# For the size of Canada, how large should our armed force be?



## ammo303 (20 Sep 2009)




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## Infanteer (20 Sep 2009)

The size of Canada is irrelevant - the size of our Forces should be dictated by what strategic ends we wish it to achieve.


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## observor 69 (20 Sep 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The size of Canada is irrelevant - the size of our Forces should be dictated by what strategic ends we wish it to achieve.



In a perfect world free of political influence.  ;D


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## gcclarke (20 Sep 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> In a perfect world free of political influence.  ;D



And we'd all have gold plated rifles that shoot rainbows! 

Actually, scratch that. In the perfect world, the size of the armed forces would actually be 0.


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## Yrys (20 Sep 2009)

gcclarke said:
			
		

> Actually, scratch that. In the perfect world, the size of the armed forces would actually be 0.




That could be a "1984" world...

Humans are not perfect, and won't ever be.

Thinking of a world without armies with humans, 
may means a world with strong/s government/s
who washout brains...


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## Edward Campbell (20 Sep 2009)

One can argue that there is an _appropriate_ "size" for a defence budget, in our imperfect world.

That size (expressed as a share of GDP) is based upon _ambitions_ and _realities_.

For Canada the reality is, about 1% of GDP - which buys just enough "defence" to allow us to maintain a semblance of sovereignty and independence. Anything much less and we will be ignored in e.g. world trade negotiations because _interconnectedness_ is real.

Canada, regularly, expresses _ambitions_ to be a "leader" - at least amongst the so-called "middle powers." A seriously ambitious country would spend more than 2% of GDP on defence. See here for a more detailed analysis.

Our GDP (2008) is about $1.3 *T*rillion. Our defence budget (2009/10) is about $18 *B*illion. We spend about 1.4% of GDP on defence. That's a bit better than minimally _realistic_ but no where near what's needed if, Big *IF*, we are serious about our oft expressed _ambitions_.

How "much" of what you get for _n_% of GDP is a whole different issue. But both, _resources_ and "what" or "how much" are, or should be, parts of a nation's _strategic calculus_.


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## Dennis Ruhl (20 Sep 2009)

If we looked around at likely threats it would be easy to conclude that we don't need much of a military.  Investing in anti-terrorist intelligence might be money better spent.  If our ships spend most of their time tied up in port, how many do we really need?  When is the last time we deployed much more than a squadron of fighters.  When is the last time we deployed more than a brigade of troops?  The answer to the last 2 questions is 64 years.

Subsequent to WWI and prior to the Cold War we kept 3 battalions of infantry and 2 cavalry/armoured regiments and 100 plus regiment militia that mobilized active service battalions as required.  I think that's a fine model for the army.  It worked from 1867 up to Korea and could still work.


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## aesop081 (20 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> I think that's a fine model for the army.  It worked from 1867 up to Korea and could still work.



As long as we revive the 19th of course.....


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## Neill McKay (20 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> If our ships spend most of their time tied up in port, how many do we really need?  When is the last time we deployed much more than a squadron of fighters.



Be careful how far you take that argument.  There's always a requirement for down-time.  Using ships as an example, they can't sail all the time.  Among other things they need time alongside for maintenance.

In any given fleet of ships there will be a fraction that are ready to go on several hours' notice, some that could be made ready in a matter of days or weeks, and some that would take months because bits of them have been torn apart to be worked on.

The crew needs time ashore too.  They have training to do, leave to take, and any number of other things going on.  Just as with the ship itself, only some of the crews in a given fleet will be worked up and ready to sail at any given time.


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## Colin Parkinson (20 Sep 2009)

The biggest our forces ever reached was approx. 1 million from a population of 11 million, quite impressive. I would say that our manning level needs to be at least twice the current rate and even that will be tight, actually 2.5 of our current size would allow us to maintain a expeditionary forces of the size of forces deployed to Afghanistan and maintain the other requirements the military has.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> If we looked around at likely threats it would be easy to conclude that we don't need much of a military.  Investing in anti-terrorist intelligence might be money better spent.  If our ships spend most of their time tied up in port, how many do we really need?  When is the last time we deployed much more than a squadron of fighters.  When is the last time we deployed more than a brigade of troops?  The answer to the last 2 questions is 64 years.
> 
> Subsequent to WWI and prior to the Cold War we kept 3 battalions of infantry and 2 cavalry/armoured regiments and 100 plus regiment militia that mobilized active service battalions as required.  I think that's a fine model for the army.  It worked from 1867 up to Korea and could still work.



If you really think the way we mobilized in 1939 and the way we cobbled together brigades for Korea and NATO _circa_ 1950 were examples of a "fine model" then I would hate to see what you consider not so fine.

Unless I have, totally and completely, missed your point, I think you are talking through a very large hat.


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## PPCLI Guy (20 Sep 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The size of Canada is irrelevant - the size of our Forces should be dictated by what strategic ends we wish it to achieve.



Hmm - it is also a function of the means available - and what other instruments of statecraft a country choses to have (or not have) and in what amounts.


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## Sonnyjim (20 Sep 2009)

I was always curious what Canada would do if we were to enter another full scale conflict. How would they mass recruit but still maintain the quality of training our soldiers are getting today and gear issue on a mass scale?


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## George Wallace (20 Sep 2009)

Without any significant "War Reserve", which happens to be the state that we are at right now, the conflict would be over before we would ever be able to mobilize.  Our Government would not be able to make up its mind quick enough.  Our Military would not have enough qualified pers, quarters, infrastructure, or supplies to Train the thousands required in a short timeframe.  Our Industry would likely be targeted before it was able to convert over to becoming a "war machine".  Our Communications would be the first targets, with hackers disrupting everything from Websites like this, to Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft applications, and other as of yet named systems.  

Our Government is incapable to react to any significant incident in a timely manner.  They literally need months of lead time, and I highly doubt any serious Threat would be so obliging.


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## SupersonicMax (20 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> When is the last time we deployed much more than a squadron of fighters.



Both Fighter Squadrons fly operational missions quite a bit in Canada.  Kosovo, 1999, 2 squadrons were deployed in Aviano, Italy.  Desert Storm, 1990, 2 squadrons were deployed.


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## Dennis Ruhl (20 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> If you really think the way we mobilized in 1939 and the way we cobbled together brigades for Korea and NATO _circa_ 1950 were examples of a "fine model" then I would hate to see what you consider not so fine.



To repeat, we have spent a trillion current dollars from 1953 to 1991 without a shot being fired in anger.  The trillion being $ 20 billion times 50 years, purely an estimate.  How prepared do we want to be and at what cost? While the first 2 battles of WWII were disasters, poor training was probably not the deciding factor.  2PPCLI, the first battalion in Korea performed very well probably because it had sufficient war veterans, especially among the officers and NCOs.

The deployment to Afghanistan proceeded slowly enough that 3 regular force battalions could have rotated through before the "cobbled together" units hit the field.


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## PuckChaser (20 Sep 2009)

The deployment to Afghanistan proceeded slowly? We were caught with our pants down trying to fight on a modern battlefield with limited modern equipment or a budget to acquire it. Our procurement process is so cumbersome that'd we'd have trouble equipping our entire current manning, let alone kitting out mass-recruits for a conventional conflict.

As you've said, we've spent a trillion current dollars... however I'd wager to say those veterans from Medak Pocket would argue about firing shots in anger. $1 trillion dollars bought us a global police force. To maintain a combat effective military, we need ships, less than 20 year old fighters, and armoured vehicles that were not designed to face off against the Red Menace.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> To repeat, we have spent a trillion current dollars from 1953 to 1991 without a shot being fired in anger.  The trillion being $ 20 billion times 50 years, purely an estimate.  How prepared do we want to be and at what cost? While the first 2 battles of WWII were disasters, poor training was probably not the deciding factor.  2PPCLI, the first battalion in Korea performed very well probably because it had sufficient war veterans, especially among the officers and NCOs.
> 
> The deployment to Afghanistan proceeded slowly enough that 3 regular force battalions could have rotated through before the "cobbled together" units hit the field.




There is a price to be paid for being a responsible member of the family of nations. There is a higher price to being a respectable one. The Trillion dollar WAG (Wild Assed Guesstimate) is just the price we paid for being respectable, until 1970, and then just barely responsible, until around 1995.

