# Top soldier hopes Forces can reduce overhead, increase efficiency



## 57Chevy (13 Jun 2010)

Top soldier hopes Forces can reduce overhead, increase efficiency:

The Canadian Forces have too much overhead in some headquarters and officials are looking to re-assign military personnel to field units as they prepare for future operations, says the country’s top soldier.

Gen. Walter Natynczyk, Canada’s chief of defence staff, said although the review of the current command structure, both in Ottawa and elsewhere, has yet to be done, he is hoping to see some military personnel shifted to frontline units.

(article continues)

Read more: http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/soldier+hopes+Forces+reduce+overhead+increase+efficiency/3149910/story.html#ixzz0qmwDVp7o


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## daftandbarmy (14 Jun 2010)

Why is it that everytime I see the word 'efficiency' during an economic downturn I think of 'layoffs'? Oh, maybe because organizations like the CF like to purge themsleves of the younger, talented people, while hanging on to all the old politic0 butt kissers, in the name of 'efficiency'.


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## stealthylizard (14 Jun 2010)

Less field exercises???


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## blacktriangle (14 Jun 2010)

I read that we are standing up a new "Divisional HQ" in Kingston. Didn't we have this same thing not so long ago (before my time possibly, but wasn't it in the last 10-15 years?), only for it to be done away with?


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Jun 2010)

stealthylizard said:
			
		

> Less field exercises???



Are you suggesting that as an answer to the problem?   ???


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## 211RadOp (14 Jun 2010)

Spectrum said:
			
		

> I read that we are standing up a new "Divisional HQ" in Kingston. Didn't we have this same thing not so long ago (before my time possibly, but wasn't it in the last 10-15 years?), only for it to be done away with?



The last time 1st Canadian Division stood up, prior to this year, was in 1989 to be disbanded again in 2000.


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## CBH99 (14 Jun 2010)

This is a good topic for debate, and one that I'm sure a lot of us that have been in for a while now have some ideas on.

What are some of your ideas & suggestions on how we could become more efficient??  How could we save money, or use our time & manpower more efficiently, than we are now??


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## TimBit (14 Jun 2010)

Rumor around town is that the dot coms are going down the drain...soon.


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## vonGarvin (14 Jun 2010)

> The Canadian Forces have too much overhead in its  headquarters



There, I fixed the quote in the first post in this thread.  That is where we should start.


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## Old Sweat (14 Jun 2010)

The challenge in restructuring in search of reduced overhead and increased efficiency is to get the aim right. Is the objective to improve the efficiency of the process, or is it to increase the quality and quantity of the results? At the risk of oversimplification, the choice is between the Eaton's and Walmart business models. Too often in the CF we have gone for solutions which make the management process work better, at least on powerpoint, while not really producing any tangible results for our employment of the operational forces.

Maybe this time will be different, with the CDS playing good cop, and Lieutenant General Leslie doing the dirty work.


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## Tank Troll (14 Jun 2010)

211RadOp said:
			
		

> The last time 1st Canadian Division stood up, prior to this year, was in 1989 to be disbanded again in 2000.



Yeah Dangerous Jack was the Commander and some one that frequents these boards was his Driver. 



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> This is a good topic for debate, and one that I'm sure a lot of us that have been in for a while now have some ideas on.
> What are some of your ideas & suggestions on how we could become more efficient??  How could we save money, or use our time & manpower more efficiently, than we are now??



If some piece of equipment or vehicle is damaged/broke to the point that it will cost more to fix it than buy a new, then buy a new one. Don't pay 3 million to fix a Tank that only cost 1 million to replace. Or 10 million on a 3 million dollar boat.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Jun 2010)

I find it odd that the US has had some success with their recently introduced 'plug and play' brigades - making a conscious effort to get away from the large and unwieldy 'divisions' - yet we seem to be going down the path of yester year.

It would seem to make more sense to reinforce our brigades to make them more combat capable, partnering them up with our 'mole-itia' brigades for support while making them more self-reliant and viable, and running a plug and play plan from Ottawa, or wherever, to meet the nation's needs.

Then again, I haven't stayed at a Holiday Inn Express for awhile now...  ;D


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Jun 2010)

There has been no suggestion (yet) of establishing a Division - rather it is about deployable HQ that can be scaled from either Div level (think RC South) to Brigade / National Command Element level (think Task Force Kandahar).  Moreover, it could also be used for something like, say, Task Force Games or even the G20.  The continual ad-hocery of HQs is problematic - and is further hampered by a cumbersome and static command structure (ie the dotcoms).

I think that this is a unique opportunity to re-imagine our command and control structure to better suit the nature, scope and duration of the kind of operations we find ourselves involved in.  I would imagine that everything is on the table, and that once the dust settles, we will see some substantial changes - and not just for their own sake - no need to respond with the tired and shopworn "leading change"knee-jerk response.


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## dapaterson (14 Jun 2010)

We are dancing around semantics.  We are standing up a Div HQ - less any troops under command so far.

Using my simple brain, however, I look at an office building to the south east of NDHQ and wonder why, if we have 600 staff officers there for "operational commands", we are unable to generate HQs from that group to command on operations?

One would think that 600 staff officers could easily man an ongoing commitment of 60 to Afghanistan, plus surge to provide another 60 for the Olympics or G8/G20 or some other routine, scheduled event, and retain sufficient capacity for their day to day office work.

That we now have 600 more staff officers and complain of a lack of capacity for C3 suggests, to me, an organization prime for pruning.

(Our penchant for massive HQs is another issue that needs to be addressed - how many LCol and above do we currently have deployed in Afghanistan?  How many are truly needed, and how many are branch X wanting to get some of their senior people the tick in the box?)


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Jun 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> We are dancing around semantics.  We are standing up a Div HQ - less any troops under command so far.
> 
> Using my simple brain, however, I look at an office building to the south east of NDHQ and wonder why, if we have 600 staff officers there for "operational commands", we are unable to generate HQs from that group to command on operations?
> 
> ...



It is more than merely semantics.  CEFCOM was established as a static organization and it has a static mindset in its well-appointed static facility.  A deployable HQ would be manned differently, and would be organized differently.  And I am not for one minute suggesting that we transfer those 600 PYs from Startop to Kingston.  Rather I think we need to do a first principles review of the C2 needs of the CF (start with Strategic Joint Staff - designed to be a short hallway, but quickly re-assumed the functions of DCDS that CEFCOM and CANCOM were supposed to replace - but I digress) and then work our way through all L1s and then to formations etc.

A rough order of magnitude SWAG that is PIDOOMA based would suggets that we could easily meet the existing PY pressures and bids....



> (Our penchant for massive HQs is another issue that needs to be addressed - how many LCol and above do we currently have deployed in Afghanistan?  How many are truly needed, and how many are branch X wanting to get some of their senior people the tick in the box?)



Sadly some of this is out of our hands - call is the multi-national coefficient of rank inflation....


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## Jarnhamar (14 Jun 2010)

Tank Troll said:
			
		

> If some piece of equipment or vehicle is damaged/broke to the point that it will cost more to fix it than buy a new, then buy a new one. Don't pay 3 million to fix a Tank that only cost 1 million to replace. Or 10 million on a 3 million dollar boat.


Whoa
You've just been red flagged by about 6 dozen IT guys at NDHQ for this VERY Un-Canadian Forces like talk.


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## Michael OLeary (14 Jun 2010)

Apollo Diomedes said:
			
		

> Whoa
> You've just been red flagged by about 6 dozen IT guys at NDHQ for this VERY Un-Canadian Forces like talk.



