# Victoria Class Submarines



## TR23 (18 Sep 2005)

Are the subs still tied up awaiting the results of the accident inquiry?  Are they undergoing a refit or update since they're tied up anyway?  Are they any clues to how extensive the required refits will be?

I've read that Canada removed the minelaying and sub-Harpoon launching capabilites from the Victoria's.....was this due to outdated components, lack of an operational requirement for these tools, lack of funding....or something else?  Can this capability be restored quickly (if for some operational reason), or is it lost until a major refit is undertaken?
Also, I've learned that the Victoria's hull design is similar to nuclear boats, and that they are suited to long range patrols.  It seems many of the media articles surrounding the subs speak of using them in a sovereignty role, watching over our own waters.  Does Canada's plan to use to the subs overseas at all?  Where the O-boats employed in that role?  Perhaps escorting our surface groups, or working with our allies in intelligence/ASW/training missions?  Are our replenishment ships capable of caring to a submarine's requirements?

Lot's of questions, but even if someone can only answer one at a time I'de appreciate it.

Thanks,
TR23


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## Seaman_Navy (18 Sep 2005)

I think HMCS Victoria as well as HMCS Winsdor went through sea training and sucessfully passed. For these two, they can think of going back at sea. However, HMCS Chicoutimi is still undergoing maintenance and it could take up to two years to complete. I don't really know for the Corner Brook.


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## Ex-Dragoon (18 Sep 2005)

Cornerbrook is up on the lift whether she is being Canadianized or not I am not sure.

TR doing forget the original Upholder class was designed to fire the Spearfish torpedo while we use the MK48, that may have had something to do with the removal of the SUb Harpoon and minelaying capability. Could it be restored? Probably but not without extensive not to mention expensive m,odifications which would probably increase the length of time this class has been out of service already.


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## TR23 (18 Sep 2005)

I had thought about that being the potential reason behind removing the Harpoon and Mine capabilities, but I also figured that if we we're retrofitting American Mk48's then the American Harpoon and mine-laying capabilites would fit in the same package.  They may or may not, but they would surely have driven the cost of the program up(seeing how the MK.48s were refits from the O-boats).  It would have involved purchasing additional munitions and war stocks as well, perhaps driving the cost up significantly.

TR23


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## Cdn Blackshirt (26 Sep 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Cornerbrook is up on the lift whether she is being Canadianized or not I am not sure.
> 
> TR doing forget the original Upholder class was designed to fire the Spearfish torpedo while we use the MK48, that may have had something to do with the removal of the SUb Harpoon and minelaying capability. Could it be restored? Probably but not without extensive not to mention expensive m,odifications which would probably increase the length of time this class has been out of service already.



Ex, can you explain why we decided to remove the Harpoon capability?  It always sounded to me to be the equivalent of having a Swiss Army knife, then breaking off one of your blades.



Matthew.   ???


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Sep 2005)

No idea, even some of the submariners I spoke with had no clue. We did agree it was far beyond our pay level.

Speculation:
Maube the government did not want to shell out the extra bucks to get sub harpoon, maybe the navy did not want to go through the hassle of extablishing procedures and doctrine to use Sub-harpoon, it can takes years to get everything down right.


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## Monsoon (27 Sep 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> No idea, even some of the submariners I spoke with had no clue. We did agree it was far beyond our pay level.
> 
> Speculation:
> Maube the government did not want to shell out the extra bucks to get sub harpoon, maybe the navy did not want to go through the hassle of extablishing procedures and doctrine to use Sub-harpoon, it can takes years to get everything down right.


My understanding of the byzantine procurement procedure leads me to suspect that the "Concept of Employment" for the Victorias when they were purchased was literally just to replace the O-Boats, so any capability that exceeded the O-Boats couldn't be justified from a force planning perspective.  Since the whole system had to be modernized anyway, and since a Harpoon capability would have required suitable shore trainers and an addition to the operational doctrine (and, yes, the purchase of sub-launchable Harpoons), it was decided not to modernize the sub-surface missile capability.

