# Why Are Our HQ's Growing and Can They Be Stopped?



## Bruce Monkhouse (5 Sep 2014)

Since I joined this site way back in the early 2000's, there has been one standard theme that has run through many, many threads.  
That is the general disgust at the growth of various HQ's, and the amount of valuable money they suck up that could be used for equipment and/or training.

I wanted to start a thread solely on why, after all these years, do they seem to continue to grow?  Do folks conveniently forget once they reach one of them that they used to rail against them?
Is there some 'inner circle' [if you will] that are just looking out for their buddies?  Does the thought of slower promotion and/or no longer having a job make change impossible?

It just seems very hard to swallow that a topic is always somewhere in a thread here on army.ca can not be known by those whom might be able to afford change, and yet after all these years of reading about 'cutting HQ's' being the answer, we seem to be worse off then we were years ago.
Is the Canadian taxpayer being sold out by those who would profit from the abundance of 'lack of command' command's?

I know this topic can be, and has been, part of many threads in the past but I'd like one on the "why's' we can't accomplish what seems to be an almost unanimous consensus for a long, long time here.


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## Old Sweat (5 Sep 2014)

It must be in our collective military DNA. An old saying goes along the lines of if you put three Canadian officers together in a room, they will create a headquarters. Some of it might be pen_s envy at not having a large enough military to actually field a proper formation structure, some of it might just be the tendency of Type A personalities to want to take charge, and maybe there is some fascination in being part of a giant self-licking ice cream cone.


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## GR66 (5 Sep 2014)

My personal gut feeling is that it's ultimately due to a lack of clear direction as to what the CF is expected to be able to do.  We seem to operate under the assumption that the current CF should be structured in a way to be able to rapidly expand to become a WWI/WWII style (multi?) divisional field force using that same basic structure as our forces already in existence.  I think this is pure fantasy.  We don't have the equipment available to field and maintain in combat even a single fully-equipped division in a peer-vs.-peer conflict.  Vehicles (and aircraft, and ships, and missiles) are so complex now that we can't pump them out of our factories to rapidly build our forces (or replace our combat losses) in the same way as we did in the past and we don't have the money/willingness to stockpile enough vehicles/equipment/munitions in advance to support a force of this size.

If we ever are faced with full-scale mobilization I think either we're going to either have to deploy a smaller (Brigade Group) sized force and maintain it with Reservists and by stripping equipment from the various units of the Reg Force.  Ultimately if the conflict goes on long enough to eat through our available equipment/manpower we will have to come up with a new force structure based on what replacement equipment is actually available.  

If this is the case then our organizational/command structures should be based on the more realistic scenario of a single deployed Brigade Group.  If and when full mobilization ever becomes necessary we should build the new structures to support whatever form of mobilization we're able to support at that time.  We're wasting money now on provisional structures for a what-if scenario that will likely not suit the situation we face at the time it comes anyway.  

The same is true of our military capabilities in general.  We cut funding for various pieces of kit and essentially lose the physical capability in that area (or maintain a very bare-bones capability) but we maintain an organizational/command structure to support that capability I guess in hopes that funding for the kit/Person Years returns or if we need to mobilize and recreate that capability.  

The government needs to produce new and realistic Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers which clearly define what is expected of our military.  Absent that our military leadership has to stand up and say to the government that given the funding that we have we can no longer offer the following capabilities and will restructure the CF to focus on those capabilities we are able to maintain.

With more clarity the CF can focus it's energies on mastering those capabilities we decide to maintain.  The organizational/command structures can then be rationalized to support these capabilities.  At the very least it will allow outsiders to point at the current structures and say "why do you need x commands/HQ to support capability y", etc.  With open-ended priorities and capability requirements you can justify almost anything.


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## Remius (5 Sep 2014)

Those are good points GR66 but I would also go one step further and blame our culture of careerism and how overranked our system is.   I think it was ER Campbell in another post that indicated that many of our GOFOs are overanked for what they do.  Seeing it first hand I tend to agree.  It's almost as if we are creating positions and groups just to justify the rank levels we have.  Should General's be in director level positions?  How many staff jobs could be better served by the PS? Or vice versa?  I'm convinced that some jobs could in fact be accomplished by Majors and LCols rather than Generals or Colonels for that matter.