Technological changes developed in the 1930s and '40s hugely _inflated_ in the '60s, '70s and beyond and drove defence budgets, everywhere in the West, into crisis.

We, Canada, didn't wait for that inflation. We began to cut, deeply, in the '60s. We got rid of all the fat. Then, in the '70s, we got rid of a lot of the meat, muscle and bone, too.

I understand that you do not want to pay the price of responsibility or respectablity. That's your right as a Canadian. But you are wrong, just as Canadians were wrong in the 1930s and in 1949 and, again, in 1970. And the consequences of listening to people who think as you do is the same price we paid in 1939-45 and in Korea; and it is too high.


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## JAWS228 (20 Sep 2009)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Our Government is incapable to react to any significant incident in a timely manner



Sobering to anyone who does not possess knowledge of our military/defence.

Totally unsurprising for people who do.

Our armed forces will never be large enough to defend the whole country from a serious "threat", there's just too much space and too little resources.  Even if a small part of our country, IE the South West coast was attacked, we'd pretty much  be screwed if it was a real threat.


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## Dennis Ruhl (20 Sep 2009)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Both Fighter Squadrons fly operational missions quite a bit in Canada.  Kosovo, 1999, 2 squadrons were deployed in Aviano, Italy.  Desert Storm, 1990, 2 squadrons were deployed.



http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=4050



> Lieutenant-Colonel Alain Pelletier, now commanding officer of 425 Tac F Sqn, led a formation of four Canadian fighter jets, part of a 16-ship NATO strike package, that flew from Aviano Air Base in Italy to a pre-planned target in southern Serbia.



16 aircraft - have they shrunk squadrons that much?  Sounds like 2 half squadrons to me.

In the Gulf War think only 439 Squadron had fighters.  423 Squadron had helicopters.


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## aesop081 (20 Sep 2009)

Denis, please just go back to whatever it is you do when not on here.......


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## Dennis Ruhl (21 Sep 2009)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Denis, please just go back to whatever it is you do when not on here.......



Is there an error somewhere?  8 aircraft would be an extremely small squadron in any airforce.  You're right I should be working to pay taxes to support a larger military that has not put more than a brigade in the field or a normal squadron equivalent in hostile air in 64 years.  It's just my opinion, nothing more.


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## aesop081 (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Is there an error somewhere?



Based on your entire posting history i would say that there is something majorly wrong but i will try to just stick to what you just posted here.

You stated that 16 jets is a small sqn. The article you quoted stated that the individual lead a 16-ship NATO force that included 4 canadian fighters. How you got from this that a Sqn is down to 16 jets , i have no idea. Maybe you should note that a fighter Sqn is typicaly composed of around 12 aircraft.

In what is typical fashion for you, you have taken unrelated numbers and are dishing them out in incorrect ways to support an eroneus argument.


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## aesop081 (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> that has not put more than a brigade in the field or a normal squadron equivalent in hostile air in 64 years.



How quickly you forget that during the 50 years where faced the USSR, Canada deployed forces of significant size in Europe. let us not forget 4 CIBG and later 4 CMBG. let us not forget the fighter squadrons ( yes...plural) that Canada based in England, Germany and France. I assure you that those days were quite hostile.


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## SupersonicMax (21 Sep 2009)

Sorry Dennis, 416 Sqn also deployed in Irak.  Get your facts straight.


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## Dennis Ruhl (21 Sep 2009)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> You stated that 16 jets is a small sqn. The article you quoted stated that the individual lead a 16-ship NATO force that included 4 canadian fighters. How you got from this that a Sqn is down to 16 jets , i have no idea. Maybe you should note that a fighter Sqn is typicaly composed of around 12 aircraft.



The Kosovo force was 2 squadrons with 16 aircraft which divides out to 8 per squadron.  The particular officer in the article commanded 4 aircraft in a 16 aircraft Canadian force which was part of many hundred aircraft NATO force.

I was unaware that Canadian squadrons only had only 12 planes.  I have never researched the subject, it just seemed low.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/squadron.htm



> Until 1992, the Air Force predominantly organized its active fighter aircraft in wings of three squadrons, with 24 combat aircraft in each squadron. However, in 1992, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the squadrons be reduced to 18 aircraft. By 1997, most fighter squadrons were reduced to this smaller size, leaving only 54 aircraft in most wings
> 
> ..................
> 
> Subsequently as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) F-15C squadrons were reinstated to 24 primary assigned aircraft (PAA). This was intended to reduce stress on the F-15C squadrons as they dealt with an increasing operations tempo with reduced manning.



Apparently at times Canadian squadrons had 18 or 25 aircraft.

http://www.international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=10927



> 13. The Minister of National Defence said that the F-86 aircraft, with which 8 of the 12 squadrons in the Air Division in Europe were equipped, was obsolescent and should be replaced with the least possible delay. When the Supreme Allied Commander Europe had been in Ottawa last month he had recommended that the Air Division should have a strike/ reconnaissance role and had indicated that he would be prepared to accept the re-arming of the F-86 squadrons on the basis of 18 aircraft each instead of the present 25 per squadron now.


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## Dennis Ruhl (21 Sep 2009)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Sorry Dennis, 416 Sqn also deployed in Irak.  Get your facts straight.



No they didn't.  Part of 416 Squadron did.


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## SupersonicMax (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis, the 2 squadron did not deploy at the same time, but consecutively in Kosovo (425 first, then 441).  

In Iraq, 416 augmented 439 squadron, making it, really, 2 squadrons deployed at once.  

There are more than 12 jets in a Squadron these days.  Just like you could probably guess, they are not all serviceable all at once.  The maintenance is staggered so that we have a constant number of jets on the line (minus snags), day after day. 

While there maybe more than 1 package in the sky, what 16 aircraft means is that the guy was commanding 16 aircraft all going towards a single objective.  You have the strike formation, the escort formation, the SEAD formation, the OCA, sweep, whatever was required.  That added up to 16 aircraft.  Not all aircraft were Canadian (yes, there were Canadians leading american planes in combat, in the recent past)



			
				Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> No they didn't.  Part of 416 Squadron did.



Just like part of 425 and 441 deployed in Kosovo and part of 439 deployed in Iraq.  You rarely deploy a WHOLE unit.


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## Dennis Ruhl (21 Sep 2009)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> How quickly you forget that during the 50 years where faced the USSR, Canada deployed forces of significant size in Europe. let us not forget 4 CIBG and later 4 CMBG. let us not forget the fighter squadrons ( yes...plural) that Canada based in England, Germany and France. I assure you that those days were quite hostile.



Yes we employed as many as 120,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, not one of whom fired a shot in anger.  The Cold War was definitely a different situation from today.  In those days everyone fully expected to be at war on short notice.


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## aesop081 (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Yes we employed as many as 120,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, not one of whom fired a shot in anger.  The Cold War was definitely a different situation from today.  In those days everyone fully expected to be at war on short notice.



Yup, yet you claimed that Canada had military forces that had never deployed more than a brigade or a single sqn. You are blatantly wrong. The cold war was a confrontation that consumed resources and , above all, lives.


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## TCBF (21 Sep 2009)

Sonnyjim said:
			
		

> I was always curious what Canada would do if we were to enter another full scale conflict. How would they mass recruit but still maintain the quality of training our soldiers are getting today and gear issue on a mass scale?



- The 'quality of training' is at present a 'targetted quality of training.'  We are recruiting a wide variance in human talent.  Some of it is obviously short-term hires in a practical sense, in that their social and intellectual qualities do not consist of the stuff we want to make Junior Leaders out of. We better not, anyway.  Sad thing is, it would create some issues if we told them they are of limited use.  it will have to be a self-awareness thing, I am afraid.


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## George Wallace (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> ........  I have never researched the subject, it just seemed low.




I might suggest that next time you do research the subject before posting.  As you can see, many of the replies on this topic and others are corrections to your historical inaccuracies.


As for not having fired shots in anger, perhaps that may be true; however many shots have been fired in self defence.  I would like to remind you of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Cyprus defending themselves with several sever casualties and KIAs in 1974.  This was not one of your "no shots fired in anger" moments for them.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Sep 2009)

I think we need to bear in mind that Dennis Ruhl represents an important minority of Canadians in that:

•	He is highly critical of _defence management_ in Canada; and

•	He is interested and minimally informed about the topic.

