# MGS/MMEV dead yet?



## plattypuss (15 Jun 2006)

Hot off the presses apparently both the MGS and MMEV projects have had requests for cancellation signed off by the CLS IOT to seek cabinet approval.  Links to follow:

MGS http://vcds.mil.ca/cls/dmcs/FilesO/DMCS-36199.tif

MMEV http://vcds.mil.ca/cls/dmcs/FilesO/DMCS-36200.tif


Haven't read the meat and potatoes of the documents yet. Yes I edited my comments so that I didn't look totally (although still some) moronic.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (15 Jun 2006)

They're _requests_ for cancellation - not actual cancellation documents.  Cabinet has to make that call.

(links are DIN only)


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## pbi (19 Jun 2006)

(I tried a search to see if this has already been posted. I think I'm OK...)

The unclassified CLS letter cancelling the MGS  has been released around the Army. The Leo will be extended to 2015. I haven't seen any media releases.

Cheers


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## Thompson_JM (19 Jun 2006)

YAY, all we need now are the jets to move em around and we'll be alright...


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## ExSarge (19 Jun 2006)

What's the buzz, any replacement vehicles been mentioned as of yet? I thought the Leo's had already been retired, doe's this mean that they will be reissued to the RCD?


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## Echo9 (19 Jun 2006)

Gee, Leslie moves fast.  4 days on the job and a major announcement already...

Any comments on why it's been cancelled?  Has the program been cancelled by the US Army, leaving an orphan (can anyone say ADATS, sorry, MMEV + ;D )?

I know that there were technical issues with it, particularly in terms of it having a very high CoG.  I also know that its death will be unlamented in the Cavalry (can't really call them Armour anymore, can we...)

This does open up an opportunity to re-assess our vehicle fleet and the requirements for future ops.  Should be fun!


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## probum non poenitet (19 Jun 2006)

With the Hillier/Leslie dynamic duo, we are going to have to get used to common sense decisions like these.

It might be tough on those of us who aren't used to it.


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## turretmonster (19 Jun 2006)

Plse deliver my new M1A2 by x-mas...   ;D
Thanks
TM


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## chaos75 (19 Jun 2006)

Was Caron that cancelled the project, not Leslie.


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## Journeyman (19 Jun 2006)

Echo9 said:
			
		

> Gee, Leslie moves fast.  4 days on the job and a major announcement already...



The official acknowledgement is just now circulating, but several supporting elements (eg: the Jimmy's replacing the radio harnesses on the Leos) have been working the project for several weeks now.

So, a) not Leslie's doing, and b) no M1A2s I'm afraid.  

(_~sheesh~_ you'd think the Zipperheads would be happy to at least keep tanks, but noooo....want, want, want )


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## turretmonster (19 Jun 2006)

You mean it's not just about us, us, us???  Just who changed the rules anyways???
Ummm we'll take some Danish Leo 2A5's then, but with a timmies cup holder.. 
TM


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## Britney Spears (19 Jun 2006)

The new Leo 2 PSO was unveiled at Eurosatatory this week. PSO stands for *Peace Support Operations*. I think the name will go over very well with our Canadian sensitivities(it's for supporting peace! no one could be against that! hide the flechette rounds in the back of the rack), and the turbodiesel engine is fuel efficient too. Look, it's even got a dozer blade for building renovations. With white paint and the cute and cuddly rounded lines it looks practically harmless.


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## blacktriangle (19 Jun 2006)

Congrats to all of you  ;D

Now quick, buy some tanks. Then we can keep them for 30 years before anyone gets any ideas...


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## nullterm (19 Jun 2006)

2015 is quite a ways off.  What are the main contenders to replace the Leo1's?


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## probum non poenitet (19 Jun 2006)

Replacement for the Leopard?
The NDP budget option:


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## orange.paint (19 Jun 2006)

The worst part is this will take up more peoples time and careers training for nothing.We all had that feeling in Wainwrong when we "retired" the Leopards there.All those weeks of BS for no value to us in training.

Want to destroy morale?Place guys in a position where they can never deploy and train on beautiful equipment that will never be used for anything except getting a combat team commander a check in the box for his course.

2015 and then what?The tankers are _*NEVER*_ getting a tank or fake POS tank if these two high ranking members (former dragoons) say 2015.Next we'll have a airforce general with little to no concept of panzer's and definitely no connection to the beautiful creatures.

They were good enough for Kosovo why not Afghanistan? Lets see some refitting,upgrades and up-armour and deploy 2 troops.Nothing says intimidation to Afghan terrorist quite like 105 hesh.

2015.... wow my son will just be getting to age of enrollment and me retirement.


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## TCBF (19 Jun 2006)

"The unclassified CLS letter cancelling the MGS  has been released around the Army."

- Not so fast.  The letter you speak of:  was it refering to a proposal he submitted to higher RECOMMENDING the cancellation of the MGS?


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## Journeyman (19 Jun 2006)

Just note how "force protection" has increasingly trumped "boots on the ground interacting with the populous" (you know, that key to countering insurgencies), and you will see the escalation from GWagon to Nyala.......to Leopard. 

You're right, they _were_ good enough for Kosovo (all 5 of them). And with all the media flap surrounding casualties, the Leopards will be over in A'stan soon enough. But.....

-will they protect the crew better than a GWagon - yes. 
-will they advance the cause of defeating the insurgents through better population interaction and HUMINT - no.
-will a 105mm HESH round do damage to its target - yes.
-will there be many suitable HESH targets, bearing in mind the requirement to minimize collateral damage - hmmm, not likely.
-will they take pressure off of the other vehicle crews by being a better target for Ahmed the RPG-gunner, or Habib the AT-mine-stacker. You betcha. While a tougher target, just imagine the bragging rights of whoever takes out an infidel tank!

But they'll be there soon enough, and who knows, maybe a _half-_Sqn of tank folks will get to deploy  

(do I need to include that this is just my $0.02)


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## Pte Joker (19 Jun 2006)

I've always liked the old Leopard C2 it may be old but i like it


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## orange.paint (19 Jun 2006)

leopard in a small camp=security

the poor attack on lav 3's= lack of attack on leopards

I know they took out t-55 back in the day (79 etc) but it appears they lack the tech now or lav 3's would be brewed up all over the place.

overwatch in an outer cordon 

advancing Afghan's (50 or more)= hesh

choppers+tanks+infantry=bad day in Afghanistan.

If we ain't getting MGS deploy the leopards,use them with the hundreds of well trained tankers out there dying to get that operational tour on tanks.

dam that would be sweet as hell.....up armour....supporting lav's......ummm.....

but i have to agree with you on the antitank mines unfortunately. But I would gladly sign the wavier to have the honour to be a panzer commander in Afghanistan (I would sort of be like the cool crewcommander on the beast....I understood him.

We don't leave the TANK!!!
dam traitors. ;D


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Jun 2006)

Please post this letter if its true and unclassified.


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## vonGarvin (19 Jun 2006)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> -will there be many suitable HESH targets, bearing in mind the requirement to minimize collateral damage - hmmm, not likely.


I disagree. Given that they've been launching Volkswagens in suborbital transits on the bad guys (155 rounds from the M777s), I'm pretty sure that they'd launch the pumpkins on the baddies in similar situations.


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## orange.paint (19 Jun 2006)

+1

think of hesh as "the more friendly way" ;D


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## dapaterson (19 Jun 2006)

TCBF said:
			
		

> "The unclassified CLS letter cancelling the MGS  has been released around the Army."
> 
> - Not so fast.  The letter you speak of:  was it refering to a proposal he submitted to higher RECOMMENDING the cancellation of the MGS?



Always the voice of reason around here, aren't you?  

I suspect that is the letter PBI raised; it's one of two that were signed off.  It indicates CLS' desires to the centre.  But never underestimate the importance of jobs in London vs military requirements.


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## Jordan411 (19 Jun 2006)

I would think this would be a pretty big issue. I guess I'll just wait patiently for something media release.


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## Infanteer (19 Jun 2006)

Make no bones about it, this had something to do with it.


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## armybuck041 (19 Jun 2006)

rcac_011 said:
			
		

> Want to destroy morale?Place guys in a position where they can never deploy and train on beautiful equipment that will never be used for anything except getting a combat team commander a check in the box for his course.



Slightly OT, but:

Granted with our MOC a vehicle is more of a mode of tpt and rolling tool box, but we just took possesion of a brand new fleet of very nice MTVE's and TLAV's that will never leave the country either. 

Best part is that we train crews on the tracked fleet we have in Canada and then end up having to scramble to produce LAV crews and eventually borrowed Dragoons to crew our LAV's when we deploy overseas.


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## armybuck041 (19 Jun 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Make no bones about it, this had something to do with it.



Good read...


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## Franko (19 Jun 2006)

Heard about that the other day....and it's bloody well over due.

