# Orders that would result in your death



## iæfai (21 Mar 2010)

A friend of mine who is not exactly a supporter of the military asked an interesting question the other day.

As a naval officer, what situations exist where you may be given an order which would result in your death? Are there grounds to refuse such an order?


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## FSTO (21 Mar 2010)

Well, since you are on a ship and if the captain makes the decision (or is ordered by higher authority) to prosecute a submarine or go up threat to defend a High Vaule Unit (HVU) you don't have much choice except jump overboard. Which means a slow death by hypothermia.

During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, small destroyer escorts did a suicide charge agiainst Japanese battleships and cruisers. They did this to defend the landings on Luzon and their sacrifice saved the invasion of the Philipines.


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## Pusser (21 Mar 2010)

This falls under the principle of "ultimate liability" which states (more or less) that leaders may have to give orders that will lead to someone's or that you may receive orders that could result in your death.  The only order that may be lawfully refused is one that is "manifestly unlawful."  This would be an order that is so abhorrent that a reasonable thinking person would consider it as such.  The example given in the QR&O is an order to shoot an unarmed child. 

Having said that, could an order to throw yourself under a tank track (presumably to slow its progress) be considered manifestly unlawful?  I would argue yes, because a reasonable person would conclude that it would mean certain death, but would accomplish little.  However, an order to run down a "sniper alley" in order to capture a position may not.  The bottom line is that if you ever receive a questionable order, you have to make a decision as to whether to follow it while keeping in mind the consequences (i.e. charges of cowardice at the extreme and/or charges of disobedience of a lawful command).

Even if an order doesn't make sense or seems stupid, the regulations state you must follow it, unless it is manifestly unlawful.  Presumably, the Chain of Command and the military justice system will take care of the one who gave the stupid order at a later date.  It is highly conceivable that in the case of refusing a stupid order, both the giver and the refuser could be charged, found guilty and punished.  The former for giving a stupid order and the latter for refusing to follow it.  Such is the burden of command.


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## Rifleman62 (21 Mar 2010)

There are several instances similiar to the one posted by FSTO. Here is one:

The most famous ship of the G class Fleet Destroyers is HMS Glowworm, who encountered the German Heavy Cruiser, Admiral Von Hipper and her destroyer escorts on 8th April 1940. The Glowworm had been built by Thornycroft at Woolston, launched on the 22nd July 1935, commissioned for trials on 14 January 1936, and in May that year joined the 20th Destroyer Force in the Mediterranean. In August she transferred to the 1st Destroyer Force where she remained until June 1938 when she moved back to Portsmouth to be paid off. The approaching threat of war led her to be recommissioned and transferred back to the 1st Destroyer Force in the Mediterranean in July 1938. She recommenced peacetime duties such as escort work at the time of the Spanish Civil War and the Munich crisis. In an eerie foretaste of what was to come, she suffered moderate damage to her bow when she collided with her sister ship, HMS Grenade, on 16th May 1939, off the island of Malta during night exercises. Glowworm also collided with the Swedish ship Rex in February 1940. Both incidents resulted in the ship having to have significant repairs made to her. 

The Glowworm was transferred with the 1st Destroyer Force to Harwich in December 1939. On the 5th April 1940 she sailed as part of the destroyer escort to the battle-cruiser HMS Renown and the cruiser HMS Birmingham in Operation Wilfred, an attempt to intercept the expected German invasion force, and if necessary, mine Norwegian waters. On the 6th April, whilst screening a mine laying operation, Glowworm lost a man overboard in heavy weather. Her CO, Lt Commander Gerard B Roope obtained permission to conduct a search for the missing man. After spending sometime looking for him, the Glowworm attempted to return to the group. On the 8th April, the Glowworm sighted a destroyer who when challenged, identified itself as Swedish. It was in fact the German von Röder class destroyer, Bernd Von Arnim, which very quickly opened fire, to which Glowworm responded. Unfortunately another German destroyer, the Paul Jakobi soon appeared. However, the Von Arnim was packed with invasion troops and soon both it and the Paul Jakobi turned and fled into a rain squall. Lt Cdr Roope gave chase despite guessing that they were trying lead him onto their main force in an attempt to discover there whereabouts and inform the Admiralty. 

