# What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?



## Yard Ape

What does everybody here think the structure of the Army should be?  How many Bde‘s should we have?  What should their composition be?  What should become of the tank regiments?  Should we maintain the Light Bn‘s?  How many rifle Coy‘s should there be per Bn?  Should we maintain an airmobile capability, and in what form?  

Many of the treads deal with different aspects of this, but i‘d like to bring them all together.  The future of the army should not be decided peice meal, but it often seems that is the way it is done.  We bought the LAV III for the Inf, but don‘t yet know the role that the Armour will be playing in 10 years!

   Yard Ape


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## Gunner

Yard Ape, a better question is what should the role of the Canadian army be?  If you accept the 93 White Paper‘s role for the army being general purpose combat capable forces, the army must structure as such.  If the 93 White Paper role is no longer valid in the 21st century perhaps a better topic for discussion should be "What is the future role for Canada‘s Army?"  Once the role is debated and accepted you can begin to structure according.  Canada‘s army (reg and reserve) remains stuck in a cold war structure...some would argue a WWII structure that we have not evolved out of.  

Any comments?


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## McG

Excellent point Gunner.  It is very much like picking a tool. If you pick the tool first, you limit the jobs you can do.  If you decide what jobs you want to do, you know what tools you need.  In this case the roll is the job, and the army is the tool.

Due to the unpredictability of the future, it is impossible to predict what specific tasks the army may be faced with.  For this reason alone, I would argue that the multipurpose force must still be the roll of our armed forces.  The world today is in need of many more peacekeepers than are availabe.  Several large aid to civlil power operations have demonstrated the need for an adaptable organization to come the populations aid when tragedy and the unpredictable strike.  And, you never now when, who, or if you will be fighting, nor can you know the intensity.  By the time any of these factors become predictable, it is already too late to develope a new force to accomodate them.  That force must be in existance aleady.

Chimo!


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## Brock

I would like to point out that the last paper was in 1994 not 1993 (it was made in 1993, but published in 1994).  I am not being a smart ass, just calrifying the actual year.

The 1994 Defence White paper retains many admirable qualties that a relevant for today and the future, but in my opinion a new white paper should be written to guide the changes that the CF should undergo.  The key element of any new  paper, should maintain the CF‘s "multi-purpose combat capable" element.  As to what level of multi-purpose and combat-capable  force should the CF maintain is the most important question.

The CF should no longer try to do everything as we currently are.  I believe the CF should focus on several niche capabilities for combat operations.  General conventional war (ie. WWII) is highly unlikely to occur, not that it may never occur, but the prospect in the near future is basically nil, and unlikely at best in the long term. Limited conventional wars and low intensity conflicts are highly likely to occur and in fact there are many occurring right now.  Canada should seek to provide a capability to provide special niche capabilities for any type of coalition force operation/war that might occur.  The financial realities of the Canadian military will never allow the CF to train properly for a general conventional war or nuclear war.  Those two categories require enormous resources and indeed only the United States is likely to be able to financially fight a general conventional war.  This is not a defeatist attitude, but a realistic attitude that seeks to enhance the CF, by not giving in to thetypical Canadian "we can fight in any manner, regardless of equipment limitations if we just train and/or fight hard enough and we will not suffer negative consequences" attitude.

Canada should provide a medium armoured wheeled force and forego heavy armoured forces that can not be adequately equipped or trained without a massive Canadian culture shift toward the military.  I propose that the regular and reserve army be organised into eight combat brigade groups of two types.  First the regualr army would field three Combat Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBG) of approxmately 4000 soldiers utilizing the LAV III as its baseline and sole amroured vehicle with a number of supporting wheeled vehicles.  Each of these brigades would be statiioned entirely at CFB Edmonton, BFC St. Hubert, and CTC Gagetown.  The second type of brigade would be the Combat Light Brigade Group (CLBG) of approximatley 3000 soldiers.  The regular army CLBG, stationed at CFB Petawawa,  would be entirely air mobile and all tactical helicopter assets would be stationed at CFB Petawawa with the exception of the training squadron which would be stationed at Gagetown.  The reserves would have four CLBGs one for LFWA, LFCA, LFQA, and LFAA.  This would entail a dramatic reorganization of the militia system and a reduction in a number of regiments, particularlyin the infantry.  All people who are die hard regiment proponents relax only a relatively small number of regiments would be cut.  Each CLBG would have three infantry battalions of around 500+ troops divided into three companies, a combat support company, a headquarters company, and a battalion headquarters.  Each infantry company would be a reserve regiment located at one or more locations in close proximity to each other, such as the GGFG and Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa.  In addition each company would also have one of the combat support company‘s three platoons co-located with the infantry company (it‘s company headquarters would be co-located with one of its platoons).  The CLBGs would also have a brigade recce squadron mounted on HUMVEEs or similar with the .50 Cals and C-6s.  The Brigade would have an artillery and combat engineer regimet (battalions), each with three companies and a headquarters company and a regiment headquarters.  Also the CLBG would have a service battalion, an intellegence company, an air defence battery, and a brigade headquarters, which would be staffed by regular army personel and located at the same base as the regular army units.  Regt. COs and RSMs would become
Majors and MWOs.  But would operationnaly be only OCs (OICs) and CSMs.  This is a basic structure  of the army that  I advocate, because it focuses on quality of soldiers rather than upping paper numbers and on simplifying LFC structure and reducing overhead costs.

I do have a number of specific points that I have mentioned briefly that I would like to clarify.  I have said that the regular CLBG should be air mobile by helicopter and not a parachut unit, although it may maintain parachute recce platoons, for a specific reason.  Para operations are effective only when able to properly support them,  the CF does not and will not acquire the necessary capabilities to support an effective para operation (dropping  a brigade would entail the entire CF Herc fleet and would require more to provde supplies and support).  In addtion, helicopters are a battlefield necessity now whereas the mass para formation is not.  As such, improving the tactical helicopter capability is far more effective.  The location of all tactical helicopters at CFB Petawawa is ideal, because in the event of a national emergency the helicopters are able to Herc deploy or self-deploy to almlost  anywhere in Canada in less than a day, more than acceptable.  In international deployments scenarios again the the Hercs from Trento are close by.  This enables the brigade to train effecitively.

The Leopard C-2s will be retained in three small training units (most will go into storage) at each of the regular army bases to provide the CF with a tank force to train against and in to retain tank knowlegde to a limited extent.

I am sure that I have left out lots of questions unanswered, but if you would like to know more of my thoughts or have questions please reply and I will do my best to respond to your questions or comments.


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## the patriot

To put it quaintly in a nutshell, things would be a lot better if the defence dollars would go towards the training of our soldiers instead of funding all those nice CBG HQ‘s that suck the training dollars out of the system.  The troops at the bottom of the ladder never see those dollars benefit them in any way or form.  The current form of the military suits the country just fine.  As for the comment "we‘re still stuck in a WW II format that we still have not evolved from".  Now who is guilty for that?!  If all the overweight, alcoholic, Sergeants and Warrants (and Officers) would step out of the way.  Things might be a little more efficient.  Leaving it on the back of the Americans to cover our asses in a conventional war is completely rediculous and tells me that the public would happily just lay on their backs and be conquered by an opposing force.

-the patriot-


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## Yard Ape

Okay, now here‘s how I see things should be:

The primary element in the army should be three CMBG‘s located in Edmonton, Pet, and Valcartie.  The CMBG‘s would be identical, and evolved from the current 20 CMBG model.  The tank Regiments would be replaced with Cavalry regiments consisting of a Recce Sqn (no longer independant), and AT Sqn, and a Heavy Recce Sqn.  The Inf Bn‘s would be expanded to include a DF Sup Coy, and an AD Pl.  Artillery regiments would loose a Bty of guns but gain two Btys of HIMARS.  CSS would be altered as needed to accomodate the new structure.  All elements of the CMBG‘s would be full mechanised in LAV III or other suitable vehicles.

In addition to the CMBG‘s there would be two independant Battle Groups.  An Airmobile Battle Group based on a light Inf Bn with Artillery, Engineer, and Cavalry support.  The Cavalry would be in the form of LUVW‘s for recce and AT roles.  This BG would be located in Shilo and have an attack helicopter Sqn and logistical helicoters to transport the entire BG.

A Heavy BG would be responsible for maintaining the doctrine and skills required for Canadians to employ heavy armour.  The BG would be based on a 20 CMBG Tank Regiment with two rifle Coys, a Combat Sup Coy, Artillery, and Engineers attached.  The BG would be based out of Gagetown, and one of its secondary roles would be to provide a heavy enemy force for the CMBG‘s to Train against.

The reserve CBG‘s would be maintian, however all elite roles (parachute taskings etc) would be stopped.  Regiments would be structured as Coy and not Bn (unless said Regiment were capable of sustaining multilple Coys at a health strength).  Each Regiment would also be tasked with a role of an Combat Sup Coy Pl.  Reaserve "Tank" regiments would be equiped with the same vehicle employed by the DF Sup Coy‘s and The Cougars would be refitted with LAV25 turrets for the reserve Recce Regiments.  Each ATC would maintain a Bn‘s worth of AFV for the reserves to train with.  These vehicles would consist of Cougars, Grizzlys and Bissons (which would be replaced entirely by the LAV III for the Reg force).

For the Armchair Generals, I have below a list of topics from which either myself, or others have made the arguments which form the basis of my above vision.

Canada should adopt the LAV III as its sole armoured vehicle
Recce Doctrine 
What should the role of reserves be? 
TOWED OR SELF PROPELLED - What does Canada still require? 
M-109 replacement... 
AIR DEFENCE 
Air Defence 
Should the CF retain MBTs? 
Resurrect the Airborne Regiment? 

The visions only problem, is money.  Maybe one day.   

 Yard Ape


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## McG

Some very adventurous ideas here.  Would any of them see the CERs raised to three field Sqns and an armoured Sqn (as laid out by doctrine) or would they be left the understrenghted two field Sqns and an armoured Tp status-quo?


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## Infanteer

I recently read LtCol. Douglas MacGregor‘s "Breaking the Phalanx."  Although it is oriented to force restructure in the United States Army, it has a lot of good ideas that could be applied in Canada.
In the book he argues for breaking down the U.S. Army Division into smaller "Combat Groups" with combined arms battalions.  This has the two-fold advantage of:
A)  Taking the battlefield down to a smaller level of command, a phenomenon that has been steadily occuring since the 18th century (Napoleonic Corps to World War I Divisions to World War II "Kampfegruppen")
B)  Allowing more flexibility to react to situations around the world.  The next enemy the NATO countries face will probably not be as inept as the Iraqis and will not allow the massive 3 month buildup to occur, thus mobility and deployability are key (This could also be the case with Rwanda.).
In Canada, we are already moving towards something like this, with are British-inherited combined arms Brigade Groups.  Kick Brigade Group command back up to Brigadier (where it should be).  Reinforce the Armoured Regiments to 3 squadrons each.  Split a brigade group into three battle groups consisting of perhaps an Infantry battalion, an Armoured squadron, and an Arty Battery.  Give this command to a Colonel.  Maybe we could give each brigade group a different tasking along the lines what MacGregor‘s presents.
1st CMBG could become Canada‘s airmobile Brigade Group.  Essentially a light infantry Brigade, it would be given its own arty and helo‘s for rapid deployment capibilities, yet adequete firepower to hold the field.
2nd CMBG would be Canada‘s combat Brigade Group.  With three squadrons of Leopard MBT‘s, this Brigade would possess alot of firepower and would be used to present heavy and decisive force projection wherever it was deployed.
5th CMBG would become the assault/strike group.  It‘s squadrons would be equipped with LAVs and Coyotes, giving it the ability to provide adequete firepower to hold its own, yet be light and mobile enough to be where it was needed quickly (peacekeeping etc.).
This is just a neat little idea I got while reading the book.  Although it is used in an American context, there is no reason why we can‘t use a few good ideas from them.  Any thoughts?


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## Flakes

While you are doing all this planning and restructuring do you think you could locate some of those soldiers on this side of the Rockies (that‘s the western side).  Granted the Navy (such as it is) resides in Victoria but they aren‘t going to be of much help to us in the event of a disaster and it‘s one heck of a long way to Edmonton.  Vancouver Island has been left virtually defenceless with the exception of the Reserve units who are having a terrible time getting anyone through the recruiting process.  Ottawa seems to have forgotten us.  Pencil us into that plan please.


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## Gunner

> Peggy Parry-Bran stated: Granted the Navy (such as it is) resides in Victoria but they aren‘t going to be of much help to us in the event of a disaster
> and it‘s one heck of a long way to Edmonton.



There are lots of military units within British Columbia: MARPAC, 39 CBG, Comox, ASU Chilliwack, CFAD Rocky Point, etc,etc.  Disasters are a provincial responsiblity and if the disaster warrants a response by the CF then you will receive military units in accordance with the disaster.  We are part of a NATION, not just a province, BC needs to learn this as much as Quebec does.  We help one another.



> Peggy Parry-Bran stated: Vancouver Island has been left virtually defenceless with the exception of the Reserve units who are having a terrible
> time getting anyone through the recruiting process.



Vancouver Island defenceless .... Against Whom?    Who are we defenceless against?  Recruiting is a problem throughout Canada Regular and Reserve.



> Ottawa seems to have forgotten us. Pencil us into that
> plan please.



That is your perception and it is not reality.

Cheers,


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## Andrew Brunton

Peggy Parry-Bran mentioned that having centralized forces would leave certain parts
of the country defenceless (namely BC) having them spread out is maybe not the best 
thing either. Canada is an enormous land mass. To spread enough troops out across
the entire country to make an acceptable defence strength everywhere would thin 
defences. There simply aren‘t enough soldiers. And when was the last time Canada 
fought a defensive war? Not in this century. However we have mobilized our forces
many times for action on foreign soil. A task made simpler when our forces are centralized
in a few locations and task forces can be easily formed from the resources and soldiers 
already available and onsite.


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## mortarman

Hi to everyone out there,

This is my first post on the war diary but I just had to throw my two cents worth into this topic. I agree with what alot of you guys are saying about our organization but I have a few ideas I‘d like to add/amend. Here is my proposal for the organization of the Army:

Firstly, the Army would be divided into categories based on each unit‘s level of readiness and reg/res mix. ‘Category A‘ would be units that are maintained at or near 100% regforce strength, ‘Cat B‘ are any from 30/70 to 60/40 reg/res mix and ‘Cat C‘ are almost 100% reservists. So Based on this the ‘Cat A‘ units/formations in the army will be as follows:

6 Mechanized Infantry Battalions (67 LAV III each)
2 Armoured Regiments (43 Leo C2 each (3 Sqns of 14), 21 Coyote)
2 Medium Arty Regts (18 M109A4+ each)
2 Cbt Engr Regts (MTVL/MTVE/M113A3)

‘Cat B‘ units:

3 Brigade Group HQ and Sigs Sqns
3 Light Infantry Battalions (BV-206/Motorized)
1 Armoured Cav Regt (29 Coyote DFSV, 16 Coyote)
1 Light Arty Regt (18 LG1 MkII)
1 Cbt Engr Regt (Light)
1 Recce Regt (Armd Sch) (14 Leo C2, 22 Coyote)
1 GS Arty Regt (Arty Sch) (6 M109A4+, 6 LG1 MkII, 6 C3)
1 Engr Sp Regt (MTVL/MTVE/M113A3)
1 AD Regt (24 ADATS)
3 AD Btys (WLAV-VSHORAD/Javelin S15)
3 CS Svc Bns
3 GS Svc Bns
3 Fd Amb

‘Cat C‘:

9 Brigade Group HQ and Sigs Sqn
24 ‘Mech‘ Inf Bns (Regts) (LAV III)
12 ‘Light‘ Inf Bns (Regts) (3 with para capability)
9 Armd Regts (Cougar)
9 Recce Regts (LUVW)
9 Arty Regts (C3)
3 GS Arty Regts (C3)
9 Fd Engr Regts/Sqns
9 CS Svc Bns
9 GS Svc Bns

OK I know that‘s probably too much info, but I‘ll explain it all now. The equipment hldings are listed to show that it is possible to go to this organization now, with what we have. The Cat A units as listed will pretty much correspond to the regforce units we have now. There would be two mech brigades: 1 CMBG in Edmonton/Shilo and 5 GBMC in Valcartier/Gagetown. Some of the units from Val would have to move to Gagetwon as the former is too small for a mech bde. As you can see, the Armd Regts of these brigades will hold the majority of the Leos.
The Cat B units would mostly comprise a Light Brigade based in Petawawa with (essentially) a small Coyote DFSV regt. Also there would be some "Army" units in Gagetown to support the schools and act as a basis for trg/mobilization. The GS Arty would basically be W Bty+, The Recce Regt would be 8CH and would possess all the vehs used by the Armd Sch. Same thing goes for 4 ESR and 4 AD Regt. None of these units would be manned to full strength but would require augmentation from similar Cat C units (ie the Cat C GS Arty units would augment the GS Arty Regt in Gagetown)
The ‘Cat C‘ units (mostly militia) would be organized into 6 ‘Mech‘ and 3 ‘Light‘ Brigade Groups. Each would have 4 inf units, a recce regt, an armd regt etc. There would also be some army-level units not assigned to Bdes. The role of these units is to provide formed sub-units to "round-out" the cat a and b units. Each Bde would be twinned with a Cat A Battle Group and would provide augmentees for that Battle Group during trg/operations. For example: 3 PPLCI BG in Petawawa goes on tour as a light BG. 39 CBG in BC (the LFWA light bde) would provide the augmentees for the entire BG (inf coy, armd, arty augmentees etc.)
Equipment - I‘ve listed the equipment so that you can get an idea that this is possible, but I must qualify two things. Firstly: the equipment for the Cat C units would only be sufficient for trg at the sub-sub unit level. Basically there are sufficient LAVs for approx 4 per unit; there are enough Cougars for 8 per unit and enough C3s for 6 per unit (lucky gunners). This equipment should be held centrally at Brigade Training and Support Centers similar (but smaller) to the MTSCs. MTSC was a good idea but it only benefits those units within 8 hrs driving time. Secondly: As new equipment is brought on-line (ie ACV, MIFS) there should be sufficient quantities so that the Cat C units can train on the same equipment as the Cat A & B units. This would greatly ease augmentation and training.
OK I‘ve said too much. I could write a book on all the ideas I have! If you have any questions please feel free to email me! I have  lots more info and could answer some of the questions my ideas have no doubt created. Cheers!


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## Yard Ape

Does anyone have any new ideas on this topic in light of recent events in the US and south Asia?

   Yard Ape


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## Linc

I beleive that the Land Force should be staffed AT MINIMUM to be able to simulataneously undertake the following tasks.  I believe this is a fairly modest expectation, given the political climate in Canada towards the military:

1)SUSTOPS capability of one complete mechanised brigade for an indefinite period of time, capable of operating in a high-intensity combat theatre, which does not require any ad-hoc units or reserve augmentation, along with a second 1700-man battle group in a seperate theatre in an low-to medium threat environment.  

2) SURGE capability of a least one 1700-man battle group to the same or completely separate theatre, for up to six months in a high threat environment or for operations such as UN/NATO peacekeeping missions.  Surge capability should be deploy within 30 days of receiving notice.  

3)Deployability of 1 brigade-size force, mostly reservists, for domestic emergencies such as the Red River flood or Quebec Ice Storm.

4)Rapid Reaction Brigade, capable of mobilizing within seven days‘ notice for periods no longer than 6 months, and fully deployable either by air or amphibious means.
Attached to this brigade would elements such as DART.

What do you think?


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## Linc

Hmm guess this isnt the right place for this topic.


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## Gunner

Well...you aren‘t talking doctrine, you are talking policy.  Although you state what your prefered policy should be, you do not state why.


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## Linc

Well, I had hoped the topic would evolve to include ‘doctrine‘ in later posts, hopefully with input from those who have more military experience than I do.  In particular, I was looking for someone who has some insight into a full deployment, with respect to the use of CMBG assets such as the Leopard MBT‘s and/or airborne assets in the modern era.   Unfotunately, I didnt get any bites.

As for why, though Im sure we would all love to see Canada with a million-man army, as I said before, given the realities of Canadian economics and politics, this is the minimum that I think this country should aspire to to pull its weight in the intl community.


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## Gunner

> though Im sure we would all love to see Canada with a million-man army,


As a matter of fact, I would not.  Armies are a drain on a countries economy.  Why have such a large force if there isn‘t a qualifiable threat?


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## Linc

ANd the line below continues:

"given the realities of Canadian economics and politics..."

The reader is meant to infer that this ‘million-man‘ army is neither economically (it can not be afforded) nor politically feasable (it would not be tolerated).  The question then becomes: given there are obvious and real constraints on Canada‘s military ability, what resources should this nation accept as adequate for the defence of Canada and for pulling our weight in the international community?

I was trying to avoid turning this thread into a military ‘fantasy football‘ topic but it would be nice if Canada had a multi-trillion dollar economy that allowed such things as fleets of aircraft carriers and stealth bombers.


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## Coniar

Numbers dont matter as much as training and equitment do, our military certainly could be a little larger and we could really use some new equitment from what ive seen and heard, but our training is exxelent and our soldiers and pilots and sailors are among the best in the world, I think a slightly larger and far better equiped set of armed services would be just fine, we dont need to try and best the united states or the UK in numbers rember we are a much smaller country in terms of population. But per capita I know we are taxed more and spend less on our armed services than the US...

Coniar


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## Linc

Well I think it needs to be significantly larger, currently the Cdn Forces can barely sustain the fairly small Battle Group in Bosnia and the odd 6-month tour here and ther in places like Afghanistan or Ethiopia/Eritrea.  

Currently, our Land Forces SUSTOPS is one BG in Bosnia, with a very limited surge ability of yet an even samller BG elsewhere, which is only managed with special govt extra funds or the "rob peter to pay paul" innovations from NDHQ.

We obviously couldnt/shouldnt try to best UK or US, but come on,  Canadas current contributions abroad are analagous to sending one rubber dinghy to a flotilla of Aircraft Carriers.  (Afghan deployment aside- but even that is now dramatically scaled back to 3 ships and 3 planes, and a few JTF2).

That is not pulling your weight as a country.  Dont forget, at the end of the day, Canada still stands as one of the world‘s wealthiest nations, and could easily afford a force of 100,000 personel as opposed to the current force which is 60,000 on paper and about 53,000 actual.


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## Christopher

Saw an article in the Globe and Mail today, written by a well-established US military academic:

 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030812.ucanada/BNStory/International/   

I know that most (if not all) of the people here on this forum vehemently oppose a collective armed force which is trained for peace, and not war - which is justified, since the official goal of the CF is to "protect Canada, and Canadian interests and values, while contributing to international peace and security".

But I think he still makes a good point. After all, "contributing to international peace and security" goes hand in hand with a peacekeeping force. And isn‘t peace and international stability important Canadian interests and things that Canadians value?

However, I think he‘s spilitting hairs, regarding a traditional ‘war-fighting‘ military, and a ‘strategically effective‘ military.

What do you think?


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## Michael Dorosh

Where exactly would we peacekeep?  It‘s going out of style....


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## Jarnhamar

And when were peacekeeping what happenes when the situation explodes, breaks out into an all out war and were in the middle of two armed and angery forces?


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## Big Kev

That is a very interesting article and I‘ve got a couple things to say that I‘ve kept locked up and that I really want to vent out. There are things in the article I agree with but also other things I don‘t. I honestly think that an army should absolutely be ready to peacekeep but at the same time peacekeeping should absolutely not be its main mandate. In other words, peacekeeping should be something that an army is capable of performing say on the side but it should definitely not be its main goal or priority. Peace should be seen as an ultimate goal that all soldiers and armies should strive for. But they should also realize that nothing is for free and that hard work has to be done to attain that goal; that is peace not just for conflicting states but also to ensure that peace doesn‘t get disrupted or taken away back home. So we need to take the proper measures to ensure that we are and always will be on stable footing. Peacekeeping should be a task that we perform and a task that we train for but it should not be the only thing we train for. Peacekeeping should be done as a a favor, a side thing to help out and to ensure the well-being of those caught in a crisis, but definitely not a main primary mandate that all our resources and training should be directed towards. There I finally vented it all out. Thanks for reading.


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## onecat

Kev,

I have to agree with on this. I‘ve always thought the role the CF plays as a peacekeeper is very important, and something the world respects us for.  But that shouldn‘t be the role the CF is mandated solely for.

The only way you can keep peace is by having a Force that is trained for war and has the equipment for war at hand.  If the Cf was only trained for peacekeeping was little more than a police force, why any side listen to us on the ground in a conflict.  

Certianly don‘t that Canadian should stop being a peacekeeper, even if that role is changing; but it should never be just that.  An Army is trainied is for war, and by that you are keeping the peace.


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## MG34

personally I feel that Peacekeeping is a waste of resources and time that could be much better spent on training and equipment.Peacekeeping has got to be the most useless task an Army can do in most of the missions that Canada has been involved in there has been no resolution by either side, a useless waste of time and effort.
 Anyone who thinks that troops go on these missions for the betterment of mankind is seriously misguided in fact most couldn‘t care less about either side as long as the FSP and UN cash is rolling in the troops will line up to go.The sad thing is peace keeping is the only way that most of us can actually come close to doing our job,which must always be preparing for war.


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## Jungle

If you don‘t have the tools (legal AND physical) to IMPOSE peace, then you have nothing to keep... Modern Peacekeeping is a lot closer to war than it used to be. This is the reason some countries now consider missions in 2 categories: "war-like conditions" and "non war-like conditions". Typical Peacekeeping missions may be found in either, depending on the situation.


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## RCD

We seemed to hit a raw nerve on this topic. Under THE lav-III forum.I pose this question to you‘s
What would you like our forces including (navy& airforce) to have?


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## dano

You‘re topic seems very different from the question asked.... But that may be me.. I never bothered to read the 80+ posts in the LAVIII topic.


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## gosho4

I think so far the Canadain Armed forces have played important Role in PEacekeeping and have been Part in everyone of thhem since the 1950‘s and have commited over 100,000 troops throughout the whole time and have payed their dues almost every year on time.Some 106 Canadian Peacekeepers have lost their Lives but They have lost their lifes for something greater then themselfs .I think so far Canada has gained a Reputiation of being a Great Peacekeeping nation that can rise to the challenge when called upon and I think that Canada needs to Keep on being a peaceful Nation whithin the UN Sphear.


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## Slim

> Originally posted by GD:
> [qb] I think so far the Canadain Armed forces have played important Role in PEacekeeping and have been Part in everyone of thhem since the 1950‘s and have commited over 100,000 troops throughout the whole time and have payed their dues almost every year on time.[/qb]


Well, it‘s important to understand that soldiering and peacekeeping are two very different tasks for a soldier to perform.
Tradionally the Cdn Forces are pictured as these friendly guys handing out chocolate bars to little kids in war ravaged areas, and helping to broker talks between rival nations.

The truth is that Peacekeeping actually degrades an army‘s fighting capability! that‘s why we must train so hard once we come home from some peacekeeping gig someplace across the pond. And if we are unable to keep the peace then we must have the ability to defend ourselves if it comes to it. ( Canadian troops being taken prisoner in Yugo comes to mind.)
It‘s all well and good to be a peacekeeping nation but we must train for war in order to continue the role we now have.


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## gosho4

Umm no offence But I think that Canadian Soldiers have proved more then once they can defend themselfs and holdtheir Ground and Provide security at a disadvantage.For example in Sarajevo there were I think a total of 143 Canadian Peacekeepers and for more then 1-2 months they held off the Bosnian Serbs of roughly 20,000 Strength.

also fighting the Croatians in their Sector...


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## Slim

> Originally posted by GD:
> [qb] Umm no offence But I think that Canadian Soldiers have proved more then once they can defend themselfs and holdtheir Ground and Provide security at a disadvantage.For example in Sarajevo there were I think a total of 143 Canadian Peacekeepers and for more then 1-2 months they held off the Bosnian Serbs of roughly 20,000 Strength.
> 
> also fighting the Croatians in their Sector... [/qb]


No one is denying the fighting spirit of the Canadian Forces. 
But, when an army (doesn‘t matter who) spend time sitting on it‘s collective behind, watching two opposing forces trying to decide whether they‘re going to stop fighting or not, it means that they aren‘t training.
Further, the example you gave is that while there was a limited number of Canadian troops in the city, they WERE NOT AT WAR! They were trying to slip between two opposing armies that were. the most that they got was harrassing fire. Not full frontal assaults.
I‘m not saying anything against those that were there. They did a tremendous job under very difficult curcumstances and should have all of our admiration.
But( and anyone who has been out in the sticks will agree) peacekeeping and war are at the opposite ends of the conflict spectrum.
I urge you to do some research on the subject of conflict verses peacekeeping and maybe talk to some of the others here who have first hand experience in different peacekeeping roles before deciding what you think about this subject.


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## 311

I think this whole gearing our military towards peace keeping is a mistake. The army is here for one reason, to kill the enemy. Peacekeeping should be an after thought. Because of this we should have full fighting capibility, incase the situation arose where we needed to invade another country.

Getting rid of the MBT is fine, however what are we replacing it with? A LAV-III ? What happens when we get rushed by T-80‘s ? If were not going to have a MBT then we need better support ( anti-armor helicopters ect. ).

I believe ( as others have posted ) we should adopt a USMC like force. However we would need lots of money ( for ships, aircraft, helicopters ) and im sure thats not going to happen any time soon.


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## Thompson_JM

I agree alot with Slim and Thunder... 

the CF needs to take a role similar to the marines and also utilize the reserve better as well.. perhaps as the brits do, train us and use us as a territorial army. for homeland defence, and disaster relief. I feel that the CF completly underutilized the Reserve soldiers and could do alot more with the CF if they gave us more oppourtunities to go on tours.. if canada sends 2000 troops make a larger component reserve.. I know alot of people (myself included) who would be willing to go. 

but then again. what do any of us know? most of us are just Jr NCM‘s Sgt‘s and a few Jr. Officers..  our ideas have far too much common sense and logic to ever accually be implemented!!!


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## Old Army guy

Normally there is a difference between warfighting and peacekeeping but the example here that slim uses i disagree....I agree with most here that there is a small difference in "roles" that soldiers play between peacekeeping and warfighting at the start of the mission. But the hair that splits the two is pretty fine.
To use Slims quote they were NOT AT WAR is perhaps not true.  Canada does not have to declare war and neither does the UN for a Soldier to open fire.."it‘s in his ROE‘s"..
a soldier that does open fire his only goal at that moment is to stay alive...running through all his "combat" drills deploying his section...bringing to bear everything in his track on one target...
to see that target destroyed....then to mount up again and to drive on.with each member reliving thier part in the attack ..was that not war ?....
Perhaps not according to you. maybe it was harrassing fire....but to me this was Combat....Not every day i spent in Yugo was like this one but they were intersting in the early years....I don‘t think you need a full frontal assault to be at war...To me, all you need is to discharge your wpn in anger...to be trying to take another life before he takes yours. you call it harrassing fire i call it combat...
Every day that we went out on patrol i taught my troops something ,anything to keep them sharp. they knew that while they were in threatre it was real....


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## gosho4

Plus a few months later 500 Dutch or Danish troops I forget Lost the Same city against same numbers with more firepower on their Side.

Also Yugoslavia was a 4 way war.Bosnian Serbs Vs Bosnia Vs Croatia Vs UN.

If you look at it there were 28 casualties. Also considering Total UN casualties count up for 261 in all those Balkan Missians.In fact Peacekeeping are alot harder then normal warlike missians sicne they require more.War requires you shoot back and employ your skills in peacekeeping you have to be alot more carefull since usualy you are outnumbered Drasticaly.


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## Slim

> Originally posted by Old Army guy:
> [qb] Normally there is a difference between warfighting and peacekeeping but the example here that slim uses i disagree....I agree with most here that there is a small difference in "roles" that soldiers play between peacekeeping and warfighting at the start of the mission. But the hair that splits the two is pretty fine.
> [/qb]


what was the objective of the Canadian soldiers in Yugo? To keep the peace or make it?
I believe that to be the difference.


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## gosho4

There was no Difference in Yugo and war.They were there to keep any fragile peace that Diplomats made but Then ended up making the peace.They fought with all sides to Protect the Civillians


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## Old Army guy

Perhaps you have misunderstood me Slim, At the start of Yugo conflict, while we were at the airport. Every Soldier on the ground knew what the objective was,they knew what thier job was. We were sent there to "peacekeep",while the war continued. That was a political decision,not DND‘s.
And to do our jobs somedays that required going into combat with the serbs or croat‘s "to keep your section alive" "or maybe to keep the peace" So while we were there there was no difference for us.peacekeeping and war were one in the same.

Is was not until later that the region had stabilized enough to keep the peace. Enough that you could clearly see a difference in the roles.


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## Slim

I think we‘re going to have to agree to disagree on this particular subject. I understand what you‘re saying in that you were engaged by the enemy and had to return fire and fight offensively, I just don‘t don‘t think that Canada on the whole was at war.
However let me remind you that the origional subject was " whether Canadian troops should only do peackeeping". I believe it was proposed that the Cdn Forces don‘t need to train for war as they do just fine at peacekeeping.
I disagree with that as well.
Slim


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## 311

If someone told me I wasn‘t training for war, and that I would just end up as a peacekeeper, I probily wouldn‘t be in the army. What would be the point to all the hard training we do if we were just going to be peacekeepers. As Old Army Guy told us, peacekeeping was the same as being in a war. Thats why we should train to kill, not to keep the peace.


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## Spr.Earl

> Originally posted by RECON-MAN:
> [qb] We seemed to hit a raw nerve on this topic. Under THE lav-III forum.I pose this question to you‘s
> What would you like our forces including (navy& airforce) to have? [/qb]


#1- Get rid of the P.C.crap!!
#2- Get back to basic‘s again!!
#3- Never mind the Gucci Kit give us the Tool‘s to do our job!

I‘ll stop as I‘m getting wound up!!


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## Slim

Peacekeeping is a fine thing and, done CORRECTLY, is quite effective ( that is something of a supposition as the U.N. has not been very effective since the Korean war.)BUT, in order for troops to be able to Peacekeep they have to be trained to fight. Period. Because when the belligerents decide to ignore the peacekeepers (as in Yugo) then the peacekeepers have to be able to step up and demonstraite that non-compliance will not get them any place!
Soldiers must, first and formost, be warfighters!


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## Jarnhamar

I thi9nk to relieve stress we should have manditory yoga and bongo playing classes and trips for our famlies down to flordia in the winter all on the tax payers expense.
Maybe when we retire we can throw outselves lavish parades
Where‘ve we seen that before


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## Ex-Dragoon

Whats the old quote:
"Those who want peace must prepare for war" or something along those lines.


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## dbrock

The Canadian Government needs to quite attempting to use the Canadian Forces as a political tool on the world scene. Get back to the basics

1. Aid to the civil power.
2. Back up our allies in NATO and NORAD.
3. Protect Canada‘s northern sovereignty.

Get rid of the official DND underwear (I bought my own, so can the new generation of Canadian troopers)and other useless kit that the idiots thinking this stuff up don‘t have to hump in the bush ot load into a Rad van.  :soldier:


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## L/MCpl_Argyll_ Kurrgan

But the new underwear is CRACK!  So much support for Carl and the Boyz.  Best pair of underwear ever.  Doesn‘t rip when you give someone a wedgey either.


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## dbrock

HAHAHAHA!

I wear that same type myself in civvie life but I never thought that the military could come up with gucci gitch for our troops.  Bet it cuts back on the chaffing during a forced march
   :soldier:


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## Lost_Warrior

> Further, the example you gave is that while there was a limited number of Canadian troops in the city, they WERE NOT AT WAR! They were trying to slip between two opposing armies that were. the most that they got was harrassing fire. Not full frontal assaults.


That‘s a rather un-informed opinion.  The battle of Medak Pocket was more than just harrassing fire.  It was the CF up against Croatian heavy machine guns, armor and artilery....

 http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wctu/wctc003.shtml


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## Mountie

Here is a new force structure for 2020 I have worked on.  Just interested in any comments. (See my next post with details on my proposed Canadian Medium Brigade Group.)

1 Canadian Joint Task Force:
1 CJTF Headquarters (Created by disbanding all Area Headquarters and the CF JOG)
   - Command Support Group (Signal Sqd, MI Co., MP Co. & Admin Co.)
1 CMBG - Edmonton
2 CMBG - Petawawa
4 Air Expeditionary Wing - Cold Lake (2 Sqds of 18 CF-18 Hornets, one in support of each CMBG, eventually CF-18 Super Hornets or CF-35 JSFs)
1 General Support Group (Reg/Res) (general support battalion, engineer support squadron, signal troop, ResFor light air defence battery, Total Force 100-bed field hospital)

2 Canadian Joint Task Force:
2 CJTF Headquarters (Same as 1 CJTF)
4 CMBG - Gagetown (new bde promised by Paul Martin - QOR of C, 8th CH (PL), 4 RCHA, etc)
5 CMBG - Valcartier
2 General Support Group (Reg/Res)

Combat Training Centre (Moved to Shilo to allow 4 CMBG to use Gagetown, 1 RCHA & 2 PPCLI moved to Edmonton)

8 Transport Wing - Trenton
   - 4 Transport Squadrons (8 CC-130J Hercules each)
   - 1 Strategic Transport Squadron (4 CC-150 Polaris MRTT)

Search & Rescue Wing
   - 5 SAR Squadrons spread across country (2 CC-27J Spartans & 3 CH-149 Cormorants each)

Maritime Command - Pacific & Atlantic Fleets each:
2 Maritime Task Groups each with:
  - 1 Halifiax-class Air Defence & Command Frigate
  - 3 Halifax-class Patrol Frigates
  - 1 Halifax-class frigade-based Support Vessel (similar to RNZN's HMNZS Endeavour) instead of new Joint Support Ships.
1 Coastal Defence Squadron
  - 6 MCDVs
1 Fast Sealift Squadron
  - 2 Medium-size Fast Sealift Vessel (funded by selling off the Victoria-class submarines)
1 Maritime Air Wing
  - 2 Maritime Helicopter Squadrons (6 CH-148 Cyclones each, borrow CH-60 Sea Hawks until CH-148s arrive)
  - 1 Maritime Patrol Squadron (4 CU-163 Altair Maritime UAV or CP-295 Persuaders, still undecided if role can be performed by UAVs)


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## Mountie

Follow-up to my proposed Force Structure 2020 found in "Current Affairs"   What do you think of this idea for a new Canadian Medium Brigade Group?

Just to clarify a few pieces of equipment.   The LAV-III Medium Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) is a LAV-III with an Improved Protected Weapons Station mounting an M2 .50-cal HMG or a Mk.19 40mm AGL not the manned Delco 25mm turret.   The new LAV-III MICV is basically the US Army Stryker.   It would be cheaper to procure, maintain and operate than the present LAV-III APC and carries more dismounts.   (See www.sfu.ca/casr.com for more on this idea).   If it is good enough for the US Army, surely it is good enough for the Canadian Army.   Then I have created a new class of vehicle which I called the Light Armoured Support Vehicle.   It is basically my version of the UK Army's Future Command & Liaison Vehicle.   This is a MOWAG Eagle IV armoured car mounting a IPWS (www.mowag.com).   Many LAV-III support variants such as the RRB, FEV, MMEV, as well as the infantry's Coyotes and the engineer's Mambas can be replaced by the much cheaper Eagle IV.   The HLVWs and MLVWs have been replaced with the 5-tonne and 2.5-tonne versions of the US FMTV, respectively.   The VHLVW is the 11-tonne PLS version of the FMTV.   The LSVW has been replaced with the 1.25-tonne version of the G-Wagon.   The final stage would be to replace the Coyote and Bisons of the cavalry regiments with LAV-IIIs.   The LAV-III Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle (Coyote II) is a LAV-III with the two-man Delco 25mm turret.

The idea is to reduce all the vehicle fleets to just four basic fleets, G-Wagon (LUVW & LSVW), FMTV (MLVW, HLVW, VHLVW and artillery systems), LASV and LAV-III.   This would significantly reduce maintenance and logistics costs and would pay for itself within a few years.   In addition to selling off the old vehicles and equipment there would be additional money to purchase some of the new vehicles
.   
Briagade Headquarters (74 troops)
- Uses ISO containerized command vans carried on HLVW PLSs.   This allows for quick displacement and allows staff to continue operating while moving to a new location.   This eliminates the need for an alternate CP.   Brigade Headquarters are more often in the static role during peace support operations anyways (ie, Bosnia, Afghanistan).

Command Support Squadron (178 troops)
- a large signal troop
- an electronic warfare troop using a EW version of the LAV-III.
- a military intelligence troop
- a military police platoon
- an administration troop for support

3 x Medium Infantry Battalions (753 troops) [Medium infantry is basically light infantry in armoured vehicles.   They could operate as traditional light infantry when required]
-Battalion Headquarters (3 LAV-III Command Vehicles [TAC CP, Ops Section & Intel Section]+ RMP & Chaplain in LUVWs)
-Headquarters Company
   - Co. HQ 
   - Regimental Orderly Room
   - Signal Section (LAV-III CV, 2 x LASV RRBs and a LCIS & Stores Det with LSVW Cargo & MRT, RSO rank reduced to Lieut)
   - Logistics Platoon (stores section, food service section, 4 small company tranport sections each with 4 HLVW and 2 HLVW FAR)
   - Maintenance Platoon (repair parts supply det., recovery section, LAV repair section, light vehicle repair section, ancillary repair section)
   - Unit Medical Station (enlarged by converting all drivers and unit litter barrers to Med As, and by adding a Physicians Assistant)
   - Close Reconnaissance Platoon (8 LASV Reconnaissance Vehicles with IPWS, Plt HQ and 3 sections, each vehicle 2-man crew & 2 dismounts)
   - Mortar Platoon** (three sections of 2 LAV-III 81mm or 120mm Mortar Fire Support Vehicles)
        ***eliminated if the close support artillery batteries are equipped with the 120mm Armoured Mortar System rather than the MAVS (see artillery regiment for more details)
-3 Combined Arms Infantry Companies
   -Co. HQ (command section (2 LAV-III CVs), stores section (4-MLVWs), maintenance section (LAV-III MRV & 2-LSVW MRTs) and medical section (LAV-III Ambulance and platoon Med As)
   -3 Rifle Platoons 
        - Platoon HQ (Plt Cdr, Plt WO, signaller, two 2-man C6 GPMG teams, vehicle driver & gunner, and a LAV NCO that commands the 4 LAVs when the platoon dismounts, all with C8A1s)
        - 3 Sections (2 crew with C8A1s, 8 dismounts with 2 C9A1s and 2 C7A2s with 40mm grenade launchers, the rest with C7A2s, plus a Javelin anti-tank missile launcher and a Carl Gustav for each section)
   - Fire Support Platoon (2 LAV-III MGS, 2 LAV-III TUA, 2 LAV-III DFSV with remote 25mm cannon carrying Plt Cdr, Plt WO, two 60mm mortar teams and a 3-man sniper team)

Cavalry Regiment (377 troops)
-Regimental Headquarters (same as infantry battalion)
-Headquarters Squadron (same as infantry battalion, minus mortar and recce platoons, and smaller support troops to reflect the smaller size of the regiment)
-Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Reconnaissance Troop (3 LAV-III NBC Recce vehicles)
-2 Medium Reconnaissance Squadrons
   - Sqd HQ (same as infantry company but LAV-III CVs have the original 25mm Delco turret)
   - 3 Recce Troops (6 LAV-III Coyote II ARVs)
   - Anti-Armour Section (2 LAV-III TUA)

Combined Artillery Regiment (569 troops)
-Regimental Headquarters (similar to infantry battalion but with a Fire Direction Centre and a detached Bridage FSCC all using HLVW ISO Command Vans for rapid displacement)
-Headquarters & Services Battery 
   - Bty. HQ
   - Regimental Orderly Room
   - Signal Section (same as infantry)
   - Service Troop (stores, transport & maintenance sections)
   - Unit Medical Station
   - Target Acquisition Troop (2 US FireFinder Radars, a survey team & a meteorological section)
- 3 Close Support Artillery Batteries, each supporting an infantry battalion
   - Bty. HQ (TAC CP/Battle Group FSCC in LAV-III CV, command section and recce det with a LASV)
   - 3 Fire Effects Detachments each with a LASV Fire Effects Vehicle and each supporting an infantry company
   - Support Troop (stores, maintenance, medical, food service & ammunition sections)
   - Firing Troop (CP and 6 gun detachments, either 105mm Mobile Artillery Vehicle System mounted on HLVW or 120mm Armoured Mortar System mounted on LAV-III, both would tow a trailer with additional ammo)
- General Support Battery, supports the cavalry regiment and provides counter-battery and deep strike capability
   - all the same as close support battery except only 2 Fire Effects Detachments, one per cavalry squadron and firing troop has 4 HIMARS detachments in place of 6 gun detachments
- Low-Level Air Defence Battery
   - Bty. HQ
   - Maintenance Section 
   - 6 Air Defence Sections (HQ with LASV Command Vehicle and 4 LASV Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle with pedestal-mounted Starstreak missiles.   New version of the Starstreak is a dual missile similar to the much heavier ADATS.   6 missiles are mounted on the pedestal mount on the back of a LUVW or LASV rather than the heavy ADATS that would require a LAV-III and would be very top heavy and unsafe.)

Combat Engineer Squadron (246 troops)
-Sqd. HQ
-Service Troop (orderly room, stores, transport, maintenance and medical sections)
-3 Field Engineer Troops (3 LASVs for Troop Commander, Troop WO and Recce Det, MLVW for stores and 4 Engineer sections each with a LAV-III ESV [US Stryker variant].   Engineer section is organized and equipped the same as an infantry section.)
-Engineer Support Troop (3 mobility support sections each with a HLVW Dump Truck, an assault bridge carried on a HLVW and 4 Multi-Purpose Engineering Vehicles (MPEV); a heavy equipment troop with a road grader, a heavy crane, 2 HLVW tractor-trailers to carry them, a track excavator, 3 HLVW Dump Trucks and 3 MPEVs; and a water section with 2 ROWPUs.)

Brigade Service Battalion (561 troops)
-Bn HQ
-Administration Company
-Transport Company (combat supplies platoon, 3 transport platoons each with 30 VHLVWs and a maintenance section)
-Maintenance Company (repair parts supply platoon, recovery platoon, heavy mobile repair platoon, medium mobile repair platoon and a maintenance support platoon)
-Supply & Services Company (general & technical supply platoon, laundry & bath platoon, decontamination platoon and ResFor finance and postal platoons if needed) 

Field Ambulance (189 troops) [will function as a Role 3 facility for low- to mid-intensity peace support operations with little augmentation]
-HQ (same as present)
-Service Platoon (stores, transport, maintenance & food service sections)
-Preventative Medicine Section
-2 Medical Platoons configured as a 40 bed mini-hospital similar to the Royal Marine Brigade's Logistics Regiment's Medical Squadron 
   - HQ (Emergecny Medical Officer & Operations Officer)
   - Stabilization Section (EMO, Physican's Assistant and 8 Med As) with ISO Containerized Facilities
   - Surgical Section (General Surgeon, Orthapedica Surgeon, Anasthetist, OR Nurse & 2 OR Techs) with ISO Containerized Facilities
   - Ward Section (2 Nursing Officers, ICU Nursing Officer & 7 Med As) with ISO Containerized Facilities
   - Clinical Support Section (2 Lab Techs & 2 X-Ray Techs with mobile lab and x-ray equipment in MLVW Vans)
   - Dental Section (Dental Officer & 2 Dental Techs with mobile clinic in an MLVW Van)
-2 Ambulance Platoons (HQ and 2 sections of 6 LSVW Ambulances each, total of 24 LSVW Ambulances)

Tactical Aviation Squadron (CH-146 Griffon would ideally be replaced by US Army UH-60L Black Hawk versions, which I will call CH-170 Hawk) 
-Command Section (2 CH-170 Hawk Command & Control variants)
-4 Close Support Flights each supporting an infantry battalion/cavalry regiment (2 CH-170 Battle Hawk attack variant & 2 CH-170 Hawk)
-Medical Evacuation/Combat Search & Rescue Flight (4 CH-170 Medivac/CSAR variants)
-Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Flight (6 CU-161 Sperwer TUAVs)


----------



## Inch

I just have a question about the "CH170 Hawk", so other than the alpha numeric identifier, how would you differentiate between a CH 170 Hawk and a CT 155 Hawk? We don't tend to name aircraft the same, especially different airframes. Also, only 2 troop lifters per Battalion? Air mobility would be a nightmare. You need pretty much an entire Sqn to move a battalion. I'm not sure the exact breakdown for a TacHel Sqn since I'm MH, but it's more than 4 helos per flight and having half your fleet as attack helos is a few too many. 

