# German Doctrinal Changes in the First World War



## TangoTwoBravo (12 Feb 2008)

The thread on Equipment and Doctrine has had me thinking and looking at how Doctrine evolves.  I came across a good little paper titled The Dynamics of Doctrine:  The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.  It is authored by Timothy Lupfer from the West Point History Department as part of the _Leavenworth Papers _ in July 1981.  It is a relatively easy read and provides an excellent overview of the German doctrinal process during the war.  The book opens with a quote from Wilhelm Balck ,a WWI German divisional commander and writer on tactics (his son should be known to students of WWII), that *"Bullets quickly write new tactics."*  Two developments that receive attention in the book are the _elastic defence _ adopted in 1917 and the _offensive tactics of 1918_.  

The elastic defence grew out of German studies of the defensive battles of 1916, particularly the Somme.  While British commentators focus on the horrific British losses of the Somme, the Germans also suffered high casualties trying to hold forward positions in the face of heavy artillery preparation.  Out of this experience grew the idea of an elastic defence based on several lines of defence.  Forward lines would be lightly held and the enemy would essentially be allowed to enter into a _battle zone_ within the depth of the defence.  Machine gun posts would engage the advancing enemy from the flanks and the rear, while the artillery would hold fire during the preparation phase and focus on hitting the advancing enemy within the main line of resistance.  Counterattacks would then hit the isolated and confused enemies.  Ground was not seen as important in and of itself.

The offensive tactics employed in 1918 have been given many names by non-German observers, ranging from Hutier Tactics to Storm Troop tactics.  The author prefers the term _infiltration_ but he notes that the term infiltration it goes beyond individual infantry sneaking up but rather refers to a combined arms team bypassing enemy centres of resistance. Key aspects of these tactics are a short but sharp artillery barrage (hours instead of days) and several waves of infantry working their way forward identifying and bypassing enemy centres of resistance.  The first wave was essentially scouts finding strong points.  The second wave would have support weapons and flamethrowers (the Storm Troops) who would seek to press forward and bypass enemy strong points. A third wave would also consist of Storm Troops but would have heavier support weapons with the task of supporting and protecting the second wave.  Regular infantry elements would follow the Storm Troops to deal with the isolated enemy strong points. The foundation for these tactics had been laid in the counter-attacks developed as part of the elastic defence, so one change evolved into another in this sense.

German Armies established Storm Troop battalions (alternatively called Storm Battalions or Storm Units) with specialized training, equipment and oganization, while some Divisions had ad-hoc Storm Troop battalions. A battalion might have up to five infantry assault companies, two heavy machine gun companies, a flame thrower section, an infantry gun battery and a trench mortar company.  The infantry assault companies were based at their lowest level on the group (Gruppe).  A group had two squads (Trupps).  One squad had a light machine gun (a relatively new innovation of the time) with four soldiers while the other squad had eight men (leader and seven riflemen).  It is noted that the primary purpose of the riflemen was to protect the light machine gun.  

The German adaptations to the tactical situation on the Western Front are compared with French and British practices.  The French adopted a rolling barrage with which the infantry had to keep up.  This lead to disasters in Nivelle's 1917 offensive.  The author makes the point that the French tied their infantry to the artillery, while the Germans reversed that and essentially tied the artillery to the infantry.  The author does, however, credit a French officer named Captain Laffargue with writing an article in 1915 that inspired German thoughts on what eventually became their infiltration tactics.  The British seized on the tank as a solution along with heavy artillery preparation.

Of interest to me (I live in the doctrine and training world) were the details on how the Germans went about developing these changes.  The Army High Command on the Western Front (OHL) had an Operations Section consisting of twelve staff officers with a Major as the chief of operations (compare that to us today...).   In addition to running the war on the Western Front (as well as Italy and the Middle East) these officers collected observations from the field and analysed the information.  They consulted captured enemy doctrinal notes as well as their own.  They then produced doctrine through a rather collaborative effort.  A certain Captain Geyer is credited with writing both the elastic defence and infiltration tactics.  The OHL then promulgated and trained the units on the Western Front in these ideas, and the overall Commander tolerated criticism and debate.  It is also interesting that the commander did not call these tactics "his" but rather "ours."  Nivelle, on the other hand, seemed to take this innovations somewhat personally. 

