# Death Traps; The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two



## 3rd Herd

Book Review​
Belton Y. Cooper's book "Death Traps; The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two has been re-released and is an interesting look at the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate suffered by the US 3rd Armored Division. Mr Cooper served as a member of the maintenance battalion of the aforementioned division whose duties included the responsibility of compiling the combat loss reports and the movements of reinforcements back to the forward positions. I found his book to be interesting for several reasons, the first being the unheard of casualty rates. Secondly, he provides information on an aspect of warfare rarely touched upon, what happens to the destroyed/damaged vehicles. Additonally, Cooper fully explains the advantages and disadvantages of American armor verses those of Germany and the internal politics that formed the American armored doctrine. The American super tank is covered by both photographs and written explanations including the one and only combat incident. The book closes with the discovery of German test sites and the reestablishment of German industry. Yet again proof that the strategic bombing campaign was not as successful as many claim it was. There are also two excellent appendices, the first reiterating the Sherman verses Panzer arguments and the second concerning the 'up protecting' and 'up gunning' of the Sherman tank. The third appendices covers the field deployment of an American armored division. The down side to the book is that Cooper tends to repeat his arguments through out the book and has followed the literary format of noted author Stephan Ambrose who I do not particularly enjoy. That aside his book is still a interesting read on the shaft behind the sharp point in world war two armored combat.


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## Old Sweat

I assume the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate is for tanks (and perhaps other vehicles) as the author served in the maintenance battalion.


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## 3rd Herd

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I assume the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate is for tanks (and perhaps other vehicles) as the author served in the maintenance battalion.



Yes you are correct the casualty rate is for tanks only. The  M2, M4, M26 and T2 recovery tanks.


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## 3rd Herd

A Canadian/Commonwealth loss comparison from South Albertas, Graves, Donald, Robin Brass Studio, Toronto,1998.

"Between 8 February and 10 March, the seven armoured brigades (four British, two Canadian,and one Polish) which fought in the Rhineland lost a total of 385 tanks. The heaviest losses incurred by a single brigade were those of the 4th Canadian Division, which lost 98 tanks between 25 February and 10 March". As for the South Albertas, "during the same period the Regiment lost 61 tanks, a casualty rate that was about one hundred percent of its tank strength..."

Additionally,"the South Albertas received 204 AFVs of all types between 1 August 1944 and 4 May 1945-a replacement rate of 283% of its war establishment or authorized strength."(p.326)

As with Cooper, Graves highlites the issue of exactly how many tanks were lost given the return to battle of AFVs repaired and returned to service. In one circumstance a particular tank commander had three tanks shot out from under him in a single day.


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## geo

Uhhh... call me simple but: how can you have a 580% casualty rate?

If all of your resources are = 100% then I truly do not see how you can lose more assets than what you have in the 1st place.


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## Centurian1985

If the unit was supposed to have (i.e.) 100 tanks as part of their TOE, then that means they lost a total of 580 tanks?


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## geo

Aaaahhhh

I see said the blind man 8)


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## Centurian1985

Whether its good or bad would depend on how long it took to accomplish that and the scale of losses... I guess over a couple of years of heavy fighting, 580% might not be bad for a small unit, but pretty costly for larger units.  How many tanks were in a US armored div at that time?


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## geo

Heh

While the Allies were fighting with Shermans and the Germans were fighting with Pz IIIs IVs and Tigers - their little guns just couldn't engage the germans at long range (like the germans could).  You'd end up with complete troops being knocked out before they could start fighting back.

I can easily believe 580% losses

However, with the US / Canada / UK industrial complex behind the war effort, new tanks could be pushed forward in record time.


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## The Rifleman

wasn't one Sherman per troop a Firefly with the British 17 pounder gun? More than a match for the Mk4, Panther & Tiger. Also, don't forget the Germans were usually hull down or in prepared positions where they sprung ambushes so it wouldn't have mattered too much if both sides had identical tanks.

Did Canadian armoured units operate any other tanks in NW Europe? Churchill? Comet? Cromwell?


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## geo

Firefly was a "staple" in UK & Cdn formations a short while after D Day 
but the 17 pounder was a Brit gun design and the US had a problem in instaling em in their Shermans.

Canada used, for the most part, Shermans, Churchills, Ram I & II, the Grizzly (Sherman variant) AND the Skink (sherman with quad 20mm Hispano Suiza).