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## Edward Campbell (5 Sep 2014)

Over two years ago, I _think_ Prime Minister Harper gave DND a chance ~ even direction ~ to "cut the fat" and, I _suspect_ to escape much, much deeper cuts. The DND top level management: the previous MND, Peter MacKay, former DM Robert Fonberg and then CDS Gen Walter Natynczyk thought he could be ignored. My prsonal _guess_ is that they were wrong and that some of the deep budget cuts in 2013 and 2014 are, in fact, punitive ... pay back, if you like, for not cutting where Prime Minister Harper directed. (It would not be the first time a PM punished a department.)


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## Old Sweat (5 Sep 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Over two years ago, I _think_ Prime Minister Harper gave DND a chance ~ even direction ~ to "cut the fat" and, I _suspect_ to escape much, much deeper cuts. The DND top level management: the previous MND, Peter MacKay, former DM Robert Fonberg and then CDS Gen Walter Natynczyk thought he could be ignored. My prsonal _guess_ is that they were wrong and that some of the deep budget cuts in 2013 and 2014 are, in fact, punitive ... pay back, if you like, for not cutting where Prime Minister Harper directed. (It would not be the first time a PM punished a department.)



I think you are probably correct, but I would add the department couldn't or wouldn't organize a sensible procurement system for major projects. This caused the government considerable embarrassment over fixed wing SAR, F35, various ship building fiascos, the inability to buy trucks, etc, etc. Instead DND seemed to concentrate of layering bureaucracy onto an already obese structure. If there was a BMI for organizations, National Defence would be at 35 or 36. 

Shoot, look at the honours and awards system compared to what we had in the two world wars and Korea. It can take years to get an award approved after it makes its way through multiple committees when it should go from commander to commander until it finally reaches the GOFO authorized to approve or reject the recommendation.


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## daftandbarmy (5 Sep 2014)

Top heaviness is a big problem, everywhere.

The solution?

First, let's fire all the managers, of course:

http://www.uky.edu/Centers/iwin/RTOCT12/GreenHBRarticle.pdf


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## The Bread Guy (5 Sep 2014)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Top heaviness is a big problem, everywhere.
> 
> The solution?
> 
> ...


Thing is, though, that those who make the "restructuring" decisions are very unlikely to say, "yeah, you don't need me".***

*** - I've only seen this happen *once* in watching municipal politics for 10+ years, where the manager of a sort-of arms-length group said, "Your Worship, Council, your options are A - cutting x staff or B - cutting me and my sidekick, and merging the group into a larger, already-existing municipal organization."


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## Old Sweat (5 Sep 2014)

That's why cuts have to be arbitrary and imposed by the top down with a distribution by rank so that the seniors do not escape. There also should be as little wiggle room as possible or the bureaucracy will produce a ton of papers, work studies, dire predictions, etc proving that the cuts will actually damage the organization. There have been efforts to reduce organizations that actually resulted in the targeted groups growing after they proved their indispensability. (Is indispensability a real word?)


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## dapaterson (5 Sep 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> (Is indispensability a real word?)



Clearly we need an executive level working group to study this issue and identify recommendations that can be ignored for years.  I think national hearings (in 5 star hotels) are in order.


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## daftandbarmy (5 Sep 2014)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Clearly we need an executive level working group to study this issue and identify recommendations that can be ignored for years.  I think national hearings (in 5 star hotels) are in order.



Or a Royal Commission!  ;D


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## Colin Parkinson (5 Sep 2014)

Even in the PS, the people you want to cut are very good at protecting their butts, because that is job #1 for them, which is why frontliners take the heat because protecting their jobs from their bosses is why down the list of things to do.

Basically make everyone deployable, send them to the North, cut comms for 2 weeks and see what happens, starting handing pinkslip to anyone not missed as they get off the airplane.


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## dapaterson (5 Sep 2014)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Basically make everyone deployable, send them to the North, cut comms for 2 weeks and see what happens, starting handing pinkslip to anyone not missed as they get off the airplane.



Problem is that it's very easy to fire the people who are responsible for long term planning - since there's no immediate impact.


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## Edward Campbell (5 Sep 2014)

The actual business of *forcing* change is simple. The MND, for example, can direct a major overhaul of the command and control, superstructure including, for example, a reduction in admirals and generals from about 1 X Gen, 10 X LGen 25 X MGen and 60 X BGen (which is about what we have today) to, say, 0 X Gen (a _cosmetic_ change designed to send a message) 5 X LGen (including the CDS) 20 X MGen and 40 X BGen. (That's a 35% reduction.) The reason the MND can, confidently, direct such a change is that there is no *right* organization for the C2 superstructure, especially not with regard to rank structure. Some structures are better than others, of course, but one thing a _proper_ C2 superstructure should not be is "bloated," as ours certainly appears to be.

