# Charles Company's Tough Go in Panjwai



## The Bread Guy (30 Sep 2006)

Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1159566611565&call_pageid=968332188492&col=968793972154

*The story of C Company*
Sep. 30, 2006. 05:44 AM
MITCH POTTER
MIDDLE EAST BUREAU


PANJWAII DISTRICT, Afghanistan—One must turn back time several generations to find Canadian soldiers in the state that Charlie Company finds itself today. Not since the Korean War has a single Canadian combat unit been so cut to pieces so quickly.

Either of the two events that rocked their world in the dust-caked hills of southern Afghanistan one month ago might qualify as the worst day of their lives. That they came back-to-back — one disastrous morning followed by another even worse — is a matter of almost incomprehensibly bad fortune.

The epic double-whammy — a perfect Taliban ambush of unprecedented intensity, followed one day later by a devastating burst of "friendly fire" from a U.S. Air Force A-10 Warthog — reduced Charlie to a status of "combat ineffective." They were the ones to fire the opening shots of Operation Medusa. But even as the massive Canada-led assault was gathering steam they were finished.

The soldiers left standing are not the same today as the ones who deployed to Afghanistan with nothing but good intentions barely seven weeks ago, as part of 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, based in Petawawa, Ont.

A few are emotional wrecks, too fragile still to speak of what transpired during that fateful Labour Day long weekend. Others bleed anger from their every pore.

Some cling to wounded pride, anxious for it to be known that if not for enormous self-sacrifice, the volume of Canadian blood shed these two mornings would have been vastly greater.

Others are disillusioned, having come to regard their work in Afghanistan as a mission impossible. And others still are more driven than ever to succeed, if only to lend greater meaning to the loss of their fallen Canadian brothers.

The survivors of Charlie Company are closer now than they were before. And the other thing they have in common is a need to tell their story, which they do today for the first time.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The White School was the objective, and not for the first time. A full month earlier the 1st Battalion of the Edmonton-based Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, on the tail end of their six-month deployment, encountered serious Taliban resistance from the single-storey building. It was a hub of Taliban activity, but on the morning of Sept. 3, as Charlie Company's 7 Platoon bore down on the building, only the Taliban knew what a hub it was.

In hindsight, some of the soldiers acknowledge their "spidey sense" was tingling. It was quiet that day. Possibly too quiet, as the platoon motored through fields of ripening marijuana plants, each taller than a man.

The engineers went first, using an armoured bulldozer to open two breaches through barriers between the pot fields. A clear path to the school was opened, and into it went four LAVs and a G-Wagon, the lightly armoured Mercedes-Benz jeep that many of the Canadians in Kandahar have come to despise as a "bullet magnet."

Approaching left to right, the Canadians lined up 50 metres from the school, like ducks in a row. Sitting ducks, it would soon become clear.

"All hell broke loose," says Master Cpl. Allan Johnson of Owen Sound, in command of the LAV known as 3.1 Alpha.

"It was dead quiet. And then I saw a guy jump up on a roof. Maybe he was giving a signal to the other Taliban. 

"All I know is the entire area just lit up. We were taking fire from at least two sides, maybe three, with everything they had. Rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms fire, the works.

"It was the cherry-popper of all cherry-poppers. And once we started taking casualties, we moved up to provide cover fire. Our cannon didn't stop from that point on."

The LAV from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment was the first hit, sustaining a bull's-eye RPG strike beneath the gunner's turret. The radio call announced injuries. It was the day's first fatality — Sgt. Shane Stachnik, 30, of Waskatenau, Alberta. 

Seconds later the G-Wagon exploded, with an RPG blasting through its passenger-side windshield, instantly killing Warrant Officer Rick Nolan, 39, of Mount Pearl, Nfld. Suddenly, 7 Platoon had lost its leader.

Cpl. Richard "Doc" Furoy, 32, of Elliot Lake, Ont., one of the company medics, was sitting directly behind Nolan inside the stricken G-Wagon, where he suffered light shrapnel injuries. He barely remembers the chaos that followed.

"Everything in the world came down on us and then, whoomp, the G-Wagon went black. I sort of lost consciousness. I could still feel the spray of gunfire, I could feel the concussion of the rounds inside my chest. But I couldn't hear anything," Furoy told The Star.

"At some point, somebody butt-stroked me with their rifle to snap me out of it. I came back into the present, got my wits about me. I knew I was needed. I checked on the Warrant Officer (Nolan). He was dead."

Thus began a firefight that lasted a full 3½ hours. As crews dismounted to retrieve the dead and wounded, the Canadian LAV gunners let fly into the marijuana fields with turret-mounted 25mm cannon and C6 fire. Each vehicle burned through at least two "uploads," representing more than a thousand rounds of firepower. 3.1 Charlie went through three uploads of suppression fire before pulling back from its original position, the last to leave the battlefield.

