# Senior Ranks



## OLDRUPERT (4 Feb 2002)

The Canadian Forces is now more top heavy then it has ever been including when we had been fully mobilized for WWII.

Has anyone ever heard what justification is used for this or is it just another case of Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell"?


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## rceme_rat (5 Feb 2002)

I think the answer to this question can be found in three observations and a bit of floow-on discussion.  

The first observation is a trite one that can explain some of the statistics freely thrown around by the press.  In WW II, a brigadier was just that; now he‘s a brigadier-general.  Of course, most of our generals are at this level.  This certainly doesn‘t eliminate the growth at the top, but it does tend to make the numbers far worse when most of the officers we are counting today wouldn‘t even have been included before.

The second observation is an economic one based on the concept of fixed and variable costs, recognizing manpower as the cost.  There are certain jobs that require people to have certain qualifications and experience. They also require certain pay levels to keep those people around.  In our system, that combination of quals, experience and pay comes together at the general officer ranks.  (This observation also applies to all senior officers, not just general officers).  Many of these positions are essentially fixed costs - you need them regardless of the number of soldiers on the ground.  Other jobs are variable costs - you only need another brigade commander when you create a new brigade, e.g.

The third observation is related to the skills, etc. point above.  Much of what we do in peacetime is not typical soldiering work.  The balance swings to planning, analysis, etc. and an understanding that if the grunt work is to be done in a large combat scenario, then we will have significant recruiting and training.  So, for a proper comparison, I would suggest that if you wnat to look at WW II, you should focus on pre-war peacetime numbers, not combat numbers.  

This is not to say that the current manning levels are as "sharp" as they could be.  For example, many senior positions could be found by bringing units up to full ORBAT manning levels.  This would have to be done by eliminating other units.  We could probably eliminate a brigade‘s worth of senior officers while keeping the soldiers and some of the junior officers around.

The effect in the reserves would be even more dramatic if we called a spade a "fuc*in‘ shovel" and held "unit" manning levels down -- if you have 30 soldiers on parade regualrly, you are now a troop, and are commended bya Lt/Capt.  What, you have 100?  O.k., you‘re now a company - we‘ll let you have a Maj.  This isn‘t a reserve-bashing exercise, it is an examination of the effect of building our structure with an emphasis on lean command.

A final thought - the optimum use of varied resources in any situation is rarely the one that represents an extreme for any one resource.  Just as having all generals and no soldiers would be ridiculous, so would having no officers and all soldiers.  An extremely lean command structure might be ineffective in controlling the resources under its command, particularly hen those resources are sophisticated, powerful, and highly independent, and when they operate in a semi-autonomous fashion.  

Given that one of the key roles of the senior level of command is to collect, organize, analyze  and understand data and to plan based upon that understanding, it seems likely that even more effort will be needed at higher levels to combat the increased amount of data and the increased complexity of both the global situation and the battlefield.  

At the same time, the individual soldier is very much more an independent fighting platform than his WW II counterpart.  While he has the technology to be far more effective (and in much smaller numbers) he does need far more support.  This support extends through the (bloated to some) ranks of the cbt sp and css troops to the higher levels of command. 

Another way of getting lean is to civilianize even more of the NDHQ and other command positions.

All of which is to say that this is a complicated area and that raw numbers alone can‘t really explain anything.  Unfortunately, they do make great news stories


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## OLDRUPERT (5 Feb 2002)

You make good sense.  If the Armed Forces were a large coporation run by men and women who had the motivation of maintaining a good profit margin..the CF however, is largely managed by uionized or self interested (or uninterested) senior beurocrats.

Yes, I agree with you that the job of running the CF is no longer as simple as it may have been 60 years ago, or even 20.  And yes there are a great deal more "HR" issues and "operational"  situations that have to be dealt with.  But lets face it, don‘t we  overcomplicate the issue by pretnding to be more than what we are....