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## Staff Weenie

The allies were able to sustain loss/damage/replacement that high due to a greater industrial complex and higher overall manpower base. As well, as the allies were on the advance (for the most part) they could recover and repair or cannibalize damaged tanks - whereas any vehicle lost to the Germans in the retreats of 1944 was most likely gone forever. The allies, most particularly the Americans though, had a far greater logistical capability than the Germans (actually a key failing of the Wehrmacht). For all their mechanization, the Germans just never built a robust logistical tail.

As for the advantages and disadvantages of the Firefly - it really wasn't the great panacea for all. The 17 pdr cannon gave it greater range and penetration, and the ability to take on the larger/heavier German tanks, but there were drawbacks. The Firefly's had a slower rate of fire, and the tank chassis itself still suffered from the same problems - high profile, vertical sides, thin armour, petrol engine. The canon itself also had to be laid on its side to be adapted into the turret. Though I've not the expertise to be definitive, I would also suspect that the German optical sights were qualitatively better than the Sherman's (I've heard it mentioned before - but no hard comparative facts). Sure - the Firefly could now engage out past 1000m on a good day - but could it hit anything reliably?

Furthermore, the battles in Normandy, in the bocage and the breakout from the bocage, saw the Germans using their armour for ambush and flanking, not great frontal assaults, or massed force on force tank battle. In this regard, the Germans would lie in wait, eliminate the Firefly per troop first (if possible), and then pick off the remaining tanks. The Germans also excelled at anti-armour ambushes with the 88mm gun (such as the PaK 43).

All in all, the Firefly helped to level the playing field somewhat, but there weren't sufficient quantities to make a huge difference, and the Firefly itself was never more than a short term stopgap measure.


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## The Rifleman

The Ram never saw combat (apart from OP vehicles).  It is interesting that the Dutch concreted them hull down used them as pill boxes during the cold war.


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## geo

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> The Ram never saw combat (apart from OP vehicles).  It is interesting that the Dutch concreted them hull down used them as pill boxes during the cold war.



A testament to the gun, if not the basic tank design


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## The Rifleman

or the fact that they got them for free!


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## geo

that too


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## Old Sweat

It may have been the free factor, as the Ram could only mount the 6-pounder due to the diameter of its turret ring.

As for the Firefly, according to Report No. 14 by 1 Canadian Field Research Section, 14 June 1945, the 17-pounder had accuracy problems and a hit on a target as large as a tank at ranges greater than 1000 yards.


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## The Rifleman

a Ram OP varient in Normandy - but with a wooden gun


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## Centurian1985

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> a Ram OP varient in Normandy - but with a wooden gun



What did it shoot? 25 mm Flaming arrows?


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## The Rifleman

no - if Jerry got too close he would get splinters!  :dontpanic:


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## Colin Parkinson

The 17pdr had some early problems with it’s discarding Sabot rounds, once they were solved the gun was deadly. The 6pdr with APDS was also slightly better at AT than the 75mm, but APDS was in short supply. Some of the British 75mm were actually bored out 6 pdrs. 
A lot of the Allied tank causalities were attributed to poor coordination between infantry, tanks and artillery, a lot of the causalities seem to take place shortly after Normandy, and was reduced when all arms training was given. Most of the Allied tank were lost to AT guns rather than other tanks. I have read accounts of Stuarts in small villages taking out Panthers by flanking them and getting them in the rear. Also read reports from Panther Commanders that showed they had a healthy respect for the 6dpr. If I remember correctly the side armour of the Panther was not terrible thick (I actually got to crawl around a panther under restoration, I will try to post some pictures later tonight) Plus they stored their ammo in the sponsons over the tracks. 

The Germans excelled at battlefield recovery and field repair of their armour. 

I wish the RAM had been ready for N. Africa


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## 3rd Herd

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> Furthermore, the battles in Normandy, in the bocage and the breakout from the bocage, saw the Germans using their armour for ambush and flanking, not great frontal assaults, or massed force on force tank battle. In this regard, the Germans would lie in wait, eliminate the Firefly per troop first (if possible), and then pick off the remaining tanks. The Germans also excelled at anti-armour ambushes with the 88mm gun (such as the PaK 43).



