# Fire Support downsizing continues - blame precision



## Kirkhill (3 Nov 2005)

First the USAF/USMC/RAF start steaming the HE out of bombs and filling them with concrete to reduce collateral damage

Then the 250 lb Small Diameter Bomb enters the scene

Meanwhile the Hellfire becomes weapon of choice for UAVs with its 20 lb warhead

Now the Hellfire is being complemented by something called Viper Strike with a 4 lb warhead.  It is a variant of the Brilliant Attack submunitions that was to be deployed from MLRS missiles.  Now it is  man in the loop stand-off munition launched from AC-130 Specter.  It needs its target to be lased, either from the ground or the air.

Same rational precision means more targets hit.  Less need for overkill to ensure that near-misses get the job done.  

http://www.defense-update.com/directory/viper-strike.htm


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## Infanteer (3 Nov 2005)

Meanwhile Taliban take to the caves and have to be rooted out by foot soldiers.


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## CBH99 (3 Nov 2005)

What do you propose we do about that in regards to warhead size, Infanteer?


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## Infanteer (3 Nov 2005)

I'm a Biddle fan - don't worry so much about warheads and get more boots on the ground.   Warheads are the realm of the Airpower crowd who are by nature an extention of the Artillery crowd of WWI who thought you could pound the trenchline to dust and walk in.   90 years later and the concept still hasn't proved to be true.

A 4-pound warhead is no better than a 2000-pound JDAM when it lands on some wedding party.  As the thread title says - blame precision.


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## CBH99 (3 Nov 2005)

Fair enough, point made.


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## 3rd Horseman (3 Nov 2005)

What ever happened to the adage "Never send a man were a warhead can go first" That does not mean send a war head only it means just first. The battle effectiveness of artillery and air power has improved astronomically since the original concepts of WW1. The concepts of precision in WW1 are the for fathers of all we do now dont knock them it was like the wheel being invented in the difference it made to the Inf. Vimy was perfect example.


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## Kirkhill (3 Nov 2005)

With some of the unarmed micro uavs being able to fly into the caves I don't think it will be long before somebody marries something like the Raven UAV with the 25mm programmable round from XM25 system and flies rounds in targeted support.

No attack with artillery, or air support, has ever been the cake-walk that the more optimistic supporters (many of the infantry) have hoped.  On the other hand, as 3rd Horseman suggests, very few if any attacks have gone in without successful fire support.  The difference today is that arty/air is more likely to achieve as much as they can with less effort. For example at Vimy one soldier stated that from his vantage point there were 51 pill boxes in his field of view (I forget the source, probably Dancocks).   The arty spent days trying to reduce targets like that and eventually had to send over a massive curtain to neutralize and isolate them long enough for individual soldiers with 1lb hand grenades to take them out.  Now 51 white concrete boxes on a muddy brown/green field would be dealt with pretty expeditiously. (And in a considerably more environmentally friendly fashion - fewer nasty holes in the ground with UXO in the bottom).

M72-LAW, CG-84, Javelin, Viper Strike, TOW-2, Hellfire, 155-CCF, Excalibur, G-MRLS, SDB, ATACMS-P, JDAMS.... on the other hand there will always be enough angry survivors that Infanteer's not going to run out of employment any time soon.


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## Infanteer (3 Nov 2005)

3rd Horseman said:
			
		

> What ever happened to the adage "Never send a man were a warhead can go first" That does not mean send a war head only it means just first.



Your absolutely right - however, the "Air Power" crowd doesn't seem to think we even need to do this.  The Desert Storm and Kosovo air offensives seem to be rightfully regarded as largely ineffectual - both needed serious ground power to achieve the aims.  The Afghanistan model of SOF soldiers guiding PGM's in has been shot down by Biddle.  Fix and strike - you need 'em both (who cares which group is doing the fixing and which is doing the striking).  Fighting power is made at the sharp end by the seamless integration of combined arms capability - it's been that way since Vimy.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Now 51 white concrete boxes on a muddy brown/green field would be dealt with pretty expeditiously. (And in a considerably more environmentally friendly fashion - fewer nasty holes in the ground with UXO in the bottom).



They found an Al Qa'ida command bunker in Tora Bora with 5 2000lb JDAM craters around it and yet Infantry had to still go in and root the bad guys out.  I don't see concrete boxes being replaced anytime soon - microterrain, and not technology, is still the largest factor on the battlefield.


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## Kirkhill (4 Nov 2005)

Give credit where it is due Infanteer...they're getting closer


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## Kirkhill (4 Nov 2005)

http://www.mindfully.org/Technology/Kenneth-Edwards-LOCAAS1sep96.htm



> Lockheed Martin Successfully Flight Tests Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System
> 
> 
> (Source: Lockheed Martin; issued Nov. 3, 2005)
> ...



http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34


PS Infanteer -  

JDAM with GPS - 13 m CEP (40 ft)
JDAM without GPS, using Inertial Navigation System (INS) only - 30 m CEP (100 ft) -  GPS jammers are known to be commercially available from foreign governments (employed in Iraq)
JDAM with GPS and/or INS AND with DAMASK seeker - 3 m CEP (10 ft) - DAMASK compares picture of target to target - as long as it can get a clear look at the target it will likely hit it - INS can get it close enough and unlike GPS can't be jammed.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Dec/Planned_JDAM.htm
http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~pacrange/s1/news/2000/DAMASK2.htm

As I said they're  getting closer - and they're doing it from farther away, with smaller bombs, launched in greater numbers from individual platforms, for less cost.


