# 6 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels being no longer Mothballed



## Stoker

Apparently 3 of the oldest vessels on each coast are going down. They may keep a forth on the West for training sometime during the year. Current contracts will be honored until they run out. The Commodore is having a town hall on Wed about what this all means, budget and manning shortages are suppose to be the reason.





_I couldn't stand it anymore and fixed the title_


----------



## FSTO

The reservist screwed themselves with the MCDV's. Not that they couldn't sail the ships, it is that the Naval Reserve wore out the small cadre of people who were willing to live on 3 year Class B contracts.
Many of these folks decided to go all hog and go reg force or they quit entirely.

Do not know what the answer is.

How about getting rid of NAVRESHQ (Quebec) and rolling it into NSHQ (Since we all about returning to the past around here  >)


----------



## DONT_PANIC

Any idea of the timelines for this happening?  Given that it's the end of the school year, a lot of reservists who are in school will be heading out to the coast for OJT.  I wonder if they will start putting more and more reservists on the heavies over the next 4 months in anticipation of reduced sailling time on the MCDVs.


----------



## Stoker

Don't know all the time lines for this, details will be worked out soon I guess. There will be a training platform stood out west and I know CCFL will try and have a platform for training out here we hope.
For what I have heard people will be still employed to keep the corporate knowledge for the Arctic Patrol Ships. I have been told I still will be employed on Class C because of my specialty.
It's really a shame through, since the ship's have been upgraded with new radars, ops room fit etc.


----------



## Cronicbny

Yes, we had our announcement out here (West) last week. 

Indepth inspection of the Naval Board briefings foretold all of this a few weeks ago now. There is money set aside for disposal of the 6 KINGSTON class which will be taken off-line and sold/scrapped. It isn't a foregone conclusion that the oldest ships will be retired - three of the ships have expensive refits done ISO OP PODIUM for greater INMARSAT connectivity. Post Deployment input to DMRS is being sought as to how well the Interim Kingston Class High Speed Data Connection worked and possible placement in another three vessels - DMRS is foreseeing a huge cut to the KHSDC plan overall and are coming up with a solution. 

DONT_PANIC - The timeline is immediate. Notwithstanding, we have plenty of space for OJT personnel out West and the East Coast will (apparently) maintain the fourth hull for OJTs in particular until the end of the summer.

I can say this unequivocably - THE WEST COAST IS NOT STANDING UP THE FOURTH HULL*(starred relaxation)

FSTO - > While that is partially true, most people have been on Class C contracts since 2002. At that time we had six full ship's companies. The problem was a combination of excessive sailing days per hull and, more importantly, when some manning shortages were apparent (after NAVRES failed to Force Generate adequate numbers of sailors) we pierhead jumped a good majority of people so they were sailing effectively 260+ days a year. Some might even argue that the culture shock of moving from the Gates and Pigs to an actual ship with somewhat more recognized capability and the commensurate lack of "booze cruises" drove alot of people away. We could argue a million reasons why NAVRES has found itself in this hole but the solution, in my opinion, will only come after the Strategic Review this fall. I suspect the Navy as a whole may move to some "full time/part time" construct or NAVRES simply won't Force Generate the KINGSTON class.

Starred Relaxation:
* Assuming the cost estimates from Coastal Div East weren't out to lunch.


----------



## Cronicbny

Stoker said:
			
		

> I have been told I still will be employed on Class C because of my specialty.



Everyone currently on contract will have them honoured until at least May 2011 - no special reference to specialties exist. Post 2011, each ship will still have a crew on Class C (6 hulls in total) and approximately half a crew available as standby for coursing, MATA/PATA etc. All told there should be at least 204 Class C positions available in addition to numerous Class B positions for trainees.


----------



## Stoker

I really don't think the sky is falling, hvr this is a good time to try and generate more qualified pers and hopefully in a few years will have a more healthier pool of individuals to more to the Arctic Patrol Ship's. As Cronicby has said, there still are lots of jobs to go around. I suspect a lot of the younger guys will use this as an excuse to CT. There's even talk of offering a 5 year contract to remainding pers's, essentially making that person "regular force" but stuck to class.


----------



## Cronicbny

Stoker said:
			
		

> I really don't think the sky is falling, hvr this is a good time to try and generate more qualified pers and hopefully in a few years will have a more healthier pool of individuals to more to the Arctic Patrol Ship's. As Cronicby has said, there still are lots of jobs to go around. I suspect a lot of the younger guys will use this as an excuse to CT. There's even talk of offering a 5 year contract to remainding pers's, essentially making that person "regular force" but stuck to class.



Funny enough Stoker, just the opposite happened in my department. I had three of my most junior guys (and gals) come up and ask how they could amend their AVREPs so they could extend and get some of the core crew billets!  Needless to say I showed them the forms and helped them out. I think we should give the younger folk credit - they see change and feel an opportunity. The only people I have spoken to who were more actively considering a CT already had plans to do so...

It will all come out in the wash  8)


----------



## Sailorwest

This is really not a surprise. The Naval Reserve was manning 4 or 5 ships on a permanent basis prior to the MCDV's and then doubled that commitment with no corresponding increase in total establishment. The initial thought was that sailors would return to their NRD's following a posting to one of these ships but that never materialized. Instead, they remained with the ships, found postings ashore, CT'd to the regular force or simply released. The bench strength at most NRD's is incredibly thin. 

As far as force generation goes, this will be a complete shock to those of you who have never served meaningful time at an NRD but people don't join the reserves to be full time employed by the Navy. Those people are directed to the regular force.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Hello Sailorwest. I hope all is well at Tecumseh.

I just want to correct a few facts here. Before the MCDV's, the Naval Reserve never manned ships on a permanent basis as a method of operation. In the few years leading to the arrival of MCDV's, it was felt that the knowledge base and experience of all reservists had to be raised to prepare for the switch from Gate vessels and PB's. To do that, a small cadre of reservists were put on long term contracts and two ships were acquired to provide better platforms for  training (mostly in minesweeping): The Moresby and Anticosti. These are the only ships that the reserve manned on a permanent basis before the MCDV's. 

Otherwise, the reserve operated six ships (five Gate Vessels and Fort Steele, sometimes added to this: the fifth PB) full time for four summer months to provide MWV BWK training and trade training OJT. These same ships were used in fall, winter and spring to carry out week-end training of reserves. These ships each had regular force "custodian" who was the DA holder for all onboard materiel and  a regular force chief engineer. These two seaman sailed with the ship in the summer and on week-ends unless the reserve unit using the ship was able to provide for these positions. Also, on each coast, the administrative unit in charge of the reserve ships was augmented by a certain number of officers and trades people who were on an extended contracts, usually for a year or two, who assisted and supported those functions.

For instance, I had a year free between my two university courses in the early 80's and put that year in with (then) TD3 on the West coast. From the end of one school year to the beginning of the next, it went like this: from May to August, full time manning, I acted as a ship's officer, from September to April, with TD3, I provided administrative support for the various units coming down for the week end training, and when need be augmented their crew if they were short watch keepers, then May to August, back to being ship's officer for the summer. During that time one other officer was on a contract with me for the winter and about eight-nine other trades people, working out to about three or four of us per ship.

When the MCDV's were purchased, they were to replace all six reserve ships and to replace the PB's which were manned by the regular force and used for Mars III and first phase Mars IV training. However, after the MCDV's came online, the regular force ceased manning any of the MCDV,s (even though there was a slight increase of regular force personnel assigned to the MCDV's to cover the electrical/electronics trades ) and the whole burden fell squarely on the reserve to full time man ten ships. If this made sense for a few years at the beginning, in order to create quickly a core of trained personnel in every reserve units, it has long outlived its usefulness and has now long been a detrimental drag on the reserve. And yes, all this has been done without any increase in overall number of reservists.

So, having burned the candle from both ends, the Navy and in particular, the Reserve, finds itself where it should have been about two years after the introduction of the MCDV's to the fleet. It must make some serious decisions based on its view of the need for these vessels and for a credible and sustainable reserve force:

1) Do I need some of these MCDV's for Mars III and Mars IV, first phase training? If so, take these ships, put them on the West coast and man them fully with regular force personnel, like the old PB's. (Besides, the old PB's provided the reg force with something it is now missing: junior commands that let up and coming LCdrs show their mettle in preparation for later major commands - Trust me, it would also help the reg force with retention of LCdrs).

2) Do I want a viable reserve force as a basis for expansion in case of major conflict? If so, go back to the concept of operation that was used with the Gate vessels. You may have to increase the number of regular force support personnel to five or six per ship (CERA, Custodian, Buffer, Sr ET, Sr NET and maybe a A/CERA) from the two we used to have, but it will again provide the reserve with large number of sea positions in the summer and full training week ends. This will help with part timer's retention in reserve units, increase morale and go back to sustainability levels, though it may require foregoing some of the more exotic types of operations, such as route survey or ROV operations, but not necessarily so.

If, however, the Navy decided that it NEEDS all ten MCDV's manned and ready full time, it should then man them all fully with regular force personnel and find some other way to train the reserves.

As you can see, splitting the ships between East and West to perform these two tasks would likely end up requiring eight MCDV's in Esquimalt and four in Halifax.

By the way, if the Navy intends to  operate the AOPS in the arctic, or the gulf of St-Lawrence for that matter, when ice is present, the reserve will NOT be able to operate them, and in fact the regular force will find it difficult. I am originally from Quebec City, home of the largest fleet of icebreakers of the Coast-Guard , and have many friends on those ships. They reckon a watch keeper is safe to operate by herself in iced waters after acquiring about two to three years (cumulative - not calendar) of experience and a captain needs about ten to fifteen years.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Additional on my last re: "foregoing some of the more exotic types of operations":

In another stream ( http://Forums.Milnet.ca/forums/threads/77766.0.html ), there is a suggestion the AOPS will start coming on line in 2014. Since they are intended to replace the MCDV's, and unless someone can point me to a significant mine threat to Canada's coasts in the next three years, is there a reason to continue to train anyone in mine warfare on the MCDVs? And if such a threat exists, should we ignore it in the future when we start decommissioning the MCDVs?

Truth is the mine threat on this side of the Atlantic/Pacific (as applicable) is negligible. We lived without such capacity for years and only acquired it back (with the MCDVs)  because we had plans to acquire nuclear subs, which would have warranted the expenditure by our enemies of the moment of the efforts required to covertly approach our shores to plant deep mines.

I know form another stream here ( http://Forums.Milnet.ca/forums/threads/92998.0.html ) that DND is looking at acquiring new remote mine disposal systems for the MCDVs, which makes little sense if we expect to start disposing of them in a few years. These systems have to be deployable from crafts of opportunity  however, and that may be all you need to cover the threat of mine in our waters, in view of the low level. Besides, the MCDVs are great diving support platforms. Perhaps upon decommissioning one can be kept on each coast for use as diving tender by FDU's.

