# Unification



## Black Watch (7 May 2005)

Hello! Im doing a scholl project on the CF in the 60 and 70. I'd like to know the following:
1. Why the unification;
2. If Mobile Command Force (MCF) had air support squadons, why did they didn't do the maintnance on the CF5's?
3. Why did the CF used the green service uniform?
4. Why all CF's commands were moved in Ottawa that late (1996)
5. Why the unificcation didn't work out? and;
6. Why MFC lost it's flying squadrons?

Thanks to all


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## Michael OLeary (7 May 2005)

Have you tried Google to start with? A search on "canadian force unification" returns 117,000 websites.

A search on Army.ca for "unification" return 6 pages of results.


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## BDG.CalgHighrs (10 May 2005)

Here's a start:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecintro.html#TOP

This is a report by J.L Granatstein on Structure within the CF while he was acting as commissioner on the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Canadian Forces.

There is also this nifty website created by googls for the lazy that allows you to avoid using article indexes. I even did the search for you.:

http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=canadian+forces+unification+act


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## CH1 (22 May 2005)

Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.
cheers


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## Michael Dorosh (22 May 2005)

CH1 said:
			
		

> Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.
> cheers



It was in some ways a wise move that did indeed delete duplications and save money and effort.  General consensus among serious scholars, however, is that the implementation was failed, on many levels.

The problem with discussing unification is that it is hard to tell when someone is talking seriously, or simply rehashing the same old hysterical, visceral diatribes.


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## Michael Dorosh (22 May 2005)

Black Watch said:
			
		

> 3. Why did the CF used the green service uniform?



The previous service uniforms indicated a specific branch, so one colour was chosen to represent the fact that the CF was now one single service.  The uniform wasn't a complete departure from previous unifoms; one can see an evolution from the tropical worsted jackets of the 1940s and 1950s and the CF uniform.  The colour was definitely different, and the deletion of shoulder straps was significant, though that is easilly explained by the desire to include air force and naval rank insignia into the mix.  The work dress uniform - particularly the "bus driver" jacket - was more of a departure, seeming rather unlike what had gone before, its closest predecessor perhaps being the denim battledress blouse.


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## Infanteer (22 May 2005)

CH1 said:
			
		

> Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.



Really, that's not what I got from reading all the material on it - the quest for unified Defence Policy and Planning seemed to be the number 1 issue.


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## CH1 (12 Jun 2005)

Micheal & Infanteer

I will stand corrected.  I was responding from some obviously bitter memories.  The big thing pushed @ regimental & unit levels was the need to conserve dollars by reducing the duplication of trades & uniforms in the Tri service.  Although we also were told about the need to form a cohesive defense structure, emotions ruled the day.  The S2 & S3 dress, was I think derived from what we used to call T-Dubs.  This was a common pattern between the Army & Air Force.  It was a really fancy Summer Parade dress & the wool BDU's were the standard work & parade dress.  Still have my T-dubs & used them on occasion to sub in for my "Blues".

Personal Note:  Micheal I am home for sveral weeks now & Will dig out the voice procedure you are looking for.


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## STA Gunner (24 Jun 2005)

Desmond Morton has an excellent account of unification, right from the motives of Paul Hellyer to the impact on the CF as a whole into the 1980s.  I would highly recommend you getting it from a library (I'm not going to do your research).

http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/item....mond+morton&N=35&Lang=en&Section=books&zxac=1

On the whole, an interesting subject, and I wish you luck.


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## jmacleod (25 Jun 2005)

Unification was the brainwave of Toronto Liberal MP and former Army Corporal Paul Helyer, who was
chosen as Defence Minister in the Liberal government of the period. The concept, despite all the
academic introspection and nit picking was based on costs, commonality of purpose and support,
single sources of supply, etc, etc. The model was the United States Marine Corps - (don't think
Helyer was aware that the Corps is a Department of the US Navy). It went thorough to approval
despite absolute shock by the RCN, because, for one thing, the RCAF supported the concept,
which, for another, would commission all RCAF Aircrew except hard working FE's. Air Force
senior people knew that the Air Force would dominate the "officer corps" of the soon to be
renamed Canadian Forces. It was of course a disaster of epic proportions. In our house the
Canadain Navy is the Royal Canadian Navy, period. The long suffering first rate Canadian Army 
emerged relatively unscathed, but lost some first rate, battle trained outstanding senior officers
who were sent on their way - but the Army survived and remains the most effective overall "branch"
of the Canadian Forces. MacLeod


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## jmacleod (25 Jun 2005)

