# Re-creating History



## YZT580 (16 Jun 2008)

For any military history enthusiasts who are going to be in the area, the battle of Waterloo will be re-fought on its orignal site this coming weekend, June 20,21.  The forces of France have vowed that this time the outcome will be different.  Waterloo is now a suburb of Brussels and is quite simple to get to from any part of central Europe

This happens every two years and it is well worthwhile if you are planning to be in Europe.


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## kincanucks (16 Jun 2008)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> For any military history enthusiasts who are going to be in the area, the battle of Waterloo will be re-fought on its orignal site this coming weekend, June 20,21.  The forces of France have vowed that this time the outcome will be different.  Waterloo is now a suburb of Brussels and is quite simple to get to from any part of central Europe
> 
> This happens every two years and it is well worthwhile if you are planning to be in Europe.



Damn and I just visited there last year.  If the French trade places with the British they might have a chance.


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## ExSarge (19 Jun 2008)

kincanucks said:
			
		

> If the French trade places with the British they might have a chance.



If Grouchy [Emmanuel de Grouchy, 2nd Marquis de Grouchy (October 23, 1766 – May 29, 1847)] had been where he was supposed to be, when he was supposed to be, the victory might well have gone to the French!


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## YZT580 (19 Jun 2008)

Likewise if the french had either ignored Hougoumont or did what they did later and just levelled it with artillery.  IF pretty well sums up the entire thing.  If I had them I'd be a king, cried the queen.  In 1815 it was Brittain and Prussia that saved the continent, this year it was the Irish's turn.  GB having surrendered to the French this time around.  I guess that isn't politically correct is it?  Weather forecast, Saturday rain, sunday thunderstorms.  Should be a perfect replay.  It rained the night of the original battle too.


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## 3rd Herd (19 Jun 2008)

ExSarge said:
			
		

> If Grouchy [Emmanuel de Grouchy, 2nd Marquis de Grouchy (October 23, 1766 – May 29, 1847)] had been where he was supposed to be, when he was supposed to be, the victory might well have gone to the French!



If von Gneisenau, von Blucher's Chief of Staff had not "obfuscated" his orders regarding the marching order of the Prussians the battle would have been over much sooner. von Gneisenau's reasoning other than paranoia is said to range from; having a Prussian Army remaining after the British defeat in order to protect Prussia's boarders, to having a fresh and ready army to defeat the battle worn French after their battle with the British and therefore claim a Prussian victory and the resulting glory.


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## ExSarge (19 Jun 2008)

Alex,

Don’t get me started on Von Gneiesenau! With his Anglophobia it’s a wonder considering his position, as Blucher’s Chief of Staff that the relationship with the British was not worse then it was! Whatever he intended it for; I think it’s safe to say that he saw his duty as maintaining the Prussian Army in being as a viable fighting force, whatever the outcome of the battle.


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## 3rd Herd (19 Jun 2008)

John,
aside from the issue of Von Gneiesenau's "Anglophobia" his decision exemplifies the circumventing "blind obedience to orders" an issue that Prussians and later Germans have had to deal with( one eye towards the future). In more modern times Hoth's circumventing Hitler's order to send his remaining panzers in the cauldron of destruction of Stalingrad by claiming they were down for maintenance [mice eating the insulation on the wiring] is another example of waitting for the battle outcome prior to commitment. In this case the down tanks suddenly became runners in time for the attempted relief in another formation. Rommel in his dash for the coast during the French campaign of 1940 also acquired units (Panzer Mk III's) from a unit whose commander was less than decisive. Some argue this resulted in his success of reaching the Channel coast.

In regard to the French though, they seem to have this method of warfare down to fine art given the examples found in the Peninsular wars and your mentioned example of Grouchy in the Waterloo era. As for Wellington, twenty ADC's each with multiple horses saw to his orders being carried out in most circumstances. Despite the ability or lack of and in some cases the sanity of his senior commanders as a result of interference of both Parliament and the Horse Guards. Given the vast amount of treatise written on this battle few realize that many of the British units were not the same as they had been in the past decade. In fact many were composed of new recruits, officered by gentleman who had not fought in battle prior to Waterloo. Recall that with Napoleon's abdication the British government commenced with what has become a historical trend "threat is gone, time to downsize" as quickly as possible.


