# Building Better Officers (merged)



## tomahawk6 (18 Nov 2012)

The so called management virus was introduced by Congress. The guru of military management was Peter Drucker. He replaced case studies in combat leadership. While Westmoreland and Abrams get the blame for Vietnam,the blame should fall on the Congress who stopped funding the Vietnamese government and forced a pullout of our advisory effort. Now we have essentially done the same in Afghanistan. Remember at the time we had hundreds of thousands of people protesting the war. It was these protests that forced us out of the war.It was a victory for the left but it also was the death of the draft.Without a draft the left could never again leverage their agenda from the states.Instead they took the long view and took over the democrat party and the universities.Maybe one day the democrat party will return to their actual roots.


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## FJAG (18 Nov 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The so called management virus was introduced by Congress. The guru of military management was Peter Drucker. ...



I'm not sure to what extent Drucker influenced McNamara and to what extent McNamara was just a contemporary who developed much of the management practices he used by himself. It strikes me McNamara had already earned his MBA at Harvard and was employing management principles in the Army Air Corps during WWII before Drucker started becoming popular. 

Whatever - I expect there was an influence in his later life before he came to be Secretary under Kennedy and started to "reform" the US military system.

By the time I became an officer in 69 we here in Canada knew that the US officer corps was heading in a very bad direction and we smugly sat back and criticised from the sidelines. What we didn't really understand was that we were destined to head in the same direction within a few years. I've always thought that we Canadians were even more to blame for what we did in going down the 'managing defence' track than the Americans because we could see exactly where their system was failing them.

Most of us knew we were in trouble when the recruiting posters for officers put out by the CF started showing a bright-eyed young Captain in his new green uniform stepping out of the door of one of our new Boing 707s carrying an attache case.

I've never blamed our government for that change in officer ethos. Governments don't know any better. They set defence objectives and allocate funding. Its the senior military leadership that decides how we as officers are trained and developed. The Americans' senior leadership failed them in the 60s and ours failed us in the 70s. What we are reaping now in our present senior officer corps is as a result of what we sowed then.


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## tomahawk6 (18 Nov 2012)

Forget McNamara. I am talking the post-Vietnam era 1975 on. The Army once again changed its doctrine to be ready for a war with the Russians. Much like todays Army is returning to a post Afghanistan doctrine. Meaning tanks,IFV's and self propelled artillery. Combined arms warfare while keeping the light forces for anti-terror operations.


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## Old Sweat (18 Nov 2012)

Mods, can we split this into a separate thread?

The management virus started in the sixties with our defence establishment headed by the MND becoming mesmerized by the image of the "Harvard whiz kids" bringing modern management practices to the US DOD. I have just finished a goodly portion of lake trout along with a carafe of wine, so I will leave my magnificently profound insights for the morning.


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## Nemo888 (19 Nov 2012)

I find Generals are too often the most self serving careerist douchebags imaginable. Too much politics, PR and taking credit for others work and not enough character.


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## Edward Campbell (19 Nov 2012)

I agree with Old Sweat re: when the _management virus_ spread. Its origins were in, actually before, World War Two:* think _operational research_, a subset of mathematics that led e.g. to the development and proper utilization of radar by the RAF, and the famous _RAND Corporation_. The _management_ of logistics had been studied, seriously, by military staffs for over 100 years - the development and rail transport and associated ideas about e.g. mass production and warehousing fundamentally altered how nations, rather than just armies, could fight. The management of logistics, at the _strategic_ level, was, or appeared to outsiders, an almost miraculous undertaking and it _inspired_ Robert McNamara and it was what he saw in Washington in the 1940s that he took back to Detroit and married to e.g. Drucker's _Management by Objectives_ theory. When he, McNamara, returned to Washington, as SecDef, he had a fully formed idea that a "systems approach" to management should and could work on the US defence-industrial base and, perhaps, even deeper in the military itself. He was right on the former idea, wrong on the latter - but it's not fair to blame McNamara for the systematic errors made inside the US military: generals and admirals were fascinated by his ideas, in part, at least, because the very notion of _systemization_ seemed to promise less risk and "more bang for the buck," (one of the watchwords of _operational research_, but usually called _utility_ in that domain). That's one of the reasons it spread to Canada, our military is always too cash strapped to accept risks ... but it also built bureaucratic _empires_ which are irresistible in Ottawa, Canberra, London, Washington and Beijing.

The marriage of a _systems approach_ and general purpose computing created a monster. The _information management_ business succeeded at almost everything except: sorting the wheat (5%) from the chaff (95% of the _information_ with which a 21st century staff officer must deal because the intellectual _mill_ - the one which fascinated and inspired McNamara in 1942 - has been cast aside).

_____
* One can argue that the discipline began in the early 19th century when Charles Babbage examined and rationalized the UK's postal service.


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## Old Sweat (19 Nov 2012)

I wonder how much of poorly executed command is a function of being bogged down in too large headquarters with too many sources of information being presented in a slick manner? Being headquarters bound was a failing of the British and Canadian armies in Normandy where the doctrine was that commanders could best exercise command from their headquarters studying maps and reports. One example was shortly after first light on 8 August 1944 during the consolidation on the Phase One objectives of Operation Totalize. The CO of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment realized that the Allies had broken through the German lines and, in his words, there were more Germans behind us than in front of us. Unfortunately the Canadian senior leadership were in their HQs essentially tidying up the battle and as a result the second phase formations did not begin to pass through the front for another seven hours. In the meantime the Germans were able to cobble together a force that delayed the inevitable defeat by a week or more.

Is there a parallel today with (some) commanders being tied to their headquarters by graphics and displays? Does the OPP contribute to this?


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## Edward Campbell (19 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I wonder how much of poorly executed command is a function of being bogged down in too large headquarters with too many sources of information being presented in a slick manner? Being headquarters bound was a failing of the British and Canadian armies in Normandy where the doctrine was that commanders could best exercise command from their headquarters studying maps and reports. One example was shortly after first light on 8 August 1944 during the consolidation on the Phase One objectives of Operation Totalize. The CO of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment realized that the Allies had broken through the German lines and, in his words, there were more Germans behind us than in front of us. Unfortunately the Canadian senior leadership were in their HQs essentially tidying up the battle and as a result the second phase formations did not begin to pass through the front for another seven hours. In the meantime the Germans were able to cobble together a force that delayed the inevitable defeat by a week or more.
> 
> Is there a parallel today with (some) commanders being tied to their headquarters by graphics and displays? Does the OPP contribute to this?




