# "Light Infantry/Airborne Capability" & "Canadian Airborne - a waste of $$$?"



## claybot

From what I understand about this site is that it is an area for open discussion on the CF. 

Some people including myself do not see a need for the Light Infantry Battalion so I'm asking the following.

The Light Infantry Concept in the Canadian Forces is a Qucik Reaction dimounted force that uses multiple means to deploy either amphibous, airmobile or airborne within 24-48 hours. The former Airborne Regiment also fits into this category.

Has the Light Infantry Battalion/Airborne proved its worth in the Canadian Army based on the above statement?
If so how and on what missions (list)? (World War 2 doesn't count)

Yes I'm a retired Corporal, I do not have a jump course and have never served in a LIB. But I do study military history and try to keep aware of what is going on past present and future in the CF.


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## Brygun

claybot said:
			
		

> From what I understand about this site is that it is an area for open discussion on the CF.



In theory   Ive found the less value placed on cheap shots whose only content of a post is to attack another member of army.ca a topic the better. A post could debate the issues or disagree, that's what discussion forums are for. Everyone has opinions... some won't agree with you or me. Some can discuss others just take shots at others. Involve yourself with those who discuss, wave away the rest.



			
				claybot said:
			
		

> Has the Light Infantry Battalion/Airborne proved its worth in the Canadian Army based on the above statement?
> If so how and on what missions (list)? (World War 2 doesn't count)



One fundamental of conflict is to have a means to resolve/defeat/dislocate the opposing nation/faction/policy. It is always possible for an OpFor to contain as one means it performs conflict to have human beings with small arms, blades, clubs or even just punching and kicking. As such there will ALWAYS be a need to address this and that will take a human being with preferablly better equipment to go deal with them. Tanks, planes, missiles, shells all have their use. It is only the infantry which can deal with the "up close and personal" issues. 

Now the degree to which an OpFor uses or is effective in using "minimally equipped infantry" (MEI for an abbreviation) will vary. During the cold war NATO plans where focused on massvie armored battles in Germany, MEI where not likely to appear. In Veitnam the MEI in the jungle where a serious contender. MEI where also a serious tactical problem in Mogadishu and a major issue currently in Iraq.

Clauzwitz in "On War" points out that infantry is the least dispensible unit. It has the least mobility and the least firepower (recall the time period being horse cavalry, wooden wheeled cannon and infantry). His key points on the control of territory still remain true. It is infantry which has the manpower vs cost to "control" an area. In modern operations it is more a matter of "police" than control but the manpower issue is still key. 

Tanks and aircraft of today also require significant logistic support, supplies, fuel and down time for maintenance. When the tanks are being fixed who protects them and the front if not the infantry. Who protects the airbase... which for a flight of 100 planes could have 1,000 technicians, refuellers, ATC and other necessary personel if not the infantry.

You will need some form of "light" infantry with better equipment and training than the MEI."Foot Infantry" with few vehicles, at least in the tactical sense, will always be the effective means to deal with control and many MEI situations. They also need to carry armament system to deal with regular forces which they might find themselves engaged with. Either when first establishing control of an area or if another country decides to support the MEI. 
For the latter consider the Veitcong and the NVA. The communist equipped NVA regulars eventually came to supplement the Vietcong. While Canada wasn't the fighting force the light infantry have proven they are needed for jungle terrain.
Jungle terrain will involve light infantry.

Since WW2 we have the creation of mobile strategic units. Battalions, regiments and divisions with the tactical forces moving at wheeled or tracked speeds.  These where highly effective until they came into contact with cities. In the modern day you see in Afganistan and Iraq that we are having to deal with the "control" or "policing" of urban terrain. 
Armor proves itself to be useful in supporting but not leading such terrain. Able to "bunker bust" the armor they carry assists safely getting their weapon into play. "Bunkers" in urban terrain can be plentiful with an industrial section of a city being a series of fortresses immune to small arms. Tanks though are either unable or a dangerous choice to follow up investigation or pursuit into a building. They still need the infantry.
Aircraft have shown they are of very limited use with urban terrain. They can hit facilities and disable their systems, such as factories or communication. Without the use of nuclear munitions one question from an air strike "how long is it out". Damage by a bomb hitting the exterior of a radio site knocks out the tower, so OpFor raises another for the same transmitter. A deep penetration bomb may get the radio equipment but how do you know for sure. Further, whether effective in an attack or not aircraft have one vital tactical issue in their limited loiter time. At some point they must land to get more fuel. Again infantry need to "control" the refuel/rearm point and only infantry can assure "control" of an area.
And what of the MEI in urban terrain? With the massive amounts of cover some of the equipment differences disappear. Usually their familiarity with the terrain (its their home town) also restores some or all of the mobility issues, at least within the city.
The "Black Hawk Down" incident saw MEI vs a modern force. A summary for this discussion shows that airmobile succeeded in seizing the target for a brief time. An armored (insufficiently armored) force then meet with them to escort the objective out. It was NOT possible for the armor and airmobile force to remain in control of the city. It would have taken a large infantry force to have accomplished that (if "control" rather than "seizure" had been the objective).
Urban warfare, the armor forces and air forces necessitate the existence of light infantry.

Outside of these closed terrain there is the more conventional vision of mechanized infantry. In offense that is of providing the infantry forces for confirmation, security and clearance of pockets while the Armor and Air forces contain to smash through the countryside. In defense it is of providing the security to the supply lines, laying ambushes and in effect creating pockets that the enemy forces would need their own infantry to resolve.
Rapid mechanized warfare also calls for infantry, of light or some other form.

Other threads have discussed some matters pertaining the CAR, parachuting and paratroops. First for this post it is recognized that the increased training, the spirit and the creation of a goal of achievement for our forces of the paratroops is considered by myself and others highly valuable. What is less certain is the physical act of a parachuting (which yes can be argued as not completely separable from the previous factors).
Canada has not conducted a large "air drop" in decades. Nor does it seem that we are likely to. Our country has not been one to initiate "coups" such as the USA paradrop on Panama. 
For discussion lets consider two sizes of air drop, a small raid (company or smaller) or a large invasion (battalion or higher). 
The small raid is what we have the aircraft and funding to achieve. Targets for a small raid can be a person or a surprise on a facility. Unless contacted by a larger force the small raid is unlikely to survive for long in contact with the nations response forces likely to be of battalion or larger forces. Therefore the small para force alone must go into evasion. For a human target this limits them to killing or capturing a significant person which is not how Canada deals with the world. A facility could be destroyed, guarded until relieved or given a true "surprise inspection", which is a possible means for Canada to deal with a situation.
If a small raid plan does involve a relief force then there is the possibility that an advance party of the relief force, such as a light infantry group, could also have achieved the objective. Not always but it would be a consideration. Light infantry, the topic of this thread, could achieve some small paradrop objectives but there are many ones which it could not.
The larger paradrop is generally considered beyond our means. It is at the large size of force that you see the ability to hold for an extended time an objective while at the same time holding the drop zone for resupply. Such operations may be to open interior fronts during a major invasion, a major invasion of which Canada is unlikely to do on its own for funding and policy reasons. 
A large paradrop could also be response to an international terrorism to quickly establish "control/police" of the area. These possible targets though are generally limited popularity and could usually find an airstrip some place near. Even the US paratroops would rather walk off their planes then come down with guns blazing at them, not just for safety but for cohesion. A near field landing does create a significant gap of time in which the leaders or terrorists could respond, such as by fleeing or going into caves. Thus if you wanted to "grab" the terrorist force you would need to "grab" quickly which a large paradrop could do.
In either the small or large paradrop the one aspect that para forces have is rapid strategic deployment. By being a force which can be thrown out a perfectly good aircraft they can also get all their gear into that same aircraft. Not all forces can. Even the US has issues the number of aircraft which can flay some of their equipment. One US response is the reforger units where sets of equipment are already on ships or in depots around the world. A huge stockpile of funding sitting idle on the chance that it might be needed is also beyond Canada's means.
All of these paradrop possibilities though are based on light infantry for the simple reason it's the bulk of what we can deploy by parachute. There is artillery and sometimes tanks (Sheridan or MGS) that can go with them. The amount of this "heavy" equipment is in the a supporting rather than primary role.
Paradrop operations are infantry, and the ultimate in light infantry.

There is also the idea of airmobile forces.  For this post airmobile refers to an infantry force capable of remounting its air transport quickly. Typically this is by helicopter. It could in future see such things as tilt rotor, such as the Osprey, or very short take off and landing transport planes (a next generation Hercules of instance).To load onto the air transport the airmobile force is usually of an infantry force. 
To make use of the airmobile on a large scale they could be deploying to a location isolated from friendly forces. This means establishing their own "control" or security perimeter. They have the same needs of infantry to protect their equipment, guard the landing/recovery areas, take the objective, sweep through the objective and then guard the objective. The may also have artillery, light tanks, LAVs but they as Clauzwitz pointed out find that infantry is the indispensable part of their force.
A small airmobile operation could possibly be of mostly a non-infantry force. If they are foregoing their "aerial remount" then they do not need to guard their landing zone. Alternatively they could be planning on finding another suitable area to "aerial remount". This could be to conduct a patrol, such as those done in Vietnam, or in future war to send out a raiding party or deploy a sensor vehicle. It is unlikely though that an airmobile raid does not either include light infantry or plans on meeting up with it.
The airmobile force, with all its tactical wonders, also has the issue of having aircraft. While deployed airmobile forces may or may not have infantry they need an airbase of some sort. That means technicians, fuel, ammunition and repair shacks all of which returns to the need to "control" its base of operations with light infantry.
From the above you see Airmobile operations will need infantry.

For the final consideration on the need for light infantry consider the third branch of the service of, the navy. The goal of the navy is the control of sealanes for our use while denying that to others. The whole of sea control is to get goods from one place to another. They need to be loaded onto the ships requiring a port. Then you need to get the goods off the ship to be used also requiring a port. If the port is friendly and under "control" from local police forces all is well. If there is an issue, such as rioting, how would you ensure Canadian bound or delivered goods are not destroyed in the docks and warehouses? A harpoon missile wont do it. 
To complete the role of the navy you may potentially need infantry.

In these roles, historical instances and "what if" scenarios, you have seen there is and will always continue to be the need for light infantry.


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## Kirkhill

Nicely stated Brygun. 

The basic structure for imposing the authority of the state rests on the shoulders of the infanteer who meets the opposition face to face.  If working in a permissive environment (people not shooting) he can go about his duties unarmed as a policeman.  If he is opposed in his duties (people shooting) then he needs to make sure he owns the biggest gun in the neighbourhood, or at least he is on friendly terms with the guys who do own it.  But at bottom it is about the PBI, not the tools.

Cheers


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## Michael OLeary

Brygun,

I'm not sure where to begin. Perhaps you could enlighten me by defining your professional military background, because some of what you're expounding just doesn't seem to match the curriculum materials I remember from my experiences at Staff College, either as a student, or the past few years as supporting staff.

For now I will point out that your argument that the defence of all nature of military installations (airbases, seaports, etc.) as an infantry task is incorrect. It is a standard military principal that all elements and formations be capable of providing their own basic self-defensive activities and being able to participate in rear area security tasks. These are not stereotypical tasks of line infantry.


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## claybot

Thanks Brygun

I see you are also into history in fact you are more up on than I am in some cases.
I have this discussed this topic with senior officers in the Infantry and in fact written it out just waiting to see if an editor will print it or not.

This is what I meant by the question I asked.

After 9/11 the Light Infantry Battalions were on the chopping block and from what I recall 3rd VanDoo was already beginning to disband when OP APOLLO came around. Many believe that the mission should have gone to Mech Battalion such as 2 PPCLI as they were back from Bosnia and still had a lot of troops. Instead 3 PPCLI an understrength battalion was sent and had to be augmented by the entire C Company 2 PPCLI as well as pers from Sniper, Recce and other organizations.
This in turn resurrected the Light Infantry Battalion.
I view this mission a failure for the Light Infantry Concept as it proved that mech forces could do Light missions without a problem. If this mission were a true LIB mission then the extra company/manpower should have been drawn from one of the other two Light Infantry Battalions either RCR or VanDoo.
For OP ATHENA missions all the LIBs were using LAV and Iltis/G-Wagon. If LAV's were required then it is a Mech mission not a Light mission.


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## Britney Spears

Sorry, but isn't C/2VP also a light unit? That's what they all tell me.....


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## Blakey

Actually, they've been broken up and distributed through the rest of the BN. (Mainly A and B Coy's)
Edited to add:
They do have a skeleton crew there still. 
2nd Edit: Who is "they"?


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## Britney Spears

Yeah, I meant _was_.


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## Blakey

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Yeah, I meant _was_.


They were a LAV Coy just like A & B Coy's were, only thing was all three Rifle Coy's had to rotate through the LAV's as there were not enough for the whole BN.


Mod: Spelling


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## Britney Spears

Oh. 

Those dirty 2nd Bn boys tell me all kinds of lies......

EDIT: No, not you Blakey, the other one......


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## Blakey

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Oh.
> 
> Those dirty 2nd Bn boys tell me all kinds of lies......


I have no illusions that they don't...next thing cominning out of their filthy sewers will be "We're all happy to be in Shilo"  ;D


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## Britney Spears

> I have no illusions that they don't...next thing cominning out of their filthy sewers will be "We're all happy to be in Shilo"  Grin



But that's what Colonel Day said, is he happy to be in Shilo?


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## Blakey

He isn't with the BN anymore...he left in '04, prior to the move to Shilo.


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## Britney Spears

> He isn't with the BN anymore...he left in '04, prior to the move to Shilo.



Thanks, next I need someone to explain my own joke, I'll PM you. Do all snipers have such a wonderful sense of humour?


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## Blakey

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Thanks, next *time* I need someone to explain my own joke, I'll PM you. Do all snipers have such a wonderful sense of humour?


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## BITTER PPLCI CPL

We don't have Col. Day anymore (unfortunately), we have Sharpe instead. I almost fell asleep reading that 8000 word post!


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## Blakey

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> Thanks, next I need someone to explain my own joke, I'll PM you. Do all snipers have such a wonderful sense of humour?


I'm sorry, you must have me confused with somebody else, the only _optics_ I look through now is that of a D100.


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## Brygun

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> For now I will point out that your argument that the defence of all nature of military installations (airbases, seaports, etc.) as an infantry task is incorrect. It is a standard military principal that all elements and formations be capable of providing their own basic self-defensive activities and being able to participate in rear area security tasks. These are not stereotypical tasks of line infantry.



The presented material was in support of the need for a lightly equipped person on foot, which as you clarify is more than the line infantry. Sorry about that. Base/port defense personnel where presented in that "lightly equipped person on foot" format in comparison to a force of armor or say mechanized infantry. I can see where lumping in MPs etc was not clear.

Namely a rebuttal to:


			
				claybot said:
			
		

> do not see a need for the Light Infantry Battalion




There are at times occurences, ones I can reference date to WW2, where infantry forces augmented on base air defense. For example Canadain units in south England sending their MG forces to augment AA defenses. The same infantry forces where tasked to respond to German paradrops and retake airfields should they ever have come.

It would be unusual for "dock riots" to provoke a Canadian enforcement. If it did require something of battalion size it could be debated where the manpower would come from. Not sure if the Navy could form up the manpower or whether they might call on army "lightly equipped person on foot" for manpower. (Very unlikely scenario. Reserves likely rather than line infantry but still a "lightly equipped person on foot")


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## Michael OLeary

Brygun said:
			
		

> The presented material was in support of the need for a lightly equipped person on foot, which as you clarify is more than the line infantry. Sorry about that. Base/port defense personnel where presented in that "lightly equipped person on foot" format in comparison to a force of armor or say mechanized infantry. I can see where lumping in MPs etc was not clear.