Cheers


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## George Wallace

Mountie

Is it just me or do your links to simon fraser Univ and Mowag not work?

GW


----------



## Mountie

RE: Hawk

You're right.  You would have to rename it.  I just shortened Black Hawk to Hawk.  I forgot about the CT-155.  I guess you would have to rename it.  Just like the H-92 Super Hawk became the Cyclone.  

They should be www.mowag.ch and www.sfu.ca/casr/101.htm   Sorry about that.


----------



## Mountie

RE: Troop Lift

A medium infantry battalion would not need troop lift.  The two utility helicopters are just for basic combat service support and battle taxi duties.  On the odd occasion that the battalion would actually be used as a light infantry battalion you would have to pool the resources of the four tactical aviation squadrons or rely on Allied assets.  Peace support operations have been traditionally mounted operations.  3 PPCLI in Afghanistan was one of the few exceptions.  And we still didn't have the helicopters to support them.  US Army aviation assets were employed.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

There are a number of posters here (whom I should point out have much much more experience than I do) who are very much into confining our roles to those we've had previously.

I on the other hand am much more "objective-focused" and have in the past argued (much less eloquently than PPCLI) that we need to start from scratch with "what is it we want to do?"

My big picture objective:   "Create the best ground forces we can, then realign all our naval/air assets to have the ability to unilaterally deploy then support said ground forces anywhere in the world."

In short, redesign the entire CF to be Ground Forces-focused, and be willing to sacrifice those assets, roles (NATO fleet refueling) that do not fit this new objective.

Bottom Line Question:   What is your big picture objective, how did you come to that conclusion, and how would it affect procurement, reorganization plans over the coming years?

Cheers,



Matthew.


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## DJL

> My big picture objective:  "Create the best ground forces we can, then realign all our naval/air assets to have the ability to unilaterally deploy then support said ground forces anywhere in the world."
> 
> In short, redesign the entire CF to be Ground Forces-focused, and be willing to sacrifice those assets, roles (NATO fleet refueling) that do not fit this new objective.



Do you understand what contradiction means?

Unilaterally deploy naval assests..........get rid of AORs......  ???


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## Zoomie

Interesting premise - if not a little short-sighted.  A military cannot just exist to support the crunchies on the ground.  Naval and air assets are just as involved in necessary day-to-day operations which do not have anything to do with army.  The "raison d'etre" for the CF is primarily the defense of Canada.  I would say that the Navy and the Air Force are the only arms of the CF that are actually accomplishing this feat.  The projection of power and our position in the world's spotlight is how well our deployable forces act - ie overseas deployments.  I would then counter your argument and say - should we focus directly on the defense of Canadian soil (of which the army takes a back seat) or should we be a solely deployable force and leave the defense of North America to the Police and DFO?  
Keep in mind that when our Navy and Air Force assets go on "exercise"  they are 100% operational (ie defending the Country) - can you say the same when 1CMBG deploys to Wainwright?
In my little nook of the CF, every time I go up flying I am operational - even my training flights are still at 30 min Notice to Move anywhere in BC and Yukon - if we're flying someone is dying...


----------



## PPCLI Guy

I think that perhaps you cut to the chase too quickly...

I see a question chain something akin to this:

What is our National Policy?
What elements of National Power are we willing to expend to achieve said policy?
What are the Foreign affairs implications of that decision?
What Defence Policy can we derive from that?
What do we want our military to do?
What capabilities should our military have?
How should we organise those capabilities to best achieve National Policy?

That is what I mean by First Principles.  If the answer to all of those questions lead us to the inevitable conclusion that we need to create a chain of small smart left-handed 14 year old girls chanting Girl Guide songs, then that is what we go out and get...


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## Cdn Blackshirt

DJL said:
			
		

> Do you understand what contradiction means?
> 
> Unilaterally deploy naval assests..........get rid of AORs......   ???



When did I say "get rid of AOR's"?   What I said was withdraw from our commitment to provide the NATO fleet with an AOR.   In essence, focus on unilateral deployment and support capabilities and cooperate/coordinate when other nations choose to join causes we are committed to.



Matthew.


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## DJL

I guess I missread "and be willing to *sacrifice those assets, roles (NATO fleet refueling)* that do not fit this new objective".......My bad


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I think that perhaps you cut to the chase too quickly...
> 
> I see a question chain something akin to this:
> 
> What is our National Policy?
> What elements of National Power are we willing to expend to achieve said policy?
> What are the Foreign affairs implications of that decision?
> What Defence Policy can we derive from that?
> What do we want our military to do?
> What capabilities should our military have?
> How should we organise those capabilities to best achieve National Policy?
> 
> That is what I mean by First Principles.   If the answer to all of those questions lead us to the inevitable conclusion that we need to create a chain of small smart left-handed 14 year old girls chanting Girl Guide songs, then that is what we go out and get...



In your logical hierarchy, the only thing I've tried to assess #1.   I want a unilaterally deployable/supportable set of battlegroups (primarily ground forces, but unilateral deployment of air assets and naval assets would be equally important) that can operate anywhere in the world to intercede in wars, peacemaking, and peacekeeping operations based on the will of the Canadian People, not the UN.   

Obviously poorly worded, to put it into your terminology, my question was intended to discern what everyone else's #1 would be....including yours.

Cheers,


Matthew.     

P.S.   To Zoomie - I'm not saying self-defence with naval and air assets would not be a priority, it would just be the secondary priority as I simply don't see a looming threat upon the horizon.   That being said a foreign policy/defence policy review should be completed annually to quickly identify if the world is changing and if those priorities need to be reversed.


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## PPCLI Guy

> Obviously poorly worded, to put it into your terminology, my question was intended to discern what everyone else's #1 would be....including yours.



I want a Defence Policy!!!


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## Slim

Here's a question;

*What defines the defense of Canada*? Remember its no longer Ivan the commie bastard coming over the hill. Now we have terrorism, counter-drug ops, countersmuggling ops (which I might add submarines would come in rather handy) Arctic and Northern sovereignty, as well as the battlegroup support that seems to have become the focus of everyones attention this last little bit.

The list could go on and on depending on your particular point of view!

So what constitutes the defense of Canada?

Slim


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## Ex-Dragoon

> There are a number of posters here (whom I should point out have much much more experience than I do) who are very much into confining our roles to those we've had previously.


How is wanting to retain and hold on to what we have confining? Wanting air defence destroyer AORs, MBTs etc is not confining our roles it only makes sense.



> I on the other hand am much more "objective-focused" and have in the past argued (much less eloquently than PPCLI) that we need to start from scratch with "what is it we want to do?"


Which to me basically say niche roles, which only hurts all the all round capabilities of the CF.



> My big picture objective:  "Create the best ground forces we can, then realign all our naval/air assets to have the ability to unilaterally deploy then support said ground forces anywhere in the world."


You really can't have it both ways..first you want the air force and navy to act as a taxi service all the time then support the ground forces. I don't have a problem with supporting ground forces but you are leaning towards cuts in capabilies



> .In short, redesign the entire CF to be Ground Forces-focused, and be willing to sacrifice those assets, roles (NATO fleet refueling) that do not fit this new objective.


In my 10 years in the navy I have seen the east coast tankers away supporting the NATO forces maybe twice. The AORs are for the most part used for Canadian Task Group replenishment and for Operations like OP Apollo.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

To Ex-Dragoon (and others),

First off I'm not trying to contend I have all the answers.   I'm actually struggling to ask the right questions so I can learn from you guys.

Bottom Line:   If it were up to you, how would set National Policy and how would that translate into reorganization and procurement?

Many thanks (and my apologies for my clumsy writing skills)....



Matthew.   

P.S.   To Ex-Dragoon re:   The NATO Fleet Tasking - Thanks, I thought it was more often than that....


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## Inch

Well I've got a few thoughts on this so here they go.

Almost 80% of the countries in the world have some shoreline, and the vast majority have some sort of naval power. Let's look at the defence of Canada,   considering we have the largest coastline in the world and we have shores on 3 of the world's oceans, not to mention that 2/3 of the world is covered in water, I'd say that a capable navy is the most important force a country like ours could have. Followed closely by a capable airforce.   If the bad guys can't get to us, how many ground troops do we actually need to hold the ground? 

Now, when we get into foreign policy and being a world power, navies still have the most firepower and mobility to get from one side of the planet to the other and be a show of force. One important caveat of military force is that you don't even have to use that force to be an intimidating presence on the world's stage. What could be more intimidating than a fully capable naval force that can get anywhere in the world in a week? The Americans aren't a superpower because of a large army, the Chinese have a bigger army than any other country, do you hold them in the same regard as the Americans? Not likely, the Americans are a superpower because they can get arse loads of firepower to within 12 nautical miles of 80% of the countries on the planet.

So, my opinion on the big picture, you can't just control one dimension or one terrain.   If you want to be a credible force in the world, you need a well balanced military with emphasis on air superiority and naval supremacy. Without air superiority or naval supremacy, the guys on the ground have no secure means of resupply let alone transport to where they're going. Don't get me wrong, a fully capable army is important too, there's no other way to hold ground or provide an "up close and personal" view of a country's power. What Canada needs to do is sit down and think long and hard about what position we want to have in the world, then build the military to meet that demand. If we want to be a stabilizing force in the world, we need a credible force with the capability to force the renegades to obey the rule of law.

I know this post was a little "Navy" heavy but forgive me, I'm in the middle of my Maritime Warfare course and I'm sold on the benefits of a bitchin' navy.

Cheers


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## Ex-Dragoon

Do I detect a MARS career in your future Inch?


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## Inch

Don't you swear at me!

Definitely not MARS, but quite possibly MH for my career. I love flying too much.  ;D


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## Garry

not to hijack the thread or anything, but anyone wearing a uniform who doesn't realise that his SOLE purpose in Military life is to support the 19 year old infanteer with muddy knees and a bloody bayonet had better re-examine his/her career.

Yes, our Fighter Force may well rid the skies of the bad guys, and our Navy may keep the seas Canadian, but it's all for naught if our Infantry aren't occupying the ground. Note the term Infantry- Tanks take ground, Infantry holds it. Artillery supports them both. As does the Log branch, ferrying bullets and beans- and the Recce guys, Combat Engineers...well, I'll eventually run out of room or forget someone, so I'll stop there- you should be getting the point by now. We all support that 19 yr old kid.

Just for fun, study ANY air war, and see what it's predicated on- the Ground Commanders plan. Naval strategy- same thing- support the ground commander.

Pick ANY war- and it's the same- all the arms support the ground commanders plan to take, and hold that ground. ..and the ground commander? He depends on that 19 year old kid. 

Frankly, I cannot see any other way of doing it.

You may carry on 

Cheers-garry


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## Inch

Garry, spoken like a "the world revolves around me" infanteer.  How about the Battle of Britain? 4 years prior to any ground action in France, I guess they were supporting the infantry that was holding the ground in England.

Why is it that the infantry types tend to hack on other capabilities to remind us all how important they are? Of course you can relate any job to the guy holding the ground, but I'll tell you how many infantry guys MH crews support on a daily basis, zero. We support the navy, the navy maintains sea superiority so the cargo ships can get through, the cargo ships bring supplies to the theater, TacAirlift delivers them, so in a round about 4th or 5th party way, we support the infantry.  Not in all cases does the infantry hold ground. It was the RAF that prevented the invasion of England, there were no ground battles fought on English territory so tell me how they held ground there?

Anyway, I digress, the infantry will keep bringing up the fact that they're the centre of the universe so I'll go back to my cushy helicopter and try not to get shot down with a Sea Sparrow.


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## Ex-Dragoon

I agree Garry but is that infanteer not more effective if he has air cover and the supplies that arrive by sea are well protected? To concentrate on one branch of the Forces at the expense of others is folly as has been tried to have been pointed out.


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## Goober

What good is air and/or naval superiority without any infantry to hold the ground? You can also ask, how can the infantry expect to hold any ground without air and/or naval superiority?

All 3 areas of the Forces work to support each other, no one is more important than the other, because without one, the others value has been significantly decreased.

There is something I fear in todays world. It's that terrorism is seen as the big threat now, and "guerrilla tactics" seem to be the choice of many hostile fighting forces out there, and many countries when trying to adapt to these "new" enemies, they may sacrifice some of their traditional defences or abilities. The Cold War may be over, but the threats we faced then are not gone. There may come a time when another country declares war on us, or one of our allies, and we have to be able to defend ourselves, or an allie.


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## PPCLI Guy

> spoken like a "the world revolves around me" infanteer.



I am one of those guys who has always spouted that line, but, at the risk of being jumped on by all my fellow infanteers, there is a pardigm shift going on here with respect to the relationship between fire and manoeuvre.

Doctrine, organisations and tactics over the last 50 (one could argue 250) years have all been designed around the precept of manoeuvre supported by mass fires.   There is a new theory (that we have formally adopted in the CF by way of various Transformation documents) that the relationship should be precision fires supported by manoeuvre.   This echoes US thinking on Effects Based Operations.   If one accepts that theory, then doctrine, organisations and tactics must necessarily follow, and I think that we may find the previously unassailable moral high ground held by the infantry under attack.

Now having said that, we as a military lack a wide spectrum precision capability, and with a lack of strategic *and* tactical mobility (no strategically mobile engineer mobility assets to speak of), one can question our ability to manoeuvre.

Strikes me though that if you take a careful read of Strategy 2020, the Strategfic Operating Concept, and the various Transformation documents, we are slowly evolving our theory and hence doctrine of war fighting.   Organisations, equipment and tactics are sure to follow.


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## Infanteer

Inch, I'll disagree with the prioritization of the Navy and the Air Force over the Army.  People do not live under water or in the sky.  To truly serve our National Interest and force our will upon others (which is the root of conflict) you need humans on the ground, using force upon their society if necessary.  Even moreso in our current global world, the strategy of containment and isolation through access of the air and the sea is unworkable.  We need to push our interests overseas, and only troops can do this.

Hitler could strafe and bomb Britain with the Luftwaffe and sink convoys with the U-Boats to his hearts content; but until he was marching soldiers into Whitehall, the war was still going.

Anyways, I've made a new discussion about the broader discussion of Canadian Foreign and Defence policy (vice Naval policy) here:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/21567.0.html


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## Inch

PPCLI Guy and Infanteer, 

In no way was I trying to diminish the necessity of having troops on the ground nor the job the infantry does. I'm just sick of hearing that old line, especially when it's thrown in rebuttal of post that I put a bit of thought into.

The thing that a navy can do that an army or airforce can't do is project a presence without the need to invade or hold ground.  International laws of the sea state that any warship must be a min of 12 nautical miles from shore. So before you start dropping guys in or doing a beach landing, a show of force offshore is sometimes a better way of achieving your political agenda.  A sizable and capable naval fleet can do this without even adopting an aggressive posture, just being there is enough. Now we're not going to send troops into every country that needs to be put in line and if we do it without permission it can be considered a hostile act and escalate a conflict. So to avoid this, you obey the law and put a naval fleet offshore and conduct "exercises" as a show of force. In most cases the troublemakers will step down and holding ground wouldn't be necessary.

It's something the Americans do quite well with their carrier battlegroups.

Cheers


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## DJL

Though this looks like a circular debate, I feel the need to add my two bits........

If you could ask Rommel who his greatest foes were during the North African campagin, I wonder if he would say Sommerville and Cunningham instead of Monty and Patton?


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## Infanteer

My point was to debate this statement and point out that it is unfair to view the Army as the least relevent force based along lines of an "isolationist" stance:



> Let's look at the defence of Canada,   considering we have the largest coastline in the world and we have shores on 3 of the world's oceans, not to mention that 2/3 of the world is covered in water, I'd say that a capable navy is the most important force a country like ours could have. Followed closely by a capable airforce.   If the bad guys can't get to us, how many ground troops do we actually need to hold the ground?



As DJL points out with an excellent analogy (He's precisely right; Monty eeked out a victory at Alemein because Rommel failed at Seaborne supply from Italy), arguing over which service is the most important is stupid and liable to get us nowhere.

To be a truly effective fighting Force, one must be strong in all areas, as they are all vitally important.

The Army can waste away on unfriendly shores (if it can even get there) without a strong Air Force and Navy.

The Navy, without troops to support or air assets to launch, can sit off shore and shake it's fist and curse at our enemies; especially if they happen to be naval superpowers like Afghanistan.

Airpower, contrary to the wet dreams of many an Air Force general, does not win wars.   Airpower is, however, a crucial component to a marching army or a fleet.

Hence, all three are important.   As much as we detest Unification (I do for many reasons), we are on the right track to Unify our military in a search for jointness (unfortunately, we don't quite practice this to the level we should).   A good example of the seamless level of joint naval, land, and air power that we should move towards would be the USMC or the Royal Marines - both these organizations employ naval assets supported by airpower to project land power around the globe.   If this isn't what the Canadian military, as an expeditionary force, is working towards perfecting, then I don't know what we're doing.


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## Slim

I think a first good step to defending this country would be to get the current govt. out of power and install one that is actually interested in focusing on defense issues...Instead of treating the military like a second rate organization that gets a handout or two now and then and is the first thing stripped of its budget when they need some extra coin.

The rest of the plans and thoughts regarding enforcing our sovereignty are nothing more than a well-thought out wish list without the govt.'s support.

Slim


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## PPCLI Guy

Its a democracy.  The people voted the govt in.  Get over it.


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## Slim

*"Get over it?"*

Buddy, its not my career that will suffer.

I say what I say because I care about the defense of this country...How about you?

Also, having been friends with a number of excellent people who call your Regt. home I wonder what they would have to say about your comment?

If you have a problem with the fact that I take offense to the govt. lying to Canadians on this subject then PM me and we'll sort it out. But I stand by what I said.

I don't think that comment of yours is the right way to think about this issue and I would ask you to re-evaluate why you said it.

Slim


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## Infanteer

Slim, we have to be more creative then simply saying "we can't do anything until Party X is gone".  This could be considered "waiting for Santa Claus" and putting off needed changes until the "presents are under the tree".  The military found out the hard way that it doesn't usually work that way when the Conservatives took over in the 1980s.

As far as I'm concerned, short of total deprivation or censure, we can succeed or fail despite the support of the government of the day.  Tieing our fortunes (good or bad) to the fickle nature of democratic politics will do us no good.  Our fate is in our own hands.


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## Slim

As usual Infanteer you have a number of excellent points.

The problem, as I see it, is this;

The military is mandated to carry out a specific number of tasks...Or should be, because no one really knows what direction the service is headed in.

The cold war is over, we're out of germany and now, although we have no shortage of enemies, the govt. of the day can't decide what we're going to do, to what extent we're going to do it, or if they should just let the US defend us and let our Forces go to pot.

I know the PC's aren't much better but at least they tried to do something for the service the last time they were in (EH101's under Kim Cambell)

My point in all of this is how can you set any kind of direction and long term strategy when the govt. ignores your service on a good day, rapes it as soon as the general public isn't looking any more, and, when they do replace aging and dangerous kit the service gets about a quarter of what it needs. And the replacement kit is substandard half the time.

Maybe the serving members need to tow the line more than the guys who've moved on, but, I gotta say that that kind of thinking kind of got me going a bit.

Yourself or PPCLI Guy are welcome to send me a PM to discuss this more and I would welcome the thoughts of others on this. I just don't see the sense of saying "oh well" and brushing it off.

Any other thoughts are welcome

Slim


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## DJL

> Slim, we have to be more creative then simply saying "we can't do anything until Party X is gone".  This could be considered "waiting for Santa Claus" and putting off needed changes until the "presents are under the tree".  The military found out the hard way that it doesn't usually work that way when the Conservatives took over in the 1980s.



Thats the truth!!!  I bleed Tory Blue, but I'm still waiting for the twelve nuke boats promised in the '87 white paper.........


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## PPCLI Guy

Slim,

No call for a PM - I started it in public, so I should finish it there.

I apologise. :-[  

The comment wasn't so much directed at you as it was to the general defeatist thinking that I keep running across.  We can't wish our problems away - although we sure tried from about 1970 to 1995.  We have to figure out how to a) make it work within the limitations that have been set for us by the people of Canada (in the form of their elected government - and we can argue on a separate thread on just how democratic our process really is - but its the one we have) and b) how to influence those limitations so that we can better serve the people of Canada.

So again, my apologies.

Dave

P.S. - For those that know me, I apologise for shocking you by apologising - twice!


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## Mountie

I came up with a couple of different options:

I mentioned it in the artillery section in more detail, but what do you think of each artillery regiment having three close support artillery batteries with a troop of 4 LAV-III 105mm Denel SPHs and a troop of 4 LAV-III 120mm Armoured Mortar Systems, fully supported by HLVW ammo carriers and LAV-III support vehicles such as CP versions, etc.  And of course eliminate the infantry battalion mortar platoons in return.  This allows for the artillery to completely control all medium and heavy fire support elements within the brigade.

With regards to the total CF structure.  Instead of the two Joint Task Forces, separate transport wing and maritime units that I proposed early, how about four smaller JTFs.  This allows each JTF to deploy as a complete unit in a major regional conflict.  Each JTF would have:
- JTF HQ (formed by reconfiguring each LFC Area Headquarters and splitting up the CF JHQ)
- 1 x Command Support Group (as above - by splitting up the Joint Signal Regiment, Area Signal Squadrons and adding ResFor MI Company and Total Force MP company)
- 1 x CMBG (as above)
- 1 x Air Expeditionary Wing
   - 1 x Tactical Fighter Squadron with 18 CF-18 Super Hornets or CF-35 JSFs
   - 1 x Transport Fighter Squadron with 8 CC-130J Hercules and 1 CC-150 Polaris MRTT
   - 1 x Tactial Helicopter Squadron (as above, but with upgrade CH-146 Griffons similar to upgrade UH-1Y Twin Hueys of the USMC)
   - 1 x SAR Squadron (not deployable)
- 1 x Maritime Task Group (as above)
- 1 x General Support Group (general support battalion, composite engineer support squadron, ResFor civil-military affairs company, ResFor air defence battery with MANPADs, Total Force Advanced Surgical Centre-based mini-hospital)


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## a_majoor

If I were the CDS:

1 "Special Forces" brigade, grouping valuable but hard to categorize units like JTF 2, CF DART and a Cyberwar unit. (add own favorite specialty units here). Core fighting power should be the "Canadian Parachute Battalion", created by bringing all the para assets under one canopy. (couldn't resist)

1 Regular Force Brigade/Area with one Light Infantry Battalion (maybe upgraded to an Airmobile Battalion), and three "Manoeuvre Battalions": composite formations resembling current battlegroups, but all under one "cap badge" for organizational and esprit de corps reasons. (If it makes traditionalists happy, the "cap badge" could be the current one, even though "I PPCLI" and the "LdSH(RC)" under this plan would have the same TO&E). 

3 Reserve Battalions/Area, using the same TO&E as the Regular brigades. For realistic funding, equipping would be limited to one battlegroup stored at the Area Training Centre, but units would be lavishly equipped with proper simulators to gain and maintain proficiency with the equipment. Concentrations might be done on a rotational system, or even staggered through the year (i.e. *1 Bde will be the first two weeks of June; *2 Bde the first two weeks of July and *3 Bde the first two weeks of Aug).

Air Force to supply one strategic transport Sqn, and an air expeditionary wing/Area with the ability to lift and support one battlegroup (Support may be done with UAV/UACVs rather than manned fighter-bombers, AWACs, JSTARS etc.)

Navy configured to provide sealift and littoral support to a deployed Brigade.

C&C through Area Joint HQ's, with "jointness" promoted throughout the organization (common communications means, letting the Air Force and Navy types have "ownership" i.e. "Those are our guys we're transporting" etc.)

No back of the envelope cost figures or exact breakouts of unit mannings; this is the skeleton idea for a balanced force which can fight at almost all levels, and has a balance between strategic, operational and tactical mobility and fighting power.


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## Inch

Where do I even begin. 

Let's start with the thing that's bothering me the most.  It's been mentioned that the Airforce should provide Strategic airlift and close air support as well as air mobility.  What about Air Superiority? Domestic SAR? How about base SAR? Bad stuff can happen even at home or close to home and believe me, spending a night in -40 weather after ejecting from an aircraft just isn't an option. No mention of VIP transport, guess they're on their own. 

Now, the Navy, littoral support and sealift is fine, what about defense on the high seas? You want your BG equipment protected by capable ships don't you? Destroyers and Frigates will cure what ails ya. You think MCDVs can go into the open ocean? Nope, hell, they can barely do 15 kts. They don't have helo capability so they're useless in ASW and they're too small for AAW.  Frigates are pretty quick and very capable, but I'd still say they're too small to provide area air defence and C&C. They only carry one helo and for ASW, it's far more effective to have two helos working together, that way you don't lose your contact when you pull the ball up to reposition. There are plans on the table to either replace the destroyers or heavily modify some frigates, I can't tell you much more info than that.  No mention of Maritime patrol either, quite effective for Domestic ops (fishery patrols, drug patrols and any other illegal activity on the water), they're also very effective Sub hunters and with their speed they can search far more ocean than a helo or ship could. Back to the ships, I think the Sub necessity has been beaten to a bloody pulp. 

Anyway, that's some food for thought, just my opinion though.

Cheers


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## hugh19

Just a few navy points if I may

A tanker based on a CPF is a bad idea the hull is not designed for that, and the Endeavour is too small for our needs IMO. The MCDV's are quite useless for anything other than training really. The subs need to stay

 Also the CPF is a good size for C3 and AAW it would need mods to the design though. As the CPF is actually longer wider and heavier than the 280's are.


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## Ex-Dragoon

To add to sledges point as well....CPF are single hulled by law a tanker must be double hulled.


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## hugh19

oh yeah thanks ex forgot that part and I am a tanker wanker LOL


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## a_majoor

OK so maybe that should have been "When I am VCDS".

These are very valid points, the capabilities I am talking about are the "joint" capabilities which the Airforce and Navy can directly add to support our activities on the ground. They can also adapt some of these capabilities for their own use, and will have to have some specialized things for their own use.

Some of this will have to be "common platforms" just for funding/economy of scale issues. A large and capable UAV like "Global Hawk" could be the basis for an AWACS, JSTARS, ocean surveillance and C3I platform, for example. The HMAS Jervis Bay is a converted high speed ferry the Australians used to transport a battalion's worth of troops to East Timor (Max speed=35kts). Using a similar hull for transport, supply, "Frigate" and so on would result in a production run of about 20 ships, all with similar capabilities (no slow movers in that convoy).

But the basic point is to create a flexible and "joint" structure to handle a wide range of scenarios. (The assumption that we will have allied or coalition help also needs to be carefully examined, especially if the Government wants to undertake a mission which potential allies do not have a vital stake in).


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## hugh19

OKay like I thought I mentioned before you cannot use the same hull form for a tanker that you would for a transport ship or a frigate or destroyer. It would be like trying to use a sports car to pull a semi trailer, or a Tractor trailer to race sports cars.


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## a_majoor

It depends on what you are trying to do, Sledge. While a dedicated tanker design can carry a lot of fuel, it cannot keep pace with the combatants in the convoy. 

Thinking of "Jointness" to support Army missions, we start with a large volume, fast hull form like Jervis Bay to move 500 troops and their equipment very quickly to the deployment (a ship that can cross the ocean at 30 kts will get you there much faster than a transport ship plodding along at 15 kts). The large volume available to transport troops lends itself to other uses, such as a high speed oiler or supply ship, or a "frigate" with the volume to carry a large vertical launch cell of missiles, etc. It is true the supply ship isn't going to be as efficient as it could be, but the prompt arrival of the battlegroup with the associated supporting vessels in one package would probably have a lot more of an effect on whatever sort of operation you are doing than the slower or piecemeal arrival of efficient, dedicated ships with differing characteristics.

The cost factor of building a common hull and filling it with different "stuff" may or may not offset the cost of building a dedicated ship, I am inclined to believe it will, but don't know for sure.


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## hugh19

OK first off warships don't travel across the ocean at 30 knots unless its a huge emergency its a fuel conservation thing. So that idea is shot as with your mini tanker there would be no fuel left after crossing the Pacific. But 18 knots is NATO standard cruising speed. Hull form is for speed, Warships need a long thin hull for speed and manouverability. Supply and transport need much wider hulls for stability for one thing and to carry a payload thats worthwhile. So while its a nice idea its not feasible or practical. If it was don't you think navies the world over would have already done it? They don't for a reason. I am not trying to put you down in anyway but I do have a lot of experience with ships.


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## pbi

Details of hulls and cruising speeds aside, its good to see that there's some unity of thought on the idea that we can't just configure the Army in a vacuum-we need to think about a joint force "package" that can project/protect/employ/sustain/recover itself in a expeditionary way. We cannot afford to have Army, Navy, Air Force (nor supporting organizations such as Comms, MP, Med) focused on their own little rice bowls and losing sight of the big picture. I hope that some of the thinking we see in these posts will be reflected in the results of the Def/ForPol review and the resulting force structure. Cheers.


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## jrhume

I think all this thinking and planning is a healthy thing -- I just hope people high up in the Canadian government and CFHQ are doing the same thing.

One thing that strikes me is the unconscious mind-set I see -- that Canada is unlikely to ever be attacked from the outside.  Peggy mentioned possible threats to Vancouver Island and she was pooh-poohed.  After all, leaving aside the US, who could invade Canada?  

Well, how about a commandeered ro-ro carrier?  Filled with maybe 5,000 bloodthirsty terrorists.  How long would it take an armed mob to disembark from the ship, take over local transport and secure the entire island?  

Mind you, I'm not talking about an enemy intent on conquering Vancouver or any other part of Canada.  I'm talking about terrorists intent on killing all the infidels they can find and probably holding large numbers of civilians hostage.  The horrible possibilites are endless.

So, tell me.  If Canadian authorities had four hours notice of the approach of this ship, what forces are in position to assault into Vancouver and stop them?  Remember, they'll have the ship laden with anti-air missile defenses and probably some anti-ship missiles.  Such things are not hard to come by.  And a ro-ro ship would be difficult to sink.

General, you have four hours.  How do you stop the terrorists?

Time starts -- now.

PS: I'm not comparing Canada and the US here.  I'm not sure we're geared up adequately for this threat either.


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## Danjanou

Old Guy, if you'd presented that scenario say 3-4 years ago I'd have said you've reading too many Tom Clancy novels. Now as unlikely as it sounds it could happen. Who'd have though of a dedicated bunch of individuals taking over 4 not 1 airliners with box cutters and the devastation they caused.

Could it happen, possibly. Could we prevent, react to it, I have to admit probably not.


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## Edward Campbell

pbi said:
			
		

> Details of hulls and cruising speeds aside, its good to see that there's some unity of thought on the idea that we can't just configure the Army in a vacuum-we need to think about a joint force "package" that can project/protect/employ/sustain/recover itself in a expeditionary way. We cannot afford to have Army, Navy, Air Force (nor supporting organizations such as Comms, MP, Med) focused on their own little rice bowls and losing sight of the big picture. I hope that some of the thinking we see in these posts will be reflected in the results of the Def/ForPol review and the resulting force structure. Cheers.



Agreed.

I think we need to recognize some strategic imperatives:

*First*: we must have sufficient _internal security_ and _home defence_ forces.   These will likely be 'reserve' forces - not in the sense of a regular/permanent force vs. reserve/militia force but rather in the sense of expeditionary (ready) vs. reserve (resting/rebuilding) components;

*Second*: there is no 'conventional' direct threat to Canada but we must maintain the surveillance, detection/identification and interception capabilities, including quick reaction, light (almost certainly air mobile if not airborne) *land* forces.   Forces which have intercepted an intruder must be powerful enough to see the intruder off - a couple of Mounties ferried about in a _Griffon_ is not the right answer;

*Third*: the threats to our _peace and prosperity_ are best countered by taking _preventive_ military actions - e.g. to rescue _failing_ states.   We need sufficient expeditionary forces to -

"¢	Conduct, *unilaterally*, large unit/small formation *low intensity* operations anywhere in the world and on fairly short notice,

"¢	Participate, as members of a *coalition of the willing*, in mid-to-high intensity operations anywhere in the world after a brief period of preparation/mobilization;

"¢	Participate, as members of an *alliance*, in all levels of operations - including general war, far from home, after a period of mobilization.

We probably need some light (amphibious and air mobile/airborne) *army* forces - maybe several battle groups' worth, organized into joint task forces at the heart of our _permanent *expeditionary*_ force.   These forces will be best able to handle low intensity, unilateral operations and to 'lead' the way into mid-intensity operations.   We should, also, have a 'medium' (motorized/mechanized) formation (brigade+/-) within another joint task force which can participate, fully, in mid-intensity operations and 'lead' the way into higher intensity missions.   These must be backed up by adequate reserves (who are available for internal security in their copious free time between deployments).   

Consider, just for the sake of argument:

"¢	10 to 15 battalions of infantry - four light units (two amphibious and two airborne) at high states of readiness and three more in a mechanized/motorized formation - in an up to strength albeit not too 'ready' state;

"¢	A half dozen 'cavalry' units - some with _Strykers_ or even light tanks, some with recce/surveillance/target acquisition systems and some with attack helicopters.   Some units will be full regiments, others independent squadrons or composite units;

"¢	An artillery brigade;

"¢	Combat support and combat service support units - including army aviation and electronic (information) warfare units;

"¢	A few VSTOL fighter/bomber squadrons;

"¢	An air transport wing (maybe four heavy lift _strategic_ transports - like the C-17s, possibly leased, 30+ *modern* medium tactical transports plus some heavy lift helicopters - not unlike the ones we sold to the Dutch several years back); and

"¢	A couple of Navy task groups built around a 30,000+/- ton strategic transport/landing platform.

That would require a massive increase in the defence spending - maybe (remember, please, I've been retired for a long, long time) a 100% increase (to 2% of GDP) over a fairly short period - say five years, and then *sustainment* for protracted periods.


----------



## Inch

Old Guy said:
			
		

> I think all this thinking and planning is a healthy thing -- I just hope people high up in the Canadian government and CFHQ are doing the same thing.
> 
> One thing that strikes me is the unconscious mind-set I see -- that Canada is unlikely to ever be attacked from the outside.   Peggy mentioned possible threats to Vancouver Island and she was pooh-poohed.   After all, leaving aside the US, who could invade Canada?
> 
> Well, how about a commandeered ro-ro carrier?   Filled with maybe 5,000 bloodthirsty terrorists.   How long would it take an armed mob to disembark from the ship, take over local transport and secure the entire island?
> 
> Mind you, I'm not talking about an enemy intent on conquering Vancouver or any other part of Canada.   I'm talking about terrorists intent on killing all the infidels they can find and probably holding large numbers of civilians hostage.   The horrible possibilites are endless.
> 
> So, tell me.   If Canadian authorities had four hours notice of the approach of this ship, what forces are in position to assault into Vancouver and stop them?   Remember, they'll have the ship laden with anti-air missile defenses and probably some anti-ship missiles.   Such things are not hard to come by.   And a ro-ro ship would be difficult to sink.
> 
> General, you have four hours.   How do you stop the terrorists?
> 
> Time starts -- now.
> 
> PS: I'm not comparing Canada and the US here.   I'm not sure we're geared up adequately for this threat either.



You're gonna have to think up a harder question than that. If people would actually listen to someone that knows what's going on, they'd be told that a couple Nuke subs could stop any seaborne threat without being detected.  It really is a simple solution. If we're worried about an assault from sea, I would highly doubt that the infidels have a good anti-sub capability, even if they have a few SSKs (keeping in mind that SSKs aren't designed for overseas ops, they're more of a domestic operator).  So you head over with your 2-3 Nuke subs at a high rate of speed (Nukes can do about 30+ knots) and you launch a few torps, it only takes one hit to sink most ships and buh-bye terrorists. 

In reality, with Sat images and the wealth of intel out there, we'd know quite a while in advance, they don't just show up without warning. We watch out to 200nm, even if the badguys are doing 20kts, it'll take them 10 hrs to reach shore. That's tons of time to launch an Aurora and confirm the ship's location without getting in range of the AA defences, then they tell the Frigates and missiles away. I apologise for the vagueness of my answer, but due to OPSEC, I can't tell you the details on how we'd do it, but we could.  I still think a sub would be way more effective, but given the equipment we've got, we could probably handle it long before they got to shore.

Cheers


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## Ex-Dragoon

Yeah that pretty much sums it up Inch.


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## a_majoor

sledge said:
			
		

> So while its a nice idea its not feasible or practical. If it was don't you think navies the world over would have already done it? They don't for a reason. I am not trying to put you down in anyway but I do have a lot of experience with ships.



Just getting back to Naval support for the expeditionary force, here is an interesting link for an already existing, made in Canada solution:
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-navalsc4.htm   the catamaran ships built for BC Ferries! They are actually bigger than the HMAS Jervis Bay or similar ships the American Army and Navy are experimenting with, so launching a large part of a Brigade Battle Group should be possible.Maybe I am missing something, but most of what I have read regarding the INCAT catamaran ships at least implies they can cross the ocean at 30kts. Even if they cross the ocean at 18 kts, the ability to make high speed dashes would probably provide some extra protection to the convoy and the battle group as they prepare to deploy near the hostile shore.

Although there are lots of possible objections to converting a civillian ship for military use, these are available _now_. We don't need to wait a decade or more for the Joint Support Ship, and the experience gained through the use of these ships by both the Navy and Army communities will make the next generation of purpose built ships even better.


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## Inch

It doesn't make a lick of difference if the tanker can go faster than the ships that are escorting it, because it will never leave it's escort. Tankers are high value assets and they're continuously protected by the other ships in the Task Group. As was stated already, warships don't do 30kts in the open ocean, it really eats the gas. If you needed stuff in theater yesterday, Strategic airlift is how you get it there, not sea lift. So, despite popular belief that heavy sea lift is the answer, you better have the *war*ships to defend your high value assets. You think losing a man or two is bad? How about an entire battlegroup and their equipment on an unescorted tanker? There's a reason each US nuke carrier sails with tons of other ships, it's high value and nothing gets close to it without permission. Period.

Cheers


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## hugh19

OK as to the RO RO  4 harpoons would leave it a burning hulk. No need to sink it and plus added benefit of BBQed terrorists. Ever seen burnt sailors??? Not pretty imagine a burning tank with 250 people on it and no where to go.

 As for the ferries, the INCAT ferries have a wave piercing bow designed for the open ocean. The BC ferries would have been designed for coastal work. Much different construction required. Plus no amphib capability either so it would have to dock at a already secured jetty not often going to happen. Plus what would the ships do when not carrying troops? Not much use navalwise. Unless u want a true amphib ship.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Not to mention the CF18s that are forward deplyed in Comox. I am not sure if we have the airlaunched harpoons but thats an option as are CRV7 rocket pods and laser guided bombs.


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## R031button

Now I may be just a newbie ass Private (Recruit), but bear with me on this.

What Canada needs is a force that is large enough for us to mount a sustainable 5-6 op and not drain our forces too much. This being said, we NEED more, twice if not three times, then what we have. We also have a 9 billion dollar budget surplus, and no reason no to expect another one.Taking both these points into consideration, I propose this. We add 2 billion dollars to the budget each year for 6 years. In addition we cut much of the bureaucracy found at DND HQ, and then cut down on the number of reserve regiments(but all get there later). The result would be a "light Corps" commanded by a Lt. General, and organized as such. It would be made up of 3 divisions, commanded by Maj. Generals, containing 3 brigades, a battalion of artillery and a full CER. Two of it's Brigades, commanded by Brigadiers, would be mechanized; made up of two Infantry Regiments and an Armoured Regiment, commanded by Cols. The Infantry Regiments would consist of a LAV3 Battalion, a DFS company (replacing the Combat Support company) of LAV3 based DFS systems, a battery of 6 LAV3 120mm Mortars, an engineering platoon in LAV 3 variants, a Support and maintenance coy,and a Recce platoon mounted in LAV3's. All of this would correspond to approximately 1,200-1,500 troops. The armoured variant would be much the same; only based on a battalion of 3 Squadrons of 15 tanks(purchased off of our NATO allies) or the LAV3 DFS, it would be supported by: an Infantry Sqdn, a battery of 120mm mortars, an armoured engineering trp, an armoured Recce Sqn of Coyotes, and a maintenance and support Sqn(containing an armoured recovery trp). This formation would also be of about 1,200-1,500, brining the full Brigade up to between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers.The their brigade would be an air mobile one, made up of two battalions of infantry, one Para and the other Airmobile. These would be supported by an Canadian Aviation Regiment, made up of enough transport planes to drop on battalion, and enough large helicopters (Chinooks preferably) to move the remaining battalion, as well as a small number of Recce/attack helicopters to provide the light battalions with DFS support. These light Brigades would be of about 3,000 soldiers, and on a higher level of readiness then the other Brigades. The airforce would also be reorganized, into four Tactical Wings, each consiting of Fighter, Transport, and Helicopter Squadrons, plus the required maitenance resources. Also, two SAR Wings would be built up to provide SAR for Central and Western Canada. The Navy would also have two SAR wings(one per coast), attached to one of two coastal defense fleets. These fleets would be built around MCDVs, OSPVs, UAVs and CPFs, as well as Martime Helicopter Squadrons. The would be responsible for the security of Canada's coast lines against Drug trafficking, illegal immigrations, smuggling, etc. This would replace/merge with the coast guard (providing men and money). In addition to these fleets would be the Navy's 4 expeditionary fleets(2 to a coast), designed around the concept of moving, deploying and supporting a full Regiment in a Theater of operations. These would be built around a JSS, Destroyers and Frigates, as well as a Martime Helicopter squadron. One fleet, Wing and Brigade would be designated rapid reaction for as long as four months at a time, before rotating.


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## jrhume

So a ro-ro carrier or something like that is no threat, eh?  Satellites can look inside a ship and tell when one is loaded with terrorists?  Somehow, I don't think you understand how chaotic worldwide shipping can be.

And, of course, there'll be a nuke sub handy to sink the thing.  Or a plane loaded with Harpoons.  P-3s carry a couple, when on maratime patrols.  Does Canada have routine maratime patrols out?  I don't need an answer that involves operational security.

I believe something like this scenario is a definite threat -- not just to Canada, but to the US and other targets around the world.  

But, I'm probably just being an alarmist.  

  Jim


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## Inch

R031button said:
			
		

> These would be supported by an Canadian Aviation Regiment, made up of enough transport planes to drop on battalion, and enough large helicopters (Chinooks preferably) to move the remaining battalion, as well as a small number of Recce/attack helicopters to provide the light battalions with DFS support. These light Brigades would be of about 3,000 soldiers, and on a higher level of readiness then the other Brigades. The airforce would also be reorganized, into four Tactical Wings, each consiting of Fighter, Transport, and Helicopter Squadrons, plus the required maitenance resources. Also, two SAR Wings would be built up to provide SAR for Central and Western Canada. The Navy would also have two SAR wings(one per coast), attached to one of two coastal defense fleets.   One fleet, Wing and Brigade would be designated rapid reaction for as long as four months at a time, before rotating.



R031, the army part looks good to me, but I'm an airforce guy and I see some holes in your airforce theory. 

If you've only got 4 wings and 9 Brigades, you're over rotating the airforce wings by having 1 of each on a constant rapid reaction stance. You'd be further ahead and waste less resources if you went with Sqn size units. We also tend to be always on a higher readiness, just the nature of the job.   You may need a couple strat airlift sqns to move a brigade overseas, but you're not going to need more than one to sustain it. Also, unless you're doing air mobility operations on a regular basis, having more than a Sqn of TacHel in theater is just a waste.

From an organizational standpoint, I think we've got the Air Force nailed down as is, we could use a few more sqns here and there, but for the most part we've got it.   A Wing in the air force is simply a name for the operational units on a particular base, ie CFB Moose Jaw is the infrastructure that supports 15 Wing, which consists of 2 CFFTS, 431 AD Sqn and 15 Air Traffic Control Sqn. There are a couple exceptions, but no more than that. We have multiple different Sqns/Units at any Wing, with 2 exceptions, those being 12 Wing (MH) & 1 Wing (TacHel).   

12 Wing based in Shearwater controls all MH sqns (the 2 operational sqns, the training sqn and the air maintenance sqn), since we only send one helo per ship in most cases, they're sent as detachments. In this manner, we're quite flexible as to how many ships we can support if we had more men and aircraft. Not all ships are at sea at the same time, so the airdets rotate to the ones that are going to sea. 

1 Wing is the TacHel Wing, the sqns are spread across the country at all the major army bases where they're needed. This keeps all tactics and procedures common across the Wing and enables augmenting as required with no difficulty in integrating. If you wanted to add a TacHel sqn for each battalion or brigade, you could simply add a second or third sqn to the base of choice, all the while maintaining the command and control through 1 Wing HQ.

As for the fighters, they do a lot more than close air support (CAS), stuff like Combat Air Patrols (CAPs), Air superiority, interception of hostile and civil aircraft, as well as precision bombing. CAS is just a small piece of the puzzle and in that respect, I think the existing organization is fine too.   Anytime CAS is needed, they send a detachment of jets to wherever they're needed. An entire Sqn of 15 jets isn't necessary. At present we have four Tac Fighter Sqns, two at 4 Wing Cold Lake and two at 3 Wing Bagotville.

4 SAR Wings is definitely overkill, at present we have 4 SAR _Sqns_, which seem to do the domestic SAR role quite well. They're based in Comox, Trenton, Greenwood and Gander. If you're talking about Combat SAR, then you're opening a whole new ball of wax, at present only the Americans posses that capability, not even the British. We also have 3 Combat Support Sqns (CSS) flying Griffons, their primary role is base rescue for the fighter bases: Cold Lake, Bagotville, and Goose Bay (all foreign fighters, we don't have any Sqns at Goose other than 444 CSS).

Transport and Maritime Patrol Sqns are pretty much the same as SAR, there's multiple Sqns across the country at different Wings.

Since you'd only have 1 or 2 Brigades, or at most 3, overseas at any one time, WW3 aside, it'd be far easier to rotate the Sqns required instead of having a dedicated Wing of multiple Sqns, some of which wouldn't be used, rotated with the Brigades. 

I think you've got a good grasp on the Army side, but I think you need a little more exposure to the Air Force and Navy before you start suggesting   how they should be organised. They don't work the same way the Army does.

Cheers


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## Inch

Old Guy said:
			
		

> So a ro-ro carrier or something like that is no threat, eh?   Satellites can look inside a ship and tell when one is loaded with terrorists?   Somehow, I don't think you understand how chaotic worldwide shipping can be.
> 
> And, of course, there'll be a nuke sub handy to sink the thing.   Or a plane loaded with Harpoons.   P-3s carry a couple, when on maratime patrols.   Does Canada have routine maratime patrols out?   I don't need an answer that involves operational security.
> 
> I believe something like this scenario is a definite threat -- not just to Canada, but to the US and other targets around the world.
> 
> But, I'm probably just being an alarmist.
> 
> Jim



Jim, you replied while I was typing my novel. I never said a sat could look inside a ship, but if it's hijacked or stolen, by the time it gets here, someone is going to know. Most companies don't just sweep the loss of a multi million dollar ship under the rug. It's amazing what Intelligence can know and find out. Plus, a ship that size has to port somewhere.  The nuke sub was a theoretical thing, a "what if we had them" kinda thing. Auroras do patrol quite often, they don't carry Harpoons that I know of, but they don't need to. They're connected to the Frigates with a data link and can target for the ship to fire her weapons. From what I've found on the internet, ro-ro's do about 20 kts, our Frigates can go faster than that so catching it isn't a problem. 

Anyway, I'm having some serious doubts that this could be a problem, 20 kts isn't a "oh my god! The terrorists are coming!" kind of thing.

Cheers


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## Kirkhill

With respect to Old Guy's scenario, I've always thought that a Container ship declaring an emergency and hauling into Prince Rupert would make for an interesting scenario.  Vessel hauls into the harbor with a compliant and authorized Captain on board.  Containers burst open, 1000 nasty looking individuals with adequate training hit the dock.  Commandeer available vehicles and scatter.  In about 10 hours a goodly number of them are amonst the pipelines, refineries and tarsands of Alberta.  The rest of them who knows where.

On the other hand they could come in at Vancouver airport wearing suits and cause a lot less fuss.


