# Reassigning Combat Arms trades



## Mountie (6 Oct 2005)

There have been other posts regarding joining the officer trades into a general Combat Arms Officer or joining the separate MOCs into a Combat Arms MOC.  There have also been posts about reassigning combat support trades to different branches.  Here is another option for discussion.

Rather the completely stripping the infantry of their combat support platoons and forming the DFS unit out of the LdSH (RC) why not divide the combat support skills among the different corps.

The Infantry would specialize in all direct combat skills.  This would mean in addition to infantry, the TUA and Mobile Gun Systems from the armoured corps would be reassigned to the infantry battalions.

The Armoured Corps would specialize in ISTAR.  Infantry battalion recce platoons and all the TUAVs within the brigade would be assigned to the armoured (reconnaissance & surveillance) regiment in each brigade.  The regiment would conduct all aspects of reconnaissance and surveillance.  This means for task force deployments the recce squadron would provide all levels of ISTAR similar to the proposed task force organization already proposed where the Coyote troop and infantry recce platoon working together under an ISTAR command cell.  

The Artillery would specialize in all aspects of indirect fire support.  This means mortars and artillery.  Perhaps a close support battery would have an artillery troop and a mortar troop.

And nothing would really change with the engineers.


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## KevinB (7 Oct 2005)

Bad Idea...

 Take ALL VEHICLE SYSTEMS and give them to the armoured.

It is ludicrous despite what some black hats think to expect them to assume foot/mud recce and sniper duties.

 Similiarily the Infantry's job is to Close with and Destroy the Enemy - not to pitter about with guns on vehicles.
Armour wanted TUA - and they can have it -- keep a Javelin (US) type system for Light Infantry and voila.

 Making a singluar Combat Arms trade is similarily ill founded -- while it may work at higher levels it will NOT work at the Pl and Coy levels - since there is a huge disparity of skills between the trades at those levels.



Stripping the Combat support elements from the Infantry Battalion is DUMB - perhaps even criminal if we ever got into a real shooting war.  Mortars and Pioneers are required for a unit to engage the enemy with enough resources to minimise their casaulties.  I wont go on on a long winded rant as to the benefits of the Cbt Spt Coy - but simply point out that be removing it we have created a non deployable Battalion.


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## DG-41 (8 Oct 2005)

This topic popped up as an article in the latest Canadian Army Journal, (entitled "Time for Consideration: One Combat Arms Classification" by LtCol Shane Brennan) and I was dumbfounded as I read it. 

The gist of it was that officers would all become staff officers, and the senior NCOs would take up the command positions at the platoon/troop level and possibly even higher.

"The Canadian Army has it backwards. It initially trains officers as specialists, when it really needs combat generalists. In the long run, it is not so much a competent platoon/troop commander the army desires as a competent sub-unit commander, solid second-in-command, or skilled key staff officers."

"The army should harness the expertise of senior NCOs by expanding their responsibilities in the execution of critical tasks.[...] The reason why a comissioned officer is required to call for fire, control a command post, plan and supervise obstacle construction is a throwback to older cultural class divisions. This requirement no longer fits the requirement of Canadian society. Senior NCOs want and should have more responsibility. Officers should focus on wider issues related to commanding and co-ordinating tactical operations rather than the mechanics of tactical tasks"

The driver for this conclusion appears to be the move towards combined arms operations in ever-smaller formations (at one time the smallest combined arms formation was the division, then the brigade, then the battalion sized combat team, and now company-sized combined arms formations are not unusual) and the increasing vehicle commonality across the arms. He specificially cites the  new LAVIII based American Stryker Brigade Combat Team, which does not have integral tank support, and whose direct-fire capability comes from MGS commanded by infantry officers.

Reading between the lines, I think what he's actually getting as is the elimination of the Armoured corps and integrating Armoured functionality into the infantry. I note that Col Brennan is PPCLI....

