# Black Hawk Down



## fhilliard (23 Jan 2002)

Most people going to see the movie Black Hawk Down will come away with the impression there isn‘t any way to deal with irregular militias armed with RPG‘s and assault rifles. I think this is nonsense and that the truth of that particular situation was  that the Americans blew it. I have an artcle on the subject at this URL:  http://politicalcommentary.ca/militaryindex.cfm  and I‘d be very interested in your response.


----------



## enfield (23 Jan 2002)

There are plenty of ways to deal with situations like those of October 1993, and I believe the book BHD deals with them.
Overwhelming firepower, overwhelming violence, and speed of action used when and where it is needed. (I believe the US accomplished this in Afghanstan on a national scale.) 
Spectre gunships, LAV‘s+Bradleys, Apaches, and a decent QRF on standby. 
....Taking water, body armor, and NVG‘s is also helpful. 

Aidid didn‘t make a peep when 20,000 Marines were in Mogadishu.


----------



## Disturbance (23 Jan 2002)

Damn armchair general. Its easy to critique something you know nothing about and well after the fact.


----------



## fhilliard (23 Jan 2002)

> Originally posted by Disturbance:
> [qb]Damn armchair general. Its easy to critique something you know nothing about and well after the fact.[/qb]


If it‘s so easy, how come the previous correspondent suggested Bradleys, LAV‘s and Spectre gunships? A very small improvement in tactics by the Somali fighters would have bottled both these vehicles up. In fact, the Somailis did manage to destroy some of the Pakistani LAV‘s in the rescue convoy. The book doesn‘t mention how, but I can guess. The Spectre gunship has a 105mm gun and presents a pretty jucy target to the folks on the ground. My suggestion, which you may not have read, was a four-piece battery of 155mm guns.  They could be far enough away to be out of trouble, and close enough to be ranged. 

And incidentally, what‘s wrong with reviewing the tactics the Rangers used? They were undergunned and they will be again without some artillery support.


----------



## Gordon Angus Mackinlay (24 Jan 2002)

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Two articles from the BBC world service.  They have had surplus details removed.

Wednesday, 23 January, 2002, 13:11 GMT 
Somalis cheer Black Hawk Down
By the BBC‘s Hassan Barise in Mogadishu 
Thousands of Somalis have flocked to cinemas in Mogadishu for the opening night of Black Hawk Down, the war blockbuster based on the shooting down of two US Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia in 1993. 

Residents of the capital formed long queues outside more than a dozen cinema halls, jostling for the hottest ticket in town. 
But they were watching pirated copies of the film and applauded when the helicopters were shot down. In the Dualeh cinema in the Bulo Hubey neighbourhood, the capacity audience crowded onto the sandy floor, glued to director Ridley Scott‘s version of one the most violent episodes in the city‘s turbulent history. 

The movie has been widely criticised for glorifying US troops while turning the Somalis themselves into violent two-dimensional caricatures. The audience certainly gave the film a rapturous reception, but probably not for the reasons that Mr Scott intended. 

In Dualeh cinema, young spectators clapped and cheered every time they saw a white man killed or wounded. The downing of each helicopter was met with even more enthusiastic applause. "In this fighting, I lost nine of my best friends on one spot," said movie-goer Warsameh Abdi, a former militiamen fighting against the Americans under the late warlord General Mohammed Farah Aideed. "It was that very helicopter," he said, pointing at the screen. "It hovered on top of us and shot us one by one." 

Not surprisingly, some were less than impressed with the film‘s portrayal of the Somali people. "There‘s not one single word of the Somali language nor Somali music, almost nothing of our culture in the movie," said Mohamed Ali Abdi. "This is absurd, but still they copied our sandy streets and rough buildings and the crazy nature of the Somalis to continue the fighting," he said. 

Aside from critical reservations about the film, there was also scant regard for US copyright laws in its distribution. The film was initially purchased on a pirated video cassette from the United Arab Emirates, watched at ten US cents per ticket in three cinema halls. According to the Dualeh cinema owner, Mr Shukeh, it was then copied again and redistributed to all of Mogadishu‘s remaining cinemas. Tickets for the re-copied version went for five cents a head. Mr Shukeh said each copy cost about 100,000 shillings, or about $5, to make. 

The only real-life reminder of the incident in Mogadishu are the last few rusting remains of one of the helicopters, which still lie among the cactuses. The shell lies next to the house of the Weheliye family, who say they lost seven members on 3 October 1993, when the US troops arrived. The buildings around the Olympic Hotel, where much of the fighting was concentrated, have been rebuilt but the streets remain as dusty as ever. 

