# Helicopter/Cyclone discussion (split from HMCS Fredricton thread)



## Baz

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> FRE is going to head back to sea in a few days.  I would imagine that the RCAF and MH community are going to be starting to think about how to get another helo over to that part of the world.  The ship is far less capable without an embarked helo.   I would imagine thought has been given to this already.



It's late in the deployment, and you would have to C-17 it over.

And 12 Wing isn't particularly fat on aircrew.

But maybe.

*Sarcasm on*  The ship never seems to think this when your their *Sarcasm off*


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## SeaKingTacco

Baz said:
			
		

> It's late in the deployment, and you would have to C-17 it over.
> 
> And 12 Wing isn't particularly fat on aircrew.
> 
> But maybe.
> 
> *Sarcasm on*  The ship never seems to think this when your their *Sarcasm off*



We do not yet have an approved method of air transporting a Cyclone by C17. It is still on the “to do list”.


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## MilEME09

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> We do not yet have an approved method of air transporting a Cyclone by C17. It is still on the “to do list”.



Life sometimes has a way of moving things on the to do list, to the do now list,or maybe that's just what having a wife does. However I am not going to speculate on the RCN/RCAF next move as I have zero experience on those matters.


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## Good2Golf

C-17 can airlift CH-147F Chinooks and CH-149 Cormorants, both larger than the CH-148 Cyclone, so I’d think it may become a ‘prioritized effort’, as MilEME09 notes above.


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## SeaKingTacco

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> C-17 can airlift CH-147F Chinooks and CH-149 Cormorants, both larger than the CH-148 Cyclone, so I’d think it may become a ‘prioritized effort’, as MilEME09 notes above.



I agree, it is not rocket surgery, but it does take effort to get a Cyclone to Trenton; do the load trials; document it; get Sikorsky engineering to sign off on the procedure; publish it all and fabricate/procure any specialized handling equipment. There is a huge laundry list of thing that all need doing- this is just one item.


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## dapaterson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I agree, it is not rocket surgery, but it does take effort to get a Cyclone to Trenton; do the load trials; document it; get Sikorsky engineering to sign off on the procedure; publish it all and fabricate/procure any specialized handling equipment. There is a huge laundry list of thing that all need doing- this is just one item.



Wouldn't it be easier to send a C17 with crew to Halifax?  (Non-pilot, non-ATC, non-aircrew here).


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## tomahawk6

What about a NATO chopper and aircrew to fill in ?


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## Baz

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> What about a NATO chopper and aircrew to fill in ?



It's quite easy for a helicopter to cross-deck, that is land and get fuel (and maybe something to eat).

It's harder to operate from the other ship for a couple of days.  You'd need some maintainers and a fly-away kit (a small pack up of spares, tools, etc).

It's actually quite difficult to deploy a det.  The det comes onboard with aircraft specific maintainers, tools,, support equipment; and not to mention procedures.  This pack-up is actually specific to ship type and needs to be stowed specifically.

So probably no.


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## Baz

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Wouldn't it be easier to send a C17 with crew to Halifax?  (Non-pilot, non-ATC, non-aircrew here).



That's how we normally did it with the Sea King.  Doesn't solve all the other problems SKT listed.

Not to mention knitting some aircrew.  There are other deployments coming up as well.


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## daftandbarmy

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> What about a NATO chopper and aircrew to fill in ?



If they do, and it's a British crew, you'll never get rid of them after they hit the galley


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## Cloud Cover

Baz said:
			
		

> It's quite easy for a helicopter to cross-deck, that is land and get fuel (and maybe something to eat).
> 
> It's harder to operate from the other ship for a couple of days.  You'd need some maintainers and a fly-away kit (a small pack up of spares, tools, etc).
> 
> It's actually quite difficult to deploy a det.  The det comes onboard with aircraft specific maintainers, tools,, support equipment; and not to mention procedures.  This pack-up is actually specific to ship type and needs to be stowed specifically.
> 
> So probably no.



They need to work on that, maybe...


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## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If they do, and it's a British crew, you'll never get rid of them after they hit the galley



Don't forget, Canadian ships are dry at sea now.


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## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I agree, it is not rocket surgery, but it does take effort to get a Cyclone to Trenton; do the load trials; document it; get Sikorsky engineering to sign off on the procedure; publish it all and fabricate/procure any specialized handling equipment. There is a huge laundry list of thing that all need doing- this is just one item.



Unless things are different with the Cyclone, the WSM can authorize such activity.  It took 1 day to get the load trial done for the Hornet.


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## SeaKingTacco

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Unless things are different with the Cyclone, the WSM can authorize such activity.  It took 1 day to get the load trial done for the Hornet.



Perhaps leveraged heavily from USN/USAF procedures? We are the only operator of the Cyclone. There is nobody else to leverage technique off of.


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## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Don't forget, Canadian ships are dry at sea now.



No. Way.


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## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Perhaps leveraged heavily from USN/USAF procedures? We are the only operator of the Cyclone. There is nobody else to leverage technique off of.



Not that I know of.  We used standard CFTOs procedures to remove and crate wings, reduce pressure in the oleos and then found a way to pull the aircraft into the C-17.  When there is a will there is a way.


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## Zoomie

Cormorant has been put into the back of a C-17 at least once - it flew down to South America. 

Contacts at IMP divulge that the capability to do it again has expired and substantial effort would be required to make it happen.


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## CBH99

Not to sound cheeky, but how did the capability expire?

We still have CH-148's in the inventory.  We still have C-17's.  

??


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## Baz

CloudCover said:
			
		

> They need to work on that, maybe...



Possibly... but it's worked fine for decades.  A helairdet is not an independent entity, it's meant to work with a certain class of ship, which is how most if not all other countries do it as well.

When we had tankers and 280s the dets were different as well.  Plus high readiness and low readiness dets (PUKs) are different.

I'm not convinced that spending the effort to make them more flexible wrt ship they can deploy to is woth it, esp when there is so much other important work to be done.


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## Eye In The Sky

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Not to sound cheeky, but how did the capability expire?
> 
> We still have CH-148's in the inventory.  We still have C-17's.
> 
> ??



Do you mean CH-149s?  (149 = Cormorant, 148 = Cyclone)


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## dapaterson

CloudCover said:
			
		

> They need to work on that, maybe...



You wouldn't take your BMW to a Ford dealership for maintenance; maritime helicopters are the same, but more complex, doing that work at sea.


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## Dana381

Sikorsky's website says that the S-92 is transportable by a C-17. They must have procedures documented. How much different is the CH-148 to a S-92? could the same procedures be used as a starting point and reduce the time required?

This makes a case for in flight refueling on the Cyclone. I'm sure this isn't the only time it would come in handy.


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## Good2Golf

Dana381 said:
			
		

> This makes a case for in flight refueling on the Cyclone. I'm sure this isn't the only time it would come in handy.



Do you mean hover refueling (HIFR - helo in-flight refueling)?


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## CBH99

*Do you mean CH-149s?  (149 = Cormorant, 148 = Cyclone)*


No.

Ditch had mentioned that some contacts at IMP indicated the capability of moving a Cyclone via C-17 had expired.  I was just wondering if someone could elaborate on that more, seeing as how we have both airframes in use.  

It seems like if we've done it before, it could be done again fairly easily.  But I don't have any first hand or technical knowledge of this, so was hoping someone could elaborate on why the capability may not exist anymore, when we still have the airframes to do it.


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## blacktriangle

You might want to re-read the post by Ditch, I think he was talking about the CH-149. Cormorant, not Cyclone.


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## Eye In The Sky

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Do you mean hover refueling (HIFR - helo in-flight refueling)?



I thought he was referring to this type of refueling...


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## CBH99

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> You might want to re-read the post by Ditch, I think he was talking about the CH-149. Cormorant, not Cyclone.



Ah.  You guys are right.  My mistake.   :facepalm:


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## suffolkowner

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I thought he was referring to this type of refueling...



That's what I thought too. Hat's off to anyone that's done it though Halifax to wherever across the Atlantic would seem to be an exhausting trip and not very safe at all


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## PuckChaser

Live feed via RCAF Facebook of the ramp ceremony. https://www.facebook.com/61263506236/videos/816304812197469/


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## Good2Golf

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I thought he was referring to this type of refueling...



I had assumed he was talking about the only in-flight (albeit hover) refuelling that I'm aware of navy helicopters conducting, not special forces/operations/CSAR probe-and-drogue helos.


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## Cloud Cover

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You wouldn't take your BMW to a Ford dealership for maintenance; maritime helicopters are the same, but more complex, doing that work at sea.



That and a question of very limited number of air frames, spare parts, air crew, techs etc.   Perhaps when the JSS comes online with the facilities for Cyclones there may be some improvement.


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## Dana381

Good2golf I was talking about probe and drogue refueling. We were discussing transporting a Cyclone to HMCS Fredericton, the refueling your mentioned would not be suitable as you would need to be near a ship all the way. 

Could a probe equipped helicopter paired with a C-130 refueling plane make the trip if it went via Reykjavik? I suppose the inherent risk may deem this an undesirable mission. I just thought it would be quicker than disassembling/reassembling a Cyclone. They would have to use an Italian base to do the reassembly and fly tools and technicians over with the helicopter. Unlike when the CAF took Griffons and Chinooks to Afganistan where we had a base and maintainers on site.


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## Good2Golf

Probe and drogue refueling for helicopters requires: a) a refueling boom and associated equipment (which the CH-148 does not have, nor is it an easy add-on); b) has a significant training and currency cost that even for units with appropriately-equipped helicopters (MH-47G, MH/HH-60, CH-53, H225M, etc.) results in only a minority of the aircrew holding air-to-air refueling (AAR) qualifications; and c) needs proximal fixed-wing refueling aircraft, most likely KC-130s, which one does not often find on trans-oceanic routing, but rather in-theatre to support extended operations.  What most people fail to appreciate, is what happens if you can’t ‘hook up’?  It’s happened before, and crews have been lost because of that.  Things become pretty stark when that gets added to the risk assessment matrix. 

What would be more practical, would be fitting internally-mounted auxiliary fuel tanks to the CH-148 Cyclone as mission-specific equipment. Approximating (guessing?) a CH-148’s fuel burn at 1500 lbs/hr, and using an auxiliary internal fuel tank such as Robertson's ERFS 2 tank (used for CH/MH-47 Chinooks, they don’t have an S-92/H92 tank at the moment), you could get another ~3 hours endurance or about 400nm range.  

All said, I don’t see Maritime Helicopter AAR being a practical effort, but I’m a green/black helo guy, not grey/navy guy, so I stand to be corrected. 

Regards
G2G


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## PuckChaser

Yeah, this doesn't look easy at all...

https://youtu.be/myqg0wiNAw8?t=208


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## daftandbarmy

Dana381 said:
			
		

> Good2golf I was talking about probe and drogue refueling. We were discussing transporting a Cyclone to HMCS Fredericton, the refueling your mentioned would not be suitable as you would need to be near a ship all the way.
> 
> Could a probe equipped helicopter paired with a C-130 refueling plane make the trip if it went via Reykjavik? I suppose the inherent risk may deem this an undesirable mission. I just thought it would be quicker than disassembling/reassembling a Cyclone. They would have to use an Italian base to do the reassembly and fly tools and technicians over with the helicopter. Unlike when the CAF took Griffons and Chinooks to Afganistan where we had a base and maintainers on site.



Someone who knows more about Sea Lift will likely correct me, but I'm pretty sure you could contract a shipping firm and put a new aircraft one on a freighter to the Med. 

From Halifax, I assume it would take a week or so to get there? My  :2c:


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## Navy_Pete

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Someone who knows more about Sea Lift will likely correct me, but I'm pretty sure you could contract a shipping firm and put a new aircraft one on a freighter to the Med.
> 
> From Halifax, I assume it would take a week or so to get there? My  :2c:



That would be the easiest way; if you can sea lift an entire ship, a single helicopter would be no problem.  LAVs, TAPV and battle tanks have to get there somehow as well.

There are contract mechanisms to expedite the bidding process for a genuine operational need.

With the cause unknown though, probably too early to really think about that, and might also be kind of brutal for the crew.  Tough call.


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## dapaterson

The CAF has had bad experiences with contracted sealift...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Megaphone


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## Eye In The Sky

Dana381 said:
			
		

> Good2golf I was talking about probe and drogue refueling. We were discussing transporting a Cyclone to HMCS Fredericton, the refueling your mentioned would not be suitable as you would need to be near a ship all the way.
> 
> Could a probe equipped helicopter paired with a C-130 refueling plane make the trip if it went via Reykjavik? I suppose the inherent risk may deem this an undesirable mission. I just thought it would be quicker than disassembling/reassembling a Cyclone. They would have to use an Italian base to do the reassembly and fly tools and technicians over with the helicopter. Unlike when the CAF took Griffons and Chinooks to Afganistan where we had a base and maintainers on site.



I for one would not want to be on a ferry crew taking a helicopter from the East Coast to say, NAS Sigonella in Sicily (close to the AO).  I've done more than a few transoceanic transits from the East Coast on Fixed Wing to places like Iceland, Scotland, Sigonella, Norway and also across the Pacific from the West coast.  I would not want to do that, at all.  I know those 'hops' from eastern Canada to Greenland to Iceland to the UK look 'small' on Google Earth but, having flown them in FW I would not want to do it RW.   :2c:


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## NavyShooter

Understand from an open-source Fbook post today that FRE's HELAIRDET is RTU to Halifax.

No ferry flight to worry about.


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## Jarnhamar

[quote author=Eye In The Sky] I would not want to do that, at all.  I know those 'hops' from eastern Canada to Greenland to Iceland to the UK look 'small' on Google Earth but, having flown them in FW I would not want to do it RW.   :2c:
[/quote]
Is it really crappy conditions?


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## daftandbarmy

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Is it really crappy conditions?



If 200kph winds means crappy then yes, I'd say so 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gneJVNlqVgE

I've only had to endure short hops in Arctic Norway, on sea and air, and those were 'character building'


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## PPCLI Guy

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Someone who knows more about Sea Lift will likely correct me, but I'm pretty sure you could contract a shipping firm and put a new aircraft one on a freighter to the Med.
> 
> From Halifax, I assume it would take a week or so to get there? My  :2c:



I would think that the easiest way might be to use a Frigate?   :dunno:


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## PuckChaser

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I would think that the easiest way might be to use a Frigate?   :dunno:



Do we have a 2nd one that's not the RDS with a crew that can sail?


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## Eye In The Sky

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Is it really crappy conditions?



Conditions can be pretty bad, yup.  You can plan (some) for weather and deviate around localized stuff, but if you have a small gas tank, those deviations can be a bigger consideration.  Helo's also can't necessarily fly over some of the stuff, either.  Thunderstorms (CBs, cumulonimbus clouds) are bad enough....line them up into a squall line and you can be in for a bad day.   Over the G-I-UK Gap (Labrador Sea, Arctic Ocean, North Atlantic, Norwegian sea, North Sea and land masses), there are some fairly sizable expanses of land (Greenland) and water that are what I would call cold and/or extremely remote.  I would not want to transit those spaces in a small or rotary wing aircraft.  

Colder temps, sea states, SAR response times...a bunch of things I think of that make me say the effort to load it into a Globemaster would be the efficient and smart thing to do.  

There are other considerations;  wear/tear on the airframe and YHR you burn off just moving it around.  Diplomatic clearances.  repair plan if/when you go unserviceable (we never carry all the possibly required parts on transits...I've waited days in locations before, for parts to be hand carried or couriered to some remote places, like Guam).


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## dapaterson

Wikipedia states the range of the S-92 is just under 1000km.  Sounds like even with multiple refuellings you'd need multiple crews to transit transatlantic, and stops for crew rest.


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## Eye In The Sky

Here is the official open source information on range, etc for a CH-148.  

RCAF CH-148 Cyclone on the Technical Specification page:

Range
740 km (400 NM)

Max. Speed
287 km/h (155 knots)


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## Sub_Guy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Do we have a 2nd one that's not the RDS with a crew that can sail?



I think with the limited time the Freddie has left there’s no point trying to get another Cyclone to her.  Especially since they’ve ordered a “pause”. 

They are less effective, but still very relevant without an organic air asset.


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## Stoker

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> I think with the limited time the Freddie has left there’s no point trying to get another Cyclone to her.  Especially since they’ve ordered a “pause”.
> 
> They are less effective, but still very relevant without an organic air asset.



I agree the entire air det left to come back to Canada a couple of days ago. Sounds like they're not replacing it.


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## GR66

I was fortunate enough to be able to wait along the Highway of Heroes at Brock Street in Whitby as the motorcade passed.  It was heart warming to see at least 100 people along the overpass and the side of the highway (despite construction at the bridge and all best efforts to maintain social distancing) and hearing all the passing cars and trucks honking their horns in support of the families of the fallen.  Even afterward as I drove West along the 401 after they had passed you could see the large numbers of people that came out to show their support.

Rest in Peace and God bless their families.


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## Blackadder1916

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I would think that the easiest way might be to use a Frigate?   :dunno:



Load planning?
https://youtu.be/eE6ZlTWU994?t=846

Why go by sea when it can go by air?  It's not like it would be a first time for the CF to fly the friendly Russian/Ukrainian skies.  If they're feeling good they may even offer to share their vodka.


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## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> I was fortunate enough to be able to wait along the Highway of Heroes at Brock Street in Whitby as the motorcade passed.  It was heart warming to see at least 100 people along the overpass and the side of the highway (despite construction at the bridge and all best efforts to maintain social distancing) and hearing all the passing cars and trucks honking their horns in support of the families of the fallen.  Even afterward as I drove West along the 401 after they had passed you could see the large numbers of people that came out to show their support.
> 
> Rest in Peace and God bless their families.



Dayum, that's awesome. Go Canada!  :cdnsalute:


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## Weinie

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Load planning?
> https://youtu.be/eE6ZlTWU994?t=846
> 
> Why go by sea when it can go by air?  _*It's not like it would be a first time for the CF to fly the friendly Russian/Ukrainian skies.*_  If they're feeling good they may even offer to share their vodka.


