# Geopolitics in the 21st Century



## Edward Campbell (3 May 2014)

Part 1 of 2

I was planning to include this is the "Grand Strategy for a Divided America" thread, but Walter Russell Mead, in this (rather lengthy) essay, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_, deals with more than just America: he's talking (when he says the EU and the USA) about Australia and Canada and Japan, too - the whole of the US led West and, of course, he's dealing with the push back from China, Iran and, most notably, now, Russia:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics


> The Return of Geopolitics
> *The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers*
> 
> By Walter Russell Mead
> ...



End of Part 1 of 2


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## Edward Campbell (3 May 2014)

Part 2 of 2








> *THE POWERS THAT BE*
> 
> The revisionist powers have such varied agendas and capabilities that none can provide the kind of systematic and global opposition that the Soviet Union did. As a result, Americans have been slow to realize that these states have undermined the Eurasian geopolitical order in ways that complicate U.S. and European efforts to construct a post-historical, win-win world.
> 
> ...




I don't agree, fully, with Mead just as I did not agree, fully, with Fukuyama. I agree, fully, that Marxist-Leninist communism was, indeed, finished, it was "too uncreative and unproductive to compete economically and militarily with liberal states." And I'm sure that the Chinese, at least, say 'good riddance to bad rubbish.' But I am not so sure that Western liberal-democracy is the best or ultimate solution to the problem of how the word organizes itself.

I do agree with Mead and Fukuyama that if we are going to triumph over the _"revisionist states"_ we will have to become something more, something better than "a narcissistic consumer with no greater aspirations beyond the next trip to the mall."

Who, which country, will lead us to the next page of history?


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## Edward Campbell (3 May 2014)

Part 1 of 2

And here, also reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_, is a counterpoint by John Ikenberry:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141212/g-john-ikenberry/the-illusion-of-geopolitics


> The Illusion of Geopolitics
> *The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order*
> 
> By G. John Ikenberry
> ...



End of Part 1 of 2


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## Edward Campbell (3 May 2014)

Part 2 of 2



> In fact, although they resent that the United States stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework, and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment, and technology from other societies. Rules give them tools to protect their sovereignty and interests. Despite controversies over the new idea of “the responsibility to protect” (which has been applied only selectively), the current world order enshrines the age-old norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. Those Westphalian principles remain the bedrock of world politics -- and China and Russia have tied their national interests to them (despite Putin’s disturbing irredentism).
> 
> It should come as no surprise, then, that China and Russia have become deeply integrated into the existing international order. They are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, with veto rights, and they both participate actively in the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-20. They are geopolitical insiders, sitting at all the high tables of global governance.
> 
> ...




So there are two American views: one pessimistic and the other optimistic.

I am not as gloomy as Prof Mead but nor am I as hopeful as Prof Ikenberry. I'm not convinced that liberal democracy is "the most globally organized and deeply entrenched order the world has ever seen," and even if it is I am not persuaded that it is "the end of history."

I do not believe in exceptionalism, not in American exceptionalism nor in the exceptionalism of liberal democracy.


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## Kirkhill (3 May 2014)

I think I can render my own appreciation succinctly for a change.

I do not believe in belief.

Belief is the luxury afforded to those that are not struggling for survival. The less the individual has to worry about survival the more time they have to ponder.  Those with the most time to ponder are those that are paid to do so:  professors, pundits and journalists.  

It is little wonder that they spend their time debating ideologies and beliefs.

Meanwhile most of humanity spends their time debating how they can take advantage of the opportunities available to put bread on their tables.

Those with full bellies don't understand what it means to be starving and at the mercy of the world.

Stalinists, Maoists, Mussoliniists and Schickelgruberists were less driven by the ideology of their leaders than their ability to put shoes on their kids feet and make the trains run on time.

Unfortunately for all the authoritarians in the world the only counter to entropic chaos is energetic action - and as we are all fully aware just now, energy costs money.  The more order is required the more energy has to be expended.

Capitalism, and Churchillian democracy, are not just opposing concepts to the central planning of Communism and The Sun King, they survive as the "least worst solution" because they share the "lowest common denominator".  Short of outright anarchy, which imposes an insufferable burden on the individual, they are the "least cost solution" for both those that would impose order and those that seek peaceful lives.

Russians are not driven by belief to revert to Neo-Nazi Communism.  They are driven by despair, lack of grand-kids, the high price of vodka, failure to succeed outside of their borders and poor pensions to seek comfort where they can.  They don't want Putin to be a Communist.  They want Putin to be Stalin and make their lives simpler.


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## a_majoor (3 May 2014)

Oddly enough stumbled upon this while looking at something else, and also considered posting it on the "Grand Strategy for a Divided America" thread. This is a reaction to WRM's essay by an American SF author, but has some pretty succinct and terrible predictions for us:

http://www.voxday.blogspot.ca/2014/04/faith-and-trust-and-pixie-dust.html



> *Faith and trust and pixie dust*
> 
> David Brooks asks a grand strategic expert to help him make sense of his impression that the international system is collapsing:
> 
> ...



And from the comments:



> Trust, or rather the lack of it, is the key issue here whether we're talking about international or intra-national relationships. The U.S. is no longer trusted to manage the world's reserve currency nor is it trusted to maintain the Pax Americana in a manner that, if not palatable, is at least bearable by the other major powers. Additionally, no supra-national organization (e.g. UN, IMF, etc.) is trusted to fulfill those roles. Similarly, the U.S. gov't is no longer trusted to look after the best interests of its own citizens. The default will be nations and cohesive groups (within the U.S.) looking after their own interests. This is both natural and inevitable. Statists/one worlders may dream of an all-powerful dictatorship that can keep humanity and human nature subservient to their goals by brute force, but it remains an unachievable dream that will, unfortunately, kill millions before it lands on the ash heap of history with its kin for the simple reason that you cannot force trust. Without trust, such complex systems collapse under their own weight.


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## Kirkhill (4 May 2014)

Peggy Noonan yesterday via Real Clear Politics



> ....To be in Europe is to realize, again and at first hand, that America has experienced a status shift. Europeans know we are powerful—we have the most drones and bombs and magic robot soldiers—but they don't think we are strong....