Since you used the term infantry 37 times and never mention MPs or alternative "lightly equipped persons on foot" once, it would appear you made no obvious attempt to be so general. Your original post was also specifcally in response to whether or not "Light Infantry Battalion/Airborne proved its worth in the Canadian Army," not to generalize the various potential tasks for dismounted, lightly armed personnel of all Corps and services in support of their primary missions.

The use of infantry in some of the tasks you mention in defence of your thesis were the employment of troops already in rear areas, whether awaiting deployment to combat zones or in rest rotations. The employment of such troops in support of rear area security missions is an established secondary task, when and if the emergency need arises, but it was not their primary mission at the time. And other plans would have been in place in their absence.

I also note that you chose to omit any response to my first question, namely a request for you to establish your credentials, which I am sure you understand is a valid request given the topics at hand and the audience.


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## Britney Spears

> I also note that you chose to omit any response to my first question, namely a request for you to establish your credentials, which I am sure you understand is a valid request given the topics at hand and the audience.



It seems he already has in the <a href=http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33494/post-253349.html#msg253349>"Useful things to read before going to basic"</a> thread.


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## Brygun

claybot said:
			
		

> Thanks Brygun
> 
> I see you are also into history in fact you are more up on than I am in some cases.
> I have this discussed this topic with senior officers in the Infantry and in fact written it out just waiting to see if an editor will print it or not.



Your welcome. Perhaps you can get permission to post the reply... or a jist of the conversation.



			
				claybot said:
			
		

> I view this mission a failure for the Light Infantry Concept as it proved that mech forces could do Light missions without a problem. If this mission were a true LIB mission then the extra company/manpower should have been drawn from one of the other two Light Infantry Battalions either RCR or VanDoo.
> For OP ATHENA missions all the LIBs were using LAV and Iltis/G-Wagon. If LAV's were required then it is a Mech mission not a Light mission.



Two biggest differences between Light Infantry and Mechanized is first the presence of the vehicles and secondly the large differences in costs to operate and train in those vehicles.

It would be preferable if you could always have mechanized carriers for any mission for the infantry. I present to you instead that the OP ATHENA showed the adapability of LIB to become upvehicled. We had enough vehicles and funds for the vehicles to go so the vehicles should be there. 

The question was more a matter of why the LIB infantry:



			
				claybot said:
			
		

> Many believe that the mission should have gone to Mech Battalion such as 2 PPCLI as they were *back from * Bosnia and still had a lot of troops. Instead 3 PPCLI an understrength battalion was sent and had to be augmented by the entire C Company 2 PPCLI as well as pers from Sniper, Recce and other organizations.



While the reasons for the choices you mentioned I dont know for sure it may have to do with that "back from". Some times force leaders rotate who is going out whether training or operational. Was there another full strength Mech Battalion available? Are you sure its available and not tasked to some major training exercise or on a stay-home cycle? The US 82 airborne for instance uses a rotation schedule where one battalion is always on 2-hour standby to be on planes (you basically dont leave the base). To achieve that the battalions of the 3 brigades each spend two weeks is at that readiness. At that moment that other battalions are at other stages, 5 hour response time, training or at "rest status" so they have time to be fathers and mothers to their families.

It would useful to your topic to list what else was available.

The other implication perhaps is to the unpopular idea of keeping the transport vehicles in a seperate organization from the infantry.   Namely you would shuttle into the situations the Mech Vehicles and attach the various LIB as needed. A true "battle taxi" service could in theory (not practice) pick up and move infantry force A then go get infantry force B. Nobody uses this approach as at least one infantry force should be intimately familiar with using the vehicles and the personnel operationg it. The only way to get the most out of the transports is to train regularily in using them. Temporary, such as what you describe, inserts of forces does happen when needed but not the whole infantry force swapping around.


For the other assets (sniper, recce) etc is it not the idea to assemble from our regular forces and reserves the right mission force.


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## Brygun

Britney Spears said:
			
		

> It seems he already has in the <a href=http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33494/post-253349.html#msg253349>"Useful things to read before going to basic"</a> thread.



So far Michael is the only person to have asked about it nicely. So far in the army.ca the people demanding it where ones going on with a "you asked a question you are going to fail" or "how dare you recommend a book". Frankly with the bad attitude of those people (of which no one in this thread has been) is why I wont be adding any more profile information. Such people are only looking for something to take yet another cheap shot at someone over since they cant present a discussion.

Again, no one in this thread has shown that attitude but after the experiences with others with bad attitudes that also demanded profile information I wont be responding to general profile requests. To your credit Michael you are the first who wasnt also shooting mouth.

Agree or disagree with things posted or ask is what discussion forums are about. If someone has something better to say by all means go ahead and I'll learn something too.


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## Michael OLeary

Brygun,

unlike some forums which are treated as a free for all in the conduct of posters, this board attempts to achieve and maintain a degree of credibility through its debate and emphasis on experience-based contribution, including the challenging (however politely) of posters' credentials to establish the veracity of the data they present as reasoned fact. That philosophy is well represented in Mike Bobbitt's Conduct Guidelines for the forums. I have pointed out that your posts, however detailed, appear to be in conflict with my experiences and training at the Army's Staff College. Because of that, I requested clarification of your background to help all readers place your comments in context. If your remarks are simply the result of your personal synthesis of material you have read, that is fine, but it allows the use of a different interpretive lens than if you were a Command and Staff Course qualified Maj or LCol talking about infantry employment in all types of operations (of which there are also some on the baord).

I am not looking for an argument, simply for a better standpoint from which to interpret your remarks.


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## Brygun

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> If your remarks are simply the result of your personal synthesis of material you have read, that is fine,



That would be the one. 

I appreciate your approach, its rather refreshing and restoring a faith in the members of army.ca


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## Brygun

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> appear to be in conflict with my experiences and training at the Army's Staff College.



Will you, or are you permitted, to share these views? I am interested in what your view is.


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## Michael OLeary

You would have to be more specific. I'm not about to try and narrate the total of 26 weeks on course plus two years on the support staff of the Staff College bridging two fundamentally different doctrinal and technological eras. The aim of the Staff College is to teach the Operational Planning Process at battle group (task force) and brigade group levels in the full spectrum of operations to the Army's captains. It does so by starting with detailed examination and analysis of the doctrinal units and formation in use at the time of the course, which are used in all of the College's exercises and staff problems, leading up to the exercising of student staffed headquarters in fully supported computer simulations covering the full range of activities from peacekeeping to combat operations. The general principals taught are then used by the graduates adapted to whatever organization they are afterward posted. It's not a matter of it being too complex to deliver, it is a problem that the entire package is just that, a package of interlocking concepts and training objectives; which is dependent on the preparatory training and experience of the participants, as well as their mutual cooperation and expertise in their own specialist areas, to absorb at the level of detail and pace the College delivers.


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## a_majoor

I am unclear what is meant or implied by "failure of the Light Infantry concept"? The fact that the government does not provide enough funds to maintin battalions/regiments at full strength? If you look at where the 3 PPCLI battlegroup deployed, you will see very little opportunity to have used the LAV III platform at anywhere near its capabilities. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.



			
				Brygun said:
			
		

> The other implication perhaps is to the unpopular idea of keeping the transport vehicles in a separate organization from the infantry.   Namely you would shuttle into the situations the Mech Vehicles and attach the various LIB as needed. A true "battle taxi" service could in theory (not practice) pick up and move infantry force A then go get infantry force B. *Nobody uses this approach as at least one infantry force should be intimately familiar with using the vehicles and the personnel operationg it. *The only way to get the most out of the transports is to train regularily in using them. Temporary, such as what you describe, inserts of forces does happen when needed but not the whole infantry force swapping around.



Actually the Australians use this approach. There are links in several other threads to articles about how this is done and how well it works. In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.

WRT filling in your credentials, it is your choice, of course, but the rest of us do take what we see there into account when reading posts and assigning "value" to what the poster has to say.


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## Kirkhill

The issue Brygun is are you using the vehicle to transport the infantry and their kit to the field, or is the vehicle itself to fight on the field.

In the first case there is limited coordination required. In the second case there is intimate cooperation required.  Still more training and cooperation seems likely to be necessary if the vehicle and infantry are to assault as a team.

The Aussies, as a_majoor reminds us, have created separate M113 subunits and units that are composed entirely of crews.  The guys in the back are infanteers and come from attached units, much like they might be assigned to work with helicopters.  Although we had M113s integrated in the Mech battalions at the section level they too were essentially just transport with the section driver and the vehicle being removed from the line and lagered up at a Zulu location.  You could see the old organization as a light infantry battalion with an M113 platoon attached and integrated.

When the vehicles got a turret and the turret became more capable the vehicle ceased to be just transport for infantry, it became a fighting vehicle in its own right and too valuable to be left out of the fight.  This, along with the fact that the vehicle could not transport a full section of infantry in addition to the 3-man crew has forced the revision of TO&Es as well as TTPs which in turn means that the infantry in the back of the LAV has less in common with the infantry that fights dismounted, or light.

Which brings us all the way back to the beginning, in my view.  Can a common structure for Light and LAV infantry be found so that one type of infantry company or battalion can switch roles easily?  One day fighting on foot without vehicles.  The next day mounted and integrated with vehicles.


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## Brygun

a_majoor said:
			
		

> In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.



Interesting. Wasnt aware of that. I will look into that. Thanks.




			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.



This type of "strategic" mobility I had heard about but as you say, not into a fight. Couldnt recall off the top of my head who.


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## Brygun

a_majoor said:
			
		

> It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.



Which reminds me... two "lightly equipped infantry on foot" scenarious I forgot where mountain, espically where caves are present, and huminatarian aide (tanks dont do so well and handing out foods though they do tend to keep the roads clear of fallen trees).


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## claybot

Well it seems this thread has generated some good discussion I was hoping for that.



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> I am unclear what is meant or implied by "failure of the Light Infantry concept"? The fact that the government does not provide enough funds to maintin battalions/regiments at full strength? If you look at where the 3 PPCLI battlegroup deployed, you will see very little opportunity to have used the LAV III platform at anywhere near its capabilities. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.



The Failure I implied is that the mission showed that Mech forces can do the Light Infantry work. If our Mech forces are capable of doing the work of the LIB whats the point in having the LIB. We could just make each LIB a Mech force or better yet disband the unit and use the troops to bring the understrength Mech battalions up to full strength.
AOTF/managed readiness is the same point I received from a now senior officer. To me thats an excuse we have other LIB's. With OP APOLLO being used to justify the LIB Concept then it should have been a pure LIB.
All it proved is that its easy to re-roll a mech force into a LIB.

As I've stated in other threads/posts we would just have one type of Infantry one capable of Light and Mech roles. 

And yes I've updated my Profile a bit should show in the signature block


----------



## a_majoor

We cannot look at the soldiers in isolation.

A 600 man LIB will have a certain logistical footprint, transportation requirements (strategic i.e. how to deploy from Canada) and intrinsic abilities to work in close or restricted terrain. A fully developed Light Infantry doctrine would have a TO&E and TTPs reflecting the strengths of light infantry, rather than rehash the various arguments look at the "Towards a true Light Infantry" thread http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/32580.0.html

Similarly, a 600 man Mechanized Infantry Battalion would have a very different logistics footprint, transportation requirements and intrinsic abilities to operate in open terrain. The Mechanized TO&E and TTPs would reflect the fact that a section would be smaller due to the interior layout of the vehicle, but fighting in conjunction with the vehicle has a higher degree of firepower, far more than a comparable LIB section.

None of this should be taken to imply that dismounted infantry soldiers can or cannot do certain tasks, there is enough overlap in the common skill sets so *an infantry soldier* can fight in the Sha-e-kot, the Fulda gap or the streets of Fallujiah, but when looking at TO&E or TTP issues, *a six or seven man section* trained to employ the firepower of the 25mm chain gun and coax GPMG might require a certain degree of reorientation before leaving the LAV behind and climbing up the hills. Similarly, *an eight man Light section * (light infantry could potentially have as many as 12 men per section depending on organization and doctrine) will need to drop some soldiers to fit in a LAV, and get some orientation to understand how to employ the vehicle to its full effect.

OP Apollo really only proved two things: our system of training is flexible and comprehensive enough for infantry soldiers to take on different roles when required, and we haven't fully developed doctrines to really differentiate Light from Mech yet. I suspect in the fullness of time, composite Cavalry Regiments, such as those advocated by 2Bravo will evolve and take on what we now see as the Armoured role (but with the addition of a dismountable element for close protection and to deliver the assault), while LIBs may evolve into true light infantry with very restricted kit lists and small logistic footprints in order to deploy rapidly, operate in "stealth mode" and provide force projection capabilities in restricted terrain. Each type of capability is required, but in what ratio is an open question.


----------



## Sapper Bloggins

Nicely put Brygun. 
Your posts have proven to be very informative. thanks


----------



## Brygun

In regards to the carrier in Mech Inf:

The worlds infrastructure is based around the width of a pair of horses. The roads that where wagon trails, with more than two horses being done in pairs sets of pairs, became our roads. This influence affect the design of the space shuttle as the rocket boosters where sized to be carried about on roads. 

Military vehicles with the intention of driving down road lanes are also constricted to this. They also run into the width factor in not just roads but on air transport which most are fixed around the width of a care lane. This fix on width means that you have either height or length to increase volume. 

To add more carried infantry by height is impractical. To increase volume to the point of fitting more people either you end up with a vehicle they height of double decker bus or at least some of the infantry are laying down prone inside the carrier. The latter delaying speed of deployment and mixed feelings on comfort going over rough terrain. Height also increases the profile greatly impacting hull down and spotting factors greatly.

This leaves length for the design of the carrier.To carry more infantry you need a longer vehicle. Its been commented already in the thread of the different squad sizes between mechanized and light infantry. Length does impact the size of the target while having a lesser impact on "hull down" or "stealth" factors. Length also impacts turning radius of which there will be an upper limit based on the turning radius that roads are designed for. Since a city bus can only awkwardly make the turn a military fighting vehicle needs to be something shorter than a bus, still leaving possible room for increasing lenght. (There may be other factors regarding the choice of length).

Part of the issues, as brought up, was the presence of stay-behind on the vehicle being drawn out from the infantry squad. A more comprehensive vehicle for being able to mech-the-light would be to have a longer carrier that could carry a full infantry squad in addition to the vehicle crews.

The other solution to picking up foot infantry is to increase the number of carriers. This leads to squads, platoons etc being split over multiple vehicles. This reduction of cohesion under fire is readibly apparenet as a drawback. Further it is likely that the "odd men out" dont equal a full vehicle load so somewhere there are carries with mixed load of infantry, some of whom belong to squad A and other who belong to squad B. So when carrier with squad A goes left and carrier with squad B turns right where does the A+B odds and end carrier go?

So what does all this have to do with the need for Light Infantry Battalion? 
Well until we get longer carriers that carry "full" infantry squads the carrying limits make fighting with "reduced" squad sizes a type of speacilist skills. Similiar yes but not quite the same.
Further what if the terrain is, as mentioned, unsuitable for the transports (bog, swamp, dense forest, urban rubble, blocked roads, moutains etc)? If you only have mech-inf you are sending "reduced" size squads into action and without the fire support of   their carrier. A light infantry battalion can act in the area at "full" size with the full integration of its support weapons. Operators of the support weapons/systems are familiar and have trained with the foot infantry part of the force.

