# Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)



## Marc22 (26 Mar 2005)

Has anybody heard about what the army is going to do in the CASW (AGL) file?
We have just received our C & R (command and recce) G-Wagons and they arrived with a C-6 mount. I was told that they would be fitted with either a .50 cal M2 machine gun or a CASW. 
What should I expect for the future?


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## Bomber (26 Mar 2005)

Something that shoots 40mm grenades.  Trials are on going out in Valcartier.


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## KevinB (29 Mar 2005)

The Gwagon's ring mount will not function for long with the .50 or the GMG.

Get used to the C6...


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## Mountie (6 Apr 2005)

What does "CASW" actually stand for?  I realize the weapons system is a 40mm AGL, but I was just curious what the Canadian "CASW" designation stood for.


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## MG34 (6 Apr 2005)

Company Area Suppression Weapon


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## Steel Badger (10 Apr 2005)

Under the proposed light inf orbat...each inf coy will carry 4 CASW in the direct fire section of the support pl...

If it happens


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## Ex-Dragoon (13 Jun 2005)

Some more info on the CASW from the CASR site:

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-casw.htm


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## spacelord (14 Jun 2005)

Steel Badger said:
			
		

> Under the proposed light inf orbat...each inf coy will carry 4 CASW in the direct fire section of the support pl...
> 
> If it happens



did I read that correctly?  This is to be a company weapon for the light infantry ie. dismounted? some dude is going to have carry that? Jeepers H. Crackers, I wouldn't want to be him.


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## Britney Spears (14 Jun 2005)

> did I read that correctly?  This is to be a company weapon for the light infantry ie. dismounted? some dude is going to have carry that? Jeepers H. Crackers, I wouldn't want to be him.



Well obviously it won't be carried by one person. Presumably the barrel, reciever, and tripod come apart, and the ammo distributed.


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## KevinB (14 Jun 2005)

Just cause its LIGHT it does not mean footborne

 Look for vehicle - GWagon, BV206 and ATV's.

You cant hump enough ammo via your ruck.


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## AIC_2K5 (7 May 2007)

http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2694489&C=landwar

Older article from CASR
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-casw.htm

"I’m bringing in CASW, but I have to remove something from the inventory and that something could be 60mm mortars,” Riffou said. “They’re using 60mm mortars right now in [the Afghan] theater and there’s always the fear” of losing a capability.


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## MG34 (9 May 2007)

As much as i like the idea of a 40mm belt fed,no fucking way am I going to give up the 60mm Mortar. The 60 was the most effective dismounted weapon we had during  my Roto with TF 3/06, to get rid of it for a weapon that offers less capability in most areas id just idiotic. Of course the fine folks in the Crystal palace don't seem to give a damn.


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## daftandbarmy (9 May 2007)

Sheer madness, certainly. Why eliminate the 60mm? Keep it to augment the 40mm, which will most likely remain vehicle mounted anyway.

But of course, the new 84mm MOR will help fill the gap:

"But Riffou said CASW, linked with 84mm mortars and a range of munitions, will provide a significant improvement in capability. He called the CASW a system of systems in that it will involve a fire-control system linked to the gun"


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## Infanteer (9 May 2007)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> He called the CASW a system of systems



Where have I heard that buzz-word before?  Let's kill it like we killed that stupid "Multi-Mission Effect Vehicle" idea....


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## KevinB (9 May 2007)

84mm Mortar  ???

 Did I miss something?

The 40mm AGL is a nice piece of kit -- and it has a role -- however its role is an augment to the M2HB .50 HMG, and in some way the 60mm Mortar -- but it does not replace either.

What to retire something worthless -- Eryx


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## Kirkhill (9 May 2007)

Without in any way offering an endorsement of the notion of removing the 60mm MOR (a silly notion) perhaps the slip-up wasn't in the calibre but in the weapon.  Perhaps "those that know" are thinking of pairing the the 40mm AGL with the 84mm Carl Gustaf and adding all those neat extra ammunition types to the system.

I seem to recall some years ago that Computing Devices of Canada (now with General Dynamics) developed a Computerized Laser Assisted Sighting System that was basically a simplified Tank Fire Control System that could be mounted on DF weapons like the CG/HMG/Mk19/Stryker-AGL and the CG-84.  I can only find current reference to a similar system by L3 Communications, the XM116 Small Arms Fire Control System, but I note that the Stryker-AGL (the machine gun, not the vehicle) has a similar sighting system included as does the 25mm OCSW.  Maybe there is some thought to trying to simplify training by introducing a family of weapons that all use a common sighting system and can cover most, if not all, of the capabilities of the Lt MOR.



> FFV441 is a HE Shrapnel round, useful in a "lobbed" trajectory to 1,000m, which can be fused to fire on impact or airburst.
> FFV441B is a high explosive round with an effective range against personnel in the open of 1,100 m. The round arms after 20 to 70 m of flight, weighs 3.1 kg, and is fired at a muzzle velocity of 255 m/s[1].
> FFV469 is a smoke round fired like the FFV441, with a range of about 1,300 m. The 3.1 kg round is also fired at 255 m/s[1].
> FFV502 is a high explosive, dual purpose HEDP round. The term high explosive is misleading, however. It is a HEAT round, with the ability to be set to detonate on impact or one tenth of a second afterwards. Effective range is 1,000 m against broad soft targets such as infantry in the open, 500 m against stationary targets, and 300 m against moving targets. Minimum flight is 15 to 40 m to arm the warhead. Penetration exceeds 150 mm of armor. Ammunition weight is 3.3 kg and muzzle velocity is 230 m/s[1].
> ...



http://www.answers.com/topic/carl-gustav-recoilless-rifle


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## KevinB (9 May 2007)

Well I'm not the biggest fan of the 60 admittedly -- both from using it -- and we seem to have a det in this AO that uses two of them insessantly at us -- but fortunately [in this case] the payload on the 60 is so small that you almost need a contact hit to kill...

   However for smoke and illum missions - its a good tool.

The US M224 with the newer ammo has a 3500m range -- beyond that of the Mk19/Hk GMG and 84mm CarlG.

IIRC from my Mortar firing table book the the 60 with the bipod can do 2500 at least.  Which is also past the range of the replacement systems talked about.

Unless 81's all of a sudden fall from the sky and come back to home to the Infantry -- the trade needs the 60


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## daftandbarmy (10 May 2007)

This South African Commando/ Patrol style 60mm MOR looks pretty handy. 650mm barrel gives 2000m max range and it can be fired from the prone position (e.g., while in contact). Anyone out there tried it before?

http://www.denel.co.za/Landsystems/LS_LightOrdnance60mmMortarSys.pdf

Something like this would be a handy, practical compliment to the CASW


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## KevinB (10 May 2007)

Uhm -- I've fired the CF 60 from the prone...
 (loading is a bit of a bitch)


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## GAP (10 May 2007)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> Uhm -- I've fired the CF 60 from the prone...
> (loading is a bit of a bitch)



It's amazing what contortions your body can do while still protecting your tail...... ;D


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## KevinB (10 May 2007)

It was in Wx, sorry - no cool 60 warstories.  
But I was trying to set the standard as MJP's det was on the next attack.


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## GAP (10 May 2007)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> It was in Wx, sorry - no cool 60 warstories.
> But I was trying to set the standard as MJP's det was on the next attack.



Did you set the standard?


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## a_majoor (10 May 2007)

Peerhaps we are looking at "last year's technology", automatic grenade launchers have been around since the 1960's, but we are dealing with new threats and environments.

Perhaps what we need is an automatic mortar like the Soviet 2B9 "Vasilek" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2B9_Vasilek, although I think with a little inginuity we could make a lighter and less complicated version. Breech loading mortars exist in sizes as small as 60mm (mostly designed for use in turret mounts), which might also be closer to what we are looking for: a weapon that can fire both direct and at a high angle, and deliver a useful payload against the enemy.

The illustration is the "Scorpion", an automatic mortar mounted on a HMMVW


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## KevinB (10 May 2007)

I got to see the 82nd Abn do a Mk19 demo in Pet from Juliet Tower in the fall '92 time frame.  Add in what I've seen them accomplish overseas and I think it is a very valuable weapon system.  Either it or preferably the Hk GMG.
  
(GAP -- well Mike tells his story one way -- I tell mine the other, and admittedly he did lend me the Mortar Firing table book - I had neglegently left behind, and when I did the demo for the group elsehwere - I would have looked REAL dumb without Mike's help --- and then me briefing the Safety Officer on what I was and was not allowed to do  : - true story )

I do think the 60 could be improved in the handheld role -- with a angle/cosign indicator thingy (you can get them for sniper rifles to determine slope [and its effect on your book value range])  so you could lay on more aqccurately.
   Other issue is the PSQW does not really qualify you for a mortat - its more of an intro -- I started in the Arty and also have a reasonable familiarity with the 81 so I ran the 60 det like a real mortar -- but they dont teach Indirect Fire methods of recording and layign the tube on the PSWQ (I took course 0 as I did not have Eryx and thus my MG, Mortar, SAC and a bunch of other stuff did not count  :)  

Sorry for the Kev hijack -- but I think IF the 60 is to remain (and I think it has a role -- that it needs both some upgraded parts - and the 031's need to go back to Mortar school)

Still I'd kick the 60mm to the Light Units -- and replace the 60mm 1:1 with the 81mm in the Mech units - give the coy a 4 tube group in the defence -- and though I've used the 60 in the attack -- it was light -- I've never seen a Mech unit use a 60mm for an attack.


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## Lance Wiebe (10 May 2007)

For those that have seen the 40mm gun in action, I'm sure that you will agree that it is an awesome weapon.  It provides much needed area suppression capability that we are currently lacking.  Not to degenerate the 60mm mortar, of course, but the rate of fire of the Mk19 and the effects downrange are astounding.

I have been arguing for years that we should have bought the 40, of course my argument was for each platoon to have one mounted in a RWS, preferably in a LAV III chassis.  I'm kind of worried that we will only buy the ground mounted version, and try to cram the weapon, tripod and ammunition in the back of our already to crowded LAV's.  I hope that we do buy the RWS variant!

As for the 40 replacing the 60mm mortar, I'm of two minds.  While the preferred option would be to have both, if the choice was boiled down to "pick one, and only one", I think that the 40 is a more versatile weapon when mounted in a RWS.  Perhaps we can also purchase some vehicle mounted breech loaded mortars that are appearing, sometime down the road.


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## Kirkhill (10 May 2007)

> Rheinmetall Canada’s director of land systems, Jean-Claude Rollier, said a new tripod has been developed for the Heckler and Koch gun so it can fire at a higher elevation for use in the indirect fire mode that Canada is interested in.



Interesting bit of "Canadianization" here - a High Angle tripod.  I don't know what that will do for range but in terms of effect might it not put the weapon into the same category as the Vasilek?  Rate of fire compensating for weight of shot?  Wouldn't it also allow for engagement of EN in defilade with the C2A1 sight without having to resort to the more exotic "programmable" rounds?

I still can't really see the AGL (or for that matter the HMG or the 81mm MOR) as "dismounted" systems except in a prepared position.  Due to the weight of ammunition involved don't you require at least a light vehicle with each weapon or two?


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## GAP (10 May 2007)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> As for the 40 replacing the 60mm mortar, I'm of two minds.  While the preferred option would be to have both, if the choice was boiled down to "pick one, and only one", I think that the 40 is a more versatile weapon when mounted in a RWS.  Perhaps we can also purchase some vehicle mounted breech loaded mortars that are appearing, sometime down the road.



And that's where the difference is...the 60 and its' ammunition is manpackable for those really exotic/erotic places no one else wants to go...


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## KevinB (10 May 2007)

Well I disagree on the 60 being manportable -- it can be -- but when you factor in the ammo weight -- your not going very far with the thing and be effective.
  
 When you start overloading troops you ruin combat effectiveness.  Not to mention you've got a 2min ammo supply

  Keep in mind with the weapons and ammo we currently saddle the troops with they are carrying damn near (and over in some cases) 100lbs of gear BEFORE you add Mortar - Carl G etc.

   I always wanted to play "Rat Patol" with an Iltis and Mk19   
--- the US mil has some Mk19's in RWS here on both Strykers and Hummers -- but the majority are manned turrets.  I think for the Light Bn's that a vehicle mounted - like a mobility det Hummer - with the CASW would be advantageous -- and you can always dismount them and even jump them (though once again we are getting in to the law of Light Infantry Firepower diminishing returns)


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## GAP (10 May 2007)

> Well I disagree on the 60 being manportable -- it can be -- but when you factor in the ammo weight -- your not going very far with the thing and be effective.
> 
> When you start overloading troops you ruin combat effectiveness.  Not to mention you've got a 2min ammo supply



Shoot, if we had only used those arguments, but who knew.....


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## KevinB (10 May 2007)

hehe - touche -

I was more thinking in line with current operations and the requisit force protection equipment worn.

Still even if everyone carries 3 bombs in a Light Pl -- its makes your quick attack a littel bit more deliberate when you need to set an ammo point etc.


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## a_majoor (11 May 2007)

Since mortars are "the" area supression weapon, and since a 60mm mortar bomb has much greater volume than a 40mm shell (hence a bigger bang), then there should be some work done to make the 60 lighter and more effective, as well as looking at the possibility of an automatic mortar in that calibre for mounted use (i.e an RWS or turret mounted version, or something which can fit on a flatbed like the Scorpion illustrated earlier). The DF option of shooting a 60mm through a window or into a bunker firing slit would make a dramatic addition to the capabilities of a mortar.

The AGL has its uses, but a mortar with its high trajectory can get to more places, if man portable can be carried to more places, and with a bigger warhead can have a much more dramatic terminal effect.


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## Kirkhill (11 May 2007)

Panhard has had the vehicle mounted 60mm mor on their AML for a number of decades now.  Breech loading, standard rounds, 100m - 4000m range, 10-20 RPM.  You would need to add a lot of metal to make an autoloader as capable as the much more flexible No.2.  I don't know about DF mode but I don't see why not.  If the old British 2" (51mm) MOR could be fired horizontally (using a suitable tree, wall or rock for a base) then presumably this weapon could also be fired at the same angles.   



> AML 60 SAYMAR Ltd. has developed an upgrading kit for this vehicle consisting of the following:
> Automotive Upgrade(refer to AML 90 upgrading kit) and a new 60 mm mortar operated from the inside to replace the existing one in the original AML 60. This improves the vehicle fighting capabilities and lethality, extends the vehicle operational life, and enables the extended use of the existing fleet among other state of the art military vehicles.
> 
> The 60 mm "Soltam" mortar is an advanced mortar with a firing range of 4000 m capable of firing a large variety of bombs including: high explosive, smoke bombs, and illumination flares.
> ...


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## KevinB (11 May 2007)

Guys while you CAN fire the 60 direct - its NOT ideal.
  The 40mm HV round for the CASW have a larger payload - and greater velocity (and hence way greater range) than the M203.  The ROF on a 40mm AGL give a HUGE leap in firepower than a mortar just does not have.

  Your trying to make the 60 into something it is not.

IF it came down to it -- I'd rather lose the 60 than the CASW, I'd prefer not too -- but..


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

Comparing the 60mm (a great weapon) with the 40mm (another great weapon) is like comparing apples and geosynchronous satellites.  Both are round, but that's about it.
I-6 pointed out the really big drawback to the 60: the ammo load.  Remember that if you have 4 mortars, and wish to have 5 minutes of fire at 15 rounds a minute (which isn't all that much, when you think about it), that's 4 x 5 x 15 = 300 (someone check my math: PLEASE!) Assume that each round in its tri-pack and its relative share of packing is a "mere" 2kg, then you are talking 600 kg.  0.6 Tons.  For five minutes.  Sure, you can dole that amount around a bit, BUT, those "pack mules" also carry their own ammo, water, rations, weapons, med kits, ballistic plates, and so forth.  The one good thing that can help ease this burden is that with its range using a bipod, you don't have to carry that stuff as far.
One big plus is its ability to fire mulitple natures of ammunition as well as providing reasonably accurate firepower, that can be "zeroed in" by day or by night in all weather.  Its high angle ballistics means that it can hit people "hiding" behind "things".
I'm not going to comment on the 40: it's not my lane.  Suffice it to say that I share the belief that a better world would be "both" 60 and 40, certainly not "either".


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> The ROF on a 40mm AGL give a HUGE leap in firepower than a mortar just does not have.


No doubt in my mind that the belt-fed 40mm AGL has a higher firepower.  I know very little about it.  Can it be zeroed in (aka "DFd") and fired on "target numbers" from a map as with the 60?  I imagine that since it's on a tripod (of sorts) that it can (much like the GPMG/SF).


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## Armymedic (11 May 2007)

I don't know gents, but if you give me a target I can see at 3000-5000 m, I would rather pepper it rapidly with 40 mm grenades thru a sight, then having to waste 2-3 rounds and TOF to hit the tgt, and then have a fire for effect.


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

St. Micheals Medical Team said:
			
		

> I don't know gents, but if you give me a target I can see at 3000-5000 m, I would rather pepper it rapidly with 40 mm grenades thru a sight, then having to waste 2-3 rounds and TOF to hit the tgt, and then have a fire for effect.


Perhaps.  Now suppose said "target" refuses to comply and goes behind a berm.  What then?


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## Lance Wiebe (11 May 2007)

Captain Sensible said:
			
		

> Perhaps.  Now suppose said "target" refuses to comply and goes behind a berm.  What then?



Use airburst, of course.  It's available for the AGL.


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## KevinB (11 May 2007)

Uhm 3-5km is outside what you can do with with either system - realistically outside a pre set firepower demo.  - Thats CAS, Arty and the 81mm territory

 I've only seen the Mk19 with the .50 T&E once -- HK GMG has both a Tripod and a Quadpod thingy -- with a recoil absorbing cradle, and can be setup with the equiv of a C2 sight -- or more advanced sightign systems.

I have no idea how either could be employed in a RWS in an accurate laying method for IDF (I dont know much about RWS setups).

My answer to the question is 40mm AGL and 81 goes back to the 031's  
  Button them up with the AGL - and .50  or 25mm depeding who you are -- and then rain IDF on them.


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> Uhm 3-5km is outside what you can do with with either system - realistically outside a pre set firepower demo.  - Thats CAS, Arty and the 81mm territory
> 
> I've only seen the Mk19 with the .50 T&E once -- HK GMG has both a Tripod and a Quadpod thingy -- with a recoil absorbing cradle, and can be setup with the equiv of a C2 sight -- or more advanced sightign systems.
> 
> ...


(I tried to avoid the whole 5 km away thing) ;D
The main advantage of an AGL is the responsiveness of the fire.  You see a baddy, you fire at him/her, and you get near instant results.

Even with airburst though, there are some times when the good old high angle fire is what the doctor ordered (so to speak).  
Another difference between the two systems is in the terminal ballistics.  With the 60 coming from above, you get near uniform 360 degree spread of fragments.  There are situations, though, were I would guess that an AGL's up/down left/right blast would be an advantage.  

So, to sum up, they aren't the same systems, nor are they similar, and I couldn't see one doing the job of the other.


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## Kirkhill (11 May 2007)

> Rheinmetall Canada’s director of land systems, Jean-Claude Rollier, said *a new tripod has been developed for the Heckler and Koch gun so it can fire at a higher elevation for use in the indirect fire mode * that Canada is interested in.


  http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2694489&C=landwar

Ahem  

New tripod. Higher elevation. Indirect fire.  = Belt Fed 40 mm Automatic Mortar. N'est ce pas?


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Ahem
> 
> New tripod. Higher elevation. Indirect fire.  = Belt Fed 40 mm Automatic Mortar. N'est ce pas?



If that's the case, and if it get's similar range etc as the 60, then I say "DON'T JUST BUY ONE, BUY A BAZILLION!" ;D


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## AmmoTech90 (11 May 2007)

Just a few points...

Regarding payload- 40mm HV (H&K GMG/Mk 19) Average around 30-40 grams of HE.  60mm- 300 grams
Weights- 40mm, belt of 36 around 20-30 kg (this is off the top of my head from working with Marines are few years ago).  60mm- 4 pack around 10 kg (81mm comes in the three packs btw Capt Sensible).
So weight for payload is around the same, just delivered in a different number of rounds.
Range of the H&K GMG is 2400 metres max, 2000 effective.  60mm out ranges it, but only in bipod role.  Handheld, I seem to recall you can only fire it at Charges 0/1/2, this may have changed.

So, neither are packable if you want any sustained fire.  So assuming you have a vehicle to truck around the ammo what are the pros and cons.
60mm pros- More HE per round, better effect on buildings, esp if you fire on delay.  Longer max range.  More versitile ammo (HE/Smk/etc).  You can pack it with a couple of rounds.
60mm cons- Weight of fire not as good for "shock effect".  Slower in the direct fire mode and using ammo to adjust eats up what ammo you do have quickly.  Not that good against armour.

40mm pros- Heavy weight of fire.  Better suppression.  Some (not much) effect against armour.
40mm cons- Packable in the same way a .50 cal is packable (not very).  Shorter range.  Illum and smoke (if available) is not as useful as the 60mm version.

There are some very nice airbursting rounds that use prox fuzing are are can maximize the beaten zone that a is produced rather than sending most of the frag up.  Where these are with regard to in-service suitability I dont know, but the ones I saw were "in development" 18 months ago.  In my experience that means, we've designed, they've worked a couple of times, if some government wants to throw money at us we'll actually get them working reliably...sometime.

The RM are still putting the 51mm to good use along with the 40mm HK GMG.  Different courses for different horses, isn't that how it goes?


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## vonGarvin (11 May 2007)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> 60mm- 4 pack around 10 kg (81mm comes in the three packs btw Capt Sensible).



I'm showing my 81mm -isms, I suppose  :-[ (Also why I asked people to check my math, INCLUDING adding together four bombs, vice three) ;D


Good post, by the way!  You are correct re: handheld role.  Unfortunately, due to training, very little is taught on employment with bipod HOWEVER I believe that is changing.  I would disagree that you cannot get "shock effect" with 60 *IF* it were to be employed in groups of four a la the old mortar group of, well, old (please allow myself to introduce.....myself...)
4 mortars at 30 rounds a minute for one minute is 120 rounds, or 36000 grams of HE...ok, I know it doesn't work that way...anyway, the point is that if employed with bipod and grouped in fours, the 60 can put down a significant weight of fire.
I suppose any AGM "teams" could do the same with fewer firers, though...


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## daftandbarmy (11 May 2007)

I served with quite a few (very senior to me at the time) officers in the British Army who went up against Indonesian paratroopers in the Borneo campaign (1948-1960). These operations were primarily focused on dismounted infantry focused recce and fighting patrols conducted in the jungles and mountains, usually well beyond the range of indirect fire support.

They spoke often of the effectiveness of the enemy's 60mm mortars. I recall that the term "F-ing nasty" was used. Apparently, within about 30 seconds of making close contact with an Indo Company, you could count on an extremely accurate stonk with a flurry of HE (delay fuse to penetrate the jungle canopy), followed rapidly by an immediate platoon sized flanking attack of some kind. The recommended counter drill was to either immediately get into line and assault forward in column of platoons, or break contact and set up an ambush well back, supported by your own 2 in MORs, otherwise you'd be plastered by the enfor 60mm. 

These experiences always drove home to me the effectiveness of the 60mm.


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## Armymedic (11 May 2007)

Ok then  gents, my bad...try the same senario at the 2000 m range. Max effective rng of the ole Mk19 is roughly 2000m


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## Infanteer (11 May 2007)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> The RM are still putting the 51mm to good use along with the 40mm HK GMG.  Different courses for different horses, isn't that how it goes?



That's what I was looking for.  Why have we delved into a comparison between the two (and why are staff guys sizing the two up to get rid of one) when they are two different and complementary weapon systems.  It's like saying "well we have the M203 so lets get rid of the CarlG".


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## daftandbarmy (11 May 2007)

Amen.


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## TheHead (12 May 2007)

St. Micheals Medical Team said:
			
		

> I don't know gents, but if you give me a target I can see at 3000-5000 m, I would rather pepper it rapidly with 40 mm grenades thru a sight, then having to waste 2-3 rounds and TOF to hit the tgt, and then have a fire for effect.



I'd love to see you hit a target at 5km away with a 40mm Grenade or Mortar  :


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## Michael OLeary (12 May 2007)

TheHead said:
			
		

> I'd love to see you hit a target at 5km away with a 40mm Grenade or Mortar  :



(Warning: slight hijack) Not with a 60 mm mortar, but with the L16 81mm and Norwegian NM123 HE, 5000 m is within range.


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## TheHead (12 May 2007)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> (Warning: slight hijack) Not with a 60 mm mortar, but with the L16 81mm and Norwegian NM123 HE, 5000 m is within range.



Truth to that, but nothing with what a Canadian Infantry Soldier is issued in a Rifle Section.


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## a_majoor (12 May 2007)

Since these systems are complimentary, then the pin heads who are saying we can get rid of one because we now have the other should get a good sharp rap to the head. If PY's are the problem, then empty out sopme positions at the various headquarters so you can man the mortars.

IF (big assumption here) there is no recourse but tohave only one system, then some sort of breech loading mortar seems to have a better range of effects. Hopefully we won't have to go that route for now.


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## KevinB (12 May 2007)

IF you are tasking a Section to look after a 5km depth - let along whatever frontage -- you've got problems.

It all comes back to the fact is that the 60mm Mortar and 40mm AGL are not a one or the other item.
   Tell Major whatshisface to drop the Eryx if he wants to get rid of a system.


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## AmmoTech90 (12 May 2007)

Captain Sensible said:
			
		

> Good post, by the way!  You are correct re: handheld role.  Unfortunately, due to training, very little is taught on employment with bipod HOWEVER I believe that is changing.  I would disagree that you cannot get "shock effect" with 60 *IF* it were to be employed in groups of four a la the old mortar group of, well, old (please allow myself to introduce.....myself...)



Thanks,

Yes, if you use 4 mortars you can lay down an lot of HE over a big area, probably as large an area as you can with one 40mm GMG, thats why I put it in the con argument.


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## ArmyRick (12 May 2007)

I have a lot of expirience with both 60mm and 81mm mortars (I would love to some day fire the US 120mm mortar   

Anywho here is one thought not being considered

Have you ever seen the effects of the C112 60mm Illumination round? It is damn good.

On the last DP 1 infantry course I instructed, we did a night illum shoot combined with an SQ MG shoot at night. Firing a volley of 60mm ILLUM is impressive.

I agree that 40mm and 60mm is like deciding wether to keep a car or a boat. They both a place and a function.


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## Armymedic (12 May 2007)

TheHead said:
			
		

> I'd love to see you hit a target at 5km away with a 40mm Grenade or Mortar  :



Yep, 5000m is a bit far, even from a mountain top in Afghanistan, for the issued Cdn weapon with regular ammo. There are 60 mm mortars out there that will fire to 5 km.

But would 1st or 2nd round hits with a 60mm mortar out to 3900m shut you up? (that should stir up some debate)


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## McG (12 May 2007)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's what I was looking for.  Why have we delved into a comparison between the two (and why are staff guys sizing the two up to get rid of one) when they are two different and complementary weapon systems.


It is a PY thing.  If we buy the CASW, we need to find crews.  I suppose another option would be to shutdown a rifle section in every second Pl, but that certainly would not fly.

However, it could be that the Pl 60 mm mortars are grouped in a Coy Wpns element.  Reduce the number of mortars to 1 or 2, and use the crews for the reduced mortars to fight the CASW.  (3 x CASW: 1 x 60 mm; or 2x CASW: 2 x 60 mm)

We could even buy CASW without any reduction of 60 mm mortar if we only mounted the weapon in existing RWS (such as those on the Nyala, Engr LAV, TLAV, and still-pending LAV RWS).  However, this would mean the CASW is never dismounted.  

An other "zero loss" option would be to train wpns dets on the full use of both 60 mm & CASW.  As part of battle procedure, the appropriate mix of sp wpns would be determined.  The weapons not planed for could remain in the FOB,  at the airhead (KAF for the present Op), or even in Canada.


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## vonGarvin (12 May 2007)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> (Warning: slight hijack) Not with a 60 mm mortar, but with the L16 81mm and Norwegian NM123 HE, 5000 m is within range.


(Continuing with slight hijack).  With the L16 81mm and CANADIAN C72A2, 5600 m is within range.


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## KevinB (12 May 2007)

MCG -- with the same issue you bring up-- then just add the damn thing to the PSWQ -- troops then get 9mm Pistol, SAC, Eryx, Mortar, MG, and now GMG.
(I'd make the case iif I was part of DInf or the InfSchool that pistol and SAC should be seperated back into a SACC, Eryx into BIQ, and Mortar, MG and GMG be a PSWQ)

  The weapons dets can never really man the entire complement (even overseas) so adding another tool in the tool box won't hurt.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (12 May 2007)

Regarding the 60mm mortar and its ability to be "man-packed", how often even in a theatre like Afghanistan would troops be out of range of a hypothetical vehicle-mounted 120mm mortar (which obviously would have far greater hitting power and ammunition-carrying capacity)?

I'm just visualizing trading the 60mm mortar for the CASW and something similar to Nemo or AMOS mounted  on newbuild LAV-III chasis with a mix of precision-guided and regular munitions.


Matthew.   ???

P.S.  The ability to utilise Saab/Bofors anti-armour munitions (Strix?) or eventually PGMM with a 120mm mortar in the inventory is also interesting.


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## TheHead (12 May 2007)

St. Micheals Medical Team said:
			
		

> Yep, 5000m is a bit far, even from a mountain top in Afghanistan, for the issued Cdn weapon with regular ammo. There are 60 mm mortars out there that will fire to 5 km.
> 
> But would 1st or 2nd round hits with a 60mm mortar out to 3900m shut you up? (that should stir up some debate)



QQ I hit a target at 18500m (whatever max range is)  with a 25mm SABOT round  :

I wish there was better ways to denote sarcasm on the internet.


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## George Wallace (12 May 2007)

TheHead said:
			
		

> QQ I hit a target at 18500m (whatever max range is)  with a 25mm SABOT round  :
> 
> I wish there was better ways to denote sarcasm on the internet.



One too many zeros there.  LOS hit at 18.5 km is pretty good.   :warstory:


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## vonGarvin (12 May 2007)

TheHead said:
			
		

> QQ I hit a target at 18500m (whatever max range is)  with a 25mm SABOT round  :
> 
> I wish there was better ways to denote sarcasm on the internet.


22177 m is max range at 40 degrees of elevation, I believe.  (charts not directly on hand).
Was your target the earth?  Otherwise, I imagine it would take a lot of BOT to get on, given that the ballistic site only goes to 2400 for Sabot.


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## Armymedic (13 May 2007)

TheHead said:
			
		

> QQ I hit a target at 18500m (whatever max range is)  with a 25mm SABOT round  :
> 
> I wish there was better ways to denote sarcasm on the internet.



Yes, we also wish there was a way.   :clown:

Anyway, let me talk to the ones who will listen....
Eliminating one of the 40mm/60mm from the inventory would be foolish. Depending on the mission and terrain, both weapons have a distinct difference in capability. 

For instance:
the 40mm AGL would be excellent for quick defensive and offensive firepower from 200 - 2200 m. Given to ability to instantly correct and repeat engagements with a limited TOF would give the operator max flexibility to engage multiple targets at various ranges, and also to hit multiple moving targets.
A 60mm mortar, can engage from 500-6000m (depending on the sight and ammo used) in the direct or indirect roles. But has an increadably long TOF esp at the longer ranges. Not so good agianst mobile targets like Taliban fighters on the run. But better at the indirect role from position of natural cover.

So I agree "a this or that" weapon system idea is not productive, because it will remove a tool from the toolbox and not enhance capability. But there is an arguement out there, IRT why we need a 60 when the combination of the 40mm AGL and a 81 mm mortar can do just as much, with one less type of weapon and ammo to procure and maintain, as there would be if we to adapt a 40mm, 60mm, 81mm ground based bomb delivery sytem.


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## Armymedic (13 May 2007)

MCG said:
			
		

> We could even buy CASW without any reduction of 60 mm mortar if we only mounted the weapon in existing RWS (such as those on the Nyala, Engr LAV, TLAV, and still-pending LAV RWS).  However, this would mean the CASW is never dismounted.
> 
> An other "zero loss" option would be to train wpns dets on the full use of both 60 mm & CASW.  As part of battle procedure, the appropriate mix of sp wpns would be determined.  The weapons not planed for could remain in the FOB,  at the airhead (KAF for the present Op), or even in Canada.



+1, Given the size and wieght of current AGLs and its ammo, I find it would be highly unlikely that such a weapon system would find alot of use in a dismounted role. The best use of a weapon like that is, as you mention, veh mounted to supplement MGs. Whereas newer models of 60mm are quite man portable and easily carried by dismounted troops.

It would be as you say, mission dependant.


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## KevinB (13 May 2007)

SMTT -- you neglected to tell the poor lad that you where not talking about the conventional system CF 60mm
  Which IMHO are on their last legs anyway...


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## Armymedic (13 May 2007)

I didn't...But I thought we were all talking about the next generation of 40mm AGLs and 60mm mortars...not the antiques the CF Infantry are currently using.

My bad.


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## vonGarvin (13 May 2007)

Command-Sense-Act 105 said:
			
		

> Sensible you are bang on for 22177 max range but I think that's at QE 800 mils (45 degrees).  Even though the Trg Safety manual tries to say that this range is possible for QE <=10mils, it's not so once you get into the physics formulas and run the numbers.


I think that _in vacuo _ 45 degrees works for longest range.  _As I recall_, 40 degrees in reality with give longest range.  All I know is: 22177 is one heck of a distance away !  ;D.


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## TheHead (14 May 2007)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> SMTT -- you neglected to tell the poor lad that you where not talking about the conventional system CF 60mm
> Which IMHO are on their last legs anyway...



Thank You.


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## McG (15 May 2007)

I've heard this project has been renamed to get "company" out of the title and replace it with something more reflective of an all arms weapon.  Anyone know the new name?


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## ArmyRick (15 May 2007)

Multi-Mission Effects Weapon? Just kidding, have no idea what the new name will be.


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## McG (12 Jun 2007)

MCG said:
			
		

> I've heard this project has been renamed to get "company" out of the title and replace it with something more reflective of an all arms weapon.  Anyone know the new name?


Found it on CID.  It is still the CASW, but that now stands for Close Area Suppression Weapon.


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## GK .Dundas (15 Jun 2007)

I never understood this deep need by some to replace perfectly good weapons  with some newer system.  BTW how many times have we replaced the.50 caliber HMG 3 or is it 4 times?
While I like the concept of the AGL (actually love it ! ) I really don't want to give up the 60 MM either.perhaps we could look at getting both an AGL and a new mortar ,does any one here have any experience with the American M-224?


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## Gunnerlove (16 Jun 2007)

The elevation giving max range is altered by the proj velocity, weight, sectional density and coefficient of drag, as the higher you put the bullet the less air resistance it will encounter and the farther it will go. 

So in short there is no single perfect answer, but 800 mils (45 deg) is in the ball park. 


Mix the AGLs in with the vehicle mounted GPMGs. The AGL in a RWS such as in a Nyala is a very potent direct or indirect weapon.


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## Brock (17 Jun 2007)

This is an interesting topic. A system of systems for indirect fire support and direct fire support within the infantry rifle company is great issues. The Canadian Army is currently at a cross roads in terms of equipment. The capabilities of the M19 60mm mortar is extremely important, but it is also lacking in capability. The M19 mortar is extremely limited in its ability to provided direct fire support and rapid area suppression capability. The M19 must be dismounted or incorporate a special mount to be fire effectively. In the handheld mode the M19 is limited to less than 2km range. More importantly the M19 require large quantities of ammuntion--see mass--to be effective.

How does the Canadian Army provide effective integral company indirect fire support? The answer includes the answer revolves around question of how the infantry provides long range direct fire support to its infantry companies. The Canadian Army infantry companies will acquire a platoon, company, and battalion level indirect and direct fire support capability that eliminate the need (drastically reduce) the need for the Eyrx, M72 (SRAAW[L]), Carl Gustav [M], and M19 mortar at the company level. The Canadian Army should acquire the Milkor MGL-140 40mm multi-barrel grenade launcher, the Mk.47 Striker automatic grenade launcher, and the Saab Bofor NLAW or Lockheed Martin Predator/Kestrel Short-Range Attack Weapon to be provide the required capabilities.

I personally believe the light infantry at least should operate 2 MGL-140 and at minimum 6 and maximu 12 NLAW or Predator/Kestrel at the platoon level. All regular and reserve nfantry companies should operate a heavy weappons platoon with a platoon headquarters section, an anti-armour section equipped with 2 Javelin anit-armour detachments, a heavy machine gun section with 2 12.7mm M2HB-QCB heavy machine guns, and a 40mm automatic-grenade launcher section with 2 Stirker 40mm AGL detachments. Comined with the procurement of the Milkor 40mm MGL-140 multi-barrel grenade-launchers, the M203 UGL, and the NLAW/Predatore the Canadian Infantry will have a drastically improved capability at the infantry rifle platoon and company level.


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## muskrat89 (17 Jun 2007)

> The answer includes the answer revolves around question


   ???

Welcome to the site  8)

A more complete profile will lend credibility to your posts; of course, that is your prerogative.


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## KevinB (17 Jun 2007)

Allow me to comment  -  :

  VLTOR is making an updated licensed version of the Milkor for the USMC.  Effectively you've removed a rifleman for a heaiver system with a brief increase in firepower over the M203 or Hk AG/C.  That is a periphery issue (if related anyway) to the Mortar/CAWS issue.

The Hk GMG is IMHO going to be the CAWS -- and I fail to see what any of your other jibbering was somehow related?


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## Michael OLeary (17 Jun 2007)

Command-Sense-Act 105 said:
			
		

> 2.  What is going to carry all this stuff?



Let's see the ammunition load and load tables, in both mounted and dismounted TOE.


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## GK .Dundas (18 Jun 2007)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Let's see the ammunition load and load tables, in both mounted and dismounted TOE.


Now I know I waaayyy out of my lane here but I suspect we're looking at at least one 18 wheeler for a section sized fire unit.......BTW is there a smiley for bemused astonishment?


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## Brock (7 Jul 2007)

I guess its time for me to reply to my slightly confusing post that I wrote last time and clarify what I wrote; note to self...do not post while slight under the influence.

Personally, I do not believe the CASW or Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) should replace the M19 60mm light mortar. I also do not believe that CASW should be grouped at the company level, but as it is it looks like that is the way the army will be grouping it, but I could be wrong as I am out of the loop now.

With that said, if the CASW is to grouped the rifle company level it should be part of a new heavy weapons platoons. This platoon will require additional soldiers rather than be manned by soldiers with the existing manning numbers...much like the mechanized companies have higher manning levels than light infantry company. Understrength companies are an issue in it of itself...but I digress.

I propose a heavy weapons platoon consisting of an anti-armour section with 2 Javelin ALAWS dets, a CASW section with 2 CASW dets, a heavy machine gun section with 2 M2HB dets, a 60mm mortar section with 2 dets,  and a platoon headquarters section. Each heavy weapon section will have 8 soldiers. The platoon headquarters will consist of a platoon commander/company ops officer (senior captain), a platoon warrant officer, a platoon radio operator (an attached signaller not an infantry soldier), and 3 corporal/private soldiers functioning as driver/storeman/gunners/signallers for a total platoon strength of 39 soldiers and 1 officer.

The platoon itself would normally operate mounted in fire support vehicles--currently the GWagen LUVW C&R--or in static defence roles, but will in parts be capable of conducting extended dismounted operations. In the future, a variant of the planned Light Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle to be procured for the infantry reconnaissance platoons would be a better option as a dedicated fire support vehicle for the platoon. The French long wheelbase VBL/VBR springs to me as a potential vehicle see http://www.panhard.fr/anglais/index.htm for details.

The complete platoon could conduct dismounted operations with the assistance of Gator 6X6 vehicles or similar to reduce the burden of ammunition weight in most areas of operation. I think CASW and HMG dets would be hard pressed to carry a useful load of ammunition if man packed, but perhaps if the 2 sections combined to man pack 2 of the CASW/HMG...the 2 sections could carry a useful load of ammo in the dismounted role even w/o a Gator 6X6 assisting.

As it appears based on unconfirmed reports the CASW may be slated to replace the 60mm mortar in the rifle company, but as I am now outside of military that might be a rumour.

Personally, I think creating a heavy weapon company with 3 heavy weapons platoons, minus the mortar sections, would be a far better organization as the company could detach sections to rifle companies as required, but the company also be used independently at the battalion/battle group commanders discretion. Where do the soldiers come from...that is a separate, but related issue.

Fire Support at the Rifle Platoon Level:
****************************

In any case, I believe the Milkor MGL140 six-barrel grenade launcher at the platoon level would be far more useful given the lighter weight of the ammo and system allow for a greater number of target engagements than the 60mm light mortar. The 40mm LVG weighs .23kg versus 1.68kg for a 60mm mortar. The MGL140 weighs 5.9kg each while the M19 60mm mortar in the light role weighs 7.7kg. A 60mm mortar debt can engage targets theoretically out to around 1000m, but in reality accuracy is limited with the mortar dial sight. Typically it takes 4 round to bracket the target and 1 to hit it for a total of 5 rounds to hit one target. While some soldiers can do much better on the range the stress of combat will probably require 5 rounds for a single hit on target. As such 8.4kg of 60mm mortar ammo is required for 1 target with a 60mm mortar. Therefore a two man light mortar det could carry 16.8kg of ammo and the 7.7kg M19 mortar (a total of 24.5kg/54lbs) and engage only 2 targets with 1 mortar hit each or 1 target with 6 rounds to suppress/attack the target. Keep in mind that the 4 or 8 rounds are likely off target and may cause unwanted civilian casualties. Finally, the stated mortar load is in addition to the normal infantry load and doesn't take into the physical volume of 10 60mm mortar rounds.

Now compare a two soldier MGL140 det with 1 (or 2 MGL140). Each soldier could carry 24 X 40mm LVG @ .23kg or 5.52kg each of ammo and 1 MGL140 @ 5.9kg for a total load of 16.94kg or 37.3lbs. Add a second MGL140 and the total load jumps to 22.8kg/50.25lbs. Now consider that the MGL140 can engage in a semi-indirect and direct fire role very rapidly and accurately without wasted rounds. Each MGL140 could use up 6 40mm rounds per engagement. As such with 48 rounds, 8 separate targets could be engaged or more if fewer rounds are required. I concede that the 60mm mortar bomb has approximately twice the range of 40mm grenade under ideal conditions; future 40mm rounds will have longer ranges. More important is the ability of the MGL140 to rapidly engage targets at most combat ranges. Finally, I propose that the 60mm mortar be re-tasked to the company fires support role in the bipod role where the enhanced accuracy of the dial sight and greatly increased range of the mortar in the bipod role make it far more useful. The 60mm mortar will still be available at the platoon level if detached for specific missions. I believe the benefits of replacing the mortar by the MGL140 at the platoon level outweigh the negatives...but I am not in favour of retiring it, just relocating it to a company suppport level

Where do soldier come from to operate the MGL140 at the platoon level? I would argue that rifle platoon weapon det should consist of a C-6 det and an MGL140 det of 2 soldiers each plus the det commander. The Carl G SRAAW (M), the M72 SRAAW(L), and Eryx SRAAW (H) should be nixed in favour of something like the new generation of throw-away missiles Bofors (BAe) NLAW or Lockheed Martin Predator (Kestrel) or Rafale Spike SR. The latter weapons are capable of defeating armour and able to function as bunker busters and all have soft-launch capabilities. When MGL140 and one of the above stated low-cost throw-away missiles are combined with the current 40mm M203 UGL in the rifle sections, the infantry rifle platoon would have better combat capabilities and reduced training requirements. Keep in mind the British Army has a very similar set up. I am not suggesting that there are no disadvantages, but I believe it provides for better overall combat capabilities while attempting to reduce combat load creep.


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## CG440 (25 Jan 2008)

Good Day,

I am the project director for the CASW.

I read all the posts in here.  Some are well written and very interesting.

Here is a bit of background.  In 2000, a capability deficiency record was initiated to address the obsolescence of the 60mm for which there are no spare parts and that cannot handle the high pressure of modern mortar rounds.  The 60mm we've been using (the M19) dates back to WW2 and didn't go through any life extension program.  It was in fact almost forgotten after the Korean War when we used the 81mm heavily.  It remained in our arsenal and saw a bit of revival in the late 80s as a mean of providing smoke and illum.  It really came back in favor when we went to Afghanistan for one reason: It's the only integral indirect weapon our infantry is left with.

We lost the 81mm platoon in our battalions five years ago and the tubes were sent to the artillery.  Both the infantry and the artillery are not extremely happy with this but it seems that dollars and person/year constraints were the driving factors.  There are now efforts towards regaining and improving indirect capabilities for the infantry.  This is the background on why the 60mm is sometimes perceived as essential.  It may not be the best tool but it is the only one available now in the units.  The M19 is now obsolete and unsustainable and we have to retire it.  Considering the advances of other types of weapons and the possibility of reintegrating the indirect fire at battalion level, we think it is not worth replacing it with another similar one.

The operational research looked at the options for replacing the old 60mm and it was found that a 40mm high velocity round was stable enough to actually be fired in both direct and indirect modes.  The key was getting a FCS that could compute both direct and indirect solutions and a round that would not self-destruct in the air because of the long flight times.  The ability to use programmable airburst rounds in direct fire also allows us to put rounds through windows and clear walls, corners and dead ground in complex terrain – This is a major consideration.  These issues have been resolved and there are companies out there that are ready to provide the system.  Because of the enhanced capabilities of the AGL/FCS system, we found that there was too many overlap in capabilities to keep a 60mm mortar in service.  Furthermore, the 60mm does not provide modern features like IR observation and airburst that we want to see in our new weapons.  Also, it was found that most rounds fired by the 60mm in theatre where 
still smoke and illum.  This capability will be taken over by the introduction of new Carl Gustaf rounds.  The effects of the remaining HE fired just don't compare with other options available like the Carl Gustaf with airburst ammunition.  The fact is that the 60mm is just not killing much unless you get a good direct hit.

The CASW and the new CG ammo are designed to provide supremacy in the company area of influence that we figure as a 1500-2000m radius.  Using a mortar is not the preferred way when you have a direct line of sight or a mean to get at protected targets within those ranges.  Beyond those ranges, you usually need to have forward observation and you fall in the true indirect fire realm.  Insertion into an integrated indirect fire plan would have to be considered.  This alone is a huge doctrinal consideration as the ranges for long 60s reaches the 6km mark and full fire controller training is required.  We do not want to see an infantry platoon crew served weapon team burdened with this...  The application of heavy and meaningful indirect fire and air support is a specialty in itself.  They do massive damage and they carry the ammo to do it.  The low weight for the 60mm is the usual selling point but if you factor the real numbers of rounds to achieve suppression/destruction you soon find out that it is not that clear cut.

That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point.  I won’t bore you with the national procurement cap imperatives that forces us to retire old systems to introduce a new ones.  A modern AGL will serve us better in the long run.  That being said, if we were pushed hard, through an unforeseen operational requirement for example, it would be possible to buy a weapon for a specific mission.  There are special provisions associated with those kind of purchases that allows us to avoid the national procurement cap for the length of the mission.

The statement of operational requirement has been signed by the Commander of the Army and the Extended Infantry Advisory Board supports the CASW.  The CASW project is still going ahead and is the process of securing funding for implementation.

Let's start a new topic if there is interest in this.

I will check the forums from time to time and update this thread as things are moving along.

Cheers.


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## Scoobie Newbie (25 Jan 2008)

"That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point."

Who is "we"?  So your saying that 2 weapon systems will do the job of the ONE its replacing?  I'll let the more eloqunet expand on your thoughts but I think the Carl G firing Illum rounds in leu of the 60 mm isn't right but I guess its the only solution.

Also what happens when the Carl G is replaced as our anti armour wpn?  Will we be getting for example a Javlin that fires Illum?


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## ArmyRick (25 Jan 2008)

Javelin is specifically an anti-armour weapon where as there are numerous types of 84mm ammunition avalible (canister, HE, HEAT, ILLUM, HEDP, etc, etc). 

The one question I have had though is how do you angle the carl g with illumn rounds, fire it and not have the backblast launch you off the ground? 

before anyone jumps on me, I have alot of expirience with 84mm Carl G.

I am still a fan of the 60mm mortar but the Cg440 does bring up some good points. It would take alot of rounds to get on target and unless they are troops in the open, the effect on target would not be the same. 

(Put helmets on, I'm gonna brag!) Now, given that I have used the 60mm alot, I know i can get on target usually within 2-5 rounds. But then again thats simply alot of expirience with the old bad boys.


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## vonGarvin (25 Jan 2008)

The CASW is a direct fire weapon that is both unproven in combat and cannot replace a high trajectory weapon that the 60mm is.  I understand that a CASW would be awesome, but it ain't no mortar.  The 60, though old, can certainly be "replaced" with new barrels.  Simple fix to a simple problem.


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## Scoobie Newbie (25 Jan 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I understand that a CASW would be awesome, but it ain't no mortar.  The 60, though old, can certainly be "replaced" with new barrels.  Simple fix to a simple problem.



Exactly.


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## Scoobie Newbie (25 Jan 2008)

M224 60mm Light Mortar


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## RCR Grunt (25 Jan 2008)

Someone out there makes a perfect replacement for the good ol' 60.....

Israeli 60mm Mortar Family

Perhaps we should look into this ... or maybe we already have... (cue suspenseful music track)


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## dapaterson (25 Jan 2008)

Don't forget one key constraint:  Money.  As mentioned, the national procurement budget (that pays for repairs, refurbishment and life extensions for weapons, along with the ammunition to fire) is in a world of hurt.  So bringing in new systems is a non-starter unless you're willing to give up something else, or at least reduce its capability significantly.  From a practical standpoint we can't sustain everything we want - so we have to pick and choose.

It's easy to arm-chair quarterback and say "Gimme everything".  Not gonna happen.  So we have to prioritize and make choices:  40mm ammo for the CASW or 60mm ammo for the mortars?  Which system will we have parts to fix?  Which system will we have techs available to fix?

Or which other systems are you willing to do without?


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## vonGarvin (26 Jan 2008)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Don't forget one key constraint:  Money.  As mentioned, the national procurement budget (that pays for repairs, refurbishment and life extensions for weapons, along with the ammunition to fire) is in a world of hurt.  So bringing in new systems is a non-starter unless you're willing to give up something else, or at least reduce its capability significantly.  From a practical standpoint we can't sustain everything we want - so we have to pick and choose.
> 
> It's easy to arm-chair quarterback and say "Gimme everything".  Not gonna happen.  So we have to prioritize and make choices:  40mm ammo for the CASW or 60mm ammo for the mortars?  Which system will we have parts to fix?  Which system will we have techs available to fix?
> 
> Or which other systems are you willing to do without?


Very good point.  Given the restrictions on funding, I would stick with the .50 for direct fire out to 2000 (+/-) m, refurbish the 60, and we already have the techs.  Heck, I mean, when arty tubes fire off their max EFCs, they get new tubes.  Same with tank barrels.  Same with rifles.  Same with pistols.  Why not the same with 60s when it has been proven SO WORTHY in combat over the past two years?


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## dapaterson (26 Jan 2008)

But we're not replacing all the barrels.  We're adopting concepts like whole fleet management because we can't afford everything We don't have the money.  The state of the NP budget is atrocious, and getting worse.  We've already got more than we can support; if we go forward with CASW we'll have to give up some things.  If we don't, we'll have to give up less.


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## vonGarvin (26 Jan 2008)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> But we're not replacing all the barrels.  We're adopting concepts like whole fleet management because we can't afford everything We don't have the money.  The state of the NP budget is atrocious, and getting worse.  We've already got more than we can support; if we go forward with CASW we'll have to give up some things.  If we don't, we'll have to give up less.


Then I say stay with the known (60s) and forget the unknown (CASW), in order to keep more of the stuff that works (and has been proven to work)\


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## Michael OLeary (26 Jan 2008)

As some are aware, I am a fan of mortars.  Admittedly, I’ve only been a fan of mortars since first learning to lay the 81 in late 1979.   I have remained quiet throughout much of the mortar debate here, primarily because I’ve spent a lot of time in the past 25 years seeing pro-mortar arguments fall on deaf ears.

The “60”, in particular, has always been the red-headed step-child throughout my career.  When I took basic infantry training at Aldershot in the summer of 1979, it was being “phased out” and there was no ammo available for us to fire it.  It came back into use and training the next year, but was one it way out again in 1983 when I was taking Phase II officer training (and again didn’t fire it).  Oddly enough here we are, 25+ years later and that worn out weapon system is still in use and deployed on operations.

Personally, I continued to get my mortar ‘fix’ with the 81, teaching it as a Reserve NCO, taking my Advanced Mortar Course as a Reg F officer and then both commanding a mortar platoon and being SME Mortars at the Infantry School.  While at the school it came to light that some units were dragging the old 60 bipods and baseplates out of QM basements and using them in training.  I delivered a proposal to the Cmdt of the school at the time, offering to undertake rewriting mortar drills for the system (since the bipod was not the same as the 81’s and the sight was fundamentally different).  I was told to stand down because (1) the 60 belonged to the small arms wing and not mortars, and (2) the use of the 60 bipod was “not in our doctrine.”  Sadly, an ignored  doctrine trumps reality, and we missed an opportunity then to start a credible move toward a “family of mortars” training system.

Throughout much of my career I found that many in the infantry did not understand mortars or indirect fire concepts beyond the basics needed for training course. (CG440, don’t take that as an insult, it’s just the reality of my personal experience as a strong proponent of mortars for nearly 30 years.)  I suspect this is undergoing a radical change with increasing experience overseas (but this does not necessarily include everyone in the current acquisition programs).  Unlike the US Infantry, where it seemed every issue of their journal had a brief article on the actual employment of mortars, any similar discussions in the Canadian Army were non-existent.   Those who chose to “play” with mortars were allowed to; otherwise most commanders simply left issues of indirect fire to be sorted out by their BCs and FOOs.

The 60 vs. CASW is an awkward debate, generally being participated in by long-time fans of proven systems arguing against those who chose not to understand mortar capabilities and who seek to bring in a new system.  And new is always better, right?

The 60 and CASW both provide close fire support, each can provide, to one degree or, another direct or indirect fires. (In this context, I use the term “direct fires” in reference to those where the weapon operator can see his target, it is not in relation to the relative height of trajectory.) 

Comparison of the weapons often falls into relative merits of the “low-tech”, “old, “worn-out” mortar versus the “high-tech”, “advanced technology”, automatic CASW.  Notably we don’t see any credible explanation why the groups examining this issue have not examined in detail the option of new light mortar systems, along with the sighting and fire control technologies that have been developed in the 40-50 years since we adopted the M19. This includes the extended range bands of newer ammunition and barrel combinations.

Similarly, we haven’t seen any realistic data on comparative dismounted movement of the CASW, mean time between failures for the equipment, or the maintenance requirements for weapon and FCS.

Perhaps most important of all, we have seen no detailed analysis of comparative logistic costs to place the same effective neutralizing weight of fire on a given target. Regardless of which system has the “better bullet”, the real measure in suppressive fire is what can be achieved with the same weight/bulk/cost of ammo, because delivery of ordnance (whether by truck, by hel or on foot) can easily be the determining factor in what will give the commander the best effect.  I seem to remember that “effects based operations” is on the current staff buzz-words card, right?

Admittedly, I haven’t been to Afghanistan, and am unlikely to go.  I am willing to accept the opinion of those who have been there as a baseline for further study.  I know mortars and I admit to a bias in that direction.  I don’t ‘know’ the CASW, but am willing to be convinced if the right information and demonstrations can be provided, and that they are effective enough to convince my combat experienced fellow infantry soldiers and officers.  Does every single one need to be convinced? No, certainly not, there will always be hold-outs.  But it does stand to reason that if the CASW program is having difficulty changing the opinions of most of the experienced mortar guys as well as those new to mortars with recent operational experience, then it is perhaps time to revisit the first principles of the case and find out where the analysis and explanations (if not the facts of the case) have gone wrong.

Remember, the Ross rifle also presented well to the Commanders and in controlled demonstrations too during the acquisition stage, but it had some slight difficulties under field conditions in the hands of the troops whose lives depended on it.  Is the CASW a Ross rifle equivalent? . . , I highly doubt that. But there could be lessons to be found there in the transition from manufacturers glossies, through controlled demonstrations on the way to operational employment.  If we generalize that the CASW is “replacing” the 60, it will only take one failure of the system to do something the 60 could have done effectively to completely undermine confidence in the weapon system.


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## McG (26 Jan 2008)

Lone Wolf Quagmire said:
			
		

> Also what happens when the Carl G is replaced as our anti armour wpn?  Will we be getting for example a Javlin that fires Illum?


PMEWS (not ALAWS) will be the Carl replacement.  PAAWS will be the M72 replacement.  If anything, ALAWS will/must replace Eryx (because apparently we can no longer get the ammunition).


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## Kirkhill (26 Jan 2008)

PMEWS?

I assume Multi-Effects Weapons System but the P? Personal? Platoon? Primary? Preferred?


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## KevinB (26 Jan 2008)

Well all I can add if I have seen a Mk19 used ineffectually against an insurgent mortar position and the team needed to go to their 60mm (not a Cdn unit).  

I'm a hige 40mm AGL fan - but I cannot accept the "fact" that a system needs to be withdrawn to add one.  Its assinine and comepetely ignorant of asymetrical warfare.


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## Scoobie Newbie (26 Jan 2008)

Whatever happened to the KISS rule.  Esp in a time of war.  The .50 Cal has been around longer then most on this board.  It is a simple, effective design and has remained relatively unchanged during its life time.  The 60mm is also a simple design that has proved effective.  Tube, lever, firing pin.  Add a C2 sight, bi pod and base plate and your very effective.  No batteries, no worries of the elements.  Now we are replacing a simple, proven system with one that has a spanky fire control system.  We all know that something with all the high speed shiny features tend to fail sooner then the robust simple system.   I personally would rather see the 60 retained with new tubes and more money directed to new optics for the LAV as well as a STAB RWS for all the vehicles that are using the RWS.  I do realize that the money isn't allocated like that however I think we have more pressing issues then adding a system that seems to compliment the 50 not replacing the 60.


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## vonGarvin (26 Jan 2008)

Very well stated, quag.  About the RWS, it is "fitted for, but not with" stab.  Making it stab (on the Kongsberg, anyway) would only add to its effectiveness.


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## tomahawk6 (26 Jan 2008)

My problem with the CASW concept is that comparing it to a mortar is apples to oranges. The CASW is much heavier than the mortar it seeks to replace. It will require much more ammunition which adds to the weight issue. In Canadian service I see this weapon as primarily vehicle mounted. Hauling a 75 pound crew served weapon w/ ammo/sights around the mountains of Afghanistan or anywhere else just will slow the infantry down. Fielding infantry weapons should be all about weight and reducing the burden on the infantry who already have pack loads of 100 pounds. Now if this weapon is to be mounted on a vehicle then that negates my weight argument until the infantry has to go somewhere the vehicle cant.

The US Army M224 Mortar fires the newer ammunition with a max range of almost 3500 meters.

http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/indirect/m224.html

Finally this entire project claims to replace an obsolete weapon with a modern one. Cost is claimed to be a consideration,but if that were true the CF would simply buy the M224 and save money. The replacement cost of the M224 is under $11,000. The US MK19 was purchased for the NG at a cost of around $15,000. The MK 47 that the SF uses in Afghanistan/Iraq I am sure is at least that much money. Neither version has the range of the 60mm mortar.Bottom line the CF wants to replace one system that is not as capable as the so called obsolete system and weighs more to boot. 

Here's a thought buy the M224 and CASW. Mount the CASW on various vehicles and give the infantry a new 60mm mortar. The cost of doing both isnt huge since you arent equiping more than 9 mortars per battalion. NDHQ wastes more money than that in a week [same with DoD]. There would be more cost to the CASW as it would probably end up on engineer vehicles, trucks ect. The infantry can do without CASW but cannot do without their 60's.


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## Infanteer (27 Jan 2008)

CG440 said:
			
		

> Good Day,
> 
> I am the project director for the CASW.
> 
> I read all the posts in here.  Some are well written and very interesting.