But there were more complications when the guns of one of the LAVs, 3.1 Bravo, either jammed or ran dry. Its crew compartment now loaded with casualties, Bravo reversed through the marijuana at 35 km/h, only to crash into a four-metre-deep irrigation ditch. Immobilized, its hydraulic rear ramp jammed shut against the ditch, Bravo took two direct RPG hits before its occupants were able to break open an emergency escape hatch.

With the tops of the pot plants snapping off around them as the Taliban barrage continued, many of Bravo's crew managed to make their way to 3.1 Charlie. Into a crew compartment designed for a maximum of eight, they stacked themselves like cordwood, the injured laid out on the laps of the untouched, and raced for cover.

Every battle plan includes a CCP, or casualty collection point. But in the frenzy of that Sunday morning the Canadians adapted their plan, moving their casualties to the nearest point of cover they could find — an armoured Zettelmeyer front-end loader belonging to the combat engineers.

And it was there that arguably the most tragic death of the day occurred. Warrant Officer Frank Robert Mellish, 38, of 8 Platoon was not meant to be in the teeth of battle that day. But when Mellish, a native of Truro, N.S., learned that fellow Warrant Officer Rick Nolan was dead, he stepped up to help retrieve the body. They were best friends.

Moving from the rear guard, more than 1.8 kilometres from the White School, Mellish made it as far as the Zettelmeyer when he was caught in a storm of shrapnel and died. Now 8 Platoon, too, had lost its leader. And in the same barrage, Sgt. Major John Barnes suffered a concussion, taking another key player out of the fight.

The day's fourth and final fatality fell next — Pte. William James Cushley, 21, of Port Lambton, Ont., taking shrapnel to the head. And if it seemed the worst was behind Charlie Company, it wasn't. As work continued on sorting out the wounded, the cab door of the Zettelmeyer popped open and its bleeding driver stuck his head out, shouting, "I'm fucking hurt, too" before slamming shut the door to await rescue.

The Canadians had left three stricken vehicles on the battlefield, but were far enough back now to call in air support to renew a bomb assault on the sources of the ambush. And what they saw next gave chills to the entire company.

"In the middle of all this chaos, we see this big, black fuck-off bomb coming toward us," said Cpl. Rodney Grubb, 25, of Kitchener.

"It was like a big, black steel football. It hit the ground and bounced and bounced and bounced. I hit the ground thinking, `Okay, we're done.' And then I got back up. The bomb just came to a stop. It didn't go off."

The 500-pound, laser-guided bomb had come from the belly of a U.S. warplane. What saved the Canadians from its explosive force was a safety mechanism designed to disarm the device when it strays from its intended co-ordinates.


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There was little sleep that night for Charlie Company, which withdrew to safety and watched with grim satisfaction from the top of the Arghandab escarpment as the air and artillery bombardment of the White School and the lines of Taliban ambush were renewed. Some of the men remember hearing the burp of American A-10 Warthog Gatling guns as they bore down on the White School. 

"I'm convinced someone was watching over us. The amount of bullets that were flying, I just don't know why some of us are still here," said Pte. Daniel Rosati, 27, of Woodbridge.

"It was the way people stepped up and covered each other. Everyone stepped up."

And now, their blood was up. Charlie didn't want ramp ceremonies for the fallen. They wanted payback.

"Your adrenalin wears off, but all you want is to be in that turret and hit those guys as hard as you could," said one of the company's gunners.

New orders came down. In the morning Charlie Company was to return to the battlefield to perform "a feint" — to create the appearance of another punch into the ambush, but this time with the intention of drawing out the insurgents.

At daybreak, the company had only begun to stir when the fireworks erupted. In the nanosecond between the speed of light and the speed of sound, they saw, but did not hear.

"There were sparks in the dust, like the sparklers you wave on Canada Day," said Sgt. Brent Crellin, of Yorkton, Sask. "And then we heard the burp of the gun. And then we felt sick."

The A-10 Warthog did not deliver a full burst that morning. But so lethal is its seven-barrel Gatling gun that even the aborted strafing reduced 8 Platoon, Charlie Company, to almost nothing. Of the nearly 40 men in 8 Platoon, only eight were left standing.

Dead was Pte. Mark Anthony Graham, 33, of Hamilton, a former Olympian and described by many as "the biggest, strongest guy in the company." And among the wounded was Maj. Matthew Sprague, the company commander.

Pte. Greg Bird, 34, also a Hamiltonian, was saved by nature's call. He stepped away just moments before the strafing.

