# LSTs, LAWs and Russia's Potemkin Wars.



## Kirkhill (31 Jan 2022)

Vladimir Putin’s Amphibious Gambit Demonstrates Value Of New USMC Ship Design
					

A Russian amphibious sortie to the Black Sea earlier this month may help reinvigorate the U.S. Marine Corps' beleaguered effort to procure between 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships, or LAWs.




					www.forbes.com
				






> Vladimir Putin’s Amphibious Gambit Demonstrates Value Of New USMC Ship Design​
> In January, as Russia sent an aged fleet of six diminutive landing craft on a cruise towards the Black Sea, a fearful Europe took notice. Confronted by ships that are, at best, modernized variants of America’s once ubiquitous World War II-era Tank Landing Ship, or LST, Sweden re-deployed their military, and Finland worried over their demilitarized Åland Islands. Beyond the Baltic Sea, countries dedicated some of their most modern military resources to track and escort the little band of ships around Europe, through the Mediterranean and towards Ukraine. Despite the uproar, all the little Russian fleet has done so far is to demonstrate the military relevance of utilitarian landing craft, offering the U.S. Marine Corps an opportunity to reinvigorate their flagging effort to get “old-school” LSTs back into the American fleet.





> Russia’s motley amphibious expedition, a set of five _Ropucha_ (Type 775) class LSTs and one new-but-obsolete _Ivan Gren_ (Design 11711) class LST, are all rather small, displacing only between 4,000 to 5,000 tons apiece (To compare, a single American _San Antonio_ (LPD-17) class amphibious assault vessel displaces 25,000 tons). The Russian LSTs are also quite old — the Russian task force includes the first _Ropucha_ LSTs that are well into their fourth decade of service.
> 
> The West’s exaggerated response is a tacit admission that even small, militarily insignificant amphibious ships, if used creatively, can cause a lot of problems in the developed world’s littoral zones. The West’s close scrutiny of the Russian fleet suggests the vessels may even be carrying some exotic troublemakers—nuclear weapons, modern sea mines or fancy missiles.
> 
> ...



Also, apparently Canada isn't the only place that commands are "handled".



> In U.S. Navy circles, a huge debate exploded around the Marine Corps’ surprise effort to procure Light Amphibious Warships. The LAW, envisioned in 2019 as a class of 24 to 35 small-but-cheap $150 million amphibious ships, were proposed as a cost-effective means to move small groups of Marines around the Pacific. But, in Washington, the idea has gone over like a lead balloon, with many naval bureaucrats hoping the project will go away when the LAW’s biggest advocate, General David H. Berger, the smart, reform-minded Marine Corps commandant, retires.
> 
> Some theorists believe the LAW concept is already sunk. The Navy’s powerful shipbuilders, vested in building bigger and far more expensive amphibious assault vessels, despise the LAW concept and see it as an existential threat. The Navy’s high-end warfighters, disinterested in escort duties, scoff that the LAW is just a “Large, Slow Target,” leaving many Marines to wonder just how they’ll survive ashore if they are supported by the smaller, slower craft. Even Congress—which is eager to grow the Navy—seems skeptical.
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> ...



So will the LAW go the way of the Army's Tactical Airlifter (the C27J Spartan) or the Army's Operational Sealifter (the Spearhead JHSV-EPF)?

Is it just me that sees a similarity in the Canadian Militia debate?  Institutions warring over turf and budget, externally and internally, creating cracks along the seams.

It seems obvious that there is utility in simple logistic solutions where quantity has a value all its own.  But it has big opponents.

The AOPS has elements of the LAW if not the LST about it.  Perhaps some more LST like variants might be worth considering.  

If the RCN would deign to consider it.


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## Colin Parkinson (31 Jan 2022)

Inter-institutional warfare in the US military is nothing new, however it never quite got as bad as the very real and bloody Inter-institutional warfare in 1930-40's Japan.


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## OldSolduer (3 Feb 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> Inter-institutional warfare in the US military is nothing new, however it never quite got as bad as the very real and bloody Inter-institutional warfare in 1930-40's Japan.


At least one high ranking officer was assassinated by a lower rank officer.


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## daftandbarmy (4 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Vladimir Putin’s Amphibious Gambit Demonstrates Value Of New USMC Ship Design
> 
> 
> A Russian amphibious sortie to the Black Sea earlier this month may help reinvigorate the U.S. Marine Corps' beleaguered effort to procure between 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships, or LAWs.
> ...