The more America, and the West generally, develop strategies that emphasise these:














and move away from these:














the more we are demonstrating that we may win battles but we have lost the war.

We consider the other guys' bombers as terrorists because they won't stand up and fight like a man.  They don't take us on in a fair fight.  They strike assymetrically at our civilians in ways that we can't counter.

Pretty much the same thing the other mob has been accusing us of since Clinton started lobbing cruise missiles at baby-milk factories in Sudan rather than answering questions about shot-spots on his intern's dress.

There needs to be a lot more of this






I don't believe we can gain the moral ascendancy that wins wars unless we are willing to commit boots on the ground, lives, to the task at hand.

And as a civilian, past service age, I fully appreciate what I am saying.  Particularly when 3 VP et al, HMCS Regina and  425 Squadron have just headed for Eastern Europe.


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## TangoTwoBravo (4 May 2014)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I think I can render my own appreciation succinctly for a change.
> 
> I do not believe in belief.
> 
> ...


 
I think that belief plays a huge role in conflict and people's willingness to resort to violence to resolve conflicts. Intense nationalism across the European countries of 1914 certainly played a role in that conflict. The German people did not march to war in 1939 to make the trains run on time or have a chicken in every pot. The people of the USSR did not make the sacrifices that they made trying to achieve the same. Looking at the insurgencies and wars of national liberation of the post-war era you can certainly find strong beliefs held by the folks doing the killing and dying. Combine beliefs with changes to the distribution of power or perceived inequities with the distrubition of that power and you have wars.

I offer that the wars of 1866 to 1945 were generally centred around the question of Germany's place in Europe. The Cold War repressed some fracture points in Eastern Europe as the USSR was willing to quash any resistance. The end of the Cold War and the lessening of Russia's power led to the settling of nationalist issues that had been repressed up until then. In some cases there were relativley peaceful transitions and we gained new NATO partners. In others we had some drawn out wars. Russia's power has rebounded, however, and now we have tension as they reassert themselves. Both sides of the Ukrainian issue are fuelled by belief. I argue that Russian people are also fuelled by a sense of their own place in the world. I suggest that nationalism is not dead.


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## Fishbone Jones (4 May 2014)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

>



Is that guy in the back row, fourth from the left, wearing a smilie face buckle?

Yea, sorry. That's my take away from an otherwise good discussion. :blotto:


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## Kirkhill (4 May 2014)

T2B - I think you offer the chicken to my egg.

I don't believe (funny word for someone that doesn't believe in it) the belief is causative.  I certainly agree that belief is a key element in organizing people into a functional following - a motivated herd.

But what is the spark that encourages the herd to coalesce and move, stampede if you will.  I think (there, that's better, if less exact) that there has to be  a set of externals extant that set in train the conditions that encourage the herd to form, to seek a solution to their predicament, to look to a leader with a plan.  And keep following him as long as he/she doesn't lead them off a cliff.

A follow-on from that is that, given the mortality of leaders, and  the difficulty of finding good ones, a key problem for any herd is succession planning.  What do you do when your successful leader dies or quits?  How do you choose the next leader?  Do you believe in blood, nature, nurture, education, institutions, common sense, plebiscites or experts to find you the next leader to take you to the next green pasture?

I am less inclined to see history as a series of beliefs that have changed mankind than I am to see history as a series of crises (volcanos, asteroids, floods, ice ages, droughts, pestilence, disease, famine and wars) that have encouraged mankind to move.  Not necessarily in a particular direction, just away from the threat.  Kind of like the conditioned response to the cry "Arty, Arty, Arty".

Moses didn't develop a following because the Jews were fat, dumb and happy.  The Jews were peeved with the tax regime and were looking for a leader.  Aaron, his brother, like any good priest or Sergeant-Major, brought up the rear, encouraging morale by a combination of institutional belief, the promise of free bread in a land of milk and honey, the threat of the wrath of God, or the CO, and the occasional judicious application of the rod.  Not to mention rationalizing a good smiting from time to time.  This left Moses time to find water, part the Red Seas and plan his next miracle.

Unfortunately the Jews proved little better at succession planning than the Russians.


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## Kirkhill (4 May 2014)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Is that guy in the back row, fourth from the left, wearing a smilie face buckle?
> 
> Yea, sorry. That's my take away from an otherwise good discussion. :blotto:



No worries - coffee and rum on a Sunday morning here.

Could be a happy face - not inappropriate if we are talking about morale.

I wonder though if it could be some sort of Regimental Belt Buckle.  The Corps of Guides and the Frontier Force regiments were all partial to the Jaegers' hunting horn.






56th Punjabi Rifles (Frontier Force) Indian Army as an example.


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## TangoTwoBravo (4 May 2014)

I agree that external pressures and injects can alter the behaviour of societies and states, but I do not look to these acts as the primary factors. Beliefs do motivate people, but these beliefs and not simple props devised by cunning leaders to dupe the masses. It is true that we are social beings, and that certain people can certainly hold sway over groups from time to time. I think, though, that successful ideologies and belief systems are able to tap into some existing sentiment in society.  

The crowds in London before the First World War who were demanding additional Dreadnoughts were not being manipuated by clever leaders. These smart, well-fed members of the middle class who rode trains that were on time actually believed in Britains place at the top of the world. Nationalism may be a dirty word today in the West, but I think that it is alive and well.


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## Kirkhill (4 May 2014)

I accept that Nationalism exists.  I don't know that I accept that Nationalism falls into the same category as Communism, Catholicism, Presbyterianism or Fascism.

Nationalism is a form of tribalism, as is football hooliganism, or any other form or fanaticism.  Any institution, espousing any set of beliefs will have its own fanatics, its own tribe.  But although there are Presbyterian Tribes (Up the 'Gers) and Catholic Tribes (Up the Pope) their belief systems can be pretty flexible.

Hence you have Nazi Russians calling themselves Communists, Polish Jews siding with the Nazis and Catholics of Anglican, Lutheran, Gallican, Dominican, Franciscan, Benedictine and Cluniac stripes.  Some people adhere to the belief systems and some just to the institutions.  Some because they truly believe and some because everybody else in the neighbourhood is running towards the cliff so they might as well go along as well to see what happens.


