# Conservatives plan to legislate CAF unification into history?



## McG (13 Apr 2014)

Missed this when it first came out.  It looks like the Conservatives plan to legislate unification into history.  I guess there is nothing more important than erasing the last half century.


> *The ‘Royal’ in Royal Navy, Air Force to get legal weight*
> Michelle Zilio
> iPolitics
> 11 Feb 2014
> ...


 http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/02/11/the-royal-in-royal-navy-air-force-to-get-legal-weight/


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## McG (13 Apr 2014)

General Hillier's transformation plans were defeated by environmental chiefs who declared they would not cooperate for the glory of their tribes.  I can only imagine empire building and stove-pipes to get worse if the services are re-enshrined in law.

Once again there is no need for this change, but I suppose there is nothing else important that should get in the way of removing the last half century from our history.


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## rmc_wannabe (13 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> General Hillier's transformation plans were defeated by environmental chiefs who declared they would not cooperate for the glory of their tribes.  I can only imagine empire building and stove-pipes to get worse if the services are re-enshrined in law.
> 
> Once again there is no need for this change, but I suppose there is nothing else important that should get in the way of removing the last half century from our history.



Like the de-unification itself, this annoucnement is entirely political. 

Mr. Harper wants his legacy intact if the Liberals regain control further down the road. I reckon his money in on the Second Coming of Trudeau  returning things back to the way they were, again, if elected.


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## Edward Campbell (13 Apr 2014)

As far as I can see the Budget Implementation Act will, simply, make some (necessary) administrative amendments to the NDA to authorize e.g. ranks like trooper, gunner, sapper, etc. I did not see any proposal to amend the existence of the Canadian Armed Forces and/or to recreate e.g. the RCN as a separate service, with a legal "life" of its own. This _administrative_ requirement was discussed in the various "buttons and bows" threads.


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## Stonegeneral (13 Apr 2014)

My read of the Budget Implementation Act seemed to suggest that the current rank schedule included in the NDA was to be replaced by one that actually removed references to old RCN and RCAF rank titles. As for references to the old services, it looks like they are just going to be written into the NDA by name, as they are now, commands and not separate services as they had been pre-68.


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## a_majoor (13 Apr 2014)

rmc_wannabe said:
			
		

> Like the de-unification itself, this annoucnement is entirely political.
> 
> Mr. Harper wants his legacy intact if the Liberals regain control further down the road. I reckon his money in on the Second Coming of Trudeau  returning things back to the way they were, again, if elected.



Considering the Young Dauphin's expressed level of knowledge on subjects as varied as what constitutes the Middle Class or the political model of China, I don't believe he will be able to contribute any meaningful dialogue as to the nature or management of the Armed Forces should he ever achieve power. 

The CDS and Service Chiefs will be able to run circles around him, but their primary job in that era will be to manage an even more rapidly diminishing pool of resources rather than considering nuances like what colour their jacket facings should be...


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## McG (13 Apr 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> As far as I can see the Budget Implementation Act will, simply, make some (necessary) administrative amendments to the NDA to authorize e.g. ranks like trooper, gunner, sapper, etc.


Those ranks have been in the NDA for decades.  Only Colour Sergeant and one of the French translations were missing.


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## Old Sweat (13 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> Those ranks have been in the NDA for decades.  Only Colour Sergeant and one of the French translations were missing.



Are you sure? There was a MBdr awarded the MMV from Afghanistan and when the award was gazetted, he appeared as a MCpl. The explanation put forward on this site and elsewhere is that MBdr was not an authorized rank under the NDA.

I know that circa 1968 after the Unification Act came into effect, we were directed to call our junior ranks privates and corporals, but gunner and bombardier (and the French equivalents) never really disappeared.


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## dapaterson (13 Apr 2014)

The NDA provides that personnel are referred to by ranks as listed in column 1 of the schedule to the NDA, and permits the minister to authorize the use of other ranks within the schedule.

There's a QR&O that, in turn, specifies that we use column 1, except for folks in naval DEU, who are referred to by column 2.

There are columns 3 and 4 to the schedule as well, with traditional Army & Air Force names.

When the then MND made the announcement about traditional ranks, he included "ensign" and "colour sergeant".  However, those two ranks do not appear in the NDA.

Therefore, to bring into force what the MND announced, the NDA must be amended to include those ranks, and a new QR&O must be written to authorize the use of column 3 of the schedule for those wearing an Army DEU.


