# The Will to Intervene (W2I) - Going Beyond Responsibility to Protect (R2P)



## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

I’m starting a separate topic here, in our *Canadian Politics* area, because, while related to the *Canadian Military* and *International Situation & World News* areas, this is a Canadian _political_ issue.

Concordia University’s Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies has just published a report by Sen. Roméo Dallaire. That report, which is worth a read, can be downloaded here or  (in either English or French) here.

The report, which has been _embraced_ by _inter alia_ Conservative Sen. Hugh Segal and Robert Fowler, was discussed on CBC radio’s _The Current_ this morning – the discussion should be on their web site tomorrow. The aim of Dallaire and friends is to influence, indeed, shape Canadian *policy* – that’s a *political*, albeit not necessarily highly *partisan* act.

This brings up an opinion piece by Prof. Tom Flanagan which is reproduced here under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/intervening-abroad-do-we-have-the-means-to-match-our-will/article1296302/


> Intervening abroad: Do we have the means
> to match our will?
> *Before shipping out to protect distant interests, we should consider our limitations*
> 
> ...



For those who do not want to read the whole thing, here, taken from W2I’s _Executive summary_ is a list of recommendations:

*Enabling Leadership*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The Prime Minister make preventing mass atrocities a national priority for Canada (p.18)
• The Prime Minister appoint an International Security Minister as a senior member of the Cabinet (p.20)
• The Government of Canada support and promote public discussion on Canada’s role in preventing mass atrocities (p.21)
• The Parliament of Canada convert the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Prevention of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity into a standing joint committee (p.22)
• Parliamentarians exercise individual initiative and use their existing powers and privileges to advocate the implementation of R2P as an international norm and a vital part of Canada’s foreign policy (p.24)


*Enhancing Coordination*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The Government of Canada create an interdepartmental Coordinating Office for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities (p.30)
• The Coordinating Office for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities create standard operating procedures for disseminating intelligence concerning the risks of mass atrocities throughout the whole of government (p.32)


*Building Capacity*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The Government of Canada establish a Canadian Prevention Corps (p.37)
• The Government of Canada increase its diplomatic and development presence in fragile countries (p.38)
• The Government of Canada continue enhancing the Canadian Forces’ capabilities by increasing its force strength and developing operational concepts, doctrine, force structure, and training to support civilian protection (p.41)


*Enabling Leadership*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The President of the United States issue an Executive Order establishing the prevention of mass atrocities as a policy priority (p.25)
• The United States Congress create a Caucus for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities (p.25)
• Members of the United States Congress take individual initiative and use their existing powers and privileges to advocate for the implementation of R2P (p.26)
• The United States Government foster public discussions on preventing mass atrocities (p.28)


*Enhancing Coordination*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The President create an Atrocities Prevention Committee to coordinate interagency policy on the prevention mass atrocities (p.33)
• The National Security Advisor create an Interagency Policy Committee on Preventing Mass Atrocities to coordinate policy across the executive branch and liaise with the Atrocities Prevention Committee (p.34)
• The National Security Advisor create standard operating procedures for disseminating intelligence on the risks of genocide and other mass atrocities (p.36)


*Building Capacity*

_W2I recommends that:_

• The United States Government allocate federal funding to institutionalize the prevention of mass atrocities within civilian agencies (p.43)
• The United States Government re-establish its soft power capacity by expanding its diplomatic and development corps, and enhancing the field training of USAID and State Department officials (p.44)
• The Department of Defense develop and incorporate doctrine and rules of engagement on preventing and responding to mass atrocities and train the military in civilian protection (p.45)


*Ensuring Knowledge*

_W2I recommends that:_

• Canadian and American civil society organizations develop permanent domestic constituencies by forming national coalitions for R2P in Canada and the U.S. (p.48)
• Canadian and American civil society organizations expand their advocacy by targeting local/municipal and state/provincial levels of government to support R2P (p.51)
• Canadian and American civil society groups develop strategic, outcome-based proposals geared towards key decision makers in the government (p.52)
• Canadian and American civil society groups leverage new information and communications technologies to educate the public and government (p.53)
• Canadian and American civil society groups initiate public discussions on the prevention of mass atrocities and related foreign policy issues (p.55)
• Individual journalists, media owners, and managers in Canada and the United States commit themselves to “the responsibility to report” (p.56)


Of course, I will have more to say on some of those issues later.  :

Much of the report is taken up with case studies from Rwanda and Kosovo and I hope Army.ca members will be able to _critique_ that information.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

Here, in two parts, from the MIGS web site, is a list of  members of “The Research Steering Committee of MIGS’ Will to Intervene Project:”

------------------
*Maurice Baril* served in the Canadian Forces for forty years. He joined as a reservist while studying at the University of Ottawa. During his military career, he held command and staff responsibilities across Canada, in Europe, the US, the Middle East and Africa. In the 1990s he was successively commander of the Army Combat Training Centre, military advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York for three years, Commander of the Army from 1995 to 1997, promoted to the rank of General in 1997 and appointed Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff until retirement in 2001. He is a graduate of Canadian Army Command and Staff College, US Army Special Forces School Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris. Since retirement, General (ret.) Baril has been special advisor to the Ambassador for Mine Action of the Department of Foreign Affairs Canada. In January 2003, he was appointed Inspector General in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations Secretariat. 

*Ed Broadbent* was leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada from 1975 to 1989 when he represented the riding of Oshawa. After retiring, he returned briefly to Parliament in 2004–2006, representing the riding of Ottawa Centre. From 1990 to 1996, Broadbent was the founding president of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal. He was made a member of the Privy Council in 1982, an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1993 and a Companion of the Order of Canada in 2002. He is now a Fellow at the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University.

*Fred C. Fischer* worked for the US government for thirty-eight years, during which time he directed some of the largest disaster relief operations ever mounted. These included earthquake recovery in Guatemala and Nicaragua; famine and refugee relief in Pakistan, Djibouti, Kenya, southern Sudan, Somalia, Malawi and Mozambique; covert cross-border humanitarian assistance from Pakistan into Afghanistan (during the Soviet invasion); and aid to the victims of apartheid in South Africa. His overseas assignments included First Secretary of the American Embassy in Bonn, Germany (1964–1968); US Coordinator for Emergency Relief in Ethiopia (during the great famine of 1984–1986); and Director of the USAID Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (based in Nairobi, Kenya, 1990–1995). 

Fischer played a key role in the design of the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), currently being used by USAID around the world; and developed a Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) system for countries that are prone to civil conflict and human-made disasters. He was named Federal Executive of the Year in 1986, for management of the emergency relief program in Ethiopia, the largest ever carried out by the US. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin with a BA in Journalism and Political Science in 1956 and was a Sloan Fellow at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1974–1975. Since retiring in 1995, he has carried out consulting assignments for USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank. He lives in Leesburg, Virginia, and is currently researching a book on the American Civil War.

*Tom Flanagan* is the award-winning author of _Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power_ (2007) and _Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning_ (1995). In 2001–2002, Dr. Flanagan managed Stephen Harper’s campaigns for the leadership of the Canadian Alliance (2002) and of the Conservative Party of Canada (2004), as well as the Conservative Party’s national election campaign in 2004. He was the Senior Communications Adviser in the Conservative war room during the party’s successful 2005–2006 election campaign. Previously, from 1991 to 1993, Dr. Flanagan was an adviser to Preston Manning and the Reform Party.

Prior to his involvement in federal politics, Dr. Flanagan was best known for his scholarship on Louis Riel, the North-West Rebellion, and aboriginal land claims. His book _First Nations? Second Thoughts_ (2000) received the Donner Prize and the Canadian Political Science Association’s Donald Smiley Prize for the best book on Canadian politics published in the year 2000. He has served as a consultant and expert witness for the Crown in aboriginal and treaty-rights cases such as _Dumont, Blais, Benoit, Victor Buffalo_, and _Manitoba Metis Federation_.