Good day, welcome to the forums and thanks for taking the time to explain the project.



> That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point.  I won’t bore you with the national procurement cap imperatives that forces us to retire old systems to introduce a new ones.  A modern AGL will serve us better in the long run.



I've seen the studies done and the briefings at the IAB.  I will qualify my position now.  I am not a mortarman.  I am one of Mr O'Leary's "amateurs".  I do not hold any advanced qualifications on any mortar system.  I was taught the basics of the 60mm as both an Infantryman and an Infantry Officer, as well as getting a lesson on employing the 60mm with the sight. bipod and baseplate.  I do not have a stake in this.

However, like Mr O'Leary, I am concerned by what I see.  The following points he raised need, in my opinion, to be answered to justify the statement that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run":



			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> Comparison of the weapons often falls into relative merits of the “low-tech”, “old, “worn-out” mortar versus the “high-tech”, “advanced technology”, automatic CASW.  Notably we don’t see any credible explanation why the groups examining this issue have not examined in detail the option of new light mortar systems, along with the sighting and fire control technologies that have been developed in the 40-50 years since we adopted the M19. This includes the extended range bands of newer ammunition and barrel combinations.





> Similarly, we haven’t seen any realistic data on comparative dismounted movement of the CASW, mean time between failures for the equipment, or the maintenance requirements for weapon and FCS.





> Perhaps most important of all, we have seen no detailed analysis of comparative logistic costs to place the same effective neutralizing weight of fire on a given target. Regardless of which system has the “better bullet”, the real measure in suppressive fire is what can be achieved with the same weight/bulk/cost of ammo, because delivery of ordnance (whether by truck, by hel or on foot) can easily be the determining factor in what will give the commander the best effect.  I seem to remember that “effects based operations” is on the current staff buzz-words card, right?



I've humped the 60 before; used it in both the Platoon dismounted role (Platoon commander's hip-pocket indirect fire) and the Company dismounted role (Coy "Mortar Group" of 3-4 tubes) - granted, not on a two-way range.  I'm also a former machine-gunner, and since the 40mm-AGL is essentially a large machine gun with specialized ammo, I think this comes into play.

1.  Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.

     a.  If our Infantry Companies are mounted in the LAVIII, they have an exceptional 25mm stabilized turret.  I can't see a AGL being mounted on the pintle due to its size and due to the fact that it will compete with (and lose to) the 25mm for ammo storage.  So are we going to have this big AGL in the back of a LAV to pull out if we need to lob a few rounds high angle to hit a target that the 25mm cannot punch?  Considering this is a tripod mounted weapon with a sophisticated fire control system, due you think that a mechanized platoon or company rolling along is going to have the time to employ this?  Manpower, along with space, also becomes an issue; two men can easily employ a mortar and pack it up and revert to riflemen by slinging the 60 onto their back in minimal time - an AGL takes three guys out of the picture.

     b.  Okay, how about a dismounted platoon or company?  An AGL is huge; looking at the pictures, the .50 cal was very unpleasant to hump in the dismounted role (thankfully, something I never had to do).  If we got a patrol moving through the mountains or jungle, you want them to hump this thing?  And the ammo?  Ever played with a can of 25mm rounds or a bandoleer of 40mm grenades?  Very awkward and very heavy.  Mortar bombs are fairly light and easy to break down within the company.  Conversely, a broken down 40mm belt is awkward and heavy (the link is the real killer in the heavier rounds) and, as with any machine-gun, continually breaking and relinking is liable to cause damage to the link and increase your rate of stoppages and misfeeds.  Having fumbled around with 25mm link, I can only imagine how un-fun 40mm link must be.  To be honest, I don't really see a dismounted role for this thing.

2.  The most likely method of employment will be on the LPV (RG-31), attached to the remote weapon station.  This is similar to how the Americans employ their AGLs - in a mix with .50 cal M2's on Humvees and other light vehicles.  This is great, and is a "nice to have" that I'd like to see.  However, as others have said, this is apples and oranges.  An AGL mounted on a remote weapon station does not seem to be a replacement for a lightweight mortar tube.  Is this relatively narrow method of employment really a good justification to do away with a weapon system like a 60mm mortar which is quite versatile?

3.  Has any consideration been given to the fact that we are putting our Infantry "indirect fire" eggs into a very sophisticated basket.  To achieve the results that the studies of your program lays out, the AGL requires a sophisticated fire-control system and programmable ammunition.  Having worked with all things sophisticated in the infantry (radios, sat phones, MNVGs, WES-gear, etc, etc) I can tell you that a safe maxim is "the more complicated a thing is, the more chances there are for it to break down when you really need it" or, more simply, Murphy's Law.  As another person mentioned, the idea of tube, pin and trigger with simple bomb is pretty foolproof.  The 60mm mortar has been much improved over the years - it's a bit unfair to compare it to the one we use today.  That's like comparing a modern assault rifle to an Enfield - not even, as the 60mm is a mortar tube and the 40mm AGL is essentially a machine-gun.  Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?

     All in all, I remain unconvinced that _*"a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run"*_ - I've looked at the presentations and the studies and there are big holes that lead to questions - questions that have been asked here.  This whole thing reminds me of the Mobile Gun System/Main Battle Tank debate that plagued the Armoured Corps a few years back.  The MGS had some value (The Americans employ them today), but was not a tank.  We wasted time and money and did a nice pirouette and ended up with an MBT.  Until I see these questions answered, I remain unconvinced that a jacked-up machine gun, while nice to have, can take over an indirect suppressive role from a mortar.  Something else is at play here....


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## daftandbarmy (27 Jan 2008)

Bottom line - if the 40mm CASW can't root the enemy out because it can't reach far enough or get into the holes they're hiding in, infantry will have to do it at close quarters with grenades/M203. Or, they'll have to wait until other suitable indirect fire assets are available. This could lead to more casualties, a much higher demand on limited 81mm/arty/air resources, or mission failure.


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## McG (27 Jan 2008)

I have read a summary which came to the conclusion that neither the 60mm nor the CASW met all the requirements of the CDR.  It seems to me that CASW may be something that is being approached with blinders on in order to replace one piece of kit of another.  Just as ALAAWS suffered because it was not part of a larger anti-armour concept expressing the role of all systems, the CASW does not appear to be within a larger infantry support weapons concept.  When the only dicussion seems to be light mortar vs CASW, then I tend to think we've lost sight of the bigger operational picture.  How does CASW fit next to .50 cal, C6, M203, etc?


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## JackD (28 Jan 2008)

Hi - I noticed this article; http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-marines-buying-715m-in-flowformed-mortars-04571/ And felt it would be of interest in this debate


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## McG (28 Jan 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> PMEWS?  I assume Multi-Effects Weapons System but the P? Personal? Platoon? Primary? Preferred?


Portable Multi-Effect Weapon System.  It is the M3 Carl.  PAAWS = Personal Anti-Armour Weapon System



			
				Lone Wolf Quagmire said:
			
		

> Whatever happened to the KISS rule.  Esp in a time of war.  The .50 Cal has been around longer then most on this board.  It is a simple, effective design and has remained relatively unchanged during its life time.


Same could be said of the M2 Browning HP.  Would you be happy keeping the current pistol because it is old, or would you be willing to acknowledge there is some flaw in your argument?



			
				CG440 said:
			
		

> ... as the ranges for long 60s reaches the 6km mark and full fire controller training is required.  We do not want to see an infantry platoon crew served weapon team burdened with this...  ..


What about as an infantry company crew served weapon?  Considering all of the enablers that must already be coordinated in the Coy fight, this does not seem like too much of a leap.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> Perhaps what we need is an automatic mortar like ...


Maybe, and to make it more man-portable lets reduce the ammo from 60 mm down to 51 mm or 40 mm.  Let's also make it breach loaded so so that in a pinch it can do the direct fire role ... oh wait!  40 mm automatic mortar with a direct fire capability ... it's CASW.  What have I done!  :-\


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## vonGarvin (28 Jan 2008)

CG440 said:
			
		

> ...Insertion into an integrated indirect fire plan would have to be considered.  This alone is a huge doctrinal consideration as the ranges for long 60s reaches the 6km mark and full fire controller training is required.  We do not want to see an infantry platoon crew served weapon team burdened with this...



In the LAV Coy or even combat team with tank troops attached OPCOM, you have a variety of hard hitting low trajectory weapons, firing a variety of kinetic and chemical energy munitions.  The max effective range of engagement is circa 1800 m (I know things shoot farther, but the vast majority of low trajectory weapons, from GPMG (SF) to Leopard cannon can all engage to that range.)  Even without tanks, the most any weapon can fire is just under 2.5 km.  The 60mm with current CF ammo can engage just beyond that.  In terms of range, it is a nice fit.  
The one integral tool missing from the Coy/Cbt Tm tool box is NLOS* capability.  Given the nature of the 60mm mortar's external ballistics, and terminal ballistics as a by product of its high angle flight 1, it adds a certain dimension to the all arms battle that is both timely and integral to the coy/cbt tm.  It reduces the need for coys to call for fire to the battle group, thus reducing the reaction time required to engage often fleeting targets.  As well, it reduces the staff effort required at the battlegroup FSCC as it assists in the destruction of the enemy as part of the all-arms battle.  Besides, the FSCC has bigger and better things to worry about, such as the deep battle and coordinating external fire support elements.
The CASW, though able to engage NLOS targets to _some _ extent, cannot match the 60mm in terms of firepower.  With a plethora of low trajectory weapons available to the combat team, there is no niche for the CASW to fill in third tier units.  The question that needs to be asked is: on which AFV is it to be mounted?  And it certainly does not lend itself to be easily man portable.  Though probably a capable weapon system, it just cannot compete with a fully stabilised 25mm auto cannon or certainly not a 120 mm smoothbore fully stablised tank cannon.  

As for training section commanders on call for fire, that is a non-starter.  The skill sets are being taught now, though certainly not to the level taught to FOOs (or once taught to infantrymen on the advanced mortar course).  I highly doubt that we would expect section commanders or platoon commander to make calls for linear targets as one example.
As for plotting the fire at the mortar group/battery, the procedures are really no different than calculating data for indirect machine gun fire, a skill already expected of section commanders in the infantry.

As for integrating the firepower of the 60mm into a fire plan, that is well within the capability of any infantry company commander and tank squadron commander.  Let us not forget that they are all staff trained, and have probably already completed a battle group (or higher) staff job, contributing to fireplanning for much greater operations than a combat team hasty attack.  To say that integrating the 60mm firepower into a combat team fireplan is too much for a company commander is, in my professional opinion, a non-starter.  

Though the CASW may have a niche with tier 2 or tier 1 units, that is not my concern as I am not knowledgable enough about their TTPs to comment on their orbat or weapons.  The fact is that we have a battle proven weapon system, though old and tired.  I have a much simpler solution: acquire new barrels.  We do that when tank barrels reach their maximum EFCs.  Why throw the baby out with the bath water?

EDIT: Of course, I neglected to add that the 60mm can also provide the combat team with illumination and screen/blinding capabilities, thus further reducing the strain on the battle group.  After all, if integrated with higher assets, the screen/blind missions could easily be carried out by the 60, thus freeing larger calibre weapons to deliver HE on the target.  


----------------------------------
1 Due to the projectile impacting at nearly vertical angles, the blast pattern from a mortar bomb is virtually circular when viewed from above, thus maximising its blast potential.  Low trajectory weapons that are not shaped charges typically have circular blast patterns as well, but they are vertical, thus losing nearly 50% of its blast potential on impact.
*NLOS: Non Line of Sight


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## tomahawk6 (28 Jan 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> I have read a summary which came to the conclusion that neither the 60mm nor the CASW met all the requirements of the CDR.  It seems to me that CASW may be something that is being approached with blinders on in order to replace one piece of kit of another.  Just as ALAAWS suffered because it was not part of a larger anti-armour concept expressing the role of all systems, the CASW does not appear to be within a larger infantry support weapons concept.  When the only dicussion seems to be light mortar vs CASW, then I tend to think we've lost sight of the bigger operational picture.  How does CASW fit next to .50 cal, C6, M203, etc?



We didnt set the parameters of discussion, rather DND did by touting CASW as the replacement for the 60mm mortar. For my money AGS/CASW is complimentary to the .50 cal and other crew served weapons. Each serves a purpose.


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## McG (28 Jan 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> We didnt set the parameters of discussion....


Not sure why you thought the finger was pointing at you.  Try reading what you've quoted again.


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Jan 2008)

"Same could be said of the M2 Browning HP.  Would you be happy keeping the current pistol because it is old, or would you be willing to acknowledge there is some flaw in your argument?"
There may be a flaw but none that I am aware of.  The M2 is past its prime.  A brand new M2 or variation that actually works well is fine by me and most others.  If its built well from the beginning like the .50 cal or C6 and maintained and tweaked why make something more complicated.  Are you being the Devil's Advocate because I would have assumed that you would agree that the simplest effective weapon system is the best for those using them in austere conditions.
I should also add that I would rather have a new realiable 60mm then a CASW if I had to choose between one or the other.


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## vonGarvin (28 Jan 2008)

actually, the flaw is in the comparison (no offense intended).  Here's what I mean
Pistol is worn out.  DLR offers to get us a taser to replace it.   I would keep a refurbished browning over a taser

(My point is that DLR is "offering" to replace the 60mm with a weapon that is more like the .50 than anything else)


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## tomahawk6 (28 Jan 2008)

If you want CASW buy the Russian AGS-30. It weighs 16kg - lock stock and barrel.


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## tomahawk6 (28 Jan 2008)

MCG I was just responding to this line.Its quite possible I have misunderstood the post. 


> When the only dicussion seems to be light mortar vs CASW, then I tend to think we've lost sight of the bigger operational picture.


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## KevinB (29 Jan 2008)

FYI the Browning M2 is the .50, the pistol 9mm service Inglis No.2 Mk1* is the BHP as used by the CF.

  I agree with Mortarman Rocjpainters analogy between the pistol and the taser replacement, as as to the method that was used for the GMG.
I am a big fan of AGL's but they are not a substitute for a Mortar.


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## GK .Dundas (29 Jan 2008)

The more I read both here and elsewhere about CASW debate the more I am left with the feeling that it is a solution in search of a problem .This is not to say that  it might not be a good idea  just the way it is being sold however bothers me  bothers me a bit.  
I don't view it as the answer but as perhaps as part of the answer..Is it just possible that maybe we should be looking to purchase both an AGL and a new 60 MM mortar?
 Please don't make me bring up the fact that we are a member of the G- 8 one would think we could afford both after all in the greater scheme of things they are relatively cheap compared to Pumas, Chinooks and CC177s'.


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## dapaterson (29 Jan 2008)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> I don't view it as the answer but as perhaps as part of the answer..Is it just possible that maybe we should be looking to purchase both an AGL and a new 60 MM mortar?


I hereby nominate you as a CQ.  So you'll have to ensure you've got sufficient ammo for the C7s - 5.56 ball.  For the M203s - 40mm grenades - a variety of natures.  For the C-9s - 5.56 4B1T.  For the C-6s - 7.62 4B1T.  For the Inglis Mk II pistols - 9mm.  For the Carl Gustavs - 84mm in a variety of natures.  For the 60mm mortars - in a variety of natures.  For the AGL - 40mm belt fed.  A supply of whatever fire-and-forget AT system we acquire (M-72 or otherwise).

Am I forgetting any man-portable weapons in the company?


Add to this the need to maintain proficiency with the all weapons (something we don't do now, unless we're deploying).  Add the requirement for more training for your armourers (where we're already concerned about the length of training).

Lots of tools in the toolbox = a good thing.  But are we forgetting to KISS?


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## MJP (29 Jan 2008)

Meh having a full tool box is a good thing in my mind.  You do not have to use every tool for every mission.  But the flexibility to include certain ones or the right mixture of them all greatly enhances a commanders ability to conduct the mission.  Hamstringing leaders by taking out proven and still used weapon systems and replacing them with systems that don't do the same job is assine.  I'm a big fan of AGLs but not at the loss of the 60mm mortar.  Two different weapons systems with different effects and abilities.  One cannot simply replace the other.

In any case I really wish that someone would get off their ass and make a decision.  There is no more 60mm mortar taught on IPSWQs out here in the west and there is damm little if any ammo for domestic training.  But surprise surprise no AGL in sight to replace the mortar and no news on when if ever it is to be delivered.  Me thinks that the 60mm will become like the .50...taken out of service then magically reintroduced a few years later when someone realizes that it works.


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## Scoobie Newbie (29 Jan 2008)

Ummm the 60mm was taught on the last IPSWQ we ran which was only a few months ago.  I want to say Nov.


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## MJP (29 Jan 2008)

Yes and we taught it as well just recently but you'll find that it probably will not be on future courses.  Again it may be more specific to my Bn as that is where I get my information from.


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## Scoobie Newbie (29 Jan 2008)

Roger that.  I wasn't sure if you were basing this on older info and that is what confused me as we just ran one.  I haven't heard anything on this end but will assume your info is accurate and applicable to me.


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## McG (29 Jan 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Interesting bit of "Canadianization" here - a High Angle tripod.  I don't know what that will do for range but in terms of effect might it not put the weapon into the same category as the Vasilek?  Rate of fire compensating for weight of shot?





			
				CG440 said:
			
		

> I am the project director for the CASW.





			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> The CASW is a direct fire weapon that ... cannot replace a high trajectory weapon that the 60mm is.


I would like to ask the PD to answer one quick question for the board.  It has been pointed to a few times that the project intent (as seen in various media articles) is to deliver a 40 mm automatic weapon capable of indirect fire.  In some of my own searching for answers, I've been told this indirect fire capability includes the same high angles of mortars so that the CASW will be able to put fire onto targets protected by complex terrain (such as compound walls, berms, buildings, hills, etc).  However, in this thread, the standing argument seems to be that CASW cannot replace a mortar because AGLs are direct fire weapons.  So, here comes the question.

Is there a 40 mm automatic weapon, capable of direct and high angle indirect fires, that has been proven in operational trials under realistic field conditions?


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## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2008)

All I know is this: if a 40mm grenade were to be launched at angles above 1600 mils, then it would be very susceptible to atmospheric conditions, and therefore largely inaccurate


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## McG (29 Jan 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> All I know is this: if a 40mm grenade were to be launched at angles above 1600 mils, then it would be very susceptible to atmospheric conditions, and therefore largely inaccurate


And by that you mean that anything spin stabilized in an atmosphere naturally wants to invert itself and so we would expect the 40 mm grenade to return to earth facing backward & no longer stable?


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## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> And by that you mean that anything spin stabilized in an atmosphere naturally wants to invert itself and so we would expect the 40 mm grenade to return to earth facing backward & no longer stable?


Spin stablised is not a problem, so long as the spin is neither too much nor too little.  Too much spin, and it will "bottom out" when it hits earth, not enough and it will flop around.  
What I mean more is its mass.  It has less mass than other projectiles, and therefore less momentum (which helps stability and therefore accuracy).   Due to its lower mass, it is easily more affected by external forces: it goes back to Newton's laws.  A force at rest and all that.  So, it takes less wind to move a lighter object off its trajectory than one that has more mass.


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## Reccesoldier (29 Jan 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Spin stablised is not a problem, so long as the spin is neither too much nor too little.  Too much spin, and it will "bottom out" when it hits earth, not enough and it will flop around.
> What I mean more is its mass.  It has less mass than other projectiles, and therefore less momentum (which helps stability and therefore accuracy).   Due to its lower mass, it is easily more affected by external forces: it goes back to Newton's laws.  A force at rest and all that.  So, it takes less wind to move a lighter object off its trajectory than one that has more mass.



Couldn't that be compensated for with some sort of drag on the back end of the projectile?


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## HItorMiss (29 Jan 2008)

Reccesoldier said:
			
		

> Couldn't that be compensated for with some sort of drag on the back end of the projectile?



Then to be used as Direct fire you need more propellant or a seperate ammo for direct and indirect, seems like a waste


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## McG (29 Jan 2008)

Reccesoldier said:
			
		

> Couldn't that be compensated for with some sort of drag on the back end of the projectile?


That would be fin stabalised.  It would not have a desire to invert itself in flight, but would still be affected by wind.



			
				BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Then to be used as Direct fire you need more propellant or a seperate ammo for direct and indirect, seems like a waste


Many fin stabalised mortars already do direct & indirect, but (as you've pointed to, propellant is variable in such a system.


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## HItorMiss (29 Jan 2008)

Right but the AGL is direct in that it is a point and shoot gernade...as in it's a gun you point and click, adding more drag to the end of a bullet (which is basicaly all the AGL runds are big Bullets that go BOOM) you'll need more propellant to compensate for the increased drag used to compensate for the light round used indirect.

So why bother just go with two rounds which is a strain on logistics but seeing as the 25MM has like 4 or so for combat it wouldn;t be that much for the system but it might be a bit in terms of the Company.


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## McG (29 Jan 2008)

Increasing drag will not stop the effects of wind on a projectile.  If anything, that will increase it.


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## Reccesoldier (29 Jan 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> Increasing drag will not stop the effects of wind on a projectile.  If anything, that will increase it.



Nothing will stop the effects of wind, but even a very small amount of drag will keep the fuse end front as it should be.


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## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2008)

MCG: you saved me: i was going to post exactly that.
Now, to avoid confusion, "direct fire" and "indirect fire" have nothing to do with trajectory.
Paraphrasing here, but "direct fire" is that fire in which the shooter sees the target area and aims and corrects fire by himself.  Indirect fire is that fire in which a third party sends information to the firer, including initial aiming point and any corrections.

As an example, a 60mm mortar crew sees an enemy platoon at 1200 metres.  They lay the sight on the target, "geusstimate" the range, and fire a round.  They see the impact, and they make corrections based on what they observe, until they hit the target.  That is direct fire.

Now imagine a GPMG crew dug in with the SF kit on a reverse slope.  It's night, and they have no night vision.  An OP some distance away sees bad guys "out there" and it's not near a DF.  So they send grid and stuff.  The MG Det comd plots the direction and distance, it's applied to the MG, and they fire.  They get corrections, until they are "on" the target.  That is indirect fire.


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## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2008)

Reccesoldier said:
			
		

> Nothing will stop the effects of wind, but even a very small amount of drag will keep the fuse end front as it should be.


The right amount of spin (not too much, not too little) will keep it nose-first. Rocket scientists and big brains figure out all that nonsense


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## Kirkhill (29 Jan 2008)

Is this germane to this discussion?  It has all sorts of ballistics charts and scatter diagrams an' stuff.

Heavy Machinegun Fire Control as a Distributed Operations Enabler
9 May 2007


Modified to fix major OOOOOOPs on link  :-[ :-[


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## Reccesoldier (29 Jan 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> The right amount of spin (not too much, not too little) will keep it nose-first. Rocket scientists and big brains figure out all that nonsense



So is there a rifled 40mm Coy area suppression weapon?

Scratch that.  Come to think of it, this isn't a fin stab/rifled problem it's purely a matter of mass.  In order to have an accurate indirect round a certain amount of mass is required to withstand the longer time of flight of an indirect trajectory.


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## HItorMiss (29 Jan 2008)

Ok but back to the drag issue, if you have something causing more air friction slowing the round (weight. fins etc etc) you would need more force to move said round to compensate.

As for direct indirect fire I understood the difference but going with the previous theory of more drag it has a direct effect on the range of the round in both roles.

Now MRP is right in the end about how it all works just that to do it with the previous theory it wont work.

Reccesoldier, there is no 40mm CASW in current use within the Infantry.


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## Reccesoldier (30 Jan 2008)

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Ok but back to the drag issue, if you have something causing more air friction slowing the round (weight. fins etc etc) you would need more force to move said round to compensate.
> 
> As for direct indirect fire I understood the difference but going with the previous theory of more drag it has a direct effect on the range of the round in both roles.
> 
> Now MRP is right in the end about how it all works just that to do it with the previous theory it wont work.



"Drag" can be created without significantly increasing weight.  If you take a ball and attach a straw to it and throw it the flight of the ball will eventually lead to the straw at the read end.  It's got more to do with aerodynamics than any significant "drag".



> Reccesoldier, there is no 40mm CASW in current use within the Infantry.



I know, but, isn't the Mk19 rifled?  2200m seems like an awfully long way for a relatively light fused projectile to be shot without some spin to ensure a nice little boom at the end.


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## HItorMiss (30 Jan 2008)

Drag is drag whatever you use to create it, weight etc you'll still in the end be slowing the projectiles movement through the air thus requiring more force to move the projectile equal distnace then the less drag round.,

As for rifled yes I believe though I do not know for sure that the MK19 is a rifled barrel, someone that has used one would have to say for sure.


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## vonGarvin (30 Jan 2008)

Let us not forget that spin stabilisation also reduces overall range.  Some energy used to propel the projectile is lost in the projectile's spin.  That's why some tanks have smoothbores: higher projectile velocity.  (That's also why they have fin stabilisation: without it, they would not be stable)


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Jan 2008)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mk19.htm

MK19 40mm Machine Gun, MOD 3

The MK-19 (Mod 3) Automatic Grenade Launcher/Machine Gun is a selfpowered, air-cooled, belt-fed, blowback operated, crew-served weapon. The MK-19 replaces or augments selected M2 .50 caliber Machine Guns throughout the Army. It is also in use by the US Navy, Marines and Air Force. The MK-19 is mounted on HMMWV's, trucks and M88 Recovery Vehicles to deliver intense suppressive fire against enemy personnel and lightly armored vehicles or bunkers. 

The MK19 Mod3 40mm Grenade Machine Gun was first developed by the Navy in the early 1960's. TACOM-ARDEC has since suggested modifications to this system which has enabled the Army to deploy the MK19 in the harsh environments encountered during world-wide operations and has therefore enhanced its performance. The MK19 firing rate is over 350 grenades per minute and it is effective to ranges of over 2200 meters. The system was deployed in Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Storm and devastated enemy infantry. 

The MK19 40mm machine gun, MOD 3 is an air-cooled, disintegrating metallic link-belt fed, blowback operated, fully automatic weapon and is crew transportable over short distances with limited amounts of ammunition. It can fire a variety of 40mm grenades. The M430 HEDP 40mm grenade will pierce armor up to 2 inches thick, and will produce fragments to kill personnel within 5 meters and wound personnel within 15 meters of the point of impact. Associated components are: MK64 Cradle Mount, MOD 5; M3 Tripod Mount; and the AN/TVS-5 Night Vision Sight. The MK19 also mounts in the up-gunned weapons station of the LVTP7A1 model of the AAV and vehicle ring mounts. 

Many antiarmor platoons have the capability to replace the TOW weapon system with either an MK19 (40-mm grenade machine gun) or the M2 (caliber .50 machine gun). This allows the platoon to provide fire support when there is no threat of enemy armor. Both of these weapon systems can be fired from the HMMWV, using the HMMWV interchangeable mount system (HIMS) and also ground mounted on a tripod. 

*The MKI9 is effective at 1,500 meters against point targets and out to 2,200 meters against area targets.* The weapon has a sustained rate of fire of 40 rounds each minute and a rapid rate of fire of 60 rounds each minute. *The weapon system (gun, tripod, and T&E) weighs about 120 pounds. A container of 48 rounds weighs 64 pounds. The weight of this system precludes manpacking for other than short distances.* The AN/TVS-5 can be mounted on the weapon to provide effective night fires. 

The standard round of ammunition is HEDP, which can defeat 50-mm of RHA or 16 inches of concrete. An HE round is also available for engaging troops in the open or other soft targets. Both rounds have a bursting radius of 15 meters and a flat trajectory out to 800 meters. *The weapon can be employed in an indirect-fire role to engage targets from 800 meters out to the maximum effective range. *The methods of controlling indirect fires is the same as the 60-mm mortar--direct lay, direct alignment, or an observer to provide corrections and the use of the T&E mechanism to apply these corrections to the gun. 

*In the offense, the MK19 can be employed similar to the 60-mm mortar in the indirect-fire role *and similar to the TOW in the direct-fire role. The MK19 can be employed from an overmatch position to provide responsive suppressive fires if enemy contact is made. The weapon can also suppress/destroy enemy weapons and positions on the objective prior to the infantry assault. It may also support the isolation of the objective area by blocking likely avenues of approach with concentrated destructive fires. When employed from the M3 tripod with the T&E, the gun is very accurate for an area type weapon. 

*In the defense, the MKI9 can be effective in both the direct and indirect-fire roles. It can be assigned a priority target or an FPF just like a 60-mm mortar. The enemy will attempt to locate and destroy these weapons early in his attack. Unless the MK19s are employed from defilade/fire from prepared dug-in firing positions, they are very vulnerable.* The mobility capability for the MK19 when mounted on the HMMWV must be balanced against the vehicle's vulnerability to detection, and destruction. 

Although the MK 19 is a recent entry into the Army guns inventory, development began in 1963. The first version was a hand-cranked multiple grenade launcher called the MK 18. In 1966, the need for more fire power inspired the development of a self-powered 40-mm machine gun called the MK 19 MOD 0. This model was neither reliable enough nor safe enough for use as a military gun. Product improvements begun in 1971 resulted in the 1972 MOD 1, of which only six were produced. The MOD 1 performed effectively in Navy riverine patrol craft, and broader applications for the MK 19 were found. In 1973, the Navy developed the MOD 2, which featured improved reliability, safety and maintainability. In 1976, a complete redesign resulted in the MK 19 MOD 3, which the Army adopted in 1983. The Army uses the MK 19 within the tactical environment for defense, retrograde, patrolling, rear area security, MOUT, and special operations. 

One of the ARNG critical readiness requirements is small arms and crew-served weapons modernization. With the advent of Army Transformation to Units of Action (UA's) the ARNG has currently documented shortfall of 3,377 MK-19's. Operational requirements resulting from the GWOT have resulted in extensive unit-to-unit transfers of MK-19's to deploying units. M2 .50 calber machine guns and operational barrels are also in short supply. As the primary supressive weapon for CS and CSS any shortage of these weapons is critical. 

The RDD validates an ARNG requirement by 2005 for 9,159 MK-19's at a cost of $15.5k each. On hand are 5,782 MK-19's, the majority of which are deployed. Fielding to fill the previous ARNG requirement was completed in 2003 and the new increased requirement has not yet been programmed. The MK-19 UFR is 3,377 and may increase as ARNG modularity above UA level is documented. The only alternative weapon systems are the XM-307/312 Advanced Crew Served (Air-burst) Weapons which are still under development with no projected fielding date. 

Funding the MK-19 will give National Guard Soldiers the same capability as Active Army Forces to deploy and operate with maximum effectiveness on all fronts of the Global war on Terror. It greatly contributes to their ability to rapidly defend themselves with high volume, suppressive fire in adverse conditions. Failure to fund the MK-19 will increase soldier risk and the costs of pre-deployment cross-leveling, which also degrades the ARNG's ability to train for and execute both its federal and state missions. 


Manufacturer: Saco Defense Industries
Length: 43.1 inches (109.47 centimeters)
Weight:
Gun: 72.5 pounds (32.92 kilograms)
Cradle (MK64 Mod 5): 21.0 pounds (9.53 kilograms)
Tripod: 44.0 pounds (19.98 kilograms)
*Total: 137.5 pounds (62.43 kilograms)*
Muzzle velocity: 790 feet (240.69 meters) per second
Bore diameter: 40mm
Maximum range: 2200 meters
*Maximum effective range: 1600 meters*
Rates of fire:
Cyclic: 325-375 rounds per minute
Rapid: 60 rounds per minute
Sustained: 40 rounds per minute
*Unit Replacement Cost: $13,758*


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Jan 2008)

MK47 MOD 0                                                       MK19 MOD 3
Caliber 40mm                                                     40mm
Gun weight 39.6 pounds (18 kg)                           77 pounds (35 kg)
Length 37 inches (940mm)                                  43.11 inches (1,095mm)
Length (Barrel detached) 24.02 inches (610mm)    N/A
Width 10.04 inches (255mm)                               13.39 inches (340mm)
Height 8.07 inches (205mm)                                8.19 inches (208mm)
Total charge pull 55 pounds (25 kg)                     99 pounds (45 kg)
% Mass recoiling 55%                                        22%
Maintenance Round counter                                N/A


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## KevinB (30 Jan 2008)

Well - I've seen a US ODA attempt to use a Mk47 in a mortar like method and they gave up and got out their high speed mortar range was ~700m.
  They had the wizbang sight too FYI...


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## Scoobie Newbie (30 Jan 2008)

Clearly the Americans don't know what they were doing.  





Yes that clearly was sarcasm.


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## McG (30 Jan 2008)

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Drag is drag whatever you use to create, it weight etc you'll still in the end be slowing the projectiles movement through the air thus requiring more force to move the projectile equal distnace then the less drag round.


 Mass is an object's resistance to acceleration.  Weight is the force of gravity acting on a mass; it is not drag (nor does weight create drag).  Drag is a result of object size, shape & surface, and of air turbulence & speed (relative to the projectile).  Air resistance (drag parallel to the direction of flight) can be described in four components which affect projectiles: forebody drag, base drag, skin friction, and excrescence drag (fins & wings).  But, most of the discussions on atmospheric forces thus far have focused on moving the projectile off the target.

The 40 mm projectile, having less mass than a 60 mm mortar projectile, will be more affected by an equal lateral force.  However, being smaller and without a tail, the 40 mm projectile will likely experience much less lateral force in the same wind as a 60 mm projectile.  I6 and a few others hear may have some experience (actual observations of both weapons firing under the same conditions) to make an educated guess.  Outside of those few, the best any of us can do while sitting in front of our computers,  is make wild guesses as to which projectile would be affected more at an given lateral wind speed (unless someone happens to have CAD projectile models and CFD software).


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## HItorMiss (30 Jan 2008)

"In physics, drag consists of the sum of all the aerodynamic forces in the direction of the external airflow. *It therefore acts to oppose the motion of the object*. In a moving object it is overcome by thrust. Types of drag include form drag, pressure drag, lift-induced drag, and wave drag. The overall drag of an object is characterized by a dimensionless number called the drag coefficient, and is calculated using the drag equation."- Websters Online Dictionary  changed slighty by me to be applicable.

Now I took some of that from Websters Online dictionary. But it still proves my point on DRAG and how it would act on said rounds. And again proves that the initial theory of more drag on the round to achieve the desired effect would require more thrust to be put on the projectile. Which in turns means that evertyihg from direct to indirect fire is now off.


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## vonGarvin (30 Jan 2008)

The thing about drag is that much of it can be offset by projectile design, such as dovetailing.

I think that I-6's comments are more telling.  I also find it interesting that in our army at one time we were going to replace a tank with a Wheeled Direct Fire Support vehicle.  Now we are thinking of replacing a mortar with a heavy machine gun.


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## daftandbarmy (30 Jan 2008)

Some good background on the 60mm is available on the web. The US are looking at ways to improve its effectiveness based on previous successes in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Israeli's mount them on the tanks as a result of lessons learned in the 1973 War.


TTPs for the 60mm mortar section

In the first week of April 2003, Task Force Red Devil, comprised of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne) and Delta Battery, 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, conducted two artillery/mortar raids outside of the northern Iraqi city of Irbil. These missions were against an Iraqi Republican Guard Battalion supported by armor and artillery.
The mission was to destroy forward Iraqi observation posts, dug-in Iraqi positions, and to neutralize Iraqi armor and artillery pieces. The 60mm mortar primary targets were personnel and light-skinned vehicles near the observation posts. The battalion 120mm mortar section and two 105mm howitzers were tasked to neutralize the enemy armor and artillery. The mounted rifle companies were tasked to provide route security, security of the firing elements at the firing points, quick reaction force (QRF) duties, and to emplace accurate fires onto the enemy using their vehicle-mounted 50-caliber machine guns and Mk-19 grenade launchers.

The 60mm mortars from Alpha Company, 1-508th Infantry, were tasked to provide immediate indirect fire support onto known and suspected targets. Upon reaching their planned mortar firing point, the section immediately dismounted their HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) and conducted an emergency occupation. The section immediately received a call for fire from their forward observers. Within 60 seconds of occupation, the section was placing accurate high explosive (HE) and white phosphorus (WP) rounds onto and in the vicinity of the Iraqi observations 

posts.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_3_93/ai_n6366546


Mortars in Afghanistan
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAzioXfgVhY

81mm and 60mm Mortars in OIF

http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:hp83XNf3ES8Jroceedings.ndia.org/C347/Clayton.pdf+60mm%2Bmortar%2Beffective&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=20&gl=ca





Indirect fire the close fight: the 60mm mortar

Army-wide, light infantry platoons are reluctant to incorporate indirect fires, specifically from the 60mm mortar, when the enemy establishes contact in the close fight. Some platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, team leaders, and also forward observers (FOs) are reluctant to use the mortars in the close fight because they are not familiar with the weapon system, nor do they trust it. This situation should cause great concern. The mortars exist to support infantry platoons, enabling them to conserve their combat power during chance contact and to maximize it during the decisive fight. The 60mm mortar can be a valuable asset to a light infantry platoon by providing highly responsive and short minimum range indirect fires that either kill the enemy or suppress his fire, thus enabling the assaulting rifleman to close with and kill him. We cannot blame the platoon leadership for being wary of using mortars. I wouldn't use a weapon system that I wasn't familiar with or did not trust. It is vital that we develop a solution that will help platoon and company leaders establish trust in a weapon system that is a "critical and irreplaceable element of a rifle company's maneuver"

After action reviews from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from the 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 94 to the 1st Quarter, FY 00, have shown that there is a recurring trend in infantry battalions--team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders are not aware of or just not comfortable with calling for fire. The result is that units have failed to integrate indirect fires into chance contacts with the enemy, thus allowing the enemy to break contact on their own terms. A former senior brigade fire support observer/ controller at JRTC stated that the failure to adjust indirect fires onto a fast-moving enemy when contact is made contributes to the 7:1 loss ratio between the blue force (BLUFOR) and the opposing force (OPFOR) at JRTC. The 60mm mortar is the only indirect weapon system organic to the light infantry company. Regardless of the conditions or constraints applied by higher levels, the 60mm mortar is all-weather, always present, and approved at company level. The situation in Afghanistan reinforces the need for infantry platoons to incorporate mortars into the close fight and fix the problem. Because of conditions such as extreme altitude and inclement weather, coupled with mission specific constraints, there were times when the 60mm mortar was the only indirect fire asset available to companies conducting dismounted patrols during combat operations. The fact is that without the employment of mortars during the close fight, platoons can neither conserve nor maximize their combat power.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_93/ai_n6123808


Defense Update

The 60 mm mortars are becoming a popular weapon of choice among peacekeeping forces, engaged in war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they are rapidly fielded as low-cost, highly effective defensive or offensive weapon to improve the integral fire support of small contingent forces fielded by contributing NATO members. Old generation tubes, including 60mm and 51mm tubes were quite popular in the past, but in recent years were practically shelved due ammunition obsolescence. The British Army already decided to phase out its 51 mm tubes in favor of 60 mm mortars, while the US Army is currently considering a similar move. The Israeli army fields 60 mm tubes with all tanks and heavy APCs as a lesson from the 1973 Yom Kippur war. 

http://www.defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/ausa07fires.htm



Small Arms - The 60mm Mortar

For mobile platoon and company level action, an easily portable weapon for use between the effective ranges of hand grenades and the 81mm mortar was needed. Hence, the 60mm M2. The bipod was often left attached to the tube for speed in bringing the mortar into action, and the combination was readily carried by two men, with ammunition in complete rounds being carried by supporting troops.

In the Marine Corps, our 60mm guns were usually in three gun-squads in a 20-man mortar section commanded by a lieutenant, reinforcing each Rifle Company. Each gun-squad consisted of a squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner and 3 ammo bearers. In deployment for action, the ammo carriers humped 6 loads, in addition to their weapons and equipment. On the move, the gunner carried the complete mortar w/o sight, and all other men carried ammo bags or packboards strapping 12 loads. In addition all men carried their equipment and a carbine, and the squad leader carried the M4 sight. These guns were invaluable in close support. Sometimes in battery, but usually assigned one gun per platoon, they moved fluidly close behind our assault troops, and registered on assault lanes in front of the platoons before night, so as to be ready to quickly provide murderous close support.

They often had to.

Infantry mortars are normally employed in defiladed positions, such as the reverse slope of a hill or ridge, so as not to be vulnerable to enemy direct fire positions. Hence direction and altitude settings are normally controlled indirectly by a forward observer, or an aiming stake about 10-25 yards forward of the gunner, and the rounds are normally dropped down the barrel. The 60mm M19 could be used as a direct fire weapon by attaching the small M1 base plate to the barrel. This reduced the mortar weight substantially, and greatly lowered the weapon profile in the open during fluid engagements where targets were close and in direct view.In such situations, however, the recoilless rifle or bazooka were usually more effective.

Comparing weight of material to destruction delivered at the target, mortars are very efficient. "The infantry's artillery", they provide small infantry units artillery-like fire support when artillery either was not available, or could not be moved forward fast enough. The initial Chinese Communist assaults of November and December 1950, did not bring artillery, but they did bring mortars, and used them with great effectiveness.

Typical CCF assault tactics were to drift strong infantry units near our lines at night, and use small probing attacks to locate our automatic weapons and machine guns and, if possible, junctions between our platoons or other weak points. Then, they would attack in strength with platoons armed only with grenades, followed by submachine gun platoons. Their light mortar units would follow quickly, and place their fire on our strong points from fairly close distances, enabling them to fire with reasonable accuracy even though at night and without prior registration.

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/60mm.htm


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## tomahawk6 (30 Jan 2008)

http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_Mortars,,00.html



> military. Easily transportable (either by man, truck, or helicopter) and with an ever-increasing range, mortars represent the most effective fire support asset available to maneuver ground commanders. In Afghanistan, for example, ground commanders have turned to mortars to provide immediate fire support during ground operations. The mortars have the advantage of being immediately available, accurate, and easily sustained.
> 
> With the introduction of precision-guided mortar munitions(PGMs), the mortar now has the ability to provide extremely accurate and immediate ground support fire in urban environments where the threat of collateral damage is high. In these situations the mortar is superior to air delivered munitions, which require a great deal of planning and cross-service coordination to employ. In addition, while air delivered PGMs are quite accurate, the smallest of these weapons is currently 500 pounds, which, in many cases, is simply too large for use in built-up civilian populated areas. While precision mortar munitions (at $10,000-$20,000 a piece) are more expensive than the mortar rounds typically fired, when a ground commander needs immediate precision ground support, they are priceless.



Afghanistan:


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## CG440 (30 Jan 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> I would like to ask the PD to answer one quick question for the board.  It has been pointed to a few times that the project intent (as seen in various media articles) is to deliver a 40 mm automatic weapon capable of indirect fire.  In some of my own searching for answers, I've been told this indirect fire capability includes the same high angles of mortars so that the CASW will be able to put fire onto targets protected by complex terrain (such as compound walls, berms, buildings, hills, etc).  However, in this thread, the standing argument seems to be that CASW cannot replace a mortar because AGLs are direct fire weapons.  So, here comes the question.
> 
> Is there a 40 mm automatic weapon, capable of direct and high angle indirect fires, that has been proven in operational trials under realistic field conditions?



The answer is yes.  The 40mm is a light round but surprisingly stable throughout the trajectory.  The biggest issue with high angle was not the ballistic but the self-destruct fuse where the flight time would exceed the normal burn time and the rounds would detonate on the way down.  Some new SD fuses rely on the spin rate of the round instead.    The indirect aspect is mature enough that my current concern is more towards the ergonomics of the tripods than the ballistic.

There is a lot of talk about the indirect aspect of the CASW but it needs to be acknowledged that maybe 99% of rounds fired will be in direct and airburst modes.  If you have a LOS to the target, going into super elevation will just add to engagement time.  Instead, just lase the target, let the computer get the firing solution (almost instant), bring the crosshair on the target and fire away.  If the target is behind a wall, you can shoot through the wall with your normal HEDP or switch to AB, lase the wall, add 3 meters correction and fire.  True indirect without seeing the target will require the normal observer and correction drills.  The big difference is that you can input the grid directly and register a bunch of targets in memory.

Admittedly, it is a bit hard to discuss when we don’t work from the same data.  There were 3 main Operational Studies that were conducted by our research establishments.  They looked at the option of acquiring new 60mm vs other systems, it included gap analysis – Matching best wpn & ammo with effects, it confirmed the suitability of automatic grenade launchers (AGL), it confirmed the lethality of the 40mm High Velocity (HV) and it describes optimum deployment – 4 x AGL per infantry coy.  A lot of it is classified and so is the proprietary information from industry.  Sadly, I just can’t post the movies from the airbursts/indirect trials or some other interesting data that I include in my presentations.


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## vonGarvin (30 Jan 2008)

Here's the problem, which is obvious to me.  From the time you "see" the target to the time you shoot at him, your LAV cannons have already opened up, on the move.  Same with the Leo cannons.  Now, Taliban fighters may have been born at night, but they were not born last night.  Their TTPs are the same: when shot at, get out of LOS.  Run.  Hide.  Dont' stick around.  So, the "lase and blaze" analogy is good for fig 11 targets, or an enemy that is in the open (hence it may still be a niche weapon for tier 1 or 2).


As posted in a multitude of articles, the 60 mm is capable of firing accurate fire within 60 seconds from setting up.  The 60 is combat proven, reliable, and simple.  It has a bigger kill radius (almost 4 times as big of a kill radius) and I can't say this enough: it's combat proven.  WE DON'T WANT OR NEED ANOTHER HMG IN THE MECH INFANTRY COYS!  The 25mm does quite well, thank you very much.


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## Jammer (30 Jan 2008)

I might just toss this one in as well.
Compare the ORBAT with a CA Mech Inf Coy and a Stryker Inf Coy. 
Both are similarly equipped in term of veh type, with the glaring difference being the RWS on the Stryker.
Then you can see where a 40mm system would/could make up a firepower shortfall.
From my experience during Medusa (put yer helmets on), the .50 was really the only weapon that we missed. It could have minimized the amount of 25mm expended (causing at times critical shortages).


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## vonGarvin (30 Jan 2008)

Jammer said:
			
		

> I might just toss this one in as well.
> Compare the ORBAT with a CA Mech Inf Coy and a Stryker Inf Coy.
> Both are similarly equipped in term of veh type, with the glaring difference being the RWS on the Stryker.
> Then you can see where a 40mm system would/could make up a firepower shortfall.
> From my experience during Medusa (put yer helmets on), the .50 was really the only weapon that we missed. It could have minimized the amount of 25mm expended (causing at times critical shortages).


The firepower "delta" of Medusa has already been addressed.  Instead of .50 or 25, the troops received 105 mm and then 120 mm.  I still maintain: no niche for CASW in a mech coy or mech cbt tm.  As well, if the 60 goes, then the ability for integral HE, Illum or Smoke within the coy's Area of Influence is gone: the Coy/Cbt Tm will have to rely on higher assets, and therefore compete for priority with other coy/cbt tms.


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## Infanteer (30 Jan 2008)

I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.


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## vonGarvin (30 Jan 2008)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.


That is spot on, and I believe part of the problem.  Granted that the 60 is tired and old (yet reliable), so with good intentions, a replacement was sought.  Instead of getting another mortar, they are getting an HMG because, as we all know, battles are fought on Euclidian planes as we "lead with sensors, overmatch with long range precision effects and exploit with infantry"......:


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## Jammer (30 Jan 2008)

IIRC the 60 was part of the Coys TO&E, but it was a bit of push/pull at the BG level to actually employ them.
E Bty was wary of the Coys interfering with the overall fireplan. ROZs had to be established before ALL indirect fire missions as well as BiPing IEDs and UXOs.
Personally I think there was a certain level of empire building on the part of the guns. They figured that because they controlled 81 tubes as well that they should be the 'Center of Excellence' (deployed), for all indirect fire.


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## McG (30 Jan 2008)

Jammer said:
			
		

> Personally I think there was a certain level of empire building on the part of the guns. They figured that because they controlled 81 tubes as well that they should be the 'Center of Excellence' (deployed), for all indirect fire.


It has nothing to do with empire building, and is a necessity of the combined joint environment in Afghanistan.  I don’t think I can be more specific than that without getting into TTPs & other things that do not belong on this board.


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## Arius (31 Jan 2008)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.



Ah, the elusive doctrine.  What come first? The equipment or the doctrine?  DLR or DLFD?  Here is my take on this.

If I remember well, the original doctrine for the 60mm was from the US.  There was 3 tubes grouped within a section of 19 men at the company level.  Of those 19 men, 12 were ammo carriers – mules basically – and each of those men would wear a vest with 12 pockets carrying 12 bombs. 144 bombs in total.  It was recognized that grouped fire was necessary to achieve some kind of effect.  The US Marines in WW2 were the prime users as they had to wait for the subsequent landing waves to bring in the heavier mortars and artillery.  I may be off a bit but that is a fairly clear cut doctrine.

How we got inspired to procure it in the late 40s and how we ended up basically shelving the 60mm for over 40 years is beyond me.  Korea was probably a big factor.  The 81mm proved itself invaluable and we still tell stories of the tubes firing red hot at masses of Chinese.  For many years the big mortar platoon in the big battalions was a must.  Europe and the Cold War didn’t change this and even reinforced the need of the mortar platoon at unit level because the divisional artillery concept would often make the guns unavailable for small unit action.  This is the origin of the “We can never trust the guns but we can always rely on mortars” mentality that we still have in the infantry.  During that time, the 60mm may be on the REMAR but it doesn’t get fresh air often.  It is so forgotten that we don’t even bother with any life extension or modernization for it.  That’s why we can’t fire at full charge today btw.  It comes out again in the mid to late 80s but there is no doctrine for it.  It is a smoke and illumination device.  

Cold War is over, time to reap the Peace dividends:  Budgets cuts, restructuring, downsizing and massive crippling of the big battalions.  We lose the mortar platoon...  And we don’t even put up a fight about it.  Shame on us for that one.  What now?  We dig up the 60mm.  It’s there, it’s not rusted out yet so let’s use it because we have nothing else in the unit.  That is the doctrine.  Harsh words for a harsh reality.  I'm not sure there was ever a proper "fit". 

The people in DLR didn’t try to kill the 60mm btw.  It killed itself by underperforming against a lowly Mk19 during trials.  The thing is that most – if not all – engagement with the 60mm are line of sight under 2000m.  In some scenarios, it takes only 24 40mm rounds to achieve suppression on a platoon versus 18 rounds of 60mm.  You can fire a whole box of 40mm before the first mortar round hits the ground.  What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.  Line of sight and 2000m or under?  Give me that Mk19, and I’ll trade you the .50 cal also.  CASW = Mk19 + computer + thermal sight airburst + indirect.  I’ll take it – but make sure it comes with good old iron sights also.  Weight?  A Mk47 and 24 rounds vs a full M19 60mm with 18 rounds is probably pretty close I would think.  I’ll calculate some day.

The people in the Land Staff are working on the direct and indirect plans and also on the Army structure for 2011 and beyond.  I saw some stuff of where they wanna go and the CASW is there with guess what?  AMOS 120mm.  Now we’re talking real modern firepower for the infantry.  There is a big push to bring back mortars and go for the 120mm automatic.  AMOS may be too expensive but I’ll go for any 120mm mortar with automatic loading.  A few PGM for those accurate shots and we’re in business.  So, future doctrine for the infantry would include:  Usual small arms, 120mm mortar, CASW, PMEWS, Javelin, still some 25mm and RWS that we don’t know yet.  No 60mm, no .50 cal, no Eryx.  I guess CASW's fit would be in a dismounted-static or short movement-overwatch-protection-suppression role in complex terrain.  The kind of thing you put on your FOB or that you shoot through windows or from rooftops in built up area.  I can see some good use for it but I want the 120mm to be available for the real badass indirect.


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## Scoobie Newbie (31 Jan 2008)

You seem articulate enough so good you fill out your profile to add some credence to your points.
0 death count.  Well that may be true but finding bodies isn't always the easiest so really who's to say.  We also have a bayonet but I don't recall hearing anyone kill a Taliban with that either.
No more .50 Cal.  Been there, heard that, the cheques in the mail and I won't c*m in your mouth.  All these fancy forecasts are great until the NDP gets into power and shuts it all down.
Are you proposing both having the MK19 and MK 47?


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## KevinB (31 Jan 2008)

While my Arty Tech, and FO tech courses were a long long time ago (damn near 20 years).
 I am still somewhat conversant with small arms external ballistics.
 Muzzle Velocity, Mass of the projectile can be input with the projectiles BC (ballistic coefficient) to determine both drop and windage.  If somone knows the BC of the two projectiles one can easily input the data and find out how much drift would occur at a given wind.
 This all must have been done somewhere - however as mentioned I would guess most if classified or coporate knowledge subject to NDA (non-disclosure agreement not National Defence Act)

  My concent with the Project Managers statments is that he is predetermining the TIC to be a LOS engagement.  However is an dispersed battlefield, especially in Urban areas - it is NLOS -- where you will have insurgent Mortar teams that are attacking a site - however they do not have the good manners to be simply behind a wall across the street.  Imaging they are across a small River (hypothetically we will say the Eurphrates   ) -- and three compounds over from the one ajoinign the river road.  You simply cannot do the whole fucking village to get to them in a LOS engagement (or I hope you wont - for if you think that way Asymetical Warfare is not for you and you should get out now).  Now how do we knwo they are there? -- we have radar and a bunch of other toys.  While I really am a big fan of driving over and shooting people in the face (TM SSFD) due to the terrain the Mortar team will be broken down and dispersed by the time one can do that.  So you need a Mortar, also having the mortar on the roof of your team house with the Mk47's mean you tend to deter the next crew that does not want to meet Allah anytime soon like the first one did...

I think the AGL is great for conventional warfare, and a great convoy firepower enabler when one is mobile and typically dealing with LOS engagements (if any beside a roadside IED/EFP).  However it is not a IDF tool - and its adoption as a replacement rather than augmentation to the 60mm will leave some critial engagement/protection gaps that the enemy will identify and expoit.

 just my 0.02 - I am not longer in the CF, but I do still care about it and the soldiers serving in it - and I think the way that this program has been implemted will get troops killed.


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## McG (31 Jan 2008)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> My concent with the Project Managers statments is that he is predetermining the TIC to be a LOS engagement. However is an dispersed battlefield, especially in Urban areas - it is NLOS


Actually, he is saying that the CASW will fire high angle in order to lob bombs onto the heads of the enemy mortar that you've described.  There does not seem to be a disconnect in what a rifle company needs to be able to do.  The difference of views is that the PD is telling us the CASW can do this (high angle fires) but many do not believe it is possible.


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## vonGarvin (31 Jan 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.  Line of sight and 2000m or under?  Give me that Mk19, and I’ll trade you the .50 cal also.  CASW = Mk19 + computer + thermal sight airburst + indirect.  I’ll take it – but make sure it comes with good old iron sights also.


I have issues with this claim that since WE didn't kill anything, then it is unreliable and/or ineffective.  Now, I personally have not used in in battle, however, several of my colleagues have.  They have nothing but praise for it.  Praise that at times seems over the top; however, given that they are the ones with the experience, I'll take that over anyone's.
Another point of "battle proven" is the experience of our allies.  There are several open source references that also praise the 60mm.  Now, our current model may be worn out, but what's to stop us from (a) getting new barrels or (b) getting a new 60?
As for LOS 2400m and under, I'll take 25mm M 242 over Mk19 AND .50.  Anyday, any time, day or night, moving or not moving.  The problem is as I stated earlier: the bad guys don't like to remain LOS to us.


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## daftandbarmy (31 Jan 2008)

MG34 said:
			
		

> As much as i like the idea of a 40mm belt fed,no ******* way am I going to give up the 60mm Mortar. The 60 was the most effective dismounted weapon we had during  my Roto with TF 3/06, to get rid of it for a weapon that offers less capability in most areas id just idiotic. Of course the fine folks in the Crystal palace don't seem to give a damn.



This is the only convincing I need.


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## GK .Dundas (1 Feb 2008)

with all the usual provisions involving copyrights ,just thought I'd add a lil more fuel to the fire.

 http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20080201.aspx


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## Arius (1 Feb 2008)

The future of the 60mm mortar was discussed at the Extended Infantry Advisor Board (XIB) held on 14-15 November 2007.  (These are the COs & RSMs & reps of all the battalions and other infantry related units - It's the advising body to the CLS) These form part of the list of recommendations below. 

_It is recommended that the LF in Horizon 1 take the following action with regard to the 60 mm Mortar System:

Retain the 60mm mortar, including all three natures of ammunition in service until CASW achieves FOC, which is now predicted to be 2012;

Create a new capital project should a capability deficiency be identified after CASW is introduced;

Continue to employ this system using direct fire procedures; and

Obtain the VCDS approval to dispose of the 60mm mortar capability once CASW achieves FOC._

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is in 2009 - The first battallion fully equiped.  Full Operational Capability (FOC) is 2012 - All units fully equiped.  The 60mm and CASW will probably co-exist for a bit before they smelt the little guy.  The neat thing is that they leave the door open for another weapon system if there is additional requirement after CASW FOC.  We can rant and curse all we want but this is where we are all going.


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## tomahawk6 (1 Feb 2008)

Arius we both know how this game is played. Once CASW is fielded there wont be a purchase of 60mm mortars.This entire argument made by the CASW project is entended to field a weapon that isnt needed. We know right now that CASW will create a capabilities shortfall because it doesnt have the range of even the current 60mm mortar. The door being left open after fielding is disingenuous at best. I cannot believe that infantry officers would support a weapon that isnt even as capable as the venerable M2 .50 cal MG.


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## McG (2 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Arius we both know how this game is played.


Which game, the malicious staff officers pulling the wool over the troops' eyes game or the staff juggling the priorities of the troops against the hurdles of bureaucracy game?  If the COs & RSMs of the Army have bought in, then I suspect it is the second game in which case the Army probably will make the effort to introduce a 60 mm mortar project after CASW (though how it survives at higher joint boards would be another question).


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## daftandbarmy (8 Feb 2008)

There go those old fashioned Royal Marines, using that obsolete 60mm mortar again. And just last week too. Sheesh.

Note: Each company has it's own FS troop (platoon)

------------------

Royal Marines from Fire Support Troop, Charlie Company, 40 Commando Royal Marines engaging Taliban positions near Kajaki, Northern Helmand. The Operation is part of OP GHARTSE SPIKE and Charlie Company was supported by RECCE Troop 40 Commando and elements of the Afghan National Army. [Picture: LA (Phot) AJ Macleod]

http://www.blogs.mod.uk/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/02/07/blog7.jpg

http://www.blogs.mod.uk/defence_news/2008/week6/index.html#entry-45205364


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## vonGarvin (9 Feb 2008)

Those marines are junk.  I mean, come on!  Afghanistan is a land-locked nation!  What were they thinking?  :



(NOTA BENE: this post was in total sarcasm)


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## Arius (11 Feb 2008)

Not sure what the 40 Cdo adds to the debate...  They are Naval Infantry with fairly old landing crafts and don't have the vehicules to go around and carry heavy stuff - Hence the Quad on the right.   The mortar is a 51mm I would think...  Bit sad actually.  Their 51 and 81 do fit in their original employment concept.  They did an "amphibious" op in one of the reservoir I think.  Royal Marines are exceedingly tough soldiers but they could use some heavy mech in Afghanistan as they are not equipped for long drawn out operations.


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## vonGarvin (11 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> *Not sure what the 40 Cdo adds to the debate*...


In the interest of brevity, you should have left your post as I've clipped it above.  

Allow me to tell you what it brings to the debate: the Royal Marines are using, today, and with great effect, the very weapon _type_ that some feel can be replaced by a 40mm Machine Gun Grenade Launcher.  That's what it brings.

Don't get me wrong: a 40mm grenade launcher would be a welcome addition to any "toolbox"; however, not at the expense of a very unique weapon system, which it could never EVER hope to replace.


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## daftandbarmy (12 Feb 2008)

More proof that those wacky Royal Marines are way out to lunch. 