Lupfer offers the following description of the German doctrinal change process:

a.  perception of a need for change

b.  solicitation of ideas

c.  definition of the change

d.  dissemination of the change

e.  enforcement throughout the army

f.  modification of the organization and equipment

g.  thorough training

h.  evaluation of effectiveness

i.  subsequent refinement

All in all an interesting little read that I recommend to those who can find it.

Cheers

T2B


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## Blackadder1916 (12 Feb 2008)

> All in all an interesting little read that I recommend to those who can find it.



Lupfer's paper The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War can be viewed at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lupfer/lupfer.asp or downloaded in pdf (10.2 mb) at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/lupfer.pdf


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## TangoTwoBravo (24 Feb 2008)

Thanks for the link Blackadder!

There are other books on this topic out there, such as Gudmundsson's Storm Troop Tactics  and Samuel's Doctrine and Dogma .  Osprey also has a volume regarding the German Stormtrooper with its usual high standard of illustration along with a very readable format.

I recently read Doctrine and Dogma and it went into greater detail on fundamental German doctrinal concepts. Samuels introduces the reader to German terms like _Stosskraft_ (assault power) and _Feuerkraft _ (firepower).  He goes on to say that the Germans didn't care so much about who provided a given effect (ie assaulting or shooting).  Rather, they cared about the delivery of a given effect in concert with the other.  Effects is a term we like to use a lot these day, but it is interesting to see that the Germans focused on _what_ was done to the enemy rather than _who_ did it.  He argues that the Germans avoided some of the branch-parochialism battles that plagued other armies.  

Again, it is interesting that contemporary opponents thought that these tactics were the work of one man (General Hutier), when in fact they were derived from a collaborative process combining the efforts of innovative tactical leaders with trained staff officers.  

I have also noted, however, that Western writers tend to exhault the German system while viciously attacking the British Army of WW1, due perhaps to the horrendous casualties from numerous offensives (Loos, Somme, Passchendaele).  We should not lose sight, however, of the 963,000 German casualties suffered during their spring offensive of 1918 (using the figures given in the Osprey book).  Of those, 125,000 were killed and another 103,000 missing or prisoner.  The storm troop tactics were not, therefore, without cost.  They did, however, lay down many of the fundamentals of tactics still employed today.

While this might belong in the military history board I put it here due to the doctrinal process at the heart of the tactics described. How does our process (in practice) compare?


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## CougarKing (24 Feb 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Thanks for the link Blackadder!
> 
> There are other books on this topic out there, such as Gudmundsson's Storm Troop Tactics  and Samuel's Doctrine and Dogma .  Osprey also has a volume regarding the German Stormtrooper with its usual high standard of illustration along with a very readable format.



These sources refer to the WWI-era _Strosstruppen/Sturmtruppen_, right? The highly mobile(I presume these were not mech.infantry yet) infantry formations which quickly bypassed strong points to take key areas? Didn't these units serve as the model for Heinz Guderian's _Panzer _ divisions being established throughout the late 1930s?


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## TangoTwoBravo (24 Feb 2008)

CougarDaddy said:
			
		

> These sources refer to the WWI-era _Strosstruppen/Sturmtruppen_, right? The highly mobile(I presume these were not mech.infantry yet) infantry formations which quickly bypassed strong points to take key areas? Didn't these units serve as the model for Heinz Guderian's _Panzer _ divisions being established throughout the late 1930s?



They do indeed refer to the World War 1 German infantry tactics (called Storm troop tactics among other things).  It has been argued that the _Blitzkrieg_ devised in the 30s and applied in the 40s was essentially these 1917/18 tactics applied to a mechanized force.  Indeed, one can see much of today's infantry tactics, weapons and organizations in the WW1 German Stosstruppen.


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## a_majoor (25 Feb 2008)

What would be interesting is a comparison of Canadian tactics and doctrine during the same period, since the Canadian Corps was used to crack open some fairly formidable German defense lines.