Since at the time of the award of the MMV for the Artillery MCpl the use of column 3 ranks was not permitted, the award was properly gazetted as MCpl.


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## OldSolduer (13 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> General Hillier's transformation plans were defeated by environmental chiefs who declared they would not cooperate for the glory of their tribes.  I can only imagine empire building and stove-pipes to get worse if the services are re-enshrined in law.
> 
> Once again there is no need for this change, but I suppose there is nothing else important that should get in the way of removing the last half century from our history.



I would like to have seen a few high profile people that were resisting fired......not "resigned" because of personal reasons.

The speech would go like this:

"Effective immediately I have relieved (insert rank/name) here from his duty as (insert job) because of his/her delaying tactics in implementing (insert policy and what not here). Effective immediately I have assigned (insert rank/name) to replace him/her. He/she have 10 business days, effective immediately, to begin to implement (insert policy etc here).

I know this will never fly.....but one can dream. Sorry for the tangent.


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## PuckChaser (13 Apr 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Are you sure? There was a MBdr awarded the MMV from Afghanistan and when the award was gazetted, he appeared as a MCpl. The explanation put forward on this site and elsewhere is that MBdr was not an authorized rank under the NDA.
> 
> I know that circa 1968 after the Unification Act came into effect, we were directed to call our junior ranks privates and corporals, but gunner and bombardier (and the French equivalents) never really disappeared.



The ranks in the NDA are just a set of tables. When they did the unification thing, they just stated that only Table 1 would be used, and Table 2 for the RCN. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/page-147.html#docCont

They're also going to have to modify those tables to change Signalman to Signaller.


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## uptheglens (16 Apr 2014)

Oh, boo hoo, MCG. The CF was a ****ing mistake from the get-go. But that mistake is now a part of our culture, so we should keep it, because its now been inured, much like a benign tumour. **** off, you ******


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## blacktriangle (16 Apr 2014)

uptheglens said:
			
		

> Oh, boo hoo, MCG. The CF was a ******* mistake from the get-go. But that mistake is now a part of our culture, so we should keep it, because its now been inured, much like a benign tumour. **** off, you thunder****



…and goodbye _uptheglens_


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## Nfld Sapper (16 Apr 2014)

uptheglens said:
			
		

> Oh, boo hoo, MCG. The CF was a ****ing mistake from the get-go. But that mistake is now a part of our culture, so we should keep it, because its now been inured, much like a benign tumour. **** off, you thunder****









Personal foul... there will be no personal attacks on the Moderators or any other members of this site...


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## Navy_Pete (16 Apr 2014)

I've done a few joint exercises now and they seem to go relatively smoothly when the three elements work together under a single command.  One thing that might be nice on the equipment side is more crosstalk on comms and other things like that (including the SOFCOM folks)  so the navy doesn't end up with a 'land forces comms radio' that uses frequencies the army abandoned in the 90s.  To be fair, the process to put it on board probably started in the early 80s, but it took a while to work through the system.

No worries though, the Defence Procurement Strategy will fix that!  Fixing bureaucracy with... more bureaucracy!  ...yay... :facepalm:


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## SeaKingTacco (16 Apr 2014)

No one thought to give the Ships TCCCs radios to replace the 524 sets that are still installed....


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## devil39 (16 Apr 2014)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> No one thought to give the Ships TCCCs radios to replace the 524 sets that are still installed....



All the more reason to stop Environment led and focussed parochial FD.  If it has not been coordinated and costed as a "Joint" project, it should not get the money.  The only way FD will become joint (and rational?) is if take more out of the hands of the environments in my opinion.  

Unification did not appear to have made us very Joint.   Maybe 3 strongly separate environments with all of their "bling" will be easier to unify?


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## Edward Campbell (17 Apr 2014)

devil39 said:
			
		

> All the more reason to stop Environment led and focussed parochial FD.  If it has not been coordinated and costed as a "Joint" project, it should not get the money.  The only way FD will become joint (and rational?) is if take more out of the hands of the environments in my opinion.
> 
> Unification did not appear to have made us very Joint.   Maybe 3 strongly separate environments with all of their "bling" will be easier to unify?




