# Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)



## the patriot

Hello,

Having been five years now that our great nation has existed without an Airborne Regiment on paper, how does everyone feel about the idea of bringing back the unit to the Order of Battle?  For a country of our size, simple logic would dictate an airborne mobile capable force.  That‘s political issues notwithstanding of course.

-the patriot-


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## JO

Canada has a huge landmass - it needs a highly mobile rapid-reaction unit that can respond to threats in far-off regions such as the Arctic (not just threats - imagine an airplane crash, or something like that nuclear-powered Soviet satellite that broke up in space and spread itself all over Canada‘s North a few years back). It could also use an "elite" unit to which members of the Forces could aspire - the morale boost of having a world-class elite battlefield unit would be significant. I realize we do have the JTF - but its small size and extremely selective testing puts it out of the reach of a vast majority of soldiers, and as such does not aid morale in the same way the Airborne did. The Airborne was a useful unit for developing infantry and fieldcraft skills to a very high standard - an invaluable training ground.
   However, it did have its limitations; like all parachute infantry units, it had high strategic mobility, but limited tactical mobility (ie. can‘t move too fast or far once on the ground, especially when compared to mech or air cav units); and of course there was always the difficult problem of extraction once the mission was done (especially in Canada‘s nether regions). A natural question rising from this: would an airborne or air cavalry unit be better for rapid reaction in Canada? There‘s points for both.
   If we did bring back the Airborne as a para unit, how would we structure it? We could try something along the lines of the SAS, for example: instead of set up for parachute assault, train it in battlefield special operations (green ops) and able to work in small platoon- or company/commando- sized groups as well as a battalion level; able to handle long-range reconnaissance behind enemy lines or destoy key objectives. In short, not a conventional airborne/parachute unit but a special operations unit. Or we could set it up like the US Rangers - a qualifying Commando course, specializing in personal and small-unit fieldcraft and light infantry skills (expand on the Airborne Indoc course?) as well as the qualifying jump courses. A person who passes the course would receive a "Commando" patch on their uniform and be given the option to join the Airborne - not all would have to; some could return to their units and disseminate their developed skills throughout the infantry. Those who go to the Airborne would spend a maximum three years there and then have to return to their parent unit to pass on what they learned; they could return later on and pass a refresher course to spend another three-year tour. Officers in command positions should have experience commanding in the regular infantry at the level they are intended for in the Airborne - an Airborne Commando commander, for example, would have to command a line infantry company first to qualify.
   I don‘t know how many of these ideas would be practical, but they may work. What do others think?


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## bossi

Once upon a time, each Militia unit would nominate their "top soldier" for the jump course - it was a goal to strive towards, the wings were something both tangible and visible (and, there was only one "Total Force" standard).

The concept of an "elite" unit also makes perfectly good sense, as long as it remains elite.  Furthermore, it seems increasingly obvious that we need a "rapid reaction" unit.

However, don‘t forget - it also made sense for Canada to replace our aging helicopters, but political considerations overrode logic and common sense.  Thus, I harbour no illusions or hopes as to the reversal of the decision to further erode Canada‘s military capabilities.

The Airborne Regiment is now merely history, just like the Bonaventure, Baden & Lahr, a light-weight summer dress uniform, ... need I continue?

Dileas Gu Brath
Mark Bossi, Esquire


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## HastyP

My heart says "yes" but my mind says "why?" 
Are parachutes merely an outmoded form of tranportatioin?
It seems a fine concept to be able to
insert a group anywhere in the world quickly, but how to sustain them? Pararescue is still a viable entity, but airborne?
they have been touted as the answer for assisting in 
natural or manmade disasters across this
large country mainly to justify their existence.
However, survivors of an aircrash in the
Arctic would freeze to death well before any material aid could reach them and natural disasters are more a case of evacuating
people rather than dropping more in, and radioactive 
crash waste will not go anywhere very fast.
Regretfully the only situation I see making
practical use of paratroops since WWII was
the US Army‘s plan to load C-5‘s with paras
in the States and drop them to previously
assigned defensive positions in Germany,
but that was during the Cold War.
I‘m not anti-para (have quite a few jumps myself)
but can anyone give some real reasons for
having a parachuting force? I‘d like to 
consider them.


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## Boyd

I‘m not sure that you‘re wrong about parachuting, but doesn‘t it make sense to train your "rapid reaction" force to be able to reach the battle field in the most time proven method.

I also think that roles outside Canada are more likely than sending paras to clean up nuclear waste in the Arctic.  The most likely example would be a UN mission gone seriously awry.  While I‘m sure that a horde of former peacekeepers will leap forward to assure me that the UN is always quick to allow it‘s peacekeepers to take the required action(LOL), what, if any, plans exist for extracting or reinforcing a Canadian force overseas?  JTF2 isn‘t a option for a wide variety of reasons, the least of which is that they are simply TOO small to be of any real use.  A good type of mission example might be the British Paras in Sierra Leone.  They came in quickly to secure the area to achieve a short term objective, then bogged off.

Essentially, what I‘m proposing is a battalion sized force who‘s role is to provide a force that can reach any of our UN missions rapidly in the event of a serious escalation in a UN mission.  While the political aspect of creating this force would be difficult for a wide spectrum of reasons(If you called it Airborne or Commando, the same peacenik hippies that were screaming about Canadian peacekeepers having claymore mines in East Timor would claim that this force is a group of government sanctioned baby killers.), I think that not having a independent rapid reaction force, but still sending our forces to far off lands operationally is a disaster waiting to happen.


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## Michael OLeary

OK folks, lets go for some brutal honesty here. I know that there are a lot of proponents of the Airborne Regiment out there, but generally they are those who served in the unit and succeeded through their own dedication, and/or willingness to be assimilated. Generally I have found that there are thee types of servicemembers that talk about the CAR:

 - those who who have never served and "have no right to an opinion because they have never served"
 - those who served, thrived and defend the CAR, 
 - and those who served but don‘t support it, which is ‘sour grapes‘ because they never really fit the "airborne mystique."

And I guess you can consider me to be in the first group.

And it is this differentiation driven by the strong CAR advocates which make any rational discussion of the unit, its roles, employments and usefulness difficult.

Let‘s consider some of alternative views:

 - The CAR was never used in its primary role.
 - It actions in Cyprus were simply because it was there, its credible performance was because of the quality of its soldiers, not because of its primary role. Other Canadian battalions have performed as well in crisis.
 - It was expensive to maintain, which is a real-life factor, as unmilitary as it seems.
 - The airborne regiment drained many of the parent regiments‘ best soldiers, with the attendance loss of those personnel to the originating battalions.
 - The airborne regiment also attracted many undesirable soldiers, often with excellent personal field skills, but unable to work in a military team. They were, however, willing candidates for the ‘elitism‘ of the CAR and readily sent there where they joined others of the same rebellious ilk. This formed the core element of the few that gave the many their poor reputation.
 - Good soldiers stayed with the CAR, or returned to it, there was insufficient cross-pollination to see a perceptible "increase in basic light infantry skills in the battalions by returning soldiers."
 - Despite the high technical ability achieved by the CAR, if they had developed such a comprehensive light infantry capability, why don‘t the light infantry battalions have a published light infantry doctrine?
 - The existence of the airborne regiment, while a career objective for  few (who now aspire to their battalions‘ recce platoons), has never been proven to have contributed to the morale of the Army at large. They were like the battalion hockey team, which in most units was coddled and pampered, missing much of the exercise season to be taken away for games. Soldiers build unit (or Army) morale on shared experience, not on separation and elitism.

If we want to prepare a case for a revived (or maintained) airborne capability, build it with todays needs, budgets and forces in mind. 

What role and missions can we realistically perceive that such a unit might meet?

Even augmenting a Canadian UN mission, when we are talking about a deployed infantry battlegroup, will 600 light infantry soldiers be a help or an impediment (lacking transport, resupply, etc.) At the reach of a CC-130, or even a borrowed Starlifter, what the hell good is 600 men who can‘t get themselves out? Do we really think there is the political will to set outselves up for an another Arnhem? Perhaps an airborne engineer battalion would better meet humanitarian aid and disaster response roles?

Our primary operational jumpers right now are SAR Techs and the Skyhawks, neither of which use classic military jump styles or equipment. And has there been a decrease in quality of these groups becasue rge CAR no longer exists as a feeder organixzation? How many SAR Techs or Skyhawks even came from the CAR? 

Do we even need a military jump capable force for most of the perceived missions? A battalion (or two, three?) trained over a summer each to jump by sport parachute standards would secure the capability, at a lower cost and lower attrition rate. Lower descent velocitiies, square steerable chutes, shorter training times - cheaper, faster, easier. 

Many people point out the JTF as a the ‘elite‘ organization. I would hazard to say they are eleite and that the CAR never really was. Entrance to the CAR was unit recommendation (because you wanted and deserved it, or it was the quickest way to get rid of you) and passing the jump course and airborne indoc (both of which were primarily drill and obedience focussed (please correct me if I‘m wrong)). The JTF balanced physical and psychological selection, we‘ll never know the stats but I suspect that there were as many CAR failures and those that succeeded in the JTF selection. ‘Elite‘ doesn‘t necessairly equal ‘elite.‘

Many people, including myself, are willing to listen to rational argument for the re-establishment of another (or even more) infantry unit(s). But lets build the case on concrete argument meeting todays defined missions and needs, and staying within todays budgets and capability envelopes. Specialist unit of any kind are expensive, diffivult to mainatian, and constitute a drain on the personnal and resources of the Army as a whole. Any such units have to generate a personnel and morale ‘profit‘ to be worthwhile. Tentative, hypothitical employment possibilities don‘t so that.

The CAR was good for the CAR, and that‘s about it. The Army at large hated to see a unit gone from the order of battle, I would hazard to suggest it didn‘t necessarily mourn the CAR as it was.

As a final note, I‘d like to say that I have nothing particular against an airborne capability. The CAR saw many of the best soldiers of our regiments, unfortunately it also saw many less desirable characters. In many respects, for their reputation in and out of the Army, the Airborne has no-one to blame but itself. If the current operational tempo is to be maintained then perhaps we need more infantry units (as well as the supporting arty, armd, engr, tn, sup, etc., etc.). But I don‘t personally think we ned the CAR back first.

Mike
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/


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## JO

Perhaps the first question to ask when approaching this issue is this: Does Canada really need a rapid reaction infantry force anymore (leaving aside the prickly question of what kind of force - para, air cav, marine, or other - for the moment)? Would it be in Canada‘s interest to have a unit that can rapidly move to an area to "put our presence on the ground"? And, very importantly, could we afford it? What could we use a unit like this for?

There‘s bound to be a variety of opinions on this. What do people think?


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## Michael OLeary

If we put aside the details of role and organization, aren‘t we basically asking, "Should the Canadian government support a DART, or a CAR?" 

Realistic humanitarian support (domestic and/or international) versus power projection (assuming one light infantry battle group (at best) constitutes power projection).


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## ducimus

Posted to ducimus.com by a regular infantry Captain 2 Feb 2000.

Here‘s some more food for thought... and perhaps heresy to some: Do we really need a para capability? Gone are the days of the mass-drops (WWII). Given that we cannot possibly do everything, can anyone see Canada using its para capable forces in the forseeable future?


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## ducimus

Reply posted to ducimus.com 4 Feb 2000 by a retired reserve infantry Major.

I agree that there is no way that we or anyone might mount a strategic para drop of the WWII type with any hope of success. I do think, however, that we must maintain the capability to insert, by para, a small tactical force (up to company str.) into a situation. Rotary wing transport is great but I feel that a ni insertion by para troops equiped with GPS to get to the FUP might provide enough suprise to ensure success of the mission. Just my $.02.


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## ducimus

Reply posted to ducimus.com by a serving regular infantry Captain 11 Mar 2000.

For all the arguments which attempt to support the sustainment of an airborne capability, none seem to be able to provide concrete examples of their use in combat in the past 40+ years. The "airborne mystique" remains firmly embedded in Normandy and Arnhem. The mobility these forces provided in WWII has been replaced by airmobility. Since Vietnam, the use of helicopters to rapidly deploy ground forces when air superiority can be maintained has been entrenched. I would much rather see an emphasis on hel-ops up to bn level than an increased airborne capability. 
That being said, no-one seems to have considered or developed theories on potential uses of airborne troops in more peaceful situations. Perhaps it is the difficulty of envisioning the stereotypical tough guy paratrooper in less tense situations. 
I would suggest that maintenance of a basic jump capabaility may well gain palatability as, for example, the capability to drop a security force and airfield repair team preparatory to deploying the Disaster Emergency Response Team (DART) on either domestic or international aid operations. But, we should also consider that this could as readily be done with civilian sport parachuting technologies (2 days trg, slow descent steerable chutes, etc.) to reduce costs and simplify getting and maintaining the best personnel on the ground without undue dependence on completing a lengthy course focussed on physical conditioning.


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## ducimus

Reply posted to ducimus.com 8 May 2000 by a serving reserve infantry Corporal.

-The short answer would have to be no. -Should we aim to have one in the future, probably. But this should be far down on the shopping list even if we miraculously got a 10 fold increase in DND budget and manpower. -The purpose of airborne troops is strategic. (Tactical operations will invariably be better fulfilled by either heliborne or ground based troops.) -There are then 2 types of strategic airborne operations. First, clandestine type operations such as sabotage, assasination, abduction, rescue etc. This would fall to CSIS or specailized groups such as SAR or JTF and involve small groups (if not individuals) and, accordingly, a single small aircraft. Second the short term military operation. Securing bridges, beachheads, airfields, etc. or as a flanking type manouver to sever enemy supply/retreat/communication. If the situation makes such operations potentially useful then they also will dictate that the operation be large. Battalion if not brigade or division strength. Now aside from the obvious problem for the Canadian forces to commit such a large portion of our extremely low troop strength to such an operation (a certain WWII bridge comes to mind). There is also the problem of getting several large, slow aircraft deep behind enemy lines. Since the mass drops of yester-year AA technology has become extremely effective, portable and inexpensive. The American‘s managed a significant insertion during the gulf war only after first reducing this threat AND establishing ABSOLUTE air superiority. Against any opposition strong enough to make a large airborne operation a strategically good idea, our airforce just doesn‘t have the #s to achieve the same thing. The obvious response to what I‘ve written so far is "What about multinational forces?" Well what about them. Other nations with airborne units have as many or more of them than we have in all our infantry. If we add a battalion or even brigade to an operation with several divisions from other nations is that enough to make a differnce? Of course not. I‘m sure our allies would prefer we used the meager funds, manpower and training time to send a larger number of troops with another specialization.


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## ducimus

Reply posted to ducimus.com 10 May 2000.

While reviewing the posts on the subject of "do we need a para capability" I am somewhat disturbed by the lack of awareness towards the tactical employment of airborne forces in battalion strength. 
Most of the posts seem to only envision "mass airborne drops" such as that of Operation Market Garden, Crete, etc. However airborne forces have been used at the battalion level very successfully in the last 40 years. 
The British have a firm grasp on the viability of what role airborne forces can play as evidenced by the information found at <http://www.army.mod.uk/army/organise/infan/para/roles.htm> 
While the decision to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment was primarily a political one, the present situation of keeping Canada‘s airborne forces in the jump company of a light infantry battalion form is a failure to employ the resources properly. 
Here are some examples of successful battalion level airborne operations since the Second World War, taken from the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) website at <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/> Date: 1964 Units: USAF C-130 squadron, Belgian Paratrooper Bn Operation: Dragon Rouge Troopers: 320 Belgians, 1 American Country: Belgian Congo Dropzone: Stanleyville Airport Aircraft: C-130 Hercules Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Gun jeeps, Crew-served machine guns Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump 
Operation DRAGON ROUGE, "RED DRAGON" in English, was one of the most dramatic military missions undertaken during the Cold War. It involved a flight of more than 4,000 miles by USAF C-130s carrying Paratroopers of the crack Belgian 1st ParaCommando to rescue hostages who had been held for more than three months in the Congolese city of Stanleyville. 
Africa was an unstable place in the 1960s, even more so than it is today. The former Belgian Colony of Congo, now known as Zaire, was granted independence in 1960, and almost immediately became the site of chaos. When the crisis ended in early 1964, a new one broke out as Congolese rebels calling themselves "Simba" rebelled against the government. The Congolese government turned to the United States for help. In response, the U.S. Strike Command sent JTF LEO, a task force made up of a detachment of C-130s, communications personnel and an 82nd Airborne security team, to Leopoldville. 
By early August, 1964 the Congolese, with the help of the LEO force and a group of white mercenaries led by Major Mike Hoare, was making headway against the Simbas. In retaliation, the Simbas began taking hostages of the whites in areas under their control. They took them to Stanleyville and placed them under guard in the Victoria Hotel. 
While the world watched anxiously, in Washington and Brussels the United States and Belgium were hard at work trying to come up with a rescue plan. Several ideas were considered and discarded, while attempts at negotiating with the Simbas failed - no one could be found to negotiate with! 
In mid-November the C-130Es and crews of the Tactical Air Command rotational squadron from Pope AFB, NC were called back to their temporary duty base at Evreux-Fauville AB, France from missions throughout Europe. The crews were told simply to go to their barracks and get some rest, because something big was brewing. On Tuesday evening, November 17, the crews were told to report to the operations room on the Margarite where the airplanes were deployed. The crews were told to rig seats and take-off. Just before take-off, each navigator was given a Manila envelope and instructed not to open it until their airplane had reached 2,000 feet and there were no mechanical problems to make them turn back. When the crews opened the envelopes, they learned they were going to Klinebrogel, a Belgian military airfield outside Brussels. When they got to Klinebrogel, each airplane loaded with Paratroopers wearing red berets, then took off again after being handed another envelope. This time it told them to head south for Moron AB, on the Spanish Mediterranean. At Moron the navigators went into Base Operations where they were given maps and instructions for the next leg of their flight, to Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, where they arrived 18 hours after leaving France. 
By this time everyone knew they were on their way to Africa, but first there was a time of "hurry up and wait" on secluded Ascension, where the rescue force was out of sight of the prying eyes of the world. While they waited, the American airmen and Belgian paras got to know each other, and began working out procedures to drop the Belgians. 
On Sunday before Thanksgiving the force left Ascension and flew across the Atlantic and much of Africa to Kamina, an airfield in the southern Congo. There the crews and Paratroopers waited again. By this time all hopes of negotiation had vanished, and that evening the American and Belgian commanders were told to launch Operation DRAGON ROUGE. 
In the early hours of November 23, 1964, 5 x C-130s took off from Kamina, each with 64 Belgian Red Berets in full combat gear seated on the red nylon troop seats in its cargo compartment. Behind the assault force came seven more Herks, with Chalk 12 configured as a hospital ship. The C-130s flew north at high altitude, then dropped down to treetop altitudes to follow the Congo River as they neared the city of Stanleyville. 
As the sun was breaking over the horizon out of the African Veldt, a CIA A-26 INVADER flown by a Cuban mercenary pilot made a strafing pass over the Stanleyville Sabenas airport. Right behind the A-26 the first C-130 roared low over the runway. As the airplane came over the field, Paratroopers led by Col Charles Laurent spilled from the doors on either side of the airplane. Within seconds, 310 Paratroopers were in the air, then landing on the strip of grass alongside the runway. The five jump planes came around for another pass to drop the jumpmasters and bundles of equipment. As the airplanes came off the drop zone, they began taking fire from a .50-caliber Heavy Machine Gun. After dropping the troops, Chalks Two through Five left the area for Leopoldville, where they were to refuel and stand-by. Chalk One, carrying the C-130 mission commander, Colonel Burgess Gradwell, and flown by Captain Huey Long of the 777th TCS, orbited over the airfield until they were hit by several heavy shells that knocked out hydraulics. Long pointed the battle-damaged airplane toward Leopoldville. 
Forty-five minutes after he jumped, Col. Laurent reported that the airfield was secure. Five other C-130s roared in for assault landings from their orbit point near Stanleyville. Each airplane discharged troops and vehicles to join the Paratroopers on the ground, then took off again and headed to Stanleyville. Meanwhile, Chalk Six, flown by Captain Mack Secord‘s crew, approached Stanleyville. They had lost a life raft after takeoff from Kamina and had to return for the spare airplane. Secord was told to land, and wait with Chalk Twelve, the hospital plane, until the Belgians returned to the airport with the hostages. 
After leaving the airport, the Belgian rescue team made haste to reach the Victoria Hotel before the Simbas carried out their threats to kill the hostages if a rescue was attempted. Several blocks from the hotel a Paratrooper rounded a corner just in time to prevent the Simbas from firing a second volley of shots into the assembled hostages, who had evidently been walking toward the airport. Some of the hostages later said they thought the Simba officers intended to turn them over to the Belgians unharmed, but some of the Simbas, who had been drinking and smoking Hemp all night the night before, decided to take matters in their own hands. They shot their own officers, then turned their guns on the hostages. They had fired one volley, picking women and children as their targets, and were preparing to fire another when the Red Berets showed up on the scene. At the sight of the Belgians, the Simbas lost their courage and ran! The Belgian Paratroopers had stormed the city and freed the hostages. Casualties included 3 Soldiers dead and 7 wounded, as well as 27 dead among the hostages, but 2000 hostages were saved 
After more than an hour on the ground at Stanleyville, Mack Secord‘s crew finally saw the first hostages coming toward them. As they were the most badly injured, they had been driven to the airport. Seeing the engines running and thinking the C-130 was about to take-off, the frightened whites rushed aboard the airplane through the open rear ramp. Secord‘s loadmasters, there were two aboard, tried to get them over to the other airplane where a doctor waited to tend their wounds. After finally getting the most seriously injured people to leave, Secord‘s crew closed up their airplane and began taxing for the runway. As they passed a clump of elephant grass, a pair of Simbas ran out. One ran alongside the airplane trying to get inside the door while the other sprayed the underside of the wing with a submachinegun. No one inside the airplane knew what had happened; the whole thing was witnessed by the crew of Chalk 12. Secord took off and headed for Leopoldville. When he got there, he had to be bodily lifted from the airplane and taken to the hospital where he was treated for a brain concussion he had received the night before when he bumped his head getting into the airplane. 
For the rest of the day, C-130s and other transports shuttled between Stanleyville and Leopoldville. More than 2,000 people were airlifted out of the city. That night a Belgian mechanic working on a DC-4 was killed by sniper fire. Several times during the day the field was mortared, and every airplane was hit by ground fire during their landings and takeoffs. One was hit in a wing fuel tank. The airplane crew chief whittled a plug from a broom handle and wrapped it with a rag and used it to plug the leak. 
The airlift continued the next day. Late in the day the Belgians were pulled out of the city and flown to Leopoldville. Early the next morning a smaller scale mission designated as DRAGON NOIR/BLACK DRAGON, freed hostages held at Paulis, a town 225 miles northwest of Stanleyville. The hostages at Paulis had also been harmed by the Simbas. An American missionary had been beaten to death during torture. 
After DRAGON NOIR, the rescue force retired to Kamina to await further orders. While they were waiting, an African thunderstorm prompted one C-130 crewmember, none of whom had had a bath in days, to grab soap and go out into the rain for an impromptu shower. The rest of the force followed his lead as the airmen and Paratroopers ran around naked in the rain! A few days later, in response to political pressure from the Third World, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the force ouf of Africa. 
For their role in DRAGON ROUGE, the C-130 crewmembers recieved the 1964 MacKay Trophy for the most meritorious flight of the year by USAF aircraft. All of the crewmembers were decorated with the Air Medal, while Captain Mack Secord received the Distinguished Flying Cross. 
Date: 22 February 1967 Unit: 1st Bn/506th Airborne Operation: Junction City Troopers: 845 Country: Vietnam Dropzone: Katum Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Gun MULEs (M274s), 105mm artillery pieces, 81mm, 4.2 inch mortars, 1/4 ton jeeps, 3/4 ton trucks Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump 
On February 22d, 1967, Paratroopers of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, parachuted into a wide clearing in the jungle of War Zone "C" as part of Operation Junction City. Their mission was to form a blocking force near the crossroads hamlet of Katum, South Vietnam, to support a large-scale cordon and search by U.S. forces. The 780-man Airborne task force was delivered in two sorties of aircraft from Bien Hoa Airbase. The personnel drop of 13 x C-130 Hercules aircraft arrived over Drop Zone Charlie at 9:00 a.m. General Jack Deane, Commander of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sigholtz, Commander of the 2-503d Task Force, and Sergeant Major Harold Proffitt led the jump from the first aircraft. A total of 778 troopers hit the silk in two passes over the small drop zone, settled to the earth, and began assembling without any enemy opposition. Thirty minutes later, 10 heavy drop C-130s arrived and dropped 6 x M101 105mm howitzers, 4 x 4.2 inch mortars, 6 x 81mm mortars, 4 x 3/4-ton trucks, 5 x jeeps, 6 x M274 "Mule" vehicles, one trailer, and 3900 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition. By 10:00 a.m., all 845 men and equipment were deployed into blocking positions and the command post and artillery firebase were established. As units from the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 173d Airborne Brigade began closing the horseshoe around suspected Vietcong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) positions, Operation Junction City became a series of small unit firefights for the Paratroopers. On February 28th, the "Sky Soldiers" of the 173d overran the Vietcong Central Information Office, a key enemy propaganda facility. As the multi-divisional attack continued through mid-May, major battles raged around the horseshoe with three Vietcong regiments and one regiment of NVA regulars. Operation Junction City succeeded in driving major enemy forces from War Zone "C" across the border into sanctuaries in Cambodia. The operation was terminated on May 14, 1967. 
In 1978 the 2e Regiment Etranger Parachutistes jumped into Kolwezi, Zaire in order to rescue a civilian population in grave danger. The mission was a success, as the civilians were evacuated and the regiment suffered 5 dead and 25 wounded. 
For anyone who thinks that Canada does not need an airborne capability due to the "ineffectiveness" of a single airborne battalion, do some additional research, and then re-examine your original thoughts. I‘m sure that you‘re opinion will be swayed.


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## ducimus

Reply posted to ducimus.com 8 Jun 2000 by a serving reserve infantry Private.

Yes, Canada does require a para cabaility. For, example a company of Canadian soldier on a UN tour are taken hostages by about 200 rebels during a chapter 7 peace enforcement mission. Normally, Canada would negotiate a settlement, but unfortunately the rebels are fanatics that merely want to demonstrate to the Westtern world that they are not afraid of NATO or the UN, etc... Unfortunately, Canada disbanded its only rapid reaaction para battalion and no other country could help, becuase they were busy rescuing their own soldiers or they refused to help, becuae Canada hasn‘t been pulling its weight. 3 days later 120 Canadian soldiers are executed and the slaughter is seen on CNN around the world. If Canada, had a para capability of approximately 500-700 soldiers the majority of would have been saved. I am suggesting that Canada need an airborne brigade for airborne drops like WWII, no. Canada needs a dedicated para battalion for company and battalion missions, but not to be used like the SAS, but merely as highly motivated paras (ie better infantry soldiers who like parachute); the JTFII should cover SAS style operations. HMM, maybe the JTFII should be renamed the Canadian SAS and their roles expanded in addition to a Canadian Parachute Regiment.


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## Ex Coelis

If we had the budget and the military and political will, it would be a great asset to have a high readiness Forced Entry organization in the form of a parachute deployed Light Infantry Battalion/Brigade to expediently accomplish our foreign policy.

However, the military is not over the Somalia syndrome; neither are the politicians.  Our Army is presently reshaping itself into a Medium Force with restricted capabilities for high intensity conflicts.  We are persuing interoperability with the US Army by following very closely the transformation of two of their Brigades into IBCTs (Interim Brigade Combat Teams.  The aim is to be able to be "attached" as seamlessly as possible to these formations in the event of a multinational operation. 

The Army Staff worked very hard in the past months to produce a proposal to the CDS and Minister on how to restructure itself in order to find sufficient funding to pay for the O&M of the new LAV III.

THIS is the reality.

I have served with the Cdn Abn Regt and the Parachute Company in a Light Inf Bn.  I am a light soldier at heart.  The Army needs to be able to use the parachute as a deployment method of personnel and equipment for SAR, MAJAID, Relief Supplies, Resupply of troops in remote areas, insertion of strategic troops, rapid reaction capability etc.  I think the delivery method will stay no matter what. 

Viable Option.  Regroup paratroopers, after a thorough selection, from the Light Inf Bn with the CPC.  CPC would become core of a rapid reaction force centraly located.  Doesn‘t hurt to be close to the Hercs either.  Roles:  Early entry force, CSAR, Protection/Cordon force for JTF2 operations (like the Rangers for Delta and the Parachute Regt for the SAS), DART/MAJAID, Light Inf specialist formation (Pathfinder, Mountain Operations) in addition to CPC‘s vocational training of paratroopers. Size:  Two company-groups plus actual CPC establishment.

Feasible, most resources already exist, politically acceptable.


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## bmccann42

What about the possiblity of bringing back the Canadian Independent Parachute Battalion that we formed during the Second World War, only train them in a joint airborne/air-mobile concept, not unlike the american 101st.  Instead of the kind of force the Airborne Regment was(special forces, SAS type work)why not look at a straight airborne battlion like the American 82nd or British Para Regiment, only cross trained for helicopter insertion(really parachute insertion is looking to be too costly and too casulty prone these days)like most light infantry battlions these days, but heavily trained for short term insertion and striaght leg infantry maneuvers.
I know that this is the role of basically any light infantry unit, but here we could have something for the common infantry man to look to, the old jump wings and jump boots of old, maybe issue the old red berets(or adopt a new color for these special para/heliborne soldiers, like a navy blue or forest green beret).

please tell me what you think, i know it‘s full of holes but feedback is always accepted.


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## Brad

I think that having a Airborne type regiment would be a huge benefit to the CF. It would give soilders something to look forward to and to train for. This would help get soliders in better shape (as we all know most people in the Infantry are not in the best shape, it‘s a general statement but, true).

The operational benefits have already been well stated in other posts.

What I think (I could be wrong) moral would improve and fitness would improve and professionalism would improve if you had to compete for a chance to get in a regiment like we are talking about.


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## the patriot

Within the last few months, rumours are now rampant that DND is considering destroying the very concept of a Para tasking withing the Land Element.  This should worry every single individual in uniform for the jump capability is a greatly needed tool in a combined arms attack.

-the patriot-


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## RCA

As things stand today I see no need for a parachute trained unit. (though I don‘t think we should loose our parchute skills.) I think we are confusing airborne with airmobility. Paratroopers are not a aprt of the all-arms battle because they are so vunerable from the moment thay board the aircraft until they are releived. However Airmobilty (thru helecopters) is what is required.What they Forces need today is straight infantry. 

And for those that don‘t know, Canada does have rapid reaction force (even though it is tied to NATO) on short notice to move. It is a infantry battalion group and is part of AML


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## McG

> . . . (a) regular CLBG should be air mobile by helicopter and not a parachut unit, although it may maintain parachute recce platoons, for a specific reason. Para operations are effective only when able to properly support them, the CF does not and will not acquire the necessary capabilities to support an effective para operation (dropping a brigade would entail the entire CF Herc fleet and would require more to provde supplies and support). In addtion, helicopters are a battlefield necessity now whereas the mass para formation is not. As such, improving the tactical helicopter capability is far more effective.



This point, made by Brock, when discusing the structure of the Army largely conforms to my opinion.  However, I would suggest a single battle group is large enough, and that parachute capability should be maintained by atleast a full Coy within the Battle Group.

In the book Significant Incident, David Bercuson made some very good arguments, on why the Airborne Regiment should have never been Airborne but instead Airmoblie.  For anybody intrested it is a good read and likely available in a library near you.

In closing, the airmobile assets should be concentrated into a single Battle Group sized unit with complete all arms support, at least one Coy maintaing full parachute capabilities, and the CMBGs becomeing full mechanized (w/out light Bn‘s).

btw:
AMF(L) = ACE Mobile Force (Land)
ACE = Allied Comand Europe


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## Yard Ape

I agree with McG.  By concentrating the airmobile capabilities within a single unit at a single location, the costs are reduced to maintain the same number of effective Paratroops/airmobile troops.  I would like to see it based on an infantry battalion as opposed to the Airborne Regiment (with companies not comandos).  

I also agree that the CMBG‘s should be three mechanized infantry battalions; not two mechanized and one light. If nothing else, the vehicles must be available to transform the light battalion to mechanized without pillaging vehicles from other units.  

I do not think reserve units should have parachute taskings.

 Yard Ape


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## Soldier of Fortune

These are just some of my opinions:

-Maybe JTF2 has airborne capabilities
-What if there is a disaster up north, how will Canada deploy troops

and Michael Oleary, 
                                     Everybody is entitelled to their own opinion. Its a free country!


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## Yard Ape

The JTF 2 can be airmobile, but its role is vastly differtent from an Infantry Bn.  It does not train, nor does it have the equipment to do the job of the Infantry in the field.  If we want that capability for the CF, we must maintain it through an airmoblie Bn.  We cannot limit this to Jump Coys.  The Infantry don‘t fight alone, and if the all arms support is not jump capable, then the Infantry don‘t jump into the real thing.

 Yard Ape


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## fortuncookie5084

Let‘s not forget that, to my knowledge, Canada is the only NATO country that does not have an Airborne Rapid Reaction Force.  We need this capability. Its lack is a serious deficiency. If other obviously worse-off countries than Canada are ready to deploy such a force at a moment‘s notice, then we should get with the NATO standard. Sure, Canada will never turn Trenton into Fort Bragg...but let‘s at least show them what we can do with a versatile, more compact force.


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## Doug VT

I personally believe that it would be a mistake to eliminate the role of operational parachutists from the CF.  Those who have never worn a Maroon beret will never know what it means to the person who wears it.  It‘s something that should be important to all members of the CF and should be expanded to something like it once was.

Cheers


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## Briar

As people keep pointing out, Canada is a big country. Airmobile is good, and should be kept, but airborne is needed too and can cover a massive distance with heavier equipment than airmobile with less of a support "tail". A brigade is needed rather than a few jump companies. I can see the cost factor, but company level units would be useless without having proper support to complete a mission. (Sometimes the extra signals, artillery, and recon comes in useful.)


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## Se7eN

I would just like some opinions of facts. Whatever you can offer. I just find it strage we have the second largest country in the would and we are the only NATO country that does not have a rapid reaction force. I would just like to know if it is possible for the Regiment to "rise for the ashes." And on pg 18 of the Canadian Alliance‘s defence poliy it mentions re establishing such a force. What does everyone think?


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## fortuncookie5084

Fact:  Many Canadians are unaware that Canada even has an army.
Fact: Most of the Canadians who know we have our own army believe we are spending too much on it.  When asked, they said overwhelmingly for the money to be sent back into Medicare instead.  They also said nobody would attack us because the USA would bail us out.
Fact:  People on my street were convinced it was the Americans cleaning the street after the Ice Storm--because the American news showed American soldiers in NY.  
Fact:  Most politicians are counting on the US Army to bail Canada out in the event of an attack on the continent.  
Rumour:  the PM had asked for the entire 10th Mountain Division to occupy Quebec under the UN flag should the YES side have won the last Quebec referendum.  
Fact:  We need the Airborne.


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## ender

Fortuncookie5084,

I have to agree that most Canadians are totaly ignorant about the army and dependent on the US.
It‘s pretty sad actually.


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## fortuncookie5084

My occasional ranting and raving about the USA aside (like my above post...), we each must realise that it is up to each of us to promote our Army (that‘s Army with a capital A...not army, and not CF) and what we do.  If we create intelligent, accurate awareness at the street level, then the people around us will be compelled to reconsider the ways in which the media portray us.


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## fortuncookie5084

I‘m sick of seeing people condemning parachute forces to the military dustbin.  Yes, today mass Market-Garden or D-Day style jumps are not practical, then again war on that scale is not likely to occur.  Also advances in parachute technology have solved many of the concerns about dropping "sitting duck" paratroops from slow aircraft:  GQ Parachutes of the UK has designed a chute where the canopy opens first, THEN the lines come out.  They have jumped versions of these chutes from SEVENTY FIVE FEET successfully, from an aircraft flying at 135 knots.  From GO until landing the paratroop is in the air no more than eight seconds.  Operationally, British Paras intend to mass-drop this technology from no more than 250 feet.  Russia mass-drops troops using chutes with a drogue chute instead of a static line, and BMD2‘s from the SAME aircraft onto the same DZ, from aircraft going as fast as 250 knots and as low as 250 feet.  Yes, jumping T10-style junk chutes from slow Hercs flying at 600 feet or more, with more Hercs dropping cargo onto a different DZ,  won‘t win the next Airborne battle.  But the technology and vision exists with in all of us who believe in the power and potential of Airborne, and in particular parachute forces.


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## RBruceMair

I was never in the Airborne, I had only limited experience training with the Airborne.  For what it‘s worth here‘s a different thought.  I think we do have a need for an Airborne Battalion.  I do not think it should be organized the way the last one was.  Why not consider the British model?  A seperate Battalion that a person could join right off the street.  Not a "dumping ground" for discipline problems in existing battalions, not an "elite", just a battalion with a unique capability.  As our army continues to mechanize (LAV III), I feel we do have a need for a quick reaction force of some sort.  A dedicated Airborne Battalion would be extremly useful for various roles including UN deployments, UN evacuations, Sovreignty exercises (both real and political), Rapid Reaction, etc.  Again, to look at the British, they needed dismounted, light troops to tackle the Falklands.  A mechanized force wouldn‘t have been deployable / sustainable.  Granted a single Airborne Battalion wouldn‘t be very survivable for long periods of time but it would provide a foot in the door in many cases.

  What do we call our Battalion?  What would be wrong with the 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion?  I have no idea how that would go over with the pencil pushers who decide on names and protocal but we sure as hell could never call it the airborne again.  The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion served with distinction and pride (as did the CAR).  I feel that this would honour the past Battalion and set a standard for the new Battalion. 

  Those are my thoughts on the matter for what its worth.  Will it ever happen?  Sorry, not a chance.


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## fortuncookie5084

There is always a chance.  Military strength ebbs and flows, and we are about where we were in the mid-late 1950s:  No distinct role, leadership not acclimatizing to present realities and future probabilities, and low (indeed at its lowest now) public support.  We can‘t forget that after 1 Can Para was disbanded we were left with the jump companies.  April 8, 1968 the Airborne Regiment was born, only to die in 1995 at the hands of politicians who didn‘t know any better.  It could come back one day.  Not any time soon, but it will be back.  

Good ideas about modelling it more closely after the British Paras.  The CAR was becoming more and more imitative of the 82nd Airborne---a detriment to its service to our country from what I‘ve heard.


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## the patriot

I‘ve come across some very interesting sites with respect to the Airborne Regiment.  Please find them listed below.

The Unofficial Canadian Airborne Regiment Home Page 

The Canadian Airborne Regiment 

-the patriot-


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## KibbyCC

Was reading the Ottawa Citizen today and came across this article..

They make some point about likely hood of large airborne drops... but come on.. get rid of the airborne?     

---------------------------------
 http://www.canada.com/search/site/story.asp?id=669E8ABD-BA42-46B9-921E-D9EFB14197B4 

*Parachute troops face extinction*
_Days of large-scale deployment of airborne units are over: report; Move would be a severe blow to army‘s morale_

a journalist  
The Ottawa Citizen 
Tuesday, May 21, 2002

They may have served with distinction in war zones from D-Day to Afghanistan, but Canada‘s paratroopers are going the way of the dodo.

A report prepared for senior military officials and obtained by the Citizen recommends eliminating the army‘s parachute capability. If acted upon, the move could be a severe blow to the morale of some soldiers who view parachuting as a symbol of combat-readiness and esprit de corps.

The study, produced 17 months ago, recommended cutting the parachute companies in units based in Edmonton, Petawawa and Valcartier, Que. It also called for the closing of the Canadian Parachute Centre in Trenton. Any remaining parachuting skills would be moved to the air force and kept only for search-and-rescue missions.

Army officials say no final decision has been made on what to do with the paratroopers. But Col. Howie Marsh, an adviser to army commander Lt.-Gen. Mike Jeffery, said the days of large-scale parachute drops of airborne troops are over.

"It is likely there would be insertion of small numbers of people by parachute, but the parachute-type company or the unit drop -- I don‘t think is going to survive in the future," said Col. Marsh, who is helping develop the army‘s strategy for the future.

Although the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded in 1995 by the Liberal government during the aftermath of the Somalia mission, the military has retained a parachute capability in its three light infantry battalions. Paratroopers from Canadian Forces Base Edmonton were recently involved in the missions against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, although they were transported by helicopter rather than parachuting into the area. 

As well, the soldiers killed during the recent accidental bombing of Canadian troops in Afghanistan by a U.S. aircraft were paratroopers.

Brig.-Gen. Vince Kennedy said any decision on what to do with a parachute capability in the Canadian Forces will have to wait until after the government-ordered defence review is completed. That is expected to be finished by the fall.

As far as the army goes, parachuting will still be needed to insert troops onto battlefields, but whether that continues in the form of parachute companies in the light infantry battalions still has to be decided, Brig.-Gen. Kennedy said.

Last week the army announced it wants to expand the light infantry battalions in terms of numbers of soldiers, but it did not mention the parachute aspect of those units.

According to the report prepared for the Armed Forces Council, the Canadian military no longer has a requirement to drop large numbers of soldiers or equipment into war zones, and "the retention of a standing parachute capability is not essential."

The Armed Forces Council is made up of generals and is a key advisory group for the Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Ray Henault.

Another memo from the office of the military‘s director general of strategic planning argued that there is also no need to have even the capability to quickly retrain soldiers for a parachute role. "Since we do not feel we need a combat para capability, we also do not feel we need a way to re-generate it quickly -- any more than re-generating an aircraft carrier capability," according to the memo.

It costs the Canadian Forces around $16 million a year to keep its parachute capabilities. Shutting down the parachute companies in the light infantry battalions would save $6.6 million a year.

Retired Maj. Gen. Robert Stewart, a former member of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, said it would be a mistake to get rid of the paratroopers. "The savings are so minimal," he said. "It‘s peanuts compared to everything else you would get from it."

Although he acknowledged it is highly unlikely Canada would conduct airborne operations in the future, he said such units produce soldiers that are "a bit extra special." Airborne soldiers are mentally and physically tough as well as possessing an esprit de corps and a "can do" attitude, said Mr. Stewart.

He noted that most armies in the world still maintain parachute units, likely for those very reasons. During the Falklands War and during a recent rescue mission in Sierra Leone, Britain sent paratroopers to do the job, Mr. Stewart added.

The military report acknowledged that parachuting is a "morale issue" for the army and could help in retaining and recruiting soldiers. 

But retired army colonel Doug Bland said the army doesn‘t have the extra money for paratroopers. "It is important to have high-readiness forces but they don‘t have to go by parachute," said Mr. Bland, chairman of the Defence Management Studies program at Queen‘s University.

Helicopters have become the mainstay of moving units around war zones.

© Copyright  2002 The Ottawa Citizen


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## portcullisguy

Never had the desire to willingly jump out of a perfectly good aircraft that wasn‘t on fire or about to crash -- I can however sympathize with paras in Canada.

The airborne ability is essential not only to esprit de corps, morale, and so many intangibles, but also to the tangibles such as combat effectiveness and quick reaction to trouble areas.

Although Canadians didn‘t, Americans DID insert by air at least once during the Afghanistan campaign currently underway, and with positive effects.

Our JTF2 lads will still use airborne insertion whether the regulars keep the ability or not.  Since most of the early JTF2 members were former Airborne Regiment blokes, I would imagine this would be a skill they would want to keep available in the pool of potential special forces candidates.

In Britain, the SAS have an entire squadron that bears a majority of its members from the Parachute Regiment, and paras are scattered throughout the entire SAS in all four squadrons.

If helicopters are the main method of transport these days, then no problem.  You can parachute out of one no problem.

Paras are a different breed, and so it should remain.  My crap-hat‘s off to them.


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## Doug VT

The article is a 17 month old reprint with a few new things added.  Things have changed.  Besides, large scale airborne drops are a thing of the past.  Three divided companies of paratroopers are obviously not going to do a major drop(people wise)  Disregard the article.


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## Brock

I agree that conventional parachute drops are not really required of Canada, but Canada does require a dedicated airborne trained special operations capable unit that it not a true special force unit, but somewhere in between.  This is not a new idea, but one that is already in effect in the many of our allies militaries.  The British Army has its Paras.  The US Army has its Ranger Battalions.  The Royal Australian Army has its 4th battalion Royal Australian Regimet [Commando].  The three units named have many commonalities.  First, they are all airborne trained.  Two, they are all high readiness units.  Three, they are not "true" special forces units, but hilghly trained airborne infantry units used for specific roles.  To be fair to the US Army Ranger battalions, they are the most specially trained of the three units.  The Rangers are not used for general peace support operations whereas 4 RAR (CDO) and the Paras are.

These aiborne infantry units are useful in a mcuh wider variety of roles than true dedicated special forces units and are far less expensive.  Quite often airborne units provide heavy support to special forces units, becuase they often train together and have similiar, but not identical, mission mandates.  For example, the US Army Rangers provided support to the US Army Delta Force during the failed peace support operation in Somalia.  The British Paras provided heavy support to the British SAS in Sierra Leone in the fall of 2000 to rescue British Army hostages; no rescue would have occurred without Para support or a higher death toll would have resulted.

Needless, to say conventional airborne infantry units may indeed be a thing of the past, but limited special operations capabale airborne infantry battalions will continue to be required in the short and long term.  Therefore, I believe that some form of semi-specialized airborne commando unit--not unlike the CAR--is required to complement the JTF 2, but not replace it.  I would suggest that any new CAR-like regiment have a much more focused mandate and have a defined selection process that will better weed out any "rambo-types" that attempt to get in so that disciplinary problems do not become a problem again.


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## ParaMoe

You know what?  I think that the officer who wrote this article is not a paratrooper and therefore is quick to decide on what the capabilities of a paratrooper are.  
Whether it be a large scale drop, or a small unit behind enemy lines a Little Group of Paratroopers, WILL cause stress and havoc behind enemy lines.  Highly motivated, keen, trained hard and the williness to fight makes paratroopers an awsome asset to have and employ.  
I‘ve worked within units who are not paratroopers and let me tell you the initiative to get things done and the ability to fight hard is not there.  Only in a para unit will you find a tough spirit that is hard to break.
If anyone thought about getting rid of the AIRBORNE well did they think how much moral WILL suffer?  Good soldiers want to be challanged, a Para unit is made up of volunteers.  If you take the Paras away how challanging will it be to maintain vehicles all day in a mechnized unit.  Trying to get recruits is hard enough for the CF.  Keeping guys in is even harder.  So if the powers that be say shut down the Airborne, well they are going to loose a lot of good soldiers real fast.  :mg:


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## para

I fully agree with paramoe and I dare somone to argue for getting rid of the para coys!


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## rceme_rat

Elite units can have many roles - they don‘t have to be airborne any more than they need to be clearance divers.  They do, however, need to be relevant.  Otherwise, their only reason for existence is their own perpetuation.  

If the strategic analysis leads to the conclusion that parachuting is a desirable skill but that unit-level AB ops are highly unlikely, then we should disband jump coys.  If JTF2 requires AB skills, it can use para trg as part of the selection process.  SAR can do the same.  (Does the raise the question of whether we end up contracting out the Para Centre, though, doesn‘t it?)

Other discussions have indicated airmobile ops is likely to replace AB ops.  This will  cost more, not less, than AB ops -- probably safe to assume we won‘t be acquiring this capability in the short term, even if we really need it to maintain credible combat presence among our allies.

As suggested above, this could all be the result of political in-fighting within the military.  We can‘t afford to let that happen - there is no point bickering over limited resources.  We don‘t need another Vernon, e.g., leading us to an sharp end force that can‘t support itself, or any of the many possible outcomes that reflect personal fiefdoms over mission-oriented realities.

What we really need is a "big picture" analysis of what our military is expected to do, what roles are to be fulfilled, what skills are required, and what resources are necessary to make it happen.  This has to be balanced against what funding the government is prepared to give.  Take note of the recent (unscientific) Globe & Mail poll indicating only slightly more than 50% of Canadians think we should have an immediate increase in military spending. We can‘t expect more resources, and we know that we can no longer do more with less. 

I‘m skeptical of such a White Paper level review ever happening under this govvernment.


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## fortuncookie5084

This article is flawed right to the core.  It is an undeniable truth that large numbers of troops with all manner of equipment (the Yanks man-jump the Stinger missile!!) and vehicles can he inserted far behind enemy lines with, to steal a line from A Bridge Too Far, "thunder-clap surprise."  I feel compelled to remind any non-believers that the United Stated dropped a company sized fighting force in Afghanistan which not only successfuly completed a raid against an armed enemy but seized the airfield as well, allowing themselves to be airlifted out by three C-130‘s about one hour later.  I‘m sick of Canada‘s "we can‘t do it" excuses.  I hate to think the Americans are better but they sure showed the military community that mass para drops are still a great way into the bad guy‘s back yard.


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## rceme_rat

A company-sized drop is _not_  a mass para op.  It  _is_  the kind of para op contemplated as still being likely.

The comment regarding the US drop in Afghanistan is incredibly ironic -- in stating that a sub-unit sized drop shows the world that mass para ops remain essential, you only emphasize how small our military is and how little we understand large-scale operations.  

When we stopped studying Corps ‘86 on the basis that we were better off studying how to use what we had (rather than what we would hope for should we ever go to Europe en masse), we committed ourselves to studying tactics, not strategy.  

Major decisions in large forces revolve around divisions - we can‘t put one together before a major op is concluded.  Since we don‘t have a deployable division, we don‘t study how to use it.  So be it - but let‘s not delude ourselves into thinking that we are preparing for mass ops of any kind.

Anything less than a drop of a complete division is not a mass para op.  A brigade drop might be a large scale operation, but it hardly contemplates mass ops.  Indeed, the heyday of para ops was in WWII, when everyone saw what a mass drop really was.

This distinction does not render our para  training meaningless.  Indeed, if we are consciously focusing on small-unit ops, one could say that all soldiers should do basic para, since it appears that small-unit ops is the future of AB tasks.  Perhaps the real conclusion from the Council‘s report is that we are not consciously focusing on small-unit ops, since the recommendation re para forces seems based on a large force concept.  

[Incidentally, this focus on smaller units also explains why we have no real understanding of logistics -- we don‘t have enough ground forces to create a serious logistical problem (consider the problems faced by the US in supplying food, fuel, ammo and repair parts in the Gulf War).  If we did study larger ops, we would be trying to grow a larger tail, not a smaller one -- the logistics problems you experience on ex will only be magnified in the real world.]


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## spacemarine

The 2REP showed what a small para drop could do in Kolwezi, 1978. They jumped and saved thousands of whites that were being slaughtered by the Katanga (?) rebels.


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## fortuncookie5084

I see rceme‘s point about just what is a true mass drop. As you can see I‘m a product of the mid-late 1990‘s Canadian Forces. 

 I still consider 3 hercules flying abreast to be a mass drop.  I do agree that the likelyhood of a true mass drop (10-20 000 troops) to be almost impossible.  But company-sized drops are entirely realistic as long as they can either get out fast (like in my example) or have heavy follow-on forces relieve them. Plus, let us not forget, 2eme REP may have a storied history and get some fancy missions, but if Canada were to get a juicy mission we would excel at the task.


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## cagomez

Weird,

A few guys in my unit were just offered a jump course...
Good article concerning the jump course and light infantry in general.

 http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/correspondent_vernon/20020527.html


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## rceme_rat

Interesting article.  No disputing the comment that troops that train together under difficult circumstances will come together like no others.  That doesn‘t mean those circumstances have to be under ‘chutes, though.  Any tough training will do, and that training should be done at all units, not just para units.  

Quite frankly, parachuting itself is not really that difficult.  I‘ve done it, and landed safely all five times.  We drop cargo, and it seems to find the ground.  If we need to drop troops, they can be trained to hit their targets using steerable square ‘chutes as suggested.  The difficult part is what you have to do once you are on the ground.  

The technological hurdle is developing a highly steerable ‘chute which can handle the load of a fully-equipped infantryman, while providing the fast descent rate necessary for military ops.  Ideally, it will be as small in area as current ‘chutes so as to remain relatively less visible.

Once again, I‘d note that the kind of ops mentioned in the article as the future of para seem to be smaller, not larger, teams.  The other interesting point in the article is the argument that we need to maintain capabilities in a variety of ops - light, medium and heavy.  Either that, or we had better get ready to saying "NO" when asked to support missions for which we are not equipped or trained.    

Finally, for those who wonder about the credibility of journalists -- Mike Vernon, the article‘s author, is a former PPCLI officer and RMC grad (mid-80s) who came by his military interest the old-fashioned way -- he followed in his Dad‘s footsteps for a while.


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## Jungle

All right !!! A mass drop does not necessarily mean thousands of troops are going at the same time in the same place. "Mass drop" is used when troops exit the aircraft from both side doors, putting a number of troops over a relatively small area. The largest drop I was involved in was 540 jumpers over the same Drop Zone in a few minutes and believe me, it WAS a mass drop!!! All WW2 drops went in over a number of DZ‘s, never was a Division dropped on a single DZ. 
Now about the parachute, you cannot use a square for large drops (see mass drop above) because there is a great risk of entanglements in the first few seconds of flight with troops going in different directions. The next generation "mass drop" parachutes will enable the jumper to turn and choose the side on which he will land, but it will still follow wind drift to avoid collisions between jumpers.
Finally, journalists, no matter what their background, are in it for the scoop and to make money, no matter what!!!   
(read comment below, it is still relevant today)


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## rceme_rat

Any group of soldiers who are told that what they are doing is extremely difficult, that they are the only ones who can do it, who are encouraged to think of themselves as an elite, who are led by similarly-minded NCOs and officers, and who are trained to fight, will fight.  They don‘t have to be paratroopers.  This doesn‘t take away from our jumpers.  They get the kudos they deserve and have borne the brunt of a slagging they don‘t (i.e., Somalia fall-out).

The question that is raised by this discussion, as in many other discussions on this board, is one of priorities -- what does the government expect the military to do and what are they willing to accept as the costs (either in dollars or forgone capabilities).  These things have to be decided at a high level, and I don‘t think this government is prepared to give the military the explicit direction necessary to allow real planning.


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## Jungle

Well, I think Mr Montgomery had better knowledge and experience of the real thing than you or me to make this comment. Even though I respect your opinion, I think you are out of your field of expertise on this one...


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## rceme_rat

But would Monty be looking at paras for this quote if he were around today?  It may be that it is a little dated.  Perhaps he would be suggesting some other form of elite soldier.

My main point is that we shouldn‘t be hung up on para solely because of tradition, esprit de corps, etc. -- if the skill is still needed, we should train for it; if not, we shouldn‘t waste time or money on it.  Same goes for whether we should or should not have para units.

It is worthwhile asking whether there are better ways of doing things rather than simply continuing to do them the same way we always have.  Leadership involves knowing when to stop following.


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## Gordon Angus Mackinlay

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe this newspaper article deserves wider circulation.  Being someone who spent seven of the formative years of his life in the (and out) of the three regular bns of The parachute Regiment, which shaped me and made me the human being I am, I must say that I am bias.  However, even though having finally left the system after a lifetime, I am still firmly conviced that there remains a need for airborne units, with operations of company-battalion group size a distinct possibility.

I am not over impressed with the references to Saving Pte Ryanor Band of Brothers.
Yours,
Jock in Sydney.

Parachute troops produce top soldiers

Dave Brown  
The Ottawa Citizen 
Saturday, June 01, 2002

The possibility of declaring parachute troops obsolete has caused upset among the few former jumpers I know. They say parachuting isn‘t the issue, and the decision to remove it should not be made by people who never did it. 

It‘s a confusing issue, they say. It‘s something one has to live through to understand. 

Searching for an explanation, I put the question to Brig.-Gen. (retired) Ian Douglas, a 36-year veteran of the military who was Commander of Canada‘s élite Canadian Airborne Regiment from 1982 to 1985. 

He, too, seemed to struggle, trying to find common ground with a person who has no military experience. We found a starting point when he asked if I had seen Steven Spielberg‘s epic war movie Saving Private Ryan, and the made-for-television series Band of Brothers, made by Mr. Spielberg in partnership with Tom Hanks.

"Something those films show well is what is required of troops in combat; the amazing things we expect young men to do under terrible circumstances. The sacrifices they become willing to make. 

"I think what most people don‘t realize is that they don‘t do those things for a country or a flag or an ideal. They certainly aren‘t interested in politics. They do what they have to do for each other. For the small unit. In combat, the small unit, the infantry section, becomes something stronger than family." 

Is it the terror of combat that creates those bonds? 

"I‘ve never been in combat," said Brig.-Gen. Douglas. "But I‘ve known terror.

"The most terrifying moment of my life was standing for the first time in a mock tower as a young officer knowing I was going to have to jump (10 metres). You jump in pairs and there was a young private with me waiting for me to do it, then he would have to follow. 

"I could see he was as scared as I was. But we did it, and at that moment there was a bond formed between us neither would ever forget. We had both conquered a great personal fear."

The training of parachute troops, it seems, is a way of substituting actual combat with something almost as tough and terrifying. 

Those who experience it become set apart from the rest of us, and in the mutual overcoming of fear and great discomfort find a new respect for each other. 

That isn‘t the right word, but there doesn‘t seem to be one.

I‘ve travelled to many military ceremonies in many countries and have seen the paratroop phenomenon. They seek each other out and even former enemies have that special bond. 

As a man who spent much of his military career preparing young men to perform under terrible circumstances, Brig- Gen. Douglas shows open fear at the possibility of losing the parachute as a training tool. 

"We expect so much from these kids. We have to give them every bit of help we can."

He sees the parachute not as a device to slow a falling body, but as a psychological training tool. 

In 1982, the general recalled, he took part in the Maroon Beret course at Petawawa. He was a colonel at the time, but all rank was removed and everybody on the course was a paratrooper, including the regimental sergeant major. Nobody got preferential treatment. 

They spent their days and nights together sharing rough duty in the field. They picked the same bugs out of the same field rations. They went on runs at five in the morning. And they jumped together. 

As one of two men responsible for jumping with a medium machine-gun, Brig.-Gen. Douglas recalls that particular horror. 

"You are so loaded with equipment that the jump masters have to stand you up, help you to the door, and hold you in place until the green light comes on. Then you jump, or perhaps fall out of the airplane would better describe it." 

He recalls his "airborne buddy" from that course was a young trooper from 1er Commando Aéroporté, the Airborne‘s francophone unit. 

"We did everything together; checked each other before jumps, literally lived and breathed with each other for 10 days, 24 hours a day.

"Every time we met after that, even if I was inspecting the troops, we had a little look for each other. Not quite a wink. He was my airborne buddy." 

In a letter to the editor in this newspaper last Saturday, similar sentiments were expressed by Col. (Retired) R.L. Cowling of London, Ont. 

"(Paratroopers) have the ‘can-do‘ temperament, and the willingness to accept hardship and danger that is the mark of the professional soldier world-wide." 

Canada‘s military leaders have promised a decision in the fall about whether to retire the parachute. The military isn‘t a democracy so there won‘t be a vote. One thing is clear. Those who have experienced parachute training think dropping it would be an awful mistake.

Dave Brown is the Citizen‘s senior editor. Send e-mail to dbrown@thecitizen.southam.ca Read previous columns at www.ottawacitizen.com

© Copyright  2002 The Ottawa Citizen
NOTE
In regard to Spielberg.  During the making of Pte Ryan the extras that played the American/German soldiers  (apart from the initial scenes of the invasion when the Irish Army provided the big blob of people) in the vast majority of the scenes, were a group of 18 either serving regular members (or who had just been discharged) of the Para Regt and Royal Marines who were on leave, most being Cpls or Sgts (British equivalent not CFs), and either Jocks or Londoners.

Spielberg was fascinated by them, because when they did a scene - it was done to perfection, no retakes like they do with Hollywood extras/stunt men, these blokes were professionals.  They would contribute their own thoughts to the proceedings, which enhanced the dramatic appeal of many of the scenes.

So Spielberg was absolutely and totally impressed, although his minders were quite upset with the behaviour, believing the chaps should kowtow to the great man.

He would talk to them during breaks being fascinated by stories of the Falklands, Northern Ireland, para/commando training, in short everything to do with them.  But, what really amazed him was their sense of humour, and the constant rapatee between them.

In our regimental association we have a chap who is ex Para Regt, and who got the job as an extra on the day he completed his 22 years and was waiting to migrate to Australia (since then three of the other extras have arrived in Sydney as migrants).  He telling the story, since confirmed by the others of Spielberg asking the lads if any of them were Jewish, of which three of them where (lot of Jewish lads have joined the Para Regt over the years).

He then asking if anyone had had family who had died during the war, another of the lads - a true cockney, born in the Tower Hamlets, piped up and said "yes, I had a uncle".  Spielberg saying he was sorry, and what camp did he die in.  So and so said the cockney, "terrible, that was a death camp"  from Spielberg.  "How did he die", "o‘h he fell out of a guard tower"!

18 Tom‘s roaring with laughter, some 10 or 11 of Speilbergs minders, saying disgusting, terriblce, how racist et ect et ect.  Spielberg, standing there like a stunned mullet, then finally disintergrating in hysterical laughter.

For the rest of the production, he was constantly saying ‘he fell out of a guard tower‘.  When the final scenes requiring the lads was shot.  He took all 18 and their wives/lovers/girlfriends out for dinner (no minders present), presenting each with a silver pint tankard with the traditional glass bottom with a gold guinea inside, each engraved for the bloke‘s, and the movie details.  A number subsequently took part in the filming of Band of Brothers.


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## Jungle

thanks Jock for a great article...
Of course the non-believers will think: "here we go again..." but guess what...
I have never heard of a Mechanized Infantry Brotherhood, or a Tank Loader Brotherhood... but the International Brotherhood of Paratroopers, even though not an official organization, really exists. There really is a bond between Paratroopers that goes beyond nationality, religion, color, language etc...


