# Saving Money in the PRes (From: The Defence Budget)



## ArmyRick (20 Nov 2013)

I would like to see attrition be one way...but it seems like both reg and res force have alot and I mean, alot of "hang ons". People who are long past their best expiry date and never seem to leave until they are CRA. I am not talking RSM, CO, Div Comd and CWO, etc. Those key positions are managed by "well aged" soldiers.

I am referring to 30 year service combat arms corporals or 35 years service captains type situations (not just those two ranks either, irrelevant is dead weight). Either your advancing and part of succession plan or 20 is done, get out (or 25 for younger guys). Harsh but seriously, we can not molly coddle everybody.

I would also look at perm Class B positions OUTSIDE P RES units and get rid of them. When you start cutting troops, there is no way to justify these positions.

HQ from Brigade and up. Cut, cut, cut. Ya, like that will happen. Should but probably will not. 

For the P RES support line serials get rid of a mandatory annual PWT shoot and go to a bi-annual PWT (like some other stuff on PWT). Trust me, you do not forget how to shoot overnight. Save ammo $$$. People in these positions get out there, wiggle through a PWT2, pass and do not touch a weapon until next year. They are shooting so we can put a check mark in the box. Stop it. 

For P RES, slow down or reduce concentration exercises (Ya, that hits my regiment). Focus P RES for most of the time on individual-section-platoon skills (infantry example).


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## Remius (20 Nov 2013)

ArmyRick:  I agree with most of what you wrote.  Getting rid of hangers on.  I'd also drop the guys that get class Bs and disapear until they need something.  Captains sitting in made up jobs just to keep buddies on strength.  Or the warm weather warriors that don't come out when the weather sucks.

I disagree though with your ideas about PWT and area concentrations.  Shooting is vital.  While you won't necessarily forget how to shoot it is a perishable skill that we should maintain.  Concentrations are an excellent tool to validate IT and is sometimes the only chance to put all the pieces together short of deploying.  Cutting these leads to holes in operational capability.


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## Kirkhill (20 Nov 2013)

Like Crantor I agree with most of what you wrote Rick.  Again, like him I think that PWT is a core skill.

If it were my dollars to save I think I would be discarding any kind of group training in the Reserves and focus entirely on individual training.  Instead of using dollars to take a small body into the field for a tactical exercise of limited value spend it on ammunition for both personal weapons and the occasional crew served weapon.

Together with skills like  comms, navigation, cross country driving in available vehicles, first aid, a bit of explosives and pyro, you could make a very interesting syllabus for the occasional soldier, and leave a body of people with skills that could be integrated into a reg force organization as necessary.

Shooting government ammunition is very popular.


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## OldSolduer (20 Nov 2013)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Like Crantor I agree with most of what you wrote Rick.  Again, like him I think that PWT is a core skill.
> 
> If it were my dollars to save I think I would be discarding any kind of group training in the Reserves and focus entirely on individual training.  Instead of using dollars to take a small body into the field for a tactical exercise of limited value spend it on ammunition for both personal weapons and the occasional crew served weapon.
> 
> ...



What you have all said is good, and it is a debate the PRes has to have. We cannot be all things to all people. We need our role and we need to stick to it.


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## Halifax Tar (20 Nov 2013)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> What you have all said is good, and it is a debate the PRes has to have. We cannot be all things to all people. We need our role and we need to stick to it.



I wonder if you think the ideas would work for the Naval and Air reserves.  Or are these three such different beasts that they would need three different approaches ?


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## Remius (20 Nov 2013)

To be honest i think the NAVres has it right.  I believe they don't exercise during the year but have training events on tuesdays and on weekends but they certainly aren't always on ships or doing true naval exercises during the year (coastal units not withstanding) but focus on sailor and soldier skills until tehy are deployed for summer taskings and class b on MCVDs.  I could be wrong though.  

This would be a good approach for the army reserves.  Focus on IT and section level (maybe platoon) drills and validate that during summer concentrations.  Most units can't exercise beyond the platoon level anyways and CSMs and Coy commanders would only truly benefit during the concentrations anyway.  They likely don't get much at the unit level beyond admin.  Some exceptions exist but are rare.


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## a_majoor (20 Nov 2013)

A bit conflicted on the CT portion.

On the one hand, CT allows you to validate the skills you have in a realistic manner and gives the trroops something to work towards. Without some sort of validation/reward training and many of the simulators become worthless as troops lose motivation.

OTOH many reserve exercises turn into a mad scramble to pack as much "training" into a 72 hr period as humanly possible. Things are rushed, done in a half assed manner or can't be pulled off because the forcasted numbers of people didn't get off the bus. Few proper AARs ever get done either. This leads to total cluster f***s like SG 13; where the troops attacking fixed enemy positions (in a quarry and in a MOUT site) took up to 70% casualties. They didn't train _well enough_ to pull that off, so the huge collective training bill for a concentration had very little result (and how many lessons learned from that are going to be incorporated into SG 14 I wonder?).

So by all means do CT, but focus on one particular aspect per training event, and treat it like practicing a team sport: do the drills, have an AAR, reset and do it again. Rinse, repeat.


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## ArmyRick (20 Nov 2013)

To cover off what I am talking about reference PWTs.

For most infantry units, I would like to see the hustle to get EVERYBODY PWT shot every year dropped. Its a waste. Yes shooting is a core skill. Its very relevant for most soldiers. What I am against is having Joe Clerk and Bob Supply Tech in the Springfield Rifles, dragged out, shoot their token (thats how it is treated) PWT. They do it NOT for the aim of ensuring they maintain good soldier skills but for the aim of saying "Yay, we have 86% qualified PWT vice 82% in our unit".

So what is the alternative? How about returning to proper range weekends. Shoot, shoot, shoot, (practice) and then do your PWT. SHoot for the purpose of getting better or maintaining your skills. Look at what really happens. In both worlds.

Thucydides, you hit the nail on the head. If we are gonna do CT, lets do it right and make it worthwhile and steer clear of cluster f*cks


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## ArmyRick (20 Nov 2013)

Since money is disappearing lets have the non-pointy end troops shoot PWT every second year (save ammo $$$). Just one small idea. Read carefully what I wrote above and think. Something or many things have to go. Money is tight and getting tighter. 

Or we could say lets do it all, give up none of our training while money disappears. Units like 2 RCR can have 250 all ranks and Algonquin regiment can have 35 all ranks on unit strength. Bad idea huh? 

There has to be a MAIN EFFORT and that is where the training must be focused.


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## Rifleman62 (20 Nov 2013)

ArmyRick: 





> Since money is disappearing lets have the non-pointy end troops shoot PWT every second year (save ammo $$$).



Every year I would ask Bde HQ for all natures of ammo unexpanded by all the units near the end of the fiscal year. Negotiate with Bde staff off and on as the FY end approached. 

Our Annual Trg Plan always had range shoots for Sep, Apr (unexpanded ammo wkend) and Jun. Shilo Ranges were booked for a Apr wkend for all natures, as it was easier to turn off than to turn on at the last minute. Weather could/was a problem though.

All ranks in the unit at least did a familiarization shoot with the C6 and C9 MG's , grenade launchers, insert M-72, Carl G. Jun was a workup shoot, PWT, 





> {Shoot, shoot, shoot, (practice)


and Sep was the qualifying PWT .

Everyone qualified with the pistol every year as nobody used the 9MM ammo but us. We also fired the 9mm in the indoor ranges prior to the range shoots. Twice we had the RCMP (D Div was 2 blocks away) conduct tactical pistol trg. How many soldiers get to fire a pistol? We did at least twice a year, outdoor and once indoor.

The soldiers loved it. They had confidence in their ability, and skills as SOLDIERS. Cool factor in the JR also.

This was a PRes Svc Bn.

There is ALWAYS ammo turned in. Use it!


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## ArmyRick (20 Nov 2013)

Your completely missing the point. Completely. Go back, re-read. This is about finding SAVINGS in defence spending. I am not running a thread about IBTS. 

What must be sacrificed? What must we give up? Dollars are going to get clawed back. Yes, there may be surplus ammo, can not always rely on it. Bonus if you can get it. You should know that. If hope is not a COA, then neither is begging, praying, dealing, etc, etc.

If you were a brigade commander for a P Res brigade and someone said you had to cut XX million dollars out of your budget, where do you think it should come out? 

I will say this, we be prepared to find efficiencies somewhere in cost savings in the near future and propose them. Otherwise we get told something like "you can recruit five people this year" or "your unit gets 4 weekend exercises this training year". Following my drift?


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## a_majoor (20 Nov 2013)

Probably the biggest saving for the PRes is the same as where savings in the RegF shoud come from: the bloated overhead.

Realistically, few reserve "Battalions" or "Regiments" parade more than an actual Coy sized unit in any location, and many nights and weekends we see reinforced platoons/troops on the road, overseen by a LCol, RSM, a hocky sock of Majors, Captains, MWO's etc. Bde Headquarters are also great places to visit with a flamethrower, during my time at 31 CBGHQ we had a double handfull of ACOS positions manned by LCols who had finished their command tours (this on top of the "real" positions like BComd, COS and one specialist Col; the Bde Surgeon). Remember too this is on top of the 15 LCols and staffs for the 15 units.....

Most units could be comfortably run by a Major, and virtually all the ACOS positions were the sort being sniped upthread. If we _really_ have a special project that needs that much horsepower, these LCols could be drawn from the Sup Reserve list, given a 30 day contract to get the job done and a thank you note at the end. As for the need for senior officers to run the various branches, my boss, the G6, was a Capt, and I worked as acting branch head at my rank when my boss was away for a tour.


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## MilEME09 (21 Nov 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Probably the biggest saving for the PRes is the same as where savings in the RegF shoud come from: the bloated overhead.
> 
> Realistically, few reserve "Battalions" or "Regiments" parade more than an actual Coy sized unit in any location



Just to clarify, most PRes "battalions" are only authorized to have the strength of a Coy caping out at around 120~ personal at max authorized strength. Now there are exceptions to this, but it just shows how top heavy the CF is, in my unit we have a LCol CO, Maj DCO, 2 Maj OC's, 2 Maj Coy 2 IC's, 8 Capt's filling various op's and training roles, 2 Lt's as platoon commanders, and finally 2 2Lt's as platoon 2IC's. If a unit only has one bloody platoon why the hell does it need a OC and a platoon commander? it can be merged into one position. Most of these officers I'd love to see knocked out because they don't know a thing about even running a proper range let alone command troops in the field. Not to mention most of them could declare their toes MIA....but that's a different story and issue


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## chrisf (21 Nov 2013)

So if we eliminate collective and concentration training, how do you folks propose to effectively train logistics and support elements?

I've spent far too much time suffering through leaders in the militia who have absolutely no grasp of anything beyond a 48 hours with a 20 man platoon... What the hell is a a resupply? We brought more than enough rations and water for the whole weekend and the truck has a full tank... What the hell are comms? We're close enough to shout at each other... You don't need a maintenance plan, we can just turn everything in on Sunday.

Obviously there's a finite pot of money, but completely eliminating everything except individual training??? Unless it's john Rambo going through that individual training, the results won't be pretty.


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## ArmyRick (21 Nov 2013)

A sig op, 

Watch the attitude. I was reg force, I understand life on both sides of the fence. Militia? It's the primary reserve. Militia is a term long gone.

As far as collective training, we are very limited in what we can do on the weekend and at best we do one an ARCG week long ex in winter and usually a week long ex in the summer if budgets allow.

First off, for weekend exercises, I have seen attempts to pull brigade units together to loosely form a battle group size exercise (small BG). Often it turns into a giant shyte show. Usually very little training value for the troops and not much more for command staff.

Command ex such as JANUS I found to be good and budget worthy training tools, not to mention its a lot easier dealing on time and space when you do not have troops to deploy.

Focus on basic individual skills, move to section skills (or crew or gun det, you get the point). Then moving to platoon level training. It is useless to train collectively when the lower level training effect has not been achieved. Yes I get that logistics, combat support, etc has to be trained. Not at the expense of lower level trig.


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## Halifax Tar (21 Nov 2013)

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> So if we eliminate collective and concentration training, how do you folks propose to effectively train logistics and support elements?



Its funny you bring this up.  My working with the Army Reserve is little but we did take a number of army reserve sup techs with us on 1-10.  These troops were good soldiers with a solid foundation of soldiering skills.

Once it came time to drive a forklift, pack a pallet, pick stores or use the supply system they were very inexperienced to the point where they couldn't read a location system; and seemed put off by having to do supply work,  most thought they were some kind of infantry soldiers with a second job. 

I have to wonder what is easier to teach, basic soldiering skills or competency in ones trade.  Perhaps when it comes to Army Reserve CSS folks we should be ensuring an understanding of their primary job and a competency in that field is established as the basic soldiering skills needed for a CSS troop can be brought up to speed with a few months pre-deployment training.


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2013)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> ... Yes I get that logistics, combat support, etc has to be trained. Not at the expense of lower level trig.



.... and Professionals study Logistics....

I am firmly of the opinion that whatever Reserve structure is adopted the biggest bill should be / must be the bill for a full time support staff to maintain the kit, plan the training and execute it.  

Reservists, generally, just don't have the time to learn the intricacies of running an organization much less actually do all the work to ensure all the moving parts keep working.

If there is to be a Reserve training system that is effective then it has to be staffed by Reg Force PYs.  And that includes Reg Force mechanics and techs - the very trades that appear to be in short supply.

I believe that the bill can be reduced by having the Reserve focus on individual skills and supply them with civilian model, two axle vehicles that anyone with a common driver's licence can drive and that can be supplied and maintained through local dealerships.

All collective training would be done under the auspices of and in conjunction with Reg Force training.

I think I am going to have to apply for a Danish passport (I must have some Viking blood in me somewhere).  I find myself constantly seeing common sense solutions there.

The Danes have Armed Forces that are made up of the all aspects of Danish society.  They still have the "trained but unwilling" conscripts although that portion of the force is decreasing annually.  They also have "Full time" soldiers that are both fully trained and fully willing but the contracts on which they are engaged are variable - everything from home service to Afghanistan.  Not everybody signs up on the same terms.  But all members of a unit seem to be engaged on a common contract.  

The Danish Reserves are time expired trained soldiers that can be called back to the colours - either for active service or for training as required.

The final element of the Danish system is the Homeguard.  This element is made up of local unpaid volunteers, with no military background, that are trained by a Regular Force element in individual/crew/section skills to supply point defence to the local community as well as disaster relief.

Danish Homeguard  Their terms of reference are broadly similar to those of our Canadian Rangers.

Danish Army Personnel - Case Study


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## Edward Campbell (21 Nov 2013)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> .... and Professionals study Logistics....
> 
> I am firmly of the opinion that whatever Reserve structure is adopted the biggest bill should be / must be the bill for a full time support staff to maintain the kit, plan the training and execute it.
> 
> ...




So you're saying, I guess, that the full time, professional, standing army should be weighted more towards combat support and combat service support _specialists_ with greater, concomitant emphasis being given to _reserves_ that can provide lots of adequately trained individual (and even a few small unit) augmentees to regular force combat arms units ... right?


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## Fishbone Jones (21 Nov 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> So you're saying, I guess, that the full time, professional, standing army should be weighted more towards combat support and combat service support _specialists_ with greater, concomitant emphasis being given to _reserves_ that can provide lots of adequately trained individual (and even a few small unit) augmentees to regular force combat arms units ... right?



Reg Force in the rear with the gear and the PRes as cannon fodder? :Tin-Foil-Hat: ;D


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## MilEME09 (21 Nov 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> So you're saying, I guess, that the full time, professional, standing army should be weighted more towards combat support and combat service support _specialists_ with greater, concomitant emphasis being given to _reserves_ that can provide lots of adequately trained individual (and even a few small unit) augmentees to regular force combat arms units ... right?



Makes no sense to me, your just taking techs away from the reg force, the major problem with PRes CSS I find is the CoC really has no clue what we need for training as techs. As a result we have techs that have done their trade a hand full of times in 10 years. These members are more then willing to put the time in to get trucks running, re-barrel rifles, and get supplies for the unit and run clothing stores, but the chain gives us maybe a day every few months to do things and have a poor image of what we do even if we tell them what we do.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Nov 2013)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Reg Force in the rear with the gear and the PRes as cannon fodder? :Tin-Foil-Hat: ;D




That's one way of looking at, to be sure ... but: equally surely, the points Kirkhill raises are valid and, if that's so, then the _solution_ is equally obvious: more support and service support _regulars_. Given that we are not getting any more, new PYs anytime soon that leaves two options:

     1. Fire a whole shitload of generals and colonels and replace them , one for one, with vehicle techs and admin clerks and supply people and so on ~ a good great choice, but unlikely; or

     2. Move some (several hundred) combat arms establishment "lines" to the reserves and fill the resulting _regular_ vacancies with support troops, many of whom, along with some additional combat arms people,
         will be supporting the reserves.


