# NATO:  Too Many Restrictions on Foreign Forces in AFG



## The Bread Guy (4 Sep 2006)

Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

UN envoy demands Afghan shake-up 
Financial Times, 4 Sept 06
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/976e13fa-3c32-11db-9c97-0000779e2340.html

The senior United Nations envoy to Afghanistan has warned that some Nato troops in the country are operating under excessive restrictions that are hampering the alliance’s mission there.

The alliance, whose credibility is widely seen as hanging on its success in the country, is facing unexpectedly fierce opposition from resurgent Taliban fighters that has alarmed some Nato governments.

The warning from Tom Koenigs, the UN’s special representative for Afghanistan, came as Nato’s entire civilian and military leadership flew out to the country. Nato said the visit had been long planned to demonstrate a joint commitment to the mission – but officials said it should help fight the perception that the alliance was losing its way there.

*Mr Koenigs said Nato needed more troops and fewer restrictions on their freedom of manoeuvre. In particular, he said that there were “around 71 caveats” or restrictions on the Nato mission, which he argued were “too many and must be removed”.*

Key caveats limit the combat role of Germany’s 2,800 troops and restrict them to Kabul and the relatively peaceful north of the country. Nato can deploy them elsewhere only “under exceptional circumstances and on a temporary basis”.

Mr Koenigs, a German national, added that the country’s soldiers in Afghanistan had been “lucky to be deployed in the relatively peaceful north [of the country] but they must now accept having to go to the south.”

Both the local police and military were currently “hopelessly overstretched,” he said.

On Monday, the Netherlands, another country that has recently debated a possible troop redeployment, confirmed that about 100 Dutch soldiers had been temporarily reassigned to the southern province of Kandahar to assist Canadian forces.

Mr Koenigs was scheduled to meet the Nato delegation, headed by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, secretary general, and James Jones, the alliance’s top military commander, during its three day trip to Afghanistan. The ambassadors of all 26 Nato nations are also participating in the visit . . . . 

This was mentioned in this report, too, on 22 Aug 06:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf

''*An attack on the Norwegian-Finnish PRT in normally tranquil Meymaneh, in western Afghanistan, in February 2006 had given an indication of an emerging problem: the need for a rapid military response capability for rescue operations. When the PRT was attacked, no NATO combat forces were in the region
to protect the ISAF personnel.* Other NATO forces that were nearby had caveats prohibiting their use in combat operations. Eventually a British plane and forces were found to end the attack on the PRT. Before and after the attack on the PRT, NATO SACEUR General James Jones called upon the NATO governments to pledge forces to ISAF that would be capable of combat operations. He has waged a constant campaign to cajole allied governments not to place caveats on their forces that ruled out combat operations.''

''....*Berlin was adamant that German forces would not engage in combat operations; according to NATO officials, the German caveat against combat has limited the alliance in integrating German forces
with those of other allied governments. * Former Defense Minister Struck had opposed merging ISAF and OEF commands because it “would make the situation for our soldiers doubly dangerous and worsen the current climate in Afghanistan.” These restrictions on German forces in ISAF continue. However, when the mandate for German forces in Afghanistan expires and is renewed in fall 2006, there is a possibility that the Merkel government may allow a more forceful response from its soldiers when they confront warlords, drug traffickers, and other armed groups in the vicinity of their PRTs."

''The Dutch government . . . . does not want its ground forces involved in combat operations. Dutch forces are wearing olive, and not camouflage, uniforms. In the Dutch view, ISAF’s purpose is “to provide a secure and stable environment for reconstruction.” However, the Netherlands endorsed the “synergy” of ISAF and OEF commands and has made available four F-16s for missions in both ISAF and OEF. The aircraft may be used for missions from intelligence gathering to close air support. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands is in the process of sending 1,400 troops to Afghanistan for Stage Three operations.  *The political effects of the domestic Dutch debate have found their way into the field. Dutch commanders on the ground in Afghanistan reportedly insisted to NATO counterparts that no Dutch troops must be killed in combat*, a view they were told was unrealistic, given that Uruzgan is one of the most restive provinces in Afghanistan.''


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## paracowboy (4 Sep 2006)

having European troops attached to Canadian/British/American forces wouldn't necessarily be an asset. Try to get them to fight. Try to get them to dismount. Try to get them to leave the MSR. 
My section was called out to provide security for some Germans. 
Giddy up. Off we go, expecting to find a det, or maybe a section. 
Nope.
A *platoon*. Terrified. :


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## The Bread Guy (4 Sep 2006)

Yikes -  This may sound naive, but as worthy as the task of helping straighten things out in AFG is, it sounds WAY more complicated than I figured (and I figured the drugs, warlords, tribal animosity, history, poverty, isolation and lack of capacity alone were biggies!).


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## boondocksaint (4 Sep 2006)

with what para said 'and try to get them to leave the PX'

the only other ppl we saw fight were americans and brits, and the ana of course, i woulda thought that most euro countries would understand better then most the value of assisting other nations in a war, 

there is definitly an 'us' and 'them' nato feeling 
the next time the euro's need saving perhaps we should 'caveat' ourselves, till after the playoffs, or may 24, or xmas.....

mho


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## silentbutdeadly (4 Sep 2006)

Well the french in Spin were doing some fighting too , we just never really heard about up in our area.


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## dglad (4 Sep 2006)

Even in (relatively peaceful) Bosnia, there were numerous caveats applied to the use of various national contingents and their ROE.  Our TF LEGAD spent a major portion of his time trying to unravel, for the Comd, who could do what, when and where.  So this is nothing new.

On the other hand, some national contingents were quite permissive in terms of how they could be deployed.  Interestingly, one of the most robust I worked with was Romania, whose forces, incidentally, I found to be extremely professional and competent.  The trouble is as much trying to keep track of the various national caveats as you design ops and do the troops-to-task assignments, as what they actually are.


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## The Bread Guy (4 Sep 2006)

Just found this, adding to the "what the Dutch are up to" file (appears to be back-filling, rather than strictly pointy end), shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

*Dutch Soldiers Active In Kandahar*
Netherlands National News Agency, 5 Sept 06
http://www.nisnews.nl/public/050906_2.htm

About 100 Dutch soldiers are currently operating in the Afghan province of Kandahar in support of the Canadian army. For this reason, the Dutch left their own base in Uruzgan last week.

The defence ministry in The Hague confirmed the "temporary presence" of Dutch military in Kandahar yesterday. *They are guarding a post on the route between Kandahar city and Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan. The Netherlands' support enabled Canadian soldiers in Kandahar to participate in an offensive against the Taliban.*

*Defence Minister Henk Kamp already said in the Lower House last week that incidental help outside of Uruzgan was within the mandate agreed earlier with parliament. Only if there was a question of structural deployment outside the Dutch military's 'own' province would a new situation arise which the Lower House would have to approve, according to Kamp.*

The socialists (SP) had requested clarification following reports that the regional command of the NATO-led ISAF international security force wanted more freedom to deploy military troops more effectively in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. This concerns Kandahar and Helmand, where the British are stationed.


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## Mourning (4 Sep 2006)

Hi guys, my first post here.

First off ... nice site you people have up here  .

I have to "disarm" some of the comments made in the posted articles above. Can't believe some of that stuff even made into official reports.

1) The Dutch troops ARE wearing camouflage uniforms. I don't know how that article came up with that:

http://www.ad.nl/uruzgan/article446931.ece

http://www.landmacht.nl/Extra/Fotogalerij/frmMediaThumbnails.aspx?nCategoryID=14

2) 1.700 Dutch troops are operating in Uruzgan ALSO in the more dangerous southern provinces of Afghanistan and also have regular fire contact with Taliban elements. So, it's not like our troops are staying on their base and doing nothing. When they encounter or locate Taliban troops they do actively engage them. It's not like they are just in hiding waiting to surrender.

3) No mention of Dutch Special Forces actions in Operation Enduring Freedom and the mission of ISAF in Southern Afghanistan? No mention of 6 AH-64D Apache Longbows and not 4, but 6 F-16MLD's available to all allied forces in Southern Afghanistan and assisting Canadian and UK forces the past few weeks aswell.

4) The Dutch contingent based in Tarin Kowt, together with about 550 Australians has been at full manpower since end of july, so it's not in the process of beying deployed. They are already there, so a factual error in  that report which is dated august 22nd 2006.

It's true that some of our politicians are soooo scared of casualties it drives a lot of soldiers mad. However, it's not as bad as this article wants to portray, not nearly as bad.

I can't speak for the Germans though, their politicians are even worse then ours.

However, one thing I will say: "GO !"

Regards,

Mourning  8)


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## Edward Campbell (4 Sep 2006)

Mourning said:
			
		

> Hi guys, my first post here.
> ...



Welcome to Army.ca!

Some of us have had the pleasure of serving with your forces - back (until 1970) when we were in NATO/NORTHAG and, for a few of us, in HQ AFCENT in Brunssum.  I think we all understand that our Dutch allies are, still, _"valient and stout hearted"_ as Churchill decribed them.  We all have politicians we would rather send to Afghanistan.

That being said, many members here, members with recent combat experience, are not keen on fighting alongside most Europeans.  Don't be offended; correct us when we're wrong and join us in supporting our *combined*, allied efforts in the _War on Barbarism_.