So basically what you said, I guess.


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## NavalGent (18 Oct 2005)

One question from the original post that hasn't been answered is whether the subs would be used overseas. I've been wondering about this as well.

Anyone?


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## George Wallace (18 Oct 2005)

NavalGent said:
			
		

> One question from the original post that hasn't been answered is whether the subs would be used overseas. I've been wondering about this as well.
> 
> Anyone?


Now, I hope you realize you have opened yourself to a lot of ridicule with that question?


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## NavalGent (18 Oct 2005)

My bad...how about..._underseas_ in distant parts of the world?


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## Cloud Cover (18 Oct 2005)

The JSS will be configured to refuel them, so they will likely have some ability for distant operations. Certainly be an effective deterrent to keep enemy subs a fair distance from the TG.


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## Anthony (19 Oct 2005)

I know this may be an odd question, I didn't wanna start a new topic over it so I figured I'd throw it in here.

Do submariners have any means of staying in shape/exercising while on deployment? Just curious because if submariners can be assigned to a sub without neccesarily volunteering, and you're stuck in a sub and have to be sedentry for months at a time, well that would be agonizing :blotto:.


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## SHF (19 Oct 2005)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> The JSS will be configured to refuel them, so they will likely have some ability for distant operations. Certainly be an effective deterrent to keep enemy subs a fair distance from the TG.



For W601, tactically an SSK like the Victoria is not well suited for ASW.  It's primary roles would be ASuW (Anti Surface) or intel collection.  SSKs do not have the speed or endurance to reposition quickly enough to counter a sub threat to a TG.  Worldwide SSK crews train for ASuW.  It is a common misconception to believe that they are a good ASW platform; however, with proper cuing and some luck in positioning, our O boat crews could take on American LA crews and win.  Enemy subs in the hands of well trained crews will provide the first indication of their presence with a torpedo in the HVU (high value unit) or a SS-N-27 launch at the force.  It is the potential sub threat to friendly surface forces or SLOCs that appears to have been overlooked, as we and our allies ignore that reality and only focus on the requirements of today.


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## Neill McKay (19 Oct 2005)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> The JSS will be configured to refuel them, so they will likely have some ability for distant operations. Certainly be an effective deterrent to keep enemy subs a fair distance from the TG.



This never occurred to me before; can the current AORs not RAS a submarine?


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## cobbler (19 Oct 2005)

> This never occurred to me before; can the current AORs not RAS a submarine?



Can any AOR's RAS SSK's at sea? (Whoa, a few acronyms there). I have never seen or heard of it, but have wondered about it from time to time. I know there have been submarine tenders in the past (and presently in the USN), but surface dedicated AOR's being capable of servicing subs is something to ponder.


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## Grizzly (19 Oct 2005)

> It is a common misconception to believe that they are a good ASW platform; however, with proper cuing and some luck in positioning, our O boat crews could take on American LA crews and win.



Are SSK's poor at ASW vs. all subs? If I understand what you said correctly, a SSK is only effective against an SSN when the conditions are favourable. This I can believe since SSN's have much more maneuverability and speed. However, how do SSK's fare against other SSK's? It would seem at first glance that they would be competent enough, but then again I'm no expert. The reason I'm bringing this up is, if SSK's are effective at ASW versus other SSK's, then shouldn't they be considered for use in a task group? Or are they too slow and limited in range for this tasking? Would AIP make a difference? Since most of the threat submarines that we're likely to face are of the conventional type, I was wondering if this is feasible.


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## Cloud Cover (19 Oct 2005)

SHF said:
			
		

> For W601, tactically an SSK like the Victoria is not well suited for ASW.   It's primary roles would be ASuW (Anti Surface) or intel collection.   *SSKs do not have the speed or endurance to reposition quickly enough to counter a sub threat to a TG*.   Worldwide SSK crews train for ASuW.   It is a common misconception to believe that they are a good ASW platform; however, with proper cuing and some luck in positioning, our O boat crews could take on American LA crews and win.   *Enemy subs in the hands of well trained crews will provide the first indication of their presence with a torpedo in the HVU (high value unit) or a SS-N-27 launch at the force*.   It is the potential sub threat to friendly surface forces or SLOCs that appears to have been overlooked, as we and our allies ignore that reality and only focus on the requirements of today.