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## vonGarvin (25 Feb 2008)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> What would be interesting is a comparison of Canadian tactics and doctrine during the same period, since the Canadian Corps was used to crack open some fairly formidable German defense lines.


Not having my library at my fingers (I'm in Ft Bliss on training), I can only allude to my memory, so hold on!  ;D

Whereas the Germans resorted to infiltration, penetration and driving on to discomfit the enemy, I would argue that the Canadian Corps used firepower to discomfit the enemy, mixed with well rehearsed actions on a narrow vice broad front.  The Germans were feeling the pinch in manpower moreso than we, so I think that was part of the cause of their Stosstruppen tactics.


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## TangoTwoBravo (25 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Not having my library at my fingers (I'm in Ft Bliss on training), I can only allude to my memory, so hold on!  ;D
> 
> The Germans were feeling the pinch in manpower moreso than we, so I think that was part of the cause of their Stosstruppen tactics.



The writers refer to the Germans realization that they cannot win a war of _Materialschlacht_ (one of those wonderful German words that have about a paragraph of meaning in them) or _battle of material_.  The Germans realized that they could not win a war based on preoponderance of numbers so they looked elsewhere. 

Thucydides,

The Lupfer paper mentions a successful attack by Empire troops on 9 April 1917 that worried Ludendorf as it was the first real test of the new elastic defence.  Lupfer mentions, however, that it was determined that the elastic defence princples had been applied half-heartedly by the German commander.  It is odd as a Canadian to see Vimy simply alluded to along with the victory explained away to some degree, but at least a glaring defeat for the elastic defence is addressed.  

Lupfer does mention later on the successful attacks by Empire troops in August 1918 that "displayed greater finesse in their attacks...using short artillery bombardments and integrating large numbers of tanks and aircraft in well-executed attacks."  I assume that that aludes in part to the Canadians along with the Australians.  I will go back and read Schrieber's book that came out a couple of years ago for a Canadian perspective.

Several historians make the point about the British Army's focus on the tank as a technological solution to the tactical problems of the First World War while pointing out the German Army's solution based on soldiers and tactics.  I think that the point can be made too strongly, but it is attractive nonetheless.


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## TangoTwoBravo (26 Feb 2008)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> What would be interesting is a comparison of Canadian tactics and doctrine during the same period, since the Canadian Corps was used to crack open some fairly formidable German defense lines.



I have done a little digging, primarily with Shane Scheiber's Shock Army of the Empire.  The Canadian offensive method employed in the 1917 and 1918 battles can essentially be described as "carefully ochestrated set-piece attacks that relied heavily upon firepower, specifically artillery, to obliterate the outpost and main battle zone."  The creeping or rolling barrage was employed with the infantry moving closely behind.  Canadian attacks typically had limited objectives.  In addition, the Canadians had a comprehensive counter-battery artillery program in place that paid dividends on numerous occasions.

Canadian infantry tactics in 1918 are described as being based on groups of about 40 men employing dispsersed formation, terrain and fire and movement.  Great importance is placed on Lewis Guns (a mobile machine gun also employed by the Germans), Mills Bombs (grenades) and mortars.  Thus, there are some definate similarities with German Stosstrup tactics.  Initial Canadian attacks at Amiens feature a line of scouts approximately 100m ahead of a line of tanks.  Infantry sections follow behind the tanks in single file.  The tanks are seen as part of the success of Amiens, but they suffer heavy losses and are seen in lesser numbers in future attacks.

After the Amiens battle of 8 Aug 1918, one Canadian commander describes an attack in three phases: first is the attack supported to the limit of the field artillery barrage; second is the attack supported to the limit of the heavy howitzers while the third was open warfare with no planned bombardment.  The focus on artillery is important and is perhaps one difference between the German and Canadian systems.  The Canadian system could also, perhaps, be described as more methodical than the German one but this might be an overstatement.  

