# Major-General Lewis MacKenzie CM, MSC, OOnt, CD



## bossi (26 Oct 2002)

It's well-documented in the media that most government decisions are not made in cabinet - instead, they're made in the PMO (and, the death knell of democracy, with far too much input from partisan political advisors instead of loyal Canadians - after all, those smug, smarmy twerps who analyse the polls don't have to swear an oath of allegiance to Canada - instead, they've got their noses so far up the PM's butt ... they can see the bottom of Sheila Copp's shoes ... but, I digress)

As I was saying, it's ironic that decisions made in the PMO's office are finally coming home to roost.

Specifically, the quislings have been neglecting defence spending in favour of "more important" priorities (i.e. musical fountains in the PM's riding, or Challenger jets for Papa Doc Crouton).

The irony of it all is that now they've slit their own throats.   Canada is (or already has) lost it's place on the world stage, since we can no longer contribute with meaningful military forces.

And so, those psycophantic weasels now face political oblivion - Canada is becoming a Third World nation (as far as international influence is concerned), and the quislings have nobody to blame except themselves.

Ah, the irony ... hoisted by their own policies ...
However, loyal Canadians (who actually have sworn oaths of allegiance) deserve better.

It's a shame that the Liberal party has manipulated the Freedom of Information Act to exclude "party" documents and discussions, since that's were the treason has actually taken place.

Only in Canada, eh?   Pity ...

Meanwhile, McCallum ... ?   Blah, blah, blah ...

Strapped military costs credibility
Ex-CO calls Chretien's anti-terrorism vow hollow

By BILL RODGERS, SUN OTTAWA BUREAU

 Canada has lost its credibility to speak out against terrorism because it's failing to put money where its mouth is, says retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie. 

MacKenzie warns that in shortchanging security forces, Canada is putting a serious strain on our relations with the U.S. 

"The attitude of Washington is no longer disappointment," says MacKenzie, the security adviser to the Ontario government. "They're pissed off and they're more than happy to say that behind closed doors." 

MacKenzie gets an earful during tours of the U.S. on the military lecture circuit, and says the Chretien government's vow to stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. and its allies on the war against global terrorism rang hollow from the outset. 

Meanwhile, Defence Minister John McCallum was calling on his own government yesterday to spend more on the military, saying Canada should be contributing more toward the defence of North America and the free world. 

Reaction to McCallum's first address since taking the portfolio four months ago ranged from dismissive to hopeful. 

At the Edmonton Garrison, troops aren't holding their breath waiting to see new cash. "It's nice that he's asking for more money," says one. "We've had promises like this before and they haven't amounted to a hill of beans. It's all part of the Ottawa tug-of-war and we don't dwell on the details - we just to have to live with the results." 

The minister said the Canadian Forces are demoralized and financially wounded, and promised to appoint a panel of private-sector experts to streamline his department's administration. 

"If you ask me if we should do more or less than we are currently doing in the defence of our country and our continent, I would say more," he told an audience of about 50 at the Toronto Board of Trade. 

"If you ask me if we should do more or less in deploying our forces to the myriad trouble spots of the world, I would say more." 

While the federal government cut about 25 per cent from the defence budget in the '90s, it's promised to restore more than $5 billion between this fiscal year and 2006, he noted. 

"Notwithstanding these improvements, we should be spending more than is currently planned," said McCallum, in the opening salvo of a campaign to pressure his government for more money in February's budget.

+++

Yes, we have no military
   
The Ottawa Citizen 
Friday, October 25, 2002

Among the qualifications required for promotion in Canada's modern military, we have concluded, is not only a clear enthusiasm to preside over the dissolution of Her Majesty's Armed Forces but a willingness to deny that it is happening, no matter how obvious the signs of its demise.

So we were not surprised when reports that a Canadian crew had refused to put to sea in one of those leaky, reconditioned British submarines were promptly and vigorously denied by Vice-Admiral R.D. Buck, chief of maritime staff. He wrote to this newspaper that "this recent case is an excellent example of how our very effective process to identify and ultimately resolve safety issues was used and worked well. As a result, no orders were given that could have put submariners at undue risk."

In other words, when they said they wouldn't sail that submarine, you avoided technically ordering them to.

Then the Citizen reported that on Sept. 11, 2001, Canada had to rely on American fighter planes to escort a suspicious Korean Airlines flight through Canadian airspace. (There were fears that it, too, had been hijacked by terrorists. Fortunately, this proved not to be the case.) We weren't short of planes, Chief of the Air Staff Lt.-Gen. Lloyd Campbell promptly wrote. Heavens, no. We have lots of planes. The Americans were just closer.

Uh-huh.

As the old saying goes, nothing is too good for the Canadian Forces, and that's what they usually get.

Next, Rear Admiral Glen Davidson, commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic, said he hopes to have one of those British submarines ready for service in Halifax by Christmas -- except for an absence of those pesky torpedo thingies. Or, in bureaucratese, "She won't be fully operational in the sense of a weapons-firing capability."

Some nations might consider this a major drawback in a warship, but not our brass hats.

Nowadays, we await with anticipation a smoothly plausible explanation from one of this nation's high-ranking officers of a recent report about Kosovo. The report says that during the April 1999 NATO bombing of parts of the former Yugoslavia, we Canadians had to beg the Americans in writing for bombs for all those sparkling, combat-ready planes.

So load those pens and fire away, all you top brass. We sleep better knowing that at least the public relations department of DND is always ready, aye, ready.

+++

McCallum seeking money for Forces, modern equipment

By DANIEL LEBLANC
Saturday, October 26, 2002 (Globe and Mail)

OTTAWA -- Defence Minister John McCallum says that he will cut administrative fat and outdated weapon systems out of the Canadian Forces, and acknowledged that he is looking for money for more troops and to buy modern equipment.

In a well-received speech in Toronto yesterday, Mr. McCallum acknowledged that convincing Canadians and the rest of the federal government to spend more on the military will be a massive task.

In making his case to the public, he stated that the country's sovereignty depends on a bigger and better-equipped military.

"Sovereignty . . . doesn't come cheap," Mr. McCallum told the Toronto Board of Trade.

He said that to remain sovereign, Canadians must be able to fight terrorism and participate in the protection of the continent while maintaining a presence in the Canadian North and promoting democracy around the world.

"Our government must be able to deploy forces overseas to reflect Canadian priorities and values, to help Canada achieve its foreign-policy objectives and to do our fair share in the struggle for democracy and freedom around the globe," Mr. McCallum said.

The troops cannot keep up with deployments in places such as Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and, potentially, Iraq, he said.

Canada was involved with 79 military missions in the past decade, compared with 24 from 1948 to 1989.

Mr. McCallum said that in recent years, the government has had to funnel millions of dollars out of capital budgets just to make ends meet. Over all, "we should be spending more than is currently planned," he said, calling for more money as early as the next budget.

He did not say how much he needs, but most experts believe it must be at least $1-billion more a year.

In the meantime, Mr. McCallum is considering chopping old capabilities, which he called "remnants of an earlier era," and calling on private-sector input to streamline the military administration.

While Mr. McCallum did not state specific targets for cutbacks, experts say that the Forces are considering getting rid of armoured vehicles to become lighter and more mobile.

Retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie said Mr. McCallum seemed to hit many of the right notes in his bid to win public support for the Forces. "I would agree with the sovereignty argument from a political point of view," he said, praising the attempt to chop the bloated bureaucracy.

Former Liberal foreign-affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy sided with Mr. McCallum, saying that Canada needs better logistics, airlift and intelligence capabilities to "make our own choices." The Conference of Defence Associations said Mr. McCallum is on the right track, showing rare transparence for a defence minister.

The Canadian Alliance said it is time for Mr. McCallum to deliver.

"Minister McCallum's rhetoric matches that of his predecessors in the portfolio. But that rhetoric has never translated into cash on the table for our Armed Forces during almost a decade of Liberal rule," Alliance MP Leon Benoit said.


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## Gunnar (24 Feb 2003)

Our forces need more money -- and a vision
   
Lewis MacKenzie   
National Post 


Monday, February 24, 2003

   
What a shame that any and all attempts to have a serious discussion in this country regarding something as important as how our tax dollars will be spent immediately degenerates into duelling sound bites on the six o'clock news. Professional media consultants feed their government clients talking points and one-liner rebuttals and the quality of the debate goes downhill from there. Parliament's Question Period contributes to the dumbing down of policy discussions with its time constraints and restrictions.

Before commenting on some of the specifics regarding the military's share of Finance Minister John Manley's largesse, permit me to make a couple of points. First, any budget that does not require the Canadian Forces to give back dollars has come to be accepted as pretty good news. Depending on how you do the math, the defence budget has been reduced by somewhere between $20-billion and $29-billion since 1993. That oft-quoted calculation is based on the money the military would have had to carry out its directed tasks if it hadn't been required to make the largest contribution of any government department to help Paul Martin stare down the deficit dragon. Considering the fact that inflation for military equipment can, and usually does, run significantly more than that experienced by the civilian economy, the military's budget has pretty well been cut in half during the past 10 years.

Secondly, in light of the government's last eight budgets, the Defence Minister, John McCallum, deserves considerable credit for convincing an overly centralized and competitive budget decision-making process to commit $800-million additional dollars to defence during each of the next three years. Mr. McCallum is a quick study and, in spite of self-admitted indifference to things military before he took over the portfolio, he now realizes and appreciates the disproportional contribution our Forces make to our security and international reputation.

Unfortunately, when it was suggested by some that the additional funds were far less than adequate to resolve the Forces' current and future manning, rust-out and operational training challenges, the inevitable one-liner rebuttals were mobilized. Mr. Manley himself, when cross-examined on a national TV network, indicated it was only the "retired military" that were calling for more than the $800-million -- and amazingly, he got away with it! The fact is, the most outspoken "lobbyists" for additional funding beyond the $800-million per year were: the Liberal-chaired commons standing committee on national defence and veteran's affairs, the Liberal-appointed Auditor-General and the Senate of Canada's report on the same subject. The first two, after thorough analysis, recommended that $1.5-billion be added to the base line during each of the next three years, making a total of $9-billion versus the $2.4-billion promised in the budget. The Senate called for an immediate injection of $4-billion into defence in the first year alone. The "retired military" were merely a few forlorn voices in the choir.

Mr. McCallum, responding to criticism, tried to put the onus back on the military, indicating that it was the uniformed members who said "$800-million is what we need to do the job." Not really. What has not been readily revealed is the amount of money that has and will continue to be robbed from the capital equipment fund to pay for an operational tempo that deploys a higher percentage of our forces abroad than any other country in the world. Virtually all major purchases will have to be delayed at least seven years, thereby compounding the "rust-out" crisis. As a result, the percentage of the defence budget spent on equipment will tumble to 10% -- the lowest by far in NATO. A few scant years ago we were committed to move it from 15% to 23%. The long-term implication will be a bankrupt capital equipment (ships, plans, vehicles etc.) budget.

Compounding the budget issue is the absence of a government-conceived and -directed vision for the Forces. The 1994 defence white paper is history and could not be implemented under any circumstances considering current funding and the state of the Forces. In spite of multiple ministerial promises to the contrary during the past few years, it would appear that foreign and defence policy reviews will not commence until late 2004 at best.

In the meantime, the Minister will probably be forced to remove or mothball a number of capabilities -- tanks, artillery, destroyers? -- without a clear vision of the future role of the Forces as determined by the public and their elected representatives. A defence review is absolutely critical, and the sooner the better. The $800-million per year will hopefully sustain the Forces until such a review is completed and the people of Canada have decided what they want their military to do and how much they are prepared to pay for it.

Maj.-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, now retired, commanded UN troops during the Bosnian civil war of 1992.