Again, my own feelings are that the Op Athena showed the adability of the infantry soldier.   :warstory: It was not a "perfect" match but thats what real life is about, getting things down with what you have.

What is needed, and to some extant exists now, is a range of possible forces to use. Like a tool box with a hammer, saw, screwdrivers, level and so forth we have/need a mix of solutions of armor warfare solution, mechanized infantry and as my first essay focused on is that there are many needs a "lightly equipped person on foot"... the light infantry battalion.

a_majoor touched on a very excellent point on the logistic side.   It enforces the need for different types of forces, of which light infantry battalion is one, on the cost per use. Not all missions require the same functions. You could build a hammer sized version of a multi-tool with a hammer, saw, screwdriver in it but how many could you afford to maintain and deploy? Using the multi-tool example there are some multi-tool jobs they can do but not so well... for example the length of the screwdriver bit may not reach well through and obstruction and on my own the knife has some cutting styles blocked by the width of the multi-tool handle. By having a set of tools you choose which one to use. Even with a multi-tool in my house its a big box of tools that goes with me to work on my car.

Getting back to Clauzwitz's "On War" (a book on the army's recommend reading list) there is a chapter of the "Relationship between the Branches of the Service" (pg 285-291 of the 1984 Howard and Paret). Bear in mind that he is in an age of musket infantry, wheeled cannon and horse cavalry. Stil the fundamentals and principles he discusses are important enough to keep the book on the reading list. Highlights of the chapter as follows:

pg 286:
1. Infantry is the most independent of the arms.
2. Artillery has no independence.
3. When one or more arms are combined, infantry is the most important of them.
4. Cavalry is the mosteasily dispensable arm.
5. A combination of all three confers the greatest strength.


Also pg 286:
"a squadron of 150 horses, a battalion of 800 men, and a battery of eight six-pounders cost approximately the same both for equipment and maintenance"

Today we have many more than three types of forces. The idea though he address is the same as a_majoor, the creation and operational cost of the forces.

On pg 291 the strongest support for the necessity of infantry is in his four conclusions to the chapter:
"1. Infantry is the main branch of the service; the other two are supplementary."

Today we think of an integrated force. Yet for all the missiles, armor plating, diesiel engines, smart bombs and so forth we still have that "lightly equipped person on foot".


----------



## Brygun

Brygun said:
			
		

> or at least some of the infantry are laying down prone inside the carrier. The latter delaying speed of deployment and mixed feelings on comfort going over rough terrain.


 ;D
I cant help but keep chuckling over the vision of the same prone positions when going on smooth terrain... nice little nappy time beds for the foot soldier. Imagine the squad running to remount and someone shouting "dibs on the top bunk!". :blotto: Wonder if they would SOP who it should go to  ???  

A "second height" mech carrier just not going to happen.


----------



## Brygun

On infantry doing airbase defense:

The original post in the thread wanted non-WW2 information in which there where several examples of regular infantry defending airbases. One post-WW2 on infantry formations defending an air base includes the French and Vietnamese (not yet split North/South) forces in the battle for the Dien Bien Phu airbase. One formation involved was the 5th Vietnamese Parahcute Battalion. The reference also mentions "Thus only nine battalions remained for Dien BienPhu" but does state specifically if they are "light" or "line" infantry though the assorted photographs lacking tanks make it likely.

Khe San, US vietnam era, also bears consideration for infantry defending an airbase. The references I have on hand do not list the particular formations other than to address them as "four battalions" of "Marines". IIRC there was an air strip of some sort there but that is also proving difficult to find a confirmation as to the extent of the "airbase".


----------



## 1feral1

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Brygun,
> 
> I'm not sure where to begin. Perhaps you could enlighten me by defining your professional military background, because some of what you're expounding just doesn't seem to match the curriculum materials I remember from my experiences at Staff College, either as a student, or the past few years as supporting staff.



I too would like him to put his money where his mouth is, as I had asked him yesterday to fill in his profile, as we have all seen this way too often on here. Graphs, books, magazines, movies, the INet, and 'games' do not equal life experience and a condecending attitude to boot.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Brygun said:
			
		

> On infantry doing airbase defense:
> 
> The original post in the thread wanted non-WW2 information in which there where several examples of regular infantry defending airbases. One post-WW2 on infantry formations defending an air base includes the French and Vietnamese (not yet split North/South) forces in the battle for the Dien Bien Phu airbase. One formation involved was the 5th Vietnamese Parahcute Battalion. The reference also mentions "Thus only nine battalions remained for Dien BienPhu" but does state specifically if they are "light" or "line" infantry though the assorted photographs lacking tanks make it likely.
> 
> Khe San, US vietnam era, also bears consideration for infantry defending an airbase. The references I have on hand do not list the particular formations other than to address them as "four battalions" of "Marines". IIRC there was an air strip of some sort there but that is also proving difficult to find a confirmation as to the extent of the "airbase".



Actually neither Dien Bien Phu nor Khesahn are good examples of what you are trying to describe. Neither of these were established airfields/areodromes that subsequently needed "infantry" to defend them in order to continue their operations. In your orginal post you postulated:



			
				Brygun said:
			
		

> Tanks and aircraft of today also require significant logistic support, supplies, fuel and down time for maintenance. When the tanks are being fixed who protects them and the front if not the infantry. Who protects the airbase... which for a flight of 100 planes could have 1,000 technicians, refuellers, ATC and other necessary personel if not the infantry.



In both cases the airstrips in location were developed/improved principally to support the troops in place, not vice versa.

Dien Bien Phu (March-May 1954) was selected by General Henri Navarre specifically to develop a strongpoint in order to draw the Vietmihn into a pitched battle. And the two airstrips were out of commision early in the battle, so the concept that the troops were there primarily to defend the airstrip is a weak argument. (See A Dictionary of Battles (1816-1976), by Brigadier Peter Young, D.S.O., M.C., M.A., , Mayflower Books, 1978)

Khesahn was a small US Special Forces camp that General Westmoreland decided to build up "as a springboard againt Ciommunist sanctuaries in Laos." In late 1967, in response to reports that the NVA was concentrating to attack Khesahn, westmorland reinforced it with 6000 Marines and developed a targeted bombing cammpaign to support the seige. With that reinforcement, the intent was not to "defend" the airstrip (which throughout the battle was the garrison's supply and evac route, not conducting independent operations) but to set a "trap" for the massed attacking Communist forces. (See Vietnam, A History, by Stanley Karnow, Viking Press, 1983)

For the record, AAP-6(V) NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH) (1998) does not include the term "airbase". Applicable terms and definitions are:



> aerodrome / aérodrome - An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations and equipment), landing and take-off of aircraft.  Also called "airfield". 20/11/96



Note that "aerodrome, or airfield " infers the establishment of a semi-permanent or permanent installation for the support of flight operations.



> air strip / bande d'atterrissage An unimproved surface which has been adapted for take -off or landing of aircraft, usually having minimum facilities. See also aerodrome. 1/2/73


----------



## Unknown Factor

Well I'm not going to venture down the arguement of 'uses of the infantry'.  But if the specific arguement is whether or not Canada needs this capability I'll bite!

Canada does need this capability and easily at the strength of 3 BN's spread accross the country.  I would even go further and suggest that these BN not only maintain 1 Coy each as jumpers but instead qualify the entire Unit, re-enforce the method of insertion as just that and get rid of the Maroon Berets in the units. I'm disapointed that particular discussions are (if only implied) based on personal feelings of units which may at times work in an 'elitist enviroment'.  The arguement that (and we are talking about todays mech bn's) Mechanized soldiers are capable of and ready to perform the tasks that 3 PPCLI conducted in Afghanistan is obviously based on pride and not on facts. I don't dispute that Mech Inf soldiers are capable of conducting the same type of operations however the whole basis of having light infantry is that they are ready at a moments notice and are trained specifically in the operations which they conduct 'before' they reach the theater of operations.

Additionally these Units also maintain the bulk of the Infantry soldiers accross Canada that are experts in LRRP's, Mountain Operations and small unit tactics to name a few.  In regions such as Afghanistan, the majority of operations that are being conducted are those of small unit tactics and SF, there has not been a build up of American or British soldiers at the mechanized level - airmobile is the order of the day.  If anything Canada has to further their lessons learned from Afghanistan and apply many to the defence of Canada.  With a land mass the size of Canada light infantry forces are much more flexable in the defence of the Nation, capable of massing all 3 bn in any region well before any mechanized forces.

With resructuring in the Army well underway, we should have done ourselves a huge favor and adopted the Australian concept.  As our army in small it would have created much more flexability for the commander on the ground.  I think that the idea of crewing the LAV with armoured trrops would have in the long run been a lot more effective than my fellow infantiers becomoing tankers.  They may disagree with me but with the attrition that BN in Canada face it is a struggle just to keep the crews together as well who now is the commander of the sect? the guy sitting under armour while his men are doing the dying? or the sect 2i/c?  Why not utilize the experience that or Armoured folks have and let them operate the Lav much like we used the tanks.  Get those Mech infantry soldiers back on their feet and give Canada the capability of fielding 9 inf BN regardless of what theater of operations they are in.  I remind everyone that Canada sent all of it's inf bn's including 3 which became reserve units to Korea all as light infantry.  

I would argue that their is in fact less justification in keeping Infantry soldier mech qualified.  It is a lot easier to get a infantryman to dismount from any mode of transportation than it is to teach him how to use and employ the method.  It to me anyway makes about as much sense as being given the key to the helicopter and told to fly myself.  Infantry soldiers are trained to 'close with a destroy the enemy' not become systems experts. If the infantry soldier you are training requires the amount of training that it currently takes to become a Lav gunner or Crew Commander then how is that position filled when Battlefield attrition begiins? If the basis of the infantry soldier becomes dependant on his qualification to operate a vehicle then his position has become a liability and too difficult to be filled by replacements.  The entire defence of a nation will be to a certain extent how quickly you can train basic soldiers - look at Russia for example during WWII.

We should not be so quick to assume that with modern systems comming on-line that we will be any more effective than we were with M113 w/ .50 cal.  Even an old mech inf soldier from that era will tell you that the amount of time the infantryman was mech was for less than 3 months of the year - hello RV's, the remainder of the time was spent on their feet conducting dismounted operations and winter ops.  So why re-invent the wheel and try to become something entirely different, I enjoy the company of Armoured Troops and have full faith in their abilityies to operate the LAV and provide me with the fire support that in require. 

"Go light, it's right"


----------



## Brygun

Wesley H. Allen said:
			
		

> I too would like him to put his money where his mouth is, as I had asked him yesterday to fill in his profile, as we have all seen this way too often on here. Graphs, books, magazines, movies, the INet, and 'games' do not equal life experience and a condecending attitude to boot.



That would be the thread where multiple persons where so blaringly rude over a simple book recommendation. It speaks volumes that the moderator stepped in and locked the thread. I support the moderators decision and have moved on. It would do as all good for any others stuck back there to also move on.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Brygun said:
			
		

> That would be the thread where multiple persons where so blaringly rude over a simple book recommendation. It speaks volumes that the moderator stepped in and locked the thread. I support the moderators decision and have moved on. It would do as all good for any others stuck back there to also move on.



Establishing your credentials would go a long way in preventing potential problems as well, Michael O'Leary(who is a Moderator as well) also requested that you establish them as well.


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## Brygun

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Establishing your credentials would go a long way in preventing potential problems as well, Michael O'Leary(who is a Moderator as well) also requested that you establish them as well.



and was given the requested information.


----------



## Infanteer

Brygun, I'm trying to read through your babblegaffle, but I can't figure out WTF you're trying to say.  Get it down to one paragraph, and back it up with something substantive (eg. "I know this because we tried it in Fallujah...." or something), or switch your radio to receive and head back to the wargaming forums.


----------



## Brygun

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Brygun, I'm trying to read through your babblegaffle, but I can't figure out WTF you're trying to say.



Rather vague. Which matter/paragraph are you refering to? If its just a matter of disagreeing thats fine.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Brygun said:
			
		

> Rather vague. Which matter/paragraph are you refering to? If its just a matter of disagreeing thats fine.



Do you make it a habit of trying to be difficult with the DS of every forum you fo to? If so, you will find it does not sit well here.


----------



## Infanteer

On another note, I find myself agreeing with Unknown Factor's post.   Here is two other posts by members who have a solid background in the subject at hand and come to the same conclusions:



			
				devil39 said:
			
		

> For what I might be able to add to this thread I will.
> 
> C Coy 2PPCLI was a Coy that never made the transition to LAV prior to its deployment on OP APOLLO.   Our training prior to deployment focused on "Light Infantry" skill sets.
> 
> I was blessed, as Coy Comd with a congruence of capabilities that made a deployment with 3 PPCLI much easier than would be possible today.
> 
> 1.   Soldiers.   I had a company of soldiers who had very extensive experience in JRTC and NTC in "Light Infantry" roles in the 3 or 4 years preceding me, under some really excellent Coy level leadership.   They were a relatively experienced bunch, with outstanding multiple skill sets, especially wrt weapons, tactics and terrain.
> 
> 2.   Primary Leadership.   The leadership from the Cpl/MCpl/Sgt and WO level were a diverse combination of leaders with Abn Regt/AMF (L)/ Light Bn/etc experience, who had in many cases led their soldiers in gaining the above mentioned skill sets, and who completely understood the requirements and necessity for fitness, wpn skills and tactical knowledge to accomplish the task at hand.
> 
> 3.   My officers were among the best I have ever worked with.   3 excellent Coy 2ICs (over the term) and 3 excellent Pl Comds.   Fit, smart and above all tactically competent.
> 
> 4.   My CSM was a incorrigible Light Infantryman, ex Abn Regt, whose fitness and tactical sense and unwavering support was an incredible asset.
> 
> 5.   I had experienced 1 PPCLI as a Pl Comd in the AMF(L) Bn where we spent our winters conducting multiple (Light) exercises in the mountains, and where our transition to Mech was relatively straight forward.   I had spent 3 years in 3 PPCLI prior to a posting to 2 PPCLI.   I therefore knew most of the officers in 3PPCLI and had worked with the CO of 3 PPCLI when we were both in 1 PPCLI (hmmmm strength of the Regimental System?).
> 
> C Coy 2 PPCLI was never a LAV coy in the 20 months that I commanded it.   We never made the transition from M113 to LAV III due to the APOLLO deployment.
> 
> *My personal belief is that the transition between Mech and Light Infantry will become increasingly difficult as formed sub unit, due to the complexities of LAV III training and manning.*   That being said, we do not need two separate streams, we should continue to cross pollonize our Infantry battalions to the benefit of the Corps as a whole.





			
				eyre said:
			
		

> Great discussion here.   I have been involved in both the Light Forces Working Group when it was a grassroots infantry initiative and after the Army took it over.   I was involved in drafting the initial cut of the definition in the first post that has since gone through the mill several times by the staff in Kingston.   A key part of this definition regarding platforms has been addressed by MCG and Dave.   The intent is not to define light forces in terms of any one platform (i.e. LAV unit) or insertion method (para unit, etc), but to give them the inherent flexibility to use whatever vehicle or insertion method the task calls for.   One task they could be in trucks, the next on helicopters, and then on foot.   It is what they do on the ground that is vital.
> 
> *The other key part of the definition is 'optimized for military operations in complex environments.'     Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects.   High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges.   Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â â€œ counter-insurgency â â€œ a task that has historically fallen to light forces.*
> 
> As a bit of a SITREP, light forces development is being guided by the Army's Combat Development process, and is in fact, I think, one of the first initiatives to be put through the process.   Those interested in tracking it can find the LFWG on the DLSC site on the DIN (I don't have the address now as I'm at home).
> 
> *The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training.   Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.*
> 
> The three critical shortfalls, as I see it, that we have in light forces now are firstly training (see above paragraph â â€œ we're not there yet and Dave touched on some of the problems), firepower, and transport.   Quick hits for firepower involve some of the new inf weapons systems on the books, adopting the new light rifle coy structure with a weapons platoon, enhancing our sniper capability, and better integrating non-integral fires (close air, etc).   We need to get light direct fire support back at the unit level as well.   A quick hit for transport is a light patrol vehicle, perhaps based on the special ops variant of the G-Wagon (but this could be problematic in a high-density IED environment).   We have to fix our helicopter situation, but this will not be a quick hit.
> 
> On the subject of donkeys, by coincidence currently elements of B Coy, 3 PPCLI, are undergoing mule training at the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre.   Don't laugh, it might be useful some day.