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## Kirkhill (10 Nov 2005)

> Raytheon Successfully Demonstrates Multi-Weapon Netted Battlefield
> 
> 
> (Source: Raytheon Company; issued Nov. 7, 2005)
> ...



http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.16743278.1131606546.Q3LyEsOa9dUAADz4jJI&modele=jdc_34


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

35 out of 35 250 lb bombs - all within 4 ft of the aim point and with a 60 nautical mile range.  Moving on to operational testing.  Unit cost roughly comparable to Javelin, TOW or Hellfire ATGMs or Excalibur 155 PGM (at something between 60 and 90,000 USD each while the others range from 60,000 for an old model Hellfire to 180,000 for a current model TOW)


http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.16746179.1131732850.Q3TfcsOa9dUAAGglTnk&modele=jdc_34




> Boeing Small Diameter Bomb Enters Operational Testing
> 
> 
> (Source: Boeing Co.; issued Nov. 10, 2005)
> ...


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Nov 2005)

Hmmm - all this talk of CEP and warhead size - perhaps we are missing the point?  Not to parrot the sexy word of the day, but surely the key determinant for any weapon, be it a warhead or "boots on the ground", must be a firm understanding of the effect that one is trying to acheive?  Once the effect is determined, then you can progress to discussions of the means....

Dave


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

Ooooohhhh - EBO.


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

The smaller the bomb the easier it is to fly, the easier it is to fly the more accurate it is, the more acurate and smaller it is the less collateral damage you get without lossing the target kill capability.


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Nov 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Ooooohhhh - EBO.



yeah yeah, I know...


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

I thought the primary effect expected of the artillery was to make obstacles in the way of "boots on the ground" disappear? 

If the obstacle disappears temporarily behind a curtain of HE it's neutralized.   If it is permanently removed it is eliminated.   Precision surely means less need for neutralizing which takes up a lot of ammunition and a heavy logistics load?   It also means fewer rounds and smaller rounds to eliminate the obstacle.

From here it also looks like the effect is the warhead and not the missile.

M67/(C3?) Hand grenade, M72, CG-84 and 60mm mortar all deliver "warheads" of something between 1 to 5 lbs to the target.

Spike/Javelin/Hellfire/Netfires-PAM have warheads in the 20 lb range (Eryx is about 10 lb or roughly the same as an 81 mm mortar round and TOW about 30 lb or about the same weight as a 120 mm mortar round)

105mm arty seems to be around 18 kg or about 40 lb while 155 mm arty fires a bullet or warhead of about 100 lb (47 kg)

The next group up seems to be around the 100 kg warhead (200 - 250 lb or so) including 250 lb bombs "naked" or with add on kits like Paveway, JDAM, DAMASK or Diamond Back;   the Small Diameter Bomb and the old reliable Maverick as well as the GMRLS ground launched missile with the 90 kg unitary warhead.

At 200 kg or about 500 lb we have the same kits as are available for the 250s (except that the 250 is only theoretical where they are in service on the 500s) along with the Harpoon and its SLAM-ER variant and the ATACMS unitary launched from the same launcher as the GMRLS.

At 400 to 500 kg or 1000 lb there are the same options for bombs as are available for the 250s and 500s   as well as systems such as the Joint Stand Off Weapon, the Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile, the Storm Shadow, the KEPD-350 and even the Tomahawk

At 2000 lb there are the same bomb kits as previously noted for the smaller rounds and the Air Launched Cruise Missile - Conventional with its 1450 kg warhead (actually about 3000 lb) 

Theoretically this progression could continue upwards through to Conventionally armed ICBMs, both sub launched and silo launched.

All the bombs and missiles are capable of being fitted with similar targeting devices and thus achieving comparable accuracies.   The guns seem to be little bit further behind the accuracy curve because of the high g's experienced on launch and the need to spin the round to stabilize it in flight but they are catching up with Course Correcting Fuzes and rounds like Excalibur.

The questions then become what kind of platforms can you carry with you to the fight,   how far away are they from the target, what is the response time and who has release authority.

I accept that even with all the gee-whiz stuff many if not most rounds can miss their target but before you might have had to bank on one Hornet with a 2000 lb bomb on board hitting (ie getting close enough to damage) the target.   Now that same aircraft can carry 8 SDBs each one of which has a chance at landing close enough, and carrying a sufficient warhead, that it can achieve the same effect as that 2000 pounder ( if it hit its target).

Because of that increase in the effectiveness of a 250 lb warhead (it can land close enough) then it seems also possible to consider swapping out some of the Air Support tasks and transferring them to GMRLS launchers.   One truck with a 6 pack of GMRLS missiles with ranges of 70 to 100 km can carry almost as much "effect" as a Hornet with 8 SDBs which in turn are approaching the "effectiveness" of dumb 2000 pounders.   It is also faster to reload an MRLS launcher than a Hornet.   And one might suggest it would be easier to deploy, cheaper to purchase and support, more likely to be available in all weathers 24/7 and faster off the mark to respond to a fire mission.

