# PSU WEAPON OF COICE (your input please)



## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

I would appreciate your input regarding A (PSU) Port Security Units weapon of choice. 
To summarize and compare what we do , we are responsible for access control to an area , think of it as a road block for cars of course instead of cars we stop boats and ships. 
every one agrees that the weapon we use right now is not the most appropriate weapon (the C7) THE VESSEL WE WORK IN IS CLOSE QUARTERS WE CANT MANOVER AROUND OUR OWN BOAT WITH A LONG RIFLE. 

My recommendation.  C8 with grenade launcher. it affords us range and penetration. as well as the stopping power of the grenade , and the flexibility to use less than or non lethal. 

I feel that the ability to use non or less than lethal would be appreciated since our concept of ops does not allow us to leave continental North America. and we primarily deal with your aunts and uncles here in Canada.  

and the grenades would give us options against swimmers / divers

My second choice is the Remington 870 with collapsible stalk. again for the same ammo flexibility as the grenade launcher , I also feel that the 1/4oz deer slug is one of the best rounds for stopping a boat. not to mention that the round might cause less collateral damage in a urban environment given its lower velocity. 

Third and last choice not my choice the MP5  given the weapons compact size it is easy to maneuver around the boat  the 9mm round might be considered a safe ammo for use in an urban environment . i don't think this round would stop a boat or penetrate a hull to hit a driver.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 Jan 2010)

If the Navy was going to get serious about Port Security well I can't agree with your points.
  Grenade Launcher- first off there is the safety concern. If you have an accidental discharge of a 40 mm GL onboard your RHIb or other vessel your going to take out both your crew and your ride. Halifax and Victoria have oodles of merchant and recreational craft everyday arriving and departing. You may risk collateral damage or worse civillian casualties. In the event you have to board a suspect vessel, a grenade launcher is a valuable prize in the event you take casualties. 
  If the Navy was going to get you something else I would think a mounted C6 GPMG or .50 cal HMG would be more then adequate. If there is a diver threat chances are you will not be able to engage them anyways. There are explosive charges in the system to handle that.
  For a long gun something like the SR-25 would give you a platform that you would be familiar with and the hitting power that maybe necessary for stopping a boat. 
  The 870s we use are great for maintaining security onboard a ship we are  searching but beyond the initimadation value, do you plan on boarding a craft with your limited crew? Have you done tests using the slug on moving boats to verify that it will stop a moving craft and cause the damage you need it to. MP5s are nice and accurate but really does PSU need them when you have C8s?


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## ammocat (23 Jan 2010)

I am curious about your choice of 40mm grenade to be used against swimmers and divers. The two versions of 40mm HE (HE/Frag & HEDP) grenades that are currently in service both use impact initiated fuzes. So firing these at divers, the grenade in theory would detonate on the waters surface, reducing the effectiveness if the diver was submerged. Also depending at the angle at which the grenade strikes the waters surface it may not detonate at all. 

There are items specifically designed to deal with divers such as the Anti-Frogman DM211, which is in service.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 Jan 2010)

Thanks for the designation ammocat.


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## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

" The 870s we use are great for maintaining security on board a ship we are  searching but beyond the intimidation value, do you plan on boarding a craft with your limited crew? Have you done tests using the slug on moving boats to verify that it will stop a moving craft and cause the damage you need it to. "

it is my understanding that The force protection boats used by the PSS Port Security Sections have the C6s now

I still like the C8 because i wouldn't have to spend a lot of time re training people on the weapon given the transient nature of the persons typically manning the boats crew.

I cant say if Canada has done any weapons testing. I was at the special mission school at MCB Camp Lejeune and they had done testing and they informed me of the shot gun  as well as their testing with less than lethal.

the U.S. boats have a .50 up forward saw,s on the side and a 40 mm grenade launcher in the rear. there is a document stating that there will not be a 50 mounted on our boats in Canadian waters. I find that funny because the MCDVS and Orcas have 50.s mounted on them for podium.