The key to finding a better rank "fit" is to examine the first level _executive_ in our system. It seems completely self evident, intuitively obvious to me, that a ship's captain (commander) regimental CO (lieutenant colonel) and RCAF squadron CO (lieutenant colonel) is our first level executive rank. *BUT* in our HQs the first executive level is Capt(N)/Col; re-rank all those Capts(N) and Cols to Cdr/LCol and, suddenly, you see a huge change and an almost natural downwards _progression_ in rank at the higher levels.

Now, a downward change in ranks is NOT going to save money - in fact it is likely that Cdrs/LCols and above will all get pay raises to compensate them for increased (upward) responsibilities. But, a *cut* in 35 GOFOs and, say, 35 more Capts(N)/Cols should give us money to hire one company of infantry or the crews for two or three AOPSs.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (5 Sep 2014)

...and yet for the last 13 years I've heard "we need" or "we're bloated" and yet, in times of fiscal responsibility, nothing gets done.


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## OldSolduer (5 Sep 2014)

I think it will take some will on the part of very senior leadership, despite all the braying and screeching of bureaucrats - both military and civilian.


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## x_para76 (6 Sep 2014)

IMO it's because we're not a wartime military anymore. We went over 40 years between proper conflicts in this country and as result we lost what was important in regard to how a military should be run.


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## PMedMoe (6 Sep 2014)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> very senior leadership



And why just them?  Why not ask some of our "junior" leadership?  Today, I found out our positions were moving because there's no work where we (for us as a trade) are.  I told them that three years ago, and I'm sure someone told them before that.  Exception being those who took advantage of it.  Google "empire building"....everyone is doing it now.  And it makes me want to puke.   :-X


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## a_majoor (6 Sep 2014)

A plan for the brave (since whoever does this will essentially be doing a Kamakazi run and be outcast for the remainder of their careers):

1. Do "Operation Paperchase" to identify and eliminate useless paperwork, reports and returns in the system. Then eliminate the jobs of the people who look after that paperwork.

2. Have an outside military organization audit the CF to clearly identify the bloat and school the Minister on "best practices". The USMC is one possible auditor, but the Royal Marines, the Armed forces of Singapore or even Australia are also good choices (similar cultures of small fitting forces with limited resources).

3. Have another outside auditor of the CF's logistics and procurement systems. In this case I would look to the commercial world: WalMart or Amazon.com, for example

The Minister can almost certainly do number one on his own and at any time. Methodologies like "Six Sigma" can help identify bottlenecks and inefficiencies. Outside auditors and the resulting restructuring would be very difficult and potentially drawn out processes (as GOFO's and bureaucrats have to be fought hand to hand in the corridors of power, and they will be fighting to the last taxpayer...), but with enough willpower, it could be done.

The bonus is that clearing the decks this way would actually bring far more value for money; even if we don't get any more actual cash the money we do get will go a lot farther than before, which should be a good "hook" for the political process to get started (getting a much more capable military for the same price as we pay now can only be seen as a good thing).


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## GAP (6 Sep 2014)

Who gets to define the parameters? 

Anyone with a vested interest (political/military/commercial) is going to protect their own breadbasket.


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## Edward Campbell (6 Sep 2014)

One thing to remember: some things are beyond our your the CF's or DN D's control.

Consider, just for example, _official languages_ or various flavours of _equality_: there *will* be elements in the DND C2 superstructure to _advise_ or _regulate_ or _direct_ in various policy areas and no one gives a flying f___k what the MND, DM or CDS thinks about it. These things are imposed, they are government policy and we march along, in step ... even if we do so mindlessly.

Another thing: we make international agreements and we agree, in writing, to adhere to those. They, too, require some _supervision_ and staff effort. (In my last job one my majors could, with a very few key strokes, send out a memo to D____ or PM ____ saying something like: "in project _x_ or proposal _y_ you have forgotten to include binding international standards 1, 2, 3 and 4 and equally binding national standards 5, 6, 7 and 8 and your project or proposal cannot progress until you apply their provisions." She had that stuff so close at hand because she sent that memo out on an appallingly regular basis. We were just one of many directorates that had and used _standardization_ authority ~ we enforced standards to which Canada had agreed ... presumably, we hoped, for good reasons.)