A few comments on the Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", which was underwritten by the US Government in the 'sixties to provide high performance, turbine fighters to the international sector
considered friendly to the US at a low price. RCAF of the period needed to replace the F-104
and expected to buy the famous McDonnell-Douglas F-4 "Phantom" - but Northrop, anxious to
sell their airplane offered production to Canada (Canadair-Montreal) - bonus for Quebec. To my
knowledge, the military of the period, referred to the high mobility brigade, as a Mobile Strike
Force. The CF-5 went to Fighter Squadrons like 416, Chatham NB, RCAF of the period insisted pn
total control of all aircraft in their inventory and all maintenance of course. In 2005, people forget
what a powerhouse the RCAF (later the, would you believe, Air Element) was in the overall scheme
of things in DND - why? NATO and the freedom of the real world. F-5 was a solid, tough workhorse
easy to fly and maintain - could do the job but lacked legs (range). The design team on the Northrop
F-5 , led by the late Lee Begin, designed the YF-17, which became the YF-18L "Cobra" which, at
the request of the US Navy and assimilation with McDonnell-Douglas, (MacAir) became the F-18
-CF18A "Hornet". The Northrop team in Canada was headed by Canadian and AVRO "Arrow" veteran
Richard C "Bud" Turner, and LCOL Herb Graves, former CO 417 OTU Squadron Cold Lake - a great
team. Worked with them for several years - spent an afternoon in Northrop Hawthorne talking
with Designer Lee Begin and some of his team - a memorable experience. MacLeod


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## FSTO (25 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> Unification was the brainwave of Toronto Liberal MP and former Army Corporal Paul Helyer, who was
> chosen as Defence Minister in the Liberal government of the period. The concept, despite all the
> academic introspection and nit picking was based on costs, commonality of purpose and support,
> single sources of supply, etc, etc. The model was the United States Marine Corps - (don't think
> ...



Looking through my salt encrusted navy blue coloured glasses I would dispute your statement that the Army is the most effective branch. Time and time again the Navy has been able to respond and sail with 10 days notice and arrive in theatre ready to go. While the Army was still sorting out its transport. (East Timor for example).
That being said, I hope that Hillier vision is able to right the wrongs of unification. 
of the Canadian Forces.


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## Gunner (25 Jun 2005)

> Time and time again the Navy has been able to respond and sail with 10 days notice and arrive in theatre ready to go. While the Army was still sorting out its transport. (East Timor for example).



If this is your definition of effectiveness, than I would have to disagree with you.  Army units (ie the immediate reaction unit (IRU) maintained by each area for domestic response are able to easily meet the 8/12/24 NTM timing for the recce/vanguard company/main body respectively (I can't remember what the NTM is for your ready duty ship).  This has been accomplished time and time again when responding to domestic emergencies.  For the Ontario/Quebec ice storm, LFWA was able to deploy 1 CMBG in its entire in approximately a 48 hours period with its vehs and eqpt arriving shortly thereafter.  Can the army power project in a short amount of time?  Sure can, and it has.  Can it power project overseas in the same amount of time?  It could but a deployment doesn't mean simply dumping soldiers in a hot DZ and then heading off for a shower (ie a self contained ship or the air force deployed to a five star hotel).  There is a large logistical tail required by the army in order to achieve sustained operations.

Having said that, I believe it is a totally falacious argument to compare a mechanized infantry battle group with all the bells and whistles attached to it with a self contained ship(s) or an aircraft(s) is like comparing apples to oranges to bananas.  Rethink your answer and post it if the navy wasn't able to tie up at a port for six months and then think if it would be able to deploy in only 10 days.

Cheers,

PS - I don't agree with jmcleod comments on the army being the most effective "branch", but I don't agree with your argument.


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## FSTO (26 Jun 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> Rethink your answer and post it if the navy wasn't able to tie up at a port for six months and then think if it would be able to deploy in only 10 days.



Little late in the night to be re-thinking, so I'll only give a short reply:

East Timor: Was watching the news with the wife when PM Chretian was in New Zeland at a conference and stated that Canada would send troops to East Timor. I said to my wife that we (PROTECTEUR) would be going. Got the call about 2 hrs later and 10 days later we left. I might add that we took a whole load of unnecessary kit for the Van Doos. (winter equipment, I kid you not!).
There are several other examples and I'll address them later.

I don't want to start a pissing contest between the Army and Navy on who is more operationally relevent. We both bring seperate tools to the table. I always thought that Unification should have used the USN or RN as the model (having the Marines). I think that General Hillier has bought into the "From the Sea" concept (borrowing a USN term). Lets see if Ottawa will let him follow through with it.

good Night!!


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## Infanteer (26 Jun 2005)

Let's gang up on the Air Force - you have Naval Aviation and you have the Army Air Force.  Two services that run their own shows.... :dontpanic:


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## jmacleod (26 Jun 2005)

As a final word on "unification" - it was badly thought out, without consideration to the overwhelming
negative aspects to the Canadian military, and its ability to undertake what eventually became very
complex military operations. Unification caused many dedicated, smart and higly trained professionals
representing all ranks to leave the Forces, caused the huge growth of non military bureaucrats in
DND, and their ability to introduce and undertake major policy decisions which in many cases had
a negative effect on the composition and morale of the forces - the direct result of this type of
activity was the termination of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. MP Helyer promoted "unification"
because of his ambition to become leader of the Liberal Party (an impossible dream), but in fact
caused what became the slow and unrelenting down-sizing of the military presence in Canada and
abroad, and the contempt of our NATO and US allies - that is Helyer's real legacy. The Mulroney
government understood this to a certain degree, and attempted the first steps in undoing "unification"
by the introduction of three distinct uniforms for the Canadian Forces - unfortunately, his government
did not have a long enough mandate to finish the job. MacLeod


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## Infanteer (26 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> caused the huge growth of non military bureaucrats in DND, and their ability to introduce and undertake major policy decisions which in many cases had
> a negative effect on the composition and morale of the forces



Just curious on how Unification caused this?   My understanding was that this didn't come around until Donald MacDonald and Management Review.