Thanks Bill. Yes, you're right and my bad. I guess the O-boat/688 scenario above is the one I have to base my observation on. I actually never worked with an SSK on the west coast during my TI- only the USN and even then only the USS Indianapolis, an SSN. From what you are saying above, the SSK could only enage another sub when the right opportunity and circumstances present themselves? Would that scenario also apply to an SSK on SSK encounter, such as Victoria vs. Kilo or Collins v. Kilo?    


WRT the SSN-27 comment, this excellent Indian navy fan type web site has some good balanced information for readers:    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Klub.html
Interesting that this cruise missile is available in a sub-launched anti-submarine variant with a much reduced range of ~ 50nm and that there is at least a strong possibility that India will deploy this missile with it's new class of AIP subs reprotedly being built for them by the Russians.* 

Cheers all.

*edit: I guess we are left to ponder what the acquisition of this technology in the anti-submarine variant by India and probably China potentially signifies? First, they recognize the extreme submarine threat from the USN, Japan, and to a lesser extent the UK, Australia, Singapore and in very remote circumstances even Canada.    Second, they are probably adopting tactics and technology to the extent where adversaries must include the potential effects of such weapons and tactics in their own planning. Pretty straight forward stuff so far. Problem is, are there known hard counter measures available that are likely to have a high degree of success- are those countermeasures practical to deploy and are they available for deployment now- since the 91RE1 variant of the missile is apparently available and can be launched from a 533mm tube. 

The control guidance is stated to be inertial- which is probably true but the missile must somehow acquire a moving target or it would be practically useless against a reasonably alert opponent.


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## SHF (19 Oct 2005)

SSKs are best suited in a choke point role or in a dedicated intel gathering mission.  They are limited by their reduced transit speeds, in that they have batteries to recharge, and you can imagine why a surface transit would be unwise for a variety of reasons.  Either way no SSK in the world (including AIP) can keep up with a transiting TG.  

  SSK vs SSK has the same problems as SSK vs SSN.  A submarine has a very small look zone when compared to a surface ship using the many other sensors available for area search.  Submarines want to stay covert, so the use of Radar or active SONAR is considered foolish.  Tom Clancy has written an excellent book on submarine tactics "SSN Strategies of Submarine Warfare" 1996.  A Canadian TG in a static location IE Gulf of Oman, Straits of Malacca, could make excellent use of an SSK dedicated to providing covert intel to the applicable commander.  Our SSK poses great threat to OPFOR surface vessels.  

  The preferred weapon of choice for potential hostile SSKs will be the SS-N-27 Sizzler(Club).  IAW Janes, it has Radar homing to enhance the enroute INS and packs a 220 KG warhead.  With some initial other party targeting, the SSK could launch the missile, submerge and wait to the hear the very long range explosions.  Janes lists ranges extending out to 220 KM.  

  Given this capability, no SSK could ever be properly positioned to counter this type of threat.  Currently Russia, India, and China are reported to have theses missiles.  "An unconfirmed report in 2004 stated that eight new Chinese `Kilo' class submarines will be fitted with Club-S missiles, with the boats and missiles delivered between 2005 and 2008. Up to June 2005 around 30 Club-S and Club-N missiles had been tested in Russia and India, including six 3M54 missiles launched from Indian `Sindhughosh' class submarines."

  Many challenges ahead for the Navy and supporting air forces, should we ever be called upon to fight in this manner.


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## SeaKingTacco (20 Oct 2005)

I'm going to wade in here and disagree with SHF about the efficacy of SSKs in the ASW game.