And Mogadishu residents continue their struggle to move from decades of conflict to some semblance of peace. Black Hawk Down certainly amused the crowds, but told no one anything they did not know already. 

Wednesday, 23 January, 2002, 17:28 GMT 
Hawk facts questioned again

The accuracy of Ridley Scott‘s film Black Hawk Down - which is based on actual events - has been called into question once again, this time by a senior Malaysian politician. Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak told a newspaper that the role of Malaysian troops in the rescue of American soldiers in Somalia had been underplayed. 

However, the minister has not yet seen the film and his comments come after reading the book on which the film is based. Eighteen US Army Rangers and one Malaysian died on October 1993 when Somali militias shot down two US helicopters in the capital Mogadishu. "We are disappointed that the film Black Hawk Down had denied the sacrifices of our Malaysian Battalion team during the rescue operations when two US helicopters went down in Somalia," he told the New Straits Times newspaper. "We cannot stop anyone from making their movies for commercial value... however, we have to take it with a pinch of salt," the minister added. 

Brigadier-General Abdul Latif Ahmad - who was the leading Malaysian general in Somalia at the time, also felt the contributions of his forces - and others from Pakistan - had also been glossed over. "I feel that the record should be put straight," he told the BBC World Service‘s East Asia Today. "Early on the operation was done by the Americans alone, but later on things were not going right and we were requested to come in and help." 

There have been criticism in several parts of the world that the film unfairly glorifies American troops while belittling other nationalities involved. 

Malyasian and Pakistani troops were involved in the operation as part of United Nations military intervention.


----------



## fhilliard (24 Jan 2002)

I‘m not surprised the Somalis cheered the movie; after all the incident was a great victory for them. The direct result was that American forces left the country two weeks later.

If I could turn once again to the incident itself, I wonder why it‘s so hard in a specialized forum like this to get some discussion going on the military issues involved. For all the firepower used, it was always possible for both sides to hide successfully behind mud brick walls. The largest weapon in action appears to have been a recoilless rifle used by the Somalis and even it didn‘t punch through the walls the Rangers were sheltering behind. Even one small artillery piece with an armoured skirt dropped into this battle would have been worth its weight in gold. The British are very good at this trick, dropping a gun into a battle with helicopters. I saw a demo of this once in England where the army had a 4-gun battery helicoptered in, set up and firing in about one minute. The Americans don‘t seem to like lifting their artillery pieces and as we‘ve seen from Somalia (and Afghanistan) they don‘t like using long guns at all. The only reason I mention this last point is that massed artillery is how the Russians won the war in Chechnya after first trying attacks with APC‘s and tanks.


----------



## enfield (24 Jan 2002)

How is one movie supposed to cover the Americans, the Somalis, the Malaysians, the Pakistanis, the entire UN mission from day one, and the previous raids by TF Ranger. Christ, it‘s only a 144 minutes long!
I just watched CounterSpin on CBC and they discussed the movie - despite the fact most of the panel never saw the movie - and pretty much condemned it for not showing all sides, which I believe was impossible.
Saving Private Ryan never showed the Germans, but no one complained about that.  

I personally don‘t believe artillery would have been a viable addition to the raid.


----------



## Infanteer (24 Jan 2002)

> The only reason I mention this last point is that massed artillery is how the Russians won the war in Chechnya after first trying attacks with APC‘s and tanks.


It would seem that massed artillery would be an irrelevant weapon in an Operation Other than War.  Western sensabilites would not allow this particular tactic to be taken.
I don‘t think the American public would have taken a liking to the U.S. using Russian tactics and lobbing 30,000 shells a day on Mogadishu to bomb out a warlord.


----------



## Infanteer (24 Jan 2002)

As a side note, anyone with questions or issues with the stratagy, tactics or other actions taken by Taskforce Ranger in Somalia should go to socnetcentral.com at the special operations.com website.  One of the members there was wounded in the battle of Mog and he has answered many questions on the topic.  Just search the 75th Ranger Regiment Forum for "Somalia", "Taskforce Ranger", or "Blackhawk Down."


----------



## fhilliard (24 Jan 2002)

I think you are taking me out of context. What I said in my article on the subject (link above) was that in the Somalia operation four pieces could have been used firing smoke initially, and targeted HE subsequently to cover the extraction. I further said the total casualties would have been less than the 1,500 killed or wounded Somailis there actually were. 