Primarly due to losses, equipment replacement and allied air coverage what you have stated is correct. However there are several instances of troop attacks by the Germans. In both books I have mentioned in this thread provide several excellent examples. Perhaps the best was Wittmans attack prior to his death(which is still contested, depending on which author you read and their sources-Canadian Firefly,British Sherman or a Typhoon). There was also in Graves book the mention of a Firefly ace(Panthers, Mark 4's and assult guns). Another recent work is A Fine Night For Tanks by Ken Touts which covers the Yeomanry experience in Operation Totalize. As for regiment strength's and equipment though Graves book is outstanding. He mentions and on after thought gives an excellent description of the role of the DR's and their causality rate exceeded those of the tank crews.


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## Old Sweat

There were a number of occasions when the Germans mounted attacks based on armour, although admittedly the majority were counterattacks in an attempt to restore the local situation. The major exception was the Mortain offensive of 7 August which was conceived by Hitler to cut off the American breakout and finally destroy the Allied armies in Normandy.

As for Wittmann, I am not confident that we will ever know for sure whether he was killed by A Squadron of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment or A Squadron of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry. (B Squadron of 144 Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps also took part in the engagement.) As I noted in the appendix of my book that discussed his death, it is likely that he fell to a Canadian tank, but I can not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. We can discount the Typhoon theory based on a study of the RAF records for 8 August. In October I had a fruitful discussion in the RCHA Association in Kingston with a British historian who had also written on Normandy. We agreed that we did not know, and we are probably as knowledgeable on the matter as anyone can be sixty years after the event.


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## geo

Colin P said:
			
		

> The Germans excelled at battlefield recovery and field repair of their armour.



While the Germans might have been aces at battlefield recovery & repairs of their armour,  their vehicles did not lent themselves all that well to quick teardowns & replacement of damaged parts.

Have seen recent documentaries that show the replacement of a Sherman's transmission VS doing the same on Pz IIIs & IVs.
Same can be said when road wheels got damaged.  To get at the inside set of road wheels, you had to dismantle a number of interlocking ones... not very practical


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## Colin Parkinson

They did however have the organization to recover battlefield wrecks quickly and bring them back into line faster. In fact this ability was one of the critical factors to maintaining their fighting ability.


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## 3rd Herd

Colin P said:
			
		

> They did however have the organization to recover battlefield wrecks quickly and bring them back into line faster. In fact this ability was one of the critical factors to maintaining their fighting ability.



Yes this was true in the glorious advances particularly in the early stages of the Desert and Eastern campaigns but you cannot recover and reequip what is well behind the front lines particularly after 1943. As for Normandy, as mentioned allied air cover simply prevented this as well as the establishment of the echelons required to complete the tasks. Although there were "Herculean" attempts to do this as illustrated in Steel Inferno  and They Are Coming


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## TangoTwoBravo

While the shortcomings in the tanks of the Western Allies are well known (the Sherman in particular), this should be balanced against the overall situation during the later years of the war.  Allied tanks were usually on the offensive against an enemy with a plethora of anti-tank weapons in some fairly tight terrain.  While good strategically and operationally, being on the offensive often places the advancing troops at a tactical disadvantage.  Allied losses should be seen in this light.

German tank attacks suffered significant losses during their own offensive operations.  While limited in scope in the big picture, attacks by Panthers of the 12 SS HJ Div during the beachhead battles resulted in fairly significant losses.  Five or six Panthers were lost in the attack on the Reginas at Bretteville, and these apparently were to PIATs and anti-tank guns.  A Panther attack against a Regina company in Norrey the next day resulted in seven destroyed Panthers, with the majority reportedly to a Sherman Firefly from the 1st Hussars.  Advancing tanks are especially vulnerable to attacks from the flank due to both thinner armour and a tendency to have tunnel vision forward (there are cases of entire platoons, companies and battalions getting shot up from a flank without ever seeing the enemy).  

Attacks against determined infantry are going to be costly affairs, although tight coordination between arms can help.  While the Germans are usually credited with having outstanding all-arms cooperation, there are some cases of this breaking down for them as well.

As an aside on the issue of tank "quality", the rather humble MkIVH was quite formidable when defending, due in no small part to its good gun.  As a tanker I'm a big fan of protection, but a good gun is a great start for a tank design.


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## The Rifleman

From Daily Mail, 26 June 2006:


_As a German war hero, he was in a deadly class of his own - having destroyed nearly 300 enemy tanks and guns.

So astonishing were Michael Wittman's exploits that Hitler went to his wedding and he was feted throughout the Third Reich by the Nazi propaganda machine.

So when the highly-decorated Waffen-SS tank ace met with his death in the Normandy countryside in August 1944, several Allied units claimed the distnction of having killed him.