Dr, Flanagan studied political science at Notre Dame University, the Free University of West Berlin, and Duke University, where he received his PhD. He has taught political science at the University of Calgary since 1968. He was head of the political science department from 1982 to 1987, and was named University Professor in 2007. Dr. Flanagan was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1996. 

*Robert Fowler* has had a distinguished career as a Canadian diplomat and public servant. He was the Prime Minister’s Personal Representative for Africa. He was a member of former Prime Minister Paul Martin’s special advisory team on Darfur. Fowler served as Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations (1995–2000) and Italy (2000–2006), and as foreign policy advisor to three Prime Ministers. He was also the Deputy Minister of National Defence (1989–1995).

*Yoine Goldstein* was appointed to the Senate in 2005. Prior to becoming a senator, he was a senior and managing partner of the Montreal law firm, Goldstein, Flanz & Fishman. He is currently with McMillan Binch Mendelsohn LLP in Montreal as Senior Counsel. In 2003 he served as Special Advisor to the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in connection with its report on amendments to Canadian bankruptcy and insolvency legislation, and in 2001 and 2002 as chair of the Federal Personal Insolvency Task Force. A graduate of McGill University's Law Faculty in 1958, he went on to complete his studies in France, where he obtained a Doctorat de l’université from the Université de Lyon in 1960. Senator Goldstein taught law at l’Université de Montréal from 1973 to 1997. In 1992 he received the Lord Reading Law Society Human Rights Award and the Lord Reading Law Society Service Award in 1998. He is a member of the Community Advisory Board of the Concordia University Chair of Canadian Jewish Studies. Senator Goldstein is the only Canadian lawyer to have been elected a Fellow of both the American College of Bankruptcy and the American College of Trial Lawyers. In 2007 he received the Quebec Bar’s honorary distinction of Avocat émérite.

*Bill Graham* is the former Liberal Party Leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defence. Before entering the public service and serving as a Member of Parliament for over thirteen years, Graham taught in the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto where he pioneered the international law program. He was a Member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade from 1994–2002 and Chairman from 1996–2002, and during 1998 led the drafting of the Standing Committee report on the Arctic: “Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century.” Graham served as Leader of the Official Opposition until his retirement from Parliament in 2007. 

*David A. Hamburg, MD*, is DeWitt Wallace Distinguished Scholar at Weill Cornell Medical College and chairs the United Nations Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention. He was President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York from 1982 to 1997 and has been Professor at Stanford University and Harvard University, President of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Hamburg is the author of _No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict_ (2002) and _Learning to Live Together: Preventing Hatred and Violence in Child and Adolescent Development_  (2004). He was a member of President Clinton’s Defense Policy Board and the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology and was the founder of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government. He is the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences Public Welfare Medal and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

*Ted Koppel* is Discovery Channel’s managing editor. In this role, he anchors _Koppel on Discovery_, a series of long-form programming that examines major global topics and events for the largest cable network in the United States. He and his team of award-winning producers joined the network in January 2006. Koppel is also a senior news analyst for National Public Radio. Koppel came to Discovery Channel after forty-two years at ABC News. From 1980 until 2005, he was the anchor and managing editor of ABC News _Nightline_, one of the most honoured broadcasts in television history. As the nation’s longest running network daily news anchor, his interviews and reporting touched every major news story over a span of twenty-five years.

A member of the Broadcasting Hall of Fame, Koppel has won every major broadcasting award including forty-two Emmy Awards (one for lifetime achievement), eight George Foster Peabody Awards, ten duPont-Columbia Awards and two George Polk Awards. His ten Overseas Press Club Awards make him the most honoured journalist in the Club’s history. He has received more than twenty honorary degrees from universities in the United States. Before becoming _Nightline_ anchor, Koppel worked as an anchor, foreign and domestic correspondent and bureau chief for ABC News. A native of Lancashire, England, Koppel moved to the United States with his parents when he was thirteen and became a US citizen in 1963. Koppel speaks fluent German, adequate French, and smatterings of a half dozen other languages. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Syracuse University and a Master of Arts in mass communications research and political science from Stanford University. He is married to the former Grace Anne Dorney of New York City. They reside in Maryland and have four children and five grandchildren.

*Juan É. Méndez* was the United Nations’ special advisor on the prevention of genocide from 2004 to 2007. He has taught at the University of Notre Dame, Georgetown University Law Center, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies, and in the Oxford Masters Program in International Human Rights Law. His work on behalf of political prisoners of Argentina’s military dictatorship in the 1970s led to his torture and administrative detention for over a year, during which time Amnesty International adopted him as a “Prisoner of Conscience.” Following his release, he moved to the United States and began work with Human Rights Watch. Méndez has received multiple awards for his work, including the University of Dayton’s inaugural Oscar A. Romero Award for Leadership in Service to Human Rights (2000) and the Jeanne and Joseph Sullivan Award of the Heartland Alliance (2003).


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

Part 2 of 2

*Alex Neve* is the Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada’s English-speaking branch. He has participated in Amnesty International missions to Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoïre, Guinea, Honduras, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Grassy Narrows, Ontario. He represented Amnesty International at the 2001 Summit of the Americas, the 2002 G8 Summit and the 2003 Asian Plurilateral Symposium on Human Rights in China. He has appeared before numerous Canadian parliamentary committees as well as various UN and Inter-American human rights bodies. He holds a Bachelor of Commerce and Bachelor of Laws from Dalhousie University, and a Masters Degree in International Human Rights Law from the University of Essex. Neve is the Chair of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Centre for International Justice, and a member of the Board of Directors of Partnership Africa Canada. He was named a Trudeau Foundation Mentor in late 2007 and is an Officer of the Order of Canada.

*André Pratte* is the editor-in-chief of the Montreal’s _La Presse_ and the author of five books on journalism and politics, including _Aux pays des merveilles: Essai sur les mythes politiques québécois_  (2006), _Le Temps des girouettes_  (2003) and _L'Énigme Charest_  (1997), a biography of a Jean Charest. He was one of twelve prominent Quebecers, led by former Premier Lucien Bouchard, who signed the 2005 manifesto entitled “_Pour un Québec lucide_” (“For a Clear-Eyed Vision of Quebec”), which provoked a passionate debate about Quebec’s future. He also edited and contributed to _Reconquerir le Canada: un nouveau projet pour la nation québécoise (Reconquering Canada: A New Project for the Quebec Nation)_, a collection of essays promote federalism in the province.

*Kenneth Prewitt* is the Carnegie Professor of Public Affairs at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Previous positions include director of the United States Census Bureau (1998–2001), director of the National Opinion Research Center, president of the Social Science Research Council and senior vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Russell-Sage Foundation, and member of other professional associations, including the Council on Foreign Relations. Among his awards are a Guggenheim Fellowship, honorary degrees from Carnegie Mellon and Southern Methodist University, a Distinguished Service Award from the New School for Social Research, various awards associated with his directorship of the Census Bureau, and in 1990 he was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit from the Federal Republic of Germany. Prewitt’s recent publications include _Politics and Science in Census Taking_ (2003) and _The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations_  (2006). He has authored and coauthored a dozen books and more than 100 articles and book chapters. His current manuscript under preparation is _Race Counting In America: Past, Present, Future_. 

*David Scheffer* is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law, where he teaches international criminal law and international human rights law. He is the former US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997–2001) and led the US delegation in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. During the first term of the Clinton Administration, he was Senior Advisor and Counsel to the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Madeleine Albright, and served on the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. 