I think you are on the _key terrain_ here. It is the staff's job to _winnow_ the really important information, the wheat, from the "noise" or chaff in which it is, inevitably, cloaked. The _knowledge_ that we had a breach was, or should have been, *vital* and should have led, very quickly, to a swift, violent offensive action, and it might have had we had a _Rommel at the Meuse_ rather than a _Simonds in the Chateau_ (and yes, I know that's a bit unfair but it's early in the morning here).

Adequate telecommunications makes it *easy* and highly desirable (even mandatory?) for commanders to command from forward, Tac HQs where they can see the vital ground impose their will, by force of personality, on subordinates. They, commanders, don't need all the unprocessed information; they are NOT staff officers; it is better to have a bit of useful, processed information than masses of data which is awaiting analysis. Chiefs of staff need to be able to set the priorities for analysis and the working staff need to get on with it. The big screens and elecronic map overlays and computers are wonderful aids - fewer, better trained staff officers can sift much more data and "mine" it for real information at much higher rates and with greater accuracy than was ever imaginable to people as old as Old Sweat and me. And the Chief of Staff can, also more quickly, pout it together and send it, *only* the "wheat", not any "chaff, "at the right time, in the right form and at the speed of light to a commander who is away from the distractions of a "main" HQ.


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## tomahawk6 (19 Nov 2012)

Today combat can be viewed in real time by a HQ whether its a battalion or a brigade or higher. With the advent of the UAV, staff's are overloaded with information. UAV's soak up most of the bandwidth which isnt good when troops on the ground need to communicate with each other.So far a happy medium has not been found.  With this technology the trick for a commander is not to micro manage his subordinates,but to allow them to fight the battle.


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## Old Sweat (19 Nov 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Today combat can be viewed in real time by a HQ whether its a battalion or a brigade or higher. With the advent of the UAV, staff's are overloaded with information. UAV's soak up most of the bandwidth which isnt good when troops on the ground need to communicate with each other.So far a happy medium has not been found.  With this technology the trick for a commander is not to micro manage his subordinates,but to allow them to fight the battle.



I submit that has been a problem for a very long time. Most generals have tended to have healthy egos and strong personalities. It was natural for them to direct their subordinates more than was necessary or even helpful. For a fairly recent example American officers have told me of their experiences in Vietnam when a bevy of helicopters would form up over a battle and more and more senior officers would begin to interfere bring their superior judgment and insight to bear on the situation. Perhaps the enhanced situational awareness provided by a helicopter has now been replaced by UAV feeds and all the rest.


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## Infanteer (19 Nov 2012)

German officer in the 19th century were saying this same thing.  Moltke warned of commander's tied to the telegraph.  Plus ca change, plus c'est le meme chose.


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## GAP (19 Nov 2012)

We used to really enjoy having the masterful direction of some twit a 1,000 feet above us telling us that "we can do it so get moving!!"  :


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## OldSolduer (19 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I submit that has been a problem for a very long time. Most generals have tended to have healthy egos and strong personalities. It was natural for them to direct their subordinates more than was necessary or even helpful. For a fairly recent example American officers have told me of their experiences in Vietnam when a bevy of helicopters would form up over a battle and more and more senior officers would begin to interfere bring their superior judgment and insight to bear on the situation. Perhaps the enhanced situational awareness provided by a helicopter has now been replaced by UAV feeds and all the rest.



I've long said that the CF suffers from over supervision from the top down, right to the recruit level. No one is allowed to make an error in training, and we all know the best lessons come from failure, not success. It irks me to see a WO, a Sgt and a MCpl watch a Cpl/Pte and all offering suggestions on how he could do it better. Give the kid the task, explain what you want, the limitations  and get out of he way.  Let him figure out the "how".

I imagine it is the same at higher levels except its much more polite....


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## ModlrMike (19 Nov 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I've long said that the CF suffers from over supervision from the top down, right to the recruit level. No one is allowed to make an error in training, and we all know the best lessons come from failure, not success. It irks me to see a WO, a Sgt and a MCpl watch a Cpl/Pte and all offering suggestions on how he could do it better. Give the kid the task, explain what you want, the limitations  and get out of he way.  Let him figure out the "how".
> 
> I imagine it is the same at higher levels except its much more polite....



Patton: Never tell your troops how to do something. Tell them what to do and let them get on with it.


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## daftandbarmy (19 Nov 2012)

General Failure

“To a shocking degree, the Army’s leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a risk-averse middle where they are more likely to find stalemate than victory. A few high-profile successes, such as those of General David Petraeus in Iraq, may temporarily mask this systemic problem, but they do not solve it.”



Looking back on the troubled wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many observers are content to lay blame on the Bush administration. But inept leadership by American generals was also responsible for the failure of those wars. A culture of mediocrity has taken hold within the Army’s leadership rank—if it is not uprooted, the country’s next war is unlikely to unfold any better than the last two. 

On June 13, 1944, a few days after the 90th Infantry Division went into action against the Germans in Normandy under the command of Brigadier General Jay MacKelvie, MacKelvie’s superior officer, Major General J. Lawton Collins, went on foot to check on his men. “We could locate no regimental or battalion headquarters,” he recalled with dismay. “No shelling was going on, nor any fighting that we could observe.” This was an ominous sign, as the Battle of Normandy was far from decided, and the Wehrmacht was still trying to push the Americans, British, and Canadians, who had landed a week earlier, back into the sea.

Just a day earlier, the 90th’s assistant division commander, Brigadier General “Hanging Sam” Williams, had also been looking for the leader of his green division. He’d found MacKelvie sheltering from enemy fire, huddled in a drainage ditch along the base of a hedgerow. “Goddamn it, General, you can’t lead this division hiding in that goddamn hole,” Williams shouted. “Go back to the [command post]. Get the hell out of that hole and go to your vehicle. Walk to it, or you’ll have this goddamn division wading in the English Channel.” The message did not take. The division remained bogged down, veering close to passivity.

