# Organisation and weapons of the 1960's Infantry Battalion/Regiment



## Colin Parkinson (18 Aug 2018)

Following a thread on 1960s Yugoslavian org charts. I was posting about ours, but not that sure if I am right:


Section Commander with SMG, LMG gunner (FNC2/Bren depending on time period) with a support gunner (FNC1). The rest of the 5 men would have FNC1's. Ammo for the LMG would be spread across the section, along with grenades. 

3 x rifle sections to a platoon with a Captain/lieutenant and signaler/runners 

3 x rifle platoons to a company with a HQ and heavy weapons platoon 

3x rifle companies to a regiment/Battalion with a heavy weapons support company (mortars, 106mm RR, HMGs) a Transport company and support company (quartermaster stores, cooks, medical, vehicle repair)


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## FJAG (18 Aug 2018)

I may be a little off on this (since I was a gunner then) but during the late sixties I believe the establishment for a section was ten men with a section commander with an SMG and six riflemen each with an FNC1 while the section 2i/c with an FNC1 led a further two men each armed with an FNC2. Sections back then, like today, were often undermanned.

One of the riflemen was also a driver for either the 3/4 ton truck or the M113. In the case of the M113 another rifleman would generally take over the .50 once the section commander dismounted which left a total of 6 people in the rifle group and the three in the C2 group on the ground.

The platoon commander was always a lieutenant in those days. Captains weren't in platoons until the Hellyer captain era started to bear fruit in the very late sixties early seventies.

I don't have a copy of CAMT 7-84 anymore but here's a link that might help.

https://www.canadiansoldiers.com/tactical/infantrysection.htm

 :cheers:


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## Infanteer (18 Aug 2018)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't have a copy of CAMT 7-84 anymore but here's a link that might help.



Luckily, I still do.  Attached images should answer the questions.


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## FJAG (19 Aug 2018)

I thought that it was four rifle companies but wasn't sure enough to say so. Glad to see that senility hasn't set in completely yet.

 :cheers:


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## tomahawk6 (19 Aug 2018)

Napolean said that the side with the bigger battalions win the US Army battalion then had 1000 men in Vietnam that shrank to 800 and now its less.With smaller units combat casualties could make it combat ineffective. The tendancy now is to make up forsmaller units with more armor. You need the boots on the ground if you in an urban environment IMO.


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## FJAG (19 Aug 2018)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Napolean said that the side with the bigger battalions win the US Army battalion then had 1000 men in Vietnam that shrank to 800 and now its less.With smaller units combat casualties could make it combat ineffective. The tendancy now is to make up forsmaller units with more armor. You need the boots on the ground if you in an urban environment IMO.





> God always favours the big battalions.
> In 1673 (well before Napoleon’s birth in 1769), French aristocrat and letter writer Madame de Sévigné told a correspondent that Viscount Turenne used to say fortune was for the big battalions. Four years later her cousin, the memoirist Roger de Rabutin wrote, “As a rule God is on the side of the big squadrons against the small ones.” Voltaire and Frederick the Great also repeated this line. Ralph Keyes, in his book The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where and When, concludes that this alleged Napoleon Bonaparte quote is actually an old saying, especially favoured by the French. (1)



https://shannonselin.com/2014/07/10-things-napoleon-never-said/



> “God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best.”― Voltaire



https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/voltaire_403415

 :cheers:


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## Colin Parkinson (19 Aug 2018)

Thank you Infanteer


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## exspy (19 Aug 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Following a thread on 1960s Yugoslavian org charts. I was posting about ours, but not that sure if I am right...



The Canadian infantry battalion went through many changes in the 60's, and to know which war establishment was being used you would have to pick a time period and a location. The battalions in Germany were not always organized like the battalions in Canada.

Early in the decade the battalion establishment, while having updated it's weapons, still looked like the  version used in the Second World War. The establishment in CAMT 7-84 came next, it's main distinctions being every rifle section mounted in a 3/4 ton vehicle and support weapons placed at the rifle company level. It also saw the short lived experiment of using the 4.2" mortar in the battalion mortar platoon.

The next establishment, beginning in 1965, saw the introduction of the M113A1 CDN APC. Only the three battalions in Germany were completely mechanized. The battalions in Canada divided between using the mechanized establishment (without the full complement of APC's) or on a light Special Service Force (SSF) establishment for UN and other international duties. Oh, and an anti-tank battalion with ENTAC's and SS11B1's was organized.