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## pbi

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> With respect to Old Guy's scenario, I've always thought that a Container ship declaring an emergency and hauling into Prince Rupert would make for an interesting scenario. Vessel hauls into the harbor with a compliant and authorized Captain on board. Containers burst open, 1000 nasty looking individuals with adequate training hit the dock. Commandeer available vehicles and scatter. In about 10 hours a goodly number of them are amonst the pipelines, refineries and tarsands of Alberta. The rest of them who knows where.
> 
> On the other hand they could come in at Vancouver airport wearing suits and cause a lot less fuss.



Kirkhill: your second option is a lot more effective. If you're familiar with the Prince Rupert area, you know that it would be pretty difficult for terrorists to "scatter"-there's only one highway running into PR, through quite rugged country.As well, these folks might not "blend in" very well, if you know what I mean. Once warned of the event (it's hard to imagine that they could completely shut down ALL comms in a community the size of PR) it would be a relatively simple matter to block the roads. Even if we couldn't get the IRU up there in time, the local fellas with their pickups and shotguns would no doubt be more than happy to shoot at a few persons of that particular persuasion. In fact, if I was a terr I'd be more worried about the locals in northern BC than about the security forces! Cheers.


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## Kirkhill

> the local fellas with their pickups and shotguns


 Hey I'd be worried about them with hockey sticks, much less guns.  ;D


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## Acorn

People need to analize intent a bit more before putting forward scenarios of 1000+ terrorists hitting Wreck Beach. Part of the int fuction is to provide commanders with the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action. If int were to flood commanders with "most funky" scenarios decisions would never be made.

That being said, regarding the terrorist takover of a ship and attack in Vancouver, the CF has a number of options. 

First: there are CF-188s on alert in Comox. They could react and attack any maritime target in a fairly quick time period.

Second: one gets to Vancouver via waterways that connect to Esquimalt. Given sufficient warning the navy could have a frigate or destroyer shadowing or attacking a suspect vessel in fairly short order.

Finally: the effect of torpedoes is overrated in modern warfare. Do not assume that any civvy ship is an easy target for a sub or surface ship. modern maritime construction has come a long way from WWII, especially tankers (to give an example - a WWII German type VII sub could probably expend its whole torpedo load into a modern ship without sinking it).

And finally, Army response would be last resort, and 1k+ terrorists hitting the beach in False Creek would be a disaster - the militia is the only close response of the CF, and I seriously doubt they could mount a credible response in a reasonable amount of time.

A more realistic threat is a terrorist takeover of a ship filled with toxic chemicals or explosives and detonating it in Vancouver harbour. Not much the Army could do to prevent that, so we'd be more likely to be used in post-attack relief.

Acorn


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## Ex-Dragoon

> Finally: the effect of torpedoes is overrated in modern warfare. Do not assume that any civvy ship is an easy target for a sub or surface ship. modern maritime construction has come a long way from WWII, especially tankers (to give an example - a WWII German type VII sub could probably expend its whole torpedo load into a modern ship without sinking it).



The effect of torpedoes is certainly not over rated!. If anything they have gotten more deadly. Ask any carrier CO and he will tell you that torpedoes are still thier main concern, neither anti ship missiles nor cruise missiles. Ships are certainly more survivable then they were in the past but a Mk 48 will certainly break a super tanker in two just the same. Even a Victoria class sub would not have to expend its entire war load. 
Any sailor worth his salt fears the fish.


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## Inch

Ex-D, maybe this will help.

To add a bit.... Missiles (ie harpoon, etc), don't tend to sink ships, they'll do massive damage but not anywhere near what a torpedo will do. I've seen a video of two harpoon missiles fired at an old destroyer and all they did was punch two holes in the side of the ship. They exploded inside and did a lot of damage but the ship was left afloat. The only visible damage from the outside was the two holes that resembled bullet holes.

I posted this link in another thread. It's a single Mk48 torpedo fired at a decommissioned Australian Destroyer by a submerged sub, the sub was 12 miles away and out of sight. Now tell us again how much of a threat modern torpedoes are, keeping in mind that modern torpedoes have a bit better sonar than their WW2 counterparts. Now in the following pictures, take notice of the second picture, the puff of black smoke is from the concussion wave forcing the smoke out of the stack.

http://www.ssbn622.homestead.com/Sinkex.html

Cheers


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## Ex-Dragoon

Two modern comparisons come to mind as well:
The 2 exocets fired at the _USS Stark _ by the Iraqi Air Force. The Stark albeit with casualties and heavy damage survived.

The _General Belgrano_, a WW2 vintage USN cruiser (Brooklyn class I believe), is engaged during the Falklands Islands war by HMS Conqueror and is sunk. Most WW2 cruisers were built with a thick anti torpedo belt which would act almost like a double hull in modern day comparisons.


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## a_majoor

There is really a need for "two armies", the expeditionary force to project power abroad, and a "Home guard" type of force to deal with the Tom Clancey scenarios. 

The reserve could be the basis for the home guard, since they don't have to be on high alert all the time, and because they are geographically dispersed, it is impossible to take them out with a single event. In fact, it might even be prefferable to relocate reserve units which are in major urban centres and potential target zones to get them out of the "LNG tanker exploding in the harbour" range.


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## Kirkhill

I agree with you a_majoor.   There should be two armies.   The Militia should perhaps be organized around concentric rings.   A permanent full-time cadre (regulars essentially by so as not to create an argument) responsible for adm and trg as well as providing an emergency response group (platoon for example) perhaps with CT, EOD and Hazmat/CBRN skills.   The next ring could be B and C class reservists, essentially employed full time in their local area and reporting to the armoury for their stand-by shift.   Next ring would be A Class organized like a volunteer fire department with pagers and anticipating a fan-out call,   and finally supplementaries that undergo regular but infrequent refresher trg   (current schedule perhaps? fewer weekends but 6x 4 day weekends a year?   just thinking...)?

Training would require dedicated time slots.   eg 1-3 months for new entries?   2- 4 weeks for Rank and Trades Qualification courses?     Plus training that could be done in the armouries while members are available.

This way the community is not deprived of the earning power of the Militiaman who is no longer filling their primary role in society (whether that be courier, lawyer, CEO or doctor).   Their duties can be scheduled within the needs of the community and they will still be able to do their day job. Just like a volunteer fireman.   They would be fully available to serve in their Militia role when the economy of the community shuts down due to some major disaster or threat of disaster, be they natural or man-made.

And of course their would be nothing to prevent the Militiaman volunteering to make him/herself available for training and deployment with the expeditionary force.   

For home guard duties I perceive the primary tasks as being Field and National Communications, Tactical Transport (for when the roads don't work), EOD and possibly CBRN type Hazmat, Engineering duties, and security which would require infantry and wheeled patrol capabilities primarily equipped with small arms and some heavier, man-portable direct fire weapons.  Other duties would include the ability to rapidly supply shelter with water, power, sanitation and meals.  

I don't think that there should be much emphasis on the medical side beyond providing for the needs of the units themselves.  The provincial and national medical systems should be organized to provide that type of care in a national emergency. Likewise for engineering, their is lots of civilian capability available to rebuild infrastructure rapidly. It just needs to be organized.

One other role I would emphasize for the Militia could be the provision of fire batteries for the Artillery.   It seems to me that the need for FOOs/MFCs in current expeditionary ops is greater than the need for Gunners per se.   Perhaps the observation and command elements should form the core of the expeditionary arty regiments with only one or two fire batteries per regiment but each regiment could have a larger number of Militia fire batteries attached for call up in the event of higher intensity conflicts.   The duties of such Militia units could be complementary to their internal security duties.   The Brit Arty and the USMC Arty I believe are routinely used on peace support missions without their guns.


----------



## Boydfish

While I don't have the military experience of the various people here, I used to be a emergency planner for one of the largest health care regions in the confederation, oddly located in BC.  Hopefully, this can help move the discussion forward.

First, the thing that needs to be understood is that if it's going to be here in over 72 hours, don't bother sending it, because the people it wil likely help will be dead.  The people trapped in buildings, critically injured or otherwise in distress are dead at that point.  If you're talking about CF assistance in disaster operations as an aid to civil power, a 12 hour response time will do nicely, but every hour after that up to 48 means another few hundred "injured" converting to "dead".  After that, the difference between 72 hours and 72 days is non-existant:  All you're doing is moving rubble around with a shovel in both cases.

Second, send me nothing I ever need to feed or fuel because I won't.  Sending me a battalion of Picklies from Alberta is counter-productive if they don't run thier own fully independent logistics train with them.  I'm too busy feeding and fueling my own log train to deal with even 50 extra people.  I'll feed and fuel CF people/equipment if they have special skills to further my own agenda that I can't get elsewhere, ex. a med coy or a sqdrn of engineers, but that's it.  I'm also going to be interested in units that will increase my own logistic efforts, ie. a helo sqdrn that I can use to lift people to Royal Inland hospital or a Herc load of IMPs.

In terms of fending off an invasion of BC proper, that's really a non-concern.  The approaches that could be taken are pretty heavily protected by NORAD and the USCG by simple default:  The Alaskan and Washington coasts bracket the BC coast, making them monitor it by default more than anything else.  As well, fighting a war in BC would be a great way for an invader to die:  Every kind of terrain on the planet, including deserts, dense urban, sub-arctic, sub-tropical jungle, alpine and maritime environments in a land mass larger than most countries on the planet.  Look at the Normandy invasion of WW2:  The Allies had to land thousands of troops and countless supplies to fight across the relatively "easy" terrain of Western Europe.  Care to imagine how long a single kampfgruppe could have held the line on the average coastal mountain?  If the locals can bottle that beachhead for six months, the CF can bomb them insensate and then run them right back into the Pacific, no problem.

My suggestion for the organization of the CF would in line of "Two Armies" mentioned before, but perhaps not in the format that it was advanced.  Here's what my basic idea is:  Since the CF cannot afford the resources to have fast enough/large enough forces reach all points of the confederation for aid to civil power operations, it needs a strong reserve/auxilliary force to provide immediate response.  The broad idea is that the local reserve/auxillary force would provide immediate mitigation of the problem as well as laying the basis of a logistical train to run the regular force in if required.  However, in broad terms, I'd want a reserve/auxillary force that is fully independent, fully equipped and able to operate unsupported by the regular force for a minimum standard of 30 days.


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## Kirkhill

Boydfish I generally like what you are saying but why do you specify 30 days of independent operations?   Is it not likely that a supply line could be opened in less time than that?  The options are road, rail, sea, fixed wing and helo.  Does your planning suggest that all links will be severed completely for that length of time?


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## a_majoor

Interesting responses to the home guard argument. Unlike Kirkhill, I would have put MORE emphasis on things like Medical/Engineering because any event severe enough to require military call-up is probably one which affects the infrastructure in one way or another. This doesn't have to be a terrorist event, just think back to the Ice Storm or Manitoba Floods.

While the requirement to be self contained isn't in dispute, I wonder how it could best be done. The current system requires the logistics train to move out to the AOR, which might be problematic in some cases, especially in light of the 12hr time-line (I would have thought 24 myself). If the 12hr figure is a "given", then part of the restructuring will have to be pre-packing and pre-positioning supplies in armouries and depots to keep a unit up and running for several days to a week. This shouldn't be taken as building a huge warehouse beside each armoury, but several pallet-loads or 20' "sea cans" of vital supplies (IMP,s, water, radio batteries, extra radios, fuel etc.) This would require the Area Support Groups to keep tabs on things and rotate the stock at least annually (exchanging old sea cans for new ones, then taking the consumables out of the old sea cans and using or destroying them as appropriate.)

For units, this would mean at least one extra HLVW type truck to move the sea cans, along with the full time drivers to run and maintain the truck.

Expenses for implementing this system should be picked up by either the emergency management system, or by the Provincial Solicitor-General's office, since they are the outfits which will call for military assistance.

Reserve support for the Expeditionary force should be augmentation by available people, either as individuals, or formed sub-units. If a unit isn't designated for some specialty Home Guard task like NBC Defense, then they should be trained with the same doctrine and equipment as the Expeditionary force (even if it is using simulation systems and the real thing once a year) in order to interoperate with Expeditionary force units. (This is the biggest weakness right now, since Reserve Infantry could only realistically augment the three LIBs, and Reserve Armour is now inhabiting a completely different world than the rest of the Corps. I am not entirely sure how Reserve Arty fits in any more...) The amount of re-training to bring augmentees up to speed really limits the usefulness of Reserve soldiers in many situations, and this is not a knock at the reserves, but the system we operate in.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

_For units, this would mean at least one extra HLVW type truck to move the sea cans, along with the full time drivers to run and maintain the truck.

Expenses for implementing this system should be picked up by either the emergency management system, or by the Provincial Solicitor-General's office, since they are the outfits which will call for military assistance._

Just nitpicking here but I think you would have to factor in the cost of full-time security on the provisions also.


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## a_majoor

By all means, just get the Solicitor General's fin code!

Actually, a set of sea-cans placed inside the armoury compound shouldn't cost all that much over and above the regular operating costs, and the cans themselves would have "customs seals" so the ASG personell would be able to see if a can had been pilfered during the rotation cycle.

Probably the biggest expense would be the trucks and possibly handling equipment (if the sea cans are stacked, for example), followed by the recurring stock rotation costs, then the manpower costs for the extra staff at the Reserve units. Security is probably not going to be as big of a factor in terms of operational costs.


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## Kirkhill

> Unlike Kirkhill, I would have put MORE emphasis on things like Medical/Engineering because any event severe enough to require military call-up is probably one which affects the infrastructure in one way or another



My point here, and I stand to be corrected or proven wrong, is that on the medical front, in the event of a major disaster in the lower mainland, given the number of medically qualified personnel and the dispersal of hospitals in the area I feel that it will be more effective to get undamaged and least damaged facilities back on line with emergency power and water, then transport patients and staff to the facilities that are "up".  If I am not mistaken it takes quite a bit of effort, logistically to get even one field hospital (do we have one yet?) and staff (are we at authorized manning levels, is that enough and will they be available if our two battlegroups are deployed overseas?).   And one field hospital seems to have a capacity of about 200 patients.  Basically a drop in the bucket.  On those grounds I think it would be better to figure out how to make better use of the facilities that are available locally.  

Perhaps the local medical community and reserves should become familiarized with each other. Not to mention police, fire and SAR.

The need to transport patients regardless of road availability suggests to me the need for tactical transport like helos, all wheel drive 2.5 tonnes and vehicles like the Bv206.    Also, in the event of disaster, anywhere in the world looting and lawlessness seem to present a risk.  Thus my suggestion for the need for security forces.  Comms I think are self explanatory.  And some specialist engineering capabilities, but traditional "mobility" engineering and "vertical" engineering could surely be handled by local civilian contractors, especially if they were organized in advance by boydfish and his ilk.

Cheers.


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## a_majoor

While I cannot speak for the lower mainland, living in Ontario, I do recall how completely things went for a loop during the Ice Storm, and the great power blackout two summers ago. Heck, even the SARS outbreak in Toronto almost paralyzed the medical community.

While you are most likely correct in thinking the field hospital would only be a drop in the bucket over-all, I can see a scenario where the hospital operates close to the disaster area as the triage centre, quickly stabilizing patients and then getting them whisked away to operational hospitals outside the zone.

Similarly, if *1 CER were to arrive at the disaster area right away, they could do some initial "digging", survey the area and do the organizing of civilian kit as it arrives on scene. 

It would take an improbably large medical and engineering infrastructure for the Home Guard or Reserves to take on 100% of the task. 

The getting acquainted part of the equation is happening here, partly because we do have serving reservists who are police, fire and ambulance workers, and because we are building on the groundwork from OP ABACUS (1999-2000), where we did some planning along those lines. You are right, we need to do more work along these lines.


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## pbi

Folks: very interesting discussion. A few comments:

Role of Reserve in Dom Ops: We in LFWA may be a bit ahead of the pack already. 39 CBG is in the process of being issued seacans with emergency supplies to be kept at selected armouries for use in response to a major earthquake disaster (CONPLAN PALADIN). LFWA's planning for initial response relies heavily upon 39 CBG as the ground "force in place", as it could be some time before the remainder of LFWA (1 CMBG, 1 ASG, 38 and 41 CBGs) could move forces in.   Comd LFWA two years ago issued an authorization to all Res COs to respond immediately in their communities to bona fide "immediate life and limb" requests from local officials, without recourse to higher auth(this is for emergency humanitarian assistance only). Here in 38 CBG, under CONPLAN BISON, we have plans for three regional response coys, each designed to be as self-sufficient and mobile as possible. We tested this CONPLAN out during OP PEREGRINE and found it to be fairly effective, although we have a few things to sort out and improve.   So, all to say that within reasonable limitatons, Res units can play a leading role in Dom Ops, and indeed IMHO they should.


Reserve as a Home Guard: I would be opposed to depriving the Regular Army of a valuable and necessary augmentation base by converting the entire Army Reserve to nothing but Home Guard(or Home Defense, or WTH you want to call it...) Our Regular Army is simply too small and too shallow, and likely will be for some time to come, to sever itself from an effective augmentation base. I agree that Res units can and should be assigned some local security roles, but these must be realistic and achievable and must not detract from combat training: there is simply not enough time to do everything.

Reserve assuming HAZMAT/CBRN Role: I doubt that we will ever be able to train Res soldiers to be first responders in this role. Consider that the "real" first line of defence for this in Canada, our professional full-time fire depts located in larger centres, find it very demanding to maintain only a few small teams trained and properly equipped to respond to the huge and ever-broadening field of threats in this area. Most smaller, volunteer fire depts (the majority of the total number of fire depts in Canada BTW) have only an extremely limited capability to respond to   serious or complex incident. They face the same (or worse) training time issues as our Res do. I suggest that, at best, our Res units could provide GS to civilian first responders, but that is about it;

Reserve Providing Medical/Engineer/Technical Forces: Based on what I have seen in the Dom Ops I have been involved in, I wouldn't bother too much. The civil sector has far, far more capacity, better training, and more current skill sets than we will ever have in these areas. For example, when we ran the Op for the Toronto SnowStorm, the City deployed about 800 pieces of snowfighting equipment. 2 CMBG brought about ten pieces, most of it not really ideal for snow clearing in cities. What we really bring to these emergencies are the traits we require (and acquire) for combat operations: strong C2, ISTAR, mobility, flexibility, self-sufficiency, and the ability to rapidly task organize under all sorts of conditions. Most civilian organizations have few or none of these capabilities.

Cheers.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer and I were discussing something along these lines the other day.

Is there any merit to rethinking the Militia as a body of independent teams along the lines of the RAF Regiment Field Squadrons?   The Field Squadron is a self contained deployable body of about 150 personnel that fields 4 rifle platoons. All platoons are trained in basic infantry tactics, focussed on area defence.   All platoons are trained to do vehicular patrols in Landrovers.   One platoon has additional skills and responsibilities in providing marksmen/snipers and machine gunners, while the fourth platoon is responsible for manning 4x 81mm mortars as the situation demands.   The Squadron has something like 30 to 40 Landrovers and trailers as well as IIRC 11 MLVW type vehicles and a POL vehicle to supply logistic support (including field kitchen) as well as having its own CP and Comms that also includes 4 despatch riders.

As of now I believe there are about 138 individual militia units across Canada.   Suppose the planning base started from a force of 138 Field Squadron type units spread across Canada. That equals roughly one per every 200-250,000 people or two electoral districts.     In urban areas the Squadrons could be brigaded and capabilities combined to a degree for the sake of efficiencies but always recognizing the advantages of having dispersed units capable of taking independent action.

I recognize that 138 x 40 Jeeps is an awful lot of money (about $200,000,000 if we could get them at $35,000 each) not to mention trucks and comms.

The Squadrons could have their current specialized war roles (infantry, lt armd, arty, engr, etc...) but they would also be required to become proficient in the skill sets described above.   

Question here:   Is it realistic to have the Res Svc Bns involved in maintenance or would they be better employed transport and movement roles?

Also, I believe that military first aid has advanced a lot since my day.   Aren't troops being trained to intervene more aggressively when their buddy is wounded alongside them?   It seems to me that I have heard of infanteers being taught to introduce intravenous solutions in the field.      If that is the case I can't help but think that boydfish would not look ungratefully on a formed uniformed body, in vehicles that can handle floods, slides, debris fields and broken roads, capable of extracting the uninjured, offering first aid where appropriate and communicating with the limited EMS personnel as to where they are needed.   All the time their presence in uniform, possibly with side arms would act as a stabilizing force and help to lend an air of security.

On the HAZMAT front pbi, there I was wondering if there was a role for the Federal Government to supply funding for Full time CBRN trained teams through the Militia, comprised of Regular personnel and Militia personnel on fulltime Callout (that's C Class isn't it?).   I agree with you that I don't think that Militiamen can be that all-singing all-dancing but suppose each of my Squadrons was equipped with a HAZMAT section on standby, as I said that would be the full-time job of those individuals, perhaps some or all of them could be equipped on a similar basis with an EOD or even CT capability.

Further to the HAZMAT issue, and this would be in keeping with NBC training I would think, how much emphasis should be given to training troops to maintain order in a HAZMAT environment when confronting an angry and frightened and unprotected populace.   For example what happens if another SARS epidemic breaks out and it is decided to quarantine Toronto.   How would we prevent people panicking and leaving?   How would people react to being confronted by troops, even unarmed troops, in Gas Masks and NBC suits telling them to go back?

I agree with you that the Militia shouldn't end up being divorced from the Regs.   There should be a free flow of personnel between the Militia and the Regs.   But perhaps, in assigning war roles we could start by looking at domestic needs, deciding what we need to do locally, then looking at some of those skills and asking if it is not appropriate for the Regs to ask the Militia to supply those skills when necessary to augment the expeditionary force.   Those skills that the Militia do not supply, either through lack of domestic need or it being unreasonable to expect any great degree of proficiency then those are the skills that will need to be held in the Regular forces.

Based on the scenarios described here Militia skills would be skill at arms with small arms and sidearms,   section and platoon tactics, communications procedures, vehicular movements and patrols, transport and logistics, first aid, operations in an NBC environment, C2 and ISTAR, possibly even (and contentiously) IS drills.   Any time left over could be devoted to marksmanship with heavy weapons, tactical movements, patrolling, ATGMs, Mors and Guns.   

Oh dear, I may have done it again.......oh well, have at it


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## pbi

> Is there any merit to rethinking the Militia as a body of independent teams along the lines of the RAF Regiment Field Squadrons?  The Field Squadron is a self contained deployable body of about 150 personnel that fields 4 rifle platoons. All platoons are trained in basic infantry tactics, focussed on area defence.  All platoons are trained to do vehicular patrols in Landrovers.  One platoon has additional skills and responsibilities in providing marksmen/snipers and machine gunners, while the fourth platoon is responsible for manning 4x 81mm mortars as the situation demands.  The Squadron has something like 30 to 40 Landrovers and trailers as well as IIRC 11 MLVW type vehicles and a POL vehicle to supply logistic support (including field kitchen) as well as having its own CP and Comms that also includes 4 despatch riders.



OK, but what happens to the role of "augment the Regular Force"? Unless the RegF is composed of similar units, how will we execute this function? For example, how would we augment/repl units of Engrs, Arty, Armour, etc? A few units like this might be of use,  but I would not be in favour of wholesale conversion to this role. unless the Regular Army was to go to a corresponding organization.



> The Squadrons could have their current specialized war roles (infantry, lt armd, arty, engr, etc...) but they would also be required to become proficient in the skill sets described above



37.5 days/year: that's what you're up against. What will you cut so you can teach this other skill set?



> Also, I believe that military first aid has advanced a lot since my day.  Aren't troops being trained to intervene more aggressively when their buddy is wounded alongside them?  It seems to me that I have heard of infanteers being taught to introduce intravenous solutions in the field.



This is for Regular Force or for soldiers deploying on operations. It is not normally part of Res trg (although it certainly could be if we found time for it...)



> If that is the case I can't help but think that boydfish would not look ungratefully on a formed uniformed body, in vehicles that can handle floods, slides, debris fields and broken roads, capable of extracting the uninjured, offering first aid where appropriate and communicating with the limited EMS personnel as to where they are needed.  All the time their presence in uniform, possibly with side arms would act as a stabilizing force and help to lend an air of security



OK-we can do that more or less now. See my earlier post on our CONPLAN BISON, also see LFCA's CONPLAN TRILLIUM which has a similar concept.



> On the HAZMAT front pbi, there I was wondering if there was a role for the Federal Government to supply funding for Full time CBRN trained teams through the Militia, comprised of Regular personnel and Militia personnel on fulltime Callout (that's C Class isn't it?).  I agree with you that I don't think that Militiamen can be that all-singing all-dancing but suppose each of my Squadrons was equipped with a HAZMAT section on standby, as I said that would be the full-time job of those individuals, perhaps some or all of them could be equipped on a similar basis with an EOD or even CT capability



OK-but I have a hard time thinking about Class C as "Reservists"-they are gap-fillers in Regular establishments.(OK-OK-calm down everybody!!!) I agree with you that once you put a Res soldier  on full time service, you have solved the "time available" issue, but the question in my mind is the employment of the "traditional" Reservist: the Class A, 37.5  days/per year and two weeks in the summer  guy who makes up the overwhelming bulk of our Reserve. IMHO we have to think about roles and missions that make sense for that guy, not for the relatively few Res who can go on Class C.



> Further to the HAZMAT issue, and this would be in keeping with NBC training I would think, how much emphasis should be given to training troops to maintain order in a HAZMAT environment when confronting an angry and frightened and unprotected populace.  For example what happens if another SARS epidemic breaks out and it is decided to quarantine Toronto.  How would we prevent people panicking and leaving?  How would people react to being confronted by troops, even unarmed troops, in Gas Masks and NBC suits telling them to go back



How would you prevent people from panicking and leaving a city with a metropolitan area of over 4million people? I don't know, short of deploying the entire CF and every spare cop you can lay your hands on. You are venturing into the ever controversial issue of using the Res for public order ops. Now, the USARNG does this, and the average level of training of the average USARNG soldier is, as far as I can make out, no better than the average Canadian Army Reserve soldier. For a start, our guys parade much more often. So, in theory this skillset could be taught to our guys. But, again, what unit training do you drop to develop and maintain this skillset? It has to be refreshed regularly or the troops will be a liability rather than an asset. Do you want money spent to buy riot gear or other, more combat-related stuff?



> I agree with you that the Militia shouldn't end up being divorced from the Regs.  There should be a free flow of personnel between the Militia and the Regs.  But perhaps, in assigning war roles we could start by looking at domestic needs, deciding what we need to do locally, then looking at some of those skills and asking if it is not appropriate for the Regs to ask the Militia to supply those skills when necessary to augment the expeditionary force.  Those skills that the Militia do not supply, either through lack of domestic need or it being unreasonable to expect any great degree of proficiency then those are the skills that will need to be held in the Regular forces.



I suggest that is designing an Army backwards. Maybe what Canada needs is a volunteer Civil Defense Service, like we had in the 1950s, to concentrate on disaster skills to augnment the civil authorities. You would probably attract people who want to serve, but don't want to be in the military. Then we could focus our very limited training time and resources on training our soldiers for operations, while retaining an approriate "last resort" or "immediate life and limb" response capability much as we have now.



> Based on the scenarios described here Militia skills would be skill at arms with small arms and sidearms,  section and platoon tactics, communications procedures, vehicular movements and patrols, transport and logistics, first aid, operations in an NBC environment, C2 and ISTAR, possibly even (and contentiously) IS drills.  Any time left over could be devoted to marksmanship with heavy weapons, tactical movements, patrolling, ATGMs, Mors and Guns.



I agree: but that's pretty well what they do now. Cheers.


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## Kirkhill

I always look for commonalities and points of agreement so on that note let me look at where we seem to be in accord first.



> Quote
> Based on the scenarios described here Militia skills would be skill at arms with small arms and sidearms,   section and platoon tactics, communications procedures, vehicular movements and patrols, transport and logistics, first aid, operations in an NBC environment, C2 and ISTAR, possibly even (and contentiously) IS drills.   Any time left over could be devoted to marksmanship with heavy weapons, tactical movements, patrolling, ATGMs, Mors and Guns.
> 
> 
> I agree: but that's pretty well what they do now. Cheers.





> 37.5 days/year: that's what you're up against.



OK so the basic skills that I suggested are skills that Militiamen currently have.   So the basic training plan and career development plan works and works reasonably well within the context of 37.5 days per year.   Is that a fair statement?   Would it also be a fair statement that the skills described above are basic "soldier" skills and would be common to all trades, whether infanteer or EME? Especially in an environment where it has been suggested by others that the "tail" needs to be hardened.





> Quote
> If that is the case I can't help but think that boydfish would not look ungratefully on a formed uniformed body, in vehicles that can handle floods, slides, debris fields and broken roads, capable of extracting the uninjured, offering first aid where appropriate and communicating with the limited EMS personnel as to where they are needed.   All the time their presence in uniform, possibly with side arms would act as a stabilizing force and help to lend an air of security
> 
> OK-we can do that more or less now. See my earlier post on our CONPLAN BISON, also see LFCA's CONPLAN TRILLIUM which has a similar concept.



So on this point we can agree that the skills the Militia currently have are generally up to the task are and will continue to be a useful adjunct to emergency preparedness planning.





> Quote
> Also, I believe that military first aid has advanced a lot since my day.   Aren't troops being trained to intervene more aggressively when their buddy is wounded alongside them?   It seems to me that I have heard of infanteers being taught to introduce intravenous solutions in the field.
> 
> 
> This is for Regular Force or for soldiers deploying on operations. It is not normally part of Res trg (although it certainly could be if we found time for it...)



On this point humour me and let me assume that it is a priority that will serve troops well in the field and also make them more valuable for emergency response. How many of the 37.5 days are necessary to complete that training and how often does it have to be refreshed?   Is it an insurmountable load?




> Quote
> Further to the HAZMAT issue, and this would be in keeping with NBC training I would think, how much emphasis should be given to training troops to maintain order in a HAZMAT environment when confronting an angry and frightened and unprotected populace.   For example what happens if another SARS epidemic breaks out and it is decided to quarantine Toronto.   How would we prevent people panicking and leaving?   How would people react to being confronted by troops, even unarmed troops, in Gas Masks and NBC suits telling them to go back
> 
> How would you prevent people from panicking and leaving a city with a metropolitan area of over 4million people? I don't know, short of deploying the entire CF and every spare cop you can lay your hands on. You are venturing into the ever controversial issue of using the Res for public order ops. Now, the USARNG does this, and the average level of training of the average USARNG soldier is, as far as I can make out, no better than the average Canadian Army Reserve soldier. For a start, our guys parade much more often. So, in theory this skillset could be taught to our guys. But, again, what unit training do you drop to develop and maintain this skillset? It has to be refreshed regularly or the troops will be a liability rather than an asset. Do you want money spent to buy riot gear or other, more combat-related stuff?



I agree that you won't stop people panicking.   And I agree that you can't seal off every exit out or Metro Toronto.   So where are the choke points that allow you to isolate pockets of contagion and thus prevent transfer to uninfected populations?   Does that mean barricades at the borders and airports (possible)? Securing the Lake Ontario shoreline (possible with troops at marinas, air cover and marine patrols I suppose) and barricades on Highway 11 and the 401?   Thus you isolate Southern Ontario from the rest of Canada.   Maybe you then have to think about putting up barriers around uninfected communities within the containment zone to keep strangers at bay.   There is historical precedent for all of this.   Look to how cholera, typhus, small pox and plague were handled in the past and in Canada.

Yes I am wandering into the controversial area about using the Militia in public order ops.   Is there not need for somebody to be prepared to do the job and if not the Militia then who?   Do the police want the job and are there enough of them?   Do you want the job?   Do we want a separate full time body like some of the Europeans have designed specifically for these type of operations.   My sense is that those forces are universally loathed, seen as instruments of state repression and are expensive to maintain.   Perhaps the Militia, being neighbours and co-workers, would be seen in a more understanding light with greater degree of empathy, and would at least be cheaper to maintain.   Having said that I recognize that historically it has been a problematic area, especially with the Militia having been called out to break strikes, a task that even I find anti-democratic.





> Quote
> Is there any merit to rethinking the Militia as a body of independent teams along the lines of the RAF Regiment Field Squadrons?   The Field Squadron is a self contained deployable body of about 150 personnel that fields 4 rifle platoons. All platoons are trained in basic infantry tactics, focussed on area defence.   All platoons are trained to do vehicular patrols in Landrovers.   One platoon has additional skills and responsibilities in providing marksmen/snipers and machine gunners, while the fourth platoon is responsible for manning 4x 81mm mortars as the situation demands.   The Squadron has something like 30 to 40 Landrovers and trailers as well as IIRC 11 MLVW type vehicles and a POL vehicle to supply logistic support (including field kitchen) as well as having its own CP and Comms that also includes 4 despatch riders.
> 
> OK, but what happens to the role of "augment the Regular Force"? Unless the RegF is composed of similar units, how will we execute this function? For example, how would we augment/repl units of Engrs, Arty, Armour, etc? A few units like this might be of use,   but I would not be in favour of wholesale conversion to this role. unless the Regular Army was to go to a corresponding organization.




OK.   Perhaps we don't need 138 independently deployable infantry companies also capable of doing some light recce work.   I can see that.     Perhaps we maintain the current warfighting focus of each unit but we make each unit a self contained, self deployable entity, complete with its own transportation and A and B echelon support.

That would mean that If the Army needed their services as formed units it could call up the entire entity and plug the whole group into an existing unit without having to figure out where the extra service support was going to come from.

In the meantime the community they serve would have access to an independent unit with the basic soldier skills they are capable of currently acquiring in their 37.5 days.






> Quote
> The Squadrons could have their current specialized war roles (infantry, lt armd, arty, engr, etc...) but they would also be required to become proficient in the skill sets described above
> 
> 37.5 days/year: that's what you're up against. What will you cut so you can teach this other skill set?




But haven't we just agreed that the skill sets needed for emergency preparedness are basic soldier skills, which they have and they apparently still find time to become Gunners, crewmen, surveillanc ops and proficient light infantrymen already?







> Quote
> On the HAZMAT front pbi, there I was wondering if there was a role for the Federal Government to supply funding for Full time CBRN trained teams through the Militia, comprised of Regular personnel and Militia personnel on fulltime Callout (that's C Class isn't it?).   I agree with you that I don't think that Militiamen can be that all-singing all-dancing but suppose each of my Squadrons was equipped with a HAZMAT section on standby, as I said that would be the full-time job of those individuals, perhaps some or all of them could be equipped on a similar basis with an EOD or even CT capability
> 
> OK-but I have a hard time thinking about Class C as "Reservists"-they are gap-fillers in Regular establishments.(OK-OK-calm down everybody!!!) I agree with you that once you put a Res soldier   on full time service, you have solved the "time available" issue, but the question in my mind is the employment of the "traditional" Reservist: the Class A, 37.5   days/per year and two weeks in the summer   guy who makes up the overwhelming bulk of our Reserve. IMHO we have to think about roles and missions that make sense for that guy, not for the relatively few Res who can go on Class C.






Here we may be coming to the crux of the matter.   You may have noticed that throughout I have been making reference to the older term Militia as opposed to Reserve.   In keeping with the notion of two forces, one domestic and one expeditionary, I think that it is appropriate to use the distinct term Militia as opposed to Reserve.   It emphasises separateness ( I can hear you now....).   But if there are to be two forces, a concept with which I am generally in agreement, contained within DND then lets make it so.        

Perhaps I should say at this time that I see two different types of forces commonly being called armies.   One is the American style army and the other is what I consider a traditional army, what the Americans would historically have considered a "standing army".   In my view a standing army is an agent of authority, designed to impose order and maintain control over borders and populations.   This army is heavy in infantry and uses light cavalry to conduct patrols to dominate the surrounds.   This type of army was anathema to the Americans as it was to the Brits who left Britain to escape the depradations of that type of force wielded with an over-heavy hand against them.   As I see the American army it is a counter-army, in the sense of counter-recce and counter-battery.   In fact in my view the entire US military structure is designed explicitly to defeat armies.   Its masters historically have had no desire to forge a tool capable of imposing order for fear that it could be used on them selves.   Consequently the American forces are designed to destroy forces in being and eliminate threats.   It is not trained in coercive activity.   

The value of such a force was demonstrated in WW2 and that reinforced the correctness and value of such a position in the American mind.   Other forces also so value in like capability and attempted to emulate it at various levels, all with lesser degrees of success.

Following on from this is the discussion over   Constabulary/Peacekeeping duties.   The notion exists that real armies don't do peacekeeping.   I argue American style counter-armies don't do peacekeeping.   Armies do do peacekeeping.   That is what armies have always done.   Far from an Infanteer being a policeman with a rifle, a policeman is in fact an Infanteer without a gun.   A policeman is an authority figure, a governmental presence that is permitted by society and the operational environment to wander the streets on his own.   He is merely one end of a spectrum that starts with getting out of the LAV, taking off the tin-lid and pointing the weapon at the ground.

With those thoughts in mind I see the need for the government of Canada to have at its beck and call the tools of a traditional army to control the population within its borders and to control its borders.   Because the risks coming from within are relatively low I don't see a need for a large full-time force.   Nor do I see a need at most border crossings for much more than a couple of Mounties with ready access to a Rapid Response Hazmat/EOD team (of whatever size).   I do see a need for beefed up surveillance and control of our approaches and the North and that should be a permanent force.

But some such permanent full-time capabilities, the local ones anyway, not the Northern ones, could be supplied by C Class Militiamen who are employed full time in their community.   Working their shifts but going home to their own beds.   They could be backed up by B Class personnel, also living in their communities but making themselves available for short periods full time thus allowing them to blend Militia service into their home and community lives.   Finally there would be the basic A Class personnel, with their 37.5 days per year (authorized - how many would be willing to make a greater commitment if it were Armoury time as opposed to "Camp" time?) that would available to fan-out like the Volunteer Fire Department (at various levels of Notice to Move).   The local units would also require a permanent "careerist" cadre to direct and administer operations.

The Northern and approach ones will continue to be a Coast Guard and Permanent Force operation augmented to the extent possible by the existing Ranger force.

In this scenario I see the Regular, Expeditionary Force, the Army as opposed to the Militia as being a mixed, deployable force.   It is a combination of both Army and Counter-Army. In its Army role it can be despatched to other countries to offer support to the central authority, thereby offering a valuable service and also learning lessons that could be applicable within Canada at some point in the future. To this end I agree that the free flow of Militia and Army personnel and sub-units is both necessary and mutually beneficial.   The Army should also be a Counter-Army and this is where it should concentrate its   focus.   Others would call it warfighting. It should prepare itself as a deployable force that can destroy other organized forces that are a threat to the Militia-type Armies responsible for maintaining order.   This mutual interaction between the Army and the Militia, practiced at home and abroad could also be used to broaden Canada's influence and for that matter support a higher rank structure.   Suppose Canada were to supply a "Counter-Army" Battle Group and an "Army" battle group in support of a peacekeeping mission.   Could we add a couple of locally raised and Canadian financed and trained battalions under Canadian operational control and thus justify a Canadian Brigade and Brigadier.   If we got a couple of allies to supply "Army" battle groups   that would support their own local battalions could we justify a Canadian led division and a Major-General?   The primary focus of the Expeditionary Army in this case would be the "Counter-Army" Battle Group, Command and Control, ISTAR and Logistic support.   The "Army" Battle Group would also be an Expeditionary Force element but it could be heavily augmented by Militiamen on voluntary Class B and C callouts from their units and their training working with their local civil authorities and populations would be directly applicable to their temporary voluntary expeditionary duties.

In essence I see the part-time soldier as a Militiaman first, a part-time volunteer offering service to his home community first, and a Reservist, "gap-filler" for the Regs, second.   If there are "gaps" in the Reg structure then they need to be filled first, perhaps even at the expense of capabilities.

However, in my world of the tooth-fairy and Santa Claus, I would like to think that we could add some more money to support a fairly broad range of capabilities without gaps.





> Quote
> I agree with you that the Militia shouldn't end up being divorced from the Regs.   There should be a free flow of personnel between the Militia and the Regs.   But perhaps, in assigning war roles we could start by looking at domestic needs, deciding what we need to do locally, then looking at some of those skills and asking if it is not appropriate for the Regs to ask the Militia to supply those skills when necessary to augment the expeditionary force.   Those skills that the Militia do not supply, either through lack of domestic need or it being unreasonable to expect any great degree of proficiency then those are the skills that will need to be held in the Regular forces.
> 
> 
> I suggest that is designing an Army backwards. Maybe what Canada needs is a volunteer Civil Defense Service, like we had in the 1950s, to concentrate on disaster skills to augnment the civil authorities. You would probably attract people who want to serve, but don't want to be in the military. Then we could focus our very limited training time and resources on training our soldiers for operations, while retaining an approriate "last resort" or "immediate life and limb" response capability much as we have now.



And here we disagree.   I would argue that the primary role of the government is to defend its citizenry.   That means that first off they need to evaluate the threat and respond to the threat then organize their forces around the threat.   Skills and capacities necessary to counter the threat, that are surplus to immediate requirements can be put at the beck and call of Department of Foreign Affairs to secure advantage in the national interest.


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## Kirkhill

By the way, with respect to equipping our Militia force I am fascinated by the prospects of fielding hybrid diesel-electric versions of LSVW/MLVW type vehicles, maybe based on the Pinzgauer and Stewart&Stevenson type trucks.

These trucks, which have already been field tested by S&S amongst others combine diesel engines,   generators, large battery packs and electrically driven wheels.   Batteries or the generators power the wheels while the battery pack is charged by the gen and the gen is driven by the diesel.   These vehicles apparently have demonstrated some gas savings but strangely some of their biggest savings come in maintenance.   There are no gears to crunch.     Some armies are looking at them because they supply a lot of electricity on a battlefield that is becoming more dependent on electricity. They also present tactical advantages in the form of silent watch and silent movement, running off the batteries.

However, in addition to military utility I could perhaps see some civil defence uses:

Plugging into a gas station to run the pumps to get the fuel out of the underground tanks.
Plugging into a police station/fire station/city hall to establish command and control
Plugging into a cell phone tower to reestablish communications.
Plugging into a hospital to get its triage/operating rooms and ICUs back on line
Plugging into municipal water treatment and sewage plants to meet those most critical needs
Supplying power to commercially available water pumps to fight forest fires and urban fires.

And all the time the Militia has a tactical vehicle capable of being used for patrols, logistic support, heavy weapons support and capable of being employed overseas with tactical utility in support of the Expeditionary Force and the National Interest.

Cheers.

http://www.ssss.com/Home/Products/HybridSolutions/
http://www.ssss.com/Home/Products/TacticalVehicles/FMTV/SpecsBrochures.htm?pm=160
http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/vehicles/stewart_stevenson/
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=DATADETR.story&STORY=/www/story/02-23-2004/0002114401&EDATE=MON+Feb+23+2004%2C+08%3A30+AM
http://www.pinzgauer.uk.com/   (NOTE THE PATROL VARIANT DEAD CENTRE - Kirkhill)
http://www.pinzgauer.uk.com/Specifications.htm
http://www.pinzgauer.uk.com/Gallery.htm
http://www.operations.mod.uk/veritas/img/veritas/45cdogp/buzzard_vehpatrol.jpg

For that matter maybe municipalities should be buying buses with these systems....less gas and pollution? less maintenance? emergency movement of population? and mobile generators.

If they work as advertised.  However I have no reason to doubt they would.  The technology has been used on trains for more than 40 years, ships of all types have used it for at least the last 20 years and the American Navy is planning to use it in the "Electric" ships.  Basically what is different know is that controls and components are smaller and less costly.


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## Mountie

With regards to the Militia Brigade Groups:  I'm not sure what the Militia restructuring has in order, but how about organizing the Militia into battle groups, as opposed to the present under-strength brigade groups.  I propose 11 battle groups, 4 in Ontario, 2 in Quebec and 1 each to BC, AB, SK, MB and the Maritimes.  Each battle group would be maintained at full strength and could train as a light infantry battle group.  In the very unlikely event of National Mobilization these battle groups could expand to brigade groups just as easily as the present brigade groups can be brought up to strength.  With each battle group having 800-900 troops at full strength, this means less than 10,000 troops in total.  You could group these battle groups into a brigade (area) HQ if you wanted, which would be mobilized into a division HQ.  

I will use the Manitoba Battle Group as an example:
Battle Group Headquarters 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Infantry Company  
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada - Infantry Company
Royal Winnipeg Grenadiers - Infantry Company
Fort Garry Horse - DFSV/Recce Squadron 
26th Field Battery, RCA (mortar troop, towed 105mm troop, air defence section)
22nd Field Engineer Troop
17 Service Company
17 Medical Platoon (attach it to service company)

Each sub-unit would be fully manned.  In the event of national mobilization the battle group headquarters would be the cadre for expansion to a brigade headquarters.  Each light infantry company would expand to a battalion.  This provides the cadre for the battalion.  The company commander & headquarters would become the battalion commander and headquarters.  Each platoon commander and platoon warrant would become the company commander and CSM.  Section commanders would become platoon warrants.  Section 2i/c would become section commanders, this would provide one experience section commander in each of the new platoons.  The same would be true for the armour, artillery and engineer sub-units.  The service company would act as the administration company of the light infantry battalion providing Role 1 CSS, however it would expand to become the brigade service battalion upon mobilization.  The supply & transport platoon would become a supply & tranport company, maintenance platoon would become the maintanence company, etc.  The same is true for the medical platoon, it will provide the UMS for the battalion but it would expand into a full field ambulance unit or medical company upon mobilization.  The battle groups Regimental Police section would expand into the brigade Military Police platoon, etc.  

If you read my earlier post on this topic I proposed four Reg Force Canadian Medium Brigade Groups divided into four Joint Task Forces each also having an Air Expeditionary Wing, a Command Support Regiment, an attached Maritime Task Group and a General Support Group.  Many of the General Support Group units would come from the Reserves.  Therefore, I would propose four General Support Battalions, one per Miliita brigade/area.  Each capable of supporting a Reg Force Joint Task Force.  The battalions would be deployed on operational tours more often than other Militia units, but it would be augmented with soldiers from all battle group service companies for deployments.  I would also have eight Civil-Military Affairs Platoons, four CBRN Platoons, four Light Air Defence Batteries (MANPADS & 35mm guns), eight Advanced Surgical Centres (small 60-bed surgical hospital organized identical to USMC surgical company with 182 personnel), four Military Police Companies, four Engineer Support Regiments (each tasked with one of the four independent Reg Force engineer support squadrons I proposed as part of the General Support Groups).  These combat support, combat service support and health service support units would be highly effective in peace support operations as well as at home in Canada in the event of a nature disaster or terrorist attack.  

This would obviously require an enthusiastic recruitment drive, especially in the area of medical professionals.


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## Edward Campbell

A few rather random thoughts:

"¢	As *whiskey 601* (I, personally, prefer _whisky_ but there's no accounting for tastes) said elsewhere: "What the Navy probably hasn't planned on is being shoved off by those who erroneously view the Navy's sole purpose as being reduced to hauling a few army trucks and Griffons around and labelling that role as "jointness.""   Too true - the Navy, uniquely, has the task of *independent power projection* - independent because it can do the job without local supporting bases.   A joint Navy/Air task force - land based long range patrol aircraft, land based fighter/bombers flying CAP and a strong surface force represents a major 'statement' by the country which deploys it.   Canada needs this capability and appropriate naval and air forces have to be earmarked for it.   It may be that a joint naval/air task force will have an army (amphibious) component added but readers are reminded that amphibious operations are *naval* operations and naval commanders do not 'chop' their land forces to a local, ashore commander until the naval commander is fully satisfied that the land/air forces put ashore can survive in their own;

"¢	The Air Force, also uniquely, has some single service roles: airborne and space based surveillance, warning and control, for example, and theatre air defence; some nations put most threatre level air defence assets - even missiles - in the air force and most make air-space management, including air defence management, a task of the theatre air commander.   Appropriate air forces must be *assigned* to continental air defence; and

"¢	Our _reserves_ have a number of tasks - resting, refitting and retraining between missions, _aid to [of] the civil power_, civil assistance (floods, fires, etc) which is quite a different thing, providing formed units for home defence (as the Navy Reserve does), training, providing individual augmentees, providing the national mobilization base, etc, etc, etc.   It is wrong, I think, to try to pigeon hole them into a few roles. 