....did we really need to spend $2 000 000.00, two years and pay "x" amount of brass and countless civies for that period, to research clothing issues for females only to find out that you can buy a sports bra cheaper than designing a new one for female soldiers??

The truth of the matter is, is that we are top heavy.  Not only in Uniforms but in Suits espeacially.  Have you ever worked or visisted NDHQ...?   The infrastucture there could run two of our present day militaries  (though probably just as poorly).  There is no clear up or down in the Larger command structure.   We have adopted lateral management techniques in an organisation that demands  hardened lines of communication.

I definitely agree with you on the reserve issue.  We are esupporting a command staff in the militia far to large for what we field....Having been on both sides, I can say with some level of confidence, those senior officers (and NCO‘s) that are there, are not the expeirenced and well trained group you gave mention to and should be thined out.  (I can count at least 3 Maj‘s and and a hand full of WO‘s and CWO‘s that have not even been checked out on weapons let alone current on doctrine.)

Please do not think that I am all for wading into the senior brass and Beuracrats with an axe.   We definetely have a a lot of great people that do a fatastic job with what they have....but sugar coating the current state of top level administarion with new age management speak is not going to make the problem better; and there is a problem.


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## ryemaybee (7 Feb 2002)

Hey guys, interesting posts by both. I just thought I would speak to the reserve issue; the way we‘re set up now is "supposed" to support stage four mobilization, something on the order of magnitude like WWII. Hence the Lcols commanding "Regiments" with a Sqn‘s worth of soldiers...the Brits had the same problem and came up with a novel solution: Amalgamation...but not elimination of traditional unit insignia or history. They pushed all the London area TA units into one battalion, the London infantry or something like that, but within it were the London Scottish Company, the London Rifles etc. The unit CO was drawn from the best sub unit commander as was the RSM. So instead of having five or six weak "Battalions" you end up with a reinforced battalion with some competition for senior appointments...which can only be healthy. Also they retain the ability to rapidly expand from sub unit size to unit incase of emergency or need.
My two cents for your consideration.


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## OLDRUPERT (7 Feb 2002)

Stage Four mobilization unfortunetly would be impossible to acheive.   Even if Canada were suddenly thrust into a Total War tommorow.  The necessary legislation required for such a massive build up has never been maintained over the years.  
 Things like, "will I have a job to go back to", enforcement of current members actually showing up, etc.  (Don‘t even bother asking about conscription);  has never been maintained or adapted to to match the times...espeacially in recent years the role of the NDA in diciplinary action has been thrust into question.  (Anthrax invacination)

So to maintain the idea that we need to keep a large infastucture to support a possible build up is really a poor defense.   

I did hear about the TA‘s though ... I know it added a lot of credibility to the Ranks and their capability....But didn‘t the MOD have real fight on their hands when it came to  deciding regimantal staus in the OrBat and Regimental Quifs etc...??

Not a bad point for more discussion though.


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Feb 2002)

> Originally posted by OLDRUPERT:
> [qb]The Canadian Forces is now more top heavy then it has ever been including when we had been fully mobilized for WWII.
> 
> Has anyone ever heard what justification is used for this or is it just another case of Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell"?    [/qb]


what was the question of the poll?  I voted yes but I didn‘t see the question posted anywhere.


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Feb 2002)

> Originally posted by rceme_rat:
> [qb]The effect in the reserves would be even more dramatic if we called a spade a "fuc*in‘ shovel" and held "unit" manning levels down -- if you have 30 soldiers on parade regualrly, you are now a troop, and are commended bya Lt/Capt.  What, you have 100?  O.k., you‘re now a company - we‘ll let you have a Maj.  This isn‘t a reserve-bashing exercise, it is an examination of the effect of building our structure with an emphasis on lean command.
> [/qb]


Doesn‘t this presume there is no need to train senior officers?  They too suffer wastage in war.  If, as is suggested in several threads, we adopt the British model where one company expands into a battalion in time of war - where will you find the experienced battalion COs to command them?


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## OLDRUPERT (11 Feb 2002)

Logical reply.