Actually, in 1968, two of the _unified_ commands, MARCOM and Mobile Command were about as _joint_ as anyone might want; too _joint_ for the tastes of the Air Force _'leaders'_ who insisted that everything that flew, including things that had *never* been part of the old, pre-1966 RCAF, must be placed into the new, and totally unnecessary, Air Command in 1975. _Unification_, in the form of _joint_ Maritime and Mobile Commands, was never given a chance. But it wasn't the _bling_ or the _i"jolly green jumper"_ or even RAdm Landymore that killed it, it was old fashioned _empire building_ in Ottawa.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (17 Apr 2014)

I fully second what ERC says.

I would add the following, however, "joint" operations involving the Maritime and Mobile components only makes sense for operations at the "interface" that is the littoral. 

There is little that land force can contribute to fighting on the high seas, and little that the Navy can contribute to land warfare inland from the coasts. That is just the nature of the beast. 

This said, unification, IMHO, has been particularily successful with the interoperability of the various "purple" trades and eliminated countless pre-unification inter-service committees that never seem to resolve issues surrounding adoption of a "single" Canadian standard for whatever support activity they provided to their respective service.

We should just make sure that, come what may, we don't trow that baby with the bathwater…It would be a shame.


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## McG (18 Apr 2014)

uptheglens said:
			
		

> The CF was a ****ing mistake from the get-go. But that mistake is now a part of our culture, so we should keep it ...


No.  We should keep the CAF because we are a far stronger and more effective and efficient organization than we otherwise would be.  The CAF fielded some outstanding, successful capabilities to Afghanistan, Libya, various bits of the former Yugoslavia, the decades long NATO commitment in Germany, and various other places around the globe.

We can be sustained by a leaner national HQ because of unification.  There is better internal communication because of it.  We could have better synchronization of capitol equipment because of unification.  There is potential that we are not currently realizing and should work to attain.

The problem is, as E.R. Campbell commented, that unification was never given a chance.  Service pride fought it from the very beginning, and it has incrementally been rolled back by the same service pride and environmental empire building ever since.

Rather than reversing unification to appease a lobby that wants to erase the last 50 years, we should re-engage on unification.  Bring forward Hillier's transformation concept and revisit elements like the consolidation of capability development from the ECSs into CFD.

I look to the enormous waste that occurs on maintaining separate service identities in the US military.  We don't want to emulate that.  Nor to we want to emulate the barriers to communication, cooperation, personnel management, etc that exist because each service exists as its own silo of excellence.


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## RedcapCrusader (18 Apr 2014)

I think Unification was done in the wrong fashion. The idea behind it was fine, but the execution not so much. That is why, in my opinion, we see so much animosity towards the Unified model. Now that we have returned to 3 separate identities within a unified CAF, we are a more effective fighting force, but those that were around during unification will still fight against it.


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## CombatDoc (18 Apr 2014)

RedcapCrusader said:
			
		

> ...Now that we have returned to 3 separate identities within a unified CAF, we are a more effective fighting force, but those that were around during unification will still fight against it.


Considering that Unification was announced 46 years ago, I doubt if there are any still serving who were around at that time. However, it may be a different matter for some of the honouraries, regimental patrons, etc.


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## Halifax Tar (18 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> The problem is, as E.R. Campbell commented, that unification was never given a chance.  Service pride fought it from the very beginning, and it has incrementally been rolled back by the same service pride and environmental empire building ever since.



I know you love to kick this horse until its ground beef,  and frankly its getting old,  but if you think there are no empires in the "unified" CAF Branches you must open your eyes.  The Log Branch is IMHO a great example of an "empire" that needs to be toppled.  

In fact I would say there are many empires within this empire, some regional some based on uniform.  

ERC has also stated the unification went too far in destroying service identities and pride, don't be selective in what you choose to represent, paint the whole picture not just the part you want people to see.

Besides if unification was such a success why wasn't it copied by others ?  And why has it been allowed to slowly unravel sense the mid 80s ?  Surly our political masters wouldn't let something go that was saving oodles of money and resources.


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## sandyson (18 Apr 2014)

I think the word distinction needed herein is integration versus unification.  Having been commissioned RCOC (ordnance) I was sent on the first logistics course at the CFSAL Borden in the Service Corps (RCASC) lines. We were all retrained as finance, transport, and supply officers to serve at whim on ship, in the field, or on an air station.  I recall that from the start of the course the Navy and Army officers lined up against the Air Force.  The interchanges were sometimes frustrating and heated.  The Navy and Army said that the spread of three specialities into one was probably far too much, but the notion of posting an army log officer from the field to a ship at sea was ridiculous.  Environments were much more than just the physical ones. A log officer had to know the one of conflict as well as the social one. The Air Force said an officer could easily switch between the two e.g. a ration depot was just a ration depot. The Navy and Army agreed on integrating the log procedures but not the environmental ones. A duty officer in any one environment was very different from the other and so it went for five long months.  I hope people are now applauding integration and not unification. The latter proved very foolish.