American troops were fighting to stay alive—no small feat in that summer’s bloody combat. One infantry company in the 90th began a day in July with 142 men and finished it with 32. Its battalion commander walked around babbling “I killed K Company, I killed K Company.” Later that summer, one of the 90th’s battalions, with 265 soldiers, surrendered to a German patrol of 50 men and two tanks. In six weeks of small advances, the division would use up all its infantrymen, requesting replacements of more than 100 percent.

General Collins removed MacKelvie on the very same day that his tour revealed no fighting in progress. Collins instructed the 90th’s new commander, Major General Eugene Landrum, to fire the commanders of two of the division’s three regiments. One of those two, the West Point graduate Colonel P. D. Ginder, was considered by many to be a disaster. One man, a mortar forward observer, remembered that Ginder “almost constantly made the wrong decisions.” He had been in command of his regiment for less than a month when he was replaced.
MacKelvie’s successor, Landrum, was given a few weeks to prove he was an able commander, but by midsummer he too was judged to be wanting. Before he was relieved, Landrum fired the assistant division commander he had inherited, Sam Williams, with whom he had clashed. “I feel that a general officer of a more optimistic and calming attitude would be more beneficial to this division at this time,” Landrum wrote. General Omar Bradley, the senior American general in France at the time, concurred. He topped off the dismissal by demoting Williams to colonel.

Within a few weeks, Bradley relieved Landrum as well, and sent Brigadier General Raymond McLain, whom he had brought from Italy to England to have on tap as a replacement when someone was fired, to take over the 90th Infantry Division. “We’re going to make that division go, if we’ve got to can every senior officer in it,” Bradley told him. Two days later, McLain gave him a list of 16 field-grade officers he wanted out of the division.

The swift reliefs of World War II were not precise, and while many made way for more-capable commanders, some were clearly the wrong move. Nonetheless, their cumulative effect was striking. The 90th Division, for instance, improved radically—transforming from a problem division that First Army staff wanted to break up, into “one of the most outstanding [divisions] in the European Theater,” as Bradley later wrote. 

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/1/?single_page=true


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## daftandbarmy (19 Nov 2012)

I liked this article in the Atlantic. They pretty much nail it I think....

General Failure:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/108334.0.html


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## Infanteer (19 Nov 2012)

Already been posted in the Patreaus thread.  Rick's grinds his usual pop-centric COIN narrative axe.


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## FJAG (19 Nov 2012)

ModlrMike said:
			
		

> Patton: Never tell your troops how to do something. Tell them what to do and let them get on with it.



Famous example is Patton's order to Grow's 6th Armoured Div to "Take Brest". Clear, simple, and direct. Unfortunately Grow's infantry light, armour heavy force covered the 200 miles to Brest in good order but then couldn't punch through the defences.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Adequate telecommunications makes it *easy* and highly desirable (even mandatory?) for commanders to command from forward, Tac HQs where they can see the vital ground impose their will, by force of personality, on subordinates.



It's funny how in one thread we can chastise senior commanders for not leading from the front and at the same time say they shouldn't be hovering around their subordinates telling them how to suck eggs. The only lesson I can take from this is that commanders must have a flexible style which can be adapted to the circumstances and that no matter what one does, there will be someone who won't be satisfied with how it was done.


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## PPCLI Guy (19 Nov 2012)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> I find Generals are too often the most self serving careerist douchebags imaginable. Too much politics, PR and taking credit for others work and not enough character.



As a Reserve Medic, how many Generals have you actually worked for?  Or even met?  In other words, what are you basing your opinion on?


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## Edward Campbell (19 Nov 2012)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Famous example is Patton's order to Grow's 6th Armoured Div to "Take Brest". Clear, simple, and direct. Unfortunately Grow's infantry light, armour heavy force covered the 200 miles to Brest in good order but then couldn't punch through the defences.
> 
> It's funny how in one thread we can chastise senior commanders for not leading from the front and at the same time say they shouldn't be hovering around their subordinates telling them how to suck eggs. The only lesson I can take from this is that commanders must have a flexible style which can be adapted to the circumstances and that no matter what one does, there will be someone who won't be satisfied with how it was done.




In my opinion the two most important things a commander does in his HQ are:
.
.
.
.
.
1. Sleep; and
2. Eat.
.
.
.
.
.
It is also a very good place to make plans when his forces are resting . But *leading* and, albeit to a lesser extent, commanding are best done in the immediate vicinity of those being led and of those being commanded. But that's a very, very army-centric and _tactical_ opinion.


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## Haggis (19 Nov 2012)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> I find Generals are too often the most self serving careerist douchebags imaginable. Too much politics, PR and taking credit for others work and not enough character.



I disagree.  And I daresay that I deal with more Generals on a daily basis than you do. There are some incredibly talented, astute and intelligent General and Flag Officers in the CF today.  There are also some numptys - just like any other large organization - but, in my experience, they are becoming fewer and farther between.


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## Towards_the_gap (19 Nov 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I've long said that the CF suffers from over supervision from the top down, right to the recruit level. No one is allowed to make an error in training, and we all know the best lessons come from failure, not success. It irks me to see a WO, a Sgt and a MCpl watch a Cpl/Pte and all offering suggestions on how he could do it better. Give the kid the task, explain what you want, the limitations  and get out of he way.  Let him figure out the "how".
> 
> I imagine it is the same at higher levels except its much more polite....



+1 on this one. 

The real problem I suspect is fear of failure, at all levels. And an inability to really critically examine our shortcomings. Ever see a Maple Leaf article which states ' Exercise reveals major problems'??? No, it's like reading Pravda sometimes. Which of course is why I do not read it.


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## Robert0288 (19 Nov 2012)

Haggis said:
			
		

> There are some incredibly talented, astue and intelligent General and Flag Officers in the CF today.



I've spoken with more than a few while working civy side.  And from what I've seen, the above statement is fairly accurate.