If we are having trouble figuring out how to load them into a CF-17, can't even imagine what problems would be encountered with an Antonov, although several liberal dosages of vodka may alleviate any concerns and lead to creative solutions....not that that has ever happened.  :


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## blacktriangle

Weinie said:
			
		

> If we are having trouble figuring out how to load them into a CF-17, can't even imagine what problems would be encountered with an Antonov, although several liberal dosages of vodka may alleviate any concerns and lead to creative solutions....not that that has ever happened.  :



What's a CF-17?


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## PuckChaser

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> What's a CF-17?



Cargo variant of the CF-98.


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## Weinie

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> What's a CF-17?


Added an F.  You missed the point. Tie


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## Walt

CC-177 Globemaster III is the official designation, for the aircraft you are referring to, by the RCAF and the Canadian Armed Forces.


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## Scoobs

If we are going to get picky, the correct designation is CC177, i.e. there is no dash.  I just got out in January where I worked at DTAES, which is the authority for a/c designations.  Both the media and RCAF Public Affairs incorrectly use the dash.  I tried to correct them, but they literally quote each other as justification for using the dash.


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## Good2Golf

Scoobs said:
			
		

> If we are going to get picky, the correct designation is CC177, i.e. there is no dash.  I just got out in January where I worked at DTAES, which is the authority for a/c designations.  Both the media and RCAF Public Affairs incorrectly use the dash.  I tried to correct them, but they literally quote each other as justification for using the dash.



Scoops, I have up on them years ago after trying to point out the references.  I think it was an underlying Americanization trend to use the dash, even though we maintained the triple-digit type designator.  Alas... 

Regards
G2G


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## Oldgateboatdriver

Personally, I find it sad that right at the beginning of the Cyclone era, we are already down one airframe - not to mention one crew, may they rest in peace.

But with only 28 airframes and since we are using a unique design no one else has decided to acquire, can they be replaced as more and more of them become unavailable?

I mean, would Sikorsky agree to restart the line to build one or two more at a time? 

And are the ten still not "delivered" on the assembly line or just waiting for the final upgrades to spec so the line is actually already closed?

I would appreciate knowledgeable answers on these to try and map out the future of the fleet capability for an upcoming article I am working on. 

P.S.: Open source only, please.


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## Good2Golf

OGBD, sadly this happened with the Cormorant fleet as well.  Time will tell if programmatic restrictions placed on either project by the Governments of the day had any influencing factor, either during implementation or affecting in-service support and life-cycle management.  Both projects had elements of notable delays to the acquisition of the capabilities imposed upon them. 

Regards
G2G


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## Colin Parkinson

Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.


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## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.



The S92 crash off NFLD a few years ago was the result of an oil leak from the gear box. DND originally required a 30 minute run dry gear box for safety reasons. However with delivery very behind schedule and the gear boxes not yet made the choice was made to axe that modification. I hope to God that wasn't the cause otherwise our procurement system cost us 6 lives.


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## Navy_Pete

Colin P said:
			
		

> Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.



One of the news releases had the depth of water at 3000m. Does salvage equipment exist that can go down that far?  I know they've sent drones down 10km to the Marianna trench, but figuring out how to float a cyclone up would be a big different then taking some video.

Grisly job, but hopefully they can do that and confirm the cause. From my personal experience, the maintainers are highly skilled and meticulous, and the pilots were always very, very good, so was always assuming it was some kind of catastrophic mechanical failure. Not going to speculate on it, but as much as they can be a pain in the ass, the whole air det is just too good for something like this to happen because of human error.


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## MilEME09

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> One of the news releases had the depth of water at 3000m. Does salvage equipment exist that can go down that far?  I know they've sent drones down 10km to the Marianna trench, but figuring out how to float a cyclone up would be a big different then taking some video.



Im no expert but if the CIA was able to raise a soviet submarine from a depth of 4600m in 1974 (although they did loose part of it on the way up due to a failure of the equipment) I am guessing technology has made recovery of a helicopter at 3000m possible. Likely it would be costly though to get to that depth, depends as well if the fuselage is intact or in pieces/sections, along with I am sure a lot of other factors.


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## SeaKingTacco

Colin P said:
			
		

> Latest report is that it went down in sight of the ship on approach, likely a sudden failure of a important component. The S92 which the Cyclone is derived from which had a transmission failure as I recall leading to a fatal crash. I would assume that lessons from that were incorporated into the updated design. It's going to be awhile before they can recover the airframe as they will have to find a contractor with the right equipment for that depth.



There is no publicly available cause of the crash, AFAIK. There might not even been be any cause factor yet, given the early stage of the investigation. Therefore, I would not go around the internet stating it was a component failure.


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## Baz

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The S92 crash off NFLD a few years ago was the result of an oil leak from the gear box.



That's a massive oversimplification.  I suggest you read https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2009/a09a0016/a09a0016.html  In particular though, I draw your attention to:


> 7.The S-92A rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) MGB oil system failure procedure was ambiguous and lacked clearly defined symptoms of either a massive loss of MGB oil or a single MGB oil pump failure. This ambiguity contributed to the flight crew's misdiagnosis that a faulty oil pump or sensor was the source of the problem.
> 8.The pilots misdiagnosed the emergency due to a lack of understanding of the MGB oil system and an over-reliance on prevalent expectations that a loss of oil would result in an increase in oil temperature. This led the pilots to incorrectly rely on MGB oil temperature as a secondary indication of an impending MGB failure.
> 9.By the time that the crew of CHI91 had established that MGB oil pressure of less than 5 psi warranted a "land immediately" condition, the captain had dismissed ditching in the absence of other compelling indications such as unusual noises or vibrations.





			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> DND originally required a 30 minute run dry gear box for safety reasons. However with delivery very behind schedule and the gear boxes not yet made the choice was made to axe that modification.



Another massive oversimplification.  Although the press reports of the time only hint at it, it is subject to the certification and airworthiness requirements of the aircraft.  In this case, the aircraft is certified to FAR-29.  I draw your attention to other quotes from the same flight safety investigation:


> The FAA's Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) was published on 27 November 1984. For section 29.927(c)(1) Category A rotorcraft the NPRM stated:
> _It must be shown by tests that each rotor drive system, where the probable failure of any element could result in the loss of lubricant, is capable of continued operation, although not necessarily without damage, for a period of at least 30 minutes at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, after indication to the flightcrew of the loss of lubricant._
> The FAA's Final Rule was published on 02 September 1988. The Final Rule took into account comments received from stakeholders. One commenter had noted that, as proposed, the requirement in paragraph 29.927(c) could be interpreted to preclude credit for auxiliary lubrication systems or to require consideration of lubricant failures to self-lubricated bearings. The FAA stated that this was not intended, and the wording of paragraph (c)(l) was revised to eliminate this possible ambiguity. The proposed rule was therefore modified to require that:
> _*Unless such failures are extremely remote*, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flight crew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant. (emphasis added)_





> The update of the design requirements for large, multiengine transport rotorcraft (Category A) recognized the need for main gearboxes (MGB) to have a significant capacity to operate following a loss of lubricant in order to optimize eventual landing opportunities. This consideration led directly to the introduction of the 30 minute requirement to operate after a loss of MGB lubricant. However the introduction of the "extremely remote" concept following the comment phase of the rule-making made it possible for a helicopter to be certified without being capable of operating for 30 minutes with only residual lubricant. Category A rotorcraft certified under the "extremely remote" criteria may not be capable of continued operation for 30 minutes with only residual lubrication. These helicopters remain vulnerable to gearbox failures stemming from unforeseen massive losses of MGB lubricant, placing passengers and crew at risk.
> Therefore, the Board recommends that:
> The Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency remove the "extremely remote" provision from the rule requiring 30 minutes of safe operation following the loss of main gearbox lubricant for all newly constructed Category A transport helicopters and, after a phase-in period, for all existing ones.


Ie, there is an ongoing problem with what "run dry" means, and the FAA rule in FAR 29 allows exceptions.  Given the Cyclone is certified under FAR-29 led to issues.  Basically it is about it is 30 minutes _after indications to the crew_, unless the cause is extremely remote, as shearing of the three titanium studs was supposed to be, and still is considered that way as the three studs have been replaced by 6 steel ones.

However, to be clear (and I checked the checklist), if there are indications of an _imminent_ gear box failure, the S-92 then, and now, and the Cyclone now, must _*Land Immediately*_.  The S-92 Newfoundland incident crew did not fully understand what the indications were (again, see the report).



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I hope to God that wasn't the cause otherwise our procurement system cost us 6 lives.



I also hope that is not the case; however, I'm relatively certain it isn't.  The S-92 crash was about the factors that led them to not understand they were facing an imminent MGB failure.  Nothing in the Cyclone incident that has been released indicates they had any indication of an MGB failure.

By the way, the S-92 incident pilot was ex 12 Wing and was a good stick as well.

I'll also note, again, that much of this speculation is being fueled by _one ex- Sea King pilot_ in the media.  He first speculated they wouldn't get the CVR/FDR because it was so deep, demonstrating a lack of knowledge how the CVR/FDR is designed to depart the aircraft.  Once it became clear that is not the case as it was recovered, he then started speculating that they need the wreckage in any case because the CVR/FDR is not sufficient.  There are no indications at this point that is the case; how about we wait until the experts analyze that data, in addition to the eye witness accounts which *have not been released* (and no, it's not a coverup).  Even it is a MGB Lube problem, which I doubt but have no contrary information either, the FDR well tell us a great deal.

Am I showing my frustration???


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

You have every right to be annoyed, Baz. And for the very reasons you state. So don't feel bad about it.

Now, I'll comment on something that is in my lane:

Yes, equipment and personnel that can recover an airframe at -3000 meters does exist. It is specialized equipment for sure, but not that rare, and recovery is well within current capabilities.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Baz said:
			
		

> Am I showing my frustration???



Not at all, but _if_ you were it would be for good cause.

MilEME09;  seriously.  Give it a rest.  Your 'pin the tail on the donkey' posts are misleading and annoying. 

Your own words:



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Im no expert


----------



## Baz

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Personally, I find it sad that right at the beginning of the Cyclone era, we are already down one airframe - not to mention one crew, may they rest in peace.
> 
> But with only 28 airframes and since we are using a unique design no one else has decided to acquire, can they be replaced as more and more of them become unavailable?
> 
> I mean, would Sikorsky agree to restart the line to build one or two more at a time?
> 
> And are the ten still not "delivered" on the assembly line or just waiting for the final upgrades to spec so the line is actually already closed?
> 
> I would appreciate knowledgeable answers on these to try and map out the future of the fleet capability for an upcoming article I am working on.
> 
> P.S.: Open source only, please.



OGBD: given my earlier reference dump, I'm not in the frame of mind to provide refs, but I will share some thoughts.

The original number of airframes was 35 which was basically two TGs, two available 24/7 in each (around 5 aircraft), plus two independent deployed.  Basically at one in four deployed with surge to 1 in 2, 15 det equivalents in 11 sets (4 two help sets... not having them will affect sparing) so make it 4 avail any given time surge to 8.

So that's 15 aircraft, 2 more in Sqn HQs, 8 in 406, 1ish at HOTEF (now 434 Sqn MHTEF) and a couple or more in heavy maintenance... so 28.

Oversimplifying, but original plan was 35 (plus 15 SAR when it was EH-101) so 7ish for attrition.  Not exactly, but CEFGW.

So it's less of one will affect us.  But here's the kicker: are the original estimates still valid: 406 and readiness aircraft vs sims, west coast sims, AOps, two helo sets, TG composition, two in the screen, tanker wanker 2nd line, etc, etc???

Right now the shortage isn't aircraft, it's crews.  Sort of.  Maybe.  Serviceability?

Don't forget the bathtub curve: historically most aircraft are lost at the begining(inexperience) and end (training phase out , lack of spares, etc) of life cycle.  Tried to plan for it, but you know how it goes.

So, building more... probably not.  Without saying the line is closed, it's complex.  Aircraft are in various stages of 1.0, 2.0, and 2.1, with a bunch of other stuff.  Supposed to firm up with 2.1 delivery.

And how much Sikorsky resources have been moved to 53K?

Not helpful, I know.  PM me... if it's for something credible and not media bs we can chat and maybe I can hook you up with the right people. 

Editted: sorry, didn't proof read, lots of typos.  Let me know if you need it cleaned up, but as I said better to pm me.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> There is no publicly available cause of the crash, AFAIK. There might not even been be any cause factor yet, given the early stage of the investigation. Therefore, I would not go around the internet stating it was a component failure.



I dearly want the Cyclone to succeed and give us many years in service. I also have a very high opinion of our helicopter pilots who fly off of the ships. My understanding so far is a fairly routine flight, approaching the ship and weather and vis fair to good. That it happened so quickly leads me to believe equipment failure and unlikely pilot error. I could be wrong, but that's the way I leaning for now. 

3 of the helicopters I have used for work have crashed, a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.



Sad, but true:

Cross decking between ships.... biggest SAS death toll from a single incident in history, so far:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-454382/For-time-25-years-fomer-SAS-man-tells-Falklands-tragedy-killed-20.html

Flying to a meeting... killed more senior Intelligence Officers than the IRA ever did:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Scotland_RAF_Chinook_crash


----------



## Baz

Colin P said:
			
		

> I dearly want the Cyclone to succeed and give us many years in service. I also have a very high opinion of our helicopter pilots who fly off of the ships. My understanding so far is a fairly routine flight, approaching the ship and weather and vis fair to good. That it happened so quickly leads me to believe equipment failure and unlikely pilot error. I could be wrong, but that's the way I leaning for now.
> 
> 3 of the helicopters I have used for work have crashed, a helicopter is always looking for ways to kill it's occupants.



Colin,

With all due respect, that may be the way your leaning, but what purpose does it serve to speculate about it on the internet?


----------



## Lumber

Baz said:
			
		

> Colin,
> 
> With all due respect, that may be the way your leaning, but what purpose does it serve to speculate about it on the internet?



Spur discussion?
Correct assumptions?
Educate the ignorant?
Dispel myths?


----------



## Good2Golf

DFS is pretty good (world renowned, actually) at effectively and openly communicating its findings, usually in a phased approach that appropriately provides as much information as possible as early as possible, while respecting the integrity of the overall investigative process.  In several months, we’ll have a better idea of what happened, and then the drive to get expedited information now won’t seem as important then. Best to let DFS perform its investigation per the policies and procedures in place, and then comment thereafter in an informed manner. Conjecture can be quite damaging, even if well-intentioned. 

:2c:


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> Spur discussion?
> Correct assumptions?
> Educate the ignorant?
> Dispel myths?



Except his speculation is based on assumptions.  Therefore, is he really educating anyone.  He's not actually dispelling any myths as there are no incorrect statements he's correcting.

I'm all for spurring discussion if it's a discussion of the facts and the possible implications.  The facts as publicly known  are it was evening but still VFR, clear weather, the aircraft was serviceable to that point, and they were "returning to the ship."  As anyone who's flown MH (as crew, not along for the ride) can tell you, that can mean a lot of things.  Assuming they we're transitting and then just fell out of the sky is more than the statement implies.

Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).


----------



## Old Sweat

Please let an old, superannuated pongo who subscribes to the theory that if God had wanted soldiers to fly, he would have made the sky brown, interject. I find your discussion gratifyingly honest, restrained, and professional, as well as refreshingly free of speculation. My knowledge of technical matters rotary-winged is limited to not much more than wondering if "the Jesus nut failed" when said nut was s blanket term from my subaltern days for the power train between the engine and the rotor. And this is not speculation and I am not offering it as a possibility. Please continue your debate; maybe I will learn something.


----------



## Baz

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Please let an old, superannuated pongo who subscribes to the theory that if God had wanted soldiers to fly, he would have made the sky brown, interject. I find your discussion gratifyingly honest, restrained, and professional, as well as refreshingly free of speculation. My knowledge of technical matters rotary-winged is limited to not much more than wondering if "the Jesus nut failed" when said nut was s blanket term from my subaltern days for the power train between the engine and the rotor. And this is not speculation and I am not offering it as a possibility. Please continue your debate; maybe I will learn something.



Ah, the Jesus Nut.  Not just a blanket term: 





> Jesus nut is a slang term for the main rotor retaining nut or mast nut, which holds the main rotor to the mast of some helicopters, such as the UH-1 Iroquois helicopter. The related slang term Jesus pin refers to the lock pin used to secure the retaining nut. More generally, Jesus nut (or Jesus pin) has been used to refer to any component that is a single point of failure which results in catastrophic consequences.


 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_nut

Sea King had one too, here is a picture: http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/gallery/Sea-King-Details/2014_09_13_40

To be fair, I have no idea if the Cyclone has one... SKT?

Edited to add, it seems it does.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Baz said:
			
		

> Ah, the Jesus Nut.  Not just a blanket term:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_nut
> 
> Sea King had one too, here is a picture: http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/gallery/Sea-King-Details/2014_09_13_40
> 
> To be fair, I have no idea if the Cyclone has one... SKT?
> 
> Edited to add, it seems it does:



No idea. I have had no reason to be up looking at the head of a Cyclone yet.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Baz said:
			
		

> Edited to add, it seems it does:



My AVN friend calls it a _Main Rotor Shaft Nut_.


----------



## Underway

Baz said:
			
		

> Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).



This is a reason that I believe the CDS decision to not release preliminary crash information is the right one.  Wait until the report is done and all the rocks have been turned over.  Then inform the families of what happened, then the public.  This way forward feels right.


----------



## OldSolduer

Underway said:
			
		

> This is a reason that I believe the CDS decision to not release preliminary crash information is the right one.  Wait until the report is done and all the rocks have been turned over.  Then inform the families of what happened, then the public.  This way forward feels right.



Agreed. All kinds of people ask me what brought that chopper down- I'm infantry  (red crayons are the tastiest)- so I politely tell them that is not my area of expertise and I refuse to speculate.


