# No More Easy Wars



## daftandbarmy (25 Nov 2013)

No More Easy Wars

America is resurrecting the same strategy that failed in Iraq -- and ground troops will pay the price.

Why is the myth of easy war so appealing to American strategists? 

Over the last decade, the United States spent more than a trillion dollars and the lives of thousands of American troops unlearning the tenets of network-centric warfare, the 1990s-vintage belief that precision strikes by coordinated, high-tech forces would allow the country to obliterate critical nodes in enemy defenses. Hostile forces would collapse under such punishment, and opponents would rapidly bow to American desires, making the capability to execute protracted ground wars unnecessary -- or so the theory went. 

By 2003, as the United States prepared to invade Iraq, a military-intellectual bubble had built up around these ideas, manifested in the doctrine of Shock and Awe. And for a few short weeks that spring, as U.S. forces launched their first salvos against Saddam Hussein and rolled toward Baghdad, this plan seemed to work -- until it failed catastrophically. No one had planned what to do after U.S. forces threw that first spectacular punch and our enemies decided not to surrender. For the next eight years, the story of Iraq became a story of a U.S. strategic establishment overcoming its own denial, wrestling with the natural consequences of "easy war." Ultimately, it learned that war is not about target lists and networks. It remains an unpredictable, dynamic human endeavor. 

Now, suddenly, those pivotal lessons have vanished like smoke. Even though their ideas miscarried, no one has asked the Shock and Awe acolytes to explain themselves. No one has asked why their ideas failed to defeat the opposition in Iraq. While those who claimed that Iraq would be a "cakewalk" took a thrashing, no one has asked how to win the clash of wills from a distance when bombing fails. The easy-war theorists have been spared hard questioning -- in fact, they are once again being embraced.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/20/no_more_easy_wars_army_strategy?page=0,0


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## Edward Campbell (25 Nov 2013)

Good catch ... it's a useful reminder.

Here are two more extracts: the first asks who is doing this, and why? The the second addresses the all important "so what?" question.

*Q:* _Who is doing this, and why?_
*A:* "A coalition of parochial retirees, think tanks, and special interests are using the current political winds to engineer a flawed defense strategy. Their plan virtually ensures the United States will be unprepared for the next war for three reasons. First, they once again are making indefensible assumptions about the future use of ground forces. Second, they are advancing a techno-war solution for all U.S. security needs that cannot even meet today's challenges. Finally, they are building their strategy on tools that are becoming obsolete."

*Q:* _So what?_
*A:* "What we should not do is delude ourselves. Strike-based theories are attractive because they offer deceptively easy solutions. They assume away intractable problems and focus on challenges for which we can engineer clean solutions. They make us feel good. They prey on our desire for the cheap miracle cure. Unfortunately, they are really only good for starting wars, not winning or deterring them. If the bankrupt Shock and Awe theory is dressed up as strategy again, someone will call our bluff. Having assumed away hard choices, U.S. leaders will find themselves stuck with two bad choices: accept an intolerable situation or engage in a struggle for which we are unprepared. That is exactly what happened in Iraq. And if we continue to adhere to the same fallacies, we can be sure it will happen again. There are no easy wars."

See, also, Thucydides' comments, in another thread about how China is already moving to counter _Air-Sea Battle_. Now, it is well known that I do not think China is or should be made into a military enemy. China is not our friend, that's for sure, but she is not an enemy either. A faction in Washington ~ "a coalition of parochial retirees, think tanks, and special interests" ~ wants needs a near peer enemy to justify new naval and air weapon systems but that's a way of backing into a strategy, probably a strategy of failure, not making a strategy for success.