I agree entirely that effect is the best method of evaluating systems.   Though if the primary effect of the artillery (naval, terrestrial, aerial or strategic) is to remove obstacles this is usually accomplished by creating large holes where they used to be.   The size of the hole is directly related to the weight of the warhead.   The size of the hole necessary is directly related to how close the warhead lands to the target.   The closer the round lands, the smaller the hole necessary, the smaller the charge, the smaller the missile and the more that can be carried.   At the same time rounds landing closer means fewer rounds required - fewer trucks, helicopters, aircraft and ships to carry them and fewer drivers and loaders.

From my stand-point, at least as far as arty support is concerned, effect is synonymous with throw-weight (warhead) and accuracy (CEP).

(Beware - civvie flapping his gums again.... some facts may have been altered for purposes of discussion and due to sheer incompetence) ^-^


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

Comparing a soldier closing with rifle and grenade to a bomb dropped from a jet misses the point that PPCLI Guy brought up before (and I poked fun at) - namely the effect.  One must consider the effect in both the physical and the mental planes of conflict, which looking at payloads and distances can't do.

This is what my earlier example of the Al Qa'ida bunker with 5 JDAM craters around it alludes to - a grunt closing with the enemy is not merely a way to deliver a small bomb, it is psychological dislocation of the enemy.  An infantry soldier shooting-and-moving to the flank of the enemy starts him worrying about his security; an infantry soldier closing in on the assault with copious amounts of supporting fire (remember, at low level tactics, firepower enables maneuver) gets the bad guy shitting his pants because he's about to be killed.  A bomb from a plane or an artillery gun, whether it be 20lbs or 2000lbs provides a psychlogical shock of limited intensity and duration.  This is why soldiers in the Trenches could endure all the weight on the Western Front dumped on their heads by artillery and still manage to man their positions when the attack came.  A bomb from a plane or a gun can have devastating physical effects if it catches the enemy off-guard, but as Biddle's paper on Afghanistan shows, a smart enemy will soon learn how to not get caught off-guard.

This is why, in the end, all the precision in the world doesn't improve the ability of stand-off firepower to win wars.  The adage that "Firepower Destroys and Infantry Occupies" is wrong, and its modern day techno-modification that "Precision Firepower Destroys even better" is equally wrong.  In the end, it is the psychological dislocation of the attack (this is right in our doctrine) that wins the day; this is why, after 5 2000lb JDAM's, the US Infantry still had to root their Al Qa'ida enemies out of that bunker....


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

I am not suggesting that precision will "win wars" on its own.  I am suggesting that precision will reduce the logistical burden necessary to achieve the physical effect of eliminating obstacles.

With respect to WWI -  all the weight of fire in the world (at the time), for extended durations, making loud bangs and shaking the earth did not stop German machine gunners from clambering out of their holes to man their positions and inflict significant harm on advancing Canadian troops.

By contrast, I suggest that IF (stressed and stipulated - I will concede that this may not be the state of the art currently) IF the 51 bunkers previously alluded to were to be seen disappearing one after the other,  all bunkers targeted, no rounds wasted, no sense of "luck" in the equation, that this might encourage the rest of the inhabitants of the other bunkers to vacate the premises.  I believe that Gulf War I demonstrated something of that effect as Iraqis surrendered at the first opportunity because they felt that it was only a matter of time before their dug in tank or company disappeared next.

As you well know - I am strongly of the belief that technology only serves the "boots on the ground".  It doesn't win wars on its own.  

However the more effective the technology is the less need there is to carry lots of it around with you.  And with a good delivery system you need to carry still less.

This thread was not started to suggest that arty will be replacing infantry anytime soon.  

It does support the observations and conclusions of the Royal Artillery that in an environment where weight of fire is not called for,  where bullets travel farther from their launcher and land closer to their targets there is less need for bullets, less need for launchers and increasingly, less need for the same number of gunners to man the guns and mortars.  There have been automatic firing systems for mortars, rockets and missiles for at least the last 20 years.  Laying and firing can be automated - the only manpower necessary is to refill the magazine, check the batteries and recalibrate the sights.

Similarly, in the Air Force, there is a decreasing need for pilots to go screaming over the deck at 50 m to try and place one bomb on target.  The Brits gave that up in Gulf War I.  The Yanks had given it up sometime previous.  Now with the stand-off and precision targeting more missions can be flown at high altitude well out of the range of air defence systems.  With more rounds per aircraft and fewer rounds per kill it ultimately means less need for pilots and aircraft.  Together with increasing use of UAVs and the increased capability that more precise targeting gives to smaller warheads which can be ground launched this reduces the need for aircrew and aircraft.

One final point about your firing and manoeuvering comment.  Do copious amounts of ammunition flying overhead really get the enemy "******** his pants" if they aren't hitting the target?  Surely by that standard American troops fighting in the Zabul engagements mentioned previously should all have run away?  By contrast, it has been suggested that one of the contributing factors to the Argentinians surrendering to 2 Para at Goose Green, even though they outnumbered the Paras, was the fact that a high percentage of them were being hit between the eyes as they stuck their heads up.  The ratios of attackers to defenders and dead to wounded, coupled with the high number of head shots on that engagement briefly had the Paras under review for their conduct because they were so far removed from the norm.