As I understand it from all of the briefings that I have received from VICTORIA Class operators, this class was designed to hover in the GIUK gap and ambush Soviet Nuke boats as they tried to get into the Atlantic and sink or convoys rushing    the rest of 1 CAN DIV to Germany and hopefully plug the Fulda Gap before it was too late.  They seemed pretty comfortable with their ASW capabilities- given the right set of circumstances.  I'm guessing the right circumstances might be shallow water and messy acoustical conditions.

I have worked against HMCS VICTORIA and found her to be a very elusive boat.  Good luck to anyone who wants to find her while she is on batteries and does not want to be found.  You will need it...

Cheers.


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## Cloud Cover (20 Oct 2005)

Wow. If Sam 69 was here he'd be right into this one!!


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## a_majoor (20 Oct 2005)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I'm going to wade in here and disagree with SHF about the efficacy of SSKs in the ASW game.
> 
> As I understand it from all of the briefings that I have received from VICTORIA Class operators, this class was designed to hover in the GIUK gap and ambush Soviet Nuke boats as they tried to get into the Atlantic and sink or convoys rushing      the rest of 1 CAN DIV to Germany and hopefully plug the Fulda Gap before it was too late.   They seemed pretty comfortable with their ASW capabilities- given the right set of circumstances.   I'm guessing the right circumstances might be shallow water and messy acoustical conditions.
> 
> ...



A bit over my head here, but the conditions described would be most favorable for the SSK since the Soviet subs would be transiting at high speed to enter the convoy zones and block the arrival of re enforcements. The Soviets would be making lots of noise, and would have very limited ability to hear or otherwise sense the presence of any defending force. "Alpha" sub drivers probably didn't care, since they were (supposedly) fast enough and able to run deep enough to evade most threats, and on the grand scheme of things the former USSR was bloody minded enough to accept fairly high casualty figures to force the gap and get their subs operating in the open Atlantic.


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## SHF (21 Oct 2005)

Tacco,

Can't let this one go.  

A.  The Russian SSN/SSK hordes are not heading southerly on any intercept courses to take on any CA TG; also trust me I knew my enemy.

B.  I agree that if a threat axis is known, an SSK can be prepositioned (given time) to provide an ASW deterrent.

C.  In open water the SSK cannot keep up with an SSN.  Speed equals noise and renders other sensors ineffective.  The SSN simply has greater speed and can run far and hide each and every time.

Perhaps my initial point has been lost, SSKs have proven for me to be the most difficult targets to track.  They work well in shallow water, have small MAD signatures, and are ultra quiet on battery.  My point is that an SSK is not a good choice as an ASW platform unless cuing is in place or the threat axis can be readily identified.  Tacco is right when he says the Vic is quiet, I too can attest to that.

It is good to see some discussion on ASW.  Things in the Aurora community are slanting towards overland.  There is an Aurora crew flying on Phoenix Ram this week.  Us older Cold Warriors have a hard time shifting gears, but we're willing to learn.  How big is the Taliban Navy?


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## Spr.Earl (22 Oct 2005)

The boats had been in service with the Brits for just on 2 years before they decided to go for a all Nuke Service and paid them off.Any seaman worth his salt knows you can't lay up a ship or boat for close on 10 yrs and expect everything to be as it was when laid up.Also it took our Gov. just on 2yrs to acquire them once they had decided to buy them.

Majority of the blame can be put on the Gov. and some on DND,right now the Vic is in the graving dock for her EDR which when finished will have cost $23 mil.
Hey the B.C. Ferries just put in $32 Mil for the passenger up grades but prick nada down below on each of 3 ferries now so $23 Mil for a near new Sub sounds good to me as long as the job is done right.
The main engine is having a 6,000 hr refit and that's only 250 day's running,the Vic had only 150 odd day's at sea under our flag.


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## buckahed (30 Oct 2005)

To answer the refuelling question. no, AOR's cannot refuel SSK's at sea.  No need, really, the Victorias have a range of 18500 klicks. Don't use much when the boat is on station, either.


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