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## daftandbarmy (25 Nov 2013)

Yet one more example why these kinds of wars aren't 'easy':

Afghanistan 'plans to reintroduce public stoning as punishment for adultery'

Human Rights Watch calls on international donors to withhold funds if government presses ahead with controversial new law to bring back stoning

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10472518/Afghanistan-plans-to-reintroduce-public-stoning-as-punishment-for-adultery.html


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## tomahawk6 (27 Nov 2013)

I thought about posting earlier and was a bit rushed for time.I served on the Joint Staff from 2001 until my retirement in early 2006 in J5 Strategic Plans and Policy and J3 Operations.I am familiar with the pre-operational planning for both OEF and OIF.Shock and Awe was first visited upon the Iraqi's at the start of Desert Storm.Its how America fights plain and simple.Take out the command and control of a nation's armed forces and it makes it easier for the ground operation.Its a tactic that is right out of our doctrine of war fighting.Every operation has its own challenges that dictate the war plan or OPLAN.

Our challenge in confronting Chinese encroachment is how to do it without actually having to fight.Today two B-52's overflew the Senkakus which are located within China's expanded air defense zone.That certainly sends the message.Reinforcing the 7th Fleet is another approach.Ultimately diplomacy should have a chance to work.Armed conflict between the US and China on the high seas would be catastrophic for the PLAN and not without cost to the US.The Chinese have a strategy to obtain control over as many minerals/oil and gas as they can.Its a good strategy if you have the military capacity to defend those resources.China is a paper tiger beyond their shoreline.As I have stated previously they are a potent land power,but are not a naval or airpower.They have nukes but nothing like the US or Russia.


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## Bert (27 Nov 2013)

Quote from article "What we should not do is delude ourselves. Strike-based theories are attractive because they offer deceptively easy solutions".  

I read the article and felt the author's discussion of tactics, stradegy, political follow through, and intended/unintended consequences were somewhat mixed up.  I thought shock and awe worked quite well in Irag with the leader in a hole and the military and government apparatus mostly destroyed.  Is what came later another issue?


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## Edward Campbell (27 Nov 2013)

Bert said:
			
		

> Quote from article "What we should not do is delude ourselves. Strike-based theories are attractive because they offer deceptively easy solutions".
> 
> I read the article and felt the author's discussion of tactics, stradegy, political follow through, and intended/unintended consequences were somewhat mixed up.  I thought shock and awe worked quite well in Irag with the leader in a hole and the military and government apparatus mostly destroyed.  Is what came later another issue?




I think the author's point, reinforced by tomahawk6, is that _Shock and Awe_ is a _tactical_ artifact, not a _strategy_. I agree that the _Shock and Awe_ tactic → Saddam-in-a-hole and Iraq in ruins, worked. What I'm less sure of is: what was the _strategic_ aim? Did America have a coherent, achievable _strategic_ aim? Did the Pentagon understand it when it made its _tactical_ plan?

Consider Vietnam ... the American _strategy_ in force in the late 1950s (Eisenhower) was, still, _containment_; it was a global strategy and it involved preventing the (further) spread of the USSR's power and influence in Asia. But, in the early 1960s, (Kennedy) and later (Johnson) the size and scope of involvement of the US _advisory_ mission changed and then became a full blown ground combat operation. The initial _strategic_ objective ~ making South Vietnam a tougher nut to crack ~ was replaced by a stronger one: preventing reunification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh's  communist regime. One might argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that _containment_ might have been better served by making Ho Chi Minh into a friend because it was the USSR, not communism, that needed to be contained. All that to say that the Pentagon, and administrations, is/are, most often, good at tactics but only fair to poor at grand strategy.


Edit: grammar  :-[


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## GR66 (27 Nov 2013)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Armed conflict between the US and China on the high seas would be catastrophic for the PLAN and not without cost to the US.The Chinese have a strategy to obtain control over as many minerals/oil and gas as they can.Its a good strategy if you have the military capacity to defend those resources.China is a paper tiger beyond their shoreline.As I have stated previously they are a potent land power,but are not a naval or airpower.They have nukes but nothing like the US or Russia.



I'd argue that it would more likely be catastrophic for the US as well.  I realize that you're talking about the military results of a high-seas confrontation but I seriously question the wisdom of shooting your banker in the absence of a existential threat to your nation.  