You never have to worry about the IT guys at NDHQ, they're so far behind that when someone asks them about tablets, they think cuneiform.


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## Infanteer (14 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I find it odd that the US has had some success with their recently introduced 'plug and play' brigades - making a conscious effort to get away from the large and unwieldy 'divisions' - yet we seem to be going down the path of yester year.



The American's aren't moving away from Divisions at all - Divisions are still the primary large-scale tactical unit in their arsenal  and they currently have 3(?) in Iraq and 2 in Afghanistan.  The movement towards Brigade Combat Teams was an effort to push combat support/combat service support slices commonly found in US Doctrine at the Divisional level down to the Brigades to make them more independant; infact, if anything, this mirrors the Canadian practice of very robust Brigades.

I do agree with what PPCLI is getting at - we need a deployable, scalable structure.  In my view, the HQ should do three things:
1.  Provide a Division HQ for the 3 Reg Force Brigades, thus eliminating the need for the 4 Area Commands;
2.  Should train and be able to deploy as the Div Command for the 3 CMBGs in the event of a major regional contingency; and
3.  Should be able to provide, in conjunction with the CMBGs, the manning for expeditionary task force HQs.  Having this HQ will allow Task Forces to be fielded without completely depleting the CMBGs which usually still have at least half a brigade to run at home.  As well, it will allow the Div Command to work as a team so that, in the event that we are given such a command (as has happned in the past) we don't have to build from scratch.

I like calling it 1 Can Div not because it should mirror the old one, but because I'm nostalgic.

My 2 cents.

PS.  Much of the characteristics that PPCLI Guy mentioned seem very similar to the idea of the USMC MAGTF.  However, MAGTFs - MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs - are separate structures from the Marine Divisions and take command of them or their components when deployed on expeditionary operations.  I'm not sure we want (can sustain) HQs independant of field forces that are maintained simply for command and control?


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Jun 2010)

Add in a Div (on the Army side) to command all of the Militia Brigades, and a re-invented DCDS that provides nowt more than overwatch and short hallway functions to CDS, I think that you are onto something very close to what the current Chief of Transformation wrote in his 1999 AMSC paper (which has disappeared from the net...)


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## dapaterson (14 Jun 2010)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Add in a Div (on the Army side) to command all of the Militia Brigades, and a re-invented DCDS that provides nowt more than overwatch and short hallway functions to CDS, I think that you are onto something very close to what the current Chief of Transformation wrote in his 1999 AMSC paper (which has disappeared from the net...)



The CF`s C2 conundrums are wider than just the Army - any attempt to address them must be joint, and must also open the kimonos of all the top-level organizations.  Fixing the Army C2 without fixing the CF does nothing.

Branches such as MARE, EME, AERE and Log need to have their NDHQ-centric models pared back; if over 50% of your occupation strength is in NDHQ, perhaps those functions are not core military, but rather can be addressed through public service hiring.


We also need a return to some basic principles.  We assign an infantry section commander a 2 i/c plus eight troops, since we know that a broader span of control creates problems of communication, co-ordination and control.  CF Transformation ignored basic group dynamics, and posited that expanding the number of direct reports woudl streamline communication, co-ordination and control.

Perhaps some of the quesitons that need to be asked include: What functions should be vested in DND?  What functions in the CF?  What functions can be combined into one?  What functions can be divested?  What functions can be delivered outside DND/CF to better effect?

Examples:  How large a Civ HR organization do we need, given the existence of the Public Service Commission and other GoC agencies?  Why do we engage in pay delivery, when PWGSC has a common payment system for the remainder of the government?  Do we need an undergraduate military university?  Is C2 abroad fundamentally different from C2 at home, or can both be delivered by the same entity?


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## Matt_Fisher (14 Jun 2010)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Add in a Div (on the Army side) to command all of the Militia Brigades, and a re-invented DCDS that provides nowt more than overwatch and short hallway functions to CDS, I think that you are onto something very close to what the current Chief of Transformation wrote in his 1999 AMSC paper (which has disappeared from the net...)



Why add a layer of reserve leadership when the primary mission of the reserves is to provide individual augmentation to regular force units, usually within the same land force area.  

Why not have the reserve brigade groups brought into the fold of a reg force brigade group? That way you establish habitual relationships with the reg f units which the reservists are to be augmenting and working with for expeditionary and domestic operations.


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Jun 2010)

Span of Control


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## Infanteer (15 Jun 2010)

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> Why add a layer of reserve leadership when the primary mission of the reserves is to provide individual augmentation to regular force units, usually within the same land force area.
> 
> Why not have the reserve brigade groups brought into the fold of a reg force brigade group? That way you establish habitual relationships with the reg f units which the reservists are to be augmenting and working with for expeditionary and domestic operations.



The last thing Commander 1 CMBG wants to do is take a trip out to Doolittle, Nowhere to see how his Fusiliers are doing.

It ain't adding a layer of leadership if you do away with Areas - roll 4 Areas into 2 Divs and push the support part of the Areas to the ASGs.


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## Journeyman (15 Jun 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> .... if over 50% of your occupation strength is in NDHQ, perhaps those functions are not core military..


Oh, you are so going to hell   op:


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## dapaterson (15 Jun 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Oh, you are so going to hell   op:



Can you save me a good seat?


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## Journeyman (15 Jun 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Oh, you are so going to hell
> 
> 
> > Can you save me a good seat?


Sure. I know people   ;D


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## daftandbarmy (15 Jun 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> PS.  Much of the characteristics that PPCLI Guy mentioned seem very similar to the idea of the USMC MAGTF.  However, MAGTFs - MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs - are separate structures from the Marine Divisions and take command of them or their components when deployed on expeditionary operations.  I'm not sure we want (can sustain) HQs independant of field forces that are maintained simply for command and control?



Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!


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## Osotogari (15 Jun 2010)

If anyone's looking at efficiency, they should go through all the headquarters first and cut all the redundancy then, as stated previously, find out how much is being wasted re-furbishing rusted out equipment vs replacing it outright.  They're spending dollars to save dimes.  

There's also no doubt, in my repeatedly concussed brain, that now that the reserve force has proven its worth AGAIN in this current round of operations, that the focus on dismantling the regimental system will continue from where it left off on September 10, 2001 if for no other reason than to smack us back down.   Imagine all the HD flatscreen monitors they'll be able to buy for NDHQ with the all money saved from firing a half-dozen Class A commanding officers in each CBG.


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## Mountie (15 Jun 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The American's aren't moving away from Divisions at all - Divisions are still the primary large-scale tactical unit in their arsenal  and they currently have 3(?) in Iraq and 2 in Afghanistan.  The movement towards Brigade Combat Teams was an effort to push combat support/combat service support slices commonly found in US Doctrine at the Divisional level down to the Brigades to make them more independant; infact, if anything, this mirrors the Canadian practice of very robust Brigades.
> 
> I do agree with what PPCLI is getting at - we need a deployable, scalable structure.  In my view, the HQ should do three things:
> 1.  Provide a Division HQ for the 3 Reg Force Brigades, thus eliminating the need for the 4 Area Commands;
> ...



I think you hit the nail right on the head.


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## Matt_Fisher (15 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!



Your name isn't Paul Hellyer per chance is it?


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## TimBit (15 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!



That would be a very land-centric architecture which doesn't equate well with our coastlines or northern air sovereignty concerns. The USMC and the RM's are designed as quick-deployment shock operations forces. That does not condition any knowledge or understanding of more "static" missions belonging to the AF and the Navy such as sovereignty patrols, air defence, fish pats, and so on. I doubt you would see the US recommend that Air Defence or Routine coastal ops be assigned to air or naval units belonging to the USMC.