"I was caught with my pants down. And when I came running, it was a complete gut-kick. Five minutes before, my head was on my pillow. When I found my pillow, there were pieces of shrapnel in it.

"We were fired up and ready to go and suddenly my platoon was in ruins."

Everyone in Charlie Company describes the scene as a kind of slow-motion horror film — bleeding men everywhere, some crawling, some moaning.

Within minutes, every available shred of medical aid was converging on the site. And within minutes again, the company medics had run dry on QuickClot, a coagulation-speeding agent that burns even as it saves lives.

U.S. soldiers and Afghan National Army regulars joined in the rescue effort. In some cases, the lesser injured were seen to be treating the worse-off, even as they themselves bled.

"It was a total effort from everyone on the ground, Canadian, American, Afghan, it didn't matter," said Bird. "The response saved lives. Whatever you felt about the attack, you pushed it away and just started helping any way you could."

Most of the survivors of Charlie Company are forbidden from speaking about the U.S. Warthog attack, having already testified at a board of inquiry that has yet to pass judgment. Canadian and American military officials were in attendance during the testimony, taken at Kandahar Airfield.

But privately, the soldiers say they are gratified to know that the A-10 pilot "owned up to the error" immediately upon landing the aircraft. In stark contrast to the 2002 friendly fire episode that cost Canada its first four casualties in Afghanistan, they say, this pilot is taking responsibility.

"It shows you how incredibly deadly the Warthog is," said one soldier. "There aren't very many situations in life where a one-second mistake can do this much damage. That's what this aircraft can do. I know nothing can make this right. But I also know the pilot will have to live with this for the rest of his life."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


A punch so hard, followed by a punch even harder, makes one wonder how Charlie Company can stand today. But stand they do.

Following the A-10 strike the company returned to Kandahar Airfield, saying goodbye to the fallen five in a ramp ceremony, along with the worst among the injured, who were flown out of Afghanistan for further treatment. But barely 36 hours later they were back in the field, returning to Panjwaii.

And there, according to the company's regulars, some payback was had. All told, Charlie Company believes itself responsible for as many as 200 of the more than 1,000 Taliban insurgents that NATO officials say died during Operation Medusa.

As the operation wound down, Charlie Company managed to get a closer look at the battlefield. There in the marijuana fields they found the telltale signs of an insurgency that, for whatever reason, chose to field itself conventionally this one time. Among the accoutrements were reinforced trenches flanking the lines of ambush.

The Canadian soldiers also retrieved the flak jacket of fallen Pte. Cushing and buried it in situ. A cross was staked there in his memory, and a second cross for Warrant Officer Mellish.

Today Charlie is still out there, having pushed farther west to a location that has not yet been given a name — and cannot be identified for publication, even if we knew what to call it.

The ranks have changed dramatically. A captain is now a major, and so on down the chain of command, as the company reconstitutes in real-time to face whatever comes next. It is four months still before they rotate home to Canada, but most cannot see that far down the line. Many are focusing on their three-week mid-tour leave.

And what, after such a battering, do they make of the mission today? It is a touchy question. Very touchy. So touchy, in fact, that although The Star has a notepad filled with the names and ranks of the soldiers who spoke to the question, we have chosen to withhold their identities. After all it has endured, Charlie Company hardly deserves the added grief of answering for the sin of outspokenness.

What do they make of the mission?

One soldier answered plainly, "I plead the fifth" — borrowing an Americanism to absolve himself from comment, lest he incriminate himself.

Another answered, "Hearts and minds? Fuck that. This is not peacemaking, this is a war for us." One soldier went so far as to answer "You don't," when asked how this war will be won. "It's like squashing an idea. How do you do that?" 

But many, perhaps even a majority, hold to a different view. In the words of one turret gunner: "Now that your friends have died, you don't want to walk away for nothing."

They all loathe New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton. Each, to a man, interprets Layton's stand on Afghanistan as an expression of indifference for their lives. But in almost the same breath, they say they need help. Canada's ratio of boots on the ground versus behind-the-wire support personnel at Kandahar Airfield frustrates this front-line. "The numbers are backwards. More combat, less support is what we need," said one section leader.

Capt. Ryan Carey, 35, a native of Oakville, is not surprised to hear the complaints. Like all of Canada's commissioned officers in Afghanistan, he is acutely aware that the real battle ahead will be political, not military.

"We lost amazing people. The experience and the personalities of the men who died, they just can't be replaced," he said.

"And if the result is a harder attitude on the part of some of these guys, I don't agree with it. But I understand it. You're not going to win this thing with a group of grunts who just went through this and then turn around to ask them to do hearts and minds.

"We still think everyone approaching us wants to kill us. We have no choice but to plan for a fight right till we leave."

But Carey, like the rest of Charlie Company's newly ascended leadership, doesn't see more troops as the answer. Not more foreign troops, in any event.

