman Empire and trace the complete military history of Arabs; you'll find your thesis doesn't really hold any water.

P.S.   I'm trying to remember for the life of me which Arabs lost a war in 2001; unless of course he means that huge Arab population in Afghanistan.... :

P.P.S.

48, Torlyn is correct.   One can't judge "effectiveness" on casualty figures alone - if we were to do that, the German invasion of Russia and the American intervention in Vietnam would be unqualified successes.


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## 48Highlander

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 48, Torlyn is correct.  One can't judge "effectiveness" on casualty figures alone - if we were to do that, the German invasion of Russia and the American intervention in Vietnam would be unqualified successes.



    That's true.  This all depends on which arabs we're talking about.  The original topic was "why arabs lose wars", not "why arabs are ineffective terrorists".  The invasion of Iraq was a war.  What's going on there now....maybe I'm splitting hairs here, but I wouldn't consider it a war, no more than two airplanes crashing into the world trade center constituted a war.  And yes, I know that the Bush administration is calling the whole thing a "war on terror".  That terminology is probably part of the reason why the insurgents in Iraq are having as much success as they are; because they US forces are trying to fight a war, while the insurgents use mainly hit-and-run tactics and indiscriminate bombings.  Same thing if you look back to when Israel was first formed and attacked.  The Arabs lost the war, but the terrorist tactics going on now are "effective".  The way I see it....any idiot can pick up a weapon and start taking out civilians....or make a bomb and drive it into the middle of a military formation....and on a man-for-man basis it'll seem to be pretty effective.  It's much harder to create a fighting force which can stand up on the field on battle and engage and destroy their enemies.


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## Infanteer

48Highlander said:
			
		

> That's true. This all depends on which arabs we're talking about. The original topic was "why arabs lose wars", not "why arabs are ineffective terrorists". The invasion of Iraq was a war. What's going on there now....maybe I'm splitting hairs here, but I wouldn't consider it a war, no more than two airplanes crashing into the world trade center constituted a war. And yes, I know that the Bush administration is calling the whole thing a "war on terror". That terminology is probably part of the reason why the insurgents in Iraq are having as much success as they are; because they US forces are trying to fight a war, while the insurgents use mainly hit-and-run tactics and indiscriminate bombings.



So what you are really trying to address is the definition of war.   How is an Republican Guard soldier taking on an American soldier any different than an Insurgent in Fallujah taking on an American soldier?   You may want to be careful on how you answer that lest the answer be confined to the box of "Westphalian state actors".

Some thinkers believe that terrorist attacks and insurgency fighting are just as relevent to the dialogue of conflict and war as high intensity battles.   I think they're on to something:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19350.0.html



> Same thing if you look back to when Israel was first formed and attacked. The Arabs lost the war, but the terrorist tactics going on now are "effective". The way I see it....any idiot can pick up a weapon and start taking out civilians....or make a bomb and drive it into the middle of a military formation....and on a man-for-man basis it'll seem to be pretty effective.   It's much harder to create a fighting force which can stand up on the field on battle and engage and destroy their enemies.



And despite the best efforts of the most powerful military force on Earth, two years later they are still fighting for control of Iraq with these "idiots who picked up weapons".   Again, perhaps your focusing too narrowly on the conflict through the lens of Western, Westphalian norms and placing too much emphasis on the physical level of conflict - try moving to the moral level.


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## 48Highlander

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So what you are really trying to address is the definition of war.  How is an Republican Guard soldier taking on an American soldier any different than an Insurgent in Fallujah taking on an American soldier?  You may want to be careful on how you answer that lest the answer be confined to the box of "Westphalian state actors".