*Hugh D. Segal* is a graduate of the University of Ottawa. Senator Segal spent several decades in the private and public sector before being appointed to the Senate in 2005 by Prime Minister Martin.  His public sector experience spans the Cabinet Office at Queens Park and the Prime Minister’s Office in Ottawa.  He is a former President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy and remains a Senior Fellow and teaches at Queen’s University.  In the private sector, he worked in the alcohol and food, marketing and advertising, and financial service sectors. He sits on various corporate and public boards, as well as serving on not-for-profit and charitable organizations.  Since being appointed to the Senate as a Conservative, he has sat on the Senate Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Agriculture and Forestry, Aboriginal Affairs committees and the Special Committee on Anti-Terrorism.  In 2003 he was named to the Order of Canada; in 2004 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the Royal Military College and in 2005 was appointed an Honorary Captain of the Canadian Navy.  He has authored numerous books and articles on public policy, the Conservative party and was before the Senate appointment, a regular television commentator on the CTV, PBS and CBC networks. He makes his home in Kingston, is married to Donna Armstrong of Kingston and they have one daughter, Jacqueline.

*Jennifer Allen Simons* is President of The Simons Foundation, Visiting Fellow at the Morris J. Wosk Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University and Adjunct Professor with SFU’s School for International Studies. She is a former Director and Adjunct Professor of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia (UBC), which she established jointly with UBC. Simons was a member of the Canadian government delegation to the UN 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the 2002 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference and is a member of the Steering Committee of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs/Non-Governmental Organizations Consultations on Nuclear Issues. SFU honoured Simons with the Jennifer Allen Simons Chair in Liberal Studies and the 1996 Chancellor’s Distinguished Service Award; she is the recipient of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s Golden Jubilee Commemorative Medal for her service in support of the global effort to eradicate landmines and the 2006 Vancouver Citizens’ Peace Award.

*Janice Gross Stein* is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. She is the co-author, with Eugene Lang, of _The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar_  (2007), recipient of the Shaughnessy Cohen prize for political writing. Among her other books are _Networks of Knowledge: Innovation in International Learning_  (2000); _The Cult of Efficiency_  (2001); and _Street Protests and Fantasy Parks_  (2001). In 2006, she was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Laws by the University of Alberta and the University of Cape Breton. She was the Massey Lecturer in 2001 and a Trudeau Fellow. Gross Stein is the recipient of the Molson Prize by the Canada Council for an outstanding contribution by a social scientist to public debate and an Honorary Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a member of the Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario.

*Allan Thompson* is an Assistant Professor at Carleton University’s School of Journalism and Communication. He joined the faculty at Carleton in 2003 after spending seventeen years as a reporter with the _Toronto Star_, Canada’s largest circulation daily newspaper. Allan worked for ten years as a correspondent for _The Star_ on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, reporting on foreign affairs, defence and immigration issues. He first reported from Rwanda for The Star in 1996 during the mass exodus of Rwandan refugees from eastern Zaire. He visited Rwanda again in 1998 to prepare a series of feature articles. Over the years he has also chronicled Roméo Dallaire’s career in a series of reports for _The Star_. In January 2004, Allan travelled to Arusha, Tanzania, to report on Dallaire’s testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 

*Thomas G. Weiss* is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, where he is co-director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project. Weiss is the interim executive director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. He was awarded the Grand Prix Humanitaire de France 2006 and is chair of the Academic Council on the UN System. He was a co-editor of _Global Governance_, Research Director of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Research Professor at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, Executive Director of the Academic Council on the UN System and of the International Peace Academy, a member of the UN secretariat, and a consultant to several public and private agencies. He has written or edited some thirty-five books and numerous scholarly articles about multilateral approaches to international peace and security, humanitarian action and sustainable development.

*Harvey Yarosky* has practised law in Montréal since 1962 and has been a member and chairman of various committees of the Bar of Montréal, the Bar of Québec and the Canadian Bar association relating to the administration of justice. He taught criminal law at McGill University, where he was adjunct professor of criminal law, as well as at the University of Ottawa and Université de Montréal. Yarosky is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and has acted as Independent Counsel to the Canadian Judicial Council. He appeared before many federal and provincial commissions of inquiry including, most recently, the “Gomery Inquiry”. He also conducted inquest, as “special coroner” into the shooting death of Marcellus François by the Montreal Urban Community police force. 
Yarosky was executive assistant to the federal Department of Justice Committee on Hate Propaganda (the “Cohen Committee”), the report of which formed the basis of the provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code on the advocacy and promotion of genocide and on hate propaganda. He has also been counsel to Senator and LGen (ret) Roméo Dallaire in relation to a number of international investigations, inquiries and proceedings regarding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
--------------------


This is not a bunch of loony-left wing _kooks_. It is, as Prof. Flanagan noted, more Liberal than Conservative, in Canadian political terms, but it is, broadly, multi-partisan – enough to merit our consideration, anyway.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

One factor, not to be ignored, IF one wants the UN to be the agency that will _authorize_ interventions, of whatever sort, then one cannot ignore the *fact* that China, broadly and generally, opposes interventions in the affairs of sovereign states – especially, of course, it opposes any sort of _intervention_ in the affairs of China. But, despite occasional forays into e.g. Vietnam and Burma, China has adhered pretty faithfully to this _principle_ (non-intervention) for 60 years.

China is a UN Security Council permanent member so it has a *veto* on almost anything the UN proposes.


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## GAP (22 Sep 2009)

On first blush, I keep getting the feeling this is pie-in-the-sky wishful thinking.

(I am simplifying here) They want a separate entity focusing on mass atrocities, yet there are few conflicts that do not have that potential, and even less lead up time. 

Rawanda is a good example. There was lots of rhetoric prior to, but little actual evidence it would be as massive as it was. The personnel were already there who could have mitigated the atrocities, but there was no will by the UN to give them permission to interfer.

Why do they think having a focused group will allow them to head off another one? There is no standing force suggested, so it sounds like they will just throw "whatever" at the issue, with no definition of "whatever" is.

As you said...this is politics, and empty politics at that. I don't see much, except noise to change much.


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## a_majoor (22 Sep 2009)

W2I seems to suffer from some of the same problems of R2P. It dramatically blurs the boundaries of the State and formalizes interference, interventions and invasions as a matter of policy for events which, while serious, are not existential threats to other States.

This is a very Westphalian veiw of the world that I am adhering to, but they want us to spend blood and treasure when it is very clear that a large percentage of our population in Canada and the West in general has no stomach for such interventions (see former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, Mymar [Burma], etc.)

It seems pretty clear to my military mind that this also would require massive increases in our armed forces to carry out sucessful interventions should the concept of R2P or W2I be adopted, once again something our electorate seems pretty uninterested in.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

In fairness, on pages 41, 42 and beyond, Dallaire _et al_ say:



> The shift towards low-technology, high-casualty, intrastate conflict necessitates a reorientation of the Canadian Forces’ approach to peace operations. During operations, the Canadian Forces have been repeatedly exposed to, and required to operate within, an environment that has been termed the “three block war” ... Canada has reduced its military capabilities over the past few decades. The government’s decision to cut the military’s budget in the early 1990s was tied to the belief that the end of the Cold War and a sustained period of international peace would yield a significant “peace dividend.” These savings reduced the federal deficit, but the cuts adversely affected military capability. During this time the Canadian Forces were reduced from 85,000 to approximately 55,000 personnel—a cull which, despite years of budgetary surplus, is only now being remedied ... At present, the Canadian military is overstretched ... Overall, the higher-than-expected attrition of mid-career personnel, who possess valuable expertise and experience, has prevented the Canadian Forces from expanding. The forces are treading water ... The Canadian Forces must be better prepared to confront the new security challenges of the 21st century. W2I recommends that the Canadian Forces be allocated sufficient resources to recruit and retain more soldiers to strengthen the military overall—and the land forces in particular.




However, beyond “welcoming” the _Canada First Defence Strategy_ and the _promised_ 2.7 percent annual increase in spending, the W2I folks stay away from any useful comments on the defence budget (like, say, asking for 2%+ of GDP) or force structure (like, say, demanding 75,000 “full time” CF members and _n_ thousand “part time” reserve members).