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## rceme_rat

There is also the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.  And the Teamsters.  Let‘s not get hung up on a word.

If the time has come for para to be replaced by airmobile or some other concept, so be it.  If the time is to change the focus of the use of para, that‘s fine too.  And if the current use of para should remain, then let it continue.  But the decision has to be based on strategic assessment, not on sentiment or regiment.

History teaches us lessons, but we musn‘t forget that it must be viewed in today‘s context if it is to be of any value.  Any unit can be made into an elite, no holds barred, fight to the finish unit if you are permitted to have high standards, intense training, and solid leadership.


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## Recce41

Great Post.
 As one of the "Last of the First" ( Served with the 8CH/RCD jump troop 83-93. I know the feelings of we don‘t need it. 
 We were always enemy force, it was great. The LEG Sqns never had a chance. We made the last operational jump Oct 31, 93.  With a total of 26 Drops and 5 LAPES, our Lynxs were well worn. To all of the Airborne Brothers.  Airborne /Bold and Swift


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## Jungle

Rat, these things you‘re talking about are official organizations... but I guess you don‘t care !! I recognize the lawyer in you, and the frustrated Ringknocker who was probably told he would never make General, and the cherryjumper who never made it in the Regiment... you see, there was only one MAINT O in the Regt, and it was never you !!!
It seems you have a solution to all the problems in the system, yet you are looking at it from the outside... have you thought about coming back and changing all those things ??? I am still in, and will be for some time. I work hard to make things better in my organization, and motivating young people to stay in the system is very difficult. I know by experience that an Airborne unit is great motivation for troops who aspire to more than debussing from a veh, and it helps keep good soldiers in the system. So can we afford to lose good soldiers because there is no challenge for them ? Does debussing from a veh or helo give the feeling that you have conquered fear ? A former boss of mine told me one day: "Choose your battles"... well, a lot of people, including myself,  think this one is worth fighting for !!!


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## rceme_rat

To address Jungle‘s points for those who may not have read as many of my posts as he:

A.  Regarding the basis for my point-of-view:

I never had to worry about being a General and certainly never had to be told that in the first place.  There are only one or two EME generals at any one time, and it would have been incredibly unrealistic to expect it to happen, particularly given my inability to master French beyond the functional level.  If I had not left, I‘m confident my career would be progressing as well as I could have hoped for.

I never had any interest in joining the CAR, nor in doing the jump course.  After 4 or 5 (sport) jumps, I realized jumping per se wasn‘t my thing - while jumping itself is fun, there is nothing driving me to do it again and again (and note that there is no attempt here to equate sport jumping with military jumping, since they are clearly different).  Motorcycling, hang-gliding and climbing are a little more fun for me and have an allure which maintains my interest more than jumping ever could.

Maint O?  No, not of the CAR (and used herein, its successors).  But of a differnt combat arm unit - yes, I did that tour.  I‘ve co-ordinated the efforts of multiple multinational Maint Os as well.

Do I agree that there should be elite units, or at least advanced quals that require soldiers to push themselves, for the purposes you mention?  Yes, there should be something to aspire to, particularly for soldiers who easily conquer most other challenges.  Para might still be one of those quals, if it is truly relevant to future ops.  But if it doesn‘t have any other value, is it the best challenge to offer, or is it just an officially-recognized form of adventure training?

As far as "having solutions", I don‘t claim any infallible insight.  Far from it, since I recognize a lot of my experience involved making mistakes large and small.  I do have opinions regarding solutions, or approaches to determining solutions.  They are based on my education (engineering at RMC, and business and law at civilian universities),  - my military experience (line and staff EME positions across Canada and with the UN),  and my civilian work, as a lawyer.  They are also based on a continued interest in and discussion of military affairs.  

Is that interest from the outside?  Yes.  Be thankful that some of us on the outside have military experience and continue to care about what is happening.  In the end, the major decisions will be made by people on the outside, and a lot of them have no military experience.  Maybe they will be inclined to listen to other people on the outisde if not to soldiers who are sometimes thought to have a vested interest.

Should I come back?  A continual personal debate.  The areas of practice offered in JAG are not my most favoured and the pay is about half of the best positions on Bay Street.  Frankly, I‘d be better paid if I came back as an EME officer (than as a JAG officer), but I think the years I spent at law school and in practice could be put to better use.  

B.  As for the topic at hand:

‘Official organizations‘  are not sancrosanct -- whether they should remain or not is a fair topic of discussion, particularly given the current reality.  At present funding levels, and with no real improvement in sight, something will have to give soon.  Don‘t be surprised if units disappear or their roles change.  If the army continues to fight internally over establishments, it is likely that it won‘t be the navy or air force that suffers.  

We must continually evaluate our strategic and tactical plans and, if the analysis points to disbanding units or even eliminating certain skills, then we should do so.  If the sole raison d‘etre for the CAR is as a training ground, then it seems a luxury we can no longer afford.  

If it is better to maintain the CAR as an element of a diverse force, rather than disbanding it to provide for a deeper, but more concentrated, force, then it should be kept.  But it shouldn‘t be kept just because there are a bunch of jumpers who can‘t envision change.

Should you fight this fight?  By all means.  By putting forth the best arguments in favour of keeping the CAR, or even in just maintaining para skills, it will provide the best possible means of evaluating the value of doing so (flexibility of response, special teams, maintenance of unique skills that are not easily replaced, etc.) compared to the potential value of changing tactics, of consolidating equipment types, of ensuring we have similarly trained soldiers throughout the forces, etc.  

At the same time, jumpers should not be afraid (perhaps hesitant or resistant would be better words) to conclude that their role is passe if that is where the analysis leads them, since they are usually among the best troops and they will easily adapt to whatever new, probably elite, role is assigned to them.  Just don‘t situate your estimate.

Frankly, I don‘t see the army giving up the airborne skills quite yet, particularly for small team operations (say, company level or smaller).  I do see the outside possibility that they will become more of an advanced qual.  Personally, I do think it would be nice if the tower (at least) was part of basic for everyone.  No reason it shouldn‘t be, just as rappelling was.

Finally, and perhaps as an aside, consider that if someone doesn‘t occassionally ask the hard questions, the answers may be forgotten when you really need them.  This is a good time to remind ourselves (and others) of what we want our military to do for use as a nation, how they must do that, and what support they require.


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## spacemarine

rcemerat: I‘m confused.....did you actually earn your wings at the CABC/CPC or did you ‘jump‘ as a civy? Any fat chump can go jump out of a cessna in a pink powerranger outfit and say he‘s airborne.  Jumping from the mock tower and the helicopter or plane tests someone more than rapelling/fastroping/obstacle crse does. I‘ve never seen anyone refuse to rapell off a tower or rock face. For the experience and challenge it provides to motivated troops and for the small amount of money (was it $100mil?) it costs it is a great investment.


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## rceme_rat

I thought I was quite specific in that I had not done Basic Para and that I do see the value of the course, and in particular the tower, as a confidence builder.

As far as what stops people in their tracks, I have seen people refuse to jump from a Cessna, others who have frozen at the top of the cliff when on belay, others who couldn‘t breathe with scuba gear, etc.  In almost all of these cases, it is simply a matter of learning to trust yourself, your peers, and your gear.

As far as cost goes, I think the real cost is not the obvious training cost - it is the loss of depth in similarly equipped and trained troops (for rotos, etc.), the additional support costs, etc.  These may be perfectly acceptable in light of what para-equipped troops can accomplish.  But it appears that it is time for a serious discussion of the pros and cons of having para.  One of these discussions should centre on jump coys vs. CAR -- which makes more sense in light of our approach to ops in the future?


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## McG

A paratroop can always participate in an airmobile operation.  The reverse is not true of conventional light infantry participating in an airborne Op.  With paratroops you get two capabilities in a ground force for the price of one.

It is also intresting to note that the scale of parachute operations has shrunk to a size ideally suited to Canada.  The prevailing wisdom is that parachute operations will be conducted at the Bn and Coy levels.  

With that in mind, we should be looking at how we can get the most out of parachute units.  Do we want a standing Airborne Battle Group (like CAR) or do we want Airborne Companies within Airmobile Battalions?

The characteristics of an Airmobile force include its reach (which is far deeper that of conventional ground forces) and its speed of deployment.  Both the reach and speed of an Airborn force exceed the reach and speed of an airmobile force.  

There is not question about it, parachuting is a necessary skill for the Army and it will remain a neccessary skill into the forseable future.


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## ParaMoe

Is it not funny how a bunch of crap hats tell us how much we need the airborne? 
Only a true AIRBORNE soldier knows the capabilities of an airborne unit. Sure some officers up at NDHQ might have thier wings on thier uniform but two months under the beret does not make you a paratrooper.
Money is not a option, effectiveness is. The keener non-JTF troops are in the Paras, though it may seem like elitetism but the facts are true. More heart, more guts, more skill, and an ego that is hard to break which make paratroopers the world over a force to recon with no matter the size.
Take away the AIRBORNE, PARACHUTE COYS or whatever you want to call it, then watch out carrer manager you‘re gonna get a lot of troops getting out.

L.G.o Ps will mess up your day.    :mg:


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## sgtdixon

I Know this is a late reply as I have been quite busy prep‘ing for my Six Wekk Survival instructors course (for which I Leave on the 6th). Every since i was a kid living on base in the PMQ‘s in Greisbach and my father came home after an ex‘ resplendant in his maroon beret I was mystified and since then I have wanted to follow the same path as my father,(he was an MSE Op with SvcCdo),i was amazed by the camariadie that the Airborne had, and i was inspired by my fathers stories about how on his Mountaineering course he was the only Tradseman there and everyone else was an Infanteer, and he outran ‘em all cuz he was gonna let "no f(*)ing grunt!" run him into the ground, and for the first time when the Airborne was disbanded i saw my father weep, for the orginization that had helped him become a soldier was no more, but there was light because there were still the Pars coys,And now i plan on in one year enlisting and becoming a member of that brotherhood. So the to Generals, dont kill the para coy‘s for political reasons, do what an officer is supposed to do, be there for your troops and prove that the upper echelons still know there is a need  for these Jump Coy‘s.


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## the patriot

With the recent events surrounding September 11, 2001 in New York and the performance of our paratroopers in Afghanistan, it would make complete sense to see the CAR returned to the orbat.  3 PPCLI‘s deployment proved that there is still a need for rapidly deployable and capable soldiers that can perform in any environment.

-the patriot-


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## Linc

Don‘t think that just because recent gov‘t policy has been to effectively limit the Canadian Forces to peacekeeping and disaster relief, that those are the only military ‘jobs‘ left to do in the world. Nor should you assume that just because Canada likes to deploy troops in small ad-hoc battle groups that this is the standard depolyment force required in any future operations.  

Afghanistan proved that there is still a need to field an effective combat force.  Airborne infantry provide a heavily armed, highly mobile force that can quickly deploy to and around a combat theatre.  Airborne troops would be a ‘first in first out‘ unit.  An example of an ideal para mission in the modern age might be dropping a force to seize an airfield in a land-locked country, such as Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan, and securing the surrounding area allowing allied transport planes to land allowing regular infantry  troops to deploy from the airfield and continue the campaign. This could even be used in "peacemaking" operations such as those in the early 90‘s in the Former Yugoslavia, where NATO allies had to basically force thier way into the country to establish a presence.  Also can be used as a rapid reaction unit  to reinforce peacekeepers in a deteriorating pecekeeping mission.  

Aid and releif are done by DART, as this is not a combat unit, but should be expanded to provide more releif services.  DART was successful in Turkey, and was on standby to go to New York after 9/11, and would be deployed in Canada in the even of a mjor emergency here.  DART is definitely essential to Canadian interests and even the pacifist anti-military types seem to support it.


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## combat_medic

OK, first things first:

Elite forces = soldiers who are trained above and beyond a "normal" level of soldiering, while still employing the tactics of conventional warfare and therefore still subject to the Geneva Convention (ie US Army Rangers, British Airborne etc.)

Special Forces = soldiers trained in UNconventional warfare (anti-terrorism, hearts and minds ops, LRRP etc.) as well as conventional warfare who are NOT afforded the protection of the Geneva convention (SAS, Delta Force, Navy Seals, Spetsnaz)

now that we have that straight, in my reservist-REMF opinion, Canada seems to have no real elite forces any more with the probably exception of the para companies. While have a para-capable unit with the expectation of an op like Market Garden is not feasable, the ability to effectively deploy troops quickly is always going to be present, as has been in evidence in Afghanistan. 

So, why not have an airborne/airmobile/light infantry battalion who is trained in desert/jungle/mountain ops, who can do a mass static line jump OR an air mobile operation. Make an elite force for the other troops to aspire to and have them all in same area, rather than spread out all over the country the way the jump companies are now. Does this make sense to anyone else?


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## Jarnhamar

Wow i just stumbled across this site and its great.
Should we have an airborne regiment? I would have to say with out a doubt yes.  You can spend hours listing the tactical reasons why every army needs an airborne force. The idea of paratroopers dates back to michael angelo "Where is the king who can defend his castle against soldiers falling from the sky".

Will canada ever reform the regiment? I would have to say with out a doubt no.  Canada is in love with the idea of peacekeepers. Critics do not believe paratroopers (who by training are  arguably "agressive") make good representives of peece keepers. I served a peacekeeping tour with one of the jump companies in bosnia. While there a general addressed our company in a question and answer sitting and the question was asked if it was planned to get rid of the jump companies and the general said yes. I cannot quote him exactly but he basically said there is no real requirement for  for airborne troops and even light infantry battalions and since canadians bought the new LAV 3s they want to see them used so the light infantry battalions will be made into mech battalions.


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## Futur_Para

We I‘m a civi, My main goal in life as a teenager was to earn my wings and have the honour to wear the maroon beret and best of all The CAR cap brass. As a civi I noticed that the CF has been going down in moral and man power. Even the respect we used to have as one of the best trained militarys with the equipment we have.. No we are losing that. My father served 25 years in the AF and retired as a WO. He looks at the military today and tears come to his eyes as they do to mine. I know of over 50 people from all over Canada that wanted to join the CAR. It was there main goals. maybe 20 of them joined the Reg force after the disbannedment. 10 joined the reserves. And most just looked at the military as .... No comment. Many people I know say the CAR was the Last soul of the Military. I know many service men will not like that. People say the Airborne is dead. I think not. The spirit lives on in those who love the regiment. Like a sister or brother You love them no matter what they do.
I donno what else to say.
Airborne... You are not forgotten.


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## para

This is in ref. to GHOST778
I was at that meeting (in the ranks) and to my recollection what the General said was true however this little get together was about 2 - 3 weeks before 9/11 and I am sure that the top brass will (as always) change there stance on Light Infantry Battallions for the future.

"GO LIGHT OR GO HOME"
"JUST ME AND MY BLACK CADILLACS"


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## Jarnhamar

Hopefully they will see the wisdom behind light infantry battalions. Especially considering the state of our vehicles and equipment.
Afganastan was a perfect example; Light Infantry being moved around by helicopters and what not.

What i read in the books regarding armored vehicles and peacekeeping is that ‘Armored vehicles offer the soldiers a great deal more protection however large armored vehicles often anger crowds and insite them to violence.  
ex-when nato ordered the banks closed down and how the crowd reacted to the APCs involved.


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## coreybain

OK, assume airmobile is the answer and the para option is out dated and unlikey because of lack of transport. What helos are we goin to use ? the Griffon? please, only six troops in winter conditions. (anyone else notice how promenent winter conditions are in Canada) Also we have no Attack/armed helos either, I know they are looking at arming some Griffons, but how effective are they going to be compared to an Apache? Airmobile or Para Canada does not have the equipment or the political will and money to get the equipement or set up such a unit (just my oppinion, and I hope I‘m proved wrong). Ideally I believe a light INF Regiment is what we need, two airmobile battalions and a Para battalion ie combine the existing Light INf battalions and Para coys, they exist already, and such a move i feasable if unlikey. As for equip only God knows!


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## combat_medic

I think that ALL of the previous ideas mentioned here are dependant on the CF receiving a higher budget (resurrecting the CAR, a light inf bn., airmobile etc.) Heck, we‘re going to need a larger budget just to maintain the airborne capabilities we have now.


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## Jarnhamar

We would have more cash if we wouldn‘t allow certain soldiers (to be polite and avoid finger pointing) to purchase $800 dollar toilet seats, $1200 dollar designer shower curtans and spend $200 on a can of helicopter wax or a few thousand dollars on a pair of binoculars.

What does the army suggest to save money?
Eliminate the rear right pocket and the parts at the bottom which you tuck into your boots to save 8 cents on each pair.


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## Spr.Earl

The Air Borne will return.
Why? All the western Armies are going 
light and rapid.

If you notice we still have jump companies
with in the Reg.‘s and amongst the Sapper‘s we
still  send boy‘s on thier jump course.

We were up there with the best and will be 
again.

 Have faith,I do.


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## para

WEST IS GOING HEAVY
EAST IS GIONG MED(LAVS)
CENTRAL(PETAWAWA)LIGHT>


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## Jungle

West is going MEDIUM, the rest are going light. Each Bde will have LAV-3 Batt(s) and a Light Inf Batt. 1 Bde will have all the Leos, M-109s and mech engineer eqpt. The Light Inf batts will develop a spec ops capability, with 2 year rotations as dedicated QRF. We will never see a heavy Bde in the Cdn Army.


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## Student Sapper

Northern Iraq.   :warstory:  

‘nuff said.


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## Wilson601

It does my heart good to say yes, but as it was put earlier, my brain says no. 

I can see how the mystique really gets to a soldier, its rather disheartening to think a young soldier like myself will never get the chance to a part of something so great as the CAR. It would have been an attainable goal, for an aspiring young soldier to be the best. This is why (through the eyes of the soldiers at least) the Canadian Airborne Regiment will..HAS been greatly missed. and thats my opinion.  :skull:


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## Student Sapper

A new Airborne unit is required.  It is the only way o ensure that  parchute force wil be garunteed the combat support required for a mission.  You could designate te standard level of support required by a jump Coy (Say a Sect each of Recce, Mor, TOW, and HMG, and an Engineer Tp).  It would not be enough, within a Bde, to only train the minimum number of sub-units to fill this task. What if the requirment for TOW is unusualy high?  What if one of the setions is unvailable due to pers on courses, recent return form deployment, injuries, etc.  To work, each Bde would have to train two of each of these units, or

A full Airborne unit could prvide the internal redundancy to support three rilfe companies.  The unit would not have to train additional combat support groups below the Coy level, becuse of the Cb Sp Coy.


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## 51BNS

Yes we need an elite in our army and the airborne regiment was this elite. Every countries in the world have large commandos forces ready for war, even freaking Poland have some and us?? just jtf2...is that enought to defend ourselves or attack? i dont think so. The only waste of money in the forces is the minister McCallum paycheck.


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## Jarnhamar

A special forces unit isn‘t going to defend us from attack. A well trained and equiped front line military will.
JTF is great but how effective would they be at taking and holding ground with out the artillery armored engineers or infantry?
We don‘t need an elite unit like the airborne. We need a well trained army which includes an airborne element.


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## cheechue

I totally agree Ghost...but in order to fill those front line positions we need people and we just don‘t have the manpower for it. 

By creating elite units we can utilize our smaller numbers.

And aren‘t you supposed to be in Pet right now? We‘ll go for a beer when you get back.


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## Jarnhamar

I think beer comes out of the taps in petawawa instead of water but i‘ll take you up on that beer.

If we don‘t maintain or improve our military as a whole i think that would actually make the JTF less effective because they would be called upon to do regular military tasks. As much as many soldiers hate to admit it, were know as peacekeepers. In the future i can‘t see us doing anything besides peacekeeping really. A role which i don‘t think the jtf would be suited to at all.


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## Slade

i think the regiment should be resurrected.  it was a great unit, except for its unfortunate history.  i would think that the only thing that would hinder its resurrection is the public.


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## Yard Ape

Slade,
What do you think of reserve units maintaining Para Coys?  I think that type of Coy belongs only in the Reg force.  Reservists can‘t maintain the high readyness that makes Para units worth the while.

   Yard Ape


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## McInnes

I do think that our reg force should be updated and expanded. and actually our manpower isnt that bad. we could expand it, its just that our government and general public seems to think that having a puny military on a "lean" budget that is actually...i will stay off that actually, but yes, i dont think we need another elite unit. better reg force, and proper transport capabilities, so that we can actually transport troops...that would be nice...


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## Jason Jarvis

Has any thought ever been given to raising a 4th battalion to one of the three regular regiments, and designating it as (Para) or better yet, (Cdo)?

I‘m thinking along the lines of 4RAR, which I think fills much the same role in the Australian Army as the CAR did in ours.

This would provide the army with a semi-elite force (like the Rangers) without the association of being "another airborne regiment" and it would provide natural lead-in training for JTF-2. It would also give the infantry room to recruit the extra bodies they need to bring the line battalions up to proper strength.

Just a thought.


----------



## FlightSergeantRose

Having an elite unit such as the Rangers or Paratroopers makes people want to be part of them because they are seen as being the best, and most people with drive and determination want to be with the best. But the CF has no elite unit at all, and definitely is not seen as an elite fighting force. JFT-2 is there but it‘s only accessable to only a very select few, and their media is very low key so they don‘t really count. I think that having a larger group of soldiers that are ‘above‘ the regular soldiers, considered the elite of the army‘s best, would increase recruitment and foster a healthy rivalry between the two.


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## McInnes

> I think that having a larger group of soldiers that are ‘above‘ the regular soldiers, considered the elite of the army‘s best


first of all, with the army the size that it is, i dont think we can have a larger group of anything really. We cannot support a group of 900 troops for more than 6 months over seas. Our reg force is stretched to the breaking point as it is. I think we should increase the size of our regular force before we start worrying about "elite forces".


----------



## Jarnhamar

I agree with Mcinnes.
Everyones always talking about special forces and commandos this and airborne that.  How much it raises moral. How people want to be the best of the best. 

We sent 30 of our guys overseas with out weapons. Makes it a little difficult to picture highly trained crack troops dropping behind enemy lines taking out sentries with shoe laces and gerbers then blowing up bridges and disapearing into the bushes like wraiths. It was said the JTF is low key and very difficult to get into. Of course. ITS ‘special forces‘ so to speak. If it was a lot easier to get into then wouldn‘t they lose their effectiveness?  Canada doesn‘t send troops all over the world. As far as combat soldiers deploying we send troops to bosnia and soon now afghanastan. It‘s putting a major strain on our military. How could we afford or even justify more special operations guys whom i bet require way more service support then regular guys.


----------



## Jason Jarvis

Why do we keep doing this to ourselves?      The d@mned government is just NOT going to kick in any more money than they absolutely need -- and then maybe not -- to keep the CF alive.

True enough, we don‘t need more special forces. If the British Army with it‘s pool of 200 000 soldiers has determined that it can only provide enough trained manpower for a 300-400 strong SAS regiment, where does our government -- with an army 1/10 the size of Britain‘s -- think it‘s going to get 500-600 operators for JTF-2?   :blotto:  

What does our army need? How about a comprehensive foreign and defence policy review, to begin with? How about the funds to bring all line units up to strength, or beyond? Get rid of "just in time" supply! Strategic airlift so they don‘t have to hitchhike would be nice, too, but this doesn‘t necssarily mean C-17s -- A400Ms would work just fine for us. RO-RO ships would be great, although I‘d take the navy‘s ALSC design, if that‘s all I had. Hey -- how about some helos that could carry something useful, like, say, a 105 piece, or a complete section. And on and on and on. . . .

Sorry, I had to get that off my chest.


----------



## Yard Ape

Much like some of the people who post here, I do not belive our government can grasp the difference between Commando Forces and Special Forces.  The goverment wants CAR/Rangers and Delta/SAS in a single unit.  They want to build that unit from the JTF.  It won‘t work.

We need more Regular Force Airborne capability.

   Yard Ape


----------



## FlightSergeantRose

I think you missed what I was trying to get at. I know very well that the CF is underfunded and the problems with keeping our troops supplied with proper equipment and so on. I also know that we have a small army. This is also due to funds. 

What I was trying to say was simply there would be much more interest in the army and the CF (from the civies) if there was something better then the regular army. Something for people to aspire to join. To be apart of an ‘elite‘ force, the ‘best of the best‘. The government would then advertise this to the public and many people would become interested because of what being apart of this unit would stand for. 

I know we shouldn‘t advertise JTF-2, and that it should be kept secretive, small, etc, etc.

I personally don‘t all that much care about that idea because I know I want to be an infantier, regardless of us having a ‘marines‘ type unit. But a majority of the public doesn‘t know jack schit about the army, or the CF in general. And those that have no ties to the army at all ( relative, friends ) think of our army as a joke. ( from my experience, anyways ). I was more addressing an idea of how to get more people interested in the army.


----------



## Bert

Theres been alot of interest in JTF2 and special forces, but rather than public opinion, it takes leadership to figre out what the do with the land forces in general.

The Canadian Army, specifically the land force ground pounders, are made up of reserve and
regular army, light infantry like PPLI and RCR, airborne cerified members, and JTF2.  The special forces are designed for specific and special tasks where the regular infantry isn‘t the best option.

Infantry takes, holds, and occupies territory.  Airborne units drop into an area, often behind enemy lines, and hold it for the regular army or special task.  Light infantry are more mobile and handle the direct thrusts than regular infantry.  JTF2 are the CBQ and counterterrorist specialists and from my understanding, are not a replacement for the Airborne though I‘m sure some members are jump certified.  To have a special forces, or re-engagement of the airborne forces, the leadership has to identify if the Forces requires and wants to spend money on keeping and equiping such a unit.  Once the government mandates the military, public opinion has little to do with the functionality of the Forces.  I believe the airborne functionality of the Forces was not lost after CAR was disbanded, but yes, it was affected.

Its interesting to speculate how the military will organize itself in the coming years.  Will it create more small special unit forces or update the regular army with equipment and multi-roles?


----------



## Jungle

> I believe the airborne functionality of the Forces was not lost after CAR was disbanded, but yes, it was affected.


I believe it was lost. The Battalion is the lowest level that is self-sufficient in operations, and we lost the expertise in deploying and resupplying one when the CAR was disbanded. Even the Air force is having difficulties keeping crews current in TAT (Tactical Air Transport). In 99, they could not scrape enough qual‘d pers to fly a 3-plane formation in Trenton (actually, there was not a single crew qual‘d Adv TAT to lead a formation), but they could all fly in single-plane formation... not very useful in a tactical situation.


----------



## skura

I've asked this question on an airborne forum but have yet to receive an answer, most likely because all capable of answering are either currently over seas or far from a computer...so given the experience on this forums (as well as theirs) I'll ask here as well...

What are the roles of a paratrooper in todays Canadian Army?

On an unrelated note;

I've heard them (paratroopers) be referred to as "trained killers" by men who used to serve in the regs and by some who still serve on the reserves and my first thought was "aren't all infantry?"

Any comments?


----------



## Fishbone Jones

skura said:
			
		

> I've asked this question on an airborne forum but have yet to receive an answer, most likely because all capable of answering are either currently over seas or far from a computer...so given the experience on this forums (as well as theirs) I'll ask here as well...
> 
> What are the roles of a paratrooper in todays Canadian Army?
> 
> On an unrelated note;
> 
> I've heard them (paratroopers) be referred to as "trained killers" by men who used to serve in the regs and by some who still serve on the reserves and my first thought was "aren't all infantry?"
> 
> Any comments?



Comments: 

I doubt they're all deployed, probably just hiding. Maybe they have gotten tired of answering the same question 15 or 20 times a week from people who won't reserch the subject and just want quick answers.

Try these links:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/1739.0.html

http://army.ca/forums/threads/1821.0.html

If that doesn't satisfy you, try a simple little solution we have here called a "SEARCH". You'll find two pages of threads simply by typing "airborne" then try "paratrooper"

If you still have a specific question after looking through all 40 or 50 threads, feel free to repost.


----------



## JasonH

(Damn title was to long lol)

*By land, by sea: If Canada wants to build a rapid reaction force the answer is simple
The Airborne Regiment*
   





CREDIT: Pat McGrath, The Ottawa Citizen 
In recent years, many senior officers and even government officials are coming to realize the potential value of the role the now-disbanded Airborne Regiment played in the Canadian Forces. 

Chris Wattie 
The Ottawa Citizen 

Saturday, October 09, 2004

Canadian defence planners and military strategists have been wrestling with the idea of some kind of rapid reaction force for decades, a large body of soldiers that can be sent quickly to a crisis zone anywhere in the world.

The troops would intervene in humanitarian crises, rescue Canadian citizens caught up in a civil war or natural disaster, or capture and hold an airport in a combat zone until Canadian or allied reinforcements can be flown in.

Major-General Brian Vernon, a retired army officer, believes he has the answer: the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

"If they want a strategically transportable, combat capable force of, let's say 1,000 to 1,100 men, then you want the Airborne Regiment," says Maj.-Gen. Vernon, who served with the now disbanded regiment for seven of his 39-year military career.

"Although you probably couldn't call it that," he adds quickly.

The very name of the now disbanded unit has been anathema to successive defence ministers and senior military officers since the regiment was stricken from the army's rolls in 1995 in the wake of the Somalia scandal.

But in recent years, Maj.-Gen. Vernon says that many senior officers and even government officials are coming to realize the potential value of the role the Airborne played in the Canadian Forces.

"To make that initial assault ... to get our guys in there quickly, then what you want is something that's going to look a lot like the Airborne Regiment," he says. "Imagine if we'd had them available to get to (Canadian General) Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda or in Afghanistan, should our troops over there get into serious trouble."

"These (airborne) forces can be very, very useful ... The French have proven that over and over again with their Force d'Intervention, which is based on their 10th Parachute Division."

He says the government appears to be trying to fill that role by expanding JTF-2, the Canadian Forces' secretive commando unit.

In 2001, as part of its response to the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington, the federal government boosted JTF-2's budget by $119-million in order to double the size of the anti-terrorist force. But the unit has so far been unable to attract enough qualified applicants to reach its goal of 600 commandos, even after lowering its rigorous standards.

"I think it's doomed to failure -- our army isn't big enough to support that many special forces," says Maj.-Gen. Vernon.

As well, he says the training and work done by anti-terrorism or special forces units such as JTF-2 is not particularly well-suited to the role he envisions for a future airborne force.

"My professional opinion is that it has to be nothing smaller than a battalion ... big enough to be self-sufficient and pack a reasonable punch, and small enough to be easily transported and affordable."

Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, the now retired head of UN forces during the siege of Sarajevo, agrees it is time the Canadian army got back into the air.

He envisions a parachute battalion forming part of a much larger force that is "air deployable" into whatever international hot-spot that the federal government decides to send them.

"By which I mean they can fit their kit into whatever aircraft we have to transport them."

The heart of such a "light brigade" would be a parachute infantry battalion along the lines of the Airborne Regiment. "But I would call it First Canadian Parachute Battalion," Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie says. "For historical reasons." (First Canadian Parachute Battalion was the airborne unit that jumped into Normandy on the night before D-Day, during the Second World War).

"You need guys with their kit all packed, ready to go the moment the balloon goes up."

Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie says that the best argument for reforming the Airborne Regiment and a supporting "followup" brigade is the flexibility such a unit would give the government in responding to international crises.

"Seventy-two hours after someone in Ottawa sends out the call, an airborne regiment could be in the planes and on their way. That gives the government a phenomenally effective tool."

But Maj.-Gen. Vernon says it would be relatively simple to reform the Airborne Regiment -- under whatever name is eventually chosen.

"There are still enough experienced NCOs around from the Airborne Regiment that you have a good nucleus to form the unit around. It wouldn't take any time at all, once the decision's made."

What might take some time is acquiring the right aircraft to get the paratroopers there and to support them with air strikes or supply drops once they land. The air force's workhorse fleet of CC-130 Hercules is almost 40 years old and is plagued by maintenance problems that ground up to two-thirds of the planes at a time.

But the biggest hurdle to overcome might be the unfortunate legacy of the former Airborne Regiment which still looms large in the minds of government leaders, says Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie. "It's possible to sell this idea to the public," he says. "But I don't see any politician taking that risk."

© The Ottawa Citizen 2004

http://www.canada.com/national/features/tugofwar/story.html?id=27c69f1c-936e-439b-a497-23151a8b2af2&page=1


----------



## Scott

Well, if the gov't is serious about the forming of a new Brigade then they can put some of those alloted positions in here. 

I think that this will turn into a very touchy subject.


----------



## JasonH

Screw the 5000 man peacekeeping idea.

Give a 1000 men to form a new Airborne reg. and put the rest in to fill out the other brigades.  Or you could have two but I'm pretty sure that's on the expensive side.


----------



## Scott

I like the idea of keeping our SF unit small, can't attract that many elite soldiers from a 60,000 pers military, small, simple and effective, creation of a CAR-like unit would take alot of the demand off of our SF unit. I am all for it.


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## JasonH

Yea but I think this quote says it best

*But the biggest hurdle to overcome might be the unfortunate legacy of the former Airborne Regiment which still looms large in the minds of government leaders, says Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie. "It's possible to sell this idea to the public," he says. "But I don't see any politician taking that risk."*

 :-\


----------



## Scott

True, it'll be hard selling it to the public, too. I know many were outraged over the Somalia scandal, but, IMHO, more were pissed at the hazing videos and the stories of their behavior at Pet. How the elitist culture rules over them. Public perception of the new Regiment, whatever they call it, is going to make or break it before it gets off the ground.

How much you wanna bet Scott Taylor is wetting himself in anticipation of this one?


----------



## Armymedic

Heres a thought,
Lets call it the 2nd Canadian Parachute Bn/Brigade/Force.


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## Scott

I think that whatever the name is that they have to steer clear of "Airborne" lot of bad feelings come with that name, IMHO. I am not on that side of things, just making suggestions.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

And they woudl jump out of what?


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## NavyGrunt

Lets call it-

Fighting long onto war, everything regiment.

We'd call them FLOWER for short. That way the public would love them.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

scott1nsh said:
			
		

> True, it'll be hard selling it to the public, too. I know many were outraged over the Somalia scandal, but, IMHO, more were pissed at the hazing videos and the stories of their behavior at Pet. How the elitist culture rules over them. Public perception of the new Regiment, whatever they call it, is going to make or break it before it gets off the ground.



You don't think any serving soldiers were pissed at the Somalia scandal, or the hazing videos, or the talk of a regiment "out of control"?

I would suggest that any such new unit would need to be founded on the promise that what Canadians - soldiers and civilians allike - saw in the CAR won't be repeated.  I would like as much as anyone to believe that the hazing and atrocities were the result of a few "bad apples."  Fair enough, it can't be allowed to happen again.

Does anyone disagree with that?  The solution is not to stick our heads in the sand or limit our capabilities, but to be exceedingly careful in how we proceed.

Was the CAR/Somalia an aberration, or is it to be expected from any "elite" warfighting unit.  And if it was simply an aberration, how do you prove that to the politicians, the public, and even other soldiers who may be skeptical?


----------



## Scott

Michael, I think to answer your final questions would touch off huge debate. I think we have all read the arguments stating that sending the CAR to Somalia was a mistake because of the unit's mandate. I am sure we have also read that the root of the trouble was just a "few bad apples" I am no expert and I did not serve in the unit. I believe the former argument, but as I said, I was not in the unit nor do I know that much about them other than what I have read and what has been related to me by former members (Incidentally, one of their former CO's is my cousin, PM if you would like his name)

It's been almost 10 years since they have been gone and I hope for their return under whatever name and in whatever place.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Sadly I don't ever see the CF being able to live down the the whole 'somalia' affair. I just don't think the average voting Canadian has the ability to see things for what they are/accept the past.

RE- The new brigade.
I think a major hurdle would be transport for this new airmobile regiment, no?   Right now we have to contract out to civilian pilots so our soldiers can complete their basic parachute course. 

Jay Hunter. You can't just snap your fingers, pick 1000 guys out and say preseto. You need stuff like shacks for the troops to live in, vehicles, weapons, equipment, service support (attached medics, cooks, weapons techs etc..)
Also your going to need trained soldiers, NCOs and officers. Your going to have to draw them from the other battalions which will reduce their numbers of experienced soldiers/leaders and just over all numbers.

I saw how much support (Equipment, lodging, service support)   just one infantry company needed and it was a lot. We even had to take weapons out of war stock.


----------



## Pencil Tech

Aren't the 3rd battalions of PPCLI, RCR, and Van Doos the light bns where the jump coys are? Isn't this where the remaining nucleus of a new para bn would come from?


----------



## onecat

"True, it'll be hard selling it to the public, too. I know many were outraged over the Somalia scandal, but, IMHO, more were pissed at the hazing videos and the stories of their behavior at Pet. How the elitist culture rules over them. Public perception of the new Regiment, whatever they call it, is going to make or break it before it gets off the ground."

I would have to disagree, on the Public reaction to a CAR unit.   Yes there was out rage over what happened in Somalia and on teh hazing videos... but it was an over reaction.   The PM and liberals took the oppotutunity to do gut the CF at the when they knew they would look like heros and the public won't look twice at the over reaction.   Even then I remember there was alot of out rage at the disbandment of a proud tradation.   And I believe the Canadian public would be glad to have it returned.   Now the question is would this happen, Marin was in the government at the time, I don't believ for second he cares about the Forces any more than Jean did.   He is more reasonable than Jean so you never know what will happen    The extra money and people would be nice.   But I don't think the Liberals would for a second actually return combat capabilities taht they have removed.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Jumping out of planes is different then being a commando reg.   A start but many steps to go.  
I have also heard that near the Somolia time CAR started to get a lot of the rif raf from other units.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

radiohead said:
			
		

> "True, it'll be hard selling it to the public, too. I know many were outraged over the Somalia scandal, but, IMHO, more were pissed at the hazing videos and the stories of their behavior at Pet. How the elitist culture rules over them. Public perception of the new Regiment, whatever they call it, is going to make or break it before it gets off the ground."
> 
> I would have to disagree, on the Public reaction to a CAR unit.  Yes there was out rage over what happened in Somalia and on teh hazing videos... but it was an over reaction.  The PM and liberals took the oppotutunity to do gut the CF at the when they knew they would look like heros and the public won't look twice at the over reaction.  Even then I remember there was alot of out rage at the disbandment of a proud tradation.  And I believe the Canadian public would be glad to have it returned.  Now the question is would this happen, Marin was in the government at the time, I don't believ for second he cares about the Forces any more than Jean did.  He is more reasonable than Jean so you never know what will happen   The extra money and people would be nice.  But I don't think the Liberals would for a second actually return combat capabilities taht they have removed.



So put yourself in the government's shoes - what would YOU have done in the wake of Somalia to ensure the public that the Canadian Army was still a proud institution that could be relied on to fulfil its duties without embarrassing the rest of the country?  You're awfully quick to think the government disbanded an entire regiment just to spite the military.  Name an alternative to their course of action and explain why you think it would have paid political dividends.


----------



## Scott

Very good point, Michael. 


CFL, I think that the rumour has long been that while the CAR drew many fine soldiers that it also was a place for a unit to send their "problem children", once again, my commenting for or against this argument would be useless, I was not in. However, I can see how this would happen and I think that it could only be a natural form of thought. I also think that this argument takes away from the men who served. I would think that even if a troop was "off loaded" by his unit into the Airborne that the standards that they kept for themselves (as I understand it) would quickly sort those individuals out.

So, what to do? Should they get rid of the jump companies in the respective unit's if they re-form the CAR in some way? Like CFL said, jumping out of planes is different than being in a commando reg't. Ideas?


----------



## pbi

I agree 100% that we need a rapid reaction capability, probably about battalion group size, but I'm not sure that a knee-jerk resurrection of the CAR, or any all-para unit, is the required response. IMHO confusing this new unit with JTFII is nonsense: they are two different creatures and rightly so. We will damage the JTFII if we try to use it as a "Ranger-type" RRU.

My suggestion is just to carry on the work that has already been started: continue to develop our three Regular Light battalions as true 21st-century light infantry. That is to say SOC (Special Ops Capable), not just "vehicle-deprived" IMHO the Light Bns are on the way already, as proven by 3PPCLI in Afghanistan. The high quality of our soldiers and NCOs is ideally suited to this development, and the Light Bns already incorporate a para capability. I am against starting from scratch-this would be wasteful, confusing, and unnecessary.

As others have pointed out, we need a few more things, too:

-all the assets to make sure that the RRU(s) can execute the combat functions effectively;

-the lift that can RELIABLY and QUICKLY depl the RRU or it won't be very "R";

-the abillity to sustain and protect it (Air and Sea, are you listening....?) and

-the ability to  generate (and then deploy, sustain, protect and recover) the remainder of a Brigade.

I suggest that this RRU capability is not just an Army problem: to do it right we will really have to become a joint force as opposed to just a unified one.  

Cheers.


----------



## Spooks

What do you define as an RRF (or QRF)? If it is a unit that is able to be deplyed in a short period of time, then, in my opinion we do have Neo-taskings which is a 3-hr notice or something. Not sure on that number though.

As for ressurrecting the Airborne Regiment, that is a touchy issue. I believe that you would never be able to bring back the Airborne regiment as a unit designation. In Ottawa that screams controversy and also Minister of Foreign Affairs doesn't like the brutality or negative image that such a unit name would portray onto Canada's international image. You cannot say 'who cares what the minister says' because that's why the PM said there would be an increase of 5000 -peacekeepers- to the forces. Under a different name, perhaps, but they would not be able to be labbelled as trained killers, though ironically the definition of the infantry is to destroy the enemy.

As for needing the para role...in 3VP we're attempting to have the Battallion para-qualified within four years, a 2 year rotation for the para role around the companies. One active para-coy, one in reserve. The jump course in November should put us (if everyone passes) to nearly a full 2 coys out of the 3 rifle coys. We just did an ex in "Leschitown" where friedly forces needed to gain a foothold in a city and dropped in on the outskirts. Did this on a coy level to rescue a 'lost section' and also on company level to 'aide local govt by pushing back militatn forces'. The para role is still vital for light infantry.

As for a SF unit, I'd say work on the regulars beforehand. Compared to nearby neighbors, we are already a more rounded soldier in reagards to training and it is just getting better. Fast roping may be introduced up here soon, and the OBUA training that we are receiving (for the units that have received it already) is some of the most intense and comprehensive in the history of the Canadian Forces (including CAR). Some retired American Rangers have even noted that some of us perform better in OBUA than their Rangers. (you can debate this fact, I'm just stating what was told to us)

My four rubles
-Spooks


----------



## McG

Jay Hunter said:
			
		

> Screw the 5000 man peacekeeping idea.
> 
> Give a 1000 men to form a new Airborne reg. and put the rest in to fill out the other brigades. Or you could have two but I'm pretty sure that's on the expensive side.


Group the light battalions into a common new brigade.  Use some of the 5,000 PYs to establish a Bde HQ, Cbt Sp, and CSS elements to that brigade.  Use the rest too beef-up the brigades that already exist.

The new light brigade would give us the option to continue with one parachute company in each light battalion or to stand-up a parachute battalion next to the three light battalions.


----------



## pbi

Spooks: I didn't mean to say that we don't need a para capability: what I meant was that _whatever_ config we choose for the RRU (or whatever we call it) we must not knee-jerk to a conclusion, but instead figure out what we need, including by taking  close look at what is going on in the world. I have no doubt that some degree of para capability will definitely be in the bn, as you have pointed out.

I agree with you on the right course of action to develop an RRU(s): build on the high quality Light Infantry we have now. You also raised an interesting point: maybe RRU should remain a rotating task rather than a permanent one? Cheers.


----------



## George Wallace

If one wants to lump all these troops into the "new' Brigade, there is another option to truly make it a Rapid Reaction Force and that would be to rebuild an Airborne capability of Bn strength and place it in a Bde that was also responsible for our "SEA HORSE" capabilities.  Chris Wattie wrote an accompanying article to the reserection of the Airborne in the Ottawa Citizen's Saturday Observer under the byline 'BY LAND, BY SEA' about "SEA HORSE'  and its' ability to make Canada's military able to intervene just about anywhere in the world.  This would be a Bn to Bde Gp that would deploy by sea in the 'new' Joint Support Ships (JSS) and combine Naval, Air and Land units in a common task.  

A Bde combining the Airborne and Sea Horse capabilities would be a solution that would be effective in filling all our needs.  It would be a Bde like that of 4 CMBG, in that one would have to prove themselves to earn a posting there and then be limited to a three or four year posting before returning to their previous units.  Rotating people in this fashion would work in the same way that our three year cycle is 'supposed' to work now, except that it would call for an actual posting into a "Tour Bound Unit" for a fixed period of time.  That may remedy some of the problems faced now with Battle Groups currently prepping and then having "add ons" arrive in theatre.

I know this was very concise, but it opens the floor for development.

GW


----------



## Genetk44

I guess I'm a bit late in this thread but what the heck. As a civilian who was working overseas at the time of the Somalia affair I was very disappointed at the behaviour of the troops in question. I was even more disappointed in our governments' reaction to it. To disband the entire unit was,in my humble opinion, a complete and inappro priate solution. I don't know how useful a para unit is in todays' world but I personally would like to see it reformed....but I'm a traditionalist ;D
Cheers
Gene


----------



## pbi

GW: I think that you have presented   the essence of the idea: a joint force, focused on getting Canadians to the action, then sustaining them there. In my opinion, the biggest force we could probably maintain in this role is a Bde. Cheers.


----------



## excoelis

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> You don't think any serving soldiers were pissed at the Somalia scandal, or the hazing videos, or the talk of a regiment "out of control"?
> 
> I would suggest that any such new unit would need to be founded on the promise that what Canadians - soldiers and civilians allike - saw in the CAR won't be repeated.   I would like as much as anyone to believe that the hazing and atrocities were the result of a few "bad apples."   Fair enough, it can't be allowed to happen again.
> 
> Does anyone disagree with that?   The solution is not to stick our heads in the sand or limit our capabilities, but to be exceedingly careful in how we proceed.
> 
> Was the CAR/Somalia an aberration, or is it to be expected from any "elite" warfighting unit.   And if it was simply an aberration, how do you prove that to the politicians, the public, and even other soldiers who may be skeptical?



Thanks for the support Michael.  Just like the old saying "with friends like you.................."



> "There are still enough experienced NCOs around from the Airborne Regiment that you have a good nucleus to form the unit around. It wouldn't take any time at all, once the decision's made."



Here's the reality in my biased opinion.  The troops from the Airborne formed the nucleus of JTF2 and the Light Inf Bns.  Who has been on the front line since disbandment?  How much have we embarrassed Canadians "soldier or civilian alike" in this capacity?  I'm not asking to be part of an 'elite' warfighting force.  I only wish to be grouped in a realistical way, with like-minded soldiers, and be given the equipment necessary to fulfill a role that I have no doubt will be asked of me by the public I work for and represent.

In the last year in the service of this country I have seen three good men die.   One was a good friend, one worked for me for the better part of the year preceding his death, and last but not least was the soldier I only wish I had been given the time to get to know better.  In April of this year I ran to the aid of one of my troops who had cracked his pelvis down the middle on a particularly hard landing during a static line plf.  Just last week I ran to the aid of two ppf candidates who during a night freefall descent had a mid air collision resulting in a canopy wrap and plummeted to the ground.  I could go on and on about injuries sustained in the last year by my troops alone.  I only gave the examples I was personally involved with as an example of the impact on one soldier who is trying very hard to maintain a capability in the off chance that the 'powers that be' decide to use him to his full capability.

I left the Airborne as a MCpl and I am now well into WO rank.  I have a lot of qualifications and fortunately still have the mental capacity to pass them on, the physical capacity to lead by example, but possibly most important is that despite what appears at times to be insurmountable odds, I still have the will to do this.

We are fighting a war of attrition.  The longer I spend in the army, the more(by default) I am responsible for specialist duties.  

Shit or get off the pot. 

At some point in the future this noble vocation will lose it's luster in my eyes and I will move on.

I think you could pretty much argue that the whole military is living in the same glass house.  So let's all agree to leave the rock throwing out of this.


----------



## Kevins833

When the CAR drew its troops from the reg Inf. units what where their qualification needed to get into the regiment. Was there a tryout type process troops had to go through?


----------



## McG

pbi said:
			
		

> GW: I think that you have presented   the essence of the idea: a joint force, focused on getting Canadians to the action, then sustaining them there. In my opinion, the biggest force we could probably maintain in this role is a Bde. Cheers.


For force generation, I think the smallest force that can efficiently maintain this (and allow for RRU as a rotating task) would be a Bde.   Having three battalions across three brigades does not make the cut as it does not establish a structure to develop the engineers, artillery, and CSS within a light capacity.   

Anybody who has convinced themselves that infantry can stand alone in a light capacity, has fooled themselves.  The Canadian Airborne Regiment had these other arms.  Our current light force structure does not.


----------



## Scott

Great post excoelis!!!


----------



## pbi

McG said:
			
		

> For force generation, I think the smallest force that can efficiently maintain this (and allow for RRU as a rotating task) would be a Bde.  Having three battalions across three brigades does not make the cut as it does not establish a structure to develop the engineers, artillery, and CSS within a light capacity.
> 
> Anybody who has convinced themselves that infantry can stand alone in a light capacity, has fooled themselves. The Canadian Airborne Regiment had these other arms. Our current light force structure does not.



Yes-IMHO Bde is the optimum in our circumstances. It is the smallest, for the reasons you have stated, but it probably also represents the largest force we can realistically consider being able to project/protect/sustain and recover using Canadian military resources (and that would only be achievable with considerable improvement to our jointness and to our expeditionary capability.) Given our recent decisions to strip integral capabilities out of the Infantry and parcel them out to other Branches, you are quite right to say that in our present situation a Light Bn would need additional grouping to be effective. Cheers.


----------



## McG

Such a reorganisation is the only way we could win from the PM's promissed new brigade.


----------



## IPC10

I don't want to break anyone's hearts but the CLS has issued a Capability Development Planning Guidance â â€œ Light Forces.

In it he states â Å“LFC light forces will not generate an airborne (i.e. parachute assault) capability.  However, parachute delivery skills will be maintained to the extent required by CF tasks assigned to LFC (airborne capability and parachute capability are defined in the reference parachute capability study).â ?

This was in July of 2004.

I think that of the 5000 new regular force positions only 2500-3000 will go to the army.  These PY's could be re-invested in the 'hollow army' syndrome which plagues our tasking processes.  Of course, as mentioned, by the time the money shows up, people are recruited, trained and sent to units could be awhile.

WRT McG comments on 

â Å“Anybody who has convinced themselves that infantry can stand alone in a light capacity, has fooled themselves.  The Canadian Airborne Regiment had these other arms.  Our current light force structure does not.â ?

I believe the other arms â â€œ notably the Engrs and Arty are now included in the Light Forces Working Groups.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

What they say and what ends up happening can be totally different in my experience.


----------



## jmacleod

My friends and I have written many letters to the Minister's of National Defence of the past several years
advocating that the Canadian Parachute Regiment be reformed and placed in the Canadian Army Order
of Battle. Here is an excerpt from a letter from former MND David Pratt. "The land force is in the process
of developing force structure options as part of its modernization effort; however there is no consideration being given to the formation of additional regiments, including parachute forces.
Airborne capability was recently reviewed through an initiative known as the Canadian Forces
Parachute Capability Study. The study has been completed and the matter will be considered as
part of the future Defence Review. For the foreseeable future therefore, the Land Force will
maintain its parachute capability through the three parachute companies located at Canadian
Forces Bases Edmonton, Petewawa and Valcartier". Signed The Honourable David Pratt,PC,MP
Minister. We think the term "Land Force" should read, "Canadian Army", and we have recommended
a model for the possible Canadian Army Airborne Brigade, based on the familier British Army model
MacLeod


----------



## G .Dundas

I'm trying  to remember something I heard some years ago.That when the Airborne regiment was disbanded was'nt there talk of using it to form the cadre of a light infantry brigade?


----------



## McG

IPC10 said:
			
		

> I believe the other arms â â€œ notably the Engrs and Arty are now included in the Light Forces Working Groups.


The Engineers are involved.  I do not know about other arms.


----------



## McG

bossi said:
			
		

> Don't ya think that maybe, just maybe ... this [Trenton] might be an intriguing location for the campaign promise of a "new" 5,000 person Joint Brigade (... but, NEVER, EVER, EVER calling it the SSF ...)?


If the light battalions were grouped into a single bde that included all the elements necessary to support light and limited special forces ops, why not stick it in Pet where there is already infrastructure?

2 PPCLI could replace 3 PPCLI (which would move to Pet) in Edmonton, and 2 (or 3) CMBG would split itself between Shilo and Gagetown.  This would leave room for a "2 CLBG" or "SSF" in Pet.  2 RCHA would convert to a light regt to sp the light formation, and 1 RCHA would become responsible to sp 1 CMBG and 2 (or 3) CMBG (possible with the transfer of a sub unit + from 2 RCHA).  2 CER would convert to a light regt, and 4 ESR would be re-established as a CER.


----------



## TCBF

Re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic.


----------



## Infanteer

TCBF said:
			
		

> Re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic.



How so?


----------



## TCBF

We are again tempted to spend money re-organizing - money better spent training soldiers or buying ammunition - without an increase in capability.  It may increase CONVENIENCE, but convenience is not capability.


----------



## McG

In a few of our threads, I think positive arguments are made that a light formation would actually increase capability:
All Arms Light Force - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27631.0.html
How Does the loss of the CAR still affect trg & capability? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27589.0.html


----------



## Skinny

http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=31a9fa57-81f0-402c-b870-d8652ef4a051

Ten years after the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded, the army is creating a strike force of fast-moving, highly trained "ranger" troops that will reprise most of the former elite parachute unit's roles, senior army officers have told the National Post.

The planned Light Force will be able to airdrop into trouble spots around the world on its own or as a backup to the commandos of Joint Task Force 2, Canada's secretive special forces unit.

The Light Force, developed in tandem with the defence policy statement released last month, will form the backbone of a new Special Operations Group, which defence planners foresee as the future "911 Force" for military missions abroad or at home.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Galea said the new force will be based on the three existing light infantry battalions -- units of about 600 soldiers with light weapons and equipment and almost no vehicles.

"The aim is for the Light Force not to become special forces themselves, but to be trained to support special forces such as JTF-2," he said. "The supporting groups would not need to be trained to the same abilities.

"They will be tactically deployable by air ... by helicopter or in parachute operations."

Lt.-Col. Galea said the new force will be similar to the Canadian Airborne Regiment, disbanded in 1995 after a series of incidents arising from the ill-fated 1992-93 mission in Somalia.

"There are certainly comparisons you could draw, but I don't think what we're talking about is exactly the same," he said. "The parachuting would be limited in scope, parachuting into a permissive environment. So it's parachute operations as opposed to airborne operations."

"But a comparison you could draw to the Airborne Regiment is [that] we're talking about a high-readiness and rapidly deployable force."

Each of the existing battalions includes a "jump" company of 150 paratroopers -- the remnants of the former Canadian Airborne Regiment -- but Lt.-Col. Galea said it has not yet been decided whether the new force will be consolidated into one regiment or brigade. "It's too soon to tell," he said. "We're going to do an estimate on how best to achieve that concept. There are all sorts of ways to skin the same cat."

Dr. Sean Maloney, a professor at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ont., who specializes in the modern military, said the planned force could be a valuable addition to any Canadian Forces operation overseas.

"These guys will be the pointy end of our strategic rapid-reaction force, which hearkens back to the original role of the old Airborne Regiment," he said.

While JTF-2 commandos perform small-scale, specialized raids, the new force will give them the bulk to do their jobs more effectively, Dr. Maloney said.

"JTF-2 does very precise, surgical operations.... This force will be there to secure the area so they can do their job and move on."

He said the only possible drawback to the planned force is the chance Ottawa may be reluctant to use it for the potentially risky operations for which the soldiers will be trained.

"Once we have this thing, the question is will the government have the inclination to use it," Dr. Maloney said. "I think we should use it. We should get on with it because we're needed out there."

Lt.-Col. Galea said the new force will fill the same role as the U.S. Army's Ranger battalions or the British parachute regiments.

"But they'll also be able to conduct more traditional infantry-type operations," he added. "We're not looking to overly specialize these guys."

The force should be brought into being over the next five years, Lt.-Col. Galea said. "The plan is to take this in steps ... but we'll find a way to make it happen."

The Light Force arose out of the defence policy statement released last month, which called for troops "capable of integrating with Joint Task Force 2 elements" and acting as pathfinders for larger missions -- the first troops on the ground in a new area.

The defence policy committed the Canadian Forces to increasing the size of JTF-2 and its supporting elements as part of the Special Operations Group, a formation that would include JTF-2, a nuclear, biological and chemical defence company based in Trenton, Ont., and the new Light Force.

The Special Operations Group would also include naval and air force elements to transport troops and give them fire support.


Now they just need the planes to get them in :


----------



## tomahawk6

http://www.canada.com/components/printstory/printstory4.aspx?id=31a9fa57-81f0-402c-b870-d8652ef4a051

Latest article about the new battalion. Airborne forces are the ultimate in rapid deployment forces. The ability to go anywhere in the world in a matter of hours is unrivaled.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Galea said the new force will be based on the three existing light infantry battalions -- units of about 600 soldiers with light weapons and equipment and almost no vehicles."


----------



## Whiskey_Dan

Hmm the planes to get them in...well has anyone seen a horse fly lately? 'Cause the chances of getting new planes is as slim as that IMHO. 
But what do I know eh? Let's hurry up and wait and see.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

"There are certainly comparisons you could draw, but I don't think what we're talking about is exactly the same," he said. "The parachuting would be limited in scope, parachuting into a permissive environment. So it's parachute operations as opposed to airborne operations."    ???

If you can't do jumping in the 'full operational spectrum' why bother?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I think that this is simply a part of the move from having three mechanized battalions on a light scale of equipment to a true Light Force with supporting doctrine, organization and equipment.  There has been a fair amount of work done in this area and having been exposed to some of it I think that good things will come of it.  Based on managed readiness I'm fairly sure that it will be based on the three existing "light battalions."  The Group HQ could be interesting.  Would the three units have to be in the same location?  If the current units stay in their locations would they still fall under the CMBGs or under this Special Operations Group HQ?

As for planes and helicopters, I think that we should focus on getting CH47s or their equivalents.  Airmobility should be the focus, even it it means we have to borrow airlift to get to the theatre.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

The points raised about transport are extremely valid.  Air Command needs to get a program in place and extremely fast to obtain tactical airlift (ie. C-130J) and medium/heavy helicopters (CH-47) to ensure that a light formation can be employed to its maximum effectiveness.

What would be gained and what would be lost by grouping the 3 light infantry battalions together?

Pros:   
-Easier access to parachute training center and aircraft
-light infantry oriented training area
-access to supporting arms in the light force (arty, engineers, CSS)

Cons:
-access to specific local training areas (ie. 3 PPCLI being 3 hours drive to Rocky Mountains for mountain warfare training).
-understrength MBGs due to loss of 3rd infantry battalion.

There are many more out there, but it's Monday morning and I really should be working rather than playing on the board, so please feel free to contribute and carry on.


----------



## a_majoor

To properly do this, we need to "grow" the army by a minimum of five companies: 3 to replace the jump companies in the LIBs, as well as the CS and CSS companies the "Light Force" will need.

After that, some sort of air transportation/mobility is needed. If I was to have a say, I would place this new "Light Force" in Winnipeg, so it is centrally located both in terms of deployment and in terms of training (fly out to Wainwright if they are preparing to operate in open terrain, fly to Pet to train in more forested terrain etc.), as well as to marry up with whatever "follow on" force that will be sent to the mission.


----------



## TCBF

"existing formation structure, or is just a tasking?"

If they have any brains at all, it is just a tasking.

Our current tank weighs 2/3 of a modern one, and our APCs weigh 1/3 to 1/2 of modern ones, so we are already a medium force.   When you take into account the phasing out of the ADATS, GDF-005s, M-109, eventually the leo C2s,and our current VOR rate, we are for all practical purposes a light force, albeit an immobile one due to a lack of tpt.

You guys have hit the nail on the head: without aviation, this is just mental masturbation.

So, one thing to remember: this plan is not intended to increase capability, it is intended to DECREASE capability by ensuring a large part of the defense budget gets mis-directed into areas of spending that have no military effect.

Spend money on publicity, enviro studies for the new 'light" base, aquiring land, constructing buildings, hiring civilian staff, moving and posting soldiers and office workers,etc.  But NO money for more soldiers, weapons, aircraft, or equipment related to combat operations.  Just another bureaucratic boondogle designed to fritter away our resources.

I think FM Slim once said something about not creating special units, just properly leading, training, and equiping the ones you have for the roles and missions they have.   He was right.

In Canada, when all is said and done, much is said and little is done.


----------



## TCBF

"In a few of our threads, I think positive arguments are made that a light formation would actually increase capability:"

A light AMERICAN, BRITISH, or ANZAC formation would.  A light Cdn fmn won't.  All of our formations are light formations now, but power is useless without the will to sustain it and use it.  We do not have the political will to fund this, so it is pointless to attemp to aquire it. 

One is tempted to sympathize with the Vermont farm wife who said "Stay weak, Canada.  America does not need another Cuba to her north."


----------



## jmacleod

DND Minister should simply reinstate the famed Canadian Airborne Regiment, which should never
have been disbanded. The people responsible for the decision were flunkies to the former PM
and when their talents were combined, created the Canadian Sponsorship Program, now playing
live on Justice Gomery's watch. Logic and common sense dictates; reinstate the Canadian Airborne
Regiment - MacLeod


----------



## Matt_Fisher

a_majoor said:
			
		

> To properly do this, we need to "grow" the army by a minimum of five companies: 3 to replace the jump companies in the LIBs, as well as the CS and CSS companies the "Light Force" will need.