I, for one, am still generally supportive of Unification in a general sense - some of it finer nuances are bad for business and need to be done away with (the discussion on Purple trades and basic training is an example), but Unification saves us alot of hassle at the senior level (where are problems seem to be more related to civilianization).


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## Edward Campbell (26 Jun 2005)

Unification was, indeed, poorly thought out but Mr. Hellyer can be forgiven because he received lousy advice - including from his service chiefs.

Two factors dominated:

"¢	Money; and

"¢	More money.

As early as 1960 the government-of-the-day (Conservative (Dief the Chief) or Liberal (Mike Pearson), makes no never mind) faced an ever growing list of increasingly expensive defence materiel requirements which had to be accommodated in an environment in which Canadians wanted to spend less and less on _services_ which brought them no direct, measurable benefits (usually seen as a cheque with a red maple leaf on the envelope),  Ministers from successive governments and senior bureaucrats were convinced that DND, especially, was poorly organized - top to bottom.  Many politicians and senior bureaucrats had WWII service and they had, almost uniformly, returned to _civvy street_ with a firm conviction that Navy, Army and Air Force HQs were part of the problem - any problem.

The Glasco Commission was not so much evidence of bureaucratic ineptitude - throughout the government - as it was an indictment of the military and civilian staffs in defence HQ.  The AVRO Arrow fiasco gave the Commission all the evidence needed to convince ministers - not just Hellyer - that the defence staff and the civilian departmental staff were paralyzed, unable (not unwilling) to make sound policy judgements.

Hellyer should not be blamed for coming to believe that he might find some of the savings he needed by shaking up a moribund bureaucracy.

Hellyer should be blamed for two things:

"¢	Picking a lousy staff; and

"¢	Failing to pay attention to the briefings given by his American colleagues.

Paul Hellyer's closest advisor was a retired RCAF senior officer named Bill Lee.  Lee was a public relation officer and a political whiz kid of considerable repute.  He had a particular point of view - he detested the _Anglophilic_ navy and army, regarding them as anti-French and anti-modern anachronisms which were dangerous to national unity and served as impediments to logical, _operational_ defence reorganization.

Hellyer and Lee listened to the (then) recent, bruising experience in the USA.  The Americans told them:

"¢	_Unification_ (joint staffs, joint formations, joint operations): *Yes!*

"¢	_Integration_ (_purple_ units and diluted, multi-service standards): *No!*

----- At this point 'facts', as I understand them, end and opinion begins. -----

It has always seemed to me that Hellyer and Lee got the whole thing back-asswards, probably by mistake.  Relations between Hellyer/Lee and most of the senior admirals, generals and air marshals were already poisonous because Lee insisted upon putting himself in between Hellyer and DM and service chiefs Hellyer insisted upon making sure he stayed there.  Much has been made of Hellyer's bitterness at his own wartime service - compulsory re-musters, etc - and I think they did play a role in fuelling his distrust of the senior officers and strengthening his faith in Lee, who had his own axes to grind.

LGen Geoffrey Walsh (late RCE) was almost the 'perfect' worst choice to serve near Hellyer and Lee - he was a rough, tough, gruff man who inspired fear more than any other emotion in subordinates; he was, probably, everything Hellyer (and many other politicians and bureaucrats) hated about the 'old' army.  The navy, I think, was even worse: snobbish, pseudo-British to the core.  In _official Ottawa_ - Mike Pearson's Ottawa (Trudeau was not yet a power) - there was a perceived requirement to remake Canada in a new, less British, image.  The other Royal Commission - B&B - had put that wind in every sail.

My guess is that Hellyer was impressed with what he heard in Washington: _unification_ (as the Americans -  correctly - understood the word) was solving, had solved many of the worst inter-service rivalry problems which, too often, paralyzed military decision making.  It also cost less: there were fewer big, _national_ headquarters and new inter-service _agencies_ promised even more savings on _common_ services.

"Let's do it!  Let's integrate,â ? one can imagine Hellyer saying.  One can also imagine Lee (and a few others) agreeing because _integration_ goes way beyond unification - out to a _new frontier_ - where _things_ would really get shaken up and where reputations might just be made.  Notwithstanding the highly (but briefly) publicized (ridiculed, actually) resignations of e.g. Moncel and Landymore, there were many senior officers in the CF, led by (newly minted) Air Chief Marshall Miller who thought _integration_ (purple suiting) was a splendid idea.

The media was on Hellyer's side - Bill Lee was a highly skilled PR officer, after all - and the media moved public opinion on side, too.

