# Networks fighting networks



## jumper49 (22 Aug 2005)

In their book "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy" Arguilla and Ronfeldt argue that networks must be opposed by networks, i.e. networks fighting networks.

England has stated that 

"Typically, the CF has agreed that organizational change is as important to RMA transformation as is technological and doctrinal change, but has provided no direction on what form organizational adaptation is to follow.  This position took a dramatic shift in the 2002/03 CDS Annual Report, when network based organizational change replaced the 'industrial, hierarchical means of thinking linear and vertical."

Source: http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/england.htm

This suggests that the CF may be moving toward "netwar".

However, Banks and Bondy have made a pitch for the "single combat branch":

"Changes made since the 1960s must be rolled back to support force structure and professionalism. In order to achieve this goal, the CF needs to de-unify the forces and focus on operational jointness instead of administrative unification. LCol Banks supports exploring a single combat branch to replace the existing armour, artillery and infantry but through different approaches. If the Army cannot maintain armour and artillery branches that provide significant support that a modern and complete infantry unit could generate, these branches should be reduced to sub-military occupational classifications (MOCs) or employment streams within a single, centralized MOC."

Source: http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&id=312

Recently a rifle company of 1PPCLI marched down the road to become Echo Company of LdSH(RC). Is this both a step toward the formation of the "single combat branch" and a move to a networked organization?  

But what exactly does it mean in practical terms that, say, terror networks must be opposed by networks? I haven't been able to find any discussion of the form of opposing networks. In Iraq the US is perceived as an occupying force, i.e. occupies an area. Al-Qaeda and its supporters comprise a network, i.e. points (nodes) and lines.
However, Predator UAVs (nodes) over Iraq, controlled via communication lines from bases (nodes) in Nevada, detect then attack insurgents and their vehicles (nodes).

How would a single combat organization fight a netwar?


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## a_majoor (23 Aug 2005)

What we need to do is define exactly what is meant by "network". For the purposes of the book, and most discussions about organizational change (both business, government and military), networking means reducing and flattening the formal heirarchy of command and control. 

In the case of Al Qaeda, individual cells operate mostly on "commanders intent"; i.e. the 1998 declaration of war against the United States and various audiotapes and other messages which arrive from time to time. Osama Bin Laden does not sit in the op centre in the depths of a cave complex monitoring the activities of individual AQ cells.

The most dramatic example in American military practice was the use of about 250 Secial Forces operators in Afghanistan using satellite phones, GPS recievers and laser designators to directly contact aircraft and deliver strikes against fleeting Al Qaeda and Taliban targets within hours or minutes of sighting. Previously, teams on the ground reported contacts through a long reporting chain to be recorded, prioratized and fed into a planning matrix before being assigned to a plane, a process which could take hours to days in the first Persion Gulf war (1991)and the Kossovo air campaign (1999).

How does this relate to a single combat branch? At the platoon and combat team level, probably by streamlining communications between lateral units and arranging both fire and logistical support, since everyone is on the same "net". Advanced capabilities like long range fire support by otherwise unengaged units could be part of this, so long as everyone was in the same "loop" or network segment, if you will. This can happen even without a "single branch" organization through command and control arrangements, but the deeper linkages and interactions between people serving together in a single combat branch, or composite unit (See Armoured Cavalry, Modular Manoeuvre Battalion or Combat Team of Tomorrow threads, for example) would make this more effective. These are much smaller networks that also act within a much larger mesh network.

Networking would also make larger formations (Battlegroups and Joint formations) more effective by tying "Shooters" and "Sensors" together, as well as allowing a more effective "pull" logistics and support system to evolve (much like how WalMart can keep their stores stocked with low priced goods that reflect the particular consumer purchasing preferences of each store/district/region), although I havn't seen much written about this aspect. (Not being a logistician, I may have overlooked entire encyclopedias or writings on this subject...). Networking also allows "reachback" to national level systems and capabilities; for a fanciful example imagine a section commander in Afghanistan using an Iridium sat phone to communicate with a translator sitting behind a desk in Winnipeg.

The application of "netwar" between Western armies and irregular or terrorist forces like Al Qaeda would almost certainly be in the SOF "mirroring" AQ, with small teams of operators using "commander's intent" to derive their COA on the ground and only occasionally reporting to some sort of SOF node for intelligence updates and arranging logistics and other needs not otherwise available on the ground.


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## jumper49 (24 Aug 2005)

Many thanks, a_majoor, for your detailed response. It is very useful to get this kind of insight from someone with recent operational experience.

It now seems to me that the concept of "networks fighting networks" should focus on communication networks. So just as previous "revolutions" in war meant adopting stirrups, longbows, muskets, levee en masse, steam-power metal dreadnoughts, aircraft, tanks, nuclear weapons, etc., the present network revolution will entail the incorporation into the battlefield of advanced communication systems.

In other words, "networks fighting networks" refers to opposing forces both reliant on sophisticated communication networks, where the winner will be that force which makes the most ingenious adaptation of the new technology.

Rather obvious and perhaps self-evident, but I needed that extra bit of help to get it together. Now what kind of military organization can best support these emerging communication networks?

Some of my thinking to date my be reviewed in my PowerPoint presentation "Adapting Warfare to Social and Technological Change" at URL: http://rlmi.ca/PPNotice.html


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## a_majoor (24 Aug 2005)

Communications is a rather large part of it, but the way these networks are organized and how they are used is a much broader way of looking at it.

In terms of technology, the conventional phone system is a heirarchical system of switches which pipe you directly to the person you wish to call. Attacking the switches potentially could cut you off from large parts of the phone system. This is the physical aspect of the system. A network like the Internet uses various routing protocols to send a message from computer to computer. If a computer is off line for any reason, the message is routed around it, and the reciever still gets the message regardless of the condition of the intervening network.

In terms of organization, in a "conventional" environment, you would call the foreman, who calls the supervisor, who calls the manager, who calls...etc. This can happen regardless of the actual technology used to make the call. *In a "Networked" environment, you are able to call the person who can best answer your question,* regardless of where they sit on the "org chart". Since users have more power over their environment, this actually requires less communications bandwidth (consider again an SF team in 1991 calling through a long and complex chain of command to vector in an airstrike, vs an SF operator in 2002 using "speed dial" on a satelite phone to speak directly to the pilot who is coming in with the bombs and rockets).

The organizational network is the one to concentrate on when thinking about using networks in military operations.


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