Meanwhile, why don't we just concentrate on using them to qualify as many of the reserve units real part time officers and NCMs as possible?


----------



## Sailorwest

Greetings Oldgateboatdriver,
You won't find me arguing against the model that you're describing. The challenge now is the paradigm that the Naval Reserve has placed itself regarding 'Total Force'. This is problematic on a few fronts. Primarily, the KIN Class became the exclusive domain of reservists, with only the NET and Electrician being Regular force. Now much of the trade OJT and the refresher training requirements for Cl A reservists are platform specific. This limits options. Secondly, as we are obliged to meet the same training standards as the Regular Force, recruiting into the Naval Reserve is more challenging in comparison with the Army Reserve. We cannot do any sort of in unit BMOQ training (ala SYEP/PRSTP) at the NRD where our compatriots in the Army Reserve can. I have seen potential recruits point to this as a reason why they do not choose to join the NR. What probably should happen is a reassessment of that concept of Total Force.


----------



## Monsoon

Sailorwest said:
			
		

> What probably should happen is a reassessment of that concept of Total Force.


Well, everything looks like a nail to a man with a hammer. I would suggest that out-of-routining six Kingston class ships because of budget cuts is not a good reason to scrap Total Force - in fact, I would suggest that the two things are not only completely unrelated, but counterproductive. With fewer dedicated platforms, maybe NAVRES can move away from the Kingston class pigeonhole and start augmenting on the heavies - actual Total Force.

At the risk of dragging this thread far, far off topic: what some of the old guard don't get is that vast majority of the current Naval Reserve joined under Total Force, did their training under Total Force and identify with Total Force. And, as has been pointed out, NAVRES hasn't grown since Total Force was introduced - it hasn't shrunk either. So going back to the old way would (1) risk alienating the overwhelming majority of the formation to the benefit of a small minority who would suddenly be once again promotable, and (2) reduce overall effectiveness to no benefit. I agree that NAVRES has failed to force generate sufficiently to man twelve Kingston class ships, but it can still do six in a sleepwalk - a 100% improvement over the capability provided 15 years ago.

So yes, we could go back to the old "healthy NRD" model with legions of C&POs and senior officers holding down the bars of their respective messes with their elbows, but for what it's worth I'd rather see the NRDs relatively thin on the ground but populated with people dedicated to maintaining their trade and contributing to an actual mission (even, or especially, a mission that's just a bit of a stretch to achieve). There are already organizations for people who want to maintain their affiliation with the Navy without staying current.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

To be so dismissive of naval mines as oldgate* does really scares me. Mines are one of the cheapest and potentially most deadly weapons out there. Because today we see our threats under a low threat, all it would take is one freighter to drop a couple of score of mines over the side and  our major ports will be paralyzed.

Its too bad we are looking at getting rid of these 6, while I am not a big fan of MCDVs I always thought they filled a nice niche role. Personally I think we should have built dedicated minehunters, minesweepers and command vessels rather then the ad hoc approach we tend to take. I think if we had a specific role for the Reserves we may able to retain more.


----------



## Sailorwest

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Well, everything looks like a nail to a man with a hammer. I would suggest that out-of-routining six Kingston class ships because of budget cuts is not a good reason to scrap Total Force - in fact, I would suggest that the two things are not only completely unrelated, but counterproductive. With fewer dedicated platforms, maybe NAVRES can move away from the Kingston class pigeonhole and start augmenting on the heavies - actual Total Force.
> 
> At the risk of dragging this thread far, far off topic: what some of the old guard don't get is that vast majority of the current Naval Reserve joined under Total Force, did their training under Total Force and identify with Total Force. And, as has been pointed out, NAVRES hasn't grown since Total Force was introduced - it hasn't shrunk either. So going back to the old way would (1) risk alienating the overwhelming majority of the formation to the benefit of a small minority who would suddenly be once again promotable, and (2) reduce overall effectiveness to no benefit. I agree that NAVRES has failed to force generate sufficiently to man twelve Kingston class ships, but it can still do six in a sleepwalk - a 100% improvement over the capability provided 15 years ago.
> 
> So yes, we could go back to the old "healthy NRD" model with legions of C&POs and senior officers holding down the bars of their respective messes with their elbows, but for what it's worth I'd rather see the NRDs relatively thin on the ground but populated with people dedicated to maintaining their trade and contributing to an actual mission (even, or especially, a mission that's just a bit of a stretch to achieve). There are already organizations for people who want to maintain their affiliation with the Navy without staying current.


I guess the point is about why you have a Naval Reserve. If that is to have a full time flleet of ships run by full time reservists, an HQ organization manned by full time reservists, fleet schools and MOGs filled up with full time reservists, then you have essentially an operational reserve and should probably be at war (a naval war that is). If all of these people are working full time for the navy should they not be considered Regular Force? Why have Naval Reserve Divisions at all if there only purpose is to recruit sailors to join the permanent force? We have a recruiting organization for that. 

The concept of a reserve is to have the ability to rapidly expand the organization in times of crisis. We now have limited ability to grow because of the large percentage of the current TES that is on full time service. We no longer have a strategic reserve capacity in the Navy. You may well have viewed it as a bunch officers and  chiefs holding the bar down with their elbows but they were there and available should they be needed. Now that there is little purpose for the Cl A sailor, a number of them choose to vote with their feet and once they are gone to the sup list, very rarely do they ever come back. When you make the value of being a 'citizen sailor' at the NRD worthless, then they will cease to exist because their time to do other things will be more important to them.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> By the way, if the Navy intends to  operate the AOPS in the arctic, or the gulf of St-Lawrence for that matter, when ice is present, the reserve will NOT be able to operate them, and in fact the regular force will find it difficult. I am originally from Quebec City, home of the largest fleet of icebreakers of the Coast-Guard , and have many friends on those ships. They reckon a watch keeper is safe to operate by herself in iced waters after acquiring about two to three years (cumulative - not calendar) of experience and a captain needs about ten to fifteen years.


Thanks for the historical perspective on NAVRES ship manning - very interesting.  

I agree with you about needing to gain experience in Northern operations, much like was done in the early 50s as HMCS Labrador came into naval service.  This could be obtained through exchange programmes with Norway (since the AOPS is based on their SVALBARD), Denmark (Thetis class), and/or from the Canadian Coast Guard.  Unlike the LABRADOR, the AOPS is 'only' capable of dealing with one metre of ice - suggesting it will not be competing with our heavy Coast Guard icebreakers but rather have freedom of manoeuvre during the 'navigable season'.  Some of the experience gained by Halifax, Kingston, and Victoria class vessels during the last few years will also be applicable.

I'm currently in a joint unit and a bit out of touch with the navy but has AOPS been declared the replacement for the Kingston class and to be manned by the NAVRES?


----------



## Monsoon

Sailorwest said:
			
		

> If all of these people are working full time for the navy should they not be considered Regular Force? Why have Naval Reserve Divisions at all if there only purpose is to recruit sailors to join the permanent force? We have a recruiting organization for that.


I don't disagree - but that's not a "Total Force" issue (which has to do with equality of training and the ability to seamlessly transition from part-time to full-time components; in fact, we aren't even really Total Force yet), it's an expectations issue and a PRes/Reg F definitions issue.



> Now that there is little purpose for the Cl A sailor, a number of them choose to vote with their feet and once they are gone to the sup list, very rarely do they ever come back. When you make the value of being a 'citizen sailor' at the NRD worthless, then they will cease to exist because their time to do other things will be more important to them.


But if the sole purpose of the Cl A sailor is to serve an "in case of war, break glass" function and nothing more, isn't that why we have a SupRes? I agree that we do an abominable job of keeping SupRes info up-to-date, but that's the real balloon-goes-up we'll-take-anyone women-and-children-first reserve. The active reserve needs to be, well, active. And in a more than community outreach function.


----------



## Stoker

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Thanks for the historical perspective on NAVRES ship manning - very interesting.
> 
> I agree with you about needing to gain experience in Northern operations, much like was done in the early 50s as HMCS Labrador came into naval service.  This could be obtained through exchange programmes with Norway (since the AOPS is based on their SVALBARD), Denmark (Thetis class), and/or from the Canadian Coast Guard.  Unlike the LABRADOR, the AOPS is 'only' capable of dealing with one metre of ice - suggesting it will not be competing with our heavy Coast Guard icebreakers but rather have freedom of manoeuvre during the 'navigable season'.  Some of the experience gained by Halifax, Kingston, and Victoria class vessels during the last few years will also be applicable.
> 
> I'm currently in a joint unit and a bit out of touch with the navy but has AOPS been declared the replacement for the Kingston class and to be manned by the NAVRES?



I agree that with "global warming" the ice free season is getting longer and longer and we don't really need the same experience as the Canadian Coast Guard. We do have some officers that have operated in ice and the plan as I understand it is to have sufficient personnel trained to operate in ice for the years to come when we finally get AOPS. Probably from serving on coast guard vessels and exchange with other ice operating countries.

While it is expected that NAVRES will have some billets on  ASOP's,  no final decision as been made yet and studies are ongoing. If I was a betting man, we will indeed be manning these ship's however, with a greater reg force compliment on board, such as weapons techs, hull techs and possible aircrew.


----------



## Stoker

We just had our "town hall" meeting with the Commodore today.  Out east the ship's that are staying will be SUMMERSIDE, GOOSEBAY and MONCTON. SHAWINIGAN  will be retained at least until late summer for training. Lots of things are being looked at, such as possibility putting a MCDV alongside Quebec City for training. These ships are not being disposed of, not yet anyways. Even though the ship's are going down, NAVRES budget's not been affected so far, so these are plenty of jobs for pers. There is also a strategic review happening soon that will probably redefine the role of the reserves.
Even though we are going to 6 ship's, op temp will be the same and probably may increase, but may utilize more crew switching out from time to time to prevent burnout.
The army side of things was mentioned with the Class B freeze and how they were way over established on billets. There will be no contract cuts on our end like they are having.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

I love vigorous but polite exchanges of views. I think it benefits everyone, and sometime gives people in authority new perspective on a problem leading to a better solution.

Now back to topic: All I am advocating is this: If you mothball three MCDV's per coast, why not do it in such a way that you can easily reactivate two or three of them for three to four months every summer and run them with the real part-timer reservists out on short class A or B employment? It may  not be sufficient for them to learn new material, but it would be good for morale, retention and at the least, it would maintain their skill level through practice. This more than anything else could help with the "total force" idea of "seamlessly going from part-time to full-time" employment .

Now Ex-D, I am not dismissive of mines, far from it, and I could not agree more with you that  we should have  a small number of real minehunters. However, they would be for deployment oversea mostly, in support of the heavies. 