It doesn't seem to be the amount of noise that makes people decide not to fight so much as the imminent and inevitable prospect of death.  Which is more frightening?  Lots of noise or watching your mates disappear one at a time knowing that you are next in line?


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

As a fire support coord guy I view the fire support weapons at my disposal as arrows in the quiver, I want as many different arrows as possible to suit each attack and target, thus weapons are selected and used to accomplish specific ends. Through weight is important if the effect is keep there head down and cause disruption so inf can maneuver close to stick in bayonet more neutralize than kill. When used for kill in non built up areas great even better but with todays urban fight selection of warhead is vital to keep the civi in Apt 12B alive while you take out bunker in apt 1A. The choice of 250 sdb is a move toward precision which is a kill capacity and is normally done to reduce casualties it is not intended to reduce ot eliminate another weapon specifically. The 250 came about when the 2000 pavways were too big and killing too many civilians and causing too much infrastructure damage (and all inf said about cost and log train). As such the down scale of bomb found an easier capability to fly (maneuver the bomb) than with the big stuff. For example a 2000 ib could be maneuvered about 100 meters off original aim point halfway through its trajectory. With a 1000 you get a bit more and as you go down you get better maneuver. Precision is not identical with weapons they vary based on the percent error and ability to maneuver the error out. Thus with a 250 lb bomb with an error of 350 meters you can fly it back onto target or change targets mid drop to acquire another or as was the case on occasion in Bosnia to steer away the bomb when friendly or non combatant was found at target site after release. 

 So to sum up precision is about choice of usage based on target and nature of the attack.

In artillery and fire support size does not matter, effects do, 105 has little kill capability compared to a 155 yet a 172 has less than a 155. In mortars 120 motar has higher kill capabilty for weight than a 155. Delivery is a way to attack it changes with the mission. Choice is whats important.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

Thanks for filling me in on the accuracy issues 3rd Horseman.

I take your point on choice.

Can you clarify something for me though with your comments about arty and fire support weights? (I will stipulate that a HEAT, HESH, HE or Thermobaric warheads will all have different effects though they may also weigh the same)

You mentioned that the 





> 105 has little kill capability compared to a 155 yet a 172 has less than a 155. In mortars 120 motar has higher kill capabilty for weight than a 155.


  Doesn't that have a lot to do with the construction of the shell and the necessity of building a bullet (or bomb) that will survive the launch?  The 120 launches less violently than the 155 so it doesn't require as heavy a construction.  When the payload detonates on the 120 it doesn't have to punch its way through as much metal as it does in a 155.

When you go to "soft-launch" systems like missiles and air-dropped bombs you don't need those heavy casings to allow the launch so surely the effect is more directly proportionate to the weight of the warhead (or perhaps more precisely the weight of the filler)?


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## George Wallace (14 Nov 2005)

Kirkhill

You have to remember that Artillery rounds and Mortar rounds are constructed differently.  Artillery rounds have to have thicker casings than Mortar rounds, cut to the way that they are fired from their tubes.  Artillery rounds have to survive greater forces, from larger charges (in their propellants) to achieve their greater ranges.  Mortars have less range, and have less violent propellant charges involved.


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

You have good points,

    HEAT and HESH are direct fire so not in the main quiver of a fire support inventory and they are more and extention of the bayonet in the close in fight. 

    Weapon (warhead) weight was a determinate for distance and the lowering of casing size and weight was to achieve greater distance on the battlefield. I would suggest that survivability of launch was not a design aspect when air drop and missile was created it was a weight factor that limited distance fired. Thus a good example of comparison would be 120 mm rocket vice 120 mm mortar. You are right the change of delivery will change the amount of explosive in the warhead but the net result wont necessarily be an increase in kill capacity. A person could be 50 meters from a MLRS 120 and alk away but a 120 mortar you would die some 150m away, oh and it hurts very loud.

    The drive towards precision in my mind wont lesson the number of people in the chain it will just change there jobs or location. With an attack on a target that requires no interest in collateral damage I would select a combination of precision and big bombs. The initial stage would be precision strikes to kill specific targets that are HPTs (or is dangerous to the maneuvering Inf) then a combonation of heavy weight to keep the head down and shake the internal organs so the enemy will give up the will to fight. So instead of 4 aircraft dropping 2 bombs each at a weight of 1000lbs each   you wont find less aircraft with precision you would get 2 aircraft dropping precision 250s 8 each and then folowe up with the 2 dropping the big stuff the cause disruption.


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> By contrast, I suggest that IF (stressed and stipulated - I will concede that this may not be the state of the art currently) IF the 51 bunkers previously alluded to were to be seen disappearing one after the other,  all bunkers targeted, no rounds wasted, no sense of "luck" in the equation, that this might encourage the rest of the inhabitants of the other bunkers to vacate the premises.  I believe that Gulf War I demonstrated something of that effect as Iraqis surrendered at the first opportunity because they felt that it was only a matter of time before their dug in tank or company disappeared next.