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## Edward Campbell (15 Jun 2010)

I’m another who wants the CF to be _joint_, top to (nearly) bottom.

I favour fewer but larger HQs with minimum crossing of lines. For me, that means _regional_ joint command which own and operate pretty much everything in their areas (there are few exceptions, like SOF units and CSE, but even they can be administratively supported by their ‘parent’ areas even as they receive operational direction from others in Ottawa): joint (naval/air and land/air and, maybe, eventually, even naval/land/air) task forces, reserve forces (formations and units) and support forces.

There would, of necessity be _room_ for a few _functional_ exceptions: Canadian NORAD Region and even a deployable, operational formation HQ. (1 Cdn Div, anyone?)

I would envisions units that are, currently, national, like AETE in Cold Lake, and the CFSDs, being owned and operated by Commander _Xxxx_ Command. Even RMC would be owned and operated by its _regional_ commander. _Guidance_, on a wide variety of issues – operational, professional, administrative and so on, would flow to the _regional_ commanders from the CDS’ minions in a big, integrated HQ in Ottawa. The _regional_ commands would also have big, integrated HQs being able to generate and employ forces (in domestic operations) and to support all forces in the region.

Some C2 overhead is necessary. I have no idea if we have too many staff officers in too many HQs but I am sure that clarity and simplicity (minimum overlaps of authority and responsibility) are essential elements of any C2 system.

I still see a need for _professional heads of service_ (CMS, CLS, CAS) in Ottawa to lead on matters of doctrine, equipment and training and, perhaps, personnel.

I envision NDHQ as having several 'components:'

•	The _Joint Staff_ - planning and _managing_ operations;

•	The _Defence Staff_ - _managing_ DND and the CF on a day-by-day basis;

•	The _Departmental Staff_ - making policy and _managing_ resources;

•	The _Service Staffs_ - as described above; and

•	So on.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (15 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!



I hate to burst your bubble, but in the US, the Marine Corps answers to the Navy - not the other way around. The Commandant is a Marine general that is himself under the Chief of Naval Operations, an admiral. Considering that our navy is smaller than either the air force or the army, I very much doubt that putting everyone under the command of an admiral would go down well with the generals  .

As to the ways to both "degrease" headquarters and save money, here is an easy solution (which I have offered before): De-link the military and civilian "pay-and-grade" scales that was imposed on us during the years of "civilianization" of the military under unification. Then, you can give officers in HQ's the appropriate ranks.

For instance (and I may become a traitor here to my navy), with the small flotillas we maintain on each coast, a Commodore would be sufficient rank for each coast's command, which would make CMS' rank that of rear-admiral. Similar downgrades would be appropriate for the other elements too. This would then permit us to cap the "specialist" top dogs to a reasonable rank (considering how few people they  "lead", why do we need general ranked officers as top JAG, Padre, Surgeon or Provost Marshall ???), say as four ringers max , better as three ringers in some cases.


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## Infanteer (15 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I hate to burst your bubble, but in the US, the Marine Corps answers to the Navy - not the other way around. The Commandant is a Marine general that is himself under the Chief of Naval Operations, an admiral. Considering that our navy is smaller than either the air force or the army, I very much doubt that putting everyone under the command of an admiral would go down well with the generals



Incorrect.  The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy are two services in the Department of the Navy - they both answer to the same boss - the Secretary of the Navy (and operationally to the CJCS, but I'm not sure of the legal details of that relationship).


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## Oldgateboatdriver (15 Jun 2010)

I only have one question for you ERC: How do you geographically organize the world?

Yes, because the Navy does not operate in Canada. Our mission of protection of Canada's national interests means that the whole planet is our  OPAREA. And we do not split it by geography: The mission in the gulf of eden/somalia coast, for instance, can see a ship from either the West coast or the East coast fleet fulfill it. Also,  every time we slip the lines, we fall under a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities and automatically integrate into the current joint CANUS structure for maritime defence of North America, which predates NORAD, by the way. 

As a result, most of what the Navy does is neither area-centric nor joint. What you propose would either not work for these naval tasks or impose on admirals duties with regards to the army and air forces that they have little training or knowledge to carry out. Learning the naval trade is more than sufficiently demanding to preclude the simultaneous learning of land and air operations.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (15 Jun 2010)

You are partly correct Infanteer. My mistake on who answers to whom: they both do answer to the Secretary of the Navy. However, you are incorrect on the CJCS. He has no operational authority over any of the three departments (Navy, Army or Airforce). The CJCS job is co-ordination but he is not an operational commander. Each of the departments retains its operational independence.


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## Edward Campbell (15 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I only have one question for you ERC: How do you geographically organize the world?
> 
> Yes, because the Navy does not operate in Canada. Our mission of protection of Canada's national interests means that the whole planet is our  OPAREA. And we do not split it by geography: The mission in the gulf of eden/somalia coast, for instance, can see a ship from either the West coast or the East coast fleet fulfill it. Also,  every time we slip the lines, we fall under a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities and automatically integrate into the current joint CANUS structure for maritime defence of North America, which predates NORAD, by the way.
> 
> As a result, most of what the Navy does is neither area-centric nor joint. What you propose would either not work for these naval tasks or impose on admirals duties with regards to the army and air forces that they have little training or knowledge to carry out. Learning the naval trade is more than sufficiently demanding to preclude the simultaneous learning of land and air operations.




I think we can have _regional_ commands in Canada that _generate_ forces for operations and _conduct_ domestic operations within their regions. Now as to who conducts the overseas or _combined_ (multinational) operations: maybe NDHQ/_Joint_ Staff, maybe designated commanders, maybe even _regional_ commanders, themselves, sometimes. Other nations do it; are they that _managerially_ superior to us? Most of the US ships in any CANUS operation 'belong' to a US _unified_ command: CINCLANT, CINCPAC, etc.

With regard to you other point re: ranks. I wholeheartedly agree.


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## Journeyman (15 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> ... a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities...


Well, only because today seems to be nitpicking day.....SEATO hasn't existed since 1977.

Other than that, I've got nothing.


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## TimBit (15 Jun 2010)

Interesting idea here on lowering ranks of positions here at NDHQ. While it certainly could and perhaps should be done, I see two interesting bumps along that road:
1. Pay rates were locked in comparison with civilian's pay based on equivalent tasks. Therefore it was assessed, at the time, that a say a Colonel was doing the equivalent job to an EX1 and therefore the salary is the same plus 8% military factor. Now in jobs that are alternately occupied by civvies and military persons (there are some), that means that if the job can be occupied by an EX1 therefore it should be occupied by someone with an equivalent wage. If we lower the posn to LCol, then one of two things happen: we bump up the whole pay structure to equate with PS ranks, or we lower the civvy classification of the job. I don't think that last one would fly.
2. The whole career structure of officers would have to be reviewed. Are you ready, as a LCol, possibly pre-command, to become a director at NDHQ? I don't think so. Many Captains are not even posted to NDHQ but rather go to regional HQ's or sometimesbrigade level duties for staff jobs. Then Majors might get a junior job here in policy or something along those lines. That means very few officers are actually ready to lead a mixed civvy-military directorate in policy, force development, programs, and so on. Lowering jobs by one rank would probably entail more staff exposure before DP4.

Any thoughts?


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## Oldgateboatdriver (15 Jun 2010)

Oh! Timbit, don't get me started.

Your post emphasizes all that is WRONG with the current system. Where to start?