The attempts by Canadian cavalry to exploit the victory of 8 Aug 1918 met very heavy casualties and subsequent infantry attacks encountered stiffening resistance.  The Canadian Corps pulled out of the Amiens area once a stalemate ensues before being committed to the north into some ferocious battles to break through to Cambrai and unhinge the German line.  The Canadian assaults of Amiens, the Drocourt-Queant Line, Canal du Nord and Cambrai seem to have a pattern of initial gains under a rolling barrage followed by a stall once the advancing troops outrun their artillery and encounter German reinforcements (unfortunately at the same time).  Nevertheless, the Canadian Corps does pound through successive German lines, often employing relatively audacious methods such as night infiltration and passing the Corps through a single Division frontage penetration before fanning out.

I find it interesting that the Canadian methods successfully employed were similar in principle to the disastrous _Nivelle Offensive _ methods of 1917 which also featured a rolling barrage.  The differences in detail between the French and Canadian execution of a similar approach might be interesting to examine.  My quick reading indicates that the French rolling barrage frequently outran the infantry, while the Canadian attacks featured excellent infantry-artillery coordination.  Little details can, perhaps, make all the difference.


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## TangoTwoBravo (5 Mar 2008)

Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics of the Western Front  (1994) offers an interesting alternative view to tactics from a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) perspective with a focus on the period between 1916 and 1918.  He argues that BEF tactics underwent contant evolution and that the differences between the German Storm Troops and BEF troops can be exagerated.

Griffiths has pulled up many BEF doctrinal notes and pamphlets from World War 1 and there does appear to have been both analysis of the tactical problems and solutions tendered.  He gives a good look at how platoon-level BEF tactics evolved into the following (from a 1917 pam called SS 143 "Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Operations"):

   a.   Assault Team:

         (1)    "Rifle" Section with nine men including a "sniper" and a "scout"

         (2)   "Bomber" Section with two expert "bombers (grenade throwers) and three bomb-carriers

   b.   Fire Team:

        (1)    "Lewis Gun" Section of nine men with one Lewis Gun (forty drums of ammo carried by the men)

        (2)    "Rifle Bomber" Section of nine men with four rifle-grenades

In addition to this was a platoon HQ.  The platoon was thus rather self-contained in terms of ability to provide fire support and tackle objectives.  It does not seem all that dissimilar to the Storm Troop concepts.  The Rifle and Bomber sections would lead, with the scout in front.  Upon contact the Lewis Gun section and Rifle Bomber section would provide suppressive fire to enable the Assault Team sections to destory the enemy up close with both grenades and rifle-fire/bayonets.  The Assault Team was to find an approach from a flank if possible.  These tactics appear quite sophisticated and not all that different from what are employed today, although sections today seem more self-contained.

The division into an Assault Team and a Fire Team seems quite similar to the German concepts of_ Stosskraft _ and _Feuerkraft_.  While the BEF did not field flame throwers they did employ the "Stokes Mortar" to give fire support in addition to the artillery.  The BEF did not seem to employ the infantry guns like the German storm troops but they did employ tanks with the infantry (different approach to a similar effect).  The support provided by artillery to the German Storm Troops should not be ignored.  The differences, therefore, between the German Storm Troops and the BEF might be more subtle than we tend to think.


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## Infanteer (9 Mar 2008)

Martin Samuels would disagree with those assertions, Tango2.  I read Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 and his research is fairly exhaustive.  He really looked at where the rubber met the road at the Divisional/Corps level school system for propagating what was said in those neat pamphlets - the British pamphlets should resemble the German ones because in many cases the British plagiarized captured doctrinal writing.  This is all fine and dandy, but the British only took bits and pieces and never bothered to concern themselves with how those bits and pieces fit into grand scheme of German tactical doctrine.  Thus, the pamphlets were largely ignored and tactical lessons were propagated in a much more ad hoc, hit-or-miss manner.

I can't recall the finer details of the book and I don't have my copy on hand to refresh my memory, but this one is well worth the read.


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Mar 2008)

I read Martin's Doctrine and Dogma  (up in post 3 I think), and he would certainly disagree with me.  I would recommend combining a read of Martin's work with that of Griffiths to get a slightly opposing view.  
I would agree, however, that doctrine and training were more centralized in the BEF than with their German opponents.  Gudmundson's book provides good details on this.  My reading of Griffiths, however, leads me to believe that the BEF should not be seen as a monolith either.