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## geo (4 Sep 2006)

After seeing what happened in BH, Sudan, Rwanda, etc.... it is obvious that the ROEs that are imposed on troops has the effect of tying one (or both) hands behind their back.

NATO, national gov'ts AND the UN MUST get their act together and provide troops with clear direction of what is expected of them - and how they are expected to deliver the goods.


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## George Wallace (4 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> Welcome to Army.ca!
> 
> Some of us have had the pleasure of serving with your forces - back (until 1970) when we were in NATO/NORTHAG and, for a few of us, in HQ AFCENT in Brunssum.  I think we all understand that our Dutch allies are, still, _"valient and stout hearted"_ as Churchill decribed them.  We all have politicians we would rather send to Afghanistan.
> 
> That being said, many members here, members with recent combat experience, are not keen on fighting alongside most Europeans.  Don't be offended; correct us when we're wrong and join us in supporting our *combined*, allied efforts in the _War on Barbarism_.



Actually Edward, some have had the pleasure of operating with the Dutch in Afghanistan, and seeing their Apache's and Fighters in action.  They have not gone unnoticed.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (4 Sep 2006)

+1 George.  See, for instance:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33069/post-246433.html#msg246433

However, as I and others have expounded upon before, the caveats (in many cases) severely restrict the operational effectiveness of ISAF contingents, to the point where we have some countries unwilling to operate outside a particular police district in Kabul centre.  Moreover, the operational focus of some ISAF members is somewhat lacking - to put it mildly.


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## The Bread Guy (4 Sep 2006)

Welcome, Mourning...

My source for the Dutch not in cam is from a report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a reasonably unbiased research service for the US House of Congress.  The report is here:
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/71867.pdf

and the Dutch reference to a lack of cam uniforms is not attributed or footnoted in the report.  Other information seems to be based on interviews CRS staff did with military and political officials from the USA and other NATO countries, but these officials aren't named.

Thanks TONS for adding to the information pool here!


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## McG (4 Sep 2006)

I understood the intent of the article to be emphasising that the Dutch had a temperate combat uniform (lots of green) as opposed to an arid pattern uniform (lots of tan/brown).  In this respect, it is correct.


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## tomahawk6 (4 Sep 2006)

The restrictive ROE's are intended to keep certain European contingents out of actual combat.


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## 17thRecceSgt (4 Sep 2006)

Tomahawk6

Okay, I'll bite.  Why?  (serious question).

MRM


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## tomahawk6 (4 Sep 2006)

Nothing to bite on. Restrictive ROE's are intended to keep a nations troops out of actual combat period. Meaning that if your ROE only allows you to return enemy fire or to respond in self defense then those troops wont be doing combat sweeps along the Pakistani border.


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## 17thRecceSgt (4 Sep 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The restrictive ROE's are intended to keep certain European contingents out of actual combat.



I thought by this you meant it was "intentional and for that very reason", and that NATO has done is knowingly.


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## geo (4 Sep 2006)

all we have to do is remember our ROEs from BH............ they stank!


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## The Bread Guy (4 Sep 2006)

My understanding is that the restrictions on ROE's come from national gov'ts/HQ's, not NATO, so I'm guessing it's all based on the political equation "what can we (governing party of country in question) do to help in AFG without losing power here?"


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## geo (4 Sep 2006)

some gov'ts have sent troops after having their arms twisted a bit.... so it's....
here are my troops for you to use BUT, I get complete say on how they are used outside the wire.


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## paracowboy (4 Sep 2006)

milnewstbay said:
			
		

> My understanding is that the restrictions on ROE's come from national gov'ts/HQ's, not NATO, so I'm guessing it's all based on the political equation "what can we (governing party of country in question) do to help in AFG without losing power here?"


not quite. It's more like "What can we do to appear to partake in the effort, in order not to lose the US's protection, while simultaneously contributing as little to the actual effort as possible, so we can continue to bad-mouth the US at every opportunity, while claiming to being doing our part".


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## GAP (4 Sep 2006)

paracowboy said:
			
		

> not quite. It's more like "What can we do to appear to partake in the effort, in order not to lose the US's protection, while simultaneously contributing as little to the actual effort as possible, so we can continue to bad-mouth the US at every opportunity, while claiming to being doing our part".



Now that I can agree with...


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## McG (4 Sep 2006)

milnewstbay said:
			
		

> My understanding is that the restrictions on ROE's come from national gov'ts/HQ's, not NATO, so I'm guessing it's all based on the political equation "what can we (governing party of country in question) do to help in AFG without losing power here?"


Something like that.  Had it been NDP at the helm (as opposed to Liberals) we likely would have been launched with problem ROEs like are described here.  We'd be over there with a big presence but no effect.


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## tomahawk6 (4 Sep 2006)

Or in Darfur.


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## pbi (4 Sep 2006)

The overriding ROE are always the ones set by your national chain of command, not the ones set by NATO, UN, etc. Although we have enjoyed pretty good ROEs for most ops in the last decade or so (with a few notable exceptions), don't forget that the ideas of being expeditionary,  and of going to dangerous places where you will probably have to kill somebody; are unfamiliar and extremely unpopular ideas in some countries: Japan comes to mind. My sense in dealing with the Germans in ISAF VI was that while they were basically good soldiers, they were extremely risk averse, to the point of being of limited use in some situations. This was, I think, a reflection of their ROEs.

Unfortunately, (IMHO) these weak ROEs are based in the naive hope that somehow NATO troops will not be targeted if they are not "aggressive" (like those nasty US, UK and Cdns). Thus, the government will be able to avoid awkward and unpleasant explanations of deaths in Afghanistan. The Germans in particular know that this is sheer nonsense. In my opinion, the result of these wek ROEs is either:

somebody else's troops will carry the load when things get bad; or

there may be nobody ready to deal effectively with the Taleban and friends, unless some of those "nasty" troops happen to be in the vicinity. 

IMHO the problem is that the govts of some of these troop contrinuting nations are caught between trying to stay on good terms with the US by being seen to "do something" on the one hand, and their national public opinion on the other hand. Going too far towards the former could cause them to lose the latter, and end up out of power.  (Not a completely unfamiliar situation in Canada...)
I guess the best that can be said for these nations is that they are doing work in Kabul that otherwise we might have to shoulder.

Cheers


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## Teddy Ruxpin (4 Sep 2006)

I'll chime in with this:  we're talking apples and oranges here.

ROE are different than national caveats. 

ROE are applicable to _engagements_ and define how soldiers employ force.  Caveats, which are what we're talking about here, are political restrictions on where, when and under which command a nation's forces can be employed.  National caveats may read something like this:

_Operations within PD 12 only.  Use of deadly force restricted to self-defence.  May not be used for crowd control operations._

When planning operations, we would have a huge list of the caveats for each country.  Some, like the US and UK, had none.  Others had entire paragraphs, with incredible detail.  Force composition was essentially determined by which caveats were applicable.  A nation may grant very robust ROE, but direct extremely restrictive caveats.  One nation would only permit its helicopters to carry soldiers of a certain nationality, for instance, or impose a geographical restriction.  This has the effect of virtually guaranteeing that its forces wouldn't become engaged in "unpleasant" operations.  Often, we'd say to hell with it and rely on the usual suspects to undertake difficult operations rather than bothering to go through the trouble of figuring out who was "available".


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## Cloud Cover (5 Sep 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> This has the effect of virtually guaranteeing that its forces wouldn't become engaged in "unpleasant" operations.  Often, we'd say to hell with it and rely on the usual suspects  to undertake difficult operations rather than bothering to go through the trouble of figuring out who was "available".



Is the CF a "usual suspect?" I am somewhat curious since I'm pretty sure this is the very claim which is being disputed at political level [i.e. is there some disagreement as to what national caveats were in place on or about January 21, 2006 and have they been modified since January 22?].


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## Teddy Ruxpin (5 Sep 2006)

The actual caveats are an OPSEC issue, so I won't get into them further.  Suffice it to say that Canadian caveats weren't an operational issue (at all) when I was there.


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## civmick (5 Sep 2006)

I thought after Srebrenica and the huge soul searching in Holland that an attitude of "go in hard or don't go at all" would be the basis of future deployments of Dutch forces.  Apparently not if the posts above are true.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (5 Sep 2006)

Well, let's not be too hasty.  None of us know what the Dutch caveats really are.  As stated above, the Dutch Apaches were quite highly thought of...

I believe that the initial story was referring to all countries that have directed extremely restrictive caveats in an effort to avoid operations - an accusation that can apply to a fairly wide variety of European and non-European contingents.


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## Roy Harding (5 Sep 2006)

Apropos to nothing, I would like to mention here that the ROEs imposed upon any nation's military by their respective governments are NOT necessarily reflective of the quality of troops deployed.

We in Canada have had the experience of overly restrictive ROEs, imposed by politicians who didn't know better (or didn't care).  It is a most demoralizing situation for the soldiers involved.   I would submit that other nations suffer the same mindset from time to time.

Just because a national government restricts what its' respective troops may engage in does not mean those troops are not pulling their weight to the best of their (legal) ability.  In my experience, most soldiers are in some state of disagreement with their respective politicians.