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## Old Sweat (22 Sep 2009)

It remains to be seen whether this report is more than a two day wonder, based on the unique ability of the news cycle to jump on the crisis of the minute. Maybe it will be blessed with luck and we will be free of deceased celebrities for the next little while. Having said that, in order for this to develop legs one or both of the two major political parties must be willing to embrace it, without disguising it as peacekeeping. It would also be useful if the other party did not dump on the embracer for emulating the Bush/Cheney agenda. 

Despite the high power, bipartisan credentials of the panel, I wonder if their influence is sufficient to keep this ball in play.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

The W2I report says, in its Preface:

“The W2I report uses the term “humanitarian intervention” in its widest sense to include the broad spectrum of tools that our governments can employ to prevent mass atrocities. These include “soft” and “hard” power tools, non-military and military actions. In the preventive phase of a humanitarian intervention, the governments of Canada and the U.S. can offer development assistance and financial aid, technical support, training, debt reduction, and mediation. When consensual preventive measures fail and more robust action is required, they can introduce the withdrawal of visas and scholarships for children from the recalcitrant political elite, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, the enforcement of no fly zones, and the use of military force. *W2I strongly supports the view that credible military force must be visible in the wings to potentiate non-military preventive action. Consensual soft-power methods can succeed, but peace spoilers only cooperate with them when they know their forces can be neutralized*.”
My *emphasis* added.


That’s a realistic approach, wholly consistent with Joseph Nye’s definition of “soft power.” It’s an encouraging start point.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ...
> The report, which has been _embraced_ by _inter alia_ Conservative Sen. Hugh Segal and Robert Fowler, was discussed on CBC radio’s _The Current_ this morning ...
> ...




The CBC’s _The Current_’s programme is now online:



> "Will to Intervene" – Panel
> 
> We started this segment with a clip of General Romeo Dallaire speaking on As It Happens on April 7th, 1994. No one knew it then, but he was describing the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide ... a hundred days of bloody massacres that would leave 800,000 people dead. It's been fifteen years since those events and more than 60 years since the United Nations General Assembly first condemned genocide as a crime punishable under international law.
> 
> The world is still struggling with how to stop mass atrocities. And according to Romeo Dallaire, we are still failing. Romeo Dallaire is now a Liberal Senator. He's also part of a project called Will To Intervene. Yesterday, the group released a report that it hopes will help stop mass atrocities ... a report that has the backing of several prominent Canadians, including Conservative Senator Hugh Segal and former Federal NDP Leader Ed Broadbent who was also the President of the International Centre of Human Rights and Democratic Development at the time of the Rwandan genocide. Romeo Dallaire, Hugh Segal and Ed Broadbent joined us from Ottawa this morning.



Click on “Listen to Part Three:” at the bottom of the page.


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## dapaterson (22 Sep 2009)

I believe the CF have never not suffered from an exodus of skilled "mid-career" personnel - there's a tendency to forget that the miltiary retirement schemes are designed to promtoe turn-over and new blood.  The concept that everyone should be a 20 year veteran is absurd and counter-productive; indeed, we likely need a more vigorous pruning, by widening the pool at the bottom and narrowing the pool at the top (a small group of those servign beyond 25 years for the long-term memory of the institution, and a variety of schemes to offer training, experience then reintegration to society writ large.  Interesting work was done around the time of unification, which then was corrupted beyond all recognition).

While the authors will no doubt pat themselves on the back, they ignore the realpolitik that ERC so plainly lays out: As long as nations in the security council oppose, nothing can be done through the UN.  Couple with that internal obstacles between DFAIT, DND/CF and CIDA (just to start) and this remains a dream.  Creating new bureaucratic strucutres in Canada will not break down those barriers; however, I'm not certain of what approach will meet that goal.


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## Roy Harding (22 Sep 2009)

The link for "The Current", which ERC references:

http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2009/200909/20090922.html


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> While the authors will no doubt pat themselves on the back, they ignore the realpolitik that ERC so plainly lays out: As long as nations in the security council oppose, nothing can be done through the UN.  Couple with that internal obstacles between DFAIT, DND/CF and CIDA (just to start) and this remains a dream.  Creating new bureaucratic strucutres in Canada will not break down those barriers; however, I'm not certain of what approach will meet that goal.



Ah, yes: the *goal*.

The very first sentence of the report, proper, in Part One: Introduction, 1.1 A Call for Leadership and Action, says _"Generating the international political will necessary to prevent mass atrocities remains one of the central challenges of the 21st century."_

So I take it that "generating political will" is the goal.

To follow up on Old Sweat's comments, it's not clear that they can (or even should be able to) generate any _national_ political will here in Canada or the USA. It will require a tremendous *communications* effort - especially in the USA where the competition for political attention is much more intense.

Now there are some expert _communicators_ in that group, including e.g. Ted Koppel. Roméo Dallaire, himself, is an expert and enthusiastic communicator and an even more expert media _manipulator_ - and I mean that as a compliment. He wasn't always so media _savvy_ but after Rwanda and especially after he "crashed and burned" he learned fast and he made some real "friends" in the media: people who trust him to provide a "good" story with "good" 10 second sound bites, etc. He makes good use of them.


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## Infanteer (22 Sep 2009)

At first I thought W2I was the next generation Nintendo Wii....

Interesting report and good topic.  I cherry-picked my way through, perusing the most interesting parts and my thoughts are:

1.  I liked the discussion on "National Interest", if anything because it highlights what an elusive concept National Interest can be.  Thomas Barnett goes into this in "Pentagon's New Map".  Politicians can trot out national interest to back policies, but I bet you if you asked one what our national interests were, they'd be hard pressed to give a decent answer.  What is the national interest?  Territorial integrity is obvious, but it's kind of the throwaway, because you can't really formulate foreign policy on "preserving Canada's territorial integrity" (or, at least the last century or so would seem to indicate).  So, is it ensuring the average Canadian can have their Timmy's, gas up there SUV and head to work?

Are the lives of other citizens in the world a national interest?  How so?  Where does conscience and interest collide?  I think Section 1.4 gives a respectable response and is probably the best part of the report.

2.  There seems to be some tricky "ethical calculus" at work.  What constitutes an atrocity?  How many deaths count?  If I, as a petty dictator, keep my body count down below 10,000 people, do I get to keep my national sovereignty?  What about wanton destruction and repression (ie. Taliban), or am I shit out of luck if my shitty government isn't putting people in big ditches (yet)?

3.  How about a "statue of limitations" on atrocities?  The very last appendix, at 1 page, is probably the most important part of the whole document and yet it is shelved at the back - perhaps because the authors didn't want to wrestle with one of two real issues of the whole concept of W2I - Intervention.  It seems to try to distance itself from Operation Iraqi Freedom, when Iraq probably was a good example of why we need W2I.  "But Saddam wasn't mass killing civilians anymore!" is a kind of weak response.

4.  Canada doesn't need a "Prevention Corps" - we already have one; the CF.  The PRT represents that fusion of government officials capable of operating in austere environments (or "JIMP capable forces operating in a WoG approach" for the buzzword groupies).  I haven't been part of a PRT, but I have worked at arms length with one, and they seem to be on the right road to getting the OGAs involved. 

5.  Flannagan's article is spot on, and its opening byline sums it up best.  "Before shipping out to protect distant interests, we should consider our limitations".  This is the other part of W2I that the report has trouble wrestling with - Will.  We can barely keep the public on board for Afghanistan.  The "Cry Darfur" crowd, which seems to be a part of this panel, doesn't seem to really want to broadcast (consider?) the fact that toppling another Islamic government will invite every loonie in Cairo to hop on a bus to blow up an Infidel.  Intervening means we have to have the will to invade countries, fight bad guys, bring about civilian casualties due to our intervention and fighting, be allied with the US as they are the biggest fish in the sea when it comes to Force Projection, and to stay for the long-haul after we've broken the china.  It means broken bodies, airstrikes, and Canadians coming home in flag-draped coffins.  The cover of this report should have the following three pictures to sum up its recommendations.  They represent the true cost of having the W2I....