I say he is part of a minority because the *majority* amongst our fellow countrymen is:

•	Highly critical of _defence management_ in Canada; and

•	Totally disinterested and completely uninformed about the topic.

Dennis Ruhl is telling us what most Canadians are telling pollsters and politicians. We should all pay attention and try to remember that the Canadian *majority* is ignorant and apathetic but it (the Canadian majority)_”supports the troops”_ even as it dislikes the military *for its expense*.


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## ArmyRick (21 Sep 2009)

Well said. Mr Campbell.

My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?

Do an estimate.

Have the generals and admirals sit down and figure out their mission analysis from the Government. This Government has charged the Canadian forces to do what exactly and in what priority?

Next, they take in all the factors and weigh them out
-What are the threats? From most realistic to very unlikely.
-Who is the threat?
-What resources do we have (Manpower, funding, support, industrial capability, etc, etc)
-so on and on (The wizards at the top will have far more info than me)

Next I would say the figure out 3-5 Courses of Action (in this case how and what our military is structured for) It could be based on best case scenario (High budget and lots of man power) down to worst case scenario (Lower budget, lower man power). Between five different secnarios, weigh them agaisnt each other and figure out what we need.

One final word, no sacred cows. No preserving this unit or that because of history, fairness to both cultures, etc, etc.

I am sure that the guys at the top have already done this (Is this how we ended up with Canada Command, exp. command, etc?).

If I were the CDS or the Emperor of Canada, this is how I would go about it. 

My 2 cents, with interest equals 3.76485 cents.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Sep 2009)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Well said. Mr Campbell.
> 
> My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?
> 
> ...



This is, largely, done - over and over and over again. But it is done in a few _secretariats_ of the Privy Council Office, right across the street from Parliament Hill.

The CDS and the admirals and generals are rarely involved, even though _inputs_ are always sought from DND, usually provide by both the Deputy Minister's (mostly civilian) staff and some military staff, through the DM, himself.

This is part of a constant, ongoing, _strategic_ review that is (or at least was) done with great care, *but*, especially in a minority situation or during times of financial crisis (e.g. 1993-2000), it is too often ignored by the prime minister and his/her cabinet.


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## Old Sweat (21 Sep 2009)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?
> 
> Do an estimate.
> 
> ...



I wish it was that easy. As Edward has noted, there have been no end of strategic reviews, most of whichb result in a statment such as "there is no obvious level of defence spending for Canada." In my opinion, defence spending is a factor of how much can be siphoned off from what really matters to the Canadian people without provoking too much of a backlash.

With a few exceptions - the two world wars and the first twenty years of the Cold War - Canada has not faced a serious threat that could not be countered by deploying an armed mob of hastily-assembled militia and civilians. Neither the Fenians nor the Metis were in the same league as the Jacobites in the case of the UK or the CSA and the tribes on the great plains and the south-west that opposed the US. Even in wartime our planning was based on shipping partly-trained levvies to the UK, where they would complete their training before deploying to the continent. Moreover, besides depending on the might of the British Empire, we also were protected by geography and the Monroe Doctrine. We also propagated the myth that Canadian farmers and shopkeepers had rallied to the colours to repel the Yankee invaders in the War of 1812. Thus, we put our faith in the existence of a large number of poorly-trained and ill-equipped militia regiments. This had the advantage of maximizing pork (the minister, not the military, decided promotions and key appointments) while keeping defence expenditures pitifully low.

The notion that defence comes cheap is engrained in the national consciousness. It will take much, much more than a comprehensive estimate to banish that to the wood shed of history. Besidesit is too easy to rely upon first the British and now the American taxpayer to protect us.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Sep 2009)

There are, broadly, two sorts of _strategic_ reviews:

1. The _permanent_, always ongoing one in PCO which I described above; and

2. The seemingly endless series of _special_ reviews that Old Sweat described. Those special reviews are sometimes done _in house_, by government people with axes to grind, sometimes done by _consultants_ (frequently retired government people with even more axes to grind), and sometimes by "distinguished" outsiders - being from Oxford helps.

Mr. Manley's recent "review" of the Afghanistan Mission, is one example - it was very localized but still _strategic_. Ditto Jeniffer Welsh's aborted rewrite of Paul Martin aborted White Paper on foreign policy.


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## PuckChaser (21 Sep 2009)

I personally think if someone has an issue with how the military spends their money, they are more than welcome to walk into the recruiting center, sign up to be an officer, and work at being CDS. Then maybe you can be informed about how things work and effect some change.


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## observor 69 (21 Sep 2009)

My fear......A few years down the road with the deficit still present, federal debt  high from recession stimulus spending and a political reluctance to raise taxes we get a Paul Martin answer.....cut programs, the big one "Defence" comes with little political cost. We have our new toys but few dollars for maintenance or operation, sound familiar?


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## George Wallace (21 Sep 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> My fear......A few years down the road with the deficit still present, federal debt  high from recession stimulus spending and a political reluctance to raise taxes we get a Paul Martin answer.....cut programs, the big one "Defence" comes with little political cost. We have our new toys but few dollars for maintenance or operation, sound familiar?



Quite a discusion for a topic that was started with only a    posted.

I fear, that when the Government pulls us out of Afghanistan, we are left with "NO toys", as many/most/all will be left in theatre.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Sep 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> My fear......A few years down the road with the deficit still present, federal debt  high from recession stimulus spending and a political reluctance to raise taxes we get a Paul Martin answer.....cut programs, the big one "Defence" comes with little political cost. We have our new toys but few dollars for maintenance or operation, sound familiar?



I suspect your fear and forecast are completely accurate. Plus, it will not matter if the government-of-the-day is Conservative or Liberal.


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## The Bread Guy (21 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I suspect your fear and forecast are completely accurate. Plus, it will not matter if the government-of-the-day is Conservative or Liberal.



Because it's only "sexy" to announce bright, shiny things, not O&M budgets....  :


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## Dennis Ruhl (21 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think we need to bear in mind that Dennis Ruhl represents an important minority of Canadians in that:
> 
> •	He is highly critical of _defence management_ in Canada; and
> 
> ...



Not highly critical of defence management - just a different vision.

I must confess to being minimally informed on the airforce and you might as well chuck in the navy.  Besides people that disagree with other people are always ignorant.

I just see no need for expansion of the regular forces when there is no apparent enemy past 2011.  I'm suppose we can find an enemy should we look hard enough.

Defence spending has never won anyone an election and you're right, after 2011 it's only going down and I'm not sure that is a bad thing.  Part of the majority - I sure am.


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## Edward Campbell (21 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> ...
> Defence spending has never won anyone an election and you're right, after 2011 it's only going down and I'm not sure that is a bad thing.  Part of the majority - I sure am.




And here, Mr. Ruhl, is where *your majority* discusses its views.


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## Old Sweat (21 Sep 2009)

Defence spending may never have won an election, but defence policy  - specifically nuclear weapons - lost the 1963 one for Diefenbaker and the PCs. For those that are not familiar with the issue, Canada had agreed to take on a nuclear role for both 4 CIBG and 1 Air Division in Europe and for RCAF Air Defence Command at home. He then procrastinated until several ministers including the MND resigned in protest. His minority government was defeated in the House and the Liberals under Pearson were returned, also as a minority.

Dennis, I am not going to debate defence policy with you. It would be a waste of my time as you appear to have firm opinions, without, as you admit, having taken the time to inform yourself of the issues. 

Oh, and as for the level of defence funding, through most, if not all, of the Trudeau era, the direction to the MND was to maintain the/a minimum military capability.


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## observor 69 (21 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Oh, and as for the level of defence funding, through most, if not all, of the Trudeau era, the direction to the MND was to maintain the/a minimum military capability.



"The Starfighter was bought in 1959 to fulfill a high speed strike and reconnaissance role. In the 1960s, the CF-104 was used as a nuclear strike Aircraft and, from 1971 on, it was used exclusively as a low-level attack Aircraft."
http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/equip/hst/starfighter-eng.asp

Trudeau took a "high speed strike and reconnaissance" aircraft and put it in the air to mud role.


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## gcclarke (21 Sep 2009)

Equipment and personnel are prone to being re-assigned to fill a role that is needed more than the role that they were previously filling, until such time as the new role can be filled by something better suiting the requirements.

And honestly, I rather doubt that decision was made even close to Trudeau's level. At best, he might have decided not to fund new planes to fill the low-level attack Aircraft role that the Starfighter was re-assigned to.