All that being said, we are *not* a major league country - not like the USA or China or even France, but we are a *Triple A* country and we need *Triple A* armed forces (with apologies to Kent Foster from whom I pilfered this idea about 25 or 30 years ago):

"¢	*A*ppropriate for one of the world's top ten nations (by any sensible measure).   That includes being *A*vailable, too.   Having forces is wasteful unless some - enough - are trained, equipped and ready to deploy whenever and wherever needed;

"¢	*A*daptable - all this planning, in Ottawa and here in _cyberspace_, by experts and amateurs alike - in both places, is guaranteed, 100%, to be wrong.   The forces we build and maintain must be flexible in structure, equipment, doctrine/training, etc so that they can adapt, quickly and effectively (and efficiently, too) to the situations which will, really, obstain; and

"¢	*A*ffordable.   I _guesstimate_ that we need to double, plus, the defence budget (to $20+ Billion/2% of GDP - which is about $1 Trillion, now) to get anything like appropriate, available and adaptable forces - and I _guesstimate_ that we need to do that fairly soon and fairly quickly, say four or five big, big increments.   But, big *BUT*: I think another $8-12 Billion is easily found.


----------



## Acorn

Beside also preferring whisky _sans "e"_ (preferably malt, and preferably Islay) I have to agree that the Army tends to consider *joint* to mean *support the Army*. however, the Navy has some institutional bias that needs to be overcome as well (i.e. how does one provide NGFS with a 57mm direct-fire cannon).

Nit: space-based surveillance isn't an Air Force role/task. it is national, and very purple.

I somewhat agree with Kirkhill's description of the difference between a _Militia_ and a _Reserve_ force. The latter, by definition, carries a role of augmenting the Regular (expeditionary) force, while the former implies home defence. The fact that we have essentially been expeditionary for a century aside, I think we need to re-examine the Army reserve more critically than we have been. Can we afford the expense of "community relations" benefits at the expense of truly effective and deployable augmentation of today's Regular Army? (This is the "do we need so many Regiments, with the regimental infrastructure, to provide ptes and 2lts to the regular force?" argument).

Finally, I do agree that we are underfunded for what we truly need these days, though I would feel more comfortable if the politicians would step up and, as they are mandated to do, define our arcs. However, it's evident that _the people_ are more accepting of the words as they do not understand the actions. To whit: a politician can say "multi-purpose, combat capable" and the roles will nod sagely. If the same pol says "peacekeeping constabulary" the people will be agitated, as it implies a lack of concern for their own defence. This is where political _*leadership*_ is supposed to come into play - interpret and apply what the people desire, without dinking around with semantics.

Acorn


----------



## a_majoor

Regarding the "Field Squadron" idea, it is very good, very adaptable and very doable. Each reserve unit has a particular "wartime" mission and is tasked to provide some small sub sub-unit of trained soldiers to do the job, leaving a large fraction of the unit less than gainfully employed. I will use the Armoured reserve as an example, to make this clear.

Windsor Regiment, and 1H are to provide a formed 8 car recce troop, and are provided enough equipment (Illtis, for now), to do this. Each unit has far more soldiers than are needed to supply the troop, and in the near future, retention may become an issue, especially for new soldiers fresh from DP01 training who are now "on the bench" while the senior soldiers do troop training.

If these DP01 soldiers were formed into the "Field Squadron" (or even a reinforced Field Troop), they would have a role and mission while waiting for trades training to become available. Senior soldiers could also be rotated from the Armoured Recce Troop into the Field Squadron organization to allow others to gain or refresh their Armoured skills, and learn some new skills of their own. The Combat Arms units can be quicklly adapted to this new structure, while support and service support arms might not benifit as much (although a Field Squadron might make a good light convoy escort force for CSS units).


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## Inch

Acorn said:
			
		

> Beside also preferring whisky _sans "e"_ (preferably malt, and preferably Islay) I have to agree that the Army tends to consider *joint* to mean *support the Army*. however, the Navy has some institutional bias that needs to be overcome as well (i.e. how does one provide NGFS with a 57mm direct-fire cannon).
> 
> Acorn



In all fairness, it's not the Navy's fault they don't have NGFS. Most countries don't these days if you're talking about guns specifically. The days of the Battleship and her 12" guns are long gone. If you're talking Tomahawks and other SSM's, then you need a bigger ship than a frigate. The Navy only has funding for 3 destroyers, the 4th is indefinitely tied up in Victoria. Not to mention that they're 30 years old. You can blame the lack of NGFS on the government for not giving that capability to the Navy.

Cheers


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## pbi

Kirkhill:_ Whew!_ Where to start? Ok-let me try:



> OK so the basic skills that I suggested are skills that Militiamen currently have.   So the basic training plan and career development plan works and works reasonably well within the context of 37.5 days per year.   Is that a fair statement?   Would it also be a fair statement that the skills described above are basic "soldier" skills and would be common to all trades, whether infanteer or EME? Especially in an environment where it has been suggested by others that the "tail" needs to be hardened.



Yes-the Res system works fairly well as long as it has a narrow focus. It's critical limitation is time(not really money, as some would have us think), which confronts the Res with what amounts to almost a zero-sum game: if you add _this_, you must drop or cut _that_.Yes-I agree that these skills form a useful backbone for employability. Strangely, Res CSS are more "hardened" in the sense that they are always Army: they are not "purple" as many RegF CSS are. A Res sup tech will be an Army sup tech her whole career. A RegF sup tech may serve all over the place, most of it perhaps not in the Army field operations environment.



> So on this point we can agree that the skills the Militia currently have are generally up to the task are and will continue to be a useful adjunct to emergency preparedness planning.



Yes-we are there now and the situation is improving.



> On this point humour me and let me assume that it is a priority that will serve troops well in the field and also make them more valuable for emergency response. How many of the 37.5 days are necessary to complete that training and how often does it have to be refreshed?   Is it an insurmountable load?



I don't know how many days are required, but it is normally taught initially during entry-level DP1 trg, then refreshed occasionally during the training year. My suggestion would be to teach combat first aid and lifesaving from the get-go, and build lifesaving into all field training events.



> Yes I am wandering into the controversial area about using the Militia in public order ops.   Is there not need for somebody to be prepared to do the job and if not the Militia then who?   Do the police want the job and are there enough of them?   ....  Having said that I recognize that historically it has been a problematic area, especially with the Militia having been called out to break strikes, a task that even I find anti-democratic.



Yes-there is a need for public order to be maintained. Normally, we assume that it will be maintained by the civil police at the municipal level. If this is inadequate, the municipal police can be reinforced by other municipal police, by the Provincial Police (OPP, SQ, contract RCMP) and finally by the national RCMP resources. Calling out the Army for public order must be regarded as an absolute last resort. If the military is to be called out to assist in maintaining public order, a very high level of weapons handling, C2, discipline and situational awareness are necessary to avoid needless slaughter   or further loss of control of the situation. This is why this task in Canada, since WWI, has largely been the responsibility of the Regular Army combat arms units.(I think you will find that the military response to the Nanaimo Coal Strike, the Cape Breton Coal Strike, the London Factory Strike, the Winnipeg General Strike, etc consisted largely of Permanent Force units and RCMP, with some NPAM in support) Regular non-combat arms units have not traditionaly been considered capable, although I would argue that the Navy's boarding parties today probably have the requisite levels of training. Reserve units have traditionally  been considered as too poorly trained, and to have the additional vulnerability of possibly being subject to revenge by disaffected locals once the uniforms come off.   However, as a Res soldier in the mid-1970s we took it on ourselves in our unit (RRegtC) to do some riot training (we built the batons and shields) and we produced a squad that, according to one Toronto Police officer in the unit, was as good as the Toronto unit at that time. How did we do it? We had time. Why did we have time? Because in those days, as far as training went, units did pretty much what they wanted to do. There was no serious thought of using large numbers of Reserve soldiers on any operation, deployed or domestic, so the Res fiddled about doing largely whatever it wanted to. Those days are gone (under a number of pressures) and will not return. Time remains the critical factor.



> OK.   Perhaps we don't need 138 ....would have access to an independent unit with the basic soldier skills they are capable of currently acquiring in their 37.5 days.



Roger that.



> But haven't we just agreed that the skill sets needed for emergency preparedness are basic soldier skills, which they have and they apparently still find time to become Gunners, crewmen, surveillanc ops and proficient light infantrymen already?



You have confused me a bit (perhaps by juxtaposing the Qs and As differently...), but yes, you are right ..............(_senses ambush_.............)



> Here we may be coming to the crux of the matter.....However, in my world of the tooth-fairy and Santa Claus, I would like to think that we could add some more money to support a fairly broad range of capabilities without gaps.



You have advanced quite a lengthy and   complex set of arguments. In reduction, my responses are:

One Army, with one Army Reserve focused on combat operations but with inherent capability for domestic ops on a "last resort" basis-this is what we can afford. It has taken us years to break down the fences of mutual hostility that have traditionally existed between the two parts of the Army (to the extent we have been able.....) IMHO this idea risks creating yet another "class";

Enforcement of public order to remain in the hands of the police, with the RCMP having a "heavy" element such as the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie or GSG to handle more dangerous situations, thus absolutely reducing those occasions in which we will be required to use force against our own citizens. The Army to come out as a last resort, but to come out properly trained and equipped so as to avoid unnecessary killing; and

the US _does_ peacekeeping and nation building-they are doing it right here and now in Afghanistan, using   Regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard forces including both conventional and SF forces. They are transitioning back and forth to combat ops as required.It's quite interesting and blows our Canadian stereotypes out the window.



> And here we disagree.   I would argue that the primary role of the government is to defend its citizenry.   That means that first off they need to evaluate the threat and respond to the threat then organize their forces around the threat.   Skills and capacities necessary to counter the threat, that are surplus to immediate requirements can be put at the beck and call of Department of Foreign Affairs to secure advantage in the national interest.



Yes-I agree-but "_defend its citizenry_" does not IMHO mean "_have the Army do everybody else's jobs for them_". The Fire Dept defends the citizenry, as do the Police, the Customs Service, the Weather Service, the Coast Guard and environmental protection agencies. The right tool for the right job. Two examples of how we have progressed in this area in Canada are prison response and EOD. At one time (not that long ago, actually...) both of these situations would have probably involved the military if they went beyond a relatively insignificant state. Today, most police forces of any size have their own EOD (or access to Regional EOD) and the idea of military prison intervention has dwindled drastically as CSC and various LEAs have greatly improved their response capabilities. This improvement has not happened across the board in every capability area, and we may still be called upon _in extremis_, but IMHO that is how it should be kept: _in extremis _ not as a a default.

Cheers.


----------



## Acorn

Inch said:
			
		

> In all fairness, it's not the Navy's fault they don't have NGFS. Most countries don't these days if you're talking about guns specifically. The days of the Battleship and her 12" guns are long gone. If you're talking Tomahawks and other SSM's, then you need a bigger ship than a frigate. The Navy only has funding for 3 destroyers, the 4th is indefinitely tied up in Victoria. Not to mention that they're 30 years old. You can blame the lack of NGFS on the government for not giving that capability to the Navy.



Yes, the gov't bears some blame, but the Navy decided to eliminate the 5" gun for a 76mm AA weapon. The Navy bears some of the blame, just as the Army beasrs some of the blame for the way tanks seem to be going the way of the dino.

Acorn


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## Boydfish

> Boydfish I generally like what you are saying but why do you specify 30 days of independent operations?   Is it not likely that a supply line could be opened in less time than that?  The options are road, rail, sea, fixed wing and helo.  Does your planning suggest that all links will be severed completely for that length of time?



A couple of different reasons and factors come into play.

First, no, there is no certainty that the supply lines will be open in 30 days, especially if we're talking about the dreaded biological incident.  

Second, I also like the idea of being effectively able to "wait out the storm".  As one example, there are different scopes and scales of disasters.  An earthquake is a pretty local event, but if you look at the biggest disaster response in North America in the last twenty years, September 11th wins it, hands down.  The entire North American continent went to an essential war footing overnight.  If the CF needs to mobilize every reserve unit for local operations, how fast can the CF re-supply those units if they need to re-supply everybody.

Third, remember that log train that I'm going to latch onto as much as possible?  For every Herc load of supply for the reserve units that they don't need, I can bring in "stuff".  As well, for medevac purposes, freeing up flights so I can fling 100 "walking wounded" to Foothills rather than having them patched up locally is a "good thing".



> current system requires the logistics train to move out to the AOR, which might be problematic in some cases, especially in light of the 12hr time-line (I would have thought 24 myself). If the 12hr figure is a "given", then part of the restructuring will have to be pre-packing and pre-positioning supplies in armouries and depots to keep a unit up and running for several days to a week.



The 12 hour time line is so that the logistics are in place by the 24 hour mark.  Once you have the team on the field and aimed in the right direction in 12 hours, the front line medical staff that ate the initial wave are either a)Dead(I'm not kidding, if we're talking a bioevent, they're either dead or infected and thus likely to die and cannot be used for further treatement options.) or b) In dire need of a break.  As well, the call for assistance is likely to take upwards of 4 hours to make, so even if we hit the 12 hour mark, the "event" likely happened over 16 hours ago.



> Expenses for implementing this system should be picked up by either the emergency management system, or by the Provincial Solicitor-General's office, since they are the outfits which will call for military assistance.



I'd go one step further.  Offer to have the CF reserves take over the entire PEP mandate(And budget), providing SAR and other emergency responsibilities.



> My point here, and I stand to be corrected or proven wrong, is that on the medical front, in the event of a major disaster in the lower mainland, given the number of medically qualified personnel and the dispersal of hospitals in the area I feel that it will be more effective to get undamaged and least damaged facilities back on line with emergency power and water, then transport patients and staff to the facilities that are "up".



Hospitals in the Lower Mainland are, in varying degrees, essentially self-sufficient.  VGH has two giant D/E generator sets, plus a backup D/E set with bunkers to run 30 days enough to light up the whole facility.  Others...are not so well prepared.

I'd strongly suggest that moving patients is done at the very end, right when you are pulling the plug on the hospital and abandoning it forever.  Generally speaking, you will lose 25%-50% of your patients in an evac move.



> Perhaps the local medical community and reserves should become familiarized with each other. Not to mention police, fire and SAR.



You really don't want to know what the medical community expects out of the reserves/CF.  To explain that, BC uses a common disaster management system at all levels and locations.  This system was designed and developed in the wake of the Oakland earthquake in the late '80's.  The planning framework expects the CF and the reserves to provide a response equal to the California National Guard capabilities.  No matter how you try to explain to executives that the CF in total isn't the size of the CNG, let alone what they're going to be able to get to BC.

Now you understand why I got the hell out of that job before the "main event"?



> While you are most likely correct in thinking the field hospital would only be a drop in the bucket over-all, I can see a scenario where the hospital operates close to the disaster area as the triage centre, quickly stabilizing patients and then getting them whisked away to operational hospitals outside the zone.



Yep.



> I would be opposed to depriving the Regular Army of a valuable and necessary augmentation base by converting the entire Army Reserve to nothing but Home Guard(or Home Defense, or WTH you want to call it...) Our Regular Army is simply too small and too shallow, and likely will be for some time to come, to sever itself from an effective augmentation base. I agree that Res units can and should be assigned some local security roles, but these must be realistic and achievable and must not detract from combat training: there is simply not enough time to do everything.



I might be repeating what have already been suggested to a degree, but if we can have two armies, why can't we have three armies?  A regular force, a reserve/augmentation army and a "territorial army"?  You could even have the reserve and territorials work closely together, even sharing armory space(ex. the Reserves parade on Tuesdays and the Territorials parade on Thursdays).



> If that is the case I can't help but think that boydfish would not look ungratefully on a formed uniformed body, in vehicles that can handle floods, slides, debris fields and broken roads, capable of extracting the uninjured, offering first aid where appropriate and communicating with the limited EMS personnel as to where they are needed.  All the time their presence in uniform, possibly with side arms would act as a stabilizing force and help to lend an air of security.



As I said before, if I have to feed it, forget it.  In general at disasters, the community reaction is generally positive and helpful.  People self-dig and pitch in quickly.



> Maybe what Canada needs is a volunteer Civil Defense Service, like we had in the 1950s, to concentrate on disaster skills to augnment the civil authorities. You would probably attract people who want to serve, but don't want to be in the military. Then we could focus our very limited training time and resources on training our soldiers for operations, while retaining an approriate "last resort" or "immediate life and limb" response capability much as we have now.



Got my vote for that.  Big time.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> Yes, the gov't bears some blame, but the Navy decided to eliminate the 5" gun for a 76mm AA weapon. The Navy bears some of the blame, just as the Army beasrs some of the blame for the way tanks seem to be going the way of the dino.


Considering most navies(mostly except for the RN and USN and a couple of others) new builds are 76mm for a main gun I think it was a good idea. The 5 inch is a slower firing weapon and considering the the proliferation of sea skimmers and cruise missiles coming on to the world stage, they went with something that could help defend the ship. As for support you might see us get the Harpoon2 to provide that modicum of aid to the troops ashore but in reality how will it help? NGS is a science that most be practiced regularly. Simulation is fine but live fire is where you confirm your skill set and I cannot see the Navy spending an added couple of million for missiles every couple of exercises..


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## Cloud Cover

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> As for support you might see us get the Harpoon2 to provide that modicum of aid to the troops ashore but in reality how will it help? NGS is a science that most be practiced regularly. Simulation is fine but live fire is where you confirm your skill set and I cannot see the Navy spending an added couple of million for missiles every couple of exercises..



Wouldn't that be a waste of a good a perfectly good Harpoon? LOL - unless it is to be used for some sort of preplanned deacapitation strike, or perhaps take out a bridge. If the troops are ashore, perhaps they might see fit to bring along something heavy with them and some radio gear to call for airsupport if available. Perhaps a Harpoon with a cluster munitions payload? 

As far as NGS, one of the principle reasons it fell out of favour was it's ineffectiveness, especially with multi-purpose mountings, like the twin 3"70 POS. Awesome visuals but little practical effect for the massive expenditure of ammunition.   But ...  a dedicated NGS mount, such as the UDS 155mm that is supposed to go on the USN's DDX ship might be extremely useful to the army, since the FOO actually takes control of the rounds and guides them target ... 60 kms away from the ship.   Problem is that you need 2 of them, because one will surely be offline, and this necessitates a very large ship, in the order of 10 000 tonnes.


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## DOOG

Mountie..
The idea of being organized into Brigades is to have a basis for mobilization. We can (and do) still train more as Battle Groups. As for your suggestion for distributing the BGs around the country, I would suggest 1 BG in each of LFWA, LFCA and SQFT and 3 or 4 in Atlantic Canada..sound silly? ..Nine % of the population, 20 % of the Army (Reg). 1600 tps on ARCON with no Reg F Brigade. I think you underestimate us a tad.


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## Guardian

Back to the NGS issue, it should be pointed out that the Brits found their ship-mounted guns invaluable in the Falklands conflict. Far from being ineffective, ship-mounted guns tend to have a higher rate of fire and can be just as accurate as Arty howitzers on hard ground. Read some of the accounts by RA naval gunfire controllers from that conflict - they did a lot of work with the SAS / SBS, as well as supplementing the regular Army's firepower. I've heard it said that "we'll never fight a war like that again..." but it doesn't change the fact that a good proportion of the world's population lives within spitting distance of a shoreline. It doesn't take a lot of imagination to think of a scenario where it could come in handy. Here's one:

- Non-combatant evacuation operation - Canada deploys JTF-2 to someplace like Ivory Coast or Liberia (without any integral artillery support, of course  ) and redirects a nearby frigate to help with the extraction. The crap hits the fan and JTF needs some firepower... If the frigate had a 5-inch it would help a great deal.

Most of the time it probably wouldn't be necessary. But it would restore the naval gunfire control capability to the CF - allowing FEOs (the new FOOs) to have yet another source of fire on call. Even if our own ships weren't available, the training a Cdn FEO received in conjuction with our Navy could help him/her call for fire from a US / RN vessel on a coalition operation if the case warrants. And our contingents don't always have an integral indirect fire subunit with them - this could partially address the shortfall, especially in the case of rapid deployments.

Thoughts?


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## Edward Campbell

It will come as no surprise to discover that not everyone agrees with me that another $10+ Billion is, in fact, easy to find in Ottawa.   Most people who stop to consider money in our nation's capital work from a zero sum base: *all* current spending is necessary, effective, efficient and proper and, therefore, any 'new' money for programme A must come from programmes B, C or D.

With that in mind and noting that the national _commentariat_ has been beating the *more* drum for increased defence spending for months and months, it is timely to note that the _social_ 'counter offensive' is in full swing ...   see, for example



> _ The report, which condemns Canada for disregarding the very research on the importance of early childhood learning that it has been a world leader in producing, was nonetheless applauded by government ministers, child-care researchers, and advocates alike. It is a piece of perfect timing for the coming meeting of social-services ministers in Ottawa starting Nov. 1 where drafting a national system of early childhood education and care tops the agenda they say._


 at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20041026/CHILDCARE26/TPNational/TopStories



> _ The premiers are meeting with the federal government to work on a deal, with Ottawa holding firm to an offer of $10.9-billion a year in 2005-2006 that it made to the premiers at last month's health summit. The program was to have delivered $8.9-billion in 2004-2005, but Ottawa has also agreed to raise that figure to $10.8-billion._


 at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20041026.wprems1026/BNStory/National/

Both the provincial premiers, some of them, at least, and the child care proponents feel that they must be _*next in line*_ at the federal trough ... just behind health care but before cities, the environment, tax cuts, agricultural subsidies, EI, seniors, the handicapped, post secondary education, the CBC ... corporate welfare, tourism, art galleries, symphony orchestras and, oh yes, down near the very bottom of the national priority list, defence.

It will take intense lobbying effort to keep defence budget increase *REQUIREMENTS* at the front of parliamentarians' minds â â€œ and it requires more effort now because all MPs matter in this type of minority government, not just a few ministers.

The DM and CDS cannot lobby, _per se_ and my, personal, opinion of DND's tame lobby group â â€œ the Conference of Defence Associations â â€œ is fairly low, so ... well, don't hold your breath waiting for all those extra billions.


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## Kirkhill

Further to my point about vehicles as generators.
I'll get back to structure when I have a few more minutes.  Cheers

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34


Quantum Ships First Fuel Cell Vehicle to U.S. Army 
  
  
(Source: Quantum Fuel Systems Technologies Worldwide; issued Oct. 25, 2004)
  
  
 WASHINGTON, and IRVINE, Calif. --- Quantum Fuel Systems Technologies Worldwide, Inc., and the U.S. Army TARDEC's NAC (Tank-Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center's National Automotive Center) unveiled a high performance, fuel cell off-road vehicle at the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army in Washington, DC.  

The â Å“Quantum AMVâ ? (Alternative Mobility Vehicle), nicknamed the â Å“Aggressor,â ? is a fuel cell vehicle designed and manufactured by Quantum at its California operations for the U.S. Army under contract with the NAC. This vehicle provides significant advantages to U.S. troops for high mobility in stealth operations.  

Features of the Quantum Aggressor include:  

--Stealth mode: virtually silent operating mode with reduced thermal signature  
--High-performance: far superior acceleration compared to similar diesel or gasoline-powered all-terrain vehicles  
--Export power: on-board electric power generation to support communications, surveillance, targeting, and other electronic equipment  

The Quantum Aggressor runs on compressed hydrogen utilizing Quantum's proprietary Type IV impact resistant carbon fiber storage tanks. A 10 kW fuel cell is coupled with an energy storage module in a parallel hybrid configuration, which provides power on demand to a high-torque electric motor driving the rear-wheels. Preliminary tests have shown that the acceleration of the Quantum Aggressor is far superior to an unmodified gasoline internal combustion engine-powered all-terrain vehicle, reaching 40 miles per hour twice as fast. Ungoverned, the Quantum Aggressor is capable of reaching speeds of 80 miles per hour. Quantum's electronic control system imposes torque and speed limits on the drivetrain to enhance traction and safety.  

The Quantum Aggressor can be driven to the intended destination and then be used as a silent power generator to produce high quality electricity for telecommunications, surveillance, targeting, and other battlefield equipment. The vehicle does not produce any emissions throughout the different operating modes.  

In addition to being on display at the AUSA meeting, the Quantum Aggressor will be displayed at the annual SEMA (Specialty Equipment Market Association) show in Las Vegas, Nevada, from November 2 through 5, 2004, and the Special Operations Forces Week and Advance Planning Briefing To Industry Conference (SOCOM-APBI) in Tampa Bay, Florida, next June. Quantum and the NAC will also test and evaluate the vehicle on different military bases for a period of six months.


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## Cloud Cover

Guardian, I am going to open up an NGS forum in the Navy forum. Lets take this discussion there.


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## Kirkhill

Further to the discussion about the structure of the CF and the reference to the RAF Regiment field squadron I thought I would post what I have been able to find out about the organization.   These comments are drawn from my interpretation of two articles that appeared in a British magazine Combat and Survival.   Their orbats and technical appreciations are usually accurate. The errors will be mine.

A RAF Field Squadron is an area defence entity, designed to hold an airfield against a lightly armed force and infiltration.

It comprises 164 all-ranks:   7 Officers, 1 Warrant, 13 NCO's, 24 Jr. NCO's and 119 other ranks (aircraftsmen).

These are organized into 6 platoons (or flights):   HQ flight, Logistics flight, Support Weapons flight, Machinegun and Sniper flight and 2 Rifle flights.

The Support Weapons flight, Machinegun and Sniper flight as well as the 2 Rifle flights are all apparently organize on the same basic structure as all of them can revert to Rifle flight roles and reports of the unit holding 4 51mm mortars, usually issued in British service at the rate of one per platoon HQ would seem to confirm this.

The basic structure is a platoon HQ of 1 Offr, 1 NCO and 2 Signallers with three 8 man sections under command.   The sections are broken down into two 4 man bricks.   

In a Rifle Platoon, the sections are identical, both in composition and structure.

In the Machinegun and Sniper platoon, one section divides into four 2 man teams each armed with the 7.62mm L96A1 (soon to be replaced by the Lapua LRR?) while the other two sections each man 2 7.62mm GPMGs (our C6) in the SF role.

The Support Weapons platoon mans 4 81mm mortars.   At a guess, based on maintaining the basic platoon structure this may be organized with 2 tube sections, each manning 2 mortars, and an observation section.

The Logistics platoon includes medics, chefs, mechanics, EME techs and armourers.

The HQ platoon apparently contains the usual assortment of dogsbodies.

The tactical organization of the Squadron is interesting here but as pbi has pointed out we don't organize out companies this way from a tactical view and also we probably don't need 138 identically organized light infantry/light cavalry companies.   

Having said that I think the RAF Squadron model does seem to offer some interesting capabilities for consideration.   These capabilities are based around its equipment and its structure.

First of all, looking at its equipment.

Operationally the Squadron has at its disposal the following assets:

Anti-Armour Weapons 

LAW 94mm (2 per section)

Indirect fire

81mm mortars   4x
51mm mortars   4x (1 per platoon)
AGGS rifle grenades issued as ammunition 

Direct fire

L96A1 7.62mm sniper rifles   4x
GPMG 7.62mm Sustained Fire and Bipod Mounts 14x   (4 SF and 10 bipods??)
SA80A2 5.56mm Light Support Weapons (2 per section)
SA80A2 5.56mm Individual Weapons (personal weapon for all personnel)

To facilitate operations the Squadron is also equipped with the following assets:

Situational Awareness

MSTAR (Manportable Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar)   2x
CLASSIC ground sensors   10x
Spyglass thermal imagers   10x
LP7 hand held laser range finders 4x
Passive night sights (2 per section)
CWS weapons sights (1 per LSW and IW)

Communications

VRC353 Vehicle mounted radios 14x
AM352 Amplified radios   31x
Clansman 74x

Mobility

Command Post Vehicle 1x
Motor Cycles 4x

Heavy Goods Vehicles (equivalent to our MLVW's - about 4 tonne capacity) 10x
Recovery Vehicle 1x 
POL Vehicle 1x

Land Rovers with trailers   36x
Mortar Vehicles 4x

All of these non-tactical, facilitating capabilities I would imagine are the same capabilities that boydfish's EPC folks would find most valuable in time of local crisis.   He apparently isn't looking for warm bodies unless they are contributing something.

Curiously it seems to me that those capabilities are the same thing that we are missing at the unit level in the Militia/Reserves.   Without them and the opportunity to train with them training opportunities are curtailed, utility to the community is reduced and I would argue utility to the Army is curtailed.   

This local problem is the same problem that the CF at large has with respect to adequate LUVWs, LSVWs, MLVWs, HLVWs, Utility and Medium lift helicopters, Hercules replacements and Strategic Air and Sealift.   All of these transport capabilities along with Service Support like kitchens, water, sanitation and shelter are the very areas that boydfish and the emergency planners need.

So the question to me becomes not one of whose budget is going to be robbed to pay for these capabilities, thus depriving that department of other capabilities, but how can both departments present a common usage plan for the same set of kit.

I think I can hear the squawks now but hear me out......

I know that delivering services during a SARS epidemic entails a different risk than flying out troops when bullets are flying.

But.....

At bottom the difference is not the equipment, it is who is operating it and what they are being asked to do with it.

Sticking to the Militia/Reserves level and the local Squadron sized unit for a moment.

Could the argument be made, and could both Civil Defence and the Militia/Reserves and the CF at large live with this type of compromise?

The Government be requested to purchase for each Militia unit in the country kit to outfit one HQ platoon and one Logistics platoon after the fashion of the RAF Regiment Squadron.   These would be dispersed around the country, thus protected from disaster at any one location and would be available to be activated at short notice.   Manning would be a mixture of Permanent staff and Militia/Reserves with a high proportion of Class Cs and B's from the local community responsible for maintaining the kit.   Operators, like signalers and chefs and drivers would be Class A's.   

These manned and equipped HQ/Logistic entities would be beneficial to Emergency Preparedness.

However, it can't be forgotten that Civil Defence and the CF have one crucial difference between them.   Civil Defence exists to SAVE people.   The CF does not.

HQ and Logistics in the CF exist to support people, and can be employed to support civilians in crisis, and very effectively, but they exist primarily to Command and Support SOLDIERS â â€œ people prepared to close with and destroy the enemies of the nation.

If the government buys this equipment for the nation, to aid it in its periods of crises, then could the government not put the same equipment at the service of the CF in support of its soldiers so that they are rendered more operationally effective and can train more effectively.

What I am effectively suggesting, perhaps dangerously to some, is that the Militia units be built around a common backbone at the unit level.   That backbone would have to come to an accommodation serving two masters - both Emergency Preparedness, communicating with EPC, Coast Guards, RCMP, local police, fire and emergency services â â€œ as well as an operational element tasked in support of CF operations.

I could see such an organization having internal cohesion stresses but I also see a way for the CF to get kit, the Militia to get a role and capability, for training opportunities to improve and for the CF to get a true Plug'n'Play capability out of the Militia.   It could deploy complete subunits with their own A and B echelon support.   The senior organization wouldn't have to figure out how to feed and shelter these bodies.   Also it would present the CF the opportunity of fielding deployable independent subunits.

As well, as a_majoor suggested the concept is flexible.

The basic RAF structure, with its emphasis on light vehicles and small unit patrols is similar in role to a light recce armoured unit (much better equipped than currently envisioned in the CF but similar).

I agree with pbi.   There is no need for 138 light recce units with all other capabilities ignored.

I see no reason why, especially amongst F echelon, why the existing trades responsibilities couldn't be maintained.

For example, all of the infantry, artillery, armour and possibly the engineers could be organized on the basis of a doctrinal light infantry company at the tactical level.   Say for example three rifle platoons with weapons dets and possibly a marksman det, or whatever.   To this organization attach a supernumary fourth platoon similarly organized and manned but assigned to a particular skill set (mortars, guns, foot recce, engineers etc).   This fourth platoon/troop could be employed either to add depth to an independent deployment or it could be detached and chopped to a Regular force entity.

Such a subunit (Squadron) could continue to be a source of trained individuals for the CF on peace-time deployments.

Variations on a theme could be worked, for instance in a recce squadron maybe all four troops have LUVWs, maybe only the fourth troop has them.   Maybe the fourth troop has Bisons or LAVs instead.   

Service Support elements could be similarly organized but would probably be different in execution.

One point that I would make is particular to the Infantry.   I would start with all Infantry being organized on a light infantry basis but all infantry units should have adequate tactical vehicles to be able to lift all troops across rough terrain.   To do this I would think that you would want a vehicle small enough to be used on patrols, capable of lifting a large enough body of troops (minimum section) so that the number of drivers required can be minimized and not distract the unit from its primary role and capable of mounting (and supplied with the means to mount) medium and heavy weapons. Such vehicles should also be of benefit to the civil authorities.

Armoured vehicles may be supplied to the fourth platoon of some units but light infantry and light vehicles should be the order of the day, providing both a non-threatening vehicle for domestic operations (including tasks like delivering bodies to a fire line) as well as supplying a useful training platform and an operationally capable and internationally deployable platform.

Such an organization could be maintained by local personnel, working out of their home communities, if volunteers can be trusted to maintain fire trucks surely they can be trusted with these types of vehicles.   Perhaps they are employed on Class B callouts for 16 hours a week at the armouries specifically to maintain the kit.

Anyway, creating a Militia substructure like this would serve both the needs of the CF and EPC as well as the Militia itself.

And on a related thought, perhaps the other support equipment and services we need should be sold on the same basis.   One set of equipment, purchased to serve two departments but manned and operated according to the situation.   Volunteers for specific tasks if necessary....

Well that's my thought for the day.   Thoughts end.   Waiting for snickers to erupt and return fire.

Cheers.

By the way this would also necessitate a change to training and also to readiness checks.  Perhaps trainers will have to come to the units and a regular series of checks of readiness of personnel and equipment by dedicated Inspectors would do the job.


----------



## a_majoor

The one thought which went through my mind while reading Kirkhill's post was "ASG". The Area Support Group concept is similar in principle to what Kirkhill is suggesting; a "support backbone" that all units/formations in an Area can hook into for support. Unfortunately, my experiences with ASG have been frustrating, as it is a large and powerful bureaucratic monster, which responds to things on its own time and for its own reasons. 

While I an fairly sure the reason for the ASG concept was to provide a strong and flexible logistics backbone as opposed to a cumbersome logistics tail, the reality of a centralization and the power of literally having everyone in the Area by the short and curlies has created something else.

If the support structure Kirkhill has in mind is pumping more resources into the ASG system, it probably would work, although I would certainly like to take a took kit and hammer out some of bureaucratic stuffing. If he is thinking of a separate EMS support chain, with its own budget and bureaucratic survival imperatives, then I can see both stand-up and operational nightmares happening as everyone wrestles for control.

I think the fundamental idea of a support backbone is good in theory, but more work has to be done in order to make it light and flexible.

Side note on Naval Gunfire; the US Navy's DD-X program may start with a 155, but the ultimate goal is to have an electromagnetic rail gun which can fire kinetic energy "darts" several hundred kilometers (with most of the trajectory being out of the atmosphere), and which can destroy hardened targets through kinetic energy alone. That would raise an interesting battlespace coordination issue as you now have to account for rounds screaming in from space....


----------



## Kirkhill

a_majoor

I hadn't seen what I was discussing in the ASG light but your correct in essence.  However rather than have things centralized in half a dozen warehouse complexes across the country I am suggesting getting the kit distributed down to the unit level and make the units responsible for it.  As I kind of waltzed around, on the same model as the local Volunteer Fire Hall.  

I admit this would make it harder to administer and maintain, more things might get broken and go missing,  but that is where the kit needs to be.  And as in every other case make the unit responsible.  

I am suggesting that maintenance and care of the kit could be done with more local unit members on local Class B callouts, or even more authorized Class A hours.  The learning value and pride alone would be worth some effort.  As noted if the local Volunteer Firemen can take care of their kit can't the Militia do the same.

As to the manning of the Logistics and HQ platoons, I see that as a mix of Regs and Local Reservists, all at various levels of callout (determined by how many hours are realistically required to perform their tasks), all locally based and all undertaking the job on the understanding that they are double hatted.  They have an operational role that they must train for and support but they also have an Emergency Services Support role that they can be called out for at any time.

They are CF personnel first, training to support their tactical element at war, but they are also on call to support the local Fire Department.


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill: you are a prolific fellow, aren't you! ;D

Anything that makes the Army Reserve more capable with a clear focus on readiness for combat operations, has my vote. By implication, improving combat capabilities such as C2, CSS, mobility and survivability will also improve the utility of the Res unit to its community in the case of a civil emergency that exceeds the capacity of local agencies.

However, much of what you are encouraging (as good and useful as it is...) exists to some degree or another already. In particular as I have observed earlier, the capability of the Army Res to respond to civil emergencies (as well as the wllingness of the DCDS to use them) has increased exponentially in the last decade, as it should have.

A few specific comments:


> Curiously it seems to me that those capabilities are the same thing that we are missing at the unit level in the Militia/Reserves.   Without them and the opportunity to train with them training opportunities are curtailed, utility to the community is reduced and I would argue utility to the Army is curtailed.



While the heavier support wpns and nivis eqpt do not normally exist at unit level, pretty well all of the other capabilities exist to a greater or lesser degree either at unit level, or if not certainly regionally within each CBG. It is actually at CBG level that most detailed planning and coordination for civil response occurs, because that is the first level of C2 at which there is adequate planning horsepower and access to resources. For example, within 38 CBG while our individual units may respond immediately to a local "Imminent Life and Limb" if requested by local authorities, the next stage of response is one or more of our BISON coys that are constituted on a regional basis with adequate C2, mobility and CSS capabilities based on all Bde resources. What is lacking, in my opinion, is integral CSS at unit level. The version of ARE that took the CSS away was, IMHO, an error   in judgement.



> The Government be requested to purchase for each Militia unit in the country kit to outfit one HQ platoon and one Logistics platoon after the fashion of the RAF Regiment Squadron.   These would be dispersed around the country, thus protected from disaster at any one location and would be available to be activated at short notice.   Manning would be a mixture of Permanent staff and Militia/Reserves with a high proportion of Class Cs and B's from the local community responsible for maintaining the kit.   Operators, like signalers and chefs and drivers would be Class A's. ...These manned and equipped HQ/Logistic entities would be beneficial to Emergency Preparedness.



As I mentioned in my earlier post, this is already beginning in 39 CBG, and has been proposed for the other Res CBGs in LFWA.As OCIPEP is actually under DND (or was...) it is the same budget (but anyway its a bit academic as all Govt expenditure comes of of the General Revenue-it's just a question of priorities as you pointed out). I agree that Res units need a higher proportion of full time people, although they do not necessarily need to be Regular (full time in the USARNG, for example, is done almost totally by ARNG soldiers not by Active Army)



> What I am effectively suggesting, perhaps dangerously to some, is that the Militia units be built around a common backbone at the unit level.   That backbone would have to come to an accommodation serving two masters - both Emergency Preparedness, communicating with EPC, Coast Guards, RCMP, local police, fire and emergency services â â€œ as well as an operational element tasked in support of CF operations.



This is more less what exists now. However, we only have so many people/resources: if we deploy them to one kind of op, we can't use them for another (or even engage in training..)



> One point that I would make is particular to the Infantry.   I would start with all Infantry being organized on a light infantry basis but all infantry units should have adequate tactical vehicles to be able to lift all troops across rough terrain.   To do this I would think that you would want a vehicle small enough to be used on patrols, capable of lifting a large enough body of troops (minimum section) so that the number of drivers required can be minimized and not distract the unit from its primary role and capable of mounting (and supplied with the means to mount) medium and heavy weapons. Such vehicles should also be of benefit to the civil authorities




I see what you mean, but at present we are heading toward a very specific usage of "light infantry" in our Army: it will likely come to rfer to high-readiness "Ranger" type units. But I know what you'r getting at.



> Such an organization could be maintained by local personnel, working out of their home communities, if volunteers can be trusted to maintain fire trucks surely they can be trusted with these types of vehicles.   Perhaps they are employed on Class B callouts for 16 hours a week at the armouries specifically to maintain the kit.



Pretty well what happens now, although again I think we could do a much better job of giving Res units an integral CSS capability. Just because it was mismanaged in the past (and, IMHO, "cut the grass" of some people in the CSS world..) is no reason not to try again, smarter.



> By the way this would also necessitate a change to training and also to readiness checks.   Perhaps trainers will have to come to the units and a regular series of checks of readiness of personnel and equipment by dedicated Inspectors would do the job.



In LFWA at the moment this exists in two ways: there is an annual ATI of equipment, and each unit must field its Mission Tasked Element to take part in at least one evaluated exercise/yr. I am not sure COs would be too keen to see hordes of "Inspecctors" descending unless they were followed by "Fixers and Helpers"

Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

OK pbi,  time for me to put a cork in it anyway and let you professionals have at it.   ;D 

Seriously, the reason I post is twofold (ok maybe three - I do enjoy seeing my thoughts out there) one is just to present alternatives, not necessarily correct and often wrong just to see for myself if I understand how things are being done and how they are progressing. The second is I continue to see this board as an opportunity to educate some of us civvy lurkers and potential supporters of the cause.  I figure that if my thoughts get knocked out of the ballpark with a rational response then I have learned something and maybe its given some others something to chew on.

Cheers, and thanks for the rational responses.


----------



## pbi

> OK pbi,  time for me to put a cork in it anyway and let you professionals have at it.



This would be the worst possible result: we all benefit from each other's perspective and experience: that is the great strength of Army.ca.



> Cheers, and thanks for the rational responses.



You are welcome. Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

No worries, the cork is extractable.


----------



## Kirkhill

> the US does peacekeeping and nation building-they are doing it right here and now in Afghanistan, using   Regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard forces including both conventional and SF forces. They are transitioning back and forth to combat ops as required.It's quite interesting and blows our Canadian stereotypes out the window.



pbi: just going back over my diatribes and your responses, I just wanted to clarify something on this point -   I wasn't suggesting that the Americans don't make good peacekeepers, nor I guess should I suggested that they didn't know how.   The Marines and the Special Forces have both demonstrated that they can in the past.   In fact IIRC the SF "Green Berets" were effectively raised with hearts and minds operations as a, if not the, primary focus.

No, the point I was trying to make is that the US Army in particular appeared to me to have been an Armour heavy (if not dominated) organization that believed in combining Cavalry Raids (some raids may be a couple of years long but the intention was to get in and get out - not hang around for the long haul) with a massive Artillery force capable of delivering overwhelming fire support.   And from where I stand that spectrum of fire support starts with the Mortar and the Tank Gun - although perhaps it should start with the rifle - and proceeds through 155s and MLRS's, past F16s and B2s all the way to ICBMs.

The point I was trying to make is that the Americans themselves, in talking about this Transformation are could in fact be construed as converting from a Cavalry Ethos to an Infantry Ethos.   Converting from the notion of the raid, to the notion of holding ground.

Don't take me wrong. I am a believer in and supporter of both the Americans and their forces, especially at the individual level.

Cheers. 

(Cork in).

By the way, after reviewing your responses here and under the Domestic Response Coys thread I see that I am late on parade again.    

(Cork back in)


----------



## Guardian

ARMYboi69 said:
			
		

> Many parents are buying Kevlar Vests here in sending them to their sons that are in the military, deployed in Afghnistan or somewhere else because the ones the military provide are old and irrelivant.



Could you provide a source for this information? I haven't heard of this happening here - or are you talking about events in the US?


----------



## a_majoor

American Army Doctrine has been dominated by "AirLand Battle" since the early 1980's. This in turn was a response to the US changing its strategic focus from the periphery to the centre (ie wars in the third world to the Central Front in Europe), and lessons learned form the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Given the potential threats, strategic focus and available technology of the day, it is hardly surprising that we now see the "Heavy Metal Army" dominated by massive armoured vehicles and supported by air and artillery power on a scale no other army or armed force in the world can match. The cavalry analogy isn't quite correct; the American way of war calls for slashing attacks to unbalance the enemy, supported by massive amounts of firepower to destroy opposition.

To their credit, the US Army has supported niche activities like Low Intensity Combat (Special Forces, Green Berets, Rangers), and have been attempting to undergo a transformation form the Heavy Metal Army to a lighter and more flexable instrument. Given AirLand Battle took about ten years to develop and another ten years for validation (the First Persian Gulf War), I am not at all surprised they are having a rocky time right now, using the Heavy Metal Army to conduct a counter-insurgency war in phase 2 of the Second Persian Gulf War (Phase 3 could either be a Kerry pull out, or recognizing that Iran and Syria are part of the problem, and dealing with them).

The transformational effort does not contradict the American way of war at all, the Future Combat System suite of vehicles are meant to be lighter, faster and more lethal, while backed by precision firepower to destroy the opposition (in the form of PGM's delivered by all kinds of platforms).

WRT ASG's and other supporting structures, I totally agree things should be dispersed, with sea cans of supplies sitting inside unit compounds and a few extra trucks and drivers on the unit roles to support the DOMOPS scenarios. There will still be a need for a centralized structure to do the mundane things like purchase items, stock sea cans, ensure the stock is rotated etc. My big concern is pretty soon, you could see the support structure driving the operation, rather than the other way around. ("Hey, we bought those trucks, so we'll tell you what trucks are suitable and when to use them"). 

You are correct in stating the extra logisticians, signallers and bodies will also enhance the combat capabilities of the unit, but if an "outside agency" is supplying the funds, won't they also try to dictate the terms of service ("Who said you could take OUR trucks and drivers to the Res BTE?"), negating any potential increase in combat capability.

Once again, I think we are putting the cart before the horse. The very first thing we need to know is what is our job, as laid out in an unambiguous White Paper. Once we know that, then it is easier to figure out how many submarines, LUVW's or lunch rooms the CF needs to procure, and what support structure is best suited for the tasks at hand.


----------



## Infanteer

ARMYboi69 said:
			
		

> I have heard about this going on in Canada, and it's been on News TV Stations, so I can't give you a link. I also have heard about this going on in the U.S. too, and the U.S. have had this happen more.



Unless you're willing to validate your claim with proof, why don't you stick to chasing skirts at your highschool instead of throwing the conversation off topic with your speculation and hearsay.


----------



## Kirkhill

> Once again, I think we are putting the cart before the horse. The very first thing we need to know is what is our job, as laid out in an unambiguous White Paper. Once we know that, then it is easier to figure out how many submarines, LUVW's or lunch rooms the CF needs to procure, and what support structure is best suited for the tasks at hand.



Fair comment.

But I think that part of the value of this exercise is determining what things might be doable, how close is our existing structure to the demands that we might place on it in the future and thus, from that how much money is involved.

I don't think you can look at it as a linear process (this is what we want/need to do, this is what we want/need to buy, this is the cost, write the cheque).  It has to be an iterative process, you have to go round and round in ever decreasing circles for a while before working your way to the target (hopefully not doing the inevitable and disappearing up your own a***hole).

The Aussies, as in so many things, got it about as right as possible.  They sat Defence, Treasury and Foreign Affairs (I would add Anne McLellan's bunch as well) down at the one table and had them sort out the problem jointly.

So in the meantime...does it hurt to consider what you might be able to do if..?

Cheers.

BTW points on the AirLand Battle taken,  as is the comment to the effect that a focus on LIC activities does not mean that High Intensity Warfare needs can be ignored or are wrong.  The point is that both capabilities need to be addressed and the US force was/is heavy on HIC capabilities and light on LIC capabilities.  And that has been a conscious US Army policy since at least Vietnam - some soldiers, up to an including General Powell, apparently didn't want to focus on tools that would allow an administration to get them back into another Vietnam situation. AirLand Battle grew out of that mindset.

As to the ownership and use of equipment, certainly that would be a sticking point.  Is it insurmountable?


----------



## PPCLI Guy

pbi said:
			
		

> Anything that makes the Army Reserve more capable with a clear focus on readiness for combat operations, has my vote. By implication, improving combat capabilities such as C2, CSS, mobility and survivability will also improve the utility of the Res unit to its community in the case of a civil emergency that exceeds the capacity of local agencies.



This goes back to Defence Policy and Defence Tasks - and we would have to be very careful in how we "sold" this.   Proposing an enhanced EPC role for the Militia will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.   We are supposed to be a force of last recourse, but if we receive funding and equipment specifically for EPC type tasks, that could quickly end up as our raison d'etre.   The Civil Preparedness days of the 60s and 70s just about killed the Militia, and we wouldn't want to go down that route agin...would we?




> As OCIPEP is actually under DND (or was...) it is the same budget (but anyway its a bit academic as all Govt expenditure comes of of the General Revenue-it's just a question of priorities as you pointed out).



Actually, they have been hived of to the Minister of Public Safety who is also the Dep PM), and are called PSEPC now.



> I agree that Res units need a higher proportion of full time people, although they do not necessarily need to be Regular (full time in the USARNG, for example, is done almost totally by ARNG soldiers not by Active Army)



Heretic time...

How about if the RSS currently posted in to units focus on their primary functions, and devote less time to full time school, career courses, tours overseas etc etc.   I know, that is a broad brush and hence intrinsically unfair comment to make, but I seem to remember that RSS was supposed to be hard work - and ultimately very rewarding.