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## George Wallace (21 Nov 2013)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Its funny you bring this up.  My working with the Army Reserve is little but we did take a number of army reserve sup techs with us on 1-10.  These troops were good soldiers with a solid foundation of soldiering skills.
> 
> Once it came time to drive a forklift, pack a pallet, pick stores or use the supply system they were very inexperienced to the point where they couldn't read a location system; and seemed put off by having to do supply work,  most thought they were some kind of infantry soldiers with a second job.
> 
> I have to wonder what is easier to teach, basic soldiering skills or competency in ones trade.  Perhaps when it comes to Army Reserve CSS folks we should be ensuring an understanding of their primary job and a competency in that field is established as the basic soldiering skills needed for a CSS troop can be brought up to speed with a few months pre-deployment training.



This is one of the major communication gaps between the Regular Force and the Reserves.  Regular Force members can not comprehend the fact that unlike them, the Reservist can not at the drop of a hat go on career courses.  They require a good amount of lead time to arrange Leave from their Civilian jobs to attend a Crse.  That is if there is even a Crse to begin with.  If there are limited numbers of positions on Reg Force Crses for Reservists, then there is a long line up of people nominated and no guarantees that they will be choosen to attend.  That complicates any planning for absences from their Civilian job; do they get the crse or not and when will they know for sure.  The shortages of spaces on a crse, or even the crse itself, compounds the amount of Trades Trg Reservists in some Trades will progress through.  Availability of resources, equipment, continuation trg, etc. after having a crse is also important.  Without that, knowledge fade occurs.  

So; yes it is easier to train them on their basic soldier skills at their unit on regular training nights and weekends.


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## George Wallace (21 Nov 2013)

We have already seen the 10/90 Bns in the past.  They failed.  Perhaps we didn't give them the time to actually become effective; but at the end of the day, they were done away with and returned to full Regular Force Bns.

I remember years ago, the idea being bounced around in the RCD lines, before the whole unit went to Coyotes and became Recce, of having a Troop of Reservists join the Regiment as Class B Callouts to fill a Recce Troop of jeeps/Iltis/G Wagen.   They would have been drawn from all of the LFCA Armour units.  Funding and vehicle shortages ended that idea before it ever took off in any serious planning.


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> So you're saying, I guess, that the full time, professional, standing army should be weighted more towards combat support and combat service support _specialists_ with greater, concomitant emphasis being given to _reserves_ that can provide lots of adequately trained individual (and even a few small unit) augmentees to regular force combat arms units ... right?



ERC, 

I don't know if that _should_ be the structure, it is certainly the one that I favour, and - if the Total Force construct is to be a reality - is really the only way that I can see to make it work.   

I like the idea, common in Europe, of active units having a Repl pool of Augmentees (reservists generally now)  that they can call upon to squeeze triggers and drive vehicles and otherwise flesh out the ranks.  They use this means to add bodies to sections, sections to platoons and platoons to companies.  I don't think they do much about the platoon level these days.  (ie no fielding of reserve brigades).

The alternative, in my view,  is to go back to a very small, highly trained professional force and a completely separate, and unequal, militia for home service tasks.


MilEME09....

The point that you are making is that time is needed to maintain kit.  I agree entirely.  Are you willing to do that on an unpaid basis?  Or do you expect to be paid for the service?  If you expect to be paid for the service, out of class B or class C dollars, in what way are you different to a Reg Force PY?

I have no doubt that your skills are up to the task but clearly you feel your "management" is not up to the task.  Would you be better served with "management" that has more time to devote to:
using your time wisely;
ensuring that you have the necessary training;
ensuring that you have the necessary parts, tools and consummables to fix the problem before you;
and conducting the appropriate quality control before returning the "finished" product back to the ungrateful wretches who broke it in the first place?

And Recceguy.....not far off the mark.  Although I would prefer that the government's Afghanistans, Bosnias, Haitis and Rwandas be handled by whatever pool of Expeditionary Regulars they see fit to fund, with augmentation by volunteers from the Reserves.


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## chrisf (21 Nov 2013)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Watch the attitude. I was reg force, I understand life on both sides of the fence. Militia? It's the primary reserve. Militia is a term long gone.



As a reservist myself, the word militia was intentionally and carefully chosen in that case.

There's plenty of good troops in the reserves, there's plenty of bad troops in the reserves, that's no different than the reg-force. There's also good leaders and bad leaders.

Far far far to often though, particularly as a signaler sitting manning a CP, I've seen exercises fall apart at the command and control level, and the logistics level, because despite having read about these things and been taught about them, leaders have absolutely no idea how to actually use them. Some are good, many are not.

If we don't train as an army, how do we call ourselves an army? If you pump all your resources into training individuals as individuals, and then expect them to come together when needed, with little to no experience doing that, how is that not a militia?

We (our local army units, sometimes the local nav-res unit, as well as the air-res and even the rangers have shown up) have been having great success with collective training... the "cramming a brigade exercises into a weekend" sort. Immediately after the last ARCON ex, we started running our own mini  version. It was very much a gong-show the first couple of years, but got better each time, as people learned, it's getting pretty effective now.

Of course there's no point in exercising the bigger stuff, if the individuals can't do their jobs, but we've been getting pretty good at integrating individual and section training into the larger training.


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## MilEME09 (21 Nov 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is one of the major communication gaps between the Regular Force and the Reserves.  Regular Force members can not comprehend the fact that unlike them, the Reservist can not at the drop of a hat go on career courses.  They require a good amount of lead time to arrange Leave from their Civilian jobs to attend a Crse.  That is if there is even a Crse to begin with.  If there are limited numbers of positions on Reg Force Crses for Reservists, then there is a long line up of people nominated and no guarantees that they will be choosen to attend.  That complicates any planning for absences from their Civilian job; do they get the crse or not and when will they know for sure.  The shortages of spaces on a crse, or even the crse itself, compounds the amount of Trades Trg Reservists in some Trades will progress through.  Availability of resources, equipment, continuation trg, etc. after having a crse is also important.  Without that, knowledge fade occurs.
> 
> So; yes it is easier to train them on their basic soldier skills at their unit on regular training nights and weekends.




This about sums it up, and at the same time, more for CSS since I don't know how it is in the combat arms, what motivation does a soldier have to go on a career course if when he or she returns to the unit they won't use the skills they learned? Then to top it off take heat from the chain of command when we cant do anything on a support exercise because only six people showed up and are trying to do the work of 20, and cant do the work anyway cause of a lack of tools. If we are to make some cuts, or more money i should say, I think we could save money if we actually had people who knew how to run things properly. I mean if your planning for $26,000 weekend EX for an expected 35 people and 15 show up, that adds up over the course of a training year as wasted funds.


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> We have already seen the 10/90 Bns in the past.  They failed.  Perhaps we didn't give them the time to actually become effective; but at the end of the day, they were done away with and returned to full Regular Force Bns.
> 
> I remember years ago, the idea being bounced around in the RCD lines, before the whole unit went to Coyotes and became Recce, of having a Troop of Reservists join the Regiment as Class B Callouts to fill a Recce Troop of jeeps/Iltis/G Wagen.   They would have been drawn from all of the LFCA Armour units.  Funding and vehicle shortages ended that idea before it ever took off in any serious planning.



Wow.   I'm having trouble keeping up here.

George - You hit the nail on the head - funding and vehicle shortages. It doesn't really matter whose ox is gored, somebody's ox is going to be gored.  

The point I am trying to make is that any effective organization is going to spend money.  If there are to be Reserves then money needs to be spent on them.  

Is it realistic that you can turn part-time volunteers into effective Reserves?   To be honest I am not convinced.  I think I would sooner see Reserves supplied from all those Reg Force types that are seeking release into the Alberta economy.  I would be inclined to grant conditional releases to the Supp List, with a cash value for staying engaged, and bringing those troops back every couple of years for paid refreshers.

The Homeguard model of unpaid volunteers, supplemented with a cadre of full time instructors and administrators, does seem to be a cheap way to ensure "community engagement".

I have to break off now and go to work - so I apologize in advance for not continuing the discussion.


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Nov 2013)

I found as a young Troop Leader and then Battle Captain in the reserves circa 1989-1997 that the best training was weekend ranges and summer concentrations. The weekend ranges were actually useful and you could get basic soldiering done in the time allotted. This was true whether for personal weapons or Cougars. The summer concentrations let you actually get some tactical development going. I found the Thursday nights to be not very useful outside of the social aspect of going to the mess. 

I should add that we had a few table top/cloth model exercises on weekends that were very useful.

I did an exchange with a Unites States Marine Corps reserve battalion, and they had one weekend a month with a two week Annual Training (AT) event. The monthly weekend was always shooting. The AT was somewhere and something interesting (mountain my year, amphib the next, Norway the year before etc).

If we were looking to save money but preserve effectiveness, my thought would be to cut evening parades and focus on one range weekend a month plus an annual two week concentration.


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## Dissident (21 Nov 2013)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> If we were looking to save money but preserve effectiveness, my thought would be to cut evening parades and focus on one range weekend a month plus an annual two week concentration.



I could live with that. Quite easily as a matter of fact. Especially if this get us trigger time on weapon system we don't get enough of and allow us to do live fire mounted drill.


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## dapaterson (21 Nov 2013)

Ideally, the Sept-May training year should work build from individual skills in the fall, to small groups (det / section) in the winter, to section/platoon in the spring, with summer exercsies to confirm the platoons.  Lather, rinse, repeat.

Training evenings can be useful.  A month of training should have about one night of annual required briefings (IBTS etc); one night of refreshers for the upcoming exercise combined with stores & equipment prep; one night of post- exercise drills (clean up kit etc) plus one night geared towards PD/fitness (for support trades, much of that could be consumed with trade-specific work to maintain skillsets).

Building a regular, predictable training cycle makes it easier on planners and easier on the troops - they know what to expect and can see how things fit together.


Or someone can say around 18:30, "Hell, it's a training night.  Better think up something quick!"


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## ArmyRick (21 Nov 2013)

Training nights in my regiment are very useful. TOETs for troops, Teaching weapons drills for potential MCPLs, walk through and rehearsals of sect and platoon drills, etc.

My regiment, from sept to now we have covered off on thursday nights, C7, C6 Light and SF, C9, Grenade, M203, M72, Carl G, Shotgun, Lee enfield, as well as other patrol, offensive ops, etc.

Now having said that, what is more useful, weekend vs weeknights, weekends hands down! But if we only do weekends, we risk a soldier going NES very easily and quickly. A slippery slope.


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## Rifleman62 (21 Nov 2013)

A idea we used was to print and distribute for all ranks, the annual trg plan calendar in a flip calendar booklet that fit in the cbt shirt pocket. All trg days/nights, FTX's. Range shoots. CO's Pde (once per month), Solder's Xmas Dinner,  etc, etc. The trg days/wkends all had a short summary of the activities for that period. FTX's had location, aim, skills in basic form.

BP was incorporated for FTX's i.e. four weeks out the Coy Comd issued OO, three weeks out the Pl Comd issued OO's, two weeks out the Sect Comd issued OO's, one week out, confirmatory OO for the OIC Ex. This was printed in the calender, so everyone knew what was to happen and the leaders knew what was expected.

Range shoots had preliminary trg listed including TEWTS on the wpns and indoor trg secessions. We used the indoor wpn trainer more than all the units in Minto Armoury. 

If something fell through the cracks as it sometimes did on a Tuesday night - down to the wpn trainer (I forget what it is called!!)

This did save money because it improved retention. The unit did not fool around with NES. You paraded or you where out. All were briefed on this during the annual briefing to all ranks on the Bde approved trg plan. The soldiers appreciated getting rid of the dead wood.

Print extra for pers who join the unit later on in the year, including those who enroll and will be off to Garrison for BMT.

Don't get me going on the PRes CSS trg. DAP knows the four/five year study I did on the CF Schools complete failure of trg PRes CSS soldiers.


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## MilEME09 (21 Nov 2013)

How long ago did you do that study and is there a place to view it?


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## Rifleman62 (22 Nov 2013)

Nov 05.  I will try to condense.


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## MilEME09 (22 Nov 2013)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Nov 05.  I will try to condense.



Downloading the entire report would be fine too if that's easier for you


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## Stoker (22 Nov 2013)

Crantor said:
			
		

> To be honest i think the NAVres has it right.  I believe they don't exercise during the year but have training events on tuesdays and on weekends but they certainly aren't always on ships or doing true naval exercises during the year (coastal units not withstanding) but focus on sailor and soldier skills until tehy are deployed for summer taskings and class b on MCVDs.  I could be wrong though.
> 
> This would be a good approach for the army reserves.  Focus on IT and section level (maybe platoon) drills and validate that during summer concentrations.  Most units can't exercise beyond the platoon level anyways and CSMs and Coy commanders would only truly benefit during the concentrations anyway.  They likely don't get much at the unit level beyond admin.  Some exceptions exist but are rare.



I for one would like to see NAVRES eliminated as a formation and fleet school Quebec closed and amalgamated into the fleet schools in Halifax.  At one point NAVRES was actually in Halifax and reserve trades in fleet schools on both coasts. I know there is political considerations, but still a good idea.


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## kratz (22 Nov 2013)

I have to disagree with you Chief Stoker on your points.

The very reasons NAVRES appear "to have it together", is they own their reservists.
A positive example is that we are the only PRes with our own Career Managers.
Following your suggestion, we would not have CMs or be at higher risk of being
rated less than our actual ability for our trade/platform.

There are well deserved reasons all the historical SHAD and other negative comments 
were used to describe naval reservists. 

Through the past 20 years, in many areas, standards set by NAVRES, but virtue of being it's own formation, 
have shown to have been higher than the other formations. ie: days at sea, NRTD, Port Security
Those tasks and recognition for them would not have been realized under your suggestion.

Aside from headquarters and CFNOS (Q), what savings vice good would be achieved against
the independence to meet the assigned tasks? Cutting for saving sake is the worst answer.


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## Stoker (22 Nov 2013)

kratz said:
			
		

> I have to disagree with you Chief Stoker on your points.
> 
> The very reasons NAVRES appear "to have it together", is they own their reservists.
> A positive example is that we are the only PRes with our own Career Managers.
> ...



Not all NAVRES CM's are reservists such as my CM who is a regular force Mar Eng. Res CM can continue in Ottawa or Halifax. Many NAVRES trades are done in other fleet schools anyways and with all trades eventually being the same as their regular force counterparts they could easily accommodated in the various fleet schools just as it was done before and close proximity to the ships would be beneficial. Right now people are flown back and forth at significant cost to do various modules on the ships. I personally think the reason why there is such a divide between res and reg is that NAVRES is tucked away in Quebec City filled with people who never go to sea. We would be better served in my opinion to be absorbed in MARLANT, with res billets of course. Even moving NAVRES back to Halifax like it was in the early eighties, probably would want more people to actually want to work there!


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## WLSC (22 Nov 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Probably the biggest saving for the PRes is the same as where savings in the RegF shoud come from: the bloated overhead.
> 
> Realistically, few reserve "Battalions" or "Regiments" parade more than an actual Coy sized unit in any location, and many nights and weekends we see reinforced platoons/troops on the road, overseen by a LCol, RSM, a hocky sock of Majors, Captains, MWO's etc. Bde Headquarters are also great places to visit with a flamethrower, during my time at 31 CBGHQ we had a double handfull of ACOS positions manned by LCols who had finished their command tours (this on top of the "real" positions like BComd, COS and one specialist Col; the Bde Surgeon). Remember too this is on top of the 15 LCols and staffs for the 15 units.....
> 
> Most units could be comfortably run by a Major, and virtually all the ACOS positions were the sort being sniped upthread. If we _really_ have a special project that needs that much horsepower, these LCols could be drawn from the Sup Reserve list, given a 30 day contract to get the job done and a thank you note at the end. As for the need for senior officers to run the various branches, my boss, the G6, was a Capt, and I worked as acting branch head at my rank when my boss was away for a tour.



You are right but...

Since the regiment are not combat organisation but more of a family name, do not put the Majors and MWO doing the tactical and the institutional in the same time.  That's purely madness.

His there to much units ? Yes.  Can we do things differently ? Yes.  Will it happen ?  Dont know, dont thing so.  34 GBC is quite lucky to have 3/4 of its units IVO the Montreal island, this solution might not work for each CBG.  Can we, in Montreal, out of the 5 regiments (2 franco and 3 anglo) have 2 battalions (one franco, one anglo) on the island and move one (franco) on the South shore ? Yes.  Will it be done, dont know but feasable.  Can we amalgamate some units so all those regimental institution could be manager at the right level ? Yes.  Will it be done, I really dont think it will.    