As the Glowworm emerged from the squall she came face-to-face with 14,000 ton the German Heavy Cruiser, Admiral Von Hipper armed with eight 8 inch and twelve 4 inch guns. The Glowworm laid smoke and conducted torpedo attacks from the cover of the smoke screen but failed to hit the Hipper. Glowworm had sustained substantial damage by this time and Lt Cdr Roope gave the order 'Stand by to ram'. The Hipper, realising what was happening tried to turn and ram the Glowworm but was too slow. The Glowworm tore into the starboard side of the Hipper amidships and tore 100 feet of armour plating away, damaged her starboard torpedo tubes and punctured two fresh water tanks. After ramming the Hipper, Glowworm drew clear, but received another close range salvo from the Hipper to which the single gun, commanded by Petty Officer Walter Scott responded. Glowworm by this time had sustained massive damaged and started to sink and Lt Cdr Roope gave the order to abandon ship. He went down to open the sea cocks himself and the ship started to sink, forcing men into the freezing water or onto her bow. The Captain of the Hipper, Helmuth Heye, gallantly stayed for over an hour picking up survivors. He positioned Hipper so that the tidal currents would carry the survivors too them. All the personnel on deck helped with hauling survivors aboard but many were too exhausted to make the final effort of climbing up the ropes and ladders and slipped away, including Lt Cdr Roope who helped many of his men to get life jackets on and to get to ladders. Out of a crew of 149, only 31 survived, the only officer being Lt Robert Ramsey. The prisoners were treated well by the Germans who congratulated them on a good fight, and Captain Heye told the men that their Captain was a brave man. Later, Heye sent a message through the International Red Cross recommending Lt Cdr Roope for the Victoria Cross, *the only time in British history that a VC has been recommended by the enemy*. The survivors spent the rest of the war as PoWs and afterwards, Lt Ramsey was able to return home and tell the whole story. The story was published on the 10th July 1945, in the Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette for Friday, 6th July 1945. As a result, Lt Cdr Roope was awarded the Victoria Cross, Lt Ramsey the Distinguished Service Order and three other ratings received the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. 

HMS Glowworm website:  http://www.hmsglowworm.org.uk/

Note picture of ramming re relationship of size of the two ships.


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## ballz (21 Mar 2010)

Wow, what a story... Can't believe there isn't a movie about it.

Brave men.


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## Rifleman62 (21 Mar 2010)

The battle to which FSTO is refering to was, I believe, the only time in history that surface warships engaged aircraft carriers. See photo of Escort Carrier, with shell spashes. Ship in circle is Japanese. A near run thing!

USS Heermann was of the famous Fletcher class distroyers.

USS HEERMANN (DD 532)

CDR Amos T. Hathaway, USN, Commanding Officer

HEERMANN was the only surviving destroyer of Taffy III. At the outset of the engagement she laid protective smoke in the rear of the escort carriers with the smaller DE's. When the word, "small boys - intercept," was ordered by RADM Sprague, she bravely turned to attack the heavy cruisers and battleships of Centre Force. Although none of her torpedoes found their target, almost better results were realized. The mighty Japanese battleship HIJMS YAMATO was forced to comb her torpedo wakes and was subsequently placed out of position for the remainder of the action. After her torpedoes were expended, she bravely engaged the Japanese warships with 5-inch gunfire. She was hit several times and was notably down by the bow before the action concluded. Her superb action in defense of the escort carriers proudly shows that she was most likely the only U.S. destroyer in World War II to engage heavy cruisers and battleships directly and survive.