However, the senoir ranks in the reserve units, for the most part, are no where near the standard to expand in to a full time order of battle.

Most are equiped with the skills needed to run a QL course and survive a handfull of days on a training ex.  Not to replace full time officers of the line.

Not militia bashing just stating reality.


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## Black6 (11 Feb 2002)

OLD RUPERT:

Not militia bashing, eh? Your attitude is exactly the reason why TOTAL FORCE has never and will never work. 

Don‘t think that the regular army is an elite force. I have seen plenty of idiots, fatsos and incompetents there - gormless people who could never cobble together a life for themselves on the outside. The reserves does NOT corner the market on incompetence.

As for reserve units being top heavy - it‘s called "infrastructure". How long does it take to train an infantryman or armoured crewman? A few months, right? How about sr officers and NCOs? Years and years. Ramming people through courses without time in rank to gain experience would be foolish - hence the need for a unit skeleton that can be flushed out with soldiers when/if required.

The German Army was capped at 100,000 men prior to WW2. All where trained at least two levels higher than required for their position (Riflemen trained to platoon sgts, Lts to coy/bn command) When Uncle Adolph expanded the army it was ready to take in the new blood. This "top heavy" organization lay a beating on the Allied professional armies.

Our doctrine wielding "professionals" were wiped out or replaced for their incompetence. Who did that leave to carry on the fight? You guessed it, the reserves and our nations citizens. People who can think out of the box and get the job done. Where else would you find 26 year old armoured brigade commanders? In the regular army? Phhhhhhht!

Have you heard of the Battle of the Medak Pocket in FRY? The largest firefight the CF has been involved in since the Korean War. Our soldier kicked *** ! But the Canadian public didn’t hear about it for years after the fact. Maybe because the platoon commander and 70% of his troops were reservists! Hmmmmmm – who stands to gain from suppressing that kind of information? Perhaps someone making an argument that the reserves are not a good investment for our limited defence dollars. 

The structure of the entire CF is out to lunch. How many countries in NATO have a larger standing army than their reserve? Answer: Portugal & Luxembourg. Why do we follow their model? Do they inspire confidence/competence with that system? 

Have you ever wondered why our force structure is upside down? (talk about top heavy, Sheesh!) Who‘s job is it to define the role of the reserves? (take a wild guess) Answer: the regular force. Who has capped reserve manning and eqpt? Who has pushed for the funding of new vehicles for the reserves through the Treasury Board and then taken those vehicles away on delivery? Who pushed for an Meaford Reserve Training Centre to be built at a cost of $220 million but didn‘t include a single classroom or any improvement to the actual training area...and then turned it into a "Centre of Excellence" disguised as an ersatz RCR home station?

The cost of training in Meaford now is ridiculous. Luckily, we here in Windsor can justify training in the USA on based on time/distance form Meaford (The regular army will not allow cost to be entered as a factor in our argument). As it turns out, training in the US is far cheaper for us than in our own country. Meaford charges us about $25 a day for rations per day and  $12 a night for a soldier’s accommodation. In the US we pay $5 a day for rations and $24 a weekend for an ENTIRE barracks! Training in the US involves less hassle and red tape (the cross border clearance request is a simple formality). The service we receive from US bases is top notch and we are treated with a level of courtesy and professionalism that is unknown to us in our own army. Any resource that is available is ours to use – this ranges from OPFOR uniforms to training areas, vehicles and MILES eqpt. I only wish our army would allow us to but our ammo there too – $26 grenades, $80 M-72s and 5.56mm for mere pennies!

So go ahead an bash that which you don’t (can’t?) understand, OldRupert my friend. As they say – ignorance is bliss.


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## cagomez (11 Feb 2002)

In my unit trained and experienced NCOs are few and far between. Most of the experienced personnel have been assigned to staff rolls (QM, stores, office pers) instead of to the rifle platoons because there isnt enough trained pers to run the unit and train the soldiers. It actually makes more sense to have a top heavy structure. Today they are especially needed to supplement the wave of new (and undertrained) recruits resulting from the governments "aggressive" recruiting campaign. In combat the more trained NCOs and officers you have the better.