Dave


----------



## Kirkhill

> The Civil Preparedness days of the 60s and 70s just about killed the Militia, and we wouldn't want to go down that route agin...would we?



No, we wouldn't.



> How about if the RSS currently posted in to units focus on their primary functions, and devote less time to full time school, career courses, tours overseas etc etc.



Dave, you are nasty fella.  >  Do you have MANY friends down at the mess?  ;D

Cheers.


----------



## pbi

(_Rolls up sleeves, spits on hands.......)_



> Heretic time...
> 
> How about if the RSS currently posted in to units focus on their primary functions, and devote less time to full time school, career courses, tours overseas etc etc.  I know, that is a broad brush and hence intrinsically unfair comment to make, but I seem to remember that RSS was supposed to be hard work - and ultimately very rewarding



  RSS is like any duty in the Army: you should work hard, but work well, and try to enjoy yourself while you're at it. in my opinion, RSS who do their jobs properly, and serve their units well, will work considerably harder than most of their peers on Regtl duty.We have generally been blessed with good RSS in this Bde: we have had a couple of clangers but fortunately they are all gone. 

 WRT taking school, I cannot spreak for RSS outside 38 CBG, but I can defend the Regular FTS in our Bde. Since I have taken over as COS in Jan of 2002, I am aware of one officer out of our 16 units who was absent on classes, and that was not on a full time basis. (Perhaps a 38 CBG poster will pop up to embarass me, but I don't think so...). In order for that officer to do that, the first requirement is the concurrence of the unit CO. Next, the CO will discuss it with me, since I assist the COs with any RegF career or PD issues. No RSS person is going to "skive off" without the concurrence of the CO. And, if we consider the fact that the Army  now expects us to improve our education, and offers us money and time towards it, as well as the fact that RSS must not become a "career graveyard" (as it was when I was a Reserve soldier), then it makes sense to permit RSS (and Res on FTS) to be able to improve their education _where and when the workload permits_, but not "willy nilly" or "any time they feel like it", any more than they could if they were back on Regtl duty.

WRT career courses, the COs in this Bde are in pretty universal agreement that they want their RSS folks to advance in their careers: I have never heard of a CO resisting a career course (the Bde Comd would probably overrule them anyway...). That's not to say that the absence doesn't cause pain: it does, but the COs seem to understand it, although  I know that they don't like it. We will normally authorize a Class B backfill (if such a suitable Res officer is available, which tends to be a problem for us). The point is that RSS cannot be a career graveyard.

As for overseas duty (again speaking only for our Bde..) we do not permit RSS to volunteer for tours, or to go "tour hunting". An RSS person will go on a tour if the Army tasks us to send them (assuming a Res will not do the job just as well...) This happens, of  course: we  have now dispatched me (the COS) our G3 and and our G1 (Class B) here to ATHENA, in response to taskings from LFWA. Class B or Class A are viewed a bit differently: we encourage them to do tours as they are able. The fact is that the Army is at such a manning state that there is very little choice. Fortunately, we can suck it up to a certain extent in Bde HQ, but there is no such capacity at the units.

Cheers.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

All fair enough - and I did say that it was an unfair, broad-brush comment.  I apologise to all of those hard working RSS (and they are the vast majority) who I have painted with that brush.

I am simply frustrated by the amount of full-timers that it takes to run a Reserve Unit these days, as compared to 88 when I was Cl B "Acting RSS", 91-94 when I was RSS, and 94-95 when I was 10/90.  I realise that, to some extent, the admin burden has increased since then, and hence the workload - but not that much.  Cl B is, in most cases, Cl A money that comes off of the Armoury floor.  The exception is the Cl B backfills for RSS - and I lament that necessity as well.

I found my RSS experience to be extremely rewarding.  I worked harder than I had in my first Regtl Tour, and had much more responsibility.  Like most postings, it is what you make of it.  

So, thanks for slapping me upside the head PBI - an offhand rant that did not articulate my true point - that somehow we need so many full-timers to run a unit.

Dave


----------



## pbi

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> All fair enough - and I did say that it was an unfair, broad-brush comment. I apologise to all of those hard working RSS (and they are the vast majority) who I have painted with that brush.
> 
> I am simply frustrated by the amount of full-timers that it takes to run a Reserve Unit these days, as compared to 88 when I was Cl B "Acting RSS", 91-94 when I was RSS, and 94-95 when I was 10/90. I realise that, to some extent, the admin burden has increased since then, and hence the workload - but not that much. Cl B is, in most cases, Cl A money that comes off of the Armoury floor. The exception is the Cl B backfills for RSS - and I lament that necessity as well.
> 
> I found my RSS experience to be extremely rewarding. I worked harder than I had in my first Regtl Tour, and had much more responsibility. Like most postings, it is what you make of it.
> 
> So, thanks for slapping me upside the head PBI - an offhand rant that did not articulate my true point - that somehow we need so many full-timers to run a unit.
> 
> Dave



Ok-forgiven. Ah knowed ya wuz jes kiddin'.

About the number of full timers-I argue that the day the Army decided to place more demands on the Army Reserve is the day it had a responsibility to ante up for an adequate FTS in each unit. Quite apart from the increased opred demand is the burden of governance that is now placed on a Reserve CO and his people-running the training is the easy part. The Army has tried to fill the gaps to a limited extent, but  not to the extent required. RSS has remained a low manning priority: for the first two years I was in 38 CBG, we had less than half of the required number of RSS officers for our 16 units, and at one point we were down to about a half dozen. At the peak of our RSS manning  crisis, we were spending as much on Class B backfill as we were to run an average-sized unit. Even then, the shortage of suitable officers available for Class B meant that some units just went without a full time officer altogether, with noticeable suffering in unit efficiency as well as an added burden on the Class A COs. It also affected our ability to fill courses or run training, particularly in the Arty units.

At present, we tightly restrict the Class Bs in our units. We will backfill to ensure that there is one officer and one WO/Sgt on FTS, and we will fund a clerk posn/unit in the Grn OR pools or at an isolated unit. Units are not permitted to hire without Bde auth. Now-all that is not because we are against having adequate FTS:quite the opposite. Rather, it is because we have to watch the pennies or there will be no money to train the troops. When I hear of units in certain CBGs to the east with their full RSS PLUS five or more Class B at a single location unit, I shudder. Where is that money coming from? Are the troops on the Armoury floor getting the mandated 37.5 DPY?

In our LFRR Phase II Proposals, we included plans for two "grouped" (to avoid the "A"-word) units: 38 Svc Bn and 38 Field RCA. Our FTS manning slate approximated the following for one of these units:

Unit HQ location:
Capt Adjt: Class B
Capt Ops: RegF
Ops/Trg WO: RegF
Chief Clk: RegF/ClassB
Stmn/Dvr: Class B
Clerk (pool/detatched): Class B

Outlying Battery/Coy:
Ops/Trg WO: RegF
Clerk (pool/detatched): RegF/ClassB
Stmn/dvr. Class B

This was based on a majority of pers admin and trg coord functions being moved to unit HQ from the former three unit HQ locs, with the outlying locations retaining only the capability to function as a sub-unit.

Further, we completed a poll of our COs and RSSOs last year on a number of issues to do with RSSO employment. The results were quite surprising in some respects. (we sent it up the CofC-I don't know what became of it...) One of the questions concerned whether or not FTS need to be Regular or just FTS. We used the USARNG example: there are effectively no Active Army personnel in most ARNG units: FTS are "activated Guardsmen" (we would say Class B). The response we got was that while some Class B officers can certainly do a credible job , and may in fact be far more suited as Capt Adjt than a young RegF Capt who has no experience above Platoon/Tp level, there were clear benefits to having the Res/Reg relationship at unit level.

So my point.....oh...yeah...what _is_ my point? OK-right-that we DO need a healthy FTS in our units, but that the Army must resource it such that we do not have to make a Hobsons' Choice between paying the troops and supporting their trg/admin. Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

The historiography of the development of AirLand battle is certainly not complete, and arouses controversy even today. It was an iterative response to what was seen as the pressing problems of the time, hence the emphasis on heavy, conventional forces and the lack of attention to the unconventional/low intensity conflict aspects of war and conflict.

This is why I am such a firm believer in a new White Paper. By all means get the TB and Foreign Affairs involved with the drafting of the paper, and make it an open process with public involvement as well. We need to know what idea to circle around, or we will end up as Kirkhill suggests and dissapear down our own...orifice.

The question of "ownership" of people and resources funded by outside agencies is very important. If it is unclear, then it will become a battle of wills settled at either TB or Cabinet level. These are battlegrounds we do not do well at historically. I will pull back from endorsing the idea that the Provincial Soliciter General or Emergency Management fund extra supplies and manpower for DOMOPS, rather that money should be added to our budget in the sure knowledge that it will _also_ improve the combat capabilities of the augmented units. We also need to be clear as to how much we can and should do in DOMOPS scenarios. 31 CBGHQ is working on our own plan, which stresses the limited nature of support available. The seacans of supplies and extra manpower would make a big difference to us, but in the bigger scheme of things, is would be an extra teacup to drain the Great Lakes.


----------



## Kirkhill

I completely agree the question of ownership is a critical one,  but it is essentially an administrative one.  It is one that can and should be dealt with when there is time for debate and not in the middle of a couple of competing crises. 

I also am in agreement with the observation we traditionally haven't handled those types of questions well (although SAR services seem to be functioning) and also that we need a realistic White Paper based on doable options with firm decisions taken.

Once folks know what they have to deal with, atts, dets and own forces as well as budget, then they will figure out the best way to use them.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

> 31 CBGHQ is working on our own plan, which stresses the limited nature of support available.



What do you think of CONPLAN RAPTOR?   (It was issued on my watch :-\)   Is the Bde happy with the increased Liaison and Planning authority?   How are you incoporating the "Community Contingency Planners" :


----------



## pbi

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> What do you think of CONPLAN RAPTOR?   (It was issued on my watch :-\)   Is the Bde happy with the increased Liaison and Planning authority?   How are you incoporating the "Community Contingency Planners" :



WRT to these "CCP", in our Bde in particular and in LFWA in general it was made quite clear that the original idea from the LFRR shop was poorly thought out. We do not need to provide military personnel to civil authorities to "help" them plan for emergencies. In most provinces, municipalities are required by law to have a plan and a designated lead person (usually the Fire or Police Chief). As well, becoming intimately involved in civilian agency planning before a request has been made violates one of our tenets of Dom Ops:   avoid creating expectations or committments we may not be able to honour at the moment. We already have quite adequate planning staff in the Bde HQ, sufficient to prepare the generic, capability-based type of CONPLAN that is (IMHO) the most appropriate form of Dom Ops planning in the absence of a specific request. We are not "front row" on emergency response nor do we have any mandate to be except _in extremis_.

The direction we have taken is to use them as Regional LOs who will augment the four Provincial Dom Ops dets (Victoria, Edmn, Regina, Wpg) on an "as required" basis, but will continue to train and parade with the units. They will receive some basic LO /Dom Ops trg (Dom Ops is not hte "rocket science some would have us believe...) and be ready to go.  In our Bde in particular we do not have such a richness of officers that we can have "floaters" who do nothing but sit about waiting for civil emergencies. Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

I am actually working on some of the implementation of CONPLAN RAPTOR, but many issues still have to be ironed out. We should be putting it to the test in the near future, and if possible, I will start a new thread to share the "open source" lessons learned stuff.


----------



## bossi

pbi said:
			
		

> WRT to these "CCP", in our Bde in particular and in LFWA in general it was made quite clear ...



Glad to hear that articulated by somebody who has a better chance of being listened to ...


----------



## pbi

bossi said:
			
		

> Glad to hear that articulated by somebody who has a better chance of being listened to ...



What is LFCA's take on the CCPs? Cheers.


----------



## MSE_OP18

An 11 Ton VHLVW can't really replace a SHLVW(16 Ton) as most of the containers we carry now are getting closer to the 16 Ton weight capacity now , ISO, CP's and other mech shelters are not really going to get much lighter....are they? We cannot forget heavy lift capability. Other then that I like the! plan


----------



## ArmyRick

Getting away from MSE specifics here is my idea for army structure....
1. Bin the DFS regt idea (In LdSH) the wealth of equipment should be divided so that any brigade that gets assigned a mission won't have to "borrow" or task the FS gear soon to be in LdSH.
2. Go with 4 equla size brigades (1 out west, 2 in Pet, 4 in Gagetown and 5 in valcartier)
3. Have the LAV III remain with infantry, Coyote, LAV MGS, MMEV and TUA remain armor (direct fire capability), purchase the 120mm mortar and have the arty man those (The AC Delco AMS system looks good) and the engineers can stick with mobility/counter mobility roles using what ever gear they get.
4. Have 3 x Battalions of Infantry for each brigade, the third will be light and quick deployable battalion (Ditch this theater activation team out of kingston).
5. If you do the math, you must stand up one more REGT of infantry (The guards sound OK) and the 8th CH can be activated again.
6. Before people scream about tanks, arty guns and what ever, lets be realistic. We are in the CF and we KNOW why our equipment is what is and what it is going to be. (Hint the word "Tanks" were a scare tactic ofr a certain election in June).


----------



## ArmyRick

So more to follow..
4 x Brigades basically means 
4 x REGTs of INF w/3 x BN each (RCR, R22eR, PPCLI, Canadian Guards) Eric Leclerc would love that (He was originally a guard) !!!
4 x REGTs of Cavalry (Armour is kind of not appropriate) RCD, 12RBC, LdSH, 8thCH
4 x REgts of Arty (1,2,3 and 5 RCHA/RALC)
4 x CER, 4 x SVC BNs and 4 x FD AMBS


----------



## ArmyRick

My idea gives you in...
4 x Battle Groups capable of quick deployment
8 x Battle groups capable of sustained ops
So we could in theory deploy easily 3 battle groups at a time and not burn out the army (i thinks anyways)..


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## pbi

MSE_OP18 said:
			
		

> An 11 Ton VHLVW can't really replace a SHLVW(16 Ton) as most of the containers we carry now are getting closer to the 16 Ton weight capacity now , ISO, CP's and other mech shelters are not really going to get much lighter....are they? We cannot forget heavy lift capability. Other then that I like the! plan



What do you guys think about HEMTT ("Hemm-It"), the SHLVW that the US uses? I see a few of them here at Bagram: pallet, POL, CFR, and semi-trailer with HIAB. Cheers.


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## a_majoor

1 "Special Forces" brigade, grouping valuable but hard to categorize units like JTF 2, CF DART and a Cyberwar unit. (add own favorite specialty units here). Core fighting power should be the "Canadian Parachute Battalion", created by bringing all the para assets under one canopy. (couldn't resist)

1 Regular Force Brigade/Area with one Light Infantry Battalion (maybe upgraded to an Airmobile Battalion), and three "Manoeuvre Battalions": composite formations resembling current battlegroups, but all under one "cap badge" for organizational and esprit de corps reasons. (If it makes traditionalists happy, the "cap badge" could be the current one, even though "I PPCLI" and the "LdSH(RC)" under this plan would have the same TO&E).

The Reserves expanded to 3 brigades/Area, with similar TO&E to the Regular force brigade, but with the added responsibility of Home Defense; and the appropriate "Home Defense package" of extra equipment and manpower to respond to a local crisis within 12 hr. Equipment holdings might be limited and pooled to each Area Training Centre for a singel battlegroup worth of kit (not ideal, but financially doable)

The whole Army supported by a flexible and strong logistics backbone, which is decentralized and responsive.

The Navy configured with the core capability of transporting a brigade battle group and all its equipment as a package from either coast to the AOR, defending the package in transit and supporting the package ashore with AAD, NGS and command and control until they are firmly established. These defense and support capabilities are transferable to Naval operations when the Expeditionary force is not being assembled and sent out, joining other specialist capabilities and ships which are required for Naval operations.

The Air Force organized into "Air expeditionary wings", one per Area, and sized to provide tactical and operational support for a deployed battlegroup. Once again, most of the capabilities needed to support the expeditionary force can be used when not deployed. A Strategic support wing is also required to support the Air expeditionary wings, and a "Special Forces Wing" is needed to support the Special Forces brigade.

HQ's at Brigade and above levels should be intrinsically "Joint HQ's", to promote interoperability and flexibility.


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## Infanteer

Since we're playing "CDS" for a day, I'll agree with alot of what A Majoor has said.  I don't have the energy to give the little specific quirks from my "shopping list", put the principle of force structure should be EXPEDITIONARY...anything (meaning equipment and planning structure) that is sits in war-stocks, can't be moved and supported properly, or is geared towards _augmenting and mobilizing_ is simply preparing for the last war and is a drag on the limited resources we have.

Every dollar should be focused into the ability to quickly project flexible combat power to whatever flavour-of-the-week is in the National Interest.


----------



## pbi

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Since we're playing "CDS" for a day, I'll agree with alot of what A Majoor has said. I don't have the energy to give the little specific quirks from my "shopping list", put the principle of force structure should be EXPEDITIONARY...anything (meaning equipment and planning structure) that is sits in war-stocks, can't be moved and supported properly, or is geared towards _augmenting and mobilizing_ is simply preparing for the last war and is a drag on the limited resources we have.
> 
> Every dollar should be focused into the ability to quickly project flexible combat power to whatever flavour-of-the-week is in the National Interest.


Infanteer: I certainly agree with your emphasis on being expeditionary, but I caution against too zealous an application of 





> or is geared towards _augmenting and mobilizing_ is simply preparing for the last war and is a drag on the limited resources we have.


. This was, in a manner, the sort of thinking that led to the degradation and ruination of the Army Reserve in the 1960s and 70s, as being an obsolete appendage to the "come as you are" war. As the US has found (remembered...) in Iraq and Afghanistan, a nation must posess the ability to augment and mobilize its standing forces in order to deal with the unexpected or protracted operation. One could argue that the US may have gone overboard in the shifting of resources into the USAR and ARNG, but the fact is that they are now drawing very heavily on  both in what began as two expeditionary campaigns.

I am all for a capable, joint expeditionary force package: the "CJEF" if you will, but let's not fall into the traps of the past. Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Sorry, my statement was geared towards the Regular Force, I should have made that caveat more clear.  When I envision an expeditionary force, I picture something akin to the USMC of "three-block-war" fame; capable of patrolling the mean streets of Haiti or fighting a conventional battle into Baghdad.

The Reserves should be geared towards a homeland defence roll (I would consider building an Army up for 3 years in the British Isles while waiting to kick in the door of the Third Reich to be "Homeland Defence".)- we must be wary of using "Homeland Defence" to turn the reserves into a volunteer firefighter/snowshovel brigade or something else _al la_ the 1950's when ground forces were thought to be obsolete.  As well, I think the current policy of seeing the Reserves as a "farm team" is like sitting adrift with no sail, give the Reservists a mission.

The Regular Force is for the "Cabinet Wars" while the Reserves come for the "National Wars".

http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_092404,00.html


----------



## pbi

Ok, I'm with you, except for:



> As well, I think the current policy of seeing the Reserves as a "farm team" is like sitting adrift with no sail, give the Reservists a mission



The Reserve has three very important roles now: Augment the Regular Force, Provide a Base for Mobilization and Connect with Canadians.Under the first two fall deployment on Intl Ops, training for combat, and being ready to take on Home Defence or other domestic ops.

Now, those aren't nice tight little mission packages with grid references and timings, but to what extent is that really practical, or even desireable? How do you give a fixed "mission", when the nature of a Reserve is to deal with the unexpected that the standing force is unable to? What degree of specificity are you looking for?

Hey....wait a minute.......I think we've debated this somewhere else already.....?

Cheers.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> The Navy configured with the core capability of transporting a brigade battle group and all its equipment as a package from either coast to the AOR, defending the package in transit and supporting the package ashore with AAD, NGS and command and control until they are firmly established. These defense and support capabilities are transferable to Naval operations when the Expeditionary force is not being assembled and sent out, joining other specialist capabilities and ships which are required for Naval operations.



*Sigh*  : still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.


----------



## NavyGrunt

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> *Sigh*   : still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.



Yup thats our only use EX. Delivery........say do you Army blokes need extra cheese?


----------



## Infanteer

Reading Clay Blair's definitive history on the U-Boat campaign, I was interested in reading how the Royal Navy had become intoxicated with Mahan's notion of the Decisive Battle at Sea, essentially Clausewitz on the water.  This infatuation, Blair ably argues, was one of the reason the Brits had a tough time in dealing with the U-Boat threat in both Wars; they forgot that their prime mission was to protect British trade.  Blair writes:

_"[they] postulated that control of the seas could most effectively be insured by husbanding naval assets for a single, decisive, offensive naval battle with the enemy; they opposed the diversion of naval resources to convoying, which they viewed as mundane and defensive and which, if adopted, would be an admission that Britain had, in effect, lost control of the seas to an inferior naval power."_

Now, this is an honest question to you guys in the ships.  What do you feel that the prime role of Navy should be?  How can it best contribute to furthering National Interests?  Granted there are some independent operations that would fall on to the Navy (fighting pirates or smugglers), but in thinking "joint operations", how can the Navy best contribute.

In our uniquely Canadian situation, does having a Grand Fleet of cruisers and aircraft carriers looking for Gotterdammerung on the high seas in order to command the oceans seem like the ideal goal?  Or does having a fleet that is able to adequately protect itself from subsurface, surface, and air threats while independently projecting Canadian ground and air power into the places they need to be sound better.  Obviously, when the role of transport/sustainment/support of an expeditionary force is proposed, it doesn't mean floating yellow taxis.  Naturally, there is a certain level of proficiency and capability required to move this kind of hardware - just look at the Marine Task Groups.

Honestly though, I'm interested to hear about what you guys think about the future roles of the Navy and how it should fit into a joint context to execute defence policy.  You are the guys that work on the things day-in and day-out, so maybe your experiences will point out some important details I may have missed.

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## Infanteer

pbi said:
			
		

> Hey....wait a minute.......I think we've debated this somewhere else already.....?



Maybe I missed that one.

Anyways, when I say farm team I mean "We need X guys for 3 Platoon..."

I am a firm believer in deploying formed reserve platoons and companies on operations on a volunteer basis if the situation demands; I was part of the militia experience in ROTO 11 and I thought it worked well.  It is a great way to get more experience to the reserve units.

When I say mission, I mean for the Reserves as a whole.  Is the Reserves really optimized with company-sized regiments in paper Brigades waiting to be called to arms and farming out its services in the meantime?  Is their an alternative structure and approach to mission that would better serve both Reservists and their communities?  Right now, I'm kinda prone to some stuff Kirkhill had been throwing around regarding a local all-arms military presence.  Something like the Canadian Rangers or the Aussie Pilbara guys, only for our provinces - the RAF was a neat model.  Anyways, I'm just throwing ideas into the sky.  If you can link me to the discussion I missed, I can join in.

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## pbi

> Sigh*    still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.



If that is an accurate representation of the Navy attitude towards becoming part of a joint force instead of refighting the Battle of the Atlantic all over again, I am afraid we are not going to make much progress amongst the three services. Being an effective part of a joint CEF does not mean being "a glorified taxi service", as I think we have already pointed out in a few posts. Modern surface and subsurface combatants, an air defense capability and capable naval aviation are all a part of that package, as far as I can see. Cheers.


----------



## pbi

> Anyways, when I say farm team I mean "We need X guys for 3 Platoon..."
> 
> I am a firm believer in deploying formed reserve platoons and companies on operations on a volunteer basis if the situation demands; I was part of the militia experience in ROTO 11 and I thought it worked well.   It is a great way to get more experience to the reserve units



It is a bit difficult to progress beyond this level of things when, short of an Order in Council, we have no effective means of mobilizing Reserve units for deployed operations. As long as our Res remains a wholly volunteer thing, we are IMHO going to struggle with "who gets off the bus". However, to be fair to the Res, they have stepped up admirably and in a manner that few expected. Kudos to them.



> When I say mission, I mean for the Reserves as a whole.   Is the Reserves really optimized with company-sized regiments in paper Brigades waiting to be called to arms and farming out its services in the meantime?



OK-now----are you talking about their mission, or the way they are organized? If it's mission, I've already stated my case. If it's organization, then I do believe some changes can be made. As a example (_Oh..here he goes with his stupid Bde again.......)_ we have put forward two proposals under LFRR to achieve "tactical grouping with a view to amalgamation" amongst our three Arty units and our three Service Battalions, so that instead of an unsustainable command structure, we have a single unit HQ in one location, and sub-units (or sub-sub-units) in all of the current locations(End state one Svc Bn, one Arty unit). No fewer soldiers, no less equipment, no less capability, no closed locations: just less command overhead which we very clearly cannot sustain.

Surprisingly,we built a strong consensus of support within our Bde on both these proposals, including amongst our Hons. The enemy was an external one: Reserve 2000 immediately attacked us (in an extremely ill-informed and unprofessional manner that showed what their true relevance is....) and threatened us with all manner of   damnation and destruction.

The funny thing is that both these proposals were about seven or eight years old in our Bde. as an aside, I can recall, as a Sgt in RRegtC in the late 1970's agreeing heatedly in the Mess with all my Sgt buddies that we needed a single strong Inf battalion in Toronto Militia District, not five weak ones. As we know, nothing came of it. IMHO this is because organizations such as R2000 (despite the good they have undoubtedly achieved) have waged such a fear/smear campaign that for years they effectvely paralyzed the ability to think rationally about the structure of our Army Reserve. Why is amalgamation such a nasty word? After all, many of the Res units that exist today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA seems to survive almost endless amalgamations. Is it because of a general mistrust of any change at all? (Perhaps not without historical justification....) Or is it actually just parochialism?

In any case, I think that many serving Res soldiers today would buy into an intelligent, respectful process of amalgamation provided that it clearly led to greater Res capability, not to less. I am quite sure we can achieve this goal. Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

> No fewer soldiers, no less equipment, no closed locations: just less command overhead which we very clearly cannot sustain.



I think I proposed something very similar to that months ago on a thread; I'll see if I can find it.   Needless to say, I agree with that proposal.


----------



## pbi

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I think I proposed something very similar to that months ago on a thread; I'll see if I can find it.  Needless to say, I agree with that proposal.



Excellent. Now-what do the rest of the folks out there think? Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Found it (Looking at it, I seem to be contradicting some of the things I've proposed, I'll have to go through all my ideas again and redefine my thought process  8)):

http://army.ca/forums/threads/16950.30.html


Anyways, what are we all going to yak about...boats or reservists?


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## Edward Campbell

Well, OK, in the _*ADM Policy for a day*_ mode (force structure is *not* the CDS' job: _how much? how many? what kit? configured how?_ are questions which, in our system of government, are asked and answered by civilians: asked by politicians and answered by mandarins - some from the defence department, others (the really important ones) from treasury/finance and the Privy Council Office. They seek _some_ (not too much) _advice_ from the CDS and his colleagues but more from retired officers/professors and analysts in think tanks.   It is the same in Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark and in the UK and the USA, too.

As DND's ADM Policy I tell the Clerk of the Privy Council and the DM of Finance that I want:

"¢	A strategic intelligence gathering service - based, as now, on CSE - which shares intelligence with key allies: Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States and cooperates, to a lesser degree with lesser allies: NATO, etc;

"¢	In cooperation with the United States: a continental surveillance, target acquisition, identification, interception and _*combat*_ force which can detect, identify and deal with intruders - space based, airborne and seaborne which enter the _approaches_ to the continent we share;

"¢	Two 'blue water' joint task forces which can project Canadian power anywhere in the world, on fairly short notice and for protracted periods - several destroyers/frigates/oilers and long range patrol aircraft and, whenever possible, land based combat aircraft ;

"¢	Two 'blue water' joint task forces which can project Canadian power *ashore* - essentially combat ships, big (35,000+/- ton) landing ships, amphibious battle groups (maybe 1,000-1,500 soldiers each) and VSTOL fighter/bombers.   These two forces must be able to conduct low intensity operations for protracted periods on a unilateral basis - no US support - and they must be able to join allies in mid (and after preparation) high intensity operations;

"¢	A quick reaction - air mobile/airborne - formation with supporting transport aircraft (including dedicated heavy lift helicopters) and VSTOL fighter bombers, which can deploy on unilateral low intensity missions and mid (even high, after preparation) intensity operations, like the amphibious forces;

"¢	An expeditionary brigade - motorized/mechanized - the leading elements of which can be deployed within a very, very few weeks to relieve/reinforce either the amphibious or air assault joint forces.   This formation would train to fight as a formation within a larger allied force;

"¢	Home defence and reserve forces - full time and part time - for, especially, search and rescue, internal security/_Aid of (to) the Civil Power_, civil assistance and disaster relief, vital point security, coastal/fisheries patrol, Arctic patrol, individual augmentation, and, and, and ... nearly _ad infinitum_, as is always the case for 'reserves;' and

"¢	A defence base consisting of 3rd line logistical resources, bases, dockyardss, schools, etc.

I think we need 60,000+/- people in permanent force (full time) _operational_ units: ships, regiments and battalions, flying squadrons (including full time 'reserve' ships and units), dockyards, flying bases, joint HQs, etc.   I suspect we need another 30,000+/- in a variety of logistics, support and command and control elements and 40,000+/- civil servants supporting the 90,000+/- permanent force and, maybe, 30,000 part time people. I think it can all be had for about 2% of our $1 Trillion GDP: about $20+ Billion per year, plus *real* defence industry inflation plus a bit of real growth, year after year and decade after decade ...


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## Ex-Dragoon

The navy has no problem with joint ops its when other branches feel we should concentrate on providing lift at the expense of combat ability is when we get annoyed. Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so. However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities. From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.


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## Kirkhill

Ex-Dragoon

I think some of the miscommunications comes from both sides defending their own end too fiercely.  Understandable when the budget is short but ultimately unhelpful.

While I have come around to understand your position on multi-use platforms and the need for Area Air Defense, I still get the feeling that some 'blue suiters" have a gut level problem with supplying taxis and taxi drivers.

The unfortunate thing is that we need taxis and their drivers and those jobs probably won't be as good a path to promotion as perhaps subs and frigates are.

I am drawn to this conclusion by the fact that as DJL said in the AAD thread "steel is cheap and air is free", and on the pricing of "transport ships" from the US, Australia, Britain, Spain, France that we could easily get what we need,  unarmed motor barges essentially, at a cost of 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 Dollars apiece.  The Brit/Dutch/Spanish vessels are about 160,000,000 each and a USNS Bob Hope vessel is 250,000,000 USD according to McGregor in Transformation Under Fire.  3 or 4 vessels of that type, manned by a couple of full time crews of 50-60, 3 or 4 reserve crews and some top up reservists specializing in bolt on point defence systems, would not take an incredibly large chunk out of the Navy's budget.  Especially if you consider a vessel life in excess of 40 years.  (Fearless and Intrepid were commissioned in the 60's and are just now being decommissioned by the RN).

One of the vessels could be permanently manned for humanitarian assistance and to possibly acting as a floating command post (bolt on CP) for units ashore.  The other units would be manned by reservists for the duration of a crisis and wouldn't hang around in a war zone.  Get in, get out, come home, reload if required.

If you got your bluewater task force, which I agree is needed, then that taskforce could supply in-transit defence to the "motor barges".

Cheers,


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> Now, this is an honest question to you guys in the ships.   What do you feel that the prime role of Navy should be?   How can it best contribute to furthering National Interests?   Granted there are some independent operations that would fall on to the Navy (fighting pirates or smugglers), but in thinking "joint operations", how can the Navy best contribute.


Sorry Infanteer missed this one. Any element should maximize their combat potential first and foremost. That is what we train to do, we are no different then the infanteer who goes over section battle drills or the fighter pilot who learns to dogfight. Sailors are trained to fight their ship. As a navy, the JSS is the right way to go because it combines replenishment at sea and sealift in 3 hulls. It does not solve the problem of carrying vast quantities of troops and vehicles but its the step in the right direction. Let us get proficent at that first before looking at LPDs, LHDs etc. We have several aspects of naval warfare we need to get good at again before we even move into a new one carrying troops. Getting the subs back up and running for one another is getting enough payloads for the MCDVs. We desperately need the 280s replaced and its capbilities retained.



> In our uniquely Canadian situation, does having a Grand Fleet of cruisers and aircraft carriers looking for Gotterdammerung on the high seas in order to command the oceans seem like the ideal goal?   Or does having a fleet that is able to adequately protect itself from subsurface, surface, and air threats while independently projecting Canadian ground and air power into the places they need to be sound better.


Your second option is what the navy is striving for.



> Obviously, when the role of transport/sustainment/support of an expeditionary force is proposed, it doesn't mean floating yellow taxis.   Naturally, there is a certain level of proficiency and capability required to move this kind of hardware - just look at the Marine Task Groups.


I don't have a problem with the expeditionary role. What I do have a problem with is when people decide we don't need this and that so we can be focus more on being a transport force vice combat force. Look at all the posts here from members that feel we do not need subs or the 280s. While an important mission, what would it do to morale if we went to an all transport force for the navy. No army type seems to care about what sailors think, they just care on whether or not we can get them from Point A to Point B.

The navy is a firm believer in joint ops, we do it all the time with the air force. We have built up a lot of respect in MIO, Boarding Ops, Escorting USN ARGs and CVBGs. Do you really want us to lose that?


----------



## pbi

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> The navy has no problem with joint ops its when other branches feel we should concentrate on providing lift at the expense of combat ability is when we get annoyed. Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so. However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities. From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.





> Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so.



The fact is that given our likely resource limitations, all services may have to give up some favourite gear or mission in order to achieve transformation. Tanks and SP arty come to mind in the Army. 



> However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities



But what are you basing that statement on? Who is "the Army" in this case?



> From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.



I'm not sure what the difference is. I cannot imagine a truly useful CJEF that lacked a naval combat capability, as   I mentioned above. How are you distinguishing between "combat" and "expeditionary"? "Combat" to achieve what objective, as opposed to the projection of power (however modest that may be) in the service of a particular national aim, that is represented by a CJEF?

Maybe parochialism isn't just a "brown" problem. Cheers.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> The fact is that given our likely resource limitations, all services may have to give up some favourite gear or mission in order to achieve transformation. Tanks and SP arty come to mind in the Army.


So because you lost something (which most naval personnel would agree was a stupid decsion) that the navy/airforce might? What if the goverment decided the army should be an all infantry force and the air force should scrap all of its CF18s?



> But what are you basing that statement on? Who is "the Army" in this case?


Look at the some of the posts here. People that while well meaning feel we should get out of the sub business all together without having a clue about naval warfare. I have yet to see any sailor advocate the army or air force get rid of a piece like the army has for the navy.

By expeditionary I mean vessels constructed for transport and support of ground troops

As for inferring I have a narrow minded view there is no need to be insulting. I have never advocated nor supported cutting capabilities (in any element) whereas you see no problem with it.


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## McG

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> By expeditionary I mean vessels constructed for transport and support of ground troops


Would this include fire support to ground forces and theater air defence?



			
				Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I have never advocated nor supported cutting capabilities (in any element) whereas you see no problem with it.


Is it simply a matter of cutting one elements capabilities over another's?  . . . or, is it about trading one set of capabilities for a set of new capabilities?


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

No because I am looking at the USMC model and that is provided by the USN cruisers and destroyers that get assigned to an ARG, it is not integral. USN also man the LHDs, LPDs and the myriad of other amphibs.


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## McG

In that case, I would agree that looking at the Navy only as a means of transport is close minded.  However, I do think there is room to expand the Cbt Sp capabilities of our Navy (and possibly its strategic striking capabilities).  I think this would be a natural preference for someone in the Army.  However, as the token naval dude, would you rather retain subs or increase your inland reach?


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## Ex-Dragoon

Without question retain a submarine capability.


----------



## a_majoor

I am sorry if my post implied the Navy is the Taxi service for the Joint Expeditionary Force. Perhaps a better way to look at is is the Navy requires sufficient combat capability to perform power projection missions across the ocean, while also supporting the "U-Haul" function of transporting the battlegroup and supporting them ashore. That will define the size of the fleet (more platforms for Mine counter measures, AAD, NGS, surveillance and so on).

I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?

Pbi's other point about stripping away excessive overhead is well taken. When reading the LFRR Phase 2 briefing packages, the implications were pretty clear to me. In my brigade, we would go from having six company+ sized Infantry "Regiments" to six companies within a notional "31 Infantry Brigade". Collapsing all the various units into sub-units of a larger organization (31 Infantry Bn, 31 Armoured Regt, 31 Artillery Regt, 31 SVC BN and 31 CER) results in reducing LCol's, RSM's and Staffs from the current 15 to five. For esprit de corps reasons, the companies/squadrons/batteries might retain the historical titles in their unit designations (A/31 "Essex and Kent Company").

On a larger scale, the Brigade headquarters and Joint Expeditionary Force HQs will also need reforming, using modern communications and "reach back" capabilities to tie into national level assets when needed, rather than carry a lot of staff and equipment around. Database development and "distributed programming" (think of a military Kazzaa or Napster for finding information on the DWAN) will help reduce the possibility of "decapitation" by an enemy armed with WMD.  Other organizational changes to reduce "overhead" are also urgently needed to speed up the pace of information flow, and free up funds for the "sharp end".


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## Ex-Dragoon

Agreed a majoor. That would work for us.


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## McG

I once read an observation that unification resulted in administrative unification only and that it failed in its intent to produce what we now know as "jointness."   But at the same time, some of unification's successes have been undone.   I believe that the helicopters should be placed back under the command of the forces that employ them (the pilot would remain an Air MOC, but the airframes and crews should be commanded by the guys that employ them).

This would see Tac Hel under Land Forces Comd and Maritime Helos under Maritime Comd.


----------



## pbi

> So because you lost something (which most naval personnel would agree was a stupid decsion) that the navy/airforce might? What if the goverment decided the army should be an all infantry force and the air force should scrap all of its CF18s?



I am not doing a very good job of expressing myself. However,I think you may be putting the wrong spin on it: you are depicting suggestions (that I haven't actually made, BTW...) that the Navy consider any loss of a particular capability as being motivated by narrow-minded pouting vengeance on the part of the Army, because "the government" took the Army's toys away. The force structure and equipment changes in the Army are almost all internal decisions, mostly driven by the last CLS. "The government" has contributed little of any substance to the Army Transformation program, except to choke the Army for funding (much as it has all the Services) and to studiously avoid any national strategic guidance that might help with Army. That is one of the reasons that we are looking forward to a proper   Foreign Policy/Defense Review, although in the Army's case the Transformation train is already leaving the station.



> Look at the some of the posts here. People that while well meaning feel we should get out of the sub business all together without having a clue about naval warfare. I have yet to see any sailor advocate the army or air force get rid of a piece like the army has for the navy.



I agree with you-they may be ill informed. But they really aren't "_the Army_"-they are some Army people who think that way. On your second point, I could challenge you by asking you to what extent the Navy(in general) even thinks about the Army (in general)? Maybe the reason "The Navy" has not proposed   changes to the Army (in a joint force package) is not because the Navy has any particular regard for the Army, but because it simply does not care. Maybe it has focused on ASW to the exclusion of anything else, as a default occupation, because it no longer has any other significant capability? Much as some people in the Army would have us focus on "peacekeeping" to the exclusion of preparation for war: equally a "default" occupation.

 Do you support developing a CJEF, if it means de-emphasis on "classic" naval actions(ie: independent formations of surface and subsurface combatants manoeuvring and engaging independently in order to achieve a naval decision?) As a soldier I support developing a CJEF, even if it means a de-emphasis on heavy forces for the Army (almost a throwaway, because we are on our way there now...).


----------



## DJL

> I am drawn to this conclusion by the fact that as DJL said in the AAD thread "steel is cheap and air is free", and on the pricing of "transport ships" from the US, Australia, Britain, Spain, France that we could easily get what we need,   unarmed motor barges essentially, at a cost of 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 Dollars apiece.   The Brit/Dutch/Spanish vessels are about 160,000,000 each and a USNS Bob Hope vessel is 250,000,000 USD according to McGregor in Transformation Under Fire.   3 or 4 vessels of that type, manned by a couple of full time crews of 50-60, 3 or 4 reserve crews and some top up reservists specializing in bolt on point defence systems, would not take an incredibly large chunk out of the Navy's budget.   Especially if you consider a vessel life in excess of 40 years.   (Fearless and Intrepid were commissioned in the 60's and are just now being decommissioned by the RN).



Kirkhill, here's an option that might intrest you (intrested me):

http://peos.crane.navy.mil/futureships/MPF(F)/MPF.htm

IMHO, a hybrid RO/RO such as this, could be within the CF's reach based on only a slight increase in the current budget.



> No because I am looking at the USMC model and that is provided by the USN cruisers and destroyers that get assigned to an ARG, it is not integral. USN also man the LHDs, LPDs and the myriad of other amphibs.



Here's a link to the Wasp's website which might make a little more sense of what Ex-Dragoon is saying:

http://www.wasp.navy.mil/

Now if you scroll down and look to the left, you will see which ships make up the Wasp's strike group.

Notice:

1 688 nuke boat
1 Burke destroyer
2 Ticonderoga cruisers
1 LSD
1 LPD

And of course the WASP.(I won't bring up the supply train)


----------



## a_majoor

Unification; Jointness; Imperial Defense Council, these are mostly words of the week to describe very similar concepts. The real "sticking point" is tribalism, as was noted a few posts back. The main reason 31 CBGHQ is  NOT lording over 31 Inf Bn and the rest of the 31 battlegroup is the well justified fear that Regimental Senates and Associations will scream bloody murder. The response might be just short of HQ personell being beheaded on Al Jazeera by enraged former CO's (although a few current CO's might be thinking along those lines...step back sir...sir...)

For now LFRR Phase 2 remains a slick briefing package, and there seems to be no mandate to pull the trigger on the full implimentation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks DJL,  looks more in line with what I was thinking about.  Even a large freighter with LASH capability (Lighter Aboard Ship - big ship carries small shallow draft boats that can land cargo ashore (a commercial not military vessel)) would do.

I can't see an amphibious assault capability in the Canadian Navy anytime soon.  And I am not convinced we need that.  We just need transport.

For comparison, the C17 is not armed and costs so much that both the USAF and the RAF prefer to fly into ports where there is no or very little threat.  I can't see my way clear to understanding why we cant acquire ships to operate in similar environments.

Cheers.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> We just need transport.


I think we need more than this.  In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force.


----------



## pbi

> We just need transport.


No! This is exactly what Ex-Dragoon has complained of: reducing the Navy to a barge service. This is not jointness at all: An Army does not need a Navy to operate barges: the US Army Quartermaster Corps has its own barge and tugboat service. We need a Navy that is an equal and capable combatant partner in a joint force package that includes the ability to project land force ashore without immediate access to a port facility. This does not imply "Iwo Jima", rather a degree of flexibility.



> I think we need more than this.   In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force



Roger that. Cheers.


----------



## DJL

> Thanks DJL,  looks more in line with what I was thinking about.  Even a large freighter with LASH capability (Lighter Aboard Ship - big ship carries small shallow draft boats that can land cargo ashore (a commercial not military vessel)) would do.



I think the US military sealift command looked at that in the early 80s and decided that in most senarios a conventional Ro/Ro (with mexe-float like barges) would do (In most cases, it's easier to load and unload). With that said, I think they operate a couple barge carriers for outsized cargos.


----------



## Kirkhill

OK poorly put.   I will try again.

I agree with the need for Bluewater capabilities.   I agree with the need for the current force structure, subs and all.   I can see the need for the AAD destroyers and the command capability.   I   agree with all of the above. 

What I am trying to say, and maybe you are all understanding this and I am still not getting it, what I am trying to say that the next capability we (the nation) need is the ability to transport land forces from here to there.

While LHA/LHD/LPDs would be very nice at the prices that are involved, the manpower that is involved, the additional systems that are involved would require a MASSIVE increase in the naval budget alone.   Here I agree with Ex-Dragoon as well.

We can buy the transport capability at a considerably cheaper price so that the Navy can afford to buy the Blue Water fleet that we really need and maybe also the Inshore fleet that we need as well.

I don't imagine turning the entire Navy into Taxi Drivers, but no matter how you dress it up we still need Taxi Drivers and if the Navy doesn't supply them, amongst the other jobs they do then who will drive them?   Do we need a separate Lift service that drives both the Air and Sea Taxis?

LPD-17 San Antonios cost over 1 Billion Dollars each and require a 400 man crew and would get used infrequently
Rotterdam/Bay LSDs cost about 150-200,000,000 each and require a 50-120 man crew and would get used infrequently.

Either one of them would also require the task group referred to by Ex-Dragoon and DJL to give us over the horizon assault capability.

Frankly I don't see that happening.    I would love to be wrong.

But if I am right .... as far as I am concerned better half a loaf than none.   At least there would be some circumstances we could get troops to foreign lands and get them back.

Not a Navy OF Taxi Drivers.   A Navy WITH Taxi Drivers.

Cheers.


----------



## DJL

> I think we need more than this.   In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force.



Aside from an aircraft carrier, I tend to think that many of those needs could be solved with about 4-6 of these:

http://peos.crane.navy.mil/ddg51/default.htm

All we need is about 4-6 billion dollars   :-



> No! This is exactly what Ex-Dragoon has complained of: reducing the Navy to a barge service. This is not jointness at all: An Army does not need a Navy to operate barges: the US Army Quartermaster Corps has its own barge and tugboat service. We need a Navy that is an equal and capable combatant partner in a joint force package that includes the ability to project land force ashore without immediate access to a port facility. This does not imply "Iwo Jima", rather a degree of flexibility.



I tend to agree, with (relatively) small investment of a few billion dollars, we could have a few capable assault ships and the inherited ability to deploy, land and support a battalion sized group. We just need the money, will and leadership......


----------



## REZTEEN

i must say this. we must make sure that we are prepard for what ever this new century can throw at us. cause i would be humilated to have the yanks to the dirty work for us if something was to happen to us. i would like there help but we must make sure we are ready. that means the right training, leadership, eqiutment, man power, support of the public, the big one MONEY. we must the Money to do what we have to.


----------



## McG

The employment of UAVs should also be considered as part of the joint force structure.   These are valuable at sea and on land.   Where possible, ship based UAVs should support both enviroments.


----------



## pbi

Speaking of UAVs!!! I attended a meeting this afternoon here in CJTF76 at which a new min-UAV was discussed. This system, which is being trialled here, is so light it is launched by throwing it, like a model aircraft. It can easily be carried by a single soldier as an individual load, and provides real time video. The discussion revolved around the use of the system as a coy/bn level "pet UAV" To me, this is something that we need to pay close attention to under the ISTAR area of interest. Fascinating stuff! Cheers.


----------



## Edward Campbell

McG said:
			
		

> I think we need more than this.   In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power ... as part of a joint force.



This is the correct start point.

From a *policy* perspective we want to:

"¢	Be able to fight - in mid to high intensity operations if necessary; but

"¢	Avoid combat by _projecting_ our power and, therefore, showing our willingness and ability to fight, if necessary and alongside allies.

It isn't just the Navy which must be able to do this - although _power projection_ is, traditionally, their primary domain.   The army and air force must also be built and maintained to be parts of joint and combined (multi-national) forces which can and will project power - and use it, too, if it becomes necessary.


----------



## Inch

You guys were busy, too bad I was in ground school all day!




			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?



It's been said before what we need.   We don't have a problem having Taxi drivers amongst us since that's one of our current capabilities.   Strat airlift is lacking, Tac Airlift is not in a healthy state since the Hercs are in bad need of replacement and the Griffons can't do what we bought them to do.   As Ex-D said, the Navy and Air Force have been working jointly since unification and we integrate quite well. MH is a necessity, since the only thing a sub fears more than another sub is a Maritime Helo with 2 Mk46's. MH also provides utility flights for the Navy, SAR for a Task Group, we transfer NBP's (not as common now but once the Cyclone is in service it'll be more common place), we also provide the range and speed the Navy requires to see what's "out there". We're the eyes and ears for the fleet,   we extend the range of the ship's sensors.

It can be argued whether or not we need to be responsible for Domestic SAR, but since no one else can afford to provide the service, we get stuck with it. 

Now I could get into the rest of the capabilities, but to be honest, short of Strat airlift and more money so that we can be proficient at what we do (flying time costs money and regardless of what you non believers will say, flying is the only way to get flying experience, simulators can't do it all), we have all the capabilities we need to perform what our country asks us. We just need new aircraft to enhance our capabilities, technology has advanced and so must we if we want to be effective.

The biggest problem with kit for the Navy and Air Force is the price. There is nothing the Army can buy that will cost $100 million a pop. That's the reality of the Navy and Air Force.