I have both studied mine warfare and served on exchange in British sweepers, French minehunters and even as NATO observer/Referee in mine warfare exercises in the Channel. Bear in mind, mines are not IED's. Yes they  are cheap but only as compared to building warships, missiles or torpedos. They are not devices that individuals can just build in their garage then get to a boat. Also, they are large and heavy pieces of equipment (They must have an anchor of some sort for one thing - even the bottom mines). So they are not something you just  "chuck over the side" of a ship, but require quite a seamanship evolution with cranes, davits or rails. Modern freighters are not equipped to do this and it would require the collaboration of a large part of the crew, with the other ones noticing for sure. This would not happen from one of the large commercial merchies that cross the Atlantic/Pacific to come to North America (Besides, mining another's waters is an act of war in intn'l law - not something the countries of large merchies would want).  

As for Hamiltongs, be kind to your seniors. People like me are not referred to as "old guard" but as "dinosaurs". However, we do not like to be referred to as people tending bars. The reserve units are for more than "in case of emergency, break glass". In WWII they became the front line of recruiting and basic indoctrination. You see, if you recruit into the regular force in case of large wartime expansion, when the emergency is over you can't release them because they have contracts. The US found that out after Vietnam: They released people on dishonourable discharges for the most insignificant of breach of discipline as a force reduction strategy, with the effect you can imagine on morale and  attendant resentment. 

The SupRes cannot provide this, nor can it provide the numbers of trained people the Navy might need in a hurry. This has to do with two facts: first, as the regular careers are extended, the average regular spends 25 to 30 yrs in service, retiring around age 45-50. Thus, being available for only 10 to 15 yrs on SupRes. This means at any time, only 2 or 3 thousand people are available for SupRes status. Second, they do not train as a rule, so they become quite rusty, where the PriRes who do their week-ends and annual two weeks at least keep their skill level up. (If you don't believe it, I have had young SupRes LT's  come do a two week stint after being out for three or four years who could not navigate me out of Halifax harbour safely at the end of their two weeks - no reflection on them, its just that you get rusty)


----------



## Sailorwest

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Now back to topic: All I am advocating is this: If you mothball three MCDV's per coast, why not do it in such a way that you can easily reactivate two or three of them for three to four months every summer and run them with the real part-timer reservists out on short class A or B employment? It may  not be sufficient for them to learn new material, but it would be good for morale, retention and at the least, it would maintain their skill level through practice. This more than anything else could help with the "total force" idea of "seamlessly going from part-time to full-time" employment .


The challenge with this idea, I think, is the level of complexity of the engineering of the KIN Class and the cost of maintenance. We stood up NAN in 2006 for COJT. Not too dissimilar from what we did in the 80's and early 90's. It took over a month to get things up to speed, including addressing all the supply issue for a ship which had been 'scavenged' for spare parts and tools while sitting alongside for 6 months. Of that crew, over 1/2 were full time reservists att posted to the ship for the summer, with a minority coming from the Cl A world.  Today there are very few Cl A MESO's that would be able to come out and do this. They tend not to return to the NRD's. Although many of the command/control, commuications, and deck functions are not too different, the engineering is. This isn't your father's MCDV.


----------



## Monsoon

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> As for Hamiltongs, be kind to your seniors. People like me are not referred to as "old guard" but as "dinosaurs". However, we do not like to be referred to as people tending bars.


You're not the "old guard" - the old guard are the diehard C&PO/Lt(N)/LCdrs who to this day continue to come in once every three weeks or so despite not having ever seen let alone sailed on a Kingston class ship. They're not doing "a weekend a month and two weeks a year", they're just taking up space in the org chart for senior personnel while contributing at a level that would see an LS shown the door.

As for the "in case of emergency, break glass" function - you denied it, but then went on to describe the role of a reserve to be to provide an easily disposed-of wartime recruiting base. Given the choice of being part of an organization that does nothing until a war is declared (and let's be honest, no war will ever be "declared" in the future), then I'd just as soon wait until the war gets underway to sign up.

As for the rusted skillset theory - I don't buy it. If someone on the SupRes can't do the job after a couple of years, how can someone in the Reg F posted to Ottawa for two back-to-back postings ever be expected to go to sea again? The Reg F does practically nothing by way of refresher for people posted out of environment. Also, the SRR is composed of ex-reservists, who generally get out younger than their Reg F counterparts. If wartime mobilization is your priority (and I think it's pretty clear that it isn't at DND), then improve the SRR, don't downgrade the PRes.

All that aside, my point is this: in the absence of a clear day-to-day mission _in addition to a wartime augmentation role_, the organization will flounder, particularly as the majority of current serving members joined under Total Force. It's been over a decade and a half now; time to move on.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Lex
The CCG does not normally operate in the North during the winter months, our icebreakers are not “heavy class”, more medium in the scheme of things. The Polar 8 was supposed to be able to over winter and be very capable in thick multi-year ice, but that’s a faded memory.

Oldgatedriver
Merchant ships disappear on a regular basis and reappear under new colours with new crews (the fate of the old crew is only guessed at) It would be difficult but not impossible to equip a standard merchant ship with mine laying capability, disguised as a fuel tank or such dropping out of the bottom. Only a few onboard would need to know the true intent, the rest would assume drug smuggling or something and accept the bribes to ignore anything odd. The ship would be registered in a 3rd world country with several front companies owning it. 
The biggest trick would be to keep the shipyard crew who modified it to keep quiet (Not a problem in North Korea) and then to arrange that that ship to be in or near the right harbour when you want to start hostilities. Beyond the resource of the terrorist groups for now, but not of some rather unethical countries.

This thread reminds me of the amalgamation of the CCG, Science and DFO fleets, vessels were disposed of that were later needed.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

All good point everyone.

Colin, I know what happens to merchies - I read the intel - but what you say confirms what I said: The threat is negligible, which in naval termes does not equate zero but is sufficiently low "at this time" to provide the required lead time to deal with when it becomes necessary. 

I take it from your post that you are Coast Guard, so I do not know your level of mine warfare knowledge. Basically, true mine hunters (as suggested by both Ex-D and I, would be useful) are the single most expanseve warship to build on a per-ton basis. So in a tight budget, it becomes: what are the biggest threat I can deal with within my budget.

P.S.: Conecerning wintering in the Arctic: Amundsen does it, but more importantly, if you go to the AOPS thread of this forum, you will see that the latest AOPS plan calls for ships about 5500 tons, Polar 3 capable only with a maximum continous speed of 17 kts , that will be very lightlyarmed with small  weapons you could bolt on just about any  merchant hull. Last time I checked, the river class icbreakers you mention, like Radisson and DesGroseillers were exactly that size and capable of 16.5 kts continous in open waters. They also had agreat big landing pad on their stern. So do we need to spend 3.1 B$ for an extra half knot or is it easier to get four or five more Radisson's for the Coast guard and from time to time strap light weapons on thier decks, embark military operators and deploy them on "sovereignty patrols"?


----------



## MarkOttawa

Oldgateboatdriver:  Good stuff on the Arctic.  Have a look at these posts at _The Torch_:

Coast Guard, not Navy, for Canadian maritime presence in the North 
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/coast-guard-not-navy-for-canadian.html

Arctic/Offshore patrol ships: More never never land 
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/arcticoffshore-patrol-ships-more-never.html

The icebreakers we should build 
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/08/icebreakers-we-should-build.html

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Thank you Mark. Glad to see I am not the only one thinking its an expansive half knot!

And thank you Hamiltongs. But trust me, I am a dinausor: I am about to be honourably discharged from the SupRes by Her Majesty as my ten years are up.

There is a thrid way for the future of the reserve which is neither the pre Kingston days, nor the current one but is closer to the "total force concept". I have been advocating it for years to whoever wishes to hear it: An american style reserve: Four regional reserve training centers  (East, Quebec, Ontario, West) manned by reg force administrative officers and relevant trade training personnel. These centers would have all the simulators, classroom and materiel training ressources required.

Once a reserve is recruited and enrolled by recruiting center, she would be processed through basic at St-jean like every regular force person, but mostly in the summer (to avoid screwing up school year). Then, the appropriate "regional center" would take her over and provide her with a schedule of ten monthly week ends  a year when she would be expected to show up for trade/skill maintenance training and two weeks of full time service. When trade qualified , he would be posted to an existing team of some sort (harbour defense, MCDV crew, inspection diving team, etc.). While on such team, the monthly week end and two week annual training would be with that team so that all the time would be devoted to team training and readiness maintenance. In case of need (wartime or otherwise) the whole team gets called out.

Now, that is "total force", but it is bold and goes against the organisation of reserves we have used for 83 years. However, it is important to remenber that until not so long ago (last 12 years, roughly, reserve units used to do their own recruiting, medicals, enrolment and provided most of the basic training and trades training internally. This is not so anymore and it then begs the question, what do we need the units for, other than maintaining 24 buildings?

Good pondering everyone.


----------



## Neill McKay

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> what do we need the units for, other than maintaining 24 buildings?



I'd suggest that Cmdre Hose's vision is still relevant: NAVRES divisions bring the navy to the hinterland.  Whether that application is being fully exploited or not is a matter for discussion.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> P.S.: Conecerning wintering in the Arctic: Amundsen does it, but more importantly, if you go to the AOPS thread of this forum, you will see that the latest AOPS plan calls for ships about 5500 tons, Polar 3 capable only with a maximum continous speed of 17 kts , that will be very lightlyarmed with small  weapons you could bolt on just about any  merchant hull. Last time I checked, the river class icbreakers you mention, like Radisson and DesGroseillers were exactly that size and capable of 16.5 kts continous in open waters. They also had agreat big landing pad on their stern. So do we need to spend 3.1 B$ for an extra half knot or is it easier to get four or five more Radisson's for the Coast guard and from time to time strap light weapons on thier decks, embark military operators and deploy them on "sovereignty patrols"?


AOPS is based on the Norwegian SVALBARD design but is being modified for Canadian service.  SVALBARD is 6,300 tons full load displacement with a maximum speed of 17.5 knots.  She only operates a medium (NH-90) helicopter which is one of the Canadian modifications (our MH are much larger).  She cost approximately $90 Million USD (plus CSE fit) in 2002.  Part of the reason for the $3 billion AOPS budget is the switch to accrual accounting methods for capital purchases.  It is also worth noting that the AOPS programme stated that "There is currently insufficient infrastructure in both Esquimalt and Halifax to berth the AOPS.  As a result, some additional jetty infrastructure renewal would be required.  The project will also establish a docking and refuelling facility in Nunavut.  These infrastructure costs - estimated at approximately $274 million - will be included in the AOPS budget."  I don't think that purchasing a 30+ year old design such as the CCG Medium/River icebreaker is necessarily a better approach than AOPS nor will it prove any cheaper.