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## Edward Campbell (10 May 2014)

And here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_, is an entirely predictable, and equally predictably error filled diatrribe from one of the _left's_ regular voices:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/get-the-pitchforks-the-cold-warriors-are-back/article18571329/#dashboard/follows/


> Like hawkish zombies, the Cold Warriors are back
> 
> DOUG SAUNDERS
> The Globe and Mail
> ...




Quibbles, first: Russia can, certainly, deploy, quickly, more than just a few "tens of thousands," and Europe, including the US military in Europe, does not have "hundreds of thousands of soldiers who can be deployed instantly."

But, Doug Saunders is on the right track, even if the doesn't understand it: the way to bring Russia to its geopolitical knees is, essentially, economic ... but the easiest way to force the Russians to make bad economic decisions is to entice them into a military confrontation - an arms race. Defence spending is, almost always, unproductive* and it is often counter-productive. That would be the case for Russia if it was forced if it forced itself to redirect economic resources from domestic demand to military production. The Russian economy cannot manage that; social stability requires jobs and hope for the future; state planned military spending doesn't offer that. The very nature of Russian crony-capitalism means that defence production will be a zero sum game and the _zero_ will go to people who are, already, restive and unhappy. A full scale economic collapse in Russia, followed by riots in the streets and a nice, bloody civil war would be good for our businesses ... we, the West, will be able to pick up the useful pieces - resources - and leave the trash behind.

____
* Of course there are exceptions, but they are few, far between and easy to identify.


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## Journeyman (10 May 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> But, Doug Saunders is on the right track, even if the doesn't understand it: the way to bring Russia to its geopolitical knees is, essentially, economic ... but the easiest way to force the Russians to make bad economic decisions is to entice them into a military confrontation - an arms race.


_Panem et circenses_.

 Putin's popularity remains high because he's giving the Russians bread and circuses.  Seeing Crimea as a success restores Russians' egos in the wake of the Cold War.  It's no surprise that he's unilaterally suspended Russia's agreement with Lithuania on bilateral information exchange and military inspections.  Putin will be fiddling (shirtless) as Moscow collapses.  

Maybe 'journalists' should start practicing the spelling of "Kaliningrad."


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## Brad Sallows (10 May 2014)

Saunders is right about the most useful lever being economic this time, but he is wrong about the value of military confrontation, about the obviousness of deciding how to respond, and about the Cold War in general.  Tipping points are easy to identify long after the fact, as are the few among the horde of contemporary prognosticators who were correct.  But while events are still current, it is impossible to foresee with complete clarity how things will unfold and to confidently declare victory and stop applying pressure at all possible points.  If Saunders wishes to be useful, he can apply his research and knowledge and identify today's tipping point exactly as it happens so that we can comfortably return to our mundane daily lives.  Hindsight armchair criticism and moral posturing about past events serves the public not at all.

Military confrontation is ultimately what burnt out the USSR.  The West (predominantly, the US) could afford to consume resources fighting proxy wars; the USSR could not.  The West (again, mostly US) could afford to pursue the bleeding edge of military technology; the USSR could not.  The West could sustain itself by co-operation rather than enslavement; the USSR could not.  At some point, Putin's expansionism should be stopped.  At some point, Putin may choose a military response to diplomatic and economic pressure.  We'd be stupid not to be undertake the former and be prepared for the latter.  "Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen" is a sound principle for moral as well as material strength, but I suppose that along with Cold War zombies we'll get Cold Anti-War zombies crawling out to dissuade the West from showing any resolve.


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## tomahawk6 (11 May 2014)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Saunders is right about the most useful lever being economic this time, but he is wrong about the value of military confrontation, about the obviousness of deciding how to respond, and about the Cold War in general.  Tipping points are easy to identify long after the fact, as are the few among the horde of contemporary prognosticators who were correct.  But while events are still current, it is impossible to foresee with complete clarity how things will unfold and to confidently declare victory and stop applying pressure at all possible points.  If Saunders wishes to be useful, he can apply his research and knowledge and identify today's tipping point exactly as it happens so that we can comfortably return to our mundane daily lives.  Hindsight armchair criticism and moral posturing about past events serves the public not at all.
> 
> Military confrontation is ultimately what burnt out the USSR.  The West (predominantly, the US) could afford to consume resources fighting proxy wars; the USSR could not.  The West (again, mostly US) could afford to pursue the bleeding edge of military technology; the USSR could not.  The West could sustain itself by co-operation rather than enslavement; the USSR could not.  At some point, Putin's expansionism should be stopped.  At some point, Putin may choose a military response to diplomatic and economic pressure.  We'd be stupid not to be undertake the former and be prepared for the latter.  "Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen" is a sound principle for moral as well as material strength, but I suppose that along with Cold War zombies we'll get Cold Anti-War zombies crawling out to dissuade the West from showing any resolve.



Actually what did in the Soviet Union was that they couldnt keep up the defense spending to match the US.They sacrificed their civilian economy which collapsed.To this day they haven't recovered their conventional power,but they have learned to pay attention to their economy.


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## pbi (11 May 2014)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Saunders is right about the most useful lever being economic this time, but he is wrong about the value of military confrontation, about the obviousness of deciding how to respond, and about the Cold War in general.  Tipping points are easy to identify long after the fact, as are the few among the horde of contemporary prognosticators who were correct.  But while events are still current, it is impossible to foresee with complete clarity how things will unfold and to confidently declare victory and stop applying pressure at all possible points.  If Saunders wishes to be useful, he can apply his research and knowledge and identify today's tipping point exactly as it happens so that we can comfortably return to our mundane daily lives.  Hindsight armchair criticism and moral posturing about past events serves the public not at all.
> 
> Military confrontation is ultimately what burnt out the USSR.  The West (predominantly, the US) could afford to consume resources fighting proxy wars; the USSR could not.  The West (again, mostly US) could afford to pursue the bleeding edge of military technology; the USSR could not.  The West could sustain itself by co-operation rather than enslavement; the USSR could not.  At some point, Putin's expansionism should be stopped.  At some point, Putin may choose a military response to diplomatic and economic pressure.  We'd be stupid not to be undertake the former and be prepared for the latter.  "Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen" is a sound principle for moral as well as material strength, but I suppose that along with Cold War zombies we'll get Cold Anti-War zombies crawling out to dissuade the West from showing any resolve.