There was one big problem: in all the fuss over _integration_ the _unification_ issue was put aside - for about 40 years.  It used to get mentioned - my old boss (MGen H.C. Pitts (late QORofC)) used to pound the table on a regular basis but the inter-service rivalries which Hellyer had tried to diminish were stronger than even - despite everyone being in the _jolly green jumper_.

Problems were, in fact, exacerbated by lazy ministers who decided that they didn't want to do the hard work of sorting out the inevitable and healthy disputes between military chiefs with their ever increasing laundry lists of expensive requirements and the DM  who is the keeper of the public purse.  The _unification_ (of sorts) of National Defence Headquarters forced an unnatural and highly ineffective _partnership_ on the DM and CDS - they are now required to agree even when they cannot and should not.  The effect is to paralyze decision making, yet again and even more, by allowing the minister to claim that matters are still _under review_ when, in fact, they are simply stalled because neither the DM nor the CDS can give further ground.

Defence is an expensive business; there are limited ways to save; making the headquarters and the overall _structure_ more efficient or cost effective was, and should always be a noble goal - it's always, without fail, better than cutting troops or failing to equip (adequately) the troops we have.  That was the problem Hellyer set out to solve, I think.  He and his minions ended up doing something else.  Too bad.


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## Infanteer (26 Jun 2005)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> "¢	_Unification_ (joint staffs, joint formations, joint operations): *Yes!*
> 
> "¢	_Integration_ (_purple_ units and diluted, multi-service standards): *No!*



That's what I was getting at - Unification makes sense as defined in the top line - like you, I think this was the original intent; we fumbled the ball somewhere and ended up with Integration (which, to me, signifies _unifying_ from the bottom up - we are better served by "Jointness" at that level).



> The _unification_ (of sorts) of National Defence Headquarters forced an unnatural and highly ineffective _partnership_ on the DM and CDS - they are now required to agree even when they cannot and should not.   The effect is to paralyze decision making, yet again and even more, by allowing the minister to claim that matters are still _under review_ when, in fact, they are simply stalled because neither the DM nor the CDS can give further ground.



Again, was this not a product of Donald MacDonald (and the perfumed prince himself, Trudeau) civilianizing the DND with the Management Review in 1972?  As far as I am aware of, Hellyer's Unification kept the DND and CFHQ separate (this is something he maintains to defend his actions to this date - "The other guy f#&@ed everything up, not me!").

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## CH1 (26 Jun 2005)

My final thoughts on Unification.

Long before the fall of the CAR, was the retiring the colours of many a good unit.   Pers were transferred into other units or branches.   Generally there was a lot of confusion at the sharp end of the stick.   I think the intent of retiring colours was to strengthen other units while reducing costs.

It is apparent that did not fare well in the long term.

As bitter as I am over unification, in retrospect, the "purple trades" are not that bad an idea.   They reduced a lot of duplication.   How ever the execution left a little to be desired.   The other thing connected to the "purple trades", was that some pers that were not classified as "purple" ended up scattered to the 4 winds as it were.   They were in 1 element & spent more time with other elements, which did not help esprit de corps.

I think that for those of us that were part of this party, we have different views, than those that followed.   We inadvertently became the demarcation line between the "old school WWII, Korean" lines of thought & the "new   Tri-service".   The Tri-service became the kinder, gentler military.

I think we all agree, no matter what the reasons, that there was a lot of long term damage created, that still affects the military today.

Cheers


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## TCBF (26 Jun 2005)

Hellyer was a square peg in a round hole.  Strange, but his opinions on Health Care made more sense than those that were adopted.  He differed with (leadership rival) Walter Gordon on the basic philosophy of the system.  He believed Gordon's plan of the gov't paying for everything was inflationary and non-sustainable.  He thought the gov't should be there after you have done your bit for yourself - not immediately.  Gordon told Pearson that Hellyer's ideas were not politically sound.  Pearson backed Gordon.

And here we are.

Tom


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## jmacleod (26 Jun 2005)

I intended to opt out of this post, because frankly, I have heard all the points of view before, but
I can add some information which hopefully is pertinent. My family came to Nova Scotia fom Ireland in
1819 - a book was written about my mother's family, "The Williams Family - A Family of Sea Captains"
but they were more than that, strict Roman Catholics, they were founders of the Liberal Party. They
also fought in all the wars, and served with distinction in the Volunteer Reserve of the RCN (RCNVR
the Wavy Navy) in WWII. Several were decorated for hunting elusive German submarines. So I have
a political and military perspective of "unification". In the Liberal Party, not really a democratic bastion
Helyer and Lee were considered fools - when I mentioned to my father that Helyer wanted to be
Leader and PM, he just laughed. Donald MacDonald was another non-entity, elected on Truudeau's
coat tails - if you mentioned the CF to MacDonald his eyes glazed over. But Trudeau was not an
enemy of the military, his view of the CF was totally pragmatic (he was trained by Jesuits after all)
but could not be convinced that a large. expensive military was sensible, in a counrty whose GNP
and annual birth rate continued to fall. But my father, and his friends, with their DSC's OBE's, MBE's
Atlantic Stars and scars, never forgave or accepted Naval officers who accepted "unification" they
were in good company with Admiral Harry DeWolf RCN, High Pullen RCN and many others, who fought
the U-Boats, point blank on the North Atlantic. No one could ever convince us that "unification"
was a positive decision made to ensure a more effective and "gentle" military (what ever that is).
MacLeod