51mm MOR in use during Op Volcano in the opening sequence...

http://www.operations.mod.uk/video/20070205opvolcano.wmv


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## baboon6 (12 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Not sure what the 40 Cdo adds to the debate...  They are Naval Infantry with fairly old landing crafts and don't have the vehicules to go around and carry heavy stuff - Hence the Quad on the right.   The mortar is a 51mm I would think...  Bit sad actually.  Their 51 and 81 do fit in their original employment concept.  They did an "amphibious" op in one of the reservoir I think.  Royal Marines are exceedingly tough soldiers but they could use some heavy mech in Afghanistan as they are not equipped for long drawn out operations.



They have Land Rovers too and the Viking tracked vehicle (the latter not shown in this sequence). Here are the rest of the photos from that day, they also have 40mm GMGs, .50 Brownings, GPMGs, Javelin missile, so not exactly lacking in firepower. The Commando21 orbat with two close combat companies (three rifle troops [platoons] each), two stand-off combat coys (each with a rifle troop, HMG/GMG troop and Javelin missile troop), command coy (command/signals plus recce troop, Javelin troop, 81mm mortar troop, GPMG-SF troop) and logistics support coy(admin, medics, 2 A Echelons and a B Echelon) is pretty robust. I assume this "Fire Support Troop" is a composite one made up of elements from Javelin and HMG/GMG troops and attached to a close combat coy. 

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Templates/PictureViewer.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7b2055C9A7-1237-4CD5-B9C6-980C5E61D52E%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2fDefenceInternet%2fPictureViewers%2fInPicturesAggressiveMarinePatrolsSupportHelmandHealthcare%2ehtm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest#image1

Other recent photos of 40 Commando in Afghanistan:

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Templates/PictureViewer.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7bC3B1B7FA-54AF-4107-B6F8-8E3035AEF41A%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2fDefenceInternet%2fPictureViewers%2fInPicturesMarinesMeetAfghanCommunities%2ehtm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest#image1

Article on the Viking vehicle:

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/VikingVehiclesProveTheirWorthInVolatileHelmand.htm

Commando21 orbat:

http://www.onceamarinealwaysamarine.co.uk/cdo21.htm


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## daftandbarmy (14 Feb 2008)

Another good example of a light mortar in action. Royal Marines (again) in the assault in Afghanistan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FcXWZ0XVuw&feature=related

2:00 and 2:36


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## daftandbarmy (14 Feb 2008)

Oops. Forgot this one. UK Airborne Forces in a firefight. 51 mm MOR at the centre of the action starting at about 2:00 mins.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUW0BWDX4oA

Tell me again why we'd want to get rid of an important, inexpensive, and easily portable asset like this at the platoon level when we're buying new tanks and aircraft off the shelf for bejillions of dollars?


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## KevinB (14 Feb 2008)

daftandbarmy -- if I had to take a guess, I'd say a technogeek was incharge or procurment and he/they have zero combat experience.

  I'd have a mortar with me if we where allowed them...
BigRed was going to get us a few when we where on a teamsite together in lower nowhere -


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## McG (14 Feb 2008)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Oops. Forgot this one. UK Airborne Forces in a firefight. 51 mm MOR at the centre of the action ...
> 
> Tell me again why we'd want to get rid of an important, inexpensive, and easily portable asset like this at the platoon level when we're buying new tanks and aircraft off the shelf for bejillions of dollars?


Just to add some more depth to this debate, how does the 51 mm mortar compare to the 60 mm mortar?  Would Canadian mortar proponents support going to a lighter light mortar?


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## KevinB (14 Feb 2008)

No idea on the 51 -- the 60 has a pretty poor payload as is -- I wonder what the 51's is?
 *the 40mm has an even more pathetic burting radius -- but is still pretty good for the intended role (not IDF) with the HEDP round.

Since the 60mm is US issue - and alledgedly Cdn SOF issue as well -  IMHO it makes more sense to adopt a modern 60...


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## AmmoTech90 (14 Feb 2008)

The payload on the 51mm ranges from about the same as some 60mm bombs (140-160 grams of HE) to half of some (some 60mm have 300 grams).  The effective danger area is much larger than a 40mm grenade, and will be approximately equal to a 60mm.

As everyone else has said, each weapon has a role and you can't really drop one without losing some sort of capability.  I'm working with the Brits right now and they have got a mix of 51mm, 40mm HV/LV, 81mm, etc.  There are definite roles for each and I have seen first hand what the consequences are when you don't think through disposing of a system.


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## McG (14 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Since we don't talk about AGLs here anymore, I would suggest starting another thread on the future use of mortars in the Army.  I would be interested in some real debate and informed opinions.


Done: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22545/post-674855.html#msg674855



			
				Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> No idea on the 51 -- the 60 has a pretty poor payload as is -- I wonder what the 51's is?
> *the 40mm has an even more pathetic burting radius -- ...


Volume of fire is an important factor in addition to payload of the individual projectile.  If more smaller & slightly dispersed projectiles can be put onto a target in the open, then there is the potential for equal or better blast & frag effects.  If we are going for equal effect, it would be interesting to see a comparison of rounds per min required from 40 mm, 51 m and 60 mm (and then make a comparison by kg per min).

Now, if you want to punch through something (like a field fortification) the bigger projectile is going to be the way to go.


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## KevinB (15 Feb 2008)

MCG -- well -- if I wanted to work a wall that ol' mohammed was hiding behind the Mk19 with the HV HEDP would be ideal.  I think the design of the payload is also very important, more important thant the weight.

  While weight of fire is cool -- the issue is also how does one hump all that ammo -- having brought a box up to roof top for a Hk GMG -- its not the most easy stuff to pack ina  urban of LI environment -- as opposed to a mortar bomb here and there.


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## Royal (15 Feb 2008)

Weight Myth: 60mm vs CASW

M19 60mm:	             20.5 kg                Mk 47 40mm:	     41 kg
M720 x 1 shot           (1.7 kg)                 M383 x 1 shot   (0.340 kg)
18 shots 	                30.6 kg                24 shots	        8.16 kg	
Fire mission:	           51.1 kg                 Fire mission:	    49.2 kg

Subsequent fire missions
18 shots 	                 30.6 kg               24 shots 	   8.16 kg

How many rounds do you really need to carry?  After 1 fire mission, the CASW out strips the 60.  
How long to get an effective round on target with the 60mm?  15-30 seconds with a good, practiced team.
How long for a 99% first round hit with the CASW?  How long to load and press fire......

Next up, 18 rds at max rate takes90 secs to fire and 120 to arrive.  24rds on target with a 5m group takes less than 60 secs.  Also, my personal favourite, I can hit a single person at 2000m with an air-burst and then send in the brooms to sweep-up the mess.


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## vonGarvin (15 Feb 2008)

Royal:
Perhaps a comparison of the CASW vs. the .50 or the M 242 would be more relevant?  Given that people usually don't like to be shot at, and that said people like to hide  in order to avoid being shot at, there are times when a mortar (of any calibre, and irrespective of who's shooting it) is a better choice.  Given our recent acquisitions, and given the faulty reasoning and in some cases blatant lies in the Statement of Requirement (which I've read), the CASW is going to fill a niche that doesn't need filling given the .50 in light coys and the M 242 in Mech coys.


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## Royal (15 Feb 2008)

I am all about effects, man.  The biggest tool for the job is usually the best tool.  So if I want to kill/incapcitate dsmtd inf at 2000m or destroy an IED, the most precise wpn is the one that I want.  Besides, the CASW is not replacing the .50cal, the 242 OR the 60mm.  But like most things military, if we want something new, we need to get rid of something old, especially if that thing is both a burden and an administrative nightmare to repair.  We are buying firing mechanisims from european countries who are getting them out of their "for destruction" boxes, but have been to lazy to actually destroy.  Like the tanks, we were buying our own spare-parts back from the people we sold them to as junk at 7times what we sold them for.  Talk about paying through the nose twice......


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## vonGarvin (15 Feb 2008)

I realise that the CASW isn't meant to replace the 60; however, in a discussion with an esteemed member of DLR, that was his exact point.  Not only was it going to replace the 60, but it was a "Wunderwaffe" that not only looked cool, it did everything but butter your toast.

Then again, if they want to get rid of something old, I can be bought off ;D


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## AmmoTech90 (15 Feb 2008)

Royal,

The problem with your table is you are saying that 1 40mm HV round will do the same job as 1 60mm Mortar bomb.  For HE this is not the case, and if you get into Smk and Illum you are definitely going to need more than a 1:1 ratio.  Try around 3:1 for HE and 5-10:1 for Smk/Illum (if it's even available).  Also you are burdened with a full belt of 40mm HV, things start going wrong when you break them by hand.  You can distribute 60mm in a nice mix amongst troops, I don't think they would be too keen to carry a full belt of 32 40mm.


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## McG (15 Feb 2008)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> The problem with your table is you are saying that 1 40mm HV round will do the same job as 1 60mm Mortar bomb.


No he did not.  If you go back, he has 18 x  60 mm to 24 x 40 mm.

... and the 40 mm still comes out on top for weight.


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## AmmoTech90 (15 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> No he did not.  If you go back, he has 18 x  60 mm to 24 x 40 mm.
> 
> ... and the 40 mm still comes out on top for weight.


You are absolutely correct.  I was looking at his ammo weight.  Let me try another tack.

As an AT I am not advocating that you carry ammunition in an unpacked state but hey, it happens, especially with mortars.  Not a big deal for someone to carry three or four mortar bombs.  I know the Canadian packaging (the 4 packs of green tubes) is not the best but it can be done.  Now 40mm grenades come in 32 round belts.  These are a bitch to break, and once broken even harder to relink in such a manner that you dont get stoppages.  So you are looking at a minimum load of 32 rounds, and you probably want them in a box, right?  So you are looking an ammo can the size of 2 to 2.5 .50 cal cans end to end, all up weight in the 20 kg range.  So you minimum weight is not 8.16kg, but rather 20kg, 50% more rather than 300% more than the 60mm, and then you are only looking at one nature.  Well that's a given as the 40mm HV can't provide Smk or Illum.
Basically it's nice you can suppress an enemy (only sometimes as Arius said) with 24 rounds but you have to carry 32.  You can give pers 0 to however many mortar bombs to carry depending, you want them to hump GMG ammo, have 32.  Dismount the 60mm from it's bipod, sight, baseplate, you still have a weapon with a km+ range.  Dismount the 40mm from it's pintle/tripod what do you have?
BDA assessments aside (and they always give us a good chuckle when we read them), what is the reasoning behind giving up (in 2012 or so) the 60mm?

40mm GMG is a great weapon but having worked with a force that uses 40/51/60/81 all together I can see where giving up the light mortar leaves a capability gap.


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## seamus (15 Feb 2008)

The problem or the base of it is , that we keep thinking in a typical manner. I have seen both used in a combat zone and both are equally as good at suppressing/fixing the enemy. As we keep relating to other army's and how they use both weapons systems, the fact of the matter is that they use both. Replacing one with the other is only creating a problem in a different area. I know they are replacing one with the other when in actual fact the best viability is to have both.


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## daftandbarmy (15 Feb 2008)

seamus said:
			
		

> The problem or the base of it is , that we keep thinking in a typical manner. I have seen both used in a combat zone and both are equally as good at suppressing/fixing the enemy. As we keep relating to other army's and how they use both weapons systems, the fact of the matter is that they use both. Replacing one with the other is only creating a problem in a different area. I know they are replacing one with the other when in actual fact the best viability is to have both.



+1. 

At the Company level, we have more than one kind of anti-armour weapon, more than one kind of grenade and more than one kind of MG in recognition of the need for different capabilities. Why not more than one kind of indirect fire capability?


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## Arius (18 Feb 2008)

We have to remember how the CASW project emerged.  The 60mm was nearing the end of its service life no matter what.  It’s was not serviceable anymore just from the spare parts point of view.  The question then became what would replace it?  A newer 60mm might have been the obvious answer but it’s not how DLR works.  They need to ask:  What is the target? What is the distance? How is it protected? What is the effect?  They end up with a matrix and they put all the various weapons systems and munitions effects in there and it becomes a numbers affair.

The range might have been an issue but they found that the 2 km mark the max distance of engagements at coy level except for anecdotal evidence for the 25mm.  The 60mm was found to be firing more than 90% of the time at a max range of 800m and with a line of sight to the target - And that was a big blow.  Put it an error area of 90m X 200m at 2000m versus 100m for a 777 at 20km with some doctrine commitment that we won’t deploy without arty/cas support and you have an almost impossible sell.  The other thing was that 2/3 of ammo expenditure is smoke and illum.  A CG84 smoke round produces 3 times the volume and similar illum than a 60mm.  At this point we almost get no reasons not to just take out the 60mm and not replace it.

The need for fast and precise suppression out to 2000m and effects in complex terrain is what it came down to.  With a +600% suppression rate over the 60mm, the AGL came on top (6 offensive platoon being taken out in the time it take the light mortar to suppress 1).  More number crunching and studies by our brainiacs in our Research Facilities and the 40mm  with airburst capability came on top.

Hard certified data trumps personal anecdotes all the time when you spend the tax payers money and with nothing to challenge its data, the CASW plodded forward.

Operational research just doesn’t support other options than the CASW right now.  How to long-term sustain it is through National Procurement and there is a cap on this.  You cannot spend more NP money when you bring something into service.  Between the CG84 ammo and the CASW there was little use left for the 60 and its NP funding was set aside for them.

That being said…  If we find that we absolutely need a light mortar in theatre after the intro of the CASW and CG84 ammo we can draft an unforeseen operational requirement, bypass the process, and get a top of the line light mortar sent into theatre in no-time and have the separate ops budget to finance it.  A bit underhanded but feasible.  I can see a few tactical scenarios where I would like to have a light mortar section at my disposal but they are very specific.  We would need to consistently start to operate outside the big guns indirect umbrella to justify the return of the mortar in infantry units.  By then we could try to get some NP offset from the torpedoes of the navy.  I wish we could have the “Arms Room” concept like the SOF people but we can’t atm.


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## vonGarvin (18 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> We have to remember how the CASW project emerged.  The 60mm was nearing the end of its service life no matter what.  It’s was not serviceable anymore just from the spare parts point of view.  The question then became what would replace it?  A newer 60mm might have been the obvious answer but it’s not how DLR works....ma
> 
> _Remainder deleted in the interest of brevity_



It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.

Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).   
Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.  
Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.


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## McG (18 Feb 2008)

The name calling can stop.

Cheers,
The Staff


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## vonGarvin (18 Feb 2008)

Noted.  However, I stand by my post.  In my opinion, decisions are being made that could have the potential to cost lives (in the worst case).  I have had personal discussions with person(s) from DLR on this very issue, and I was holding back.  The decisions being made are, in my opinion, short-sighted and faulty in logic.  I have many qualifications and experiences to back up my opinions, as well as the many battlefield experiences of others.   


I fully accept the DS position; however, I refuse to alter my post and I will gladly accept any consequences for my actions in this regard.

Thank you.


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## Nfld Sapper (18 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.
> 
> Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).
> Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.
> Having said that, *have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.*  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  *It might be worth it.*



Maybe you should write a proposal for it.


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## vonGarvin (18 Feb 2008)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Maybe you should write a proposal for it.



Maybe I should.  I think that a CASW type weapon, on a stablised mount on a T-LAV (or whatever) with an RWS would be a nice addition to a non-LAV subunit.


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## Nfld Sapper (18 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Maybe I should.  I think that a CASW type weapon, on a stablised mount on a T-LAV (or whatever) with an RWS would be a nice addition to a non-LAV subunit.



You do that and I will come drive the T-LAV for you


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## McG (18 Feb 2008)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> Not a big deal for someone to carry three or four mortar bombs.  ...  Now 40mm grenades come in 32 round belts.  ...  So you are looking at a minimum load of 32 rounds, and you probably want them in a box, right?  So you are looking an ammo can the size of 2 to 2.5 .50 cal cans end to end, all up weight in the 20 kg range.


If we can tactically carry mortar bombs out of the box, then why not have a tactical way of carrying 40 mm for dismounted ops (maybe something along the lines of the cloth ammo bags for MGs?).  If we get the weapon, you can expect that we'll also nationalize the ammunition production at GDOTS in Montreal.  Given that, we could also have belts built to our preferred lengths.



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Perhaps a comparison of the CASW vs. ... the M 242 would be more relevant?


The Bushmaster is not dismountable, so there is a clear problem in that comparison.  You'd do better to compare against the XM307 & XM312.  The project has stalled in the US, but that does not mean Canada could not buy in.



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.


The CASW crowed tells us that CASW will be high & low trajectory.



			
				Arius said:
			
		

> What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.


By doctrine, firepower is used to destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy.  I'd suggest disrupt is another useful function.  If light mortars are achieving all the effects less destroy, then it would certainly seem they have proven themselves.  Sometimes, all it takes is a few rounds of illum to silence enemy guns & send him hiding (because he knows what else comes from the tubes which fired the illum).



			
				Arius said:
			
		

> The people in DLR didn’t try to kill the 60mm btw.  It killed itself by underperforming against a lowly Mk19 during trials.


Was this an LFTEU trial or a METC test?  I've read the stuff from DLSE, but that is only a computer sim.  I'm assuming there must have been a real world shoot-off to compare effects of the real world weapon systems.

In any case, reviewing some information presented so far, it seems the man portability of either 60 mm or 40 mm is debatable.  But, I do have a few questions on what we've seen.


 | *M19 60mm*​ | *Mk 47 40mm*​ | *L9A1 51 mm*​ | *Wt Weapon*​ | 20.5 kg | 41 kg | 6.275 kg | *HE Proj*​ | M720 | M383 | ?? | *Wt HE Proj*​ | 1.7 kg | 0.340 kg | 0.920 kg | *Shot per fire msn*​ | 18 | 24 | 20-22? | *Wt Ammo per fire msn*​ | 30.6 kg | 8.16 kg | 18.4 kg - 20.24 kg ? | *Total Wt, 1 x fire msn*​ | 51.1 kg | 49.16 kg | 24.675 kg - 26.515 kg ? | *Total Wt, 2 x fire msn*​ | 81.7 kg | 57.32 kg | 33.075 kg - 46.755 kg ? | 


Do the mortar weights include bi-pod & base plate?
Does the Mk 19 weight include FCS & batteries of the CASW?
Does the 40 mm weight include the link?
How many mortars are required to achieve a suppressive rate of fire?
How many soldiers currently share the load of carrying mortar & ammo?  If ammo is spread over the whole Pl/Coy is it going to be available to the weapon when it is needed?
How many fire missions need to be carried at the Pl & Coy level?



			
				Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> MCG -- well -- if I wanted to work a wall that ol' mohammed was hiding behind the Mk19 with the HV HEDP would be ideal.


I'd rather hit it with a Carl firing a HESH type round (or better a thermoberic).


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## vonGarvin (19 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> The Bushmaster is not dismountable, so there is a clear problem in that comparison.  You'd do better to compare against the XM307 & XM312.  The project has stalled in the US, but that does not mean Canada could not buy in.



Actually, I was thinking in terms of weapon's effect vice portability.  From what I've read, the CASW is not that portable.  Dismountable, yes, but not portable (think .50 cal with tripod and ammo.  Can't get too far with that too quickly).  Though firing the M 242 is not really practicable NLOS, I think to the old methods of indirect shoots (semi-indirect?) with tan[/pre]


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## Arius (19 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.
> 
> Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).
> Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.
> Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.




Can't really let you get away with this...


*It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.*

Probably more common than you would like to assume.  They invite guys back from ops all the time so they can debrief them and orient the future projects.  They will even pay TD and hotel if you are really good and have decent tactical insight.  Stop by the St-Laurent building in Hull and tell them how they suck when you get a chance.  After they are done chuckling they will buy you a coffee and explain things to you.  Maybe you will have something to contribute that they don’t know yet.

*Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?*

I would say in an already packed vehicle in a soft tactical container and then carried for a short distance to the firing position.  I don’t expect it to be strapped on somebody’s back for long periods of time.  Nobody does.

*Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?*

I fully expect the 25mm to be used if it’s the best way to go about it.  The AGL would probably be used in situation or location where it is the best option.  Maybe FOBs or overwatch in built up areas and such.  I see it mainly as static defensive weapon with great observation capabilities for any unit that may need it.  Defense of gun positions and airfields are valid options I think. 

*(Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).*

Please be specific if you think you know what you are talking about.  There it is:
http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/CID/Project-Home_e.asp
CASW project number is 00000562.  Look into uploaded documents for the SOR.

*Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.*

I did, its on TITAN.  All the way back to Op Medusa.

*It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.*

Never said it was 1/3-1/3-1/3.  But smoke and illum still make roughly 2/3 of overall 60mm consumption.

*Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.*

I’m fairly confident of my looks and “operational” credentials so personal attacks like that don’t bother me.  Being in Petawawa, a posting in Darfur or being in exchange with the Brits doesn’t make you a tactical God whose words are beyond questioning – Far from it.  Punching your ticket in Ottawa is not shameful as it makes you understand how real influence and money flows in the CF and how you can bring about real changes.  I try to explain some of it at times so we can have a bit of an educated discussion.  Sorry you don’t fucking get but trying to pass yourself as the only true defender of the Infantry is laughable.

*You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.*

The only thing that would surprise me at this point is you stopping to use caps aimlessly like a 12 year old.  “They” are the troops I guess.  “They” have to say what they need or want and their leadership needs to articulate it so that it can be acted upon.  So far, the XIAB is the forum through which “They” express themselves and they endorsed the CASW over the 60mm on the 14 Nov 07.

I was not convinced either the first time I heard about the CASW.  There is some tactical value from the programmable airburst and the AGL overall is not a bad concept.  I don’t think it is a miracle weapon but I would bet that we won’t bother with the C6 SF and the .50 cal once we get it and it will at least fill these roles plus 80% of the 60mm.  I may be wrong but I think it’s worth a try.

*Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.    Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.*

Baseless condescending comments don’t add to your dismal credibility.  The RWS project is a few cubicles down and I talk with them on a regular basis as with Rheinmetall and Bofors reps among others.  The requirements of the RWS haven’t specified the type of weapon that will eventually go on it.  Big factors like the weight of the turret, the commonality, the feeding and stowage of ammunition are still being debated and will influence the weapon type.  It could be a twin AGL/C6 or a med velocity 25mm airburst or anything around that.


There you go.  Hope we're even.


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## McG (19 Feb 2008)

Now that everyone has had a chance to vent, lets bring the conduct, tone and content and  back to an acceptable level. The freebies are over.

Cheers,
The Staff


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## Infanteer (19 Feb 2008)

15 Love.  As MCG said, let's get back to the issues and not personality.

Arius, as you are obviously in a position to know, my original questions still stand.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I've humped the 60 before; used it in both the Platoon dismounted role (Platoon commander's hip-pocket indirect fire) and the Company dismounted role (Coy "Mortar Group" of 3-4 tubes) - granted, not on a two-way range.  I'm also a former machine-gunner, and since the 40mm-AGL is essentially a large machine gun with specialized ammo, I think this comes into play.
> 
> 1.  Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.
> 
> ...



As I said, this seems to be like the MBT/MGS debate.  Why has the AGL/Mortar debate become an "either/or" argument?  I think a 40mm AGL is a "nice to have", but not at the expense of a light mortar - the questions above highlight why I hold this conclusion.


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## vonGarvin (19 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Please be specific if you think you know what you are talking about.  There it is:
> http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/CID/Project-Home_e.asp
> CASW project number is 00000562.  Look into uploaded documents for the SOR.



I'm not sure if that is available on the internet vice DIN.  Hence my vagueness in referring to it.  From the URL, it appears as though it is DIN only, so I shan't get more specific.


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## daftandbarmy (20 Feb 2008)

"The soldier cannot be a fighter and a pack animal at one and the same time, any more than a field piece can be a gun and a supply vehicle combined." -- (J.F.C. Fuller to S.L.A. Marshall, 1948)

The weight issue is always a significant one for the infantry. As it's so unwieldy, it's clear that the CASW is meant for mechanized/ mounted operations, which seems to support the current doctrine for most of our forces.  The light mortar, as seen with British Forces, supports a doctrine which supports the orbat and vehicle/ weapon systems to support dismounted unit operations. As we've seen, this includes a light mortar. 

As Canada seems to be destined to stick with tanks and (increasingly) heavily armoured infantry, that will stay close to the road networks and associated indirect fire and combat service support channels, a 40mm AGL might be the right way to go for at least 2/3rds of our infantry units. 

Regardless, this does not, as mentioned earlier by Arius, preclude us from pushing through a UOR for a new light mortar that will better meet the needs of our infantry during the various dismounted operations undertaken now, and into the future. We should have a weapon like this for use by the one light battalion in each of our regiments (the other 1/3 of our infantry), CSOR and any other similar dismounted units who are unlikely to be able to man pack a 50 cal or AGL.


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## Arius (20 Feb 2008)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 15 Love.  As MCG said, let's get back to the issues and not personality.
> 
> Arius, as you are obviously in a position to know, my original questions still stand.
> 
> As I said, this seems to be like the MBT/MGS debate.  Why has the AGL/Mortar debate become an "either/or" argument?  I think a 40mm AGL is a "nice to have", but not at the expense of a light mortar - the questions above highlight why I hold this conclusion.



_*Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.*_

Doctrine has a hard time in the CF and in the Army in particular.  It should get directions from strategic thinkers and drive equipment acquisition but it doesn’t happen that way.  Without the strategists – political or military – painting us a decent picture of the battlefield where they will commit us 10 years down the road it is impossible for the doctrine people to come up with the requirements for the hardware.  We then have the equipment people trying to meet needs or replace stuff without a clear long term vision.  That’s why we have 3 types of RWS in service, unsustainable vehicles in theatre and fast-tracking of tanks and airplanes.  Over-simplified a bit but not far from the truth.  There is no hard doctrine for the AGL but there is enough of a consensus in favour of its potential to keep moving it forward.  Your post and the discussion we have here are probably the seeds of that doctrinal employment.

_*If our Infantry Companies are mounted in the LAVIII, they have an exceptional 25mm stabilized turret.  I can't see a AGL being mounted on the pintle due to its size and due to the fact that it will compete with (and lose to) the 25mm for ammo storage.*_

True for the LAVIII as we know it now.  The AGL/CASW can be adapted to an M3 pintle if needed but we are most likely to have it mounted in a RWS in the next fleet of vehicles.  The RWS and the weapon(s) that will go on it are another ball game.  For discussion sake, the RWS come with their own FCS so if you only put the AGL part of the CASW into it, it’s not a CASW anymore.  I don’t see the RWS people buying the full CASW but only the AGL if they go for a 40mm solution..

_*So are we going to have this big AGL in the back of a LAV to pull out if we need to lob a few rounds high angle to hit a target that the 25mm cannot punch?  Considering this is a tripod mounted weapon with a sophisticated fire control system, due you think that a mechanized platoon or company rolling along is going to have the time to employ this?  Manpower, along with space, also becomes an issue; two men can easily employ a mortar and pack it up and revert to riflemen by slinging the 60 onto their back in minimal time - an AGL takes three guys out of the picture.*_

Are we rolling in through the objective or cordoning it off and destroying in place?  For the first scenario, I think the the CASW is a very deliberate weapon and that it will not compete with readily available direct fire weapons, be it 120mm or 25mm, unless you need that capability in a location a turreted vehicle cannot reach.  I would also expect that we will consider using the Carl Gustaf airburst ammo before we think about breaking out the CASW for its airburst capabilities.  Direct and airburst fire are faster to bring to bear effectively and more precise than indirect so for me indirect is a last option.  I would personally prefer using the artillery to reach a non-line-of-sight-target.  Full MET data allows a M777 to hit within 100m at 20km and correct within 50m on the subsequent shot.  That’s the weapon of choice imho.  If this is not available, I would like to have my dreamland 120mm mortars from battalion (Nevermind the CASW/60mm polemic – I believe in the need for integral, modern, fast-firing, high lethality, PGM-enabled, heavy mortars in infantry units).  No big indirect and no CAS available?  We should know in advance I hope.  We then break out the CASW within range and plug in the computer the likely grids from which we will correct fire – or fire and walk the rounds to the target.  I would deploy a CASW before rolling in if possible.  Would a CASW deploy as fast as a handheld light mortar?  Of course not but bringing the target under constant effective fire is the key here - Constant fire with a handheld is difficult.  Against a light mortar with bipod and baseplate that need one or two bedding shots?  The CASW will deploy and pepper the target effectively faster.  Second scenario is no contest I believe as I see it as a cut-off or support weapon on a known target.  The direct, airburst, high angle, IR observation combination almost nullifies the concept of cover and dead ground.  But it needs to be a deliberate well thought out deployment of the weapon. 

_*Okay, how about a dismounted platoon or company?  An AGL is huge; looking at the pictures, the .50 cal was very unpleasant to hump in the dismounted role (thankfully, something I never had to do).  If we got a patrol moving through the mountains or jungle, you want them to hump this thing?*_

No.  In fact, I don’t want anybody to carry anything that deliver an effect on the target that can be achieved from another remote/long-range weapon system.  Be it close air support or long range artillery.  The current infantryman is grossly overloaded even with just his basic load.  I humped 105lbs of kit at 5000m altitude in 35 degree heat without carrying any crew served ammo – It is demented.  We lose guys from dehydration before getting to the start line these days.  I cringe whenever we talk about new personal kit with improved armor or that require batteries.

_*And the ammo?  Ever played with a can of 25mm rounds or a bandoleer of 40mm grenades?  Very awkward and very heavy.*_

Yes and yes.  No arguments there.

_*Mortar bombs are fairly light and easy to break down within the company.*_

Maybe but we now get back to the discussion about total weight per fire mission…

_*Conversely, a broken down 40mm belt is awkward and heavy (the link is the real killer in the heavier rounds) and, as with any machine-gun, continually breaking and relinking is liable to cause damage to the link and increase your rate of stoppages and misfeeds.  Having fumbled around with 25mm link, I can only imagine how un-fun 40mm link must be.*_

The coupling often gets sheared when you de-link and you need a special pliers-type tool to relink.  A soft pack can be easily designed to avoid the awkwardness of the box.  But you still look at a 30-40 pounder bag.

_*To be honest, I don't really see a dismounted role for this thing.*_

It’s not an easily man portable weapon that’s for sure.  The question is the type of dismounted operation, how far, what effect, etc.  Long-range patrol?  Forget it.  Urban ops?  I can see some use.  Overwatch/op day/night?  Definitely.

_*The most likely method of employment will be on the LPV (RG-31), attached to the remote weapon station.  This is similar to how the Americans employ their AGLs - in a mix with .50 cal M2's on Humvees and other light vehicles.  This is great, and is a "nice to have" that I'd like to see.  However, as others have said, this is apples and oranges.  An AGL mounted on a remote weapon station does not seem to be a replacement for a lightweight mortar tube.  Is this relatively narrow method of employment really a good justification to do away with a weapon system like a 60mm mortar which is quite versatile?*_

I understand the first part but RWS and CASW are two very different things right now and they shouldn’t mix.  For the last sentence we could flip it around a bit and ask ourselves:  Is a 60mm as versatile as a CASW and CG84 with new AB/Smoke/Illum?  Because that’s what the financial offset of the light mortar buys.  Vesatility+effect on the target may not be in favour of the 60mm at the moment.

_*Has any consideration been given to the fact that we are putting our Infantry "indirect fire" eggs into a very sophisticated basket.  To achieve the results that the studies of your program lays out, the AGL requires a sophisticated fire-control system and programmable ammunition.*_

Back up is the reflex sight or flipping up the iron sight for direct fire.  Airburst rounds are dependent on the laser and computer combo but will detonate as normal rounds if the computer fails.  Indirect is just going into super-elevation and watching the fall of shot - The computer is for first shot accuracy and registering of target.  I will mention that ballistic tables with fixed ranges/elevation should be included with the mount.

_*Having worked with all things sophisticated in the infantry (radios, sat phones, MNVGs, WES-gear, etc, etc) I can tell you that a safe maxim is "the more complicated a thing is, the more chances there are for it to break down when you really need it" or, more simply, Murphy's Law.*_

95% RAMD/14 days per weapon system is the minimum requirement.  It is as reliable as it gets.  Optics and computer have no moving parts.  The actuator that keeps the sight on target is the only moving part outside the weapon.  If all of those fail you can still go for reflex/iron sights.  Murphy is most likely hiding in forgetting to change the batteries and its not a weapon issue.

_*As another person mentioned, the idea of tube, pin and trigger with simple bomb is pretty foolproof.  The 60mm mortar has been much improved over the years - it's a bit unfair to compare it to the one we use today.  That's like comparing a modern assault rifle to an Enfield - not even, as the 60mm is a mortar tube and the 40mm AGL is essentially a machine-gun.*_
Yes, no, maybe.  The simplicity of the mortar tubes is beyond question.  The effectiveness of mortars are dependent on accurate data bringing the rounds on target.  The smaller the rounds, the more accuracy you need.  Even a modern Soltam or Viktor will have an error area of 90x200m at 2000m on the first few rounds.  Granted, things get better after bedding and   MAPAM-type  rounds would help but they would still lose out for the speed of suppression with line of sight under 2000m.

_*Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?*_

Because a modern option was considered and lost out against the CASW/CG84 combo.  Why not consider a new 120mm mortar instead and sort out the doctrine for the infantry?

_*All in all, I remain unconvinced that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run" - I've looked at the presentations and the studies and there are big holes that lead to questions - questions that have been asked here.  This whole thing reminds me of the Mobile Gun System/Main Battle Tank debate that plagued the Armoured Corps a few years back.  The MGS had some value (The Americans employ them today), but was not a tank.  We wasted time and money and did a nice pirouette and ended up with an MBT.  Until I see these questions answered, I remain unconvinced that a jacked-up machine gun, while nice to have, can take over an indirect suppressive role from a mortar.  Something else is at play here.*_

I would be less likely to support the CASW if we had solid data for the 60mm.  Anecdotal evidence are ok as a starting point but they cannot be used to justify doctrine or spending.  For each anecdote where we praise the 60mm you get the other one where a ranged 60mm failed to get that guy in the open and he ran away scratch free after 15 rounds around him.  If we had smelted the little guy in the 70s I’m not sure we would miss it today.  As for the very specific scenarios, where we would patrol the jungles of Burma 50km from a fire base and require mortar support, we can go and UOR something.  I’m not crazy about the 60mm because I feel it’s underpowered.  The very least I would lconsider would be a portable 81mm at company level with some PGM.  I don’t think there is a anti-60 conspiracy.  It just too hard to sell atm.


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## Matt_Fisher (20 Feb 2008)

I'm curious if during the evaluation between the number of rounds on target to achieve desired effects took into consideration some of the advancements that is going on with respect to 60mm mortar munitions.
The M224 mortar (which the Marine Corps is obtaining new ultra-lightweight 10lbs tubes and lightweight baseplates for) has a multi-option fuse; M720A1 HE mortar bomb with the M734 Multioption Fuze which allows for airburst, giving the mortar more lethality than just surface impact bombs.
JUNGHANS Feinwerktechnik GmbH & Co. KG have available the Optical Mortar Proximity Fuze PX581 which allows for airburst capability, again increasing lethality of the 60mm mortar platform.  
Additionally, DARPA and BAE Systems are developing an Optically Directed Advanced Munition (ODAM), which can provide a high degree of first round accuracy, whether fired line of sight and guided by the firing party, or guided through forward observers.  As well as the precision guided capability, the program is hoping to achieve much larger terminal effects (comparable to 105mm HE artillery shells) than what the current 60mm bomb provides.  Wow... a 60mm that packs the wollop of a 105mm?  Talk about 'more bang for the buck'.  Given that we're reliant on airlifting everything to the current theatre of operations, that sounds like a logisticians dream in terms of lessening the supply train.
This to me seems like it would greatly reduce ammunition expenditures needed for the 60mm to achieve effects on target (making it competitive with CASW in terms of ammunition expenditures), as well as have excellent potential to tie into future programs such as Integrated Soldier System Platform to provide effective indirect fires, with a much lighter weight platform (viably manportable in both light and mech infantry contexts) than a 40mm AGL/GMG CASW.


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## Infanteer (20 Feb 2008)

Arius, thanks for taking the time to respond to my questions in detail.  Some thoughts on the responses:



			
				Arius said:
			
		

> Without the strategists – political or military – painting us a decent picture of the battlefield where they will commit us 10 years down the road it is impossible for the doctrine people to come up with the requirements for the hardware.  We then have the equipment people trying to meet needs or replace stuff without a clear long term vision.  That’s why we have 3 types of RWS in service, unsustainable vehicles in theatre and fast-tracking of tanks and airplanes.  Over-simplified a bit but not far from the truth.  There is no hard doctrine for the AGL but there is enough of a consensus in favour of its potential to keep moving it forward.  Your post and the discussion we have here are probably the seeds of that doctrinal employment.



Ack - agreed.



> If this is not available, I would like to have my dreamland 120mm mortars from battalion (Nevermind the CASW/60mm polemic – I believe in the need for integral, modern, fast-firing, high lethality, PGM-enabled, heavy mortars in infantry units).



Ack - vehicle mounted like the AMOS?  Perhaps - the Marine Corps "Triad of Fires" seems to be a solid artillery concept.  However, this is above the level of discussion we are looking at; this stuff may not always be available to a company or platoon needing some suppressive "hip pocket" support.



> Would a CASW deploy as fast as a handheld light mortar?  Of course not but bringing the target under constant effective fire is the key here - Constant fire with a handheld is difficult.  Against a light mortar with bipod and baseplate that need one or two bedding shots?  The CASW will deploy and pepper the target effectively faster.  Second scenario is no contest I believe as I see it as a cut-off or support weapon on a known target.  The direct, airburst, high angle, IR observation combination almost nullifies the concept of cover and dead ground.  But it needs to be a deliberate well thought out deployment of the weapon.



Ack - not a man-packed weapon system and one that requires deliberate well thought-out employment.  Nothing wrong with this per se (you could give this definition to a M777) but do we want to lose a man-packable, platoon level system to get it when, as you said earlier, higher-level assets like arty could deliver the effects of deliberate, well thought-out employment?  I am going out on a limb here in assuming that a CASW, like most other platoon/company weapons in the vault, should be something that can be employed quite quickly.



> No.  In fact, I don’t want anybody to carry anything that deliver an effect on the target that can be achieved from another remote/long-range weapon system.  Be it close air support or long range artillery.  The current infantryman is grossly overloaded even with just his basic load.  I humped 105lbs of kit at 5000m altitude in 35 degree heat without carrying any crew served ammo – It is demented.  We lose guys from dehydration before getting to the start line these days.  I cringe whenever we talk about new personal kit with improved armor or that require batteries.



Agreed, especially with your last sentence.  But would it not be prudent to maintain a suppressive capability that can be packed - preferably a lighter, modern one as Matt Fisher alluded to above?  Stripping a small unit of something because we have remote/long-range weapon systems on hand seems awfully dangerous - reminds me of Anaconda and those American's pinned down for lack of their inorganic support.



> For the last sentence we could flip it around a bit and ask ourselves:  Is a 60mm as versatile as a CASW and CG84 with new AB/Smoke/Illum?  Because that’s what the financial offset of the light mortar buys.  Vesatility+effect on the target may not be in favour of the 60mm at the moment.



I guess a question of versatility is "where can I employ it?"  We've acknowledged above that the 40mm AGL CASW is largely static and requires prep time and somewhat of a heavier logistics tail to support it (a vehicle to move the hard case and the 40-pound ammo bags around).  What good is rate of fire and time onto target if you can't get the thing where it needs to be ASAP?



> 95% RAMD/14 days per weapon system is the minimum requirement.  It is as reliable as it gets.  Optics and computer have no moving parts.  The actuator that keeps the sight on target is the only moving part outside the weapon.  If all of those fail you can still go for reflex/iron sights.  Murphy is most likely hiding in forgetting to change the batteries and its not a weapon issue.



That's what the guy who sold us the PLGR said....



> _*Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?*_
> 
> Because a modern option was considered and lost out against the CASW/CG84 combo.  Why not consider a new 120mm mortar instead and sort out the doctrine for the infantry?



Doctrine is another matter, but I guess this is a small attempt to "sort it out" by trying to figure out if this bugger is going to be versatile enough for a company to be more than a fancy "we use it sometimes" kind of thing.  As for larger mortars, they are rather irrelevant, because I can't supply the manpower at the platoon/company level to hump those - they are heavy.

As for the modern option that lost out - right now I'm looking at the Statement of Operational Requirement, the Confirmation of CDR Compliance, and the Limited Objective Experiment 0201 and, as far as I read it, all comparisons use the poor, tired old M19 as opposed to something snazzy like the M224 that Matt Fisher mentioned above.  Am I missing something?



> I would be less likely to support the CASW if we had solid data for the 60mm.  Anecdotal evidence are ok as a starting point but they cannot be used to justify doctrine or spending.  For each anecdote where we praise the 60mm you get the other one where a ranged 60mm failed to get that guy in the open and he ran away scratch free after 15 rounds around him.  If we had smelted the little guy in the 70s I’m not sure we would miss it today.  As for the very specific scenarios, where we would patrol the jungles of Burma 50km from a fire base and require mortar support, we can go and UOR something.  I’m not crazy about the 60mm because I feel it’s underpowered.  The very least I would lconsider would be a portable 81mm at company level with some PGM.  I don’t think there is a anti-60 conspiracy.  It just too hard to sell atm.



Roger.  I'm still leery about this.  Anecdotal evidence aside (we can find tons for both a 40mm AGL and a 60mm mortar) I really wish this "either/or" situation never came about.  The CASW looks like something we should have had 10 years ago - it is a snazzy piece of kit that can provide excellent suppressive fire in some situations - you highlighted the difficulties with portability and speed of employment above.  I would be game for it if I also saw the PASW project, which replaced M19's with M224's and gave the platoon and company commanders that hip-pocket ability when the CASW was packed in it's expensive box in the CQ's truck or down because, of all things, that 95% RAMD/14 days decided to crap out when we needed it.

If this military can get C17's, I'm sure a PASW shouldn't be an problem....

Anyways, good info and discussion.

Cheers.


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## tomahawk6 (20 Feb 2008)

The enemy has mortars and use them to engage coalition forces beyond the range of an AGL. If the infantry company no longer has its mortar section then they must rely on CAS or artillery - if available.
CASW should be shelved and the money for that program should be used to buy modern 60mm or 81mm mortars.


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## Kirkhill (20 Feb 2008)

T6't be

I may be wrong again but I believe we already own 81mms.  We used to. I just don't know what condition the ones we have in stock are in.  The problem seems to be a lack of bodies to man them.

But attaching a 2-3 tube det of 81s to each company, giving a 4-5 km umbrella, as Arius has also suggested, couldn't be a bad idea.  Could it?


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## dapaterson (20 Feb 2008)

When you're PY starved every "little" demand adds up.  Three tubes per coy?  Three men per tube?  Three coys per bn?  Nine Reg F bns?  That will run you 243 PYs, please.  Where do you want to take them from?  The Pioneer platoons?  Already traded those in.  Cut back the engineers?  Slice the artillery?  Eliminate the echelon?


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## daftandbarmy (20 Feb 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> T6't be
> 
> I may be wrong again but I believe we already own 81mms.  We used to. I just don't know what condition the ones we have in stock are in.  The problem seems to be a lack of bodies to man them.
> 
> But attaching a 2-3 tube det of 81s to each company, giving a 4-5 km umbrella, as Arius has also suggested, couldn't be a bad idea.  Could it?



We used to do that alot in 1 PARA. We had a 2 tube det with us most of the time as an SOP, man packed, and all of us simple rifle company mules would carry our two 'greenies' per man. 18 lbs of mortar ammo per person was never too much when you get the firepower 2 x 81s can provide. The MFC stayed with me at all times in Coy HQ too, unlike FOOs and FACs, who could come and go depending on what the  priority was at the time. As a result, our MFC became our main 'go to' guy for most fire planning.


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## Kirkhill (20 Feb 2008)

DAP 

I take your point. In fact I believe I stipulated that I believed that our problem was not a lack of kit but a lack of the necessary personnel.

Cheers.


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## dapaterson (21 Feb 2008)

Kirkhill:  ACK on that.  But there are two distinct issues in fact:  Lack of positions to hold people against, and lack of people.  Or, as has been dubbed in various working groups, chairs, and asses in chairs.  The force structure lays out the chairs; the recruiting and training system gets asses into chairs.  Hopefully the right asses.  Right now we have too many empty chairs, and a large number of asses either standing up or parked in the wrong chairs.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Feb 2008)

Come back the Mortar Platoon, all is forgiven :'(


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## Royal (21 Feb 2008)

"243 PYs" - This number is a little thin.  I am currently working on the issues from a different angle.  I know the costs and have had the back-breif the Mor issues (giving a couple of tubes per Coy).  Cost in 3 guys per tube is a direct fire weapon only, LOS I can see'em and hit them.  Anything more needs to have more pieces, group comd, MFC Line NCO to ensure that every thing is as safe as we can make it, this means the addition of another 6 PY/Coy.

Guess what, 3 tubes is now 15 PYs/Coy x 3 Coy x 9 Bn = 405.  All Infantrymen.  In a LAV Bn there are 390 Infantrymen in three Coys (not including the PRes Augmentation who will not be able to do Mortars) this means that we need another Bn worth of Infantry to man a couple of tubes per Coy.

The CF is capped at 68,000 Reg Force, of which the Inf Bns are capped at 5607 (623 x 9) and we are not there yet.  Even if we had all the PYs for the 623 (which we don't yet) we do not have "asses in chairs".  Evey little position in the Institutional Army (Inf Sch, HQs, RSS, Special tasks, augmentation to Foreign nations, ETC) takes Sgts, WO, MWOs, Capt, Maj, LCols out of the units, leaving holes that need to be filled.  On the bright side, once the 5607 is met in PYs, we will be gin looking at the IA rationalization.


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## tomahawk6 (21 Feb 2008)

Light infantry companies have a 2 tube mortar section and the battalion mortar platoon has 6 81mm mortars.The stryker infantry company has a 2 tube 120mm mortar section.So if you were pressed for manpower you could stand up a battlion level mortar platoon with 6 tubes and attach as necessary to the rifle companies or hold them in general support.


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## McG (21 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Maybe but we now get back to the discussion about total weight per fire mission…


On this I've asked but still don't have an answer yet: How many fire missions are required/recommended at the platoon and company level?  I recognize this difference impacts on things such as re-supply (especially when talking helicopters where weight can be more a factor than bulk).  However, it really becomes an issue for the end user that must haul a basic load (either in tactical vehicles or on human backs).  So, what it the basic load (by # fire msn)?


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## TangoTwoBravo (21 Feb 2008)

As always I will caveat by saying that I am _not _ infantry, although I have gone on exchange with a mortar platoon (81mm) and a heavy guns platoon (Mk19s and HMGs).  

The capability that I see the 60mm mortar giving is the quick and simple provision of suppressive fire support to a platoon during the initial stages of a fire fight.  The intent is not to provide destructive fires that obliterate the enemy.  Those fires will come, but those tend to take some time.  A 60mm mortar lets the platoon commander put down some suppressive fire at relatively close range over obstacles such as walls and high crops while he manoeuvres into place to further define the enemy for more destructive fires later on.

If a group of bad guys are flushed out of a compound by a 60mm mortar and then engaged by other systems where does the 60mm fit into the "metrics" of hard data?  The mortar may not have killed anybody, but it may have been one of the horns of the dilemma created by the platoon commander for the enemy to face.

I would find that the 120mm at battalion level would "compete" with M777 and other high-end fire support pieces.  I don't see the 60mm at platoon level competing with assets that all need higher levels of control and clearance to employ.


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## Arius (21 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> On this I've asked but still don't have an answer yet: How many fire missions are required/recommended at the platoon and company level?  I recognize this difference impacts on things such as re-supply (especially when talking helicopters where weight can be more a factor than bulk).  However, it really becomes an issue for the end user that must haul a basic load (either in tactical vehicles or on human backs).  So, what it the basic load (by # fire msn)?



Basic load would be 3 boxes per guns for a total of 96 rounds.  Fire missions data is trickier and I'm not sure fo what you are asking exactly.  Suppression of platoon on offense would be 24 rounds at 1000m for exemple but at 500m you could put a single round in a guy's chest.  HEDP rounds will punch through 50mm of steel so do you put 5 rounds through that brick wall or use 3 airburst over it to hit the guy behind?  There is a test where 3 normal rounds where fired at a wall and I would have expected good fragmentation on the metal witness plate behind to represent incapacitation but the plate was actually cut in half - Bit of an overkill.  I want to find a good answer but there is no such thing as a standard load per fire mission.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Basic load would be 3 boxes per guns for a total of 96 rounds.  Fire missions data is trickier and I'm not sure fo what you are asking exactly.  Suppression of platoon on offense would be 24 rounds at 1000m for example but at 500m you could put a single round in a guy's chest.  HEDP rounds will punch through 50mm of steel so do you put 5 rounds through that brick wall or use 3 airburst over it to hit the guy behind?  There is a test where 3 normal rounds where fired at a wall and I would have expected good fragmentation on the metal witness plate behind to represent incapacitation but the plate was actually cut in half - Bit of an overkill.  I want to find a good answer but there is no such thing as a standard load per fire mission.



Our mortar geeks used a rule of thumb as follows, if I remember correctly:

3 -5 rounds to get bedded in and on target (varied depending on good/poor observation and bedding in drills and ground conditions)

10 - 12 rounds fire for effect to get you from the attack position to the enmy position

10 - 12 rounds in reserve for 'repeats', depth targets or other stuff

This totalled about 23 - 29 rounds, mix of smoke (WP) and HE, which can be easily carried by two sections (2 rounds per man). So each company got about one and a half to two fire missions each with the first line ammo scales carried by the company troops. Remember, Coy HQ carried ammo too.

This means you could do about three company attacks with your own resources before you had to resupply from the echelon, by which time you'd probably want to change around lead company. The echolon would then re-bomb the 'former' lead company when they went into depth.


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## tomahawk6 (21 Feb 2008)

Daft, with PGM for mortars you can be on target with 1-2 rounds .


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## daftandbarmy (21 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Daft, with PGM for mortars you can be on target with 1-2 rounds .



Oh man, I just got a chubby....


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## McG (21 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Basic load would be 3 boxes per guns for a total of 96 rounds.


So, a 33 kg basic load of ammo (plus link & boxes)... and how does this compare to the 60 mm?




			
				Arius said:
			
		

> I want to find a good answer but there is no such thing as a standard load per fire mission.


My question is based on a comparison from earlier:





> | *M19 60mm*​ | *Mk 47 40mm*​ | *L9A1 51 mm*​ | *Wt Weapon*​ | 20.5 kg | 41 kg | 6.275 kg | *HE Proj*​ | M720 | M383 | ?? | *Wt HE Proj*​ | 1.7 kg | 0.340 kg | 0.920 kg | *Shot per fire msn*​ | 18 | 24 | 20-22? | *Wt Ammo per fire msn*​ | 30.6 kg | 8.16 kg | 18.4 kg - 20.24 kg ? | *Total Wt, 1 x fire msn*​ | 51.1 kg | 49.16 kg | 24.675 kg - 26.515 kg ? | *Total Wt, 2 x fire msn*​ | 81.7 kg | 57.32 kg | 33.075 kg - 46.755 kg ? |


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## Michael OLeary (21 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> Basic load would be 3 boxes per guns for a total of 96 rounds.



What would be the usual mix of ammo natures in these 96 rounds?  One difficulty in selecting ammo for a weapon with a variety of possible rounds is the hazard that you may not have enough of the optimal one(s) for each of its various possible applications when you need them.  If the fall back position, as it often is, is to simply stick with a majority of general purpose rounds like the HEDP, then the effectiveness of the specialized rounds in real-world scenarios starts to become moot.

If the primary case for the weapon is being built on its flexibility of ammunition natures, how do you ensure they are always available to support the argument?

Without that advantage, the gap between an improved 60 and the AGL becomes less so on that particular point.


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## Arius (22 Feb 2008)

Random answers here, it’s late…  PGM is very expensive and wouldn’t fly with our budget as high consumption ammo.  PGM argument would give more weight to a 81-120mm proposal as you deliver more payload for a similar priced guidance system.  Some people with a black budget could probably afford it for the 60 but not the common infantry.  The numbers of 60mm rounds for a fire for effect is debatable.  I haven’t seen these kind of numbers in 3 years with the SA cell and I don’t think they would be supported by research.  The 4 criteria would influence the ammo required.

What about first shot hit at night?  There is video of a Mk47 with thermal engaging 5 targets (wrecks) between 300-700m twice (10 lase/fire engagements) and hitting 100% under a minute – And the CASW is huge leap ahead of the Mk47.  Can a 60mm do this?  Lets not lie to each other here: All engagements with the 60mm are line of sight and 90% are within 800m.  So why advertise ourselves with bedding shot or illumination?  Close Area Suppression be damned, its just an lousy acronym.  Lets take them out with the very first burst.

Most engagements will be with HEDP but if you are uncertain you can load up the AB and use it as a normal round.  The beans counters won’t be happy but so be it.  I figure one box out of 3 would be AB.  AB belts are the ones I would consider breaking.  Maybe in 5 rounds belts to accommodate the “string of pearl” firing option that detonate the 5 in a 25m line or all on the target.  Flipping in those AB would take 3 sec and you wouldn’t have to remove the main HEDP box.  Double feed is not an option on AGLs.

These are very good points to take into consideration.  There will be a user trial where a real section and the people from the infantry school will be given a week or two to hump the beast around and use it in all scenario possible to sort out what works best and what sucks for the Canadian soldier.  A good number of observations from this forum will make their way there.  I’m off to the other side of the pond for a week for related stuff.  I’ll let you know if the beast lives up to some of the expectations mentioned here.

Cheers.


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## vonGarvin (22 Feb 2008)

We shouldn't compared the CASW with the 60.  Apples to shopping carts: both are found in shopping malls, but you don't send your kid to school with a shopping cart.
First round hits, at night, are awesome, and for that a definite niche exists for a CASW-type weapon.  Perhaps in the echelons mounted on an RWS.  For LAV Companies, the first shot hit at night _on the move_ is the specialty of the M 242.  No need for another expensive direct fire weapon in the LAV Coy (IMPO)


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## tomahawk6 (22 Feb 2008)

Can you imagine the ROE for units with the CASW ? They might need to call NDHQ just to be able to fire the damn thing all the while under attack from an enemy with no worries about ROE.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> We shouldn't compared the CASW with the 60.



Especially since it can't fire illum or smoke


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## vonGarvin (22 Feb 2008)

Not only the illum/smoke, which are also good points, but also we should not compare the direct fire, hand held mode of the 60 vs the various firing modes of the CASW.  Just because we choose to not employ the weapon to its full potential is not to fault the weapon, instead, we are to blame if that's what we do.  

But, anyway, the CASW certainly does have a role (IMPO), but it's not with the mechanised infantry.


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## Michael OLeary (22 Feb 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> What about first shot hit at night?  There is video of a Mk47 with thermal engaging 5 targets (wrecks) between 300-700m twice (10 lase/fire engagements) and hitting 100% under a minute – And the CASW is huge leap ahead of the Mk47.  Can a 60mm do this?  *Lets not lie to each other here: All engagements with the 60mm are line of sight and 90% are within 800m. * So why advertise ourselves with bedding shot or illumination?  Close Area Suppression be damned, its just an lousy acronym.  Lets take them out with the very first burst.



We may not be lying to one another, but it would appear that a situated estimate is fine for presenting to those without experience on either type of weapon.

I know you've already said that the idea of comparison to modern 60 mm mortar systems was brushed aside early in the process, but why continue to return to comparing a new AGL to the 50-year old M19 60 mm mortar in the handheld only? (Oh right, because that was our only published doctrinal role.)

If we're going to create an argument to buy a modern AGL technology, let's at least compare it to capabilities of a modern 60 mm system.  Where is the realistic examination of modern 60 mm systems with improved laying and sight capabilities? We could even design a sighting system (mounted or separate from the mortar to minimize shock) that uses a laser to determine range and change of elevation to automatically calculate charge and elevation.  That should be no more complicated than the CLASS sight trialed for the Carl G.

If we assume the AGL won't be man-packed, we can compare it to a similarly weighted 60 mm system with bipod and baseplate.

With a larger baseplate on a 60, bedding in is less of an issue, too many people are stuck on the image of the 60 on its little spade baseplate, or the 81 bedding-in on high elevation and charge.

I've been doing my best to stay out of this thread, but more and more it sounds like the case for the Thomson-Brandt RT-61 in the mid-80s.  If you don't bring in realistic competition, then they desired system wins every time.  And, once you dispense with the need to match a doctrine, since you've told us we don't have an effective _doctrine-weapon system_ approach, it just seems to lack a certain element of balance in the argument.  Now, I'm quite sure there's more information that you can't post here, but the appearance of an incomplete estimate is bothersome.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Feb 2008)

Slightly off track, but I'm wondering if this rationale and process is similar process to the one we used to come up with the Eryx? You know, kind of like: 'there's a cool system that another country uses, so let's situate the estimate so we can get it'.

Oh, and I used a Brandt Mortar in the 80s, without the bipod, on a loaner from the Omani army. Highly impressed. As I recall, one of my guys was dropping bombs through the top of an old APC at about 900m after about 3 or 4 rounds. Me, being an officer of course, took a bit longer but got similar accuracy. The troops loved it so we took it everywhere, used it alot in live firing in the desert in Oman and took it on ambushes at night etc. Great for reaching into wadis and other nooks and crannies. Wonderful illum.

I seem to remember that it was a bit heavier and longer than the old 60mm MOR.


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## tomahawk6 (22 Feb 2008)

This concept must have come from the troops are dumb school of procurement. Mortarmen require alot of practice and skill so lets buy a weapon that can be operated by anyone with machine gun training.  

As an infantry officer I would never even consider replacing my company mortars with an AGL. Its a step backward in capability as it is more akin to the machine gun in how its employed. The range of the mortar excedes that of the AGL. The fragmentation is certainly more lethal as one 60mm shell will create 2000 fragments. The 81mm and 120mm shells will create 5000-7000 fragments but lets leave them out of this discussion.The M224 can fire 120 rounds in 4 minutes. While the rate of fire is lower than with an AGL it is alot more lethal considering the fragments. If your unit is taking enemy rocket or mortar fire you arent going to get them with an AGL. If all you have is your AGL you better hope fire support is available.

The Russian AGL in Chechnya.Fast forward to 3:53.The troops had to run a gauntlet of enemy fire carrying their AGL.

http://russianremote.com/710.html

http://russianremote.com/710.html


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## McG (23 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> We shouldn't compared the CASW with the 60.  ...  Perhaps in the echelons mounted on an RWS.  For LAV Companies, the first shot hit at night _on the move_ is the specialty of the M 242.


To be fair, it is like you, in an effort to save the apple, are trying to turn an appls vs oranges into an oranges vs pears debate.

While the HEI-T is proving to be an adequate people killer, the 25 mm is really a KE system while CASW will be CE.  With the 25 mm, there is nothing of the likes of HEDP (which brings together elements of HEAT and HE Frag).
You cannot dismount the 25 mm (Reply 195)
An AGL in an RWS is not a CASW (Reply 202)
The Bushmaster does not have an airburst capability
The Bushmaster is direct fire, line-of-sight, flat trajectory only



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> No need for another expensive direct fire weapon in the LAV Coy (IMPO)


Maybe, but it has been pointed out that CASW will be both direct & indirect, line-of-sight & non-line-of-sight, and flat trajectory & high trajectory.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> As an infantry officer I would never even consider replacing my company mortars with an AGL. Its a step backward in capability as it is more akin to the machine gun in how its employed. The range of the mortar excedes that of the AGL. The fragmentation is certainly more lethal as one 60mm shell will create 2000 fragments. The 81mm and 120mm shells will create 5000-7000 fragments but lets leave them out of this discussion.


The 81 mm & 120 mm are a distraction from this debate.  Neither one is being considered as an offset to allow for the CASW.  The 120 mm has never been in Canadian service and the 81 mm still is (though no longer with the infantry).  You can talk about these mortars here: http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/22545.0.html 



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> This concept must have come from the troops are dumb school of procurement. Mortarmen require alot of practice and skill so lets buy a weapon that can be operated by anyone with machine gun training.