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## ExSarge (19 Jun 2008)

I will concede your point on the British “Threat is gone, time to downsize” an unfortunate course of action that they past on to their former colonies. Is your contention that the circumventing of orders is a national trait of the German military? It’s an interesting premise but I think the evidence is a little flimsy. I would suggest the German system (after the defeats in 1809) was based on flexibility and adaptability. That I think holds true for WW I and WWII. Which is not to say there were not some overly cautious and hide bound commanders. Gneiesenau’s almost pathological distrust of Wellington did more to strain relations between the Allies then anything else. Having said that I also believe he was right in his distrust! Had the battle gone the other way I believe (based on flimsy, anecdotal and circumstantial evidence I will grant you!) that Wellington would have done whatever it took to preserve his Army, to include abandoning the Prussians and falling back to the coast.


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## 3rd Herd (19 Jun 2008)

Is the circumvention of orders a national trait ? Not so much out of doctrine but more out of circumstance. While the Prussian did surprise the world at large with their abilities in the roles of "flexibility and adaptability" this could not have occurred without their developments in the regard of command and control. This it is argued is a result of the Prussian military to make the psychological conversion from the ides of Fredrick the Great to those fitting with more modern times. Many other nations could not overcome this facet, which resulted in the mythical invincibility of the Prussia and in the early Second world war era of German domination. 

As to Wellington, a march back to the coast was in the plans but turned out not to be necessary.

Edit to add:

"...let us repeat that had Grouchy, during the crisis, arrived and attacked the Allied army, there is no doubt it would have been completely destroyed. Its remnants would retreat towards Ostend, picking up the 20,000 troops previously left at Val for the purpose of protecting that very route. The Peninsular veterans who were returning from the unhappy American war of 1812, would have joined them at Ostend and shortly Wellington, in case he had survived (something rather improbable but nevertheless possible), would have had another professional army of 50,000 to take the field again." (DR G.A. CHRISTIDIS, The Battle of Waterloo, http://www.rapidttp.com/milhist/vol012gc.html)


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## ExSarge (20 Jun 2008)

3rd Herd said:
			
		

> While the Prussian did surprise the world at large with their abilities in the roles of "flexibility and adaptability" this could not have occurred without their developments in the regard of command and control. This it is argued is a result of the Prussian military to make the psychological conversion from the ides of Fredrick the Great to those fitting with more modern times. Many other nations could not overcome this facet, which resulted in the mythical invincibility of the Prussia and in the early Second world war era of German domination.



I agree with you on this. However there is nothing like a defeat to get a nation’s military to re-examine itself. Again I give you Prussia after 1809, the United States Army after Viet Nam, the French after the Franco Prussian war ( I was going to be facetious and say every war!) even the British after the Crimea. With the possible exception of pirates (a notoriously cautious and conservative bunch!) there is no group traditionally more resistive to change then the military high command. History is rife with examples.

As Christidis points out in his work, it’s unlikely that had the battle gone the other way the French would have allowed Wellington the opportunity to withdraw to the coast unmolested. With the unreliability of the Dutch, Nassauer’s and some of his German troops it’s my contention that Wellington, ever the pragmatic, would have done every thing he could to maintain the core of his army (his British and KGL battalions) intact as a viable force. 

I spent the night in a feverous search for supporting documentation for this claim without success. I’m sure I have seen something in Somerset’s letters that would support this!


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## Danjanou (20 Jun 2008)

Lets not tar all the Anglo Allied troops with the same brush. The Nassau Brigade held the far left flank at Papelotte all day against repeated French attacks. Ironically they were driven off by the advancing Prussians who thought that they were French. They were still wearing the uniforms they were issued as part of the Grand Armee.

The Brunswickers did charge home at Quatre Bras unlike the Dutch Belgians and while they did little (their Jagers at Hugoumont aside) at Waterloo they didn’t withdraw even during the bombardment and Ney’s repeated cavalry attacks.

I do agree with a fighting withdrawal to the coast possibility similar to say the retreat from Quatre Bras, Wellingtons Light Cavalry (British and KGL) were still relatively intact and could have covered them. The Corps left back to cover the retreat would have enabled this too.

Personally I still think the most telling aspect of the battle was the weather. The heavy rains on June 17th meant the ground was too wet for Napoleon to site his artillery. Had the battle commenced at 8:00 am as he wanted instead of 11:00 it would have been over three hours before the Prussians arrival. 

Even if everything else had happened the same, the waste of a Corps at Hugoumont, the charge of the British Heavy Cavalry and the destruction of both them and D’Orleons Corps. The wasted repeated unsupported cavalry charges by Ney, Napoleons illness, the Prussians cautious advance, Gruchy’s wandering in the wilderness. All could have happened and the end result would have been the same.