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## Dissident (20 Nov 2012)

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> The real problem I suspect is fear of failure, at all levels. And an inability to really critically examine our shortcomings.



ALLE-FUCKING-LUIA

As someone who has come a long way because I had to (and still do) take a good long hard honest look at myself, it is absolutely frustrating to see people living in denial.  Lets make mistakes, let subordinates make mistakes, be honest (but tactful) with superiors when they make mistakes.


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## Blackadder1916 (20 Nov 2012)

As this thread has veered from the specifics of one individual's peccadillos to a wider discussion of military leadership, it is inevitable that someone must mention ""Where, oh where have all the Tigers gone".  It has been, after all, the lament of Canadian officers for nearly forty years.  


> . . . . .
> What preoccupies me is the suspicion, confirmed by one experience as a member of a promotional board, that the higher-rated officers are the earnest, colourless young men whose chief virtue is technical diligence; who never express boisterous exuberance in the mess; whose manners and social conduct are impeccable; and who always accord their seniors (and their seniors' wives, of course) the proper degree of reverence. There seems to be a concerted effort to prevent the advancement of any young officer who deviates from the nice, neat, grey middle ground. In other words, the road to flattering PERs, and to promotion, seems to be open primarily to those who do not  “rock the boat". I find it hard to reconcile this approach to officer development with my own experience. It has always seemed to me that those people with the greatest lust for life are the ones most likely to attempt, in defiance of all logic, to achieve the "impossible" goal.
> . . . . .



While it was often in reflection on the quality of young subbies following an uneventful mess dinner that did not result in any "extras", it can equally be applied to (now grown up) senior leadership.   Though there is a new generation of young officers who have been blooded in battle and performed well, Colonel Nicholson’s timeless article (to my understanding) was more about the growing tendency (that he noticed back then) to approach a military career in the same manner as one would in scaling the corporate (or public service) ladder.  Credentials seemed to be more important than competence, and there was often as much effort put into ensuring an unblemished record as there was in learning the craft.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> . . . . . . . When he, McNamara, returned to Washington, as SecDef, he had a fully formed idea that a "systems approach" to management should and could work on the US defence-industrial base and, perhaps, even deeper in the military itself. He was right on the former idea, wrong on the latter - but it's not fair to blame McNamara for the systematic errors made inside the US military: *generals and admirals were fascinated by his ideas, in part, at least, because the very notion of systemization seemed to promise less risk and "more bang for the buck,*" (one of the watchwords of _operational research_, but usually called _utility_ in that domain).   . . . . .



While initial acceptance of "systemization" by the generals and admirals may have been based on its promise of "less risk", my belief is that its entrenchment in (and effect on) the personality of many military leaders is also due to the constant measurement of everything.  More so in the US military than the CF (though I fear that that we have drunk the cool-aid) nearly all aspects (including advancement) of an officer’s career is predicated on meeting certain benchmarks, the measurement of which is often unrelated to military success.


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## Old Sweat (20 Nov 2012)

As one who had the honour and the pleasure of working for Colonel "Nick" for three years when he commanded the Combat Arms School, I can attest that he practiced what he preached. He also would come down very hard on people who abused students for the sake of instilling discipline - he called it mindless bullsh.t. Nick also was capable of coming very close to the line. When he was CO of the Recce Sqn in 4 Brigade he was ordered by the commander to attend a reception in the mess for a fairly senior German general. During the war Nick had been a trooper in the 12th Manitoba Dragoons, which was the 2nd Canadian Corps Armoured Car Regiment. He did not like socializing with German officers of the same vintage all that much and protested and was ordered to attend. He was duly introduced to Herr General who said something like "Nicholson, Nicholson. Haff ve ever met?" Nick replied "I don't think so, oh wait, I didn't recognize you without your hands up."


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## FJAG (20 Nov 2012)

:goodpost:


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## q_1966 (21 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> As one who had the honour and the pleasure of working for Colonel "Nick" for three years when he commanded the Combat Arms School, I can attest that he practiced what he preached. He also would come down very hard on people who abused students for the sake of instilling discipline - he called it mindless bullsh.t. Nick also was capable of coming very close to the line. When he was CO of the Recce Sqn in 4 Brigade he was ordered by the commander to attend a reception in the mess for a fairly senior German general. During the war Nick had been a trooper in the 12th Manitoba Dragoons, which was the 2nd Canadian Corps Armoured Car Regiment. He did not like socializing with German officers of the same vintage all that much and protested and was ordered to attend. He was duly introduced to Herr General who said something like "Nicholson, Nicholson. Haff ve ever met?" Nick replied "I don't think so, oh wait, I didn't recognize you without your hands up."



That made my night


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## BeyondTheNow (9 Feb 2013)

This question is only slightly related to the initial paragraph of this article, which made me wonder if there are any similar feelings among the Canadian Forces regarding this particular line, “...Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished..."

I have no military experience. The closest thing I _do_ have is a few relatives who served, a few acquaintances who are serving members and a brother who was ResF for 10+ years.  I'm just curious if the general consensus is that the CF recognizes its officers/NCMs in a timely manner for exceptional work either in combat or otherwise? On the flip side, are disciplinary measures enforced readily and in equal measure? (i.e. 'x' action will equal 'x' result in all instances). I'm just trying to gain a greater understanding of the overall environment. To clarify, I'm not the type of person who expects a, "Gee, great job, Jonny! You just earned yourself a raise and a beer with the boys!" and a pat on the back for simply doing what was expected.  I'd just like anyone's personal perspective on the subject.  (Please let me know if this topic has been discussed in other threads.)


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## The Anti-Royal (30 Oct 2013)

Shared with the usual caveats:

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_BuildingBetterGenerals_0.pdf

I must admit that I've only skimmed the paper, but found the notion of "tracking" officers to either operational or enterprise appointments an intriguing one.


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## The Bread Guy (30 Oct 2013)

The Anti-Royal said:
			
		

> I must admit that I've only skimmed the paper, but found the notion of "tracking" officers to either operational or enterprise appointments an intriguing one.


