# Should Canada adopt the LAV III (AKA: Stryker) as its primary armoured vehicle family?



## Brock

This is a question of some debate.  For some, the answer is simply, no.  Many diehard military personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces believe that Canada should have a tracked military equipped with the newest and best main battle tanks (MBT), self-propelled howitzers (SPH), infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and the associated combat service support tracked vehicles.  Many of people that hold thes beliefs simply dismiss arguments for the adoption of an all wheeled armoured fleet as naive.  However, I argue that Canada‘s military would be better off with the LAV III as the baseline armoured vehicles for all mechanized combat and combat support units. All tanks and all tracked vehicles, with the exception of the BV-206s, be deleted from our current inventory and a new set of military strategies and tactics be developed to employ the LAV III seried of wheeled armoured vehicles for all trades.  This will rationalize logistics and drastically reduce training costs.

Right now the Canada‘s CBMGs consist of a hodge podge of mixed units equipped with LAV III‘s on the way for the infantry, M113s, some Coyotes, some Grizzlies and AVGP variants, some units are light infantry without vehicles, and a small number of tanks, about 20-30.  This creates logistical nightmares and also costs a lot of money, becaue all units use the same armoured vehicles.  A single baseline armoured vehicle will reduce VTech training costs and simplify parts procurement and shipping.  In addtion LAV III is wheeled which costs less in terms of fuel and maintenance costs.  The LAV III is much faster than any tracked vehicles for battlefield mobility.  Tactical mobility across open ground is not however as good as a tank or the best tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), but is better than M113s.  They do get stuck more easily in soft terrain such as swamps, deep snow, or very soft sand.  They do carry about the same armour and firepower as most modern IFVs (the LAV III Kodiak equipped with add-on armour provides protection from up to 30mm rounds).  It is also well known that wheeled IFVs provide better overall protection from mines and have a better combat survivability rate than tracked IFVs due to their wheeled nature.  As well, one must remember that soft terrain is not the modern battlefield and it is highly unlikely to be so in the future with 75% plus of the worlds population living in urban areas where the tracked vehicles better tactical mobility in soft terrain does not exist.  One must also remember that LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank, therefore new tactics and strategies need to be developed if an all wheeled fleet is adopted.

But what about tanks?  A LAV III can not replace tanks.  Yes, a LAV III  can not fullfill the same role as a tank, because it is not designed to.  However, Canada does not need tanks if adopted new tactics and strategies.  Tanks are designed to be able to go toe to toe with other tanks.  They are extremely expensive to procure, maintain, and to operate.  They are also required in large numbers to be effective.  Canada‘s small numbers of around 125 divided amongst three brigade groups and a tank training unit does not provide Canada with the capability to employ tanks.   There is still a place on the modern battlefield for MBTs, but not in Canada‘s army.  Canada by maintainin an ineffective MBT capability wastes valuable military finnacial resources that could got towards providing a small number of attack and heavly lift helicopters which are not needed in massive numbers.  What would provide direct fire support for the infantry without tanks, missiles are far too expensive?  A version of the LAV III equipped with a 105mm cannon turret, either conventional or low profile.  It retain the baseline LAV III vehicle, thus providing logistics commonality, and the firepower of a MBT for direct-fire support.  Is it not more vulnerable to anti-tank missles than an MBT.  Yes, it is, but due to the proliferation of heavy anti-tank weapons that can easily defeat even the most heavily armoured tanks, including US M1A2 Abrams, heavy armour is just as vulnerable.  It must be stressed that combat units will use new tactics and strategy that minimizes their weaknesses and maximizes their capabilities rather than utilizing strategies that were designed for a type of warfare that doesn‘t exist today.

In addition, it most be noted that Canadian have trouble understanding why we need tanks and all the modern tracked IFVs, SPHs, and support vehicles that go with them.  And rightly so,  why should Canadian‘s pay to equip a military to fight wars that require tanks and are not likely to occur and that they do not want us involved in.  Massive tank battles are the dreams of the "glory" days of warfare.  The real battles today are low to medium intensity wars, but high intensity combat (i.e. people are still shooting at you), and peace support operations (PSO) gone wrong that tanks can‘t get to fast enough before the shooting ends.  Many countries that require PSOs by the UN or NATO soldiers to help stabilze the country will not accept heavily armoured tracked military units, because that is considered a loss of their control and sovereingty.  Canada‘s military industry would also be benefited, becuase the LAV III is a Canadian vehicle that can be bought for uninflated prices due to a bulk buy and help in securing foreing military sales for friendly nations.

This proposal of mine will no doubt be heavily criticized by those who support US style militarism, but please provide constructive criticism to this proposal/idea rather than just rhetoric.  In addition. keep in mind that new tactics and strategies must be developed to make a an all LAV III fleet effective.  Thanks, Brock


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## Brad Sallows

>and a new set of military strategies and tactics be developed to employ the LAV III seried of wheeled armoured vehicles for all trades

Without getting too deep into the weeds (I take issue with some of the "facts" above), think about this one.

Does one buy the tools for the job or choose only jobs which suit the tools?  I do not regret decisions to buy equipment which suits the most common employment of our armed forces.  But we shouldn‘t make what will amount to false assumptions by trying to shoehorn one equipment feature set into all battle roles.  It is safer to admit that some jobs might need different equipment (eg. tracks, heavy armour protection, self-propelled artillery), and not attempt those jobs until we are prepared to buy the proper equipment.


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## 2 Charlie

Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit.  The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about.  It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the  order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role.  Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them.  Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.    

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.


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## McG

I would have to say I‘m sitting on the fence with this one.  
  I do not belive that Canada can abandon all tracked vehicles as easily as you would suggest, Brock.  Some specialized vehicles cannot be built on a LAV III chassis.  Such vehicles include the AEV, AVLB, 155 mm self propelled howitzer, and the MBT.  I do not belive that Canada should do without these vehicles either.  You have phrased it nicely yourself when you said, "LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank."  To assume that there will be no future need for a MBT is to suggest that one knows when, where, and how the next war will be fought.  This is never the case.
  Your argument does hold some merit however, and as I said, I‘m sitting on the fence with this one. 
   The potential of the LAV III is highlighted by the recent US decision to equip its medium mechanized brigades with the vehicle.  To meet this need there are already a 105 mm FSV, Engineer section vehicle, CP, Ambulance, NBCD Recce, Mortar carrier, and other variants developed and available off-the-shelf. Additionally, the LAV III could be adapted to replace any other M113 variants serving in the CF. 
  BUT: the Americans were buying the right tool for the right job.  Their plan was to establish rapidly deployable brigades that could get to the fight quicker than the M1A2 Abrams.  The LAV brigades would deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US.  The MBT is not eliminated from this scheme, nor is the armoured cavalry.  A new element is added to fill the void in between.
  How does this apply to Canada?  If you belive we cannot afford multiple different levels of Mechanized Brigade groups (which we cannot)  then you must leave the MBT within the Brigades as they now are and deploy them as needed.  This would allow a brigade to upgrade from medium to heavy, through the arrival of its tanks, while deployed.  Alternatively, you could suggest that all the MBT be concentrated within a single regiment (LdSH, because they have more room for tanks in the prairies) and have the army restructured into two medium brigades and one heavy.  This would correct for the excessive dispersion of the current fleet of Leopards.

Some parting thoughts:
1.   Why continue spending funds to train reservists the fire the 76 mm gun on the cougar when the vehicle should never se operational deployment again?  Why not replace the turret with the Delco turret of the LAV III and Coyote?  This would train reservists in the same gunnery techniques as their regular force counter parts and make it easier to integrate them in to units preparing for overseas duty.
2.  The Australian LAV-25s have the same Delco turrets as on our LAV III, except that some also have TOW launchers on either side of the turret.  If Canada had chosen those turrets for the LAV III (or at least on one per Inf Plt) it could have greatly increased tank killing capacity and thereby reduced  dependency on MBTs.

"To be prepared everywhere, is to be weak everywhere."
     Sun-Tzu ‘The Art of Warfare‘


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## 2 Charlie

It warms my heart to see someone who has studied this book.  

Not to mock you in particular, however it disappoints me when I hear someone adopt a quote from it at an O Gp or on a crse.  I will engage them afterwards and ask them to elaborate, to which a normal response is a stunned blank look, or occasionally, some keen young officer or sect commander will strike up a conversation.

Clive Milner when the Bge Comd for 1 CMBG had a habit of throwing out the odd qoute, must of had the Coles Notes version.

Sun-Tzu ‘The Art of Warfare‘


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## McG

Brock said:

"The Canadian Armed Forces recently updated all of its Leopard C-1 MBTs to Leopard C-2 standard. In my opinion, this is merely another round of wishful thinking that it has the equipment and therefore capablility to fight a modern mechanized war with heavy armour MBTs and supporting vehicle‘s. Even tankers must admit that the Leopard C-2 supported Combat Brigades, even if fully equipped with Leopard C-2s, could not go toe-to-toe with a brigade equipped with modern MBTs and supporting AFVs such as the Leopard II‘s and Marder‘s or T-80‘s and BMP-3‘s that had crew of similar training. Canadian crew‘s would be decimated, even by a smaller force. The Leopard C-2 is merely an improved vintage late 1950‘s tank design. Why pretend that Canada has mechanized combat brigade groups that can fight "with the best against the best", when clearly we are not equipped to do so and it is highly ulikely that Canada will ever be.
"Canada would be much wiser to embrace the the interim combat brigade groups that the US is scrambling to create and has just recently ordered 2000 plus LAV III from Canada based Diesel Division General Motors to equip three brigade groups plus spares for training and attrition. These brigades fast and highly mobile, although in some area‘s tracked vehicle‘s enjoy advantages such as in severly swampy terrain. They are essentially modern day cavalry brigades supported by substantial numbers of infantry and combat support units such as artillery. These brigades are of use in all war scenarios, even high intensity conflict where they are able to act as quick strike brigades. Although they aren not able to go toe-to-toe with a heavy armour brigade equipped with modern MBTs and AIFV‘s they can easily run away if they meet stiff opposition. Yes, Canada loses the capabilty to fight even in a very limited heavy armour battle, but is it likely that Canada ever would and since we aren‘t equipped to do so what person would want to. When or if MBTs are not utilized by the CF, it is even more unlikely that any politician or officer would ever put the military into a situation where they must go toe-to-toe with a well-equipped mechanized armour brigade group.

"The LAV III should be adopted as the sole armoured vehicle in the Canadian Armoured Forces due to its excellent combination of more than adequate tactical mobility and fighting capability and its exceptional strategic mobility. In a high intensity situation Canada could offer battle or combat brigade goups entirely equipped with LAV III vehicles to act as fast strike units where tracked vehicles are too slow, without losing world influence to allies because of riding on past actions (ie. Desert Storm). In medium to low intensity conflicts LAV III equipped brigades are far superior to their tracked counterparts. And in peackeeping scneario the vast majority of parites will have no problem with a well equipped wheeled combat brigade on their homeland, but the many countries will not accept heavily armoured vehicles, because they signal a loss of control to the conflicting parties. Also, when things get out of hand these brigades are able to hold their own. Just my thoughts. Please provide yours, as other critiques could improve improve mine or show mine to be wrong."

I just felt that these comments from the Armour section added some depth to your position here, and provided some new ideas to consider.  
 It raises the questions for strong supporters of the MBT to answer:  if our tanks can‘t do the job (of a modern MBT) then what should their role be (a mobile gun for the infantry?), or do replace them?  and if we do with what?


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## Michael Dorosh

> <font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
> *Hi Brad,
> 
> Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit.  The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about.  It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the  order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role.  Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.
> 
> Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them.  Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.
> 
> Never happened, thank god.
> 
> Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.*</font>




Heavy recce - a historical example of this was the South Alberta Regiment in WW II - they were officially the recce regiment of the 4th Armoured Division, but in practice they were equipped identically to an armoured regiment - all Shermans.  It seems that their employment didn‘t much differ from an armoured regiment either.


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## 2 Charlie

Not to dampen our armour friends.  But has anyone taken the time to really look at the actual upgrade.

Remember the pictures of our first kick at the CAT trophy in Germany using borrowed Leopard 1A1‘s, Belgique I believe, they had the original round frying pan turret.  Our tankers won.

Tadda, if you examine the turrets of the up grade to the C2, it is a 1A1 turret with a complete add on of angular bins and armour add on‘s.

We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret.

Next up, with our shrinking Bge capabilities and the advent of the LAV family, there was talk of Two light Bge (LAV) Gps, with one back Heavy (tracked).

I have my doubts.  Especially with the rumours of a Bge being disbanded.


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## RCA

As I have stated in a previous post, I think it is time for Canada to get off the pot a make a decision to what our capabilities are to be and start moving in that direction.

I personally feel that we should more to an "all LAV" type concept. This will standardize the army from the hodgepodge we have now. It will force a re-thinking of our doctrine and a rewrite of our tactics. In other words a complete re-working of the army from doctrine, tactics and training. I think this would be a good thing by bringing debate to the army and in the end grow from that debate.

Going wheeled in the long run decreases maintaince costs, standardizes training ( and being easier to cross train Regs and reserves). and because we are basically buying from one family of vehs we will be able buy more. (increasing our sustainability something we don‘t have now with the Leopards)

There is nothing wrong with us doing the- "deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US". This could become our new role, one which could well suit us. As a secondary role, it would be no problem having LAV Bde or Bn in the peacekeeping/making role either.



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Ubique


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## McG

I can agree that maintianing a MBT fleet is low on the priority list v.s making the bde‘s mobile, but i belive we should look to maintian some sembelance of heavy armour in the long-run.  I like the sound of two medium, and one heavy bde, but I realise this approach would be impractical.

What do think should happen with the light battalions?  Should they continue to pound the gravel while a third of thier numbers are air mobile,  or should everyone be put in LAVs aswell except for airmobile companies?


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## RCA

I believe because of our size and financial constraints we should not dilute our effort and for better or worse stick with one path which I think should be all LAV ( or Wheeled). (I know it is putting all our eggs in one basket, but it is better to do one thing well than a lot half-assed.


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Ubique


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## the patriot

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept we are now seeing is that most NATO countries are dropping the armour in favour of mobility and speed.  Hence the current situation where the LAV seems to be overtaking the MBT as the armoured vehicle of choice.

-the patriot-


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## 2 Charlie

One of the few nations who went with a light mobile wheeled force was South Africa.  Right down to wheeled 155‘s.  The only country to even look at their tactics was Isreal, maybe we should have a look.

All other nations who have gone light and mobile and wound up in a shooting war did not do so well.

The Russians relied primarily on their BTR families in Afganistan, Chechnya, and several other regions.  The numbers tell the truth, body bags do fit all sizes.  The russians understand the need for a mix of track/wheeled, light/heavy.

We are getting into a doctrine that failed the US in Vietnam, light, fast, mobile.  

It‘s nice to take a piece of ground, but you have to put something on that piece of terra firma to keep it.  That is were the heavies pay off.

The LAV can do many rolls, which is great, but I question it‘s overhead protection and survivability on a sustained manouver warfare engagement.  You can only shoot and skoot until the fat lady closes all the exits, then it turns in to a turkey shoot.

Read some of the other posts of late, get rid of the head sheds, rationalize our budget, get proper kit, get on with the job.

UBIQUE


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## Gunner

I‘m really impressed by some of the discussion on the adoption of the LAV III as our sole armd veh.  While some of the comments have been the usual whining from the usual suspects for the most part there has been some good banter.

Choosing vehs and eqpt is a combination of many military factors (the threat and doctrine) vs society factors (culture, resources and politics).  The Coyote (LAV II if you will) and LAV III are all a result of a combination of how the military and societal factor mix.  

I‘m a firm believer that the purchase of the LAV III was the correct one for Canada and for the Army.  It provides mix of protection, firepower and mobility at a fraction of the cost of a mechanized force.  Considering the missions we‘ve been on in the last decade the LAV III will give us a capability that we‘ve never had before.  

If the threat against Canada changes, our eqpt and doctrine can change as well.

Gunner sends....


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## McG

I agree that purchasing the LAV III was the correct choice for our army, but should it be the only purchase?  If we cannot afford a new MBT but can afford LAV 105mm and AT platforms, then we should go with all LAV III.  If wec cannot afford either option then we are left with an army hampered down to the battle goupe level by its inhomogeneity.  I think it is time that the boys in the palace have this discusion before there are any large purchases that go against the plan.
Does everyone here know the Eng M113 is to be replaced by the new generation M113?  it has a longer hull, aditional road wheel, a grizzly turret, and it will not be able to keep up with an all LAV Btl Gp.


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## Gunner

McG, The Army has had a plan in place for years to rationalize the current fleet of eqpt.  The phasing out of the Lynx and introduction of the Coyote.  The phasing out of the M113 and Grizzly and the phasing in of the LAV III.  LAV III FOO and Pnr variants to replace their current vehs (Wow, a FOO vehicle that will bring us into the 21st century).  On the armd side the Cougar is no longer used by the Regs and will be replaced in the interium with a Leopard C2/Coyote mix within the Regts.  The long term vision (2010) is for everything to be replaced by the Armd Combat Vehicle (whatever it is).  The bison (LAV II) will be used as ambs, mortars and CPs.  I think the only M113 that will be kept are for TUA and Engrs? 

Hence, the 113 fleet, Grizzlies and Cougars will for the most part be tossed.  Some will be refurbished for MRTs, etc.  Once completed we will actually have a fairly robust force that is all mounted in wheeled vehs with a fairly heavy firepower capability.  Will we have a fairly modern and homogenous force to boot.  

Just because you don‘t know what the Army intends to do doesn‘t mean there isn‘t a plan.  If you are not able to access the info over the internet or in your unit.  Spend a couple of bucks and do a access to information request and you will be amazed at how much info and plans are out there.  

The army is finally able to move forward in terms of "good kit" and everyone is still complaining.  If you wanted to complain about the state of eqpt within the Reserve Force and what direction they should take....that would be a good discussion.  The Reserves...Mechanized or Light?  Advantages/Disadvantages.


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## McG

I am aware of the CF‘s vision for 2010, however in the area which we a discussing I would suggest it is too vague to be a plan.  Let us look at what the plan says about the wheeled fleet, and the ACV.

Convert the land forces to a primarily 
wheeled fleet of combat and support 
vehicles.  CLS is to develop a plan to 
equip the land forces with wheeled vehicles
for most combat and support functions.
Specifically, CLS will seek PMB Preliminary 
Project Approval by end April 2000 for an 
ACV replacement for the Leopard and Cougar.

Now lets consider what it says.

1.  The plan suggests moving to a MOSTLY wheeled fleet.  This still leaves the handicap that wheeled vehicles will not be able to fully exploit their speed, and tracked vehicles will not be able to exploit their ability to travel where wheels cannot.  To do either would result in the Bde‘s assets being spread out and unable to support each other.  I hope we all realise at this point in time, that all combat arms are required to be successful in warfare.  So my observations stands: the puzzle palace must decide to go all wheeled, or to establish different homogeneous Bde‘s based on light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.

2.  It is not stated that the ACV will be wheeled or tracked; it could be either.  IMHO, no one vehicle can replace both the cougar and the Leopard.  The Leopard, as a MBT, can only be replaced by another MBT.  As a fire support vehicle to the infantry the Cougar sufficiently matched mobility with its APC (Grizzly) counter part, however its 76 mm gun was inadequate, the Leopard in the same role has the desired fire power in its 105 mm but lacks the speed of the LAV III.  To truly replace both vehicles in their roles would require a new MBT, and an infantry support gun.

And, as an aside, the plan also calls for the acquisition of NEW LAV ambulances (i.e. not the bison) and the TUA has already been placed an a LAV chassis (I saw one as early as last May).  There was mention of acquiring a MLRS system, but mention of field artillery is limited.  Should the guns become all SP, or towed.  Should they be wheeled or remain tracked?  Cougars are not being tossed; they are going to the reserves.

Now to get back to the point, Should Canada go all wheeled, or develop medium/light Bdeâ€™s and heavy Bde‘s?  Should we maintain a MBT capability (replace the leopard, or not)?  Do you agree with the "Plan?"  It seems that the difference of opinion on this topic is actually split by those who feel Canada should prepare for low and some medium intensity conflict, and those who feel Canada should prepare for the entire spectrum of low to high intensity conflict.


[This message has been edited by McG (edited 29-01-2001).]


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## pat

Well I am not in to doctrine or the yes/no question. If you have ever spent time on any ex, or op living in an engineer 113 it sucks. Living, working, and just keeping up is a true test. I personally liked the SEV. SEV what‘s that well let me tell ya it‘s an MLVW with a special cage and auger between the back cargo area and cab. With hydraulic tools built in to it. If you seen one their is no mistaken it for any thing else. 

As for the SLAV III, I have not seen what their eng version is. The last word was that the Engineers would be converted to a total track unit with modified and newly painted 113 that come from the infantry once they are converted to the new SLAV family. But they way things are going, we are on wait out. 

What ever they decide, do it quick. Then we can get on with the task of training, modifying out SOP‘s and learn how to work with every one else.


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## Gunner

McG, don‘t look at CF vision for 2010 to provide exact details. It‘s simple a mid term vision statement.  Look at the Army‘s Eqpt Rationalization Plan for more specifics.  I think you‘ll find that alot of information is close hold until decisions can be made or it can be presented properly.  I‘m getting a brief by the CLS later this week and I‘ll let the forum know the results.

I don‘t think we‘ll get to an all wheeled fleet simply due to financial constraints. The  refurbishing of the Grizzly and M113 for special variants is a cost saving measure that provides an adequate vehicle...vice the best vehicle for the job.  I‘ll have to check on LAVIII chassis being purchased for Ambs.  That is new to me, I‘d always heard that the Bisons would.  

The Leopard will be in service until at least 2010 and the ACV whatever it will be will come into service around that time.  I think its a wheeled vehicle (LAV IV?) with a 105 mm mounted gun system.   There are alot of advantages and disadvantages for a MBT or a wheeled veh.  We can train for war with wheeled vehicles even if we probably will only be involved in Chapter 6 and 7 missions abroad. 

Anyway, we are left with a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the Bde Gp.  Should we make our brigades (will there be any left) into heavy, medium or light?  While it would look good on paper the separate training requirements and logistical support would overwhelm our system.  Heck, we have enough trouble training ourselves with everyone going through the same training!

Canada does not have a military threat against it.  Our main threat is in the form of the United States.  How can we guard against a nation as big as they are?  

Because we don‘t have a military threat we don‘t have a large military and it probably wouldn‘t be a wise use of taxpayers dollars to spend it on expensive hardware.  Hence we strike a balance.  A vehicle that is capable of training soldiers in war fighting skills, that could be used during a ground conflict in a variety of roles, and is very usefull for peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations.  A medium weight capability seems to be the option that covers all avenues.  Should it be wheeled?  Sure, but is the money there to make it so?


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## McG

LFC Strategic Operations and Resource Plan (SORP) :
http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/level1bcp/CLS/part1.doc
http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/level1bcp/CLS/part2.doc
http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/level1bcp/CLS/part3.doc

Armoured Personnel Carrier Life Extension Projects
http://www.dnd.ca/crs/home/pdfs/apclife_e.PDF

CF Equipment
http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/cds_report/english/anxd_e.htm

Canadian Manoeuvre Troops: a New Model Army for the Next Millennium 
http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/nh/nh9798/0087.html


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## RCA

Hey Gunner-

"Wow, a FOO vehicle that will bring us into the 21st century"- don‘t you know we‘ve always had a dedicated FOO veh - the trusty Iltis with its trailer, what more could you want - it has wheels also and can go anywhere and it will start (most of the time) in the 21st century  
	

	
	
		
		

		
			





 Now if we could get a LAV III for  TSM/BSM‘s veh and a SP version for the 105 now your talking and don‘t forget a CP version. (that would be our best recruiting tool you could find.)  
	

	
	
		
		

		
		
	


	




 and to top it off it‘d be nice to happen before I pull the pin. Ah well wishful thinking

Keep your powder dry

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Ubique


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## Yard Ape

With regards to Pat‘s mention of MLVW SEVs, and RCA‘s reference to the Iltis:  Does anybody here really believe there is still a place for soft skinned vehicles in the F ech of a mechanised formation?  It goes against the entire reasoning of acquiring the LAV.

btw Gunner: Korea was "only" a chapter 7 operation, and there was plenty of use for MBT‘s there.  

  Yard Ape


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## McG

The Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL) is a modernized version of the M113 armoured personnel carrier with increased mobility and capacity. It will be used in field engineer, vehicle recovery and general purpose support roles.

On tracks and soft skin vehicles:

While better that the old M113‘s the MTVL will still lack the speed to keep pace with all LAV unit. The Engineer SEV, which would be more capable to keep pace w/the LAV, lacks the protection of an armoured vehicle and puts the section members (and therefore the mission) at greater risk.

A much better option would have been to replace both vehicles with a LAV III Engineer, and give the SEVs to the reservists.


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## Gordon Dundas

> Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
> *Hi Brad,
> 
> Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit.  The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about.  It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the  order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role.  Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.
> 
> Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them.  Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.
> 
> Never happened, thank god.
> 
> Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.*


----------



## Gordon Dundas

As  I recall the lynx did‘nt go on thechopping block until long after the Hvy.Recce concept went away .Further as I understood it ,it was to consist of 3 recce sqns of lynx/Iltis‘s (ilti?) and a sqn of leo‘s.


> Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
> *Hi Brad,
> 
> Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit.  The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about.  It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the  order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role.  Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.
> 
> Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them.  Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.
> 
> Never happened, thank god.
> 
> Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.*


----------



## Yard Ape

I think McG has got it right on this one.  You can use wheeled vehicles to support a tracked F ech, but not tracked vehicles to support a wheeled F ech.  No amount of arguing will make an M113 or M548 (or MTVL) fast enough to keep pace with a LAV.  Canada has chosen the wheeled route, now it must go all the way.

As for the original question about should Canada go all LAV III.  The answer is no.  The AVGP‘s and LAV II (bison and coyote) still have life in them.  There is also the consideration of roles not well suited to the LAV III (in any of its 6x6, 8x8, or 10x10 configurations).  With the iltis reaching the end of its life we should consider the need for an armoured security/liaison vehicle.  The Mowag Eagle, Panhard VBL Scout, and armoured Land Rovers come to mind, but there are many other options on the market.  We should also look for a Medium Armoured Logistic Vehicle Wheeled (MALVW?) to replace the M548 and in some cases the MLVW.  Both vehicles are dated and in need of a fully armoured and wheeled equivalent in forward support roles.  Perhaps the German Fuchs (I hear a 8x8 variant has been developed).






  Yard Ape


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## 2 Charlie

From Â» Artillery   Â» How inglorious ... 

"To refer to the LAV program, yes I am glad that the equip (re-equipping is occurring), it will make it easier to maintain the fleet, and yes provide us with a modern mechanism to present a military presence whether PKO‘s or whatever. I have a concern as to the general acceptance, but if you starve someone long enough, what ever you give him or her will be greatly appreciated.

The LAV (MOWAG) family serves a very specific role, light, urban, mobile etc. I am concerned that we are adapting it for pretty much every front line function. However, the LAV family as originally designed has an inherent weakness with its top armour. We are strengthening the sides, etc, but the top remains a concern. Yes I am aware of our vision and mission, we have discussed this previously, I make my point again the, vision is vague and we are adopting a program with pro's and con's, no clear end solution 

What does this have to do with wheel/tire probs. Simple, once the equip is deployed and manned, will this become a long forgotten issue until something goes wrong and someone gets injured or worse. Like the MLVW fleet, it was forgotten about until wheels started falling off.

To my AN, even we the CF have adopted a new anti armour weapon that is designed to strike the top of armour vehicles, the weakest point, hmm. "

Part of my comment re: the current wheel/tire issue.  Reposted it to get a reaction about my LAV comments.


----------



## Yard Ape

I took some quotes form an discusion on the future of the armoured corps on an official forum on LFRR.  Just figured i could add some fuel to this fire.  It is not so much LAV III yes/no? as it is a look at the tactical, doctrinal, and other such philosophical aspects that are relavent to deciding IF we should go all LAV  or pursue other options.  They bring up some good points, and some we have already seen.

--------------------------------------------
WO S MacDougall, 8CH

We can train for war with whatever we are given. It has always been so. The only question is how well we will be trained. In addition to training, we must also be equipped for war. An armoured cav veh does not miraculously turn itself into a tank when needed. A future conflict requiring a tank regiment needs a tank regts worth of kit prior to any commitment of forces. Three of four widely separated sqns of tanks, in different regts don‘t give us the ability to put a regt into the field when required. A battle group going up against an armour equipped enemy must have tanks, not ACVs. One tank sqn per brigade severely limits the brigade commanders options.

. . . 

One more thing I must mention..the idea of anyone in the Army actually suggesting that we do more with less as if it were a policy upsets me greatly. Certainly, as soldiers we must persevere and work through whatever shortages we encounter. However, we should not be telling our political masters that in the future we can pretend that this or that will suffice as a bandaid for the real stuff. This only places another nail in the coffin of our effectiveness. I do not believe that pulling our punches when we talk about roles, tasks, capabilites or equipment is in the best interest of the nation. The Army needs a sufficient quantity of modern equipment to train for war, and to conduct operations in the future as part of any allianace or international force in which we are involved. This means that the Reserves must hold a certain amount of the same equipment and have access to more, in order to be prepared to do our part in any future operation or conflict.

. . .

Just answer (to yourself) this one question..who predicted any of the wars, police actions, conflicts or operations that this nation‘s military has participated in, over the last 100+ years, with enough lead time to create policy, doctrine and a budget to fit it?  You continually preach the lesser prepared format because we don‘t know what we will be up against. That is the reason we must be prepared to participate in a broad spectrum of operations and tasks..we just don‘t know what will be next.

--------------------------------------------
G.M. Towhey

. . . Defence of Canada scenarios inevitably reduce to protracted guerilla-style defence in depth, demanding significantly increased anti-armour capabilities pre-positioned throughout the country. 

Clearly, Canadian Forces also require the ability to project force abroad and in this role there is a definite need for armour in order to succeed. However, this suggests relatively modest numbers of ally-compatible, readily transportable, light or medium tanks. Again, anti-armour capabilities must also be improved. 

Another truism is that Canadian Forces will not have a window of opportunity to buy new armoured vehicles once the decision has been made to commit to battle. The next shooting engagement will be a "come as you are war". Such was the case in Korea, Cyprus, the Gulf War, Medac, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and it will be the case next time. 

The idea of training regular or reserve "tankers" in "tank trainers" a la Cougars is, was, and always will be simply ludicrous. How much of my infantry career was spent lining up my Grizzlies behind Cougars on the final assault? As if the Cougars offered any more protection than my own armoured shell. 

Here was the Cougar: definitely not a tank, but rather a lightly armoured, relatively low-maintenance, low-cost vehicle, with an acceptable direct fire weapon system against soft-skin targets, capable of rapid deployment at up to 100Km/h on paved roads. A relatively decent direct fire support vehicle for infantry. 

Did anyone ever develop a single comma of doctrine or tactical procedure that made any use whatsoever of the vehicle‘s capabilities? No. Never. 

Instead, we pretended it was a heavy tank and taught blackhatters to lumber around the battlefield in swift, light vehicles as if they were 60 tonne behemoths going "toe to toe" with T-80‘s. 

Whatever the weapon system assigned to future regular or reserve armour units, please God, let them have the sense to use it wisely. 

--------------------------------------------
Maj BD Sallows, 12 Med Coy

I note the US Army is not completely moving to a more rapidly deployable structure in lieu of heavy armour. They are hedging by retaining heavy weight forces while they develop medium weight forces and the tank of the future. Perhaps it is appropriate, useful, and affordable for Canada to focus on a medium weight force, particularly the Regular Force - and this does not exclude armoured, tracked, turreted vehicles. 

Having raised the question of whether tank trainers are of use, I agree they do not serve well in the "come as you are war", nor should we assume that in any future "struggle for national survival war" that we will have the luxury of being the only nation making demands on the industries of Canada and its allies. Whatever weapons required by our doctrine and force structure, we should always have some on hand. 

--------------------------------------------
LCol Tom Burns

. . . 

One of the themes that has emerged is the contention that, as we cannot accurately forecast the scope of future operations, we should re-focus our doctrine, training & equipping to be more "realistic" & affordable. The thinking goes like this: There is an operational continuum that starts at Humanitarian Assistance operations and extends all the way up to High Intensity(HI)war. We have not been involved in HI ops since Korea. We are pinched for funds. Therefore we would be wise to focus on, say, the mid 80% of the operational continuum. With such a focus, we can rationalize an Army that does not require the capability to conduct HI combat ops. Supporters of this line of thought cite the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) and the assymetrical nature of war in the 21st century as reasons we should cast aside HI capabilities in favour of lighter, more projectable forces tailored to the "niche" operations falling in the mid 80% of the Operational Continuum that we will undertake.This estimate is badly flawed for two reasons. 

Firstly, the reason we have an Army is because, in a country like ours, the Army alone has the ability to respond to situations in which no other organizations can be effective. Situations like Op Abacus, Oka, Gustavson Lake, the Medak Pocket come to mind. These situations are put in that order because they span the Operational Continuum from low to high. In addition, they are all situations which started off as relatively minor issues and, through Assymetry, quickly escalated into major undertakings which strained Army capabilities. 

The second flaw derives from the first. Why was the Army effective in dealing with those situations? It was effective because we are trained for HI ops. Because of that we retain the C3 capabilities to deal with any situation and the combat power to deal with a shooting war, however unforseen & undesired. If we ever lose our capapility to undertake HI ops, we will soon thereafter see the corresponding C3 capabilities deteriorate to the point of uselessness. 

Given the Assymetry of War in the 21st Century, what do we see that provides comfort that HI ops will not be required? Nothing. What can undertake HI ops other than the well trained, well equipped & well led combined arms team? Nothing. Has the RMA rendered tanks, guns, engrs, sigs & inf supported by CSS obsolete? No. 

. . . 

--------------------------------------------
Sgt A Stagg

. . .

‘Trainer‘ vehicles are a next to useless cost savings. In Mob 1 deployments, the pers need to be completely re-trained to use the ‘real‘ vehicle. In 2/3/4 deployments, the required depth of vehs to actually deploy the tps simply doesn‘t exist. (Remember that UNIMOG took Rad Vans from almost every Sig Res unit in Canada to meet the op reqr. Image if it had been Leopards, SP Howitzers, or Coyotes that were required!!) Just as impotantly, a trainer veh has completely different logistics requirements. How much fuel does a track burn in moving 250km? How about a ‘trainer‘? Will the Res Officer who can‘t be trusted to lead the tps in battle know how much fuel is actually required when preparing the Log plan?  (OK, trainers can be used to great advantage but it is essential the the actual kit be abvailable, assigned, and frequently used to ensure that pers are actually abnle to operate it. After that, we can work on saving money.)

. . . 

--------------------------------------------
G.M. Towhey

. . . that the Army must train for worst case scenarios. I have often talked about the "myth of peacekeeping" in presentations I give here and there. The great myth is that peacekeeping is "nicer" than fighting. That peacekeepers are kinder than soldiers. The reality, even in Cyprus, was often more like: the best peacekeepers are the toughest SOB‘s on the block. Only combat-trained soldiers can effectively keep the peace, even in classic Cyprus style situations. In the new era where everything is called "peace" this or "peace" that, thinly disguised euphemisms for warfare, combat skills are even more important. The great irony is that the Canadian Forces all but invented the Myth of Peacekeeping, and it may prove to be their undoing. Alas, another discussion for another time.

. . . There never was a war where the soldiers crossed the start line with all the kit they wanted. There never will be such a war. The "give me tanks" or send me home argument doesn‘t really wash. I say, better to contribute a force that can win, than a force that looks good on an overhead slide. This means, tailoring the force structure to the likely missions. . . 

. . . 

Canada should equip its forces with the best available equipment to meets its strategic needs. Because they may ultimately have to defend Canada, we should equip our forces with the best equipment for this task. We should then look for opportunites to contribute in a meaningful way to our collective defence allies within the scope of our domestic defence abilities. 
Tanks are the best weapon system to destroy other tanks. There is, however, no heavy armour threat to Canada . . .

To meet our own domestic deployment requirements as well as our strategy of forward action, our forces must be easily transportable. If the role we choose to fill as part of our collective defence agreements is light or medium armour, then we should offer that in force to NATO. If it‘s artillery, let‘s do that. If it‘s highly transportable, highly trained combat forces, as I believe it probably should be, let‘s do that. 

Whatever it is, let‘s do it better than anyone else. Being perfect isn‘t necessary. Being better is.

. . .

--------------------------------------------
WO S MacDougall

. . .

I am CAVALRY. I will always be CAVALRY and I strongly believe that this army and the Armoured Corps need a light armoured, highly mobile, well armed vehicle, to be used in formations such as a Cav Btl Gp. I agree that we will never go to war, except as part of an alliance. I agree that we should use North American built equipment. Most of all, I agree that a specialization for our army, within the framework of our alliances would be best. However I think that we should not put all our eggs in one basket. One of our problems seems to be that we want all our formations to look the same. 

Why does each Armoured Regt have to be the same. Why can‘t 1 Brigade be "heavy" and 5 Brigade be "medium" and 2 Brigade be "light". Why not have one Reg Force unit specialize in tanks, while the others specialize in light armour, while maintaining a small tank capability (1/2 sqn?). The Reserve units in the applicable area would train to augment the Reg Force brigade as required. Some units (Reg and Res) should have "national tasks" (especially in LFAA since there is no Reg Force formation).

I am not a proponent of busting the bank to outfit three full regts with M1 tanks. I am suggesting that the same number of tanks we have now, distributed differently, might be the plan. As for light armoured vehicles..first we would have to make up our (collective) min/motorized unit, the CAR was sent because it was "fair." So, we stripped a mech unit of vehicles and drivers (thus disabling a battalion) and re-trained the airborne in mech ops so they could be sent overseas. Would it not have made more sense to send the mech unit in the first place? Oh, yeah, sorry. It wasn‘t their "turn". 

You‘ve identified a key structural design principle: Build to task.

--------------------------------------------

If you want to read through the whole thing it (and several other discusions on LFRR) is at:
http://www.army.dnd.ca/cgi-bin/forum/ultraboard.pl 


 Yard Ape


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## Brock

When I wrote this posting, I expected to get a bit of flack and a bit of acceptance and encouraging comments to my surprise my thoughts recieved more acceptance than I thought.  I must affirm that I agree that the LAV III can not do everything, but I must point out that it can mount a 155mm howitzer and a 105mm cannon.  I also insist that Canada simply isn‘t capable, financially, of fighting light, medium, and heavy mechanized.  To all proponents I say look to our defence funding history in non total war scenarios.  Unless we are in a total war scenario Canada‘s military will always be extemely strapped financially.  We should do the best with what we have and accept that we will never have the capability to field a Patton armoured divison.  I do not mean to sound arrogant, but stop wishing your wasting your time.  The LAV III is simply the best multi-purpose combat capable armoured vehicle currently available and in production and Canadian (via Switzerland‘s MOWAG).  I have read all of these articles before and agree they have merit, but not for Canada.  We need doctrine that can fit the capabilities we can afford politically and financially.  When we have these capabilities we must ensure their proper use.  To all those that say wars are "come as you are" and advocate a heavy mechanized capability should take a look at why Canada couldn‘t go to Desert Storm, our equipment was too old.  If we had been there would our soldiers want to go head to head with an Iraqi tank (T-72).  Our training may be better, but no thanks. We likely would have suffered more casualities than any other allied force.  We must accept that we do not have ability to field a properly equipped heavy mechanized force.  As a military we will get far more respect politically and militarily, because we will be able to participate if we choose to provide what we can provide rather than not providing what we can.  Just my thoughts (sorry for any sarcasm and forgive my editing)


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## Brock

When I wrote this posting, I expected to get a bit of flack and a bit of acceptance and encouraging comments to my surprise my thoughts recieved more acceptance than I thought.  I must affirm that I agree that the LAV III can not do everything, but I must point out that it can mount a 155mm howitzer and a 105mm cannon.  I also insist that Canada simply isn‘t capable, financially, of fighting light, medium, and heavy mechanized.  To all proponents I say look to our defence funding history in non total war scenarios.  Unless we are in a total war scenario Canada‘s military will always be extemely strapped financially.  We should do the best with what we have and accept that we will never have the capability to field a Patton armoured divison.  I do not mean to sound arrogant, but stop wishing your wasting your time.  The LAV III is simply the best multi-purpose combat capable armoured vehicle currently available and in production and Canadian (via Switzerland‘s MOWAG).  I have read all of these articles before and agree they have merit, but not for Canada.  We need doctrine that can fit the capabilities we can afford politically and financially.  When we have these capabilities we must ensure their proper use.  To all those that say wars are "come as you are" and advocate a heavy mechanized capability should take a look at why Canada couldn‘t go to Desert Storm, our equipment was too old.  If we had been there would our soldiers want to go head to head with an Iraqi tank (T-72).  Our training may be better, but no thanks. We likely would have suffered more casualities than any other allied force.  We must accept that we do not have ability to field a properly equipped heavy mechanized force.  As a military we will get far more respect politically and militarily, because we will be able to participate if we choose to provide what we can provide rather than not providing what we can.  Just my thoughts (sorry for any sarcasm and forgive my editing)


----------



## McG

As much as I do not like the thought of not having any heavy capabilities, it seems to be the generally arrived at consensus that it is outside our budget.  However, I feel it is important to point out that most of the advocates of the RMA, that I have heard from, speak of light and intelligent v.s slow and dumb.  Given the same recce and ew capabilities, a heavy unit can be just as "inteligent" as a light unit.

That being said, it is time to get on with how we will employ this new force.  I feel it is time for a radical restructuring of the Bde Armour componet in our chosen direction.  The Tank Regiment and Recce Sqn should be replaced with a single Cavalry Regiment.  This regiment would consist of the current recce Sqn (in Coyotes) and a medium cavalry sqn (in LAV based armoured cavalry vehicles).  The role of the recce sqn would not change from it‘s present.  The medium sqn would serve as a guard/screen against enemy forces (with the primary gaol being to keep thier heavy forces "dumber" than our light), Convoy escort operations, and recce by force.

Fire support to the infantry would be provided by a battalion‘s direct fire support coy.  The personel of a DFS Coy need not be infantry, they would be armour crewmen posted into the infantry battalion.  The vehicle employed by the Coy would likely be the same LAV III mobile gun system that the US Interm Bde‘s are placing directly into the rifle companies.

Brock, I think you have missed the point of what was being said about the "come as you are" wars.  The quotes were not suggesting that we are ready to go into a high intesity conflict as we are now.  They suggest that when we select our equipment it must be capable of participating in whatever conlfict we go to, and we must buy enough of it to equip whatever formation we send (without borrowing short-falls from other units and making those units inoperational).  At the time of the Gulf War and through to today, we have not been ready for the "come as you are" war.  We will only be ready when we can say "were ready to go now, but fortunatly have nowhere to go."


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## Yard Ape

I know 155 SP guns can be wheeled, but are you sure a LAV III could suport one?  It is a *big* gun.

 Yard Ape


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## Harry

Have done a little research and have sent off a request to the manufacturer.  A 155mm has not and will more than likely not be incorporated into the LAV family.  

I have included a link that shows a 105mm concept, and a few others of interest.
http://www.gdls.com/releases/IAV_Specsheet.pdf


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## Brock

Harry, you are in fact wrong about the LAV III being equipped as part of the US Army‘s Interim Armoured Vehicle (IAV) fleet.  It is in fact an essential part of the fleet.  However, it is not fully developed.  The LAV III 155mm self-propelled howitzer will utilize a joint US-UK developed super light weight howitzer.  It is fully developed as a towed howizter and will be modified for use on the LAV III.  Previously without the 155mm howitzer was simply too heavy to be put on a vehicle the size of the LAV III, but now it is being integrated by British Aerospace defence systems for use on the LAV III.  Check out http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/mav.htm 

In regard to the come as you are war.  I believe I am not missing the boat.  The distinction between high, medium, and low intensity conflict must be made.  All combat is high intensity when it occurs.  I apologize for not being clear.  I think Canada should focus on what it can contribute to combat scenarios, I believe that should focus on what we can actually provide.  A light mechanized brigade, example 3500-4000 soldiers equipped with a LAV III baseline vehicle is suffficeint for all war scenarios, but must be utilized properly within that context.  Our units should be fully trained and personnel levels should be at full strength at all times for combat units.  Canada could then fight wars, maybe not every situation in all war intensity levels, but we could provide a credible combat force rather than no combat force as would be the case now.  So I agree and apologize for being unclear.


----------



## McG

Go to this site and you can see a picture of a LAV III TUA, which was discussed earlier in this topic.  It is right of center on a colage of other LAV pictures.  Also shown are the TOW/25mm turret I mentioned, and a US LAV TOW carrier.
http://www.delcodefense.com/index.htm


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## Yard Ape

While we are into giving out links showing the LAV, I thought I‘d pass along this one.
Mowag Photos 

It shows the whole family through all three generations (the AVGP is in there w/the first generation).  Plenty of different configurations which support the arguments about the ability to make the vehicle fit _most_ missions (is that LAV III 6x6 sporting starstreak AD missles?).  I‘d like to take back my suggestion about a Fuchs 8x8 as a ALVW; the LAV III 10x10 looks good for the job.











  Yard Ape


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## Yard Ape

Okay, I cannot sit on this any more.  If we are to be ready for anything, we must have heavy capabilities.  I support the McG‘s model for the light mech Bde‘s, but we need atleast one heavy Bde!  I would sugest using the current CMBG‘s as a starting point and increasing the tank regiment to two Battalions, and adding a fire support sqn (of light tanks) to the infantry battalions.  I would then suggest selecting a modern tracked replacement for the M-113, and the best vehicle for the job would be the Swedish made CV-9030.   We cannot limit our future options.  Every combat vehicle in the heavy CMBG would be tracked, with the possible excepption of recce.  If the threat to Canada changes there will not be time to replace our equipment so we must be ready now.

Combat Vehicle 9030





CV 90105 light tank





CV 90120





 Yard Ape


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## Yard Ape

And let us not forget the need for a new MBT to replace to leopard I.











  Yard Ape


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## McG

As I said in my last post, we have come to a general understanding that maintaining a Heavy Bde is outside the realm of fiscal reality in this country.  That being said, Yard Ape, your _fantastic_ design for a new and improved heavy CMBG is not (and will not be in the near future) affordable.  

For those who are not content to stop beating this dead horse (or those who just want to know more), try reading through some of these related posts from the old War Diary:

Leopard and Cougar replacement

DND Orders Final Batch of LAV III Vehicles





_LAV III IFV_


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## Yard Ape

Re: Leopard and Cougar replacement

When they pick the vehicle for the ACV I hope they ask themselves if they want a fire support vehicle for the infantry or an armoured cavalry vehicle which can perform independant of the infantry.  I belive the LAV III MGS could perform well in the first role, but not in the second.

I think an armoured cavalry vehicle should take a look at a BMP-3 for variety of weapon systems.  A 25 mm bushmaster, a 90 mm or 105 mm cannon, and TOW launchers like those on the Bradley.  (I would suggest a 120 mm cannon instead of the 90 mm or 105 mm, and TOW; I do not think a LAV could support such a system though).  This vehicle would be overkill for just a fire support to the infantry though.

If we replace the Leopard it should be with another MBT.  The ACV should be seen as a replacement solely for the Cougar.






  LAV III MGS

 Yard Ape


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## Yard Ape

I agree Nate.  You‘ve got me sold.



> . . . Canada should integrate the Armour Regiments with the Inf battalions, using LAV 105s and focusing on combined arms.
> However, with the manpower saved in this reorganization, Canada should form a single, small, Armoured Cavalry Regiment-equipped exclusively with MBTs, tracked RECCE, and tracked SP howitzers. this forces main goal would be to retain a core heavy armour formation for the CAF LFs, should the need ever arise to reconstitute a heavy armour capability. A secondary (or primary) purpose for such a unit would be to allow the mainstay light armour brigades to train against heavy armour units, and develop and hone tactics for successfully engaging such. It could act as a regular OPFOR at Shilo or Petawawa, and allied heavy and light armour formations could train against them, for a user fee. This fee would be used to fund the maintenence of the ACR.
> 
> Composition could be as follows:
> 
> 3 squadrons of 36 MBTs (Leo 1C2s for now, perhaps surplus M-1s or Leopard 2s in future)
> 
> Each squadron would have a troop of say 12 M-113 equipped for RECCE-with Delco 25TOW turret, or just a simulated weapon-the idea here is training, not actual combat.
> 
> Support-use the Taurus, Beaver and Badger LEO variants for comabt service support, engineers, etc.
> 
> ID Fire Support-one battalion of the M-109s, sell the rest.
> 
> Basically, the CAF ACR would be a slightly scaled down version of the US ACR. It would retain the core heavy armour function of the CAF, 2000-2500 men, it would be available for an emegency, but its main purpose would be to train our reg Brigades in counter heavy armour warfare, and retain a MBT capability.
> 
> The real issue behind giving up MBTs is that we some think that once it is gone, it is gone. This is true to a degree. But if we aren‘t going to use MBTs, and can‘t afford a army which will utilize MBTs for its primary mission, then why attempt to retain them in an operational capacity? For the Reg force brigades, go all wheeled, rapid response capability. Give the navy and air force the ability to transport these forces strategically. If money is left, and these missions are covered first, maintain a small cadre of MBT and heavy armour for training/reconstitutive purposes.



 Yard Ape


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## RCA

"ID Fire Support-one battalion of the M-109s, sell the rest."