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## Pikache (22 Feb 2004)

http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/spotlight/2004/02/21/afghantime040221.html 

Time to go on the offensive in Afghanistan 

by Lewis MacKenzie

Last week in Kabul, the 3rd Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment took over from the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment and commenced six months of helping to secure the Afghanistan capital, thereby keeping the interim government of Hamed Karzi in control â â€œ at least in Kabul, if not in the rest of the country. Their tour of duty will end in August of this year, at which time Canada will have fulfilled Chrétien's promise to provide the bulk of ISAF's combat power in Kabul for a year.

Last year NATO was persuaded to take command of the ISAF mission when it was determined that Canada was unable to fulfil the previous PM's grandiose commitment that, â Å“Canada would take over and run the mission for a year!â ? Displaying an appalling naivety of things military, Chrétien failed to realize that â Å“runningâ ? the mission, meant providing the majority of the personnel and infrastructure, including the communications, for a large headquarters, including the operation of the airport and medical facilities. When he was so advised, he sent out feelers for help and, fortunately for our international reputation, NATO came to the rescue.

Afghanistan aspires to run its first democratic election in June of this year. Much international effort has been dedicated to making such an achievement possible. Unfortunately, things are not looking good. Karzi's interim government is pretty well confined to Kabul, and the war lords still rule the hinterland, some with the support of the Kandahar-based, US-led coalition still tracking down the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida throughout the country. The illegal drug trade has flourished since the removal of the Taliban regime, and Afghanistan's poppy fields have re-established themselves as the world's number one supplier of opium and heroin (ironically, with another â Å“liberatedâ ? part of the world, Kosovo, playing a major role in the drug's distribution). There are strong indications that the defeated elements of the Taliban and al-Qaida, along with some new indigenous resistance elements, are joining forces in an attempt to destabilize Afghanistan even more and to disrupt preparations for the proposed election. Recent suicide attacks on members of ISAF, including the one that took the life of Canadian Corporal Jamie Murphy give some credibility to this speculation.

NATO was keen to take on ISAF's leadership; however, its member nations have not been lining up to take over the job of patrolling Kabul's streets from the Canadians in six months‘ time. Enter the dreaded mission creep. What was announced to the Canadian electorate by Chrétien as a one-year commitment and not a day more is now morphing into a five- to ten-year Canadian military presence, if the collective opinions of those involved in the decision-making process are to be taken at their word. Major-General Andrew Leslie, the outgoing deputy commander of ISAF, has speculated that it will take up to ten years to create a safe and secure Afghanistan. Prime Minister Martin, in a surprisingly candid admission suggested we might well maintain a military strength of 500 in the post-August 2004 period.

Much to his credit, the Minister of National Defence, David Pratt, while visiting Afghanistan last week, indicated that it was too early to speculate on the role Canada would assume post-August. A wise statement, indeed, as all too often in the past, a cap on the number of troops to be deployed to a particular mission was determined long before their role was confirmed â â€œ a common shortcoming of the UN, I hasten to add.

There are a number of options.

We could continue to serve with the ISAF security force in Kabul, patrolling the streets and the immediate surrounding areas. A cap of 500 would only permit a couple of hundred-man companies, plus headquarters and administration support. NATO would probably be pleased and President Karzi would be somewhat satisfied.

We could create a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) â â€œ get used to the acronym as you will be hearing it a lot over the next few months. The plan is that PRTs, consisting of around 300 personnel and made up of engineers, medical personnel, logisticians, etc., along with a modest security element, would venture into some of the more stable outlying areas, with the support or at least the tolerance of the local war lord and help with the reconstruction of the country. There is much talk about the need for such teams, and the government will be tempted to volunteer us for such a role, as it matches the false image of ourselves as â Å“peacekeepersâ ? â â€œ surely the most abused and misunderstood term in the Canadian lexicon this past decade.

We should do neither. The Rules of Engagement for both roles would lock us into a relatively passive and defensive posture. With the first option, we would continue to actively patrol in and around Kabul, and with the second, defend the folks doing the reconstruction, but in both cases, the enemy will have the initiative and come to us.

There is a third option that I much prefer. Leave the ISAF force and move South to rejoin, yes rejoin, the US-led multinational force that we were an important part of in the period following Sept. 11, 2001. This force is conducting the war against terror in the rugged areas of Afghanistan and tracking down the cowards on their own terms. There is little risk of becoming a victim to suicide bombers out there. If someone suspiciously runs towards you in the mountains of Afghanistan, you don't have to hesitate killing him, as you would on security patrol in downtown Kabul, thinking that perhaps he is just a young urban kid wanting some food or to say hello.

Canada became involved with ISAF in Kabul to ease the friction with the US regarding the PM's decision to not support their liberation of Iraq. Thanks to the quality of our leaders and our soldiers, we have done good work there. Now we have an opportunity to put our soldiers where they should be and where they like to be â â€œ on the offensive. Lets take it! 

This article appears here with the kind permission of Maj-Gen Lewis MacKenzie (Ret‘d). It also appears in the 21 February 2004 issue of the National Post.

***

Hmmm... It‘s on DND site. Interesting.


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## Sh0rtbUs (22 Feb 2004)

I agree with him entirely. Nothing will be gained if we sit on the defensive all the time. Push the enemy back, and give the people of Afghanistan some breathing room.


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## logau (22 Feb 2004)

Lets go on the offensive - Hoo boy!

Great idea - only thing is its coming from Gen Mackenzie who is not currently in any capacity to commit troops.

He does embody the aim though - raise awareness of what should be done.

I think the reserves could be lined up to commit 54 platoons of Infantry - indefinitely = good for a five year program at least. Lets stand the thing on its head - and get ourselves into a nice quiet little war - commit 2 regular bns and simultaneously activate a trg pipeline to flesh out all the regulars on their expiry of their 6 months term in Afghan - of course the regulars could all be tasked for a year but without a reserve component - it won`t amount to much because the full time forces are being employed against a short term plan.

Now you may think I`m blowing smoke - the Brits were in the region at the turn of the last century and the forces committed to pacifying the various valley kingdoms was on the order of 8-35,000 at a time.

The gound hasn`t changed nor have the independant minded inhabitants who - by the way - don‘t have any conception of Gen Leslie‘s safe and secure Afghanistan. 

Background reading on (non-heliborne) operations in that area 

From Winston Chruchill‘s view  http://216.123.50.100/p94russell.htm 

The Tirah campaign of 1897 on India‘s notorious North-West frontier was part of what was known at the time as the "Great Game" between Britain and Russia. Throughout the last half the 19th century Russia‘s territorial and colonial ambitions rivaled those of Britain and nearly brought the two Empires to war. (In the 1880s the "Russian threat" was even taken seriously as far away as New Zealand where coastal batteries such as Fort Kelburn in Wellington were established).

Afghanistan was the crucible of this strategic conflict... more  http://www.cabarfeidh.com/dargai.htm 

Typical climate conditions  http://64.1911encyclopedia.org/T/TI/TIRAH.htm 

So - where are those volunteer forms? You‘re still behind this aren`t you?


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## Spr.Earl (22 Feb 2004)

Logau,I did volunteer for this last tour when asked!

But alas they only took two guy‘s from my present trade with in our trade.

If given a second chance I would do it again.


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## Sh0rtbUs (22 Feb 2004)

I would go to Afghanistan in a second.


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## Duotone81 (22 Feb 2004)

I don‘t know how M.Gen MacKenzie aligns himself poilitcally but regardless of party if he did run for PM I‘d vote for em. He‘s a no bs kind of guy that tells it like it is and offers clear logical solutions. He seems like a good honest man to me. Too bad for the CF he‘s retired eh.


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## Scoobie Newbie (22 Feb 2004)

I believe he ran in politics under the PC banner.


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## Spr.Earl (22 Feb 2004)

The only reason our Lew is not C.D.S. is because he became to vocal in regard‘s to the U.N. and our own Gov. in regard‘s to Yugo. and became very vocal on our own failing‘s toward‘s our own Military and the Gov. of the day did not like his forthrightness.
Ergo,he retired to the loss of us and the Nation!
Forced out in my opinion

I would serve under him any day as in my own opinion he‘s a Soldier‘s Soldier and our Goverment does not like that.

Ever read his auto-biography?
A another Sapper does good!
Yup he was a Sapper also.
He grew up in the Wack.
His father was a Sgt/Maj. in the Engineer‘s.


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## Spr.Earl (22 Feb 2004)

> Originally posted by Spr.Earl:
> [qb] The only reason our Lew is not C.D.S. is because he became to vocal in regard‘s to the U.N. and our own Gov. in regard‘s to Yugo. and became very vocal on our own failing‘s toward‘s our own Military and the Gov. of the day did not like his forthrightness.
> Ergo,he retired to the loss of us and the Nation!
> Forced out in my opinion
> ...


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## Infanteer (23 Feb 2004)

> I think the reserves could be lined up to commit 54 platoons of Infantry - indefinitely = good for a five year program at least. Lets stand the thing on its head - and get ourselves into a nice quiet little war - commit 2 regular bns and simultaneously activate a trg pipeline to flesh out all the regulars on their expiry of their 6 months term in Afghan - of course the regulars could all be tasked for a year but without a reserve component - it won`t amount to much because the full time forces are being employed against a short term plan.


I honestly think this is "do-able".  With the last of the reservists coming home from Bosnia, everybody in the Mo will be chomping at the bit.

As well, a clear mission like the one you presented above would eliminate the "what the **** are we trying to do here?"  additude so present with mission creep.

I like the idea, speaks bounds politically and gives us something to focus on.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 Feb 2004)

I though Lewis MacKenzie started out as infantry and not as a sapper?


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## bubba (23 Feb 2004)

didnt russia send in close to a million men into afghanistan a few years back,and got the **** kicked out of them.somebody want to tell me what 500 canadians are gona do if those tribes,warlords start uniting..if big lou wants to put the troops on the offence,i would rather see a full brigade at least, tanks, guns and all the toys.if the balloon goes up 500 men might become combat ineffective real quick.(hey sarge bye,you got the number for 911....)


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## Pikache (23 Feb 2004)

I believe Gen Mackenzie was QOR then PPCLI.


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## Michael Dorosh (23 Feb 2004)

Soldiers have never fared well in Canadian politics unfortunately.  Andy McNaughton was at least as popular as Mackenzie, at least among the troops he commanded, but he got nowhere in the federal elections (despite being Minister of Defence for a brief period).


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## Engineer Corporal (23 Feb 2004)

Reserves committ 54 platoons of infantry>? That‘s pretty impractical. Most of the reserve soldiers are in school either university or high school. Also reservist civilian jobs are not federally insured like the americans.But lewis mac kenzie is a good man and it is too bad that a soldiers soldier is looked down apon by our government.


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## logau (23 Feb 2004)

I don‘t think its impractical - every unit can raise 1 platoon and fit into a deployment. Its a goal that any unit should be able to work to.

As for the "tired old?" argument of reserves are all in school. It seems to me a collossal and possibly a system problem that reserve‘s can‘t spell off regulars on a deployment for at least 8-10 weeks in the summer.

The caterpiller will eat this leaf a bit at a time!


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## Infanteer (23 Feb 2004)

> didnt russia send in close to a million men into afghanistan a few years back,and got the **** kicked out of them.


The Russians never had more than 100,000  men in theater.



> somebody want to tell me what 500 canadians are gona do if those tribes,warlords start uniting..


Why don‘t you go research the differences between the Soviet and Coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and come back and tell us the answer....



> if big lou wants to put the troops on the offence,i would rather see a full brigade at least, tanks, guns and all the toys.if the balloon goes up 500 men might become combat ineffective real quick.(hey sarge bye,you got the number for 911....)


How would tanks help us in the Tora Bora mountains hunting terrorists in caves?


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## bossi (23 Feb 2004)

MGen MacKenzie‘s point re: shoot/don‘t shoot is bang on target
(i.e. our guys who got hit by the suicide bomber probably only had a split second, at best ... whereas the decision to use deadly force is made slightly more simple in the hills ...)