The problems with this proposal are absolutely legion, and it's impossible for me to write up a sufficiently detailed and researched rebuttal off the top of my head this late at night. I've been musing about writing an actual rebuttal paper ever since I read this piece... and the one thing that has prevented me from getting started is the wisdom of going head-to-head with the current Chief of Staff of the Joint Operational Group Headquarters in a public forum. (Be it here or in the pages of CAJ)

But very quickly:

It is very true that the current trend is to drive the size of the formation where one is operating in a combined-arms mode ever smaller. I can imagine a formation that is basically a 2-car Recce patrol, an infantry platoon mounted in LAVs, a 2-vehicle direct fire element (either a tank or some sort of LAV-based big-gun vehicle - hell, even a pair of Cougars) a FOO, and maybe a section of engineers mounted in a single LAV-based engineer vehicle. Such a formation wouldn't have much staying power in the face of a similarly-equipped enemy determined to fight it out, but would make an ideal, flexible formation in an asymmetric warfare type mission.

I readily grant that our current force structure makes assembing and training such a team difficult. Our current level of cross-arms unit is the regiment, and that is tailored to the fielding of combined-arms brigades.  In my case, we share an armouries with an infantry regiment, but we don't work together anywhere except at brigade-level concentrations (which are rare and brief) and so the problem of how to get the arms to work together, especially in smaller formations, when we never train that way, is a very real one.

But that being said, the solution is not to train officers as generalists and then require them to learn (as the Col suggests) arm-speciific tasks from their senior NCOs.

The biggest thing I see here is that the effect of personal leadership, especially when under fire, by small unit commanders is GREATLY undervalued. It is something that is not easily quantified (as anyone who plays tabletop or computer wargames will know) but when you read any historical accounts of actual action, effective leadership, unit morale and cohesion, and the effective direction of the local situation often trumps technical superiority, superiority of numbers, or even superior tactical position.

In short, the well-led army "fights above its weight", and effective leadership should be considered the most important force multiplier.

Note that I'm not talking about staffwork here; I'm talking about the ability of an effective leader to inspire troops to work and fight harder, to take greater risks, and to recover from initial setbacks. LEADERSHIP, vice MANAGEMENT.

And the single most powerful component of a successful leader is COMPETENCE. (with "deciciveness" a close second) It doesn't matter if you are an asshole, or ugly, or smell bad, or anything else; if the troops feel that you are competent in the job assigned to you, that you actually know what you are doing, are smart enough to apply that knowledge to an ever-changing tactical situation (ie you are "street smart" not just "book smart") that the decisions you make in the heat of the moment are well-founded and likely to lead to success (and as a bonus - and historically, NOT the prime determinant for professional soldiers - likely to keep them alive) then they will follow you.

And if you are an idiot, they won't.

Now like it or not, there is a tremendous amount of arm-level specialization when it comes to actual combat tasks, especially when you get away from the pure infantry tasks. I could probably do a reasonable job as an infantry platoon commander (although having a strong platoon warrant would be a big help) Asking me to command an artillery battery or lead a bridging operation would be a huge stetch though, and I'd be totally in the hands of the senior NCOs. Hell, we have trouble enough with Armoured officers crossing the line between Sabre and Recce - to expect a battery commander to step into my shoes and lead a full-bore troop-level Recce advance (no matter how switched on he might be) is equally a stretch - and would be patently unfair too. It is impossible to inspire confidence and lead by example when you are constantly flailing around trying to figure out just exactly what it is you are supposed to be doing.

My Recce training was the highest-intensity, most difficult thing I have ever undergone in my entire life, and I am neither young nor insulated. It had to be that intense and difficult because there was so much to learn, and the stakes for failure were so high. No generalist is going to be able to pick that up - even after the official training, there was still much more to learn in practice.

The Col's counter argument to this is that senior NCOs could do the job instead. Pull the officer out of the small unit, send him to the CP, and let the WO handle it.

This is a terrible idea... but I'm going to have to think about how to phrase this before I write anything on the subject. There are plenty of competent senior NCOs out there, and I don't want a hastily composed phrase to accidently slight any of them.

I will say this though - there is a powerful synergy between a troop-level officer and a senior NCO. Each brings different experiences and world views to the table, and the interaction of this as a team produces a stronger leadership core than would be possible with just an NCO on his own, or with an officer on his own. Different people have different strengths, and the differnent career paths between officer and NCO also build different strengths.