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## Tibbson (7 Sep 2014)

Out of those who have already commented on this topic I'd be interested to know who has actually been posted to a Headquarters?  I ask that question only for context, not to trivialize one persons views over another.  All views are what makes a discussion.  With that having been said though I've had a long and varied career that never included a posting to HQ...until this summer that is.  Prior to posting I always viewed HQ more as a hindrance then a help.  Its where good ideas, complaints, policy changes and equipment requests go to die.  It was where the broken, the chosen and the inept went to spend their time on coffee breaks and pet projects for as long as they could or until retirement.

Now, there is some of that going on for sure since no system is perfect, but overwhelmingly I've found a group of dedicated, competent, professional and concerned individuals...military and civilian, who work hard and who want to make things better for those on the pointy end.  

- Those requests for additional vehicles needed by the troops that nobody at HQ seems to care enough about to action?  Well they have been working on it but they've also been busy punching up the weak substantiation you supplied, trying to find the funds to buy them, working with (and in many cases fighting with)  the transport types and supply types to source them through PWGSC.

- That deficiency report with the suggestion to replace unsuitable kit?  They've been battling with a supply system that essentially says "We dont care if its deficient, we have thousands on the shelf and we wont buy the better ones the troops need until the old (deficient) ones are used up.

-  That order or policy that is outdated?  They know about it but the one person assigned to oversee that task isnt an SME on everything so he's got to farm the rewrite out to someone who IS an SME so that its effective.  Since that person has other prioities it takes months to get it rewritten (or longer) but then it has to go for review then a legal opinion to make sure its proper, then translation, then review again to make sure the french matches the english (context/meaning/intent)  and then final approval.

-  Tired of the unfilled positions at your Unit?  Well I'm already tired of them at my national HQ too.  We could have the vehicles for you in spite of the above noted issues but someone decided this ongoing task requires no more then one WO.  That kit you need, the MWO is working hard to get it for you but shes also filling one of the national training positions since the MWO there retired and the position wont be filled by the career manager until next summer(IF she has the money for the posting).  Those orders....well there were 9 funded PYs (military and civilian) dedicated to that cell but it was decided by outside forces that most would be transfered to another HQ after a ministerial inquiry determined they were needed elsewhere (ie: a flavour of the day political pet project).

Yep, in any organization there is always bloat to some degree or another, at any number of levels, but I'm not convinced (yet) that its a systemic problem.   I certainly have not been here long enough to be assimilated into the Borg collective but I have been here long enough to already wonder if my previously held views were not a bit harsh.


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## Tibbson (7 Sep 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> A plan for the brave (since whoever does this will essentially be doing a Kamakazi run and be outcast for the remainder of their careers):
> 
> 1. Do "Operation Paperchase" to identify and eliminate useless paperwork, reports and returns in the system. Then eliminate the jobs of the people who look after that paperwork.
> 
> ...



1.  The sheer scope of your proposed "useless paperwork" review would be overwelming and never come to an end.  Yes, some things could always be eliminated but much of it is in place gecause we are required to adhere to other govt department's needs and policies to get our jobs done,  outside regulations dictate some if it or the government has instituted it.  Case in point...I used to be able to book travel quite easily but under our new system, on imposed upon us, it can take a day and a half of justifying, comparing and eliminating other options to send someone to one of our sub units for a mandated biannual standards inspection.

2.  I'm in almost weekly communications with Aust, Brit ans US counterparts and if you think for one moment that they do things better then you are sorely mistaken.  They also work within entirely different governments with different policies and requirements.

3.  Just dont get Target to do it and while they are at it they had better be mandated to look ar PWGSC and shared services too.  Not that I think such a review would be benicial or relevant.   We'd most likely end uo with Walmart proposing that they run a national supply system like Logistic Unicorp.  Your Unit needs a new vehical?  No problem, if you have the points just call up and order it.  Need bulkets?  Sorry, you will need to wait until you get more points.  Those tank tracks were the wrong ones?  Just call for a return authorization, send them back and when the right ones are off backorder they will send you the right ones.  Dont like the points system?  No worries, if Walart takes over we will all get Walmart Mastercards and gift cards issued and we can order up to the annual limit.