Moving slightly off topic here but I must clear up a misconception.

The strength of the artillery is it‘s ability to mass fires. Each manuver unit should have a dedicated (ie in direct support) Artillery resourse. But the arty commander (be it FOO, BC, CO etc) must have the ablity to bring multi-arty units fire to bear as required. That is why arty batterys/regt are never under command of a supported unit. So when talking arty you must look at the big picture not just a manuver units reqiurement.


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## Yard Ape

I belive the suggestion recognizes the need for artilery to be controlled at a higher level than the manouver unit.  That is why it is only suggested that it be placed there for the recomended Armoured Cavalry Battle Group, which would have no higher peace time formation.  This is why it did not suggest a change to the artillery composition of the three CMBG‘s asside from making them wheeled.

The comments were origionaly posted in answer to the question " Should the CF retain MBTs? " and  further clarification on the position with respect to artillery was given on the M-109 replacement suggestion.

 Yard Ape


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## Fishbone Jones

Been reading all the threads. Great ideas, lots of input. Fact- until the sitting government gives up on "Soft Policy" a la Art (hope I win the Nobel Peace Prize) Engleton and they quite trying to increase the budget surplus by cutting back on defence spending, this is all a pipe dream. Walk softly and carry a big stick!  We cannot field the regiments possible to sustain a HI conflict with the current recruit policy (whatever the problems, another subject). As per the helicopter fiasco, Kraus-Mafi, who manufactures Leopard, offered the Cdn govn‘t all the new MBT‘s they wanted if we would take their tank to the Gulf and battle prove it. It is the only modern(?) MBT not to be proven in combat. This was not an offer for replacement of existing stock, but as many as we wanted! Typically, as per the offer from the Yanks for a large AC carrier when we scrapped the "Bonnie", the government wouldn‘t pay or supply the pers to man it, ergo no deal. We have, on a number of occasions had the same offer from the yanks( surplus M60‘s, all we wanted, M1A1‘s, all we wanted for a five year maintenence contract, no other cost!) The LAV family provides a platform for MOST needs. As was mentioned earlier, train for the most intense conflict, and all others become training exercises. Each has it‘s own unique variables, and as we are we can‘t be ready for everything. Nothing major will happen as far as expenditures as long as we try to fit the purchases to the budget. The proof is in the pudding. The helicopter replacement program is a fiasco that would cause the fall of any other western nation‘s govm‘t. Bombardier recieves contracts, without bid, to supply vehs and equip that is below original manufactures specs and well above what it would have cost off the shelf for better and more( the CEO happens to be related to the sitting PM). Buy Cdn means put more money in our election war chest and pad my bank account, not what is the best for our troops and our coountry. Western Star recieves a contract for the LSVW after failing all tests, changing the test criteria and then disbanding LETE so the results won‘t be known)  just after Kim Campbell retires as Prime Minister. All this aside, if your interested in what the higher up in the Armoured Corps think about the future of the corps, check out the latest RCAC Association Bulletin (vol 9, Apr 2001). There‘s also a good article on the whole new LAV family and an article called "ARMY SELECTS LAV III VARIANTS TO EQUIP NEW INTERM BRIGADES" reprinted from the (US) Armor Magazine. This article also happens to show a 105(LOW VELOCITY!!) pedestal mounted, on a LAV. It only shows it firing over the front, rumour has it that when it was fired at 3 & 9 oclock the cargo tie downs on the veh were used for just that, to tie the veh down. The Cougar no longer has the distinction of having the worst platform rock in NATO!  Could we make our own MBT? Should we? Do we have the recruit base to sustain it at present levels of pay, benefits, deployments, etc. Is the Cdn govm‘t interested in soldiers with blue berets that should be seen and not heard? Lots of questions, but no answers within our control. Vent as you will, we can try to change the system from within. We can only plant the seeds, it won‘t happen in our generation, but we can pass the torch to the next generation who feel the call to answer their countries call to arms. Soldier on with what they give you, voice your opinion when you can and hope, hope someone listens before it‘s to late.In every major conflict his country has been in, we‘ve been caught with our pants down, doin the dirty behind the pasture wall. To paraphrase "those who forget the past are destined to relive it (our govm‘t in a nutshell).


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## Yard Ape

The LAV trials are underway in Gagetown now.  Perhapse now we can get some performance based feedback on this new machine.

   yard Ape


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## Yard Ape

Well, for those who‘ve looked in the Maple Leaf in the last little while, it has become apparent that the CF does not intend to keep just a few M113s and the new MTVLs in service.  With about a dozen new vehicles or new upgrades comming out, we have been commited to a sizable tracked fleet.  I think we must accept that this has also been a step backward.  The LAV III is capable of filling all the roles the new 113/MTVLs will be filling.  Now we are still going to be stuck with a mixture of vehicles operating within every battle group.


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## rceme_rat

I was very surprised to see that yet another upgrade of the M113 had been approved!

Our vehicle requirements are too small in the aggregate to justify maintaining a large number of different vehicle families.  The costs associated with each new vehicle type - in driver and maintenance training, spares logistics, documentation, etc. - are excessive.  

The LAV III should be capable of all roles assigned to the M113, with perhaps the exception of ADATS -- a top-heavy application on the 113 that would be equally at risk on the LAV.  (It should have been put on a Leo or M109 chassis for the extra stability of the wider track width.)  

In an ideal world, I would envision LAV III for all light armour roles.  I would go further and suggest that all wheeled support vehicles should have the same track width as the LAV, and should use the same engine to the maximum extent possible.  That would leave jeeps, tanks and SP arty left for discussion.  E.g. - do we even need jeeps when a wide-wheeled base truck (Humm-Vee, e.g.) would do?  Could we adopt a wheeled arty piece on a LAV chassis - could it be 155?  Does it have to be 155 in the first place?

Again, it all goes back to defining what we want our army to do for us.  A new White Paper - one which we actually intend to implement - would be very useful in steering our future acquisitions.


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## Yard Ape

If the LAV can even be used as the basis for a bridge layer.  There is not very much we would require any other vehicle for . . . excpet, maybe, the fire power that comes from a 120 mm cannon.


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## Fishbone Jones

Here‘s a site for the opposing view. There‘s some good argument here for staying track. Dangers of wheel over tracks . Not playing devil‘s advocate, but the whole concept should be looked at from all sides.


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## Korus

I really don‘t like it when people make ‘essays‘ (for loss of a better word) utterly one-sided... It‘s nice that you can find lots of pictures of destroyed/damaged wheeled armoured vehicles, but unless you represent both sides of the story, the ‘essay‘ is pretty worthless... If you dig enough you can find pictures of tracked vehicles with lost tracks, etc then make a completley one sided website about how tracked vehicles are a mistake...

I could find some pictures of damaged/crashed helicopters and jets, and from that deduce that the CF made a mistake buying aircraft as opposed to ground vehicles.

Not saying I agree or disagree about the lav IIIs, I don‘t really know enough about ‘em to make a worthwhile opinion yet... All I can say is that they look cool..   

As an aside, Is/was that guy even in the military?  I couldn‘t find any mention on his page, but I may have missed it if it was there...


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## Gordon Angus Mackinlay

Ladies and Gentlemen,

having looked at the web site listed in previous posting, I find it is from the USA "Military REform" people.  The whole thing is full of inaccuracies, half truths and outright lies.

Example being he says the Australian Army has pulled its LAVII (known as ASLAV in Australia) out of East Timor because they were not performing.  Thruth being the ASLAVs returned to Australia because of unit rotation (we only have 2 Cav Regt equipped with the vehicles), they were replaced by The Queensland Mounted Infantry, 2 Cav is now back up in ET.

The inference being that Australia flew its M113 force into ET, they all went by sea, the New Zealand regt, the Queen Alexanders Mounted Rifles flew two of its M113‘s into ET on the first day to provide support to NZ tps who had responsibilty for defending the airfield on the initial deployment.

His remarks that the LAVIII is not airportable by C130 is correct when you use the C130-E variant (and not that there is many of them in service), the -H variants onwards can transport all models of the LAVIII save three of the support variants, the fire support vehicle, the NBC, and I forget the third.
The RNZAF has moved their LAVIII‘s by their -H models, which are the very first of the variant to be manufactured back in 1966.

His use of the NZ problems have been taken total out of context, if you place them in the corrrect context of two political parties having a brawl, then you understand the story.

He also talks about the death of a NZ infantryman, and how a LAVIII could not have come to the patrols support.  Due to the severe country NO FORM of armoured vehicle could have supported the patrol.

What this chap fails to point out in all of his writings is theFACT that the LAVIIIs are not being used to create armoured formations, but, are being purchased to provide a means of transportation for light infantry brigades.  

A means of transportation that allows them to have a firesupport vehicle available for each rifle section (their squad).  The same concept has been used by Britain with their Saxon vehicles, Australia with the Bushranger (if it ever works), NZ with the LAVIIIs, South Africa with their Buffels, France with their various types of wheeled vehicles, Germany etc etc.

In Australia, the Army was forced to accept an upgrade of its M113‘s.  All we have received is M113‘s that are not as maintenance heavy, and are still expensive to run (fuel, spare parts), and is virtually still the same vehicle we had in South Viet Nam in the 1960‘s!

He quotes the Swiss upgrading their M113s with additional armour, this was correct, what he does not tell you is that the units they went too are local defence units, which have the singular role of defending a specific locality!  With the lastest Swiss defence cuts those units are being disbanded.

Yours,
Jock in Sydney


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## Harry

Not trying too stir the pot (too much    ), but if there are any Bird Gunners out there, was not the Merican version of the ADATS that was dropped in 1990‘ish mounted on a LAV platform.  Recall it was a toss between the Bradley and LAV and the LAV won.  Regardless, the Mericans cancelled the project and we got stuck with an expensive (yet awesome) piece of kit, no other market, limited production line. yadda yadda    , etc.


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## McG

The US had ADATS mounted on an M60 chassis.  Makes one wonder why we didn‘t put ours on a MBT platform in the begining.


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## rceme_rat

Obvious answer, McG -- money.

When it looked like the Leos were to be replaced, one of the projects being tossed about was to use the chassis for ADATS (others were to keep them as is for Hy Recce, and conversions for engineering and maintenance variants).  Well, we still have the Leos, and we‘re stuck with ADATS - a resource for an org level we aren‘t even seriously contemplating staffing!


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## Yard Ape

I‘m surprised that part of the new 113/MTVL pakage did not include a new ADATS platform.  I could see the short sighted thinking that would lead the powers that be to the oh-so clever conclusion that an MTVL is a much better plaform for the ADATS.

Why didn‘t we by Leo bodies for the ADATS when we did the C2 upgrade?

There is always an excuse.

   Yard Ape


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## Jungle

I will support Mr Mackinlay‘s comments regarding use of armd vehs in East Timor. During the INTERFET mission, the Aussies were using ASLAV (our bison) and Kiwis were using M-113‘s. Neither were very effective except on the road network and in the towns. Maybe in some areas of the coastal plains could they be used offroad, then again only in the dry season.


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## Brock

Regarding the LAV III and its ability to mount a 155mm howitzer in the self-propell role--it is possible.  British Aerospace is working on integrating the UK/US ultra-lightweight 155mm towed howitzer onto the LAV III.  The new howitzer in towed form is half the weight of the M198, but fires the same rounds the same distance.  The LAV III chassis can handle a 155mm howitzer by using a mounting system similar to the Giat Caesar truck mounted howitzer.(go to www.giat.fr and follow links to products and howitzers, etc...)  The LAV III 155mm SPH will not be the same as a M109-type, but will provide considerable capabilites in most war scenarios.  However, if the LAV III 155mm SPH proves to costly, a LAV III with a towed 155mm howitzer can do the job.  Maybe, not as effective in high intensity fast paced armoured war, but in that case Canada would have to buy new tanks, attack helicopters, tracked IFVs, etc...  For all intents and purposes either solution is viable way to replace the current M109A4/A4+.


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## Harry

:boring:  Brock, is it me or do I get a sense that you really like the idea of the LAV155, I think it was this time last year when this topic came up and too the best of my knowledge you were a proponent.

Lets look at from a Gunners point of view  :rage:  .  We have a man pad howitzer 105mm now.  We need an armored howitzer too support brigade level ops.  In the big games that the M-109 was designed too play in, they require, high firing rates, maneuverability and protection for the crew.  All it takes is one round of counter-battery  :skull:  directed fire to take out an exposed crew, no crew, no fire support.

Before some pencil pusher gets the idea that â€œHeyâ€ the troopies think this would be great, think again.  I think it is ridiculous to throw a crew into an armored vehicle, only too have them function exposed whilst performing their job, indirect fire support.  All of the variants I have seen too date are of an externally mounted gun with only the vehicle as protection too the front. 

I have seen the new mortar support track being worked on by DEW, hmm.  We finally deal with the threat too mortar crews by giving them a track and then this topic banter of taking the protection away from gunners by giving them a set of wheels, come now.  A Cadillac is a Cadillac is a Cadillac, even stretched, but this is not an armored heavy indirect fire vehicle.  Just a gunner taxi with a gun strapped too the outside.  :bullet:    :boring:


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## Brock

You are indeed correct.  I am a proponent of a family of vehicles concept.  However, the wheeled LAV III 155 SPH is being designed to operate with a 3 or 4 person crew.  Unlike the Giat Caesar the crew does not have to leave the vehicle, they stay in their vehicle nice and comfy and an autoloader does all the "work."  Whether or not it will work, only time will tell.  I am all for maintaining the capabilities of a high mobility armoured war with main battle tanks, tracked SPH and IFVs, etc....but unless I am dreaming, Canada will never again field such a force without another war on the scale of World War II occurring where the Canadian public and government has to take an interest in the military.  I have accepted this fact--I say fact, because evidence against is very weak and for very strong--because I think the CF should get on with soldiering and field the best military we can within a strategy of choice.  Fielding a miliary equipped with a mix of vehicles that do not complement each other and designed for different styles of warfare is not helpful to making the Canadian miltary effective.  Canada is not the only country that is making hard choices, look at Belgium, Australia, etc...  The point is my proposition is to field the best capability we can with the best use of Canadian resources.


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## Harry

Well not too belabor this topic, and do not take this as a challenge.

Our military is indeed facing the same dilemmas as many of our allies and  other freedom (and not so democratic loving) nations.

The ray of sunshine in all this is simple.  Yes we are getting new armor platforms (LAV), but thank god for the people on the 17 and 18th floor of the palace who found the money too upgrade the tracked fleet.

Some see the tracked fleet as a veritable albatross on our land forces.  Take a pause two three, just think if the proverbial hits the fan, we will be one of the nations able to field both light armored and heavy armored elements.  We will be able too engage in several types of land force operations concurrently.

As an example, rapid deployable light armor combat teams that can charge into a refugee enclave and hold ground while the heavies (113â€™s, TUA 113â€™s, Leopards, 109â€™s) trundle in.  Much the same concept of the Merican Air Mobile, just we donâ€™t have air mobile, but we can substitute a LAV for a Chinook or Stallion in lieu there of.  

I am not keen on discussing tactics in this or most any forum not task related.  But too reiterate (in my so humble opinion), the continuance of tracks in our land forces should not be seen as, promoted as nor perpetuated too be a shortcoming in defence planning.  The track fleet gives us an edge that once gone, we will probably never get back and in todayâ€™s real world events, I am glad we have land force (deployable) options.  Each fleet (wheeled and tracked) has itâ€™s advantages and when we send troopies off too do their job, lets hope we have the kit for the job.  The days of Canadian ingenuity and adaptation make us good, but reality can but a real damper on that real quick if you donâ€™t have the right tool for the job.

UBIQUE


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## McG

yes, but it would be nice to see all tracks confined to one brigade or standing battle group.  Instead they will be spread across all the brigades and mixed in with the wheeled fleets.  As a homogenious unit, tracks would be an asset.  As a component of a wheeled LAV formation, I see them as a hinderance.  How can a batle group take advantage of the LAV‘s speed it the Engineers cannot keep pace to open the route?  How long will they continue to shoot it the MTVL stores vehicle cannot bring up resupply as fast as they advance?


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## Yard Ape

I came across this image of a Pirannah mounted ADATS and was reminded of the conversation here.  The location atributes this vehicle to the Swiss, and also showed the Canadian 113 mounted model and a US Bradley mounted ADATS.  I thought that this LAV variety looked a lot more sable than ours (at least from this picture).  Consitering that the ADATS can also perform the duties given to the US LOSAT system, should we not look at transfering this onto the LAV III?


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## Yard Ape

It has often been stated on this board that what works for Americans cannot neccesarily be made to work for Canadians.  This fact is the result of the vastly different size of our armies and resources available to each.  However, with the Interm Armor Brigades that the US is forming, I belive that they are being desinged to fill a role that the Canadian army has been striving for since it first aquired the AVGP.  

 Read:Brigade Combat teams 

I think many of the suggestions it makes for the Americans apply even more so to us.

   Yard Ape


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## Coniar

Well after reading all the posts in this thread (theres alot), each one seemed to have an entirley different opinion       My personal opinion based on my limited military knowledge and all the info I took in well reading this thread is that there should be a mix of both.

The LAV III is a great fire support fast-attack and APC type veichle but is incapable acting like a tank. For training puroses the 2 need to be split up minimizing costs, In combat they need to be used together in a round about way. Get rid of all tracked veichles that are not MBT‘s have 1 Bde of Modern MBT‘s  and 2 of LAV III. 
In combat have the numerous LAV‘s hurry ahead skrimishing and gaining ground, If heavy enemy resistance is encountered or the LAV forces have to retreat because of unmanigable #‘s of enemy armor they only retreat as far as the MBT‘s behind them. Then they either advance on the enemy with the MBT‘s or take defensive positions and wait for the enemy if they are belived to be in pursuit. In this way ground is taken and held costs are kept to a minimum. The key though is having MBT‘s capale of dealing with enemy strong points and other MBT‘s the LAV III have to be capable of taking care of similar vechles and ground forces. The LAV speed is not lost and ground can be taken and held with the superior fire-power of the MBT‘s 
With 360 LAV III on order and an option for 291 more for a grand total of 651 enough to replace all existing Cougars Grizzly‘s and Bison (662 in total). Sounds like enough for 2 Bde‘s

Now that Ive said all that everyone can shoot it full of holes       :mg:   

Coniar


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## Yard Ape

The Infantry and the Armour compliment each other.  That means the most effective fighting formations will, to some extent, have both.  LAV III based Infantry battle groups with wheeled cavalry and fire support meet that requirment.  However, that still leaves Tanks without complimentary tracked Infantry.  
The system breaks down even farther when you try to form a Combat team as we know it today.  
















   Yard Ape


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## Coniar

Ok newbie Questions
what does Foo mean???
How many Infantry does a LAV carry (I think its 10 with full equitment but I cant rememmber)
Is that chart in actual proportions??? (Like would there really be 12 tank troops?)

And that is an exellent chart   
Thanks

Coniar


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## McG

> Originally posted by Coniar:
> [qb]what does Foo mean???[/qb]


Forward Observetion Officer.  Its the  Arty guy everyone loves to have around, because he tells the bombs where to fall.



> How many Infantry does a LAV carry


1 Section (2 crew, 7 dismounts, and commander)



> Is that chart in actual proportions??? (Like would there really be 12 tank troops?)


4 Tanks to a Troop.  12 tanks would almost be a Squadron.  I would caution that much of that chart looks fictional (Including some of the kit).


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## Coniar

Thanks for the awnsers, Im still trying to learn all the slang. This forum makes a lot more sense if you know what a FOO or ADAT means...

Coniar


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## Long in the tooth

If you‘ve ever worked in a Bn Maint Pl you know that these guys make the Bn run.  I agree that tanks may be best in some (fewer and fewer) situations, but as the saying goes, "the good is the enemy of the best".  Especially at half price.  Let‘s go with a sturdy, mobile common chasis.  
The Germans lost the War in the East not due to major battles (Kursk excepted) but because they were inexorably ground down.  The plethora of guns, turrets and chassis left the poor buggers in the mobile field repair shops behind the eight ball compared with the Russians and their T34/76s and 85s.
120 smooth bores will always be the weapon of choice for black hatters; lower velocity HEAT/HEP ammo is used as well....


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## Jason Jarvis

Sorry to beat this horse again, but I‘ve gone searching through the archives and haven‘t found an answer.

*Question:* When was it decided to adopt the LAV III and why was it chosen? Were there trials with other IFVs?

No need to start this discussion all over again -- which was really excellent, BTW -- I‘m just hoping someone can send me reference link or something.

I can‘t wait to read analysis of the performance of tracked vs. wheeled IFVs in Iraq. I wonder if it‘ll make anybody reconsider earlier decisions?

Thanks.


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## SNoseworthy

I can‘t answer your question on why we selected it, however, the contract for the LAV III was awarded in 1996.


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## McInnes

I‘ve noticed that the US Army is going with the GM Stryker family, while the Canadian Army has gone with the LAVIIIs. The US marines have gone with the LAV Is and i believe they are planning to buy LAVIIIs. I was just wondering if anyone how the Strykers compared with the LAVs and if anyone knew any pros and cons of the two families of vehicles.


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## gate_guard

As far as I know, the LAV 3 and the Stryker are the same vehicle. The LAV 3 is an infantry fighting vehicle while the Stryker (american) comes in the same IFV variants as well as a turretless 105mm variant for close fire support and anti-tank. So regarding your question of performance, well, they‘re the same vehicle platform overall. I think you mean the U.S. LAV 25 when you say LAV I which is essentially our Coyote (which has major recce upgrades).


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## McInnes

well, i came up with my question while surfing the General Motors Defence section. It lists the LavIII and the Stryker Family as different. I didnt see too many difference so i was just wondering. And if they were essentially the same, why would the US go a different route. Anyways, thank you for the clari.


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## gate_guard

I could only guess as to why the Americans want to call their LAV 3 the Stryker instead. Usually, though, countries using the same vehicle will make any number of modifications to it to suit their own needs and roles. Take our Coyote and the US LAV 25. Essentially the same vehicle but when the Canadians got hold of the vehicle platform they modified the exterior (not sure about specs such as armour but the Canadian turret is larger) and added surveillance gear to fit the role it‘s in now, armoured recce.


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## McG

The US selected the LAV III as the vehicle for its interim medium brigade groups.  They also decided to buy the vehicle under the name Stryker (in the tradition of naming vehicles after war generals & heroes).  It is basicly the same vehicle.  The US APC will not have a turret or 25 mm cannon.  Instead, it will have a remote weapon station capable of mounting a .50 Cal or grenade launcher.

gate_guard,
Technically, the AVGP is a LAV I and the Coyote is a LAV II.  I believe the US Marines‘ LAV-25 is LAV I and the Bison is LAV II. The Stryker is a LAV III.  (the I, II, and III refer to the generation of the vehicle).  We do own more than one LAV, but we only refer to the LAV III as "LAV".

Have a look through the Mowag photo album.


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## Rick Goebel

Despite automotive similarities, the Stryker infantry carrier and the LAV III are quite different vehicles.

The LAV III has a turret with a stabilized 25mm gun.  The ten-man load includes a driver, commander and dedicated gunner, leaving only seven dismounts.  This vehicle is clearly intended as a fighting vehicle which can carry infantry.

The Stryker has only a remote weapon station with either a .50 MG or a 40mm automatic grenade launcher.  While I cannot say for certain that the weapons are not stabilized, nothing I have seen indicates that they are.  The eleven man load includes a driver, a commander/gunner and nine dismounts.  This vehicle is clearly intended as an infantry carrier that can provide some fire support to the dismounted infantry.

The differences between weapons, the mounting of  the weapons, the number of people who can dismount and the lack of a dedicated gunner in the Stryker are significant.


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## dalredane

Just wodering what some of the actual future users of this vehicle think of its potential:

- capabilities
- relevance
- as well as the loss of the Leopard capability


Thanks


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## Spr.Earl

Oooop‘s sorry dalredane I should have posted the link here DoH!
All your info is on the link I posted about the Stryker.

 http://www.army.mil/features/stryker/


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## Bert

Since WW2, the technology of war has changed and the tools evolve.  Given what has been learned from a Canadian point of view, the MBT would be nice to have but it cannot be afforded.  The question really is if the Stryker is the best bang for the buck.  The choice of a valid replacement should not be made politically but for functionality and performance.

If I am not mistaken, the last use of MBTs and heavy armour was in the Korean War. In the cold war, Canada kept heavy armour in Europe to help counterbalance Soviet forces on the other side of the iron curtain.  Given a conventional engagment, the war would be fought there by air forces and army (infantry, paras, and armour).  The MBT would be crucial at that time.
A tactical nuke would make the battlefield empty of all.

Today, the technology of war has changed and the
MBT‘s viability is questionable.  Look at what the Americans did to Iraqi armour in both Gulf conflicts.  Look at what Israel did to Eqypt, Syria, and Jordan during their conflicts.  The MBT is a sitting duck without air support and intelligence.  The American Apaches, Commanches, A-10s, and communication systems co-ordinated together were responsible for the devastation of Iraqi armour.  Guarenteed every serious military in the world has taken notes. 

On the other hand, if a area of land has to be taken quickly, armour for speed and support and infantry are needed to take and hold it.  The American forces in Iraq did well with this.

The question for Canada is where do we fit and what can we honestly do?  What is the best replacement for armour?  

The engagements Canada could face in the future
wouldn‘t be a conventional attack on our soil.  It is police actions in other parts of the world and perhaps assisting in engagments on the scale of Korea of the early 1950s.  Easily transportable effective armour, support systems, and transport are the issues.

I‘d like to see another White Paper by the government since as they want to radically change the force structure of the army.  The flowery crap made available to the public isn‘t specific enough to state their intentions.  It should be discussed publically more.


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## Recce41

I am not saying to buy a M1 or Leo. But a Light type tank. A CG 2000, 30 tons, tracked, a 105 HV (it can kill a T72), has a crew of 4, no auto loaded. If a miss fire the CC does not have to get out. If the Coax has to be reloaded the crew does not have to get out. ETCETC. In Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo Tanks! were used. It is because we cannot air lift them, we never use them. But we cannot airlift the new ones also. 
 You don‘t need air support to use tanks. Has anyone seen what happens when the lavs assault the Obj. They get stuck. I remember using the old Cougars, as tanks. **** them got stuck and there was not support for the Inf. As I said if you loose the skill who will teach it.If we need it. 
 A light tank will do the same job, as aMBT. Its tracked, has tracks, can move cross country, can fire on the move cross country. 
 It does not matter if we have track or wheels, it all costs money. Even now, there are no parts, No parts for Coyotes, no parts for the Lavs, no parts for crap.
 Most people think of the tank as the big fire breathing beast. It is more, its the ring of steel. The shield on the assualt.


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## Bert

Good post Recce41.  I can only hope Mr. McCallum reads it in his drive to balance functionality with political expediency.


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## onecat

"MBT‘s viability is questionable. Look at what the Americans did to Iraqi armour in both Gulf conflicts. Look at what Israel did to Eqypt, Syria, and Jordan during their conflicts. The MBT is a sitting duck without air support and intelligence. The American Apaches, Commanches, A-10s, and communication systems co-ordinated together were responsible for the devastation of Iraqi armour."

I just had to point out that if the MBT is a sitting duck without support from the air; what do you think the CF LAV"s are going to be?  With weaker armour, I think they will be an even easier target.  And like has been stated before they get stuck... just how bad will it look our force is wiped out because they were stuck in the mud.


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## Bert

Exactly, so what is behind McCallum‘s thinking?  (I point him out because ultimately he makes decisions based on information presented to him).

The Styker isn‘t a replacement for the MBT and can‘t be considered a "tank" due to its inefficienies and mobility issues.  Either the government is reducing the capability of the Army
(no shield for assault) to fill a niche in multi-national engagements or an intermediate step for combined arms.  Offical public documents are ambiguous about this change in force structure.

The face of battle can change in a conflict, but Canadian LAVs wouldn‘t be placed in a situation intentionally matched against T-72s or significantly placed off-road.  Another ally would end up doing that.  Against large conventional forces, the combined arms of air, artillery, armour, and infanteer would face off.
Canada hasn‘t seen this since the Korean War.  We trained for it during the Cold War.

Small scale conflicts that pit small light infantry, sniping, guerrilla (sp?), terrorist small arms, and mines are now common in Canadian operations.  Armour built for these operations has become lighter, more mobile on existing roads, more stealthy, less intrusive, and more intelligent due to shared command and control nets.  Is this the style of conflict for the next 25 years?

So again, were does Canada fit?  Where should we fit? Does McCallum know? If you were to rearrange Canadian Army force structure with manpower and materials, how would you do it?


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## Ex-Dragoon

Quote:

MBT‘s viability is questionable. Look at what the Americans did to Iraqi armour in both Gulf conflicts. Look at what Israel did to Eqypt, Syria, and Jordan during their conflicts. The MBT is a sitting duck without air support and intelligence. The American Apaches, Commanches, A-10s, and communication systems co-ordinated together were responsible for the devastation of Iraqi armour. Guarenteed every serious military in the world has taken notes. 

I do believe M1s and British Challengers were in on defeating the Iraqi armour nor was I aware that the Commanche entered service.


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## Bert

Sorry guys, I don‘t mean to hijack this thread.  I‘m bored, the girlfriend is at work, its Sunday, and my first day off in 16 days.  Tell me to shut up if you want.

Ex-Dragoon>
"I do believe M1s and British Challengers were in on defeating the Iraqi armour nor was I aware that the Commanche entered service."

Yes, I‘m not saying that armour didn‘t defeat armour.  Air support made a majority of the hits.  The different was the command and control nets the Americans used that the Iraqis and most militaries couldn‘t.  An A-10, an AWACs, could receive targetting info from the ground and then relay that to an M1 or a Challenger, and BOOM off a round or several to the target and vis-versa.  Thats combined arms. The air component gave the Americans greater visibility and enhanced ability to target.

From my reading, Commanches are found in the active US military on trial basis and even in Iraq but I don‘t know if they‘ve entered service per se either.  I‘ll try to find the link.


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## Recce41

Bert
 On one of my tours to bosnia, I ended up looking at the wrong end of a T64 tank‘s barrel. What was I in a Cougar, 76mm, wheeled. On another tour, I had rounds fired on my Cougar. If it was a tank, I wouldn‘t have cared. The Lavs are just fancey Cougars. Why does the Dutch have LEO tanks in Bosnia? Just in case, they are needed. Why does the US have tanks in Kosovo? just in case, why do the British have tanks on ALL their tours, just in case!
 Our Leos in Bosnia/ Kosovo were the only tanks that could cross, bridges the Leos, M1, Challangers could not. They were used all the time. Even a troop of 4 tanks makes people look. 
 People say what tanks do we have to face. All the rag ***  countries own tanks. Even old T55, T64,T72. A Leo with add on armour could face down a T80, with a well trained crew. 
 Why? It is a tank. A Lav agains even a T55? where could it go of road? maybe not. A tracked veh has a better chance. If we all give in now, the Military will be a small no punch Military. 
 I have seen programs on TV, and the US, Britian etc. Say why even hear Canada? For we have gone to # 12 in Peacekeeping, # 31 for Aid, # 6 in world affairs, and **** last from 4th in Nato standing. Now no tanks. We should just pull back and hide. For even most Africian/ Asian countries have more power than we do.


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## Ex-Dragoon

That was my understanding as well Bert...never heard of any Commanche that made its way to Iraq


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## Coniar

Reasons why Stryker is a bust.

1. Cant stand up to a MBT
2. Lots of bugs and gremlins
3. Downgrading from 114 MBT‘s to 66 of something that cannot replace a tank in any sense.
4. Undeployable with our current airlift capabilities.
5. They have been documented as a failure by the U.S. 
6. Waste of money, we could buy alot of other things sorley needed instead of blowing cash on something that will never be used effectivley
7. No tracks. Limiting strategic options as well as increasing vulnrability


Good Things about the Stryker

1. Takes Leo‘s out of service wich are mechanically hard to keep running.
2. Built with an eye for current and future operations.


This is the information I have gathered from the news and this forum as well as several newspaper articles. It seems to me as if the Stryker is not the best choice for the Canadian armed forces. Realisticley we cannot afford the cost of MBT‘s and cannot deploy them effectivley if we could afford them. We cannot afford to buy "replacments" that do not replace anything the Leo‘s brought to the table and dont even do well at what they are built for. the best REALISTIC option would be to purchase smaller tanks with smaller guns and possibly TOW missiles such as the Bradleys. Smaller tanks with smaller guns are PROVEN to be effective even agaisnt a MBT. Case and point Rommel and the Afrika corps. British "honey" tanks where highly effective against the Panzers and Panthers in the desert due to better mobility and picking the weak spots on the enemy. Well the stuart wast the "perfect" weapon for the job it still did the job. 
I dont know if such a veichle exists or how much it would cost to purchase it, but a small, tracked TANK, possibly with a TOW type system, deployable by Hercules would be ideal for our needs and resources. Once again with the cost and lengthe of time involved in R&D and procurment unless such a veichle is already being produced it would be a very long time before the Canadian forces ever saw it...

THIS is exactley what im talking about

 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/stormer30/index.html


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## Bert

Recce41>
"On one of my tours to bosnia, I ended up looking at the wrong end of a T64 tank‘s barrel. What was I in a Cougar, 76mm, wheeled. On another tour, I had rounds fired on my Cougar. If it was a tank, I wouldn‘t have cared. The Lavs are just fancey Cougars."

I wonder whats in McCallum‘s mind then if Stryker‘s are acquired?

I don‘t want to sound morose, but how long would that T-64 survived if there was an engagement?  I assume there would have other CF personnel and equipment there plus several T-64s and enemy positions.  Dispite the gun pointed at you, how would the situation evolve?

In the situation of you being fired at, how would the situation evolve if a Cougar got hit it had turned serious?  I understand there was ROE. What sequence of events would occur to neutralize the enemy.   

Given that the enemy would shoot first, the CF would shoot back, and a sequence of events would take place unit one side or the other is in ruins.  If McCallum is acquiring Strykers, and put them in the senario, the question is WHY?  Is there a logic to his reasoning?


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## Jason Jarvis

If crew protection is an issue, why not put the main gun in a turret? I know this would increase the weight, but would it also make the vehicle even taller (and so make it less likely to fit into a Herc)?

Here are a couple designs I found interesting:

LAV-105 (with a 105 mm in a turret) 
LAV-300 (with a 90 mm in a turret) 

It doesn‘t look to me like the turrets add any extra height over the MGS.

Given the capabilities of modern ammunition, how much is lost if the MGS switched from a 105 to a 90 (logistical arguments aside)?


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## jrhume

I haven‘t read enough about the Stryker to form an opinion yet, but I would like to point out that the M1 tank suffered from a number of defects and the accompanying bad publicity during the 70s and 80s.  Ongoing development took care of those shortcomings and led to the M1A1 of today.  Further enhancement will occur during the service life of the Abrams.

I know a Marine who has a poor opinion of the Stryker, echoing some of the same issues that have been raised here.  Possibly, the thing will never do the job for which it was designed.  On the other hand, further development may improve it more than any of us can imagine.

One thing I know for sure -- the Stryker will see active service.  Soldiers will pay for mistakes made in development.  As usual.

As for what Canada does, my opinion counts for little or nothing.  It seems to me that Canada could support at least one all-up armored brigade.  If that brigade was set up with the same equipment and technology as a US armored force (following the pattern established by Canadian naval forces), then it could be trained and deployed alongside US forces in a seamless manner -- or it could be deployed as a stand-alone force for peacekeeping or other duties.

Just a thought -- and not a new one, even on this forum.    

Jim


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## McG

Much has changed since the initiation of this thread.  Some changes have brought us closer to an all LAV III force and some have brought us farther.  We recently had a change in Prime Minister and a major cabinet schuffel that saw a new MND.  As of now, we do not have an indication of what funding priority this team will put toward the CF and we do not know their stance on some critical decisions made in the last few months of the previous PM (ie MGS).

Plans are a foot to retire the Cougar without a replacement (a loss of 100 Cavalry/DFS vehicles) and it has been announced that all 114 x Leopard C2 will be replaced by 66 x LAV III MGS.  This will leave only 200 Coyote available as potential Cavalry vehicles (and even then the value of the surveillance suites will limit what is available for this role).  The ADATS is being looked at for conversion to MMEV (mounted on a LAV III and with a variety of missile types available to fill specific roles) and it appears that the M109 will be replaced by towed or wheeled SP howitzers (possibly on a LAV III platform).

The AVGP life extension program has introduced CP, gun tractor, VSORAD, and other variants.  The M113 life extension has also turned into a much larger endeavour than was originally predicted in this thread.  However, the bulk of the M113A3 and MTVLs were destine to serve in Armd and Arty Regts along side tracked Leopards and M109s (vehicles which now seem unlikely to hang around).  Have these changes been able to invalidate any of the opinions surrounding the LAV III as the sole platform of the land forces?

I continue to want to see MBTs remain (at a reduced level) in our army (1 x heavy, 2 x medium CMBGs).  For commonality of mobility, I would have no objections to seeing TLAVs employed alongside the MBTs.  However, if we do not continue to employ tanks then there is no need for TLAVs in the Armd Regts, and if we do not continue to employ M109s then there is no need for TLAVS in the Arty Regts.  

In our wheeled units, we should be looking to replace all AVGP and Bison with LAV III (and not extending the life of those vehicles).  These vehicles are not able to keep up with the LAV III, and their presence in a unit puts an extra burden by requiring to maintain additional spare parts for one or two unique vehicles and by requiring the maintenance of small cadres of trained mechanics and crews.  Replacement of these vehicles would require a commitment from our government to buy additional LAV III, but I think the long term benefits would prove to be worth the cost (and due to the nature of roles filled by AVGP and Bison, we would save money by not requiring that these new LAV III have turrets).

With a few exceptions, I believe the LAV III could provide a common platform for all CF Armd Veh.

Recce.  The LAV III is too big to fill this role & still be stealthy.  This is the reason I do not recommend it to replace the Coyote.  There are many who would argue that the Coyote is also too large and we should have an Armd LUVW/LPV .  However, no arguments make the LAV III better suited that our current vehicle.  One could also suggest the need for such vehicles to be amphibious. 

Engineering.  The LAV III will not be able to do many of the tasks that would be required of an engineer vehicle.  It would not have the earth moving power nor the ability to get to as many places to do tasks where they are required.

Tank.  Only a tank can replace a tank.  However, this deserves closer examination.  The tank is the idea all-in-one cavalry vehicle, DFSV, and tank destroyer.  As a DFSV, the LAV III MGS may provide an acceptable alternative to a tank.  Due to the 105 mm cannon the vehicle would have the same range, same tank killing potential, and similar rate of fire as our Leopard C2.  The LAV III MGS could be employed in a fire base on a LAV Coy attack.  It could be dug-in anywhere one might consider using a tank to harden a defensive position, and it could be employed anywhere one would position a tank to take sniping shots out to its max range.  However, I have heard several arguments on why the LAV III MGS cannot fill the role of cavalry vehicle (fight mounted enemy in open country, intimate support to infantry, exploitation, pursuit, lead advance to contact, etc).  Most of the arguments revolve around the reduced situational awareness (compared to a turret) that the MGS layout will result in.  A LAV III Armd Cav Veh could take the form of a LAV III with a turret much like the APC but with two TOW missiles (or two Javelin AT missiles) in ready to fire launchers.  Alternately, turrets with a 60 mm or 90 mm cannon and two anti-tank missiles could be considered.  It would also be worth while to consider the several successful platforms which have incorporated a 105 mm cannon or larger onto a wheeled cavalry vehicle.  Regardless of what is chosen, unless we have tanks, we will only have a partial replacement.

_Note 1: Some of the key related threads to this topic have been:
 LAV III with 105mm  
How does the stryker compare with the LAVIII APCs? 
New DFS vehicles 
Getting the Stryker-redeployment of the Leo‘s  
The Stryker 
Should the CF retain MBTs? _

_Note 2:  The MTVL&TLAV family of APCs could also have provided a common platform for all CF Armd Veh to a greater extent than the LAV III.   They could have filled the recce (new Lynx) & some engr roles that the LAV cannot._


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## Jarnhamar

Hey when will you guys start building aircraft that look like UFOs?

Or should I say, get them out of storage...


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## Recce41

The poster are old. There should be 4 tank troops of 4 tanks. But! the ****s in Ottawa, want 3 troops. The Lav should have 3 crew and 8. But!, the ****s in Ottawa, have the CC getting out. The Lav cannot fight, without a CC. Hiller has stated THER will be, COMMITTED CREWS.


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## Garry

Interesting discussion.

FWIW, let me throw this in- we in the Military don‘t make policy, we enforce it....although it is fun to debate!

When we do go to enforcing the policies, we do it in the manner that the electorate desires- and right now that manner includes country‘s that we have treaties with.

Take the old standard "you never stand alone" and broaden it, from the soldier to our country.

What I believe we need is clear direction on what we‘re expected to do by the electorate (ie MND). Once our mission has been decided, then we can go ahead and equip and train our Forces....and we‘ll do it right.

As a taxpayer, I don‘t want to loose any more of my hard earned dollars than need be. Can we afford a true "balanced" force? Maybe, but the social programs would take a terrible beating, and while I‘m comfortable with that, I doubt I‘ll see it...and maybe that‘s a good idea.

That leaves us (I say us ‘cause we‘re the electorate too) with a decision to make- do we want to spend big $$ on a small, balanced, all-arms Military, or do we want to reduce the force, and specialize in certain aspects of warfare in conjunction with our Allies?

Tough call, that, deciding to rely on friends for our own sovereignty......

Other considerations are our commitments to our friends...as they rely (somewhat) on our contributions. Keep in mind that making War eventually devolves down (to a large extent)to $$-those who spend the most tend to win. As well, those who carry the largest burden in collective defence tend to get to make the big decicions (like reconstructing Iraq, for instance)

Trade decisions within NATO, actions taken on country‘s political wants, and to a large degree the respect that other country‘s hold each other in is often based on their contribution to the mutual good- and we‘ve lost a lot of influence and respect world wide in the past decade.

While I really don‘t care what the rest of the world does, and therefore could care less how much influence Canada has on the rest of the world, there are times when it is VERY nice to have influence- like in gaining release of Canadians held abroad, or when negotiating tarifs or other disputes.....

IMHO- if we‘re going to send our kids in harms way we, as the guys sending them, OWE them the best kit and training that exist...or we shouldn‘t send them. Argue all you want- but if I send my kid to war I want him (or her) to have Tanks leading the way, with 155 Artillery and MLRS rolling overhead, up to date Fighters operating behind the lines, and Infantry keeping the Tanks safe (sorry, couldn‘t resist!)...heck, I‘d love to see the Bonny II making steam.....

Am I dreaming? 

No- the gear may not be ours, but our allies.

It‘s up to us to make whatever we have left desireable enough to our Allies that they WANT us there. We did it with the PPCLI snipers a few years back, and the rest of the Reg‘t made such an impression on the US Army that they have a free ticket to play anytime.

What we have is good...heck, great. If keeping it that way means downsizing, or even specializing, I‘m all for it. 

At least give us the opportunity to hold our head up.

Cheers-Garry


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## RCD

Before we commit to these new toys. let‘s put our resources to our LIFT (Air& Sea) capabilies first.
On the RV-85 it took 7 to 10 days to recievied our equipment from Petawawa.An that was in Canada move.Today method seems to be to contract out and hope for the best.We waited this long we can we can wait a little longer.


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## Jarnhamar

Thank you, I appriciate that you give credit where it‘s due    

I‘ve always wondered what you guys would use the firestorm for. Besides taking cattle and probing hill billies of course.


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## Mogrok

The purpose of a military is to enhance and enforce foreign policy.  It gives the government an option that if they continue the current state of affairs we will no longer have.

Lav 3‘s to replace everything is not really an option.  The lessons learned from the recent Iraq conflict showed MBT‘s leading the way even into Urban areas to give infantry cover and positions to fall back on as well as fire support.  The lighter Bradleys were getting taken out too easily.  And the wheeled vehicles were slowed down with a simple flat.  Which under combat conditions is hard to change.    

Future warfare based on globalization will definitely have a urban component too it which light forces simply cannot survive in.   Armour is required there.  

I do agree that the LAV family is an excellent platform and that almost all support and infantry can be supported thru them.  However a MBT whether in its current role as the hammer or in a role as a Infantry support vehicle is required. 

Our Leo1‘s with modern warheads and if there was a political will for DU rounds could fullfill this roll if they were overhauled completely with new internals.  The hull can still stand up to urban warfare and its mobility as a lighter tank has in the past surprised our allies on manoevres.  Against modern TOW and Main Armaments no it cannot stand up.  But luckily for us most of our allies are the only ones with that capability.  Our Leo‘s would of been fine in Iraq fighting against the Tanks: T-72 and older, for which they were designed to beat.

I would of course prefer newer modern tanks but if cost was an excuse then the above option would be acceptable.  

Regarding the Lav 105mm same armament as the Leo so we are not getting an increased Kill capability but we are losing both the mobility and armour protection.  Interesting idea but when your main support weapon can be taken out by a good shot shooting at tires it seems a little weak.  

The americans want it to provide some fire support to the Airborne when they hit the ground and for there rapid deployment brigades.  More of a defensive role not offensive.  An example is the Iraq war once again once the Airfield in Northern Iraq was secured the Heavy Lifters brought the Abrams in.  This requires larger lifters then our current aging fleet of Hercules.

This goes to a larger question:  What is the future role of our armed forces?  Maybe irrelevant considering we are signatories of several international agreements for what our commitments of military are supposed to be, not that we even meet those. 

Our biggest waste of money is the fact that we have way too many Wings across the country just to keep employment in some smaller areas that belong to some MP‘s riding.  We need maybe 3 Wings, 2 naval Bases, and probably 3 Army Bases.  Not including training areas.  

Construction of military equipment in Canadian factories.  Yes this provides jobs but usually ends up doubling the cost of the project as opposed to just buying the equipment elsewhere fine if the government doesn‘t mind using the Military for economic supports but take the difference out of some other budget not ours.  If we could buy it somewhere else cheaper then the Government should reimburse us for getting there MP‘s reelected.   

Well enough of my rant.  Having been in Armour for 7 years, Communications for 2 and now in Intelligence I have seen and heard so many of the problems with our military and it all seems to stem back to a backboneless leadership and a much too involved civilian process in how we do our business.   Any General that does have a backbone that makes any statement usually winds up ending his career progression.  

I welcome full debate on this and totally expect to get slagged.


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## RCD

What is the future role of our armed forces?That is a good question Mogrok.


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## Jarnhamar

How important is a rapid reaction force when the western world usually knows about a hotspot months in advance?

I really don‘t see us being blind sided by a large hostile force and need to react within 72 hours.


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## RCD

A rapid reaction force is very important!

An don‘t count on other countries to move our forces.


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## Gunnar

> The purpose of a military is to enhance and enforce foreign policy. It gives the government an option that if they continue the current state of affairs we will no longer have.


"War is nothing but the continuation of state policy by other means" - Karl von Clausewitz, 1833



> Future warfare based on globalization will definitely have a urban component too it which light forces simply cannot survive in. Armour is required there.  I do agree that the LAV family is an excellent platform and that almost all support and infantry can be supported thru them. However a MBT whether in its current role as the hammer or in a role as a Infantry support vehicle is required.


Armour costs money, and most Canadians think that the forces are unnecessary, as there will be now be no more wars.  Who‘d want to attack Canada?  How are we to convince the government to pay for something the electorate doesn‘t care about?



> Our Leo1‘s ... its mobility as a lighter tank has in the past surprised our allies on manoevres.


Heard a story, possibly apocryphyal, of a Leo "jumping" an M1 which was hidden behind a sand dune, with barrel pointing to the rear.  Instant bullseye!  May allso be another kind of bull tho...



> we are losing both the mobility and armour protection. Interesting idea but when your main support weapon can be taken out by a good shot shooting at tires it seems a little weak.


But the Canadian forces will only ever be deployed in pre-pacified, peacekeeping areas where everyone will see the maple leaf and automatically love us.  Why would they shoot at tires?



> Tanks...require larger lifters then our current aging fleet of Hercules.


But since we won‘t be getting tanks, it‘s kinda pointless to discuss.  We probably won‘t even be getting new Hercules. 



> This goes to a larger question: What is the future role of our armed forces? Maybe irrelevant...


See where the line broke?  I think that is the future of the Canadian Forces.  Sad, isn‘t it?



> Our biggest waste of money is the fact that we have way too many Wings across the country just to keep employment in some smaller areas that belong to some MP‘s riding. We need maybe 3 Wings, 2 naval Bases, and probably 3 Army Bases. Not including training areas.


Like any other political vote-buying scheme, the bases that are open are determined by political requirements, not by the requirements of national defence.  The largest military bases are located in remote areas to defend us against unemployment.  The reserve units are in the major centres in case of an invasion.    



> Construction of military equipment in Canadian factories. Yes this provides jobs but usually ends up doubling the cost of the project as opposed to just buying the equipment elsewhere fine if the government doesn‘t mind using the Military for economic supports but take the difference out of some other budget not ours. If we could buy it somewhere else cheaper then the Government should reimburse us for getting there MP‘s reelected.


From a strictly defensive point of view, it makes sense to have the tools to build your military apparatus in-house.  War tends to use up materiel, should it ever come.  However, this crap where they buy a 3-rate piece of junk from some Canadian firm, solely because it is Canadian, is stupid.  Buy the *plans* for the equipment, built it in the country, and insist on only the best.