I just skimmed the exec summary, and wonder what happens if you get a "warfighter" who knows little/nothing about institutions, or an "institutional" person who knows little/nothing about war fighting, at the very top of the military pyramid where they'd have to deal with both.


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## The Anti-Royal (30 Oct 2013)

I suppose you get a general officer who's insufficiently "general".


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## FJAG (30 Oct 2013)

This type of proposal makes its way in and out of military command philosophy on a cyclical basis. 

The problem is that people just don't live enough to gather all the training and experience necessary to be all-singing, all-dancing senior leaders. 

After a dozen years of anti-terrorism warfare, a developing, outward looking China, and a resurging Russia, are we in a situation where we need to seriously address our roles, missions and methods? Hell, yes.

In an environment where there is limited time to develop senior leaders in all the ever expanding complexity of their jobs do we need to address how best to do this? Hell, yes again.

Do we need to create flag officer career silos? Hell, no. 

If one creates two classes of officers (operational and enterprise), regardless of what rank level you start at, you will create two groups whose practical experience in the other class approaches zero. At best the result will be distrust and inefficiency; at worse chaos.

It's interesting to recall that Eisenhower never commanded anything bigger than a battalion before he was made Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations although he held numerous significant staff jobs. Under the proposed system he could easily have been shunted into the "enterprise" stream and never received operational command.

If we need CEO-like skills for certain areas of expertise then that can be provided through properly trained civil servants or the senior leadership of military administrative branches or other solutions short of the authors' recommendations. In many ways senior leaders are already "streamed" into appropriate education and experience positions but without the rigidity called for here.

Sorry, but this whole article strikes me as a "publish or perish" paper written to justify the funding grants that CNAS receives. Regretfully CNAS, while a young organization, seems to be listened to in high places (read the White House)

I hope that what appears to me as a fad hitting the top of the reinventing the wheel cycle doesn't become a policy set in stone.  :2c:

 :cheers:


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## Humphrey Bogart (30 Oct 2013)

FJAG said:
			
		

> This type of proposal makes its way in and out of military command philosophy on a cyclical basis.
> 
> The problem is that people just don't live enough to gather all the training and experience necessary to be all-singing, all-dancing senior leaders.
> 
> ...



 :goodpost:

Many people who comment on what we "need our generals to be" have little to no clue on what a general officer actually does.  Generals are by definition "Generalists" and they need to have a breadth of experience across a cross-section of areas so that they are able to make "informed" decisions.  Btw we already have streaming systems in place to make Generals and Formation CWO's, they just are invisible to most people within the organization.

edit:  Just skimmed the paper, it is a bunch of mumbo-jumbo.... goes on about how our Generals haven't been given enough time to adequately develop their strategic thinking ability through education.... My Answer:  "Earth to Johnny!  We have been fighting a war for the past 12 years where the heck have you been!"

Talks about managing an "increasingly volatile international security environment".... In what sense?  The wars we just fought are winding down, defense budgets are being slashed and the "security situation" is probably the best its been.... ehhh ever  :



> Sorry, but this whole article strikes me as a "publish or perish" paper written to justify the funding grants that CNAS receives. Regretfully CNAS, while a young organization, seems to be listened to in high places (read the White House)



Couldn't agree more


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## jollyjacktar (30 Oct 2013)

But have we been fighting what will be the last war and not our next one?  As is one of the common complaints on a militaries focus.  And, those senior commanders who saw us through the last 12 years.   How many will be left in a couple of years time?

Do we generally (pardon the pun) get enough experience at the coal face for those who will be our next commanders?  It's not like we're operationally busy as the Yanks are on a regular basis.  Won't we always be doomed to learn on the fly as the war arises as has been our experience these past say 125 years or so?


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## pbi (31 Oct 2013)

Still not finished this piece, but my initial comments:

-Gen (Retd) David Barno is not really somebody who has 





> little to no clue on what a general officer actually does.


. He was the overall US Comd in Afghanistan (CFC-A) when I was there in 04-05, so he does have at least a modicum of operational experience (and thus IMHO should know better);

-I agree completely with FJAG that this type of thinking is both cyclical, and IMHO typically US. It's cyclical because every so often we realize that our officers aren't being educated or trained (or both) properly for what we think they should be capable of doing. On our side, you can go back to the Rowley Report of 1969, and lots of stuff out of CDA and other places since. Its typically American, because it proposes yet another "systems" approach to solving an essentially human or social problem, which may actually not have a real "solution". It reminds me of Macnamara's idea of dividing the US Army into a "Support Army" and a "Field Army" (I'm paraphrasing here...), which IMHO was an equally unsound idea; and

-a "general officer", as Royal Drew points out, is exactly that: a generalist. If you look at the most successful general officers in history, you will probably find that very little of their success had to do with any particular aspect of their officer career development process, or their specific knowledge of anything, and much more to do with their character, mental flexibility and decision making skills. This is much the same for CEOs and for senior level public servants. Look at Arthur Currie or Bert Hoffmeister: what "officer career development process" did either of them go through? (They may be limited examples because they were both war fighting generals and not institutional generals, but I think they illustrate the point...)

I would not want to see a CCA who had no operational experience, any more than I would want to see one who had no concept of how to manage the institutional aspects of the CA, either. I spent much of the first two thirds of my military career serving under GOFOs who were all about the "institutional" side (because that's what our system produced) but whose last operational experience was maybe as CO in Cyprus (if they were lucky...). The results were usually uninspiring and sometimes hideous. "Streaming" is IMHO an almost certain guarantee of this kind of outcome.

And please don't try to use the "German example" of the General Staff Officer class to justify the sort of idea proposed in the paper: the German system was designed to produce well-rounded and capable officers who could be both effective commanders _and_ very good senior staff officers: it was not "either/or".

The Americans already have a pretty damned good PME system(I'm a graduate of part of it): IMHO what happened is that the massive pressures of two wars, combined with all the other extant demands on the US military, caused a focus away from PME as a "luxury" and onto operational duty. The system is fine if is allowed to work properly.