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## Tibbson (7 Sep 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Now, a downward change in ranks is NOT going to save money - in fact it is likely that Cdrs/LCols and above will all get pay raises to compensate them for increased (upward) responsibilities. But, a *cut* in 35 GOFOs and, say, 35 more Capts(N)/Cols should give us money to hire one company of infantry or the crews for two or three AOPSs.



As I understood it our numbers are capped based on people, not money, so that getting rid of 35 Generals and 35 Capts/Cols would only allow us to hire 70 pers from the various Branches those assorted 70 big shots came from.


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## SeaKingTacco (7 Sep 2014)

Only partially true, as I understand it.

While our force levels may be set (xx amount of people), the wage and benefit bill also comes out of DND's overall budget. 70 Captains (or WOs, or Cpls, etc) are cheaper than 70 BGens That extra money can then be used elsewhere.

Additionally, many General Officers are entitled to an EA and/or office staff. Fewer General Officers mean that those staff (mil and civ) can be redeployed to other priorities.

Finally, I would say that empowering, Cols and LCols to make decisions that were formerly made by higher ranking individuals can make job satisfaction much higher.


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## Edward Campbell (7 Sep 2014)

We have shrunk (mostly) but also grown the numbers many, many times since I joined more than half a century ago.

I served, in NDHQ, during a series of cuts ~ cuts in which NDHQ and CHQs, too, were singled out for real reductions. In at least one set we got a (small, but measured) personnel "bonus" for the fleet and field force when the cuts at the top were made.

What was more interesting was that during the deep HQ cuts in the late 1990s our _performance_ did not suffer: we identified what we weren't going to do and we stopped doing it. Some people, some quite senior people, didn't like that - fortunately a couple of even more senior folks said, "that's how it's gonna be."

Cuts don't have to hurt, in fact I believe that quite steep and totally arbitrary - across the board - cuts to HQs are actually helpful. (Cuts should be arbitrary but the _remediation_ when one discovers that D___ was cut too much and D___ too little must be quick and real.)


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## Edward Campbell (7 Sep 2014)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> Finally, I would say that empowering, Cols and LCols to make decisions that were formerly made by higher ranking individuals can make job satisfaction much higher.




That's a key point that Old Sweat has made before. When we have too many GOFOs ~ Type A personalities who want, need to achieve something ~ they start looking for things to do ... including the wrong things.


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## Fishbone Jones (7 Sep 2014)

Nothing significant is going to happen until the Feds place a moratorium on General promotions. 
This can no longer be left to the cronies and friends that have an unsubstantiated  story or opinion of their friends which becomes the narrative for their promotion.

Too many people are making it to the lofty heights on the say so of their peers without a proper vetting.

We have pompous, dead wood, egotistical morons that know nothing about business, or man management, sitting in judgment on who they should let into their club, instead of looking at the persons qualifications and what they can do for the men.


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## Happy Guy (8 Sep 2014)

Harsh words, but true for the most part.

GO/FOs are selected for their perceived abilities to lead, but at that level how many actually do lead as opposed to manage?
Despite the constant disdain for "managers" the CAF needs them - look at the bureaucratic mess we are in now because our leaders want to lead and ignore the managing part.  Very few of them understand the complex and interrelated Logistics, communications / computers, intelligence and other enablers aspects of maintaining a general purpose combat ready force.  One can say that it is up to their staffs to inform them, but if the ops staff is made up of the same "leaders" as the leadership isn't this the same as the blind leading the blind.

The CAF urgently requires leaders but their basic knowledge in understanding how to conduct operations at the strategic level is very much lacking.  They know to fight at the tactical level (very sexy), but are sadly deficient at the strategic level (translating political aims into military objectives (campaign planning) and making critical decisions that maintain, support and sustain military operations.  Consequently they are making decisions without fully understanding implications.  The CAF needs leaders who can also manage effectively.


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## ModlrMike (8 Sep 2014)

Happy Guy said:
			
		

> Harsh words, but true for the most part.
> 
> GO/FOs are selected for their perceived abilities to lead, but at that level how many actually do lead as opposed to manage?
> Despite the constant disdain for "managers" the CAF needs them - look at the bureaucratic mess we are in now because our leaders want to lead and ignore the managing part.  Very few of them understand the complex and interrelated Logistics, communications / computers, intelligence and other enablers aspects of maintaining a general purpose combat ready force.  One can say that it is up to their staffs to inform them, but if the ops staff is made up of the same "leaders" as the leadership isn't this the same as the blind leading the blind.
> ...