Maybe it came from a school of thought that msoldiers are smart enough that we shouldn't be limiting them to  a weapon that only does just simple automatic line of sight engagements.   Everything I'm reading tells me that CASW must be more than just an AGL/GMG.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> You know, kind of like: 'there's a cool system that another country uses, so let's situate the estimate so we can get it'.


Many countries have AGLs, but does anybody have a CASW?


----------



## tomahawk6 (23 Feb 2008)

MCG said:


> Many countries have AGLs, but does anybody have a CASW?



I reviewed the CASW web site and saw that two of the systems being evaluated are the US Mk19 and Mk 47. The CASW is a role not a weapon at least as I understand it.

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-casw2.htm
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-casw1.htm


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## Kirkhill (23 Feb 2008)

I note that the CASW, as referenced in the title of this thread is a CLOSE AREA SUPPRESSION Weapon.

What is the clinical definition of SUPPRESSION these days?  IIRC it used to mean force the other guy to keep his head down....not necessarily kill (DESTROY) or render ineffective (NEUTRALIZE).

Also, wrt the PGM aspect, as an AREA weapon isn't a lack of precision an advantage?  One of the knocks against the old Bren/L4 as an LMG, in addition to its poor magazine capacity, was that it was less effective in suppressing the enemy because of its lack of an effective beaten zone. It was too precise.  MGs in indirect mode are expected to create a large beaten zone aren't they?  And this particular MG is chucking airbursting grenades all over a large area creating a storm of many slivers.  Would that not tend to keep heads down?

Finally, to clarify for this fella, CLOSE/Company area: are we talking 800m, as with most Platoon weapons or 2000 m as with other Company Weapons (in other armies) like Javelin (ALAAWS)?


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## tomahawk6 (23 Feb 2008)

I would think you are on track any target engaged from the position out to 2000 meters. I view the AGL as the same role as the heavy machine gun but with a bit more punch maybe. Both weapons saturate the target area and are great in the defense in the attack with some limitations for the AGL.


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## McG (23 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> MCG said:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


CASR is not an official site though.  I'd agree that CASW is a name given to a not-yet specified item of kit that will deliver a specific capability.  However, the conversation in this thread & information on various links (official & not) suggests that 

CASW = AGL + advanced FCS + ground mount for flat & high trajectory fire

I know there are several AGL in service with many nations.  Does any nation have the other two components of CASW?


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## tomahawk6 (23 Feb 2008)

I'd say that Mk 47 does.I have to add that when you add the FCS to the equation you also add weight which limits mobility when used in a dismounted role. In our service these AGL's are vehicle mounted and I havent seen anyone lug one in a dismounted role. I agree the FCS is the key to most of these weapons systems which enhances the basic weapon system.Mortars havent changed much through the decades but technology has added tweaks that make them lighter and more lethal with metals technology that make the rounds more lethal by increasing fragmentation. 

Same is true of the AGL. We first used the Mk19 in Vietnam.Technology has enhanced the lethality of the grenade it fires but has lacked a FCS. The MK47 is a leap ahead by being lighter but the weight saving is offset by a FCS that makes the system alot more effective.





http://www.defense-update.com/products/m/M47striker40.htm


----------



## MedCorps (23 Feb 2008)

Mk 47 --> complete with Mk 108 Tripod and AN/PWG-1 video sight = 90 lbs. 

As you say it limits mobility <smile>

MC


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## tomahawk6 (23 Feb 2008)

MedCorps said:
			
		

> Mk 47 --> complete with Mk 108 Tripod and AN/PWG-1 video sight = 90 lbs.
> 
> As you say it limits mobility <smile>
> 
> MC



The Russians use the AGL without a sophisticated FCS which is certainly more deployable by dismounted infantry.I think when the CF obtains this weapon system it will most likely be in the mounted role where the superior FCS and weight issues arent as important as they are in the dismounted role.

Russian Marines:









Video of the AGS-17 and AGS-30 [Russian AGLs fire 30mm grenade]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QK0pHsoZXug


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## McG (23 Feb 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> What is the clinical definition of SUPPRESSION these days?


... and how many light mortars are required to achieve a suppressive rate of fire?


----------



## tomahawk6 (23 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> ... and how many light mortars are required to achieve a suppressive rate of fire?



Suppressive fires is pretty much the same as its always been - to degrade the effectiveness of enemy fires.

The number of light mortars you need to degrade a target depends I guess on the nature and size of the target. I would say in platoon and company operations one or two 60mm mortars can be a difference maker. A single 60mm mortar can put out 120 rounds in 4 minutes.Each shell can create over 2000 fragments. The larger the mortar obviously the more fragments craeted.An 81mm shell can create over 5000 fragments. Set the fuze to either burst 3 feet above the ground for maximum effect or if they are dug in set to burst on impact.
http://shock.military.com/Shock/videos.do?displayContent=157044


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## daftandbarmy (23 Feb 2008)

Holy cr*p. I would not want to be on the receiving end of that fire misson.


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## vonGarvin (24 Feb 2008)

Never look at a weapon in isolation.  If a platoon needs to suppress something with its own firepower, then consider everything from rifles to Gustavs.  Considering all the weapons in a platoon, the CASW fills no niche.  From the GPMG reaching out beyond 2000 m (SF "Indirect" role...that's no typo.  If you have the DIN, check out the actual figure), to the C7's firing suppressive out to 600 (section level), the platoon packs quite a punch.  Right now, the only weapon that can hit bad guys who don't want to be hit (generally most bad guys) is the 60 mm.  The CASW, as advertised, can hit "some" of those guys with its airburst round.  That's if the computer doesn't fail.  Granted it takes a few minutes to set up the 60, but once done, the only failure would be a catastrophic failure of the rounds in the breech.  
As for training, if we wish to train people to use the CASW, then why not train them to use a mortar in indirect role?  We have that capability right now.  DP 3A teaches (taught at one time, anyway) indirect fire with the GPMG, and the procedure is quite similar.  One "det" commander could calculate data in a similar method.  
I would also argue that a CASW would also require a few minutes to set up.
At the company level, the story is similar, but the ranges are longer.  The CASW has even less to add as part of the LAV company.  Light company, maybe, to supplement the .50.  But given that a vehicle is required to get it into the fight....not very light


But, I digress...


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## KevinB (25 Feb 2008)

Any idiot can use the 60mm on the bipod in indirect -- I ran a tube/det for a demo in '04 -- I simply recorded a aiming point - and gave corrections to my two young Pte's on the tube while I observed the tgt and the mortar was hiding in the pit (okay a bit more involved - but you get the jist).  Using my trusty Vector and MJP's mortar book (I may have forgot one thing for the shoot  :-[ )  it went off no problem (even with a young Pte using drop fire).

 Given a brief (and IMHO inadequate) idea on MFC'ing is on the PSWQ - add a few more days and the guys should have no worries.


----------



## McG (25 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Suppressive fires is pretty much the same as its always been - to degrade the effectiveness of enemy fires.


You are missing a key element: temporary.  Definitions can be found in JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2007): 





> *suppression* - Temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.
> *suppression mission* - A mission to suppress an actual or suspected weapons system for the purpose of degrading its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives at a specific time for a specified duration.
> *suppressive fire* - Fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives, during the conduct of the fire mission.


 and AAP-6(2007) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions: 





> *suppression fire* - Fire that degrades the performance of a target below the level needed to fulfil its mission.  Suppression is usually only effective for the duration of the fire.


but, as has been said: 





			
				Arius said:
			
		

> Close Area Suppression be damned, its just an lousy acronym.  Lets take them out with the very first burst.


So let’s have a look at the whole capability (destroy, suppress, neutralize, disrupt & attrit).



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Never look at a weapon in isolation.


You are absolutely correct.  



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Right now, the only weapon that can hit bad guys who don't want to be hit (generally most bad guys) is the 60 mm.  The CASW, as advertised, can hit "some" of those guys with its airburst round


Which targets will the 60 mm hit that the CASW will miss?  With airburst, CASW will get enemy in trenches, taking cover in a road drainage ditch, or hiding behind a wall.  With high angle fire, CASW will get the enemy lobbing bombs from two blocks over (or so the project has told us in this thread & on the links at the start of this thread).



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> From the GPMG reaching out beyond 2000 m (SF "Indirect" role...that's no typo.  If you have the DIN, check out the actual figure)


You’re only looking at range and not terminal effects here.

 Dismountable capability to defeat light armour at 2000 m – Currently the Pl has nothing to do this; CASW will do it.  (If we get ALAAWS & find ourselves fighting a mech foe, that weapon will be busy looking for heavier targets) 
 Dismountable capability to destroy an advancing platoon at 2000 m -  I’ll accept that C6 can suppress at this range, but I cannot see the one platoon C6 achieving the destroy at this range
 Capability to breach heavy walls at 600 m to 2000 m –  Currently the Pl has nothing to do this; CASW will do it. 
 Dismountable capability to suppress & attrit fortified enemy (~ Pl size) at 2000 m – CASW will do this.  A C6 can suppress, but is unlikely to attrit; a 60 mm mortar would be able to attrit but can it achieve a rate of fire to suppress?  In this instance, one CASW could stand in for two other systems (C6 + 60 mm, or 2 x 60 mm).



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Considering all the weapons in a platoon, the CASW fills no niche.


I can think of at least one.  Lets consider the discussions on these boards about the mechanized infantry company’s in ability to defeat TB holed up in grape huts back in 2006.  It appears to me that a 5 round burst of HEDP  would open a nice hole through which a following 5 rounds of air-burst would suppress & attrit (or destroy) the occupants, and it could do this from ~ 2 km stand-off.


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## vonGarvin (25 Feb 2008)

> You’re only looking at range and not terminal effects here.
> 
> Dismountable capability to defeat light armour at 2000 m – Currently the Pl has nothing to do this; CASW will do it.  (If we get ALAAWS & find ourselves fighting a mech foe, that weapon will be busy looking for heavier targets)
> Dismountable capability to destroy an advancing platoon at 2000 m -  I’ll accept that C6 can suppress at this range, but I cannot see the one platoon C6 achieving the destroy at this range
> ...


Actually, though I didn't mention terminal effects they were front and centre, but I didn't point that out.
For defeating armour at 2000 metres, that's getting into the company's range band of effects.  ALAAWS will indeed help take out stuff that far out, and if it is doing that, then we are fighting an enemy that most likely is not much to worry about (exposing at such a range, but of course, there are always exceptions)
As for destroying an advancing pl at 2000 m, I thought that the "S" in CASW was for "suppression".  The C6 can do it at that range, and beyond. Also remember that platoons now have 2 GPMGs.  
I do have a question re: CASW.  I suspect the answer is "yes", but indirect fire is a capability, no?  (I don't mean "high angle" fire, but the true sense of indirect)
Though heavy wall breaching is good, I doubt that a platoon would have to do such at 2000 m.  600 is also a stretch, though not beyond the realm of the possible.  But at those ranges, it's only accuracy (or lack of it) that keeps a Gustav from doing its job: CE rounds of course do virtually equal damage irrespective of range.
I would argue that a 60 could suppress, albeit for shorter periods of time.  The shock of round hitting in such quick succession, combined with other weapons effects, is what wins battles (eg: moral plane, and stuff like that)

This is interesting; however, I am afraid that the songs of praises of the CASW are being sung in order to situate the estimate, while the praises of the 60 are being drowned.


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## McG (25 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> As for destroying an advancing pl at 2000 m, I thought that the "S" in CASW was for "suppression".  The C6 can do it at that range, and beyond. Also remember that platoons now have 2 GPMGs.


"S = surppression" is a pretty weak argument to dismiss the ability for a single weapon to destroy an enemy platoon.


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## tomahawk6 (25 Feb 2008)

+1 MR.


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## tomahawk6 (25 Feb 2008)

Its not worth debating this topic.


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## McG (25 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> MCG, have you ever been Infantry?


It is my secondary role & I've practiced it enough (usually dismounted) to not be out of my lane here.


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## tomahawk6 (25 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> It is my secondary role & I've practiced it enough (usually dismounted) to not be out of my lane here.



Fair enough. I am surprised by your advocacy for this weapons system with your infantry experience. Would you still support the system if it was going to replace a 25mm gun on 1 LAV in each platoon ?


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## a_majoor (26 Feb 2008)

I note one of the key objections to the CASW program is the weight and bulk of the thing. Perhaps we need to widen the lanes a bit, since there are at least two lightweight designs I am aware of which can provide the physical aspect (hurling grenade munitions). The FCS and high angle mount are the two special ingredients that make it a CASW rather than an AGL, but I would suggest these can be tailored for the actual gun.

The Chinese  QLZ-87 automatic grenade launcher admittedly fires a non standard 35mm round (but the design can be reverse engineered for this thought experiment), and weighs 12 Kg in the "light" configuration (only a bit heavier than a C-6 GPMG) and 20 Kg when mounted on its tripod (but without ammunition). For a light or dismounted infantry unit, the weapon would probably be used as a AGL for the vast majority of actions, and only mated to the tripod and FCS for deliberate attacks or in the defense (which seems to be the argument the program manager is using anyway). The downside to this option is no Western company makes anything like this to my knowledge. The weight and bulk of the ammunition will be an issue regardless of the role it is used in. An evolved semi automatic version also exists which is even lighter, but no longer has the ability to suppress area targets with volume of fire.

The other weapon which might fit the bill is the ST Engineering LWAGL, which weighs 19kg and is much smaller and narrower than the competition. Unlike the Chinese weapon, it seems to be able to only fire from a tripod, but a two man crew could man pack it with greater ease than more conventional AGL's. Once again, ammunition weight and bulk are issues when employed in the light role. WRT reverse engineering, even the Russian AGS-30 comes in at 30kg with its tripod (a high angle design) and a 29 round drum, so these are not impossible design specifications.

Since tripods (even ones capable of high angle fire) are pretty basic low tech equipment, and we can hope the FCS will gradually shrink as technology improves, lightweight AGL's should be considered to be the "core" of the CASW system, and competitors given some pretty compelling incentives to create a lightweight launcher.


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## McG (26 Feb 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Would you still support the system if it was going to replace a 25mm gun on 1 LAV in each platoon ?


For one LAV & with all the potential promised of CASW (not just of an AGL), probably yes.  I can think of a few occasions where the ability to suppress with air bursting munitions would have killed a few more of the bad guys.  As mentioned in my previous post, I think it could have made a difference in a few grape hut engagements, and I cannot think of a single mounted indirect fire weapon at the company level (C6 & 60 mm both must be dismounted in this role).

That being said, a 40 mm automatic cannon with APFSDS, Frange, HEDP & airburst munition options might be a better option for all the LAV  .... but it would come with its trade offs  ... and, that's a topic for a whole other thread.


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## a_majoor (26 Feb 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> That being said, a 40 mm automatic cannon with APFSDS, Frange, HEDP & airburst munition options might be a better option for all the LAV  .... but it would come with its trade offs  ... and, that's a topic for a whole other thread.



You mean like the CV 90 Fan Page?


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## McG (27 Feb 2008)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> You mean like the CV 90 Fan Page?


Maybe or not.  I’m only commenting on the weapon & not a whole vehicle.


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## vonGarvin (27 Feb 2008)

How about 120 mm HEAT?  I'd rathe that than 40mm "airburst".  Again, no weapon in isolation.


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## McG (27 Feb 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> How about 120 mm HEAT?  I'd rathe that than 40mm "airburst".  Again, no weapon in isolation.


If 120 mm is available then sure, but we all know that is a limited resource.  

.... and HEAT does not have ideal terminal effects for most targets over there.  The type of projectiles I'd prefer as the "average target" killer in TFA are thermoberic, HESH, HEDP then HEAT.  It's unfortunate that HEAT is the only popular 120 mm round in my list.


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## Royal (2 Mar 2008)

The Inf School will be participating in the trials of the selected variant of the CASW in the summer of 08, to determine the method and training to get this into units from IOC to FOC.  And incidentally the Inf sch will be the first unit to get them so that they may be injected into the training.  Not sure yet, but I believe that they will create an instructors course and run through the Sch instrs and the battle school ( couple from each) in the early fall, with the first course-ware delivery to the fall 08/winter 09 courses.  The current plan is to have these deploy with TF 3-09.


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## daftandbarmy (2 Mar 2008)

I trust that the School of Infantry will recommend the addition of a bayonet lug prior to deployment of the weapon system?  ;D


----------



## tomahawk6 (2 Mar 2008)

Sounds like CASW is a done deal.


----------



## Royal (3 Mar 2008)

Seems so.  I just hope that it lives up to its claims and that the ammo guys get all the nature's through in time for delivery.


----------



## McG (3 Mar 2008)

Royal said:
			
		

> I just hope that it lives up to its claims


Same here, and if we are already committed to a specific product then somebody had better already know that it will.


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## KevinB (8 Mar 2008)

I'm pretty sure the HK GMG is the CASW -- but I've been wrong several times before.


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## 421 EME (8 Mar 2008)

They are looking at the US MK47 also, better FCS and the receiver is stronger and will last longer (that's what they tell me).


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## Matt_Fisher (8 Mar 2008)

421 EME said:
			
		

> They are looking at the US MK47 also, better FCS and the receiver is stronger and will last longer (that's what they tell me).



I don't think that Mk47 has the high angle tripod that the HK/Rheinmetall GMG CASW submission though, limiting its long range semi-indirect fire capability though, however I could be wrong.


----------



## 421 EME (8 Mar 2008)

Here is the Program Overview from NAVSEA on the MK47 GMG: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/smallarms/Lambr.pdf

 More info on the MK47: http://www.bellum.nu/armoury/GDMk47.html

Info on the HK GMG: http://www.bellum.nu/armoury/HKGMG.html

I do know that these are 2 of the GMG's that the CF is looking into. If they have made a decision on which one we are getting, I haven't heard anything.


----------



## daftandbarmy (12 Mar 2008)

A good description of how the 'Grenade Machine Gun' can be useful:

British soldier awarded the Military Cross for fighting off 150 Taliban
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3511901.ece 

Military Cross for hero of ambush
A BRITISH soldier who almost single-handedly took on 150 Taliban after he and his 50-man convoy were ambushed in Afghanistan has been awarded the Military Cross. 

Fusilier Damien Hields used his grenade machinegun to destroy seven Taliban positions before his ambushers realised he was their main threat. After peppering his vehicle with bullets, they hit the 24-year-old soldier. He had to be dragged off for treatment by his driver after he tried to continue fighting. 

“Fusilier Hields showed extraordinary courage under intense fire,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Huw James, his commanding officer. “I was astonished at the state of his vehicle. There were so many holes in it, it was like a teabag. The Taliban did everything in their power to neutralise [him] and Fusilier Hields was having none of it. His actions allowed his patrol to come out of the ambush in which they were outnumbered by three or four to one and probably saved a lot of lives.” 

Hields was awarded not only the Military Cross, the third highest award for gallantry, but also the Nato Meritorious Service Medal for his actions, which were part of a Nato operation. 

However, he will not be allowed to wear the Nato award because army rules do not permit soldiers to wear non-British medals - an anomaly that has upset his commanding officer. “We think he has earned this decoration for gallantry and that it is only right that he should be allowed to wear it,” James said. 

Hields was one of 28 Military Crosses announced last week. There were also five Conspicuous Gallantry Crosses, the second highest award after the Victoria Cross. 

From Denby in north Wales, he joined the army at 16 and is married with a four-year-old son. Last summer he was posted with the 1st Battalion, the Royal Welsh to Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. One mission, 100 miles north in Uruzgan province, was to help Dutch troops disrupt the movement of Taliban fighters and drugs smugglers. 

They were on their way back to Kandahar on June 3, driving south in a valley, when the Taliban attacked. One of the Land Rovers hit a landmine and was flipped upside down by the blast. “There were Taliban dug in all around and they started hitting us with AK47s and mortars. We could not see where they were at first.” 

Hields followed the trail of RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades coming towards him and started firing grenades one at a time, trying to home in. “Then I switched to automatic fire,” he said. A grenade machine gun has a box with 32 grenade rounds. “I emptied a box onto that position and you could see all the dust and smoke flying about where they hit. 

“After that no fire came back from that position and I moved on to the next one. One or two rounds until I got onto the target, and switch to automatic and empty the box.” 

Realising that Hields was the main threat to them, the remaining Taliban fighters homed in on him with their RPG7s, Dushka heavy machineguns and Kalash-nikov rifles. Hields was undaunted and continued firing. 

“I got through six boxes in about 15 minutes and we were winning the fight,” he said. “They started it. We were going to finish it.” 

One of the Taliban rounds finally hit home as he was bending down to reload. “I felt a sharp punch in the kidneys on my right side,” he said. “It knocked me into the bottom of the [Land-Rover]. I looked down and saw a hole in my body armour and a bit of blood.” 

Hields was dragged out of the Taliban fire and back about 20 yards where Lance-Corporal Carley Williams, the female medic attached to the troops, had dashed through enemy fire to set up a first aid position. 

“The lads were screaming at me to get into cover,” said Williams, 23, from Llanelli. They saw one round actually pass between my legs.” She was awarded the Joint Commanders’ Commendation for her bravery. 

Hields said: “It turned out the bullet had smashed a rib and gone out of me again without touching any internal organs which was very lucky. It was just a flesh wound really.” 

He and the other wounded were evacuated by helicopter. After treatment and recuperation, Hields was back taking part in operations in Afghanistan in July. “Obviously I’m extremely proud but I’ve got friends still recovering from injuries and it’s them I’m more worried about.”


----------



## vonGarvin (12 Mar 2008)

Good on the Fusilier!

Now, is this a AGL, or a CASW?  The difference has been pointed out several times, so is this post even germane to the discussion?


----------



## Kirkhill (12 Mar 2008)

Likewise WRT the Fusilier AND the L/Cpl.

WRT the Weapon in question:

The GMG (Grenade Machine Gun) was used on Automatic - according to the Fusiliers own testimony.  ERGO we can safely say the device Automatically Launches Grenades and consequently is an Automatic Grenade Launcher or an AGL.

No for the tricky bit.

The Fusilier used the weapon to Neutralize or Destroy, not Suppress (enemy remained Suppressed even after the Fusilier ceased firing), 6 enemy Positions, or Point Targets.  However those Point Targets were within his Area of Operations and his Area of Interest. But the Fusilier was acting as part of a 50 man entity which could be an understrength Company or equally a reinforced Platoon.

So your choices are now Company Area Suppression (Permanent) Weapon, Company Point Neutralization Weapon, Company Point Destruction Weapon, or equally Platoon AS(P)W, PlPNW, PlPDW.

One might equally speculate that since it was handled by a lone Fusilier it is a Fusilier Point Destruction Weapon.

Any way you look at it, it is 6 targets successfully engaged by 6x32 rounds in 15 mins by one Fusilier and one Pl/Coy extricated successfully.  

Nice piece of kit.


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## KevinB (12 Mar 2008)

I think the role of the weapon in the above -- is in keeping with how most of us who have some experience and/or intelligence would see it employed for the most part in the Canadian system -- part of a vehicle EIS. 

Thus my accronym would be CAKK (Covoy Ass-Kicking Kit)   ;D


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## vonGarvin (12 Mar 2008)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> I think the role of the weapon in the above -- is in keeping with how most of us who have some experience and/or intelligence would see it employed for the most part in the Canadian system -- part of a vehicle EIS.
> 
> Thus my accronym would be CAKK (Covoy Ass-Kicking Kit)   ;D


I hate to say it, but +1.  Some mounts could include an RWS on the venerable TLAV, RG 31 or other systems, vice the all singing, all dancing version proposed.


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## rambo123 (12 Mar 2008)

Tahe Close Area Suppression Weapon is new to the Canadian Military but it has been around for a long time in other Nato Armies, but calling the CASW a replacement to the very valuable platoon 60 mm mortar is not a good idea, from what I have read on the CASW it is going to be a direct fire weapon which means you have to see your target to shoot at it. From using the 60 mm mortar myself in the bipod role with the C-2 sight unit, all you need is a bearing and elevation to drop some mean S**t on you enemy before they see you both weapons have a place in the new way they are doing this in the forces, both weapons should stay because they both have an important job to do. Do not do what they did with the .50 cal taking it completely out of the infantry then deciding oh my god we made a mistake and then bringing it back in and having to train new gunners


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## McG (12 Mar 2008)

rambo123 said:
			
		

> from what I have read on the CASW it is going to be a direct fire weapon which means you have to see your target to shoot at it.


So, what you are saying is that you've not read this thread because it has come up a few times that the CASW will be both direct & indirect (one of the things setting it apart from most AGL/GMG).


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## Arius (14 Mar 2008)

In the last few weeks I had the chance to shoot one of the current AGL with the Vingmate FCS.  We can say that the Vingmate was almost custom built on the CASW required specs.  The shooting was with practice rounds and it was hard to figure out the impacts beyond 1200m because of the tracer burnout and the deep snow that would absorb the marker dust.  The accuracy was impressive even with a M3 pintle mount on a vehicle – About the worst situation.  My personal impression is that anything out to 600m would be more likely killed than suppressed with the first burst - No ranging shots needed thanks to the FCS.  Beyond that the weapon still hits the area but it is the gunner’s job to be steady and lase accurately.  Reverse slope targets are easy as you just lase the top of the ridge then aim a meter above.  The trajectory arc of the round almost nullifies the concept of dead ground in normal rolling terrain.  I was pleasantly surprised by the stability of the 40mm HV at long range.  Even with serious crosswinds the deviation is way less than expected.  Indirect may be more precise than anticipated.

At night, you can either use II/IR or use your NVGs with a standard laser designator aligned with the FCS.  You walk the beam to the target, lase and bring it back on target.  Great for maintaining situational awareness and will probably be the preferred way of doing it if pinpoint accuracy is not needed.  There will be an uncooled IR capability on the CASW and their staff will attend STANO trials that are being conducted next months.

No indirect shoot but the module for it is integrated.  Trials for indirect are coming within a few months.  I also attended a demo shoot for the airburst round.  What was special about it was the fact that it was a radio programmable round.  No muzzle coils or contacts in the chamber.  The transmitter sits on a rail and is linked to the FCS and the firing solution is transmitted to the round as it exits the muzzle.  I’m wary of too much technology but it works fine and cannot be jammed or reprogrammed in flight.  Think of it as a Mk285 but programmed in flight instead of in the chamber.

Good feeling overall.  Easy to learn and use.  2 boxes and any soldier can be proficient with it.  The technology feels mature and it is guaranteed that we will be getting the top of the line.  I’m curious to see what the AB round cost will be.      

For those who are wondering, there are possibly three contenders for the CASW and no choice has been made.  We probably won’t know until Jan 09 after all the bidding process.  CASW has been endorsed by the Projet Management Board early this month and is going for the Treasury Board in May – The final step before industry is asked to submit their bids.

Cheers


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## a_majoor (23 Mar 2008)

I am guessing the finalists will be the heavyweight AGL's fitted with high angle tripods and a miniature FCS.

As noted by most of the supporters of the 60mm light mortar, this is far to bulky for Infantry soldiers to use easily in a dismounted role. I also have seen little discussion on terminal effects, for example will a burst of 40mm smoke rounds launched from the CASW have a greater, lesser or equal effect as, say, 3X60mm smoke fired from the company light mortars? How about illumination?

While this may seem like nit-picking, I am a bit uncomfortable with a weapon that realistically can only be used on a RWS or vehicle mount. There will be lots of situations, not only in COIN but in conventional operations where the soldiers need portable firepower. If the weapon is comparable in size and weight to a GPMG (which is possible, I cited 3 examples in an earlier post), then it will have much more utility. If the ammunition has equal or greater terminal effect than a comparable 60mm round, then the amount of ammunition needed is also brought to manageable proportions.

I think you will find a lot more acceptance if the portability issue is addressed.


----------



## daftandbarmy (23 Mar 2008)

A portable CASW is called an M203 

Please let us keep our 60mm mister, pleeeeeeezzzeeeee  ;D


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## McG (23 Mar 2008)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I think you will find a lot more acceptance if the portability issue is addressed.


I agree.  In fact, neither side has done a particularly good job in convincing me of their weapon's portability.  At a certain point, ammunition in fact makes the 60 mm mortar heavier.  The CASW side has done a very good job of arguing this, but not on selling the idea that the ammo required is at or above this level.  The counter for the mortar is that the 60 mm projectile can be carried individually, and so they can be spread around in order to make the 60 mm a more manageable load .... but not a single mortar guy has attempted to define how many projectiles are required.  Do you need sooo many that even spread around they become a burden ... and how much can this load be dispersed & still available to the tube when needed (does no good to have a dozen projectiles carried in a rifle section if the sections are engaged while the mortar is 800 m away)?  



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> I also have seen little discussion on terminal effects,


But terminal effects have been one of the leading arguments in favour of CASW.  We've read that a CASW will destroy 2 x platoons at a total weight of 30% under a 60 mm mortar (comparison repeated here).  We've been told the CASW has a 600% improvement in suppression.  We've even been presented with evidence that should the FCS fail, the AGL underneath can continue to hand out more destruction than other weapons from our current inventory (even with those other weapons considered at an aggregate level).  

Right now, the disconnect seems to be in linking weight with requirement.  Maybe the effects required are such that the ammo carried is less than the point where the CASW starts to become the lighter total weight option, or maybe it is the other way around.  What is the capability (encompassing engagement methods, ranges, targets types, and numbers of engagements) required?  (In answering this, lets avoid the disingenuous argument that S = suppression & nothing greater.  If destruction is required then it is part of the requirement).  Following that, you have to answer what can meet the requirement using either system (number of mortar vs CASW, Total weight of Ammo by system, number of pers to achieve effect, etc).  Without getting to this point, there will be no real discussion & people will only continue to dig in on which ever side of the issue they find the greatest emotional attachment.


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## KevinB (23 Mar 2008)

The issue is also that shoud the fancy dancy FCS fail (and it will) then you have a Direct Fire Machinegun with exploding (or not, since the FCS programs many of them) rounds.

  The Mortar and the CASW are different weapons, with sometime complementary roles and sometimes seperate.

I would like to see the CASW claims for many of it munitions combat trialed - prior to use selling our soul for this system of systems  -- cause I see it failing miserably.


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## Infanteer (23 Mar 2008)

I still think its funny that we are fighting over the two.  If this military could get 4 C-17's in less than 5 years, I see no reason why we can't have a AGL and a light mortar for the infantry; both are things I think all can agree we both need and want.


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## KevinB (23 Mar 2008)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I still think its funny that we are fighting over the two.  If this military could get 4 C-17's in less than 5 years, I see no reason why we can't have a AGL and a light mortar for the infantry; both are things I think all can agree we both need and want.



I would sustitute funny - with extremely sad and unfortunate


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## Arius (26 Mar 2008)

The weight will be an issue for as long as we want to make it.  There has to be a big chunk of steel to absorb the kick of a 40mm HV that flies 2km downrange and we just can’t get around the physics of it no matter how much we wish steel to lighten.  There are light AGLs and the lightest is the LWAG from STK that comes at 50% of the weight for the gun itself.  The drop in accuracy and endurance prevents it from being a contender.  The requirement calls for the whole system plus an ammo box to be broken down into 3 loads of no more than 30kg so that it can be humped for short distances.  At the very worse, I assume that short distance means a few hundred meters from the vehicle to the overwatch/firing position.  The average infantryman is already grossly overloaded with just his normal combat load and plates and he won’t be carrying a CASW or anything else unless it is critical.  CASW will be at its best in a deliberate positioning or static scenario.

Is there going to be a need for a weapon that can deliver a 40mm HV and be truly man-portable?  Will there be a semi-auto 40mm HV gun at some point?  Something like what the Barret did for the .50 cal?  I don’t know.  There are talks to improve the range of the 40mm LV and get into the 40mm Med Velocity.  Checkout the the Mercury HEDP from MEI for more.  I predict that it is where we are going.  LV will go MV with launchers like the MGL-140 for weight and portability.  The HV and Heavy AGLs will remain in their own class.

The RWS with a possible 40mm is another matter entirely and is a totally different project from the CASW which only deals with the dismounted option.  Hopefully, the RWS will integrate the same gun and they will just reprogram the CASW firing tables in the RWS FCS but we’re not there yet.

I understand what Infidel is saying about having both the 60mm and the CASW and the C-17 example.  Here is the geeky side of it.  The problem is the difference between procurement and life-cycle management.  Buying is easy if you don’t have to maintain it.  You just find money in the current fiscal year budget and burn it without having to go through the normal steps of acquisition that would include long-term maintenance, training, ammo stocks, etc.  For the equipment that will be in inventory for the next 20 years, you need to go through the life-cycle hoops and that includes the dreaded National Procurement funding.  NP is the guaranteed recurring budget from year to year that deals with spare parts, ammo, refit, etc.  There is a cap on NP funding.  It doesn’t matter if you have $100M to spend on toys this year, you won’t get the toys if you cannot grab a slice of NP for long-term maintenance.  C17s and tanks are not really projects; They are political buys and they obey their own rules.  Bringing in the CASW meant that the NP offset had to come from somewhere within the army and the NP for the 60mm was the obvious target.  Can’t have both unless we prove that the 60mm is so essential that something else is worth axing on the NP side.  On the other hand, it is easy to UOR a cheap weapon like the 60mm for operations so I wouldn’t worry about troops running out of indirect fire options.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (26 Mar 2008)

If thats the case than I would be more worried about running out of troops to man the options.....


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## MJP (26 Mar 2008)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> If thats the case than I would be more worried about running out of troops to man the options.....



But that is the exact opposite of what several people on here (myself included) have been saying for quite some time.  I rather have more options in my "toolbox" as leader than less.  Having the ability to tailor equipment for a mission or task is much more desirable than just making do with what you have.  I absolutely hate when we try and tie specific weapons or equipment to troops numbers, we don't have nor should we man all weapons systems just for the sake of manning them.  All they are from the LAV/Tank down to individual and crew served weapons are "Tools" that a commander can choose to use or not use.  

Arius thanks for the update.  I think the army/CF in general does a poor job of explaining options that are taken to soldiers.  All we see at the Bn is we are losing yet another weapon system with no rationale given.  Your explanations (and those from  a few other posters), highlight the why for us.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (26 Mar 2008)

MJP said:
			
		

> I absolutely hate when we try and tie specific weapons or equipment to troops numbers, we don't have nor should we man all weapons systems just for the sake of manning them.



Hey, I'm an old Gunner,...one can never have enough indirect.

More tools are always nice, except when they sit in the garage not being used for lack of available time.
Bitching about work-up times now?,... just add a few more weapons, that one see's a few time a year, and throw it into the mix. 

Come on be real, if they do not add troops to go with a new system than something is being relegated.[ or at least the skill set diminished]


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## MJP (26 Mar 2008)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> More tools are always nice, except when they sit in the garage not being used for lack of available time.
> Bitching about work-up times now?,... just add a few more weapons, that one see's a few time a year, and throw it into the mix.
> 
> Come on be real, if they do not add troops to go with a new system than something is being relegated.[ or at least the skill set diminished]



Specific weapons take up very little of the work-up time and they are not a problem to run.  Muscle memory and a good small unit training plan will ensure soldiers are ready for range time.  If you know your going to use the weapon system then you train on it.  No use on doing it if you are not going to use it.  I don't see a problem with a "tool" sitting in the box for a while if it doesn't meet the requirement for the task/mission.

The real killer is getting ready for, waiting for and then going through all your level 2-6 live fires.  Then you add in your non-kenetic scenario based training and you start to get a ton of Exercise creep.  Not to mention all the "DLOC" training done in garrison.

TF3-09 will try and mitigate the long work-up times by not standing up until next Jan(ish).  This puts more of the onus on units to prepare troops through PCF and various weapons ranges so the TF can kick off into it's own training cycle.  If it works it certainly means a lot shorter of a work-up time.  We will see though.

Sorry for the hijack


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## Kirkhill (26 Mar 2008)

If I understand Arius correctly then he seems to also be saying that "training" comes out of the National Procurement budget, or at very least is factored into the Life Cycle costing.

If that is the case then I believe that the Army and I have a similar problem.  I am dealing with putting together a new plant in an environment where labour is scarce and turnover is high.  Also the conditions of service are not the greatest here for the guys on the floor so lets just say we don't get too many Medical School candidates applying.  Traditionally we have been able to tailor processes based on having long-service employees that learned the ins and outs of very complicated processes and how to handle problems with very simple tools.  Alternatively we could rely on one good supervisor to direct the activities of a handful of strong backs.

Now we don't have the strong backs and the supervisors are hard to come by.  Fortunately electric motors can replace most of the strong backs and computers can do some of the supervision.  But we can't eliminate people entirely.  The best we can do is make systems that look after themselves, conduct self-diagnoses and let the guy on the button at 0300 know which part needs to be fed or changed.   Whenever possible we try to make one post look like all the others so that people can be moved around easily. With simple Microsoft-type "Start" instructions then we can start getting useful work out of a newby fairly quickly.  Otherwise we spend 6 months training somebody who immediately shops his resume around as a "trained operator".  No 3 years of guaranteed service for us.  We get what the market supplies with Militia terms of service.

Assuming that this is what the Army is facing as well, if slightly more predictable, I would think that one of the "advantages " of the CASW over the 60mm is that, as has been noted, the CASW is basically a Machine Gun firing a heavy round at superelevation.  Thus anybody familiar with the drills and sights for the C7/C9/C6/M2 shouldn't have much trouble picking up the CASW.  That sight system would be very similar, I believe, to the CLASS system developed by CDC which could be applied to any Direct Fire weapon, including the Carl Gustaf.  One training course would take you from C7 to AGL with iron sights. Another would take you through the same weapons with the FCS.

Meanwhile I seem to recall long discussions both here and in Ducimus about whether normal range safety procedures were necessary for something as simple as the 60mm with the Company Infantry saying procedures necessary for 81s and 155s weren't appropriate for their personal arty.  I am pretty sure that goes back to the issue of training and how much training and what kind of training and who to train - gunners or riflemen.

The CASW may not make a great mortar but I am guessing that it will successfully engage many of the targets that a mortar can.  Meanwhile, in my opinion, it would seem that a better discussion would still be how to get 81s or 120s into the Battalion Support. Leave the OC and CSM responsible ONLY for the training, maintenance and deployment of DF weapons.  Other weapons to be brought in by specialists according to situation and operational need.

Another unwanted 2 cents worth.

Cheers.


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## McG (12 Apr 2008)

You lack a little quality with phone cameras, but here is one potential CASW in a high angle firing position:


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## vonGarvin (13 Apr 2008)

Looks nice.  Doesn't look too portable (eg: where does it fit in the back of a LAV?)
Did they have any with it mounted on a vehicle?


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## Nfld Sapper (13 Apr 2008)

Strap it to the back deck  ;D


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## KevinB (13 Apr 2008)

IIRC - it has a very limited arc when in high angle...

Then you have to unbed it and move the whole kit and kaboodle


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## Arius (30 May 2008)

It’s a done deal.  The Treasury Board has approved the CASW submission on 29 May 2008 without conditions.  This summer, the CASW project will put out a request for proposal to industry in order to buy 304 systems.


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## Kirkhill (30 May 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> .....in order to buy 304 systems.



Say again all after "in order to buy", Over.

2 CASW/Coy = 152 Coys???


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## tank recce (30 May 2008)

The original GWagon 8-car recce troop loadout was 4x GPMG, 2x ATGM, 2x AGL. So. 2 per RegInf coy, + 2 per ResArmd tp = ... ?  ;D

(Yes, I'm being completely facetious. We can barely get AMUs for these things. I really can't see a full-FCS DF/IF weapon going in.)  :


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## blacktriangle (30 May 2008)

Soon we won't have G Wagon's to mount them on Tank Recce!  >


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## vonGarvin (2 Jun 2008)

We've jumped the shark.  Lovely.


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## Arius (2 Jun 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Say again all after "in order to buy", Over.
> 
> 2 CASW/Coy = 152 Coys???



Inf Bn:  144 (4 per coy + some with recce)
Armd Recce:  21
Arty Regt:  42 
GBAD:  12
SVC Bn:  18
CMTC:  18
Inf School:  12
CFSEME:  8
Log Stocks:  29

Total :  304

Tentative, DLFR has the last say on the exact distribution plan.


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## McG (2 Jun 2008)

Is Log Stock = Op Stock in this case, or is the plan to take from units to equip operations?


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## Kirkhill (2 Jun 2008)

Many thanks Arius.

Does that mean that the CASW project was fused with the AGL/ROWS requirement or are all of the systems intended for Ground Mount vice Vehicular Mount?


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## Arius (2 Jun 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> Is Log Stock = Op Stock in this case, or is the plan to take from units to equip operations?



Short answer:  Initially the ops weapons will be from the units.

Long Answer:  In theory each unit would deploy with the CASWs assigned to them.  This is one of the reasons why the numbers were increased from 179 to 304 - To avoid the "whole fleet management" of what is basically a platoon crew-served weapon.  What will most likely happen though is that 20-30 systems will be assigned to the theatre and stay there... Screwing up the distribution plan.  DLFR and DLR don't see eye to eye on this but Ops trump all so DLFR has the final say.  We can't set aside weapons only for operations since there is a need to assign the weapon to a hard UIC to justify all the associated costs (let's not get into the NP discussion) and ops are temporary.  The log/op stock is a % of that number and not a discretionary or contingency lot.  The way to reconcile (or go around) this and assign weapons to missions is to call up the contract option for extra systems and have the Army pay for the guns and FCS through the ops budget.  You need to have the weapons in service first to do that.


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## Arius (2 Jun 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Many thanks Arius.
> 
> Does that mean that the CASW project was fused with the AGL/ROWS requirement or are all of the systems intended for Ground Mount vice Vehicular Mount?



No.  The CASW project is a stand-alone project since it has to integrate the AGL, advanced FCS and thermal imagery in one package specifically to operate as a dismounted system.  Just the power management of the computer-viewer-imagery-actuators is a challenge in itself.

A lot of people would like to see the same gun that will be acquired by the CASW project also be purchased by the RWS project – It would make sense to have only one type of AGL in service.  But its not a given…  Public Works could force the RWS project to go out for bids if the contract is substantial.

If an AGL is chosen as a solution for the RWS, it will be as separate project and contract.  They will buy the RWS AGL, and it will probably come with a basic tripod and reflex sight that will be strapped inside the vehicle in case you need to dismount the gun from the RWS.  The electronic ballistic tables of the RWS could be purchased as a license from the makers of the CASW FCS or it they could develop their own.  This is the only linkage between the CASW and all the RWS initiatives.  I don’t see the RWS going for the airburst capabilities of the CASW since it requires a physical ammo swap from the HEDP.

I just hope we get a twin RWS that can accommodate a two weapons configuration whatever it may be.  If there is an AGL on this we need to have a machine gun with lots of bullets for close quarters and general suppression.  Otherwise we will be burning through even the big box of 96 40mm rounds in no time.

There are some ideas floating around where CASW-type systems would be deployed and operated remotely in area-denial and observation roles.  Ground RWS concepts may be around the corner.


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## Kirkhill (3 Jun 2008)

And again Arius.

Thanks.


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## 421 EME (4 Jun 2008)

Ok so where buying 304 systems, but which one ( HK GMG, MK47, ?????? )


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## McG (4 Jun 2008)

421 EME said:
			
		

> Ok so where buying 304 systems, but which one ( HK GMG, MK47, ?????? )


You'll have to wait for the competitive process to decide that.  There are restrictions on sole-sourcing that prevent us from just selecting brand X.



			
				Arius said:
			
		

> We can't set aside weapons only for operations since there is a need to assign the weapon to a hard UIC to justify all the associated costs (let's not get into the NP discussion) and ops are temporary.


That is unfortunate.  I guess this is a restriction unique to weapons as I am aware of other capital purchases that procured specific log & ops stock systems (though Kabul day predicted scales for 2 lines of operations have turned out to be lower than what we want in Kandahar alone today).


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## McG (11 Jun 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> The Army also wants to ensure the grenade launchers can be mounted and operated from a remote weapons station on its vehicles.


 ... interesting disagreement with the view we've been told the CASW project has of the system.


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## Kirkhill (12 Jun 2008)

Arius said:
			
		

> ......
> Nick Papiccio, vice president of business development for Rheinmetall Canada , Saint-Jean-sur-Richeleau, Quebec, said the firm will bid on CASW, proposing the Heckler and Koch 40mm grenade launcher. He said the Heckler and Koch weapon is respected among military customers and is in use in 16 countries. Rheinmetall Canada would integrate a fire-control computer and thermal sight on the Heckler and Koch weapon. It has also modified the tripod to allow the weapon to be used in an indirect-fire mode, said Duncan Hills, director of government relations and industrial benefits for Rheinmetall Canada .....



If the past describes the future I'm putting a case of beer on this being the final solution.....


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## daftandbarmy (12 Jun 2008)

Well, there's a good argument there for starting up a SOM (Save Our Mortars) Facebook page, petition or something. We could plan a thousand man march on Defence Procurement HQ... in increments  ;D


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## blacktriangle (12 Jun 2008)

I already buy my own boots, intend to buy my own ruck, whats a 60mm worth these days?

 ;D


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## KevinB (12 Jun 2008)

RWS in US units here hold anything from the M240 (C6 for Canadians) to .50 M2HB and Mk19 -- If I had to guess I would give the nod to Hk, but the US Mk47 is also a nice piece of kit.

Sole sourcing the AGL for the RWS from CASW is IMHO a no brainer -- why would you add another AGL system...


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## daftandbarmy (12 Jun 2008)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> RWS in US units here hold anything from the M240 (C6 for Canadians) to .50 M2HB and Mk19 -- If I had to guess I would give the nod to Hk, but the US Mk47 is also a nice piece of kit.
> 
> Sole sourcing the AGL for the RWS from CASW is IMHO a no brainer -- why would you add another AGL system...



Because, when we are buying things to blow people up, we need to be 'fair' of course.


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## MedCorps (19 Jun 2008)

popnfresh said:
			
		

> I already buy my own boots, intend to buy my own ruck, whats a 60mm worth these days?
> 
> ;D



I saw this for sale not all that long ago: 

60mm Canadian Mortar -  bipod and tube with wooden issued box  	$495.00  (Cdn Fund)	

Original Canadian 60mm mortar bipods in box. Supplied with unpainted dummy tube. No base plate. Minor fitting required for tube to fit bipod collar.

There you go <smile>. 

Cheers, 

MC


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## daftandbarmy (4 Jul 2008)

Army loses bureaucratic mortar skirmish

http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=790726ea-0881-43c7-90d6-ee2e33a9a192 

"Arrrrgggggg......"

 - Charlie Brown -


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## Teeps74 (4 Jul 2008)

The village idiot, inbred, half wit bean counter who forced that decision on the CF should be put in uniform, then sent directly to the sandbox to a front line unit to see the impact his/her decision will have. I have so little time for the Treasury Board and Public Works... 

Grrrrr.


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## daftandbarmy (4 Jul 2008)

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> The village idiot, inbred, half wit bean counter who forced that decision on the CF should be put in uniform, then sent directly to the sandbox to a front line unit to see the impact his/her decision will have. I have so little time for the Treasury Board and Public Works...
> 
> Grrrrr.



"The further you are from the sound of the guns, the less you understand"

(W. Natynczyk)

"You spend more time fighting off bureaucrats than you do fighting off  the Taliban, and we're not sure that is the right system"

(Senator Colin Kenny)


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## 3rdroyal (4 Jul 2008)

Aside from the fact that the AGL is not comparable to a mortar (any mortar) in terms of deployment and effects on the enemy (60mm is a bigger  punch than 40mm), the AGL is essentially a machine gun, and probably has all the problems machine guns have, ie more moving parts that will eventually break, more probability for malfunction (see bottom link) where the mortar is a simple tube that, with the appropriate amount of practice, can rain death upon the enemy with ease. Also, the AGL being a machine gun, it will require  lots of ammo. Where are we supposed to keep that? I dont mean to imply the AGL is useless, its not, it looks awesome. But the mortar should NOT be thrown aside so quickly. Remember when they wanted to that with Tanks? 



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrdrsZZ8Hn8&NR=1


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## retiredgrunt45 (6 Jul 2008)

Army has to give up 60mm mortar before the treasury board will approve the procurement of a new automatic grenade launcher system. which required the military to dump one type of weapon before it could buy a new one.

"Shaking my head on this one"  ??? Bureaucratic medling once again. The only battle they ever fought was against a paper jam in a photo copier. 

Maybe we should also start recruiting more bureaucratics to send over to Afghanistan, since they've now become weapons experts. :

http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=790726ea-0881-43c7-90d6-ee2e33a9a192


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## vonGarvin (6 Jul 2008)

Just brilliant.  I have a weapon we could give up for the AGL: the TOW missile system.  Hasn't been used (by Canada) since when?  Ever?  Makes more sense than getting rid of a weapon that is not only in good use, but also very effective and easy to maintain.


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## dapaterson (6 Jul 2008)

This is not a Treasury Board / PWGSC decision.  The Army has a finite resource envelope to support its equipment.  The Army, not Treasury Board or PWGSC, decided to offset the cost of operating the new CASW by retiring the 60mm mortar.


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## Teeps74 (6 Jul 2008)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> This is not a Treasury Board / PWGSC decision.  The Army has a finite resource envelope to support its equipment.  The Army, not Treasury Board or PWGSC, decided to offset the cost of operating the new CASW by retiring the 60mm mortar.



Ok, did the army consult the Coys and Pls in the infantry corps for feed back on giving up the 60? I know myself, as a senior PL WO would not give up my 60, not for something that essentially HAS to be vehicle mounted to be useful. (Yes, yes, I know, it can be dismounted, and my troops can carry maybe 200 rds for it... Not at all practical for the dismounted advance though, and do not try to convince me other wise.)

I like the 40mm gun, do not get me wrong. But I like my 60 far more... More fleixibility. Simpler to use. And with practice, deadly accurate.


----------



## daftandbarmy (6 Jul 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Just brilliant.  I have a weapon we could give up for the AGL: the TOW missile system.  Hasn't been used (by Canada) since when?  Ever?  Makes more sense than getting rid of a weapon that is not only in good use, but also very effective and easy to maintain.



I vote to trade the Eryx for the 60. Anyone else?


----------



## Teeps74 (6 Jul 2008)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I vote to trade the Eryx for the 60. Anyone else?



The Eryx would be handy when the Americans invade us for our water and oil.   ;D


----------



## 421 EME (6 Jul 2008)

Trade ADATS for them, at least CASW will get used on OPs. (  ;D Sorry 4AD, there are no magic carpets to shoot down over there ;D )


----------



## dapaterson (6 Jul 2008)

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Ok, did the army consult the Coys and Pls in the infantry corps for feed back on giving up the 60?



Nope.  They consulted the Extended Infantry Advisory Board, I believe - all the COs, the CO of the school, D Inf...  so if there's a problem, ask the senior Infanteers of the Army.


----------



## daftandbarmy (7 Jul 2008)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Nope.  They consulted the Extended Infantry Advisory Board, I believe - all the COs, the CO of the school, D Inf...  so if there's a problem, ask the senior Infanteers of the Army.



Isn't that how it was decided to issue Garrison Dress?  ;D


----------



## Greymatters (7 Jul 2008)

Not one of their proudest moments...


----------



## the 48th regulator (8 Jul 2008)

Thread gone under quick clean up, more to follow.

Please keep the specualtion and innuendo to yourselves.

Unless you have valid facts, with regards to a reporters method of operation, do not post from the hip on "What you think" that reporter did.

dileas

tess


----------



## ammocat (25 Aug 2008)

Just read esprit de corps, aug 08 edition and it claims that funding was approved in May for the purchase of 304 CASW units and if the program remains on track the CASW will be in use by fall 2009. I guess only time will tell.  

I found the end of the article humourous, "With the current stocks of mortar shells and their 20-year plus shelf life, the old mortars will not be phased out of service any time soon." - I don't believe the ammunition held in stock has anything to do with whether a weapons system is removed from service. Just my opinion.


----------



## daftandbarmy (25 Aug 2008)

ammocat said:
			
		

> Just read esprit de corps, aug 08 edition and it claims that funding was approved in May for the purchase of 304 CASW units and if the program remains on track the CASW will be in use by fall 2009. I guess only time will tell.
> 
> I found the end of the article humourous, "With the current stocks of mortar shells and their 20-year plus shelf life, the old mortars will not be phased out of service any time soon." - I don't believe the ammunition held in stock has anything to do with whether a weapons system is removed from service. Just my opinion.



AFAIK, the reason we have 60mm and 81mm mortars now, is that we were left with tons of ammo from the 2 inch and 3 inch mortars from WW1 & 2. So you could argue that ammo reserves have some kind of influence on weapons development.


----------



## Old Sweat (25 Aug 2008)

Daft and Barmy,

That must be it. It explains why I supported and the Commander 4 CIBG approved the recommendation from NDHQ that we sell our war stocks of 60mm ammunition to the Americans in 1965. At that stage we were not using the weapon and there was not intention of retaining it in our inventory. Fortunately someone wiser that the Young Sweat must have hide the weapons in sports store at 25 CFSD or somewhere similar.


----------



## ammocat (25 Aug 2008)

I don't think the ammunition stock has anything to do with the decision on which weapon systems stays or goes. Once a decision is made to get rid of a certain weapons system the remaining stocks of ammunition are put up for sale. After the required time period has elapsed, if the ammunition cannot be sold, then it goes for demil.

It was not too long ago that all the 155mm in the CF was going up for sale and demil back up plans were being discussed. The requirement for the M777 quickly changed that. 

When I left the infantry and saw some of the stuff that we were disposing of, all I could think was "where was all this ammo when I was in the weapons det"


----------



## The Bread Guy (7 Nov 2008)

Just offering this up to those interested in this weapon system - does this mean what I think it means?
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/81068/post-775675/topicseen.html#new

Does "solicitation cancelled" = "program cancelled"?


----------



## a_majoor (7 Nov 2008)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> AFAIK, the reason we have 60mm and 81mm mortars now, is that we were left with tons of ammo from the 2 inch and 3 inch mortars from WW1 & 2. So you could argue that ammo reserves have some kind of influence on weapons development.



Sometimes it does.

British Empire units were stocked with .303, while Americans used Winchester .308 during WWII. Post war, the UK experimented with a .280 "ideal" round, and built the EM-2 program around it. The US, with its vastly larger resources and about a zillion rounds stockpiled from WWII insisted Winchester .308 be the NATO standard round, and won. No EM-2 (which was already in limited issue), and "we" got the 7.62 X 51 round NATO wide.

LMG's "should" have a 6.5 or 6.8mm round for effectiveness, and there is some opinion that the 5.55 rounds used in NATO small arms isn't very effective (even in the SS-109 configuration). Surprise, it is Remington .223, purchased in vast amounts by the US for the Viet Nam war as they unilaterally transitioned from the 7.62 round....


----------



## Gasplug (7 Nov 2008)

> I don't think the ammunition stock has anything to do with the decision on which weapon systems stays or goes.



Ammocat,

You are partially right.  What makes the difference ultimately is what funds the Army has available in the National Procurement budget.  This is the money used to pay for spares, ammunition, and any new items after a capital programme is closed-out.  Most capital programmes procure 2 years of ammunition and 2 years of expected spare parts usage with the weapon system . Once that is purchased, the services have to budget procurement of follow-on spares, ammo, etc...  That is where is the Army is hurting - not in the capital programmes where money is relatively plentiful - but in the NP funds.  With all the new weapons systems coming in, it is getting more and more difficult to keep all the older weapons systems on the shelves and some of them have to be cleared out to make space for a new one.

I am not saying I agree with the process since I am a firm believer in the "golf bag" approach.  The more tools you have in your toolbox the more chances you have on having exactly the right one for the job.  The problem is maintaining such a variegated fleet of weapons, vehicles and the ammo and spares is bleeding the Army dry; hard decisons were required.  

PS: I am basing this comment on info that may be dated but I do not think it is so.

Cheers,

Gasplug


----------



## dapaterson (7 Nov 2008)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Just offering this up to those interested in this weapon system - does this mean what I think it means?
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/81068/post-775675/topicseen.html#new
> 
> Does "solicitation cancelled" = "program cancelled"?



Not necessarily.  It could mean "Oops, we screwed up on the specifications and are going to re-write them".  It could mean "Industry feedback has made us go back and rethink".  It could mean "Program cancelled".  It could even mean "Oops, forgot to get all the necessary approvals before we posted the solicitation".

Nothing heard to date about cancellation; makes me suspect it's one of the others.


----------



## The Bread Guy (7 Nov 2008)

Thanks for the clarification of what ELSE it could mean.


----------



## a_majoor (7 Nov 2008)

Just an interisting bit of historitrivia:

http://world.guns.ru/grenade/gl00-e.htm#agl



> It is generally believed that first automatic grenade launchers were developed in USA by mid-1960s, following the US involvement in the Vietnam war. These weapons were developed by US Navy and several military contractors to provide troops with close to medium range support and area suppression weapons, effective against enemy infantry and light structures. These weapons were light and compact enough to be installed on riverine crafts, combat helicopters, jeeps, and on light infantry mounts (tripods). What is generally not known is the fact that very similar weapons were developed and tested in USSR prior to WW2, in around 1935-38. There were several designs of such weapons, but most developed of these was the 40,6mm automatic grenade launcher designed by Taubin. This magazine-fed, selective fired weapon was developed as a more versatile alternative to the 50mm mortar; it fired 40,6mm fragmentation grenade (based on standard issue 40,6mm Dyakonov rifle grenade M1930) in either direct and indirect fire modes. However, changes in General Staff of Red Army following Stalin's repressions of 1937-39 resulted in withdrawal of Army support to this project, and Taubin grenade launcher never went past prototype stages. The Taubin itself has been arrested, tried on false accusations, found guilty and later executed



Sucks to be a weapons designer under Stalin!


----------



## Old Sweat (7 Nov 2008)

Thuc posted:

British Empire units were stocked with .303, while Americans used Winchester .308 during WWII. Post war,

Actually the US used the .30-06 as its standard calibre during the Second World War and Korea.


----------



## vonGarvin (7 Nov 2008)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Does "solicitation cancelled" = "program cancelled"?


I friggin' well hope so.  I have not seen ONE INSTANCE over here where that 21st century Ross would do better than anything we have.  In most cases, it would be worse.  Just imagine trying to (a) fit it in the back of a LAV and (b) hump it around with you up and down the Arghandab.  They do it right now with the 60, and from ALL accounts: the 60 is worth it's weight in gold!  And then some.


----------



## The Bread Guy (11 Nov 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I friggin' well hope so.



Hate to be the messenger, MR, but it's baaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaack.....
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/81068/post-777032.html#msg777032


----------



## MedCorps (14 Feb 2009)

I reckoned that I should update the thread as it has been sometime and nobody else has done it yet. 

Since the Notice of  Proposed  Procurement (NPP) was canceled for some unknown reason on 7 Nov 08 it has been reissued as of 2 Feb 09.  To me the two NPP's look the same, with the total number of systems equaling 304. Also included in the NPP is the requirement for ammo, project management, spare parts, and training.   

We will see what happens this time around... fun fun. 

MC 

The new closing date is 17 Mar 09 and you can find the details on MERX.


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 May 2009)

kkwd dug up this article. It confirms for me that anyone thinking about getting rid of the 60mm MOR is nuts:

For longer-range fire, each platoon
possessed the venerable 60 mm mortar. Old, heavy, and
rudimentary, no other weapon system in the platoon could
saturate an enemy position with fragmentation bombs at
2,000 m more than the dependable 60 mm mortar.
Although the bipod mount, which allows for sustained and
accurate fire, is old and growing increasingly unstable, the
60 mm mortar is still a critical weapon system in the
platoon’s arsenal (especially given the fact it can also fire
smoke and illumination rounds).

http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/bulletin/TheBulletinVol12No3eng.pdf


----------



## dangerboy (24 May 2009)

It makes you wonder if the people that want to get rid of the Mortar have talked to anyone that has deployed.  Almost everybody I have talked to love the 60mm and the 25mm HEI.


----------



## Redeye (30 May 2009)

That sounds like an excellent justification for getting rid of the 60mm indeed.  I've yet to understand the logic that says an AGL is an adequate replacement for the 60.  If they're old and obsolete, they should be replaced with a new mortar, and complemented with an AGL perhaps as well, since those are another good piece of kit.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Good article. In particular I liked the comments on the 60mm, which apparently 'they' don't think 'we' need anymore... sheesh...
> 
> For longer-range fire, each platoon
> possessed the venerable 60 mm mortar. Old, heavy, and
> ...