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## Edward Campbell (26 Jun 2005)

Sorry MacLeod but you are wrong.   Trudeau despised the military and the people in it.   He took few pains to disguise the fact.   _â ?Pierre Trudeau viewed soldiers as unintelligent thugs. Likewise, his perception of the major powers was distorted: he saw the USSR and US as moral equivalents. His belief that Canada could find a new way in foreign and defence policy led to European-based Canadian military reductions in NATO.â ?_ and _â ? â Å“Trudeau had a low opinion of the military which he believed to be populated by robots trained to kill . . . the generals and their soldiers were dolts, frittering away their time and the government's money.â ?_ (Jack Granatstein, Who Killed that Canadian Military? Toronto, 2004) _â ?Trudeau was too much of a pacifist and a leftist for the Americans, some of whom considered him little more than a communist. He did nothing to change this perception when he said, during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1971, that the overwhelming American presence posed "a danger to our national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even military point of view." â Å“_ (Government of Canada, DFAIT, Canada and the World: A History)   _"Why would a guy as smart as you waste his time in the military?"_   (Pierre Trudeau to Bill Lee (see above) (then Liberal Party fo Canada campaign organizer) in 1968)   

He was a well educated man but an intellectual light weight.   He was, I think, afraid to test his education in the larger world so he returned to Québec and contented himself with vilifying Dupessis, â Å“international capitalism and Quebec clericalism.â ?   He argued that _â ?the civic and electoral immorality of the French Canadians, their propensity for authoritarianism, the antidemocratic theses that they learn in the colleges, the childish structures within which they debate at university, the small place occupied by the laity within the Quebec church, the low level positions they occupy in the authoritarian structures of capitalism, their fear to use the state, the only instrument capable to pull them from their plight, the lack of concern manifested by most for violations of freedom of speech, of the press or of association, all of these constitute characteristics of a people that has not learned as yet to govern itself, of a people where democracy cannot be taken for granted.â ?_   (La théorie du roi nègre, Claude Bélanger, Montreal, 1999) Heady stuff, I suppose, but all sound and fury and based, almost entirely, on his own pedigreed, puffed up pomposity.   His deep disregard for his fellow citizens provided too much fuel for the separatist fires.   Trudeau, as much as Lévesque, is the godfather of the _Parti Québecois_.

I am quite confident in my, personal, judgment that Pierre Elliott Trudeau was a weak man â â€œ he played the daredevil â â€œ to disguise his own knowledge that the sum of the man was far less than the parts,   Many admire him; he was a man of great charisma but small character â â€œ a poltroon, as I have said before.


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## jmacleod (26 Jun 2005)

Actually, I am not wrong. One of our cousins was the "desk" for the Atlantic Region in the PMO.
Senator Keith Davey and former Liberal Party President, Norman MacLeod of Toronto were very
close to the political Pierre E. Trudeau, and Trudeau was often, in those days, the topic of the
day - there is no question, the Right Honorable P.E.Trudeau was no lightweight intellectual, 
and his opinion of the military as quoted by Granatstein is nonsense. As far as Trudeau commenting
to Lee, you must be kidding - he would not talk to Lee at all, much less comment on "Lee being
smart" - Lee was not smart, and Granatstein has traded on his preception that Trudeau destroyed
the military for years. The problem was, that the then PM was focused on other areas; the economy
the continuing falling GNP, the mediocre leadership in the Nixon Government, and the real threat of
Premier Rene Levesque, ( a really smart guy, every bit Trudeau's equal, and a threat to unity). And
then there are the Generals and Admirals, most scared shitless of Trudeau - none had the ability
or the intestinal fortitude to confront him - but Trudeau realized that a significant military contribution
to NATO and the defence of Europe was a continuing (but hopefully from his perspective) a declining
neccessity for Canada's economic presence in Europe and the UK. It was a personal intervention by
Trudeau that generated the decision by DND CF to buy the McDonnell-Douglas-Northrop F18A -
I know, I was there. The New Fighter Aircraft Program (NFAP) was up until the MHP the largest
single military acquisition in dollar value. Trudeau did not hesitate to order DM Barnett Danson and
Project Manager General Paul Manson to buy the airplane, hardly the act of a politician who was
against the military.  Met Trudeau many times, campaigned with him, Davey and Norm MacLeod in
Toronto - the Canadian public rate him, to this day, very highly, which is what really counts. MacLeod


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## Edward Campbell (26 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> Actually, I am not wrong. One of our cousins was the "desk" for the Atlantic Region in the PMO.
> Senator Keith Davey and former Liberal Party President, Norman MacLeod of Toronto were very
> close to the political Pierre E. Trudeau ...