"More Canadians? Is that not just like giving candy to the Taliban? I think what we need is more ANA soldiers. At the end of the day it is the Afghans, with lots of backing for reconstruction, who are going to turn this thing. Not the people who point the weapons."


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## pbi (30 Sep 2006)

Actually not bad coverage. To me this reminds us as soldiers of what our predecessors had to go through in Korea, the world Wars and South Africa, when a company might be cut in half in an hour. War is frightening, disillusioning and brutal. For each of the 120-odd soldiers in a company, there will be a different personal reaction, as the article points out. That is, I think, because we are humans and not killbots. 

It also reminds us of just why we spend so much time and effort in the military (especially the Army, more specially the Combat Arms) on studying and developing leadership. NO OTHER ORGANIZATION does it as much, or as well. Period. It is only leadership that will keep our crews, sections, platoons and companies together when troops are dispirited, frustrated, frightened, tired, and "alone in a crowd". We have always believed that we produced some of the world's finest junior leaders, whether they wear stripes, crowns or bars: now they are facing a huge challenge. God bless them, and the troops they lead.

Cheers


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## GAP (30 Sep 2006)

Great snapshot...


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## kilahara (30 Sep 2006)

The version that ran in the Spectator is about 40 inches shorter than the one in today's Star. The full-length story, along with Rick Madonik's photographs, can be found <a href=http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1159566611565&call_pageid=968332188492&col=968793972154>here</a>.


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## Infanteer (30 Sep 2006)

> They all loathe New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton. Each, to a man, interprets Layton's stand on Afghanistan as an expression of indifference for their lives. But in almost the same breath, they say they need help. Canada's ratio of boots on the ground versus behind-the-wire support personnel at Kandahar Airfield frustrates this front-line. "The numbers are backwards. More combat, less support is what we need," said one section leader.



...and there it is.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (30 Sep 2006)

> Canada's ratio of boots on the ground versus behind-the-wire support personnel at Kandahar Airfield frustrates this front-line. "The numbers are backwards. More combat, less support is what we need," said one section leader.



Frankly, I get tired of this old line, particularly as we're trying - right now - to put a support package together for armour on a shoestring.  "less support" = less capability, full stop.  And before we get regaled with "REMF" stories from the BTDT guys on this forum, I seem to recall plenty of media play/whining (some of it here) about not having a Timmies in Kandahar with not a peep about how it would increase the on-camp support bill.

You can't have it both ways; the Brits have been trying it in Helmand on a nickel and dime basis and we've seen where that's got them.  We're conducting full battle-group mechanized operations from an airhead exactly half-way around the world from Canada.  This requires an enormous support system, from maint to movement to camp security.  I know better than many that economies of scale can be achieved by eliminating some functions and parochial interests, but I seriously doubt we'd have a functioning field force without extensive support from "on camp".  LAV optronics don't repair themselves...


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## Gunner (30 Sep 2006)

TR - Exactly.


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## Kirkhill (30 Sep 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Frankly, I get tired of this old line, particularly as we're trying - right now - to put a support package together for armour on a shoestring.  "less support" = less capability, full stop.  And before we get regaled with "REMF" stories from the BTDT guys on this forum, I seem to recall plenty of media play/whining (some of it here) about not having a Timmies in Kandahar with not a peep about how it would increase the on-camp support bill.
> 
> You can't have it both ways; the Brits have been trying it in Helmand on a nickel and dime basis and we've seen where that's got them.  We're conducting full battle-group mechanized operations from an airhead exactly half-way around the world from Canada.  This requires an enormous support system, from maint to movement to camp security.  I know better than many that economies of scale can be achieved by eliminating some functions and parochial interests, but I seriously doubt we'd have a functioning field force without extensive support from "on camp".  LAV optronics don't repair themselves...




Treading where angels fear -  

Perhaps the problem is not so much too much tail as too few teeth.

By this I mean that when you deploy 1 LAV you need somebody along to look after the Optronics of that LAV.  That means 1 more body on strength.  But suppose that individual isn't gainfully employed throughout his/her work day - either on stand by or engaged on other duties perhaps.  That individual might be able to look after the Optronics of 4/8/15 LAVs.

When you deploy a small force you still have to take along all the capabilities of a large force,  even if some of the capabilities are underutilized in their primary role.

This is often a problem for small companies in industry - regulations and practicalities demand that many tasks be performed, many of them specialist tasks, but the small company doesn't have the revenues to support all the trades necessary to run a company successfully.

So again - putting it another way - is the problem the fact that there are 1700 supports trades or is the problem that there is only one battalion (reinforced) with 3 rifle coys.  Could those 1700 support  4 or 5 companies and an armoured squadron?  Could they support two battlegroups?