There is a similar thread at the Canadian Naval Review website that is worth reading: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/forum/view.php?topic=2


----------



## Colin Parkinson

One of the issues with “river class” icebreakers is that they are designed with more longitudinal strength than horizontal, Ocean class breakers need the horizontal strength to avoid being crushed by shifting ice flows. That being said the Larson and the 1100 class are pretty much the last dedicated icebreakers we have built since 86-87. I don’t think Canada has the institutional knowledge to build them anymore and certain not up on the current technology. That expertise can be imported both through purchasing proven designs and bringing SME’s from other shipyards and design firms. While having a hull built offshore is faster and cheaper, it’s not likely politically doable.
As for manning them, well the first couple of months in the Arctic is rather exciting, after that……
Oldgatedriver, If I recall the drive in minesweeping tech was to make it modular, so the equipment was supposed to be able to be moved from ship to ship as required, is/was that the case, did they succeed or are there technology choke points to cause problems?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Colin:

Minesweeping gear is pretty well modular. We have a limited number of kits and they can be moved from one MCDV to the next fairly easily. Minesweeping is not high tech and has not changed much since it was conceived at the end of Victorian times. However, sweeping only deals with moored (or tethered) mines. offensive mine warfare has evolved passed that and we now have to deal with bottom mines. These you have to "hunt", and the hunting is technology driven. 

Basically, think of hydrographic surveying: you are trying to derive a picture of the bottom of the water in sufficiently rough details that you can point out where the "bumps" on the bottom and general slopes are. In mine hunting, using similar techniques,  we are trying to pin point objects in realtime that are from the size of a barrel down to the size of a bankers box on the sea floor that look like they do not belong there to start with. 

In Canada, I'll say it again here, the MCDV were acquired to deal with ONE mine warfare threat: deep anti-submarine mines. This is because at the time we developed the MCDV's concept of operation, we were in the middle of the acquisition program for six to eight nuclear submarines. Such submarines were sufficiently high value assets to warrant an attack by deep sea mines.

The MCDV's were to deal with such mines in two ways: Moored mines would be team swept with mechanical EDATS gear (Extreme Depth Armed Team Sweep). Dealing with the bottom mines was different : in "peace" time, extremely detailed route surveys of the routes would be taken by the MCDV's using side scan sonar. Anything unusual revealed by these surveys would be identified by divers or ROV and catalogued. In case of increased tension or suspected mine attack, the route survey would be re-taken and compared to the original one. Anything new would be considered a mine and re-identified or destroyed by divers/ROV again. So here is a first technological choke point: The volume of data that needed to be stored, then compared for discrepancies - with the attendant "noise to signal" problems, not to mention "matching of data: did the ship go over exactly the same ground, were the sonar angles the same, is this a different rock, or the same rock which shifted a bit or was not measured from the same position, etc. I do not know (as I have been out for a while) if we ever managed to make it work. I know we had not when I retired. 

Just think of the expeditions that go looking for important warship sinking sites: They have a good idea of where the ships sank because navies keep pretty good navigational records and they are looking for a six to nine hundred foot ship. Still they search for weeks, months and sometimes fail to find their prey. You are looking for something very small that may or may not be there and never know what your search area will be exactly until you start finding mines. That is why, for the shallower area where regular mines are used against surface ships we need mine hunters that have two important assets: 1) every possible and conceivable measure of self protection possible, and 2) the single most advanced computing system for realtime analysis of data, the Mk1 human eye/brain computer.

For this type of mine hunting work, modular systems are more problematic: First, it is difficult if not impossible to know the exact boundary of the mined area, and thus cannot come up with a safe standoff distance for any Craft of opportunity that would receive the modular package. Such craft does not have self protection measures built-in and losing it and the modular package before even starting is not the best scenario. Moreover, it would have to be stand off technology. We are slowly getting there and the latest generations of machines are getting better, but such technology has to work in nature and, whether  you have an umbilical control or radio control (more complicated as you still need something connecting the underwater system to the surface antenna) search system, it is affected by under water currents, the way it is driven by the operator, the distance off you are (time delays) and the effect of the weather on the surface mother ship. So if you are in a hurry, you can miss things or easily fail to  maintain proper attitude or lose contact with the system or fail to realize the actual position of the object you are inspecting more closely, etc.  In all cases, the safety of your craft of opportunity  has now been compromised.  

As you can see, while the technology is improving, we are not there yet and mine hunting is still a craft that requires people going in harm's way in the mine field relying on their experience and the safety of the self-protection measures built in the craft they use.

Sorry if I bored some people with mine warfare 101.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Not boring at all, even though I knew a fair bit of it. As for the mapping issue, the ability to map bottom terrain is increasing both through the GPS acquisitions, ability to store and read data and multi-beam sonar. The future of that kind of mine warfare likely lives in AUV's operating ahead of the ship to sweep the area. I worked with the Underwater Research Lab from Simion Fraser University where they where working on AUV's and in fact I am taking a small ROV out for field inspections next week   http://www.videoray.com/products/10-pro-3-e

One option I can see is that when the minehunter detects a target either directly or remotely, they deploy a ROV sled which carries the AUV to the vicinity. The AUV detaches from the sled and investigates the target, sending real time video to the sled, which is then relayed back to the ship. This will reduce the AUV's biggest handicap which is transmitting complex data through the water column. If the target is identified as hostile, then the AUV or a specialized ROV destroys it. 

These guys have been working the AUV angle for quite sometime and I have seen their AUV being tested in Indian Arm, there larger one was on a direct heading for our vessel which it detected and altered course for, quite interesting stuff. 
http://www.ise.bc.ca/auv.html


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Canada's navy cuts coast patrol fleet in half
Last Updated: Thursday, May 13, 2010 | 12:50 PM AT 
CBC News  






HMCS Saskatoon and the other coastal patrol ships were built in the mid-1990s. (DND)

A shortage of money and sailors is forcing Canada's navy to mothball half of its fleet of coastal patrol vessels.

Canada's 12 Kingston-class ships, based in Halifax and Esquimalt, B.C., are operated by the navy reserve. The 55-metre vessels are used to patrol the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific ocean coasts.

In a statement to CBC News, the navy says it made the tough choice to leave several ships at dock and strip them of their crews because it doesn't have the resources to operate all 12.

The navy says the move is necessary to continue the primary mission of defending Canada.

"Upon close examination of resources and priorities, this was deemed necessary to safeguard and optimize our operational capability, both now and in the future," wrote Denise LaViolette, a navy spokeswoman.

Three ships will remain on each coast. The others won't be scrapped, but they will be put in long-term storage.

No financial details given
The navy has not said how much money it would need to keep the whole fleet active, or how much it will save by reducing the fleet by half.

The Kingston-class ships were built in the mid-1990s to hunt for mines that could block Canadian ports. They are lightly armed and can be converted to carry a small underwater robot or even platoons of soldiers.

LaViolette said that, despite the navy's actions, the federal government is providing "stable and predictable" funding. She said the navy continues to modernize its frigates and refit its submarines.


----------



## SeanNewman

For too long, good-old-fashioned Canadian soldier creativity has kept the mission going at all costs no matter what constraints were placed on him.

The problem is that nobody ever notices there's a problem when you get the job done.

Kudos to the people in charge here for not saying "okay now we'll man these ships with 10 people and we'll train by firing one bullet per year out of the cannon".  It's not about playing hardball, but saying "Look, this is what we can effectively do and if you need more I need X, Y, and Z".

And the proof is in the media responses.  People are now forced to take notice, instead of those 12 becoming 11 which would become 10, etc.


----------



## Nuggs

> ...and three frigates, HMCS Montreal, St John's and Vancouver will now be conducting domestic and continental missions to a "limited degree"...



Anyone care to speculate on what exactly that means?

I take it as, cancel all plans of crossing the pond.

I only ask as I'm posted in 3 weeks


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Crockett said:
			
		

> Anyone care to speculate on what exactly that means?
> 
> I take it as, cancel all plans of crossing the pond.
> 
> I only ask as I'm posted in 3 weeks



Don't speculate it only contributes to making things seems worse then they might otherwise be.

Milnet.Ca Staff


----------



## Nuggs

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Don't speculate it only contributes to making things seems worse then they might otherwise be.
> 
> Milnet.Ca Staff



Point taken  :nod:


----------



## NavyShooter

There was some interesting reading that came my way the other day, and consider this (with respect to ship capabilities being supported.)

Why would we spend money to maintain systems that are, quite literally, at the end of their service life due to the HCM project?

Should we spend a limited budget on systems that are being phased out through the life of the project?  Or should we transfer the parts to the ships that are doing the missions, and let those ships that aren't doing much more than low or standard readiness tasks go with what they have until they get the brand-new gear through HCM??

Do we want to invest $$$$$$$$ in SPS-49 radar parts when there's not going to be a single SPS-49 in the fleet in 5 years?  

Or, do we want to invest that money into a 3D radar system that will be taking the CPF's into the future through the next 20 years?

Yeah, it sucks that we're tying up platforms, and that some ships are losing capabilities, but in the near term, how much will that affect us?  

In the longer term, Halifax is headed for HCM, and her "old" parts will be available for the other 11 ships to use...and as more ships head into the ditch, their "old" systems will be available to support the other pre-HCM ships.

If we do that instead of buying new parts for the old systems, we'll keep most of the capability, with a fraction of the cost, and the money can go to the new gear, which is, where it really needs to go.

YMMV, but it's a hard choice that's had to be made, depending on your perspective, you can see why the decision had to be made.

NS


----------



## jollyjacktar

NS, you better watch yourself.  You're making sense.


----------



## MarkOttawa

E.R. Campbell:


> Either sinks MacKay.



I cannot see the prime minister making the minister walk the plank over the matter--esp. after Guergis/Jaffer. 

Just before all this blew up, never never land words from Mr MacKay:

Navy renewal proceeding
http://www.thestarphoenix.com/business/Somnia/3021815/story.html



> ...
> Our defence blueprint is providing the navy what it needs to serve on our three coasts and internationally. We are modernizing our frigates and refitting our submarines, and are set to invest tens of billions in building a several large vessels.
> 
> The soon-to-be finalized National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy will set the way ahead for the fleet. On the personnel front, an increasing number of skilled and dedicated people are joining the navy...



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## stealthylizard

I love the shouts of criticism from the opposition parties.  Did they forget the "decade of darkness" already?


----------



## Snakedoc

Its quite amazing the amount of news coverage this has received across Canada over the past 24 hrs, this has certainly brought the naval ships/lack of ships issue to the forefront.


----------



## kratz

from CBC.ca




> Order to cut navy's coastal vessels rescinded
> Last Updated: Friday, May 14, 2010 | 1:54 PM ET Comments0Recommend5.
> CBC News
> The order to cut Canada's 12 coastal defence vessels by half has been rescinded — just one day after it was announced, according to the country's chief of defence staff.
> 
> "We're going to rescind the order and have a look at the resources that are being provided, not only the money … but also the crewing and what we can do to maximize the available personnel, not only in the navy but the rest of the Canadian Forces to ensure that the navy's next 100 years is as successful as the last," Gen. Walter Natynczyk told a press conference in Ottawa Friday.
> 
> On Thursday, a navy spokeswoman told CBC News that a shortage of money and sailors would force Canada's navy to mothball half its fleet of 12 coastal vessels used to patrol the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
> 
> More to come


----------



## SeanNewman

stealthylizard said:
			
		

> I love the shouts of criticism from the opposition parties...