----------



## Scoobs

I worked in the Directorate of Technical Airworthiness and Engineering Support (DTAES) upon my retirement this past January.  During a portion of my time at this unit, I was responsible for the section that approved any out of scope maintenance program changes that the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) could not approve.  This was for all RCAF fleets.  Part of my duties also involved working on the certification (minor role) of the Cyclone.  Thus, I know of potential problems that this helo had and I have my theories as to what some cause factors of the crash could be, but I will not share them for the following reasons, nor will I respond to any private messages about this issue:

1. There is an ongoing FS investigation.  All former and serving RCAF mbrs damn well know better not to speculate on causes prior to DFS completing their investigation.  There is a process.  It exists for a reason.  Part of this reason is to avoid speculation.  Part of this reason is to avoid the so called "experts" coming out of the woodwork, being quoted in the media, and Joe Q uneducated public forming a misinformed opinion.  Joe Q public barely knows his ass from his elbow, so how do you expect him to differentiate between one ex-military guy that knows diddly about a/c and investigations or someone that actually does?  They don't.

2. Out of respect for our fallen.  I've already been successful at correcting a so called "expert" who was quoted in one of the first CBC articles.  I emailed him and expressed my displeasure at his remarks.  To his credit he contacted the CBC reporter, who actually adjusted the story.  Reinforcing my point 1 above, there HAS been speculation on pilot error.  No one knows this, especially at the start of the FS investigation and just stating this to the press (which makes it into their stories) drags the good names of the aircrew through the mud for no reason, with no factual basis.  Just imagine how the family feels when they see this speculation in the media.  

Summary:  stay in your lane.  Stop speculating.  Let DFS do their investigation.

Some clarification from different posts in regards to the "Jesus" nut:

-most of my career was spent in Tac Hel, not MH, but most helos don't actually have a "single" Jesus nut.  For example, the Griffon had one assembly that resembled a Jesus nut, but in fact it was attached to the mast/head via many bolts that are all lockwired in.  For the life of me I cannot remember its name as per the CFTOs.


----------



## Underway

The only Jesus nut that I know of is the homeless strung out guy who yells at me  "I am Jesus" on my way to work in the morning.  But I digress....


----------



## Good2Golf

Scoobs said:
			
		

> -most of my career was spent in Tac Hel, not MH, but most helos don't actually have a "single" Jesus nut.  For example, the Griffon had one assembly that resembled a Jesus nut, but in fact it was attached to the mast/head via many bolts that are all lockwired in.  For the life of me I cannot remember its name as per the CFTOs.



“Retaining nut” on all Bell teetering rotors: CH118, CH135, CH136.


----------



## observor 69

Flight control software glitch haunted Cyclone helicopter during trials
The CH-148 Cyclone helicopter has what the air force calls a "triple redundant" flight control system — and during a 2017 training mission off Nova Scotia, all three of those computers momentarily failed at once.

It was a major software glitch, alarming enough to ground the fleet for nine weeks.

At the time, the military described the incident publicly as a "severe bump" which reset the controls and caused the aircraft to briefly and suddenly lose altitude. The pilot managed to recover and land safely. 

https://www.cbc.ca/news/SOMNIA-1.5566656


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I, for one, wish Mr Byers would stick to what his UBC profile suggests he is actually knowledgeable in;  there is no indication he's flown or crewed so much as a paper airplane so not sure how a person with his education and experience is dubbed an 'expert' in anything aviation-related.

Example:



> "If you are just a few hundred feet above the water, you have no time to respond," he said.



Having flown 'just a few hundred feet above the water' and had emergencies happen at low level before, I can assure him, from personal experience, that is not a factual statement.

 :2c:


----------



## NavyShooter

I worked with a group in the RCN called "Route Survey" a few years back.  We were responsible for side-scan SONAR systems and Q-route surveillance.  I have awareness that there are systems available to the Canadian Government that can reach down to 3000m that have been used for deep sea recoveries in the past.  

I'm not going to speculate on the cause of the crash - the report will come out eventually.  I hope the recovery efforts find the aircraft quickly and brings closure to the families of the fallen.

NS


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> Flight control software glitch haunted Cyclone helicopter during trials
> The CH-148 Cyclone helicopter has what the air force calls a "triple redundant" flight control system — and during a 2017 training mission off Nova Scotia, all three of those computers momentarily failed at once.
> 
> It was a major software glitch, alarming enough to ground the fleet for nine weeks.
> 
> At the time, the military described the incident publicly as a "severe bump" which reset the controls and caused the aircraft to briefly and suddenly lose altitude. The pilot managed to recover and land safely.
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/SOMNIA-1.5566656



Just to be clear, ANYTHING written or said about this accident that does not come from the Directorate of Flight Safety is, by definition, speculation.

I realize newspapers/media got to sell stories. But if you are actually interested in what really happened, you have to wait  until the investigators report. Until that happens, you are not helping anybody by speculating.


----------



## dimsum

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Just to be clear, ANYTHING written or said about this accident that does not come from the Directorate of Flight Safety is, by definition, speculation.
> 
> I realize newspapers/media got to sell stories. But if you are actually interested in what really happened, you have to wait  until the investigators report. Until that happens, you are not helping anybody by speculating.



This statement should be in big, bold, flashing neon letters.


----------



## observor 69

1. I thought this article by the CBC looked reasonably creditable or at least contributed some background to the situation.

2. The odds on me as a retired serviceman/civy of ever hearing the results of the Flight Safety Report are slim.


----------



## Baz

Dimsum said:
			
		

> This statement should be in big, bold, flashing neon letters.



Yep.



			
				Baden Guy said:
			
		

> 1. I thought this article by the CBC looked reasonably creditable or at least contributed some background to the situation.
> 
> 2. The odds on me as a retired serviceman/civy of ever hearing the results of the Flight Safety Report are slim.



http://flightcomment.ca/


----------



## observor 69

Thanks for the link, much appreciated.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> 1. I thought this article by the CBC looked reasonably creditable or at least contributed some background to the situation.
> 
> 2. The odds on me as a retired serviceman/civy of ever hearing the results of the Flight Safety Report are slim.



On point number 2: Not true. The Directorate of Flight Safety posts their reports to the internet. They are publicly available. 

That nothing is available now means nothing is ready to be reported. It does not mean anything is being hidden.


----------



## dapaterson

Much as it pains me as a guy with a heavy Army background to say nice things about the RCAF, I cannot say enough good things about the RCAF's continuous work to build and sustain their flight safety culture.  They don't take shortcuts; they build an environment where there can be open and frank discussions about what went wrong to find and fix root causes.

And part of that is letting the professionals do their work.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The Directorate of Flight Safety posts their reports to the internet. They are publicly available.
> 
> That nothing is available now means nothing is ready to be reported. It does not mean anything is being hidden.



And, here is the link:  RCAF Flight Safety Investigation Reports

*note* Recent Flight Safety Investigations summaries: Epilogue, and preliminary information about current investigations: From the Investigator, are available on this page. For the full report or any additional queries contact DFS (dfs.dsv@forces.gc.ca).


----------



## observor 69

And thanks to you Eye In The Sky.
All links bookmarked. Thx to all.


----------



## dapaterson

Anyone looking at building / repairing sustaining a safety program would be well advised to look at DFS publications, for ideas on how to promote the culture, and for discussion articles about errors / flaws / ways to improve.


----------



## Navy_Pete

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Anyone looking at building / repairing sustaining a safety program would be well advised to look at DFS publications, for ideas on how to promote the culture, and for discussion articles about errors / flaws / ways to improve.



That's not really the Navy way; we bury and overclassify so that BOI, tech investigations etc never see the light of day.


----------



## dapaterson

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> That's not really the Navy way; we bury and overclassify so that BOI, tech investigations etc never see the light of day.



See, in the Army we find a convenient corporal to blame, assume it's a one-off, and repeat.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> That's not really the Navy way; we bury and overclassify so that BOI, tech investigations etc never see the light of day.



Cough [Protecteur Fire] cough....


----------



## NavyShooter

It took 3 years for me to find out from a CPO1 who was on the BOI that the LS we lost in 2005 was not a suicide, it was an accident.  


2 years ago, I bumped into a sailor who was there that night - he had never heard the outcome of the BOI.  I brought him up to speed.  The Navy has....challenges....when it comes to distributing knowledge to the lowest levels that may need it.


----------



## FSTO

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Cough [Protecteur Fire] cough....



Yes, where is that? Should it not be front and centre at DC Schools Kootenay and Galiano?


----------



## FJAG

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> That's not really the Navy way; we bury and overclassify so that BOI, tech investigations etc never see the light of day.



Not just the Navy way but the Army too.

Back in the 1970s when the German Army started using Shilo they fired a few hundred 105mm tank HEAT-T rounds but stopped shortly after because of a high dud rate. Since then they fired exclusively 105mm TPT (Target Practice Tracer,) an inert projectile almost physically identical to the HEAT-T except for colouring.

In 1980 a scrap yard worker in Winnipeg died in an explosion as he was cutting a scrap shell delivered to the yard after a range sweep. A BOI was held and a civilian Fatalities Inquiry was conducted and established the circumstances that in fact some 105mm HEAT-T blind rounds were on the ranges.

In 1998 another worker died at a Winnipeg scrap yard as he was cutting a 105,, HEAT-T blind in half with metal shears.

I was retained in 2000 as counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany at the Fatalities Inquiry for this second death (a second BOI was also held). What was remarkable is that notwithstanding the clear evidence established by the first BOI was that no one at range control or in the ammunition chain at Shilo was aware of the fact that the first explosion had been a German 105mm HEAT-T and that such rounds had ever been fired in Shilo. (Instead the generally accepted lore was that the first blast had been a Canadian 105mm Howitzer projectile) Each range sweep thousands of 105mm TPT rounds would be found scoured of paint and no one was checking to see if any of them were a 105mm HEAT-T blind. (Incidentally a post explosion re-examination of the scrap at the yard found an additional 12 105mm HEAT-T, one 84mm HEAT, one 90 mm HEAT, one 81mm mortar (with unknown filling) one 90mm (with unknown filling) and one 105 mm smoke canister.)

Back around 1985 or 6 I also sat as president of a BOI respecting two reservists killed when their 106mm recoilless rifle jeep rolled over. We completed all the interviews and within a month had the board report finished (including a draft letter for release to the families) and forwarded to FMC HQ. It took one year before FMC headquarters finally released a summary of the findings.

 :cheers:


----------



## Underway

There are things to be learned from the air safety program.  But it has its drawbacks as well.  God forbid one questions the wisdom of the air safety program on board ship, even when it negatively impacts operations or refits to the ship.


----------



## Kat Stevens

FJAG said:
			
		

> Not just the Navy way but the Army too.
> 
> Back in the 1970s when the German Army started using Shilo they fired a few hundred 105mm tank HEAT-T rounds but stopped shortly after because of a high dud rate. Since then they fired exclusively 105mm TPT (Target Practice Tracer,) an inert projectile almost physically identical to the HEAT-T except for colouring.
> 
> In 1980 a scrap yard worker in Winnipeg died in an explosion as he was cutting a scrap shell delivered to the yard after a range sweep. A BOI was held and a civilian Fatalities Inquiry was conducted and established the circumstances that in fact some 105mm HEAT-T blind rounds were on the ranges.
> 
> In 1998 another worker died at a Winnipeg scrap yard as he was cutting a 105,, HEAT-T blind in half with metal shears.
> 
> I was retained in 2000 as counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany at the Fatalities Inquiry for this second death (a second BOI was also held). What was remarkable is that notwithstanding the clear evidence established by the first BOI was that no one at range control or in the ammunition chain at Shilo was aware of the fact that the first explosion had been a German 105mm HEAT-T and that such rounds had ever been fired in Shilo. (Instead the generally accepted lore was that the first blast had been a Canadian 105mm Howitzer projectile) Each range sweep thousands of 105mm TPT rounds would be found scoured of paint and no one was checking to see if any of them were a 105mm HEAT-T blind. (Incidentally a post explosion re-examination of the scrap at the yard found an additional 12 105mm HEAT-T, one 84mm HEAT, one 90 mm HEAT, one 81mm mortar (with unknown filling) one 90mm (with unknown filling) and one 105 mm smoke canister.)
> 
> Back around 1985 or 6 I also sat as president of a BOI respecting two reservists killed when their 106mm recoilless rifle jeep rolled over. We completed all the interviews and within a month had the board report finished (including a draft letter for release to the families) and forwarded to FMC HQ. It took one year before FMC headquarters finally released a summary of the findings.
> 
> :cheers:



This is why we are now required to put two perf charges on any full bodied item that we find during clearance ops.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG was that a Seaforth Jeep that rolled, I seem to recall them losing one of their people that way?


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> FJAG was that a Seaforth Jeep that rolled, I seem to recall them losing one of their people that way?



No. This was a Manitoba Militia District (at the time) accident in Saskatchewan on the Trans Canada heading back from Dundurn to Winnipeg. If I remember correctly one was from the RWpgRif and the other from the FGH.

 :cdnsalute:


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Underway said:
			
		

> There are things to be learned from the air safety program.  But it has its drawbacks as well.  God forbid one questions the wisdom of the air safety program on board ship, even when it negatively impacts operations or refits to the ship.



I have been involved in more than few discussions of this nature, over my flying career. Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal. Since it is literally our necks in the noose, the MH Folks take the technical readiness of a ship to receive an aircraft seriously. Perfect is actually the standard.

Nothing negatively impacts naval operations at sea like an aircraft accident. Just ask FRE.


----------



## FSTO

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal.


So what can the Navy and Maritime Air do together to change this mindset? 
I have some suggestions but they would take time, money, and a structural change to the training system that I doubt would be well received by the holders of the current silos.


----------



## Jc066

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I, for one, wish Mr Byers would stick to what his UBC profile suggests he is actually knowledgeable in;  there is no indication he's flown or crewed so much as a paper airplane so not sure how a person with his education and experience is dubbed an 'expert' in anything aviation-related.
> 
> Example:
> 
> Having flown 'just a few hundred feet above the water' and had emergencies happen at low level before, I can assure him, from personal experience, that is not a factual statement.
> 
> :2c:



I have not been following this thread heavily nor in the news. I did contact the det cheif and passed my condolences along to all members in the det.

EITS, is this who is being quoted in the media?


----------



## Lumber

Baz said:
			
		

> Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).





			
				Underway said:
			
		

> This is a reason that I believe the CDS decision to not release preliminary crash information is the right one.  Wait until the report is done and all the rocks have been turned over.  Then inform the families of what happened, then the public.  This way forward feels right.





			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Cough [Protecteur Fire] cough....



Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?

It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were _very_ eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?
> 
> It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were _very_ eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).



Understood, but they can't tell us what happened until they know what happened.  In the early days of an investigation, all you have is some facts, not the whole cause. It doesn't help anyone to promulgate a partial investigation; as a matter of fact, it may be counter-productive (see the discussion ref the Newfoundland offshore S-92 incident above). In the extreme case, it helps span conspiracy theories.


----------



## Underway

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I have been involved in more than few discussions of this nature, over my flying career. Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal. Since it is literally our necks in the noose, the MH Folks take the technical readiness of a ship to receive an aircraft seriously. Perfect is actually the standard.
> 
> Nothing negatively impacts naval operations at sea like an aircraft accident. Just ask FRE.



Don't get me wrong.  I get it.  I've flown in the Cyclone over water and can easily see how one minor issue could have lead to an accident.  This opinion isn't developed off hand.  It's from hours of discussion and back and forth with Air Dets, on deployment, sea training and just generally being curious.  As an engineer, I and ask engineering things, and want to know why things are the way they are.  There are factions in both that vigorously defend their turf.  The Air Forces (most likely used to "dumb" Naval Officers) automatic reply to any question or suggestion for change is a resounding "NO".

The Cyclone, fortunately, is changing that as all the old logic and publications are under review for the aircraft.  I'm also in the PMO now working with the airforce quite a bit on their requirements, and there is quite a bit up for review/discussion and re-evaluation as the new ships are designed.

There are things that are needed for air safety, and there are things that are nice to have.  And a lot of the nice to have's/preferences are presented to the frigates as must-haves (as I'm discovering in PMO).


----------



## Lumber

Baz said:
			
		

> Understood, but they can't tell us what happened until they know what happened.  In the early days of an investigation, all you have is some facts, not the whole cause. It doesn't help anyone to promulgate a partial investigation; as a matter of fact, it may be counter-productive (see the discussion ref the Newfoundland offshore S-92 incident above). In the extreme case, it helps span conspiracy theories.



Ok, but perhaps instead of waiting for final, approved, and fully vetted reports, they could continuously divulge major details as soon as they become available. They could come out and say (as soon as they have the inf) that: "We've established it is not x, so it could still be y or z", or would "y or z" be leaving it open to too much speculation?


----------



## Underway

Lumber said:
			
		

> Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?
> 
> It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were _very_ eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).



Yah you can find it on the DWAN.  The engineering community is all over it, especially at DC School and Sea Training.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

FSTO said:
			
		

> So what can the Navy and Maritime Air do together to change this mindset?
> I have some suggestions but they would take time, money, and a structural change to the training system that I doubt would be well received by the holders of the current silos.



Those are not easy questions. MH aircrew used to be better at Naval doctrine. But, we got busy learning a new helicopter. Naval Officers used to be better at flight ops, but fewer and fewer ships had HELAIRDETs, so the institutional knowledge got lost as people advanced through the system with no exposure to flight ops.

For the aircrew, the Maritime Warfare Standard course was great. But it seems to be gone now. I have long advocated that one aircrew attend each serial of the ORO course. That would go along way to fixing the knowledge issues on both sides.

For the Naval Officers, (NWOs and Engineers), we seem to handle most of their air ops training by OJT. Good luck with that if you never get sent to a ship with a HELAIRDET. Most of the problems we have seen lately are on the Engineering side. Aside from the frigates just getting old, entire regimes of inspections and certifications have just been lost or forgotten. And, contrary to what the RCN hopes for, they cannot wish away inspections and certifications (or documenting those inspections. If it wasn%u2019t documented, it never happened) with Airworthiness implications. All CAF (notice I did not say RCAF) Airworthiness issues are ultimately a Ministerial responsibility. They are not in a Service Chief Silo. So, maybe, airworthiness needs to be taught to NWOs and Naval Engineers.