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## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_ web site, is a report on the _unveiling_ of W2I, with special emphasis on Bob Fowler’s involvement:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-handed-genocide-intervention-plan/article1297118/


> Ottawa handed genocide-intervention plan
> *Report lays out steps government - and media - should take to prevent mass atrocities from occurring abroad*
> 
> Bill Curry
> ...


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## a_majoor (23 Sep 2009)

I'm a bit leery about another aspect of W2I (and similar issues revolve around R2P as well), which is the rather elastic definitions of what constitutes a crisis requiring our intervention (which Infanteer has pointed out), and also the rather flexible interpretation of "International Law".

If groups like the ICC can claim the authority to prosecute Israeli soldiers for war crimes while ignoring atrocities comitted by HAMAS, or the Spanish can issue a warrent for Augusto Pinochet the same week Fidel Castro was in Madrid for a State dinner, then who is to say W2I won't be manipulated into another weapon to attack Western democratic nations?

It isn't a big stretch of the imagination to see climate change alarmists requesting intervention against Canada on the grounds that carbon emissions from the oil sands constitutes a grave threat to the people of Canada and the world, and the GoC is doing nothing to reduce or eliminate it. This is already being done through agressive propaganda by climate change alarmists, now imagine they can call on some real State power to back them.


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## Old Sweat (23 Sep 2009)

It seems W2I has underwhelmed much of the media, who may have missed its import and implications. Senator Dallaire was interviewed for only a few minutes in the third quarter of "Question Period" yesterday. The _Ottawa Citizen_ and the _National Post_ had the story buried towards the rear of their first sections this morning, and I have not seen it discussed on the tube today. Having noted that, it could perhaps gain some momentum behind the scenes, especially if it was seen as having some political advantage. Maybe it is nothing more than an attempt to revive soft power, but it does provide an opporunity for internationalist busybodies to kick start their agenda.

Having said all that, the world doesn't need a published doctrine for the true believers to push their agenda. We probably stand a good chance of being pilloried in the media and perhaps taken to court over the oil sands, let along the seal hunt or the plight of the aboriginals.


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## Journeyman (23 Sep 2009)

One of the problems with debating here is that many of us are political realists, by virtue of having served in the real world at our government's behest. We clearly need more grad-student Marxists in here, who, while never having seen a callous or blister in their life, _know_ that all workers are oppressed. 

OK, having said that, I was taken by Fowler's particularly disingenuous comment:





> Today, Mr. Fowler joined other Canadian foreign-policy experts in warning that *Ottawa still does not have the policies in place to prevent genocide * in the future.



Now, my _very limited _ exposure to Mr Fowler has convinced me that he's a very bright politician; he knows that it takes more than "policies" to prevent genocide. But merely crafting policies can't take much effort or national treasure, can it?

As mentioned, the CF is already a standing "Prevention Corps." So what's lacking, and what he's clearly smart enough, along with his W2I cohorts not to bring up, is the price-tag associated with the actual implementation of their pie-in-the-sky recommendations.

And that, my good idealists, is disingenuous


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## observor 69 (23 Sep 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> One of the problems with debating here is that many of us are political realists, by virtue of having served in the real world at our government's behest. We clearly need more grad-student Marxists in here, who, while never having seen a callous or blister in their life, _know_ that all workers are oppressed.



Upon reading your comments to my better half, a non-artsy grad student, I have been instructed to pass on the word that she is prepared to show you her "calluses and blisters" at a time and place of your choosing.  ;D


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## Journeyman (23 Sep 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> ...she is prepared to show you her "calluses and blisters" at a time and place of your choosing.  ;D


"Dear Penthouse, I never believed your letters until..... "   >


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## Blackadder1916 (23 Sep 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 4.  Canada doesn't need a "Prevention Corps" - we already have one; the CF.  The PRT represents that fusion of government officials capable of operating in austere environments (or "JIMP capable forces operating in a WoG approach" for the buzzword groupies).  I haven't been part of a PRT, but I have worked at arms length with one, and they seem to be on the right road to getting the OGAs involved.
> . . .





			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> As mentioned, the CF is already a standing "Prevention Corps." So what's lacking, and what he's clearly smart enough, along with his W2I cohorts not to bring up, is the price-tag associated with the actual implementation of their pie-in-the-sky recommendations.



Perhaps it’s the use of the word “corps” in the report’s recommendation that generates such responses, but my take on the proposed “Prevention Corps” (besides it being a cheesy name) is that its function is nowhere similar to the capability offered by the CF.  While the PRTs may function well in Afghanistan, they are not there in a “preventive” or “fact-finding“ role as proposed in the report,   The PRTs are an “after the fact” operation, not a diplomatic mission.

From the W2I report. (italics are as per the report, all other highlighting mine) 



> 2.3 BUILDING CAPACITY
> 
> A *state’s capacity for the prevention of mass atrocities is comprised of its civilian and military capabilities*. A shortage of either civilian or military capacity diminishes the political will for action. *Civilian capacity consists of non-military measures available to a government to encourage positive state behavior through diplomacy, economic incentives, or other inducements.*  Civilian capacity can also thwart negative state behavior through punitive measures such as travel and study bans,  economic sanctions, and the severing of diplomatic ties.  However, military capacity is also essential. It enables decision makers to complement soft power options with credible threats of hard power actions. In the absence of civilian capacity, governments are only left with two options: doing nothing or applying force hastily. A state possessing soft power has the credibility, legitimacy, and influence to affect international decisions without having to resort to the use of force.
> . . .
> ...



While I was far down the food chain in 1994 with regards to operations in Rwanda and thus have no first hand knowledge of the poor use of intelligence in the (government’s) decision making process, there were obvious gaps in the information available to us as we (very quickly) prepped and deployed OP PASSAGE.

It’s correcting this malfunction that I see as the primary role of any Prevention Corps.  While (members of) the CF are trained, equipped and willing to go into austere and dangerous regions to perform almost any task, there are certain limitations in the skill sets available in uniform.  Sometimes just wearing a uniform is a hindrance when dealing with certain individuals.  As (somewhat) noted lately in the “Africa” thread with regards to the “bungle in the jungle”, the appreciation was situated by the PM when he sent the army commander to Africa.  Similarly, if all “prevention” related activities were assumed to be the responsibilty of DND/CF then it almost automatically supposes that any solution has to have a military component (besides the waiting in the wings with a stick element that is necessary if a soft approach is to have any credibility).

One of the points that this report makes very clear was the inability or reluctance of individual government ministers, departments or agencies to accept ownership of the developing situation in Rwanda.  Though there is much in the report to which I can take exception, a central authority/agency (if not a separate ministry) either within DFAIT (maybe not the best) or answering to the PCO (probably better) could be the answer.  Just as the government has a military (with a specialist military staff) which can develop military approaches and solutions to an international problem, it makes sense to also have a specialist staff that can develop non-military approaches and solutions to the same problem.  While it should naturally be expected that such advice would be forthcoming from appropriate DFAIT officials, it appears to not always be so.


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## Edward Campbell (23 Sep 2009)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> While I was far down the food chain in 1994 with regards to operations in Rwanda and thus have no first hand knowledge of the poor use of intelligence in the (government’s) decision making process, there were obvious gaps in the information available to us as we (very quickly) prepped and deployed OP PASSAGE.
> 
> It’s correcting this malfunction that I see as the primary role of any Prevention Corps.  While (members of) the CF are trained, equipped and willing to go into austere and dangerous regions to perform almost any task, there are certain limitations in the skill sets available in uniform.  Sometimes just wearing a uniform is a hindrance when dealing with certain individuals.  As (somewhat) noted lately in the “Africa” thread with regards to the “bungle in the jungle”, the appreciation was situated by the PM when he sent the army commander to Africa.  Similarly, if all “prevention” related activities were assumed to be the responsibilty of DND/CF then it almost automatically supposes that any solution has to have a military component (besides the waiting in the wings with a stick element that is necessary if a soft approach is to have any credibility).