But now, 62 years on, the man who really killed off the most successful tank commander of the Second World War has finally been revealed - Joe Ekins, a modest, retired shoe factory worker, now aged 82.

Astonishingly, as a 21-year-ols tank gunner, he had only ever fired five practice rounds before the encounter near St Aignan de Cramesnil on August 8, 1944.

But in 12 minutes of superb shooting, the young trooper knocked out three heavily-armoured German Tiger tanks - including one containing the 30-year-old Nazi - with shells from his Sherman Firefly.

Later that morning, he destroyed another German tank before his Firefly was hit and he and his crew had to run for safety.

After it was revealed that Wittman - who had destroyed 138 tanks, 132 anti-tank guns and other artillery pieces as well as hundreds of light vehicles - was dead, the kill was claimed by a number of Allied units, including Canadians, Poles and various airborne forces. But evidence now shows it was Mr Ekins' Firefly of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry that fired the fatal shot.

And tomorrow he will relive that brief but highly significant battle when he is shown the world's only remaining working Tiger at the Bovington Tank Museum, near Bournemouth.

Following the D-Day landings in Normandy in June1944, Joe Ekins and his comrades had been stuck in the bridgehead for six weeks as the British tried to batter their way through the German defensive lines.

'Eventually we went out on a night march in a column - about four miles into German territory,' he recalled. 'We settled in an orchard near St Aignan de Cramesnil and in the morning the Germans counter-attacked.

'I could see at least three Tigers coming and we had three Shermans and one Firefly.'

The Firefly was an upgraded version of the normal Sherman fitted with a powerful 76mm gun - the only one that could penetrate the thick armour of a Tiger.

'The squadron had two other Fireflies and I expected them to send one to help, but they decided not to and left me alone.

'We pulled out of the orchard and I fired twice at the third tank at the rear and it blew up. We reversed into the orchard so we could come out in a different place. But the second Tiger fired two or three rounds and hit our turret lid.

'The lid must have hit the commander's head and he jumped out, so our troop officer took over.

'We pulled out again and fired at the second Tiger and it exploded. We pulled back again and by this time, the third Tiger knew it had lost its two mates.

I finished it off with two shells and had taken out all three in 12 minutes. We later hit one more tank and then we were knocked out. There was a loud bang and sparks flew and we got out and ran like hell - the officer was hit by shrapnel. When we got back, we were made into new tank crews and I was made wireless operator. It seemed a bit odd making your best gunner a wireless-operator.

'But it proved lucky, because over the next eight months we were one of the few crews who got through the lot. I only found out eight years after the war that one of the people in the tank we hit was Wittman, but I'd never heard of him.

'He was very well known in Germany and there were lots of claims about who killed him, but it is well accepted now that we got him. He was an ace, but he wasn't too clever that morning.

'Usually it took five Shermans to beat one Tiger, but the Fireflies were better. When I heard about the concentration camps, I knew it was all worth it. I'm quite proud. Wittmann was a Nazi from the start - he must have known about the camps. It didn't matter who killed him, just that he was killed.'

After the war, Mr Ekins married his sweetheart Gwen and had two children. They now also have two grandcildren.

He went back to work in the shoe factories near his home in Rushden, Northamptonshire, and retired 34 years later after becoming a factory manager.

Tank museum curator David Willey said: 'A lot of myths built up after the war. Some started to believe that Tiger tanks were so powerful that our tanks could never have destroyed them.

'And so the destruction of the Tigers was attributed to the air force, naval bombardment - anything but our tanks.

'But it is pretty much accepted now that Joe Ekins was the man who knocked out three Tiger tanks in one morning, including that of Michael Wittmann.

'We want to restore the balance between all that is written about Wittmann and his heroics and that which is written about Joe, a humble cobbler.' _


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## Danjanou

Ah all that recent  reading on Normandy finally pays off.



> Canada used, for the most part, Shermans, Churchills, Ram I & II, the Grizzly (Sherman variant) AND the Skink (sherman with quad 20mm Hispano Suiza).



There were 18 “tank” regiments during the war in the four armoured brigades, one in each Armoured Division and two independent brigades. At various times prior during training they were equipped with Matildas, Lee/Grants, Churchills and Rams, although Churchills were used only once at Dieppe and then the 1st Armoured Brigade turned them in. Only 3 Skinks were built and only one saw action, briefly, in 1945 with the LdSH in Holland. 