However, all the other points about Afghanistan are valid, too - similar to good old Yugoslavia, which ate up ... how many German Divisions ... (nine)?  And, let‘s not forget - satellite imagery and close air support can only achieve so much - the last chapter must be written by "point of bayonet".

Nope - we‘ve got to fight smarter.  The whole point of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is to help the reconstruction effort, while at the same time taking some of the pressure off of Kabul (presently over-populated by as many as two million ...).

The smart way to win this war is to cut the legs out from under the bad guys 
(i.e. denying them any support from the locals, similar to Malaya).

And, although some squirm at the phrase, "winning hearts and minds" causes less collateral damage.

Killing is easy.  Both sides can do it.

Only one side can win hearts and minds.  Think about it.

"Bello et pax consensius"    :warstory:


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## Infanteer (23 Feb 2004)

> The smart way to win this war is to cut the legs out from under the bad guys
> (i.e. denying them any support from the locals, similar to Malaya).


Just curious sir, from your experience in the region, how would you say the best way of going about this would be.

I have a hard time drawing parallels to Malaya because it seems easier to sell democracy over communism rather than democracy over tribalism.  As well, what do you do when the biggest threat to stability is a feudal warlord embedded within the local populace rather than ethnic Chinese recieving help from outside.

Am I correct, or am I out to lunch?


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## Pikache (23 Feb 2004)

Well, it‘ll be democracy vs. Islamic fundamentalism and religion has very strong hold on a population, especially in third world countries.


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## Infanteer (23 Feb 2004)

I‘m not sure about that.  There was alot of opposition to the Taliban.  Religion meant a rats *** to all the warlords when the ruling Islamic tribe happened to be Pushtuns from the south.


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## Engineer Corporal (23 Feb 2004)

Tired old arguement? Maybe so, because it‘s the truth. Ok most reserve units work say a thursday night and 1-2 weekends per month. The rest of the time those ppl are in school or at a civilian job or collecting EI. I only speak the truth, as far as the summer goes ppl are away on courses and taskings to train new ppl.In the reserves ppl come and go so often that the summers are really busy to fill the gaps. I think that a platoon from every reserve unit would need at least 6 months of work up training. Especially if it‘s gonna have to be fighting in a real war.


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## gate_guard (23 Feb 2004)

Whether the reserves have a current deployable status or not shouldn‘t be the question. What are the reserves for if they can‘t deploy to a combat zone? If the militia is just a domestic help line for national/provincial emergencies, we may as well turn in all our weapons. This speaks to reservists as well who haven‘t considered the fact that some day they may have to deploy. For the scenario mentioned of deploying a reserve contingent, obviously a period of group training and qualification would be necessary but this by no means a foreign concept. As reservists, we already have a 5 month workup for Bosnia, so cut out the bs of that workup and add more grunt work.


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## Brad Sallows (23 Feb 2004)

If each reserve infantry battalion were to commit a platoon, it would have to commit a platoon commander, platoon WO, and three each section commander and 2I/C.  Presumably these will all be people with time available, or ability to make the time.

After that happens, and while it is being sustained, what do you think are the odds of your BMQ / SQ / MOC / PCF / PLQ etc being cancelled summer after summer due to lack of instructors?

From where I sit, I think we need to put some serious undiverted effort into ensuring our reserve training system is completely capable of sustaining any reserve commitments we intend to make.


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## bubba (23 Feb 2004)

hey infanteer my point is we need to be ready for anything from suicide bombers to an all out fight.we got to have the men,gear and means to handle that.helpen to rebuild the infastructure is a major priority,winnin hearts and minds is also good.comin home in one peice is numero uno baby..and as for big lou i always respect a man who is NOT politically correct.oh yeah,about researchin the russians it doesnt matter how many wer there,they still got there asses kicked by men in caves....right or wrong,infanteer bye  
ps.which battalion you with,i was with 1rcr( dont worry im not into stalkin ya im just lookin for some old buds of mine)haha


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## Infanteer (23 Feb 2004)

> hey infanteer my point is we need to be ready for anything from suicide bombers to an all out fight


With the limited resources we have, we must focus on what is necessary, not the entire spectrum of conflict.



> yeah,about researchin the russians it doesnt matter how many wer there,they still got there asses kicked by men in caves....right or wrong,


I thinked you missed my point.  The Coalition only has 2 Brigades max in country, ISAF in Kabul and an American one in Bagram.  The Russians had 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, and yet "got there asses kicked by men in caves".   

Is our force commitment and posture wise based on this compelling evidence you have provided?  That is what I wanted you to come back with.



> ps.which battalion you with,i was with 1rcr( dont worry im not into stalkin ya im just lookin for some old buds of mine)haha


Nope, I‘m a western guy...can‘t help you there.


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## Engineer Corporal (24 Feb 2004)

All I‘m saying is what your asking will never happen unless their is a big war going on.Then the canadian people would have to decide to send in the reserves or whatever. Anyways that day has‘nt come yet and I hope it never does.


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## Infanteer (24 Feb 2004)

> All I‘m saying is what your asking will never happen unless their is a big war going on


Well, that‘s not the right additude.  Do you think wars of the future will give us three years to mobilize the militia?  We must work on ensuring the militia doesn‘t become the second-rate farm team to the regular force that it is on the way to becoming.


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## John Nayduk (24 Feb 2004)

The man-power arguement is irrelevant as I doubt there will be the political will to carry on such a mission.  The government has been preaching that we are â Å“peacekeepersâ ? rather than war fighters and the rest of the country believes it.  Without a change in opinion and the political will, we will remain what we are; an under-funded branch of Canada Inc.


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## Engineer Corporal (24 Feb 2004)

It‘s spelled attitude, and another recce man your absolutely right.


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## bubba (24 Feb 2004)

i see what youre sayin now infanter;and another recce guy summed it up pretty good.catch ya on the next engagement....(OF WORDS)HAHA


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## Infanteer (24 Feb 2004)

> It‘s spelled attitude


Uggh, late night editing


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## bossi (25 Jun 2004)

*The effects of Political correctness on Canada's military. *
Training isn't the problem
Politics, not a lack of skills, is why our troops are leaving Kabul
  
Lewis MacKenzie 
The Ottawa Citizen 
Friday, June 25, 2004


Canada turned down a U.S. request last week to extend the tour of our 2,000 soldiers in Kabul until the fall so they could provide a rapid-reaction force during the Afghan elections in September. It's necessary to have such a force on standby to move throughout Afghanistan to deal with the inevitable attempts by terrorists and certain warlords to interfere with the democratic process.

Unfortunately, it was left to a junior Defence department spokesman to explain why Canada would not agree to the U.S. request: "What the Americans are looking for is not exactly what our troops are trained for."

This need not have been such a highly embarrassing admission, as it is blatantly untrue. There are reasons why our contingent is incapable of taking on such a role, but it has nothing to do with a lack of training. On the contrary, they are the best-trained troops for such a mission in the multinational force.

In 2001, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, then-prime minister Jean Chretien pledged that we would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our U.S. friends in the war on terror, starting with the dispatch of the 3rd battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to join the U.S. brigade operating out of Kandahar.

Unfortunately, he neglected to tell President George W. Bush that we would only be with them for six months. As the alarm went off indicating the six months were up, he brought the battalion home, indicating that we did not have the resources to replace or extend the 800 soldiers.

Yet a few months later, when it looked like the U.S. was going to intervene in Iraq and Canada would be asked to participate, Mr. Chretien ordered 4,000 soldiers (2,000 per six-month mission) to serve with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul for a year. Magically, the soldiers were found (and conveniently the shelves were emptied for any potential Canadian contribution to Iraq).

Canada would not be directly involved in the war on terror, but would contribute to the establishment of some degree of security in and around Kabul. This would help Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his government survive, at least in the capital, as his movements outside of Kabul are few and far between due to the risks involved.

Regrettably, a considerable degree of inflexibility was built into the organization of the Canadian contingent and a very un-Canadian solution was chosen. It was decided that the soldiers would live in a large encampment with creature comforts previously unknown and deemed unnecessary on other missions -- Internet cafe, exercise tents, individual living compartments, a sewer and water system, extensive air-conditioning, etc.

Despite the fact that Afghani-stan qualified as an operational theatre, civilian contractors were brought in to run the logistics support system for the soldiers. Meals, accommodation, ammunition control, overall maintenance of vehicles and equipment were all centralized in a static civilian component that could not deploy outside of Kabul.

Erroneously assuming that the Canadian mission to Afghanistan would not change and that the umbilical cord to the civilian supply system would always be available, the infantry battalion was required to leave behind in Canada its own internal supply capability provided by its service support company -- which normally provides the services offered by the civilian contractors in a more austere manner, but is considerably more flexible and mobile and can deploy into high-risk areas.

I can appreciate that our government might not want to respond positively to the recent U.S. request. To do so would mean that we would take on an expanded role that would see our soldiers move throughout Afghanistan during the election process to confront any attempts to interfere with the democratic process. Any increased support for the United States during the current election would be seen as a negative for the government, given its anti-U.S. Iraq policy rhetoric.

When National Defence was told to come up with an excuse for our not agreeing to the U.S. request for us to rejoin the war against terror, the response should not have been that our troops were not trained for such a role. An honest -- but politically unacceptable -- response would have gone something like this:

"Sorry, the need to find more savings in our defence budget forced us to contract out the logistics support for our soldiers to a static civilian organization and that restricts them to operations less than 70 kilometres from Kabul. We also have a massive administration and security overhead in Kabul, which means that out of our 2,000 personnel, only about 300 are available for taking any potential fight to the enemy. That reality is extremely unfortunate because the 3rd Battalion Royal 22 Regiment soldiers in their light infantry role would be as good as any elite unit in the world at tracking down and eliminating the terrorists who would threaten the election process and the security of Afghanistan. They spend most of their time training for such a task and would prefer it to patrolling the streets of Kabul."

The lessons we can learn from this are: (1) we should think of our soldiers' morale and pride when politically correct excuses are made for all the world to see; and, (2) we should not fool around with the well-proven organization of an infantry battalion on the assumption that a particular role in a particular mission area will not change. It will, as it should but can't in Afghanistan.

Lewis MacKenzie is a retired major-general in the Canadian Forces.


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## Lance Wiebe (25 Jun 2004)

This serves to highlight one of the major problems in our Forces.

Our very own NDHQ is so politically orientated, that they are simply disgusting.

This is supposed to be OUR LEADERS!

Bunch of spineless a**holes. 

A major shakeup HAS to be done at NDHQ, and get rid of that idiot Henault and all of his lapdogs, and place some real leaders in command of the fine men and women that serve our nation.


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## ags281 (25 Jun 2004)

While I appreciate him standing up for our troops like that, what we really need is for CURRENT leaders to stand up to stuff like this. The quote about the soldiers not being trained for what was needed came from a defence spokesperson, probably a jr bureaucrat I would assume. Why on earth does our military tolerate such politically motivated bs (this being but a small example)? Isn't the whole point of having senior officers so that military matters can be handled by military personnel rather than paper pushers? Sometimes it feels like we might as well just cut off rank progression at Col and fill all the top brass spots with civil servants to save on the cost of gold thread.   :akimbo:

(perhaps a bit more bitter than I need to be due to being woken up almost three hours early for no reason)


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## Guardian (25 Jun 2004)

The last time the senior generals and admirals in this country stood up for doing the right thing was during the Cuban Missile crisis. Some admirals defied Diefenbaker's orders to do nothing, saw that the Soviets were deploying submarines to threaten shipping off the East Coast of North America, and put the Atlantic fleet on high alert. They even deployed a carrier battlegroup to protect the US East Coast.

The defence minister at the time (Harkness?) then quietly put the whole military on alert.

The Liberals were in opposition at this time, and believe it, they noticed the initiative taken by the admirals.