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## Old Sweat (21 Sep 2009)

Trudeau's plan was to withdraw our NATO forces from Europe. That this foundered on the rocks of realpolitik should not disguise the point that in the early seventies in Ottawa there was talk of going back to pre-Korean War  NATO numbers. He may not have decided to re-role the CF 104s, but he was not likely to agree to purchase more suitable aircraft for a role that was planned to disappear.


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## observor 69 (21 Sep 2009)

Some badly needed history lessons: 

Canadian military forces in West Germany

http://books.google.ca/books?id=8uxfTF4Lm-kC&pg=PA215&lpg=PA215&dq=trudeau+nuclear+cf-104&source=bl&ots=4nphP9YurX&sig=Q7Xl0OyXA3o2_zajIYuDR1BMNsI&hl=en&ei=KgK4SrT5BY3g8QaNm6iTDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=trudeau%20nuclear%20cf-104&f=false


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## Michael OLeary (21 Sep 2009)

So, we should have continued pumping a few billion a year into th endless European vacation?

Instead of bemoaning Government decisions which have to balance multiple priorities (including the fact that no-one has actually suggested a credible military threat to Canada), perhaps a more useful thread direction would be to suggest and consider force structure options in an uncertain future.  How about starting with the assumptions that the Defence Budget will not be allowing the grand purchases of the past decade? How do we organize what we can afford? What tasks and missions do we train for that any Canadian Government (irrespective of party) is likely to support?


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## VIChris (21 Sep 2009)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Quite a discusion for a topic that was started with only a    posted.
> 
> I fear, that when the Government pulls us out of Afghanistan, we are left with "NO toys", as many/most/all will be left in theatre.



Would they really leave a bunch of equipment there when our budgets are dwindling? Where's the sense to that?


----------



## aesop081 (21 Sep 2009)

VIChris said:
			
		

> Would they really leave a bunch of equipment there when our budgets are dwindling? Where's the sense to that?



For the same reason that the US left a massive ammount of equipment behind after the 91 gulf war : The stuff is worn out to begin with and it would cost a fortune to bring back.


----------



## observor 69 (21 Sep 2009)

Well in my perfect world I would settle for a government that took a hard rational look at defence and then properly funded and supported the resultant policy.
I have always said that I don't care how small our military might become as a result of a government implementing a realistic well thought out defence policy as long as it was properly equipted and manned.
But IMHO it would be a historical miracle to see a Canadian, or many other western country's, government manage defence in serious professional manner free of political games.


----------



## VIChris (21 Sep 2009)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> For the same reason that the US left a massive ammount of equipment behind after the 91 gulf war : The stuff is worn out to begin with and it would cost a fortune to bring back.



I understand there's a cost to transport and refurbish our equipment, but is it really greater than buying more equipment when we need it next? I know for a fact it costs an off the street retail customer only $1500 CDN to ship a car from Japan to Western Canada. Were we to charter a full cargo ship - many of which are sitting idle these days - I have a hard time believing a deal couldn't be struck that would be favorable.

 And in terms of leaving old equipment there, does that not help arm the people we were just fighting with? Are our forces not seeing Afghan insurgents using old Soviet block equipment currently? Do we destroy the equipment? I ask thee questions as it pertains directly to irresponsible spending, and public opinion, though I know it's on a tangent from the OP. Maybe a new thread is needed here?


----------



## George Wallace (21 Sep 2009)

VIChris said:
			
		

> I understand there's a cost to transport and refurbish our equipment, but is it really greater than buying more equipment when we need it next? I know for a fact it costs an off the street retail customer only $1500 CDN to ship a car from Japan to Western Canada. Were we to charter a full cargo ship - many of which are sitting idle these days - I have a hard time believing a deal couldn't be struck that would be favorable.
> 
> And in terms of leaving old equipment there, does that not help arm the people we were just fighting with? Are our forces not seeing Afghan insurgents using old Soviet block equipment currently? Do we destroy the equipment? I ask thee questions as it pertains directly to irresponsible spending, and public opinion, though I know it's on a tangent from the OP. Maybe a new thread is needed here?



When Canada pulled its Bde out of Europe, it left all its vehicles, with the exception of some of the F Vehicles, in Europe.


----------



## aesop081 (21 Sep 2009)

VIChris said:
			
		

> I have a hard time believing



I'm not too worried about what you beleive or not. What i stated is a well published fact. You would be shocked by the ammount of equipment left behind by US forces wherever they go. It usualy gets put up for sale to anyone that is acceptable to Uncle Sam and is willing to cart it off themselves.

 Most of the equipment we have over there will be well worn and will require significant rebuild/refurb before it can be of any use, if ever. Some of it will be useful and sufficiently valuable to rerturn home, alot of it wont. Is it worth returning kit to Canada that has very little life left ot it ? If its anything like tours i have been on in the past, some equipment is so mission-specific that it has no uses here at home........why bring it back ?


Afghanistan being landlocked only increses the cost and effort required to return barely serviceable ger back to Canada where it is of little use to anyone without a significant further investment in funds.

As far as you car from japan deal, well, one passenger car is not hundreds of vehicles, some weighing more that 40 tons. Its also massive ammounts of supplies........alot of it with limited shelf-life....yadi yadi yada....


----------



## VIChris (21 Sep 2009)

I see your point on the maintenance/ lifespan costs. If they're done, they're done. I just figured with the state of the transport industry these days that the cost of transport is relatively cheap compared to the value of the goods being shipped, and that transport costs alone shouldn't be the reason we leave gear behind, nor really be a big factor in it.


----------



## TCBF (22 Sep 2009)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> When Canada pulled its Bde out of Europe, it left all its vehicles, with the exception of some of the F Vehicles, in Europe.



- And my poor Lynx ended up in a logging role in Hungary, I suspect.

- Most of our vehs will be repatriated from Afg.  I would not be surprised if a few of the 'older' trucks, such as MLVW, LSVW, G-wagon and the white toyota CFR fleet were 'gifted' to a NATO ally, but the fighting vehicles will go to refurbishment.


----------



## Monsoon (22 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Not highly critical of defence management - just a different vision.


That would make you "critical", in that you observe it with a critical eye.



> I must confess to being minimally informed on the airforce and you might as well chuck in the navy.  Besides people that disagree with other people are always ignorant.


Ignorance isn't disagreement. Ignorance is the process of martialling inaccurate facts to reach a pre-determined conclusion.



> I just see no need for expansion of the regular forces when there is no apparent enemy past 2011.  I'm suppose we can find an enemy should we look hard enough.


Can you agree that on September 10th, 2001 there was no clear "enemy" for the CF? Can you agree that since that date we have struggled and failed to generate the personnel needed to fight the enemy that emerged the day after that date? Can you agree that the role of a military is, to some extent, to exist in the absence of a clear enemy just because it's a good thing to have when you need it?



> Defence spending has never won anyone an election and you're right, after 2011 it's only going down and I'm not sure that is a bad thing.  Part of the majority - I sure am.


Representative of the majority you may be, but why should 2012 be any different from 2000, 1989 and 1950? Do you own a magic crystal ball that can predict the exact date that the CF needs to start preparing for the next conflict, or are you deluded enough to believe that the world is becoming a safer place?


----------



## gillbates (22 Sep 2009)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Do you own a magic crystal ball that can predict the exact date that the CF needs to start preparing for the next conflict, or are you deluded enough to believe that the world is becoming a safer place?



Precisely. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, "The price of freedom is eternal paranoia - vigilance is not enough."


----------



## Colin Parkinson (22 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Trudeau's plan was to withdraw our NATO forces from Europe. That this foundered on the rocks of realpolitik should not disguise the point that in the early seventies in Ottawa there was talk of going back to pre-Korean War  NATO numbers. He may not have decided to re-role the CF 104s, but he was not likely to agree to purchase more suitable aircraft for a role that was planned to disappear.



If I recall the starfighter was the fastest lowflying aircraft in the world at the time. Although the bomb load was small. Might have been a hard target to hit, but likely dead if it was.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (22 Sep 2009)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> That would make you "critical", in that you observe it with a critical eye.



Your mixing up the many definitions of critical.  Saying I am not highly critical meant that I was not pointing out flaws or errors.  Critical can have a positive or negative connotation.