The mainstay of the Canadian Armoured Regiments in WWII was the Sherman usually the Sherman V and the Sherman Firefly as well as the M3 /M5 Stuarts/Honeys  used in the recce role including a version with the turret removed the4 “Jalopy”



> a Ram OP varient in Normandy - but with a wooden gun



The wooden gun was a simple ruse so as the observer tank resembled a regular tank and therefore didn’t draw any unwanted enemy attention and/or fire.  With the extra radios in the turret there was no room for a real gun and ammo and besides the crew would be too busy doing other things. 

Those arty types really hate being disturbed when they’re playing with maps and grease pencils. There were other OP tanks as well including Sherman variants. Although having a couple of brigades worth of Rams sitting in England meant they were available for all sorts of uses, including gun tractors to tow 17 pdr anti tank guns, APCs (Kangaroos), and flame thrower tanks (Badgers).



> 'But it is pretty much accepted now that Joe Ekins was the man who knocked out three Tiger tanks in one morning, including that of Michael Wittmann.



And not to take anything away from Tpr Ekins, as I’m sure he believes it was his shots that killed Wittman, but I agree with earlier posters that this one is still up in the air. In the quoted post a British historian says their guy did it. It would be just as easy to quote a Canadian source stating their guy did it. This debate in some circles is starting to resemble that of the “who killed the Red Baron” one again with national pride at stake.


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## Old Sweat

Rifleman,

I agree, as do most people who have studied the engagement in which Wittmann died, that Trooper Elkins knocked out three Tigers in the early afternoon of 8 August 1944. However there were seven Tigers that took part in the battle and five were destroyed. The claim that Elkins knocked out Wittmann's tank first arose in an article by Les Taylor, himself a vetern of the Northamtonshire Yeomanry, in After the Battle magazine in the early-1980's. Mister Taylor apparently confined his research to his units log and war diary as two other Allied armoured squadrons also engaged Tigers in the same place and at the same time. These sub-units were B Squadron, 144 Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps and A Squadron, the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment), and both claimed one or more Tigers destroyed. 

In particular the Canadian squadron has a strong claim, as it was concealed behind a stone wall on the north side of 
Gaumesnil, a small village that overlooks the Caen-Falaise Road within a few hundred meters of the place where Wittmann met his timely end. Having said that, I cannot put my hand on a bible and swear that he fell to the Canadians or to Joe Elkins. In October I discussed this with a military history professor from Sanhurst over dinner and drinks after his lecture at the Royal Military College of Canada. We agreed that we could not decide who killed Wittmann and that we probably would never know.

What makes this engagement significant is not that Wittmann died, but that the German attack failed and that there were no Allied tank losses.

Note: I originally identifed the village as Hautmesnil, but have changed it to Gaumsenil. My apologies.


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## The Rifleman

or ..........


more important was that we got the bugger!


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## Old Sweat

This engagement may have seen the greatest loss of Tigers at any one time in the Second World War and is an exception to the usual turn of events. Last year I corresponded by email with an ex-Panzer officer in the Bundeswehr who told me that he and his colleagues felt that Wittmann never should have been commissioned as he was tactically inept. Most of his impressive score was against poorly trained Soviet troops in the early years on the Eastern front. In two major engagements he fought in Normandy, his tank was knocked out on both occasions, once by a six-pounder and once by a Sherman.


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## The Rifleman

back in the 90's I visited the German Army Tank Battalion at Castlemartin on the South West tip of Wales. We were shown around the Leopard 1 and watched a fine display of live firing. The tactics were very much hit and run and the accuracy was amazing. I was glad that those Panzers were on our side


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## 3rd Herd

Just a couple more thoughts on this theme. One must not forget on the German side the divisive perspectives of either a "mobile battle by tanks, however ingenious the static defenses or intensive the intervention by aircraft." The 'Russian school' of thought advocated by senior German staff who had recently fought in the Eastern campaigns. In this was in visioned a heavily armoured thrust of Panthers and Tigers supported on the shoulders by Sturmgeschutz and Jadgpanzers. The armoured anti guns allowing this less mobile heavy German tanks the opportunity of mobile warfare. This ran counter to the older theme of massive forts and fortifications advocated by Hitler and other members of the German General staff. This difference presented a strategic dilemma to the German defenders which was still not resolved as the invasion occurred.