My reference to the Russians was to show that, in principle, urban warfare with LAV‘s is a mug‘s game. Even with tanks, it‘s dicey if the opposition has their wits about them.


----------



## portcullisguy (24 Jan 2002)

What is more important, the mission or the men?

Clearly, to the commanding officer, the mission takes the priority.  The mission was not to utterly destroy downtown Mog, it was to extract several high profile prisoners with the assistance of a Ranger security force.

Artillery, LAVs, all this would have been great stuff, no doubt.  But the U.S. was not present to wage urban warfare on hapless militia, they were there to find and arrest Aidid.

Their best tool in the chest was Delta Force.  Clearly, when small elements of men maneuvered the hostile streets, they were able to operate without the same harassment as the massed troops and Humvees.

One thing I found missing from the movie, and can‘t recall in the book, is the lack of contigency planning during the orders phase.  No mention of what do to if things got f***ed up, which they did.  They had no clue how they were going to deal with more than one downed helicopter (although they did have one SAR team airborne on standby).  The group troops had no clear contingency plan if the extraction screwed up, and they didn‘t really know what to do after the chopper went down.

Vehicles got lost, people got separated, and a second helicopter got shot down.

I can‘t give a clear suggestion as to what should have been done -- afterall, the mission was a success, technically.  However, I do wonder how the British or the Canadians might have executed it.

I think the thoughts of one of the Deltas from the movie sum it up best when he said, "You can‘t control who gets shot." and something to the effect of "You can only do your job.  You made it this far, time to start worrying about how you are gonna get your men back."

Reminds me of another adage I‘ve read:  Stay in your lane.  Let the generals live or die by their choices politically, and let the troops live or die by theirs in person.  1,000 Somali dead and only 19 U.S. dead, it seems quite clear to me who won the day.


----------



## Disturbance (24 Jan 2002)

I think the arty role sounds good but in reality is a little too much, way to much collateral damage. Also that recoiless rifle was never used. That was only in the movie. 

The CSAR team was the backup plan for a bird going down. And it was admitted that having two birds gown down was not planned for. The contigency plan for the troops was to secure the crash site and wait to be picked up. Just because it was not mentioned in the doesnt mean it was not thought of. Unexpected yes, but how they react is what counts and although chaotic they did what was needed. That brings a question up as to how many contigency plans you need have. What if they planned for 2 to go down but then 3 did in reality?  Is that still a planning error


----------



## fhilliard (24 Jan 2002)

Well so far in this discussion everyone else agrees artillery would have been too much. But consider this. What if the relief convoy had been pulling a few pieces along with them? They had the five ton trucks. Just clip the arty on the back and away we go. The relief convoy was stopped for hours at the crash site taking fire the whole time. Are you folks telling me that if they had some guns with them they wouldn‘t have used them? Or secondly, are you suggesting that it would have been unsportmanlike to sweep all these tribsmen off the streets, off their houses, out of their back alleys and bury them in a ton of rubble? 

I honestly don‘t get this line of reasoning or the one I read elsewhere on this site that extoles the virtues of heroism and poopoos any criticism of the tactics or weapons used. 

The truth of the matter is the Americans greatly underestimated the Somalis. Half their tactics, especially the low approaches by heavy helicopters, seemed designed to frighten their opponents. Well, what if the bad guys don‘t scare so easy, what then?

And on the issue of "relief" convoys. When was a five ton truck every considered something you‘d relieve someone with? In the Second World War trucks were considered "soft" transport that always had to be escorted by armour. Even the heavy machine guns on the Humvees had no shields on them. Everything was out in the open as if this was some kind of game. 

The movie is exciting precisely because the battle was so close, so nearly lost. My personal preference is for battles in which the enemy is wiped out in as efficient and boring a manner as possible. It may not make for a great movie, but then again, if the Mogadishu battle had been organized right, there never would have been a movie made about it.


----------



## Gunner (24 Jan 2002)

Frank, I think you are confusing the situation within Somalia.  The rangers and delta force are elite soldiers and their purpose in Somalia was very specific.  If the situation was similar to the German/Russian conflict in Stalingrad, I would agree on the need for assault guns, etc.  But its not Stalingrad, it‘s Mogadishu.

This was a simple snatch and grab mission that was suppose to be over in a manner of minutes.  The Rangers and Delta Force had attempted the same type of operation many times with poor results.  This was simply another mission using a tactic that had been done many times before. 