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## FJAG (31 Oct 2013)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> But have we been fighting what will be the last war and not our next one?  As is one of the common complaints on a militaries focus.  And, those senior commanders who saw us through the last 12 years.   How many will be left in a couple of years time?
> 
> Do we generally (pardon the pun) get enough experience at the coal face for those who will be our next commanders?  It's not like we're operationally busy as the Yanks are on a regular basis.  Won't we always be doomed to learn on the fly as the war arises as has been our experience these past say 125 years or so?



I think this is a general (also pardon the pun) problem. 

If you think about it the US officer corps that existed during the 80s and 90s had their experience in Vietnam, a specialised and often counter-productive, experience for the Cold War army (including Korea). Those who led in the two Gulf wars and Afghanistan got their experience (what there was of it) in Grenada, Panama and Somalia as well as the then disintegrating Cold War army. Again nothing that really prepared them for the next event.

Canadian officer development experiences prior to Afghanistan were decade after decade of blue beret peacekeeping, a little Somalia and a lot of book-learning. We seemed to muddle through okay.

I sometimes think that the only army that ever really trained for the war they were fighting next were the Romans.  ;D

 :cheers:


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## GAP (31 Oct 2013)

I suspect that the Israeli's are probably closest to training for the next war.....they know they are going to have one periodically....


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## tomahawk6 (31 Oct 2013)

Selection for general officer in the US and perhaps most others is who do you know and if you have checked the right boxes.To be selected for BG you have to have had a brigade command as a Colonel.You have to have graduated from a war college and you have to have had Joint Staff experience.It helps to have been an Executive Officer for a General.Generals tend to select officers that mirror themselves.In some cases they may have served with one or more Board members.


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## daftandbarmy (31 Oct 2013)

A Letter from General George S. Patton to His Son

On June 6, 1944, General George S. Patton wrote this letter to his twenty-year-old son, George Jr., who was enrolled at West Point. Patton Sr. was in England training the Third Army in preparation for the battles that would follow the invasion at Normandy.

Note: The letter’s grammar and spelling have been slightly edited for clarity.

APO 403, N.Y.

“D-Day”

Dear George:

At 0700 this morning the BBC announced that the German Radio had just come out with an announcement of the landing of Allied Paratroops and of large numbers of assault craft near shore. So that is it.

This group of unconquerable heroes whom I command are not in yet but we will be soon—I wish I was there now as it is a lovely sunny day for a battle and I am fed up with just sitting.

I have no immediate idea of being killed but one can never tell and none of us can live forever, so if I should go don’t worry but set yourself to do better than I have.

All men are timid on entering any fight; whether it is the first fight or the last fight all of us are timid. Cowards are those who let their timidity get the better of their manhood. You will never do that because of your blood lines on both sides. I think I have told you the story of Marshall Touraine who fought under Louis XIV. On the morning of one of his last battles—he had been fighting for forty years—he was mounting his horse when a young ADC [aide-de-camp] who had just come from the court and had never missed a meal or heard a hostile shot said: “M. de Touraine it amazes me that a man of your supposed courage should permit his knees to tremble as he walks out to mount.” Touraine replied “My lord duke I admit that my knees do tremble but should they know where I shall this day take them they would shake even more.” That is it. Your knees may shake but they will always take you towards the enemy. Well so much for that.

There are apparently two types of successful soldiers. Those who get on by being unobtrusive and those who get on by being obtrusive. I am of the latter type and seem to be rare and unpopular: but it is my method. One has to choose a system and stick to it; people who are not themselves are nobody.

To be a successful soldier you must know history. Read it objectively–dates and even the minute details of tactics are useless. What you must know is how man reacts. Weapons change but man who uses them changes not at all. To win battles you do not beat weapons–you beat the soul of man of the enemy man. To do that you have to destroy his weapons, but that is only incidental. You must read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find that war is simple. Decide what will hurt the enemy most within the limits of your capabilities to harm him and then do it. TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. That is quite different from being rash. My personal belief is that if you have a 50% chance take it because the superior fighting qualities of American soldiers lead by me will surely give you the extra 1% necessary.

In Sicily I decided as a result of my information, observations and a sixth sense that I have that the enemy did not have another large scale attack in his system. I bet my shirt on that and I was right. You cannot make war safely but no dead general has ever been criticised so you have that way out always.

I am sure that if every leader who goes into battle will promise himself that he will come out either a conqueror or a corpse he is sure to win. There is no doubt of that. Defeat is not due to losses but to the destruction of the soul of the leaders. The “Live to fight another day” doctrine.

The most vital quality a soldier can possess is SELF CONFIDENCE–utter, complete and bumptious. You can have doubts about your good looks, about your intelligence, about your self control but to win in war you must have NO doubts about your ability as a soldier.

What success I have had results from the fact that I have always been certain that my military reactions were correct. Many people do not agree with me; they are wrong. The unerring jury of history written long after both of us are dead will prove me correct.

Note that I speak of “Military reactions”–no one is borne with them any more than anyone is borne with muscles. You can be born with the soul capable of correct military reactions or the body capable of having big muscles, but both qualities must be developed by hard work.

The intensity of your desire to acquire any special ability depends on character, on ambition. I think that your decision to study this summer instead of enjoying yourself shows that you have character and ambition—they are wonderful possessions.

Soldiers, all men in fact, are natural hero worshipers. Officers with a flare for command realise this and emphasize in their conduct, dress and deportment the qualities they seek to produce in their men. When I was a second lieutenant I had a captain who was very sloppy and usually late yet he got after the men for just those faults; he was a failure.

The troops I have commanded have always been well dressed, been smart saluters, been prompt and bold in action because I have personally set the example in these qualities. The influence one man can have on thousands is a never-ending source of wonder to me. You are always on parade. Officers who through laziness or a foolish desire to be popular fail to enforce discipline and the proper wearing of uniforms and equipment not in the presence of the enemy will also fail in battle, and if they fail in battle they are potential murderers. There is no such thing as: “A good field soldier:” you are either a good soldier or a bad soldier.

Well this has been quite a sermon but don’t get the idea that it is my swan song because it is not–I have not finished my job yet.