    How often do these insurgents "take on" American soldiers?  A lone sniper does not an army make.  Or a guy with an RPG, or a suicide bomber.  If you want definitions, look in the geneva conventions.  You'll notice that enemy combatants in civilian clothing are not considered soldiers, and are dealt with quite differently.  Can you have a war without an army?  That's usualy called a revolution, or an uprising.  You want to talk about wether or not Arabs can organize effective revolutions, hell, that's a different subject entirely, and I'd deffinitely agree that they're quite good at that.  They should be, they've been engaged in revolts against one another for a few centuries  



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Some thinkers believe that terrorist attacks and insurgency fighting are just as relevent to the dialogue of conflict and war as high intensity battles.  I think they're on to something:
> http://army.ca/forums/threads/19350.0.html



    I totaly agree.  Any time anyone has the desire and capability to kill you, that's pretty relevant to how you're going to fight your battles.  But terrorist attacks alone do not make a war.  Not by the definition.  People who think of it as a war tend to fight it like a conventional war, which is just setting yourself up for failiure.  That's why we have so many different terms to describe different types of conflict.  War, terrorism, insurgent fighting, uprisings, rebelions, revolutions, tribal warfare, peacekeeping, peacemaking, gang warfare, guerilla warfare...they may all have death and destruction as their basis, but they ARE different types of conflicts which cannot be resolved by using the same methods.  Every problem has a different solution, so before you can implement a solution, you have to identify the problem.  That's why I disagree with people refering to the current conflict in Iraq as "war".  And why I can make the statements that arabs are historicaly pretty ineffective when it comes to war.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> And despite the best efforts of the most powerful military force on Earth, two years later they are still fighting for control of Iraq with these "idiots who picked up weapons".  Again, perhaps your focusing too narrowly on the conflict through the lens of Western, Westphalian norms and placing too much emphasis on the physical level of conflict - try moving to the moral level.



    Moral level?  Sure.  Can you start me off here?  What are the moral issues pertaining to how well Arabs fight wars/conflicts?  Are you talking about the fact that the insurgents are succeeding in making Americans look like the bad guys in the forum of public opinion?  I'd agree with that.  That's about the only thing they've actually had success in.  But then again, that's not a very difficult.  World opinion has been turning against the US for a long time.  It also doesn't have much to do with morals, but a lot to do with public perception of world events.


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## Acorn

A couple of things directly to the topic:

1948 - Jewish (proto-Israeli) forces in fact outnumbered Arab forces. The Arab nations surrounding the fledgling Israeli state were juvenile themselves, and committed troops to Palestine soley for their own territorial agrandizment. Numbers committed reflected that.

1956 - British and French involvement had a certain amount of influence. It is interesting that Israel is considered to have won, while her closest allies at the time - UK and France, clearly lost.

1967 - Pre-emption. It can work. It was the single most successful Israeli operation, and is too often conflated with other conflicts.

1973 - A "damn near run thing." If one wishes to analize "why Arabs lose wars" it is probably the best example. Defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory, unless one is Israeli - they consider it a defeat. Israel's casualties were greater than those of all previous conflicts combined.

1979-1982 - This is where the paradigm shifted. No longer would Arab forces challenge the Israelis on the conventional battlefield.

Subsequent conflicts, '91 and '03, were a case of hyper-power superiority. The US is conventionally so far beyond any other force on the planet that this should not be a discussion. That applied in '91 as well.

Acorn


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## enfield

I quickly Googled the 1948 war and found the following numbers for the 1948 war, and please correct me if these are inaccurate. It appears the Israeli's were slightly outnumbered, fighting from a tiny territorial area against much larger foes. And I believe some of the Arab troops, such as the Arab Legion, were considered quite good. 

"Over the next few days, approximately 10,000 Lebanese, 60,000 Syrian, 4,500 Iraqi, 50,500 Egyptian, and 60,000-90,000 Transjordanian troops entered the former Mandate. Together with the few thousand irregular Arab soldiers, they faced a Zionist army numbering 30,000-35,000. Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Zionist advantage grew steadily"
 from: http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/1/19/1948_arab_israeli_war.html#Phases%20of%20the%20War

1973 Yom Kippur War - By rights, Israel should not exist, given they were outnumbered 12:1 (according to some Israeli sources I Googled up). What is  surprising is not that they did so badly, but that they did so well. The entire Arab world (including Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Tunisia, Sudan,Lebanon, Morocco as well as the usual suspects), with massive Soviet support and overwhelming size, attacks a tiny state with a 12 to one advantage in forces, and STILL ends up losing? The war ended with Israeli forces closing on Cairo... not too bad. 2,688 Israeli soldiers died, and Israel does consider it a military failure despite battlefield victory, although I'd say they were being too hard on themselves.