For the record, I've served with British, Aussie, Kiwi, Czech, Dutch, German, American, Finnish, Swedish, French, Danish, Romanian, Belgian, Pakistani, Malaysian, Irish, Indian, Spanish, Argentian, Brazilian,  and many other nations' troops (which unnamed nationalities are unimportant and left unmentioned only for space and failing memory considerations - no slight is intended at all).  I have found that, for the most part, soldiers are soldiers - despite their respective nationality.  They are all (in my experience) "can do" and "gung ho" - and they bristle when their home nations' government restricts their actions.  That restriction, however, is the essence of democracy - democratic armies don't get to do what they KNOW needs to be done - they get to do what their duly elected government TELLS them to do.

As I said at the beginning - this post is apropos to nothing, I would just hate to see this thread degenerate into "national character bashing" - not that it has, just that I would hate to see it do so.


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## pbi (6 Sep 2006)

Teddy: you are quite right-I was not being clear about ROE vs caveats. As you will recall, ISAF had VERY robust "Levels of Force" (=ROE) on paper but they were utterly hamstrung by national caveats.

Roy Harding: I have seen a few of the world's armies too, and I wish I could be as charitable as you. While I agree that we should not name names, some of them, I'm sorry to say, were rubbish, regardless of what their ROEs/caveats/etc might have been. (And, to be fair, some surprised me.) Sometimes it's a reflection of the military culture: some armies are just not designed for operations that require initiative and autonomy at the lower levels. Other forces have no sense of professionalism amongst their officers, such that ethical behaviour or leadership by example are relatively rare, with predictable results on their troops' performance. I will be the very first to admit that we have, in the past, seen examples of this kind of behaviour in deployed Canadian troops, but we clearly recognized these as aberrations contrary to our ethos and traditions and have worked hard to deal with them since then.


Cheers


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## tomahawk6 (8 Sep 2006)

ROE article from Strategypage. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20060908.aspx

September 8, 2006: NATO commanders in Afghanistan are not happy with all the strings attached to their authority by politicians back home. The ROE (Rules of Engagement) for NATO troops contain over seventy restrictions on how the NATO commander may use troops assigned to him. Most of these have to do with where national contingents can be moved, and how much they can be exposed to danger. 

In the last six weeks, the NATO force of 20,000 troops has suffered 38 dead, but has killed about twenty times as many Taliban fighters. The NATO troops are good at what they do, but they could do more, and at less risk to themselves, if the NATO commanders had fewer strings attached to who can be used where and how. That would seem impossible, given that three dozen NATO nations have troops in Afghanistan. But it's only the major contributors of combat forces that NATO commanders are really worried about. Of particular concern is the German contingent of nearly 2,000 troops. Current ROE restricts the German troops to Kabul. 

By going public with complaints about the ROE problem, the NATO commanders are setting up the politicians back home to take the heat for any casualties in Afghanistan. It also puts pressure on the politicians to ease up on the ROEs, which were created mainly to win political points back home.


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## Love793 (8 Sep 2006)

I seem to remember a certain country deploying 2 fighter Sqns to the Gulf during rd 1 of the Gulf War, with the restrictions that they will not be used out side of CAP missions with in Saudia or Bahrainian airspace.  This was lifted towards the end of the war, after the majority of fighting was concluded.


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## -Marauder- (8 Sep 2006)

Roy Harding said:
			
		

> Apropos to nothing, I would like to mention here that the ROEs imposed upon any nation's military by their respective governments are NOT necessarily reflective of the quality of troops deployed.
> 
> We in Canada have had the experience of overly restrictive ROEs, imposed by politicians who didn't know better (or didn't care).  It is a most demoralizing situation for the soldiers involved.   I would submit that other nations suffer the same mindset from time to time.
> 
> ...



Well said.  While I have worked with some troops who were floppers from other nations, I have encountered a few Canadian floppers as well.  Insulting the character of a nation (or it's soldiers) is offensive and not something we as Canadians appreciated when we found ourselves in similar situations and the brunt of similar comments.  Anyone remember the vitriol sent our way for bowing out of Iraq?

EDIT - That is not to say that it wouldn't be great if the caveats attached to currently deployed troops were lifted or relatively free for new arrivals.  Simply that it is a function of democracy.... which is one thing we are supposedly fighting for.

Cheers,

Mike


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## Cloud Cover (9 Sep 2006)

Well, from what I saw on ctv tonight, some country with at leat 5 Pzh 2000 in theatre has decided to give a hand in the south, they seem to be directly supporting Canadian troops.


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## tomahawk6 (9 Sep 2006)

They be the Dutch if the pic's are accurate. ;D

http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_200697231223.asp


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## couchcommander (9 Sep 2006)

Teddy, pbi, t6 and the other usual suspects... once again a very informative thread. Great stuff, thanks.


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## Mourning (10 Sep 2006)

First of all, thanks to all of you for the kind words.

Secondly, yes, we send 3 (not 5) PH-2000 155mm SP to Afghanistan. They were supposed to provide our two camps in Uruzgan with some direct long range heavy firepower around the bases in case allied troops would come under fire if friendly aircraft weren't nearby for direct fire support or wouldn't be enough.

It was decided last week that they won't be going to our bases, but will stay in Kandahar to support the Canadian and other troops taking part in Medusa.

Link: http://www.mindef.nl/actueel/nieuws/2006/09/20060905_pzh.aspx (soory, guys .. in Dutch. I can translate it for you if you really want it)

A company of Dutch troops has also been deployed from Uruzgan to a Canadian base, Martello, to free up troops for the Canadians, so they could use those for Medusa. One or two days after they arrived and took over positions they were attacked by an estimated 100+ taliban and drove them off, no casualties on our own side, luckily. 

Link: http://www.mindef.nl/actueel/nieuws/2006/09/20060905_martello.aspx (again, same as above, in Dutch, willing to translate if asked)

Dutch F-16's and Apaches (and I would also think Chinooks, knowing the shortage of medium transport heli's in the region) were also involved in fire support missions in Kandahar.

As for the camouflage, well it seems that most troops are wearing olive green t-shirts under there desert camouflage uniforms, some support and logistics troops DO have olive coloured camouflage clothing, but all the manouevre (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc) are wearing desert-like camouflage unforms.

Here's a link with a small dia-section, just press the play button:

http://www.rtl.nl/actueel/rtlnieuws/binnenland/missie_uruzgan.xml

Regards,

Mourning  8)


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## KevinB (11 Sep 2006)

Before we speak ill (and I do it too) of other nations ROE or Nat' restrictions - let us remember that during the post Somalia CF we had some pretty stupid restrictions placed on us to make all but ineffective in UNPROFOR


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## Edward Campbell (12 Sep 2006)

These two pieces, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act, are from the BBC on Friday, 8 Sep 06:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5322698.stm 


> Afghan force 'needs more troops'
> 
> Nato's leaders have urged member countries to provide reinforcements to help in its campaign against Taleban guerrillas in southern Afghanistan.
> 
> ...





> Nato's Afghan mission under pressure
> 
> By Jonathan Marcus
> Diplomatic correspondent, BBC News
> ...



Having been out of uniform for a decade or so, I am not equipped to speak on ROE.  I do have some, possibly outdated, experience with _caveats_.

My sense of the current NATO situation is that some countries have imposed caveats of a nature which, effectively, preclude their participation in actual combat operations.  Those countries may have brave soldiers, we will likely not be able to find out because they will be hidden behind walls and fences – well away from the action.

Some other NATO member nations are unwilling even to send troops to Afghanistan.

We, Americans, British and Canadians, stationed our troops _in harm’s way_ – in the very front line against a huge nuclear/chemical equipped Warsaw Pact force for decades in the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s and so on: protecting Western Europeans and setting the stage for Eastern Europeans to break free of Russian imperialism.

Now we, the same three plus our stout hearted Dutch allies, are once again face-to-face with the enemy while too many Europeans are absent.


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## Edward Campbell (14 Sep 2006)

This article, from today’s (14 Sep 06) _Globe and Mail_ is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20060914.AFGHANNATO14/TPStory/  


> Silence greets call to NATO to help Canada
> *Officials still hold out hope that members will fill general's order for 2,000 troops*
> 
> GLORIA GALLOWAY
> ...



I have a couple of observations:

•	This could split the Alliance – resulting in a Franco-German led EU alliance and a separate, *competing* (for UN mandated missions) _Anglosphere_ based *global* alliance which would, likely include several current NATO members including (in addition to e.g Australia, Canada, Fiji, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, _formal alliance averse_ Singapore, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) Iceland and Norway, and, quite possibly, one or more of: the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia; 

•	It seems to me that we need, in Sothern Afghanistan, a _two tiered_ force: a mobile _force de frappe_ which can seek, find, engage and kill the Taliban and a rather more stationary, lower risk _occupation and security_ force to consolidate the gains made by the combat forces and protect the PRTs.  I do not see Canada backing away from the combat force – nor even if the Liberals are back in power.

I think the Liberal _back room_ and the bureaucracy (heavily Liberal _leaning_ as it is) both support the mission and the active combat role.  I suspect that LGen Leslie’s _20 year mission_ is the accepted wisdom in _official Ottawa_ – that does not mean that everyone likes the mission, just that there is broad, general agreement that we should do it, we *can* do it and _cutting and running_ would be hazardous to our vital national interests.

Personally, I welcome a _*crisis*_ within NATO.  I had reservations about expansion and about ‘out of area’ operations – not because I did not think it was important to integrate newly _free_ Eastern Europeans into the West but, rather because I thought NATO needed to die and be reborn, with a new, active, even global focus.