I don‘t think the US underestimated the Somalis.  I think they were caught off guard the level of resistance that was put up during this one episode.  Had the americans been aware that that level of resistance was expected, the tactics and equipment would have been alot different.  

I read the book and I watched the movie.  I can critique the battle procedure and tactics all I want, but in the end...I wasn‘t there.


----------



## fhilliard (24 Jan 2002)

With respect, I don‘t agree with either your premis or that of the Rangers. The problem with snatching an opponent is getting accurate information on where he is. The Rangers missed Aidid six previous times and so decided this time to go after his lieutenants. These attempts gave the Somalis a ringside seat on the tactics the Rangers liked to use. It often takes an opponent a while to work out how to deal with a new threat and the Somalis were no different. Using RPG‘s against helicopters is a very risky business because the shooter is marked by the smoke trail, but they had that worked out too; wait until the chopper goes over and shoot at the tail from a narrow street. They actually managed this the first time a week before the incident, killing three Blackhawk crewmen. 

Incidentally, speaking of being there. I was in Mogadishu 32 years earlier and flew over the city in a Somali Air Force Cessna. Lovely spot then.


----------



## Marauder (25 Jan 2002)

As **** hot as the Nightstalker pilots are, I‘m not too certain they would have appreciated gun shells flying over the city while they were providing fire support with the AH-6s and C2 with the command ‘Hawks. You‘ll remember that the SOAR LTC and the other light colonel in that C2 bird were trying to steer the convoy back to airport since the Orion overhead didn‘t have direct commo to LTC McKnight. If there are arty shells flying everywhich way to Sunday, then there is always the chance that a shell may clip another bird, and then you are in even deeper ****.
Second, who is to say Komrade Klinton would have given TFR gun tubes anyway? They deep sixed any armoured support or Spectre gunships.
Third, what happened that day is a case study on Murphy riding shotgun on any op. What if Blackburn hadn‘t burned in? What if the Orions could comm with the convoy? What if Eversmann‘s chalk had landed in the proper place? What if, what if, what if? Truth is, those men accomplished their mission and then did their god damndest to pull those pilots out and get as many guys back in one piece as possible, in an environement that was hostile from the vertical, horizontal, diagonal, ****  every other plane. They did this without any political support and with less than optimal circumstances.
In the same situation, any other force would have been decimated. Those men had their hard training, courage, and mental toughness rewarded with loosing as few men as they did, and inflicting as much damage to the enemy they did.
As Gunner said, if you and I weren‘t there... then you and I don‘t know.


----------



## portcullisguy (25 Jan 2002)

Just because none of us were there is no reason we shouldn‘t argue the tactics, decisions, etc. that were made.

It just means we cannot do so from a position of authority, only from an academic perspective.

Afterall, the entire subject of military history is a study of past events normally undertaken by those who were not there when it happened.

I‘ve read many perspectives on the who affair, and it seems in hindsight, that our favorite Rhodes Scholar, Clinton, was indeed sorely mistaken in his decision to remove the initial Marine Expeditionary Unit that landed in Somalia and formed a beachhead for later humanitarian efforts.  That led to the warlords being able to consolidate under Aidid, and harass the UN.  This necessitated the use of special forces in an environment which, I‘m sure we can all agree, they would have preferred not to be in.

Arty was right out the window for this type of mission.  As was heavy armour.  The intent was to have a quick reaction force snatch the targets, based on as reliable information as they could get.  It worked, the info was right, they got the bad guys, they got them out.  They lost some men.  The bad guys had their intelligence too, and were on the ball.  It happens.

At the end of the day, training and experience on the part of the U.S. -- controlled short bursts of gunfire, not long wild full-mag bursts -- won the day.

I still think about those two brave Delta snipers who, against better judgement, went in to the second crash site to save Mike Durant, and in doing so, sacrificed their own lives.  How many of us would do the same?  I hope we never have to find out.


----------



## rceme_rat (25 Jan 2002)

Excellent point from portcullisguy.  

Reading, studying, discussing military issues is the basis for exercise and drills, and eventually combat.  As with an estimate, which serves as much or more to prepare you for the unexpected as it does to assist you indeveloping your plan, academic study prepares you to confront "new" situations.

Indeed, not having been on the ground can lead to better objectivity - often comments from those most involved in a situation can be biased.


----------



## Hodie Non Cras (25 Jan 2002)

Indulge me if you will and let me throw my two cents in.

If I were the force commander for the US forces in Somalia, here‘s what I might have done instead.