Good post. However, I might be one of those Cold Anti-War zombies, or something like them. Maybe. I find it a bit difficult to articulate clearly.

I certainly understand that the Russians really only respect strength and determination, and that at some point we may have to re-draw the old Cold War line in the sand and stand behind it. As I've posted elsewhere, I find Russia a pretty repulsive mess in most respects and I look forward to its ultimate decline. But I would like a clear explanation of is just what it is, specifically, that is going to be worth Canadian lives and the potential risk of a much greater conflict?  Remember that confrontation is a game of chicken, with much higher stakes, but with just as much unpredictability. Don't ever, ever underestimate the role of misunderstanding, paranoia,stupidity or pride in triggering war.

Poland, and maybe even Romania: OK-I get it. Those are very clearly outside Russia's legitimate backyard. The Ukraine: no, I don't get it. I think we in the "West" have done (again...) what we did in FRY-pick sides where there really may not be any truly "good" guys, except the one we pick.  (Croats=good, Serbs=bad) This raises the question of the Balts: by putting additional NATO forces there we probably reassure those countries, but unless we're making a hollow threat, we're saying that we're prepared to go to war over them? Has anybody asked the Canadian people about that?

Maybe I'm a craven defeatist already. Perhaps. Or, maybe I'm thinking along the lines of the US Republican party when it fought the 1940 election on an anti-intervention platform. Why make it our fight? Why not ask ourselves, very clearly and openly, what our national interests are in this case? Do an analysis based on the facts of the current situation, not on shallow, "conventional wisdom" resurrection of conditions that existed over 70 years ago. If that analysis truly shows us that we need to make it our fight, OK. This is not 1937 and we need to be very clear on that. 

I'm not saying do nothing. I am saying that before we get into that game of chicken, we exhaust the strongest set of economic and financial restrictions that the West can muster. At the same time, make it clear that NATO will do what it was created to do: for its membership. Provoking or antagonizing the Russian population , who have in my view a very mercurial, paranoid and distorted understanding of the world in the first place, may not have the results we want. Whatever else Russians may be, history makes it quite clear that they are not cowards. However, history also shows (ie: reaction to the Berlin Airlift; the Cuban Missile Crisis; their political analysis leading to their decision to withdraw from Afghanistan) that they can be pragmatists.

And, yes, part of that calculus of pragmatism would be an assessment of  the risks versus the benefits, including military risks. They will calculate the trade-off on pushing further West against the potential risks. They will engage in that thought process no matter what we do: I suggest that we want them to engage in it as coolly and rationally as possible, not out of paranoia or anger. 

A firm, calm hand on the tiller is needed right now.


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## Edward Campbell (11 May 2014)

I'm pretty much with you, pbi:

     1. I, too, look forward to Russia's ultimate decline and, probably, dismemberment into, possibly, a semi, but not quite European state, a Eurasian state and an Asian one;
     
     2. I don't think there is any need to fight to achieve that. Nor is there any really good reason, short of Russian military aggression, to fight them at all; but

     3. We do need to rekindle the _cold war_ to drag them back into an arms race which will, sooner rather than later, deprive the Russian people of what they really want - peace and prosperity; and

     4. We need to attack them, relentlessly, on all economic fronts, provoking the people into open revolt.


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## Brad Sallows (11 May 2014)

>This raises the question of the Balts: by putting additional NATO forces there we probably reassure those countries, but unless we're making a hollow threat, we're saying that we're prepared to go to war over them?

Membership has its responsibilities, as well as privileges.

I agree about Ukraine.  If Russia decided to take it tomorrow, we should let them have it (and everything else up to NATO member borders).  And we should prepare to assist in the defence of those borders, while turning every possible screw on the Russian economy.


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## tomahawk6 (11 May 2014)

It does my heart good to see that NATO members have the option to defend one another.It exposes the myth of the Treaty Organization.


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## MilEME09 (11 May 2014)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> >This raises the question of the Balts: by putting additional NATO forces there we probably reassure those countries, but unless we're making a hollow threat, we're saying that we're prepared to go to war over them?
> 
> Membership has its responsibilities, as well as privileges.
> 
> I agree about Ukraine.  If Russia decided to take it tomorrow, we should let them have it (and everything else up to NATO member borders).  And we should prepare to assist in the defence of those borders, while turning every possible screw on the Russian economy.



I agree a bit, if Russia say takes just the south and East of Ukraine, or even just the east, I would push to bring it into our sphere as well as finland to contain Russian expansion


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## tomahawk6 (11 May 2014)

Putin is aware that NATO nor the EU will fight him.Its the same dynamic that Hitler pursued.Taking small chunks will inevitably give him the whole cake.He got the Crimea and will soon have eastern Ukraine.Then he could turn his attention elsewhere.Putin doesnt need to invade the former republics,just coerce them to join the USSR,a sort of slavic EU.


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## Fishbone Jones (11 May 2014)

If the Cold War zombies are rìsing, Ronald Reagan will be amongst them. He beat the Soviets single handedly before, he can do it again.

Unless a shirtless Putin takes up a Cossak sword and removes his head. We'll have to keep them apart until we can get Ronnie to Berlin.


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## ArmyAviator (13 May 2014)

Well I haven't been to Army.ca in a LOOOOOOOONNNNNGGGGG time. It is good to see such a dynamic discussion on the current regional power struggles.  While I still like discussions on the best small arms and tac vests, the Poli-Sci Major in me relishes a good discussion on international relations. One must look at Russia and China from a different perspective then the expansionist Soviet era state and revisionist Chairman Mao's China.  The two modern states of Russia and China while seeking larger global influence do not seek any expansion in their territory other than those neighbouring regions that they believe are theirs. (Wow crappy sentence structure  ;D ).  Why did Putin's Russia not intervene when Poland or the Czech Republic moved towards NATO.  These are not historically part of Russia. However, when the Ukraine started getting too cozy with the west Putin goes a little mad.  Why, the Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine were Imperial Russia's territory that Kruschev put under Ukrainian administration, never thinking that the Soviet Empire would ever crumble and that a once puppet state would have issues of national jurisdiction. This is the same for China. If you are Tibetan or Taiwanese you might disagree with me, but in reality these regions are considered, by the current powers at least, to be Chinese Territory.  In Taiwan the general population will tell you that they ARE Chinese and look forward to rejoining the mainland someday if freedom and democracy was to ever be implemented in mainland China.