> Well enough of my rant. Having been in Armour for 7 years, Communications for 2 and now in Intelligence I have seen and heard so many of the problems with our military and it all seems to stem back to a backboneless leadership and a much too involved civilian process in how we do our business. Any General that does have a backbone that makes any statement usually winds up ending his career progression.


Which is why the troops still love Lou MacKenzie, even to this day.  But he is no longer a General, except in name.


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## Mogrok

Regardless of how Canadians think about our military we need to have the goods to do any job that is handed to us.  If we totally rely on the rest of the world to provide protection for us how then can we have any say in how things are done in that world.  

There is a lot of waste in our military and even with our current budget we could be doing better if there weren‘t political decisions behind all appropriations and base sites.

As a society we have to decide if we either want our military or not, if we do our spending should reflect that and if we don‘t fine then as well.  Just get rid of this half assed military we got right now.  

What we need to show the government how far our military has fallen is to fall flat on our faces in one of our operations.  But no we find away to overcome all the odds and usually surpass expectations.  No wonder the government thinks we don‘t need more money.


----------



## McG

> Originally posted by Ghost778:
> [qb] How important is a rapid reaction force when the western world usually knows about a hotspot months in advance?
> 
> I really don‘t see us being blind sided by a large hostile force and need to react within 72 hours. [/qb]


While a rapid reaction capability is important, I think it is less relevant to the Canadian LAV debate.  We lack sufficient integral airlift capability to move any mechanized force rapidly.  Rapid reaction could be done by light infantry (and there are airmobile armoured vehicles we could buy to support such a force).  

Our mechanized forces are moved by chartered sealift or chartered airlift (neither a good option for rapid reaction).  In the event that forces are deployed by sea, there is very little difference between a tank and a LAV.  The problem is less to do with lift and more to do with the political will to deploy Leopards/M109s & the logistics associated with supporting an additional vehicle platform.  With a LAV based alternative, we may start to see our deployed forces including this greater capability.  If the LAV III based alternative comes at the expense of maintaining MBTs & heavy SP Arty, then we will find our capabilities greatly compromised if we ever fight a mechanized war.



> Originally posted by Mogrok:
> [qb] There is a lot of waste in our military and even with our current budget we could be doing better if there weren‘t political decisions behind all appropriations and base sites. [/qb]


Much of what we need now will require major capitol expenditures.  These big one time costs cannot be covered by reducing waste in the CF & DND.  They must be budgeted for individually to ensure that the money comes.  Some times the government would rather pay more in the long run that spend a lot now (and benefit from greater efficiency).  



> Originally posted by Mogrok:
> [qb] What we need to show the government how far our military has fallen is to fall flat on our faces in one of our operations.  But no we find away to overcome all the odds and usually surpass expectations.  No wonder the government thinks we don‘t need more money. [/qb]


Sad because it seems to be true.


----------



## strat0

> Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
> [qb] Not to dampen our armour friends.  But has anyone taken the time to really look at the actual upgrade.
> 
> Remember the pictures of our first kick at the CAT trophy in Germany using borrowed Leopard 1A1‘s, Belgique I believe, they had the original round frying pan turret.  Our tankers won.
> 
> Tadda, if you examine the turrets of the up grade to the C2, it is a 1A1 turret with a complete add on of angular bins and armour add on‘s.
> 
> We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret.
> 
> Next up, with our shrinking Bge capabilities and the advent of the LAV family, there was talk of Two light Bge (LAV) Gps, with one back Heavy (tracked).
> 
> I have my doubts.  Especially with the rumours of a Bge being disbanded. [/qb]


If you had any knowledge of the C2, you would know that the turret you have talked about is the same as the Leopard 1A5. This has a completely new gunnery system than before and equals that that is the Leo 2 !


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## Thompson_JM

but isnt it still a 105mm?  the Leop 2 has a 120 right?


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## Mogrok

With modern rounds, especially if we get DU penetrators but even with Tungsten, the difference in calibre is less of an issue.  Few tanks can take a hit from an APFSDS/DU round.  So engagement speed and accuracy count for more.  The new turret systems have vastly improved our marks in those areas.  I wonder how the CANAM challenge went this year?


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## strat0

The last CANAM was won by the Americans 36-33. The Strats sent newly qualified crews and gave the Americans a run for their money. The B Sqn team won the main gun shoot but lost overall to coax night shooting. The Regiment intends to return the trophy to Canada by winning in Oct in Suffield!  :tank:


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## jrhume

But do your politicians understand the difference between a 105mm cannon armed LAV3 and an MBT?

Lets say they elect to purchase a limited number of wheeled, armored vehicles, like the LAV family, and maybe add enough new C-130 aircraft to handle minimal deployment capabilities.  The current government seems fixated on "peacekeeping" as opposed to "warfighting".  So they re-equip the CF for that role, whether we‘re talking LAVs, C-130s, or other equipment.

Then 5-10 years down the road that same group of pols, or even a new bunch, are forced to commit your forces into a combat scenario halfway around the world.  The reasons for such a move could be many, but they would be primarily driven by a political response to a situation somewhere in the world.  In other words, the military wouldn‘t really be involved in the decision process -- as usual.  The CF would just get marching orders and be expected to carry on.

So now your reinforced brigade, equipped entirely with wheeled vehicles and trained primarily for peacekeeping duties is deployed into combat.  Who do you think will get the blame when all those young Canadians get shredded by an enemy fielding tracked, armored vehicles?  It won‘t be the pols, although they may lose control of the government in the long run.

Look at the British forces deployed to France in 1940.  Their function was to die and buy time for the British Army to reinvent itself in a form suitable for armored combat.  Same thing with ABDA naval forces in the opening days of the Pacific War in 1941-42.  Wrong weapons, wrong tactics.  The sailors died buying time.

South Africa uses wheeled, armored vehicles to a large extent and uses them well.  However, their likely engagement scenarios are pretty much limited to Africa and they are unlikely to ever face a real armored force -- at least for the forseeable future.  

Canada‘s pols seem to feel that your country will never face direct assault by a foreign power.  I think that‘s true, but that means that Canadian troops must be prepared for everything up to and including armored combat with tracked vehicles because the possibility of their encountering such a scenario is far higher than the pols assume.  At least in my opinion.  Warfare is the least controllable activity people engage in.  Canada‘s forces are likely to be involved in combat against tank-equipped forces somewhere, sometime.  

Besides, hasn‘t anyone ever considered the possibility of a large scale suicide assault conducted with some sort of armor from a Ro-Ro type freighter.  Tom Clancy described the taking of Iceland in "Red Storm Rising" using just such a ship.  What could a battalion-sized terrorist group do with something as common as T-72 tanks backed up with simple APCs in one of Canada‘s port cities?  

Western civilization is engaged in a long-term conflict with people who loathe all of us, not just Americans.  Canada is a target and could be viewed as an easy target by certain groups with the wherewithal to carry out such a raid.

People tend to think of invasions as being conducted in order to take and hold territory.  But what if the enemy just wants to kill Westerners and has no intention of holding ground or even of surviving?  What ships would stop them?  How long would it take the CF to engage and destroy the terrorists?  Especially if your wheeled armor is deployed on peacekeeping duties in God knows where?

I got off the subject.  LOL.
<hops off soapbox>

Jim


----------



## strat0

There is definately Pros and Cons for everything. What you have to understand is that they are not replacing the Leo. The Leo‘s are remaining in the West with the Strathcona‘s. Some in Edmonton and the rest in Wainwright as part of the training establishment. The LAV MGS is going to be used as a counter recce vehicle, stripping the enemy recce vehicles in conjunction with hand held anti-armour weapons. It should not be up against large numbers of MBT‘s in combat only those that are part of the enemy recce elements, while tactics,etc are not developed yet that is the intent. We know how vulnerable the vehicle is but that is what the government is giving us, so we have to get on with the job. Hopefully with flanking tactics and fire & movement we can deny the enemy information. We will definately NOT be using them for direct assault on enemy defensive positions, etc as the tanks were used for.   

  :tank:


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

I haven‘t read through it all but thought I‘d post anyway.
 http://www.cochraneinstitute.com/Reports/strykerreality22.pdf 

 http://www.cochraneinstitute.com/Reports/preventdeaths43a.pdf 

 http://www.combatreform.com/lavdanger.htm 

Fact or fiction?  Not to sure, but I got it from here:  http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=11663 

See Yard Ape‘s answers.


----------



## Kirkhill

First Stryker Brigade Proving its Worth in Iraq 


(Source: US Army; issued April 6, 2004)


 WASHINGTON --- A year after conducting its Initial Operational Capabilities testing, the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team is fairing well in Iraq, according to senior Army procurement officials.  

Members of the Pentagon press corps got an update April 5 on successes of the Army's first fielded SBCT -- 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, based in Fort Lewis, Wash. -- and the Army's fielding plan for the remaining planned Stryker brigades.  

â Å“The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division is performing extremely effectively in combat in Iraq,â ? said Col. Nick Justice, acting assistant deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management for the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. â Å“The SBCT has effectively used speed and situational understanding to kill and capture dozens of enemy fighters.â ?  

That speed and quietness of the wheeled Strykers, compared to armored track vehicles, has earned the 3-2nd a nickname among many Iraqis, Justice said. Iraqi citizens around Samarra gave the brigade Soldiers the nickname â Å“Ghost Ridersâ ? as the Stryker vehicles arrive and deploy their infantrymen with little noise or warning.  

Citing that no Soldiers have been killed due to rocket-propelled grenade or improvised explosive devise attacks while riding in a Stryker vehicle since the 3-2nd arrived in Iraq last fall, Justice said that Army leaders are very pleased with its survivability in combat. The most serious injury due to an RPG attack against a Stryker vehicle to date has been a broken ankle.  

The brigade has suffered casualties in Iraq -- chief among them, three Soldiers were killed in a Stryker rollover when a roadway embankment gave way in December.  

Strykers in Iraq are augmented with add-on slat armor that is proving effective against RPG attacks.  

Despite the effectiveness of the slat armor against the current threat in Iraq, the Army is still pursuing the development of reactive armor.  

â Å“Slat armor is successful, but we don't want to be locked into it as there are other threats out there where reactive armor is needed,â ? Justice said.  

The Army plans on building enough Stryker add-on reactive armor kits to equip several brigades. Those brigade sets will be drawn from a pre-positioned site and used when a mission requires it, according to Army officials. The first brigade set of reactive armor is scheduled to be fielded in March 2005, with another set ready the following year.  

Stryker operations in Iraq have given Army procurement officials some lessons learned that will be implemented in the near future. Among those lessons, there is a need for greater sensor range and greater reach back communications capability. To address the sensor issue, the Army plans to make the sensor mast on the Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle taller; and for the communications issue, replace the 44 Near-Term Digital Radios in the brigade with 53 satellite radio sets capable of operating in a joint environment over greater distances.  

On the logistics side, the 3-2nd is proving that having a common chassis for its combat vehicles means a smaller logistics tail. The brigade is carrying about 160 lines of spare parts, compared to an armored brigade that carries about 300 lines of parts, Justice said. Having a common family of vehicles within the brigade also means a common set of skill sets among brigade Soldiers to keep the vehicle maintained, he said.  

Stating that a year of combat operations equates to about seven years of normal operational use of a combat vehicle, Justice said the operational readiness rate of the Stryker is about where he expected it to be -- above 90 percent.  

There are two variants and eight other configurations of the basic Stryker Infantry Carrier. The Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaisance and Survey Vehicles have yet to be field due to several human engineering issues that are being worked, according to officials. Low rate production of the MGS is expected to start late this summer, Justice said.  

The Army's second SBCT -- 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division â â€œ is currently undergoing it Initial Operational Capabilities evaluation. It is expected to certified by the Department of Defense as operationally ready sometime this summer.  

The next brigade to transform to a SBCT will be 172nd Infantry Brigade (Separate), Fort Richardson, Alaska. The 172nd will start getting its Stryker vehicles in May, Justice said.  

A February Defense Acquisition Board decision has funded the fourth Stryker brigade -- 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, La.  

DoD has recently directed the Army to include the remaining brigades for Stryker conversion -- 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Pennsylvania Army National Guard -- in its budget planning process.  

-ends-  

 http://195.154.204.115/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.1538.1058812216&modele=jdc_34


----------



## GregC

Does it not seem odd that an Infantry carrier is going to be outfitted with reactive armour?

Isn‘t RA inherently dangerous to any personnel in the nearby area? For tanks this isn‘t as much of an issue (generally), but for a troop carrier that halts and deploys infantry, isn‘t this dangerous? 

What if the vehicle takes a hit shortly after deploying troops, or if the troops are pinned down close to the vehicle after employment, while the IFV takes multiple hits?

Can anyone shed some light on this? Maybe RA technology has advanced significantly to allow this on IFV and APC‘s....I‘m just a civilian after all.


----------



## George Wallace

BTT

Some interesting questions to be discussed on this vehicle and some recent developments in Iraq with its‘ employment and performance there.

GW


----------



## PriceCHofO

The first article (I haven‘t read the other two) seems to be satisfying an already predetermined agenda, rather than giving a fair analysis of the vehicle. The writing seemed rather biased to me.


----------



## McG

Here is a concept graphic for the MMEV that I mentioned earlier:


----------



## Garry

Good discussion.

Bottom line, we need direction, ie: a white paper on defence. Once we know what our war time tasks are, we (read none of us  ) can then structure our Force to meet those objectives.

One thing to consider is that we, as citizens, must ensure that if we send our kids "in harm's way" that they are trained, equipped, and led to not only win, but win with the least number of caualty's possible.

Anyone remember "Blackhawk down"?...think a tank or two would have made a dfference.....?

Cheers-Garry


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Actually I do think that the tanks that were sitting onboard the ships off-shore would have made a differance, in fact this whole episode may not have happened if the UN had a heavy armoured force on the ground the ROE's to back it up. Not to mention a command structure that was willing to make an example out of one of the warlords.


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## Yard Ape

I agree with Yard Ape  ;D


 8) Yard Ape


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## Yard Ape

Have you seen the presentation for the MMEV?   The Army leadership has been pretty firm about our presenting the message that â Å“the MGS will not replace the Leopard.   The MGS is one of a spectrum of vehicles that will displace the Leopard while sustaining our combat capability.â ?   The problem is, the â Å“newâ ? vehicles will also â Å“displaceâ ? the M113 TUA and the ADATS.   What are the new vehicles?   They are LAV III TUA, MGS, and MMEV.   

What do they bring?   The MGS has the shortest range, but fires on the move and has a higher rate of fire.   The TUA has slightly better range & accuracy, but reduced rate of fire.   The MMEV may be to only step forward in capability . . . maybe.   It will have the greatest range in the Anti-Armour role.   However, the intent is to have new missiles developed to give it a range of mission specific capabilities not currently available (much like the CF-18 can have bomb loads configured to a mission).   I have heard talk of single purpose munitions (AT or AA specific), scatterable mine munitions, demolition/anti-bunker missiles, and the traditional dual purpose missile.   However, we will have few MMEV than we do ADATS (and this means not enough to do all the wonderful stuff promised).   

Why is indirect fire not part of the â Å“displace the Leopardâ ? plan?   A LAV III with AMOS or AMS would be a valuable asset to an Infantry Company Group without tanks.   The breach loaded 120 mm mortars could fire conventional or dual-purpose munitions in indirect & even direct roles.   The dual-purpose munitions would give the ability to threaten armour hidden on a reverse slope.   Smart munitions could identify and target tanks.   If we are not going to have tanks, then at the very least, this is another capability we need to assist in the â Å“displacing.â ?

. . . then again, think what we could do with all the above and tanks. 

 8) Yard Ape


proud member of:
Apes for Tanks   :tank:


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## Infanteer

Wow, I think this has to be the most persistent thread at army.ca.  And I don't think it has resolved a single thing yet....


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## bossi

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Wow, I think this has to be the most persistent thread at army.ca.  And I don't think it has resolved a single thing yet....



Sometimes it's okay to flex our "cerebral muscles", just for practice ...  


> A man who takes a lot of exercise rarely exercises his mind adequately.
> B.H. Liddell Hart:  Thoughts on War, xi, 1944



Call me a heretic, but ... a mixed fleet always has advantages as well as disadvantages.
For example:  If every armoured vehicle we own has a turret on it ... the logistical tail/echelon might become prohibitive.



> "At the operational level much more than the tactical, logistics may determine what is possible and what is not; for a campaign plan that can not be logistically supported is not a plan at all, but simply an expression of fanciful wishes."
> - John F. Meehan III, The Operational Art



And, the tank/armoured car debate always reminds me of the fire/garden hose debate:  
You can water the lawn with a fire hose if you have to, but ...

Go hard or go home.
As an infanteer, I'd like to believe my armoured brethren can go anywhere, kill anything (bigger than me).
We're witnessing too many examples of "dumbing down" requirements and specifications (e.g. EH101).
I'd hate to read about some Canadian soldiers getting killed because they should have had tanks instead of armoured cars (and, yes - I'm deliberately using antiquated terminology, in order to underscore the suggestion the difference between tracked dreadnaughts and wheeled pyrotechnic incinerators ... chuckle).


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Well, it took a while, but I have finally read all of the posts on this thread.

Good arguments from both sides, and several have hit the proverbial nail on the head.  The current direction for the Armed Forces is fairly straight forward, in it, the Canadian Army has to be able to field a Brigade capable of fighting in a mid to high intensity conflict.  Tha actual wording includes "able to fight alongside the best, against the best", and "The retention of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces represents the only prudent choice for Canada. "  

Does the sole use of the LAV III and its variants allow us this capability?  Not a hope.

For those that say we cannot afford tanks, I say, look at Australia.  A similar sized armed forces, that get less of a budget, but they are much more combat capable than we are.  Do you suppose it could be that they do not spend over one third of the bidget in NDHQ?  Or that maybe that 26% of the strength of our Armed Forces are commissioned officers?  Or that they do not have 600 full Colonels/Naval Captains?  Or that Full Colonels and above receive a 15% bonus on their pay every year?

Could it be that Canada does not need money so much as it needs a complete overhaul of our hierarchy?  Could it be that Canada can afford to have a medium brigade, plus two or three light brigades equipped with LAV III & varaints, if we cut down our extravagant command element in Ottawa, and put the money where it is required?

Maybe once the defense review is done, it will be time for another White Paper, and maybe our focus can be restored.

Maybe, but until somebody has the courage to take on the bureaucracy, any more money assigned to the Forces will be swallowed up by the so-called leaders that inhabit NDHQ.

At least, in my not very humble opinion!


----------



## Garry

Lance!!!!

Welcome to the board, and great to hear from you...long time no see!

Excellent post!

Cheers-Garry


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## Lance Wiebe

Why, thanks, Garry!

I'll be posting a few more thoughts once in a while, but there sure is a lot of stuff to read on this site!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Going by this article from Reuters, it would appear that big business hasn't written off heavy armoured vehicles just yet!

By F. Brinley Bruton 
LONDON (Reuters) - With its last-minute swoop on tank-maker Alvis, Europe's biggest military contractor BAE Systems seeks to meet armies' renewed demand for traditional battlefield equipment. 
BAE Systems on late Thursday said it would buy the maker of the Vickers Challenger tank and other armoured vehicles for 355 million pounds ($651 million), or 320 pence per share. Alvis withdrew its recommendation for a 280p bid by U.S. military contractor General Dynamics. 
BAE's move tracks the increasing dependence of armed forces on armoured vehicles in the wake of the war in Iraq, experts said on Friday. 
"What Iraq showed was that there was a renaissance in the need for heavy armour. There you saw major armour and tank engagements the like of which you hadn't seen for decades," said Lee Willett, head of military capabilities at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. 
Not only does Alvis manufacture the sort of 70-tontanks called for by battles in Iraq, it is also a major player in the light and medium-sized military vehicle sector, which became more important during the recent spike in international instability that came after the end of the Cold War. 
"The Iraq war last year and the ongoing occupation of the country by U.S. and British troops, among others, show the need to both deploy and protect soldiers in close combat situations," Willett said. 
ACHILLES HEEL 
With Iraq and other conflicts, governments are sinking more money into so-called land systems, such as the tanks and armoured infantry fighting vehicles that Alvis makes. BAE, which traditionally emphasized air and naval equipment, saw Alvis as key to covering that sector, said analysts. 
"Land systems have always been BAE's weakest point. That has been an acceptable position to have when air, and to a certain extent naval, areas have been receiving a disproportionate amount of the budget," said one London-based aerospace analyst who asked not to be named. 
"Land systems are beginning to start taking a bigger share of the budgetary cake," he added. 
Willett said Vickers Challenger tanks performed better than their U.S. counterparts in the Iraq conflict. While reports show that the U.S. forces have lost about 20 of their tanks, the British have lost only one, and this one through friendly fire 
By buying Alvis, Britain's only armoured vehicle manufacturer, BAE makes sure that aggressive and acquisitive General Dynamics does not corner the European market, said Clive Forestier-Walker of Numis Securities. 
"Leaving aside the industrial logic, it is just to make sure that General Dynamics is not a prime contractor in the UK," he said. 
BAE announced the deal at a time that European industry executives and politicians have expressed fears of U.S. domination, fueled by rising U.S. defense spending, which at over $200 billion a year dwarfs what Europe spends collectively. 
The Royal United Services Institute's Willett said that BAE was making sure it benefits from the growing realization that wars in the future will not be won by generals staring at computer screens or by planes flying high above the battlefield. 
He quoted military historian and author T. R. Fehrenbach: "You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud." 
BAE's shares were down 0.59 percent at 211-3/4p. Alvis shares jumped 14.29 percent to 316 pence. 
(Additional reporting by Louise Heavens and Steve Slater) 

 :tank:


----------



## Yard Ape

bossi said:
			
		

> Call me a heretic, but ... a mixed fleet always has advantages as well as disadvantages.
> For example:   If every armoured vehicle we own has a turret on it ... the logistical tail/echelon might become prohibitive


Nice summary of a complex position.  I think we need two fleets of general purpose armoured vehicles: one wheeled & one tracked.  Inside each fleet, the vehicles should be homogeneous (ie: all wheel are LAV III based, and all track are TLAV based).  As for the comment on turrets, we have put the turret on far more vehicles that we should have.  A LAV III that was bought to fill the role of a CP does not need a turret (but our's have them!).  We need to look at the turretless LAV III with protected weapon station (PWS) in the Canadian Army.

Note:  The Stryker is basiclly just a turretless LAV III with protected weapon station (PWS).


----------



## 30 for 30

I agree. At the very least I'd like to see one light-medium tracked battlegroup in the order of battle, using  M113A3s/MTVLs, MTVEs etc. (all of which we have recently upgraded...almost 300 I believe), so we would at least have one formation that could be drawn upon if we needed to deploy somewhere where cross-country maneuver in challenging terrain was an issue. 

Such a battlegroup would also have the advantage of being easily up-armourable to achieve RPG protection. From what I've read RPG protection is a problem with wheeled LAVs, and our LAVs are generally at maximum weight levels already (?). Hopefully technological developments will allow for eventual comprehensive RPG protection. On the downside the tracked formation would not have the punch of a LAV battlegroup, but tracked TUAs that we already have could assist in that department. 

Mixing both tracks and wheels within a battlegroup (ie. M113s supporting LAVs) is something we should try to avoid as much as possible, as LAVs need to use their speed advantage at every opportunity for maximum success. After reading through this entire thread I think the best plan for the Army is to be overwhelmingly LAV wheeled, but to also keep tracks, and keep tracked units together in their own formation. I personally would keep all vehicles under 30 tons to ensure easier deployability and keep costs lower, though I know some will disagree with me on that point. Perhaps the purchase of the 66 DFS vehicles could be broken down into 2/3 MGS and 1/3 M8 AGS so the tracked battlegroup would have some medium (25 tons with RPG armour), tracked, protected, DFS. Anyway, I should probably stop there


----------



## bossi

(chuckle - oh, what the heck - why stop there ... ?  I'm going to throw another jerry can on ...) :evil:
I've got one enduring memory of an exercise I spent with the RCDs 
(remember, I'm an infanteer ... I was getting some OJT/famil prior to my Mech Cbt Tm Comd crse ... but, I digress ...)

One of the more educational experiences was the privilege of riding around for the better part of a day in the SSM's APC, most of which was spent un-bogging Cougar's (okay - they were Cougars, not LAV III's, but ...)
I was impressed at how the APC never got stuck, and how the Cougars got bogged down so often
(and, it wasn't even the monsoon season ...)

And, I'm glad to see others agreed with my turret comment - thanks, Yard Ape - glad we're on the same team! :tank:


----------



## Yard Ape

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Wow, I think this has to be the most persistent thread at army.ca.   And I don't think it has resolved a single thing yet...


Is it any different than the persistent topic that is the basis of a dozen threads?


. . . oh wait, it is that too.


----------



## bossi

Hmmm ... it's a shame this guy killed himself, but since we're discussing the merits of tracks vs. wheels ...

 Tank Man in Granby, Colorado 

(url=http://www.nbc10.com/news/3385580/detail.html] Another URL with video clip [/url]


----------



## karpovage

Isn't a Stryker similar to the CA's Bison? What's the difference?


----------



## George Wallace

Karpovage said:
			
		

> Isn't a Stryker similar to the CA's Bison? What's the difference?



No.  It is a whole different 'animal'.  The Bison is the 2nd generation of LAV.  The Stryker is a much larger vehicle and the 3rd generation.  The Stryker family comes in different variants.  The US has bought an APC variant that from a great distance may look like a Bison, but when put side by side, it would be a lot larger.

Canada's LAV III's have the same turret, more or less (more), as the Coyotes.  They have the 25 mm Bushmaster M245 Chaingun and a few upgrades.

GW


----------



## Yard Ape

Here is the line-up that will replace the last tracked vehicles in the Infantry & Armoured.  Notice that in all cases we will also see a reduction in numbers:


----------



## SoCalSooner

Is the Canadian Army getting this and is it any good?  Cheers, from sunny Southern California.


----------



## MG34

Depends on what vehicle you are talking about,the Stryker APC variant is much less capable than our 25mm cannon armed LAV 3 although they share a common chasis.If you mean the MGS then maybe we will be getting them maybe not..The lieberals that the sheep have voted in again for some unknown reason have a pretty good track record for lying.


----------



## Yard Ape

SoCalSooner said:
			
		

> Is the Canadian Army getting this and is it any good?


Stryker is the name that the US government gave to the vehicle platform that we call the LAV III (note: Stryker is LAV III).  We had an APC variant with a LAV 25 turret long before the US decided to buy LAV III (and it was a while after that decision was made that the US chose to rename the vehicle "Stryker").

The US has several types of "Stryker" just as we are developing additional types of "LAV III" (TUA, MMEV, Engineer).  Canada has decided to buy the Stryker/LAV Mobile Gun.  Because this was designed for the vehicles the US is buying (and GM does not want to upset the bigger customer) we seem to have taken to calling the MGS as "Stryker" (technically it is incorrect of us to refer to just this platform as "Stryker" as we should be calling it "LAV III MGS" or "Stryker MGS").

So, Canada had "Stryker" before the US, but ours are different and the US has more types.


----------



## soldiers301

The Stryker are too heavier for the CC-130Hercules, and one of the principal reason to buy it was to be air transportable by the CC-130Hercules  :-\. What do you think about it ?

http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/TorontoSun/News/2004/08/15/pf-583586.html


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## George Wallace

First off, Canada is not buying the STRYKER.   We have LAV III.   The MGS is a POS that we are in the process of procurring.


This article (SORRY I DON'T HAVE A LINK) being circulated through RCAC channels is more accurate to the thread that you have just started:

GAO Calls Stryker Too Heavy for Transport
Weight of Armored Vehicle Cuts Flying Range of C-130 Aircraft, Congress Is Told"
By Thomas E. Ricks



Washington Post Staff Writer


The Army's new medium-weight armored vehicle, the Stryker, weighs so much that it curtails the range of C-130 military cargo aircraft that carry it and under certain conditions make it impossible for the planes to take off, a new report for Congress found.



"The Stryker's average weight of 38,000 pounds -- along with other factors such as added equipment and less-than-ideal flight conditions -- significantly limits the C-130's flight range and reduces the size force that could be deployed," said the Government Accountability Office, the watchdog arm of Congress. 



Indeed, the report said, a C-130 with an average-weight Stryker wouldn't even be able to take off from higher elevations in Afghanistan, such as Bagram or Kabul, during daylight hours in summer. 



The findings support the claims of critics that the eight-wheeled Stryker -- now in use in Iraq -- won't be able to meet the original goal of being able to roll into a C-130, be flown 1,000 miles and leave the plane immediately able to engage in combat. When 2,000 pounds of associated equipment such as ammunition is loaded into the aircraft with the typical Stryker vehicle, the report said, the C-130's range is about 500 miles -- and if heavier equipment is loaded it's much less. The report noted that the Army subsequently has dropped that 1,000-mile range requirement for the system. 



The Stryker program -- expected to have a total cost of about $8.7 billion for acquiring about 1,800 vehicles -- is the centerpiece of the Army's controversial attempt in recent years to move away from heavy, tank-oriented forces and become more agile, both in getting to the battlefield and in maneuvering on it. Critics, however, worry that the Stryker is too vulnerable to enemy fire, and that attempts to strengthen it would decrease its ability to be deployed. 



Indeed, two years ago, those critics had gained so much attention that the Army put on a demonstration in which four of the combat vehicles were airlifted to Andrews Air Force Base. Before an audience that included one leading skeptic, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), a C-130 pulled up in front of a hangar, dropped its ramp, and offloaded a Stryker and all its gear, plus two crew members and nine infantrymen, in less than 10 minutes. 



But the GAO report found that the weight of the Stryker and its gear and crew makes such a scenario unlikely in a real combat deployment, because it probably would be necessary to move much of the "equipment, ammunition, fuel, personnel and armor on separate aircraft." After being unloaded from the C-130s, the Strykers then would be outfitted with their armor and prepared for combat, a time-consuming task. 



Asked what he now thinks of the October 2002 demonstration at Andrews, in light of the GAO findings, Gingrich was bitterly critical of the Army, calling the display "a cheap stunt." 



"It was a nice piece of public deception," Gingrich said. "The senior Army deliberately misled the Congress and the secretary of defense about air transportability." 



An Army spokesman didn't have any immediate comment on the GAO report, which was released when the Pentagon was all but closed on a Friday in August. He noted that the Defense Department, when asked by the GAO for comment, stated that it "concurs that operational requirements for airlift capability . . . need clarification." 



The GAO's findings are especially troubling for the Army because fighting in Iraq over the last two years has resulted in changes to the Stryker that make it even heavier. New armor is being issued to the vehicles to protect them against rocket-propelled grenades, which have been a major danger to U.S. forces in Iraq. 



The report also said that some variants of the Stryker, such as the Mobile Gun System, are heavier than the average version, and so are "probably too heavy" to be transported very far via C-130.    

GW


----------



## scm77

Either way.....D'OH!


----------



## Gobsmacked

:fifty: Surprised nobody caught this little bomb released by GAO late Friday. (also a highlights page available on GAO site).

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04925.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04925high.pdf

  :rocket: :tank:

Strykers Weigh Too Much For C-130 Transport, GAO Says
By Lisa Troshinsky
08/17/2004 09:54:51 AM

The U.S. Army's Stryker vehicle, developed to fit into the service's transformational plan of becoming lightweight and rapidly deployable, will be too heavy to be transported by C-130 aircraft in many circumstances, especially when equipped with add-on armor, according to a new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.

"The Stryker's average weight of 38,000 pounds - along with other factors such as added equipment weight and less than ideal flight conditions - significantly limits the C-130's flight range and reduces the size force that could be deployed," says the report, released Aug. 13.

The GAO recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) provide to Congress clarification of expected capabilities and limitations of C-130 transport for Stryker vehicles and Future Combat Systems vehicles, as well as options for alternative transport.

DOD agreed that operational requirements for airlift capability for brigade transport need clarification, and said it is exploring the mobility capabilities required to support the National Military Strategy with an ongoing Mobility Capabilities Study. The study includes an assessment of the intra-theater transport of Army brigade combat teams, and is due in spring 2005.

Reaction

"The conclusions of the GAO report bear out some of our concerns, in that significant deployment of the Stryker with C-130s is more limited than we were given to believe at the time we chose to move forward with the program," Rep. Jim Saxton (R-N.J), who chairs the House Armed Services Committee's terrorism and unconventional threats subcommittee, told The DAILY. "Now we have to look at other ways to deploy the Stryker, for example, in larger aircraft like the C-17, on which three Strykers could be loaded. The problem is that recently completed mobility studies done with the C-17 and C-5 didn't consider this mission, and the Air Force would have to buy more C-17s than what is currently planned. The service originally planned to buy 220, and have so far committed to procuring 180 C-17s."

But an Army official said the service "never intended to have the Stryker fully combat capable, to roll-off a C-130 in fighting condition.

"We'll get the vehicles to specific areas of operation, then upload the equipment and ammunition. If the Stryker, fully loaded, can't fly on a single C-130, "the combatant commander has a number of options," he told The DAILY. "He can use more C-130 trips or other means of transportation. In a joint environment, we can work solutions."

No 'major' problem

Loren Thompson, an analyst with the Lexington Institute, said he doesn't believe the Stryker has a "major" weight problem.

"Every pound you give up in weight translates into loss of survivability and becomes less effective to operate," Thompson told The DAILY. "There is a problem now with weight that is specific to Iraq. The vehicles need add-on armor to protect against IEDs [improved explosive devices] and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades], but you won't have a problem like this in Bosnia or Afghanistan."

According to a study of C-130 transport of Army vehicles by the Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, an armored C-130H aircraft taking off in ideal conditions such as moderate air temperature could transport 38,000 pounds for a maximum range of 860 miles. Adding just 2,000 pounds onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission equipment or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's takeoff-to-landing range to only 500 miles, the GAO said.

The Army has already ordered more than 1,200 - or 68 percent - of the eight Stryker production vehicle configurations it plans to buy, along with limited quantities of the two developmental vehicle prototypes for testing - the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes. Stryker program costs have increased about 22 percent from the November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion, the GAO said.


----------



## Franko

Just to shed some light on this.....

Canada DOES NOT have the Stryker...we have the LAV III...different beast in many ways

Much heavier, differnent turret, FCS etc....

Also....Canada does not have the lift capabilities. They require the C-130 J to get off the ground (barely BTW)

Don't even get me started on the MGS POS

Regards


----------



## Kirkhill

> Don't even get me started on the MGS POS



TOO LATE!!! :dontpanic:


----------



## George Wallace

Franko said:
			
		

> Just to shed some light on this.....
> 
> Canada DOES NOT have the Stryker...we have the LAV III...different beast in many ways



Too late.   Said the same thing two days ago on another thread about the Stryker being too heavy where I provided the same news article sans links at:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18250.from1092600839.html#new

No further comments were added, unless you include SCum77.   


GW


----------



## Yard Ape

Franko said:
			
		

> Canada DOES NOT have the Stryker...we have the LAV III...different beast in many ways
> 
> Much heavier, different turret, FCS etc....


Yes, but wrong.  Stryker & LAV III are names given to the vehicle platform (and are not names given to a variant).  Our LAV III APC have GDLS LAV25 turrets.  Their LAV III ICV have a PWS.  Our LAV III MGS will be their Stryker MGS.  Our LAV III TUA will have the turrets from our M113 TUA, their LAV III ATGMV will have a GDLS elevating TOW turret.

To say that our APC has a turret & their's does not have a turret does not make the vehicle platforms different.  "Stryker" is just the name that the US gave to the LAV III.  Both names would apply to all variants regardless of what "bits" may have been added.


----------



## George Wallace

Yard Ape said:
			
		

> Yes, but wrong. Stryker & LAV III are names given to the vehicle platform (and are not names given to a variant). Our LAV III APC have GDLS LAV25 turrets. Their LAV III ICV have a PWS. Our LAV III MGS will be their Stryker MGS. Our LAV III TUA will have the turrets from our M113 TUA, their LAV III ATGMV will have a GDLS elevating TOW turret.
> 
> To say that our APC has a turret & their's does not have a turret does not make the vehicle platforms different. "Stryker" is just the name that the US gave to the LAV III. Both names would apply to all variants regardless of what "bits" may have been added.



So does that make our M113's   the same as Sparky's "Gavins" and our Coyotes the same as the Marine Corps LAV25?

GW


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## Yard Ape

"Gavins" are M113

LAV 25 are LAV I
Coyote are LAV II
therefore Coyote and LAV 25 and so these are not the same.
"Coyote" is also a variant name & not a platform name ("Bison" is also LAV II)


----------



## George Wallace

Yard Ape said:
			
		

> "Gavins" are M113



OK; now I know where you are coming from.   One of Sparky's ilk.

M113s are NOT Gavins, never were and never will be, except in the mind of "Sparky".

Sorry. ???

As for the rest...they are all different. :-\

GW


----------



## Yard Ape

George Wallace said:
			
		

> One of Sparky's ilk.


Ouch.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> M113s are NOT Gavins


That is correct, but for the eccentric few that feel the need to talk about "Gavins" they are in fact talking about M113. (My reply assumed you were one of these few.  Apologies if I was wrong.)


----------



## 30 for 30

I've seen the US Army's website use the term "Gavin" on an equipment page. Surely that's a sign that the name is catching on somewhat.


----------



## George Wallace

RNW said:
			
		

> I've seen the US Army's website use the term "Gavin" on an equipment page. Surely that's a sign that the name is catching on somewhat.



There is this guy, "Sparky", who is well known in the Armour/Armor community here and abroad who is notorious for writting papers on the M113 and calling it the "Gavin".  He is a fanatic, an ex-paratrooper, of the US Infantry who spends 'all his waking hours' praising the "Gavin" and tearing apart the LAVs and all other wheeled armoured vehicles.  He is well published, but very closed minded and opinionated and not very well appreciated on other Armor Forums.  So usually if you see the word "Gavin" in any documentation, it has originated from his desk.

GW


----------



## 30 for 30

Would that be Lt. Mike Sparks? Sounds to me like it's him. I've read a lot of the information his group puts out. I think they make some good points and there is some important commentary on the importance of tracks, but unfortunately the rhetoric definitely borders on the fanatical at times, and the anti-LAV 111 information is very often way off base and inaccurate. I certainly read everything they produce with a critical mind, as the other side of the story is very rarely evident.


----------



## George Wallace

To the best of my knowledge he is long Ret'd.

GW


----------



## Recce41

OK Fellas
 Heres some imfo. The Styker is the org APC with the RWS. The others have not received a name as of yet. The Gavin is/was to be a replacement for the Bradley. Our Tow turrets will be replaced with the update one. It will have 8-12 TOWs. 
 The Coyote is getting the LAV sightheads which are better. There are many more changes coming. All/most of our LAV family vehs will not be the same as the US/Aussie ones.


----------



## Yard Ape

Stryker is the platform name.  The US APC is called Stryker ICV (infantry carrier vehicle).  There is Stryker NBC reccon vehicle, Stryker MGS (mobile gun system), Stryker ESV (engineer section vehicle), Stryker Amb, etc.

TUA has been put on the LAV III and tested.  The LAV III TUA is in all the documents describing army transformation.  You may be thinking of the MMEV which will be ADATS placed on a LAV III and used primarilly to engage ground targets.


----------



## George Wallace

I think 'we' had better be careful of how much 'we' are starting to put onto this chassis.  I've seen the photos of the ADATS turret on the LAV III and thought it was not as good as on the M113 or TLAV chassis for exterior servicing and operation.  The LAV chassis is a lot narrower than the tracked chassis.

I know we have a 'roll-over' problem with the LAV IIIs in certain conditions, and fear the placement of heavy turrets on that chassis.  That much weight above the vehicle's center of gravity will only compound that problem.  

I will not get into the MGS debate here.


GW


----------



## Gunner

Washington Times 
September 2, 2004 
Pg. 20 

Army Off Its Wheels? 

By Jack Kelly 

Until recently, and especially after the Russians' troubles in Grozny, the 
conventional wisdom held armor was not as effective in an urban environment 
as it is in the countryside. Narrow streets restrict visibility and 
mobility. Tall buildings permit defenders to attack tanks and armored 
personnel carriers at their most vulnerable point. (The armor is thinnest on 
the top of the vehicle.) 

But the Israelis and now the Americans have stood the old conventional 
wisdom on its head. They have shown nothing is more effective in urban 
combat than armored vehicles, properly employed as part of a tank-infantry 
team. 

The importance of armor in urban combat can be overstated, as it was in Alex 
Berenson's article in Monday's New York Times. It's important to remember 
that in Najaf we fought a remarkably incompetent foe and there were no 
buildings so tall the guns on an Abrams or a Bradley couldn't be elevated 
enough to engage people on rooftops. 

Still, it is clear other nations will examine carefully the lessons learned 
in Najaf, and earlier in Baghdad, in rewriting their doctrine for combat in 
built-up areas. Alas, it appears the U.S. Army may not be among those 
learning the lessons of Najaf. 

The Army seems hell-bent on replacing the armored forces that brought us 
victory with a lightly armored bus. An armored bus. Think about the concept 
for a moment. 

They say a camel is a horse designed by a committee. The Army must have 
consulted that same committee in coming up with the Stryker, which lacks the 
speed and agility of an armored car, but also lacks the firepower and armor 
protection of a Bradley. It is, however, very expensive, fulfilling what 
seems the chief requirement of new weapons systems. 

The Stryker is the brainchild of Gen. Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the 
Army in the last years of the Clinton administration. Gen. Shinseki was 
embarrassed when wheeled Russian vehicles were able to get to Kosovo ahead 
of American tanks and Bradleys. 

The Stryker is a super-sized version of the armored car the Marines have 
used for decades. The LAV-25 is fast mid maneuverable, and--with a 
turret-mounted 25 mm chain gun and a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun--packs a 
wallop. 

The Stryker is larger and heavier (19 vs. 11 tons), because the Army wanted 
it to carry a full nine-man squad (vs. six for the LAV-25) and have enough 
armor to protect against heavy machine guns. (The LAV-25 protects only 
against small arms.) 

The gain in size and weight is a problem, because the Stryker is supposed to 
fit on a C-130 tactical transport. To address this problem, the turret and 
chain gun were dispensed with. The basic Stryker has either a ..50-caliber 
machine gun or a 40mm grenade launcher, which the gunner must reload from 
outside. 

There are a half-dozen proposed variants of the Stryker vehicle, the 
nuttiest of which is the armored gun system, a 105mm cannon mounted on a 
Stryker chassis. 

It is a profoundly bad idea to put a big gun on a wheeled vehicle, because 
the vehicles lack the stability to absorb the recoil when the gun is fired. 
The cannon can't penetrate the armor of a modern tank, because the gun had 
to be dumbed down to lessen the recoil. Even so, in tests, the AGS has shown 
a disturbing tendency to flip over when the gun is fired, if the gun is not 
perfectly aligned along the center line of the vehicle. 

So the AGS doesn't work, wouldn't be of that much use even if it did, and 
can't fit on a C-130. But the Army wants it to replace tanks, which plainly 
do work. 

Someone who learns only from his own experience is said to be a nitwit. So 
what do you say about those who refuse to learn from their own experience? 

Jack Kelly, a syndicated columnist, is a former Marine and Green Beret and a 
former deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan 
administration. He is national security writer for the Pittsburgh (Pa.) 
Post-Gazette.


----------



## Jarnhamar

> which the gunner must reload from outside.



What a clever idea.


----------



## Danjanou

Gunner said:
			
		

> It is, however, very expensive, fulfilling what seems the chief requirement of new weapons systems.



As is said all to often on this board, I don't know whether to laugh or cry.


----------



## Gobsmacked

Franko said:
			
		

> Just to shed some light on this.....
> 
> Canada DOES NOT have the Stryker...we have the LAV III...different beast in many ways
> 
> Also....Canada does not have the lift capabilities. They require the C-130 J to get off the ground (barely BTW)
> 
> Don't even get me started on the MGS POS



 :

As previously noted by others, Stryker is LAV III.5  (ie. adjustable height, pws, etc)

It looks like members have not put 2+2=5 together yet re: MGS and deployability. (also possible via C-130H - but just barely  )

Per a _'Technical Briefing'_ by MGen Caron following Army Transformation announcement late Oct 03.

_"You would have to look at one - more than one trip to have at least four MGS in theatre.  And the usual - the usual unit of employment is at least four, at the minimum three."_
Therefore, based on Air Force restrictions _"Three Hercules flights are required to transport two LAV-III vehicles"_ (As noted in Air Force's 2003 _'Aerospace Capability Framework'_ released 31 May 2004 - what they don't acknowledge is what was stated in GAO report that the Hercs in question are Tactically Armoured C-130Hs), *a minimum of 6x CC-130Hs* (out of 11 Hs total)  *would be required for basic intra-theatre movement of 4x  18,734kg (41,300 lbs) MGS* (per GDLS-C website) *less-than 250 mi - in nearly ideal flight conditions*, based on GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data (per GAO report - ie. max 100nm @ 42,000 lbs).  You can't count the 2 C-130H-30s - weight reduced by some 5,000 lbs - the approx added weight of the 15' stretch mods w\o any additional fuel capacity, therefore not capable of LAV-III transport, possibly Bison.  *Plus, at 48% availability* - requiring two Hercs assigned to ensure completion of one mission, *this doubles the requirement to 12x CC-130H* (not accounting for those in normal 3rd line maintenance/upgrades - ie. *likely max 9 of 11 available* at any given moment - or hr based Periodic inspections) to airlift 4x MGS.  This compares very unfavourably with just 2x _'C-17 equivalent'_ aircraft needed to move 6x AMOS MMEV-FSV or MMEV-ADATS or LAV-III-type vehicles over 3,000 nm. :fifty:
 
Cheers


----------



## George Wallace

So what are you trying to say?

GW


----------



## George Wallace

Gobsmacked said:
			
		

> :
> 
> As previously noted by others, Stryker is LAV III.5 (ie. adjustable height, pws, etc)
> 
> It looks like members have not put 2+2=5 together yet re: MGS and deployability. (also possible via C-130H - but just barely )



No one in the CF calls the LAV III a Stryker, so why do you civies?

We have covered the POS MGS and many of its' pitfalls in a thread or two on the MGS.

We know they won't fit in Hercs.   We know Canada does not have the Airlift capabilities to move troops, without bringing up the question of vehicles.   We know the Canadian Navy does not have the capabilities to move troops or equipment by sea, having no RORO ships.   We all, in this trade, can read between the lines when NDHQ pushes "Wheels" over "Tracks".   We know the Left run the country and we are now a "Third World Army" at best (probally further down the scale).

Gw


----------



## 12alfa

Anyone here think we will fly Lav's or MGS's to wherever?

The usuall mode of transportation had been seaborne has it not?

Halo was by a Antonov I think, ah yes , got pics from Federation airport.

Sea is the norm, this C-130 is a pipe dream, in which the pipe is filled with funnie stuff I would think.

But I may be wrong, was once.....last year.


----------



## Gobsmacked

George Wallace said:
			
		

> No one in the CF calls the LAV III a Stryker, so why do you civies?
> 
> We have covered the POS MGS and many of its' pitfalls in a thread or two on the MGS.
> 
> We know they won't fit in Hercs.  We know Canada does not have the Airlift capabilities to move troops, without bringing up the question of vehicles.  We know the Canadian Navy does not have the capabilities to move troops or equipment by sea, having no RORO ships.  We all, in this trade, can read between the lines when NDHQ pushes "Wheels" over "Tracks".  We know the Left run the country and we are now a "Third World Army" at best (probally further down the scale).
> 
> Gw



George,

I don't call LAV-III Stryker either, read more carefully please! :

Piranha = LAV
LAV-I = USMC LAV-25, CF Grizzly; Cougar; Husky
LAV-II = Coyote, Bison
LAV-III = CF LAV III, and variants: CP; FOO; TUA; PNR; MMEV-ADATS.
LAV-III.5 = US Styker & Stryker variants, & MGS.

The initial 16 MGS will have _"Minimal Canadian-Specific Equipment . . . almost identical to the U.S. model"_ - even though MGS remains at developmental prototype stage, per Recent 2003 *SECRET* level *ANALYSIS* _'Whether to acquire the Mobile Gun System for the CF'_.
The Schedule calls for contracting of initial 16 MGS vehicles, _"no later-than Dec 04"_ under MND C$30M authority (w\o ILS), for _"January to June 2006 delivery"_ - with _"No Canadian Acquisition Prior to U.S. Order for_ (initial 72 low-rate) _Production Version"_, followed by Nov 05 Treasury Board approval of  C$661M balance of project for remaining 50 MGS for 2007-2009 delivery.

As for why the extra MGS/airlift info - I figured those viewing the site might be interested in some of the details, and not just the conjectural (sometimes right) banter. 
Remember, the Canadian Public hopefully views this site sometimes! ^-^

As for what we've spent on deployments to Afghanistan alone, at last count per ATI its somewhere near US$100M for both airlift (An-124/Il-76) and sealift (chartered of course).  
         [$ currency amt corr 05/09/04]

Remember, I'm not one of the uninformed kiddies who rant on this site.
Chk my writing in: Vanguard, Frontline, CDR, Air International.

Edited: 04,09,2004 - LAV-II - Coyote  [Typo Corrected]  Yes, its possible for a guy to have a 'Blond Moment' too. ;D


----------



## 12alfa

The Cougar is a LAV-I as the Griz and huskey.


----------



## George Wallace

12Alfa said:
			
		

> The Cougar is a LAV-I as the Griz and huskey.



'think that was just a typo....should have been Coyote....