> Ignorance isn't disagreement. Ignorance is the process of martialling inaccurate facts to reach a pre-determined conclusion.



I'm not sure that my facts were all that wrong and I'm not sure that very many people without airforce experience have a clue on the intracacies of air force squadrons.  The Canadian Forces awarded a battle honour to one fighter squadron in the Gulf War.  The Canadian Forces awarded battle honours to 2 fighter squadrons that served consecutively, one at a time.  Strictly speaking, I guess I still can stand by my original statement that little more than a single squadron served at any one time, however, in the Gulf War the squadron was augmented to 24 or 26 aircraft and the Kosovo squadrons were also augmented.



> Can you agree that on September 10th, 2001 there was no clear "enemy" for the CF? Can you agree that since that date we have struggled and failed to generate the personnel needed to fight the enemy that emerged the day after that date? Can you agree that the role of a military is, to some extent, to exist in the absence of a clear enemy just because it's a good thing to have when you need it?



In 2001 there was no clear enemy.  The military should exist but at what level?  I say that it should be at a low level supplemented by a large trained reserve.  The more a war makes sense for national survival the easier recruiting will be.



> Representative of the majority you may be, but why should 2012 be any different from 2000, 1989 and 1950? Do you own a magic crystal ball that can predict the exact date that the CF needs to start preparing for the next conflict, or are you deluded enough to believe that the world is becoming a safer place?



I am deluded into believing that the world is a safer place.  Having a brigade or two to inject into a situation should be adequate to allow expansion of combat units.  Remember Canada has only 1/9 of its infantry battalions in Afghanistan.


----------



## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> ...
> I am deluded into believing that the world is a safer place.  Having a brigade or two to inject into a situation should be adequate to allow expansion of combat units.  Remember Canada has only 1/9 of its infantry battalions in Afghanistan.




Safer than when? Safer than in 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999? I don't think so.

I would love to live in a Canada that had two combat ready brigades - because that's what you must mean if you are counting on them to do something, anything, while the remainder expands. Hell's bells, I would be happy to live in a Canada that had one combat ready brigade. By my reasonably well informed _guesstimate_ Canada has zero combat ready brigades - it has some brigade HQs and some units but no combat ready brigades.

How many of the eight infantry battalions that are not in Afghanistan are combat ready?


----------



## Infanteer (22 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Remember Canada has only 1/9 of its infantry battalions in Afghanistan.



Are you sure about that.  Discounting battalions preparing or battalions that have just returned (and usually shrink) I'd be willing to bet you that your "1 battalion" estimation is out to lunch.


----------



## Old Sweat (22 Sep 2009)

Infanteer is spot on in his above statement. I submit that we have closer to two battalions in theatre once we add in the PRT force protection organization and the OMLT and a few other bits and pieces.

I wonder if there is a critical mass below which it is impossible to maintain a combat ready, deployable battle group? Maybe it should be measured in terms of companies or platoons, I don't know. Maybe it is better expressed in percentage of GDP devoted to defence.

Certainly for much of our history we did not maintain effective combat ready land forces except for the fifties and sixties with a residue in Europe for the next two decades. As for reserves, it largely was a focus of community pride rather than an army on the shelf. The wars ranging from the North West Rebellion to Korea and the NATO build-up demonstrated that it was a hollow force, once we get past the rhetoric and regimental pride. An example, and I am only citing it because I know it well. In October 1899 Canada mobilized an infantry battalion of roughly 1000 all ranks for service in South Africa. Roughly 150 NCMs, including the RSM and all eight 'CSMs' were regulars. Of the members of the battalion, the CO estimated about half were no better than raw recruits and about a third had no previous military experience. His assessment of the officers was even more critical. And these, presumably, were the cream of the crop.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon (22 Sep 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Are you sure about that.  Discounting battalions preparing or battalions that have just returned (and usually shrink) I'd be willing to bet you that your "1 battalion" estimation is out to lunch.



Like so many of his views....


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (22 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Certainly for much of our history we did not maintain effective combat ready land forces except for the fifties and sixties with a residue in Europe for the next two decades. As for reserves, it largely was a focus of community pride rather than an army on the shelf. The wars ranging from the North West Rebellion to Korea and the NATO build-up demonstrated that it was a hollow force, once we get past the rhetoric and regimental pride. An example, and I am only citing it because I know it well. In October 1899 Canada mobilized an infantry battalion of roughly 1000 all ranks for service in South Africa. Roughly 150 NCMs, including the RSM and all eight 'CSMs' were regulars. Of the members of the battalion, the CO estimated about half were no better than raw recruits and about a third had no previous military experience. His assessment of the officers was even more critical. And these, presumably, were the cream of the crop.



A 110 year old example?  Today the reserves have in all likelihood more than ten times the training.  In the ancient past militia units went through some years without any training.  The vast majority of the officers in WWI and WWII came from militia units because the regulars started as only 3 understrength battalions.

As to the preparedness of the other 8 battalions, would it not be a reasonable assumption that all units be prepared for the job they've waited 50 years to do?  So much for the value of a standing army.  I think you're helping my argument.


----------



## Edward Campbell (22 Sep 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> A 110 year old example?  *Today the reserves have in all likelihood more than ten times the training.*  In the ancient past militia units went through some years without any training.  The vast majority of the officers in WWI and WWII came from militia units because the regulars started as only 3 understrength battalions.
> 
> As to the preparedness of the other 8 battalions, would it not be a reasonable assumption that all units be prepared for the job they've waited 50 years to do?  So much for the value of a standing army.  I think you're helping my argument.




That's absolute rubbish and tells me, forcefully, that your ignorance extends well past the air force and the navy. You know nothing at all about the army, ancient or modern.

The skillset of any militia soldier _circa_ 1900 was certainly much, much closer to that of a regular than is the case today. That's why, today, even "well trained" regulars and all reserve force personnel have to undergo long and intensive training, maybe too long. The skills required in battle, today, are many, varied and complex. They are too many, too varied and too complex to be fully and properly covered in a regular's basic and trades training; they cannot be found in the reserves - except for a several dozen soldiers who are just, recently, back from the battlefield.

Given your self proclaimed ignorance of the air force and navy and your demonstrated ignorance of the army one wonders why you are still "contributing."

I apologize for coming on a bit "strong," Mr. Ruhl, but, really, your contributions, in this thread, have been pretty much 100% wrong. It's frustrating.


----------



## Old Sweat (22 Sep 2009)

Nonsense. As I stated, there has been no attempt to maintain a combat ready balanced force in Canada for overseas employment without a long period of training, ever.

On what do you base your statement that the vast majority of officers in both world wars came from the militia other than urban myth? I do not have the figures for the Great War handy, but there are two factors that are germane about the Second World War. On 15 November 1940 the Minister acknowledged in the House that many of the mobilized Militia officers were unsatisfactory and that the army was going back to the system used in the First World War of promoting from the ranks. As it worked out, of the 43,224 individuals granted commissions in the Canadian army in the Second War, less than half - 20,723 - rose from the ranks. A cursory look at the strength of the pre-war militia would indicate that most of the others entered from civilian life. 

And there only was one infantry regiment before the Great War and three before the Second. In neither case were the units organized and trained as battalions. Instead they were split up across the country in company-sized detachments. In 1939 the RCR had four companies with bases in Halifax, St Jean, Toronto and London, with the two PPCLI companies were in Winnipeg and Esquimalt. The lone Vandoo company was in the Citadel in Quebec City.

The average militia member may receive better training that his predecessors, but the units are hardly in any better shape, albeit for different reasons. If anything the militia as a mobilization base is in worse shape than in any time before the mid-fifties.


----------



## dapaterson (22 Sep 2009)

VIChris said:
			
		

> I understand there's a cost to transport and refurbish our equipment, but is it really greater than buying more equipment when we need it next? I know for a fact it costs an off the street retail customer only $1500 CDN to ship a car from Japan to Western Canada. Were we to charter a full cargo ship - many of which are sitting idle these days - I have a hard time believing a deal couldn't be struck that would be favorable.
> 
> And in terms of leaving old equipment there, does that not help arm the people we were just fighting with? Are our forces not seeing Afghan insurgents using old Soviet block equipment currently? Do we destroy the equipment? I ask thee questions as it pertains directly to irresponsible spending, and public opinion, though I know it's on a tangent from the OP. Maybe a new thread is needed here?