I guess my continued criticism is aimed at the fact that I don't think "Precision" is the revolution it's chalked up to be.   We've had "precision" since WWI - a British Artillery unit new exactly where the Hun was (his friggen trench was only a few hundred meters away) and was competent enough to put a round on whatever he wanted.   The fact that they put an additional 25,000 rounds on that piece of real-estate means that for all the precision in the world, microterrain still provides a foil for anything that technology can put forth.   As I said above, the smart enemies figure out real quick (by watching the dumb ones die) how to avoid our asymmetrical advantage in firepower.   This is why I've quoted the Biddle anecdote extensively.   If a "precision" platform is dropping 2000lb bombs on a bunker and not killing it, then precision means nothing because the value of the terrain makes it impervious to stand-off firepower.   Your 51 bunkers probably don't care if we shell them for 3 days or if we drop 51 precision bombs on their bunkers because if they do things right, they'll more or less survive either way.

This is Stephen Biddle's principle premise with his idea of the Modern System of Force Employment.   The idea is covered in a case study of Afghanistan  and fully developed in his book Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.

The Iraq example is the result of the US Air Force foisting the gods of technology upon us in the form of "RMA" - this is best expressed in Richard Hallion's Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War.   However, I feel that this has been successfully put in its place, especially after Kosovo.   Biddle makes Iraq one of his 3 main case studies in his book to prove that.

Firepower in any form and at any level is half the equation - I know we both believe this to be true.   However, I'm concerned that efforts of the "Firepower RMA" crowd are using precision as a replacement for boots on the ground (Biddle's paper take special aim at this).   We're seeing this leech out into things like the MMEV; its proponents think they can turn the LAV into some precision wielding death machine.   I'm really not concerned about how accurate these weapons systems are - our Gunners can put a dumb round where they want to; I'd be just as happy having a full Regiment of M777 155mm guns on line with a full "quiver of arrows" instead of chasing the dream of increasing precision.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

Good stuff, thanks again.

I think what I have been skating around as much as anything may be that with the evolving technologies it seems to me that "effect" is becoming less dependent on the missile, the launcher and the platform carrying the launcher and more "just" a function of the warhead.

I do understand what you said and I know this may sound like I am contradicting you but I'm trying not to.

Hellfire and TOW are both direct fire systems that deliver warheads to a target.   Originally they delivered HEAT warheads to defeat tanks.   Now they are being used to deliver bunker-busting and thermobaric warheads.   I see them as being analogous to single-use UAVs.

The Air Force fills their bombs with all manner of interesting concoctions just as the Arty fills their bullets.   The filling (& the construction) of the bullets determine the effects.

In the past each of the above systems evolved from the specific needs of particular services, were dependent on available technologies and resulted in envelopes of capabilities that were often entirely distinct from each other.   Now technologies seem to be widening those envelopes of capability so that there is an increasing degree of overlap between systems and services.   Are we getting to the point where some of the systems are less critical in planning?

I'll stick with the HIMARS/LIMAWS-R GMRLS/ATACMs for a moment here.   Its envelope seems to be expanding to encompass some of the missions that might be flown by Close Air Support forces (small bombs attacking precision targets).   It also is capable of its earlier mission of seeding the ground with grenades and mines.   This is usually done, so I gather in one fell swoop of number of rounds.   

One of the attributes of guns and mortars is that they can sustain fire.   Can't a rocket troop/battery sustain fire just by spreading out the launch times?

With the Lockheed producing loitering missiles, with rockets carrying brilliant sub munitions to kill tanks, why not carry a cargo of 10x 10 lb charges with programmable precision seekers instead of one 200 lb charge as an alternative?   The dumb grenades and the unitary charge, the mines and the thermobarics, as well as the brilliant tank killers could all still be available - driving that choice of effect.   

Perhaps I can ask it another way - how might you develop systems so as to increase the choice of effect while at the same time reducing the logistical burden?   Can advantage be taken of the increasing size and overlapping natures of the capability envelopes?

In a specific case do you see it possible for Canada to deploy to places like Darfur or Kandahar (minimal air threat) without taking along fixed wing support but instead taking along something like HIMARS?

By the way,   while HEAT and HESH are currently direct fire   what might you call a HEAT warhead attached to a vertically launched missile that can attack on any azimuth for 0 to 6400 mil and has a range of 40 km with the intent of taking out tanks and bunkers.

- And George - how did you get that post in AFTER my post?   

Infanteer:  Chalk and Cheddar - I am NOT talking about substituting precision for boots.  Full stop.  We can stop "violently agreeing" - apologies to 2B ;D.

Nor am I saying that accurately placing an ineffective charge will make the resulting explosion any more satisfactory.

What I am saying is that one of the reasons big bombs have been used in the past is that even if they missed by a mile they created enough of a draft to blow the house down.  On the other hand there are targets that even now require a nuke dropped right on their heads to make a dent. 

With missiles becoming more precise then, in addition to the issues I was asking 3rd Horseman about, it increases the number of weapons that are available to effectively engage particular targets.  It also forces the enemy to spend more resources digging in and building overhead protection making hasty defences less effective.  

Ultimately (we violently agree again I think) the conventional WWI/WW2/Iran-Iraq battlefield becomes less tenable and the enemy chucks his uniform, gets a credit card and an adjustable wrench, heads to an Ontario Hydro substation and drains all the coolant from the transformers.  In the meantime the enemy has been denied the conventional battlefield.  Leave it up to Ontario Hydro to make sure all their plugs stay in place.

