# "Manning Priorities - Does the Army Have Them Right?"



## Infanteer (5 Oct 2006)

Here was an excellent paper (IMHO) by LCol(Ret) David Pentnay in a recent edition of the Army Journal:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_09/iss_1/CAJ_vol9.1_08_e.pdf

Seems to conflict with some common conceptions that have been expressed here - is the good Colonel on target?  His numbers seem to show that the Staff and Training establishments are properly manned and that it's the field force that is drastically short on troops.  We've always knew the latter, but I've seen the former (no trainers/staff officers) alot - thoughts/comments?

Anyways, here are some interesting parts I found in the article:



> The Regular Field Unit function provides at least 70% of the Army’s personnel resources committed to overseas operations, yet this function only represents 22.64% of the Army’s PE. The answer to the question of sustaining operations becomes clear: the actual pool that provides the majority of personnel to conduct and sustain overseas operations is fewer than 12,000.



Basically enunciated what I wrote above.



> The only sub-units that are in the “operational” category are the light infantry companies and the TOW Under Armour (TUA) squadron. The surveillance squadrons fall into the “effective” category. The remaining Field Force sub-units are noneffective.  The status of the artillery field batteries and the combat engineer field squadrons is particularly alarming when one considers that they are now responsible for providing the indirect fire capability and the pioneer capability that were formerly integral to the infantry battalions.



I found this interesting, especially with all the talk of bringing back Combat Support Platoons.  Obviously, the decision to put the capabilities on the Artillery and the Engineers was a bad one, as these are two very undermanned Branches as is (both now heavily involved in providing support to the maneuver forces).  The fact is we need more boots on the ground...period.  The figures also tell us how hard our CS/CSS trades are hurting in the field force.



> So, what has happened over the past 15 years? All of the functions except the Regular Field Unit function have increased. Command and Control, the Support Infrastructure and Training Infrastructure functions have all seen significant expansion.  The Reserve Unit and the Ranger functions have seen much more modest growth. On the other hand, there was a significant, if not drastic, reduction in the Regular Field Unit function. Clearly, the past 15 years has been a period of considerable change.



The pages before this quote were interesting as they highlighted how the Army changed from an organization centralized on FMC to the one we have now - any comments/criticisms on moving from 1 HQ to our current structure.  Of course, with the latest focus on joint organizations, I can feel that we will see further changes down the road.



> Traditionally, Canada used the “rule of four” for the design of Canadian brigade groups and manoeuvre unit WEs. This recognized that offensive and defensive operations require two manoeuvre elements for the main operation, one for depth and a fourth as reserve. Current WEs reflect a “rule of three”. The genesis of this drastic reduction to the WEs was not the result of a fundamental review of operations. It was
> caused by a perceived need to move the positions elsewhere outside of the Regular Field Unit function.



Force structure is driven not by operational neccessity but by pragmatic recognition of the resources and manpower available.  This has led to us to move from Unitary Battlegroups to cut'n'pasted plug-n-play Task Forces.  Is a wholesale review of our force structure required now - this one being based upon a "fundamental review of operations"?  Lord knows "The Infantry Battalion in Battle" is woefully out of date.



> A good indicator is the distribution of its general officers. In the late 1980s, there were a total of 13 general officers in the Army. Of these, there were four in the C2 function, two in the Training Infrastructure function, four in the Reserve Unit function and four in the Regular Field Unit function. There were four general officers in FMC HQ—a lieutenant-general (Commander), a major-general (Deputy Commander) and two brigadier-generals (one Assistant Chief of Staff Operations and the other Assistant Chief of Staff Administration). The Commandants of CLFCSC and CTC, the Commanders of the four Militia Areas and the Commanders of the four CMBGs were all brigadier generals.  Three of these latter four also had responsibilities in the Support Infrastructure function. Today, the Army has 15 general officers, all in the C2 function. The distribution is: one lieutenant-general (CLS); two major-generals (Assistant CLS and Commander LFDTS); and eleven brigadier-generals (the four Area Commanders, four Area Deputy Commanders, DGLS, DGLR and DGLCD).



I found this interesting as a highlight to how we structure command arrangements.  The author believes that one of the causes of the problem was the fact that no field force units were represented on the Army Council with the downgrading of Brigade Commanders to Colonels.  His recommendation is to bump them up to Brigadiers by bumping down the Land Staff Director-Generals.  An interesting proposal, but would it really address the problem?  The whole issue of how ranks are structured within the military was also covered recently in the Australian Army Journal; in it the author argues that rank inflation is leading to problems in organization (which may or may not be similar to the above article's targetting of a slide to management at the expense of the field force).