On this note: Much of the equipment was purchased without long-term maintenance plans, without integration into training - because it's intended to be used and disposed.  Keeping dozens upon dozens of mixed fleets strains the maintainers who are already unable to maintain VOR rates where commanders would like them to be.

And re: The Reserves today

We're essentially mobilized to a significant degree.  Over half the leadership (MCpl and +) in the Reserve Force is on full-time service of some sort - and thousands of soldiers as well.  The ability to the current system to sustain itself (let alone provide any sort fo surge) is questionable.

Getting back to the core question:  First principle of war:  Selection and maintenance of the aim.  What is the aim for the CF?  CFDS (the strategy, not the dentists) is in theory that aim - so what do we need to achieve the goals therein?  What can we eliminate to add resources where they are needed?  And how to we align that with the neccessity for the CF to be a nationally representative institution - what degree of redundancy / inefficiency are we willing to accept to maintain a national presence?


----------



## Michael OLeary (22 Sep 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In October 1899 Canada mobilized an infantry battalion of roughly 1000 all ranks for service in South Africa. Roughly 150 NCMs, including the RSM and all eight 'CSMs' were regulars. Of the members of the battalion, the CO estimated about half were no better than raw recruits and about a third had no previous military experience. His assessment of the officers was even more critical. And these, presumably, were the cream of the crop.



Of the 1158 all ranks on the roll of the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, The RCR, including reinforcement drafts, only 84 were original RCRs (i.e., R.C.R.I. at the time).  When you add in the other Regulars (6 Cavalry, 15 Artillery, 1 Engineer and 2 Medical) and 4 other Permanent Force personnel (from unspecified units) plus 4 British Army, the total only gets to 114.

The Colour Sergeant of "H" Company came from the 63rd Halifax Rifles.

And saying William Otter was critical of something is like going to Statler and Waldorf for an objective opinion.


----------



## Scott (22 Sep 2009)

Okay folks, show's over. Mr. Ruhl is going on listening silence for a while, if not just an outright ban, I am sick of his shit here. 

"Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level and beat you with experience."

Scott
Army.ca Staff


----------



## bdave (26 Sep 2009)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> The deployment to Afghanistan proceeded slowly? We were caught with our pants down trying to fight on a modern battlefield with limited modern equipment or a budget to acquire it. Our procurement process is so cumbersome that'd we'd have trouble equipping our entire current manning, let alone kitting out mass-recruits for a conventional conflict.
> 
> As you've said, we've spent a trillion current dollars... however I'd wager to say those veterans from Medak Pocket would argue about firing shots in anger. $1 trillion dollars bought us a global police force. To maintain a combat effective military, we need ships, less than 20 year old fighters, and armoured vehicles that were not designed to face off against the *Red Menace*.



While i am not qualified to really ask such a question, i will do so anyway because i am interested in the answers some of you will provide.
Russia has shown interest in the Arctic. Especially parts which we claim as our own. What would happen and how would Canada react to an "invasion" (for lack of a better term) of Russian Military on our Arctic territory?


----------



## kratz (27 Sep 2009)

bdave,

As a mentor, I am relictant to simply state search MilNet. I did do a search for Arctic invasion and came up with a full page of MilNet threads discussing this possibility. I hope you can make use of this simple answer.


----------



## bdave (27 Sep 2009)

Awesome, thanks.


----------



## Dean22 (14 Oct 2009)

I have not read the entire thread but based on the original question I would say our military should be anywhere from 0.5% to 1% of the countries population.

The United States has around off the top of my head 2% of their population in the military which, is about 6 million of 300 million.

Canada has around (from last I heard) 60,000 in our military which is about 0.2% of 30 million.

In world war 2 Canada had around 5-10% of it's population in the armed forces.


While, we used to have a large enough military for peacekeeping the way the current world is developing with us following suite with NATO and the US we need a larger military and funding even if it's just an improvement of 0.1% of the population with the proper equipment and auxiliary.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (14 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> The United States has around off the top of my head 2% of their population in the military which, is about 6 million of 300 million.



http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=United-States-of-America

Active Military Personnel: 1,385,122 [2008]
Active Military Reserve: 1,458,500 [2008]


Given the approximate 10 to one population differential we have less than 1/2 the regular military and 1/7 the reserves.


----------



## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

In the future I would advise against using wikipedia quoted sources.

This website has the actual numbers of 5.4+ million servicemen including their TIG and their % by rank.

http://usmilitary.about.com/od/joiningthemilitary/u/joining_up.htm#s1


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> I have not read the entire thread ...



And therein lies your problem. Go back to page 1. Infanteer gave the correct answer. Any and all attempts to deal with numbers of ships, tanks, troops and aircraft are silly until one has addressed his point.




			
				Dean22 said:
			
		

> ... our military should be anywhere from 0.5% to 1% of the countries population.
> 
> The United States has around off the top of my head 2% of their population in the military which, is about 6 million of 300 million.
> 
> ...



All of which is completely meaningless. We are not the USA and we are not trying to do what other countries are doing.

There is a *range* of values for national defence spending as a percentage of GDP based on an assumption about or national goals. But if you don't state the goals - goals such as the ones former Prime Minister Martin set out in a largely forgotten 2005 White Paper - then you cannot propose any numbers.


----------



## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The size of Canada is irrelevant - the size of our Forces should be dictated by what strategic ends we wish it to achieve.



Wouldn't we need a larger military than for our strategic needs since our current size was only suitable for peacekeeping? I remember a report a while ago saying we didn't have enough vehicle technicians to manage our tanks for example. I can imagine it being a lot easier managing a tank in a peacekeeping environment vs. one that has taken RPG splatter, small arms fire etc.

Also, no offense to the United States but I don't think high technology is a solution to wars when facing numbers or guerilla warfare.

If we look at World War 2 Germany did not have the numbers but they had the technological advantage that the allies did not. But the allies had numbers and they would sacrifice 100 T-34's to kill a single German tiger tank (5 t-72's for an Abrams?).


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> In the future I would advise against using wikipedia quoted sources.
> 
> This website has the actual numbers of 5.4+ million servicemen including their TIG and their % by rank.
> 
> http://usmilitary.about.com/od/joiningthemilitary/u/joining_up.htm#s1



You talkin' to me?

The site globalfirepower.com isn't identified as as wiki.  Not that I noticed.  Are you sure about that?

Then you reference about.com, which although less liberal in editing, is very similarly provided by volunteers whose expertise may vary.  Also the about.com site is a recruiting page with no summary.

Then there's wiki:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_armed_forces

Reguler 1,445,000

Reserve 850,000


----------



## X-mo-1979 (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Wouldn't we need a larger military than for our strategic needs since our current size was only suitable for peacekeeping? I remember a report a while ago saying we didn't have enough vehicle technicians to manage our tanks for example. I can imagine it being a lot easier managing a tank in a peacekeeping environment vs. one that has taken RPG splatter, small arms fire etc.



Here you are spouting off to members of this site about getting their fact right.Let's get this fact right.
The reason we had a shortage of Leopard C2 mechs was due to our army deciding to get rid of tanks.We mothballed our fleet and started making monuments.Therefore the Mech's were not getting trained for a few years.Suddenly the military realized that getting rid of a very large mobility and firepower asset was a mistake and decided to haul them out of storage and begin using them again.Therefore a lack in training happened over a couple year period.

Leopard 2A6M tech's have to be trained in Germany at the moment for IIRC 10 to 15 weeks.There was of course a shortage of techs/mechs due to the fact that it was new equipment.

As for your comment about tanks needing more maintenance In Afghanistan than in say a peacekeeping mission,your wrong.During peace support operation tanks dont move much.They are a offensive weapon.Sitting around kill's tanks.We only have to look at the large amount of maintenance required for small exercises here in Canada.And usually the first week the VOR rate is very very high.In Afghanistan I never once pulled pack.And for the most part nothing went too wrong with it as it was being used daily.

Please tell me what small arms and shrapnel damage causes and how long that takes to fix oh wise one.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Also, no offense to the United States but I don't think high technology is a solution to wars when facing numbers or guerilla warfare.
> 
> If we look at World War 2 Germany did not have the numbers but they had the technological advantage that the allies did not. But the allies had numbers and they would sacrifice 100 T-34's to kill a single German tiger tank (5 t-72's for an Abrams?).



I believe your second paragraph disproves the first.  