The performance of the British 5th Army during the Peace Offensive (especially between 21 and 23 March 1918) is often used as an example of the British copying German doctrine without truly understanding it.  It is also offered as the shining example of the superiority of the Stormtroop tactics.  There is most certainly truth there, but we should also remember that the 5th Army (and indeed the BEF) was undermanned and that the Germans benefited from a rather fortuitous mist on the first day.  One important eason for the collapse beyond the initial gains of 21 March was the lack of reserves in 5th Army (and unskillful employment of what was there) to check the Germans after their first day.  A subsequent German effort in April had good initial gains but was checked this time by the timely arrival of reserves.  The phenomenon of famished German troops loosing impetous due to the looting of British supply dumps may have some merit, but I also detect the desire to the give them a "pass" and explain away problems.  The German gains of 1918 came at great cost.  All that being said, I don't want to become the official apologist for the 5th Army nor to become the critic of the Stormtroops. I have been suprised, however, by some of what I have come across that did not jive with my conventional wisdom going in.  World War 1 tactics are a richer field than I thought.  

The Germans certainly do seem to have been better at being able to feed machine-gun "sharpshooter companies" into gaps and buying time to reform the line.  It reads a lot like their use of mobile PAK fronts to check allied penetrations in the next war.

I would still offer, based on my reading of the works of others, that the differences at the tactical level between the Stormtroop tactics and those of the BEF (to include the Dominion troops) can be overstated.  The Germans employed "creeping barrages", and there are cases of their barrage outstripping their infantry on 21 Mar 1918 with negative outcomes.  The Germans rehearsed attacks in great detail in the early stages and made lengthly preparations.  The Germans employed counter-battery fires.  These are all things that I normally thought of as being "Canadian."  At the same time, small unit tactics for the BEF included some aspects we ascribe to the Germans.  All that being said there were certainly differences in equipment.  The whole issue of the trust given to the junior tactical leaders is also very interesting.

I will hunt down the Samuels book you mention, and thanks for the lead!

Cheers


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 Mar 2008)

Gudmundsson's Stormtroop Tactics  gives some good examples of the latitude given to the lower-level German leaders for the training of their men.  Capt Rohr (the second commander of the first assault detachment) was given the direction by his commanding general to train his unit "according to the lessons he had learned during his front line service." 

To bring this thread back to the present, how does that compare with our current training methodology? 

Another interesting contrasts is the use of "bull rings" by the BEF to train units that had come out of the line prior to their return to the front.  At these training centres the men underwent instruction in new techniques by a permanent staff of instructors while the unit leaders did other things.  German units undergoing training retained their chain of command.

Anyway, off to the RMC library to hunt for the other Samuels book.

Cheers


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Mar 2008)

Infanteer,

I'm through the Samuels book, and half-way through a Tim Travers book on similar subject matter.  I'll post in a couple of days. 

I post today (21 March 2008), however, because this is the 90th anniversary of the start of the German _Michael Offensive_.

Happy Easter,

T2B


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## TangoTwoBravo (27 Mar 2008)

Infanteer,

Samuels mentions the British platoon tactics fleshed out in more detail by Griffith, although Samuels states that they were developed in 1916 but not applied until 1917.  As such, I will stand by my assertion that there was actually much in common in the offensive systems worked out by the combatants.  The British defensive preparations of 1918, however, are indeed a cautionary tale on a number of levels.  

I feel that Samuels goes a little too far down the path of trying to make a case for"'Directive Command", and he also seems to put the German General staff on a pedestal while slamming the BEF at every turn.  I admire the German system as well, but I found it odd that in his book he does not mention the virtual annihalation of a German corps at Ypres in 1914 when it attacked in dense formations.  He also stops at the initial successes of the German March 1918 offensive and leaves out the subsequent succesful BEF/Empire offensives.  Vimy Ridge gets a quick mention, but he states that the German commander had failed to apply the elastic defence.  This neatly explains away a BEF/Empire victory, but if we accept that we are left with a bit of a dilemma.  If the German Army was unable to apply its own doctrine in this first big test why should we be surprised that the BEF had similar problems?

Still, I enjoyed the second Samuel's book and he has given me some leads on sources for a Russo-Japanese paper I am working on.

Cheers


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