GW


----------



## Spc_Cameron

oh boy...

alright yeah the Stryker wasn't one of the  US Army's better ideas and we're paying for it to.  the first week 2ID was in Mosul they lost 4  ( the armour is to light ). but hey what can you say... common sense isn't all that common specially when it comes to the Brass.

The marines, as much as I hate to admit it , have the right idea.. If you're going to build a  Med brigade of vehicles, stack that baby with a 25 mm , hell a CIV ( commanders Independant Viewer ) would be nice too. Thank god I'm a BFV crew member.


----------



## 12alfa

George Wallace said:
			
		

> 'think that was just a typo....should have been Coyote....
> 
> GW



Had I done that (typo) you would be kickin my ass all the way to Scotty dog woods on this fourm, wouldn't ya!


----------



## George Wallace

;D


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

I would love to have a meeting with whoever signed off on these for us and give him a swift kick in the junk.


----------



## canuck101

I thought it was the honarable John Macallum that signed the contract. i could be wrong.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Well I mean the officer who convinced him to go this way.


----------



## canuck101

Well we will never know that i think.


----------



## canuck101

well usually at that level it would be a general giving the minister options i would think.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Sorry I misread your post as saying "you will never know what I think".  I will be deleting my post.


----------



## canuck101

cool no problem man.  ;D  Just staying up in the OC ie Ottawa 8)


----------



## Franko

Gobsmacked said:
			
		

> The initial 16 MGS will have _"Minimal Canadian-Specific Equipment . . . almost identical to the U.S. model"_ - even though MGS remains at developmental prototype stage, per Recent 2003 *SECRET* level *ANALYSIS* _'Whether to acquire the Mobile Gun System for the CF'_.
> The Schedule calls for contracting of initial 16 MGS vehicles, _"no later-than Dec 04"_ under MND C$30M authority (w\o ILS), for _"January to June 2006 delivery"_ - with _"No Canadian Acquisition Prior to U.S. Order for_ (initial 72 low-rate) _Production Version"_, followed by Nov 05 Treasury Board approval of   C$661M balance of project for remaining 50 MGS for 2007-2009 delivery.



So what is your source? Please don't say the local news paper....  

Regards


----------



## Recce41

Fellas Fellas
 The Cougar/Huskey/Grizzly are not "LAVS", they are AVGPs. The LAV family started with the LAV 25/ Bison. The LAV II is the Coyote and the LAV III is well our LAV (Kodiak) and the Stryker Family. Being at the School you find things out.  I have a poster kicking around. It has the GM family from AVGP to the LAV family. It has different mods even a halftrack pic.
 Franko
 We are tagging on to the US order. The first will most likely go to the School then to the Regt (Strats). It's a big circle, people should not worry, a tank will come back. Remember, Canada is not a Military Country. From the start, Canada has over come. From in 1812-15, 1836, then the Boar War, then WW1, WW2, Korea. We are a buy to need Military. If we would train to be the best, with what we have. And stop bitching about it. The Military would be better. Fuck I was happy in my Lynx. Over the Coyote. 
 An Army is not what you have but how you use it. 
 By the way even the US cannot load to fight their Strykers. It takes 3 Hercs or 2 C-17s.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Gobsmacked said:
			
		

> Remember, I'm not one of the uninformed kiddies who rant on this site.
> Chk my writing in: Vanguard, Frontline, CDR, Air International.



Under what byline?


----------



## George Wallace

Recce41 said:
			
		

> Fellas Fellas
> The Cougar/Huskey/Grizzly are not "LAVS", they are AVGPs. The LAV family started with the LAV 25/ Bison. The LAV II is the Coyote and the LAV III is well our LAV (Kodiak) and the Stryker Family. Being at the School you find things out. I have a poster kicking around. It has the GM family from AVGP to the LAV family. It has different mods even a halftrack pic.



How soon we forget.

(Recce41, there are some questions you can answer for a girl in the Thread "What happens during QL3?" if she hasn't received enough info yet.)

GW


----------



## 12alfa

Data from Mowag (the 1st manuals if you were around to have them) (which I do) state that indeed the veh we call the AVGP is a Piranha I, and that would make the bison a Piranha II, and therfore what we have now is a Piranha III, we now call them LAVIII's.

But what do I know?

Do a search, the AVGP is a name the Canadain gov put on the project to buy new veh's thats all.

LAV is like MBT is it not?   light armoured veh, and main battle tank.......

I still miss them.....


----------



## George Wallace

Fill your boots.

All the D&M for the AVGP family of vehicles is different from the Bison.  The D&M for the Bison is different from the Coyote.  The D&M for the Coyote is different from the LAV III.  In all cases, the parts are different, driver stations are different and just because you are qualified to drive one, does not qualify you to drive all.  You require an Air Brake Crse before you can get on a LAV III D&M Crse.  So if you are happy with your views fine,  but I am sure that if you were to tell anyone that a Bison is the same as a Coyote, ie. LAV II, you will be shot down.

GW


----------



## 12alfa

I'm not trying to start something here GW.

I'm posting what the manufacture has said, not what you or the armoured school says.

As you know there are many varaints of the mowag, with common parts in some and differences.

My post was from the mowag site and the orginal pams we got way back when, and they I would think would know the facts, but feel free to correct me and them at your leisure.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Recce41 said:
			
		

> I have a poster kicking around. It has the GM family from AVGP to the LAV family. It has different mods even a halftrack pic.



I would be very interested in seeing the image of the "halftrack" LAV/Pirahana.

Anyway you could get the poster scanned (at least the halftrack section) and post it online?


----------



## George Wallace

If I remember right, from all those IDR journals I used to subscribe to, MoWag used to always trial both wheeled and tracked prototypes of all their designs.

GW


----------



## Gobsmacked

Franko said:
			
		

> So what is your source? Please don't say the local news paper....
> 
> Regards



As always, an ATI request from earlier this year.
(You'd be amazed at all the 'horsepucky' you can gather from seemingly disparate requests)

Regarding Franko's OPSEC concerns in  this thread:  http://Army.ca/forums/threads/18309/post-101201#msg101201



I took the info out, pasted it in here. If the consensus is that it's OK, we can just copy and paste it back in....





FYI - a little bit more from same analysis:

"November 2005 - MND & PW&GS seek EPA from Treasury Board and authority to exercise the contract option for 50 additional MGS; January to June, 2007 - delivery of second 16 vehicles; January to June, 2008 - delivery of third 16 vehicles; June 2008 to March 2009 - Delivery of final 18 vehicles; April 2009 to March 2010 - Standardization of all MGS to final configuration.

Delivery of sixteen vehicles during the Preliminary Project Approval stage [by January/June 2006] is necessary to address integration issues [fitting of some Canadian unique  equipment - Radios; Smoke Grenade Launchers; C6 Machine Gun; and Laser Warning receiver, and operator/maintainer training] and to provide an early operational capability.  Four vehicles are required to conduct integration work and to verify the functionality of some Canadian unique requirements, such as the communication system.  Twelve vehicles [squadron = basic operational formation] are needed to develop the military tactics, techniques and procedures for this new equipment.  Early delivery of twelve vehicles for tactical development is necessary to ensure that the CF have some direct fire support capability [ twelve vehicles would be ready to deploy on operations by July 2007] that can be deployed when the Leopard I tank is phased out of service in 2007.

   

Procurement of a new direct fire vehicle through an Advance Contract Award Notice [ACAN] to GDLS-C
 [London, Ontario]:   The ACAN process is used when the Government believes that only one contractor is capable of meeting a statement of requirements (still in formulation stage).  The intention to enter into a contract is posted and other manufacturers have the opportunity to demonstrate they can meet the operational requirement.  In this way, the ACAN process is considered competitive.  Should another contractor offer a compliant product, the full competitive contracting process must be invoked.  Disadvantages - Other potential suppliers may view the use of the ACAN process negatively because the 30-day posting of the notice does not provide them with much time to respond."


----------



## Herecomesthegun

http://science.howstuffworks.com/stryker.htm
there are many pages of info (some specifically for the MGS), 
im not sure if this is the right section of the forum to post this website


----------



## Gayson

Very cool!


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Interesting page.  Explain all of the Stryker varients.

http://science.howstuffworks.com/stryker1.htm


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

"So in keeping with the "best of both worlds" approach of the Stryker project, its tires are built with a new technology that makes them almost as versatile as tracks."

"The Eaton/Dana Corporation created a special pressure-control system (CTIS, or Central Tire Inflation System) for the Stryker's eight tires, so that they can be inflated or deflated at will from within the vehicle"  Too bad we aren't allowed to use them on the LAV anymore.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Critics of the Stryker, including military analysts, congresspeople and combat veterans, have argued that the project has not met its objectives and may never fulfill the ambitious ideals of the Army Transformation Plan (see the later section Mission: Vehicle for the New Army for details). Discussion has focused on three main problem areas: 
Vulnerability - Even with the addition of the slat armor "cage," there is a significant concern that the Stryker is susceptible to RPG attack. As of April 2004, at least one Stryker had fallen victim to an RPG in Iraq. According to reports, of two RPGs fired at this particular Stryker, one got past the slat armor and destroyed the vehicle. (More on slat armor in the next section.) Strykers in the field have also been damaged by bombs and rollover accidents. 

Weight and Transportability - The 7,000+ pounds of additional armor added to the Stryker before shipping off to Iraq may have increased its weight and height beyond the standard allowable capacity of C-130 payloads. Even without the added armor, during one phase of testing the Stryker's crew had to temporarily remove several components before it could be loaded on a C-130. After landing, it took as long as 17 minutes to ready the Stryker for its mission. 

General Design Flaws - There have been complaints about several systems not working as well as was claimed by the manufacturer. Some combat troops have reported problems with frequent tire blowouts, and the excess weight from the added armor has caused problems with the self-recovery winch. In addition, there are some reports that the slat armor increases the width of the vehicles to such an extent that they can not travel in groups of two, side-by-side, on narrow roads.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

The cannon can fire four different types of ammunition: 

HE/HEP (high-explosive) rounds, which penetrate and destroy bunkers and walls 
KE (kinetic-energy) ammunition, which destroys armored vehicles 
HEAT (high-explosive, anti-tank) ammunition, which attacks vehicles and personnel with its fragmentation capabilities 
Anti-personnel canisters, which are designed to attack infantrymen outside of their vehicles 
In addition, the MGS has up to two secondary weapons, a 7.62-mm and a .50-caliber machine gun. To match all of this weaponry, the defensive system of the MGS is more robust than that of the ICV. Current plans for MGS armor call for special, reactive armor to go with the current steel structure and ceramic tiles. This Stryker also contains detectors for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. By definition the heftiest of Stryker variants, the MGS presents the biggest challenge in meeting the weight requirements for rapid deployment by C-130 plane.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

General Shinseki's plan ordered the development of a new set of combat brigades to be known as an "interim force." Each of these brigades would be self-sufficient, as powerful as a tank battalion, and able to be deployed by air anywhere in the world within 96 hours. This is no easy task considering that current heavy brigades must be moved by ship and often require weeks to deploy. An interim-force brigade or platoon of brigades would be used in one of two ways: 

as a first-responder, establishing and *maintaining a presence until the heavier mechanized units arrived *


----------



## VRC

The Stryker has been reported as both over weight & oversize.  The overweight means that (a) it can't carry a full combat load, or (b) the Herc has a range of less than 200 miles.  Those facts have been reported on newer, USAF Herc - would anyone care to guess how our somewhat older CC-130's will cope?


VRC


----------



## Gobsmacked

muskrat89,

Thanks for putting the ATI info back into my Sept 16 post.   

Besides this info being _"Italicized"_, keep in mind that MGS SOR is (still in formulation stage) - even though we will be putting the Cart before the Horse (before TB EPA approval) and purchasing 16 LRIP MGS (in basic US config with minimal mods) by Dec 2004 for amazing price of just C$30M (under MND purchase authority) once US LRIP of 1st 72 MGS occurs.   :
For a bargain! like this we should be able to acquire all 66 MGS for just C$123.75M ?, plus ILS, Cdn mods and ammo.   

Also, in my post in 'Leo C2 not a tank' thread, 
In pro-MGS CAJ Vol7.1 PR mouthpiece - LCol Petit also indirectly trashes the argument for MGS as he attempts to trash 120mm SP mortar acquisition by noting that,
_"The acquisition of 120mm turreted SP mortars would be very expensive and time consuming as *vehicle*/ammunition *development and full type qualification must be completed prior to production.*"_
Acquisition of a 120mm turreted mortar system is discounted by LCol Petit, even though MGS is being acquired under same circumstances - MGS still developmental! until completion of LRIP build and testing by US Army!   
Yet some 72x AMS is in Saudi service on LAV-II 8x8 chassis (sounds like type qualified to me), while twin-120mm AMOS, capable of 14 MRSI, is on order for Finnish Army (x24), and has already been integrated on: 6x6 XA-203 PC; Swedish CV-90 (with a couple dozen CV-90 chassis pre-ordered for AMOS integration; and combat boat 90.
Not to mention all the HE/WP/Smoke/ILLUM/Cargo (AFV top-attack) ammo currently available for these mortars, incl: Strix PGMM - precision IF capable of knocking out MBTs through use of Precision top-attack munitions from 1,500m to 7,500m.
Maybe DLR office just doesn't follow current developments??  ???

Gob


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Interesting points, Gobsmacked!

Perhaps LCol Petit is starting to think that DLR tells the Army what its requirements are?  

Instead, of course, of providing equipment to meet the requirements of the Army.

It sometimes seems that way......


----------



## Gobsmacked

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> Perhaps LCol Petit is starting to think that DLR tells the Army what its requirements are?
> 
> Instead, of course, of providing equipment to meet the requirements of the Army.
> 
> It sometimes seems that way......



Lance, It sure does!
It just wouldn't do to give the Army a usefull multi-purpose, ie. a potential MMEV-FSV (Multi-Mission Effect Vehicle - Fire Support Vehicle), piece of kit that could deploy with all LAV-III battlegroup deployments (providing both IF - sorely lacking - and bunker-busting DF) vs inadequate MGS that can only deploy 50% of time under planned squadron-level CONOPS alongside MMEV-ADATS and LAV-TUA.

Also, LCol Petit is Extremely Ill-informed regarding current 120mm SPM developments (as we are sure they would not resort to 'misinformation' to defend the inadequate MGS   ) by claiming _"there is no hi explosive antitank [HEAT] round developed for these systems"_ as *HEAT rounds for 120mm turreted SPM are available from at least 2 sources*, CIS and China, and likely under development by western manufacturers.  
A quick reference check reveals a 120mm HEAT round for the 8x8 BTR-8 2S23 NONA turreted 120mm SPM, with Min 300m DF capability to potential Max 13,000m IF capability, is available from CIS sources.   
The 11 August 2004 _'JDW'_ also notes _'New ammunition for Chinese 120mm mortar'_.  _"To engage armoured targets in the direct-fire mode, a fin-stabilised HEAT [high-explosive anti-tank] projectile has been developed with a claimed range of up to 1,500m.  Its HEAT warhead will penetrate up to 600mm of conventional steel armour.  It is much less effective against more advanced armour systems.  _(Meanwhile,)_ there is also an HE projectile containing 5kg (vs standard 1.8kg) of TNT with a maximum range of 9,500m."_   

LCol Petit also states SPM can _"*fire standard HE rounds at LAV and tanks in self-defence,* and damage should result, *but this ammo is not expected to defeat tanks*"_.  Yet two-120mm HE mortar rounds direct-fired simultaneously from a twin-120mm AMOS at close range (in an emergency) should prove extremely potent - although the provision of PGMM such as Strix should mean that only in rare cases would AMOS or AMS have to directly face MBT as the SPMs' 'raison-d'etre' is IF.   :soldier:


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## Lance Wiebe

There is a huge amount of potential in the 120mm mortars.  Some, I would argue, are crossing the border between mortar and gun!  

For those interested in following the 120mm mortar debates raging throughout many publications, there is a lot of information available.  In my opinion, there is still work to be done on the 120mm breech loaded mortar.  Having said that, there is a huge amount of R&D going in to the devolpment of this weapon system, much more than is being put into the MGS!  

But, there are many advantages to the 120mm breech loaded mortar.Much cheaper to produce, because of the simple recoil systems and breeches.  Highly effective in built up areas.  Also, as noted, HEAT rounds for self protection against armoured threats.  Besides all this, they can act as regular mortars providing fire support.  The 120 ammo is much more effective than the 81mm mortar!

The disadvantages include the requirements for direct fire and indirect fire FCS systems, the difficulty hitting moving targets (due to the muzzle velocity - think Cougar), fairly low ammo loadouts due to the size of the ammunition.  The rounds are also fairly long, and the fins easily damaged.  This is primarily due to the fact that even with a higher muzzle velocity than a standard mortar, the muzzle velocity is not high enough to make the fins as small as a 120 smooth bore cannon, for example.  Various companies are out there working on solutions to these disadvantages, and I believe that a major western army will be buying these really soon, like within the next two or three years.


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## 12alfa

Another disavantage is their slow reload times, in comparison to a cannon /tube in a MBT.

Can't really see them replacing a DF afv.

re: leoC2 turret...
"We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret."

What was  the thinking of the poster?


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Sorry, 12Alfa, I missed that one!

Where is it?


----------



## 12alfa

Re: Canada should adopt the LAV III as its sole armoured vehicle? 
 « Reply #7 on: January 26, 2001, 13:33:00  »   

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not to dampen our armour friends.  But has anyone taken the time to really look at the actual upgrade.

Remember the pictures of our first kick at the CAT trophy in Germany using borrowed Leopard 1A1's, Belgique I believe, they had the original round frying pan turret.  Our tankers won.

Tadda, if you examine the turrets of the up grade to the C2, it is a 1A1 turret with a complete add on of angular bins and armour add on's.

We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret.

Next up, with our shrinking Bge capabilities and the advent of the LAV family, there was talk of Two light Bge (LAV) Gps, with one back Heavy (tracked).

I have my doubts.  Especially with the rumours of a Bge being disbanded.


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## Lance Wiebe

Ah.  An ill-informed post by an ill-informed person.

I checked his profile.  Joined Jan 2001, last active Feb 2001.  

Obviously tried to stir up some smelly stuff, and then quit when not successful, or maybe was banned.


----------



## Southby

I'm a civy, currently a reserve applicant (just to get that out of the way). I did do searches for the topics but couldnt find any.... so...


I was just watching CBC, and they had a small blurb on some training at Wainwright (Just got the end part, something about their 'minds being focused on the poor submariner) and then it went onto show some LAV III's, saying how "The Canadian forces are upgrading all their old armoured vehicles to this LAV III variant..." and then how the "Leopard tanks are being REPLACED by a modified version that has the 25mm gun replaced with a bigger 105mm gun, and it will be called the striker (stryker)...."

basically, I'm just curious if this is just CBC political garbage, or is there more truth to it?  I was under the understanding that the submarines were getting shelved for now (unfortunately, but hopefully they get them back out soon), the coyotes and such were getting upgraded, and that the leopards were getting mothballed (a sad case indeed) and the strykers were going to be bought in, not to replace the tanks, but more so as a heavy assault vehicle instead....

Could some one please point me in the direction of more correct info or reply with their opinion.


----------



## a_majoor

As users of the LAV family since the 1970s, Canada should be in a position to modify the vehicle to maximise the effectiveness of the LAV III and its variants. The LAV series is known to have deficiencies in mobility and protection, as well as firepower in the MGS version. Modifications designed to address these issues will have benefits for the users of LAVs, and some of the R&D can be paid for if the US adopts these ideas for the STRYKER family. In the ideal world, retrofits of existing LAVs will be followed by new builds to the 3.5 standard (the Army calculated a need for over 1000 additional LAV variants), leading to an even more capable LAV 4 which would provide many of the capabilities of the FCS at a portion of the cost.

*Mobility* The LAV's cross country mobility can be improved by increasing the engine power. A larger engine has logistics implications, but hybrid electric systems are now developed to the point of being mass produced for cars and light trucks. Electric engines can provide the extra power for acceleration, pulling out of mud, or silent run ups, allowing the LAV 3.5 to have a smaller diesel engine.

An improved suspension is also required, and Canadian research into active suspension can provide the LAV 3.5 with greater cross country stability and performance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. See http://www.dres.dnd.ca/ResearchTech/Products/MilEng_Products/RD95010/index_e.html

Ground pressure affects cross country performance, so the LAV 3.5 needs to go on a diet. The turret can be replaced by an overhead weapons mount (see illustration: http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-lavpws.htm ), and steel components should be replaced with lightweight composites wherever possible. Very wide profile tires to reduce ground pressure will also enhance cross country performance.

*Protection* Up armouring the LAV should be done by selectively adding armour to vital spots on the vehicle, while reducing visual, thermal, audible and electronic signatures. Fitting flush stowage bins along the sides of the vehicle will reduce radar signature, for example, while also providing a certain "stand off" protection of the armour envelope.

More drastic internal changes could include placing vehicle systems in the front 60 degree arc to add their mass to the armour envelope. A round which penetrates the armour still has to punch through other "stuff" before penetrating the crew compartment. An overhead "umbrella" can be added to the OWS to protect against top attack munitions.

A major rebuild would be to centre the engine in bow, with the driver and crew commander on either side of the transmission, and the gunner under the overhead weapons station. All the crew will be below the turret ring for added protection when hull down. Crew ergonomics will also have to be improved for crash and impact protection, including "form fitting" seats and harness systems to keep all the passengers and crew firmly attached to the seat.

*Firepower* All versions of the LAV will need fully stabilized weapons mounts to allow the crews to fire on the move. The 25mm chain gun might be a bit much for an infantry carrier, perhaps an HMG/AGL combination would be more useful? The laws of physics limits the size of weapon a light vehicle can fire without ill effects (unless a very exotic weapon like the "High/Low pressure gun is adopted). Various cannons from 60-75mm have been developed for this sort of application, including the ARES 75mm cannon firing telescoped ammunition. This weapon could fire in 3 round bursts, and coupled to the right fire control system was considered capable of engaging T-72 tanks or Hind helicopters with a good probability of success. (unfortunately, I can't find the citation).

*Other* To operate effectively, the crew needs an information display system which is "clean" and doesn't overwhelm them. They also need good all around vision, which may have to come through the use of cameras and the weapons sight, since the crew is below the turret ring. Active protection on the lines of the Russian ARENA or DROZOD system might be worth looking into.


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## a_majoor

LAV 3.5.1

The problem with late night posts is you start loosing track of your thread:

*Firepower* (cont) To suppliment any direct fire assets, the LAV 3.5 needs a brace of fire and forget missiles on the OWS. Javelin, Gill/Spike or even Stingers (depending on the circumstances) will allow the LAV crew to deal with unexpected point or hard targets. This should be considered a defensive system only, and not a means for the LAV crew to shoot in an attack.


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## 12alfa

a_majoor said:
			
		

> LAV 3.5.1
> 
> The problem with late night posts is you start loosing track of your thread:
> 
> *Firepower* (cont) To suppliment any direct fire assets,



As we have seen in studies, reports, war-gaming etc, the Lav is not a tank. Up gunning it with ATGM's will I would think make the crew think they are a MBT, they already think this now. The Lav needs tanks in there support if they want to make it to the obj. An ATGM is an offensive wpn to battle tanks, if so they have little chance in battling other forces in this area in a Lav. For a AFV to need ATGM's one would think the enemy is not using ak's but rather MBT's,a Lav moving in this area with out tanks is fool hardy.
 Lets use them for what there designed for, a personal carrier, a taxi. It is not a tank, and to use them in this role when no other army does makes for bad tactics.
Tell me, would you do battle with t-72's in a Lav with ATGM's? =T-72 many rounds, Lav with ATGM's with 2-4 launchers, somehow it doesn't seem fair does it.

I think the US has the correct idea, no turret and a small wpn station on there Striker's, and the tanks doing the tank work.

How did we get to the point where we think a Lav will fill the role of the tank by placing ATGM's on the veh?
.


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## a_majoor

12Alfa said:
			
		

> As we have seen in studies, reports, war-gaming etc, the Lav is not a tank. Up gunning it with ATGM's will I would think make the crew think they are a MBT, they already think this now.



I fully agree, the LAV is not a tank, but in the absence of real tanks, the LAV crews need something to protect themselves. I was careful to state the Fire and Forget missiles were a *defensive* system, and not to be used to shoot in the attack. High standards of training and discipline will help keep LAV crews from going "tank hunting"




> I think the US has the correct idea, no turret and a small wpn station on there Striker's, and the tanks doing the tank work.
> 
> How did we get to the point where we think a Lav will fill the role of the tank by placing ATGM's on the veh?



The LAV 3.5 idea does consider the 25mm chain gun is a bit much for an infantry carrier, an OWS will provide a bit more interior room, lower wight and lower profile for the LAV. How did we get to the point of suggesting Fire and Forget ATGM's on a LAV? Ask Mr Martin....


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## McG

Putting fire & forget missiles on a LAV will not automatically force the crew to fight like a tank.   They will fight the way they are trained.   Fire & forget would allow for a "shoot & scoot" approach to self defence.   In a chance encounter with enemy armour, mountend infantry platoons & companies could employ integral   antitank missiles to facilitate breaking contact.   The objective being to hand off the fight & get behind the dedicated tank killing platforms.



			
				12Alfa said:
			
		

> I think the US has the correct idea, no turret and a small wpn station on there Striker's, and the tanks doing the tank work.


I think you missed the US idea.   Tanks are not a part of the Stryker brigades.   They are a part of the legacy brigades.   Each type of brigade is suited to a different type of fight.


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## Mountie

Those that think the Stryker isn't any good should read some of the articles coming from the 3rd Bde, 2nd US Infantry Division (first SBCT) from Iraq.  I just searched "Strykers in Iraq" or the unit itself and found several articles.  Many by civilian newspapers interviewing troops.  Many had their doubts when they first received the Stryker but now they love them.  They say the speed and quietness of the vehicle make up for the lighter armour and lighter firepower. They are able to sneak up and deploy their troops before anyone knows what's happening.  Let's also remember, a medium infantry battalion is just basically a light infantry battalion mounted in Strykers.  It is not a replacement for heavy mechanized infantry.  It is more of a replacement for the light infantry that is too vulnerable in peace support operations.  The medium battalion is made to ride into battle and then fight dismounted with limited fire support from the Stryker's RCWS.  So when we are comparing and judging, try comparing the Stryker to the HMMWV or the LUVW that light units use.  That is what they have really replaced.  

And I'm just curious.  The one thing I read more on this site, is crying about losing the tanks.  When do you think the Canadian Army is going to use tanks?  Kosovo was the one and only time Canadian tanks were operationally deployed since Korea.  Same with the M109A4+, when have they been deployed lately?  

A complete LAV-III fleet is the way to go.  As I heard quoted by an American, "the LAV-III is the M113 of the 21st Century".  You can have everything you need all in one fleet; Mobile Gun System to replace the tanks, and 120mm Armoured Mortar System (turreted) and 105mm Denel SPH to replace the M109 and LG1, plus all the APC variants to replace all the M113, Grizzly and Bison vehicles.  I would also take those expensive and space consuming turrets off the infantry section carriers and replace them with an improved Protected Weapons Station.  I read about the PWS on the manufacturer's site.  A laser designator and stabilization system are option.  Add these to the PWS and equip it with a .50cal HMG or a 40mm grenade launcher and you have a Canadianized Stryker.  This would allow for 9 dismounts to be carried, or an 8-man section and extra ammo, food and water.  This would also eliminate the debate over who should command the vehicle and who should dismount to command the section.  Like the M113, the Stryker only needs one vehicle commander/gunner.  But at the same time, when the section is mounted the section commander has a crew commander's station to occupy to the left of the gunner.


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## Lance Wiebe

Mountie, I envy you.  

Once upon a time I believed everything I read, too.

But then I grew up, got some experience, listened to those that were more experienced than me.  I now no longer believe it when I read a manufacturers blurb.

Sigh.  The innocence of youth.


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## a_majoor

Mountie is getting into the "Combat Team of Tomorrow" territory http://army.ca/forums/threads/22245.0.html , which is good, since the ideas are very closely related. 

The speed and relative silence of a LAV compared to an M-2 or Leopard gives us some ability to unhinge the enemy by out flanking and out manoeuvring him, like the Stryker Brigade in Iraq


			
				Mountie said:
			
		

> They are able to sneak up and deploy their troops before anyone knows what's happening.


 Attacking the enemy's morale is as important as physically destroying him, just harder to "measure" until they throw down their guns and run away. The LAV 3.5 ideas are an attempt to improve on what we have, so we can get the good (road speed, quiet movement) without too much of the bad (being stuck on roads, lack of protection).



> Let's also remember, a medium infantry battalion is just basically a light infantry battalion mounted in Strykers. It is not a replacement for heavy mechanized infantry. It is more of a replacement for the light infantry that is too vulnerable in peace support operations. The medium battalion is made to ride into battle and then fight dismounted with limited fire support from the Stryker's RCWS. So when we are comparing and judging, try comparing the Stryker to the HMMWV or the LUVW that light units use. That is what they have really replaced.


 Our own Mech brigades were not all that heavy even "in the day", so if there is a way to get an acceptable LAV DFVS (either a better gun like the ARES 75, or some sort of missile system like FOG-M or LOSAT), then we are almost back to where we were in the 1980s.

I had actually tried to start LAV 3.5 as its own thread, since the technical issues involved in product improving the LAV family will feed back into the organizational and tactical issues raised in other threads, but this is good too.


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## Franko

Ignorance is bliss.... 'eh Lance?

Let's just go out and get some of these be all, end all vehicles....the MGS must be the best of 'em all!

....wait a tick!     ......failed most trials...... based on theory that was thrown out in WW2....


OUTSTANDING PURCHASE!  :

Regards


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## Mountie

I'm not saying I believe everything that I read.  Just made a comment on a few articles I read.  And they were not from the manufacturer.  The articles were from civilian newspapers.  Sure, the soldiers being interviewed may have been forced to make those comments, who knows.  

The LAV-III can't be too bad.  It has been purchased by a lot of countries the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.  And the British have showed interest in 1,500 LAV-IIIs and LAV-IVs for their Future Rapid Effecst System.  Surely they must have done a little research and testing.  The Germans and Dutch have also purchased the Boxer Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle, which is similar to the LAV-III.  The French are building the VBCI which is similar to the LAV-III or LAV-IV.  The Germans have used the wheeled Luchs recce vehicle and the Fuchs APC for decades.  As have the French used the VAB and the AMX-10RC recce vehicle, the British the Saxon APC and Fox recce vehicle and the CF the AVGP, Bison and Coyote.  Its not like wheeled armoured vehicles are a new and untried concept.  If you were to put tracks on the LAV-III instead of wheels everyone would have thought it was the best thing since sliced bread.  I'm not saying tracks wouldn't have been a good thing.  The British Stormer tracked light APC might have been a great alternative to the LAV-III, but the fact is that the LAV-III is here to stay.  Just acknowledge that it has some good points.  Its better than the old M113s and AVGPs that our guys operated in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Somalia.


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## Lance Wiebe

The LAV III has many strengths, and just as many weaknesses.  One of the great weaknesses is the fact that as wheeled vehicles gain weight, they lose cross country mobility.  The US and most other countries have done a great many things to reduce weight while enhancing effectiveness.  Our LAV, with its 25mm cannon, is at the very tip of the maximim weight that a wheeled vehicle is useful.  Add more weight, and you end up with a vehicle useless for cross country mobility.  Both the MGS and the proposed MMEV will be well beyond the usefull weight point.

I don't think anyone here is arguing that the LAV III is the vehicle that we will be using well in to the future (as long as we keep the current policy of not using it from Jan - Apr in the field).  The LAV III is next to useless in deep snow.....The main argument is the fact that it is being touted as the end all and be all.  The MGS, any Artillery variants, and the MMEV will all be restricted to limited cross country capability, which is not what a military really wants.

Check out the mobility and duties expected of the Centuaro and the Rooikat.  Quite different from "replacing the tank and M109"...


----------



## a_majoor

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> The LAV III has many strengths, and just as many weaknesses. One of the great weaknesses is the fact that as wheeled vehicles gain weight, they lose cross country mobility. The US and most other countries have done a great many things to reduce weight while enhancing effectiveness. Our LAV, with its 25mm cannon, is at the very tip of the maximum weight that a wheeled vehicle is useful. Add more weight, and you end up with a vehicle useless for cross country mobility. Both the MGS and the proposed MMEV will be well beyond the usefull weight point.





> Ground pressure affects cross country performance, so the LAV 3.5 needs to go on a diet. The turret can be replaced by an overhead weapons mount (see illustration: http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-lavpws.htm ), and steel components should be replaced with lightweight composites wherever possible. Very wide profile tires to reduce ground pressure will also enhance cross country performance.



Most of the suggestions in LAV 3.5 were "top of the head" suggestions to trim the weight and reduce ground pressure, taking the continued use of the LAV for at least a generation. Which ones would be most feasible and useful in your opinion?

One of the various computer studies described in the ADTB had a notional MMEV mounting an "electro-thermal cannon", giving it the ability to fire high velocity rounds for direct fire engagements, but also lower velocity rounds in "howitzer" like engagements as a form of SP artillery (presumably using less current). If we want an "all singing and dancing" MMEV, ditch the missile route and go for a gun solution. A very simple and effective MMEV for the first generation would be a direct fire platform with a fairly decent on board ammunition supply. Modify the gun mount and cradle for high angle fire, and supply both high velocity "tank" rounds and low velocity "smart" rounds. The low velocity rounds can use a "stub" casing that fits the breech of the gun, without the full propelling charge of a high velocity round.

"Smart" rounds have been around for a while, with the 155mm "copperhead" laser sensing round introduced in the 1980's, and the 120mm STRIX infared seeking mortar round in Swedish service today. The UK also experimented with the 81mm "Merlin" mortar round, which used a form of on board radar. If we really want missiles, the LAHAT through tube missile can be fired from a gun for 8km direct engagements, and 13 km indirect engagements.

CASR also posted an interesting gun concept, using the cast off 155 barrels from the M-109 as a starting point. http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-mgs.htm

IF we want to go the MMEV route, go all the way and replace SP artillery, Anti-Armour systems and direct fire artillery with one gun armed vehicle. Distribution of ammunition determines the role that particular vehicle will perform (direct or indirect fire), sorting out lots of logistical issues (although creating a few new ones). The "three headed monster" we are creating now will have so many difficulties in terms of interoperability, logistics, etc. that it may be best to get a clean sheet of paper and start over. The LAV chassis is versatile enough to support something along these lines so long as we can be content with calibres ranging from 60mm-90mm.


----------



## Kirkhill

> Distribution of ammunition determines the role that particular vehicle will perform (direct or indirect fire), sorting out lots of logistical issues (although creating a few new ones). The "three headed monster" we are creating now will have so many difficulties in terms of interoperability, logistics, etc. that it may be best to get a clean sheet of paper and start over



I take exception here.  

ARTY is inherently a Multi-Mission Effects capability.  The Gun/Mortar/Rocket is simply a method of delivering the "Weapon" of choice to the desired location to achieve a particular effect.  Sometimes that is by direct fire, as in anti-tank, anti-air and field gun roles, sometimes it is indirect.  It can be an area effect or a precise effect.  It can be an observed target, a designated target or a blind target.

Forget the platform here.  MMEV isn't about the platform.  It is about an ability to deliver a variety of munitions to a particular target depending on circumstances. It is about the ability to select the mix of munitions depending on the mission.

Right now arty can select from HE, ICM, DPICM, flechette, SMK,Ill, Pamphlets and Nukes, as well as various precision guided weapons.  

The Apache AH64 that enamours us all is so desirable because it can handle a number of fire support tasks.  It has it 8 km Hellfires and its 30mm cannon. It can also handle the Hydra-70 70mm rocket series which carries all the payloads mentioned above.

The new UK lightweight MRLS system will fire not just 30 km MRL rockets, it will also fire 70 km GMRL missiles, 300 km ATACMs missiles and 70 km Polyphem fibre optic missiles.

The Tracer recce system was designed as a platform for both the Hellfire with an 8  km range and also the new Brimstone variant with a 32 km range.  Both missiles can be fired man-in-the-loop or fire-and-forget.  The Brimstone can be fired from ground mounts, helos and fast air.  Just as the Hydra-70 can - both dumb and guided versions.

Perhaps it would help if we stopped thinking of the MMEV as a underarmoured, wheeled tank replacement that is going to go toe-to-toe with "real" tanks and instead think of it as what it is.   A wheeled, lightly armoured self-propelled artillery piece that is going to stand back anything from 8 to 30 km from the FEBA (depending on the missiles that the Government buys) and launch a large number of precision-guided, discriminating, fire and forget rounds into the battle space in front of you.  Sitting in your Coyote 5 km away from the enemy tanks, out of range of their guns and hull down you will be able to lase the incoming rounds onto the target.    If you are in close country or cities, the tanks might sneak up on you then the infanteers with the Javelin CLDs can launch their own weapons or can lase incoming rounds onto them, or for that matter onto bunkers or buildings.

I admit that the LAV is not an assault vehicle.  It looks to be a great transport vehicle, patrol vehicle (in the right circumstances) or battlefield support vehicle.  

And with respect to wheels over tracks for support vehicles why do you need tracks if you are able to do your job from 30 km away? Can't you find good firing positions within range with that kind of flexibility?  

Tracks in general are designed to distribute weight over a large surface area.  Wheeled light vehicles can go most places on the planet.  Some places you do need tracks, as on the BV206.  But just because you have tracks doesn't mean that you can go all the places the Bv206 can go.  Tanks and M113s get bogged down too.  (By the way some of the places the Bv206 can go foot traffic can't go either).  Tanks were equipped with tracks so that they could carry a heavy weight of armour over ground that the armour could not cross otherwise.  The ground was crossable on foot.  Where the foot couldn't go the tanks got bogged down anyways.

I believe in the need for heavy armoured assault vehicles. I also believe that the greatest weight of protection can be carried on a tracked vehicle. 

I do not believe that all vehicles in well rounded, multi-purpose formation need to be tracked, especially for the types of jobs being asked not just of you but of all armies.  

The one thing that I would like to see in the new army units/battle groups/what-have-you would be one tracked subunit team complete with its own wheeled transport so that it could keep up with the rate of advance of the LAVs and deploy as required.  PUMA/CV90/SEP/Dardo  vehicles in the 25-35 tonne range.  As well I would like to see more use made of the Bv206/Bv206s/S10 series of vehicles.

By way of closing, perhaps we would do better not to think of the MMEV as a tank replacement in a square combat team, but rather as the mortar replacement which is to be used in support of the TUAs/MGSs and their laser designators.  Those vehicles also have a direct fire capability that can handle a variety of battlefield threats.

Rant ends......


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Some thoughts, in no particular order....

The MGS was purpose built with a new light weight 105 mm cannon, capable of firing all natures of NATO ammunition.  Canada opted out of this, because we still have a couple of hundred M68/L7 barrels laying around.  Just because they weigh three times the amount of the designed barrel, didn't matter to the PMO team at all.  Cost, not capability was, and is, the sole factor considered.  The fact that the weapon mount, and the vehicle suspension was designed for a lighter weight system also doesn't matter.  The US Army has no intention of using M68 barrels on their MGS, BTW.  That the vehicle top heavy weight also has caused the US Army to place restrictions on its use doesn't matter, either.

The MMEV may, indeed, become a vehicle that will work wonders from several map sheets away.  Who knows?  No design team has sat down yet, indeed, no statement of requirement as of yet.  It will be at least a decade before we see a vehicle of this type.  Therefore, the over weight top-heavy MGS, accompanied by the TOW variant will do without.  Also no requirement for a wheeled artillery vehicle yet, the towed pieces we own will do fine.

The MMEV, TOW, and MGS may, just may, be able to do the mission of tanks on the defense side, but have absolutely zero capability when forced to do anything on the move, such as on the assault, or even retrograde ops.

Although the MMEV may be able to fire from the next province in the future, it might be nice to give it the capability of leaving a parking lot before it is in a fire position.  It simply cannot move in the winter cross country, and will have limited cross country capability any other time.  Even with such super capable vehicles, which will obviously be the very best in the world, we actually may have to engage some country or organisation that may even have such things as smart artillery rounds, or even UAV's.  We just might want the ability to manouever away from the mall parking lots......

I don't really have anything against the LAV III family of vehicles.  I do have strong thoughts (anyone notice) on basing our entire army on one platform.  I don't agree with the powers that be that we will never, ever, required to operate alone, that we will always work with allies with capabilities we don't have.  That says to me that we are seconding command of our future forces away now, to our allies.  I wouldn't mind seeing maybe two light brigade size forces equipped with this family of vehicles, with one Brigade size force as air mobile, and on brigade size force as heavy.

Also, GD has announced that the MGS will be produced in the USA, not in London.  No "buy Canadian" argument there!

In the future, EMP weapons may even make the LAV family even more worthwhile.

I do have another thought, though.  Why in tarnation did we, as an army, spend hundreds of millions of dollars upgrading the tank, rebuilding the Cougars, and developing the so-called TLAV, just to park them all?  An army always screaming about having no money seems to have had plenty to waste in the recent past.

Speaking of waste, why are SSM's in Recce Squadrons being issued LAV III's, in a Coyote Squadron?  Just so mechs have to be dual qualified, more spare parts carried, seeing as how they use 85% different parts, or what?  Does this make any sense?  Well, I suppose as much sense as using a multi-million dollar Coyote to conduct route recces........


----------



## Kirkhill

ex





> The MGS was purpose built with a new light weight 105 mm cannon, capable of firing all natures of NATO ammunition.  Canada opted out of this, because we still have a couple of hundred M68/L7 barrels laying around.  *Just because they weigh three times the amount of the designed barrel, didn't matter to the PMO team at all*.  Cost, not capability was, and is, the sole factor considered.  The fact that the weapon mount, and the vehicle suspension was designed for a lighter weight system also doesn't matter.  The US Army has no intention of using M68 barrels on their MGS, BTW.  That the vehicle top heavy weight also has caused the US Army to place restrictions on its use doesn't matter, either.



Just plain dumb....



> The MMEV may, indeed, become a vehicle that will work wonders from several map sheets away.  Who knows?  No design team has sat down yet, indeed, no statement of requirement as of yet.



Exactly, so why not look around at what is available and what is on the realistic horizon and see what can be used to plug identified gaps in the system of systems when it is applied to specific scenarios?



> It will be at least a decade before we see a vehicle of this type.



Unfortunately you are probably right but it doesn't have to be that way.  If there is one thing we should be pressuring the government to do is to improve the procurement process. Regardless of kit.



> Therefore, the over weight top-heavy MGS, accompanied by the TOW variant will do without. Also no requirement for a wheeled artillery vehicle yet, the towed pieces we own will do fine.



Considering what the gee-whiz types are coming up with and have developed for arty, precisely to fill in gaps in capabilities, isn't it a bit premature to suggest that arty might not be able to offer some answers?  Wheels and range mean that arty can bring fire to more areas of the battlefield.  Precision means with greater effect.   What am I missing?



> The MMEV, TOW, and MGS may, just may, be able to do the mission of tanks on the defense side, but have absolutely zero capability when forced to do anything on the move, such as on the assault, or even retrograde ops.



Inclined to agree with you here.



> Although the MMEV may be able to fire from the next province in the future, it might be nice to give it the capability of leaving a parking lot before it is in a fire position.  It simply cannot move in the winter cross country, and will have limited cross country capability any other time.  Even with such super capable vehicles, which will obviously be the very best in the world, we actually may have to engage some country or organisation that may even have such things as smart artillery rounds, or even UAV's.  We just might want the ability to manouever away from the mall parking lots......



I sense sarcasm here...............



> I don't really have anything against the LAV III family of vehicles.  I do have strong thoughts (anyone notice) on basing our entire army on one platform.  I don't agree with the powers that be that we will never, ever, required to operate alone, that we will always work with allies with capabilities we don't have.  That says to me that we are seconding command of our future forces away now, to our allies.  I wouldn't mind seeing maybe two light brigade size forces equipped with this family of vehicles, with one Brigade size force as air mobile, and on brigade size force as heavy.



Actually, in total agreement here.



> Also, GD has announced that the MGS will be produced in the USA, not in London.  No "buy Canadian" argument there!



If the purchase goes ahead then this wouldn't be a bad thing.  A diminution of "buy Canadian" could only speed up procurement and reduce costs.  However I think while the assembly will be done in the States its likely that things like the fire control system could be done here in Canada and that that would be part of the negotiation slowing up decisions, as in the case of the ALAAWS.



> In the future, EMP weapons may even make the LAV family even more worthwhile.



You jest?



> I do have another thought, though.  Why in tarnation did we, as an army, spend hundreds of millions of dollars upgrading the tank, rebuilding the Cougars, and developing the so-called TLAV, just to park them all?  An army always screaming about having no money seems to have had plenty to waste in the recent past.



Lack of a workable, budgetted long-term plan maybe?




> Speaking of waste, why are SSM's in Recce Squadrons being issued LAV III's, in a Coyote Squadron?  Just so mechs have to be dual qualified, more spare parts carried, seeing as how they use 85% different parts, or what?  Does this make any sense?  Well, I suppose as much sense as using a multi-million dollar Coyote to conduct route recces........



Finally, and with great relief as far as you're concerned no doubt, I have no opinion.....

Cheers Lance


----------



## a_majoor

> Perhaps it would help if we stopped thinking of the MMEV as a underarmoured, wheeled tank replacement that is going to go toe-to-toe with "real" tanks and instead think of it as what it is.   A wheeled, lightly armoured self-propelled artillery piece that is going to stand back anything from 8 to 30 km from the FEBA (depending on the missiles that the Government buys) and launch a large number of precision-guided, discriminating, fire and forget rounds into the battle space in front of you.  Sitting in your Coyote 5 km away from the enemy tanks, out of range of their guns and hull down you will be able to lase the incoming rounds onto the target.    If you are in close country or cities, the tanks might sneak up on you then the infanteers with the Javelin CLDs can launch their own weapons or can lase incoming rounds onto them, or for that matter onto bunkers or buildings.



I actually have no disagreement about that part, but when I am advancing with the troops I would like to have the fastest response time possible, which means some sort of direct fire capability. (We can all agree this should be considered in a Cavalry type context of flanking, screening and economy of force, rather than direct assaults against prepared positions)

The gun armed MMEV is an idea of getting that capability without having to field even more sub types of the LAV family, just issue them to direct fire units (Armoured regiments, Anti-Armour platoons) with a load of high velocity ammunition, Artillery units with "smart" rounds and base bleed ammunition, and develop some AD ammunition for the Air Defenders. We go from three types of direct fire platforms and any number of indirect fire platforms to one "gun LAV", the LAV infantry carrier, and ideally a LAV 3 based surveillance platform. Other variants are possible as well, but there should be 85% commonality between them.


----------



## 12alfa

Re:
*but when I am advancing with the troops I would like to have the fastest response time possible
The gun armed MMEV is an idea of getting that capability * 

I would think, (after operating on many a net(s) ) for many years, fail to see how a MEWV can deliver a wpn to a target  faster than a MBT in a suppoting role as we have been doing for the last 60+ years.

We all know that this ISTAR and comms is not all that great at the best of times. No lazer trg'ing and firing on with said ammo from 20 KM back (in a parking lot) is going to cut it for a grunt on the ground taking fire from a AFV.

Wake up people! we will lose people with these drawing board systems, lets go with what we know works, why is this so hard to understand?


----------



## McG

Mountie said:
			
		

> A complete LAV-III fleet is the way to go. As I heard quoted by an American, "the LAV-III is the M113 of the 21st Century".


Not 100% in agreement.  The bulk of the arguments here focus on the LAV III not being heavy enough for some roles.  I would suggest that the LAV III is too heavy for some roles.  Specifically recce (not to be confused with surveillance), cbt sp to recce, and liaison.  The LAV III may be the M113 of today, but even in its day we went smaller than the M113 for recce (remember the Lynx).


----------



## a_majoor

If we were clever enough, we could have a series of LAVs, LAVlettes, LAV+ for almost any purpose. The M-113 provided a large part of the mechanical heritage of the Lynx, as well as numerous other machines like the M-109, M-548 and so on.

A "cut down" 6X6 using LAV III mechanicals could be the basis of the recce vehicle, while the 8X8 stripped of the fighting systems can be the "Bison II" for CP's, Ambulances, or Logistics vehicles. MOWAG had demonstrated a 10X10 chassis as well...


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## Kirkhill

MOWAG used to build a 7.5 tonne 4x4 variant of the LAV.


----------



## hammerz

Well we now know the LAV III can take a beating!!!

http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_2004101123.asp


----------



## Inch

Getting hit indirectly with a bomb and getting hit with an APFSDS are quite different. A Sabot round will kill just about anything out there. I bet a Leo or Abrams wouldn't have shown nearly as much damage in the roadside bomb scenario.

Cheers


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## McG

That Stryker looks like an APC.  I bet guys in an M113 would not have been so lucky.


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Hmmm.

Rolled one and a half times.  Nobody hurt at all, aside from ringing in ears.

Any of you guys ever been in a rollover?

Something smells about this story.  I think a wee bit of propaganda is in evidence.


----------



## Kirkhill

More to add to the debate on the LAV-Stryker

US Army perspective after employment in Iraq AND in Alaska (during Winter)

http://www.news-miner.com/Stories/0,1413,113~7244~2588955,00.html


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## Kirkhill

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

And from the other side of the argument, the Dutch buy 184 CV9035s - now there's a useful round, a reasonable weight of armour, good volume and good mobility.


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## Kirkhill

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

A little bit more on the Stryker as perceived by the Americans.

Summary.

Very Good, Best Available, Especially for Urban Warfare, Not Perfect - Improvements suggested and being implemented.