My recommendation for the primary round would be a simple flash bang. . I have done personal testing with what is called a bear banger and feel that even the bear banger would be good as a warning shot. if the warning shot didn't work unload a flashbang into a small boat and see what happens to the crew


There are anti swimmer specific ordinances available to the Canadian NAVY you can even set depth so they wouldn't go off in you vessel. The U.S. uses concussion grenades nice and simple. A flaw in my idea for grenade launcher in anti swimmer use it unless your carefull the round can skip resulting in a stray round.

as for boarding vessels  we don't touch bylaw enforcement at all that is up to local authorities. Some one is always saying what if we do a boarding. i don't think i  can get to in-depth into our SOPS but the plan is to take the vessel in question to a secure location / jetty and bring a search team on board. I have specialside in Port security since 1991 and have never seen a boarding. I am not saying it hasn't happend jut that I haven't seen it.  and protocol's always change.

A problem is that the people making the recommendations are NAVycentric and only know of the weapons used by the NAVY . they don't know of the option available to us.

in regards to the .50 again some one in Ottawa said NO WAY. and we would have to train the people. but a 50 would stop the vessel before a 9mm would.


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## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

ammocat said:
			
		

> I am curious about your choice of 40mm grenade to be used against swimmers and divers. The two versions of 40mm HE (HE/Frag & HEDP) grenades that are currently in service both use impact initiated fuzes. So firing these at divers, the grenade in theory would detonate on the waters surface, reducing the effectiveness if the diver was submerged. Also depending at the angle at which the grenade strikes the waters surface it may not detonate at all.
> 
> There are items specifically designed to deal with divers such as the Anti-Frogman DM211, which is in service.



you were quicker to the draw than i was see my last post. I am disappointed with the direction we have taken regarding anti swimmer training. other that that i cant get into it.


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## ammocat (23 Jan 2010)

Just a note, I am assuming that the 40mm mounted on the US ships is the automatic grenade launcher, which uses the 40mm x 53 ammunition. The M203 uses the 40mm x 46 Low Velocity ammunition. The ammunition is not interchangeable.


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## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

ammocat said:
			
		

> I am curious about your choice of 40mm grenade to be used against swimmers and divers. The two versions of 40mm HE (HE/Frag & HEDP) grenades that are currently in service both use impact initiated fuzes. So firing these at divers, the grenade in theory would detonate on the waters surface, reducing the effectiveness if the diver was submerged. Also depending at the angle at which the grenade strikes the waters surface it may not detonate at all.
> 
> There are items specifically designed to deal with divers such as the Anti-Frogman DM211, which is in service.



PSU normally though. comes under the NAVAL RESERVES. we no longer receive demolition training and therefor no training on the dm211. it would be nice


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## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

ammocat said:
			
		

> Just a note, I am assuming that the 40mm mounted on the US ships is the automatic grenade launcher, which uses the 40mm x 53 ammunition. The M203 uses the 40mm x 46 Low Velocity ammunition. The ammunition is not interchangeable.




Never asume you make an ass out of ume. but you are correct.


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## ammocat (23 Jan 2010)

No training on the DM211, that is unfortunate. I would think it would be a valuable resource for the protection of ships, harbour structures, etc. Since the DM211 is really a complex underwater grenade, I would think it would be easy to conduct dry training with dummy variants. It may be much more difficult to conduct live training as you would need a suitable body of water, there would be concerns about marine life, and dealing with duds would be difficult and would require EOD qualified divers. 

I have no training or information wrt port security and I am a little confused. Would personnel with MP-5's or 870's be required to stop a boat by shooting the engine or operator? I would think that stopping a boat would up to a mounted weapon such as the C-6 or .50cal. Aren't the MP-5's and 870's more for personal protection once the suspect vessel has been boarded?


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## Monsoon (23 Jan 2010)

ammocat said:
			
		

> I have no training or information wrt port security and I am a little confused. Would personnel with MP-5's or 870's be required to stop a boat by shooting the engine or operator? I would think that stopping a boat would up to a mounted weapon such as the C-6 or .50cal. Aren't the MP-5's and 870's more for personal protection once the suspect vessel has been boarded?