I have had a troop WO who was god's gift to administration and logistics, the "beans and bullets" stuff. I never once had to ever see to *any* troop admin (vehicles serviced, troops properly bombed up, kitted, fed, washed, and slept) It all "just happened" without any direction or interference from me. (This was unlike another troop WO I once had, where half my time was spent making sure we had rations, POL etc) On the tactical side... not so much. But together, my strength in tactics and his strengths in admin were mutually re-enforcing, and the troop was much better off for the partnership.

That senior NCO/officer split isn't a "class division"; it is a splitting and sharing of responsibilites in a manner that strengthens the unit as a whole.

Enough of that, I'm about to enter territory where phrasing becomes too important, and it's getting late.

DG


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## old fart (8 Oct 2005)

DG....not bad for a late night contribution. I agree with much of what you say.  I have served time on both side of the fence in my almost 28 years and know the value of the system as established.

I'll end by saying in agreement that those who aspire to lead are by extension "leaders" not managers.

I hate the word manager applied to leaders in the service as much as I hate being referred to as a customer!!!!!!

CHIMO-AIRBORNE-UBIQUE


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## George Wallace (8 Oct 2005)

DG-41

Not bad for a "Late-Nighter", but it does have a few flaws.  You are looking at it from purely a Reservists Point of View.  Some of your perceived problems do not exist in the Regular Force.  I took exception to a few comments, not yours, and feel that Armour officers are by far the more rounded when it comes to Cbt Team Commanding, but that is for arguing against Infantry officers commanding DFS vehicles.  The Regular Force has much more opportunities to carry out Combined Arms Trg and they do.  I suppose the Reserves could too, if someone were to use their imagination and coordinate with another Unit to do so.  However, I find that sometimes in the Reserves, inter-Unit and inter-Service rivalries sometimes get in the way of that happening.  Trg Budgets limit these things also.  

On a whole, a nice start, and I imagine with some decent input from others you'll be able to draw up a nice rebuttal.


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## McG (8 Oct 2005)

Mountie,
Are you proposing changes to combat arms occupations, or just re-grouping capabilities in specific units?


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## Mountie (10 Oct 2005)

I was thinking of changing occupations.  Not simply the merging of units like the PPCLI company that joined the LdSH (RC).  I guess merging units could be an interim fix, but the goal would be permanent changing of occupations.  Such as the mention US Stryker units that have sent the MGS to the infantry rather then the armour.  If an infantrymen can crew a TUA then why not a MGS?  The MGS is not going to be deployed in large units, but rather as troops attached to battalion-size task forces, so just give them to the infantry.  

I do agree the comments about the Cbt Spt Coy.  The infantry has been robbed.


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## DG-41 (10 Oct 2005)

So for the last few days I've been chewing on how to proceed with fleshing out my previous article, and I've come to the conclusion that Col Brennan is a crafty one.

He has managed to write his essay and frame his argument in such a way that any attempt at rebuttal gets lured into arguing against his idea that junior officers be sucked out of the smaller formations and replaced with senior NCOs. As soon as one is forced to fight on this piece of rhetorical ground, one runs the risk of accidentally stating or insinuating that senior NCOs aren't up to the task, and that would drag the argument into non-productive and devisive territory - and effectively scupper the rebuttal.

I'm not sure if the good Col did that on purpose or not. If he did, that's a neat trick. But I have recognised his trap and refuse to step in it.

Instead, let's examine the Col's other points and assertations:

The article claims that combined arms teams are being formed at decreasingly smaller formation sizes. In this, he is correct. The types of conflicts we have been involved in in the recent past and in the forseeable future have not relied on brigade or division sized units, but rather batallion or company sized units. It is clear that the Army as a whole needs to spend more time developing combined arms training with smaller formations than has been traditionally done.

The article asserts that a major obstacle preventing such training is the current division of the combat arms into specialized corps. "Current combat arms leadership remains an impediment to change because of the parochial view linked to specialized corps. There comes time for a new mindset. The past should be preserved in museums and history books, not in military leadership structure. Without a fundamental change in the leadership culture that embraces, from its conception, combined arms doctrine and ultimately joint operations, we are struggling within a confined closed space within a creative closed box. Simply put, it would be better to commence leadership training with an integrated combined arms focus rather than corps based specialized training."