While they're worrying about that you can spend your time making sure that his poorer brothers without the credit card aren't getting up to mischief at home.

Keeping in mind that an SDB can punch through a foot or two of reinforced concrete to get to the aircraft within for $100,000 how much overhead protection can build over your position?  TOWs and MILANs that are comparably priced are being used to defeat machine gun positions on a regular basis so its not as if you're not worth the investment  .


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

The majority of forward thinking fire support people don't subscribe to the precision replacing boots argument.

   Precision is about the whole package that includes the director of the fire support to the selection of the weapon and last but not least the big boom on the target. The US has a very poor record of using the full package and I would suggest that they do not have the skill set to do the task. Kosovo was a failure of skill and not precision. I would suggest that the better skilled soldier would select a better weapon to defeat a cave. The use of a high precision weapon with good flight capabilities in the hands of a skilled operator would kill or incapacitate a cave dweller. That attack in combination with an Inf attack would result in a success. The US like to drop bombs the day before and a bunch of bad weapons no matter how big (below nuc) wont kill a dug in enemy.

WW1 did not have much precision and the result is as has been described. 

A 250 SDB flow into the mouth of a cave with a delay fuse would result in a kill collapse or incapacitation of the dweller. Giving the Inf a chance to enter and closewith the enemy with a safer result.

EDIT it would appear we are all agreeing....


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

I guess I'm trying to say that to me the value of precision isn't that it will kill the enemy any better (which I don't think it will) but rather that it won't kill people around him quite so much.   This is why I thought 51 bombs on 51 bunkers was irrelevent.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2005)

> EDIT it would appear we are all agreeing....



On this site its the journey as much as the destination... 

Cheers and thanks again.


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

Agreed, bad example thou the US like to drop big bombs on hills to make themselves feel good. No doubt it did not work.

The precision argument not killing his next trench over mate is valid that is why selection of weapon is so important. Precision is for the HPT dangerous target for the maneuver Inf and the rest of the quiver is for the assult so the Inf can get close without getting shot at.

As for the good question of overlap or using HEAT weapons in softer missions I would disagree never go to a knife fight with a knife you want to use the big stuff. Always arrive prepared for overkill it is a slippery slop to tailor a force for a mission that is why we are in the pickle we are in now. A full up mech cold war brigade can take on anything tayloring will get you killed when your enemy shows up with a bigger gun then you cause he bought it from a black market.


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

3rd Horseman, the quiver analogy is a good one - I'd like to see artillery being versatile enough that even systems could be included in the quiver.  81mm and 120mm mortars, 155mm howitzer, MLRS; a good artillery team can be put on any system and use it as the mission requires.

Now show me the money!  We need more than 6 M777's!


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Nov 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Now show me the money!   We need more than 6 M777's!



Or perhaps one more light infantry battalion with 6 snipers.  Again - it depends on the effect.  if the effect that you desire is taking the fight to the bad guy, and slotting him, then give me the 6 snipers every time...


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

Or how about 17 snipers as per the LIWG proposal?


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## 3rd Horseman (14 Nov 2005)

If the desired effect is death of the enemy then a mech battalion against a light battalion the light unit will die very fast even if all the battalion are snipers thats the effect. 

I see your 6 snipers and raise you 1 fire support team.


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## Infanteer (14 Nov 2005)

3rd Horseman said:
			
		

> If the desired effect is death of the enemy then a mech battalion against a light battalion the light unit will die very fast even if all the battalion are snipers thats the effect.
> 
> I see your 6 snipers and raise you 1 fire support team.



Yeah, I bet you the Russians were saying that after Grozney I. :tsktsk:


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## 3rd Horseman (15 Nov 2005)

Bad soldiers is no example but they did win that war anyway even with bad soldiers. The example is better made with two equally trained units if one was mech and one was light. Just check out casualty rates in Iraq for light troops compared to mech vast difference never take a knife to a gun fight.

Have you seen the movie road to Grozni or $%#&* column (weird Russian name) the title is bad translation from the Russian it profiles a Russian mech battle group as it fights through Chechnya. They slaughter all they come upon it is mech violence at its best against light troops. It was filmed by the unit itself on hand held video cam.


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## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2005)

All this assumes that the mech battalion can get to the fight......and can find a place to fight once it gets there.

In fact the whole issue is a discussion of overmatch - how do you get more to the fight than the other guy can get and how do you get it there faster.  Not just to get into theater but to "change flanks" once you get there and wrong foot the other guy.


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## 3rd Horseman (15 Nov 2005)

Yes you are so right that is why a mech bn can dismount and go light if it desires. The way we used to be way back when in the 80s.  But I think I have gone off topic sorry I digress.


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## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2005)

In the 80s we weren't so much Mech Inf as it has come to be meant now (Armoured Inf or Panzergrenadiers) as Light Inf with armoured transport.


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## Acorn (16 Nov 2005)

And "going light" meant carrying less and walking. There's a bit more to Light Infantry than that. Or so I'm told.


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## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2005)

> There's a bit more to Light Infantry than that. Or so I'm told.



That seems to be the question of the hour, doesn't it?