While I believe that the EU has achieved great success in making itself a major economic _power_ I do not regard it as a friend.  I see the EU and China as _competitors_, of equal ‘worth’ – neither friends nor enemies, just fellow actors on the world stage.  I do not think we serve our national interests by giving the EU a _free ride_ on security/defence issues.  If we are carrying a full load then we must *demand* that the Europeans do the same – some Europeans plan to ‘profit’ (economically and politically) from our sacrifices; we ought to oppose that, at least by mounting a major PR campaign reminding Canadians that the Europeans are not famous for courage or _burden sharing_.  That would be a bit hypocritical, I know, but what the hell, it is foreign affairs so it will be normal.


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## GAP (14 Sep 2006)

> I welcome a crisis within NATO.  I had reservations about expansion and about ‘out of area’ operations – not because I did not think it was important to integrate newly free Eastern Europeans into the West but, rather because I thought NATO needed to die and be reborn, with a new, active, even global focus.



I agree. The EU version of Nato still envisions Briton, the US, and probably Canada picking up the tab and doing the heavy lifting like they have for 50+ years... Some realignment according to reality is needed.


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## boondocksaint (14 Sep 2006)

ditto to gap's words


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## Kirkhill (14 Sep 2006)

I'm inclined to firm up the Central Europeans, the Balts and the Scandinavians along with your anglo-centric alliance.  Italy, Germany and Spain are waverers.  They are ultimately the battle-ground for the propaganda wars with the EU.

France (and southern Belgium) is the "centre of gravity" in terms of the battle for Europe.  

IMHO there is a sufficiently large number of well-connected and well-positioned anti-American/anti-anglo Gaullists and Communists in the country that are capable of actively engaging similarly inclined Russians and Chinese in a useful anti-liberal force.  Liberal used in the French sense of crypto-fascist anglo conservatives and not our well known Canadian sense of limp-wristed, dithering, socialists.  

You think the Afghans have got long memories.  The Franks and the Frisians (Angles) have been hammering at each other since before Caesar showed up.


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## Edward Campbell (14 Sep 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ... large number of well-connected and well-positioned anti-American/anti-Anglo Gaullists and Communists in the country that are capable of actively engaging similarly inclined Russians and Chinese in a useful anti-liberal force ..



There are not that many "anti" Chinese.  We are foreigners and, therefore to be pitied - not hated.  We have money - the Chinese do not hate money.  The Russians are stupid: the Chinese are not.


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## Kirkhill (14 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> There are not that many "anti" Chinese.  We are foreigners and, therefore to be pitied - not hated.  We have money - the Chinese do not hate money.  The Russians are stupid: the Chinese are not.



 ;D


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## Kirkhill (14 Sep 2006)

It occurs to me that we are still talking about the Bourbons vs the Northern Protestants vs the Holy Roman Empire within Europe.


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## Mike Baker (14 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> The Russians are stupid: the Chinese are not.


 ;D The Chinese are smart. They created gunpowder and from what I was told in English class today, the printing press as well, but that's another story. But for those of you who drink, the Russians created vodka. They were also pretty good in making the AK-47, which is being used on our troops as well as our allies in A-Stan, and by the Afgan Forces, kind of ironic I guess.


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## probum non poenitet (14 Sep 2006)

So you're a middleweight European power ... you can choose to join an alliance led by *the U.S. and the U.K.* ... the winningest duo in military history ... or by *France and freakin' Germany * ...  the not-so-winningest duo.
  
You could rename the alliances the NATO Yankees and the EU Red Sox, because I think the EU would be due for a success about once every 86 years.  >


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## Mourning (15 Sep 2006)

Mourning said:
			
		

> First of all, thanks to all of you for the kind words.
> 
> Secondly, yes, we send 3 (not 5) PH-2000 155mm SP to Afghanistan. They were supposed to provide our two camps in Uruzgan with some direct long range heavy firepower around the bases in case allied troops would come under fire if friendly aircraft weren't nearby for direct fire support or wouldn't be enough.
> 
> ...



According to todays briefing by the CINC Royal Dutch Armed Forces the previously mentioned elements have been used in operation Medusa:

F-16M's, AH-64D Apache's, the 3 PH-2000 SP 155mm SPA and a small Infantry Company to take over control of Canadian post "Martello" in Kandahar.

New today is that Special Forces and a second Infantry Company have been actively engaged in Operation Medusa itself. The CINC would only report that they had to secure territory and had been actively engaged in fighting Taliban forces in Kandahar, he also noted that Medusa on the ground seems to be mostly done, but that the military air elements are still very actively engaged in Medusa.

I have also heard of an unspecified number of Danish Special Forces preparing to move out to Southern Afghanistan, while Poland will send in february 2007 instead of june 2007 a 1.000 troops strong Armoured Infantry force.

Regards,

Mourning  8)


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## The Bread Guy (17 Sep 2006)

And now, a full two weeks or so after we started discussing the report here on Army.ca....

*NATO faces five-year effort to pacify Afghanistan with reluctant European allies: U.S. report*
Murray Brewster, Canadian Press, 17 Sept 06
http://canada.com.dose.ca/news/story.html?id=9a2a1bd0-030d-49cf-9ffb-4a1b76474d21

Canada, Britain and the United States face a struggle of five years or more to wrestle Afghanistan from Taliban influence in a NATO mission rife with political differences, tenuous public support and the outright refusal of some European members to accept combat missions, says a newly released U.S. Congressional research report.

The three traditional allies have shouldered the brunt of the heavy fighting because most European forces are lightly armed, trained for garrison duty and reluctant to go into harm’s way, says the report, entitled NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Most European countries, with the notably exception of France, send their troops to the war-torn country under tight restrictions, without proper equipment and with little money for reconstruction efforts. 

"These restrictions, for example, may prohibit forces from engaging in combat operations, or from patrolling at night due to a lack of night-vision equipment," says the review, published by the Congressional Research Service on Aug. 22 and* made available last week in Canada*.

(milnewstbay note - I guess Canadian Press doesn't troll the internet as much as we do here)

"These governments tend to be reluctant to send their forces out into the field to confront the Taliban and control warlords and their militias. The result, in this view, has been that British and Canadian (International Security Assistance Forces) and U.S. forces (Operation Enduring Freedom), bear a disproportionate share of the most dangerous tasks."

Attempts by allied commanders to limit so-called national caveats "have met with limited success," the report concluded . . . .


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## Mourning (18 Sep 2006)

milnewstbay said:
			
		

> The three traditional allies have shouldered the brunt of the heavy fighting because most European forces are lightly armed, trained for garrison duty and reluctant to go into harm’s way, says the report, entitled NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance.
> 
> Most European countries, with the notably exception of France, send their troops to the war-torn country under tight restrictions, without proper equipment and with little money for reconstruction efforts.
> 
> "These restrictions, for example, may prohibit forces from engaging in combat operations, or from patrolling at night due to a lack of night-vision equipment," says the review, *published by the Congressional Research Service on Aug. 22 and** made available last week in Canada*.



With the exception of France? Excuse me? Also this was published BEFORE Medusa on aug. 22 when the ISAF mission in Southern Afghanistan had amply started.

Regards,

Mourning  8)


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## The Bread Guy (8 Oct 2006)

CDS agrees -  Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-3340

*More nations must `step up,' Hillier says*
General says too many caveats imposed by some NATO members that limit how their troops can be used
Rosie DiManno, Toronto Star, 7 Oct 06
http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1160171411452&call_pageid=968332188492

Bullet-shielded and combat-shy military deployment — pseudo-troops from NATO partners that won't fight, kept on a short, politically measured leash — could doom the international security mission in Afghanistan, where Canadians are paying such a high price in blood and treasure.

That comes, if not in those exact words but the frustration is palpable, from Canada's top soldier, Gen. Rick Hillier.

In an interview with the Star yesterday, Hillier said 2,000 more troops are needed now: Boots on the ground to hold the ground in volatile Kandahar province where the Taliban strike, if not at will, then certainly wilfully and with lethal cunning.

"The NATO force structure to do the job is not on the ground," Hillier stated bluntly, and just days removed from an eyes-on assessment of the situation in southern Afghanistan.

Promises, so easy to make in the prestige-polishing, shoulder-to-shoulder environment of summit conferences, have not translated into the kind of bold, integrated and shared effort that was envisioned originally and to which the NATO community (plus non-NATO partners) committed itself anew only 18 months ago.

At that time, some 37 nations signed on again to what is essentially a contract of intention — the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements — that included a further theatre reserve battle group of 2,000 troops.

"The core of that theatre reserve battle group would right now, if (NATO) had it, be deployed in southern Afghanistan, probably in Kandahar province," said Hillier. "With those forces, we could exploit the huge opportunity that we have in front of us a result of the significant tactical win in Operation Medusa."

Operation Medusa was the recent and vigorous combat mission, in which Canadians played such a vital role, to clear out Taliban forces that had massed in villages of the Panjwaii district west of Kandahar city, an area that has been repeatedly scrubbed by NATO troops. The Taliban had purportedly been planning a full-frontal assault on the provincial capital. Holding the city, if only for a few hours, would have been a sharp stick in NATO's eye and incalculable status success for the insurgents.

In conventional combat, the Taliban can't defeat NATO troops. Its leaders claim they dispersed to fight another day, and to continue fighting by other means, those most conducive to sapping public support in NATO countries — by suicide bomber and roadside bombing ambush.