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## Halifax Tar (18 Apr 2014)

sandyson said:
			
		

> I think the word distinction needed herein is integration versus unification.  Having been commissioned RCOC (ordnance) I was sent on the first logistics course at the CFSAL Borden in the Service Corps (RCASC) lines. We were all retrained as finance, transport, and supply officers to serve at whim on ship, in the field, or on an air station.  I recall that from the start of the course the Navy and Army officers lined up against the Air Force.  The interchanges were sometimes frustrating and heated.  The Navy and Army said that the spread of three specialities into one was probably far too much, but the notion of posting an army log officer from the field to a ship at sea was ridiculous.  Environments were much more than just the physical ones. A log officer had to know the one of conflict as well as the social one. The Air Force said an officer could easily switch between the two e.g. a ration depot was just a ration depot. The Navy and Army agreed on integrating the log procedures but not the environmental ones. A duty officer in any one environment was very different from the other and so it went for five long months.  I hope people are now applauding integration and not unification. The latter proved very foolish.



I don't know if your aware Sandyson, but AFAIK Log Os are now element specialized, meaning a Sea Log O wont be employed in first line Army or Air units as an example, and the same rings true for the Army and Air Log Os as well.   The same cannot be said,  sadly,  for the CPO1/CWO and below Log types. 

As well I agree with integration, but not unification.  1 common Supply system with common trg for all and employment within your element,  for example again. 

Obvious exceptions to this can be JHQs and other J UICs.  

( J = Joint )


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## McG (18 Apr 2014)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> ERC has also stated the unification went too far in destroying service identities and pride, don't be selective in what you choose to represent, paint the whole picture not just the part you want people to see.


I have never suggested every element of unification was done well.  But the contrary, that unification was all bad, is also wrong ... But that has been argued in efforts to toss the baby with its bath water.



			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> ... if you think there are no empires in the "unified" CAF Branches you must open your eyes.  The Log Branch is IMHO a great example of an "empire" that needs to be toppled.
> 
> In fact I would say there are many empires within this empire, some regional some based on uniform.


Yes there are many empires that have evolved since unification.  It is why I did not suggest things are utopian and why I noted there is potential we have not tapped.  I would not suggest Logistics is a particularly concerning example; at least it is still decentralized into the supported commands.  MP and medical, who's silos reach all the way to the national HQ, have only been riding the arguments the services used to rebuild themselves.  If everything that flies can only be managed by a stratification stovepipe owned by pilots, then surely the same applies to medicine and doctors ... Right?  I suspect the CAF has facilitated an environment conducive to empire-building through the desire of environments to work in competition as opposed to in cooperation.



			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> ... why has it been allowed to slowly unravel sense the mid 80s ?  Surly our political masters wouldn't let something go that was saving oodles of money and resources.


Because they don't really care about the CAF?  Because it is easy to score cheap political point by making a spectacle of reversing what the other party did while it was in power?



			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Besides if unification was such a success why wasn't it copied by others ?


There are plenty of nations with single service militaries, but you would dismiss any examples that are not from a "peer" military.  So, we could see that the IDF has a fairly unified military.  Like Canada, they have different uniforms (but common rank insignia) for Navy, air and ground forces.  Unlike Canada now, they do not have big, strong environmental commands separating these forces from the national HQs.  That is potentially a model we should take a look into.


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## Monsoon (18 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> There are plenty of nations with single service militaries, but you would dismiss any examples that are not from a "peer" military.  So, we could see that the IDF has a fairly unified military.  Like Canada, they have different uniforms (but common rank insignia) for Navy, air and ground forces.  Unlike Canada now, they do not have big, strong environmental commands separating these forces from the national HQs.  That is potentially a model we should take a look into.


While I'm inclined to broadly agree with you about unification, I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two. In that context, strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the "tyranny of the majority".

Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.