Cheers.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

I'm just curious if they would still be available if all the previous productions lines had switched to Strykers?



Matthew.     ???


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## Kirkhill

Sorry Blackshirt, I didn't understand your question. Could you rephrase?

In the meantime here is another commentary on the Strykers.   George should be interested in this one.



> Stryker Brigade Concept Proves Itself in Ninewa
> 
> 
> (Source: US Department of Defense; issued Jan. 15, 2005)
> 
> 
> BAGHDAD, Iraq --- The Stryker Brigade is well-designed for the decentralized war against insurgents the coalition is waging in Iraq, said Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of Task Force Olympia, during an American Forces Press Service interview today.
> 
> With 14 months of combat experience under its belt now, the Stryker Brigade concept has proven itself. The brigade in Mosul now â â€œ the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division -- is using its flexible capabilities to hunt down insurgents and terrorists intimidating Iraqis who want a free and democratic country.
> 
> The brigade has substantially more infantry than a typical brigade, and uses technology to leverage the infantry when they dismount. The brigade also has more intelligence capabilities â â€œ including an unmanned aerial vehicle capability â â€œ and more internal options for firepower.
> 
> The Stryker vehicle itself has received glowing reports. The mission-capable rate dipped below 90 percent only once in the last year, and that was during the equipment hand-off from one brigade to another.
> 
> The wheeled vehicle also can move faster and farther than the typical infantry brigade. The smooth-riding vehicle also allows troops to arrive at a fight rested. "It doesn't shake the crew like a typical Bradley (fighting vehicle) does," Ham said.
> 
> The brigade demonstrated that capability many times in 2004. Strykers moved from Mosul to Kut and Najaf in April. They arrived ready for the fight. "We often launch strikes that go over 100 kilometers into the desert," Ham said. "That's tough to do in a Bradley.
> 
> *"But it's important to remember that it's not an 'either-or' proposition," he continued. "There is a definite place for Bradleys and main battle tanks. We have tanks in Mosul right now, and I'm here to tell you that the insurgents don't like them."   *



http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34


----------



## ArmyRick

Big thing to remember is the US army is going with three types of forces
Heavy Mechanized (Bradley, abrams, paladin, etc), Light (airborne, air assault, etc) and now they want medium (Stryker brigade combat teams).
The SBCT were not meant to replace a abrams or bradley. Shinseki implemented this concept because the army needed a medium weight, semi-quick deployable force with some fire power..
A stryker brigade has less fire power than a Armoured brigade but can move quicker..
A stryker brigade has more fire power than a light brigade but is harder to deploy..

When talking strykers in US concepts they employ them differently than what we would do..


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## Kirkhill

Stipulated on all counts and agreed Armyrick.

Cheers.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Sorry for the vagueness Kirkhill.

What I meant to ask was how hard would it be to convert a production line back to LAV-III's if we wanted more of them?



M.   ;D


----------



## Matt_Fisher

I think that NDHQ needs to pay attention to the last paragraph in particular.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2005/n01152005_2005011502.html

Stryker Brigade Concept Proves Itself in Ninewa
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service 

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 15, 2005 â â€œ The Stryker Brigade is well-designed for the decentralized war against insurgents the coalition is waging in Iraq, said Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of Task Force Olympia, during an American Forces Press Service interview today. 

With 14 months of combat experience under its belt now, the Stryker Brigade concept has proven itself. The brigade in Mosul now â â€œ the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division -- is using its flexible capabilities to hunt down insurgents and terrorists intimidating Iraqis who want a free and democratic country. 

The brigade has substantially more infantry than a typical brigade, and uses technology to leverage the infantry when they dismount. The brigade also has more intelligence capabilities â â€œ including an unmanned aerial vehicle capability â â€œ and more internal options for firepower. 

The Stryker vehicle itself has received glowing reports. The mission-capable rate dipped below 90 percent only once in the last year, and that was during the equipment hand-off from one brigade to another. 

The wheeled vehicle also can move faster and farther than the typical infantry brigade. The smooth-riding vehicle also allows troops to arrive at a fight rested. "It doesn't shake the crew like a typical Bradley (fighting vehicle) does," Ham said. 

The brigade demonstrated that capability many times in 2004. Strykers moved from Mosul to Kut and Najaf in April. They arrived ready for the fight. "We often launch strikes that go over 100 kilometers into the desert," Ham said. "That's tough to do in a Bradley. 

"But it's important to remember that it's not an 'either-or' proposition," he continued. "There is a definite place for Bradleys and main battle tanks. We have tanks in Mosul right now, and I'm here to tell you that the insurgents don't like them."


----------



## Kirkhill

Good question.

Do we want more LAV-IIIs?  Or would Stryker variants fill the bill?


----------



## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Do we want more LAV-IIIs? Or would Stryker variants fill the bill?



We are kinda arguing MacIntosh and Spartan or Granny Smith here.  

I do see us upgrading Coyote chassis to LAV III chassis in the future (but not near future) just for commonality of the fleet.  Remember that we lost the Lynx, not because it was really older than the M113--which it wasn't, but because there were a variety of parts that were no longer manufactured.  I can see this happening throughout the Forces, as Bison, Grizzly, Coyote parts become more rare, then it would only make sense (If it makes sense, it won't happen) to build a fleet based on the LAV III Chassis and we will have the "Stryker" here also.

GW


----------



## Kirkhill

Further along the line of "If wishes were horses then Gypsies would ride",

If we were to consider a HEAVY Tracked Component in any fielded force,

But we still wanted to maintain a road mobile 

rapid relocation capability 

And we followed on from George's thought about the MAN transporters

What would happen if we considered this combination?

http://www.oshkoshtruck.co.uk/Products/HET.cfm
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/cv90/

The HET can carry 2 of the CV90 class vehicles at a roadmarch speed of 80 km/h.  

That would mean that 8 HETs could carry 16 CV90s in some combination of the CV9035 and CV90120, or a mini-combat team.

A team like that could be added to either a LAVIII battle group (either Recce, Inf or Light Armoured) in the "open spaces" or could be on hand to supply support to a Light Infantry force in an Urban setting.

Could the CV90 be sold as a heavy APC rather than a tank, even though it is armoured, has tracks and a large gun?

Would the CV90 supply enough protection?  Stipulating it couldn't go toe to toe with another CV90120 let alone an Abrams or a Leo 2 (or for that matter a Leo C2).

30 tonne vehicles like Bradley and Warrior seem to survive a lot of hits in Iraq.


----------



## Daniel San

I must be repeating what some might have said before me but I believe that the MBTs should still be imployed and for quite a while still in the cdn army.

Why: 1- Go over a pile of metal scrap (aka a car wreck) with an tire-equipped veh. I've got news for you, tires get punctured.
            2- Armour strength, the LAV III as modern as it is still is not as well armoured as the Leopard.
            3- Manoeuvrability, ya sure, the LAV is thinner than the Leopard therefore it squeeze into smaller spaces but the turning radius is largely in favour of the large cat, try rotating 360 ° with a LAV.
            4- With over a 100 MBTs, you can retire a few and conserve them for spare pieces, no? (cannibalizing)
            5- Go see what Matt Fisher suggests:

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-fisher1-1.htm

Transform the Leopard into an dedicated urban warfare weapon system. That would be useful.   ^-^


----------



## a_majoor

The argument about common logistics is cancelled out in true Canadian fashion by the retention and rebuilding of LAV I (6X6) and LAV II (Coyote, Bison) in the system. While I totally understand the impulse (desperation, since the government agreed to buy @ 400 of the required 1400 LAV III variants identified), it really doesn't help anyone except GD, who get nice contracts to do all this for us.

Here is *A* thought into what versions the other 1000 LAV IIIs "should" be: (add in the Reserve and there would be more than double the number)

*LAV III section carrier*: similar to the current version, but replaces the turret with an OWS for reduced silhouette, weight and hight.

*Coyote IIa recce vehicle*; mounts the Delco turret with LLTV or TI sights and carries a four man dismount squad in the back. Partnered with the *Coyote IIb*, which has a much improved surveillance suite that does not take 30 min to raise/lower. If warrented, a *Coyote IIc* with an NBC recce suite in the back can also be procured. Coyote IIb can also be issued as the forward observer vehicle for the Artillery.

*LAV FS*: a direct fire support vehicle carrying a small (60-90mm) high velocity cannon and a generous ammunition load (@ 40 rounds). The gun mount is high angled to deal with those annoying rooftop snipers in an urban fight. The same chassis is also available with a breach loading 81mm mortar (since you can pack a lot more 81mm mortar bombs into the vehicle as compared to the 120mm. Numbers do count).

*LAV AT*: carries a long range missile system such as HELLFIRE, BRIMESTONE or FOG-M, and replaces LAV-TOW and MMEV, since the missiles can be used direct or indirect and have at least an 8 km range. *LAV-AA* would use the same chassis if procured.

*LAV LOGISTICS*: configured like a pick-up truck, would carry pallatized or modular supply packs to support the other versions. A "camper top" would be added for ambulance, CP, mobile workshop and other similar vehicles.

*LAV Pioneer*: Mostly a light engineer vehicle that can keep up with the rest of the combat team and provide some mobility/counter mobility for the troops. The *LAV MRT* would be based on this version, and maybe both would be subvarients of the LAV LOGISTICICS "pickup truck".

*LAV SP*: The 105mm SP version of the LAV III, "just because".

The argument about the LAV being "too complex" for the reserve does not hold a lot of water for me, many armies issue equipment of equal or greater complexity to their reserves (Just walk past the compounds in Ft Knox, KY and you will see the equipment for a modern American Armoured Brigade stored for the Kentuckey National Guard...). If nothing else, the constant flow between the Regular and Reserve worlds would encourage and support the use of high end equipment.

The false economies of buying small numbers of equipment is really the crux of the problems accepting the LAV and the entire "wheeled army" thing. (I am aware of the virtue of track, so please don't start  ;D). If enough LAVs were available, then the equipment would be familier; and more people could have the experience to make sensible suggestions for modifications, changes to doctrine and TTPs and so on. A big production run would also invite economies of scale, most of the reason LAVs are so expensive is they are essentially hand built.

This draws a number of threads together, and "perhaps" will stimulate some thinking in the procurment world.....


----------



## Kirkhill

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/050217/dcth035_1.html



> STERLING HEIGHTS, Mich., Feb. 17 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- The U.S. Army has ordered a fifth brigade of Stryker wheeled combat vehicles from General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD - News). The order for 423 vehicles to equip the brigade is valued at $582 million. Vehicle deliveries are slated for January 2006 through January 2007.




1000 mixed LAVs approximately 1.7BCAD with delivery from roughly January 2008 to June 2010.  Assuming the Americans only pick up the 6th Brigade set and don't opt for more.


----------



## George Wallace

a_majoor

That is the direction we should go if we want to stay with this "Wheeled" philosophy we currently seem to have.  At present, commonality of parts is a serious problem.  We are modifying AVGPs and retaining them in the system.  Coyote and Bison do not have commonality of parts.  All three of these vehicles do not have any commonality with LAV III and that is a serious supply and logistical problem, not only in parts but in other aspects such as vehicle recovery and transportation.  In vehicle recovery of all these vehicles, different methods must be utilized.  In transporting these vehicles, different procedures are implemented such as different tie down procedures, different numbers of vehicles loaded per rail car, different requirements to close up (ie. Coyotes require the exhausts to be plugged so that the turbos don't get damaged) vehicles, etc.  

A common platform would cut down on the Logistics problems.  It would cut down on training; D & M and Gunnery.  

Current Coyote, Bison and AVGP variants could be cascaded down to the Reserves solving a serious problem with lack of equipment to the Reserves and perhaps boost Recruiting.

GW


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

George Wallace said:
			
		

> a_majoor
> 
> That is the direction we should go if we want to stay with this "Wheeled" philosophy we currently seem to have.   At present, commonality of parts is a serious problem.   We are modifying AVGPs and retaining them in the system.   Coyote and Bison do not have commonality of parts.   All three of these vehicles do not have any commonality with LAV III and that is a serious supply and logistical problem, not only in parts but in other aspects such as vehicle recovery and transportation.   In vehicle recovery of all these vehicles, different methods must be utilized.   In transporting these vehicles, different procedures are implemented such as different tie down procedures, different numbers of vehicles loaded per rail car, different requirements to close up (ie. Coyotes require the exhausts to be plugged so that the turbos don't get damaged) vehicles, etc.
> 
> A common platform would cut down on the Logistics problems.   It would cut down on training; D & M and Gunnery.
> 
> Current Coyote, Bison and AVGP variants could be cascaded down to the Reserves solving a serious problem with lack of equipment to the Reserves and perhaps boost Recruiting.
> 
> GW



George, my understanding was that AVGP were all LAV-I's, and the Coyote and Bison were LAV-II's (and as such would have parts commonality at least in the engine, chassis, etc.)?  Is that incorrect?

Thanks in advance,



Matthew.


----------



## George Wallace

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> George, my understanding was that AVGP were all LAV-I's, and the Coyote and Bison were LAV-II's (and as such would have parts commonality at least in the engine, chassis, etc.)? Is that incorrect?



I wouldn't really  call the AVGP family LAV 1s, nor the Coyote and Bison as LAV II, but some do.  I truly have not heard anyone in the Forces call them that.  I imagine that this is the result of us calling the LAV III a LAV III and some want to create in their minds that its' predecessors had to be the LAV I and LAV II.    

The Bison came on line just after the LAV 25 that we produced for the USMC.  It had different suspensions and engines/trasmissions, etc.  The Coyote came on line later and include 'improvements' on them both.  Unfortunately, although they may look like they are the same, they are not.  Bison parts are not interchangable with those of the Coyote.  Suspensions are different, engines are different, etc.  If I remember correctly, you can't even exchange the wheels/tires.

Gw


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

I do favour an all LAV aproach to our infantry and recce forces.  LAV III with TOW or Javelin make a solid support system for infantry.  It is not a MBT, nor is the MGS, but it can defend itself if it finds itself facing an MBT.  It is not the same as the US or UK forces that can expect to whistle up heavy armour if they run into trouble, we must have the ability to defend ourselves with our own kit.  Lighter recce LAV, perhaps replacing the turret with .50 HMG to reduce weight, lower profile, and increase offroad performance, upgraded Coyote's for surveilance, dedicated missle LAV III for AT and AA.  LAV III with 120mm mortar for indirect fire, and 105mm direct fire.  We are not going to get MBT, we can do LAV.  If we go all LAV, we gain strategic speed, if we go half LAV half tracked, we can't catch the little guys, and can't fight the big boys.  If we go all LAV, we can have a robust fighting force that can contribute as part of an allied force, or alone.  Its something we can afford, and something we can use to accomplish the tasks we are likely to face.  As far as the theoretical air deployment ability of the LAV, not with our Hercs, not even if every one of the old birds were in the air at once.


----------



## George Wallace

There are vast differences in Wheeled and Tracked Forces.   Wheels may be faster on roads, but bog easily cross country, be it wet ground or sand.   Tracked vehicles tend to win the manoeuvrability contest.   Wheeled win the highway contest.   I find a serious problem with people who think like civies and think the next conflict is going to involve highspeed moves across roads and parking lots in ideal conditions.   Tracked would win the day.   It is like a Tortoise and Hare story.

The amount of armour that can be applied to Tracked vehicles is usually more than can be applied to wheeled.   

Bridge classes that can be crossed by tracked vehicles are usually more flexible than wheeled vehicles.   A bridge may allow a 
60 Ton tracked vehicle to cross, but only a 20 Ton double axled wheeled vehicle (a little exaggerated, but hopefully you catch my drift.).

The armour protection and size of weapon system that can be applied to wheeled vehicles as opposed to tracked is vastly different.

When it comes to travelling on roads the Wheeled fleet has the advantage.   When it comes to cross country, only a maniac in a wheeled vehicle can keep up to tracked vehicles.   

I am positive that the decisions to go wheeled are being made by NON-COMBAT ARMS, or at the very least non-combatants, who have no real idea of what a combat vehicle requires.   It amazes me that we have all these new publications; LESSONS LEARNED, and they are all old ideas and lessons that have been forgotten by the "younger" generation of officer we have today.   I argue vehemently against going Wheeled.   I forsee us having to learn more lessons over again, with a great loss of life in doing so.

But if we have to, we can see some very good suggestions on where our Wheeled Fleet should head, in the above posts.  Just remember that the type of employment we send these vehicles will be rather limited in scope.


GW


----------



## Zipper

I agree with you totally GW! 



			
				mainerjohnthomas said:
			
		

> It is not a MBT, nor is the MGS, but it can defend itself if it finds itself facing an MBT.



Hmmm...    ...why do I doubt that? I seem to remember in Gunnery being told that the first shot wins, so be sharp and make it count(along with a cuff to the head).

If a full troop was facing a single MBT, I might say you'll get out with at least one. But since they usually travel in groups...

Sorry, I just find it rather naive to think that way.



			
				mainerjohnthomas said:
			
		

> We are not going to get MBT, we can do LAV. If we go all LAV, we gain strategic speed, if we go half LAV half tracked, we can't catch the little guys, and can't fight the big boys. If we go all LAV, we can have a robust fighting force that can contribute as part of an allied force, or alone. Its something we can afford, and something we can use to accomplish the tasks we are likely to face.



You know? Your probably right. I'm sure the politicians would love to hear it too. But then we lose the capability of getting and deploying MBT's quickly when the shit hits the fan. And it always hits the fan at some time. We're placing ourselves right back in the 30's, and we're going to make the same mistakes again and pay for it with lives. Plain and simple.

Of course, the candy man is going to be coming to town on Weds. Lets see what he has to say and then we'll be right back here looking at LAV variants.


----------



## Zipper

I'm not sure if this has been posted yet, as I did not read all 17 pages. But it brings the whole LAV III and wheels into a rather clear light.

http://www.g2mil.com/LAV-III.htm

Makes you think.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

The only problem with M113 proposals is that to a Canadian politician, that gives them an excuse to not buy us new kit, but take our clapped out antique M113's and send them to Quebec where we will spend $500,000 each to refit Vietnam era kit to standards equal only on paper to the $200,000 price tag of the new kit.  On the air mobility aspects of the M113 with 25mm/Javelin turret, those proposals were based on the US C130-J, does anyone know if they are true of our own older birds as well?


----------



## ArmyRick

Zipper, that link you posted, is a couple years old.

As far as the picture of a US LAV25 getting stuck? In mud like that, beleive me the M113 would too. I have lots of expirience with the old classic. They're time has come. Only a handfull of re-fitted ones are all we should keep.

Most of the guys I know who are qualified M113 and LAVIII, say they would take the LAVIII hands down.

The LAVIII is not a grizzly or a LAV25, its alot better and far more mobile.

So what about tracked vehicle that would be fast and mobile? How about the Alvis Stormer APC series. The latest variants can do 80 KM/h Forward or reverse...


----------



## Zipper

Ok thanks.

No argument about the M113. Let the old thing die. 

I posted that articule to reference more to the non-ability of packing one of those things (as well as a stryker) in a Herc. As well as the the argument about going all wheeled. No doubt they have their uses and will function quite well. But we have to maintain our armoured (track) capability as well.

Ah well.


----------



## Zipper

Here is another website that may be of interest. Considering their growing power both military and financial.

http://www.sinodefence.com/army/armour/default.asp


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

The Chinese WZ551 family of APC/IFV include:
Other variants include:

WZ554 self-propelled twin-23mm antiaircraft artillery guns, 6X6 
WZ551D DK-9 (PL-9) air defence missile system, 6X6 
WZ901F (Type 86) patrol vehicle, 6X6 
WZ91 anti-tank guided missile launch vehicle, 4X4 
Long-hull APC, 8X8 
120mm Self-Propelled Mortar-Howitzer, 6X6 
Armoured recovery vehicle (ARV), 6X6 
Armoured ambulance, 6X6 

Our LAV is a superior platform in all respects, but the WZ family shows the versitility of the basic design, and outlines production variants similar to those that a Canadian LAV force would grow to include.  I would like to see our LAV numbers ramped up the the 1000+ initially promised to the Canadian Army, and including dedicated antitank, antiaircraft, patrol, direct and indirect fire support, engineer and ambulance variants.


----------



## Zipper

Maybe so. But the reason I posted that site was to point out the fact that while the Chinese are building "rapid reaction" divisions with wheels, they are still greatly invested in track. As are the Russians and most of the countries that could be deemed "unfriendly" to us. Meaning that they do not have mutual protection agreements with us.

Its rather interesting that the "west" is turning itself into light forces by going wheeled (and shrinking in numbers) and making themselves believe the world is a safer place by putting out these brush fires in small African and middle-eastern nations. Meanwhile those countries that have been our historical opponents are still going heavy and increasing the sizes of their military's. China has the capability alone of fielding an army approx. 1.7 million in numbers. How many armoured divisions would that be?

Not that we should be preparing for a war with china, considering our attempted economic changes there. But I think we should be planning for "worst case" scenario's. And by slipping ourselves into a strict niche, we do ourselves a disservice.

It is unfortunate that the military in the States has once again been taken over by the politicians and is listening to Rumsfeld and his crazy "go light and fast" ideas. All that work put in by Powell and company to learn the lessons of Vietnam not with standing.


----------



## Kirkhill

"All that work by Powell......" almost resulted in a the US only having half-a-dozen sledgehammers in their tool box and confronted with a world of screws and nuts. 

No doubt a sledgehammer is required.  Maybe even 2 or 3.  But other tools are needed as well.

Part of the Powell programme was expressly to limit the ability of the US government to act by limiting the tools available.  Light forces and Special forces represent a screw-drivers and multi-tools. Every bit as necessary as sledgehammers to allow governments to achieve outcomes in their national interest.


----------



## big bad john

Everyone has been talking about WZ551's and CV90's.  So I posted some photos of the families of vehicles.  enjoy


----------



## Zipper

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Part of the Powell programme was expressly to limit the ability of the US government to act by limiting the tools available.   Light forces and Special forces represent a screw-drivers and multi-tools. Every bit as necessary as sledgehammers to allow governments to achieve outcomes in their national interest.



But wouldn't that be just the point? The US forces HAD light forces (Marines, Rangers, Airborne, etc) and Spec forces already and knew how to use them. So those tool were already in the chest if you will. The whole idea was to keep the government out of the day to day decisions, and to choose targets that were not only "politically" driven.

They've swung the opposit direction now, back to where they were in the early 70's. Micro-managed by people who do not know how to fight a war.

It still leaves to question the US's focus on light troops instead of keeping a successful mix.


----------



## Kirkhill

> The whole idea was to keep the government out of the day to day decisions, and to choose targets that were not only "politically" driven.





> Micro-managed by people who do not know how to fight a war.



War is a political act.   Politicians get a say.   It is equally valid to say that soldiers should have no say because they don't know politics.

Of course there is friction between the two sides - always are, always will be, especially when strong egos and heart-felt positions are involved.

The US did indeed have light forces - but they didn't have many of them and they had to fight awfully hard for a share of the budget.   The current focus on light is only by difference.   Before all the effort was dedicated to the heavy forces.   Much effort was directed against finding roles and budget for Marines, Infantry, Airborne troopers, Rangers and SF troops.   The ultimate denigration of all ideas associated with them was "too light to fight".   Any money that didn't go into diesel and tracks was wasted.   

Infantry in this view was only good for securing tank lagers and clearing defiles as the Shock Army roared around the edges of town.

If it looks like the Legacy Armored Force is taking a back seat it is only because they have occupied the front seat for so long and now the US is finding that they aren't much use to them in Iraq today.   The call now is for the Infanteer - and they don't have enough.


----------



## a_majoor

US forces exist across a wide spectrum. The purpose of the SBCT and the "Objective Force" is to have something which hits harder than the "light" forces; while more portable than the heavy force. Consider it took 6 months to assemble the force for the first Gulf War, and moving 4ID was almost impossible in time to take part in OIF; a medium force makes sense.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Considering our own, far more limited logistics ability, we have to take a serious look at what force we can actually support, once deployed.  The LAV III with all variants, would give us a commonality of parts to make our logistics tail supportable.


----------



## Zipper

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> War is a political act.   Politicians get a say.   It is equally valid to say that soldiers should have no say because they don't know politics.
> 
> Of course there is friction between the two sides - always are, always will be, especially when strong egos and heart-felt positions are involved.



Thats for sure. Politicians get a say about whether TO go to war. Once it has been said, they should step back and let the soldiers do their job of winning it while working on ways of ending it as soon as possable. The first gulf war was a good example of this.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If it looks like the Legacy Armored Force is taking a back seat it is only because they have occupied the front seat for so long and now the US is finding that they aren't much use to them in Iraq today.  The call now is for the Infanteer - and they don't have enough.



Also a good point. You cannot be to "heavy" on the armoured side. The whole point is to hold ground, which needs a infanteer. So I would agree that they need to balance the mix again. But keeping the heavy side is a must.



			
				mainerjohnthomas said:
			
		

> Considering our own, far more limited logistics ability, we have to take a serious look at what force we can actually support, once deployed. The LAV III with all variants, would give us a commonality of parts to make our logistics tail supportable.



Good point as well. If your going to invest in a chchassisthen stick with as few as possable throughout your variants to keep the support costs down. But I still say we need tracked, and to the point of an MBT. 

The fact that we still have AVGP's, Coyote/Bison (LAV II's if you will), and are getting the LAV III just doesn't make sense from a cost/support point of view. Eliminate two of them and stick with the one wheeled chassis. Then get a tracked chassis (CV-90 perhaps?) and its variants, and then an MBT. Not necessarily in that order.

Three chassis to support and pay for, and less headache.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Mar/UF-Marine_Corps.htm

US Marine Corps wants to add 5 more LAV companies in Iraq with a total of 125 vehicles.  Future plans for armour also discussed.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The USMC were pioneers in this field and their success in DESERT STORM lead to the Saudis making a huge order for LAV-25s and renewed interest in Australia, Canada and other nations.  

I doubt that the US SBCTs will serve in their intended purpose of being a force deployed to a theatre after the light forces and before heavy forces.  I believe that they will instead become the forces intended for the stability and security phase of a campaign (after the light and heavy forces do their thing).  LAVs have some advantages over both light and heavy forces in security operations.  A force of Coyotes and LAV IIIs would be quite useful in Iraq (outside of the Fallujah style battles, perhaps).

Cheers,

2B


----------



## a_majoor

The Objective force may be a "bell curve", some light on the left, the bulk of the forces being medium weight deployable for followup, security and stabilization, flanking, screening and rear area security, exploitation and persuit; and some heavy forces on the right to crack the hard nuts.


----------



## Farmboy

I'll have to find the story but it seems that all the LAVs in Iraq are parked because the armour SUCKS.

 They have a "Bird Cage" on them to help protect against RPGs however the enemy just uses a one-two punch with them to penetrate the cage and armour.

 They are great vehicles as long as they don't have to fight.


----------



## a_majoor

Going over the posts of people who have "been there"; as well as articles and blogs by serving US service members, and articles in US Military professional journals paints a different picture of the LAV and Stryker in combat.

We all know the LAVIII/Stryker is not meant for the stand up fight, and current efforts are directed to developing the proper doctrine and TTPs to use these vehicles. I suspect you are reading an article with an ulterior motive: proponents of the "heavy metal army" who want to keep the traditional army, opponents of George W Bush who ignore any good news and play up bad news, competitors of GD who want us to buy something else...

The arguments we want to examine here are based on the fact that we have them, and we need to find the best way to use them


----------



## Kirkhill

As usual I'll have to agree with a_majoor on this one.

LAVs and Strykers do seem to have their uses - and add a lot of capability to the forces out there.  The secret, as far as I can tell, like everything else, is to fully understand the limitations and advantages and employ it in situations maximizing potential benefit while minimizing potential risk.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Farmboy,

You can't use M1s to patrol an entire country.  LAVs offer the patrolling mobility advantages of HUMMVWs while having better protection against most threats (small arms, mines IEDs, VBIEDs).  The USMC LAV-25s fought in both Gulf Wars and they seem happy with them.  LAVs cannot replace a heavy force in front line combat but they do offer advantages elsewhere. 

I'd rather conduct mounted escorts, QRFs and patrols in a Stryker/LAV (not talking about the MGS here) than a HUMMVW.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Zipper

Agreed but again. Majoor does have his point, and the LAV III (I'll still reserve judgement on the MGS) is a good piece of kit within its operational capabilities. And I think the Stryker is the MGS  2Bravo.

However for us to be going over entirly to LAV's sets us into such a small operational capability as to be stifling. 



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> We all know the LAVIII/Stryker is not meant for the stand up fight, and current efforts are directed to developing the proper doctrine and TTPs to use these vehicles.
> 
> The arguments we want to examine here are based on the fact that we have them, and we need to find the best way to use them



You bet they have their place. But is that place allowing us to keep a properly trained and flexable military? 

Maybe for now, since we are so broken. But we have to look at expanding that role so that we just don't become the only 1st world nation (G-8 nation) military having the same capability as a many 3rd world nations do now. Hell at the cost of their own people, many of those countries have larger militaries with MBT's.

And at the cost of repeating myself about the China example. In the Globe yesterday (I think, and I'll need to find it), they refered to the growing fear around the world of China's continued 10 year double diget build up of its military.

Now that they have nukes, their current power (on land) rivals that of the US and Russia combined (my own assessment from looking at the numbers).

So for now the LAV's are a good thing to help fix our broken military, and we need to figure out the TTP's to use them properly. But we need to do this quickly and then start looking at gaining back the capabilities we lost by scrapping the MBT's and track programs.


----------



## George Wallace

The Stryker is a family of vehicles.  The MGS is only one of the versions.  The majority of vehicles in a Stryker Bde are turretless.

GW


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Zipper,

As George pointed out the LAV familiy is called many things in many places.   In US Army parlance the "Stryker" refers to the whole family of vehicles.   The Mobile Gun System (MGS) with the 105mm Low Profile Turret is not yet in service but the Infantry Section Carrier (basically a LAV III without the 25mm turret) is in service in Iraq with the US Army.   In Canada the MGS is sometimes called "Stryker" because we already have the LAV III and the press picked the term up.   I call it the MGS to prevent confusion.   

A Troop of MGS might have been good to have on hand in Kabul but I wouldn't patrol the streets with it.   The Stryker ISC would be a good patrol vehicle in the IED threat environment. That is why I mentioned the LAV/Stryker but stated that I was leaving the MGS out.   In trying to be clear I guess I ended up being confusing.    

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Kirkhill

Zipper:

If a guy comes at you with a sword, which would you choose?  A shield, a gun, or be sporting and pick up another sword so as to give him a chance?

Just because the Chinese have lots of tanks I don't consider that an argument for us to have lots of tanks.  Frankly I want something that renders their tanks useless.

While I, and a lot of others here, accept the role of tanks on the battlefield and would like to see them in our inventory the reality is otherwise and there needs to be workarounds.

As to maintaining tanks, as you might have noted the future planning suggests that 30 tonne vehicles are likely to be replacing 70 ton vehicles in US/UK planning over the next 10-15 years.  Already 30 ton Bradleys and Warriors, not to mention 25 ton Strykers (20 tons + Cage (estimated) are protecting their crews against RPGs.  So in 5-10 years time the kit on the marketplace is likely to be somewhat different than the kit on offer today.

So your recognition of the need to get things right today with what we have and add capabilities in the future,  while right on the money, may mean that in  5-10 years time the consensus as to what the battlefield requires may change again.

Cheers.


----------



## Zipper

GW/2Bravo - I stand corrected.  

Damn you Kirk. To damn logical by half. 

I am stating not so much that we must have a tank to tank match for the Chinese, but that we (and other western countries) are reducing their military's (personal and capabilities) while they are greatly increasing theirs. Yes rolls will change again in 10-20 years I am sure. I would just like to see some idea of us changing with it in that we are recognizing that we need the greater capabilities of "heavier" track, and even to the point of MBT's. There roll is no where near as dead as some would like to think.

And I will argue the survivability of the "cage" system. One hit yes, multiple hits no.


----------



## a_majoor

I think even a Leopard or M-1 might not look too fresh after taking multiple hits. Even if the vehicle is not destroyed, the electronics and sight system will be damaged by the impact. If the birdcage allows the crew to back out or debus before they are incinerated, then it serves its purpose.

Once again, *the LAV family is not for the stand up fight!*

Enhanced surveillance from "LAV-TOW" will be very handy for the Cavalry concept, especially down at the Cavalry team level. This gives the Cavalry team commander real time input independent of the "recce troop" or "surveillance squadron", as well as supplimenting input upstream to the ISTAR CC. I will restate the need for replacing the TOW with a more capable multi-mode weapon to give the team more punch on the screen/counter recce battle, as well as to fight out of an ambush or other bad situation.


----------



## Kirkhill

> And I will argue the survivability of the "cage" system. One hit yes, multiple hits no.



I won't argue that one because I don't know. Perhaps somebody else can look it up. One thing I do know is that the only current effective defence on the market that will protect any vehicle in the 360 degree environment is ERA - reactive armour.  And than Definitely won't sustain multiple hits.


----------



## Farmboy

> Once again, the LAV family is not for the stand up fight!



 So if Canadians do need to stand and fight.............??

 What about patroling and getting ambushed??

 Enemy tactics have already employed two RPGs fired at the same vehicle moments apart.

 Should we just stay away from anywhere we might get engaged?


----------



## Kirkhill

> Once again, the LAV family is not for the stand up fight!
> 
> 
> So if Canadians do need to stand and fight.............??
> 
> What about patroling and getting ambushed??
> 
> Enemy tactics have already employed two RPGs fired at the same vehicle moments apart.
> 
> Should we just stay away from anywhere we might get engaged?






			
				2Bravo said:
			
		

> Farmboy,
> 
> You can't use M1s to patrol an entire country.   LAVs offer the patrolling mobility advantages of HUMMVWs while having better protection against most threats (small arms, mines IEDs, VBIEDs).   The USMC LAV-25s fought in both Gulf Wars and they seem happy with them.   LAVs cannot replace a heavy force in front line combat but they do offer advantages elsewhere.
> 
> I'd rather conduct mounted escorts, QRFs and patrols in a Stryker/LAV (not talking about the MGS here) than a HUMMVW.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 2B


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Farmboy said:
			
		

> So if Canadians do need to stand and fight.............??
> 
> What about patrolling and getting ambushed??
> 
> Enemy tactics have already employed two RPGs fired at the same vehicle moments apart.
> 
> Should we just stay away from anywhere we might get engaged?


       Mobility, armour and firepower are the hallmarks of armour, but lets face it, ambushes are rarely initiated by people who don't think they can put enough bang down range to do the job.   Even against heavy armour, the initiation of an ambush is usually watching the lead vehicle get killed.   The cannon on the remainder of the patrol should provide suppressing fire, and fire support while the infantry dismounts and flanks the enemy who initiated the ambush.   MBT would be great, but no ones buying them for us.   Tracked IFV can bear more armour, but are hard to keep on the road, and the result would that on longer missions the same patrol in soft skinned vehicles while the armour stayed in laager.   The LAV's have the armour superior to light vehicles, weapons credible enough to act as support, and mobility that can be maintained during extended deployments.   Who cares what armour we could put on a vehicle without the legs to patrol with the intensity that ours require?   The choice is a patrol with armour (LAV) or a patrol reduced to soft skinned vehicles, with armour relegated to reaction forces due to maintenance necessity.   Take a look at the km logged by the LAV fleet in Iraq, verses the Bradley.   The Bradley is the badder boy all right, but it is sure hard to keep on the road, and the US have lavished more support on them then we ever could.


----------



## George Wallace

Remember that an Ambush is set up to kill everything in it.  If it is set up to kill tanks, it will.  The amount of armour you have protecting you is never enough.  You have to use your head to stay alive.  If we don't have tanks, then we must learn to use whatever we have to the best we can.  If it is the LAV, then we will have to use it.  

In an Ambush, everything in the Kill Zone is covered by fire or mined.  There is no way that the forces caught in one should be able to get out.  If they do, then the chances of the Ambushers getting a "Clean Break" and escaping will be lessened.  So it is in their best interest to ensure that no one gets out.  

Will a LAV survive a properly placed Ambush?  No.  Many here have seen the videos from Afghanistan of BTRs being blown up into the air and all killed by double or triple stacked AT Mines.  

GW


----------



## a_majoor

Ambush/counter-ambush drills will have to be adapted for the LAV; some common sense stuff needs to be enforced (i.e. vehicle spacing), surveillance, intelligence and "bush sense" used to the max to sniff out potential ambushes before they are triggered, and agressive counter-ambush drills practiced to give everyone the best possible chance to make it out, or at least take down the bad guys.

LAV-TOW or sucessor vehicles will be important because of the surveillance capabilities. I can see two vehicles from the TOW troop/platoon standing local overwatch while the other pair leapfrog forward (an easier proposition than with Coyotes), and the Infantry travelling "one up", leaving the other two sections and any attached CSS vehicles one and two bounds behind. Considering there should also be recce platoon/troop vehicles forward and Coyote or UAV/Griffon overwatch, the enemy ambush will have to be dug in very deep indeed.....


----------



## Zipper

Question on ambushes? 



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Remember that an Ambush is set up to kill everything in it. If it is set up to kill tanks, it will. The amount of armour you have protecting you is never enough. You have to use your head to stay alive. If we don't have tanks, then we must learn to use whatever we have to the best we can. If it is the LAV, then we will have to use it.
> 
> In an Ambush, everything in the Kill Zone is covered by fire or mined. There is no way that the forces caught in one should be able to get out. If they do, then the chances of the Ambushers getting a "Clean Break" and escaping will be lessened. So it is in their best interest to ensure that no one gets out.



Is this entirely true now a days? If fighting a conventional force I would say yes. But since much of what is happening today is Gorilla ( I spelt that wrong) in nature. It seems it is only hit and run tactics that are used. So the fact that you take out even one vehicle and kill its crew means that it is a success. They know that any deaths are not going to go over well back at home, and thus to even kill one person is a win. 

Yes this is not true in Iraq. But that fight is a much larger situation with a larger foe. The opponent is well aware of world issues and would know that Canada will not stomach such things as the Americans are right now.


----------



## ArmyRick

George, would M1s, leopard 2s or Bradleys survive a well placed ambush? No.

Heavy armour is not indestructable.


----------



## George Wallace

Army Rick

I think that is what I said.

Zipper

If you want an Ambush to be solely a Hit and Run Tactic, you had better make sure you have good cover to run away in.  I wouldn't call 'Hit and Run' tactics ambushing in the true sense of the word.  I would say that a properly run ambush will see the troops in the Kill Zone completely destroyed.  If they are not killed, you will land up withdrawing under their fire, and that most likely will mean that sooner or later you will have to expose yourself and become a victim of their fire.


----------



## Zipper

George Wallace said:
			
		

> If you want an Ambush to be solely a Hit and Run Tactic, you had better make sure you have good cover to run away in.   I wouldn't call 'Hit and Run' tactics ambushing in the true sense of the word.   I would say that a properly run ambush will see the troops in the Kill Zone completely destroyed.   If they are not killed, you will land up withdrawing under their fire, and that most likely will mean that sooner or later you will have to expose yourself and become a victim of their fire.



Agreed. especially if you try to pull it off in anything other then an Urban enviroment. But considering that most of the attacks happen in the Urban enviroment, it is not hard to hit and run out the back door. Especially with those few seconds of confusion you buy yourself in the initial hit.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Heavy armour is not indestructable.



Your right. It isn't. But it sure as hell can take more then one (or two) hits from lightly armed (RPG's) insurgents. I don't think a LAV could say the same.


----------



## Kirkhill

Zipper, here's some light reading for you.  Maybe these aren't quite the urban deathtraps you are rightly worried about.


http://www.strykernews.com/archives/cat_32_brigade_news.html



> December 10, 2004
> Stryker vehicle performance passes muster with Army
> Link to Full Article
> By BETH IPSEN, Staff Writer
> 
> Army officials are pleased with the combat performance in Iraq of the Stryker vehicle Fort Wainwright troops are fielding as they work their way toward a combat deployment.
> 
> "It's fast, it's quiet and it tracks incredibly well on the snow," said Col. Michael Shields, commander of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Wainwright. "Soldiers have total confidence in the weapon system. It's incredibly accurate and lethal. It works very well in the Arctic environment."
> 
> However, Iraq is considerably warmer and more hostile than Interior Alaska.
> 
> 
> The eight-wheeled infantry carrier vehicles are at the heart of the new brigades that are aimed at bridging the gap between a slower Army of the Cold War to a faster, more mobile and lethal force of the future. The eight versions in production weigh from 19 tons to 24 tons, which includes the 4,500-pound slat armor that was added to vehicles in Kuwait before they entered Iraq.
> 
> The vehicle, which is assembled by General Dynamics in Alabama, is not only quieter than its heavier predecessors, but has digital technology that feeds soldiers simultaneous information on the locations of both friendly and enemy forces.
> 
> "If you want to destroy everything in an urban environment, completely level it, then the M1 tank would be the perfect suited weapon or system," said Lt. Col. Karl Reed, battalion commander with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, which returned to Fort Lewis in October after spending a year deployed to Iraq. "This particular war is about balance. This particular war is about insurgents that mix with friendly forces and I think the precision is what's necessary in order to win this type of conflict and the Stryker gives you that."
> 
> Reed and other commanders from the first Stryker brigade that served in Iraq talked about instances in which_ *the vehicle and the soldiers inside them survived rocket-propelled grenade attacks, roadside bombs and car bombs while fighting insurgents in Iraq*._Soldiers from the Department of the Army headquarters in Washington, D.C., the 3rd Brigade and Fort Wainwright's 172nd held a video conference Thursday to talk about the Stryker vehicle for media at the different sites.
> 
> The conference was televised on a large screen set up in a heated tent that is serving as the 172nd's tactical operational center during a simulated combat exercise this week.
> 
> Lt. Colonel Gordy Flowers, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, said *more than 50 percent of his Strykers were tagged by roadside or car bombs or hit with rocket-propelled grenades*.
> 
> No soldiers in his battalion were killed in such attacks, Flowers said.
> 
> Lt. Col. William "Buck" James, battalion commander of the 3rd Brigade's 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, talked about a fight Aug. 4 with a large enemy force on the western side of Mosul, the third-largest city in Iraq.
> 
> The Strykers not only delivered his soldiers to the edge of the battlefield, but gave them up-to-date information on the location of the enemy, giving his troops the ability to strike decisively.
> 
> "I think, personally, in my experience in urban combat, the Stryker and the soldiers it delivered were the best force for that mission," James said.
> 
> It's these experiences that the 172nd is learning from before they take their turn in Iraq within the next year.






> December 01, 2004
> Army Finds Stryker Shines In Iraqi Combat Zone
> The following article was published by Defense Today, which requires a subscription to view full content. We've included an excerpt below. Thanks to Fred for the article.
> 
> By Scott Nance
> 
> The Army's project manager of Stryker brigade teams gave the new vehicle high marks in its initial use in the war in Iraq.
> 
> Some 311 Strykers in Iraq have driven more than 3 million miles, according to Col. Peter Fuller.
> 
> Speaking yesterday at a conference in Washington, Fuller heaped praise onto the new platform for its mobility, survivability and other capabilities.
> 
> The first Stryker brigade was deployed in Iraq in October 2003, Fuller said. The Army recently used Strykers as part of its campaign against Iraqi insurgents in the city of Fallujah.
> 
> "They road-marched a unit down to support that operation," he said. "And then, when Mosul started to heat up, they ran them back up north. We are finding they are very mobile in the theater."
> 
> *Stryker has also been "very survivable*," Fuller said.
> 
> The vehicles have taken numerous improvised explosive device (IED) and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) hits, and "they keep on surviving," he said.
> 
> No IED attack has managed to penetrate the Stryker's hull, Fuller said, though he noted that one vehicle was lost due to a secondary fire.
> 
> The Army has been using a slat armor, referred to as a "bird cage," around Strykers to defend against RPGs.
> 
> "It's working very well," he said.
> 
> Fuller displayed a picture to conference attendees of a scene where an IED had exploded next to a Stryker, with the force of the detonation rolling the vehicle twice.
> 
> "No one was killed in this," he said.
> 
> Fuller also displayed a photo of the Stryker lost in that secondary fire.
> 
> "Everyone walked awayâ â€no one gets hurt in this," he said. "As a matter of fact, one individual jumped out and sprained his ankle when he was jumping out." [...]
> 
> To maintain the Strykers, the Army has embedded mechanics with the units, whether in the United States or in combat zones, Howe said.
> 
> "We're talking about mechanics being embedded in the combat units, just the way reporters were during the initial start of [Operation Iraqi Freedom]," Fuller said.
> 
> "They are absolutely embedded with the unit."
> 
> I had an opportunity to speak recently with one of the mechanics who was embedded with the 3/2 SBCT last year. He had some very good things to say about the vehicle after seeing it in action during the deployment.



And here's another link with more on the subject

http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4224092p-4014822c.html

Just another point of view,

Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

And another one - a letter to the editor in the Washington Times from a Recce Troop commander that got caught in an ambush himself and relates the results of another ambush in Mosul

There are other reports of Strykers with the cages surviving multiple RPG hits.

Curiously I noticed that when the Black Watch went north during the Fallujah offensive it had Cage armour on its Warriors.  These Warriors are already up armoured and were reported to have survived RPG strikes in the original assault on Basra and survived without the cage.


http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20050213-085725-4274r.htm



> Letters to the Editor
> 
> 
> 
> Stryker brigades fit for duty
> 
> I would like to respond to the opinions Col. Douglas A. MacGregor voiced in his letter to the editor ("Army transformation," Friday).
> First, as a commander of a reconnaissance troop in the Stryker brigade, I do not view myself as the leader of a "SWAT" team, as Col. MacGregor describes Stryker brigades. No offense to the members of those great organizations, but the mission I am trained to handle is far more complex. I am charged with conducting "full-spectrum operations," meaning everything from peacekeeping to high-intensity conflicts. Stryker brigades demonstrated the capability to accomplish these missions on multiple occasions in Iraq. True, there were days spent doing presence patrols of Mosul or handing out school supplies to needy children. But many days were spent conducting successful, productive raids on the homes and businesses of insurgents, as well as other direct-action operations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Col. MacGregor asserts that the "Army's generals have kept the Stryker land-combat vehicle out of urban fighting in places such as Fallujah and Najaf, where they would have sustained serious losses." To my knowledge, Col. MacGregor is correct that there were no Stryker units in those operations, but he's wrong on the reason why. When U.S. forces launched the offensives to retake those towns from insurgents, the battle-hardened, more experienced Stryker unit â â€ the first Stryker brigade â â€ had just been sent home after a year in Iraq. The replacement unit â â€ the second Stryker brigade â â€ had only been on the ground for less than a month. It was still in the process of becoming familiar with the situation and the conduct of missions there.
> As far as the belief that the Stryker would have sustained serious losses if placed in urban combat, I look to personal experience to refute this statement. While conducting escort operations in Baghdad, my convoy came under a well-coordinated combined-arms ambush: small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars. Intense fighting was sustained for some eight to 10 minutes â â€ a very long time by close-combat standards â â€ without the loss of any U.S. or coalition forces or vehicles. The insurgents lost multiple fighters that day. It was the last serious attack on a Stryker-escorted logistics convoy that I know of until we left Baghdad in early August 2004.
> A second and more telling ambush took place in Mosul on Sept. 5, 2004. This ambush include between 50 and 65 insurgents attacking one of my reconnaissance platoons â â€ which consists of four Strykers â â€ with no less than 100 rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and improvised explosive devices. Several of the Strykers took multiple RPG shots and continued to roll. Two RPGs hit the gunshield of a Stryker vehicle, causing superficial wounds to the trooper behind it. Remarkably, the trooper continued to fight and earned an Army Commendation Medal with a "V" for valor for his actions in heavy urban combat.
> In my opinion â â€ and, I'm sure, in that of many others â â€ the Stryker is a keeper.
> 
> LARRY R. JORDAN, JR.
> Commander, C Troop 1-14 Cavalry
> Ft. Lewis, Wash



Cheers again.


----------



## a_majoor

It looks like I might have to modify my stand about the LAV III not being designed for the "Stand up fight" instead.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

In my opinion, the whole Stryker debate on both sides of the border focused on the wrong comparisons.  The debate seemed to focus on Stryker vs Tank (strategic mobility vs protection).  The real debate should have been Stryker vs HUMMVW or truck (comparable mobility and improved protection).  I'll say it again, I'd rather have an escort or QRF provided by LAVs, Coyotes or Strykers than HUMMVWs or G-Wagons. 

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Kirkhill

Agreed 2B.

It looks as if the real threat to the LAV-Stryker would be a weapon of 25mm or larger, which requires a vehicle, which would be detectable, which brings us up to conventional army tactics.  And tanks.

Bluntly put Tanks and Strykers should not be in the same battlespace.  But then again, they don't have to be.  LAVs and Strykers can run farther, faster than tanks on tracks or on transporters.  Therefore the issue is Situational Awareness at the Operational Level or what is the Armoured threat in theatre?

The other question that comes to my mind is the effectiveness of the Cage against even the ATGMs.  They and the RPGs share a common warhead - HEAT, that requires split-second timing to get the stand-off distance right to achieve effect.  How well does the Cage disrupt the ATGM, which is the next level of threat that might be found in an urban environment with a well-financed enemy?


----------



## Zipper

Good articules Kirk. Thanks

It would seem that I have to agree with 2B. The comparrison is not right. Nor should it be.

The LAV's are going to do a bang up job for those operations where you are dealing with people on foot with hand held weapons. To go back to Kirk and his ATGM question. I shudder to think.