Class FLETCHER 
Displacement 2,100 tons 
Length 376 feet 3 inches 
Beam 39 feet 8 inches 
Draft 13 feet 
Speed 33 knots 
Complement 273 
Armament 5 (5 x 1) 5-inch radar controlled GP guns
10 21" (2 x 5) torpedo tubes
6 40mm AA guns
11 20mm AA guns
6 depth charge throwers
2 depth charge racks 
Sensors SC air-warning radar
SG surface search radar
MK-4 fire control radar
sonar 
Laid Down unknown 
Launched 5 December 1942 
Commissioned 6 July 1943 

Namesake Information

Lewis Heermann was born in Kassel, Germany on August 3, 1770 and commissioned Surgeon's Mate in the U.S. Navy on February 8, 1802. In the War with the Barbary States, Heermann was left in command of the bomb ketch INTREPID. In 1805 Heermann took a leave of absence to study in Europe until 1808, when he returned to active duty in Norfolk, Virginia. Largely due to his pleas for better medical care for the men of the Navy, Congress passed a bill authorizing the construction of hospitals at several naval stations. Heermann served for an unknown time as Fleet Surgeon in the Mediterranean. He remained there until he died in May of 1833.

Career

HEERMANN was built by the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company of San Francisco, California. After shakedown training out of San Diego, she joined the U.S. Fifth Fleet on 21 October 1943 for the assault on the Gilberts. 

Campaigns

Gilberts - 20 to 23 November 1943

Arriving off Tarawa in RADM Harry W. Hill's Southern Attack Force, HEERMANN soon saw action. Her guns sank a small enemy craft inside the lagoon. During the next two days, she supported the ground troops ashore with direct gunfire support. Upon completion of this assignment, she returned to Pearl Harbor for voyage repairs and training.

Marshalls - 29 January to 23 February 1944

On 23 January 1944, HEERMANN sailed with the screen of an attack transport reserve force. This force steamed east of Kwajalein in support of amphibious landings. During the next two weeks, HEERMANN screened escort carriers which were launching strikes to support the landings. Next, she steamed to Eniwetok Atoll where she joined the preinvasion bombardment group and then patrolled off the atoll during mop-up operations.

The Admiralties - 18 March to 20 April 1944

Assigned to U.S. Third Fleet, HEERMANN joined Task Force 39 on 18 March 1944 for troop convoy and supply convoy escort duty. During this period, she made many transits back and forth and also hunted enemy supply barges along the coast of New Hanover.

Solomons, Admiralty Islands, Carolines, and Marshalls - Summer of 1944

Arriving at Port Purvis on 3 June 1944, HEERMANN participated in the bombardment of a tank farm on Fangelewa Bay, New Ireland on 11 June. She then searched for submarines along the sealanes separating the Solomons, Admiralty Islands, Carolines, and Marshalls, until 26 June 1944. For the remainder of the summer, HEERMANN escorted convoys bound for various ports including Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides Islands and Noumea, and New Caledonia Island.

Leyte Gulf/Samar - 17 - 25 October 1944

HEERMANN screened transports and landing ships safely to the beaches of Leyte and then joined Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's Escort Carrier Task Group 77.4 which was made up of three escort carrier task units, known as the three "Taffies" because of their radio call signs: "Taffy 1", "Taffy 2", and "Taffy 3". Destroyers HOEL and JOHNSTON joined her in screening Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's unit, "Taffy 3" which also included his flagship FANSHAW BAY (CVE-70) and three other escort carriers.

Dawn of October 25, 1944 found Taffy 3 east of Samar steaming north as the Northern Air Support Group. Taffy 2 was in the central position patrolling off the entrance to Leyte Gulf, and Taffy 1 covered the Southern approaches to the Gulf some 130 miles to the southeast of HEERMANN. At 0645 Taffy 3's lookouts observed antiaircraft fire to the northward and with 13 minutes later were under heavy fire from Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's powerful Centre Force of four battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The battle off Samar was thus joined.

The only chance for survival of the little group of light American ships lay in slowing the advance of the enemy warships while withdrawing toward Leyte Gulf and hoped-for assistance. The carriers promptly launched their planes to attack the Japanese vessels, and the escorts promptly set to work generating smoke to hide the American ships.