Interesting you say that. In classical management theory, leadership is one of the four pillars of management. The others being planning, organizing, (leading), and controlling. The military treats leadership as a separate entity, and has it removed from the management functions.

Maybe that's something we have to think about; that managers are leaders and leaders are managers. Perhaps at different places on the same continuum, but performing inter-related, not separate functions.


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## Colin Parkinson (8 Sep 2014)

A good leader in a crisis might be a poor manager for the day to day stuff. But if they know that about themselves and bring in a good manger who they will listen to, then you can have a workable team.


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## Ostrozac (8 Sep 2014)

The one HQ that still seems (to me) to be quite lean is the CMBG HQ. At last count it was, what, about 55-60 people? With one Col and one LCol as the highest ranks?

Admittedly, a CMBG HQ does like to attract attachments and when in the field can swell up to fill the largest of circus tents, but it has managed to avoid keeping all those attachments from filling up the HQ in garrison.

Now a CBG HQ is bigger than its regular counterpart for some reason, has a Col and 3 LCol, and I won't speak in its defence, but the CMBG HQ seems to be an HQ echelon that actually works. So if we decide to wholesale restructure our C2 structure, I'd recommend avoiding slashing too deep in Pet, Val and Edmonton.

Higher echelons? Sure. I'm not entirely sure that we even need any intermediate HQ in Toronto, Halifax or Montreal -- brigades used to report directly to Army Headqurters in Saint Hubert, they could do so again.


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## Edward Campbell (8 Sep 2014)

Tactical HQs shrink when you are in highly mobile operations - a highly mobile brigade HQ might go down to less than a dozen (and hordes of Signals people, of course) plus a small handful of staff clerks and rover drivers. Make the HQ _static_ (as in Afghanistan, for example) and it will grow. The best way to shrink any HQ is to burn all the "circus tents" ~ people will migrate to warm, dry places if given the choice ... or simply stay at home.


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## Monsoon (8 Sep 2014)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Now a CBG HQ is bigger than its regular counterpart for some reason, has a Col and 3 LCol, and I won't speak in its defence, but the CMBG HQ seems to be an HQ echelon that actually works.


If you won't, I will. The difference is that a CMBG is a tactical HQ and a CBG is an administrative HQ. The work of CBGs is largely consumed with recruiting, training up to the OFP, and personnel administration - tasks that the CMBGs can entirely rely on other administrative HQs for (CFRG, CDA, CADTC, etc). This is personnel-intensive work.


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## OldSolduer (9 Sep 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Tactical HQs shrink when you are in highly mobile operations - a highly mobile brigade HQ might go down to less than a dozen (and hordes of Signals people, of course) plus a small handful of staff clerks and rover drivers. Make the HQ _static_ (as in Afghanistan, for example) and it will grow. The best way to shrink any HQ is to burn all the "circus tents" ~ people will migrate to warm, dry places if given the choice ... or simply stay at home.



I was in 1 CBG HQ & SIGS for four years. The Bde HQ was not very big - once it set out and was moving every 12 hours it got smaller, much like Mr. Campbell has explained.


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## Kirkhill (16 Oct 2014)

Not a uniquely Canadian problem apparently.



> Star Creep: The Costs of a Top-Heavy Military
> 
> 
> (Source: Third Way; issued Oct 15, 2014)
> ...



http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/158005/too-many-generals-cost-too-much.html


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## daftandbarmy (18 Oct 2014)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Not a uniquely Canadian problem apparently.
> 
> http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/158005/too-many-generals-cost-too-much.html



This redistribution of resources away from front line troops clearly reflects the type of enemy one faces in peacetime (internal political) versus war time (external operational)  :nod:


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## dapaterson (18 Oct 2014)

I recently saw a document that was discussing another topic, but I came away with this nugget: in 1976, five per cent of the Regular Force was Senior Officers (Maj and above).  Doing a rough comparison to today, there has been a 60% increase - now we are at eight per cent Senior Officers.

A reduction to 1976 levels of Senior Officers would free up over 2000 positions for other purposes.


Of course, there is a very real risk that such an action could lead to a serious PowerPoint gap...


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