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## Marauder (11 Feb 2002)

Black6, if you do not mind me asking sir, are you EKSCOT, WinRegiment, or 21ServiceBatt?

Hey FUS, if you run across MCPL‘s Kroetch or Finnie, or PTE‘s Fraser, Mitchell, O‘Brien, or Perry (tough little dude) tell them that PTE Watson says "Hey."
Thanks.


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## Fishbone Jones (11 Feb 2002)

Marauder,
I think you‘ll find your answer in the tac sign he‘s using!


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## Brad Sallows (11 Feb 2002)

Our most valuable resources are probably young "trained" (classification and command/staff) captains and youngish sergeants and WOs.  The more senior ranks would have a role to play on mobilization, building up the infrastructure, establishments, schools, etc and in formation staffs.  Very few senior militia officers are in an age range suitable for command, if the experience of wartime is any indicator.

We could cap senior militia ranks one level down and not lose a great deal.  However, the resulting downward rank pressure might raise problems in our army, which pays some lip service to the importance of appointment vice rank but doesn‘t always practice it.  If we throttle back battalion-sized units to a major‘s command, and company-sized units to a captain‘s command, what should happen at the brigade HQs and to at least some of the RFCs?


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## cagomez (11 Feb 2002)

Marauder

Small world. I take it you met them on course this summer. I‘ll tell them you said hi.


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## Marauder (11 Feb 2002)

Recceguy, I‘m going to then step out on a limb and say that the "Black" refers to Crap, errrrr, Blacks hats, and will thusly a$$ume he is a track type. Geez, how many of you Windsor Regiment guys are lurking around? LOL It makes a lone Scottish type nervous.    But honestly, I love you armoured guys. Without you I wouldn‘t have a target for my M-72s.   

Fus, yes I did meet them on course up in **** , errrr, Meaford this summer. A quarter of our training PL was RHFC. 
I forget which coy MCPL Kroetch is in, but if he‘s in yours, you can tell him that irony of irony, me and Wheeler ended up in the same section with Fournier. And Fournier is still an oxygen stealing numpty thud who picks his nose. Unfortunately our sect cmdr won‘t let us lose him up in the woods in Meaford. Go figure.


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## OLDRUPERT (11 Feb 2002)

Black 6

Looks like I started a fire....I got another one for ya.

Tell me why it is, that we in this country, knowing better and seeing it work better in other countries (your eg. USA), still allow a backward dept (and you will never convince me that it is not over "Infrastuctured") to make the decisions and form policy?

You know where it doesn‘t work. Even I have a spark of clarity know again (In between short handed, early A.M. rants).   So what is it then?  If it isn‘t that we are over burdened with protectionist buerocrats and general ranks that do nothing but set themselves up for retirement.  How many new general ranks were created  in the last 2 decades?  And why?

I am a past member of a very proud and capable militia Infantry Regiment.  One that has more than its fair share of vets.  Including ones from Yugo.

I have a tendency to over simplify.  Old habits.  
But things need to be shaken up in the military world.  

I agree that the militia, and our army is and always be a militia army, is the cornerstone to the forces.  But the training budgets have been chopped so much in the last 5 years that we are not producing or training fully qualified Officers or NCO‘s for the regiments...even One year of this kind of policy can cause a problem that would take a couple of years to correct.   So what is going to happen now that we can‘t get Junior officers onto Phase training or NCO‘s into proper 6B‘s or section commander crses.

Your looking at a trend that will make  mobilazation unlikey if not impossible, let alone a Total Force Concept.  At least any that would not allow us one or two years to build up and train, like WWII, (and that was with a total war mentality present in the country).

Its seems like for every one step forward we take two back..   The reserves finally get compensation and benefits.  Then they pull the training rug out from under foot

Looking forward to your reply......