----------



## McG (31 May 2009)

Redeye said:
			
		

> If they're old and obsolete, they should be replaced with a new mortar, and complemented with an AGL ...


Where do the crews come from?


----------



## Kirkhill (31 May 2009)

MCG said:
			
		

> Where do the crews come from?



Not wanting to be facetious but perhaps the same place they used to come from:

Old fashioned Platoon Weapons Det - 3 Men
Weapons Manned 

- C5/C6 - Minimum firing crew - 2 men 
- CG-84 - Minimum firing crew - 2 men
- 60 mm - Minimum firing crew - 1 man

5 operators to man all weapons at minimal effectiveness -  A full section would have been better for ammunition carry, SFMG and Bipod 60 operations.

We have already established a pattern of more weapons than manpower.  

Is there any reason why CQ/RQ can't carry surplus kit - eg ATGMs (Eryx/Javelin/Spike) to deal with the unexpected?


----------



## MJP (1 Jun 2009)

MCG said:
			
		

> Where do the crews come from?


Kirkhill is bang on. 

I hate this numbers game hiding behind "crews".  I know that is how they choose weapons systems sometimes but it is ridiculous.  If it were true a Pl weapons det would have at least 7-9 people if not more to man the weapons we currently have available.  I think they are forgetting that they are taking one tool out of the toolbox only to replace it with something similar but can't do the same job.  Give leaders the tools and let them pick the most appropriate one for the mission at hand.  Company raid, go and draw the 60mm mortar.......Convoy escort, mount the vehicle with the AGL etc etc


----------



## Fusaki (1 Jun 2009)

> .Convoy escort, mount the vehicle with the AGL etc etc



Which vehicle though?

In a Rifle Coy mechanized with LAV3s, the AGL is not really necessary as the 25mm cannon uploaded with HEI-T kills dismounts and soft skins pretty effectively.

I think the AGL will really shine with sub units that roll in RG-31s, TLAVs, Bisons, or those fancy new LAVs-with-no-turrets (Strykers?).  A convoy escort throwing a healthy mix of .50, 40mm, and 7.62 downrange is pretty intimidating.  Our allies have been using that mix effectively for awhile now.


----------



## MJP (1 Jun 2009)

Wonderbread said:
			
		

> Which vehicle though?
> 
> In a Rifle Coy mechanized with LAV3s, the AGL is not really necessary as the 25mm cannon uploaded with HEI-T kills dismounts and soft skins pretty effectively.
> 
> I think the AGL will really shine with sub units that roll in RG-31s, TLAVs, Bisons, or those fancy new LAVs-with-no-turrets (Strykers?).  A convoy escort throwing a healthy mix of .50, 40mm, and 7.62 downrange is pretty intimidating.  Our allies have been using that mix effectively for awhile now.



Ideally what you listed is where it would go, ideally have CSS and other vehicles that have some heavier firepower makes sense.  That way you can lessen the load of LAV/Armoured guys that do some of the convoy escort now.  

It is still a weapon that a LAV centric Pl should have, probably not on the LAV itself but I wouldn't discount the idea. LAVs aren't the end and be all of all things warfare.  Simply another tool in the box and another (of many) method of getting troops to where they need to go.  Again giving as many tools as feasibly possible to a leader to tailor their equipment to the task/msn at hand.


----------



## Fusaki (1 Jun 2009)

> LAVs aren't the end and be all of all things warfare.



Heresy!! ;D

Seriously though, I see your point. An AGL would compliment the C6 in the SF role in places the LAVs can't get to.


----------



## KevinB (2 Jun 2009)

Your AGL would be able (hopefully) in its mount to elevate higher than the LAV cannon, which as several of us know, does not always elevate as high as one would want...


----------



## Kirkhill (2 Jun 2009)

Infidel-6 said:
			
		

> Your AGL would be able (hopefully) in its mount to elevate higher than the LAV cannon, which as several of us know, does not always elevate as high as one would want...



So do want the AGL on a ring mount on the Comd hatch like the C9, on a ROWS mount on the turret or, like the old Marder, a separate mount on the rear deck?

And if super-elevating (over 45 degrees, presumably for urban combat) doesn't that launch the projectiles on the same trajectory as ....... a mortar?

Not to create too much of a firestorm but it does seem that if you athe daling with a platform like the LAV, or even an armoured HLVW, the whole question of "manning" becomes moot, especially with Remote Operating Weapons Systems.  One operator could operate main, coax, MBGD and ROWS and the vehicle could support the payload and the ammunition.

The question is somewhat other if you are talking about dismounted/light troops.  Then it really does become a case of what can be taken into the field if the LAVs ain't there - but perhaps there is a spare jackass or two.


----------



## a_majoor (3 Jun 2009)

Although this gets away from the CASW arguments, high elevation mounts for AFV's are important to operate in complex/3D environments (putting HE rounds into the upper floors of buildings can do wonders against RPG crews hiding up there). For a LAV or similar vehicle with a powered turret mounting an automatic cannon, this also provides a means to discourage helicopters/UAVs and UACV's from coming too close.

High elevation mounts also provide the means for larger AFV's such as tanks or fire support vehicles mounting 105mm cannons to act as SP artillery under certain circumstances, use through tube missiles for extended range engagements (13 KM with a spotter for LAHAT) or special buckshot or self forming fragment rounds vs helicopters and aircraft. AFV's with secondary SP and AAA capabilities would need high bandwidth communications with spotters and targeting systems to be fully effective. 

So far the best turret design to allow this is the Wegmann "cleft" turret. As for AGL's mounted on AFV's, this seems a bit redundant given 20mm+ rounds can be had in HE and more advanced forms (like AHEAD ammunition) in addition to AP, so mounting AGL's on patrol vehicles like the RG-31 makes perfect sense. Indeed, a small turret like the old AVGP Grizzly mounting a .50 for hard targets and an AGL for area targets might actually be the best solution for convoy escorts.


----------



## McG (3 Jun 2009)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So do want the AGL on a ring mount on the Comd hatch like the C9, on a ROWS mount on the turret or, like the old Marder, a separate mount on the rear deck?


... but if we go back through this thread, we might find where the proj staff pointed out that the CASW as we are buying it cannot be mounted on a vehicle.  It is a dismounted weapon that can shoot at its targets, shoot airburst over the targets, or do a high trajectory automatic mortar thing.


----------



## Kirkhill (3 Jun 2009)

MCG said:
			
		

> ... but if we go back through this thread, we might find where the proj staff pointed out that the CASW as we are buying it cannot be mounted on a vehicle.  It is a dismounted weapon that can shoot at its targets, shoot airburst over the targets, or do a high trajectory automatic mortar thing.



We would find that.  We would also find that there was/is a separate project for a vehicle mounted ROWS capable of mounting AGLs similar to those also being considered for the CASW - but, admittedly, different.  

My point was, for those that were talking about choosing weapons based on vehicles and crews, that once you have a platform you can bolt on a multitude of weapons and wire them all under the control of a single operator.  Situational Awareness would be a bit of a bugger but it seems that that is a problem in any event.  There seems to be a degree of antipathy to something called SAS.

On the other hand, dismounted troops don't have the luxury of humping everything that they would like to have at hand - but that shouldn't preclude having alternate solutions in their immediate A-Ech.


----------



## KevinB (7 Jun 2009)

argh large comment was lost.

 My point was not nec vehicle mounting, but the ability to dismount it and employ it in a move advantageous postion.
  Somewhere in my plethora of pictures I have a Hk GMG employed on the roof of a house in Iraq, as well as the LW 60 mortar.   Hard to do hump a 25mm Chaingun up to the third or foruth floor of a house...


----------



## MedCorps (17 Jun 2009)

Of note from the recently released Third (US) Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Realizing this is Iraq and not Afghanistan. 

Issue: The MK-19 40mm machine gun repeatedly proved itself as the decisive weapon while in contact

Discussion: In every contact, the MK-19 distinguished itself as the premier killing system throughout the engagement. Its ability to simultaneously and overwhelmingly both suppress and destroy enemy positions saved the lives of countless U.S. soldiers. The wing man concept of precision M2 cal .50 machine gun fire in tandem with the MK-19 quickly overwhelmed any dismounted or lightly armored enemy force. The MK-19 is a magnificent weapon in combat, despite the shortcomings in training ammunition and its unfamiliarity to many soldiers.

Recommendation: Continue to use the MK-19 and manufacture greater numbers in the Army inventory. This will allow gunners to become more proficient and result in fewer shortages during times of war.

Cheers, 

MC


----------



## vonGarvin (18 Jun 2009)

There is no doubt in my military mind that the MK-19 is a superb weapon.  Of note is that it was mostly used by 3 ID as a mounted weapon, similar to the M2HB, which is noted in the AAR point.  The CASW is intended to be a ground-mounted system, so the AAR point by 3 ID is moot.


----------



## Kirkhill (18 Jun 2009)

To me the whole thing seems silly.

We have/had a direct fire weapon (C5/C6/Vickers MMG) that can/could be fired in suppressive and indirect modes.
With the C5/C6 the same crews used the same sights on the 60mm mortar to deliver high angle indirect fire.

Consider 3 soldiers with a vehicle with a ROWS with a dismountable Mk19 or HK-GMG or Striker or whatever 40mm variant you like.  Throw a 60mm tube and bi-pod in the back.  On dismounted ops, where the vehicle can't go, you have the option of lugging the 40mm (a possibility if you are planning on staying in a fixed position for a while)  or breaking out the 60 and hauling it and the ammunition (a possibility in both fixed positions and manoeuvre ops).  VC and Gnr maintain/swap roles in dismounted action.  Dvr becomes an ammunition number/spare gnr.

Higher gets to decide if vehicles or not, if 60 or 40, or the mix appropriate to the mission. IM (not so) HO.


----------



## a_majoor (18 Jun 2009)

The CASW arguments seem to have devolved into the issues of mobility when dismounted (which seems pretty appropriate considering the size/weight of the thing). In a way, this seems almost like a turn of the wheel back to the Canadian MG Corps in WWI.

The Corps became virtually an arm of its own, with MG firepower increasingly centralized partially due to the size/weight issues of machineguns of the day, a water cooled MG being roughly similar in size and weight to a .50 on a ground mount today. With everyone having limited mobility and warfare having devolved into trench warfare, this wasn't that much of an issue, and may even have been to the advantage of the Canadians by emphasizing the power of MG's in the defence.

During the last 100 days, however, the Corps was less able to make a contribution. The habit of centralization made them less flexible and the size/weight issues left them less able to keep up with the advance anyway. Superior tactics by the infantry and the widespread availibility of the Lewis gun in platoon formations worked to overcome the deficiencies of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.

Back to the 21rst century, we now are offered a great weapons system which offers lots of benefits in the defense, but is not well suited to the dismounted advance. TTPs will develop taking this into account (centralizing the CASW firepower, anyone?). The 60mm mortar has the potential to be the "lewis gun" of the story because it is portable and flexible.


----------



## Kirkhill (18 Jun 2009)

I wouldn't go any further in centralization than putting the 40/60 combo (in the TAPV) under the direct control of the OC as a Company Weapons Section (12 soldiers with 4 vehicles and 8 weapons).  In a LAV mounted Company the same entity could be used as the OC's own flank force.


----------



## daftandbarmy (18 Jun 2009)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I wouldn't go any further in centralization than putting the 40/60 combo (in the TAPV) under the direct control of the OC as a Company Weapons Section (12 soldiers with 4 vehicles and 8 weapons).  In a LAV mounted Company the same entity could be used as the OC's own flank force.



I think the UK's 'Commando 21' orbat is designed to make best use of the new weapons systems we now have available. It might just be time to ditch the orbat we in the infantry have been using, relatively unchanged, since WW2 to make better use of weapons like the Mk19. Oh, and note that they've managed to keep the light mortar too apparently!:



Commando 21

We have a range of new equipment coming into service that is increasing the firepower and mobility of our units today and, by 2010, will have converged to provide a comprehensive, modern and highly effective range of capabilities that will take the UK Amphibious Force through to 2020 and beyond. The challenges now facing the Royal Marines are to organise the Landing Force to make best use of this equipment, to maximise the effectiveness of the Amphibious Force to deal with Defence Tasks assigned to it, and to evolve National and NATO operational concepts. The first part of this process is a programme for restructuring our three Commandos, which has been given the project title of 'Commando 21'.

http://www.onceamarinealwaysamarine.co.uk/cdo21.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commando_21
http://www.navynews.co.uk/articles/2000/0012/0000122901.asp


----------



## baboon6 (23 Jun 2009)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Good article. In particular I liked the comments on the 60mm, which apparently 'they' don't think 'we' need anymore... sheesh...
> 
> For longer-range fire, each platoon
> possessed the venerable 60 mm mortar. Old, heavy, and
> ...


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (23 Jun 2009)

baboon6 said:
			
		

> I suspect if the Canadians get rid of theirs something similar will happen.



The only reason that we would get rid of them is because we have bought new ones. When they do it will probably be replaced with the M224.


----------



## AmmoTech90 (23 Jun 2009)

Oh No a Canadian said:
			
		

> The only reason that we would get rid of them is because we have bought new ones. When they do it will probably be replaced with the M224.



What do you base that statement on?

Plans are afoot to withdraw them without a mortar replacement.  See these threads:
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/1910.0.html
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28805.0.html


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (24 Jun 2009)

Although the DND is not the smartest with what equipment is needed and what is not in the field (refer to main topic) but with the nonlinear type conflicts with enemies using guerilla warfare tactics the light motor is a must. All talk is just that, until something happens it's just talk. Wasn't the M2 supposed to be gone years ago?


----------



## Jungle (24 Jun 2009)

Oh No a Canadian said:
			
		

> gorilla warfare tactics


Sounds like scary stuff... is King Kong involved ??


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (24 Jun 2009)

Jungle said:
			
		

> Sounds like scary stuff... is King Kong involved ??



  :-[  

He is their Rambo


----------



## a_majoor (30 Dec 2009)

The key objection to replacing the 60mm mortar with the CASW is the weight of the weapon prevents it from being used effectively in the dismounted role. A parallel idea for a dismounted platoon support weapon is to launch high velocity 40mm projectiles from weapons something like the Swiss Arpad 600. On firing the barrel recoiled out of the rear of the weapon a distance of 14"/35cm, controlled by a hydro-pneumatic buffer. There was no backblast and the 35mm 167gm projectile was propelled at 600m/s. Since the round took only a second to reach 500m the weapon had considerable potential against moving targets. It was intended for destroying point objectives such as machinegun nests, light vehicles and helicopters. The launcher weighed 6.8kgs and the rounds were light so 20-30 could be carried by the firer. The HE round contained 45gm of explosive and had considerably greater range and accuracy than a conventional rifle grenade.

For our purposes, reworking the weapon to fire a 40mm high velocity grenade provides the ability to attack DF targets with the available CASW ammunition. If the weapon has the proper sighting system and grenades have programmable fuses then they can provide airburst capabilities over dug in targets, otherwise, the weapon will need some sort of secondary sight and be fired aimed upwards with the soldier in the standing or kneeling position to drop rounds onto the target.

Not ideal, but better than having to leave the CASW behind all the time...


----------



## SeanNewman (4 Apr 2010)

More convenient solutions than that are side-load style M203s that allow for medium velocity rounds that are too long to get in the current one.


----------



## McG (5 Apr 2010)

I suppose the good news is that, in addition to 120 mm mortars, the people bringing us the CASW have also talked about medium velocity grenades and sole-purpose "grenade rifles" (MGL-105).

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/74005.0.html


----------



## Matt_Fisher (5 Apr 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> I suppose the good news is that, in addition to 120 mm mortars, the people bringing us the CASW have also talked about medium velocity grenades and sole-purpose "grenade rifles" (MGL-105).
> 
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/74005.0.html



DLR-5 Source?


----------



## McG (5 Apr 2010)

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> DLR-5 Source?


Two years dated, but yes.


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## daftandbarmy (6 Apr 2010)

Good paper, and an interesting description of the Soviet use of their AGL in Afghanistan in the dismounted role:

Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer

Okay, time for a deep dive into the tactical. The point of departure is this paper by Army Maj. Thomas Ehrhart, Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer (.pdf), written last year at the Command and General Staff College, that says fighting in Afghanistan has exposed the fact that American infantry are poorly equipped and trained for long range firefights.

In Afghanistan, the infantryman’s “weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate,” Ehrhart says. Unlike on the streets of Iraq, where firefights were few and were typically fought under 300 meters, insurgents in Afghanistan skillfully use the wide open rural and mountainous terrain to stretch the battlefield. The following excerpt sums it up pretty well:

“Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.”

There’s a lot to unpack in this paper, the author gets into the relative merits and disadvantages of the 5.56mm round, reliability of the M4, the rifleman’s standard ACOG site, basic training, adding more marksmen to the squad and even the shortcomings of the standard issue magazines (Magpul gets a real big shout out for their PMAG M4 mag replacement). He concludes that only with significant changes to training, doctrine and weapons will infantry be able to engage targets out to 500 meters.

“In the table of organization for a light infantry company only the six –M240B 7.62-mm machineguns, two– 60-mm mortars and nine designated marksman armed with either 7.62-mm M14 rifles or accurized 5.56-mm M16A4’s rifles are able to effectively engage the enemy. These weapons systems represent 19 percent of the company’s firepower. This means that 81 percent of the company has little effect on the fight. This is unacceptable.”

I’m going to get into a number of these points throughout the week, but first off, I want to get into Ehrhart’s description of meeting engagements in Afghanistan and the standard U.S. tactical response. “The enemy travels light and employs supporting weapons from standoff, to include mortars and medium machineguns. Faced with these conditions, the modern [U.S.] infantry attempts to fix the enemy with direct fire and use supporting assets to kill the enemy,” he writes.

Supporting assets is either artillery, if in range, or more commonly air strikes. My question, can U.S. troops be provided enough organic lethality that they can overmatch the enemy with both direct and indirect fires without having to wait for air strikes? Prompt air support might not always be available and the infantry must have the weapons to overmatch the Taliban.

The Soviets in Afghanistan ran into the same tactical challenge. Read accounts of Soviet infantry firefights in Afghanistan in the 1980s and you’ll see they invariably hauled their AGS-17 30mm grenade launcher with them on most every dismounted operation, particularly in the mountains. It was cherished for its high rate of fire and nearly 1,700 meter range.

I know this gets into another important point the paper raises, which is an overly encumbered infantryman trying to run down Taliban light fighters. Yet, at around 50 pounds with tripod and ammo, the whole package was relatively light and mobile; it could be broken down into manageable parts. Soviet infantry valued the AGS-17 so much they built a special harness that attached to the assistant gunner’s back so that if they ran into a firefight he would drop down on his stomach and the gunner would mount the grenade thrower to his back and begin firing. The AGS-17 became the weapon around which the squad or fire team was organized, much like the light machine gun in U.S. and western armies.

U.S. infantry do not have a comparable weapon. The Mk. 19 40mm launcher weighs 73 pounds (the AGS-17 gun weighs 37 pounds), and that’s just the gun, add another 20 pounds for the tripod and then ammunition and you see why it’s typically mounted on vehicles. The weapon also has a bad reputation for rattling itself apart during sustained use.

The Soviets learned pretty quickly in Afghanistan that high rates of fire were vital. Lessons from Afghanistan led them to mount auto-cannon on their BMP infantry fighting vehicles, BTR wheeled vehicles and they rushed lots of ZSU 23–4 quad anti-aircraft guns to theater. The Soviets had lots of towed, rapid fire anti-aircraft guns organic to their infantry units and these were liberally placed about combat outposts in Afghanistan.

Another U.S. shortcoming in the small arms fight is the lack of a GPS guided mortar round. Only now is the Army developing a GPS round for its 60mm and 81mm mortars, and they have yet to reach the battlefield. With a 60mm mortar and GPS guided rounds, American infantry would be ale to accurately target Taliban fighters on the next ridgeline, and even behind it.

The American military, and particularly the Army, has been “platform focused,” doctrine and weapons development has focused on crews fighting a mounted weapons system, be it a tank, Bradley or what have you (the Army plans to spend $7 billion over the next few years to develop a new armored fighting vehicle to add to its massive fleet of armored fighting vehicles). The future of irregular conflict will predominantly be small-unit infantry fights, a fact the acquisition community has not grasped. It’s about time they did and begin fielding lightweight, highly accurate and lethal weapons that are easily carried by the infantry.

http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/taking-back-the-infantry-half-kilometer/


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## brihard (6 Apr 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Good paper, and an interesting description of the Soviet use of their AGL in Afghanistan in the dismounted role:
> 
> Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer



Great article! Thanks.


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## a_majoor (26 Apr 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> More convenient solutions than that are side-load style M203s that allow for medium velocity rounds that are too long to get in the current one.



My understanding was the longer rounds were non lethal "baton"  type rounds. I'm not sure that either the weapon or the shooter could handle the increased recoil loads of medium velocity grenades (which explains the recoil system of the ARPAD-600).

Soviet era soldiers manpacking the AGS-30 is exactly the argument I am making against the current slate of CASW contenders; they are far larger and heavier and in no way "man portable".
The Russians have product improved their 30 mm AGL, and the Chinese have a very portable 35mm AGL (comparable to a GPMG in size and weight), which support the use of AGL's in all phases of war. Ours can be dug in for the defense, or vehicle mounted, but not brought up in the advance by dismounted infantry. (Another point is a light AGL will improve the performance of the carrying vehicle by reducing the amount of mass up top, and maintaining a low center of gravity).

Back to the drawing board.


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## Kalatzi (27 Apr 2010)

I note with interest this thread sarted in 2005. 

I recall hearing discussions that it was an urgent operational requirement.

I just hope that skynet doesn't send the current management team back to 1915 so they can work on the "Tank' project

Sheesh  :


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## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2010)

*Bump*






This came out as a requirement in 2004, before we engaged in combat operations in Kandahar.  We'll be out one year from now.  No CASW in sight.


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## dapaterson (9 Jul 2010)

But if we'd had the CASW, everything would have turned out so much better...


If we don't succeed in Afghanistan, it's all the fault of the 60mm mortar.


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## vonGarvin (10 Jul 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> But if we'd had the CASW, everything would have turned out so much better...
> 
> 
> If we don't succeed in Afghanistan, it's all the fault of the 60mm mortar.


:rofl:


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## vonGarvin (26 Aug 2010)

Wow, after six + years, the name has gone from:
Company Area Suppression Weapon, to
Close Area Suppression Weapon, to
C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher System 

This, ladies and gentlemen, is progress. :


Oh, in case anyone failed to notice, we are in our fifth year of combat with an obselete weapon that this will replace and supercede.  Funny, our Leopard C2s were found to be "lacking", and we were able to get Leopard 2A6M's in theatre, and purchased 100 or so other models of that same tank in 1/8 the time.


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## GK .Dundas (26 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Wow, after six + years, the name has gone from:
> Company Area Suppression Weapon, to
> Close Area Suppression Weapon, to
> C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher System
> ...


 I keep wondering how long it would take if it *wasn't* an urgent requirement ?


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## dapaterson (26 Aug 2010)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> I keep wondering how long it would take if it *wasn't* an urgent requirement ?



The CASW AGLS is not a UOR.  It is being treated as a routine procurement and hence follows normal timelines.


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## vonGarvin (26 Aug 2010)

And since the 60mm fills a capability requirement quite well, we continue to have some self-licking ice-cream cone somewhere in Ottawa reminding us poor dumb grunts that we need a CASW  C16 AGLS.  :


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## Fishbone Jones (26 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> And since the 60mm fills a capability requirement quite well, we continue to have some self-licking ice-cream cone somewhere in Ottawa reminding us poor dumb grunts that we need a CASW  C16 AGLS.  :



TV,

Perhaps it's not just Ottawa . Meanwhile, you may want to take a stick and try convince some of your peers of your case. :nod:


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## GK .Dundas (26 Aug 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The CASW AGLS is not a UOR.  It is being treated as a routine procurement and hence follows normal timelines.


I'm sure there are a lot of words I could use to describe this program but I have to tell you the use of normal and routine for some reason scares the hell out of me .
I suspect that everyday People connected with this project  (as well as the rest the DND procurement projects) must thank God that truth in advertising laws do not apply to them.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Oh, in case anyone failed to notice, we are in our fifth year of combat with an obselete weapon that this will replace and supercede.  Funny, our Leopard C2s were found to be "lacking", and we were able to get Leopard 2A6M's in theatre, and purchased 100 or so other models of that same tank in 1/8 the time.



Funny that: a zippper head CDS rushes a new tank to the front in record time.  :  

If Hillier had been an Infantry officer you might have seen an AGL rushed into service, right after he introduced some boots that didn't cripple the owners first time out and a chest rig that was designed for something more than the Tim Horton's QRF "Double away for a double double, you lot!".  ;D


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## a_majoor (26 Aug 2010)

I don't think that is entirely fair to Gen Hillier, since he was also a huge advocate of getting a "Big Honking Ship", as well as heavy lift for the Air Force. Eventually, you discover you only have so much bungee cord (or whatever metaphore you want to use), so save it to lash down the really big items on the roof/in the trunk and try to tie off all the other things with leftover pieces of 550 cord you happen to have in your pocket.

My big hope is some future CDS blasts the bureaucracy and replaces it with a more streamlined structure that can respond in a reasonably swift manner. Don't forget that in WWII all sides were able to introduce entirely new technologies and generations of weapons to millions of troops across the globe using pens and paper rather than Blackberries and videoconferencing, so we know it can be done....


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## SeanNewman (27 Aug 2010)

The biggest problem all along has been that one does not have to be compared to the other.

IMO, a mortar and grenade machine gun are no more alike than an artillery gun and a tank, and then saying since the Artillery gun shoots airburst rounds we don't need a tank anymore.

The CASW/GMG/C16 is an awesome killing weapon system and has proven itself with our two closest allies already.  As a vehicle mount on smaller systems (LUVW cupola or LAV3 pintle) it would greatly increase our capabilities.

I am also of the impression that on a static defence position, if I were forced to choose one (which is again a dumb argument because we shouldn't have to choose one) I would go with the C16.  However, as I have granted all along it is far from man portable so it's moot.  If you're on foot a mortar it should be.

Straight from D Inf at yesterday's Inf Shl Leadership Symposium, but he has voiced our concerns and those who need to know have heard the calls of the troops who love the mortar.  Just because the C16 is great doesn't mean it has to replace a mortar anymore than it has to replace a C6.

That being said, the mortar as we know it is an antique and needed to go.  But rest assured that other options are being looked at, whether it's a newer/lighter mortar, a different calibre, or whatever else might fill the gap.  It might be just as simple as new tubes like the 84 got.


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## vonGarvin (27 Aug 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> The biggest problem all along has been that one has to be compared to the other.


Agreed 100%.  I would say 150%, but that's impossible.  ;D



			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> That being said, the mortar as *we know it is * an antique and needed to go.  But rest assured that other options are being looked at, whether it's a newer/lighter mortar, a different calibre, or whatever else might fill the gap.  It might be just as simple as new tubes like the 84 got.


Yes, the pieces of metal we have (M19) is old, tired and needs to rest in peace, having done yeoman's service for way too long.  The capabilities it provides would be better served by a newer 60mm mortar.


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## dapaterson (27 Aug 2010)

Good.  Let's buy new tubes (relatively cheap).  But we now have to support two systems with ammo, spares, training etc.  How are we going to pay for that?

We can't have one of everything.  We have to make choices about what to keep, what to buy, and what to scrap.  Hoarding everything like an old woman and cats doesn't work.

So, what should the Army divest?


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## medicineman (27 Aug 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, what should the Army divest?



Some redundant HQ's and their associated staffs perhaps?

MM


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## SeanNewman (27 Aug 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Good.  Let's buy new tubes (relatively cheap).  But we now have to support two systems with ammo, spares, training etc.  How are we going to pay for that?



You're missing the point.

The same way a platoon already has 9mm, grenades, 5.56, 7.62, 60mm, 84mm, M72s, etc.

A CASW/C16 is significantly different than a mortar and should not be seen in a one-or-the-other mindset.  Saying we can't have a mortar and a C16 in the CF is like saying we can't have a flashlight and night vision or we can't have a light and a medium truck.


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

medicineman said:
			
		

> Some  *All  * redundant HQ's and their associated staffs perhaps?
> 
> MM



There, fixed that for you.  ;D

Anyway, as Petamocto said, we have lots.  9mm.  5.56mm Ball.  5.56mm Belt.  7.62mm Belt.  25mm TPDS-T.  25mm HEI-T.  25mm APFSDS-T.  40mm Low Velocity M203  thingy (I forget the grenade launcher's nom du jour).  And on.  And for each, there are weapons, simulators, parts, tech training, etc and so forth.  I get it: things ain't cheap.  But as medicineman already alluded, reduntant HQs and their staffs are a drain.  We may not have a mortar/pioneer or anti-armour platoon anymore, but I'm certain we have a J-3-5-2 somewhere, whose only job is powerpoint, F T W.
But, if we need to divest something, divest the Eryx.


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## dapaterson (28 Aug 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> You're missing the point.



Nope.  You're missing it.  Things cost money. Money isn't unlimited.  Therefore, to stay within the money we have, we have to make choices about what to keep and what to scrap.



> The same way a platoon already has 9mm, grenades, 5.56, 7.62, 60mm, 84mm, M72s, etc.
> 
> A CASW/C16 is significantly different than a mortar and should not be seen in a one-or-the-other mindset.  Saying we can't have a mortar and a C16 in the CF is like saying we can't have a flashlight and night vision or we can't have a light and a medium truck.



Guess what?  We're buying less trucks - no one for one exchange.  We're buying fewer fighter aircraft.   All because we have insufficient funds to acquire and sustain them.  Similarly, the Army can't afford everything it wants. 

Petulant children demand "I want, I want, I want".  Parents have to temper those desires - what is needed, and what is affordable.  The Army's want list is unaffordable.  It's not a need list.  And thus requires rationalization.

Note that I am not saying "Mortars are useless" or that "The AGLS is useless".  I am saying that the Army needs to decide and prioritize capabilities and decide where to draw the line.  It won't be pretty.  It won't be popular.  But the current flowing taps of money are coming to an end, sooner rather than later, and the Army will have to readjust to lower rates of spare part availability.  Less ammo.  Less money for large-scale movements for training.  Maybe even return to using (gasp) water buffaloes instead of bottled water to save money.  Living within that reduced funding means choices have to be made; it's naive and foolish to wish it away.

Are there savings that could be made elsewhere?  Of course.  Do we have the institutional will to do it?  Probably not.  There's no well-defined requirement for the jump companies in the 3rd Bns.  (MAJAID up north?  Well, the Boxtop crash never used infantry to jump in).  Removing that role would save funds in training costs, para allowance, and would let us close CFLAWC, handing off the mountain warfare courses to the infantry school, and contracting out any residual para training to the US.  Millions in savings and dozens of PYs saved, even after sending a few to Gagetown.   Plus reduced hours on aircraft, permitting them to perform other tasks.  Much more savings than any minor HQ rationalization would provide.

So, how about it?  Lose the jump companies and CFLAWC and keep the mortars and the AGLS?  Or what other specific changes - in the art of the possible (no "close the Snowbirds", please) -  do you propose?  Which HQs will you eliminate?  Where will those functions go?


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## Kirkhill (28 Aug 2010)

OK DAP,

I'm feeling suicidal tonight.

Change 1 - Ditch 5.56 completely and, as the C7 family reaches the end of its service life re-issue a 7.62 family and forget all this talk about "junior snipers" with their own special weapons.  

Change 2 - Eryx does sound like a winner to lose - its soft launch was nice but virtually all the modern ATGMs feature that and that 600m range ...... 

How about the CG-84?  Is it being used effectively?  We never bought the full range of ammunition that would make that system sufficiently versatile to justify that weight.  If all we want is the AT capability in the 84mm calibre why not purchase the AT-4 and issue them as rounds as needed like the M72.

A civil cheer to you.


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## Infanteer (28 Aug 2010)

Not being a budget guy, I seriously doubt small arms make a huge dent in the defence budget compared to the money tubes I see such as L1s with numerous directorates, daily frivolties (9,000 for an officer and his wife to fly to the UK for dinner comes to mind), or employing 20% of the Reserve Force so that you can get sloppy with you HR Management and use that 20% of the Reg Force to fill needless positions.

There's the money I'd cut - the money is (or should be) there so you don't have to choose between absolute basic capabilities (indirect/anti-armour fires) from the most basic fighting organizations.  And in trade, I'll be happy knowing that an infantry battalion won't get steamrolled by anyone with something bigger than pickup trucks (try doing an estimate with today's infantry battalion in the defensive; pretty sad).  What's the point of elaborate HQs, programs and computer systems if your F echelon is not able to do its job?


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## ArmyRick (28 Aug 2010)

DAP,

To echo what some of these other guys said, we do an estimate and work from mission requirements upwards.
We need both 40mm AGL and 60mm Mortar to be as combat effective as possible therefor we PRIORITIZE those systems and ditch something else of lower priority. Beleive me, there is plenty of waste to ditch...


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## KevinB (28 Aug 2010)

Infantry Weapons are a pretty insignificant budget part.
 (well outside of LAV's)

AGL's and Mortars are compelmentart weapon systems, not replacement for each other.


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...Change 1 - Ditch 5.56 completely and, as the C7 family reaches the end of its service life re-issue a 7.62 family and forget all this talk about "junior snipers" with their own special weapons...



First, nobody is talking about junior snipers.  A designated sharpshooter/marksman is nothing at all like a sniper.  They are a soldier/rifleman/infanteer first, and they can also shoot up to 600m.  I would argue that a sniper is a covert reconnaissance platform first.

A sniper takes a hell of a long time to train and generate, where as a sharpshooter would only get a couple extra weeks training and a slightly different rifle.

On a bigger note, inside the fight of 0-300m 7.62 is not the right choice.  You can tell me I'm wrong, but you'd be arguing with NATO, too.

I am not saying that 5.56 is the answer to everything, but as an Army we must look at what the group can do and not the individual.  As a group, you will kill more enemy with 5.56 than you will with 7.62 for reasons already listed.  When you need more lethal area effects past 400m you have a C6.  When you need more lethal precision effects past 400m you have a sharpshooter.

PS - Saying that we should change our entire stock of newly refurbished C7A2s in order to save money is quite an ironic suggestion.  How much is it to replace those rifles?  How much more does it cost to fire every single live or blank round with 7.62 instead of 5.56 would immediately double the cost of everything we do.


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## ArmyRick (28 Aug 2010)

One issue I had with someone who voiced "this system or that system" is what expertise does said individual have on small arms requirements for the infantry?

On this thread in particular, you can tell the grunts apart from the civies or "other trades". The more remarks I read from people who clearly lack expirience in handling small arms and the use of infantry weapons, the less I take then seriously.

So for those who don't have a clue, keep chirping, we can better identify you as an amateur.

BTW, I can't wait to my hands on the 40mm AGLS! I first said that in 2005 or 2006. Oh well, 2016 will be here before you know it and so will the 40mm AGLS!

Yeah, I am in beligerent mood today...


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

Just out of curiosity, who is it that you're writing about?  I did a quick "Control + F" for "system" and found several results; all of which seemed to be generally Infantry-type people.


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## Kirkhill (28 Aug 2010)

This equally belligerent civilian amateur is not arguing that it should be 7.62 or 5.56.  He is responding to the challenge set forth by DAP that something has to give to get the "job", whatever that may be, done.  

I won't say that 5.56 doesn't get the job done within 300m.  I will say that you apparently need 7.62 to get the job done over 300m.  I will also say that 7.62 will also get the job done within 300m.  It got the job done when I was a weekend warrior in the Molitia.  It got the job done in the Falklands.  It got the job done all around the Commonwealth, including India, Oman etc.  It also got the job done when employed by guys carrying M14s.

Can I carry 5 rounds of 5.56 for every 2 rounds of 7.62? Yes.  Which is going to result in a more effectively, and permanently, neutralized target in the greatest variety of situations?  I would argue that your current search for heavier weapons (7.62 SS, .338 Lapuas, 12.7 LRSS) suggests to this observer the 7.62.

And yes, I do know that the Sniper is the guy in the Ghillie suit and binoculars whose primary role is (or at least was) to be at the forward edge of the battalion screen supplying more information than he did covering fire.  I also understand that there is a need for the section to generate aimed fire on a battlefield crowded with bystanders.


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## Kirkhill (28 Aug 2010)

Further (and my apologies for the split post - having difficulties with the computer on longer posts) I would argue that within the battalion the issue is not whether or not you always have all the weapons necessary to confront all the threats in all environments but.....can your battalion officers coordinate the following four types of fire:  

low angle - line of sight
high angle - plunging
direct - shooter adjusts for fall of shot
indirect - third party adjustst for fall of shot

so as to achieve the desired effect, namely recreate that photograph from the Oka crisis where a lowly private, acting as the government's armed ambassador, went nose to nose with an armed insurgent and convinced the insurgent to walk away from the fight.

If they can coordinate rifles supplying all those types of fire then they have to tools to coordinate all weapons on the battlefield.

Beyond that, as in the case of the Eryx and the CG-84, I would argue that the training necessary to familiarize  an individual to put rounds on target with any low angle, direct fired ATGM is  sufficiently short that those types of weapons system can reasonably be purchased on a theater specific, as required, UOR,basis and moneye saved directed towards crew served systems, like the mortars, that need time develop a co-ordinated team.


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## ArmyRick (28 Aug 2010)

ummm...yeah...no.

Do you not find it suspicious that all the nations you refer to have all switched over to 5.56mm as their primary caliber.

Yes, we know the 7.62 was great in the falklands and the .303 was great in WWI and II, etc, etc.

You want to talk small arms calibers?

5.56 primary, for the close fight (300m and forward)
7.62 for stand off fight (C6 and I would love to see 2 marksman armed with HK417 in every platoon)

This whole argument that DAP put forth is out to lunch. Yes I realize there are only XXXX defence dollars but thats why we got 100 Leopard 2 and not 200, thats why we only got 600 some odd LAVIIIs when the original plan called for over a thousand.

When it comes to infantry small arms, they are cheap (compared to tanks, fighter aircraft, new ships). Deciding we only we need one caliber is ridicolous.

Nuff said?


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## ArmyRick (28 Aug 2010)

Kirkhill,

Can you translate that last paragraph or get to your point? I feel like I am getting dumber reading your post.

As far officers Co-ordinating fire (economy of effort?) it is taught. I don't think you have a real understanding of our current operations (COIN) and I think you under estimate the abilities of our infantry officers. Assuming I comprehended your post correctly.


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## daftandbarmy (28 Aug 2010)

IMHO, the riflemen can carry pistols if they want, as long as you have a 60mm MOR that can flush 'em out and C9s and C6s that can chop 'em up. 

A GMG alone won't be able to dig the bad guys out of a good defilade position beyond the range of your grenade launchers, and it can't be used where you can't take a vehicle anyways. Also, as the experts tell me, the best anti-sniper weapon is either another sniper or indirect fire, like a 60mm MOR.

Regardless, I think this issue has been discussed to death elsewhere in this forum, no?  ???


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## Kirkhill (28 Aug 2010)

Not really Rick,

I get your point.  I really do.  But I also get DAP's point - perhaps that is because I have moved around amongst a number of different organizations, civil and military, as employee, customer and supplier and seen that there is one verity in life:  Everything is political.

There is never enough money to do all the things everyone wants to do.  The other guy's project is always ridiculously expensive and can be done for a whole lot less than he is asking and in any case it is unnecessary.  My project is, however, absolutely essential and is being proposed on a shoestring budget and will be delivered on time an on budget.  If only I was a better salesman/politician then I could make my boss's boss's boss see that and give me my necessary dime from that other department's dollar budget.

Ex-D needs/wants a new AAW frigate.  GW needs/wants new Leos.  TV needs/wants new mortars.  CDS needs/wants new radios, computers and satellites just to see what's going on and talk to you lot.  Decisions are made.  People get p*ssed off.  That ultimately is why politicans get voted out.  As soon as they start making decisions they start losing friends.


Treasury Board and the CDS have decided they can only give the Infantry X number of dollars to get the job done.  That sucks.  But that will always be reality.

And I was around wnen the 5.56/7.62 debate  was raging.  And the reason you have the 5.56 is that somebody made a decision that p*ssed off a whole bunch of people who then rewrote the training pams to accomodate the new, and to many unpleasant, reality.

As to translations - I am sorry if I am unable to make myself understood by you.


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## Infanteer (28 Aug 2010)

I'm not too sure where savings could be made by moving from 2 primary small arms calibers to 1 - you still have to buy the same amount of bullets either way.


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm not too sure where savings could be made by moving from 2 primary small arms calibers to 1 - *you still have to buy the same amount of bullets either way.*


Not true, my NATO friend.  You see, 7.62mm is heavier, and the magazines are only 20 rounds, so...by that logic, assuming that we still provide soldiers with x amount of magazines' worth of bullets a year, we decrease that amount by 1/3.  

Stand by, we're going with 5-round .50 calibre magazines for all.  A whopping 1/6th of the cost!  ;D


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## ArmyRick (28 Aug 2010)

Section attacks are going to be real bag drive if we all humping barret 50 cal rifles (Glad I am a WO now)!


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ...a GMG alone won't be able to dig the bad guys out of a good defilade position ...



Nor can a mortar have any hope to hit a truck speeding away (which as you mentioned has been  :deadhorse: already).

But it just keeps reinforcing that they shouldn't be compared against each other because they do different things.


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Section attacks are going to be real bag drive if we all humping barret 50 cal rifles (Glad I am a WO now)!


The weapons will be .50 cal, but they can't be the baretta (too big).  Go with Desert Eagles all round ;D


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## Oh No a Canadian (28 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> The weapons will be .50 cal, but they can't be the baretta (too big).  Go with Desert Eagles all round ;D



.50 Beowulf  ;D

It was on Future Weapons so it must be what the US will soon use.


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

I started to reply to a previous post, but then thinking back to other  posts about what weapon does what within the infantry platoon, I asked myself this question:
What capability is provided by what weapon in the Infantry Platoon?
So, without further ado, here is my list.  The points *in bold* demonstrate which capability is either unique or is provided by another system out to longer ranges.  All ranges listed below are “estimates”, and in some cases are explained.  The list of capabilities are as follows:
Point fire: the ability for the soldier to fire at one target and hit it with one round.
Direct Area Suppression: the ability for the soldier/crew to fire at an area target and suppress it, thereby prohibiting that target the freedom of action.
Anti-APC Fire: the ability for the crew to fire at an APC and destroy it.
Anti-bunker fire: the ability for a crew to fire at entrenched targets and destroy them.
Indirect area suppression: the ability for a crew to fire at a target having received initial aiming points and subsequent corrections from a detached observer.
Blind/Screen/Marking: the ability for a crew to fire smoke munitions.
Illumination: the ability for a crew to provide battlefield white light or IR illumination
*Rifle:  Point fire out to 300 m *  
The range of 300 m is a bit of a stretch in my opinion, as it assumes the firer is prone-supported and firing at a stationary man-sized target.  Its useful or practicable range is certainly much less.
40mm Rifle Grenade: _Direct area suppression out to 350m_
LMG (C9):_ Direct area suppression out to 600m_
LMG (C6): _Direct area suppression out to 800m_
MMG (C6 SF): _Direct area suppression out to 1800m; indirect area suppression out to 2400m_
Coax: _Direct area suppression out to 1400m_
Pintle: _Direct area suppression out to 800m_
25mm: *Anti APC fire out to 2200m*; _direct area suppression out to 2400m_
84mm: _Anti APC fire out to 700m; battlefield illumination out to 1000m_;  *anti-bunker fire out to 500m*
60mm: *Direct and Indirect area suppression (modern systems), Illumination and blind/screen/marking over 3500m (modern 60mm Mortars).*
AGLS: _Direct area suppression out to 2000m; anti-APC  fire out to 1500m_
So, looking at the list above, there are to the detached observer a number of apparent  redundancies, and one could argue that infantry platoons only need rifles, LAV 3 APCs, Carl Gustavs and 60mm Mortars.  This, naturally, is nonsense.  LMGs and MMGs provide infantry platoons with hand-held capabilities for when the LAV 3 APC cannot influence the battlefield.  As well, even though a 60mm provides direct and indirect area suppression at ranges much longer than any other system, and even though the 60mm is man-portable, it cannot provide the reactive fire that low-angle weapons can, even in the direct fire role.  So, we now include the machine-gun back to the infantry platoon.  But which one?
The LMG (C9) is operated by one person, and the LMG (C6), though can be operated by one person, is normally crewed by two.  It has a longer range than the LMG (C9); however, there are six within the platoon, and is integral to the section, thereby providing the section commander greater flexibility.  The LMG (C6) on the other hand, is a platoon weapon, and its greatest flexibility is that when mounted on a sustained fire kit, it “morphs” into the MMG (C6), providing the platoon commander over double the range of effectiveness.  As for the COAX and the Pintle Mounted MG, they are part of the LAV 3 APC, therefore, they stay with the platoon along with both the LMG (C9), LMG (C6) and MMG (C6).  The latter two will henceforth be referred to as the GPMG (C6), as they are one in the same gun.
The role of the 40mm Rifle Grenade is less clear.  It can hit targets in the open and in limited cover, and it is integral to the section, at a scale of issue of two per section.  Just as the LMG (C9) provides the section commander with integral direct area suppression out to 600m, the 40mmm Rifle Grenade adds an extra dimension with its ability to provide high-explosive capabilities out to 350m.  This high-explosive capability is good for targets in limited cover, including in buildings or thin-skinned vehicles.
The last weapon to be considered is the ALGS.  It provides a unique capability if and only if the LAV 3 is not able to affect the battle (Anti APC fire out to 1500m).  Having said that, it is not man-portable for long distances, therefore making it useful only in a defensive role, such as mounted in a sangar at a FOB or other defended locality.    For direct area suppression, it does have a marginally better range than the MMG (C6); however, as stated, it is not able to be easily manoeuvred about the battlespace for any useful distance.
So, having said all this, my question to DLR is this: just what capability gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?  Whatever it can do can be done by other existing weapons within the platoon.  A C6 and a 25mm can both hit that moving truck, and given the stabilised turret on the 25mm, it can do so much more accurately at longer ranges.  The GPMG can provide longer-ranged area suppression (indirect), and is by far much more man portable.  An AGLS is tripod-mounted, and the HK 40mm  (I'm not sure what kind we are getting, but could very well be this, and it's lighter than the US AGLS)   I'm not sure how much the ammo weighs..
So, anyone, what gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

Techno,

Awesome points of course, but in Plato-like fashion I will attempt to make your counter-argument to prove or disprove your argument; not out of disagreeing but in order to find the truth.

Much of your logic I believe can be thinned down to this:  The LAV can do all of your heavy precision + suppression killing when it is there with the soldiers, and since the C16 is not easily man-portable it provides no use since a LAV will always be close by.

So here are my best answers:

1.  Why must the argument boil down to the LAV being the vehicle?  There are sub points to this:

a.  Seeing how long we've had the mortar and C6, they have both outlived many vehicles, thus we must assume the C16 will outlive the LAV.

b.  Even if assuming the LAV is the answer for Mech Infantry, what about Motorized Infantry?  What happens if we de-couple ourselves from the LAV in a non-IED/mine environment?  Why can't the Infantry have the C16 on a LUVW cupola?  Why can't a Recce Platoon have the C16 in an ATV trailer to move it around and then place it on a tripod when static?  Why can't an IRU or NEO carry a C16 in a crate and carry it around in a pickup bed when they get where they're going if LAVs will take weeks to get there?

c.  Why even Infantry?  Why can't the Log convoys have a C16 on the roof of an HLVW / AHSVS to do their precision + supression killing when there aren't any LAVs around?  Why can't the Armour have a C16 on one of the troop's pintles when a 7.62 or 105/120mm doesn't seem like the right choice?

2.  How non-portable is it, anyway?  

a.  As per the comparison test where it was theoretically trialled against a mortar, the difference between the two systems is that the C16 is gun heavy and ammo light where as the mortar is tube light and ammo heavy.  So ironically the more you use the C16 the lighter it gets in comparison (I think it was something like 3-4 fire missions where it passed the mortar and just got lighter after that).

b.  Does man portable mean that it has to go everywhere at a fast pace?  Did the 81mm mortar or .50cal MG ever go anywhere dismounted at a high rate of knots?  Were they equally useless because of their weight, or could they be broken down into a crew of three who had to suck it up (at the cost of their spine) and do what they could?  Or were those systems also brought a few km up the road whenever an MLVW was close by?

3.  Does it have to be brought everywhere at all?  We have taken systems like the C6, 84, and 60 and made them permanent fixtures, but there are also certain systems like the ERYX that have become "sometimes" weapons (static defence, etc).  

4.  Worst-case scenario: Say we face an enemy with air superiority to us and they destroy all of our LAVs relatively soon because Finger Wood-like spots to back in and cam up don't exist everywhere.  Then what?  Don't we have overlapping effects for a reason, or did the cool guy on Navy Seals who said "Two is One and One is None" have it wrong?

I have tried my best in the name of finding the answers to these questions.  I also feel very good that I belong to a military where professionals at arms can have these discussions.


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> c.  Why even Infantry?  Why can't the Log convoys have a C16 on the roof of an HLVW / AHSVS to do their precision + supression killing when there aren't any LAVs around?  Why can't the Armour have a C16 on one of the troop's pintles when a 7.62 or 105/120mm doesn't seem like the right choice?


I limited my argument deliberately to the infantry.  For other arms and services, I agree that a C16 on a pintle on anything would be perfect, especially for future missions in which we may have LUVW (or something similar).  Having said that, "they" have decided, in their infinite wisdom, to only have it ground mounted :

So, for capabilities-only arguments, with Mech Infantry (supposedly we are all "mechanised", yet we still have para coys....so....), there are other things out there.  But unless they put a C16 on a vehicle, I see no role for it _in the infantry platoon_.


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> ...supposedly we are all "mechanised", yet we still have para coys...



Don't knock the Para Coys!  Everything can be Airborne nowadays:







Small detail: Not that the rest of the scene is believable, but do you think if you were falling through the sky in a tank that you would have a nice pile of brass under the gun?

[/tangent] [C16]


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## vonGarvin (28 Aug 2010)

maintaining the tangent:
I seriously _just _ recovered from laughing at that!  I must have laughed for five minutes straight!  Thanks, I needed that laugh.


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## Franko (28 Aug 2010)

Ahhh yes, tank paratroopers.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOSK-7Vrijg

Enjoy the tangent.

Regards


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## Infanteer (28 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> So, looking at the list above, there are to the detached observer a number of apparent  redundancies, and one could argue that infantry platoons only need rifles, LAV 3 APCs, Carl Gustavs and 60mm Mortars.  This, naturally, is nonsense.  LMGs and MMGs provide infantry platoons with hand-held capabilities for when the LAV 3 APC cannot influence the battlefield.  As well, even though a 60mm provides direct and indirect area suppression at ranges much longer than any other system, and even though the 60mm is man-portable, it cannot provide the reactive fire that low-angle weapons can, even in the direct fire role.  So, we now include the machine-gun back to the infantry platoon.  But which one?



What is the definition and difference between "point fire" and "suppressive fire"?  These seem to me to be two different concepts, thus undermining your model.

As well, the Storr articles I referenced elsewhere on this site point to empirical data that points to machine guns, and direct/indirect high-explosive as being the real killers on the battlefield.  How does this impact your model?

Finally - what the weapons do is nice, but perhaps what they do to the enemy is more more important (you touched on it with the idea of suppression).  How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out?  From my understanding, this is very rarely the case; rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.  How do weapons effects make this happen?


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## SeanNewman (28 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out? ... rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.



Clausewitz?  Is that you??


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> What is the definition and difference between "point fire" and "suppressive fire"?  These seem to me to be two different concepts, thus undermining your model.


I don't see how this undermines anything.  I'm talking about individual weapons, and their capabilities, what they allow an infantry platoon to do with various tools.
"Point fire" I loosely define as one person firing one weapon at one target.  Yes, I realise that several rifles together at an area target can provide suppression fire, but I don't refer to "suppressive fire" but "area suppressive fire".  Semantics, perhaps, but again, loosely defined, the ability to fire at a target area that consists of several individual targets with the aim of limiting or negating that target area from manoeuvre, be it firing back or moving out of the target area.  


			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As well, the Storr articles I referenced elsewhere on this site point to empirical data that points to machine guns, and direct/indirect high-explosive as being the real killers on the battlefield.  How does this impact your model?


It doesn't.  I'm talking solely about the integral tools that the infantry platoon can use.  


			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Finally - *what the weapons do is nice, but perhaps what they do to the enemy is more more important * (you touched on it with the idea of suppression).  How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out?  From my understanding, this is very rarely the case; rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.  How do weapons effects make this happen?


I talk solely about what they do to the enemy, so I'm not sure what you mean.  I also didn't talk about manoeuvre, the use of shock action, the tactics, techniques and procedures that we use.  These are simply the tools that provide capabilities to an infantry platoon, and by using those capabilities effectively as a start.  Weapons effects are all I am talking about, and at what ranges they can do that.  

As an example, suspend reality for a minute, and imagine two identically armed groups of men arrayed on the battlefield.  They all have the same number of rifles, machine guns, etc that a Canadian Platoon has.  All members of both groups know how to use their weapons.  But on side "A", the leaders know how to employ those weapons, know tactics, leadership, etc.  On the other, they don't know jack about the employment of those weapons.  Sure, number 1 on the GPMG knows his burst rates, how to aim, how to record targets, etc.  But that side is lacking higher knowledge.  That side we'll call side "B".  Side "A" will then know how to use those tools and beat side "B" every time.

Another analogy is to imagine Mike Holmes versus me in a house building contest.  We have the same number of hammers, screws, nails, etc.  He will beat me hands down, as I am rushed to the hospital for nailing my hand to something.

So, in conclusion, we have to start somewhere, and if someone wants to say that all we need is MGs and high explosives, that's fine.  But in the time before that HE starts dropping, perhaps the platoon can only suppress.  Keep that in mind, and re-read what I posted.


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## dapaterson (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Another analogy is to imagine Mike Holmes versus me in a house building contest.  We have the same number of hammers, screws, nails, etc.  He will beat me hands down, as I am rushed to the hospital for nailing my hand to something.



Yes, but you have 60mm mortars to call down fire on his position...


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## daftandbarmy (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> So, anyone, what gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?



The LCF-envy gap that exists between us and the UK & US forces, of course  ;D


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## ArmyRick (29 Aug 2010)

Do we not have 33 x LAVIII Infantry Section Carriers (The LAVIII without turrets equipped with nanook RWS)? 

Why not equip some of thos with the AGLS?

I could imagine a few other places that AGLS will slide in.

I do agree with the point that it NEVER should be a "you can have 60mm or 40mm but not both" situation. 

I absolutely agree that leadership needs to know how to properly site and employ their support weapons. Guys would get nailed for that when we did our combat estimates on 3B.


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Yes, but you have 60mm mortars to call down fire on his position...


:rofl:


Not if DLR has its way ;D


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Do we not have 33 x LAVIII Infantry Section Carriers (The LAVIII without turrets equipped with nanook RWS)?
> 
> Why not equip some of thos with the AGLS?


Because that makes perfect sense, that's why.  I say this because the plan, right now, is to make them all tripod-mounted.  All we have to do is think of the AGLS as a 40mm-Fifty Cal (similar roles, characteristics, etc), and use accordingly.  IMHO anyway.


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## Infanteer (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I don't see how this undermines anything.  I'm talking about individual weapons, and their capabilities, what they allow an infantry platoon to do with various tools.
> "Point fire" I loosely define as one person firing one weapon at one target.



Yes, but I could suppress you with point fire and I could provide point fire with an LMG or GPMG.


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## SeanNewman (29 Aug 2010)

I'm not a fan of the use of "point fire" and those weapon systems.

You can use a MG or C16 to hit a specific truck for example, but you could not use them to hit one person in a group of many.

In the Infantry context I would save point/precision fire for something like the C7 inside of 200m (book says 400m but that is unrealistic if moving around the battlefieeld) and a sharpshooter rifle potentially doubling that (the book will say 600m).

I don't know what else one could call it though, so maybe there is a distinction between point and precision, even in the Infantry context.

_(*Note*, Infantry "precision" for me means one specific person, where as in the Sniper context it has a more precise meaning)._


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yes, but I could suppress you with point fire and *I could provide point fire with an LMG or GPMG*.


No, you can't, not effectively.  But you are completely missing the point.  I mean, I can also open beer bottles with a C7.  I'm talking about the main roles of individual weapons and how they can be used. Hell, a LAV 3 APC can fire single shot, right?  Big friggin' deal. 

If I were to argue that an LMG or a GPMG can be used for both direct area suppression fire and  point fire, then why have rifles?  *That* is the kind of question that "they" would ask. 

Now, we all know that weapons can be used in a variety of ways.  The point is the unique capabilities that each brings to the fore.  The fact that some can be carried and operated by one person (eg: rifle) and others require a crew (GPMG) and others aren't very man-portable (LAV 3 APC), this requires some overlap.

So, my question reverts to: what can the AGLS bring that is not already there to the infantry platoon?


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> I'm not a fan of the use of "point fire" and those weapon systems.
> 
> You can use a MG or C16 to hit a specific truck for example, but you could not use them to hit one person in a group of many.
> 
> ...


So, "precision" has a more "precise" meaning?  :rofl:
(Sorry, couldn't resist)
As loose definitions, I would offer that "point fire" means the ability to hit a man sized target _most _ of the time, where "precision fire" means the ability to hit a man sized target _all _ of the time. (50% of the time, it works every time! ;D)

But, in all seriousness, that distinction would need to be fleshed out, lest some bean counter "up there" look down and say "Well, your rifles do the same.  If you want longer ranges for that capability, then why doesn't everyone get it?"  Though I think that you and I both know that there is a difference.


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## Kirkhill (29 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yes, but I could suppress you with point fire and I could provide point fire with an LMG or GPMG.



Or for that matter a section of riflemen.  Just as a section of riflemen can engage a target behind a ridge simply by pointing their rifles to the sky and adjusting their aim in response to a third party observer calling fall of shot.

Both of those are possible, and effective, and have been trained for in the past (circa 1910) but mechanisation, in the form of MGs (rifle calibre, cannons and grenade caliber as well as Quick Firing field guns with shrapnel and even automatic mortars) made the business of chucking lead pellets at the enemy much more efficient in terms of applied PYs.

How many lead pellet chuckers do you need to get the job done?   How many do you need to be able to kill a specific individual and how many do you need to broadcast the pellets?


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## SeanNewman (29 Aug 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> How many do you need to be able to kill a specific individual and how many do you need to broadcast the pellets?



Basic tactics say a section because wherever there is a lone enemy there may be 1-2 more nearby, so in order to keep something resembling a 3:1 ratio we need a section.

And in that section we have:
2 x LMGs.
5 x C7s, two of those with M203s.
1 x sharpshooter rifle (pending).


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## Kirkhill (29 Aug 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Basic tactics say a section because wherever there is a lone enemy there may be 1-2 more nearby, so in order to keep something resembling a 3:1 ratio we need a section.
> 
> And in that section we have:
> 2 x LMGs.
> ...



In my continuing effort to be obnoxious I would offer that your M203s are also designed to "chuck lead pellets" in broadcast fashion just as the 81 mm HE is.  However they can broadcast them on the other side of a brick wall or a ridge in an effiecient manner with minimal expenditure of PYs.  

Also, unlike MGs and massed riflemen, you dont have  to worry about springs breaking at inopportune times and imposing a maintenance burden on folks like our Aussie brother who must not be named.

Mortars don't break down as often or as easily as MGs and QF guns, therefore their availability is higher than an MG

                                                  
An interesting addendum to further the discussion: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-90/Appb.htm




.


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## Kirkhill (29 Aug 2010)

Or ask yourself another question:

If all your MGs breakdown or run out of ammunition and you are reliant on hand grenades, rifle grenades, M203s and/or 60 mm mortars could you broadcast pellets to suppress both an attack on open ground to your front and enemy forming up over a ridgeline?

Now ask the same question only this time relying on MGs and similar automatic weapons.