----------



## the 48th regulator

> Brygun, I'm trying to read through your babblegaffle, but I can't figure out WTF you're trying to say.  Get it down to one paragraph, and back it up with something substantive (eg. "I know this because we tried it in Fallujah...." or something), or switch your radio to receive and head back to the wargaming forums.



uhoh brother,

the P.C Barbarians are gonna get riled up with your "holier than thou attitude"......

dileas

tess


----------



## Britney Spears

WRT to the mules.

<a href=http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050813/ap_on_re_as/afghan_us_donkeys>Donkey-borne Marines in Kunar Province</a>


----------



## 1feral1

Brygun said:
			
		

> That would be the thread where multiple persons where so blaringly rude over a simple book recommendation. It speaks volumes that the moderator stepped in and locked the thread. I support the moderators decision and have moved on. It would do as all good for any others stuck back there to also move on.



What a piss weak answer   :

Frankly Brygun, its your attitude that really sucks and I take great offence to. Being new on here, maybe you should learn and LISTEN and take some decent advice from many good posters on here. Its obvious you know nothing shy of a few book issues, and whatever shit spews from your mouth should be taken at that.

Should you ever get get into the CF, you will really be struggling to say the least. To me attitude means everything, and although this is the INet, you can choose a brave face while hiding behind it. With almost 30 yrs in two armies I have seen your type way too many times come and go, and crash and burn sooner or later. That is guaranteed.

I have taken the time to read every single post YOU have created on here, and as of late, you seem to play some kind of an arrogant no-it-all expert role on subjects which you are clueless about. At least you have admitted you are so unfit, you   can't even do one SINGLE pull up to pass a basic PT test, which tells me you are not even a member.

Just remember its your credentials on here and your reputation at stake, not ours, and as far as I am concerned you've burnt your bridge with me, and I can see there are others who are a wee tad agitated also.

So, gonna fill in your profile? Look at mine (and others), I have nothing to hide. Time to fish or cut bate Brygun, the choice is yours.


----------



## Infanteer

I'd listen to Wes - he can be cranky (he's allowed to be), but he's usually right....

Anyways, let's get this one back on topic.


----------



## Acorn

Why bother with "fill in your profile?" It only makes a difference in the initial assessment of a poster's (poser's) knowledge. Frankly, I find "fill in your profile" to be a lazy way of assessing someone. The more posts one makes, the easier it is to establish, or destroy, credibility. The fact that the profile can be exaggerated (to say the least) makes it less than usefull as an assessment tool.

Brygun has made certain statements. His (her?) words have "filled in the profile." 

Acorn


----------



## Brygun

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Quote from: Brygun on Today at 21:16:13
> Rather vague. Which matter/paragraph are you refering to? If its just a matter of disagreeing thats fine.
> 
> 
> Do you make it a habit of trying to be difficult with the DS of every forum you fo to? If so, you will find it does not sit well here.



Seriously, it was a sincere offer to clarify. How it was considered something else is baffling. My apologizes for not protraying the sincerity.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Acorn said:
			
		

> Why bother with "fill in your profile?" It only makes a difference in the initial assessment of a poster's (poser's) knowledge. Frankly, I find "fill in your profile" to be a lazy way of assessing someone. The more posts one makes, the easier it is to establish, or destroy, credibility. The fact that the profile can be exaggerated (to say the least) makes it less than usefull as an assessment tool.
> 
> Brygun has made certain statements. His (her?) words have "filled in the profile."
> 
> Acorn



Agreed.  How much weight would one give somebody, for example, because he has "ex-Cpl" in his profile?  Could be Scott Taylor posting for all we know.  I would agree that one establishes one's bonafides every time they post.


----------



## Brygun

Rather hope we can get back on topic shortly. The army.ca privacy statement clearly states the profile information is optional. An option to leave blank IS being taken. I dont consider it any fault of mine to refuse demands on optional material.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Back on track guys. I think some things are pretty obvious and there's no need to belabour them.


----------



## Brygun

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Actually neither Dien Bien Phu nor Khesahn are good examples of what you are trying to describe. Neither of these were established airfields/areodromes that subsequently needed "infantry" to defend them in order to continue their operations.



Thank you for a good post. Its discussions like yours Michael that are part of why I took the time to participate in army.ca.


----------



## claybot

Infanteer
The quote you use

_For what I might be able to add to this thread I will.

C Coy 2PPCLI was a Coy that never made the transition to LAV prior to its deployment on OP APOLLO.  Our training prior to deployment focused on "Light Infantry" skill sets.

I was blessed, as Coy Comd with a congruence of capabilities that made a deployment with 3 PPCLI much easier than would be possible today._

This part should be clarified a little.... Yes C Coy 2PPCLI hadn't made the transition to LAV prior to OP Apollo but thet were still a mech company since they had M113's prior.
Yes they did focus on "Light Infantry" Skill sets prior to deployment - but that training was just more of what the 2 bn normally did, rucksack marches were part of morning PT. The final range that C Coy went through for their confirmation training was the same range the rest of the battalion went through.


----------



## Kirkhill

Claybot:

Your observations and Devil39s comments suggest the compatibility of Light Infantry and the M113, an armoured truck or transporter as opposed to a fighting vehicle.

The LAV looks to me more like an armoured fighting vehicle, or armoured car, that can carry a few troops as well.  As noted elsewhere the difference in vehicle capabilities and limitations on ability to transport personnel have resulted in different TTPs and less commonality between Light troops that could hitch a ride in the back of an M113 and those troops that work regularly with LAVs.

Replacing M113 with Bison/Stryker would have likely preserved 9 similar infantry battalions.  Sticking a turret on the vehicle changed the game entirely.  IMHO  ;D.


----------



## Unknown Factor

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Replacing M113 with Bison/Stryker would have likely preserved 9 similar infantry battalions.   Sticking a turret on the vehicle changed the game entirely.



I agree entirely with this statement, being defined as Mech Inf in todays Army is a lot more specific than it used to be.   When all 9 BN's had M113's we regularly called them Mech BN's, this at the time was, I belive, to be correct as the main effort of those BN was to close with the enemy in a large mounted Mech attack.   That did not however mean that we were continually training for Mech op's with those vehicles.   In fact as I stated before we spent a good majority of the year training dismounted a fact that I think is eluding some.   In fact I would compare a lot of the training to that what was conducted in the CAR while I was there less the jumping and intensity.

If you want to integrate Light Inf into the Mech attack, I think it may actually be prudent to give them M113's as there is no mech attack that will outrun it over broken terrain. Additionally the inclusion of the vehicles to any operations in the north would be an asset, especially for continued operations, with an airlift capability they could be brought in once suitable austere airstrips could be developed.   Keeping to a simple platform would enable the Light Inf to qualify drivers as well as gunners on wpns which are much more user friendly such as the .50 cal and mk19 within turreted systems, without disrupting their current training tempo or without becoming to complex.

Expansion of the roles within the Light Inf would facilitate a Bn within each Regt that maintains the capability of Airborne, Airmobile, Amphibious and Complex Terrain, with further trg operating patrolling and gun platforms based on the G-Wagon and M113. This in it's self would greatly enhance the retention of younger soldiers who look for something else to aspire to rather than just being an extension of a vehicle. But the arguement that the Light Infantry requires extensive trg to become mounted soldiers is a bit out of place, there has been a lot of excellent progress in the past few years, specifically in the areas of who to send to which theater.   With the expectaion of opening another front - so to speak- in the next few years I belive the Mech units will find their plate rather full in the next few years.

With that being said, 3 Light Inf Bn in Canada has given them the ability to accomplish more in the stand point of being proactive in a theater rather than just making a presence.   I believe there are still people out there in the Army that look at themselves as Peacekeepers first killers second, accomplishing the tried and true rather than venture into an area of operations which may cause casualties.   Since 2001 operations as they relate to the Canadian Army are no longer considered to be "Safe" and if anything has impressed me in the past few years it has been the Armies willingness to accept those risks and prepare it's soldiers for those risks and in no place has this been more true than within the Light Inf Bn's themselves.


----------



## BITTER PPLCI CPL

Hey Claybot, we just didn't do sets of light infantry training and we did a heck of a lot more ranges than the other coy's. I got in 2001, it wasn't until 2003 I actually did mech shit, and that was enemy force in Gage town, so that doesn't really count! Your either one of 2 things; someone in 2VP who is bitter and didn't get to go on Op Apollo, or are gullable and listened to someone who is pissed and didn't get to go and are cutting us down out of spite.  :threat: :threat: :threat:


----------



## Jungle

BITTER PPCLI CPL said:
			
		

> Paracowboy; now you know how I see   our so called Airborne capability, I see it too in a certain way, a waste of $$$


I disagree... while our present Airborne capability is not "doctrinal", it will serve as a solid base for the coming Light Force, which has to have an Airborne capability. Like it or not, it's the way ahead...


----------



## ArmyRick

IMHO (I am not a paratrooper, however I spent a year with para coy, 3 RCR). I beleive we should keep para capability, but with a specific role. I don't beleive we need an entire battalion.

Now airmobile forces would be far more beneficial but we need decent choppers for that. 

A light force that is airborne, airmobile, amphibious capable ? Damn straight. Thats what we should have. I also beleive we should concentrate our light (maybe future airmobile) units in petawawa. Its close to Trenton (for quick deployment) or maybe in the future Halifax bug outs (if we ever get the JSS going?). 

Well those are my thoughts.


----------



## KevinB

I think ALL of our Cbt Arms should be Para qualified.

Ideally all of our Light Forces be MFP.

 It is a needed capability


----------



## paracowboy

the fact that we do not have a proper Airborne capability, or that they have not been employed properly is not reason to eliminate them, rather it is reason to rid ourselves of the mentally lethargic individuals who are responsible.



> I think ALL of our Cbt Arms should be Para qualified.


as should every CS and CSS pers who is even vaguely interested. It's far more than simply a course where they teach you to fall out of an aircraft.


----------



## ArmyRick

You two are really living in reality. Where do you get the aircraft and the funding? The manpower and the time allotment for trg everybody? I am for keeping jumpers but lets be a bit more realistic.


----------



## paracowboy

"Realistic" would be grasping that we are involved in a war that is not going to end any time soon, with the most asymmetric foe ever faced, and having money thrown at us until we ask them to stop.
"Realistic" would be having Aircraft built/purchased specifically to project force anywhere we needed.
"Realistic" would be training the guts out of the entire CF, to turn us from 'peace-keepers' to counter-insurgency specialists.
"Realistic" would be churning out soldiers at a rate that would make the brooms in The Wizard's Apprentice look like pikers.

However, Canada has not been particularly "Realistic" in the past 30 years. We prefer to cower in our beds, while others protect us. Then we bite them in the back for doing so.

aahhh! That's better. Now, where were we? Oh yes.
At a minimum, we should have an entire BN group, with CS capabilities, per Regt, Airborne capable. With the ability to project and sustain them. 
We should have those units practice jumping into Exercises together, so they get SOPs down, and become inter-changeable.
We should have those units practice supporting the boys at DHTC.
We should have those units train in conjunction with the mechanized units, so that they learn the capabilities of each other, and the weaknesses. 
We should have those units work with those of the UK, the US, Australia, and New Zealand (mostly so I can meet Lucy Lawless).
We should, but we won't.


----------



## Blakey

> We should have those units practice supporting the boys at DHTC.


*IMO* That is, by far, the most reasonable argument put forth that I have seen.
Edited to add: Oh ya BTW im a _Leg_


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## KevinB

I kinda want to cry Para - that was perfect. 

Fact we are at WAR - some people are too stupid or naive (or both) to realise that - the sooner we are a country come to grips with that the better.

 Second the quicker our OWN Army come to grip with getting the RIGHT tool for the job - (COIN) the better LAV's and Coyote's are not very usefully in that operation despite what some people (for their own reasons) want you to think.


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## ArmyRick

If I was the CDS and told I could have extra funds for one of two options 
(a) Really good choppers (Chinook Ds, EH101, black hawks, apaches or a combination of any of these) to develop a superb airmobile force or 
(b) Stand up an airborne battalion....

I would go for (A).  Having spent a year with Para Coy 3RCR, I am very much aware of what you guys are capable of in a para role and to quote one of my previous section commanders (he was a pathfinder) "He would not want to jump into battle". 

I think the are alot of things the army needs and do explain exactly how more paratroops are going to help the army ?


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## BITTER PPLCI CPL

Don't think I hate Airborne, because I don't! If I was the CDS and we had a lot of money! This is what I would do; buy C-17's, C-130J's and the stretched versions and Chinook helicopter's. Then I would stand up an Airborne bn and an Airmobile bn. The only reason I say what I say is because at the present time we don't have the money to spend on this!


----------



## ArmyRick

Having thought on this idea and stuff, I think we really need more than anything is a battalion of troops that perform a similar role to US Rangers. If I were CDS, I would make their primary role airmobile and put the emphasis on those operations (assuming we get a decent chopper for it). They would also be trained in airborne and amphibious operations.
Their primary role would be a rapid deployment force capable of delivering a quick fast strike anywhere in the world from our JSS or trenton. They would also be tasked with supporting the Dwyer Hill gang.

I would also make it so that  members would complete a basic para, airmobile ops and a course similar to the Ranger course. This would help keep the ranks filled with motivated, physically fit and very aggressive soldiers that I served with in 3RCR Para. 

Again I would emphasis their primary role should be airmobile as I beleive airmobile ops are far more flexible than airborne. But as Grenada shows, keep the para capability and skills in the back pocket just in case you need to seize that airfield.


----------



## Jungle

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Having thought on this idea and stuff, I think we really need more than anything is a battalion of troops that perform a similar role to US Rangers. If I were CDS, I would make their primary role airmobile and put the emphasis on those operations (assuming we get a decent chopper for it). They would also be trained in airborne and amphibious operations.
> Their primary role would be a rapid deployment force capable of delivering a quick fast strike anywhere in the world from our JSS or trenton. They would also be tasked with supporting the Dwyer Hill gang.


You are describing something close to what the coming Light Force will be. Also, according to the SCTF project, the LIBs would be deployed (one at a time) on the CDS's "big honking ship" (San Antonio class ??) and be ready for depl at short notice. They would be able to use amphibious assets from the ship, use Helos for airland or airdrop, or move to a safe airfield to board aircraft for a Parachute op inland. Airmobile is nice, but when you have to cross long distances, or insert large numbers of troops rapidly, nothing beats a half dozen C-130s; these can drop 240 fully equipped Troops in minutes in any area.


----------



## claybot

You got in during 2001 and its now 2005 and your already a  BITTER PPCLI CPL. And you never did mech crap until 2003 which means you were either in B or C Company which merged into C Comany for the deployment. Also means you were a private at that time. So I'm sure you have amassed a lifetime of experience during those short few years. Good For You...... Hows Shilo........ 