This is one of the points that Daryl Copeland discusses in _Guerrilla Diplomacy_. He is convinced that traditional diplomacy - not just traditional Canadian diplomacy - is inadequate for the sort of _intelligence_ gathering that can, usefully, warn of social and political crises. Rwanda, and the haphazard information gathering and processing by all Western nations *prior to the crises that provoked* the genocide, was one of his examples of the failures of traditional diplomacy.


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## Journeyman (24 Sep 2009)

OK, lets try and be realistic before dismissing the CF as the fire-brigade of choice.

We provided a Strategic Advisory Team to the Afghan government. Why? Because DFAIT didn't have the people willing to get their hands dirty. Sure, they were more than happy to bitch about the military doing the task, but they weren't willing to belly up to the bar until forcefully shamed into it. They _may_ have learned their lesson.

Recall that the whole impetus here is to "prevent genocide." What, prey tell, would Elections Canada have done to stop Pol Pot's Cambodian genocide? Anyone else having an inkling that this is all about the non-DND civil servants getting a little miffed at the military's growing clout? -- after all, the MND now gets to sit by the PM.   

As for staffing this "Corps" (ooh, how reminiscent of the US Peace Corps), "experts would apply to join the corps on a full-time basis from their respective departments." If you were a _competent_ civil servant, even vaguely concerned with your career progression within your department, are you likely to volunteer to move to a line-serial where your job description is, "Wait. If a crisis unfolds, move; but until then, wait." Yep, they're likely to get the best and the brightest.  :

I'm sorry, but at the end of the day, the CF _is_ the "Prevention Corps." Not everyone is a door-kicker. There is the DART, the CFJIRU, all kinds of deployable Construction Engineers.....plus people whose skill sets mesh pretty well with an ability to provide security for these folks -- and all the immediate strap-hangers...

.....until the necessary people from Elections Canada show up and take over, that is.



Edit: typo. I know, hard to believe  :-[


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> OK, lets try and be realistic before dismissing the CF as the fire-brigade of choice.
> 
> We provided a Strategic Advisory Team to the Afghan government. Why? Because DFAIT didn't have the people willing to get their hands dirty. Sure, they were more than happy to bitch about the military doing the task, but they weren't willing to belly up to the bar until forcefully shamed into it. They _may_ have learned their lesson.
> 
> ...




There is a lot of that "return to Camelot" sort of thing in the W2I report. Some of it is not surprising given some of the members, many "came of age" in the '60s and still hold some of those views.

Returning to _guerrilla diplomacy_, one of the things about which Copeland warned his audience, with had many current and past Foreign Affairs folks in it, was not to wish for a return to some _golden age_ or another but, rather, to focus on the world as it is and deal with that. (Note: I do not agree with his world view; I do not see global pandemics or climate change as *threats*, _per se_ but, rather, as _catalysts_ that give rise to strategic threats.)

I think the "Prevention Corps" exists, but in three parts:

1.	The *Early Warning*  System- which is provided, mainly, by the foreign service (which includes CF attachés, for example) aided by NGO people who are, often, serving in hot spots;

2.	The *Soft Power*_ Team – which exists, now, in governments (both in Canada and the USA) and whose work is, already, coordinated by e.g. the Privy Council Office. The decisions to take preventive actions – trade sanctions and the like, are already made there and they are already coordinated from there. The Privy Council already is the “coordination office” the W2I authors seek and there already are cabinet committees to coordinate policy. PCO can also coordinate some of the actions of the NGOs, civil society and the private sector, who are or can be important contributors to Soft Power.

3.	The *Hard Power* Team – which is, of course, the CF. 
_


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It seems W2I has underwhelmed much of the media, who may have missed its import and implications. Senator Dallaire was interviewed for only a few minutes in the third quarter of "Question Period" yesterday. The _Ottawa Citizen_ and the _National Post_ had the story buried towards the rear of their first sections this morning, and I have not seen it discussed on the tube today. Having noted that, it could perhaps gain some momentum behind the scenes, especially if it was seen as having some political advantage. Maybe it is nothing more than an attempt to revive soft power, but it does provide an opporunity for internationalist busybodies to kick start their agenda.
> 
> Having said all that, the world doesn't need a published doctrine for the true believers to push their agenda. We probably stand a good chance of being pilloried in the media and perhaps taken to court over the oil sands, let along the seal hunt or the plight of the aboriginals.




It is, certainly, not getting the response the authors sought. It is being overshadowed by e.g. the UN Opening, including Canada's _leadership_ in walking out on Ahmadinejad and the leadup to the opening of the G20. Maybe they misjudged the "news cycle."

Here is one report, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Foreign Policy_ web site:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/21/interview_lt_gen_senator_romeo_dallaire


> Interview: Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire
> *The general who tried to stop the Rwandan genocide warns FP that the line has blurred between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It's a cautionary tale for the age of Afghanistan and Iraq. Are the world's militaries up to the task?*
> 
> BY ELIZABETH DICKINSON | SEPTEMBER 21, 2009
> ...



Do we really need "new doctrinal basis" and a "retooling of the military" to address the "protection of civilians?" I though e.g. the _Geneva Conventions_, etc, and our own basic humanity and morality provide the "doctrinal basis" and that e.g. the Red Cross help with the work.

In saying, near the end, that one of the two biggest threats to _peacekeeping_ is that the "developed countries are staying out" he is echoing the UN's own words on the topic. It is part of the _myth_ that Afghanistan is, somehow, *less* a UN mission just because there are no baby-blue berets in the FOBs.


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## TangoTwoBravo (24 Sep 2009)

I guess I am one of those conservative thinkers from the opening of the first article who think that we should base foreign policy on national interest. Even a small county bereft of much in the way of resources can do a lot when its genuine national interests are threatened. Defining national interest is difficult, but I offer that we will know it when we see it! If the effect of a story on the news is "Wow, that is terrible. What is that country called again?" then I would say that we are not in the realm of national interest. If the effect of a news story is "Holy Crap, we are screwed! or "Holy Crap, we really could be next!" then we are entering national interest.

I am very skeptical of doctrines and policies based on what we want to do rather than what we must do. That being said I respect doctrines implemented by states that run along the lines of "We consider everything that happens within this area as being our business and we do not appreciate anyone else interfering."


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2009)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ... I respect doctrines implemented by states that run along the lines of "We consider everything that happens within this area as being our business and we do not appreciate anyone else interfering."




Which is, pretty much, what China says, with "area" being defined as either:

•	A geographic expression, such as Tibet or Xinjiang; or

•	A function, such as civil rights.


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## dapaterson (24 Sep 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> We provided a Strategic Advisory Team to the Afghan government. Why? Because DFAIT didn't have the people willing to get their hands dirty. Sure, they were more than happy to bitch about the military doing the task, but they weren't willing to belly up to the bar until forcefully shamed into it. They _may_ have learned their lesson.



Has the CF?  Was the SAT our "best and brightest" or sometimes "our friends who we want to give a jammy go"?  Were they role models for the other CF members deployed, following the same rules, or would pers from KAF fight for a chance to visit the SAT to engage in fraternal toasts and other activities forbidden in KAF?



> As for staffing this "Corps" (ooh, how reminiscent of the US Peace Corps), "experts would apply to join the corps on a full-time basis from their respective departments." If you were a _competent_ civil servant, even vaguely concerned with your career progression within your department, are you likely to volunteer to move to a line-serial where your job description is, "Wait. If a crisis unfolds, move; but until then, wait." Yep, they're likely to get the best and the brightest.  :



Interestingly, I had the identical discussion yesterday - but about the CF and "jointness", and how, for a hard-charging Navy, Army or Air Force officer, joint time is time out-of-sight of your environoment, with PERs not crafted in the same manner, so you're written off as "not being one of ours".