Your affectionate father.

http://www.artofmanliness.com/2011/08/21/manvotional-a-letter-from-general-george-s-patton-to-his-son/


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## Journeyman (1 Nov 2013)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> You cannot make war safely but no dead general has ever been criticised so you have that way out always.


Perhaps we need to see the occasional General, dead on operations...... 

    :dunno:     

     ^^
...added because I'm not overly concerned


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## Edward Campbell (1 Nov 2013)

Maybe ...

But being KIA will not make one immune to unjustified criticism nor will it guarantee that one is remembered.






Brig John Lawson ~ killed in Hong Kong in 1941.
Just recently I had to remind the most senior members of one regiment that Col Geoff Parker was not the highest ranking officer of his Regiment killed in action ...  :not-again: 






MGen Malcolm Mercer ~ killed at Mount Sorrel, Belgium in 1916.
And John Lawson wasn't the highest ranking Canadian killed in action.


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## Old Sweat (1 Nov 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Maybe ...
> 
> But being KIA will not make one immune to unjustified criticism nor will it guarantee that one is remembered.



There were two other Canadian brigadiers killed in action in the Second World War - JN Lane, the CRA of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, and EL Booth, the Comd of 4th Armoured Brigade. Some of you may recall that Booth had been found sleeping* on the floor of his tank while his brigade was attempting unsuccessfully to advance down the Caen-Falaise Road in Phase 2 of Totalize. He was killed on 14 August in Operation Tractable when his tactical headquarters drove at right angles to the axis of advance until it encountered some German anti-tank guns. Why he was not fired immediately after the Totalize incident still baffles me. He was a menace who was grossly over-promoted.

* An euphenism for passed out drunk.


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## GnyHwy (1 Nov 2013)

Only read the exec summary, but this is not much different that what we already do.  Is it a necessary evil?  Maybe, but I don't think so.  We do the same thing with NCMs too.  The big pitfall I see is if the operational and enterprise staff stovepipe their own efforts to avoid friction with each other.

If they don't stovepipe, then you have two different cultures and priorities constantly in friction with each other, which is good in my eyes, but very bad in other peoples eyes; especially when they have an agenda.

This is philosophy of picking your horses for their end position and guiding them through the necessary hoops to get there.  I don't necessarily subscribe to this, mostly because you are creating quasi-knowledgeable (theory and classroom, but no practical application) leaders at best , but it is a fairly simple time appreciation if you think about it.  If you want some to be a 4 star by the age of 55, add up the prerequisite positions needed prior and you'll probably come up with the person needing to be a LCol around the age of 30.


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## Navy_Pete (1 Nov 2013)

Not sure about the other elements, but this sounds similar to what we already do in the navy, with MARS as the operators and the NTOs and Logs as the support trades.

To be really good at whatever your trade is you need a solid understanding of the needs of the other two.  Not sure about logs, but they've recently promoted some engineers up to RAdm, and are increasingly filling some senior operational type billets with engineers as well (by changing them to purple type jobs).

Again, not sure about the various american elements, but at least in the USN there isn't a good comparison between the trades, as they are much more specialized then we are (ie they have techs dedicated to a single piece of equipment, vice ours that maintain a suite, and their officer corp on a ship are all MARs, with the senior NCMs providing the technical expertise for navigation, engineering, etc).

The only way I can see this actually working for them is to completely overhaul their occupation structures and how they generally do business, which is probably not too likely to ever happen.  Nice to see someone can get paid for writing utter drivel though.  Wonder if I could somehow translate all my crap postings here into internet dollars somehow? ;D


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## tomahawk6 (1 Nov 2013)

Unfortunately selection to general officer is somewhat political at BG and MG,but becomes very political at the 3 and 4 star ranks.Until selection to general officer an officer works in his branch and staff assignments.This is felt to mold a future leader with varied assignments.


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## pbi (1 Nov 2013)

GAP said:
			
		

> I suspect that the Israeli's are probably closest to training for the next war.....they know they are going to have one periodically....



IIRC their last foray into Lebanon proved exactly the opposite: a decade or more of focus on limited security operations (anecdotally...maybe others here have references...) found the IDF sadly lacking against a surprisingly capable and well-prepared enemy. This prompted some serious IDF soul-searching on just what had happened to their focus and their capability set.

You start every war with what you've got, including experience and outlook.



> To be a successful soldier you must know history. Read it objectively–dates and even the minute details of tactics are useless. What you must know is how man reacts. Weapons change but man who uses them changes not at all. To win battles you do not beat weapons–you beat the soul of man of the enemy man. To do that you have to destroy his weapons, but that is only incidental. You must read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find that war is simple. Decide what will hurt the enemy most within the limits of your capabilities to harm him and then do it. TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. That is quite different from being rash. My personal belief is that if you have a 50% chance take it because the superior fighting qualities of American soldiers lead by me will surely give you the extra 1% necessary.



This, to me, is the real heart of it, technocrats and "Popular Science" warriors to the contrary.  There was much, far, more intelligence and insight in Patton's character than popular wisdom and that stupid movie would ever suggest. IMHO one of his greatest traits was his understanding of people, which along with his encyclopedic knowledge of history, no doubt helped him be the commander he was.

IMHO there is a reason why a General like Hillier stands out so vividly in our military senior leadership culture and upsets so many people, for better or worse. GOFOs like him (and Dextraze) are brief splashes of bright colour on an otherwise pretty dull canvas of bureaucratic mediocrity. This has been what our system has historically produced, with a few exceptions now and then.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Nov 2013)

It seems to me that the most important part of a CF member's career ~ officer or other rank ~ is near the start.

I remain convinced that the single most important thing the military does is to train junior leaders: subaltern officers and small team leaders. That _foundation_ training will be the firm base upon which everything that officer or soldier does ~ good and bad, all the way up to the most senior ranks ~ is built. If there is a bad CDS or your unit RSM is a disgrace then we can, almost certainly, blame it on whatever happened during the first few years of their careers, especially during their initial leadership training.