Obviously my 2 years in Germany and my 3 UN tours and 1 NATO tour in 2 different battalions plus 1 published article about the Army and intrest in Military history (On Infantry is a great book to read over and over) plus the great time I spent in the MEDAK POCKET in no way compares to your established career of what 4 years.........

Oh and by the way I was clarifying that C Company was a Mech Company before they became a Light Company But of course how would you know that, you were a Civvie when they were MECH.


----------



## BITTER PPLCI CPL

Thanks Claybot for responding, I read your posts. And concur with what you say.


----------



## claybot

Yes there are wars going on and in case you haven't noticed we have not really deployed to any of them except OP APOLLO, which by the way its primary role was to guard the airstrip not go into combat. Our primary mission still is PeaceMaking and that is what our government likes and always will.

Yes there are people who are trying to convert the LIB's into a US Ranger type force with full Jump capability. And if the LIB's get enough good press this will probably happen, there is no way it will be called the Airborne.

But is this the way to go? Is this going to work going back to a single specialist unit? Able to deploy at a moments notice when we have a govement unwilling to do so?

All this talk about if  I were the CDS I would do this........... If you were the CDS and tried to this you would be unemployed......

More than likely it will go back to the way it was the former members of the Airborne will get there beloved unit back under a new title specializing in rapid response to a mission that will never come.

Just like the the past the Unit will sit on their rucksacks waiting and hoping a war will start and off they go only to have the mission cancelled at the last moment (Remember the Sahara). While the remaining 6 Infantry Battalions will rotate through mission after mission with very little breaks, doing all the work. Sending their social misfits to this new unit trying to keep the best soldiers for themselves.

History repeats itself........


----------



## 2 Cdo

The last line in your second last paragraph is exactly why I don't like or respect the higher ups who ran the battalions in the late 80's, early 90's. Plus putting up with the 2 VP Germany crowd, where EVERY Germany exercise story began with "Remember when we pulled up to the Gastof,,,,". The attitude in the 2nd was extremely anti-airborne, I don't begrudge anyone if they don't want to jump out of planes, but the people who slammed the airborne usually were those who couldn't even pass the PT test let alone the course.
Just one mans observation.


----------



## Brygun

I agree very much that any nation involved with international affairs, (Canada), needs a fast deployment force to deal with matters not on our own territory. This is one well known aspect of airborne even if they deploy without jumping. THEY GET THERE FAST.

Even if they do not get involved with immediate combat they establish a deterrent and the seriousness of our nations commitment to the situation. This can limit or deter the need for actual violence.

The actual act of the parachute jump has been debated by those more informed than myself. I personally feel the affect of the paratrooping ideal of higher than normal standards is very vital to the armed forces while the liklihood of actually doing large drops is very low.

I do agree Canada needs to have a means of putting a battalion, or larger, with all the support recources from artillery to logistics quickly in place into another nation. The cost of having them ready and getting them there is the challenge.

The US for instance to have a single battalion on short notice is/was running the 82nd airborne with nine (9) battalions rotating around different tasks. I do not feel without an unlikely shift in national funding we can sustain that same pattern. That does mean getting into a pattern of using non-para forces.

I do feel it is more plausible to build up a helicopter fleet that could act as transport force assigned en masse to operations. An airborne vs air drop arrangment has the transports remain in closer support of the infantry. The types of opposition we have been running into have tended to have (compartively) very little anti-aircraft ability so why not make use of tight air-ground interations to our benefit?

Is there a transport helicopter that can achieve a trans-atlantic/trans-pacific flight? Im not confident there is one (maybe with frequent in flight refuelling but it would be an exhausting ride).

We could perhaps, though costly, keep the helicopter force based in an allies territory. This would make it possible for them to bound from land based refeulling to land based refeulling until they got to the location. 
An overseas basing gives access to Europe, Asia and Africa with minimal over water flight. Depending on the range of the helicopters and support of island nations they could also reach Australia and the numerous pacific islands. There is a major political hurdle to this approach in resolving over flight permission. A second helicopter transoprt/support force might remain in Canada for training and to deploy across the North and South America continents.
If we used this the activated land forces would fly conventionally and meet with the helicopters at an airport. Then the force could deploy a few hundred kilometeres (or less). 
It does not though provide the same para-battalions ability to arrive without prior warning. It does retain most of the response time and the opposing force wont know for certain which drop/landing zones are used. It is quite likely from media sources they would know the helicopters where on the move.

I do feel we need to encourage positive qualities associated with paratroopers and a force that to go overseas is very much required for our foreign policies. A large paradrop though is beyond our $$$ so other choices need to be considered. An overseas helicopter transport force is one way. It would certainly be faster than using a ship for initial insertion of materials.


----------



## paracowboy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Having spent a year with Para Coy 3RCR, I am very much aware of what you guys are capable of in a para role


actually Rick, I don't think you are. I don't think anyone in the CF today outside of the few ol' Airborne dogs, and the very few who have witnessed foreign militaries do a MassTac, have any idea of what Paratroopers are capable of. When the sky turns black with 'chutes, and big metal things come tumbling down from the sky followed by angry men with guns, your entire worldview shifts slightly.

Grenada was mentioned previously, but there have also been combat jumps into Panama, Aghanistan, and Iraq. As well, there have been parachute descents into those, and other theatres, on a much smaller scale.

In closing, I wish to quote the bumper sticker:


> When it absolutely, positively, has to be destroyed overnight. You call, we fall. No sky too high


----------



## Kirkhill

Brygun:   

There is no Inter-continental helicopter.   Nor is there likely to be one.   Their operational range (100 to 500 miles) and their slow speed (max ~200 mph) means that they have to be deployed by ship.   The 101st is possibly the hardest division to deploy in the US   order of battle.      

To create an entire heliborne assault force of divisional size, (effectively turning the entire Canadian Army into the 101st Air Assault Division) requires a massive amount of helicopters, ships, gas, maintenance staff etc.   It is an extremely expensive proposition.    By contrast, teaching ALL Canadian Forces personnel (including cooks and clerks) to fall out of aeroplanes would be cheaper.   It is true that a few helicopters can be of immense usefulness in the area but look up the problems that the US had deploying Apaches to support operations in Kosovo.   And in that case they had a relatively secure base to operate from.

Enthusiasm is one thing Brygun, you have that in spades.   You also express yourself well.   However you have an unfortunate tendency to sound as if you are trying to be something you are not.   

You, like me, are not an expert.   You come across as if you wish your notions to be presented as expert opinions.   They are not.   They are notions.   And frankly some of them are ludicrous (vise reloadable claymores that Wes has called you on a couple of times).

When you have an idea, take the time to do a bit of research on it first.   Present it with a degree of humility and humour and be prepared to be told by those that have "Been There and Done That" that your idea is a load of old cobbler's.

You can get a lot more out of this site by asking questions than making statements.

Cheers and Wait Out.


----------



## GO!!!

claybot said:
			
		

> Yes there are people who are trying to convert the LIB's into a US Ranger type force with full Jump capability. And if the LIB's get enough good press this will probably happen, there is no way it will be called the Airborne.
> 
> But is this the way to go? Is this going to work going back to a single specialist unit? Able to deploy at a moments notice when we have a govement unwilling to do so?
> 
> Just like the the past the Unit will sit on their rucksacks waiting and hoping a war will start and off they go only to have the mission cancelled at the last moment (Remember the Sahara). While the remaining 6 Infantry Battalions will rotate through mission after mission with very little breaks, doing all the work. Sending their social misfits to this new unit trying to keep the best soldiers for themselves.
> 
> History repeats itself........



The Airborne was never a specialist unit - it maintained capabilities (airmobile, amphibious) that the "working"   : Bns did not, at least in a meaningful context. So maybe it was a specialist unit - in everything.

Having a unit on standby is not a waste of time or money, any more than the firefighters who watch porn for four, four day shifts in a row, but no - one begrudges them that, because eventually, there will be a fire!

As for sending social misfits to the Airborne - I joined long after the Airborne was gone, but I've met alot more losers in uniform who trash the airborne, than people who were actually IN it. I suppose it's easy to critisize if you could never hack the entrance requirements, and had to watch all of those fit, well trained and disciplined misfits collecting jump pay while you pounded track in Winterpeg...


----------



## 1feral1

Brygun said:
			
		

> 1. Even if they do not get involved with immediate combat they establish a deterrent and the seriousness of our nations commitment to the situation. This can limit or deter the need for actual violence.
> 
> 2. Is there a transport helicopter that can achieve a trans-atlantic/trans-pacific flight? Im not confident there is one (maybe with frequent in flight refuelling but it would be an exhausting ride).
> 
> 3. Depending on the range of the helicopters and support of island nations they could also reach Australia and the numerous pacific islands. There is a major political hurdle to this approach in resolving over flight permission. A second helicopter transoprt/support force might remain in Canada for training and to deploy across the North and South America continents.
> 
> 4. I do feel we need to encourage positive qualities associated with paratroopers and a force that to go overseas is very much required for our foreign policies. A large paradrop though is beyond our $$$ so other choices need to be considered. An overseas helicopter transport force is one way. It would certainly be faster than using a ship for initial insertion of materials



Firstly, what does your post have to do with the CAR? If you have suceeded in one thing, and thats hijacking a perfectly good thread. You have also suceeded in having others closed because of your hollow posts.

Now a brief response to your post.

PARA 1. Actual violence? Thats a new one. This simply leaves me speeceless!

PARA 2. Trans-Atlanitc and trans-Pacific, ya sure at 140 Knts/PH, in a large 'fleet' of helos, supported for refuling by how many a/c? Pure fantasy, might make good game for some who knows nothing about the real world though.

PARA 3. BTW, Australia is a 9 hour flight from Hawaii alone (and thats at 1000 kph). How long is that at a helo's cruising speed? You're the expert, you tell us. I don't know what you are reading or what you are smoking, but you are fast becoming a serial pest on here, and obviously have no idea what you are indeed talking about. The   'we can wait for them at the airport bit' is the straw that broke the camel's back for me! Your failure to take heed on a moderators advice is beginning to prove that possibly you have a hidden agenda to harass, hijack and attempt to try to discretly wreck havoc on here. Today your actions have been reported to the moderators for their action. You had been warned in the past, not only by the moderator, but by other members (including myself) and your failure to comply shows nothing but true arrogant contempt not only for the moderator, but also for this site, and its members in good standing. 

PARA 4. Well, I am not even going to comment on this, but I will say the ongoing continual posting by this person (who has already been warned) is nothing but a waste of band width, and I hope someone shuts him down soon.

Being honest, I am embarrassed that others from around the world (and first time visitors) will read such CRAP on here, and overall making us all look like idiots. First impressions count, and its our integrity and credibility that cop a hiding. So, to those foreigners, first timers, and other guests who are reading any posts by 'brygun', please take them for what they are worth, absolutly NOTHING.   

This poster refuses to use his 'optional' profile, and refuses to even tell us his qualifications and his experience. Its obvious he has no military experience whatsoever is is most likely a role playing adolecent child with little more than computer games as his information source. 

Regards,

Wes


EDITed for spelling and english


----------



## paracowboy

oh, can't believe I forgot Haiti! While it wasn't a jump, the mere threat of the entire 82nd Airborne Division being Airborne and inbound was enough to cause the belligerents to see things in a new light.


----------



## Britney Spears

Speaking as another "empty profile" poster, I should point out that Brygun has indicated in other threads that he is currently in the recruiting proccess and has no military experience.  A quick click on "last posts by this user" will reveal this.  

And here ends the hijack.


----------



## 1feral1

Even though you have no profile, your entegrity of almost 1000 posts speaks for itself mate. As does the quality of brygun's posts but in the opposite direction. 

He was 'challenged' and openly refused to give us any info to back up his posts. What does he have to hide, and yes I read that he could not even do one pull-up, but that is now, as he might have had previous expereince somehow elsewhere, but with what I have read, this is HIGHLY unlikely, infact extremely hightly unlikely. The more he posts the more he sinks deeper into a pile of his own crap.

Give him time, as he has already given himself enough rope.

Cheers,

Wes


----------



## Infanteer

No worries, Brygun will get some "receive" time on these means - I think his heart's in the right place, he just can't figure out that this isn't some wargamer forum; so we had to help him the hard way.

Anyways, back to your regularly scheduled programming.


----------



## paracowboy

*and* I forgot the "Exercise" Jump into Honduras along the Nicaruagua border in '88. With full battle rattle, live ammo, and really bad attitudes. Funny how the Nics settled right down. Again, no actual combat, but the message was certainly received.


----------



## Jungle

Here's a link to all the Airborne ops in history: http://www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/paratrooper.htm
The first half is mostly about US ops, but the second half is about Int'l Airborne ops. There have been more of them than we suspect, by more countries than we expect...
There will always be a debate around Parachute Troops, but they are an essential component of modern Armies, no matter what any of you think.
It takes courage (not to be confused with Bravery) to exit an aircraft from a thousand feet, with full combat gear, in the middle of the night, jumping into a place you've never been to... a lot of people lack that courage, and most of the opponents of Parachute / Airborne Troops come from them.
Good reading !!!


----------



## claybot

Well lets address these points in the order you present them.

GO!!!
_The Airborne was never a specialist unit - it maintained capabilities (airmobile, amphibious) that the "working"    Bns did not, at least in a meaningful context. So maybe it was a specialist unit - in everything.

Having a unit on standby is not a waste of time or money, any more than the firefighters who watch porn for four, four day shifts in a row, but no - one begrudges them that, because eventually, there will be a fire!

As for sending social misfits to the Airborne - I joined long after the Airborne was gone, but I've met alot more losers in uniform who trash the airborne, than people who were actually IN it. I suppose it's easy to critisize if you could never hack the entrance requirements, and had to watch all of those fit, well trained and disciplined misfits collecting jump pay while you pounded track in Winterpeg..._

1st paragraph -- Airborne was never a specialist unit it maintained capabilities that the working Bn's did not ..... 
I guess those company level Airmobile ops I went on in RV or in (get your helmet on) Germany in Blackhawks never really happened as for those amphibious ops That the 3 PPCLI (Work Point Barracks) and 2 RCR (Gagetown) have done never really happened either. I would think that only having one unit with a jump capability makes that unit a specialist unit.

2nd paragraph -- As per the last post having a unit sit on their rucksacks waiting for a mission the government will never authorize is a waste of money

3rd paragraph -- Yes well trained soldiers joined the Airborne alot of my friends who I joined up with were in the Airborne, but the fact is that the battalions used the Airborne as well as other trades as a dumping ground for undersiables within in their unit. Unlike you I was in the military when the Airborne was around and I've seen this happen. Being critical of the airborne and being critical of the Airborne uses and capability are two different things.

GO!!! If you had joined long after the airborne was gone how could you possibly discuss or even know what the Airborne was and what there capabilities were. I may have not been in the Airborne but I was in the Army doing tours while the Airborne waited and waited to go one. 
And for the jump pay .... The Real Airborne jumped from airplanes to earn their jump pay.... not helicopters.........

This thread is about the usefullness of the CAPABILITY not the soldier perhaps if you read the title of the thread you would understand.

But whats the point I'm bringing up points that were before your time, I was in the Army, you were in high school.