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## Edward Campbell (14 May 2014)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Al Jazeera English_ (no more (nor less) a _biased_ source than, say, the _New York Times_) is a god overview of the state of President Obama's P2A (Pivot to Asia) policy, especially as it relates to the Philippines:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/philippines-strategic-dilemma-b-201451491631575749.html


> The Philippines' strategic dilemma: Between an eagle and a dragon
> *The Philippines granted the US precious access to its military bases, but failed to garner full support against China.*
> 
> Last updated: 14 May 2014
> ...




I would take issue with one point Mr Heydarian makes. I doubt one visit by President Obama was capable of "delicately guiding Kuala Lumpur out of China's sphere of influence in the ASEAN." It may have nudged Malaysia back towards the USA but, I think, one state visit by Xi Jinping, will likely nudge it back.


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## Edward Campbell (20 May 2014)

Further to the item just above and to the P2A (Pivot to Asia) and to the notion of _containing_ China, in general, Prof James R Homes of the US Naval War College suggests, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _The Diplomat_, that the whole idea of containment is both misplaced and unnecessary:

http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/why-america-cant-contain-china/?utm_content=buffer790e1&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer


> Why America Can’t Contain China
> *Despite Beijing’s concerns, the U.S. couldn’t contain China even if it wanted to.*
> 
> By James R. Holmes
> ...


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## Edward Campbell (22 May 2014)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_, is an interesting analysis of the emerging geopolitical situation by David Gordon and Jordan Schneider (both of whom are, I think, from the Eurasia Group, a political risk management and consulting group:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141450/david-gordon-and-jordan-schneider/treacherous-triangle


> Treacherous Triangle
> *China, Russia, the United States, and the New Superpower Showdown*
> 
> By David Gordon and Jordan Schneider
> ...




We must remember that:

     America is the dominant social/cultural, political, economic and military power on earth - China is nowhere near America's equal ... yet;

     China is _rising_, it's _rise_ since Deng Xiaoping put it on its current course back in the late 1970s has been quite phenomenal. But it is not, yet, anything like 
     a global superpower. China's _rise_ will, certainly, be interrupted by domestic social and economic crises, but it is most likely to continue on all fronts: social/cultural,
     economic, political and military; and

     Russia is in _decline_ - "demographics is destiny," said white supremacy apologist/author Arthur Kemp and the demographics point to a weaker and weaker
     future for Russia.

There is, still, in my _opinion_, an open question about China's aim. I think it wants to create a new bi-polar world in which it _shares_ supremacy (and the responsibility for keeping the global peace) with America; I also think it wants a _fractured_ West in which Europe and America are not in anything like real accord and in which Europe, itself is divided. I'm guessing that China wants to control East Asia, the _Sinic_ 'world' , which includes Japan and Korea. It wants America off the Asian mainland. My _sense_ is that is a vital strategic objective for China. But I also _sense_ that it does not want to intrude into the "Arabic-Islamic world of West Asia and North Africa," or the "Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India and Southeast Asia." In other words, I think China wants a global _mosaic_ in which it shares a dominant position with an American led _Anglosphere_.

I revive the notion of the _Anglosphere_ because I think America's position will, increasingly, need some shoring up by Australia, Britain and Canada ... including in the Pivot Towards Asia (P2A) _strategy_. The _Anglosphere_ is, as Thucydides reminds us a _maritime_ coalition and his elephant vs. whale or tiger vs. shark analogy comes into play. A war between an American led West and a Chinese led East is possible, but pointless ... I think (maybe just hope?) that better strategic minds than mine can see that such a war can have no winners, just losers. I think _competition_ on all four fronts, will be the order of the day and I hope that sound leadership will keep that competition peaceful ... rough and tumble, at times, but without resorting to military force.


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 1

This article is a bit long but well worth the read. It explains how we, the American led West, got led here by the Americans. It is by noted historian Robert Kagan and was originally published in the _New Republic_; it is reproduced, in toto, under the fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Brookings Institution's_ website:

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/05/26-superpowers-dont-retire-kagan#.U570KGg_Dn0.twitter


> Superpowers Don't Get to Retire: What Our Tired Country Still Owes the World
> 
> By: Robert Kagan
> 
> ...



End of Part 1


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 2



> The events of 1941 forced a fundamental reassessment not only of America’s global strategy but also of how to define America’s interests. Even as they waged the struggle against Germany and Japan, Roosevelt and his advisers during the war began thinking of how the postwar world ought to be shaped, and they took as their guide what they considered the lessons of the previous two decades.
> 
> The first had to do with security. The Japanese attack had proved that vast oceans and even a strong navy no longer provided adequate defense against attack. More broadly, there was the realization—or rather the rediscovery—of an old understanding: that the rise of a hostile hegemonic power on the Eurasian landmass could eventually threaten America’s core security interests as well as its economic well-being. As a corollary, there was the “lesson of Munich”: would-be aggressors in Eurasia had to be deterred before they became too strong to be stopped short of all-out war.
> 
> ...



End of Part 2


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 3



> This new American grand strategy for the postwar world could not have been a more radical departure from “normalcy.” Its goals were not simply defense of the territory, prosperity, and sovereign independence of the American people, but also the promotion of a liberal world order that would defend not only America’s interests but those of many other nations as well. The rise of a Eurasian hegemon would threaten other nations long before it would threaten the United States, for instance, yet Americans now accepted primary responsibility for preventing it. The new strategy was not selfless or altruistic. American officials believed that it was in the best interest of the United States. But neither did it fit the normal definition of the “national interest.” As Dean Acheson explained, Americans had to learn to “operate in a pattern of responsibility which is greater than our own interests.” This was the real revolution in American foreign policy.
> 
> The new strategy was not directed at any particular nation or any specific threat—at least not at first. The Soviet Union had not yet emerged as the next great challenge to the new global order. During World War II, Roosevelt and most other top officials expected mutual cooperation with the Soviets after the war, and even as late as 1945, Acheson still believed in the possibility of partnership with Moscow. Rather than responding to a specific threat, the new grand strategy aimed at preventing a general collapse of global order, which meant supporting an open international economic system, enforcing principles of international behavior, supporting, where possible, democratic governments, encouraging a minimum of respect for human rights, as defined in the U.N. Charter, and generally promoting the kind of world that suited Americans and those who shared their beliefs.
> 
> ...