Those money saving need to be seen in all the defence spending, where the big fish are, should we begin at the tactical level ?  Dont know ether but I would say, for once, begin way higher.

If we really go and push the issue of having regiment be commended by Majors, push the logic to the limit and amalgamate.  Do not let a poor 30 years old Majors and his MWO dealing with career management, institutions, training, and every thing else alone.

As for training, we should go away from doing every thing individual training.  It was supposed to be the miracle system,and this is why we had 14 months work-up training.  No a lot remembered how to do the basics as a unit.  We should aim to go back to the old ratio of 40 indiv & 60 collective but, structure properlly so the collective training could be use to do OJT so it could be validated.  In short, aim the old ratio but not the old way of doing business wich was some time, scarry.  

We will never have the perfect system, just the best we can hmake out of it and make it work.

Sorry to bring and ''old'' reply.


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## MilEME09 (22 Nov 2013)

FusMR said:
			
		

> As for training, we should go away from doing every thing individual training.  It was supposed to be the miracle system,and this is why we had 14 months work-up training.  No a lot remembered how to do the basics as a unit.  We should aim to go back to the old ratio of 40 indiv & 60 collective but, structure properlly so the collective training could be use to do OJT so it could be validated.  In short, aim the old ratio but not the old way of doing business wich was some time, scarry.



I think part of this too is that many reserve units try to compress to many concepts into one training year, as a result budget is spent trying to cover all these issues. I would sooner see Reserve units use a cycle system where we focus on more specific training goals in a year and change roles the following year and so on. by putting the focus on one type of training I think that could save some money.


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## brihard (22 Nov 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think part of this too is that many reserve units try to compress to many concepts into one training year, as a result budget is spent trying to cover all these issues. I would sooner see Reserve units use a cycle system where we focus on more specific training goals in a year and change roles the following year and so on. by putting the focus on one type of training I think that could save some money.



I can only speak from my experience as the Ops/Trg NCO in one unit. I basically designed much of a number of our exercises for a training year, and there was pressure to try to capture as much collective BTS as possible within single (short) exercises. It ended up forcing us to 'script' tacical scenarios more than I think would have been optimal... But then I think this has always been a problem within the reserves.

It's hard to get much done in a Friday evening - Sunday afternoon exercise. I think most units try to do far too much in that time. There is also often a strong push to operate at platoon level when realistically we should be focusing on the sections and, I would content, worrying about platoons only when doing brigade collective stuff where those platoon commanders get a decent context to operate within. By the time we got to those exercises we'd have sections much better able to do things at their level and roll more quickly into platoon tasks. Just my $.02.

An abandonment of CT within the reserves though? No and hell no. Our leadership need to train too.


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## WLSC (23 Nov 2013)

Brihard said:
			
		

> I can only speak from my experience as the Ops/Trg NCO in one unit. I basically designed much of a number of our exercises for a training year, and there was pressure to try to capture as much collective BTS as possible within single (short) exercises. It ended up forcing us to 'script' tacical scenarios more than I think would have been optimal... But then I think this has always been a problem within the reserves.
> 
> It's hard to get much done in a Friday evening - Sunday afternoon exercise. I think most units try to do far too much in that time. There is also often a strong push to operate at platoon level when realistically we should be focusing on the sections and, I would content, worrying about platoons only when doing brigade collective stuff where those platoon commanders get a decent context to operate within. By the time we got to those exercises we'd have sections much better able to do things at their level and roll more quickly into platoon tasks. Just my $.02.
> 
> An abandonment of CT within the reserves though? No and hell no. Our leadership need to train too.



From time to time, there is that good idea fery that comes and try to push to much thing in an exercise.  But, most of the time, in 2 div, the wisdom prevail an we stick to our limited things to do in one exercise.  The BTS are covert during the years training.


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## MilEME09 (23 Nov 2013)

Brihard said:
			
		

> I can only speak from my experience as the Ops/Trg NCO in one unit. I basically designed much of a number of our exercises for a training year, and there was pressure to try to capture as much collective BTS as possible within single (short) exercises. It ended up forcing us to 'script' tacical scenarios more than I think would have been optimal... But then I think this has always been a problem within the reserves.
> 
> It's hard to get much done in a Friday evening - Sunday afternoon exercise. I think most units try to do far too much in that time. There is also often a strong push to operate at platoon level when realistically we should be focusing on the sections and, I would content, worrying about platoons only when doing brigade collective stuff where those platoon commanders get a decent context to operate within. By the time we got to those exercises we'd have sections much better able to do things at their level and roll more quickly into platoon tasks. Just my $.02.
> 
> An abandonment of CT within the reserves though? No and hell no. Our leadership need to train too.




CT is valuable for sure, at the Reserve CSS level, nothing ever goes past section level, atleast in my unit. As my signature block suggests (its a qoute from my section commander) my unit has very low turn out due to various major issues. What if though we move some BTS in the reserves to every two years you need a check in the box, not every year? This could give a few more weekends a year to devote to section level training. In my unit a few years ago we trialed a modified training calendar we eliminated 2 wednesday nights and combined them into an extra saturday of training. General idea is more can be done with a full day (especially in CSS) then we can do in a 3 hour parade night. Some how this has saved money set aside for class A pay within the unit, and increased productivity in the unit.


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## Rifleman62 (23 Nov 2013)

This is the presentation I did on CSS Trg as of Nov 05. I bet there are still many of the same problems, although some of it is stale dated. Some pertains only to 38 CBG.

It was sent out of the chain of command to everyone I could think of: 2 Army G4's, the LFA G4's, school Commandants, reserve trg cell Gagetown, etc, etc. 

The EME Branch was really screwing around with Army PRes trg as you will see. The notes to the slides amplify the trg problems not only for the Army CSS, but in some cases all Army PRes.

Anyway, my research and opinion at the time. It was difficult to pry the stats from the schools, especially EME. 

In four parts:

*Slide 5 Notes:* We do not have the capability to do Close Support. We do Integral Support, which does not make a difference to the soldier. The 38 CBG Infantry units NEVER establish a CP with command and administration radio nets. Their officers have lost this skill. Their Echelon (CQMS), carries all supplies needed for a weekend. What happens when they have to operate for longer than 36 hours? They will not know how. When we support them it is a matter of liaison and figuring it out from a master events schedule (if there is one!). I have requested Brigade HQ to include Infantry CP BTS’s for 2005/6 Operating Plan.

*Side 7 Notes:* Part of this problem of getting MSE Op’s qualified QL3 has been alleviated by conducting QL3 Part 1 Conversion (must be Driver Wheeled qualified as a course prerequisite) This means a soldier would be able to get qualified QL3 in one summer, if course vacancies are available, and the soldier was able to get qualified Driver Wheeled during winter LHQ training cycle.

*Slide 10 Notes: * A LFWA QL3/2 was conducted in 1999, 2003 and in 2005. Three courses in 7+ years (as far as my records go back) for 7 Reserve Svc Bn’s!  17 Svc Bn got one soldier (waited 5 years) on a Borden course in 2004. 
A complete QL3/1 was not conducted by LFWA in the summer of 2005. MSE Ops who completed BMQ or SQ during the Winter CITY cycle were, of course, not qualified Driver Wheeled, and consequently did not receive any training. If we can load a soldier on EME Common or a QL3 crse prior to SQ, we do so. That soldier will then take his out of sequence SQ training prior to QL4. 38 CBG only conducts SQ in the Winter CITY period as a COOP crse i.e. High School Student COOP 5 days a week which gives them a High School credit. Therefore the soldier invariably goes to WATC in the summer to get SQ equating to no change on how long to get qualified to MCpl.

*Slide 11 Notes:* 15, and 17 Svc Bns just got one HLVW in 05 ( 11 and 12 Svc Bns still share one HLVW??)  With only one HLVW it is difficult for the Drivers to stay qualified at 500 Km per year. Also, there will soon be a requirement for Veh Techs to be qualified HLVW Driver/airbrake as a prerequisite for QL3 training.

*Slide 17 Notes:* EME Common should be conducted by the ASGs, to ensure uniformity across the LFAs. There are several course packages out there, some only 20 training days. 17 (Wpg) Svc Bn has conducted this course 3 years (2003/4/5) during the summer. 38 CBG funded the 2003 and 04 courses. We just received a new CTP consisting of 31 training days. Suggest that EME Common and Driver Wheeled, including HLVW/airbrake be conducted back-to-back in order to get a soldier qualified to go on their QL3 the following summer. The Veh Tech should be qualified LSVW, MLVW, and HLVW. MILCOT, possibly, as repairs for this vehicle are conducted at dealerships (is MILCOT necessary??) A Veh Tech can’t fix them; if they cannot road test them.

*Slide 19 Notes:* Often only one Anglo course is conducted with 14 vacancies available for 17 Anglo Svc Bn’s. More later.

*Slide 21 Notes: *In 2007, QL3 course may be 52 training days, or 54 training days if the two blocks are not taken together. The new course may be validated summer of 2006. The QL5 course may also be reduced to 37 training days.

*Slide 23 Notes:* Only one Anglo course is conducted annually with 10 vacancies for the 17 Anglo Svc Bn’s. More later.

*Slide 25 Notes:* The difficulty with cooks, is the distinct lack of a 6A qualified cook to order rations so that the cooks can actually practice their trade in garrison and in the field. A Reg F 6A cook must be on the establishment of  P Res Svc Bns to build the new Food Svc Pl.  

*Slide 27 Notes:* Cook QL4 OJT is identical Reg/Res and is unrealistic. All training is in a Mess environment, none in the field. Includes baking!

Due to the length of time it takes to train Res cooks, seldom do we have a QL6A on unit strength (unless we are fortunate to get an ex Reg F soldier as 17 Svc Bn has – now on his way to Afghanistan – so now there will be no cook training, nor can we deploy our kitchen trailer for the next 10 months). Without a QL6A qualified cook, our cooks can basically do nothing as no one is qualified to draw fresh rations.  A perpetual problem for 17 Svc Bn is that as soon as the soldier gets qualified QL4, they join the Regular Force (3 in less than 2 years). I don’t have a problem with that, as long as they get the QL4 qualification on enrollment (which we had to fight for one ex 17 Svc Bn soldier). The role of the Reserves is augmentation, whether it is for an operation, or enrolling as a career choice. This does add to the problem, as MCpl’s are not being produced, therefore no supervision and no one to draw the rations = no cooking by the QL3’s who get frustrated and either quit, or OT (we lost 2 to the Infantry).
It would be a great benefit if the Reserve Svc Bn’s establishments were amended to include a Regular Force QL6A qualified cook (Sgt or MCpl). I brought this up at the 2003 CO, Svc Bn Working Group, and there was agreement to this proposal. Understand there is probably a Regular Force shortage here, and knitting 19 QL6A cooks would be a problem, but we can at least look at this.

*Slide 28 Notes:* RMS Clerk, in my opinion, is not a hard CSS MOC, as every unit requires the trade. There are a fair number of courses at various levels. The course content is the same Reg/Res. Some of the training has no relevance to the Reserve. The course teaches the Regular Force pay system, and not the Reserve RPSR. Could not the course be split off at some point to concurrently teach the Reserve candidates the RPSR?

I have not included a set of slides for Sup Tech. There are QL3 courses every summer, and QL5 courses are conducted with some regularity including QL6. Unfortunately, at least in 38 CBG, not many recruits select Sup Tech as their MOC and courses are cancelled. The course content is the same Reg/Res including the CFSS, which in spite of the CANLANGEN, we in 38 CBG do not have access to, other than look in.


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## Rifleman62 (23 Nov 2013)

Pt 2:

*Slide 2 Notes:* A very big IF, based on the number of vacancies available annually, course length, the unfunded/underfunded OJT requirement, etc.
A very big intangible here is that the soldier recruited in 2005, may NOT be the soldier who, if they were extremely lucky, and got all the required training every year, is leadership material. It may be the soldier that is recruited in 2006 or 7. Not every soldier recruited will be a MCpl. I say soldier, as with the limited number of course vacancies, we are only training, basically one soldier per MOC per year. This is why we have so few MCpls. More later.

*Slide 3 Notes:* What civilian employer will allow an employee a leave of absence for the length of the QL3 and QL5 courses, to P Res personnel to attend as instructor augmentees?  Would all of the Federal Government departments?  DND does not have MOU’s with every federal department now for operational deployments or training, and we are talking about the same employer!

*Slide 6 Notes:* This is best case scenario. It does not mean the soldier has the experience, maturity, and leadership skills to be a MCpl. This does show, how far behind  P Res CSS soldiers are. In The P Res our soldiers e.g. would be in the same Armory, the same junior Ranks Club to socialize, after being on the same BMQ/SQ course. They see a buddy in the Cbt Arms, who was on the same BMQ/SQ course as they were, very likely progressing much faster. This does not help retention, especially for our ambitious CSS soldiers who want to be leaders.

*Slide 10 Notes:* LFWA Crse - QL3/1 conversion crse ( must be qual Dvr Wh ), followed by QL3/2.  38 CBG has 6 vacancies on each part, but loaded 9 for QL3/2.  Does not account for backlog of pers who require QL3/2, as QL3/2 has only been conducted by LFWA three times in 7+ years (1999, 2003 and 2005).

I personally sent the Ops O of CFSEME a long email, and spoke to him on several occasions when the course calendar came out (Jun) to ensure at least one course of each commenced in Jul. The crse schedule was changed for whatever reason. 

The courses were cancelled for, you guessed it, lack of Reserve augmentation. We must STOP sending our full time, Reg F and P Res CSS NCOs and Offs, who are posted to P Res Svc Bns  to e.g. WATC to instruct BMQ and SQ.  They should be filling instructor billets wherever a CSS course is conducted, whether its Borden, or Edmonton etc. Hopefully the Area Reserve CSS Coordination Cell will get a grip on this. This is not unique to LFWA.

For 17 (Wpg) Svc Bn it was an horrific year. Four soldiers arrived at CFSEME, Borden, 2 for QL3 and 2 for QL5, only to be told on day 1 that the courses were cancelled. Additionally, 2 soldiers did not get QL5 MSE Op due to the second course being canceled.

*Slide 12 Notes:* The same question, after you have seen the course commencement dates. The majority of our soldiers who require QL3 are in High School. The school year for High School generally ends the last week of June. Additionally, I would think that after 12 years of school, a student/soldier would like to attend Graduation, and Grad Night.

CFSTG states that they schedule courses at the request of the Army. We must find out the truth. Who is responsible?  Who is the authority that schedules the start date, the number of courses, etc?  Until this is determined, we will continue to have problems.

*Slide 13 Notes:* *AATC Crse

The courses were cancelled for, you guessed it, lack of Reserve augmentation. We must STOP sending our full time, Reg F and P Res CSS NCOs and Offs, who are posted to P Res Svc Bns  to e.g. WATC to instruct BMQ and SQ.  They should be filling instructor billets wherever a CSS course is conducted, whether its Borden, or Edmonton etc. Hopefully the Area Reserve CSS Coordination Cell will get a grip on this. This is not unique to LFWA.

The cook course was hanging by its teeth. We were looking to load on a Nav Res course.


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## Rifleman62 (23 Nov 2013)

Pt 3:

*Slide 4 Notes:* The distances to get all 38 CBG units together, or the 3 Svc Bn’s.

*Slide 6 Notes:* * MSE Pt 2 is not included in the grand total, as it is not a complete crse.

* LFWA conducted crse, including the QL3/1crse that 17 Svc Bn conducted in the summer of 2004, as there was none being conducted elsewhere.

*Slide 7 Notes:* * MSE Pt 2 not included in the grand total.

*Slide 9 Notes:* We go through the long process of attraction; processing, BMQ, SQ then hit the stumbling block of too few QL3 vacancies. Some of the approx 75+ pers, over the five years were nominated again ( figures I cannot separate), some transferred to the Combat Arms ( we do not try and hold  them in my unit), some quit. That’s a lot of time and money down the drain, and certainly does not enhance the Army’s image as an employer of choice, especially in smaller communities.

*Slide 13 Notes:* CFSEME does not conduct Reserve QL6 Veh Tech courses. You must get on a Regular Force course through a Career Manager. Since 2005 the P Res gets 2 vacancies per serial.

CFSEME does not conduct Reserve QL6 Wpn Tech courses. The Army must decide if there is a requirement for this qualification. A problem would be is that the Reg F QL6 has armaments in the course content which is not taught on the P Res QL3 to 5.