That one paragraph contains no less than three fallacies:

Firstly, the leadership of the various arms corps are every bit as aware of the move towards smaller, tightly-integrated formations as anyone else. Nobody is acting under any sort of illusion that what we faced in the former Yugoslavia, or what we face in Afganistan, is a potential Soviet style attack of large formations of massed armour and mechanized infantry. Certainly *my* leadership, from unit through brigade at least, is shifting the training focus toward what we can expect in the current operational scheme. And while we could probably do better on the combined arms front, the challenges there lie elsewhere than in a parochial view brought on by corps specialization.

Secondly, I point out that the past contains lessons that were hard-won on the battlefield. There is no better teacher than the enemy, and the tuition he charges is dear indeed. While circumstances change with the march of technology, much of what happens in the past remains applicable to this day, and to ignore those lessons just because they are kept in museums and history books means that we give the enemy the opportunity to teach them to us all over again - and claim his price for it.

Thirdly, leadership training does not start out specialized. I have been through the leadership training cycle twice; once as a Reg Force military college cadet, and once as a reservist comissioned from the ranks. In both cases, leadership training started out general - not even *element* specific - then progressed to a common "Army" level, and then from there moved to the arm-specific training. I stated earlier that I could probably function as an infantry platoon commander; I owe this abiliy to being taught how to do this on my BOAT course prior to embarking on my arm-specific (and role-specific; I was trained in Recce) courses.

It seems to me that all that Col Brennan wants to accomplish with regards to further integrating combined arms training could be accomplished within the current arm structure without requiring a "combat arms generalist" officer trade.

Col Brennan also seems to feel that the increasing push towards smaller combined arms formations will result in these combined arms units being made permenant; that instead of troops of armour coming together with companies of infantry ad-hoc, that instead we will form permenant combined arms regiments. That may well be, but in order to accomplish this, one need not eliminate arm-specific leadership training.

Looking at one of those history books, in this case the regimental history of the South Alberta Regiment, we find that the wisdom of keeping detatched subunits working with the same subunits of a sister arm was already recognised as wise practice in WW2. "From the outset, in the spring of 1944, the same SAR squadron always worked, whenever possible, with the same infantry battalion in the brigade and this paid enormous dividends as the squadron/batallion attachments soon evolved into highly effective tank/infantry teams" (The South Albertas, a Canadian Regiment at War, page 357)

On the same page, the history book describes the need for arm-specific training: "SAR commanders found that their main problem was to get the infantry to accept the limitations of the tank, as infantry officers often had unrealistic beliefs about its capabilities" and about the inherent flexibility of combined-arms operarations "There were no hard and fast rules on how to conduct [combined arms operations] The ground over which the battle was to be fought (the state of the going and the cover availible) the extent of enemy opposition and the tactical situation determined the method to be used and the degree of detailed co-operation between the two arms. Command varied - sometimes the armoured corps officer led the tank/infantry team and sometimes the infantry officer."

Summing up then, I find the article to be a thinly-veiled attempt to suck the Armoured Corps functionality into the Infantry, which, in so doing, ignores the lessons of history that describe in detaiil the necessity for detailed and specialized training specific to that arm. Col Brennan can have his better and smaller combined arms teams, but he need not disembowel the Armoured Corps to do it.

DG


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## TangoTwoBravo (11 Oct 2005)

I figure that if we want to re-align/reassign we might as well do the Infantry and Cavalry split.   Get half the maneouvre units to be real good at "light" stuff and call them Infantry.  Get the other half to get real good at mounted stuff and call them Cavalry.  I'd make the guys in the back of the LAV part of the Cavalry.  Leave the indirect fire stuff to the artillery.  By all means put mortar Tps/Pls in the Infantry and Cavalry Regiments but make them gunners.  Ditto for the sappers.  

Instead of training infantrymen and cavalrymen to fire mortars and do engineer stuff give them even more training on the weapons that they use (machineguns, carbines and pistols to the nth degree).  To me its all about time.  Fill any spare time with language training.

Cheers,

2B


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## KevinB (12 Oct 2005)

2B,
 I agree with you post in general - but I am goign to make a generalization that your view is typical of non pioneer qualified officers.  Pioneers are NOT Engineers - they have some overlapping skills - but by and large while they can be mutally supporting their are not mutally replacing. 