There's a lot that's wrong with PSU that has nothing to do with the weapon choice. The doctrine to date relies very heavily on "visible deterrent" and gets muddy when anyone is actually called upon to use the weapon.

Fr'instance: The RHIB coxswain is "in charge" of the boat, but he's also the driver, and communications are relayed through a third member. The ROE are delegated directly to the rifleman/bowsman (typically the most junior person in the boat). To compare this to an army context (and, really, PS is more like what the army traditionally does than what the navy traditionally does), it would be like making the tank crew commander the driver, putting the driver up in the turret with the radio, and letting the aimer and loader shoot at whatever they want. Not a recipe for tactical success, I would suggest.

IMHO: Make the RHIB coxswain just the RHIB's driver, give the rifleman a weapon that's directed on order by the RHIB "commander", who holds the ROE and is a MS+ of any trade specifically trained to do the job and who has comms back to the OPCEN (preferably using an encrypted trunk radio with a headset that allows it to be used when the boat is at speed).

And while we're at it, let's stop pretending the OPCEN is the bridge of a ship. Sit a junior watch officer down at a computer console with an electronic chart of the harbour communicating directly with the boats. Have a senior watch officer there to liaise with outside authorities and command who, realistically, will seldom be present when bad stuff starts to happen in a PS context. Give them a NAVCOM and an NCIOP to assist as required. Designing an OPCEN around the principle that the NAVCOMs and NCIOPs should be fully employed as they would be on a ship is a bad idea.

But of course that will never happen. And that's why PSU is not my favourite sport.


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## chief_of_da_fence (23 Jan 2010)

I have always felt that the PSU boat is more of a jet fighter. I would never want to be in charge. of a platform that has to come in close quarters with a nother fast moving platform and not be at the helm myself. I don't think I could handle the stress of my life not in my hands, and I have been driving the boats since 1991. as for the trunked coms OMG we have wanted that scine 2005 or so. preaching to the choir here. granted we have wanted new weapons since almost day one. 

And I agree about the micro management of the boats by op cen, it rely got bad in the latter days of PSS. and trickled into PSU.

I wont even get into how the west coast screwed up and taught un authorized tactics for the past 5 years resulting in all the coxns for op podium having to be retrained. lol I get to say I told you so on that one.


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## Monsoon (23 Jan 2010)

Fair enough, to the extent that PS use of force is geared toward boat tactics rather than use of weapons. But that assumes that you're only going to be confronting wandering tourists, water-borne media and nuisance protesters (the 98% case, I admit) rather than armed people intent on doing damage. In that case, the boats shouldn't be particularly close and the overriding concern is ROE, arcs of fire and collateral damage (words I've seldom heard uttered in a PS context). If we're going to put weapons in a boat, we should do it properly.

A very experienced boatswain may be able to drive, communicate and direct weapons at the same time... but mostly we're talking about killicks with a couple of weeks of boat tactics training. It behooves us to put someone fairly senior in the boat who can do the other stuff (escalatory hails, directing warning shots, etc), and who can use their experience to ignore the OPCEN when events overtake its picture of what's happening on the water.


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## NavyShooter (26 Jan 2010)

The essence of this will boil down to what threat you are trying to protect against?

The tools can be chosen based on that.

Part of it is probably based on the level of threat assesed to be present.

Remember, part of the threat continum is a physical presence as a deterrent.

If that is not enough (which so far it is thank goodness!) then obviously the tools used in port security would have to be re-assessed.

What weapon system would be "ideal"?  Well, no weapon will be "perfect" for every job, so in the absence of a specific targetted threat, the best thing to do is use a generic service weapon.   That way there is commonality of training and a consistent presence.

There are pros and cons to every weapon you may choose.  

An 870 will not be able to reach past 50 meters effectively, and has very limited ammunition capacity, and is relatively slow to reload.

An MP-5 will not reach past 100 meters effectively, has good ammo capacity, however, it requires additional training that not everyone has.