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## enfield (11 Feb 2002)

The idea that the Militia fought WW2 - or any war for that matter - is an incorrect one. The vat majority of soldiers sent overseas joined for the war. The Militia regiments, broken down, half-empty and bankrupt as they were, were filled up by recruits.  
Same goes for WW1. **** , in Korea they didn‘t even bother asking the Militia or the Regs. 

The Reg-Res hostility is a major problem in the Army (a  problem that is missing for the most part in the Navy and Air Force). 

The problem, as I see, is the civilianization of DND and the upper ranks of the CF. Trudeau combined the CF and DND, and added civilian positions and such things to the top ranks. Now, the entire upper echelon is politicized and is filled with polictial appointees - generals promoted by politicians and civvie bureucrats put there by politicians. 

The fact we‘ve been ignored for 50 years by Ottawa doesn‘t help much. 
The CF is not made to fight. It is simply the sum total of a range of competing polictial interests, including, but not limited too: militia political pull, liberal PR, public opinion, industry, and our allies. The various strengths and weaknesses of the CF are a result of this. 
Through a process called "satisficing", in which the lowest common denomiator solution satisfactory to  each group is used to create and agreed upon low standard, the CF has been created and managed. 

This is not all that different than other nations...except in most nations little things like "national security", "defence", "force projection" and such things come into play.

However, I have no doubt that our Soft Power and human security agenda has just as much impact as a carrier battle group....


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## Black6 (12 Feb 2002)

BRAD SALLOWS:

At least you didn‘t mention doing away with the Regimental System. That‘s the strong point.

Points to improve/ponder:

1. The depth of any unit/force comes with experience. Experience is comensurate with rank and appointments. 

2. People need recognition for good work and achievements. Our system allows rank progression based on merit - it shouldn‘t be automatic because someone passed QL6B or ACT.

3. If you cap the rank sturcture, even demoting everyone by just one rank, you will have a  serious problem. By having senior unit appointments, there is room for progression (based on merit) for positions of greater responsibility and skill. Most of those positions require a certain rank so that person can effectively deal with peers, subordinates and other units and HQs.

4. If you are going to cap ranks then it must be across the board: reg and res. Total Force. Full Stop. Did you ubderstand the subtle demotion of Reg F bde comds from BGen to Col? This happened when the reserve districts were turned into bdes. (no reserve generals, please)

4. RFCs (?) Reg F Cadres, I presume. Most I have met are the refuse of the regular army. Being posted to a reserve unit is not the sign of a rocketing career. There are a few that try hard and actually help out...not many, though. One of our current RFCs recently remarked, "I frankly don‘t give a flying f*ck if this Regiment lives or dies!" Do you really think we‘ll get even 50% effort out of someone like that? Perhaps in cases like that we should fire the incomps and get our own people in there for two reasons: they have a stake in their unit and it builds depth and experience in that person (and therefore the unit). A big "Thank You" to the Reg F for all the bumblys you sent us. When you put together a QL2/BMQ crse would you put your worst instrs there to tech/instruct/lead? No, because garbage in produces garbage out. 

5. Generally, fitness and age and closely related. Having said that I could point out examples of people older and fitter than me (I‘m 36) and peolpe much younger and unfit. So I don‘t buy that arguement. Have you ever heard of Montgomery, Moltke (the Elder), Patton, MacArthur or Scwarzkopf, Franks (one-legged Corps Comdr Desert Storm)? No spring chickens - but their age has allowed them to amass great expeience and knowledge. I know we are not th most fit fighting force in the world - anyone who has gone on a deplyment can tell you that we Canadians are the rounder types amongst our allies - but our fitness tests are a joke. C‘mon now, CF Express test!? I‘d like to see a single standard battle fitness test regardless of age, gender, colour, sexual orientation, element, component, MOC, etc. If you can meet the standard you get to stay in. If not - C&P. Some ouf our roundest members are amongst the "day staff". of our garrison! With 2 hours a day for PT on company time they should look like Olympians!