When they later formed a government, they took action to ensure that the military leadership in this country would never go against political direction again. This action was carried out by a guy named Paul Hellyer - unification. Stripped of their tradition and their pride in their service identities, and with the civilian DND headquarters merging with the military high command to form NDHQ (albeit over several years), the senior leaders quickly learned to be docile and keep their heads down.

With that historical example in mind, I can see why the senior leaders might be reticent to take a stand. Someone with some pull has to do it eventually, though, or it's only going to get worse...


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## ags281 (25 Jun 2004)

Guardian said:
			
		

> When they later formed a government, they took action to ensure that the military leadership in this country would never go against political direction again. This action was carried out by a guy named Paul Hellyer - unification. Stripped of their tradition and their pride in their service identities, and with the civilian DND headquarters merging with the military high command to form NDHQ (albeit over several years), the senior leaders quickly learned to be docile and keep their heads down.
> 
> With that historical example in mind, I can see why the senior leaders might be reticent to take a stand. Someone with some pull has to do it eventually, though, or it's only going to get worse...



Hellyer unified the forces, yes, but he did not merge the military and civilian aspects into NDHQ. He's actually spoken out in opposition to this merge:



> The problem began in 1974, seven years after I left the Department, when Prime Minister Trudeau and Defence Minister Donald MacDonald decided to merge the military and civilian headquarters. This was a very bad decision because oil and water don't mix. It was the beginning of what has been called the "civilianization" of the forces.


from here (see foreign affairs - military)


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## Military Brat (26 Jun 2004)

Along with the already stated reasons, both by this gentleman and the official statement from the government/military, I think that the fact that soldiers would be put in more danger than they already are might have played a factor. Right now they are stationed in the relative security of Kabul, and I am sure that there is fear that if Canadian soldiers are sent out into the countryside to hunt down the actual terrorists rather than patrolling Kabul neighborhoods, that the bodybags will start to pile up. No matter how few casualties that brings, the media would be all over it like a bee on honey. And when the media portrays something in a bad light, it tends to have the same effect on Canadians. When the coffins started coming home, the public would turn against the mission and I assume we would see protests telling the government to bring our troops home.


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## Limpy (26 Jun 2004)

"While I appreciate him standing up for our troops like that, what we really need is for CURRENT leaders to stand up to stuff like this."




The problem is today about speaking up is you run the risk of losing a promotion or your job. Then again some people are just gold diggers that will be yes men that will attempt to benefit themselves through never saying anything contradictory even though something is wrong.


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## Scoobie Newbie (27 Jun 2004)

I love that man.  I hope the PC's get in and he is put in charge of the military.


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## Gunner (27 Jun 2004)

> The last time the senior generals and admirals in this country stood up for doing the right thing was during the Cuban Missile crisis. Some admirals defied Diefenbaker's orders to do nothing, saw that the Soviets were deploying submarines to threaten shipping off the East Coast of North America, and put the Atlantic fleet on high alert. They even deployed a carrier battlegroup to protect the US East Coast.



Actually I would argue that the Admirals didn't defy Diefenbaker's orders rather they were implementing what they considered previously agreed upon alliance and treaty responsibilities.  While they did what they considered right...they were negligent in remembering that the government is the final authority in this regard.



> While I appreciate him standing up for our troops like that, what we really need is for CURRENT leaders to stand up to stuff like this. The quote about the soldiers not being trained for what was needed came from a defence spokesperson, probably a jr bureaucrat I would assume.



Gents, you have very short (and limited) memories of our past.  What about MGen Cam Ross resigning in 2003 due to policy differences with the Liberal government over CA deployment to Afghanistan (vice Iraq).  Before that was a plethora of Patricia Generals (Vernon, Mackenzie, et al) who pulled the pin due to the disbandment of the CAR.  Prior to that was General Anderson who resigned as CDS when the Liberals cancelled the EH 101 in 1993.  How about the famous Admirals revolt in the late 60s and early 70s.  If members of the military can't recall the sacrifices of our leadership, why would any civilians?  I believe it was Cretin or one of his lackeys that made fun of retired senior officers speaking out against government decisions.  Where was the outrage at the Liberals blatant disregard for an officer's loyalty?

Its easy to pass the buck onto senior leadership but what have you done?


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## Tebo (27 Jun 2004)

> .....if Canadian soldiers are sent out into the countryside to hunt down the actual terrorists rather than patrolling Kabul neighborhoods, that the bodybags will start to pile up. No matter how few casualties that brings, the media would be all over it like a bee on honey. And when the media portrays something in a bad light, it tends to have the same effect on Canadians. When the coffins started coming home, the public would turn against the mission and I assume we would see protests telling the government to bring our troops home.



Do you seriously think the Canadian media would dishonour fallen Canadian soldiers defending the right for democratic election in Afghanistan by saying we should turn tail and run away?  Balance the death stories with our victories and coverage of the election.  If Canada does not have the will and stomach to let the military DO ITS JOB  why do we even bother deploying?


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## Kirkhill (30 Jun 2004)

In support of MGen MacKenzie's position of   the value of the structure of the Traditional   Infantry Battalion structure, and those that advocate the advantage offered by tanks I am posting this article from today's Sun in Britain.



> Our Boys' unseen war
> 
> 
> 
> ...



http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,5-2004301024,00.html


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## Infanteer (30 Jun 2004)

> LUCKY cook Alex Whitlam, 22, holds up a shrapnel-hit baking tray â â€ after a mortar bomb smashed into his kitchen at â Å“The Alamoâ ? outpost in Al Amarah.
> 
> Lance Corporal Whitlam, from Norwich, walked out to fetch extra rations 20 SECONDS before the strike.
> 
> ...



Hey, what do you know, a combat cook.  Probably alot more efficient than locals hired and supervised by some civvie contractor taking at least Sergeants pay.


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## Ex-Dragoon (30 Jun 2004)

The Prince of Wales Regiment wasn't that Sharpes regiment?   ;D


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## ags281 (30 Jun 2004)

"I thought this would be a simple peace keeping tour. But as soon as we got here it turned into something just like Black Hawk Down."

Hmm... so tell me again how taking the teeth out of our forces is justifiable for a focus on peacekeeping missions?


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Jun 2004)

Bayonet charge.  boy I bet there will be some well deserved stories coming from that incident.


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## Kirkhill (30 Jun 2004)

Ex-Dragoon wrote:



> The Prince of Wales Regiment wasn't that Sharpes regiment?




'Mazing what a good publicist can do for you, eh.b


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## Kirkhill (30 Jun 2004)

Further to the PWRR and the Bayonet attack.



> "They are being attacked virtually every day and sometimes several times a day, usually with rockets or from mortars. They are tired, primarily because the attacks mean sleep is constantly interrupted, but their morale is high."
> 
> Two weeks ago, 28 men from the battalion took part in a rout of Iraqi gunmen who had been terrorising the Route 6 motorway which links Al Amarah to Basra. The troops had been ordered to rescue two vehicles and their occupants from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which was ambushed by a group of 50 Iraqis.
> 
> ...



http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/13/wirq113.xml


I can't find the other articles on this action, it was widely reported on BBC, the Sun and the Times, often with some confusion as to whether it was the Tigers or the Argylls that launched the charge.

From recollection the Argylls had been patrolliing the Highway in a pair of Land Rovers and had been bounced three times in the same day, if I remember rightly on one occasion an RPG round came in one window and out the other.

On the third attack they called for backup and a PWRR platoon in Warriors showed up to deal with the mob of smugglers and would-be Mehdists (al-Sadr's bunch).

They are apparently the ones that actually conducted the assault.


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## Limpy (1 Jul 2004)

"FIX BAYONETS!!!" OOOH, I love that command. At least in the movies.


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## GGboy (25 Nov 2004)

From Wednesday's National Post. Someone should nail this to the door of the PMO ...

Peacemaking is not social work

by Lewis MacKenzie
Last week Prime Minister Paul Martin departed on a 10-day foreign mission that includes a visit to the Sudan. On Sunday, Toronto Star columnist Graham Fraser suggested that General Roméo Dallaire's recent recommendations -- that soldiers who can both make peace and build civil society intervene in failed states -- were both timely and appropriate, considering Mr. Martin's impending stop in Sudan. Presumably, he was also suggesting that the Prime Minister should give them serious consideration. To do so would be a mistake.
Having been conditioned by a military culture that encourages one to disagree without being disagreeable, I must strongly do so with my old colleague and friend Roméo. Mr. Fraser suggests that past generals have wanted "clarity and simplicity" in their mandates and that "Dallaire learned the hard way that clear mandates and exit strategies don't fit the ragged chaos in a new spectrum of violence."
In fact the opposite is true. Dallaire learned the hard way that clarity and simplicity apply more today then during the relative simple peacekeeping missions of the Cold War. His mandate in Rwanda -- actually not his, but that of his boss on the ground, an incompetent UN diplomat, Cameroonian Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, representing the UN Secretary-General -- was to "establish an atmosphere of security." That was the problem. The mandate was far from precise and the resources to achieve all or part of it were not provided.
Mandates that flow from the deliberations of the UN Security Council are typically vague, and most are written in such broad terms as to defy interpretation. Add to this the fact that the resources, always inadequate, are provided by the member states of the General Assembly, and you have a recipe for chronic failure.
As a result of his sole disastrous experience with UN operations, General Dallaire is now convinced that new skills must be added to the old warrior skills of soldiering. Not so. Civilian personnel, well trained and educated in essential nation-building skills, such as judges, police officials, social workers and civil servants, have to be standing by to assist in rebuilding societies once the soldiers are successful in their primary task, which is to stop the killing. Soldiers are not social workers with guns. Both disciplines are important, but both will suffer if combined in one individual.
The case for the essential separation of security and nation-building tasks exists today in the Darfur Region of Sudan, where tens of thousands of innocents have been slaughtered at the hands of militias supported by the Sudanese government, which has tried to put down a four-year-long uprising in Western Sudan.
Colin Powell, among others, has stated that the killings perpetrated by the Sudanese-backed militias amount to genocide, yet the UN Security Council continues to debate if the slaughter actually qualifies as such. As with Rwanda in 1994, the important and simple task in Sudan is to stop the killing. But the soldiers who can do that have not been dispatched. Instead, aid agencies have been trying to stitch together the shredded social fabric in Darfur under atrocious and dangerous conditions.
If peacemakers are dispatched to stop the killing, the intervening soldier's role should be restricted to providing security to the innocents in the Darfur Region -- easily identified as most of them are in camps. Once security is assured, aid agencies could do what they are best at, while diplomacy could continue without the shadow of a daily body count of dead women and children.
Rwanda was not a complex problem. One group was attempting to annihilate the other. General Dallaire himself has stated that with 5,000 professional soldiers, properly equipped, he could have stopped the genocide. I believe him.
He didn't need a force led by officers educated in anthropology, psychology or philosophy who "understood" the sensitivities of what was going on in Rwanda, as he has more recently suggested. He needed leaders conventionally trained in the application of deadly force to stop the killing. Once that was achieved and 800,000 lives saved, the nation-builders could safely come in and start the rebuilding process.
The same is true in Sudan and will continue to be true in the future when brutal regimes set about killing innocents.
Many at the UN, on Parliament Hill and in capitals around the world don't want to believe this. "Never again" has lost all meaning to those political leaders who want to find a safe, no-risk way of stopping the bad guys. The result is needless debate in place of action that would prevent genocide.
While in Sudan, the Prime Minister would be wise to consider the immediate benefits of deploying a professional, multi-national military fighting force with the clear mandate to protect the victims of Sudan's bloody campaign in Darfur. Mr. Martin should not, however, place too much faith in the long promised deployment of an African Union intervention force. It will be slow getting there and will contain some national contingents that in the past have exacerbated problems they were supposed to resolve.
The military solution to Darfur could well rest with the G20 group of nations, which the Prime Minister wisely suggested might have a role to play in the application of "the responsibility to protect."

Maj-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, now retired, commanded UN troops during the Bosnian civil war of 1992.


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## pbi (25 Nov 2004)

Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.