But this is a day-to-day struggle, containing the Taliban if not eradicating them, and that containment would be immensely more achievable, says Hillier, with a more robust infantry contingent, minus the restraining "caveats" that many NATO countries have quietly inserted into their rules of engagement.

The upshot is that a large portion of the 18,000 NATO troops in-country — bolstered last week, if only organizationally, by 12,000 pre-existing American troops who have now come under NATO command — don't actually engage at all in the most perilous assignments. Yet they do get to boast that they're in Afghanistan, carrying their portion of the burden.

"In the south, the Dutch, the Brits, the Americans, us, the Romanians — who've got a significant force on the ground and who are doing very well — along with the Australians, are doing the heavy lifting," said Hillier.

"The rest of the countries in NATO need to step up and fill that (Combined Joint Statement of Requirements). They've got to do that.

"I'll take any of the other countries outside that group and say, you've got to step up.''

Commanders need to impose genuine command, making full tactical use of those entire NATO troop contributions, in order to meet the complexities of a mission that has tilted heavily toward combat in the last six months, stalling promised reconstruction of Afghanistan as a functioning state.

"We need the flexibility to use all the forces that are already there," said Hillier. "And not without all these national caveats that prescribe where they're going to be and how they can be used."

The chief of defence staff was also busy stomping out the brushfire of a huge public relations disaster that arose this week, as reported yesterday by the Star's Bruce Campion-Smith: Ugly optics of an existing Canadian military policy that takes away "danger pay" from soldiers wounded in the field, even if they are removed from the theatre of war for medical treatment at the primary military hospital in Germany or back home in Canada.

That, Hillier vowed, will be changed — in application if not bureaucratic protocol — although he didn't explain how or how quickly.

"I'm not going to let any of our soldiers down. That's my commitment to them as chief of staff."

Hillier admitted he had not known about the policy — "it wasn't even on my radar" — until he heard complaints from troops when he was in Afghanistan last week. "The soldiers brought it up to me and I said: `I got it. We'll look after that. We'll get it fixed and we'll get it right.'"

On Thursday, he ordered his staff — the "big-brained" crew at his office — to find a way to fix it.

"I said: `Here's the issue. Now come back and tell me what the solutions are and what the options are to make sure we look after those soldiers.' We'll get at it. We'll make sure those soldiers get their money.

"Our soldiers have to understand quite clearly that we're not going to have them pay another penalty after they've taken a wound for Canada, a body blow for Canada, in service of their country, in service to Canadians. Even if we (the military) were absolutely irresponsible, our country wouldn't permit that to occur."

In an earlier scrum with reporters at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto, Hillier indicated the bizarre policy would be redressed within a matter of "days and weeks."

Continuing the combat pay allotment, which totals a not insignificant $2,111 a month for soldiers serving in Afghanistan, would apply, Hillier said, to soldiers who've suffered both combat and non-combat injuries. The resolution would also be retroactive to cover all the Canadians soldiers, about 200, who have been injured during their tours in Afghanistan.

"We could not start from this day and go forward, and look after some but not look after the rest. We're going to look after all those men and women."

Afterward, Hillier departed for Trenton and yet another round of solemn repatriation ceremonies for two Canadian soldiers slain in Afghanistan earlier this week.

Sgt. Craig Gillam and Cpl. Robert Mitchell: Numbers 38 and 39 in the roll call of the dead.


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## The Bread Guy (10 Oct 2006)

Is this a "back door" way of getting more combat troops into areas needing them?

 Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

*Australians fight an unbeatable foe in Afghanistan's forgotten war*
Clive Williams, Canberra Times, 11 Oct 06
http://tinyurl.com/q5pof

ACCORDING to the Defence website, there are currently around 510 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Slipper. *The major new development is the phased transfer of 400 ADF personnel to the Netherlands-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Oruzgan (aka Uruzgan) province. The contingent should be fully there by November. * 

The Australian Reconstruction Task Force is equipped with Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicles and Australian light armoured vehicles. But as the force's name implies, its primary role is to focus on reconstruction and community-based projects. 

The Australians form part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a coalition of NATO forces and other contributing nations, deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. ISAF has 32,115 personnel, with the major components (that is, 1000 plus) being the US (13,300), Britain (5000), Germany (2750), Canada (2000), Netherlands (2000) and France (1000). NATO forces are there mainly because the Europeans have come under US pressure to take some of the burden off the US in the "war on terror". 

The insurgency in Iraq post-2003 has made Afghanistan the forgotten war, but ISAF casualties are mounting, leading to growing public concern within those countries suffering the major military losses: US (339), Britain (40), Canada (38), Spain (19) and Germany (18). 

It is therefore not surprising that the Bush Administration is having trouble getting allies to contribute more, particularly combat troops. The key question for Australians is - should we be deploying our young men and women to this high-risk environment, and will our commitment make a difference to Australia's security over the longer term? 

Australia has been fortunate not to have suffered many military casualties in Afghanistan so far - we have had one SAS sergeant killed by a mine and a number of soldiers wounded. But Afghanistan is gradually taking on some of the high-risk characteristics of Iraq. The main reason is the imported experience of those who have fought in the insurgency in Iraq. 

Before the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, suicide bombings were rare in Afghanistan; they are now commonplace. There is also increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs); to date I have seen no evidence of shaped charges being used, but it seems only a matter of time. Sniping, and the execution of local "collaborators" have become common Iraq-style tactics. 

Who are the adversaries? Essentially a mixed bag - most of whom resent external interference in Afghanistan, and have a deep suspicion of foreign infidels. They also have little respect for the weak central government in Kabul. 

The main threat is a resurgent ultranationalist, mainly Afghan, Taliban - but the threat includes local insurgents and the forces of local warlords, al-Qaeda and its affiliates from Pakistan, other Islamist extremist groups, criminal gangs and narcotics traffickers. Often the distinctions between groups are blurred. 

Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah claims to have 12,000 jihadis in the southern provinces. There are more Taliban in the eastern provinces, with possibly another 10,000 in Pakistan, but nobody really knows for sure. The Taliban include older fighters with experience of former campaigns, younger recruits - mainly Afghans from Pakistani madrassas and refugee camps - local recruits, and some foreign fighters. 

The most dangerous areas in Afghanistan are provinces within 300km of the Pakistan border. According to reliable sources, the number of Taliban crossing into Afghanistan has increased since the end of 2003. They generally seem to operate in groups of 50-100 - and break up into smaller groups of 10-15 to conduct attacks. 

*Oruzgan province, north of Kandahar, is assessed by the Canadians to be a high-risk, volatile environment. The Taliban commander for Oruzgan is located at Quetta in Pakistan. Oruzgan is a staging area for insurgents who infiltrate north along the eastern border of Zabul. * 

The Taliban claim to control Oruzgan, but have limited capability or motivation for pitched battles with ISAF combat elements. Their aim is to regain political control over several decades through local alliances, intimidation and propaganda. 

Interestingly, *the Canadians are deploying Leopard tanks to their area of operations southwest of Oruzgan, because they believe the Leopards are ideal for that environment.* Australia is, of course, phasing out Leopards in favour of Abrams. We have no plans to deploy tanks. 

_*Given the existing constraints in Afghanistan (weak governance, insufficient ISAF combat troops, poorly equipped Afghan forces, insufficient reconstruction activity and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan), the insurgents and Taliban are not beatable. * _  (?????????)

It seems likely to be only a matter of time before NATO politicians decide to cut their losses and draw down their forces. That may not happen in the short-term; but I doubt we will see the current level of NATO commitment five years from now. 

Hopefully, in that time the Australians will have achieved some local area improvement and not suffered casualties. 

 Clive Williams is a Visiting Fellow at the ANU and an Adjunct Professor at Macquarie University.


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## Kirkhill (13 Oct 2006)

From the Times of London commenting on CGS Dannat's Interview.



> General James Jones, the military chief of Nato, said that the lack of those troops was leading to Nato casualties. *The worst casualties have been among the Canadians in Kandahar and our own troops in Helmand. * *If we had provided the rapid reaction force we promised it would have spent most of its time in Helmand and Kandahar. Put simply Canadian and British troops might not have died. We have been cutting off our nose to spite our face.* Blair’s willingness to let the Republicans off the hook by keeping our troops in Iraq at the expense of soldiers' lives is a disgrace. Blair should bring them home now and put all our effort into Afghanistan where, if we move fast, we might just manage to do some good.



http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2006/10/at_last_a_comma.html


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## The Bread Guy (24 Nov 2006)

Longish, but VERY interesting approach by this German journalist - kicks off by referring to one of Canada's fallen (from Espanola in "southern Canada") leading into the piece on Germany's caveats.  In spite of complaints about the GOVERNMENT'S policy on caveats, let's not forget - 18 German troopss have died in AFG since 2003 - shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

*Are the Germans Stationed in Afghanistan Cowards?*  
Susanne Koelbl, Der Spiegel (DEU), 24 Nov 06
Article Link

Southern Afghanistan is far from having been pacified -- a bloody war with the Taliban has erupted there. German troops have picked a relatively comfortable spot for themselves in the north of the country. Because they have avoided deadly fighting, they have been labeled "cowards" by the Americans and Brits. But are they?