Technology does save lives but ultimately infantry wins wars.  Letting technology do the job keeps them alive to accomplish their goals.  Just my opinion and I never was infantry.  Russian WWII tactics worked for them because their friends behind them were just as willing to shoot them as the enemy ahead.  

Whatever numbers Canada has, we should not bite off more than we can chew.


----------



## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> You talkin' to me?
> 
> The site globalfirepower.com isn't identified as as wiki.  Not that I noticed.  Are you sure about that?
> 
> ...



I am happy you decided to look at the link I wrote and read the congressional report on military personnel instead of relying on wikipedia and their references.


----------



## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

X-mo-1979 said:
			
		

> Here you are spouting off to members of this site about getting their fact right.Let's get this fact right.
> The reason we had a shortage of Leopard C2 mechs was due to our army deciding to get rid of tanks.We mothballed our fleet and started making monuments.Therefore the Mech's were not getting trained for a few years.Suddenly the military realized that getting rid of a very large mobility and firepower asset was a mistake and decided to haul them out of storage and begin using them again.Therefore a lack in training happened over a couple year period.
> 
> Leopard 2A6M tech's have to be trained in Germany at the moment for IIRC 10 to 15 weeks.There was of course a shortage of techs/mechs due to the fact that it was new equipment.
> ...



I was talking about the Chicken fencing.

Also, a lot of people on these forums have been saying the Leopard 2 has a weak point in the turret (maybe older version? because I don't always see that point on all tanks) where RPG's can penetrate the ABC protection.

Would vech techs work on chicken fencing and penetration in ABC or metal workers?


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> I am happy you decided to look at the link I wrote and read the congressional report on military personnel instead of relying on wikipedia and their references.



I'd love to read it.  Why didn't you link the report directly?  Which link on the recruiting page do I click on?


----------



## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> I'd love to read it.  Why didn't you link the report directly?  Which link on the recruiting page do I click on?



Give me about an hour. To be honest I cannot find the exact link with all the forces at the website at the moment. Maybe it had been an incorrect report like you had suggested. The about website looks official I didn't know it was as unofficial as wikipedia.

However, I did find the # of personnel by rank. Interestingly 33% of the US army is at the rank of SGT with only 11% at Private.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Give me about an hour. To be honest I cannot find the exact link with all the forces at the website at the moment. Maybe it had been an incorrect report like you had suggested. The about website looks official I didn't know it was as unofficial as wikipedia.
> 
> However, I did find the # of personnel by rank. Interestingly 33% of the US army is at the rank of SGT with only 11% at Private.



Curse, curse, curse.  Be back tomorrow.  I have to leave the room tearing my hair out.


----------



## Roy Harding (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Give me about an hour. To be honest I cannot find the exact link with all the forces at the website at the moment. Maybe it had been an incorrect report like you had suggested. The about website looks official I didn't know it was as unofficial as wikipedia.
> 
> However, I did find the # of personnel by rank. Interestingly 33% of the US army is at the rank of SGT with only 11% at Private.



Dean22:

You are talking out of your hat.

Bring up VALID and AUTHORITATIVE (NOT Wikipedia) links before you post in this thread again.


Roy Harding
Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## X-mo-1979 (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> I was talking about the Chicken fencing.
> 
> Also, a lot of people on these forums have been saying the Leopard 2 has a weak point in the turret (maybe older version? because I don't always see that point on all tanks) where RPG's can penetrate the ABC protection.
> 
> Would vech techs work on chicken fencing and penetration in ABC or metal workers?



I'm Guessing your talking about slat armour?Vehicle techs don't work on slat armour and we don't have metal workers.Our Mat techs can aid in removing snapped off bolts etc associated with slat armour.

What weak point are you talking about?How many tanks have you ever seen/worked with in real life?What the hell is ABC protection.I have never heard of anything called ABC protection.


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## wannabe SF member (15 Oct 2009)

Maybe he meant NBC, but that would have nothing to do with protection against RPG rounds.


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## Edward Campbell (15 Oct 2009)

Please, there is a logical, sensible way to explore this. Sequentially:

1. Define the *AIM*. The aim will probably have two broad components -

a. Defence of the realm, which may also be subdivided into -

(1) Internal security, and

(2) Territorial defence, and

b. Protection and promotion of of vital interests around the globe;

2. Define the required capabilities. An example of a "capability" might be- _"be able to 'see' (maintain surveillance over) our national territory, its contiguous waters and the airspace over both;"_

3. Define performance standards for each capability. An example might be _"be able to detect and track all surface intruders on the contiguous waters of Canada, below nnoN, out to a distance of nnnkm;"_

4. Define equipment/system capabilities and limitations such as ship range, aircraft reliability, availability and maintainability levels, etc;

5. Define numbers and types of "systems" (ships, units, etc) required;

6. Define required states of readiness for various systems;

7. Define the number of people required for each system at each state of readiness; and

8. Add up the costs of the systems and people. Compare that to the available budget. Go back to step 1 and redefine the *AIM*. Repeat until costs <= budget.


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## Dean22 (15 Oct 2009)

X-mo-1979 said:
			
		

> I'm Guessing your talking about slat armour?Vehicle techs don't work on slat armour and we don't have metal workers.Our Mat techs can aid in removing snapped off bolts etc associated with slat armour.
> 
> What weak point are you talking about?How many tanks have you ever seen/worked with in real life?What the hell is ABC protection.I have never heard of anything called ABC protection.



Yes I meant NBC. ABC is what it is in another language.



			
				ironduke57 said:
			
		

> After seeing the attached pic I though maybe someone interests this.
> 
> On this welding you can easily identify an Leo2 which was originally an A3 or lower. Originally this was an hatch for ammo resupply, but starting from A4 it was deleted. (An turret hit could deform/open it and ABC protection would be broken.) On all earlier versions it was welded with the hull as you can see here.
> 
> ...



Picture from original post linked.


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## Roy Harding (15 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Yes I meant NBC. ABC is what it is in another language.
> 
> Picture from original post linked.



What part of:



			
				Roy Harding said:
			
		

> Dean22:
> 
> ...
> 
> ...



didn't you understand?

When I put the "Milnet.ca Staff" under my name, it means that I'm talking on behalf of the site owner.

Take 24 hours and come up with the links mentioned before you post again.


Roy Harding
Milnet.ca Staff

Edited to clarify a thought.


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## Franko (17 Oct 2009)

Dean22 said:
			
		

> Also, *a lot of people on these forums* have been saying the Leopard 2 has a weak point in the turret (maybe older version? because I don't always see that point on all tanks) where RPG's can penetrate the ABC protection.
> 
> Would vech techs work on chicken fencing and penetration in ABC or metal workers?



Who? So far I've only seen one example and you provided it. No offense to Ironduke but he's not trained on Leo 2A6 IIRC. I am an end user and have done time in the sand in one.

The area you have pointed out is not a weak point on Leo 2 full stop. 

RPGs are a concern for any armoured vehicle...just less of a concern for a Leo C2 or Leo 2 crew.

Please don't post any more Wiki-BS on armour...being a potential RHLI recruit does not make you a SME on anything relating to armour.

Regards


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## Old Naval Guard (31 Jul 2010)

Hello, My  :2c:   Armed Forces should be at the 90,000-100,0000 personal level. We are the 2nd largest country in th world with three coasts. The Navy 15,000 Reg Force with 5,000 Naval reserves. The Army should be around 43,500 personal whila milita of 30,000 including Comms. An Airforce of 40,000 backed by a reserves of 5000-8000 personal. We are a member of NATO,NORAD and claim to be a Middle power. Its time we had a Middle power Military. Yes I am propseing to return our Military to Pre-unification levels. The post war trend of large reg Force anf smaller reserve forve would continue. Perhaps this would be scence by some as unrealistic,however with hard work and spending it can be done.  Cheers Old Naval Guard


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## Michael OLeary (31 Jul 2010)

Old Naval Guard said:
			
		

> Hello, My  :2c:   Armed Forces should be at the 90,000-100,0000 personal level. We are the 2nd largest country in th world with three coasts. The Navy 15,000 Reg Force with 5,000 Naval reserves. The Army should be around 43,500 personal whila milita of 30,000 including Comms. An Airforce of 40,000 backed by a reserves of 5000-8000 personal. We are a member of NATO,NORAD and claim to be a Middle power. Its time we had a Middle power Military. Yes I am propseing to return our Military to Pre-unification levels. The post war trend of large reg Force anf smaller reserve forve would continue. Perhaps this would be scence by some as unrealistic,however with hard work and spending it can be done.  Cheers Old Naval Guard



I will assume you understand that capabilities of the CF are not simply a matter of personnel strength.  Have you actually completed an estimate to determine what capabilities - i.e., based on combat functions leading to required ships, planes and land based weapons and equipment, plus all needed combat and combat service support requirements, etc. - are needed that would then establish a requirement for those manning levels you feel are appropriate.