China is currently a competitor for resources and markets around the world.  A ferocious competitor to be sure, but it is not acting outside international law in its activities.  It is not seizing resources or territory by force...it's just out buying the competition.  If the US resorts to force to prevent that, or if they use force against China to thwart their territorial interests in their own, traditional sphere of influence (read as China's Monroe Doctrine) they will turn China from a competitor into an enemy.  The US can never hope to defeat China on the ground and how can they hope to outspend them in the long run when China is the very country that is keeping their economy afloat?


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## daftandbarmy (27 Nov 2013)

GR66 said:
			
		

> I'd argue that it would more likely be catastrophic for the US as well.  I realize that you're talking about the military results of a high-seas confrontation but I seriously question the wisdom of shooting your banker in the absence of a existential threat to your nation.
> 
> China is currently a competitor for resources and markets around the world.  A ferocious competitor to be sure, but it is not acting outside international law in its activities.  It is not seizing resources or territory by force...it's just out buying the competition.  If the US resorts to force to prevent that, or if they use force against China to thwart their territorial interests in their own, traditional sphere of influence (read as China's Monroe Doctrine) they will turn China from a competitor into an enemy.  The US can never hope to defeat China on the ground and how can they hope to outspend them in the long run when China is the very country that is keeping their economy afloat?



Yeah, good old peace monger China  :

Chinese Army's Industrial Espionage Continued Even after Exposure 

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/520221/20131107/chinese-army-industrial-espionage-pla-cyber-attack.htm


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## tomahawk6 (27 Nov 2013)

At the end of the day its the politicians that have to sign off on the strategy and procure the money to implement the strategy.Where the original strategic aim was to contain communism,it is now the aim to contain islamist goals of world domination.This strategy will be much more difficult because the threat we face at this point is asymmetrical.That is until Iran gets nuclear weapons,then its an all new ball game.

Air-Sea Battle is the current strategy behind the US pivot to the Pacific.

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf


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## Lightguns (27 Nov 2013)

GR66 said:
			
		

> I'd argue that it would more likely be catastrophic for the US as well.  I realize that you're talking about the military results of a high-seas confrontation but I seriously question the wisdom of shooting your banker in the absence of a existential threat to your nation.



Really, the debt is all virtual.  Iraq held some US debt, defeating them wiped it out.  Think about it, if you defeat or regime change your debt holder, what happens to the debt now that you have sway over it?  You could even freeze Chinese assets in the US.  Boith sides would hurt.  A banker should not shoot his customers anymore than a client should shoot his banker.  Neither side seems to get that, silly little children.


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## tomahawk6 (27 Nov 2013)

Lightguns said:
			
		

> Really, the debt is all virtual.  Iraq held some US debt, defeating them wiped it out.  Think about it, if you defeat or regime change your debt holder, what happens to the debt now that you have sway over it?  You could even freeze Chinese assets in the US.  Boith sides would hurt.  A banker should not shoot his customers anymore than a client should shoot his banker.  Neither side seems to get that, silly little children.



Quite true.In the 80's our top debt holder was Japan and now its China.Ebb and flow.


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## pbi (2 Dec 2013)

I doubt China's currently limited joint force projection capabilities will remain so "limited" for long.  For this reason, the US should pursue a firm and fair approach with China, but not one designed to aggravate or marginalize China (and thereby accelerate its drive to increase its military capabilities).  I am not at all convinced that the effects of a war between the US and China are fully "manageable", nor even predictable. Diplomacy is by far the better approach, particularly as China shares in the desire to limit Islamism as a geopolitical force.

One could argue that China has the same degree of legitimacy in its claim to be a regional power as the US does to exercise "Manifest Destiny"  (or its 21st century equivalent) in the Western Hemisphere: this needs to be understood. I see no immediate reason for this to translate into an automatic hostility: as ERC points out, it is never good to see the US make an enemy of a country that, with a bit more skill and patience, it might have "turned" successfully. Cuba comes to mind.

As a US General who spoke at Army Staff College here a while back said: "Why go picking a fight with China?"


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## a_majoor (2 Dec 2013)

Perhaps the biggest issue with the Americans is they are so focused on the "Tactical" level of war that they seem to forget the strategic implications (i.e. what do you want the end state to be?).