Posts "alternatively occupied by civvies and military": Why do they exist? Either a post exist to fulfil a military purpose, in which case it is to be manned by a uniformed member, or it fulfils a civilian oversight of the military purpose, in which case it ought to be manned by a civil servant at all time. In the first instance, the soldier reports to the CDS, not a civilian, in the later case, the civil servant reports to the Deputy-Minister.

"Pay rates were locked in comparison with civilian's pay": Read my original post: That is exactly the "de-locking" I talk about: It serves no specific military purpose. Have a military pay scale that has nothing to do with the civilian one (I am not aware of other nations where they lock one to the other, but I may  be wrong here), then let uniformed personnel fulfill their task at whatever rank they happen to have  as long as they are capable of the job. I, for one, could not care less about my rank when carrying my job as a ship driver: Be it Lt, Lcdr or Cdr, I would do the job and be happy to do it.

"The whole career structure of officers ...": YES! The purpose of a military is to FIGHT, not to provide career progression. If a  lieutenant is doing a good job but does not possess the qualities required for promotion to next rank: let him be. Find a way to use his good skills as a LT.

"Are you ready, as a LCol, ... , to become a director": Yes. Why not? Even as a Major or, dare I say it a Captain. It is not the rank that makes the director, its the intellectual capacity as a staff officer and the amount of higher level of strategy and military management (in the noble sense of the term) knowledge. Some general officers do not possess it while some lowly ranked officers do. There is a way to develop it and identify it quickly: A continental european style General Staff: identify early on the officers with the intellectual abilities for HQ staff work and advance them quickly through junior command tours and advanced schooling in military affairs (grand strategy, plans, intelligence, etc.) so they may fill these HQ "elated" positions as staff  and senior staff and become the collective repository of military professional knowledge and national  defence plans.

I will confess here that I am a follower of Major John Hasek.


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## TimBit (15 Jun 2010)

> Oh! Timbit, don't get me started. Your post emphasizes all that is WRONG with the current system. Where to start?


Ok I guess I should have added that my post was for discussion purpose   I don't necessarily support the situation, I was playing the devil's advocate. That being said, I disagree on a few things you said.



> Posts "alternatively occupied by civvies and military": Why do they exist? Either a post exist to fulfil a military purpose, in which case it is to be manned by a uniformed member, or it fulfils a civilian oversight of the military purpose, in which case it ought to be manned by a civil servant at all time. In the first instance, the soldier reports to the CDS, not a civilian, in the later case, the civil servant reports to the Deputy-Minister.



I'm afraid it's not that clear cut. Areas like legal advice, financial planning, intelligence, CF property and land management, defence policy, operations policy, CF and DND security, etc... are much more integrated than that. For example, if someone is working on the future Arctic Security Environment and what it involves for DND in terms of capabilities, should that be a civvy job or a military one? What about WMD's? Most experts in the field are civvies but then they normally do not go on inspections, and therefore many teams are mil-civ integrated. Where do you draw the line b/w Ministerial finances and CF finances? 

Drawing a definite line b/w civvy and military jobs here at NDHQ would not only be extremely difficult in about 15-20% of cases, but would also involve reneging permanently on the capability to place uniformed personnel in some positions to influence things a certain way.



> "Pay rates were locked in comparison with civilian's pay": Read my original post: That is exactly the "de-locking" I talk about: It serves no specific military purpose. Have a military pay scale that has nothing to do with the civilian one (I am not aware of other nations where they lock one to the other, but I may  be wrong here), then let uniformed personnel fulfill their task at whatever rank they happen to have  as long as they are capable of the job. I, for one, could not care less about my rank when carrying my job as a ship driver: Be it Lt, Lcdr or Cdr, I would do the job and be happy to do it.



Ok. But once you de-lock the structure (but that's not gonna happen) you still have a structure. You're not paid on performance. So you have to tag ranks for certain jobs. Otherwise, hey keep everyone a private no matter the job! Much cheaper. !?! Even driving a ship is like that... the Lt(N) does not get to be responsible for fighting and managing the ship, because he would be underpaid. So we recognize the responsibilities added and promote the person and pay them better! What I'm saying, is that every organization in the world which has a large structure has titles and pay grades linked to job descriptions. Thinking we could just skip that is wishful thinking.




> "The whole career structure of officers ...": YES! The purpose of a military is to FIGHT, not to provide career progression. If a  lieutenant is doing a good job but does not possess the qualities required for promotion to next rank: let him be. Find a way to use his good skills as a LT.



Come on, I was not saying the purpose of the CF is to provide you with a career. I am saying that the career structure is there to make sure that you do possess those skills before promotion, by the largest exposure possible to 1. your trade 2. your element 3. the CF and 4. the Department. From where I sit, I would say that the system SEEMS to work. Most of the Colonels I work with are pretty switched on and aware of the big picture. Of course, not EVERYONE needs to be promoted. Fine Captain? Good! I never said the contrary. But then, don't put him in a job above his capabilities, which should be reflected officially in his/her rank.



> "Are you ready, as a LCol, ... , to become a director": Yes. Why not? Even as a Major or, dare I say it a Captain. It is not the rank that makes the director, its the intellectual capacity as a staff officer and the amount of higher level of strategy and military management (in the noble sense of the term) knowledge. Some general officers do not possess it while some lowly ranked officers do. There is a way to develop it and identify it quickly: A continental european style General Staff: identify early on the officers with the intellectual abilities for HQ staff work and advance them quickly through junior command tours and advanced schooling in military affairs (grand strategy, plans, intelligence, etc.) so they may fill these HQ "elated" positions as staff  and senior staff and become the collective repository of military professional knowledge and national  defence plans.



Again, if people have the capability, they are promoted, then they get the job. Otherwise, how does a CM who oversee 500-20000 knows that this guy, a mcpl, is no good, but that one, is fantastic and can do a cpo2 job. He/she bases that on the rank. Finally, I would say that the "European General Staff model" is what the career progression you slammed in the last para tries to do: line-staff-line-staff-line-staff. Prussian model adopted pretty much everywhere in the world, including here.

Again, not trying to defend the system or say it's infallible, just discussing some issues posed by reform. Food for thought...  ;D

I will confess here that I am a follower of Major John Hasek.[/quote]


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## Edward Campbell (15 Jun 2010)

I was told, many years ago, by a senior official who was, back _circa_ 1963, _'present at the creation'_ that the DND position was that a Cdr/LCol/Wg Cdr was the "first level executive" rank, equivalent to a director in the public service. Somehow, during a very complex process, the DND position was ignored and we became "equal" at one level to higher, *possibly* because the military had appointments called "director" that were occupied by Capts/Cols/Gp Capts but that were equivalent to directors general in the public service.

Is a pre-command Cdr/LCol ready to be a director? My opinion, having been one (a director): Yes, without doubt, in 99% of cases.


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## daftandbarmy (15 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> As to the ways to both "degrease" headquarters and save money, here is an easy solution (which I have offered before): De-link the military and civilian "pay-and-grade" scales that was imposed on us during the years of "civilianization" of the military under unification. Then, you can give officers in HQ's the appropriate ranks.
> 
> For instance (and I may become a traitor here to my navy), with the small flotillas we maintain on each coast, a Commodore would be sufficient rank for each coast's command, which would make CMS' rank that of rear-admiral. Similar downgrades would be appropriate for the other elements too. This would then permit us to cap the "specialist" top dogs to a reasonable rank (considering how few people they  "lead", why do we need general ranked officers as top JAG, Padre, Surgeon or Provost Marshall ???), say as four ringers max , better as three ringers in some cases.