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting aside about airborne troops:

During the battle for Dien Bien Phu, the French Union forces suffered high casualties among the specialist and support trades. The beseiged garrison desparately required replacement personnel, but the airstrip had been closed early in the battle and air landing troops was not an option. The French command in Hanoi wanted the replacement troops (volunteers all) to undergo a complete parachute training cycle before they could be deployed to the fortress, but with time being against them, this idea was dropped. (sorry)

The specialists were dropped into Dien Bien Phu without "airborne" training and only rudimentary parachute instruction, yet they arrived and apparently only suffered about 5% casualties due to landing accidents and other parachute related hazards; fairly typical numbers even for French paratroopers of the era. (This is particularly amazing since this was a combat drop into a very hot LZ).

You can read this in more detail in Bernard Fall's book "Hell in a very small place; the battle of Dien Bien Phu"


----------



## Jungle

claybot said:
			
		

> And for the jump pay .... The Real Airborne jumped from airplanes to earn their jump pay.... not helicopters.........


Yeah... ignorance talking again... I belong to a Para Coy, and just this week, the Troops have conducted the following drops from C-130s:
one day, no eqpt, double-door jump
one night, full eqpt, double door jump
one day, no eqpt, ramp jump (after the drop of a heavy eqpt platform)
one day, full eqpt, double door jump
one day, no eqpt, ramp jump (with civilians as observers)
That's 5 jumps in 5 days... not all weeks are like that, but we get a fair number of C-130 jumps. We have C-130s lined up for Oct and Nov as well. CH-146 jumps are useful to keep Parachute skills honed.
Claybot, re-read my previous post in this thread, you will likely recognize yourself in the last part  :
The biggest problem we have in our Army is jealousy... It is one of the major obstacles preventing us from moving forward on a lot of projects.


----------



## baboon6

Jungle, have you guys ever done an NBC jump? I was reading something recently about the British 1 Para doing one in Kuwait just before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Apparently it was so hot guys were almost passing out on the aircraft...


----------



## Jungle

No, never done one; but it must be very hard on the Troops. I wonder how the mask does during the exit...


----------



## Kirkhill

a_majoor brings up an interesting point: the difference between using the parachute as a means of transportation versus training troops to operate in places that parachutes can take them.

Virtually anybody can be trained to fall out aeroplanes and land safely most of the time (assuming good packers and a clear LZ).   Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians are taught this capability every weekend in industrialized countries.   I know it can be done.    One weekend at Claresholm Alberta, about 3 hours of ground instruction and by the end of the weekend I had my first two jumps in.

Is that the same as jumping into a hole in the map where you don't know if you're going to be shot on the way down? No
Is that the same as jumping with an additional 150 to 200 lbs of kit? No, but is it always necessary to attach that much kit to the parachutist? Especially if the LZ is known to be secure.

If, for example, you wanted to build up a force in an otherwise secure area then teaching soldiers to fall out of planes should not be that difficult.

Suppose we consider a Canadian Example.   A Northern Example.      Any foreign small unit incursion (humour me ) is likely to be miles from any place.    Response options could be drop on the enemy by parachute (dangerous), drop by helicopter (noisy and more dangerous?), drop away from the en posn and walk in dragging your pulk behind you (less noisy, less dangerous?, slow, poor support), drive gear by M113/Bv206.....(no preferences here just any suitable vehicle - all of which have to come from somewhere, which takes time) or drop troops away from en posn (50 -100km) along with LAPES'd vehicles and then proceed in a conventional advance to contact.

Parachutes open up the whole of Canada to exploitation.   This is the reason that cadres of Smoke Jumpers were employed to fight fires (apparently there currently only exists one in Canada in the North Peace district of BC).

Airborne training, despite Field Marshal Montgomery's observation, seems less about getting out the door than dealing with what is likely to be encountered on the ground in an unknown and unsupported environment.

Parachute training, on the other hand is just about getting out the door - much like teaching a kid to get on those vicious looking machines in the mall, the ones with all the teeth that move really fast through impossibly high holes in the ground? You know.   Escalators.      If you have forgotten just watch a mother or father try to convince a balky toddler to get on an escalator the next time you are in a mall.   Often the first few endeavours involve dragging them on......problem two is to convince them to stop playing on the things once they have figured out they aren't dead ;D

Helicopters are slow and noisy and expensive.   Aircraft are fast and less noisy and in some ways less expensive (payload hours and miles).   Aircraft can drop vehicles and supplies virtually anywhere.   Helicopters can as well but they are more limited in carrying capacity, take longer to get where they are going and advertise their presence.    The only issue is that of getting people on the ground and I believe that that is more of a psychological barrier that can be overcome than anything else.   I don't think there is much difference in training someone to step out the door and to trust in a parachute and training that same individual to step off a tower, or the door of a helicopter, and to trust in the rope down which the are required to rappel.

A parachutist is not the same as an Airborne Commando.


Edit:  By the way helicopters are absolutely necessary - as recovery vehicles more than delivery vehicles.  While parachutes and planes can deliver anything anywhere, including tree tops and swamps, the helicopter is the only anti-gravity device we have to be able to pull people and stuff OUT of anywhere, including tree tops and swamps.


----------



## Jungle

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> A parachutist is not the same as an Airborne Commando.


... and that is the difference between red wings and white ones !!!  
Even though the Para Coys, like the LIBs they are part of, are not "doctrinal" yet, we work very hard to maintain some of the skills inherent to "Commando" type Troops; not easy in today's context, but manageable.


----------



## KevinB

Dont mistake civy jumps for MIL.

 A civ plane with 3-6 pax. is doing about 90kps when the skydivers exit.  The chute opens slowly and has both forward speed and turning ability - plus a GREAT deal less of vertical speed.

 Mil jumping is all speed and violence - the Herc is MOVING, the sky in much more crowded and unlike a civy chute all you can do (CT-2 exempted) is make a vain attempt at slipping away from anything you dont want to run into.  Add in pers kit, weapon etc.  and the fact that the terrain is not always ideal - and you have a receipe that demands more than a 3 hour ground school.  Plus 1000-1200 AGL is a wee bit lower than 3500 which most civy jumps do as a MIN.  Partial failure in a civy chute and you have a bit of time to assess pump your toggles and decide if you want to cut away - Exiting a Herc and you get a bad canopy - you had best immediately be doing your IA's for either complete or partial malfunction...

 I did a civy jump last month and only had a few open cells -- In theory you should cut away, but I knew that I had a great deal of time - so I pumped and the chute opened - If I ever waited on a Mil jump they'd be naming a DZ... (if I was lucky)


----------



## Kirkhill

Definitely NOT confusing civvy and MIL jumps Kevin.   I understand your point fully. That is why I differentiated between parachuting in a secure environment as a means of transportation and parachuting in a contested environment as part of an assault.   

The point I was trying to make I think, is that not all parachute deployments have to be assaults.   They can just be transport, as was effectively the case for the US Brigade that parachuted into secured airfields in Northern Iraq.  It was probably cheaper on gas than landing the aircraft.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The point I was trying to make I think, is that not all parachute deployments have to be assaults.   They can just be transport, as was effectively the case for the US Brigade that parachuted into secured airfields in Northern Iraq.   It was probably cheaper on gas than landing the aircraft.



Roger that - BUT they have to have the ability to be assaults.  Kinda shitty is you plan on an unopposed landing and have an admin jump onto a held airfield.


----------



## Kirkhill

Fair Enuff.


----------



## paracowboy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> It was probably cheaper on gas than landing the aircraft.


and less stressful on the aircraft involved, I understand. (Air Force types feel free to correct me, but I was told that the stressful part of an aircraft's life is the landings and take offs.)

That being said, let's keep in mind that the 173rd jumping in to Northern Iraq were fully expecting it to be a hot DZ. They jumped in expecting to be under contact while under canopy. Fortunately, the Kurds on the ground were not only friendly, but competent.


----------



## McG

claybot said:
			
		

> the remaining 6 Infantry Battalions will rotate through mission after mission with very little breaks, doing all the work. Sending their social misfits to this new unit trying to keep the best soldiers for themselves.
> 
> History repeats itself........


Sending "problem children" to the airborne was a fault of the system & not an insperable negative of paratroops.   It was a fixable problem, and an avoidable problem if we start new.   David Bercuson addressed this in his book "Significant Incident."


----------



## Kirkhill

Fair comment paracowboy.

Sometimes (???) I let myself get carried away.   For the 173rd it was an unknown until the hit the ground and found nobody shooting at them.


----------



## Jungle

In any situation, whether it is an amphibious landing or a Para drop, can you afford to be unprepared for things to turn ugly ??


----------



## Kirkhill

Pretty much the difference between those that are first on the ground and follow on forces isn't it?  Those that are tasked with securing the LZ or Beachead and those that are just supposed to pass through on their way to conduct an operation elsewhere.

The farther from the AOR that the LZ is the less risk to the landing, but increased risk to the overall operation.  Both approaches (remote LZ and landing on the objective) have succeeded and failed in the past.


----------



## Old Sweat

Kirkhill,

I don't think you are suggesting that follow-on forces shouldn't be prepared to fight immediately upon their arrival, are you?


----------



## Kirkhill

No.  I'm not.

But isn't there a difference between entering an environment that already has a friendly presence securing the locale than entering a completely unsecured environment?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> No.   I'm not.
> 
> But isn't there a difference between entering an environment that already has a friendly presence securing the locale than entering a completely unsecured environment?


The first foot on the ground may not have been successful in securing the landing for the follow-on.


----------



## Kirkhill

I guess what I am asking is: Would it be necessary for all forces to deploy like the first guys in, ie carrying full marching order and supplies for 72 hours attached to each individual trooper?  Or might it not be possible for the Follow-On Forces to jump in fighting order with rucks and supplies dropped on pallets under the auspices of the CQ, as an example?


----------



## paracowboy

it's possible, but not necessarily prudent. If the DZ/LZ/Beachead isn't secured, then you may be dropping a re-sup for the bad guys. I'd suggest that every troop should have his 24/48/72 hrs rats etc on his person, and if the ground is secured, then have a re-sup brought in. This way, if he has to fight, dig in, run, then he's good for X amount of time.
I guess I'm saying: "plan for the worst".


----------



## KevinB

You can still jump troops combat loaded with pallets in the Herc - best bet any combat terrain jump is full combat gear - any extra kit can be palletized.  Troops exit then the cargo can get dumped (hint clear the DZ quick... -or "is that a 5 ton troops those yanks just dumped on us... - fuck run")

 I dont think ANYONE would willingly jump into foreign territory w/o his ruck, unless its someone in civies doing SOE/OSS type stuff.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ok.  Lets try it from another angle.

Is it feasible to train 9 battalions of infanteers to become parchutists as well, if not necessarily "commandos"(defined however you will)?


----------



## Kat Stevens

Why not just go all out and make basic para a part of 031 QL3, or whatever we call it this week?  Oops, I already know the answer...$$$$$

Kat


----------



## KevinB

Yes - as long as you accept then jumping from Cassa's   

 Realistically the Course is 10days training - plus J stage - and the LIB's have PI's and the appropriate facilties - Mock Towers, Racks, Landing Swings and Aircraft mockups to do them on site.

 Given enough PI's you could run two courses side by side with 40ish troops / serial.

So within a few months you could get it done. 


HOWEVER - you then need the infrastructure to maintain the capability - extra Riggers, drying towers (or whatever those damn thigns they hang the chutes in are), and AIRCRAFT to do real training (and that would be Herc's or god willing C17's) 

*I've never jumped CASSA, but I understand its not a tactical aircraft nor can it dispatch a lot of troops quick.


----------



## Kat Stevens

Hell, even take em all up and chuck em out of a chopper every six months.  Or failing that a kind of "mini para" familiarization... launch all the boots out of the tower a few dozen times....  General Urquhart jumped into Arnhem with exactly zero jumps, if I remember correctly   ;D

Kat


----------



## KevinB

FWIW - IMHO the Tower does zero once your already qualified.

 I managed to go 8 years between jumps once and was not worry about such things (or required to do one) as a tower refresher. Flight - Check, Landings - Check, AC - Check - GTG Jumper...

 Chopper jumps are good for Bare Ass fun - but rather unrealistic for much other than practise watching the ground come up at you.  I mean - IF you have a chopper - land in it   it nicer landing with a ruck in a helo. 

I'd have CABC (whoops) I mean CPC as the centre for excellence in Airborne Para Operations - Running AMO, JM, PI, MFP and MFPI - then farming Basic Para out to the Bde's


----------



## Kirkhill

Stop teasing Kevin --- Cassa indeed.

How about the "Baby Herc" the C27J?  That looks like a stand up exit ~40 Jumpers? 

And the C17 for jumping?  Kind of overkill isn't it?  I thought they could only carry about as many jumpers as a stretch Herc, about 90 jumpers - maybe 120.

C17 excells on Kit more than bodies. The C130 and even the C27 seem to be a much more cost effective way of keeping jumpers current.  Keep the C17s for hauling vehicles and those jumpers that you can put in the fuselage seats.

Cheers anyway


----------



## BITTER PPLCI CPL

I just checked the C-17 can carry 102 para's and the C130J-30 (stretched) can carry 92, that's not much of a difference. Maybe we should look at the C130J-30 as a replacement?


----------



## KevinB

Yes but in a C17 you can have a large amount of palets (inc vehicles) that you can dump out on the DZ after the troops have jumped.  

Since out Dinosaur fleet - whoops I meant Herc fleet -s archaic they need to be replaced - get the J-30 and be done with.

 The C27 fufills no role for me - it might be a decent Buffalo replacement but I cant see how to employ it outside dropping small numbers of SF troops.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks BPC:

So - C17,            102 paras
      C130J-30 ,      92 paras
      C130E/H/J      64 paras
      C27J              34 paras (US) - 46 paras (Euro)

Kevin: 

The first link below is to an article in the National Defense Magazine from the US about replacing the US Army's C23 Sherpa - a small aircraft that replaced the Buffalos and Caribous in their service.  The article describes it as the most utilized aircraft in Iraq, even moreso (on a per aircraft basis) than the Herc.  As far as I can gather it is like an airborne 5 tonne truck delivering everything everywhere. The Casa 295 and the C27 are both competing to replace it.  The other link is to the FWSAR thread on this board.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Sep/Battle_Heats.htm
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23889.165.html

I guess where my concern lies is in the flow of troops and materiel to the field.  Large aircraft carry large loads but cost a lot to run.  Small aircraft carry small loads but cost less to run.

I am going to stipulate that we have need for large aircraft, in particular C-17s, but unlike some I don't see them as particularly useful for international operations.  The C17 actually has quite short legs when maximally loaded meaning it has to land and take off 2 or 3 three times to get half way round the globe.  Their expense means that we are unlikely to get a large number for the CF.  By contrast a small number could be well utilized domestically making relatively short hops of 1-4 hours moving outsize cargo to any of a few hundred suitable airfields within Canada.    Internationally it seems to me that the CDS's BHS (Big Honking Ship) and some medium lift helos make more sense.

Putting the movement of outsize cargo aside, and looking at the lifting of troops and supplies, after the initial lift of bodies and kit:  How much materiel must be constantly lifted to support a unit in the field?  And how dispersed is the unit?

I take your point on the C130J-30 for the initial delivery.  But is it necessary for sustaining the force in the field, especially if the force is dispersed with deliveries being made to the dispersed locales?  Also, for those periods when operations are not being conducted what other uses can the aircraft be put?  Which is the lower cost training vehicle so as to allow more troopers to be kept current?  A C17 carrying 102 troops, even a C130J-30 carrying 92 troops or something smaller that can carry only 30 to 50 troops?  

The advantage of the C23/C27/C295 type aircraft is that they are (generally speaking) more useful in more situations.  They can conduct SAR searches relatively cheaply, conduct training drops, carry supplies both administratively and operationally, and contribute to foreign operations.  Larger aircraft are less flexible.  In the C17 case that is obvious but the capability they supply can't be matched by other options.  In the case of th C130 family vs the smaller aircraft the differences still exist but decrease.