No kidding!  I couldn't believe my ears hearing an NDP guy yell out "When will the Prime Minister answer for how poorly he has funded the military...?".

The budget has been increased by how many billions in the last decade?

Granted the Liberals started us going upward, but you can be rest assured one party was voting against every penny of it.


----------



## MarkOttawa

The CDS has cut the legs from under the Chief of the Maritime Staff who, in my view, has no choice but to resign.  This certainly cannot be good for service relations; and the CDS is sadly taking on a bit of the appearance of a ministerial poodle.

Which did not appear the case previously, see here  and here:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afghan-detainee-docs-cds-sticking-it-to.html
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/cds-serves-hard-one-to-government.html

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## PanaEng

I guess some peoples phone lines and BB are going nuts. Wish the drama/storm was televised.  op:
The public damage is done, might as well watch the show.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

....and just a heads up, those "some peoples" are watching this thread very closely.
And, for some reason, they seem very thin-skinned.

Bruce
Staff


----------



## jollyjacktar

Good to hear of the screams from the money lenders, but, I won't hold my breath on new stuff until there is new stuff.  How the Lieberals/NDP can shout the odds is beyond me after the 90's but maybe this will be a good thing.


----------



## The Bread Guy

This just out at the CF web page:


> Recent media reports about the Navy are over-stated.  In fact, in this Navy’s centennial year, the level of support is strong.  We have not stood down a single ship.
> 
> I am very proud of the Navy’s significant role around the world.  The Navy has projected leadership abroad in missions like Haiti and anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.  That role will continue.
> 
> La protection de la souveraineté du Canada est une priorité.  Les patrouilles maritimes vont se poursuivre.  Le rôle de leadership que joue la marine continuera.
> 
> As Chief of Defence Staff, I am very happy with the significant investments made by this government in recent years.  The DND Budget Line continues to rise every year.
> 
> The instructions with respect to readiness levels of the fleet, for this fiscal year, which were issues by the Chief of Maritime Staff on April 23, 2010, are rescinded.
> 
> We will have to review the resource allocations across the CF and issue new instructions with the Minister’s endorsement.


----------



## MarkOttawa

More here, with video of the CDS:

Top general reverses navy decision to mothball ships
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20100514/naval-cuts-100514/20100514?hub=TopStoriesV2
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/latest/navy-cuts/#clip302191

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> The CDS has cut the legs from under the Chief of the Maritime Staff who, in my view, has no choice but to resign.  This certainly cannot be good for service relations; and the CDS is sadly taking on a bit of the appearance of a ministerial poodle.
> 
> Which did not appear the case previously, see here  and here:
> http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afghan-detainee-docs-cds-sticking-it-to.html
> http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/cds-serves-hard-one-to-government.html
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa



Nowheres does the CDS even hints that he has lost confidence in the CMS, nor has the Navy. So as a serving sailor I feel your view is not only wrong but one based upon the obsolete custom of falling on ones sword.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Sorry, all, I think the CDS just _screwed_ the CMS and I agree CMS should resign on principle. But a resignation will do no good; it will be a half day wonder, at best.

The CDS has done a Baril; pity.


----------



## Cloud Cover

I too think the CDS has now done even more damage to the Navy. 

Our Navy requires a serious modernization and upgrade in combat power. This is not probably not going to happen if they are forced to maintain ships and systems that are obsolete. And sorry, I dont think the modernization of the HFX class was even close to bringing a sufficient upgrade to the fleet. 

How long has it been since Canada has cut steel for a major surface combatant or a support ship of serious capability. 

The MNDs 40 billion dollar fleet is just political words, and unfortunately so now are those of the CDS. What was needed was real land practical leadership from the CDS as demonstrated by the CMS, and today that did not happen.  Indeed a pity.


----------



## medicineman

So I guess I have to change some points I passed on in my O Group the other day?

MM


----------



## Cronicbny

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> ....and just a heads up, those "some peoples" are watching this thread very closely.
> And, for some reason, they seem very thin-skinned.
> 
> Bruce
> Staff



Bruce,

Understood. Perhaps a lesson can be learned about establishing a coherent communications strategy before releasing the news to every sailor in the Formation(s) man (woman) to man (woman). I was actually a bit surprised it took this much time for the news to hit the MSM.

And to be clear to everyone here, and looking from "beyond" - the letter was never Classified or Designated and it certainly wasn't LIMDIS. 

Whoever leaked it should get a job in Public Affairs... transparency and establishing a "single message" must still remain the focus within the Navy, CF and DND as a whole.

EDIT to add: The representations in this post are mine, and mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the overall mission statement:

Commemorating the Past, Celebrating the Present and Committing to the Future - Bringing the Navy to Canadians


----------



## SeanNewman

Very unfortunate that a lot of CDS bashing is going on here.  (Comparing him to Baril?     Are you serious?).

Let us not forget that the RH MND Peter MacKay seemed a bit taken aback by the comments yesterday, too.

Nobody on this board can say they know the motives behind anything that has been said in the last two days, but it is not a stretch to imagine the MND's reaction resulted in direction to the CDS.

Stay loyal, people!


----------



## NavyShooter

The chips will lie where they fall, and the sailors and fleet will carry on doing their jobs to the best of their abilities, as we have done for the past 100 years, and will continue to do.

Whatever the fallout, info was distributed, and now decisions appear to have been made that may result in changes that will affect the originally distributed info.

*shrug*

How many of us have seen plans change in mid-stream because the original mission that the plan was based on was updated/changed?  There's a reason that the ship's schedule is called a "FLEX"....mostly 'cause it's flexible.  We always roll with those changes, let's roll with this one.

I vote we continue being sailors, work our butts off as we usually do to earn our beer/rum and leave the finger pointing and name calling out of it.

I'm back to work Monday, but tomorrow, I have an 800 meter rifle match to shoot.  Anyone wanna go play?

NS


----------



## Nuggs

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> The chips will lie where they fall, and the sailors and fleet will carry on doing their jobs to the best of their abilities, as we have done for the past 100 years, and will continue to do.
> 
> Whatever the fallout, info was distributed, and now decisions appear to have been made that may result in changes that will affect the originally distributed info.
> 
> *shrug*
> 
> How many of us have seen plans change in mid-stream because the original mission that the plan was based on was updated/changed?  There's a reason that the ship's schedule is called a "FLEX"....mostly 'cause it's flexible.  We always roll with those changes, let's roll with this one.
> 
> I vote we continue being sailors, work our butts off as we usually do to earn our beer/rum and leave the finger pointing and name calling out of it.
> 
> I'm back to work Monday, but tomorrow, I have an 800 meter rifle match to shoot.  Anyone wanna go play?
> 
> NS



I'll take ya up on that in 3 weeks


----------



## Cronicbny

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> The chips will lie where they fall, and the sailors and fleet will carry on doing their jobs to the best of their abilities, as we have done for the past 100 years, and will continue to do.
> 
> Whatever the fallout, info was distributed, and now decisions appear to have been made that may result in changes that will affect the originally distributed info.
> 
> *shrug*
> 
> How many of us have seen plans change in mid-stream because the original mission that the plan was based on was updated/changed?  There's a reason that the ship's schedule is called a "FLEX"....mostly 'cause it's flexible.  We always roll with those changes, let's roll with this one.
> 
> I vote we continue being sailors, work our butts off as we usually do to earn our beer/rum and leave the finger pointing and name calling out of it.
> 
> I'm back to work Monday, but tomorrow, I have an 800 meter rifle match to shoot.  Anyone wanna go play?
> 
> NS



No argument here - In Ardua Nitor


----------



## Edward Campbell

If this story, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Ottawa Citizen_, is substantially correct then Gen. Natynczyk looks a little less like Maurice Baril and, with Deputy Minister Robert Fonberg, a lot like Monty Python:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Defence+chief+rescinds+navy+fleet+cuts/3029113/story.html


> Military rescinds cuts to Canada's navy fleet
> 
> BY DAVID AKIN, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE
> 
> MAY 14, 2010
> 
> OTTAWA — Canada's chief of defence staff took the rare step Friday of overturning a directive made by his top admiral — an order that some analysts said was essentially gutting Canada's navy and, as a result, quickly became a political liability for the Conservative government.
> 
> Last month, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, the head of Canada's navy, ordered half of the country's maritime coastal defence vessels to be docked indefinitely and also shelved upgrades and maintenance on many other ships, including frigates.
> 
> McFadden's order, first reported by the Ottawa Citizen earlier this week, said he was forced to take such drastic action because he simply didn't have enough funding.
> 
> "I have had to make difficult choices that will directly impact fleet capability and availability this year and possibly for the medium term," wrote McFadden.
> 
> Defence analysts called it a major reduction in the number of ships available for service, prompting howls from opposition MPs in the House of Commons that the Conservatives were essentially starving the navy of the money it needed to keep ships afloat — and to rub it in, was doing this in the navy's centennial year.
> 
> But after two days of tough questions, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk reversed McFadden's decision, saying the Canadian Forces will re-allocate some financial resources so that McFadden and the navy won't have to tie up a substantial portion of the fleet.
> 
> "Recent media reports about the Navy are over-stated. In fact, in this Navy's centennial year, the level of support is strong. We have not stood down a single ship," Natynczyk said in a statement posted Friday on the Department of National Defence's website.
> 
> "The instructions with respect to readiness levels of the fleet, for this fiscal year, which were issued by the Chief of Maritime Staff (McFadden) on April 23, 2010, are rescinded. We will have to review the resource allocations across the (Canadian Forces) and issue new instructions with the minister's endorsement."
> 
> That sets up the possibility of a fierce turf war within the Canadian Forces as each service — the navy, the army and the air force — and each command — the reservists and special forces, for example — tries to defend existing budget allocations.
> 
> "I think there's a lot of frustrated people in the navy," said a defence-industry lobbyist, speaking on condition of anonymity. "But all the services have had to essentially park their assets. There's no money anywhere."
> 
> Natynczyk would not say if he was directed to undo McFadden's order by Defence Minister Peter MacKay, who, earlier this week, appeared caught off guard by McFadden's decision.
> 
> "I heard Minister MacKay with regard to his guidance, but at the end of the day, in the military chain of command, it's my direction to rescind the order," Natynczyk told reporters at a Parliament Hill news conference. "It's my job to make sure that my minister's not surprised."
> 
> "What McFadden did was, he got his way," said military analyst Mercedes Stephenson.
> 
> "So, ultimately, he wins because he got the cuts reversed. What will become of him, I'm not so sure because there will be a huge price to pay for having had the minister look like he doesn't know what he's talking about."
> 
> Early Friday, Conservative MP Laurie Hawn, MacKay's parliamentary secretary, angrily denied that McFadden had even issued such an order.
> 
> "No ships are going into dry dock. That is simply false," Hawn told the House of Commons. "The navy has been given $200 million more this year than last."
> 
> But even with that extra money, the navy — like the other branches in the Canadian Forces — is finding it tough to keep up.
> 
> "We could always use more money," Natynczyk said. But he also suggested that part of the reason for mothballing ships in dry dock — what the navy refers to as putting them in "extended readiness" — was due to a shortage of trained sailors.
> 
> McFadden had told the naval officers under his command that the Kingston-class vessels would be reduced from 12 to six ships.
> 
> The Kingstons are the smallest of the navy's 33 warships, submarines and coastal defence vessels. They were launched between 1995 and 1998 and carry crews of about 35, most of whom are naval reservists. Each ship has an anti-aircraft gun and two machine guns for basic self-defence.
> 
> But McFadden had also ordered that three frigates — HMCS Montreal, HMCS St John's and HMCS Vancouver — would now be conducting domestic and continental missions to a "limited degree."
> 
> Additionally, combat systems on HMCS Toronto, HMCS Ottawa and on the destroyer HMCS Athabaskan would be "minimally supported to enable safe to navigate sensors and communications only," according to a letter McFadden sent to his senior officers.
> 
> A key weapon system on board the Protecteur-class supply ships designed to destroy incoming missiles "will not be supported," it added. Some anti-submarine warfare capabilities for the navy's destroyer fleet would also not be supported.
> 
> © Copyright (c) Canwest News Service