However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions. I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.

Cheers.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (25 Nov 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.
> 
> However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions. I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.
> 
> Cheers.



I'm betting the original article by Fraser fits the Liberal Parties ideological 'bent' for the military to a T.   

_"If we just have a nice calm decision over why they shouldn't be killing each other, I'm sure they'll all stop and we can build a school together."_


Matthew.     :


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## bossi (25 Nov 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> ... I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option. I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.
> 
> However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions.



Bang on!  The only "exception to the rule" is when the environment is too hostile for GOs/IOs/NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance - then, the military is the "option of last resort".

I've been told/shown/taught that the military starts meddling in humanitarian assitance when there's not enough peacemaking/peacekeeping to do, and commanders start looking for things to do ... (i.e. perhaps a useful litmus test for "when it's time to pull out" ... ?)


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## pbi (25 Nov 2004)

Also, a goodly number of IOs/NGOs/GOs are not too keen to have us in the humanitarian game in the first place, as some say it results in their workers being targeted. As well, IMHO, that field tends to attract some people with an anti-military bent. Cheers.


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## Kirkhill (26 Nov 2004)

pbi.... the problem I have is how does the situation get handled where you have: a suffering population that needs help; a body of nationalists/thugs (your choice) that does best when the populationi is unhappy and they can create instability; anti-military humanitarians that won't supply help in an insecure environment; and troops that need the population to be fed to combat the instability so that they can go after the thugs.

If that sounds like a circle it is.  But it seems to me that unless the Aid agencies are on side with the Security forces and also willing to accept risks then the Military is going to be forced into the delivery end of the game.  

And if the Aid agencies do seem to be onside then they are no longer neutral and become targets.  A pretty big circle to square.

(By the way on the subject of Aid agencies and Neutrality - anybody else see the references to the IC Red Crescent offices in Fallujah being used to store weapons and instructions to pick up fighters before civilians? -  I'll look for the source info).


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## pbi (26 Nov 2004)

Kirkhill: My answer would be that military should concentrate its efforts first on dealing with the security threat, next on facilitating those humanitarian organizations that are ready to act(but not doing it for them), and only finally and as a last resort actually do humanitarian tasks itself.



> the Military is going to be forced into the delivery end of the game.



The military can only be forced into something by its own government (or by the enemy). And this, IMHO, is where the problem lies, and we get things like DART which is to my mind a perfect example of what I am opposed to. We should not start out by building a unit for hum ops-we should focus on a mobile, capable joint combat force that, if tasked, can create the conditions for humanitarian agencies to work. The resources put into DART should have been plowed into the readiness capabilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Instead we start from the premise that it our job to do humanitarian work in foreign countries.  Cheers.


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## Kirkhill (26 Nov 2004)

pbi... I agree with you (and for a change there are no "Buts").

Cheers.


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## Big Foot (27 Nov 2004)

We are soldiers first, peacekeepers second, or at least thats the way it should be. As JL Granestein put it in "Who Killed the Canadian Military?", when the time comes to fight a war, soldiers will just end up saying "No, sorry, we don't do that anymore." Soldiers should be soldiers, trained to fight when the time comes, not trained to peacekeep then try and apply those skills in battle. Now I'm not saying we should give up our humanitarian pursuits, I'm just saying its important that when the time comes, we can do whats required of us.


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## pbi (27 Nov 2004)

Most Canadian soldiers would agree with you. And, I hope, you will be pleased to discover that despite all the many obstacles and distractions we face, we still try to train for war, because we know that the most effective way to keep the peace between hostile parties is with a force they are reluctant to mess with. Cheers.


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## Spr.Earl (28 Nov 2004)

After reading the above opinions,my gist of those are "The Military stays out of Civil Affair's but stays with it's traditional job of security and civil peace under Martial Law,which most U.N. mandates are but under the guise of U.N. Articles etc.."

So why have we set up CIMIC?


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## pbi (28 Nov 2004)

The primary purpose of CIMIC (or Civil Affairs=CA as the US calls it) is to establish good relations with local civil authorities, in order to contribute to mission success. CIMIC takes part in information operations (by gather information from the local population and by disseminating Info Ops messages), it contributes to Force Protection, and it reduces tensions by assisting with an improvement to living conditions for locals. CIMIC elements should not normally be "doing" humanitarian works themselves unless there is no civil agency (GO/NGO/IO) capable of doing so, but most CIMIC teams do get involved in at least some activities.

We are latecomers to the business of having designated CIMIC forces-the US have had CA battalions and HQs in the Army Reserve for years-here in Afghanistan they are responsible for establishing and "tech net" guidance to the PRTs that the US run (about twice to three times the size of the ISAF program), and CA types also run the CJ9 Branch of both Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF76)   the major subordinate command of CFC-A. The Brits, on the other hand, have no CIMIC branch and do not feel they need one. When it comes to CIMIC stuff, operational commanders just get on with it.

We have been doing "CIMIC" stuff for years, under different titles, but without a permanently established CIMIC org, and doing it quite well. Where CIMIC really got its launch was during Op ABACUS, when JTF ABACUS, the national-level TF led by MGen Jefferies, ordered the Regional TFs to adopt the term "CIMIC" for what up until then we had   called (and still call....) "Domestic Ops". 

Since Op ABACUS, as an element of the LFRR process, CIMIC was identified as   something that was ideally suited to the Army Reserve, which is where we have our CIMIC assets now. The CIMIC teams in each LFA are focused on deployed ops but could be used for domestic ops in an emergency. Most CIMIC teams on int'l ops today are composed of Res soldiers. Cheers.


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## bossi (28 Nov 2004)

Spr.Earl said:
			
		

> So why have we set up CIMIC?



In a nutshell ...
Civilians are a part of the battlefield, no matter whether it's high intensity conflict, peacemaking, or peacekeeping.   Always have been, always will be
(one school of thought is that they're increasingly a part of the modern operational environment ... I'll leave that up to the personal judgement of the readers, lest we go off on a tangent ...).

So, in order to accomplish our mission, we make sure we can deal with whatever obstacles we encounter
(whether we're talking about minefields, water obstacles, hordes of refugees blocking our MSR, guerilla insurgents aided and abetted by non-combatant villagers ... )

As an aside, when we first adopted the "continental staff system" (i.e. G1, G2, etc.) CIMIC was G5.
Thus, at one point in time, it was recognised that CIMIC was important enough to be part of "The Original Five" (hmmm ... ya don't suppose the "continentals" were particularly attuned to this, having firsthand experience with the effects upon their civilian populations during the First and Second World Wars ...?)

However, as with many symptoms of malaise with peacetime armies, lessons learned during war can sometimes become less pressing than ... things that seem more important ...

So, rather then allow military operations to become bogged down in complex civil-military environments, CIMIC has been resurrected as an "overlooked" capability (I say "overlooked", simply because here in Canada it fell by the wayside - for a while, we had an "ad hoc" approach to CIMIC - personnel selected were often those who commanders deemed incompetent to trust with "vital" appointments ... i.e. "We'll keep stupid Fatso Bloggins away from the troops by putting him in CIMIC" ... which perhaps wasn't the best approach ...)

Now, recognising that reservists sometimes have a civilian skillset not normally found in the military, our Army has given CIMIC to the Reserves in order to get "twice the bang for the buck".   Also, by clearly identifying CIMIC personnel and providing them with proper training well in advance of operations, it's a more professional approach.

While I'm on my soapbox, I'll dispell one myth:   CIMIC should not NORMALLY perform humantarian assistance tasks - that's the purview of the civilian organisations (e.g. CARE, MSF, Red Cross) - however, in a hostile environment where the civlians can't operate, military commanders can sometimes become obliged to conduct humantarian relief activities (for example, UNHCR ceased operations in Afghanistan at one point, when one of their workers was assassinated).   However, this is a topic that should be discussed at length ... but I won't bore all of you more than I already have ... chuckle!

Finally, I'd suggest CIMIC contributes to "situational awareness" in several ways - they get out there and talk ot the civilian population, sometimes hearing things that might otherwise be overlooked ...
And, in the context of arming our own troops with all the ammunition they need to win, CIMIC can also provide information to avoid making mistakes which then blow up in our faces (e.g. under the heading of "smooth move, Ex Lax" - some dunce thought it was a bright idea to name the operation in Iraq "Crusade" ... as opposed to being wary of doing something that would only inflame, and unite the ENTIRE population against the "infidel invaders" ...)

Sum up?
CIMIC is not anything new - if anything, it's a "forgotten art" and an example of "the indirect approach" to winning wars.
"pbi" nailed it on the head in his post, and I thank him profusely for doing so:



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Although I don't always agree with everything he has said and written, I believe MGen(retd) MacKenze is largely correct here. *We should concentrate on soldiering, and do humanitarian stuff only when there is no other option.* I do not quarrel with us facilitating GOs/IOs/NGOs to give humanitarian support--I quarrel with us doing it ourselves.
> 
> *However, I believe very strongly that leaders in any operation need to have an excellent understanding of the political and cultural situation, and thus of the consequences of their actions.* I am not sure that he himself fully understood Yugoslavia before he went there, although he probably had a pretty good idea by the time he left.
> 
> Cheers.



P.S. (this is funny - in a display of "converging attacks", pbi posted while I was typing my verbose reply ... chuckle!)


----------



## RDA (29 Nov 2004)

A couple of questions from a civy trying to make sense of all of this:

1.   Is there a difference between the role of CIMIC and the role of Intelligence personnel in peacemaking operations, and if so, can one draw a clear line to separate the two roles, or is it more of a transition zone?
2.   Are Public Relations officers used in a CIMIC capacity in international operations, or do they strictly deal with the Canadian public?

Actually, perhaps a better question than the above two would simply be to ask who (trade-wise) delivers the CIMIC capability?


----------



## bossi (29 Nov 2004)

RDA said:
			
		

> 1.   Is there a difference between the role of CIMIC and the role of Intelligence personnel in peacemaking operations, and if so, can one draw a clear line to separate the two roles, or is it more of a transition zone?



1.A. Yes - there is a significant difference between CIMIC and Military Intelligence.   If you picture a Venn diagram, there is a small overlap between the two circles - however, the remainder of the two circles is much larger than the overlap.  Military Intelligence oversees the collection of information from many different sources (e.g. patrols, UAVs, satellites, EW, HUMINT), collates and analyses it, and transforms it into "intelligence" (e.g. estimates of enemy capability and predictions of intent).  CIMIC, on the other hand, focusses on the civil-military environment vice the enemy (hopefully my attempt to explain the difference between the two won't draw howls of protest from the Int community ... okay guys?)

Thus, the interaction between the two is that CIMIC often hears information and passes it on to Int, who then incorporates this info into the overall Int picture.  However, CIMIC deals with a broader sphere of activities in the civil-military environment, just as Int deals with a broader spectrum of sources, information and military intelligence.

CIMIC are NOT "spooks", and the ability of CIMIC to interact openly with and be trusted by the civilian population hinges upon this fact.



			
				RDA said:
			
		

> 2.   Are Public Relations officers used in a CIMIC capacity in international operations, or do they strictly deal with the Canadian public?



2.A.   Public Information Officers also have a different role from CIMIC - to use civlianised terminology, they work in "external and internal communications" which includes "media relations".   To highlight the difference, PIOs do not normally become directly involved in CIMIC tasks such as liaison with civilian government, NGOs, and the populace.   And, while CIMIC might talk to the media/journalists, they do so with the advice and assistance of PIOs.  They stay in their separate, parallel "lanes" (even though they do cross from time to time).

CIMIC and PIOs do work together (along with Intand PSYOPS among others), in the context of Information Operations.  However, it's another Venn diagram - some overlap, but much more non-overlapping activity.
Again, the ability of CIMIC to be trusted hinges on their credibility - they must NOT be perceived as Int "spooks", PSYOPS, etc.

And, on a technicality, PIOs could in theory be employed as CIMIC, as explained below ...