Do you think that this new light force will be centred around a single battalion formed by reconstituting the jump companies (essentially a reborn single battalion CAR) or do you think that the 3 LIBs will be grouped together as the new formation (essentially a reborn SSF)?


----------



## 30 for 30

Conspiracy!!!


----------



## a_majoor

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> Do you think that this new light force will be centred around a single battalion formed by reconstituting the jump companies (essentially a reborn single battalion CAR) or do you think that the 3 LIBs will be grouped together as the new formation (essentially a reborn SSF)?



Based on what the opening article said, I would expect the Light Force to be a unitary formation like the "Airborne" of old. Trying to cobble together a force from different units and different areas simply makes no sense (_oops, isn't that the new model of Task tailored forces_). Since the Light Force needs to be able to move quickly (in theory), then having everyone available in one spot simplifies everything from training, logistics and mounting operations IMO.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

So now the question posed is whether the formation will have the 3 LIBs relocate to a new home as part of a higher formation? Or, whether the 3 LIBs will relinquish control over their jump companies, who will relocate, while the battalion stays in their current status with the CMBGs?


----------



## Edward Campbell

I agree with a_majoor: logic dictates a single _light_ formation, based in one area, near the major flying station which has a tactical transport wing.  There might, also, be another _heavier_ motorized/light armoured formation based in a single area â â€œ not too far from major seaports.  There is, also, an ongoing requirement for units to relieve/replace elements of these two formations when they (parts of them) are deployed on operations â â€œ if our light _formation_ has two battle groups (one airborne, one air mobile) and the heavier _formation_ has two more battle groups â â€œ APC mounted infantry plus MGS (_Strykers_?) or light tanks, and assuming PPCLI Guy was correct when he said 5:1 is the 'use-up' ratio to sustain deployed forces, then we need an army of 20+ battalions/regiments of infantry/armour - and/or something like _panzer-grenadiers_, perhaps?  We now have what, a dozen?

Anyway let us not revive the Airborne Regiment or 1 Can Para; no cap badge wars with the attendant angst â â€œ let us assign the jump role to one battalion.  Maybe others can rotate through the job (and the station) every five years or so, like we did in Germany in the '50s and '60s.


----------



## George Wallace

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> http://www.canada.com/components/printstory/printstory4.aspx?id=31a9fa57-81f0-402c-b870-d8652ef4a051
> 
> Latest article about the new battalion. Airborne forces are the ultimate in rapid deployment forces. The ability to go anywhere in the world in a matter of hours is unrivaled.
> 
> "Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Galea said the new force will be based on the three existing light infantry battalions -- units of about 600 soldiers with light weapons and equipment and almost no vehicles."



Gee.......Tom

Wasn't that what we were able to do back in 1980 in the SSF - anywhere in 24 hours.  As a matter of fact, FMC was supposed to be able to move any formation in a short period of time, less than seven days.


----------



## Old Sweat

George,

FMCHQ in those days couldn't have organized a movement in seven days, let alone moved very much more than a vanguard within a region. How does this fit in with having a battle group embarked cruising the oceans of the world waiting for shyte to happen? Much more thought is required.

Chirs Wattie - an air force brat and grandson of a Boer War vet - is an experienced journalist who was embedded with 3 RCR in Afghanistan for a spell. Some of us may recall the piece he wrote after the two Royals were kia, extracts of which were read at their memorial service in country. (I did not include their names as I am not sure of the junior member's spelling and did not wish to insult his memory.) He also was a Strathcona and is now an officer in the GGHG. I suspect he has left somethings unsaid because he can not pin them down.

There is an awful lot still to glean from all of this, and I am grateful for the thoughtful observations on this means.


----------



## TCBF

Yup.   We didn't have to train, because we WERE trained - in the field constantly.   We didn't have to DAG, because we WERE DAGged - every six months or so.   If you didn't pass DAG, you got sorted out or released.

And we did this with 'normal' brigades.   You want light?   Train light.   But no, we will pee away all of our money in re-organizing, so that there will be none left to train with.

When a unit went to the field, it went to the field - ALL of it. None of this two hundred men on rear party because they are "hurt" or have "issues".

Our brigades, and certainly our units, were mobile enough.  Whether our HQs were robust enough to plan and execute the move is another matter.

Time to cull the herd.


----------



## George Wallace

The reality of Canada putting a Battle Group complete aboard ship, at sea, waiting for shyte to happen is in all probability a figment of fiction.   We may see Troops earmarked for such a contingency, but never prepositioned.   We are currently looking at prepositioning equipment, the downfall of which is that Troops no longer have the kit to train with, and that prepositioned kit deteriorates due to lack of maintenance.   In all our discussions so far, we have basically concluded that we need a major increase in manpower and equipment.   The Government's lack of true and honest support in these matters is what is going to keep us crippled for years to come.   Hollow promises in the Press do us no good.   


[Edit 1805hrs]  Right now, as we discuss, we are experiencing the "Cheque is in the Mail"syndrome with the current 'Budget Increase'.


----------



## Old Sweat

George,

Reference my last, first line, between a and movement, insert, bowel.

There are a ton other later examples. The bungle in the jungle merits examination re the old maxim, if in worry, if in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout.


----------



## Zipper

Did everyone get a gander at this article in the National Post today?

http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=31a9fa57-81f0-402c-b870-d8652ef4a051

One of the big things that caught my eye was:

"There are certainly comparisons you could draw (to the CAR), but I don't think what we're talking about is exactly the same," he said. "The parachuting would be limited in scope, parachuting into a permissive environment. So it's parachute operations as opposed to airborne operations."

OK????? So after reading the rest of the article, I'm still confused as to HOW these guys will be trained? For war? Or for limited "intervention" type missions?


----------



## TCBF

I would think the soldiers would be trained for "battle", since "battles" happen across the Full Spectrum of Operations (all three blocks).  By all means, continue with Mission Specific Training - as we do now - AFTER the troops and, more specifically, their leaders, have successfully completed the relevant BTS.

Do you think a generation of soldiers will accept a new generation of leaders who qualify as only "Boy Scouts With Guns"?  Not bloody likely.


----------



## a_majoor

> "There are certainly comparisons you could draw (to the CAR), but I don't think what we're talking about is exactly the same," he said. "The parachuting would be limited in scope, parachuting into a permissive environment. So it's parachute operations as opposed to airborne operations."




I think this is mostly a PC line to keep opponents of the CAR quiet. After all, any unit must be trained to operate in the "full spectrum" of war, so a jump capable or airmobile unit will have to be able to function should the DZ/LZ suddenly get "hot" for whatever reason.


----------



## Jungle

It means we will avoid carrying out Airborne "assaults" like in WWII. We will insert Paras where the local threat is low. This is what the Rangers did on the Kandahar airfield in Oct 2001, and the 173rd ABN BDE in northern Iraq, or the Marines in Somalia.
Obviously the use of ISTAR will be required before a tactical op, like an airmobile insertion, or the insertion of Pathfinders before a strategic para-drop.
Permissive means the threat level is low (or acceptable) in the insertion area. This is to avoid heavy losses while the Force is at it's most vulnarable stage of the deployment.


----------



## a_majoor

> It means we will avoid carrying out Airborne "assaults" like in WWII. We will insert Paras where the local threat is low. This is what the Rangers did on the Kandahar airfield in Oct 2001, and the 173rd ABN BDE in northern Iraq, or the Marines in Somalia.
> Obviously the use of ISTAR will be required before a tactical op, like an airmobile insertion, or the insertion of Pathfinders before a strategic para-drop.
> Permissive means the threat level is low (or acceptable) in the insertion area. This is to avoid heavy losses while the Force is at it's most vulnarable stage of the deployment.



In the perfect world, that is exactly what we want (think of Market-Garden), but enemies are hard at work developing technologies and techniques to defeat ISTAR and similar (think of Market-Garden).

Whatever the notional situation is, our troops still must be prepared for the worst. When the fire department drives out to answer a call, the firefighters bring their truck and are all suited up. What may have been a small incident when it was called in might have escalated during the drive from the station. This will be important as the reach of expeditionary forces increases. 

In the book "The Ingenuity Gap", the author notes a US exercise in the late 1990s where about 500 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division were flown non stop from Georgia to Khazastan to jump into an exercise, the longest such jump in history. If a battalion is dispatched from North America to intervene half way around the world, the local situation might change for the worse during the flight, or even the final run in. That battalion might also be stuck there for a long time waiting for relief or ressuply, so they need to be able to engage in full spectrum (or "third block") operations just as a mater of principle.


----------



## Jungle

a_majoor said:
			
		

> 500 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division were flown non stop from Georgia to Khazastan to jump into an exercise, the longest such jump in history.


What's so special about that ? Aren't these two republics neighbours ??

OK, couldn't resist !!!  

A force deployed by airdrop would never go without a Recce element in place (pathfinders). The Airborne Force Commander is in contact with the Recce element, and the aircraft captain is in contact with the DZ controller. So the chances of a big surprise are reduced.
I don't think it says anywhere in the document that the Light Force will not be equipped for the full spectrum of ops, I think what it says is that it will not be intentionnally dropped directly over an enemy position.


----------



## Zipper

It still leaves me wondering what the hell the difference between parachute dropped troops and Airborne is? 

While the article indicated a move in a direction we have discussed on this board for some time (light forces). It still left me with some reservations as to just what those light units will be expected to do (besides backing up JTF2 all the time)? How do they fit into the greater scheme of being able to be deployed in a sustainable manner into the missions we have seen to date? Are they going to unify the light battalions under a single command (bring back the CAR?)? Or leave them spread across the country to make it look like everyone is sharing the fun?

What happens to the other 6 battalions? And are the emasculated armoured and arty units going to find a sustainable place in all this?

And yet another question.  Now that the foreign policy review has been unveiled, I have either missed it entirely or, has the defense policy review come out yet?


----------



## pbi

I think a few of us are going overboard here. The "Light Force" hoopla appears to refer to the Light Task Force role that will be an ongoing part of the Army Managed Readiness program, with a single TF based on a LIB, available at any time to deploy as a Strategic Reserve or for "pop-up" missions. To assume that all three LIBs would be available at once would be to kick the AMR model in the ditch, for several reasons but not least because a TF consists of more than just "bayonets"; and, as usual, one of our crucial limiting factors for force generation will continue to be our very small number of CSS who are field deployable, especially in vital MOCs such as the EME 400 series (wpn techs, veh techs, FCS techs) without whom no modern unit can function for more than a day or so.

As for Matt's concern about delivery by parachute: I would not worry too much about that. IIRC, the Israelis long ago converted most   of their Para Bdes to air assault, in recognition of the fact that an opposed para drop today, in the face of SA-7s (and HN5, etc) ZSU 23-4, Coyotes and LAV-IIIS with 25mm chain guns,etc is probably suicidal. The best and most successful para drop would likely be to put the paras wherever the enemy is NOT.

The CLS stated pretty clearly in the last Army Op Plan (available to any DIN user) that he is accepting risk in not funding infrastructure, and the standing DND policy is to reduce infrastructure ownership as much as possible, or at least by 10%. Because of that, I would be very surprised to see any new base being constructed to house this "Light Force".

But, of course, we live in interesting times and all things may change: I stand to be corrected.

Cheers.


----------



## FSTO

Comment from an outsider here (From the Sea?). If the current party stays in power we will never see the name Airborne again. If the Conservatives get in we may see Airborne again just to poke ole' Chretian in the eye.

On a more serious not, the lack of Air Mobility is a huge concern, a rapid reaction force is pretty useless if it can't get anywhere quickly (DART? anyone). So unless we address our air transport question, this is all moot.


----------



## Jarnhamar

> It still leaves me wondering what the hell the difference between parachute dropped troops and Airborne is?



The same difference between FIBUA and OBUA. Someone doesn't like the way one sounds so they change it.


----------



## LawnDart

TCBF said:
			
		

> we are for all practical purposes a light force, albeit an immobile one due to a lack of tpt.



Great line TC. Couldn't have said it better myself!

I've been criticized for not having anything positive to say on this site. Well, I guess I do now, sort of.

I would be willing to bet that this is the brainchild of Gen Hillier. And I think he really wants to do it. I also think it's a great idea and a total necessity. If we are going to maintain an army that can operate with our historic partners (UK, US, Aus) then we should have units that are compatible with them. The Brits have Paras and Marines, American's Rangers, and Aussies both an Airborne Battalion and Commando Battalion (3,4 RAR respectively).

 One of the reasons this came about was from the operations in Afghanistan in 02, when we didn't have a medium intensity level, light unit, that was capable of supporting JTF2 operations to the level required. That capability hasn't existed in the CF since Feb 5th, 1995, as I'm sure all are aware.

So finally, the need has been recognized, and I think the CF can thank General Hillier for that. 

What I'm skeptical about is how it will be implemented. I think it would take someone with the powers of Jesus Christ to overcome the Regimental rivalries, petty bickering, language politics, bureaucracy and anti-elitism that is a staple of the CF. And that will be a necessity to get the unit up and running. When you factor in the Airlift and infrastructure requirements the project will call for well...... That takes bucks, and they are always in short supply in our military. 

I give the guy credit. He's trying, and it's been a long time since we had a top leader who appeared willing to do that.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Would the practical solution be to transfer all the light bn troopies into a new unit then? Would the troops go for that?


----------



## LawnDart

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> Anyway let us not revive the Airborne Regiment or 1 Can Para; no cap badge wars with the attendant angst â â€œ let us assign the jump role to one battalion.   Maybe others can rotate through the job (and the station) every five years or so, like we did in Germany in the '50s and '60s.



The problem with that Ed is that;

1: The calibre of personal in the average infantry battalion isn't up to the level required for a high speed, medium level rapid response, Airborne battalion. The personnel requirements would make it impractical to rotate them.

2: The Regimental rivalries would render any attempt to pick one particular Regiment as the parent unit for "Canada's Elite Force" impossible. You couldn't just make the Van Doos or Pats the only regiment to provide that type of training for it's members. Number one, the recruiting pool would be too small, ensuring a lower quality soldier, and number two, it would affect the morale of the Regiments not picked to service the tasking.


----------



## TCBF

Mr. Campbell's idea of rotating the parachute role from bn to bn is a proven one, and it worked in the MSF/DoC Force concept in the 1950s.  We actually had the equivalent of a parachute bde then, truly the halcyon days of military parachuting. 

I remember a Weekend Magazine or Star Weekly story in the late 1960s where the same issues were raised. I think it was called "Here Come The Marines (That's the Canadian Marines to you, Buddy)" or some such.  The end of that process was the Cdn AB Regt in 1968 - a logical choice..

FM Slim, I think, said something to the effect of not needing special units, only special training.

Times have changed.  Be interesting to se the results


----------



## Infanteer

Just a question that may or may not be related to the issue - has anyone worked with 4 RAR?  I would imagine that our new fancy unit would be similar to them, so how do the Aussies do it.

How do our Light Battalions stack up with 4 RAR (in other words, how much of a "capability gap" do we have to make up in implementing this)?


----------



## kj_gully

As an old paratrooper, I would love to see the rebirth of the regiment. However, Gen Hillier seems intent on building a Marine Corps. I think you should be looking to the sea for your next elite force, Marine recon, SBS or what ever. Check out my post in the "how does disbandment of the CAR affect trg..etc" or something like that, its in the Combat Arms forum, just a couple down from this one.


----------



## kj_gully

In case you think I'm just guessing the CDS mind.. here's a link
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/main/toc_e.asp
, sorry, not literate enough to make it "hot"


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

mobility of light inf BN is a big prior for the CLS


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

which I am indirectly implying is probably a capability gap.


----------



## a_majoor

Jungle said:
			
		

> A force deployed by airdrop would never go without a Recce element in place (pathfinders). The Airborne Force Commander is in contact with the Recce element, and the aircraft captain is in contact with the DZ controller. So the chances of a big surprise are reduced.



I certainly hope so, but in the context of a fast moving operation (say some sort of crisis intervention), the time to put pathfinders in place (or fly in Global Hawk UAVs to provide coverage) would be very limited, and the appearence of planes bringing in the Pathfinders would certainly tip off the "bad guys" as to what may happen next. This is like 3D chess where the right combination of moves is difficult to forcast. 

The idea of avoiding "hot" DZs makes sense from a limited perspective, you don't want the force chewed up like the British Paras at "Market Garden or the French Foreign Legion at Dien Bien Phu, but on the other hand, dropping them into a "cold" LZ and having them do a long "tab" to the AOR negates the entire idea of airborn/airmobile forces: their ability to arrive on the ground quickly. (I am not advocating dropping into a hot LZ BTW, rather I am pointing out the idea we can entirely avoid doing so is very questionable at best.)


----------



## c4th

jmacleod said:
			
		

> DND Minister should simply reinstate the famed Canadian Airborne Regiment,



Unfortunately and realistically it will never happen.  Now, what would be interesting is once again raising '1 Can Para Bn' and adding a 2nd and 3rd Bn.  It would give those 5,000 new troops somewhere to go.


----------



## TCBF

Yup.   But, we already have 5,000 holes in the units and formations we have now, should we keep them as hollow entities as we knit a new formation?   

We have to fund the trg centres before we hire the 5,000.   What's our funded intake next year for infantry?   Barely to replacement level, I bet.

"Vision without funding is insanity."


----------



## Jungle

When they talk about parachute ops, I believe they mean something like the 173rd ABN BDE did in northern Iraq: secure an Air Point Of Entry (APOE) for a larger force to be airlanded. I know WE don't own the aircraft at this moment, but we are talking coalition ops right ? 
This is probably the same thing they see for our future amphibious capabilities: to be able to send troops in to secure a Sea POE for a larger follow-on force. I don't see us doing amphibious assaults on defended coastlines anymore.
I am convinced in a full blown war things would change, and the risk analysis would be much different; but in today's low-to-med intensity ops, the Light Force will be very useful, not only in Para-related ops.


----------



## Haggis

Here's what to watch for in the coming months:

Old headline:  LIBERALS TO ADD 5000 NEW TROOPS, 3000 RESERVES

Future headline: LIBERAL TROOP PROMISE DIES UNDER TORY VICTORY

The only reason the Canadian public is behind the new CF spending initiatives is becasue they know they will never be allowed to happen.  

Same old tricks performed by a new dog....


----------



## TCBF

Tories will up the troop levels.


----------



## Haggis

TCBF said:
			
		

> Tories will up the troop levels.



Let's be realistic, Tom.  The recruiting system is so slow and ponderous that many prospects simply look elsewhere.  There are not enough instructors to train these 8000 new members.  Not enough bed spaces, boots, bullets or bug juice.  No one should take this "promise" seriously until the infrastructure is in place to make it happen.

So, here's an idea:

First we rob Peter to pay Paul by cannibalizing exisitng units to form the SOC forces.

Second we move the best Reg F instructors from the recruit school back to the regiments and battalions to teach these SOC forces.

Third we recruit like the dickens and get those 8000 in the gate (before they wise up and find a more appealing and better paying job  ;D)

Fourth we staff St Jean and all the ATCs with a 25/75% mix of Reg F and Reserve Class C (to make it more appealing and get the best possible) instructors.  Give the Reservists a 3 year contract.  If they don't work out, the regulations say you can punt 'em with 30 days notice. (less if the f**k up big.)

Fifth we recruit regionally and train regionally.  There's lots of empty spaces at the ATCs.  We do Franco recruit serials at St Jean/Farnham and Valcartier.  English recruits go to Meaford, Wainwright or Aldershot. Hell, we could even re-open Dundurn!

Sixth we lengthen BMQ to include more field skills to lessen the strain on the Battle Schools/ATCs

Lastly (and this is a biggie) EVERYBODY goes through these schools. Reg F. Res F. Army, Navy Air Force.

This way the Regiments/ Battalions get their most capable instructors back and the Reserves get valuable experience and make a tangible  and lasting contribution to the CF.

Now, after all that thinking... I need another coffee.
 :blotto:


----------



## TCBF

My short term solution would be to bring back YTEP.  My long term, to enable the final solution to the Navy/Air Force not wanting their recruits/junior/senior leaders to go through our training, is to separate the training systems for the three services.


----------



## a_majoor

> Now, after all that thinking... I need another coffee.



Double double for you, sir?

Yes, we certainly need to sort out the infrastructure and training end of things, especially if we want to sustain any capabilities we have, create or want. In the short term, a "Light Force" of some sort can be created, possibly by amalgimating the jump companies and the CPC to create a very small "1rst Canadian Parachute Battalion" (avoiding the use of the "A" word lest it offend anyones sensibilities).

A little bit of self advertizement, here is an idea for an evolved "Light Force" which should be robust enought to fulfill the various sorts of missions desired of a "light" unit but capable of operating in all three blocks of the "Three Block War"

"The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles" ADTB Vol 5 No 4 Winter 2002-2003 http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_5/adtb_vol5no4_e.pdf

Once we evolve the infrastructure to raise and train the troops, then this (and almost anything else) becomes possible.


----------



## Jungle

Haggis said:
			
		

> Let's be realistic, Tom.   The recruiting system is so slow and ponderous that many prospects simply look elsewhere.   There are not enough instructors to train these 8000 new members.   Not enough bed spaces, boots, bullets or bug juice.   No one should take this "promise" seriously until the infrastructure is in place to make it happen.


Well, here's some news:
1. Language school is moving out of the Mega, leaving almost the whole building to CFLRS. Language school is moving to Campus Fort-St-Jean.

2. CFLRS will open a trg det, likely in Borden, to take a portion of the Recruits during the expansion period. This should happen in 2006, and last as long as it takes. The staff will be a mix of Regulars, who will be posted there, and Reservists on contracts.

3. BMQ and IAP are being revamped, adding 3 weeks to BMQ (not sure for IAP). They are adding more PT, more field time with portions of SQ, and more range time.

CFLRS is in the process of expanding and reorganizing already.


----------



## Haggis

Jungle said:
			
		

> CFLRS is in the process of expanding and reorganizing already.



Finally someone other than "The Voices" is listenting to me!!   I wish the rest of my suggestions were actioned as fast....



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> Double double for you, sir?



Is there another choice??? ;D


----------



## LawnDart

TCBF said:
			
		

> Mr. Campbell's idea of rotating the parachute role from bn to bn is a proven one, and it worked in the MSF/DoC Force concept in the 1950s.   We actually had the equivalent of a parachute bde then, truly the halcyon days of military parachuting.



Can't agree with you there at all. The MSF was never really a starter. Firstly, you can't say it was proven because they were never used in an operational role, which is the true test of a unit.

Secondly, they didn't even really acquit themselves that well on the ground in training. Look at Exercise "Eagle", in 1949. Eagle was such a disaster that the Calgary Herald later editorialized that;

*"the Joint Army-RCAF Exercise Eagle has shown that these defence arms, in their present stage could not deal repidly and effectively with even a comparatively small landing by enemy airborne troops and fighter aircraft along the Alaska Highway and on these Northland aerodromes."*

It was precisely because MSF didn't work that the Airborne Regiment was developed. And it DID work. At least until it was disbanded for crass political reasons by politicians whose idea of honour is to leave envelopes full of cash for their buddies in Italian restaurants.


The problem with any type of rotational concept is twofold.

1. It weakens the Regimental system that we've subscribed to for a century or so. The regimental system is used simply because it works. By diluting it, we lose the history, comraderie and consistency that has been a proven winner for Anglo-Centric armies for years and years. 

2. It leads to unworkable personnel problems. The fact is that although the average combat arms battalion has many good, enthusiastic, fit and motivated soldiers, they also have a large proportion of dead weight who simply aren't up to the standards required of a hard nosed, truly "semi-elite" unit. In a true first strike oriented unit, those types can be weeded out through a selection process to offset extra incentives (extra pay, distinctive uniforms, better chance at seeing action etc.) 

You can't do that if you're just going to say "O.K. 2 RCR, you guys are now "elite". The next time JTF 2 has to smoke some Al Qaida village in the Afghan mountains, we're going to cover their extraction zone. Oh, and by the way, Mortar Platoon, you guys are going to be doing a 14 km hump with full battle gear and fire mission load on a mountain range. At night. In winter. 

Do you think for a minute that even a third of those guys are going to be "combat effective" by the end of it? 

To do those kinds of tasks, you have to train for it constantly, like the US Rangers. I would argue it's better if you can start your guys from the beginning of their careers, like the Brit Paras or Marines. 

The best way to meet the task would be to re-form the Airborne Regiment. It may be true that our military is unlikely to be jumping into Dive's Crossing or Arnhem anytime in the near future. But "Airborne" ops are a great development tool and segway to the type of soldiering that the type of light force being considered demands. 

Re-constituting an Airborne Regiment  would maintain a sense of regimental history and esprit de corps while avoiding the internecine bitching that would inevitably occur if one particular unit were tasked with the responsibility. 

It won't happen though. If I were to bet money, the Liberals would never subject themselves to the criticism that would follow re-instating the Airborne Regiment. It would be like the Sea King fiasco. 

And if I were really going to bet money, I would bet that all those Regimental rivalries, squabbling, limited transport resources and jealousy will derail this idea before it even gets out of the gate.

JTF 2 will just use the Rangers or Paras when they need to. And the CF can hand out food packages to kids, build schools and man OP's.


----------



## Haggis

LawnDart said:
			
		

> It won't happen though. If I were to bet money, the Liberals would never subject themselves to the criticism that would follow re-instating the Airborne Regiment.



An Ipsos-Reid Poll on Global National tonight shows the Lieberals with a 1 percentage point lead over the Con-Servatives if an election were to be held today.

What that means is that whomever would win, it would likely be another minority government.  Minority governments are pre-occupied with their own survival. Other considerations are secondary.  Re-instating the Airborne Regiment (or anything that even resembles it) would turn the ruling party into Opposition chum in the House of Commons.  Not quite the Gomery Inquiry as far as entertainment goes but, with no NHL, it would be a close second.


----------



## TCBF

I"t was precisely because MSF didn't work that the Airborne Regiment was developed.'

That's a twenty year gap.  Did we not have three jump bns until 1958, when it went to three jump companies?


----------



## Jungle

TCBF said:
			
		

> I"t was precisely because MSF didn't work that the Airborne Regiment was developed.'
> 
> That's a twenty year gap.   Did we not have three jump bns until 1958, when it went to three jump companies?


Yes, the Jump Coys were called "the Defence of Canada Force". It was cheaper than the MSF, but just as ineffective.


----------



## TCBF

"the Jump Coys were called "the Defence of Canada Force". It was cheaper than the MSF, but just as ineffective."

I think that would depend on what you wanted them to do.  If we view the parachute as 'just another way of going to work' then I can't see those bns being any worse than the other bns in the Army.  If, however, we see the parachute as a symbol of elite soldiers, then some may/may not  be able to state that none of the jump bns could match the Cdn AB Reg.  Most of the detractors of the jump bns did not - I suspect - serve in them, just as forty years fron now, most of the detractors of the Cdn AB Regt will not have seved in it.

Depends what you want.  A parachute/air mobile bde for DOC/MSF Ops, or commandos?


----------



## Jungle

Airborne, or Parachute, Troops have to be elite. I'm not talking about some kind of superior men to serve in those units. I'm talking about the fact that no matter how you use them, they have to be able to jump in with 72hrs of supplies and be cut from the main force for 48hrs or more. They have to be trained to survive and operate in isolation in all types of terrains and climates, with very little to no log support. As a matter of fact, that is exactly what the French Army does on it's Commando trg program. Other troops can receive this kind of trg, through a CDO course or something similar, but Paratroopers MUST have the trg.


----------



## TCBF

"with 72hrs of supplies and be cut from the main force for 48hrs or more. They have to be trained to survive and operate in isolation in all types of terrains and climates, with very little to no log support."

- Sounds to me like part of a description for a good soldier - whether he jumps or not.  Whether he got there through the double doors of a Herky Bird or a Grizzly, basic fieldcraft, survival, and existing on light scales should be the nothing earth shattering.  Not only Parachute troops get cut-off and surrounded in War.  Methinks we don't do E&E enough.

But back to my post(s).  I see two schools of thought.   The MSF Bde existed as a means of delivering soldiers to isolated areas in Canada in a time when long range heavy lift helicopters did not exist.  Getting there was the issue, and the troops would have been expected to handle setbacks and adversity in the same way their proud regiments always had, once on the ground.  But comparing their role to that of a 'Commando' one I think is off the mark.


----------



## Jungle

TCBF, how much time have you spent in a Light Inf, or Airborne / Para unit ? I spent 12 years in Airborne/ Light Inf/ Para, and a little bit of time in a Mech Batt, enough to notice there is a difference in the philosophy of trg between the two.
You seem to support the "good at everything, excellent at nothing" philosophy that we have been stuck in for decades. I disagree with that, so I will stop arguing with you.
Have a good one.


----------



## KevinB

Jungle said:
			
		

> enough to notice there is a difference in the philosophy of trg between the two.



A HUGE difference...


----------



## TCBF

"You seem to support the "good at everything, excellent at nothing" philosophy that we have been stuck in for decades."

No, I agree with you guys on this.  I was under the impression that the 1950s concept of the MSF was a logical one at the time, given the sixe and role of our Army then, and that done differently, it might be again.  

You have made the point that anything less than a properly trained dedicated parachute unit is inadequate and gives only the illusion of capability - perhaps a 'jump club' as one source (LCol Bernd?) put it.

Being as how you  are in the know, not me, I stand corrected.


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> tomahawk6 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Galea said the new force will be based on the three existing light infantry battalions -- units of about 600 soldiers with light weapons and equipment and almost no vehicles."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Gee.......Tom
> 
> Wasn't that what we were able to do back in 1980 in the SSF - anywhere in 24 hours.  As a matter of fact, FMC was supposed to be able to move any formation in a short period of time, less than seven days.
Click to expand...

I think the key difference is that (from the sounds of things) this force will be in the magnitude of three times the Airborne Regiment.  It is also possible that the Li Bde would not consolidate the parachute capability into one bn.  I predict such a bde would keep the jump coys decentralized with one in each bn.


----------



## Zipper

I think the idea of hot and cold LZ's may be correct from that limited point. So the idea of us dropping into a hot LZ has never been something that we "wanted" to do. But I think what they are meaning is more towards that we will not be sending in these rapid deployment forces to any theatre that is "hot" in any way, shape, or form. They will be "rapid" in that they will be sent into areas where lightly armed forces will be far heavier armed then anything they come into contact with and thus able to move about to deliver their aid un-encumbered by anything larger then a few "peasents" with AK-47's and a truck or two.

They want to keep us as far from any "action" larger then platoon size, so that it looks good in the media and we don't have any possable multiple body bag incidents. And we all know from experience, even with all their talk and grand plans, we will never send anything larger then a battle group even if we manage to equip a full light bde.


----------



## GO!!!

All of this aptly coined "mental masturbation" can be neatly summed up in the phrase "SHOW ME THE MONEY" 

When the cash comes, the rest of the plan will form quickly. Without it, this light task force is just as ficticious as the one that was just worked out in Wx. 

Plus, as was stated on Pg 1, there does'nt exist the governmental cojones to deploy an elite unit anyway. 

I still hope this comes to fruition though.


----------



## qor556

Also is it going to fall under the regimental system? Relocate ALL the personnel from the light companies from the 3 light infantry units? R22eRs, will they have to compromise their french-speaking  ???


----------



## CBH99

Guys, the article wasn't that *confusing.

Basically, as I understand it, is that the CDS wants to transform the light infantry battalions into a Tier 2 force, with enhanced firepower, communications, and mobility.  He doesn't want to change the role of the light infantry battalions, he just wants to add to their capabilities so they have the ability to support JTF2 on the ground, or conduct Ranger-style missions on their own.*


----------



## Kal

scm77 said:
			
		

> Improvements in communications, mobility, firepower and support capabilities of the light forces will allow them to better integrate with a newly created Special Operations Group that includes JTF2.




     So there will be three elements, the light infantry, a special operations group and the JTF?  Or will the light infantry and the JTF become the special operations group?


----------



## Old Sweat

Based not only on the practice in other countries, but also on the statement, the special operations group will include JTF2 and the light infantry battalions.


----------



## GO!!!

Traditionally, the Tier 1 organisations (like the JTF) who are small in numbers, but truly "elite" are supported by a crack infantry unit. These are referred to in the west as Tier 2 organisations, (like the US Ranger Bns). An good and well known example of their use was seen in Blackhawk Down, when the Rangers cordoned off a building, and Delta force went in and grabbed some "persons of interest" 

Having said this, your Tier 1 organisations are of limited value if they do not have a bigger force to back them up (SAS/Brit Paras, Delta/Rangers, JTF2/LiBns???)

We can only hope I guess...


----------



## civvy3840

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Guys, the article wasn't that *confusing.
> 
> Basically, as I understand it, is that the CDS wants to transform the light infantry battalions into a Tier 2 force, with enhanced firepower, communications, and mobility.   He doesn't want to change the role of the light infantry battalions, he just wants to add to their capabilities so they have the ability to support JTF2 on the ground, or conduct Ranger-style missions on their own.
> *


*

Ok I get it now. *


----------



## Bartok5

I will keep this reasonably short, as my time is limited.   I will simply offer up the proposition (based on personal experience) that our collective sights are far too high regarding "SOC" in the international context.   

What am I saying?   Simply this.   Back in the dark ages of 2002 when 3 VP BG was serving with TF Rakkasan in Kandahar, we weren't allowed to employ our Recce Pl as it was intended because such tasks were the sole purview of "Strategic Recce Forces".   What we would consider to be typical "close recce" tasks were the inviolate arena of the international collective of "all-stars" embodied within TF K-Bar and others.   It seemed that the only folks who could leave the conventional fold of immediate aviation support were the various international SF.   To make a long story short, that was a joke, and a mistake which our partners (to their credit) finally realized - albeit just as we were leaving theatre.

When Op CHEROKEE SKY came up (recce-in-force of Zabol Province) in June 02, 3 PPCLI BG were finally able to make a pitch to employ our Recce Pl as intended.   They had fully proven themselves around the K'har area of influence, running countless overt and covert recce patrols, OPs, snap VCPs, etc, in conjunction with the local Afghan militia.   We arranged for the Pl Comd to brief the new U.S. Bde Comd about 3 VP Recce Pl's integral capabilities and qualifications.   To make a long story short, at the end of that briefing our U.S. tactical commander's words were (I was there, so I directly quote) "goddamn - those guys are Special Forces".   And therein lies the rub - in the U.S. (and I suspect NATO lexicon), they were indeed the equivalent of your NATO "run of the mill" SF.   I'm not just talking about our snipers, who had already reached near-legendary status amongst the U.S. forces involved in OEF.   I'm talking about the fact that our 3 Recce Section Commanders were all PPF qualified (with all that it entails) and 2 of 3 were MOI to boot.   Add to that the fact that everyone else was Basic Recce qualified.   Then add on the fact that every #2 and #3 in those Recce Dets was ISCC (now PLQ-Inf) qualified.   When we drew the comparisons of those Canadian qualifications to the U.S. equivalents, they were quite simply blown away by the demonstrated talent resident within our Recce Pl.   Hence their willingness to finally (finally!) let us play in the "big leagues".        

The proof was in the pudding.   During Op CHEROKEE SKY, where we finally had permission to employ Recce Pl in their appropriate role, we "twinned" them with the U.S. SF A Team responsible for Zabol Province.   Well, suffice it to say that it was a match made in heaven.   Our guys immediately went "SF" (tan uniforms & ball-caps, beards, Toyotas) and were seamlessly interfaced with the applicable U.S. SF ODA.   Furthermore, they provided us with the first-hand   information required for the main body to go in and do the "Recce in Force" job in Zabul Province.   This was a critical enabler for our success - having our own guys on the ground - that had been seriously lacking to date, due to the "watering down" of first-hand information that inevitably occurs between "Strat Recce" and "unit of action" feedback.

I could also go on and on about how 3 PPCLI BG's preparations for the Tora Bora mission had the local Ranger company in total awe.   We spent the better part of our 10 days awaiting final mission orders practicing vertical cave shaft entries (inverted rappel with an oxygen mask/tank, swiss seat, and a pistol), close-confines combat, etc, using abandoned buildings around Bagram Airfield.   The Rangers thought (and quite happily told us) that what we were doing was "seriously hard-core".   They were grooving on our "can do/will do" attitude, coupled with typical Canadian "make do" as required attitude - coupled with intensive and extremely detailed mission prep as time allowed.   

There were numerous other incidents wherein it became abundantly clear that 3 VP possessed the capabilities and (perhaps more importanly, the eager willingness) to go "above and beyond" the expectations of a U.S. line battalion.   Basing our Recce Pl outside of the KAF wire to co-locate with the local Afghan Militia when we were in the KAF Defence would be one such highly successful (and soon emulated) "rule breaker".   Our insistance upon physically dominating a 6 km radius of "no mans land" around KAF when we had defensive responsibility for the Coalition base, through the conduct of overt and covert recce patrols, standing patrols, OPs, joint patrols with the Afghans, a concerted CIMIC effort, etc, etc, would be yet another obvious example of 3 PPCLI's willingness to break with formation convention in the interests of doing what we Canadians do best.   It has been my humble experience that more often than not, the "basics" still work.... 

You can accuse me of being many things, but a sentimental and self-serving/self-forgiving "wannabe" is not one of them.   I have enjoyed the good fortune of serving with numerous international military forces on training exchanges, peace-support operations, and combat operations over the past 25 years.   And the one thing that I am here to tell you which we Canucks often "pooh, pooh" in our desire for modesty, is that at unit level and below, we are still pretty damned good.   And I mean that across the full spectrum of operations.   Given a reasonable opportunity to train (as was 3 PPCLI with our IRF(L) pot 'o money), I have zero doubt that any of the 3 Canadian "Light Battalions" can and will easily achieve "Special Operations Capability" (as far as NATO expectations are concerned) in the natural course of events.   3 PPCLI BG was clearly "there" in the OEF context, and I have little doubt that 3 RCR or 3 R22eR could acheive the same give a similar mission and pre-deployment training opportunities.   It was no coincidence that the TF K-Bar Ranger Battalion came looking to us for a joint op late in the Op APOLLO game, because they'd seen how effective we could be as a "Tier 2" unit.   That particular op never came to pass for a whole bunch of good reasons, but it was nonetheless another solid indicator of our recognized level of in-theatre capability.   

The Canadian Army may be small, but when given the resources to prepare we are also very potent (on an admittedly limited scale).   If we were to actually put our collective minds to it, we could produce a standing Tier 2 SOC that is second to none.   And trust me - unless I seriously underestimate the level of training that 3 PPCLI, 3 RCR and 3 R22eR currently possess, it wouldn't take much to get there from where we currently are.....

There is more that could be said, but if you don't get the message by now then I am unlikely to convince you.   The fact is that back in 2002, there in no doubt in my mind that 3 PPCLI BG was already "SOC".   All that particular unit was missing was the monniker and some of the high-speed kit.   Seems to me however, that we made due with what we had and in typical Canadian Army fashion we "adapted and overcame".  How we as an Army choose to go about formalizing such capabilities and the associated funding/kit in the forthcoming years will be interesting indeed.   I have zero doubt that as an organization, the Canadian Army is fully capable of fielding such units.   I say this because I have seen it occur (on an international basis) in real-time as circumstances dictated.   The question is, how we make it a permanent thing, rather than an inconsistent "child of circumstance".....   

Just my thoughts for this evening....

Mark C


----------



## Infanteer

Ok, now I'm confused - we're talking about a "Tier II" SOC Unit - but from what I gather from LtCol Bernd Horn's article, the Tier II defintion doesn't really fit (from this article, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol5/no3/Special_e.asp).  Where's the mix-up?



> - 'Tier One' SOF consists of primarily 'black operations' or counter terrorism. Normally, only 10 to 15 percent of those attempting selection are successful. What makes this number so impressive is that a large percentage of those trying out are already second or third tier SOF members. Organizations that fall into this category include the US 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta), the German Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG 9), the Canadian Joint Task Force-2 (JTF 2), and the Polish Commandos (Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno Mobilnego) (GROM) (Operational Mobile Response Group), to name but a few.
> 
> - 'Tier Two' SOF reflects those organizations that have a selection pass rate of between 20 and 30 percent. They are normally entrusted with high value tasks such as Strategic Reconnaissance and Unconventional Warfare. It is at this level that selection is separated from training because the skill sets are considered so difficult that the testers are looking only for attributes that cannot be inculcated. The actual skills required can be taught later during the training phase. Some examples include the American Special Forces (also referred to as Green Berets), the US Navy SEALs, and the British, Australian and New Zealand SAS.
> 
> - 'Tier Three', consists of those units, such as the American Rangers, that have a selection success rate of 40 to 45 percent, and whose primary mission is Direct Action. At this level, selection is mixed with training. However, the quality control line is drawn here. Generally, units below this line are not considered SOF.


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## Bartok5

Infanteer,

We're talking pure semantics.  If you go with Horn's categorization, then 3 PPCLI was a tier 3 unit, as would likely be any formalized "line SOC" organization within the interim/future force Canadian Army construct.  Unless I am fundamentally mistaken in my read of the wind's current direction, we will not be forming any Tier 2 units IAW LCol Horn's criteria.  

I would happily be proven wrong, but I don't think so....

Mark C


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## paracowboy

okay, my understanding of the "tier system" was similar to Col Horn's as well. Now I ain't so corn-fuzed.
Hey, maybe we'll get shiny stuff! I love shiny stuff.


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## Infanteer

Mark C said:
			
		

> We're talking pure semantics.



Okay, thanks Mark.  I wasn't sure if there was official terminology on SOC units somewhere in the book or not - all this talk of a "Tier II" unit had me thinking of what I had read in Col Horn's definition.

Either way, recognizing that infantry are useful for more than a combat team attack is a plus - you won't see me arguing against us sharpening the spear.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## TCBF

"it was a match made in heaven.  Our guys immediately went "SF" (tan uniforms & ball-caps, beards, Toyotas)"

Before we knew we were going on Op CHEROKEE SKY, whenever we rolled our Coyote past some VIP's Toyota parked at the edge of the Rose Garden, my crew and I would wonder why it was up on blocks and had no tires.  Later, in Zabul Prov, it all became so clear.. ;D

A great 4 or 5 days.  The scenery was biblical.


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## GO!!!

tcbf, you obviously dont "get it". 

The resistance that exists in our military and others to the creation and maintenance of SF is severely aggravated by the insistance of the members of some units to "rub it in" that they do not have to shave, wear all of their uniform or otherwise act differently from regular units when it did'nt really matter (like in a base like Kandahar).

Ask yourself, why did you want to look different? Are the LdSH elite? and what did you prove? In a REAL crack unit, like the Paras or Rangers discipline is strict. 

The expression "...and sharpness in the execution of all things." comes to mind.

Guys running around with beards and ball caps only ruffles the feathers on the golden goose that must give us the gold!

Cheers


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## TCBF

Okay, GO!, I wan't you to re-read my post again. 

 It was ref the 'Toyota's" on CHEROKEE SKY.  During the lead up to the OP refered to in the post I was quoting, Recce Pll went through 'a lot' of spare tires.  So many, that someone had to strip all of the tires off a Toyota at the rose garden.  Since a large part of the 3PPCLI BG drove/walked past said Toyota on blocks every day, inquiring minds wanted to know what was going on.  Once we rolled into Zabol prov, saw the vehs being used, and the nature of the ground, we saw the need for an 'emerg' replen of Toyota tires previously. 

 My comment was not related to the military fashion show that was Kandahar, where guys (not Canadians) whose only job was to burn 45 gal drums full of shite every day dressed like they worked for the CIA.  In the Coyotes, we shaved every day.  The rest of the BG shaved every day. Some of the dismounted troops on ops had better things to do with their water, as they could not carry as much.  Fine.  But we had enough, and we shaved,and when they got Chinooked back to camp, so did they.


----------



## GO!!!

Did anyone else get the same impression from that post that I did, or has my gift for misinterpretation surfaced again?


----------



## TCBF

I perhaps should have limited the quote to the 'Toyotas' or said 'Ref the Toyotas above' , but I didn't think it would be an issue.  So, maybe I should more closely ref my quotes.  Moon not in line with Venus, dam is bust, jute mill isploded, etc.

Tom


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## Bartok5

I clearly understood TCBF's comments regarding the Toyotas up on blocks, but then again I already knew the context....  

Regarding GO's comment about needless "SF affectations", I couldn't agree more.  The "LCF" and associated visual manifestations of "elitism" are completely unnecessary, and could very well prove to be counter-productive within a small Army such as ours.  It tends to breed suspicion and pointless "penis envy".  We're sufficiently small and close-knit as an organization that everyone tends to know who's who in the pecking order of relative capability regardless of "signage". 

In the interests of context, I should clarify precisely why it was that 3 VP Recce Pl adopted an "SF" appearance for OP CHEROKEE SKY.  The reason was very simple - camouflage in the interests of OPSEC.  By kitting out the platoon with Toyota trucks and having them adopt typical U.S. SF dress (tan combat pants, t-shirts, ball-caps, chest-webbing, facial hair, sunglasses, etc), they were able to blend in with the ODA responsible for Zabul Province and conduct joint recce of the BG's target AO without arousing suspicion.  The locals were used to seeing the ODA, and were comfortable with their presence.  Conversely, to suddenly see CADPAT-attired soldiers roaming around the area in Iltis gun-jeeps would have aroused a great deal of suspicion.  At the very least, it would have spooked our target audience (Taliban remnants) and created a "dry hole" long before the BG main body's air/mech insertion.  As it turned out, the "visual deception" worked perfectly - to the extent that elements of Recce Pl were able to gain access to a local Afghan fortress overlooking the capitol city and gain some very useful intelligence without arousing any suspicion whatsoever.  Once OP CHEROKEE SKY ended, the platoon reverted to standard grooming, dress and equipment.  In summary, the whole charade was a necessary means to an operational end, and NOT some bizarre "just because we can" affectation.

Cheers,

Mark C


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## McG

GO!!! said:
			
		

> The resistance that exists in our military and others to the creation and maintenance of SF is severely aggravated by the insistance of the members of some units to "rub it in" that they do not have to shave, wear all of their uniform or otherwise act differently from regular units when it did'nt really matter (like in a base like Kandahar).
> 
> Ask yourself, why did you want to look different? Are the LdSH elite? and what did you prove? In a REAL crack unit, like the Paras or Rangers discipline is strict.


Well, despite earlier talk of tan berets, I cannot see much room being given for elitist dress for the Li Bns or any future transformation from them.  I could see unique kit/dress based on operational needs of a force that operates differently than the majority of the mechanized army.

â Å“Penis envyâ ? would be a foolish excuse to not expand the roll of the Li Bns to include sp to SF Ops.


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## Michael Shannon

The "airliner" down justification for an airborne capability may have merit, but why infantry? Wouldn't a para sapper squadron and a platoon of para medics make more sense. The "enemy in the arctic" scenario was war gamed for years and the Airborne Regiment dropping into the arctic was found to be a non starter. Even if you could arrive in time to stop whatever sabotage was planned imagine resupply by air of 1300 troops in the arctic. 

     In the Canadian context mass parachute operations make no tactical sense. Thus the only other obvious reason to train parachutists is recruiting and retention. This is probably a valid reason for maintaining CPC but we shouldn't then extrapolate this into a tactical justification and then build "son of the airborne".


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## paracowboy

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> In the Canadian context mass parachute operations make no tactical sense.


bollocks! The fastest way to get boots on the ground, so that bad guys can get dead, is to drop them from aircraft. "The Canadian context" is no different than any other. We have enemies who want us dead, and our way of life eliminated. The best way to get rid of them is to make them very dead, very fast. That's where large numbers of motivated, armed, and highly-caffeinated infantrymen come in. The fact that our government is too short-sighted, and morally weak to realize this and act on it has no bearing on the truth.


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## Infanteer

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> In the Canadian context mass parachute operations make no tactical sense. Thus the only other obvious reason to train parachutists is recruiting and retention. This is probably a valid reason for maintaining CPC but we shouldn't then extrapolate this into a tactical justification and then build "son of the airborne".



Captain Rickard seems to disagree with your assessment, and has published a good reason why:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_07/iss_3/CAJ_vol7.3_13_e.pdf


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## Jungle

Thanks for the link Infanteer. Very interesting reading, and certainly extremely pertinent with the coming reorg of our LIBs.
For some reason Airborne, or Parachute, troops have always attracted some people, and repulsed others. From my limited experience, it has a lot to do with the required "can-do" attitude, or the absence of it !!! I have met with many outstanding Soldiers who don't have Wings, even though they had the right attitude; they simply chose not to go Airborne. I respect them. I also met with many who don't have the required attitude, and who despise those who do; I don't respect those.


----------



## McG

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> In the Canadian context mass parachute operations make no tactical sense.


What about a smaller drop of a Bn or Coy Gp?  Does it have to be a mass drop or nothing?


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## Michael Shannon

Thank you for Capt Rickard's article. I don't want to get into a real slanging match but a will make a few observations. 

    The most recent US airborne ops were really for show and not tactically necessary. Certainly Grenada was just to get combat stars and was close to a disaster. Probably all of the earlier ops would have been airmobile if the helicopters had been available. The later US jumps were just salemanship.

    You may be able to jump in conditions that preclude a heli-borne op, but what current commander would authorize an op that could not be extracted or supported by helicopters? It's not enough to have a capability you must have the will to use it. Imagine the faces in NDHQ when they read of a proposal to drop a company or battalion into the White Mountains without support. No go.

     Jump casualty figures are difficult to gauge because we select our training DZs, altitude and wind conditions with care to prevent casualties. I suspect the casualties from a night jump into the mountains of Afghanistan would be a bit more dramatic than 1/2 %.

     I can't see why you would choose to entry a battle by parachute rather than by helicopter. The helicopters give so much more flexibility 
firepower, and tactical mobility that the mass para drop is simply obsolete. What do you do if the enemy has packed up and run in the time it took to mount the drop...chase after them carrying our combat loads? How do you propose to move your guns and ammo? Evac casualties? Helicopters can land you on the ridge tops...DZs will likely be in valley bottoms. You're at a tactical disadvantage as soon as your jump boots hit the ground. 

     If you are concerned about building an adventurous mindset in the troops I suggest mountaineering. It's more dangerous than parachuting and has a practical purpose. Perhaps an eidelweiss could replace jump wings as a sign you were fit, tough and brave.


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## KevinB

I take issue with Michael Shannons comments about recent jumps.

 The jump into Iraq by the 173rd Abn Brigade was a necissity to show the Kurds that this time the US was thier to stay (they could not get out) and put troops inbehind Sadam
The US has done numerous SOF jumps in smaller amounts in Afghan.

 Secondly - want to seize an airfield?  Paratroops are still the #1 method to get in and seize it in a hurry without laying waste to the airfield.


Helicopters are an asset - but they cannot fly far or in many types of weather.

Defend the North in a hurry - YOU NEED JUMPERS.

Until teleporters have a NSN the Airborne has a riole despite the naysayer's

Supplies can be LAPES'd or door/ramp bundled onto the DZ..


----------



## GO!!!

Of course there is also the issue that helos cost millions, as do their crews, require forward operating bases, and, perhaps most importantly, the ones we own are pretty useless in terms of capabilities.

The limited range of helos,  and their susceptability to ground fire is also an issue.

Even if we used every gryphon in Canada, we could'nt insert a Bn anywhere out side Canada. 

Other than that, they are a great idea.

No one is advocating that we start jumping into every mission every time. But parachuting remains a useful tool that could have a place in modern warfare.

In addition to this, mountaineering is only as hard as you make it, and I have yet, in 9 years of mountaineering seen an event to test a soldier's fitness and bravery like a full kit, double door mass exit at the beginning of a 2 week exercise.


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## Michael Shannon

If CF wants to be able to insert small patrols by free fall fine, but no US mass jump op has been necessary or even wise since at least early Viet Nam. The US does them because they can get away with it not because it's necessary. The French have a different situation in their old colonies...one that we don't have.

           Defend the north? It was war gamed extensively. Parachuting into the high north didn't make sense against the Soviets and who else is left?  

           Mountaineering versus parachuting. I guess it's a matter of taste, but I think mountaineering is more difficult and dangerous.

        The difficulty of airborne ops has always been the logistics side and air crew training more than the actual parachuting. For a Canadian airborne unit to make sense you have to invent missions that:

 a. we have never done 
b. are in a strategic vacuum and 
c. are in a political vacuum. 

           Sure a para bn could be useful if we were going to seize an airfield in West Africa but we always work with allies and a simpler way of achieving the same thing would be for the local MEU to take it from the sea. Almost all para strategic missions i.e. "rescue the foreigners from rioters in Central Africa" require a level of ruthlessness the Canadian government doesn't have. Even if the government did decide to invade (!) Gambia the CF shows no inclination to maintain forces at the high readiness required to pull it off. Finally we (like almost all the rest of the world) lack the airlift required for a strategic bn drop and follow up. 

         The Griffon is a crummy helicopter and airmobile ops would be better served with a good medium lift copter. Let's lease some now and stop wasting effort trying to resurrect the airborne regiment.


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## GO!!!

Lest you forget,

Your last line Michael was the answer to all of the problems mentioned above. The Airborne was airmobile capable, a quick reaction unit, and had the ruthlessness required to undertake such a mission as you concieved.

In reference to your point about "a mission we have never done before" you're right. Let's never do anything new, it would just be too hard.

Defence of the north?
1 Denmark raising the flag on our soil in 2004.
2 The northwest passage being free of ice year round in less than a decade, and subject to foreign shipping.
3 Canada has never - in our 138 glorious years undertaken a unilateral mission in another nation, and no event happens in a strategic or political vacuum anyway, which makes parachuting even more valuable. Joint ops anyone?

As to asking the "local MEU" to perform our national obligation - why not - we can contract out coastal defence to KBR at the same time. :

The three goals of any nation's foreign policy are to increase power, presitge and influence. By maintaining the capability to insert 130 hard chargers where and when we need them, we can send message, even if they are extracted by truck.


----------



## mdh

> If CF wants to be able to insert small patrols by free fall fine, but no US mass jump op has been necessary or even wise since at least early Viet Nam. The US does them because they can get away with it not because it's necessary. The French have a different situation in their old colonies...one that we don't have.
> 
> Defend the north? It was war gamed extensively. Parachuting into the high north didn't make sense against the Soviets and who else is left?
> 
> Mountaineering versus parachuting. I guess it's a matter of taste, but I think mountaineering is more difficult and dangerous.
> 
> The difficulty of airborne ops has always been the logistics side and air crew training more than the actual parachuting. For a Canadian airborne unit to make sense you have to invent missions that:
> 
> a. we have never done
> b. are in a strategic vacuum and
> c. are in a political vacuum.
> 
> Sure a para bn could be useful if we were going to seize an airfield in West Africa but we always work with allies and a simpler way of achieving the same thing would be for the local MEU to take it from the sea. Almost all para strategic missions i.e. "rescue the foreigners from rioters in Central Africa" require a level of ruthlessness the Canadian government doesn't have. Even if the government did decide to invade (!) Gambia the CF shows no inclination to maintain forces at the high readiness required to pull it off. Finally we (like almost all the rest of the world) lack the airlift required for a strategic bn drop and follow up.
> 
> The Griffon is a crummy helicopter and airmobile ops would be better served with a good medium lift copter. Let's lease some now and stop wasting effort trying to resurrect the airborne regiment.



Michael,

This topic is out of my lane but I've found it a pretty fascinating. I read Capt. Rickard's article and thought that it was trying to shoe-horn a rather traditional concept of airborne ops into what is essentially a Special Forces role.   

I don't know what other guys who have actually experieced airborne ops think, but the notion that you can achieve an airborne response against an insurgent target within 24 hours sounds ambitious.   (The level of organization and coordination would have to be phenomenal.)

Moreover I thought Rickard's using Dien Bien Phu as a vindication of the soundness of airborne ops was odd.   Although he may have been referring to a specific raid, the use of airborne forces to bring the Viet Minh to a decisive battle was undermined by all the usual reasons airborne forces often fail - too isolated, too light, and eventually cut off from supply - the battle was lost - (and ironically the use of airborne was indeed decisive - for the Viet Minh.)

In the final analysis I thought Rickard was left - when you scratch the surface - arguing for what is essentially an SF role for parachute troops.

Any one else have thoughts on this?

Cheers, mdh


----------



## KevinB

I do not want to be a dick and use the L word here - but Michael you seem to have a pathological hatred of an Airborne capacity.

GO!!! gave a good consise disertation as to why we NEED it and you seem to be offering half assed excuses as to why not...

Furthermore like GO!!! I am rather disgusted by your attempt to hand off our tasks onto others, I guess your not an awe inspiring Canadian Nationalist?  I for one think Canadians have the right to expect that WE as CF members will put it on the line to ensure their safety.

 IF we where required to do a NEO mission paratroops may be require to seize and hold an airfield - perhaps as part of a larger International Mission - but it is one Canadian soldiers have trained for and are quite capable of executing.
Secondly that MEU that you mention - what happens if it outside the Range of a SeaKnight? (Labrador) which is only 132 NM to which you have to deduct the distance the BattleGroup is offshore. 

We could always enplane in US A/C and use them as a means of delivery - circa Dragon Rouge which the Belgian Para's did in the Congo.  It is a valuable asset that WE should maintain.

You missed the whole rationale for the 173rd's jump into Kirkuk, Iraq - the kurds would not have fought Sadam w/o US troops on the ground beside them.  I guess you still be shutteling them in via Griffon?  "2 more on the next lift"  :

 Plus everyone knows Paratroopers are inherently better people; both lovers and fighters  ;D


----------



## paracowboy

mdh said:
			
		

> I don't know what other guys who have actually experieced airborne ops think, but the notion that you can achieve an airborne response against an insurgent target within 24 hours sounds ambitious.   (The level of organization and coordination would have to be phenomenal.)


 the Yanks and Brits do it. Look at the the 82nd and Haiti a few years back. Entire Division wheels up, stood up, hooked up, and waitin' on a green within 24 hrs.


----------



## Michael Shannon

What the Yanks do is not relevant. What ex colonial powers do isn't relevant. Our government has decided not to field all purpose combat capable forces. It doesn't want to spend the money. It doesn't want to send troops into unknown danger. Can it get more unknown than a hastily prepared 8,000 mile flight followed by a parachute jump? Can anyone imagine a Canadian government sanctioning a strategic airborne operation?

      The jumpers are the least worrying part of an airborne operation. The key is trained airlift in sufficient quantities to make the operation feasible. Forgetting fanciful talk of defeating the mighty Danes in the north, what would a battalion drop into Africa take? How long do you have to plan and stage the operation? How many C130s for a battalions worth of troops and combat supplies? For how many days? What kind and how many vehicles do you take? What happens when you can't make a runway safe for airlanding because it's under indirect fire or AAA fire.       

    Those are just some of the problems before you get to the cost of aircraft, aircrew and maintenance, political and legal questions.


----------



## KevinB

:

Michael - I take it back your not an Airborne hater - your a CF hater.  Just because we have not yet done some tasks does not mean we should give up that capability.  You seem to be pushing for compete dismantling/ of the CF and outsourcing it.

Herc are rough field capable - so as long as the airfield seizure goes I doubt the NEO tasking scenario is going to invovle anyone with the capability to seriously crater the runway, you cannot ignore missions in search of the perfect zero risk one - you just cannot.  With your North African mission - figure 64 paratroopers per chalk.  Basically three per company with some supplies - make it four with 48hrs rats POL and ammo (it been a long time since I gave some serious thought to this option)

SO 12 HERC for 3 rifle companies  - In my "worst case NEO task" a company would seize an airfield - semi permissive.  Another compnay would secure the perimeter and the other coy would deploy to the main concentration of non combantants we where evac'ing with Assaulter elemets for the surgical doorkicking.  Once the airfield was secured a road patry could be dispatch via HErc landing conventionally and offloading Gwagons/ ML ' s and SOC Hummers.  Ideally for that we would borow (since we are not in a vacum right) C17's from the US AF (and then LAVIII's could be used for a less permissive environement).  The road convoy would run to the assemble point and retrieve the non combatants with the LI-SOC group fighting a rear guard if necessary or being pulled at the same time.

IF we had C-130J-30's the lift requirement would be reduced to 3 Hers / coy with supplies.

IF it took longer Herc's running from Italy could easily make the trip 2x a day IF NEC for medevac and more supplies/vehicles.

 If we had to bug out in a hurry we could always torch the vechiles on the airfield and scram (people are worth more than kit).


----------



## a_majoor

Considering getting around inside Canada requires transporting elements for distances that most other nations consider strategic, the idea of an Airborne/Airtransportable/Airmobile force makes a huge amount off sense. Forgetting about the high arctic, Gambia or Lower Volta for a moment; how long would it take for the CF to deploy troops from Pet to Windsor in response to a major terrorist event? Responding to anything in Saskatchewan or Manitoba is pretty problematic, since troops are so thin on the ground, and should a major earthquake hit the West Coast, driving 1 Brigade through the rockies would be a bit of a problem.

If you want to provide forces to respond in a hurry, air transport is the only way to go. Military commanders and theorists through the ages have always known that speed can be more important than mass (Bedford Nathan Forrest getting there "Firstest with the Mostest", M.N Tukhachevskii's Deep Battle or Liddel-Hart's "Tank Marines" for examples at different scales and eras). In fact, if you want to be flexible, you need to augment the "1rst Canadian Parachute Battalion" with airborne engineers (minimum), and start adding support capabilities as well (a real "Airborn Battlegroup) to be able to deal with the many and varies problems commanders would face in "home Defense" and "DomOPs" situations. Once we are able to do that, the same skills and capabilities also become available for "expeditionary" work


----------



## Michael Shannon

I give up. You guys are right. We definitely need an airborne capability to hold off the Danes, save Saskatchewan from terrorists and rescue people in Africa, if the US will lend us the planes and don't just go ahead and rescue the foreigners instead of waiting for the Canadians to show up.


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## TCBF

Well golly, Mike.  You could use the same logic to disband all of the Canadian Armed Forces.  Just what missions do YOU think we should do?  Give examples...