First, I would have inserted Delta Force operatives to do their snatch-and-grab operation under cover of night. While they were doing their thing, I would have created a *big* diversion in the Bakara Market. Something big enough to draw the hornets
far far away from their nest, to speak.

If things really got hairy, I would have had lots of helos armed with MG‘s and 2.75" rockets going into the are to provide fire support. If that wasn‘t sufficient to allow the snatch teams to exfiltrate, then (and only then) would I have dropped in QRF teams to try to create a cordon around the snatch team, with helos on the ground, on standby to allow a successful exfil. These cordon groups would only engage if fired upon.

If the QRF teams proved insufficient - then bring in 
a few battalions of infantry and heavy armour and artillery.

The Americans screwed up by attempting the op in broad daylight, and with inadequate intelligence and reconnaissance resources, plus the obvious lack of armour and air support.

I‘ve read the book, but the movie made me realize that it was a miracle that any American soldiers got out alive. The tactical situation on the ground could have been much different if the Somali militia had had any degree of professional training and experience. Minus the daily dose of khat, mind you.


----------



## Infanteer (25 Jan 2002)

One interesting part I found in the book is when the Somalis welded metel tubing on the back of their RPG‘s to vent off the backblast so it would not hit the ground and fry them when they fired up, at the helos.  It goes to show you that the Somali‘s, for being a rag-tag group of loosely organized, stoned militia men were adapting to the American tactics.


----------



## enfield (25 Jan 2002)

I think the events of Somalia have been reciewed and studied extensively by the Americans, and have no doibt that many SOP‘s and other issues were changed or reviewed. The entire Somalia mission was the learning ground for many doctrine that is used todya in peace support missions, as well as the ‘Three Block War‘. 

It‘s fairly obvious that that TF Ranger required more support than it had for the overall mision it was assigned. However, this support was limited for political reasons.  Thye knew what they needed and wanted, and akse dfor it, but it was denied. Personally, I think arty and MBT‘s is too hevay for the environment. Apaches, Spectres, and mechanized infantry were the key, and well within the rules of force application.

Given the political restrictions placed on them, I don‘t think there‘s any quick and easy solution to what happened. In retrospect, given the mission TF Ranger was sent to accomplish with the support they had, something was bound to happen - given the facts we know now.

Here‘s a question.. Canadian vests, the current Bosnia ones and the new LBV‘s, carry 4 mags, plus one on the rifle. How long do you think that would have lasted?


----------



## Recce41 (26 Jan 2002)

The Ranger and Delta did non- Sp OPs too. The Movie was about the second Raid. the first sucked too. In Somalia everything was F***up from the start. So you have to take the movie as a flag waver. I know I was there in Somalia.

 Sgt J CD,CDS com


----------



## portcullisguy (27 Jan 2002)

> Originally posted by Hodie Non Cras:
> [qb]Indulge me if you will and let me throw my two cents in.
> First, I would have inserted Delta Force operatives to do their snatch-and-grab operation under cover of night. While they were doing their thing, I would have created a *big* diversion in the Bakara Market. Something big enough to draw the hornets
> far far away from their nest, to speak.[/qb]


While, certainly I am sure this would have been their preference as well (given their NVA‘s and training), clearly the mission was also time-sensitive and had to be done when they knew the bad guys were in that specific spot.  The intel wasn‘t quite as bad as the movie made it out to be, according to the book, it had been confirmed by other sources.



> [qb]If things really got hairy, I would have had lots of helos armed with MG‘s and 2.75" rockets going into the are to provide fire support. If that wasn‘t sufficient to allow the snatch teams to exfiltrate, then (and only then) would I have dropped in QRF teams to try to create a cordon around the snatch team, with helos on the ground, on standby to allow a successful exfil. These cordon groups would only engage if fired upon.[/qb]


Probably the Deltas wouldn‘t have minded operating without the massive (comparitavely) security force which guarded the perimeter, assuming of course they could have done the mission at night.

Once the sh** hit the fan, the more men on foot was probably not a detriment.  Certainly with so much equipment in operation, something was bound to happen.



> [qb]If the QRF teams proved insufficient - then bring in
> a few battalions of infantry and heavy armour and artillery.[/qb]


I really don‘t think the U.S. even seriously considered a failure.  According to the book, the first Black Hawk going down to an RPG on Sept. 25, just over a week earlier, was seen as a one-in-a-million shot and there was no way Sammy could do it again, especially with so many up in the air and such a big ground force.  Their thinking negated any use of "battalions of infantry..." and certainly ruled out armour and arty.