*Slide 17 Notes:* The greater majority of  NCM  Reserve recruits are 17/18 years of age, and enroll while in grade XI or XII. They are in the learning curve and in cynic with receiving instruction. 

Experience on LHQ courses has proven that new soldiers naturally seek out the individuals who grasp the instruction, whether they have past military experience or are quick learners.

I Believe, CFSEME has recently adopted what you could describe as the semester system, which has been in use in the school/secondary school system for decades.

What are we teaching soldiers on the Reserve Veh Tech course? The vehicles we utilize in the Reserves were built in the 80’s and 90’s. The technology is 1950’s.  The new vehicles will be repaired under a National warranty contract.

What are we teaching soldiers on the reserve Wpn Tech course? The weapons we utilize in the Reserves are 40’s and 50’s (MG42=C6, Armlite AR15= C7/C8 ).

This is not rocket science.

*Slide 21 Notes:* If courses are broken down into Blocks, it will accommodate a Reserve soldier who has 2/3 weeks annual employee vacation if the blocks are short enough. For Wpn Tech example, this would accommodate a high school student who cannot miss starting a semester late and only has Jul and Aug off. That’s IF the course is conducted in this time frame, which CFSEME traditionally does not. Breaking into Blocks one great disadvantage is it will add additional year/years on to the time to get a soldier QL3 qualified.

*Slide 22 Notes:* Overview of EME technical training

**********This is a build slide***********

- Reg force QL3 for veh techs is 144 trg days
- it is trimmed down for the reservist to 60 days, reduced in scope to wheeled vehs, first line only. (still long period in summer for some reservists)
- it is proposed to further breakdown in two blocks. A first block of 20-25 days could be done at the armoury with DL package. Reservist would only spend 25 days in summer at Borden
Same thing for wpns techs. Reg force trg at 130 trg days and includes for blocks as indicated here. Block I: Small Arms (SA),Block II: Crew-served Weapons (CSW), Block III: Armaments, Block IV: LAV III, Block V: Grizzly, TUA, C3 Howitzer
- trg has been reduced to 53 trg days and reduced in scope to only block I & II
- it is proposed to further split into two blocks of 25 days that could be taken over two summer periods or one full summer. Possibilities of DL not yet fully investigated (low number of candidates)


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## Rifleman62 (23 Nov 2013)

Pt 4:

*Slide 2 Notes:* This CFAO is almost 2 decades old!!!

In Jun 2001 ( reissued Feb 2004), the army promulgated  LFCO 29-12 Army Reserve Career Profile (ARCP) Interim. This document provides direction and guidance on career progression for Offrs and NCMs in the Army Reserve. The Annexes lays out the training requirements the Army wants P Res Offrs and NCMs for career progression. What frustrates me is that the Army deferred to this 18 year old CFAO for one thing – acting promotions, paragraph 18. This CFAO has the original career profile that has been revised 3 times since 1987, but never amended in the CFAO. The Army, in its LFCO states the career progression for its personnel, but defers to one paragraph only in the CFAO. Someone's personal agenda is at work here. We have an ex 2 PPCLI Warrant Officer (Acting Lacking), who transfers to the Reserves. He has to take his crown down and become a Sergeant because he is missing his ILQ, and cannot be an acting rank in the Reserves if he does not have the required leadership qualification. Ridiculous. This promotion policy is RIGIDLY ENFORCED by LFWA. No amount of reasoning will change the minds of the staff officers responsible!!

The replacement of the CFAOs for promotion is currently underway.  The Army is not the OPI for these CFAOs, though Land Staff G1 pers are in communication with ADM(HR-Mil) on this issue .  However, the issue of permitting acting rank while lacking a leadership qualification has been discussed and rejected by senior members of the Army. 

The implementation of ILQ within the Army Reserve has been recognised as an issue of great importance (and the backlog of Sgts awaiting training is recognized as well); in the upcoming SORD 2006 there will be over $1.5M in additional funding (nationally) to address this need (directed by the Assistant Chief of the Land Staff at the Army Program Board in Oct 2005).

*Slide 3 Notes: *These are old CFAO’s (1987 and 1991) and are based on the old Junior NCO/Junior Leader courses (remember all the changes to these courses?) We now have PLQ, with 6 modules. A Reserve CSS soldier must have PLQ (Land) mods 2 to 6 to be leadership qualified ( Mod 1, Physical Fitness is not authorized to be conducted for the Reserves). A Regular Force CSS soldier only requires CF PLQ, a 36 day course.  Without all the PLQ mods, 2 to 6, a Reserve CSS soldier cannot be promoted, ie to MCpl. A Regular Force soldier not qualified CF PLQ, PLQ (Land) or PLQ (Infantry), the leadership qualification, can be promoted MCPL (AL).

 It would appear that the normal practice for the Regular Force Combat Arms is to not waive the leadership qualification. Regardless, a Regular Force CSS soldier does not require PLQ mod 6 as it is not a component of the CF PLQ, while his Reserve counterpart does. This is due to the fact that the Army is the MA for all MOC’s of the Army Reserves, and is not the MA for Regular Force CSS MOC’s (some dispute here- the Army says its not the MA when it is convenient, and says it is when it promulgates LFCO 29-12 !!)

What exasperates this is, the tremendously tedious Reserve CSS Career Profile with limited vacancies. This is clearly indicated in the previous slides, even at the QL3 level which shows the length of time to even get a soldier into the MCpl promotion zone. We are only generating five QL3 soldiers a year, usually one per MOC. In 5 years, it is possible to have five, i.e., Veh Techs at various stages of the DP process. Only one of those Veh Techs, after 5 years, will be at  the point of having the prerequisites to take PLQ. The soldier may have the prerequisites, but are they leadership material?

It is no wonder we do not have CSS NCO’s, as not all of these soldiers stay the course. This needs to be amended for the Reserves. At the very least, authorize promotion for a Reserve CSS soldier to MCpl on completion of PLQ mods 2 to 5. I suggest we still continue the requirement for the mod 6, but allow acting rank. See slide 89. This also impacts on MSE Op in cab driver instructors.

Another big problem is that our CSS PLQ Mod 6 candidates do not have all the “combat or Infantry” skills required for this Mod. The last time they participated in a section attack was on their SQ course, let alone led the attack/patrol. The CSS Battle school should look at a pre Mod 6 training for P Res soldiers.

In The P Res our soldiers e.g. would be in the same Armory, the same junior Ranks Club to socialize, after being on the same BMQ/SQ course. They see a buddy who was on the same BMQ/SQ course as they were, very likely progressing much faster. This does not help retention, especially for our ambitious CSS soldiers who want to be leaders.

*Slide 4 Notes:* JLC has been replaced with PLQ mods 1 to 6.

*Slide 5 Notes:* Old messages. I Cdn Div does not exist. The LFCO was revised in Feb 2005, and still lists these references.

*Slide 8 Notes:* What does PO 207 - Lead a section in offensive ops; PO 208 - Lead a section in defence; and PO 209 – Lead a dismounted patrol to do with driver instruction??

*Slide 10 Notes: **Ex Reg F

The Sup Sgt is the Cl B Quartermaster in our Single Point of Service (SPS) Garrison QM . The MSE Op MCpl is our Cl B SPS dispatcher who transferred in from another unit. The RMS Sgt and Veh Tech Sgt are the first members of 17 Svc Bn to make that rank in 9 years. The RMS Sgt will be transferring to the Supp Res in Sep 06, as he will be articling for his CGA.

In 2005, two Veh Tech MCpls  component transferred from 17 Svc Bn. One to the Regular Force as a Traffic Tech, and the other to the Air Reserve as a Aero Engine Tech. To replace these NCO’s will take years, as currently only 3 soldiers are eligible to take QL4 (commencing Jan 06),and only 2 are available. Two Wpn Tech Cpls failed in the last week of PLQ Mod 6.

*Slide 11 Notes:* A huge gap here. All the 2Lts are in various stages of completing CAP.

*Slide 20 Notes: *How do they do it? We train 37.5 days per year, plus courses/concentrations.


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## MilEME09 (28 Nov 2013)

thanks for posting, are you still in the same role since you wrote that? and given the changes that are happening in CSS trg do you think it has addressed some of the points you brought up? I'm going through the new weapons tech system now. Cook QL3 is now 2 summers, wpn and vehicle techs take about 4 summers to train now. Wpns techs right now will get C3 howitzer in our final course allow us to go on the reg force 6A course (rumour is the C3 might be taken out of the system though).

This reminds me of an idea i had, would it save the Pres and the army as a whole money if we decentralized reserve training away from the schools? most bases have the facilities needed to do training for most if not all trades. So why not have say an Armoured school east and west? to save on TD, travel and such?


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## McG (29 Nov 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> This reminds me of an idea i had, would it save the Pres and the army as a whole money if we decentralized reserve training away from the schools? most bases have the facilities needed to do training for most if not all trades. So why not have say an Armoured school east and west? to save on TD, travel and such?


It costs manpower to have two of the same school.  It is better to decentralize courses that make twin branch schools.
The TD efficiencies of decentralized courses can also be quickly lost if a few max load courses become replaced by many min load (and below-min load) courses.  The little bit saved in plane tickets gets lost in paying for many additional Cl B instructors, Crse NCOs, Crse Officers and other overhead.


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## ModlrMike (29 Nov 2013)

MCG said:
			
		

> It costs manpower to have two of the same school.  It is better to decentralize courses that make twin branch schools.
> The TD efficiencies of decentralized courses can also be quickly lost if a few max load courses become replaced by many min load (and below-min load) courses.  The little bit saved in plane tickets gets lost in paying for many additional Cl B instructors, Crse NCOs, Crse Officers and other overhead.



It also costs less to use existing schools than to create additional ones. For example NAVRES sends their Log branch (LogO, Supply) to Quebec when Borden has the pre-existing infrastructure and expertise (Standards etc) to provide the training.


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## Monsoon (29 Nov 2013)

ModlrMike said:
			
		

> It also costs less to use existing schools than to create additional ones. For example NAVRES sends their Log branch (LogO, Supply) to Quebec when Borden has the pre-existing infrastructure and expertise (Standards etc) to provide the training.


The Log branch courses run at QC are delivered in a different format than those at Borden to accommodate a reserve training cycle. The QSPs deliver the same POs, but portions of them are shifted to DL and OJT, and a lot of the flex time is squeezed out of the in-house phases (PT and admin periods are reduced, length of work days increased, etc). I'm sure CFFS(Q) would be happy to send the courses over to CFSAL (which is involved in the course standards anyway), if only CFSAL would recognize that not everyone can take a six-month QL3 that runs from February to July (for example). There's nothing efficient or cost effective about designing training that your people can't take.


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## ModlrMike (29 Nov 2013)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> There's nothing efficient or cost effective about designing training that your people can't take.



True enough, but other schools manage it. 

BTW, I heard a rumour yesterday that they might be merging Reg/Res LogO trg. That's an outcome that will seriously hamper Res trg. Then again, another option I heard was employment based ie: shorter, more specific blocks for Compt, Foods, Admin O etc. The later is a more manageable option for folks who already work full time.

Whichever outcome, trg designed from the perspective that everyone can take two months off in the summer starts with a flawed premise and is destined to fail to meet its goals.


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## MilEME09 (29 Nov 2013)

I could see the blocks happening more as that is the way NCM training has been going, all RCEME courses are two months or less as of now, spread over a longer period of time. Which in my mind shows some one is starting to get it that we cant take long periods of time off from our civilian jobs. I wonder though if for some trades some of the theory stuff cant be made as DL to do at the home unit before the course, thus making a course shorter by a few days or even a week which can make a difference for a reservist. That said its not possible for all trades, and all courses, you can't teach how to take apart a C7 via DL. However you can do say principles of ammunition and small arms over DL for example, all those theory items could cut a week off a two month course.


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## Eowyn (29 Nov 2013)

ModlrMike said:
			
		

> BTW, I heard a rumour yesterday that they might be merging Reg/Res LogO trg.



I am not surprised by that.  The current Army PRes Log O course is 12 years old.  The Reg F trg has changed with the PRes stagnating.  I think making PRes officers take the Reg F is troublesome, since most can not get the time off from their employers.  It will be interesting to see if modularization of the Reg F course can be done.


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## dapaterson (29 Nov 2013)

Eowyn said:
			
		

> I am not surprised by that.  The current Army PRes Log O course is 12 years old.  The Reg F trg has changed with the PRes stagnating.  I think making PRes officers take the Reg F is troublesome, since most can not get the time off from their employers.  It will be interesting to see if modularization of the Reg F course can be done.



Of course it can be done.  It's a question of whether various empires are willing to do it.

(And, ideally, abandon the failed environmental stovepipes and return to a Log officer occupation organized on competencies)


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## Canadian.Trucker (29 Nov 2013)

Eowyn said:
			
		

> I am not surprised by that.  The current Army PRes Log O course is 12 years old.  The Reg F trg has changed with the PRes stagnating.  I think making PRes officers take the Reg F is troublesome, since most can not get the time off from their employers.  It will be interesting to see if modularization of the Reg F course can be done.


It has already been in effect for Inf O DP1.1 for almost 7 years, so I'm positive it can be done for Log O as well.


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## Fishbone Jones (29 Nov 2013)

One simply has to look to the angst that the PRes Armour and CTC go through on an almost annual and constant basis to try reach accommodation between Units, HQs and the School.

I spent decades working through those systems, watched the wheel go around more than a few times and nothing has really changed.

You will never reach the ultimate solution that balances a Reservists time and the needs of the trade.


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## MilEME09 (30 Nov 2013)

recceguy said:
			
		

> You will never reach the ultimate solution that balances a Reservists time and the needs of the trade.



While I believe you are correct, I do believe that there has to be a better arrangement that can be made compared to the current system. Now keeping on with the thread topic, the question becomes is whether these compromises to make it easier for a reservist would be cost effective for the army. Now I would argue if it leads to greater retention and higher moral in the reserves then i would say it is worth it. 

Another cost saver, I remember seeing a few months ago on the "what's Canada Buying" Thread DND was looking for someone to build duel purpose live fire - SAT ranges. Building something like this in major reserve cities could save a lot of costs for a unit in fuel, and travel costs.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (13 Dec 2013)

Don't mean to unnecessarily revive a dying topic, but...

Having seen things on both sides of the fence, I don't think there is a real use for the reserves. 

I know people will quote a battery of statistics on how much of what roto was reserve and the benefit of the reserve but at the end of the day, I don't think the same or better couldn't be accomplished with the same money invested in a larger Reg Force.

In the CSS specifically, you can't really train up a operator or tech on a night a week (which is normally eaten up by inefficient administration or poorly executed parades) and a weekend a month. As stated by others, 3 hours in a night doesn't get you anywhere, and the exercise proves nothing as sustained operations are never done over even 1 resupp cycle.

As a whole, the reserve was always nothing more than a place for retired reg force to socialize while collecting enough beer money to make it worthwhile.

The only way I see the reserve ever truly working is for it to focus ENTIRELY on individual training, preferably by tagging on in small groups in reg force units during IBTS weeks and then practicing CT on exercises. The nights and weekends ought to be scapped entirely. Otherwise you end up with the blind leading the blind and re-inforcing bad habits.


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## OldSolduer (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> Don't mean to unnecessarily revive a dying topic, but...
> 
> Having seen things on both sides of the fence, I don't think there is a real use for the reserves.
> 
> ...



Well now that we have your opinion, ........maybe you should strive to become the MND and disband all the PRes regiments. I am former Reg Force who retired for four years before I was asked to join the PRes. I can assure you that I am not collecting "beer money".


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## Edward Campbell (14 Dec 2013)

There has been a long standing argument that the PRes should be focused on generating junior soldier and leaders, officers and NCOs, for the arms; the implication is that many specialized functions ~ engineers, signals, medical and logistics (including RCEME) ~ should be strengthened, in numbers, in the regular force.

I don't have a position, but I have been reading this and related threads with interest. The difficulties of training specialist soldiers have been made clear. The question is: how to overcome them?


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## GR66 (14 Dec 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> There has been a long standing argument that the PRes should be focused on generating junior soldier and leaders, officers and NCOs, for the arms; the implication is that many specialized functions ~ engineers, signals, medical and logistics (including RCEME) ~ should be strengthened, in numbers, in the regular force.
> 
> I don't have a position, but I have been reading this and related threads with interest. The difficulties of training specialist soldiers have been made clear. The question is: how to overcome them?



Perhaps the problem is that there are many "types" of Reserves but one Reserve system.  The Reserves may be tasked to provide trained individuals to augment the Reg Force.  They may be tasked to provide a sub-unit with specialized skills and the ability to operate with the Reg Force.  They may be deployed for a variety of Domestic Ops.  Or they could be used as a mobilization base in the case of a required expansion of the Reg Force in a war.  Each of these roles might require a different system to properly fulfill those tasks.