With respect to the German recovery efforts there were a multitude of problems. Having over whelming air superiority the allies inflected sever losses on the German logistical services. A description by Karlludwig Opitz states "...the huge Mercedes diesels of the workshop company are hit by rockets.....Electrial fitting machines, lathes, automatic welders, workshops on wheels..............and lorry loads of spare parts........  '(The Iron Fist: A History of the SS panzer Divisions, pg 98) Later in the campaign as German Lines were pushed closer and closer to the German boarder a new problem occurred described Colonel Hans Von Luck in which " I sent one of my best Sergent's, the highly decorated leader of a anti tank platoon, to our workshops in the rear, with a couple of drivers to bring back some armoured trackers that had been repaired." Travelling on verbal orders Luck's detail was stopped by a Field Tribunal. Asked for his movement orders the Sergent replied that they were verbal. This resulting in the Tribunal's statement "We know about that, that is what they all say when they want to dodge things. In the name of the Furher and by the authority of the Commander in Chief of army group center, Field Marschell Schoerner, I sentence you to death by shooting on account of proven desertion" Luck informs us that he wrote a letter to the Sergent's parents allowing that their son "had unfortunately meet a soldier's death in the performance of his duties".(Panzer Commander: The Memories of Colonel Hans Von Luck, pg 249-250) Even at this stage in the war particularly on the Eastern front there had been the consistant interuption of nocturnal repairs by the Russian "Night Witches" and other members of similar components of the Russian air force. In the book on JG 52, Hauptmann Johannes Steinhoff,  mentions that "We simply couldn't grasp that the Soviet airmen that caused us the greatest trouble were in fact women. These women feared nothing. They came night after night in their very slow biplanes, and for some periods they wouldn't give us any sleep at all." In conclusion the German repair effort was hampered by lack of resources ranging from required equipment to losses both  in noncombative and combative situations of trained and skilled repair personal.


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## 3rd Herd

Sorry for the double posting but in answer to a previous question.

The German armoured divison was according to US intellegence supported by a "with a workshop company consisting—for a regiment of six companies—of a headquarters platoon, 1st and 2d (repair) platoons, 3d (recovery) platoon, an armory section, workshops for communications equipment, and a company supply section." the duties of such:

(1) General.—The workshop company operates as far as 15 to 20 miles behind the fighting tanks of its regiment, except that the recovery platoon works in the battle area, mainly to tow out disabled tanks. The workshop company handles repair jobs which take up to 12 hours. Repair jobs requiring up to 24 hours are sent back to rear repair bases. 

2) Tank Recovery Platoon.—According to information received from prisoners of war, the towing vehicles and trailers of the recovery platoon are sent forward to regimental headquarters and operate under its direction. The current method is to send two or three recovery vehicles forward with the fighting units. These vehicles advance in the line of attack and cruise across the width of the battle front. The Germans believe that hostile forces will be preoccupied with the German tanks and therefore will not attack the recovery vehicles, even when they come very close.

The towing vehicle usually goes forward alone, and tows a disabled tank away by tow ropes. Towing is used in preference to loading on a trailer. A prisoner of war explains that in the North African desert the latter operation may take as long as 20 minutes—and time is precious in front-line recovery. Prisoners state that trailers are being used less and less and that their use is confined chiefly to roads. On roads a higher speed can be maintained, and the trailers neither cut up the road surfaces nor weave as much as a towed tank. In roadless parts of the desert, trailers are resorted to where the ground is bad, and towing is done where the ground affords reasonably good going. 

The recovery platoon is not given the whole responsibility for the important work of salvaging tanks. In case of retirement, the Germans use combat tanks to tow disabled tanks. Instances have been reported in which, even during battles, combat tanks have been employed both to protect towing operations and to assist in the towing. 

Recovered tanks are towed to an assembly point behind the combat area. Trailers may be used to take the disabled tanks from the assembly point to a workshop company. 