What we often refer to as "service parochialism" is really just a natural human bias in favour of what we understand over what we don't. The sum of all military capabilities really is too much for one man to know thoroughly. Except in the unique context of the IDF's stable-and-growing budget, in the absence of service-level control crucial capabilities end up getting dropped because of inherently biased decision-making.

Again - I'm not arguing strongly against unification (especially as it has recently evolved), but I do think a strong service culture protects commanders from their unknown unknowns.


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## Halifax Tar (18 Apr 2014)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> While I'm inclined to broadly agree with you about unification, I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two. In that context, strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the "tyranny of the majority".
> 
> Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.
> 
> ...



I agree with you Hamiltongs.  

I was on HMCS Toronto during the RCNs initial anti piracy patrol.  The commander of CFECOM, Gen Gautier, came on board for a visit.  

Him and his RSM came into the main cave.  He opened and closed his speech with this "I have no idea what you guys are doing out here but if you have any questions about Afg I will field those".  That was from our commander.  I guess this is what you get in an Army centric military.  Anything that isn't green or on land is threatening to some.


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## Jungle (18 Apr 2014)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> "I have no idea what you guys are doing out here but if you have any questions about Afg I will field those".  That was from our commander.  I guess this is what you get in an Army centric military.  Anything that isn't green or on land is threatening to some.



I heard a similar speach from a Naval officer, who was commanding the Canadian contribution to the INTERFET coalition in East Timor. I also heard about an Admiral who did not know we had Paras in the CAF. So there is no monopoly on this kind of thing.


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## blacktriangle (18 Apr 2014)

Jungle said:
			
		

> I heard a similar speach from a Naval officer, who was commanding the Canadian contribution to the INTERFET coalition in East Timor. I also heard about an Admiral who did not know we had Paras in the CAF. So there is no monopoly on this kind of thing.



Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do. 

Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table. 

We can even award stupid pins to those that complete the PD and pass a test or something.  ;D


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## Scoobie Newbie (18 Apr 2014)

Are you being serious?  My sarcasm meter is on the fritz today.


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## blacktriangle (18 Apr 2014)

I'd really rather not have to take it that far.

Maybe people could...you know, learn a bit about the military they serve in? Rather than just having blinders on and only paying any attention to their trade/empire/element? It seems like there is a fair bit of ignorance in such matters, all the way up to the GOFO level.


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## Old EO Tech (18 Apr 2014)

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do.
> 
> Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table.
> 
> We can even award stupid pins to those that complete the PD and pass a test or something.  ;D



I don't have any SA on officer PD, but for NCM's this is done during the ILP/ALP/SAP etc, were you get to sit and chat with your peers from other elements.  I got more from time at the mess and coffee than the formal TP during these courses :-/  My syndicates have included Navy surface guys, submariners, SOF guys, a few hard Air guys, and lots of us Army guys from all over.  I will say as Army CSS, we have much more in common with the RCN that you would think.  

As to the original subject, I'd be interested in seeing how the government plans on amending column 3 in the rank table without putting it all in force....not that I personally would mind that, but that is another discussion.


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## Monsoon (19 Apr 2014)

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do.
> 
> Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table.


That programme exists - it's called the Joint Command and Staff Program, but even that year-long, quite intensive overview delivered right before promotion to LCol/Cdr can't provide completely comprehensive coverage of all the "nooks and crannies" that exist in CAF capabilities, and you won't be kept abreast of subsequent changes.

You don't make it to flag/general rank without being bright, motivated and eager to learn - none of the men in the anecdotes above are stupid, they're just admitting their weaknesses. My point is that such weaknesses are inherent and can't be got around in an organization this size; the natural solution is to parcel the organization into manageable chunks and let the experts in their field hash out priorities at a macro level together while letting them individually manage their own respective micro priorities.


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## PuckChaser (19 Apr 2014)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> That programme exists - it's called the Joint Command and Staff Program, but even that year-long, quite intensive overview delivered right before promotion to LCol/Cdr can't provide completely comprehensive coverage of all the "nooks and crannies" that exist in CAF capabilities, and you won't be kept abreast of subsequent changes.



I don't think you'll ever find someone that knows every "nook and cranny" of every job in every trade in the CF. Do we need another PD program? Maybe. But the information is out there, if people are willing to learn on their own time. I took the time to visit HMCS Kingston when it was here, specifically so I could learn a little bit more about what the RCN does and what a sliver of what kit they have.