Your _opinions_, and those of your cousins, are noted and the appropriate values are attached to each.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> - the Canadian public rate him, to this day, very highly, which is what really counts.



This reference to Trudeau may be the crux of the current problems with the Canadian Military.   In the 1970's, it was not Trudeau who wanted to replace the Centurion Tanks.   They were going to end their life cycles with no replacements.   It was prepressureom our NATO Allies that brought about the purchase of the Leopard tanks that we eventually got.   They were purchased to meet our NATO commitment, not to replace one for one our fleet of CentCenturionsn effect, we saw the beginnings of the current trend of replacing equipment with half of what we had before.   128 Leopards replaced over 350 Centurion tanks.   You may notice the trend today, in the fact that those 128 Leopards are to be replaced by sixty odd MGS.   The same is witnessed in any Military replacement program to date;   2 1/2 Ton to MLVW, LSVW, Jeeps to Iltis to G-Wagen, ...........Trudeau and the Liberal Party have not been 'friends of the military'.

Oh! And I was there.


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## Infanteer (27 Jun 2005)

From my reading of Bland, the Leopards came about because JADEX had the stones to go right to Trudeau (skipping the DND) and say it flat out that we needed them and he would not lose them on his watch.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (27 Jun 2005)

I also seem to recall "a walk in the snow" between the German Chancellor and Trudeau during which Canada's commitment to keeping the Brigade operational were "discussed".  The Leos followed soon after - in minimal numbers.  If I recall my history correctly (yes, I'm too young to remember - even at nearly 40, sorry guys!), we were looking at Scorpions to replace the Centurion...eek!

BTW, as an aside, jmacleod:  Trudeau might well be popular with Canadians in Ontario, but he's still reviled by many (most?) here in the West.  To me, he's the epitome of the Eastern Canadian intellectual clique that has so dramatically altered Canada and Canadian political life.  I know I rolled my eyes at the "national hero" talk that accompanied his funeral, along with the concurrent attempts to re-name Mt Logan in his honour.


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## jmacleod (27 Jun 2005)

Well, a lot of people and politicians are reviled in Alberta, including Stephen Harper and Ralph
Kline, but nobody cares. In the Canadian military Messes of forty years ago, talk focused on
politics was strictly forbidden - it was a closed shop mentality, which cost the Military dearly,
because most of the senior officers were generally unaware of what they were dealing with
in the "politcal arena". I agree that there was no real empathy or understanding of the Military
from the politicians of the era, except those like Barnett Danson and George Hees, and others
who had served in World War II. But today, because every military decision has significant political
emphasis and economic consequences, the top officers in the CF are very much on top of the
political situation, particulary since the roughshod way the Army was treated over an isolated
incident in Somalia. In the military of forty years ago, if EMail existed, a high profile, articulate
Forum like this would have been discouraged to say the least. MacLeod


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## Edward Campbell (27 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I also seem to recall "a walk in the snow" between the German Chancellor and Trudeau during which Canada's commitment to keeping the Brigade operational were "discussed".   The Leos followed soon after - in minimal numbers.   If I recall my history correctly (yes, I'm too young to remember - even at nearly 40, sorry guys!), we were looking at Scorpions to replace the Centurion...eek!



It was, I think, a complicated time.

Trudeau was busy, in the late '60s and throughout the 70s, playing his childish, pacifist and _anti-capitalist_ role which, as others have pointed out, went down and still goes down very well amongst many, many Canadians.

Trudeau, who had little knowledge and less skill in economic and trade matters was off on his disastrous _third option_ scheme â â€œ through which he hoped to persuade Canadian businessmen that they should sell to buy from a remote, highly protectionist, expensive market rather than the big, free, easy one close to home: a policy of absolutely monumental stupidity which still attracts favourable comment from the economic illiterate today.

Trudeau had just (Oct '68) cut Canada's commitment to NATO (Europe) in half â â€œ a commitment with real, nuclear tipped military value and even greater symbolic value to, especially, the Dutch and Germans.  He delivered a kick in the slats to Europe with his left foot and then shoved his right foot in saying, â Å“Hey, Europe: Buy more and more of our products!â ?  It took a special kind of stupidity to do all that.  He really, really was out of his intellectual depth whenever he had to deal with grownups.

Anyway, he and Helmut Schmidt were personal and philosophic friends â â€œ socialist, anti-nationalist _one-worlders_ and that sort of thing.  Schmidt is reputed to have told Trudeau, quite bluntly, (See: Canada, NATO and the Bomb (1988)) _*â Å“No tanks, no trade.â ?*_  He didn't mean just any tanks, either: Trudeau came home from the famous (early '70s) _walk in the garden_ and ordered the procurement of German Leopard tanks despite the fact that he, personally, had avowed: â Å“No tanks in Canada.â ?

We got the tanks but not the trade: Schmidt _may_ have been Trudeau's friend but Valerie Giscard d'Estang was calling the shots in Europe and Canada â â€œ along with the rest of the world â â€œ was shut out.  Things may, almost certainly would have been different had we bought 350 _*French*_ tanks and 250 *French* airplanes, but ...