So I guess I have to ask. Are we limiting ourselves to just these type of operations? Would we be able to participate in an action in Iran, Pakastan, Syria, or another of the ex-russian republics, with just the LAV's?

Would we be able to participate with our allies (with less then a 2 year upgrade) in a larger scale conflict?

I am still unhappy with our loss of capability (training in armoured shock tactics) and the fact that we are deluding ourselves into believing that larger conflicts in which we will be apart will never happen again.

Until history proves me right, the LAV is going to be it and will hopefully serve us well.


----------



## a_majoor

Its not that bad Zipper. 

The LAV family is modular and adaptable, with the basic vehicle able to deal with small arms, and adaptable enough to carry different armour arrays to fend off different types of attacks. The cage is a clever, "low tech" way of dealing with a certain threat, but ceramic strike plates can be layered over vital spots, or steel stand off armour, or non explosive reactive armour, or even an active system like the DROZAD or ARENA systems can be added to the basic vehicle.

The real change is organizational; we no longer expect to "walk into" a fight and take it on the chin, but rather infer or discover where the enemy is and pre emptively deal with him. How effective this will be is anyone's guess, but even if we have a 50/50 chance of smoking out the enemy prior to his taking action, we are well ahead of the game.

If you take a close look at the "Objective Force" and FCS programs in the United States, they are taking it as an article of faith that a 20-30 tonne vehicle *WILL* be the equivalent of a 70 tonne M-1 in 2020. This is not "niche" but rather mainstream thinking on the part of the Americans. Assuming they can actually pull this off, we have the experience of several decades worth of light-medium force experience; and the reasonably close relationship with the US, so perhaps when it is time to retire the LAV III, the replacements will be members of the FCS family of vehicles, which we will already have a force structure and practical experience to take advantage of these attributes. Even if they haven't got it 100%, they will still be the most lethal 20-30 tonne vehicles in the world.


----------



## Zipper

LOL, I am melodramatic eh?

I guess I have little faith in this new concept of 20 being 70. Yes, we have the experience and are already trained in many of the aspects, but it still doesn't "feel" the same without at least 50 tons of armour around you. It is also the fact that I am old school Armour, and do not wish to see the Armour Corps death, nor its taking on a lesser role. 

There is still a place for the "heavier" elements (not that we can afford them at the moment), and I just hope we are still around and do not need to learn everything from scratch again.

This is why I am liking Kirk's idea of the Armour having all the turreted vehicles (preferably with an up gunned/TOW turret) with the Infantry in the APC and other variants (TOW, etc). It allows the Armour to keep its roll and still be able to function as part of either the cavalry/recce team or the Infantry support team.


----------



## Gobsmacked

Kirk/AMaj,

Just to play devils advocate, don't forget the other side of the fence.
As I posted on the MGS SOR thread, as noted on the InsideDefence website
Headlines from Inside the Army,  January 24, 2005 - Vol. 17, No. 3 
Don't forget that, 
_"As of early January, nine Strykers were either destroyed or rendered 'non-missiion capable' after hits from rocket-propelled grenades, bombs and small-arms fire.  Two were incapable of executing missions after rolling into a canal, and five were damaged in enemy attacks, according to a former service official."_


----------



## Kirkhill

And if we are going there Gobsmacked then let's not forget British and American troopers that drowned when there respective Challengers and Abrams rolled off Canal Dykes.  

Same situation, different vehicle, same result.

This article talks about the early experience of the Brigade in Mosul.  They other articles talk about Stryker ops after about a year in Iraq.



> April 03, 2004
> Stryker Vehicles in Iraq
> 
> April 3, 2004: After four months in Iraq, the Stryker brigade up in Mosul lost its first Stryke[r] armored vehicle to an RPG attack on March 28th. Two RPGs were fired at the vehicle and one was not stopped by the Slat Armor. The vehicle caught fire and was destroyed. None of the crew were hurt. Only the driver was aboard, and he got out. The rest of the crew (an infantry squad) were on foot patrol at the time.
> 
> About half a dozen RPG rounds have previously been fired at the brigades 309 Strykers, only causing minor damage. Two Strykers were damaged when hit by a roadside bomb. Only one soldier was injured. Three Stryker crewmen were killed, back in December, when a Stryker rolled over when part of the dirt embankment underneath it collapsed.
> 
> The troops like the Stryker, mainly because it's faster than the M-2 Bradley tracked armored infantry vehicle that many of the troops had used earlier in their careers. The Stryker has a smoother ride and it is quiet. This has proved to be a significant advantage when going on raids, or just patrolling. The road wheels and metal pads of a tracked armored vehicle make a lot more noise. The Iraqis are unnerved by silent Strykers sneaking up on them.



http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/04/03/stryker_vehicles_in_iraq.html


The discussion on the site goes on to say that the reason the Stryker caught fire was one of the RPG rounds (the one that got through) actually didn't get through.  It ignited a can of fuel oil being carried externally.

Not to pick fights here but if we are going to reasonably evaluate prospects then all available info should be on the table don't you think?

Cheers


----------



## Gobsmacked

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The argument about common logistics is cancelled out in true Canadian fashion by the retention and rebuilding of LAV I (6X6) and LAV II (Coyote, Bison) in the system. While I totally understand the impulse (desperation, since the government agreed to buy @ 400 of the required 1400 LAV III variants identified), it really doesn't help anyone except GD, who get nice contracts to do all this for us.
> 
> Here is *A* thought into what versions the other 1000 LAV IIIs "should" be: (add in the Reserve and there would be more than double the number)
> 
> *LAV FS*: a direct fire support vehicle carrying a small (60-90mm) high velocity cannon and a generous ammunition load (@ 40 rounds). The gun mount is high angled to deal with those annoying rooftop snipers in an urban fight. The same chassis is also available with a breach loading 81mm mortar (since you can pack a lot more 81mm mortar bombs into the vehicle as compared to the 120mm. Numbers do count).
> 
> *LAV LOGISTICS*: configured like a pick-up truck, would carry pallatized or modular supply packs to support the other versions. A "camper top" would be added for ambulance, CP, mobile workshop and other similar vehicles.
> 
> The false economies of buying small numbers of equipment is really the crux of the problems accepting the LAV and the entire "wheeled army" thing. (I am aware of the virtue of track, so please don't start  ;D). If enough LAVs were available, then the equipment would be familier; and more people could have the experience to make sensible suggestions for modifications, changes to doctrine and TTPs and so on. A big production run would also invite economies of scale, most of the reason LAVs are so expensive is they are essentially hand built.
> 
> This draws a number of threads together, and "perhaps" will stimulate some thinking in the procurment world.....



AMaj,
- In regards to your 1st para, just a slight correc on #'s - 
The M-113LE CRS report notes that _"Despite a move toward a predominantly wheeled fleet, life-extension of the in-use M-113 tracked vehicles was viewed as cost-effective and affordable.  _(Especially in view of a protected Combat Service Support [CSS])_ capability shortfall attributed to a decision to purchase 651 LAV-IIIs, against a stated requirement of approximately 1,800 new-wheeled _(armoured)_ vehicles.__"_  The urgent requirement for protected CSS in 'the three block war' that DND expects to find itself is reinforced by the US experience in Iraq which demonstrated that most CSS vehicles require provision of armour protection as there is no defined front line behind which CSS vehicles will operate.

As noted in a 2003 CFC NSSC 5 study paper, _'Not Fighting all the Fights'_, Col J.C. Collin shows that due to _"*THE LACK OF TOP-DOWN, PRECISE, CONGRUENT DIRECTION*"_ some of the above noted wastefull spending need not have occurred.  _"Three anecdotal examples will serve to illustrate the importance of this precise guidance...or lack thereof.  First, the CF's main battle tank, the Leopard, has just completed a refit program to obtain thermal imagery and greater accuracy [at a cost of Cdn$139 million] just in time to be placed in preservation, based on the current belief that the Army should be a wheeled and light armoured force, _(plus the discovery of serious hull deterioration on 38 tanks)_.  Similarly, the Department is spending Cdn$366 million to life-extend the tracked armoured personnel carrier fleet _(- just to prematurely retire them in 2005)_ - again whilst announcing a rapid transition to a wheeled fleet.  This paper will not debate the merits of the 'wheeled' versus 'track' decision, but simply highlight that such a drastic change in equipping philosophy [and thus capability] has been done without a national security policy or Defence White Paper that clearly articulates what is expected of the Canadian land forces.  Another example is the purchase of the Griffon helicopter which neither meets the needs of the White Paper, Strategy 2020, or the Army's requirements for the future battlefield.  At a cost of Cdn$1.2 Billion _(actually Cdn$1.097B)_, the need for clear top-down guidance beginning with a national security policy is clear, _(especially considering 13 of these relatively new platforms have been declared surplus to requirements - a Cdn$142.61M waste)_.  These arguably needless projects are examples where long-term policy would better focus acquisition.  As one somewhat frustrated Lieutenant-Colonel in the Directorate of Land Requirements at National Defence Headquarters announced: 'From my own experience the greatest challenge the Army has faced in the past has been to sort out what we want given the available funding and not change the entire plan every second year . . . Buying equipment takes 5 to 10 years [or more!] on average and if you keep changing your mind all the time you do not get anything at the end of the day.' "_  

To the above examples must be added the 1990s ill-considered Cdn$278M LSVW procurement, plus the 100x Cougars that recently underwent depot level inspection and repair (part of the AVGP Cdn$230.4M life-extension reft - yet another example of 'Lack of Direction'), but have been prematurely retired and replaced by G-wagons for Militia close recce, plus planned premature retirement of Leopard I Badger AEV - delivered from March 1990 for Cdn$51.521M - if the CF eliminates its MBT fleet.  This is without even counting the untold Cdn$ Millions spent during the mid-late-90s in acquiring advanced AHEAD ammunition, acquired for the 35mm/Skyguard II air-defence combo - purchased in 1989 (as part of the Cdn$1B LLAD acquisition of 36 ADATS, 10 Skyguard II radars, and 20 twin-35mm GDF-005 guns) and now deemed surplus to requirements, for *well over Cdn$978M wasted on Army related procurements in just the past decade.*  Surely not a sign of forward thinking force planning.  :blotto:

The 12 Dec 02 BN _'Strykers for Canada'_ provides recent Army Transformation costs. 
_"Canada is in the process of taking delivery of 651 new 8x8 LAV-III Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles [AIFV] at a cost of approximately Cdn$2.327B and not so long ago took delivery of 203 Coyotes [8x8] at a cost of approximately Cdn$882.8M.  When the new LAV-IIIs and Coyotes are combined with the approximately 500 Bison [8x8] _(199 acquired for Cdn$100M in early-90s)_ and Armoured Vehicle General Purpose [AVGP] 6x6 Grizzly vehicles soon to be re-roled and life extended at a cost of approximately Cdn$230.4M.  Canada will be close to having a completely wheeled mechanized force.  Canada will continue to operate 289 Life-extended M-113 tracked APCs in a Combat Service Support [CSS] role."_ 

_"With the exception of a wheeled Direct Fire Support Vehicle with adequate firepower . . . to date, approximately Cdn$5.340B has been spent procuring and upgrading the Army's wheeled armoured vehicles.  Used a rough estimate of Cdn$2.0B for the initial procurement costs of the 500 remaining Grizzly, Husky, Bison and Cougars."_ 
Another recent pre-MGS 'Transformation' cost was the Leopard IC2 Thermal Sight project completed 11 September 2001 for Cdn$139M (final Cdn$200K payment committed in FY 2004-05), that included 18x Gunnery Trainer Simulators - under a Cdn$14M subcontract.  Additionally, as part of the Cdn$630M Omnibus ISTAR project, Cdn$93M is being spent to Enhance and integrate Existing Sensors on: ADATS (during MMEV v2 conversion); LAV-III; LAV-Recce Coyote; and Skyguard air defence radar, Cdn$44M for C4I, plus Cdn$123M to Enhance EW Sensors on Bison EW variants (per Spring 2003 Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, ISTAR Primer).  To this must be added Cdn$68.97M for 1,061 'Silverado' Light Utility Vehicles Wheeled (LUVW) from Nov 2002, and Cdn$130.44M for 1,159 G Wagons and 180 Armour kits from Oct 2003, as part of the Army Transformation effort, Aug 2004 Cdn$22.85M LAV-TUA upgrade, plus the now-defunct Cdn$366M M-113/MTVL life-extension upgrade, *for an overall to-date Army Transformation vehicle cost of a Whopping Cdn$6.65B.*  This does not even account for the: Cdn$691M MGS project, proposed Cdn$136M TOW Missile acquisition, planned Cdn$400M MMEV-ADATS, 'Interim' Cdn$96M MAVS acquisition, and planned Cdn$210M Coyote Life Extention project costs, or premature LSVW Cdn$150M replacement, basically an additional Cdn$1.68B in Army Transformational vehicle costs (nearing Cdn$8.33B total), whilst still leaving the army with a protected CSS _"capability shortfall"_.  Also, not including the Cdn$6.1-million August 2003 contract awarded to General Dynamics Canada for the development and evaluation of a Multi-Mission Virtual Vehicle (MMVV) as part of the Multi -Mission Effects Vehicle [MMEV] technology demonstration project.

[Unfortunately, an April 2003 DND report by CRS notes the _"Low Risk"_ (as with MGS) M-113 Life-extension ran a to-date Cdn$95M cost-overrun for a total cost of Cdn$366M, with project completion _"on track at March 2007"_, and some 200 M-113/MTVL upgrades completed by 2005.  The reduced 289 M-113/MTVLs are a _"substantial 29%"_ vehicle reduction from originally planned 406 x M-113 Life-extension, with a 40% cost increase per vehicle (_"assuming the project remains at Cdn$366M, the per unit vehicle cost will have risen from Cdn$0.9M [Cdn$366M/406] to Cdn$1.26M [Cdn$366M/289]"_ each), while _"at this stage, there remains little margin for error as all contingency funds have been committed"_.  Even the much touted 'expenditure review' that accompanied the back-loaded 2005 budget increase notes that Accelerated Retirement of the tracked M-113 fleet _"in line with Army transformation objectives"_, after spending between Cdn$366M to Cdn$328.479M (as identified in the 2004-05 RPP - with Cdn$311.542M spent by 31 March 2005) on upgrading the fleet, only saves a minimal _"Cdn$24M Total"_ by 2009-2010 (_"FY: 06 - Cdn$3M; 07, 08 and 09 - Cdn$7M each"_) when Cdn$5.7B of the Cdn$12.8B increase kicks in.

Even though just 289 M-113A3 / MTVL variants are currently being upgraded for the CSS role, _'Jane's Armour and Artillery'_ notes DND _"awarded a Cdn$215M contract to DEW Engineering and Development of Ottawa for the M113 APC-LE programme.  United Defence LP . . . is the main subcontractor, and was awarded a Cdn$147M contract by DEW for the supply of 156 M-113A3 upgrade kits, and 174 upgrade kits for the stretched MTVL version, engineering data and integrated logistic support."_  Therefore, even though DND has paid for 330x M-113 upgrade kits (Cdn$0.445M each) and integrated logistics support, *DEW has 41x unused M-113 upgrade kits in stock that DND has paid Cdn$18.245M for.*   A mixed tracked-wheeled fleet provides some flexibility when terrain and/or weather conditions limit the deployability of the wheeled LAV-III.


- As to your *'LAV FS'* - I suggest the twin-120mm turreted AMOS mounted on the 8x8 LAV-III chassis, those meant for the ADATS (due to the 'Top-Heavy' issues noted elsewhere) in the guise of an AMOS MMEV-FSV (Multi-Mission Fire Support Vehicle).  AMOS (Advanced MOrtar System) twin-120mm MMEV-FSV on LAV-III, with twin, breech-loading, semi-automatic mortars capable of achieving 14 multiple rounds simultaneous impact (MRSI) out to 10 km, is preferable vs GDLS 120mm Armoured Mortar System (AMS) with its much slower rate of fire (4 MRSI) and requiring twice as many vehicles (and PY) to deliver equivalent firepower.  AMOS, with its computerised fire-control system capable of 'scoot and shoot' techniques, also has an impressive maximum rate of fire stated to be 26 rds/min.  AMOS on 6x6 XA-203 has a demonstrated loadout of 90x 120mm mortar bombs (ie. 84x HE & 6x Strix PGMM - with 30x of these rounds stored in the turret bustle), the 8x8 LAV-III chassis should easily surpass this loadout and handsomely beat the limited 18x 105mm round ammo capacity of the MGS.  The streamlined AMOS turret also incorporates stealth characteristics.
[Note: I'll present a separate post expanding on this when time permits later in March.]


- As to the *'LAV LOGISTICS'* - see below:
The wasted Cdn$978M noted above could, for comparisons sake, have covered the procurement of 300 CSS LAV-III CSV, plus over Cdn$348M for other high-priority projects.  At DNDs valuation of _"Cdn$2M per _(basic)_ LAV-III chassis"_, plus Cdn$30M in NRE outfitting costs, some 300 LAV-III CSV variants could have been acquired for Cdn$630M - providing the Army a protected, wheeled CSS CSV fleet that would fully interoperable with the current fleet, and reduce logistics costs, whilst enabling equivalent mobility to US Stryker brigades.  As a NZ Army logistics officer, responsible for developing the 1st line CSS organisation to support their newly acquired LAV3's, noted elsewhere _"it is only recently with the lessons learnt from Iraq and Afghanistan that CSS A-line security has started to be taken seriously, after all it is no good having a fleet of top of the line LAV 3's as your teeth, if the tail is naked"_ (ie. unarmoured).  As previously noted, the requirement for protected CSS vehicles, in 'the three block war' that DND expects to find itself, is urgent as there is no defined front line behind which CSS vehicles will operate.

The 15 October 2003 _'JDW'_ noted _"Details have been revealed of a dedicated logistics support variant of the General Dynamics Land Systems _(Canada)_ Australian Light Armoured Vehicle [ASLAV] that will enable fast-moving and far-ranging Australian Army cavalry units to double the duration of combat operations remote from support echelons.  Known as the *Combat Support Vehicle [CSV]*, the 8x8 vehicle was developed several years ago be the Land Systems Division of BAE Systems Australia and has since undergone trials with the army's 2nd Cavalry Regiment across northern Australia. . . . Based on a Type 2 ASLAV hull, three to four CSVs would typically be attached to a cavalry squadron. . . . In addition to increasing the endurance of the squadron from two days to four, the CSV, with the same mobility and protection levels as the standard ASLAV, removes the need to return to forward arming and refuelling points for resupply.  The semi-permanent installations in the CSV require no modifications to the base vehicle and make use of the internal volume in what is normally the rear troop compartment.  To undertake the replenishment mission, the CSV is fitted with two 650-litre tanks for diesel fuel and racks for carriage of twenty 20-litre jerrycans for water or petrol, oils and lubricants.  Additional replenishment items such as ammunition and ration packs can also be carried.  An internal rail system mounted on the underside of the hull roof permits the two-person crew to move jerrycans along the length of the vehicle under armour protection."_

Acquisition of the AMOS MMEV-FSV would provide an opportunity to inexpensively redress some of the CSS mobility shortfalls as the 24x Bison LAV-II (w\ boxy capacious compartment and hinged roof hatches - ideal for CSS conversion) 'Wolf' 81mm (turntable mounted) mortar carriers (that would be replaced by AMOS MMEV-FSV) that could be re-roled to a CSS Combat Support Vehicle [CSV] role to support the five LAV-II Coyote Recce squadrons, as this would enable a logistically compatible LAV-II fleet in the Recce sqns.  Meanwhile, transfer the 24x 81mm 'Wolf' turntable mountings to all-terrain BV-206 carriers to enable comparable dedicated Company-level mortar support (as presently provided by the dual-tasked LG1/81mm artillery batteries) to the three light battalions - or LAV-III companies operating in a 'light' role, until such time that a lightweight-120mm mortar is acquired. 

SUGGESTED:
*BDE Recce Sqn* {9-27-157} 197 PY   [w\ 27x COYOTE, 2x LAV-TUA, 4x BISON CSV]
SHQ {4-3-12}19 PY
    Comd {2-2-4}- COYOTE x2 (command, remote-tripod)
    SHQ Sec {2-0-4} - LAV-III CP; GRIZZLY CP
    Sigs Sec {0-1-4} - LUVW; GRIZZLY (Radio Relay) x2
    Anti-Tank Sec {0-2-6} - LAV-TUA (Overwatch/AT)
(x3) Recce Tp {1-4-27} 28 PY - COYOTE x8 (2x mast, 4x remote-tripod, 2x command);
Close Recce Tp {1-3-20} 24 PY - LUVW G-Wagon x8
1st Line CSS Admin Tp {1-7-38} 46 PY   [Note: based on interpolation of DF Sqn Admin Tp]
    Comd Section {1-3-3} - COYOTE (command); GRIZZLY CP; MLVW,
    SQMS {0-1-2} - LSVW; MLVW,   Medical {0-0-3} - BISON AMB,
    Tpt Section {0-1-16} - BISON CSV x4; MLVW x1; HLVW x2; HLVW POL x2,
    Food {0-0-2}- MLVW w/ Kitchen Trl,
    Maint Section {0-2-12}- BISON MRV; BISON MRT x2; GRIZZLY MRT x2; HUSKY ARV.

Note: Addition of: 2x LAV-TUA, 4x CSV, close recce troop, plus additional: COYOTE (command); and radio relay, address Recce Sqn structural issues raised in recent past issues of the _'Armour Bulletin'_ by numerous Armour experts, while CSV addresses the Sustainability/Survivability issue, thus allowing a fully armoured LAV-II-based A1 support echelon for improved battlefield mobility/survivability.
CSS excerpt noted below by the previous Corps Adjutant RCAC in v33:
_"SUSTAINABILITY.   Reconnaissance forces can expect to be in operations for extended periods of time.  The concept of resupply well forward of friendly lines and perhaps behind enemy lines has always been of great concern.  The administration troop is normally divided into A1 and A2 echelons.  This organisation of B vehicles has a self-defence capability limited to small arms and some handheld anti-tank weapons.  It is a very vulnerable target on the battlefield.  The introduction of the Coyote has placed a strain on the administration troop.  The troop organisation has changed little while the squadron equipment has changed drastically with the implementation of the Coyote, certainly in the area of ammunition requirements.  During intense and prolonged operations the squadron will require frequent resupply of combat supplies, ie. ammunition, POL.  Therefore, the administration troop will be moving continuously and will be susceptible to enemy observation and destruction.  Further, the troop, as organised, has insufficient lift to carry the ammunition required."_


Kirk,
As to the situation of the Canals, I agree they are just as deadly to tracked as to wheeled.  
The point I wanted to make was that LAV is Not Invulnerable, just like Tracked, they can be destroyed, even in the Non-Combat (in the traditional Red vs Blue sense).  Definitely Not something any 'US Army Approved' News Item or Press Release will hype up or even fully acknowledge.  As you say, all available info should be out there.
For some non-conformist opinions, besides POGO, check out  http://www.g2mil.com/Spring2005.htm

But I agree, for Patrol against Aysymetrical forces (without Tanks or other Armoured vehicles) the faster/quieter LAV is Ideal - But not suited for Combat, especially the MGS which is not (in US service) even tested/trialed/equipped in Anti-tank role.


----------



## Zipper

I guess we have to just answer the question then. Should the LAV III be the "sole" armoured vehicle?

When it comes to Wheeled vehicles. I'd say yes. Lets have economy of one chasis to support and have variants within that.

Should it be the only one? NO! I believe we will eventually HAVE to have tracked vehicles again. Whether that is anothr MBT or something like the CV90, Bradley, or some such I do not know.


----------



## Infanteer

Now I know we have a 20 page argument on the LAV chassis, but this is a simple question.

I see the link to the Aussie ASLAV fleet that Kirkhill provided (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/2cav/newgear.html) shows that they use 3 varients:

The ASLAV 1 (our Coyote) which is the only version fitted with a 25mm turret.

The ASLAV 2, which is a turretless LAV III and requires a crew of 2.

The ASLAV 3, which is the recovery and maintence/fitter varient.

Would our mechanized force benefit in terms of O&M costs, training requirements, parts, ect, etc if we binned the Bison and all its varients and adopted the turretless LAV III as a general purpose vehicle?  Out LAV fleet would resemble the Aussies to some respects in that we have:

- Coyotes
- Turreted LAV III
- Specialty LAV III (recovery, maintenance, engineering?)
- General Purpose LAV III

The eventual goal would be to eliminate the Coyotes (as the turreted LAV III can fulfill that role) and move to a single chassis - perhaps by this time frame we might be moving beyond the LAV III anyways to either a FCS-type light tracked system or a SEP-like modular wheeled system.


----------



## Zipper

I agree. But would you want our forces to resemble the theories already being discussed in the "light" threads?

This is what I would like to see:

Infantry

All light

Cavalry (Armoured) This would almost be a combined arms unit

LAV III (General) To haul either infantry or supplies
LAV III Turret (Upgunned and with TOW with some staying with 25mm and coyote capability)
LAV III Maintence/recovery/engineer
LAV III TUA/Morter/MGS (both of these handled by RCHA) either/or all of these.

I don't know what the role of the RCHA is right now with the lose of the M109, but it would give them three great vehicles.

Arty

105mm/morters/etc.

But if not. Yours sounds good too. ;D


Scrap all other chasis (AVGP, LAV II) and stick with the one until we eithre look at getting another entirly, or wish to expand our capabilities by adding track.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The ASLAV 2, which is a turretless LAV III and requires a crew of 2.


I think it is actually a turetless "LAV II" or Bisson as we call it.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Would our mechanized force benefit in terms of O&M costs, training requirements, parts, ect, etc if we binned the Bison and all its varients and adopted the turretless LAV III as a general purpose vehicle?


Yes, but then you have procurment costs.  I'd cut the AVGP fleet first.


----------



## Infanteer

I wasn't referring to Force capability, only the Army Fleet.

with over 100 (expensive) Coyote frames that are relatively new, scrapping them isn't an option in the near future.   Unfortunately, we will have to deal with a multi-vehicle fleet for now.   How interchangeable are parts on the LAV 25 (Coyote) and the LAV III (I remember someone saying that Coyote and Bison were two different creatures altogether)?

LAV TUA/Mortar/ MGS (perhaps a smaller cannon - 90mm?) would be worth looking at.

As for artillery, I always thought guns stuck on a LAV chassis looked awkward.   I always thought the South African G-6 would go well with a LAV CAV organization - I know its a different chassis, but thems the breaks.   Any thoughts on this?


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> I think it is actually a turetless "LAV II" or Bisson as we call it.



Actually, going on my AFV skills, I think you're right.  Those smallish tires on the turretless varients say "LAV 25".  I'm not sure if it is the equivelent of a Bison though.  I thought George Wallace said that the Bison and the LAV25 are two different creatures.

My mistake was mixing up ASLAV 3 (which is a turretless LAV 25) with LAV III.

Oh well.



> Yes, but then you have procurment costs.   I'd cut the AVGP fleet first.



Sounds like a good start (I'm assuming AVGP means Grizz/Couger?).


----------



## Kirkhill

Zipper and Gobsmacked:

Don't scrap the AVGPs and the Bison/Coyotes - Pass them back to the reserves.

Better than what they have aren't they.   GW and ArmyRick have made a similar suggestion on some of these threads.

Infanteer:

How about that GDLS LAV/Denel 105 with the 30+ km range that the Americans trialled? Not an option for you?

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/21166.0.html

Posted by GW.


----------



## Zipper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> LAV TUA/Mortar/ MGS (perhaps a smaller cannon - 90mm?) would be worth looking at.
> 
> As for artillery, I always thought guns stuck on a LAV chassis looked awkward.   I always thought the South African G-6 would go well with a LAV CAV organization - I know its a different chassis, but thems the breaks.   Any thoughts on this?



Since the MGS is basically a SP gun, then either a 90 or 105 would do. Yes it looks weird, but having the same chasis is what this is all about.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sounds like a good start (I'm assuming AVGP means Grizz/Couger?).



Yes. Include the Husky as well.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> with over 100 (expensive) Coyote frames that are relatively new, scrapping them isn't an option in the near future.   Unfortunately, we will have to deal with a multi-vehicle fleet for now.   How interchangeable are parts on the LAV 25 (Coyote) and the LAV III (I remember someone saying that Coyote and Bison were two different creatures altogether)?



Yes, your right. We couldn't scrap them. Scrap the AVGP and send all the LAV II (bison and 25) down to the reserves. That would give a leg up on training some of the armoured regiments in Cavalry.

The parts are not interchangable between the 25 and the III. As well as the Bison and 25. GW knows more about that.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Infanteer:
> 
> How about that GDLS LAV/Denel 105 with the 30+ km range that the Americans trialled? Not an option for you?
> 
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/21166.0.html



Hey, never looked at that.  If it works - great.  Saves us from having to implement another chassis and gives the guns the ability to play the fast and furious LAV CAV game.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Since the MGS is basically a SP gun, then either a 90 or 105 would do. Yes it looks weird, but having the same chasis is what this is all about.



I just figured that there were a few 90mm turrets that didn't present such a problem to incorporating it as that silly 105mm "Tank Killer" - but yes, you're right, SP Gun is what we're looking for in an MGS.



> Yes, your right. We couldn't scrap them. Scrap the AVGP and send all the LAV II (bison and 25) down to the reserves. That would give a leg up on training some of the armoured regiments in Cavalry.



You're right - the possibility here exists - although I'd want to keep the chassis' for the reserves at a minimum as well.

The Reserves is an imporatant issue - all our talks about Force Capabilities and Reorganization and we've yet to touch on the subject once.



> The parts are not interchangable between the 25 and the III. As well as the Bison and 25. GW knows more about that.



That's what I thought.  Too bad - makes a bigger footprint.


----------



## Zipper

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> How about that GDLS LAV/Denel 105 with the 30+ km range that the Americans trialled? Not an option for you?
> 
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/21166.0.html



Wow. Very nice. Get rid of the MGS in favour of that. Or put it down to 90mm and call it a sp and still give it to the Arty.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

I don't know how many of you watch what is happening with international arms sales and procurement on the Jane's sites, but these were in my last land force update:

SOCOM eyes Stryker for urban ops
The US Army is sending 16 8 x 8 Stryker medium armoured vehicles to special operations forces in Afghanistan and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is considering further purchases for urban warfare, according to senior military officials.
[Jane's Defence Weekly - first posted to http://jdw.janes.com - 25 February 2005]

Turkish Pars fighting vehicle to start trials
The Turkish FNSS Savunma Sistemleri Pars (Leopard) 8 x 8 armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) will soon start a series of trials in Turkey, following its unveiling at the IDEX 2005 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in February.
[Jane's Defence Weekly - first posted to http://jdw.janes.com - 25 February 2005]

Czech Republic set to revise 8 x 8 requirement
The Czech Republic Ministry of Defence (MoD) has ordered the army to re-evaluate its requirements for new 8 x 8 armoured vehicles by the end of the first quarter of 2005, before an international tender worth up to Kcs25 billion ($.1.1 billion) is announced.
[Jane's Defence Weekly - first posted to http://jdw.janes.com - 25 February 2005]

Mowag Piranhas get bigger and tougher
The Swiss company Mowag has already won a leading position in the field of wheeled armoured vehicles with its Piranha series and it is now following its success with further development of the third-generation Piranha III and work on the new, fourth-generation Piranha IV.
[Jane's International Defence Review - first posted to http://idr.janes.com - 24 February 2005]


News Briefs enjoys a unique subscriber base worldwide. If you are interested in advertising to this audience, call Carly Litchfield on +44 (0) 20 8700 3738 or e-mail: carly.litchfield@janes.com

        As you can see, the LAV III and its equivalents are enjoying a large amount of interest from those nations who are interested in maintaining modern fighting forces.   These are not "poor man's tanks", but a light cavalry fighting vehicle.   Canada should indeed move to an all LAV III regular force, with the Coyotes and Bison relegated to the Reserves, where they would provide much better training for the LAV III than the Cougar ever gave for the Leopard.   The LAV III is not fought like a Main Battle Tank, and a Mongol horse archer never fought like a heavy cavalry knight, but they managed to carve a fairly large path through them.   Canada is not going to be able to fight a heavy cavalry war, we lack the size to build a credible force, or deploy one.   We can provide a robust light cavalry, a combined arms force of mechanized infantry, armoured reconnaissance, direct and indirect fire support, with logistics and support elements mounted on compatable LAV III chassis for ease of maintenance, and survivability in low and mid intensity sustained combat operations.      ;D


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Hm.

It seems to me that all of the quotes from Jane's talk about getting a wheeled vehicle to augment existing capabilities.  They all have an armour Corps, they all have attack helicopters, they all have SP arty, in other words, the wheeled vehicle is being used not as a sole operating vehicle, but as a niche vehicle.

I've said it before, by going all LAV, we drastically reduce the capabilities of our Armed Forces.  

However, I fully endorse the idea of cascading the AVGP fleet to the reserves, with the idea of cascading the Coyote down to them in the future.  It would be a win-win for all concerned.  Especially seeing as how we are rapidly becoming a niche army......


----------



## George Wallace

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> Hm.
> 
> It seems to me that all of the quotes from Jane's talk about getting a wheeled vehicle to augment existing capabilities. They all have an armour Corps, they all have attack helicopters, they all have SP arty, in other words, the wheeled vehicle is being used not as a sole operating vehicle, but as a niche vehicle.
> 
> I've said it before, by going all LAV, we drastically reduce the capabilities of our Armed Forces.
> 
> However, I fully endorse the idea of cascading the AVGP fleet to the reserves, with the idea of cascading the Coyote down to them in the future. It would be a win-win for all concerned. Especially seeing as how we are rapidly becoming a niche army......



Lance

When the PC Party makes you Min of National Defence, can I get to be your Deputy?    ;D

GW


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> Hm.
> 
> It seems to me that all of the quotes from Jane's talk about getting a wheeled vehicle to augment existing capabilities.   They all have an armour Corps, they all have attack helicopters, they all have SP arty, in other words, the wheeled vehicle is being used not as a sole operating vehicle, but as a niche vehicle.
> 
> I've said it before, by going all LAV, we drastically reduce the capabilities of our Armed Forces.
> 
> However, I fully endorse the idea of cascading the AVGP fleet to the reserves, with the idea of cascading the Coyote down to them in the future.   It would be a win-win for all concerned.   Especially seeing as how we are rapidly becoming a niche army......


----------



## Lance Wiebe

mainerjohnthomas;

Did you have a comment?

George;

They wouldn't dare.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Sorry, the computer ate my last post, save the quote.  As I attempted to say earlier, we are a niche army now.  The Leo's we have, medium outdated tanks that they are, will never again see deployment.  All we are going to field are light cavalry forces, and going with an all LAV III fleet gives us the chance to deploy an expeditionary force with sufficient punch for low and mid intenstiy conflicts, and to serve as a screening/skirmishing force for a coalition force where the US/UK supply the heavy armour.  We are out of the tank business, and that is that (I personally don't like it, but no one voted for me).  We are a small army, keeping commonality of parts reduces our logistics tail and increases our force projection ability.  The LAVIII family gives us a platform that provides APC, SP direct fire, TUA anti tank, ( and hopefully soon an SAM and 120m mortar), engineering, amubulance, and logistics vehicle.  All the roles required, on a single platform, a supply chain that Canada can actually support with our (deplorably run down) airlift capability.  Give the Reserves the LAV II in all its forms, and let them train on kit that has some relavence to the material they will use with their parent Regiments (anyone else recall the stupidity of Cougar training as a "Leopard Trainer"?).   If we have more platforms, it reduces our ability to supply and deploy them, it results in a force that trains like a tiger in Wainwright, and deploys like a hamstrung chicken overseas because we cannot deploy all the required elements, and  some of the elements deployed become hanger queens because we cannot maintain them if employed agressively.  I would rather train on a force that resembles what we will actually deploy, and deploy a force that can patrol and fight sure and certain of the knowledge that spares are available, and what is deployed can be maintained in fighting orde for the duration of deployment.  Tracks are wonderful, tracks are matchless, tracks are a stone bitch to keep running after a few hundred clicks of bad country. LAV's we can do, if we have all LAV III we can do more, longer, more effectively.  Going all LAV III increases our ability to meet mission objectives, if we were defending Edmonton from an invasion from BC, than tracks would get my vote, since we're fighting "over there" than wheels is the way.


----------



## Zipper

Agreed with you for the most part there.

Unfortunately our government probably won't see it that way. Chances of any LAV's ever making down to the Militia are probably few and far between for a few years yet. Chances of going to an all III platform are also not good, since we have so many coyotes and bisons already, not to mention still useable Huskies. 

Also, the chances of them purchasing all those variants are not good either. Thank god they are for the engineers, but the rest? Jeez I hope so.

As for being able to deploy them. Not right now. Not unless we lease or borrow other aircraft. Our Hercs are in no shape to do the job, nor are they able to move the III chassis anyway.

And if you ask me, the chances of us being made into a light Cav force, or even able to engage in a medium intensity conflict anytime soon (5 -10 years) are close to nil.

But who knows what may happen.


----------



## George Wallace

Actually, mainerjohnthomas, I thought what you just posted to be a crock pot full of big words put together randomly to give the appearance of something that they aren't and impress the impressionable, but confuse the knowledgable.  It was absolute crap.

GW


----------



## T.S.Rea

Despite the large amount of money sunk into the LAVIII, significant numbers of M113 based vehicles remain, as do upgraded versions of the LAVIII's immediate predecessor.  It does not represent a significant technical hurdle to convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration so that the whole force enjoys the tactical mobility of wheels and the tractive and protective benefits of tracks when required.  A significant part of the cost of the LAVIII are electronics, sensors, and weapons that are not indivisible tied to the vehicle.  Selected M113's can be re-armoured where relevant at zero weight growth, offering far superior protection than the LAVIII will ever offer, and even if they sell the existing unused M113's, worn out hulls can be bought cheaply.  I reject virtually all arguments concerning the merits of the LAVIII as confusing theory with the actual reality of its implementation, it is a sunk cost fallacy, and one that can be remedied while actually saving money in the intermediate term.  Weight to military value is critical to strategic mobility of the army and its relevance (if not the very survival of the armed forces as a geniune military force), and support costs grow exponentially with weight.


----------



## McG

T.S.Rea,
Unless you plan to entierly replace the hull, I cannot see how you would increase the armour of an old M113 without any increase in wieght.

What do you mean by "convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration"?


----------



## George Wallace

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Despite the large amount of money sunk into the LAVIII, significant numbers of M113 based vehicles remain, as do upgraded versions of the LAVIII's immediate predecessor.



Could you more clearly define what you mean by "LAV III's immediate predecessor"?



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> It does not represent a significant technical hurdle to convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration so that the whole force enjoys the tactical mobility of wheels and the tractive and protective benefits of tracks when required.



I'd like to see your figures on this?  I am sure that the costs are prohibitive and the whole idea to be unrealistic.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> A significant part of the cost of the LAVIII are electronics, sensors, and weapons that are not indivisible tied to the vehicle.



The same is true of all modern AFVs.




			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> Selected M113's can be re-armoured where relevant at zero weight growth, offering far superior protection than the LAVIII will ever offer, and even if they sell the existing unused M113's, worn out hulls can be bought cheaply.



M113's are already being upgraded.  Some have been upgraded to TLAV, a whole new animal.



			
				T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> I reject virtually all arguments concerning the merits of the LAVIII as confusing theory with the actual reality of its implementation, it is a sunk cost fallacy, and one that can be remedied while actually saving money in the intermediate term. Weight to military value is critical to strategic mobility of the army and its relevance (if not the very survival of the armed forces as a geniune military force), and support costs grow exponentially with weight.



Huh?


----------



## Infanteer

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Huh?



I'll second that.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Actually, mainerjohnthomas, I thought what you just posted to be a crock pot full of big words put together randomly to give the appearance of something that they aren't and impress the impressionable, but confuse the knowledgable.   It was absolute crap.
> 
> GW


     So you would be the impressionable or the knowledgable ;D?  Seriously, if its all the gov't is going to buy, isn't it time we stopped mourning what we can't have, and work on how to use what we can?  As far as the weapon mix being crap, there are a lot of nations using various wheeled platforms to provide the same weapon mix, and if you don't beleive me, look into it.


----------



## Zipper

mainerjohnthomas said:
			
		

> So you would be the impressionable or the knowledgable ;D?   Seriously, if its all the gov't is going to buy, isn't it time we stopped mourning what we can't have, and work on how to use what we can?   As far as the weapon mix being crap, there are a lot of nations using various wheeled platforms to provide the same weapon mix, and if you don't beleive me, look into it.



I know GW is going to come back on that one. But I think the moaning is about the fact that those countries using wheeled vehicles are also using track, and the wheels are simply an augmentation of capability as opposed to a singular. 

As for the other meaning. Well thats what this place is for. To bitch about things (for those still in) without the possibility of screwing your career, and to exchange views on what may or may not be better alternatives in both equipment and use of such. 

Quite frankly there have been some incredibly good ideas put forward on these boards that, who knows? May actually have a chance of being listened too.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Zipper said:
			
		

> I know GW is going to come back on that one. But I think the moaning is about the fact that those countries using wheeled vehicles are also using track, and the wheels are simply an augmentation of capability as opposed to a singular.
> 
> As for the other meaning. Well thats what this place is for. To ***** about things (for those still in) without the possibility of screwing your career, and to exchange views on what may or may not be better alternatives in both equipment and use of such.
> 
> Quite frankly there have been some incredibly good ideas put forward on these boards that, who knows? May actually have a chance of being listened too.


     Actually, I agree with the necessity of track.  I just think that Canada has become a niche army.  And that if we are to play any meaningful role in international affairs, it is by providing a force that can contribute to an international effort with a force that we can provide, deploy and support.  I just don't see us having the ability to do heavy armour any more.  It WILL be important on the battlefield of tomorrow, it just won't be us driving.  The US or UK will be senior partners in any major conflict the CF deploys in, and we must concentrate on providing an army that can bring its own weapons and skills to that coalition.  Wheeled light cavalry and mechanized infantry is what the gov't has decided we are going to do.  Having said that, we must concentrate on making the most of that role.  And by going all LAV III we can make a credible contribution, getting the most bang for our buck.  If we are going to specialize, to be a niche force, let us be the best and most well rounded practitioner of the craft.  Done properly, we can have an army that will serve us well, and serve any coalition we are part of.  Let us be a real force at what we can do, and not a paper tiger that dabbles at a hundred tasks we cannot commit to doing well.


----------



## ArmyRick

"Actually, I agree with the necessity of track"
Agree it has its place.

 "I just think that Canada has become a niche army."
Agree.

"And that if we are to play any meaningful role in international affairs, it is by providing a force that can contribute to an international effort with a force that we can provide, deploy and support."
This is the CDS intentions...

 "I just don't see us having the ability to do heavy armour any more."

We have been out of this game ALONG time now. Some won't admit it. If we were going to become a real mech force to be taken seriously. during the mid eighties was the optimal time to do so. Our M113s were at the 25 year point then. We could have upgraded to warrior or more than likely Bradley (yes a pricey$$$ affair). However we didn't.

For all you people out there yapping on and on about we need heavy MBT this and that, we need SPH and so on. 

If we are going to acquire a heavy force, then we need serious air lift capability and Sea lift capability. WE DON'T HAVE THAT. So its off to become a medium force. 

Oh the p*ssing and moaning about how soldiers are going to dye in the hundreds because we use LAVIII. Come on we have been using LAVIII on operations for a couple of years now and if anything, they have enhanced our capability.

I would say yes, if the LAVIII were serving in Iraq (not the US stryker) it would do fine. That 25mm chain gun is nothing to sneeze at.

Heavy armour for Canada is not around for now, the CDS is quite clear we are going to have medium and light weight forces. Let get on with it. 

As I have said before, our best weapon is a highly trained and motivated infantryman.


----------



## T.S.Rea

The 6V53 engine of the M113 is 1960's technology, very heavy for its performance.  The Volkswagen V10 diesel is an example of what can be accomplished with a clean sheet of paper in terms of power to weight, and given that this or comparable engines are in production for the civilian market, inexpensive by military standards ($10,000?).  At least a thousand pounds forward saved for frontal reinforcement, as well as some additional useable space.

Improving the protection quite literally would require armour removal, in this case by milling the thickness of the relatively soft and thick aluminum of the hull in selected areas with CNC machinery.  I have worked with such machinery in the recent past, and am quite familiar with what it can do (the key factor is the competence of the operator to ensure that it cuts the metal where required, since errors would be time consuming to correct, but the learning curve is low and it is more a question of the operator's personality and work habits).  The installed and ready to go cost of this machinery is no more than $500,000, significantly less if moderately simpler and less powerful tooling is employed (cost-benefit analysis required, made easier by the thousands of companies operating such machinery). 

Some sections would be easier to remove wholesale, the most obvious being the broad sections of the sides and front, removed in sections with cutting tools attached to the  CNC machinery.  There are likely to be some complicating details to removing some sections of plate, but none that would be insurmountable with proper prepartion and removal of the relevant items, just as would be done with some conversions to install length extension plugs to the vehicle.

The removed material would be remanufactured as an aluminum/aluminum oxide matrix composite, a material with twice the ballistic resistance of homogenous alloys of aluminum.  If practical, the replacement panels would be manufactured on site, quite possibly within a few dozen feet of the CNC machinery in order to eliminate handling and shipping costs, which might also be used be used to cut the remanufactured material to shape if moulds for every replacement panel would not be cost effective.  The replacement panels would be re-welded to the vehicle in process, either by manual methods or CNC aluminum welding machinery.

Small quantities of granular titanium and/or tungsten carbide would be incorporated into the outer layers of the aluminim matrix armour to enhance ballistic performance, as well as significantly further raise the energy required to initiate self-sustaining combustion of the new aluminum-aluminum oxide (the materials inside the vehicle actually cause the vehicle to burn in the same manner as steel vehicles, a re-evaluation of these materials should be the priority; the heat required to cause self-sustaining combustion is many times higher than that required to kill the occupants regardless).  Titanium panels are already used in up-armoured versions of the M113, once again a remanufacturing process without a material cost.  Lower hull sections of the M113 would not benefit significantly from remanufacturing, they would be reinforced with thin external titanium plate and a thick liner of fire-resistant Kevlar and Spectra fibres.

At 12 tons, the remanufactured vehicle would possess 50% greater internal space than the LAVIII at 16 tons, a 100% increase in weight efficiency at roughly a quarter of the cost of the latter.  Lower silhouette and center of gravity, double the protection, more maneouvable, development potential if required, air portable by C-130 or CH-47, lower support costs.  The development cost of the vehicle would not be high, since the separate elements of the new drivetrain, powertrain, and re-armouring can all be performed and thoroughly tested and evaluated independently.  I would be concerned about the ability of the military and large companies to do this in a cost-effective manner, perhaps the only real problem area, but as a small to medium business exercise well within feasibility.

Although this conversion could be described in greater detail, hopefully this is sufficient to explain what was meant by my remarks.


----------



## Infanteer

M113 is gone - sorry to let you down.

Better start talking about what to do with LAV CAV instead of wasting energy on "aluminum matrix milling"....


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> M113 is gone - sorry to let you down.
> 
> Better start talking about what to do with LAV CAV instead of wasting energy on "aluminum matrix milling"....



The Department of National Defence (DND) is upgrading approximately 400 M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) as part of the overall Canadian APC Life Extension (LE) Project modernization program (i.e TLAV). The M113LE Project addresses existing capability deficiencies of mobility, capacity, firepower and protection by providing the Canadian Forces with a low risk, cost effective, and modern APC with growth potential to meet the Canadian Forces operational requirements to the year 2020. 

There are 6 variants,
MTVL http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/MTVL.html
MTVE http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/MTVE.html
MTVC http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/MTVC.html
MTVF http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/MTVF.html
MTVR http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/MTVR.html
M113A3 http://publications.dewengineering.com/tlav/web/m113a3.html

Chimo!


----------



## Infanteer

Sorry, I should of clarified - I meant that is was gone as the primary maneuver vehicle of the CF (along with the Leo).  I was aware that is was being maintained for certain support functions.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sorry, I should of clarified - I meant that is was gone as the primary maneuver vehicle of the CF (along with the Leo). I was aware that is was being maintained for certain support functions.



Lol, should have thought that one over a bit more before I posted it  

Chimo!


P.S. Has anyone done the TLAV course? I will be doing it mid-april and would like a heads-up of what to expect.


----------



## T.S.Rea

Some 280+ M113's remain in the inventory, and old surplus ones can be bought for a song.

LAV can not be lifted by C-130 over anything but short range at cool sea level conditions, unless you believe in the two billion dollar C-17 fantasy to move a handful of armoured vehicles at a time.

A C-130 crashed on take-off in Afghanistan killing all aboard because they thought it was loaded to 25,000lbs, investigation later revealed it was about 32,000lbs and was the direct cause of the crash.   Maximum practical limit of C-130 is 25,000lb., the goal the original M113 was designed to meet.   Antonov's require large prepared airfields, and can not be flown where there is anything more than an extremely remote chance of being fired on, assuming they are even available when needed.   Ro-Ro ships can not dock in land-locked countries like Afghanistan, some minimum airlift capacity required regardless.

It is often necessary to airlift fuel and supplies, which can cost as much as $25 a pound.   OEF is costing the Americans tens of billions, much of it the cost of extensive airlift, despite the close proximity of available fuel.   Support costs are critically important to the effectiveness and quality of tools available to a globally deployed force, and these tools have a vital effect on effectiveness regardless of the training, skills, and dedication of the people using them.