			
				RDA said:
			
		

> Actually, perhaps a better question than the above two would simply be to ask who (trade-wise) delivers the CIMIC capability?



A.   There is no specific military trade for CIMIC.   Operators are primarily selected from the reserves, and can be any MOC (Military Occupation Code) as long as they've got the necessary soldier skills and appropriate people skills.   Sometimes Regular Force personnel are employed in CIMIC, too, in order to ensure that a destructive "us and them" situation doesn't evolve.

One aspect of this selection process is that civilian skillsets are considered - reservists normally have a civilian career in addition to their military experience - thus, it's "two for the price of one" - some of the CIMIC operators I've worked with included a P Eng, RN's, a workplace health and safety inspector, a banker with a Master's degree in law, a master's degree in communications, journalists, and others ...

CIMIC personnel can also be selected for their language skills - it really helps if you can, or at least try to speak a local language ... which most often is NOT English or French.  On one occasion in Kabul, a local mayor commented that this was the first time he had met a Canadian and he said "... you're just like us ..." - it was a treat to watch his jaw drop when the soldier replied in Farsi "Of course - what did you expect?"

Similarly, when going into a specific theatre of operations, CIMIC selection criteria can vary according to local cultural influence (e.g. in Afghanistan, facial hair is the norm for much of the civilian population - on one occasion, a taxi pulled up alongside a patrol and gave the "thumbs up" to a magnificent moustache ... chuckle!)  Sure - it may sound like a small thing, but ... when your bread and butter is to build and improve relationships with the local population ... it's the little things that count.  It's difficult to win hearts and minds if you're perceived as a barbarian ...


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## RDA (29 Nov 2004)

Thank you bossi for taking the time to answer my questions in such a clear and comprehensive manner!   

I just have a few follow up questions: 



			
				bossi said:
			
		

> Public Information Officers [...] stay in their separate, parallel "lanes" (even though they do cross from time to time).



I presume Public Information Officers drive down a relatively narrow lane, and are expected to stick to the "official party line" in their communications.   I am wondering if the CIMIC lane is a little wider, i.e. are they given a little more room to manoeuvre so that they can be more effective in gaining support from the local leaders in day-to-day negotiations?   (Please feel free to opt-out of answering this question if you don't feel comfortable doing so.)




			
				bossi said:
			
		

> [CIMIC] operators are primarily selected from the reserves [...] sometimes Regular Force personnel are employed in CIMIC, too, in order to ensure that a destructive "us and them" situation doesn't evolve.



Does "us and them" reffer to the "reserves and regulars" or to the "locals and foreign troops"?




			
				bossi said:
			
		

> On one occasion in Kabul, a local mayor commented that this was the first time he had met a Canadian and he said "... you're just like us ..." - it was a treat to watch his jaw drop when the soldier replied in Farsi "Of course - what did you expect?"



No question here.   I just think that is a great anecdote... thanks for sharing!




			
				bossi said:
			
		

> Similarly, when going into a specific theatre of operations, CIMIC selection criteria can vary according to local cultural influence (e.g. in Afghanistan, facial hair is the norm for much of the civilian population - on one occasion, a taxi pulled up alongside a patrol and gave the "thumbs up" to a magnificent moustache ... chuckle!)


Do you have any pictures of your moustache for us?   




			
				bossi said:
			
		

> Sure - it may sound like a small thing, but ... when your bread and butter is to build and improve relationships with the local population ... it's the little things that count.   It's difficult to win hearts and minds if you're perceived as a barbarian ...



Do CIMIC troops carry rifles?   I'm not saying I think they should or shouldn't, I'm just curious to know if they are charged with their own security or if that responsibility falls on a different group, for the sake of public perception?   (You'll have to forgive me if I am butchering the military lingo...)


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## bossi (29 Nov 2004)

RDA said:
			
		

> I presume Public Information Officers drive down a relatively narrow lane, and are expected to stick to the "official party line" in their communications.   I am wondering if the CIMIC lane is a little wider, i.e. are they given a little more room to manoeuvre so that they can be more effective in gaining support from the local leaders in day-to-day negotiations?   (Please feel free to opt-out of answering this question if you don't feel comfortable doing so.)



To a certain degree, "the official party line" for CIMIC and PIO can sometimes be the same, or be "apples and anvils" (i.e. very different).   CIMIC depend on credibility and honesty in order to build trust, but so do PIOs.
And, using the example of Afghanistan where verbal agreements can become binding contracts under local religious law ... honesty is the best policy, and the CIMIC Golden Role remains "Make No Promises" (especially ones you can't keep ...).



			
				RDA said:
			
		

> Does "us and them" reffer to the "reserves and regulars" or to the "locals and foreign troops"?



When I wrote my reply, it was the former (i.e. Canadian Army reservists and regulars).
In the context of Canadian troops dealing with foreign civilians, reservist CIMIC troops have the option of being able to say "... back home I'm a ... (insert civilian occupation here)" - depending on the situation, this can help build relationships, empathy and credibility (e.g. visiting a school construction site with Norwegian CIMIC, it was extremely useful when negotiating with the local contractor ... especially when you could say "... when I build windows back home ..." - the contractor knew he couldn't pull the wool over our eyes, and had to putty the windows ... there might even be some photo's in the link below ...).



			
				RDA said:
			
		

> No question here.   I just think that is a great anecdote... thanks for sharing!
> 
> Do you have any pictures of your moustache for us?



You're welcome, and as Jim Durante would say "I've got a million of them"
 (click here to see for yourself) 



			
				RDA said:
			
		

> Do CIMIC troops carry rifles?   I'm not saying I think they should or shouldn't, I'm just curious to know if they are charged with their own security or if that responsibility falls on a different group, for the sake of public perception?   (You'll have to forgive me if I am butchering the military lingo...)



First and foremost, CIMIC troops remain soldiers - so, yes - they carry weapons (we carried both rifles and pistols, so that even at the negotiating table our pistols remained close at hand).   In the context of Afghanistan, we deliberately wanted to cultivate the "public perception" that it would be a very bad idea to attack well-armed, well-trained CIMIC troops ...

When the threat level is lower (e.g. when I visited Bosnia) some NGOs/IOs such as the Red Cross might object to overt displays of weapons in their meetings (but luckily our pistols fit into pockets) - in Afghanistan, however, nobody asked us to disarm ... ever.

Also, depending on the "threat level", there might also be additional troops assigned to escort CIMIC - it's very situational dependent (hope that doesn't sound like a "cop out" answer, but it's a simple fact).


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## RDA (30 Nov 2004)

Once again bossi, thank you for the very informative response.   Fascinating stuff!!   

Great pictures...   The "Welcome to Kabul" pic belongs in a regional geography textbook.
I also enjoyed the possum lodge... and yes, that is indeed a magnificent moustache!

Take care!


P.S. "I'm a man... But I can change... If I have to... I guess."


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## bossi (30 Nov 2004)

RDA said:
			
		

> ... and yes, that is indeed a magnificent moustache!



"if the women don't find you handsome, they should at least find you handy"

Quando Omni Flunkus Moritati


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## Spr.Earl (30 Nov 2004)

Thank's PBI and bossi for your answer's they are most welcome.
It's cleared up a few question's but here are some more. 

But why is CIMIC limited to Sgt. and above?

As for me I'm a M/Cpl with 28yrs plus as a Field Eng.,also I'm a Marine Engineer on Civie St. but can't get into CIMIC because of my Rank ???

I think CIMIC should except on experience and qualifications on Civie St. and Military regardless of rank.

What are your thoughts on this?


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## bossi (30 Nov 2004)

Spr.Earl said:
			
		

> But why is CIMIC limited to Sgt. and above?
> 
> As for me I'm a M/Cpl with 28yrs plus as a Field Eng.,also I'm a Marine Engineer on Civie St. but can't get into CIMIC because of my Rank ???
> 
> ...



Initially CIMIC was restricted to Sgts and above to try and ensure a certain degree of maturity, plus enough military training/experience/time in (so that CIMIC operators weren't "wet behind the ears").

Also, keep in mind that CIMIC often has to deal with civilian bureaucrats - and, one of the more universal personality traits of BUREAUCRATS is that they can be very rank conscious, in a petty way (i.e. sometimes they feel snubbed if the military representative isn't a high enough rank ... but, don't get me started ...)

As with anything, "rules are only guidelines" and there are exceptions to every rule ...
Based on your quick description of your background, you'd be a good candidate for making an exception to the rank rule (except, of course, for the fact that we already KNOW you from here ... JUST KIDDING!)


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## ArmyRick (30 Nov 2004)

I am a trained CIMIC operator and I never served a minute with LFCA CIMIC. I was fired in last minute for roto 13 bosnia.
Having said that here is WHAT CIMIC DOES and DOES NOT DO (Sorry far too many post and I have not read them all).
(1) Provide a civil military liasion in SUPPORT of the commanders mission (everything we must do must benefit the BG/contingent)
(2) Provide commanders with detailed local and area assessments (every bit of info concerning civil defence, infrastructure, religion, history, economy, ethnic breakdown, etc whatever makes the town tick)
(3) Facilitate projects IF they will  benefit the CF by raising popularity for our troops (psy ops stuff).
(4) Co-ordinate and link up with local governments, NGOs and IOs to find out who is doing what and where. They also look for where areas need the most help.
(5) Advise commanders on civil military relation issues based on their knowledge of the local area.

YES we are armed (most CIMIC is combat arms and they are best suited for the role)
NO we are not supposed to hand out teddy bears and bicycles
YES we work for the Coy/BG/contingent commander
NO our primary role is not to build nice things for the local people, it is much better to facilitate projects.

YES proper NATO CIMIC doctrine in the CF is new (we have had CIMIC around for years but not properly trained or employed)

NGO and IO are much better at re-building and handing out humanitarian aid. Armed troops are for security, peace implementation (getting the beligerents to behave according to conventions, accords, etc), gathering information.
We have wasted alot of money on FAILED projects in Bosnia (including ones where CF troops think they have succeeded but they don't realize the truth).
By the way, the NSE CIMIC on roto 13 paladium was not authorized and did operations that violated the BG (RCD) comd's AOR. This is an example of CF meaning well but causing harm.
WE MUST BEWARE of what the results of our actions will be.


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## pbi (4 Dec 2004)

> WE MUST BEWARE of what the results of our actions will be.



Excellent point. Sometimes our well-meant Canadian intentions can cause problems, especially if they do not support the commander's intent for the mission, or fit into the local situation. In many of these locations we need to be careful about manging expectations. Cheers.


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## Infanteer (4 Dec 2004)

Excellent thread.  Thanks for the good explanation, I must admit I was in the dark about how CIMIC fit into the big picture, thanks for filling us in Mark.


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## bossi (7 Dec 2004)

Glad to see LGen MacKenzie quoted again:



> *Admiral: Forces not in position to add recruits
> Military needs new equipment, facilities, to boost full-time numbers by 5,000 people *
> By TERRY PEDWELL / The Canadian Press - Tuesday, December 7, 2004, The Halifax Herald Limited
> 
> ...


----------



## bossi (10 Dec 2004)

Since this topic "strayed" slightly ...
(but, then again - the whole point was that peacemaking is very dangerous ...)

Here's an article I noticed today - the US Army counterpart of CIMIC is Civil Affairs (which is part of CAPOC - Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command - which, in turn, is part of SOCOM - Special Operations Command) - I only point this out in order to emphasize the importance the US Army has placed upon Civil Affairs (i.e. because I wish CERTAIN people in the Canadian Army would do so, too ...)

This story is particularly poignant for me, as I can remember "pulling the short straw" for CIMIC security details, too ...

http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/TorontoSun/News/2004/12/10/775915.html



> *News from a new front*
> U.S. SOLDIER WRITES FROM IRAQ, WHERE POLITICS HAVE NO MEANING, MARK BONOKOSKI DISCOVERS
> 
> By Mark Bonokoski - Toronto Sun, Fri, December 10, 2004
> ...