HEERMANN, in a position of comparative safety on the disengaged side of the carriers at the start of the fight, steamed into the action at flank speed through the formation of "baby flattops" who, after launching their last planes, formed a rough circle as they turned toward Leyte Gulf. Since smoke and intermittent rain squalls had reduced visibility to less than 100 yards, it took alert and skillful seamanship to avoid colliding with friendly ships during the dash to battle. She backed emergency full to avoid destroyer escort SAMUEL B. ROBERTS and repeated the maneuver to miss destroyer HOEL as HEERMANN formed column on the screen flagship in preparation for a torpedo attack.

As she began the run, dye from enemy shells daubed the water nearby with circles of brilliant red, yellow, and green. HEERMANN replied to this challenge by pumping her 5-inch shells at one heavy cruiser, CHIKUMA, as she directed seven torpedoes at another, HAGURO. When these "fish" had left their tubes, HEERMANN changed course to engage a column of four battleships whose shells began churning the water nearby. She trained her guns on the battleship KONGO, the column's leader. Then she quickly closed HARUNA, the target of her of her last three torpedoes, which were launched from only 4,400 yards. Believing that one of the "fish" had hit the battleship, she nimbly dodged the salvoes which splashed in her wake as she retired. Japanese records claim that the battleship successfully evaded all of HEERMANN's torpedoes, but they were slowed down in their pursuit of the American carriers. The giant, YAMATO, with her monstrous 18.1-inch guns, was even force out of the action altogether when, caught between two spreads, she reversed course for almost 10 minutes to escape being hit.

HEERMANN sped to the starboard quarter of the carrier formation to lay more concealing smoke and then charged back into the fight a few minutes later, placing herself boldly between the escort carriers and the column of four enemy heavy cruisers. Here she engaged Japanese cruiser CHIKUMA in a duel which seriously damaged both ships. A series of 8-inch hits flooded the forward part of the plucky destroyer, pulling her bow down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water. One of her guns was knocked out but the others continued to pour a deadly stream of 5-inch shells at the cruiser, which also came under heavy air attack during the engagement. The combined effect of HEERMANN's guns and the bombs, torpedoes, and strafing from carrier-based planes was too much for CHIKUMA who tried to withdraw but sank during her fight.

As CHIKUMA turned away, heavy cruiser TONE turned her guns on HEERMANN who replied shell for shell until she reached a position suitable to resume laying smoke for the carriers. At this point planes from Admiral Stump's "Taffy 2" swooped in to sting TONE so severely that she too broke off action and fled. The courageous attacks of the destroyers and aircraft thus saved the outgunned Taffy 3.

Temporary battle-damage repairs were applied at Kossol Passage. From there, she was sent to Mare Island, California for a much-needed overhaul. She would not return to the Western Pacific until January 1945.

Iwo Jima - 19 February to 24 March 1945

Quickly transiting to the battle area, HEERMANN was then assigned to picket and anti-submarine duty in support of the Iwo Jima landings. On 20 March she sank a small surface vessel and rescued seven of the crew.

Okinawa - 26 March - April 1945

Assigned to aircraft carrier escort duty, she took part in downing several enemy planes which threatened the invasion force. With the assistance of her task unit, on 18 April HEERMANN was credited with sinking the Japanese submarine I-56. She continued to support carrier operations until late June, when she steamed to Leyte for replenishment and voyage repairs. 

Summer of 1945

On 1 July, HEERMANN was assigned to a fast carrier strike force which kept the pressure on the Japanese home islands. This assignment lasted for five weeks.

On 15 August 1945, while on radar picket duty, 200 miles off the coast of Tokyo, Japan, HEERMANN was attacked by a suicide plane. Her gun crew splashed the attacker which cumulated in one of the last actions of the Pacific war. The end to hostilities had been announced only a few hours earlier.

On 16 September 1945, veteran HEERMANN entered Tokyo Bay as part of the U.S. occupation force. She departed for home on 7 October 1945, nearly one year after her action off Samar.

USS HEERMANN (DD 532) received nine Battle Stars for her service in World War II.