According to prisoners of war, the drivers of recovery vehicles have done front-line duty for about 8 days at a time, and then worked at the rear, between assembly points and workshops. One prisoner who had been a driver reported that he usually had a crew of two unskilled men with him. It was his opinion that skill was not so necessary as a fair amount of intelligence and plenty of courage.(GERMAN TANK MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY:http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/tankmaint/index.html


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## 3rd Herd

For the Russian perspective on this subject I happend upon this site:TECHNICAL REPORT FROM THE 10th TANK DIVISION, AUGUST 1941,
http://home.comcast.net/~markconrad/10TD1941.html Not too bad of a read giving the strenghts and weaknesses of their own equipment for those who think the T-34 was the bee's knees. Their perspective on recovery and repair: Edited to shorten

"V. Repair and recovery of vehicles and the supply of replacement parts​
The supply of replacement parts before combat operations was extremely poor, especially for wheeled vehicles,. The district automotive-armored-tank directorate demanded monthly requests for these, but the percentage that was filled was insignificant. Such a situation with replacement parts had an immediate ruinous effect during combat operations. Vehicles frequently went out of service due to the smallest mechanical defects. Before the beginning of military operations the division had a very limited number of replacement parts for combat vehicles and none at all for wheeled transport. There was likewise no stockage of spare parts in the division’s "NZ" (1). 

The recovery of combat vehicles from the battlefield was done exclusively by tanks, under difficult circumstances and under the protection of battleworthy vehicles. An operational KV tank, towing a damaged tank and not having spare power, often broke down itself.  Many times a vehicle’s crew along with the repair crew sent to help them, not wanting to abandon the machine, were fixing it in direct proximity to the enemy, and when their unit withdrew they themselves were surrounded. The fate of a whole number of such personnel is still not known at this time.

The absence of corps and army collection points for damaged vehicles complicated the work of evacuating combat and transport vehicles, and the division’s resources could not deal with this task under the conditions of a general retreat. Under such circumstances the number of Voroshilovets tractors held by the division was plainly insufficient. 

While going forward a couple of years to the Battle of Kursk:

In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.( Don to the Dnepr, Colonel David M. Glantz)


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## vonGarvin

The 5th Guards Tank Army was rehabilitated and then sent back into the storm again in August of 1943 (a month and a bit later), and faced a similar pounding from the Germans at the third (and final) battle of Kharkov.  The fact that they were committed at all and that Hausser's men had to use chalk to count the pile of Russian Tanks on the battlefield suggests that the Germans had indeed come out on top on that battle near Prokorovkha.  Still, any victory would have been pyhrric (spelling?), given the Allied landings in Sicily and the utter failure of the Northern Wing of "Zitadelle".


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## geo

The endless supply of new T34s and M4 Shermans created a situation that the germans, in the long run, could not win.

Overengineered "superior" tanks on the german side lost to the continuous wave of replacement tanks.


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## 3rd Herd

geo said:
			
		

> The endless supply of new T34s and M4 Shermans created a situation that the germans, in the long run, could not win.
> 
> Overengineered "superior" tanks on the German side lost to the continuous wave of replacement tanks.



and willing young men to man them.

Geo,
I also found a reference in Copps Field of Fire that a Sherman Firefly knocked out 7 German heavy tanks in one engagement. The Sherman was from the Canadian Hussars. Unfortunately, they were on the receiving end the next day and as with others in this topic suffered severe losses.


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## geo

As discussed earlier, the firefly with it's brit gun was THE tank to take on the german PZs on anything near an equal footing - except for their this skin.  With a gas engine and much lighter than it's PZ foe, the firefly had agility to the PZ braun,


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## vonGarvin

It was much more than material that defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front.  As demonstrated at Stalingrad (Op URANUS), Kursk and especially in 1944 (Op BAGRATION), the Soviets became masters at Operational Level of Warfare.  Although the upgunned T-34's with their 85 (?) mm cannons made the headlines, in the end, it was through focussed attacks with goals set at the HIGHEST of levels that won them the war.
As for the firefly, etc, let us not forget that the workhorse tank of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS was the Mark IV.  By the end of the war, it had graduated from an infantry support tank with a short barreled 75mm gun to a formidable foe!


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## 3rd Herd

Hauptmann Scharlachrot said:
			
		

> It was much more than material that defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front.  As demonstrated at Stalingrad (Op URANUS), Kursk and especially in 1944 (Op BAGRATION), the Soviets became masters at Operational Level of Warfare.  Although the upgunned T-34's with their 85 (?) mm cannons made the headlines, in the end, it was through focused attacks with goals set at the HIGHEST of levels that won them the war.
> As for the firefly, etc, let us not forget that the workhorse tank of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS was the Mark IV.  By the end of the war, it had graduated from an infantry support tank with a short barreled 75mm gun to a formidable foe!



Interesting points herr Haptmann but are we not digressing from original idea of "how,who and why" armoured regiments fought and died and who has written credible literary efforts in this area. I would be more than willing to discuss the eastern front overall or facets in another thread. It seems you have some good source information in that regard.