I've spent some time in 'LAWs', and they weren't trying to beome a Mini-Me Navy . 









						Landing Craft | Royal Navy
					

The primary role of landing crafts is to transfer personnel, vehicles, and equipment onto potentially hostile shores.Get the full story here.




					www.royalnavy.mod.uk


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## Kirkhill (4 Feb 2022)

RFA Sir Galahad (1966) - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




I think they are talking about the next size up.


General characteristicsNamesakeGalahadBuilderAlexander Stephen and SonsLaid downFebruary 1965Launched19 April 1966Commissioned17 December 1966IdentificationIMO number: 6615508Fate
Destroyed 8 June 1982, during Falklands War
Hull sunk on 21 June as a target by submarine HMS _Onyx_
Declared war grave post-war
Class and typeRound Table class LSLTonnage
6,390 GRT
2,215 t DWT
Displacement
3,322 t standard
5,765 t fully loaded
Length412 ft (126 m)Beam60 ft (18 m)Draught13 ft (4.0 m)


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## daftandbarmy (10 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> RFA Sir Galahad (1966) - Wikipedia
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Introducing the capability to the CAF would take a huge investment of time, training and doctrine refreshing I believe.

I'm by no means an expert but, from my small part in various amphibious evolutions, it seemed to me that there were alot of moving parts involved, many of which we don't have or seemed inclined to obtain.


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> Introducing the capability to the CAF would take a huge investment of time, training and doctrine refreshing I believe.
> 
> I'm by no means an expert but, from my small part in various amphibious evolutions, it seemed to me that there were alot of moving parts involved, many of which we don't have or seemed inclined to obtain.



Unfortunately you're probably right.


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## Colin Parkinson (10 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> RFA Sir Galahad (1966) - Wikipedia
> 
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> 
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She also had a Mess that served Red Lion Beer and fun crew. They used to come to Vancouver regularly and we got an invite to go aboard for a few drinks.


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> She also had a Mess that served Red Lion Beer and fun crew. They used to come to Vancouver regularly and we got an invite to go aboard for a few drinks.


So a bit of a globetrotter then?  Despite her size.


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## Blackadder1916 (10 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So a bit of a globetrotter then?  Despite her size.



The Brits used to transport vehicles (tanks, APCs, trucks being rotated in/out of Suffield) and ammunition by the LSLs from the UK and Germany via the Panama Canal to Vancouver and Prince Rupert for onward shipment to Alberta, so it was not unusual for _Sir Galahad_ (or any of her sister ships) to make the run to Vancouver.  At the start of the Falklands War, one of them, _Sir Bedivere_ was at Vancouver from whence she headed back to the UK, loaded up and headed south to war.  The Brits later just used chartered vessels to Montreal, cheaper and more efficient.


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## KevinB (10 Feb 2022)

daftandbarmy said:


> Introducing the capability to the CAF would take a huge investment of time, training and doctrine refreshing I believe.
> 
> I'm by no means an expert but, from my small part in various amphibious evolutions, it seemed to me that there were alot of moving parts involved, many of which we don't have or seemed inclined to obtain.



While I think there could be a good role there, you are absolutely right.
  Army - it's not a LAV
  Navy - who pays for this?
  Army - you, and we probably won't ever use it
  Navy - thanks for coming out...


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## daftandbarmy (10 Feb 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> She also had a Mess that served Red Lion Beer and fun crew. They used to come to Vancouver regularly and we got an invite to go aboard for a few drinks.



I've met some Welsh Guards who were on board when the bombs hit, and one of the Marines that tried to get them off before the (inevitable) air strike.

If we ever consider venturing into this type of capability there's definitely a need to look at ships like this from the point of view of fire proofing/ survivability improvements, as well as properly training the troops who use them. 


Bluff Cove air attacks - Wikipedia


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## Colin Parkinson (10 Feb 2022)

KevinB said:


> While I think there could be a good role there, you are absolutely right.
> Army - it's not a LAV
> Navy - who pays for this?
> Army - you, and we probably won't ever use it
> Navy - thanks for coming out...