Now get 'em into theater.....    >

Ooops....sorry. Getting too aggressive for a moment.     :

Regards


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## Teddy Ruxpin (20 Jun 2006)

One other note...MMEV was also recommended for cancellation - both cause for celebration!


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

Don't tell me common sense is starting to rule the day.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (20 Jun 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Make no bones about it, this had something to do with it.



Page 3 of that pretty much sums up all the reasons why an MGS or equivalent will never be able to replace a proper MBT regardless of how you try to rewrite doctrine or tactics.


Matthew.


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

"ultimately war demands closure with the enemy force within the minimum safety distance.  Our armored systems enabled us to close with and destroy the heavily armed and fanatically determined enemy force often within urban terrain and impunity.  No other ground combat system currently in our arsenal could have delivered similar mission success without accepting  enormous casualties, particularly in urban terrain."


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

The comment about situational awareness is also telling.


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## a_majoor (20 Jun 2006)

On a heretical note, there is a place for a wheeled fire support vehicle to compliment the wheeled LAV fleet, so long as the role is clearly defined as either "Cavalry" or integrated closely with the LAV infantry battalion. Commanders need the ability to substitute speed for mass when shaping the battlefield, and this sort of formation has a lower "profile" in COIN OPs than a heavy combat team.

Tanks (of any sort) need a complimentary set of tracked vehicles to make an effective combat team/battle group. This is only common sense, if the FOO/FAC/MFC,  Infantry and Engineers cannot keep up with the tanks (especially if you have to leave the road and go cross country), then everyone will be in trouble. Current Leopards can make do with M-113 and their derivatives, and Generation 3 and 3.5 tanks have their own "national" IFV or HAPC counterparts. 

With the current state of the art, the Swedish CV90 family could provide the basis of a "mechanized" combat team (CV-90120 tanks, backed by "CV9025" armed with a 25mm chain gun to mesh with our logistics chain, rather than a CV9035 or CV9040 as in European service), and if we are willing to do the R&D, a family of heavier and more protected vehicles (about equal to early model M-1s) could be developed from the PUMA.

As noted, there needs to be a great deal of attention paid to the logistical aspects of this; if the tanks and heavy combat team/battlegroup is unable to get to theater, then what is the point?


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## Thorvald (20 Jun 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Make no bones about it, this had something to do with it.



Hey good find on that one!

Thanks


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

Nothing in the CANFORGENS yet.  Would they be published there?


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## Red 6 (20 Jun 2006)

Clearly, a mix of light, medium and heavy forces is the optimum goal. The logistical tail, all things being equal, should not be what drives the choice of a combat system. If you need it, you need the ability to get it where it needs to be deployed. Conversely, if your higher HQ will not support the logistics to get it into combat, maybe it isn't the correct combat system for your force. 

My two cents worth is that you need an MBT and a wheeled gun support system. The trouble with AT missiles is that they all go under light armor. It takes a 125 mm round about a second to travel 1,200 meters. I think it takes 12 for a TOW to travel the same distance. My times may be a little rusty, but you get my point. There's a problem with basing your force structure on the last war. You learn all the wrong lessons for the next one. 

The US Army is putting all of its eggs into the Stryker basket. If we ever have another conventional battlefield (ie Korea) I think this will be a huge problem. For all its cost and complexity, the Stryker still mounts a .50. Granted, its a reliable and deployable system, but you would think the Army could put a bigger main weapon on it.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (20 Jun 2006)

Probably not, Quagmire.  As indicated earlier, they're _requests_ for cancellation, not the actual direction.  Things could conceivably change with political intervention...  Even if they're cancelled, you won't likely see a CANFORGEN unless it's done as part of a wider update to the entire CF.

Cheers,

TR


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## ArmyRick (20 Jun 2006)

Keep in mind that in the US Army, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is a MEDIUM weight force (more powerful than light infantry but doesn't deliver a punch like bradley-abrams tag team).  No they are not putting all their eggs in that basket either. They are not replacing any of their heavy divisions with strykers.

The reason they don't have heavier guns on the stryker IMV is because it will cut down the number of dismounts and if you require 25mm fire power than they view the fight as a bradley-Abrams (Heavy armoured type of fight).

hope this clears it up where the SBCT stands in the US scheme of things.


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

Ack Teddy.


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## Red 6 (20 Jun 2006)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Keep in mind that in the US Army, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is a MEDIUM weight force (more powerful than light infantry but doesn't deliver a punch like bradley-abrams tag team).  No they are not putting all their eggs in that basket either. They are not replacing any of their heavy divisions with strykers.
> 
> The reason they don't have heavier guns on the stryker IMV is because it will cut down the number of dismounts and if you require 25mm fire power than they view the fight as a bradley-Abrams (Heavy armoured type of fight).
> 
> hope this clears it up where the SBCT stands in the US scheme of things.



Well, I may have overstated the point a bit, but the Bradley-Abrams fleet is considered "the Legacy Force." This isn't my term. It's what the Army calls it. If you look at the way the medium force is configured and the break down of medium and heavy units of action, the writing is on the wall for the heavy force.


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## pbi (20 Jun 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Probably not, Quagmire.  As indicated earlier, they're _requests_ for cancellation, not the actual direction.  Things could conceivably change with political intervention...  Even if they're cancelled, you won't likely see a CANFORGEN unless it's done as part of a wider update to the entire CF.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> TR



This is true, but it is worth considering that as part of the recent CF strategic force development process (led to a great extent by Gen Leslie in his last job), all three services had to identify functions and projects that they will reduce or drop in order to fund the higher priority functions and projects. Although Gen Caron signed the letter, this was done about a week before he handed over. It seems reasonable to assume that Gen Leslie, as the heir apparent, was involved to some degree in the Army deliberations. Because of that, I doubt that the decision to recommend cancellation to the VCDS comes "out of the blue" or as any kind of surprise. In fact, I doubt it is really a "request" at all, but rather a formalization of things already talked about and agreed on.

In the end, of course, the Tories may exercise the tried and true practice so beloved of all incumbent governments: pork barreling defence expenditures as opposed to making them for military reasons. I would hope that the Tories are the least likely of any party to do this, but since most previous Cdn, US and British govts have IMHO porked it up at one time or another, I guess we should watch and shoot.

Cheers


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## Teddy Ruxpin (20 Jun 2006)

> It seems reasonable to assume that Gen Leslie, as the heir apparent, was involved to some degree in the Army deliberations.



Undoubtedly - IIRC, then-MGen Leslie was tasked by the CDS to conduct a review of all major procurement to see if they met the requirements of the current transformation initiatives.  Direct fire was certainly part of that review and we're seeing the fruits of it now.

In the current climate, it would take a very, very brave government to second-guess a formal army request _not_ to spend money.


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Jun 2006)

So if things do go the way of the army and it is done what is a best guess as to when this will be announced.

P.S.  no more photo shop for the officer types.  That's got to be my favorite reason why these things were considered.  Take the LAV chassis and photo shop any kind of armament on to it.


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## Cloud Cover (21 Jun 2006)

Could the army use just plain model Stryker currently being made for the USA at GDSL?  (the one with the RWS) 

As I understand things, if the plant in London does not get new orders, there will be layoffs very soon which will be unwanted political fallout for Harper.


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## sabot41 (21 Jun 2006)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Could the army use just plain model Stryker currently being made for the USA at GDSL?  (the one with the RWS)
> 
> As I understand things, if the plant in London does not get new orders, there will be layoffs very soon which will be unwanted political fallout for Harper.


I would highly doubt the cancellation of a few Canadian MGS orders will affect GDLS-C in the slightest. It would only speed up production for USA and follow on orders from other countries. With the Americans footing the bill for R&D for Stryker series of vehicles, I'm pretty sure GDLS is quite happy with its bottom line moving forward. Besides, with most of these projects, there is probably a huge penalty to pay for cancellations.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (21 Jun 2006)

Do we not have another order of LAV-III's due to be produced over the next couple of years or am I halucinating?


Matthew.   ???


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## prom (21 Jun 2006)

am I reading this wrong, but do you infer that the MGS verson of the LAV III is called a Stryker. IIRC from other post on this topic here the Stryker name is from the US and refers to all varriants of the LAV III.


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## Kirkhill (21 Jun 2006)

prom: you're reading this wrong.

I am fairly sure that GDLS must have figured that after they got the US Stryker order, which demanded a massive bulge in production to produce a large number of vehicles in a short time, that they must have factored in what they were going to do after the bulge passed.  IIRC, in order to meet the demand they expanded their workforce at a number of US plants and farmed out work to them that had been done at London.  London was surviving before the bulge on a relatively low rate of production.  The real question will be is whether those "bulge" jobs created in the States result in pressure to keep them there in competition to the London operation.


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## prom (21 Jun 2006)

thanks KH


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## Scoobie Newbie (21 Jun 2006)

We we haven't had any orders for more LAV's I think A Stan will cause us to rethink that.