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/journal/AAJ_Winter06/Patterson_ArmyForce.pdf



> The Army appears to have structured itself well for managing things right. However, is it managing the right things?



The crux of the author's paper; his near term solution is:



> There are two options to do so. One option is to consolidate what is available into fewer formations and units....Another option would be to retain the same number of formations and units that exist now, but consolidate at the sub-unit level. Rather than having three under-strength rifle companies in a battalion, for example, have two full-strength ones with the third being manned with a very small cadre.



Interesting ideas for ad-hoc solutions - I have actually seen both done before.  But do they address the problem with CS/CSS functions?

Anyways, I thought the article layed out clearly a whole gamut of issues that are related to how are forces are organized and manned in a fairly clear fashion.  In our joint forces, the issue of purple trades, Joint Units (CSOR) and joint HQ's come to mind - all things that he brushes upon, but I still think the emphasis on the conventional field forces are a valid one.

Anyways, give 'er a read and put your thoughts up.

Infanteer


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## Infanteer (12 Oct 2006)

<crickets>

123 views and no replies?

I guess the good colonel is on the ball, as there really isn't much to add.


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## Echo9 (12 Oct 2006)

A lot of it makes sense.  A lot more focus does need to get allocated to the pointy end, although where I would diverge from his analysis ( and he does touch on the point) is that he's looked solely within the army.  I would suspect that the analysis carried through- that a greater proportion of the war establishment in HQ functions are filled than the field force.


One other note that I would make is that while establishments are funded fully for Reg F, the 90% manning for reserve (in the table) is deceptive- for the simple reason that funding is not allocated on the basis of establishment but instead on the basis of actual parading soldiers (which is fair, but it can make growth to that establishment figure harder).  Even if LFRR was completely successful, which it wasn't, the number of parading reservists would only have reached 18k, not the 23k indicated in the table.   On the whole, this isn't something that he addresses, so I'll leave it at that.

In terms of the meat of the argument, he makes some good points:
1.  The rule of 3 seems to have been adopted as a doctrinal change through the back door- I get the impression that we went in that direction more as a reflection of what we actually do, rather than what we should do.  It does have some substantial implications in terms of depth/ reserve tasks that should have been tackled head-on.   Kind of like the greatly debated pioneer/ mortar thing but below the radar.

2.  The training establishment is quite possibly manned to the extent that it needs to be according to establishment.  One of the things that the analysis may have missed, but that is apparent in the real world is that the army is trying to grow.  Growth puts huge stresses on the training world, since the establishment is really only geared to support replacement.

3.  I'm not sure that the stress on what's actually in the PE as opposed to the WE matters that much.  The establishment is the document that tells a CO how many per he's got, and what the rank/ experience distribution is.  He will usually have the flexibility to organize those working parts as he sees fit.   Ultimately, the issue is not that there are 7 man sections on the PE, it's that the battalion is allocated only 430 pers (or whatever the number is), rather than the 680 (or whatever) that it should have.

4.  The main point that he makes is right on the money- ultimately this is all about prioritization, and the decisions made over the years suggest that commanders have valued their staffs over having more soldiers.  This is a completely rational decision to be made in peacetime, since extra soldiers generate more staff work, without a corresponding benefit.  Of course, we're not in peacetime these days, are we?


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## pbi (13 Oct 2006)

I was Dave Pentney's OpsO and Adjt, so I know quite well the professional knowledge and background he brings to his writing. He was a true soldier and a humble person. He was CO of 1PP at a time when battalions were very "hollow": we still had four rifle companies on paper, but in fact we had difficulty manning even three: the fourth was really just a cadre of a few officers and NCOs that was used to run PCF courses, provide support to Res training, etc. The rest of the unit was always being ravaged by taskings, sick chits, people away on courses and releases. One day Dave walked into my office and told me that he and the RSM had figured that there were a total of 80 Inf Cpl/Ptes on bn parade that morning.

It seems that we have not progressed very far, despite having cut the size of the Inf battalions, and not having provided manning increases to the Arty and Engrs to suck up the Mor Pl and Pnr Pl roles we lost. The Inf is the backbone of any army, and is clearly one of the key branches in the type of operations we are engaged in for the near future. The Inf needs the best people (after SF) and lots of them. It seems we aren't getting them. Worse, it seems that the other branches that support and enable us aren't getting their people either. All this at a time that we are in dire need of a capable fighting force with enough depth to sustain rotations over the long haul. So I agree with him on all of that. I also agree, more or less, witrh his ideas about options, although I think we have tried both (or slipped into them by default) at various times.