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## McG (22 Apr 2014)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two.


Israel is surrounded by enemies and does not have access to infinite resources.  National survival depends on the military making the right capability developments and trade-offs.  I see no good reason to dismiss the IDF as an example of a successful first world military that is not based upon strong, separate peer services.



			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the *"tyranny of the majority"*.
> 
> Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.
> 
> ...





			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> *You don't make it to flag/general rank without being bright, motivated and eager to learn* - none of the men in the anecdotes above are stupid, they're just admitting their weaknesses. My point is that such weaknesses are inherent and can't be got around in an organization this size; the natural solution is to parcel the organization into manageable chunks and let the experts in their field hash out priorities at a macro level together while letting them individually manage their own respective micro priorities.


The ideas do not seem compatible.  Do we have bright, motivated GOFOs or do we have GOFO who will retreat to their comfort zones and not utilize the specialists on their staffs?  Do we need strong, isolated tribes to square-off against each-other in defence of Navy, Army, Air Force, Medical, Police, Communications, etc?  Maybe there is a better way.  Maybe it is more frequent cooperation and exposure at more junior levels?  Somewhere there is a right balance of separation and unification.  Anecdotal evidence has implied some of our allies may see us as closest to that right balance.




			
				Dimsum said:
			
		

> Ask the average ADF member and they would think that our unified military is great, just because our empire-building, duplication of effort (basic training, admin) etc. is less visible.




I think we are in a good place as far as that balance goes (and I think you agree), but I also think we are moving away.  Legislating the three services back into the NDA will take us away from that balance.


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## Privateer (22 Apr 2014)

Here is the actual (proposed) text of the amendments to the NDA, as contained in Division 7 of Part 6 of Bill C-31, styled the _Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1_, (apologies for the wonky formatting):



> NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT
> 
> Amendments to the Act
> 
> ...



Schedule 5 just lists the current ranks, using the standard (current) army names.  So the updated/backdated names (depending on how you look at it) to be used in everyday speech and writing will actually be set out in a future regulation.


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## Monsoon (23 Apr 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> Israel is surrounded by enemies and does not have access to infinite resources.  National survival depends on the military making the right capability developments and trade-offs.  I see no good reason to dismiss the IDF as an example of a successful first world military that is not based upon strong, separate peer services.


I'm not "dismissing" the IDF as a first world military, I'm saying that it's not a relevant comparator to Canada exactly because its circumstances are not ours. Canada is NOT surrounded by enemies and our national survival (generally) does NOT depend on our military. As such, our military is periodically surged in size and budget but for the majority of its existence is being pared back. That just ain't the IDF.



> The ideas do not seem compatible.  Do we have bright, motivated GOFOs or do we have GOFO who will retreat to their comfort zones and not utilize the specialists on their staffs?


I don't think you're being charitable to our GOFOs. Someone on "the track to greatness" will be each of a Cmdre/BGen, RAdm/MGen, and VAdm/LGen for three or ~maybe~ fours years apiece before succeeding to (if their spouse is supportive and they have a bent for masochism) the position of CDS. Each of these jumps is huge and they barely have time to learn the ins and outs of the Ottawa bureaucracy and the political interface mechanisms while doing each of the demanding jobs they're assigned, let alone to master the capabilities of the other services. In my (admittedly limited) experience of their lifestyles, there basically aren't enough hours in the day. At the same time, decisions we like to believe are subject to rigorous staff-thrashing are thrust on them with little notice in response to political imperatives and they have to make decisions as well as they can with what they have available to them: for the most part, preconceived notions.


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## McG (23 Apr 2014)

Privateer said:
			
		

> Here is the actual (proposed) text of the amendments to the NDA, as contained in Division 7 of Part 6 of Bill C-31, styled the _Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1_, (apologies for the wonky formatting):


For reference, the sections currently read as:



> 17. (1) The Canadian Forces shall consist of such units and other elements as are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister.
> 
> (2) A unit or other element organized under subsection (1) shall from time to time be embodied in such component of the Canadian Forces as may be directed by or under the authority of the Minister.






> 21. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the schedule.
> 
> (2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the schedule opposite the rank held by that person.