Two escort carriers Gambier Bay and St. Lo, the destroyers Hoel and Johnston, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts were sunk and four other American ships damaged. The destroyer Heermann, despite her unequal fight with the enemy, finished the battle with only six of her crew dead.

More than one thousand sailors and aircrewmen of the escort carrier units were killed. As a result of communication errors and other failures, a very large number of survivors from Taffy 3 were not rescued for several days, many dying unnecessarily as a consequence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Heermann_(DD-532)See:


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## Ex-Dragoon (21 Mar 2010)

I wonder how the Japanese viewed the USS Heermann based on the Code of Bushido.


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## Rifleman62 (21 Mar 2010)

It was not only the USS Heermann. The other DD's and the smaller DDE's (  Destroyer Escorts, similar to Corvettes).

I like military history, and when I was younger read all the stories of these battles. Books long out of print, especially WWII books. Too bad.

Here is Taffy 3's story: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar

I know lots here don't like wikipedia. 

To answer Ex-Dragoon' s question:

"As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, the survivors saw the enemy standing at attention to salute." refering to DD USS Johnston attacking by itself a heavy cruiser.

The DDE USS Samuel B "Roberts had moved so close that the enemy couldn't depress their guns low enough to hit her; the shells passed overhead"
Attacking a heavy cruiser with one 5 inch forward, and one aft.

Also at the Battle of the River Plate, Dec  39, the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter exposed herself to give the two light cruisers (HMS Achilles and HMS Ajax)a better chance against the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee. Great great movie if you ever get to see it. HMS Achilles played herself in the movie!!!
"Action this day" Piipe, Raise Battle Ensigns"

Regret hijack of orginal question.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Mar 2010)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> The battle to which FSTO is refering to was, I believe, the only time in history that surface warships engaged aircraft carriers. See photo of Escort Carrier, with shell spashes. Ship in circle is Japanese. A near run thing!



A signalman on one of the escort carriers is recorded by the USN historian as saying "They're getting away!" when the Japanese battleships and cruisers retreated.  Admiral Kurita's decision to withdraw is a hotly debated topic even today.

As an aside, HMS Glorious, a Royal Navy aircraft carrier, was sunk by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau by gunfire off Norway in 1940.  To go with the thread, though, her two destroyer escorts went down charging the two battlecruisers in an attempt to save the carrier.  Those destroyer crews faced certain destruction, but they went anyway.

For the original poster in the thread, an officer in any branch must be prepared to execute an order that may, in all likelihood, result in his death.  He must also be ready to issue an order that may result in the death of his subordinates.  That doesn't mean that he wants to, but simply that he must be prepared to do so if his estimate of the situation leads him to believe that it is necessary.

If you don't mind me asking, are you a serving officer?


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## helpup (22 Mar 2010)

Nice Post,  I enjoyed reading it enough to offer that the "stories" aka historical tributes be under it's own title as they dont really fit under the original post title.


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## CountDC (22 Mar 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> If you don't mind me asking, are you a serving officer?



me thinks not:



			
				iæfai said:
			
		

> I have received an acceptance from Windsor (EE) and ROTP (Marine Systems). The kind person at the recruitment centre is now checking to see if Windsor is acceptable for ROTP purposes.
> 
> I was wondering if anyone else has been accepted as well and either going or looking to go to Windsor.


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## vonGarvin (22 Mar 2010)

iæfai said:
			
		

> As a naval officer, what situations exist where you may be given an order which would result in your death?


I'm not sure what those situations could be, but all officers in the CF could be given an order which would result in his or her death.


			
				iæfai said:
			
		

> Are there grounds to refuse such an order?


If you refuse on the grounds that you simply don't wish to perish, well consider this sample charge from the Queen's Regulations and Orders, Vol II, Discipline:


> FROM COWARDICE, WHILE IN COMMAND OF A DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES, WHEN CAPABLE OF MAKING A SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE, SURRENDERED HIS DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT TO THE ENEMY
> Particulars: In that he, on (date), at (indicate place of offence), while in command of the DND power-house situated there, although capable of making a successful defence of the said power-house, *because of fear of personal danger  * surrendered it to the enemy.