A .50 M2 Machine gun has a HUGE effective range, but requires a stable mounting platform (ie not a small boat) and additional training to use it well.  It also has a REALLY large danger template.

A C-7 reaches out several hundred meters, has the ability to penetrate thin steel plate, has good ammo capacity, does not have an excessive danger template, and every member of the CF has been trained in it's use.

There's all kinds of arguments that can be made for and against each of these weapons, but until there is a specific threat requiring a specialized weapon other than a C-7, I don't think you'll see them replaced in this role.

NS


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## chief_of_da_fence (26 Jan 2010)

That's one of the reasons I thing the C8 is  a more appropriate weapon. its basically a small version of the C7 no training required. just a familiarization soot (or two) Both my trips to the sand box I used  C8 and C7a2 and required no additional training.



now if you send me to Africa I want a c6 up front  well I would still be happy with  a .50

Pleaase don't thing anything I say is an attempt to disagree it is only an attempt to get information or answer question's.


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## NavyShooter (26 Jan 2010)

What advantages does a C-8 provide versus a C-7 except for being slightly handier in close quarters?

The shorter barrel provides a lower initial muzzle velocity, thus slightly reducing it's effectiveness.

With the transient nature of PSU's, (as you've mentioned already) it's probably hard enough to get people who are current on their C-7 PWT's.

NS


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## chief_of_da_fence (26 Jan 2010)

The C7 is very difficult to move around with in the boat the barrel is constantly hanging up on fittings or obstacles in the boat..  it is hard  to say what the distance of a confrontation would be I haven't seen one. it is believed that it would be about 20 to 30 yards. Granted the west cost was trying to train people to "ride off "  what they coincided the equivalent of a pit manover. which would force you to come in direct contact with the VOI vessel of interest.  i disagree with the riding of tactic for access controle it might be good for bylaw enforcement but not for PSU. fleet school has crushed the attempts to teach riding off . thank god. I digress.

keep in mind I am also asking about the use of the grenade launcher for non or  less than lethal. I guess lethal could be an option.


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## DBF (26 Jan 2010)

chief_of_da_fence said:
			
		

> The C7 is very difficult to move around with in the boat the barrel is constantly hanging up on fittings or obstacles in the boat.


 The C8 is only 6.4 inches shorter than the C7.


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## Fishbone Jones (27 Jan 2010)

chief_of_da_fence,

We have a requirement here for posters that wish to engage in discussion. That is, to the best of their ability, to use the spell check, use proper grammar and to capitalize and punctuate, where necessary. It makes the post much easier to read and helps hold people's interest. Please endeavour to help us out in this regard, by reading, and correcting your replies prior to hitting 'Post'.

Thanks

Milnet.ca Staff


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## chief_of_da_fence (27 Jan 2010)

DBF said:
			
		

> The C8 is only 6.4 inches shorter than the C7.



is that with the butt completely collapsed .

 All so some of the spaces on our current vessel are Less than one foot in width in these cases every inch counts. think about it MP,S  and some drivers, get them in the sand box so they can get in and out of their vehicles. I think even flight crews might get them , don't quote me on that one.


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## Ex-Dragoon (27 Jan 2010)

chief_of_da_fence said:
			
		

> is that with the butt completely collapsed .
> 
> All so some of the spaces on our current vessel are Less than one foot in width in these cases every inch counts. think about it MP,S  and some drivers, get them in the sand box so they can get in and out of their vehicles. I think even flight crews might get them , don't quote me on that one.



Unless you know for certain don't speculate.

Milnet.Ca Staff


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## Nfld Sapper (27 Jan 2010)

chief_of_da_fence said:
			
		

> is that with the butt completely collapsed .
> 
> All so some of the spaces on our current vessel are Less than one foot in width in these cases every inch counts. think about it MP,S  and some drivers, get them in the sand box so they can get in and out of their vehicles. I think even flight crews might get them , don't quote me on that one.



FYI when refering to length of the rifle, I believe you generally will quote the length of the barrel and here are the fol lengths of barrels for the C7/C8 FOW.....