My money suggests that the simple, high angle, low velocity weapons are both more reliable and more flexible and thus more useful than complex reciprocating machines throwing individual highly energetic pellets.


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

This appears to be taking another tangent, and for that I apologise.

In any event, even the basic capabilities I listed above are only the tip of the iceberg of the various capabilities and characteristics of each system.  But the basic capabilities are a quick indicator of what each system does.  So, again, *for the mechanised infantry platoon*, what does it provide that cannot be provided by another, _existing_ system?


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

Now an historical example from the US Army:


> a. Company C was leading the 39th Regiment's advance, with its 1st and 3d platoons in front and 2d platoon trailing. Suddenly, the Germans opened fire with flak cannon and machine guns from hidden positions. The 1st and 3d platoons were pinned down, unable to move. At the same time, German mortars and artillery began to fall on the 2d platoon and the company command group.
> 
> b. The company commander took the 2d platoon and a machine gun section with him and tried a sweeping maneuver to the right. He was unable to get any farther forward than the right flank of the 3d platoon. With all its rifle platoons pinned down by close and accurate enemy direct fire, the company was facing heavy casualties.
> 
> ...


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## daftandbarmy (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Now an historical example from the US Army:



It would be nice to have a platoon of these in direct support of a company attack, no?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kBdmLgzBKY

Of course, this is the way I preferred to fire them:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdbMpLHE8ww&feature=related

And an example of the Royal Marines using the 51mm MOR in their firebase... which you couldn't do with a GMG in the dismounted role

 @ 1:23  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqJ-QQB8LcQ&feature=related


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## Infanteer (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> No, you can't, not effectively.  But you are completely missing the point.  I mean, I can also open beer bottles with a C7.  I'm talking about the main roles of individual weapons and how they can be used. Hell, a LAV 3 APC can fire single shot, right?  Big friggin' deal.
> 
> If I were to argue that an LMG or a GPMG can be used for both direct area suppression fire and  point fire, then why have rifles?  *That* is the kind of question that "they" would ask.



I'm not missing the point - I'm asking the question based on the model you presented.  In your model, you make a distinction between a rifle and a machine gun which I questioned.  Everyone here seems to agree that "point fire" and "suppressive fire" are two completely different concepts, thus pointing to flaws with your model which attempts to use "weapons effects" as indicator of effectiveness and utility.  "Weapons effects" may be a useful model (I think so, at least), but as far as I can tell we haven't classified them properly.

Is "suppression" even a capability of a weapon, or an effect of its employment when combined with other factors?  "Suppressive fire" seems to be a characteristic of anything that shoots, no?

We can write this off as semantics, but I think such vague definitions don't do our understanding of weapons, effects and organization any good.  A rational model is good for starters, but we need some empirical data to add to the mix.  We wouldn't want to take a faulty model to them, would we?


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## Kirkhill (29 Aug 2010)

Wouldn't a sniper picking off people that stick their head above the parapet, a la WW1, and thus discourage them from sticking their heads up, as is required by machine gun crews, be considered suppressive fire?


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## ArmyRick (29 Aug 2010)

First lets talk modern operations (or I am going to grab my winchester and hop on my granddad's horse)

Look at the current threat. An elusive enemy that blends itself in with local population and wears no distinct uniform. He can adapt to our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and makes some use of modern technology (such as cell phones). 
They prefer to attack us with IED (sometimes with impressive results) and then may/may not follow up with an attack with RPG, AK and RPK weapons. 
They do make use of trucks and motorcycles and even on occassion will form together to fight.
They can have unique information network based on watching us when we do not realize it.
They will intimidate and attack local populations or friendly forces they can overwhelm

That is the current THREAT.

I do not agree with references to WWI, napolean or any other war fought more than 20 years ago. Technology, tactics and the threat have changed the shape of warfare.

How does GMG/AGLS fit into this?

I agree, I do not see it having a place within the LAVIII equiped platoon unless that platoon has a ISC. However for other vehicles involved with Recce, force protection, etc, etc. Sure fire away!


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## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm not missing the point - I'm asking the question based on the model you presented.  In your model, you make a distinction between a rifle and a machine gun which I questioned.  Everyone here seems to agree that "point fire" and "suppressive fire" are two completely different concepts, thus pointing to flaws with your model which attempts to use "weapons effects" as indicator of effectiveness and utility.  "Weapons effects" may be a useful model (I think so, at least), but as far as I can tell we haven't classified them properly.
> 
> Is "suppression" even a capability of a weapon, or an effect of its employment when combined with other factors?  "Suppressive fire" seems to be a characteristic of anything that shoots, no?
> 
> We can write this off as semantics, but I think such vague definitions don't do our understanding of weapons, effects and organization any good.  A rational model is good for starters, but we need some empirical data to add to the mix.  We wouldn't want to take a faulty model to them, would we?


I'm sorry, but *you have missed the point.  Completely*.
At no time do I "attempt to use "weapons effects" as indicator of effectiveness and utility".  I simply point out what their capabilities  are.  Their main capabilities, in general terms on an internet forum.  And at no time do I divert from the infantry platoon, I don't speak of organisation and use admitedly simplistic terms, but in my simplicity, I believe I have hit the nail on the head (my lack of skill with carpentry notwithstanding). 
To revisit: 
Target: one individual or vehicle.
Target Area: several targets within an area
Point Fire: loosely defined as the ability to quickly hit a man-sized target with a high possiblity of success.
Precision Fire: loosely defined as the ability to hit a man-sized target with near 100% possibility of succes AND that fire has negligible effects on others.
Area Suppressive Fire: loosely defined as the ability to engage a target area with the effect that those within the target area lose their freedom of action.

Anyway, you have diverted from my question: what does the AGLS bring to the table that isn't already there in an infantry platoon?  But, if you can do better, the floor is yours.

I'm outta here.

Edit to add: your questions add no value and you seem to be diverting from the points I laid out previously, and I admit that there is more to any weapon that it's capability.  There are such things as the terminal ballistics involved, ease of use, portability, flexibility, etc.  If you wish to clutter things  up by getting all philosophical on the matter, that's fine.  I would prefer to keep the discussion in easy to comprehend terms.  

And, to emphasise my point:

*WHAT DOES AN AGLS PROVIDE TO AN INFANTRY PLATOON????  ANYONE?   BUELLER???*


----------



## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> First lets talk modern operations (or I am going to grab my winchester and hop on my granddad's horse)
> 
> Look at the current threat. An elusive enemy that blends itself in with local population and wears no distinct uniform. He can adapt to our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and makes some use of modern technology (such as cell phones).
> They prefer to attack us with IED (sometimes with impressive results) and then may/may not follow up with an attack with RPG, AK and RPK weapons.
> ...


Yeah, got it. That's today's threat in one single theatre of operations.  Thanks for that.


			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I do not agree with references to WWI, napolean or any other war fought more than 20 years ago. Technology, tactics and the threat have changed the shape of warfare.


Yes, warfare may have changed.  Oh, wait, the Boers did this shit years ago.  And back 21+years ago, there was zero threat of fighting in an urban setting.  Oh, wait, Germany was full of cities, but they were Germans, so, they don't count.  

Listen, bullets still hurt, bombs still fall from the sky.  Yes, I agree, "warfare" may have changed.  But then again, maybe not that much...


			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> How does GMG/AGLS fit into this?


That's the question du jour, though, isn't it?  I don't see it fitting into an infantry platoon.


			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I agree, I do not see it having a place within the LAVIII equiped platoon unless that platoon has a ISC.


I disagree, it doesn't fit within that infantry platoon, LAV 3 APC or not.  If the LAV 3 APC is there, there are four 25mm chain guns, stabilised, at that.  If that platoon goes dismounted, we need a few Schwarzeneggers to carry the thing and tripod.  Then there's the ammo.


			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> However for other vehicles involved with Recce, force protection, etc, etc. Sure fire away!


Perhaps, I'll let those in Recce, force protection, etc, comment on that.  And remember, kids, the Mensa candidates at DLR have decreed that it will be ground-mount only.


----------



## ArmyRick (29 Aug 2010)

Technoviking, 

Did you carefully read my 2nd last line you qouted? I said I do NOT see it having aplace within a LAVIII platoon unless one of those LAVs has no turret and is equipped with the RWS instead.

We actually agree on that point, don't we. Basically if we have all the LAVs with 25mm then no GMG for the platoon.


----------



## vonGarvin (29 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Technoviking,
> 
> Did you carefully read my 2nd last line you qouted? I said I do NOT see it having aplace within a LAVIII platoon unless one of those LAVs has no turret and is equipped with the RWS instead.
> 
> We actually agree on that point, don't we. Basically if we have all the LAVs with 25mm then no GMG for the platoon.


/facepalm/
I misread it, sorry.  I think we are in violent agreement.  an AGLS would make PERFECT sense mounted on a  vehicle.  (sorry)  (I misread ISC and thought you mean "infanty section carrier")



Mea Culpa


----------



## Infanteer (29 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> That is the current THREAT.
> 
> I do not agree with references to WWI, napolean or any other war fought more than 20 years ago. Technology, tactics and the threat have changed the shape of warfare.



A minor threat at best.  If we consider mediocre irregular forces as the THREAT then we're setting ourselves up for a fall when an modern fighting formation hits us.  At no point are irregulars a physical threat to our state or our deployed military forces.  They can sting us if we're not careful, but they're hard pressed to conduct any meaningful tactical actions.  A true threat is something that can cause 152 KIA in day, not 5 years.

The references to previous conflicts are useful, as the empirical evidence they provide is concrete proof of what happens when people fight.

As well, how has warfare changed?



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> Anyway, you have diverted from my question: what does the AGLS bring to the table that isn't already there in an infantry platoon?  But, if you can do better, the floor is yours.
> 
> I'm outta here.
> 
> Edit to add: your questions add no value and you seem to be diverting from the points I laid out previously, and I admit that there is more to any weapon that it's capability.  There are such things as the terminal ballistics involved, ease of use, portability, flexibility, etc.  If you wish to clutter things  up by getting all philosophical on the matter, that's fine.  I would prefer to keep the discussion in easy to comprehend terms.



Don't get angry - if you don't want to discuss the matter in detail, just say so.  I still contend that your line of reasoning is off.  Suppression is not directly related with the capabilities (point/precise/area) that a weapon produces.  It's an after-effect of employment - I could suppress you with point fire with a sling shot if I was good enough.  Therefore, nix that statement from your list of weapons capabilities.

Your model states the difference between an AGL and a MG being simply one of range (since they both are, in your terms, "area suppressive weapons").  The "effort to keep things simple" completely ignores the fact that AGLs deliver high explosive onto the target whereas MGs clearly don't.  Hence why your model doesn't answer the question (and begs for the Bueller response).  The ability to deliver HE to a target is - at least to me - the key point in answering your root question of "what an AGLS provides to an infantry platoon". 

LAVs also deliver HE, which is why I think we are all tracking the limited utility of these things when put up against an M242 Bushmaster.  That being said, should we take a vehicle with a turret as a given?


----------



## SeanNewman (30 Aug 2010)

Agreed in terms of the threat.

Also, since we are so close to being done Afghanistan I would argue that any focus on that mission in training sets us up for failure by fighting the last war.


----------



## ArmyRick (30 Aug 2010)

Rubbing my crystal ball, I don't fore see us battling it out with mass armour formations or any real well organized militaries.

The world is full of unstable, irregular regimes/war lords/dictators, etc, etc.

I would bet that any future enemy will adopt some of the talibans tactics.

Takers?


----------



## SeanNewman (30 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I would bet that any future enemy will adopt some of the talibans tactics.
> Takers?



I don't think the Taliban is doing anything new.  They are using the best tactics they can for being significantly less powerful in terms of military might.

Any force we fight that can't stand up to what we put forward is better off blending in as best they can, prolonging the fight as long as they can, and slowly attriting us until we quit.

However, that does not mean our training's main effort shouldn't be against an equal foe who goes head to head with us


----------



## Fishbone Jones (30 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Rubbing my crystal ball, I don't fore see us battling it out with mass armour formations or any real well organized militaries.
> 
> The world is full of unstable, irregular regimes/war lords/dictators, etc, etc.
> 
> ...





			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> I don't think the Taliban is doing anything new.  They are using the best tactics they can for being significantly less powerful in terms of military might.
> 
> Any force we fight that can't stand up to what we put forward is better off blending in as best they can, prolonging the fight as long as they can, and slowly attriting us until we quit.
> 
> However, that does not mean our training's main effort shouldn't be against an equal foe who goes head to head with us



Guys,

Not sure just where it is right now, but there is a recent thread on this already. Watch the tangent. This thread has already skewed too many different ways already.

Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## Infanteer (30 Aug 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Rubbing my crystal ball, I don't fore see us battling it out with mass armour formations or any real well organized militaries.
> 
> The world is full of unstable, irregular regimes/war lords/dictators, etc, etc.
> 
> I would bet that any future enemy will adopt some of the talibans tactics.



If you have a crystal ball that works, where did you get it.  A "future enemy" (whomever that is) could be just as likely to seek some conventional advantage to nullify our (usual) preponderant strength so that he can achieve his aims decisively.  Nobody here can predict the future and things like Russia crashing into Georgia a few years back are good examples of "when armies collide".  As Petamocto has aptly put it, we're best off preparing for the most dangerous enemy.  

Either way, good training and equipment will handle both.


----------



## McG (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Wow, after six + years, the name has gone from:
> Company Area Suppression Weapon, to
> Close Area Suppression Weapon, to
> C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher System
> ...


It is quite common that the weapon/vehicle/"thingermajig" that a project delivers comes with a name other than the official project title.  Given some of the extraneous, vague, goofy and/or fruity project titles, this is not neccesarily a bad thing.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Rubbing my crystal ball, I don't fore see us battling it out with mass armour formations or any real well organized militaries.


The "great powers" of the world were saying the same things in 1910 and 1935.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Wouldn't a sniper picking off people that stick their head above the parapet, a la WW1, and thus discourage them from sticking their heads up, as is required by machine gun crews, be considered suppressive fire?


Yes.  A well concealed shooter (sniper or otherwise) taking single well aimed shots can cause a significantly larger force to go to ground/cover.  Such a shooter could bring a dismounted platoon to a full stop and hold-up a company long enough for indirect fires to engage.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I simply point out what their capabilities  are.


... but capabilities need to be looked at with limitations to get a true appreciation of a weapon system.  There is no perfect weapon and so there is a trade-off made for every increase in terminal effect, range, precision, accuracy, supportability, portability, engagement time, etc, etc.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> WHAT DOES AN AGLS PROVIDE TO AN INFANTRY PLATOON????


Our firepower doctrine calls for a spectrum of weapon systems with overlapping capabilities & diverging limitations.  In this way, there should never be a situation which prevents us from employing all capabilities even if ground/environment/other prevent us from using one or two specific weapons.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Your model states the difference between an AGL and a MG being simply one of range (since they both are, in your terms, "area suppressive weapons").  The "effort to keep things simple" completely ignores the fact that AGLs deliver high explosive onto the target whereas MGs clearly don't.  Hence why your model doesn't answer the question (and begs for the Bueller response).  The ability to deliver HE to a target is - at least to me - the key point in answering your root question of "what an AGLS provides to an infantry platoon".


On the AGL vs MG comparison - in addition to just HE (or HEDP, or HEI, etc), the modern AGL can have airbursting munitions.  Neither MG nor LAV cannon do this.


----------



## dapaterson (30 Aug 2010)

Well, among others, the AGLS provides increased job security for EME technicians (EO Techs in particular) as it has an increased degree of complexity compared to a mortar.


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Well, among others, the AGLS provides increased job security for EME technicians (EO Techs in particular) as it has an increased degree of complexity compared to a mortar.


:rofl:
Well, they could keep a mortar for DP 1 EO tech so they practice with tubes with nails in them before progressing!  8)


----------



## McG (30 Aug 2010)

Are you pro-mortar or anti-AGL?  Right now you are coming off as the later, and I could convince Treasury Board that we don't need either just by putting you in a room with someone using a same approach to argument from the CASW camp.  Really, there are roles for both types of weapon.  Instead of positively arguing for what we need, this thread is looking at just two pieces in the whole suite of dismounted weapons and negatively dissecting each.  Limitation of resources mean we cannot have everything.  The “tool box” is not big enough for everything, so instead of arguing tools out of the tool box – lets empty the box and make an argument for which tools go back in.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> WHAT WOULD AN AGLS PROVIDE TO AN INFANTRY PLATOON THAT IS NOT ALREADY BEING PROVIDED BY THE EXISTING FAMILY OF INFANTRY PLATOON WEAPONS?


A broader spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations.  I thought you believed in that concept.


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> A broader spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations.  I thought you believed in that concept.


I raise the Bullshit flag on that, given that it is not man-portable, and it brings nothing to the table that isn't already there.


An AGLS is an awesome weapon.  Given its weight, mount it on a vehicle.  Otherwise, give them to anyone but the infantry.  We already have a broad spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations.  
I'll ask nicer this time.

Would some one please tell me, what would an AGLS bring to the table that is not already available in an infantry platoon?


----------



## daftandbarmy (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Would some one please tell me, what would an AGLS bring to the table that is not already available in an infantry platoon?



It would close the dangerous and growing 'me too' gap currently present between the CF and our allies, like the UK and the US, who already deploy a GMG.  ;D


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It would close the dangerous and growing 'me too' gap currently present between the CF and our allies, like the UK and the US, who already deploy a GMG.  ;D


:rofl:
In that case, I want mortar platoons back, just like our allies.  ;D


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> Are you pro-mortar or anti-AGL?


Re-reading your post, I am not talking AGLS vs. Mortar.  I'm asking a simple question:
What does the AGLS bring to the infantry platoon that is not already provided better by other systems?

You see, your point is part of the problem.  Way back when, when the earth was still cooling and there were tours to the top of the World Trade Center, "someone" said that the mortar was a thing of the past and that we needed a grenade launcher.  Well, the earth cooled, the WTC fell, and we found ourselves in combat.  And that attitude still lives on.  

Don't divert from the very simple question: what does it bring that's not already there?

Edit to add: in spite of making large font in my question, it has been missed.  Therefore, I will make it smaller, because maybe then SOMEONE will RTFQ.


----------



## a_majoor (30 Aug 2010)

When you ask the question in the form "what does a tripod mounted AGL bring to the table that existing weapons don't" then the answer is "nothing".

This means the CASW program has been an expensive tangent and consumed large amounts of time and money for very little result (we don't even have an AGL to show for the process). Since we have a real question for a starting point, then the obvious (to me) follow up is to ask what *does* bring something new to the table that existing weapons do not. This means we *should* be looking at lots of different systems and solutions, as well as asking what the AGL can do that nothing else can (vehicle mounted RWS weapons systems, for example).

By this reasoning, we should be considering a wide array of weapons (a few favorites of mine):

Starstreak: provides mounted/dismounted AA protection against aircraft, helicopters and UAV's, as well as a secondary use against LAV class targets (KE on impact similar to a 40mm cannon shell). The high speed and man in the loop operator system allows engagements out to 6000m in under 5 sec with little chance of being jammed or foiled by countermeasures.

Breech loading automatic mortars. These provide the ability to fire large calibre HE projectiles in both the direct and indirect roles. A 60mm version would have devastating effect against bunkers and the like, and still be able to drop rounds on defiladed targets. An 81mm would be a vehicle mounted or towed weapon, but have the same advantages as a 60mm version.

Lightweight AGL's. Unlike the current idea of a CASW, lightweight AGL's pack a similar punch in a package about as large and heavy as a GPMG with SF kit. This would answer most of the objections to the CASW as currently described. This also segues into man portable high velocity grenade launchers. With proper optics, a man portable single shot weapon that fires HV grenades would provide the ability to supress or destroy targets at considerable range .

I'm sure that many other weapons and systems can be considered as well.


----------



## SeanNewman (30 Aug 2010)

Not making this anything about the mortar, can we spread this into the Fire Control System (FCS)?

Something that bothers me about this purchase, and the simulated comparison was that it had a lot to do with this magical FCS that doesn't yet exist, and when it does exist will be just one more complicated system away from the KISS principle.

IMO, whoever uses the C16 (not Infantry for argument's sake), what they need is a simple Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) as the UK calls it.  Not a wonder weapon, not something you need to lase a target with and plug grids into a computer, just something that you load, ready, aim, and fire until the enemy is dead.

Do soldiers (Pte-Gen) really need yet another complicated system to learn?  Are lessons not learned from the 522 radio?


----------



## Infanteer (30 Aug 2010)

I still think the answer to the original question is "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him".  The M242 Bushmaster alost can do that, but we don't always have LAV with us to provide that fire.  Aside from mech infantry, defending COPs/Patrol Bases seems to be a good fit.  As well, perhaps mounted on a MBT as a method of close protection.  Artillery gun lines could take them and give the Infantry their 81mm "Local Protection" mortars back.  LAV ISCs and any other turretless vehicle would be a good fit (a mix of AGL and HMG is a well-known combo).  This is obviously a weapon that is too versatile to give up.  It is obviously also a weapon that doesn't replace "deliver indirect fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him" - I'll believe that when I see both weapons employed and we quit bringing a mortar because the CASW is simply more effective and foolproof.



			
				Petamocto said:
			
		

> Not making this anything about the mortar, can we spread this into the Fire Control System (FCS)?
> 
> Something that bothers me about this purchase, and the simulated comparison was that it had a lot to do with this magical FCS that doesn't yet exist, and when it does exist will be just one more complicated system away from the KISS principle.



Agreed 100%.  Although not a luddite, I'm a bit suspect of a system that has a computer AND special fuzes to operate.


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I still think the answer to the original question is "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him".  The M242 Bushmaster alost can do that, but we don't always have LAV with us to provide that fire.  Aside from mech infantry, defending COPs/Patrol Bases seems to be a good fit.  As well, perhaps mounted on a MBT as a method of close protection.  Artillery gun lines could take them and give the Infantry their 81mm "Local Protection" mortars back.  LAV ISCs and any other turretless vehicle would be a good fit (a mix of AGL and HMG is a well-known combo).  This is obviously a weapon that is too versatile to give up.  It is obviously also a weapon that doesn't replace "deliver indirect fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him" - I'll believe that when I see both weapons employed and we quit bringing a mortar because the CASW is simply more effective and foolproof.


1.  Why "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him"?  Why HE?  Why not kinetic energy?  Why blast energy and fragmentation?  But, if we must, then the 60 mm does that already, as do the 4 x M242s in the platoon.  
2.  No, you don't always have the LAV there to provide that fire.  So, if they are not there, then the assumption is that you have walked or have flown in.  You will need something man-portable.
3.  I only speak of Mech Infantry, because we have no other kinds according to our Force Employment structure.  And Infantry are the only ones getting the C16, so talk of other arms and services is moot.
4.  Though I'd love to have 81mm back, it does nothing to address what an infantry platoon has as an integral asset.  (Besides, we'd have to kill 3 battalions to get the PYs)
5.  It's not going on vehicles.  Dismounted on tripods only.  Talk of going on a vehicle in any way, shape or form is moot.  *IF* the brain trust at DLR (short on both if you ask me, but that's just my opinion) were to suddenly fund a vehicle mount for this thing, for the LAV sans turret, then we could. (Side note: when did they term a LAV without turret as "ISC"?  As I recall, "ISC" referred to "Infantry Section Carrier" to denote the configuration in the back, as different from say CP variant)
6.  Since you brought up what weapons do, "destroy" is not one of the things that the weapons in the infantry platoon do: the infantry do that themselves.  The weapons* suppress so that the infantrymen can close with and destroy.  I'm digging way back in my furthest recesses of my memory here, but I do believe that only the **King of Battle can destroy targets on its own.
7.  If you can find a place within the back of a LAV to stow it, or find enough troops to haul it around, then good on you.  Otherwise, this is just a 70+kg hunk of junk that will soon be relegated to the dustbin UNLESS we mount this on vehicles.  As a weapon for a RWS, stabilised with night vision would be a perfect place for it.  In that role, perhaps superior to the 25mm HEI-T from the M 242 for anti-pers fire out to ~2000m.

*Not just the platoon weapons, but all weapons, up to Corps level if need be, and beyond.  The platoon only needs weapons to suppress (eg: to deny the enemy freedom of action, thereby protection your own freedom of action), and only long enough to let the higher assets get in on the fight.

**Artillery.


----------



## a_majoor (30 Aug 2010)

GDLS will be upset, but the only weapon that satisfies the "man portable" "tripod mounted" criteria is:

*AGS-30 Automatic Grenade Launcher System * 

Round VOG-17, VOG-17M, VOG-30
Sight PAG-17, optical
Muzzle velocity, m/s 185
Sighting range, m 1,700
Rate of fire, rds/min 400
Overall dimensions, mm 360 x 500 x 1,100
Weight with mount without ammunition box, kg 16 ±0.5
Fire unit, rds 90

A rugged sight unit is a must, the CLASS sight from the 1980's provided day/night capabilities along with laser rangefinding and a ballistic computer, so what CDC could do back then could probably be replicated now. Otherwise a coincidence rangefinder with one fixed and one moving prism....

The CLASS was advertised to provide ballistic calculations for 84mm, .50, Mk 19 Mod3 AGL and apparently the ASP 30mm cannon. Programming different weapons seems to have been as easy as "flashing" the firmware, but this is a guess based on an old Infantry journal article I remembered from long ago. Perhaps a retooled CLASS sight with ballistic tables for the C6 (SF), .50 HMG and 84mm would do far more than any new wonder weapon. The tests on the 84mm provided really improbable first round hit ranges against moving targets, something like 800m with HEAT/RAP at night, so you can just imagine how much more effective other weapons would be with that sort of capability.


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

Video of the AGS-30 here.  Around the 1:20 mark, you see a single soldier lugging it up the stairs about as easy as hauling a C9.  (Yes, C9, not C6).
If THAT were the "C 16 AGLS", then I could very well see it to provide the platoon with fire support when not using the LAV.


----------



## McG (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I raise the Bullshit flag on that, given that it is not man-portable, and it brings nothing to the table that isn't already there.


and I'll suggest you are ignoring what does not fit your conclusion so that you can pretend you've not been answere3d.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> Would some one please tell me, what would an AGLS bring to the table that is not already available in an infantry platoon?


Here is one answer:



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> On the AGL vs MG comparison - in addition to just HE (or HEDP, or HEI, etc), the modern AGL can have airbursting munitions.  Neither MG nor LAV cannon do this.






			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> 1.  Why "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him"?  Why HE?  Why not kinetic energy?


Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?  Because there are different terminal effects.  If you are trying to kill an AFV, a MG can force the cerws heads down to impare the crews ability to locate and return fire.  However, that machine gun will not reliably strip the AFV of its optics - blinding the vehicle and making it impotent to its pending destruction.

An AGL with airbursting munitions can deny an enemy nature cover from kinetic machine gun fire, and higher rate of fire will ensure greater frag casualties that in the beaten zone than would be achieved with mortars.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> 6.  Since you brought up what weapons do, "destroy" is not one of the things that the weapons in the infantry platoon do...


B-GL-300-007/FP-001, Chapter 1, para 1, first sentance states that firepower is used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and harass the enemy.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> GDLS will be upset, but the only weapon that satisfies the "man portable" "tripod mounted" criteria is:
> 
> *AGS-30 Automatic Grenade Launcher System *


This raises an interesting question.  Did the CASW project go wrong because we constrained it to NATO standard ammunition?  A few years back, the US was looking at a 25 mm intermediate velocity weapon between a MG and an AGL.  The vision was that it would replace both the .50 cal and the AGL.  The US project was to deliver a weapon able to deliver both KE and CE rounds, to have an air-burst capabilty, and to be lighter than the .50.  Maybe this is the way CASW should have gone - replacing the .50 with a 25 to 30 mm intermediate velocity cannon.  At the same time, maintaining the company mortar.


----------



## Kirkhill (30 Aug 2010)

Funny thing Thucydides, as soon as the FCS notion cropped up I immediately thought of the CLASS system as well.  Basically it was a binocular sized laser range finder system that could be clipped onto any DF weapons system from MGs to ATGMs and CG84s.

Howizzit that a system fielded 20 years ago with US Rangers (as I recall) seems to have drifted off into the blue while its capabilities are stil being "developed" and it costs mega bucks more than it did then?

The Navy seems to have similar problem with its AOPS.  An 80,000,000 Norwegian ship is due to become a 250,000,000 Canadian ship after suitable delays and posturing.

Likewise the Mk19 becomes the CASW at some indeterminate time in the future, equipped with "developmental" technology that was available off the shelf some time back and will be authorised only for the only role for which it makes minimal sense.

Is there a pattern there?




> CLASS is a full-solution fire-control system which improves the range and performance of direct fire weapons. CLASS is interchangeable between weapon systems and has been successfully used on the 84 mm Carl Gustaf RCL, the 106 mm RCL rifle, the 25 mm M242 cannon, the 30 mm ASP-30 combat support weapon, the Mk19 40 mm Automatic Grenade Launcher, the .50 calibre M2 HMG and the M190 155 mm towed howitzer (direct fire).Following successful trials, Computing Devices Canada received a contract from the Canadian Forces in October 1995 for an initial 50 CLASS sights for their Bofors Carl Gustav rocket launchers. CLASS has also been included in the 1998 US Joint Lightweight 155 mm Howitzer project Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI) providing the direct fire sighting function


  Source, Janes


----------



## vonGarvin (30 Aug 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> and I'll suggest you are ignoring what does not fit your conclusion so that you can pretend you've not been answere3d.


And I suggest that your suggestion isn't called for, *especially * considering that you're DS here.


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Here is one answer:Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?  Because there are different terminal effects.  If you are trying to kill an AFV, a MG can force the cerws heads down to impare the crews ability to locate and return fire.  However, that machine gun will not reliably strip the AFV of its optics - blinding the vehicle and making it impotent to its pending destruction.
> 
> An AGL with airbursting munitions can deny an enemy nature cover from kinetic machine gun fire, and higher rate of fire will ensure greater frag casualties that in the beaten zone than would be achieved with mortars.
> B-GL-300-007/FP-001, Chapter 1, para 1, first sentance states that firepower is used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and harass the enemy.


....
Tanks?  F**king Tanks?     As in this : :tank2:  ?
Are you serious?

I ask "why HE" and you ask "Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?"  I am talking about the infantry platoon, and you talk about tanks?  OK, I'll answer.
Tanks are required to kill everything on the battlefield.   I do know a thing or two about terminal effects.  But I did acknowledge that we already have THREE systems (for a total of ELEVEN* weapons) in an infantry platoon that are capable of delivering HE.  But, in the case of the infantry firing at shit, that shit is mostly human.  Tanks fire at other tanks, at people, at bunkers, etc.  Apples and handgrenades (pun intended) is what you are comparing.

Now, reference firepower, please add the rest of that paragraph, the opening one.  Okay, I will:


> Firepower effects occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and must be synchronized with other attack systems. Maximum firepower effects require the full integration of army and joint service systems and procedures to determine engagement priorities, locate, identify, and track targets, allocate firepower assets and assess battle damage. Firepower should be viewed as a joint concept as it includes conventional land, air and maritime weapons effects. It encompasses the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data from all sources, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and non lethal means against air, ground and sea targets.


So, the firepower of an infantry platoon is to DESTROY?  When it "...should be viewed as a joint concept"?  As I've stated in another post, the only arm that can DESTROY by FIREPOWER on its own, is the Artillery (and again, I'm not sure of the conditions or limitations, but unless firepower is nuclear or artillery or joint, then it's not destroying without manoeuvre).

Finally, I do agree that airbursting ammunition is awesome: we already have airbursting ammo.  Yes, I read about the higher rate of fire, and all things being equal in that (smaller) beaten zone, more casualties.  Perhaps.  Maybe.  But going back to first principles: you have to lug that thing to within range.  Right now, just blast away with what you have, fix them there long enough to enable either firepower to destroy the enemy, or for the infantry and armour to manoeuvre to destroy the enemy.

If an AGS-30 were brought in, it can be carried much like a C6 SF, but that point is moot.  We are getting H and K, it will be ground mounted, and only the infantry will get them.  (Unless things change, anyway)

*_4 x 25mm Chain guns, 1 x 60mm Mortar, 6 x M203 grenade launchers._


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## Infanteer (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> And I suggest that your suggestion isn't called for, *especially * considering that you're DS here.....



The fact that he called you on your line of reasoning has nothing to do with his status as a mod.  Your free to continue the discussion (which is interesting) or not, but don't making a "modding" issue where there is none.  For some reason, you are the only person in here that is getting wrapped around the axle and defensive by a good discussion on weapons.


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## Infanteer (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> 1.  Why "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him"?  Why HE?  Why not kinetic energy?  Why blast energy and fragmentation?  But, if we must, then the 60 mm does that already, as do the 4 x M242s in the platoon.



....because the effects of falling HE on a target are different than falling shot.  If you are in a bunker or a building, me putting a 10 round burst of 40mm grenades into the window would be much different than me putting a 10 round burst of 7.62, no?  Be pedantic and try and find the execeptions, but the basic principle applies.  Yes the 60mm can do it, but not in the fashion of an AGL (as your direct/indirect distinction above made clear).



> 3.  I only speak of Mech Infantry, because we have no other kinds according to our Force Employment structure.  And Infantry are the only ones getting the C16, so talk of other arms and services is moot.
> 5.  It's not going on vehicles.  Dismounted on tripods only.  Talk of going on a vehicle in any way, shape or form is moot.  *IF* the brain trust at DLR (short on both if you ask me, but that's just my opinion) were to suddenly fund a vehicle mount for this thing, for the LAV sans turret, then we could. (Side note: when did they term a LAV without turret as "ISC"?  As I recall, "ISC" referred to "Infantry Section Carrier" to denote the configuration in the back, as different from say CP variant)



I'm speaking in terms of general applicability of a weapon across a wide spectrum (they appear useful), as we tend to use stuff in ways never imagined by the Kingston braintrust.  Mea culpa on the ISC (a 7 seater with a turret) - I meant RWS (which I guess is what the name for the turretless LAVs is).



> 6.  Since you brought up what weapons do, "destroy" is not one of the things that the weapons in the infantry platoon do: the infantry do that themselves.  The weapons* suppress so that the infantrymen can close with and destroy.  I'm digging way back in my furthest recesses of my memory here, but I do believe that only the **King of Battle can destroy targets on its own.




Sheesh.  If I hose a section of 8 guys down with a AGL, turning all of them into a fine pink mist, they and the square on the map they represent have been destroyed.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> This raises an interesting question.  Did the CASW project go wrong because we constrained it to NATO standard ammunition?  A few years back, the US was looking at a 25 mm intermediate velocity weapon between a MG and an AGL.  The vision was that it would replace both the .50 cal and the AGL.  The US project was to deliver a weapon able to deliver both KE and CE rounds, to have an air-burst capabilty, and to be lighter than the .50.  Maybe this is the way CASW should have gone - replacing the .50 with a 25 to 30 mm intermediate velocity cannon.  At the same time, maintaining the company mortar.





			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> Video of the AGS-30 here.  Around the 1:20 mark, you see a single soldier lugging it up the stairs about as easy as hauling a C9.  (Yes, C9, not C6).
> If THAT were the "C 16 AGLS", then I could very well see it to provide the platoon with fire support when not using the LAV.



Now we're cooking with gas (and perhaps have identified the key problem with the AGS project)!  How heavy is the ammo?


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## Oh No a Canadian (30 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Video of the AGS-30 here.  Around the 1:20 mark, you see a single soldier lugging it up the stairs about as easy as hauling a C9.



There is also a video on youtube of a Russian soldier shooting a 12.7mm machine gun while standing, Russian propaganda videos aren't exactly what I would call a primary source of information.




			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> How heavy is the ammo?



http://world.guns.ru/grenade/gl22-e.htm

This site says it weighs 16 kg with tripod, 30 kg loaded with 29 rounds of ammunition.


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## vonGarvin (31 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Now we're cooking with gas (and perhaps have identified the key problem with the AGS project)!  How heavy is the *ammo*?


I would offer that the mass of the ammo alone isn't *the *  key problem, it is *one *  of the key problems.  Perhaps mass of the *weapon system* is.

Now, when looking at getting something "new" for any arm, and if that new thing isn't a replacement (eg: the FN C1A1 is aging, so we get a new rifle), "they" look at what capabilities it provides.  It should provide a key capability that is lacking.  What I tried (and apparently failed to do) is to show the main capabilities of each weapon system within the infantry platoon.  Now, knowing this, I do get that for example rifles can be used in the anti-aircraft mode, and the 25mm can be used for point fire in certain situations, but we must remember that the infantry platoon's main job isn't to destroy by firepower alone (though in some cases, it can be done, if luck is on our side, if the wind is right, if Mars/Ares smiles upon us, etc).  So, all things being equal, we have to look at something and say "this is its main job" and "that capability is currently lacking".  It's not up to DLR to buy us stuff and shrug their shoulders and say "they'll figure out how to use it", or "they'll improvise in ways we never imagined".

An AGLS is an awesome weapon system, don't get me wrong.  But it is being given to an element that already has every capability it offers.  Yes, 40mm grenades are larger than 25mm HEI-T rounds, but I would offer that given the external ballistics of the 25mm and the fact that there are four systems in every platoon, they can create the effect of suppression on an enemy better than a single AGLS.  In short, an AGLS offers nothing new to the platoon.  


(Pedantic note: you used "direct/indirect" fire where I think you mean "low angle/flat trajectory vs.  high angle", but I know what you meant)


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## KevinB (31 Aug 2010)

AGS for RWS and non RWS vehicle mounting...

  Add it to a Gwagon (whatever its called now) and RG31 - some RWS (for higher threat AOR's) and non RWS for the more DART/NEO/IRU duties.

  Its NOT a Dismounted Inf weapon by any stretch of the imagination, but they are good for FOB defense.


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## vonGarvin (31 Aug 2010)

KevinB said:
			
		

> AGS for RWS and non RWS vehicle mounting...
> Add it to a Gwagon (whatever its called now) and RG31 - some RWS (for higher threat AOR's) and non RWS for the more DART/NEO/IRU duties.
> Its NOT a Dismounted Inf weapon by any stretch of the imagination, but they are good for FOB defense.


I agree that for an RWS (or any vehicle mounted system as you laid out above) is ideal for an AGLS.  I also agree that they are good for FOB defence; however, given that we already have GPMGs and HMGs, does it warrant this loooooooooooong drawn out procurement process to have a weapon that fits such a unique (and single-purpose) capability?  

The problem is this: "they" in their infinite wisdom, have decreed that there is a capability gap (false), that the 60mm is a "millstone around the neck of the infantry" (with all apologies to the former CDS, but again, a false statement) and that the AGLS is a dismounted infantry weapon system (again, false).


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## OldSolduer (31 Aug 2010)

I will follow this with interest. Not being an expert on the grenade launcher, I'll keep my thoughts about it to myself for now.


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## dapaterson (31 Aug 2010)

Finally, an explanation for the CASW/AGLS.


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## a_majoor (31 Aug 2010)

Dredging through the memory bank, the reason CLASS was never adopted _seems_ to be (and I could be very wrong here) that the internal optics were easily knocked out of alignment by the recoil or blast effects of the larger calibre weapons. It is great to hit the first tank at 800m with your Carl G, but not so much when when you have to re-zero before his angry team mates get you....

However, this is pretty much like one of my other favorite hobby horses. Radio and communications equipment has advanced light years beyond the AN/PRC 522, but cost, bureaucracy and inertia keep me carrying 1980's vintage technology on my back when I could spend $400 and carry a GARMIN RINO in my pocket (with FM voice/GPS/SAS and map display capability built in, plus it floats when you drop it in water...). I suppose since the design for CLASS is pretty old you *might* be able to licence it for a song from CDC or whatever successor company has it and fix whatever the flaw was for the production "CLASS II".

I think the idea of being able to get first round hits with DF systems would add a great new capability to the table (speed of engagements, being able to open up at vastly greater ranges, logistics, etc), and is probably a far better place to put our resources.


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## Fishbone Jones (31 Aug 2010)

I love it when all you guys get hung up in here. It makes it so peaceful for the rest of us outside on the boards ;D


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## Infanteer (31 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> An AGLS is an awesome weapon system, don't get me wrong.  But it is being given to an element that already has every capability it offers.  Yes, 40mm grenades are larger than 25mm HEI-T rounds, but I would offer that given the external ballistics of the 25mm and the fact that there are four systems in every platoon, they can create the effect of suppression on an enemy better than a single AGLS.  In short, an AGLS offers nothing new to the platoon.



Except for the Battlegroup Rifle Platoon we had overseas with a LAV RWS' overseas - an AGL would have been nice to have on that.  

The employability, not the capability, of an AGL is - to me - the severe limiting factor of this project at this time.    

To be a worthwhile project this would be better off looking at other places in the Army - something like the TAPV screams AGS.  I'd have an Infantry unit take it, but not at the expense of other systems with a different capability/employability mix, not as a "Company Area Suppression Weapon" (A Rifle Company needs other things first please), and, in my opinion, on a lower priority than other items which offer a more versatile mix of capability/employability.

Then again, I think we said this 5 pages ago.


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## SeanNewman (31 Aug 2010)

The extremely drawn out procurement process for a relatively easy weapon is because of two things:

1.  The made the requirement one all-inclusive system (GMG + FCS), not two separate procurements; and

2.  An administrative mistake that meant the competition had to be re-opened even though there was still only one real option, but a left field second competitor attempted (failed) to compete.

The School of Cool has the skeleton draft PAM written and has had it for several months, just awaiting final word to hit print.  An upcoming conference will tell more.


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## vonGarvin (31 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Except for the Battlegroup Rifle Platoon we had overseas with a LAV RWS' overseas - an AGL would have been nice to have on that.


Agreed.  But it's not going there, sadly.  A LAV 3 APC with the 25mm would have been preferable in my opinion, but an AGLS would have been better than what's there.


I maintain that the AGLS is a white elephant for a few reasons.  Two main reasons:
1.  It's being given to the wrong element (eg: infantry platoons)*
2.  Some idiot somewhere seriously thinks we (the infantry) can carry this thing.  And by carry, I mean either in a LAV APC or on some poor slob's back.

*I agree that a LAV RWS screams out "PUT AN AGLS ON ME!", but the LAV APC (with 25mm) with its GM Delco Turret is even better than that (in terms of firepower.  In terms of troops in the back, I _believe _ that a LAV RWS carries more troops)


Now, as an aside, I understand that my initial (and now deleted)** post failed to satisfy the pedants out there, with such arguments as "a skilled rifleman can suppress large groups of troops" or "a burst of 40mm vaporising 8 guys will destroy that section", but my point was this: you give the element (in this case, the infantry platoon) the tools it needs to do the jobs you can give it, and expect success.  For example: consider an infantry platoon dug in on the defensive.  It will not have the task to "destroy", even though it may "destroy" (doctrinal definition) enemy sub-sub units as it "blocks" or "fixes" or whatever.  The company commander will expect it to be able to achieve its task by suppressing the enemy in the objective ("fix") or yes, maybe even destroy sub-sub-sub units (eg: sections of engineers attempting to breach) in order to achieve the objective to block, thus allowing countermoves to destroy by fire (artillery) or manoeuvre (armour and infantry).  
On the attack, if a platoon were tasked to "destroy" (which it can), and if a platoon commander back briefed his OC with a plan to destroy the enemy using the firepower of his platoon, the OC would send the young subaltern back to the drawing board.  Again, with luck and Ares on his side, the platoon commander may get lucky and catch the enemy in the open and sit back and drop M203s on him, hitting an Ammo Depot and vaporising them all.  

But don't bank on it.

Yes, I acknowledge that firepower alone can destroy (doctrinally), but as I pointed out earlier, the only arm that is expected to be able to do that on its own is Artillery, and even then it takes a massive amount of firepower to have a reasonable expectation of success.  Same with putting HE into a window.  That is but one specific situation, and right now, there are 11 individual weapons in the platoon that can do that: 4 x LAV APCs, 6 x M 203s and 1 x 84mm.  And the 84 is the only one that can be expected to make a new window, if need be (depending on construction of said house).

So, though my explanations may have been flawed in that they weren't complete and failed to acknowledge every single improvisation or adaptation of all weapons, I stand by my argument that even if the AGLS weren't so bloody difficult to move about the battlefield, let alone employ, it offers no new capabilities to the infantry platoon that aren't already there.  In short, the weapons that are there (from rifles to 25mm Chain Guns) allow infantry platoons the ability to manoeuvre against virtually any opponent on its own (given proper force ratios, naturally), and if those force ratios aren't there, those weapons allow that platoon to at least begin, rather effectively, to win the fire fight.  At least long enough to allow the really heavy hitters (eg: Artillery) to free that platoon (and company, etc) to maneouvre with a view to destroying.


Those are my points on it.  DLR?  You get a big fat freddy for this one.  Now it's up to the PBI to figure out how to deal with it.  Thanks for that.  

**No conspiracy folks: I asked for it to be deleted.


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## OldSolduer (31 Aug 2010)

I see the debate going two ways:

Infanteer - pro
Techno - con

SO, you two being of much larger and younger brain than I, where would you employ this, who would be issued with it etc.


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## Infanteer (31 Aug 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Those are my points on it.  DLR?  You get a big fat freddy for this one.



Which I agreed with when I said " not at the expense of other systems with a different capability/employability mix, not as a "Company Area Suppression Weapon" (A Rifle Company needs other things first please), and, in my opinion, on a lower priority than other items which offer a more versatile mix of capability/employability".

The AGL is another tool in the toolbox - I'll take it.  A big fat freddy is, in my opinion, the "System of Systems Armoured Regiment".


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## vonGarvin (31 Aug 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The AGL is another tool in the toolbox - I'll take it.  A big fat freddy is, in my opinion, the "System of Systems Armoured Regiment".


I wouldn't.  It adds nothing (to the infantry platoon) that isn't already there.

Now, *if* we need to divest something, then the .50 cal is most like the AGLS in terms of employment, characteristics, weight, etc.  And that's not an infantry platoon weapon, so I'll let the other arms and services pretend to talk about that, because they aren't getting it: we're saddled with it.


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## McG (1 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Tanks?  F**king Tanks
> 
> Are you serious?
> 
> I ask "why HE" and you ask "Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?"


Actually, you asked: why HE - why not KE?  In your rush to be theatrical, you casually dismiss what the analogy illustrates.  KE and CE projectiles bring different capabilities to the equation – they have different terminal effects against different targets and they are each affected differently by various natural/man-made covers from fire.  Every other platoon-level rapid-firing flat-trajectory weapon that is not locked into a vehicle currently only launch KE projectiles down range.  No other platoon-level flat-trajectory weapon offers air-bursting ammunition.  No other platoon-level rapid-firing weapon engages with CE projectiles out to the same range band.

If the enemy has a linear cover from fire (mud/brick wall, elevated road/railway, drainage ditches, etc) or a network of such cover, then all the KE weapons of the platoon may effectively keep enemy heads down but they will not fix the enemy who has freedom to manoeuvre behind that cover with the KE projectiles harmlessly passing above.  Even with HEI, the LAVs will suffer the same limitation.  At the Coy level range band, the M203s will not contribute and the one solitary platoon mortar will at best harass.  

Since we state that we want broad spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations, there should be at least two types of weapons capable of hitting that enemy via different means.  An AGL with the airburst capability gives us this.  Where detonation range is automatically varied & the weapon slewed across the target area, an equal size beaten zone can be saturated with a higher rate of smaller fragmentary projectiles.  There will be higher frag casualties and greater suppression/fixing achieved.


			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> … I did acknowledge that we already have THREE systems (for a total of ELEVEN* weapons) in an infantry platoon that are capable of delivering HE. …
> 
> *_4 x 25mm Chain guns, 1 x 60mm Mortar, 6 x M203 grenade launchers._


Of course, range is also a component of capability and when you look at what can reach-out to influence in the company range-band, those six M203 fall out of the equation.

… and the four 25 mm cannons are not a given.  Contrary to previous suggestions, this is true more often than just when the infantry are flown in or have walked in.  Those 25 mm cannons do not dismount from the LAVs, and if somebody decides there is a higher importance for those platforms to be providing the capability of the vehicle then they can be out of the fight – making the weapons unavailable.  I have seen this in situations out of contact, and have heard second hand from others who have experienced it while in contact (with LAVs being dispatched to other duties after the shooting had already started – to move casualties one way, bring ammunition another way, reinforce out-of-contact patrols with a mobility casualty, etc).



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I also agree that they are good for FOB defence; however, given that we already have GPMGs and HMGs, does it warrant this loooooooooooong drawn out procurement process to have a weapon that fits such a unique (and single-purpose) capability?


Not just FOBs, but also platoon houses or dispersed Pl/Coy strong points. I recall a little platoon house way out  north by itself in bandit country with help typically being 30 min to hours away.  If that house were hit by a determined enemy, it would have needed the ability to destroy (make combat ineffective) the attacker.  My time there was exceptionally minimal & others here may tell me that my observations were the exception as opposed to the norm, but to do its business half the platoon (-) would head-out in the LAVs for the day to conduct ops in the area while the rest remained back to hold the position with the dismounted weapons.  I suspect regular tenants of that house would have loved the addition of an AGL in their platoon.  On the topic of the .50 though …





			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> … *if* we need to divest something, then the .50 cal is most like the AGLS in terms of employment, characteristics, weight, etc.  And that's not an infantry platoon weapon, so …


 of course, there used to be a time where every section had an HMG, and the tripods existed so that such weapon systems could be dismounted if the situation called for it.  With the arrival of the LAV, this heavier dismountable MG firepower largely went away without too much discussion (possibly because the weapon never fully retired).  This brings us back to asking – is there a role for something heavier than a GPMG/MMG in a platoon or company?  Was the failing of CASW that it constrained itself to NATO standard 40 mm high velocity grenades & thus made itself too heavy for what is required?



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> … my point was this: you give the element (in this case, the infantry platoon) the tools it needs to do the jobs you can give it, and expect success.  For example: consider an infantry platoon dug in on the defensive.  It will not have the task to "destroy", even though it may "destroy" (doctrinal definition) enemy sub-sub units as it "blocks" or "fixes" or whatever.  …


It may not have the mission to destroy … but I have seen many sets of orders produced by infantry officers tasking platoons or companies to destroy entities one magnitude larger in a designated KZ from an assigned battle position.  Usually, this is to hang-up an even larger force to be hammered by other means in a KZ farther back into the enemy.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> … even if the AGLS weren't so bloody difficult to move about the battlefield, let alone employ, it offers no new capabilities to the infantry platoon that aren't already there.


I am still not convinced that it offers no new capabilities.  When the full range of capability is considered, it clearly does offer new things.  You might be able to sell the idea that the capabilities offered by an AGL are not worth any of the trade-offs we might make in order to fit it within our resources.  Should the project staff have chosen to sacrifice a little hitting power per round in order to get a lighter weapon?


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## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> No other platoon-level rapid-firing weapon engages with CE projectiles out to the same range band.


You lost all credibility with this sentence.  To illustrate, the M 242 fires at rates of either single shot, 100 or 200 rounds per minute.  One of the munition types is HEI-T.  It fires out to 2400 m, longer range than the HK by ~900m (effective range of 1500m, max range of 2200 m).


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> At the Coy level range band, the M203s will not contribute and the one solitary platoon mortar will at best harass.


You lose more credibility here.  You talk of the coy level range band and then talk about the platoon mortar.  You cannot pick your range bands willy nilly, and then alter them to fit your uninformed argument.  (If it's coy ranges, then there are four mortars, FYI.  And they would provide only the initial fire whilst others are called to join the fight.)  


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> In your rush to be theatrical...


That was not necessary.


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## TangoTwoBravo (1 Sep 2010)

I am not an infantryman.

Having said that (and some would offer that I should have stopped there) I have been following this disucssion with interest.  I think that we should try to avoid getting too wrapped up in "platoon" vs "company" weapons.  I see the point, but I think that exclusively focusing on one level can be problematic.  

I served on exchange with a USMC infantry battalion for a couple of exercises.  This was pretty much a pure infantry battalion with only a smattering of vehicles.  I was attached to the Weapons Company that had a Mortar Platoon (81mm), an AT Platoon (Dragon IIRC) and a Heavy Guns Platoon.  The Heavy Guns had 4 x 50 cal and 4 x Mk 19.  Each was mounted on an HMMVW.  They could be chopped out in mixed pairs to the four rifle companies or used as a platoon to support battalion fights.  I should note that the rifle companies had a mortar squad with 2 or 3 60mm mortars that were company commander weapons.

A battalion attack could thus bring quite a bit of firepower.  One thing that the Mk19s could do was fire a little longer than the mortars leading up to an assault (like tanks in a firebase when the arty lifts).  It was also simpler to shift the fire around (no radio chatter).  The 50s could work on "harder" targets such as buildings, vehicles or wood bunkers.  I liked the concept.  The Heavy Guns used their HMMVW to get their weapons to their firing location and would then dismount, although they could fire mounted and did so when employed as ersatz recon.  I was part of one evolution that involved taking them in by helicopter and humping them across mountains for two days (with mules for the first day).

Now, a LAV battalion conducting an attack can get very similar effects as the heavy guns platoon with the 25mm cannons.  It means some infantry are left out of the fight or go in without their LAVs if LAVs are used in the firebase.  In my operational experience I found my infantry colleagues full of praise for their 60mm mortars and I was not terribly impressed with the drive to replace the 60mm with the CASW.  I don't see it as an either/or.  I would place an AGL after 60mm mortars (and indeed 81mm mortars) in a LAV battalion in terms of priority, but still see a place for the AGL concept (but bear in mind that I am an armoured guy).

I do note, however, that the prospect of having infantry companies mounted on TAPV is coming into view.  I think that a company or battalion of TAPV might find AGLs and 50 cals very useful, since you won't have 25mm cannons.  One option would be to have the section vehicles (a section will go on more than one vehicle) mount a mix of 50 cal and AGL, giving the section/platoon/company a mix of complementary systems.  I offer that a TAPV battalion or company could benefit from a dedicated platoon or section whose only job was to bring their 50s and AGLs into firebase positions and fire dismounted with a plentiful ammo supply and more training.  We couldn't call them Heavy Guns.  Maybe Pipes and Drums?

Anyhoo.


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## SeanNewman (1 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ...but bear in mind that I am an armoured guy...



Now I'm confused for an entirely different reason.  I always get jacked up by black hatters when I called them Armoured.


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## McG (1 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> You lost all credibility with this sentence.  To illustrate, the M 242 fires at rates of either single shot, 100 or 200 rounds per minute.  One of the munition types is HEI-T.


My appologies.  I meant to indicate that No other dismountable platoon-level rapid-firing weapon engages with CE projectiles out to the same range band.  However, if you want to declare "lost all credibility" and ignore the meat of the argument, then fill your boots.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> You lose more credibility here.  You talk of the coy level range band and then talk about the platoon mortar.


No.  The company range band comes from the big hitting platoon level weapons - C6, AGL, 60 mm mortar.  When we are doing dispersed operations and a platoon is out by itself, it still needs these weapons to influence out into what is traditionally that company range band.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> That was not necessary.


It was an honest assesment on the technique of your argument.


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## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

Forget it.  The AGLS is the best thing since sliced bread.  I submit.


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## TangoTwoBravo (1 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Now I'm confused for an entirely different reason.  I always get jacked up by black hatters when I called them Armoured.



Am I now a "person of armour?"


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## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I do note, however, that the prospect of having infantry companies mounted on TAPV is coming into view.  I think that a company or battalion of TAPV might find AGLs and 50 cals very useful, since you won't have 25mm cannons.  One option would be to have the section vehicles (a section will go on more than one vehicle) mount a mix of 50 cal and AGL, giving the section/platoon/company a mix of complementary systems.  I offer that a TAPV battalion or company could benefit from a dedicated platoon or section whose only job was to bring their 50s and AGLs into firebase positions and fire dismounted with a plentiful ammo supply and more training.  We couldn't call them Heavy Guns.  Maybe Pipes and Drums?
> 
> Anyhoo.


I'm not an infantryman either: I'm an infantry officer ;D


In the case of a TAPV, then employing an AGLS/.50 mix (as required, and as conducted in the past) makes sense, IF the primary role is to have them mounted in lieu of something else.

AGLS in a mech infantry platoon with LAV APCs is, as I stated in my previous post, the best thing since sliced bread.  Bring more AGLS.


----------



## SeanNewman (1 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> ...  Bring more AGLS.



Je vous presente: Metal Storm.







Also conveniently man portable.


----------



## Infanteer (1 Sep 2010)

As usual, I agree with everything T2B has to say (We've gotta quit meeting like this).



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> In the case of a TAPV, then employing an AGLS/.50 mix (as required, and as conducted in the past) makes sense, IF the primary role is to have them mounted in lieu of something else.



The latest design for Reg Force Infantry Battalions I've seen is 9 battalions each consisting of 2 LAV companies and a "Non-LAV" Company.  This will likely be TAPV or something else - but that something else will, I'm sure, not have an M242 Bushmaster on it.  Anyways, "Non-LAV" infantry has been a reality for sometime with today's OMLT and PRT Force Protection Companies - dressed up Infantry organizations without LAVs (either not having them or leaving them behind); in essence, Infantry that have been running for years without a LAV turret.

Bring on the sliced bread indeed.


----------



## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

The force employment structure for infantry battalions is four companies (2013 model), three in LAVs, and reservists relegated to "force protection".  I can't recall the vehicles for the fourth coy, but TAPV does jump to mind.

Force generation model is as you put it: three coys, all identically structured, with 1 or 2 in LAV, the other in....Interim Combat Boots.....


----------



## daftandbarmy (1 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Forget it.  The AGLS is the best thing since sliced bread.  I submit.



Not until they fit it with a bayonet  (you know it makes sense :nod


----------



## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Not until they fit it with a bayonet  (you know it makes sense :nod


Hell, they may as well have.  


I for one am sick and tired of getting terminal ballistics "lessons" and bullshit on this from non-infantry people.  Especially this little gem:



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Since we state that we want broad spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations, there should be at least two types of weapons capable of hitting that enemy via different means.  An AGL with the airburst capability gives us this.  Where detonation range is automatically varied & the weapon slewed across the target area, an equal size beaten zone can be saturated with a higher rate of smaller fragmentary projectiles.  There will be higher frag casualties and greater suppression/fixing achieved.Of course, range is also a component of capability and when you look at what can reach-out to influence in the company range-band, those six M203 fall out of the equation.



Ok , since when did you get involved in Infantry Weapons procurement?  Why the “we”?  Tell you what, leave the killing to us, the armour and the artillery, and just breach for us, ok?  Don’t worry, if we use you as infantry, we’ll let you lug the AGLS around: you can have it.  But right now, we have in the infantry platoon a “broad spectrum of overlapping capabilities with blah blah blah”.  An AGL that is too heavy to carry adds nothing of value.  I couldn’t care less if it slices, dices and makes julienne fries, if you can’t lug it around, it may as well be a paperweight.


----------



## dapaterson (1 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Now I'm confused for an entirely different reason.  I always get jacked up by black hatters when I called them Armoured.



I think you're just getting mixed up about black hats.


----------



## vonGarvin (1 Sep 2010)

T2B is in the navy?


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

I was wrong.  The AGLS is definitely man-portable as seen in this photo:


----------



## Michael OLeary (2 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I was wrong.  The AGLS is definitely man-portable as seen in this photo:



And there's a job for you in that platoon too.   Ballast.    ;D


----------



## OldSolduer (2 Sep 2010)

I don't know if I've told this story, if I have my apologies.

In 1979, we humped .50 cals with ammo 3 km and back, total about 6 km. It was not fun.


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> And there's a job for you in that platoon too.   Ballast.    ;D


Isn't "Know your subordinates and employ them within the limitations of their capabilities" a principle of leadership?  ;D


----------



## a_majoor (2 Sep 2010)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I see the debate going two ways:
> 
> Infanteer - pro
> Techno - con
> ...



The debate isn't so much "pro" or "con", rather if the proposed issue and employment of the weapon makes any sense as currently envisioned. As a dismounted platoon/coy level weapon I woud have to say "nay". If the box is opened up and the AGL is mounted on patrol vehicles or issued out to Service Battalions to defend supply points (or whatever the acronym of the day is), then I'm all for this.