(One of the reasons we went the Cougar/Grizzly >>> LAV III/_Stryker_ route, I think, was that the minister and DM of the day interpreted Trudeau's statement, in the House of Commons, to be an absolute prohibition: No tanks, period.  The Direct Five Support vehicle programme was in full swing when I was in the operational requirements staff in the mid '70s.  While the UK _Scorpion_ and the American _Stingray_ light tanks were popular amongst some armoured officers (including folks like Jimmy Fox and Jack Dangerfield?)  who wanted to keep, at least, a 'training tank' which might, also, be useful in low intensity operations â â€œ my, personal, recollection is that the programme was aimed squarely and exclusively at wheeled vehicles â â€œ tank = tracks, therefore no tanks = no tracks, not even light ones.)

Off topic: I was, still am, fascinated with the idea of 'light' forces with air-transportable tanks.  I remain convinces that the proper role of armour is to let the infantry do the heavy lifting and then dash through the gap and shoot up the enemy's cook-houses and supply depots.  A few tanks, even light tanks, clanking about on the low or mid intensity battlefield can have the sort of _shock effect_ which wheeled mobile gun systems will never, in my personal opinion, achieve.


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## Infanteer (27 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> Well, a lot of people and politicians are reviled in Alberta, including Stephen Harper and Ralph
> Kline, but nobody cares.



Seeing how Ralph Klein has been elected 4 times in a row and Stephen Harper is an MP from that province, I can't see how the revulsion can be that extreme.



			
				Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> Trudeau, who had little knowledge and less skill in economic and trade matters was off on his disastrous _third option_ scheme â â€œ through which he hoped to persuade Canadian businessmen that they should sell to buy from a remote, highly protectionist, expensive market rather than the big, free, easy one close to home: a policy of absolutely monumental stupidity which still attracts favourable comment from the economic illiterate today.



Ahh...the "Great Pirouette"; I remember learning about that one in a Foreign Policy class.


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## jmacleod (27 Jun 2005)

Kiline and Harper are constantly being "put down" by many Western Canada newspapers, most notably
the Sun Group, which most reader's think are "conservative", but in fact are not. Fact is, no one
in Central or the Atlantic region cares if Kline got elected four times, and Harper, unfortunately is
on his way to a new life. Sun newspapers have done a lot of harm to the small "c" conservative cause.
Trudeau was a graduate of the London School of Economics and a student of Dr. Harold Laski, which
colored his view of international economics. The real pressure on Canada during the period referred
was to maintain a presence in NATO, which resulted in several threats to Canadian economic trade
-to this day, try to buy Canadian butter in Europe. DeGaulle had withdrawn from NATO, which cost
the other members many dollars and unanticipated committments - at home, the Canadian economy
except for central Ontario was not exactly briming over with success. So, money was the real factor
in the concept of "unification" which was, in my opinion, an absolute diaster - the concept had no
redeeming qualities. Just a point, for an interesting point of view of armoured tactics, History channel
has been offering various aspects of the IDF in the various wars with Syria, Egypt, Jordan etc. General
Sharon appears to have known a lot about the tactical application of tanks. MacLeod


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## I_am_John_Galt (27 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> Kiline and Harper are constantly being "put down" by many Western Canada newspapers, most notably
> the Sun Group, which most reader's think are "conservative", but in fact are not. Fact is, no one
> in Central or the Atlantic region cares if Kline got elected four times, and Harper, unfortunately is
> on his way to a new life.


I still don't get it ... maybe you should come out here for a little while and see how "reviled" they are (methinks you might have been a little mislead by the Central and Eastern Canadian media).




> Trudeau was a graduate of the London School of Economics and a student of Dr. Harold Laski, which
> colored his view of international economics.


Is your point that he lacked the capacity for independent critical thought?


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## TangoTwoBravo (27 Jun 2005)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> I remain convinced that the proper role of armour is to let the infantry do the heavy lifting and then dash through the gap and shoot up the enemy's cook-houses and supply depots.



You've got my vote!  I'll need an HLVW to follow for the plunder.  I wouldn't feel quite right, however, about shooting up a cookhouse.  Cooks are some of my favourite people in the field and some of the enemy ones might be very good.  Never shoot up a chance at fresh rations.

Sorry.   

I've actually gained some interesting perspectives here.  I've read some books that touched on unification, but can anyone here recommend a good, balanced book that lays out the history without too much baggage?  Its hard to know where we're going when we don't know where we've been.   Unification strikes me as a massive self-inflicted wound, but I'm basing that more on intuition than knowledge.


Cheers,

Iain


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## jmacleod (27 Jun 2005)

What is "independent critical thought?  Just asking. Macleod


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## Infanteer (27 Jun 2005)

I'm curious - are you intentionally spelling Ralph Klein's name wrong?


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## Black Watch (27 Jun 2005)

But why all the commands hq were spred all over the country (MF in St-Hubert, Air command in Winnipeg and so on) instead of ONE big NDHQ in Ottawa as it is now?