I am now recalling that Gen Tommy Franks, in his book "Into the Storm", was amazed the Army commander did not actually define the end state for his Corps. The Corps planning staff eventually settled on "To the Blue" (or words to that effect), with the Corps plan being to do the left flanking through the desert and eventually hook around the Iraqi Army and end at the Persian Gulf, sealing the remaining Iraqis in Kuwait and preventing the arrival of reinforcements from Iraq.

The premature end of the war kept the Corps from reaching the end state, and the end devolved into essentially a farce, as the Iraqi's were defeated in the field, but no effective change to their government, policies or behaviours was achieved. (The fact that both the Bush Administration and the Senate Intelligence committee, as well as many other western Intelligence agencies, were convinced that the Saddam Regime was still attempting to develop WMD, and the continuing defiance of the Iraqi regime to UN resolutions, sanctions and the conditions that were put in place after the war is a reflection of this lack of change). 

So "Shock and Awe", "Air-Sea Battle" and other constructs reflect the American desire to decapitate the enemy with an overwhelming strike and reduce or eliminate their ability to fight back. The compression of modalities, time and space allows the concentration of a very great amount of force in a limited time, and limits the overall deployment of resources (getting a decision with a single shock battle rather than a prolonged conventional war).

Counter constructs like 4GW or Unrestricted Warfare seek to decentralize command and control nodes, and expand the modalities, temporal and spatial dimensions of war so a single overwhelming strike is neither possible or practical. If there is to be a future strategy for warfare, it may have to be crafted to resemble a biological system such as the immune system, which circulates constantly in the "body" being defended, and is cued to seek out and attack "foreign" particles (fighters, ideas, financial transactions, trade manipulations etc.) that are hostile to the "body" and could damage or destroy it. A military force designed to operate as part of an "immune system" will be far different than anything that exists today.


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## pbi (3 Dec 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Perhaps the biggest issue with the Americans is they are so focused on the "Tactical" level of war that they seem to forget the strategic implications (i.e. what do you want the end state to be?)..



When I was a student at Quantico, one of the lectures was "The American Way of War", which described an approach to armed conflict much as you have related.

Unfortunately, it has only little or nothing to do with the way the US has actually fought most of the wars it has ever been in. Nevertheless, ever since the days of Billy Mitchell there have been folks selling the idea that there is a shiny technological solution to the problem of drawn-out, messy, confusing, indecisive and in the end, politically unsaleable warfare.

Sadly, the enemy that doesn't present itself neatly to get whacked by "AirLand Battle", or "AirSea Battle", or "Total Information Dominance", or "Shock and Awe", but instead just sidesteps it and goes for the elephant's belly, will probably do pretty well. And that fact is institutionally threatening to alot of people with big budgets.


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## a_majoor (4 Dec 2013)

On a somewhat larger scale, thsi is also VDH's argument about the "Western Way of War", which seeks a decision based on a decisive "shock battle". Western armies since Classical times certainly reflect that, being generally built around heavy Infantry and Cavalry, while most of the opposition outside of the *west* is fast moving light infantry or cavalry, who usually don't wait around for the decisive engagement.

As old time Imperialists knew, the only way to achieve victory there was to occupy the land and starve them out (while building your own civilization in place), or co-opt them into joining your Imperial Auxilliaries to chase down the other tribes on the borderlands, or both.


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## dapaterson (4 Dec 2013)

Interesting discussion; reminds me of a paper I wrote about a year ago on "the comprehensive approach". This is a hadnful of snippets from that paper.


Military doctrine unfortunately has a tactical focus - defeat / destroy the enemy on the battlefield, with little consideration of what occurs once "peace" is established.  I think what's needed is more four-year olds running the show - since, whenever you tell them a story, they ask "And then what happens?"

Like it or not, a victorious military will, post victory, be pushed into nation-building.  And while military theorists panic and say "No!  Never!  Not a role for the military!" (Yes, Dorn & Varney, I'm looking at you) in the real world soldiers are given the task, and then flail around in the absence of established doctrine.