----------



## ArmyRick (11 Dec 2004)

Sgt. Bryan Freeman RIP.


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## bossi (20 Dec 2004)

Along the same lines as Lew MacKenzie's original point (i.e. peacemaking is a dangerous business, and we shouldn't be lulled into complacency vis-a-vis mistakenly thinking peackeeping is the be all and end all ...).

Here are a couple of articles on aid workers in nominally non-permissive environments, where they too have naively succumbed to the siren call of "warm and fuzzy" at the expense of situational awareness which could cost their lives ...

Also, once again the old saw surfaces about how the military shouldn't partake in humanitairan assistance ... which is tantamount to being "in denial" vis-a-vis these aid organisations shrilly decrying the military ... while at the same time bemoaning the fact that they're unable to operate in a hostile environment ... (which brings us right back to the military solution ... funny about that, eh?)

Also, as an aside - you'll note the author of the second article seems to be in this for profit ... which brings us back to another important point:  It's only natural that aid organisations are going to decry military involvement in humanitarian assistance - after all, it's a thriving industry when you remember that the overwhelming majority of monies donated by the public ends up being consumed by "administrative overhead" (... which includes salaries ... and it's only human nature to react when one's rice bowl is threatened ...)

http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/12/19/news/afghan.html 



> *Aid groups in Afghanistan feel they are under siege *
> By Carlotta Gall and Amy Waldman The New York Times, Monday, December 20, 2004
> 
> 
> ...



http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1220/p09s01-coop.htm



> *Security for aid workers - a missing link*
> By Edward Girardet
> 
> KABUL - The release last month of three kidnapped United Nations election monitors in Afghanistan does not mean that all is well for the international aid community operating in conflict and recovery situations worldwide. Nothing has really changed on the security front for aid workers.
> ...


----------



## bossi (22 Dec 2004)

Gee whiz - it almost sounds like some snot-nosed Liberal party whankers might have been paying attention ...

http://www.canada.com/components/printstory/printstory4.aspx?id=afc0dd62-f0f3-4a9e-b0d1-61a927a3b4d7



> *Our Forces need more muscle*
> Graham: 5,000 new troops to bolster ability to fight overseas
> 
> Mike Blanchfield, The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, December 22, 2004
> ...


----------



## Kirkhill (22 Dec 2004)

We live in hope, bossi.

Merry Christmas


----------



## pbi (27 Dec 2004)

> In September, after the government dismissed Ismail Khan, the powerful governor of the western province of Herat, a move supported by the United Nations, a mob looted and burned 15 offices of United Nations and other agencies in the city of Herat. After the presidential elections Oct. 9, which were sponsored by the United Nations, three foreign election workers were kidnapped and held for three weeks by a Taliban splinter group.



This is so typical of what happens when the media decides to create a reality as opposed to reporting it. These two incidents were completely and utterly unrelated. The first one involving Ishmail Khan was a "gesture" by a recently deposed local leader against an easy target: the local UN compound. "IK" wanted to express his displeasure at losing his job but was not about to take on the strong US/ANA forces that had been moved into the city. The riot was believed to be orchestrated and was of fairly short duration, and was not likely an expression of true popular feeling but rather the action of a "crowd-for-hire". As a rule the aid agencies function very well in the Herat area, and it is considered to be one of the most secure regions of the country.

The second incident, the kidnapping, in Kabul, on the far side of the country, was not against an NGO or an aid agency: it was against three foreign employees of the Joint Election Management Board (JEMB) which is an agency of the Afgh govt. The suggestion that it was the Taliban is regarded with some skepticism: it was more likely just local criminal types: at one point the name of the Kabul City Police Chief was even rumoured.



> But this summer the city often had electricity only eight hours a day. It continues to suffer from a lack of hospital beds, sewage facilities, clean water and housing.



Yes, but does anybody bother checking to see what it was getting before that, or what the actual problems are? Does this article report that there is in fact widespread home electricity use, using car batteries? (Just look at Kabul by night...) Of course Kabul has deficiencies: show me one city in this part of hte world that doesn't? In fact, as far as hospitals and beds go, Kabul is relatively well equipped: what it lacks is doctors, nurses and technical staff. What this article does not report (of course...) is that the overall standard of living, by Afghan terms, has improved greatly over the last year, as a direct result of the military efforts of the US, the ANA and ISAF.



> Particularly in Kabul, many feared that the hostages would suffer the same gruesome fate as those executed by extremists in Iraq. This, in turn, might have prompted more aid agencies to leave Afghanistan just when the recovery is beginning to make headway.



Read this statement closely. It actually says very little. "Many" (who...?) "feared" that the hostages would suffer. Of course they feared that. But, guess what: they were released unharmed. "Might have prompted"--well, did it or didn't it? Guess what: it is really just speculation dressed up as fact so it doesn't matter.



> While the military may obtain good public relations by building bridges or schools, such initiatives double as intelligence-gathering operations.



I assume that this is directed at the US. Too bad the authors didn't bother to do any research to find out what the US policy in Afgh is on US military actually doing these projects as opposed to assisting and facilitating the Afgh Govt, GOs or even NGOs to do them. This statement ignores the whole way the US PRT system works. And, as for "intelligence-gathering"......I'm sorry--I must have missed something. What exactly is wrong with gathering intelligence? Exactly how does any military force expect to function without doing that? (Asinine and outdated UN "peacekeeping" restrictions aside, please...) How do you provide for your own force protection, or contribute to the security of the GOs/NGOs without an effective intelligence system that includes a very strong HUMINT function?

The rest of the article is, IMHO, littered with such rubbish. I think the real problem is that many of these GOs and NGOs are populated by people of a rather lefty persuasion who see a devil behind every Western soldier no matter what. They neither like nor understand the military and it shows. My experience over the last few years suggests to me that "aid" is a business and that a number of  these people figure that we might cramp their style.

Cheers.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (27 Dec 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> My experience over the last few years suggests to me that "aid" is a business and that a number of these people figure that we might cramp their style.
> 
> Cheers.



BINGO!!! Someone's got what we've been saying all along. ;D


----------



## bossi (2 Jan 2005)

And, in the context of "what does the CIMIC Assessment  provide?"
Here's an example (in the context of Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies/MAHE, since it's too late for Civil Emergency Planning/CEP):



> "The message to Canadian policymakers is that you have to do an assessment of the capacity of the Sri Lankan government, which can't do it all," said Alphonsus. "You have to assess on the ground who can deliver it."



http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/Co...&c=Article&cid=1104621011891&call_pageid=null


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## qb1244 (18 Feb 2005)

With talks of relationships between CIMIC, reg forces, IOs, and INGOs, and roles and responsibilities for each, i'd like to throw in an additional thread to this discussion on CIMIC.   i understand that the Canadian Government has adopted an integrated "3D approach" (defense, diplomacy, development) to providing assistance in conflict or post-conflict environments.   

Does anyone know who spearheaded this initiative (pmo, DND, dfait or cida)? When?   
How is it being received, at different ranks, by members of the forces?   
Without getting too candid, is any of the three partners playing or taking more of a lead role?   
Any feedback on how tactically the partnerships are being implemented in the field?
Will this approach pass the test of time, or is it considered by insiders as an experiment in foreign policy?

.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon (7 May 2008)

Just for a little bit of fun.


----------



## dapaterson (7 May 2008)

I voted no:

(1) Didn't know the system.  Despite his "Man from outside" schtick, Gen Hillier knows well how the system works, and how to work it (and work around it).  MGen Lew would have been bitten and stung repeatedly by things he never saw coming becasue of his lack of NDHQ savvy.

(2) Different times.  His style (carefully cultivated with speechwriters and the ghostwriter who helped him write his memoirs) would not have worked well with the political leadership of the time when he was serving.

(3) Didn't display sufficient leadership when it was called for.



> MGen (ret) MacKenzie testified before us in an honest and straightforward manner. He alone seemed to understand the necessity to acknowledge error and account for personal shortcomings. We did not always accept everything that he said, but we accept that what he offered us was the truth as he saw it. Unlike some senior officers who appeared before us, he was never less than courteous and respectful in the way that he gave evidence or responded to our questions.
> 
> Also, MGen (ret) MacKenzie fully accepted the need for a public accounting of what went on in Somalia. He invariably supported our effort to probe the incidents and events in the wider public interest. We regard his comportment and demeanour throughout his testimony before us as consistent with the highest standards of military duty and responsibility.
> 
> ...



http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol4/v4c31e.htm


----------



## The Bread Guy (7 May 2008)

I only voted no because I don't think he'd be keen on being a "political" soldier, in spite of him trying to be a politician proper in a previous election.


----------



## McG (7 May 2008)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Just for a little bit of fun.


Are you proposing him to replace Gen Hillier?  He would not be the first General brought out of retirement to be CDS (though maybe the first who was not already CDS prior to first retirement).


----------



## Ex-Dragoon (7 May 2008)

No I am just trying to guage the membership view on whether or not he would have made a decent CDS based on their experiences and knowledge of him.


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## acheo (7 May 2008)

> Are you proposing him to replace Gen Hillier?  He would not be the first General brought out of retirement to be CDS (though maybe the first who was not already CDS prior to first retirement).



Not really. John de Chastelain was brought back in 1994.



> In 1989, he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1993, he transferred to the Reserves and was appointed Canada's Ambassador to the United States. In 1994, he was recalled to Regular Force duty and re-appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, from which post he retired in December 1995.


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## acheo (7 May 2008)

> though maybe the first who was not already CDS prior to first retirement).



sorry, had not seen your note, (technically true)


----------



## geo (7 May 2008)

A man of the times..... BEEP!"  Time's up!

Next!


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## Gunner98 (7 May 2008)

Lewis MacKenzie would have made an OK CDS if we had stayed in the Peacekeeping realm, I don't think he would have had a smeck on how to lead a war-time national force.  He has been pretty controversial writer and columnist since his retirement in 1993.  He reached MGen after 35 years of service and did not compete with his peers at the time.

He had his day at the airport in the Sarajevo sun.  It was so glamorous at the time but IMHO it pales in comparison to what Battle Group Commanders and TF Commanders are doing today in a combat setting.

All those voting yes have chosen not to comment, interesting indeed! ???


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## Mountie (7 May 2008)

I think he would make a good CDS but I do agree he's been out of the game too long.  It might take him a little while to get back in the groove.  

On a related note, I've heard a few members in the RCMP suggest Gen. Hillier for our next Commissioner of the RCMP.  I totally agree.  I think he would be great for us.  Not that Commissioner Elliot isn't doing a great job, by if Hillier could do for the RCMP what he did for the CF, bring him on.


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## dapaterson (7 May 2008)

I somehow think Gen Hillier will spend the first year or so of "retirement" burning off accumulated leave and writing his memoirs, with his feet up by the fire.

Then, once the Maple Leafs fall (as they do every spring) he'll be back out and about - though I can't yet imagine what he'll be up to.


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## P-PLATOON (5 Oct 2008)

Have one more chapter to go, but I really enjoyed this book. It's not a very long read at 280 pages. The initial 2 chapters about his youth are little boring but it helps shape and explain his personality later in life.



I definitely recommend for anyone interested.


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## Dog Walker (5 Oct 2008)

There is an excerpt from the book on the Publishers web site. It deals with his comments about Carol Off. 

http://www.dmpibooks.com/book/9781553653509/excerpt


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## Old Sweat (5 Oct 2008)

I know Lew fairly well, having first met him on the Combat Team Commanders' Course in 1972 and having crossed paths many times over the years. We most recently renewed our relationship at a social function near Ottawa this June. (We were always on a first name basis despite our difference in rank.) I cannot comment on Ms Off's work, but I would like to go on record as supporting the general's comment about soldiers making one look good. Like him, throughout my career I was fortunate enough to find soldiers tolerant enough of my foibles to carry out my orders in a way that reflected well on me. 