 Light Fighters or Cav (which I agree with wholeheartedly) will still need Pioneer skills to help breach enemy positions - be it plain of Europe Soviet Style defensives (utterly unrealistic these days) or enemy strongpoint in houses etc.  While Enginners may forma  breach in a line they are not a Bn asset but a Bde one and as such they cannot be relaied upon to be available in the number need to support sub unit operations across the AOR.  If I need a breach in a house now -- it has to be now not in however mnay hourse my target comes up on Bde's list of things to do with a Beaver...

 If we form a true combined arms unit and make it a GIVEN than it delpoys and trains together then I feel that the 021's can have Mortars - until that time Light Inf or Cav/Mech will want (and need) organic fire support at the Bn level.


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## DG-41 (12 Oct 2005)

I've been chewing on this for a little bit....

1) The task of the driver, gunner, and crew commander in a LAVIII are basically the same tasks required of the same slots in Coyote or Leo. The *mission* is different (a LAV is not quite a tank) but the basic skill set is the armour skill set - drive vehicle in tactical manner, fire gun from mounted turret, and co-ordinate both.

That argues for having the crew of the LAV be armour trained, with a focus on the particulars of the infantry transport/support mission.

2) There is precident, in that the crew of a chopper in an airmobile mission are pilots/flight engineers, not infantry.

3) It takes 4 X LAVIII to transport an infantry platoon (right?) That happens to mesh very well with the size of the traditional tank troop....

So maybe then we stand up three armour regiments to serve as crew for the LAV-portable infantry batallions. It takes roughly one squadron to carry an infantry company, so maybe A, B, and C sqns are stood up as "taxi and close support" LAV squadrons, with D sqn staying the Reserve recce squadron.

As far as chain of command goes, each troop gets an Lt per normal, and the infantry Coy HQ gets an armoured captain to act as BC - except now he reports to the Coy commander instead of an armoured OC. Each squadron is permenantly attached to their respective Coy. (and each Tp their platoon)

Presto! Now you keep all the benefits of specialized trade training, plus you get the tightly-intergated combined arms you need. Everybody wins, nobody loses.

DG


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## TangoTwoBravo (12 Oct 2005)

Kev,

I suppose the Assault Troops suffered a similar fate, even though they were also not engineers (nor infantry).  

What I suggest, however, is that a Task Force (Infantry or Cavalry) have integral engineers and mortars.  These soldiers would come from different trades but would belong to the Task Force (battalion sized unit in this case) as a posting.  In this way the unit gets its integral support but the system does see some efficiencies.  Hopefully a Regt/Bn HQ would have its combat support and CSS platoons/troops posted to permanently and would take these on deployments regardless of any "plug and play" of its sub-units.

Thus a Canadian Cavalry or Light Battalion-sized Task Force would have mortars and sapper Tps, while there could also be Canadian Engineer Sqns and Arty Batteries deployed but controlled by a multi-national brigade HQ.

We have another issue with the whole "train as you fight" piece.  If you reorganize each time you deploy then I guess that org charts are meaningless.

DG,

The Norwegians I worked with had armour crews and infantry dismounts with a mirrored command structure.  The structure had a certain appeal to me.


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## Observer23 (12 Oct 2005)

I like the idea of infantry and cavalry.  I believe we should explore it further.

I don't see a "Combat Arm Trade" being realistic. Even for the officers.   In WWI, every rifleman (generically speaking) was just that a rifleman.  Today we have so many specialists in the craft that it would impossible to develop a competent (skill wise) soldier who was employable in every direction.  In the Cbt Sup Coy, the skills and mind set between some one in the AT PL and let's say the Recce Pl are very different.  The tools, tactics, and thinking have to be different to accomplish their individual task.

I also support KevB's notion that the infantry should be left to their duties of firing a rifle and kicking in doors.  Let the armoured dudes employ mounted direct fire support resources.  This would focus all the veh techs to support one organization.  I remember reading in the Infantry Journal the idea of having the LAVs employed as a taxi service with dedicated armoured soldiers driving, firing and maintaining them.


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## mover1 (12 Oct 2005)

Observer23 said:
			
		

> I like the idea of infantry and cavalry.   I believe we should explore it further.
> 
> I don't see a "Combat Arm Trade" being realistic. Even for the officers.     In WWI, every rifleman (generically speaking) was just that a rifleman.   Today we have so many specialists in the craft that it would impossible to develop a competent (skill wise) soldier who was employable in every direction.   In the Cbt Sup Coy, the skills and mind set between some one in the AT PL and let's say the Recce Pl are very different.   The tools, tactics, and thinking have to be different to accomplish their individual task.