Maybe only certain trades lend themselves to individual augmentation due to the difficulty of learning the skills on a part-time basis.  There could be a role for units that focus on providing generalist skills required for many (non-specialized) domestic ops or as a mobilization base.  Some units could perhaps focus on fairly narrow specialist skills that could be used to augment the Reg Force on a sub-unit level (way out of my lane here...Mud Recce?  Mortars? you tell me).  Releasing Reg Force members or Reservists with specialist civilian skills (commercial pilots, merchant seamen, paramedics/nurses/doctors, law enforcement, heavy equipment operators, electronics specialists, etc?) might need a system where they work directly with Reg Force units in order keep their skills in line with current military requirements.

This all comes back however to what E.R. Campbell shows as the one key thread (http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22099/post-1276259.html#msg1276259).  First we as a nation need to define what it is we expect the military to do before we can tackle the specifics of how we do that.

Now for the $64,000 question...how do you get that debate on the agenda?


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## mariomike (14 Dec 2013)

GR66 said:
			
		

> Releasing Reg Force members or Reservists with specialist civilian skills (commercial pilots, merchant seamen, paramedics/nurses/doctors, law enforcement, heavy equipment operators, electronics specialists, etc?) might need a system where they work directly with Reg Force units in order keep their skills in line with current military requirements.



How much Military Leave would that require from their full-time employer each year?

This is the policy where I worked:

"Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.

The maximum period of absence is two weeks in a calendar year."


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## MilEME09 (14 Dec 2013)

mariomike said:
			
		

> How much Military Leave would that require from their full-time employer each year?
> 
> This is the policy where I worked:
> 
> ...




well under the Alberta employments standards leave for reservists is:



> Reservist entitlements
> 
> Under the Code, employees who are reservists are entitled to an unpaid, job protected leave of
> absence when deployed to an operation outside of Canada (including any required pre- or
> ...




20 days doesn't give a lot of time, though there are provisions for how to get more time off in the document


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## mariomike (14 Dec 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> well under the Alberta employments standards leave for reservists is:





> In addition, a reservist is entitled to unpaid leave of up to 20 days each calendar year to
> participate in annual training.



Ontario has ( unpaid ) Reservist Leave:
"Reservist leave is unpaid, job-protected leave for employees who are Canadian Forces military reservists and who are deployed to an international operation overseas or certain operations within Canada."
http://www.worksmartontario.gov.on.ca/scripts/default.asp?contentID=1-5-6#H1

If the topic is, "Saving money in the PRes", the jobs listed by GR66 would likely loose income on unpaid leave.


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## Journeyman (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> I don't think there is a real use for the reserves.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


And I'm called upon to post, _one more time_.....

There are opinions...and there are *informed* opinions.

Based on your opinion (the first type), I suspect that:

a) your militia unit had abysmal leadership (I was posted RSS to a Reserve unit; leadership varies);
b) you're not qualified, possibly not capable, to consider Reserve utility above the Pte/Cpl level;
c) nuanced thinking (ie - make adjustments vs. disband the Reserves) is not your strong suit.


I found your earlier posts on grounding spikes interesting though.  Maybe "staying in one's lane" isn't a bad thing


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## Newt (14 Dec 2013)

What about reducing the number of exercises that take place at area training centers? Increase the number of exercises conducted in the urban areas where units are located.

This could:
1. Reduce transportation costs.
2. Reduce fuel costs for units with large vehicle fleets such as Armoured Recce.
3. Increase public awareness of the PRes in the community.
4. Increase time spent training, decrease time spent sitting on a bus.

Challenges:
1. Blank ammunition cannot be used, but given current fiscal realities militia rounds would probably be used anyways.
2. Public relations challenge due to the fear of "soldiers, on street corners, with guns."


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## Jarnhamar (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> The only way I see the reserve ever truly working is for it to focus ENTIRELY on individual training, preferably by tagging on in small groups in reg force units during IBTS weeks and then practicing CT on exercises. The nights and weekends ought to be scapped entirely. Otherwise you end up with the blind leading the blind and re-inforcing bad habits.



You're describing what would amount to being an administrative nightmare. You're talking about removing time that reserves have to practice and train and then throw them in with full time soldiers who probably won't exactly appreciate having to turn around and teach and practice the reservists in order to pass IBTS.   Reservists also can't just take off a few weeks last minute to attend reg force ibts training.


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## George Wallace (14 Dec 2013)

Newt said:
			
		

> What about reducing the number of exercises that take place at area training centers? Increase the number of exercises conducted in the urban areas where units are located.
> 
> This could:
> 1. Reduce transportation costs.
> ...



Additional Costs:

1.  Class A employment for pers who would have to obtain proper clearances from:
     a.  Local Municipal governments;
     b.  Notify local Police and Emergency Services;
     c.  Private property owners;
     d.  Business that may be affected by Exercise; and
     e.  Business that may be involved in Exercise (supplying materials, equipment, fuel).

2.  Class A employment for pers who would be involved with Damage Control (Insurance coverage).


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## PuckChaser (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> The only way I see the reserve ever truly working is for it to focus ENTIRELY on individual training, preferably by tagging on in small groups in reg force units during IBTS weeks and then practicing CT on exercises. The nights and weekends ought to be scapped entirely. Otherwise you end up with the blind leading the blind and re-inforcing bad habits.



I've got a unit you can post into to try out that theory. I guarantee you won't like it.


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## Newt (14 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Additional Costs:
> 
> 1.  Class A employment for pers who would have to obtain proper clearances from:
> a.  Local Municipal governments;
> ...



Those are points I hadn't considered, thank you. There are certainly a lot of logistical concerns that would have to be addressed, and they may not offset the costs of travelling to area training centers.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (14 Dec 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> And I'm called upon to post, _one more time_.....
> 
> There are opinions...and there are *informed* opinions.
> 
> ...



You have your opinions, I have mine. While your obviously don't agree with my opinion, it doesn't necessarily make it any less valid, or less informed.

While I feel that my experience certainly makes me qualified to offer an opinion, and I feel that I certainly am capable of nuanced thinking, these too are opinions, just as your assumptions of me are.

My feeling that the reserves, as a whole, is a not a cost effective way to achieve the capabilities that I think the military needs. My personal feeling that we ought to reinvest that money in the regular force stems from my experience with the reserves. Most of the people I worked with were university or high school students, typically staying in only for 4 years. That's a lot of investment in a person that the military is making, especially in the technical trades (like ACISS for my experience) where they have attempted to provide the same level of training for the reserves as they do for the regular force. While the average time in for a regular force person is either their VIE (~4 years) or until retirement (~25 year CE) the average time in is significantly longer in the regular force.

I've never been one to buy the idea of "it's good to have a population with military experience" argument, as I feel modern militaries are much more complex, and the likelihood of Canada being invaded is remote, and the likelihood of Canada being invaded by a power that is not capable of simply rolling over our modest military is rather non-existent.

So my opinion is this, our limited tax dollars are best spent maintaining a well trade, well equipped professional full time military. If resources are available to be spent on the reserves, I think those same resources would be better spent increasing the size of the established regular force. 

My opinion. You don't have to agree.


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## Haggis (14 Dec 2013)

If we do away with the Reserve Force (and I assume you mean only the Army Reserve?), how do we maintain the CAF's footprint in the community?  Of course you realize that, in small town Canada, Reservists are the face, representatives and ambassadors of the CAF.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (14 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> If we do away with the Reserve Force (and I assume you mean only the Army Reserve?), how do we maintain the CAF's footprint in the community?  Of course you realize that, in small town Canada, Reservists are the face, representatives and ambassadors of the CAF.



I don't know about you, but I grew up in a small town that way nowhere near any reservist unit. Everyone's opinion of the military was exceptionally high, higher than in any town like London Ontario, or Saint John NB. I don't see that being worth the money spent.


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## kratz (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> You have your opinions, I have mine. While your obviously don't agree with my opinion, it doesn't necessarily make it any less valid, or less informed.
> 
> *<snip>*
> 
> ...



Based on your post, I'm not assuming you are an expert between elements and the inner workings of the other parts of the reserves.
Granted you are entitled to many things. "Your opinion indicates your recommendation of throwing out the baby with the bathwater."

If the RCN were to have followed your suggestion, two to four of the heavies would have been tied up along the wall for the past 15 years
due to the mix of manning shortages and mission requirements.

As you emphasis, if there had of been no PRes within the RCN. The training pipe for MARS IV officers would have been several affected, along with many mission critical responses during those same years. NRTD, Port Security and other missions assigned to NavRes through those years that have been acclaimed would also have gone unmanned.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (14 Dec 2013)

Santa's Coattails said:
			
		

> Based on your post, I'm not assuming you are an expert between elements and the inner workings of the other parts of the reserves.
> Granted you are entitled to many things. "Your opinion indicates your recommendation of throwing out the baby with the bathwater."
> 
> If the RCN were to have followed your suggestion, two to four of the heavies would have been tied up along the wall for the past 15 years
> ...



I'm looking at the opportunity cost. That same money directed to recruiting additional sailors could, and in my opinion, would be better spent.


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## a_majoor (14 Dec 2013)

Radioopetc. might consider that other nations with different reserve systems can operate combat systems up to mechanized combat teams with tanks etc., sometimes spending even less time parading than the Canadian PRES does. This might suggest the real issue is we have not optimized our reserve training, or are focusing on some other metrics, or just not very good at it under the current system.

Given the multiple examples of effective or usable reserve forces in other nations, I think the question of PRES organization and training desrves far more attention than it gets, and certainly there is long historical experience that demonstrates that reserve forces make effective force multipliers and allow military forces to respond in a flexible and effective manner to all kinds of contingencies. Certainly the idea that you can increase the number of "boots on the ground" when needed at a lower cost than having them paid and employed ful time is always going to be attractive to governments concerned with finances, if nothing else.


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## Harris (14 Dec 2013)

Newt said:
			
		

> What about reducing the number of exercises that take place at area training centers? Increase the number of exercises conducted in the urban areas where units are located.
> -SNIP-
> Challenges:
> 1. Blank ammunition cannot be used, but given current fiscal realities militia rounds would probably be used anyways.
> 2. Public relations challenge due to the fear of "soldiers, on street corners, with guns."



My Unit does this now and has for the last 9 years.  Your two challenges above haven't been an issue at any of them.  We're currently planning on doing another one in Mar.  Involves more co-ordination and prior planning for sure, but not significantly so.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (14 Dec 2013)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Radioopetc. might consider that other nations with different reserve systems can operate combat systems up to mechanized combat teams with tanks etc., sometimes spending even less time parading than the Canadian PRES does. This might suggest the real issue is we have not optimized our reserve training, or are focusing on some other metrics, or just not very good at it under the current system.
> 
> Given the multiple examples of effective or usable reserve forces in other nations, I think the question of PRES organization and training desrves far more attention than it gets, and certainly there is long historical experience that demonstrates that reserve forces make effective force multipliers and allow military forces to respond in a flexible and effective manner to all kinds of contingencies. Certainly the idea that you can increase the number of "boots on the ground" when needed at a lower cost than having them paid and employed ful time is always going to be attractive to governments concerned with finances, if nothing else.



Just because other nations have part time reserves doesn't mean it's the best decision. Plenty of other countries make less than optimal decisions, just as well do. 

Personally, I think the expected standard for militaries has been increasing overtime. The jobs have gotten increasingly more complex. Even in my experience the difference in what was expected of a Rad Op is nowhere close to the breadth and scope of the job we expect now for the new guys coming up through the ACISS trade. It's only getting worse as well. 

I know it seems to be making a lot of people here angry or uncomfortable, but from my perspective, if I had to make the decision on where to invest tax dollars, I would trade 20,000 reservists for 5,000 regular forces.

Obviously I don't think this is going to happen, it would be too politically risky for MPs coming from places like London ON, areas around Toronto, parts of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. Not to mention inside DND where people like to feather their future nests.


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## dapaterson (14 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> I know it seems to be making a lot of people here angry or uncomfortable, but from my perspective, if I had to make the decision on where to invest tax dollars, I would trade 20,000 reservists for 5,000 regular forces.



You wouldn't get 5K for 20K.  Reg F pay is $100M/week for 68K.  Thus, for 5K Reg F you need to find $7.3M/week, or $380M annually.  Shutting the Army Reserve completely (around 20K) wouldn't save that much.


On the other hand, returning the Sigs branch to field signals and relying on civilians and contractors for in garrison networking would save a considerable chunk of change and free up Reg F PYs for other purposes.


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## OldSolduer (15 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> On the other hand, returning the Sigs branch to field signals and relying on civilians and contractors for in garrison networking would save a considerable chunk of change and free up Reg F PYs for other purposes.



Agreed. Maybe we could disband the Reserve Signals and give those PYs to the Reg Force Sigs. And then send them to the field.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (15 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You wouldn't get 5K for 20K.  Reg F pay is $100M/week for 68K.  Thus, for 5K Reg F you need to find $7.3M/week, or $380M annually.  Shutting the Army Reserve completely (around 20K) wouldn't save that much.
> 
> 
> On the other hand, returning the Sigs branch to field signals and relying on civilians and contractors for in garrison networking would save a considerable chunk of change and free up Reg F PYs for other purposes.



I don't think you'll see the saving there. Civilians and contractors make more than military counterparts in the signals side. Best we could hope for there is that SSC is able find efficiencies in network consolidation in the federal government that we would not need so many people to run what systems we have (3000 separate network enclaves in the federal government, with DND by the far the worst offender).

I would like to see reserve sigs changed into additional reg force sigs. The cost of actually providing valid and current equipment 23ish reserve units rather than the 5ish major signals units in the regular force means we won't see a return on the investment. Why keep training reserves on equipment that the regular force stopped relying on a decade ago?


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## Kirkhill (15 Dec 2013)

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2013-other-reserve-force.page

Total Primary Reserve Cost (Reservists, Regular Support, Facilities, Vehicles, Equipment, Clothing, Ammunition - All Services)  $1,366,731,000 for 2012-2013 
Authorized Strength Army PRres - 19,471 2013



> The average paid strength of the Primary Reserve reported on 31 October 2011
> for 31 August 2011 was:
> Army Reserve 18,845
> Naval Reserve 3,548
> ...



A few numbers for consideration.


----------



## MilEME09 (15 Dec 2013)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2013-other-reserve-force.page
> 
> Total Primary Reserve Cost (Reservists, Regular Support, Facilities, Vehicles, Equipment, Clothing, Ammunition - All Services)  $1,366,731,000 for 2012-2013
> Authorized Strength Army PRres - 19,471 2013
> ...



That said how many of those are in long term Class B positions? I'm all for giving a reservist opportunities however is the cost worth it to give some one from say BC a 3 or 4 year contract in Ottawa? While the reserve do augment the reg force, it should be the goal from a cost perspective to keep those long term contracts to a minimum if not make them near non-existant by filling them with reg force staff. I believe this can be done without additional recruitment, but by simple redistribution of personal, we all know there are some places that have more people then they need.


----------



## dapaterson (15 Dec 2013)

P Res cost figures are not accurate.  There is no segregation of full time Res positions in Reg F units, and the cost attribution is arbitrary and unvalidated (until recently, about 20% of Leo I costs were charged to the P Res, as were 100% of the Bison costs)

In other words, never trust DND accounting.


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> .....In other words, never trust DND accounting.




Well! Ain't that speshul.

Note:  In any further discussions I must refrain from bothering to bring any metrication to the table.  In future, it seems, unsubstantiated opinion will serve at least as well as any discussion based on official data. 

 :

Please tell me there is an accurate set of books, hidden someplace, that everyone agrees on.  The alternative is much more unpalatable.


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> P Res cost figures are not accurate.  There is no segregation of full time Res positions in Reg F units, and the cost attribution is arbitrary and unvalidated (until recently, about 20% of Leo I costs were charged to the P Res, as were 100% of the Bison costs)
> 
> In other words, never trust DND accounting.




Even though some miserable SOB stole several of them from the militia's allotment in order to put the Army's Tac EW Sqn "under armour."


----------



## PuckChaser (15 Dec 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Even though some miserable SOB stole several of them from the militia's allotment in order to put the Army's Tac EW Sqn "under armour."



They can have them back. Bison EW vehicles are next to useless.


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 Dec 2013)

They're still there?!?  :not-again:


----------



## PuckChaser (15 Dec 2013)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> They're still there?!?  :not-again:



EW Bisons were "forgot" when the new projects came out to replace the Bison fleet. Rumint now is that the who fleet of 16 will be replaced by LAVUP and TAPVs. Which is great, because with a bigger vehicle the EW project pers will be able to fit bigger kit into the hull and max out another vehicle's weight limit.