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## Pieman

> 48, Torlyn is correct.


Hey! Torlyn is the white Knight! 

48, I am not sure the opposing forces in Iraq can really be considered to be terrorists, if I had to choose a word  I would use rebels or insurgents.

But really, I am sure the tactics of battling a terrorist, rebel, army, or whatever are certainly different. But should the insurgents/terrorists/army continue to disrupt the stabilization process to the point where the Americans pull out in frustration (let's pretend for the moment), wouldn't that constitute winning the war? It is quite possible to lose every battle, yet still win the war. 

So if you are saying the current conflict is not a 'war' then what is it? And why is it different? Are we arguing over semantics here, or is there really a definite difference? I honestly don't see it, but please clarify if you do.


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## Acorn

Those Jordanian numbers alone lead me to believe there is some error in the rest of them; they look like the figures for the entire Jordanian Army of the time. In any case, I don't have the source here, my apologies.

King Abdullah only committed the Arab Legion (about a bde group) to actually sieze Jerusalem, and some other forces elswhere. He may have had 60-90 thousand troops on hand, but they were not committed to battle. Lebanese forces actually committed, IIRC, numbered around 5,000. Those are the only numbers that come to mind from memory.

We have the same problem with the Arab-Israeli wars that we once had with WWII in the East. Lack of souces from one side usually lead us to accept the other side's view less critically. Our Western predjudice against both the sides that we lack info on - Arab and Soviet - makes it easier to accept the accounts from the other side.

Acorn


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## enfield

Fair enough, not exactly the best source for info.

I still have to believe, however, that the combined weight (land mass, resources, population, GDP, military forces) of the Arab combatant states in 1948 was greater than that of Israel, either in pure numbers or in equipment, material, and weapon systems. If Israel did hold a numerical superiority in combatants, I could only see that as because every fit person grabbed their .303 and headed towards the sound of the guns, which while it speaks of bravery, it does not equate to well-equipped soldiers with combined arms support. The Arab states may have been infant states as well, but Israel was fresh from the womb.

I'll poke around and see if I can find something more reliable and substantial - maybe something to actually back up what I'm saying


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## winchable

> but Israel was fresh from the womb.



Does anyone know if mommy was still watching over baby when the Arab states invaded?


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## Infanteer

Interesting article from William Lind.  I have three other books by the author (John Poole) and they are all excellent tactical primers by a Marine Corps NCO.  I'm going to take a look at the book to see what it's all about.

http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_111704,00.html

_William S. Lind: Tactics of the Crescent Moon

November 17, 2004

U.S. forces have taken Falluja. Were we fighting a war in the Spanish Netherlands in the 17th century, and were Falluja the fortress city of Breda, the victory might mean something. Caught up as we actually are in a Fourth Generation war in Iraq, the event is almost meaningless. Most of the guerillas fled before we attacked, as guerillas are supposed to do ("When the enemy attacks, we retreat.") U.S. forces are finding few dead resistance fighters; the 1,200 to 1,600 "body count" the American command is claiming will prove as phony as those in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the resistance is hitting us elsewhere. When U.S. forces leave Falluja, they will return there too. And the U.S. military has again destroyed the village in order to save it, giving its enemies a victory at the moral level. Will we ever learn? 

If we do ever learn, a good bit of the credit should go to one of the most innovative and practical modern writers on military tactics, retired Marine John Poole. His first book, The Last Hundred Yards, was the best small unit tactics manual published in many years. Now, just in time for Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else the neo-cons want to send American soldiers to die, he is offering his take on how Islamic non-state forces fight. Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods should be in the backpack of every American soldier and Marine. 