The CF has many strengths, but must also be willing to engage in reflection to improve - boasting about "us vs them" does nothign to improve the institution.


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## TangoTwoBravo (24 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Which is, pretty much, what China says, with "area" being defined as either:
> 
> •	A geographic expression, such as Tibet or Xinjiang; or
> 
> •	A function, such as civil rights.



Absolutely. This is no great insight, but I think that conflict arises when we get a Venn diagram of overlapping genuine national interests. If a foreign power wants to affect my human rights or those of a close ally then I will get worked about it. The people who devise policy doctrines in a vacuum should be ignored outside of their post-doctoral peer review circles.


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## a_majoor (24 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> This is one of the points that Daryl Copeland discusses in _Guerrilla Diplomacy_. He is convinced that traditional diplomacy - not just traditional Canadian diplomacy - is inadequate for the sort of _intelligence_ gathering that can, usefully, warn of social and political crises. Rwanda, and the haphazard information gathering and processing by all Western nations *prior to the crises that provoked* the genocide, was one of his examples of the failures of traditional diplomacy.



Interestingly, Robert Kaplan also made this sort of observation in "The Ends of the Earth" (my copy is at home while I am staff on a DP3A course in Petawawa), saying in effect that Embassy staff are insulated from the real world they are working in by air conditioned limousines, fortified embassy compounds and working a social circuit of privilaged and elites from other embassies, the host nation and high priced NGO's.

Kaplan, on the other hand, was reporting based on walking through slums and taking busses, trains and the occasional transport truck through large areas of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. While finding people of Robert Kaplan's character might be difficult, our diplomacy and intelligence must be based on real world information from the ground, not the cocktail circuit. The British used to have long service officers (both military and diplomatic) who essentially went native, living and working in location for years at a time (and often marrying locals and raising families), we need to do something similar; kicking people out of the embassies and having them live on the economy in austere conditions in the places they are to report on.

Some NGO's do this, but they should be considered an auxilliary source of information at best, given their motives and goals might be different from what we see as the "national interest".


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2009)

Copeland agrees that





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... *Embassy staff are insulated from the real world they are working in by air conditioned limousines, fortified embassy compounds and working a social circuit of privilaged and elites from other embassies, the host nation and high priced NGO's ...* [and they gather little useful intelligence, while] *... walking through slums and taking busses, trains and the occasional transport truck ...*


is what Copeland says the effective _guerrilla diplomat_ does and, in the process, becomes a primary source of real, useful intelligence for, e.g. W2I.

On that basis a reformed foreign service, staffed by "better' diplomats, and supported by military and NGO people, is the *Early Warning*/Intelligence gathering component of the "Prevention Corps" and since the CF is the *Hard Power* component then it doesn't seem necessary to add bureaucrats and complexity to coordinate the *Soft Power* bits.

The "Prevention Corps" is a bad idea.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Sep 2009)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s’ _Ottawa Citizen_, is an opinion piece that reflects some recognition of reality:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/Shutting+down+killing+fields/2026752/story.html


> Shutting down the killing fields
> 
> By Kate Heartfield, The Ottawa Citizen
> 
> ...


_


The “point” of W2I would have been much better made had it made a *clarion call* for improvements in what we have – the foreign service and, above all, our military - before in called for new ministers (essentially a US style National Security Advisor) and an poorly defined “Prevention Corps.”

I do not argue with Sen. Dallaire’s *aim* – no one I know wants to promote genocide or protect war criminals – but I think his tragic, personal story, which includes being betrayed by many of the organizations that paid him, leads him down the wrong path.

On the broader front, Ms. Heartfield is 100% correct when she says:




 “... it is next to useless for citizens to organize and make YouTube videos and hand out plastic bracelets and scream at their government to "do something about Darfur" -- or about any one conflict. By the time Darfur became a household word in Ottawa, the Canadian military had been diminished by years of neglect, and besides, there was Afghanistan to worry about. On the diplomacy and development side, Canada was equally weakened ... When the next genocide begins, Canada won't be willing or able to do anything about it, and it won't matter how many newspaper editorials I write about it.”

Click to expand...


That’s the reality; until our intelligence gathering, diplomatic and military capabilities have been rebuilt and expanded to reflect the dangerous state of the world and our ambitions in that more dangerous and complex world we are eunuchs. Canadians had better get used to that fact.
_


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## Edward Campbell (16 Sep 2010)

A pair of unreconstructed Trudeau era Liberals, Pink Lloyd Axworthy and Alan Rock, weight in on how the UN *might* (in all likelihood might not) advance the ‘doctrine’ of _Responsibility to Protect_ (R2P) in this article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/the-unfulfilled-promise-of-un-protection/article1709144/


> The unfulfilled promise of UN protection
> *The R2P doctrine needs tools and decisiveness to be effective in preventing mass violence*
> 
> Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock
> ...



Axworthy and Rock are correct in saying that _”R2P has failed to fulfill its promise in places such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Theoretical advances are of no comfort to defenceless civilians savaged by lawless militias or wicked regimes.”_ R2P failed and continues to fail for the very reason Sir Martin Gilbert described it as _”the most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in 360 years.”_ It invites chaos. The _Peace of Westphalia_ established an often ugly and sometimes brutal, but ultimately stable, _regime_ for international law and relationships – R2P aims to remove the stability without offering any effective ways to combat the brutality.

The Axworthy/Rock ‘shopping list’ is heavy on diplomacy and good will and light on _force_. It calls for a _”standing rapid-response force with specialized training and equipment, so that protection is only a few hours away.”_ I wonder if either of these worthy gentlemen has any idea at all about what they are seeking. A “standing force” with that level of “reaction” (hours) would be very large – imagine how many people you need to keep, say – just for argument – a combat capable light infantry battle group on, say – again just for argument, 12 hours notice to move. My guess is that you need, at least, five fully staffed, fully equipped battle groups (indeed overstaffed and over equipped to take account of in garrison ‘casualties’ (broken equipment, soldiers with tooth aches, etc) which must be ‘rotated’ out of the rapid reaction force every six months or so. Getting five rapid reaction battle groups in the ‘rotation’ therefore requires about 15 battle groups – a fully formed light infantry division. Further, these must be sophisticated, ‘capable’ troops, supported by ‘at priority call’ heavy lift transport and tactical air support. 

How many countries in the world can ‘afford’ such a force? My guess: three.

How many countries would be willing to assign such forces to UN command? My guess: *zero*.

My further guess is that Axworthy and Rock were put up to floating this nonsense by their Liberal _fan club_ that still wants a Nobel Prize for Pink Lloyd.


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## Old Sweat (16 Sep 2010)

These two distinguished Canadians have once again demonstrated their dubious grasp of the realities of the world. Who makes the decision to intervene in a sovereign nation? The Security Council? Its record is not good, especially when one or more of the permanent members stands to end up with egg on its face, or it is against its national interest to have an intervention occur. Even if a deal could be cobbled together, by the time it is structured, the situation will in all probability have gotten much, much worse.

Are they proposing a world super government that could act unilaterally with forces permanently assigned? That idea may have appeal inside the UN bureaucracy, but I submit it won't fly anywhere else outside of academia. 

Now, if a decision could be made, as Edward noticed, there are very few nations that have the capability to mount an intervention on short notice and in the numbers required to be decisive. And if the budgetary woes are any indication, that number may shrink, or at least their physical ability to do may. So we fall back on the old standby of poorly trained troops of the correct racial mix to assure a suitable level of comfort for the part of the world that is tumbling into chaos. And that probably excludes the few powers that would have the capability to intervene in a timely and effective manner.