Another issue I have noticed is command tour length. It is too short. Some COs drive their ships like they stole them for 18-24 months with no thought to long term engineering implications, because it is the only shot they are getting at Command. They do not allocate enough time for preventative maintenance in the Opsked (to say nothing of engineering drills), so that bow wave just builds from CO to CO until the ship just becomes a piece of crap and is either unrecoverable or really expensive to fix. The Engineers, in the mean time, just give up or go work for a civvy company.

It is not all bad. The submarine force has a safety and engineering culture very much like in the RCAF. If we could get the surface fleet to come onboard with the same culture, we would be in better shape.

My 2 cents, anyway.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Underway said:
			
		

> Yah you can find it on the DWAN.  The engineering community is all over it, especially at DC School and Sea Training.



I know, but it took many years.


----------



## Good2Golf

Lumber said:
			
		

> Ok, but perhaps instead of waiting for final, approved, and fully vetted reports, they could continuously divulge major details as soon as they become available. They could come out and say (as soon as they have the inf) that: "We've established it is not x, so it could still be y or z", or would "y or z" be leaving it open to too much speculation?



DFS will release an Initial Report if they can.  It’s part of the Flight Safety system noted earlier. 

See:



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> And, here is the link:  RCAF Flight Safety Investigation Reports
> 
> *note* Recent Flight Safety Investigations summaries: Epilogue, and preliminary information about current investigations: From the Investigator, are available on this page. For the full report or any additional queries contact DFS (dfs.dsv@forces.gc.ca).


----------



## dimsum

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> For the aircrew, the Maritime Warfare Standard course was great. But it seems to be gone now. I have long advocated that one aircrew attend each serial of the ORO course. That would go along way to fixing the knowledge issues on both sides.



Aurora crews (Pilots and TACCOs) could benefit from that as well.


----------



## Lumber

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Aurora crews (Pilots and TACCOs) could benefit from that as well.



In addition to that, we need them to sit down and do actually training with the OROs. After learning about ASW tactics and the capabilities of the cyclone, we did a tour of 423 Sqn, and discovered that not only did we have a different idea of tactics, our understanding of cyclone capabilities was off, and in some areas, significantly off.

Mind you, even within 423, we got different answers on some questions between an AESOP, a Capt pilot, and a Maj ACSO.


----------



## Navy_Pete

Underway said:
			
		

> Yah you can find it on the DWAN.  The engineering community is all over it, especially at DC School and Sea Training.



Nope, there have been bits and pieces fed out about what happened, but there was never anything comprehensive to come out of the BOI that would be useful for lessons learned and also for fixing the underlying habits that led to the fire. The videos that they have pumped out are useful in understanding what the crew was dealing with, but totally different from what you would get out of a proper BOI result. For a good example, see the Westralia BOI below. You can find similar public reports for a lot of the USN incidents where they break down timelines and try to understand what people knew when they made the decisions, and that's the useful and important bits. You need the full context of what they knew and what they were thinking at the time to understand the decision; generally 'mistakes' make perfect sense after the fact when you understand that, and can help you correct it to prevent it happening in the future. There are still a huge amount of misinformation of fitted systems that prevent them from being used in a timely manner, and things that we know have led to fires still happen. 

One thing I found working with the det was that, even when someone does something stupid, it's looked at as a learning opportunity and no one is blamed. Because of that underlying culture, they take the opportunity to learn from it and widely distribute the report. Also, part of their routine was to review every air safety report and make sure they didn't repeat the same mistakes.

Aside from the PRO fire, there were also BOIs for the PRO/ALG collision, when PRE allided into the Irving floating drydock, and a few other fires. AFAIK, none of those have an unclass summary of events available, and unless you know a guy, you'll never see the actual reports, as they are still treated as a 'need to know'. Tech Investigations are even worse; they get done, filed away (in a number of unlinked, limited access databases) with folks very rarely seeing the actual results. I had the full engine room halon bank fire off on me without warning that was on Environment Canada's radar due to the amount (which can result in massive fines directly to crew members if they are found to be negligent) and didn't see anything about it until nearly two years later when it was finally finished, and the author forwarded me the results as a courtesy (faulty PGA on the main cylinder). If I hadn't known him would never have seen a copy, and wouldn't be able to see where it was logged.

Westralia BOI: https://s0.whitepages.com.au/d73ef9ce-8c9c-4d2b-becb-975402164fac/collaery-lawyers-document.pdf


----------



## Baz

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> For the aircrew, the Maritime Warfare Standard course was great. But it seems to be gone now. I have long advocated that one aircrew attend each serial of the ORO course. That would go along way to fixing the knowledge issues on both sides.



I had a SAC working for me as part of P91... it was really good, as he was connected back into the Fleet. One of the ideas we bandied around was having SACs in both Pat Bay and Shearwater, and remote radars to them.  That way operational sqn COREXs could be briefed by them, and then they could control them.  Reinforce the interaction, and get them control time.  There are far too many C and D SACs in the fleet.

There was also something else in the works for P91, but we just never got there.  Use TCDL to connect back to the same place as the radars are remoted from, and use it for both a sim net and to monitor the crew.  In other words, you could see and hear what the crew were doing (the Tacplot and ICS), and you could control onboard simulations from the ground.  So, for instance, you could create an underwater track that isn't really there, and have two helos track it.  Or you could create above water tracks the same way. It would also open the door for plug in sim functions for the aircraft... it could be a sim sitting in the hangar.  We could do that for development of P91.

At that point it would then make sense to somehow get the Ops Room officers involved as well... maybe have a deployable sim cell that can go on exercises, controlling the helos sims from one or more of the ships, or even use an MCDV or Orca as the sim cell. At one time I read the US Navy had (or has) the capability to plug into a ship pierside with a tractor trailer, and in effect make the ships combat system a simulator.  More of that, integrate it together.

We also need to get HLA working (and, as part of that, a West Coast Sim). More time in the box, 443 doesn't have to fly back, and we can connect East and West coast for standardization and tactics development.  Also connect into the Navies Ops Rooms sims (or plug in sims if we can make that work). Get the crews and ship's fighting without the cost of going to sea. And have full warfare scenarios, that take days and include crew cycles, not just one sortie. MH crews don't come to the fight cold.

Make the harbour link exercises more common (they used to be weekly) and ensure there is Wing involvement.  Maybe put an antenna on the mission sims?  Or maybe use the antenna at Caldwell Rd to join the avionics lab to those once it moves to Halifax.

And for all of this, good virtual mission brief and debrief.  Have the sim cell and warfare cells from CFMWC do good wash ups. Not just drive bys, but actual opportunities to have extended warfare discussions.  You're not at sea so there are no pressures from the flex.

But the most important part is a warrior mentality...


----------



## Good2Golf

Has there ever been an MH GO in the Naval Staff?  The Army has embedded RCAF (TH) GOs in the past into its staff, and The RCAF embedded an Army Col into a COS position in 1 CAD HQ; both ways to enhance Air-Land Integration (ALI) efforts.  MH senior leaders embedded (and vice versa) would likely achieve similar benefit and operational and institutional understanding between RCN and RCAF. 

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Baz

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Has there ever been an MH GO in the Naval Staff?  The Army has embedded RCAF (TH) GOs in the past into its staff, and The RCAF embedded an Army Col into a COS position in 1 CAD HQ; both ways to enhance Air-Land Integration (ALI) efforts.  MH senior leaders embedded (and vice versa) would likely achieve similar benefit and operational and institutional understanding between RCN and RCAF.
> 
> :2c:
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Yes.  At times the commander would have been; when we had Naval Air.

There's a reason the MARCOM badge has an albotrose in it.

The ComdMAG used to perform that function, !CAD certainly doesn't, and neither MAC(A) or MAC(P) very well.  And the disappearance of MAG E&R is to weep...



> This is the real meaning of modern seapower.  Seapower without airpower is nothing.  Airpower without sea
> power is nothing.


https://books.google.ca/books?id=X04EAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA109&lpg=PA109&dq=%22seapower+without+airpower%22&source=bl&ots=x63P1uzQXY&sig=ACfU3U1uDBY7E8Kuvmgj-COIjkTjhCN8IQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj83reT3bPpAhWjgnIEHYaBD4QQ6AEwAHoECAMQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22seapower%20without%20airpower%22&f=false Lide magazine, Dec 1st, 1941.  6 days before Pearl Harbour.

We've forgotten that.


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> In addition to that, we need them to sit down and do actually training with the OROs. After learning about ASW tactics and the capabilities of the cyclone, we did a tour of 423 Sqn, and discovered that not only did we have a different idea of tactics, our understanding of cyclone capabilities was off, and in some areas, significantly off.
> 
> Mind you, even within 423, we got different answers on some questions between an AESOP, a Capt pilot, and a Maj ACSO.



Tactics development is in the early stages right now.


----------



## Navy_Pete

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> For the Naval Officers, (NWOs and Engineers), we seem to handle most of their air ops training by OJT. Good luck with that if you never get sent to a ship with a HELAIRDET. Most of the problems we have seen lately are on the Engineering side. Aside from the frigates just getting old, entire regimes of inspections and certifications have just been lost or forgotten. And, contrary to what the RCN hopes for, they cannot wish away inspections and certifications (or documenting those inspections. If it wasn%u2019t documented, it never happened) with Airworthiness implications. All CAF (notice I did not say RCAF) Airworthiness issues are ultimately a Ministerial responsibility. They are not in a Service Chief Silo. So, maybe, airworthiness needs to be taught to NWOs and Naval Engineers.



I agree with you, and to add to the context, usually the air inspections come up when the ship is being reactivated, so you have minimal crew, newly jammed together, and you are running around trying to just get the ship safe to get off the wall. If you are lucky you have an experienced flight deck ET and stoker who can pick away at the air det stuff, and if you are really lucky you have a few more senior MS or POs that did the job previously that can lend a hand (if they have time while not trying to duct tape things together). So at best, you have maybe a half dozen techs with experience; worse case you have two with the package done, limited real experience, and the manuals to go off of.

Normally the OPSCHED has at least a few ships fighting for priority, and odds are good that you won't get any for air equip until the 11th hour, and only then when it's critical.

At some point when you are doing this, you will randomly get a visit from sea training to hammer your bag about the air readiness, but you probably won't care because toilets aren't working, there isn't hot water, and you are working 7 days a week to try and get the ship to be able to go to the basin to do some basic workups without sinking. The air equip is a problem for future you.

Eventually future problems become the problems of now, but you are still trying to figure out how to get the ship off the wall safely and get six months of work done in six weeks, with three weeks worth of resources. On top of that, you now have air workups scheduled at the start of the full workups, even though none of your systems have had their set to work finished, and you won't get JP5 until a few days before, so best of luck.

I was lucky and had a few sets of AirWUPs and multiple AirDets as a trainee, so understood the air safety requirements reasonably well, and knew how much it was going to hurt, but it was still a nightmare on my HOD tour. Having an air det fly in from the opposite coast at the last minute didn't help, but the lack of shore support ahead of time and how much was pushed to the ship was crazy. Even once it was all up and running, keeping it going involved a lot of lost sleep and extra work.

Hopefully with Deputy Engineers coming in to help the HOD, should be able to better track and manage things, but doesn't change the fact that the ships are old, the systems are old, and the maintenance resources are in short supply.  If we don't scale down the schedule, as well as load level it (so that all ships aren't fighting for the same resources at the same time, then all sailing at once so there is no work), we should look at rejigging how we provide shore support, as I would have loved nothing more then to have some floaters around to be able to turn wrenchs and check electrons for reactivating things like the bear trap and flyco. If the standard is perfect, then 'the best we can, with the time and people available' should be concerning.

Burnout is a real issue, and had to rotate a few people through the jobs as they were being driven into the ground with a busy flypro. Usually there would be a bunch of maintenance to the equipment after flying, and somehow never got scheduled for during crew rest, so my guys would usually be working for a few hours after flying, and up a few hours before flying to get it ready. It was just brutal, and never a battle I was able to make headway on.


----------



## Lumber

Baz said:
			
		

> Tactics development is in the early stages right now.



I'm not talking about Cyclone/LFA specific tactics, I'm talking about basic/universal ASW tactics, and basic cyclone Caps/Lims.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Jc066 said:
			
		

> EITS, is this who is being quoted in the media?



It's a bit ambiguous, but it was the only person I could see they're relating to the 'expert' label.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Lumber said:
			
		

> In addition to that, we need them to sit down and do actually training with the OROs. After learning about ASW tactics and the capabilities of the cyclone, we did a tour of 423 Sqn, and discovered that not only did we have a different idea of tactics, our understanding of cyclone capabilities was off, and in some areas, significantly off.



How LRP, MH and RCN units all exist so close together yet never have time to 'exercise' together has always baffled me.  The one time I can remember doing co-op with a RCN Frigate and RCAF MH was on a Dynamic Manta.  Why does it seem so impossible for the 3 communities to sit/talk/learn/develop bi-annually?  I think it is more vital than some of the 'mandatory' stuff forced on us that erodes time from our work week.




			
				Lumber said:
			
		

> Mind you, even within 423, we got different answers on some questions between an AESOP, a Capt pilot, and a Maj ACSO.



Each of those are SMEs in different areas on their crew.  Experience is a factor in 'answers', as well and that could be part of the difference in answers.  Can you give an example of a question that had variations in answers?  RADAR capabilities, etc?


----------



## dimsum

Lumber said:
			
		

> In addition to that, we need them to sit down and do actually training with the OROs. After learning about ASW tactics and the capabilities of the cyclone, we did a tour of 423 Sqn, and discovered that not only did we have a different idea of tactics, our understanding of cyclone capabilities was off, and in some areas, significantly off.
> 
> Mind you, even within 423, we got different answers on some questions between an AESOP, a Capt pilot, and a Maj ACSO.



If it's about technical capabilities, that's weird.  If it's about tactics, then it'll be different depending on the operator - there are too many variables to only use standard solutions like "when A happens, do B".


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Dimsum said:
			
		

> If it's about technical capabilities, that's weird.  If it's about tactics, then it'll be different depending on the operator - there are too many variables to only use standard solutions like "when A happens, do B".



It's not all _that_ weird, though, is it?  Ask a NASO A Cat, a TacNav and a FO about the APS 508:

NASO:  "its a multi-mode... :blah:...and can do imaging with different polarization... :blah:...*insert random RADAR tech terms here*…this carries on until eyes glaze over or people start leaving...

TacNav:  the radar has XX range for this mode, YY range for this...they can use it for weather really well.  I do "this tactic" for "this task" because the ranges are pretty solid now that we've had it for ZZ time.  I don't know about all the PRF stuff the NASO was talking about...doesn't matter to me, I have him/her to maintain/manage that knowledge.

FO:  APS...you mean, like...the posting season?  Wha?   :dunno:


Front end should know hard aircraft stuff...important stuff about keeping it flying.  Tac's...mission / tactical SMEs.  Sensor Ops...how to operate, optimize, tactically employ and troubleshoot their systems.  (short/dirty version)


----------



## Lumber

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Can you give an example of a question that had variations in answers?  RADAR capabilities, etc?



To be fair and give credit where credit is due, there are differences within the UWW, SAC, ORO and support cells within the school as well. 

That being said, this was a while ago, but one that still comes to mind was "if you at the dip, with your ball deployed at max depth, how long would it take to recover and be moving again?". We got different answers from literally everyone, including different sections within the school. Obviously, I can't actually say what those answers were, but the delta between the lowest to highest number was _significant_.



			
				Dimsum said:
			
		

> ... - there are too many variables to only use standard solutions like *"when A happens, do B".  *



Are you forgetting about ASW preplans?


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> That being said, this was a while ago, but one that still comes to mind was "if you at the dip, with your ball deployed at max depth, how long would it take to recover and be moving again?". We got different answers from literally everyone, including different sections within the school. Obviously, I can't actually say what those answers were, but the delta between the lowest to highest number was _significant_.



Just curious... if it was a while ago, was it for the Sea King or Cyclone.  Because it wasn't that long ago that most people wouldn't know for the Cyclone.

Those numbers aren't classified, but they are ITAR.  They're not published as a time, they are published as a cable length and speed, which changes as the ball is brought up.  So, math?  :dunno:

Come to think about it, I never really thought about that much on the Sea King. It wasn't really that significant when compared to the transit and dip approach... which was always random as the pilots messed about at the gate. I guess it would have been nice to know the ball depth for the software so the dip farthest on could include the recovery time... the fact it didn't probably says we didn't care that much.


----------



## Lumber

Baz said:
			
		

> Just curious... if it was a while ago, was it for the Sea King or Cyclone.  Because it wasn't that long ago that most people wouldn't know for the Cyclone.



A while ago means before Christmas with a million questions being asked on subjects we weren't tested on so remembering specific details/questions that we asked/discussed that day is diffcult.

I do remember, however, walking away from there with the impression that the MH community knows more about ASW and EW than the RCN does, and wanting to actually sit down and discuss tactical scenarios with them. (if x, what's y?)


----------



## Sub_Guy

Lumber said:
			
		

> I do remember, however, walking away from there with the impression that the MH community knows more about ASW and EW than the RCN does, and wanting to actually sit down and discuss tactical scenarios with them. (if x, what's y?)




Every time I worked with the RCN on ASW events, it always felt like amateur hour.  To be fair it wasn’t exclusive to the RCN, there’s been plenty of times where our tasking made zero sense.  

The ASW capabilities of the Cyclone and Aurora compliment each other nicely and when you combine the two you have what is quite possibly the best airborne ASW team in existence. 

I’d like to see more linked up sim events.


----------



## Baz

My concern is that everybody wants to jump right into the advanced scenarios, without working up to them.  Couple that with the advanced scenarios are supposed to be about exercising command, not individual skills.