Here's a sample paragraph that might usefully have been read by those who planned the Falluja operation: 

*Through better tactics, U.S. forces could take fewer casualties at close range without alienating the local population and without sacrificing their long-range capabilities. More powerful than firepower in this new kind of war will be the preservation of infrastructure. For it is the lack of social services that gives the foe his recruiting base. In the 21st century - as it was at the end of World War II - food, water, clinics and jobs will do infinitely more to secure the ultimate victory than bombs. Better small-unit technique costs nothing. It requires only a slower operational pace and the authority to experiment at the company or school level. *

Interestingly, Tactics of the Crescent Moon begins at Gallipoli, where the British were handed a major defeat by the Ottoman Turks during World War I. How did they do it? Poole argues that the Turks won in part because of better tactics. 

It would appear that Middle Easterners were using "maneuver warfare" at the individual and squad level some 65 years before Americans could do it at the regimental level. To lure an entire British battalion into a trap, the Turks had needed only bogus orders, harassing fire, and deliberate withdrawal...When they reemerged to stalk the flanks and rear of the British formation, they may have further enticed it to advance. By the time their quarry realized that it was alone and fragmented, it was too late. 
After examining lessons from the Iran-Iraq war and Israel's expulsion from southern Lebanon, Poole goes on to consider each of the main Islamic Fourth Generation forces the U.S. may find itself facing. His discussions of the Afghan resistance to U.S., not just Soviet, invaders and the Iraqi opposition could not be more relevant.  

Part Three of Tactics of the Crescent Moon offers his prescription for how U.S. forces should act. As in his other books, Poole stresses small-unit tactics and techniques. Seeing clearly the moral disadvantages that massive use of American firepower brings, he notes how good small units - true light infantry, which America sadly lacks - can win without the vast collateral damage and civilian casualties that work against us. The keys are high levels of small unit autonomy and far better peacetime training, training that permits experimentation and adaptation rather than forcing everyone into a cookie-cutter sameness. 

For those who want to learn, Tactics of the Crescent Moon is an invaluable resource. The question is whether the U.S. military can learn and adapt. At the small unit level, it can, when it is allowed to do so. The problem is that, typical of a Second Generation military, the U.S. armed forces must bear the burden of a vast, centralized, bureaucratic command structure that has little interest in adaptation. Populated with rafts of modern major generals who cannot tell at sight a Mauser rifle from a javelin, but know all too well how to grab more bucks for irrelevant high-tech weapons, our headquarters resemble the British at Gallipoli more than the Turks. The result is likely to be more flattened Iraqi cities like Falluja, more victories on the moral level for our opponents, and in the end, ignominious withdrawal and defeat. Now, if we could just convert all those headquarters and their staffs into mine-clearing platoons... _


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## Acorn

Interesting article Infanteer. I'll  have to start looking for Poole to add to my library.

Enfield, one of the oft-ignored aspects of the 1948 war was Arab politics and motivation. Contrary to the subsequent mythology, Palestine's Arab neighbours had little interest in an independent Arab Palestine - they wanted key terrain and resources to themselves. Water played a major factor (as it does today), control of the river Jordan and lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) remain important regional objectives (as a side note: Arab farming "inefficiency" is better at preserving regional water supplies than the Israeli mythology around "making the desert bloom.")

These Arab states were looking for an easy land-grab off of a weak opponent. They also wanted to preserve their fledgling new armies, thus they failed to commit significant forces to the actual battle, and when they did commit it was half-hearted.

In regard of training, the Israelis had a significant number of combat veterans from British and other Allied forces. The only well-trained Arab force was the Arab Legion - trained by the British and commanded by a British officer (BGen Glubb, known to the Arabs as "Glubb-Basha.") It's a matter of record the difficulty the Israelis had in shifting Arab Legion troops out of West Jerusalem, and they were unable to secure the whole city.

As well, the Israeli project had captured the minds of many world-wide. There were a number of experienced soldiers and airmen who aided them, either directly by travelling to Israel to fight, or by expediting equipment. Canadian fighter pilot George "Buzz" Beurling, a WWII ace with 32 victories and a very, shall we say, unconventional style, died en-route to Israel when the aircraft he was travelling in crashed taking off from Rome. He had been recruited by the Israelis to fly P-51s for their fledgling airforce.