First, I agree with David Akin’s source, defence analyst Mercedes Stephenson:  _"What McFadden did was, he got his way … So, ultimately, he wins because he got the cuts reversed. What will become of him, I'm not so sure because there will be a huge price to pay for having had the minister look like he doesn't know what he's talking about."_

The last phrase is why Fonberg and Natynczyk look like they are running amateur hour, not the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The Minister is not supposed to be surprised, as Natynczyk says he was, and he’s not supposed to made to look like a fool, either and the two people *responsible* to ensure the MND is properly briefed, not caught by surprise, not made to look silly when *major policy decisions* are announced, are Fonberg and  Natynczyk.

Second, we can be about 99% sure that this route, challenging the government’s wholly inadequate defence spending programme, can only get used once; that door is, now, closed.

The real villains, in my opinion are two very senior civil servants: Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) Jill Sinclair* and Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) Josée Touchette. Tying up ships is, as I have already said, a major policy decision; if Sinclair didn't know this was coming down the pipe then she was not doing her job. Maybe Adm McFadden _et al_ blindsided her but I, personally, find that a bit hard to believe; the 13th floor of NDHQ (the _Executive_ floor), at least in my experience (out of date though it may be) is a pretty small place; it’s hard to keep ‘secrets’ there. Ditto Touchette: it was her job, her responsibility, to coordinate announcements of major policy decisions  - beginning with ensuring that the rest of the government’s propaganda PR machine is good to go with whatever DND is saying.

Natynczyk is, publicly, falling on his own, personal, CDS, sword not, in fairness to him, blaming the Navy for this fiasco. McFadden is going to be something of a hero in the Navy, which is a good thing, I suppose, because he is, now, about as popular as a screen-door on a submarine in the rest of NDHQ and the Government of Canada. The this is a fiasco … sad.


----------
* *Jill Sinclair*

*Position:* Former assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy. Sinclair is now the assistant deputy minister (policy) at Department of National Defence. Sinclair was copied on some of Colvin's memos.

*Response to Colvin's testimony:* Sinclair referred all questions to the public affairs office at DND.

Source: http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2009/11/20/f-afghan-detainees-colvin-whoswho.html


----------



## Edward Campbell

More opinion, from Don Martin, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Ottawa Citizen_:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Natynczyk+makes+miss+Hillier/3031403/story.html


> Natynczyk makes us miss Hillier
> 
> BY DON MARTIN, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
> 
> MAY 15, 2010 8:16 AM
> 
> Quick. Bring back retired Gen. Rick Hillier before Canada's armed forces enter a decade of deference.
> 
> In a particularly spineless move by a top general already prone to weak-kneed appearances, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk bowed to political pressure Friday and ripped up his own vice-admiral's order to mothball half the fleet of coastal patrol vessels to stay within budget.
> 
> To make matters worse, he rewrote the job description of Canada's supreme military leader as someone who meekly serves and protects Defence Minister Peter MacKay.
> 
> "It is my job to make sure my minister is not surprised, that's my job," Natynczyk told startled reporters on Friday. "I have a role to support the minister and if the minister is uncomfortable with this kind of intention, then I have to adjust resources in there to ensure we achieve the minister's intent."
> 
> Good grief. A military leader already ridiculed in senior circles for spending too much time flying his Challengers around the globe on questionable trips apparently now sees himself as a political staffer to MacKay.
> 
> It's not as if Natynczyk didn't know navy orders were coming down to dock half of Canada's coastal defence ships, reduce service for three frigates and mothball advanced weapon systems. His name is on the circulation list.
> 
> And given that even Liberal senators had copies of the orders several days ago, it defies belief that MacKay was "surprised" by the contents of a vice-admiral directive sent out last month.
> 
> Sure, MacKay's sensitivity to the move is understandable coming from an MP whose Central Nova riding, about an hour's drive from Halifax, borders a key Atlantic naval base. But sending pit bull MP Laurie Hawn into the Commons on Friday to insist the orders were "false" is a bit rich given they were in effect and being implemented until Thursday afternoon.
> 
> Natynczyk's move has got to hurt military morale, particularly having the country's top general tiptoeing along in the footsteps of no-nonsense Hillier.
> 
> The last budget dinged the military, eliminating future increases in spending that were already on the books and required for upgrades and replacement equipment in a post-Afghanistan military.
> 
> But not a peep of protest was heard from widely nicknamed "Uncle Walt."
> 
> Replay that tape under Hillier's vigilant watch and you'd have heard his howitzer of a howl deep underwater in the mid-Atlantic.
> 
> Speaking of submarines, let there be no doubt the Canadian navy is far from tip-top shape as it waits for overdue replacement vessels to arrive.
> 
> I was standing in St. John's harbour when HMCS Corner Brook pulled in last Friday. It was one of those used subs we bought from Britain in 2003, most of them having spent far more time in repairs than under water.
> 
> Well, you've got to see this bucket of bolts to believe it. Corner Brook has deep pockets of rust from bow to stern. Dozens of external panels appear to have fallen off. A foreign-looking steel plate has been screwed onto the hull. I asked one of the seamen if he felt safe submerging in this relic.
> 
> He shrugged. "I just follow orders."
> 
> I digress.
> 
> In RCMP circles, what's being done here is called the Musical Ride Manoeuvre. When the Mounties are ordered to cut costs, they inevitably put the popular equestrian tourist attraction on the chopping block. It's a given the public outcry will immediately force politicians into rescinding the cuts.
> 
> Perhaps Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden was engaging this strategy, knowing it would not be politically tolerated by the Halifax-elected MacKay. Perhaps he's willing to endure the public humiliation of having his orders rejected in order to force Natynczyk into pledging a review to find the funds to keep the ships on active duty.
> 
> But land and air chiefs must be plenty worried because refloating the fleet will require a lot of money siphoned from other areas of the Canadian Forces. (Ironically, a senior source says Natynczyk returned almost $500 million of unspent military funds last month.)
> 
> Canada's chief of defence staff has a duty to defend his military, not subject it to change orders based on political expediency. For his soldiers, sailors and pilots, his job performance must come as a rude surprise.
> 
> *Don Martin* writes on national politics.
> 
> © Copyright (c) The Ottawa Citizen




The CDS’s range of options was limited:

•	Stand up, with McFadden, and tell Canadians what is, or ought to be self evident – the _Canada First Defence Stategy_ which Minister MacKay says provides predictable defence funding is, as I predicted, wholly inadequate;

•	Do a complete Baril – blame McFadden and, maybe even, fire him; or

•	Do a partial Baril – fall on his own, CDS, sword, give McFadden more money (the Navy no doubt thanks the Army, Air Force and central support services who will, now, do without) and hope it will all blow over in a day or two.

As taught in Appreciating the Situation 1010, Gen Natynczyk chose the least unacceptable course of action but it is going to cost him some reputation points, as it should.

Martin says, and I believe him, that Natynczyk was made aware of McFadden’s *major policy decision*. If his staff failed to alert him then he needs to do a wholesale cleaning of the 13th floor; if he knew and failed to brief Fonberg and MacKay then he messed up one of his primary duties – he is the _link_ between the defence staff and the government. He has direct, unrestricted access to the Minister, all the time, and he has relatively unfettered access to the Clerk of the Pricy Council and the Prime Minister on important *military* matters - and one would have thought tying up part of the fleet just might be an important military matter.

I think that, in the current fiscal climate, going to MacKay and even Harper and saying “we’re going to tie up part of the fleet if you don’t give us more money” would have resulted in tying up part of the fleet - but it would have saved one and all a lot of public embarrassment.

Perhaps Martin and I are wrong, perhaps McFadden blindsided everyone, including Natynczyk and _floated_ this in relative secrecy, until it exploded in the media. But I don’t think that’s the case.


----------



## GAP

And the irony in all this is......wait for it....

They are going to do it anyway.   There's more than one way to skin a cat, and over the next few months you'll see it. They can call it Mary Poppins or something equally preverbial, but you will now find all ships tied up enough to equal what they were going to save....just spread out, and out of the public's and MSM's eye...


----------



## Old Sweat

It seems to me from following this thread over the past little while, that Admiral McFadden took the course that was going to result in the most cost and operationally effective solution. There are not the crews available to keep all the vessels in service at rotating standards of acceptable readiness. That opinion is far out of my lane, and I apologize for it if I totally misread the situation.


----------



## Infanteer

This is all pretty neat....are we going to get that Big Honking Ship?


----------



## Edward Campbell

I have no basis upon which to critique McFadden _operational_ decision; I am pretty sure he won a major _political_ battle for the Navy (NDHQ politics) which means at the expense of the Army, Air Force and purple/common support services given the zero-sum budget position with which DND must cope for at least the next couple of years.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> This is all pretty neat....are we going to get that Big Honking Ship?



My guess is that the Navy is going to have a few problems _steering_ anything past the 'grownups' for the next couple of years - memories are long in NDHQ. There are a lot of people in Ottawa who resemble the _Bourbon_ kings of France in that they remember everything but learn nothing.