Or are those numbers simply the product of a rectal imaginarium?


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## Ex-Dragoon (31 Jul 2010)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> I will assume you understand that capabilities of the CF are not simply a matter of personnel strength.  Have you actually completed an estimate to determine what capabilities - i.e., based on combat functions leading to required ships, planes and land based weapons and equipment, plus all needed combat and combat service support requirements, etc. - are needed that would then establish a requirement for those manning levels you feel are appropriate.
> 
> Or are those numbers simply the product of a rectal imaginarium?



Not too mention the bottleneck in training we already have that would become worse with all these additions. I am all for expanding the CF but lets do it with intelligence and common sense.


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## pbi (1 Aug 2010)

Since (despite all the earnest and well-meaning chrystal ball gazers in places like DLCD and elsewhere...) we will probably never have a very clear idea of what the next conflict will look like, or where it will be, or what Canada's political climate will be when that conflict happens, maybe we should ask a different question: "How large does the CF (or, if you prefer, the Army...) need to be in order to preserve a basic "toolbox" of capabilities that we can adapt to any conflict on relatively short notice?"


Cheers


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## time expired (2 Aug 2010)

Since WW2 Canada`s military policy has been based on one given,Canada cannot be

defended by the CF,therefore we had to join military alliances,NATO,NORAD to help

share the load.The responce of the various governments to this situation was to do

the absolute minimum to keep our allies from tossing us out.We constantly reneged

on our promises to reequip,increase our military budget to 2% of GNP and to upgrade

our capabilities.However we still managed to get a General or two into every HQ and

the military seemed happy with the situation, at at least in the upper echelons.

Now however we seem to be entering a new phase in Canada`s foreign policy,we

have turned our backs ,by our" cut and run policy "in A-stan.,on our old alliance

partners and by the way the UN.Does this mean Canada is now going it alone?,if

so will this mean a huge increase in our military?or does it mean that the age old

idea will prevail,the Yanks(Brits) will never let anything happen to us.

I suspect the latter will be the opinion of the Canadian public,but I also suspect

this will one day bite us in the ass.

                                                   Regards


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## stealthylizard (2 Aug 2010)

Turning our backs on our allies?  The US is also set to start withdrawing July 2011.  The Aussies and the Brits are withdrawing 2014.  One country just left this past weekend.  Are they turning their backs on their allies too?  I don't know the expected withdrawal dates for other ISAF nations but I think most everyone is leaving within the same time frame 2011-2014.

<edited to add>  While I don't think we should be leaving, as the job is incomplete, I would hardly call it turning our backs on anyone except for the people of Afghanistan.  I also won't be surprised if we are still there after 2011, just under a different mandate.


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## REDinstaller (2 Aug 2010)

We also can't afford to be the last man stnding. Our Btl Gps are far too small to operate and hold an airfield. We would almost need to have 2 Btl Gps in TFA at a time to do this once HLTA plans kick in.


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## time expired (2 Aug 2010)

US leaving?.who told you that?.Ah Obama,do you believe everything he says?.Both Obama and Cameron

have added a caveat to their announcements"if the situation allows".We however are simply pulling the plug

regardless of the fact that the job is nowhere near complete,Brits and GIs will fill the hole we leave and do

the fighting and dying for us. To me it is as if after Dieppe , the Canadian government had said sorry we 

have had enough ,and bought our boys back home.

What I see as am aftermath to this pullout is another" peace benefit" and a large reduction in defence

spending and you guys that are trying to make a career of the army will spend the rest of your lives going

"bullets bullets bang bang" in Wainwright or Gagetown. 

                                                                                Regards


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## pbi (2 Aug 2010)

time expired said:
			
		

> What I see as am aftermath to this pullout is another" peace benefit" and a large reduction in defence
> 
> spending and you guys that are trying to make a career of the army will spend the rest of your lives going
> 
> ...




I agree that we'll probably suffer the first bit: most armies in democratic states do go through a cut back, once the political masters believe that the immediate fire is out. We'll have a belt tightening, but then consider that by Canadian standards the Army has gone through most of the last decade spending like a drunken sailor. If we wanted it, we got it, more or less. That will end.

As for the second part: I don't think so. Since we got involved in Yugo back in the early 90's, we;ve been continuously heading off to unexpected, dangerous places. We come back from somewhere, say "we'll never do THAT again", then the next one comes along. IMHO, the overall trend (with a few exceptions) has been for missions to be more confusing and more dangerous. Our efforts in Afghanistan put us squarely in the list of countries that will take on dangerous missions if the political conditions are right. I don't see that changing anytime soon. 

Cheers


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## GK .Dundas (3 Aug 2010)

Der Panzerkommandant.... said:
			
		

> Who? So far I've only seen one example and you provided it. No offense to Ironduke but he's not trained on Leo 2A6 IIRC. I am an end user and have done time in the sand in one.
> 
> The area you have pointed out is not a weak point on Leo 2 full stop.
> 
> ...


 unless you 're on the CBC or inmost of the print media.  :-[


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## ArmyRick (4 Aug 2010)

I can't comment on Navy and Air Force capabilities because I lack enough first hand information to really make an intelligent decision about that.

Focus on the army. If we do our estimate, I fore see these as being the task/missions of the army
1. Defending Canada; In a most realistic setting, this will be done through domestic operations such as re-enforcing security for international events (G summits and the olympics) and reacting to disasters (Floods, ice storm, major plane crashes). Priority on this would be (in my world) HIGH

2. Northern Soverinty (spelling off I know). Waving our flag through frequent soverienty exercises in the north is important plus we maintain a capability to operate in the north. This ties hand in hand with Deefending Canada but has a unique twist because of the challenges faced in getting troops to the north and the potential of something happening. Beyond a plane crash or some other disaster, I do not see a genuine threat in the north. Priority MID

3. Particapating in International Operations: This is the most difficult one to plan. In the year 2000, no one in the CF would have beleived we would spend a decade in Afghanistan. Then 9/11 happened. So who only knows? Where will we be? I would count on unstable nations and rogue governments (there are plenty) to be the most realistic threats. Yes there is N. Korea but I see that playing out as the modern Asian "cold war Part II" sort of thing. I would reccomend we maintain 2 x battle groups ready to go. Priority HIGH

4. Expeditionary Capability; This ties hand in hand with above. We were looking at one time having a standby task force ready to go but with Afghan being the main effort that seemed to fall by the waist side. Do we want a "marine Force" capability ready to go? Ship bound? Company size? Battalion size? Light or Mech or somewhere in between? If we want to exercise something like this then we would need strong political will to see it happen. 

I think for the most part I have defined in my wee little mind the potential missions and task the Army would have to meet. What are the COA we go with is the next question?


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## pbi (5 Aug 2010)

> Defending Canada





> Northern Soverinty





> Particapating in International Operations





> Expeditionary Capability



These all make good sense, and IMHO you have them in about the right order of priority. Pri #1 and Pri #2 are actually linked, since the sovereignty of all of our territory is an essential element of defending Canada. As the Arctic ice situation continues to change, and resources become in greater and greater demand, I think that the issue of our capability to operate in the Arctic will take on a much higher profile than it has now: some of our comfortable assumptions may go away. And, anyway, the security of Canada=the security of North America=the security of the USA. So, if we want to take our relationship with the US seriously, we will always have to be careful not become a security liability for them.

Pri #3 and Pri #4 are also linked, in my view, since if we are going to go somewhere outside Canada to conduct operations effectively, we need some kind of expeditionary capability. Unfortunately, being truly "expeditionary" isn't just an Army thing: we need our Joint partners to provide the lift, the sustainment and the enablers to get there, do it, and get back. We're only the "projectile" of the Joint "gun".

These priorities aren't too much different than what we've always recognized, and I think they are a solid framework for shaping our future Army.

Cheers


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