And this:


> if the officer acted from cowardice, is liable to imprisonment for life or less punishment, and in any other case, is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s service or to less punishment." (1 September 1999)



This all relates to the service offence: "OFFENCES BY COMMANDERS WHEN IN ACTION".  So, yeah, just because you don't want to die, that's no excuse for disobeying a lawful command.


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## TimBit (22 Mar 2010)

What is particularly interesting from the QR&O passage you (Technoviking) picked is, however, this:



> WHEN CAPABLE OF MAKING A _SUCCESSFUL_ DEFENCE, SURRENDERED HIS DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT TO THE ENEMY



So the way I see this (and I'm no JAG) is that if you could prove that there was no way in hell that you could mount a successful defence then it would not be cowardice. 

This all comes back, once more, to the _lawful_ character of the order. What if the commander, the lawful authority, is giving this lawful order (i.e. the order is not contravening canadian or international law) which cannot be accomplished? Would there be grounds for refusal?


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## Snakedoc (22 Mar 2010)

TimBit said:
			
		

> So the way I see this (and I'm no JAG) is that if you could prove that there was no way in hell that you could mount a successful defence then it would not be cowardice.
> 
> This all comes back, once more, to the _lawful_ character of the order. What if the commander, the lawful authority, is giving this lawful order (i.e. the order is not contravening canadian or international law) which cannot be accomplished? Would there be grounds for refusal?



The way I see it in this situation, it would technically not be cowardice as per the definition.  However, it would still be disobeying a lawful order as it is not 'manifestly unlawful' to be ordered to mount an _unsuccessful _ defence of a defense establishment (especially if, for example, this results in strategically slowing down the enemy for a successful retreat and therefore saving many other lives).

I could also think of other charges that can be thrown on there such as disgraceful conduct, negligent performance of duties etc.


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## gcclarke (22 Mar 2010)

Plus this hinges on the concept of a defence. Hold this hill, etc. An order to go on the offensive and engage the enemy is also quite perfectly legal, regardless of what you figure your odds of surviving the attack might be.


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## 40below (22 Mar 2010)

I'm enjoying the discussion here, so how about this hypothetical as it's got me curious: do the QR&O allow commanders to order attacks that are by definition suicidal but that inflict damage/death upon an enemy? I'm thinking of kamikazes here to continue the WWII naval theme, but you could bring it up to suicide vests just for the sake of argument. Regardless of the ethics and any personal distaste for such tactics, would that be a lawful order?


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## TangoTwoBravo (22 Mar 2010)

Ordering someone to flood a compartment to save the ship with that person inside the said compartment would be tragic (and I'm not sure if it is technically possible but I read an account of someone flooding the magazine that they were in), but I don't think that it would be unlawful.  Ordering someone on a mission with little probability of survival would not be unlawful.  Ordering someone to put on a suicide vest, though, would be manifestly unlawful.  I don't think that you can separate ethics from the whole concept of lawful/unlawful command as you have asked.  I can't find a situation when I would order a soldier to use a suicide vest.  My own ethical code tells me that it is manifestly unlawful. 

Regarding cowardice, lets say that I was a company commander who had been ordered to defend a town against an enemy reinforced brigade.  If I did my estimate and figured that I had little probability of success and then I decided to abandon the town I would expect to be charged with and found guilty of cowardice.  My chances of success might not have been great, but I had the means to mount a successful defence, however slim they were.

If, on the other hand, I resisted the enemy and then surrendered only after all our ammunition was expended, our ability to care for our many wounded was overwhelmed, we were cut-off and we had no prospect of relief I would be surprised to be found guilty of cowardice.  I tried, and only surrendered when it was obvious that further resistance would only be futile. 

I have read an account of an American company commander at the Bulge who ran away after a firefight with vastly superior German forces.  He thought that he was going to be court-martialled, but his boss was amazed that he had held his ground as long as he did.  He had only ran after his troops had gradually faded away and he had found himself alone in the fight.  Later, his company reformed and they soldiered on.  They had fought to the point that reasonable people expected of them, even though it hadn't been formally expressed before the fight.  More fanatical troops might have shot themselves in their foxholes to avoid the shame of capture or flight, but we don't celebrate that brand of fanaticism.