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## a_majoor (21 Jun 2006)

Based on US experience in Iraq, there may be a move to "zero time" Canadian LAVs coming back from theater, certainly a few will need heavy duty repair, and a small batch could be produced to replace combat losses. (LAVs, like most military equipment, are virtually "hand built" due to the low volume of production).

Perhaps after the next election, the new government may be more able to spend money on the military, and the LAVs would then not only get "zero timed" but also upgrades based on combat experience in Afghanistan, a LAV 3.1 so to speak. Any new builds would also be to the "3.1" standard.

My opinion anyway.


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## GAP (21 Jun 2006)

At least the C-17's wouldn't have to dead-head it back to Canada, they could bring back dead LAV's, and misc. other things like people, etc


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## TCBF (21 Jun 2006)

GDLS London (formerly GMDD) was not going to get any MGS play anyway. ...


EDIT:  I was incorrect and so removed the bulk of my post.


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## Cloud Cover (21 Jun 2006)

TCBF: thats not quite accurate. 

The bottom and intermediate sections of the hull of the MGS were to be fabricated at GDLS on Oxford Street, London  and shipped to Anniston. http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002combat/howe.pdf.  The upper hull structure and the MGS turret were to come from the Lima plant. All assemblies, component and and subsystems [engines, drive train etc.] were to be finally assembled in Anniston.  

No less than 50% of the material in the Canadian MGS was to be directly sourced from Canada.  http://www.gdlscanada.com/purchasing/Download/terms-e34.pdf

IIRC there was an MOU being contemplated that proposed the $ difference between material sourced in Canada and 100% of the contract price (at the time of closing the contract) was to be made up in equivalent dollar value contracts in other work to be sourced to Canadian plants. I believe one proposed method was to increase the amount of work that went to GD in Ottawa, such as the increasing the amount of electronics improvement work to be done on M1 Abrams tanks in Ottawa and some further commitments to more development work on MESH IDS.   

If the MGS is gone [whether good or bad], about 600 million worth of GDLS work in Canada may disappear as well. 

As a side note, I was surpised in surfing the GDLS site to see the LAV A-2 is going back into production for the USMC: http://www.gdls.com/retiree/landmark/2006/February2006.pdf


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## TCBF (22 Jun 2006)

Whoa, was I ever off in left field.  Thanks for the info.


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## AIC_2K5 (24 Jun 2006)

In my mind, it looks like this decision was motivated by two key factors: we are having a surge in funding as well as the fact that the airforce may soon very well have a way of moving our tanks around.

Another probable motivator is that senior armour officers can point to Iraq to show the usefullness of tanks in 21st-century warfare.

Even after considering these ideas, this decision seems to make too much sense and I'm scared it might be too good to be true...


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## Scoobie Newbie (26 Jun 2006)

Well the MND said he hasn't seen any paperwork on this being cancelled and therefore is still ongoing.


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## ArmyRick (26 Jun 2006)

Talked to someone in the LdSH and funny they have not heard a thing about this cancellation.  Watch and shoot me says.


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## Scoobie Newbie (26 Jun 2006)

I'm sure the direct fire guys will be the last to know.


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## Infanteer (26 Jun 2006)

Remember guys, this is only a request by the Chief of Land Staff to cancel the projects; nothing official has happened yet.


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## Scoobie Newbie (26 Jun 2006)

We know Sir.  We are just giddy with aniticipation that it will be cancelled.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (26 Jun 2006)

> Talked to someone in the LdSH and funny they have not heard a thing about this cancellation.  Watch and shoot me says.



The senior leadership in the Regiment knows - I can guarantee that.

I cannot imagine that the CF would be directed to buy this rather nebulous vehicle in the face of a direct request for cancellation from the Army.  The press would have a field day.  Then again, I was around for LSVW....


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## Scoobie Newbie (26 Jun 2006)

Ah but Teddy have you riden in the back of one. ;D

what's with the use of "nebulous" lately.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (27 Jun 2006)

Quagmire said:
			
		

> Ah but Teddy have you riden in the back of one. ;D



Yes, yes I have...was qualified to drive one at one time too... 



> what's with the use of "nebulous" lately.



Nebulous:  Lacking definite form or limits; vague: nebulous assurances of future cooperation.

Seems to fit a variety of recent situations, eh?  Heh...


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## Scoobie Newbie (27 Jun 2006)

Yes it does.

I suppose now a days your driven in a Chyrsler 300.  lol j/k


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## ArmyRick (27 Jun 2006)

Another thing I kind of wonder of wonder about the whole MGS concept.  The US Army is totally using it as an infantry direct fire support vehicle designed for shooting fortifications, bunkers, blowing halls in walls using HEP, etc.  Why not go with a 90mm gun instead? Its a little smaller but I am sure the effects on target will be similar?  Also 90mm guns have been used on wheeled vehicles before.

I know I am going to get shot with a ball of **** because I am not suggesting just getting a new MBT but I am looking at the MGS as what the US meant it for. The 100 KM/H speed will be usefull for getting it around a larger AOR.

Another note.  Here is my idea of a DFS Regt.  First, MGS stay with the infantry LAV Battalions. The DFS regt with 4 squadrons. Each Squadron has (if no new equipment is availible)
-Squadron HQ
-2 x Troops of Abrams
-2 x Troops of Bradleys with 4 dismounts only.

Whoa! Did I just suggest heavy vehicles? Yes! Why did I do that?  It seems we are not far from getting a capable aircraft (C17 perhaps) that can actually move the kit (Fingers crossed).


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## Mortar guy (27 Jun 2006)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Another thing I kind of wonder of wonder about the whole MGS concept.  The US Army is totally using it as an infantry direct fire support vehicle designed for shooting fortifications, bunkers, blowing halls in walls using HEP, etc.  Why not go with a 90mm gun instead? Its a little smaller but I am sure the effects on target will be similar?  Also 90mm guns have been used on wheeled vehicles before.
> 
> I know I am going to get shot with a ball of **** because I am not suggesting just getting a new MBT but I am looking at the MGS as what the US meant it for. The 100 KM/H speed will be usefull for getting it around a larger AOR...



Funny you should mention that as the CMI 90mm Mk 8 gun was actually a contender for the SBCT MGS requirement. Observe: http://www.cmigroupe.com/defence/mk890b_en.htm However, it is my understanding that they went with 105mm because there was a readily available supply of M68 barrels and 105mm ammunition lying around.

I still think there is a place for what you describe: an assualt gun that would do well in certain roles in places like Afghanistan. I like the idea of the LCTS 90 turret on a LAV chassis but that's just me.

MG


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## AIC_2K5 (28 Jun 2006)

> The DFS regt with 4 squadrons. Each Squadron has (if no new equipment is availible)
> -Squadron HQ
> -2 x Troops of Abrams
> -2 x Troops of Bradleys with 4 dismounts only.



Iteresting idea, Armyrick. So we convert the DFS regiment into an armoured cav-type unit?


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## ArmyRick (29 Jun 2006)

If we get heavy lift cargo planes? Hell yes.  We either get Bradley and Abrams in the next two to three years or we can always playout the time until US Army FCS comes on line and we use some of those systems (So far the theory is great, if they can back it up, even better). 

Why do I like the Bradley and Abrams option as our heavy direct fire maneuver option? 120mm, 25mm, Co-axial machine guns and TOW missiles at your finger tips.

Without the planes to move them though, they will IMO only end staying in Canada.


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## AIC_2K5 (29 Jun 2006)

> Why do I like the *Bradley and Abrams* option as our heavy direct fire maneuver option?


What about the Leo 2A6 and the ASCOD?
Both are new (and better) than the M1 and M2 and both are available right now.

Leopard 2A6: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/leopard/
ASCOD: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ascod/

Euro style!


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## DG-41 (29 Jun 2006)

Ditto on the Leo2. It has a much better fire control system than Abrams, and the conversion over from Leo1 is pretty straightforward.

Abrams A1 is getting kinda dated, and Abrams A2 is too expensive for even the Yanks to build in quantity.

DG


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## George Wallace (30 Jun 2006)

AIC_2K5 said:
			
		

> What about the Leo 2A6 and the ASCOD?
> Both are new (and better) than the M1 and M2 and both are available right now.
> 
> Leopard 2A6: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/leopard/
> ...



Ah!  A man after my own heart.  You're not too bad for an Airforce guy!


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## TangoTwoBravo (30 Jun 2006)

Leopard C2 till 2015.


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## AIC_2K5 (30 Jun 2006)

> Ah!  A man after my own heart.  You're not too bad for an Airforce guy!



 :threat:



> Leopard C2 till 2015.



What then?


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## TangoTwoBravo (30 Jun 2006)

Who knows?  Its sufficiently far away.

I'd have been real excited to have read that the funds ear-marked for the MGS were going to the M1A2.  That isn't going to happen, but at least we're getting Chinooks...