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## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2005)

http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_20054811.asp
http://www.govcomm.harris.com/solutions/marketindex/product.asp?source=alpha&product_id=333

Getting back to the 51 MG positions - and the desire to eliminate them as HPTs - I find it difficult to believe that our WWI observer, both Allied and German wouldn't have been impressed by the capability supplied by the SDB, and on the allied side happy to see them gone -  some German airborne sappers that had to deliver satchel charges on Fort Eben Emael in WW2 might also have preferred that intervention as well.

Not answer to everything - but sniping with bombs, plastering with bombs or dropping sappers with satchel charges?


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## Kirkhill (19 Nov 2005)

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/dec1/Services_Focus.htm

This article from the December 2005 National Defence Magazine covers much of the same ground covered here.

A few interesting highlights:

Excalibur is compatible with 1RCHAs new M777 155mms.



> ....Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., is working to fulfill an urgent request to put the 155 mm guided Excalibur howitzer round, known as the XM982, into combat by early 2006.
> 
> The Excalibur, the service's first fully autonomous guided projectile, is more accurate than any other round currently available, according to Col. Ole Knudsen, project manager. During a demonstration firing at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., in September, an Excalibur hit a target 15 kilometers away. It detonated within seven meters of the target.




Viper Strike is deployable on AC-130 gunships, Predator UAVs and Little Bird helicopters



> Viper Strike is a gliding munition that is capable of standoff, precision attack. It uses satellite-aided navigation and a semi-active laser seeker, explained Steven L. Borden, the Army's deputy product manager for submunitions. It is intended for operations that require a flexible angle of inclination-steep or shallow-particularly in mountainous terrain or built-up areas, where strict rules of engagement are in force.
> 
> Its small size and precision provide for low collateral damage in cluttered urban environments, Borden said. Viper Strike's exact precision is classified, he said. However, he did say that it could hit within one meter of its target.
> 
> ...



HIMARS is the truck-mounted version of the MRLS system - it fire guided missiles beyond 70 km with a 200 lb payload and the TACMS-P out to 300 km with a 500 lb payload



> In addition, HIMARS reduces ground troops' reliance upon close-air support to protect them from enemy fire. "The Air Force and half of the Marine Corps believe that air power is the only way to provide fires," said Marine Maj. William D. Rice, his service's precision-fires liaison at Redstone. "But air can't operate in bad weather. HIMARS can help pick up that slack. It doesn't worry about the weather."



And then there is this pertaining to LOS, BLOS and NLOS engagements:



> BLOS uses a manned or unmanned sensor to acquire a target, and allows the shooter-either an MCS or an Abrams-to hit the target without exposing itself to enemy fire, Tarcza explained.
> 
> In contrast, line-of-sight engagement requires the shooter to acquire the target at greater risk of coming under fire. Non-line-of-sight combat employs an observer, usually from another unit, to acquire the target. With BLOS, the target is acquired by a member of the same unit as the shooter. This gives the commander greater control and increasing the speed of the operation, especially compared with non-line of sight engagement, Tarcza said. A BLOS operation requires an average of 12 seconds to fire-not as fast as the line of signt scenario at eight seconds, but much speedier than the non-line of sight at 2:15 minutes.


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## Kirkhill (24 Nov 2005)

I feel moved to comment on a comment by Infanteer on this thread (http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28146.105/topicseen.html) about Naval Gunfire Support.



> Obviously, Naval Surface Fire Support is important if we are to undertake "sea-based operations ashore".  Precision, as Kirkhill mentioned above, is one important factor.  Precision is a useful tool and can be a force multiplier in complex warfighting.  However, precision isn't a panacea - as argued in this thread, there are many cases where a well placed munition won't matter, for there are many ways to protect oneself from both the accuracy and the power of precision weapons (this comes out of Biddle's paradigm of Modern System of Force Employment).  The other half of the equation is physical mass - physical mass backed by volume.  Should a platform like the one being discussed above be able of providing both precision and mass?



He seems to be suggesting that because I noted that PGMs could be mounted aboard vessels and launched from the Vertical Launch System that I continue to labour under a belief that precision will displace mass.

If you are monitoring this Infanteer, and I know you are  , my point is not that PGMs necessarily displace mass but that PGMs make applied mass more effective and thus fewer launched rounds are "wasted" by falling remotely from the point of aim.  This reduces the number of rounds necessary in theatre and the wear and tear on the launchers, or conversely the number of targets engaged.

If you want to employ area suppression tactics then perhaps an airbursting PGM would be as effective, if not moreso, as a point detonating shell falling 200 m away from the intended target.  

The Course Correcting Fuze, a cheap (at about 2000 dollars a fuze to be fitted to a 1000 dollar shell versus a 100,000 dollar Excalibur) seems to recognize this by aiming to reduce the CEP for shells employed in supplying "mass" fires TO 50 m.  This is compared to CEPs of 1-13 m for various PGMs and a CEP of 200 m ("LW 155 shall have a bias circular error probable (CEP) not exceeding 200 meters (threshold) to 50 meters (objective) at 25 kilometers." - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lw155.htm).

It seems to me that once the Point of Aim can be reliably hit then it wouldnt take much effort to create a fire plan that could cover a large area for an extended duration.  The converse would be that if you can't reliably hit the Point of Aim then it will take a lot of time and area to create the conditions necessary to finally hit a point target.  