End of Part 3


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 4



> When the cold war ended, many did believe that the United States could finally unburden itself of the vast global responsibilities that it had shouldered for more than four decades. As in the 1920s, the world of the early 1990s seemed safe enough. The former Soviet Union was in a state of economic and political collapse; China, following the Tiananmen Square massacre, was diplomatically and economically isolated. Americans’ biggest concern at the time was the booming economy of Japan, which, as it turned out, was just about to fall into 20 years of stagnation. So what grave threat required America to continue its abnormal, outsized role in the world? Could not the United States return to being more of a normal nation with a more normal definition of its national interests?
> 
> In September 1990, in an article titled “A Normal Country in a Normal Time,” Jeane Kirkpatrick argued precisely that. With the Soviet Union collapsing, there was no longer a “pressing need for heroism and sacrifice.” The cold war had given foreign policy “an unnatural importance” in American life. The “foreign policy elite” had grown accustomed to thinking of the United States as having “expansive, expensive, global purposes” that “transcended ... apparent American interests.” It was time for the United States “to focus again on its own national interests,” by which she meant national interests as “conventionally conceived”—“to protect its territory, wealth, and access to necessary goods; to defend its nationals.” This was the “normal condition for nations.”
> 
> ...



End of Part 4


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 5



> Historians often refer to the “maturing” of American foreign policy since the nineteenth century. But if nations can learn, they can also unlearn. These days it is hard to watch both the conduct and the discussion of American foreign policy and not sense a certain unlearning, a forgetting of the old lessons on which the grand strategy was premised. Perhaps this was inevitable. World War II is as distant from today’s “millennials” as the Civil War was from the generation of the 1930s. A generation that does not remember the cold war, but grew up knowing only Iraq and Afghanistan, is going to view America’s role in the world differently. Combine that with the older generations that have tired of playing the old role, and it is hardly surprising that enthusiasm is flagging. Americans today are not isolationists, any more than they were in the 1920s. They favor the liberal world order insofar as they can see how it touches them. But they are no longer prepared to sacrifice very much to uphold it.
> 
> This is understandable. Americans have been Atlas carrying the world on their shoulders. They can be forgiven for feeling the temptation to put it down. Under the best of circumstances, playing the role of upholder of the liberal world order was always a monumental task. At the dawn of the American era, Truman called it “the most terrible responsibility that any nation ever faced.” George Kennan was convinced that the American people were “not fitted, either institutionally or temperamentally, to be an imperial power in the grand manner.” Actually, he underestimated them, for Americans maintained their global commitments for decades, better than most nations.
> 
> ...



End of Part 5


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2014)

Part 6 ... the last Part!

 :bla-bla:



> You never miss the water ’til the well runs dry, or so the saying goes. One wonders whether Americans, including their representatives and their president, quite understand what is at stake. When President Obama first took office five years ago, Peter Baker of The New York Times reported that he intended to deal “with the world as it is rather than as it might be.” It is a standard realist refrain and has been repeated time and again by senior Obama officials as a way of explaining why he decided against pursuing some desirable but unreachable “ideal” in this place or that. What fewer and fewer seem to realize, however, is that the last 70 years have offered Americans and many others something of a reprieve from the world “as it is.”
> 
> Periods of peace and prosperity can make people forget what the world “as it is” really looks like, and to conclude that the human race has simply ascended to some higher plateau of being. This was the common view in Europe in the first decade of the twentieth century. At a time when there had not been a war between great powers in 40 years, or a major Europe-wide war in a century, the air was filled with talk of a new millennium in which wars among civilized nations had become impossible. Three-quarters of a century and two world wars and a cold war later, millennial thoughts return. Studies cited by Fareed Zakaria purport to show that some “transformation of international relations” has occurred. “Changes of borders by force” have dropped dramatically “since 1946.” The nations of Western Europe, having been responsible for two new wars a year for 600 years, had not even started one “since 1945.” Steven Pinker observes that the number of deaths from war, ethnic conflict, and military coups has declined—since 1945—and concludes that the human race has become “socialized” to prefer peace and nonviolence.
> 
> ...



End of Part 6


Why does this matter?

Countries, Canada, too, do things for reasons ... they send you to sea, in harm's way, or into battle for what you need to hope are good geo-political reasons. It helps to consider *why* natons, not just national leaders, make the choices they do. Why was America so resolutely isolationist in the 1920s and '30s? Why is it so timid today? Robert Kagan helps to answer those questions.


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## Edward Campbell (18 Jun 2014)

Here is a (blessedly short) provocative look at geopolitics from a pretty well qualified source, Prof Randall Schweller. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_:



> The Age of Entropy
> *Why the New World Order Won't Be Orderly*
> 
> By Randall L. Schweller
> ...




I think his points about _information overload_ (and its _restrictive_ rather than _liberating_ effect) and non-state actors (including corporations, organized crime, international humanitarian organizations and terrorists) both merit consideration and discussion.


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## Colin Parkinson (18 Jun 2014)

I'm living the dream, the current projects I am working on likely contain roughly 60,000+ pages of information at the Environmental Assessment level and that is not counting the lower level technical documents. I spent yesterday on a teleconference, while scanning 3,000 pages and dealing with my e-mail, this is becoming the norm.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2014)

Part 1 of 2

More words, I'm afraid ...  :bla-bla: ... this time in an essay by James B Steinberg and Michael E Hanlon which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_. This essay suggests that "*More signals, less noise*," "each side [being] clear about its true redlines and the price, at least in general terms, it is willing to pay to defend them ... can be enough to help keep full-scale conflict at bay, an outcome that prudent people on both sides should be seeking:"

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141476/james-b-steinberg-and-michael-ohanlon/keep-hope-alive


> Keep Hope Alive
> *How to Prevent U.S.-Chinese Relations From Blowing Up*
> 
> By James B. Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon
> ...