As was already mentioned, even though everyone likes the way the Marine Corps works, the USN provides all the firepower to protect them. 

Cheers


----------



## bossi

pbi said:
			
		

> Speaking of UAVs!!! I attended a meeting at which a new min-UAV was discussed.  This system, which is being trialled, is so light it is launched by throwing it, like a model aircraft.  It can easily be carried by a single soldier as an individual load, and provides real time video.



Good - on Roto 0 we heard about them being used by an ABC ally - glad to hear the other colonials are catching up ... (chuckle)

The other version was described to me as being like a Frisbee ... thus I can only imagine the Aussie version, a Polaroid taped to a boomerang ... ?


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## a_majoor

Re mini-UAV's, I proposed getting some R/C model Predators, which even come with a digital camera: http://www.rctoys.com/predator.php and have an optional GPS module for long ranged flights w/o a dedicated pilot. I got a few strange looks on that one...

Question for Inch: since we don't have Aircraft carriers, what should we be doing to project tactical air power for the Joint Expeditionary Force? CF-18s have very short legs, but I can't really see us buying used F-15 Strike Eagles or Su-31's for long range tactical air power either. (Or should we be considering getting an entire new generation of aircraft?)

Question for the Navy people: How much of an advantage is going really fast. I see both the US Navy and Army have gotten INCAT "Wave Piercing Catamarines" with advertised speeds in the high 30 kts. This woudl certainly allow the package to get to  the AOR much faster than today, but what are the + and - sides of the equation?


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## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> (Or should we be considering getting an entire new generation of aircraft?)


Or perhaps a combat UAV?  Another option is GPS guided cruise missiles.


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## a_majoor

I am a fan of UAV/UACV's in theory, but as a practical matter, they are very small aircraft with limited ranges and payloads. A "Strike Eagle" could take off with a bomb load bigger than a WWII era B-17's, fly from Quatar to Afghanistan, do a bomb run and return with Air to Air refuelling.

I can imagine a CF-15E "Snow Eagle" capable of doing long range patrols over Canadian airspace, and being big enough to have useful secondary combat roles as well (CF-15E "Sea Eagle" capable of mounting attacks with air launched Harpoon missiles against hostile shipping in the 200 mile zone, for example).

Tactical UACV's would need some sort of aircraft carrier light to bring them within range of the AOR, perhaps another generation down the road for us, anyway.


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## DJL

> Question for the Navy people: How much of an advantage is going really fast. I see both the US Navy and Army have gotten INCAT "Wave Piercing Catamarines" with advertised speeds in the high 30 kts. This woudl certainly allow the package to get to  the AOR much faster than today, but what are the + and - sides of the equation?



The INCAT ferries are being looked at for transport at a inter-theater, not strategic level.

On the plus side they are fast........

On the down side, they have a limited payload.....


IMHO, we need to worry about the strategic level first.


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## pbi

bossi said:
			
		

> Good - on Roto 0 we heard about them being used by an ABC ally - glad to hear the other colonials are catching up ... (chuckle)
> 
> The other version was described to me as being like a Frisbee ... thus I can only imagine the Aussie version, a Polaroid taped to a boomerang ... ?



No-that is a different type. This resembles a model aircraft. Its intended purpose is very close aerial recce, to look along routes for ambushes, IEDs, enemy movement, etc. There does not seem to be any discussion about arming it. Apparently there is another type being trialled in Iraq that is considerably larger and resembles a flying saucer-perhaps that is what you are thinking.



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> Re mini-UAV's, I proposed getting some R/C model Predators, which even come with a digital camera: http://www.rctoys.com/predator.php and have an optional GPS module for long ranged flights w/o a dedicated pilot. I got a few strange looks on that one...



Yes- a majoor: I thought immediately about your very prescient article when this subject came up. You were on the money. IMHO, this capability is well witin our price and tech range. The scarier thing is that it is only a matter or time before baddies start to buy COTS systems or just COTS components and put their own UAVs (including UAIEDs) in the air. Maybe the point man in each section should carry a shotgun.... PULL!

Cheers.


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## enfield

Wow, there's a lot of great ideas and a lot of original work going on in this thread. Very impressive. 
The thread began with discussing overall defence policy, in the form of a White Paper, and has gotten more and more detailed. I'd like to back things up a bit to the macro, long-term strategic picture. 

First, I believe that in order to fullly move forward with a new military structure, two points need to be acknowledged. 
One, Canada is not, and will not be in the forseeable future, threatened by military force. Terrorism, crime, smuggling, etc., yes, but not military force. Hence, "national defence" or "homeland defence" - defending Canada itself - should not (and I argue has not been) a military priority, or something we should seriously prepare, plan, train for or invest in.  
Two, Canada will not be involved with a major world war, a Total War, a WW3, or large scale open combat, in the forseeable future. We will not be storming fortress europe, stopping the Red Army in Germany, and will not be operating divisions, corps, or drafting conscripts. Hence, anything do with "mobilization" needs to be erased from the military psyche, and the military needs to realize that when we fight, we fight as we come. No mobilization, no conscripts, no mass volunteers, no industrial mobilization, no Normandy's, Kurks, Stalingrads. 

Next we need to realistically look at our place in the world, who our allies are, and who potential threats will be. I would put forth thatthe Navy And Air Force will not be fulfilling their primary roles - the Navy will not be fighting blue water battles, escorting mass convoys, or hunting an enemy fleet on the open seas. The Air Force will not be engaged in air superiority operations over Canada, and will always, always be operating within a broader Coalition air package.  
So....
The Canadian Forces must focus itself as an expeditionary military organization, with the emphasis being on power projection and deployability. In this way we can act in national interests, fulfill overseas objectives set by the government, take part in coalition military action, and even act independetly if needed. 

I envision two types of expeditionary "packages", based around method of deployment: Maritime Expeditionary Force, and Airborne Expeditionary Force. the exact composition of such units (coys, weapons, vehicles) can be debated and has been looked at already. The broader picture and characteristics is what I'm getting at. 
Maritime- the usual, which has been discussed quite a bit, modelled on a MEU or a British ARG. Self-supporting, high firepower, deployable, sustainable.  
Airborne- smaller than the Maritime version, a Ranger/CAR type unit. 
It was stated earlier than airborne forces are no good to Canada because we can't supply them. I would challenge this since a) if an airfield is captured, we can use our own transport aircraft b) it is realistic to expect that we would have allied support, such as US re-supply.
I picture the Airborne unit as a bridgehead type force, meant to rapidly seize an area, do what it can (whether that be kill bad guys, hold vital facilities, or deliver aid) and await reinforcement by slower Cdn units or allied forces. The type of mission I'm envisioning for it would be a Kolwezi style mission, or perhaps a potential intervention in Rwanda or Sudan. Immediate reinforcement, or evacuation, is the key here. 

I picture the Maritime unit as being able to act independently with reinforcement or immediate resupply from Canada, maybe to as a spearhead for a UN mission (I'm thinking Brits in Sierra Leone, or USMC in Haiti-type mission here).

I would recommend keeping the 1/3 readiness cycle, and I doubt that Canada can reasonably be expected to maintain more than one maritime expeditionary unit at a time. The Airborne force would obviously be light, but the Maritime units would be mixed - enough armour (LAV3, Stryker, Direct Fore Gun Systems, etc) to be effective, but there is an obvious limit to what a ship can hold. 
So, I see one Battle Group (or brigade combat team..whatever fits in the ships) at sea, or assigned near or at the Navy facility. One has just returned, one is preparing to go. Thats three Battle Groups so far. Plus, we need more to fill out the regular peacekeeping and long-term ops (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Cyprus, etc). Nine seems like a good number, and gives some flexibility to the system, and the military stays teh same size. The Airborne (battalion size?) would remain outside of this cycle, and maintain its own readiness system - one company on 48 hours notice, another on 3 days, another on 6 days, etc. I see the two arms - water and air based - as complimentary, with personnel flowing between them, as two equal specialties. 

If we need to fight a larger war, one with a build up period, we can. If we we need to deploy fast, we can. If we need to deploy independently, the Maritime Unit can do it, if its close to sea. If not, Airborne may be an option. We need flexibility in the structure.

Air Force and Navy-
Exist to support the Army expeditionary forces. Make sure the unit gets to the area of ops safely, protects it in theatre, protects its withdrawal and return. For the Navy this means dominating and controlling the waters in the immediate areas of ops, right up to the beach and maybe even in coastal waters, and obviously operating marine assault ships. 
For the Air Force - well, Strategic Airlift is an obvious requirement. More to the point, I would seriously question expensive air superiority fighters that are difficult and costly to deploy. The Air Force needs to be able to support the troops on the ground overseas, and F-18s in Bagotville can't do that. I would rather see them flying Apaches or Super Cobras than fighters, if it means they can get to the theatre, probably aboard the expeditionary vessels. Harriers, or other VTOL aircarft, should also be looked at. In short, for what Canada will likely do in the future, helicopters have priority over Hornets.  

Sorry for the length, I realize much of this has been said before in different ways. Any thoughts on my initial points?


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## Inch

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Question for Inch: since we don't have Aircraft carriers, what should we be doing to project tactical air power for the Joint Expeditionary Force? CF-18s have very short legs, but I can't really see us buying used F-15 Strike Eagles or Su-31's for long range tactical air power either. (Or should we be considering getting an entire new generation of aircraft?)



I don't know that I'd go so far as to call an F-15E a "long range tactical air power", I could only find the ferry range on the USAF website and it's only about 100 miles more than the CF-18.   Combat range is certainly less since they tend to change the drop tanks for bombs, but I'd still say that they're not too far off each other. The truth is, there isn't a fighter in the world that can reach out and "touch" someone from our geographic location and the only way we'd be able to have close air support or combat air patrols is either a carrier or a forward base in some friendly country close to the hostilities.

Enfield, I'm not going to quote your post but your attitude sounds awful similar to the world's attitude in 1919, remember the "War to end all wars"? 21 years later they had another war that out did the first one. Given human nature, our unquenchable thirst for power and our ability to be "jerks" to each other, I'd say you're living in a dream world to expect that it can't happen again.

As for the comment on helos being higher priority than fighters, they do different jobs. Helos lack the speed and endurance to inflict pain from any great distance and they're easy targets, a .50 cal will take a helo down. Good luck hitting a jet with a .50 cal.   

Considering it's going to take almost 30 years to replace the Sea King (yes, there were proposals in 1981 to replace it), do you honestly think that we can think only in terms of "the foreseeable future"? Who's to say what the situation in the world is going to be in the next 20-30 years, we all know how it's changed in the last 30 years. You have a lot more faith in the human race than I do.

Cheers


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## Infanteer

Inch, you took the words out of my mouth.   History shows us never to say never.   With the way the world works, the impossible can become possible very quick.   Look how WWII caught everyone unprepared, even the Germans.   Thus, we adopt the notions of "never" and "we won't" to our own peril...next time the English Channel might not be enough.

This is why I believe flexible and mobile expeditionary forces are essential - they can help us to project force anywhere in a timely enough manner to avoid a conflagration that would require us to mobilize.   Being that we live in Dandurand's "fire-proof house", having joint sea, air, and land forces are essential; barring conflict with the United States, we'll need taxi's to get to our wars....


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## Inch

Infanteer, I agree with you.  We need taxis and we need combat capable forces, the only bone that myself and the other non-Army types had was that it seems like being taxis is the only thing people envision when they think of the Air Force and Navy. Not to fear though, that opinion is CF wide. I was on my Maritime Warfare course with a bunch of MARS officers.  One of them asked me what we (Sea Kings) do. After I explained what we do, he kinda said "really?" I asked what he thought we did and he replied "I thought you guys just went out joyriding". So, being an Air Force guy on a Maritime Warfare course certainly opened my eyes to what the Navy's capabilities are and I think I enlightened them on what we do. I would have never advocated this before that course, but I feel joint ops requires an understanding of the other service(s) at the junior officer/senior NCM level and not just for the 3 ringers and up.

Cheers


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## Acorn

Historically our "fire-proof house" has allowed us to raise expeditionary forces from scratch, ÃƒÂ  la South Africa and Korea. I think we still need a mobilization plan, but we should be realistic in acknowledging that mobilization is a long-view concept. We need standing forces capable of providing what our civilian masters require at relatively short notice. 

So, if I were CDS what would I recommend to the PM? Funding sufficient to support the following:

Army:
Two brigades each comprised of three fully manned medium battlegroups (this goes to the "combat arms" MOC - that's for another thread, or later). Equipment includes much of what we have today, adding the MGS when it comes on-line.
One heavy brigade group with two infantry-heavy battle groups. This one would have tanks and SP artillery. A capability for high-intensity conflict should it be needed (i.e. had we agreed with the US over Iraq)
One light brigade comprising three light battlegroups (centered on our exisiting light infantry)
One helicopter brigade comprising two light lift squadrons (with a more suitable helo than the Griffon) one medium lift sqn (Chinook) and one attack/recce sqn (mixed recce and attack helos)

Air Force:
An expeditionary air wing comprising three CF-188 squadrons - one roled air-to-air and the remainder air-to-ground - they would have the necessary *deployable* support elements.
A tactical transport air wing comprising our exisiting Herc fleet suitably modernized
One Strategic lift wing comprising exisiting Airbus fleet and a suitable *military* strategic transport (C-17 comes to mind, but there are other options available)

Navy:
Sufficient manning for the exisiting ships in their exisiting structure plus (with consideration to modernisation/replacement of ships as necessary):
Minimum 3 multi-purpose transport/replentishment/command ships (assuming such a beast is actually feasable) - these need the ability to lift one of the battlegroups above, provide fleet replentishment, have the facilities to support a Joint HQ and have helicopter facilities for minimum 4 helos.
Re-establish an NGFS capability - likely by replacing the 5" guns on the DDs. If the FFs have the capability to carry something in the 4" range that should also be looked at.
Light littoral warfare capability in the form of the exisiting sweepers (multi-function vessles) as the basis for task groups of smaller vessles - swift boats if you will.
Submarine capability as it exisits today (with the current subs upgraded and repaired as necessary).
A MH wing comprising sufficient MHs to equip the ships.
An MP wing comprising P-3-like aircraft providing coastal surveillance.

Most of what I mention above is expeditionary. The Airforce would need more CF-188 sqns in order to allow for rotations as the Army does. The Navy has most of the necessary platforms, but lacks the manpower and equipment to float everything - whenever a ship returns from deployment it is stripped of crew and equipment in order to deploy the next one.

I think all of it is possible within the 2% of GDP model, though it would require a few years to put in place.

Most importantly the above needs to be supported by a robust and *deployable* logistics organisation, from A-ech back to third line. On-demand and ASD have been shown to have major limitations. We need stocks in place, and the logistics pers to ensure that the right bullet gets to the proper weapon at the proper time.

Acorn


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## Infanteer

Okay, since everytime one of us Army guys mentions "taxi" or "joint" the other teams want to knock us out, I drew a little rough diagram to help picture what my notion of a "Joint Expeditionary Force" entails.   It looks at requirements for Force Projection and Sustainment at the Operational Level.   This should not abrogate the Strategic Level of responsibility that each element has.   The "Joint" package is merely a way to deliver combined naval/air/ ground combat power to an area away from our shores. Once there, each element has it's own required job to do to ensure mission success.  This does not relegate the Air Force and the Navy to sideshow, taxi ops - however, the fact remains that:

1) Ground Power is needed to decisively enter a conflict.  Humans live on the ground, not underwater or in the sky.

2) Unless the Army decides to swim or sprouts wings, it is going to need boats or planes to project ground power.  That requires the assistance of Naval and Air forces.  Essentially, projection of ground power becomes a shared responsibility, necessitating true "jointness".

The Navy cannot just sit off the shore without committing ground power, just as the Air Force cannot bomb from Italy or the Army hope to accomplish anything by pulling a "Khartoum-esque" expedition into the Sudan.   All elements have to do what they do best to ensure success of the expeditionary force.

There is also a bigger picture, more independent oriented "strategic mission set" that each element has.   This is where things like submarines, C-17's, and Tanks come into play.   No point sending out a Joint Expeditionary Force if the sea lanes are swarming with Akulas.   Nor is there any point in dropping a light expeditionary force into play without heavy back-up and the means to move it around quickly (and expensively) if needed.

Here is my first crack at diagramming an idea.   Have fun with it.   I'm going to watch _Soprano's: Season 3_


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## DJL

> the Navy will not be fighting blue water battles,



 Red China is increasing the size and scope of their blue water navy. Who's to say that with their ever growing nationalism and economic size, in the coming decades we won't face a new cold war.......

A bamboo curtain if you will.




As for the "expeditionary" concepts being "floated" (pun intended) here's a Page that could almost be termed "Amphibious Warfare for dummies"   

Very intresting read, includes "ways and means".........


http://www.exwar.org/Htm/5000.htm


The LHA(R), (under the Amphibious Warship Modernization Programs link) has garnerd my intrests in light of all the talk about "joint element operations".......


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## Kirkhill

Brock posted this back in April when the JSS was announced



> The current Protecteur AOR class operate with a crew of about 275--excluding air detachment; 365 with--whereas modern AOR ships operate with only 125 give or take a few sailors.   Four AOR ships with a crew of 125 add up to 500, plus two transport ships at 125 add up to 750 sailors and officers versus 550 and don't forget we only very recently retired the HMCS Preserver which if you add it up equals 825 crew members for only 3 ships.   A pretty good deal all things considered more ships and therefore longer sustained op tempo, with lower personnel requirements.   What a deal.   The Dutch Navy has two ship designs that could suit the Canadian Navy's needs very well without breaking the budget.
> 
> check out this link at   http://www.scheldeshipbuilding.com/schelde%20enforcer.htm   :look at the "Enforcer" amphibious transport ship designs that are low cost and two of the medium sized designs would perfectly suit army support and sealift needs.   The British, Dutch and Spanish navies operate 8 ships based on this design built in the last 10 years.
> 
> This link shows   http://www.scheldeshipbuilding.com/products.html#   the Dutch Navy's "Amsterdam" fleet logistic support ship design, also very well suited to the Canadian Navy's needs.



http://www.scheldeshipbuilding.com/products.html#
http://www.mod.uk/dpa/projects/landing_ship_dock_auxillary.htm


These update Brocks links.   They also show the types of vessels that I refer to in the option below.


	Regular Establishment						Regular Establishment				
	Current						Possible				
	Vessel		Units	Crew	Total		Vessel		Units	Crew	Total
	SSK	Victoria	4	50	200		SSK	Victoria	4	50	200
	FFH	Halifax	12	225	2700		FFH	Halifax	12	225	2700
	DDH	Iroquois	3	280	840		LCF	de Zeven Provincien	3	227	681
	AOR	Protecteur	2	365	730		AOR	Amsterdam	3	160	480
							ATS	Largs Bay	1	60	60
							OPV	South African	12	29	348

	Total Regular Force Crew				4470		Total Regular Force Crew				4469

	Reserve Establishment						Reserve Establishment				
	Current						Possible				
	Vessel		Units	Crew	Total		Vessel		Units	Crew	Total
	MM	Kingston	12	37	444		MM	Kingston	12	37	444
							ATS	Largs Bay	2	60	120

	Total Reserve Force Crew				444		Total Reserve Force Crew				564

This leaves a force with the current subs and frigates, replaces the 3 active DDHs with 3 AirDef and Cmd Frigates that are SM3/Harpoon capable, replaces 2 AORs with 3 AORs and an ATS/LSD(A) which will lift up to 700 troops and 1200 lane-meters of vehicles.   As well it allows for the crewing of 12 85m class OPVs.   All within the current required manning levels.   

The Reserve force which currently operates the Kingstons would be responsible for finding 120 more bodies to crew two more ATS/LDS(A).   

I am still looking for the prices on the AAD Frigates, the AORs and the OPVs.   The ATSs are 160 Million each.   Three would cost 480 million.   The JSS project is budgeted at 2100 million.   2100-480 leaves 1620 million to go against the purchase of the 3 AORs.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

With regards to Enfield's view I agree with Inch and Infanteer. You have a very idealistic opinion.

DJL with regards to the INCAT ferries sure they are fast but can they handle the North Atlantic and how much fuel to they use. Fast is good but too fast is just a waste of resources.

Acorn...the navy numbers are increasing and it is not quite as bad as you have portrayed. Again as I have said time and time again, big guns on frigates are redundant as they cut down greatly on the defensive fire power of the ship and reduces the degree of protection for the ships it escorts. 5"/54 and its replacements on the destroyers, maybe, but I hope a CIWS would be mounted forward so it would not lose the fwd defence arc that the current 76mm provides. As for putting command on the JSS type vessels, I can see for the army but leave Task group command with the destroyers, it works and it works well. The MCDVs are too slow to provide any degree of useful littoral capability, we need a whole new ship class for that. Replacement of the 280s is crucial now as well as upgrades to the CPFs.

Kirkhill..although a CPF crew is 225 we generally sail with 240+.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ex-Dragoon:

Tight Quarters or Hot Bunks?


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Tight quarters, cots and people sleeping on settes. Hot bunking is a health issue so it does not happen, maybe at one time yes, but that is before my time.


----------



## Kirkhill

Unfortunately the American fishing industry isn't quite "health" conscious.  ;D

Fortunately I always managed to plan my trips when they were running with light crews and could snivel a bunk or at least found a settee somewhere.

Cheers.


----------



## DJL

> DJL with regards to the INCAT ferries sure they are fast but can they handle the North Atlantic and how much fuel to they use. Fast is good but too fast is just a waste of resources.



I don't think handling the North Atlantic is a requirement, with that said, the ex-Aussie ferry the USN has, deployed and supported a SEAL team during the Iraq war.

I'm not sure on the fuel efficiency.......I seem to recall that being one of issues with the BC ferry fast cats.


----------



## Acorn

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Acorn...the navy numbers are increasing and it is not quite as bad as you have portrayed. Again as I have said time and time again, big guns on frigates are redundant as they cut down greatly on the defensive fire power of the ship and reduces the degree of protection for the ships it escorts. 5"/54 and its replacements on the destroyers, maybe, but I hope a CIWS would be mounted forward so it would not lose the fwd defence arc that the current 76mm provides. As for putting command on the JSS type vessels, I can see for the army but leave Task group command with the destroyers, it works and it works well. The MCDVs are too slow to provide any degree of useful littoral capability, we need a whole new ship class for that. Replacement of the 280s is crucial now as well as upgrades to the CPFs.



I'm glad the Navy's numbers are increasing, but a fairly senior Naval officer of my acquaintance does not sound so confident. 
I never meant to imply Task Group command should be on board the JSS. Joint command is what I was looking at, we do things jointly now, whenever possible.

Acorn


----------



## enfield

In regards to the concern over the Navy becoming simply a taxi service, I'm reminded of a statement by Admiral Fisher, commander of the Royal Navy before WW1 and creator of the Dreadnought - it was something along the lines of "The Army is simply another weapon fired by the Navy"  ;D

I'll try substantiate by statements regarding future conflicts. 

First, regarding homeland defence. Who will our enemy be?
a) no democracy has ever fought another democracy, so we can rule out them. 
b) the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic represents barriers that no state on Earth has the capacity to transport a significant military force over.Except of course....
c) The US. I think we can agree, an unlikely enemy, and an enemy a little overwhelming to begin seriously planning to fight.

Also, if someone did, somehow, land troops or place a military force in our seas or skies... Face it, the US would deal with it. Thats not signing away our soveriengty, or contracting out our defence, its a reality. 100,000 Chinese/French/Nigerian/Fijians land in Prince Rupert or Nova Scotia, we'd see the US Army up here pretty fast, like it nor not. 
But, I think we can all agree, somewhat, on all that. 

No major future conflict, I think was more controversial. 
For 50 years it has become increasingly unusual for a Western military to fight a force that actually wears uniforms. Today, and in the future, I see it being an anomaly for a Western army to engage an enemy that has uniforms. All of the over used cliches - asymetrical warfare, etc - are somewhat true. We'll be fighting, certainly, but the nature of these conflicts will be different. 
Again, who are we supposed to be fighting? If we do engage in a major conflict, it will undoubtedly be part of a large American and allied effort. Which state on this world can the US not roll over? Sure, occupying a country is a different matter, but doing to an enemy what we did to Germany or Japan is different, and, arguably, easier. Defeating China, India, or the EU might prove challenging - but are any of those likely? And, in the event of a major war, how important would a mobilized Canada be?
If, today, we were embroiled in a large, global war: How many volunteers could we expect? Is it even possible to train a mobilization army in all of the skills needed to be a modern soldier? We can barely train the professionals we have in all the skills that are needed. How long would it take to teach 100,000 volunteers just to use the TCCCS radios? Where would we find the radios, C7's, LAVIII's, cadpat uniforms, etc, to equip them? Can Diemaco turn out rifles and GM turn out LAV's at that rate?
It took roughly 3 years in WW2 to build up an army to a high standard. Today, I would argue, the standard is higher due to technological demands - how many years do we need to mobilize an effective army? If we started today, by 2008 First Can Div might be ready to roll.  Not only is there no one to fight, in a long, global conflict, but the modern state and society just can't mobilize like it used to. I just can't see it happening - war will be over, one way or another, by then. 

I'm not sure I would call my opinion idealistic. I see us being involved in a number of messy, low-intensity (like Vietnam was low intensity) conflicts, asymetrical warfare, and all that jazz. I see us fighting a lot, sometimes in the "3 block war" scenario, sometimes in pure combat. But, we'll be fighting wars far away from our borders, against enemies who indirectly effect our security by challenging our interests (economic, political, etc). I also see a broader domestic role for the CF, when some of the asymetrical conflict comes home. But, we will still be harnessed by a limited defence budget, one which has to be focused on where the forces will be used the most - overseas, expeditionary, in wars that will either be over relatively quickly due to overwheling Western firepower and professionalism, or turn into Iraq's and Afghanistans. We need to focus on deployable forces so that we meet the enemy elsewhere, sooner, rather than closer to home, later.


----------



## a_majoor

Enfield is quite right to suggest the "Three Block War" will be the most common type of conflict for most of our careers, but he has also identified something else: the need for long term preparedness.

China has definite hegemonic ambitions in the Far East, Iran has regional ambitions, which it hopes to back with nuclear capabilities, and India also is a nuclear power with regional ambitions. It will take these nations time to build their economic, political and military power to match their ambitions, but we need to keep track of these things and adjust own own powers and capabilities to match. We also need to think "outside the box", since these powers will probably not challenge us in the traditional manners (like direct invasion), but use other means. Iran, as an example, is loosely allied with the Jihadis to drive the West out of the Middle east and recreate a theocratic Caliphate with its foot on the world's oil based economy. India and China may either fight each other, or use the threat of nuclear weapons to blackmail potential opponents and drive them out of their self declared "areas of interest".

We need to be able to handle terrorism, conventional war and missile defense, all with a relatively small resource envelope.

One thing which hasn't been touched on in this thread is "space power". This is one area where the West has no peers or challengers, and can be leveraged for huge benefits. The CF should start looking at developing the ability to launch and support "micro satellites". Being able to send a fleet of very small, very cheap satellites over the AOR will give the commander access to enhanced communications and reconnaissance. Farther in the future, it may be possible to use this as a weapons system (a de-orbiting satellite is moving at @ Mach 27. The metal liner of a shaped charge warhead is accelerated to @ Mach 25. If a few ounces of metal at Mach 25 can destroy a tank, what could a few kilograms of metal do?).

Being able to send a Joint Expeditionary Force based on elements of "One Can Div", having the ships and airplanes to support the package and having some space based assets will take time. It is up to us to convince the Government and people to take that time now, so we are not facing an emergency in 2010 by trying to gather and train even 5000 volunteers without adequate resources.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

Interesting article on the how geopolitical changes affect force structure and transformation.   In this case the article is focused on US Forces but in my opinion the lessons are directly applicable the debate in this thread.

Enjoy,



Matthew.     

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Force Structure 



THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT 

Force Structure 

By George Friedman 

Since it is clear that the war will continue regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, it is time to focus on the single most important strategic issue facing the United States: the size and composition of the U.S. armed forces. Unless jihadist opposition throughout the Islamic world ends suddenly, which is unlikely, the war will continue for several years. The U.S. military, however, is in no position to continue fighting the war with current forces -- particularly Army and Marine forces. Therefore, something has to give. To be more precise, there will be a massive increase in the size of the U.S. military in 2005. 

In order to understand the cure, it is necessary to understand two symptoms of an underlying disease. The disease was a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of warfare after the Cold War. During the Cold War, the primary focus was on a global war with the Soviet Union, particularly involving high intensity conflict on the North German plain. Such a war required a large and balanced military, including naval and air power and substantial ground forces tasked globally. 

It was understood that the end of the Cold War eliminated the requirement for this model. However, the new model that emerged had little to do with the reality the United States is experiencing today. The core geopolitical assumption was that the United States no longer faced the challenge of sustained ground combat in Eurasia. To American thinking, the precondition for such combat was the existence of a patron state -- the Soviet Union -- that would provide the wherewithal for second- and third-rank countries or guerrilla warfare for extended combat operations. No patron state, no extended combat operations. 

This did not mean that the United States didn't expect to be engaged in wars in Eurasia. Throughout the 1990s, there was a constant deployment of forces. However, these deployments had three characteristics: 

1. They were narrowly focused on one country at a time. 

2. Significant combat was expected to terminate quickly. 

3. They were elective operations -- the United States could choose or decline combat without affecting the national interest. 

In sum, the United States controlled the scope, extent and tempo of its operations. It expected to be able to do this permanently. Put differently: The United States expected geographically confined conflicts of short duration as and when it elected to engage. 

This strategic perception contained two operational principles. The first was the priority of technology over manpower. This has always been a priority for U.S. forces in Eurasia, where technical force multipliers alone made it possible for numerically inferior forces to fight. However, during the 1990s, the focus on force multipliers intensified overwhelmingly. Getting to the theater and defeating enemy forces quickly became paramount considerations. Crises came and went too rapidly to build up major ground forces, and the cost of major ground deployments was too high to justify under most circumstances. Kosovo was worth an air campaign. It was not worth a multi-divisional armored assault. Therefore, the United States became focused on a smaller ground force that was lighter and faster, and on the use of power as an alternative to ground forces 

Second, given the intermittent nature of U.S. involvement, U.S. planners shifted from primary dependence on standing forces to much increased dependence on Reserve and National Guard forces. For some specialties now in high demand -- such as civil affairs -- the force consisted almost entirely of reservists. That meant that in order to bring the military to its minimal fighting capability, it had to begin by mobilizing Reserve forces for extensive periods of time. 

Defense planners simply did not foresee what was about to happen. After Sept. 11, they found themselves in a war whose characteristics were the exact opposite of what they expected to be dealing with during the 1990s: 

1. Rather than being narrowly focused one country at a time, the United States found itself engaged in substantial combat in two separate theaters of operation -- Afghanistan and Iraq -- as well as in other theaters simultaneously. 

2. Significant combat did not terminate quickly, but has become open-ended, with new potential theaters of operation in the wings. 

3. Operations have ceased to be elective -- assuming that they ever were. First, Sept. 11 created a military challenge that the United States could not decline. Second, whatever the wisdom of Iraq, it is now a highly active theater that is not about to go away. Declining combat is no longer an option, according to either U.S. President George W. Bush or Sen. John Kerry. 

The mix of technology to manpower, and the relationship between active and Reserve forces are simply inappropriate to the war that is being fought. 

The Need for More Forces 

There are three phases of U.S. warfare: deployment of forces, destruction of enemy forces and occupation of enemy territory. U.S. military doctrine developed in the 1990s assumed that the greatest challenge was formed by the first two problems. In fact, as we have learned in this war, the United States might well have solved the first two problems, but it has not come to grips with the third. That by itself is not a criticism. Pacification, counterinsurgency and controlling the ground in a low-intensity conflict represent the toughest problems faced by the U.S. military or any military. 

At the same time, it is an area to which the United States has paid the least attention. Occupation warfare is least amenable to technological solutions. But it must be said that compared to force projection and destruction, few technological efforts have been devoted to occupational warfare. Therefore, the occupation of countries has changed minimally over the past century. It requires the presence of ground forces in a highly dispersed and exposed mode, in numbers far in excess of those needed to defeat an enemy armored force. In other words, the force that was needed to defeat the Iraqi army is too small to pacify Iraq if there is substantial resistance. When we add to this the fact that Iraq is far from the only theater of operations the United States is or might be engaged in, it is obvious that more forces are necessary. 

The 1990s solution was to reach into the various Reserve components. That is essentially what the war has been fought on since Sept. 11. Each service has used reservists to fill out the force. The problem with this strategy is that the Reserve force was recruited in the 1990s and agreed to serve based on the premises of the 1990s. Even those premises proved disruptive, as reservists were called up for multiple operations. However, just as the Pentagon did not anticipate that it would be fighting a multi-theater, multi-divisional war in Asia, its reservists did not expect to be continually called to extended active duty. 

Clearly, the reservists signed up for whatever was required. Equally clearly, they did not expect what has happened. The Reserve consists of older, experienced troops, skewed toward higher ranks. They also tend to be heads of families, with children, mortgages and responsibilities. Some own small businesses that will fail without them. Others have bought homes they cannot pay for on military pay. Defense planners, having few options, are ignoring these realities and wreaking havoc in the lives of the reservists. 

Therefore, the reservists will quit as soon as they can, as will active-duty soldiers. The military can issue stop-loss orders, essentially barring people from leaving the military. However, the United States cannot win this war with a captive force that is not being -- forget replenished -- expanded. The United States drew its forces down during the 1990s, expecting a certain geopolitical reality. A very different geopolitical reality exists. The administration is essentially trying bludgeon a force designed for the 1990s into a force for the 2000s. It can work for a while, but not for long. Within a year the United States will have an army that has either been hollowed out by discharges, or in which an insufficient force of men and women is being forced to carry the burden of a war that is going to go on for a while. 

During World War II, troops left home and did not to return for years. This was mitigated by a sense of a universally shared fate. During Vietnam, a profoundly unfair draft was partly compensated for by the fact that a tour of duty took only one year and the draftees were out in two. Not only was there deep resentment, but just about the time the soldiers were getting good at their jobs, they went home. 

The United States will expand its force, particularly its ground forces. It cannot use a Vietnam-style draft because that draft failed militarily -- it ruined effectiveness and unit cohesion. You cannot train today's military specialties in a few months, and then deploy troops to combat. The last thing needed in Iraq is cannon fodder. In an extended war, you must have an extended and highly trained force. You can simply take the force that already exists and force it to continue to serve indefinitely, but that doesn't solve the expansion problem. In fact, it makes it tougher to expand. You can have a czarist conscription policy -- a number of people will be randomly selected to serve for five, 10 or 20 years -- but that will go over like a lead balloon. 

Expanding the Force 

The force must be expanded. It must contain people who understand the commitment is extended and open-ended. It must contain people who will be trained in some specialties for a year, and then be available for deployment for years after that. The force must include young officers, as well as enlisted men. And these will be people who can readily get other civilian jobs. This cannot be a force of the failed. 

One solution has been to substitute civilian contractors for soldiers. This is not a bad solution for some jobs, and outsourcing of semi-military specialties -- such as logistical services -- is as old as the republic. It is usable as a force supplement, but not as the force itself. The job of a soldier is to voluntarily put himself in harm's way, submitting to the orders of his superiors. The job of the contractor is to turn a profit. We find nothing shameful in this, but the natures of the missions are not only different, they are in a certain sense, at odds. Being a warrior and being a contractor are simply different things. 

Nevertheless, this is the United States and it is a commercial republic. It is one thing to risk your life. It is another to emerge impoverished from the experience. The soldier's job is to place himself between home and war's desolation. It is the homeland's job to reward a soldier for a job well done. It is the peculiarity and, to us, the charm of the United States that soldiers will indeed give their lives for their country out of patriotism -- but they expect their country to pay them for the risk. 

There is an unpleasant tradition in our country of paying soldiers poorly. It is as if the United States intends to dare its troops to serve. There is another side to this -- a hidden contempt by businessmen and professionals toward those who would serve at that kind of pay. We know that the children of wealthy businessmen and professionals don't serve, but the deeper shame is the lack of respect the elite has for those people who do. Part of it goes back to the aristocratic tradition of the enlisted man as brute, but it also extends to officers -- there is a feeling that if these men and woman were any good, they would be selling bonds. 

That is about to change with a vengeance. The United States will not institute a draft. The children of the elite will not enlist. The United States is going to lose its army in the coming year or so, or will face a revolt of the exploited in the ranks -- men and women trapped in commitments that are far more extensive than anyone expected, and whose lives are being thereby ruined. But there is a war on and it is not going to go away. 

The United States will have to replace some of the existing force, will have to compensate the remainder for staying on and will have to induce others to join. These will be men and women prepared to sacrifice their lives if need be, but not their financial futures. Nor is it fair to expect them to do so. They will be fighting not only so that others might live -- but also so that others can make a pile of money while they serve. 

No one wants a draftee on his flank, but those who will not serve must surely pay and pay big time. The idea that a captain leading a company in Iraq should make less than a successful professional in any other field is absurd. The idea that a senior IT technician at a brokerage or hospital should have a 401(k) while a sergeant working computers in Baghdad has to put in 20 years before he sees a nickel in retirement income, is obscene. 

And, leaving moralism aside, it will not work. There is no way around an expanded force and there is, therefore, no way around vastly increased pay and benefits for the troops. This will mean either higher taxes or cutbacks in other areas. However, those who don't serve and don't send their children to serve are no longer going to be able to simply count on being protected by the faceless "others." There ain't no such thing as a free lunch -- and that goes for national defense, as well. 

Something healthy will come out of this. For a country that fights as many wars as the United States does -- and it fights a lot of wars -- the idea that the profession of arms should be treated worse and paid any less than professions like the law or medicine is absurd. Soldiers do not deal with matters of less importance to Americans than lawyers and doctors. In the past, it was possible to get soldiers on the cheap. Those days are past. If the United States plans to have a military in two years, it will have to pay for it. 

(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved. 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


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## Kirkhill

What kind of knock-on effect would this have on Canada if the US adopted the Foreign Legion/Gurkha model and formed their own very well paid Foreign Legion with a Green Card after 2-5 years of service?

Any takers?

How many ex-CF personnel currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan for Blackwell etc.?


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## ArmyRick

I thought I had made my previous post on another thread (canadian Army structure) but what the hey, this one works !
First I understand and even appreciate history and tradition. But if change does not take place, then lets keep riding horse into battle with sabers and first rank kneel, load, etc... Get my drift..
 CHANGE IS PART OF BEING IN THE MILITARY ! 
I am a proponent of change as well as opponent of it. With that being said, here we go..
OK, here is my idea.  
The army (less tactical aviation wich is air force anyways) is split into two corps, Combat Arms (Infantry, artillery, armour and field engineer) and Service Support Arms (EME, Logs, medical, etc). Combat Support Arms such as Sigs, int, MP, etc will be assigned specialist within the units...
The combat arms are broken down into three Combat Arms Regiments for each brigade..
A Combat arms regiment will consist of.....
-HQ Company (RHQ, Sigs, Int, MP, CIMIC, Regt OPs, Defence platoon, HUMINT, Psy Ops, Regt ISTAR HQ or command cell for all info gathering)
-3 x Rifle companies LAVIII (Coy HQ, 3 x rifle platoons and a 4th platoon for the ALAAWS wich is either going to be Javelin or Spike) Note Yes the CF has already made a decision to purchase one, I don't wich one it is, in ref to ALAAWS
-Direct Fire Support Company (3 troops of one of MGS, one of TUA and one for MMEV)
-ISTAR Company (3 x Coyote troops and a UAV Troop)
-Mobility Company (3 x troops of field engineers + heavy equipment troop)
-Indirect Fire Company (Regt FSCC and 3 x troops of 120mm mortars or the Mobile arty system)
-Service Support Comapny (Coy HQ, 3 x A echelon resupply platoons, RQMS, UMS, REGT Orderly Room and Maint Troop)

When in combat these will break down into 3 x Maneuover Teams (replace old combat team)
More to follow, over....


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## ArmyRick

The Maneuover Team will consist of 
-one Rifle Company
-one DFS Platoon (maybe 2 MGS, 2 TUA, 2 MMEV)
-one ISTAR platoon
-one Mobility platoon
-one Indirect fire support platoon
-one A echelon resupply platoon (follow on)

Why ??? I can hear the screams of protest now. Well forget Tanks. Tanks are history wether we want them to be or not !!! Note I have done several combat team exercises w/LdSH and RCD, I DO very much appreciate a MBT vs MGS. But the powers that be have made their decision, so lets learn to fight with the gear we have..

Training ?
We ditch BMQ for the army. We send all army directly to a COMBAT ARMS run school aka ATCs (look at the JUNK that comes out of PAT Pl in Borden)
All army pers will do a BMQ/SQ together (maybe call it Basic Soldiers Qulaification) approximately 16 weeks of training (guys now in the CF are averaging a year before they get to an operational unit)
CSS trades will go do OJT or their actual course if one is starting.
Combat arms guys will then proceed to a Combat Arms Soldier Qualification (additional 8-10 weeks training) and then after serving in the battalion for a year or two they will speciliase in either LAVIII crewman, Reconnaissance (ISTAR) soldier, MGS crewman, TUA Crewman, MMEV Crewman, Idirect fire Gun number, Mobility soldier (AKA engineer), or signaler.
For PLQ all Combat Arms troops will undergo the previous 6A infantry and for their qulaification to SGT they will specialise in their above mentioned skills.

Will this happen ? No.
Why? Too much resistance to change in the CF IMO.

Anyways that is my idea. Lets hear your opinions....
Cheers.......


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## ArmyRick

Oh, woops wait the new structure army wide ?
1st Canadian Maneouver Brigade (West in shilo/wainwright)
Brigade HQ
1,2 PPCLI
LdSH (same orbat as the other combat arms units)
1st CSS Regt

2nd Canadian Maneouver Brigade  (gagetown)
Brigade HQ
1,2 RCR
RCD
2nd  CSS Regt

5th Canadian Maneouver Brigade (valcartier)
Brigade HQ
1,2 R22eR
12RBC
5th  CSS Regt

4th Canadian Airmobile Brigade (petawawa)
Brigade HQ
3 RCR
3 PPCLI
3 R22eR 
4th  CSS Regt (restructured to support LIBs not mech combat arms units)
emphasis on placing more tac hel squadrons in Petawawa
Pet is not very conducive for any type of mech trg which is why I reccomend it be set aside for the LIBs/spec ops guys


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## McG

I think that it is very important that we do not over emphasis our force generation structure mimicking our typical force employment structure.   The original recommendation to convert our brigades into regiments would have merged the manoeuvre regiments and transposed the regimental identity to formation level.   Beyond that I did not see much in the way of anything new proposed.   ArmyRick proposes (as others have before) a permanent force structure identical to the BGs that we send overseas.   Such a permanent structure would be a mistake.

It would strip us of our ability to operate at brigade level.   It would prevent us from deploying a CER (which we have done twice in recent history).   It would force technical skill sets down to a level where there will be insufficient depth for those skills to be sustained.

There is nothing wrong with pooling PsyOps, MPs, Engr, some Sigs, Medics, etc at Bde level and then inserting them into BGs for deployments.   Specifically looking at your Engr element, you have called for increasing the numbers of Engr by a factor of a bout 3.   At the same time, you will have stripped the Engr from providing any support beyond the capability of pioneers.   ROWPU, MCM, Resources, dive sp, assault mobility (armd engr), and construction are all gone from your force structure.   The minimum organization to sustain these capabilities within a force generation unit is three troops.   However, three troops is also enough to support a full brigade.   Here we win by keeping everything together.   Also gone from your force structure is the Engr planning structure that a CER provides to a Bde HQ while deployed.   

Where would the FSCC and ASCC from the Arty be found?

I do not oppose transferring regimental identities to the formation level and grouping the manoeuvre arms.   I do oppose permanent BGs structured for Bosnia & Kosovo.   They will lack flexibility and/or contain redundancies that would be eliminated through our current force generation structure.


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## ArmyRick

When I set the new orbat I described above, I was thinking of what kit we are going to see (not wanting to see) and I planned each regt for war fighting. For lower scale peace support ops, I would reccomend leaving certain elements of your regt on rear party (as we do now anyways).
As far as the engineering side of the house, I would split engineers up. Their are your hard chargin, blow up, build any obstacle you need in 3 seconds type Field Eng and I have also seen what construction engineers, plumbers, mapping dudes, etc do.
 I would put the more technical engineering into CSS regiments and keep the hard core fighting engineers in the combat arms regt.
You will note I did reccomend keeping a heavy troop in the Combat arms mobility coy (bridge layers, Badgher AEV, that new engineering kit you guys got that looks like a back hoe but is wickedly fast and what ever kit you guys feel you should keep including ROWPU ?)


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## pbi

Because we were talking about UAVs here earlier, and I made a comment about the baddies eventually developing that capability, check this out from the CBC News site this AM (08 Nov):



> Hezbollah drone plane enters Israeli airspace
> Last Updated Sun, 07 Nov 2004 16:55:25 EST
> BEIRUT - For the first time, the militant group Hezbollah has violated Israeli airspace by sending an unmanned spy plane into northern Israel.
> 
> 
> INDEPTH: Lebanon
> 
> In a statement Sunday, the militant Islamic group said the move was in response to Israel's own repeated violations of Lebanese airspace since it withdrew its forces from the south of the country four years ago.
> 
> Hezbollah says the drone flew as far as the northern Israeli coastal city of Nahariya.
> 
> It wasn't clear whether the spy plane was homemade or had been bought from a foreign supplier.
> 
> Israel says it was made in Iran and confirmed that it had flown over western Galilee.
> 
> The Israeli army says the flight proves that Lebanon does not have control over its own territory.
> 
> Hezbollah says it will stage more drone flights over Israeli territory in the future.



Interesting. Nobody owns ideas. Cheers.


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## McG

Proof that instead of getting out of the AD business, we should focus on getting AD assets down to lower levels and with greater precision to use against miniature aircraft.


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## pbi

McG said:
			
		

> Proof that instead of getting out of the AD business, we should focus on getting AD assets down to lower levels and with greater precision to use against miniature aircraft.



Excellent point, McG. A further incident to reinforce your point is the recent air attack by the Govt of Cote d'Ivoire on the French force there, killing nine French soldiers. Who says there is "no air threat in the Third World?" Cheers.


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## a_majoor

This would seem to indicate an organic AA ability for deployed sub and sub sub units, since I find it difficult to envision an AA system which has the portability, flexibility and mobility to keep up with small groups of soldiers.  (The alternative would be to huddle under some sort of AA umbrella, which would make manoeuvre difficult). 

I wonder how adaptable the new generation of fire and forget missiles are?


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## pbi

I agree fully with integrating AA down to sun-unit level(in my article in CAJ I suggested that it be organic to a Close Combat Unit.) As well, we need to integrate our Navy into providing theatre air defense (TAD) in littoral areas such as Cote d'Ivoire, using AD platforms offshore. We should also look at an expeditionary capability for at least one sqn of CF-18s. The world is always changing. Cheers.


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## DJL

> As well, we need to integrate our Navy into providing theatre air defense (TAD) in littoral areas such as Cote d'Ivoire, using AD platforms offshore.



[Cheap Plug] I remember reading somewhere, that a single Burke class destroyer is more capable then a Patriot Battalion....[/Cheap Plug]


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## Kirkhill

What size of umbrella would a TAD vessel create DJL?


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## DJL

Raytheon lists the SM-2 as having a range of ~80 km.....


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## Kirkhill

.........And HOW far upriver can you drive one of those boats?


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## pbi

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> .........And HOW far upriver can you drive one of those boats?



That's why I said "littoral areas": sea-based TAD doesn't do much good in a place like, say, Kabul. However, there is a current school of thought that says since most population centres are located in littoral areas, these are likely locations for conflict and thus for deployed ops. TAD would probably have worked in Croatia and parts of Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti (if there had been a threat...), etc. Right tool for the right job: a Joint Expeditionary Force gives you a bigger toolbox. Cheers.


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## a_majoor

Various proposed upgrades to the Aegis system suggest you will get an even bigger umbrella; this is an element in the US ballistic missile shield with Block 3 missiles. Link extended range capabilities with space based sensors, and your real limitation will be time of flight.


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## Kirkhill

I need to be more careful when trying to be humorous....'pologies.

I just checked the SM2/SM3/SM6 capabilities.  

SM2 Block III out to 160 km.
SM2 Block IV Extended Range out to 368 km
SM3 Block I  Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Missile - no range published but might it be fair to assume it is greater than 368 km?
SM6 Programme Theatre Cruise Missile Defense Missile - likewise no range published but would it be less than previous generations?