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## axeman (30 Sep 2006)

less support  /less tail means less support . in OP Apollo we had a fairly heavy tail , while at time i was not appreciative of the "extra support personel"  when ever anything broke or we had problems there was always some one there to help out and support you . Thay assisted in keeping the line troops off gate and other details and allowed the teeth to go do what their real job to be there .  whe pointy end never always apprciates the tail the  outsiders see that there are seven  of the same trade techs in one section  but dont realize each focuses on differnt parts of the  gun or optronics etc... we need the tail as the stuff that breaks like that will not be fixed by the rifleman with a leatherman and 5 - 50 cord and gun tape. as they wont have it hell eve the supply techs  are specilists when it come down to it . sure there are the company storesmen but to keep a Battle group going? 

 my hats off to you over there


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## pbi (30 Sep 2006)

If you want beans, bullets and bandages, you need the folks to do it. If you want them to do it effectively and on a short turnaround  for 24/7, 365, you better have more than one guy in a job. Support is the price of a modern, expeditionary force. Just look at the forces that bring little or no support capabiity with them: what ends up happening? Somebody else (Canada/UK/US) ends up carrying them.

Having commanded Admin company, (the smallest company in the battalion, by the way...) I know that too many Inf soldiers (of all ranks) sometimes have very little appreciation or understanding of CSS until they:

a) get posted to Admin coy; or

b) need admin support in a hurry because they forgot to arrange support.

 If you want to deploy LAVs, modern arty, Nyalas, etc, you have to be able to sustain them, and the people who use them.

Cheers


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

For the record it's Charles Company not Charlie

And second the rest of you can sit here and explain to the masses how the tail is needed (and it is) but the front line troops get tired of seeing the discrepancy in such things as fighting to get the drivers pistol and every clerk and their dog has one on the basis that a rifle is too cumbersome for the office they work in etc etc, it's get so frustrating with the little things that the troops forget the big picture of just how much help the CSS trades give and just how needed they are.

As for the article itself it was decent somethings are sensationalised of course and real important things are missing but overall decent reporting, cept for getting the name wrong of the Coy in question.


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## vonGarvin (30 Sep 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> For the record it's Charles Company not Charlie
> 
> As for the article itself it was decent somethings are sensationalised of course and real important things are missing but overall decent reporting, cept for getting the name wrong of the Coy in question.



Was it Charles Coy?  Or do you mean it was another company?


Yes, Duke's Coy, City of London Coy, Charles Coy and the old Delta (they needed a new name)!


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## big bad john (30 Sep 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> For the record it's Charles Company not Charlie



He knows, he was there.


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

Yes VG it was Charles Company.. but like another article found on here that reffered to all the companies in the battle as PPCLI the reporter just used the common nomenclature instead of researching the fact that the 1 RCR has uncommon names for 2 of it's Rifle Companies, or at least some proof reader thought he had got it wrong when he called it Charles and just that since the phonetic alphabet has C and Charlie that the writer was confused and meant Charlie instead of Charles.


Either way the Company in question is Charles Company 1 RCR


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## vonGarvin (30 Sep 2006)

Thanks, thought so.


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

No worries VG, all in the name of accuracy for the guys that lived through it.


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## vonGarvin (30 Sep 2006)

Roger

I know it's confusing to the non-Royals out there (India Company?  WTF?!?!?!), just trying to keep it in the ranch, so to speak


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## Colin Parkinson (30 Sep 2006)

How about upping the force using reserves to provide the base security so the support staff can do their jobs and not stand sentry duty, unless they are already doing this?


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

Colin this thread is not about the CSS troops this about the guys who did some phenomenal soldiering, if you want to debate it or put forth ideas make a new thread please.


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## Armymedic (30 Sep 2006)

I saw this:



> bleeding men everywhere, some crawling, some moaning.
> 
> Within minutes, every available shred of medical aid was converging on the site. And within minutes again, the company medics had run dry on QuickClot, a coagulation-speeding agent that burns even as it saves lives.
> 
> U.S. soldiers and Afghan National Army regulars joined in the rescue effort. In some cases, the lesser injured were seen to be treating the worse-off, even as they themselves bled.



I am inferring what we taught you guys helped. Hopefully, it saved a couple lives. I heard Rick, JP and John did a really good job that day despite their own injuries.


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Sep 2006)

I would hate to imagine what kind of carnage there would be had we deploy just knowing the St Johns Ambulance sling and doughnut bandages.
Eye opening article.


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## George Wallace (30 Sep 2006)

Missed that earlier today, but just changed the title of this topic to "Charles".


