# The Utility of Force (Gen. Sir Rupert Smith)



## Edward Campbell (15 Nov 2006)

I have just finished General (ret’d) Sir Rupert Smith’s* new book: _The Utility of Force_ (_Penguin_, London, 2006).  It is worth a read.  Those who found themselves challenged by Thomas P Barnett (_The Pentagon’s New Map – Putnam_, New York, 2004) will get much the same _rush_ from Smith.  He lays out the existing _paradigm_ (and, as he speaks English, he actually knows what the word means and where/how it ought to be used) and explains why it is obsolete.  He then describes _War Amongst the People_, which he believes is the model within which we, this generation plus, must fight its battles.

Smith lays out a series of trends which define his new paradigm:

•	The objectives for which we fight are changing from the _hard_ objectives which define a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which an outcome may be decided;

•	We fight amongst the people, not on a battlefield;

•	Our conflict tends to be timeless, even unending;

•	We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective;

•	On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of _industrial war_

•	The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multi-national grouping against some non-state party or parties. (pps. 17 and 169)

Although section, company and brigade commanders will all find something they recognize from operations in the Balkans or Afghanistan in Smith’s writing his target audience, I think, comprises people like Tony Blair, George Bush, Robert Gates, Stephen Harper, Rick Hillier, John Howard, and Gordon O’Connor.

Smith posits that Washington, especially, and Canberra, London and Ottawa, too, as _followers_, are pursuing a strategy of failure because they do not understand *why* they are fighting – they do not understand, according to Smith, the _utility_ of the force they apply to this, that or the other problem.  He goes further and, in the final section, he offers some concrete suggestions for the _institutional thinkers_.  They are not radically new – in fact, in part, he returns to some basic _Principles of War_ which ought to be familiar to Canadian soldiers, beginning with *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*.

In part this book is a severe indictment of the Bush/Rumsfeld campaign against Iraq.  Smith suggests that since they didn’t understand their own AIM (they did not, he appears to think, know ‘why’ they wanted to invade Iraq, depose Saddam Hussein, etc) they could not possibly develop a strategy and tactics to achieve anything but failure.  He is equally critical of the US led, sometimes UN approved campaigns in the Balkans, where he was, in 1995, Commander UNPROFOR.

In the main, however, Smith avoids direct criticism and uses his own experiences and his readings in history to illustrate the nature, uses and then enduring utility of force.  It is not force which is obsolete – sorry _Taliban Jack_ and the _Canadian Peace Alliance_, but your heads are still firmly up your rears, according to Gen. Smith – what has changed is the _paradigm_ within which we still need to apply force to accomplish our national/alliance *aims*.  The _industrial war_ model, for which we (Canadians included) prepared and within which we fought for nearly a century is, Smith posits, as dead as a Dodo.  The new model, existent since 1945 he suggests, is _War Amongst the People_.  We, soldiers mostly, have been very successful at adapting out _industrial war_ equipment and organizations to fight battles in this new paradigm but Smith argues that we must change our political/strategic thinking if we want to win the wars.

  Here is a comment from _The Sunday Times_ of about a year ago (September 2005), reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2092-1785151,00.html 


> Interview: Jasper Gerard meets General Rupert Smith
> *You’re fighting the wrong war, Tony*
> 
> This is a man who feels at home with violence. As a young paratrooper, he hugged his commanding officer who was engulfed in a tower of flame until the fire was extinguished. As one of the finest generals of his generation, he used industrial strength force against Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic. And with his bomber jacket and masculine good looks — Jeremy Irons with a shot of testosterone — General Sir Rupert Smith could be a Hollywood action hero rather than an old British war dog.
> ...



I would like to add to two points, repeating myself, I know:

•	While I do not suggest that we need to repeat Scipio’s treatment of Carthage I think the way to deal with al Qaeda is to *re*turn its attention inward, to Arab societies and states.  To this end I think an Iraqi disintegration and civil war will serve our larger purposes.  Al Qareda, busy in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, will lose interest** in the _Great Satan_ and its friends in the West; and

•	The proposal to bring democracy to Iraq and, consequently, make Iraq a democratic beacon for the rest of the region was, always, from the get go, pie in the sky and poorly conceived pie in the sky, to boot.  Experience shows that Arabs, like most people, want to have a say in deciding how they will be governed.  Given that choice they will opt for an fairly strict _Islamist_ regime – that happened in fairly _Westernized_ states like Algeria, Egypt and Iran; it will happen in Iraq, too.  Democracy, as we know it, has taken root and prospered only in societies which already have strong legal and regulatory institutions – such as Germany and Japan had *before* World War II.  Russia, for example, has never had such institutions and it struggles, to be kind, with attempting to implement some sort of democracy – my guess is it will fail.   

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* General Sir Rupert Smith retired from the British Army in 2002. His last appointment was Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe 1998-2001, covering NATO's Balkan operations, including the Kosovo bombing, and the development of the European Defence and Security Identity. Prior to that he was the general Officer Commanding in Northern Irelnd, 1996-1998; Commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, 1995; the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Operations, 1992-1994; and General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 1990-1992, including the Gulf War. 

Born in 1943, Rupert Smith was educated at Haileybury, ISC, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He enlisted in 1962 and was commissioned into the Parachute Regiment in 1964. He has served in East and South Africa, Arabia, the Caribbean, Europe and Malaysia. 

He holds an honorary doctorate from Surrey University and is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. His interests include history and sailing.

** Added note: Al Qaeda _et al_ will not lose interest as much as they will have much more compelling interests in *reforming* Muslim societies which, in the main, they regard as apostate, degenerate, etc, etc.  This will take priority over 'us' (the Great and lesser Satans in the West); they'll still hate us and pray for our downfall, pit of fire, etc but they will be preoccupied with the _purification_ of the _umma_.

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Edit: added note


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## c4th (13 Jan 2007)

Read it.  Definitely worth the read.


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## 54/102 CEF (14 Jan 2007)

The utility of force concept goes both ways - if a non-industrial warfare proponent wants to do something they`d best think it through also.

A recent book review I did for your background - read Sageman - save your $ on Gerges - see link  http://www.donlowconcrete.com/CDAC/Utlity.htm


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