My seem to know exactly what to do to train team sports: individual basics (like fitness), individual skills, small team skills (like forwards acting together, etc), shift skills (ie everybody on the field at one team), whole team tactics, team strategy (like trades, etc).  Yet for arguably the biggest team sport we try to jump right to tactics; which is all the harder because the team line up is constantly changing.


----------



## Underway

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> Every time I worked with the RCN on ASW events, it always felt like amateur hour.



Not really that surprised.  The ships have so many other mission sets that need to get exercised, and after all those interdiction operations dring the war on terror we have a bunch of skills to relearn.  Even the RN has stated as much publically for them as well.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Why can't there be more training events close off the east and west coasts?  Seriously, it _baffles_ me.  

Just like when we were doing IMPACT ground schools and it was all sim's.  I said "Gagetown has this HUGE training area.  gunfire, BUAs, wooded areas, roads to do veh follows, route scans...its almost pefect".  Never went there once for overland trg (outside of supporting COMMON GROUND or something).   :facepalm: :facepalm: :facepalm:

Like DH mentioned, combined / linked sim events...follow up with a wet-ex.


----------



## Lumber

Dolphin_Hunter said:
			
		

> Every time I worked with the RCN on ASW events, it always felt like amateur hour.  To be fair it wasn’t exclusive to the RCN, there’s been plenty of times where our tasking made zero sense.
> 
> The ASW capabilities of the Cyclone and Aurora compliment each other nicely and when you combine the two you have what is quite possibly the best airborne ASW team in existence.
> 
> I’d like to see more linked up sim events.



We did a sim event with the USN back in fall 2018 (or was it in winter 2019?) called Virtual Flag (I think) and we had an Aurora from Greenwood participate linked thru their simulator (were you a part of that?).

During the event, the Aurora started doing things (or saying that they could do things) that no one in the room knew they could do. All these LCdrs, Lt(N)s, Chiefs and PO1s, and none knew about the new and full capabilities of the Blk 3, and some we're game changers for how we wanted/expected to employ the MPA.


----------



## dimsum

Lumber said:
			
		

> We did a sim event with the USN back in fall 2018 (or was it in winter 2019?) called Virtual Flag (I think) and we had an Aurora from Greenwood participate linked thru their simulator (were you a part of that?).
> 
> During the event, the Aurora started doing things (or saying that they could do things) that no one in the room knew they could do. All these LCdrs, Lt(N)s, Chiefs and PO1s, and none knew about the new and full capabilities of the Blk 3, and some we're game changers for how we wanted/expected to employ the MPA.



When Blk 4 comes out and is used in ops, remember this conversation and talk to the Aurora folks again.  It might not change the ASW game as much as the Blk 2 to Blk 3 jump, but SATCOM, Link 16 and other stuff will definitely help in the ASuW and patrol roles.


----------



## Sub_Guy

Lumber said:
			
		

> We did a sim event with the USN back in fall 2018 (or was it in winter 2019?) called Virtual Flag (I think) and we had an Aurora from Greenwood participate linked thru their simulator (were you a part of that?).
> 
> During the event, the Aurora started doing things (or saying that they could do things) that no one in the room knew they could do. All these LCdrs, Lt(N)s, Chiefs and PO1s, and none knew about the new and full capabilities of the Blk 3, and some we're game changers for how we wanted/expected to employ the MPA.



I wasn’t a part of that exercise.  I heard about it and I think it’s something we (CAF) should aim for at least 4 times a year. 

A huge problem we have is we are all short bodies and I feel like we are training to the minimum, just enough to be safe and effective. It’d be nice to have our most experienced personnel working on new tactics and advanced sensor employment.  I’ve been out of the game for a bit, so this very well could be happening, but I doubt it.


----------



## Halifax Tar

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Another issue I have noticed is command tour length. It is too short. Some COs drive their ships like they stole them for 18-24 months with no thought to long term engineering implications, because it is the only shot they are getting at Command. They do not allocate enough time for preventative maintenance in the Opsked (to say nothing of engineering drills), so that bow wave just builds from CO to CO until the ship just becomes a piece of crap and is either unrecoverable or really expensive to fix. The Engineers, in the mean time, just give up or go work for a civvy company.



Not trying to derail.  But the highlited and underlined portion hits the nail on the head in so many aspects not just this.  Fixing that to longer periods of 3 - 4 years would really do wonders.


----------



## MilEME09

Attached is what the CDS has said about recovery of the remaining wreckage.


----------



## Navy_Pete

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Not trying to derail.  But the highlited and underlined portion hits the nail on the head in so many aspects not just this.  Fixing that to longer periods of 3 - 4 years would really do wonders.



That would really have to correspond to a reduced ops tempo or general change to how much gets pushed down on the ship and crew; most senior people are running on fumes at the end of the existing 18 month-two year tour. Burned out people have a pretty low GAFF, which wouldn't do any good for the crew.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I suspect the Promotion Beast would not like a 3-4 year command cycle, they have high ranks to fill with bodies that have jumped through the hoops. Mind you a 3-4 year command cycle would produce some very good Captains.


----------



## Underway

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Not trying to derail.  But the highlited and underlined portion hits the nail on the head in so many aspects not just this.  Fixing that to longer periods of 3 - 4 years would really do wonders.



Define Command cycle.  Current CPF XO's have generally done a stint as CO's on MCDV's.  This gives them much more experience in the chair.  I think that more war driven exercises and work with the Airforce needs to be done.  Much of these skills that we are re-learning is a function of the 25 year constabulary missions in the Gulf/Arabian Sea. The tech and experience has moved on.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> That would really have to correspond to a reduced ops tempo or general change to how much gets pushed down on the ship and crew; most senior people are running on fumes at the end of the existing 18 month-two year tour. Burned out people have a pretty low GAFF, which wouldn't do any good for the crew.



Would that be so bad ?  I can see the advantages of not bashing our kit and, more importantly, people to pieces for the sake of the promotion boards. 



			
				Underway said:
			
		

> Define Command cycle.  Current CPF XO's have generally done a stint as CO's on MCDV's.  This gives them much more experience in the chair.  I think that more war driven exercises and work with the Airforce needs to be done.  Much of these skills that we are re-learning is a function of the 25 year constabulary missions in the Gulf/Arabian Sea. The tech and experience has moved on.



Command Cycle as seen from 3 Deck = Another CO, XO, Swain team injected into a crew -> Tics in the boxes achieved as fast as possible, crew beaten and pushed to the limits professionally and personally again; rinse and repeat.  Emphasis on repeat.  

I have long wished we would leave command teams in places for longer periods.  Especially after long deployments.  As it is now, they switch out the day after a crew and ship comes home with the new batch chomping at the bit to get going hard again and completely unsympathetic to the other 75-90% of the crew who are still there. 

Either leave them in place or have a mandatory 100% crew swap after long deployments. 

As for your second part, move MH into the RCN as whole, uniforms and all.  Reestablish the Naval Air Arm. Put us all in the same house and we will act like a family; vice someone who comes to sleep over from time to time.


----------



## dimsum

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> As for your second part, move MH into the RCN as whole, uniforms and all.  Reestablish the Naval Air Arm. Put us all in the same house and we will act like a family; vice someone who comes to sleep over from time to time.



[tangent]

Why stop at MH?  LRP works with the RCN most of the time.  LRP in other militaries is split either between their Air Forces or Naval Aviation arms.

[/tangent]

Back to the original point though, unless you have a permanent air det with each ship, the crews/techs will still be "sleeping over", just wearing the same clothes as you.


----------



## FSTO

Dimsum said:
			
		

> [tangent]
> 
> [/tangent]
> 
> Back to the original point though, unless you have a permanent air det with each ship, the crews/techs will still be "sleeping over", just wearing the same clothes as you.



In the same uniform they’d be your brothers and sisters coming for a visit instead of your first cousins.


----------



## dimsum

FSTO said:
			
		

> In the same uniform they%u2019d be your brothers and sisters coming for a visit instead of your first cousins.



Fair enough.  

Actually, that is a topic in the 2019-2020 Air and Space Power Research List.  It's only on DWAN so I can't send the link unfortunately (I don't have access right now), but the gist is whether the RCAF should devolve management of organic air power to the Army (Tac Hel) and Navy (MH, maybe LRP?) but keeping the flight safety, training, etc common stuff in the RCAF.  

Now this is an actual topic shift so mods, feel free to split as you see fit.


----------



## dapaterson

Arguably, if we give MH to the RCN and TH to the Army, the Flight Safety function now becomes purple, and would be moved out of RCAF lines to VCDS to oversee all three colours of aviator uniforms.

And given the dogs breakfast of RCAF administered and operated pilot training, that function should be taken away from the RCAF to fix it, regardless of whether MH and TH stay in the RCAF.


----------



## quadrapiper

Dimsum said:
			
		

> [tangent]
> Back to the original point though, unless you have a permanent air det with each ship, the crews/techs will still be "sleeping over", just wearing the same clothes as you.


Who've also, presumably, been through Fleet School/VENTURE for part of their training, and would, presumably, be present at senior levels within the RCN organically.

How necessary, too, is command at sea for senior officer development, unless you're aiming for one of the relatively limited number of flags commanding ships? Seems like something where some continuity might have more value than box-checking for someone.


----------



## dimsum

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Who've also, presumably, been through Fleet School/VENTURE for part of their training, and would, presumably, be present at senior levels within the RCN organically.



I'm not sure how much value aircrew or techs would get out of going to Fleet School or VENTURE except for an "intro to the Navy" course.  There's no point spreading out training and requiring more places, people, etc.  

I remember reading that back in the day, RN Fleet Air Arm officers were also qualified BWKs, but realistically I don't see a point now.


----------



## kev994

Do the aircrew/ techs on ship conduct fire fighter training?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

kev994 said:
			
		

> Do the aircrew/ techs on ship conduct fire fighter training?



Oh yeah. Good times, all round.


----------



## quadrapiper

Dimsum said:
			
		

> I'm not sure how much value aircrew or techs would get out of going to Fleet School or VENTURE except for an "intro to the Navy" course.  There's no point spreading out training and requiring more places, people, etc.
> 
> I remember reading that back in the day, RN Fleet Air Arm officers were also qualified BWKs, but realistically I don't see a point now.


Was thinking of the "intro to the navy," plus whatever modules of e.g. NWO coursing might be of value, and whatever might be useful for the techs.

Presumably, also, you'd be bringing experienced pilots back to teach at VENTURE.


----------



## kev994

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Was thinking of the "intro to the navy," plus whatever modules of e.g. NWO coursing might be of value, and whatever might be useful for the techs.
> 
> Presumably, also, you'd be bringing experienced pilots back to teach at VENTURE.


We don’t have enough pilots to teach at pilot school, let alone Navy school.


----------



## dimsum

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Was thinking of the "intro to the navy," plus whatever modules of e.g. NWO coursing might be of value, and whatever might be useful for the techs.
> 
> Presumably, also, you'd be bringing experienced pilots back to teach at VENTURE.



I'm not sure any other NWO courses would be of any value.  The aircrew and techs are doing a completely different job.  

There wouldn't be anything for the pilots or techs to teach at VENTURE either.  Again, totally different job.


----------



## quadrapiper

Dimsum said:
			
		

> I'm not sure any other NWO courses would be of any value.  The aircrew and techs are doing a completely different job.
> 
> There wouldn't be anything for the pilots or techs to teach at VENTURE either.  Again, totally different job.


Was looking at the comments re: lack of understanding between MH and nonflyers - wouldn't one of the ways to address that be to include, for the former, something in the way of increased awareness of whatever it is that's driving shipboard decision making, and for the latter, at some point between commissioning and being in a position to misunderstand the needs of and regs governing MH, to get Care, Feeding, and Employment of MH Dets delivered to them, preferably _by_ a pilot.


----------



## dimsum

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Was looking at the comments re: lack of understanding between MH and nonflyers - wouldn't one of the ways to address that be to include, for the former, something in the way of increased awareness of whatever it is that's driving shipboard decision making, and for the latter, at some point between commissioning and being in a position to misunderstand the needs of and regs governing MH, to get Care, Feeding, and Employment of MH Dets delivered to them, preferably _by_ a pilot.



Yes, but that's not what NWO training does.  Or at least it didn't years ago.  MARS III and IV taught you basic navigation and how to be a BWK.  You don't really get into ship routine, etc until you start sailing at the last month or two of MARS IV.  

There was (is?) a course called the Naval Operations Course that gets into that sort of thing after you're done MARS IV - I don't know much about the specifics but it's taught in Halifax, not VENTURE.  My info is really old so maybe they do talk about MH dets on NOC.


----------



## kev994

Do I hear a new DLN course in the making?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Article Link

Technical Brief on the Recovery Operation of the RCAF CH-148 Cyclone Helicopter 

Media advisory

May 18, 2020 – Ottawa – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Media are invited to a technical brief, on Tuesday, May 19, 2020, to discuss the recovery operation for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CH-148 Cyclone, following the accident that resulted in the tragic deaths of Sub-Lieutenant Abbigail Cowbrough, Captain Brenden Ian MacDonald, Captain Kevin Hagen, Captain Maxime Miron-Morin, Sub-Lieutenant Matthew Pyke, and Master Corporal Matthew Cousins on April 29, 2020.

In order to respect physical distancing, space will be limited. We encourage media to pool their coverage of this event and/or attend by teleconference. 

When:
Tuesday, May 19 at 3:00 pm

Where:
West Block, Room 225
Parliament Hill
Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario

What:
Canadian Joint Operations Commander (CJOC), Lieutenant-General Michael Rouleau; Maritime Component Commander (MCC), Rear-Admiral Craig Baines; and Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Major-General Alain Pelletier will provide information about the planned Recovery Operation to locate and recover the remains of our fallen members and the Cyclone helicopter.
Teleconference:

Media can also participate by teleconference. 
Toll-free (Canada/US) dial-in number: 1-866-206-0153
Local dial-in number: 613-954-9003
Passcode: 1325562#


----------



## daftandbarmy

kev994 said:
			
		

> Do I hear a new DLN course in the making?



Or a helocast-podcast


----------



## Drallib

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Article Link
> 
> Technical Brief on the Recovery Operation of the RCAF CH-148 Cyclone Helicopter



U.S. Navy helping Canada to recover helicopter from fatal military crash | FULL

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrt5PupBUo4


----------



## PuckChaser

Out of security concerns (I got a malware warning when going to the last posted link), I binned the last post. The issue wasn't with the website or the author, but an ad server that the website uses that is a known malware distributor.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

OceanBonfire said:
			
		

> Update: US Navy contributes Remora ROV to Canadian CH-148 recovery attempt
> 
> The US Navy (USN) is contributing a Remora 3 salvage remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to the Canadian Armed Force’s (CAF’s) recovery attempt of a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone maritime and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter crash that took place in the sea off Greece on 29 April.
> 
> The Phoenix International Remora 6000 is a 6,000 m-rated work-class vehicle developed for deep ocean salvage, search, and broadcast-quality optical documentation. There are two Remora ROVs: Remora 2 and Remora 3.



The Remora will be mated with the EDT Hercules for the operation.


----------



## MilEME09

https://www.facebook.com/207409132619743/posts/3448510705176220/

Post and pictures by CAF operations, ship has left Greece destined for the search/recovery area. Expected to arrive in approximately 48 hours.


----------



## MilEME09

Part of the helicopter has been found.

"Update: The combined #CAF and US Navy search and recovery team operating from EDT Hercules has located a large piece of the #Stalker22 fuselage and remains of our fallen were also found in the vicinity of the wreckage. The recovery team will continue their search for both our fallen and additional pieces of the wreckage. We remain committed to staying on site for as long as necessary. We know this operation is important to many of you, and we will provide updates as they become available."

https://www.facebook.com/207409132619743/posts/3454051124622178/


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

???

Am I the only one that thinks it's pretty funny that, according to that GoC Facebook page, the only parts of our armed forces that are actual armed forces are the RCN and the Thunderbirds?

Everybody else, including the Canadian Army, the RCAF and the CAF are listed as merely "government organizations".  ;D


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The next Liberal "White Paper" "No military needs scary weapons"


----------



## Cloud Cover

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> ???
> 
> Am I the only one that thinks it's pretty funny that, according to that GoC Facebook page, the only parts of our armed forces that are actual armed forces are the RCN and the Thunderbirds?
> 
> Everybody else, including the Canadian Army, the RCAF and the CAF are listed as merely "government organizations".  ;D



Not only that, it’s the USAF Thunderbirds, not even our own 426 Thunderbird Sqn....


----------



## Eye In The Sky

https://www.facebook.com/CBCNovaScotia/videos/274226737106157/

Recovery operations have concluded; 8 days total.  EDT Hercules is en route to Augusta, Sicily.


----------



## PuckChaser

Update from RAdm Baines with details from the recovery mission including debris field size and sizes of the debris itself.

https://www.cmfmag.ca/operations/search-and-recovery-mission-wraps-up-for-stalker-22-and-caf-personnel/?fbclid=IwAR1OevPQgfzj_P96GQH4QgcY4piD0vG15SBlA8F_UhX57eNhgF9XUOzYbl4


----------



## OceanBonfire

> *Directorate of Flight Safety releases initial report on CH-148 Cyclone accident*
> 
> https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2020/06/directorate-of-flight-safety-releases-initial-report-on-ch-148-cyclone-accident.html


----------



## observor 69

I appreciate the link. Cheers


----------



## MilEME09

So in simple terms it lost lift and crashed into the ocean?


----------



## Mick

Loss of lift is not mentioned in the From the Investigator summary.  No cause is mentioned for the final high energy descent.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So in simple terms it lost lift and crashed into the ocean?



There is no 'in simple terms' to speak of, at all.



> The FTI report is a brief summary of the circumstances and factual information known at this time. It does not provide full details surrounding the accident, which is still under investigation.



