# A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN



## a_majoor (1 Feb 2018)

Real Clear Defence has a very interesting article looking at the factors behind the Schlieffen Plan. The plan has always been one of the central planks in the histories of the Great War, so this brings it more into focus:

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/01/a_re-examination_of_the_schlieffen_plan_112995.html



> What best explains the German General Staff’s decision to go to war in 1914? Was Alfred von Schlieffen’s war plan a self-fulfilling prophecy that pushed the Triple Entente to balance together against Germany? This article argues that the best, most recent scholarship concerning the impact of pre-war German military planning depicts a situation in which not one, but a multitude of of causal factors led Germany to go to war in 1914. The most compelling scholarship illustrates that the primary factors that led Germany to war include: the culture of nationalism, militarism, and the ideology of the offensive that was prevalent in the General Staff; pessimism about the prospect of victory in the future and optimism about victory in the present (preventive war thinking); perception about the strength and unity of the Triple Entente; the psychology and cognitive biases of German War planners; incoherence of strategic planning and organizational politics; and last, the idea that “grand strategy in this era was a three-level game in which the need to cobble together working coalitions on the domestic and alliance levels often seemed more pressing than even the life-and-death threats posed by foreign competitors.”[1]



It is a very long article, so follow the link.


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2018)

From an academic point of view, this essay suffers from the fact that it doesn't reference any of the articles that came from the running (6 year) debate in the journal War in History.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459900600302?journalCode=wiha

This was probably the most significant piece of scholarship on the Schlieffen Plan out there, not because of what Zuber says, but due to the response and counter-response that played out in the journal over a 6-7 year span.  There was enough material that it spawned a couple books on the plan and its role in German war planning by Zuber.

https://www.amazon.com/Inventing-Schlieffen-Plan-Planning-1871-1914/dp/0198718055

https://www.amazon.com/Real-German-War-Plan-1904/dp/0752456644/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_0?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=8544GRYPDTGP3E397JGT

There are holes the size of Von Kluck's First Army in an essay on the Schlieffen Plan if it doesn't cover Zuber and his debate.


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## MarkOttawa (1 Feb 2018)

If one reads the actual plan, one sees that von Schlieffen himself essentially concluded it would not work (not enough German troops, friction, logistics) but nonetheless needed to be tried in any event since nothing else might just bring a quick victory over France--which by attacking in Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 "Battle of the Frontiers" gave the younger Moltke a much better chance on the German right wing than otherwise would have been the case (wrote an essay on the plan in university a long time ago based on Ritter's book):
https://www.gwpda.org/memoir/Ritter/ritter1.pdf

Battle of the Frontiers--terrible French casualties: "Over the course of a single day, August 22, some 27,000 French soldiers died at Ardennes and Charleroi" (more than the British on the first day of the Somme):
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lorraine.htm
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/heavy-casualties-suffered-in-the-battles-of-the-frontiers
http://www.france24.com/en/20140822-august-22-1914-battle-frontiers-bloodiest-day-french-military-history

The French attack on the Germans' left wing played right into the updated Schlieffen Plan and effectively created a "revolving door" helping von Kluck and von Bülow on their right wing push forward fast--until, as von Schlieffen himself acknowledged almost surely would happen, they nonetheless ran out of steam.

Mark
Ottawa


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## pbi (2 Feb 2018)

From what I have understood about both the Schlieffen Plan and the causal factors that led to WWI and Germany's role in it, two things seem to come out.

First, as noted above, Schliefffen already had doubts about whether it would really work, before he died. As the General Staff tinkered with the plan, these doubts were exacerbated. Apparently Schlieffen's last words on his deathbed were to the effect of "don't weaken the right flank" because this is what he feared was happening.

Second, my take on the First World War is that  in the years (say...) 1890 to about 1910 or 12, it was absolutely not a foregone conclusion that Great Britain would go to war against Germany, or be allied with France and Russia. There were opportunities for things to have gone in other directions.

If Kaiser Wilhelm II had listened to Bismarck (as his father and grandfather did...) instead of sacking him, the First World would (IMHO) not have happened, or if it did, it would have been very different. For one thing, the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and Austria might have brought about quite a different situation in the East, where the War got started.  Bismarck was very mistrustful of the Austro-Hungarians and the last thing he wanted was for Germany to be drawn into a war with Russia in order to save the Hapsburgs' bacon from stupidity. But Wilhelm scuppered that.

I agree that the fuel of toxic German nationalism was the necessary cause: it was Wilhelm who was the immediate cause. Once he got on the throne without Bismarck or some other wise voice in his ear, some kind of war was in the cards.

But, unfortunately, Wilhelm was a very mercurial, unstable and intensely jealous poser, who gradually formulated a very different and ultimately disastrous strategic "vision" or perhaps "hallucination", of his own. And we know what happened next....


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## HB_Pencil (2 Feb 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> From what I have understood about both the Schlieffen Plan and the causal factors that led to WWI and Germany's role in it, two things seem to come out.
> 
> First, as noted above, Schliefffen already had doubts about whether it would really work, before he died. As the General Staff tinkered with the plan, these doubts were exacerbated. Apparently Schlieffen's last words on his deathbed were to the effect of "don't weaken the right flank" because this is what he feared was happening.
> 
> ...



Yup. That's well detailed in AJP Taylor's masterpiece the Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918. Prior to the 1882 Austro-German alliance, the states of europe acted almost like free atoms that balanced each other out. After the triple treaty, atoms arranged themselves into two set groups. England attempted to remain above the fray, and nearly went to war with France over Fashoda in 1898, but the uneven balance created by the Austro-German alliance pushed them towards the Franco-German sphere. An attempted rapprochement in the 1900s by Germany was rebuffed, especially after German Naval armament plan were unveiled after 1905.


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## JohnWick7 (5 Oct 2018)

It is very informative.


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## brihard (5 Oct 2018)

Dammit. Based on an inside joke with an equally nerdy friend in second year military history, I can’t read the title of this and not say to myself “Lisa needs braces.”

Sorry, I need more coffee in my face hole...


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