Where I'm not so sure is the argument about the C2 and trg establishments being "fat" at the expense of the field force. We may be comparing apples and oranges here. My guess would be that the biggest need for people in the field force is at the junior Capt/Lt and Sgt to Pte levels. These ranks are not generally found in large numbers in Army HQs, and those who do exist are often not Cbt A. Army HQs HQs tend to have most of their CbtA strength in the LCol to senior Capt and CWO to WO levels. Granted, numbers of these folks are needed in field forces too, but the rank distribution is quite different. 

As for the old FMC structure vs the current Army: I'm not sure how relevant that comparison is. What I have heard several times over the years is that the new structure did three things that the old post-unification Army structure did not do, or do as well. First, it reduced the span of direct control of the CLS to a much more manageable range. He now has four LFA Comds, Comd LFDTs and a small number of others answering directly to him, with all of the Army structure grouped under them. Previously, the CLS had to deal with four CMBG Comds, five Militia Area Comds, a number of Base Commanders, Comd CTC, Comdt of CFLCSC, etc.

Second, it integrated both Reg and Res parts of the Army into one system: something that simply did not exist before. Under the old system, there were very definitely "two armies". You could argue how much attitudinal change still has to happen to make the integration complete, but the structural change is over and done and works, IMHO, more or less.

Third, it structured the Army in far more effective way to be able to make best use of ALL of its resources-not just the CMBGs-in a coordinated and rational response to domestic emergencies. In standing up the LFAs, the Army assumed most of the functions that were (in theory) discharged by the old post-unification CF "Regional" authorities, but who really had not much in the way of an existing C2 structure to back them up. Until their recent integration into (NOT their replacement by...) the new JTFHQs, the LFAs provided a workable and tested system that IMHO was improving with every operation. To say that the CMBG HQs could have discharged the same role is to betray a serious misunderstanding of all that is involved in the field of domestic operations, from building Province-wide liaison to coordinating all resources (including reach-back to other LFAs and Commands) to keeping Provincial and Federal govt leaders informed to providing meaningful C2 above the tactical level.

So I'm really not sure that the LFA HQs represent a valid target, or that the supposed "golden eggs" to be gained might actually justify killing the goose. As far as the Army training system goes, remember why we plussed up the manning of the training system: to try to relieve field units of the murderous and very disruptive tasking system that reduced units in some cases to little more than labour pools, with a large chunk of the leadership gone. That plus up had to come from somewhere. As well, as one reader has pointed out, if we want to maintain and grow the Army, the means to do that is a training system that has the capacity to generate all the trained people we need, at all rank levels and MOCs. That requires a whole bunch of NCOs, WOs and junior officers.

Cheers


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## Infanteer (13 Oct 2006)

Interesting perspective PBI - I find myself agreeing with the point on rank distribution WRT HQ's and field units.  Some ideas on potential solutions to bring the field force up to snuff and perhaps generate some more discussion:

1)  As the Aussie article alludes to, slow down the progression at the 2Lt to Captain level in order to keep junior officers at the lowest tactical level a bit longer to allow them to both learn their trade better and provide more support to the system.  We've lengthened the basic "career pattern" with the 25 year pension; should we not fudge the career progression and accession pattern to recognize this?

2)  Give bonuses to Ptes/Cpls to re-sign.  What's better, paying to train a new Private on a 3 year basic engagement or getting one to re-sign after 3 years?  We give $40,000 to get guys off the street, why not $20,000 as a bonus to sign on for 5-years after a basic engagement (taking the guy to the JNCO level and beyond)?

3)  I'm not sure if it exists, but are we perhaps pushing guys towards a commission to much?  I seem to get the idea that degree = commission (I've definitely heard it from some CFRC folks) which, in this day in age, shouldn't be true at all.  I think retooling of the SNCO/WO role is essential to get young, educated Canadians to pursue a career in the ranks.

4)  Career courses like Pioneer seem to be a must in order to maintain many a troops interest.  Perhaps some "CF-wide" courses (that old article on a Commando course comes to mind) are needed as short-term incentives for younger folks?

Anyways, grist for the mill.