End of Part 1


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2014)

Part 2 of 2


> *NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH*
> 
> The most likely prospect for a direct military encounter between the United States and China in the near term comes from the growing tensions in the East China and South China seas. U.S. security commitments to Japan and the Philippines, both of which have territorial disputes with China, and U.S. willingness to assert basic navigational rights in the region (which set the stage for a close encounter between the USS Cowpens and Chinese ships last December) could entangle Washington in a conflict even though the United States itself has no territorial claims in the area. These tensions are not likely to be resolved anytime soon. The actual interests at stake are small, and many of the conflicts involved could be managed were there sufficient mutual will to do so. But all involved seem to fear that any show of restraint or accommodation will be taken as a sign of weakness, leading to even more assertive behavior in the future. This makes it all the more important to find ways of preventing crises from emerging or keeping them contained once they do so.
> 
> ...




In _my opinion_ this, the Sino-American relationship is the biggest, maybe the only really big threat to global peace and security. Global _terrorism_ and the _civil war_ within Islam can be either ignored (dealt with by the occasional _swat_) or _isolated_. But we cannot, as Napoleon might have suggested, "let China sleep." China is awake and it is, indeed, "shaking the world." The "shaking" cannot, should not be avoided but it can be _managed_ and, in my opinion, Steinberg and O'Hanlon offer some useful ideas, for both America and China, on how to manage it.


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## a_majoor (23 Jun 2014)

Geopolitics in the 21rst century will resemble that of the 19th century, or for that matter from the time of the Pelloponnesian Wars. Power, resources and the willingness to use power remains at the bottom of everything. As Thucydides (the Athenian general and author) told us: 

"The strong do as they wish, while the poor suffer as they must."


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## Edward Campbell (26 Jun 2014)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Part 2 of 2
> 
> 
> 
> ...



More on  the "More Signal, Less Noise" theme from Prof Jennifer Lind in this rticle which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141601/jennifer-lind/pivot-problems


> Pivot Problems
> *What Washington Should Concede in Asia*
> 
> By Jennifer Lind
> ...




I'm sure that Prof Lind will not mind me pointing out that the key issue, 60_ish_ years ago, wasn't distinguishing between the treaty right of access and the minutia of rubber stamps, it was the fact, and in the 1950s in was a *fact*, that the US ~ the American people and government ~ were ready and willing to go to war, to global thermonuclear war, over Berlin. That's what settled the issue: President Kennedy warned the USSR and reassured the Germans that America would fight, all out, for Berlin.

I wonder if any Asian country, even Japan, believes that President Obama any American president the American people are willing to go to war, a real war, with China for or against or even about anything.

(Many, many years ago the American author James A Michener put a line into the mouth of one of his characters: "I know what you're against ... what are you *for*?" That's a key to a sound _strategy_: it is insufficient to be against something; there has to be an AIM ~ something we want, some outcome, for which we, the people, (mostly) agree we will fight. In the 1950s and '60s we weren't just "against communism," we were *for* liberal, Western democracy, including _for_ our recent enemies. We believed that liberal democracy was necessary for the West and desirable, at least, for everyone. It was something for which we were willing to fight.)

The Chinese *government* appears to know what matters to it ... it has been modestly clear, as clear as the Chinese can ever manage to be, about the issues _for_ which it will risk war. It seems to me that Taiwan (and, of course, China, proper, including Tibet) is at the top of that (very, very short) list and, in my own, limited, experience, that is understood and agreed by the Chinese people. (Maybe that popular support is the result of an aggressive domestic advertising campaign.) It is not clear to me that China is willing to risk a war over anything in the China Seas. Confrontation? Yes, willingly and confidently. Even the "accidental" downing of an aircraft or two or the equally "accidental" and tit-for-tat sinking of a couple of patrol boats? Yes, if the risk is manageable. War .. with anyone? No, not as far as I can read the tea leaves.

But I am more certain that America, _circa_ 2015 is not prepared to go to war for anyone, except in its own defence, and maybe, Canada's, and is certainly not ready to go to war _against_ a bit of Chinese aggression ... at least I'm pretty sure that's how Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping see it.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Jul 2014)

More, relative to the first four posts in this thread ~ the original _Foreign Affairs_ essays by Walter Russell Mead and John Ikenberry, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fb9a5ba6-fd4d-11e3-96a9-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz35z6EG16b


> Revisionist powers are driving the world’s crises
> *China is likely to emerge the challenger to the US-dominated global system*
> 
> By Gideon Rachman
> ...




In the final paragraph Mr Rachman is, rather shamelessly, plugging his own book _Zero Sum World_, that predicts that the ongoing financial and economic crisis would lead to a zero-sum world, exemplified by increasing tensions between the major powers, especially rising tensions between the US and China, and political disunity within the European Union.

I agree with him that it _might_ be a dangerous trend but I do not believe it is gaining momentum. In fact I think China is trying to damp down tensions ... not too much, but enough to assure the US that it, China, will stop short of war, unless the US (or its regional puppets) provokes one.


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Jul 2014)

I don't think anything that happens with China's foreign policy is done without a stern eye on the domestic situation. A notable number of Chinese have tasted the good life and want more, a large number can see the good life from afar and know they will never have it. Some dream of the days where everything was controlled. I can imagine the internal forces pulling and pushing within China must give her leaders constant indigestion.


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## Edward Campbell (7 Jul 2014)

It will take you three and a half minutes, but I think you can spare that to listen to Fareed Zakaria's take on why Samuel Huntington might have been right when he wrote e.g. Culture Matters.


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## Edward Campbell (8 Jul 2014)

Part 1 of 3

This is another of those _loooong_ article over which many of you will just pass ...

Here are the two concluding paragraphs:

     Western governments should follow China’s example and take good ideas wherever they can find them. Close to home, they should pay attention to Sweden’s successful experiments with school vouchers. Farther afield,
     they should consider India’s progress in reducing hospital costs and Brazil’s welfare program based on conditional cash transfers, which requires recipients to meet certain goals, such as making sure their children attend school
     and receive vaccinations. 