Acorn

An interesting side-note is that Syrian armour included 1940-era French equipment and some surplus German Panzers. I don't recall that any were engaged.


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## Infanteer

Acorn said:
			
		

> Interesting article Infanteer. I'll have to start looking for Poole to add to my library.



Don't let the covers of his books fool you - the artwork is rather childish; one book has the picture of a Ninja while another is some sort of Rambo dude with a bandana.  The material inside is good stuff, mostly tactical primer and individual to platoon level stuff.  His main focus is on the indirect approach (such as infiltration) of non-Western infantry forces (to make up for their material deficiency) and how we could learn from them.


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## Shec

Acorn has hit the nail on the head:


> In regard of training, the Israelis had a significant number of combat veterans from British and other Allied forces. The only well-trained Arab force was the Arab Legion - trained by the British and commanded by a British officer (BGen Glubb, known to the Arabs as "Glubb-Basha.") It's a matter of record the difficulty the Israelis had in shifting Arab Legion troops out of West Jerusalem, and they were unable to secure the whole city.
> 
> As well, the Israeli project had captured the minds of many world-wide. There were a number of experienced soldiers and airmen who aided them, either directly by travelling to Israel to fight, or by expediting equipment. Canadian fighter pilot George "Buzz" Beurling, a WWII ace with 32 victories and a very, shall we say, unconventional style, died en-route to Israel when the aircraft he was travelling in crashed taking off from Rome. He had been recruited by the Israelis to fly P-51s for their fledgling airforce.



The 1948 War   was one of the few instances when Israel faced almost equal forces on the other side: 35 to 45 thousand Israeli soldiers faced 42 to 54 thousand in the combined Arab armies.   In my opinion the Israeli advantage lay in a couple of factors that will undoubtedly resonate with soldiers on this board:

1.   Available for service were the trained Jewish Palestine veterans of the British Army's Jewish Brigade Group which had seen action in Italy and Northwest Europe during the last year of WW2.     Thus there was a cadre of well trained and disciplined troops representing all arms and services in a conventional military formation.   

2.   The Machal - the estimated 3,500 to 4,000 foreign volunteers, mainly veterans from allied armies in WW2,.     For example, West Point graduate & former US Army staff officer Col. Mickey Marcus wrote the new army's training syllabus & SOPs.     Cdn.   Ben Dunkelman who won the DSO as a Queens Own Rifles of Canada company commander led the IDF's 7th Brigade which opened the road to Jerusalem - one of the wars pivotal campaignas.   And as previously mentioned leading WW2 RCAF fighter ace Buzz Beurling died flying for the Israelis and is buried with full honours in Haifa.     

These 2 groups comprised about 20% of Israeli forces and were the core around which a modern army was   organized, equipped, trained and lead.     With the exception of Jordan's Arab Legion the Arab opposition   just did not have the same levels of experience and discipline that had been acquired during WW2. 

If anyone is interested in more feel free to contact me - I can pass on some book titles from which I have drawn this information and conclusion.

One last thing.  This whole discussion about "Why Arabs Lose Wars" is dangerously ethnocentric.  Nothing PC about me saying that.  Rather its an old principle - never underestimate the enemy.    After the 67 victory Israel made the mistake of falling into that arrogant mindset, which is why they got caught with their pants down in 73 and almost lost.   And that my friends is the real lesson.


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## winchable

> One last thing.  This whole discussion about "Why Arabs Lose Wars" is dangerously ethnocentric.  Nothing PC about me saying that



I think the general topic has kind of moved past that original idea.
But you're right.


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## bossi

Shec said:
			
		

> One last thing.   This whole discussion about "Why Arabs Lose Wars" is dangerously ethnocentric.   Nothing PC about me saying that.



(chuckle)  Yup - might as well start a thread "Why France Loses ... (and then has to get their ass saved by English-speaking armies ...)"  >


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