Doctrinal tomes expound on theories for destroying the enemy on the physical and moral planes. Today's modern military theories are rife with three letter acronyms to describe new constructs – NCW! EBO! RDO! SOD! – which remain focused on destruction of the enemy (or, at the very least, their will or ability to fight). Introducing the additional complexity of post‑conflict concerns such as economic development, security sector reform and local governance would serve to move away from that traditional mindset. Improving the economic life of marginalized communities may well be appropriate work for a Jesuit, but is hardly seen as appropriate work for a soldier.

Dobbins et al observed on this, writing 


> Nation-building has been a controversial mission over the past decade, and the intensity of this debate has undoubtedly inhibited the investments that would be needed to do these tasks better. Institutional resistance in departments of State and Defense, neither of which regard nation-building among their core missions, has also been an obstacle. As a result, successive administrations have treated each new mission as if it were the first and, more importantly, as if it were the last.


 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html, page xxvii)

Dorn and Varey have complained that the three block war concept, which attempts to provide a simple framework for consideration of a complex battlespace with multiple types of simultaneous missions, risks confusion between mandates for combat, peacekeeping and reconstruction. They posit (with their emphasis)


> Personnel _cannot_ and _should not_ be expected to serve as humanitarian workers, peacekeepers, and warfighters all at the same time, and within a small area. Combat should be separated as much as possible from other functions, which should, preferably, be done by distinct organizations, including UN agencies, police, and peacekeepers.


 (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/07-dornvarey-eng.asp)

While their writings and theories are fine from the perspective of a professor's chair in Toronto or Kingston, they do not necessarily translate into the reality on the ground. Indeed, they acknowledge in their writing that such actions have occurred and do occur.  Simplistic attempts at providing new stone tablets engraved with additional “Thou Shalt Nots” merely result in Talmudic debates between military theorists of little to no institutional value.  Critiquing a model for daring to highlight the reality of friction caused by conflicting mandates does not contribute to useful analysis or discussion.


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## daftandbarmy (4 Dec 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> On a somewhat larger scale, thsi is also VDH's argument about the "Western Way of War", which seeks a decision based on a decisive "shock battle". Western armies since Classical times certainly reflect that, being generally built around heavy Infantry and Cavalry, while most of the opposition outside of the *west* is fast moving light infantry or cavalry, who usually don't wait around for the decisive engagement.
> 
> As old time Imperialists knew, the only way to achieve victory there was to occupy the land and starve them out (while building your own civilization in place), or co-opt them into joining your Imperial Auxilliaries to chase down the other tribes on the borderlands, or both.



Victor Davis Hanson: outstanding book, along with 'Carnage and Culture'.

As much as VDH resonates with me, his objectivity has been tainted - for me anyways - with his connections to the US Republican movement. 

Political views[edit]

Hanson is a registered member of the Democratic Party but a conservative who voted for George W. Bush in the 2000 and 2004 elections.[7] He has been described as a neoconservative by some commentators,[8][9] and has stated that: "I came to support neocon approaches first in the wars against the Taliban and Saddam, largely because I saw little alternative."[10] Feeling that the current Democratic Party does not have a morally responsible approach to US foreign policy and no longer addresses the concerns of ordinary Americans, Hanson writes: "The Democratic Party reminds me of the Republicans circa 1965 or so – impotent, shrill, no ideas, conspiratorial, reactive, out-of-touch with most Americans, isolationist, and full of embarrassing spokesmen."[11]

Hanson was a strong defender of George W. Bush and his policies,[12] especially the Iraq war.[13] He was also a vocal supporter of Bush's Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Hanson wrote of Rumsfeld that he was: "a rare sort of secretary of the caliber of George Marshall" and a "proud and honest-speaking visionary" whose "hard work and insight are bringing us ever closer to victory".[14]

On the issues pertaining to the constant political turmoil in the Middle East, Hanson emphasises the lack of individual and political freedom in many Middle Eastern nations as a major factor retarding economic, technological and cultural progress. He further relates the root cause of radical Islamic terrorism to insecurities and a need to regain honour and reputation.[15]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Davis_Hanson


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## tomahawk6 (4 Dec 2013)

I have been a long time reader of VDH and he is I believe a pretty fair observer of military affairs.As with any writer you take what you will from their work.