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## Retired AF Guy (5 Jul 2006)

Thought you guys might be interested in this little tidbit from Tuesday's (04 July) Globe and Mail. The paper has an article by J.L. Granatstein in which he talks about the recent defence announcements. In the article he mentions that "Ottawa  . . .  is backing away from" buying the MGS and will instead keep the Leo I until 2010.  One reason Granatstein gives for killing the MGS is that both the CDS and VCDS "black hats" in other words armoured corps types who want to keep the Leo I. 

Enjoy.


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## George Wallace (5 Jul 2006)

Full article published/posted here:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/44423/post-405798.html#msg405798


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## Teddy Ruxpin (5 Jul 2006)

> ...is backing away from" buying the MGS and will instead keep the Leo I until 2010.  One reason Granatstein gives for killing the MGS is that both the CDS and VCDS "black hats" in other words armoured corps types who want to keep the Leo I.



I typically enjoy what Dr Granatstein writes, but he's out to lunch on this one.  The Army was directed to undertake a strategic-level review of capital programmes, in common with the other services.  The CF-wide review was led by LGen Leslie, a gunner and now CLS.  The Army's recommendation for cancellation - as posted on another thread - was signed off by LGen Caron, a Vandoo and was the result of this capital review.  The suggestion that there's some sort of "tank" mafia at work here does a disservice to the staffs who conducted the strategic reviews and who rationalized CF requirements.  

TR


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## George Wallace (5 Jul 2006)

.....And as I said in the other Topic,  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/44423/post-405802.html#msg405802  the MGS would have done more harm to the Armour Corps than good, so the CDS and Minister, both being 'Black Hatters' is a ridiculous premise.


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## forrest_gump (8 Jul 2006)

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=0a9b5efa-4d55-4084-a1f5-cdb772194175&k=24613


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## MarkOttawa (8 Jul 2006)

Letter just sent to the Ottawa Citizen:

'Is there any other kind?

A front-page headline July 8 reads: "Army backtracks on plan to ditch armoured tanks". 
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=f103c834-10c6-4e79-971b-1e6ab894ef34
I await your headline that says: "Air Force plans to buy flying airplanes".

The same edition has another story on this subject, "The return of the Leopard".  
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/observer/story.html?id=95b4c9e5-de13-4425-bc87-218c1031583c
This is accompanied by a photograph captioned "Mobile Gun System".  But the vehicle has no gun.  The photo is actually of the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle, also mentioned in the story.  Dear me.'

I await the jokes about "flying airplanes" from commenters here.

Mark
Ottawa


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## Ex-Dragoon (8 Jul 2006)

Maybe we will get 66 Leopard 2s vice 66 MGS


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## GAP (8 Jul 2006)

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> Letter just sent to the Ottawa Citizen:
> 
> 'Is there any other kind?
> 
> ...



Why do they have to fly.....conservatives?....Oh.., not Liberal "never will see said airplanes" deal....understand now....I think...


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## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2006)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Maybe we will get 66 Leopard 2s vice 66 MGS


66 is such a "merde de taureau" number that it virtually makes me vomit.  Consider this:
"Whole fleet management" requires that the number of vehicles to be deployed at a certain level (eg: squadron) be based in Montreal (?).  Another same set of numbers with a unit for training.  Then add a third set of same amount of vehicles for the first line deployment.  So far, none have been allocated to the school.  So, a fourth set of vehicles.  That's 16 vehicles per, remainder of 2.  
So, with LdSH (RC): 16 vehicles (training up for deployment)
In "whole fleet management" storage: 16 (for "just in case")
First line of deployment (eg: over in the Sandbox, or whereever): 16
Royal Canadian Armour School: 16 (for training with Tactics school on Combat Team Commanders' course, for"phase IV" training, as well as "Phase III" as well as 3A Crew commander and 3B Troop Warrant courses, etc.
Strategic Reserve: 2 (in case of war, break glass!)
Embarrassing?  Yes!
(_Reminds me of Jay Leno shortly after 9/11.  The joke went something like this in his monologue:
"Canada has pledged to fight along side us against those who committed these attacks.  They said that we can borrow their tank."_)
Now, the SCTF is "supposed" to have a Direct Fire Squadron with them as well.  So, again, for every 1 vehicle, you need 3 for the same reason: 1 to actually "go over", one for training up, and the third for "whole fleet management".  Are we at 8 vehicles per user now?
Here's a novel idea (copyright 2006: Garvco Industries Incorporated)
Purchase a tank (Leo 2A6?  M1A2 SEP?  Whatever) with the following allocation to units
Royal Canadian Armour School: 19 (enough for a squadron at 4 per troop and 3 for SHQ)
Royal Canadian Dragoons: 59 (3 squadrons and two for RHQ)
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians): 59 (same as for RCD)
12e Regiment Blinde du Canada: 59 (la meme chose)
Keep the Recce squadrons OUT of those three regiments.  Make them tankers, and tankers only (less the assault troops, naturally.  Oh, yes, reactivate the assault troops) 
Stand up "Channel 8" (8 CH) as a recce regiment with 3 recce squadrons.
Here's how "Feldmarschall von Garvin" would then make things happen:
First line of deployment: one armour regiment (for sake of argument, RCD, as part of 2 CMBG, from which all deployed elements come)
High readiness training: another armour regiment (for sake of argument, LdSH (RC), as part of 1 CMBG, from which all soon-to-be-deployed elements come)
Reconstitution: a third armour regiment (again, sake of argument 12e RBC, as part of 5 GBMC, from which all just-redeployed elements come)
Brigade recce?  With my COA, a squadron from 8 CH would be an Army asset, attached OPCOM to each brigade.  For example, A Squadron attached OPCOM to 1 CMBG (and would be stationed there in Edmonton with the rest of the Brigade).  B Squadron with 2 CMBG (again, stationed in Pet) and C Squadron with 5 GBMC (living the dream in QC!).  Their RHQ would be mostly administrative, and could be anywhere: Moncton?  Sussex?  Gagetown?  Ottawa?  Whereever.  
Either this or add a "D" squadron to each of the three regiments for brigade recce.  Personally I'd prefer that this brigade asset (Recce Squadron) would come from a different regiment so that, for example, the LdSH (RC) wouldn't have to share their gravy boats with those recce dudes.  They would focus instead (and rightly so, I believe) on tank stuff, such as Full Spectrum Operations in the Contempory Operational Environment, or whatever.  

Does this make sense to anyone but me?  Or is this clear as mud?

Over to you for criticism  :warstory:


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## George Wallace (9 Jul 2006)

VG

I agree with your plan.  You would of course need even more for the School, War/Strategic Reserve, and your "Whole Fleet Storage", but those numbers would probably add up to another 100 there abouts (on the cheap).

This plan would take us back to the year 1966 when we also had the Fort Garry Horse (Regular Army) and way over 350 Centurian Tanks.

We would also have to bring back the Heavy Troops in the Engineers with Biber, Badger, etc.

Service Bn would also be wise to get MAN Tank Transporters.  Same engines as the Tank, was a nice "Emergency" feature, and the capability to actually "Recover" the tank they were going to pick up.

When did you say you were running for office?   ;D


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## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> When did you say you were running for office?   ;D


What?  Do they elect "Feldmarschalls" now? 
If so, start the campaign now!
Of course, I'll have to select a tank.
How about this one:


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## Cdn Blackshirt (9 Jul 2006)

von Garvin said:
			
		

> 66 is such a "merde de taureau" number that it virtually makes me vomit.  Consider this:
> "Whole fleet management" requires that the number of vehicles to be deployed at a certain level (eg: squadron) be based in Montreal (?).  Another same set of numbers with a unit for training.  Then add a third set of same amount of vehicles for the first line deployment.  So far, none have been allocated to the school.  So, a fourth set of vehicles.  That's 16 vehicles per, remainder of 2.
> So, with LdSH (RC): 16 vehicles (training up for deployment)
> In "whole fleet management" storage: 16 (for "just in case")
> ...



Out of my lane again....sorry that this is becoming a habit.   

For me anyway, this just comes down to "With the fixed budget we have, what can do that will best project power into any given theatre to first deter a potential enemy from even considering and attacking, and second if they do attack us, provides us the ability to first take their opening ambush, and then pound the everloving shiiiit out of them."

Since the budget is now in place to create a heavy lift capacity to get whatever we now want to our theatres, we can now engineer what our forces will look like with any vehicle mix we'd like given that additional funds are going to be harder to get.

For me, my first priority remains increasing the minimum protection levels on all vehicles including supply and logistics vehicles because if the enemy is able to choose the time and place of their ambush, they're going to try to hit the softest vehicle possible in order to maximize casualties.  The new medium truck program is a start for the drivers.  The additional Nyala's are even better.  The LAV-III's seem to be doing a great job.  But we have to take G-wagens and anything else that light out of IED/VBD environments.  Ergo, before I bought new tanks I would be expanding our LAV-III fleet so that they make up a larger portion of any deployment (and if we don't have the funds to do that - then go with something a little less expensive like the Aussie Bushmaster vehicles or something).