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

Doc you got no idea how useful it was, When I finished the course I was sure it should be the standard of First Aid for Cbt Arms troops, on the 3rd it was confirmed 1000 times over.


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## cplcaldwell (30 Sep 2006)

> And it was there that arguably the most tragic death of the day occurred. Warrant Officer Frank Robert Mellish, 38, of 8 Platoon was not meant to be in the teeth of battle that day. But when Mellish, a native of Truro, N.S., learned that fellow Warrant Officer Rick Nolan was dead, he stepped up to help retrieve the body. They were best friends.
> 
> Moving from the rear guard, more than 1.8 kilometres from the White School, Mellish made it as far as the Zettelmeyer when he was caught in a storm of shrapnel and died.



I was out today wandering around. Fall days are nice to sneak in a ten click walk or so. Around noon I was by a little joint I know that makes a good souvlaki, time for lunch. It's the kind of place that has a bazillion papers lying around. I was lucky to get most of Section A of the Star; what can I say all the Sun's were spoken for....

I ran across this article, and I must confess, I probably studied it for an hour. The passage above, was the one that struck me...

Now I know that a lot of you have been there, I have friends there, I know some of you were in that place on that day, but this one part of passage struck me... I'm sure the death, as any death of a friend, is tragic, but there is an element of the hero that is not explored in the article's text, it was that element that struck me..._"from the rear guard, more than 1.8 kilometres  ...  he stepped up to help retrieve the body. They were best friends."_


I never met this WO Mellish, it's too bad, he must have been quite a guy....

_"Dulce et decorum est, *pro patria * et filii mori..."_


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## HItorMiss (30 Sep 2006)

Frank and Rick were lifelong friends, They were also the role models for 100's of soldiers myself included the day they died a little part of what was 1 RCR Recce Platoon history and my heart died with them.


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## Kirkhill (30 Sep 2006)

"Greater love hath no man than that he give up his life for another."


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## vonGarvin (30 Sep 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> Frank and Rick were lifelong friends, They were also the role models for 100's of soldiers myself included the day they died a little part of what was 1 RCR Recce Platoon history and my heart died with them.


I didn't know them, and I didn't know the effect that they had on you and so many others.  Take this for what it's worth, but take their final acts on this Earth as just one more example for all of us to follow: doing all for your mates.  What Frank Mellish did he didn't have to do according to orders, but he did have to do it according to the person that he was.


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## couchcommander (30 Sep 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> this about the guys who did some phenomenal soldiering



Indeed it is. 

As is always, you all have served you country with honour and distinction worthy of more praise than I can express. Allow me, as well as I can however, to express my thanks, and the thanks of all of us who have the privilege to reside in this nation. I, and I should hope we, are as always, truly grateful. 

As I have said many times before, I am continually impressed.


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## Jacqueline (30 Sep 2006)

This really gives an animated example of what's really happening, and how soldiers stick together.


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## pbi (1 Oct 2006)

> And second the rest of you can sit here and explain to the masses how the tail is needed (and it is) but the front line troops get tired of seeing the discrepancy in such things as fighting to get the drivers pistol and every clerk and their dog has one on the basis that a rifle is too cumbersome for the office they work in etc etc, it's get so frustrating with the little things that the troops forget the big picture of just how much help the CSS trades give and just how needed they are.



Hating "the REMFs" is a pretty SOP reaction for everybody forward of B Ech. Don't make the mistake of confusing the purpose of the system with stupid human mistakes or weaknesses. Check out how many Cbt A staff guys are in base or Kabul walking around with gear like pistols, C-8s, etc that may be more needed elsewhere(they certainly were when I was there, but then in those days K-town was the only game except for us two up at Bagram..) Dump those clerks, and who does all the pers admin stuff that pisses people off it it doesn't get done, like pay and HLTA? Fix the system, but don't wreck it.

Cheers


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## GAP (1 Oct 2006)

Guys this hasn't changed in 40 years. REMF"s are just as frustrated as the the guys outside the wire. I was "lucky", in that right off the hop I saw action at Phu Bai, then when I arrived at Cua Viet, they sent me outside the wire as a radioman (because that's what I did at Phu Bai). 3 months later someone looked at my MOS and said, whoa...wait a minute, but in the meantime I saw my share. After that it was a constant fight to go back outside the wire...some I lost, some I won.

The guys who's MOS stated they were REMF's only occasionally to go outside the wire on presence patrols, listening posts, guard duty, etc. . There was the typical gung ho attitude of some (some were really ridiculous) and a lot of gloaming of supplies that belonged to the guys in the field. 

It happened then, it happens now, will probably never end. The REMF's want to soldier also, put yourself in their position and you probably would be as frustrated. But without  the REMF's, nothing is going to happen for very long in the field. I was a Ground Radio Tech, and when they walked in after a frustrating patrol and slammed the PRC-25 on the desk telling me "it talked, but wouldn't listen", they were very happy when I fixed it.