Tom


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## Bruce Monkhouse

Seems to me he only has problems,.....no solutions.


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## Zipper

Not that I disagree with you guys on this, but I see Michaels point (I think). Maybe we should try to get what we have already down solid before expanding (back) into areas that are going to cost quite a bit in support and organization. Much like the Tanks, we're not going to be seeing the airborne ability back in any big way for some time. Mores the shame.


----------



## LF(CMO)

The subject has been 'beat to death', but here we go.  We have a public that is almost totally apathetic to the military, as well so morally bankrupt that they can't even find the courage to get rid of a corrupt third world government.

 Com'on people face REALITY, when the CAR was disbanded that was the proverbial 'beginning of the end'.  The last real vestage of what had been a real 'kick a** ' Army was done.  It's gone; it's not coming back!!  The Liberanos will do anything to keep control.  They would make Islam the state religion if they have to.

 The next election is going to be the most critical in Canadian history.  If the Libs aren't tossed.........??  I was talking to our MP today and he says that he doubts if they (Conservatives) will win.


----------



## Infanteer

LF(CMO) said:
			
		

> Com'on people face REALITY, when the CAR was disbanded that was the proverbial 'beginning of the end'.   The last real vestage of what had been a real 'kick a** ' Army was done.   It's gone; it's not coming back!!



Are you sure about that?  Judging from the comments of our American allies, we haven't been doing too bad in Afghanistan.

Why do people assume that the Canadian Army of today is a big sack of pussies because we don't have The Airborne Regiment/Tanks/insertyourcausehere?


----------



## a_majoor

Zipper has a point, but not the one he thought he was making (hey, it happens)

We are thrashing about to have a "balanced" and "General purpose" armed forces without any clear definition of what it is we are supposed to do. I'm not talking in the Gen Hillier sense ("we kill people"), but in the more philosophical "why we kill people" sense. If we are killing people in far away places to ensure local instability doesn't boil over into regional or even international mayhem, then we need to concentrate on a particular type of force structure, which is generally light and expeditionary in nature. Extrapolating from this, we end up generating airbore forces and SOF units so we can "kill people" over there rather than waiting to deal with the problems over here.

If the people we want to kill are not local terrorists, criminal warlords or other miscreants, but work in organized armies using the power of the State to threaten neighbours etc., then we need more capable killing tools, and the means to transport and support these tools and equipment to the theater of operations. Iraq is the premier model, being a thorn in everyones side since the 1980s. Iran is certainly gunning for that spot now, as is North Korea, and there is a large body of opinion that China is also there.

The other thing is the end state we want to achieve. A commercial Republic like the United States really needs a Navy and Marines to launch punitive expeditions. An Imperial power needs legions which can defeat all comers and has the muscle and logistics to stay in place for years and decades (an Empire can be a Democracy, the Athenians converted the Delian league into their own Empire, and the British Empire was also a Constitutional Monarchy, with decisions made by parliament. How far the United States has gone down this path is a matter of debate).

We as a nation need to debate this issue and come to a consensus. If it is felt that killing people only involves terrorists and the like, then light, airborn forces and SOF are the way to go. If it is felt that State powers are the "real" threat, then medium and heavy forces with appropriate transport and logistics must be procured. If we really feel the need to be part of an Empire, then the size and composition of the forces will be much different and much larger than anything we currently envision, while punitive forces will also require a change in direction.

Although I have posted extensively on other threads about the organization of medium forces (since that is where we are at currently), if I had a clean sheet of paper I would be on the side of the airborne/expeditionary model for "firefighting" local and regional instability, with some medium forces that could follow up and act as a QRF for the deployed airborne forces. I would also like to see an expanded Navy which could support overseas deployments, and control and secure the shipping lanes vital to our trade. BMD would also be nice.

Airborne and SOF forces can be derived from a clean sheet of paper approach to what we want/need, as well as from the many arguments we see in previous posts.


----------



## George Wallace

Seriously, and using KISS, we are facing two major problems in this matter.  

First, the lack of Political and Public will to fund our military: and

two, the lack of Public will to 'man' the CF.

With no money and no pers, have no ability to even talk about Airborne Forces, Air Mobile Forces, or more SOF troops.  Lack of Aircraft, lack of land equipment, etc. neuter any dreams of this in the near future.


----------



## LF(CMO)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Are you sure about that?   Judging from the comments of our American allies, we haven't been doing too bad in Afghanistan.
> 
> Why do people assume that the Canadian Army of today is a big sack of pussies because we don't have The Airborne Regiment/Tanks/insertyourcausehere?



 Canadians,  the Military in pparticular have a tradition of 'soldiering on'  despite the circumstances, politics etc.  That is why we are respected by our allies especially our neighbors.  Remember what Nancy Green said," hard work and PERSEVERIENCE"!


----------



## Infanteer

LF(CMO) said:
			
		

> Canadians,   the Military in particular have a tradition of 'soldiering on'   despite the circumstances, politics etc.   That is why we are respected by our allies especially our neighbors.   Remember what Nancy Green said," hard work and PERSEVERIENCE"!



Doesn't answer my question - I'm curious as to why you consider the Army of today to suck ass, which seems to be implied with the "real kick a**" remark.


----------



## LF(CMO)

Please re-phase your question with out the epithets, 'suck' and 'pussies'.


----------



## Infanteer

Well, I lowered it down to the level you took it to with the notion of the loss of a "real kick ass" Army with the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.  My question still stands, how is it that our Army does not "kick ass" anymore, when you consider that much of our equipment is top notch, we have leadership which has an unprecedented amount of operational experience, we have a CDS who's leading from the front and has almost total support of the Forces, and we are shifting back to a combat footing by moving down to Kandahar and going on the offensive with our American brothers who seem to, from all the anecdotes I've heard, value our contribution as a proficient fighting force.

So I ask again, where are you getting this notion that we don't "kick ass" anymore?


----------



## mover1

....Firstly we shoud get some planes for you to jump out of


----------



## LF(CMO)

The Canadian Army does very well because despite everything that happens there are some very dedicated people (you are obviously one yourself or you wouldn't be pursuing this so vigorously) that somehow manage to carry on.

 PERSEVERIENCE!


----------



## paracowboy

syrup with that waffle?


----------



## Zipper

Agreed with Majoor and GW ( as usual George!  ) And thanks Majoor for expanding on what is really going on in my limited skull space. ;D

As for our military sucking whatever. I guess that is a perception (however wrong) on the part of many of the public. When do we ever hear anything really good about our military beyond short snippits here and there? 

If something goes wrong, you hear about it ad nasium for weeks.

Its also the fact that we DO A VERY GOOD job combat wise, but only with small units (platoon and smaller) that do not get much attention. 

Gone are the days of regiments and larger formations doing a bang up job and marching with battle honours flying (and bands playing) down streets crowded with people cheering. This is the whole reason for pomp. 

So here is a question.

How do we as either still serving soldiers/ex members/interested public (good on ya) go about raising the profile of our military to that of something that is once again valued by the public at large?


----------



## MJP

LF(CMO) said:
			
		

> The Canadian Army does very well because despite everything that happens there are some very dedicated people (you are obviously one yourself or you wouldn't be pursuing this so vigorously) that somehow manage to carry on.
> 
> PERSEVERIENCE!


That ladies and gentlemen is how you backpedal!


----------



## HItorMiss

I think the biggest step to that would be having people with previous service in places of power in both business and government. Seems to me that one of the huge reasons that the military (beyond historical reason of course) in the US has such support is that many of the influential players of the public and private sectors push it upon the populace constantly and they also have a military that knows which side it's bread is buttered on and place to it IE: the encouragement of say Marines to wear their dress blues every chance they get.

Think about the glut of military genre movies and books and TV specials constantly barraging the average joe with the gung ho kick butt attitude, hard not to support your forces when all you see is the hard charging soldier doing his duty for "old Glory". Now what we need is a serious big budget movie like BHD say depicting the Medak or the operations of ours snipers and JTF2 in Afghanistan put it out there make the public see what we do and how we do it, hit them with mainstream (CanWest) TV specials showing our troops and the courses we do and life in the field for our hard chargers...trust me a year or 2 of that and recruiting would be up public oppinion would be up and we would be back in the spot light we never should have left.

thats just my thoughts though.


----------



## Infanteer

LF(CMO) said:
			
		

> The Canadian Army does very well because despite everything that happens there are some very dedicated people (you are obviously one yourself or you wouldn't be pursuing this so vigorously) that somehow manage to carry on.



Thanks for the straight-forward answer; I now know to look for substantiation to claims you make on these forums....



> PERSEVERIENCE!



*per ·se ·ver ·ance*

n. 

Steady persistence in adhering to a course of action, a belief, or a purpose; steadfastness.


----------



## LF(CMO)

"That ladies and gentlemen is how you backpedal!"

  As to the above:the   I had nothing to add to the original statement other than the comments that followed.   I do apologise for the misspelling of the P word.  I'm in the middle of haying and I needed a part for my swather. I just stopped by here for some diversion while I was in the house for Coffee!


----------



## Acorn

LF(CMO), I was in the Combat Arms in the "old Army" that you said "kick a**." Looking at what I see in the New Army (I'm still in, just not Cbt Arms) I think the New Army is fundamentally superior to the Old. Airborne Regiment or not.

But that's just my opinion, worth what you paid for it.

Acorn


----------



## a_majoor

Zipper said:
			
		

> Agreed with Majoor and GW ( as usual George!  ) And thanks Majoor for expanding on what is really going on in my limited skull space. ;D



Hey, what are friends for anyway!  ;D ;D ;D


----------



## Black Watch

We need an airborne unit


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Black Watch said:
			
		

> We need an airborne unit



Thats obvious but try and quantify your statements with logic... :


----------



## LF(CMO)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Thats obvious but try and quantify your statements with logic... :



 Is 'logic' an issued item?


----------



## KevinB

LF(CMO) call me a critic but your a CIC officer right?  Why dont you stay in your lane.


----------



## redleafjumper

I believe it was Field Marshall Slim who said in his book Defeat into Victory words to the effect that specialists were unnecessary because they cost too much and expected special treatment, however he said that the one exception to this is paratroops.  

Slim also wrote that all infantry should have the opportunity to take parachute training as it builds esprit de corps, pride and trust.  
Paratroops tend to be can-do types who take pride in physical fitness and personal training skills.  

Being a jumper is much more that being someone who takes advantage of an expensive transportation system to go into battle.  Those who have jumped have conquered fear within themselves and not only that, they know that every other jumper has also conquered that fear.  That knowledge builds a very strong bond.  An incident many years ago brought this home to me personally.  I was coming home from a training course and my ride picked me up and told me that we are going to a garden party.  I said, no thanks, I want to get out of my greens, have a shower and read a book.  I got talked into it (hard to say no to mom!).  Well, there was an old gentleman at this party who came up to me and said in a slight accent, " I see you have jumped.  May I ask how many times?"  I responded that I had only seven jumps from the CF basic parachutist course.  He said "That is more than me.  I have only 5 - 2 training jumps, with Model in Holland at the start of the war, Crete, and when our Junkers was shot down by a P-38 in Czechoslovakia!"  Needless to say we had a grand chat and I was glad that I got to meet a member of the airborne brotherhood who had served in some amazing operations and through some of the toughest fighting in the war.  It was time much better spent than reading any book.  The point is we bonded instantly and it was much beyond something to chat about.  I could see the look on his face as he relived his experiences as a fallschirmjaeger all those years ago.  

Does Canada need paratroops?  It is a long thread and it has been said before but as long as we have an army we need paratroops, or something very like them.


----------



## McG

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> Our government has decided not to field all purpose combat capable forces. It doesn't want to spend the money.


Have you read the new defence policy?



			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> It doesn't want to send troops into unknown danger.


That must be why we have a PRT going to cuddly Kandahar.



			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> I give up. You guys are right. We definitely need an airborne capability to hold off the Danes, save Saskatchewan from terrorists and rescue people in Africa ...


You sure are sarcastic in defeat.  What if we consider our recent NEO deployment to Haiti.  Do you think that paratroops might have been a decent asset had there not been a secure airhead?



			
				LF(CMO) said:
			
		

> Com'on people face REALITY, when the CAR was disbanded that was the proverbial 'beginning of the end'.   The last real vestage of what had been a real 'kick a** ' Army was done.   It's gone; it's not coming back!!


You could also do with a read through the new defence policy and the progress of the LFWG.  The 'kick a** ' army is here with 'kick a** ' leadership taking us in a bold new direction.

One thing that I feel is critical for our small army is that our airborne elements must be special operations capable.  We cannot afford to have pers filling separate Abn and Abn-SOC elements.  ... But, I don't imagine anyone in a position to influence things would consider a "non-SOC" Abn.


----------



## Zipper

MCG said:
			
		

> You could also do with a read through the new defence policy and the progress of the LFWG.   The 'kick a** ' army is here with 'kick a** ' leadership taking us in a bold new direction.



Well to play devils advocate on this statement. But...

  ...a defense policy is an "intention" to do something. It hasn't happened yet, and we can only hope they stick to it. But like they've stuck to any in the past?

Kick ass army is here? Where? Ok, I'm game. Have we solved all the problems over night?? Lets say that we're a kick ass army with what little we've got, just like we were yesterday and the last 50 years or so.

Kick ass leadership? Ok again, where? Hillier? One man with good intentions has finally made it to the top position. Great. Lets support him, but not hold our breath. To much history of disappointment to finally go running in the streets cheering. If he manages to get the policy all the way through and it all comes true, I'll be the first in the streets. Maybe even naked. ;D


----------



## Michael Shannon

Kandahar Air Base. Unknown? The PRT will be at a major established US airbase with about a brigade guarding it. Coalition troops have been in the area for over three years. The PRT will be able to hide in the fort if things get overly dangerous. This hardly equates to the danger of a para jump onto an insecure airfield on 24-48 hours notice without ground or air support.

     The problem with the parachute solution to a problem is that they are always militarily unnecessary, politically unrealistic, logistically unsustainable or come out of desperation.  For the para option to be required you need the airhead to be insecure and the enemy to be pathetic, no ground or naval forces available, and the airmobile option impossible. Before that you need political will, legal authority and the aircraft to make the drop. The Hercs might make it to the area but what about CAS? Does a parachute or any operation have to be within fighter range? How about the weather? The enemy also have a major say in this. Can you drop the combat power needed to overcome the enemy? 

     These are basic staff questions. Until they can be answered the para option will sit on the shelf, like it has for 60 years. Improved amphibious capability, better helicopters and aircraft like Osprey will make para ops less rather than more likely.

     Just to be clear. How many para bns should Canada have? If the answer is one what do you do with the other 3rd battalions? What do you mean by Special Operations Capable?  I get the feeling you mean patrolling or do you want the CF to develop unconventional warfare units?  We haven't fallen so far that the recce patrol has become "special ops", or have we?


----------



## McG

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> Kandahar Air Base. Unknown? The PRT will be at a major established US airbase with about a brigade guarding it. Coalition troops have been in the area for over three years. The PRT will be able to hide in the fort if things get overly dangerous. This hardly equates to the danger of a para jump onto an insecure airfield on 24-48 hours notice without ground or air support.


No.  The PRT will be by itself in town (just as the PRT that we are replacing).


----------



## McG

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> The problem with the parachute solution to a problem is that they are always militarily unnecessary, politically unrealistic, logistically unsustainable or come out of desperation.  For the para option to be required you need the airhead to be insecure and the enemy to be pathetic, no ground or naval forces available, and the airmobile option impossible. Before that you need political will, legal authority and the aircraft to make the drop. The Hercs might make it to the area but what about CAS? Does a parachute or any operation have to be within fighter range? How about the weather? The enemy also have a major say in this. Can you drop the combat power needed to overcome the enemy?


I see you are one that likes to situate the estimate.



			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> These are basic staff questions. Until they can be answered the para option will sit on the shelf, like it has for 60 years. Improved amphibious capability, better helicopters and aircraft like Osprey will make para ops less rather than more likely.


The Osprey is not yet an option, and movement by sea for an amphibious approach is significantly slower than air movement.



			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> What do you mean by Special Operations Capable?


Think US Rangers.


----------



## Jungle

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> These are basic staff questions. Until they can be answered the para option will sit on the shelf, like it has for 60 years.


Follow this link: http://www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/paratrooper.htm
Scroll down the page, you will find a multitude of Airborne Ops that took place since WWII, like the Indonesian drops in East Timor in Dec 1975, the French 2-Battalion drop in the Congo in June 1997, or the dropping of 3000 troops by Russia in Chechnya in April 2000.
That's quite the shelf...

Note: it may be hard to reach the site linked above. Since I posted the link, they are experiencing bandwidth problems... Try in the morning if you have difficulty reaching it.


----------



## buzgo

We just got a bunch of info on JATF, I'm not going into details other than:

The org chart looks alot like the CAR;

JATF is a placeholder. They will have a 'proper' name shortly;

Looks like things will get rolling in 06 for the HQ and Coy leaders.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

ohhhh Rob's curious.


----------



## Sapper6

signalsguy said:
			
		

> We just got a bunch of info on JATF, I'm not going into details other than:
> 
> The org chart looks alot like the CAR;
> 
> JATF is a placeholder. They will have a 'proper' name shortly;
> 
> Looks like things will get rolling in 06 for the HQ and Coy leaders.



The ORBAT I saw didn't look like the CAR at all.  With consideration for OPSEC, I will say that my take is that each Coy will have a specific role. More to follow if this becomes open source.

Heard the same thing about the JATF name.  Possibility of a name change in the months/years to come....heck, it didn't take them long to change SOG to CANSOFCOM.

S6.


----------



## McG

Word is that the JATF is now known as the Canadian Special Operations Regiment.


----------



## TCBF

Well, if we are going to stick with the geographical names of our regiments, lets call it "The Yukon Regt".  That way, at least somebody can have 'Siberia" as a battle honour.
 ;D

Tom


----------



## Sapper6

MCG said:
			
		

> Word is that the JATF is now known as the Canadian Special Operations Regiment.



Yup, heard the same this week. 

S6.

[....sitting in Ottawa, close to the heartbeat of CF Transformation (sic)...]


----------



## silentbutdeadly

Thats a way better name then the last one! Will make the guys have some pride ! If it wasn't for this tour i would love to be apart of this org.!


----------



## Journeyman

Having read through this thread, I just couldn't help but have deju vu flashbacks to several other recurring discussions, such as what colour berets the VP TOW troops posted with LdSH would be wearing. Maybe we should just create a standing thread addressing such critical fashion issues. 

Mind you, my issued berets have been green, black, scarlet, maroon, UN blue (career attention deficit disorder; when bored, remuster   ) - -  personally, I'm just happy to have a fleece toque now, rather than that itchy wool thing!   ;D


----------



## McG

Joe Blow said:
			
		

> Like many, I too would like to know if the Canadian Parachute Regiment [proposed by the Conservatives] would be in addition to the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, or in place of the CSOR.
> 
> 
> 
> I like what I heard tonight but was really curious about that point.  What does this promise mean for the army exactly?  I understand the CSOR will be a company from 3 RCR to begin with and will 'grow with the army' from there.  Would the new Airborne Regiment just be an amalgamation of the the airborne brigades?  If so, where is the advantage?  (Seriously ..I really wouldn't know.  Anyone?  Arguments for or against..?)  and what of the rest of the army ..the same but without jump battalions?
Click to expand...

Joe,
We do not have airborne brigades or jump battalions.  We have three parachute companies (one in each of the light infantry battalions).


----------



## Joe Blow

Thanks for the help MCG.  (Clearly I need some education about the proper organization of a regiment.)

As regards my question about the advantage of amalgamating the jump companies over the status quo ..and the wider implications for the army of having a CSOR and an Airborne Regiment  ..well, I'm going to read the thread.


----------



## Infanteer

Joe Blow said:
			
		

> (Clearly I need some education about the proper organization of a regiment.)



There is no "proper organization" for a Regiment in the Canadian Army - in the British tradition it is a "tribal affiliation".  Regiments are made up of battalions, all of which share the same customs and traditions.  Canada has, for the time being, settled on 3 battalions each for its regular Infantry Regiments; it used to be 1 or 2.  Australia has made all 6 (IIRC) of its infantry battalions part of the same Regiment, the RAR.  On a side note, Armoured units call their battalions "regiments", as do Engineers, but they are battalions for all intensive purposes.

Check out www.regiments.org for an explanation of the Commonwealth tradition behind the regimental system.

Now, if you go to the US or other, non-Commonwealth militaries, the Regiment is an actual field unit which is similar in size to a brigade.  The US Army has Armored Cavalry Regiments, the US Marine has Artillery and Marine (infantry) Regiments, and most former Eastern-Bloc countries use the Regiment as a form of organizing battalions.


----------



## McG

Joe Blow said:
			
		

> As regards my question about the advantage of amalgamating the jump companies over the status quo ..and the wider implications for the army of having a CSOR and an Airborne Regiment   ..well, I'm going to read the thread.


To revisit your question, you want to know if we need three parachute companies spread across the three light battalions, if we need three parachute companies grouped into one parachute battalion/regiment, or if we need a parachute brigade (three parachute battalions).  You also want to know if a special operations battalion/regiment should exist in addition to the parachute capability, or if the same unit should fill both rolls.  Does that sound about what you want to ask?


----------



## UberCree

I say this whole thread is moot if Hercs cannot fly in formation... which they cannot correct ???  Otherwise a 'para' or 'airborne' unit is an airborne unit in name only.


----------



## Michael OLeary

UberCree said:
			
		

> I say this whole thread is moot if Hercs cannot fly in formation... which they cannot correct ???  Otherwise a 'para' or 'airborne' unit is an airborne unit in name only.



http://members.aol.com/samc130/formation.html



> In those days TAC C-130 crews still flew close formation, though it would not be long before the low-level in-trail formation would become the norm. Crews would go out on 5-hour locals that included a low-level training segment followed by an airdrop on one of the DZ's on Fort Bragg, a period of close formation flying. It was a thrill to see a flight of Herks return to the field for landing, as they would come over the airfield in an echelon formation, then "pitch-out" in a 360-degree Overhead Recovery. TAC troop carrier pilots flew their airplanes the same way fighter pilots did.



http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/hercules/hercules6.html


----------



## Recce41

I have the numbers for the JATF. It was 395 to start. Most are Inf positions. ie out of the 39 WOs 21 are hard Inf. 18 are other badge. As of now, I'm the only Armour WO that has asked for it. Most are to hesitent about asking. There is to be a troop of Engs, Armour, and Arty, as of the last info I received. 
 3 RCR is the lead until the PPCLI/R22R are on reorg phase.


----------



## Spr.Earl

I hope it comes to fruition,as it will bring somthing for all Cbt.Arms to strive for.


----------



## Joe Blow

> To revisit your question, you want to know if we need three parachute companies spread across the three light battalions, if we need three parachute companies grouped into one parachute battalion/regiment, or if we need a parachute brigade (three parachute battalions).  You also want to know if a special operations battalion/regiment should exist in addition to the parachute capability, or if the same unit should fill both rolls.  Does that sound about what you want to ask?



Yes.  Thanks.  That's what I was curious about.  What the advantages of having one parachute battalion/regiment would be over the having the companies dispersed as they are.  If they are better off consolidated would this leave the present light infantry battalions impoverished?  ...and is there further advantage to keeping such a unit separate from a special operations regiment.

Infanteer - Thanks for the word on regiments and the link too.  Great site.

(...still reading the thread.)


----------



## Infanteer

Joe Blow said:
			
		

> What the advantages of having one parachute battalion/regiment would be over the having the companies dispersed as they are.



...and now you are about to learn the intricacies of Regimental politics....


----------



## McG

With the Conservatives planning on dropping "rapid reaction battalions" all around the country, maybe they could lump them together into a light brigade?


----------



## Adam_18

I'm not sure if this has been addressed yet, but it was my understanding that the old ariborne regiment had attatched units of airborne gunners and engineers. I'm just wondering if the new regiment will have somthing similar to this structure?

Adam


----------



## Michael OLeary

Adam_18 said:
			
		

> I'm not sure if this has been addressed yet, but it was my understanding that the old ariborne regiment had attatched units of airborne gunners and engineers. I'm just wondering if the new regiment will have somthing similar to this structure?
> 
> Adam



Since it's nothing but a fading election promise at this time, that's a little hard to say. Why don't we wait and see what the new goverment actually does with defence policy and then we can all ask question as real information is disclosed.


----------



## Slim

*Secret breed of soldiers*

New Canadian commando unit, ready for action by year's end, will help in hunt for Taliban, al-Qaida

By STEPHANIE RUBEC, SENIOR POLITICAL REPORTER

OTTAWA -- A new secret commando unit will begin operating out of CFB Petawawa by year's end and see its ranks swell to 750 strong, according to the force's new commander. 

Col. David Barr said the first soldiers vying for a coveted spot on the special regiment will first have to complete a grueling 16-week elite training session beginning this April in Petawawa. 

Barr said he expects about 260 soldiers of that first group will meet the "high standard" set during the course and will then participate in some fall training before being deemed ready to conduct operations abroad. 

"It will better enable us to counter, fight and defeat the terrorist threat at home and abroad," Barr told reporters yesterday after he was sworn in as the first commander of the Canadian special operations forces command. 

Barr said the first pool of soldiers will mostly be plucked from existing units located at CFB Petawawa. 

The regiment is being created to complement the secretive Joint Task Force, whose commandos are now hunting down Taliban and al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan. 

"It allows us to have JTF 2 do the real precision work, but be supported by special operators that they work with, they train with, that they have confidence in," Barr explained. 

The regiment will also be deploying clusters of its members to conduct secret missions abroad without JTF 2 members. 

JTF 2 is itself in the midst of a massive recruiting effort as the military moves to double the unit's numbers in an effort to increase its phalanx of assaulters and support staff. 

Barr said the creation of a special operations regiment has the Canadian Forces following in the footsteps of other countries' military forces, which discovered in recent years a need for a multi-tasking specialized unit that can provide muscle in missions abroad, support special forces soldiers and deploy in small units of about 12 soldiers to tackle tough jobs abroad


----------



## William Webb Ellis

I was reading the Brit Para jump thread, and it made me wonder if the airborne capability is still useful?

Please be clear this is not an attack on the airborne or it's brotherhood.  It is me wondering if the situation(s) that developed/fostered this tactic of dropping troops into battle is still relevent when you look at the other abilities to to deliver troops to battle.


----------



## MikeL

Um, theres been quite a few Airborne drops in the past while, AFAIK all were successfull. Rangers parachuting in to seize Kandahar airfield, members of the 173rd jumping into Northan Iraq, etc, plus the jumps that happened in the '80s(Urgent Fury an Just Cause).


----------



## HDE

Check out a book called "Bast*ard Sons", by Bernd Horn.  He traces the history of Canadian Airbone units and the reasons/lack of reasons for the unit over the years.  The main point is that there was a lot of ambiguity over what exactly the Airborne was expected to do, at various times, over the years.  An interesting read.


----------



## Jungle

It's not because Canada chooses not to use it that it is redundant; check out this link, especially the recent ops towards the end of the page, and make an informed opinion:
http://www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/paratrooper.htm


----------



## William Webb Ellis

It's not because Canada chooses not to use it that it is redundant; check out this link, especially the recent ops towards the end of the page, and make an informed opinion:
http://www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/paratrooper.htm

Thanks I will..


----------



## geo

while the CAR is gone, the individual "commandos" survive (+/-) as part of the light battalions. With the addition of JTF2 and the planned addition of the CSOR, think we've got this one covered thank you.


----------



## Centurian1985

A very sensitive subject for a lot of people - lets avoid past hostorical events and deal with the future: 

1) It is unlkely that Canada will require an entire battalion of jump-trained soldiers.  Why? Because it is highly unlikely that we will ever conduct aggressive attacks that require an element of surprise by attacking into a rear area and then waiting for armoured link-up.  Why? For several reasons; no particular enemy to conduct such tactics on, no armour, no operations that require that tactic, not enough troops to conduct such a tactic, and not enough aircraft for such troops to jump out of.

2) However, it is of the utmost importance that soldiers have a higher level of achievement to aspire to.  The US has a multitude of such forces i.e. green berets, rangers, marine recon, seals, delta, etc. all in a set hierarchy of achievement. We need a similiar system in order to allow soldiers to demonstrate their motivation and self-determination, to distinguish themselves from others on the same level. In this regard, it is very important for us to have a 'next level' that soldiers can achieve through intense pyhsical effort and determination. Such soldiers are then allowed to demonstrate their unqiueness by wearing different clothing, berets, and recognition than the 'other' levels wear. 

3) However, again, such soldiers, having proven themselves to be a superior level than those beneath them, by successfully meeting the demanded standard, although grappling for the title of 'elite', then must realize that they ARE NOT the top of the food chain.  They are merely a selection phase that weeds out those with lesser physical standards and determination. It is from this INTERMEDIATE achievement of jump-qualification that many of the next level of elite forces are selected; SAR, CSAR, JTF, SSF, Strat Recce, to name a few.  To reach this next higher level, soldiers must continue to demonstrate physical expertise but must also demonstrate mental capabilities which seperate them from those with merely physical expertise. 

4) On a point sure to enrage airborne-proponents, a jump course is a qualification on par with other specialized skills that seperate soldiers from others who passed 'basic' training.  This includes mountain warfare, air assault, diving, hand-to-hand combat, markmanship, specialized intelligence teams, and other groups with unqiue skills related to combat zones and tactics but not involving a parachute.  All are equally unique, and all require a higher standard than the normal soldier.  Some require more physical skill while others demand higher mental skill, but all require the demonstration of a higher level of skill, and none can do the job of the others to the same standard (despite many claiming that they can or do).  Elite forces select from these groups in addition to the jump-trained solderis, a fact that many jump-trained soldiers tend to forget. 

In Summary:
I do not believe that there is an operational requirement for an entire  airborne unit, due to the lack of CF operations and tactics that would utilize such expertise.  However, I do believe that it would be a travesty to eliminate the opportunity  for soldiers to gain this skill, or the recognition that soldiers gain by achieving this skill.  Soldiers need a level of achievement to attain, a mountain to climb, a means to show themselves better than their fellow soldier.  It is also an excellent means of proving that a soldier has the drive and determination that is sought by elite units higher up in the chain. Further, if Canada were to ever actually go to actual war and need this skill it would be a travesty to have eliminated the tactial and operational capability by having no one who knew how to jump out of an airplane, or to train others to do same.  Finally, until someone invents an anti-gravity belt, transporter, or some other means of moving soldiers from an air platform to the ground, this will remain a required skill area and thus must train our soldiers for its potential use; do not eliminate a strategic weapon for the projection of power unless you have something to replace it with!   

Thus endeth the lesson...


----------



## 3rd Horseman

Airborne is not just redundant it is obsolete. It is a poor way to send troops into battle, we have developed better methods to achieve the same goals. That comment in no way casts any doubt on the previous glory of those fine units that conducted airborne activities in the past just that it is now the past. Notwithstanding the use of small unit airborne insertion is still a modern requirement for special ops activities but not full blown assaults.


----------



## Jungle

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> 4) On a point sure to enrage airborne-proponents, a jump course is a qualification on par with other specialized skills that seperate soldiers from others who passed 'basic' training.  This includes mountain warfare, air assault, diving, hand-to-hand combat, markmanship, specialized intelligence teams, and other groups with unqiue skills related to combat zones and tactics but not involving a parachute.  All are equally unique, and all require a higher standard than the normal soldier.  Some require more physical skill while others demand higher mental skill, but all require the demonstration of a higher level of skill, and none can do the job of the others to the same standard (despite many claiming that they can or do).  Elite forces select from these groups in addition to the jump-trained solderis, a fact that many jump-trained soldiers tend to forget.


Maybe you are right;  : but why is it none of those specialties, apart from the Divers, get specific skill badges and task-specific allowances ?? I don't believe debussing from a LAV-III has anything in common with jumping with full combat gear, at night, from 800ft AGL, into a place you've never been before... Again, look at the link I posted in my previous post in this thread, and tell me there is no use for Airborne Troops in modern warfare.
Canada chose not to use aerial delivery (of troops or supplies) during the "Peacekeeping era", but things are changing fast...


----------



## Centurian1985

I would gladly like to hear any ideas on how to use Airborne troops in our current operations.  Also, note that I said there may still be a future use for Airborne!

Reference your remarks about special badges: to be recognized you have to have a history and a group of leaders fighting for you to be recognized as a unique skill and have leaders willling to fight for your recognition of having that skill; airborne has had that since WW II.  The rest of the specialists are just catching up.  

Reference your remarks about extra pay; the purpose of the extra pay was to entice young soldiers to risk their health to jump our of aircraft; I agree that the airborne is one of the most physically dangerous jobs in the forces and you earn your pay by having the balls to trurn yourself into a potential lawn dart. 

Reference the level of danger you have implied: yeah its dangerous to jump out of an airplane at night in full combat gear; its also dangerous to dive into a shipwreck; or to hang off the side of a mountain;  or rope out of a helicopter during a heli-assault; or to sit in a forward sniper team ready to take out a guy with only a two-man backup; or to walk around in enemy areas with only one other person as backup and talk to people who would love to drag you off and put a hole in you and then you in a hole; or drive through hostile areas where the locals are throwing rocks and getting ready to attack you so all you can do is smile and wave because your not allowed to shoot anyone; or to have RPGs blow up your base house because soembody asked the wrong question at an interview...

You think you're the only one who leads a dangerous life? Get over yourself! 
Be glad you got the extra bucks and the badge and the beret because the rest of us only get regular pay and the satisfaction of a' job well done'.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Failed your jump course, huh? ^-^



			
				Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> or to sit in a forward sniper team ready to take out a guy with only a two-man backup; or to walk around in enemy areas with only one other person as backup and talk to people who would love to drag you off and put a hole in you and then you in a hole; or drive through hostile areas where the locals are throwing rocks and getting ready to attack you so all you can do is smile and wave because your not allowed to shoot anyone; or to have RPGs blow up your base house because soembody asked the wrong question at an interview...
> 
> You think you're the only one who leads a dangerous life? Get over yourself!
> Be glad you got the extra bucks and the badge and the beret because the rest of us only get regular pay and the satisfaction of a' job well done'.




...and when you were doing[ cough,cough] all this, you only got "regular pay"?.........boy were you dumb!!


----------



## vonGarvin

The use of airborne troops is the flexibility it provides.  They wouldn't necessarily be dropped "behind enemy lines" and await XXX Corps driving to Arnheim, but rather those ops previously mentioned: seizing SOMETHING that is beyond helicopter range.  Say an airfield (such as Port au Prince in 2004: could have been used there), or a sea port, or whatever.

Here's an example.  Suppose country "X" is falling apart, and the Canadian Government decides to deploy troops there.  An estimate reveals that in order to seize an airfield, a battalion sized unit is required.  Also suppose that this airfield is 20 feet beyond the practicable range of helicopter insertion.  Also, due to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, it has to happen *now*.  The CF digs into its back pocket and pulls out an airborne battalion sized unit (CSOR?  Amalgamated, plugged and played Para coys of the three battalions?) and drops them onto said airfield.  After say a day or two, the airfield and the surrounding area is deemed safe enough to land Antonovs (leased) or C-17s (purchased in a dream one day) and disgorge the DART, or a mech battalion, or whatever, to fan out and accomplish the mission (whatever that may be).  

So, don't discount the value of airborne units.  There is still a need for them, perhaps moreso than (dare I say it?) heavy armoured brigades  :crybaby:

Garvin out


----------



## GK .Dundas

Jungle said:
			
		

> It's not because Canada chooses not to use it that it is redundant; check out this link, especially the recent ops towards the end of the page, and make an informed opinion:
> http://www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/paratrooper.htm


I was almost on the verge of becoming a true believer ..........up until I got to Sparky's page btw that's not a webpage, that's a psychotic episode! And a poorly written one at that.


----------



## Echo9

Airborne per se is dead as a current requirement.  Airmobile (helicopter) is still relevant.  Air drop for spec ops is conceivably still relevant.  Light Infantry is more relevant than ever.

Jump capability at the individual level is extremely valuable if for morale reasons alone.


One of the biggest shortcomings of the Airborne in Somalia (discipline aside) is that they were so eager to show that they could jump operationally that they didn't think through the logistical and tactical implications- the capability turned into a negative.


----------



## vonGarvin

Echo9 said:
			
		

> Airborne per se is dead as a current requirement.  Airmobile (helicopter) is still relevant.  Air drop for spec ops is conceivably still relevant.  Light Infantry is more relevant than ever.


I disagree.  Heliborne troops are of course still relevant.  Air Drops for battalion sized elements are still relevant. The question is: Can we afford it?  Maybe or maybe not (it is rather expensive, of course).  
Drop the moniker "Light" in front of "infantry" and I'd agree.  By definition, light, mech, motorised, whatever, only really refers to their mode of transport.  The only reason not all of our infantry units have armoured vehicles is *$*.


----------



## geo

Echo9 said:
			
		

> One of the biggest shortcomings of the Airborne in Somalia (discipline aside) is that they were so eager to show that they could jump operationally that they didn't think through the logistical and tactical implications- the capability turned into a negative.


Huh????????????????
given that your profile is blank - I have no idea what your pedigree happens to be
having trouble seeing where you come from OR where you're going with that statement


----------



## Centurian1985

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Failed your jump course, huh? ^-^
> ...and when you were doing[ cough,cough] all this, you only got "regular pay"?.........boy were you dumb!!



Ref your insults: 

1) I have never failed a single course, military or civilian, since I joined up in 1985; that includes over 75 courses and over 25 training sessions in over 20 years.  
2) How is it dumb to serve your country? I didnt join up for the pay thats for sure! What was  your motivation? 
3) I did not say I 'do all this'; I can tell you in PM about soldiers who did all these things, if you are really interested.  Whats your point?  Im not allowed to refer to other trades who do good work? Do you have anything to contribute to this debate other than insinuation?

In summary, all arguments have positive and negative sides. Quit focusing on a couple of negative comments; read the whole thing! 
You will note that I support the continuation of airborne training , but only dispute the fact that they claim elite status for themselves alone when there are other specialists and jobs out there that deserve equal recognition.


----------



## Jungle

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> 1) I have never failed a single course, military or civilian, since I joined up in 1985; that includes over *75 courses * and over *25 training sessions * in over 20 years.


That makes 100 courses and trg sessions: 5 per year  :
Let me guess: you never had time for leave... did you actually work too ??


----------



## Armymedic

If you speak of parachute capability as one tool in the tool box of the commander to get his forces into an area to which they will operate, then Airborne troops are not, nor ever will be "redundant". If you argue that airborne capability is redundant, then the same can be said about amphibious assault, airmobile assault, etc, etc. We need to keep as many options and capabilities open as we can, lest we become a one trick pony, and near useless to our allies.

I think that America's big stick, 82nd Airborne and their ability to drop in anywhere, anytime, has a positive effect on the US gov't foreign policy. Just be cause the CF can not currently effectively deploy parachute troops anywhere in the world (and questionably, not anywhere in Canada), does not make the effectiveness or need of those forces redundant.


----------



## Centurian1985

:  Not all training courses last 3 months!   :

Jungle, if you want to question my credibility and integrity go to PM, and I can send you a list.  

I note a disturbing trend here; instead of sticking to the thread, some people are attempting to use character assasination as a form of argument.  

Stick to the thread - What is your opinion on the status of the airborne?


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Quote from today,
_I note a disturbing trend here; instead of sticking to the thread, some people are attempting to use character assasination as a form of argument._  

Quote from yesterday,
_You think you're the only one who leads a dangerous life? Get over yourself!  
Be glad you got the extra bucks and the badge and the beret because the rest of us only get regular pay and the satisfaction of a' job well done'_.

But this wasn't??   I notice your a slinger but not much of a catcher.......


----------



## Centurian1985

Fair enough - in reviewing the words I used, I see that they can be interpreted at a slur against him and the airborne. My apologies to Jungle for my hasty words, my only intent was to demonstrate that there are many dangerous occupations that deserve recognition.  Sorry about that.     

In the case of Bruce, what have you to say?  I expect to have my credibility questioned, but I take great offense at having my integrity questioned.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

I was just very unhappy with the "shot" at the Airborne and specifically Jungle who I know has done a whole lot more than most and certainly a whole lot more than "No Tour Bruce".

You retracted yours and I now retract mine.........now back to the topic.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

;D


----------



## ArmyRick

To some people here, it seems if you question anything to do with airbourne, then you get labelled a weak knee piece of garbage leg, etc, etc.

I think some good points were made. Airborne capability should be kept alive. Should Canada maintain a large (brigade size) airborne unit? Hell no.

But the CSOR using para as a means of inserting to seize vital points? Yeah, I could see it.

But like airmobile and amphibious (a capability we are VERY lacking in) we should keep the skills alive.

One more point I am not a big fan of us having huge 70 ton monster AFVs either simply because we lack the means to move said monstrous AFVs from point A to B without a civilian or foreign assistance.


----------



## Kirkhill

Under the heading of stealth/surprise:

Which force can infiltrate with least warning.  A heliborne force or an airborne force?

If you are doing raids, such as the first Ranger assault on Kandahar, aren't you more likely to be able to infiltrate undetected with fixed wing aircraft than with rotary?  Exfiltratrion seems likely to be a different matter but in that case stealth has gone out the window in any case.

As to the need for a full unit - even if you don't do a unit drop don't you need to keep a full unit current to guarantee a sub-unit available?


----------



## Centurian1985

My apologoies to Bruce for my heated comments. 


Ha! Brilliant! LMAO  ---->


----------



## Echo9

Geo-

I got the information from my dad (retired LCol), who is doing a project for the war museum on the somalia deployment, who got the info from the various interviews that he's doing for that project (yes, it's third hand, but that's a couple of degrees better than usual for the internet  ;D ).  The reference was to the desire to take an airport (Belet Uen, I think) by airborne insertion.  Eventually, the CO was persuaded otherwise, and opted for airmobile instead, but the battalion was still without log support for a few days, when they could just as easily have occupied it in a more conventional manner and still achieved the mission.

Where I was going with it is that if we're looking at real deployments, instead of theoretical constructs, the airborne capability proved to be not only not an advantage, but in fact a detractor from mission performance.


----------



## a_majoor

I will wade in on the side of a battalion sized airbore capability, not because I think that we will be taking out large targets with a battalion sized drop (although you should never say never....) but because in today's security environment we will be tackling "problems" spread out over a wide area of space and time. A battalion sized unit give the commander the depth to deploy to several distinct targets and still maintain a reserve, or to carry out an extended operation, inserting fresh troops and supplies to keep things going and apply continuing pressure on the enemy. 

My fear is the CF, being fairly small, could become too fragmented now that we are trying to get all the "Gucci" capabilities. This could lead to bunfights over staffing, training and logistics at home, as well as bulky and fragmented staffs and COC problems on ops as everyone fights to get in on a "jump" operation (Jumpmaster: "Lets see now, we have two platoons from the 1rst Canadian Parachute battalion, a CSOR platoon, a platoon from the 3 R22erjump coy, a pathfinder section from the school, some guys hiding in the back wearing long hair and hippy beads today [nice outfit, by the way], a jump qualified signals det from each organization and a freaking Antonov following behind us with the joint staff....). 

One way to deal with this in my mind is to incorporate most of these capabilities into a real airborn battlegroup of regimental size, with CSOR capabilities being built into the "First" battalion. Of course, a powerful and flexible airborn battlegroup will need jump capable artillery and light armour as well....


----------



## Centurian1985

OK, lets say you got this - what type of missions could it conduct in support of todays operational commitments?


----------



## Armymedic

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> what type of missions could it conduct in support of todays operational commitments?



Nonpermissive Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.


----------



## Centurian1985

NNEO? What the HELL is that? Are you talking about emergency embassy evacuations?


----------



## GK .Dundas

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> NNEO? What the HELL is that? Are you talking about emergency embassy evacuations?


 It covers a multitude of sins actually  ,but embassy evacuations is one of them


----------



## Centurian1985

Okay, I'll grant you NNEO or similiar mission type (i know them by a different name used by the AF).  So they could have at least one type of specific mission;  :akimbo:

And how often would these missons occur?  And how would said unit(s) get to said mission area? This would also require standby aircraft ready to transport troops/armour/arty at a 48-hour notice to anyplace in the world.  How do you argue the cost versus the use?  These are the questions that higher levels will ask.  What is the use of a unit that cannot deploy anywhere because they are being held in readiness for a special mission, but the special mission occurs only once every, say, 3 years (for example)? 

These are the basic questions preventing their formation right now.  If you can justify the cost and need, everyone will jump on board!  (oooh, is that a bad pun or what?)  ;D

(Before anyone says it, yes, we already have a few of those types of units around; and no, Im not talking about JTF2)


----------



## Armymedic

I would have figured you'd know what NEO was. 

Nonpermissive is when the airhead has to be taken by force, either because it is not safe, or that it is not in control of the responsible government. Canada has engaged (in 03 if I recall correctly) in a NEO op in Haiti. Usually we are part of a coalition group where we would go in to get all Commonwealth citizens out of a country. There has also been standby for East Timor, and a couple crappy African countries in the last few yrs.



			
				Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> And how often would these missons occur?  And how would said unit(s) get to said mission area? This would also require standby aircraft ready to transport troops/armour/arty at a 48-hour notice to anyplace in the world.  How do you argue the cost versus the use?  These are the questions that higher levels will ask.  What is the use of a unit that cannot deploy anywhere because they are being held in readiness for a special mission, but the special mission occurs only once every, say, 3 years (for example)?


There has been a unit on standby for NEO tasks for 3-4 yrs the most recent being 3 RCR. And as far as I know, CSOR could be inheriting that role once they stand up.
The only piece of the puzzle missing is the strategic/tactical airlift capability. The Army can and has put the troops together. It is the Gov't and the Air force who can not get them to wherever they need to go.

Hopefully with CF Transformation, CANCEFCOM or CANSOFCOM will be able to put together all the pieces to make it fly.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I am not an expert in the field, but Airborne missions have a history of going incredibly  right or incredibly wrong. I think for the ones that go wrong it is often a case of overconfidence or ignorance of their capabilities and weaknesses. Most of the failures seem to be caused by overreaching and failure to reinforce. 

If you are going to have airborne/airmobile forces, you need to have a Regional commander that is well aware of the risks of using them and has done proper planning. Also going against their use for most western countries is that the politicians have become risk averse, so they will not like to hear: “if the operation goes wrong expect 50% causalities” 

I think having them combined as Airmobile and Airborne makes sense, from a economic and tactically point of view. Another thing that seems common in reading of historical airborne operation is the desire by Commanders to do a combat jump, either for their careers, ego’s or to justify the cost and existence of the unit. We had a saying in rescue/recovery diving: the best dive is no dive at all.

I don’t blame the soldiers for wanting to do what they have trained to do, that’s just normal, but can the commanders resist the urge to use the force and the delivery method when not required?


----------



## paracowboy

why, exactly, are we discussing this AGAIN? How often do we need to re-visit the same arguments?


----------



## Centurian1985

What was the decision and/or consensus in the last argument? Ive read through several threads and their was never a single answer.  It always seemed to drift off about the new unit forming at Pet that would support JTF2 in case of a massive domestic or overseas operation.  

Of note, in all those threads I noticed a blind angle nobody covered. In a lot of these domestic emergency situations its not the JTF2 you have to worry about being able to work with, its the civilians and police elements you have to work with.  And a lot of police elements did not like the airborne in the past, and will definately be prejudiced against a unit that reinvents itself as the 'new airborne'.  There is a lot of bridges to be crossed vis-avis community relations before this unit could be effective.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Quote,
_And a lot of police elements did not like the airborne in the past,_

Yea..sure,right...start naming names if you wish to generalize like that.


----------



## George Wallace

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> ........  And a lot of police elements did not like the airborne in the past, and will definately be prejudiced against a unit that reinvents itself as the 'new airborne'.  There is a lot of bridges to be crossed vis-avis community relations before this unit could be effective.



 ???  I am sure that if this was the case, those same Agencies harboured the same feelings to all Units of the CF, not just the Airborne.  I await your answer to Bruce's question/challenge.


----------



## Centurian1985

This goes back to when I worked with some RCMP units, not just once but across several years.  I could not help but notice many times they were not very trustful of me despite our common goals, so I asked them about it.  The blunt reply was that they had encountered too many CF and ex-CF persons who were mixed up in illegal activities, including drugs, llegal types of fishing, and association with OMGs and Mohawk groups.  It also springs from too many incidents of soldiers bringing back illegal items from overseas duties.  

Is this sterotyping and generalization on their part? Yes it is.  In the end, it didnt matter that over 99% of the forces have a good reputation and are law-abiding members of society, what matters is the 1% who get in trouble and from whom the reputation springs.   And, Wallace is right, in many cases it is an antagomsim against the CF in general, which was very annoying as their antagonism impacted some joint operations.  And again, this is not true for every police officer, I had good working relationships with many of them, but there were too many were who were antagonistic of the CF, but many were specifically distrustful of soldiers from the airborne units.  

Of all the operations that RCMP/CF have worked on together, Panamerican games, Kananaskis, etc, your telling me that no one else has ever encountered or noticed this???  Have you not noticed that you dont get invited to coffee, or that you dont get invited to meetings, or that certain information doesnt get given to you until you call up and bitch about it?  Think about it - when you start working with someone or a new company, whats the first thing you? You go out and get to know each other, you hold meetings to get to know how each other operates. It works like this in EVERY organization both CF and civi.  Once you get allowed into the 'inner circle' it is a big shock to realize just how excluded you were before!  Its part of why I was always tasked as a liaison officer to work with LEAs and other units, I had a talent for getting through these barriers and get working partnerships going.      

As for specific examples, Wallace and Monkhouse can PM me for further details about incidents, but I cant post those in an open forum. 

Now, this is not a rant against police officers; they are doing good work.  For every one I met who disliked the CF, I met 2-3 others who had no problems with CF members.  The point is that if you expect to work on domestic operations, be prepared to do some liaison work across the country so that police departments know who they are going to work with and how you will operate.  This is how the most successful DND units operate.


----------



## paracowboy

well, here's what I see:

Every other army in the world that is capable of it, has an airborne force. The most effective military in the world has an enormous airborne capability and has employed it several times recently. The simple threat of employing that force has, on occasion, prevented war. Our largest enemies are currently working on improving their airborne forces.

Seems to me that if the airborne concept were out-dated, there wouldn't be such pressure for them. (Everywhere else but here, of course.) I dunno dude, I just sense an anti-Airborne feel to your posts. Maybe I'm imagining it, but I still feel it. I kinda get the impression that you just dislike paratroopers for some personal reason, and no amount of argument is going to change your mind, so I think I'll just go hang out somewhere else.

You have yourself a fine Airborne day, now.


----------



## ArmyRick

The truth is we had alot of serious disciplinary problesm in the CF in the 80s and the 90s. Anybody who is denial of this is living with their head in the ###. 

If you don't beleive me take a look at what Clayton Matchee attitude and action did towards the the Airbourne, the army and the CF as a whole.  He bloody tortured and killed a prisoner. Yeah the guy he killed was a scum bag but if we are going to be the good guys we have to behave better than that.

A friend of mine who asked to specifically not be named but served in the airbourne regt said they're was no denying that they had problem soldiers. Some units were using the CAR as a dumping ground for these guys (instead of using the C and P system and booting them to civilian street).

Don't get me wrong, the Airbourne had alot of really superb soldiers but they had their d*ckheads as well.

Another theory I have heard as well is that they snagged the best leadership from the airbourne to stand up JTF2 in 92-93 when the Forces took over the RCMP SERT.

When post in a whole new crop of leaders for soldiers whoi were already a tight knit group, well its maybe going to take some time to shake it out.

Further more IMO, Kenward was doing a good and ballsy job of getting rid of the beligerents but the "political damage" caused by the media and the Matchee incident was too much. So the Liberals did a typical knee jerk reaction and ordered the regiment disbanded in disgrace.

Further IMO, (Using my crystal ball) I see jump companies no longer being jump companies and the only combat para unit will be the CDN SPEC OPS REGT. Watch and shoot. Keep in mind there is limited number of basic para courses being run now.


----------



## ArmyRick

Add to the above, 3RCR no longer calls Para coy PAra coy, it is once again called Mikes Company. 

Oh, I do like alot of the guys from the CDN AB REGT (BIlly Bolen, Joe "cock" Hillier and Mark Cushman are a few examples of great paratroopers and people in general). But I stand by what I said above.

Read the first paragraph above carefully, I said the CF in general and I mean alot of units had disciplinary problems, not just the 'bourne.


----------



## Michael OLeary

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Add to the above, 3RCR no longer calls Para coy PAra coy, it is once again called Mikes Company.



Mike Company was never officially named "Para Company". Mike Company is its official title in the Regimental order of battle, in accordance with Regimental Standing Orders.  "Para" is a role that Mike Company has been assigned.


----------



## paracowboy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> A friend of mine who asked to specifically not be named but served in the airbourne regt said they're was no denying that they had problem soldiers. Some units were using the CAR as a dumping ground for these guys (instead of using the C and P system and booting them to civilian street).


yup, any of the Old Dogs from the Commandos will verify this. They told us many a story. 



> Don't get me wrong, the Airbourne had alot of really superb soldiers but they had their d*ckheads as well.


as does any unit. Which is the crux. You, of all people, should be well aware that paratroopers are soldiers like any other. The differences are:
1. the way we commute. The job is the same, but how we get to it is different. And a lot more fun.
2. the morale and drive. We try to instill a drive in our troops that they have to meet the standards established by our predecessors in WW II. That they have to prove themselves to be better. They don't all make it, but they try. And that rep draws the best from other units, doesn't it? And they then take that attitude with them when they leave.



> Another theory I have heard as well is that they snagged the best leadership from the airbourne to stand up JTF2 in 92-93 when the Forces took over the RCMP SERT.


 "best" is debatable. Depends entirely on your definition. But the core for the JTF was drawn fom the Airborne regiment, as I understand it.



> Further IMO, (Using my crystal ball) I see jump companies no longer being jump companies and the only combat para unit will be the CDN SPEC OPS REGT. Watch and shoot. Keep in mind there is limited number of basic para courses being run now.


 directly contrary to what the MND has said to us in 3 PPCLI on his visit here. So watch and shoot.

The limited number of courses is directly attributable to the lack of aircraft and lack of instructors due to both being over-tasked. It's going to change (or so we've been assured.)



> Add to the above, 3RCR no longer calls Para coy PAra coy, it is once again called Mikes Company.


Mike Coy. Not possessive. And Para Coy was never the Official designation. But the use of the nickname was banned. And that was a decision by a self-obsessed, tyrannical careerist who cares nothing what-so-ever for his troops or their morale. He simply wanted to 'make his mark on Regimental history'. And destroyed what little morale the troops had at knowing he was leaving. Which was high, knowing that they wouldn't have to deal with him or his Chairborne Garatrooper regime any more.


----------



## ArmyRick

Paracowboy, my hats off to you. You are speaking on current fact not fiction. 

You obiously have first hand info on the way things are going para, did MND give you guys in 3 RCR any other good tid bits? 

I know the next several DP1 Infantry courses are predominantly ear marked for 3 RCR because of the guys you sent over to CDN SPEC OPS REGT.


----------



## paracowboy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Paracowboy, my hats off to you. You are speaking on current fact not fiction.
> 
> You obiously have first hand info on the way things are going para, did MND give you guys in 3 RCR any other good tid bits?
> 
> I know the next several DP1 Infantry courses are predominantly ear marked for 3 RCR because of the guys you sent over to CDN SPEC OPS REGT.


Rick,
dude, I left 3 RCR waaay back in 'ought-3. Right after we got back from Kabul. I'm in 3 PPCLI now. 
MND gave us a whole song and dance, none of which any of us believe for a minute. Lots o' crap about a seperate Airborne BN, in addition to CSOR, with the Air assets to make it work. Beefing up CPC. 3 more Infantry BNs *IN ADDITION * to filling out the existing BNs, _*AND*_ the CSOR, _*AND*_ a new Airborne BN, AND amphibious infantry capabilities on each coast.  :

He also babbled on inanely about how them bad ol' moo-lahs, over there in Afghanny-stan, is tellin' them Tally-ban to kill us all, and otherwise managed to display his posterior. Some of the troops were getting excited, but none of us with more than 4 years service bought into any of it. He's blowing smoke and talking crap.

Canada is not going to have a capable Airborne unit for several years yet. And as we go on without it, that's one more arrow we don't have in our quiver. Which is a shame.


----------



## Armymedic

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Further IMO, (Using my crystal ball) I see jump companies no longer being jump companies and the only combat para unit will be the CDN SPEC OPS REGT. Watch and shoot. Keep in mind there is limited number of basic para courses being run now.


When the MND visited Petawawa, he said all the same things as paracowboy mentioned above.

He also specifically said that 3 RCR will keep a para capability for the forseeable future.

One thing I am not sure is a good thing, is the renaming CPC to the new name (which escapes me right now). If it becomes the SME center for all things para, airmobile and mountain ops, then it could be an improvement. But I see it as another place where they take all the best soldiers (instructors) out of the Bns for a couple yrs.


----------



## ArmyRick

CPC is now CF Advance Land Warfare Center


----------



## ChristopherRobin

I've been wondering this for a long time and despite searching here and reading several threads, I never came up with an official reason as to why (after the CAR was disbanded) anything and everything that said 'airborne' was removed.

I'm assuming the reason is because with the media coverage back in the early 90s, the word 'airborne' became a negative term in the public's eye and the government wanted it gone completely.  I remember in 96, I spent a few weeks in Petawawa and I was told that wearing a CAR or airborne t-shirt on the base was not permitted.  The CABC was then moved and called the CPC where new t-shirts were made (old-style CABC-logo wings with ex-coelis written underneath). 

Disbanding the CAR is one thing but why call the parachute school something different from what it was before? Or, not call the para coys 'airborne' coys? 

Thanks.

edit. Ah crap, I thought I was in the 'infantry' forum.  Mods, if you want, you can move this.


----------



## Elwood

The Airborne was disbanded after the Somalia incident. I understood it best when I read "The Sharp End: A Soldiers Story" by James R. Davis. I highly recommend the book to you, because it can answer your question about the disbanding of the paratroopers quite well.


----------



## X Royal

Elwood said:
			
		

> The Airborne was disbanded after the Somalia incident. I understood it best when I read "The Sharp End: A Soldiers Story" by James R. Davis. I highly recommend the book to you, because it can answer your question about the disbanding of the paratroopers quite well.



Elwood:
 Please refrain from making comments for which you have only partial information. Yes the incident in Somalia played a part in the CAR disbandment but that was* not* the whole story.
Politically the disbandmentt was the easiest route at the time. Much easier than fixing the problems & very much faster.


----------



## a78jumper

ChristopherRobin said:
			
		

> The CABC was then moved and called the CPC where new t-shirts were made (old-style CABC-logo wings with ex-coelis written underneath).
> 
> \



CABC moved from Edmonton to Trenton because Air Command had closed the former as a flying base and moved the Hercs to Winnipeg. In fact this move was afoot before the closeout of the Regiment in early 1995-as I recall the Aerial Delivery Training moved there first, followed by the rest of the unit. As a former member of both CABC and the Regiment it hurt bad to have the word Airborne declared dirty. As for t shirts your Pet experience does not surprise me given the leadership of the base at the time-same politically correct guy that decided no one could have a beer on a Friday afternoon at Happy Hour until 1600, ginger ale only. However in 1999 I did buy some t's and sweatshirts at CPC that did say Airborne on them. Not sure what they are selling today and the place has been renamed again-a real mouthful.(Land Advanced Warfare Centre)


----------



## Elwood

It was disbanded "after" the Somalia incident. I didn't write it was disbanded "because" of the Somalia incident.


----------



## yossarian

The Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded due to the fact that the liberal government of the time felt that they had been humiliated by the death of Shidane Arone. The carefully cultivated image of the Canadian soldier was destroyed with a few snaps of a camera, and the actions of one man cost a country it's finest regiment. The idea that the Airborne was disbanded over video tapes can be dismissed by the fact that the 1994 White Paper on defence makes no mention of paratroopers. The decision had been made. 
     From March 5th 1995 Canada has been the only Western nation without a parachute capable force of at least battalion size. The Jump Companies are non operational as they are too small to fight and too big to hide. The only answer is to bring the Canadian Airborne Regiment back to the Canadian Order of Battle with an apology to all former members.


----------



## ambex

I just read over the Somalia Affair on Wikipeida and I gotta say thats ****ed up what happened over there. And it wasnt just us, apparently the Italians and Belgians did some nasty things too.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia_Affair


----------



## El Gerco

Best time in my Military career was serving as an  "Airborne Sapper". Having ready all the posts above I tend to agree that the disbandment was a 'Knee jerk" reaction by Ott to a situation they were losing control over. 

Glad to see the CSOR came around when it did it.  Along with the JTF it gives our troops an oppertunity to challange themsleves.


----------



## geo

the Govt of the day wanted to reduce our strength.
The CAR made the choice easy.  Other than being the youngest Regiment on the Orbat AND being a one battalion Regiment AND coming out of the Somalia afair, it was easy for the Gov't to decide on a "disband" and "decry" policy throughout the whole Inquiry.


----------



## McG

THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FORCES—PART 1
follow link for article.


----------



## McG

THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FORCES—PART 2
follow link for article and some interesting conclusions.



> It appears that if Canada is to have airborne forces again it will not be due to a clear
> and pervasive role.





> Despite the emotion, the tradition, political manoeuvring or the wishful extrapolation
> of possibilities, Canada does not need airborne forces. It is far better to honour those
> who have served this country as airborne soldiers by holding their accomplishments high
> and letting their memories live on than it is to create something lacking purpose,
> something that has more potential to be less than envisioned rather than all that it once
> was.


----------



## Infanteer

Removed all previous stuff that would have gone nowhere fast.  If there is nothing productive to post, leave the thread be - that includes silver jump wing types.