All that to say that I think that we can recognize these things when we see them.  Different cultures and different armies will have different ways of seeing all this as well.

Having said that there are plenty of debates to be had.  Going to the Leyte Gulf/Samar battle, Kurita has been critisized for turning his fleet around when he had an advantage.  Was it cowardice to not commit his forces to a death ride?  He had been attacked from the air for some time, had lost at least one super-battleship, and was being harried by naval and air forces.  His situational awareness was not that of post-war commentators.  He chose to preserve his force.  In WW2 Japan that decision would have taken a type of bravery all of its own.


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## Rifleman62 (28 Mar 2010)

Company Commander by Charles B Mac Donald??? a classic, and required reading in the US Army.

Correct about HMS Glorious. Forgot about that one.

A small Cdn unit, Regt not to be named here, surrendered it's UN post in the FYR when faced with a larger force. News reports at the time said they were ordered to do so by the UN.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (30 Mar 2010)

I think we are getting a little restricted by the "cowardice" factor. The actual offence is much wider and it appears at Section 73 of the National Defense Act (not QR&O's, by the way, which do not create offences). The fulle text is:

Misconduct of Commanders in Presence of Enemy

Offences by commanders when in action
73. Every officer in command of a vessel, aircraft, defence establishment, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces who

(a) when under orders to carry out an operation of war or on coming into contact with an enemy that it is the duty of the officer to engage, does not use his utmost exertion to bring the officers and non-commissioned members under his command or his vessel, aircraft or other materiel into action,

(b) being in action, does not, during the action, in the officer’s own person and according to the rank of the officer, encourage his officers and non-commissioned members to fight courageously,

(c) when capable of making a successful defence, surrenders his vessel, aircraft, defence establishment, materiel, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces to the enemy,

(d) being in action, improperly withdraws from the action,

(e) improperly fails to pursue an enemy or to consolidate a position gained,

(f) improperly fails to relieve or assist a known friend to the utmost of his power, or

(g) when in action, improperly forsakes his station,

is guilty of an offence and on conviction, if the officer acted traitorously, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, if the officer acted from cowardice, is liable to imprisonment for life or less punishment, and in any other case, is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s service or to less punishment.

Fundamentally, as you can see from the very first sub paragraph, the obligation of an officer in combat situation is to use his/her utmost exertion to bring all under his/her command to bear on the enemy. The rest are really sub-plots to this overarching obligation. If the officer fails, as we see in the final paragraph, we must find out why he/she did so: cowardice is only one of three possibilities, treason and "any other reason" are also possible, without cowardice coming into play.

All this said, it still gets back to the fundamental starting point: If you are given an order that is lawfull, you must execute it, even to the point of death.

There have been grand schemes discussed above of courageous action by ship or ships. Here is a less grandiose but equally lawfull situation where an officer would basically be ordered to die:

Scenario: Halifax Dockyard overrun by lage armed unknown force.

Commander in lobby of Naval HQ to Lcdr at same location:

"Jeff, take this gun and man that door. Hold no matter what and buy me time: I'm going in to destroy classified docs."

Enjoy!


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## Greymatters (30 Mar 2010)

All well and good to quote the regs, and a good couple of theoretical examples, but does anyone have an actual example of where a Canadian soldier/officer was given such an order and carried it out?

_Apologies if anyone actually did give one, the way I read it they all involved other countries or examples..._


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## FSTO (30 Mar 2010)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> All well and good to quote the regs, and a good couple of theoretical examples, but does anyone have an actual example of where a Canadian soldier/officer was given such an order and carried it out?
> 
> _Apologies if anyone actually did give one, the way I read it they all involved other countries or examples..._



Well I guess you could site every soldier who tried to step out off the landing craft into the slaughterhouse in Dieppe is a pretty good example.