6. Be careful throwing around the age thing - the SHARP police will get you. 

Have a nice day and enjoy your career which you would like to see frozen at Cpl/2Lt (under your system).

Black-6, OUT!


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## Black6 (12 Feb 2002)

MARAUDER:

You should feel nervous: prancing around in a skirt without any panties    

Just poking some fun there. The reserves have been able to keep military traditions alive since ‘68. 

Cheers!


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## Brad Sallows (12 Feb 2002)

If one reads my previous post carefully, I think one should conclude I didn‘t recommend a reduced rank structure.  I pointed out some pros and cons.  However, for those of you who are masters of acrobatic conclusions...

Rank progression is also based on need.  A person could be promoted to Major or MWO purely on the basis of ability and the requirements of a position.  But in the militia, I think it is necessary at the same time to be confident those people demonstrate the potential to be CO or RSM. Because we don‘t post and don‘t (often) fire people, a person promoted and subsequently considered unsuitable to be CO or RSM can end up blocking a position indefinitely.  That is organizationally unhealthy.

The problem of dealing with peers, subordinates, HQs, etc is exactly what I meant when I commented on our rank-conscious army.

I see no reason why a Reg F CO who might command a battle group exceeding 1200 all ranks should not deserve the rank of LCol while a Res F CO commanding a unit of <100 could be a Maj.  Again, the real complications are that there would be more people at Bde HQ with rank parity or advantage, and a unit might have some real interpersonal issues among Captains.

I have known many more effective RFC than ineffective RFC.

Allowing for exceptions, I find approximate age ranges for senior officers in war to be: 25-30 for a Maj/coy OC; 30-35 for a LCol/CO; 35-40 for a Col/Bde comd.  Those seem to be where the best compromises of experience and robustness lie.   That leads me to suspect that on full mobilization, a very few of the officers currently in the 35-45 age bracket will be suitable for unit and brigade command with time and training and will be punted up in rank accordingly, while the rest move sideways into less demanding appointments or are put to pasture.


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## OLDRUPERT (12 Feb 2002)

So we all know what is wrong.   We are arguing apples and oranges.

I say again.  Since we all know what the problem is, why is that the solution is never acted upon.   I mean, all the past and present members must carry some political influence?     Give more autonomy to the Forces, less to the dept.....more bang for the buck type stuff.....Anyone?


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## Gordon Angus Mackinlay (12 Feb 2002)

Ladies and Gentlemen,
You think Canada is bad, have a look at South Africa, the following are taken from African Notes of 6 February 2002 

Editorial: The appointment of even more generals and admirals unwelcome news

The announcement this week of a whole new slew of general and flags officers (see below) cannot be welcomed. The SANDF, by its own admission, now have over 200 generals and admirals for what should be a regular force of 78,000. It is currently above that level as a result of yet further holds ups with a much delayed demobilisation plan. Sweden, with a mobilisation strength of 270,000 only has 15 general/flag officer posts in its armed forces. It also has a mere 200 colonels/naval captains and reserve officers cannot advance beyond lieutenant colonel/naval commander. The US, with a force strength of over 1,2 million has around 300 generals and admirals. Kenya, with a force of 22,000 has less than 20 general officers. Comparisons are odious but this is not acceptable and yet another indictment of what can only be called a half-baked reorganisation of the SANDF by a leading consulting firm and a set of starry-eyed generals who have all now left the SANDF for the consulting circuit. Instead of fewer generals there are more. Instead of smaller service headquarters, now called "offices," there are larger structures. The SANDF‘s logistics system is in serious disarray and command and control is chaotic. The channels are too long to obtain either log support or a decision and even the most mundane issue must be referred "higher up" for approval. Service chiefs live in splendid isolation, having no chiefs-of-staff and no deputies. Yet the proliferation of brass continues. By conservative estimate if half this contingent can be regarded as unnecessary and sacked, the SANDF could save well over a billion rand a year Â­ or an eleventh of the available budget. This is also unacceptable by any international standard. It is not clear what input the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in South Africa gave on this issue, or the recent appointment of a brigadier general as the SANDF‘s director of sport and physical training, arguably a major‘s job. Information to hand is that this team is earnest in its task and sensible with its advice Â­ which, so the reporters say, are regrettably frequently ignored.