David Byers peers forth cautiously at the world from behind his narrow, steel-rimmed glasses. He's combed his short brown hair so it fits neatly under his beret. His mouth is fixed in a serious expression, and Byers looks as if he has a lot of questions on his mind. His visage is part of a photo of his batallion, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

Private Byers was 22 years old when he was first sent into the field -- in southern Afghanistan, more than 16,000 kilometers (9,942 miles) from his hometown of Espanola in southern Canada. His mission was to help bring democracy and political stability to the land of the Hindu Kush mountains -- a land where war has raged since before his birth.

Now he lies in a zinc coffin on the United States military base in Kandahar, draped with a Canadian flag.


Byers died on Sept. 18, while on patrol in the village of Kafir Band. A man approached the private and his group on a bicycle. When the man detonated a set of explosives strapped to his body, Byers and three other Canadians were killed and roughly a dozen soldiers seriously injured.

Now eight men are carrying Byers's coffin across the airfield on their shoulders. They're holding the zinc coffin with one hand and leaning on the soldier to their side with the other. The coffin carriers don't look like grown men -- more like big boys. The bare mountains of Kandahar rise against the horizon, and the dust of the desert lingers in the air.

The eight men place Byers's corpse inside the dark hold of the Hercules airplane that will take him back to Canada, back to Espanola. Three more coffins have been placed inside the plane. So far, 42 Canadian soldiers have died in Afghanistan, most of them during the past three months in the southern part of the country.

How many lives should peace in Afghanistan be allowed to cost? The total number of Western soldiers who have died there is 504, including 18 Germans. The last German to die was 44-year-old Armin Franz, a lieutenant colonel from the reserve army of Redwitz near Rodach. He was killed in a suicide attack on Nov. 14, 2005.

Master Sergeant Carsten Kühlmorgen was one of the first Germans to die in an attack in Afghanistan. He defended Germany with his life, by the Hindu Kush mountains, said Peter Struck, who was Germany's defense minister at the time. Kühlmorgen died on June 7, 2003 at 07:58 a.m., as he was traveling to the airport by bus from Camp Warehouse, the German headquarters in the Afghan capital.

Kühlmorgen was scheduled to fly home after six months of service -- back to the eastern German city of Chemnitz. A suicide bomber in a yellow Lada taxi rammed the bus on Jalalabad Road, transforming it into a fireball. Four people died and 29 suffered serious burns. One lost a leg, another his eyesight. Most of the survivors are deeply traumatized: They're suffering from so-called post-traumatic stress syndrome or the "war shakes," as it used to be called. It's a symptom of war that has ruined marriages and destroyed men's lives. 

Was it necessary? For Germany? A group of relatives made its way to this foreign world in Kabul a few months later. They wanted to know what their brothers, sons and fathers had died or been permanently mutilated for. The German military psychotherapist Karl-Heinz Biesold spoke to them following their return. "What happened became more understandable," he says, "but in the end there's always something inexplicable that remains."

The relatives visited the camp were the soldiers had been stationed. They drove to the place where the bomb had exploded. Then they went to the Shar-i-Nau neighborhood in Kabul, and stood between geranium flowers and roses, on a Christian cemetery where the German embassy had organized a memorial service.

The notable guests included Amin Farhang, an Afghan who lived in German exile for many years and is now minister of trade and industry in the administration of President Hamid Karzai. He did his best to alleviate the sadness and perplexity of the relatives: "The Afghan people will never forget the names of the great men who sacrificed themselves and died heroically to preserve the security of Afghanistan."

The problem is that Afghanistan hasn't become a secure place since the death of Kühlmorgen and his fellow soldiers -- to the contrary. Suicide bombers carried out two attacks in 2003 -- but by 2006, the number had risen to 80. More than 3,700 people died during the past 10 months: The terrorists shot schoolteachers because they were instructing girls. Civilians were killed by explosives detonated on market squares and streets. Policemen and soldiers lost their lives because they were defending their democratically elected government. Others were killed by US bombs that missed their target. In addition, 179 Western soldiers were killed.

Back then, after the December 2001 conference in Petersberg near Bonn on the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the Germans were among the first to go to Kabul. They dared to expand their mission beyond the capital and into the north of Afghanistan before others did -- the German military took responsibility for nine provinces in northern Afghanistan this summer. The risk seemed manageable: Most of the inhabitants in those provinces are of Tajik and Uzbek ancestry, making them traditional opponents of the Pashtun Taliban.

In making this move, the Germans won the respect of other NATO countries. But then, three months later, the NATO alliance expanded its operations into the Afghan south, to the heartland of Afghan drug cultivation and the hinterland of the Taliban, where skirmishes take place everyday and where NATO soldiers die almost daily in what US President George W. Bush has christened the "War on Terror."

The heaviest losses have been suffered by the British and the Canadians: Each of the countries has lost more than 40 soldiers during military operations so far. Of the 18 Germans who have died in Afghanistan, 5 died in enemy attacks and one was killed by a mine -- the others died in accidents. On March 6, 2002, the two master sergeants Thomas Kochert and Mike Rubel were killed when they tried to defuse an anti-aircraft missile near Kabul. Seven other German soldiers were killed when a CH-53 military helicopter crashed on Dec. 21, 2002.

The division of labor between the various NATO countries is now the source of bad blood between the partners. Canadian Defense Minister Gordon O'Connor would like the German, French, Italian and Spanish troops currently stationed in the relatively safe western and northern Afghanistan to be involved in operations all over the country. He wants to create pressure at the NATO conference scheduled for late November in Riga, Latvia. Re-distributing NATO troops across Afghanistan will be the "number one" issue, he has announced.

The Germans at NATO headquarters in Kabul now face open hostility: They're mocked as cowards and cop-outs. Some Europeans "obviously resist the idea that you have an army in order to fight. And I have very little patience for that," says the US ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann. Neumann wants the Germans to join in the fighting -- and the dying, if necessary -- in southern Afghanistan.

Neumann sits on the roof terrace of his residence at the end of Great Massoud Road in Kabul. To his left lies the dusty and overpopulated inner city, where hotels and new homes are being built. To his right are the bare and inhospitable peaks of the Kuh-i-Baba mountains. The Virginian knows this part of the world: His father served as ambassador to Afghanistan between 1966 and 1973.

Before he came to Kabul, 61-year-old Neumann was in Baghdad, where it seems there's little left to save -- yet another reason why the mission in Afghanistan mustn't fail as well. The conflict has cost 350 US soldiers their lives so far. The ambassador speaks quietly, but more clearly than diplomats usually do: If Afghanistan falls back into the hands of the Taliban, he warns, there will be no peace for people in the West -- including Germans.

The US diplomat is by no means the only person to hold this opinion. Many experts expect terrorists to return to Afghanistan in the case of a renewed seizure of power by the Taliban, and they expect these terrorists to plan and carry out attacks in the US, Europe and Asia. The terrorists could largely finance their own activities by the drug trade. So why are the USA's allies so hesitant, when their security is at risk? Neumann can't help but wonder.

So are the Germans cowards -- or are they just smart?



The man in the coffee shop of the new five-star Serena Hotel in Kabul is wearing the traditional Perahan wa Tonban -- a long shirt with harem pants made of soft, elegant-looking wool, and a tailor-made jacket. He's a member of parliament, from the south of Afghanistan and well informed about the situation there; he often makes appearances on television. But this time he prefers to remain anonymous: "The Taliban are a fact, and the West won't stop them," he says. "And only those who share power with them will be able to achieve security in Afghanistan."

Similarly sombre predictions can often be heard in political circles of the Afghan capital these days. Anything seems possible now that the Taliban have suddenly and surprisingly returned: An agreement could be made with the self-styled holy warriors, perhaps even with militia leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a wanted terrorist who is also a reputed veteran of the Afghan civil war. Hekmatyar has often switched sides and he's capricious.

So now there's talk of possible non-aggression pacts and about new elections because many claim that President Hamid Karzai is no longer sufficiently convincing as a political authority. Some whisper about the country breaking apart into a northern and a southern half. At this juncture, nothing seems impossible.

The speculation will have little basis in reality so long as the US continues to maintain its official position: namely that the Afghanistan mission is difficult, but can still be won as long as NATO provides the troops necessary for a decisive victory over the Taliban in the coming months.


Photo Gallery: Dying for Kabul
 Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (5 Photos)

The handsomely dressed member of parliament knows about guerrilla tactics and how to exhaust traditional armies. He once fought the Soviets as a mujahedeen or holy warrior. "How long will the Americans and the Europeans be able to take this?" he wonders, ordering a Black Forest Cake from the coffee shop's glass vitrine.

This too is part of the peculiarities characteristic of these wild days in Afghanistan: As war is once more being conducted, almost everything else continues as always -- life, everyday affairs and reconstruction too. Afghanistan is signing multi-million agreements with neighboring countries to ensure its electricity and gas supply. A high-security prison for terrorists is being built. Parliament is debating tax decisions and trade laws. An academy for generals is inaugurated festively -- and Black Forest Cake is for sale in the Serena Hotel, whose elegance makes it seem like a UFO in the center of Kabul.

So can Afghanistan be saved after all?

It's hard here to find a statement that will still hold true tomorrow. The analyses provided by experts change daily -- often according to the geographical location of the expert.