WW1 was nearly 100 years ago and most regiments were either morphed or raised into its trench fighting role.
If your going to develop skills or mind sets to become a Recce Specialist or a AT guru then what is the harm in lumping everyone into one giant MOS 001 Combat Arms Specialist. Once baisic is over and battle school is done people tend specialize. 


Lets stop fighting theVimy Ridge, Fulda gap and the cold war and move on


 If you need to see any after afffects of what this might do or what the draw backs are just look at Airforce. The airforce did this years ago. Took all its maintainers and lumped them into one giant trade.


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## Infanteer (12 Oct 2005)

Observer23 said:
			
		

> I like the idea of infantry and cavalry.   I believe we should explore it further.



We've done that here:

Light vs. Medium Forces

Canadian Armoured Cavalry

All Arms Light Forces


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## Observer23 (12 Oct 2005)

The WWI analogy was used to show that your simple soldier today is far more diversified than 100yrs ago.

I would support the idea of a combat arm battle school (much like the Marine Corp) were buddy would be qualified as an employable rifleman before we send them off to a specific combat arm trade.  This wouldn't be a MOS but just a preq to further rounding a fully qualified soldier.  Currently recruits are required to take a Solider Qualification (C6, Carl G, etc).  The program is in place, we would only have to build on it.


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## D-n-A (12 Oct 2005)

Its not just people in Combat Arms MOSs who go to SOI(School of Infantry) after basic.


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## KevinB (12 Oct 2005)

As long as EVERYONE understands that a Rifleman is the BASIC.

 The problem is some believe they are fully qualified to replace Infanteers once they have a "basic combat" course  -what non combat arms used to do when we had GMT broken into recruit (all arms) basic (cbt arms) and basic combat prior to Cornwallis getting stupified and then obliterated.

 As was messaged above (heck I even agree with DG-41) with the Leaders verus Managers issue - if in order for a young officer to be respected by his troops his must lead them and have a basic ability in trade to do that.  Creating a manager layer is only further beaurocurizing the CF - something that MUST be avoided at all costs.

Recently it is very easy to spot a trend in some CF officer trades - what I would call blowing with the wind, in certain officers at the LCol and Col ranks writing paper than seemed to attempt to find a niche for themselves in the current direction, a direction that they have been against previously.


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## McG (12 Oct 2005)

> We've done that here:


We also have:
Mech infantry or all light infantry with some Armd APC units? 
Modular Manoeuvre Battalion
Replacing Pioneers and Assault Troops

          . . . does this mean we've run out of new ideas?

I do not think Mountie is proposing anything new (from the traditional mech inf bn & armd regt in which one dominate MOC filled all cbt & cbt sp rolls) except that he has extrapolated that because the infantry could manage the TUA that they can manage their own DFS (to include MGS).   The proposal that is a deviation, from how we've always done business, is the one to exclude infantry from being trained as AFV crew and reserve that for cavalry.   Beyond this it is a TO&E debate that armd crew are part of the rifle sect, or APC section are part of the rifle pl, or APC pl are part of the rifle coy, or APC Coy in the mech Bn, or even multiple APC coy within the cav regt of the bde.

Leaving the structure debate for the many suggested threads, would this increased occupational specialization improve the proficiency of the infantry or limit its flexibility?


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## mover1 (13 Oct 2005)

Maybe we should overhaul the regimental system then. Or the brigade structure.

Lets start training like we fight. Not deploying as ad hoc units rather lets make these units the norm.


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## Mountie (13 Oct 2005)

I 100% agree.  Train as you deploy.  But the trick is to do it without destroying the regimental system.  I suggested in another post that brigades should be permently organized in combined arms battle groups/task forces.


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## Infanteer (13 Oct 2005)

mover1 said:
			
		

> Maybe we should overhaul the regimental system then. Or the brigade structure.



Funny, we've done that here as well:

Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

The Reserve Force Regimental System (Restructure & Merger)

Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems

The Downward Diffusion of Combined Arms


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