As far as the amended text, I would rather not see "including the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force" appended to organizational element of Commands.  There are some who will argue that the environmental staffs should be just that - staffs and not commands. The commands could be anything from joint regional commands to more environmentally pure operational level formations (ie. an Army Division) reporting directly to the CFHQ.  RCN, CA and RCAF can exist like Army regiments - extended families which may or may not be grouped as a monolithic organizational entity.  Regardless of your thoughts on the ideal organization, you can see that legislating these three specific commands will unnecessarily constrain flexibility of the minister's authority to organize the CAF.



			
				Privateer said:
			
		

> Schedule 5 just lists the current ranks, using the standard (current) army names.  So the updated/backdated names (depending on how you look at it) to be used in everyday speech and writing will actually be set out in a future regulation.


With MCpl and MS plugged in?



			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> I don't think you're being charitable to our GOFOs. Someone on "the track to greatness" will be each of a Cmdre/BGen, RAdm/MGen, and VAdm/LGen for three or ~maybe~ fours years apiece before succeeding to ... the position of CDS. Each of these jumps is huge and they barely have time to learn the ins and outs of the Ottawa bureaucracy and the political interface mechanisms while doing each of the demanding jobs they're assigned, *let alone to master the capabilities of the other services*. In my (admittedly limited) experience of their lifestyles, there basically aren't enough hours in the day.


The GOFO do not need to be masters of any particular element of the CAF.  They are the generalists who command the specialists who are the masters.  What they need to do is use their staffs ... like they do now.



			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> At the same time, decisions we like to believe are subject to rigorous staff-thrashing are thrust on them with little notice in response to political imperatives and they have to make decisions as well as they can with what they have available to them: for the most part, preconceived notions.


If this is the case, then it is an endorsement of a stovepipe of excellence for every field that sees itself as too complicated for anyone else.  I don't believe we need medical, MP and communications empires ... but if a fighter pilot cannot be developed over a career to be responsible for fleets and mechanized brigades, then the same must be true of hospitals and so on.


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## Old EO Tech (23 Apr 2014)

I agree with you on listing the RCN. CA, RCAF as commands, I think it would be better to list them on the "other elements" line, that way you still give them official existence, but give the MND/CDS the flexibility to organize the CAF as needed.

But then this goes full back to the need for the elemental commands at all, when they are only Force Trainers, and CJOC being the only Force employer.  Can not the Divs/Wings/Fleets manage training on there own, or under a CFHQ,  with the elements acting as either staffs at CFHQ, and/or as you state just some glue holding the pan-CA/RCN/RCAF community together in a common direction.  Much like us RCEME and Log guys do, being spread out over the CA/RCN/RCAF, while maintaining a strong identity of our own.


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## McG (24 Apr 2014)

On a related note to the "why hasn't anybody else done this" question : Col (ret) Douglas Macgregor, author of "Breaking the Phalanx," is proposing more unified structures for the US military.  Specifically in the various combatant commands, he would role together component command HQs and subordinate Div HQs into unified Joint HQs.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/143063273/SECDEF-Reshaping-the-U-S-Army-for-Joint-Warfighting-Final-Report-15-May-2013


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## pbi (4 May 2014)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... At the same time, decisions we like to believe are subject to rigorous staff-thrashing are thrust on them with little notice in response to political imperatives and they have to make decisions as well as they can with what they have available to them: for the most part, preconceived notions.



Concur. Sadly, over the last few years both in uniform and in my present role, I see more and more of this going on: otherwise intelligent, capable and well meaning GOFOs making poor decisions, hasty ill-founded decisions, (or no decisions at all...) because very clearly they have no real idea what is going on in their HQs, no time to breathe, and nobody is really getting a grip on some HQ staffs that are, (IMHO), utter train-smashes.  :trainwreck:

One of the things I find missing more and more is any kind of thoughtful analysis based on first principles such as "Why are we doing this?" Not as an excuse to stop doing something, or as a buzzword "tick in the box", but as a true philosophical gut check. The answers could be anything from:

-"Because it's the guts of what we do, so we'll preserve it no matter what";  or

-"Because it's an investment for a future that we can't predict, so we'll keep it alive"

-"Because we have no choice: it's mandated, but we're not going to let it eat the important stuff"; or

-"Because it's just the way we've always done it, for no pressingly good reason,  and we're going to stop it right now"

Not all HQs, by any means, but when you can see this happening it is both frustrating and saddening. I'm not really sure that Unification, De-Unification or anything else of a structural nature will change this. Maybe it is inevitable in today's modern, huge HQs that the Comd is really the prisoner of the staff.


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