Take Colonel Stephen Williams, for example. He's stationed in the Panjvai district, 450 kilometers (280 miles) south of Kabul. His command post is located inside a tent in Pashmul, a town in a fertile valley near Kandahar, famous for its tasty grapes and melons. Canadian and US NATO soldiers have leveled a field and dubbed the camp "Camp Rugby."

Operation Medusa took place here in September -- a massive battle that also involved the British, the Dutch and Afghanis. Five Canadians died. The Taliban lost at least 500 fighters. The holy warriors almost succeeded in taking Kandahar, the country's second-largest city, and occupying the main road to Kabul and Herat. Williams, 46, led the allied troops to Pashmul and won the battle. The Taliban were defeated -- for the moment.

The colonel brimmed with optimism. He was convinced the holy warriors wouldn't attempt to return anytime too soon in the same classic formation. "They've got to be desperate," he said. Williams led people across the battlefield, showed them the shot-up school building that had served as a headquarters for the Taliban fighters, the irrigation canals for the fields, the hemp plants as tall as grown men and the clay bunkers behind which the Taliban had taken shelter. "If they try again, we will finish them."

But the colonel also understood that this war can't be won by bullets or rockets alone.

The international community ignored the strategically important Pashtun province in the south for five years. With the exception of some combative US soldiers who occasionally stormed the homes of suspicious people or dropped bombs from the sky, the inhabitants didn't get to see too much of the new democracy. The promised hospitals and streets were never built. No one created jobs for people to feed their families with. In the spring, international teams arrived to destroy the opium harvest. They threatened to rid the impoverished farmers of their livelihood. But the Taliban presented themselves as protectors of the Pashtuns, prompting many to switch sides out of sheer desperation.

Ever since ancient times, foreigners only ever came to Afghanistan as conquerors -- from Alexander the Great to the Mongols and the British right up to the Soviets. So it's no wonder that the Americans are now seen as enemies too. Now the Taliban are taking over one village after the other -- wherever the government is weak, wherever there is neither a police nor a judiciary or an administration. The Taliban are once again guarding the territory at night.

Colonel Williams says it's now a question of convincing the Afghans that NATO is serious about reconstruction and that it's strong enough to fight the Taliban. That's why NATO is now issuing statements every day in Afghanistan -- not just about its own losses and the enemies killed, but also about good deeds: NATO gives farmers tractors, NATO provides compensation to families whose homes have been accidentally bombed, NATO builds streets, NATO treats patients and distributes rice and beans before the onset of winter. Good NATO.

Traditionally, the Taliban are impoverished young men trained for jihad in Koran schools, where they arrived as refugees or village youths. True, the Taliban who died in Panjvai included farmers and day laborers who let themselves be hired for the war for $5 a day -- cannon fodder. But the others were "true believers," as the Americans call them. They were Islamic fundamentalists convinced of the righteousness of their own actions, ready to fight to the death.

This new war in Afghanistan has only been going on for a few months, but it's already clear that it will be an unusually cruel war. A British soldier describing a bloody incident in an e-mail to the British paper Sunday Mail offers a hint of just how cruel the conflict is: He compared his unit's failed effort to save French special troops to a "The scene was like a human abattoir."

The British had tried to save their hard-pressed allies by helicopter, but it was already too late: The French had been tied to the ground, and "gutted alive" by the Taliban. "That's the worst place I've ever been," British Lance Corporal Trevor Coult from the Royal Irish Regiment says about the little city of Sangin in Helmand, where he defended NATO positions for weeks.

Coult was in Iraq before he came to Afghanistan. He was awarded the prestigious Military Cross for his bravery. In Afghanistan this September, ever new waves of Taliban tried to storm his post -- by day and by night. It makes Baghdad look like "a walk in the park compared to here," Coult says after several sleepless nights.

The Afghans are now surrounded by battle fronts, and thousands of them are fleeing from the fighting. As they now return to their villages before the onset of winter, they often find their clay huts have been destroyed and their fields strewn with mines.

Kandahar, once the spiritual and operative center of the Taliban, has once more become a city of fear. Mohammed Jamaludin, a slim man with an embroidered red cap who sells cookies, shoelaces and batteries by the side of the road, fears an attack may be imminent every time an international military convoy passes his stand near Shahidan Chowk, the city's main roundabout.

Sure, he's angry at the Taliban, but he's just as angry at the Western allies. "No one is safe anymore," he says.

A mid-level Taliban leader in the Maruf district, just a few kilometers east of Kandahar, is about 40 years old. He's one of the organization's middle echelons and wears a black turban, the scarf of which hangs almost all the way down to his knees. His beard is very long. He carries his Kalashnikov rifle slung over his shoulder as if it were a part of his clothing. "We go easy on those on our side, but the others have a hard time," he says. Half a dozen more armed men stand around him. No one here has the courage to take a stand against them.

So if the country's fate is being decided in the south, what are the Germans doing in the north?

"We're doing what we signed up to do," a high official in the new German headquarters in the provincial capital of Mazar-e-Sharif says somewhat defiantly. Up here, eight hours from Kabul by car, the soldiers are quite aggravated by the new debate over cowardice that's occuring inside NATO. In their view, they're carrying out their mission as planned. Nor has there been any official request for a military operation in the south so far.

Camp Marmal is located 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) east of the busy commercial city of Mazar-e-Sharif, famous for its gorgeous blue mosque, where Muhammad's son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib is said to be buried. The camp is named after the Marmal mountains, which rise bluishly from the desert on the horizon. The giant military facility looks like a high-walled fortress, two kilometers by one kilometer (1.2 miles by 0.6 miles). It could provide an entire German town with water and electricity. It includes a hospital and a tree nursery where local vegetation is being cultivated for future planting in the barrack yard. Mazar-e-Sharif is the German military's largest construction site outside of Germany -- one expected to cost about €50 million ($65 million).

It's like a building designed to last an eternity.

It's from here that a German general commands five of NATO's reconstruction teams, including two German teams charged with protecting humanitarian organizations and coordinating German projects such as setting up a supply of clean water. The region between the northwesterly province of Faryab and the northeasterly Badakshan has an area of about 160,000 square kilometers (61,776 square miles) and borders on five countries: China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The Taliban positions are located far away from here. The holy warriors weren't able to fully conquer the north of Afghanistan even during their five-year rule. The Northern Alliance, a league of Tajik and Uzbek militias, fought bitterly against Mullah Omar's forces under its legendary commander Ahmed Shah Massud. And the Pashtun majority the Taliban has traditionally relied on doesn't play an important role in this region of the country.

The region is rightfully considered peaceful by comparison to the south. Still it's not unperilous, as the death of two employees of the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle in early October cruelly demonstrated. The two were shot at night while camping by a river in Baghlan province.

There's a degree of liberalness here thanks to the proximity of the former Soviet Union. Women can leave the house alone, and girls go to school. It has a slight semblance to normality, but more than this little bit isn't available here at the moment. Blackmail and kidnappings are everyday phenomena here. Ten-year-old girls are forced to marry in order for the family to get a good dowry or to settle an old blood feud between families. The police are corrupt and usually don't take action until they've been bribed to do so. Detainees seldom get a fair trial and have to be bought out of prison.


 DER SPIEGEL
Graphic: The Heroin Roads
Important drug smuggling routes to Asia and Europe lead through the north of Afghanistan. The city of Kunduz, where the Germans have built a barracks facility almost as impressive as the one in Mazar-e-Sharif, is considered an important station in the international opium trade. The smaller German outpost in Faizabad is located in one of the world's poorest regions -- and in one of Afghanistan's major cultivation areas for opium poppy.

"It's probable that virtually all public offices with the exception of Governor Abdul Majid are integrated in the drug trade," states an internal report of the German Foreign Ministry on the struggle against the drug trade in Badakhshan. The shipments are "safeguarded" by top-level connections in Kabul. Whoever interferes with business must expect resistance. The German military vehicles patroling up here are shot at regularly. Home-made bombs explode in the streets, and rockets hit their camps.

Since August, soldiers from Germany's elite military force, the KSK (Kommando Spezialkräfte), have extended their support for headquarters in Kabul to also include the German military's three northern camps. The KSK troops are sometimes called "Woolcaps" in Camp Marmal because of their highly secretive manner and because they only appear wearing balaclavas back home in Germany.

The elite unit from the Black Forest has set up its command post in a separate location from that of the other German troops, in front of the tree nursery. The white tent surrounded by walls made from sandbags looks like a camp set up during a desert expedition. Inside the camp, the elite fighters buzz about on little four-wheeled motorcycles that resemble miniature tractors. Their job is to track down enemy forces and sites where bomb traps are built. They're also here to "bolster the morale" of the remaining troops -- especially since attacks and suicide bombings have recently been occuring in the north of Afghanistan as well. Despite their lack of a solid popular base here, the holy warriors are still working to destabilize the region.

At first glance, the activities of the German soldiers in Mazar-e-Sharif seems a little odd. Hardly any of the 1,380 German soldiers who have come to Camp Marmal so far have left the giant barracks to date. They keep the cafeteria running, take care of vehicles and logistics and stand guard -- not to forget cultivation of the nursery.

Soldiers patrol in vehicles outside -- mainly to secure the camp. They distribute schoolbooks and pens to children in the city, chat with merchants and passersby, smile and wave a lot. When the largest hospital in Mazar-e-Sharif burned down in September, they were there to help out with doctors, medication and tents.