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## pbi (9 Dec 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ...As old time Imperialists knew, the only way to achieve victory there was to occupy the land and starve them out (while building your own civilization in place), or co-opt them into joining your Imperial Auxilliaries to chase down the other tribes on the borderlands, or both.



At the risk of speaking heresy, I think that a conventional army, on its own, will never defeat any significant insurgency, no matter which weapons it deploys. Please do NOT bring up Malaysia: it was such a special case for many reasons, and those conditions may never repeat themselves again. I would even go so far as to say that the British Army only contributed to the final political outcome in Northern Ireland: it did not decide it.

You could argue that a conventional army freed of "wimpy" things like ROE/LOAC can do it, but I don't think that there is much evidence of that, either. Look at the Germans in Yugoslavia: probably one of the most brutal COIN operations ever waged anywhere-the Germans and the Croats were free to do pretty much whatever they wanted, but they absolutely did not defeat the Partisans. Even the Israelis, who have gone in pretty hard during their ops in Lebanon or the West Bank, (and arguably may have "crossed the line" from time to time with things such as Shatilah Camp)can't really claim to have destroyed either Hezbollah or Al Fatah.

"Occupying and starving out" IMHO only works when the insurgents are tied to a certain place (as the Boers in SA were tied to their farms and families), or have no contiguous cross border refuge to go to. "Co-opting" is probably better (look at the Zulus in South Afria, for example), and the British did fairly well at this. The problem comes when nobody is willing to be "bought", or being "bought" becomes extremely dangerous for homes and families (the fate of the Algerian "_harkis_" comes to mind...)


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## a_majoor (9 Dec 2013)

While it is true no conventional armies have "won" an insurgency, I was thinking of the approaches that have been used by Imperial powers from the time of Alexander III, and most effectively by the Romans and the British during their rise to Imperial power. It was used by the US to win the "Indian Wars" and it can be argued the Chinese are also using this approach in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Perhaps "coopting" is a better term, but the traditional leadership, power brokers and economic relationships are broken and isolated if they don't cooperate with the Imperial power.


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## pbi (9 Dec 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While it is true no conventional armies have "won" an insurgency, I was thinking of the approaches that have been used by Imperial powers from the time of Alexander III, and most effectively by the Romans and the British during their rise to Imperial power. It was used by the US to win the "Indian Wars" and it can be argued the Chinese are also using this approach in Tibet and Xinjiang...



The Romans were very effective south of Hadrian's Wall. North of that, I don't think even they would have claimed to have had real control. The British generally did well in India (but, I think, lots of "co-opting" going on there...), but then never pretended to really control the Northwest Tribal Areas, which was probably much more like a real "insurgency" than what they encountered in most of India.

The Indian Wars may be a good example. But then again maybe they worked out because the Indians largely had no place to go (even had they been inclined to leave their tribal areas). IIRCC, the ones that fled north into Canada were made to understand by the NWMP that Canada was not a base for operations against the US.


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## Old Sweat (9 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> The Indian Wars may be a good example. But then again maybe they worked out because the Indians largely had no place to go (even had they been inclined to leave their tribal areas). IIRCC, the ones that fled north into Canada were made to understand by the NWMP that Canada was not a base for operations against the US.



There is a very intriguing and informative book about the Comanches called _Empire of the Summer Moon_ by SC Gwynne. The tribe - and that is not a good description because they were loosely organized at best - dominated the southern plans for more than two centuries once they mastered the horse. The Comanches drove the Spanish back into Mexico/New Mexico and in the mid-nineteenth century pushed the line of American westward expansion back east for 100-200 miles. The last unconquered remnants were finally forced onto reservations in what is now Oklahoma by the disappearance of the Buffalo herds and by the US Army, which finally had adapted to the conditions, chasing them down. It is a fascinating read that knowingly or not addresses the issues of little wars.