In 1970, everything changed again with the personnel reductions in Germany and Canada.

If you have any specific questions, feel free to ask. The 60's were a very interesting period of change for the infantry, for the artillery too, as a matter of fact.

Cheers,
Dan.


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## Old Sweat (20 Aug 2018)

It was indeed interesting, just like a root canal without freezing. We started the decade with the three Canada based field regiments on a five battery organization - three field, one medium and one locating along with an AOP Troop and the regiment in Germany with three field. We also had an antiaircraft regiment in Picton, but it was converting to become 1 SSM Battery.

Next stop - 4 RCHA in Petawawa became a light regiment with two, later three, batteries of 4.2-in mortars, with the AOP and W (its medium battery- attached supposedly from 2 RCHA in Germany. At about the same time we formed a (short lived) divisional locating battery, and disbanded the regimental ones. The Germany-based regiment went to two field and one medium battery at about this time. The L5s appeared late 1968 at about the same time 5 RALC was formed. The M109s followed in late 1968 as did the airborne battery. The home-based regiments all were cut to two batteries with 2  RCHA in Gagetown, 3 RCHA in Winnipeg, 4 RCHA in Petawawa and 5 RALC in Valcartier. Two guns had two M109 batteries while the others field two L5 ones. Finally we ended the decade with our last series of cuts. This was the post-Korea low point for the gunners with 4 gone but retitled as 2 which moved on paper to Petawawa as a one-battery regiment, 5 still in Valcartier with two l5 batteries, 3 as the same in Shilo and E Battery in Gagetown as a M109 battery. Thus we went from 12 field, three medium, three locating and two SSM batteries in 1960 to 4 M109 and six L5 including the airborne ten years later.

It was a real blow to morale, and we did not recruit an anglo gunner until late 1973. Promotions for the NCMs was virtually non-existent until 1974 or 1975. On the personal side, I was a Captain IG in Shilo shortly before the school moved to Gagetown as part of the Combat Arms School. I was washing my coffee cup in the entryway to our stand easy when two or three AIGs came in from the hallway. All had been outspokenly negative in their comments about the future of the RCA (at least around officers), so I was frigging near reduced to tears when they began to talk about how hard they were going to have to work to preserve the Regiment, but they felt they could bring the guns through it. And collectively they (and we) never stopped soldiering and finally our world turned 
around. One of the best days of my life came in 1975 when I was the CIG at the school and we received a mass promotion message with nearly a quarter of the names of the gunner NCMs in CAS on it. 

Mods, sorry for the sidetrack.


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## Kirkhill (20 Aug 2018)

Just a pedantic note.

I have always found it interesting that the Battalion Organization always seems to follow the format 

HQ (Command)
Rifles
Support (Combat Support)
HQ (Service Support)

My own preference is for

HQ (Command)
HQ (Service Support)
Support (Combat Support)
Rifles

My rationale is that every battalion requires an HQ, even in peace time, regardless of the number and nature of the companies under command.  Equally every battalion has equipment that must be maintained even when the companies aren't engaged so service support should be high on the list so that the equipment is ready for troops to fall in on.  I rank the Combat Support element higher in the preparedness list than the Rifles because that is where the smallest number of bodies can have the greatest influence on the battlefield - especially in the defence.  

If I had a limited number of PYs available to me the first roles I would be filling would be Command, Sigs, Maint, Tpt and Cbt Spt.

The Rifle Coys - We already know that the Battalion can employ anything from 2 (Modern Brits) to 8 (1914 Canadians) Rifle Coys with anything from 2 to 5 Sub Sub Units with some or all of them being Reservists or Militiamen along with Regulars.

The most flexibility in planning is available in the establishment of the Rifles.  The most combat value is generated by the Combat Support Company.  HQ is the necessary evil that exists in peace and war.

As I say, a bit of pedantry.

But, perhaps, if the suggested sequence had been the training standard of the day then, again perhaps, the battalions would not have lost their ATs, pioneers, mortars and MGs.


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## Good2Golf (20 Aug 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Just a pedantic note.



I'll match your pedantic note and raise you, CP.