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

Thucydides makes the point.  To put things into perspective, some info on the MK 40mm GL: (aka "C16 AGLS")
Gun, tripod and holder for ammo container: 48.3 kg
1 x Ammo container with 32 cartridges: 20.2 kg
So, for a LAV 3 APC equipped platoon, it offers no value added.  Simply because it cannot be brought into battle effectively by dismounted troops.  Yes, there are exceptions to every rule, such as "what if I'm dropped off on a defensive position" or "what if it's loaded to a FOB", etc.  To illustrate an AGLS with four boxes of ammo for a total of 128 rounds (2 to 3 minutes of sustained fire), that's 129.1 kg.  

What burns me is that "they" think that this replaces the 60mm.
In the light role, it weighs 7.7kg
With bipod, it weighs 23.4 kg.


To get 3 minutes of fire, normal rate (8 rounds per minute) is a total of 24 rounds.  I can't find the mass of the C110, but similar rounds are around 2 kg.  It comes in packs of four, and I'll assume 1.5 kg for packaging.  So, rounding up, four bombs @ 2 kg each = 8 kg + 1.5 kg = 9.5 kg.  So, 38 kg.
(Someone, PLEASE check my math!)

So, with bipod and 24 rounds, that's  61.4 kg to get three minutes of fire vs 129.1 kg to get the same time of fire.

If you go light role, it's a mere 45.7 kg, although the trade off is less range (~800 m).  

Getting even more practicable, a soldier could get a four-pack of roughly 10 kg, vice a box at roughly 20 kg, to man pack.

So, if people have been wondering why I may seem irate, hopefully the mass of the system makes it impracticable for use by a LAV 3 APC equipped platoon (not needed given the current family of weapons systems) and if that LAV 3 APC is tasked away, then good luck getting that thing around the battlefield under fire.  It's a hunk of junk if it's going to Incany Platoons, which it is, so it's a hunk of junk.
So, instead of just bitching about it, a solution: get a modern 60mm mortar that has better range.  
Easy-peasy.


----------



## SeanNewman (2 Sep 2010)

Techno,

I have the in-depth weight comparison at work and I'll send it to you tomorrow.

They go very in depth with each system, how much X amount of fire missions would weigh, and what effect that would have on the enemy, etc.  It's a good write-up, but as stated what I don't like about it is that it treats the FCS like it already exists.


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Techno,
> 
> I have the in-depth weight comparison at work and I'll send it to you tomorrow.
> 
> They go very in depth with each system, how much X amount of fire missions would weigh, and what effect that would have on the enemy, etc.  It's a good write-up, but as stated what I don't like about it is that it treats the FCS like it already exists.


I have it as well, as well as the pam from the UK army on their GMG (Same system, the HK). But I don't trust what they say the ammo can do to the enemy: they also said that 25mm  HEI-T was junk and was ineffective vs infantry in the open.  I'm pretty sure we both know that they were wrong.

Edit to add:  I went with 3 minutes of fire, assuming of course the rate of fire for the AGLS.  I assume about 3 minutes of fire from the time either system would shoot (from initial contact) to until Artillery can start landing.  So, 2-3 minutes from contact, plus 3 minutes of fire = ~6 minutes of quick integral fire before the artillery kicks in.  Of course, the AGLS weighs a metric poop load, so it's still in the FOB on FOB defensive duties.


----------



## SeanNewman (2 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I have it as well, as well as the pam from the UK army on their GMG (Same system, the HK)...



Haha, is that the one I gave you?  (That the guy in the office beside you gave me).

PS - The LAV is great, I admit, but stop giving the thing a reach-around already!    We get it, you think it's the answer to everything...


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> PS - The LAV is great, I admit, but stop giving the thing a reach-around already!    We get it, you think it's the answer to everything...


hey, what I do in the turret when nobody is looking is my business! ;D


----------



## Kat Stevens (2 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Hell, they may as well have.
> 
> 
> I for one am sick and tired of getting terminal ballistics "lessons" and bullshit on this from non-infantry people.  Especially this little gem:
> ...



Offside. 10 yard penalty, soldier boy.  Plenty of thumperhead blood on the ground over there too, y'know.  Breach your own fucking obstacles and sort out your own IEDs, hero.


----------



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2010)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Offside. 10 yard penalty, soldier boy.  Plenty of thumperhead blood on the ground over there too, y'know.  Breach your own fucking obstacles and sort out your own IEDs, hero.


Boy?  Hero?  I am neither.  I'm just a man who's standing by what he said.  

(and I'm well aware of the thumperhead blood on the ground over there.  There's a reason why the Engineers have "UBIQUE" as their Battle Honour, because they truly are everywhere.  They do thankless work, and for that, I salute them)


----------



## McG (3 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I for one am sick and tired of getting terminal ballistics "lessons" and bullshit on this from non-infantry people.


If you want to bring a new capability into the forces, that goes no where unless you can sell the idea to a bunch of civilians in treasury board.  Before you can sell it to there, you have to sell the idea to PMB with its representation of Navy, Air Force and Civilian staff.  Yet some how you are going to suggest that a member of another combat arm, with formal ballistics training, is unqualified to discuss with you because only the infantry can understand?   

We afford a certain weight of truth to the conclusions & opinion of a SME.  However, when a SME is challenged with logically formed arguments based in fact, that SME is still expected to back-up their position with their own logically formed counter-arguments.  Ad hominem is not a logical argument, so you can just drop attacking capbadges.

If you really have a problem with what I’ve presented, then why don’t you address that?   You believe I just don't understand - so clearly you must be able to put together the counter arguments to show me wrong.  Instead, most of your argument has focused on theatrics, attacking the messenger, or nit-picking on the periphery.  



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> Ok , since when did you get involved in Infantry Weapons procurement?


As can be seen in project documentation, the CASW project was procuring for more than just infantry.  It is not just an infantry weapon.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> An AGL that is too heavy to carry adds nothing of value.


Bull – and, in the event you want to write off that statement for being from out side the Infantry, others from the infantry have called you on this too.

As per B-GL-392-001/FP-001, “each weapon is used according to its characteristics”- that is capabilities & limitations.  You claim to acknowledge this, yet you continue to deny the capability and to describe the weapon as simply the sum of its limitations.  The weapon has both and there are fitting uses inside of those capabilities & limitations even at the platoon level.

If you go back through all my posts, you will note that I have not stated that this is the right weapon for an infantry platoon.  My argument with you all along has simply been that your “nothing of value” conclusion is so exaggerated as to be dishonest.  This weapon does offer a significant increase in firepower capability but is so heavy that it may never be used as a platoon weapon in a mobile dismounted operation.  But, where our Army likes to establish FOBs, SPs, COPs & Pl houses, there are plenty of static operations for the infantry to exploit this weapon.

I’m fully ready to accept the notion that the value is not worth the cost.  At least from there, we could consider if there might be (might have been) another way to get that same value (or most of that same value) without the unacceptable limitation.  I am also ready to accept the notion that the value provided is not what is ultimately required.  The exaggerated denial of any value … well, that argument adds no value.

Consider, when you reach CO, if your Plans O presents a series of CoA for your decision and flat-out denies the existence of any weaknesses (or strength) to one or the other of the CoA even when those weaknesses (or strengths) had been presented to him - he may have a proper estimate and the right answer, but you will find his whole effort to be suspect.  Denying reality undermines credibility of the whole argument.

You finally got the argument this morning.  Where you continued to present the critical limitations of the weapon:




			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> What is the analogy with the .50?  Well, back in the olden days, we had a very heavy, non-mobile system that could, in theory, be ground mounted.  If we were moving by foot (and we often did even in mechanised battalions), then that .50 didn't move with us.  Now that we have troops moving by foot in combat, even today, it is irresponsible to think that they can carry something as heavy as the C16.




while giving recognition to the strengths & capabilities:




			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> Yes, it could be used in static locations such as a FOB or a COP, and with great effect ...




and providing the counter argument to those strengths & capabilities:




			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> ... but I can think of better ways of spending procurement cash.  I mean, we already have a proven weapon system, the .50 calibre, that is perfect for such a role.



Of course, I still think there is room to debate if a .50 cal, an AGL, or something else is the better weapon for that static defence role - for any arm.


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (9 Sep 2010)

Defence Watch is reporting that the winner is the H&K GMG.

http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2010/09/08/introducing-the-canadian-forces-new-40mm-grenade-launcher.aspx


----------



## ArmyRick (9 Sep 2010)

I finally figured out a role for this weapon without question.

Its going to be the "cool to fire" weapon. We don't actually deploy it, we just drag it out for ranges and run like 2 week courses on it and then have end of the fiscal year 40mm blow outs.

I would be first to line up, blast it off and yell yee haw. Like the first time I fired a 50 (except I nearly blew the QCB off!)

I mean, without a doubt, some weapons are simply awesome to fire. Its like firing the 84mm, its loads of fun. (Note I am a sadistic b*stard that was a bay ARSO and put over 60 troops each firing 2 x rounds TP RAP. Ya Hoooo I yelled out loudly that day because my hearing and sinuses felt funny/off.

Any thought been given to getting the british Jackal WMIK and jamming this thing on it? I mean the jackal would be hands down better than the G-wagon which we really don't deploy anymore. 

On a similar note to having yee haw shoots with the 40mm, I wish we still had 106mm for "fun shoots" thats a weapon I missed out on!


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (9 Sep 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Any thought been given to getting the british Jackal WMIK and jamming this thing on it? I mean the jackal would be hands down better than the G-wagon which we really don't deploy anymore.



G-Wagon will be replaced in its combat role by the TPAV, on a side note I seem to remember talk on here (can remember if it was this thread or the TPAV thread) that the C16 CASW would be mounted on the TPAV via a RWS.


----------



## vonGarvin (9 Sep 2010)

Oh No a Canadian said:
			
		

> G-Wagon will be replaced in its combat role by the TPAV, on a side note I seem to remember talk on here (can remember if it was this thread or the TPAV thread) that the C16 CASW would be mounted on the TPAV via a RWS.


The C16 AGLS is not (currently) on the scale of issue for anything other than infantry platoons as part of their weapons' detachment.


----------



## Oh No a Canadian (9 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> The C16 AGLS is not (currently) on the scale of issue for anything other than infantry platoons as part of their weapons' detachment.


Must have been someone's idea/suggestion that I read than.


----------



## McG (10 Sep 2010)

Oh No a Canadian said:
			
		

> Must have been someone's idea/suggestion that I read than.


Two years ago, the plan was to have them in Arty and CSS units as well.  Something scaled that back.

From DWAN:http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/Cid/Data/Documents/596/CASW%20PMB%20-%206%20Mar%2008%20v5.ppt#309,6,Slide 6


----------



## dapaterson (10 Sep 2010)

Nothing in subsequent SRBs to indicate that the numbers or allocation have changed.

I suspect IOC will be only at infantry units; FOC wil include roll out to other arms.


----------



## Kirkhill (10 Sep 2010)

If this thing is finally deployed how long do you reckon it will take before EME techs are asked to rig an expedient pintle mount on the weapons carrier du jour?  Policy notwithstanding TV.


----------



## REDinstaller (10 Sep 2010)

Or it might just fit into the existing 50 Cal cradles that were for the M113s.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If this thing is finally deployed how long do you reckon it will take before EME techs are asked to rig an expedient pintle mount on the weapons carrier du jour?  Policy notwithstanding TV.


I think it would take about 10.2 seconds before EME techs are asked.  This weapon screams "MOUNT ME" 




Sorta reminds me of the lasses at the old Camelot, but I digress.....


----------



## REDinstaller (10 Sep 2010)

I'm sure DLCSPM has a solution in the work already. With trials to follow.


----------



## OldSolduer (10 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> This weapon screams "MOUNT ME"
> 
> 
> Sorta reminds me of the lasses at the old Camelot, but I digress.....



Or the Grant, The Park......or the Palamino.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> I'm sure DLCSPM has a solution in the work already. With trials to follow.


:rofl:


Oh, wait, you were serious?  Sorry....


(I just find it ironic that there would need to be a 'solution', given that "solutions" imply "problems".  Isn't this thing some fancy-schmancy piece of kit that will save us all from doom?)  
I've said it before, and I'll say it again and I *know* that I'm  :deadhorse: but, this "project" began with false premises and went way out of control, and in spite of the fact that we have been in some pretty serious combat over the past 4+ years, and this thing was supposed to be "all singing/all dancing", yet wasn't rushed as an UOR, and given that the 60mm was supposed to be rather ineffective, and also given that in that same time we went from MGS to Tank to New Tank to contracts signed and rentals in theatre.....

This thing blows goats.  Especially since they won't mount it on vehicles, but instead stick it in the back of a vehicle with a 25mm chain gun.  Of course, we cannot go everywhere with that vehicle, but since this thing's weight makes it prohibitive to carry at the platoon level, you may as well issue a M777 to platoons...

[/rant]


----------



## dapaterson (10 Sep 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Of course, we cannot go everywhere with that vehicle, but since this thing's weight makes it prohibitive to carry at the platoon level, you may as well issue a M777 to platoons...



Well, the infantry did give the Artillery the 81mm (with no PYs), so it sounds like a fair deal...


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Well, the infantry did give the Artillery the 81mm (with no PYs), so it sounds like a fair deal...


Touché!  


(Oh, just wait till they see what we do to them, including removing any inscriptions, because until we gave up mortars, they weren't "colours")  >


----------



## SeanNewman (10 Sep 2010)

I think argument over it being for the LAV right now is a non-starter, no more relevant than saying how right/wrong a Browning .50 cal would be on a B17 bomber.

The same way it has been mounted on everything over its life cycle, so has a C6, and over time so will a C16.

The September 2010 outlook of where the C16 might fit on a LAV may not be perfect, but we can't be that narrow minded.

If some staff officer said to put it with the Infantry on is first draft just so we could buy the d@mn thing I say good for him; IMO it is such a good weapon (without the FCS) that we should buy it.

I love the Brit concept of 50% .50 cal and 50% GMG on their light vehicles (which I am convinced we will be on again at some point in the next decade somewhere).  The only better death-spewing combination would be 1/3 .50 cal, 1/3 GMG, and 1/3 flamethrower.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> If some staff officer said to put it with the Infantry on is first draft just so we could buy the d@mn thing I say good for him; IMO it is such a good weapon (without the FCS) that we should buy it.


But...
if to get it, we need to take away a 60mm mortar...(which was a false premise: that we won't/can't use it, that it's from 1949, etc)...when it is being used, and any arguments about its age only scream "so what?  Get a new model that fires the same ammo".


And fireballs.  It must shoot fireballs.  ;D


But, as stated, for a weapon system, the AGLS is more like a HMG than a light mortar.  Knowing that the collective IQ in the procurement shop of whoever bought this thing must be in the low 20s, I'm surprised that they didn't try to bin the .50.  After all, it's from when?  Before 1920?


----------



## SeanNewman (10 Sep 2010)

Can anyone prove that the 60mm being cut is specifically because of the adoption of the C16?

I have heard everyone from DLR to LGen Leslie compare the two and I get the feeling that the 60's retirement is more due to it's age and condition than it has to do with capability.

It seems just a coincidence that we are going after this at the same time.  It may have hastened the exit, but I don't think it was what started it.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> Can anyone prove that the 60mm being cut is specifically because of the adoption of the C16?
> 
> I have heard everyone from DLR to LGen Leslie compare the two and I get the feeling that the 60's retirement is more due to it's age and condition than it has to do with capability.
> 
> It seems just a coincidence that we are going after this at the same time.  It may have hastened the exit, but I don't think it was what started it.


I have the references at work as they are all DIN-specific.


----------



## Old Sweat (10 Sep 2010)

I do know that a very, very  senior army officer referred to the mortar as an obsolete weapons system in a discussion with me in the middle distant past.


----------



## SeanNewman (10 Sep 2010)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I do know that a very, very  senior army officer referred to the mortar as an obsolete weapons system in a discussion with me in the middle distant past.





			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I have the references at work as they are all DIN-specific.



And that's where I'm coming from: All the references I have seen would suggest they are related but not in the way that everyone seems to get worked up about.

I do not think that the 60mm was going to be around for a lot longer and then all of a sudden the C16 came along and someone said "this thing is far better than the 60mm so the mortar has to go".

Reading between the lines, I do in fact see something resembling "if we adopt X then we need to divest Y", I don't think it was the C16 that started it; I get the impression that the 60mm mortar was already on the way out because of its age, and it was more of a coincidence that something came along that was also a suppression quasi-possible-to-do-indirect weapon and someone said "okay if we're going to buy the C16, what are we going to get rid of?", and then the decision was made that since the 60mm was going soon anyway that this would just be the last straw.

If anyone can show me a ref that says otherwise though I am very interested to see it.  Basically, something that states "The 60mm was still going to be in service for a long time, but due to the C16 being 'so much better' the 60mm must go".


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Well, not in so many words, but that one document that compares the capabilities of the "CASW" to the M19 CDN is flawed, but its inference is that "due to the C16 being 'so much better' the 60mm must go".  Not in so many words, however.  But as Old Sweat stated, ingornant staff officers who didn't know what the 60 could do just showed that they were out of the loop.  But that misconception wasn't limited to staff officers.

In 2002, on ex ROYAL FIST, then LCol Vance was out when G Coy did an attack or defence of whatever.  We had just disbanded the mortar platoon, and on the recommendation of the 2IC of G Coy (not me), the 4 coy mortars were brigaded and were used in the fireplan.  Watching the fire come in, he mused that "I have 12 of those in my battalion?"  Oh, the coy inserted via chinook, so those mortars were carried in, and did quite the number down range.

Granted, it was a fairly staged "event" (as most live fires are); however, until then, he wasn't aware of the full potential of the 60s.  The "old obsolete" 60s.


----------



## SeanNewman (10 Sep 2010)

You're talking capability again though, not the specific tubes.  What I understood is that the specific systems we had were too old, not the capability itself.  It wasn't that we were divesting mortars so much as what we had was now dangerous to use.

That being said, I do not know if a decision was ever made that we should just buy new 60mm mortar tubes that were cheaper/better/lighter like the new 84s we bought, but I would be interested in seeing that, too.

Perhaps we were going to start looking at new 60mm (or 50s, or whatever) mortars and then the C16 is what derailed that, but if there's one thing I'm trying to get across is that the actual mortars we have been using for decades were ending their life cycle.

But for whatever reason, unlike the .50, the C6, or even Star Trek, it was not given a chance at a next generation.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Sep 2010)

Petamocto said:
			
		

> You're talking capability again though, not the specific tubes.  What I understood is that the specific systems we had were too old, not the capability itself.  It wasn't that we were divesting mortars so much as what we had was now dangerous to use.
> 
> That being said, I do not know if a decision was ever made that we should just buy new 60mm mortar tubes that were cheaper/better/lighter like the new 84s we bought, but I would be interested in seeing that, too.
> 
> ...


Nice star trek reference ;D

But, the pieces I had seen all referred to the age of the M19 CDN, and not the fact that there are newer, lighter and longer ranged 60mm mortars that fire the same ammo that we already have.


----------



## Journeyman (8 Oct 2010)

Just got an email from Ottawa:


> *Contract for C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher Systems Announced *
> 
> The Government of Canada has awarded a contract valued at $95 million to Rheinmetall Canada Inc., of Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu, Québec, for the acquisition of 304 C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher Systems under the Close Area Suppression Weapon (CASW) project.
> 
> ...


I guess NDHQ wasn't following the discussion here


----------



## Michael OLeary (8 Oct 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Just got an email from Ottawa:I guess NDHQ wasn't following the discussion here



Outside information is counter-productive to the well situated estimate.   ;D


----------



## vonGarvin (8 Oct 2010)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Outside information is counter-productive to the well situated estimate.   ;D


Neither is any information that goes against assumptions that help to situate that estimate.


----------



## ArmyRick (8 Oct 2010)

"situate the estimate" your bringing back memories of 3B. The do and don'ts of the combat estimate. (Flashing back to trying to sit on snow shoes and scribble out my plan all while battling sleep and hoping the DS does not pick me for the next brief).


----------



## The Bread Guy (14 Oct 2010)

News release now out via Army's web page here.


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## vonGarvin (14 Oct 2010)

Ladies and Gentlemen
Come one, come all, and witness the marvel that is our procurement system!  Conceived as the "be all, end all" for infantry platoon support weapons that was thought of before combat in Kandahar, and deemed so important, that it was brought into service just as soon as we left combat.  That's right, it's the C16 AGLS!  Bigger, stronger and faster (and heavier!)  than anything we have ever had!  So good, we could not wait until our next deployment, we are implementing it now!  Write your MP, and thank him or her personally for the government expending millions of your dollars on a weapon system that the users neither desired or know how to use effectively.  Egos trump common sense once again as a complex and overly heavy weapon system will replace a simple and man-portable weapon system.  
If our robust soldiers can carry it beyond 50 metres from the truck, it will be worth its weight in gold.  Once again, the army shows its true colours in maintaining the aim of situating the estimate and ignoring the hard work, back-breaking effort and lives and blood spilled on the field of battle by bringing in a modern-day Ross Rifle that its prime user, the Infantry, has just collective just realised is too heavy to carry.  

Once again, we are f*cked.  Thank you kindly, motherlovers.  God bless the PBI.


> Thursday, October 14, 2010
> 
> Ottawa, Ontario — The Government of Canada has awarded a contract valued at $95 million to Rheinmetall Canada Inc., of Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu, Québec, for the acquisition of 304 C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher Systems under the Close Area Suppression Weapon (CASW) project.
> 
> ...


----------



## Kirkhill (14 Oct 2010)

COMPANY / Close Area Support Weapon

304 Weapons

3 Regiments
9 Battalions
27 Companies
81 Platoons
243 Sections

Ah..... I get it.

1 CASW per section with 60 left over for Maintenance, Testing and Warstocks.

Welcome to the Foot Artillery.


----------



## vonGarvin (14 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> COMPANY / Close Area Support Weapon
> 
> 304 Weapons
> 
> ...



But, with 51 (!) reserve units, that's 51 there, still leaves 9.  I hear that the AGLS is going to replace the C9 LMG.


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## dangerboy (14 Oct 2010)

Just as long as we don't get told May 2011 all CQs will turn in their 60mm.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Oct 2010)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Ladies and Gentlemen
> Come one, come all, and witness the marvel that is our procurement system!  Conceived as the "be all, end all" for infantry platoon support weapons that was thought of before combat in Kandahar, and deemed so important, that it was brought into service just as soon as we left combat.  That's right, it's the C16 AGLS!  Bigger, stronger and faster (and heavier!)  than anything we have ever had!  So good, we could not wait until our next deployment, we are implementing it now!  Write your MP, and thank him or her personally for the government expending millions of your dollars on a weapon system that the users neither desired or know how to use effectively.  Egos trump common sense once again as a complex and overly heavy weapon system will replace a simple and man-portable weapon system.
> If our robust soldiers can carry it beyond 50 metres from the truck, it will be worth its weight in gold.  Once again, the army shows its true colours in maintaining the aim of situating the estimate and ignoring the hard work, back-breaking effort and lives and blood spilled on the field of battle by bringing in a modern-day Ross Rifle that its prime user, the Infantry, has just collective just realised is too heavy to carry.
> 
> Once again, we are ******.  Thank you kindly, motherlovers.  God bless the PBI.



You just don't understand, do you? The aim is not to give the infantry what we need in time of war, the aim is to spend millions of tax dollars in Quebec.  ;D


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## Andyboy (4 Jan 2011)

From my extremely limited perspective the capabilities of the system might make it worth humping. As for the manportability the spec calls for it to be broken into 3x30kg loads. I've (very briefly) shoudlered each load and it is manageable-i wouldn't want to do it for a living but it is doable. In practice I doubt the loads will be limited to 30kg but that is the baseline.

Anyway here are a couple of pics showing how the Germans and Swiss hump it.

Regards,
Andrew


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## GAP (4 Jan 2011)

Having humped a PRC-25 (23.5 lbs) on top of my ruck and all, I don't envy anyone having to haul this any distance.


----------



## vonGarvin (4 Jan 2011)

Andyboy said:
			
		

> From my extremely limited perspective the capabilities of the system might make it worth humping. As for the manportability the spec calls for it to be broken into 3x30kg loads. I've (very briefly) shoudlered each load and it is manageable-i wouldn't want to do it for a living but it is doable. In practice I doubt the loads will be limited to 30kg but that is the baseline.


I could not disagree more.  3 x 30 kg loads = 90 kgs.  I think that's just the system itself, no?  Add onto that mass you're carrying such sundry items as your frag vest, your personal weapon and ammo, water, food, etc.  You carry more than 30 kg.  You see, many of us here _do_ carry crap like this for a living.  Just because there is a pic of some Germans and Swiss dudes carrying the thing in a photo op...

Anyway, I've spoken more than enough on this.


----------



## a_majoor (4 Jan 2011)

I can find pictures of Russian and Chinese soldiers humping their AGL's as individuals, and I would doubt anyone on the receiving end of an AGS-17, AGS-30 or a QLZ-87 will enjoy the experience.

Since these weapons are sold on the international arms market and are eminently man portable (being just a bit larger and heavier than a C-6), my prediction is we will be _receiving_ AGL fire much more often than we will be delivering it....


----------



## 57Chevy (4 Jan 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I could not disagree more.  3 x 30 kg loads = 90 kgs.  I think that's just the system itself, no?  Add onto that mass you're carrying such sundry items as your frag vest, your personal weapon and ammo, water, food, etc.  You carry more than 30 kg.  You see, many of us here _do_ carry crap like this for a living.  Just because there is a pic of some Germans and Swiss dudes carrying the thing in a photo op...



Like this guy in the photo :camo:


----------



## OldSolduer (5 Jan 2011)

Andyboy said:
			
		

> From my extremely limited perspective the capabilities of the system might make it worth humping. As for the manportability the spec calls for it to be broken into 3x30kg loads. I've (very briefly) shoudlered each load and it is manageable-i wouldn't want to do it for a living but it is doable. In practice I doubt the loads will be limited to 30kg but that is the baseline.
> 
> Anyway here are a couple of pics showing how the Germans and Swiss hump it.
> 
> ...



You know I could care less what the Germans, Swiss, Americans or one horned one eared flying purple people eaters do. A 30 kg load equals 66 lbs, plus helmet, frag vest, LBV, ammo, pers wpn, now what does that equal? 
And you've said you've shouldered it briefly, so what qualifies you  to say its "doable"?


----------



## Journeyman (5 Jan 2011)

Andyboy said:
			
		

> I've (very briefly) shoudlered each load and it is manageable-i wouldn't want to do it for a living  but it is doable.
> 
> 
> > I could not disagree more.
> ...


If you're going to offer an inane and unqualified opinion to those who _would_ have to do it for a living, and then sulk because you got called on your dumbass post.....please feel free to post even less often.   :


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse (5 Jan 2011)

* Back on topic, all.  *


----------



## MarkOttawa (27 Jan 2011)

From _Defense Industry Daily_:

Too Late? Canada’s CASW for 40mm GMGs
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Too-Late-Canadas-CASW-for-40mm-GMGs-06694/?utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=did&utm_medium=textlink&utm_term=Too%20Late?%20Canada%E2%80%99s%20CASW%20for%2040mm%20GMGs



> ...
> The Americans have deployed 40mm GMGs from the outset of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, mostly General Dynamics’ Mk19. That inventory is modernizing, as the USA has begun buying General Dynamics’ new STRIKER 40, with programmed airburst features. Others have been slower. Britain addressed this gap back in 2006, when it began ordering Heckler & Koch GMG systems to equip its Royal Marines. Canada has been much slower to react, but 8 years after its troops entered Afghanistan, the Close Area Suppression Weapon (CASW) project aims to give Canadians the same options that other militaries already enjoy…
> 
> *The CASW Cock-Up*
> ...



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## GnyHwy (29 Jan 2011)

Is there anyone out there that has given this weapon a fair shake?  I for one would like to see it in a Cbt Tm attack.

After having looked at this and other similar threads i.e. Infantry attack (which I have posted in), maybe labeling it a Plt weapon, or making the assumption that because it is dismountable it needs to be pepper-potted around is a cynical approach.

I see it as a Coy weapon for a Coy Hvy Wpns team.  It has a range of 2K and would likely be best suited for a fire base.  With a direct role it would be similar to a 50 cal minus some muzzle velocity.  The indirect role will need to be mastered and trusted but it is not much different than a mortar or old indirect 50 drills.


----------



## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2011)

I get the point of the article you posted, MarkOttawa; however, let us remember that those forces using the 40mm AGL also didn't have 25mm Chain Guns at a scale of issue of 1/section.


But yes, it has been a very slow process.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Is there anyone out there that has given this weapon a fair shake?  I for one would like to see it in a Cbt Tm attack.


What would it add to the fight that includes 155mm raining in from the sky, 120mm HEAT, 25mm HEI-T, etc etc?  I fear it's a solution looking for a problem.


			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I see it as a Coy weapon for a Coy Hvy Wpns team.  It has a range of 2K and would likely be best suited for a fire base.  *With a direct role it would be similar to a 50 cal minus some muzzle velocity.*  The indirect role will need to be mastered and trusted but it is not much different than a mortar or old indirect 50 drills.


I think you hit the nail on the head.  In terms of range, capabilities, etc, it  is more HMG than anything.


----------



## Haletown (29 Jan 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> What would it add to the fight that includes 155mm raining in from the sky, 120mm HEAT, 25mm HEI-T, etc etc?  I fear it's a solution looking for a problem.I think you hit the nail on the head.  In terms of range, capabilities, etc, it  is more HMG than anything.



Except when the lowly Company Commander can't get the 155 support or have a 120mm tube around  or whatever because folks higher up the Chain of Command deem the fire support request to be a lower priority than other current missions.

If it is a company weapon it is available when the Company Commander needs it . . .  no asking up the chain for support.

Same reason Platoons should still have their old fashioned 60mm mortars as rapid pocket artillery.

I'm old school when it comes to moving fire support forward not to the rear. Personal bias.


----------



## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2011)

Haletown said:
			
		

> Except when the lowly Company Commander can't get the 155 support or have a 120mm tube around  or whatever because folks higher up the Chain of Command deem the fire support request to be a lower priority than other current missions.
> 
> If it is a company weapon it is available when the Company Commander needs it . . .  no asking up the chain for support.
> 
> ...


The example was in a combat team attack, not a company attack.  

But I too am all about integral fire support.


----------



## a_majoor (29 Jan 2011)

Everyone is for integral fire support, the more the merrier, but Technoviking has been leading the charge on the fact the CASW/AGL/GMG is simply not portable enough to be brought to the fight in the first place.

As Canadians, we do have the luxury of carrying a 25mm cannon with each mounted section, so perhaps the issue has been a bit masked by having LAVs handy, but should the troops have to dismount for extended periods due to terrain considerations, neither the 25mm nor the CASW will be avail for fire support; the LAV can't drive there and the troops will be unable to manpack the CASW/tripod and sufficient ammunition in any reasonable timeframe.

Now my POV is there are grenade launchers which ARE man portable (similar in size and weight to a GPMG), or weapons which can fill the man portable support fire role (small mortars, RPG's), so the search should have been for man portable weapons which provide the firepower and flexibility needed for the dismounted fight. A lot of time and money has gone downrange for very little result.


----------



## Old Sweat (29 Jan 2011)

Putting my cynical hat on for a minute, if the CASW is so good and so important, how come the procurement was not fast tracked? Look how quickly the tanks were brought back and the M777s purchased, and there are other pieces of kit, like artillery locating devices, counter-measure vehicles, improved UAVs and of course Chinooks and transport aircraft, that were obtained in very short order. What gives? Could it be that it is not an essential bit of war fighting kit? (Not quite a rhetorical question.)


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## REDinstaller (29 Jan 2011)

It might be that the CASW project wasn't high enough on the "eye candy" list. And the other items were procured as part of Troop protection or mobility aids.


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## vonGarvin (29 Jan 2011)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> It might be that the CASW project wasn't high enough on the "eye candy" list. And the other items were procured as part of Troop protection or mobility aids.


It wasn't asked for by the troops over there, as there was no perceived gap, would be my guess.  Between the section, platoon and company weapons, there were found to be more than capable, IMHO.


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## REDinstaller (29 Jan 2011)

And the need for water on ops out weighs the need for CASW, when you can hunker down and have a drink while the arty spools up.


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## Kalatzi (2 Mar 2011)

Hail Technoviking!

Once again, we are ******.  Thank you kindly, motherlovers.  God bless the PBI.

I read yesterday on CanadaNewswire a release from Rhinemetal CA announcing that BGEN Tremblay on retirement would be VP Bus dewvelopment for them 

The change of command for LFQA was today. 

I'm not triyng to call in an airstrike on myself, I'm sure that all is good. 

Given the length of the project I can't help but roll my eyes though


----------



## daftandbarmy (8 Mar 2011)

I guess this is what a contact looks like when the good guys don't have access to light mortars....


Inside a Taliban Ambush

Some good footage I found over at Militaryphotos.net that shows a Taliban ambush and the protracted U.S. response.
Big rounds impacting the rocks, Talibs not aiming, calling for single shots in Arabic, wearing chest rigs and combat boots, no US air called in…
It’s an intriguing look at a fight in Afghanistan from a perspective we rarely get.

Read more: http://kitup.military.com/2011/03/inside-a-taliban-ambush.html#ixzz1G3JYR6E3


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## GnyHwy (18 Mar 2011)

I bet the good guys are saying to themselves " I wish we had a CASW.   Maybe even some timed ammunition".  

A mortar could work too but, not with the same rate of fire, accuracy or time to effective rounds on target.  

They're all over the target with their DF weapons but can't seem to get them out of their hiding spots.  Pelt that area with 40mm grenades and you'll see them scatter out in the open where the DF weapons can get them.  

2 choices for the bad guys here.  Run and die or stay put and die.

For *this* situation, CASW wins hands down.


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## vonGarvin (19 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I bet the good guys are saying to themselves " I wish we had a CASW.   Maybe even some timed ammunition".
> 
> A mortar could work too but, not with the same rate of fire, accuracy or time to effective rounds on target.
> 
> ...


I call 'bullshit'.  How are you going to lug around several 20+ kg tins of that 40mm ammo?  Have you even seen one of these things?


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## GnyHwy (19 Mar 2011)

I guess if you make the assumption that they are dismounted, then they are not likely to have lugged a mortar and all the tubed ammo either.  If they are mounted then they could have either.


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## vonGarvin (19 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I guess if you make the assumption that they are dismounted, then they are not likely to have lugged a mortar and all the tubed ammo either.  If they are mounted then they could have either.


Here we go again.

Do you even know how much a 60 mm (light role) weighs?  The ammo?  (You probably do)


Do you even know much much an AGLS C-16 weights?  The ammo?  (You probably don't)


In short, the C16 is too heavy to manoeuvre dismounted.  The 60mm is rather appropriate for the role.  Need evidence to support that wild theory?  See "Afghanistan, 2006 - present: Canadian Forces."

If they are mounted, well, we already have 4 x 25mm chain guns, the ability to move about, protected, etc.  So, the mounted part, let's keep that out of the equation.


----------



## R031button (19 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I guess if you make the assumption that they are dismounted, then they are not likely to have lugged a mortar and all the tubed ammo either.  If they are mounted then they could have either.



Mortar rounds can be broken up amongst a platoon and then collected fairly easily. Linked 40 mm, and I'll admit that I've never used those particular rounds but I assume it's something close to any other link in the world, would be extremely difficult to do that with.


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## Illegio (19 Mar 2011)

The GMG + tripod together weigh something like forty kilos. That stretches the definition of "man-portable" by no small measure. The 60mm in the light role weighs what, ten?

Considering the terrain in which that video was taken, it's a no-brainer in my mind which is the more attractive choice.


----------



## GnyHwy (19 Mar 2011)

> If they are mounted, well, we already have 4 x 25mm chain guns, the ability to move about, protected, etc.
> So, the mounted part, let's keep that out of the equation.



Why should we keep that part out if it?  Are we to say that the .50 cal is not effective because it is difficult to dismount?  To limit this thread to a Plt-- dismounted patrol scenario would certainly guarantee it's failure and this thread would have ended 22 pages ago.   



> Do you even know how much a 60 mm (light role) weighs?  The ammo?  (You probably do) Do you even know much much an AGLS C-16 weights?  The ammo?  (You probably don't)



You're almost correct with these statements.  I have never hauled a CASW around.  I have seen the specs and have a good understanding of the ballistics.  

I have dismounted the 60mm as well as the .50 cal. The CASW, I'm guessing would be similar to the .50cal (dismounting the .50 was one of the sillier things I've ever done and yes, it did suck).  
Personal disclaimer:  "I am not an experienced Infanteer" but, I have humped enough of this stuff and enough of my own radios and tech gadgets to know how much it sucks.  I am a fire supporter, which is why I find interest in this and the Inf attack thread.  I have stated earlier in this thread as well as the Inf attack thread, I see it used as a firebase weapon on the offence.  Having it for defence is a no brainer. 



> The GMG + tripod together weigh something like forty kilos. That stretches the definition of "man-portable" by no small measure.



I agree.  This would be similar to our "man-portable" radar that comes in 3 bags and weighs as much as a large midget.  I am not trying to make an argument that the CASW is good for dismount nor am I arguing that it should replace the 60mm.  I am trying to bring attention to the fact that the CASW would provide a different dimension of fast and effective suppressive fire that would be organic to the Coy.  

The Afghanistan BG structure has lead us to believe that we always have Arty guns at the ready and that there are jets on standby waiting for a TIC.  The unfortunate reality is, a Plt or Coy in contact should never assume that they will have either of those assets to support them immediately (maybe not even at all).

Perhaps try this criteria, dismounted or mounted.

Mobility
Accuracy
Lethal Radius
Time from tgt Id to effective rds on tgt
Rate of Fire
Number of effective rds per minute
Time to effectively engage 3 targets
Moving Targets
Amount of ammo on posn and resupply.
Reliability 

Feel free to add your own criteria or correct mine if you think it's not valid.


----------



## R031button (19 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Why should we keep that part out if it?  Are we to say that the .50 cal is not effective because it is difficult to dismount?  To limit this thread to a Plt-- dismounted patrol scenario would certainly guarantee it's failure and this thread would have ended 22 pages ago.



Because the GMG is being billed as the replacement for the 60mm mortar, which is a platoon asset. The order doesn't include kit to mount them to vehicles, so it will be used dismounted, and presumably at the platoon level. Nobody said the .50 isn't effective but I ask you this, can it be set up quickly on the advance? Whats the man power bill to effectively employ it? Compare that to the 60mm. It is worth noting that most armies still employ mortars at the platoon and company level, the AGL's and .50's are usually grouped as a battlion asset, I can only assume this is reflective of the complexity of using them.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> The Afghanistan BG structure has lead us to believe that we always have Arty guns at the ready and that there are jets on standby waiting for a TIC.  The unfortunate reality is, a Plt or Coy in contact should never assume that they will have either of those assets to support them immediately (maybe not even at all).



All the more reason to keep indirect fire within the platoon and company.


----------



## ArmyRick (19 Mar 2011)

I have oodles of 60mm mortar expirience (and a decent amount of 81mm time)...

The 60mm mortar in light role (yah the oldy goldy we in the CF use) can be put into action as quick as a someone can spot the target. Note the crew does not have to see the target (They can take direction from the eyes on). An expirienced crew can put rounds on target in 2-4 rounds. You can haul a decent amount of 60mm ammo around in a platoon.

The 40mm CASW? If its not mounted on a vehicle or set up static in an OP or FOB, then no thank you. I have had my expiriences hauling around stupidly heavy things and I don't welcome the idea of dragging around the CASW. For dismounted fight, we don't need the CASW. 

Actually since we are going to talk about dragging around support weapons on foot, what was that arty piece that 2RCHA used to have? 105mm L5 or something like that? Why don't we have the troops lug that around?

Maybe we don't need it because we have other pieces of kit that can do the job, right? IMO, our 60mm or a newer 60mm would be more optimal as a platoon support weapon.

as far comparing it to the radar? Two completely different assets. One is for ISTAR and is for engaging enemy.


----------



## vonGarvin (19 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I have dismounted the 60mm as well as the .50 cal. The CASW, I'm guessing would be similar to the .50cal (dismounting the .50 was one of the sillier things I've ever done and yes, it did suck).
> ----
> PThe Afghanistan BG structure has lead us to believe that we always have Arty guns at the ready and that there are jets on standby waiting for a TIC.  The unfortunate reality is, a Plt or Coy in contact should never assume that they will have either of those assets to support them immediately (maybe not even at all).


Very sage words.  Dismounting the C16 AGLS (this is that which used to be called CASW) is akin to dismounting the .50.


			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Perhaps try this criteria, dismounted or mounted.
> Mobility
> Accuracy
> Lethal Radius
> ...


Sounds good; however, it must be remembered that if any of those criteria are considered a "fail", then that system ought to be excluded.  For example, the M777 would win on all criteria, except for mobility.


----------



## daftandbarmy (20 Mar 2011)

R031button said:
			
		

> Mortar rounds can be broken up amongst a platoon and then collected fairly easily. Linked 40 mm, and I'll admit that I've never used those particular rounds but I assume it's something close to any other link in the world, would be extremely difficult to do that with.



... and the CASW doesn't have white phos. Where's the fun in that?


----------



## a_majoor (20 Mar 2011)

Just for some perspective, the .50 HMG was used in the dismounted role in WWII by the US army, requiring a dedicated three man crew to carry the broken down weapon and an entire eight man infantry squad (section) to escort the thing on the move and carry the ammunition. (I might be off on the numbers, but the figure will be fairly close to what I remember).

I would expect a CASW/C-16 to use up the same amount of manpower (minimum) to get in and out of action. OTOH I have carried a 60mm strapped to my ruck (not exactly the most fun thing I ever did) and had a partner carrying rounds in his ruck, along with everyone in the platoon carrying one round or one belt for the GPMG; a very impressive amount of firepower and no consumption of manpower from other tasks.

Once again, I am all for AGLs, especially ones which are the same size and weight of a GPMG (such as the Russian and Chinese ones), and I would also be a big fan of the CIS .50 HMG to replace our current M-2's.


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## daftandbarmy (21 Mar 2011)

I'm guessing that ol' Smudger would have been OK if these guys had put a 60mm MOR into action against these bad guys. The target area looks like it's about 600m away, perfect for a light mortar.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jyk7e0VMwmw&feature=related


----------



## McG (21 Mar 2011)

Some propaganda from the project:


----------



## McG (21 Mar 2011)

... and more:


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## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

sigh.....who made this one ?


----------



## McG (21 Mar 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> sigh.....who made this one ?


Is it wrong?


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> ... and more:



The statement "collateral damage is not acceptable"
It smacks of "if you make an error you'll be crucified"


----------



## R031button (21 Mar 2011)

I'm more curious as to why it's shown engaging a guy with a Styer AUG in the first picture. Are we planning on a NATO intervention on the Gold Coast some time soon?


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> The statement "collateral damage is not acceptable"
> It smacks of "if you make an error you'll be crucified"



Not only that, if the CASW needs to fire indirect it needs a FOO type to direct it....otherwise......collateral damage....which is not acceptable.


----------



## Illegio (21 Mar 2011)

Is it just me or does the CEP for the CASW seem a bit small? Considering the 40mm round has what, a 1m lethal radius, that diagram is suggesting that the CEP is only 2 square meters at 2000m? Even looking at the GMG stats, it says it is effective to "point targets" at 1500m. Sounds a bit fishy.


----------



## KevinB (21 Mar 2011)

Its easy to make tables when stuff is not fielded...


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## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

Those pics are completely bogus for a number of reasons.  

1.  The CASW could not be accurate to 2 metres. Not even on a SF kit.  That seems almost as accurate as sniper rifle. Busted.
2.  It depicts the 155m error as circular and the 60mm as oval.  They are the opposite of that.  Further, a 777 @ 20 km with a 5 m radius. Not even close.  It would be more like 180 x 90 at that range.  Apologize for the estimate but, I don't have my firing tables on me .

Not sure where these sesame street diagrams come from.  Not even a manufacturer trying to sell his stuff would dare  advertise this.


----------



## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

EDIT: Those 777 stats I stated would be with conventional ammo.  Excalibur could do the 5m raduis.


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Those pics are completely bogus for a number of reasons.
> 
> 1.  The CASW could not be accurate to 2 metres. Not even on a SF kit.  That seems almost as accurate as sniper rifle. Busted.
> 2.  It depicts the 155m error as circular and the 60mm as oval.  They are the opposite of that.  Further, a 777 @ 20 km with a 5 m radius. Not even close.  It would be more like 180 x 90 at that range.  Apologize for the estimate but, I don't have my firing tables on me .
> ...



Old mortarman here....beaton zone of the 81 was long and narrow.....so why is this weapon so different?


----------



## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

I take your words as experienced but, the mortar would not be a narrow and long as a gun.  The higher the elevation the more circular it would be.  At lower elevations, closer to 800 mils (max range) of the mortar you are absolutely correct. Long a narrow.


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I take your words as experienced but, the mortar would not be a narrow and long as a gun.  The higher the elevation the more circular it would be.  At lower elevations, closer to 800 mils (max range) of the mortar you are absolutely correct. Long a narrow.



even at a high elevation the 81's BZ was long and narrow. I'd have to look but I am sure it was about 200m long (depending on range from mortar to tgt) and elevation. Width....I am not sure on. TViking might know.


----------



## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

I can check my firing tables at work tomorrow.  I just know when we calculate error for guns we calculate error for range and deflection.  Range error is usually, on average about 8x the error in deflection (error in deflection is almost neglible unless you shoot really far).  For mortars we just calculate CEP which I believe all the firing table provide but, I will double check.


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Mar 2011)

Gny, I really wish the infantry could get those 81s back@!


----------



## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

Air mobile.


----------



## GnyHwy (21 Mar 2011)

Further to those pics.  It certainly seems fishy.  The person delivering the presentation was likely lobbying the CASW.  It looks like the best case stats for the CASW vs the actual for the 60.  I do believe that if the CASW is matched against the 60 for accuracy it would be a no conteset but, the CASW ain't that accurate.  My best guess would be 1 in 10 shots would be within 2m but, with a 3-5 rds burst,  the majority of rounds would be anywhere from 5- 20m away, similar to a tight MG grouping.


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## ArmyRick (21 Mar 2011)

Those diagrams (as fishy as they are) do not address a key issue we have discussed here. ITS WEIGHT! Its either vehicle mounted or in a static position (FOB or OP). No way guys with current full kit, would be humping that. I have been on ex with yanks and I have yet to see them humping a MK19. They jam them on Hummers, Amtracks and the likes.

I suggest, we stick these things on the LAVIII ISC versions with no 25mm. I would also reccomend maybe we stick these on our MRAPs.

Anybody else? Thoughts?

Jim, your absolutely right, GIVE us back our 81mm Mortars (or buy us Strykers with 120mm mortars ;-)


----------



## dapaterson (21 Mar 2011)

I'd suggest a simple evaluation:

Two four-man crews, one from the CASW project, the other from any one of the Bns.

Each has to carry their system (together with their full personal kit) for 5km, then engage a target at 2500m.

First round on target wins the evaluation.



Anyone?  Bueller?


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## vonGarvin (21 Mar 2011)

If those project members wish to pulll themselves away from the powerpoint and lug the beast around, then I'll listen to them.  Until then, they can shut the f**** up, because unlike their propaganda states, the infantry is stilll wondering how to carry the thing, let alone stare at powerpoints.  Instead, I'll just show those staffers a photo of the supposedely obsolete weapon:


----------



## daftandbarmy (22 Mar 2011)

I'd love to have it available on a vehicle mount, but I can't see how the CASW could have been deployed in any of these (very tense) situations:

I love these guys.... ‘Got it in there baby’… extra gum for that Marine on the 60. Obviously a Pl or Coy wpns det in action:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRcINiPBw3c&feature=related

Nicely done… 51mm MOR at 2.02 and after
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoDT1NGjTR8&feature=related

Same again
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNSdoeVOFiQ&feature=related


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## OldSolduer (22 Mar 2011)

I made the point on the weight of this beast some time ago. I think the weight of the system alone prohibits "Man packing" it, never mind all the ammo the beast needs.
As for the propaganda that GAP posted...its just that....propaganda.


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## George Wallace (22 Mar 2011)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> ...........(or buy us Strykers with 120mm mortars ;-)



As an Armour guy, even I see the potential and sense in this.  I would like to see these in Armour units, as well as Infantry, to provide support.  Tanks are not that effective at firing illumination or indirect fire.  Recce has even less capabilities.


----------



## OldSolduer (22 Mar 2011)

The thing with mortars it comes with a pretty high training bill. Its not a weapon anyone can use. Numpties are not welcome in the Mortar World. TViking knows this as well.

You need to train Fire Controllers, Control Post Operators, Group Commanders, Line Cpls and the crews that man the weapons as well. 

Its costly, but worthwhile.


----------



## Michael OLeary (22 Mar 2011)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> As an Armour guy, even I see the potential and sense in this.  I would like to see these in Armour units, as well as Infantry, to provide support.  Tanks are not that effective at firing illumination or indirect fire.  Recce has even less capabilities.



Unless we are planning to go into the realm of improved munitions, then lobbying for the 120 over the 81 is a very different argument, and probably as big a difference as 60 vs. CASW.  The principal purpose of the 81 mortar was suppression. Suppression is best effected by hitting the target hard in the first few seconds of a fire mission, then maintaining a decent sustained rate of fire. Soldiers in the target area don't duck lower or stay down longer in direct proportion to the diameter of the mortar round, so heavier mortars don't necessarily scale into more effective application of fire.  The 81 can be drop fired much more efficiently than the 120, and an automatic 120 for burst capability is a different animal again with all its own problems. Sustained fire with the 81 can be achieved with approximately one-fourth the logistic penalty of providing the same number of rounds for a 120, and the coverage of 4 x 81 is about the same as 3 x 120 for about the same cost in troops and vehicles to deploy. (When we looked at a 120 program we were planning to replace 8 x 81 with 6 x 120.) And even replacing 4 with 3 results in a logistic cost of about three times the weight/bulk for equivalent HE suppressive fire effect.

The ICM argument is also a non-starter for the same reasons the Guns don't carry every possible ICM round, it takes too much capability away from core mission capabilities with HE/smoke/illum when you aren't planning specialized applications of fire.  So, if we want to get into the merits of bringing back the 81 or alternatives, then there's already a thread for that. This one can stay on the 60 vs CASW argument, along with exploring how the situated estimate is using the "doctrinal" 60 to make its case and refusing to compare new weapons capabilities.


----------



## GnyHwy (22 Mar 2011)

> I'd have to look but I am sure it was about 200m long (depending on range from mortar to tgt) and elevation. Width....I am not sure on. TViking might know





> I can check my firing tables at work tomorrow.  I just know when we calculate error for guns we calculate error for range and deflection.  Range error is usually, on average about 8x the error in deflection (error in deflection is almost neglible unless you shoot really far).  For mortars we just calculate CEP which I believe all the firing table provide but, I will double check.



Just to revisit this cause I said I would, then back on topic.

I checked the firing tables for the 81mm.  It does provide probable errors (PE) for both range (PER) and deflection (PED).  At the high elevations (1000-1500) the PED is the same or even greater than the PER which would cause a circular error on the ground.  It is not until the elevation gets below approx 1000mils before the PER starts to outweigh the PED.  The most the PER ever outweighs the PED is about 4:1 vice the average of 8:1 for an arty gun in low angle.  An arty gun would also get more circular above 1000mils.

Back on topic.  The CASW would likely follow this pattern.  In low angle it would have a long and narrow beaten zone (like an MG) and in high angle  it would get more circular.  To attain the 2m in the pic seems like quite the pipe dream.  Atmosphere issues aside and even in single shot, I don't see how this would be possible.  Not with any consistency anyway.  If a trained soldier with a CASW could hit a 2m screen at 2km more than 1 in 5 shots, I would be amazed.

P.S.  I totally agree with Michael O'Leary and the 120mm vs 81mm comments.  We deal with the same issues with 155mm vs 105mm.  Quick suppression with a high volume of fire is the key.  The bigger calibre brings a whole different animal of logistical headaches.  The main reasons we have 777s in Afghan would be range to cover the entire AO, accuracy to prevent fratricide and the ability to fire excalibur.

From now on I will post any mortar or gun comments in the mortar thread.


----------



## dapaterson (22 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> If a trained soldier with a CASW could hit a 2m screen at 2km more than 1 in 5 shots, I would be amazed.



CASW (or C16) is not just a GMG; it's supposed to be a sophisticated Fire Control System as well that's programmable to deliver the desired effect at the desired location.  Not certain of all the technical details, and we all know that no manufacturer would overstate the capabilities they're delivering...


----------



## Kalatzi (22 Mar 2011)

Close counts with grenades >


----------



## ArmyRick (22 Mar 2011)

I think the point is, no matter how super duper an FCS system, hitting a target at 2 KM with medium velocity 40mm is VERY unlikely. Unless you plan to do alot of adjusting.


----------



## R031button (22 Mar 2011)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> CASW (or C16) is not just a GMG; it's supposed to be a sophisticated Fire Control System as well that's programmable to deliver the desired effect at the desired location.  Not certain of all the technical details, and we all know that no manufacturer would overstate the capabilities they're delivering...



Because what this system needs is more weight.


----------



## McG (23 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> The CASW would likely follow this pattern.  In low angle it would have a long and narrow beaten zone (like an MG) and in high angle  it would get more circular.  To attain the 2m in the pic seems like quite the pipe dream.  Atmosphere issues aside and even in single shot, I don't see how this would be possible.


Low angle fire produces those long narrow error zones because of small variations in muzzle velocity - these small variances at the start influence through the whole flight of the projectile.  Given the high forward velocities relative to the slow fall to earth, the slightest of greater forward velocity can translate into greater travel prior to the projectile happening to hit the ground.  As you stated, this is true for rifles, MGs, tanks and artillery firing on a low angle.

However, the slide is emphasising precision engagements (hence the reason the 155 mm templates show for Excalibur and not the larger long error template of traditional rounds).  Likewise, the CASW template is not showing the conventional HEDP round - it is showing the air burst.  There are a variety of very mature technologies for ensuring _straight_ trajectory projectiles detonate in a very precise range window and these have been incorporated into operational systems - traditionally these have been in air defense guns but more recently it has also turned-up in the XM-25 (which its users seem to like).

I am comfortable with the suggestion that this weapon can (with a certain ammunition type) have a greatly shorter beaten zone, but I do wonder if wind was accounted for in the template.  Given the size and speed of the projectile, I would expect a much wider error template.  I am in agreement with:


			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> If a trained soldier with a CASW could hit a 2m screen at 2km more than 1 in 5 shots, I would be amazed.





			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I think the point is, no matter how super duper an FCS system, hitting a target at 2 KM with medium velocity 40mm is VERY unlikely. Unless you plan to do alot of adjusting.



I also wonder, if the error templates show the precision options for CASW and M777, why did the 60 mm template not reflect potential precision rounds for that weapon?


----------



## Michael OLeary (23 Mar 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> However, the slide is emphasising precision engagements (hence the reason the 155 mm templates show for Excalibur and not the larger long error template of traditional rounds).  Likewise, the CASW template is not showing the conventional HEDP round - it is showing the air burst.  There are a variety of very mature technologies for ensuring _straight_ trajectory projectiles detonate in a very precise range window and these have been incorporated into operational systems - traditionally these have been in air defense guns but more recently it has also turned-up in the XM-25 (which its users seem to like).



OK, I'll ask.

If the slide is emphasizing the best cases with the most modern technologies for CASW and 155 mm, what data are they using for the 60mm mortar.  Is it?

a. the 1960s tube, handheld, with "average" ammo (i.e., what firing table did they pull the data from)?

or

b. a modern 60, baseplate mounted, with modern ammunition with tighter tolerances and a developed fire control system?

It's easy to situate an argument when you choose not to level the playing field.

I think that's been the core of the counter-argument regarding technology all along, if we can afford to bring along a completely different weapon system, we could have at least considered a modern update to the current system for a valid comparison.

When the argument is put forth that the 60 is more appropriate to light scales and dismounted movement, that doesn't mean its use in other roles can't involve modern weapon mounts (including vehicles) and fire control systems for increased stability and precision.  As far as I can see, these options have not been explored in detail to produce a completed piece of staff work.

 :warstory: When I joined the Infantry School, as SME Mortars, I had the opportunity to sift through some of the remaining documentation on the aborted 120 mm mortar project conducted in the mid-1980s. It quickly became clear that the Statement of Requirement for that project was flawed from the beginning - the "essential" characteristics that were stated could be met by only one 120 mm mortar system then in production; the Thomson-Brandt 120 mm rifled mortar.  The "trials" that were conducted compared that mortar to a light Israeli 120 which wasn't anywhere near being in the same class of weapon (other than calibre) and an awkward 4-barreled system mounted on an M113. From what I saw, the estimate was situated so hard I don't know why they wasted their time even trying to convince people it was a useful trial.


----------



## dapaterson (23 Mar 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> From what I saw, the estimate was situated so hard I don't know why they wasted their time even trying to convince people it was a useful trial.



Obviously, you've never worked in DLR...

(I kid... a little)


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## McG (24 Mar 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> As far as I can see, these options have not been explored in detail to produce a completed piece of staff work.


I agree.  If that is not the case, there has been a horrible job communicating this even internally to audiences who should know.

Unfortunately, I think this debate suffers from a few (on either end of the spectrum of opinion) who insist on situating the estimate to their desired end.

The anti-60 mm camp has not shown that their analysis has considered considered newer mortars and newer munitions (including PGMs).  At the same time, elements in the anti-CASW camp continue present the weapon as flat trajectory and direct fire only (and thus just a big MG) regardless of how often it has been stated that the weapon will also do high-elevation and indirect fire.

The anti-CASW camp has presented a very strong argument that the weapons system itself is too heavy to be man-portable (and I believe they are correct) but the anit-60 mm camp has also presented a convincing argument that the 60 mm is not much better when ammunition weight in quantities for suppression is taken into account ... of course, that does not mean the 60 cannot still provide a meaningfull capability with less ammunition.

I really think if a little more emotion were removed from this debate, we would find there is a role for both weapons.  While one is currently slated as the offset for the other, I am not convinced that other more appropriate off-sets are not out there.

.... here's more propaganda from the project.  I wonder how these slides would have looked had the 60 mm been given a PGM option?  I suspect there would have been a little more baseline weight for the precision 60 mm fire control system (something has to program the round) but the adjustment shots & "no FCS" complaints against the mortar would have to go.  Maybe fewer rounds could achieve the effect too.


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## Infanteer (24 Mar 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> I really think if a little more emotion were removed from this debate, we would find there is a role for both weapons.  While one is currently slated as the offset for the other, I am not convinced that other more appropriate off-sets are not out there.



Yes.

I'd give up the 84mm Carl Gustav and the Eryx up as off-sets for a new 60mm mortar and a Javelin AT Missile.  The math probably doesn't work out, but there it is.  I'd gladly take a AGL - with or without FCS - too.


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## Michael OLeary (25 Mar 2011)

And there's nothing wrong with the idea of a mounted weapons detachment whose primary weapon is the AGL (for vehicle mount and static ground mount employment) that also carries a 60 mm for use in dismounted operations when vehicles and heavy kit are left behind (or for when it's the right weapon for the job).


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## GnyHwy (27 Mar 2011)

> Likewise, the CASW template is not showing the conventional HEDP round - it is showing the air burst.  There are a variety of very mature technologies for ensuring straight trajectory projectiles detonate in a very precise range window and these have been incorporated into operational systems - traditionally these have been in air defense guns but more recently it has also turned-up in the XM-25 (which its users seem to like).
> 
> I am comfortable with the suggestion that this weapon can (with a certain ammunition type) have a greatly shorter beaten zone, but I do wonder if wind was accounted for in the template.  Given the size and speed of the projectile, I would expect a much wider error template.  I am in agreement with:



I am curious about this mature technology.  It would  have to be either an advanced type of propellant or more of the existing propellant.  The only way to reduce probable error (PE) is to pack more charge behind the projectile.  When we fire timed ammo in the Arty we try to fire it at the highest charge for the same reason of reducing PE.