Not everyone will be or can be a leader. As many members here know, leading is hard: it is hard to lead a small team in an aircraft maintenance unit; it is hard to lead a platoon; it's hard to command a ship or a helicopter squadron or a whole brigade. Not everyone who joins can learn to lead and some of those who learn all the lessons cannot seem to apply them. The notion that everyone should be promoted to a rank (as opposed to, say, a specialist pay grade) is nonsense - some people do not, because they cannot, pass basic officer training; some people do not, because they cannot, pass junior leader training. But most people who can jump over those hurdles will find that everything else - staff college, senior leadership training, etc - is _easier_: not easy, just not as hard as that first, HUGE step up the ladder.

(There are a lot of things for which Paul Hellyer should be blamed and _devaluing_ the junior leadership ranks is by far the worst thing he did. As I have explained before, his motive and the motives of the military leaders who supported him were good: he wanted to give us a pay raise that he, and our leaders knew we needed.)

So, my message is: don't worry about _streaming_ admirals and generals, focus on training really first rate junior leaders and the rest will sort itself out.


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## Humphrey Bogart (1 Nov 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> It seems to me that the most important part of a CF member's career ~ officer or other rank ~ is near the start.
> 
> I remain convinced that the single most important thing the military does is to train junior leaders: subaltern officers and small team leaders. That _foundation_ training will be the firm base upon which everything that officer or soldier does ~ good and bad, all the way up to the most senior ranks ~ is built. If there is a bad CDS or your unit RSM is a disgrace then we can, almost certainly, blame it on whatever happened during the first few years of their careers, especially during their initial leadership training.
> 
> ...



:goodpost:


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## tomahawk6 (1 Nov 2013)

The big office and minions at your beck and call,who wouldn't want that ? ;D


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## Old Sweat (1 Nov 2013)

Re our penchant for bureaucratic mediocrity PBI mentioned, I recall a couple of statements by ex-Chiefs of the Defence Staff at about the time I retired back in 1994. One said that we should have more generals, not less, as our people were so good that NATO was continually asking for more to fill the various staff posts that were being created. The other ex-CDS, or he may still have been serving, when asked to comment on the closing of NDC, replied that it wasn't that important an institution as those destined for the highest ranks really couldn't afford to take a year out of the system to attend. Thus it was a place to send those officers who might make MGen/RAdm at best. He then added [I am paraphrasing] that you could pick out the real movers and shakers by looking at their chests. They did not have a lot of ribbons, as once again they could not afford the time out of the system to go on operational tours.

I dare say events have proven both of those gentlemen mistaken in their opinions.


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## pbi (1 Nov 2013)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I dare say events have proven both of those gentlemen mistaken in their opinions.



Yes, but how utterly typical of their ilk.


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## daftandbarmy (1 Nov 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Perhaps we need to see the occasional General, dead on operations......
> 
> :dunno:
> 
> ...



Nothing is so good for the morale of the troops as occasionally to see a dead general. 

    - Field Marshal Bill Slim


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## The Bread Guy (6 Nov 2013)

From a counterpoint addendum to the OP's article:


> .... If we are going to be as bold with our new doctrine and its embracing of new technology, then we need to be as bold and create an institutional culture that creates officers that can handle the tempo the doctrine writers are advocating future technology will create. This is a different culture from the one we have now. We cannot continue to write glowing documents advocating an “agile” officer, yet subtly support peacetime practices which uphold bureaucratic qualities, rather than battlefield qualities, when officers come up for promotion.
> 
> To prepare the Army for the 21st Century and create the officer corps of the future, we must
> 
> ...


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## The Bread Guy (13 May 2016)

1)  Merged a series of "making better officer" threads (those not focusing on RMC/university itself), so ...
2)  I could include the attached from the U.S. Congressional Research Service as very-recent (this week) food for further thought from our southern neighbours - their summary:  


> Congress and the executive branch are currently considering changes to the officer personnel management system.  Some of these proposed changes would require changes to the laws, including provision enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA).
> 
> Contemporary debates over officer personnel management policy often revolve around the fundamental questions of “what type of officers do we need to win the next war?” and “what skills does the officer corps need to enable the military services to perform their missions?” These questions are implicitly oriented towards future events.  Their answers are therefore somewhat speculative.  Still, contemporary trends and military history can provide valuable insight.  Additionally, a set of broader questions can help focus the analysis:
> -- What will be the key security interests and priorities of the United States in the future?
> ...


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## a_majoor (14 May 2016)

I was struck by the observation in "The Sling and the Stone" that American personal policy was still based on reforms introduced by Elihu Root between 1899 and 1904. I don't have a comparable date for our system, but it certainly mimics a lot of the principles of our American counterparts.

Hammes himself advocates for a "3600" assessment rather than top down assessments, and I know that several members here have mentioned more than once that a system of competitive exams should be used to determine promotions as well.

Probably the key, though, is the suggestion that we focus less on "process" and more on "product" (or outcome), and 3600 assessments and competitive exams are two possible tools for doing so.

_- mod edit to fix link -_


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## daftandbarmy (15 May 2016)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I was struck by the observation in "The Sling and the Stone" that American personal policy was still based on reforms introduced by Elihu Root between 1899 and 1904. I don't have a comparable date for our system, but it certainly mimics a lot of the principles of our American counterparts.
> 
> Hammes himself advocates for a "3600" assessment rather than top down assessments, and I know that several members here have mentioned more than once that a system of competitive exams should be used to determine promotions as well.
> 
> ...



Just a caution around the use of civilian inspired tools like the 360, which my company administers for various clients: it ain't all it's cracked up to be.

If not used in the right way the results can be disastrous. e.g., "you're doing a lousy job so we are going to give you a 360 ... or else".
Obviously, we avoid doing assessments under those conditions.

The military already has a great leadership development culture, enshrined in the OPP process e.g., Prepare, delegate, supervise, AAR, do it again, assign increasingly challenging tasks when ready etc. Coaching and mentoring, all cool buzzwords these days, is built in already.


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## dapaterson (15 May 2016)

Agreed, but I think a formal evaluation by subordinates can also be effective if it is done across the board - and if it is used for development, and not in a threatening or punitive manner (as you describe).  

For example, when I am asked for work-related references, I generally provide one superior, one peer, and one subordinate.


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