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## vonGarvin

Ah, seen.  Just went up a few posts and replied to them.  Sorry for the mini-split.


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## LineDoggie

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> Whether its good or bad would depend on how long it took to accomplish that and the scale of losses... I guess over a couple of years of heavy fighting, 580% might not be bad for a small unit, but pretty costly for larger units.  How many tanks were in a US armored div at that time?


-That depends on the division. Both 2nd Armored(Hell on Wheels) & 3rd Armored(Spearhead) stayed under a "Heavy" TO/E(1 March, 1942) of 2 Armored Rgts. of 3 Bn's each, totaling 232 Medium(M4, M4A1, M4A3), 158 Light tanks(M3, M5, M5A1), vs. the Light Div. strength of 186 Mediums/77 Lights.  in 1943 the remaining armored divisions reorganized under 1 Tank regiment each.


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## 3rd Herd

The annual paper presentation here at U of C is on March 2/3. One of the Presenters is going to cover:Too Few to Fight: The German Army 
Force Maintenance 1943 -Gregory Liedtke. Will post  his thoughts if worthwhile.

Full listing of papers at: http://homepages.ucalgary.ca/~cmgainer/SMSS/Historic/Conference_Website_Schedule.pdf


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## 3rd Herd

Another little gem relevant to this topic has surffaced.

Hot off the printing press or as near as we can get it is T-34 in Action  edited by Artem Drabkin and Oleg Sheremet, published in September 2006 by Pen and Sword Military, South Yorkshire, UK. It is the resulting interviews of a number of Soviet tank crewman, battle officers and enlisted. From their opinions stated it is interesting to note the the preferred lend lease tank was the Canadian built Valentine. The consensus seems to revolve around it's ability to survive due to "it being low to the ground, with a powerful gun and a quite engine."(pg.16). An example of this is provided later in in the book of two Valentines destroying three Tiger tanks. The Tigers had just finished a forward detachment of T-34s in the area of Skalat in March of 1944. The Valentines using the ground for cover took out the Tigers from the flank after moving across the ground the other Soviet tanks were destroyed attempting.(pg.159-160) 

The crewman also bring to mention the actual armour compostion in the British/Canadian(Matilda/Valentine) was a "medium hardness" and had a high nickel content. This 'softness' they credit to having reduced the numbers of KIA/WIA due to the metal splinters flying around the inside of the tank after being hit. Quoting one interview, " If a shell had gone through the turret of a British tank the commander and gunner could have stayed alive, because there were virtually no splinters, Bryukhov observed, while in a T-34 the armour would spall a lot and the crew had fewer chances of survival"(pg.24)

As for the individual positions in the tank it was felt that the drivers position was far by safer than any other. Many credit their successful survival of the war to this. In the realm of learning something new, many Soviet tank commanders were in fact the drivers not as found in Anglo/Allied armies. The Soviet model both officially as in doctrinal training and then unofficially as part of a crew ensured a high standard of cross training. Thus devastated units were reequipped and dispatched back into battle faster than opposing German forces. Other interesting facets in the book include tank crews being sent back to factories to assist in the building of their own tanks beginning with an armoured box on the floor to rolling out 24 hrs later ready for a fifty km test and then on to the transporter train to the front. 

Not all but a decent breakdown of survivability due to hits on the various portions of the T-34 is included. They indicate of total hits per area "81% of hits were on the hull and 19% on the turret, however more than half the hull hits were harmless. In breaking down the hull hits, 89% were on the upper front, 66% of the lower front and 40% on the side that failled to penetrate."(pg.27) Combing a single heavy turret hatch and weak cast armour caused high rates of the turret crew not surviving. Other faults in the T-34 attributed to the interviewed surviving crew were the "noise of the engines(early models did not come with mufflers), the noise of the steel road wheels, the uselessness of the radio operator and position, limited visibility when 'hatches closed', poor ventilation of the turret(loaders passing out due to fumes). In closing it seems that these veterans equate the Sherman with the SU-76 as "real cigarette lighters" and that the main advantage of the T-34 was it's diesel engine and the confidence it gave the crews in being able to survive. The primary fear was of being burnt alive.


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## Colin Parkinson

I was recently looking at pictures of knocked out T-34, showing massive failures of the armour which had cracked and large chunks missing from the side of the turret after being hit from a round that had passed through the turret other side.


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