My second priority would be mine/IED surveillance.  My understanding is that Predator B operates at an altitude too low so that the enemy even if they cannot see them, can hear the buzzing.  I would therefore like to find something that operates at a higher altitude with the highest-end thermal optics to act as an overwatch system feeding live video to the theatre command centre.  Their job is constantly run loops on all the paths & roadways that our forces may travel upon looking for evidence of IED/mine set-ups.  When identified, we can either engage with 155mm, drop a munition from the UAV or use coalition air support (at this point).

My third priority would be unmanned route-proving vehicles with downward and side looking ground penetrating radar.  Quite frankly it's not like you have to get through that much ground to see an IED or mine, so you should be able mount such a configuration on a chassis as small as a heavy four-wheeler.  If something is located, you call in a mine disposal team that is made up of (2) wheeled earth movers, and a couple more remote four wheelers - one of which will actually place an explosive charge over the identified mine/IED, back off, and then blow it up.  The earth moving team then immediately fills back in the hole and away we go.

Now we're at tanks that can act in the role of mobile pill boxes as necessary.  As per the link that Teddy provided one of the posters on Tank-Net hypothesized about putting a small squad of 3-4 Leo C2's at the highest point overlooking a valley with a Coyote and LAV-III escort and the absolute dominance that would provide over that valley.  In my humble opinion, more than the firepower itself, it is the knowledge of the local civilians that the enemy has no ability to dislodge our people from those positions that would be the most important impact because it would bring stability and confidence.  But bottom line is that based on COIN operations perhaps the natural TO&E for our transformation would include squads of MBT's in other regiments as opposed to keeping armour in large standalone units (which we are far less likely to deploy).  

Again way out of my lane here, but what if we created regiments based on the following (by the way I'm already starting to duck-and-cover as I type this because I'm pretty sure I've got my terminology re: unit sizes wrong and so I beg everyone's forgiveness in advance):

(1) Headquarters Troop
___(8 ) Command and Control Vehicles including Air Traffic Control (probably Bison or LAV-III-based)
(1) Intelligence Troop
___(8 ) LAV-III based SIGINT/COMMINT and Tactical UAV Launchers/Retreivers
(1) Tube Artillery Battery 
___(4 ) M777 155mm with datalinks to all UAV's and other aircraft 
(1) Rocket Artillery Battery
___(4 ) HIMARS with datalinks to all UAV's and other aircraft
(1) Air Defence Battery 
___(8 ) LAV-III based vehicles (pick your poison re: missiles)
(2) Engineering and Anti-Mine/IED Troops
___(to be determined, but again preferably based on LAV-III chassis with some remote vehicle support)
(2) Logistics and Support Troops
___(to be determined but based on heavy uparmoured trucks or Bushmaster equivalents)
(1) Aviation Company
___(8 ) CH-47 Heavy Lift Helicopters
___(4 ) Light Recce, Escort Helicopters with focus on thermal optics as opposed to radar

(2) Light Mechanized Squadrons
___(1) *Recce* Troop (corrected as per GW)
_______(4 ) Coyotes with native tactical ultralight UAV's
_______(4 ) Nyala with upgraded optics
_______(4 ) Route-proving teams (vehicles are TBC)
___(3 ) Light Mechanized Rifle Companies
_______(1 ) Route-proving team (vehicles are TBC)
_______(8 ) LAV-III's (2 with eventual direct fire missile upgrade)
_______(4 ) Nyala

(2) Heavy Mechanized Squadrons
___(1) *Recce* Troop (corrected as per GW)
_______(4 ) Coyotes with native tactical ultralight UAV's
_______(4 ) Nyala with upgraded optics
_______(4 ) Route-proving teams (vehicles are TBC)
___(3 ) Heavy Mechanized Rifle Companies
_______(1 ) Route-proving team (vehicles are TBC)
_______(8 ) LAV-III's (2 with eventual direct fire missile upgrade)
_______(4 ) Tanks (currently C2, but future model is TBD)

I'll now await summary execution....


Cheers guys,

Matthew.  


P.S.  If someone actually has any interest to rewrite that with your corrections to reflect proper terminology, I'd be greatly appreciative.


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## George Wallace (9 Jul 2006)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> My second priority would be mine/IED surveillance.  My understanding is that Predator B operates at an altitude too low so that the enemy even if they cannot see them, can hear the buzzing.  I would therefore like to find something that operates at a higher altitude with the highest-end thermal optics to act as an overwatch system feeding live video to the theatre command centre.  Their job is constantly run loops on all the paths & roadways that our forces may travel upon looking for evidence of IED/mine set-ups.  When identified, we can either engage with 155mm, drop a munition from the UAV or use coalition air support (at this point).



First things first.  This point is backwards.  The Predator operates at a high altitude and is relatively quiet.  It is the Spewer that is noisy and operating at a low altitude and the one that we currently have in our inventory.  If you had read some of the UAV threads, you may have found that it is an advantage in a way, not a disadvantage, that was unexpected.  Taliban tactics for Soviet helicopters and aircraft was to go to ground and allow them to go undetected by the overflight of the aircraft.  With the technology in use today, that is a bonus for us, as they remain stationary and are easily detectable.  

Predator use and information is available to all Coalition Forces, but controlled by the US.  So your point has already been addressed.



PS:  Stop using the term RECON......it is soo...........Gamer Oriented.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (9 Jul 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> PS:  Stop using the term RECON......it is soo...........Gamer Oriented.



First, I don't play games, but I will cease and desist.  What is the proper terminology I should be using and in what context?

Second, my apologies about the confusion over Sperwar vs Predator but I'm sure I read in an American report that Predator was detectable as well.  And re:  your point about "detection being good" - I would think that having your enemy identifiable, in the open in a position where you can bring deadly force is your best case scenario as opposed to them scurrying away due to the noise when they will invariably come back and try to hit you again, possibly in a place where detection is more difficult.


Matthew.   ???


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## rmacqueen (9 Jul 2006)

> What is the proper terminology I should be using and in what context?



In Canada the term we use is Recce, Recon is an American term.

In regards to the Leo, keep in mind that we are looking at a mixture of operational considerations and political considerations.  With the purchase of C17's we now have a reason to get the Leo's back on line while at the same time appeasing the public with the appearance of fiscal responsibility.  Refurbishment of existing heavy armour is cheaper than buying new and does not involve all the political minefields that capital acquisition entails.  Plus, it can be slid through under the radar using current funding and give breathing space for future equipment purchases.

Unfortunately, this all hinges on getting the C17's in order to get the Leo's in theatre and, with a minority government, there is no guarantee it will happen unless the Conservatives can win a majority. (remember the EH 101)


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

Well, it's nice to see that we've totally rearmed for Kursk - anyone got a plan that's a tad more realistic?  I'm apt to hold out for 2015 and equip the Army with these badboys:


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## GAP (9 Jul 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Well, it's nice to see that we've totally rearmed for Kursk - anyone got a plan that's a tad more realistic?  I'm apt to hold out for 2015 and equip the Army with these badboys:



Yeah, but they already know how to defeat them....gotta find somthing that a piece of rope doesn't defeat.   ;D


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## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Well, it's nice to see that we've totally rearmed for Kursk - anyone got a plan that's a tad more realistic?


Does this mean you are on the "tanks are relics of the cold war" bandwagon, off of which (apparently) some of our senior army officers are now jumping?
As I recall, tanks didn't do too well at Kursk, though it wouldn't have been called the Greatest Tank Battle in History without them 
They have been doing VERY WELL in Baghdad, though, as well as the Gaza Strip.  There is still a use for a heavily armoured fire breathing dragon in today's COE.

(NB: I almost typed COI instead of COE, as in "Cross of Iron", the first "expansion" gamette to Squad Leader.  For those who don't know, Cross of Iron is "The Game of Armor (sic) Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1945")


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## George Wallace (9 Jul 2006)

Matthew.   ???



			
				Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> First, I don't play games, but I will cease and desist.  What is the proper terminology I should be using and in what context?


You have been here long enough to know by now that it is "Recce" (As was pointed out.)


			
				Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Second, my apologies about the confusion over Sperwar vs Predator but I'm sure I read in an American report that Predator was detectable as well.  And re:  your point about "detection being good" - I would think that having your enemy identifiable, in the open in a position where you can bring deadly force is your best case scenario as opposed to them scurrying away due to the noise when they will invariably come back and try to hit you again, possibly in a place where detection is more difficult.



If you had read those posts, you would know that the noise of approaching aircraft mean that they would go to ground and lay still, in the open, and remain motionless - not scurry away and hid.  This makes them an easy target.

Or does 670 posts mean that you are sharing this "C/S" with someone else, perhaps more than one other, and none of you really are learning anything?