I guess it comes down to this: Do we buy a semi to deliver the groceries on a preplanned route once every two weeks, 2 HLVWs to deliver them every week or 8 MLVWS that can deliver them on demand?  Keeping in mind that the semi, like the C17, needs asphalt to get the goods to you.  That means that, assuming a suitable airstrips are available near the dispersed locales that the C17, and even the C130s  will have to make a lot of expensive landings and take-offs.  Something like the Sherpa, or the C27, with short, rough strip capability can deliver closer to more locales more frequently.

Of course the other option might be for the C17 just to fly overhead once every week or so and throw the supplies out the back.

My own aircraft collection might be something along the lines of 3 to 4 C17s (200 MUSD each - Domestic outsize deliveries and possibly international deliveries) with 20 to 30 C27s (25 MUSD each for SAR, Transport, Training, Operational Resupply, Operational SOF Support) and if money permits 6 to 8 C130J-30s (50 MUSD each - Surge deployments and about 80% commonality in support with the C27J).

But this is wandering out of lane and probably should be continued under the FWSAR thread, the Tactical Airlift thread, or the Strategic Airlift threads.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/22920.0.html
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27489.0.html

Getting back in lane, assuming sufficient assets, and looking at what you and paracowboy have written I gather that you both consider it do-able to train all infanteers to jump.  As to keeping troops current,  this doesn't need to be an army-wide regular occurence?  1-3 units, with supporting arms, could be kept current and the other units, brought up to speed readily with a short refresher course?

Again, my interest is not so much in seeing mass "coup de main" assault drops, as just getting large numbers of troops into inaccessible areas before the other guy gets there.  Eg putting a body of troops on an uninhabited rock that can't be reached by other means in order to assert sovereignty.  Or alternately moving troops into a secure FUP where they can take their time marrying up with their gear and conduct a conventional overland operation.  Both scenarios seem suitable for Canadian domestic operations where we are unlikely to encounter large enemy forces and where we are likely to have dominance in our own skies and choice of a wide variety of locations from which to mount operations, but not many of which are likely to be well serviced.

Maybe an example - somebody has secured Resolute and established a presence there (reason unkown) - govt desires the presence to be cleared out.   Option A - drop on Resolute.  Option B - drop 200 miles away from Resolute with Bv206s etc and drive to Resolute for a conventional attack.

Anyway....curiosity.

Cheers.


----------



## KevinB

Well for the C17 (kevin dreaming about real operations again) we coudl use it to jump and seize and airfield and land LAV or Gwagons for force protection /mobility usage - the nice thing about the C17 is it is a rough field craft as well.

 Plus the C17 can bring choppers.

Like I said from my end I did not see the use for the C27 - thank you for illustrating one.  I found one more - if your dropping a few Recce dets into an area you can deploy them in that rather than waste a Herc.

*I am NOT advocating C17's just for jumping - I'm advocating them for getting supplies and kit into theatre quick.  3 Fuel stops won't add a lot of time. 
 If you look at the kit a Pl has these days it could fill a Herc with justs its stores - If you had a Hummer type vehicle (or two) as a "PQ" you could add real legs and some teeth to your light forces - plus ATV's etc.

Ideally costing of AC would not play a part - just the bottom of line of sustainability and force protection. --- but...


----------



## Kirkhill

Aye...but.

I'm sure Hannibal was plunking for more elephants from Treasury when he crossed the Alps to get at the Romans.


----------



## paracowboy

what Kevin said.
Or as paracowboy says: "Big plane good! Old plane bad. Much big plane good. Much big plane and much small plane better. Now hungry."


----------



## Kirkhill

FEED COOOOOKIE.


----------



## Infanteer

Doesn't the C17 have air-to-air refuelling capability?


----------



## Kirkhill

They can do Infanteer.

I don't know if they all do.  But as I understand it fuelling a CF-18, or even a squadron of CF-18s, in flight is a different proposition than fuelling a C-17.  The amount of fuel that needs to be transferred in a short time seems to require not just a larger tank but also bigger pumps, different connection and different lines, all probably acting under higher pressures.  I understand that that is why the US Air Force doesn't use the hose system for refuelling its large aircraft.  Instead of the Hose and Reel used on the KC-130 and our CC-150s they use that flying boom on the larger KC-10.  

If we were to get C-17s that could deploy internationally without allied help then we might have to look at acquiring an even larger number of suitable tankers to get them there.

At least as I understand it.


----------



## Infanteer

Lilypads.  Let's not be concerned about something making one big hop from Canada to Durkadurkastan - can we not re-establish a presence overseas (as we are doing with Mirage) and have "lilypads" in places like Darwin or Diego Garcia?


----------



## Kirkhill

Lilypads are a better idearrr.  How about lilypads with a floating warehouse that can be moved from pad to pad as the geopolitics change?  Prepositioning instead of Amphibious Assault?

The shorter the range involved the fewer, and smaller, the craft needed.    Multiple runs per day instead of days per run.

Always assuming that the lilypads don't move of course.


----------



## paracowboy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Lilypads are a better idearrr.  How about lilypads with a floating warehouse that can be moved from pad to pad as the geopolitics change?  Prepositioning instead of Amphibious Assault?
> 
> The shorter the range involved the fewer, and smaller, the craft needed. Multiple runs per day instead of days per run.
> 
> Always assuming that the lilypads don't move of course.


I like where this is going. And even when they do, there's always somebody willing to screw over their neighbours for either money or politics. See Uzbekistan and neighbours.


----------



## Kirkhill

The world is full of "small", "poor" countries that would be likely willing to host a base - longterm or short-term.   A few million dollars, a new dock and airfield, instant ally.   It is then possible to claim "international support" for the enterprise ..... and the world is a happy place ;D

Works for everyone else.   Why not Canada?   Defender of international ideals.

Cheers

Edit: Must seek treatment for that "facetious" gene.  It keeps getting in the way of good ideas.

Realistically we could go into the business of creating our own "lilypads".  We probably should and could if we are truly perceived as "honest-brokers", "impartial" "non-colonials".  For example a base on the Comoros, the world's poorest country by some measures off the east coast of Africa, would make a great launching pad for humanitarian and "peace-support" missions in the area.  A few thousand miles closer than Diego.

On the other hand we could use existing lilypads, those of our allies, like Diego, or Dhekelia in Cyprus or Singapore or Darwin etc.... but that would require the government to declare a position and enter into meaningful alliances.


----------



## Jungle

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> On the other hand we could use existing lilypads, those of our allies, like Diego, or* Dhekelia in Cyprus * or Singapore or Darwin etc.... but that would require the government to declare a position and enter into meaningful alliances.


Not to be picky, but Dhekelia is an Army base. The RAF installations, and airbase, are in Akrotiri. IIRC, Dhekelia is East of Larnaca, while Akrotiri is West of Limassol...


----------



## Kirkhill

Shows what happens when you try to get too clever. :-[

Thanks for picking me up on that Jungle.


----------



## TCBF

"Doesn't the C17 have air-to-air refuelling capability?"

Yep.  That's how my Coyote and I got from Ramstein to Kandahar in one hop.

Tom


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRTypen/FRC-17.htm
http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRTypen/FRF-18C.htm
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=109
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mrtt/

C17     102,000 - 138,000 litres     of fuel to be transferred
CF-18      6,000 -   10,000 litres 

KC-10 can transfer up to 160,000 litres of fuel minus own needs
A-310 MRTT (CC-150) can transfer up to 40,000 litres (carries up to 96,000 litres)


----------



## -rb

Thought i'd throw this one in here as it seems as good a place as any, more fuel to the fire ...U.S. and Afghan Forces conduct a succesful para drop in Kandahar, killing 13 and detaining dozens more...

*U.S. and Afghan Forces Kill 25 Suspected Taliban in Two Raids*
Nearly 50 alleged insurgents are detained. The assaults in two provinces on successive days follow an abducted politician's slaying.

By Paul Watson, Times Staff Writer


KABUL, Afghanistan â â€ U.S. and Afghan forces killed 25 suspected Taliban fighters and captured dozens more in operations in two southern provinces over two days, Afghan and U.S. officials said.

On Monday, U.S. and Afghan forces killed 12 suspected militants and detained nine others in a raid in Zabol province, the U.S. military said. Soldiers were brought by helicopter into a remote area where militants were believed to be gathering before launching attacks. No casualties were reported among the Afghan and U.S. forces.
     
The operation in Zabol followed a raid in neighboring Kandahar province in which U.S. and Afghan forces killed 13 suspected Taliban fighters, and captured dozens more, in a remote area where a political candidate was kidnapped and executed last week, a provincial official said.

U.S. and Afghan troops dropped by parachute from American aircraft in the operation, which began Sunday, Kandahar Gov. Asadullah Khalid said by telephone from Kandahar city, the provincial capital. None of the coalition troops was injured.

The assault targeted insurgents suspected of killing Khan Mohammed, a candidate for Kandahar's provincial council in the country's Sept. 18 election who was abducted Friday, the governor added. A district commissioner and three policemen were killed along with Mohammed. 

At least four other candidates have been killed in the weeks before the election for the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament and provincial councils. It is Afghanistan's first parliamentary election since U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban's hard-line Islamic regime in late 2001.

Backed by U.S. attack helicopters, the American and Afghan troops, and local police, landed Sunday in the Lal valley, about 50 miles northwest of Kandahar, the governor said. More than 40 suspected insurgents were detained. They are being interrogated, U.S. Col. Jim Yonts, spokesman for the coalition forces, told reporters in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

Khalid said some of them might be released soon, while the rest would be put on trial as Taliban militants.

"I think this was a group that was hiding and getting ready to conduct operations to bring chaos to the process of the elections in Afghanistan, so this [assault] will decrease the danger of the Taliban insurgency," the governor added.

Yonts denied there was any link between the offensive, which was still underway Monday, and Friday's kidnappings and executions.

"What you have here is when coalition forces are notified, through intelligence means, that there are enemy forces in an area, we will quickly and aggressively take the fight to them," Yonts said.

Taliban and allied guerrillas have killed at least 51 U.S. troops in Afghanistan this year, the heaviest combat losses for American forces since the war against the Taliban and its allies in the Al Qaeda terrorist network began in 2001. More than 1,000 Afghans, many of them civilian victims of insurgent attacks, have died.

But the international security force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country considers the militants' attack rate similar to that for the period before last year's presidential election, said Maj. Andrew Elmes, a British spokesman. 

Millions of Afghans defied Taliban threats and turned out to vote in an election won by President Hamid Karzai, a strong U.S. ally.

United Nations organizers say that with more than 5,800 candidates from 72 parties running in the upcoming election, their task is several times more complicated than last year's vote.

In other recent attacks in southern Afghanistan, insurgents killed five Afghan police officers in an ambush Sunday. The previous day, guerrillas killed three Afghan police officers guarding a supply convoy headed to a U.S. military base.

Despite daily attacks by guerrillas across large swaths of southern and eastern Afghanistan, Yonts said the U.S. military saw the attacks as local or regional operations without any national coordination. 

"In our assessment, it is not connected to any kind of a network," he said. "You will see an individual attack here, you may see an individual attack in this [other] province over here. But there is nothing that we see that fuses that together from any sort of an infrastructure, or coordinated program." 

The insurgents mainly operate in cells of one to five fighters, Yonts said.  

Seems they had the means to quickly and effectively deal with the threat. Good on em.


----------



## GO!!!

Coulda sworn that said "parachute" and "after a successful drop" - not bad for an outdated technology in the context of fighting an insurgency.... although I'm sure the naysayers will say it should have been done by helo.... :

AIRBORNE!!!!


----------



## Kirkhill

GO!!! said:
			
		

> AIRBORNE!!!!



Or in the words of my father's old mob (1 Para) "Wahoooooo Mahomet".  ;D


----------



## KevinB

Quick, a vital and relevant capability!  Lets dismantle it more...  :


----------



## Spr.Earl

Whoooo Mahomet!!
I will post that as a Question where and why does it come from?
I know.  


Para's are the cheapest and most effective light troops if used properly.
Enough said.

I had the honour of meeting the last Brit Para who jumped during the Suez Crises,he was a Taffy,Tiger Jones as he was known in 1 para,as I learnt later he was wounded in the leg while fighting through the cemetary while advancing from ther DZ.

Air Borne Troops(all trades) if used properly can be very effective. 

We must bring our Para's back.


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## baboon6

1 Para didn't jump at Suez, it was 3 Para.


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## Kirkhill

1,2 and 3 Battalions did combat jumps in Tunisia in 1942.
(The first jump was by 3 Bn under the command of Lt. Col Pine-Coffin ------  as soon as the paras landed the local Arabs were all over them helping them out of their chutes, chutes that ended up as underwear at a useful profit apparently)

As to Waho Mahomet, story I heard was that the paras were amused by the sight of an old Arab on the back of donkey, perhaps at the mounting base of Bone.  Apparently the donkey wasn't best pleased with the circumstances and took off across the airfield with old Arab on his back.  The last sight anybody had of the old fella was him disappearing into the sunset yelling Whoa Mahomet.  Presumably the name of the donkey.

"The Red Beret" tells another tale of Arabs calling across valleys and starting every call with Waho Mohamet.  I'll take the word of a 1 Para chap that served with guys from Tunisia, besides it makes a better story. ;D

Anyway, after that 1 Para adopted Waho Mahomet as both their jump cry and also their battle cry.  French Legionnaires serving alongside of them reported hearing them going into the assault yelling Waho Mahomet, no doubt causing the Germans some consternation.


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## claybot

Jungle

I should have gotten back to your points sooner but I got busy

_It takes courage (not to be confused with Bravery) to exit an aircraft from a thousand feet, with full combat gear, in the middle of the night, jumping into a place you've never been to... a lot of people lack that courage, and most of the opponents of Parachute / Airborne Troops come from them_

I would partially agree with you on as I have never had any desire to jump out of a aircraft with a full combat load. I've met a lot of courageous people in my life and a lot of them never jumped out of airplanes or had a desire to so. Basically you would probably have to drag me onto the aircraft hold me down until lift off then either kick or throw me out. But what has any of this got to do with the thread I started.

_Has the Light Infantry Battalion/Airborne proved its worth in the Canadian Army based on the above statement?
If so how and on what missions (list)? (World War 2 doesn't count)_

_This is what I meant by the question I asked.

After 9/11 the Light Infantry Battalions were on the chopping block and from what I recall 3rd VanDoo was already beginning to disband when OP APOLLO came around. Many believe that the mission should have gone to Mech Battalion such as 2 PPCLI as they were back from Bosnia and still had a lot of troops. Instead 3 PPCLI an understrength battalion was sent and had to be augmented by the entire C Company 2 PPCLI as well as pers from Sniper, Recce and other organizations.
This in turn resurrected the Light Infantry Battalion.
I view this mission a failure for the Light Infantry Concept as it proved that mech forces could do Light missions without a problem. If this mission were a true LIB mission then the extra company/manpower should have been drawn from one of the other two Light Infantry Battalions either RCR or VanDoo.
For OP ATHENA missions all the LIBs were using LAV and Iltis/G-Wagon. If LAV's were required then it is a Mech mission not a Light mission._

But this thread has drifted away from the entire focus. 