Maybe DJL won't have to sail that boat that far upriver to support you pbi.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-stnd.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sm.htm

Cheers.


----------



## pbi

Hmmmm. I had no idea sea-based AD could reach so far. Impressive. Given the size of  most of our recent AOs (Bosnia and Croatia are tiny on a Canadian scale of distance...) a TAD system with a 300-400km slant range would cover much of the AO. More support for the  JCEF idea! (We would still need some kind of deployable AD for those AOs in which a UAV/manned air threat existed.) Cheers.


----------



## Acorn

think of how much help a Tribal would be standing offshore supporting a Canadian evacuation of, say, Abijan (moot, now that the French have done for the Ivorian airforce, but the concept still exists.)

Acorn


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

We would still be better off keeping SM2s as we can use them against aircraft, crusie missiles and in extremis surface targets. SM3 and SM6 are only useful, from what have we been informed, is ballistic missiles. For AAD SM3/6 are not good choices.


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## DJL

Does the SM-3/6 require a strike length mk 41 cell ?


----------



## pbi

Shifting gears a bit, here is an extract of a fascinating paper I was just sent. It is the report of a symposium held at the US Army War College, concerning the vulnerability of the US (and, by extension, Allies such as ourselves...) to asymmetric defeat. Obviously I cannot post the entire document, but you should be able to get it at the address shown. Take a look at some of  the conclusions, especially those under "Historical Perspective".



> *TAKEDOWN*:
> The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation
> 22 June 1998
> http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/takedown.htm
> by Robert David Steele of Open Source Solutions, Inc.
> -- special contributor to Defense Daily Network
> 
> Can America be defeated through asymmetric means that strike at the known Achilles' heels of the military, as well as key nodes in the largely unprotected civil infrastructure? A recent Army conference provides a strong answer: YES. This leads the reviewer to propose not one, but four distinct "forces after next," each with a prominent mix of reserve and civil counterpart elements.
> "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated", was the focus of the Ninth Annual Strategy Conference hosted by the U.S. Army War College this past spring, and the answer was a very clear cut "No, we cannot be defeated" by symmetric attack and "Yes, we can be defeated" by asymmetric attack. Hosted by MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., Commandant, and opened by LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), the conference brought together what may be the single largest collection of iconoclasts and "out of the box" thinkers who are both available to the Department of Defense, and allowed to speak publicly on this important question.1
> 
> *The Bottom Line*
> In the largest sense, the conference called into question every aspect of Joint Vision 2010, and clearly documented the need for abandoning the force structureâ â€but not the budgetâ â€required to fulfillâ â€simultaneouslyâ â€two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) and a minor contingency (the "2+" approach). Although not endorsed by all present, the strategic vision offered as a substitute might be the "1 + iii" approachâ â€one MRC, one low intensity conflict or law enforcement support scenario, one major humanitarian relief operation, and one major electronic campaignâ â€either in the offense or the defenseâ â€"1 + iii", simultaneously.
> The most difficult issue confronting most of the participants was not that of threat identification, nor even that of response development, but rather the more ambiguous political issue of "whose job is it?" According to many present, the U.S. military must not allow itself to be distracted from its primary responsibility to prepare for, deter, and win conventional wars. However, all present appeared to recognize that the U.S. government is not trained, equipped, and organized to deal with three of the four threat classes2, and therefore the larger challenge may be internal to the U.S. government as a wholeâ â€developing concepts, doctrine, and organizational means of working across legal, cultural, and budgetary boundaries.3
> 
> *A Naval Officer Opens*
> LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.) set the stage for the conference with hard-hitting remarks about how the past fifty years have left us with a defense decision-making system that has forgotten how to plan, cannot adapt to change, and is incapable of stimulating a serious dialogue. From Joint Vision 2010 to "dominant battlefield awareness", we are burdened with the proverbial naked emperor.
> With specific reference to information operations and asymmetric warfare, LtGen Van Riper stated in no uncertain terms that we have no one who can really define what information superiority means or how we achieve itâ â€we have substituted pablum publications for strategic thinking; and wishful thinking about how we want to wage war, in lieu of realistic planning.4
> Desert Storm, seen by many to be the catalyst, the vindication, or the culminating point for the so-called Military Technical Revolution, must be considered with great caution. The enemy may have suffered a tactical defeat, but at the strategic level not only retained power, but grew in influence in both the Arab and Islamic worlds. In particular, the failed promises of aviation have not been scrutinized, and too many senior decision-makers continue to believe that strategic and tactical aviation can preclude the need for placing infantry at risk.
> 
> *The Historical Perspective *
> 
> Several distinguished historians5 examined lessons from the past, but were perhaps most helpful in provoking thoughts for the future:
> ·	Mobility is more important than mass.
> ·	Technology is worth little in the absence of timely and insightful intelligence, and geospatial data at a useful level of resolution.
> ·	Tools must fit the targetâ â€we cannot afford to take out hundreds of small targets with extremely expensive high precision munitions.6
> ·	Time and space are much more available to our enemies than to ourselvesâ â€and can be traded for bodies and bullets.
> ·	The enemy's objective is to get us to spread ourselves too thinâ â€yet we persist in starting every confrontation that way: spread too thin.
> 
> *The Threat Todayâ â€Non-State and State*
> 
> Seven speakers provided a comprehensive review of the non-state threat today. Their most telling observations are summarized below
> 
> ·	We are our own worst enemyâ â€continuing to procure computers which are wide open to errors & omissions, inadvertent destruction of data, insider abuse, and outside attack (the least of our problems).7
> ·	U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack are largely in the civil sector, and include bridges, levees, dams; power and telephone switches; and downlinks for the U.S. Intelligence Community and operational commands. Most vulnerable of all are the data managed by banks and major logistics elements including fuel suppliers.8
> ·	Our enemies will succeed by waging war between the seams in our legal system, not our operational capabilities.9
> ·	Time favors the enemy using any kind of information virus.10
> ·	Our future enemies will not be stupidâ â€they will choose carefully between stand-off, indirect (anonymous) and hands-on attacks.11
> ·	The political, economic, and technological climate favors an increase in terrorism and asymmetric attack. This will lead to the privatization of security, the militarization of the police, and the gendarmnification of the military.12
> ·	Our existing criteria for victory are impossible to achieve (decisive victory, limited casualties).13
> ·	Our existing force structure is vulnerable to superior asymmetric maneuvering in time, space, and materials (e.g. infrasonic waves easily penetrating armor to harm personnel).14
> ·	We continue to be vulnerable to well-informed campaigns to manipulate the international media and our home public's perceptions, especially with regard to atrocities and casualties.15
> ·	Our Achilles heel in future overseas deployments will be our dependence on volunteer civilian contractors essential to the maintenance of complex technologies beyond the abilities of our uniformed personnelâ â€as soon as they are terrorized, we lose our cohesion.16
> ·	When all is said and done, most men, and especially men from non-Western cultures and less-developed areas, are capable of taking great pleasure in great evilâ â€the human factor cannot be ignored and cannot be underestimated as a cause and a sustaining element in conflict.17



Interesting, eh? Cheers.


----------



## pbi

I couldn't resist adding this further extract:



> MajGen Timothy Kinnan, Commandant, Air War College, was trenchant and to the point:
> 
> _We cannot afford the existing force structure, but the services are like rats in a box, eating each other over the allocation process. We need to move away from 2+.
> Technology will not replace boots on the ground...its greatest contribution may be to let us all work together in real time and finally begin the process of integrating all of our components in a sensible fashion._



Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

> When all is said and done, most men, and especially men from non-Western cultures and less-developed areas, are capable of taking great pleasure in great evilâ â€the human factor cannot be ignored and cannot be underestimated as a cause and a sustaining element in conflict.17



And here was me looking forward to a good night's sleep secure in the knowledge of the basic goodness of man and his inevitable progress towards Utopia here on Earth.

Thanks for the cheery article pbi.

Sweet dreams.


----------



## a_majoor

A bit of "cutting and pasting" from existing regiments and battalions, allied with a modest increase in funding and manpower (yes, _those_ 5000 troops we are promised) can give us the following:

The three LIB parachute companies combined with the resources currently at the Canadian Parachute Centre to create the "Canadian Parachute Battalion" (we will avoid the name Airborne Regiment for now to divert negative energy, and because it really will only be a battalion)

3 x LIBs (augmented with new companies to replace the parachute companies) combined with three squadrons worth of tactical helicopters and some innovative use of UAV's to create an airmobile capability (restyle the units as battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles). Those of you who know who I am will have have read this in the ADTB (The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, ADTB Vol 5 No 4).

This provides some light/medium capabilities to react quickly to a crisis situation, "kick in the door" for the arrival of the Joint Expeditionary Force, or carry our manoeuvre warfare at the operational and tactical levels.


----------



## ghazise

pbi, 
from your article posted would you agree with the defiencies stated from Lt. Gen. Van Riper, are aligned with instruction at the USMC Command and Staff College?


----------



## pbi

2FtOnion said:
			
		

> pbi,
> from your article posted would you agree with the defiencies stated from Lt. Gen. Van Riper, are aligned with instruction at the USMC Command and Staff College?



I'm not sure I fully understand your question. Are you asking: "Does the USMC C&SC teach the wrong thing"?, or are you asking "Does the USMC C&SC identify these weaknesses in its curriculum?"

If you can clarify for me, I'll try to answer. Bear in mind I was a student there in 97/98: six years ago. Cheers.


----------



## ghazise

Does the Staff College address these weaknessed?  Also how does the Canadian Staff Colleges address these weaknesses?


----------



## pbi

2FtOnion said:
			
		

> Does the Staff College address these weaknessed? Also how does the Canadian Staff Colleges address these weaknesses?



Not specifically at the time I attended, but we were encouraged to discuss and critiqe existing and emerging doctrine, such as the USMC/USN "Manouevre from the Sea". The course was very much like a university, with emphasis on understanding and reasoning rather than the rote learning that IMHO marred Cdn Land Force Command and Staff College when I went through in 1990. 

I have not attended Canadian Forces Staff College (Toronto): I went to Quantico instead. I do not know much about the curriculum at CFC, although I have heard that it is not very "warry". I stand to be corrected by any alumni of CFC. Cheers.


----------



## ArmyRick

pbi, is there a web site or anything that talks more in detail about the army transformation?


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> pbi, is there a web site or anything that talks more in detail about the army transformation?



Try these threads:

SORD 05/06: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17412.0.html

and for Engr Transformation:  http://army.ca/forums/threads/2139.30.html


----------



## a_majoor

Whatever our structure will be, there are a few principles it must support: speed and audacity. This will allow even our currently shrunken forces to achieve a disproportionate result on the battlefield or on PSO's

http://victorhanson.com/articles/hanson060204.html

June 2, 2004
Kill the Insurgents - Stop Talking
by Victor Davis Hanson
The New Republic

Most of the time in war, diplomatic machinations don't create enduring realities--events on the battlefield do. After World War I, the defeated, but not humiliated, German army that surrendered in France and Belgium provided the origins for the "stab in the back" mythology that fueled Hitler's rise to power. After World War II, by contrast, the shattered and shamed Wehrmacht in Berlin was unable to energize a Fourth Reich. George S. Patton, snarling to head for Berlin and beyond in 1945, grasped the importance of "the unforgiving minute," when military audacity can establish a fait accompli on the ground that diplomats quibble over for decades. His unfulfilled wish to take Prague meant a blank check for a late-arriving Red Army that would help ensure a half-century of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. 

The labyrinth of failed plans and bad-faith deals in the Balkans led nowhere until the U.S. Air Force secured in 79 days in 1999 the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic--the chief foreign policy achievement of the Clinton administration. Suicide bombing failed to bring Yasir Arafat what he could not obtain at Camp David only because of the skill and ingenuity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which--through a multifaceted strategy of border fortification, proactive attacks, targeted air assassinations, and increased intelligence and vigilance--drastically curtailed the efficacy of the tactic. Arafat today is a marginalized figure not because of a belated European perception that he is corrupt and murderous, but because he was first reduced to a humiliated lord of a rubble pile--thanks to the IDF.

In our current postmodern world, we tend to deprecate the efficacy of arms, trusting instead that wise and reasonable people can adjudicate the situation on the ground according to Enlightenment principles of diplomacy and reason. But thugs like Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Saddam Hussein's remnant killers beg to differ. They may eventually submit to a fair and honest brokered peace--but only when the alternative is an Abrams tank or Cobra gunship, rather than a stern rebuke from L. Paul Bremer. More important, neutrals and well-meaning moderates in Iraq often put their ideological preferences on hold as they wait to see who will, in fact, win. The promise of consensual government, gender equality, and the rule of law may indeed save the Iraqi people and improve our own security--but only when those who wish none of it learn that trying to stop it will get them killed.

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. *Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows.* But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt--and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

The misplaced restraint of the past year is not true morality, but a sort of weird immorality that seeks to avoid ethical censure in the short term--the ever-present, 24-hour pulpit of global television that inflates a half-dozen inadvertent civilian casualties into Dresden and Hiroshima. But, in the long term, *such complacency has left more moderate Iraqis to be targeted by ever more emboldened murderers. For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.*

*This is the context for the current insistence on more troops. America's failure to promptly retake Falluja or rid Najaf of militiamen demands more soldiers to garrison the ever more Fallujas and Najafs that will now surely arise. In contrast, audacity is a force multiplier. A Sadr in chains or in paradise is worth more, in terms of deterrence, than an entire infantry division.

There are other advantages to a force of some 138,000 rapidly responding soldiers, rather than 200,000 or so garrison troops. The more American troops, the less likely it is Iraqis will feel any obligation to step up to the responsibilities of their own defense. The more troops, the more psychological reliance on numbers than on performance of individual units. And, the more troops, the higher the profile of culturally bothersome Americans who disturb by their mere omnipresence, rather than win respect for their proven skill in arms.*

On Monday evening, the president outlined a sober, workable, step-by-step transition plan from the appointment of constitutional framers to representative delegates and on to direct democracy, which, like it or not, will at long last put a much-needed Iraqi face on both political and military operations. The long-term trends offer hope--whether we look at heightened petroleum revenue from increased pumping and prices to the influx of U.S. aid and the resurrection of the Iraqi infrastructure. But these trends won't endure unless our youth bring to bear the full force of U.S. military might that credits the Iraqis for their success in putting down the opponents of their own newly created society. 

This formula does not require more American soldiers. It requires the increasing use of admittedly unreliable Iraqi troops made more reliable by the massive use of U.S. tanks, airpower, and artillery. The former will grow in confidence, as did the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, when they grasp that real force is on their side and that their enemies have no commensurate recourse to air strikes, armor, and heavy artillery--much less billions of dollars in aid. In other words, we can accomplish two seemingly mutually exclusive goals--more security and less of an American profile--but only by using the force we have to punish the enemy on every single occasion it attacks, starting immediately.

*Practically, a new aggressiveness means greater use of Special Forces, Rangers, elite airborne units, and Marines to spearhead retaliatory raids in conjunction with Iraqi forces. Conventional and purely American units should form strategic reserves out of sight that can arrive in overwhelming force to surround recalcitrant cities should our Iraqi-American forces face problems--and they will, at first. Clear success in Falluja--defined not just by apparent tranquility, but the absence of arms caches, nocturnal assassins, and organized gangs of Baathists using homes and businesses to foment insurrection--will undermine Sadr's militias, embolden democracy-minded moderates, and frighten Iran and Syria into curbing their mischief.* Iran will talk to us soon enough about behavior that promotes stability rather than terrorism--but only when they have real reason to fear U.S. success in Iraq. A consensual Iraq, then, even in the broadest sense, is a de facto revolutionary force in the region, whose daily televised parliamentary proceedings, free and open presses, economic transparency, and vibrant popular culture offer an alternative paradigm to the same old tired Middle East dichotomy between the Islamic fundamentalism of the masses and the fascist autocracy of the elite.

By contrast, hesitation and uncertainty would propel the sequence of events into reverse. If the humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 helped create the landscape for the boat-people, reeducation camps, the Cambodian holocaust, the takeover of the Tehran Embassy, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Russian-sponsored insurrection in Central America, and a decade-long demoralization at home, so, in the same way, our momentum thus far has curtailed the Libyan weapons program, brought revelations of nuclear mischief from Dr. A.Q. Khan, and put Iran and Syria under scrutiny--a volcanic, not a static, situation that can as easily deteriorate as improve. The hard truth is that grand diplomacy and geopolitical calculus depend on the lethality of a few thousand American fighters in the streets of Karbala, Kufa, and Najaf. The more lethal they are today, the safer Iraqis and Americans will be in the years to come.

Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

© 2004 Victor Davis Hanson


----------



## RCD

We need to be less TOP heavy.


----------



## ArmyRick

Right-o recon-man, definately less top heavy IMO.
We could easily lay off most of the civilian sector in NDHQ and force all remaining excess to serve in operational units..
We should in theory already have the command staff in place to tackle a fourth brigade with minimal impact on budget (just do sh*t wack more recruiting)..
Cheers to all who have at least dug a trench and froze their bag off in the field..


----------



## ArmyRick

IF we do adopt LAVIII and its derivatives as our primary AFV (don't entirley agree) then we need NEW doctrine..
Personally I would go with 3 x Medium Brigades in the CF (Valcartier, Gagetown and Shilo), 1 x Light/airmobile brigade (Petawawa) and 1 x Heavy brigade (Wainwright) buts thats me and I won't be PM for awhile...


----------



## Kirkhill

Armyrick,

Lets take your 5 brigade structure as good, I like it, how would it work if the three light battalions were grouped together in a new light brigade for rapid intervention, the three existing brigades were reduced to two battlegroups based on the LAV mounted infantry battalions and geared towards Area Denial operations while the Blackhats were all grouped together in an armoured (Lt/Med/Hvy/what-have-you) brigade geared towards higher intensity conflicts?  Individual cross posting and unit/sub-unit cross attachments would still occur as would inter-unit training.


----------



## a_majoor

Given the very "asymmetrical" natures of the present day conflicts, I do agree a new doctrine is in order. I would go for a five brigade structure, but parcel out the light/airmobile capabilities to the various brigades, and have "5 Bde" as a Special Forces Brigade, housing the unusual and difficult to categorize elements of the CF. This would be a strategic element, capable of intervening at any level of conflict in the "firefighting" role (i.e. squelch small problems before they become big), or to prepare the ground for the Joint Expeditionary package if things are already too far gone.

While the JTF-2 is an obvious element, I would also add CF-DART; a cyberwar unit and a reborn Canadian Parachute Battalion. A very strong internal Int and CIMIC type element is also a must have in the Special Forces Bde. The Government can dispatch elements of "5 Bde" for humanitarian missions (laying the ground for favorable reception of later Canadian missions if required, JTF-2 for strategic recce, deploy the cyberwar unit to shield our IT resources, track and identify enemy IT systems and resources and take action against them and so on.


----------



## dglad

pbi said:
			
		

> If the argument is that we need Artillery officers in order to plot and control WWII-legacy "Div Shoots"   I suggest that idea   is also OBE. I doubt we will engage in such activities again, and if we ever do, I suspect it will be by the digital coordination of fires observed by UAVs, striking with more precision from fewer systems, rather than flattening a grid square with hot steel. Nothing that cannot be taught to any officer who has mastered a Mortar Platoon CP operation, with modern   fire control equipment. Further, I think that to separate fire effects from manouevre, at the level we are likely to function at, is a mistake. The two are intimately connected and in fact "fires" should really be extended to "effects" to take in the full range of lethal, non-lethal and electronic systems we may employ on different types of ops.
> 
> Apart from the "specialist" skills of the C2 element of the Artillery branch(mainly officers but with a few NCOs), the jobs performed by the great majority of the soldiers are IMHO of a limited mechanical nature that could easily be taught to infantrymen (or to anybody else, for that matter).



Back from leave....

Re the above, in fact, to take it to its next logical step, systematics could, and probably will be developed to the extent that any target that a "sensor" (regardless of who or what that may be) can acquire, a "shooter" (which may be direct, indirect, air-delivered, or even non-lethal or something working in the EM spectrum) can engage.  The decision at that point really revolves around the desired effect on that target, and what shooter assets are available to engage it.  This COULD imply the sensor having some sort of target "designator" that sends information on target back to a central clearing-house, where the decision (human or automated) is made re how to effect it.  But it doesn't necessarily have to be a case of "Cpl Bloggins pushes the button on this discriminator and waits to see what happens to the target--a surprise with every engagement!"  It could be something decidedly lower-tech.  The point is there are potentially many sensors on the battlefield, not all of whom will be "close combat" pers (so I actually see even more melding of battle functions across the force).  The targeting inputs will have to be assessed from all of them, and effects matched to those targets.  This "blurring" of the boundaries between the various forces on the battlefield is probably both inevitable and desirable (as long, as pbi points out, it's done rationally and with adequate forethought).

I would also add that "effects" also need to include information operations effects, including things like psyops, CIMIC, etc.  While we might not view these as traditional close combat effects, we need to be able to employ them in advance of, conjunction with, support of and after the application of close combat effects.  The US is facing this right now in Fallujah (and, in a broader sense, in Iraq generally).  When the shooting stops, the battle is half-over.  I think, therefore, that we also need to consider how to integrate these sorts of activities into the overall effects spectrum that modern war demands.


----------



## McG

Mountie said:
			
		

> ... I think all like-tasked systems should be grouped together. The infantry battalions will basically be combat manoeuvre battalions with all the infantry and direct fire support assets. The armoured regiments will become armoured reconnaissance units with two squadrons of Coyotes. The close reconnaissance (dismounted) assets would be in the infantry battalion recce platoons. I would equip these recce platoons with eight of the new British Panther Command & Liaision Vehicle which is basically and armoured car (similar to the MOWAG/GM Eagle IV) and equipped with a PWS. (I would call it a Light Armoured Support Vehicle). Then all indirect fire support assets should be grouped in the artillery regiment. I propose three mortar batteries of 6-8 LAV-III 120mm Armoured Mortar Systems, one artillery battery of 6 LAV-III 105mm Denel SPHs and an air defence battery of 24 Light MMEV (the new version of the Starstreak air defence missile which is dual purpose like the ADATS mounted in a 6 round pedestal mount on the back of a modified Panther LASV). All the mobility support and counter-mobility assets within a large combat engineer squadron with all the heavy engineer support assets held in the Role 3 Area Support Group, which I would rename a General Support Group.


Once again, I'll point out that your engineer squadron would have to consist of at least 7 troops (Fd & Sp) plus Admin pers and would be as large as the regiments we already have.  You will not reduce manpower, but you will destroy the ability of the engineers to support three of the four manoeuvre units in the brigade.


----------



## McG

Mountie said:
			
		

> ... Why not organize units the way they will be deployed. ... Its time to organize for operations whether it offends certain corps or not. ...


Well said.   However, I will repeat my caution that we cannot blindly match our force generation structure to our force employment structure.   There are several reasons for this.

1)   It may force us to choose between a structure that lacks flexibility or one that is inefficient of manpower.   Which missions do we structure for; Bosnia, Kosovo, Eritria, or Afghanistan?   The problem is that none of these missions had the same structure.   If we pick a slimmed down force structure we will become to inflexible to take on unforeseen missions.   If we try to structure permanent battle groups with the capacity to do anything that might come up, then we will have units which are huge and will typically leave unimaginably large rear parties.   Before anyone jumps to answer that we can trim the excess, remember that sometimes the â Å“excessâ ? is Cbt Sp.   A previous CLS identified that over half his TUA sections never deployed (I believe I heard him say that he had too much TOW) and today we have seen TUA cut by a third. 

2) Restructuring to produce only BGs would limit the scale of operation we could commit to.   Do we retain the capability to deploy an entire CER (as was done for UNPROFOR and the first Gulf War)?   Do we want to retain the ability to deploy a Bde HQ (as was done in the beginning of Op ATHEANA)?   Do we want to retain the ability to deploy a full brigade or brigade minus   (something we have not done since Korea, but would be sustainable with the PM's additional 5000 PYs)

This is not a rant against restructure.  It is only a cautiion that a proposal must take these factors into account and identify where (if any where) it may reduce flexibility or manpower efficiency.


----------



## birdgunnnersrule

I know that this is a mainly armoured thread, but I think the Canadian Forces should move away from the Regimental concept and we should not be talking about blacks hats or Artillery history.  Too much bickering limits transformation.  Enough for that....As for the thread that refers to one HLVW required to move the ammunition for each ADATS, this should not be required in a DF role.   If an ADATS fires all eight missiles on a Battle run and cannot be replen through the A echelon,  I would be seriously concerned that the battle is being lost or the MGS and TUA have been ineffective.  The focus should be on providing some sort of local protection for the ADATS as the design makes peripheral vision difficult for a Det Comd.  An HLVW is required/utilised in the Air Defence role because of the crew size (9 man Dets for continuous 24/7 operations) and the decentralised task of the Air Defence.  Systems are spread out and the availability of the ammo ensures quick reloads can take place.  A new missile should be designed for the ground role as well.
 I agree that Recce Regt's should be created and would also argue that an Air Defence Regiment is also a vital requirement for the CF.  I am sure that the families of the 9 French soldiers killed in the Ivory Coast would attest the to the need for the capability.  Expecting personnel to continually shift gears and remain proficient at the DF task and Air Defence will not work.  I guess it will come down to PY's and equipment at the end of the day.  Way above me. PS.  The ADATS is not a tank even if you take the dish off.  A piece of shrapnel or a bullet can disable this thing.


----------



## Kirkhill

Steel Badger said:
			
		

> As for the Inf Bns......perhaps we can restore forward mobility by restoring Combat SUpport Coy, adding ATGM to the INF lavs and a DFSV Platoon of 8 DFSV to CBt SUP Coy,
> 
> If heavy armour is required, use a Pz Ko from our armoured Regiment. (Since we are talking "should be-couldbe" our Army will retain a heavy Panzer unit right?) ;D
> 
> As for Capbadge, I dont know why the RCD's for example could be re-rolled as an Amd Cav / Pz AUf unit. Enroll more Dragoons and train an Assault Squadron. All bases coverd and no Capbadge issues.
> 
> Just as, for the sake of an example, 1 RCR's new DFSV Pl would be manned by Inf Pers trained to Armoured BTS. All wearing the RCR badge.
> 
> 
> Both units benefit from combined   arms; better cohesion; and no units are lost.
> 
> (Man, with all this "should be" stuff I nearly used 1 RHRofC as my example inf unit >, I MUST be dreaming)
> 
> We could focus our regular force combat units as follows:
> 
> 1 Armoured Regt
> 2-3 Amd Cav / Pz-Auf Regts
> 6 Mech Inf Bn
> 3 Air Assault Bn
> 
> 
> 3 deployable Bdes w/ 1 Amd Cav Regt and 2 Mech Inf Bns + 1 Arty Regt
> 
> And 1 Amd regt + 3 air assault Bns as "Div Troops"



While I like and understand the roles and functions here I think we are missing something.

I have heard a lot of discussion about the Rule of 3, the Rule of 4.... Maybe the magic number is 5.

What little PM is saying, when he talks about defence at all, he emphasizes, Domestic Security, Arctic Sovereignty, the Coasts and then International Stability.

With those comments in mind....

Canada has FIVE areas, Northern, Western, Central, Quebec and Atlantic.
Each one has an Area HQ
Each one has a Ranger Group
Does each one have and Area Support Group?

Across Canada we have TEN Militia "Brigades" that can, on a good day, deploy a Battle Group each.   For sake of argument say that that means they could field 10 Battlegroups.
Regardless of where they were raised then they could be deployed in support of each Area HQ at the rate of TWO per area.

OK.   Area now has under command, and locally available an HQ, an ASG?, a Ranger Group and 2 Militia Battle Groups.
I suggest that the addition of a Regular Battle Group to each Area (on demand - not permanently) would give each Area Commander a very useful Formation capable of dealing with a wide range of Domestic Security, Counter Insurgency, Foreign Terrorist type threats.   They would also enhance Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic coastal security through Patrols in support of Ranger activity.   They would enhance National Sovereignty claims in all areas including the Arctic and they would be material contributions to the Treaty requirements to supply forces to defend Continental North America in conjunction with the US.   I believe we are on the hook for 1 or 2 brigades to support these obligations.   I don't think there is anything that stipulates that they have to serve outside of National territory.

Anyway.   FIVE.

Five Area Composite Brigades complete with HQ, Support Group and Rangers permanently assigned and collocated, 2 Militia Groups permanently assigned and possibly collocated and 1 Regular Battle Group assigned on rotation, deployed on need.

FIVE.

Now for the Foreign picture.

The 94 white paper calls for the ability to deploy and SUSTAIN two Battle Groups and occasionally SURGE a Brigade Group.

The accepted rate of employment on 6 month ROTOs is 1:4 (Nominally ----- I know the Actual frequency is much higher than that but apparently that is the goal - 6 months deployed, 24 months in Canada on Home station) 

1+4 = FIVE

There's that number again.

For every Battle Group deployed we need a total of FIVE Battle Groups in the order of battle.

Two SUSTAIN two Battle Groups therefore we need TEN Battle Groups in the Army.

Now for the contentious bit.

I suggest that in order to SUSTAIN a force it means being able to replace the deployed force with an equally trained, IDENTICALLY ORGANIZED force, that can slot into the rotational programme withouth disrupting the organization of the Higher formation to whom the Battle Group might be attached.

That, in my view, demands that we start looking at the Forces, the Land Forces at least, that we consider first and foremost the dividing our Regular Forces into 10 Identical Battle Groups.   Two would be deployed, Two resting, One At Notice to move for international purposes and 5 within our own borders maintaining skills and prepared to fight in DOMESTIC terrain (urban, rural and wilderness areas) in support of the Area HQs.

Once we have met the needs of the TEN Identical Battle Groups, then we could look at filling out specialist roles, if the PM allocates the PYs to the task at hand.

With that perspective in mind I propose that we combine two further concepts, plug'n'play and the well known final phase of battle REORG.

First, plug'n'play.   Because of the deployment imperatives, and in the interests of cohesion I believe that the Battle Group is the correct level for the plug'n'play concept to implemented.   Not at the sub-unit level with coy/sqn/btys being shunted around under various Unit, Group and Brigade Commanders.   Maintain the Battle Group as a cohesive, deployable force commanded by a Colonel.   Relegate the Brigade to the previous American concept of being a Staff organization that would fight what ever Units were assigned to it.

I know the Americans are going the other way, but they have got more PYs and more $. They can afford to.

On the REORG front.

Consider after the assault.   You have taken casualties.   Some bodies have been detached to fill out other elements that have suffered worse than you have.   For some strange reason, your section commanders and platoon commander have all survived as have about half of your rifles while your C9 gunners and grenadiers are all dead and your Weapons Det has been reassigned to Combat Support.   OC comes through your position, informs you that you have to hold until relieved, no date certain, and assigns your arcs.   What do you do?   DS informs you, you may not surrender.

That is roughly where I perceive Land Force as being just now.   Might like more bodies, might like more money but none in sight and the arcs still have to be covered.

Only solution, thin out the line and bring up the clerks, cooks and MPs.

So......

By my reckoning the Regular Army consists of the following:

27 Rifle Coys
3 Recce Coys (equal to the actual 9 Recce Pl)
9 Armd Sqns
9 Arty Btys
3 AD Btys
11 Eng Sqns

Plus the following within the Brigades
3 Sig Sqns
3 Log Coys
3Tpt & Supply Coys
3 Maint Coys 
3 Amb Coys (with CAS capabilities)



As well, within the Brigades there are 
9 Inf HQs and Svc Spt Coys
3 Armd HQs and Svc Spt Coys
4 Arty HQs and Svc Spt Coys (incl 4 ADR)
4 Eng HQs and Svc Spt Coys (incl 4 ESR)
3 Med HQs and Svc Spt Coys
3 Svc Bn Hqs and Svc Spt Coys

This latter group results in a total of 26 LARGE HQ, Adm and Svc Spt Coys which coexists alongside the 15 dedicated Svc Spt Coys/Sqns found in the brigades. That equals a total of 41 Command, Control and Service subunits.

Now consider this:

27 Rifle Coys + 3 Recce Coys =   30 Inf Coys                                              Divided by 10 required Battle Groups = 3 Inf Coys per Battle Group
9 Armd Sqns + 1 reroled Eng Sqn = 10 Armd Sqns                                 Divided by 10 again = 1 Armd Sqn per Battle Group
9 Arty Btys + 1 reroled AD Bty = 10 Arty Btys                                          Divided by 10 again = 1 Arty Bty per Battle Group
11 Eng Sqns - 1 reroled to Armd = 10 Eng Sqns                                     Divided by 10 again = 1 Eng Sqn per Battle Group

There you have your F Echelon forces in your Battle Group

3 Inf Coys
1 Arty Bty
1 Armd Sqn
1 Eng Sqn

A total of 6 Sub-Units

As ArmyRick and IIRC either devil39 or pbi stated an Inf Coy size (at least for Light Roles) has been fixed at 146 All ranks by DAD.

6x 146 = 856 All ranks

To support that force in the field there are 42 HQ, ADM and Svc Spt Sub-units or    42 divided by 10 = 4 Sub Units (generally of large size) per Battle Group.

Therefore 6 F Echelon Elements are being supported by 4 A Echelon Elements.

Might it not be possible to thin out those A Echelon Elements to 2 per Battle Group and reassign the PYs to F Echelon making 2 more F Echelon Sub units available?

On that basis, if I had my druthers, I would suggest the following configuration for a Battle Group

4 Inf Sub Units
1 Armd Cav Recce Sub Unit
1 Armd Cav QRF
1 Arty Bty
1 Eng Sqn
1 C4I Sqn
1 Fwd Svc Spt Sqn/Coy

Total PYs something on the order of 1500 bodies.

I leave it up to 2Bravo et al here to figure out the best configuration for the RECCE and QRF sub units, but I would suggest that for vehicles, if it has a turret on it, it immediately goes to CAV.   I would also suggest as Steel Badger has that the force has available to it smaller, armoured vehicles that some such as George Wallace, Lance and 12A prefer for Close Recce but would also be more deployable to more theatres, more quickly - adhering to Forrest's famous maxim "Git thar firstest with the mostest"

For the Infantry they will have to be max flex forces - all things to all people.   Capable of both mounted and dismounted roles.   I suggested elsewhere, and I guess from reading Armyrick at least he, or maybe DAD concurs that vehicle skills in the infantry should be kept at the platoon weapons section level.   The 8 man - weapons section can supply 4 dvr/gnr combos suitable for manning 4 vehicles, enough to carry a platoon administratively and offer a local patrolling capability when manning an isolated protected area.   But these people would not necessarily have to be up to the vehicle skills of the CAV troops.   To reinforce that I think that the types of vehicles these troops would employ would be vehicles like the Pinzgauer LSVW or the Unimog and the Bv206.   They might also be able to be handle something like the Stryker APC, which is not a fighting vehicle, it is an armoured truck with a gun on top.

Perhaps one of the 4 Infantry Companies could actually be trained to work with or equipped with the LAV as part of the QRF.

I would further split the Battle Group into two Elements - Light and Hvy - 

Light equals Recce Sqn, 3 Infantry Coys, Arty Bty, Engrs (-), C4I, Svc Spt(-)
Heavy equals LAV inf, QRF Sqn and remainder of Engrs, and Svc Spt.

Depending on terrain and reaction time the Hvys might have to be left behind, or could follow on later.
Note the Arty (in a light force application on a low intensity mission could take their mors/guns/msls with them but keep them stowed in Seacans and act as a 4th Inf Coy on base security duties)

Two of the Battle Groups could be parachute qualified.


The net result, after this long rambling effort is:

5 National Areas HQs and their integral ASGs capable of supporting, in time of crisis, 1 Ranger Group, 2 Militia Groups and 1 assigned Regular Force Battle Group.   In peace time they would support collocated forces.

The Regular Forces would consist of 10 identically organized and manned battle groups, capable of generating 10 light groups, two of which would be parachute qualified.

At least one parachute capable Battle group would always be available, within our borders, for an Immediate Reaction Force.

At any given time 2 Battle groups would be deployed overseas on peace and stability operations.

The deployed Battle Groups would be supported from a single, domestic Contingency Support Group that would be sized to be able to support 2 Battle Groups continuously.   Most members would be located in Canada or would be surged forward on occasion.   Smaller elements would be Forward Based, possibly even on the JSSs, if they ever happen.

Finally, the Battle Groups would be trained and familiarized, through working with Canadian Politicians, Rangers, RCMP, Militiamen to supply the backbone to support an indigenous Brigade of light forces for local security and policing, or possibly a larger force if augmented by NATO allies of countries like Malaysia, Bangladesh, India, Ghana, Jamaica etc.




I know this is a long way off the Cavalry thread, it really is for Foreign Affairs, Regimental Structure, Combined Arms, ..............

But I am afraid that I see most of these discussions starting from the ground up an building brick upon brick without considering the tasks that might be required and the resources available, not what we would like.

By the way, if the Gunners and Engineers feel slighted by this concept they might take partial comfort that I think that they are the best positioned forces to revive the 10/90 concept to supply dual purpose war fighting forces that can also perform a domestic security role.   Thus, if gunners and engineers were willing to act as infantry for domestic purposes I don't see any reason why Reserve Arty and Engr Regiments couldn't be retained.

The big issue here, as always will be between armd and inf and cap badges.   I leave that up to you lot to consider...............

Cheers, and as always, thanks for letting me ramble.


[_Moved from the thread: Canadian Armoured Cavalry_]


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## Edward Campbell

The Canadian Armed Forces of the Future thread http://army.ca/forums/threads/17266.0 was closed down so I will post this here, for now, at least ...

I would like to take a crack at the defence structure debate, avoiding, I hope, those issues about which my *rusty old* knowledge has shifted from useless to downright dangerous.

I would like to begin by asserting that we need:

o	A Department of National Defence headed by the elected minister, aided by his civil service deputy minister and civil service assistant deputy ministers, etc; and

o	Subordinate to that Department, the Canadian Armed Forces, headed by a Chief of the Defence Staff, who, aided by a national joint staff and by *professional heads of services* for the Navy, Army and Air Force, directs the training and administration of the Canadian Armed Forces, through commanders of major *joint* commands.

Neither DND nor the CF will be 100% civilian or 100% military.   Some of the most important *operational* elements of the CF, like dockyards, are manned, mainly by civil servants â â€œ who do far more important, *operational* work than do most of the pay clerks in Ottawa.   Some vital *operational* elements, manned by military people, belong, properly, to the deputy minister and, indeed, the Privy Council Office â â€œ our SIGINT services (CSE + whatever we call supplementary radio these days), for example.

To begin at the top of the _operational_ heap, we need to be able to:

o	Survey our own territory (all of it), the waters contiguous to it (out to, say, 500 miles and down to the ocean floor) and the airspace over both; and

o	Collect, collate and disseminate intelligence related to the national _strategy_ and, especially, to military matters â â€œ broadly.

 I think we need a range of surveillance, warning and target acquisition systems - space based, terrestrial, shipborne, airborne and undersea â â€œ which 'belong' to a variety of national and continental commands.   There is no need for an overarching, national 'surveillance' or 'reconnaissance' office but we do need to cooperate with and support (send money to) the US National Reconnaissance Office and similar, more secret, agencies.

We can share space based radars with several allies â â€œ whereas we would want satellites in low earth orbit to tell us what's happening over Canada's territory and the approaches to it the Australians and New Zealanders and Singaporeans might want similar information, from the same satellites, when they are passing over other parts of the globe â â€œ which is most of the time.   We do, now, and should continue to help crew US and NATO owned and based AEW elements.

 Intelligence is a bit more complex.

First I must assert that I think the current thrust of intelligence _reform_ in the US is 100% wrong and will weaken US and allied security.   The US has been experimenting with _collectivization_ of intelligence since the 1970s â â€œ every single attempt has failed; all the current and future attempts will fail too.   Messy and wasteful as it may be, intelligence gathering and processing is best done in a highly competitive environment â â€œ massive collective farms don't work, neither do massive collective intelligence agencies.   The first important principle is to establish (re-establish for the US) a real, clear barrier between intelligence and _counter-intelligence_ services; they should not be mixed.   Each can, should â â€œ through a third agency â â€œ provide _steerage_ to the other but when they cooperate things *always* go wrong -   the closer the cooperation the more things go wrong and the more damage is done.

We need three kinds of intelligence agencies:

o	Foreign intelligence;

o	Domestic intelligence; and

o	Counter-intelligence.

We have one, known, foreign intelligence agency: CSE â â€œ which relies, mainly, upon SIGINT and is tied into the five nation (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States) _Echelon_ network;

We have two embryonic domestic intelligence services: CSIS (which represents an incorrect mix of intelligence and _counter-intelligence_) and the RCMP â â€œ because, recently, some _national security_ or _counter-terrorist_ measures were brought under the Criminal Code of Canada and, consequently, under the jurisdiction of the RCMP.

We have, in CSIS, incorrectly mixed, one counter-intelligence service.

In my view the entire counter-intelligence responsibility should reside in CSIS and the domestic intelligence component of CSIS should be move to a new, semi-secret _civilian_ (*not* RCMP) domestic intelligence agency.   I say semi-secret because civil-libertarians (which includes me and should include all soldiers â â€œ what else are we defending?) should demand that any domestic intelligence service operates under public scrutiny.

We should have two new foreign, non-SIGINT, intelligence services: one in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the other in DND.   Both should be highly secret â â€œ secret budgets and very, very limited and wholly secret parliamentary oversight.   The two agencies should not cooperate, both should, along with CSE, 'feed' an intelligence and security secretariat which reports directly and only to the Clerk of the Privy Council and, through him/her, to the prime minister.

More to follow, dealing, eventually, with more convention 'military' components, later, over the next week or so.


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## Edward Campbell

The more interesting question is: what force structure?

I am going to begin with a general principle: forces - formations - should, mostly, be _joint_ and this _jointness_ must reach all the way down, in an unbroken web, from the very top.

The national military headquarters must be a _joint_ HQ and the major command must be _joint_ commands which implies, mostly, _regional_ commands.

First, the exception which proves the rule.   There is one function for which _joint_ forces are not, normally, required: theatre air defence.   As a general rule, even in a _joint_ theatre command all air defence forces are under the _control_ of one, single air commander - this is essential for effective airspace management.   The air defence _region_ normally covers the largest possible area - defined by the ranges of sensors and aircraft from bases.   For us, in Canada, that means all of North America - from Alert to the outer edges of the Caribbean and from Alaska to (and below) the Panama Canal.   This is, of course, the role of NORAD and we, Canada, need surveillance and warning and _interceptor_ forces to identify, track, categorize, intercept (if necessary) and deal with everyone and everything which enters our sovereign airspace and our _area of interest_.   Our air force does not need navy or army help with this task - it, the air force, is (or can be) properly organized for the job, all by itself.   The air force should own and operate all the sensors (terrestrial and space based) which look at our territory, coastal waters and the airspace above both - obviously the navy should own and operate the sensors systems which look under the water.   This does *not* mean that we need a separate, distinct _Air Defence Command_ or, worse, an _Air Command_; heaven knows, we, in the Canadian Forces, have demonstrated our undisputed mastery of the business of _empire building_ - we can stop and rest on our laurels.   While there does need to be a separate, distinct, continental air defence _command and control_ system, the air force bases/wings and units can, each, be part of a Canadian _joint_ command.   The fact that umpteen wing in Cold Lake reports to Commander Western Command while something-else wing in Bagotville reports to Commander Eastern Command does not interfere with the continental air defence _command and control_ system - unless very senior officers install organizational _poison pills_ to fuel the turf wars, as they have done in the past.

That's the big exception.   Naval and land forces are, almost always, better off (more combat effective) when they operate in _joint_ formations - with dedicated air support.

First principle: air forces are flexible.   One air force units can - should - have multiple tasks, supporting or, at least, being prepared to support more than one naval or army element.   A fighter/bomber squadron at Aviano, for example, can fly CAP (combat air patrol) over a navy task force - any close allied navy task force - in the Eastern Mediterranean in the morning and be ready to fly CAS (close air support) for an army unit in the Balkans in the afternoon - and it can be ordered to do either or both by a local, Canadian _Joint Task Force_ commander.   Modern telecommunications and computer systems have revolutionized _operational_ command and control since the '80s, we need to exploit that - and we do *not* need a separate, distinct _Communications Command_ to do so.

What do we need?

To start we need to understand that we must have 'reserves' - every time we send a unit, any unit, overseas for anything other than a one-off, short deployment, we tie up three units: one which has recently returned from the mission and is in the process of retraining and rebuilding, the unit doing the mission, proper, and the unit preparing to relieve it.   A two to one 'reserve' requirement is not at all unreasonable.   In addition, as Tom Axworthy (formerly Pierre Trudeau's principle secretary/PMO chief) says in today's National Post* _â ?Emergencies always spring up: For humanitarian crises like the Sudan or military operations like Afghanistan, there should always be a dedicated reserve.â ?_   This is a different sort of reserve - it is a ready reserve, part of a larger _expeditionary_ force.

Our _expeditionary forces_ should include:

"¢	Two _blue water_ task forces - destroyers and frigates, long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces which can deploy _globally_ to project Canadian power and protect Canadian vital interests;

"¢	Two identical amphibious _joint_ task forces - built around a large assault ship which can deploy and sustain 750 to 1,500 soldiers with their own armour (_Strykers_, I suppose) and attack helicopters and a _six pack_ of VSTOL fighter/bombers which can fly off the assault ship.   A large ship like that I a 'rich' target so the task force needs surface escorts - two or three destroyer/frigates, and CAP - which can be provided by allied air forces.

"¢	A _light_ (airborne/air mobile) brigade - two or three battle groups with light armour, attack helicopters, artillery, etc, etc, etc and another _six pack_ of VSTOL fighter/bombers which can operate from austere strips; and

"¢	A _heavy_ (heavier, anyway) brigade - wheeled APCs and light armour and attack helicopters which forms Axworthy's 'reserve' for global emergencies.

Our _reserve_ and home defence forces should include:

"¢	Two coastal defence task forces - frigates, corvettes, minesweepers and long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces;

"¢	Two brigades - one specially equipped for continental defence.   Both available to 'rotate' into expeditionary force missions as required; and

"¢	A whole array of schools, depots, dockyards, bases and agencies which support and sustain the combat forces.

My SWAG (scientific wild arsed guess) is that we need 65,000+/- full time military and 10,000 civilian people in the combat and support forces - including the schools and dockyards and the like.   We also, I think, need another 35,000+/- full time military and 25,000 civilian people in administrative, command and control and _infrastructure_ elements.   I _*guess*_ - and I cannot overemphasize the fact that my numbers are all the guesses of a reasonably well informed layman - that we need 35,000 part time sailors, soldiers and aviators - mostly soldiers and sailors.   I also guess that we need a defence budget of about $20 billion in 2005 dollars or 2% of GDP, year after year and decade after decade.

----------

* I could not find it on the web site.   The article, in the 2005-12-18 print edition, is entitled 'Wishful Thinking Won't End Poverty'.

Edited to correct grammar


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## Edward Campbell

I am both so old and, in so far as military doctrine and tactics and consequential hardware and organization matter are concerned, rusty that I will not attempt to deal with sub-units and equipment, but ...

I think we need four major _joint_ commands - each commanded by a rear admiral/major general and each of which can deploy, on short notice, anywhere in the world, an operational theatre JHQ - probably headed by the deputy commander.   The commands _might_ be:

"¢	Pacific (BC and the Yukon for _aid to the civil power_ issues) - a navy _heavy_ command.   It would have one of those 'blue water' navy/air JTFs and one of the amphibious navy/army/air JTFs I described up above.   Major permanent force bases would be in Esquimalt and Comox, as now;

"¢	Western (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the North West Territories for _aid to the civil power_ issues) - an air _heavy_ command.   It would have most of the air force - including all the CFB Borden and Trenton air force schools and technical units at Cold Lake (which becomes the _home_ of the Air Force) along with the Primrose Lake Experimental range, etc, etc, etc.   It would have the airborne/air mobile JTF (a brigade sized formation) and, consequently, most of the nation's air transport resources.   (Parenthetically: Edmonton is, I'm told by former air transport commanders, a better base than Trenton for national and global reach and a brand new flying base at, say, Lloydminster (where I believe the number of 'good flying' days is better than even Edmonton) would be better still.   Trenton is, of course, home of the Bay of Quinte and one of the nation's finest fresh water yacht clubs, so ...)