C7  20 in (508 mm)
C7A1  20 in (508 mm) 
C7A2  20 in (508 mm) 
C8 14.5 in (368 mm)
C8A1 14.5 in (368 mm) 
C8A2 14.5 in (368 mm 

EDITED TO ADD

For what its worth:

C7/C7-A1 Length: normal butt, 1.0 m
C8 Length: butt closed, 760mm, butt extended, 840mm


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## chief_of_da_fence (27 Jan 2010)

recceguy said:
			
		

> chief_of_da_fence,
> 
> We have a requirement here for posters that wish to engage in discussion. That is, to the best of their ability, to use the spell check, use proper grammar and to capitalize and punctuate, where necessary. It makes the post much easier to read and helps hold people's interest. Please endeavour to help us out in this regard, by reading, and correcting your replies prior to hitting 'Post'.
> 
> ...



I choose to ignore your attempt to publicly humiliate me CARRY ON ! recceguy .


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## Mike Bobbitt (27 Jan 2010)

chief_of_da_fence said:
			
		

> I choose to ignore your attempt to publicly humiliate me CARRY ON ! recceguy .



...and I choose to mute you until you can follow recceguy's  politely worded request. Carry on Chief.


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## Nfld Sapper (27 Jan 2010)

And the BOSS has spoken.......


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## Ex-Dragoon (27 Jan 2010)

Anyways....back on topic please.

Milnet.Ca Staff


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## NavyShooter (28 Jan 2010)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> C7/C7-A1 Length: normal butt, 1.0 m
> C8 Length: butt closed, 760mm, butt extended, 840mm



Further to the discussion:

MP-5 collapsible stock is 700mm extended, and 550mm collapsed.  (8.9" barrel)

The C-8 is not normally fired with the buttstock fully collapsed, something tells me that the fire will be....less effective...and poorly aimed.

Adding a 40mm GL underneath would completely defeat the attempt at making a handier weapon available...looking at the M-203, it's a 1.36 KG weight added on the front end.

I'll suggest though, that instead of worrying about the specifics of the individual weapons, we have a look back at the role for PSU right now.

In truth, it is to be a visible armed presence/deterrent.  

Having a standard weapon, that everyone is trained on means that all people can fill the duty with little additional training.

If there was a threat that necessitated the carriage of a different weapon system, then sure, train the people and go for it.  

In the meantime, the basic issue C-7 is good enough for a visible armed presence.  (IMO)

If I was sitting in a RHIB doing PSU, I would not feel overly encumbered by a rifle that's 16 cm longer than another.  

NS


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## Ex-Dragoon (28 Jan 2010)

Could be worse we could be issuing PSU FNC1s lol


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## willellis (31 Jan 2010)

Haha.. I would think that something along the lines of either a sig556 Classic config. or a H&K G36C. Both offer a folding stock so that CQ are not an issue, and are both in a barrel length that are between the C7 and C8. Best of both worlds.


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## Ex-Dragoon (31 Jan 2010)

willellis said:
			
		

> Haha.. I would think that something along the lines of either a sig556 Classic config. or a H&K G36C. Both offer a folding stock so that CQ are not an issue, and are both in a barrel length that are between the C7 and C8. Best of both worlds.



Have you ever handled either weapon system beyond COD?

Which would also mean we would have to train people on a different weapon, techs to repair a different weapon, supply to order parts for a different weapon....see where I am going....:


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## willellis (1 Feb 2010)

Haha.  I do indeed, and no I have not. Just looking at the weapons out there, they seem like a decent choice. Good call tho.


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## Ex-SHAD (18 Mar 2010)

Port Security in the context of the Naval Reserves has always been a confused issue, and suffers heavily from high turnover rates, and what seems to be a lack of vision beyond defending naval assets within the context of Halifax or Esquimalt. In my own opinion, I believe that to change Port Security we must refine or change the following elements (My PSS theory is based on serving with POESB-PSS Esquimalt, and limited engagements with PSU-Halifax).
1)	Port Security Section, Port Security Unit and Formation Guard Force must establish a common operations doctrine. An effective and coherent Port Security policy is a must in an era where we face threats from both home and abroad. A solid and well executed/funded Port Security strategy is the only way to guarantee the safety of our naval assets and insure that Canada can continue to effectively wage a global war against terrorism.