Precision munitions seem to be inherently more flexible, if more expensive on a per unit basis (not necessarily a per mission basis once logistics and maintenance are included) than "dumb" munitions.

By the way, while looking for the numbers on this I came across these two presentations:

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004precision_strike/PEOPrecisionconf_final.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004fuze/finch.pdf

Some interesting stuff both on fuzes, munitions and "launchers" including Variable Volume Chamber guns.


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## Infanteer (24 Nov 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> He seems to be suggesting that because I noted that PGMs could be mounted aboard vessels and launched from the Vertical Launch System that I continue to labour under a belief that precision will displace mass.



No, I wasn't suggesting that.  I was just stating that a smaller bomb that has a precision warhead does not mean it is more effective because it is still a smaller warhead.  The comment focused on the fact that precision fire from the 16-inch guns Iowa which delivered mass and in great quantities was important - the Commandant of the USMC stated that a 5-inch gun, no matter how precise, would not meet the Naval Fire Support needs of the Marines.

My comment pointed out that precision was one side of the equation, but that if we are going to rely on seaborne forces, perhaps we need a gun with "omph" to get more mass where we need it.


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## 3rd Horseman (24 Nov 2005)

I must agree with Inf it is only a portion of the equation. As per my comments earlier it is important to slect the right weapon and launcher to get the job done, the more in the inventory the better for the fire support O to get the job done by selecting the best weapon and launcher for the job. As a note the 16 inch Naval gun as fired from the US battleships is one of the most accurate guns and it comes with much omph. The gun supported Marines in Lebanon with sniping gun tasks where precision was needed. A single shell would be fired at a single 50cal MG bunker. This was done due to its accuracy and the need to reduce collateral damage. NGOs claim it was extremely effective.


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## Kirkhill (24 Nov 2005)

I agree. A bigger package of HE applied precisely will be more effective against a wider array of targets than a small package of HE.  My point is that in the past one of the forces driving any artillery (conventional, airborne or missile) towards larger packages of HE was not just the strength of the target but also the inaccuracy of the weapons.  Large packages allowed inaccurately delivered weapons to still be effective.

All I am saying is that regardless of the size of the package of HE it pays to hit the target.  Harder targets will always require large charges but by making small charges more effective then the enemy will be forced to expend more time and money preparing harder defences.  This increases the speed with which he runs out of both and also decreases his mobility as he has more invested in infrastructure that he is likely to be reluctant to abandon.

This is not an argument to eliminate big shells, bombs and missiles - this is simply stating that precision makes smaller systems more effective and thus makes it harder for the enemy to generate effective defences.  It means that any given system is likely to be able to deal with a larger target set.  For me this suggests that this increased flexibility might be exploited in different ways by, for example, adding the GMRLS system to our arsenal thereby perhaps allowing us to undertake missions that previously might have ONLY been possible with fixed wing support.

I am not an either/or type of person.  Gray's my colour ;D.


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## 3rd Horseman (24 Nov 2005)

Agreed,

    And now for something very contraversal but applicable to the current discussion. With all the arguments and discussions for and against and agreements on a combination of the two, precision/HE  throw weight we have forgotten about the other group of weapons in our inventory....non conventional. Nuc, air fuel mix, chemical and bio. As a past fire support O these were always in the quiver for usage except chem and bio. It is important to include chem and bio as the enemy may use them on us and due to that they will defend against it. When precision is not needed and a difficult enemy needs to be cleaned up then non conventional is the way to go. Personally I like air fuel mix weapons they would have easily sorted out the 51 cave issue. 

In the words of my Inf instructor (Australian Capt on exchange)...Don't be fooled by the obvious...just because the en is small (insert unmentionable slur) always use the big stuff you will want to get every one.


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## Kirkhill (24 Nov 2005)

I know that the press finds the Air Fuel weapons controversial but I didn't think the "professionals" saw them that way.  Is there that much difference in effect (ie killing mechanism) beyond scale between and FAE round and an HE air-burst?

The controversial system that I find fascinating is the cluster munition.  As I understand them the big problem is UXOs caused by "fratricide" or grenades detonating so close to each other in time and space that the detonators of a percentage of them are damaged preventing them from exploding properly.  I wonder if in this new world of GMRLS/UAVs/RPVs/Glide bombs they couldn't attach popout wings to a GMRLS with a cargo of grenades, have it fly "lazy 8s" over the target then dispense them on a time release basis.  The ability to deploy all those grenades (200-400?) in one missile over an area, for an extended period of time would surely go a long way to supplying suppression.

As for the NBC stuff....I don't know that we are ready for that even if the other guys do use them first.  It might be different if they were a state enemy but I think that the risk of collateral damage to "innocent" civilians would be just too great -  too unpalatable for the home audience.


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## Cloud Cover (25 Nov 2005)

3rd Horseman said:
			
		

> As a note the 16 inch Naval gun as fired from the US battleships is one of the most accurate guns and it comes with much omph. The gun supported Marines in Lebanon with sniping gun tasks where precision was needed. A single shell would be fired at a single 50cal MG bunker. This was done due to its accuracy and the need to reduce collateral damage. NGOs claim it was extremely effective.



Some of those were experimental radar and radio wave guided projectiles.


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