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## daftandbarmy (9 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> I would even go so far as to say that the British Army only contributed to the final political outcome in Northern Ireland: it did not decide it.



Bang on. And that's likely the model of the future: a blended military/political approach. 

This collaborative approach is, of course, the most difficult thing for the Generals, equivalent Terrorist commanders and Politicians to swallow, which is largely why NI took 30 years, 3000 dead (approx. times 5 wounded) to sort out. Even Malaya/Borneo ran from '48 to the mid-60s.

And it's not over yet, of course, in NI/Sri Lanka/Iraq/Afghanistan etc etc, which is the other awful truth about these things that national leaders of all stripes dislike intensely.


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## pbi (12 Dec 2013)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Bang on. And that's likely the model of the future: a blended military/political approach.
> 
> This collaborative approach is, of course, the most difficult thing for the Generals, equivalent Terrorist commanders and Politicians to swallow, which is largely why NI took 30 years, 3000 dead (approx. times 5 wounded) to sort out. Even Malaya/Borneo ran from '48 to the mid-60s.
> 
> And it's not over yet, of course, in NI/Sri Lanka/Iraq/Afghanistan etc etc, which is the other awful truth about these things that national leaders of all stripes dislike intensely.



We could argue that it's not just "the model of the future": it's the current practice. Or, at least, it's stated to be the current practice.  From my vantage point in the command/staff training world (both in uniform and out) over the last five years, I'd have to say that the extent to which the Comprehensive Approach is really accepted by people varies an awful lot. It's entrenched in our doctrine manuals, but you know what those get used for..... >

By "people" I mean both military and OGDA. For some commanders and their staffs, it was a no-brainer that they embraced and got on with, breaking down some important mil/OGDA barriers along the way. For others, it was really just an irritant that got in the way of more important stuff (an attitude more prevalent amongst staffs than amongst their commanders). "Influence Activities" too often got treated as an after-the-fact "bandaid", or check-in-the box. (And, for the record, I'm not an IA Koolaid-drinker: it's just another good and useful tool in the box, but you have to use it properly to get any value out of it...)

On the OGDA side, my take was that the ground-level and junior folks for the most part got it and were willing to give inter-agency cooperation a good go. At least, the majority of the ones involved in the training events I have worked on, certainly were. The people at the top of these OGDAs also knew it was the political flavour of the month and went with it. It was (IMHO) the twenty-year folks in the middle who were suspicious and obstructive.

As you point out, the Comprehensive Approach doesn't tend to produce classic, smashing victories and massive upheavals over night, or in days and weeks. Changing the minds of a population, or of a committed movement, takes time. It is also conditions-based success, rather than timeline-based success. Thus it becomes very difficult for the Govt of the day to answer the inevitable Opposition cry of "_And how much longer will our soldiers be in "X" land?_"


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## Edward Campbell (12 Dec 2013)

At the level of _grand strategy_, which doesn't happen very often, it was the Roosevelt method. President Roosevelt set the _grand strategic_ aims for the war and the subsequent peace. Stimson and Marshall (and Knox and Forrestal and King, too) were primarily responsible for winning the war, the military strategy, while people like Cordell Hull and Henry Morgenthau Jr were responsible for "winning the peace" on the broad terms that Roosevelt had described. Roosevelt rarely interfered in the details of the military strategy (he was very, very different from Churchill) but he did take a detailed role in the _grand strategy_, until illness made it too difficult. He refereed the (early 1942) Stimson-Marshall vs Knox-King dust up which resulted in the _Europe First_ decision, and he was intimately involved in the decision to _partition_ Europe between Stalin and the (less than unified) West. He also sided with Marshall, overruling Morgenthau, in deciding, very, very late in his life, that _de-nazification_ would have to take second place to rebuilding Europe. But, broadly, he saw the war as a _continuum_: mobilizing (military and industrial) > fighting > victory > peace > reconstruction. He assembled and led a civil-military _team_ that did them all.


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