----------



## dapaterson (15 Dec 2013)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Well! Ain't that speshul.
> 
> Note:  In any further discussions I must refrain from bothering to bring any metrication to the table.  In future, it seems, unsubstantiated opinion will serve at least as well as any discussion based on official data.
> 
> ...



I am saying that the numbers DND reports must be reviewed with a jaundiced eye.  They provide a start point for discussion but the devil, as always, is in the details.



Or, to put it another way: Having been engaged in the production of some such numbers for reports, I know how much faith to put in them.


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 Dec 2013)

Wow! They were meant to a very temporary, stopgap measure until the EW Sqn got its proper share of LAVs ...  :


----------



## OldSolduer (15 Dec 2013)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> EW Bisons were "forgot" when the new projects came out to replace the Bison fleet. Rumint now is that the who fleet of 16 will be replaced by LAVUP and TAPVs. Which is great, because with a bigger vehicle the EW project pers will be able to fit bigger kit  soldiers into the hull and max out another vehicle's weight limit.



Fixed that for you.


----------



## Haggis (15 Dec 2013)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Please tell me there is an accurate set of books, hidden someplace, that everyone agrees on.  The alternative is much more unpalatable.



The official source for numbers (not budget figures) for Res F strength is D Res.

There is a Major there whose sole purpose in life (it seems sometimes -  she does other things, as well) is to produce the monthly report on P Res numbers which are then reported through to Parliament.  It's a daunting and complicated task to gather the data from a myriad of different sources and then separate information from misinformation and disinformation to produce a "_best guess_" of Res F authorized strength, effective strength and average paid strength each month.


----------



## Journeyman (15 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> The official source for numbers (not budget figures) for Res F strength is D Res.
> 
> There is a Major there whose sole purpose in life.... is to produce a "_best guess_" of Res F authorized strength, effective strength and average paid strength each month.



Do we really require a Major to do an RMS MCpl's job?   Oh right, NDHQ.


----------



## Old Sweat (15 Dec 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Do we really require a Major to do an RMS MCpl's job?   Oh right, NDHQ.



What does he do the other 29.5 days?


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I am saying that the numbers DND reports must be reviewed with a jaundiced eye.  They provide a start point for discussion but the devil, as always, is in the details.
> 
> 
> 
> Or, to put it another way: Having been engaged in the production of some such numbers for reports, I know how much faith to put in them.



DAP - It's not personal.  It's frustration.

I am a strong supporter of the system.  I try to go out of my way to give the system the benefit of the doubt.  But it gets increasingly difficult to help those who will not help themselves.


----------



## dapaterson (15 Dec 2013)

Departmental IM/IT systems are not configured to differentiate between Bloggins working full time at the Buckshot Fusiliers in support of a Reserve unit, and Bloggins working full time for the VCDS on a non-Reserve related activity; so both Blogginses are reported as "Reserve expenditures" to Parliament.


----------



## OldSolduer (15 Dec 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Do we really require a Major to do an RMS MCpl's job?   Oh right, NDHQ.



Where majors are quite happy to sell stuff from kiosks with huge smiles on their faces. In a normal unit the kit shop corporals do that task.....


----------



## Haggis (15 Dec 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Do we really require a Major to do an RMS MCpl's job?   Oh right, NDHQ.



As simple as this exercise may seem, it's not. There are several sources of both complementary and contradictory information on Reserve strength across the CAF.  Each system owner claims theirs is the correct and most accurate source of data and will fight vigorously to defend it.  

Simply put, that's bollocks. See dapaterson's post, above, which alludes to just one dynamic this Major faces when trying to reconcile Reserve Force paid strength.  That's why the weight of a Major, with a full Colonel and BGen backstop, is required to get the most right (not neccesarily the correct) data from the force generators.

A Naval or Air Reservists quite often can parade on Class A, B and C within one month.  Therefore, without this Major's efforts to _achieve_ (note I didn't say "_ensure_") accuracy, this member could/would be reported as three separate paid members.  Repeat this error on a scale of hundreds each month and the problem with data quality becomes glaringly apparent.

Journeyman:  still want to leave this mess in the hands of a MCpl?


----------



## MilEME09 (15 Dec 2013)

Maybe not one but a team of clerks, and it probably would cost the same as that 1 major. Any way I think one issue with the PRes is we have no clear directive and identity in the grand picture of the CAF. Last briefing i got was "Well they want reserves to be 90% Dom ops, and 10% expeditionary ops, while the reg force will be the opposite" I would say the floods in Alberta proved that could never happen. If the PRes is to really go that route, then our training needs to go towards that as well. Which will require a different set of skills and different equipment for some PRes units.


----------



## Journeyman (15 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> Journeyman:  still want to leave this mess in the hands of a MCpl?


I know quite competent MCpls and I know painfully abysmal Majs; if they both have the backing of some Col and some BGen.....

But truth be told, _I'd just as soon_ not get bogged down in this discussion at all, which is developing all of the hair-trigger responses as the "Relocate NDHQ" thread.


----------



## Haggis (15 Dec 2013)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> But truth be told, _I'd just as soon_ not get bogged down in this discussion at all, which is developing all of the hair-trigger responses as the "Relocate NDHQ" thread.



And this is developing into a tangent which could probably be it's own thread.


----------



## pbi (16 Dec 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Maybe not one but a team of clerks, and it probably would cost the same as that 1 major. Any way I think one issue with the PRes is we have no clear directive and identity in the grand picture of the CAF. Last briefing i got was "Well they want reserves to be 90% Dom ops, and 10% expeditionary ops, while the reg force will be the opposite" I would say the floods in Alberta proved that could never happen. If the PRes is to really go that route, then our training needs to go towards that as well. Which will require a different set of skills and different equipment for some PRes units.



Be careful what you wish for... Find some old vet of the Militia in the 1960's and say "Snakes and Ladders" to him. Let me know how that goes.


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Maybe not one but a team of clerks, and it probably would cost the same as that 1 major. Any way I think one issue with the PRes is we have no clear directive and identity in the grand picture of the CAF. Last briefing i got was "Well they want reserves to be 90% Dom ops, and 10% expeditionary ops, while the reg force will be the opposite" I would say the floods in Alberta proved that could never happen. If the PRes is to really go that route, then our training needs to go towards that as well. Which will require a different set of skills and different equipment for some PRes units.



If that were the case, should the focus of the reserves shift from covering the wide variety of trades they do now to focusing more directly on trades like infantry, engineers, MSE, EGS Techs and heavy equipment. 

As well maybe other jobs such as Powerline Technicians (to assist in reconstruction after natural disaster like the Ice storm), and maybe a type of "search and rescue lite" trade for providing assistance in ground search.

In the same mind, should we shift from a Bde setup to one more similar to the Dart? Joint-ier? 

I would think the reserves would benefit from greater specialization, in a sense, lessening the breadth of expertise required.

When I was in the reserve one of the biggest problems I noticed was the short time period that the bulk of the reserves would serve. Typically 2 - 4 years, mostly for high school students who would get out once they got a job, or university/college students that would get out once they graduated. 
I know in my current trade it takes at least 3 years fulltime before they become truly effective, the scope and complexity of what is expected of new members of the ACISS trade is intense. I know it's the same in all the trades, but perhaps the training ought to be refocused on the key essentials rather than cramming 6 months of training into 6 weeks?


----------



## Fishbone Jones (16 Dec 2013)

Where does the time, expertise and money come from?

You've got lots of grandiose ideas, but haven't said how you're going to pay for it and get everyone up to speed in their new 'tasks'.


----------



## Old Sweat (16 Dec 2013)

We used to do that sort of thing in the regular army as well, but we retained our warlike kit, unlike the reserves. (Money for the capital program in the army was so tight that the only way we were able to replace our Second World War 19 sets with the C42 family was by making the case that they would improve our capability to conduct post-nuclear strike re-entry operations.) The ropes and ladders stuff was a bit of diversion from the garrison routine for a regular army that, if the truth be known, did not train all that much, but had raised housekeeping, keeping the troops busy stuff to an art form. 

To get back to the reserve augmenation issue, I am of the belief that at least part of it was in order to inject some recent operational experience, ie people who had been shot at, into the reserves. As the size and drain of the mission grew, the inclusion of reservists probably became more of a necessity than a nice to have.


----------



## dapaterson (16 Dec 2013)

I know of at least one Reg F BGen who stated (in an off the record chat) that the Army would have collapsed without the influx of Reservists to support the mission (both through deployments and by backfilling the institution).


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Where does the time, expertise and money come from?
> 
> You've got lots of grandiose ideas, but haven't said how you're going to pay for it and get everyone up to speed in their new 'tasks'.



Typically and idea is thought of first and debated before a full business plan and white paper is drafted. Brainstorming is the word.

1) Time - As far as time, I see it as saving time more than anything. If the goal is for the reserves to be 90% of the Dom ops and only 10% of the expeditionary ops then we ought to reorient our focus on that basis. My thoughts would be to strip the unnecessary parts out of the general training. Perhaps take those part of the training and create a supplementary course for people heading on expeditionary missions or for those who wish to in the future. 
An example of this might be engineer (now this is based on my limited understanding of the engineer trade) might focus much more on the bridge construction, berm construction, earth moving and excavation, and destruction of buildings (like partially collapsed structures). The more expeditionary op focused parts of the trade (IEDs, mine clearing, and all the above domestic stuff while tactical), would be part of an expeditionary supplement that the person would take prior to deploying, or electively if they intended to go on expeditionary tasks in the future. Keep in mind, this is just an example of how this may work.

2) Expertise - Same as now, the reserves are trained by the individual training facilities, however the training be focused more on the essential information required for domestic operations. Some trades might be phased out entirely (ACCIS might be one of them). Some trades, such as Powerline might require a whole new trade startup and require hiring civilian contractors to instruct in the beginning stages. Search and Rescue lite might come from serving or retired SAR techs, civilian ground search specialists. Trade might also include urban search and rescue (like post earthquake collapsed building searches).

3) Money - May not cost more than what things currently cost. If it does, I would argue the money is better spent.

As far as the organization, moving away from the Bde setup (with more layers of CoC than an onion before you get to the few actual worker bees) and to more of a DART or even the original Domestic Response Company (DRC) plan they had 5ish years ago, before it got watered down.


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I know of at least one Reg F BGen who stated (in an off the record chat) that the Army would have collapsed without the influx of Reservists to support the mission (both through deployments and by backfilling the institution).



It definitely would have, any plan would have to allow the reserves to meet that same requirement. Don't let that be a reason to let the organization become stagnant however.


----------



## George Wallace (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> When I was in the reserve one of the biggest problems I noticed was the short time period that the bulk of the reserves would serve. Typically 2 - 4 years, mostly for high school students who would get out once they got a job, or university/college students that would get out once they graduated.
> I know in my current trade it takes at least 3 years fulltime before they become truly effective, the scope and complexity of what is expected of new members of the ACISS trade is intense. I know it's the same in all the trades, but perhaps the training ought to be refocused on the key essentials rather than cramming 6 months of training into 6 weeks?



Once again you bring up the point that some Reservists serve three or four years and then get a civilian job and leave as being a complete waste of money.  What of the Regular Force member who serves three years, (or to the end of their first VIE) and gets out, having had even more money wasted on their training so that they can move on to greener pastures in a civilian job.  

Once again an illogical concept on your part, or perhaps just a major omission on your part, but still a serious flaw in your argument.


----------



## McG (16 Dec 2013)

Is this a thread about saving money, or are we duplicating this monster:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Once again you bring up the point that some Reservists serve three or four years and then get a civilian job and leave as being a complete waste of money.  What of the Regular Force member who serves three years, (or to the end of their first VIE) and gets out, having had even more money wasted on their training so that they can move on to greener pastures in a civilian job.
> 
> Once again an illogical concept on your part, or perhaps just a major omission on your part, but still a serious flaw in your argument.



Are you on a witch hunt against me or something? 

You're going after me across a couple of threads now. I understand when it's a disagreement regarding a topic, but you seem to be personally going after me at this point.


----------



## George Wallace (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> Are you on a witch hunt against me or something?



Come on.   Answer the question put to you?  Who is the bigger waste of money: the Reg Force member who leaves after their first VIE or the student who works part-time in the Reserves?


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Come on.   Answer the question put to you?  Who is the bigger waste of money: the Reg Force member who leaves after their first VIE or the student who works part-time in the Reserves?



The bigger waste of money is the guy in the Reg Force, I don't think anyone is doubting that. The difference is there is a much higher number of people staying in for 25 years in the regular force than in the reserves. This is based on my personal experience, individual opinion or experience may vary.


----------



## George Wallace (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> The bigger waste of money is the guy in the Reg Force, I don't think anyone is doubting that. The difference is there is a much higher number of people staying in for 25 years in the regular force than in the reserves. This is based on my personal experience, individual opinion or experience may vary.



Indeed, individual opinion and experience will vary.  I would put it to you that your experience is not the norm and numbers are published to confirm it.  Meanwhile, you admit that the biggest waste of money is indeed the Reg Force member who Releases after their first VIE.  Compared to the number of Reservists who leave after only a few years, that waste (Reg Force) is still the largest.  You may be surprised to know that there are quite a few Reservists who have served and continue to serve well past 25 years.  Your argument is still invalid, in fact it may be argued that it would be better to disband the Regular Force along that line of thought.

You have displayed a great lacking in your experience and knowledge on this matter.  You have not acknowledged the 'raison d'etre' of the Reserves as put forward by other more knowledgeable posters in this thread.  Another point that I will add, is that one of the main roles of the Reserves is to augment the Regular Force at home and abroad.  The Reserves are also a great recruitment tool and training tool for the Regular Force bringing in people off the street, training them and then watching them CT to the Regular Force.  This is at a great cost saving to the Regular Force, hiring 'Skilled' members and accounts for a great number of those students you claim join the Reserves and then quit.


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Indeed, individual opinion and experience will vary.  I would put it to you that your experience is not the norm and numbers are published to confirm it.  Meanwhile, you admit that the biggest waste of money is indeed the Reg Force member who Releases after their first VIE.  Compared to the number of Reservists who leave after only a few years, that waste (Reg Force) is still the largest.  You may be surprised to know that there are quite a few Reservists who have served and continue to serve well past 25 years.  Your argument is still invalid, in fact it may be argued that it would be better to disband the Regular Force along that line of thought.
> 
> You have displayed a great lacking in your experience and knowledge on this matter.  You have not acknowledged the 'raison d'etre' of the Reserves as put forward by other more knowledgeable posters in this thread.  Another point that I will add, is that one of the main roles of the Reserves is to augment the Regular Force at home and abroad.  The Reserves are also a great recruitment tool and training tool for the Regular Force bringing in people off the street, training them and then watching them CT to the Regular Force.  This is at a great cost saving to the Regular Force, hiring 'Skilled' members and accounts for a great number of those students you claim join the Reserves and then quit.



I'm glad your experience with the reserves was a more positive one. Obviously your perspective is deeply held and I'm not going to try to convince you otherwise.

My experience leads me to think that the reserves, as they are currently organized, are not delivering the value for money that I would expect. My expectations are different from yours. 

At this point in time, I'm going to kindly ask that you stop constantly replying on my every post and accusing me of not having the lofty experience or impressive credentials that are demanded of an internet forum user.


----------



## George Wallace (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACCISOP said:
			
		

> At this point in time, I'm going to kindly ask that you stop constantly replying on my every post and accusing me of not having the lofty experience or impressive credentials that are demanded of an internet forum user.



Are you suggesting YOU stifle my freedoms to point out flaws in your thinking?

Just read what I quoted you having posted above and then reflect on your post.  It would seem that you have the impression that ONLY you are entitled the freedoms of posting on a private forum that doesn't belong to you.   Are some of my posts hitting the mark more than yours, and that is unacceptable to you?


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Are you suggesting YOU stifle my freedoms to point out flaws in your thinking?
> 
> Just read what I quoted you having posted above and then reflect on your post.  It would seem that you have the impression that ONLY you are entitled the freedoms of posting on a private forum that doesn't belong to you.   Are some of my posts hitting the mark more than yours, and that is unacceptable to you?



No, because here's the thing:  you are a moderator. Regardless of whatever your signature says, as a moderator you should be fostering forums that encourage people to debate. You are doing the opposite, you are seemingly on a mission to chase away anyone new. Here's a quote from something in another thread earlier:



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> RADOPSIGOPACCISOP
> 
> You really are bizarre.  Your logic in recent topics escapes me.  You sure you have any idea of what the heck you are talking about?  It really doesn't seem that way to me.  This is only one of your more illogical statements, and so out in left field to really not even be considered valid in any way, shape or form.   You comments are those of a civilian with no knowledge of the military, or that of a Pte who has not the smarts to absorb what was being taught him/her.