Apparently the Canadian Army couldn't do basic math, particularly when it came to number of officers in the battalion - The F-Echelon has 44 officers, while the addition of A and B Ech officers increases the Bn total to 41...  :stars:


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## exspy (20 Aug 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Thus we went from 12 field, three medium, three locating and two SSM batteries in 1960 to 4 M109 and six L5 including the airborne ten years later.



Jeez, Brian. You should write a history of the RCHA or something. Actually, a second volume covering the almost 50 years from 1970 is well overdue.

I've always found that the history of the RCA is really a history of the Canadian Army, more so than any other arm or service. I, for one, would buy it.

Cheers,
Dan.


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## Old Sweat (20 Aug 2018)

Dan M said:
			
		

> Jeez, Brian. You should write a history of the RCHA or something. Actually, a second volume covering the almost 50 years from 1970 is well overdue.
> 
> I've always found that the history of the RCA is really a history of the Canadian Army, more so than any other arm or service. I, for one, would buy it.
> 
> ...



Vol 3 of The Gunners of Canada currently under preparation is addressing the issue by direction. Although asked if I wished to bid for the contract, I said no because it is still too painful. I could not be objective as I still believe our senior officers did not see it coming despite all the indications.


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## Haligonian (20 Aug 2018)

The size of that Bn is striking.  Considering that operational research has shown the value of smaller units and many German WW 2 commanders have stated that smaller more nimble units are preferable it is interesting to see that we chose to go in the exact opposite direction.

Having that fourth rifle coy could defiantly be a bonus when a commander is trying to achieve greater depth and goes looking for a RAS force and a reserve, and potentially, a reserve separate from a c-movs force depending on the operation.  It also gives the Bn additional staying power allowing it to provide some of its own replacements initially.

Having said that, if it is clumsily handled it's just more cannon fodder.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Aug 2018)

In some important respects our large, 1960s, infantry battalions and brigade groups were well suited to the highly dispersed, _North German Plain_, nuclear battlefield that we assumed ~ with good reason since we were deployed on it ~ would be ours.

The doctrine called for considerable distance between combat teams thus allowing us to "steer" the enemy into planned Nuclear Killing Zones. Square battle groups and square brigades were well suited for a battle that envisioned a long, almost stately withdrawal in contact with a pretty large but logistically weak enemy force which we would draw father and father "in" until we could launch a potent counter-strike ... that was the theory, anyway.

A light (105mm) howitzer was useless ... all artillery had to be medium (155mm) or better to 'reach' enough targets. Air power and close air support  was critical ~ that (the North German Plain in the 1960s) is when and why the _Harrier_ was invented. There were never going to be enough Engineers: canalizing the enemy into those killing zones by creating and/or improving obstacles was a key task. 

Logistics was our (Anglo-Canadian and German ~ we didn't think very much of the US Army in the 1960s) big strength and, we thought, the Warsaw Pact forces' (even the fearsome East Germans') big weakness. We had better equipment and most of it worked most of the time and our logisticians could and did keep us resupplied ~ armed and fuelled and fed ~ while in contact, and we were going to fall back onto a more concentrated support base even as the enemy's weak logistic system would be strained past its breaking point.


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## Old Sweat (21 Aug 2018)

All I wish to add to Edward's excellent summary is that our defence was designed to be based on an obstacle. This would force the WP forces to pause and concentrate to force a breach of the obstacle, which could either be natural such as a major river or a series of large minefields.

It seems to me that the Nortth German topography was such that there was a north-south river every fifty kilometres or so. As the WP forces would close up to the river, they would concentrate to force a regimental crossing as part of a divisional operation, and if SACEUR had given nuclear release, we would drop one on a previously selected point. I won't bore you with nuclear battle procedure, but we practiced it, and the 1st Surface-to-Surface Missile Battery, RCA had earned a reputation as the best nuclear delivery unit in NATO.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Aug 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> All I wish to add to Edward's excellent summary is that our defence was designed to be based on an obstacle. This would force the WP forces to pause and concentrate to force a breach of the obstacle, which could either be natural such as a major river or a series of large minefields.
> 
> It seems to me that the Nortth German topography was such that there was a north-south river every fifty kilometres or so. As the WP forces would close up to the river, they would concentrate to force a regimental crossing as part of a divisional operation, and if SACEUR had given nuclear release, we would drop one on a previously selected point. I won't bore you with nuclear battle procedure, but we practiced it, and the 1st Surface-to-Surface Missile Battery, RCA had earned a reputation as the best nuclear delivery unit in NATO.