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## Cdn Blackshirt (9 Jul 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Matthew.   ???
> You have been here long enough to know by now that it is "Recce" (As was pointed out.)
> If you had read those posts, you would know that the noise of approaching aircraft mean that they would go to ground and lay still, in the open, and remain motionless - not scurry away and hid.  This makes them an easy target.
> 
> Or does 670 posts mean that you are sharing this "C/S" with someone else, perhaps more than one other, and none of you really are learning anything?



Nope Call Sign not shared....trying to learn....but obviously missing some key posts from time-to-time....certainly not intentionally.


Matthew.


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

von Garvin said:
			
		

> Does this mean you are on the "tanks are relics of the cold war" bandwagon, off of which (apparently) some of our senior army officers are now jumping?



Bah, not by a longshot.  You do remember that I was the guy who liked the Aussie Army chief for saying a lack of modern armour was criminally negligent.

However, I was poking fun at the idea of converting our three armoured regiments into heavily armoured MBT units.  This seems to be unworkable on multiple levels for our Army - especially when you consider our operational focus in the hills of Afghanistan and the primacy of the "Counterinsurgency" in the circles of military thought.  You are correct - MBT's are proving to be quite useful, although not in the manner they were largely defined for (that is, to take out other tanks).  I'll repost the article "Everybody Wanted Tanks: Heavy Forces in Operation _Iraqi Freedom_ for anybody who missed it; it does a good job of pointing out the strength of the MBT and attacking conventional myths about them (ie: they are no good in cities).

Michael Evan's gives a good review of Bruce Gudmundsson's On Armor:

_In the future, wheeled armoured vehicles equipped with a number of indirect weapons—turret-mounted mortars, fibre-optic guided missiles, low-calibre automatic cannon and bombardment rockets to deal with ambush and area fire - are likely to emerge and confer greater variety on armoured operations. Nonetheless, despite the potential of wheeled armoured vehicles armed with indirect precision weapons, the heavy tank remains vital in the direct fire fight, particularly in complex terrain such as urban areas. Th ose who believe that indirect-fire wheeled vehicles can substitute for heavy tanks across a full range of combat operations are likelyto be disappointed.

For example, from the 1980s, the Israeli Merkava (Chariot) tank with a hull engine, sloped armour and sufficient space for a four-man infantry team became arguably the most successful ‘low-intensity’ tank of the post–World War II era.  The Merkava has been used against well-armed Palestinian guerrilla groups on the West Bank and Gaza employing rocket-propelled grenades and suicide bombers. While tanks always require protection from infantry and engineers in classic combined-arms operations, in close combat the use of armour remains a lethal capability that professional armies are unlikely to surrender willingly in the foreseeable future.  

In sum, for Gudmundsson, the era of armour based on the all-purpose tank is clearly over and the military future lies in possession of a variety of armoured capabilities ranging from personnel carriers through infantry fighting vehicles to main battle tanks. All of these capabilities are required for the peculiar ‘high–low’ mixture of conventional and unconventional military activities that constitute 21st-century expeditionary operations.  There is no ‘zero sum’ armoured capability available, and Gudmundsson concludes his study neatly when he writes: ‘the age of the tank is over. The age of tanks has begun’._

Going back to a huge armoured formation isn't conducive to this last paragraph.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Going back to a huge armoured formation isn't conducive to this last paragraph.


In reality, what I posited only LOOKS like three armoured regiments.  What we would have would be one regiment deployed at a time (the old 3 to make 1 theory).  So, three squadrons of tanks is all that would be "over there" (whereever "there" may be).  That's all.


Though it may have seemed simpler during the cold war to have a centre of arc on a bearing of 1600 and just fire away!


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## George Wallace (9 Jul 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ....... and Gudmundsson concludes his study neatly when he writes: ‘the age of the tank is over. The age of tanks has begun'.[/i]
> 
> Going back to a huge armoured formation isn't conducive to this last paragraph.
> 
> ...



I interepreted it differently.  The age of the tank is over, but the age of Tanks (Plural) has begun.   Looks like it is time for a wider variety of Tanks on the Battlefield, and more of them.


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

von Garvin said:
			
		

> Though it may have seemed simpler during the cold war to have a centre of arc on a bearing of 1600 and just fire away!



For sure!



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> I interepreted it differently.  The age of the tank is over, but the age of Tanks (Plural) has begun.   Looks like it is time for a wider variety of Tanks on the Battlefield, and more of them.



That's how I interpreted.  But I think the definition of "tank" in this case means more than a 70 ton tracked machine of death.  It actually makes me think of the interwar British approach with I-tanks, cruisers, etc, etc.  A "low-intensity" tank is going to be different from an "expeditionary tank" - both are probably different from "some sort of armoured vehicle suitable for Afghanistan....


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## Kirkhill (9 Jul 2006)

I believe that the watch words for the Armoured Corps are/were Shock, Firepower, Movement/Manouevre.  The idea seemed to be it was a force that would be employed as heavy cavalry used to be - an arm of decision that would go looping across the battlefield in large numbers concentrating on the battle's schwerpunkt.    This was the anti-thesis to World War I's "Willlie", the infantry support tank - a combination of engineer assault vehicle for breaching defences and an artillery platform that could pace the infantry.

What I get out of Infanteer's article is that the demand for tanks in cities was for employment in the dreaded "penny-packets" - troops or even 1s and 2s - to work in co-operation with dismounted infantry.

Let's stipulate that a well-designed MBT is both a "Cavalry" Tank and an "Infantry" Tank - which role is the most likely role in current service and in future service?  Do we need Armoured Divisions (actually I will stipulate that I think that we as a nation can afford to rebuild 4 Canadian Armd Div - 2 Bdes, one Armd, one Inf - don't expect to see it?); or a separate Armd brigade which can train together and detach independent Squadrons for inf spt;  or three separate Armd Regiments as we have,  or perhaps one very large Tank Regiment with something like 5 Squadrons and 3 Light Armoured Cavalry Regiments (Stand up  8CH).

Personally and FWIW I don't see Tank Regiments cruising the Deserts and Steppes much longer.  People look at Iraq 1 and 2 and look at them as exemplars of what the Tank can do on the modern battlefield in open warfare.  But that seems to assume that we own all the tanks AND the PGMs.  What would have happened if Saddam had a better Air Force and had invested a few more of those UN petro-dollars in ATGMs for his home defence Commandos?

I do continue to see a need for heavily armoured vehicles simply because the more armour available the closer you are going to be able to approach the enemy's defences.  But their price will go up as they install counter-measures both active and passive, their availability will decrease as a result and their vulnerability in the open will likely increase as the cost of a round to kill them decreases.  That means that you can afford to buy many tank-killing rounds for every tank you can afford to buy - ultimately the cheap weapon wins.  It just swamps the expensive one.  English Arrows and French Knights, Japanese Zeros and British and American Battleships, Canadian 25 pounder shells and German Infantry Divisions, or ATGMs moving downwards from $100,000 versus MBTs moving upwards from $10,000,000.

The Tank as Specialist Vehicle, much like the vehicles of the Engineer Regiments?  Very useful when properly applied but perhaps not as generally applicable as they once were?


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> What I get out of Infanteer's article is that the demand for tanks in cities was for employment in the dreaded "penny-packets" - troops or even 1s and 2s - to work in co-operation with dismounted infantry.



Yup.  I have multiple articles from various US service journals explaining the tactics of doing this.  Seems to work.



> People look at Iraq 1 and 2 and look at them as exemplars of what the Tank can do on the modern battlefield in open warfare.  But that seems to assume that we own all the tanks AND the PGMs.  What would have happened if Saddam had a better Air Force and had invested a few more of those UN petro-dollars in ATGMs for his home defence Commandos?



Sinai II?


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## a_majoor (9 Jul 2006)

The argument that tanks are to be used against tanks is a bad misreading of history. Tanks are to provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area. 

This can be inferred from tank war theory dating from "Plan 1919" , to observing the "Independent Tank Battalion" of the Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment was near the rear of the Regimental march column (prepared to perform the exploitation task), or a Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) serving the same purpose for army and front level formations.

The circumstances of modern war suggest that mobile firepower is still important (tanks supporting Infantry in the city fight), but mobile firepower is still important in setting up cordons and preparing the battlefield, Cavalry "tanks" in this era could be performed by LAVs or similar vehicles. Helicopters and perhaps future UAVs might fill in the Cavalry role to provide the ratio of "cavalry" speed to that of the regular formations.

Last observation, although numbers are nice to have, in the fiercest fighting in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis were fighting badly outnumbered in both the Sinai and Golan Heights, and the crossing of the Suez canal was spearheaded by about 30 tanks (against the Egyptian Third Army). If the Iraqis had better weapons and leadership, there would have been more battles and more casualties, but the ultimate outcome would have been the same.


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The argument that tanks are to be used against tanks is a bad misreading of history. Tanks are to provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area.



Ouch, a tick in the "shortcoming" box.... 