2)	To elevate the status of Naval Reserve based Port Security, one of the first and most important steps is for access control/security patrols to be handed over to Port Security personnel. The continued usage of unarmed civil security guards (the Corps of Commissionaires) is an outdated practice which no longer fits with the current world situation. In my own personal experience, I found the Commissionaires to be less that suited to the job of access control, and often times making mistakes which could in theory cost of lives of countless Canadian Servicemen.  With that being said, in consultation with the Naval Provost Marshal’s (of their respective regions), Port Security Personnel should take over all security functions aboard both CFB Esquimalt & CFB Halifax.

3)	 Port Security as a whole must transition from an any trade required function, to an actual rating with established doctrine, and leadership. Now obviously some may complain that the Navy’s primary function is not combat related and that would therefore be stepping on the toes of Army, but in a historical context many services across the world(especially in the context of the world’s Air Force’s have had to create force protection units to defend air assets, a good example being the Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Defense Guards, who were created out of necessity during Vietnam when it became impossible for the United States Air Force Security Police(now USAF Security Forces) to provide coherent and effective protection to both USAF and RAAF assets). Now with respect to a Port Security Rating, it would not have to be a direct entry and instead could operate as a re-muster rating which would then bring a wealth of experience from across the NAVRES community to the rating. The other option, would be a direct entry rating, in which personnel from the time they have completed BMQ will become adept in the all the functions and duties required of a PS Sentry/Boats Crew. Now obviously, the other question remains as to whether the rating would have its own officers, or if instead officers would be seconded to the rating to simply fulfill a logistical/leadership function. The other option, would be the creation of an PS Classification for Officers, with a focus on tactics and doctrine.


4)	Now obviously in the modern CF the idea of a “fighting sailor” is considered something of a relic from the days of Nelson and the RCN, but in actuality pre-unification at least among certain elements of the RCN/RCN(R) & RCNR there seemed to be some impetus on teaching naval landing training (references to this can be found in articles in the Crowsnest Magazine). For the modern Port Security Sailor, the concept of naval landing training should be revised, since after all a well rounded fighting sailor, should be able to defend his fleet along with being able to engage the enemy without having to rely on the army, or wait for the air force to bomb the aggressor force out of existence. After all, if Port Security personnel were able to receive offensive training, as well as defensive training they could realistically be employed in combat zones (as it has sometimes been stated in the past, that the future of NAVRES PSS lies in external operations).

5)	Finally, there must be a change in the security posture of NAVRES Port Security in general. Rather than simply acting as a visual deterrent/tripwire, PSU (and its sister units) should instead adopt a more aggressive policy. After all, when dealing with any aggressor it is better to be ready to fire and be on the offensive, then to stand fast and potentially loose servicemen because of vaguely instituted policies. After all, force protection should not be viewed through a litigious lens of whether or not we are justified to use force, but instead should be based around, are our sailors ready to kill a potential aggressor, and protect his fellow shipmates from harm. Now this may seem like a rather harsh view on both policy and procedure, but if we are to look at the situation in a fair and balanced manner, how many times have we seen our US Allies loose personnel in overseas operations due to rules of engagement/policies which were either too strict, or far too vague. Simply put, a sailor must be able to make a snap decision on every call, and he must feel competent to be able to back that call, if he is made to account for his actions, in front of a jury of his peers.


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## Ex-SHAD (18 Mar 2010)

Though this article relates to ground defense and how it should be implemented in the context of the Canadian Air Force, it’s worth the read for those who are interested in Force Protection as it relates to the CF.

http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/c...obocarlsen.doc.


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## George Wallace (18 Mar 2010)

You really don't have to SPAM the site with this link.........which I can not get to work anyway.