The Van Doo's did do an exercise with a French Mistral loading and beach landing LAV's


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2022)

Blackadder1916 said:


> The Brits used to transport vehicles (tanks, APCs, trucks being rotated in/out of Suffield) and ammunition by the LSLs from the UK and Germany via the Panama Canal to Vancouver and Prince Rupert for onward shipment to Alberta, so it was not unusual for _Sir Galahad_ (or any of her sister ships) to make the run to Vancouver.  At the start of the Falklands War, one of them, _Sir Bedivere_ was at Vancouver from whence she headed back to the UK, loaded up and headed south to war.  The Brits later just used chartered vessels to Montreal, cheaper and more efficient.



I was reading something about the internal discussions the Yanks are having about building these small ships.  The Big Ship Navy was of the opinion that not only will they take money away from the Real Navy they are too vulnerable and won't be able to deploy over long distances.

It seems to me that Galahad and Bedivere challenge that assumption although they are a bit bigger than the LAW assumptions.  

Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 
a length of 200 feet to 400 feet
a maximum draft of 12 feet; 
a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;
a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;
an ability to embark at least 75 Marines; 
4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment, and supplies;
a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons, equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach; 
a modest suite of C4I equipment;
a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense;
a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;
a minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;
a “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a smaller U.S. Navy surface combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment and supplies can be transferred to another LAW


Class and typeRound Table class LSLTonnage
6,390 GRT
2,215 t DWT
Displacement
3,322 t standard
5,765 t fully loaded
Length412 ft (126 m)Beam60 ft (18 m)Draught13 ft (4.0 m)Propulsion
2 Mirrlees National ALSSDM10 diesels.
Power: 9,400 bhp (7,010 kW)
Speed17 knots (31 km/h)Range9,200 nautical miles (17,040 km) at 15 knots (28 km/h)Capacity2,443 tonnesComplement68 crew, up to 534 passengersArmamentTwo 40 mm Bofors AA guns.Aircraft carriedUp to 20 Wessex helicopters (1973)


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## Colin Parkinson (10 Feb 2022)

They were hard working ships, run by the RFA


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## quadrapiper (11 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> The Big Ship Navy was of the opinion that not only will they take money away from the Real Navy they are too vulnerable and won't be able to deploy over long distances.


Since the 1960s Round Tables were running around to Vancouver from the UK/Germany, one wonders what more the USN would want. I'm assuming they could RAS?


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## Kirkhill (11 Feb 2022)

More on the USN/USMC and LAW/LST requests.










						Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for $150M or Less - USNI News
					

The Navy and Marine Corps are finalizing a list of requirements for the Light Amphibious Warship that Marine leadership argues is key to how the service will fight its future island-hopping campaigns. The services pitch LAW as a medium amphibious warship with a small crew that can haul 75...




					news.usni.org


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## Colin Parkinson (11 Feb 2022)

The US army's navy is bigger than our regular navy









						List of ships of the United States Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


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## KevinB (11 Feb 2022)

Colin Parkinson said:


> The US army's navy is bigger than our regular navy
> 
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> 
> ...


Everyone who's been in the Army knows you can't trust the Navy, so you need your own


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## Kirkhill (11 Feb 2022)

Seems like the Army already has the Navy's solution.. kind of.   And only needs a crew of 31 soldiers instead of 59 sailors.









						General Frank S. Besson-class support vessel - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				







General characteristicsClass overviewBuildersVT Halter Marine, Inc.Operators



United States ArmySubclasses
SSGT _Robert T. Kuroda_ class
_Bacolod City_ class
Built1987–2006In commission1988–presentPlanned8Completed8Active8TypeLogistics support vesselDisplacement4,199 long tons (4,266 t)Length273 ft (83 m)Beam60 ft (18 m)Draft12 ft (3.7 m)Propulsion2 × EMD 16-645E2; 1,950 hp (1,454 kW) each at 999 rpmSpeed
12.5 knots (23.2 km/h; 14.4 mph) light
11.5 knots (21.3 km/h; 13.2 mph) loaded
Range
8,200 nmi (15,200 km) light
6,500 nmi (12,000 km) loaded
Complement8 officers, 23 enlisted


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## Blackadder1916 (11 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Seems like the Army already has the Navy's solution.. kind of.   And only needs a crew of 31 soldiers instead of 59 sailors.
> 
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From an overview of the "Army solution"   https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm4_01.pdf



To a focus on Army watercraft operations.  https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp4_15.pdf

There's more to the solution than what the boat looks like.


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## Kirkhill (11 Feb 2022)

I'm going to assume that the USN/USMC/USNS generally has most of the moving parts necessary other than the boats.  The boats seem to be their missing links.

On the other hand, if you are talking about Canada....... 