Allow me to play armchair general for a moment:

One option could have been to spend a few months beforehand with special operations units training and indoctrinating a smaller clan rival to Aidid.  This, of course, would have upset the power sharing... but hear me out -- like the SAS have done for years, you send a small unit of your guys to train their guys in your ways and get them on your side.  Then, with your guys acting as "advisors" you slip in a few of your new-found friends in beat up old trucks and shiny new armaments, snatch your targets, and extract with choppers standing by 3-5 minutes away in the air.

Or another option would have been to do what was actually done, but to scramble the Black Hawks right after the insertion and have them on station a few miles away.  They are no longer targets, and Sammy isn‘t blowing them out of the sky.  By the time Super Six One went down, the mission was almost over.  Most of the casualties were suffered in getting bogged down after trying to rescue the downed helos.  You still have the Hummers on stand by for the exfil, and the helos are ready to support the ground exfil from the air.

Or, you make a political decision as President Clinton that Somalia is not the place to be messing about, and to bail.  They did that anyway, 2 weeks after the October 3 raid.


----------



## Spr Earl (28 Jan 2002)

Having not seen the film or read  the book and my only knowledge being the U.S. and world press resulting in the opinion I present here is that :

 The Yank‘s under estimated thier enemy thinking Adid was just another 3rd world hillbilly, quite the opposite he was well educated in military matter‘s
I have been trying to find his Bio again ,it‘s a good read ,

 Russian trained in tactic‘s ,also trained by another country ( for the life of me I can‘t remember which one ) Adid was no fool he was very well educated and knew the American mind set when it came to body bag‘s!Ergo they left with thier tail‘s between their leg‘s!

         He got the result he wanted !


                   So who won?


----------



## portcullisguy (28 Jan 2002)

> Originally posted by Spr Earl:
> [qb]The Yank‘s under estimated thier enemy thinking Adid was just another 3rd world hillbilly, quite the opposite he was well educated in military matter‘s
> I have been trying to find his Bio again ,it‘s a good read ,
> 
> Russian trained in tactic‘s ,also trained by another country ( for the life of me I can‘t remember which one )[/qb]


Since Sept. 11, there has been hinting in the open media that bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda had some level of involvement in training the Somali rebels under the various warlords, Aidid in particular, in tactics to defeat helicopters specifically.

In fact, the book itself mentions in one of the opening few chapters, in a story told to the author by a participant, how some of the militia the warlords employed had in fact trained in Sudan and "other countries" and mentions the Afghanis in particular, noting their tactics used against their war with the Soviets years prior.



> [qb]Adid was no fool he was very well educated and knew the American mind set when it came to body bag‘s!Ergo they left with thier tail‘s between their leg‘s! He got the result he wanted ! So who won?[/qb]


You couldn‘t be more right.  Aidid remained in power until 1995 I believe.  The Americans left Mog only two weeks after this incident.  Clearly, Somalia shamed the Americans straight out of their capital.

I don‘t believe the U.S. is repeating their mistake in Afghanistan in the present conflict (although I do accept there are many major differences between Somalia in 1993 and Afghanistan in 2001/02).  Their heavier reliance on special forces, and less focus on larger operations, seems to be working in their favour.


----------



## Recce41 (28 Jan 2002)

Most of you have good points. I got slamed big time on the US Army site. I stated what I know when I was there and about the US there. Damn they said they were the winners. And kicked ***  in Somalia. And brought out Canada should not be in Afganistan, and we were loosers, for Unprofor failed. 
 I said with 10,000 troops total, and about only 4000 cbt troops. no country could have done it. They think they saved the Balkins. One other Canadian brought up about, where were they during Rwanada. They said they had no need to be there. But wasn‘t Rwanada like Somalia. 
  You better all keep your comments on a Canadian site, because if you done. every American will snap.
 Sgt J.  CD,CDS com


----------



## enfield (28 Jan 2002)

I have  ahard time calling Oct3/4 a "Victory" for the Americans.
The plan got screwed, and resulted in unacceptable losses. Certainly the capture of those lieutenants of Adid‘s was not worth 18 dead Americans, and if Garrison had know that the mission would cost that many lives he never would have allowed it.
The actions that resulted in the lose of 2 helicopters and 18 soldiers were not random, they were not accidents. They resulted from a failure to adequatley prepare and know the enemy and situation.