Methinks the Globe should have had its ad sales force work harder to fill the page, so the public would have been spared this piece of Grade 11 geopolitics.


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## OldSolduer (16 Sep 2010)

If I may go off on a bit of a tangent, I would like to tilt at this particular windmill: "Honour " Killings.

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-crimewave-that-shames-the-world-2072201.html 

The author (Robert Fisk) of a series of articles on "Honour" killings paints a very dark picture, and I'm sure that the esteemed persons on this site have noticed the upsurge of such "honour" killings here.


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## ArmyRick (16 Sep 2010)

Alot of interesting read here and as well, it will take some serious muling over whats here (A truly good answer can't always be the first thought that comes to mind).

The case about useless gestures such as handing out bracelets and holding protest is a good point. Some times, it takes real will power and resolve to deal with a situation.


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## OldSolduer (16 Sep 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Alot of interesting read here and as well, it will take some serious muling over whats here (A truly good answer can't always be the first thought that comes to mind).
> 
> The case about useless gestures such as handing out bracelets and holding protest is a good point. Some times, it takes real will power and resolve to deal with a situation.



My first thought when I read this is not printable.


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## Danjanou (16 Sep 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> .....As mentioned, the CF is already a standing "Prevention Corps." So what's lacking, and what he's clearly smart enough, along with his W2I cohorts not to bring up, is the price-tag associated with the actual implementation of their pie-in-the-sky recommendations.
> 
> And that, my good idealists, is disingenuous



Especially when said "price tag" is not just a monetary one, or to put it another way refer to Infanteers posted photos above.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (16 Sep 2010)

This whole plan scares me. 

This is pure political gamesmanship playing with the whole planet. Lets not delude ourselves: Just look at the true final end - getting the US to embark on such venture by telling it that "if you go along to put pressure on the rest of the world, or go alone, we'll stand with you".

Sure the lack of will to intervene by major countries has, for all practical purpose, emasculated any application of the "feel good" apparent embrace of R2P by the United Nations,. However, I think that by and large emasculation is better than the suspicions and quarrels between the major powers that would arise if they even remotely perceived any such development in the US as a will on its part to become the "global cop" that the American Neocon have envisaged for the US: intervention anytime anywhere to "enforce" American views/values/security.

I do not think that the authors of this report believe that the US would ever agree to what they propose, so they see no risk in proposing this "feel good" document so they can show that "we, in Canada really believe in applying R2P". Unfortunately, existing documents like that tend to gather dust only until someone, somewhere needs "justification" to take the political action of its own choosing. So you never know what they end up creating in the end.

Just MHO.


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## Brad Sallows (16 Sep 2010)

R2P is basically a "sure; go ahead - if you want to" doctrine.

The thought of the UN organizing military and civilian agencies to protect women against exploitation is laughable, until it cleans its own house.


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## TangoTwoBravo (16 Sep 2010)

I think that R2P is a terrifying doctrine.  There is good sense to respecting the idea of sovereignty, even when it means that bad things happen to people.  If one of the sides of a civil war has given us real casus belli by attacking us (perhaps only indirectly) or an ally then fine - intervene with gusto.  Otherwise stay out.

I think that the only reason that the members of the UN allowed it to become doctrine was that they knew it wouldn't actually play out.


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## aesop081 (16 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I think that the only reason that the members of the UN allowed it to become doctrine was that they knew it wouldn't actually play out.



Yes, the old "that'll never happen" bit......that always works out.


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## OldSolduer (16 Sep 2010)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> R2P is basically a "sure; go ahead - if you want to" doctrine.
> 
> The thought of the UN organizing military and civilian agencies to protect women against exploitation is laughable, until it cleans its own house.



Concur, heartily. Remember the UN Human Rights stuff is lead by such luminaries as Libya....


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## a_majoor (16 Sep 2010)

The 30 years war in Europe was a very violent case of R2P and W2I (protect the Protestant/Catholic minorities from the hostile Catholic /Protestant majorities in the affected territiry, and save people's immortal souls). After exhausting the various nations, much of the area claimed by modern Germany laid to waste with little or no possibility of victory in sight, everyone agreed that the Sovereign had absolute rights within his own territory (the Treaty of Westphalia) and modern nation states evolved.

R2P and W2I are ahistoric and ignore these lessons at all our peril. They also seem designed to place the West into no win situations; intervene and we are agressors interfering in the affairs of sovereign states; fail to take action and we are heartless monsters. I can also imagine groups like the Jihadis using mass and targetted media to play the public like a violin to whipsaw governments (just think of Al jezzera "snuff" videos. Now X 1000, and mix videos of atrocities against civilians with atrocities against our deployed troops.)

Intervention should always be in the support of our national interest; if killing Jihadis in country _x_ also has the effect of ending atrocities, then we have achieved a 2 for 1 victory. Otherwise, no dice.


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2012)

And W2I rears its ugly head again in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Canadian Institute of International Policy Studies_ website:

http://cips.uottawa.ca/canadas-abandonment-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/


> Canada’s Abandonment of the Responsibility to Protect
> 
> Posted on September 20, 2012
> 
> ...




R2P has _morphed_ into a weak excuse for unwarranted foreign intervention in poor, dirty, little countries; W2I supposes that there is some _policy_ foundation for R2P - I do not believe that is the case. W2I, therefore, is a bad idea resting on a weak foundation.


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## Brad Sallows (24 Sep 2012)

I'd support R2P if it were agreed among all major political parties in parliament that we would take a very firm hand and not defer to the "honor" of the "proud" peoples who need to be yanked into line (ie. occupy and govern as an occupation).  But that's not going to happen.


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## Ostrozac (24 Sep 2012)

The implication is that western governments should be conducting major interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, and Haiti, and Somalia, and Syria, and North Korea all simultaneously -- and that it is our responsibility to do so, and we are irresponsible if we don't.

This makes no sense. Even at the heights of the British Empire and the Cold War, major powers would pick and choose their wars. And the military resources of the west, right now, are stretched pretty thin.

And the argument that we should use R2P to justify wars we want (Libya), while ignoring other wars we don't want (Syria) -- we don't need R2P for that. That's just good old fashioned realpolitik. Sometimes if you get invaded by your neighbour, Canada will go to war to defend you (South Korea 1950), sometimes we won't (Georgia 2008). That's the way the world works.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Nov 2015)

I am, broadly and generally, in the non-interventionist camp ~ unless our own, Canadian, vital interests are at stake. It's a selfish position but one which I hold with, I think, reasonable _moral-realist_ comfort.

Here is an article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_ which gives some academic flesh to my views:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2015-11-20/when-intervene


> When to Intervene
> What Would John Stuart Mill Do About Syria?
> 
> By Michael Doyle
> ...





I think that, probably intentionally, Prof Doyle stops one step short of any sort of _realistic _programme ... as others have discussed in various threads here in Army.ca, IF we intervene here and there, throughout, just as one example, that part of the _Islamic Crescent_ that stretches from Morocco to Pakistan, what happens when we leave? The answer is chaos, anarchy, repression, tyranny and so on all return. The last step which we are unwilling to take is neo-colonialism. 

After the First World War we, the West, imposed a _mandate_ system under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 22 of the Covenant said that the government of territories which were no longer ruled by their previous sovereign, but in which the peoples were not _"able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world"_should be _"entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility"_.

The United Nations Charter, written after the Second World War, pretty rejected that notion and established _trusteeship_ status to facilitate the transition from colony to nation (apologies to Arthur Lower). That may have been a mistake. It _appears to many people_ that _trusteeship_ ended far, far too soon in many, many cases.

I remain, broadly and generally, a non-interventionist ... but if we are going to intervene then I believe it may need to be for a very long haul: generations. I also believe that _mandates_ or _trusteeships_ should be entrusted to individual nations, not to the United Nations, itself, but no one nation should exercise a _trust_ or _mandate_ over, say, more than two or three territories.


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