Fact of the matter is, if I were a civilian, or even "a Pte who has not the smarts to absorb what was being taught him/her" on what planet would I not be turned away from participating in that debate, even if my own thoughts or opinions were not as well developed as yours? You know what, I'm not a civilian, or Pte. I have been posted to the NCR (which related to the thread of that last quote), I was I the reserves, so you know what, I do have an experience and perspective on these topics. You don't have to agree with them, or even acknowledge them, but to pretend to "moderate" these forums and continue to talk down in the same condescending manner to new forum members is a joke. 

Think maybe for a second that someone else might have a different experience that you never did, and then listen to what they say. In my trade we call that turning on your squelch. Otherwise you're just making white noise.


----------



## ArmyRick (16 Dec 2013)

I am not staff member of moderator BUT long time poster. Here is my freindly advice to some people (won't say who). If you want to come on here and post some ideas be prepared to back them up and explain or go into depth in such a manner as to win over intelligently the other members...or be prepared to get flame broiled here. Thats army.ca life.

Would love to see much more grander explanations and specifics on organizations, training (individual and collective) and career prgression for your future concepts of the P Res. Not just abstract ideas. Please, please, do list your mil experience so we know if we should take you seriously or not.


----------



## George Wallace (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> No, because here's the thing:  you are a moderator. Regardless of whatever your signature says, as a moderator you should be fostering forums that encourage people to debate. You are doing the opposite, you are seemingly on a mission to chase away anyone new.



Ah!   I see.  As a moderator, I am not entitled to an opinion, especially if I think I am commenting on less than knowledgeable musings of a poster.  OK.  



			
				RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Think maybe for a second that someone else might have a different experience that you never did, and then listen to what they say. In my trade we call that turning on your squelch. Otherwise you're just making white noise.



I might retort with a "Carrier.  No Modulation" to your bizarre concepts of what you conceive to be problems covering all of the Reserves.  Perhaps your experience has been of a minute part of the Reserves in a poorly administered and lead unit.  Whatever your experience, it still seems to be lacking in knowledge of the much larger picture.  

And this is not from a moderator, but from a site member who has as much right to comment as you do.


----------



## PuckChaser (16 Dec 2013)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Would love to see much more grander explanations and specifics on organizations, training (individual and collective) and career prgression for your future concepts of the P Res. Not just abstract ideas. Please, please, do list your mil experience so we know if we should take you seriously or not.



I seem to remember their being a completed profile before, but it was completely wiped immediately prior to these shenanigans....


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Ah!   I see.  As a moderator, I am not entitled to an opinion, especially if I think I am commenting on less than knowledgeable musings of a poster.  OK.
> 
> I might retort with a "Carrier.  No Modulation" to your bizarre concepts of what you conceive to be problems covering all of the Reserves.  Perhaps your experience has been of a minute part of the Reserves in a poorly administered and lead unit.  Whatever your experience, it still seems to be lacking in knowledge of the much larger picture.
> 
> And this is not from a moderator, but from a site member who has as much right to comment as you do.



My perspective comes from many years working with the reserves. I know some people take personal offence with my critique of the reserves, however it's not so much a critique of the rank and file soldier there (who do the best with the system the sign up into) it's more to argue that the reserve is not the same as the regular force, and we should not pretend it is by organizing it the same way. Reserve regts are never full regt size, most I've seen barely parade a full coy. The Sqns I seen parades a Tp at best, a oversized Sect at worst. However the HQ structure for a higher level formation was there. I've been on exercises where there were nearly equal numbers of SNCOs and officers as there were JNMs. 

My arguments above I stand by. It needs to be determined what the purpose of the reserve truly is, and reorganize against that goal. If it is to provide for against domestic ops then maybe revisiting the DRC model, or DART model would be more appropriate. If the goal is to augment the Reg Force then I would argue that we need to make both the reserve and reg force work closer together. Right now they seem to be in parallel but seperate organizations. When I was in the reserves the opportunity to work alongside regular force counterparts were limited. if you want someone to augment then they need greater exposure to how the regular force operates. Maybe reorganize for instance, reserve sqns as a troop within a reg force Sqn. Have them work side by side.


----------



## PuckChaser (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Maybe reorganize for instance, reserve sqns as a troop within a reg force Sqn. Have them work side by side.



There is one unit in the CF doing that, and its an absolute failure IMO.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (16 Dec 2013)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> There is one unit in the CF doing that, and its an absolute failure IMO.



The opposite was also tried with the 10\90's.

Another dismal failure.


----------



## kratz (16 Dec 2013)

Again,
Your posts are referring to the PRes in it's entirety (all elements, broad brush) 
through your narrow personal experience.

ARAF Sqns work closely with current and retired RegF members.
NR formation/divisions have key positions held by RegF positions.

You are arguing the RegF is better, yet the above PRes elements already
have a working model that meets the CAF's mission and goals.

If you are unsatisfied with Comms Sqns, or milita units, 
please state as much when making your points.

As I've mentioned above, some PRes elements are already working well 
alongside the RegF on a regular basis.
No pun intended.


----------



## MilEME09 (16 Dec 2013)

it was a lot of bumps and a pissing contest at first but my unit and the former ASU have merged together well, to the point we are working on the floor along side them. To add to the earlier comments from my previous post on the dom ops focus. Wpns tech and Vehicle tech trades for the reserves are focused on that task now. Vtechs train on generators and heaters on DP1, wpns techs deal with the kitchen trailer, stove, lantern etc.. after the first mod of DP2 (recovery, and small ares for vtech and wpns tech respectively) the tech is considered dom ops qualified, can take PLQ for career advancement, and be a MCpl. Taking mods 2 and 3 are needed to go over seas and to get on a 6A's course. 


On cost saving maybe we need to make infrastructure investments in the short term for long term savings. Take a driver wheeled for example, you need to do off road and black out drive, do we really need to travel to wainwright from calgary to do that? perhaps use another departments land closer to home? or invest and fence off some land closer to home to limit fuel costs.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

Santa's Coattails said:
			
		

> Again,
> Your posts are referring to the PRes in it's entirety (all elements, broad brush)
> through your narrow personal experience.
> 
> ...



Point taken, Reserve RCAF do work much more closely with their counterparts and I'd argue they are more interchangeable because of that. On the flip side the AF Reserve personnel I knew normally worked much more, often it was 6 month contracts followed by 6 months of working 10 - 14 days a month. Some a little more or less. 

It would be difficult to replicate this in an army reserve unit as the army normally relies more on collective training (levels 2-5 IBTS) than the air force. Not to mention the cost of reserve pay would have to increase, or the numbers of reservists would have to come down drastically.


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## pbi (16 Dec 2013)

This argument never ends.

I had it with my buddies in the Mess as a young Sgt in the Militia in the late 1970's, and since then I've heard it in every imaginable version, in every imaginable place, almost always based on a narrow-minded focus that would saddle us with an Army Reserve that was pleasing itself (maybe...) but really nobody else. We are too small an Army to afford the luxury of specialization.

The Army Reserve has a purpose, and a very important and useful one, which has been clearly stated and put into effect for decades: act as reserve for the Regular Army, either individually or in whatever size elements we can manage.

Domestic operations are an occasional task, not a purpose for a military unit's existence. If you want to train for disasters, join the Red Cross or your local fire service. What makes the military useful in DomOps is exactly what makes the USARNG useful for DomOps, or any military force for that matter: the residual effects of training for war.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> This argument never ends.
> 
> I had it with my buddies in the Mess as a young Sgt in the Militia in the late 1970's, and since then I've heard it in every imaginable version, in every imaginable place, almost always based on a narrow-minded focus that would saddle us with an Army Reserve that was pleasing itself (maybe...) but really nobody else. We are too small an Army to afford the luxury of specialization.
> 
> ...



Is that to say there is no better way to organize, train or employ the reserve? "Worked in the past" only makes sense if the organization's environment never changes, which the military's does constantly.


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## pbi (16 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Is that to say there is no better way to organize, train or employ the reserve? "Worked in the past" only makes sense if the organization's environment never changes, which the military's does constantly.



But, better for what? And why? And under what conditions?

Defining what the Canadian Army is supposed to be for, or what threat it's supposed to be able to counter, or how big it should be, or how it's supposed to be equipped, have consumed the total production of many paper mills and breweries.

If we ever learn one thing from history, it's that we have no real idea what's coming next, or when, or where, all high-priced military punditry and pontification aside. Because we are so small,  but historically so likely to be employed almost anywhere to do almost anything and often with little warning, what matters IMHO  is that we preserve a general purpose capability, some basic military virtues, and a good backbone of trained leaders.

None of this has anything to do with not being capable of fighting under modern combat conditions, or mindlessly doing what we've always done. It's about an honest  appraisal of how big and how capable we are really ever likely to be in "peace time", to be able to do the things we are likely (or "least unlikely...) to be called on to do. Failure to accept the grim limitations that this appraisal presents is to fool ourselves.

You claim that the Reserve needs to change, based on your perspective. I joined the Militia in 1974, served in it until 1982,  had close contact with it on several occasions over my Regular Army career, then went back to being a Res for my last two years in uniform. In my perspective, in those 30 plus years, lots of things did change about the Reserve. In some ways it's utterly unrecognizable from the drunken, largely amateurish and heavily "social" rabble I first joined, when the idea of a Militia soldier going into combat, short of WWIII, was considered laughable.

But, as long as it remains a part-time, volunteer organization faced with limited time and resources, some things about the Army Reserve will never change nor could they be expected to. Trying to produce highly skilled "niche"specialists is, to me, not only an unattainable goal but a very undesirable one that will limit the utility of the Reserve in its primary role.


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> But, better for what? And why? And under what conditions?
> 
> Defining what the Canadian Army is supposed to be for, or what threat it's supposed to be able to counter, or how big it should be, or how it's supposed to be equipped, have consumed the total production of many paper mills and breweries.
> 
> ...



I'd argue that we have no choice. When I first joined using crystal controlled radios, the job was fairly simply. It was hard, we perfected our craft, but it wasn't difficult to comprehend. Now when I look at the same trade (post 2 trade renames) the same expectations for new soldiers coming in are much more mind boggling. While it might not have been that difficult to teach soldiers to use radios and teach some antenna theory, teaching soldiers the fundamentals of TCP/IP and switching and routing, server administration, electrical theory and add field craft on top of that, it all takes much longer. I'd extrapolate that to other trades, and I would bet they have gotten similarly complex. 

From what I've seen all trades are getting much more technical, the expected knowledge of a trade qualified Pte or Cpl has shot up. Luckily it has seemed so far to go hand in hand with a higher quality of recruit (smarter, more  professional, more motivated). 

I don't think this will sustain it though, eventually the minimum knowledge and expertise demanded of a qualified soldier will be more than what can be crammed in what little training time there is available to reserve recruits. While they are every bit as smart as their counterparts, they simply don't have the time to become proficient in increasingly complex trades.

So yes, I think the standards will have to diverge. I think we'd be fooling ourselves if we think we are going to have the time to fully qualify reserve soldiers up to their reg force standards. So maybe we need to look at why we want the reserves, prioritize what their aims are, and start focusing our time on that instead of trying to make them something they are not going to be.

This is why splitting the expeditionary trades and soldiering training off from the standard DP system into it's own supplement might be a first step. Reorganizing the structure of the reserve Bde might be a next good step, and refocusing the dollars from the far too numerous CWOs, LCols, Capts and WOs and back to more training for the MCpls, Cpls and Ptes that are the most important ranks to have.


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## Jarnhamar (16 Dec 2013)

[quote author=RADOPSIGOPACISSOP]and refocusing the dollars from the far too numerous CWOs, LCols, Capts and WOs and back to more training for the MCpls, Cpls and Ptes that are the most important ranks to have.
[/quote]

Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (16 Dec 2013)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.



Or restructuring so you don't need so many. If you only parade 80 people you don't need a regimental structure.


----------



## Haggis (17 Dec 2013)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.



Most major exercises now are staffed/filled through CFTPO.  If there's no brique position for said CWO, Col, Capt etc. they should not be there.


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## Haggis (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> I don't know about you, but I grew up in a small town that way nowhere near any reservist unit. Everyone's opinion of the military was exceptionally high, higher than in any town like London Ontario, or Saint John NB. I don't see that being worth the money spent.



This reply has irked me for a few days now.

Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others? 

With the Regular Force garrisoned in a small number of "super bases" across Canada, and the reduced attaction activities of CFRG, the only CAF member the majority of non-urban /rural Canadians will likely see is a Reservist (including CIC/COATS).  Many small communities rely on the Reserve Force to provide that link between them and the greater CAF for emergencies, ceremonies and to maintain their proud historical roots (think War of 1812). 

Would the Regular Force be willing to send contingents to small towns across Canada for Remembrance Day, Canada Day etc.? Would the Regular Force be able to quickly provide emergency support and manpower in small town Canada if their "super base" is hundreds of kilometers away (i.e. The 1998 Ice Storm)?

Laastly, remember that Reserve unit budgets get spent in Reserve unit communities.  Pull a half million to a million Reserve Force dollars in wages, O&M and contracts out of a small Canadian city  (i.e. Brockville, ON or Truro, NS) and see the impact. 

Reserve units can do so, have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future.  Can you quantify the impact on the CAF's visibility, reputation and relevance in small town Canada if this were to cease?

Didn't think so.


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## Fishbone Jones (17 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> This reply has irked me for a few days now.
> 
> Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others?
> 
> ...



RM,

You know from past experience here, that when someone has a hard on for the Reserves, there is no logical argument or point that will sway their bias.

That's why most have given up on this thread.

Or are using the "Ignore" function.

 :dunno:


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## Haggis (17 Dec 2013)

recceguy said:
			
		

> RM,
> 
> You know from past experience here, that when someone has a hard on for the Reserves, there is no logical argument or point that will sway their bias.
> 
> ...




Yeah...... I know.   :brickwall:  But at least I got that off my chest.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (17 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> This reply has irked me for a few days now.
> 
> Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others?
> 
> ...



It was quoted by someone before that reserve pay is approximately $1.3B. That's a lot of money to pay for staffing parades and raising DND profile. 

A big problem with the reserve is the lack of concentration. Say what you want about having the reserves scattered around, but I'm in no delusion that if a major disaster hit Saint John or St. John's that it would be the local reserve Regts that are going to handle it, rather than 4 ESR and 2 RCR.

Wasn't it a while back they sent 4 ESR to Newfoundland after a hurricane? This was Newfoundland too, perhaps the furthest point from a superbase, and still it went to a Gagetown unit to take the lead.

That's why I don't think the reserves are delivering on value for money. Could they be better organized and led? Absolutely, in my experience there were a lot of good soldiers and some good leadership but were held back by and organization that made no sense.


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## kratz (17 Dec 2013)

Radop+13

Here is where your suggestions are a failure.

During Y2K planning, reserve members, their civilian job expectations and
their families were considered as part of the planning process.

While the exercise did not pan out as anticipated, it did demonstate the varied
mix that makes an effective volunteer reserve force.


----------



## George Wallace (17 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> Yeah...... I know.   :brickwall:  But at least I got that off my chest.



But you are still left with :brickwall:


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (17 Dec 2013)

Santa's Coattails said:
			
		

> Radop+13
> 
> Here is where your suggestions are a failure.
> 
> ...



Seriously? Op Abacus was probably the biggest example of what a waste the reserves can be. All I seen was people hanging out doing HF radio checks.


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## PuckChaser (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Seriously? Op Abacus was probably the biggest example of what a waste the reserves can be. All I seen was people hanging out doing HF radio checks.



Were you on OP CADENCE?

3 weeks of IBTS for a 3 day summit.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (17 Dec 2013)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> But you are still left with :brickwall:



Perhaps it's because I no longer have a horse in that race that I can speak honestly without unfeathering my nest.

I understand why many people on this forum are made uneasy when someone comments on the problems in the organization.


----------



## Nfld Sapper (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Wasn't it a while back they sent 4 ESR to Newfoundland after a hurricane? This was Newfoundland too, perhaps the furthest point from a superbase, and still it went to a Gagetown unit to take the lead.



BTW 4 ESR is the IRU for the whole of Atlantic Canada.....5 RGC has Quebec, 2 CER all of Central Canada and, 1 CER Western Canada IIRC in addition to all the other bits and pieces through out the Areas.

They did mainly because the PRes CER's do not have all the odds and ends needed for major disaster relief.... 

BTW I was there and we integrated with 4 ESR seamlessly and it was a Joint Task force and was headed up by a PRes BGen too...