As luck would have it, a close friend of mine from high school joined the Queen's Own Rifles as a rifleman and served in the same battalion as Lew in Canada and Germany. At a recent QOR reunion in Calgary he called the general 'Sir' and was politely, told "It's Lew." That explains at least in part why he can claim that the soldiers made him look good.


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## P-PLATOON (5 Oct 2008)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I know Lew fairly well, having first met him on the Combat Team Commanders' Course in 1972 and having crossed paths many times over the years. We most recently renewed our relationship at a social function near Ottawa this June. (We were always on a first name basis despite our difference in rank.) I cannot comment on Ms Off's work, but I would like to go on record as supporting the general's comment about soldiers making one look good. Like him, throughout my career I was fortunate enough to find soldiers tolerant enough of my foibles to carry out my orders in a way that reflected well on me.
> 
> As luck would have it, a close friend of mine from high school joined the Queen's Own Rifles as a rifleman and served in the same battalion as Lew in Canada and Germany. At a recent QOR reunion in Calgary he called the general 'Sir' and was politely, told "It's Lew." That explains at least in part why he can claim that the soldiers made him look good.



Old Sweat, thanks for the insight! I have never had the opportunity to meet "Lew" but after reading the book, I feel like I know him.

He had many examples in his book of how he took care of is soldiers, the best I thought was regarding the '72 Summit Series (I wont get into detail as I don't want to ruin the read for potential book purchasers)  I wasn't alive at the time, but being an enourmous sports fan and during the cold war era, I can only imagine what the 72 Summit Series meant to Canadians and Canadian Forces Members. He managed to get a TV out into the field for his soldiers too watch game 6 during an excersize.

I also found his disagreement with Romeo Dallaire on Leadership absolutly facinating.


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## dapaterson (6 Oct 2008)

My favourite Lew story:

A Cpl in Bosnia was homesick and looking to make a call home to Canada.  As he put it, some old guy in civvies who looked like the "janitor" steered him to an office to use the phone.  The Sgt in the room sneered and sent the Cpl away.  Dejected, the Cpl returned to the janitor and complained about the Sgt.  The "janitor" said "That's odd, I never have any problems." and brought the Cpl back, in person.

Suddenly, the Sgt was very attentive and polite, and helped the Cpl make the call.  The "janitor" left; after the call, the Sgt said "You know who that was, of course."  Cpl "The janitor?"   Sgt "No!  That was General MacKenzie!"


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## gillbates (26 Oct 2008)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> My favourite Lew story:
> 
> A Cpl in Bosnia was homesick and looking to make a call home to Canada.  As he put it, some old guy in civvies who looked like the "janitor" steered him to an office to use the phone.  The Sgt in the room sneered and sent the Cpl away.  Dejected, the Cpl returned to the janitor and complained about the Sgt.  The "janitor" said "That's odd, I never have any problems." and brought the Cpl back, in person.
> 
> Suddenly, the Sgt was very attentive and polite, and helped the Cpl make the call.  The "janitor" left; after the call, the Sgt said "You know who that was, of course."  Cpl "The janitor?"   Sgt "No!  That was General MacKenzie!"



nice story.. I read this in James Davis's "the sharp end".


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## leroi (26 Oct 2008)

Yes, I can't wait to read this book too. 

I read an excerpt of the book in a September 2008 issue of MACLEAN'S magazine.

The brief bit I read gave a good counterbalancing view of (Ret.d) General Dalliare's Rawanda mission.

MGen Mackenzie delivered his assessment of the Unamir mission in a very fair way--no cheap shots. 

It sounds like this would be an important leadership book for those in the CF training to be leaders right now.


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## dapaterson (26 Oct 2008)

gillbates said:
			
		

> nice story.. I read this in James Davis's "the sharp end".



Thank you!  I was racking my mind trying to recall the source - now I have to figure out who I lent my copy of that book, and determine why it never came home...


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## Old Sweat (26 Oct 2008)

I would have expected that a senior log officer would have got a signature.


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## Armymedic (26 Oct 2008)

Carol Off has no love lost for Lew. I think they have a professional "love-to-hate-you" relationship from Sarajavo in 92. She seems to think Lew's biggest fan is himself...which could be true....but not knowing the man, how do I judge.


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## Gasplug (28 Oct 2008)

Here is my favourite Lew McKenzie story...

I was the military information officer with 1 R22eR in Sarajevo in July 92 (that's the UN euphemism for the Int O, BTW)  On the second or third day of our arrival at the airport, I managed to hitch a ride to the PTT building where UN HQ Sarajevo was located.  Once I got there, I met Gen McKenzie in the lobby and, being the very personable guy he is, he shakes my hand and asks me what was bringing me to his HQ.  I told him I was going to see his own Int shop to see "what was really going on in town".  Without breaking stride he flat out replied:  

*"If you find out, make sure you let me know!"*

Needless to say, I was quite floored by his candour but I did develop very healthy respect for the man at that point.

Cheers,

Gasplug


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## OldSolduer (28 Oct 2008)

One can't go too far wrong if one uses General Lew as a role model of how an officer and a gentleman conducts himself.

To those of you who aspire to high command, heed General Lew's words wisely.


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## dapaterson (28 Oct 2008)

Others agree that Lew is a man to emulate - and not those you'd necesarily think:



> Before analyzing our findings, we believe that some important observations should be made about MGen MacKenzie and his approach to leadership and accountability.
> MGen MacKenzie was unique among the senior leaders who appeared before us, and were involved in the Somalia deployment, in evincing a proper understanding of and respect for the inquiry process.
> 
> MGen (ret) MacKenzie testified before us in an honest and straightforward manner. He alone seemed to understand the necessity to acknowledge error and account for personal shortcomings. We did not always accept everything that he said, but we accept that what he offered us was the truth as he saw it. Unlike some senior officers who appeared before us, he was never less than courteous and respectful in the way that he gave evidence or responded to our questions.
> ...



http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol4/v4c31e.htm


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## Old Sweat (28 Oct 2008)

A story from Combat Team Commander's Course serial 7201 somewhere down the Lawfield Corridor. Scenario - the student combat team commander (SCTC), a very intense young captain in the PPCLI was delivering his verbal orders to not only his subordinate student command appointment, but the whole assembled multitude of troops. (For some reason this procedure had developed and had not yet been stamped out by the DS.)

SCTC: "Prisoners. No prisoners will be taken" followed by the rest of the orders. "Questions?"

Major MacKenzie: "Captain Medina, would you go over the part about the prisoners again? I don't think Lootenant Calley got it."

This broke up the whole combat team and the DS and threw the timings and battle procedure well off schedule. For those (most?) of you who don't recognize the reference, the Vietnam War was still underway, and the press had broken the story of the infamous My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians by US troops. The company that performed the act was commanded by Captain Ernest Medina, while the platoon commander responsible for ordering the killings was Second Lieutenant William Calley.


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## OldSolduer (28 Oct 2008)

That's a good one OldSweat!!

As an aside, orders like this "no prisoners" is what got us in a whole boat load of trouble in the 90's. The DS should have "Counselled" this officer to say the least.

That, in my opinion, would not have been a lawful command.


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## daftandbarmy (30 Oct 2008)

OldSolduer said:
			
		

> That's a good one OldSweat!!
> 
> As an aside, orders like this "no prisoners" is what got us in a whole boat load of trouble in the 90's. The DS should have "Counselled" this officer to say the least.



Like the "if one man is wounded we will leave him and carry on with the mission" action on. Who thought that stuff up?


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## daftandbarmy (26 Jan 2009)

Major-General (Ret'd) Lew MacKenzie joins Cymat Board 
    
    TORONTO, Jan. 26 /CNW/ - Cymat Technologies Ltd. (TSX: CYM), a
Toronto-based manufacturer and licensor of stabilized aluminum foam ("SAF")
products, targeting the automotive, architectural and blast mitigation
markets, announces the appointment of Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie as
a new corporate director.

    Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis Wharton MacKenzie, C.M., O.Ont. MSC and bar,
CD, is a retired Canadian general, author and media commentator. He is most
recognized for establishing and commanding Sector Sarajevo as part of the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia in 1992.
    Major-General (Ret'd) MacKenzie brings to Cymat a wealth of experience in
the military. During his 36 year military career he served with NATO Forces in
Germany for nine years and volunteered for nine peacekeeping missions in the
Gaza Strip, Cyprus, Viet Nam, Cairo, Central America and Sarajevo.
    Since his retirement from the Canadian Forces in 1993 MacKenzie has
joined numerous Corporate Boards headquartered in Canada and The United
States. Following the attacks of 9/11 he was appointed one of two advisors to
the Premier of Ontario on counter-terrorism and emergency measures. He has
received numerous honours including the Vimy award and is a Member of the
Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario for his humanitarian work in Africa.
    "We are honoured to have someone of Major-General (Ret'd) MacKenzie's
pedigree and experience join the Cymat Board" said Michael Liik, Executive
Chairman of Cymat. He added "Given Cymat's considerable corporate emphasis on
blast mitigation markets, Major-General (Ret'd) MacKenzie's knowledge and
guidance should prove invaluable".

    About Cymat:

    Cymat develops innovative materials for industry. The company has
worldwide rights, through patents and licenses, for producing Stabilized
Aluminum Foam. The ultra-light metallic foam is manufactured by bubbling gas
through molten alloyed aluminum containing a dispersion of fine ceramic
particles and can be produced as either Near-net Shapes or Flat Panels. The
result is a revolutionary material with a wide array of features including
very low density, mechanical energy absorption, thermal and acoustic
insulation, is recyclable, time and temperature insensitive and has a
relatively low cost of production. Cymat is collaborating with a number of
partners spanning the automotive, architectural and blast mitigation
industries. For further information, visit the Web site www.cymat.com.

    The foregoing press release contains forward-looking statements relating
to the development of markets, development programs, future revenues and
improvements in technology, which are subject to important risks and
uncertainties. The results or events predicted in these statements may differ
materially from actual results or events. Factors which could cause results or
events to differ from current expectations include the availability of
funding, existing and future relationships with suppliers and manufacturers,
the results of research and development activities, risks of technological
breakthroughs that make Cymat stabilized aluminum foam less attractive, risks
relating to the breadth, scope and enforceability of intellectual property
rights, general industry and market conditions, availability of qualified
personnel, and reliance on co-development partners. For additional information
with respect to these and other factors, see the reports filed by Cymat
Technologies Ltd. with the Ontario Securities Commission. Cymat Technologies
Ltd. disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any
forward-looking statements.


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## Teager (27 Jun 2018)

Auction can be found here:

http://macleanandassociates.hibid.com/catalog/135647/maclean-and-assoc---major-general-lewis-mackenzie-auction/

Also an article that gives reason for the auction.

https://www.google.ca/amp/ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/egan-maj-gen-lewis-mackenzie-selling-off-his-life/amp


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## OldTanker (28 Jun 2018)

What a sad story, but I guess we all move on. Best wishes to General MacKenzie, a hell of a soldier.


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## Gunner98 (28 Jun 2018)

DND has been searching for unused sleeping bags, I hope that there isn't a shortage of green flak jackets.  Isn't it illegal to sell military equipment for private gain; good thing he is hanging onto it, might be better still if he returned it to supply section where it belongs.


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## Furniture (28 Jun 2018)

Simian Turner said:
			
		

> DND has been searching for unused sleeping bags, I hope that there isn't a shortage of green flak jackets.  Isn't it illegal to sell military equipment for private gain; good thing he is hanging onto it, might be better still if he returned it to supply section where it belongs.



Yes... I'm sure the General's kit is the real reason we don't have enough to kit out our field forces...


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## Good2Golf (28 Jun 2018)

Gen I beast was probably a write-off, and DEUs are fair game if one wants. Was there any current-stock kit on the list?

Separately, I feel for the General. To lose a life mate this long into a life is a sad thing. 

Thoughts to Mack! 

Regards
G2G


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