One can't exist without the other. Clean out the deadwood and everything would be darling.


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## RHFC_piper (1 Oct 2006)

St. Micheal's Medical Team said:
			
		

> I saw this:
> 
> I am inferring what we taught you guys helped. Hopefully, it saved a couple lives. I heard Rick, JP and John did a really good job that day despite their own injuries.



Late reply, I know, but I can't sit at my computer all day (Hurts my legs).. with that said...

The TCCC should be manditory for all combat troops.  

When I was hit with shrapnel (from the A-10) and I was crawling for my rifle (thought we were under attack) a fellow soldier found me, rolled me over and applied tourniquets to my legs... which stopped the bleeding from my femoral vein (not artery, thank god)... when the medic inspected the tourniquets, he said "these were done perfectly... text book"
When I arrived at KAF, the docs there said that tourniquet probably saved my life.

We were all trained, by our TCCC's and medics from 2FA how to apply Tourniquets, Isreali Bandages (which they applied to the wound going through my arm) and quick clot, all of which was used the day I was wounded and the day before.

The level of professionalism demonstraited by the soldiers on the battle field in treating the casualties could only be described as absolutely amazing.  The less wounded were treating the more wounded.  And it is true what the article said about everyone pitching in; when I looked up from the stretcher, I was surrounded by a medic, an engineer, a sniper and a at least 2 others from the battalion. Everyone around me was calm and professional.

Anyway, enough ranting... to sum up; yes, the training provided was useful... it saved lives... may have saved mine.  Which is why, since I've been back home and close to my home regiment (RHFC) I have been pimping the idea of educating more reservists in TCCC.  Because we will probably be sending more reservists over seas with combat units, and the more they can be trained at home unit, the easier it will be for them to work with the Battalions.

C


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## GAP (1 Oct 2006)

Charlie Company: The rest of the story
Oct. 1, 2006. 01:00 AM
http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1159654214788&call_pageid=1140433364397&col=1140433364286

In yesterday's paper, the conclusion to Mitch Potter's interview with Capt. Ryan Carey in Panjwaii district was missing due to a production problem. Here is what was left out of the Oakville native's remarks on the situation Canadian soldiers face in Afghanistan.

"We still think everyone approaching us wants to kill us. We have no choice but to plan for a fight right till we leave."

But Carey, 35, like the rest of Charlie Company's newly ascended leadership, doesn't see more troops as the answer. Not more foreign troops, in any event.

"More Canadians? Is that not just like giving candy to the Taliban? I think what we need is more ANA soldiers. At the end of the day it is the Afghans, with lots of backing for reconstruction, who are going to turn this thing. Not the people who point the weapons."
More on link


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## HItorMiss (1 Oct 2006)

PBI

Are you disagreeing with my stuff about CSS troops? or reinforcing them? 

Regardless as I stated earlier lets keep this Thread on track and talk about the battle these guys went through and not some sub topic about CSS trades


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## Scoobie Newbie (1 Oct 2006)

My take is that PBI was saying they are very important BUT they do not need C-8's and pistols necessarily.


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## Infanteer (1 Oct 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> Regardless as I stated earlier lets keep this Thread on track and talk about the battle these guys went through and not some sub topic about CSS trades



That statement was, in my opinion, a significant point buried in a good article.  I don't see any prescriptions on what parts of the article we are supposed or not supposed to talk about.


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## HItorMiss (1 Oct 2006)

You make a good point Infanteer, but rehashing the Pointy end guys think this and the CSS guys think that, argument has occurred so much I had thought perhaps a split in thread to discuss what the Infantry guys are saying in KAF, and we could leave this thread to remarks or clarification on some of the fighting those guys did... I think it's a rare glimpse into serious combat operations in the CF. And the soldiering they did that day and the following day. 

Maybe I have over stepped my bounds, but I just think the point has been made here and that if people wanted to continue that debate then split the thread, and this thread could be for the article overall and not the niggly things


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## big bad john (1 Oct 2006)

We have had numerous threads on site about the CSS Vs the Pointy End and I for one, would hate to see this thread dissolve into another one of those arguments, there have been enough.  I would welcome further discussion on the operation itself, pro's and con's, as well as Leasons Learned.  My humble opinion.


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## Kirkhill (1 Oct 2006)

big bad john said:
			
		

> We have had numerous threads on site about the CSS Vs the Pointy End and I for one, would hate to see this thread dissolve into another one of those arguments, there have been enough.  I would welcome further discussion on the operation itself, pro's and con's, as well as Leasons Learned.  My humble opinion.



I share BBJ's opinion.