However, it was not a defeat. The mission objectives were met, and the kill ratio (which I‘m not sure is a good way to measure victory vs defeat) was overwhelmingly in American favour. Of course, the incredible actions of the soldiers involved provide the best argument for American vitcory. WHne the intelligence and plan failed, the guys on the ground accomplished everything that could be asked of them.

pyyrich (Sp??) Victory at best. Thermopylae was a victory for the Persians, but it doesn‘t take away from what the Spartans did.


----------



## Disturbance (29 Jan 2002)

Funny how if the americans took on and killed over a thousand taleeban and alkayda fighters with only a lil over a hundred troops and still managed to catch some top lts and other guys with only loosing 18 lives, everyone would be cheering ‘Victory‘.


----------



## Brad Sallows (30 Jan 2002)

The Germans allegedly had a favourable kill ratio in Russia 1941-45 and I‘ve never heard the Germans claim they won.

[I realise that‘s not exactly a fair comment.  The snatch mission was achieved so the mission itself was successful.  But that was the only success achieved, and had anyone "wargamed" out that enemy course of action one has to wonder if the mission would have gone ahead in the first place.]


----------



## Garett (30 Jan 2002)

Ways TF Ranger stepped on their ****s according to Major John D. Lock:

Rogers‘ Ranger‘s Standing Orders

#1on‘t forget nothing
-The force left NODs and water behind, believing the raid would be quick.  Yet it was past 1530 when the raid was launched-not much of a window of daylight left should anything go wrong.

#4: Tell the truth about what you see and what you do-don‘t ever lie to a Ranger or officer.
-It has been reported that SSG Eversmann, leader of Chalk 4, was unable to obey an order to move though he acknowledged that he would do so.  Only by luck and accident were he and his men discovered by LTC McKnight when he drove by the squad‘s position with his convoy.  If it weren‘t for the fortuitous moment, there would certainly have been an additional twelve Rangers added to the KIA total.

#11 Don‘t ever march home the same way.
-Take a different route so you won‘t be ambushed.  Can also be interpreted as never conduct an operation the same way twice; avoid following the same template.

#11 Don‘t ever march home the same way.
-Take a different route so you won‘t be ambushed.  Can also be interpreted as never conduct an operation the same way twice; avoid following the same template.


----------



## Gordon Angus Mackinlay (3 Feb 2002)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I deliberately have not said anything on this subject until it appear that everyone had said their fill.

Bowden‘s book "Blackhawk Down" is described as being by the only person who pieced together the whole incident."

Unfortunatly that is not so, there is much that has not been told about this incident.  For instance:

Some time after the incident in Washington DC, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso presented to five US Navy SEALs, the Silver Star medal.  In his speech thanking these men from SEAL Team Six (which according to the US Government does not exist)for their actions in Mogadishu; "As a result of the courage, commitment and utter professionalism of these men, many other brave comrades serve today, who might otherwise have been lost."  General Wayne A. Downing, the US Special Operations Command commander, also present stating "You men did your duty, for your country, for your units and your comrades."  Bowden makes mention of a SEAL in the operation, but, nothing on the involvement of a SEAL detachment.  These obviously did perform in combat to have received five Silver Stars - the third level American gallantry award.

Bowden makes no mention of the refusal of the Italian UN contingent commander to assist the American force.

He makes no reference to the sheer lack of preparation the USSF/Rangers did in anticipation of urban raids; 
a.  no large scale maps of the area of operations, 
b.  no "mud" maps nor photos, 
c.  no attempt to put in situ OPs to observe the Somali milieu, 
d.  no ongoing training in FIBUA, 
e.  no structured operation plans; with alternative options with the built in ability to improvise when things went wrong, 
f.  no planning to retrieve troops when aviation assets could not evacuate, 
g.  absolutely no thought made to use the flat roof milieu of Mogadishu for entry or exit on operations, h.  zero knowledge on their enemy,
i.  most importantly - no back up ready reaction force, with the necessary weapons and equipment for heavy FIBUA.  

It goes on and on.  Such as simple things, as brought up before in another post - no water bottles.

My personal feelings on this revolve around the tragic waste of the two DELTA snipers who went down to protect CWO Durant (both receiving the Medal of Honor), neither men carried a ammunition load which would equate to FIBUA.  According to different accounts they only carried 40-60 rounds of 7.62mm for their rifles, their superb shooting accounted for the bulk of the Somali clan fighters killed that day.  

The majority of the one thousand Somali‘s killed were just the ordinary citizens of that tragic city.  This is well documentated by the UN and NGA‘s.

Whilst the Somali‘s, hold in their eyes, American‘s in justifiable contempt, the two snipers were considered by these violent people to be real warriors!