The up-armoured Strykers in Iraq are being protected by the Kurds, and few if any are being used in the Sunni triangle in order to protect the multi-billion dollar contracts for them.   Several American soldiers have been killed in Iraq by these vehicles rolling over on them (GM would probably have been sued if these vehicles were a civilian product, just like the controversy over Ford Explorers and their tires and the resulting rollover deaths).

The LAVIII is not only a poor design that can be replaced with little to no net cost, but all costs considered it is unaffordable within Canadian defence budgets.


----------



## Infanteer

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The up-armoured Strykers in Iraq are being protected by the Kurds, and few if any are being used in the Sunni triangle in order to protect the multi-billion dollar contracts for them.   Several American soldiers have been killed in Iraq by these vehicles rolling over on them (GM would probably have been sued if these vehicles were a civilian product, just like the controversy over Ford Explorers and their tires and the resulting rollover deaths).



What are you talking about - ask Matt Fisher about his experiences in OIF in a LAV.  I've photos and stories (that are posted on these forums) of incidents with LAVs (both in accidents and in combat) and they aren't the death-trap you're making them out to be.  Heck, I think one of our members here (MJP?) was in a LAV rollover in Afghanistan and he said the crew came out of it alright.

Is your name Mike Sparks by any chance.  I'm sensing the same rabid postulating and preaching that I've seen before.  Care to provide any personal experience with all your posts?


----------



## MJP

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Heck, I think one of our members here (MJP?) was in a LAV rollover in Afghanistan and he said the crew came out of it alright.



I wasn't there, but it was one of the LAVs in my Pl that rolled over.  In that roll-over and a few others that I have seen, the LAV was always able to drive away on it's own power.  Pretty good for a so-called inferior vehicle if you ask me.


----------



## T.S.Rea

I am not familiar with the particular accident you are referring to.  Moreover, any type of armoured vehicle can rollover or be involved in similar acccidents, especially since they are being operated under dangerous terrain conditions.  Stability and a low center of gravity are important.  However, the top heaviness of the design makes it far more prone to doing this, and rollovers is any type of motor vehicle are frequently fatal.  In fact, some years ago there was a fatality in the Canadian army involving an old American jeep equipped with a 106mm recoilless rifle, an arrangement widely criticized before and after as being dangerously top-heavy.  In the pressure to outfit required equipment, little to no effort appears to be go towards the inherent safety of the vehicles themselves, resulting in fatalities without a single shot being fired.

When the American Strykers were in the original convoy to northern Iraq, two of them rolled over, killing several soldiers.  I have seen numerous references to rollovers of the LAV, and although the reports could be skewed by political bias, albeit with restricted information from military sources, the physical characteristics of this vehicle are obvious, as well as the effect of it in similar top heavy civilian motor vehicles on flat paved surfaces.  I can only view as insane the plans to mount 105mm guns and the ADATS missile on top of this.

As should be obvious, I am definitely not a fan of the LAVIII, and that view is based entirely on the vehicle itself.  A simple web search will reveal that I am not alone.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

T.S. Rea why don't you fill out your profile so we can know your background. Cause it seems you are speaking out of your ***! Can you provide your sources for the LAV incidents?

Last I heard, the Strykers were rejected by the US ARMY and therefore was not in service.


----------



## Lance Wiebe

The Americans have about 6 variants of the Stryker in service.

Seems to me there are something like 10 variants planned.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> The Americans have about 6 variants of the Stryker in service.
> 
> Seems to me there are something like 10 variants planned.



So they solved the design flaws?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Nfld Sapper,

As Lance Wiebe alluded to there are serveral variants of the "Stryker" either in US service or in various stages of design and fielding.  The baseline IFV Stryker is basically a LAV III without the turret.  This variant has been in Iraq for over a year now.

The Mobile Gun System (MGS) is the version of the Stryker armed with the 105mm Low Profile Turret (LPT).  This variant is also being sought by Canada, and I have read that this one has had some teething problems.  In Canada, the press and some soldiers call the MGS the "Stryker", and this is the cause of much confusion. 

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Thanks for the clarification 2B.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The LAV/Coyote family will work very well for us (the Canadian Army) as long as we use them appropriately.  They are excellent vehicles for the types of missions that we have been receiving and will likely continue to receive in the near future.  

Our wheeled family of AFVs performed very well in Afghanistan in my opinion.  Our Coyotes and LAVs could get around the city at speed if required.  They had plenty of firepower if required (and having the potential for firepower means that you often don't end up having to use it in those situations).  While RPGs are always a threat, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms fire were less of a threat for a Coyote crew than a crew in a soft-skinned vehicle.  Bisons offered a way to get groups of soldiers through the city with protection.

Wheeled AFVs do have a roll-over risk.  We had a Coyote roll over when the road gave way.  It was a high embankment road and a Coyote-sized "bite" out of the road was evident after the roll-over.  There were some very tense moments, but everybody walked away (the crew dug-out the driver).  Bear in mind it was the road that gave way, so perhaps even a tracked vehicle could have flipped as well.

I am a tanker, but I do think that we have a well-equipped force for our missions.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## McG

T.S.Rea,
You still have not explained what you mean by "convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration"?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

MCG said:
			
		

> T.S.Rea,
> You still have not explained what you mean by "convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration"?




I think he means turning them into half-tracks   ;D


----------



## Infanteer

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> As should be obvious, I am definitely not a fan of the LAVIII, and that view is based entirely on the vehicle itself.   A simple web search will reveal that I am not alone.



I'm not trying to shit in your hand or anything - my experience is close to nil, so I'm basing my analysis off of numerous "first-hand" sources.  I could care less about the Congressman's Report on the Stryker; we have members on these forums who've used the LAV family of vehicles from missions ranging from Humanitarian/Peace Support Ops to a full blown shooting war.  I'm going to take their word that although the LAV isn't the "all-singing, all-dancing" platform that some make it out to be (find me a system that is), it can do a good job if employed right.


----------



## T.S.Rea

Modern infinite pivot steer hydrodynamic transmissions are employed in current tracked vehicles to control vehicle turning, a process that can be refined further with modestly sized hybrid electric drive components and ABS-derivative traction control, both of which are currently entering the civilian automotive market.  The small electric drive motors would further boost available torque, provide more electrical power for vehicle systems, as well as provide a modest backup and/or silent creeping drive, although there is no great need to employ large motors beyond what are available for hybrid vehicles produced by companies like Toyota or Honda (as examples).

Steering without turning wheels is not new, its been used in the ubiquitous Bobcat front end loader found on most construction sites as well as various types of ATV's for decades.  The above technologies make it possible to employ this type of drive in higher speed vehicles with smooth gradations of turning action.  Positive drive steering provides higher traction under all conditions, which is the reason it was developed from the original ABS technology to improve traction on water or snow covered roads when the steered wheels have little to no effect on vehicle directional control.  Moreover, a Canadian LAV was tested with tracks on the two rear axle sets, but lacking differentiated power to the tracks it was incapable of being steered by the front wheels.  Bobcats and some of the ATV's have optional tracks, although they are not used often because their large balloon like tires relative to their weight provide adequate traction under the vast majority of situations.

Steering wheels consume a lot of empty space, resulting in much longer suspension arms and less space for the hull of the vehicle, which must be made narrower and sit higher up, as like it is on the LAV family of vehicles.  It is for these reasons that an equivalent wheeled armoured vehicle will be upwards of a third heavier in weight for a given package of armour, space, systems, etc., when compared to a tracked armoured vehicle, and negates any significant improvement in fuel economy gained by wheeled drive.  The narrower and higher configuration of a wheeled armoured vehicle hull in concert with the farther inboard connection to the hull in turn makes it less stable and prone to being top heavy.  If fixed wheels are employed with differential drive to port and starboard driving two shafts buried into the bottom edge of the side armour (in practice, a little more involved than described here), then you would have the benefits of better traction, weight efficiency, more stability, and the option of tracks for deep snow, soft beach sand, and similar situations.  Digital rotary hydraulic suspension components would save some additional weight over the torsion bars, as well as allow a degree of tuning for different terrain conditions (or even recoil absorption if relevant).

Bobcats and similar ATV's have length to width ratios ranging from 1-1.5:1 in order to facilitate their ability to pivot on the spot, since they frequently are performing this maneouvre.  An armoured vehicle would benefit in many tactical situations from being able to pivot on the spot, but it is not the normal mode of movement.  Tracked vehicles, or the wheeled with optional tracks configuration advocated here, do not suffer from ratios of ranging from 2-2.5:1.  A complication occurs with any four-wheeled light vehicle derived from the powertrain components, since the distance of the wheel base and the peak stress loadings on individual wheels could induce high shearing loads on the tires; however, the lower weight and reduced width criticality would allow some degree of steering of the wheels to be restored without any significant penalty.

Far from being a critic of wheeled armoured vehicles in general, I actually am a strong advocate of a complete army of weight efficient wheeled vehicles based on a single set of power and drive train components.  Tracks are necessary under some circumstances for traction and protection, but there is no reason to labour under the lower automotive efficiency and higher maintenance burden of tracks only armoured vehicles.  What I do object to is the technical means by which wheeled drive is implemented in the LAV family of vehicles, and not to the fact that they are wheeled vehicles.  The radically modified M113 is probably the most cost efficient means by which the LAV family could be replaced and sold after removal of the electronics, sensors, and weapons from them.  A country as large as our own with modest global commitments needs as mobile an army as is techological feasible, or else it will continue to suffer from diminished relevance and subsequent neglect.


----------



## Infanteer

You lost me after "infinite".

For some reason I'm seeing echos of David Hackworth and Co. screaming that the M2 Bradley was going to be the end of the US Army.   Perhaps you should focus on the strengths of the LAV III instead of dancing around the weaknesses.   The end-users seem to say it works fine.


----------



## Zipper

I think he is arguing the fact that the LAV cannot turn in its own length? And cannot be turned into a Half-track?

So here is that website again from earlier.

http://www.baesystems.se/default.asp

Is it a LAV. No. It is an alternative.

We are still getting the LAV, and arguing about it is moot. Believe me, I've tried ;D.

We need to come up with ways of using the LAV to its best advantage, which is dealt with on other threads.

So should I make another thread? Or can I ask the question about the TLAV's? What role are they going to fill?

Thanks


----------



## T.S.Rea

The question in this thread, for which my post was actually bumped from one about the MMEV, is whether or not the LAV should be the sole armoured vehicle.

My replies have little to do with the specific weaknesses or merits of the LAV in isolation, but more with what could satisfy the needs of a sole armoured vehicle type based on a couple of decades of continuous rework. 

The LAV's and M113's will continue on for the next two decades regardless.  The question in this thread has already been answered in practice, is not this a hypothetical question about possible paths to take from the present?


----------



## McG

T.S.Rea,
Was that giant post to tell me that, by "convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration," you suggest that we should convert the M113 into a wheeled skid-steer?


----------



## T.S.Rea

The steering system is not the skid-steer of old, it is differential steering, which is actually being considered for future versions of the LAV and FCS.


----------



## McG

So, you figure our primary armoured vehicle should be an M113 with a more powerfull engine, most of its hull replaced to improve armour, and the tracks replaced with a next generation skid-steer?     . . . and you figure this could be done cheaper than buying the LAV?  You do know this would require an entirely new suspension and power delivered to all of the road wheels, right?  You are asking for a whole new vehicle.


----------



## Infanteer

<cough> CV-90 <cough>


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Interesting article from the Washington Post.

Keep in mind that the US Stryker is not the same as our LAV III.  Our LAV III has a higher centre of gravity and is heavier, due to the addition of the Delco turret.  The US Stryker uses a Remote Weapons Station (RWS).



> *Stryker Army vehicle comes up short*
> Classified study says vehicle puts troops at risk
> By R. Jeffrey Smith
> The Washington Post
> Updated: 8:19 a.m. ET March 31, 2005
> 
> The Army has deployed a new troop transport vehicle in Iraq with many defects, putting troops there at unexpected risk from rocket-propelled grenades and raising questions about the vehicle's development and $11 billion cost, according to a detailed critique in a classified Army study obtained by The Washington Post.
> 
> The vehicle is known as the Stryker, and 311 of the lightly armored, wheeled vehicles have been ferrying U.S. soldiers around northern Iraq since October 2003. The Army has been ebullient about the vehicle's success there, with Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, telling the House Armed Services Committee last month that "we're absolutely enthusiastic about what the Stryker has done."
> 
> But the Army's Dec. 21 report, drawn from confidential interviews with operators of the vehicle in Iraq in the last quarter of 2004, lists a catalog of complaints about the vehicle, including design flaws, inoperable gear and maintenance problems that are "getting worse not better." Although many soldiers in the field say they like the vehicle, the Army document, titled "Initial Impressions Report -- Operations in Mosul, Iraq," makes clear that the vehicle's military performance has fallen short.
> 
> The internal criticism of the vehicle appears likely to fuel new controversy over the Pentagon's decision in 2003 to deploy the Stryker brigade in Iraq just a few months after the end of major combat operations, before the vehicle had been rigorously tested for use across a full spectrum of combat.
> 
> The report states, for example, that an armoring shield installed on Stryker vehicles to protect against unanticipated attacks by Iraqi insurgents using low-tech weapons works against half the grenades used to assault it. The shield, installed at a base in Kuwait, is so heavy that tire pressure must be checked three times daily. Nine tires a day are changed after failing, the report says; the Army told The Post the current figure is "11 tire and wheel assemblies daily."
> 
> 'Functionality shortfalls'
> "The additional weight significantly impacts the handling and performance during the rainy season," says the report, which was prepared for the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth, Kan. "Mud appeared to cause strain on the engine, the drive shaft and the differentials," none of which was designed to carry the added armor.
> 
> Commanders' displays aboard the vehicles are poorly designed and do not work; none of the 100 display units in Iraq are being used because of "design and functionality shortfalls," the report states. The vehicle's computers are too slow and overheat in desert temperatures or freeze up at critical moments, such as "when large units are moving at high speeds simultaneously" and overwhelm its sensors.
> 
> The main weapon system, a $157,000 grenade launcher, fails to hit targets when the vehicle is moving, contrary to its design, the report states. Its laser designator, zoom, sensors, stabilizer and rotating speed all need redesign; it does not work at night; and its console display is in black and white although "a typical warning is to watch for a certain color automobile," the report says. Some crews removed part of the launchers because they can swivel dangerously toward the squad leader's position.
> 
> The vehicle's seat belts cannot be readily latched when troops are in their armored gear, a circumstance that contributed to the deaths of three soldiers in rollover accidents, according to the report. On the vehicle's outside, some crews have put sand-filled tin cans around a gunner's hatch that the report says is ill-protected.
> 
> Eric Miller, senior defense investigator at the independent Project on Government Oversight, which obtained a copy of the internal Army report several weeks ago, said the critique shows that "the Pentagon hasn't yet learned that using the battlefield as a testing ground costs lives, not just spiraling dollars."
> 
> Asked about the report, Army officials who direct the Stryker program said they are working to fix some flaws; they also said they were unaware of some of the defects identified in the critique. "We're very proud of the Stryker team," said Lt. Col. Frederick J. Gellert, chief of the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Team Integration Branch in Washington, but "it hasn't been something that's problem-divorced."
> 
> According to the latest Army figures, 17 soldiers in the Stryker combat brigade have died in Iraq in 157 bomb explosions, but no delineation is made for those who perished inside the vehicle and those who were standing outside it; an additional five soldiers have died in two rollovers. No current figure was provided for those who perished in grenade attacks, although one officer said he thought it was less than a handful.
> 
> Neither the lessons-learned report nor more recent Army data state how many soldiers have been wounded while inside the vehicle. The report states that in one case, a soldier was struck by shrapnel that penetrated both the vehicle's armor and his own body armor; in another case, an entire crew escaped with minor injuries after a vehicle sustained nine grenade hits.
> 
> 'How much nicer'
> The criticisms of the Stryker's first performance in combat seem likely to give new ammunition to critics of the Army's decision in 1999 to move away from more heavily armored vehicles that move on metal tracks and embrace a generation of lighter, more comfortable vehicles operated at higher speed on rubber tires.
> 
> Senior Army officers in Iraq, like those at the Pentagon, have been surprised by the intensity of hostilities there since mid-2003, and lately some officers have said they depend on heavy armor to protect their soldiers in urban warfare, even though tanks in Iraq have also suffered unexpected damage.
> 
> But Maj. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, the Army's director of force development, said that when he rode in the Stryker for the first time, he "marveled at how much nicer it was" than riding in a Bradley vehicle or an older troop transport, the M113, which he likened to being inside an aluminum trash can being beaten by a hammer. He said the Stryker was "amazingly smooth" and quiet by comparison.
> 
> In a report completed at the time of deployment, the Pentagon's operational test and evaluation office rated the Stryker vehicles sent to Iraq "effective and survivable only with limitations for use in small-scale contingencies." Congressional auditors at the General Accounting Office in December 2003 said the first brigade "did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses."
> 
> Independent groups and a loose-knit group of retired Army officers who dislike the Stryker vehicle have alleged that the Stryker's 2003 deployment was motivated partly by the desire of the Army and the manufacturer, General Dynamics, to build congressional support for buying additional brigades. But Speakes said that was nonsense and that the brigade was deployed in Iraq simply because the Army needed it.
> 
> Researchers Bob Lyford and Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.
> © 2005 The Washington Post Company
> 
> URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7342394/


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

There was a report on CNN about this.  The conclusions were that the vehicle was too heavy (to tpt readily), too vulnerable (even with the slate armour it was only good 5 out of 10 times), to expensive.  These Stykers had the automated .50 or grenade launcher and not what we use.  The slate armour adds 3 more feet in width and 3 more tons in weight.  P.S.  They still have heavy armour in conjunction with this.


----------



## Love793

Still a POS


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Quote from the Stryker report cited earlier:
"According to the latest Army figures, 17 soldiers in the Stryker combat brigade have died in Iraq in 157 bomb explosions, but no delineation is made for those who perished inside the vehicle and those who were standing outside it; an additional five soldiers have died in two rollovers. No current figure was provided for those who perished in grenade attacks, although one officer said he thought it was less than a handful."
     Now I'm sorry, but I did my patrols in a bleeding Iltis, and I can tell you our figures would have been a heck of a lot worse than 17 KIA in 157 bomb attacks.  You can kill an Iltis with a poorly timed sneeze.  This report is not going to make me condemn the LAV III as being less well armoured than the Bismark, its going to make me wish I had the freaking thing when I had to hang my Jr ranked a$$ on the line.  For a Light Armoured Vehicle, it has performed well.  It is not an MBT, it is an IFV, and the protection it offers its infantry is superior to what Canadian light and mechanized infantry have known in the past.  To the horde of M113 lovers in the crowd, what do you think the numbers for the tin toasters would have been after 157 bomb attacks?  The Iltis offered about as much protection as CF issue bug juice, and the M113 was an RPG gunners wet dream (heck, an LMG would do it).  The LAV III is not unkillable, but it is not only a better protected carrier than our Infanteers have ever been given, but able to configure in ways to leave our infantry better supported than it has been since WWII gave us the Priest/Kangaroo combination.


----------



## tomahawk6

Here is a Stratfor's take on the Washington Post story.



> Media Report on 'Stryker' Misleading
> 
> By Andrew Teekell
> 
> 
> On March 31, The Washington Post reported that the U.S. Army's Stryker Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), which has been operating in Iraq for a year and a half, is not faring so well in the war zone. The eight-wheeled vehicle is inadequately armored, its computers are too slow and crew accommodations provide inadequate protection during rollovers.
> 
> Deficiencies noted, but the media is a bit behind the curve.
> 
> The report cites a four-month-old Army report on the LAV's performance in Iraq that did in fact find room for improvement in the Stryker -- improvement that already has been implemented or soon will be. Since first arriving in Iraq in October 2003, the vehicles and their crews have been adapting well to the mission and the environment.
> 
> Army personnel at Fort Lewis, Wash., home to the units that deploy the Stryker, tell Stratfor the LAV is experiencing many of the same problems that new weapon systems often do during their shakedown cruise in combat.
> 
> One problem, which most likely will be addressed on the assembly line, is that the tire pressure has to be checked too frequently because of the weight of the extra armor that protects the crew from insurgent rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The armor is a field modification installed when the vehicles arrive in Kuwait and before they cross the border into Iraq. Although the armor is saving lives, the Stryker's suspension and tires were not designed to handle the extra weight.
> 
> The Army report also cites problems with the Stryker's computer systems. The commander's display fails to function properly and the computers slow down or freeze up when processing large amounts of data. Sources at General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., the Stryker's manufacturer, say the computer issues have been addressed with software upgrades. The data processing and command and control equipment in the Strykers are completely new systems that had never been used in combat vehicles before the Strykers went to Iraq.
> 
> In addition, the vehicle's grenade launcher has proven to be difficult to operate under combat conditions. This is a problem that can be remedied with interim field modifications or improvements on the assembly line.
> 
> The Stryker is deployed with the 3rd Brigade of the Army's 2nd Infantry Division in Iraq. Since February 2004, when the "Stryker Brigade" deployed to Kirkuk and Mosul, two vehicles have been lost to RPG fire. Other vehicles have been totaled by landmines and improvised explosive devices. Casualties have been sustained in most cases, but few Stryker crewmembers have been killed.
> 
> The first version of a weapon system often requires refinement after being used operationally. During World War II, the M4 Sherman tank was plagued by inadequate firepower and thin armor and was shot full of holes by the powerful German tanks it encountered in Normandy. To give themselves a better chance of surviving encounters with the Panzers, Sherman crews took to bolting scrap armor plate to the front and sides and tying sandbags to the front.
> 
> An even more notable example of military field expediency is the rapid "up-armoring" of the Army's "Humvee" fleet in Iraq, which was introduced into a combat environment that it was not designed for. There have been dozens of modifications to the F-16 fighter and
> M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle since these systems were first deployed. Even the mighty
> F-117 Stealth fighter performed poorly when first used in combat in Panama in 1989.
> 
> These problems are not exclusive to the U.S. military. The suspensions of Soviet T-72 tanks used in Afghanistan were found to be inadequate for the country's rough terrain, so the T-72 was replaced by the older T-62. During Russia's involvement in Chechnya, the gas turbine engines on their T-80 tanks proved to be problematic and were replaced with diesel engines in later models. The British army's Challenger tank was completely redesigned to address problems noted during gunnery exercises and the 1991 Gulf War.
> 
> The Stryker was developed for the emerging doctrine of a lighter and more rapidly deployable force. It was a controversial shift from an Army based on heavy divisions meant to engage massed Soviet formations to a force more suited to low-intensity conflict and intervention.
> 
> When it was introduced, the Stryker was derided by critics of the new, lighter Army. So far, however -- despite some teething troubles -- the Stryker has proven itself in combat. Experience in Iraq has shown that the Main Battle Tank still has a place on the urban battlefield -- U.S. troops like the firepower and psychological advantage that the 70-ton
> M-1 gives them. And, from all accounts, they like the Stryker too.


----------



## Zipper

There are problems with the strykers and LAV III's. Fact.

There have been role overs in the Canadian LAV III's that have seriously injured their crews. Fact.

The LAV III is what we are getting. Fact.

The LAV III is better then the Grizzily. Fact.

The LAV III offers more protection then the M113's. Fact.

We are no longer using track as our main vehicles. Fact.

No arguments. Just get on with it and find ways to use them properly.


----------



## a_majoor

We do need to pay careful attention to the AARs to see what sorts of modifications we may need to add to our LAV fleet. Based on various things I have read:

1. Bolt on external armour. Non explosive reactivce armour pannels (NERA) bolted over the most vulnerable points of the vehicle would improve performance with minimal weight and not increase the size the way a cage does.

2.  Upgraded suspension system to deal with weight increases. New tires with wider footprints to reduce ground pressure would also improve mobility somewhat.

3.  Crew ergonomics. "Wrap around" seats to protect the vehicle crew, and improved seats and harness systems for the dismounted troops would make the vehicle more survivable in an accident or when struck by a weapon.

4. Weight control. Wherever possible, replace steel components with lighter ceramic or composite materials. This would mostly offset the weight gain from other improvements

Since we have so few LAVs, this will be rather expensive since most of the components will be hand built. Increasing the LAV fleet and adding these mods on the assembly line will lower the unit costs for the "LAV 3.5".


----------



## Kat Stevens

Here we go again...Why are we putting all our eggs in a basket we know can't take a punch?  It seems to my tiny mind, that if you have to "add armour", then the vehicle isn't armoured in the first place, is it?  And, glueing those little ceramic pucks all over your wagon is just plain naf, IMHO..

CHIMO,  Kat


----------



## Zipper

> Lt.-Col. Petit said the Styker MGS fits the Canadian army's needs, adding that the Iraq war proved the worth of the vehicles. â Å“For the type of missions that we do on a regular basis, that vehicle would be very useful,â ? he said. â Å“If we had that vehicle today, it would be in Afghanistan.â ?



I didn't think these things had even come close to deployment yet? So how is he saying that the US is using them? Or is he just talking about the chassis?



> One of the main issues with the Stryker involves a steel cage-like contraption the U.S. army attached to the vehicles to give them more protection against rocket-propelled grenades. The extra weight of that system has put undue stress on the vehicle's drive shaft and engine, resulting in more maintenance problems.
> Lt.-Col. Petit acknowledged that rocket-propelled grenades pose a threat to Canada's LAV-3s and the Stryker MGS. But he said the Canadian army has no plans to use the cage system its Amencan counterparts have installed on the Strykers. Instead it hopes to develop its own add-on armour system.



Now this is cause for concern. Extra maintence is something we cannot afford. Not to mention is the whole reason we're getting away from track (so they say) in the first place. Also the idea of us developing our own system of additional protection? More money for something that is hypathetical.

Please tell me if there is something NOT politically driven coming down the pipes?


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> I didn't think these things had even come close to deployment yet? So how is he saying that the US is using them? Or is he just talking about the chassis?


The one thing I don't think was made clear in David's article is that the US has not used the Stryker MGS in Iraq.  It has been Stryker APC variants (which are more similar to our LAV III than an MGS in role & layout) that have seen Iraqi service.


----------



## Zipper

Thats what I thought.

Now the question is, was LCol. Petit misquoted about the MGS? Considering that happens on a regular basis in the media. Or did he actually say that? Which calls into question he credibility as "director" of this program.

Normally I would question the media source. But considering the BS that comes from NDHQ most of the time, I cannot call it so clearly.


----------



## honestyrules

Ok fellows, i am not an expert on armour at all, but what about a combination of lavIIIs and attack (anti-armour) choppers (cobras, ah-64)...
Might have been discussed anyway. There is also an air defense platform based on the lav chassis (gatling gun + tow-stinger type of AAM) out there (american i guess).


----------



## Taylor187

Another article on the Stryker. Same stuff.

http://globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050401-stryker-report.htm



> Report rips Army vehicle
> Critics contend Michigan-made Stryker fails to protect soldiers from blasts.
> 
> In-Depth Coverage
> 
> By Lisa Zagaroli / Detroit News Washington Bureau
> 
> WASHINGTON -- The Army's most modern troop carrier, the Stryker, has failed to adequately protect soldiers from certain explosive devices and has demonstrated problems ranging from seat belts that don't fit around armored soldiers to tires that have to be replaced frequently, an internal Army report indicates.
> 
> The light armored vehicle, engineered in Sterling Heights by General Dynamics Land Systems and touted as the future of Army transportation, made its debut in Iraq over objections by some officials that it wasn't ready to be fielded.
> 
> Everything from the vehicle's communications technology overheating to the accuracy of its weapon systems were called into question in the report, published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and made public Thursday by the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog group.
> 
> "It has several flaws and some challenges," said Eric Miller, defense investigator at the oversight group. "We were concerned that it wasn't tested well enough, it was kind of rushed through. When you send something like an armored vehicle into combat and it's not really tested, you kind of give soldiers a false sense of security."
> 
> The Army report was based on interviews this fall in Mosul, Iraq, with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Stryker Brigade Combat Team.
> 
> A Pentagon spokesman defended the Stryker and said the report showed that the Army was willing to go in and retool after the development phase to make sure the vehicle works well in real-life situations.
> 
> "The reports we get from the field overwhelmingly is that the vehicle is performing in an outstanding manner," Lt. Col. Kevin Curry said.
> 
> "Soldiers say they appreciate the vehicle, they want to stay in that unit, they want to go back, and if they go back they want to go in that vehicle. You couldn't get a better stamp of approval or show of confidence."
> 
> Some of the issues in the Army report mirrored problems outlined by The Detroit News last July in a series of stories about military vehicle safety, which focused on inadequate safety features and poor driver training in the Army fleet.
> 
> The Stryker, previously known as the interim armored vehicle, is lighter than other troop carriers and reflects an Army shift toward a more mobile fleet. General Dynamics has delivered at least 1,000 Strykers to the Army, and more than 300 of them are now in Iraq.
> 
> During the vehicle's development stage, the armor on the Stryker was determined to be inadequate, so the Army had to develop a "bird cage" type assembly of armor slats that adds 3 feet to the vehicle's width, according to Globalsecurity.org, a nonprofit group that analyzes defense policy.
> 
> Soldiers had been assured that the slat armor would protect them from eight out of 11 rocket-propelled grenade attacks, but the actual experience in Iraq was that soldiers were harmed in half of such attacks because the shrapnel was able to penetrate the slats. The armor also deflected only half of attacks by high-explosive anti-tank rockets, the report said.
> 
> Curry said he didn't have official statistics, but that the actual success rate of the armor was much higher.
> 
> He said only one rocket-propelled grenade had penetrated enough to make the vehicle inoperable, and that attack came from above the vehicle.
> 
> Aside from not providing the protection it was designed for, the added armor cage also makes the vehicle more difficult to operate in rainy conditions, to transport by plane, and to tow away when it gets stuck or breaks down, according to the report.
> 
> "Slat armor significantly increases the circumference and weight of the Stryker, changing its performance," the report said. "Drivers did not receive any training on driving with slat armor until it was installed in theater."
> 
> The Stryker initially was touted as easy to maintain in part because it had tires that could be inflated and deflated with a control inside the vehicle, but having the extra armor cage forces the soldiers to do it manually because extra pressure is needed in them.
> 
> Crews have to check the tire pressure at least three times a day to maintain the proper pressure levels.
> 
> The single-ply sidewall tires were designed primarily for off-road use, but the Strykers are primarily being driven on hard pavement, leading to the brigade replacing about nine tires a day.
> 
> At least 24 crashes involving Strykers have been documented by the Army Safety Center.
> 
> In two rollovers, three unbelted soldiers died. Their deaths didn't prompt more seat belt use because the troops couldn't latch them when they were wearing their body armor and other gear, the internal Army report concluded.
> 
> In a separate report by the Army Safety Center, accident investigator Sgt. 1st Class John Temple said he was investigating a Stryker rollover that killed two unbelted soldiers and the brigade's soldiers told him he didn't have to wear his seat belt on the way to the accident site.
> 
> "I couldn't believe what I was hearing," he wrote in March for the Army's monthly safety magazine, Countermeasure. "There we were, driving to the site where two soldiers died because they weren't wearing their seat belts, and someone told me I didn't need mine."
> 
> Other findings of the Center for Army Lessons Learned report include:
> 
> * A driver vision enhancement tool is too small and obscured by the steering wheel.
> * New soldiers are being assigned to drive the Stryker in the theater with all training occurring during on-the-job missions.
> * Weapons can't shoot accurately when the vehicle is moving, and training doesn't include shooting while on the move.
> * In one model, known as the Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle, the vehicle commander doesn't have a weapon station and must stand on a step that is so high it leaves him vulnerable to attack.
> 
> Even the Stryker's horn has proven inadequate in traffic situations. The Army report suggested soldiers in Iraq replace it with a louder one purchased locally, and to help clear traffic, it recommended "throwing rocks at cars that don't get out of the way and use of local hand signals to show `slow down.'"
> 
> Curry said the comments show that these kinds of internal Army reports are "not sanitized."
> 
> "It pretty much captures anything and everything you can think about," he said.
> 
> "I can assure you everything is being addressed and has been addressed."


----------



## tomahawk6

There were flaws in the German made armor for Stryker that had to be fixed. Like Stratfor pointed out there are teething
problems with any new major system. When the M16 first came into the force there were lots of problems, that were eventually fixed.
The troops that are assigned to the Stryker brigades like the vehicle. 

http://www.strykernews.com/


----------



## Zipper

Good post Tom.

I guess one of the biggest contentions is not wether the "stryker" chassis will work or not, but the fact that in all cases except ours, it is being used in conjunction with other units which can support it. Even the Aussies have other capabilities in support (heavy armour, heavy lift, fast air, tac air, etc). 

We are looking at a singular.

So it forces us into limited options.


----------



## tomahawk6

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-766691.php

This article discusses how the troops like the Stryker. The second article is subscriber only and discusses improvements to the Stryker.

April 11, 2005

Stryker upgrades aimed at mobility, lethality
Report cites concerns from 1st combat tour

By Matthew Cox
Times staff writer


After serving more than a year in Iraq, the Army's Stryker vehicle is in need of upgrades, according to a report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Several key systems on the eight-wheeled armored vehicle are being redesigned to give future Strykers better mobility, increased protection and greater killing power, officials said.

The changes stem from soldier complaints outlined in â Å“Initial Impressions Report-Operations in Mosul, Iraq,â ? which focused on the performance of the Army's first Stryker brigade during its maiden combat tour in Iraq.

The confidential report recommends a number of solutions to problems ranging from armor shortcomings to tire inflation problems. 

By 2007, according to the report, Stryker brigades will be able to shoot on the move with greater accuracy day and night. They'll also have armored shields protecting vulnerable hatches on several variants and an improved tire inflation system that can better handle the vehicle's weight in combat.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned routinely conducts systematic reports to assess how units and systems can be improved to better meet soldiers' needs.

Army officials on the Stryker program, however, point out that the improvements were in the works long before the report was completed in December, a couple months after 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT), had come home from its yearlong tour to Fort Lewis, Wash.

â Å“There wasn't a single surprise in there; in every case, they are being worked,â ? said Steven Campbell, Stryker systems coordinator for the assistant Army secretary for acquisitions, logistics and technology.

Campbell and other officials said the problems outlined in the report have come up during the constant dialogue they keep with Stryker brigade leaders throughout each deployment. â Å“Brigade commanders aren't shy â â€ if he's got a problem, he's going to let the world know about it,â ? Campbell said.

Stryker brigades began in late 1999, when then-Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki set out to create highly mobile combat brigades equipped with armor and firepower. The brigades serve as the model for the Army's Transformation effort to create a lighter, more agile Future Force. 

Within months of Shinseki's announcement, the first Stryker brigade, 3-2, was put through a stringent training and evaluation schedule, filled with back-to-back live-fire and force-on-force operations. After testing numerous vehicles, the Army selected a version of the 8-by-8 wheeled Light Armored Vehicle-3 in November 2000 to become the new Stryker combat vehicle.

Stryker carries a full nine-man squad and a two-man crew, comes equipped with armor designed to protect against 14.5mm projectiles and can deploy on C-130 transport aircraft.

Since then, the Army has fielded and deployed two of the seven Stryker brigades it plans to field by summer of 2008. With each brigade taking with it more than 300 vehicles, those seven brigades cost the Army an estimated $7.6 billion.

The Army's second Stryker brigade, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT), completed its certification in May and relieved 3-2 in Iraq last fall.

No one in 3-2 has said the Stryker couldn't be improved, but soldiers in every rank, from colonel down to private, have praised the vehicle during numerous interviews with Army Times in Iraq, describing it as the only vehicle they would want to take into combat.

Slat armor criticized

One of the major criticisms in the report deals with Slat armor, the cagelike system intended as an interim solution to protect against rocket-propelled grenade threats until the Army perfects the special add-on armor package designed for Stryker and slated for fielding to the fourth Stryker brigade.

In addition to being too heavy and interfering with certain Stryker features, the report said the Slat armor performance â Å“is less than expected against certain types of rocket-propelled grenades.â ? Slat armor cannot defeat the penetrator on the warhead of an anti-tank RPG in most cases, according to the report. 

Soldiers operating out of the four hatches atop the Stryker are also vulnerable to anti-personnel RPGs, the report states.

Stryker program officials say Slat armor, overall, has been highly effective against threats in Iraq.

Out of the 345 documented hostile acts against Stryker vehicles and their crews in Iraq to date, there have been 17 deaths, said Lt. Col. Perry Caskey, a Stryker systems officer in the Army G-8.

Two of those deaths were caused from shrapnel hitting the soldiers out of the hatches and one from a 190-pound improvised explosive device exploding underneath a Stryker. The details surrounding the other 14 combat-related deaths were not available, Caskey said.

Of the 345 attacks, 168 of them were from IEDs and 58 were from RPGs, Caskey said.

More than 90 other attacks included everything from mortars to grenades, he said.

These attacks have resulted in 28 â Å“vehicle losses,â ? said Caskey, who explained that a loss is any vehicle that cannot be repaired in theater within 30 days. Nineteen of the 28 are repairable, Caskey said. Four are still being evaluated, and five have been labeled total losses.

â Å“If you look at the report, it sounds like Slat armor is a dog, but you talk to the soldiers, and they love it,â ? Campbell said.

Despite the report's criticisms, it recommends to continue fielding Slat armor on all Stryker variants. But Stryker officials also say improvements are in the works that will supplement Slat armor's effectiveness and help make the Stryker more mobile under the weight of the additional armor.

They are developing a ballistic shield to protect soldiers who must stand up, partially exposed in the Stryker's top hatches, Campbell said, adding that the shield is being considered for several variants.

The shield is designed to replace the practice of placing sandbags and other makeshift protection around the hatches.

â Å“We are trying to take advantage of better technology to do more than just sandbags,â ? said Campbell, adding that the hatch shields should first appear on the fourth Stryker brigade slated to be certified in December 2006.

Maintaining the correct tire pressure under the increased weight of the Slat armor has been another challenge for soldiers in Iraq, according to the report.

The Slat armor adds about 5,000 pounds to the Stryker, requiring the tire pressure to be at 95 pounds per square inch for most short missions. The Central Tire Inflation System was designed to keep tire pressure at a maximum of 87 psi, so soldiers have to increase the pressure to 95 psi with an air hose.

Soldiers also have to check the tire pressure several times a day because it tends to vary between 75 psi and 110 psi, the report states.

Stryker program officials contend that they knew that tire pressure would have to be increased manually when they issued the Slat armor, but there was no time to develop an improved tire inflation system before 3-2 deployed to Iraq, Campbell said.

An improved inflation system is slated to be fielded with the fourth Stryker brigade.

Another criticism in the report that Stryker program officials have given a high priority is upgrading the Remote Weapon Station to make it capable of shooting on the move and to improve its effectiveness at night.

The Stryker is equipped with either an M2 .50-caliber machine gun or MK19 automatic grenade launcher. The Remote Weapon Station is designed to let the gunner sight in on a target and fire from inside the Stryker.

The system was not originally designed with a stabilized, shoot-on-the-move capability because there was no requirement at the time, Campbell said. Combat operations in Iraq have prompted the Army to replace that with a stabilized version, so Stryker crews will be able to engage targets accurately while moving up to 25 mph, he said.

Program officials also are redesigning the Remote Weapon Station's targeting system to make it more effective at night. That will include an infrared system to help the gunner work with squads using infrared pointers and floodlights to identify targets for the RWS. In addition, the improved system would be able to zoom in on targets more effectively.

Campbell said that the goal is to have the changes to the weapon station in place when the fifth Stryker brigade is certified in May 2007.

Air conditioning recommended

The report included several other recommendations for improvements, such as adding air-conditioning to keep the computers loaded with Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below from overheating in temperatures that can reach 130 degrees.

Program officials said they are considering anything that will make Stryker more effective in combat, but some recommendations won't receive as much priority as others, Campbell said.

Certain Stryker variants, such as the medical evacuation vehicle, need air conditioning, but it may be some time before other Stryker variants receive it.

â Å“If it is 130 degrees outside, it doesn't matter which vehicle you have. Things are going to operate a little slow,â ? Campbell said. â Å“The issue is priority. What is more important? ... It's on the table but not a top priority.â ?

Campbell went on to say that the M1 Abrams tank is 30 years old, and the Army is still improving on the design.

â Å“There is never going to be a perfect organization or system out there,â ? he said.

â Å“The goal is to continue to improve over time,â ? Campbell said.


----------



## a_majoor

I think the final answer to the "LAV III as the sole armoured vehicle" is no.

The LAV is exceptional at some jobs, OK in others and a load of crap in still others. I can see making a case for the LAV III being the bulk of Canada's armoured fleet, especially if we go towards the Cavalry type of organization argued elsewhere, but even then there will be a need for light armour, both to act as recce vehicles and fire platforms for the light forces, and there should be at least one heavy formation in the CF to operate under conditions that the LAV force (however organized) cannot.

The other part of the question is implicit: we should dump all the non LAV III platforms in order to streamline the logistics. It makes no sense at all to have hodge-podged fleet of AVGP, LAV II (multiple and incompatable variations) and LAV III (also with multiple and incompatable variations). This is actually worse than running a mixed wheeled/tracked fleet, since the chances of error increase dramatically. Given the timelines and other factors involved in doing this, the best possible solution is to soldier on for the present, but work very hard at implimenting a common chassis in the next five years. This can replace the fleet from the bottom up, first with all the AVGP varients, then the LAV IIs (Coyote/Wolf) then finally the LAV IIIs. The CV-90 SEP is a good place to start looking.


----------



## Kat Stevens

From a semi-practical standpoint, here's my $.02...  Why would we not consider taking ALL the heavy (read TRACKED) assets, and make 1 CMBG a "heavy brigade" (relatively speaking).  In the west, we have the room to train on the heavies properly, and the expertise is still in place to train the troops.  If we don't use the knowledge, it will eventually be purged from the hive memory, and lost forever.  I still think there is a role for a heavy formation in this super-dooper high tech age...

CHIMO,  Kat


----------



## McG

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Why would we not consider taking ALL the heavy (read TRACKED) assets, and make 1 CMBG a "heavy brigade" (relatively speaking).


For a few years this was the plan.  That changed last summer.


----------



## Zipper

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Why would we not consider taking ALL the heavy (read TRACKED) assets, and make 1 CMBG a "heavy brigade" (relatively speaking).



I think one of the reasons we have not gone this direction (which makes sense to me), is the fact that we cannot even sustain over-seas operations with what we have, let alone making a separate "heavy" force. If all our units were even close to being up to strength, I think it could work. But at the moment? Hmmm...


----------



## Long in the tooth

Ferrying troops around the battlefield?   The doctrine regarding Stryker makes it clear that it is a potent but supporting antitank platform, in operation not that much different from the couger.   To suggest that it would be taxiing about a battlefield without escort....

This is akin to throwing an M901 ITV into the fray as a first line offensive veh.

I have no problems with the MGS as part of a 'system of systems', as long as the rest of the system is there, of course....


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Worn Out Grunt,

The Stryker term is somewhat confusing at it can mean sligthly different things depending if it is used in US or Canadian context.  In the US Army Stryker denotes a whole family of vehicles that are based on the LAV III chassis.  The most common so far (and the main one fielded in Iraq) is the infantry carrier that has a remote weapon station (think of it as a super bison or a LAV III without the 25mm turret).  The Mobile Gun System variant has the 105mm in a low profile turret (LPT).  This is the "Stryker" that Canada is pursuing.

Thus, having US Army "Strykers" taxiing troops around Iraq makes sense, as they are refering to the infantry carrying variant.  We do the same thing in Afghanistan with the LAV III and Bison.  The MGS has not been fielded yet.

As for the two articles I have no doubt that flaws with the basic vehicle have been found by the troops in combat.  Time will tell, of course, but I do think that the basic infantry carrier is a sound idea and suitable for these types of operations (better than riding in a HUMMVW and faster than tracks on security operations).  The Stryker debate got real political real fast in the US.  As for the tank article no big suprises.  Stand-up fighting will still need tanks, and this includes operations in urban areas.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_stryker_042205,00.html


----------



## Long in the tooth

2B - thanks for sorting me out.  I try and do my homework, but I guess I've been 'infected' by the Leopard operators' generally low opinion of non tanks in the vanguard.

If the US fully adopts the Stryker family (and keeps heavy armour), will they also keep the Bradley and the Recce variant?


----------



## tomahawk6

The Stryker is an interim platform due to be replaced by FCS [if it gets fielded]. It provides a medium weight force for the army. So yes Stryker will not replace Bradley/Abram's. I see the Stryker used on peacekeeping/low intensity ops. Bradley's are being upgraded to A3 config. Also the Army has a hyper velocity TOW in testing.

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bradley/

http://www.mechaps.com/cgi-bin/pictureArchive.cgi?&A=right_page&id=119


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## George Wallace

The US has the budget and large military where it can have the luxury of having Styker and create Medium Bdes to fit in with its Light and Heavy Bdes.   Canada has neither the money, nor the manpower to have that luxury.   The decisions have to be made of what we want to sacrifice in our "Peace Dividend" 'this week'.   I look sadly upon this situation we find ourselves.   I don't particularly like the idea of loosing all those skill sets and becoming a 'niche army', incapable of defending ourselves.


----------



## TCBF

Here's my vote:  build the BMD 3 under license in New Brunswick.


----------



## Zipper

I second both. Its a sad sad situation.


----------



## Long in the tooth

George Wallace said:
			
		

> The US has the budget and large military where it can have the luxury of having Styker and create Medium Bdes to fit in with its Light and Heavy Bdes.   Canada has neither the money, nor the manpower to have that luxury.   The decisions have to be made of what we want to sacrifice in our "Peace Dividend" 'this week'.   I look sadly upon this situation we find ourselves.   I don't particularly like the idea of loosing all those skill sets and becoming a 'niche army', incapable of defending ourselves.


I agree.  If we don't have the heavy arms needed for a high intensity war then we will have to settle for adding mech inf to our allies.  

This is not a completely bad thing, providing we are willing to give this up.  On the flip side, we need to react to our complementary allies when they ask for mech inf to help them out....

This makes pure economic sense.


----------



## MG34

It is saving lives,that's all it has to do.


----------



## Gunner

Despite its flaws, troops prefer Stryker 
Soldiers in Iraq say its safety, agility outweigh its shortcomings 

By Sandra Jontz
Stars and Stripes/Mideast edition

FORWARD OPERATING BASE MAREZ, Iraq - In spite of its flaws, there is no other vehicle Stryker Brigade Combat Team soldiers say they would rather be in.

Some soldiers say the Stryker's safety factor outweighs the litany of shortcomings outlined last year in an internal study by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

"It's a lot safer than a Humvee and we have more mobility than a tank that is so cumbersome," said 1st Lt. Drew Godwin of Delta/52 Infantry Company.

 "Being a wheeled vehicle makes it more maneuverable. I wouldn't want to be in anything else."

The CALL study reported problems that included a tendency for rollovers caused by the weight of add-on armor, a lack of protection against rocket-propelled grenades, computers overheating, and wheels that need constant attention.

Some of the findings are over dramatized, soldiers say. But in instances where the vehicles fall short, soldiers are forced to adapt.

Mechanics of 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, or "Deuce-Four," for example, are wrapping the top of the Stryker with 3/8-inch steel plating to provide additional protection to the crews who stand in the open hatches.

Soldiers had used stacked sandbags, usually three bags high and sometimes two rows deep, as a buffer. But the added weight at times caused the wheel hubs to break, said Staff Sgt. Jason Stauff, the shop foreman and senior mechanic.

Since they've replaced the heavier sandbags with steel, the number of broken hubs has decreased to nearly nonexistent, said Sgt. 1st Class Brent Stafford, motor sergeant for the Combat Repair Team.

The added weight has, however, forced the crews to disengage the computerized automatic tire inflation system, which now is checked and adjusted manually.

The Deuce-Four soldiers have seen their share of attacks by anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades since arriving in Mosul last October. Each time, the Stryker did its job of protecting the troops.

"They've hit the armor, bent the plates, but we've not had a single loss because of RPGs," Stauff, 32, said. "These things are amazing."

Usually, the crew can have a damaged Stryker back in service within 48 hours, Stafford said.

"We've been hit with a few [roadside bombs] in this thing and it's very reliable," Spc. Krist Zeynalyan, 24, said. "There are pros and cons to everything, but the pros far outweigh the cons."

The Army introduced the General Dynamics-made Strykers in 2002 and plans to have six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, or SBCTs, in place by 2008. Three already exist: the 3/2 Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade and part of the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska.

Soldiers in Iraq complain mostly about heat in the vehicle and the inability of the main weapon, either a grenade launcher or a heavy machine gun, to hit targets when moving. The Army hopes to correct the weapons problem beginning next summer..

Heat inside the vehicle is a factor, especially for the driver.

"It gets too hot in there," said Spc. Donald Durocher, 28, a driver with Delta/52. "But I'll take it over a Humvee any day. I feel safer in this than in a Humvee."

The Army report found heat caused computer systems to overheat and fail, but the problems have been rare for Deuce-Four, Stauff said.

Iraq's hottest months are approaching, with average highs in July and August for Mosul about 102 degrees. Already the soldiers are working in temperatures in the mid- to high-90s, Stafford said, "so we're pretty close already to the hottest part and they're working fine."

The most sophisticated computer systems are located in commanders' vehicles, which have climate control systems to mitigate the problem.

This summer, air conditioning units will be added to the Medical Evacuation Vehicles to provide comfort while transporting casualties. The upgrade will cost about $90,000 per vehicle.

The MEV was highly praised by medics, who prefer operating in the Stryker versus the Front Line Ambulance, a box mounted on the back of a Humvee.