----------



## MARS

Agreed.  But since we currently have a Special Operations Regiment, and threads dealing with it, can we not lock this thread?


----------



## HItorMiss

You could but the Special Operations Regiment has very little to do with the concepts discussed in this thread.


----------



## MARS

Seen.  Apologies.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Just finished reading an interview with the current CLS, LGen Peter Devlin in Esprit de Corps.  Now before somebody jumps on the 'I hate Scott Taylor...EdC is a rag I wouldn't even use to wipe my butt with...' bandwagon, there was an interesting comment made by the CLS in Vol 17, Issue #10, page 26:

_"We are examining things like genuinely light infantry as opposed to battalions minus vehicles, properly resourced and with the mindset that they are light infantry.  There are helicopters going into CFB Petawawa. I think that we need to have a very rich air mobile capability.
Where our vehicles are, the number of vehicles, the combination of light and mechanized infantry battalions are all things that we are looking at to give us the flexibility and the respect for the resourcing to allow us to train, train to excite, and train to be ready."_

Usually when someone at the GO/FO level starts making inferences or nuances like the CLS just did, it means that these are initiatives which they're looking at in terms of transforming the organization they control.  The prior CLS was instrumental in harmonizing the infantry battalion structures into a hybrid mechanized role, whereby two rifle companies were mechanized around the LAV-III platform and the third would be light infantry, however operationally, we saw that all 3 companies were mechanized for the current Afghanistan mission.  

Based on the comments that LGen Devlin made, what is the likelihood that we will see a return of the 3 light infantry battalions?  

Will we see a consolidation of 3 light infantry battalions (1 battalion from each of the Regular Force regiments) into a light infantry brigade based in Petawawa as part of a 'rich air mobile capability' with the Chinooks?

Is this move due to the fact that we've only ever had enough LAV-IIIs for 6 infantry battalions, prior to CMTC and a number of vehicles being destroyed in the current war in Afghanistan, let alone trying to fleet manage the existing number of LAV-IIIs for 9 infantry battalions?

As part of the current government's emphasis on arctic sovereignty, perhaps there may be a case to be made for a light, airmobile (not necessarily parachute capable/airborne) infantry centric army force structure which could be rapidly deployed to the Arctic.  A 3 battalion light infantry brigade sized force would allow for an operational readiness cycle which would result in us always have a light infantry battalion ready for immediate deployment for operational areas or missions whereby a mechanized force may not be ideally suited (i.e. Afghanistan 2002), or necessary (Haiti 2010).     Having the remainder of the 6 light infantry battalions would allow for a concurrent operational readiness cycle whereby we could have both a light and heavy battalion available for deployment.  
Do we have the capability to concurrently force generate 2 battalion/battlegroup sized units (1 light and one mech)? 
As an alternative to 3 light infantry battalions in a brigade formation, would we be better off with the former mix of 2 mech - 1 light in the brigades?
What about a single, independent light infantry battlegroup comprised of sub-units representing each of the 3 regular force regiments (i.e. Canadian Airborne Regiment orbat) that is constantly on a high readiness footing?  Would this create a redundancy with CSOR in the battalion/company sized light infantry direct action role?

Do we need permanent light infantry battalions, or can we institute a training regimen that modularizes our infantry force structure whereby all infanteers are skilled in mechanized and light infantry operations and we can 'plug & play' as per mission requirements?  Despite the CF tendency to promote a 'general purpose capability' over 'specialized niches', are we going to have the money, training resources, and time to be able to cover such a broad spectrum, so that the end result is an infantry force which is as adept at conducting a mechanized hasty attack as it is at conducting an airmobile assault as it is to conducting footborne patrols in mountainous terrain?


----------



## HItorMiss

No redundancy with CSOR that I could see they are SF/SOF nothing they do would be Bn size by my scope of thinking. The info I have from looking around is they are more based on a USSF concept so 6-12 guys Max. 

An Airmobile Bg would be akin to 101st (AA) and would/could be useful. As for force generation well that's for much bigger heads then me.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> No redundancy with CSOR that I could see they are SF/SOF nothing they do would be Bn size by my scope of thinking. The info I have from looking around is they are more based on a USSF concept so 6-12 guys Max.
> 
> An Airmobile Bg would be akin to 101st (AA) and would/could be useful. As for force generation well that's for much bigger heads then me.



I clarified my earlier post regarding a single high readiness light infantry battalion and CSOR.  What my main concern about redundancy was in regard to battalion and company sized direct action roles, not so much the US Army SF's ODA type structure and missions, whether they be direct action, or advisory/training.


----------



## Illegio

I think that if the light infantry battalions do return, they will likely be the same units that were light prior to mechanizing for Afghanistan e.g. 3VP, 3RCR, and 3R22eR. Regardless of whether or not those battalions are now mechanized, the "spirit" or mindset of the light infantry that the CLS spoke of certainly exists already within those organizations. The fact that helicopters are going into Pet and that there is a need for a "rich" airmobile capability is a few steps short of a major reorganization along the lines of the light infantry brigade concept.

As for CSOR, they won't mount battalion, or likely even company-sized direct action units. There simply aren't enough of them, and they guys they do have are better employed in other roles. This is what I suspect BulletMagnet was trying to say.


----------



## ArmyRick

I have advocated on other threads about a light infantry/commando organization. Now a couple of points to chew on mentally before we fire this up.

#1. Mission needs dictate how and why the infantry move. If we are operating in a mountainous or heavy wooded area, then mechanized may not be the way to go. We need our "mech" battalions to be flexible enough to go both ways.

#2. There are some skill sets that do require more than a one week exercise to develop and maintain. Arctic or cold weather skills must/should be practiced by all infantry battalions every winter (Unless ops dictate otherwise). Canada has a huge chunk of tundra and we need to be able to operate in that environment. As well Mountain ops skills are important. We should encourage each battalion to do a mountain ops school either in the fall or spring. I would run it for about 4-6 weeks. It would consist of doing basic mountain ops qual/refresher and then doing some collective trg in mountainous terrain.

#3. Now that we are in the business of operating Chinooks, we can take airmobile ops to another level. I will let the experts speak on that. I would alos like to see us expand our amphibious capability, but thats another topic (NO I do not mean to the extent the USMC does)

If I think of more stuff, I'll add it in.


----------



## Infanteer

1.  Force Generation rules all.  It's nice to have a certain capability, but if it can't be generated and sustained then I'd suggest it is of limited use to the Force Generators.  More disparity between force generation and force employment means more shuffling and more re-tasking and ad hocery, which makes for more turbulence.  I think others are recognizing this as well.

2.  Winter warfare always seems to hold a sacred place in the Army's heart.  What do we really want/need.  Winter indoc in terms of making sure we don't die if we are out in the freezing cold for over a day?  Or do we want genuine winter warfare capability?  If so, I'd suggest that stringing a toboggan up and wandering around in snowshoes is the wrong way to achieve this.

3.  ArmyRick makes a good call for "skill-camps"; the British recently moved away from (but still maintain some aspects of) the Arms Plot system.  Aspects of this, as Rick mentioned, could be worked into the Force Generation cycle to good measure.

4.  Air mobility isn't that hard.  I've seen a "mech" company (I prefer to call it a Rifle Company) conducting fast-roping onto objectives on air mobile assaults from amphibious assault ships - it wasn't SOF-standard precision but it was what one would require out of conventional forces.  It wasn't a black art for them to learn and I don't know if this requires full-scale reorganization of the Forces to accomplish.

5.  Finally, most here know my thoughts on the "Light Infantry Mindset" - I'll restate my view that it is a bit of a fallacy and that all it's positive aspects are part of a "Good Infantry Mindset" which we have and should continue to refine.  Never discount the ability of good soldiers to use vehicles to operate in complex environments to increase their effectiveness - I'll point disbelievers to William Slim's thoughts on the matter (I also agree with his thoughts a parachutes to).


----------



## vonGarvin

I agree with Infanteer on most points.  The most important is the force employment model for the land force.  Gone are the days of having brigades tasked for certain tasks, such as 4 CMBG tasked as a formation to fend off the Soviet hordes, 5e GBMC to be our CAST brigade, or later the formation to augment 4 CMBG and form 1 Canadian Division in the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of war.  

Our model now is to deploy task-tailored battlegroups, with various support and headquarters elements.  In order to deploy for operations, we need a model.  That model currently is to deploy as an infantry battlegroup into Kandahar.  The next model is...?  Anyway, I would offer that the key is flexibility.  We need forces that can operate with tanks, without tanks, with air support, without air support or however.  Can the Land Force make the risk to have fewer units, all of which are specialised?  Or do we need generalists?  I think we all know the advantages and disadvantages of both generalists and specialists.  We are indeed a small Land Force, and I would offer that forces that are flexible enough to deploy in many modes is preferable.

But what does this mean?  Does this mean that we should revert to an model in which all three regular brigades are symmetrical in order to allow for force generation to sustain an operation?  Or do we have three different versions of brigades, and as required, the brigade that best fits the model for employment is deployed, and then the other two then revert to mirror the role best suited for operation "X"?

In any event, no matter to what degree I disagree with Infanteer on "mindsets", the key is that there are many skillsets that transcend "infantry types", that one must remember the training model for any arm or branch.  The "progress" is from individual training, sharpened by continuation training, and then augmented by collective training, and so forth. 

As an example, all infantrymen must know how to do a number of things.  They need, for example, to be able to shoot, move and communicate as a member of a rifle section.  It matters not if they are with or without tanks, dropped by parachute, dropped off on shore by a landing craft, or beamed in from a Constellation class Starship.  Potential infantrymen are trained up to CF requirements on their BMQ (stuff that all NC Members of the CF require), followed by DP 1, which teaches army and infantry specific skillsets.  

Once successful, they are posted to a unit, where they develop their skillsets as part of a rifle section.  From there, you can talk about collective training.  The levels are as follows:
1: Crew
2: Section
3: Platoon
(I'll go no further for now)
As a crew member, they could become a machine gunner, a LAV APC gunner, etc.  They then train up as a crew, with crew commander, etc.  Then, they learn to fight as a section.  This differs from Individual training in that they aren't training as part of a generic section, but the actual section commander, 2IC, etc all learn to gel, and all that goes with it.  And from there to platoon.  And so on and so forth


So, no matter what they fight in, on or with, they are all trained first to a common level, and then branch from there to fit the niche required of them as part of the team.

Now, for me, my experience is virtually all mechanised.  I have, since the 1980s, learned to shoot, move and communicate as part of a combat team.  First as a section 2IC, then Section commander, then on as platoon commander (detour to mortar platoon) and then as a LAV Captain and Coy 2IC.  I see the advantages of being with a certain "type" as a base.

However:

I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role.  

So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 1.  Force Generation rules all.  It's nice to have a certain capability, but if it can't be generated and sustained then I'd suggest it is of limited use to the Force Generators.  More disparity between force generation and force employment means more shuffling and more re-tasking and ad hocery, which makes for more turbulence.  I think others are recognizing this as well.



Do we have enough forces to run a dual track of mission capability? i.e. enough mech or light roled units to allow for sufficient ramp up time for either to be trained up into the other mission capability?



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  Winter warfare always seems to hold a sacred place in the Army's heart.  What do we really want/need.  Winter indoc in terms of making sure we don't die if we are out in the freezing cold for over a day?  Or do we want genuine winter warfare capability?  If so, I'd suggest that stringing a toboggan up and wandering around in snowshoes is the wrong way to achieve this.



Much agreed, and I think the Army needs to take a more serious look at what they are required to bring to the table in terms of arctic response capability.  The current reserve company groups tasked with arctic response is pretty laughable.  Serious work needs to be made into redeveloping an Army capability that is able to respond in a timely manner, conduct operations for an extended period of time regardless of environmental conditions, and have a working sustainment system that can operate for an extended period of time regardless of environmental conditions.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  ArmyRick makes a good call for "skill-camps"; the British recently moved away from (but still maintain some aspects of) the Arms Plot system.  Aspects of this, as Rick mentioned, could be worked into the Force Generation cycle to good measure.
> 
> 4.  Air mobility isn't that hard.  I've seen a "mech" company (I prefer to call it a Rifle Company) conducting fast-roping onto objectives on air mobile assaults from amphibious assault ships - it wasn't SOF-standard precision but it was what one would require out of conventional forces.  It wasn't a black art for them to learn and I don't know if this requires full-scale reorganization of the Forces to accomplish.



I think a big problem here is the ad hoc/random nature/commander's fetish/good idea fairy mindset with light infantry training, i.e. mountain ops, long range dismounted patrolling, amphibious ops, etc. that tends to happen with respect to CF infantry training in the mech battalions.  We do a fairly good job of identifying key training milestones that a mech infantry battalion must pass as part of a readiness cycle (i.e. LAV Gunner PCF, unit gunnery ex's, mech ops, etc.) but on the light infantry side of things, there seems to be little if anything similar in terms of skillsets identified and a formalized uniform training system put into place.  USMC MEU (SOC) work up certifications for the Ground Combat Element's Battalion Landing Team have specific skillsets which could be used as a general base guideline as to where CF infantry battalions could work from to develop both mech and light role skillsets.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 5.  Finally, most here know my thoughts on the "Light Infantry Mindset" - I'll restate my view that it is a bit of a fallacy and that all it's positive aspects are part of a "Good Infantry Mindset" which we have and should continue to refine.  Never discount the ability of good soldiers to use vehicles to operate in complex environments to increase their effectiveness - I'll point disbelievers to William Slim's thoughts on the matter (I also agree with his thoughts a parachutes to).



Again agreed.  Things like physical and mental fitness, initiative, and an ability to positively respond to change should be developed as core functions of the Infanteer so as to be able to adapt and overcome adversity in his environment.  I don't think the problem so much is the individual Infanteer not being able to change roles, but more so the organizational structure in terms of how we organize echelons/support/sustainment, unit embark lists, etc. which can cause alot of growing pains between light and mech roles.


----------



## Infanteer

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role.
> 
> So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable.



Actually, we're in agreement here.  My mention above of "Arms Plot" respects the fact some lead time must be given to transition between orientation.  A CQ/2IC team isn't going to automatically know how much fuel 15 LAVs will chew up in a day.  But they'll learn quick.  What I don't believe is that there is a sharp divide between the two and that there is a black art to both that requires separate career paths and organizations.  Semper Gumby!


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

I am not a believer in the idea that you can take any unit and at the drop of the hat make them a light infantry force.  Sure at the very basic level a soldier will be able to with little effort switch between the two, a rifleman is a rifleman that we cannot dispute; however, it is at the more senior levels of the NCO cadre as well as at the Officer level where the separation must be made.  Why?  because the planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support for lets say an Air Mobile/Air Assault Op are very different from that of a mechanized force.  

This is not to say that at the present time all our infantry units couldn't conduct these operations.  The problem we have in Canada is that we have these "Light Infantry Units" but they don't have any of the necessary enablers that would make them particularly effective i.e. Helicopters.  To shed more light on this, N Coy 3 RCR is conducting an Air Mobile exercise next week, we asked for 4 griffons to assist with this operations, 400 sqn came abck said you can have two, we said fine; 2 Helicopters to move an entire company lets make it work.  They come back to us a couple of days ago and tell us now you only have one Chopper.  We are supposed to be an Air Assault Company yet we can't even get more then one utility helicopter for an exercise.

So with this being said, at this time sure all the units could definitely conduct air mobile ops, but then again the CF's approach to Light Infantry and Air Mobility/Para/Mtn Ops/Arctic Warfare as a whole is pretty sub-standard to the point where it broaches being non-existent.

If we are to have a light infantry capability lets do it right and have those units designated light infantry focus on those operations that occur in austere environments so that they can become specialists and SME's in those areas.  This is not me bashing Mech forces and to say that you couldn't do the light role, you most definitely can; however, would it not be more effective to have forces that are specialists in mechanized warfare and forces that are specialists in the light tasks.

Its like playing Canadian Football as opposed to American Football, both are relatively similar, have the same objectives etc... yet their are enough differences between the two that they require different types of players.  If we want to have an effective light infantry force we need soldiers that are out there practicing light infantry tasks day in day out.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I agree with Infanteer on most points.  The most important is the force employment model for the land force.  Gone are the days of having brigades tasked for certain tasks, such as 4 CMBG tasked as a formation to fend off the Soviet hordes, 5e GBMC to be our CAST brigade, or later the formation to augment 4 CMBG and form 1 Canadian Division in the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of war.
> 
> Our model now is to deploy task-tailored battlegroups, with various support and headquarters elements.  In order to deploy for operations, we need a model.  That model currently is to deploy as an infantry battlegroup into Kandahar.  The next model is...?  Anyway, I would offer that the key is flexibility.  We need forces that can operate with tanks, without tanks, with air support, without air support or however.  Can the Land Force make the risk to have fewer units, all of which are specialised?  Or do we need generalists?  I think we all know the advantages and disadvantages of both generalists and specialists.  We are indeed a small Land Force, and I would offer that forces that are flexible enough to deploy in many modes is preferable.
> 
> But what does this mean?  Does this mean that we should revert to an model in which all three regular brigades are symmetrical in order to allow for force generation to sustain an operation?  Or do we have three different versions of brigades, and as required, the brigade that best fits the model for employment is deployed, and then the other two then revert to mirror the role best suited for operation "X"?
> 
> In any event, no matter to what degree I disagree with Infanteer on "mindsets", the key is that there are many skillsets that transcend "infantry types", that one must remember the training model for any arm or branch.  The "progress" is from individual training, sharpened by continuation training, and then augmented by collective training, and so forth.
> 
> As an example, all infantrymen must know how to do a number of things.  They need, for example, to be able to shoot, move and communicate as a member of a rifle section.  It matters not if they are with or without tanks, dropped by parachute, dropped off on shore by a landing craft, or beamed in from a Constellation class Starship.  Potential infantrymen are trained up to CF requirements on their BMQ (stuff that all NC Members of the CF require), followed by DP 1, which teaches army and infantry specific skillsets.
> 
> Once successful, they are posted to a unit, where they develop their skillsets as part of a rifle section.  From there, you can talk about collective training.  The levels are as follows:
> 1: Crew
> 2: Section
> 3: Platoon
> (I'll go no further for now)
> As a crew member, they could become a machine gunner, a LAV APC gunner, etc.  They then train up as a crew, with crew commander, etc.  Then, they learn to fight as a section.  This differs from Individual training in that they aren't training as part of a generic section, but the actual section commander, 2IC, etc all learn to gel, and all that goes with it.  And from there to platoon.  And so on and so forth
> 
> 
> So, no matter what they fight in, on or with, they are all trained first to a common level, and then branch from there to fit the niche required of them as part of the team.
> 
> Now, for me, my experience is virtually all mechanised.  I have, since the 1980s, learned to shoot, move and communicate as part of a combat team.  First as a section 2IC, then Section commander, then on as platoon commander (detour to mortar platoon) and then as a LAV Captain and Coy 2IC.  I see the advantages of being with a certain "type" as a base.
> 
> However:
> 
> I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role.
> 
> So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable.



I hadn't read this post before I made my last one but this goes along well with my argument about Planning Considerations, we have been very fortunate that we have time on our side so we can actually do Collective Training prior to deploying overseas.  What happens if we don't have that luxury in the future.  

There is a reason why countries maintain Light Infantry Air Mobile divisions; the Dutch for instance and their 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade, so that when they need to make that forced entry they can do it quickly then call up the heavies afterwards.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, a mech infanteer can become a light infanteer and a light infanteer can become a mech infanteer. Likewise a Brigade can switch roles.

But, for the transition to occur a couple of things are required:
Time
Target

It will take time to reorient an entity from one tasking to the other.  The greater the complexity of the entity the longer time it will take.  An infanteer may make the switch with a two period briefing while a Brigade may require a 6 month Work Up.

The other thing required is a Quality Control Standard - a Target - what are the clearly defined expectations of a Mech and a Light Infantry Brigade or Battle Gp.   What can they do with the kit the taxpayer has supplied them, where can they do it and how long can they continue doing it?

To my mind developing that Target demands maintaining a Light Infantry force-in-being as a permanent entity.

A single unit would be useful for running trials but probably be ineffective as a policy tool because if deployed you have now deprived the army of its trainers and there is no one available to conduct the conversion training of follow on units.

Conversely, if you have 3 units you can have one deployed, and learning how to adapt to the enemy's plan, one back home trained in the same assumptions as the one deployed and learning their lessons learned while the third one is working with the rest of the army to bring their skill sets up to the base level.

I believe the same process was used in reverse to convert the light infantry to mech for Afghanistan.

The real advantage of a permanent light force AND a permanent mech force is that they learn how to operate within the special limitations of their kit and, more importantly, buy time for the force and the government to react more effectively to the actual needs of the situation.

The more practice they get in particular scenarios the more proficient they will become but even doing one exercise one time will supply lessons learned.

And perhaps conversion training, light to mech, mech to light should be part of the training cycle, if for no other reason than, I believe, that a CH47 can lift a Bison, and a Coyote (I think the LAV III is too heavy), it can also lift a Bv206, so it is possible that some "light" operations could involve a "mech" component.


----------



## Infanteer

Stymiest said:
			
		

> I am not a believer in the idea that you can take any unit and at the drop of the hat make them a light infantry force.  Sure at the very basic level a soldier will be able to with little effort switch between the two, a rifleman is a rifleman that we cannot dispute; however, it is at the more senior levels of the NCO cadre as well as at the Officer level where the separation must be made.  Why?  because the planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support for lets say an Air Mobile/Air Assault Op are very different from that of a mechanized force.



...and that makes "Light Infantry" unique?  Helicopters?  Sorry, but working with helicopters is not black magic.  As I said above, I've seen rifle companies do this with minimal difficulty.  I went from the guy dealing with zulu LAVs to the guy dealing with 6 CH-53s.  Planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support are different, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out - in fact it takes a well-rounded and experienced Infantry Officer and Warrant Officer to do so.

For you I go back to my original comment - does any threat to Canada really justify 3 Mountain/Jungle Warfare battalions (as that's pretty much what the "Light Infantry" have been explained to me as) and if so, how do you fit those 3 into the Force Generation cycle?


----------



## a_majoor

If  Canada is to need a specialist force, then it should be an Arctic warfare force.

That is one place which is/will become more important as we need to assert our own sovereignty, which is job one for any military force.

As Infanteer pointed out, a force which actually knows how to live, work and fight in the arctic needs more than "how to avoid freezing to death" indoc training. Loads of very specialized kit will be needed, and lots of training and experience in actually living and working in a very unforgiving environment in order to be an effective and creditable force. Since we will need all arms and elements, this is actually an Arctic Brigade group.

As for the light/heavy divide south of the Arctic circle, I don't see that we have diverged or specialized so much that there is a need for a distinctive "Panzergrenadier", Stoßtruppen or Jäger units. In some past thread, there were arguments about Panzergrenadiers being defined by being trained in the customary use the firepower of their vehicles while fighting dismounted (the vehicle being essentially a mobile firebase that fought and moved with the troops). 
Unless something has changed, this is just one of the many tactics our Infantry can use when circumstances dictate, not the ordinary and customary means of operating in a mech battalion.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and that makes "Light Infantry" unique?  Helicopters?  Sorry, but working with helicopters is not black magic.  As I said above, I've seen rifle companies do this with minimal difficulty.  I went from the guy dealing with zulu LAVs to the guy dealing with 6 CH-53s.  Planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support are different, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out - in fact it takes a well-rounded and experienced Infantry Officer and Warrant Officer to do so.
> 
> For you I go back to my original comment - does any threat to Canada really justify 3 Mountain/Jungle Warfare battalions (as that's pretty much what the "Light Infantry" have been explained to me as) and if so, how do you fit those 3 into the Force Generation cycle?



No it doesn't and your right all it takes is well experienced senior NCO's and infantry officers to make it work.  What I 
would like to see is taking all the light infantry assets congregating them into their own Brigade; something like what 
the Dutch have done.  Unfortunately this probably isn't a reality, something maybe a little bit more practical would be 
giving each of the light battalions we currently have a specific task 3PPCLI (Mtn/Jungle warfare) 3RCR (Air Mobile) 
3 R22eR (Para)... this probably wouldn't happen either because no regiment really wants to let go of their little i
individual fiefdom but lets face it a Coy of Para/Mtn Ops/Air Mobile whatever is not big enough to operate on its own... having a battalion of each would provide concentration of force and clear direction that each of these specialties is clearly lacking.

Maybe something else to consider; bringing CSOR out of the SOF world and closer to the regular army and making them
something akin to the 75th Ranger Regiment.  

In reality I think you bring up an excellent point Infanteer; how do we fit light infantry into our current force generation cycle.  This I don't really have an answer for at the moment but it would be interesting to hear what other peoples opinions are?

Thinking about off the top of my head the only way I would see it occurring would be taking the light infantry units out of their present brigades and congregating them into their own special brigade?  The biggest problem with this would be providing them with all the enablers... one way to get around this could be bringing back all the Combat Support elements Mortars/Pioneers/Anti Armour... etc but only in the light infantry.  I don't know what thoughts are on this but it is worth some consideration.


----------



## vonGarvin

I would offer that if we did go with a light force, that the light force be brigade sized, because the combat support and combat service support elements in the brigade would be required to provide those functions to any deploying unit.  I would then go a step further, and of the other two brigades, make one of them "heavy" and the other "medium" (whatever that means...)

So, what of the force generation/force employment?  Suppose we have to deploy to Kerblackistan, and a light force were deemed to be optimal. Well, the first "roto" would come from that light brigade.  But just as immediate as its deployment of a unit from that brigade, another unit (another brigade?  same brigade?) would have to them train up starting immediately with all the individual and collective training to get them to level 7 confirmed (eg: battlegroup), supposing that we maintain that we only deploy battlegroups.  Assume that the deployment is 9 months long, that give the next unit around 8 months to "ramp up", and if done efficiently, that is sufficient time.  

The same model could work with the "heavy" and "medium" brigades.  Now, in terms of readiness, and assuming a two-month confirmation period prior to deployment, each brigade would have to have a battlegroup on "medium" readiness, confirmed up to level 5 (combat team) upon entering their term of readiness.  Once warned off of an impending deployment, given that the individual and collective training has been completed to level 5, it wouldn't take long to "dust off" an exercise instruction to have that unit complete a level 7 confirmation and then deployment.  It would also require units to maintain a DAG of sorts, with monthly checks, during their readiness cycles, but it would also mean that units wouldn't have to keep cycling through CMTC, because we all know that we aren't "coiled springs" ready to fly away on missions.


----------



## HItorMiss

Stymiest said:
			
		

> Maybe something else to consider; bringing CSOR out of the SOF world and closer to the regular army and making them
> something akin to the 75th Ranger Regiment.



Wont/Can't happen you would lose the vast majority of guys there who didn't go through selection and then 7-8 months of course to suddenly say yeah forget those skills sets now you're going to be Rangers, not a viable option


----------



## Matt_Fisher

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Wont/Can't happen you would lose the vast majority of guys there who didn't go through selection and then 7-8 months of course to suddenlty say yeah forget those skills sets now you're going to be Rangers, not a viable option



And if a re-role happened, what'd these guys realistically be looking at doing as an alternative?


----------



## HItorMiss

The VAST majority would release I suspect. Some would stay of course but the idea of going back to Army and to a role such as that would/is repugnant to the people I know that hang their hat there. Thankfully I can't see there being any steam for this anywhere in CANSOFCOM but then again it isn't like I walk around the halls of Ottawa in the know about these things  8)

Don't even ask how many would be willing to go back to a normal Bn that's pretty much 0...


EDIT: Spelling and to add small point


----------



## vonGarvin

Personally I don't see a reason for CSOR to return as anything part of the army.  (Unless they just bring their 60mm mortars and let me have them)  ;D


----------



## Matt_Fisher

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> The VAST majority would release I suspect. Some would stay of course but the idea of going back to Army and to a role such as that would/is repugnant to the people I know that hang their hat there. Thankfully I can't see there being any steam for this anywhere in CANSOFCOM but then again it isn't like I walk around the halls of Ottawa in the know about these things  8)
> 
> Don't even ask how many would be willing to go back to a normal Bn that's pretty much 0...
> 
> 
> EDIT: Spelling and to add small point



We always hear the 'Troops will vote with their feet' argument, and to a certain respect, yeah probably a significant number would VR, however we've seen things like this happen in the past whereby a unit is disbanded (i.e. CAR), Re-roled, or is moved (i.e. 1RCR from London to Petawawa, and 2PPCLI from Winnipeg to Shilo) and the majority of troops just get on with things.  

I'm not saying this to belittle the efforts that the pers in CSOR have made in developing that unit, what I'm saying is that I don't always buy the 'Troops vote with their feet' argument that's made.


----------



## Old Sweat

I think Bullet Magnet is referring more to the difference in "climate" between a SOF unit where self discipline and accountability plays a large part, and the more formal and stiffer modus operendi in an infantry battalion.


----------



## Illegio

Add to that, a disproportionate amount of time and money goes into the training of each CSOR operator, so it makes sense to exploit them to the full extent of their capabilities.


----------



## ArmyRick

Matt,

Sorry bro but I don't think there is any way CSOR would/should be re-rolled into a conventional army unit. It would be btter off to simply disband them rather than make another unit.

Matt our boys are not pure mech infantry soldiers. When I was in 2VP, we more than impressed the USMC down in lejeune with our dismounted skills. We did 0 work up training but we did receive a little from US Navy and the corps (mostly on proper boarding/deboarding drills choppers, amtracks, LCAC, river boats, etc, etc). Again trg was minimal.

As far as really expanding our arctic skills and capabilities, we have the skills but we could certainly use a nice peice of kit such as the Viking ATVP (BV210). Its light enough to be hauled around by a chinook.


----------



## Kirkhill

Disregarding the issue of CSOR re-roling to inf for a moment - an unnecessary and undesirable course IMHO - and reverting to the issue of Light Battalions:

As I understand the situation current there is an allocation of something like 6000 PYs (the number 5394 seems to stick in my mind for some reason) for all Infantry based positions including sigs, medics, loggies and clerks permanently attached to battalions.  There is also a determination to maintain 9 Infantry Battalions.  There is also a limitation on the number of LAVs available so that only 1/2 to 2/3rds of the available troops are likely to be mechanized.  This is recognized by the fact that some of the TAPVs are being purchased as Section Carriers for the Infantry.

IMHO the situation is not a question of SHOULD you have Light Infantry soldiers but WHERE will you locate them?

Will they be LOB numbers waiting for their chance to ride in the LAVs?

Will they be allocated to various schools?

Will they be held as a spare platoon at company level? Company at Battalion level?  Battalion at Brigade level? Brigade at CF level?


In my opinion any numbers supernumerary to the minimum needs of the LAVs should be held at the highest possible level and organized into the largest possible groups and trained to operate within the limits that the equipment available imposes. 

It is not that LAV Troopers can't do helo or riverine ops.  It is that helo and riverine ops can also be done by troops without LAVs.  And we don't have enough LAVs to go around but we do have Helicopters.  Therefore train the LAVless in tasks that don't need LAVs.  Fortunately for Canada LAVs are incompatible with operations in the 70% of our landmass that is inaccessible by roads of any sort, the 8% of the country that is covered by fresh water and all of our littoral waters.

LAV units are absolutely brilliant as foreign policy tools.  We pick those fights and deploy what we can, where we can, as we can.  We set the terms of reference and planning permits LAVs to operate alongside Strykers, CV90s, Warriors, Bushmasters, TLAVs and the entire arms dealers catalogs with unit structures that allocate 3 to 8 vehicles per platoon and 4-12 troops per vehicle.

There is a way to generate 6 LAV battalions and 9 independent Light Infantry Company Combat Teams within the 5394 number (to include Pnrs, Mors, and AT-DF troops) but it would require downsizing the LAV platoon to 3 cars each with a 3 man crew (Fire Teams A,B & C) and a 4 man dismount team (Fire Teams D,E & F).  The Pl and 2ic would be ride alongs as would be specialist dets and teams.  (30 seats-9 crew-12 dsmounts-2 cmd = 7 specialists)

The Light Infantry wold be based on replacing the LAV with one more body creating two fire teams of 4 per section. 

The new CCV could be allocated to the RCDs and 12 RBC, organized on the same pattern as the LAV units.  That woould give the government 8 deployable LAV/CCV units and 9 Lt Infantry Combat Teams as well as 4 Armoured Squadrons from the LdSH(RC).


But regardless of the mind games: with respect to how the 5394 might be deployed and trained and maintained in a useable state it is important, IMO, that every soldier in uniform, feels that he or she is gainfully employed in a useful activity and not just warming the bench waiting for a shot at the big leagues.


One way to do that is to convert the LAVless to light infantry and thn challenge them with doing the best they can in demanding environments with the tools they have at hand.

This should not be about creating elites.  This should be about supplying the Government of Canada the greatest posssible array of tools of the best possible quality to meet that widest possible assortment of eventualities.

Note all the "if possible" qualifiers.  

This should not be about creating the USMC, the Paras or the Brigade of Guards.  It should be about creating Slim's army of "odd-job men" with a motto of "Good Enough".


----------



## Haligonian

Could anyone recommend to me some reading on Field Marshall Slim's perspective on the generalist vs specialist debate, and perhaps something from the opposite perspective as well plese?


----------



## Infanteer

Read his "Defeat into Victory" - definately one of five books that I'd say all professionals should read.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 4.  Air mobility isn't that hard.  I've seen a "mech" company (I prefer to call it a Rifle Company) conducting fast-roping onto objectives on air mobile assaults from amphibious assault ships - it wasn't SOF-standard precision but it was what one would require out of conventional forces.  It wasn't a black art for them to learn and I don't know if this requires full-scale reorganization of the Forces to accomplish.
> 
> 5.  Finally, most here know my thoughts on the "Light Infantry Mindset" - I'll restate my view that it is a bit of a fallacy and that all it's positive aspects are part of a "Good Infantry Mindset" which we have and should continue to refine.  Never discount the ability of good soldiers to use vehicles to operate in complex environments to increase their effectiveness - I'll point disbelievers to William Slim's thoughts on the matter (I also agree with his thoughts a parachutes to).


In the capability that comes of being airmobile or light, is the limiting factor the infantry or should we really be discussing everything else around the infantry?  Are service battalions organized and equiped to support airmobile, jungle, or mountain operations?  What about the Artillery Regiments?  Engineers?  Sigs?  If a conscious decision is made to forgo the establishment of a light capability in other arms & services: how does that impact on the infantry's light capability, endurance, sustainability, etc?


----------



## McG

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> Just finished reading an interview with the current CLS, LGen Peter Devlin in Esprit de Corps.  Now before somebody jumps on the 'I hate Scott Taylor...EdC is a rag I wouldn't even use to wipe my butt with...' bandwagon, there was an interesting comment made by the CLS in Vol 17, Issue #10, page 26:
> 
> _"We are examining things like genuinely light infantry as opposed to battalions minus vehicles, properly resourced and with the mindset that they are light infantry.  There are helicopters going into CFB Petawawa. I think that we need to have a very rich air mobile capability.
> Where our vehicles are, the number of vehicles, the combination of light and mechanized infantry battalions are all things that we are looking at to give us the flexibility and the respect for the resourcing to allow us to train, train to excite, and train to be ready."_
> 
> Usually when someone at the GO/FO level starts making inferences or nuances like the CLS just did, it means that these are initiatives which they're looking at in terms of transforming the organization they control.


There is currently a whole lot of formall analysis going on as to how the Army will look and operate post-Afghanistan.  I would not put stock in any CoA just yet - even if the CLS has been openly speculating.


----------



## Old Sweat

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Could anyone recommend to me some reading on Field Marshall Slim's perspective on the generalist vs specialist debate, and perhaps something from the opposite perspective as well plese?



FM Slim's perspective is that it is better to convert whole units to commando or light roles, rather than to solicit volunteers, which tends to take the highly motivated away from their units. 

Where this theory fails is in the realm of the SOF units, which are designed to operate in small numbers in hostile territory. When the SAS was reformed to serve in Malaya after the Second World War, part of the expansion was done by converting a company of the Parachute Regiment. This proved to be a failure, as the Paras who were as fine soldiers as were available in the Brit Army at the time, were unable to make the tranisition from fighting in sections and platoons to the SAS small party concept.

There is a book titled "Re-Enter the SAS" which covers this era. I have a copy somewhere and will try to find it so I can post a more complete reference.


----------



## Old Sweat

MCG said:
			
		

> In the capability that comes of being airmobile or light, is the limiting factor the infantry or should we really be discussing everything else around the infantry?  Are service battalions organized and equiped to support airmobile, jungle, or mountain operations?  What about the Artillery Regiments?  Engineers?  Sigs?  If a conscious decision is made to forgo the establishment of a light capability in other arms & services: how does that impact on the infantry's light capability, endurance, sustainability, etc?





I can comment on the light artillery question, in part because I commanded an airmobile/air portable battery. When the original SSF was created circa 1964, 4 RCHA - the field regiment in Petawawa - was converted to a two battery light regiment equipped with 4.2-inch mortars. The means to transport the mortars was the venerable Dodge M37 3/4 ton truck and trailer. By 1968 the mortars had been replaced by 105mm pack howitzers. 

While the batteries were fairly light, and the regiment's main role was providing the battery for the AMF(L) Battalion Group, RHQ et al stayed mounted in heavier vehicles. It should also be appreciated that artillery ammunition is anything but light. A staggering amount of the airlift bill for the battalion group was taken up by 105mm ammunition, even on the AMF(L) light scales.

The CAST* Combat Group (think a mini brigade) came along about 1970. It really was a more or less conventional grouping made up of "normal battalions/batteries" from 5 Combat Group and the AMF(L) Battalion Group from 2 Combat Group. It was not really a light formation, and from my point of view, did little to prepare for mountain operations in North Norway, especially in later years when command shifted from 2 to 5 Combat Group.

The airborne battery, which was part of the Airborne Regiment in Edmonton, operated on even lighter scales. In my opinion, and this is second hand info, is that the ammunition challenge was never really solved.

Where much of the difficulty arises is in the mass of specialized vehicles required in HQ, CS and CSS units. Equally daunting is the requirement to feed, re-suppy and medically look after the formation. Once again, one cannot shrink or dehydrate combat supplies. Now add some tac or med hel resources and the CSS task gets really ugly.

* CAST = Canadian Air-Sea Transportable


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Currently the regular army is structured along these lines







This see's the light infantry battalions incorporated into mech brigades.  Essentially our light infantry units are mech units on the cheap as the army has the money to fund 3 extra infantry battalions but not enough to fund the purchase of additional vehicles.

Now what if we disconnected those light battalions from the mech brigades and had them form their own brigade along these lines





Uploaded with ImageShack.us


We would still have three mechanized brigades with a reduced Infantry footprint of 2 mech battalions

This would also give us a light infantry brigade as well which in theory would make operating as a true light force easier.  As you may notice the size of the support elements would be reduced from a Btn/Regiment sized formation to a Coy level formation.  The Artillery would employ 81mm mortars while a light engineer capability would also need to be developed.  The biggest problem that would arise from this is the fact that all the battalions would not be co-located geographically together.  How we would get past this would be splitting the Support Coys up and providing each Infantry Battalion with a platoon of engineers/loggies/and artillery which would essentially become CSC/CSS assets to the Battalions but could be formed together if the need arose.

This would take care of the problems that would occur with the geographical separation that exists between the units, but if we were to do this what would be the point of even having a separate brigade?  The point is that; as Technoviking pointed out, what is needed to train Infantry soldiers is the bridging of Gap's between Individual/and Collective Training.  A mech force can act as light infantry no question; however, re-rolling from mech infantry to light infantry takes time and effort and vice-versa.  Having a Brigade formation that trains day-to-day as a light force would give Canada an extra tool at its disposal.

So I will summarize what I think are the advantages and disadvantages of this and then we can pick this bad boy apart.

Advantages:

1.  80% of Canada's territory is inaccessible to Mechanized Forces; having a dedicated light infantry force would allow Canada to rapidly react to unforeseen events over its entire border.  It would give Canadian Forces the ability to project power anywhere in Canada.  This goes hand in hand with the Canada First Defence Strategy and its first Core-Mission "Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp

2.  Going hand in hand with some comments made about Arctic Sovereignty earlier; the light infantry force could become the SME's and primary responders to a crisis in the Arctic, the Para Capability could be maintained within the 3 light battalions to give us added punch and additional arctic capability.  Within the CSS and CSC branch we could attach Troop of Sig/Eng/Log etc to the Para Coy to give them that necessary support capability and enablers.

3.  I will use OP Halo as an example for this; 2 RCR deployed for this op and it was a light operation with some air mobile assets.  I am not speaking from experience here but my OC was with 2 RCR at the time and he said 2 RCR was very lucky the way it worked out because they had by chance done collective training with helicopters and as a light infantry force prior to this deployment.  Without this it may not have been as successful.  Would it not be more prudent to have a light force that is continuously operating  in an airmobile/light role that if these sorts of deployments arise they can be deployed rapidly.  Other armies maintain this capability why can't we.  This would also support the 6th Core missions "Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp

4.  Finally; this would give us FLEXIBILITY,  As some have mentioned earlier, the current force generation cycle is heavily reliant on providing soldiers with ample time to conduct collective training prior to deployment.  Having a Light Force as well as a Mechanized Force would allow us to rapidly deploy and provide follow on forces to conduct collective training; be it in a Mech or Light Role.

Disadvantages:

1.  Logistics - Working out how these units would be supported from the army is something I will leave to people with bigger brains to me.  I personally envision certain assets such as Mortars/Engineers/Logistics being integrated into the Battalions themselves, higher level logistics could be provided by respective ASU's.  The issue with this whole thing is with the vast distances between the light battalions how do you provide this light organization with cohesion and logistical support.  This would need to be worked out by some highly qualified senior NCO's and Officers with far more knowledge then I possess.

2.  Procurement - A big problem with the whole light concept is a lot of the enablers have been taken away that would make this functional.  We are getting the Choppers back which is awesome, however the light battalions right now currently are very lacking in terms of vehicles/other key resources.  I have heard a variety of rumours that the army wants to get rid of the G-Wagon.  I have no idea why but for me these would be the perfect platform for light infantry, they are small and nimble enough to be easily transported rapidly but they also would provide light infantry units with mobility and flexibility.  One thing that Canadian Army also lacks is the necessary winter equipment to operate in the Arctic.  We have gotten rid of the Bv206's and their aren't exactly a wealth of skidoos and other equipment sitting around at the battalions (atleast not at 3 RCR).  

So procurement of specialized equipment would definitely need to be done if we wanted a true light infantry capability especially if we wanted to be able to operate in the Arctic or Northern Canada, which would be one of the main reasons behind a airmobile/light infantry brigades raison d'etre.

3.  Cost - Operating this sort of niche capability may in the end cost the army more; so money would need to be pulled from other areas to make this work.  Where this would come from I don't exactly know, maybe nice to haves like the CCV project need to be canned, the army has already identified the LAV III as its primary vehicle fleet anyways so why we need a handful of CCVs is beyond me.

4.  Additional Overhead - Do we really need to create another Brigade for this?  A lot of people complain about how much overhead the army already has do we really need another Brigade to pull something like this off?  I would argue we do so that Collective Training as a light infantry force can be achieved, and clear direction can be given; however, I am sure some would disagree with me.


Well I have dragged this post on for long enough thats what happens when I have too much time on my hands on a Sunday afternoon but really if we are going to bring back light infantry, and develop an air-mobile capability this may be a way to move forward.  It would allow the Army to satisfy the core-missions highlighted in the Canada First Defense Strategy while providing us with an increased ability to project power abroad.


----------



## cavalryman

Interesting..... In essence, the airmobile brigade you propose is a very near match to the old Airborne Regiment when the commandos were battalion-sized, minus the full para capacity of course...


----------



## Kirkhill

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> FM Slim's perspective is that it is better to convert whole units to commando or light roles, rather than to solicit volunteers, which tends to take the highly motivated away from their units.
> 
> Where this theory fails is in the realm of the SOF units, which are designed to operate in small numbers in hostile territory. When the SAS was reformed to serve in Malaya after the Second World War, part of the expansion was done by converting a company of the Parachute Regiment. This proved to be a failure, as the Paras who were as fine soldiers as were available in the Brit Army at the time, were unable to make the tranisition from fighting in sections and platoons to the SAS small party concept.
> 
> There is a book titled "Re-Enter the SAS" which covers this era. I have a copy somewhere and will try to find it so I can post a more complete reference.



OS - with the greatest respect, that doesn't fully do justice to Slim's position.  In my opinion it was not so much that line units should convert to specialist roles but that well led line units could be trained to handle any of the tasks that specialists were performing.  Based on that reading, the failure of the Paras to become instant SAS troopers could be placed at the feet of the Para leadership (IIRC at that time there were a large number of Guards officers in the Paras - a 300 year old elite clinging to 300 year old man mangement tactics).  I would note that ulitmately the Paras seem to have supplied a disproportionate portion of troopers to the SAS and that currently 1 Para has been completely reroled to take over some portion of the kinetic roles previously handled by the SAS themselves.

In a related thought I would note that Line Regiments adopted Ranger tactics which became formalized as Light Infantry companies, which then  begat Light battalions, which begat Rifle battalions, which begat the Rifle Brigade, which begat the Light Division, which resulted in the whole army using light tactics, which begat the Commandos which begat the Paras, which begat the SAS which begat CSOR and JTF2 .  Ulitmately modern armies are all using the dispersed tactics that characterised Ranger operations 300 years ago.  And that includes conducting Mounted operations after the form of Moss Troopers, Hussars, Dragoons and Boer War era Mounted Infantry.

Yea verily ;D

The evolution of the army and military force in general is that command invests a small amount of resources to determine if new tactics can beat old problems.  Successful practioners of innovation become elites.  Unsuccessful ones die.  The tactics of the elites become generalized (while at the same time the elites try to hold their postion in the pecking order for as long as they can).


Yes, Slim was against taking good NCOs out of line units just to create specialist Corps of Tree Climbers, with the union ticket to authorize them to do that work and deny others the right to climb trees.  His position, IMO, was that if somebody knows a better way to climb trees, and there is a need to climb trees, then take your troops available and teach them to climb trees the new way.  

And when they need to jump out of a plane give them a two day course and a parachute and throw them out the back.  Once they hit the ground they are doing exactly what they were doing before they got into the plane.

Now they don't need the parachute, the helicopter can get them into 90% of the places a parachute can and, unlike the parachute, can extract them from 100% more places.

My 2 centavos. and your are probably over charged at that. 

Edit: sorry for the divergence Stymiest.


----------



## Infanteer

I'll give you credit for putting forward a proposal.  I'll start with your advantages:

1. 





			
				Stymiest said:
			
		

> 1.  80% of Canada's territory is inaccessible to Mechanized Forces; having a dedicated light infantry force would allow Canada to rapidly react to unforeseen events over its entire border.



The inaccessibility of domestic territory is a red herring.  An Infantry Battalion can go anywhere regardless of its kit; it is not bound to take its vehicles.  Canada already has this ability to react to unforeseen events over its entire border embedded in its 9 Infantry Battalions.

2.





> 2.  Going hand in hand with some comments made about Arctic Sovereignty earlier; the light infantry force could become the SME's and primary responders to a crisis in the Arctic,



This one is always paraded as a strength of Light Infantry.  First off, what is your threat in Arctic Sovereignty?  Are we expecting a Russian Division?  A battalion of Danish parachutists?  A few armed foreigner corporate goons?  We need a credible threat before we can build a capability to defeat it.  Secondly, what is your proposed employment of Light Forces in the Arctic - are you going to parachute 1000 guys into the high north with tobaggans?  How will you sustain those guys?  What do you expect them to do when their mobility is likely a few km a day?

3.  





> 3.  I will use OP Halo as an example for this; 2 RCR deployed for this op and it was a light operation with some air mobile assets.  I am not speaking from experience here but my OC was with 2 RCR at the time and he said 2 RCR was very lucky the way it worked out because they had by chance done collective training with helicopters and as a light infantry force prior to this deployment.



Again, helicopters are not a black art and it doesn't take "light forces" to develop competencies in them.  There are numerous cases (some of which I was part of) of LAV-equipped companies leaving the vehicles behind to conduct effective air-mobile operations in Afghanistan.

4. 





> 4.  Finally; this would give us FLEXIBILITY,



How so?  I'd argue that it strips us of flexibility as it pigeon-holes your available forces for Force Employment.  Should you require anything that needs infantry with its own protected mobility, you have stripped 1/3 of your forces available for this.  Should you require guys to run around in the jungle/mountains, you're leaving 2/3 of your forces out of the equation.

I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence.  Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility.  I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.

5.


> however the light battalions right now currently are very lacking in terms of vehicles/other key resources.  I have heard a variety of rumours that the army wants to get rid of the G-Wagon. I have no idea why but for me these would be the perfect platform for light infantry,



So, you want motorized infantry in jeeps?  It doesn't take long to train jeep drivers; infact a driver wheeled course is a prerequisite to most heavier platforms.  So, again, the ability to deploy in small vehicles (if political conditions allow for it) already exists within all 9 Infantry battalions.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to OS comments about the need for specialist vehicles and the transport bill for artillery - as well as the comments by Stymiest.

Why not situate the estimation on the basis of light companies that are in communication with air support - both Combat and Service?

If that combination of effort can't get the job done then heavier forces can be rolled in (or flown in) to take over the main effort but in the mean time the light force got there "fustest with the mostest" that it was physically possible to supply, thereby engaging the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity and disrupting their planning cycle.

Better "a Battalion in time than a Division too late".   The Light Force is a screen to deal with low level threats on their own and buy time to concentrate heavier elements against the threat.

1 Abn Div got chewed up on North Africa because - just as Slim would have predicted, and indeed saw, once they had fallen out of their aircraft they were kept on the ground as infantry.  They didn't have the kit necessary to function as infantry until they started "finding" vehicles "lost" by other units.

There is nothing wrong, in my view, with deploying a light unit and then reinforcing it with heavier elements over time.  Equally there is nothing wrong with ultimately replacing the light units with heavier units over time and withdrawing the light units to be reallocated to taskings more in keeping with their capabilities.

But does everybody always have to carry an axe all the time in case he has to knock down a door?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> OS - with the greatest respect, that doesn't fully do justice to Slim's position.



Thank you Kirkhill - you got to the heart of what I was getting at.  My takeaways from Slim:

1.  Well trained forces will do almost anything you need of them provided you give them the right training;

2.  Creating barriers within your forces only disadvantages the whole for the "benefit" of a few.  Slim was sceptical of the value of such forces as the Chindits as they would dissapear into the jungle only to come back decimated, requiring a refit;

3.  The loss of Lines of Communication is something that can be overcome by some ingenuity and frugality, we have a penchant to oversupply units when infact we can get by with much less;

4.  Motorization/Mechanization - from a truck to a tank - can be used to advantage by a force almost anywhere in the world short of heavy swamps.  Tanks were part of his fight in some of these heaviest tropical jungles in the world; and

5.  Air mobility in the form of parachutes (and now helicopters) can and should be used to advantage by any force and should be taught to as many soldiers as possible.

Again, of 5 books I think are important for all professionals to read, this is 1 of them.  Slim has a way of turning observations of high level command into useful lessons on leadership in modern warfare.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> There is nothing wrong, in my view, with deploying a light unit and then reinforcing it with heavier elements over time.



How about deploying boots on the ground to meet the requirement of timeliness and forwarding them their heavier assets (vehicles, artillery, engineer assets) as required?


----------



## Old Sweat

I really do not want to get into a peeing contest, but I knew Slim felt it was preferable to retrain formed units for specialized roles. As for the canard about the Parachute Regiment supplying a large amount of the successful applicants for the SAS, not everybody in the Paras applies and not every Para that applies, makes it. I can't comment about the Guards influence in the Parachute Regiment, but I know the C-in-C in Malaya sent two Guards COs home. One had told "Mad Mike" Calvert that his battalion did not go thrashing around in the jungle looking for terrorists as it was not proper soldiering, or something of that nature. The other had instituted a policy that every platoon or larger would do thirty minutes drill on the parade square before leaving camp. This was enforced on the QRF responding to an ambush just down the road from the camp with obvious results.

Now, I have some problems getting my mind around forming another brigade, especially as it will be without supporting arms in the form of a field and a combat engineer regiment, along with the vital CSS tail. Moreover, this means forming another headquarters which means finding the manpower and kit for it. Admittedly forming headquarters seems to be the Canadian reaction to any issue, but the cost is too rich in resources for what the army achieves. 

As for the gunners using 81mm mortars and nothing else, that is an expedient, not a tactically viable solution. There is a requirement for both guns and artillery STA along with (Air Force) TUAV in any deployed force that is intended to fight, which implies a proper structure that is  not just a mortar platoon by any other name. When I wrote guns, I meant guns with lots of FOOS and FACS and a FSCC/ASCC function with all the bells and whistles to get the most from artillery, air and aviation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer:

Generally you and I are in agreement on the need for generalist forces.  Mech can become Light can become Helo can become Para can become Marine.  Stipulated.

But I don't agree with you that you can take a LAV unit and immediately drop it into another role and have it effectively fight.

From Vimy to your experiences with CH53s and 2VPs experiences with the USMC the keys are, in my opinion, time, training and support.

You have good troops that pick up the training quickly.  Good stuff.  But they were latching into systems that had been created and were supplied by others.  Those folks had written the manuals after they had made their mistakes.  They were surviving elites.  Your troops got the benefit of their skills.  And their service support.  

With the greatest of respect all your guys had to do was get on the back of the bus and get off at the other end.  But somebody had to supply and maintain the bus and determine if this was a suitable landing site and where the gas was going to come from.

Those skills need practice.

Now if you are arguing that LAV battalions should spend one third of their time operating without their LAVs, practicing operations in muskeg, desert and bush, heliborne and riverine, urban combat then we are on common ground.  But if you are arguing that there is no conversion bill for LAV troopers to other roles then I am afraid that I am having difficulty with that proposition.

With respect to the Red Herring - forever is a very long time and just because we don't perceive an imminent threat today doesn't mean that a threat won't eventuate tomorrow.  Additionally, if your enemy perceives that you don't pessess the ability to operate in an environment where he can operate where do you suppose he will expend effort?

In the meantime a ready Light Force (and that could be 1 VP or 3 VP, either permanently LAVless or LAVless for a 6 month to one year rotation, could find employment as an immediate reaction force, whether in Coppermine ACP  or Beirut NEO or securing an airhead until the LAVs can arrive.


Light Forces have a role.  Just because that role may only require them to be on the ground, in some circumstances for 72 hours doesn't negate their value.  LAVs don't go everywhere. People live many places LAVs don't go and can't go and the critcal issue is to bring armed, disciplined agents of the government everywhere that people live and the government claims authority.  If you can't do that, if you can't command the place AND the spaces, then you are not supplying the full range of services for which the government engages you. 

I know you know that.  I am just having a great deal of difficulty with what I perceive as the LAV battalion as being the key to the universe.

Canadian troops are good but are you really comfortable taking a position that they could immediately and effectively engage an enemy when it was necessary to conduct heliborne or waterborne operations to get to grips with them?

Or how am I misreading you?

Cheers, Chris.

And Old Sweat:  not engaging.  Apologies for the tone.  Points taken.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

cavalryman said:
			
		

> Interesting..... In essence, the airmobile brigade you propose is a very near match to the old Airborne Regiment when the commandos were battalion-sized, minus the full para capacity of course...



Yes, Each Battalion would maintain the Para Capability that they do now (You can jump from Chinooks so why not use them for that very role)

But in essence the Brigade would be based around the Helicopter and the use of small vehicles (G-Wagons(or equivalent) with Skidoos/Bv206s (Similar Vehicles) for use in the arctic) with some training from other Aviation assets.  

Other then what exists in a few of our training books already there isn't really doctrine on air-mobile operations in the CF at least there isn't any that I am aware of.  With the incorporation of Dillion Miniguns into our Griffon fleet/new ISTAR capabilities, the new Chinooks... we have an actual capability to put out an air-mobile force.  Wasting this would be foolish IMO.  This is going to require books to be written on how we employ helicopter force doctrinally and how we structure them.

It will also require a closer integration of Tac-Hel and the Army... better cooperation, and new courses.  Much of the problem that exists in the army and the air force is neither organization really understands the others planning considerations.  As well on the army side atleast their are a hodge podge of courses out there detailing helicopter ops (Hel ops, LZ/DZ controller, pathfinder, etc)... perhaps it would be prudent for the army to combine these much like the Americans do with their Air Assault Crse, this would be the helicopter equivalent of our jump course and would teach skills such as LZ/DZ marking, slingload operations, rappelling, and planning considerations for helicopter ops.

On the air force side of the house

they currently have (initial pilot training (2 Choppers per op); Category Upgrade Program (Planning with 2 to 4 Helos); ATAC (Advanced Tactical Aviation Course which is Helo pilot equivalent of ATOC (Cbt team planning)); beyond this they have Mountain Flying Course; SOA Crse; NVG Formation; ISTAR Qual Crse (In development based on the MX-15 Eo/IR Ball)

What we don't have is a course dedicated to understanding joint ops between aviation and the army, this course could go hand in hand with an Air Assault type course, and could be used to bridge the gap between air force aviation and army planning considerations.  This is important because any effort to create an Air Mobile brigade would undoubtedly require cooperation between the air force and the army.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

> 1.
> The inaccessibility of domestic territory is a red herring.  An Infantry Battalion can go anywhere regardless of its kit; it is not bound to take its vehicles.  Canada already has this ability to react to unforeseen events over its entire border embedded in its 9 Infantry Battalions.



This is true; however, if you are going to get someone to do something who will you send in first a force trained specifically in the light infantry role or a force whose primary role and what they practice the most is the conduct of mechanized operations.



> 2.
> This one is always paraded as a strength of Light Infantry.  First off, what is your threat in Arctic Sovereignty?  Are we expecting a Russian Division?  A battalion of Danish parachutists?  A few armed foreigner corporate goons?  We need a credible threat before we can build a capability to defeat it.  Secondly, what is your proposed employment of Light Forces in the Arctic - are you going to parachute 1000 guys into the high north with tobaggans?  How will you sustain those guys?  What do you expect them to do when their mobility is likely a few km a day?



This is a good point and one that is difficult to answer.  For this the threat isn't so much what exists today but what could exist in the near future.  I know that the Danes/Norwegians take Arctic sovereignty very seriously, so why with our huge land mass and potential for immense monetary gain in the Arctic not take sovereignty and Arctic patrolling seriously.  When the fight in the international community comes over Arctic Sovereignty we are going to have to show that we can actually control the territory up there, having a Brigade group with this as one of its core functions will do this.



> 3.
> Again, helicopters are not a black art and it doesn't take "light forces" to develop competencies in them.  There are numerous cases (some of which I was part of) of LAV-equipped companies leaving the vehicles behind to conduct effective air-mobile operations in Afghanistan.



Again I will say yes you are right in the sense that anybody can be taken and probably carry out an air assault operation but would it not be more effective to have a force specifically dedicated to conducting air-mobile operations.  What happens if we take the lead in a mission in lets say the Congo where Air-Mobile ops will undoubtedly play an important role.  Who would you want inserting initially, a force who works with choppers day in day out?  Or one who doesn't?



> 4.
> How so?  I'd argue that it strips us of flexibility as it pigeon-holes your available forces for Force Employment.  Should you require anything that needs infantry with its own protected mobility, you have stripped 1/3 of your forces available for this.  Should you require guys to run around in the jungle/mountains, you're leaving 2/3 of your forces out of the equation.
> 
> I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence.  Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility.  I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.



This would be true if we had enough vehicles and equipment to outfit all units universally but the fact is we don't.  The light Battalions have no vehicles and no ability to train on them.  When they were inserted into Afghanistan they required many months of pre-deployment training and build up before being inserted into theatre.  This is fine; however, would it not make more sense to give them their own delivery platform to the battlefield.  One that they could train on and become so called SME's on.  Also this goes back to my who point on Collective training.  Maybe at some point we won't be given the opportunity to have months of pre-deployment training.  At this point the ability to interchange between mech and light would add a lot of flexibility and it would give subsequent units time to re-roll themselves.  



> 5.
> So, you want motorized infantry in jeeps?  It doesn't take long to train jeep drivers; infact a driver wheeled course is a prerequisite to most heavier platforms.  So, again, the ability to deploy in small vehicles (if political conditions allow for it) already exists within all 9 Infantry battalions.



Well the purpose behind motorized vehicles in the light infantry would again be because it is air portable.  You can sling load a G-Wagon so it would definitely have its uses.


I think Infanteer, our differences in opinion are merely a product of our interpretations of certains ideas and definitions.  I view the divisions within the army as a good thing, you view it as wasteful and it would be more prudent to have everyone be proficient at everything.  My argument against this is we may not always have the time to do collective training necessary prior to a deployment; however, by having niche forces we can provide that force specifically trained in a certain area to conduct the initial insertion and afterwards allowing follow on forces time to conduct follow-on training IOT bridge the gap in skill so to speak.

I would also argue that a division between light infantry and mechanized infantry would provide a much needed morale boost for the fellows in the light battalions who often view themselves as the ugly step-children of the mech battalions.  It would provide a certain amount of esprit de corps that is lacking in the infantry.


----------



## Illegio

I think the last point about giving the light battalions a much-needed "boost" to their morale is bunk. I've seen plenty of guys from both mechanized and light units walking around as though their crap doesn't stink, and the same number that whine and moan about how terrible life is and how everyone overlooks them in favour of someone else. 1VP and 3VP live in each others' shadows, and 2VP sulks in the corner and complains about how awful Shilo is.

As for the light battalions/brigades, I think that in an army as small as ours we can afford to play the generalist role "well enough." For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support. Does this mean that training stops in the companies?

I'm not going to dispute the fact that a specialized unit will perform its given function better than a unit assigned to that role in an "ad hoc" fashion, but I also believe that in the majority of cases, "good enough" really is good enough and that a force of well-trained generalists will adapt better than an assortment of specialists.