For your other point

_Yeah... ignorance talking again... I belong to a Para Coy, and just this week, the Troops have conducted the following drops from C-130s:
one day, no eqpt, double-door jump
one night, full eqpt, double door jump
one day, no eqpt, ramp jump (after the drop of a heavy eqpt platform)
one day, full eqpt, double door jump
one day, no eqpt, ramp jump (with civilians as observers)
That's 5 jumps in 5 days... not all weeks are like that, but we get a fair number of C-130 jumps. We have C-130s lined up for Oct and Nov as well. CH-146 jumps are useful to keep Parachute skills honed.
Claybot, re-read my previous post in this thread, you will likely recognize yourself in the last part   
The biggest problem we have in our Army is jealousy... It is one of the major obstacles preventing us from moving forward on a lot of projects._

You got me there after reading your profile who would no better about whats going on in Para company than someone who is serving in one. Obviously my information was incorrect and I apologize. 

But if you are getting into jealousy in the Army remember its a two way street. There are those of us who want to see the Jump cabability gone for good and those in the Jump companies who would like to see every one jump qualified. Both sides have good arguments for debate, which is kind of hard to tell on this forum as it seems there are more pro para people on this site than in the Army.

There are a lot of posts through out this site talking about successful jumps in the last few years like Afghanistan. But the US has the capability to support those troops once they hit the ground we do not.

We do not have the airlift to resupply or the use of supporting Attack Helicopters and Fast Air to aid any forces we drop in.

Are we going to allow our Para Companies to Jump into battle without support. Most Airborne forces are only good for 72 hours without resupply and in this day and age its more like 24 hours before they cease to exist as a fighting formation. Is this what the supporters of our Airborne forces want?

Are our jump companies willing to be an expendable force?

We as an Army do not have the MONEY to properly TRAIN, EQUIP and SUPPORT any Jump capability in a combat role. If we did then the Para Companies would be Para Battalions with dedicated aircraft that could drop in the battalion in one lift.

If we have to re-equip every LIB with LAV's to every time they go on a mission then they might as well train as a Mech Force.

Yes rambling on again.............


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## KevinB

> But if you are getting into jealousy in the Army remember its a two way street. There are those of us who want to see the Jump cabability gone for good and those in the Jump companies who would like to see every one jump qualified. Both sides have good arguments for debate, which is kind of hard to tell on this forum as it seems there are more pro para people on this site than in the Army.



 Please raise a good reason for not having everyone jump qualified?
Soldiers being fat lazy or scared dont count as one reason (let alone three) BTW.

I can raise a thousand more reasons to sink the LAV's off a Pier for an artifical reef.

 We would be best served by giving the Armour the LAV and letting them command them - and if necessary they be used to Taxi the Infantry.  The fact is you cannot be both a good infantryman and a good crewman - there is not enough time in the calendar - FULL STOP.



> We as an Army do not have the MONEY to properly TRAIN, EQUIP and SUPPORT any Jump capability in a combat role. If we did then the Para Companies would be Para Battalions with dedicated aircraft that could drop in the battalion in one lift.


 FACT: We cant properly do that with a LAV Mech Battalion either - maybe we should disband the Army - its costs to much to do right... :


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## claybot

Training all the infantry for a function that will never be used is a waste of money and training. We do not have the capability to jump a sizeable fighting force and support them in combat, that is a fact of life in the Canadian army unless you count flying there and walking off the aircraft as a successful jump. 

Yes I know the US drops in battalions at a time, but they are able to support them once they are on the ground with Fast Air and Attack Helicopters plus an unbelievable amount of Artillery. Putting a C9 on a Griffon does not make it an Attack Helicopter

We would get a better _bang for our buck _ to have all our Infantry trained in Airmobile Ops/dismounted  using the LAV's as a delivery system which is entirely feasible in todays Army. You could incorporate all the physical fitness standards from the para/jump companies.

As for giving the LAVs to the Armour I fully support that idea, as I have stated in other threads.

If the forces ever got around to implementing a good physical fitness program that was followed properly by the leadership the Fat,Lazy part could be solved.

As for scared troops we all have our fears if you have none then you are either fooling yourself or haven't experienced much as a soldier I know what mine are and how to deal with them! Do you know what yours are?


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## Jungle

claybot said:
			
		

> After 9/11 the Light Infantry Battalions were on the chopping block and from what I recall 3rd VanDoo was already beginning to disband when OP APOLLO came around. Many believe that the mission should have gone to Mech Battalion such as 2 PPCLI as they were back from Bosnia and still had a lot of troops. Instead 3 PPCLI an understrength battalion was sent and had to be augmented by the entire C Company 2 PPCLI as well as pers from Sniper, Recce and other organizations.
> This in turn resurrected the Light Infantry Battalion.
> I view this mission a failure for the Light Infantry Concept as it proved that mech forces could do Light missions without a problem. If this mission were a true LIB mission then the extra company/manpower should have been drawn from one of the other two Light Infantry Battalions either RCR or VanDoo.
> For OP ATHENA missions all the LIBs were using LAV and Iltis/G-Wagon. If LAV's were required then it is a Mech mission not a Light mission.[/i]


You don't seem to understand the concept of modern (CDN) deployments: the TFs will deploy with a combination of Light and LAV Coys to give the TF Comd flexibility. 



> But if you are getting into jealousy in the Army remember its a two way street. There are those of us who want to see the Jump cabability gone for good and those in the Jump companies who would like to see every one jump qualified. Both sides have good arguments for debate, which is kind of hard to tell on this forum as it seems there are more pro para people on this site than in the Army.


I never advocated the qualification of the whole Infantry Corps in Parachuting. I believe we need both Light/ Para and Mech forces.



> There are a lot of posts through out this site talking about successful jumps in the last few years like Afghanistan. But the US has the capability to support those troops once they hit the ground we do not.
> 
> We do not have the airlift to resupply or the use of supporting Attack Helicopters and Fast Air to aid any forces we drop in.


We do have the airlift capability for small-scale ops. One Para Coy-group could be dropped from 4 C-130s with enought supplies to last 72 hours. They could be resupplied after 48 hours by 2 C-130s, or extracted by 4 C-130s hours after the drop (As was done in Kandahar by a Coy of Rangers in Oct 2001)



> Are we going to allow our Para Companies to Jump into battle without support. Most Airborne forces are only good for 72 hours without resupply and in this day and age its more like 24 hours before they cease to exist as a fighting formation. Is this what the supporters of our Airborne forces want?
> Are our jump companies willing to be an expendable force?


I have not heard of any modern-day Airborne Force ceasing to exist after 24 hours... care to expand on this one ?? Any type of Force can cease to exist in extreme circumstances... so you support KevinBs proposal, to disband the whole Army, because some units may cease to exist as a result of combat ??



> We as an Army do not have the MONEY to properly TRAIN, EQUIP and SUPPORT any Jump capability in a combat role. If we did then the Para Companies would be Para Battalions with dedicated aircraft that could drop in the battalion in one lift.


That is the opinion of a Cpl; apparently some people in the C of C think otherwise; people who have been trained in Command and Staff procedures, and who have worked in multi-national HQs during ops. Are you saying that people like Gens Hillier, Leslie and McKenzie are out to lunch ?? That's a pretty bold statement...



> If we have to re-equip every LIB with LAV's to every time they go on a mission then they might as well train as a Mech Force.


Reread my first note in this post...



> Yes rambling on again.............


Yes, I noticed...  : 
But there is one thing you can do (or maybe should have done ??  ) Attend Leadership courses, make your way up the ranks and change things you are able to at every step... get to a position where you have influence and can make decisions. This way you'll have less time to ramble.
Trust me, it works...  8)


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## KevinB

Claybot,  I would hardly use Op Athena as an example of modern combat doctrine...


3VP deployed using US avation for Op Apollo,  would you suggest this was a BAD idea and we should not have deployed forces?


Jungle covered the more salient points about supporting oursevles.


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## claybot

Jungle

Yes I understand Modern Canadian Deployments But instead of deploying a mix of Light and Lav split it down the middle and deploy Infantry capable of both.

And where to you plan on getting the C130's once a mission has started the AirForce will be using those C130s for resupply not for Para drops. And assuming you can get them what are you going to do about Air defense. We lose a couple of planes half of your company is gone and there is no resupply. Comparing a para company in the CF to a Ranger Company backed up by the entire US Army is pointless.

I was talking about Airborne forces and existing after 24 hours. The modern army consumes a lot of ammunition which means a lot of weight to carry. Yes I know the Para soldier is conditioned for this but you can only carry so much equipment. After two or three engagements you will have exhausted all your ammunition. With out resupply you will cease to exist as a fighting force. As for this happening to a modern day Airborne force, how many times have Units jumped into battle and met stiff resistance that lasted longer than 24-72 hours none that I know of. But you may recall that during WW2 the Allies conducted a massive Airborne drop that ended in disaster as the follow on forces bumped into two panzer divisions and were unable to link up with the Airborne forces who had run out of supplies. Sure they lasted longer than 24 hours but the modern day Airborne consumes a lot more supplies than the ones from WW2.
Yes it was successful in D-Day but the Airborne were able to link up with the main force. Without that link up the Airborne cannot survive.

Yes that is my opinion, I'm allowed to have an opinion, And nowhere did I say anyone was out to lunch

As for this statement
_But there is one thing you can do (or maybe should have done ??  ) Attend Leadership courses, make your way up the ranks and change things you are able to at every step... get to a position where you have influence and can make decisions. This way you'll have less time to ramble._

You do not have to attend leadership courses or move up the ranks to learn about the Canadian Forces and how it works or to even change things. Thats a myth.

I don't recall seeing you at Strategic Planning Session 7 in Cornwall November 2003. I was there along with my Co-author as a special guest invited by the CLS at the time you may know him he is now the CDS. During the opening breifing I even questioned the CLS on the future of Canadian Missile Systems. 

If you have your own ideas then put them to paper and submit it for publishing if you want I can even send you the name of the editor who will take your article into consideration

Our detailed report was published in The CF and in newspapers across Canada and according to the officers I know, it is still referred to today, and the two of us did that as Corporals.

KevinB
Wouldn't your comment conflict with Jungle's Comment
Kevin B said
_I would hardly use Op Athena as an example of modern combat doctrine..._
Jungle said
_You don't seem to understand the concept of modern (CDN) deployments: the TFs will deploy with a combination of Light and LAV Coys to give the TF Comd flexibility. _

3VP used US Aviation... my point exactly US not Canadian thank you for making my point clearer. And if you recall that Aviation was Helicpoter which means airmobile not airborne.


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## George Wallace

claybot

Don't let your head get too swollen....I have read the "Cpl's Report" and am sure I kept a copy on file.   It is great that such a paper received such a reception throughout the CF.   It was another case of Jnr NCO's having their work published and taken seriously.   I too have submitted to the Armour Bulletin and received some praise for certain comments, but that is in the past.   When I read the "Cpls Report" there were many things that I found to be right out to lunch and surprised that two Cpls with some Int trg had made such mistakes.   Comments in reference to the Armour Corps, and such, by two PPCLI Cpls were so completely out of touch with the realities of the trade and role that I was truly pissed, but in the end I must admit someone listened to what was being presented and that proved that anyone could contribute.   Unfortunately, inexperience in certain areas and people following advice in those matters, can, and probably did, cause some harm.


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## KevinB

Claybot - Combat Doctrine - versus recent deployments - two different things.
 Secondly to get LAV's into theatre we needed foreign avation assets, I do not understand why you think that supporting an Airborne operations with avation assets are anything different that aviation assets for other operations...


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## Jungle

Claybot, face the facts honestly... the Army can hardly do anything on it's own these days. We rely on Allies for ALL deployments overseas. During the next decade, we will have to hitch rides on Allies planes, helos and ships to go anywhere... why is it so dramatic when it is done to support a Parachute operation ??
I believe you are viscerally anti-Airborne, and there is nothing we can say to convince you that there is a place for Parachute Troops in our Army. I don't know the reason for this opposition, but I can imagine a few...  
Anyway, I am done with you in this conversation.  8)


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## SeanNewman

To get back to the original point...

To be Light Infantry does not mean sans-vehicles;  It means you don't use your vehicles as part of the battle.  I can jump out of a Herc, be inserted by helicopter (or ML-icopter), patrol in a LUVW (G Wagon), etc.  Yes, we can walk from afar, too.

The LAV3 is a fantastic vehicle, but it is not the be-all-and-end-all answer to everything, nor is anything that flexible.  It's fast, has great protection, and massive firepower from 2km+.

HOWEVER...

What are you going to do when the enemy is in mountains?  In cities with tight streets?  In the woods?  
What are you going to do when the enemy is looking and listening for you?
What are you going to do when you're trying to calm a crowd without driving up in what a civie sees as a tank?

Light and mech forces both have their pros and cons.  The ideal thing would be to work together in support of eachother.  A LAV is an extra tool in the toolbox, and it sure is a good tool.  It's good for what it's made for, but battlecraft skills are bound to suffer.


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## McG

SeanNewman said:
			
		

> To be Light Infantry does not mean sans-vehicles;  It means you don't use your vehicles as part of the battle.


I like the official definition better:



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> According to the Light Forces Working Group light forces are principally foot borne forces optimized for military operations in complex environment, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform. [November 2004]


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## JackD

Hello and happy new year: I've been following this interesting thread and, never being para-qualified and being... must admit it - old and out of date perhaps my contribution  ain't worth a grain of salt but one thing that isn't mentioned in this thread is one of the reasons the Canadian Airborne Regiment came into existence - northern sovereignty (if i have my information correct)  - the Airborne Regiment was an organized task force that could be relatively rapidly transported into remote regions of Canada. This was practiced wasn't it? Now the necessity of this is remote - especially since the end of the Cold War, but the geo-political necessity of this role being  able to be fullfilled - is more necessary in view of the claims and border disputes that are occurring. So the need for a para-deployable organized task force is still there - isn't it - especially since many of the assets that ensure transportability in the north are being discarded - like the Twin Otters.

One question - or a start to a new thread; What should a light infantry or/and  para-force be equipped with in terms of transport (ATVs? light trucks - what type, what numbers - are these new geo-wagons air-droppable)?), weaponry (60 mm mortars - perhaps up to specialised 81 mm mortars? and what numbers?). Thank-you in advnce for your replies.


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## GO!!!

Jack,

Other than the para coys, I am unaware of any army unit able to be deployed to a remote part of northern Canada in a timely manner, with the exception of our very capable Rangers.

The transport question is a big one, and there are no quick answers. I would support heavy (6 wheel) ATVs and snowmobiles (enough for the whole TF) as an air droppable solution, but in reality, nearly every wheeled vehicle, and even some tracked ones, can be air dropped, it is just a question of having enough planes to get them there! Our neighbours to the south regularly jump bulldozers, various logistics vehicles, Humvees, artillery and mortars, so it is not impossible.

I am unaware of a G-Wagen being jumped in Canada yet, but seeing as it fits in the back of a CC-130, and is not overly heavy, I would say it is just a matter of time.


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## JackD

Thanks for your timely reply. It seems to me that the key to what ever shape the army will be, is what ever shape the transport arm of the airforce would be. Which I guess calls into question stategic planning within - I assume NDHQ - in other words is there any - has there been any? The loss of the Chinooks limited northern transportation. The fleet down-sizing and eventual loss of the Twin Otters  does the same. I used to work, after leaving the CAF, as a Forest and Geologist technologist and most areas of the north are accessable most of the time by bushplane. It seems to me that use of these means has never been practised by the armed forces (except the Rangers) in the 'modern" era (post 80's).Perhaps some imaginative individual can start considering  the use of bush planes and bush pilots on exercises in the north and perhaps sovereignity of our northern area can be enhanced by enrolling many of these fellows into air reserve units and subsidising their bush plane companies for time and expense - "Air-rangers?"?


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