----------



## rormson

Hats off to the Admiral. He should put all of our vessels in port until he gets the cash he needs to run the Navy right and the CDS (if he were like Hilliard) would be in lock step with him. As it has been said within army.ca forums many times in the past nothing short of a major security incident in this country with get Canadians to pull their heads out of their rear ends about the need for proper, sustainable budgeting for the forces. Until then the politicians won't fund any branch of the CF properly.


----------



## MARS

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It seems to me from following this thread over the past little while, that Admiral McFadden took the course that was going to result in the most cost and operationally effective solution. There are not the crews available to keep all the vessels in service at rotating standards of acceptable readiness. That opinion is far out of my lane, and I apologize for it if I totally misread the situation.



No Sir, you have not misread the situation at all.  In fact, you nailed it.  For years we have been rotating crews at too high a rate.  Individual augmentees are sent to a ship often just for the Work-Up period and then sent to another ship (likely abouut to undergo Work-Ups).  By the time the ship that passed whatever WUPs (Mission, Directed or Full) embarks on her mission, it has lost a good number of her worked-up crew.

E.R Campbell is also correct - this was not done in secrecy.  This thread started on 3 May, Chronicbny said that the west coast briefing had been held the week prior, and the UNCLAS letter announcing the way ahead was dated in late April.

GAP is also correct - this will very likely happen in phases in much the same way we have been slowly and quietly tying up KINGSTON-Class ships for a while now.  We have never been running 12 ships (for any significant period of time) and we haven't been running 10 for a while.  The drop to 6 was actually a loss of 2, not 6.

No, all we have here is an _ Operational_ Commander, who made a sound (not just fiscally sound, but operationally sound) _operational_ decision, as was his purview, indeed his responsibility, and who was then overruled when it became politically embarrassing.

_edited for grammar_


----------



## Dissident

What amazes me is that the mothballing of the MCDVs was being discussed two months ago when I got on the ground at Veture NOTC. All the (reserve) Navy types I am surrounded by were discussing it and trying to come up with employement solution. All the sailors on base were talking about it.

This _now_ becomes an issue? Really? _Really_? Are communications at higher level that difficult?


----------



## SeanNewman

RGO said:
			
		

> Hats off to the Admiral. He should put all of our vessels in port until he gets the cash he needs to run the Navy right...



That sounds very brave and macho, until you realize that he has orders to perform tasks just like any other rank.

It would be like a Private looking at a Sgt and saying "Well you haven't given me enough sleep so I'm staying right here in my sleeping bag".

How far do you think that would go?  About as far as an Admiral parking all of his Canada's ships in protest.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Petamocto said:
			
		

> That sounds very brave and macho, until you realize that he has orders to perform tasks just like any other rank.
> 
> It would be like a Private looking at a Sgt and saying "Well you haven't given me enough sleep so I'm staying right here in my sleeping bag".
> 
> How far do you think that would go?  About as far as an Admiral parking all of his Canada's ships in protest.



It can and has been done if a ship can't sail for safety reasons. A ship cannot just take in her lines and sail willy nilly, there has to be certain checks in the box made prior to that. A ship has to be able to meet her Watch and Station bill requirements, why else do you think we have sailors from sometimes 3 or 4 other ships sailing with us, when a ship does a major deployment? :


----------



## SeanNewman

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> It can and has been done if a ship can't sail for safety reasons.



Well of course, but that's very different than what was suggested above which was more of a machismo stand off.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> It can and has been done if a ship can't sail for safety reasons. A ship cannot just take in her lines and sail willy nilly, there has to be certain checks in the box made prior to that. A ship has to be able to meet her Watch and Station bill requirements, why else do you think we have sailors from sometimes 3 or 4 other ships sailing with us, when a ship does a major deployment? :



That can be waivered by higher authority. It's just not done very often.

I suppose the Admiral could stop issuing waivers if he felt shirty, but I dunno how long he'd be the higher authority after that.


----------



## Stoker

Lots of scrambling going on right now to try and crew the ships for the summer, looks like a lot of pers put their component transfers in when they were told that they were putting 3 ship's alongside. We have at least 20 going right now. 
In the mean time people are being pulled off their career courses to sail this summer. I can see a lot more people quitting and CTing over this.


----------



## krustyrl

WoW ...no kidding. !  Certainly not good news at all.       
Interesting to see what happens when the dust settles on this one.


----------



## Stoker

The sad thing is that the oldest hull is 15 years old, operational life for the platform is 25 years. If the navy dropped a few bucks into the hull for needed upgrades the ships would be good to go. Compared to the money that is being spent on the subs, its a drop in the bucket and an excellent return for the navy.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

Stoker said:
			
		

> Compared to the money that is being spent on the subs, its a drop in the bucket and an excellent return for the navy.


Not this argument again.  The govt funds the submarines because of their strategic value.  Head over to Jetty NC and read the citation for CORNER BROOK's Canadian Forces Unit Commendation (an extensive European deployment, an Arctic Sovereignty mission, several international and domestic exercises, plus an operational mission in the Carribean) for an example.  If the Victoria Class was to be removed from service then the govt would no longer provide that funding.  It would not automatically become available for the navy to spend on other projects.  IMHO, the Kingston Class suffer from a lack of a defined strategic purpose (as does NAVRES but I digress).  I am unconvinced that spending more money on updating a 15 knot hull provides any substantial return on investment.  How would you see the Kingston Class being used in the future now that the Orca Class have taken on the training role?


----------



## Stoker

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Not this argument again.  The govt funds the submarines because of their strategic value.  Head over to Jetty NC and read the citation for CORNER BROOK's Canadian Forces Unit Commendation (an extensive European deployment, an Arctic Sovereignty mission, several international and domestic exercises, plus an operational mission in the Carribean) for an example.  If the Victoria Class was to be removed from service then the govt would no longer provide that funding.  It would not automatically become available for the navy to spend on other projects.  IMHO, the Kingston Class suffer from a lack of a defined strategic purpose (as does NAVRES but I digress).  I am unconvinced that spending more money on updating a 15 knot hull provides any substantial return on investment.  How would you see the Kingston Class being used in the future now that the Orca Class have taken on the training role?



Lex I never said I think we should not fund the Victoria Class, all I said was compare the money being spent on one class to another. The money needed to upgrade is a drop in the bucket what has been spent and will be spent.I do agree that the subs are strategic assets and are funded because of that, however have they really gone to sea that much in the last decade?. If you want to throw out sailing stats last time I checked the Kingston Class has deployed to Europe 3 times, numerous Arctic Sovereignty missions, numerous international and domestic exercises and a number of Carribean deployments, not to mention what the west coast fleet does. While it's nice to say we have subs, how many can we deploy in a moments notice?
As for a defined strategic purpose, the ship's have been and still remain a mine countermeasures platform as several of the ship's are now. As for updating a 15 knot hull, as a 15 knot hull we have been plenty busy the last 15 years doing lots of things that would be a waste to send a destroyer or CPF to do. It's a no brainer that when you compare the cost of operating a MCDV and a CPF, the military is getting a large return on their investment.
Since the Orca Class have taken over the MARS IV courses, I personally would like to see the ship's be utilized a little less and give the crews a break.  While the MCDV's conducted MARS IV courses each year, the ship's did plenty of other things. As the ship's were told several weeks ago, op tempo will probably increase for the ship's why? because they are a cost effective alternative to the bigger ship's.
I know they will never tie up the subs after the enormous amount of money spent on them, however to ignore the versatility, usefullness and cost savings of the MCDV's is a mistake.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Its too bad we never took advantage of the Danes when they were commissioning the Flyvefisken class.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Its too bad we never took advantage of the Danes when they were commissioning the Flyvefisken class.



That looks and performs like the MCDVs should have.  Yes, it is indeed a shame.  But, we MUST buy Canadian.  Mustn't we?  Same could be said of the Dutch JSS, or Australian seeing as the Navy is bound and determined to go this route.  Would get it cheaper and sooner.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> That looks and performs like the MCDVs should have.  Yes, it is indeed a shame.  But, we MUST buy Canadian.  Mustn't we?


Don't know about that - the Federal Government has no problem going offshore when it comes to ferries for Marine Atlantic:  http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2010/05/21/nl-ferries-chartered-521.html


----------



## Neill McKay

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Don't know about that - the Federal Government has no problem going offshore when it comes to ferries for Marine Atlantic:



I can think of a couple of reasons why this might have happened: the ships are being chartered (not built to order) and Marine Atlantic has a mandate to function as a business so perhaps has a freer hand in procuring its ships.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

N. McKay said:
			
		

> Marine Atlantic has a mandate to function as a business so perhaps has a freer hand in procuring its ships.


It was announced at a press conference by the Honourable Rob Merrifield, the Minister of State (Transport) - seems to me like it was a political decision.  The ships that they are replacing were built in Canada at MIL Davie of Lauzon, Quebec (and are about 1/2 the age of our tankers) so I wonder what has changed.


----------



## Neill McKay

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> It was announced at a press conference by the Honourable Rob Merrifield, the Minister of State (Transport) - seems to me like it was a political decision.



That's possible, but it's more likely that the announcement was simply seen as a political opportunity -- few politicians will waste an opportunity to make a public announcement about something new, bigger, or better.  (I will assume that Mr. Merrifield does not have any shipyards in his riding!)



> The ships that they are replacing were built in Canada at MIL Davie of Lauzon, Quebec (and are about 1/2 the age of our tankers) so I wonder what has changed.



Both ships were procured in the 1980s when the service was still provided by CN Marine.  I think things became more commercial when Marine Atlantic was spun off.  Quite a few other federal government services, especially those in the transportation sector, were turned commercial in the 1990s.

It's also possible that it was simply cheaper to build the ships in Canada at that time.  (There's a pretty stiff import duty on ships that may have made the difference.)


----------



## Colin Parkinson

For me the MCDVs represented a change in mindset. The fact that they were armed was a huge change from the YFP, gate boats, etc. I see them as part of the sea change for the navy that all of their ships are potential combatants. For that they have a warm place in my heart.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

Colin P said:
			
		

> For me the MCDVs represented a change in mindset. The fact that they were armed was a huge change from the YFP, gate boats, etc. I see them as part of the sea change for the navy that all of their ships are potential combatants. For that they have a warm place in my heart.


I agree with you.  I also like how comfortable they are (quarters etc, not sea keeping) and I'm eternally hopeful that will follow to future Canadian warships.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Colin P said:
			
		

> For me the MCDVs represented a change in mindset. The fact that they were armed was a huge change from the YFP, gate boats, etc. I see them as part of the sea change for the navy that all of their ships are potential combatants. For that they have a warm place in my heart.



Personally I hope the next generation warships are not built to mercantile standards as I don't think they are as safe.


----------



## Stoker

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Personally I hope the next generation warships are not built to mercantile standards as I don't think they are as safe.