What I mean when I say this remark is that for 50 years, we looked at a tank to be primarily an "anti-tank" weapon - we prepared, in both doctrine and practice, to utilize our armoured forces to engage other armoured forces.  Now, with a shift from "bear to snake", to quote the boss, the raison d'etre changes.  Evan's review underlines this as the shift of defining characteristics - from a weapon system of operational mobility (designed to _"provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area"_) to one focused on providing tactical utility (two moving pillboxes firing the infantry in on a dusty street in Fallujah).

Anyways, some more background reading into the future of armoured employment, courtsey of Colonel Micheal Krause of the Australian Army (I've posted this one before as well):

The Case for Minimum Mass Tactics in the Australian Army


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## Teddy Ruxpin (9 Jul 2006)

Oh my... 

I try to avoid becoming engaged in these "what if" debates, but my last five minutes of reading has been rather "interesting", so I thought I'd interject.

First, tanks aren't necessarily dedicated to taking on other tanks.  We train(ed) and operate(d) in combat teams for a reason.  In the offence, for example, tanks accompany the infantry onto the objective to provide intimate support, digging the trenches out with the grunts, blasting bunkers and providing overwatch against counterattacks.  Only after the infantry has secured the objective to the tanks peel off to form the "ring of steel" to protect against armour-drive counterattacks.

Also, on the offence (say, during an advance to contact), tanks would lead, simply because tanks are capable of taking on the widest variety of potential threats - other tanks included.

The point of this post is to remind everyone that tanks have never operated alone - they're always accompanied by infantry, who will lead depending on the tactical scenario.  A combat team, with attached engineers and FOO, is perfectly capable of conducting operations in a very wide variety of tactical scenarios, including against the "snakes" in an urban setting.  We should also remember that we can have infantry-heavy or armour-heavy combat teams, again dependant on the scenario.

Do we need three full regiments of tanks?  Probably not.  However, we do need a mix of capabilities that provide the leadership with enough flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions - from invading Iran to peacekeeping in E. Timor.

Typically, I steer away from academic discussions of tactics (and of Jane's book-type discussions of shiny new kit), primarily because tactics are extremely dependent on the actual scenario on the ground and will certainly be adjusted to suit highly individualized situations.  However, we have perfectly force structures to employ in 90% of instances, along with the doctrine to accompany them.  Fallujah isn't _that_ different from Ortona, after all...

T39, jockeying now...


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## Infanteer (9 Jul 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Do we need three full regiments of tanks?  Probably not.  However, we do need a mix of capabilities that provide the leadership with enough flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions - from invading Iran to peacekeeping in E. Timor.



That is what I was trying to say, but I guess I just muddied the waters.  Damn.

Anyways, here's more for the Jane's crowd:


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## George Wallace (9 Jul 2006)

I'd like to add something to this.

Although we don't really require three or more Regiments of Tanks, it would be to our advantage to do so.  Why?  The Armoured Corps is in the position it is today, due to the fact that we allowed the Armoured Corps to be reduced to one Tank Regiment, and now we have 'Armoured' officers who really aren't.  Officers who really don't have the knowledge, nor the experience, to be 'Armoured' officers in the true sense.  We need the Tanks to train all our Officers and NCO's to know the capabilities of the Tank, not 'Tank Trainers' or Recce.


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## a_majoor (9 Jul 2006)

The debate is undergoing a healthy shift from the benefits/deficiencies of a particular piece of kit (hey, I'm one of the best players!) to a more sober appraisal of what we want to do and what tools we need to do it with. We may end up with force structures totally divorced from what we have used since the Cold War (or WW II for that matter), and the numbers and ratios of various branches will almost certainly change.

In the last few posts, much was made about the utility of heavy armour in a street fight to support the Infantry and Engineers. Would it shock people if Leopard tanks are assigned to the Fire Support Company of an Infantry Battalion, while "Armoured" regiments received a fast moving wheeled fire support vehicle to shape the battlefield?

How about (to revive some older arguments from different threads) a "Mounted Rifles" battalion, being an Infantry heavy combined arms unit which uses its mobility to size and hold ground, with a complimentary "Armoured Cavalry" regiment, also a permanent combined arms formation but organized differently to perform fast patrols, screening and flanking and the ability to perform the persuit? Notice that here we have specified roles and formations which can exist independent of what sort of kit they are issued, LAV, CV-90 family, M-1/ M-2, Leopard/Puma, "technicals" or magic carpets can all be slotted into the TO&E in the appropriate measure to support the role of the formation.


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## edmjay (9 Jul 2006)

Hi All,

I've been reading through Army.ca as I'm again looking into joining the CF. I have a university degree so I'm looking at an officer position within either the infantry or armour trades. The fact that armour is so up in the air with their equipment now, I'm not sure what that would mean for my experience in that trade. 

Anyway, enough with the off topic stuff. In relation to the comments about tanks being effective working in smaller numbers with infantry in urban areas, here is a clip of just that. It's the US army engaging militants in Fallujah.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=sWbDikIO32Q&search=iraq%20battle 

J


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## Teddy Ruxpin (10 Jul 2006)

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The debate is undergoing a healthy shift from the benefits/deficiencies of a particular piece of kit (hey, I'm one of the best players!) to a more sober appraisal of what we want to do and what tools we need to do it with. We may end up with force structures totally divorced from what we have used since the Cold War (or WW II for that matter), and the numbers and ratios of various branches will almost certainly change.
> 
> In the last few posts, much was made about the utility of heavy armour in a street fight to support the Infantry and Engineers. Would it shock people if Leopard tanks are assigned to the Fire Support Company of an Infantry Battalion, while "Armoured" regiments received a fast moving wheeled fire support vehicle to shape the battlefield?
> 
> How about (to revive some older arguments from different threads) a "Mounted Rifles" battalion, being an Infantry heavy combined arms unit which uses its mobility to size and hold ground, with a complimentary "Armoured Cavalry" regiment, also a permanent combined arms formation but organized differently to perform fast patrols, screening and flanking and the ability to perform the persuit? Notice that here we have specified roles and formations which can exist independent of what sort of kit they are issued, LAV, CV-90 family, M-1/ M-2, Leopard/Puma, "technicals" or magic carpets can all be slotted into the TO&E in the appropriate measure to support the role of the formation.



I disagree.  There's virtually nothing wrong with the current force structure - if employed properly and fully manned.  The problem with penny-packeting, as you seem to propose, is that you lose one of the singular benefits of massed armour - shock action.  Agreed, this may not be important in every tactical scenario (particularly the ones were currently discussing), but there may well be times when it is critical.  Eliminating the capacity to mass armour and reducing the tank to an infantry support role would be a serious limitation of the capability of the vehicle and a serious mistake.

Again, we already operate in all-arms sub-units that, given the opportunity, can be exceedingly effective and that cover off 90+% of tactical scenarios.  I fail to see how organizationally reinventing the wheel will dramatically improve operational effectiveness.  The Army's suffered enough organizational angst over the last 40 years; why add to it?

Cheers,

Teddy


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## Journeyman (10 Jul 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Fallujah isn't _that_ different from Ortona, after all...



So, _someone's_ been reading the latest Urban Ops doctrine


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## Teddy Ruxpin (10 Jul 2006)

Doctrine?  We have doctrine?


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## Journeyman (10 Jul 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Doctrine?  We have doctrine?



Well.... saying "Canadian Army Doctrine" sounds more professional than "the pedantic cutting & pasting, by a committee of staff officers, of the lowest common denominator from our Allies' publications"   ;D 

But their latest FIBUA, OBUA, Urban Ops, FISH (Fighting In Someone's House) musings _do_ contain case studies of Fallujah and Ortona.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (10 Jul 2006)

> Well.... saying "Canadian Army Doctrine" sounds more professional than "the pedantic cutting & pasting, by a committee of staff officers, of the lowest common denominator from our Allies' publications"



 :rofl:


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## a_majoor (10 Jul 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> I disagree.  There's virtually nothing wrong with the current force structure - if employed properly and fully manned.  The problem with penny-packeting, as you seem to propose, is that you lose one of the singular benefits of massed armour - shock action.  Agreed, this may not be important in every tactical scenario (particularly the ones were currently discussing), but there may well be times when it is critical.  Eliminating the capacity to mass armour and reducing the tank to an infantry support role would be a serious limitation of the capability of the vehicle and a serious mistake.



Perhaps I worded that post badly, I am not proposing penny packeting, but rather matching tools to the job. If we look at the role of Armour as mobility and shock action, then the ability to move fast and pack an offensive punch would seem to be paramount (which can be provided by a variety of vehicles), whereas the Infantry role of seizing and holding ground would imply having protection and packing a big punch would support the outcome I suggested (using the Leopard as an assault gun). In the current environment, it seems the PBI will be going toe to toe with the enemy, while the Armoured should be sweeping the countryside to shape the battlefield (isolating them and bottling them up in urban areas is one possible course of action).

As well the proposed force structure is and should be independent of the actual kit; if conditions change the Armoured Cavalry Regiment can do conversion to Leopard 2A6 and Pumas, or laser armed hovertanks, or whatever is appropriate and possible at the time.