Lordy, next thing you know you'll be suggesting is that you don't have to be a MARS officer to command a ship, or a pilot to run a squadron/wing!


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## TimBit (15 Jun 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I was told, many years ago, by a senior official who was, back _circa_ 1963, _'present at the creation'_ that the DND position was that a Cdr/LCol/Wg Cdr was the "first level executive" rank, equivalent to a director in the public service. Somehow, during a very complex process, the DND position was ignored and we became "equal" at one level to higher, *possibly* because the military had appointments called "director" that were occupied by Capts/Cols/Gp Capts but that were equivalent to directors general in the public service.
> 
> Is a pre-command Cdr/LCol ready to be a director? My opinion, having been one (a director): Yes, without doubt, in 99% of cases.



Personnally I think so too. However I also think it would be even better if that LCol had been given a bit more exposure to political issues and strategic policy. Personnally I work with both Directors and Deputy Directors here and I see a difference on that front. Others might differ.


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## GAP (15 Jun 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Lordy, next thing you know you'll be suggesting is that you don't have to be a MARS officer to command a ship, or a pilot to run a squadron/wing!



Well, how difficult can it be...?

Boats....pointy end to where you want to go.....

Aircraft....don't hit birds, and things, keep it off the ground (includes mountains)....

 ;D


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## Infanteer (15 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> You are partly correct Infanteer. My mistake on who answers to whom: they both do answer to the Secretary of the Navy. However, you are incorrect on the CJCS. He has no operational authority over any of the three departments (Navy, Army or Airforce). The CJCS job is co-ordination but he is not an operational commander. Each of the departments retains its operational independence.



True - I had to look that one up - as I said I wasn't too sure on the operational relationship.  Fact of the matter remains the same; the Commandant of the USMC has no military boss - he reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy.

As for your stuff on ranks, totally in agreement.  IMO, our whole personnel system needs to be looked at to determine if a system designed for a Cold War standing military is suitable for a 21st century expeditionary force with new human and resource dynamics.

I'd say if you're going to do anything it would be to be more selective in junior rank progression.  It's basically (at least in the Army) one big sieve to Major.  A "General Staff" (which could be something as simple as an* beside a MOSID and a special career managment section that reports directly to the CDS) may be a start.


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## Old Sweat (15 Jun 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'd say if you're going to do anything it would be to be more selective in junior rank progression.  It's basically (at least in the Army) one big sieve to Major.  A "General Staff" (which could be something as simple as an* beside a MOSID and a special career managment section that reports directly to the CDS) may be a start.



In the Canadian Army, when I was still trying to learn how to spell lieutenant, once an officer passed staff college, and got the magic symbol PSC after his name on the seniority list, his file went from his Corps Director's career manager to a centralized manager. He was then on a separate and much quicker promotion stream.


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## vonGarvin (15 Jun 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> IMO, our whole personnel system needs to be looked at to determine if a system designed for a Cold War standing military is suitable for a 21st century expeditionary force with new human and resource dynamics.


I disagree that our system was designed for the Cold War.  Looking back (and around), our system evolved from what we had in the 40's, the 30's, the 20's....

I know, I know, "Cold War" is a bad term.  But let's face it, for fighting off the Soviets in a 24/7 high intensity "scenario", we had much smaller staffs juggling much larger balls.  And they did it well.  Now we have more HQs doing God-Only-Knows for what is essentially two battalions' worth of troops deployed in Afghanistan.  

In a word: fail.


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## Infanteer (15 Jun 2010)

Now Army Staff college (AOC) has a 100% attendance rate and there are no entrance requirements (there are check-in-the-box prereqs).  Guess it goes back to the question someone asked before - it the purpose of the Land Force Command and Staff College to provide a venturi for the Army's Officer Corps or is it simply to provide all officers with an understanding of the OPP?



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I disagree that our system was designed for the Cold War.  Looking back (and around), our system evolved from what we had in the 40's, the 30's, the 20's....
> 
> I know, I know, "Cold War" is a bad term.  But let's face it, for fighting off the Soviets in a 24/7 high intensity "scenario", we had much smaller staffs juggling much larger balls.  And they did it well.  Now we have more HQs doing God-Only-Knows for what is essentially two battalions' worth of troops deployed in Afghanistan.
> 
> In a word: fail.



No.  A "30's" system would feature a small permanent force designed to train the Militia and assist with mobilization.

A Cold War system is one that features a peace-time force built around formations that sees a large majority of NCMs sticking around in branch-pure units while officers rotate in-and-out to gain "depth and experience".  In theory, units were to be ready to fight in "element pure" battles as part of an Alliance.  Managed readiness was a bit of a wrench into this, and as anyone who's been a part of the mounting stage for expeditionary operations knows, the military hasn't really come to grips with it.

If "managed readiness" is a valid concept (which, IMHO, it is) why isn't the system to manage units extended to personnel?


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## vonGarvin (15 Jun 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Now Army Staff college (AOC) has a 100% attendance rate and there are no entrance requirements (there are check-in-the-box prereqs).  Guess it goes back to the question someone asked before - it the purpose of the Land Force Command and Staff College to provide a venturi for the Army's Officer Corps or is it simply to provide all officers with an understanding of the OPP?


If it's to provide all officers with an understanding of the OPP, I could do that in 2 x 40 min lessons.  I agree with you in your frustrations about it.  I was on course with many who were simply "pushed along", and the combat arms fellas (armoured and infantry officers) were held to a higher standard.  I mean, an HCA on my course got a "B", but a person from the combat arms with his understanding of "stuff" got less.  And don't get me started on the grading!!!  :threat:


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## dapaterson (15 Jun 2010)

plsc = pretty lousy staff course


The lowering of the quality bar for "trained staff officers" seems to lead to an increased demand - if we can't get it in quality, we'll make up for it in quantity.


Interesting to note that the president of Treasury Board, Mr Day, is letting parts of the public service identify areas for savings, and permitting public servants to pocket 10% of the first year savings, up to $10K.  DND is not on the list, though.  Perhaps there's fear that rather than proposals to save resources, people would submits lists of names...


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## Oldgateboatdriver (16 Jun 2010)

Rejoining this conversation, let me first state that we should not confuse what is taught at staff college and the educational requirements of a "staff" officer at the national HQ under a "general staff" system. 

Our staff college teaches a variety of things from military writing, problem solving to the fundamentals of our OPP, with a bit of military history and leadership studies thrown in (at least last time I saw the curriculum), which is fine training for officers that may so far have written more in field note books, message pads and OOW logs than in anything else. However, they are not immersed in advanced military studies and research in grand strategy and the body politics that you would get, for instance at the Frunze Academy or that someone like Gen. Guderian would have studied and reflected on when he came up with the concepts of Blitzkrieg that are still the basis of armoured combat today. That is the type of studies and training required for a European style General Staff system, which I regret to say, TIMBIT, we do not have.

Old Sweat, having checked with friends who have served on promotion boards as secretary, I can tell you that there is no separate/faster stream for officers with their PSC annotation, it does, however give them numerous "brownie" points that do get them promoted apparently ahead of more deserving officers or officer with longer service that do not have the designation.

Infanteer: here is a good recognition possibility for members of the General staff that I think you may like: Upon being accepted into it, an officer would sport a red stripe down each sides of her CF trousers. Good looking and immediately visible to all.

As for the current structure at NDHQ, it is not a continuation of our past system from the 20's, 30's, or even from the cold war.