And then there was the dreaded 'Bridge Demolition Guard', practiced and fouled up regularly, which was actually a pretty good way to engage Coy/Sqn level troops in rehearsing the All Arms fight in a strategic context: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kspwZdqqCjg


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## Old Sweat (21 Aug 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And then there was the dreaded 'Bridge Demolition Guard', practiced and fouled up regularly, which was actually a pretty good way to engage Coy/Sqn level troops in rehearsing the All Arms fight in a strategic context:
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kspwZdqqCjg



Yep, with orders to the demolition guard commander and the commander of the firing party and all sorts of things to go wrong. It had its moments; I did it as a brigade headquarters LO on the 1966 fall exercise, including passing confirmation of the withdrawal of the covering force, then receiving the code word to fire the demolition and passing it to the commander of the demolition guard. Unusually, this was a Danish battalion commander with a man pack so he couldn't talk to just about everybody. I then passed the word that the bridge was destroyed (as told to me by the umpires) as the Brit enemy force was rushing the far side of the obstacle. All this, in best 4 CIBG style, in a pitch black rainy night.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Aug 2018)

Just to reiterate: the organizations were tailored to a very real task on very real ground ... we had big battalions because we needed 'em. It wasn't a doctrinal debate, anyone who, as I did, walked the ground between, say, _Celle_ and _Northeim_ and looked at the withdrawal routes across, e.g. the _Weser Brücke_ near _Porta Westphalica_ would, I think, agree with our planners in the 1950s: big battalions, lots of guns, lots and lots of engineers and _*superb*_ logistics.

Could we have one despite the fact that the Belgian and Dutch corps (two of the fur corps in NORTHAG) existed mainly in dreams and that the German corps near Koblenz ~ the centre of three German corps ~ would likely have to move South because many people doubted that the 5th and 7th US Corps could (or would) leave their barracks)? We "gamed" it one year on a major Army managed CPX called _Summer Sales_; the results were sobering ... made us all glad we had 1SSM Bty, RCA, made us wish we had a damned regiment.

The biggest thing in our favour, I always believed, was that the Warsaw Pact, despite being HUGE, was badly led and managed and the Russian logistics system was sh!t, to be charitable. And those rivers every 50 km or so helped a lot, too ... it was like the gods were on our side.


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## FJAG (21 Aug 2018)

It's an interesting mental exercise actually. In my mind the Russian (Soviet) start line was always the East German/ Czechoslovakian border. Our strategy and tactics were clear the the way ER Campbell has set them out.

With the exception of the Baltic states, the start line is now a lot further back with about 500 kms of Poland to cross before they even get near the Oder. Makes me wonder what the big plans are these days. Looking at the German armies dispositions shows that the entire front is being covered by two Panzer divisions (light on artillery I might add although the Poles seem to have a fair amount) with a light special forces/airborne division in reserve.

My presumption is that most of them work on the assumptions that the Russians won't cross the Oder but just consolidate within the Russian friendly portions of former Warsaw Pact satellites then leave it for us to come to them (or not). Strangely enough two of the Poles three divisions are on the German border and not the Belarus one.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (22 Aug 2018)

FJAG said:
			
		

> It's an interesting mental exercise actually. In my mind the Russian (Soviet) start line was always the East German/ Czechoslovakian border. Our strategy and tactics were clear the the way ER Campbell has set them out.
> 
> With the exception of the Baltic states, the start line is now a lot further back with about 500 kms of Poland to cross before they even get near the Oder. Makes me wonder what the big plans are these days. Looking at the German armies dispositions shows that the entire front is being covered by two Panzer divisions (light on artillery I might add although the Poles seem to have a fair amount) with a light special forces/airborne division in reserve.
> 
> ...



With Putin in charge, we're more likely to see an 'insinuation', as opposed to an 'invasion' of Russian power and influence. The Crimea and Ukraine are good examples. 

We'll therefore need to build our asymmetric capabilities while maintaining something of a big, mailed fist in reserve. Unfortunately, our muscle memory tends to be aligned to the latter.


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