By no stretch of the imagination can two units (DELTA and the 75th Ranger Regt) which in their own opinion are these best in the world, claim that their actions that responded to the events of 3-4Oct1993 be of any degree of competence or ability.  18 men lost their lives, many more wounded, and the image of America went down dramatically in the eye‘s ot the third world.

To finish, the New Zealand UN contingent to Somalia, was a air transport (3 Andover aircraft), movement control and other technical personnel (67 all ranks), with a close protection element drawn from the RNZAF ground defence organisation and the NZSAS.  

The men of Task Force Ranger in the hangar area used to jeer at the Kiwi‘s for standing to at dawn and dusk, and during the day carrying out conjoint training for their own protection.  Their opinion voiced to the Kiwi‘s being that the Somali‘s offered no threat to a first world fighting force, they were just "Skinnies".

Yours,
Jock in Sydney


----------



## portcullisguy (3 Feb 2002)

Mackinlay weighs in...



> Originally posted by Gordon Angus Mackinlay:
> [qb]Bowden‘s book "Blackhawk Down" is described as being by the only person who pieced together the whole incident."
> 
> Unfortunatly that is not so, there is much that has not been told about this incident.  For instance:[/qb]


Noted.  It is, however, the only comprehensive study of that incident - which as we know, only received a breif mention for a day or two in the papers and CNN at the time.  It at least attempts to see the incident from all sides:  The U.S. commanders, the U.S. troops, the Somali militia, and the Somali civilians.



> [qb]He makes no reference to the sheer lack of preparation the USSF/Rangers did in anticipation of urban raids; [/qb]


Not being a military man, one could hardly expect him to delve into a full study of what was _missing_ when he was trying to report what had _happened_.  I won‘t fault him for this.

Clearly, judging by the way the events played out, there was some serious lack of contingency planning, and miscalculated judgement.  My bone of contention is the old "everyone goes home" philosophy.  It‘s a very nice thought.  I wonder, however, if the Brits, particularly the SAS, would have readily wasted their human resources attempting to rescue injured/killed personnel?  I would think the more practical approach: Do what you can now, but the mission takes priority - would have been the choice of any force except the Americans.



> [qb]It goes on and on.  Such as simple things, as brought up before in another post - no water bottles.[/qb]


This was mentioned ... as was the lack of NVGs.  The Amercians were convinced they would only be out of the base "for an hour".  Somebody forgot to tell the Somalis.



> [qb]The majority of the one thousand Somali‘s killed were just the ordinary citizens of that tragic city.  This is well documentated by the UN and NGA‘s.[/qb]


Neither the book, nor the movie, attempt to hide this fact.  Clearly in any populated city, you are going to have civilian casualties during a large gun fight.  However, my sympathy ends for "innocent" civilians when they leave the relative safety of their homes to actively seek out and participate in the conflict, whether as combatants, or spectators.

If 100 Rangers suddenly arrived on my street and did battle with dozens and dozens of armed militia, I‘d be sitting in my basement praying to God it all went away, not rushing outside for a better look, or to hurl insults at either side.



> [qb]To finish, the New Zealand UN contingent to Somalia, was a air transport (3 Andover aircraft), movement control and other technical personnel (67 all ranks), with a close protection element drawn from the RNZAF ground defence organisation and the NZSAS.
> 
> The men of Task Force Ranger in the hangar area used to jeer at the Kiwi‘s for standing to at dawn and dusk, and during the day carrying out conjoint training for their own protection.  Their opinion voiced to the Kiwi‘s being that the Somali‘s offered no threat to a first world fighting force, they were just "Skinnies".[/qb]


In reading Andy McNab‘s autobiographical books, Bravo Two Zero and Immediate Action, I am left with the impression that - for the SAS at least - this has always been the M.O.

The Rangers themselves, a unit based somewhat on the famed, historical "Roger‘s Rangers", claim to adhere to Major Robert Roger‘s standing orders, which include the rule "stand to at dawn and dusk, dawn is when the French and the Indians attack" (paraphrased).

Is this also the standard in the CF (asking as someone who is still going through the recruiting process)?  If not, should it be?


----------



## OLDRUPERT (3 Feb 2002)

An answer to the "Stand TO"  question...

Yes the Unit on the position "Stands To"..  Though it is really more for the beginning or ending of daily ablutions .. then for preparing for the Indian Attack.

The fact that there is no darkness on the battlefeild (just fog), kind of dispells the old idea of a fixed schedule of any expected attack.


----------