At the beginning of the cold war and at the peak of Canada's military "peacetime" manning in the late 50's, we had three headquarters for the three national institutions that were the RCN, the Canadian Army and the RCAF (Yes - the military forces are a national institution - not a department - which is why the CDS properly reports to the Commander-in-chief: the G.G.-in-council (i.e. the PM), not to the Minister of Defence), then, at the Department of defence, you had  both the then much smaller Minister's civilian staff and the Chiefs of staffs committee and other similar joint committees. After the Glassco commission and the resulting unification, all of this was merged into a single NDHQ and a huge inflation in both side of the house (military and civilian) occurred concurrently with the blurring of the lines between military and civilian area of responsibilities. Mr. Glassco must be turning in his grave knowing that the "efficient" structure he caused to be created is now three times bigger than the "inefficient" one he rejected even though it administers less than half the military forces we had then.

Quote from Timibit:

"I'm afraid it's not that clear cut. Areas like legal advice, financial planning, intelligence, CF property and land management, defence policy, operations policy, CF and DND security, etc... are much more integrated than that. For example, if someone is working on the future Arctic Security Environment and what it involves for DND in terms of capabilities, should that be a civvy job or a military one? What about WMD's? Most experts in the field are civvies but then they normally do not go on inspections, and therefore many teams are mil-civ integrated. Where do you draw the line b/w Ministerial finances and CF finances? 

Drawing a definite line b/w civvy and military jobs here at NDHQ would not only be extremely difficult in about 15-20% of cases, but would also involve reneging permanently on the capability to place uniformed personnel in some positions to influence things a certain way. "

Don't get me wrong: I did not say that there is no requirement for civilian advice or input on certain aspects and vice versa, just that each position in itself should be one or the other accordingly. Let us review the ones you mention:

Legal advice: Advice on military law and laws of war ought to be provided to the CDS by uniformed personnel only. This is JAGS area of expertise - period. Advice on other legal aspects, such as property law, torts, labour, etc. should come from civilian lawyers. However, all departments need this type of advice and, usually, get it from the Dep. of justice: why should we be different?

Financial planning: To the extent that the CDS has decisional power over the financial decision, all of his staff that are themselves in a position to make decisions should be uniformed personnel. Civilian specialists may be employed in non-decision making roles.

Intelligence: I have no doubt that Military Intelligence is to be provided to the various military commanders through military officers. Expert advice can be obtained from civilian specialist in a given field, but must be made available to commanders through their military superiors. It is critical to proper defence of the realm (and unfortunately not the case now) that the intelligence that the CDS gets and in turn provides to the PMO be the military take, not the DND civilian washed intelligence. Only then can the CDS provide the PM with the truly military view on any matter that truly helps the PM to make the appropriate call with the fullest knowledge of the facts. The very same goes for the operations policy and the defence policy where, in a democracy like ours, the political masters of the military MUST receive from the military (not civil servants) their unadulterated military views and positions from which they may then make their political policy calls.

Do I even need to deal with "property and land management", when this is one of the clearest case for civil service only positions?

All food for thoughts also. Should we create a new thread to continue?


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2010)

A couple of _quibbles_:

1. I think the JAG stands, uniquely, separate from the CDS and the DM. (S)he is, I believe the Minister's lawyer, above all else. Something from my experience tells me that all legal officers in government departments are in that position.

2. There is a *military* intelligence system but DND _housekeeps_, for the PCO, Canada's main intelligence gathering service: CSE. CSE is "in" DND but it does did not (when I served, almost 15 years ago) report to the CDS, DM or MND.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (16 Jun 2010)

Quote from the web sit of the JAG:

"Reporting Relationships

The JAG is statutorily responsible to the Minister of National Defence and “accountable” for the legal advice given to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the military chain of command, and to the Deputy Minister. This clear accountability structure was designed to enhance the integrity of the Office of the JAG and ensure the independence of the JAG from the chain of command in the provision of legal advice in all areas including military justice."

So, while responsible to the Minister, he "advises" the CDS and DM, who simply have no power over him if they don't like his advice.

Good educational point for all.

On intel. I was talking about military intelligence only - not discussing the special status of CSE, which is another component separate and distinct in the overall Canadian government intelligence apparatus. On that, I would hope, however that CSE who does signal intel is not our main intelligence gathering service. I would hope it is CSIS. Nevertheless, all three (four with RCMP?) intelligence services are coordinated, and properly so, by the Clerk of the Privy Council and it is there that the unadulterated military intelligence must be given.


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## dapaterson (16 Jun 2010)

OldBoatGateDriver:  The Joint Command and Staff Course is the "Guederian"-esque course.  (Students have the option of completing some additional coursework to receive a MAsters degree, granted by RMC).  Of course, one could ask why we post Maj/LCols (and LCdrs/Cdrs) from Ottawa to Toronto for a year, only to post them back to Ottawa after - perhaps it's time to move CFC to Barrhaven or somewhere in the NCR, to save on cost moves and improve QoL for the students...

ERC:  All civilian lawyers employed as such in the public servant work for Justice and are then assigned to other departments.  JAG is an odd bird (as are military lawyers as a group (and individually, as well, but that's neither here nor there)).


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## Oldgateboatdriver (16 Jun 2010)

Thank you for the info  Dapaterson. BTW you inverted the Gate and the Boat.

If all "civilian" lawyers at DND work for Justice, then it confirms my view on TIMBIT's point that there should not be positions at DND that require alternating between civilian lawyers and JAG officers. 

On the Guederian-esque course, you may find that in Europe the selected officers will have achieved that level well before they reach the exalted rank of Major/LCdr. In fact by that point in their careers they will have been expected to have completed the equivalent of a PhD in the subject, have numerous published work on strategy, politics or the art of war, even if just published internally. They would also have been expected to have written extensive critiques on the national plans and policies regarding defence, so that they would be at the stage where they teach the basic Guederian-esque course to their juniors.

Also, I hope you distinguish between military lawyers and lawyers also in the military: I am a commercial litigator, but a Mars officer when in uniform. I hope that does not make me an odd bird.


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## TimBit (16 Jun 2010)

> Intelligence: I have no doubt that Military Intelligence is to be provided to the various military commanders through military officers. Expert advice can be obtained from civilian specialist in a given field, but must be made available to commanders through their military superiors. It is critical to proper defence of the realm (and unfortunately not the case now) that the intelligence that the CDS gets and in turn provides to the PMO be the military take, not the DND civilian washed intelligence. Only then can the CDS provide the PM with the truly military view on any matter that truly helps the PM to make the appropriate call with the fullest knowledge of the facts. The very same goes for the operations policy and the defence policy where, in a democracy like ours, the political masters of the military MUST receive from the military (not civil servants) their unadulterated military views and positions from which they may then make their political policy calls.



I'll address the rest later. WoW! Just WOW! Your "DND civilian washed intelligence" comment is demeaning and shows you don`t know much about it really. Contrary to you, I work with those people and see that most teams are mixed, well integrated, and perform very well. Unlike other areas of the military, intelligence often requires in-depth knowledge of a target which is hard to reconcile with the posting system. Therefore, civilians in most team bring stability and long-term perspective. It all depends on what level of intelligence is being produced. Tactical and low-level op int, like that in Afghanistan, is produced in theater by military personnel with only superficial support from civilians. However, when talking about strategic intelligence, well when it comes to the future behaviour of a country I,ll put my money on the guy who completed a PhD in the subject and worked that desk 15 yrs, not the freshly posted-in Major. As well, the vast majority of those teams are led by CF personnel or former Int O`s and are often composed of former service people... so I guess if it`s "washed" it is approved in its washed form by uniformed people. So that depends what the TRUE military view is to you... oh and we don't provide anything to the PMO, a partisan, non-government organization.



