# Garrison establishment versus mobility



## Kirkhill (21 Jul 2004)

Just been thinking about the changes been made to the numbers of vehicles being supplied to infantry units and the training/prepositioning concept.

Do the planned changes make any more sense if considered this way?

During the Cold War the Canadian Army trained to supply an operational anti-armour reserve (4CMBG was the game and everybody practiced to fill positions in that organization). The requirements of the Brigade were first of all to be in place in theater, to manoeuvre rapidly to a flank and dig in, to prepare to receive and defeat an armoured thrust.  

This required strong anti-tank capabilities, the ability to manoeuver tank killing capability in the face of direct and indirect enemy fire, that ability to move troops to a flank under indirect fire, the ability to dig in and create/destroy obstacles, the ability to neutralize enemy forces at a distance to clear an area in which 4CMBG could operate relatively freely.

This required first of all that everybody be mounted for speed of response.  That everybody be under armour for protection.  A strong engineering presence, strong mobile arty and TANKS,TANKS,TANKS.


Like it or not, and not disputing the continued need for a 4CMBG capability in the forces, the forces are being asked to do "other things" these days, and if history is a guide to the future, for a long time to come.  The forces are being asked to revert to a role  as ancient as the city of Ur.

They are being asked to Garrison a community, offer protection and security to the inhabitants and do this by supplying access control to the community and to dominate the terrain surrounding the community.

Protection, Security and Access Control have traditionally been the task of the Infantry, working in conjunction with the Engineers.  

Domination of Terrain has been the work of Cavalry conducting Recconaissance Patrols and Presence Patrols.  The jobs of Light Cavalry.  
Cavalry also supplied the capability to move a critical mass of force rapidly throughout an area.  This was the job of Heavy Cavalry, primarily men who fought from the saddle in the most recent millenium.  These Lancers and Hussars were supplemented at first by mounted infantry, men that moved to the battle on horses but fought on foot - the Dragoons.  In the age of gunpwder they were further supplemented by their own artillery, in British service the Royal Horse Artillery.

If the intent of the Canadian Government were to Prepare forces, all or part of them, to conduct garrison operations as described above at Unit/Battalion/Battle Group strength, might they not be making the kinds of changes we are seeing.

1 Infantry-centric force based on dismounted light-infantry. - primarily for local patrols and to establish the numbers necessary to maintain a longterm presence -  ie 3 companies each with 4 platoons allows the provision of 2-3 permanent defended locales in a units area of operations.  The fourth platoon allows for a local reaction force plus numbers to allow for losses due to leave or sickness.

2 Vehicles reduced because not all troops will be moving at all times and also the number of bodies per vehicle can be increased.  For example some vehicles will be required for the long range patrols, in which case the troops will be living in their vehicles with all their kit and domestic supplies, probably a comfortable fit in an LAVIII with crew and 2-4 dismounts. Other vehicles would be required to move a reaction force to an area of operations for a limited period of time to suppress trouble.  If you consider troops in fighting order or riot gear rather than full service marching order bieing deployed to a locale for 12-24 hours then you could probably comfortably get 8 troops in the back for an hour or two.  The LAVIIIs would then be used by the unit commander to supply platoon size reaction forces for the company defended locales or could be held back to for a company sized unit reserve.  Under this scenario maybe 28 LAVIIIs is all the unit commander needs to get his job done.

3 Cavalry concentrating on Recce and Long Range Patrols.  But also supplying a strike capability (Lancer or Lt Hussar type role and Horse Artillery) to backup the "Dragoons".  Maybe a large troop or a couple of small troops of Direct Fire Support capability. Shock action capability in the face of a large enemy force would be limited here but is that a likely problem that will appear in a Garrison area "without warning".

4 Arty supplying fire support and in the process generating the basis of the situational awareness of the unit by mapping the area, tracking areas of risk and own forces, conducting area surveillance by electronic means (including UAVs, Radars and implanted sensors).

5 A strong engineering presence.

These things seem to be the direction the CF is headed.

The areas that seem to be lacking for this to work are:  Medical Services, Logistic and Maintenance Services and Transport Services.

Any Thoughts?


----------



## Guardian (21 Jul 2004)

That's a very good assessment - I never thought of it that way before.

Your assessment of the Arty role is almost "bang-on" with the "way ahead"-type documents being put out by the powers-that-be in the Canadian artillery these days, and it certainly matches the type of kit purchases we're looking at making. I'll add to your point that Artillery (and presumably others) are looking harder at precision munitions and other investments to improve accuracy, which would be better in a "garrison" environment.

I wonder if perhaps the government is looking at dropping the traditional all-arms brigade group concept in favour of smaller, formation-level task forces (take Afghanistan for example, with a mech inf bn, an armd recce sqn, a light arty bty, and an arty STA organization, all commanded by a bde HQ?)

Imagine, instead of three general mech bde gps, the Army of the future organized into six or seven Task Forces composed of a Mech Inf bn, an Armd Cav Regt, an engineer squadron, and a half-sized Arty regt incorporating a light gun bty and a targeting and surveillance battery. A force of about 2500 strong, and ideal for the scenario you painted.

My concern is that we as a nation don't seem to have the military werewithal to pull out any contingent on our own if things get hot.


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Jul 2004)

quote]My concern is that we as a nation don't seem to have the military werewithal to pull out any contingent on our own if things get hot.[
MAJOR problem.


----------



## Spanky (21 Jul 2004)

Not to sound too cynical, but I don't think the powers that be even have a plan.  They seem to be reacting to spreadsheets more than anything.  Even if they do have some sort of long range plan, they might be premature given that an external affairs/defence review has yet to be conducted.


----------



## Yard Ape (21 Jul 2004)

The removal of equipment to produce Op stocks & training stocks does not mean we will have less equipment when deployed.  The intent is that all the equipment will be available to a theater sooner.


----------