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## pbi (13 Oct 2006)

Infanteer: great thoughts, esp the "re-upping" bonus. I bet if we looked at thte relative costs of paying a "re-up" as against the costs to attract, process, train and post a brand new soldier, we would save a hell of a lot more than 40K/head.

Cheers


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## armyvern (13 Oct 2006)

pbi said:
			
		

> The Inf needs the best people (after SF) and lots of them. It seems we aren't getting them. Worse, it seems that the other branches that support and enable us aren't getting their people either. All this at a time that we are in dire need of a capable fighting force with enough depth to sustain rotations over the long haul.
> Cheers


Well I can't really add much on the pointy end of the debate here but you are bang on with your remarks above.  We support trades are not getting the resources we need to function on a daily basis either. We all need to grow...and drastically.
Vern


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## Edward Campbell (13 Oct 2006)

I may have endured more of the seemingly constant reorganizational turmoil than most; I joined the old army – the one with khaki uniforms, Sam Browne belts and paid _holidays_ in Cyprus and Germany and I left the one that started talking about ‘plug and play’ organizations for wars in places I could barely find on a globe.

I cannot, honestly, say that any organization could have managed the absolutely savage manpower cuts in the ‘70s and ‘80s.  They were quite beyond reason and none was applied; we just cut and cut and cut again in an attempt to meet incessant government demands to do more and more with less and less.  Much of HQ growth was government (politically) mandated.  I, personally, watched the _environmental_ staff go from one, part-time major buried deep in ADM(Mat)’s adminsitrivia bureaucracy to a full-blown staff division: a civilian director-general (BGen equivalent) with a plethora of directors (Cols) section-heads (LCols) and desk officers (Majs and Capts).  I can guarantee you that not one single PY (person-year) was provided, a dozen plus positions were _’found’_ here and there – mostly, by the time the dust had settled, from the field force and the fleet.  Ditto: enormous project offices – all to _’manage’_ regional industrial benefits and the like.  In *some* cases (not all, not even too many, but some) approved, budgeted military positions were _converted_ to civilian PYs and then given away to e.g. Supply and Services and the old Department of Regional industrial Expansion or whatever they were called for project management.

It seems to me that we need to commit to:

•	Proper, battle _able_ ships, regiments/battalions and squadrons – fewer, for a while, if that’s what it takes;

•	Properly organized, properly staffed and properly managed training schools – which are responsive to the *operational requirements* of the naval, general staff and air staffs and which answer to the commander of the force generation command(s);

•	Properly organized 1st, 2nd and 3rd line combat service support organizations – also ready for battle; and

•	Lean, efficient staffs in which the best officers and senior NCOs are proud, indeed honoured to serve.

The CDS can and should _go public_ – as I believe he is doing – to highlight the military’s manning woes.  He needs to explain, clearly, that we are stretched too far.  It may cost him his job; that’s OK; he may be the best thing since sliced bread but there are some good people below him, too, who are now confident (thanks to Rick Hillier) in their ability to effect _transformation_.

The CDS needs to shake up the recruiting and training system as his next priority.  He needs to find ways to retain many of the good sailors and soldiers who are quitting too soon – that’s got to be priority one.  Next he needs to speed up the recruiting process while simultaneously, reforming the training system and the _flow_ through the system from civvie to trained soldier.  I’m convinced that will help with retention.

Let’s not blame everyone; Pearson, Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien and Martin are responsible, not Miller, Allard, Sharp, Dextraze and so on; they _’were just following orders’_.  You can argue (as we did, to Dextraze, when he visited the Staff College) that resigning would have been better than overseeing the ongoing ‘death of a thousand cuts’ but good general and admirals would have replied that they stayed on and managed to minimize the damage to the CF.

Let’s just get on with serious, well organized, properly managed, rebuilding.  I think we have to start at the bottom – the ships, regiments/battalions and squadrons and work our way up to NDHQ.

OK, rant ends.

We know what our ‘base’ should look like; we know how to organize and support ships, regiments/battalions and squadrons; we know how many and what type of each we need and we know how many we can afford right now.

We know how to organize, staff, manage and operate our military schools and training system.  We _*ought to know*_ that training is an _operational_ function which must respond to the needs of the combat forces – not some _system_.

We know what our 1st, 2nd and 3rd line combat service support structure should look like and we ought to know how to organize and operate it (them?) in an efficient and combat effective manner.

If we get those three things right then we can pick lint and reorganize our C2 structure to our heart’s content.  I’m persuaded that the C2 structure, _per se_, is, relatively, benign: a couple of HQs here and there, and a few more (or fewer) BGens and so on do not. in my experience do much good or harm.  Let’s let the CDS of the day organize the C2 system as it suits him or her.