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## George Wallace (17 Dec 2013)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Were you on OP CADENCE?
> 
> 3 weeks of IBTS for a 3 day summit.



I was there for 3 months.....but no IBTS... ;D


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## Jarnhamar (17 Dec 2013)

Lots of reserves who CT to the regs bring with them a healthy amount of life experience and post secondary education which, for NCMs in the regular force, can be tricky to obtain. Then again I heard the reserves had their money reimbursement for schooling cut.


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## dapaterson (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> It was quoted by someone before that reserve pay is approximately $1.3B. That's a lot of money to pay for staffing parades and raising DND profile.



No.  The total cost of the Reserve Fore is reported to be $1.3B.  Just over half of that is pay.  The balance is O&M costs (food & fuel); national procurement (ammo, spares & IMPs); capital (new equipment and buildings).  Certain other national costs are also attributed to the Reserves - for example, service desks that aren't available during the hours Reservists work have a portion of their costs attributed to the Reserve Force.

Many of the costs are assigned on an attributional basis, and not on actual expenditures.  Thus, they are best estimates, and need to be reviewed in that light.

Of the pay, a considerable portion (unreported by DND corporate systems of record) is used within Reg F units and formations to backfill their vacant positions or to address short-term requirements.  There's no departmental way of tracking those expenditures, but they are annually reported as "Reserve Force" expenditures just the same.


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (17 Dec 2013)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> BTW 4 ESR is the IRU for the whole of Atlantic Canada.....5 RGC has Quebec, 2 CER all of Central Canada and, 1 CER Western Canada IIRC in addition to all the other bits and pieces through out the Areas.



The arguement Reindeer Meatloaf made was that the super base were too far put to support in disasters, but like you said, the IRUs seemed to all be located at these bases, regardless of the proximity of the reserve units.

I have no doubt that the troops gelled well with their reg force counterparts, but no doubt did lack the bridging equipment to do some of the bigger tasks.

My view is that the reserve, for it to be more effective, ought to be integrated closer with the reg force, leveraging the equipment they have that sits idle nights and weekends. When I was in the commres it would have been so much better to have more direct access to the equipment that the HQ&Sigs had.


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## Fishbone Jones (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Seriously? Op Abacus was probably the biggest example of what a waste the reserves can be. All I seen was people hanging out doing HF radio checks.



"Operation Abacus was *a Canadian military operation *  formed in 1999 in response to anticipated disruption due to the year 2000 problem. Operation Abacus had troops standing by to restore order and vital services if the year 2000 and the turn of the millennium caused disruption to computer systems, and to conduct patrols to for looters and to prevent or stop rioting."

It wasn't a Reserve operation. Any 'waste' was spread across the entire CF. As well, the Reserves only did what higher command, the Regs, dictated. If that was radio checks, so be it.

You are not in a position to judge that.

Of course had something happened in, say, Toronto they could have let the place burn while they waited for Reg Force Jimmies to show up from Ottawa to stand on corners doing radio checks to restore order. After all, in your eyes, the Reserves are clueless, incompetent boobs.

For a Reg Force Sgt, you show an amazing amount of ignorance about the CF and its goings on. 

Careful, that axe your grinding should be near to the handle and pretty well useless by now. 

Just my  :2c:

Oh well, back to ignore :boring:


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## Haggis (17 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> The arguement Reindeer Meatloaf made was that the super base were too far put to support in disasters, but like you said, the IRUs seemed to all be located at these bases, regardless of the proximity of the reserve units.



Yet, during the Ice Storm it took two full days for units of 2 CMBG to make it to the affected areas of eastern Ontario.  Reservists were deployed on day one and acted as liaison officers between LFCAHQ and the county and township EMOs, while assisting their own friends an neighbours until augmented - not relieved - by Regular Force units.



			
				RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> My view is that the reserve, for it to be more effective, ought to be integrated closer with the reg force, leveraging the equipment they have that sits idle nights and weekends. When I was in the commres it would have been so much better to have more direct access to the equipment that the HQ&Sigs had.



Now you're proposing solutions.

However, for this to work, the Regular Force has to be mandated (directed) to support the Reserve Force. Maybe then that equipment sitting idle on evenings and weekends can be used by the Reserve Force instead of being protected for exclusive use of the Regular Force.  Because if Reservists use it, it may be broken and unavailable for Monday morning.
[/quote]


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## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP (17 Dec 2013)

Reindeer Meatloaf said:
			
		

> Yet, during the Ice Storm it took two full days for units of 2 CMBG to make it to the affected areas of eastern Ontario.  Reservists were deployed on day one and acted as liaison officers between LFCAHQ and the county and township EMOs, while assisting their own friends an neighbours until augmented - not relieved - by Regular Force units.
> 
> Now you're proposing solutions.
> 
> However, for this to work, the Regular Force has to be mandated (directed) to support the Reserve Force. Maybe then that equipment sitting idle on evenings and weekends can be used by the Reserve Force instead of being protected for exclusive use of the Regular Force.  Because if Reservists use it, it may be broken and unavailable for Monday morning.



I'm sure everyone would rather be augmented by people that have experience with the kit than to risk having something break. Normally, something that mission critical is not going to be messed around with anyway, unless there is adequate spares.


----------



## chrisf (18 Dec 2013)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> BTW 4 ESR is the IRU for the whole of Atlantic Canada.....5 RGC has Quebec, 2 CER all of Central Canada and, 1 CER Western Canada IIRC in addition to all the other bits and pieces through out the Areas.
> 
> They did mainly because the PRes CER's do not have all the odds and ends needed for major disaster relief....
> 
> BTW I was there and we integrated with 4 ESR seamlessly and it was a Joint Task force and was headed up by a PRes BGen too...



In fairness, bridging was a very small part of the whole operation (Even if it was the most visible part, there was a huge logistics tail behind it), and the whole thing was roughly on par to killing a mosquito with a sledge hammer. Under the conditions, a private contractor could have accomplished the same much more quickly and cheaply (Though every available private contractor was quite busy, and the weather immediately following the hurricane was quite favorable)

The "This Hour Has 22 Minutes" sketch on the operation is not unrealistic, and as a whole, residents of the affected area should/would be able to withstand isolation/loss of services for the reasonable 72 hour period quite well, even if it means sitting in front of the wood stove, eating patridge berry jam, and drinking home brew for that period.

What it did demonstrate was the ability of 37 Brigade (and in particular, the CFS St. John's lodger units) to standup a response to a natural disaster, and conveniently, the whole thing was over a period where a large collective dom ops exercise was planned anyway (The ex of course being cancelled).

Without going into details, there were very important lessons learned on all levels, which will hopefully be brought forward into future responses. Reserve elements were also very well integrated into the response (And were also quite necessary as the operation progressed). The effects of the loss of ARCON for the local reserves units were also quite visible, at least at the individual level, but the hopefully the experience gained will carry on for the next few years at least.

As an added bonus to lessons learned, the ford depth of a chevy impala is directly proportional to the wake of the GMC Sierra in front of it.


----------



## pbi (18 Dec 2013)

RADOPSIGOPACISSOP said:
			
		

> Perhaps it's because I no longer have a horse in that race that I can speak honestly without unfeathering my nest.
> 
> I understand why many people on this forum are made uneasy when someone comments on the problems in the organization.



Your comments need some broader perspective. Being realistic about the Res is not the same as trashing them, nor is it the same as mindlessly glorifying them. 

I was the G3 for LFCA during Y2K and during the Toronto Snowstorm.  Our staff team developed, wrote and coordinated the LFCA ABACUS plan and we were the LMA HQ for the Snowstorm (Tac HQ was 32 CBG, a Res HQ, not 2 CMBG). Res played a big role in both ops.

The Reserve in LFCA in Y2K had a much, much bigger role than "doing radio checks". Including, by the way, the CommRes, which makes me surprised to read your comments. We made a particular approach to the Signals world, early in the planning process, to get OPCON of all the CommRes units in LFCA. Since there was no alternative mil comms system available to us if CSN went out (and Canada had no Emergency Broadcasting System at that time), our Sigs plan was going to depend on HF, which meant CommRes. Maybe you didn't think it was very important, but we sure as hell did.

Our ABACUS plan (and the later CONPLAN TRILLIUM which was LFCA's DomOps contingency) was very solidly based on the Res CBGs. We realized very quickly that 2 CMBG was too small and too isolated to be of much use across a province as big and populated as Ontario, not to mention that JTFHQ ABACUS had a national string on them anyway. We kept them as our "fire brigade" but didn't base our plan on them.

After ABACUS, when we re-wrote TRILLIUM, we applied the same logic. We realized that in most of Ontario, Res units can mobilize and respond in their local areas long before the first vehicles are leaving Pet for a long, slow road move. And air moves may not happen in bad weather. 

In 38 CBG (as part of LFWA) the Res became an integral part of the Dom Ops response plan (at least in 2002-2005, anyway). Our Brigade mobilized two company groups for the BC fire emergency, with very little RegF assistance. Our CBG HQ in Winnipeg practiced converting to a Dom Ops CC if it were ever needed.

Domestic emergency response is something the Res does quite well: I think the Army realized this a while ago. In most emergencies, what is needed is typically not more highly skilled technicians (the civil agencies have hundreds if not thousands of these, trained far beyond any level we could reasonably achieve for soldiers). High voltage power lines, gas systems, municipal water systems, commercial digital circuits and systems, etc are not really our bread and butter. The civvies have way more capacity and more current training.

For example, during the Toronto Snowstorm, 2 CER was able to bring only a handful of pieces of hy eqpt that were at all useful in snow clearing. The City had over 800 pieces of machinery, the Province had hundreds more, and contractors hundreds beyond that. What we had was a bunch of other skills and capabilities. That's what the military does, and IMHO should do. If you want to revive the Civil Defense of the 1950's, or mimic the Germany TNHW service, go for it.

What are usually needed most, and what the Army Res brings to the fight, are a good basic C2 capability, good organization, mobility and pretty fair self sufficiency (within limits). Mission focus and the ability to do what you're told are also important in an emergency.


----------



## Remius (18 Dec 2013)

From what I remember when we deployed for the ice storm, we didn't have an effin clue what we were doing.  Dom Ops wasn't something we had trained for (Manitoba floods excepted but this was a whole other ball of wax).  It was a rapid deployment for the reserves and we were able to get out to the communities and assess what was happening and provide some limited assistance until the big boys arrived.  It took a bit longer for them to arrive (Block leave at that time and the fact that their own area was also affected by the disaster).  What the reserves were able to provide was coordination, leadership, ready manpower and a comfort to the community as well as gathering info about the affected areas and how they were coping.  It made things a lot easier when 2 CER showed up with the big machinery and linesmen showed up doing their thing.  

Telephone fan outs (something we were good at back then) and the fact that we were all local (and mostly on location) helped a lot.


----------



## mariomike (19 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> For example, during the Toronto Snowstorm, 2 CER was able to bring only a handful of pieces of hy eqpt that were at all useful in snow clearing. The City had over 800 pieces of machinery, the Province had hundreds more, and contractors hundreds beyond that. What we had was a bunch of other skills and capabilities. That's what the military does, and IMHO should do.



A local news report from the time, pbi.
http://cdn.thegridto.com/wp-content/uploads/ts-99-01-17-snow-facts-lastman.jpg

( Click to enlarge. )

"PREAMBLE was the military operation in which Canadian Forces personnel helped the city of Toronto deal with the worst winter storm * to have hit the area in 117 years. The following is a look at this four-day operation that involved almost 2,000 Reservists and Regular Force personnel."
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Toronto's+battle+against+mother+nature.-a0113140272

* I believe the worst winter storm ( at least in terms of fatalities ) in the city's history was in 1944 in which at least twenty-one people died.


----------



## pbi (19 Dec 2013)

Thanks Mariomike. 

Bruce Poulin's article contains several mistakes. I'm not sure wher he was working in PA at the time-I don't recall him being there.

To begin with, I am not aware that any "_military reconnaissance team_" ever flew into Toronto from anywhere. If they did, they never talked to us in LFCA HQ. I was the G3: my shop stood up and ran the operation, and I was meeting constantly with the Comd, the COS and talking regularly to 2 CMBG and to 32 CBG. I don't know who this team would have been, or what they were supposed to have been "_recce-ing_".

Second, prior to the IRU fiasco, LFCA had already responded to a request from the City to provide a troop of Bison ambulances, and to employ several hundred 32 CBG soldiers who were already in their armouries for a cancelled 32 CBG exercise. 32 CBG was not "called up" for the Snowstorm (in Canada we don't actually have a mechanism to "call up" Reservists short of an Act by the Governor in Council). 

The Bisons were deployed in four downtown fire halls to provide mobility support to the TFD and EMS, since the snow clearance problem was mainly a downtown issue at that point.  The Reservists were used for snow shovelling around key infrastructure, as Poulin correctly points out. This was all before the IRU panic happened.

The CDS didn't tell us to send snow clearing equipment to TO. He told us to send the IRU, which the Comd tried to explain to him was not needed. The CDS (under obvious political pressure) insisted. The decision to attach a Hy Eqpt  TF from 2 CER to the RCD was one taken between ourselves and 2 CMBG.

2 CER did not "stay behind to help with any emergencies". We were forced to keep them in T.O. long after there was any imaginable need for them. We tried to get the entire IRU TF released to go back to Pet as there was nothing for them to do (the snow was melting) but the COS advised me that at NDHQ level there was a concern of the "optics" of "abandoning" the City. This was of course quite typical, and not the last time we dealt with NDHQ pressure to deploy troops on an unnecessary DomOp because of "optics" (Walkerton was another)

Finally, it is a moot point as to whether or not a largely unnecessary, politically-driven and wasteful deployment of soldiers and equipment is a "success".


----------



## MilEME09 (20 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> 2 CER did not "stay behind to help with any emergencies". We were forced to keep them in T.O. long after there was any imaginable need for them. We tried to get the entire IRU TF released to go back to Pet as there was nothing for them to do (the snow was melting) but the COS advised me that at NDHQ level there was a concern of the "optics" of "abandoning" the City. This was of course quite typical, and not the last time we dealt with NDHQ pressure to deploy troops on an unnecessary DomOp because of "optics" (Walkerton was another)
> 
> Finally, it is a moot point as to whether or not a largely unnecessary, politically-driven and wasteful deployment of soldiers and equipment is a "success".



Politics is always involved, During the floods in calgary we had over 500 reservists sitting on their hands cause the only tasks we would get were the left overs the city gave us. In the end maybe 20-30 people actually headed out and the rest stayed behind to play cards when trucks didn't need fixing or anything else needed to be done. All simply because the city wanted to seem like it was in control.


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## Journeyman (20 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> The Reservists were used for snow shovelling around key infrastructure.....


..._and_ bus stops (even though busses weren't running).  I was RSS in TO at the time, and the troops got to spend quality snow shovel time at bus shelters.   ;D


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## mariomike (20 Dec 2013)

pbi said:
			
		

> Finally, it is a moot point as to whether or not a largely unnecessary, politically-driven and wasteful deployment of soldiers and equipment is a "success".



Politics aside, from an operational point of view, it went better than the snow storm of Christmas 2010 did in NYC:
https://twitter.com/1PolicePlaza/status/19444239410659328

Edit to add and clarify.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Second, prior to the IRU fiasco, LFCA had already responded to a request from the City to provide a troop of Bison ambulances, and to employ several hundred 32 CBG soldiers who were already in their armouries for a cancelled 32 CBG exercise. 32 CBG was not "called up" for the Snowstorm (in Canada we don't actually have a mechanism to "call up" Reservists short of an Act by the Governor in Council).
> 
> The Bisons were deployed in four downtown fire halls to provide mobility support to the TFD and EMS, since the snow clearance problem was mainly a downtown issue at that point.



That ( official ) message from NYPD shows what Emergency Services may find themselves up against during a winter storm.


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## Fishbone Jones (21 Dec 2013)

mariomike said:
			
		

> Politics aside, from an operational point of view, it went better than the snow storm of Christmas 2010 did in NYC:
> https://twitter.com/1PolicePlaza/status/19444239410659328



Seriously? WTF does that tweet have to do with this thread?

Other than, you, being able to post another useless link.


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## mwc (21 Dec 2013)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Politics is always involved, During the floods in calgary we had over 500 reservists sitting on their hands cause the only tasks we would get were the left overs the city gave us. In the end maybe 20-30 people actually headed out and the rest stayed behind to play cards when trucks didn't need fixing or anything else needed to be done. All simply because the city wanted to seem like it was in control.



Ya, I'm glad I gave up weekend over time to go to that party, thinking we would actually do something. Cool certificates of appreciation though  :


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