----------



## vonGarvin

Illegio said:
			
		

> For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support.



And what is the doctrine/manning authorisation to consolidate into a "zulu squadron"??????

These are armoured personnel carriers, not mobile gun systems......


----------



## Infanteer

Technoviking said:
			
		

> And what is the doctrine/manning authorisation to consolidate into a "zulu squadron"??????



CO says so...leaving room for this sort of flexibility is a good thing; you know, that whole mission command thing. 

Doctrine is "what is taught", not necessarily "what is practiced", while manning authorization and TO&E are administrative tools for the adjutant, quartermaster and comptroller branches, not tactical straightjackets on the commanders.  Since doctrine and manning authorisation are usually right outta'er, I can't blame commanders for doing what they can with what they got.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> FM Slim's perspective is that it is better to convert whole units to commando or light roles, rather than to solicit volunteers, which tends to take the highly motivated away from their units.
> 
> Where this theory fails is in the realm of the SOF units, which are designed to operate in small numbers in hostile territory. When the SAS was reformed to serve in Malaya after the Second World War, part of the expansion was done by converting a company of the Parachute Regiment. This proved to be a failure, as the Paras who were as fine soldiers as were available in the Brit Army at the time, were unable to make the tranisition from fighting in sections and platoons to the SAS small party concept.
> 
> There is a book titled "Re-Enter the SAS" which covers this era. I have a copy somewhere and will try to find it so I can post a more complete reference.



In his book, Slim also said that there was little need for special forces as any unit in the 14th Army could be called upon to successfully complete tasks formerly thought the preserve of 'special units'. We shouldn't underestimate the capabilities of a 'normal', well led Canadian infantry battalion.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We shouldn't underestimate the capabilities of a 'normal', well led Canadian infantry battalion.



I'm glad you used quotes around "normal" when describing any Canadian infantry battalion...


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Illegio said:
			
		

> I think the last point about giving the light battalions a much-needed "boost" to their morale is bunk. I've seen plenty of guys from both mechanized and light units walking around as though their crap doesn't stink, and the same number that whine and moan about how terrible life is and how everyone overlooks them in favour of someone else. 1VP and 3VP live in each others' shadows, and 2VP sulks in the corner and complains about how awful Shilo is.
> 
> As for the light battalions/brigades, I think that in an army as small as ours we can afford to play the generalist role "well enough." For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support. Does this mean that training stops in the companies?
> 
> I'm not going to dispute the fact that a specialized unit will perform its given function better than a unit assigned to that role in an "ad hoc" fashion, but I also believe that in the majority of cases, "good enough" really is good enough and that a force of well-trained generalists will adapt better than an assortment of specialists.



Yes what is going on right now with vehicle shortages is not optimal; however, it will get better once all the LAV's overseas come home and are redistributed back into the Battalions. Just because we are forced at the moment to make difficult decisions in terms of how we employ equipment we currently... doesn't mean we don't need to plan for the way ahead.

I think a lot of people forget Afghanistan is not going to go on forever, things will inevitably change, right now the focus is clearly on conducting operations catering towards the mission; however, when it ends it ends and the next conflict could be entirely different.

Everyone here is quick to discredit doctrine and I don't know why because ultimately it is what dictates how we fight.  Back to the basics/alterations of training/etc.... it is all about adopting our doctrine to meet the present demands and constraints placed on us.  Ultimately doctrine is essentially a guide but without it we would not really be professional soldiers as it provides the guide from the individual soldier all the way to the very top of the organizational chain.

Illegio I feel that you are attacking my point of view without really elaborating why you believe that generalists suit our needs more and that they will adapt better then specialists... I will use the "Show me" rule and ask that you give me an actual example where you think having a military based around a group of generalists will adapt better then a group of specialists.  Most other armies seem to think differently:

The Aussies for instance have their regular army grouped into: A Mechanized Brigade, A Motorized Brigade, and a Light Infantry Brigade (hmmm I think someone else earlier gave this as situation to some of our problems in terms of equipment and manning: Heavy, Medium, Light)

The Dutch also have divided their forces into specialists: 2 Mechanized Brigades, 1 Light Air Mobile Brigade (Rapid Reaction Force capable of deployment within 7 to 20 days)

The Belgian Army is divided along the lines of: 2 Mechanized Brigades, 1 Paratroop Brigade (Rapid Reaction Force)

Come to think of it, I am very hard pressed to find armies that think being generalists is a good idea.  With this in mind we have to look at why the Canadian army is an army of generalists.  I would argue that this is more for political purposes then actual combat effectiveness.  Right now we have three homogeneous Brigade groups which give each of the major population demographics of Canada (West/Central/Quebec) roughly the same capability.  The Brigades themselves are like little fiefdoms representing their part of the country.  Splitting this up, creating new units may create somewhat of an imbalance in the army particularly when dealing with the French/English divide.

On top of that their is always the worry that we create another "Airborne Monster" qack.... my heavens people who appear different then me and show a lot of unit pride, that is so bad!    

Anyways I am kind of ranting now and stepping off topic, I think a lot of people are missing the point of what this topic is about:  Resurrecting Light Infantry Battalions.  We currently have 3 light infantry battalions thrown into what are essentially mechanized brigades.  They don't have any vehicles, well other then busted up MLVW's and LSVW's and their is no plan to procure them any.  So really they are infantry battalions with no clear focus!

We are getting Chinooks, and the Griffons have a new ISTAR/CAS capability with their minigun which gives us the opportunity to develop an airmobile capability.  The Mechanized battalions already have vehicles and ample opportunity to develop training  based around them... the light battalions can go out and do dismounted advanced to contact all day or go play with the chopper boys.  

Having a dedicated air-mobile brigade would give the light battalions a raison-d'etre and would allow for better coordination and planning between the air force and the army in terms of utilization of air-mobile assets.  It would provide us with the opportunity to develop doctrine and tactics in employing the aviation and infantry assets at our disposal, and it would I believe serve some benefit to the CF.

If this is not the way forward, then I must ask how would you go about developing an Air-Mobile capability within the CF?


----------



## a_majoor

Taking a look at what sort of bill a true airmobile unit would require led me to this.

Like many other posters, I agree that a light/airborne/arctic/Marine/Space Ranger force needs the associated support of an entire brigade structure in order to operate. Having a fifth brigade group is a necessary part of the equation, which means that various other issues have to be addressed as well. Manning and procurement are obviously big issues. If we can't afford to buy enough LAVs for our current force, what makes you think we can afford to buy helicopters, BV-206 or other kit?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Taking a look at what sort of bill a true airmobile unit would require led me to this.
> 
> Like many other posters, I agree that a light/airborne/arctic/Marine/Space Ranger force needs the associated support of an entire brigade structure in order to operate. Having a fifth brigade group is a necessary part of the equation, which means that various other issues have to be addressed as well. Manning and procurement are obviously big issues. If we can't afford to buy enough LAVs for our current force, what makes you think we can afford to buy helicopters, BV-206 or other kit?



Well the Helicopters are already bought so this part is not so hard to overcome.  As for other special equipment such as Bv206's/G-Wagon's/Skidoos etc... some things would probably need to be cut.  For this I would argue that something like the CCV is not necessarily required.  The army has already identified the LAV as its primary vehicle for Mechanized ops so why would the purchase of a 100 odd CCV's need to occur, its not as if we would be able to outfit battalions with them anyways?  With this money we could then procure Bv's/skidoos/etc.  As well,  potentially a few armoured reserve regiments would need to be cut so that we can utilize their G-Wagons in the light battalions. 

As for the support structures, if you read my earlier post you can see the new airmobile brigade would still be split up across the country.  Logistically the light infantry units could still be supported by their respective ASU's; however, we could also embed within each of the light battalions:

1.  An 81mm Mortar Platoon manned by Artillery 
2.  A Troop of Engineers
3.  Signals Platoon
4.  Logistics Platoon (manned by logistics)
5.  Maintenance and Repair platoon (EME)

If you look at my original proposal it calls for 3 battalions of light infantry supported by company sized elements of Mortars/Engineers/Logistics/EME/Signals/Etc...  this would reflect its light footprint

Given the geographical separation between the Battalions we would divide these Company level formations into platoons and allocate each battalion a platoons worth to be based internally.

These platoons could then be given access to their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions within them.  It would be organized much like the old CAR when its Commandos were Battalion sized formations.

Each Battalion would look something like this:

2xAir Mobile Coys
1xPara Coys
1xCSC Coy w/Mortars/Recce/Engineer Platoons attached
1xCSS Coy w/Sigs/EME/Logistics Platoons attached

The CSC Coys would qualify 1xSection of Engineers Para to partake in Parachuting exercises/ their would also be Signallers/Medics qualified Para to go along with this.  


So We would have an Air-mobile Brigade with its HQ in Petawawa

1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Petawawa w/1xCoy Para)
1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Edmonton w/1xCoy Para)
1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Val Cartier w/1xCoy Para)

Effectively giving us:
2xBtns of Air Assault Inf
1xBtn of Para

We would have in support
1xPl 81mm Mortar for each Battalion
1xTrp Engineer per Battalion w/1 Section qualified Para
1xPl Sig Per Battalion
1xPl Log Per Battalion
1xPl EME Per Battalion
1xPl Recce Per Battalion

Each of these units would be geographically supported by the ASU's that already support them; however, collective training and planning would be dictated by a new Brigade formation and not by the Mech Brigades.  As well I would argue that in order to make this a truly effective Brigade Air Force personnel would be required to share staffing positions at the Brigade HQ as this would effectively be a dual-element Brigade.


----------



## George Wallace

Stymiest

Some of that doesn't even make sense to me on paper, let alone in real life.  Your proposal of a dispersed unit like this is not cost effective, nor practical.  

Your breakdown of equipment to platoons in three different locations is unrealistic and impractical.  I picture a platoon from each location now being required to marry up with two platoons from the other locations to make up a Coy.

I have the same impression with your statements about their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions being only one third of the whole.  

As for the CAR having Bns, it was only one Bn (called a Regt) with three Coys (called Commandos).  It never had anywhere near 2500+/-  pers at one time.


----------



## aesop081

Stymiest said:
			
		

> I think a lot of people forget Afghanistan is not going to go on forever,



Just as a lot of people forget that many things have been going on in the CF in addition to Afghanistan. For example, your comment that we



> not take sovereignty and Arctic patrolling seriously



is off-base. I can assure you that operations to continue to assert our control and soverignty are carried out and that CF units have spent, and continue to spend, a considerable ammount of time patrolling our northern areas. While the army has had to direct its (almost) entire focus on Afghanistan, others have had to continue other missions as well.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Stymiest
> 
> Some of that doesn't even make sense to me on paper, let alone in real life.  Your proposal of a dispersed unit like this is not cost effective, nor practical.
> 
> Your breakdown of equipment to platoons in three different locations is unrealistic and impractical.  I picture a platoon from each location now being required to marry up with two platoons from the other locations to make up a Coy.
> 
> I have the same impression with your statements about their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions being only one third of the whole.
> 
> As for the CAR having Bns, it was only one Bn (called a Regt) with three Coys (called Commandos).  It never had anywhere near 2500+/-  pers at one time.



My understanding was that early on the Commando's were actually intended to be battalion size but were gradually reduced to what was a battalion of infantry.  Its original intent was to operate as a Brigade(-) element, and originally it had its own integral artillery/engineer assets etc...

I'll try to explain what I mean a little bit better.  Right now at 3 RCR all we have really for Combat Support is Recce...
we have no Mortar pPatoon and no Pioneers.  My idea is to incorporate a Troop of Engineers and a Mortar Platoon from the Artillery to give the light forces their own integral Combat Support Elements.

The Light Infantry Battalions already continue to utilize the Service Battalions as they are so why not simply continue to do so.  Rather then uproot the present light battalions and forcing ourselves to build new infrastructure we can maintain them where they are but place them in their own Brigade grouping.    

I am trying to figure out a way to take the light infantry units we currently have put them in their own Brigade but maintain them in their present geographic locations.  Logisticians please help :-D


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Just as a lot of people forget that many things have been going on in the CF in addition to Afghanistan. For example, your comment that we
> 
> is off-base. I can assure you that operations to continue to assert our control and soverignty are carried out and that CF units have spent, and continue to spend, a considerable ammount of time patrolling our northern areas. While the army has had to direct its (almost) entire focus on Afghanistan, others have had to continue other missions as well.



Point taken, I wasn't directing my comment at the CF as a whole it was more targeted towards the Army audience sorry if I offended you...


----------



## aesop081

Stymiest said:
			
		

> sorry if I offended you...



Not to worry, i was far from offended.


----------



## Fusaki

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence.  Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility.  I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.



I agree.

We need to organize and train for maximum flexibility, and build a system that allows us to learn and adapt quickly in fluid situations.

There's no sense in trying to specialize our units until we know what threat they'll be facing.  We won't know what threat they'll be facing until the war actually starts.  And even then, I'm not sure we could reach any real level of specificity before the enemy adapts to us and we have to do something new anyway.

What we should be worried about, then, is not in specializing, but in learning how to move through the OODA loop faster than the enemy.

Edit to add:

If I'm sounding really flaky, it's because I've been reading about complexity theory.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/11/coin-complexity-and-fullspectr/


----------



## Old Sweat

Let me turn to the mortar platoon again, as it seems to be just tossed around as something transferred "from the artillery." For sake of argument let us assume that it is designed to operate without other gunner support. Therefore it will require:

a. a platoon commander with a small party to perform the role of fire support adviser to the CO.

b. a FSCC with the communications and equipment to coordinate all fire support assets available to the battalion, and to control the movement and employment of the mortar groups.

c. three FOO/FAC parties, although experience from "the war" showed they should be separate, so perhaps we are tallking three FOO parties and three FACs.

d. two groups of four mortars each.

e. an administrative element to bring up the bullets and other stuff required to maintain the platoon in action.

The manpower for this will eat up close to half of the indirect fire capabiity of each field regiment. In other words, one third of our infantry is going to take command of half of our field artillery resources. I submit that this ain't going to happen.


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> CO says so...leaving room for this sort of flexibility is a good thing; you know, that whole mission command thing.
> 
> Doctrine is "what is taught", not necessarily "what is practiced", while manning authorization and TO&E are administrative tools for the adjutant, quartermaster and comptroller branches, not tactical straightjackets on the commanders.  Since doctrine and manning authorisation are usually right outta'er, I can't blame commanders for doing what they can with what they got.


I know that doctrine is a guide, but it's there for a reason.  And since Units are obliged to do certain things (eg: have xxx Infantry Companies, etc), having a "Zulu LAV" Squadron (?) may sound like a cool thing to do, there is no basis for it in doctrine or mandate for the battalions, who are mandated to train up to only level 4 (company).  Which begs the question: what BTS are they following?

Having said that, having only enough vehicles for 1/2 or less of your sub-units is right out to lunch as well; however, I fail to see how we can say "mission command" when they aren't even following the contraints from higher (eg: train up companies).


----------



## R031button

Is there a real need for this to be a Brigade, with it's associated HQ and manning? If I understand this correctly, the real core of what Symiest is proposing is the idea of light forces which would be capable of going somewhere quickly, and without the support assets required by a mechanized force. Such a force would be used to gain lodgment in a hostile area until follow on forces are available ie taking a beach head, seizing an airfield, or some other point of entry. In my opinion the Canadian military hasn't deployed more then a battle group to a combat theater since Korea, and isn't likely to do so unless the balloons go up,  so really the initial force doesn't need to be larger then a battle group. Would it not make sense then to maintain high readiness, rapidly deployable, already organized battle groups? Trained on a delivery system that allows them to be the first in, ie: airborne/air mobile. I don't think that requires creating Canada's answer to the Royal Marines, I would prefer to see something more like the British Army's plot system, where battalions cycle through the role. So 1 PPCLI spends 3 years as a mech battalion, then shifts to take over the air mobile role from 3 RCR, while 2 RCR shifts to take over the amphibious (presuming such a role is desired) role from 3 R22R. This requires no new equipment, simply shifting the ownership over (minus the amphibious role which is probably the subject of a whole different thread). I'll also but this out there, if we're talking about a purely expeditionary role for these Battle Groups, why not have them fall directly under the command of CEFCOM rather then creating a new HQ?

edit: I would also suggest that one light infantry battle group be attached to CANCOM with an arctic / mountain warfare role, possibly having companies forward deployed to the north for sov ops.


----------



## downinOZ

Stymiest said:
			
		

> 1.  An 81mm Mortar Platoon manned by Artillery
> 2.  A Troop of Engineers
> 3.  Signals Platoon
> 4.  Logistics Platoon (manned by logistics)
> 5.  Maintenance and Repair platoon (EME)
> Each Battalion would look something like this:
> 
> Effectively giving us:
> 2xBtns of Air Assault Inf
> 1xBtn of Para
> 
> We would have in support
> 1xPl 81mm Mortar for each Battalion
> 1xTrp Engineer per Battalion w/1 Section qualified Para
> 1xPl Sig Per Battalion
> 1xPl Log Per Battalion
> 1xPl EME Per Battalion
> 1xPl Recce Per Battalion



The light infantry brigade has a few pieces added to support its viability.  First, two (and soon all three) Bns are geographically located together, with all support assets, including an AVN Bde, some naval elements, and an airbase co-located.  Although almost completely interoperable, the concept of the light Bde is to seize and hold for 72 hours.  One battalion focuses on airmobile planning and airmobile operations including airborne rappel.  Another bn focuses on amphibious and littoral operations.  The third bn focuses on airborne (paratroop) operations, including holding and securing key points.  In full scale offensive operations, the airborne battalion conducts a deep airborne insertion (or tactical land) and holds open an airfield  or air point of entry for follow on forces; the amphibious battalion clears and secures a beachhead or Sea point of entry, and the airmobile secures other key points.  All are reinforced or relieved by any of the other four mechanized/motorised bns able to deploy from either ship or C17.

Each of the light infantry units is tasked with specific planning.  However, except for airborne operations, OPS cells are expected to be able to conduct planning for all light infantry tasks, and are supported by planning LOs from the required elements; Navy for amphib ops, army aviation for airmobile ops, and airforce for tactical land ops.

I think that what makes this (a light infantry bde) a viable option for the Chiefs is the logistical support established for these tasks.  The three bns mirror each other, which helps with a lot of planning: similar orbat, similar manning, similar equipment, just different ways of getting there.  When the bde conducts a Bde task, ISR is pulled from all three Bns.  When mobility is required, a cav unit supplies a Bn lift of PMVs.  The engineer and Artillery regiments deploy squadrons and Batteries in support of each Bn combat team, and airforce attachments reinforce any deficiencies not filled by the artillery.

I watched closely when the Canadian Infantry  began its modernisation - pioneers, mortars being farmed out/cut out.  The light Battalions are based around combat teams.  It doesn't matter what size.  An excellent live fire exercise was recently conducted for platoon teams.  Platoon commanders had sniper support, recon to lead them into FUP, mortar and gun fire controllers for the section of 81 mm mortars and either the 50 cal (NOT very cool dismounted), mag58 in SF role, a section ( or so) of pioneers, a section of engineers, and a JFC (Joint fires controller) to drop bombs from a section of 105s.  The attack was done after the platoon commander or JFC called in a pair of F18s, and the platoon had reorganised.

Three weeks later, that exercise was replicated at the Bn level, with tanks and mechanized infantry.  It was shit.  What it really demonstrated was that light infantry are not successful when motorised or mechanized infantry can do the job.  Te logistical support and rate of movement just aren't comparable.  So my argument is that specialisation SHOULD occur.  Light infantry can get into APCs (if Mech ever got out), and mech could get out and conduct an airmobile op somewhere.  But As a planner, I'd rather have tailored forces that I could count on the staff to know the details to sort out, and the soldiers to have the TTPs already ingrained.

Geographically, the Bde is not currently all co-located.  Yes,the engineer regiment is tasked to provide a parachute capable element.  I'm sure that 1 CER can do that.  A Bty is dedicated to parachute operations; that capability is likely being reduced to JFCs only.  In admin company, armourers and mechanics are jump qual'd.  For those rare must-have skills, specialists can be tandem parachuted into a DZ.  A signals det from the Sig regt provides a higher link, and organic signallers provide comms for whoever can still walk.   I can't comment on whether pre-deployment training time is shorter for mech/motorised/light. 

In summary;
1.  All infantry are generalists, in that there are relatively few barriers for  being posted from one Bn to another;
2.  BDEs organised along light/med/heavy makes sense, as logistical and other support (training areas, exercise planning, equipment trials) take advantage of common requirements.
3.  Everyone else comes to the party to support a mobility type - mech engineers, paratrooper mechanics.
4.  Planning for mission types is conducted with the Bn's capability in mind; recognise the light infantry battalions come with significant organic capability, but their ability to conduct protracted missions in certain types of terrain are limited. In order to conduct the mission to an expected standard, they require either the previous experience ( gained perhaps via rotational system as per R031button) or with significant pre-deployment training.
5


----------



## vonGarvin

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I know that doctrine is a guide, but it's there for a reason.  And since Units are obliged to do certain things (eg: have xxx Infantry Companies, etc), having a "Zulu LAV" Squadron (?) may sound like a cool thing to do, there is no basis for it in doctrine or mandate for the battalions, who are mandated to train up to only level 4 (company).  Which begs the question: what BTS are they following?
> 
> Having said that, having only enough vehicles for 1/2 or less of your sub-units is right out to lunch as well; however, I fail to see how we can say "mission command" when they aren't even following the contraints from higher (eg: train up companies).


Having said all this; however, given that there aren't enough to go around, I suppose it makes sense to consolidate/concentrate the few precious LAVs in one company to maintain training on them, and allowing the rifle companies to focus on other infantry stuff.


----------



## Illegio

That, and the upcoming tasks for the companies (NEO, NTC, Northern Bison) do not require the normal complement of LAVs.


----------



## vonGarvin

Illegio said:
			
		

> That, and the upcoming tasks for the companies (NEO, NTC, Northern Bison) do not require the normal complement of LAVs.


Makes sense.


----------



## Jarnhamar

question.
How come on paper we're like, 1000+ over the limit in the infantry but when I talk to guys in the battalion they say they are short manned.  I remember augmented reservists (reserves LOL) acting as section 2ICs or even section commanders for a while during work up training and on tour.

Are we really thinking about new regiments and brigades?

I'm not sure where we are getting the manpower for this.


----------



## KevinB

The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).


----------



## dapaterson

KevinB said:
			
		

> The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).



Actually, the limit does account for 100% manning of the actual establishment, including ERE employment.  There are gaps at particular rank levels that may prevent that, plus some poor pers management practices that provide some with to many and others with not enough.

But the limit does include both hard and generic positions (indeed, for officers, at Major and above the number of "Any Trade" positions outnumbers the number of hard positions)


----------



## McG

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> How come on paper we're like, 1000+ over the limit in the infantry but when I talk to guys in the battalion they say they are short manned.  I remember augmented reservists (reserves LOL) acting as section 2ICs or even section commanders for a while during work up training and on tour.


The infantry are overmanned at the Pte/Cpl level.  I suspect there is simultaneously a deficiency at the Sgt/WO level.



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).


Not so.  PML does account for all the permanent positions that a given occupation is expected to fill.  What is not accounted for is the hundereds of temporary positions in Afghanistan and on many other international operations.


----------



## KevinB

Theory or Practice?

I would say the only time I have ever seen a unit manned to strength if for deployment.

In Calgary in 1PPCLI we had a M/Cpl as a PL WO, two other jacks as Sec Cdr's and a Cpl as a sect commander, with a 2LT as a PL Comd.


----------



## Jarnhamar

I'm inclined to agree with KevinB.

Any time I've worked in a battalion they seemed to be understrength. 

With reserve augmentation I've heard comments like "Cool this is the first time we've had a full platoon in a long time" but then again it may vary.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:
			
		

> Theory or Practice?


Practice.  For every establishment position of a given rank/MOS (and also every position of rank/Occ Gp that is managed by said MOS), the CF is authorized to have a person of that rank and occupation.



			
				Grimaldus said:
			
		

> I'm inclined to agree with KevinB.
> 
> Any time I've worked in a battalion they seemed to be understrength.
> 
> With reserve augmentation I've heard comments like "Cool this is the first time we've had a full platoon in a long time" but then again it may vary.


You have identified a symptom and blamed the wrong cause.  It is not that the CF is not authorized to hire/promote the personnel, it is that typically we have not recruited & retained enough personnel to fill all of our positions.  As a result, authorized positions go vacant somewhere.  Units will see these vacancies as (unless on road to high readiness) they are lower in the manning priority list.

Right now, we are overborne as a result of significant recruiting.  However, extra infantry privates (even to the tune of triple digits) cannot fill sergeant positions or EGS corporal positions - and these people cannot be converted overnight to fill such positions.  So, vacant positions still exist.  Other vacancies appear to exist (but do not in reality) because all of the personnel deployed on operations still fill a permanent establishment position somewhere in Canada.

In summary - people missing from an organization was incorrectly blamed on the CF not being authorized to have people for all of its positions.  The real problem is that many occupations and various rank levels are undermanned, the CF has soooo many extra infantry Cpls & Ptes that we are overmanned at the aggregate level, and NCOs and experienced officers cannot be produced overnight through the doors of the CFRCs.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> Right now, we are overborne as a result of significant recruiting.  However, extra infantry privates (even to the tune of triple *quadruple* digits) cannot fill sergeant positions or EGS corporal positions - and these people cannot be converted overnight to fill such positions.  So, vacant positions still exist.



Fixed that for you.


----------



## vonGarvin

A force-employment infantry battalion for force 2013 will be in excess of 900, all ranks.  A force-generation infantry battalion for force 2013 will be 599, all ranks.  There are holes in the ORBAT starting at the rifle-section level and on up, all left as "no fill authorised".  Those holes are designated to be filled by reservists.

So, having said that, and keeping in mind the philosophy of collective training at level 2 (section), and also remembering the philosophy to "train as you fight", how can an eight soldier infantry section properly train up to level 2?

So, in short, there *are* holes in our TO and E, and they are deliberate.


----------



## McG

Technoviking said:
			
		

> A force-employment infantry battalion for force 2013 will be in excess of 900, all ranks.  A force-generation infantry battalion for force 2013 will be 599, all ranks.  There are holes in the ORBAT starting at the rifle-section level and on up, all left as "no fill authorised".  Those holes are designated to be filled by reservists.


FE Bn or FE BG?
Either way, the holes intended for reservists on operations do not exist as positions (in fact the FE BG itself is only a theoretical model and does not exist unitl created for a mission).  The previous suggestion that "the limit" does not allow for 100% manning is still un-true.  The CF would need to be authorized for 110 % + manning in order to start filling vacancies where positions do not exist.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> So, having said that, and keeping in mind the philosophy of collective training at level 2 (section), and also remembering the philosophy to "train as you fight", how can an eight soldier infantry section properly train up to level 2?


Perhapse the solution is that we need to create all the positions that don't really exist as war-time-only, and then seek a steady-state authorization of 100% manning + 30% wartime (effectively, each bde would have the ability to form 1 x FE model BG + the remainder as FG model, and the Army would then have the capacity to run the first three rotations of any new mission before tapping into the PRes for the longer haul).  Most field units would live at the 100%+30% level, but CMs Inf Bns could vary from 100%+0% to 100%+100% or 100%+30% depending on if the Bde was currently force generating or not, and if the Bn itself was next on the R2HR or not.


----------



## Kirkhill

It sounds like you're starting to get close to Infanteer's suggestion of a Platoon Command being a huggle-muggle assemblage of fire teams (7 to 10 Fire Teams per Platoon) with command being conducted by whatever number of MCpls and Sgts that the CF can spare.

Note I didn't include WOs.  I figure if you can't find MCpls for sections your probably not going to be able to find a WO to hold a 2Lt's hand.  Pl 2ics, I'm guessing, are going to be Sgts once again.


----------



## vonGarvin

I have an even more radical idea:
Man our sections, platoons and companies up to 100% strength, so that they can train up to level 4 (sub-unit) irrespective of where they fit within the Managed Readiness Plan.

Yes, I realise that this would mean only 18 rifle companies in the army; however, we don't send that many out the door, and anyone who is foolish enough to even suggest that we have 27 rifle companies now is kidding themselves.


"Train as you fight", so, "equip as you fight" as well.  

So, assume we have 6 companies deployed at any given time.  There are six "over there", six ramping up into high readiness, and six more in "reconstitution".  But what does that mean?
The six "over there" are on operations, doing what they get paid to do.
The six "ramping up" are conducting "road to high readiness" training, which means collective training at level 5 and up.  
The six "reconstituting" are preparing to hit that road to high readiness, after they do reorganisation, etc.  So this means career courses for progression, postings in and out, and more importantly, towards the end of that cycle, doing levels 1-4 training according to the BTS.

For this to work, you will need to have tours of nine-ish months.

And don't  think that you go for nine, return for eighteen, go for nine, ad nauseum.  For some, it may be like that for a cycle or so, but let us not forget that there are postings outside of the field force.  (Schools, training centres, area HQs, ASG HQs, etc).

If thought and effort went into the planning of the army collective training, then this would work.

As for no WOs, etc, that is a pers management problem that has to be solved,but not by reorganising.  Because if Sgts are going to be Pl 2ICs by design, then we have to train them as such.


----------



## KevinB

Realistically for a Pl - at least 1 of the SGT's needs to be 6B (whatever) to fill the WO jobs while he is either A/PL Comd, or on HTLA himself, and several of the Cpl's need to be ISCC (whatever) to fill both combat loss, and HLTA positions.


----------



## ArmyRick

My opinion, as an infantry WO. Having a 3B (new 6B) qualified SGT would be nice in addition to the WO but not likely to happen.

For what a PL 2IC does, I personally feel most Section commanders with at least a years expirience in the job would have little difficulty adjusting to filling in as PL 2IC. There would/most likely be learning on the fly but most infantry SGT I know could adapt quickly.

Now stepping up as PL Comd is a different story especially if you start talking deliberate ops that require more thought put inot the estimate.


----------



## vonGarvin

Though that is true in practice, I feel that any HLTA be scrapped.  It is an unnecessary drain on our resources, personnel and in essence, our entire logistical strain.  And we ought to designate a Replacement Holding Unit for combat losses, as is our doctrine.


In other words, we ought to practice what we preach.


----------



## vonGarvin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> My opinion, as an infantry WO. Having a 3B (new 6B) qualified SGT would be nice in addition to the WO but not likely to happen.
> 
> For what a PL 2IC does, I personally feel most Section commanders with at least a years expirience in the job would have little difficulty adjusting to filling in as PL 2IC. There would/most likely be learning on the fly but most infantry SGT I know could adapt quickly.
> 
> Now stepping up as PL Comd is a different story especially if you start talking deliberate ops that require more thought put inot the estimate.


Given that there are four sgts in a platoon, and given that one of those sergeants (LAV Sgt/Wpns Sect Comd) is a former Sect Comd, and therefore senior, etc, that's the dude who could step up in the immediate short term (eg: during the battle after the Pl Comd inspires his troops by dying gloriously ;D).  Having said that, one of my most effective Pl 2ICs (when I was a rifle platoon commander) was a MCpl.  I have great faith in our troops at all levels to "step up" as required; however, we owe it to them to give them the proper training for the proper job.


----------



## dapaterson

Of course, 18 companies pre-supposes 9 Bns.  Would 8 Bns of 2 coys, each with a mortar pl, come out to around the same PY bill, but give the Bns some much-needed integral indirect fire support?  Eight Bns provides two lines of six-month taskings over two years.


(The cap-badge issue could be resolved by rebadging two Reg F Bns to Black Watch)


----------



## ArmyRick

battalions with 2 x Coys for Ops is insufficient IMO. It doesn't give the CO any depth at all. It may suffice for a low intensity dom op or a humanitarian op but not one with combat or potential for combat.  If you have one coy back in rear reconsituting, that leaves one maneuver unit out in the AOR. Not to mention with 2 x coy, you really spread the troops thin over the AOR.

It not just indirect fire support that we need to operate (81mm and 155mm) but we also need engineers and armour (tanks and recce). 

Depending on future threats (armed UAV purchased by the enemy?) we may find assets like air defence more in demand again.

If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).


----------



## dapaterson

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).



Question:  Would it be better to have 4 coys of 3 pls, or three coys of four pls?  Twelve platoons either way, just with a different foot print  (and, if the TechnoViking doesn't become CDS, you can pull a platoon complete from the line for HLTA and still have a viable company).


----------



## ArmyRick

4 x platoons gives OC more platoons to fight with but it also increases coy supply requirements (Rats, water, ammo, POL) by 20-25%. 3 x Platoons is very manageable and it still leaves some depth to operations.

I would lean more towards 3 x platoons. Another option is having that fourth platoon but they man all the LAVs for the Coy (LAV SGTs would then be Sect comd within that LAV platoon and the LAV Captain would be the commander). But at that point we are re-inventing a wheel. 

IMO, 3 x platoons (properly manned) is good to go as a standing ORBAT. Specific mission requirements in the future may dictate we need a fourth platoon but we will cross that bridge at that time.


----------



## vonGarvin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> battalions with 2 x Coys for Ops is insufficient IMO. It doesn't give the CO any depth at all. It may suffice for a low intensity dom op or a humanitarian op but not one with combat or potential for combat.  If you have one coy back in rear reconsituting, that leaves one maneuver unit out in the AOR. Not to mention with 2 x coy, you really spread the troops thin over the AOR.
> 
> It not just indirect fire support that we need to operate (81mm and 155mm) but we also need engineers and armour (tanks and recce).
> 
> Depending on future threats (armed UAV purchased by the enemy?) we may find assets like air defence more in demand again.
> 
> If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).


You're thinking of a force generation battalion, not a deployed battlegroup.
With the assumption of six companies, they could be in two battle groups, a battle group and an OMLT, PRT, whatever.  With 6 rifle coys per brigade, that's still 3 x Bn HQs, 3 x Sp Coys, 3 x Admin Coys, etc.

(Naturally the Armd Regiments can also stand up BG HQs, etc)

This is based on the force employment concept, in which BGs are stood up, and sub units are attached to them for operations.  If we stick to tasking Brigades to take rotations, then this is manageable.


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Of course, 18 companies pre-supposes 9 Bns.  Would 8 Bns of 2 coys, each with a mortar pl, come out to around the same PY bill, but give the Bns some much-needed integral indirect fire support?  Eight Bns provides two lines of six-month taskings over two years.
> 
> 
> (The cap-badge issue could be resolved by rebadging two Reg F Bns to Black Watch)


Actually, we could stand up a smallish mortar and pioneer platoon in each of the 9 support platoons with the same PY bill.  THis is from the savings in going from 27 companies at 80-ish% to 18 companies at 100%


----------



## Kirkhill

Wouldn't the 4th platoon be the support platoon?  Mors, Pnrs, DFS (CASW, AT) and Vehicles?


----------



## vonGarvin

Don't even ask me about the AGLS.  No idea how that thing could be effectively used....


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Don't even ask me about the AGLS.  No idea how that thing could be effectively used....



The Gen II AGLS ? 

But not to create a tangent.... Regardless of the DFS systems (C6/C9/HMG/40mm/Eryx/Javelin/TOW) wouldn't a DFS element be part of the Support Platoon?

Then you get a complete, deployable, Combat Team.

Edit: Remove a double link


----------



## a_majoor

Slight backtrack, but "Square" organizations of 4 platoons went out of fashion in and around World War One because they were awkward to handle.

The very short and dirty explanation was you basically left 50% of your force out of battle if you were "two up", but only had 25% in reserve if you went "three up". The 3 platoon system provided more balance (you could go one up and have 66% of your force in reserve, or two up and have 33% in reserve). While there were many more factors in play, (especially the introduction of automatic weapons at lower and lower levels), the square organization was essentially dead.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Slight backtrack, but "Square" organizations of 4 platoons went out of fashion in and around World War One because they were awkward to handle.
> 
> The very short and dirty explanation was you basically left 50% of your force out of battle if you were "two up", but only had 25% in reserve if you went "three up". The 3 platoon system provided more balance (you could go one up and have 66% of your force in reserve, or two up and have 33% in reserve). While there were many more factors in play, (especially the introduction of automatic weapons at lower and lower levels), the square organization was essentially dead.



Not in armoured formations it isn't. And of course the infantry still has the 4 man patrol  ;D


----------



## KevinB

Why not go back to a real Cbt Spt Coy (Recce, Mortars, Pioneers, AAP, Sniper Cell/Section/Pl [can't be in recce anymore, and now I am told has an officer :] )

3 Real Inf Coy's
1 Real Cbt Spt Coy (hey you can Americanize it and call it HHC and then look progressive and lead chnage in your PER)
1 Admin Coy


We've totally drifted off the Ranger Bat or CAR model though.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:
			
		

> 3 Real Inf Coy's
> 1 Real Cbt Spt Coy (hey you can Americanize it and call it HHC and then look progressive and lead chnage in your PER)
> 1 Admin Coy


Can't do that.  For most of the remainder of the Army, the sub-unit named "headquarters" is more analogous to the Infantry's Admin Coy.  You will just have to keep the old title of Cbt Sp Coy.   :nod:


----------



## UnwiseCritic

There is a movement (at least out west) to bring back the airborne capability. They are able to run their own jump courses now and thus have more qualified jumpers in the battlions. To support them properly maybe we should put together a full time pathfinder capability as opposed to taking people from each platoon and quickly putting together an unqualified "pathfinder" section. Fine for exercise but not so good for real time operations. 

There are very few qualified pathfinders currently in the jump bn (out west). And they are lost in those bn's never performing their duties or working together.

So the benefits of a proposed pathfinder capability would be:

Sharper Pathfinders
    -Allowing soldiers to work together that operate at the same level will develop their skills and allow for more growth in their field. As well as the skills won't deteirorate over time.

Chemistry
   - If they are able to always work together they will have a greater understanding of eachothers strengths and weaknesses. They will be able to make sounder decisions if they "know" what the other guy is going to do. (Much like a powerplay line)

No Stealing of nco's from platoons
  - There would be no more last minute taking of leadership in the platoons,to put together a pf platoon. This allow that platoon to operate more efficiently.

Problems associated with setting up a pathfinder pl/sect.

Strain
  -There would be more strain to on individual companies to provide capable people to serve in that role. As recruitment for other units tends take these motivated people.

Budget
   -Finding money for a "new" full time pathfinder capable unit would be difficult given the new projected budget. 

Solution
Given that Afghanistan is winding down and regiments are not constantly going to be rotated overseas there is more room for different kinds of training. As opposed to the constant rotation of pre deployment and supporting pre-deployment training. This would also open up the budget slightly more. But strain on individual units to provide these people would remain.

And or we could base it more off the british in that we could accept applications from the entire army. And set up a permanent platoon in Trenton (eg). This would not put the stress on battalions to maintain the skills of these soldiers on them. However that would put greater strain on the budget as our country is much larger than England so for the pathfinder unit to support an ex out west would be slightly more expensive. As well as the infrastructure if it is not already in place.

But it's just an idea.


----------



## Jarnhamar

The new budget has seen a number of standard courses already shit canned. More pathfinder serials doesn't seem likely.

What about having a dedicated pathfinder section in either sniper or recce platoon?


----------



## UnwiseCritic

I think that they do that out east. At least in theory they do. Not sure if it's practiced or not.
Sniper platoon is in my opinion probably not the best spot as they have skills of there own to maintain.

As long as there is place for them to feed off of eachother, I think that's all that matters.


----------



## chowchow1

You mention you are infantry, and out west. I am quite certain from your post that you sure arent in 3 VP.

1: There is no jump battalion, it is a jump company. Recce has a jump det, and most snipers are static square / MFP qualified.

2: We have a number of PPF qualified members, and there is another serial getting ready to go. 

3: A movement to bring back the airborne capability? When did it leave? I have been in para coy since 2008, and have seen no shortage of numbers. In the company right now we have a full compliment of jumpers, and lots of pers in A coy ready to take the spot of anyone who leaves. We regularly do airborne exercises, so the capability is there and has not, and will not gone anywhere.

4: There is no such thing as sniper platoon. It is a detachment. 

5: If there was to be a PPF section, it would be in recce, where it belongs.

6: Where did you get your information from? Because it is not correct.


----------



## Jarnhamar

chowchow1 said:
			
		

> 4: There is no such thing as sniper platoon. It is a detachment.


We have a sniper platoon on our orbat.


----------



## UnwiseCritic

My bad I meant det.

1. 3vp has 1 coy dedicated to jump, another coy almost completely qualified, and yet another coy at least 1/3 qualified. And that was before the serials ran when I left. Not to mention the medics, engineers and arty guys attacthed at that time. And the goal was to have an entire jump bn.

2. I only knew two ( I know there is more) of which never put their skills to use. Its good that they are running more.

3. If you consider "capable" jumping 1 coy in on three passes. We have a different definition of capable. Perhaps I should have used the word relevant.

4. See above

5. My point exactly, put them together where they can work with eachother and use their skills. 

6. What part is incorrect?


----------



## chowchow1

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> We have a sniper platoon on our orbat.



You have 30 qualified snipers in your unit, in a sniper position? Sounds a bit heavy to me.


----------



## chowchow1

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> My bad I meant det.
> 
> 1. 3vp has 1 coy dedicated to jump, another coy almost completely qualified, and yet another coy at least 1/3 qualified. And that was before the serials ran when I left. Not to mention the medics, engineers and arty guys attacthed at that time. And the goal was to have an entire jump bn.
> 
> 2. I only knew two ( I know there is more) of which never put their skills to use. Its good that they are running more.
> 
> 3. If you consider "capable" jumping 1 coy in on three passes. We have a different definition of capable. Perhaps I should have used the word relevant.
> 
> 4. See above
> 
> 5. My point exactly, put them together where they can work with eachother and use their skills.
> 
> 6. What part is incorrect?



1: As I mentioned, you obviously arent in 3VP. We havent had 3 rifle companies for months. I taught on the last course, so when it comes to this stuff I am pretty up to date. Interesting you mention all the people attached to us at the time, because that is news to me. A medic, yes, but not the others.

2: Since your numbers are wrong about everything else, I dont expect you to know how many pathfinders there are in 3 VP.

3: Our formations depend on aircraft, not on jump qualified personnel.

6: See all of my above corrections to your lack of information. If you were in 3VP, it is obvious it wasnt for long. I am guessing you did 3 years, got out, and are now an expert.


----------



## Jungle

chowchow1 said:
			
		

> You have 30 qualified snipers in your unit, in a sniper position? Sounds a bit heavy to me.



Sniper Platoon has 18 positions, and is commanded by a WO, the Unit Master Sniper.


----------



## Jarnhamar

chowchow1 said:
			
		

> You have 30 qualified snipers in your unit, in a sniper position? Sounds a bit heavy to me.



That would be if that's how many snipers were in a sniper platoon.


**Jungle beat me to it.


----------



## UnwiseCritic

I know there are only two companies right now. And I know more people are about to leave. Retention is horrible but that's for another thread.

Even if we could always get aircraft we still weren't able to make a jump that could seize (and hold) an airfield or bridge. 

No I don't know how many pathfinders there are. But that doesn't change the fact they should be put together and have a dedicated pf sect.

Never claim to be an expert. The main point I am trying to get across is wouldn't it be a good idea to put them altogether? Either by bn or as a platoon somewhere.


----------



## Jarnhamar

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> I know there are only two companies right now. And I know more people are about to leave. Retention is horrible but that's for another thread.
> 
> Even if we could always get aircraft we still weren't able to make a jump that could seize (and hold) an airfield or bridge.
> 
> No I don't know how many pathfinders there are. But that doesn't change the fact they should be put together and have a dedicated pf sect.
> 
> Never claim to be an expert. The main point I am trying to get across is wouldn't it be a good idea to put them altogether? Either by bn or as a platoon somewhere.



Sounds like it would be more viable to have an airmobile/air assault company instead of a jump company.


----------



## UnwiseCritic

I think they have recently been working on that capability. Chow might be able to clarify.

Future reference for people on these forums. Don't play like a politician and try to discredit the person instead of discrediting the idea. It seems to happen on most of these threads. Even stupid people will have a good idea from time to time.

Not saying mine is a good idea or not.


----------



## McG

The Engr Para Sect in 1 CER has been asking similar questions about its own sustainability.  When you consider individual tasks and career courses, how many guys need to be in the FG base so that a functional organization is available for collective training?  Is that size sufficient to ensure availability of pers for potential FE?

Before addressing either the engr or the pathfinder question, the first answer one needs is what the Army really wants in a parachute capability.  If we are serious about having such an ability, should it maybe be concentrated in a single location as opposed to being spread about the country in different sub units, sub-sub-sub units, and individuals?


----------



## UnwiseCritic

There we go those are the right questions. Alas I don't think I am qualified to answer those questions.


----------



## IRepoCans

MCG said:
			
		

> The Engr Para Sect in 1 CER has been asking similar questions about its own sustainability.  When you consider individual tasks and career courses, how many guys need to be in the FG base so that a functional organization is available for collective training?  Is that size sufficient to ensure availability of pers for potential FE?
> 
> Before addressing either the engr or the pathfinder question, the first answer one needs is what the Army really wants in a parachute capability.  If we are serious about having such an ability, should it maybe be concentrated in a single location as opposed to being spread about the country in different sub units, sub-sub-sub units, and individuals?



Now I'm just going off a whim here and I don't think I'm qualified to make a statement but it seems your suggesting something similar to the British Army's 16th Air Assault Brigade. 16th AAB holds three of the four parachute battalions, and the air assault elements from other regiments/battalions, whilst 1st Para is under UKSF-SG.


----------



## McG

I was thinking more of a Canadian model that was developed in the '60s.


----------



## cupper

MCG said:
			
		

> efore addressing either the engr or the pathfinder question, the first answer one needs is what the Army really wants in a parachute capability.  If we are serious about having such an ability, should it maybe be concentrated in a single location as opposed to being spread about the country in different sub units, sub-sub-sub units, and individuals?



So we need to look at what capabilities we want in our land forces, and if the answer includes some form of cohesive airborne capability is included, how do we want that capability to look like.

If that is so, do we want to look at standing up the Airborne Regiment again? Or create a new unit where the members are dedicated specifically to taht unit and not posted in and our on a rotational basis from other units? Or do we go with the current model where sub-units within each regiment are tasked as airborne capable?


----------



## McG

If it is "Airborne Regiment" or "Parachute Battalion" is really just cosmetic distinction.  The capability requirement and derived structure are what need to be determined.

… and if the requirement is found not to exist, then why are we investing in the current system?


----------



## IRepoCans

MCG said:
			
		

> I was thinking more of a Canadian model that was developed in the '60s.



Care to elaborate?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

MCG said:
			
		

> I was thinking more of a Canadian model that was developed in the '60s.





			
				IRepoCans said:
			
		

> Care to elaborate?



CAR


----------



## UnwiseCritic

"and if the requirement is found not to exist, then why are we investing in the current system?"

My sentiment exactly. It's time to start asking the hard questions. And stop just accepting what is or was and look at the future on the CF as a whole. With the para question as one of the few. 

If were going to do something we should do it right and not half-@$$ it.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> If were going to do something we should do it right and not half-@$$ it.



Well that is not the Canadian way.....  ;D


----------



## Jarnhamar

I don't think we have enough people in the infantry to draw upon for a sustainable parachute battalion.  

The capability could be given solely to CSOR.


----------



## PuckChaser

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> I don't think we have enough people in the infantry to draw upon for a sustainable parachute battalion.
> 
> The capability could be given solely to CSOR.



Absolutely makes sense given its proximity to Trenton and the Chinook Sqn.


----------



## McG

This brings us to an often repeated topic here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22233.0.html


----------



## brihard

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> Future reference for people on these forums. Don't play like a politician and try to discredit the person instead of discrediting the idea. It seems to happen on most of these threads. Even stupid people will have a good idea from time to time.



Or, alternatively, don't make pronouncements outside your arcs and way above your pay grade when you then immediately evidence a lack of necessary knowledge about the organizations you're speaking of to qualify your opinion. People are not 'attacking' you, they're saying that you obviously lack knowledge on certain matters. There's a distinction.


----------



## UnwiseCritic

I don't feel 'attacked'  and yes my having little experience may not qualify my opinion or should I say idea. But does that really matter? I see that as addressing me instead of the proposed idea. Which to me shows lack of intelligence or general laziness to really get into the nitty-gritty of the idea.

As for comments being outside of the pay grade. It happens all the time. Almost every time in an aar. Lots of times it's for the better. And when someone does have a bad comment/opinion etc they are never told "hey that's above your pay grade". They explain why and address the opinion. Unless the person running the aar are lacking in the brains department.


----------



## brihard

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> I don't feel 'attacked'  and yes my having little experience may not qualify my opinion or should I say idea. But does that really matter? I see that as addressing me instead of the proposed idea. Which to me shows lack of intelligence or general laziness to really get into the nitty-gritty of the idea.
> 
> As for comments being outside of the pay grade. It happens all the time. Almost every time in an aar. Lots of times it's for the better. And when someone does have a bad comment/opinion etc they are never told "hey that's above your pay grade". They explain why and address the opinion. Unless the person running the aar are lacking in the brains department.



I was not addressing the ideas, however- rather I (and others previously) take issue with you making normative statements that are patently incorrect, and which underlie the rest of what you're saying.

The lesson you need to learn here is not to wind your neck in and only talk about things at a Pte level, because that's not what we expect and few of us find anything wrong with talking about '(much) bigger picture'- but when you want to talk about how battalions are configured, the onus is on you to do your research, because you won't be coddled when it becomes evident that you haven't acknowledged your own limited set of knowledge and expanded it accordingly in preparation for the things you're going to create a post about.


----------



## McG

Take it to PMs


----------



## Infanteer

The Australian Army, having divested their para capbility to the SOF, are asking the same questions in the latest volume of the Australian Army Journal.


----------



## brihard

MCG said:
			
		

> Take it to PMs



Fair enough; I'm done.


----------



## ArmyRick

Personally, I think getting all ramped up about a parachute capability at battalion level is not worth it. I agree that parachuting (in all its forms) is probably best left to special operations in this day and age. 

I think a more realistic marine capability with amphibious, helicopter and mountain capabilities is a better investment. Absolutely having diver and free fall qualified pathfinder element would be a nice but given fiscal restraints we are facing, its all a pipe dream.

My bottom line, there is higher priorities than developing the battalion parachute capability.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Personally, I think getting all ramped up about a parachute capability at battalion level is not worth it. I agree that parachuting (in all its forms) is probably best left to special operations in this day and age.
> 
> I think a more realistic marine capability with amphibious, helicopter and mountain capabilities is a better investment. Absolutely having diver and free fall qualified pathfinder element would be a nice but given fiscal restraints we are facing, its all a pipe dream.
> 
> My bottom line, there is higher priorities than developing the battalion parachute capability.



The main reason that militaries from countries like Britain and France have a parachute capable force is for 'Out of NATO Area' operations. This is a euphemism for 'golly bashing in our old colonies and other areas of economic/political interest'. Even then, they fight continuously to maintain the capability, which is very 'admin heavy' and challenging to practise effectively given the joint forces - at the highest levels - approach required for success.

Having said that, it's obviously a useful skill to maintain for a variety of reasons. Ramping up for an airborne exercise really isn't that hard given that all the component parts are trained to do their jobs. I've always thought that we could practise some sort of simple cycle whereby we do a BGp/Bde level airborne/airmobile ex every other year, and focus on indivdual skills development in between. A good scenario might be some kind of NEO Op, which other airborne units around the world also train for. We've got such an excellent infrastrucutre in Canada for practising these kinds of ops we might even set ourselves up as the 'Airborne/Mobile NEO Op Training Ground for the Free World', and host the equivalent of a Boy Scout Jamboree evey couple of years, or something like that. 

It would be a nice niche skill to be known for.


----------



## fake penguin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 4 x platoons gives OC more platoons to fight with but it also increases coy supply requirements (Rats, water, ammo, POL) by 20-25%. 3 x Platoons is very manageable and it still leaves some depth to operations.
> 
> I would lean more towards 3 x platoons. Another option is having that fourth platoon but they man all the LAVs for the Coy (LAV SGTs would then be Sect comd within that LAV platoon and the LAV Captain would be the commander). But at that point we are re-inventing a wheel.
> 
> IMO, 3 x platoons (properly manned) is good to go as a standing ORBAT. Specific mission requirements in the future may dictate we need a fourth platoon but we will cross that bridge at that time.



I know this is an old quote but i feel like addressing it. Not sure if you know but Canada already used a four platoon company in Afghanistan. Don't know how both OC's handled the extra platoon, but it was done.


----------



## Armymedic

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Personally, I think getting all ramped up about a parachute capability at battalion level is not worth it. I agree that parachuting (in all its forms) is probably best left to special operations in this day and age.
> 
> ......
> 
> My bottom line, there is higher priorities than developing the battalion parachute capability.



I agree completely with this entire post.

My point to add is; while it may be desirables for the Army to develop a parachute capable battalion, the RCAF lacks the number airframes to deliver it effectively.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Rider Pride said:
			
		

> I agree completely with this entire post.
> 
> My point to add is; while it may be desirables for the Army to develop a parachute capable battalion, the RCAF lacks the number airframes to deliver it effectively.



Also, a parachute capability is really only useful if you have the supporting arms able to back it up.  Seeing as how we have no airborne engineers (a platoon of engineers with their jump wings does not qualify) or any airborne artillery (again a few gunner's with jump wings does not qualify) the skill is rather useless as we cannot even realistically seize an airhead.  

People may point to the recent example of the French dropping a reinforced company group in Mali but what they also will fail to realize is the French also dropped bulldozers, heavy equipment and an assortment of other goodies with them to make the operation possible.  They also have an airborne brigade with the supporting arms capability to back up their efforts.  Even they are struggling with airframes as the A-400M is only just beginning to be delivered (they have ordered 50).

Photos posted below of French Airborne Engineers jumping as well as 2 REP 







Airborne Engineers jump on Timbuktu airfield






Some heavy equipment they brought with them






More heavy equipment






French Foreign Legion loading up for their jump






The jump


----------



## ArmyRick

Fake penguin, 

I am aware that some of the BG for A-stan re-organized into 4 x platoon companies. It is not our doctrine though, that was a commander who felt the best COA available to him was a fourth platoon. Re-organizing for a mission/operation is different than having a standard organization.

3 or 4 rifle platoons in a company, both options have good and not so good points. 

As for the airborne capability, very good point, if we don't have an aircraft capability to deliver 600 man battalion in one drop, maybe we need to really look at what parachuting means to our operations. 

I still do see parachute as a SOF method of insertion and recce elements (like pathfinders) who may need to free fall into enemy lines (or areas not occupied by coalition forces).


----------



## fake penguin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Fake penguin,
> 
> I am aware that some of the BG for A-stan re-organized into 4 x platoon companies. It is not our doctrine though, that was a commander who felt the best COA available to him was a fourth platoon. Re-organizing for a mission/operation is different than having a standard organization.
> 
> 3 or 4 rifle platoons in a company, both options have good and not so good points.
> 
> As for the airborne capability, very good point, if we don't have an aircraft capability to deliver 600 man battalion in one drop, maybe we need to really look at what parachuting means to our operations.
> 
> OK I understand were your coming from now, your right re-organizing for a mission/operation is different than having a standard organization.
> 
> I still do see parachute as a SOF method of insertion and recce elements (like pathfinders) who may need to free fall into enemy lines (or areas not occupied by coalition forces).


----------



## fake penguin

ArmyRick I understand were your coming from now, your right  re-organizing for a mission/operation is different than having a standard organization.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

If you are going to have 4 platoons in a company you may as well just have 4 companies.  Doctrinally, we are supposed to have four companies anyways.  this is all irrelevant though because we don't have the pers to properly staff three rifle companies much less a fourth one.  Airborne forces still have their uses its just we have no use for them in Canada outside SOF.

I like the way the French use their Airborne forces.  They are jumpers but they are also expeditionary focused and rapidly deployable, not only in a jump capacity.    Something that we would use CSOR for is what they use their Airborne forces for.  For instance, they just seized the Bangui Airport in Central African Republic yesterday using pre-positioned Airborne forces from 8e RPIMa in Gabon because of a Coup D'Etat in the CAR.  

"France Sends Troops to Central African Republic"

http://www.dw.de/france-sends-troops-to-central-african-republic/a-16695739


----------



## KevinB

For a strict defense of Canada aspect, I disagree on a SOF only application.

Nothing quicker to get folks to the arctic than dropping them.


However I will agree that I think beyond that, airborne means of deployment is not really useful for conventional operations in the size that Canada can/will afford to do.

A Jump Coy can be dropped to secure a airfield in support of a NEO or other tasking, which I think is a waste of SOF assets - but unless Canada makes a large investment in air-frames - the use of non SOF jump capabilities in Canada will remain limited and thus not utilized.


----------



## McG

No.  We will never have a FE Airborne BG in the foreseeable future.  However, a FG Airborne Bn would allow the Army to concentrate resources in one location to create reinforced Coy Gps for FE.  With concentration of effort, fewer people would be required as depth simply to sustain the capability for use in a FG environment - instead the Army could build the missing enablers (like engr eqpt).  And there is no need for new units.  Use an existing 3rd Bn.

The hurdle would be capbadge politics as only one of the brigades would get to play home to this capability.  That would mean two regiments lose maroon berets.


----------



## KevinB

1 Can Para BN new capbadge (I don't think anyone has the political will to bring back the CAR in name as well).

Strip the 3rd's of their Para coy's and move them (PCoy) to Petwawa -- move all the Royals to Gagetown


----------



## Armymedic

KevinB said:
			
		

> 1 Can Para BN new capbadge (I don't think anyone has the political will to bring back the CAR in name as well).
> 
> Strip the 3rd's of their Para coy's and move them (PCoy) to Petwawa -- move all the Royals to Gagetown



Not a bad idea.


----------



## KevinB

The then Para Bn would be free to use A/C from Trenton, and support SOF operations for NEO and other roles, as well as conventional requirements.

This idea got tossed about in 2005 shortly after the CAR disbandment - and I think is lingering in a few minds, as the P Coy's by themselves are just a method of retaining capability - not really employable on their own.


----------



## daftandbarmy

There's no capbadge on a paratrooper's helmet.... just a little puke inside it (dribbling down his face just before the green light comes on)  ;D


----------



## little jim

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Also, a parachute capability is really only useful if you have the supporting arms able to back it up.



I think this is the crux of the Canadian issue.  It is easy to train dudes to jump out of an airplane in order to get to work.  Its the support that we lack and where the details lie.

Unless Canada has a defined requirement to have an Parachute capabiltiy in the conventional army then there is no point to developing the specialist capability in the supporting arms or the RCAF.

The former CDS did back-peddle a bit when he commited to a parachute capable bn in Trenton - he later revised he statement to have a SAR bent for operations in the North.

A former RSM once told the assembled officers of 3VP that it would be a huge mistake for the Army to get rid of the jump companies (and sprinkling of berets in the support arms).  His logic was that it gave troops something to strive towards.  Without a requirement this is probably the only current reason to continue with the PPF course based on fiscal limitations.

In my opinion it is essential that we keep the current jump companies spread out amongst the brigades; based on that soldiers want something to strive for but frequently the 'better half' gets a vote when it comes to living in Edmonton or Petawawa.  If we start specializing too much we become a bit more american; I cringe if we end up in a situation where 1 CMBG becomes the heavy brigade and 2 CMBG the light brigade - what will that do for the morale across the Army?  Or do we make 2 CMBG home of all the 3rd battalions and start spreading the love around to 1 and 5 (SLT could be an issue).

Sorry for the ramble.  Situation no change I guess.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

little jim said:
			
		

> I think this is the crux of the Canadian issue.  It is easy to train dudes to jump out of an airplane in order to get to work.  Its the support that we lack and where the details lie.
> 
> Unless Canada has a defined requirement to have an Parachute capabiltiy in the conventional army then there is no point to developing the specialist capability in the supporting arms or the RCAF.
> 
> The former CDS did back-peddle a bit when he commited to a parachute capable bn in Trenton - he later revised he statement to have a SAR bent for operations in the North.
> 
> A former RSM once told the assembled officers of 3VP that it would be a huge mistake for the Army to get rid of the jump companies (and sprinkling of berets in the support arms).  His logic was that it gave troops something to strive towards.  Without a requirement this is probably the only current reason to continue with the PPF course based on fiscal limitations.
> 
> In my opinion it is essential that we keep the current jump companies spread out amongst the brigades; based on that soldiers want something to strive for but frequently the 'better half' gets a vote when it comes to living in Edmonton or Petawawa.  If we start specializing too much we become a bit more american; I cringe if we end up in a situation where 1 CMBG becomes the heavy brigade and 2 CMBG the light brigade - what will that do for the morale across the Army?  Or do we make 2 CMBG home of all the 3rd battalions and start spreading the love around to 1 and 5 (SLT could be an issue).
> 
> Sorry for the ramble.  Situation no change I guess.



I think the idea that soldiers need something to strive for is a weak argument for maintaining a jump capability.  It is an argument that is based purely on emotion and nostalgia and not on operational necessity and doctrine.  

As for specialization, I really don't see a problem with it as long as it serves a specific purpose.  I see your reference to the Americans and how you do not want to become like them little jim.  I hesitate to compare us to the American's like so many because we are so much smaller then they are.  fact is we are kind of an anamoly in that we are one of the few armies that don't specialize our forces.  Compare us to lets say France, the UK, Italy, Spain, Australia, the Dutch, Germany, etc... and all of these nations specialize their forces.  More interesting is the Dutch and the Australians who both are very similar to us yet they maintain specialist capabilities within their armed forces.