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## Old Sweat (30 Mar 2010)

Further to the above, there too many instances to mention where troops were ordered into action in situations where there was the real possibility of death. Darn near every attack in both World Wars and Korea could fall into that category, and remember Op Medusa for example. Going even farther back, the first example I can think of is Leliefontein on 7 Nov 1900. Lt Richard Turner of the RCD led his troop against a stronger Boer force to enable the Left Section of D Bty to make its escape. Lt Edward Morrison of D Bty wrote after the event that an unidentified dragoon said to him as he rode forward words to the effect that "I guess this will be our end." Despite that, the dragoons willingly followed their officer, who had already been wounded and was covered in his own blood, into action and prevailed.


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## Fishbone Jones (30 Mar 2010)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Further to the above, there too many instances to mention where troops were ordered into action in situations where there was the real possibility of death. Darn near every attack in both World Wars and Korea could fall into that category, and remember Op Medusa for example. Going even farther back, the first example I can think of is Leliefontein on 7 Nov 1900. Lt Richard Turner of the RCD led his troop against a stronger Boer force to enable the Left Section of D Bty to make its escape. Lt Edward Morrison of D Bty wrote after the event that an unidentified dragoon said to him as he rode forward words to the effect that "I guess this will be our end." Despite that, the dragoons willingly followed their officer, who had already been wounded and was covered in his own blood, into action and prevailed.



Audax et Celer


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## Greymatters (30 Mar 2010)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Well I guess you could site every soldier who tried to step out off the landing craft into the slaughterhouse in Dieppe is a pretty good example.



I would agree that all of the troops stepping off the boat shared a possibility of death, but not a certain or high probability of death.  Certainly those who stepped off first faced a greater risk than those who followed.  

In keeping with the original post, and in a modern setting, I think the person who asked the question was inferring about situations where possible death becomes probable or at least very high very selected members of the group as opposed to all at the same time. 

I.e. every member of a patrol in Afghanistan shares the same possibility of death/injury when they depart the base.  But if that particular patrol comes under fire, certain members will face a higher possibility, such as an order to 'take two men and take out that machine gun'. 

Does that example make sense?


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## Oldgateboatdriver (31 Mar 2010)

On a facetious note: On my BOC, we used to joke that the black line on which we signed our enrolment papers was actually micro-text that read: "I, being of sound mind and fully understanding the consequences of my action, hereby forfeit my life to Her Majesty the Queen of Canada".

But, more seriously, I believe the original question was:



			
				iæfai said:
			
		

> As a naval officer, what situations exist where you may be given an order which would result in your death?



I will admit a bias for mine warfare in view of my involvement in it but, it seems to me that the question applies directly to the officers serving onboard mine countermeasure vessels. We are the only type of ship that is wilfully and purposefully put into a known mine field, no matter what. Everybody else is diverted out. Moreover, the design and protective measures built into mine countermeasure vessels means that they have little to no capacity to defend themselves against any other threat, yet are required by the circumstances to expose themselves fully to these threats.

A good example of this is Operation Neptune, just before the landings, when the minesweepers had to clear ten channels all the way to the beaches with no protection against air, surface or shore-based threats and a time frame so short that even minesweeping had to be done at greater than speeds consistent with good self-protection practices.

Here is a sample of the orders given to the sweeping formation:

Task to be carried out:
'(a) The clearance of Channel 9 is to be continued to the Lowering position regardless of enemy interference and casualties.'     

'(b) In the event of enemy attack the sweeping formation MUST be preserved and the attack fought off with the best available means.'     

'(c) No ship must be allowed to sink in the swept channel.'

Anyone familiar with the difficulty of managing the course and speed of a minesweeper, with gear streamed, after its been blown up by a mine, will know that the last order, don't sink in the swept channel, is basically a death warrant on the engine room personnel and likely a good deal of the boatswain.

In all 43 minesweepers out of 255 were lost in Operation Neptune. No other class of ships in that operation, not even the landing crafts, suffered losses in such proportion.

A good historical read on this can be found at the following US site:

http://www.halcyon-class.co.uk/D%20Day/neptune%20minesweeping.htm


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