Also:



> “While the From the Investigator report identifies areas of focus for the remainder of our flight safety investigation, there is still a tremendous amount of work to do to understand the exact circumstances that contributed to the accident. We’re thankful for the support we’ve received so far from across National Defence, the whole of government, as well as the collaborative efforts of Sikorsky. We remain committed to conducting a thorough investigation to identify all we can that may contribute to safer flying operations.”
> 
> Colonel John Alexander, Director of Flight Safety and Department of National Defence’s Airworthiness Investigative Authority


----------



## PuckChaser

Fortunately the crash was within visual range of the ship, FDR and CVR were recovered relatively quickly and a majority of the debris was able to be brought up from the sea as well. Hopefully that makes a difficult investigation easier from an evidence standpoint and provide recommendations/solutions/closure as quickly as possible.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So in simple terms it lost lift and crashed into the ocean?



There was no indication from the investigator that vortex ring state or any other aerodynamic loss of lift scenario was being examined.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Not to put to much weight on the words of a interim statement, but it sound like the helicopter was manoeuvring into a flight path back to the ship, so it had forward momentum and was likley fairly low, which leads me to believe in a control failure without enough altitude for the pilot to compensate for, leading to a higher velocity impact. Due to the proximity to the ship, they may have some video which will help them narrow the cause. Hopefully the end was quick and painless.  :'(


----------



## Eye In The Sky

BRIEF: Lifting of the operational pause on the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter fleet

Media advisory

June 15, 2020 – Ottawa – Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Media are invited to a brief on the lifting of the operational pause on the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CH-148 Cyclone helicopter fleet. The operational pause was ordered as a precaution following the April 29 crash of a CH-148 Cyclone deployed on Operation REASSURANCE, which resulted in the tragic deaths of Sub-Lieutenant Abbigail Cowbrough, Captain Brenden Ian MacDonald, Captain Kevin Hagen, Captain Maxime Miron-Morin, Sub-Lieutenant Matthew Pyke, and Master Corporal Matthew Cousins.

In order to respect physical distancing, space will be limited. We encourage media to pool their coverage of this event and/or attend by teleconference.

When:
Tuesday, June 16, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. (EDT)

Where:         
West Block, Room 225
Parliament Hill
Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario

What:
Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier (Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Operational Airworthiness Authority), Brigadier-General Nancy Tremblay (Director-General of Aerospace Equipment Program Management and Technical Airworthiness Authority) and Colonel John Alexander (Director of Flight Safety and Airworthiness Investigative Authority) will provide information on the lifting of the operational pause on the CH-148 Cyclone fleet. There will also be an opportunity for questions.

Teleconference: Media can also participate by teleconference.

Toll-free (Canada/US) dial-in number: 1-866-206-0153
Local dial-in number: 613-954-9003
Passcode: 3246922#

Note to editors:
Members of the media are asked to confirm their attendance by contacting Lt(N) Melanie Aqiqi by email at melanie.aqiqi@forces.gc.ca.
Media are requested to arrive at the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery with photo identification no later than 1:10 p.m. (EDT).


----------



## MilEME09

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-helicopter-crash-1.5613239

According to the article, mechanical failure has been ruled out, and is now focused on aircraft systems and human error as potential causes. I am guessing aircraft systems means the software since mechanical has been ruled out.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Try this article:

https://vancouverisland.ctvnews.ca/military-to-return-cyclone-helicopters-to-service-in-the-coming-days-1.4986388#_gus&_gucid=&_gup=Facebook&_gsc=aN8SYNE


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-helicopter-crash-1.5613239
> 
> According to the article, mechanical failure has been ruled out, and is now focused on aircraft systems and human error as potential causes. I am guessing aircraft systems means the software since mechanical has been ruled out.



Potential to be another bug where the software causes the machine to do X or instructs/alerts the pilot to do X, when they should be doing Y.


----------



## Mick

If you watch the videos in the link EITS kindly provided, Col Alexander and LGen Pelletier are actually quite clear in explaining what investigators have discovered - and successfully recreated in the simulator - from data recovered from the BAU.

They also make it quite clear that the event in question is unrelated to previous flight control system issues.

And, it should be noted that the investigation of Human Factors does not imply human error.  They are not the same thing.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

mick said:
			
		

> If you watch the videos in the link EITS kindly provided, Col Alexander and LGen Pelletier are actually quite clear in explaining what investigators have discovered - and successfully recreated in the simulator - from data recovered from the BAU.
> 
> They also make it quite clear that the event in question is unrelated to previous flight control system issues.
> 
> And, it should be noted that the investigation of Human Factors does not imply human error.  They are not the same thing.



Correct on the human factors vs human error, Mick. This accident (most accidents, actually) are a long string of discrete events that line up to create an undesirable outcome. Interrupt that string of events at any point and you usually avoid the accident.  I heard very clearly From the briefing that the aircrew expected one thing and the aircraft did another. That does not mean (necessarily) that the aircrew made a mistake or that there was anything intrinsically wrong with the aircraft. A mismatch in expectations or perception at the wrong time can be disastrous.


----------



## Lance Wiebe

According to this article, it was a software "bias" that caused the crash.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-helicopter-crash-1.5613239


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> According to this article, it was a software "bias" that caused the crash.
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-helicopter-crash-1.5613239



No. It was not a software “bias”. A bias signal built up in pitch channel in Flight Director mode of the Flight Control Computer. It is important to get the terms correct. And since the flight safety investigation is only at an early stage, I am certain a lot more factors will come to light in the coming months. Remember- accidents are complex events consisting of many discrete events that contribute.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I'll have to admit, I stopped reading the CBC article Lance linked after reading "_Through a haze of technical jargon_"... :


----------



## Kirkhill

I do not know anything on this matter.  But.  It occurs to me that with any given plan it is possible for the plan to encounter circumstances unforeseen.  Everybody can do their jobs right and bad things can still happen.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'll have to admit, I stopped reading the CBC article Lance linked after reading "_Through a haze of technical jargon_"... :



Yeah. Heaven forbid a news conference provide actual, factual data.  :

If they had dumbed down the language in the news conference, they would have been roundly criticized for that.

I guarantee that every aviation professional who watched it, understood what was being said.


----------



## Good2Golf

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I guarantee that every aviation professional who watched it, understood what was being said.



:nod:

By the term ‘bias’ Colonel Alexander was referring to the flight control computer applying an offset relative to the command from the pilot’s controller, that resulted in an input to the pitch (longitudinal) cyclic actuator and resultant output to the blades that resulted in a pitch rate that differed from what the pilot believed should have occurred.  Essentially an automated adjustment to the pilot’s digital input into the flight control computer, based on the flight rules programmed, that are then translated into output control signals to the actuators. 

The concept is not limited to aircraft.  Your personal car likely has throttle-by-wire.  There is an electrical sending unit attached to the accelerator pedal that provides a varying electrical signal (could be analogue, more likely digital these days) based on the physical position of the pedal to the engine control unit, that then takes other factors into account and sends a specified signal to the fuel injection system to provide a certain amount of power relative to your pedal input. A bias could be applied by the ECU to the accelerator input if, for instance, your car had a distance-controlled cruise control system and any additional speed would cause the distance to become less than a pre-set distance.  The cruise control module (autopilot) could adjust the car’s power output (as selected by you the driver with the pedal), unti you either turn off the cruise control, or perhaps press the accelerator pedal further down, thus overriding the distance-adjusted cruise speed.   That’s a simplified example, but it’s one that many people experience everyday driving their cars. 

The point described by Colonel Alexander was that the modes in which control input biases are applied, particularly in complex (multi-axis) manoeuvres, were not immediately apparent to the pilot in time for him to take alternative action in a manner that would compensate fully for the biases.  He described that working with the OEM, Sikorsky, the RCAF will determine a comprehensive understanding of the programed flight rules for complex manoeuvres and the control input biases applied for various flight director modes, and ensure that operating procedures are consistent with the characteristics and expected behaviour of the aircraft.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'll have to admit, I stopped reading the CBC article Lance linked after reading "_Through a haze of technical jargon_"... :



Mr Brewster significantly misquoted what was said during the news conference in his article. He also drew inferences that were never made during the news conference.


----------



## Mick

I found it very interesting that although the investigation has not yet determined the "why" of the accident, investigators have a reasonable understanding as to the "what".  I'll admit, I was surprised that Col Alexander's prepared statement went into the detail it did, regarding levels of automation, and manual pilot inputs.  Still lots of questions to be explored / answered.  I also appreciated the gentle push-back against using terms like "glitch".


----------



## SeaKingTacco

mick said:
			
		

> I found it very interesting that although the investigation has not yet determined the "why" of the accident, investigators have a reasonable understanding as to the "what".  I'll admit, I was surprised that Col Alexander's prepared statement went into the detail it did, regarding levels of automation, and manual pilot inputs.  Still lots of questions to be explored / answered.  I also appreciated the gentle push-back against using terms like "glitch".



I thought the news conference was excellent, as well. It answered most of my questions.


----------



## OldSolduer

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I thought the news conference was excellent, as well. It answered most of my questions.



Reading between the lines and deciphering technical terms,  would it be fair to say its a similar issue to what Boeing underwent recently with the Boeing Max?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Reading between the lines and deciphering technical terms,  would it be fair to say its a similar issue to what Boeing underwent recently with the Boeing Max?



I am not really qualified to comment on Boeing vs Sikorsky design philosophy, so I won’t.


----------



## Baz

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Reading between the lines and deciphering technical terms,  would it be fair to say its a similar issue to what Boeing underwent recently with the Boeing Max?



I don't *think* they are in any way related.  One has got to do with Pilot expectations if flight control laws, the other has to do with sensors causing a trim input in order to make the aircraft behave differently for training purposes,  and the pilot not reacting properly to a runaway trim.

I think there is preconceived notions about fly by wire... that it is either bad or good, depending on who you listen to. It is both, it has strength and weaknesses, but it is different.

For those thinking flight control software is needlessly complex, consider just as examples the mechanical flight control mixing unit or the mechanical fuel control units on the Sea King... plus the discreet electrical ASE.

Come to think of it... I've experienced the equivalent to a sensor failure with the ASE... the gyro tumbled causing rapidly changing headings which the ASE interpreted as a Yaw input and tried to correct causing yaw kicks.  The pilot secured the ASE, isolated the Yaw channel,  reengaged ASE, and landed as soon as practical.  Anagolous to securing the automatic trim.

And everything I just wrote seems like a "haze of technical jargon."  Does the public really need to understand all that?


----------



## MilEME09

Silver lining in this is that by being able to recreate the problem in the simulator, and having all the data that they collected, hopefully they will be able to prevent what occurred from ever happening again.


----------



## Lance Wiebe

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> No. It was not a software “bias”. A bias signal built up in pitch channel in Flight Director mode of the Flight Control Computer. It is important to get the terms correct. And since the flight safety investigation is only at an early stage, I am certain a lot more factors will come to light in the coming months. Remember- accidents are complex events consisting of many discrete events that contribute.



I must admit, when the article mentioned it was a software bias, and not a software coding error, I was confused.
I have never heard of a software bias before I read the article.

I am happy to be corrected.


----------



## Ping Monkey

Out of curiosity, does anybody know how similar the CH-148 and VH-92 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_VH-92) flight control systems are?  I presume they'd be close/identical.  (_I also realize the mission suites are completely dissimilar._)


I was at NAS Patuxent River in March and was pleased to see one conducting flight testing at the time.  From a distance, I thought a Cyclone was on its way into the circuit.


Given the "high profile tasks" that the VH-92 will perform, I'd believe if this if this problem is common in both airframe types, Sikorsky would be getting some pressure by the testing community in Pax River to ensure any flight control issues discovered from this accident and during CH-148 testing are resolved for their fleet.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Baz said:
			
		

> And everything I just wrote seems like a "haze of technical jargon."  Does the public really need to understand all that?



Since the public is paying for it and providing the recruits to fly them in the future, then I would say yes. You can have the technical description with a brief summary. It's best to get one of your own to write the summary in layman's language, otherwise the media will get it wrong. They may still butcher for their own reasons, but anyone with further interest can then read the press release.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

The problem, then, is reporters who admittedly know nothing about the subj then putting things into words they think people will understand that only ends up misleading them;  things like the words "software glitch".


----------



## observor 69

"Around the world, fly-by-wire helicopters are rare — as are the experts who understand them"

Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Jun 18, 2020 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 1 hour ago"

A well-written article by Mr. Brewster with perhaps some new info for us non-rotary wing types.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809


----------



## dapaterson

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> "Around the world, fly-by-wire helicopters are rare — as are the experts who understand them"
> 
> Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Jun 18, 2020 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 1 hour ago"
> 
> A well-written article by Mr. Brewster with perhaps some new info for us non-rotary wing types.
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809



Expert cited: https://www.jurispro.com/expert/shawn-coyle-5640  He has 6500+ hours rotary wing flight; CAF pilot 1969-1984; test pilot; worked with Transport Canada as well.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> "Around the world, fly-by-wire helicopters are rare — as are the experts who understand them"
> 
> Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Jun 18, 2020 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 1 hour ago"
> 
> A well-written article by Mr. Brewster with perhaps some new info for us non-rotary wing types.
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809



No, not well written. He has stated things in the article that are the precise opposite of what was said at the technical briefing. He has badly mis-stated how bias works and and how temporary deviations from a programmed flight path while in Flight Director mode work (in fact, temporary deviations have no real impact). He implies the pilots were flying via some sort of keyboard which is just ridiculous, when you think about it. He compares this accident to the 737Max accidents, when DFS specifically stated that he did not see a linkage.


----------



## Good2Golf

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> "Around the world, fly-by-wire helicopters are rare — as are the experts who understand them"
> 
> Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Jun 18, 2020 4:00 AM ET | Last Updated: 1 hour ago"
> 
> A well-written article by Mr. Brewster with perhaps some new info for us non-rotary wing types.
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809



Generally on point, relying heavily on Shawn Coyle’s expertise (definitely a good thing), but still some inaccuracies and/or omissions:

1. Sikorsky does have previous FBW experience. It worked with Boeing jointly in the cancelled RAH-66 Comanche program. Boeing leveraged that FBW experience into the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey program and Bell subsequently applied that jointly with AgustaWestland to the AB-609 tilt rotor (that become the Leonardo AW-609) and it’s own V-280 Valor tilt rotor. It would have been good to see a link to what if any transfer of FBW had occurred internally at Sikorsky from the RAH-66 to the H-92/CH-148; 

2.  For what Mr. Brewster was trying to achieve, which I believe was a critical look at the program, it seemed appropriate to look further back in the article than the Conservative government’s 2015 formal decision to retire the CH-124A Sea King, particularly the Liberal government’s 2004/2005 decision to proceed with the H-92 as a developmental aircraft than the EH-101 Merlin production aircraft; and

3.  A Flight Director capability is not just a FBW thing, the Chinook, Cormorant and Griffon all have flight directors as well that couple the flight controls to various degrees.  Various autopilot modes fundamentally aren’t new, even if the implementation/platform specifics are. 

Regards
G2G


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Article Link

On June 18, 2020, the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario identified the remains of four of the six Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members killed in the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter crash of April 29.

Remains of the following CAF members have been positively identified:

Captain Kevin Hagen, Pilot, originally from Nanaimo, British Columbia   :cdnsalute:

Captain Maxime Miron-Morin, Air Combat Systems Officer, originally from Bécancour, Quebec   :cdnsalute:

Sub-Lieutenant Matthew Pyke, Naval Warfare Officer, originally from Truro, Nova Scotia   :cdnsalute:

Master Corporal Matthew Cousins, Airborne Electronic Sensor Operator, originally from Guelph, Ontario   :cdnsalute:

Their remains were located and recovered during a combined CAF-United States Navy search and recovery operation conducted between May 25 and June 2. The families of all crew members lost in the accident have been notified.

Remains of Sub-Lieutenant Abbigail Cowbrough, a Marine Systems Engineering Officer originally from Toronto, Ontario, were previously identified shortly after the accident. Partial remains of Captain Brenden MacDonald, a Pilot originally from New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, were originally identified on May 9; no further remains were found in the recovery operations.

Over the coming days, our fallen who have now been positively identified, will be released to the families so they can be brought home. Ceremonial arrangements are being planned by the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force in consultation with the families, and will be communicated when available.

** I realize this is already posted in _Thoughts and Prayers_;  details of the REPAT will be coming shortly.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Cyclone hot loads a training torpedo during Rimpac
https://twitter.com/RoyalCanNavy/status/1295678418562973697


----------



## OceanBonfire

Canadian Forces pilots not warned about autopilot before deadly Cyclone crash in 2020
					

As a pilot guided one of Canada's navy helicopters up into a tight turn, neither his training nor cockpit indicators warned of how a built-in autopilot would take control and plunge the Cyclone into the Ionian Sea, a military report has concluded.




					atlantic.ctvnews.ca
				












						Canadian Forces pilots not warned about autopilot before deadly Cyclone crash in 2020  | Globalnews.ca
					

All six Canadian Forces members on board the helicopter died in the crash on April 29, 2020.




					globalnews.ca


----------



## dangerboy

The Airworthiness Investigative Authority for the CAF has concluded its flight safety investigation into the accident that occurred on April 29, 2020 in the Ionian Sea involving a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter that claimed the lives of six CAF members. Report | CH148822 Cyclone - Epilogue


----------



## daftandbarmy

dangerboy said:


> The Airworthiness Investigative Authority for the CAF has concluded its flight safety investigation into the accident that occurred on April 29, 2020 in the Ionian Sea involving a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter that claimed the lives of six CAF members. Report | CH148822 Cyclone - Epilogue



I have a question but I am ignorant of the ways of things that fly, amongst many other things, so bear with me: 

Why would we continue to fly this aircraft given it's 'fatal auto-pilot thingy' flaws? Should we rename the auto-pilot to HAL 9000?