> On intel. I was talking about military intelligence only - not discussing the special status of CSE, which is another component separate and distinct in the overall Canadian government intelligence apparatus. On that, I would hope, however that CSE who does signal intel is not our main intelligence gathering service. I would hope it is CSIS. Nevertheless, all three (four with RCMP?) intelligence services are coordinated, and properly so, by the Clerk of the Privy Council and it is there that the unadulterated military intelligence must be given.



CSIS is a security intelligence agency and is focused on threats to Canada, so not much use to DND. As far as Int on the capabilities and intentions of foreign actors goes, I wholeheartedly agree with ERC. Interesting also that, aside from tactical intelligence, most of the material produced by Military Intelligence, both here and the US, is derived from the material produced by overwhelmingly civilian agencies. So is it washed at the start? Rotten to the core?

Your whole idea that civilians would alter the military intelligence and lie to the powers that be is just plain weird and shows plain incomprehension and prejudice towards how it really works.

Sorry.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (16 Jun 2010)

PMO is a typo. Should have read PCO.

And I am not trying to demean intel people at all. The various desk officers and intel analysts are doing a tremendous job and are a credit to their trade. It is with how it gets from there to the PCO that I have some reservation. My understanding of how it was done goes back about ten years, and as I understand it , in those days, the "military" intel was brought to the PCO through the Minister who had himself been briefed by the DM or an ADM. I was also lead to understand that  as a result, some analysis and conclusions reached by the military that were considered a little too hard were softened along the way. If this is not the case anymore, I can only be happy.  You seem to confirm that the teams are mostly led by uniformed personnel. To me that is how it should be: It means that  once the analysis of the facts and the research has been done (by those incomparable PhD analysts), it is reviewed by someone with military background to, hopefully distillate it into a militarily view of the generated picture that can be passed up the chain of command in a military form. ("The world is grey, Jack!": That may be so, but for military purposes, we must often assign it a black or white colour, as appropriate, so that we may  act according to the "safe" course now, rather than the "sorry" one later.) .

This is all I am saying: the system must be set up so that it is the view of the uniformed personnel that reaches the PCO, hopefully through the CDS or his most senior intel uniformed officer bringing it directly to the Clerk of the PC.

As to my "prejudice" on how civilian intel might work, I would like to point out (though I admit not a Canadian situation) that it was such agencies that carefully worded their advice to US and British politicians to correspond more closely to what they wanted to hear on Irak. This clearly occurred above the heads of the fact finders, analysts and research officers that compile the picture and conclusions derived therefrom. Interestingly enough, in both countries, it was the message from the military intel people that was the furthest from concluding to the existence of a WMD threat and expressed the greatest reservations.


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## TimBit (16 Jun 2010)

Olga:

All good, I see your point now. The only thing I would say, however, is that in the US DIA produced an analysis in support of WMD's in Irak, which was not supported by CIA. I guess both should have balanced each other. The real culprits however, and that ties in to your posts, appear to have been the elected or appointed politicians who put the agenda before the facts and threw the intel out the window in any case, so... sad stuff.


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## Infanteer (16 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> On the Guederian-esque course, you may find that in Europe the selected officers will have achieved that level well before they reach the exalted rank of Major/LCdr. In fact by that point in their careers they will have been expected to have completed the equivalent of a PhD in the subject, have numerous published work on strategy, politics or the art of war, even if just published internally. They would also have been expected to have written extensive critiques on the national plans and policies regarding defence, so that they would be at the stage where they teach the basic Guederian-esque course to their juniors.



Really.  I've read up on Officer Corps development for most other NATO/ABCA countries and I don't see anything too different from what we do.  The Brits and the Americans and us all have a similar model with a "Advanced Tactics Course" which focuses on higher level land operations.  The Germans have a bit different model, but their main venturi still remains the Command Course at the _Fuhrungsakadamie_ which is a course attended.  This is a two year course, which differs from UK/Can.  The US also has a one year course, but has the SAMS follow on year for its "Jedi" guys.

We are probably digressing into a topic split, but you seem to be focusing on more stringent and detailed junior officer development.  Add academics to the "Captain's Course" (for the Army - AOC) and make it longer than 17 weeks?


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2010)

Again, a quibbles: CSIS was established as a *counter intelligence* agency and I believe that is still its main role. The business of 'active' intelligence gathering belongs to others. If my memory serves, Signint provides *about* 90% of all intellignence to all military forces.


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## TimBit (16 Jun 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Again, a quibbles: CSIS was established as a *counter intelligence* agency and I believe that is still its main role. The business of 'active' intelligence gathering belongs to others. If my memory serves, Signint provides *about* 90% of all intellignence to all military forces.



Well CSIS is now an overall SI business covering terrorism and foreign intelligence, thereby Canadian SECURITY Intelligence Service, but yeah, initially it was simply taking over from RCMP who was mainly focused on CI. I fully support your 90% though ;D


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## MarkOttawa (16 Jun 2010)

E.R. Campbell: CSIS has been doing a fair bit to help the CF in Afstan (a threat to them is, by definition I guess, a threat to the security of Canada and thus "security intelligence"):

CSIS and sidearms
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/june-2-letters-to-the-editor/article1588609/



> A select few Canadian Security Intelligence Service employees abroad are authorized by the CSIS director to carry a firearm in dangerous operational environments such as Afghanistan (Undercover CSIS Agents Carry Guns in Foreign Flashpoints – May 26). CSIS personnel who are required to carry sidearms receive intensive training on the safe carriage and handling of a sidearm. They must also obtain a firearms certification prior to receiving the authority to carry a sidearm.
> 
> The fact that Canadian diplomats abroad are unarmed is not a model for CSIS officers. *CSIS personnel in Afghanistan are often required to meet individuals – some of whom would be described as unfriendly at best – in very dangerous situations while carrying out their work in collecting security intelligence on threats to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.* [emphasis added] They are not in Afghanistan to do administrative work. To send CSIS personnel into harm’s way in Afghanistan without adequate protection would be completely irresponsible.
> 
> ...



Elite forces target bomb makers
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/665009



> Canada's elite special forces soldiers have been launching raids on enemy compounds to directly target insurgents making roadside bombs, the main killer of coalition troops in Afghanistan, the Toronto Star  has learned.
> 
> *Using intelligence gathered by Canadian spies on the ground*  [emphasis added] in the troubled country, soldiers with Joint Task Force 2 and the special forces regiment are actively involved in going after the networks that produce the improvised explosive devices...



Getting a handle on the spy game
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/04/16/f-vp-stewart.html



> ...
> So who exactly is CSIS targeting?
> 
> From my contacts, I can tell you that I believe it is far more active in conflict zones then it was even a few years ago.
> ...



Mark
Ottawa


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## Journeyman (16 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> ..... in those days, the "military" intel was brought to the PCO through the Minister who had himself been briefed by the DM or an ADM. I was also lead to understand that  as a result, some analysis and conclusions reached by the military that were considered a little too hard were softened along the way.



Military intelligence is fed into the PCO through an Int Branch LCol/Cdr who is posted there within the Security and Intelligence Secretariat. This officer is also closely tied to the other relevant PCO Secretariat, the International Assessment Staff. Both of these feed into the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, which supports the National Security Advisor in providing info to the PMO.