     The twenty-first century is sure to be shaped by ever-fiercer competition between states to figure out which innovations in governing yield the best results. The liberal democracies of the Western world still enjoy a significant leg up
     in terms of wealth and political stability. But it’s not yet clear whether the West will be able to summon the sort of intellectual and political energy that, for the past four centuries, has kept it ahead in the global race to reinvent the state.

The rest is reproduced here under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141477/john-micklethwait-and-adrian-wooldridge/the-state-of-the-state


> The State of the State
> *The Global Contest for the Future of Government*
> 
> John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge
> ...



End of Part 1


Edit: format


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## Edward Campbell (8 Jul 2014)

Part 2 of 3



> *TANGLED WEBB*
> 
> This dream was most dramatically manifested in the totalitarian nightmares of communism and fascism. But neither of those ideologies survived the twentieth century, and it is, instead, a different concept that drove the third great transformation in modern governance. That concept is the welfare state: the idea that the government should be a companion throughout the lives of citizens, providing them with education, a helping hand if they lose their jobs, health care if they fall sick, and pensions when they get old. This is the notion around which today’s sprawling Western states were built.
> 
> ...



End of Part 2


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## Edward Campbell (8 Jul 2014)

Part 3 of 3



> *THE FOURTH REVOLUTION*
> 
> This crisis of Western liberal democracy has been brewing for decades, but it has become acute in the last few years for three reasons. First is the increasingly unsustainable debt burden that Western states are carrying. The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent global recession led to an explosion in public debt: according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, global public debt reached $50.6 trillion in 2013, compared with just $22 trillion in 2003. Much of that growth was driven by Western governments borrowing huge sums in response to the economic slowdown. In Europe, the working-age population peaked in 2012, at 308 million, and is set to decline to 265 million by 2060. That smaller group of workers will have to support an unprecedented number (in absolute and relative terms) of retirees. Between the present time and 2060, Europe’s dependency ratio -- the number of people over 65 as a proportion of the number of people between the ages of 20 and 64 -- will rise from 28 percent (the current level) to 58 percent. And those numbers assume that the EU will let in more than one million young immigrants a year; if it doesn’t, the figures will be even worse. In the United States, where the baby boomers are now crossing into old age, the Congressional Budget Office reckons that government spending on medical benefits alone will rise by 60 percent over the next decade -- and will then begin to rise even faster.
> 
> ...



I am a believer in the state, in more than just the "nigh watchman state," but I think Mrs Thatcher got it closer to _right_ than anyone else.

The Chinese do not believe that the _institutions_ of Western, _liberal_ democracy are useful or applicable to their people, but they recognize a need to understand the popular will ~ something democracy provides ~ and they are looking at different means (positive polling, for example) to try to address that defect in their system.


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## Brad Sallows (8 Jul 2014)

If we wish to reap the benefits of innovation and intellectual energy, we must first stop strangling the producers with restraints and constraints.  The problem is not government; the problem is politicians and bureaucrats and those who cannot bear the thought of people living mostly as they please.

I find it ironic that policies favoured by individualists tend to produce greater amounts of revenue to support lesser governmental ambitions, while policies favoured by collectivists tend to produce smaller amounts of revenue to support greater governmental ambitions.

Is there anything as thick-witted as a man with his hand out for tax money while he regurgitates vituperations against capitalism and free markets?


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## Colin Parkinson (15 Jul 2014)

Government and large private sector are becoming risk intolerant, partly due to the MSM relentless need for more scandal fodder. When we were asked how to improve government I said "Reward failure, not all failure but good failure" For me that means taking a risk on a new idea that despite having done planning, it fails, or knowing going in that it has a 50/50 chance of failure, but a good payoff if it succeeds. An example, Vancouver was building tourist subs for the rest of the world. They were not allowed to operate here as there was no certification for them, basically as there had been no demand and it takes Transport Canada years and years to come up with new regs (more like decades really) A risk tolerant bureaucracy would inspect the vessel with the regs that do fit and a caveat that each passenger is advised that a full certification is not possible. The Inspector is protected under the Act and the company can be more innovative, but with enough oversight not to be completely stupid. Both sides expect a certain amount of risk. This also requires senior management and Ministers to have the balls to back their people, even in front of a media looking for a juicy story.


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## Brad Sallows (15 Jul 2014)

Litigators can give the MSM competition in the contest to see which is most effective at promoting risk intolerance.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Oct 2014)

It's no secret that _I think _that trade and commerce are at least as likely to pose a grave threat to our peace and security than religion or ideology. My contribution to this thread has consisted of a series of "good news/bad news" articles by others. Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_ is another "bad news" article:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/the-world-trade-organization-needs-a-new-rule-book-backbone/article21157222/#dashboard/follows/


> The World Trade Organization needs a new rule book, backbone
> 
> BARRIE MCKENNA
> OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail
> ...




The WTO is _*our*_ creature; it was created by and for the rich countries; blaming the up and coming economies for _*our*_ failures to play by the weak rules we set for ourselves is a a cop out. Agricultural trade is vital for the poor and developing countries; it is one of the few areas where they can compete, but the Big, Rich WE ~ USA, Europe, Japan and, yes, Canada, too ~ are not only depriving them access to our markets (by high tariffs) we are, unfairly, pushing our way into _their_ markets by our massive subsidies. It is disgraceful ... the USA is not only a deadbeat, trying to inflate its way out of debt, it is a global trade bully, too. (And it's not just President Obama and the Democrats, flaunting global trade agreements is common to both parties because it is wildly politically popular.)


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## Edward Campbell (25 Oct 2014)

On the subject of "more signal, less noise," the Obama administration sends a very strong _signal_ that everything in US foreign policy, even its most worrisome _strategic_ relationships, is to be viewed through a lens of partisan, domestic politics.


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## Colin Parkinson (31 Oct 2014)

linky no work for me, but it's always been clear that some politicians should never get beyond the municipal or Provincial level or in this case State. Obama should have just been another annoying semi-useless Congressman from Detroit.


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