"¢	Eastern (Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick and PEI for _aid to the civil power_ issues) - an army _heavy_ command.   It would have most of the army - the main, combat ready _expeditionary_ brigade plus all the army schools from Borden and Kingston in a bigger, better Gagetown (the Army's _home_).   The two 'reserve' and home defence brigades would be in ValCartier and Petawawa, as now.   Combat air operations - interceptors and VSTOL fighter/bombers) would still be at Bagotville.   (Once again, an aside: I would *not* close Kingston and _La Citadelle_ because we do need to preserve and use our army (and navy and air force) heritage but I would move elements from Kingston to Gagetown and concentrate our military _professional_ schools/colleges in Kingston.   I would move almost all the permanent force units out of Borden and make it the Toronto region/Central Ontario militia training centre and I would close Trenton, completely.)

"¢	Atlantic (Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador   for _aid to the civil power_ issues) - a near mirror image of Pacific Command in so far as it concerns permanent forces with the addition of an operational flying base at Goose Bay.

Commands would 'own' all units in their area - even the Canadian NORAD HQ and, for administration, the national HQ in Ottawa.   The Canadian NORAD Region HQ would still be, _operationally_ an extension of Cheyenne Mountain/Colorado Springs but, if the MGen Commander Canadian NORAD Region (do they still call it something like that?) needs his bunker in North Bay fixed he will send an e-mail to the MGen Commander Eastern Command, who sits in a nice office in Québec City and takes a very civilized lunch in _La Citadelle_ officers mess.   Since _most_ first and second line administrative and logistics matters, including construction and properties etc would be command responsibilities no one would have to refer such matters to Ottawa because there would be no one there to 'do' or even approve anything (other than a civilian assistant deputy minister who plans and secures resources (money) five to fifteen years 'out' into the future).

Let me a bit more army specific.

I would see permanent force, _operational_ army elements as follows:

"¢	Pacific Command: one amphibious infantry heavy battle group in Comox - with some light armoured/mobile gun vehicles - _Strykers_, I suppose, and _organic_ (part of a _composite_ cavalry squadron) attack helicopters, along with a battery of either light howitzers or heavy mortars plus engineers, medics, and logistics, including military police elements;

"¢	Western Command: a _light_ brigade - three battle groups plus combat support and combat service support units.   Perhaps one of the battle group can be centred on a 'beefed-up' militia unit, a unit kept at full strength with, say, 25% regulars.   The unit would have to be based in a major city - Edmonton would do, near enough to the air transport wing to do training.   The brigade would also have a _composite_ cavalry element and its own, _organic_ tactical/utility/transport helicopter squadron;

"¢	Eastern Command: most of the army would be here - a mechanized brigade in Gagetown and two motorized brigades - one in ValCartier and the other in Petawawa.   I do not want to speculate on how much artillery and armour (tanks) we should have although I am a believer in tanks - even light tanks (as opposed to _Stryker_ type systems) can have a tremendous impact in low and medium intensity operations.   The full _shock effect_ of armour is only realized when tracked behemoths with real guns clank their way onto the ridge or, even more shocking, around the corner.   (When I _googled_ "light tank 105 mmâ ? I found, to my surprise, three modern systems - the American _Stingray_ (updated, it says, from the time I first saw them back in the '70s) and _Buford_ and the Austrian _Ulan_ LT 105 variant.   Evidently I am not the only person who thinks that a light tank is suitable for *some* units in *some* situations.)

"¢	Atlantic Command: one amphibious infantry heavy battle group in Comox - with some light armoured/mobile gun vehicles - _Strykers_, I suppose, and _organic_ (part of a _composite_ cavalry squadron) attack helicopters, along with a battery of either light howitzers or heavy mortars plus engineers, medics, and logistics, including military police elements.

That brings me to something like:

"¢	One armoured (tank) regiment - plus I would buy tanks for several (five or six) training areas, primarily for militia use by units earmarked for a tank role on mobilization;

"¢	Two light armoured regiments - _Strykers_;

"¢	One aviation (attack helicopter) regiment - one permanent squadron, two militia squadrons;

"¢	One _composite_ cavalry regiment (armour + attack helicopters + recce) and two, independent, _composite_ amphibious cavalry squadrons;

"¢	One reconnaissance regiment - ISTAR++;

"¢	Three medium artillery regiments - two with, perhaps, only one or two permanent force batteries;

"¢	One light artillery, airborne/air mobile regiment and two independent amphibious light batteries;

"¢	One air defence regiment - one permanent force battery;

"¢	One combat engineer regiment;

"¢	One light airborne/air mobile engineer regiment - with a field squadron, and airfield squadron and a base support squadron;

"¢	Two independent amphibious engineer squadrons - with a field troop and a base/port troop;

"¢	Appropriate signals, EW and intelligence units - all squadrons and independent troops, I would think - no regimental sized units in a relatively small army;

"¢	Fourteen (Eleven permanent and three 'ready' reserve) battalions of infantry - three (2+1) airborne/air mobile, two amphibious, three mechanized, and six (4+2) motorized;

"¢	Several medical/dental and logistics units.   I cannot enter the fray over service battalions vs. functional battalions.   The latter are cheaper and more efficient; the former are more effective *if* one plans to conduct brigade level operations on a regular basis; and

"¢	One tactical (transport) helicopter regiment - in the logistics branch, mixed regular and militia squadrons - and an independent squadron and two independent flights.

_Regimental_ (LCol's command) cap badges in the permanent and 'ready reserve' militia (I didn't include medical):

"¢	Cavalry: 5

"¢	Artillery: 5 

"¢	Engineers: 2

"¢	Infantry: 14

"¢	Logistics: 4 or 5

And that, by the way, is how I got (part way) to 65,000 people in the _operational_ permanent force and a $20 billion budget, and not too, too far away, I think, from _Kirkhill_, although I think I have an additional brigade because I don't think his force has enough in ready reserve.

Edited, twice to correct format and grammar errors


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## Kirkhill

Thanks for the nod, R.O.J.  I appreciate it.

I take your point on the ready reserve, I forgot to consider both the need and the possibility of using high readiness militiamen to boost the number of available units.

Otherwise, as you say, there is a lot of agreement.

One area where there is a question mark is in terms of TAC Air and Strategic Lift.  Essentially the "high-dollar" stuff.  While I agree that we can afford 2% of GCP and that we should spend that amount I have yet to see any indication that our Government is serious about that kind of investment - more shame them.  As a result I was trying to trim my suit to suit the cloth and create some sort of effective force out of what's available.

The shame is that the difference between our current budget and the budget necessary to do things right is 50 to 60 cents per Canadian per day.  If we spent a dollar then we could go a long way to meeting Pearson's goal of 0.7% of GDP on Foreign Aid as well.

Other than that point, this taxpayer would invest in your scheme.

On your point about Light Tanks, if you are looking for some more light reading then you might want to take a look at some of these vehicles as well: the new German Puma, the Swedish CV90 as well as the Spanish ASCOD.  All of them, in roughly the 20 to 40 tonne range have a good weight of armour, and can carry a section or any weapons system up to a 120mm tank gun.  This is a link that I find very useful http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ . There are companion sites for air force and naval projects.

Cheers, Sir.


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## Ex-Dragoon

> "¢   Two blue water task forces - destroyers and frigates, long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces which can deploy globally to project Canadian power and protect Canadian vital interests;



And if subs are not part of your TG structure then you are just kidding yourself to be able to do an effective job.


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## Infanteer

Don't want to put words into ROJ's mouth, but I would think the principal would be subs, cruisers, the _Dreadnought_ - whatever you Navy squids deem effective to control the sea-lanes and the Canadian littoral.


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## birdgunnnersrule

> First, the exception which proves the rule.   There is one function for which joint forces are not, normally, required: theatre air defence.   As a general rule, even in a joint theatre command all air defence forces are under the control of one, single air commander â â€œ this is essential for effective airspace management.   The air defence region normally covers the largest possible area â â€œ defined by the ranges of sensors and aircraft from bases.   For us, in Canada, that means all of North America â â€œ from Alert to the outer edges of the Caribbean and from Alaska to (and below) the Panama Canal.   This is, of course, the role of NORAD and we, Canada, need surveillance and warning and interceptor forces to identify, track, categorize, intercept (if necessary) and deal with everyone and everything which enters our sovereign airspace and our area of interest.   Our air force does not need navy or army help with this task â â€œ it, the air force, is (or can be) properly organized for the job, all by itself



I am sorry, but you are mistaken when it comes to the Air Force controlling all Air Defence forces under on single Air Commander.     I know that you are referring to the big picture, but Air Defence (Army/ADATS) has a AirSpace Coordination Center in conjunction with the FSCC and Air/Avn LO control the airspace from an army perspective on the battlefield.   We are not commanded by air force, but we provide the necessary link between the army and airforce for Airspace deconfliction.  General rule of thumb, below 10000 is mine above is there's...this really bothers the helicopter pilots who usually have to wait for us to clear them. The airforce will publish daily a detailed breakdown of sorties.   Through the grapevine I heard that in Afghanistan it was a jumble as it included Iraq and Afghanistan missions and took a lot of time to go through just to find out one was related to Kabul.   The ASCC   must break down all of these sorties to see what comes through our AO.   Once that is done we deconflict any problems with our fellow army personnel might have with the flights.   Throughout the day it is also likely to get Spins, or flights that we not planned. The Avn/Air LO is our link to the air force. Although I sometimes wonder what it would be like to have a blue beret and for the soldiers in my unit to get Spec pay as Radar Operators, sadly I wake inside the M577 Command Post with drool on the log book and another Spin to plot on the mapboard.   

[inserted quote boxes for you - Infanteer]


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## pbi

> Through the grapevine I heard that in Afghanistan it was a jumble as it included Iraq and Afghanistan missions and took a lot of time to go through just to find out one was related to Kabul.



It's not so much that it's a "jumble": it's that there is one theatre ATO produced that covers Afghanistan, Iraq and the immediately adjacent airspaces. This is seen to be the best way to coordinate the resources with ops under different commanders occurring so close together, and with the practice of assets from one part of the theatre being called to another. Cheers.


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## birdgunnnersrule

Thanks for clarifying my jumble..had a braincramp and couldn't remember ATO.


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## ArmyRick

Kirkhill and ROJ, well thought out plans and well said. We should invite the land, maritime and air commanders and the CDS to read some of this stuff.


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## George Wallace

Now ArmyRick; are you sure they aren't?   The popularity of this site is catching on and some ideas from here seem to be popping up in DND.......Who are all those "Guests" reading this?

GW


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## bossi

George Wallace said:
			
		

> ... The popularity of this site is catching on and some ideas from here seem to be popping up in DND.......Who are all those "Guests" reading this?



Which reminds me ... 25 and 23 Svc Bn's should be merged to form 48 Svc Bn, ditto for 25 and 23 Fd Amb/Hosp ...
(purely for cost-savings, of course ... and nothing to do with "synchronising" them with ... the 48th Highlanders ... ha!)

And then there's all the money the Army could save on underwear, if only kilts were more widely issued ...


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## pbi

> And then there's all the money the Army could save on underwear, if only kilts were more widely issued ...



Wouldn't work in the PPCLI. We'd have to issue extra web straps to stop things dragging on the ground. >  Cheers.


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## McG

Not to worry pbi, we could put pockets in the kilts to protect your knuckles. 
:evil: ouch! it burns.  :evil:


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## pbi

Ummmmm. (_thinks for a moment...) _  Oh, yeah?  :rage:  :rage:  :rage:
Cheers.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

As a nuetral observer, I would have to say game, set and match to McQ.


----------



## George Wallace

Now that we find Gen Hillier is to become the CDS and his feelings towards us filling niche roles in our future Combat endeavors, it truly looks like the CF is dead.  We can forseeably see the Armour Corps totally destroyed, with the exception of a few Surveillance type roles.  Infantry will become solely Infantry, with no Mech, no Airborne, no Support Wpn capabilities....more of a paramilitary force than an Armed Force.  The Artillery will slowly shrink down to Mortarmen.  The Navy will not be able to maintain any of their War Fighting skills above or below surface.  The Airforce may be lucky to keep the Snow Birds in the air for a year or two....

To fill niche roles, we have to have a capable Total Force.  We must have that so that we will know how to fit into those niches we are looking at filling.  If we don't keep a Total Force, we won't have the experience to even keep our future elite "niche troops" skilled.  We are loosing everywhere with this attitude.  We are laying down and dying.  Once lost, all our combat skills will take decades to relearn, at a great lose of lives.  It is a very long, slippery and dangerous slope we are being lead into.

Call me a dinosaur if you wish, but I believe that the most High Tech item we have in our inventory is our Soldier.  The more info we can load into his "Brain Housing Group" the more likely we are to succeed.  Give him the skills he needs and he will do the job.  Take those skills away and he becomes an expensive piece of cannon fodder.  

GW


----------



## pbi

I think you may have misunderstood the Gen, or maybe there's something floating about I haven't read? (We've been disconnected from the 'Net here in Bagram for four days-just came back on now.) Your despondent post seems a bit drastic.

Cheers.


----------



## CupFrantic

Two questions we must ask ourselves before we formulate a plan for the restructuring of the armed forces are: 

            1) What do we want our military to do (what will be the role of our armed forces) including this role being supported by      the government.

             2) I believe that the military will never see realistically more than a 18 billion(this is the best we can hope for from any governing party even the conservatives. That means everything we buy or operate must be deployable and will be commonly deployed.

Its nice to dream but it is time to be realistic.


----------



## George Wallace

We have to stop with this "make do" attitude.  It has been in effect since the 1950's and ever since, Lefties have been asking for the 'Peace Dividend' and we have sank lower and lower in our abilities and capabilities.  An Army has to have a "Back Bone" to be effective.  Ours has turned to mush.

GW


----------



## Edward Campbell

George Wallace said:
			
		

> We have to stop with this "make do" attitude.   It has been in effect since the 1950's and ever since, Lefties have been asking for the 'Peace Dividend' and we have sank lower and lower in our abilities and capabilities.   An Army has to have a "Back Bone" to be effective.   Ours has turned to mush.
> 
> GW



But, see Hugh Winsor in today's _Globe and Mail_ at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050117.wwinsor17/BNStory/Front/

Winsor is a well connected Ottawa insider and he is quoting good sources when he notes that DND has a poor reputation (at the 'centre' (PMO and Finance, all that really matters)) for whining (includes ministers, most senior civil servants *and* most senior military officers).

The *grownups* are not convinced that DND is as bad off as we, here in army.ca, or 'they' in NDHQ say ... every time 'they' plead overstretched and the government says â Å“one more timeâ ? the senior staff moans and groans and then gets on with it.   The 'centre' wants less moaning and groaning and more 'getting on with it.'   The guesstimating in Ottawa is that Hillier will deliver and that he (the military) will not be rewarded for it.   

Emphasis added



> Hugh Winsor
> 
> 'Can do' general right choice for Forces
> 
> In spite of the Paul Martin government's notoriously sclerotic difficulties making appointments and its inability to crack heads to get agreement on a new foreign and defence policy, someone seems to have got it right in picking Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier to be the new chief of the Canadian Armed Forces.
> 
> Choosing Gen. Hillier, an in-your-face, 49-year-old Newfoundlander with a self-deprecating sense of humour, meant bypassing the two most senior officers in the current chain of command. The move is meant to send the message things are going to change in the Armed Forces, even if a lot of gold braid and even some political egos could be ruffled in the process.
> 
> Mr. Martin and his Liberal government say they want a more proactive defence capability, allowing them to play harder on the world stage. They have made lots of promises including a stand-alone peacekeeping brigade but little has happened so far. *Regardless of their merits, arguments coming from National Defence headquarters to the effect the forces are overstretched, underfunded and in need of an operational pause were perceived as whining in some political circles*.
> 
> Gen. Hillier, with extensive command experience in Europe, the United States and Afghanistan, as well as in Canada, is seen as a "can do" sort of soldier who will be more inclined to say "Let's deploy," when the politicians come calling. The new chief also talks the right jargon about failing states as the major contributor to international instability. He makes it clear his priority will be restructuring DND to boost capacity for rapidly deployed expeditionary forces to respond to those failures.
> 
> The initiative to appoint Gen. Hillier rather than one of his more senior colleagues came from Defence Minister Bill Graham, after a lot of back-channel consultation last fall, reaching down into the ranks as well to retired officers and academics. Just before Christmas, the general and the minister went to 24 Sussex Dr. for a long meeting with Mr. Martin.
> 
> What apparently happened is an agreement to changes Gen. Hillier wants to make to the structure of the Forces and a commitment for enough funds to make it happen. That will be reflected in procurement â â€ modernized equipment for infantry soldiers with better air and sea lift to get them overseas. There will be a shakeup of structures, vigorous recruitment and reformed training programs. As one of Mr. Graham's confidants put it, "We expect to see Rick Hillier kick ass around here."
> 
> The dichotomy between the present plodding and the intended future will be underlined today when Mr. Martin visits the much-criticized Disaster Assistance Response Team in Sri Lanka, which is only getting up to steam three weeks after the tsunamis hit.
> 
> Contrast that with the performance of the disaster response team by Italy. At 6:40 on Dec. 27, the morning after the tsunamis, the first Italian plane landed on the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. Within 48 hours, another team had established a field hospital in Sri Lanka complete with carabinieri to protect them and firefighters to rescue people from collapsed buildings. The Italians also brought two amphibious water bombers (made by Canadair in Montreal), which permitted them to deliver supplies to disaster areas with no airports.
> 
> The difference is that the Italian Department for Civilian Protection, covering both domestic and foreign disaster relief, is a stand-alone organization with authority to commandeer any military or civilian resources needed, including aircraft. It needs only a phone call to the prime minister to go.The Canadian DART criticism is misplaced, according to angry officials at DND. They were ready to move within hours, but couldn't get a decision out of the government. As Doug Bland, who heads a military studies program at Queen's University, put it, "the guys were in the fire hall, the doors were open, the engines were running, but there were no dispatchers to tell them where to go."


----------



## George Wallace

Let's not confuse the "Make Do" attitude with the "Can Do" attitude.  Canadian Forces personnel are very proficient as the "Can Do" type of people, making things happen with little or no resources, but sheer initiative.  The "Make Do" attitude of the Cdn People is neutering the CF in their abilities to get things done, in that fewer and fewer resources are being allocated to replace current equipment, personnel, and infrastructures and initiative will not be able to carry the day.  Eventually that "Can Do" spirit will have just got up and left.

GW


----------



## Wizard of OZ

This thread was a long read dating back to 2001.  I have to agree with GW on his point of can do and make do.  The Make do attitude is the polictal one that is forced upon the CF (no longer the armed forces as it is to aggressive for Ottawa) and the Can Do is from the young men and women who do it on a daily basis with little support from the majority of the puplic and none from the the Ivory Towers in Ottawa. Where the suits are are to busy wasting precious resources on studies and re-searching things instead of buying the necessary goods to get the job done.

What do i think the CF should look like (may be a pipe dream but hey its my dream)

Army 50,000 to 70,000 this includes the armour MBT's not the MGS and artillery
Air Force 20,000 to 35,000 with stratigic lift capability and a new fighter some time in the next 10 yrs with at least 150 of them for front line service with 50 for training.
Navy of 35,000 to 50,000 with the new support ships and subs( not those used ones from England) maybe 4 nuc boats LA class from the states?

Total no more then 150,000, this total according to the paper today including all expenses and equipment could be acieved for 15 billion dollars.(5000 troops to cost 500 million)   that covers medical, pensions, salary and training.  Of corse more money would have to be spent on upgrading the equipment and such so say for 20 billion over 4 yrs.  

NOT AN UNREALISTIC OPTION.

Now all we have to do is get the government on board.

Anybody have a different opinion???


----------



## Brad Sallows

"Can do" promotes "make do".

As I've written here before, professionalism places soldiers in a Catch-22 situation.  The CF is ultimately controlled by bureaucrats and politicians.  Politicians and bureaucrats tend to ignore anything which isn't manifestly broken or accompanied by loud protestations.  The way to get something fixed is to stand back and let it break.  But that is contrary to a soldier's professionalism.


----------



## Kirkhill

Right you are Brad, which puts it squarely back in the hands of the politicians and the electorate as to how much and what.  And the "soldier" gets to determine if he likes the terms of service.


----------



## Cannon Fodder

Bonjour a tout le monde!

I know that this is a question that requires a complicated answer but I am curious about the opinions of other people on this issue, so here it is.  Given our current operational tempo and possible future deployments needed to fight the war on terror what would would be the ideal size and capabilities of the CF to respond to these threats?

The way I see it we have 4 factors to consider: Domestic Ops, the role of the Navy, the role of the Air Force, and the capabilities of the Army (I am assuming that the army would have to meet the requirements of a 3 block war).

In my opinion (uninformed as it may be) the Navy and the Air Force should focus on supporting and transporting the army.  Support in this sense should include offensive ground support capabilities i.e. attack helicopters.  The Army reserve should be well equipped to augment the Regs and well equipped for Dom Ops.  This would mean using some of the same equipment as the Reg force for training.  For example having a couple of LAV3s or Coyotes in each infantry/Armour unit respectively.  Additionally there should be greater ties to local retailers (Walmart, Canadian Tire) to quickly get any miscellaneous equipment not normally supplied by the CF.  

As far as army capabilities, I like Tanks.  Granted that they may not be as useful in the 3 block war if we get rid of them we will lose the skills required for armoured warfare to fight a bigger war. The Direct fire system is a good idea but they should use a real tank instead of the MGS, its too wimpy.   Maybe the infantry should get the airborne regiment back.  

As far as the size of the Army goes maybe we should be able to deploy and sustain a brigade in more then one country at a time.  Like I said I am uninformed.  Ideas S.V.P.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Some related threads, for background information:

What Should the Army's Role & Structure Be? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html

why would we need a large military? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/1450.0.html

Expanded role for ... reserves? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/17.0.html

What should the role of Canada's Army Reserves be? How should they structure & train for it? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html


----------



## Michael OLeary

Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> Bonjour a tout le monde!
> 
> I know that this is a question that requires a complicated answer but I am curious about the opinions of other people on this issue, so here it is.  Given our current operational tempo and possible future deployments needed to fight the war on terror what would would be the ideal size and capabilities of the CF to respond to these threats?



That is a topical question; closely related to and following - What should our defence policy be?



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> The way I see it we have 4 factors to consider: Domestic Ops, the role of the Navy, the role of the Air Force, and the capabilities of the Army (I am assuming that the army would have to meet the requirements of a 3 block war).



That's one "task" and three services. Each service will require the development of tasks to meet defence policy expectation. And don't forget all the niche elements, like JTF-2, of course.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> In my opinion (uninformed as it may be) the Navy and the Air Force should focus on supporting and transporting the army.



That's one opinion, others may differ.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> Support in this sense should include offensive ground support capabilities i.e. attack helicopters.



Search, attack helicopters has been discussed.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> The Army reserve should be well equipped to augment the Regs and well equipped for Dom Ops.  This would mean using some of the same equipment as the Reg force for training.



That's two major roles, with few overlapping skills/equipment - and still on a 37 trg day per member funding allocation. You may have to be more specific; unless this is a "money is no object" discussion.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> For example having a couple of LAV3s or Coyotes in each infantry/Armour unit respectively.



Explore the success (or not, depending on POV) of having a few Grizzlies/Cougar in designated units.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> Additionally there should be greater ties to local retailers (Walmart, Canadian Tire) to quickly get any miscellaneous equipment not normally supplied by the CF.



You mean closer ties than just buying it when the mission dictates? You want sponsorship agreements perhaps?:



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> As far as army capabilities, I like Tanks.  Granted that they may not be as useful in the 3 block war if we get rid of them we will lose the skills required for armoured warfare to fight a bigger war. The Direct fire system is a good idea but they should use a real tank instead of the MGS, its too wimpy.



Search, you'll find all the discussion on tanks and MGS you'll ever want to read.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> Maybe the infantry should get the airborne regiment back.



That's been discussed at length, try the search function.



			
				Cannon Fodder said:
			
		

> As far as the size of the Army goes maybe we should be able to deploy and sustain a brigade in more then one country at a time.  Like I said I am uninformed.  Ideas S.V.P.



Based on what defence policy objectives? Deployment range?, duration? capabilities? ......


----------



## pbi

Good comments Mike. In particular, WRT to the idea of mech trg for Res Inf, I know that during the recent Reserve Roles Missions and Tasks review process our five Inf units in 38 CBG resolutely rejected any such idea, based on the "non-success" of the Grizzly fiasco. They put their money squarely on concentrating on basic Inf skills.

Res already have a Dom Ops role, which varies slightly from LFA to LFA. As you correctly identified, the question of training them for Dom Ops raises the second order question of time and money. If you train for Dom Ops (whatever that training would be...I still don't really get it...fill sandbags?) then how do you train for combat with 37 days of training and a limited budget? If you don't train for combat, then what happens to the Res augmentation role? If all the Res do is disaster response, why do we need them in the CF? Why not create a Civil Defence, as we had in the 1950s, and put it under OCIPEP.

Cheers


----------



## AIC_2K5

Hi everyone, thought I would put my two cents in on my opinion for Land Forces Restructure...

The way I see it, we have 4 main pillars to adapt to in respect to LFR:
     1. Increase size of army;
     2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;
     3. Enforcing new 3-year cycle to allow sustained overseas deployments and;
     4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'

     Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare. In order to do this, we would cut the CF into 5 Brigades, 3 Mechanized and 2 Light:

1 CMBG - Edmonton, Alberta
2 CLBG  - Shilo, Manitoba
3 CMBG - Petawawa, Ontario
4 CLBG  - The Citadel, Quebec
5 CMBG - Valcartier, Quebec

(The two bases that would house the CLBGs would obviously have to be enlarged)

     Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs. The 3 LIBs from the CMBGs would be transfered to the CLBGs. The Jump company would be removed from the LIBs and replaced with a rifle company. The LIBs would become actual 'infantry' battalions, and would lose any quasi-SF duties that was previously stamped on them (These duties would be replaced by stand up of Canadian Special Operations Regiment). This would relieve MIBs of any LI duties and they would focus primarily on mechanized warfare for high/medium-intensity conflicts. The structure of the brigades would be housed around the new task force system, as it is no longer likely that we would send an entire brigade group overseas. This would entitle all support and combat arms units within the brigade to be reorganized so that they would be easier divided up to support TFs. 

Here is how the Brigades would be organized:

CMBG

1 Armoured Regiment (2 Direct-fire squadrons, 2 Recce squadrons)
2 Mechanized Infantry Battalions
1 Engineer Regiment (2 Field Squadrons, with supporting units divided up between them)
1 Arty Regiment (5 batteries: 2 LAV SP 155 mm batteries of 8 guns each, 2 HIMARS batteries of 4 vehs each, 1 UAV battery -> 2 troops)
1 CSS Battalion (2 supply coys, 2 transport coys, 2 maintenance coys)
1 MP Company (2 platoons)
1 Medical Company (2 platoons)
1 THS (2 Flights of 4 Griffins each)

Basicly divided each unit in half to form 2 seperate Mechanized Infantry Task Force units.

CLBG

3 Light Infantry Battalions
1 Engineer Regiment (3 Field Squadrons, with supporting units divided up between them)
1 Arty Regiment (4 Batteries: 3 batteries of 6 155 mm M777s, 1 UAV battery -> divided into 3 UAV troops)
1 CSS Battalion (3 Transport Coys/pltns, 3 Maintenance Coys/pltns, 3 Supply Coys/pltns)
1 MP Company (3 platoons)
1 Medical Company (3 platoons)
1 THS (3 Flights of 6 Griffins each)

Divide each unit by 3 to attain 3 individual Light Infantry Task Force units.

     Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.

     Basicly at any given point in the 3-year cycle, 1 Mechanized Infantry, 1 Light Infantry, and 1 Reserve Light Infantry Task Force would be deployable overseas.



Any comments?

Thanks


----------



## McG

Not sure why you would try to shoe-horn a Bde into down-town Quebec instead of Gagetown.

I also do not see reserve BGs being feasible in this country.

Your arty regts seem excessively massive, and your engineer regiments inadequate.

Why not go with just two CMBGs with thee deployable manoeuvre BGs each?


----------



## George Wallace

AIC_2K5  

I don't know what your experience is, but it really doesn't show as being much in your post.


----------



## Infanteer

AIC_2K5 said:
			
		

> 1. Increase size of army;



Okay, by how much?



> 2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;



What is smoothlining?



> 3. Enforcing new 3-year cycle to allow sustained overseas deployments and;



Don't we already have this with ATOF?



> 4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'



What's the "Big L"?



> Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare.



Are they fat and bulky?  They seem to be pretty close in size and structure to what Douglas MacGregor proposed in Breaking the Phalanx (a key driver of Transformation in the US) and what the US Army is going towards with the Unit of Action.  As well, they are similar in size to what US Marine RCT's that were formed for Iraq.



> 4 CLBG   - The Citadel, Quebec



Stick a whole brigade in downtown Quebec?!?



> Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs.



Okay, where are the 3 extra Infantry Battalions coming from, Army growth?



> The 3 LIBs from the CMBGs would be transfered to the CLBGs. The Jump company would be removed from the LIBs and replaced with a rifle company. The LIBs would become actual 'infantry' battalions, and would lose any quasi-SF duties that was previously stamped on them (These duties would be replaced by stand up of Canadian Special Operations Regiment). This would relieve MIBs of any LI duties and they would focus primarily on mechanized warfare for high/medium-intensity conflicts.



That's another option - one I'm prone to.



> The structure of the brigades would be housed around the new task force system, as it is no longer likely that we would send an entire brigade group overseas. This would entitle all support and combat arms units within the brigade to be reorganized so that they would be easier divided up to support TFs.



Essentially a "modular Brigade".  Would formation-level capability be preserved?



> Here is how the Brigades would be organized:



That's alot of extra arty, engineers and support.  How many numbers would this add to your enlargement scheme?  Is this palatable?



> Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.



Is this desirable?  People don't usually join the Reserves to be plugged into a readiness-cycle.  That's why it is called the "Reserve".


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Don't we already have this with ATOF?


ATOF was replaced was replaced with a new three year cycle (managed readiness), that does not work any better.


----------



## Acorn

AIC_2K5 said:
			
		

> Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations.



Are they? Given that battalions are around 300-400 troops?


----------



## AIC_2K5

Thanks for the feedback



> Your arty regts seem excessively massive, and your engineer regiments inadequate.



This artillery regiment organization may seem a little different than what we currently have, but the blueprint of transformation is defined by change from the past. In this example, I did not increase Engineer manning from current strength in hopes to decrease the increase of troops needed for the restructure (obviously this was a bad mistake on my part).



> 1. Increase size of army;
> 
> Okay, by how much?



I think if we add another 5,000 on top of the current goal, it should be doable. This will only happen under a conservative government...



> 2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;
> 
> What is smoothlining?



In order to get the best out of wheeled armoured vehicles, I propose reorganizing units at the battalion level so there are more combined arms units (UAV platoon and anti-tank lavs in infantry battalions). Also get rid of anything not based on a wheeled chasis; i.e. MTVL



> 4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'
> 
> What's the "Big L"?



A word dreaded by some MPs: Legislation



> Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare.
> 
> Are they fat and bulky?  They seem to be pretty close in size and structure to what Douglas MacGregor proposed in Breaking the Phalanx (a key driver of Transformation in the US) and what the US Army is going towards with the Unit of Action.  As well, they are similar in size to what US Marine RCT's that were formed for Iraq.



In my opinion, yes. I still think our brigade formations are organized to fight a cold war on a formation-level battlefield. Our brigades _are_ rather large in comparison to many of our allies. When you look at it, we have 3 infantry battalions, 2 mechanized, and one armoured regiment. We then have to field the support elements for these forces. An American infantry UA is based around just 2 infantry battalions; a heavy UA 2 combined arms battalions (M1s/Bradleys); and a Stryker UA 3 combined arms battalions. I say downsize and streamsize our brigades just a little bit, but not too small so that they are not capable of fielding a brigade-level formation in time of high-intensity conflict. 



> 4 CLBG  - The Citadel, Quebec
> 
> Stick a whole brigade in downtown Quebec?!?



Now that I think about it, this was probably not the greatest idea. But I am learning, and that's what I'm here for.



> Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs.
> 
> Okay, where are the 3 extra Infantry Battalions coming from, Army growth?



Supposedly yes.



> Here is how the Brigades would be organized:
> 
> That's alot of extra arty, engineers and support.  How many numbers would this add to your enlargement scheme?  Is this palatable?



Yes and no. Not under the Libs, anyway.



> Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.
> 
> Is this desirable?  People don't usually join the Reserves to be plugged into a readiness-cycle.  That's why it is called the "Reserve".



If this were passed, I know this would defenatly be one of the more controversial issues of the modern military in this fragile Canadian society. The US does this with the National Gaurd, but keep in mind they also deploy for 12 months at a time as opposed to 6.



> Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations.
> 
> Are they? Given that battalions are around 300-400 troops?



But then take into account the support units. I don't think anyone can argue that they can honestly see an entire Canadian Army brigade, as a formation, on a future battlefield. It's not realistic. But I think it can be with this structure. Replace old large brigade with smaller, faster, more technology-oriented and more powerful brigade.



Anything to add?
Thanks


----------



## McG

AIC_2K5 said:
			
		

> ... take into account the support units. I don't think anyone can argue that they can honestly see an entire Canadian Army brigade, as a formation, on a future battlefield. It's not realistic. But I think it can be with this structure. Replace old large brigade with smaller, faster, more technology-oriented and more powerful brigade.


I don't know.  You've doubled the size of the Svc Bn and raised the MP Pl to a Coy.  I don't see your slimming effect (except for the Fd Amb which you've cut to a single Coy).


----------



## George Wallace

George Wallace said:
			
		

> AIC_2K5
> 
> I don't know what your experience is, but it really doesn't show as being much in your post.


Once again; I would like to know your credentials.  You don't seem to really have the knowledge to be playing the role you are here.  If you are a Gamer, you truly have no concept of what you are talking about.  You actually have no knowledge of what facilites the CF really has.  You have deconstructed and reconstructed Brigades and moved them about the Country on what appears to be a pure whim.  Real Life is not like that.

Your statement: "But then take into account the support units. I don't think anyone can argue that they can honestly see an entire Canadian Army brigade, as a formation, on a future battlefield. It's not realistic. But I think it can be with this structure. Replace old large brigade with smaller, faster, more technology-oriented and more powerful brigade." is udder crap.  The Canadian Army will have to be prepared to fight. and fight as a Bde Formation in the future.  You seem to look at us as "Peacekeepers" and off on NATO or UN Taskings on a small scale.  I am also amazed that you haven't heard of Murphy's Law in your concept of a more technology-oriented and powerful brigade.  

Again, fill out your profile, and give some credentials, before you become CDS.


----------



## scottishcanuck

Army

1 Canadian task force
1 cmbg 
2cmbg
3cmbg

2 Canadian task force
4 cmbg
5cmbg
6cmbg

Units of cmbg
-2 mech battalion-could easily be used as light infantry
-1 light battalion
1 tank regiment
-3 squadrons of 20 tanks
- 1 recce squadron
1 arty regiment
-3 batteries of SP 155mm guns
1 engineer regiment
1 squadron of 10 attack Helios
logistic units

Navy

1 pacific task force
Not sure about what kinds of ships make up task force so wont try but at least 1 aircraft carrier.
1 atlantic task force
same as pacific

Airforce

3 air task forces
Units

4 squadrons of 18 Cf 18's each

Transportation- whatever needed


new at things like this so easy on me.  all we need is money and troops,sailors,pilots. also put back the royal in our name i.e rcaf,rcn, and Canadian army


----------



## PAT-Platoon

scottishcanuck said:
			
		

> also put back the royal in our name i.e rcaf,rcn, and Canadian army



I believe that the King/Queen awards certain organizations the Royal monicker, correct me if Im wrong. I.E.


----------



## George Wallace

I have locked this topic, because we now have people who have just joined this site without reading the rules, have no experience, and have not read any of the topics and information on this site.


----------



## GR66

I find this to be a very interesting discussion and would love to contribute but seeing as I don't HAVE a lane to be in any comments I might have are automatically OUTSIDE my lane.  That being said I guess I have nothing to lose but my head by throwing my own comment/question out there.

Are we creating more problems than we are solving by trying hard to stick to the existing Branch, Division, Brigade, Battalion template that we already have instead of creating something new that better suits our need.  

Could we create a formation that looks "something" like this:

1 x CCV Infantry Company
2 x LAV Infantry Companies
2 x Light Infantry Companies (using light wheeled vehicles)
1 x Medium Lift Helicopter Sqn (Chinook)
1 x Utility Helicopter Sqn (Griffon)
1 x Tank Sqn (Leopard)
2 x Recce/Surveilance Sqn (?/Coyote)
1 x Artillery Unit
1 x Engineer Unit

A Battle Group deployed from this unit could be be configured in any possible combination of ways...the CCV Coy and both LAV Coy's with the Tank Sqn for heavy combat operations...2 Lav Coys
and a Light Coy....1 LAV Coy and 2 Light Coys....whatever.  Don't get picky about what the exact make-up of each sub-unit is or what they are equipped with...it's just the general concept for a more flexible parent unit with rough "examples" given.

Once the required "mix" is determined and deployed for the operation the remaining two Coys could begin work-up training to "convert" to match the deployed Coy types.  

How would this work in practice?  I'm not sure.  It would certainly mean fewer total Battalions (would they still be called that?).  Would these be new amalagamated units or would they be composites of existing Infantry/Armoured/Artillery/Engineer Regiments?  How would/could the component units be co-located...or how would logistical support be affected?

Maybe this isn't the right approach...but on the other hand maybe the old framework we're trying to cling to might possibly be part of the problem?


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## TangoTwoBravo

GR66 said:
			
		

> I find this to be a very interesting discussion and would love to contribute but seeing as I don't HAVE a lane to be in any comments I might have are automatically OUTSIDE my lane.  That being said I guess I have nothing to lose but my head by throwing my own comment/question out there.
> 
> Are we creating more problems than we are solving by trying hard to stick to the existing Branch, Division, Brigade, Battalion template that we already have instead of creating something new that better suits our need.
> 
> Could we create a formation that looks "something" like this:
> 
> 1 x CCV Infantry Company
> 2 x LAV Infantry Companies
> 2 x Light Infantry Companies (using light wheeled vehicles)
> 1 x Medium Lift Helicopter Sqn (Chinook)
> 1 x Utility Helicopter Sqn (Griffon)
> 1 x Tank Sqn (Leopard)
> 2 x Recce/Surveilance Sqn (?/Coyote)
> 1 x Artillery Unit
> 1 x Engineer Unit
> 
> A Battle Group deployed from this unit could be be configured in any possible combination of ways...the CCV Coy and both LAV Coy's with the Tank Sqn for heavy combat operations...2 Lav Coys
> and a Light Coy....1 LAV Coy and 2 Light Coys....whatever.  Don't get picky about what the exact make-up of each sub-unit is or what they are equipped with...it's just the general concept for a more flexible parent unit with rough "examples" given.
> 
> Once the required "mix" is determined and deployed for the operation the remaining two Coys could begin work-up training to "convert" to match the deployed Coy types.
> 
> How would this work in practice?  I'm not sure.  It would certainly mean fewer total Battalions (would they still be called that?).  Would these be new amalagamated units or would they be composites of existing Infantry/Armoured/Artillery/Engineer Regiments?  How would/could the component units be co-located...or how would logistical support be affected?
> 
> Maybe this isn't the right approach...but on the other hand maybe the old framework we're trying to cling to might possibly be part of the problem?



You have something like ten sub-units under one CO, along with two airforce units that are each unit sized. Its a span of control nightmare before even considering the mixture of branches. The Brigade Group structure works just fine.

Have you waded through the Optimal Battle Group thread http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html?


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## GR66

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> You have something like ten sub-units under one CO, along with two airforce units that are each unit sized. Its a span of control nightmare before even considering the mixture of branches. The Brigade Group structure works just fine.
> 
> Have you waded through the Optimal Battle Group thread http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html?



I certainly have waded through that thread.  I'm simply throwing the question out there of whether the overarching structures we're dealing with are hindering our ability to be both flexible and "Joint"?  

Are the control issues you mention AUTOMATICALLY going to happen when you mix units with different functions into a larger grouping, or are those problems simply due to trying to mix them together without also changing the way those units are organized at a higher level?

The CF has been "unified" from a separate Army, Navy and Air Force...but has it really become a "Joint" force?  Will adjusting organizational charts at the Company, Battalion, Regimental or Brigade level get us where people feel we need to be to be truly effective or does there need to be a more fundamental change in the way we think at a much higher level for that to happen?


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## TangoTwoBravo

GR66 said:
			
		

> I certainly have waded through that thread.  I'm simply throwing the question out there of whether the overarching structures we're dealing with are hindering our ability to be both flexible and "Joint"?
> 
> Are the control issues you mention AUTOMATICALLY going to happen when you mix units with different functions into a larger grouping, or are those problems simply due to trying to mix them together without also changing the way those units are organized at a higher level?
> 
> The CF has been "unified" from a separate Army, Navy and Air Force...but has it really become a "Joint" force?  Will adjusting organizational charts at the Company, Battalion, Regimental or Brigade level get us where people feel we need to be to be truly effective or does there need to be a more fundamental change in the way we think at a much higher level for that to happen?



Are you saying that we are not effective right now? Being Joint doesn't mean that I have to be in a Joint unit.

Even if all the sub-units in your unit were of the same branch, having ten sub-units under one commander is very unwieldy. What are you trying to achieve that cannot be done with our CMBG structure?


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## Edward Campbell

Although span of control certainly is an important issue, I would be more worried about two other issues:

1. specialization and training; and

2. utility.

The Army "groups for battle" so that units often look rather like GR66's model. But there is a problem: it (the Army) only spends a small percentage of its time in battle. Most units spend most of their time doing individual and team training. Experience suggests that _specialized_ (armoured *or* infantry *or* engineer) units are best suited for individual and team training. There is, to be sure, a major requirement for larger, combined arms or all arms, team training n but the same experience suggests this is easy enough to organize on an _ad hoc_ basis.

Some units, the helicopters units, can fill many, many missions for many, many _customers_ over a wide geographic area and in limited times. Aviation is a very flexible resource. Generally, for utility reasons, they are grouped with other similar aviation units to maximize their flexibility.

My  :2c:


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## Kirkhill

In its entirety from the Lexington Institute via defense-aerospace.com:



> The Last Army Standing
> 
> 
> (Source: Lexington Institute; issued April 18, 2013)
> 
> 
> (© Lexington Institute; reproduced by permission)
> 
> 
> 
> What is the value to the United States of the Army? This is a question which the Chief of Staff, General Odierno, and senior uniformed and civilian leaders of this venerable organization are having trouble answering.
> 
> They have experimented with a number of different arguments. For example, they assert that people and governments live and work on land and it is on land that you will have the greatest possibility to influence their behavior in peace or war. Forward deployed Army units demonstrate a national commitment, provide an opportunity for engagement with foreign militaries, elites and populations in ways that air and naval forces cannot and build a valuable knowledge base about foreign countries.
> 
> When it comes to the role of the Army in war, they argue that all violent conflicts are clashes of will and the best way of impacting the adversary’s will is to seize his territory. A related point is that only ground forces can ensure a decisive outcome to a conflict; nations and non-state actors alike have demonstrated an ability to withstand protracted air strikes and naval operations. The ultimate deterrent short of nuclear weapons is the threat of occupation and regime change.
> 
> So far, none of these arguments appear to be clinching the deal.
> 
> The most powerful strategic argument for the U.S. Army may simply be this: it is the last army standing in the Western World. Economics teaches us that scarcity tends to increase the value of a good. Large, capable, expeditionary land forces are becoming a scarce commodity.
> 
> In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the land forces of the Western powers have withered to the point of near irrelevance. The German Army has shrunk from around 500,000 when the Berlin Wall fell to some 180,000 today. Even at this number, Germany has had difficulty deploying as few as 10,000 soldiers to Afghanistan.
> 
> Britain’s legendary thin red line has become almost gossamer. From a Cold War strength of 225,000 with an entire armored corps deployed in Germany, the British Army is scheduled by 2020 to shrink to 127,000 of which only 89,000 will be Regulars. The French Army has declined by nearly the same amount, from 236,000 in 1992 to only 107,000 today. The Dutch Army recently sold all of its tanks. The only NATO land force of substantial size is the Turkish Army of 400,000. It is ironic that the next time the gates of Vienna need to be defended, it could require Turkish troops.
> 
> Elsewhere in the world the situation is much the same. There are few serious armies and none with the capacity to deploy much beyond their own borders.
> 
> The Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces have never numbered more than 150,000. The big kid on the block, so to speak, is the army of the Republic of Korea, at 500,000. But it is focused solely on the threat from the North. Australian land forces, albeit small, have traditionally punched above their weight, operating side by side with the United States Army from Vietnam to Afghanistan. One reason the United States is interested in closer military ties with India and Vietnam is because these countries are land powers.
> 
> U.S allies are investing in air and naval forces. This is a good thing. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program already has eight international partners with additional countries such as Israel, Japan and South Korea lining up to buy the new fighter. The Libyan operation demonstrated how far our NATO allies had come in their ability to conduct a protracted air campaign. Great Britain is building two new aircraft carriers and a fleet of advanced attack submarines. Japan already has several Aegis missile defense capable destroyers. What they are not doing is matching these steps with investments in ground forces.
> 
> A robust, flexible and expeditionary Army provides the United States with a unique strategic instrument. The reason for this is because there are serious and growing dangers in the world not only from rogue states and violent non-state actors but as a consequence of natural and man-made phenomena.
> 
> For allies and friends confronted by threats to their territory, populations and governments, the U.S. commitment to their security is enhanced by an ability to quite literally stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their armies. For adversaries there is the political as well as military value in a force that literally can come to their neighborhoods and dig them out of their spider holes. For populations, including our own, suffering from earthquakes, tsunamis, storms and major infrastructure failures, the Army’s ability to provide water, power, communications, transportation and engineering support cannot be minimized.
> 
> Before we allow it to become like those of our European allies, we should consider the value of having the last Army standing.
> 
> 
> (EDITOR’S NOTE: This reasoning sounds good, until one realizes that the last campaigns involving Allied land armies (including the Marines) were Iraq and Afghanistan, where their effectiveness in reaching their official objective – neutralizing Al Queda and assorted terrorists – has been doubtful at best, even after an entire decade.
> This lackadaisical campaign contrasts starkly with the effectiveness of the air campaigns against Serbia and Libya, and now the drone warfare waged on terrorist leaders. These proved a comparative bargain in terms of treasure, human lives and time, and clearly demonstrated that ground armies have become relatively useless for the pursuit of political goals.
> Given today’s geopolitical environment, the only ground troops needed are special forces, except for homeland defense, a manpower-heavy mission where reservists, home guard and military police units come into their own.
> So, large armies are the dinosaurs of the modern world, and given the unaffordable cost of the pay and benefits required by modern volunteer soldiers, they will inevitably be phased out.)



Two Three comments:

The editor of defense-aerospace (IMO) has form in supporting euro-think solutions - so I tend to take his comments on the Americans with a grain of salt;

I'm not convinced that this applies directly to Canada because I believe that all Canadian Forces can be seen as "Special" in the sense that the forces raised for the Boer War and Korea were Special Service - the Canadian track record on the use of force is one of force sparingly applied both in terms of frequency and scale.   Even World War 1 and 2, although large in scale, were deliberate choices on the part of the politicians.

Currently, although there are enough HQs for a Corps there are only enough troops for a good sized Brigade Group.  That alone makes the force special.

Edited for a Grand Inquisitor moment - Has anyone got a comfy chair?


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## a_majoor

The traditional purpose of a large, standing army was to intimidate your rivals, and when the dust settled, supply the occupying force to ensure the locals paid taxes to _your_ Procouncel. Armies, beyond garrison forces, are traditionally instruments of Imperial power.

In the modern world, we "may" be able to move beyond these models simply because there are far more efficient means to get what you want beyond the raw, Imperial model of occupying territory and seizing wealth and resources. It is perhaps ironic that the Americans are the masters of these techniques, they buy what they want or need and seduce everyone else with totally irresistable industrial, consumer and cultural products for sale. In such an environment, having a Navy to secure the sea lanes for trade and an expeditionary force to kick down doors and punch the right people in the face when they screw up peaceful trade for everyone else may be the "right" formula.

If that is the case, a small expeditionary army or Marine force may be quite appropriate. Given the global reach and responsibilities of the United States, their expeditionary force will be larger and have a much more robust logistical tail than most other force (and indeed, it may well evolve that the primary function of the US forces is to provide global logistic support for their allies)


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