Wellington was on his last legs at 7:00 pm. Had he been there at 4:00 then all of the Imperial Guard  and possibly the other reserve Corp (Lobau?) could have delivered the final push as they were not fighting a holding action on the French right flank. Five Divisions, three of them Imperial Guard, instead of one assaulting in columns up that ridge even the musketry of the British Guards wouldn’t have stopped them.

Blucher would most likely have not fought a night action and Napoleon would have had the night to regroup, locate Gruchy and be ready in the morning. A Corps and some cavalry to keep the pressure on the retreating Anglo-Allied army say under Ney and a formed battle line against the Prussians on the 19th, which he may have well won.

Not saying he could have then fought a protracted campaign against the Seventh Coalition including as noted the Brits returning from North America, but he was as skilful at politics as at siting a battery so he may have bought time or a negotiated piece.


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## Kat Stevens (20 Jun 2008)

You really think Boney's ego would allow him to negotiate a peace?  I think he would have fought to the last man.


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## 3rd Herd (20 Jun 2008)

ExSarge said:
			
		

> As Christidis points out in his work, it’s unlikely that had the battle gone the other way the French would have allowed Wellington the opportunity to withdraw to the coast unmolested. With the unreliability of the Dutch, Nassauer’s and some of his German troops it’s my contention that Wellington, ever the pragmatic, would have done every thing he could to maintain the core of his army (his British and KGL battalions) intact as a viable force.
> 
> I spent the night in a feverous search for supporting documentation for this claim without success. I’m sure I have seen something in Somerset’s letters that would support this!



In a general sense Sir Edward Creasy, in The Fifteen Decisive Battles of The World From Marathon to Waterloo describes Wellington's actions on the night before the battle in that "he[Wellington] wrote several letters to the Governor of Antwerp, to the English Minister at Brussels, and other official personages, in which he expressed his confidence that all would go well, but "as it was necessary to provide against serious losses; should any accident occur, he gave a series of judicious orders for what should be done in the rear of the army, in the event of the battle going against the Allies.” However, in Lord Ellesmere's Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington the following is found "the Duke of Wellington, when speaking in after years of the possible events that might have followed if he had been beaten back from the open field of Waterloo, pointed to the wood of Soignies as his secure rallying place, saying,"they never could have beaten us so, that we could not have held the
wood against them."He was always confident that he could have made good that post until joined by the Prussians, upon whose co-operation he throughout depended."

Kat

"It is impossible to recognize the Napoleon, of 1800, 1805, and 1807, in the Napoleon of the June days of 1815. The general who wavered on the 15th and 16th, if a corps had to be sent hither or thither, right or left, was not the man with the eagle eye, who, after a long march, started in the evening in order to rush at Friedland like a tiger on his prey. The Emperor who, in the forenoon of the 18th, slowly restored the order of battle and found time to hold a review was not the man of will power and energy who called out to his marshals "activite, activite, vitesse" and in the night of 14 October, 1807, torch in hand made his artillery climb the steep Landgrafen-Hill! The master of warfare, who sent first the infantry, then the cavalry, and lastly the Guard against Wellington's front, was not the God of battles, who, at Austerlitz, swept down with his entire army against the flank of the enemy. Assuredly not. For he himself had said in 1797: "One ages rapidly on battle fields." And at the time he said it, he was in the second year of his career as a fieldmarshal. Since then, in the course of 17 years, many things had happened, bound to shake the solid structure of this colossus. A mass of indebtedness had accumulated, gnawing at the marrow of this Titan. Halting or turning back was impossible. He was driven forward, ever forward, against ever increasing forces. And to oppose them he lacked the strength. His fall was imminent, if not on 18 June, then later. It was inevitable. His mother had foreseen this when she said to her son in bidding him goodbye on the Isle of Elba: "Heaven will not permit that thou shouldst die by poison(12) or in unworthy degree, but with the sword in thy hand." To find such an end ought to have been the aim of the battle of Waterloo."(General Fieldmarshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Cannae/cannae.asp)


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## ExSarge (20 Jun 2008)

In reference to my previous post, I was looking for a letter I believe Somerset wrote that indicated Wellington was prepared to cut loose of the Prussians if the worse came to pass.

The bottom line in this debate, is regardless of what we may believe might have happened, may have happened, or could have happened, history unfolded as it did. The battle was fought as it was and over the course four days in June and the world was changed forever.


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