The Australians for instance have 1 Heavy Bde, 1 Medium Bde and 1 Light Bde.  Within their Light Bde they maintain an amphibious assault Bn, a parachute Bn (which they are considering doing away with) and a light infantry Bn.  This means they can force generate airborne and amphibious task forces because in some cases deploying a mechanized force might not be suitable, especially if it is an initial entry force.  It is also an acknowledgement by them that they don't have the proper amount of vehicles to fully equip three brigades which is something that we can also not do. 

The Dutch also maintain a light force with their 11th Air-mobile Bde and they can be deployed within 7 to 20 days of being called out not too mention the Dutch also maintain the Dutch Marine Corps which is also rapidly deployable.  

Now does Canada need these specialized forces?  Maybe not because we aren't a regional power like Australia is and we don't have former colonial interests like the Dutch do but I would ask a question of are we getting the most bang for our buck?  A lot of things we use CSOR for other countries will use Airborne or Amphibious forces for.  On top of this we have three infantry battalions full of guys that costa substantial amount of money in salaries and training but really don't offer a whole lot in terms of power projection to the army.  So really the whole point of determining whether we need to specialize our force or continue maintain what we refer to as a "general purpose combat capability" should hinge on:

1.  Do we offer the government enough solutions; and
2.  Are we being fiscally responsible with our force structure or is their a better way to achieve economy of effort and optimize our forces to achieve more bang for our buck?


----------



## McG

:ditto:



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> 1 Can Para BN new capbadge (I don't think anyone has the political will to bring back the CAR in name as well).
> 
> Strip the 3rd's of their Para coy's and move them (PCoy) to Petwawa -- move all the Royals to Gagetown


I doubt there is appetite to create a new Bn.  Unless your plan is that the third Bns cease to exist, I see this as a non-starter.


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> a parachute Bn (which they are considering doing away with)



They already have.  See the article I linked to above.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:
			
		

> They already have.  See the article I linked to above.



Ack, just had a look, so they are doing away with Airborne IOT focus on amphibious ops.  Makes sense from an Australian standpoint I suppose especially since they have made substantial investments in developing an amphibious capability.


----------



## Jungle

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Airborne Engineers jump on Timbuktu airfield



I'm surprised they have equipment loads at higher altitude then jumpers...

I hear the Army may have new plans for the LIBs (again), including the PPF capability, anyone involved in that ?


----------



## MikeL

Jungle said:
			
		

> I'm surprised they have equipment loads at higher altitude then jumpers...



I'm sure the equipment loads will adhere to the "bottom jumper has the right of way" rule 



			
				little jim said:
			
		

> In my opinion it is essential that we keep the current jump companies spread out amongst the brigades; based on that soldiers want something to strive for



Within the Battalions they can strive for Recce Platoon, etc or if they want more there is CANSOFCOM.  As well,  only those within the 3rd Battalions can strive for the Jump Coy.  Those in the 1st and 2nd Battalions can hope they get the occasional slot offered for B Para and end up not using that skill; unless they eventually are posted to a 3rd BN, CFLAWC or CANSOF.  Other things they can strive for is PPF(I know pers from Mech Battalions have gotten the course),  US Army Ranger course,  etc.

Lots of options for keen individuals to strive for that don't include the jump coy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Some interesting articles on this subject FYI:


The Future of Airborne Forces in the Objective Force

This paper will examine United States Army airborne forces as they relate to the Objective
Force. It will address the need for the United States to retain a strategic airborne force for
forcible entry operations and will explain why this force should remain a consolidated airborne
division and not some distributed capability scattered across the Army at the Unit of
Employment level. As part of this discussion, the paper will address facilities, training,
command and control, and modernization issues.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415669

Operational Employment of the Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment as a Case Study by MAJ Matthew J. Konz, U.S. Army, 87 pages.

Given the focus on the Brigade Combat Team as the Army‘s primary combat unit, the limited availability of U.S. Air Force airlift assets, and the U.S. Army history of employing predominantly medium sized airborne units, future airborne operations in support of operational level objectives will likely center around the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The combat airborne operations of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment will provide a case study to assess the elements of risk, surprise and the operational context of how the airborne unit contributed to the achievement the operational and strategic outcomes. The combat airborne operations discussed are the jump to re-take the island of Corregidor in the Philippines in February 1945, Operation Junction City in February 1967, and the airborne insertion of the 173d Airborne Brigade onto the Bashur airfield in Northern Iraq in March 2003. The intent of this monograph is to provide insights into the possible employment of the current ABCT and how to best use the resources and organization that we have, not necessarily to advocate a radically new airborne organization, propose new equipment, or recommend a new mission for airborne forces.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/SAMS/media/Monographs/KonzM-21May09.pdf


THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE (PARACHUTE)
FORCES IN MODERN ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE

The current global security environment poses fundamentally different challenges to Western
armies than the Cold War ever did. Every region now faces complex, diverse, non traditional
and interconnected security challenges as a result of the end of the bi-polar world. Resource
scarcity, globalization, demographic shifts, unparalleled technological advancement, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug-trafficking and ethnic, religious and racial hatred
compound the problem.1 Guerrillas and subversives now boast cheap cell phone
communications assets and can employ cyber capabilities and WMD, while terrorists have
succeeded in using airliners as missiles. This broad spectrum of modern threats and capabilities
has generated a new term: “asymmetric.”

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_07/iss_3/CAJ_vol7.3_13_e.pdf



South African Airborne Operations

With the advent of democratisation in South Africa in
1994, former enemies have become comrades in arms. The process of integration between former
liberation movements and other forces and the advent of a volunteer army have changed the whole
character of the airborne units in the new South African National Defence Force.
The concept of vertical envelopment, however, remains alive and relevant. Whether the new
South African National Defence Force in its design and training is going to continue to embrace this
unique and flexible form of warfare remains to be seen. Initial indications are that it will not. Severe
budget cuts, radical changes in command and control systems, the reduction of 44 Parachute Brigade
to a regiment, and the decreased airlift capacity have all contributed towards a loss of the ability to
deploy a balanced and potent independent airborne force.

http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&sqi=2&ved=0CFAQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ajol.info%2Findex.php%2Fsmsajms%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F81106%2F71329&ei=FNVRUeuBEOKOiALtuoCgBQ&usg=AFQjCNF8u2Yzr2xHoJoQ9ApE4iPRiCsHvQ&bvm=bv.44342787,d.cGE


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> I'm sure the equipment loads will adhere to the "bottom jumper has the right of way" rule
> 
> Within the Battalions they can strive for Recce Platoon, etc or if they want more there is CANSOFCOM.  As well,  only those within the 3rd Battalions can strive for the Jump Coy.  Those in the 1st and 2nd Battalions can hope they get the occasional slot offered for B Para and end up not using that skill; unless they eventually are posted to a 3rd BN, CFLAWC or CANSOF.  Other things they can strive for is PPF(I know pers from Mech Battalions have gotten the course),  US Army Ranger course,  etc.
> 
> Lots of options for keen individuals to strive for that don't include the jump coy.



The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020.  Seeing as how the course is now focusing solely on LZ/DZ marking and insertion methods it can be of some use to everyone.  Like you said soldiers have CANSOF or Recce/Snipers to aim for.  Realistically Ranger Course is only available to a few every year and seeing that it costs thousands of dollars to send one candidate on the course with no guarantee that they will even pass I think the CF is going to be a little more hesitant to send guys down there.

Thanks for the articles daftandbarmy I am going to have a look at some.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020.  Seeing as how the course is now focusing solely on LZ/DZ marking and insertion methods it can be of some use to everyone.  Like you said soldiers have CANSOF or Recce/Snipers to aim for.  Realistically Ranger Course is only available to a few every year and seeing that it costs thousands of dollars to send one candidate on the course with no guarantee that they will even pass I think the CF is going to be a little more hesitant to send guys down there.
> 
> Thanks for the articles daftandbarmy I am going to have a look at some.



S'alright,

I have never done it, but I understand the Ranger Course doesn't focus much on Pathfinder stuff or, if it does, it's pretty basic.

Also, the other side to the Pathfinder role is the staff effort required to make sure they don't wind up like Merril's Marauders e.g.,  eating their belts, out of ammo and on the run. I hope we're maintaing the ability to depoly, maintain and recover a Pathfider force too.


----------



## Sprinting Thistle

Could you provide the reference to this Army direction:  "The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020"

Thanks.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Sprinting Thistle said:
			
		

> Could you provide the reference to this Army direction:  "The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020"
> 
> Thanks.



It was in a powerpoint that I saw during a briefing on the new PPF about a year and a half ago, let me see if I can dig it up for you.

Edit:

Well I could not locate the powerpoint, I think the transition to sharepoint probably wiped it out but I did find the Trg Implementation Directive signed by the former Comd LFDTS, Maj Gen Hainse.

CLS intent:  To develop the PPF capability 
within every battalion in order to facilitate the
prosecution of Adaptive Dispersed Operations
(ADO).


----------



## Jarnhamar

You could keep the jump course as motivation for guys who want the tattoo and help support the Trenton Kitshop but change the company to amphibious orientated.
Small boat operators courses.  Maybe a watered down (ha) course like engineer divers get.  HK P11 marksman badge.

That way a light infantry battalion with have 3 companies dedicated to Airassault, mountaineering/arctic ops and amphibious methods of insertion/extraction.

We're more likely to use any and all of those well before we insert conventional Canadian soldiers by static line parachute.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> You could keep the jump course as motivation for guys who want the tattoo and help support the Trenton Kitshop but change the company to amphibious orientated.
> Small boat operators courses.  Maybe a watered down (ha) course like engineer divers get.  HK P11 marksman badge.
> 
> That way a light infantry battalion with have 3 companies dedicated to Airassault, mountaineering/arctic ops and amphibious methods of insertion/extraction.
> 
> We're more likely to use any and all of those well before we insert conventional Canadian soldiers by static line parachute.



We need to stop focusing on skills and start talking about capability and the ability to rapidly deploy or surge forces into an Area of Operations which is really what Light Infantry/Parachuting/Amphibious Ops/Air-Mobile Ops is all about.  We have lots of great soldiers in the LIB's with some great skills such as Freefall/PPF/Adv Recce/Jumpmaster's/AMO the list goes on and on but unfortunately all their skills are useless if we cannot actually kick them out the door and right now with the LIBs we cannot do that.  

For one, we don't have the vehicles, equipment or the dedicated CSS available to backstop us and two we don't have any of the necessary enablers available that really set the conditions for success.  The fact that you have a light infantry battalion based in a mechanized bde group is a fundamental flaw and we are deriving support for our LIBs from units which are not designed to support it.  

I feel we need to have a serious discussion on whether their is a utility in having light infantry forces and if we determine their is then lets set them up for success and organize them in such a way so they can make a positive contribution.  If we determine we don't need them then lets get rid of them and give the PY positions back to the 6 Mech Bn's so we can bring back some other capabilities that have been lost such as Anti-Armour, Pioneers and Mortars.


----------



## MikeL

Sorry for going off topic,  but I have a question regarding the org of the LIBs.

In regards to the Air Assault/Mobile Coy and Mountain/Arctic Coy,  why have companies "dedicated" to that?  Why not spread those skills through out the battalion?  I assume there are already troops  in the Air Assault Coy(N?) with BMO/AMO and troops in the Mountain/Arctic Coy(O?) with HII,  US Army Air Assault, etc quals.

How often does the Mountain/Arctic coy actually train in mountainous terrain and the arctic/cold weather?

I assume by seeing all the Griffons supporting 3RCR that the Air Assault/Mobile skills are practiced when air craft are available,  and a Coy(?) went down to work on those skills(and other skills) in the US with the USMC last year(?). But how often are the other mountain/arctic skills practiced/maintained?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> Sorry for going off topic,  but I have a question regarding the org of the LIBs.
> 
> In regards to the Air Assault/Mobile Coy and Mountain/Arctic Coy,  why have companies "dedicated" to that?  Why not spread those skills through out the battalion?  I assume there are already troops  in the Air Assault Coy(N?) with BMO/AMO and troops in the Mountain/Arctic Coy(O?) with HII,  US Army Air Assault, etc quals.
> 
> How often does the Mountain/Arctic coy actually train in mountainous terrain and the arctic/cold weather?
> 
> I assume by seeing all the Griffons supporting 3RCR that the Air Assault/Mobile skills are practiced when air craft are available,  and I a Coy(?) went down to work on those skills(and other skills) in the US with the USMC.   But how often are the other mountain/arctic skills practiced/maintained?



My understanding of why we have three companies that maintain three different skillsets is so we maintain what they refer to as a "General Purpose Combat Capability".  Essentially, we do all of these things so that if $H&^ hits the fan so to speak we have guys available that know how to do all of skillsets we practice so that when we need to actually standup airborne battalions/air-mobile battalions/etc... we already have the shell organizations in place.  

3 RCR itself doesn't have a dedicated company for arctic/mountain warfare, right now we are organized as follows:

Mike Coy - Para Coy
November Coy - Air-Mobile Coy
Oscar Coy - FRIES & Air-Mobile Coy
Quebec Coy - Cbt Spt Coy (Recce/Snipers/Sigs)
Romeo Coy - CSS Coy (Movement Pl, QM, Riggers, KO, Maint Pl, etc)

Practicing skills all has to do with money and aircraft availability; however, over the past two years our primary focus has been first, improving our ability to sustain ourselves while conducting air-mobile/airborne operations and secondly, working on developing a viable air-mobile command post which we now have working in its initial stages.


----------



## MikeL

Ack,  thanks for the clarification.  I thought I heard/read from somewhere that O Coy was Mountain, which appears to be wrong.

Any reason why N is Air Mobile and not FRIES while O is Air Mobile and FRIES?


----------



## Infanteer

A Coy, 3 PPCLI is oriented towards mountain operations.


----------



## Ostrozac

My initial thoughts on an airborne capability is that if it's important -- it should be centralized. And if it isn't important, the three para companies that we have in the brigades are a distraction from what is important -- light infantry and mech infantry operations. 

Personally, I think that if we build a credible conventional airmobile/light capability, that will accomplish 95% of what we can get from paratroopers. 

I can't wait to get back into a Chinook!


----------



## KevinB

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> My initial thoughts on an airborne capability is that if it's important -- it should be centralized. And if it isn't important, the three para companies that we have in the brigades are a distraction from what is important -- light infantry and mech infantry operations.
> 
> Personally, I think that if we build a credible conventional airmobile/light capability, that will accomplish 95% of what we can get from paratroopers.
> 
> I can't wait to get back into a Chinook!



How far can those fly?

Last time I looked the CF did not sign up for MH models thus no InFlight refueling ability.

The C-130 can take a chalk to Africa, a C-17 even faster with more bodies to drop.

Plus fixed wing A/C are a shit ton fast than Rotors.


----------



## MedCorps

If you look at the Force 2013 Comprehensive Review (which reaches full establishment and force structure changes at end FY-2015 - Mar 2016) it has the following: 

1 CMBG - CoE for Heavy Mech and Mountain Ops 
- 3 PPCLI - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Mtn)
- (the Heavy Mech capability resides in 1 PPCLI and LdSH)

2 CMBG - CoE for Air Mobility Ops 
- 3 RCR - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Air Mobile) 
- It highlights the Air Mobile Coy as a new institutionalized enabler

5 GBMC - CoE for Jungle and Littoral Ops 
- 3 R22R - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Jungle & Littoral) 

There is also new Airborne Operations doctrine which has just been released.  Anyone looked at it?  Might have some information on force employment structure for airborne operations.  The Force 2013 Comprehensive Review does not mention airborne ops  less, the Coys identified above. Establishment numbers in the LIBs are holding pretty much constant without any notable cuts. 

MC


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MedCorps said:
			
		

> If you look at the Force 2013 Comprehensive Review (which reaches full establishment and force structure changes at end FY-2015 - Mar 2016) it has the following:
> 
> 1 CMBG - CoE for Heavy Mech and Mountain Ops
> - 3 PPCLI - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Mtn)
> - (the Heavy Mech capability resides in 1 PPCLI and LdSH)
> 
> 2 CMBG - CoE for Air Mobility Ops
> - 3 RCR - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Air Mobile)
> - It highlights the Air Mobile Coy as a new institutionalized enabler
> 
> 5 GBMC - CoE for Jungle and Littoral Ops
> - 3 R22R - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Jungle & Littoral)
> 
> There is also new Airborne Operations doctrine which has just been released.  Anyone looked at it?  Might have some information on force employment structure for airborne operations.  The Force 2013 Comprehensive Review does not mention airborne ops  less, the Coys identified above. Establishment numbers in the LIBs are holding pretty much constant without any notable cuts.
> 
> MC



The fundamental problem with all of this is that again, when we need to kick dudes out the doors our LIBs cannot be deployed as is.  Having skills is one thing and we have lots of skills within the LIBs; however, a bunch of skills does not necessarily equal a capability which a lot of people conveniently forget, even within the LIBs themselves.  We like to talk a big game when it comes to Airborne and Air-mobile ops but how many people actually have experience conducting these sort of operations either on exercise or on operations.  My experience with air-mobile operations is based on exercise with 3 RCR over the past three years.  As well, I have also participated in the annual Marine Corps Weapons & Tactics Instruction Course in Yuma, AZ and I have completed the US Army Air Assault Course.  

When we first began developing an air-mobile capability at the Bn in 2010 we were not what I would call sharp.  This is no fault of anyone it was simply down to a lack of experience.  This was especially apparent during the first few exercises we conducted where very basic things were screwed up, such as, ensuring personnel were properly manifested and loaded into choppers, to having our embarkation and disembarkation drills sorted for different airframes, to squaring away near and far ITG.  We also were not particularly good at contingency planning for unforeseen events like immediate re-embarkation planning, emergency extraction planning, GO/NOGO criteria, TRAP Ops.

The whole point I am trying to make is having one company focused on air-mobile ops does not translate into an actual capability.  Can we do air-mobile operations?  Yah sure we have soldiers that know how to slingload equipment, we have LZ/DZ controllers, we have soldiers that know how to setup LZs but what we have a lot of trouble doing is taking all of these skills and combining them together to provide an actual capability.

Edit:

I have seen the new doctrine.  It is called air-mobile operations and it combines air-mobile operations and airborne operations into one all-encompassing doctrine.  TBH we have developed our own way of doing business at least at 3 RCR with our Force Employment Concept (FEC).  Also, The LIBs were cut last year and PY positions were reduced from 620 to 560 all ranks.   



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> How far can those fly?
> 
> Last time I looked the CF did not sign up for MH models thus no InFlight refueling ability.
> 
> The C-130 can take a chalk to Africa, a C-17 even faster with more bodies to drop.
> 
> Plus fixed wing A/C are a crap ton fast than Rotors.



The advantage of an Airborne force is it has strategic reach which air-mobile forces do not have.  As well, like you said speed is important and air-mobile forces are particularly resource intensive, far more so then an airborne force.  The CF also lacks an effective attack/escort helicopter or a recce helicopters which further weakens our ability to force generate proper air-mobile forces. 

Again an airborne force is only really effective though if we have the supporting arms to back it up with i.e. airborne engineers, artillery, supply.  I would argue that it would be far easier for the CF to field a proper airborne force then it would be to field and maintain a credible air-mobile capability, we already have the nucleus available in our jump coy's, all that would be required would be bringing these forces together into a new unit with the supporting arms cast available to them.


----------



## McG

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> ... all that would be required would be bringing these forces together into a new unit with the supporting arms cast available to them.


I think a new unit is a bridge too far in the current fiscal climate.  Rather, all airborne responsibility would have to be assigned to one of the three CMBGs.  Most of that would reside in the 3rd Bn of the CMBG.


----------



## MedCorps

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Also, The LIBs were cut last year and PY positions were reduced from 620 to 560 all ranks.



This may be transient.  Endstate Mar 2016 for the LIBs will be 593 (3 PPCLI and 3 R22R) or 594 (3 RCR). 

Enjoy your insight on this topic. 

MC


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> When we first began developing an air-mobile capability at the Bn in 2010 we were not what I would call sharp.  This is no fault of anyone it was simply down to a lack of experience.  This was especially apparent during the first few exercises we conducted where very basic things were screwed up, such as, ensuring personnel were properly manifested and loaded into choppers, to having our embarkation and disembarkation drills sorted for different airframes, to squaring away near and far ITG.  We also were not particularly good at contingency planning for unforeseen events like immediate re-embarkation planning, emergency extraction planning, GO/NOGO criteria, TRAP Ops.
> 
> The whole point I am trying to make is having one company focused on air-mobile ops does not translate into an actual capability.  Can we do air-mobile operations?  Yah sure we have soldiers that know how to slingload equipment, we have LZ/DZ controllers, we have soldiers that know how to setup LZs but what we have a lot of trouble doing is taking all of these skills and combining them together to provide an actual capability.



Airmobile operations are not rocket science, and should be in the repetoire of any infantry battalion.  I say this having worked extensively with airmobile operations at times while with a mech battalion.

It isn't about a course, or a focus, its about planning and administration at the unit level or above for the 5 plans that make up an airmobile op.  At the coy level and below, airmobile operations are pretty much the last step, the ground tactical plan, which is just bog standard infantry s**t.

When I hear talk about specializing in airmobility, I see it as a cop out for some to simply not hit the books and understand the essential steps to successful airmobile planning.  A good unit can do an airmobile operation simulated with MLs.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A good unit can do theoretical airmobile operation simulated with MLs.


Fixed it for you.

I've seen some colossally fucked up AirMobile operations by the troops themselves.

Getting on a Huey or Hook is not the same as boarding a ML.

Birds, (like jumping) add a reality to events that cannot be talked around, it takes blade hours, and that is expensive.


----------



## Infanteer

Getting on a helicopter is not a difficult skill to teach.  No bird - get the pilots and air crew over to talk the boys through a mock up.

The Germans built armoured divisions by practicing with bicycles and tank cutouts.  As corny as it may seem, anything is possible if leadership is smart enough.


----------



## KevinB

I humbly disagree.
   
I would say the Germans would have been exceeding vulnerable while the tank crews learned soldiering, if they have a major opposition early in the war before they perfected the job it would have been tough on them.

 -- aren't you the guy that said the Inf need to crew LAV's?

There is a lot more to getting proficient in Airmobile Operations that just entry and exit of a bird.   You can whiteboard an idea to death - but actually doing the activity and all the issues that it brings up is what created skill.

Walkthru Talkthru is a good basic step -- but it does not create proficiency - it create rudimentary understanding of a concept.

Perfect Practice Make Perfect --


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:
			
		

> There is a lot more to getting proficient in Airmobile Operations that just entry and exit of a bird.   You can whiteboard an idea to death - but actually doing the activity and all the issues that it brings up is what created skill.
> 
> Walkthru Talkthru is a good basic step -- but it does not create proficiency - it create rudimentary understanding of a concept.



There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".

Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?

Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.


----------



## KevinB

And I agree that conceptually it appears to be cut and dried.

 However having seen loading be buggered all to hell both on the Mattawa plain in Pet under relatively ideal situations, I've also seen loading get equally RTFO at night under mortar fire in Iraq, for different reasons, but most of which came down to crew and passenger interaction.

Secondly having been in a chopper getting ground fire (both SAM and Small Arms) I will say that having some of the "guys in back" who 1) are on comms with the crew (last time I looked, outside of SOF, the CF cannot clip into a bird by radio plug), also someone who knows where you are with a map.  

The argument I have seen is that LAV crews should be part of the Infantry team -- and I would argue this is 110% more relevant for airmobile operations, as a Helo operates in not just a liner path, but vertical, and it goes a heck of a lot fast (also tends to be somewhat less impervious to enemy fire than a LAV too).
   
    I don't think one needs a specific tasking -- but it does take time to master to the point I think that a combat operation against a medium threat could be conducted.  In the same manner that I dont think that one or two MOI's in a unit make the unit mountain operations capable -- can it be done yeah, but I tend to look at work case and mitigate from that.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:
			
		

> There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".
> 
> Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?
> 
> Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.



Nobody said anything about needing any shiny courses or other crap, like you said that is all irrelevant, and I agree with you.  My point is do we want to get serious about this stuff or don't we because their is no way you can tell me that a unit that doesn't specialize in air-mobile/airborne insertion is as good at it as one that does.  

At present we have three LIBs that have a whole bunch of *skills* at their disposal.  I would argue none of these *skills* transfer over to an actual *capability* because none of the units are given the proper resources or amount of training time to master these and turn them into an actual *capability*.  Of course with the proper work-up training and education any organization can become proficient at something but that takes time and we are in the business of delivering results now, not later.

It takes 10,000 hours to master something and I believe this also holds true in the military.


Edit:

For the record, I don't give a damn about shiny courses or any of that crap.  I am not one of the people that believe we need the airborne to give soldiers something to strive for.  I am of the school that the CF needs to get more agile with a larger focus on conducting expeditionary operations.  A lot of things we are doing in the LIBs are replicated by CSOR and they get a lot more money for training and they get to select the best soldiers which makes them far more proficient. 

I am interested in discussing questions like:  Do we need the LIBs and CSOR?  Could we do with just CSOR and get rid of all the LIBs with a large chunk of PYs re-allocated to the 6 Mech Bn's?  Do we get rid of CSOR and consolidate the LIBs into one large Airborne/Air-mobile Battlegroup?  Do we maintain the status quo?  What are we trying to achieve with the LIBs?


----------



## MedCorps

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> It takes 10,000 hours to master something and I believe this also holds true in the military.



So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality? 

There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training).  

MC


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MedCorps said:
			
		

> So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality?
> 
> There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training).
> 
> MC



If I was a CO of a Bn I would focus first on developing a CSS capability that is tailored towards air-mobile operations.  

Familiarizing my CSS Coy with various types of slingloads and equipment used in aerial resupply
Acquire enough equipment to be able to effectively resupply the Bn via aerial delivery platforms

This would include:

Fuel Blivets
Slingload Cargo Nets
Slingload Cargo Bags
Speedballs
CDS Drop systems
SHERPA Systems

I would also have them practice and rehearse different scenarios, such as, setting up and executing FARPs (Forward Air Replenishment Points), hooking up and receiving slingloads, securing DP`s, LZ/DZ Controlling, etc...

They would also need to maintain an ability to conduct ground resupp so vehicles are also a requirement.  Light Infantry does not necessarily mean you need to walk everywhere.


The Second thing I would focus on would be Communications and developing a light and air portable CP with the ability to be moved either by aircraft or helicopter.  It should also have the option of being dispatched by parachute from an aircraft.

Equipment required:

DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure
HF radio at a minimum (VHF very much limits the capabilities of an air-mobile force)
Satellite Comms if we have the option
A few four-wheelers and trailers to haul the CP around
Some skidoos and caribou trailers so we can also transport the CP in the winter

For the actual companies they would require:

HF for the Coy CP (Again sat comms if available)
117`s for every sect comd and above


Once CSS and Comms were sorted I would begin integrating all the capabilities together so they learned to work with each other.  An important part of all of this would be cross-training with the air component as often times a problem that occurs during an air-mobile op begins before the ground tactical plan and is usually a result of a mis-communication between the ground force and the air force.  

Getting on and off the chopper is the easy part, it's the CSS and Comms piece that is going to make or break your air-mobile force.  Like I said above, you should also be able to conduct mounted ops as well so the air-mobile LIB should have some sort of vehicle platform.  This vehicle should be small enough that it is not too resource-intensive.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality?
> 
> There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training).
> 
> MC



Lots and lots of really long tabs (up to 30-40kms) up and down mountains with big bergens and all your weapons with shouty people swarming around the stragglers kicking them .... and some other stuff.

Yes, really.  :nod:


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Nobody said anything about needing any shiny courses or other crap, like you said that is all irrelevant, and I agree with you.  My point is do we want to get serious about this stuff or don't we because their is no way you can tell me that a unit that doesn't specialize in air-mobile/airborne insertion is as good at it as one that does.



Royal Drew,

Ack all.   My comments were not directed to anyone here, but more towards a certain sub-culture that exists and prefers to draw a sharp line within the Infantry Corps.  It's the sub-culture that likes to draw a spectrum with LAV-based losers on the one end, JTF-2 on the other end and puts itself somewhere in the middle.  "We need air assault/mtn ops/para/amphib badges that take 3 courses and 89 days of training after you get a gold at the Coopers test", "we're better able to work with SOF" and "mech guys don't get out of carriers".  This kind of mentality is infectious and when we buy it we only put ourselves in boxes that'll limit our effectiveness as members of the profession of arms.  A simple walk through the lines of any of the battalions would reveal that Pte Gumby in 2 R22R is not much different than Pte Dumby in 3 PPLCI.  We ain't all that different.

As for how much better specializing makes you, remember that airmobile insertions are simply ingress/egress techniques - Phase I and Phase III of the operation.  The pilots do most of the work in flying us around, not getting shot out of the sky, and putting us in the right place.  After that, it's no different if you jumped out of a helo/airplane/canoe/truck/spaceship, as it is all "close with and destroy the enemy" s**t.

In my opinion, a bn with little specialization and requiring a familiarization with the interior of a Chinook, but with its basic infantry drills down and solid small unit leadership will be a better air mobile force than one that has focused its efforts on load plans, manifests and speed balls at the expense of the basics (not saying your Bn has done so, just emphasizing what makes any bn "good").  I think we're all in violent agreement that frequent work with helicopters will make the ingress/egress that much slicker, but you don't need helicopters to get good at the stuff that really counts.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Getting on and off the chopper is the easy part, it's the CSS and Comms piece that is going to make or break your air-mobile force.  Like I said above, you should also be able to conduct mounted ops as well so the air-mobile LIB should have some sort of vehicle platform.  This vehicle should be small enough that it is not too resource-intensive.



Now, if you are talking CSS and C2, the issue is something else - a force employment concept.  What is the force employment concept for this unit?  On the two airmobile operations my company did in Afghanistan, friendly link up occurred at some point during the ground tactical plan, so CSS and C2 were quite easy to factor for.

Is the force employment concept for a light battalion to pitch it off into the wild where it can only be supplied by air/avn?  Is it meant to be independant of second line support for a significant period of time?  Is this possible?  Is this desirable?  Before we start talking about how to make the CP able to function in the middle of nowhere, we need to think about why we would put it in the middle of nowhere.  The problem is that the Army has, for years, said "we have light infantry battalions" but has not defined a proper force employment concept.  As a result, "light" is whatever people want it to be.


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Lots and lots of really long tabs (up to 30-40kms) up and down mountains with big bergens and all your weapons with shouty people swarming around the stragglers kicking them .... and some other stuff.
> 
> Yes, really.  :nod:



i rather enjoyed the scene in "P Company" where the Para candidates crossed the bridge by climbing up the trusswork as part pf their morning PT. I can only imagine the sort of reaction that would get in today's army if anyone tried/proposed to do that....


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure



Get DRASH out of your system.  It isn't very useful - the smallest DRASH tents weigh in at 200 lbs.  1 CMBG played with it and it was a dismal failure - too much of an a**pain for a mech bde HQ, so it ain't the solution for a light bn.  It is very much designed for an Army that likes to drag around heaters, lights and generators so all CP personnel can charge their cellphones and run big-screen TVs....

The Sigs guys have told me that the CF is no longer pursuing DRASH, so it may be moot.  What really need is something that can be broken down and carried quite easily - both DRASH and, to a lesser extent, MOD are just to bulky for mobile warfare (light or mechanized).


----------



## MikeL

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Equipment required:
> 
> DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure
> HF radio at a minimum (VHF very much limits the capabilities of an air-mobile force)
> Satellite Comms if we have the option
> 
> For the actual companies they would require:
> 
> HF for the Coy CP (Again sat comms if available)
> 117`s for every sect comd and above



IMO DRASH is not the way to go,  like Infanteer stated it is heavy.  As well in colder weather it becomes rather brittle and can break easily.. even in warm weather it can break.  If you are planning on staying static,  having heaters, etc then it's ok,  but if you are going to be moving it around you take your chances of breaking it. The constant set up/tear down and cramming it into those carriers can be rough,  I've heard more then a few poles crack during the packing into the bag and securing it.

For your comms,  I would also look at Iridium phones.  For HF,  you will have to train pers on it as it isn't as simple as throwing up the whip antenna and your done - location/weather, etc can play factors and there are numerous antennas you can use.  Would you be using HF as your primary comms for Coy to BN CP? Because it wasn't mentioned,  I assume you would also have some 117s in the Coy and BN CP as well.  If you are pushing platoons out with the 117 but the CP is using a HF radio you won't be able to talk to each other.

Also, why does VHF very much limit the capabilities of air mobility?  Did you take into account that RRBs can be sent out to extend your VHF comms.  Of course security may become a issue if you push a RRB into no mans land with no friendly forces nearby;  a section of Infantry may have to help out with security of the RRB detachment.

Why would you want every section commander and above carrying a 117?  Why not give the Section Commanders(and Platoon Commander) a 148/152 and stick with one 117F for the Platoon Signaller.  Other things out there are amps for the 148/152,  adaptors to use 5590(522/177F batteries)


----------



## Old Sweat

I'm wandering a bit, actually quite a bit, out of my lane, but my experience as the BC of a light battery 30 years ago may have some relevance. In those days 2 RCHA had an operational role as the close support regiment in the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade which was tasked to deploy to North Norway in the event of crisis. My battery also was tasked as part of the Allied Mobile Force to show the flag in times of increased tension.

In 2 Guns we spent a lot of time thinking about air mobile operations, both as BC and FOO parties with the supported arm and in moving guns by helicopter. Besides all the technical stuff you have all discussed, one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations. Our mutual cooperation and trust grew to the extent that in the pre-night vision devices days, we actually moved and deployed the guns by helicopter at night. We only did it a couple of times as the strain of our sphincters was excessive, but we showed that it could be done. Most important, it demonstrated that the two units knew enough about each other that we could jointly plan and execute a difficult operation without difficulty.

I guess what I'm saying is that you need to understand what the aviators can and cannot do, and the best way to learn this is by picking it first hand from them. Ask them for advice instead of telling them what you want to do. The results may well come as a pleasant surprise.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Royal Drew,
> 
> Ack all.   My comments were not directed to anyone here, but more towards a certain sub-culture that exists and prefers to draw a sharp line within the Infantry Corps.  It's the sub-culture that likes to draw a spectrum with LAV-based losers on the one end, JTF-2 on the other end and puts itself somewhere in the middle.  "We need air assault/mtn ops/para/amphib badges that take 3 courses and 89 days of training after you get a gold at the Coopers test", "we're better able to work with SOF" and "mech guys don't get out of carriers".  This kind of mentality is infectious and when we buy it we only put ourselves in boxes that'll limit our effectiveness as members of the profession of arms.  A simple walk through the lines of any of the battalions would reveal that Pte Gumby in 2 R22R is not much different than Pte Dumby in 3 PPLCI.  We ain't all that different.
> 
> As for how much better specializing makes you, remember that airmobile insertions are simply ingress/egress techniques - Phase I and Phase III of the operation.  The pilots do most of the work in flying us around, not getting shot out of the sky, and putting us in the right place.  After that, it's no different if you jumped out of a helo/airplane/canoe/truck/spaceship, as it is all "close with and destroy the enemy" s**t.
> 
> In my opinion, a bn with little specialization and requiring a familiarization with the interior of a Chinook, but with its basic infantry drills down and solid small unit leadership will be a better air mobile force than one that has focused its efforts on load plans, manifests and speed balls at the expense of the basics (not saying your Bn has done so, just emphasizing what makes any bn "good").  I think we're all in violent agreement that frequent work with helicopters will make the ingress/egress that much slicker, but you don't need helicopters to get good at the stuff that really counts.
> 
> Now, if you are talking CSS and C2, the issue is something else - a force employment concept.  What is the force employment concept for this unit?  On the two airmobile operations my company did in Afghanistan, friendly link up occurred at some point during the ground tactical plan, so CSS and C2 were quite easy to factor for.
> 
> Is the force employment concept for a light battalion to pitch it off into the wild where it can only be supplied by air/avn?  Is it meant to be independant of second line support for a significant period of time?  Is this possible?  Is this desirable?  Before we start talking about how to make the CP able to function in the middle of nowhere, we need to think about why we would put it in the middle of nowhere.  The problem is that the Army has, for years, said "we have light infantry battalions" but has not defined a proper force employment concept.  As a result, "light" is whatever people want it to be.



Infanteer, completely agree with your first statement, their is a certain sub-culture within the infantry that feels the need to chest beat but soldiers are going to do that anyways it is the nature of the beast.  The leadership needs to work on humbling these fellows out and putting them in their place.  Everyone has a roll to play and they need to understand that roll.  A little bit of light hearted unit rivalry is never a bad thing though IMO.    

I also agree that we are all  infantry soldiers first and like you said it doesn't matter how you get there at the end of the day; however, that being said these skills are still skills that need to be practiced and they require a bit of time and effort to master them.  It takes time to develop capabilities and they need to be continuously practiced if we want to maintain them and be proficient at them.  It took us two years of work with lots of speedbumps in between to get our Tac CP to the state it is at now, so it does take a considerable amount of time to turn something into an actual capability.

For the rest I'll make a new post for because this will really tie into some of the questions I put out earlier.  



			
				-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> IMO DRASH is not the way to go,  like Infanteer stated it is heavy.  As well in colder weather it becomes rather brittle and can break easily.. even in warm weather it can break.  If you are planning on staying static,  having heaters, etc then it's ok,  but if you are going to be moving it around you take your chances of breaking it. The constant set up/tear down and cramming it into those carriers can be rough,  I've heard more then a few poles crack during the packing into the bag and securing it.
> 
> For your comms,  I would also look at Iridium phones.  For HF,  you will have to train pers on it as it isn't as simple as throwing up the whip antenna and your done - location/weather, etc can play factors and there are numerous antennas you can use.  Would you be using HF as your primary comms for Coy to BN CP? Because it wasn't mentioned,  I assume you would also have some 117s in the Coy and BN CP as well.  If you are pushing platoons out with the 117 but the CP is using a HF radio you won't be able to talk to each other.
> 
> Also, why does VHF very much limit the capabilities of air mobility?  Did you take into account that RRBs can be sent out to extend your VHF comms.  Of course security may become a issue if you push a RRB into no mans land with no friendly forces nearby;  a section of Infantry may have to help out with security of the RRB detachment.
> 
> Why would you want every section commander and above carrying a 117?  Why not give the Section Commanders(and Platoon Commander) a 148/152 and stick with one 117F for the Platoon Signaller.  Other things out there are amps for the 148/152,  adaptors to use 5590(522/177F batteries)



Coy CP would have both VHF and HF, I should have clarified that. The Coy CP will have a Coy Sig Op who is trained to use the HF radio, as well, all Pl Signallers should be trained to use HF as a fallback option.  One of the reasons VHF is not very good for air-mobile operations is because VHF is reliant on Line of Sight and the range is limited.  If you are conducting Ops over a large area how many RRBs are you going to push out?   Each one of these is going to require security which now eats into your manpower for conducting the actual operation.  VHF is alright but you need to overlap it with something else for long distances, Sat Comms would be ideal as in some cases HF doesn't work due to dead zones.

I would use a mix of comms equipment for the CP and overlap the capabilities as part of the PACE plan.  You would need to ability to use HF and VHF and I wasn't even thinking about iridium phones when I made that post last night so good call.  

Correction to the above and thanks for pointing it out, I meant 152's and not the 117's for the Sect Comd's.  That is what I get for making a post late at night, sometimes the brain is scrambled.  117s would be ideal for the platoon HQ.  


As for the DRASH I get what you are saying about it breaking; however, we have experimented with it here in Pet and now use it for our Tac CP.  We have managed to even drop it out of an airplane a few times and not have one pole break on us so it isn't so bad.  Of course we have had many people tell us we can't do that and we are not entitled to use DRASH or we are not entitled to replacement poles but we have done it anyways and made it work.  We also experimented with Arctic Tents and Mod Tents and found the DRASH system to be a better fit for what we required.  I would ask for your input, if we don't use the DRASH system then what are some other options we have?

Here is a picture of our Tac CP all packed and ready to be loaded btw







  

Here is a pic of the Tac CP being setup on JOAX 1-13






Generators we use for Power






Here is what we move the Tac CP with, these also can be dropped out of an airplane or loaded on a Chinook (We have tested on both of a these platforms and it works)







I am enjoying this debate and discussion fellows, a little bit of brainstorming and debate is never a bad thing.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I'm wandering a bit, actually quite a bit, out of my lane, but my experience as the BC of a light battery 30 years ago may have some relevance. In those days 2 RCHA had an operational role as the close support regiment in the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade which was tasked to deploy to North Norway in the event of crisis. My battery also was tasked as part of the Allied Mobile Force to show the flag in times of increased tension.
> 
> In 2 Guns we spent a lot of time thinking about air mobile operations, both as BC and FOO parties with the supported arm and in moving guns by helicopter. Besides all the technical stuff you have all discussed, one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations. Our mutual cooperation and trust grew to the extent that in the pre-night vision devices days, we actually moved and deployed the guns by helicopter at night. We only did it a couple of times as the strain of our sphincters was excessive, but we showed that it could be done. Most important, it demonstrated that the two units knew enough about each other that we could jointly plan and execute a difficult operation without difficulty.
> 
> I guess what I'm saying is that you need to understand what the aviators can and cannot do, and the best way to learn this is by picking it first hand from them. Ask them for advice instead of telling them what you want to do. The results may well come as a pleasant surprise.



Old Sweat I think you just homed in on something else that is very important, having all elements being in synch with each other.  When I was down at the Marine Air Weapons & Tactics School in Yuma, AZ, one of the first things I noticed was that the pilots and the ground force all spoke the same language.  They understood each other and they were used to working together.  This school is a really great place because it takes the pilots, ground force planners, FOO/FAC's and runs a course where they all spend time together planning and conducting operations.  It gets them all used to working with each other and has them all speaking the same language.  

I don't think for a second we would have the ability to replicate a school like this as we don't have the manpower or the airframes; however, what we could do is an exercise that brings all these guys together.  It could be a series of TEWTs culminating in an actual air-mobile/airborne insertion at the end.  When I was at MAWTS, our coy started off very basic conducting TEWTs and over the course of a month slowly ramped up all the way to conducting Bn(-) live fire at night with CAS and Fire Spt.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> i rather enjoyed the scene in "P Company" where the Para candidates crossed the bridge by climbing up the trusswork as part pf their morning PT. I can only imagine the sort of reaction that would get in today's army if anyone tried/proposed to do that....



They didn't film the part where we also go UNDER the bridge, hand to hand hanging on to the I beams. It's impossibly hard and almost no one made it (including me) which, as I used to explain to the recruits, is what the Airborne battle is all about really.  ;D


----------



## MikeL

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> If you are conducting Ops over a large area how many RRBs are you going to push out?   Each one of these is going to require security which now eats into your manpower for conducting the actual operation.  VHF is alright but you need to overlap it with something else for long distances, Sat Comms would be ideal as in some cases HF doesn't work due to dead zones.



How far forward would the Coy CPs be from the BN CP?  Also,  would there be Bde HQ and other units deployed as well?

For sure,  you need a backup to VHF,  especially if you don't have the man power to push out multiple RRBs.  Each system has it's limitations/capabilities,  just need to work around them.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> As for the DRASH I get what you are saying about it breaking; however, we have experimented with it here in Pet and now use it for our Tac CP.  We have managed to even drop it out of an airplane a few times and not have one pole break on us so it isn't so bad.  Of course we have had many people tell us we can't do that and we are not entitled to use DRASH or we are not entitled to replacement poles but we have done it anyways and made it work.



If you guys can make it work for you,  then great.  I'm actually surprised that no poles have broken, as it seems like every time I've worked with DRASH in the field at some point during the exercise something in the DRASH will break.  



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> We also experimented with Arctic Tents and Mod Tents and found the DRASH system to be a better fit for what we required.  I would ask for your input, if we don't use the DRASH system then what are some other options we have?



DRASH is simpler and packs up better then mod IMO because it is all in one package, so it is easier in that respect.  But is less rugged then the mod poles/a frames.  As for a better system/easily portable tentage for a LIB,  I don't know.  I've only worked with mod, arctic tents and DRASH,  I have seen some other tentage in  use,  but it would really come down to trial and error.  But I don't foresee a LIB being able to go out and buy it's own tents,  it would have to work with what we(the CF) have in the system.  I've heard DRASH is being replaced,  but I don't know what the Army has decided on if anything at this point.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> How far forward would the Coy CPs be from the BN CP?  Also,  would there be Bde HQ and other units deployed as well?
> 
> For sure,  you need a backup to VHF,  especially if you don't have the man power to push out multiple RRBs.  Each system has it's limitations/capabilities,  just need to work around them.
> 
> If you guys can make it work for you,  then great.  I'm actually surprised that no poles have broken, as it seems like every time I've worked with DRASH in the field at some point during the exercise something in the DRASH will break.
> 
> DRASH is simpler and packs up better then mod IMO because it is all in one package, so it is easier in that respect.  But is less rugged then the mod poles/a frames.  As for a better system/easily portable tentage for a LIB,  I don't know.  I've only worked with mod, arctic tents and DRASH,  I have seen some other tentage in  use,  but it would really come down to trial and error.  But I don't foresee a LIB being able to go out and buy it's own tents,  it would have to work with what we(the CF) have in the system.  I've heard DRASH is being replaced,  but I don't know what the Army has decided on if anything at this point.



This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?

I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.

Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl.


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?
> 
> I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.



This all comes back to a force employment concept.  Forced entry is a start.  But forced entry for what?  To secure a foothold for something else or to start branching out and conducting operations?  Firing companies all over the place may brief well in Adaptive Dispersed Operations, but is that really a desired operating posture we want to aim for considering how vulnerable they would be?

Does Canada have the platforms to conduct and sustain such operations?  How do you feed them after day 3?  How many pallets of rations, batteries, and other stores does it take to supply a BG that is dropped somewhere with a possibly tenuous APOE?  How much fuel does it take for that BG to sustain sub-units dispersed all over hell's half acre?

Perhaps we need a forced entry capability for a BG that doesn't go anywhere as it secures the APOE/SPOE for more robust forces?  If the light battalion is expected to operate as part of a mech bde or within a light bde, than the force employment concept changes a bit as BGs aren't expected to be so self-sufficient.



> Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl.



DRASH may be the most useful when it comes to doing those things.  I guess it is a balancing act between the packability of DRASH to the simplicity of MOD.  Having seen a DRASH nearly crash down on a Bde Comd's head or nearly crush a signaler when it fell off the truck, I'm still leery of it's fragility and awkwardness.

Unfortunately, it looks like those are the only two choices aside from the U.S. modular command post system.  I'm wondering if one can get creative and just string shelter-halfs together?


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?
> 
> I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.
> 
> Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl.



The 'high ground' for any dismounted force behind the lines and reliant on air support has to be that ground you can get comms from. 

A Bridge Too Far was a mess largely due to a failure of comms. The sigs weenies are therefore critical in the estimate process, and any Pathfinders deployed need to have comms recce in mind, which they generally do. Any 'host nation' support should generally include contributing comms related info. 

Once again, this speaks to the importance of higher formation level support in the planning an execution of these kinds of ops.


----------



## buzgo

FYI there is a project on the books to replace all the HQ/CP type canvas:

http://www.materiel.forces.gc.ca/en/hqss.page

I've seen some updated DRASH shelters undergoing testing, they are reinforced to address the snow-loading issues...of course the bidders will submit multiple options.


----------



## Infanteer

> The layout of the Headquarters Shelter System’s internal space must be conducive to fostering collaborative work areas, space for briefings and room for the multitude of command post digital display screens.



...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:


----------



## Kirkhill

Under canvas in 20 minutes and a level floor? Challenge.


----------



## Old Sweat

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:



which in turn means lots of people to go to briefings by lots of people who put stuff together produced by lots of other people who are cranking it out too quickly to comprehend the information they are processing, and most of the people at the briefings are being told stuff they already knew because they had reported it in the first place.  :boring:


----------



## AmmoTech90

The dangers of writing specs off the cuff:



> The system shall be impervious to rain and provide adequate snow load capability to safely operate in Canada’s arctic.



The average snow fall in Tuktoyaktuk is 95 cm.  The average snow fall in Pembroke is 228 cm.  Perhaps an indication of our wholesale move north?

I realize it is a draft bit of PR fluff, but it makes the project look bad when they don't even know some basic facts about Canada's climate.


----------



## Good2Golf

Infanteer said:
			
		

> There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".
> 
> Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?
> 
> Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.



This.  Particularly the importance of the GTP.

Inter-org coord is critical, but forging of relationships in the off-hours hasn't occurred in the past to the degree that it should have, and because good planning often depends on solid relationships, the airmobile op more than often turns into a well-intentioned, but less-than-optimal goat rodeo somewhere between Y-Hour, L-hour and H-hour. 

RoyalDrew also brings up good points about the C2 of the AMF, and there needs to be balance between having enough C2 cap, and having so much that it chokes the ability of the AMF to get well inside the baddies' decision-action cycle.

Enablers are important too, as is a good sustainment plan and, where it fits into the SoM, a solid Link-Up Plan as well.  It often seems that the sustainment after initial actions is either not well appreciated, or it is, but just not followed-up with.  It can be easy to get focused on the "how to get there" instead of the "what do we do when we get there."

The success to airborne/airmobile capability will be in identifying what the capability should be, then develop what method(s) are best suited to providing and supporting the capability.  It is too easy to get caught up in the specifics of how an airborne/airmobile force should get to where it should/wants to be, vice what should it be in the first place.

My own take on the overall capability space is push airborne primarily to CANSOF (with some exceptions within conventional force structure) and ensure that airmobile ops are understood by more of the field force than just the 3rd Bns...the wider the better.  Don't worry, the lifters will come to where the airmobilers are.  :nod:

 :2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Loachman

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations.



That was about the time that I was happily flying Kiowas in 427 Squadron.

We belonged to the Airborne Mess, but Loach Flight Officers tended to spend more time at the Liri Valley Mess with the Recce guys and Gunners, or the Service Bn Mess where there were more women.

Yes, we generally socialized with those with and for who we worked. We had more in common with the Recce Guys and Gunners than we had with the Slug Drivers in our Squadron. The semi-alcoholic Brit Exchange Officer Net helped a lot as well - some pretty good inter-unit training activities were spawned in the days following the collection of their monthly NATO duty-free.

Since then, however, many things have driven a wedge between us, and it keeps getting hammered deeper and deeper.

The first noticeable thing for me was the new dress uniform colours. We hardly ever heard, or used, the term "a** f**ce" before those came out. We were all one highly co-operative blob of green. All of a sudden, however, it changed to "you Army guys" and you "a** f**ce guys".

The loss of the Kiowa and conversion to an all-Griffon fleet followed. We lost the Observers in the process, and therefore part of our semi-organic Army connection. We no longer had a real role because of that machine, and certainly not one anywhere nearly as intimate as the Recce role.

The ties between Tac Hel Squadrons and the Brigades are much thinner. 2 Brigade no longer even has a Squadron. Squadrons no longer operate for the Brigades that have one - co-ordinated by the G3 Aviation and run by a Squadron CO who used to operate much like the Arty CO, except that he relied on the G3 Aviation more, and flew as much as possible. Now, the Squadron is placed into an Air Expeditionary Wing and is tasked through an ACCE, neither of which has much of a clue regarding Tac Hel. Static ops like Afghanistan have permitted this to continue, cancer-like; reversion to a more traditional mobile operation as in a general/Cold War situation would prove the problems with that.

As G3 Aviation in the SSF (now 2 CMBG), I had direct tasking authority for 427 Squadron missions in direct support of operational training for SSF. I received helquests from SSF units, conducted the required liaison, and issued heltasks to 427 Squadron with info copies to 10 Tactical Air Group (the forerunner of 1 Wing). Now, the current G3 Aviation receives helquests, sends them to 1 Wing Ops (in garrison) or to the ACCE on an exercise, where we put them into the RFE system on CSNI. Too many steps, over too long a distance, too independent upon reliable electronic means, and involving too many people of too high ranks who do not necessarily understand.

I ran five Canadian Chinooks, six Canadian Twin Hueys, six US ARNG single Hueys, and a buttload of Kiowas as a single Captain with an eighteen-year-old semi-trained Sigs Pte, a phone, a typewriter, pen, paper, and an Iltis for two hectic weeks in 1990.

That's all that one really needs - motivation, imagination, a little experience, and a logical command and control relationship and system.


----------



## Old Sweat

Indeed, but the point I was trying to make is that if one is trying to figure out how to develop an airmobile capability, one should talk to the aviation community along with a host of other folks. 

And for a bonus, direct liaison - talking and working together - can sort out a potential issue well before it even gets its first urgent tag stapled to it in the NDHQ CR. Helmets on. When moving C1s by Voyaguers we were encountering cases of the sling slipping down over the panoramic sight mount and ripping it off when the aircraft lifted the gun, which entailed a gun out of action for several weeks in 2nd line maintenance. My guys were blaming 450 and they were bad mouthing us as a bunch of incompetents who didn't know how to rig guns properly. On a recce to Norway I had got to know the DCO of 427 Sqn who had been a Voyaguer pilot in a previous existence and I gave him a call. The next time we were doing air mobility, he came to the gun position and watched. Lo and behold, a sight mount was indeed ripped out in front of his eyes. This was being caused by the aircraft dipping slightly as it transitioned to forward flight, which is perfectly normal. The gun would touch the ground and as the aircraft continued to dip, the sling would loop around the sight mount. A change in the flight profile along with some rerouting of the slings solved the problem quickly and easily. Helmets off.


----------



## Good2Golf

OS, for what it's worth, I understand that the aviation CoC in airmobile land intends on having LOs and LNCMs designated to each of the Bde units in order to establish and reinforce exactly those kinds of relationships.  That, and the double-hook configuration for the M777 should take care of things... :nod:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Old Sweat

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> OS, for what it's worth, I understand that the aviation CoC in airmobile land intends on having LOs and LNCMs designated to each of the Bde units in order to establish and reinforce exactly those kinds of relationships.  That, and the double-hook configuration for the M777 should take care of things... :nod:
> 
> Regards
> G2G



 :nod:      :nod:      :nod:         :cheers:           :nod:      :nod:        :nod:


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:



Nuts.  I wonder if they plan on asking the users what they want?

Time to launch or we will have another CIS

 :trainwreck:


----------



## GK .Dundas

while I was wandering thru the net I came across this .I hope it will help explain just how an Airborne operation actually works .
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vacad5TV2K4


----------



## Jungle

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> while I was wandering thru the net I came across this .I hope it will help explain just how an Airborne operation actually works .
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vacad5TV2K4



There are a few things wrong with that video; first of all, just 2 minutes into it, we see the CO and staff wearing the old fleece shirt as an outer garment... SACRILEGE !!! No wonder we were disbanded...  

Secondly, there are no computers, no 50-inch TVs, no inflated staff...  8)

Seriously, there are times I miss that era; good vid, thanks !!


----------



## Jarnhamar

Is the rapid (fastest in NATO?) descent speed on the Canadian chutes worth the trade off for the increased amount of injuries they cause our jumpers?

If we continue to employ conventional jump companies what about giving them some more forgiving chutes?   I realize the benefit of getting to the ground faster but I'm considering the amount of injuries against the number of times we've jumped into combat.


----------



## KevinB

CT-1 makes sure jumper go where they where 'aimed' -- larger chutes with more control don't.

The other aspect is the forward speed on a CT-2 or square chute are higher.   Generally it takes more skills to jump a steerable chute, and greater chance for injury


----------



## Jarnhamar

I am enlightened, thanks


----------



## Jungle

KevinB said:
			
		

> CT-1 makes sure jumper go where they where 'aimed' -- larger chutes with more control don't.



Actually, we don't need larger parachutes; we need lo-po or no-po canopies that will slow the rate of descent. Some modern S-L parachutes also offer steerability without forward momentum, so a jumper can choose how he will land and reduce injuries related to those rear-left landings !!


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Jungle said:
			
		

> Actually, we don't need larger parachutes; we need lo-po or no-po canopies that will slow the rate of descent. Some modern S-L parachutes also offer steerability without forward momentum, so a jumper can choose how he will land and reduce injuries related to those rear-left landings !!



 :ditto:

Their is far better technology on the market then what we are presently using; however, will we acquire it?  I believe the crew that just went down on JOAX jumped the new T11 chutes the Americans use.  Will we acquire these chutes?  Uncertain, atleast until the canopy life of our present chutes is past and even then we may end up making some decisions that maybe we simply won't replace the capability, who knows?



			
				ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Is the rapid (fastest in NATO?) descent speed on the Canadian chutes worth the trade off for the increased amount of injuries they cause our jumpers?
> 
> If we continue to employ conventional jump companies what about giving them some more forgiving chutes?   I realize the benefit of getting to the ground faster but I'm considering the amount of injuries against the number of times we've jumped into combat.



If you want guys on the ground faster just drop them at a lower altitude, of course, this may mean you are unable to deploy your reserve parachute if something goes wrong.  

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Of4E-2fSeWs

Video above is of Brit Paras jumping under 500ft

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWi_rMy2Lcg

Brit Paras again jumping with a Low Level Parachute, this time at 250ft


----------



## Jarnhamar

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> If you want guys on the ground faster just drop them at a lower altitude, of course, this may mean you are unable to deploy your reserve parachute if something goes wrong.



Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.



I'm not a jumper either I am just part of a Light Battalion so I have a little bit of background info at my disposal.  Two and a half years ago on the Bde spring Ex, Mike Coy jumped onto the Mattawa and suffered 18 injuries on the jump.  A number of soldiers were injured and the most serious had to be airlifted to Ottawa for treatment.  One guy, a Platoon Commander at the time shattered his leg and has never been able to walk right since then.  A few other suffered some head injuries, some of which I would attribute to the SPECTRA helmet we use.  The French airborne units do not use this helmet when they jump because they have deemed it unsuitable for jumping. Rather, they continue to use their older jump helmet.

A good buddy of mine was down on JOAX and said jumping the T11 and our chutes was night and day.  He landed on concrete with the T11 and not a scratch.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.



The more you parachute and the fitter you are, the fewer injuries you get. No suprises there. Only four jumps per year is just asking for injuries.

If you have some idiot who won't stop drop if the winds get above 'Lucky 13knts', or if you are dispatched from too low an altitude, you can be in trouble too. (find a happy place find a happy place find a happy place)


----------



## MedCorps

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Their is far better technology on the market then what we are presently using; however, will we acquire it?  I believe the crew that just went down on JOAX jumped the new T11 chutes the Americans use.  Will we acquire these chutes?  Uncertain, atleast until the canopy life of our present chutes is past and even then we may end up making some decisions that maybe we simply won't replace the capability, who knows?



I think the plan still is to acquire a new parachute for the Army.  

There is a long term solution project, which takes off where the interim solution project (a minor capital project) left off.  The plan was to build on the information acquired during the interim solution project in order to cut the time to final delivery of the new final parachute.  

I think that the Synopsis Sheet (Identification) and Synopsis Sheet (Preliminary Project Assessment) are in the process of being completed and they will soon be moving forward on the statement of requirements and statement of work before the end of the year. The goal is to have the new parachute in place by 2016.  Budget and extra year because the procurement system is a gong show.  At least someone (DLR) was smart enough to have an interim solution project knowing that the larger capital project would take time to sort itself out with PWGSC.  

MC


----------



## KevinB

Jungle said:
			
		

> Actually, we don't need larger parachutes; we need lo-po or no-po canopies that will slow the rate of descent. Some modern S-L parachutes also offer steerability without forward momentum, so a jumper can choose how he will land and reduce injuries related to those rear-left landings !!



Interesting -- that I did not know.
  Most of the jumps I have been at recently have been SOCOM related - and the forward speed on some of the chutes a few of those units use is rather breathtaking.

 I know that jumping a CT-2 require 15 jumps on CT-1's due to the perceived added complexity to it (I only have 1 CT-2 jump and I thought it was a shit ton easier, but that's me).


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The more you parachute and the fitter you are, the fewer injuries you get. No suprises there. Only four jumps per year is just asking for injuries.
> 
> If you have some idiot who won't stop drop if the winds get above 'Lucky 13knts', or if you are dispatched from too low an altitude, you can be in trouble too. (find a happy place find a happy place find a happy place)



Slight historical tangent: When the French were desperate for replacement specialists to jump into Dien Bien Phu, the French Parachutists insisted they undergo two weeks of training. Higher command overruled this and everyone got the basic "this is how you put on a 'chute; this is how you depart from the airplane..." lecture and was sent into battle (due to the nature of the battle, there was no time for prolonged training).

The specialists (signallers, mechanics, medics etc.) who made these emergency jumps to reinforce the garrison apparently suffered no more jump injuries percentage wise than experienced "Paras" jumping in at the same time.

Source: "Hell in a very small place" Bernard B Fall.

While this isn't an endorsement for less training, it should also suggest that the real key may lie in _how_ "jumpers" are trained.


----------



## Danjanou

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> :ditto:
> 
> If you want guys on the ground faster just drop them at a lower altitude, of course, this may mean you are unable to deploy your reserve parachute if something goes wrong.
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Of4E-2fSeWs
> 
> Video above is of Brit Paras jumping under 500ft
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWi_rMy2Lcg
> 
> Brit Paras again jumping with a Low Level Parachute, this time at 250ft



About 4 minutes into this video they note the RLI dropping at 500' as normal SOPs and one incident of a Commando being dropped at 200' in error with some casualties ( none fatal)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46XGmUh0TFw


----------



## Jungle

MedCorps said:
			
		

> I think the plan still is to acquire a new parachute for the Army.



There it is:

http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/harper-government-invests-in-canadian-armed-forces-1774084.htm



> This contract award provides for the acquisition of 600 T-11 parachutes and required spare components and is worth an estimated $3.6 million, over one year, until March 31, 2014.
> 
> "Though the missions and potential threats of the future are uncertain, the Canadian Armed Forces must be prepared to use its unique capabilities if and when a crisis demands it," said the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. "This acquisition will enable members of the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy safely into ground environments as they provide support to future national or international missions.
> 
> The T-11 parachutes will replace the CT-1 parachutes currently used by the Canadian Armed Forces. The T-11 Parachute System is authorized and certified for use on the C-17 (Globemaster), C130J (Hercules) and CH-147 (Chinook) aircraft-the primary air mobility transport assets currently in use by the Canadian Armed Forces.