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## ArmyRick (13 Jul 2006)

Here I go. George Wallace and Teddy are gonna open up on me with SABOT rounds when i am done here. I can not put proper punctuations right now because i am using a mac so bear with me.

What about permamently posting a LAV (or whatever system is in use 15 years from now) to an Armoured REgt. During combat team ops, divide the 3 infantry platoons and attach a platoon to each squadron of tanks (Tank heavy CBT TM). Then post a squadron of MBT to certain designated LAV battalions. They in turn would assign a troop of tanks to each company (Infantry heavy CBT TM).

I know in theory we did this for exercises in the past (I participated in alot of CBT TM stuff while i was in 2 VP). But what about actually posting the arm to inf and vice versa.


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## Red 6 (15 Jul 2006)

That's an outstanding idea, ArmyRick.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (15 Jul 2006)

But why do it permanently and upset the entire force structure?

For many years 1 CMBG units had affiliations.  Tank squadrons were affiliated with infantry units, as were artillery batteries.  On exercise, they _always_ worked together, building a relationship.

What happened?  Well, we slashed our manning levels to the point where we were piecemealing every exercise and operation.  Squadrons were rerolled into recce, armoured cavalry or whatever the flavour of the day was, while the artillery drifted into heavy and light guns.  None of the units were/are fully manned, making sub-unit cohesion impossible to maintain.

Again, we're reinventing the wheel.  I am firmly - utterly - convinced that, at the unit level, we are in desparate need of stability and a long term plan that will actually be implemented.  We have force structures and experience that covers 90% of the tactical situations likely to be encountered on the battlefield, yet there are constant calls for even more change and turmoil. 

Man units to 100%, stabilize their equipment issue, re-implement unit affiliations, and allow those affiliations to routinely go to the field together.  I'd be shocked if that didn't resolve most of the "issues" the people perceive exist within the force structure.

TR


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## GAP (15 Jul 2006)

Our actual normal "in-country" TO&E for a line company was an average of 60-65% if we were lucky. The few times we bumped into the high 80s/90s we could do wonders. It generally didn't last, what with people getting injured, rotating, R & R, promotions/transfers, etc., but the point that I am trying to make is this. If a simple increment of men and equipment can make such a useful increase in efficiency, then think what that would do if something similar occurred to the entire force. Teddy is right on the money.


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## Kirkhill (15 Jul 2006)

I don't know if this is common practice in the French, or other, armies but I remember seeing a wiring diagram for one of their Lt Cavalry outfits (The Para-Hussards - Sabre Squadrons mounted in a mix of ERC-90 and VBL armoured cars IIRC).  One thing that stood out for me was the presence within the Regimental structure of both a dismounted Squadron of Regulars and a separate Squadron of Reserves in addition to the mounted Sabre Squadrons and an Anti-tank Squadron ( also mounted in VBLs).

The Para Hussards are one of the High Readiness elements that is routinely deployed, seldom as a Regiment, more often as a Squadron or Troop in a Task Force.  I got the impression they stayed pretty busy in places like Chad and Cote d'Ivoire.

Effectively the policy seemed to be to overman the equipment.  The Squadron structure, number and type of vehicles, as well as the number of squadrons seemed to be based on expectations of tactical and operational need.  Manpower then seemed to be alloted to make sure that those F-Echelon sub-units could then be fully manned despite casualties, leaves and training requirements.  

I guess it is something like the fleet management programme but instead of starting from the PYs available and the Equipment available and working out towards the field it starts from the field, goes to the equipment and then to the PYs.

I will try to relocate the magazine article - IIRC it was in an ancient (1990s) copy of Combat and Survival.


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## Cardstonkid (26 Jul 2006)

I understand that Australia paid about the same for their "slightly used" M-1"s as we are proposed to spend on the Strykers. IF that is the case then couldn't we approach the Yanks with a similar deal?


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## Journeyman (26 Jul 2006)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I don't know if this is common practice in the French, or other, armies but I remember seeing a wiring diagram for one of their Lt Cavalry outfits (The Para-Hussards - Sabre Squadrons mounted in a mix of ERC-90 and VBL armoured cars IIRC).  One thing that stood out for me was the presence within the Regimental structure of both a dismounted Squadron of Regulars and a separate Squadron of Reserves in addition to the mounted Sabre Squadrons and an Anti-tank Squadron ( also mounted in VBLs).



There were two French officers at Fort Frontenac this past week, and both of their regimental presentations (one Airborne, the other Air-Defence Arty) had a Reserve element built into the RegF unit. I therefore guess it's common practice in France.


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## Colin Parkinson (30 Aug 2006)

I thought they cancelled the MGS???


http://img181.imageshack.us/my.php?image=ocpa20060829094248ge1.jpg


http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=9467

Stryker teams train with new vehicles
By Jason Kaye
Fort Lewis Northwest Guardian


FORT LEWIS, Wash. (Army News Service, Aug. 29, 2006) – A long wait is over for Stryker Mobile Gun System (MSG) crews of the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division.

The 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, received its complement of MGS vehicles last month after more than a year of waiting. They are the first vehicles to be fielded in the Army.

“I think its going to give the infantry a whole new dimension of what they can do. Armor and infantry have kept each other at arm’s length for years and years," said Sgt. 1st Class David Cooper, an MGS platoon sergeant with B Company, 2-23 Inf. "We’ve got some growing pains, but once we get out there and they see what we can do, we’re going to be everybody’s friend.”

Each infantry company is slated to receive three vehicles, though crews don't expect to operate together except on rare occasions.

The vehicles carry crews of three, and are equipped with a 105 mm main gun and a state-of-the-art fire control system. The MGS also has an onboard coaxial machine gun that’s fire controlled.

“You can literally shoot smiley faces with it at 900 meters,” said Cooper. “Even minus the big gun we can give the infantry a lot of support.”

The 105 mm is capable of firing four types of rounds: SABOT, a depleted-uranium armor-piercing round; HEAT, high-explosive anti-tank; HEP, high-explosive plastic; and a canister round. The rounds are loaded using a hydraulic auto-loader in the rear of the vehicle.

The HEP and canister rounds give Stryker units new capabilities, especially in urban areas. The HEP can blow holes in reinforced concrete walls, but unlike the rounds from an Abrams, won’t continue through the target and into surrounding buildings. The canister provides as effective anti-personnel capability.

“The vehicle’s basic role is to support the infantry. It’s not there to take on tanks or go toe-to-toe in the wide-open desert like we did with the Abrams,” said Sgt. 1st Class William Ozmet, an MGS instructor from Fort Knox, Ky. “Its primary function is blowing a hole in the wall or blowing up bunkers.”

Over the past year, the crews have been training with TOW-ITAS Humvees or other Stryker variants. Finally having the vehicles gives the crews a chance to delve into training.

“I can actually start focusing on our training, both on our mission tasks and working with the infantry,” said 1st Lt. Christopher Lilley, the MGS platoon leader in B Co.

The MGS also comes equipped with training software that allows Soldiers to train on various engagements in their own vehicles, instead of going to a simulator somewhere else.

Once the 4th Bde. completes training, instructors from General Dynamics Land Systems will move on to equip and train Soldiers in Hawaii and Pennsylvania. Training for those units may change according to lessons learned here, but the vehicle itself is expected to remain mostly unchanged.

“I’m confident that this will turn out to be a successful piece of equipment for us, the infantry and the Army,” said Lilley.


(borrowed from Tanknet)


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

a problem appears to be the change in Stryker rifle platoons with the arrival of the MGS. Going to two sections & one MGS per platoon...... understandable (to a degree) based on the stafing problems the US army is experiencing right now BUT, when you're doing fire & movement, most doctrine says something about being "two up" with one in reserve........

Then there's the issue of how you staff the MGS - Infanteers or black hats?

Then there is always the risk of someone with the MGS 105 in Direct Support, thinking he has protection from MBTs.... NOT!


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## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2006)

> “Its primary function is blowing a hole in the wall or blowing up bunkers.”



Given that primary function maybe it should be manned by your trade Geo....like the petard mounting Churchills and the other AVREs.


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

HOHO!
1million to 1 chance that no one else sees it that way


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## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2006)

geo said:
			
		

> HOHO!
> 1million to 1 chance that no one else sees it that way



That high? Where do you want me to send my Loonie?  ;D


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## Mortar guy (30 Aug 2006)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I thought they cancelled the MGS???



We cancelled OUR MGS purchase. Or, more accurately, we have asked permission to cancel our MGS purchase. The US put the MGS into Low Rate Initial Production a while back and still fully intend to field the beast.

As for the US SBCT ORBAT, I was under the impression that each Coy would have 3 Rifle Pls in Stryker ICVs and one MGS Pl of 3 vehicles. I hadn't heard of any idea to permanently group MGS with the Rifle Pls.

MG


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

Another thread on the subject............

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/49498.0.html


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