Our canvas appears to be rather blank.


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## OldSolduer (11 Feb 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> I'm going to assume that the USN/USMC/USNS generally has most of the moving parts necessary other than the boats.  The boats seem to be their missing links.
> 
> On the other hand, if you are talking about Canada.......
> 
> ...


Where did you get that pic of WInnipeg??????


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## daftandbarmy (15 Feb 2022)

We could probably use a  'Lyme Bay' equivalent, to enable amphibious ingress/egress along our own gigantic coastlines if nothing else, which looks alot like some of our Coast Guard ships:

The Royal Navy’s New Assault Ship Is The Royal Navy’s Old Assault Ship​





RFA 'Lyme Bay' with a Merlin on her flight deck and Wildcats overhead.

The world’s coasts are getting a lot more dangerous as powers such as Russia and China deploy more and more small, quiet submarines and long-range anti-ship missiles.

In response, rival powers are reorganizing their fleets. In general, naval leaders aim to spread out their ships across a wider area in order to complicate enemy targeting. They’re also pulling away from hostile shores.

The latter has obvious implications for a traditional naval concept—the amphibious assault.

Where before, a fleet might safely congregate big, slow amphibious ships just a few miles from an enemy’s beaches, today that kind of operation is probably naval suicide. Subs and missiles could make quick work of amphibs—dooming not only their crews, but the hundreds of troops riding inside.

It’s not that amphibious operations are any less important. Navies, however, recognize they need to conduct sea-to-shore assaults from farther away. That can mean relying less on slow-moving, short-range landing craft and more on fast, far-flying rotorcraft.

To that end, the Royal Navy is breaking up its normal amphibious organization. The British fleet for decades has organized its assault ships—today including two _Albion_-class landing platforms and three _Bay_-class amphibious docks—into an amphibious task group.

Now there’s a new plan—and it could result in an amphibious force with more helicopter capacity. Instead of organizing one big amphibious task group, the Royal Navy by 2023 wants to divide its five amphibs into two so-called “littoral response groups.” One for the Atlantic Ocean and another for the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

“The LRG is part of a broader initiative to adapt the U.K.’s amphibious forces to operate in a more dispersed and agile way in response to the increasingly challenging environments that they are now facing,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London explained.

According to the news website _Navy Lookout_, the Pacific LRG—slated for deployment in 2023—could include an _Albion_, a _Bay _and a frigate. But there’s a problem. None of these ships has a fixed hangar for a large helicopter type such as the fleet’s Merlin.

That’s about to change. The U.K. government’s recent Integrated Review pledged 50 million pounds—around $70 million—to convert one _Bay _for the LRG role. _Navy Lookout_ anticipates the ship in question is _Lyme Bay._

The 580-foot-long _Bay_s always were prime candidates for an aviation upgrade. The Dutch-designed landing docks, as built in the early 2000s, lack fixed hangars for helicopters.

They instead have flimsy fabric shelters that temporarily can accommodate a pair of small helicopters in the class of the navy’s Wildcat. The _Bay_s also lack the command facilities they might need for long-range amphibious operations.

It’s not yet clear what changes the Royal Navy will order for _Lyme Bay_ when the vessel enters the yard for rework, likely sometime next year. But all the likely plans involve adding a fixed hangar for up to three Merlins.

In addition, _Lyme Bay_ could get additional workstations for command and control plus recreational facilities so the ship better can accommodate up to 350 soldiers, marines and special operations troops for months at a time.

The end result should be an amphibious ship with significantly more aerial capability. That’s good news for British troops hoping to survive their next amphibious assault.









						The Royal Navy’s New Assault Ship Is The Royal Navy’s Old Assault Ship
					

The Royal Navy is breaking up its normal amphibious organization.




					www.forbes.com


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## Kirkhill (15 Feb 2022)

3x River Class 1 OPVs   25 Troops
3x River Class 2 OPVs   50 Troops
5x Type 31 Frigates       50 to 80 Troops
8x Type 26 Frigates       50 to 80 Troops
6x Type 45 Destroyers   60 Troops
3x Bay LSDA                  >150 Troops (Vanguard Strike Company)
2x Albion LPD                405 Troops (710 Overload)
2x QE CV                        250 to 900 Troops

All vessels are Merlin Capable (possibly with the exception of the Batch 1 Rivers?) and everything from the Type 31 and larger is capable of landing a Chinook or an Osprey.

32 Lily Pads.


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