----------



## PuckChaser

Here's a link to the company site with specs for the T-11 (for those unfamiliar like I am): http://www.airborne-sys.com/files/pdf/t11_08052010.pdf

Glad to see something that's its made in Canada.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Danjanou said:
			
		

> About 4 minutes into this video they note the RLI dropping at 500' as normal SOPs and one incident of a Commando being dropped at 200' in error with some casualties ( none fatal)
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46XGmUh0TFw



My all time record (which I don't recommend that you try and beat) was exiting at 450ft AGL - just below the cloud base of course - in a PX4 chute into a Scottish gale onto a DZ that included high stone fences, trees, rivers swollen by heay rain and about 100 terrified cattle with enourmous texas style long horns on them. We had one guy with a back injury and one broken leg but otherwise we did OK. Of course, the farmer hit us with a claim that included still born calves  :

The only reason I think that we didn't have more casualties was because we had prepared for the exercise well, including lots of fitness training and parachuting. Also, we couldn't get close to the Div Commander who insisted on that particular DZ ....

Eidted to add - my point in the above war story:  A canopy that allows you to deploy from 250ft safely is an excellent idea and will only broaden the scope for the effective employability of airborne forces


----------



## Danjanou

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> My all time record (which I don't recommend that you try and beat) was exiting at 450ft AGL - just below the cloud base of course - in a PX4 chute into a Scottish gale onto a DZ that included high stone fences, trees, rivers swollen by heay rain and about 100 terrified cattle with enourmous texas style long horns on them. We had one guy with a back injury and one broken leg but otherwise we did OK. Of course, the farmer hit us with a claim that included still born calves  :
> 
> The only reason I think that we didn't have more casualties was because we had prepared for the exercise well, including lots of fitness training and parachuting. Also, we couldn't get close to the Div Commander who insisted on that particular DZ ....



I remember reading  or hearing 2e REP often jumped from 400' on a regular basis. Mind the prerequsites to joining 2e  REP...........


----------



## daftandbarmy

Danjanou said:
			
		

> I remember reading  or hearing 2e REP often jumped from 400' on a regular basis. Mind the prerequsites to joining 2e  REP...........



That is really asking for trouble, especially with the old chutes. Like the British, of course, they probably get around it by reducing the deployment count to 'three' i.e. one thousand two thousand three thousand check canopy.  ;D


----------



## Danjanou

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> That is really asking for trouble, especially with the old chutes. Like the British, of course, they probably get around it by reducing the deployment count to 'three' i.e. one thousand two thousand three thousand check canopy.  ;D



Can they count that high? I always pictured them as 600 odd Zebra Mussel clones in natty green berets. ;D


----------



## Jungle

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Can they count that high? I always pictured them as 600 odd Zebra Mussel clones in natty green berets. ;D



Actually, 2e REP is closer to 1200 troops; but I agree with the rest of your post...


----------



## daftandbarmy

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Can they count that high? I always pictured them as 600 odd Zebra Mussel clones in natty green berets. ;D



I was going to say that we could only count to 10 because we only had that many fingers, but then I remembered the Mortars, MG and AT Platoons...


----------



## KevinB

Trick to jumping at low altitudes is just have the plane fly faster -- ugly opening shock - but you get the deployment count down pretty small...

Unlike the Balloon or Helo on the 5,6,7 shit - oh yeah its opening around nnnnnoooowwww.


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:
			
		

> ...Unlike the Balloon or Helo on the 5,6,7 shit - oh yeah its opening around nnnnnoooowwww.



Like going off a 47's ramp flying at 70 kts...  :nod:


----------



## KevinB

Never jumped out of a hook  :'(
   My first few Huey jumps were effectively night jumps, as my eyes were locked shut.   Unlike Freefall where I actually don't feel like I am falling - those first Huey static jumps gave me the idea I was plummeting to my death.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Danjanou said:
			
		

> I remember reading  or hearing 2e REP often jumped from 400' on a regular basis. Mind the prerequsites to joining 2e  REP...........



Last year I read "_Fighting For the French Foreign Legion: Memoirs of a Scottish Legionnaire_"  by Alex Lochrie. Lochrie was a member of the 2eme REP and mentions while taking the French Commando course they did a drop out of a C-160 Transall at 300 m. 

I would take it that being on a commando course jumping from 300 m would be exceptional and not necessary the norm. I remember the author mentioning that during parachute training they jumped from a lot higher, but can't remember anything about them jumping from 400 m on a regular basis.


----------



## Danjanou

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> Last year I read "_Fighting For the French Foreign Legion: Memoirs of a Scottish Legionnaire_"  by Alex Lochrie. Lochrie was a member of the 2eme REP and mentions while taking the French Commando course they did a drop out of a C-160 Transall at 300 m.
> 
> I would take it that being on a commando course jumping from 300 m would be exceptional and not necessary the norm. I remember the author mentioning that during parachute training they jumped from a lot higher, but can't remember anything about them jumping from 400 m on a regular basis.



As I said I can't remember the source so cannnot vouch for the authenticity. just one of those favcts that gets stuck in one's memory. I guess I could drag my ass out of this chair and check the several bookcases across the room to see if I can remember where i came across it.  BTW aside from that would yu recommend the book?


----------



## Journeyman

KevinB said:
			
		

> Unlike Freefall where I actually don't feel like I am falling ....


You're not falling; it's just really, really windy

.....as the earth moves in and becomes more focused beneath you.   :nod:


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:
			
		

> Never jumped out of a hook  :'(
> My first few Huey jumps were effectively night jumps, as my eyes were locked shut.   Unlike Freefall where I actually don't feel like I am falling - those first Huey static jumps gave me the idea I was plummeting to my death.



Add some silence, and the sound of the wind blowing through the struts of the balloon cage at 800ft AGL, and you'll find out that adeniline is brown...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCnnEOHNtwM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XK7K4ma_qF8

For all its horrors and complexities, the balloon was a good way to keep troops in date without having to go through the expense and hassle of finding a suitable airfield etc.


----------



## Jungle

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Add some silence, and the sound of the wind blowing through the struts of the balloon cage at 800ft AGL, and you'll find out that adeniline is brown...
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCnnEOHNtwM
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XK7K4ma_qF8
> 
> For all its horrors and complexities, the balloon was a good way to keep troops in date without having to go through the expense and hassle of finding a suitable airfield etc.



I did some balloon jumps in Aldershot in the same period as the videos, again with 1 Para. I was already an experienced Trooper, jumpmaster qualified, and found the balloon jumps impressive.

Thanks for the vids, brings back memories...


----------



## Old Sweat

I'm showing my age but I was on one of the last serials trained at Rivers that used the high tower in Shilo prior to J Stage. It was a ball with a very responsive chute and very, very soft well-cultivated ground to land on. You donned a chute which was deployed. It was then connected to a circular dome shaped frame and hoisted up one of the four arms of the tower, depending on wind direction. The figure of 256 feet or just about 80 metres rings a bell, but I ain't sure. There was a helluva view, even if there ain't a lot to look at in Shilo. Then the frame dropped you and you practiced flight procedures and landing while the para instructor gave you kind words of encouragement over his bull horn. It was a lot of fun.

Rumour has it that it was replaced with the Single Otter. I can't confirm that, but I did jump from an Otter a few times after I had my basic para. The interior of the cabin was cramped so the stick sat on the floor and bumped butts along it to the door. And yes, boys and girls, it took a verrrry long time for the canopy to deploy.


----------



## cupper

Journeyman said:
			
		

> You're not falling; it's just really, really windy
> 
> .....as the earth moves in and becomes more focused beneath you.   :nod:



You're really just getting sucked into the Earth's gravity well.

Either that or your gravitational attraction is pulling the Earth closer to you.

:dunno:


----------



## Loachman

cupper said:
			
		

> Either that or your gravitational attraction is pulling the Earth closer to you.



You BUGGER.

His ego is about the last one that needs any artificial inflation.

This is like a mental "wafer thin mint".

Quick, dive for cover. Forget the bucket.


----------



## captloadie

So, I`m going to go back to my original question about, in this day and age do we, as the CAF, still need an Airborne Assault capability? When was the last time conventional forces were dropped in an area of operations? Given our limited resources, is the CAF going to risk an airframe to drop paratroops, unless we have full air supremacy, in which case wouldn`t we just insert using rotary wing. Dropping equipment and resupply yes, but troops? 

We keep bringing new capabilities online, but we never seem to make the decision on what to give up to do that. There is a discussion on littoral assault ships in another thread, but we can barely get by now with what we have. If we want to go that route, would Airborne assault be the sacrifice?


----------



## Towards_the_gap

captloadie said:
			
		

> So, I`m going to go back to my original question about, in this day and age do we, as the CAF, still need an Airborne Assault capability? When was the last time conventional forces were dropped in an area of operations? Given our limited resources, is the CAF going to risk an airframe to drop paratroops, unless we have full air supremacy, in which case wouldn`t we just insert using rotary wing. Dropping equipment and resupply yes, but troops?
> 
> We keep bringing new capabilities online, but we never seem to make the decision on what to give up to do that. There is a discussion on littoral assault ships in another thread, but we can barely get by now with what we have. If we want to go that route, would Airborne assault be the sacrifice?




I'll be that guy.... I'll go back down that rabbit hole (sorry George, but I will try and frame it in relation to engineers and airborne engineers specifically)

I know that an airborne insertion was at one time considered for an op in Afghanistan, somewhere between 2007-2009, but the limiting factor was not the airframes or the troops, but the 'chutes. Your normal grunt in afg weighed too much for the issue parachute and would lawn dart into the kandahari dust. Therefore it was ixnayed.

Saying that, my troop in 2010 did an 'airmobile crater group operation' where we inserted via chinhook and humped horrendously large rucksacks full of dems over and through grapefields, blowing great big holes in roads and tracks. Yes it's not a true Pegasus/ex coelis/ride of the valkries airborne operation, but my goodness it was certainly light role and certainly a gut checker. You say we keep 'bringing capabilities online' well yes sure, big hand small map wise yes DND buys all sorts of wonderful high tech wizardry. But as an anecdote, let me say this: for all the money poured into CIED technology, I still spent, as a combat engineer, most of my tours clearing trails and roads in a manner that could have come straight out of a WWII book, mine detector and prodder. And Mk I eyeball. Sure the mine detector was more high speed than before, but the techniques were the same. I think the same way about airborne capabilities, until they invent a tactical transporter a la Star Trek, I think it behooves the CF to retain a capability, even if it's on life support, so that, should the time come, it can be ramped up again to support wartime ops.


----------



## Journeyman

Tangent (after all, I did point out to the Loadie officer that this is an Engineer thread...)



			
				Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> I know that an airborne insertion was at one time considered for an op in Afghanistan, somewhere between 2007-2009, but the limiting factor was not the airframes or the troops, but the 'chutes. Your normal grunt in afg weighed too much for the issue parachute and would lawn dart into the kandahari dust.



I'd love to see a source for that.

I just happened to be in Afghanistan for 10 months 2007-08 and pretty much in the loop with various groups' operations (I cared about deconflicting stuff).  I'm also pretty familiar working with Airborne Trials and Evaluations (including older memories of the weighted descent rate of a CT-1 parachute -- including factors like ASL weight factors).  I've heard neither end of your statement.

Seriously, if you could tell me where you got that, I'd be grateful.   :nod:


----------



## PanaEng

Maybe this should be in one of the other thread mentioned by Journeyman:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/airborne-jumps.htm

the French also have done some in Africa as well as the Brits:
http://militaryhistorynow.com/2015/01/29/hitting-the-silk-15-airborne-operations-carried-out-since-world-war-two/

Some key features: destination is far from airhead (Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Mali) aircraft more efficient that helicopter insertion in these circumstances; element of surprise; pre-op security/OPSEC; securing Key terrain for follow on forces - these may be in helicopters or landing at a cleared or built airstrip at the OBJ or by wheels/tracks.


----------



## cupper

Wasn't there a significant drop by the 82nd Airborne sometime after the end of Desert Storm. 

I recall watching a video I borrowed from someone who was there at the time. It was a compilation of footage of various things that occurred during the rotation he was on. It included among other things footage of a flyover of the highway of death, and a drop carried out by the 82nd Airborne in response to Saddam making gestures to the south again.


----------



## Towards_the_gap

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Tangent (after all, I did point out to the Loadie officer that this is an Engineer thread...)
> 
> I'd love to see a source for that.
> 
> I just happened to be in Afghanistan for 10 months 2007-08 and pretty much in the loop with various groups' operations (I cared about deconflicting stuff).  I'm also pretty familiar working with Airborne Trials and Evaluations (including older memories of the weighted descent rate of a CT-1 parachute -- including factors like ASL weight factors).  I've heard neither end of your statement.
> 
> Seriously, if you could tell me where you got that, I'd be grateful.   :nod:



JM - PM sent, but for the benefit of others, I'll say here that it was from a source that would have every reason to be credible....that being said, I should have qualified my initial comment with 'allegedly'


----------



## ArmyRick

Hay Maroon berets look awesome! Seriously, thats a tough question about keeping parachuting troops capability alive. I see the need for free fall parachuting for sure (CANSOFCOM, pathfinders, skyhawks who earn us PR points).

How about getting a company to the arctic in super quick time to conduct a tactical action? or assist in MAJAD? Seems like static line parachute is the fastest way to get there and the arctic has a whole of drop zone ish land scape.

Now your thoughts?


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Hay Maroon berets look awesome! Seriously, thats a tough question about keeping parachuting troops capability alive. I see the need for free fall parachuting for sure (CANSOFCOM, pathfinders, skyhawks who earn us PR points).
> 
> How about getting a company to the arctic in super quick time to conduct a tactical action? or assist in MAJAD? Seems like static line parachute is the fastest way to get there and the arctic has a whole of drop zone ish land scape.
> 
> Now your thoughts?



IMHO.....

As long as we keep sending Canadian civilians, and others, on 'mercy missions' into harm's way in an increasingly unstable world, we should retain the ability to deploy an independent airborne force, of at least a battle group size (inf, engr, arty, armd recce, sigs, med etc), on short notice (by C19/ C130) to rescue any of our nationals in danger of being turned into hamburger helper by machete wielding local cannibals etc.

To do otherwise, or to rely on others to do it for us, is national negligence of the highest order.


----------



## medicineman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ...To do otherwise, or to rely on others to do it for us, is national negligence of the highest order.



This bunch will likely send in people in orange jumpsuits and matching berets to try spreading hope and joy instead of lead...and if they all get captured, hey they're already conveniently dressed for You Tube.

MM


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ... we should retain the ability to deploy an independent airborne force, of at least a battle group size (inf, engr, arty, armd recce, sigs, med etc) ...


Can we retain something that we already do not have?


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> Can we retain something that we already do not have?



We've got 3 jump companies. 

You could augment them with 'jump troops' of Engrs etc and concentrate them a couple of times of year in Petawawa or Wainwright, or wherever, for a BGp Airborne Ex. The Regiments/ Divs with the jump companies (PPCLI, RCR and R22R) could take turns leading the exercises.


----------



## a_majoor

Just another tangent, but using a combination of fixed wing aircraft and parachute insertion from _verrrrry_ low altitude (I seem to recall 600') the Rhodesians were able to respond very quickly against insurgent incursions back in the 60's and 70's. The drill seems to have been fly in the troops to slam the door shut on potential escape routes and then using more conventional troops to root out insurgents or drive them into the paratroopers.

Obviously that worked well for that time and place, but in an environment where there is limited GBAD threats something like this still seems viable. Certainly being able to insert troops extremely rapidly still has a place in military operations, and being able to find the right tools to do the job in various circumstances would seem to call for retaining some capabilities so you can pull things out of the hat when you need to.


----------



## captloadie

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> IMHO.....
> 
> As long as we keep sending Canadian civilians, and others, on 'mercy missions' into harm's way in an increasingly unstable world, we should retain the ability to deploy an independent airborne force, of at least a battle group size (inf, engr, arty, armd recce, sigs, med etc), on short notice (by C19/ C130) to rescue any of our nationals in danger of being turned into hamburger helper by machete wielding local cannibals etc.
> 
> To do otherwise, or to rely on others to do it for us, is national negligence of the highest order.


Except, this is no longer a world where we can can just openly ignore another countries Sovereignty and send in a force. Nor would any party have the political will to do so.
Also, in this day and age, only certain organizations are going to be tasked for this type of insertion. 

We need to except the realities of the 21st century and stop clinging to roles that are outdated.


----------



## Journeyman

captloadie said:
			
		

> ... this is no longer a world where we can can just openly ignore another countries Sovereignty and send in a force.


Iraq, Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso..... 



			
				captloadie said:
			
		

> We need to except  accept the realities of the 21st century and stop clinging to roles that are outdated.


Then why ask the question if your mind is already made up?    :dunno:


----------



## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Then why ask the question if your mind is already made up?    :dunno:



You must be new to the internet.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

captloadie said:
			
		

> We need to except the realities of the 21st century and stop clinging to roles that are outdated.



http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Defence/article490450.ece


----------



## Kirkhill

captloadie said:
			
		

> Except, this is no longer a world where we can can just openly ignore another countries Sovereignty and send in a force. Nor would any party have the political will to do so.
> Also, in this day and age, only certain organizations are going to be tasked for this type of insertion.
> 
> We need to except the realities of the 21st century and stop clinging to roles that are outdated.




Piling on - if you can intrude on foreign airspace to drop bombs why can't you intrude on foreign airspace to drop paras?

I think the only real objection would be the willingness of the para's originating government to accept casualties.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Piling on - if you can intrude on foreign airspace to drop bombs why can't you intrude on foreign airspace to drop paras?
> 
> I think the only real objection would be the willingness of the para's originating government to accept casualties.



It's amazing how fast a country's priorities can shift once you start seeing your own civilian nationals being chopped into pieces on TV. The military should., of course, be ready to respond with a  range of options as required, one of them being immediate armed response to a 'worst case' scenario, regardless of potential casualties. 

I think we have a bunch of those options covered, except for the 'worst case' scenario.


----------



## ArmyRick

If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there. 
I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.

Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
-Permanent national QRF
-Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
-Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
-Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)

Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there.
> I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.
> 
> Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
> -Permanent national QRF
> -Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
> -Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
> -Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)
> 
> Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?



Increase your core strength to battalions, add arty, engr and other meaningful combat & CS support, and you may be in the right ball park.

We already have the 'slipper wearing Ninja' units, they need a bigger bully as backup.


----------



## Brasidas

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there.
> I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.
> 
> Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
> -Permanent national QRF
> -Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
> -Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
> -Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)
> 
> Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?



Maybe I'm missing some sarcasm here, but isn't there already a unit there of similar composition if not role?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brasidas said:
			
		

> Maybe I'm missing some sarcasm here, but isn't there already a unit there of similar composition if not role?



Not with Artillery and other things that make bad guys die faster, in bigger bunches, from a greater distance, and in smaller pieces.


----------



## Brasidas

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Not with Artillery and other things that make bad guys die faster, in bigger bunches, from a greater distance, and in smaller pieces.



I saw the delta in your post; I wasn't seeing it in Rick's.


----------



## GR66

While an airborne battlegroup certainly would be desireable, is it economically and logistically feasible for the CF?  Could you get away with an airborne company group spearhead to secure an airfield backed up by the balance of an airmobile battlegroup?


----------



## Old Sweat

Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.


----------



## GR66

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.



Is there a serious threat of Russia or China landing battalion + sized forces in the Canadian North?  To what purpose?  Where could they go from there and what military objective would they achieve?  Would it not be easier to starve them out by shooting down/sinking their resupply rather than sending in our own land forces to face them?  

I can maybe see foreign forces seizing economic assets in disputed arctic waters (drilling rigs, etc.?) but what would be achieved by taking Yellowknife or Inuvik or even the entries to the North West Passage?


----------



## Kirkhill

How much manpower would be required to locate and neutralize a section sized body bent on disrupting infra-structure?  How much for multiples?  How quickly do you want the response in place?


----------



## Old Sweat

The North American Defence Plan which dates back to 1946 included (and probably still does) the requirement to counter a Soviet\Russian lodgement to seize an airfield in the north. This was because their long range bombers did not have the range to reach targets in the US and Canada without refuelling. Whether this is still valid is moot, but the requirement to counter a lodgement by airborne assault seemed to have developed some remarkable longevity, even if there has been a degree of creative thinking over the years.  

Google Exercise Sweetbriar for an example of the type of exercises conducted as early as 1950.


----------



## Kirkhill

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The North American Defence Plan which dates back to 1946 included (and probably still does) the requirement to counter a Soviet\Russian lodgement to seize an airfield in the north. This was because their long range bombers did not have the range to reach targets in the US and Canada without refuelling. Whether this is still valid is moot, but the requirement to counter a lodgement by airborne assault seemed to have developed some remarkable longevity, even if there has been a degree of creative thinking over the years.



Does that go back discussions about threats, capabilities and intent?

Does a threat exist if only capability or intent exist?  Does the capability to seize an airfield in the north exist?  I would argue: yes.  Does the intent exist?  I would argue: I don't know.  I can't divine the thoughts of my wife let alone the thoughts of murderers or foreign politicians.

I don't think it is possible to say what perceived strategic interest may prompt some body to seize sovereign territory.  But why make it easy for them by having zero response capability?

If we can't despatch a battalion quickly to any part of Canada do we really have a claim on that territory?


----------



## GR66

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> If we can't despatch a battalion quickly to any part of Canada do we really have a claim on that territory?



I don't think any/many would argue that point.  The question is does sovereignty require the ability to conduct a battalion-sized parachute assault against what MAY (of course NOTHING is impossible) be more a hypothetical than real military threat?  Is a smaller, quick reaction force with the capability to either secure an existing airfield or prepare a rough landing field for follow-on airmobile forces enough?  

And what is the cost to other national military capabilities which may be required to counter much more probable threats if we choose to put a significant portion of our limited defence budget into supporting an airborne battalion?  What do we give up to fund this capability?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.



Depending on the threat, the 'footprint' of the airfield needs to be secured as well, not just the hard pan. That doesn't require everyone to be 'jumpers' of course, as you can air land follow on troops, but it does probably require a force bigger than a company group.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:
			
		

> I don't think any/many would argue that point.  The question is does sovereignty require the ability to conduct a battalion-sized parachute assault against what MAY (of course NOTHING is impossible) be more a hypothetical than real military threat?  Is a smaller, quick reaction force with the capability to either secure an existing airfield or prepare a rough landing field for follow-on airmobile forces enough?
> 
> And what is the cost to other national military capabilities which may be required to counter much more probable threats if we choose to put a significant portion of our limited defence budget into supporting an airborne battalion?  What do we give up to fund this capability?



But I don't perceive the two forces as mutually exclusive.

I am pretty sure that we could train every soldier in the army to fall out of a plane if we wanted to.  If we don't want to do that I don't see that it is impractical to load para trained light infantry (with necessary sappers, signallers and gunners) into trucks, helos, boats, LCUs, ships or even LAVs or Narmers.

I do think that the force structure should reflect the ability to make those kinds of shifts in a timely manner.


----------



## Old Sweat

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Depending on the threat, the 'footprint' of the airfield needs to be secured as well, not just the hard pan. That doesn't require everyone to be 'jumpers' of course, as you can air land follow on troops, but it does probably require a force bigger than a company group.



Exactly. Approaches have to be controlled and the fuel farm, ATC and other facilities have to be secured. This implies sufficient force in the initial drop to establish a perimeter and secure inside it, then build up forces to extend it and operate the airfield and marshall the follow on forces. As luck would have it, I am working on the chapter on the Defence of Nicosia Airport by 1st Airborne Battery RCA in August 1974, so I have been deep into source material. The defenders had a company formed of two troops of the battery and a troop of the Airborne Field Squadron, two 106 RRs, a troop of Brit Swingfires and one of light armour, a Lynx patrol from the LdSH(RC) and a Brit FAC. This only gave them enough troops to hold the terminal, ATC building and ancillary structures in the area. The runways, tarmac etc including the five destroyed jetliners of Cyprus Air were not within the defended area.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> But I don't perceive the two forces as mutually exclusive.
> 
> I am pretty sure that we could train every soldier in the army to fall out of a plane if we wanted to.  If we don't want to do that I don't see that it is impractical to load para trained light infantry (with necessary sappers, signallers and gunners) into trucks, helos, boats, LCUs, ships or even LAVs or Narmers.
> 
> I do think that the force structure should reflect the ability to make those kinds of shifts in a timely manner.



Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.

But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.
> 
> But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment



The Canadian Peace Establishment Committee?


----------



## Old Sweat

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.
> 
> But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment



I'd like someone who served in the Airborne Regiment to comment, but I feel the one year rotation has readiness, continuity and training issues. I am not opposed to an airportable brigade group, but suggest a permanent airborne battalion group is the way to go in just about every way except political acceptability. Oh, wait.


----------



## PanaEng

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I'd like someone who served in the Airborne Regiment to comment, but I feel the one year rotation has readiness, continuity and training issues. I am not opposed to an airportable brigade group, but suggest a permanent airborne battalion group is the way to go in just about every way except political acceptability. Oh, wait.


As a Sapper/Cpl with the AB BG in the late 80s I can attest that it was really hard to maintain the required occupational trg and the para/interoperability trg. A rotation will further weaken the overall readiness of the whole as you lose continuity, as you said, and synergy/lessons learned to build on.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I'd like someone who served in the Airborne Regiment to comment, but I feel the one year rotation has readiness, continuity and training issues. I am not opposed to an airportable brigade group, but suggest a permanent airborne battalion group is the way to go in just about every way except political acceptability. Oh, wait.



We did this kind of rotation with 5 AB Bde in the UK, and it has been continued with 16 AB Bde AFAIK. To be honest, I can't recall how long each Bn was 'in role' but it seemed like it was about a year or so.

It relies on the availability of a large number of jump qualified pers and a healthy air delivery infrastructure, of course, and about 4 solid collective field exercises per year for the in role troops. One or two of those should focus on exercising the rest of the mob as well.

Nothing like having a sect of 81mm MOR in DS by P + 15, and a bty of 105mm plus the rest of the mortars at P+30, then two more Bns of Inf at P + a couple of hours.

Compared with what it takes to keep an armoured formation in operation, I imagine it's comparable in some ways but much easier in others.


----------



## Towards_the_gap

D&B you reminded me of the SLE (Spearhead Land Element), a rotational task for a Light battalion BG for 6 months at 48hrs NTM anywhere in the world. Best bit of the workup? The final confirmation ex, where you manifested EVERYTHING you would take on a deployment (and for an engr sqn this was ALOT), packed all your kit as per the kit list, loaded it all up, transported it and yourselves all down to Brize Norton (the entire SLE BG that is), went through the whole movements process (passports, kit checks with all your gear laid out on your poncho, and all), went airside, sat on your kit for about 20 hours with nothing but a crappy tiny canteen selling overpriced instant coffee and 3 day old cookies run by an Iraqi immigrant to sustain you (the food provided at the cookhouse was not worth mentioning), and at the end of it all, some goofy RLC officer comes out, addresses the BG, and says 'Yes you did it, you got everything here on time for an SLE deployment' and boom, it was wacky races to get back to the respective camps.

Exercise in futility......

Sorry for the thread tangent


----------



## daftandbarmy

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> D&B you reminded me of the SLE (Spearhead Land Element), a rotational task for a Light battalion BG for 6 months at 48hrs NTM anywhere in the world. Best bit of the workup? The final confirmation ex, where you manifested EVERYTHING you would take on a deployment (and for an engr sqn this was ALOT), packed all your kit as per the kit list, loaded it all up, transported it and yourselves all down to Brize Norton (the entire SLE BG that is), went through the whole movements process (passports, kit checks with all your gear laid out on your poncho, and all), went airside, sat on your kit for about 20 hours with nothing but a crappy tiny canteen selling overpriced instant coffee and 3 day old cookies run by an Iraqi immigrant to sustain you (the food provided at the cookhouse was not worth mentioning), and at the end of it all, some goofy RLC officer comes out, addresses the BG, and says 'Yes you did it, you got everything here on time for an SLE deployment' and boom, it was wacky races to get back to the respective camps.
> 
> Exercise in futility......
> 
> Sorry for the thread tangent



Ah yes, the joys of airborne life. And doing it all with a raging hangover too... the lovely RAF box lunches helped make it all worthwhile though (not).

I was Lead Coy Gp a few times and got a chance to command it on a couple of exercises. It was fun having a whole Bde at your disposal for awhile.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

GR66 said:
			
		

> Is there a serious threat of Russia or China landing battalion + sized forces in the Canadian North?  To what purpose?  Where could they go from there and what military objective would they achieve?  Would it not be easier to starve them out by shooting down/sinking their resupply rather than sending in our own land forces to face them?
> 
> I can maybe see foreign forces seizing economic assets in disputed arctic waters (drilling rigs, etc.?) but what would be achieved by taking Yellowknife or Inuvik or even the entries to the North West Passage?



Not everyone sees our view of the arctic as part of Canada, if for some economic reasons having a arctic station is a good idea, what if they decide Mould bay or Melville Island would be a good place for that. Let's say the US was to racked by political tension to care. If we can't protect our own, people will eventually come for it. I would say anyone trying to predict where Canada was going to be conducting combat mission in for the last decade plus+ has been off the mark. We are entering the era where just about anything could happen.


----------



## a_majoor

The Canadian north is known as a depot of mineral and energy resources, which while expensive to get, might be worthwhile if the political or economic environment changes. We also have the global warming alarmists telling us the North West Passage will become navigable any day now (for at least the past 15 years); were that to _actually_ happen then transit between Europe and Asia will become much easier and less expensive. Even without global warming, some technical breakthrough might make passage economical enough to compete with crossing the Indian ocean, rounding Africa and sailing up the Atlantic.

All these things are even less expensive if the new owners are not going to follow or pay for Canadian environmental, labour and tax regulations.

And don't forget even the United States disputes the North West Passage as being a Canadian waterway.

So there should be some way to show serious ability to claim and defend our sovereignty in the high arctic.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The Canadian north is known as a depot of mineral and energy resources, which while expensive to get, might be worthwhile if the political or economic environment changes. We also have the global warming alarmists telling us the North West Passage will become navigable any day now (for at least the past 15 years); were that to _actually_ happen then transit between Europe and Asia will become much easier and less expensive. Even without global warming, some technical breakthrough might make passage economical enough to compete with crossing the Indian ocean, rounding Africa and sailing up the Atlantic.
> 
> All these things are even less expensive if the new owners are not going to follow or pay for Canadian environmental, labour and tax regulations.
> 
> And don't forget even the United States disputes the North West Passage as being a Canadian waterway.
> 
> So there should be some way to show serious ability to claim and defend our sovereignty in the high arctic.



If you make it worth their while tax wise etc, natural resources companies will lay claim to the arctic for us. 

Gee, has ever been done before in Canadian history? <cough> HBC <cough>

This time around you could make the spin offs far more beneficial to the locals in Northern Regions through providing good jobs, infrastructure, education etc.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If you make it worth their while tax wise etc, natural resources companies will lay claim to the arctic for us.
> 
> Gee, has ever been done before in Canadian history? <cough> HBC <cough>
> 
> This time around you could make the spin offs far more beneficial to the locals in Northern Regions through providing good jobs, infrastructure, education etc.



I think this approach is the best way to secure our sovereignty in the North.  Foreign troops wading ashore to be met by an RCMP Constable holding a double-double in his hands from the local Timmies asking "whatcha doing, eh?" turns such an action into a bonafide invasion, occupation and declaration of war against a member of NATO (and a direct threat to the USA).  Having extensive civilian infrastructure in the Arctic with people and companies actively using the land, water and resources and the civil institutions to support them is our best deterrent and defence.

I'm not saying we shouldn't maintain an airborne capability, but just not sure how large a force is really required (and affordable).  Would a light (airmobile) Infantry Regiment with three battalions rotating in readiness, each with an airborne company be enough?  A company group quick reaction force for immediate response (backed by CSOR if required)...and the balance of a battlegroup able to be airlifted in afterward.  

In case of a major situation with some warning (and I'm thinking that Russia or China initiating a war with NATO isn't likely to happen without SOME warning), the three jump companies in the Regiment could be brought up to readiness and formed into a full battlegroup.


----------



## ArmyRick

Maybe we need to re-think our potential airborne capability. Maybe a fresh approach or a different mindset is required.
We do not have the political will, financial or man power resource in this country for a larger military (maybe, maybe a larger reserves since they are cheaper). 

So the idea of we need an airborne regiment/battle group/brigade/division might be a moot point.

What if, thinking aloud here, we stick with this airborne/light forces regiment sized concept and go back to the three LARGE company size groups but approach doctrine differently.

Right now, we have been very heavy on COIN and security operations. You do not need a large manpower size unit to conduct those operations, especially when fighting in a coalition.

Everybody seems hell bent on being able to fight another professional armed forces should they lay a claim to our land (especially the far north). So instead of trying to play the manpower/logistics game of battling a large army, do we instead develop doctrine to fight as an insurgency against any larger force invading Canada?

If so, how? Where would we try to bring the fight? Up north or let them come further south? I would assume our American allies would gladly support us if we were forced into hiding and had to fight as insurgents against such a military.

My idea came from thinking about the Rhodesian Light Infantry and how they approached things and then flipped the roles around.


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Right now, we have been very heavy on COIN and security operations. You do not need a large manpower size unit to conduct those operations, especially when fighting in a coalition.



Quite the opposite - these types of operations are manpower intensive.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Quite the opposite - these types of operations are manpower intensive.



IIRC, by some estimates, the IRA kept the some 20,000 of the British Army and 10,000 local police engaged in Northern Ireland, an area three times the size of PEI or one quarter the size of Nova Scotia, for thirty years with an active force of some 250 operators.

Creating chaos is easy.
Maintaining order is hard.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Got a question . How many Aircraft would take to drop a company group ,a battle group or god help us a Brigade ? 
 I seem to recall that it used to take 14 C 130 K's to drop an British airborne battle group.


----------



## Old Sweat

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Got a question . How many Aircraft would take to drop a company group ,a battle group or god help us a Brigade ?
> I seem to recall that it used to take 14 C 130 K's to drop an British airborne battle group.



I believe a million years ago the planning figure to drop a commando group from the airborne regiment including a troop of the airborne battery, sappers, second line and the like was 12 Hercs. The pathfinders and the FOO party went in by HALO 24 hours before P Hour for the main group.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Google Exercise Sweetbriar for an example of the type of exercises conducted as early as 1950.



Interesting read......" ...more than 100 aircraft, many of them "jet propelled", took part in "Exercise Sweetbriar", and RCAF "jet propelled" Vampires operated in Arctic conditions for the first time."

It appears that there was both an air transport of troops/vehicles to an RV point, followed by a road based movement and a company sized airborne drop by (1?) PPCLI ("C Coy") to seize and hold an objective until relieved by ground forces.   A fairly large operation by today's standards....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> IIRC, by some estimates, the IRA kept the some 20,000 of the British Army and 10,000 local police engaged in Northern Ireland, an area three times the size of PEI or one quarter the size of Nova Scotia, for thirty years with an active force of some 250 operators.
> 
> Creating chaos is easy.
> Maintaining order is hard.



The standard troop strength in NI was 16 (yes, sixteen) battalions of Infantry, plus a zillion 'atts and dets' of various natures and a giant, well trained, police force. And the approx. 250 'hard core bad guys' in the IRA were matched by hundreds of others in dozens of other different terrorist organizations, force multiplied via a militarized/ co-opted civilian population.

Kind of like Iraq or Afghanistan must be these days, but probably on a much smaller scale, which is mind boggling all on its own.


----------



## Infanteer

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Got a question . How many Aircraft would take to drop a company group ,a battle group or god help us a Brigade ?
> I seem to recall that it used to take 14 C 130 K's to drop an British airborne battle group.



With a C-130 J, you can get the F Echelon of a Rifle Company out in 2.  Add on some bits and bobs and you are looking at 3.


----------



## McG

How many more aircraft are required to keep a reinforced company supplied once it is on the ground and land/sea lines of communication have not been established?  Let's assume a far north deployment scenario, and another Caribbean deployment scenario?


----------



## Infanteer

I've seen a company's supply of water, rations and an upload of ammo in CDS configuration on a single C-130.  It was 3 x containers, with most of the space being taken by rations.


----------



## MilEME09

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I've seen a company's supply of water, rations and an upload of ammo in CDS configuration on a single C-130.



how often would those drops need to be? weekly, twice a week? every two weeks?


----------



## Infanteer

Sorry, I should have elaborated.  48 hours of supply on those 3 containers.  So, that implies a drop by one plane every 48 hours.


----------



## Old Sweat

At some stage, probably fairly early on, you are going to have to prepare for withdrawal of the force and evacuation of casualties, plus build up including strategic communications. I am not up to speed on a J model's capabilities, but this implies at least a few aircraft to drop in a follow on force to build an airfield, establish an operating base including a hospital and work on sustaining the initial force.


----------



## MilEME09

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> At some stage, probably fairly early on, you are going to have to prepare for withdrawal of the force and evacuation of casualties, plus build up including strategic communications. I am not up to speed on a J model's capabilities, but this implies at least a few aircraft to drop in a follow on force to build an airfield, establish an operating base including a hospital and work on sustaining the initial force.



the max takeoff weight is about 20,000 lbs more then a C-130H model, so the J in theory can get some more supplies squeezed in.


----------



## Old Sweat

Indeed, and when we get an airfield operating the airlift can be much more efficient as we can land supplies instead of having to airdrop them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Indeed, and when we get an airfield operating the airlift can be much more efficient as we can land supplies instead of having to airdrop them.



Which is why you need to send in the Rotweillers first


----------



## McG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> At some stage, probably fairly early on, you are going to have to prepare for withdrawal of the force and evacuation of casualties, plus build up including strategic communications. I am not up to speed on a J model's capabilities, but this implies at least a few aircraft to drop in a follow on force to build an airfield, establish an operating base including a hospital and work on sustaining the initial force.


There is the problem.  Because we put parachute all over the army so that everyone has it to play with, none of those follow on enablers exist.  We have engineer jump sections, but they are focused on close support to company operations and there is no in-service droppable equipment to open a runway.  Once we put guys on the ground, we are not establishing two way movement until we get to them by land or we establish helicopter operations from an already safe APOD or from a ship.


----------



## Old Sweat

MCG said:
			
		

> There is the problem.  Because we put parachute all over the army so that everyone has it to play with, none of those follow on enablers exist.  We have engineer jump sections, but they are focused on close support to company operations and there is no in-service droppable equipment to open a runway.  Once we put guys on the ground, we are not establishing two way movement until we get to them by land or we establish helicopter operations from an already safe APOD or from a ship.



Hope is not a method, and with that I am going to have a Bushmills and go to bed.


----------



## MJP

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> the max takeoff weight is about 20,000 lbs more then a C-130H model, so the J in theory can get some more supplies squeezed in.


 
The max load will almost never be reached via CDS load.  The main limitation is the space avail to put the platforms and limitations on actual load size.  

Quite frankly we don't have a great deal of institutional knowledge when it come to supporting Airborne Ops either with supporting arms/enablers and their equipment or with actual supplies after the fact.  We focus on the sexy part which is the pathfinder/recce CT6 drops and the almost as sexy CT1 main bodies.  How we sustain that force or enable them to influence an area is largely an after thought.  Some great minds are thinking of the issues and potential solutions but they are far and few between.

The fact our entire fleet of parachutes is getting old and are Txing with no real timeline on replacement is another issue all together.


----------



## ArmyRick

Interesting. To maintain the fight we need supporting elements we do not have. It makes sense.

So to fly an airborne force to our far north
1. Initial wave F echelon troops with some atts
2. Second wave seems like it should be engineers with heavy equipment, medics (establish forward casualty post), sigs, an extra rifle platoon or company
3. Need air superiority (this scenario assumes we are fighting a conventional force).

Can hercs be fitted with skis to land a fairly flat snow covered field?
How long would it take to get chinooks to follow the initial drop? Assuming we can set up re-fueling points along the way?
Do Tac Hel squadrons have the ability to run an austere airfield for choppers?

What the hell I'll throw this in. How easily can we quickly modify a herc with 1-2 mini-guns on port side and turn it into ad ad hoc specter gun ship? Would it be worth it to give the jumpers some extra muscle?


----------



## Kirkhill

Add in:

How close is the nearest salt water and how many helicopter capable ships are in the area?

How close is the nearest point of departure?   Are you mounting from Trenton or from Rankin Inlet?


----------



## Infanteer

Question - why paradrop into the north to fight a mythical invading host?  Why not just shoot their resupply down and let them starve and freeze?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Question - why paradrop into the north to fight a mythical invading host?  Why not just shoot their resupply down and let them starve and freeze?



Or that.

Of course.  Maybe there is something they wanted to get done that only took them an hour and a half.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Interesting. To maintain the fight we need supporting elements we do not have. It makes sense.
> 
> So to fly an airborne force to our far north
> 1. Initial wave F echelon troops with some atts
> 2. Second wave seems like it should be engineers with heavy equipment, medics (establish forward casualty post), sigs, an extra rifle platoon or company
> 3. Need air superiority (this scenario assumes we are fighting a conventional force).
> 
> Can hercs be fitted with skis to land a fairly flat snow covered field?
> How long would it take to get chinooks to follow the initial drop? Assuming we can set up re-fueling points along the way?
> Do Tac Hel squadrons have the ability to run an austere airfield for choppers?
> 
> What the hell I'll throw this in. How easily can we quickly modify a herc with 1-2 mini-guns on port side and turn it into ad ad hoc specter gun ship? Would it be worth it to give the jumpers some extra muscle?



Any plan like that would have to be anchored on working from existing villages and other inhabited areas. Those would have to be our 'Air FOBs', which means we should invest in upgrading the infrastructure in all those mainly Inuit populated communities across our northern flank.

We would look pretty silly if we flew and Airborne Brigade 2000 miles north of Ottawa, then have to racetrack because the winds were too high which, based on my relatively limited experience in the high arctic, is often. We would require the ability to airland in a variety of different areas in the eastern and western arctic.

Of course, any successful Arctic excursion is mainly a feat of logistics, not tactics, so we need more propeller beanie wearing 'logistics brainiacs' on this job than 'meat bombs', at the outset anyways.

But, in the meantime, I'm still waiting for someone to let us walk a platoon to the north pole and plant a Canadian Armed Forces Flag there, just to make an international fashion statement of course


----------



## GR66

I'm still looking for a concrete example of something that Russia or China might deem vital enough to their national interest to risk a general war with NATO (or at least the USA) by either seizing or attacking with conventional ground forces in the Canadian arctic.

With the exception of Hans Island, I don't believe that there are any disputes between Canada and any other nation over ownership of any of the islands of the arctic archipeligo.  How could landing military forces on any landmass that is already legally acknowledged as being Canadian soveriegn territory be seen as anything other than an act of war.  

There are certainly disputes over where the water boundaries of various nation's Exclusive Economic Zones are, but how would launching a military invasion of soveriegn Canadian territory help with these claims when they would almost certainly result in a war with NATO/USA?  

As a stretch I could see China or Russia claiming that Canada has relinquised any claims it has over certain territory due to lack of occupation or use but again I'd suggest that that could much more easily be prevented by civil investment and economic development of the arctic rather than by designing a military force to counter a foreign invasion.

That doesn't mean that I think that Canada shouldn't have an airborne capability for a number of other military purposes or that we shouldn't have the ability to rapidly deploy a variety of types of assets in the North, but I think that organizing our airborne forces around the premise of repelling an arctic invasion is mistaken.


----------



## George Wallace

GR66 said:
			
		

> I'm still looking for a concrete example of something that Russia or China might deem vital enough to their national interest to risk a general war with NATO (or at least the USA) by either seizing or attacking with conventional ground forces in the Canadian arctic.
> 
> .........



Natural resources.  Oil.  Diamonds.  Uranium.  Other precious metals.

Canada's arctic is chock full of natural resources.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Russia is building up its naval forces again.  They are expanding their ability to conduct sustained ops in the arctic over the course of the next few years.

ISIL, the GWOT might be the soup de jour for the next few years.  IMO, the thing to look for 10 years from now is the claim to resources in places like the Arctic.  Would Russia risk a war with NATO...perhaps the question is, would NATO risk all-out war with Russia over 'some frozen Canadian tundra'.  

Cold War II could literally be that, for all we know where the world will be in 5, 10 years.  Some things are going back more to the way they were.  The US is likely going to re-open a base in Iceland.

The times, they are a-changin'...back?


----------



## Kirkhill

I joined in 80.

That was 36 years ago.  

Back then I heard the argument that nobody is ever going to attack the North.  The SSF/CAR was a waste of time. The CAST Brigade wasn't something that we wanted to do/were capable of doing. AMF(Land) was a sop to the Danes.

4 CMBG and the Heart of Darkness was the only game in town worth playing.  And Mulroney bought into that and doubled down.

Curiously, since then, the activities on which the CAF seems to have been tasked look a lot more like CAST/AMF(L)/SSF missions than 4 CMBG missions.

And Canada doesn't need defending.  Nobody wants the North.  Not even Canadians.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And Canada doesn't need defending.  Nobody wants the North.  Not even Canadians.



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11944219/Russia-builds-massive-Arctic-military-base.html

 20 Oct 2015

Russia's defence ministry said on Tuesday it has built a giant military base in the far northern Arctic where 150 soldiers can live autonomously for up to 18 months. 

The ministry said the building erected on the large island of Alexandra Land, which is part of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, is 97 per cent complete. 

Named the "Arctic Trefoil", or three-lobed leaf, the sprawling three-pointed structure is coloured red white and blue like the Russian flag. 

The base is a permanent structure located on the 80th parallel north and has an area of 14,000 square metres (150,000 square feet). 

The building can house 150 soldiers and stock enough fuel and food to let them work there autonomously for a year and a half, the ministry said. 

The soldiers can move around the base from one building to another without going outside to face winter temperatures which can reach minus 47 degrees Celsius (-57 degrees Fahrenheit). Fuel can be pumped in from tankers. 

Franz Josef Land is a chain of islands between the Barents and Kara seas north of Novaya Zemlya archipelago. 

It has maintained a Russian border post but the military presence there was withdrawn in the 1990s. It returned last November, when the Northern Fleet dispatched air defence contingents there. 

This year Russia has reopened a landing strip there equipped for large transport planes in order to deliver building materials. 

Russia is building up its Arctic military infrastructure as part of a recently updated Naval Doctrine, which proclaims the region as a top priority due to its mineral riches and strategic importance. 

Russia has already built a similar military base called the "Northern Shamrock" on Kotelny island in the East Siberian Sea further south on the 75th parallel. 

Russia has increasingly asserted itself as an Arctic nation, this year filing a United Nations claim for a vast swathe of the region including the North Pole, and holding war games in the area. 


------------------------------------






  











They sure seem interested in the region to me.   8)


----------



## Kirkhill

North of Great Slave, East of Great Bear and West of the Barren Grounds, I can put an outline of the country of Switzerland on the ground and cover five diamond mines.  Salt water is accessible via Bathurst Inlet.

What happens if the locals decide they want a better deal than Ottawa is offering them and they pull a Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, looking for diplomatic recognition from other countries?  Native land claim. Well established resource base.  Foreign investors.  Foreign governments.  Is that a domestic or a NATO issue?  

If NATO doesn't react in the Baltics will it react in Canada?  

We can't know all the "what ifs".  But you can ask yourself what might you be able to do if.


----------



## GR66

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Natural resources.  Oil.  Diamonds.  Uranium.  Other precious metals.
> 
> Canada's arctic is chock full of natural resources.



I'm not questioning the fact that the arctic has lots of natural resources.  So does the Russian arctic.  Maybe I've caught a nasty case of the "Sunny Ways"  :boke: but I honestly think we're a long way from Russia being so short of their own resources that they would go to war to seize ours.  And while European NATO members may not go to war for "some frozen Canadian tundra" I seriously doubt that the USA would stand by and accept such a blatant challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.  

Any I certainly wouldn't envy the Russian position if they were to try and take and hold Canadian territory in the far North and trying to set up mineral or oil extraction facilities.  It's hard enough to operate up there without active military forces trying to disrupt you.  I'm quite confident that it would cost much, much more than they could possibly ever gain from it.  And as Infanteer noted "Why not just shoot their resupply down and let them starve and freeze?"

As for China...they would have to go over Canadian and/or US territory in order to launch an airborne invasion of the arctic and any naval forces would have to fight their way through the choke point of the Bering straight.  Their logistical situation would be even more difficult than the Russians and they would be risking their vital export trade to their biggest export partner (the US) by taking such an action.

Short of M. King Hubbard being right afterall and "Peak Oil" unexpectedly hitting and the Gulf/Iranian/Russian/Venezualan/US oil wells all run dry making undiscovered arctic oil worth the risk of war I don't see an arctic invasion in the cards.  Might they encroach on our EEZ and start drilling wells on our side of a disputed boundary?  That I an see...but not sure what an airborne brigade would bring to that fight that wouldn't be better done by air and sea power.

Again...I do think that Canada likely should have an airborne capability for overseas deployment and greatly improved ability to rapidly move equipment, personnel and resources to the Arctic (and everywhere else in Canada), but I personally see this particular scenario very low down on the probability scale.

Much more likely in my mind that we'd have to quickly send our airborne forces to the Scandanavian Arctic to counter Russian attacks aimed at unbalancing NATO while they attempt to retake the Baltic states for example than having to use them to retake Sachs Harbour from a Russian invasion.

Just my personal opinion though of course.


----------



## GR66

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> North of Great Slave, East of Great Bear and West of the Barren Grounds, I can put an outline of the country of Switzerland on the ground and cover five diamond mines.  Salt water is accessible via Bathurst Inlet.
> 
> What happens if the locals decide they want a better deal than Ottawa is offering them and they pull a Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, looking for diplomatic recognition from other countries?  Native land claim. Well established resource base.  Foreign investors.  Foreign governments.  Is that a domestic or a NATO issue?
> 
> If NATO doesn't react in the Baltics will it react in Canada?
> 
> We can't know all the "what ifs".  But you can ask yourself what might you be able to do if.



This scenario to me is significantly more likely than a Russian (or Chinese) direct invasion.  But again I'll come back to my argument that a much better counter to this possibility is to develop the Arctic so that it and its people are prosperous (and therefore unlikely to want to trade Canadian citizenship for the questionable benefits of becoming Russian) rather than building a military capacity to counter it IF it happens.

Again...not in anyway saying that economic development of the North AND improvements to our airborne capability can't or shouldn't happen at the same time.  I just don't think that tailoring the force and optimizing it for what I believe is a low-probability threat makes a great deal of sense.

Since I'm sure that I've more than made my point I'll leave it at that so as to no longer distract from the discussion.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> I'm still looking for a concrete example of something that Russia or China might deem vital enough to their national interest to risk a general war with NATO (or at least the USA) by either seizing or attacking with conventional ground forces in the Canadian arctic.
> 
> With the exception of Hans Island, I don't believe that there are any disputes between Canada and any other nation over ownership of any of the islands of the arctic archipeligo.  How could landing military forces on any landmass that is already legally acknowledged as being Canadian soveriegn territory be seen as anything other than an act of war.
> 
> There are certainly disputes over where the water boundaries of various nation's Exclusive Economic Zones are, but how would launching a military invasion of soveriegn Canadian territory help with these claims when they would almost certainly result in a war with NATO/USA?
> 
> As a stretch I could see China or Russia claiming that Canada has relinquised any claims it has over certain territory due to lack of occupation or use but again I'd suggest that that could much more easily be prevented by civil investment and economic development of the arctic rather than by designing a military force to counter a foreign invasion.
> 
> That doesn't mean that I think that Canada shouldn't have an airborne capability for a number of other military purposes or that we shouldn't have the ability to rapidly deploy a variety of types of assets in the North, but I think that organizing our airborne forces around the premise of repelling an arctic invasion is mistaken.



Based on Russia's approach to the Crimea and other places, they are probably already occupying our arctic territories and we don't even know they are there.


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## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Based on Russia's approach to the Crimea and other places, they are probably already occupying our arctic territories and we don't even know they are there.


 Why not the Luftwaffe did it and we never knew about it until the early nineties.


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## a_majoor

For the Russians or Chinese (or even the Americans) to succeed they mearly have to block or disrupt "our" access to arctic resources, rather than immediatly attempt to extract and exploit them on their own. In fact, the scenario Chris Pook wrote upthread is fully in keeping with Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" doctrine; there is no immediate means of determining who or what is behind the action, there are enough factions within Canada to exploit the situation and utterly paralyse the GoC and the Chinese can gain credit by coming in after 15-18 months to "broker" some sort of agreement. As for access denial for extracting our own resources, one only has to look at attempts to isolate Albertan oil. We know American groups like the Tides Foundation have spent @ $300 million on anti oilsands campaigns, who knows how much the Saudis or other hostile nations may have contributed or abetted these efforts as well? Going in and physically blocking or disrupting physical infrastructure serves the same purpose and is more dramatic.

Similarly, the United States (our closest friend and ally) does not recognize our claim that the North West Passage is internal waters. Should global warming ever happen for real, an ice free North West Passage would cut travel time from Asia to europe considerably, and I rather doubt that Chinese container ships are going to bother with tiresome Canadian regulations if they chose to believe that the NW passage is internatinal waters.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Read a book over the weekend by Mark Devore published by the US Army's electronic publishing office called "When Failure Thrives" regarding airborne forces in the USA, USSR and UK. Following a study of airborne theories and operations during WW2 he examines the airborne forces of those three countries in the post-WW2 period. He makes the point that airborne forces were conceived to execute "vertical envelopment." This was a failed innovation as it never really worked out during the war. He examines the path that airborne forces took following the war from an institutional perspective. In the USSR airborne forces were their own independent branch and thus continued to thrive despite their dismal WW2 performance. In the UK the airborne forces were not really institutionalized and withered following the war. He argues that the US took a middle road with less institutionalization than the USSR but with a sufficeint airborne bureaucracy to survive despite not really having a role.

Devore argues that any military organization that faces obsolescence can adopt one of three survival strategies. First, it can invest in new technologies and tactics that enable it to continue to execute its core mission. He uses the USAF's adaptation to the North Vietnamese air defence system as an example. Second, the organization can seek new roles using the same capabililties. The USMC did this in the 1930s when they switched from being the US's Latin American police force to amphibious operations. Lastly, it can rely on elite status or nostalgia to survive.

Devore argues that the US military maintains too large of an airborne capability that can be justified by past or anticipated performance. He argues that the US airborne forces survived and indeed thrived by seeking the forced-entry role combined with having key Army leaders who came from the airborne forces. The forced-entry role, for Devore, is not something to base such a large force around and he makes the point that combat jumps have become exceedingly rare and those in recent times have been primarily for show.

I think that we can see some of Devore's thesis at play in Canada. We certainly see people seeking roles for airborne forces and also appealing to its elite status. The level of institutionalization is, however, quite low meaning that our forces are kept at fairly low levels. 

I imagine that Devore's work will cause some arguments in the US. It is a fairly short read and is easily accessible on the internet. As such I think its works a read.

Cheers


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## Blackadder1916

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Read a book over the weekend by Mark Devore published by the US Army's electronic publishing office called "When Failure Thrives" regarding airborne forces in the USA, USSR and UK.  . . .
> 
> . . .  It is a fairly short read and is easily accessible on the internet.



http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/WhenFailureThrives.pdf


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## Colin Parkinson

Perhaps better to define them as “Airmobile” with parachuting as subset? Each nation creates a “airmobile” unit based around its actual capabilities, for us that would be Griffon-Chinook-C130J-C-17.  We can advise our allies what we can bring to the fight and what speed and how long they can be sustained.

I think Entebbe and Fort Eben-Emael were brilliant uses of “air mobile” Also Glider ops in Burma, not to mention some of the heli assaults in Vietnam


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## dapaterson

I particularly enjoy the discussion on page 70ff about Insights for Policymakers: "…[I ]nstitutionally strong military organizations rarely engage in critical reappraisals of their utility and are often successful at preserving themselves long after their core mission has become obsolete."

Reads a lot like the Shirky principle: "Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the solution" 

EDIT: formatting.


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## Old Sweat

Colin P said:
			
		

> I think Entebbe and Fort Eben-Emael were brilliant uses of “air mobile” Also Glider ops in Burma, not to mention some of the heli assaults in Vietnam



The examples cited above were largely against light to nil resistance, some of the Vietnam examples excepted. Daylight assaults by glider especially were frankly blood baths. Crete comes to mind, but Operation Varsity, the airborne assault across the Rhine, also had heavy casualties. The glider-borne British 6 Airportable Brigade lost more troops killed in the few hours of the fly-in than in its tour in Normandy.


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## ueo

Based on the author's conclusions, the question now becomes one of can Canada afford, in every sense of the word, any airborne capability beyond the present SAR role. We don't seem to have any military will to retain this capability as it appears that computers, drones etc are far sexier. Politically I cannot see any government making a decision to utilise any form of "entry" ops due to the manpower costs coupled with to PR problems. Also as discussed elsewhere the one remaining option is employment in the North. Not as forced entry ops but in airfield creation ops. In my mind a specific engineering problem. For proponents of the option lets deal realistically with the availability of resources including manpower as well as the probability of our becoming involved in any symmetrical battle  space. MHO only.


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## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I particularly enjoy the discussion on page 70ff about Insights for Policymakers: "…[I ]nstitutionally strong military organizations rarely engage in critical reappraisals of their utility and are often successful at preserving themselves long after their core mission has become obsolete."
> 
> Reads a lot like the Shirky principle: "Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the solution"
> 
> EDIT: formatting.



Paras, Rifles, Fusiliers, Grenadiers, Dragoons, Carabiniers...... (Tanks) 

By the way the Marines have been around for 350 years - doing basically the same stuff:  swanning around on Her Majesty's Ships and doing whatever they are told to do.

Edit to add: Guards - but they know what their job is: Stop people killing Her Majesty.


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## Colin Parkinson

It shows you though that when used correctly they can achieve significant results. As for Crete, could the Germans have captured it any other way, what would have been the cost of a amphibious operation? I think what airborne could do was oversold. As for Glider losses, I think the majority of Allied losses in Sicily were due to friendly fire.


Glider ops in Burmahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ag9Ft__KuA


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## Kirkhill

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The examples cited above were largely against light to nil resistance, some of the Vietnam examples excepted. Daylight assaults by glider especially were frankly blood baths. Crete comes to mind, but Operation Varsity, the airborne assault across the Rhine, also had heavy casualties. The glider-borne British 6 Airportable Brigade lost more troops killed in the few hours of the fly-in than in its tour in Normandy.



But company/battalion sized insertions, either where the enemy was not or where surprise was possible, were successful.  Pegasus Bridge and the first day of Market Garden come to mind. Even the D-Day night landings. Bruneval.

Throwing in gliders, in daylight,  behind aircraft that took minutes to cross the line of sight of a single anti-aircraft gun, was not a recipe for success.

Throwing in paratroopers for days on end after the locals knew they were coming was equally counter-productive.  Pace Crete and Arnhem.


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## Old Sweat

I "fast read" the publication, so my comprehension is even more limited than usual. My feeling is that there is place for small scale airborne operations, but massive drops are frankly non-starters. The US forces have the capability to drop one brigade, but maintain a much larger force. That, I submit, is too large to fail in the short term and too small to succeed in the longer haul against any serious opposition.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Colin P said:
			
		

> It shows you though that when used correctly they can achieve significant results. As for Crete, could the Germans have captured it any other way, what would have been the cost of a amphibious operation? I think what airborne could do was oversold. As for Glider losses, I think the majority of Allied losses in Sicily were due to friendly fire.
> 
> 
> Glider ops in Burmahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ag9Ft__KuA



The author of the book I mentioned gives a study of WW2 airborne operations, including Crete. He calls Crete a Phyrrhic success where the cost of success was too much. Indeed, that operation essentially ended German airborne operations. His analysis of major airborne operations indicates more failures than successes.


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## Baz

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Similarly, the United States (our closest friend and ally) does not recognize our claim that the North West Passage is internal waters. Should global warming ever happen for real, an ice free North West Passage would cut travel time from Asia to europe considerably, and I rather doubt that Chinese container ships are going to bother with tiresome Canadian regulations if they chose to believe that the NW passage is internatinal waters.



The US doesn't consider any full passage through the Northwest Passage international waters.  There is no passage through that is always wider than 24nm, which means some of it is de facto Canadian Territorial waters. Although there are a lot of different passages, the closest is Lancaster Sound, Barrow Straight, McClure Strait which narrows possibly only once near Resolute.

They don't recognize our 1986 Declaration of Straight Baselines, which makes all of it Canadian Internal Waters.  However, as they have not actually contested or challenged it then it could become recognized.

What they do claim is that it is an International Straight, and that therefore transit passage is enjoyed (think Straights Of Gibraltar, etc).  This would mean they would not have to ask permission; certain rules of the EEZ would still apply (esp Environmental).  However, the rules for International Straights are deliberately vague; they refer to "Straights Used For International Navigation" which alludes to they need historical precedent, but they don't formally define them.  Canada believes there is no precedent for the Northwest Passage, the US does.

This http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf is a relative recent statement of their position.  Note they say it is an International Straight, and make no justification; that is so that there position is that it is a fact.


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## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The author of the book I mentioned gives a study of WW2 airborne operations, including Crete. He calls Crete a Phyrrhic success where the cost of success was too much. Indeed, that operation essentially ended German airborne operations. His analysis of major airborne operations indicates more failures than successes.



There's a quote by Patton somewhere where he suggests that Airborne Forces would have been better employed under the direct command of Army Commanders, where they could be fully integrated into the ground based  battle plan. 

I can see that, and assume that 'A Bridge Too Far' wouldn't have suffered as much from the failure of the cavalry to arrive soon enough.


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