If we don’t get the first three (combat force, training and CSS organizations) _*right*_ then nothing much else will matter because, sooner or later, we will fail and be defeated in battle.


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## Jed (13 Oct 2006)

Edward +1, That will be the day I consider yout input a rant.


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## Gunner (13 Oct 2006)

> I cannot, honestly, say that any organization could have managed the absolutely savage manpower cuts in the ‘70s and ‘80s.  They were quite beyond reason and none was applied; we just cut and cut and cut again in an attempt to meet incessant government demands to do more and more with less and less.  Much of HQ growth was government (politically) mandated.



And carried on into the 90s.....


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## riot (23 Oct 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Interesting perspective PBI - I find myself agreeing with the point on rank distribution WRT HQ's and field units.  Some ideas on potential solutions to bring the field force up to snuff and perhaps generate some more discussion:
> 
> 1)  As the Aussie article alludes to, slow down the progression at the 2Lt to Captain level in order to keep junior officers at the lowest tactical level a bit longer to allow them to both learn their trade better and provide more support to the system.  We've lengthened the basic "career pattern" with the 25 year pension; should we not fudge the career progression and accession pattern to recognize this?
> 
> ...



Hey, quick note, I joined up when I was 17, straight out of highschool, and six (glorious) years in Petawawa later, the army offered me a 19 year contract. To a 23-year-old who has already dedicated over 1/4 of his life , that was way too much. I love the army and what we do, but c'mon, offer me 3-5 years at a time! A signing bonus would definatly help, but again, who REALLY does this for the money? I transferred to the MO so I could go to school, get out of Petawawa (which is a HOLE if you are single), and chase some tail that I missed 
On point 3, There are a lot of troops I know of who do not want the responsibility of leadership, they would much rather just do the job. I'm talking about members in the CFL here, troops who are great soldiers, but don't want the promotion, just the MOI, pathfinder, unarmed combat etc. that they can't get without the PLQ (or whatever is is changed to this week). Once they have the PLQ, they are promoted against thier wishes...
On point 4, see a little of my response to point 3, but I do believe with CSOR and these anphib. units starting up, the CF is onto something. Provided they are based in somewhat good locations (petawawa isn't one of these) you would have no problem retaining troops. If there were a local mountain unit where I am now (which there SHOULD be) I would have had no problem with the 19 year contract. 
just my humble opinion from the bottom

PEACE


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## Echo9 (1 Nov 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2)  Give bonuses to Ptes/Cpls to re-sign.  What's better, paying to train a new Private on a 3 year basic engagement or getting one to re-sign after 3 years?  We give $40,000 to get guys off the street, why not $20,000 as a bonus to sign on for 5-years after a basic engagement (taking the guy to the JNCO level and beyond)?
> 
> 3)  I'm not sure if it exists, but are we perhaps pushing guys towards a commission to much?  I seem to get the idea that degree = commission (I've definitely heard it from some CFRC folks) which, in this day in age, shouldn't be true at all.  I think retooling of the SNCO/WO role is essential to get young, educated Canadians to pursue a career in the ranks.



Number 2 is intriguing to me.  It doesn't exist now because the CF has typically been a steady state, government job like all the rest.  You don't provide inducement to people who would stay anyways.  With the current pace of activity, I'm not so sure that model continues to hold.  We're definitely moving to a higher attrition model (more like the yanks and brits, where most soldiers don't pass beyond the initial contract).

So, under that model, does it make sense to have contract bonuses?  Perhaps it does.  The impact of a contract bonus would likely mean that more people would take the second contract, which in turn means that you can be pickier about WHO you give the re-contracting offer to.  OR, if you're trying to stanch an attrition problem, the bonuses work.  They may even prove cheaper in the long run- paying a guy, say $20,000 is a lot to him, but is a fraction of the cost to recruit and train the newby who's taking his place.  Perhaps as an initial measure, it's tried with one of the distressed trades.

Number 3 is the product of lazy thinking.  The university degree is not the differentiator that it once was, and our recruiting policies need to reflect that.  Interesting point is that in the French army, once you were done your initial conscription period (now initial contract), if you had the recommendation of your commander and a degree, you could go into an NCO school, where you would be put on the fast track to Sgt.  Different thought processes in place there, and not consistent with our military culture, but shows in some ways a more flexible response to the situation.


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