When working on a specific topic, subject-matter or area specialists from the Int world will go over to PCO to thrash out the details; they may be Int or Arms posted into an Int line serial. There are quite a few non-Int Capts-to-LCols posted into DG Int. I suspect it's to minimize the in-breeding  ;D  However, these PCO meetings involve all of the Int staffs in government -- predominantly DND, CSE, CSIS, and DFAIT -- but for certain topics, you'll get the relevant Int geeks, whether from the Canada Border Services Agency....or Agriculture Canada.


The reality is, on the one hand, you _do_ get differing perspectives or weighting of the information agreed; on the other, often it _is_ watered down to the lowest common denominator. The only counter to that is the "CF version" also goes directly to the CDS and Deputy-Minister.


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## Old Sweat (16 Jun 2010)

And if they get hard up, other geeks are used. I briefed PCO during Gulf 1 on a certain sensitive military subject.


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## Edward Campbell (16 Jun 2010)

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> E.R. Campbell: CSIS has been doing a fair bit to help the CF in Afstan (a threat to them is, by definition I guess, a threat to the security of Canada and thus "security intelligence"):
> 
> CSIS and sidearms
> http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/june-2-letters-to-the-editor/article1588609/
> ...




I don't know what CSIS does, or doesn't do, but I am about 99.99% certain that they are not the only Canadian intelligence service operating in A'stan.


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## blacktriangle (16 Jun 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I don't know what CSIS does, or doesn't do, but I am about 99.99% certain that they are not the only Canadian intelligence service operating in A'stan.



I'd say you can be 100% certain. 


"Canada listening in on Taliban exchanges"

http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=663b86fd-7623-4afe-b6dc-347d01a467d7&k=0

Anyone had enough Int talk yet?


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## Lex Parsimoniae (16 Jun 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Old Sweat, having checked with friends who have served on promotion boards as secretary, I can tell you that there is no separate/faster stream for officers with their PSC annotation, it does, however give them numerous "brownie" points that do get them promoted apparently ahead of more deserving officers or officer with longer service that do not have the designation.


I think you might have the cart before the horse here.  Selection for JCSP is based on merit standing, thus it follows that JCSP graduates are promoted ahead of their peers.  Somewhere around 2/3 of the graduating class is usually already wearing their third ring.


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## PPCLI Guy (16 Jun 2010)

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Somewhere around 2/3 of the graduating class is usually already wearing their third ring.



Yep - everyone but Infantry and Artillery....


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## Lex Parsimoniae (16 Jun 2010)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Yep - everyone but Infantry and Artillery....


True - but to be fair, they tend to be 5-10 years younger too.


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## PPCLI Guy (16 Jun 2010)

Not any more - the average age of students is North of 42 - including the King and Queen of Battle.


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## Lex Parsimoniae (16 Jun 2010)

Nope.  JCSP 36 average age was 39 and 37 is younger yet.  One student coming on 37 is still a Capt!


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## vonGarvin (17 Jun 2010)

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> *One student coming on 37 is still a Capt!*


STOP THE PRESSES!  A Capt is *shudder* 37?  I had no idea that the promoted them to captain SO YOUNG!


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## TimBit (17 Jun 2010)

Could it be that said Captain had joined a bit later? I can see that an increasing number of folks are joining mid to late 20's rather than at 20 (that's my case in fact) and therefore do not enter the EPZ to Major before 35. In fact, I think that with increasing education levels, people travelling before university and the increase of the CRA, that will be a more common situation in the future. Thoughts?


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## George Wallace (17 Jun 2010)

TimBit said:
			
		

> ........... In fact, I think that with increasing education levels, people travelling before university and the increase of the CRA, that will be a more common situation in the future. Thoughts?



This is nothing new.  Many have been doing this, ever since the first universities were built.   ;D


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## TimBit (17 Jun 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is nothing new.  Many have been doing this, ever since the first universities were built.   ;D



He he... I remember an advert at my Uni inciting people to use their school loans to travel. Hmmm... interesting idea...


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## vonGarvin (17 Jun 2010)

TimBit said:
			
		

> Could it be that said Captain had joined a bit later? I can see that an increasing number of folks are joining mid to late 20's rather than at 20 (that's my case in fact) and therefore do not enter the EPZ to Major before 35. In fact, I think that with increasing education levels, people travelling before university and the increase of the CRA, that will be a more common situation in the future. Thoughts?


Probably.  Or said captain is a UTPNCM or CFR.  Whatever.  
I say that in the name of efficiency, we form EFFICIENCYCOMMAND, with about 500 staff officers (and hangers-on) to come up with options...


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## Journeyman (17 Jun 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> > One student coming on 37 is still a Capt!
> 
> 
> STOP THE PRESSES!  A Capt is *shudder* 37?  I had no idea that the promoted them to captain SO YOUNG!


He's referring to JCSP _course number_ 37, not anyones' age. 

I believe the point is that one student on the course is not yet promoted to major.


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## vonGarvin (17 Jun 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I believe the point is that one student on the course is not yet promoted to major.


There: more proof why I shouldn't ever be on that course: attention to detail and all that ;D


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## Staff Weenie (17 Jun 2010)

I think instead of EFFICIENCYCOMMAND, we should call it EFFCOM, and those that have been posted there, and can talk the talk, are said to be full of EFFLUENT! I've met many people in the CF who are indeed full of EFFLUENT, and could be posted there ASAP!

Yep, I can see it now, we post all the EFFLUENT folk to EFFCOM, which shall have its HQ on a small island in the arctic, and then we conveniently forget about them. Problem solved!


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## Journeyman (17 Jun 2010)

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> ......we post all the EFFLUENT folk to EFFCOM, which shall have its HQ on a small island in the arctic, and then we conveniently forget about them.


Maybe not _all_ of them. 
It turns out that the Golgafrinchan telephone sanitizers  were actually useful, just unappreciated. 

Who knows, maybe staff officers are similar ;D


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## Oldgateboatdriver (17 Jun 2010)

Infanteer:

You are correct on the general line officer's training. I do not know how the Germans do it but in the French army, all Lt's that wish to enter the "general staff" stream must attend national exam sessions held from time to time. If selected, and I gather only about 10% of applicants are, they are then taken out of the regular/general stream and sent to do a master in military studies at one of the universities. If they pass their masters degree, they become captains and are then given a shortened command tour of a Company then sent to the national headquarters (État-major des armées) where they "apprentice" staff work and are required to do their research papers and publication. Then promotion to commandant (major), back to a unit for a tour as 2I/C of a battalion followed by a return to headquarter as Junior staff officer or attendance at one of the French government excellent public service schools for a doctorate. And so forth.

I gather this is not a "written" stream, but a known one in the service. I hold this from a friend of mine who was Staff Officer Mine Warfare for the French Atlantic commander at Brest when he retired 7/8 yrs ago (that long already? I have to get my butt back over there to visit).


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## TimBit (17 Jun 2010)

Olga:

Pardon my ignorance but isn't that what the training list system seeks to achieve, i.e. identify leaders with superior potential to lead their trade/branch/element and give them the right postings in the right order?


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## Oldgateboatdriver (17 Jun 2010)

I am not sure. First of all, their system requires the officer to elect to be tested to join the group that  become members of the "General Staff", which is a group within the officer corps, where a masters degree is a minimum. Second of all, they still identify and push through command people with superior leadership skills regardless of their being GS or not. In fact I gather they prefer to have a strong leader in command, even all the way up to commanding an army in the field, seconded by a  GS officer as his chief of staff: Strong leadership and tactical knowledge in command supported by highly intelligent and educated staffer.

I do not know how that compares with our Training List system, it is just so different.


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