BMATT mandate renewed 

The British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in South Africa is to remain in South Africa until sometime next year. The 10-member team is based in Pretoria and is currently headed by Brig SG Hughes. According to a South African Department of Defence internal bulletin the team‘s function is to assist the SANDF in its transformation, especially the process of integration, rationalisation, force development and developing a peace support capability. Its tasks are listed as monitoring and reporting of training; assessment and evaluation of personnel selection procedures and training courses; validation of criteria and standards to recognised international norms; adjudication related to integration, should the need arise; impartial advise on key aspects of democratic management of defence, especially integration, rationalisation, force development and continuing development of PSO capability; and, training assistance and support within resources on request.

More generals and admirals appointed

The chief of the SANDF this week announced the promotion of 13 general officers and six admirals. General Siphiwe Nyanda also announced the promotion to general officer rank of eight colonels and to flag rank of one naval captain. Several of the appointments are in the intelligence community according to an South African Department of Defence internal bulletin. Among the other appointments are Maj Gen MP Janse van Resnsburg as General Officer Commanding (GOC) SAAF Air Command and Maj Gen SZ Binda as GOC DoD Logistic Support Formation. Rear Adm SJ Verster has been appointed a chief director in the DoD‘s acquisition and procurement division. Brig Gen SS Kobe, currently GOC of 43 SA Brigade and the South African contingent in Burundi, is being moved to a staff post in the SA Army‘s Infantry Formation. He will soon be Director Area Defence, responsible for controlling the country‘s 83 commando units, many of whom still bear the names they wore during the two Anglo-South African wars a century ago. A 63-year- old colonel has also been promoted a substantive brigadier general and has been appointed Commandant of the SA Army Combat Training Centre at Lohatlha in the Northern Cape. Meanwhile, the SANDF was still fussing over the implementation of its "Employer Initiated Package" (or demobilisation scheme) meant to rid the services of surplus troops. Demobilisations are now scheduled for end of April, May, June and July. The SANDF could not provide numbers when requested.

MY NOTES   These Generals/Admirals are mostly (some 188) ex-Freedom Fighters, these is also some 1,000 Colonels/Naval Captains.  As the comment was made about, the vast majority are in appointments that should be held by junior officers or in some cases senior NCOs.   The British military personnel were reported in The Times, of London, last November as being very unhappy in how their advice and direct assistance was being ignored or totally rejected.

Yours,
Jock in Sydney


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## rceme_rat (12 Feb 2002)

I think the earlier points regarding the sourcing of senior officers on mobilization and the age of officers in wartime indicate that upon mobilization many officers would be rapidly promoted.  This explains why we spend so much time training for jobs that are one or more ranks above our current level.  Additionally, many of those recruited on mobilization come with bags of industry experience that allows them to be commissioned at a higher rank.  

As for Total Force, it was getting up and running when I got up and left the CF.  I worked with a number of reservists at an area HQ without any concern for their competence - and I hope I didn‘t leave any concerns about mine.  

We did up a plan by which each unit in the area would be authorized manning levels based on their assigned roles in filling out the ranks of a brigade group.  There were additional positions recognizing the nature of reserve units.  The controversial positions were the LCol and extra Maj positions -- we were told to keep them there as mobilization positions.  Apparently, a large political move was taken with respect to these positions.

I have no doubts that TF would work if it was given the funding and government commitment it calls for -- intensive training of reservists at the beginning of their careers; better pay/pension/benefits & job security; joint exercises; blending of units; equal equipment, etc.   I don‘t think we can decalre it a failed concept, or blame the higher HQ for it, when it hasn‘t been supported by the people who demanded it in the first place.


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