So why do think that? Are you talking about the ability for the ships to operate in heavy seas or the ability for the ships to handle battle damage or withstand a fire? How about the fact the bulkheads and deck heads are enclosed?


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Stoker said:
			
		

> So why do think that? Are you talking about the ability for the ships to operate in heavy seas or the ability for the ships to handle battle damage or withstand a fire? How about the fact the bulkheads and deck heads are enclosed?



I look at the ability to handle battle damage first and foremost.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I look at the ability to handle battle damage first and foremost.



Yes, a distinct lack of/decrease of watertight bulkheads as compared to MilSpec.  From what a gather from a DC POV they are not built to take it, lack of redundancy etc.


----------



## Monsoon

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Yes, a distinct lack of/decrease of watertight bulkheads as compared to MilSpec.  From what a gather from a DC POV they are not built to take it, lack of redundancy etc.



A (Canadian) MilSpec designed almost exclusively with frigate/destroyer sized ships in mind. The Kingston class may need more watertigtht bulkheads according to our MilSpec, but where would you put them? The thing only draws three metres.

As for false bulkheads and deckheads, they're standard fit on many US ships. I can't agree that they're a good idea, but countries that take their navies considerably more seriously than Canada does have decided they make the grade for inclusion.

If you want to get serious about taking battle damage, let's talk about about double armoured hulls.


----------



## Stoker

There were a lot of negative comments about all the false deck heads and bulkheads, however when KINGSTON had her major fire several years ago these deck heads and bulkheads prevented the spread of the fire. Now I doubt in regards to battle damage, they would do the same job then again its not like they're going in harms way anytime soon.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

How much battle damage does a Kingston Class need to absorb anyways?  Their main missions are coastal surveillance, sovereignty patrol, route survey, and training.

I would be careful about using terms like "safe" on a public forum.  The next thing you know it's appearing in various news media as "inside sources" reporting that the MCDV aren't safe.


----------



## Stoker

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> How much battle damage does a Kingston Class need to absorb anyways?  Their main missions are coastal surveillance, sovereignty patrol, route survey, and training.
> 
> I would be careful about using terms like "safe" on a public forum.  The next thing you know it's appearing in various news media as "inside sources" reporting that the MCDV aren't safe.



First and foremost the KINGSTON class still remains a mine warfare platform, it's not the best suited mind you but they have trained with NATO mine sweeping forces and the ship's can fill a role. We have several ships that are fitted out for that role right now.
Of course the platform is safe, the previous poster said he believed they were "not as safe", probably in comparison to a CPF.


----------



## SeanNewman

For you Navy guys, just out of curiosity do you guys have the same discussions about light + fast = safe vs heavy + armoured = safe?


----------



## Kat Stevens

I dunno about any of this, but getting your balls mofted at any time sounds pretty un good to me.


----------



## hugh19

Pet has not really been a big deal since battleships (heavy and armoured) and battlecruiser (heavy and much less armour) were scrapped.


----------



## Monsoon

Petamocto said:
			
		

> For you Navy guys, just out of curiosity do you guys have the same discussions about light + fast = safe vs heavy + armoured = safe?


Nah - "fast" isn't really an option at sea in any case. The difference between 17mph and 33mph just doesn't make that big a difference on a battlespace with nowhere to hide when it comes down to a shooting match using anti-ship missiles. Obviously there are roles that call for relative speed, but speed doesn't have to come at the price of armour; in fact the larger ships are often the fastest.

I have to disagree with sledge. Certainly there isn't any "debate", but I'd suggest that's because the foregone conclusion is that more armour is better: the Ticos are fitted with 1/2" plating and latest flight of Arleigh Burkes have 3/4" hulls. Other navies (ours, i.e.) have calculated that they should focus efforts on avoiding getting hit at all, but the only "reason" they didn't procure thicker hulls was because it would have been more expensive to build them so. The trade-off was cost-benefit, not competing priorities.


----------



## SeanNewman

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Nah - "fast" isn't really an option at sea in any case.... in fact the larger ships are often the fastest.



Great point and now that I think about it that does seem to be the case.

On that note, one way we in the Army increase survivability is to angle the armour (especially on the front which is likely to face the enemy).  Not only does that make the same true thickness of the armour be thicker from a level attack (1" armour now presents about 1.5" to the side if on an angle), but obviously you get potential deflections as well with bullet-type projectiles.

Is this even being considered at all in future naval designs, or is it just assumed that the money is better spent on trying to make sure that missile doesn't hit you in the first place?  I haven't seen a sloped ship since this:







I see this uses it a little bit, but I can only assume it is more for radar than kinetic defence:






*Disclaimer* Please excuse my ignorance.  I am the first to admit I don't know anything about the Navy which is why I am asking.


----------



## MARS

Pet,

You are right, that design is for reducing the radar signature.  Money is spent on defensive systems in part because the velocity and yield of modern missles is such that deflection doesn't really occur in the same manner as it does with smaller calibre, land-based anti-armour weapons.

Cheers,

MARS


----------



## SeanNewman

MARS said:
			
		

> ... deflection doesn't really occur in the same manner as it does with smaller calibre, land-based...



Ack, thanks.  Never safe to assume so confirmation is appreciated.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

In fact Petamocto, angled armour has been in use by navies well before MBT were even conceived. Dreadnaught, the first "battleship" incorporated a second angled plating system inside its armour belt and in between its double hull specifically for deflection and increase in thickness without added weight. The concept was included in just about every class of battleships and cruisers thereafter. For a more modern application, look up the Zumwalt class destroyer project of the USN.

However, as battle damage is concerned on mine warfare crafts, think about it: They are usually made of wood, plastic (GRP), aluminium or light steel. And they are all fairly small vessels. Anyone looking at the pictures saw the damage inflicted on a corvette by a single North Korean torpedo. You cannot expect a mine warfare craft to survive "battle damage". They rely on their signature control methods, sharp lookout and self protection forward looking mine-hunting sonars to stay out of trouble. Granted, it is not much protection against  submarines, surface warships or aircrafts, but in the mine warfare world, "c'est la vie".


----------



## GAP

Loose lips sink ships for the Maritime Command 
Article Link

The Navy – or more accurately Maritime Command – is a vital strategic asset with increasing relevance. Recent statements out of Ottawa, however, demonstrate confusion or political obfuscation – or both – rather than strategic clarity. The result threatens to undermine Canada's national interests.

On Friday the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, took the highly unusual step of publicly rescinding an order from his top admiral, Dean McFadden, after an acrimonious debate in Parliament that embarrassed the government. When questioned by the opposition, Defence Minister Peter MacKay appeared unaware of Vice-Admiral McFadden's orders (issued on April 23) to mothball half of the Navy's maritime coastal defence vessels, place certain Canadian frigates in limited domestic and continental roles, and put modernization and upgrade programs for other elements of the fleet on hold. The admiral identified the reason for his decision as fiscal shortfall. In an odd reversal of roles, opposition parties were left calling for increased defence spending, including the NDP.

Gen. Natynczyk stepped forward to reassure the public that the Navy's needs will be met, not with additional government funding, but by reviewing “resource allocations.” These vague words leave two possibilities, neither of which would solve the Navy's problems. The first is that the CDS will override Vice-Adm. McFadden's priorities, reassigning resources within the Navy, likely to highly visible programs while cutting less popular ones such as submarines. The second option raises the spectre of destructive internal turf wars in which the Navy would be preserved at the expense of the Army or Air Force. With more than $1-billion in cuts slated for the defence budget next year, suggestions that one service may have to lose some of its funding to bail out another will create bitter rivalries, undermining broad strategic vision and collaboration.

The Navy faces serious challenges, the most basic of which cannot be fixed with an immediate funding injection – a personnel shortage of more than 1,000 people, especially in high-tech trades. Unlike ships and weapons, these sailors cannot be bought off the shelf.
More on link


----------



## Colin Parkinson

ah yes, "adjust your priorities and reallocate resources" Hello the 90's are calling and want their decade of darkness back.....


----------



## Eye In The Sky

GAP said:
			
		

> The Navy faces serious challenges, the most basic of which cannot be fixed with an immediate funding injection – a personnel shortage of more than 1,000 people, especially in high-tech trades. Unlike ships and weapons, these sailors cannot be bought off the shelf.
> More on link



So aside from tieing up ships, stopping upgrades, whatever else the CMS was *going* to do...what is his plan for better retention?  Recruiting?

If its true that you have to have the kit for the sailors to use, you also have to have the sailors to use the kit.

 :2c:


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> a personnel shortage of more than 1,000 people



i know of around 30 on my ship who are thinking of pulling the plug now due to Commands insistence we do pre pre pre pre rep pre pre pre pre wups training. Sadly it will only get worse before it gets better.


----------



## dapaterson

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> i know of around 30 on my ship who are thinking of pulling the plug now due to Commands insistence we do pre pre pre pre rep pre pre pre pre wups training. Sadly it will only get worse before it gets better.



Sounds like the motnh and a half of pre-deployment for Afghanistan the Army strategically spreads over 9 months...


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Sounds like the motnh and a half of pre-deployment for Afghanistan the Army strategically spreads over 9 months...



not the Navy...on some ships you prepare to deploy a couple of years in advance...depending on your CO


----------



## Stoker

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> not the Navy...on some ships you prepare to deploy a couple of years in advance...depending on your CO



Yes, I have been on ship's that do workups before workups and end up burning out the crew. Right now we're still "hemorrhaging" personnel that are going CT. Looks like we may not have enough bodies to put 3 ship's out the door.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Stoker said:
			
		

> Yes, I have been on ship's that do workups before workups and end up burning out the crew. Right now we're still "hemorrhaging" personnel that are going CT. Looks like we may not have enough bodies to put 3 ship's out the door.



But if they are going Reg force in the same MOC, isn't that better for the Navy in the end?  

IMO, its more important that the Reg Force billets are filled before the NavRes.  I know that doesn't help your position any as a Class C sailor but...


----------



## Stoker

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> But if they are going Reg force in the same MOC, isn't that better for the Navy in the end?
> 
> IMO, its more important that the Reg Force billets are filled before the NavRes.  I know that doesn't help your position any as a Class C sailor but...



Sure it is, however I don't think our ship's will ever be taken over and manned by regular force personnel because of the manning problems the big ships are having. I don't want to see guys with mortgages, who have been on these ships for years be handed their hats.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Another robbing Peter to pay Paul situation.


----------



## NavyShooter

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> not the Navy...on some ships you prepare to deploy a couple of years in advance...depending on your CO



Ex-Drag, am I going to see you soon?  I'm supposed to be hitting WUPS in Oct/Nov....is that your window too?

NS


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Ex-Drag, am I going to see you soon?  I'm supposed to be hitting WUPS in Oct/Nov....is that your window too?
> 
> NS



You will


----------



## NavyShooter

I show up for work a Week monday, look me up and I'll buy you a coffee down in the mess.   ;D


----------