If I catch you posting it one more time, you may find your way onto the WARNING SYSTEM (READ up on it).


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## Lex Parsimoniae (19 Mar 2010)

Ex-SHAD said:
			
		

> the Navy’s primary function is not combat related


???


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## Cronicbny (20 Mar 2010)

Ex-SHAD said:
			
		

> 1)	Port Security Section, Port Security Unit and Formation Guard Force must establish a common operations doctrine. An effective and coherent Port Security policy is a must in an era where we face threats from both home and abroad. A solid and well executed/funded Port Security strategy is the only way to guarantee the safety of our naval assets and insure that Canada can continue to effectively wage a global war against terrorism.
> 
> 2)	To elevate the status of Naval Reserve based Port Security, one of the first and most important steps is for access control/security patrols to be handed over to Port Security personnel. The continued usage of unarmed civil security guards (the Corps of Commissionaires) is an outdated practice which no longer fits with the current world situation. In my own personal experience, I found the Commissionaires to be less that suited to the job of access control, and often times making mistakes which could in theory cost of lives of countless Canadian Servicemen.  With that being said, in consultation with the Naval Provost Marshal’s (of their respective regions), Port Security Personnel should take over all security functions aboard both CFB Esquimalt & CFB Halifax.



though somewhat off topic from the "Weapon of Choice theme" it would seem the Brass disagree with your vision - not only is PSS (Esquimalt) losing all of its funding, but NADEN is, in fact, reducing to the "open base" concept effective 1 Apr. I'm not saying I agree with the plan for PSS and the "open base" policy, but I would venture to say the PSS goose is cooked...

As for PSU, we shall see what the post PODIUM lessons learned bring forth. More importantly, we will see how this summer shapes up vis a vis NAVRES staffing KIN Class billets and billets in the Training Establishments - if we can't muster the personnel to complete those two (very important) Force Generation tasks then I think PSU might find its goose in the oven with the knob set to 450...

Enough with the Geese I suppose...


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## chief_of_da_fence (29 Apr 2010)

I think PSU might find its goose in the oven with the knob set to 450
[/quote]

I don't know if anything is cooked .They are now qualifying Reserve QL1  boatswains on the 24 ft RHIB, I can assume this is to bolster the amount of coxns  to be used in a PSU environment. I am sure there are other reasons . 

BOAT COXN MOD 4A RIB 02-JUN-2010 TO 09-JUN-2010 is completely loaded with AB's


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## Retired AF Guy (29 Apr 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You really don't have to SPAM the site with this link.........which I can not get to work anyway.
> 
> If I catch you posting it one more time, you may find your way onto the WARNING SYSTEM (READ up on it).



Besides not working, it locked up my computer, crashed my browser, forcing me to do a hard re-boot. Thanks!   :threat:


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## Cronicbny (29 Apr 2010)

chief_of_da_fence said:
			
		

> I don't know if anything is cooked .They are now qualifying Reserve QL1  boatswains on the 24 ft RHIB, I can assume this is to bolster the amount of coxns  to be used in a PSU environment. I am sure there are other reasons .
> 
> BOAT COXN MOD 4A RIB 02-JUN-2010 TO 09-JUN-2010 is completely loaded with AB's



Given the new CMS Readiness direction and the upcoming Strategic Review of the Reserves this fall I think we're cooking above 450.

I can't see CMS justifying continued funding of PSU given the fleet reductions we have just taken.

That being said, it's a NAVRES decision as to where they will put the money - but recent 67% cuts to NROTS makes me think PSU will find itself somewhere between funding Central region meet and greets and the Training officer billet...

*IF* funding for PSU (outside of OPERATIONS - read: IFR) continues at its previous pace while we write off half of our fleet Force Generation capability I will most humbly eat my chapeau. I whole heartedly agree that we still need to FG boat coxn's for the RHIBs though... that is a core capability we need and until DMTE relegates us to the old school "War Augmentation" Formation status of the "dark days" then it will, I suspect, remain on the Res 00105 QL1

my two cents...


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