The Germans are popular -- the macabre photos of German soldiers posing with skulls haven't changed that. They radiate a sense of security and won't hurt anyone -- not even the bad guys. Old warlords like Burhanuddin Rabbani, an influential Tajik leader in the drug province of Badakhshan, and the bloodthirsty Rashid Dostam, the powerful puppetmaster in the background, seem to have been tamed a bit thanks to international observers. The city is recovering economically.



Mazar-e-Sharif is booming. Construction and repair work is going on everywhere. Cars and horse-drawn carts make their way through the bazaar, where farmers sell fresh apples and tangerines. There's cheap make-up from China, men's suits from Tajikistan and colorful enamel houseware from Uzbekistan. Everything seems relatively peaceful.

The tasks within NATO -- a military allliance comprising 26 nations -- haven't been distributed fairly. But that's not the only thing that matters. The decisive question is what will become of Afghanistan. And there are good reasons for the Germans to insist on staying in the north of the country. Behind closed doors, during a secret meeting of the German parliament's foreign affairs committee, the German ambassador to Kabul, Hans-Ulrich Seidt, warned of a war in the south that "could not be won" militarily. The diplomat knows the region well and believes NATO is facing the prospect of a "war of attrition."

Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world. Ailing people still die on their way to the next hospital, more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) away from their village. Drug barons, warlords and feudal lords continue to oppress the farmers like serfs, and another winter of hunger is imminent. But "democracy" is a curse word these days -- synonymous with corruption, prostitution and anarchy. The level of disappointment with the Western liberators is enormous.

The plan to wage war and then reconstruct was "fast and cheap," says Joanna Nathan, an expert from the International Crisis Group with reference to the West's strategy for Afghanistan. Since then everything has become slow, difficult and expensive. The Germans are just one cog in a larger machine. They don't want to be made to pay for the failures of others.

The Pashtun member of parliament in the Serena Hotel's coffee shop gathers up the last crumbs of his Black Forest Cake from his porcelain plate. He just recently returned from the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalists make their way from there into the country from safe hideouts. Could a greater number of NATO soldiers in the south really beat back the Taliban -- at least until the Afghan military is strong enough to defend itself, as US ambassador Neumann would like? And are there really no more than 4,000 militant enemy combatants, as NATO's allied commander for Europe, James Jones, estimates?

The gray-haired Pashtun is about 60 -- a sign of wealth in this country, where average life expectancy is 43. He's already witnessing his fourth war. In 1973 he witnessed the coup against the liberal King Zahir Shah. As a young man, he fought the Soviets in the mountains. Then came the civil war, the Taliban -- and now the Americans.

"So who are these Taliban?" he asks. They're a poor people's movement, he says, held together by Islam, which promises them paradise in death since it can't offer them a good life. This army of holy warriors -- whose size he estimates is closer to 40,000 than to 4,000 -- is the most powerful weapon wielded by the regional powers, the member of parliament believes. Religious faith is the least important thing involved, he says, pointing out that interpretations of the Koran are constantly adapted to suit the political circumstances -- as when it's a question of using drug money to finance weapons acquisitions. Islamic law normally classifies drugs as haram, or sinful.

So what is really at stake? The tribal leaders are fighting for hegemony in strategically important areas, just as they did decades and even centuries ago -- but they're also fighting over incredibly large profits from smuggling and the drug trade. And the people are trying to find out who has more to offer -- the international community or the Taliban.

Afghanistan is still what it always was: an instrument wielded by moderately powerful neighboring countries like Pakistan, but also by India and Iran. Now old and new superpowers like the US, Russia and China have joined the game.


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President Hamid Karzai wants to organize a jirga or assembly before the end of the year, inviting all major tribal representatives and people of honor in the country. Karzai, who comes from the Popalzai, a Pashtun tribe, will then try to end the war and negotiate peace -- with the tribal elders, but also Hekmatyar, the militia leader, and the Taliban. There's simply no alternative.

What part will the foreigners play then, besides the usual one of being financial donors and advisors? In the end the Afghans themselves will have to sort out how their country is ruled.

And the Germans in the north? It may be a little cowardly to stay up there and radiate a feeling of security, dig a few waterholes, calm down a few of the warlords and cultivate trees.

But it may also just be smart.


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## pbi (25 Nov 2006)

Accusing the Germans  of being "cowards" is stupid. The Germans have certainly done a very thorough job of abandoning their WWI and II military history (just as much as we treasure ours), but I don't recall seeing anything to suggest that they were cowardly.

The problem isn't with the troops themselves. They don't write the caveats. It's with the political leaders of  the troop-contributing nations in Europe who must deal with their own public opinion. Political policy and inputs guide the writing of the caveats, which are then imposed on the deployed forece. Some of these publics are very anti-American, and are not willing to see a single soldier injured in the "service of Bush". Afghanistan, by extension from Iraq, is seen by these populations as yet another poorly conceived and unwinnable mess. At the same time, the govts want to be seen to do their NATO duty, and to avoid offending the US any more than they have to. So, they deploy troops, but caveat the hell out of them. The result is what we are struggling with now.

Cheers


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## Kirkhill (25 Nov 2006)

Realizing that sometimes it is hard to pin down the meaning of words: poisson/poison, nation, sex, is, emergency.....

This has to be at least a positive development.  Is it more or less meaningful if the local commanders get to decide on what is an emergency?




> Nato chief: All allies will provide emergency support
> 24/11/2006 - 16:30:18
> 
> 
> ...



http://www.breakingnews.ie/2006/11/24/story286489.html


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## Teddy Ruxpin (25 Nov 2006)

> “I’m confident that is the case, because I am confident that all 26 allies have exactly the same interpretation of what solidarity means.”



I am confident that each ally has a differing interpretation as to what an "emergency" means.  When I see German combat forces deployed to Kandahar or Helmand _outside the wire_, then I'll believe it.  Until then, I strongly suspect that the caveats will remain and that the "usual suspects" will continue with their antics in the north of the country.



> Accusing the Germans  of being "cowards" is stupid. The Germans have certainly done a very thorough job of abandoning their WWI and II military history (just as much as we treasure ours), but I don't recall seeing anything to suggest that they were cowardly.



"Coward" is a hugely strong and emotive word.  I would suggest "risk adverse", a term that can be extended to the entire German Army as an institution.  It is also a term that cannot be confined to the Germans alone.


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## Journeyman (25 Nov 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> This has to be at least a positive development.  Is it more or less meaningful if the local commanders get to decide on what is an emergency?
> 
> 
> > “In case of emergency, every single ally will come to the assistance and help of every other ally,” Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said.
> > “I’m confident that is the case, because I am confident that all 26 allies have exactly the same interpretation of what solidarity means.”


Merely another press release, which will produce absolutely no tactical or operational change.

Within NATO HQ, "solidarity" can be defined as reducing any decision to the lowest-common denominator to reach consensus - - sometimes that can be so low as to be meaningless. 

And that's just to agree to some press release or "guiding" policy (since each member remains a sovereign nation that will take its own decisions). Outside the bureaucracy, and in the field....there is very little "solidarity" given the overarching primacy of the troop-contributing nations' caveats.


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## Kirkhill (25 Nov 2006)

Oh well


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## Old Sweat (25 Nov 2006)

I agree with Journeyman. There are very large loopholes in the statement. For example, in case of emergency involving NATO member A in the south, how long will it take NATO member B in the north to decide that there is indeed an emergency and authorize its forces to come to the assistance? In fact there is no guarantee that B would even agree that there is an emergency, let alone seriously consider ordering its troops to ride to the sound of the guns. In a slightly better case, it may be that the battle procedure involved in 'coming to the assistance' would preclude the relieving force from arriving in time to influence the battle.


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## vonGarvin (25 Nov 2006)

What fries my goat is that we were there in Germany for the Germans.  From Op PANDA to the standing down of 4 CMBG and CFE as a whole in the 90's.  Had the balloon gone up, there would have been no question that our lads would have been there.  This is not a slag against the Bundeswehr, but against Bonn Berlin for humming and hawing over this NATO mission.


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## geo (26 Nov 2006)

If we point an accusing finger to one NATO/EC country then we might as well point to all the other NATO/EC countries that aren't anywhere near Afghanistan.

The germans are doing what their leaders are asking of them.  Can't hope for anything less.


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## Edward Campbell (19 Jan 2007)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act, is more on this topic from Jeffrey Simpson in today’s (19 Jan 07) _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070119.wsimpson19/BNStory/National/home


> Will Afghanistan define Canadian politics in 2007?
> 
> JEFFREY SIMPSON
> From Friday's Globe and Mail
> ...



The presence of Sen. Art Eggleton on an internal Liberal Party committee designed to ‘find a common position’ re: how to use the mission in Afghanistan to embarrass the Conservative government  does not fill me with confidence.

Simpson is right:

•	It will not be easy for the Liberals to ‘find a common position’ –  the Liberal Party is riven by the same divisions and shifting points of view which bedevil the nation at large; and

•	Resisting temptation has never been a Liberal strong suit.  They have made appealing to every possible _special interest_ into an art form.  The ‘Bring the troops home’ _special interest_ is  large and appears to be especially strong in traditionally _isolationist_ Québec.

Finally, I have seen nothing is reports out of Europe to indicate that fighting in Southern Afghanistan has suddenly become popular in Europe.  I think we must expect more and more *pressure on Canada to do even more in Afghanistan*.


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