Canadian Forces pilots not warned about autopilot before deadly Cyclone crash in 2020​BY MICHAEL TUTTON, THE CANADIAN PRESS
Posted Jun 25, 2021 12:53 pm MDT

Last Updated Jun 25, 2021 at 1:04 pm MDT


HALIFAX — As a pilot guided one of Canada’s navy helicopters up into a tight turn, neither his training nor cockpit indicators warned of how a built-in autopilot would take control and plunge the Cyclone into the Ionian Sea, a military report has concluded.
All six Canadian Forces members on board died in the crash on April 29, 2020.

According to a board of inquiry report obtained by The Canadian Press, when the pilot was flying the turn, commonly called a “return to target,” he had pointed the nose up and used his feet to turn the helicopter’s tail, overriding the autopilot to complete the manoeuvre of less than 20 seconds.

The report, however, said testing wasn’t done during the aircraft’s certification to identify what would happen if a pilot overrode the autopilot more than “momentarily” and in certain complex situations. “The automation principles and philosophy that governed the Cyclone’s … design never intended for the (autopilot) to be overridden for extended periods of time, and therefore this was never tested,” it said.


This was the case even though — as the report stated — pilots are known on occasion to override the autopilot system without manually pressing a button on their control stick, called the cyclic.

The report said that at the time of the crash, the autopilot — referred to as the flight director — was set to an air speed of about 260 kilometres per hour before one of the pilots pitched the aircraft’s nose upward for the turn. 

It was supposed to fly back over HMCS Fredericton and practise hoisting people onto the deck. Instead, the frigate’s CH-148 Cyclone helicopter crashed off the coast of Greece while returning from a NATO training mission. That crash caused the worst single-day loss of life for the Canadian Armed Forces since six soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing in Afghanistan on July 4, 2007.

The report indicated the crash might have been averted if the pilot had manually chosen to turn off the autopilot during the turn. But it also stated that it wasn’t unusual for pilots to override the autopilot and there were no explicit instructions in the manuals on the necessity to manually turn off the flight director.

In addition, the report said the pilot appeared unaware the computer would attempt to regain control near the end of the turn. 

When the helicopter flipped around, the report said, the pilot pulled back as far as he could on the cyclic, attempting to right the aircraft that the computer was flying into the sea. Within seconds, the helicopter hit the ocean at massive force.

The board of inquiry said it found no evidence the flying pilot recognized he had lost control of the aircraft until it was too late. 

Critical to the crash, the report said, was the aircraft’s software, which was certified by the military. If the autopilot is overridden, the computer accumulates digital commands, referred to as “command bias accumulation.” The more commands a pilot sends manually to the computer while the aircraft is coupled with the autopilot, the more this bias accumulation occurs, the report said.

After a pilot overrides the air speed set by the autopilot, a “feed forward look” occurs, the report said, adding that in some situations, “the pilot’s ability to control the aircraft … will be reduced or lost.”  

The board of inquiry said the pilots’ training didn’t cover “with sufficient detail” certain risks of flying the aircraft, leaving the flyers unaware the autopilot would seek to keep control of the helicopter.

The return-to-target manoeuvre, which led to the crash, was being flown by others in the maritime helicopter community, the report said. That manoeuvre has been disallowed since the crash.

The report makes six recommendations, five of which involve better training for pilots to make them aware of the potential problems that could occur if they override the autopilot. It recommended creating special cockpit signals pilots could use to warn each other about overriding flight directors for extended periods of time.

The report also recommended the military consider an engineering change “to automatically disengage the flight director under certain conditions, such as when the flight director is overridden in multiple axes, or for an extended period of time.”

According to a senior military source, that recommendation is not shared in a second, independent report by the military’s Directorate of Flight Safety, expected to be released next week. 

The second report said pilots must be well trained to almost instantly press a single button on their control stick to disengage the autopilot if they’re not getting the response they want out of their controls. It said, however, that automatically disengaging the autopilot might pose its own risks in some situations, especially when a pilot believes the autopilot will keep functioning.

The second report instead argued that the software — and its “bias accumulation” — needs to be addressed by American aviation company Sikorsky Aircraft, the manufacturer of the Cyclone.

“We need to look at that software … and see if we can eliminate this from the software altogether, being careful to understand when you make any changes like that you may introduce a butterfly effect and cause problems elsewhere,” the source said.

The board of inquiry report, signed by three members of the panel on Nov. 20, 2020, concluded the pilots were not distracted and the crew “flew well together.” It added that the aircraft captain had a strong command of the helicopter and the co-pilot showed “good situational awareness” throughout the mission.

The second report is expected to provide further analysis on the factors behind the crash. 

The military source said the recommendations of the two reports must be meshed into a single set of findings for consideration by senior Royal Canadian Air Force officers.

A spokeswoman for Sikorsky referred all questions on the report to the Canadian Forces.






						CityNews
					






					www.660citynews.com


----------



## kev994

The problem was they were essentially hand flying but with the autopilot engaged (they’re overriding it). The autopilot isn’t an issue if you don’t do that.


----------



## Good2Golf

D&B, some autopilots (AP, an oversimplified term, TBH) allow pilots to override/fly-through/manually adjust/etc., but how the AP reacts can vary greatly, ranging from: disengage; to pause until pilot input ceases; to operate while blending pilot input; to operate while applying reduced pilot input; to ignoring pilot input unless the pilot temporarily or permanently suspends AP function. 

Furthermore, there can be several ‘levels’ of AP function, ranging from ever-present stability input of flight controls up to multi-axis flight director/coupled flight control input. 

Add further to that the additional factor that the AP may have varying degrees of ‘authority’ (degree to which the AP can alter flight controls, relative to pilot’s full extent of moving the controls) with most APs on mechanical/hydraulic flight controls having a minority percentage authority (typically teens-to-20s% authority) leading to digital fly-by-wire flight control systems (like the Cyclone has, or Airbus airliners have, etc.) where an AP could have up to 100% authority (ie. totally override any manual control input).

Now, don’t tell the pilots how manual override of a coupled mode of the AP fully works, nor if there are modes specifically avoid due to the AP mode and control authority (eg. like the command bias accumulation effect that the Cyclone’s AP was using to fight the pilot’s manual input), and the holes in the Swiss cheese accident model start to line up towards an unfortunate end.

It’s not the first time that a manufacturer’s flight control software programmers programmed what they thought made sense and what the operators wanted (or may have specified or failed to specify so a default was assumed), that resulted in an accident (eg. first A320 crash, 737-MAX, CH-148), but it likely won’t be the last, either.

With automation, the good thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things, but the bad thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things…

Sadly, in the case of STALKER 22, take all that stuff above, and in single-digits of seconds as you’re descending at high speed towards the water and the controls aren’t responding the way you expect them to (not were ever provided information that such a situation could develop), the outcome isn’t good. 😔 

Regards
G2G


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Good2Golf said:


> D&B, some autopilots (AP, an oversimplified term, TBH) allow pilots to override/fly-through/manually adjust/etc., but how the AP reacts can vary greatly, ranging from: disengage; to pause until pilot input ceases; to operate while blending pilot input; to operate while applying reduced pilot input; to ignoring pilot input unless the pilot temporarily or permanently suspends AP function.
> 
> Furthermore, there can be several ‘levels’ of AP function, ranging from ever-present stability input of flight controls up to multi-axis flight director/coupled flight control input.
> 
> Add further to that the additional factor that the AP may have varying degrees of ‘authority’ (degree to which the AP can alter flight controls, relative to pilot’s full extent of moving the controls) with most APs on mechanical/hydraulic flight controls having a minority percentage authority (typically teens-to-20s% authority) leading to digital fly-by-wire flight control systems (like the Cyclone has, or Airbus airliners have, etc.) where an AP could have up to 100% authority (ie. totally override any manual control input).
> 
> Now, don’t tell the pilots how manual override of a coupled mode of the AP fully works, nor if there are modes specifically avoid due to the AP mode and control authority (eg. like the command bias accumulation effect that the Cyclone’s AP was using to fight the pilot’s manual input), and the holes in the Swiss cheese accident model start to line up towards an unfortunate end.
> 
> It’s not the first time that a manufacturer’s flight control software programmers programmed what they thought made sense and what the operators wanted (or may have specified or failed to specify so a default was assumed), that resulted in an accident (eg. first A320 crash, 737-MAX, CH-148), but it likely won’t be the last, either.
> 
> With automation, the good thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things, but the bad thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things…
> 
> Sadly, in the case of STALKER 22, take all that stuff above, and in single-digits of seconds as you’re descending at high speed towards the water and the controls aren’t responding the way you expect them to (not were ever provided information that such a situation could develop), the outcome isn’t good. 😔
> 
> Regards
> G2G


Pretty much what G2G just said. Both training and documentation has been improved since the accident.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> D&B, some autopilots (AP, an oversimplified term, TBH) allow pilots to override/fly-through/manually adjust/etc., but how the AP reacts can vary greatly, ranging from: disengage; to pause until pilot input ceases; to operate while blending pilot input; to operate while applying reduced pilot input; to ignoring pilot input unless the pilot temporarily or permanently suspends AP function.
> 
> Furthermore, there can be several ‘levels’ of AP function, ranging from ever-present stability input of flight controls up to multi-axis flight director/coupled flight control input.
> 
> Add further to that the additional factor that the AP may have varying degrees of ‘authority’ (degree to which the AP can alter flight controls, relative to pilot’s full extent of moving the controls) with most APs on mechanical/hydraulic flight controls having a minority percentage authority (typically teens-to-20s% authority) leading to digital fly-by-wire flight control systems (like the Cyclone has, or Airbus airliners have, etc.) where an AP could have up to 100% authority (ie. totally override any manual control input).
> 
> Now, don’t tell the pilots how manual override of a coupled mode of the AP fully works, nor if there are modes specifically avoid due to the AP mode and control authority (eg. like the command bias accumulation effect that the Cyclone’s AP was using to fight the pilot’s manual input), and the holes in the Swiss cheese accident model start to line up towards an unfortunate end.
> 
> It’s not the first time that a manufacturer’s flight control software programmers programmed what they thought made sense and what the operators wanted (or may have specified or failed to specify so a default was assumed), that resulted in an accident (eg. first A320 crash, 737-MAX, CH-148), but it likely won’t be the last, either.
> 
> With automation, the good thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things, but the bad thing is that aircraft can do some pretty extreme things…
> 
> Sadly, in the case of STALKER 22, take all that stuff above, and in single-digits of seconds as you’re descending at high speed towards the water and the controls aren’t responding the way you expect them to (not were ever provided information that such a situation could develop), the outcome isn’t good. 😔
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Now my head hurts. And I think I get it. All at once.

Thanks!!


----------



## Loachman

I confirmed my distrust of autopilots on my first CH146 Instrument Rating Test.


----------



## kev994

Loachman said:


> I confirmed my distrust of autopilots on my first CH146 Instrument Rating Test.


I heard that you 146 guys fly IFR twice a year; the IRT and the retest.


----------



## Loachman

The min requirements were somewhat more.

I always found IF interesting, but not something that I would consider doing recreationally.

Most of my flying time was fully manual - Mouseketeer, Tutor, Jet Ranger (Military and Police), and Kiowa - and looking where I was going.

And I was never a "146 guy". I just flew it because the better helicopter was retired.


----------



## AM Sup

daftandbarmy said:


> Now my head hurts. And I think I get it. All at once.
> 
> Thanks!!


There's a risk assessment/management process that kicks in to help mitigate terrible situations like this when they come up.  We get tech/policy experts and operators together to identify the specific risk scenarios so the RCAF can make a call regarding continued use of platforms/systems. 
The process helps to identify any specific flight profiles or manoeuvres that need to be avoided or adjusted and sets out deliverables to reduce or eliminate the risk wherever possible.  We bring in as many stakeholders as necessary so the aircrew can 'hopefully' feel comfortable and trust their systems.  It's not always easy.


----------



## Good2Golf

kev994 said:


> I heard that you 146 guys fly IFR twice a year; the IRT and the retest.


🤣 Only old 136 VFR dinosaurs… 😉  

147/135 dudes didn’t have many (any) issues…50 hrs of my actual was on a non-stabilized/non-George 135…I earned that Green Ticket! 😆


----------



## SupersonicMax

AM Sup said:


> There's a risk assessment/management process that kicks in to help mitigate terrible situations like this when they come up.  We get tech/policy experts and operators together to identify the specific risk scenarios so the RCAF can make a call regarding continued use of platforms/systems.
> The process helps to identify any specific flight profiles or manoeuvres that need to be avoided or adjusted and sets out deliverables to reduce or eliminate the risk wherever possible.  We bring in as many stakeholders as necessary so the aircrew can 'hopefully' feel comfortable and trust their systems.  It's not always easy.


The Record of Airworthiness Risk Management (RARM) process however is very much a band aid until permanent solutions are in place (although we tend to rely on it in the long term).  The Airworthiness Review Board sits twice a year to go through each fleet and their RARMs to give Comd RCAF an update on where things are for the higher profile ones (those assessed as Medium or higher risk).


----------



## AM Sup

SupersonicMax said:


> The Record of Airworthiness Risk Management (RARM) process however is very much a band aid until permanent solutions are in place (although we tend to rely on it in the long term).  The Airworthiness Review Board sits twice a year to go through each fleet and their RARMs to give Comd RCAF an update on where things are for the higher profile ones (those assessed as Medium or higher risk).


Sure, that's why I mentioned the establishment of deliverables (milestones if we're getting specific) to reduce/eliminate risk; it's a way to identify, mitigate and track issues to retain a capability while working the problem.  I work in a section of the 148 WSM that manages RARMs and was on a recent RMT (more of a  spectator, this one is well outside my lane) for the flight control logic issues behind the loss of 822.  Some RARMs certainly do tend to linger for far too long and their use as a longer term tracking tool for certain ALOS items causes problems and unnecessary work.


----------



## Scoobs

AM Sup said:


> Sure, that's why I mentioned the establishment of deliverables (milestones if we're getting specific) to reduce/eliminate risk; it's a way to identify, mitigate and track issues to retain a capability while working the problem.  I work in a section of the 148 WSM that manages RARMs and was on a recent RMT (more of a  spectator, this one is well outside my lane) for the flight control logic issues behind the loss of 822.  Some RARMs certainly do tend to linger for far too long and their use as a longer term tracking tool for certain ALOS items causes problems and unnecessary work.


Well said, with the minor correction that risk can never be totally eliminated.  For the non-RCAF folks reading this, ALOS means "acceptable level of safety".  It's another way of saying "acceptable level of risk", in that there will always be a minimum level of safety that the airworthiness authorities (I worked in DTAES prior to my retirement Jan 2020.  DTAES = Directorate of Technical Airworthiness and Engineering Support) will want to maintain.  Go below that and flying is supposed to stop.


----------



## AM Sup

Scoobs said:


> Well said, with the minor correction that risk can never be totally eliminated.  For the non-RCAF folks reading this, ALOS means "acceptable level of safety".  It's another way of saying "acceptable level of risk", in that there will always be a minimum level of safety that the airworthiness authorities (I worked in DTAES prior to my retirement Jan 2020.  DTAES = Directorate of Technical Airworthiness and Engineering Support) will want to maintain.  Go below that and flying is supposed to stop.


No, you certainly can't eliminate all risk as our good friends in DFS duly remind us each year.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       I hadn't meant to imply that all risk can be eliminated indefinitely, rather that a specific, identifiable risk can be eliminated for a short period such as a cease flying order or the suspension of use for a particular system/tool in certain cases.  In the short-term, the decision can be made to put a hard stop on something and in that sense we'd be eliminating a specific risk for a fixed period.  Hopefully, once we've come up with a game plan we can get operations back to the same level of confidence they were at before the accident/incident.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     We've been hogging quite a bit of SME bandwidth from the DTAES folks in the 148 shop, I'm sure they've had their fill of us by now.


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## Colin Parkinson

Apparently this is a Chilean Cougar with Exocet missiles. does it make sense to have a anti-ship missile function on Marine helicopters today?


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## Weinie

Colin Parkinson said:


> Apparently this is a Chilean Cougar with Exocet missiles. does it make sense to have a anti-ship missile function on Marine helicopters today?
> 
> View attachment 65812


I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.

And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.

Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.


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## Blackadder1916

Weinie said:


> I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.



Not a Chilean but a Brazilian . . . 














						Brazilian Navy Fires Exocet AM39 Missile From H225M Helicopter - Naval News
					

The Brazilian Navy (Marinha Do Brazil) carried out a firing trial of an Exocet AM39 missile from an H225M helicopter for the first time.




					www.navalnews.com


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## quadrapiper

Weinie said:


> I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.
> 
> And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.
> 
> Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.


Seconding this.


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## Pelorus

Weinie said:


> I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.
> 
> And what is target acquisition like? *Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.*
> 
> Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.



The part of your post I've highlighted was/is not always the case. And based on the trends I see in naval weapon development, I see the advantage tipping towards the surface platform going forward, so we're likely to see the helo-launched anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fall even further out of favour than it already is.

Broadly speaking, naval SAMs can be classified into two categories: Area Air Defence (AAD) and Point Defence. In a classic naval task group concept, at least one ship will be an AAD platform, designed to be able to protect the entire TG against air threats because its missiles are sufficiently long-ranged. A point defence SAM is a short range missile generally designed to only protect the ship they're carried in from air threats.

If we look at common ASCMs, say a Harpoon or Exocet, Wikipedia says we're looking at a ~110 NM range for air-launched variants. A common point defence SAM like the Sea Sparrow has a range of about 10 NM. An AAD SAM like the SM-2 can reach out to about 100NM.

Air-based surface search radars are pretty good, again thanks to the advantage of altitude. This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.

So why isn't every navy in the world using helo-launched ASCMs to increase their offensive range? My guess is that this is primarily due to weight/range limitations of the helo. Missiles are super heavy, and each time you load one onto an aircraft you're paying a significant range/endurance price. By the time you've loaded two, flown far enough away to get within weapons release range of the enemy (assuming you don't waste gas searching because you don't know exactly where they are), and fire, you probably have to return home almost immediately. You have no guarantee that 1-2 missiles is going to be effective against a modern defensive suite on your target, and now the enemy probably knows exactly where your force is because the helo probably had to fly in a nearly straight line from blue to red based off the fuel limitations.

Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).


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## suffolkowner

An Exocet or Harpoon might be a step too far but lots of helicopters are armed with smaller anti-ship or surface missiles


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## FJAG

This ends up being an arms race where the range and target acquisition capabilities of opposing weapon systems will keep increasing until one side or the other finally develops such an effective anti-missile system that none can get through. 

Since anti-ship missiles and air defence missiles are fairly sophisticated already one would think that using an anti-ship missile carrying helicopter is just one more launch platform to join the range of existing ships and aircraft so that your launch systems are more dispersed than they would ordinarily be. Of the three I would think that the helicopter currently probably has the least self-defence capability. 

🍻


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## daftandbarmy

boot12 said:


> The part of your post I've highlighted was/is not always the case. And based on the trends I see in naval weapon development, I see the advantage tipping towards the surface platform going forward, so we're likely to see the helo-launched anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fall even further out of favour than it already is.
> 
> Broadly speaking, naval SAMs can be classified into two categories: Area Air Defence (AAD) and Point Defence. In a classic naval task group concept, at least one ship will be an AAD platform, designed to be able to protect the entire TG against air threats because its missiles are sufficiently long-ranged. A point defence SAM is a short range missile generally designed to only protect the ship they're carried in from air threats.
> 
> If we look at common ASCMs, say a Harpoon or Exocet, Wikipedia says we're looking at a ~110 NM range for air-launched variants. A common point defence SAM like the Sea Sparrow has a range of about 10 NM. An AAD SAM like the SM-2 can reach out to about 100NM.
> 
> Air-based surface search radars are pretty good, again thanks to the advantage of altitude. This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.
> 
> So why isn't every navy in the world using helo-launched ASCMs to increase their offensive range? My guess is that this is primarily due to weight/range limitations of the helo. Missiles are super heavy, and each time you load one onto an aircraft you're paying a significant range/endurance price. By the time you've loaded two, flown far enough away to get within weapons release range of the enemy (assuming you don't waste gas searching because you don't know exactly where they are), and fire, you probably have to return home almost immediately. You have no guarantee that 1-2 missiles is going to be effective against a modern defensive suite on your target, and now the enemy probably knows exactly where your force is because the helo probably had to fly in a nearly straight line from blue to red based off the fuel limitations.
> 
> Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).



On the other hand, if your helicopter force was based on an atoll in the Spratly Islands...


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## Eye In The Sky

The "shooter" doesn't always have to be in the MEZ (Missile Engagement Zone) of the target.  Think OTHT (Over The Horizon Targeting).

A helo taking out an enemy heavy, or crippling it, is a cheap price to pay in a shooting war, if that helo is lost.  Like taking a tank out in battle, it can be easier to take out the supporting (softer skin) echelon vehs.  Take out the oiler...

AA RADARs, even on a mast of a surface ship....they're going to have a fairly small "surface level" RADAR horizon.  No mast mounted RADAR is seeing 200nm...they aren't "horizon huggers";  an airborne RADAR has to be fairly high to achieve 200nm eff detection and tracking.

Helo's can also "pop up/acquire/shoot/drop down"....they can egress their launch point fairly quickly compared to skimmers/submerged folks.

I think our MHs and LRP should all be "shooters".  Every single one of them....we need the punch.


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## Colin Parkinson

boot12 said:


> Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).


They just announced a successful launch. Nice looking ship


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## Eye In The Sky

Colin Parkinson said:


> Nice looking ship



Admiral Kasatonov (454)  some open-source specs/info....


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## Eye In The Sky

boot12 said:


> This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.



I just wanted to add a point on this;  the (theoretical) RADAR horizon at 25,000' is...194nm.  I say theoretical because of course, it could be slightly better (ducting/inversion layers, etc), or worse.  The same goes with passive systems like...EOIR (also a possible targeting sensor).

ESM horizons are greater than RADAR horizons.  General rule; y_ou will/can be detected before you detect_.

I'm no tactics expert; but I'd personally like the idea of someone giving me target info passively (not Link 11!) off their RADAR...and me minimizing any kind of Tx.  Especially if my EGRESS is sub-sonic.

General speaking, I'd say think of "MH RADAR" working in the 120nm and minus range, max, for detection/tracking based on a 10,000' max alt.

Various radars will also have a maximum instrumented range;  limited by technologies.  Those are not likely going to be open source.

** anyone who knows the ranges of the CP-140 or CH-148....they aren't going to post them, myself included.


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## Colin Parkinson

I can see expendable drone boats emitting strong EM signals for a task group forced to close on a hostile coast.


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## Eye In The Sky

Just wondering what purpose you see them doing?  An Electronic Attack mission to 'jam' coastal sensors...or more a la the KELT missiles in Red Storm Rising (if you read that one)?


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## Colin Parkinson

Basically to give the enemy a larger target selection to discern from, possibly a decoy TG similar to Chaff "Invasion fleet" of WWII and the IAF attacks on Berka Valley. if the enemy has 50 missile to launch from a given set of coastline, then you don't want them to see just 30 targets.


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## Edward Campbell

And now this: Fix to software problem behind naval helicopter crash needed ‘forthwith’: experts  | Globalnews.ca


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## SeaKingTacco

Edward Campbell said:


> And now this: Fix to software problem behind naval helicopter crash needed ‘forthwith’: experts  | Globalnews.ca


So, lets all be cautious of experts hired by news media organizations to sell a story.

I will use this anology: if somebody hands you a toolbox but does not really explain how all the tools work and you decide to use a screw driver where a hammer should have been used and you break the screw driver, was the tool faulty?

I am neither defending Sikorsky nor, in anyway shape or form, blaming the crew.

The automation involved in the Cyclone is complex and was previously not well taught nor uniformly well understood by crews. There is a very, very simple method of getting yourself out of trouble if the automation is doing something that you do not understand. All crews now understand that.

Maybe software does need to be re-written. Then again- maybe not. I am aware that you can create new, unforeseen problems with any new software build, so there is my bias.

As a closing note- I will personally fly on any Cyclone, on any day, with any crew on the Wing, as the software is currently written.


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## MilEME09

Have to remember this is a new aircraft (relatively) things will come up that we never even thought of in testing, unfortunately this scenario had loss of life. With so few choppers flying the data collection over time isn't that massive vs say the chinook fleet globally.


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## dimsum

MilEME09 said:


> Have to remember this is a new aircraft (relatively) things will come up that we never even thought of in testing, unfortunately this scenario had loss of life.


Exactly.  This aircraft is still in the first edge of the "bathtub curve". 

You can test something to the nth degree and still randomly find new issues when in service.  If they rewrite the code, new "new issues" will pop up, I guarantee* it.

*not a guarantee


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## Eye In The Sky

SeaKingTacco said:


> As a closing note- I will personally fly on any Cyclone, on any day, with any crew on the Wing, as the software is currently written.



Not everyone posted to your community shares that sentiment.  I don't say this off-the-cuff; I say it from hearing it directly from some of them.


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## Eye In The Sky

Before getting sucked into rabbit-holes...it might be worthy to re-read the Flight Safety Investigation Report and regain SA on the '_series of causal factors_' related to accident.

_A series of other causal factors were highlighted in the report, to include:_

_Control inputs when flying with the Flight Director engaged were not verbalized in the cockpit,_
_Flying publications contained information that may have been confusing or misleading,_
_The Statement of Operating Intent for the CH-148 did not specify the operational requirement to fly the manoeuver involved in the accident,_
_Standard operating procedures for this manoeuver were undocumented,_
_It was common practice to manually override primary flight controls while the Flight Director was engaged, and_
_The mode annunciation may not have sufficiently drawn the pilot’s attention to the fact the Flight Director was engaged during the manoeuver._
_Recommendations include the need to modify software in the electronic flight control laws to enhance flight mode annunciation and awareness to the crew, amend CH-148 publications regarding automation strategies, and establish a working group to review the Maritime Helicopter Project Statement of Operating Intent. This review will determine the CH-148 operational requirements to fly complex turning manoeuvers, including the one that led to this accident._

There's enough to be concerned about in those written words, we don't need additional ones like "_the autopilot took control of the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter_" from the media.  I also understand that "_autopilot took contro_l" is easier to understand than...

_The investigation determined that the aircraft electronic flight control system was designed and certified in accordance with applicable specifications but contained a fly-by-wire flight control law that created a Command Model Attitude Bias Phenomenon - an aircraft objectionable behaviour characteristic - that resulted in the pilots’ inability to effect a restorative pitch correction, while overriding the engaged airspeed/pitch axis flight director mode at low attitude.

The aircraft fly-by-wire control laws, when coupled to the indicated airspeed pitch axis mode of the flight director in a multi-axes manual flight manoeuvre with excessive manual input to the pedals, induced a negative pitch attitude bias resulting in insufficient aft cyclic controller command response to recover the aircraft without deselection of the flight director mode._

Take from CH148822 Cyclone - Epilogue
​


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## SeaKingTacco

Eye In The Sky said:


> Not everyone posted to your community shares that sentiment.  I don't say this off-the-cuff; I say it from hearing it directly from some of them.


That’s fine- everyone makes their own decisions. I have made mine.


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## AM Sup

I'm neither an operator nor an engineer, but I sat in on the last risk assessment for the flight control logic behind this.  There was a very specific set of conditions identified that lead to this bias phenomenon.  They've done everything they can so that the crews can avoid recreating these conditions while the problem gets worked.  It's not where anybody wants to be and I wish they had something better/faster, but it's a complex fix.


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## SupersonicMax

AM Sup said:


> I'm neither an operator nor an engineer, but I sat in on the last risk assessment for the flight control logic behind this.  There was a very specific set of conditions identified that lead to this bias phenomenon.  They've done everything they can so that the crews can avoid recreating these conditions while the problem gets worked.  It's not where anybody wants to be and I wish they had something better/faster, but it's a complex fix.


If I was flying the Cyclone, my question would be “what else is hidden in the code.”  This issue is a very significant technical oversight.

Not necessarily a reason to stop flying it but definitely would lower my confidence in the flight control logic.


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## YZT580

SupersonicMax said:


> If I was flying the Cyclone, my question would be “what else is hidden in the code.”  This issue is a very significant technical oversight.
> 
> Not necessarily a reason to stop flying it but definitely would lower my confidence in the flight control logic.


Is there really anything wrong with the  logic?  If you fly on auto the machine will do everything reasonably well so the logic works.  If you disconnect the auto, from what I understand the machine will accept your input commands and execute them without hesitation.  The problem seems to be when you leave the auto connected and then try to fly manually.  Simple solution: don't.  One or the other but not both at once and it only makes sense.  In any aircraft that I have flown, if I lock on auto and then turn away from the programmed track as soon as I release the controls the aircraft will turn back.  What is not so understood by many is simply that all the while you are controlling the trajectory manually the gremlin inside the black box is desperately trying to correct what it perceives as an error.  Even if the programmers took the time to perform every manoeuvre under the sun manually whilst on auto and documented said movement you can be sure there will be some that they simply overlooked.  You can also bet that pilots being pilots will have initiated actions on their own that are not in the flight manual just to see what would happen or to see if they can do something more efficiently.   Simplistically I believe that is all that happened in this case.  Correct me please if I am wrong


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## PuckChaser

SupersonicMax said:


> If I was flying the Cyclone, my question would be “what else is hidden in the code.”  This issue is a very significant technical oversight.
> 
> Not necessarily a reason to stop flying it but definitely would lower my confidence in the flight control logic.


Reading the recommendations as a layman makes it sound like that specific maneuver was not specified to the manufacturer when they made the software. That sounds a lot less like hidden code and more like "what else do we normally do that we forgot to tell them about".


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## SupersonicMax

PuckChaser said:


> Reading the recommendations as a layman makes it sound like that specific maneuver was not specified to the manufacturer when they made the software. That sounds a lot less like hidden code and more like "what else do we normally do that we forgot to tell them about".


Flight Control Computers software aren’t built for specific maneuvers but are built to provide a consistent feel throughout the flight envelope and add safety valves.  The fact that the autopilot drove the helo in the water with no intuitive means for the pilot to override it is a serious flaw.  Yeah there were operational airworthiness issues (SOPs, SOI, etc) but it is not uncommon for young fleets and those issues were far from being the root cause (which is a faulty FCC code).


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## AM Sup

I'm not going to comment about whether or not there's anything 'wrong' with the logic, I don't really have the background to say what it should or shouldn't do.  I will say that the question that Max raised has been asked by operators, tech authority and division and the answers that came back from the experts addressed their concerns.  Other specific/common manoeuvres, minor inputs and corrections were submitted by operators for evaluation against this logic issue as well, folks seemed satisfied with the results.  The crews have been given a very specific set of inputs/conditions to avoid.  I can only imagine the effect this has had on some of the crew and their confidence in the system.


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## Underway

Weinie said:


> I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.
> 
> And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.
> 
> Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.




Yes the missiles will drop off.  ASM like Exocet do their own target acquisition.  You essentially program the missile flight path and attack plan (time on target etc...) and then fire it.  The missile does the rest.  

Take a look at Chile's geography.  A helicopter being able to launch exocets is a really good addition given their maritime domain.

In Canada's case, we would be much better with an MPA having that capability.  For our own ships it would be better for the helicopter to provide targeting information for the ship to plan a Harpoon attack.  The Cyclone has excellent sensors to pick up things beyond the CPFs visual horizon.

There was some discussion I had with pilots about Cyclones being modified for Hellfires.  The mounting points for the Torps could take them, but I don't know any other mods needed on the internals of the aircraft (sensors, control systems, changes to cockpit to fire them).  Both to support SOF but primarily to engage swarming boats and smaller vessels.   It's well down the list of upgrades and mods when we were talking about it, and I suspect it's even further down since the accident.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Underway said:


> Yes the missiles will drop off.  ASM like Exocet do their own target acquisition.  You essentially program the missile flight path and attack plan (time on target etc...) and then fire it.  The missile does the rest.
> 
> Take a look at Chile's geography.  A helicopter being able to launch exocets is a really good addition given their maritime domain.
> 
> In Canada's case, we would be much better with an MPA having that capability.  For our own ships it would be better for the helicopter to provide targeting information for the ship to plan a Harpoon attack.  The Cyclone has excellent sensors to pick up things beyond the CPFs visual horizon.
> 
> There was some discussion I had with pilots about Cyclones being modified for Hellfires.  The mounting points for the Torps could take them, but I don't know any other mods needed on the internals of the aircraft (sensors, control systems, changes to cockpit to fire them).  Both to support SOF but primarily to engage swarming boats and smaller vessels.   It's well down the list of upgrades and mods when we were talking about it, and I suspect it's even further down since the accident.


The RCAF won’t do Helo ASM unless and until the RCN makes it a high priority.

Even then, it ain’t as simple to mod the helo as your friend made it out to be.


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## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:


> The RCAF won’t do Helo ASM unless and until the RCN makes it a high priority.
> 
> Even then, it ain’t as simple to mod the helo as your friend made it out to be.


Especially on an orphan fleet like the Cyclone, where the whole effort would be borne by the CAF vs leveraging our allies…


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Underway said:


> In Canada's case, we would be much better with an MPA having that capability. For our own ships it would be better for the helicopter to provide targeting information for the ship to plan a Harpoon attack. The Cyclone has excellent sensors to pick up things beyond the CPFs visual horizon.



I'm of the opinion Canada would actually be better of with our MPAs and MHs having the capability.  I am also confident in saying neither of them will, ever.  

Re: "long list of upgrades";  there's still a ton of work to do on 'as things are now';  2.1 is a step forward, sideways and backwards all at the same time...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

PuckChaser said:


> Reading the recommendations as a layman makes it sound like that specific maneuver was not specified to the manufacturer when they made the software. That sounds a lot less like hidden code and more like "what else do we normally do that we forgot to tell them about".



Question for SKT or other's with Sea King hours;  the return to target maneuver -  was this pretty standard in the Sea King days and, detailed in the SMG?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Eye In The Sky said:


> Question for SKT or other's with Sea King hours;  the return to target maneuver -  was this pretty standard in the Sea King days and, detailed in the SMG?


No, it never was In the SMG.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I get the feeling we have different definitions for "SMG"


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Sorry;  SMG = Standard Manoeuvre Guide;  a publication that covers a host of procedures, practices, restrictions, etc related to a specific fleet.  Also known as a SMM (Standard Manoevre Manual).  The LRP SMM is 200+ pages...and covered by CTAT/Controlled Goods policies.

They will also contain warnings, cautions, notes, as well as "should/shall/may/will/must" statements.


----------



## dimsum

Eye In The Sky said:


> Sorry;  SMG = Standard Manoeuvre Guide;  a publication that covers a host of procedures, practices, restrictions, etc related to a specific fleet.  Also known as a SMM (Standard Manoevre Manual).  The LRP SMM is 200+ pages...and covered by CTAT/Controlled Goods policies.
> 
> They will also contain warnings, cautions, notes, as well as "should/shall/may/will/must" statements.


We can't even get the damn names of two documents sync'd up.  

SMG = SMM.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

dimsum said:


> We can't even get the damn names of two documents sync'd up.
> 
> SMG = SMM.


It is now.

The Cyclone has an SMM. The Sea King had an SMG. There was no point in doing document name change in the Sea King Twilight years.


----------



## Underway

SeaKingTacco said:


> The RCAF won’t do Helo ASM unless and until the RCN makes it a high priority.
> 
> Even then, it ain’t as simple to mod the helo as your friend made it out to be.


We were talking about a Hellfire upgrade, which I don't think is covered under ASM mounting as it's a much smaller missle system.  But yah not a simple upgrade I'm sure.  It was nice to be excited about new kit for a change though I'll tell you.


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## kratz

June 254th at 1pm will be the service for Slt Matthew Pike, in Truro NS.

A notice on FB mentions a Three-volley salute will be conducted in Bible Hill NS between 11am to 11:15am, also on June 25th.


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