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## cameron (1 Oct 2006)

This article is a sobering reminder of the grim realities of combat, which get over romanticized too often, and increases my respect for Canada's fighting men and women even more.  Rest in Peace to all the fallen and Godspeed to all those still standing.


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## big bad john (1 Oct 2006)

I for one want to know much more about the first day.  It has been my experience that the one of the hardest, if not the hardest operations to effect successfully is a retrograde movement under contact.  From what I can see here.  A company was ambushed, sustained casualties, formed a baseline, recovered all casualties, and then performed a retrograde movement under contact.  All while inflicting grave damage upon the enemy.  

Excepting for the casualties, this is not a bad days work.


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## Trinity (1 Oct 2006)

HitorMiss said:
			
		

> Maybe I have over stepped my bounds,



You.. Never.....



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I share BBJ's opinion.



+1 to Kirkhill   


			
				big bad john said:
			
		

> I for one want to know much more about the first day.  It has been my experience that the one of the hardest, if not the hardest operations to effect successfully is a retrograde movement under contact.  From what I can see here.  A company was ambushed, sustained casualties, formed a baseline, recovered all casualties, and then performed a retrograde movement under contact.  All while inflicting grave damage upon the enemy.
> 
> Excepting for the casualties, this is not a bad days work.



Now... in all seriousness that is an excellent point.

To survive an ambush while being outnumbered is alone an incredible feat.  But to then
hold ground, counter attack and recover their casualties before falling back to a secure
position... all in causing incredible amounts of damage is unheard of.  

My understanding of a perfect ambush is no one walks away.   If you can take enough
time to plan out a proper ambush, no one should walk away.  So surviving one and 
turning it into your advantage = mind boggling.  Huge recognition to the OC in charge.


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## RHFC_piper (1 Oct 2006)

Trinity said:
			
		

> My understanding of a perfect ambush is no one walks away.   If you can take enough
> time to plan out a proper ambush, no one should walk away.  So surviving one and
> turning it into your advantage = mind boggling.  Huge recognition to the OC on that!!!



It was damn close to being a perfect ambush.  

All was calm when we first went in.  So calm infact, that I pulled out my camera and took some pictures of the battlefield, our positions, some ruins and compunds and even the pot fields.  Shortly after, they opened up from the same positions I was taking pictures of.

My camera is still in Afghanistan along with all of my other kit and equipment.  I'm anxious to get it back 'cause I have phenomenal pictures and video from the few days leading up to the ambush, including the "light show" the night before.

Unfortunately, I'm absolutely positive that all those pictures will be considered OpSec and I won't be able to post them.  I will, however, turn them over to the Battalion so they can use them for.. well... what ever they want.

As for the leadership on the ground; I have nothing but praise for all.  The OC of C Coy is a fantastic leader, and truely pulled us out of a potentially deadly (even more so) situation.

And to the soldiers of Charles Coy (specifically 7 & 8 platoons)... I have never in my life worked with more professional soldiers. And as this may seem like little praise coming from a reservist with only 3 weeks of a tour under his belt (thank you friendly fire), its how I feel. And I would give anything to be back with my brothers over there.


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## ladybugmabj (1 Oct 2006)

I came on here to see the comments posted about this article. I figured most or all would be in support of Charles Coy. Yes, it's Charles..not Charlie....that's the "movie term''  that J.Q Public would know. My husband was the LAV commander of Bravo LAV that recovered Rick Nolan and then landed in the ditch. I knew that much, because my husband is one to tell me most of what he does. Yes, he does hide things, but he needed to tell me. HE DID NOT tell me about the 2 RPG rounds that hit the LAV once it was in the ditch. 
  I did not know that Frank went in to recover Rick, but knew that they were great friends, making this tragedy so much worse. My husband, and the rest of 7Platoon seem to be getting on pretty good. His section is home in 12 sleeps for leave. It will be hard to let him go back, but he has his job to do. The OC for Charles Coy is actually going back...my husband was happy to hear that today. Tells you how strongly these men believe in their mission and to carry on with their "boys"
  Thank you for all your kind words for this coy and the work they are doing!


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## Scoobie Newbie (2 Oct 2006)

Well he's trying not to worry you any more then you are.


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## ladybugmabj (2 Oct 2006)

I know he doesn't want to worry me. He knows I read the news, come on these things way too much, and just generally involve myself more than I should. I'm not a wife that worries every time I hear something or read something. I was a wreck the day I heard about the incident. Didn't help I was at work!  The fact that Rick was hubby's WO and Rick was the last person I spoke to on Aug. 8, didn't help. After I spoke to hubby...I was fine. Even okay after he called 3 weeks ago to tell me about shrapenal wounds he recieved. 

Thanks!!


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