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## Edward Campbell (27 Jun 2005)

Black Watch said:
			
		

> But why all the commands hq were spred all over the country (MF in St-Hubert, Air command in Winnipeg and so on) instead of ONE big NDHQ in Ottawa as it is now?


The _initial_ structure was grafted on to the existing RCAF.

Four of the RCAF commands: Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, Air Materiel Command and Air Training Command just _morphed_ into their new (then) forms in their (then) current locations.  Mobile Command and Maritime Command were brand new but MARCOM looked suspiciously like the old Atlantic Fleet HQ with the Pacific Fleet 'under command'.

It made good organizational sense, when you stop and think about it: it limited the turmoil in a period when there was way, way too much.


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## Acorn (27 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> Just a point, for an interesting point of view of armoured tactics, History channel
> has been offering various aspects of the IDF in the various wars with Syria, Egypt, Jordan etc. General
> Sharon appears to have known a lot about the tactical application of tanks. MacLeod



One wonders if you are one of those "stream of consciousness" conversationalists. You have a way of digressing, however I'll bite:

I'll have to see what History Lite is offering, but I disagree. Sharon was a dangerous fellow that believed(s) his own myth, and became progressivly more dangerous with higher commands. In '73 he stood on the brink of launching a sizeable chunk of the IDF's armour into oblivion through his arrogance and disdain of the Egyptians. 

I'll grant that he seems to have changed his tune. Maybe finally getting the top job he lusted after since the founding of the Likud he can finally see what needs to be done - undoing most of his own policies of the '70s and '80s.

Acorn


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## jmacleod (28 Jun 2005)

DND HQ will announce today a "new command structure" featuring a Central Command based
in Ottawa headed by CDS and six national command headquarters - General Hillier's plan, which
has a definative link, perish the thought, to unification. What a clever idea. Sorry about the spelling
of Premier Ralph Kleins name, but it is so rarely publized in the east of Canada that I thought it
was the same as a long established clothing store in Halifax NS. now long gone, well know to the
Haligonians of the period 1940's. The Hillier plan is inevitable, but it is doubtful that the monies
promised by the Minority government for DND will be readily forthcoming, because of other committments, based on the NDP Agenda. Hillier is also going to be compelled to look after
house keeping, continuous upgrades of run down military bases, and a hard examination of the
Canadian Forces Housing Agency - welfare of the troops should be his first priority. MacLeod


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## Edward Campbell (28 Jun 2005)

MacLeod is correct that Gen. Hillier's plan, as I understand it, is rooted in unification.  *Unification*, in the correct sense of that word, is a good thing, an operationally essential thing â â€œ it is _integration_ (purple suiting, etc, with all that entails) which has had and continues to have serious deleterious effects on the Canadian Forces.

MacLeod is wrong when he suggest that: _â Å“...welfare of the troops should be his first priority.â ?_  â Å“Man managementâ ? (looking after the people in the armed forces) is critical but it must be one finger in a clenched fist which includes discipline, training, leadership, equipment and organization.  One of the things which went wrong, year after year and decade after decade was that too many people thought (still think) like MacLeod: think that one thing must have an absolute priority.  The end effect of such thinking â â€œ the only, inevitable effect of such thinking â â€œ is that everything else deteriorates while such resources as are available are directed towards this, that or the other transient _â ?first priorityâ ?._

We need _balanced_, combat capable, combat ready forces â â€œ because no one, not me, not Bill Graham, not Rick Hillier and not even MacLeod knows what lies around the corner.  The only thing in which we can repose a great deal of trust is that Canadian governments, especially Liberal Party of Canada governments, lack strategic vision and, usually, put self interest Ahead of national interest.  (The Tories aren't much better â â€œ they've just had fewer opportunities to do the wrong thing over the past 75 years.)

The specific areas of concern MacLeod cites (run down bases and the Canadian Forces Housing Agency) are only peripheral to the CDS's main business â â€œ they are, unless I have missed too many re-orgs, within the purview of the Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel who reports to the DM.  It is his job to look after _bricks and sticks_.  The CDS needs to worry about selecting, training, retaining, motivating, organizing and directing tough, well disciplined, well trained and well led sailors, soldiers and aviators.  The Minster and the DM have the *responsibility* to tell the CDS how many of those people he can have, how much they can be paid, how much 'welfare' will be available, what equipment they will have and use and where and when they will deploy and fight â â€œ that's part of the _system_ we almost all signed on to defend.  Parliament, wherein the Minister of National Defence looks after the defence of the realm, is _sovereign_ and it, alone, decides how much defence is needed and how much can be afforded.  Parliament gives the _crown_ enough money for the tasks at hand and the _crown_ hires people like senior civil servant Ken Calder to _manage_ policy, equally senior civil servant Allan Williams to equip the forces and senior military men like Rick Hillier to lead, train and direct those forces in peace and war.


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## I_am_John_Galt (28 Jun 2005)

jmacleod said:
			
		

> What is "independent critical thought?  Just asking. Macleod



A concept with which *far* too many lack familiarity (some guy named Socrates came up with it).


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