The second comment about wind.  Wind, air temp, air density would not be accounted for.  These PEs are in relation to a standard atmosphere with no wind.

As for comments about the indirect role.  This is not difficult to do.  Just to clarify, the low angle/high angle has nothing to do with indirect fire.  Indirect fire is only when the weapon system can't see the target. i.e. the target may be 1400m away and a forward observer would be directing the fire.  The max range is 2400m which would be an elevation of 800mils.  700mils elevation (low angle ) will still give you 2000m+ in range.  I would not fire this wpn in high angle unless it was necessary (intervening crests) because your PE will get bigger.  Referring back to timed ammo, it would have to be fired in low angle or you would have rounds bursting all over the place.


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## McG (27 Mar 2011)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Just to clarify, the low angle/high angle has nothing to do with indirect fire.  Indirect fire is only when the weapon system can't see the target. i.e. the target may be 1400m away and a forward observer would be directing the fire.


That is generally understood by the participants of this thread.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Referring back to timed ammo, it would have to be fired in low angle ...


Yes, everything that I have seen shows the airburst is intended to be fired in a flat trajectory.  This includes the project propaganda graphics:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28805/post-1028312.html#msg1028312


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## SeaKingTacco (27 Mar 2011)

It has been a (large) number of years since I did my IG Course, but unless the science of ballistics has changed recently, there is no way that I can see to achieve the small CEP the CASW project claims that they can.


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## vonGarvin (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It has been a (large) number of years since I did my IG Course, but unless the science of ballistics has changed recently, there is no way that I can see to achieve the small CEP the CASW project claims that they can.


Oh, didn't you hear about the change in the science of ballistics?  Terms such as "Internal ballistics" and "external ballistics", etc, have been replaced with "Regional Industrial Effect" and "Vested Interest".


----------



## Old Sweat (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It has been a (large) number of years since I did my IG Course, but unless the science of ballistics has changed recently, there is no way that I can see to achieve the small CEP the CASW project claims that they can.



What he said goes double for me - especially the part about the (large) numbers of years since I did the IG course. It only could be possible with little round-to-round variation in MV, which would require very consistent propellant, and a very stable platform which eliminates as much as possible variations in bearing and elevation. This would be very difficult to achieve with an automatic weapon. The question is how great is the difference between the trajectories of the rounds, which affects the fall of shot at the sharp end.


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## vonGarvin (27 Mar 2011)

But.....this is all....HERESY!  I mean, the _propaganda _ *told us* that it wouldn't require 28 rounds to adjust onto a target in the indirect role.  *THEY TOLD US*!




[/sarcasm]


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## Michael OLeary (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It has been a (large) number of years since I did my IG Course, but unless the science of ballistics has changed recently, there is no way that I can see to achieve the small CEP the CASW project claims that they can.



Sounds like a job for the Mythbusters.


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## McG (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It has been a (large) number of years since I did my IG Course, but unless the science of ballistics has changed recently, there is no way that I can see to achieve the small CEP the CASW project claims that they can.


As I stated, there are many technologies to achieve this.  On the more advanced end of the scale, MV is measured at the muzzle and the fuze programmed as the projectile leaves (this is late '80s tech) - the CASW does not have this capability.  It is also possible to develope ammunition that calculates its MV based on measuring its own peak angular velocity/rotating speed - but I doubt our programmable ammunition will do this.

At the lower end of the scale, it is possible (as many have identified) to tighten the tollarance of MV and simply go with a timed fuze.  The Bofors 3P programmable fuzes (more late '80s technology) boasted a range probable error of only 7 m front to back.  The Nammo Raufoss 40 mm programmable HE airburst grenade (AKA the Mk 285 40 mm High Velocity Grenade) uses a modern evolution of the Bofor's 3P fuze.  The projectile itself is not crimped into the casing but is secured through another means that sees tighter tollerance for shot start preassure (leading to less variance in MV).

The 1 m x 2 m CEP probably comes from the manufacture, so it will include some level of embelishment but I would not conclude that it is certainly far outside the realm of possible.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (27 Mar 2011)

MCG-

Fair enough on your comments.  Given an averagely abused or neglected grenade launcher, firing an average belt of ammo on an average day with an average crew, I would like to see what the CEP works out to.  I remain to be convinced that, in practice, it is anywhere near as accurate as claimed.

FWIW, I think that a grenade launcher is a useful addition to the toolbox, but not at the loss of the 60mm mortar.


----------



## OldSolduer (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> FWIW, I think that a grenade launcher is a useful addition to the toolbox, but not at the loss of the 60mm mortar.



Sometimes our toolboxes aren't big enough.


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## SeaKingTacco (27 Mar 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Sometimes our toolboxes aren't big enough.



You are quite right.


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## OldSolduer (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You are quite right.


We have far too many tools....yah know?


----------



## SeaKingTacco (27 Mar 2011)

I feel dirty for setting you up like that...


----------



## OldSolduer (27 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I feel dirty for setting you up like that...



Sorry about that. LOL

PM Inbound


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## McG (31 Mar 2011)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> MCG-
> 
> Fair enough on your comments.  Given an averagely abused or neglected grenade launcher, firing an average belt of ammo on an average day with an average crew, I would like to see what the CEP works out to.  I remain to be convinced that, in practice, it is anywhere near as accurate as claimed.


Scepticism is appropriate now.  The project staff should have verified all the claims before passing the manufacturer's promisses on to the eventual user group, but there are other holes in the analysis so ...

The claims are not impossible but the proof remains to be seen ... and we may be stuck waiting on FCS implementation to know.


			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> FWIW, I think that a grenade launcher is a useful addition to the toolbox, but not at the loss of the 60mm mortar.


Yes.  They both belong.  There has got to be something else more appropriate to divest ... and it should not necessarily have to be another weapon.


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## vonGarvin (31 Mar 2011)

While a great weapon that provides great target effects, the AGLS C-16 is not a platoon weapon.  Period.  The bullshit propaganda was just that: propaganda.


Now all the infantry has to do is figure out how to use it.  :


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## daftandbarmy (31 Mar 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> While a great weapon that provides great target effects, the AGLS C-16 is not a platoon weapon.  Period.  The bullshit propaganda was just that: propaganda.
> 
> 
> Now all the infantry has to do is figure out how to use it.  :



What happened when the Eryx was introduced? I assume that it sat in the armoury alot....


----------



## GK .Dundas (31 Mar 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> Scepticism is appropriate now.  The project staff should have verified all the claims before passing the manufacturer's promisses on to the eventual user group, but there are other holes in the analysis so ...
> 
> The claims are not impossible but the proof remains to be seen ... and we may be stuck waiting on FCS implementation to know.Yes.  They both belong.  There has got to be something else more appropriate to divest ... and it should not necessarily have to be another weapon.


 About divesting ourselves of a procurement officer or two perhaps the geniuses behind the "We just have replace the  ancient decrepit 60 MM mortar with this spiffy new Grenade MG ".


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## OldSolduer (31 Mar 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> While a great weapon that provides great target effects, the AGLS C-16 is not a platoon weapon.  Period.  The bullshit propaganda was just that: propaganda.
> 
> 
> Now all the infantry has to do is figure out how to use it.  :



Good Luck. The Reg Force Bns won't have enough people to man it. So who does that leave?


----------



## dangerboy (31 Mar 2011)

Question for anyone in the Infantry School.  Have they published anything with the Tech data and characteristics for this weapon, and if so is it available on the DWAN?


----------



## vonGarvin (1 Apr 2011)

dangerboy said:
			
		

> Question for anyone in the Infantry School.  Have they published anything with the Tech data and characteristics for this weapon, and if so is it available on the DWAN?


No, nothing yet.  The first batch of ICT (Initial Cadre Training) is still underway.  The stuff has to be evaluated and validated yet prior to publishing.


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## GnyHwy (1 Apr 2011)

> While a great weapon that provides great target effects, the AGLS C-16 is not a platoon weapon.  Period.  The bullshit propaganda was just that: propaganda



My thoughts exactly.  This is Coy Wpn meant for Coy/Cbt Tm attacks in a fire base role.  The fact that it is roled for dismount only does not surprise me.  It wouldn't be the first time we've bought a piece of equipment with half it's capabilities in mind.  

Also, after reading the many posts, I can appreciate the value of the 60 in the dismounted Plt scenario.  Mounted, I would have one up top the LAV for sure.  Nothing a couple wpns techs and a roll of gun tape can't make happen.


----------



## Infanteer (1 Apr 2011)

The Israeli Merkavas and Namers (the only real IFV, if you ask me) have 60mm mortars on them, IIRC.


----------



## daftandbarmy (1 Apr 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The Israeli Merkavas and Namers (the only real IFV, if you ask me) have 60mm mortars on them, IIRC.



And you can 'like it' on Facebook!

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=62896199615


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## a_majoor (2 Apr 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Good Luck. The Reg Force Bns won't have enough people to man it. So who does that leave?



Reserve armoured on top of their G wagons.....

(pulls fire hood over head)


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (2 Apr 2011)

The battalion I'm in is pretty good for manpower (missing the NCOs that were not recruited in the early/mid 90s). AGLs should be fine for vehicles as a mix with other weapons, although a couple of simulations we ran through recently with them in place of our 25mm has us referring to them as "confetti cannons" for their utter lack of effect on AFVs.

Anyhoo


----------



## vonGarvin (3 Apr 2011)

Vehicle mounted AGLS makes sense, and will be mounted on some vehicles; however, the ones we've purchased thus far (C-16) are all ground-mount.


----------



## Infanteer (3 Apr 2011)

Next you know, we'll be divesting the the C6 GPMG to pay for vehicle mounts....


----------



## OldSolduer (3 Apr 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Next you know, we'll be divesting the the C6 GPMG to pay for vehicle mounts....



Infanteer has the good idea fairy been visiting you?


----------



## GK .Dundas (3 Apr 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Next you know, we'll be divesting the the C6 GPMG to pay for vehicle mounts....


I seem recall sometime in the 60's SOMEBODY decided we didn't need the .50s and they all disappeared . A relatively short time later SOMEONE else decided that was a bad idea and we purchased  god knows how many thousands of .50 browning M 2s .And if one urban legend is true  a fair number of them were some of the MGs We 'd originally sold in the first place.


----------



## daftandbarmy (3 Apr 2011)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> I seem recall sometime in the 60's SOMEBODY decided we didn't need the .50s and they all disappeared . A relatively short time later SOMEONE else decided that was a bad idea and we purchased  god knows how many thousands of .50 browning M 2s .And if one urban legend is true  a fair number of them were some of the MGs We 'd originally sold in the first place.



Kind of like our Chinooks then? It's nice to hang onto those traditions.


----------



## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2011)

And here's what it looks like, at the Infantry School today:







And it stores in these boxes:






Enjoy humping it!  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy (15 Apr 2011)

Holy Mother of Broken Backs..... does it come with a slave to carry it, like in Sparta?


----------



## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Holy Mother of Broken Backs..... does it come with a slave to carry it, like in Sparta?


Yes.  He is known as a "00010-01 Infantryman"  ;D


----------



## Dissident (15 Apr 2011)

Oh gods.


----------



## dangerboy (15 Apr 2011)

Looking at the pictures, what is that to the left of the tripod? Looks like a spare leg.


----------



## OldSolduer (15 Apr 2011)

I can hear the characteristic now:

"Man portable for short distances"

But who decides what a short distance is?????


----------



## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2011)

dangerboy said:
			
		

> Looking at the pictures, what is that to the left of the tripod? Looks like a spare leg.


The front tripod leg has two "feet".  One for low mount (which you see on the ground) and one for high mount, which sticks forward.


----------



## daftandbarmy (15 Apr 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> The front tripod leg has two "feet".  One for low mount (which you see on the ground) and one for high mount, which sticks forward.



I thought it was a club for beating the No.3 with if they can't keep up on the march to battle  ;D


----------



## dangerboy (15 Apr 2011)

Now we just need pictures of the ammo cans that you will need to properly employ it as a fire base.


----------



## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2011)

dangerboy said:
			
		

> Now we just need pictures of the ammo cans that you will need to properly employ it as a fire base.


I'll have to go buy a wide-angle lens.  That or you can just see them from Google-Earth ;D


----------



## ArmyRick (15 Apr 2011)

Now I can make money off this....

I am going to sell to the army a damn good dead Lift routine to build some serious strength because thats the only damn way your going to move that around.

OR


DS to candidates 

"In your Estimate, when calculating time to move to the objective, ensure you allow for 20 minutes for every KM for crews humping C16 and ammo...."


----------



## Dissident (15 Apr 2011)

Did we buy any sort of vehicle mounts for that thing?


----------



## OldSolduer (15 Apr 2011)

Indulge me here>

A new trade will be required.

Exclusively for clones of this woman:


----------



## REDinstaller (15 Apr 2011)

Dibbs on that quality control job.


----------



## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2011)

Dissident said:
			
		

> Did we buy any sort of vehicle mounts for that thing?


No.  Having said that, however, new vehicles may have an AGLS on them, but they aren't the weapons purchased.  These are all ground-mounts only.


----------



## daftandbarmy (15 Apr 2011)

Dissident said:
			
		

> Did we buy any sort of vehicle mounts for that thing?



These guys had a vehicle mount but apparently it didn't help much: ;D

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IVT1y6z-tuA&feature=related


----------



## medicineman (15 Apr 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I can hear the characteristic now:
> 
> "Man portable for short distances"
> 
> But who decides what a short distance is?????



Some fecal cephalic cubicle dweller who'll never have to move it.

MM


----------



## Dissident (15 Apr 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> No.  Having said that, however, new vehicles may have an AGLS on them, but they aren't the weapons purchased.  These are all ground-mounts only.



I thought I remembered that is was so, but it is so retarded that I just had to ask again.


----------



## GK .Dundas (15 Apr 2011)

medicineman said:
			
		

> Some fecal cephalic cubicle dweller who'll never have to move it.
> 
> MM


 Using the logic applied to this weapon you could extend it  and say the C3 Howitzer in a man portable weapons system!


----------



## OldSolduer (15 Apr 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Indulge me here>
> 
> A new trade will be required.
> 
> Exclusively for clones of this woman:



Or maybe this one


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Apr 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Or maybe this one



But where does she keep her bayonet?  ;D


----------



## medicineman (16 Apr 2011)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Using the logic applied to this weapon you could extend it  and say the C3 Howitzer in a man portable weapons system!



I've seen people move a C-3...if they can move it 15 feet, it therefore must be portable, and maybe even further then.

MM


----------



## OldSolduer (16 Apr 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But where does she keep her bayonet?  ;D


Damn I knew I forgot something!!!!!!!


----------



## a_majoor (16 Apr 2011)

Back in the 80's, Soviet troops would lash the tripod of their AGS-17 to the turret roof or back deck of their BMP or BTR so they could mount the weapon and get some high angle fire against the Mujahideen perched on hill tops or other places the vehicle weapons could not reach.

Maybe we should start clearing space on the LAV deck...


----------



## GK .Dundas (16 Apr 2011)

medicineman said:
			
		

> I've seen people move a C-3...if they can move it 15 feet, it therefore must be portable, and maybe even further then.
> 
> MM


 I think we might want to stop talking about this before we give certain PEOPLE ideas.
Because I can just see it  two guys in an office in NDHQ going discussing it .
  1st Officer: God ! How brilliant ! Just think of the money we'll save by not having to replace trucks for the RCA.
  2nd Officer : And we can reduce our carbon footprint as well. And oh my god can you picture the fuel savings!


----------



## VIChris (17 Apr 2011)

Dissident said:
			
		

> Did we buy any sort of vehicle mounts for that thing?



We've had the mounts all along, we're just waiting for Red Green to put the final wraps on it.


----------



## GK .Dundas (17 Apr 2011)

I'm beginning to think the wrong AGL may have won the competition .at least the American M-47 makes an effort at trying to be man portable.

                  http://www.military.com/video/guns/naval-guns/railgun-update-from-general-atomics/904431955001/


----------



## vonGarvin (17 Apr 2011)

Yes, this is propaganda, but our former adversaries in the Germanies have a man-portable AGLS, weighing in at 16.5 kg, with a range of 1700m


----------



## KevinB (18 Apr 2011)

Fucktarded...

 Brought to you by the same folks who brought you the LSVW, GWAGON, C7A2 you name it, but this is really a crowning acheivement.


----------



## REDinstaller (18 Apr 2011)

Along with the rest of the COTS garbage painted green.


----------



## s23256 (18 Apr 2011)

So if you're interested there is an article about our first range with this puppy on the R22eR site.

http://www.r22er.com/


----------



## dangerboy (18 Apr 2011)

Interesting pictures.  Unfortunately I can't read french but I think it said they were firing 1900 m and 1400 m airburst.  Am I somewhat correct?


----------



## McG (18 Apr 2011)

dangerboy said:
			
		

> Interesting pictures.  Unfortunately I can't read french but I think it said they were firing 1900 m and 1400 m airburst.  Am I somewhat correct?


Airburst is mentioned in one of the photo captions, which would mean at least one example of the FCS system is available for the training.

According to Google Translate:





> The Weapons Integration Team (EIA) of the School of Infantry was formed in October 2009 to complete commissioning of various weapon systems that will take office in the infantry battalions. The team worked on several systems including the visual warning device (VAD), the Metal Detector Lightweight and Compact (DMCL), Thermal Sighting System (SVT), and our biggest project, the Grenade Launcher System Automatic (SLGA). The latter has languished for over a year, and studies of capacity and acquisition of weapons are initiated since 2002.
> 
> The team members are: WO Pierre Gagnon, Sgt Steve Filion, Sgt Patrick Charette, Sgt Fred Gagnon and Cpl Carl Gagné all R22eR, as well as WO Dwayne Jackman, Cody Arpin and MCpl Sgt Steven Pink RCR . The initial training of executives ended March 23 last. The three days of shooting on the CT HERSHEY we demonstrated the capabilities of the system and its powerful lethality. After you get to the system, you wish you had that weapon in theater! The PPCLI will perhaps soon be deployed with this system and all other units will follow the deployment.
> 
> ...


----------



## Troopasaurus (18 Apr 2011)

> L'équipe de tir du SLGA C16 sera composée de trois servants; un mitrailleur, un chargeur et un contrôleur de l'arme.



Three man det... It weighs 29 kg and the tripod is an additional 11 kg. add on at least 1 can of ammo (24.9kg for US HEDP M430) and you get 32 rounds for a total weight of 65kg (143lbs); for three troops... right.

VS 60mm Mortar

7.7kg (17lbs) for tube in light role, 1.45kg (3.2lbs) per round of HE. That's 32 rounds for 46.4kg (102lbs) and 54.1kg (119lbs) total for same amount of rounds.

And a modern tube ( http://www.hirtenberger.at/hds/pdf/M6.pdf ) would give 1.9km range in the light role and weigh less than the current tube.

I think we will be learning the same lesson the Brits did... bought the GMG to replace their mortars... then reinvested in mortars when they lacked a capability.



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> Fucktarded...



*edit noting MCG's comment below to add 32 rounds of HE C110.


----------



## McG (18 Apr 2011)

Troopasaurus said:
			
		

> Three man det... It weighs 29 kg and the tripod is an additional 11 kg. add on at least 1 can of ammo (24.9kg for US HEDP M430) and you get 32 rounds for a total weight of 65kg (143lbs); for three troops... right.
> 
> VS 60mm Mortar
> 
> 7.7kg (17lbs) for tube in light role, 1.45kg (3.2lbs) per round of HE.


Unless you want to be as dishonest as the maligned & hated project propaganda, your ammo estimate for the 60 mm needs to be more than one round.


----------



## vonGarvin (18 Apr 2011)

Another intangilble is the ability to parcel out the 60mm rounds as required.  Either in 4 round packs, or individually.  But I fear we won't "learn" the lesson.  Ever. 

We scrapped our battalions such that they lost very powerful and key enablers due to bean counting, and even after years of combat with the lessons screaming at us in our faces the whole time, the empires were built.  

So, C-16, get used to it.


----------



## McG (18 Apr 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Another intangilble is the ability to parcel out the 60mm rounds as required.  Either in 4 round packs, or individually.


Ack that fire mission 2, 3, 4 etc can be parcelled out through the company, but there needs (needed) to be some amount of ammo that was centrally carried so that it could be immediately available with the weapon.  How many rounds would that have been?  I assume it was something less than the quantity required to destroy a platoon (as used in the DLR weight comparisons), but still sufficient to get the first fire mission down range before the Pl WO needed to start pulling 60 mm ammo back from the rifle sections.


----------



## vonGarvin (18 Apr 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> I assume it was something less than the quantity required to destroy a platoon (as used in the DLR weight comparisons),


This shows how DLR was (is?) RTFO with this.  Since the 60 and its ammo could actually be carried into battle, there was no comparison between the two systems.  And a platoon has much more than just one weapon to "destroy".  And the infantry doesn't "destroy" by one weapon alone, but meh, what do I know?  



DLR can take a long walk to the unemployment line, for all I care.


----------



## McG (18 Apr 2011)

Yes, but ... how many rounds should be carried with the weapon vs those dispersed through the platoon & company?


----------



## Kirkhill (18 Apr 2011)

Not a new problem......WW2 standard Para Rgt, 37 Pattern Webbing,  1x 2" Mor Rd per man to be dropped off at a point designated by the Pl Comd or Sgt as the platoon deployed.


----------



## vonGarvin (18 Apr 2011)

MCG said:
			
		

> Yes, but ... how many rounds should be carried with the weapon vs those dispersed through the platoon & company?


IMPO 4 is enough.  But that's just me.  


(Assume time of flight is 20 seconds.  5 seconds from "splash" to adjustment and firing next round.  That gives over a minute to get more rounds in before they run out)


Or 8.  


But the point is moot where they are.  Each platoon will do it differently.  The point is this: you cannot carry nor break down those 20+ kg tins of 40mm ammo.  Pure and utter junk.


----------



## KevinB (18 Apr 2011)

When we ran a 60 tube for ex's my Mortar Det each carried 3rds on us.  For some certain point we carried a metric ton more - but those involved short movements, and the Pl would carry extra rounds on their rucks too.


I agree with TV breaking belted HV40mm is just not possible.


----------



## GK .Dundas (18 Apr 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> IMPO 4 is enough.  But that's just me.
> 
> 
> (Assume time of flight is 20 seconds.  5 seconds from "splash" to adjustment and firing next round.  That gives over a minute to get more rounds in before they run out)
> ...


There is reason the US Marines MK 19's are carried by the Heavy weapons company mounted on Humvees along with a mission mix of .50 cal. and TOWS .You don't suppose it's because they're (DUH! ) heavy?


----------



## OldSolduer (18 Apr 2011)

Like I said in the rucksack thread, the better kit you have, the more the numpties think you can carry, totally forgetting that the human body is not a machine that can be fixed by merely replacing a worn out back or knee, or shoulder.
The doctrine will be written by those who will never carry it, and that doctrine will be ignored by those that do.


----------



## daftandbarmy (18 Apr 2011)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Not a new problem......WW2 standard Para Rgt, 37 Pattern Webbing,  1x 2" Mor Rd per man to be dropped off at a point designated by the Pl Comd or Sgt as the platoon deployed.



And imagine how much more effective we'd be with that amount of ammo in the form of 'smart' munitions.... even I'd be able to get it on target in a oner!


----------



## Troopasaurus (18 Apr 2011)

Australia just canceled their order... 



> “Defence has cancelled contract negotiations with the preferred tenderer because it became clear that the company was not going to deliver what Defence had assessed it had promised,”




http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/land-40-ph-2-cancelled


----------



## a_majoor (19 Apr 2011)

It just occurs to me that while this army spent a decade pissing away time and resources, the XM-25 has reached limited service in Afghanistan. Add a bipod and a drum magazine to that and you have the 80% solution which is also man portable....

(While the picture is for a 90 round 5.56 magazine suitable for m-16 family weapons, it should give you the idea of what I am getting at)


----------



## KevinB (19 Apr 2011)

Dude the XM-25 is a dud.
 Lets rememebr that the LV 40MM is pretty marginal outside point targets -- and the XM-25 has even smaller payloads...

 It also centers around a advanced fire control system -- which in the C16 is on a tripod -- on a XM-25 its in handheld mode...
   How easy is it to hold something offhand for precise results -- answer its nigh impossible.

As for limited service -- there are THREE (3) XM-25 systems in Afghan, each with a Maj/Capt and SGM/MSG and staff walking around with it offering sound bites and crowing its effectiveness.


The USMC with its 6rd M-32 GL is IMHO a better option than the XM-25.



Frankly I have no issues with the C-16, I just want it on vehicles, and I want to get a new 60mm Mortar...


----------



## Michael OLeary (19 Apr 2011)

Maybe we need to send some people here to actually get caught up on the state of modern mortars:

The Mortar Systems Conference
16th & 17th May 2011
The Royal Aeronautical Society
London

The Mortar Systems Conference - PDF

(The attendees list actually says that the Infantry School is sending someone.)


----------



## dapaterson (19 Apr 2011)

Don't be ridiculous.  The mortar's time has passed.  Just like the tank.  Remember - we're buying the MGS because we'll never, ever, ever need tanks again.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (19 Apr 2011)

KevinB said:
			
		

> Frankly I have no issues with the C-16, I just want it on vehicles, and I want to get a new 60mm Mortar...



What he said!


----------



## vonGarvin (19 Apr 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Maybe we need to send some people here to actually get caught up on the state of modern mortars:
> 
> The Mortar Systems Conference
> 16th & 17th May 2011
> ...


Actually, that part just highlights past attendees.  Last year, the Infantry School sent a dashing, handsome and rather brilliant officer to speakl.  There were rumours of a marked increase in techno music during his stay, but those rumours haven't been confirmed...


----------



## s23256 (8 Jul 2011)

This thread seems to have stagnated just as the system actually gets in the hands of the lads at the pointy end.  

Based on my recent experience with the C16 here are a few points that may stimulate some additional conversation.

Weight:  Yes, its extremely heavy and the ammo adds even more.  That being said let's weigh this cost against capabilities.

Capabilities:  In the hands of an untrained firer coached by an instructor I've seen the gun put a first round hit on an AFV hull at over 700m.  The airbursting munition is outstanding and the anti-armour effectiveness of the standard HEDP round is out of all proportion to its size.  If I were on the wrong side of this thing I would be extremely worried or more likely dead.

Tactics:  Combine the factors above and draw your own conclusions.  First impressions from across a relatively comprehensive user group are that as a defensive weapon its a game changer.  Offensive employment is not impossible but requires a deliberate planning process.

Further discussion encouraged.


----------



## Michael OLeary (8 Jul 2011)

I don't think that anyone has argued that it doesn't perform admirably within its capabilities. The principal point of argument has been that it doesn't fill the role of the weapon it was purported to replace (i.e., the 60 mm mortar), thus leaving a perceived capability gap between what was achieved before it and what can be achieved with it. The result is that it has the potential to follow the Eryx into the back corner of the CQ stores, and then quietly disappear because we never develop a manning and tactical model that takes advantage of its capabilities.


----------



## s23256 (8 Jul 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> I don't think that anyone has argued that it doesn't perform admirably within its capabilities. The principal point of argument has been that it doesn't fill the role of the weapon it was purported to replace (i.e., the 60 mm mortar), thus leaving a perceived capability gap between what was achieved before it and what can be achieved with it. The result is that it has the potential to follow the Eryx into the back corner of the CQ stores, and then quietly disappear because we never develop a manning and tactical model that takes advantage of its capabilities.



No arguments here and I won't take responsibility for the info ops campaign which was attached to the procurement.  

That being said there does seem to be a general sense of dissatisfaction with the system from those with a sum total of 0 experience with it.  This is certainly in some part in response to the assumptions/justifications used in the acquisition process.  

The concern is that these preconceived notions may inhibit the integration of the system resulting in the fate you describe above whereas a more enthusiastic reception would support the TTP and doctrinal development indicated and allow the full capability (which is considerable) to be realized.


----------



## Michael OLeary (8 Jul 2011)

Unfortunately the procurement PR campaign focused on selling it to people who will never use it, instead of selling it to those who will use it. Unanswered questions created doubts. Hopefully it will prove to be everything predicted and more. But there remains the issue of answering what will fill the gap in dismounted ops when a 60 would have been carried but a AGM cannot be brought within manning and operational limitations, or the question of semi-indirect and indirect applications of fire into dead ground the AGM munitions cannot reach where a 60 would have succeeded. Perhaps if we had a better conceptual model of the infantry platoon as a fighting system, within which support weapons are one component, then any future was developments can be shown to be effective within the system model and that could have mitigated some of the internal PR damage. 

But, to be fair, we've never effectively studied the section or platoon as a fighting system - a balance of manning, weapons, mobility, etc. - and created a capability baseline we wish to maintain, accepting decreases in one capability component when offset by an advantage elsewhere. Instead, for procurement purposes, we try to argue the validity of swapping out individual items one for one, and failing to show the mitigating elements within the organizational system where shortfalls are perceived.


----------



## s23256 (8 Jul 2011)

Excellent points.  The CDEx process may (hopefully) address some of the deficiencies you have noted.


----------



## AmmoTech90 (9 Jul 2011)

By CDEx do you mean concept development?  If so why are developing a concept for something in service?  Should that not have been done during the coceive stage, even before development?


----------



## KevinB (9 Jul 2011)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> By CDEx do you mean concept development?  If so why are developing a concept for something in service?  Should that not have been done during the coceive stage, even before development?



Dont injected rationality into their reality...


----------



## a_majoor (9 Jul 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Unfortunately the procurement PR campaign focused on selling it to people who will never use it, instead of selling it to those who will use it. Unanswered questions created doubts. Hopefully it will prove to be everything predicted and more. But there remains the issue of answering what will fill the gap in dismounted ops when a 60 would have been carried but a AGM cannot be brought within manning and operational limitations, or the question of semi-indirect and indirect applications of fire into dead ground the AGM munitions cannot reach where a 60 would have succeeded. Perhaps if we had a better conceptual model of the infantry platoon as a fighting system, within which support weapons are one component, then any future was developments can be shown to be effective within the system model and that could have mitigated some of the internal PR damage.
> 
> But, to be fair, we've never effectively studied the section or platoon as a fighting system - a balance of manning, weapons, mobility, etc. - and created a capability baseline we wish to maintain, accepting decreases in one capability component when offset by an advantage elsewhere. Instead, for procurement purposes, we try to argue the validity of swapping out individual items one for one, and failing to show the mitigating elements within the organizational system where shortfalls are perceived.



Too true. The model sections and platoons seems to have been frozen in time, and weapons and systems being grafted to fit an eight man dismounted section etc. rather than perhaps seeing if the section or platoon should be reconfigured. To use two past examples, the Canadian Mounted Rifles had a different organizational and tactical model compared to line infantry based on their method of transport, and Canadian platoons in WWI were organized around the firepower of the Lewis Gun and the grenadiers (riflemen being mostly to escort the weapons and supply ammunition). 

New systems like the C-16 obviously need to be looked at in this light; if they are capable of supplying an immense increase in firepower for the dismounted infantry, then perhaps the infantry company or platoon should be reconfigured like the WWI infantry platoon around the weapon. Now there may be lots of reasons _not_ to do so, but then we also need to accept that the C-16 cannot be utilized except under unusual circumstances (i.e. enough manpower can be freed up to man the weapon).


----------



## dapaterson (9 Jul 2011)

To celebrate Public Service Week a C-16, together with project staff, set up on the concourse of NDHQ.  ("Look out public servants - we've got airburst munitions!" - messaging seems off to me, but what do I know).

I had a long conversation with them.  After five fire missions, the C-16 is lighter than the 60mm mortar (apparently).  And one of the contractors offered this helpful hint:  "Bring it in on a truck."


----------



## vonGarvin (9 Jul 2011)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I had a long conversation with them.  After five fire missions, the C-16 is lighter than the 60mm mortar (apparently).  And one of the contractors offered this helpful hint:  "Bring it in on a truck."


They are full of shit, plain and simple.


Ask them why buy a large piece of kit with no truck.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (10 Jul 2011)

They have all the wpn specs up in our coy lines.  It looks like an impressive weapon but honestly it would be suited for something like a DFS Pl and I hope the CF goes that way with it.  When we get the TAPV that could provide us with the vehicle for it.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Jul 2011)

Stymiest:
It is indeed a terrific weapon with awesome capabilities; however, it is by no means a platoon weapon.  It's too heavy, and in all honesty, virtually all of its capabilities already exist in LAV-equipped platoons.  (Yes, I realise that if the LAVs aren't there, it would be great; however, how do you get it there with no LAV to carry it?)

As for TAPV, they are gonig to come equipped with C-16 AGLS (not the guns we are getting with the CASW project, but further C 16s that will be mounted)

As a DFS-platoon weapon for the light battalions, that is the perfect place for it.  For dinosaurs such as myself, it's easy to think of the employment of the .50 in the DFS platoons, and just use the C-16 like that.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (10 Jul 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Stymiest:
> It is indeed a terrific weapon with awesome capabilities; however, it is by no means a platoon weapon.  It's too heavy, and in all honesty, virtually all of its capabilities already exist in LAV-equipped platoons.  (Yes, I realise that if the LAVs aren't there, it would be great; however, how do you get it there with no LAV to carry it?)
> 
> As for TAPV, they are gonig to come equipped with C-16 AGLS (not the guns we are getting with the CASW project, but further C 16s that will be mounted)
> ...



Yah I am not a mech guy, I am in the 3rd Bn and we have brought back a DFS Pl for this very reason.  They actually just ran a .50 cal gun camp and are doing train the trainer on the C-16 at the end of August.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Jul 2011)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> Yah I am not a mech guy, I am in the 3rd Bn and we have brought back a DFS Pl for this very reason.  They actually just ran a .50 cal gun camp and are doing train the trainer on the C-16 at the end of August.


That is great news.  PM inbound


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Jul 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> That is great news.  PM inbound



No TV, you're a Major now, you can't go command the DFS platoon, no matter how much you want to.


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Jul 2011)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> No TV, you're a Major now, you can't go command the DFS platoon, no matter how much you want to.


What if they make it a DFS company?  (All those C-16s rotting in the mech battalions need homes, too!)  ;D


----------



## a_majoor (10 Jul 2011)

For the rest of us who want a primer on using heavy weapons, I recommend this article.

For the full set in PDF format go here


----------



## vonGarvin (10 Jul 2011)

I read those articles on the "Emma Gees" for the first time in 1989 during my basic machine gunner course.  I'll just say that they were rather influential to me.  Amazing articles.


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Jul 2011)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> What if they make it a DFS company?  (All those C-16s rotting in the mech battalions need homes, too!)  ;D



How about an "FS Company"

C-16 Platoon
HMG Platoon
81 mm Mortar Platoon

 ;D


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (10 Jul 2011)

I know US Marine DFS Pl use Mk 40 grenade launcher, .50 cal and AT4 interchangeably depending on what they need to get the job done.  While the Mk 40 is not the same as the C 16 it is quite similar.  They also hump it so their is no reason we can't do it, their is a reason after all that they pick big dudes for their DFS Pl because those weapon systems are heavy as all hell.


----------



## The Bread Guy (21 Jul 2011)

Army News' story about how cool it is.


----------



## OldSolduer (21 Jul 2011)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> They also hump it so their is no reason we can't do it, their is a reason after all that they pick big dudes for their DFS Pl because those weapon systems are heavy as all hell.



So for a man portable system, what's your suggestion as to how many pers we need to hump this behemoth?


----------



## vonGarvin (21 Jul 2011)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> So for a man portable system, what's your suggestion as to how many pers we need to hump this behemoth?


As you do so, please remember that a box of 32 rounds (linked) has a mass on the order of 21 kg.  Please factor in a fire plan of 5 minutes at 30 rounds/minute, plus 10%.  Don't forget to include personal weapons and ammo.


----------



## Matt_Fisher (21 Jul 2011)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> I know US Marine DFS Pl use Mk 40 grenade launcher, .50 cal and AT4 interchangeably depending on what they need to get the job done.  While the Mk 40 is not the same as the C 16 it is quite similar.  They also hump it so their is no reason we can't do it, their is a reason after all that they pick big dudes for their DFS Pl because those weapon systems are heavy as all hell.



AT4 is used in the Marine Corps as a squad level anti-armor weapon similar to how the M72 is used.  It's not just the HMG platoon that gets these.  As far manportability of the Mk19, very very very rarely is it ever carried by hand very far.  Usually employed in the dismounted role for defensive positions.  Most of the time it's mounted on a HMMWV or MATV type platform so you can have some measure of mobility with it.


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## ArmyRick (21 Jul 2011)

TV, I got it worked out.

COA#1
If we have a 5 man det, than 3 men carry 2 boxes of 21KG. They will wear running and carry no personal weapon or personal gear. 

COA#2
We make a C16 det a 10 man operation (Sure the CSM will love coughing up that much for a single weapon). Never mind that a M777 det is only what 8-9 guys?

COA#3
We purchase and hire donkeys. CQ, straw on the next DP please.

What do you think?


----------



## daftandbarmy (21 Jul 2011)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> TV, I got it worked out.
> 
> COA#1
> If we have a 5 man det, than 3 men carry 2 boxes of 21KG. They will wear running and carry no personal weapon or personal gear.
> ...



COA#4: Attach a butt and a bipod to it and call it a 'light automatic grenade launcher', just like the Germans tried to do with the ridiculously heavy and awkward MG08:


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## s23256 (23 Jul 2011)

Brilliant!!!

Unfortunately the 600lbs of recoil force might make it a bit hard on the "light" gunner


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## Michael OLeary (23 Jul 2011)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> COA#2
> We make a C16 det a 10 man operation (Sure the CSM will love coughing up that much for a single weapon). Never mind that a M777 det is only what 8-9 guys?



You just reinvented the Lewis Gun section.


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## SoldierInAYear (24 Jul 2011)

I thought i'd post a video of the automatic grenade launcher 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnEzCFnaGw4&feature=channel_video_title



> C-16 high-velocity weapon features direct/indirect fire, thermal fire capability.



Some pictures from the video:


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## Lerch (8 Feb 2012)

This morning I had the chance to get behind one of the AGL's that A Bty had setup in the BQ. VERY nice looking piece of kit. Apparently, even though they're signed for by A Bty, they'll be handed off to HQ Bty in the near future, I'd assume for local defense.


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## vonGarvin (8 Feb 2012)

Cool story, bro.  Did you pick it up?


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## MJP (8 Feb 2012)

Lerch said:
			
		

> This morning I had the chance to get behind one of the AGL's that A Bty had setup in the BQ. VERY nice looking piece of kit. Apparently, even though they're signed for by A Bty, they'll be handed off to HQ Bty in the near future, I'd assume for local defense.



Yea my brother was texting me the other day asking how it was mounted and how the drills went.  They have the new shiny, but no one actually knows how to use it.


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## Lerch (9 Feb 2012)

Yup, as far as the BQ guys knew, the courses weren't happening till the summer, so I guess they'll have some very nice paperweights till then...


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## vonGarvin (9 Feb 2012)

Lerch said:
			
		

> Yup, as far as the BQ guys knew, the courses weren't happening till the summer, so I guess they'll have some very nice paperweights till thenit's declared obselete...



There, fixed it for you.  

The C-16 AGLS is a white elephant.  It has outstanding capabilities and it is an awesome weapon; however, it is too heavy to be of any practicable use.  And let us never forget that while tactics are nice, it's logistics that wins wars.  And I don't know how the logistical burden this thing brings the army outweighs (pun intended) any benefits.


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## REDinstaller (9 Feb 2012)

The best place to mount it would be on an HLVW Cargo with HIAB. Lots of ammo, quick replen of ammo by the palet. But I'm sure that the first round fired off the existing roof mount would totally wreck the cab.


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## GK .Dundas (10 Feb 2012)

MJP said:
			
		

> Yea my brother was texting me the other day asking how it was mounted and how the drills went.  They have the new shiny, but no one actually knows how to use it.


 I have the sad feeling I know what happens next; After several months and many many staff meetings. NDHQ  will send forth  instructors  and everyone who gets one these toys will trained in their use. And their will great rejoicing thru out the land !
 Right up to the point when it's discovered that training has burned thru  the  Ammo allotment and now due to budget cuts  no more 40 MM ammo is being procured  at this time.
 I also wonder how many times logistics will deliver 40 MM ammo to some army base.  When they unwrap the shrink wrap from the pallet it 's 40 MM alright but it's 40 MM Bofors?


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## vonGarvin (10 Feb 2012)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> The best place to mount it would be on an HLVW Cargo with HIAB. Lots of ammo, quick replen of ammo by the palet. But I'm sure that the first round fired off the existing roof mount would totally wreck the cab.









So...a soft-skinned truck is the best place to mount an AGLS?


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## OldSolduer (10 Feb 2012)

Any thought to taking these paperweights on the road and display them to the PRes Infantry units?

I bet dollars to donuts some "good idea fairy" will have the idea to pass them on to the PRes to man. ;D


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## GAP (10 Feb 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Any thought to taking these paperweights on the road and display them to the PRes Infantry units?
> 
> I bet dollars to donuts some "good idea fairy" will have the idea to pass them on to the PRes to man. ;D



Have a day trip to Shilo...........for a show & tell....


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## REDinstaller (10 Feb 2012)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> So...a soft-skinned truck is the best place to mount an AGLS?



Nope, not at all. The C16's appetite for ammo in order for it to be effective would require the HLVW cargo capabilities, the only armoured veh i can think of with the same open storage space would be a MTVF (Fitter). This would be due to the open back and the fact that the Fitter only carries a max crew of 3, and i have yet to see one carry a TLAV pack on the back deck. Here at the Strats the intent is to arm the Sabre Sqn's Adm Tps with the C16s, and all they have for Adm Tp is MLVW/HLVW.


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## OldSolduer (10 Feb 2012)

Tango18A said:
			
		

> Nope, not at all. The C16's appetite for ammo in order for it to be effective would require the HLVW cargo capabilities, the only armoured veh i can think of with the same open storage space would be a MTVF (Fitter). This would be due to the open back and the fact that the Fitter only carries a max crew of 3, and i have yet to see one carry a TLAV pack on the back deck. Here at the Strats the intent is to arm the Sabre Sqn's Adm Tps with the C16s, and all they have for Adm Tp is MLVW/HLVW.



Could we find some old M 548 Cargo Carriers and mod them? We mod everything else.


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## REDinstaller (10 Feb 2012)

I think the 548s have been disposed of. There used to be a large gathering of M113A2s at 7 CFSD, but they have disappeared.


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## Dissident (10 Feb 2012)

C16 armed tactical trunk monkey on MilCOTS, I could get behind that.


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## PuckChaser (10 Feb 2012)

NinerSix said:
			
		

> C16 armed tactical trunk monkey on MilCOTS, I could get behind that.



Would be pretty close to a Canadian version of the Somali technicals:


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## OldSolduer (10 Feb 2012)

Problem is that is a recoiless weapon. I think the recoil from an HMG or C 16 would shake that to pieces in no time.


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## The Bread Guy (10 Feb 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Any thought to taking these paperweights on the road and display them to the PRes Infantry units?
> 
> I bet dollars to donuts some "good idea fairy" will have the idea to pass them on to the PRes to man. ;D


Just like these "man portable over a short distance" beauties from the past....




.... only newer and shinier, right?


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## PuckChaser (10 Feb 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Problem is that is a recoiless weapon. I think the recoil from an HMG or C 16 would shake that to pieces in no time.



The Silverado milcots get shaken to pieces by just driving, but definitely agree with you there.  >


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## OldSolduer (10 Feb 2012)

Good idea fairy at work:

Let's trial them on the Silverado Milcot, the G Wagon and an LOSV.


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## Lerch (10 Feb 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Good idea fairy at work:
> 
> Let's trial them on the Silverado Milcot, the G Wagon and an LOSV.



I just imagined a C16 mounted to the turret of a G-Wagon...shooting at the 9 o'clock and rolling over...


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## vonGarvin (10 Feb 2012)

Having said all this:


Using a GATOR or truck or something to haul ammo in an A1 ech is good.  Along with the weapon itself.  You cannot man-pack this thing on a dismounted advance such that on contact, you can start using it.  There are limitations, huge ones.  But there are ways to use it effectively, I'm certain.


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## GK .Dundas (10 Feb 2012)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Any thought to taking these paperweights on the road and display them to the PRes Infantry units?
> 
> I bet dollars to donuts some "good idea fairy" will have the idea to pass them on to the PRes to man. ;D


 Sometime in the late 70's or early 80's There was paper advocating just that turning The PRes into Fire Support Battalions You'd have Mortar companies  (81 MM ) , MG companies  (.50/ 7.62 ) and a RCL Company ( 84 mm & 106 MM ) .One battalion per REGForce Brigade.


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2012)

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Sometime in the late 70's or early 80's There was paper advocating just that turning The PRes into Fire Support Battalions You'd have Mortar companies  (81 MM ) , MG companies  (.50/ 7.62 ) and a RCL Company ( 84 mm & 106 MM ) .One battalion per REGForce Brigade.



In the same "everything old is new again" vein you could also resurrect Perrin Beatty's VP (Vital Point) battalions.   A couple of emplaced C16s sound like just the thing to protect your local Post Office.


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## OldSolduer (10 Feb 2012)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In the same "everything old is new again" vein you could also resurrect Perrin Beatty's VP (Vital Point) battalions.   A couple of emplaced C16s sound like just the thing to protect your local Post Office.


Is that sorta like the Territorial Battalions?


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## GnyHwy (10 Feb 2012)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In the same "everything old is new again" vein you could also resurrect Perrin Beatty's VP (Vital Point) battalions.   A couple of emplaced C16s sound like just the thing to protect your local Post Office.



Points are not points anymore.  Points transition faster than a man can track; they are small and they move very quickly.


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## a_majoor (10 Feb 2012)

Even more frightening than the idea that 40mm Bofers ammunition would be delivered to the range is the misunderstanding of 40mm HV ammunition vs 40mm M-203 ammunition. 

If they were smart they would have dubbed the CASW a "41mm" grenade launcher, just like we had the "106mm" Recoiiless rifle. (Next time you go to a museum, bring a tape measure... )


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## daftandbarmy (11 Feb 2012)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Just like these "man portable over a short distance" beauties from the past....
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I can't help but wonder how you managed to secure a photo of the Phallic Symbol, Pink, 106mm, Recoiless. I assume that this is on issue with the soon to be announced 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' anti-wank units being deployed as part of the new diversification strategy....  ;D


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## GK .Dundas (11 Feb 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Even more frightening than the idea that 40mm Bofers ammunition would be delivered to the range is the misunderstanding of 40mm HV ammunition vs 40mm M-203 ammunition.
> 
> If they were smart they would have dubbed the CASW a "41mm" grenade launcher, just like we had the "106mm" Recoiiless rifle. (Next time you go to a museum, bring a tape measure... )


 I'm waiting for some bright spark to try loading an HV round In the 203' .Please please  tell me they wont chamber in a M203!. 
106 gotcha ! Used to pal around with a former weapons Tech Who was a vertible storehouse of some of the oddest military minutiae


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## a_majoor (11 Feb 2012)

I'm pretty sure you can't load a 40mm HV in a M-203, but soldiers will do the darndest things....

Perhaps the only saving grace is we don't use the HK underbarrel grenade launcher. It swings out to the side so you can load rounds of any length into the barrel


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## GK .Dundas (11 Feb 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I'm pretty sure you can't load a 40mm HV in a M-203, but soldiers will do the darndest things....
> 
> Perhaps the only saving grace is we don't use the HK underbarrel grenade launcher. It swings out to the side so you can load rounds of any length into the barrel


 Yeah thank god for small favors! Back to 4O MM Bofors  for a moment the reason the thought occurred to me at all was I can remember walking in to an armory in the early to mid eighties and finding a pallet  about to returned to what ever ammo store had delivered 76 MM ammo for their Cougars. Only thing was it wasn't 76.MM low pressure .It was the stuff the old Sherman's  had used !
I think one of the rounds was actually longer the entire gun  complete with breech!


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## AmmoTech90 (11 Feb 2012)

Having worked with a force that uses the HK grenade launcher and the HK GMG, I can say that as long as you are as smart as a British squaddie there shouldn't be a problem with mixing the ammo.  For one thing you gotta get the link off the cartridge case first.


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## The Bread Guy (11 Feb 2012)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I can't help but wonder how you managed to secure a photo of the Phallic Symbol, Pink, 106mm, Recoiless. I assume that this is on issue with the soon to be announced 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' anti-wank units being deployed as part of the new diversification strategy....  ;D


Looks greenon my screen - just sayin'....  ;D


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## daftandbarmy (13 Feb 2012)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Looks greenon my screen - just sayin'....  ;D



Curse you Freudian slip!!!!


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## KevinB (31 Jul 2012)

I was at a shoot with MARSOC a while back, and they had a 'soft' mount that was going to allow the M2 and Mk19, so I would assume the C16 could be done in a similar shock mitigating mount on a light vehicle.

It should be impossible to get 40mm HV into a M203 or M320 (new HK GL down here) however I've seen a soldier from the 82nd actually chamber and fire one in a M203 -- catastophic damage ensued to weapon (M16 and M203) and Soldier...


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## Ostrozac (12 Sep 2012)

Jay4th said:
			
		

> Still waiting...  We would probably have an easier time resurecting Machine Gun platoon with a dozen C16 automatic grenade launchers.



That's exactly how the Russians employ the AGS-17 -- as an automatic grenade launcher platoon held at battalion level.

What are we doing with the C16? Given the size of the weapon and the ammo, it certainly seems like a battalion level weapon.


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## vonGarvin (12 Sep 2012)

Jay4th said:
			
		

> Still waiting...  We would probably have an easier time resurecting Machine Gun platoon with a dozen C16 automatic grenade launchers.


It's all about being PY neutral.  Assume 3 pers per platoon in the Weapons' Det moved into a MG Platoon.  3 platoons/coy and 3 coys/bn That's 27 pers in an MG platoon.  Is that enough?


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## Colin Parkinson (12 Sep 2012)

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Having said all this:
> 
> 
> Using a GATOR or truck or something to haul ammo in an A1 ech is good.  Along with the weapon itself.  You cannot man-pack this thing on a dismounted advance such that on contact, you can start using it.  There are limitations, huge ones.  But there are ways to use it effectively, I'm certain.



It's been done
http://www.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=http://www.williammaloney.com/Aviation/AAFTankMuseum/SelfPropelledGuns/Mule106mmRecoillessGun/images/Mule106mmRecoillessGun.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.williammaloney.com/Aviation/AAFTankMuseum/SelfPropelledGuns/Mule106mmRecoillessGun/pages/Mule106mmRecoillessGun.htm&usg=__rgDqpqeBTG5v1S85J9w0ANaCz5w=&h=449&w=650&sz=55&hl=en&start=1&sig2=vVkqR_QhBodUqQ7y8mIVVw&zoom=1&tbnid=ImmULVJfZ72CpM:&tbnh=95&tbnw=137&ei=JflQUIfgAoy0rAfy1IDABw&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dmule%2Bwith%2B106mm%2Brecoilless%26hl%3Den%26gbv%3D2%26tbm%3Disch&itbs=1


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## downinOZ (3 May 2016)

New weapon systems for the ADF.

http://armynews.realviewdigital.com/?iid=140489#folio=2 - new GMG.  I'm not sure where Canada went with the CASW; this beauty will remain an option within the DFSW platoon, probably mounted on either a soon-to-be discovered ATV, and most likely incorporated in the new AFV platforms.  

http://armynews.realviewdigital.com/#folio=16 - modernised rifle including new grenade launcher attachment and optics.

I'd like to show you the new 60mm mortars but until I see an old SGT with a smile on his face, holding a real weapon system, this still remains "in the works."  Regardless, the mortar community is reading up and showing everyone who listens how the weapon has been employed since the '70s.


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## a_majoor (25 Dec 2016)

An interesting historical find, the Hughes "Heligun". This is a twin barrel revolver weapon (fixed barrels, rotating chambers) which was advertised to have a potential firing rate of 6000 RPM in a 30 lb (15kg) package of self powered goodness. Sadly, it was never able to overcome some reliability issues and development was ended in favour of the externally powers minions we are familiar with today.

http://www.forgottenweapons.com/wp-content/uploads/Heligun/Heligun%20EX17.pdf

Note, this is not related to the Gast gun (where the recoil force of one barrel powered the cycling of the other barrels loading and firing cycle through a system of linkages).

A self powered machine gun with a high rate of fire, especially when mated to a powered mount and advanced targeting system would be a great vehicle mounted system to break ambushes, drive off UAV and UCAVs and have some potential as a C-RAM weapon. In the future, we may see small UCAVs as dedicated fire support platforms for small units, and such a weapon might be useful in that role as well.


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## a_majoor (2 Aug 2017)

Came across this, the WWII era German MK-108 30mm cannon. While an aircraft canon for fighter planes and designed for use in shooting down bombers, the description of the ammunition and the size and form factor of the weapon is actually similar to an automatic grenade launcher (note the short barrel and low muzzle velocity). Reverse engineered with today's materials to reduce its weight it might actually make an effective automatic grenade launcher on a vehicle mount...

http://www.luft46.com/armament/mk108.html



> *Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108 30mm cannon*
> 
> In many ways, the Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108 30mm cannon was considered to be a masterpiece of weapons engineering, due to it's compact size, ease of manufacture and hitting power. Although it was first designed by Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1940 as a private venture, the design was finalized in 1942. It met a later RLM requirement for a new aircraft cannon that could knock down enemy bombers with the lowest expenditure of ammunition and stay beyond the range of enemy defensive fire.
> 
> ...



Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108 30mm cannon data
Designation	Maunfacturer	Caliber	Length	Weight	Rounds/Minute	Muzzle Velocity	Projectile Weight	CartridgeWeight
MK 108	Rheinmetall-Borsig	30 mm     	1057 mm 	58 kg 	660*	                500-540 m	330 g 	                480 g


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## Kirkhill (11 Nov 2022)

Bumping this up - 

Ukrainians using their AGLs as automatic mortars.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/ys9lej

To me this reopens the discussion about using the Bushmasters on the LAVs in High Angle fire.  If nothing else it might disconcert a Javelin team 4 km away.


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## McG (11 Nov 2022)

The 25 mm cannon fires a lighter round at a higher velocity than a 40 mm AGL. The wind effects will be horrible if you try lobbing that.

Remember as well, “indirect fire” is not a synonym for lobbing shots through high angles of fire. You can do indirect with flatter trajectories.


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## MJP (11 Nov 2022)

McG said:


> The 25 mm cannon fires a lighter round at a higher velocity than a 40 mm AGL. The wind effects will be horrible if you try lobbing that.
> 
> Remember as well, “indirect fire” is not a synonym for lobbing shots through high angles of fire. You can do indirect with flatter trajectories.


Aye seen the effect of wind on direct ranges and it was substantial.

We played around with longer range stuff in Afghanistan when we got a chance to play around.  Even a light winds made any kind of fall of shot  scattered and likely non effective


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## childs56 (11 Nov 2022)

Special Forces - ATV A Grenade Launcher
					

Photo showing Special Forces personnel riding on a ATV with a mounted MK47 grenade launcher - more US Special Ops photos at www.americanspecialops.com




					www.americanspecialops.com


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## Kirkhill (11 Nov 2022)

McG said:


> The 25 mm cannon fires a lighter round at a higher velocity than a 40 mm AGL. The wind effects will be horrible if you try lobbing that.
> 
> Remember as well, “indirect fire” is not a synonym for lobbing shots through high angles of fire. You can do indirect with flatter trajectories.



Understood. 

WRT the 25/40 comparison - how does the 25 compare to Plamya's 30?


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## Kirkhill (11 Nov 2022)

MJP said:


> Aye seen the effect of wind on direct ranges and it was substantial.
> 
> We played around with longer range stuff in Afghanistan when we got a chance to play around.  Even a light winds made any kind of fall of shot  scattered and likely non effective



Judging from the dispersal patterns of holes in Ukraine - and the use of Plamya, Grads, tossing rockets from helicopters and Frogfoots and even the tube artillery patterns - the locals seem quite content with harassing and suppressing and not too bothered if they don't neutralize and destroy.


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## RangerRay (11 Nov 2022)

childs56 said:


> Special Forces - ATV A Grenade Launcher
> 
> 
> Photo showing Special Forces personnel riding on a ATV with a mounted MK47 grenade launcher - more US Special Ops photos at www.americanspecialops.com
> ...


I think WCB would have something to say if they saw me ride an ATV like that…


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## markppcli (12 Nov 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Bumping this up -
> 
> Ukrainians using their AGLs as automatic mortars.
> 
> ...


It’s in the manual for the C16, but 40mm is light and slow and gets played with by wind badly.


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## KevinB (12 Nov 2022)

markppcli said:


> It’s in the manual for the C16, but 40mm is light and slow and gets played with by wind badly.


Depending on your FCS, that can be pretty much a non issue.

The 30mm AGS-17 is significantly worse for that, it’s got a slew of other issues too.


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## markppcli (12 Nov 2022)

KevinB said:


> Depending on your FCS, that can be pretty much a non issue.
> 
> The 30mm AGS-17 is significantly worse for that, it’s got a slew of other issues too.


Yeah there’s issues with ours, I’d rather used the irons myself


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## AmmoTech90 (12 Nov 2022)

markppcli said:


> Yeah there’s issues with ours, I’d rather used the irons myself


Yeah, I've hit (stationary) tanks at 1600m with a Mk 40's iron sights within 2-3 short bursts with iron sights. Enough practice you can instinctively apply elevation.  Much better on a vehicle mount I've found.

AGS-17 is ubique.  Very ubique past 500m.


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## Kirkhill (12 Nov 2022)

AmmoTech90 said:


> AGS-17 is ubique.  Very ubique past 500m.


So it is an artillery weapon then?


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## AmmoTech90 (12 Nov 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> So it is an artillery weapon then?


Yep with a 30g payload.  I mean it's not useless, but it's not great.  If you don't have an AGL and someone gives you an AGS 17/30 and ammo,  don't say no.


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## KevinB (12 Nov 2022)

AmmoTech90 said:


> Yep with a 30g payload.  I mean it's not useless, but it's not great.  If you don't have an AGL and someone gives you an AGS 17/30 and ammo,  don't say no.


Say no. Especially if you don’t know where the ammo came from… 

I’ve seen more than one spontaneous explosion on loading with them. Not a good look for the crew, fortunately the round is relatively anemic.


----------



## AmmoTech90 (12 Nov 2022)

KevinB said:


> Say no. Especially if you don’t know where the ammo came from…
> 
> I’ve seen more than one spontaneous explosion on loading with them. Not a good look for the crew, fortunately the round is relatively anemic.


Yes


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## NavyShooter (13 Nov 2022)

So....if the 30mm is anemic, and the 40mm suffers considerably from wind drift and has a similarly small payload, should we be looking at going back to 60mm mortars again?  (Thread derail notification goes here.)


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## McG (13 Nov 2022)

They do different things and should not be treated as different solutions to a common capability.


----------



## KevinB (13 Nov 2022)

McG said:


> They do different things and should not be treated as different solutions to a common capability.


Exactly.  
    In the same way a LAV and a Tank aren’t interchangeable.  

I think I’ve previously made my feelings on the 60mm fairly clear, but it really never should have been withdrawn, it should have been replace with a new 60mm, but not as an either or choice with the CASW.   


Any system when used incorrectly won’t work well (or at all).  


A properly written requirement for the CASW should have come from the field force and identified how it was going to be used, that even if not PY neutral would have made sense.  

When requirements don’t come from the field force and get written in a cubicle - all sorts of good idea fairies get involved.


----------



## daftandbarmy (13 Nov 2022)

NavyShooter said:


> So....if the 30mm is anemic, and the 40mm suffers considerably from wind drift and has a similarly small payload, should we be looking at going back to 60mm mortars again?  (Thread derail notification goes here.)



Smarter militaries have never given them up.


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## dapaterson (13 Nov 2022)

Yeah, but the British kept them, too.


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## daftandbarmy (13 Nov 2022)

dapaterson said:


> Yeah, but the British kept them, too.



Wiki says that only the PARAs and Marines will be using them. 

I suppose that's as punishment, because unlike the hat units they have to carry them on Shank's Pony, for being naughty or something:









						M6 mortar - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------