----------



## SchmDG

Interesting article in that it provides SOME feedback from the troops on the ground....   Go figure, an AFV getting hot in the desert!  I cooked a couple of radios in suffield on a warm day too.  Should have requested AC for my Iltis, eh?


----------



## a_majoor

Soldier and operational feedback can lead to great gains if the basic vehicle is adaptable enough (and it seems the LAV is).

Maybe we should be gathering this information and planning the "LAV 3.5" upgrade program now, so when we get deployed into a hot spot, the vehicles are already prepared, rather than hope crack teams of soldiers and mechanics can arc weld mods onto the vehicles into the night as they roll onto the dock from Canada.


----------



## paracowboy

I'm still not sold on the idea of wheeled armour. I say give the tankers back their tanks. Give the mech boys something with tracks. Didn't we learn anything from the French in Indo-China? I've heard more negative feedback from troops in Iraq on the Stryker than positive on some other websites I hang out in.


----------



## devil39

paracowboy said:
			
		

> I'm still not sold on the idea of wheeled armour. I say give the tankers back their tanks. Give the mech boys something with tracks. Didn't we learn anything from the French in Indo-China? I've heard more negative feedback from troops in Iraq on the Stryker than positive on some other websites I hang out in.



What they are talking about here is Stryker Inf, not our Son of Pumpkin Launcher known as MGS.  Basically a LAV III without the turret. 

It is a great infantry chassis.  Our LAV III is better I would say.  

I would take a LAV III with "run flats" over a M113 any day.  Sheer fire power and turret optics make the comparison simple.

Stryker MGS (105mm) has not yet seen the light of day in the US Army and probably never will.  Hopefully it won't in our Army either.   Best to spend our money on the Future Combat System (FCS) vice the temporary solution (MGS) for the Interim Army.


----------



## paracowboy

devil, 
I know. But, I've heard nothing good from unofficial sources. And, oddly enough,  : nothing bad from official sources. Tires are for 'peace-keeping'. Tracks are for fighting. And I used to find it extremely comforting to hear and feel a Leopard rumbling up on an objective. Or running behind one, knowing that I was invulnerable, and all I had to do was pop some rounds into the occasional trench and count body parts.

Now, I sit and watch wheeled vehicles get towed out of marshes by M113s.


----------



## devil39

paracowboy,

True enough...but wheels and the speed of LAV III gives us tactical and potentially operational speed of manoeuvre and surprise.  I was 1 PPCLI (Grizzly), 3 PPCLI (light) and 2 PPCLI (M113 and LAV 3... and eventually light).  I have always hated track because it was so slow.... despite its superior tactical mobility.....

We can more than make up for the loss of track tactical mobility with the LAV 3 speed and firepower.... and we have proved it in Gagetown on numerous combat team commanders courses.  

MGS will not replace Tanks.. and we all know that..... the capabiltiy gap that MGS will fill is still not determined. 

I would take a LAV 3 over a M113 any day.   If someone offered me MGS I would ask why?


----------



## paracowboy

devil,
I fear the idea of our vehicles being roadbound. It limits our areas of exploitation too greatly. Further, it renders them more vulnerable to mines, IEDs, ATGMs, etc. Greater speed doesn't help, if all the roads are blocked. And wheeled armour is less useful in FIBUA. (Excuse me, OBUA, or whatever it's being called this wek.) A track can roll right over most roadblocks, and what it can't, it can do a 180 on it's own axis and get outta there. As opposed to a thousand point turn.

But, then, I'm not telling you anything you don't already know. Never having been mechanized except for some tours, I'm not going to pretend to be the Armour guru. Maybe some sort of compromise is possible. There has to be tracked vehicles that can really motor out there. Or wheeled vehs that don't bog down on astro-turf.


----------



## devil39

paracowboy,

I know where you are coming from.  I have found LAV III to be very good in difficult terrain... not as good as track.  But the mobility of LAV III, with an experienced driver, is far above that of the Grizzly or Bison.  You can not even compare LAV 3 to those older chassis.

LAV III is not roadbound.... and despite what you might hear in 3 PPCLI, we probably could have used some on OP APOLLO (I know... I was there).


----------



## paracowboy

devil39 said:
			
		

> paracowboy,
> 
> I know where you are coming from.   I have found LAV III to be very good in difficult terrain... not as good as track.   But the mobility of LAV III, with an experienced driver, is far above that of the Grizzly or Bison.   You can not even compare LAV 3 to those older chassis.
> 
> LAV III is not roadbound.... and despite what you might hear in 3 PPCLI, we probably could have used some on OP APOLLO (I know... I was there).


fair 'nuff. 
How 'bout tires? I've heard reports from Iraq that the tires are getting chewed up like mad. How does that impact the CSS capability to sustain? I don't know how often tanks and the M113 threw track. Having to constantly replace tires is going to drastically increase the footprint, isn't it? Would it make just as big a strain on the logistics fellas if they were tracked vehs?


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## Zipper

Both of you have very good points. But I think it has been stated around here before that both have their advantageous under certain conditions. Wheels definitely are better for getting "too" a trouble spot as they are quicker, have a better chance of making a slow escape from a mine roll over, and are better as a patrol vehicle. This is very true in Iraq where the needed CSS to maintain the tracked vehicles far outstrips the wheeled CSS (although both are in the crazy range).

While track can be far better when in contact with the enemy. It gives you the maneuver capability that wheels do not and allows for heavier gun platforms.

What it comes down to is both money and politics as you both know. Our government does not want to spend the money on tracks, nor does it want our forces to have the "big" guns to make us look like an aggressor as opposed to the false sales job of us as "peacekeepers" with wheels and pop guns.


----------



## oyaguy

When it comes to armoured vehicles, I'm maybe an above average layman.

But I've been looking around, and it seems to me that the Stryker seems to have developed some major problems of its own, while getting rid of some advantages in comparison to a LAV-III, i.e. the 25-mm cannon is traded for a 0.5 calibre machine gun.
I found this on the web.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_rpt/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf 
The author points out, IN THE MOST IN YOUR FACE LANGUAGE IMAGINABLE, the deficiencies of the Stryker. Makes sense since he was writing it for a politician.
He has some good points. What does the Stryker bring to the table that a Bradley or Abrams doesn't, especially in the urban fighting they're seeing in Iraq, with RPGs all-around. 

Of course, if the other choice was driving around in a hummer, I think I would be grateful for a Strkyer.


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## George Wallace

oyaguy 

Stryker is a whole family of vehicles, not one.  It is not a replacement for the Bradley or Abrams, so I miss your point there.  It is a vehicle designed to transport troops; so more of a replacement for the M 113.  Having a quick look at the link you provided, I was amused at the picture on the very first page of a destroyed vehicle in Somalia.  A poor example.  The LAV and Stryker are much newer designs and would probably fair better.  So far, in Iraq, they have done their job, even when hit by RPG and destroyed they have protected their crew.  Naturally these vehicles are going to go through growing pains.  I imagine if we were to have had these forums back in the 1960's, similar complaints would have been raised about the M113s being employed in Vietnam.

Back to your link; there are some glaring biases in it.  Crew comfort, being too cramped in the back?  It is a huge improvement over the M113 and even Bradley in this matter.  It's armour is fairly well designed and sloped; or would you rather be in an 'armoured shoebox' like a M113 or Bradley?  The Stryker is new, and the Americans are constantly developing better ways to employ it.  It will fill a niche. 

I am not a LAV or Stryker advocate.  I don't like the direction that our military is headed by going all wheeled, but we do not have the Budget, nor the large military, that the US has, so we do not have the luxury of having both to any large degree.  My greatest fear is the skill sets we are losing in the Armour Corps, which cascade down to the Cbt Team.


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## Teddy Ruxpin

Just keep in mind, that this is Stryker, not the Stryker MGS that we're about to spend a fortune on.  I doubt there's much wrong with the Stryker APC, watching how our LAV IIIs are working out.

Cheers,

TR


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## ArmyRick

To understand things better, the stryker family of vehicles were chosen for a reason. Within a theater of Ops, they act kind of like fast moving and light hitting cavalry. they are also used for presence patrolling and QRF duties (fast and easier on gas)

The US Army now has Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (for really slugging it out) with bradley and abrams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (Medium, its more fire power than a light bde and faster on roads and moderate cross country terrain) and they also have Infantry Brigade combat teams. A Brigade Combat team is a new US army idea they are implementing (we have used it for a long time) where a brigade has all its own assetts (in the CF this was never really an option, since our entire army basically can form a small division).

The US will also have aviation brigades, fires brigades (arty), etc, etc.

As far keeping M113, no thanks. I have lots of expirience with M113s and beleive me, across country they couldn't keep up with our leopards and weren't as mobile either.

If we were going to get into this business, we should have purchased Bradleys long time ago, but we did not.

The US will eventually replace Heavy and stryker with FCS planned Manned Ground vehicle (go to http://www.army.mil/fcs/ for more info).

The stryker has a place and so does heavy armor.


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## paracowboy

I remain unconvinced that real armour is unable to fill the role that is currently occupied by wheeled vehs. It is far easier to turn a warfighting piece of equipment into a 'peacekeeping' veh, than vice versa. Just as with troops. And I will always see wheeled vehs as designed for 'peacekeeping'.

Glad I walk everywhere.


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## Zipper

It doesn't matter what we know to be true about one system or another. It all comes down to cold hard cash and political will, both of which we are short on.

And as always, it is GW who hits the scary nail on the head. The skills that are being lost will not be easily regained, and will ONLY be regained and paid for with the blood of our sons and daughters. Thus we have learned nothing from those who have gone before.

As for the US FC systems. I find them rather scary in that they are so heavily dependant on technology to see them through. Have we not learned from past exercises with them that our abilities to fight even when we lose our "technology" has proven to be more valuable then having a lot of lights and switch's to play with? Our strengths were always that we knew how to fight without them, but used them to augment our capabilities. I find our turning to heavy reliance on them to be a shame and something that may prove as costly as our loss of past skills.


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## SchmDG

An example of how our forces have lost experience by not having a capability for even a short 'interim' period is our subs...  Lack of practising the skills has lead to one tragedy just trying to get the boats home.  Now we are just starting to redeploy again.  Talking to a former naval officer, the navy will have to relearn a lot of lessons the hard way to catch up to where they were just 5 years ago.  Even a 'training veh' such as cougar or MGS will allow a much shorter catch up time for our tankers...  yeah, it sucks, but as was mentioned, without the cash and the lobby power, that is what we are going to get, for now.  Hope for the future???


----------



## McG

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The steering system is not the skid-steer of old, it is differential steering, which is actually being considered for future versions of the LAV and FCS.


Were you talking about the Advanced Hybrid Electric Drive (AHED) vehicle concept from GDLS?  http://www.soldiermagazine.co.uk/mag/kitstop.htm


----------



## BITTER PPLCI CPL

Paracowboy; now you know how I see  our so called Airborne capability, I see it too in a certain way, a waste of $$$


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## McG

BITTER PPCLI CPL,
Are you saying that the LAV III was a waste of money, or that a purpose built peacekeeping vehicle would be a waste of money?

All,
This is not an airborne thread.  If you want to argue BITTER PPCLI CPL's view on that, you can do it here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33797.0.html


----------



## Spr.Earl

No,we still need a good Tracked Fighting Vehicle but use the LAV 3 as a support fire base so to speak because the 25mm is a good weapon but wheeled can't go where track can.
China is still building track and so are the Russians but in the West we are not,all's I say look out if push comes to shove!


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## ArmyRick

I pit an LAV III agaisnt the M113 any day and yes cross country. I was thoroughly impressed by what LAV III could do.

Here is a tip, tracks are not magical vehicles. I seen one of my buddies get one stuck in one foot of soft mud (he was expirienced driver).

There was a good picture in an old infantry journal of an M113 in croatia (UNPROFOR) with the thing stuck in deep mud. A MBT or a badger is a different story than the M113 (larger track and far more powerfull engine)...

my 2 cents (with 7 % GST and 8 % PST and 12 % interest compounded daily is..... now $ 5)


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## Zipper

5$! LOL

Agreed Rick. But a comparison of the LAVIII with a M113 is not very good either. We don't want to argue to keep the 113. 

Compare instead modern tracked vehicles that would suit our needs better (CV90 family) with that of the LAVIII and you get a whole different picture. Especially when your trying to carry heavier armaments such as the MGS is.

Note: This of course is not to say that we want to get rid of the LAVIII (and well thought out variants). Just augment it with track like any other well equipped military.

I know...         ...dream on. ;D


----------



## Kat Stevens

Apples and oranges. Of course a tracked tin box of 1952 vintage won't out perform a snazzy new cyotobisolav.  The point that some are missing is that our (potential) adversaries are still designing, building, selling, and using tracks.  To revisit an old Armoured Engineer favourite;  "Q-how fast can a boat go through the mud? A- as fast as an AEV winch can pull it."

just my little ol' opinion, o'course...

CHIMO,  Kat


----------



## RequiemVK

Dont know if it have been already posted, but here ...


Design

In addition to generic criticisms from the choice of wheels over tracks, critics claim there are many flaws with the Stryker.
[edit]

ICV and general complaints

    * A lack of amphibious ability, since there is no waterjet. Unlike tracks, wheels cannot swim without waterjets.
    * A original "Key Performance Factor" was for it to be air-transportable by C-130. While it doesn't yet met the requirement to fly 1000 nautical miles via C130, it is still capable of flying combat ready 600 miles.
    * It is too heavy for parachute operations.
    * It is quieter but larger than comparable tracked vehicles. (Here, one must be fair: it is actually smaller in its basic dimensions than a BTR-80.)
    * The ICV weapons systems are heavy machine guns that are used with the Kongsberg Remote Weapons Station, which will have a stabilization capability to shoot on the move by 2006.
    * The vehicle's armor protects against 14.5mm, but the add-on-slat-armor only defeats RPGs with HE warheads. Armor-Piercing tipped RPGs have been known to punch through the slat-armor.
    * As with any vehicle mounted weapon, the vehicle commander must expose himself in the hatch to correct a weapons malfunction.
    * The interior is tight with a squad of fully combat equipped soldiers, to include body armor with ballistic plates and a second load of ammunition that is also carried on the vehicle

[edit]

MGS-specific criticisms

    * The C-130 cannot carry the heavier Mobile Gun System at all, thus totally failing the "Key Performance Factor" above.
    * Instead of using a low pressure gun like the M8 (or the Russian 2S25), the Stryker MGS uses the M60's 105mm M68A1 cannon. This gun has far too much recoil for the Stryker's weight class.
    * Thus, they added a muzzle brake. Muzzle brakes reduce recoil at the cost of extra blast and noise. The noise level in tests approached 200dB. It is estimated that means a soldier cannot safely approach within 450m of a firing Stryker MGS. The blast debris was also extensive, forcing the crew to fight in the buttoned-up position.
    * Even with the muzzle brake, the recoil still damages the MGS' more delicate internals, such as night vision electronics, the lights, instrumentation and helmets worn by test dummies. Without the muzzle brake, the recoil mechanism is destroyed.
    * Unlike the M8 autoloader, the MGS autoloader apparently cannot reliably select the right type of round. It also has a carousel with half the capacity, reducing its battle endurance.
    * Only 2-axles on a Stryker are equipped with run-flat tires. The MGS is too heavy to be supported on 2 axles.
    * No winch means no self-recovery
    * Various other ergonomic and survivability flaws.

[edit]

Updates

According to a Washington Post article, the Stryker vehicle has some serious faults; e.g. the insufficient ability to carry additional armor for protection against rocket-propelled grenades. The 5,000 pounds armor that was added caused problems with the automatic tire pressure system, causing crews to check tire pressure three times a day. Other problems include:

    * As designed, the weapon system does not shoot accurately when the Stryker is moving.
    * Troops cannot fasten their seat belts when they are wearing bulky body armor. This contributed to the death of two soldiers when their Stryker vehicle rolled over. This problem was fixed by the time the CALL report was published and six months prior to the Washington Post article.
    * Computer systems for communications, intelligence and other systems have malfunctioned in the desert heat due to air conditioning problems.


----------



## ArmyRick

Funny the troops who actually use the strykers sing praises for it...


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

My objections to the LAV III as our only armoured vehicle would go away if we adopted the twin TOW missiles turret in addition to the chaingun.  The cannon is never going to be a tankbuster, and if the MGS is not an anti-tank platform, then having TOW as part of the weapon mix will give our guys something to shoot back that can actually take out an MBT.  I know that we are not supposed to be fighting tanks, thats nice, and when the enemy starts accepting NDHQ proclamations on what weapons are permitted to fire on Canadian soldiers, I will actually accept it.  The argument that the Bradley and similar vehicles with missile/cannon combinations proved less effective than tanks is only relevant when you will have tanks, since we wont, a LAV that can defend itself sounds like a good move.  As far as the debate about weight, our poor old Herc's couldn't move one from Trenton to Edmonton, however it was configured, so I guess its a non issue.  Transportability would become more of an issue with an actual planing place to replace our strategic heavy lift (air) or purchase or RO-RO armour transport ships (sea).


----------



## George Wallace

TOW is not Fire and Forget.   I would not want to be in a LAV III firing a TOW at a Tank and waiting for it to impact before moving off....I'd move off alright....right through the Pearly Gates.   Unless they were being employed in the Anti-Tank role, in ambush positions, TOW would be useless to the LAVs.   Perhaps another missile system that was Fire and Forget would do.   That way the LAVs could withdraw as soon as they fire, and not remain an easy soft target to the other tanks on the field.


----------



## Kirkhill

Or perhaps something with a little more "stand-off" George?  Say an 8km missile instead of 4km?


----------



## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Or perhaps something with a little more "stand-off" George?   Say an 8km missile instead of 4km?



If that were to be the case, yes.     But, then isn't that the philosophy behind putting the ADATS int the LdSH (RC).


----------



## Kirkhill

> If that were to be the case, yes.   But, then isn't that the philosophy behind putting the ADATS int the LdSH (RC).



Doesn't mean its the only, or the best solution does it?

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/gill/



> *SPIKE-ER*
> 
> The *extended range (8km) * version, Spike-ER, also has a larger warhead. It is designed *for mounting on light combat vehicles  * but can also be removed and fitted onto a trispod. The vehicle package includes the missile in its canister, a remotely controlled turret with target acquisition system and electronics and gunner's station with multi-function display, control panel and handgrip.
> 
> A *bi-directional fibre-optic datalink  * provides Spike-ER with a Fire and Steer mode, in addition to the other two modes. This means that the gunner does not need to lock-on to the target before launch, but can choose the target after launch and steer the missile to the target's most vulnerable point or hand over to fire-and-forget.
> 
> Rafael has developed a version of Spike-ER with a Penetration, Blast and Fragmentation (PBF) warhead which only explodes after penetration of the target (e.g. a wall), minimising collateral damage.
> 
> A Spike-ER launcher has been developed for helicopters. The four-round launcher requires no modifications to the helicopter, other than software integration. It can be fitted to a variety of helicopters, including AH-64 Apache (which can carry 16 missiles), AH-1S Cobra, A-129, MD-500, Mi-24 and others.
> 
> SPIKE-LR
> Spike-LR is a portable anti-armour weapon system with a range of up to 4km, which can be operated in fire-and-forget mode and in fire, observe and update mode using the fibre-optic data link.
> 
> Spike-LR is equipped with a fibre-optic data link guidance system, which sends commands to the missile from the launch system and receives, into the gunner's field of view, images from the seeker. *The gunner can update his aim point while the missile is in flight using the fibre optic link.* As well as update target information, the datalink allows the gunner to switch *targets and also receive real-time intelligence and perform battle damage assessment*. The Spike system can work in non line-of-sight (NLOS) mode allowing the gunner to operate from a covered position. Spike-LR, which can also be installed on light combat vehicles, can be used to engage tanks, armoured vehicles, hardened shelters and low flying slow targets such as helicopters.
> 
> SPIKE-MR (GILL)
> Spike-MR, the medium range version, is a portable fire-and-forget anti-armour missile system with a range up to 2.5km. It can have the option of the additional Fire, Observe and Update mode of operation if required.



I have been a real proponent of the Javelin system but perhaps there is merit to the Gill/Spike Family to take over the Javelin/TOW/ADATS roles?

Spike MR for the Infantry
Spike ER for the Cavalry (mounted in "saddlebags" on the LAV Turret)

Find something longer ranged for the support role

Spike LR at 4 km seems to be neither fish nor fowl, much like the TOWen.  -  Relatively short range (when trading shots with tanks), slow transit, slow rate of fire, few stowed kills


----------



## a_majoor

Putting TOW on the LAV III turret is wrong for the reasons stated by George. If we do need to supply LAV crews with a means to defeat hard targets, then they also need something that can be aimed and fired quickly, either "Fire and Forget" like Javelin (sorry Kirkhill, but following the Spike to impact with its FOG-M feature has the same flaws as TOW), or "snap shooting" targets with an evolved LOSAT. (Just the shock of it screaming past the bunker at Mach 5 should give the enemy pause).

The main reason to think this way is the LAV is an Infantry carrier (or fighting machine; you decide), and so the infantry soldiers need to act or react to threats right down to 0m (i.e. a mounted patrol in the city.) Obviously a different sort of vehicle would be prefferable, but since LAV is what we have, well this solution will do for now.


----------



## Kirkhill

> either "Fire and Forget" like Javelin (sorry Kirkhill, but following the Spike to impact with its FOG-M feature has the same flaws as TOW)



I agree a_majoor.   That's why the Spike appeals to me.



> A bi-directional fibre-optic datalink provides Spike-ER with a Fire and Steer mode, in addition to the other two modes. This means that the gunner does not need to lock-on to the target before launch, but can choose the target after launch and steer the missile to the target's most vulnerable point or hand over to fire-and-forget.



It can be used both in N-LOS, man-in-the-loop, over-the-horizon mode AND fire-and-forget.

Edit:

Actually, as I read it, a Spike equipped LAV, cresting a rise and confronting something heavier could immediately launch a retaliatory round, have the driver backup into defilade while the gunner is still locating and fixing the target.  Once the target is fixed the gunner could then leave the round alone as the vehicle continues to scarper or else, if the vehicle is behind cover, continue to watch the round fly to the target, and either complete the engagement, or at the last minute (on seeing the IFF panel) divert the missile to safe ground.


----------



## Kirkhill

Another Spike related link.

http://www.rheinmetall.de/print.php?lang=3&fid=1515

The Poles have a 30mm turret with a pair of Spikes for their Patria 8x8 LAVs.


----------



## mainerjohnthomas

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Another Spike related link.
> 
> http://www.rheinmetall.de/print.php?lang=3&fid=1515
> 
> The Poles have a 30mm turret with a pair of Spikes for their Patria 8x8 LAVs.


   I like the Spike system, the LAV III would work well with twin Spike mounts, instead of TOW that I suggested earlier.  Spike gives good range, shoot/scoot ability.  The ability to snap shoot, and alter designated target after firing, allows our crews to both haul a$$ and kick it (a good idea in the light armour game).


----------



## a_majoor

That is interesting. I had thought the missile mode had to be designated prior to launch, but if the gunner can join in the regular programming after a "snap shoot" launch, then so much the better. I do think it would be rather difficult for the gunner to fix the target and guide to impact while in a bouncing vehicle driving backwards at high speed.

Snap shooting with hypervelocity rounds like LOSAT wuold allow emergency engagements, while Spike or Javelin would allow for more deliberate engagements. Perhaps a mixed battery; 2XSpike and 2X mini LOSAT in a launcher box.


----------



## Kirkhill

> I do think it would be rather difficult for the gunner to fix the target and guide to impact while in a bouncing vehicle driving backwards at high speed.



Probably so.  But the time of flight to 8 km (roughly 25 to 30 seconds) can be an asset in an N-LOS system.  With a top-attack profile and a wide field of view there is time to gather the target and evaluate the surrounding area (deduced from statements saying it is possible to evaluate the surrounding area for better targets and shift the point of aim).

Having said that, the Compact version of the LOSAT (CKEM - 60 inches, 100 lbs) could be of interest as well.  Perhaps not having both Spike and CKEM mounted on the same vehicle but maybe within the troop?  By the way, one of the problems that the LOSAT is still struggling to overcome seems to be not just a massive launch signature but a plume of exhaust gases that draw a line between target and launch point.

http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_products/antiarmor/CKEM/product-CKEM.html

Perhaps the troop could even have a support patrol/section with a pair of vehicles mouting a box of N-LOS missiles or have a section of longer range support missile vehicles assigned for particular missions?

Not suggesting answers, just alternatives.

Although I do think that the 60mm HVMS turret with a pair of Spikes, on a suitable chassis, would make for an interesting system with a useful range of competencies.  Particularly if aligned with Coyote type surveillance, Mini UAVs and something like Hellfire/Brimstone/Longbow/Netfires in support.

It wouldn't make for an assault force but it would make for a screening and skirmishing force that could supply and interesting mix of fire support.


----------



## a_majoor

Were getting a fruit salad here.

Long range firepower should be held by the "armoured" and "artillery" vehicles in the team, such as tanks, TOW, mortars etc. They can hold enough ammunition natures to make them effective at what they do, without having a bunch of infantry filling the back. For a LAV III, we should be thinking of a short to medium range weapon to allow the crew to do an emergency engagement of hard targets at short range ("Holy S**t, Earl, where did that come from? Missile, Tank ON! [gunner: ON]. FIRE!!!).

In fact, if we go all the way with this sort of thinking, a bundle of unguided rockets would allow a snapshot, cause the enemy to put his head down and allow the driver to boot it in full reverse, while in the background (say, 8 km away   ) the Spike gunner gets kicked awake and launches a round in support of the unfortunate infantry carrier.


----------



## Kirkhill

I happen to like fruit salads!!!



> In fact, if we go all the way with this sort of thinking, a bundle of unguided rockets would allow a snapshot, cause the enemy to put his head down and allow the driver to boot it in full reverse



Hmm.  What can be done with the Smoke Grenades launchers, Metalstorm type technology and micro electronics? 



> while in the background (say, 8 km away   ) the Spike gunner gets kicked awake and launches a round in support of the unfortunate infantry carrier.



Spike gunner gets kicked awake?  That might be seen as a less than complimentary view of those in support trades. 

Actually I take your point about effective IA systems for Infantry Carriers.  In fact for any vehicles.

But as to putting the Spike or similar systems, 8km behind the front line of armour plate, isn't that kind of leading with your chin?  Why not put the Spikes up there with the leading armour, use the available sensors (Coyote-UAVs-Dismounted patrols-etc) check "over the hill" to reduce uncertainty as much as possible.  Eg.  The mini-UAVs being considered for the LAVs - 10 can be flown simultaneously from one laptop out to a distance of 35 miles (something on that order - memory fading) They can take on at least some of the wheels-in-ruts type reconnaissance of lines of advance reducing risks to forward elements.

By keeping Spike etc forward then there is more opportunity to strike at the enemy before coming in range of the enemy's guns.  Isn't there?

On the question of whether the LAV-III should be the only vehicle to carry this "fruit salad" -  Use the LAV for infantry carrier and support roles as is.  But while the drive train of the system might be retained for the "weapons" vehicles, is there any real need to maintain the high profile box?  Something a little lower for recce/fire support perhaps?  A flat bed for deep support systems and cargo?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I read that the combatants in the Afghan civil war (Northern Alliance et al vs Taliban) mounted surplus 57mm rocket pods from Hips/Hinds onto BMP as a direct fire system.   They would basically let'er rip at a target and go back for more.   Not sure how effective it was, but it would make for a good video.

We've been down the LAV/Coyote missile trail a few times.   I still argue that Coyote would benefit from two turret mounted AT missiles (TOW or otherwise) to deal with situtations when they'd be far from help.   I would also say that this is less of a priority for the LAV.

During my course down south one of the interesting dilemas was how to employ Bradley mounted infantry units, especially in the defence.   The vehicle was best suited for long range fights, while the dismounts were best suited for up close (a little less of a problem with Javelin I suppose).   Unless you split the infantry from their vehicles you ended up putting one element in a position for which it was not really suited.

2B


----------



## a_majoor

2Bravo has it right, of course. No one vehicle or system can be all things to all people, and LAVs are no exception. We can attempt to festoon the LAV with all kinds of systems and devices to cover weak points and contingencies (replacing one of the rear bins with a Coleman cooler, fer instance  ), we can do some drastic surgury on the basic LAV to make specialty vehicles like Kirkhill's "LAV technical" (a giant 8X8 pickup truck with a weapons mount bolted to the flatbed. Puts Toyota Land Cruisers to shame); or we can even go to different vehicles for different roles. Long range fire support can come from missiles launched from HMMVWs, for example (with TOWs being fitted in real life, and various prototypes carrying EFOG-M, Hellfire and LOSAT), although you might be careful driving trough unsecured areas in one of those.

Since for purposes of logistical efficiency we have tried to standardize on the LAV family, we are probably best served by carrying out this process to a logical conclusion. All systems which are currently on non LAV III chassis should be phased out and transferred to new build LAV IIIs. I am with Kirkhill for a LAV III "pickup" version, you can mount a mortar, or weapons pedestal, or put on a "camper top" to make a CP, ambulance or whatever. Coyote IIs will be the only exception, the surveillance system goes on a complete LAV III with turret, and we can add a launcher box for a self defence system.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/oct/stryker_units.htm

key quotes


"It does fit on a C-130. I've flown in one with it," said Lt. Col. William James, deputy commander of 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, also known as the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team. 

"During our year there, not a single soldier died inside a Stryker vehicle. There were a couple of soldiers riding who were hit, but nobody died inside a vehicle. And there were penetrations that were fairly catastrophic," said Lt. Col. Barry Huggins, commander of the 2-3 Infantry Battalion, who served as the first Stryker Brigade's executive officer in Iraq. 

The Stryker's armor protects against 14.5 mm rounds. Before deploying to Iraq, the first Stryker brigade acquired slat armor that could be added to the vehicle to protect soldiers from RPGs. The 5,200-pound armor wraps around the sides of the vehicle and deflects RPGs, which then explode away from the vehicle. 

"There were physically very few places that we couldn't go within that urban terrain," said Mullen. 

The 1/25 has put 5 million miles on its Stryker vehicles

The Stryker operational readiness rate was in the high 90s routinely, which is way above Army standard, said Huggins, of 3/2. "That's in part a function of the vehicle, in part it's a function of the tremendous contractor support it came with. They put in place a very effective system that did a tremendous job of keeping our combat power available to us," he said. 

....a night-time operation in Samarra during which *eight platoons raided a 10 by 10 km section *  of the city 

"That battlespace that we operated in was 25 times what we were envisioned to do-50 by 50 kilometer blocks is how they designed the brigade. And what we ended up doing was covering a 276 by 226 kilometer box, around 48,000 square kilometers as opposed to 2,500. That is phenomenal," said Huggins.

Comment:  Brigade of 3864 replace 101st Div with 18,000 in the Battle Space.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/oct/army_transformation.htm

Stryker Brigade also touted as transformation model.

Discussion about the need for a Brigade Troops Battalion to handle independent companies and platoons.


----------



## George Wallace

Don't forget....what they call a Stryker has no turret.


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Don't forget....what they call a Stryker has no turret.



Right.  It is an armoured transport.


----------



## Infanteer

The Stryker is the name of the entire class of vehicles, is it not?  The troop carrying model is simply one type of Stryker.


----------



## Kirkhill

Right.

They transport Infantry sections, Engineer Sections, Cavalry Scouts, Mortars, FOO Teams, Medical Teams, NBC Teams, Sigs Teams and Command Teams.

They also happen to carry weapons.


----------



## McG

LAV III and Stryker are names for the same family of vehicle (eg. Stryker MGS = LAV III MGS).


----------



## ArmyRick

I have heard a lot of yap yap and arm chair quaterbacking about the entire stryker family, the stryker BCT concepts and so on. It seems to me that the US Army is having success and that the front line soldiers who use them actually have alot of confidence in them. I have talked to some RCD friends of mine at work and they agree alot with me (old guys too who were fully qualified on the leos)...

Fact One; The Stryker is not the death car that some web sites have made it out to be

Fact Two; M113 are a far poorer choice for the roles and missions of the Strykers

Fact Three; Yes, Bradley and Abrams rock hard and deliver a very lethal blow BUT at 60 KM/H and far fewer dismounts. Plus a taxing supply chain...

Strykers are here and they are working. Nay sayers, take a hike.


----------



## George Wallace

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The Stryker is the name of the entire class of vehicles, is it not?   The troop carrying model is simply one type of Stryker.





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> LAV III and Stryker are names for the same family of vehicle (eg. Stryker MGS = LAV III MGS).


I think I posted all that near the beginning of this thread.....or was it in another   ???


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I think I posted all that near the beginning of this thread.....or was it in another    ???



Revolution 29


----------



## Kat Stevens

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Strykers are here and they are working. Nay sayers, take a hike.



Yes Sgt! Will that be at the double, Sgt? :


----------



## ArmyRick

Stevens, ain't you been listening lately to routine orders, son? Running in combats in forbidden except during tactical training (includes CQC). Now steady up.  BY THE LEFT QUICK MARCH !


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Why "naysayers take a hike"?

There's plenty wrong with the MGS, and there is certainly room for improvement of the LAV III.


----------



## ArmyRick

Yes the Stryker Armored Family is not perfect (The MGS is not the ONLY version). However my point is all this doom and gloom about using strykers (and their are several web sites that bash it). There is supposed to be a mass stash of dead bodies from using strykers according to some of these experts.

Well, US troops (You the ones who do far more dangerous missions than our army) that use the stryker are praising them. They are fast, some what quiet (compared to a bradley I guess) and they work very well. 

Yes they required bird cage, but guess what? SO DID THE M113s in IRAQ !!! I have seen pics of the so called gavins (M113) covered in the bird cage.

Tires can't work in battle. Only tracks. I am sick of hearing this junk. Guess what? LAVIII in Erotrea lost a wheel and was able to drive back to camp still. Blow out a track on the M113 and your pooched. Unless you have enough spare track pads and end connectors., even at that it takes time to get the track back up and running.

Their is a video of a Stryker being blown to bits, and in one week it was operational again.

Oh yeah, there is room for improvement WITH any armored vehicle.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Some good reviews on the Stryker family of vehicles:


October 2005
Stryker Units Win Over Skeptics
By Grace Jean
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/oct/stryker_units.htm



> "The Stryker, as a vehicle, has proven its worth. It has saved lives," said Maj. Nicholas Mullen, rear detachment commander of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, which is known as the second Stryker brigade combat team.





> "I'm going back for a second year in Iraq, and I'm damn glad I'm going in a Stryker," said [Lt. Col. William James, deputy commander of 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division] of 3/2. The first Stryker brigade is training for deployment next summer (see related story).





> The success of the first two Stryker Brigades has fueled more confidence in the capabilities of the vehicle. But as the brigades continue to transform, soldiers in those brigades continue to evaluate strategies for best utilizing the Stryker.


----------



## a_majoor

Bottom line; the LAV III was an inspired choice for the CF, and most of the variants will be useful in our bag of tricks to support manoeuvre warfare with a medium weight expeditionary force. 

We still need to sort out some issues with the LAV family. Indirect fire needs to be addressed with both mortars and artillery. A LAV III hull would make a good 81mm mortar carrier, since it can hold a useful amount of ammunition internally as well. 120mm mortars are "nice", but I would question the amount of on board ammunition, and also the "overkill" factor when shooting danger close to the dismounted troops. Various versions of a LAV SP have been touted (I like the LAV-105 with the South African gun and ammunition), but we could also go for a turretless "gun tractor" towing a light 105 or 155 if we really need to have a low cost version.

Direct fire has been taken over by people with their heads farther in the clouds than I usually go. A LAV hull can probably mount a low pressure 105 or a high pressure 90mm max, unless the laws of physics have been repealed. Low profile turrets or pedestal overhead gun mounts don't seem to be favored, so a workable MGS would mount the GIAT 90mm turret or something similar. 

As for the missile firing version, TOW is pretty much at the end of the line, and ADATS has technical issues which limit the utility as a DF weapon. A long range missile with some "Fire and Forget" capability like HELLFIRE or BRIMESTONE is one way to go, or EFOG-M can be mounted to provide positive control to impact. Some sort of LOSAT type hypervelocity missile can be a secondary round for "snap shooting" unexpected tatgets at shorter ranges. (I would think the LAV-Missile version would load the LOSATS while on the move, and the fire and forget missiles when on overwatch. A mixed battery is also possible.)

There does not seem to be any LAV-AD in the works, which is a major oversight. The LAV III hull is large enough to mount most of the common AD turrets and a large store of ammunition. Even if most enemies do not have powerful air forces, almost anyone can cobble together a UAV, and we need to be able to put out the eyes of any enemy who can launch UAVs.

If we want to go all the way in expeditionary forces, then we also need a LAV Logistics to carry cargo under protection in unsecured areas (i.e. everywhere). Once again, the large size of the hull makes this a useful and practical option.


----------



## Jantor

Hello everyone.

 I wonder if this might be something to consider re-guarding a LAV based AD weapon


http://www.defense-update.com/products/a/aheadsparc.htm


 Buz


----------



## Kirkhill

Very interesting Jantor.

I wonder if Oerlikon Contraves are taking some of the same design principles into the ADATS/MMEV project? Specifically data linking with remote radar relying on an onboard E/O suite for tracking.  That might tend to reduce the centre of mass and the power requirements caused by incorporating the radar into the ADATS vehicle.  It also doesn't say anything about crew size.

Second thought occurs with respect to the 750,000,000 price tag for the 33 vehicles - perhaps some of that money is being used to create an integrated comms network using the MMEV as the corner stone and test bed weapons system with a view to plugging in other systems later.  The MMEV system might be able to work with netted, discrete command, surveillance (radar and Coyote) and firing (MMEV) points.  The ADATS system already allows for, as far as I understand for one vehicle to launch missiles from either its own or other assets using a hardwired network when static.  If that capability could be made mobile....and expandable

That might be worth the 750,000,000.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I'd just like some more Coyotes (along with smaller OCSs and upgraded optics).   

2B


----------



## plattypuss

One point that was recently brought up by one of the LO's (I think the TRADOC LO) in the US is that with the SCTF and in future ops - Canada will have to be prepared to operate in all three blocks and that the US would not tolerate our inability to not do so.  This was derived from the results of a wargame held where the US trialed their future abilities and we were able to utilise our future combat construct as well.  The question that I would have (and I am not a detractor of the MGS or Stryker) is whether the Operations in Iraq that are ongoing currently justify the consideration of the Stryker and MGS as a "first block" option.  Although we define war in three blocks this, I don't think, automatically means an urban only focus.  So what I am trying to get at (knowing the Marines had LAVs) is - has the Stryker family proven itself in a first block/possibly open terrain environment, to justify us using it for that purpose? It may have proven successful in the urban fight but what about the wide open battlefield?


----------



## Kirkhill

<2 MUSD apiece for new amphibious LAVs.

Pentagon Contract Announcement 
  
  
(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Feb. 2, 2006)
  
  
 General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, Mich., was awarded on Jan. 31, 2006, a $128,302,167 firm-fixed-price contract for Light Armored Vehicles and Supporting Logistics and Engineering Products.  

Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, Mich. (7 percent), and London, Ontario, Canada (93 percent), and is expected to be completed by June 30, 2008. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This was a sole source contract initiated on Aug. 10, 2005.  

The Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity (W56HZV-06-C-0255).  

  
  
 General Dynamics Awarded $257 Million Contract for Light Armored Vehicles 
  
  
(Source: General Dynamics Land Systems; issued Feb. 2, 2006)
  
  
 STERLING HEIGHTS, Mich. --- General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics, has received a $128 million increment of a $257 million contract for 130 new eight-wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAV-A2) in various configurations for the U.S. Marine Corps. The contract has a total potential value of $307 million if a $50 million option for electric turret drives is exercised.  

The LAV-A2 variants are an improved version of the Marines' Light Armored Vehicle series which entered service in the 1980s and continues operational employment today. General Dynamics will deliver armored personnel, anti-tank, command & control, logistic, and mortar variants beginning in July 2007. Work will be performed by existing General Dynamics employees in London, Ontario, Canada; Sterling Heights, Mich.; and Woodbridge, Va. Work is expected to be complete by July 2008.  

The Light Armored Vehicle A2 provides the Marine Corps' Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion a mobile, agile and survivable system for conducting offensive and defensive operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The eight-wheeled amphibious armored vehicle is equipped with an improved suspension, is fitted for enhanced armor protection and features an automatic fire suppression system for crew protection. Power is provided by a Detroit Diesel 6V53T diesel engine developing 275 horsepower coupled to an Allison MT653, 6 speed (5 forward, 1 reverse) automatic transmission. The four rear wheels drive the vehicle on a full-time basis, but eight-wheel drive is selectable.  


General Dynamics, headquartered in Falls Church, Va., employs approximately 72,200 people worldwide and had 2005 revenue of $21.2 billion. The company is a market leader in mission-critical information systems and technologies; land and expeditionary combat systems, armaments and munitions; shipbuilding and marine systems; and business aviation.  

-ends-  

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.17226637.1138985248.Q@OJIMOa9dUAABSzadU&modele=jdc_34


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my last - from National Defense Magazine:

These comments are noteworthy:



> Active protection "sounds like a great system . but I'll stick with the slat armor," said Army Lt. Col. William "Buck" James, deputy commander of the Arrowhead Stryker brigade combat team, who spent a year in Iraq.
> 
> The slat armor is a cage-like structure mounted on the Stryker vehicle. It adds bulk and limits maneuverability, but soldiers have attested to its ability to stop rocket-propelled grenades from penetrating the vehicle.





> Unlike the Marine light-armored reconnaissance companies, the Stryker units engage in more aggressive offensive operations, even though they are an infantry force.
> 
> "The Stryker brigade was designed for small-scale contingencies, but with the level of combat power it has, it's generated discussions about killing tanks," James said. Armed with shoulder-fired Javelin antitank missiles, for example, Stryker soldiers can "seek out and destroy armor."







> January 2006
> 
> Demand Grows for Light-Armored Vehicles
> 
> By Sandra I. Erwin
> 
> The Marine Corps is creating five new light-armored reconnaissance companies and is buying 120 vehicles to equip these units.
> 
> The 120 light-armored vehicles, or LAVs, could be delivered as early as 2007, said Col. John Bryant, Marine Corps program manager for the LAV.
> 
> The reconnaissance companies, by design, specialize in intelligence collection and security missions, but commanders in Iraq continue to find new ways to employ them, Bryant told military contractors at a conference of the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement in Silver Spring, Md.
> 
> "The LAV platform is so versatile that we end up performing a variety of missions," he said. Light armored reconnaissance battalions generally serve as the "eyes and ears for the division commander," Bryant noted. Light armored reconnaissance companies function as the "mobile eyes and ears" for the infantry regiment commander.
> 
> "We don't have enough LAR companies," Bryant said. The new five companies will be added to each active-duty battalion, and two will be allocated to the reserve battalion.
> 
> The new vehicles are being purchased with war-emergency funds that were appropriated by Congress last year. A bare-bones LAV hull costs about $1 million. A weapons turret ranges from $1.5 million to $2.5 million each.
> 
> A purchase agreement for the 120 LAVs was expected in early 2006, said a spokesman for the manufacturer, General Dynamics Land Systems. The vehicles will be delivered about 18 months after the contract is signed.
> 
> The Marines operate nearly 900 LAVs of several variants, and at least half the vehicles have been refurbished so they can last until at least 2015. Beyond that, the Marines have not yet decided on a replacement vehicle.
> 
> Under a so-called "service life-extension program" that began five years ago, LAVs have received upgraded electronics, control panels, corrosion control features, new tires and wheels and "thermal signature reduction" modifications to make them less visible to enemy sensors.
> 
> One of the newer variants of the vehicle, the LAV-25, will be upgraded with a sophisticated thermal sight, beginning in 2007.
> 
> The command-post version of the LAV will be equipped with digital command-and-control systems, a satellite communications terminal that works on the move, and a high-frequency radio antenna that also operates while the vehicle is in motion. The Marines own 50 command-post vehicles.
> 
> To help thwart roadside-bomb attacks in Iraq, LAVs are being outfitted with automatic fire-suppression systems, Bryant said. Most vehicles still have manual devices.
> 
> In its 2008 budget, the Corps will fund other "survivability" upgrades for the LAV, such as hardened components that can withstand landmine blasts and "active protection" systems that shoot down incoming rockets or antitank missiles.
> 
> None of these upgrades has yet been defined and no technologies are likely to be selected for at least two years, Bryant said. "We are watching what the U.S. Army is doing, we are working with some foreign governments to ensure there's more than one system to compete."
> 
> The Army is evaluating active-protection systems for its light-armored vehicles, the Strykers, although frontline troops continue to favor traditional armor as a more reliable form of protection.
> 
> Active protection "sounds like a great system . but I'll stick with the slat armor," said Army Lt. Col. William "Buck" James, deputy commander of the Arrowhead Stryker brigade combat team, who spent a year in Iraq.
> 
> The slat armor is a cage-like structure mounted on the Stryker vehicle. It adds bulk and limits maneuverability, but soldiers have attested to its ability to stop rocket-propelled grenades from penetrating the vehicle.
> 
> Unlike the Marine light-armored reconnaissance companies, the Stryker units engage in more aggressive offensive operations, even though they are an infantry force.
> 
> "The Stryker brigade was designed for small-scale contingencies, but with the level of combat power it has, it's generated discussions about killing tanks," James said. Armed with shoulder-fired Javelin antitank missiles, for example, Stryker soldiers can "seek out and destroy armor."



http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/Jan/SB-Demand.htm


----------



## Lance Wiebe

Hm.  No mention of the MGS variant.

It also sounds more like the LAV II chassis than the LAV III, doesn't it?  Detroit instead of CAT for example?


----------



## Kirkhill

Actually that would sound about right Lance.  They are probably looking for commonality with what they have since they are talking about adding companies to existing units.   And as you say, no reference to the MGS.


----------



## a_majoor

The LAV 25 is of the same generation as the Coyote or Bison, but there is no particular reason that production line can't be re opened. Now if someone in our organization was smart about it, we could slide in and at a minimum share assembly line space to upgrade our Bisons and Coyotes and  restock on spare parts.

VonGarvin and RecceDG have spoken in favor of the Bison as a mortar carrier and recce vehicle, and it is versatile enough to be a wheeled M-113 and adapted for all kinds of other roles, why not go for it and buy a few hundred new ones for the CF? Yes it will upset programs like the LARV (Light Armoured Recce Vehicle), but we could be taking delivery in 2008, not looking at the prototype in 2011.....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

What happen the Combat Engineer LAV? I heard that the prototype looked interesting but was never followed up on. If you are going to have a wheeled force, you better dam well ensure that your Combat Engineers can keep up and take care of the obstacles under fire. Do we still use that Wheeled bulldozer that they had in the mid-80’s?


The MGS (aka a bunch of problems traveling in the same general directions). Everyone claims it is new high tech, in actual fact it is an old gun (60’s) turret designed in the 80’s on a hull designed in the 90’s.

There are a lot of better turret options out there than this, also a 90mm LP gun would more ammo to be carried. The only reason to keep the 105 is so we can pretend to have some sort of AT option. Having a 90-105mm gun equipped LAV in addition to tanks is a good idea, trying to pretend they will adequately replace tanks is a very bad idea. I personally think the LAV family was a great idea, but I also think keeping a combat group using MBT’s, CV90’s and M109’s is equally important.

Canada will spend the rest of this century being involved in expeditionary wars and conflicts and each will be quite different than the other, having a mixed force of light and heavy that is always being evolved is the only way to be prepared for the next task given to the military.


----------



## Spr.Earl

Here's a question from a old Sapper who rode in the first Bison's in the Wack in 95 and has not been in a so called APC in yonk's.
How come we are having so many roll over's with the LAV?
Is it driver?
I think not ,too many in the last little while,what gives?


----------



## Kirkhill

Reviving this thread in light of 2Bravo's comments on the MGS and this article:



> Canadians survive RPG attack near Kandahar
> GRAEME SMITH
> 
> Globe and Mail Update
> 
> Kandahar, Afghanistan — A Canadian armoured vehicle was hit by two rocket-propelled grenades Friday as troops rushed to provide backup for local Afghan police and soldiers fighting a battle against Taliban insurgents west of Kandahar.
> 
> The thick armour of the LAV-3 vehicles protected the Canadian soldiers from the blast, about 10 kilometres west of Kandahar. None of the soldiers was hurt. One of the vehicle's eight wheels was damaged, so soldiers replaced it and kept moving.



http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060414.wcanafgh0414/BNStory/International/home
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.

I find this noteworthy because the LAV apparently survived a double RPG hit "WITHOUT" the benefit of the bird-cage on the Strykers.  Without getting into the details of the armour on the LAV vs the Stryker I thought this interesting.

Especially seeing as how exposure to enemy fire now (Blast, Chemical-HEAT, and I assume light Kinetic-small arms) has occured in an operational environment.  From the news reports it would seem to indicate that you are quite well protected as long as you can keep behind armour.


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

KH, I think it's a bit early to jump to any conclusions, as there are all sorts of questions incidents like these raise:


did the RPG fuse properly?
what part of the vehicle was hit?
was it a direct hit or merely a near miss?
were the rounds actually functional (a "problem" sometimes in Astan)?

On and on...  I should think that an RPG would penetrate a LAV III over all arcs, so find myself wondering what actually happened here.  Unfortunately, we'll have to wait and see...


----------



## Kirkhill

Fair Enough Teddy.

Thanks.

Waiting out.


----------



## a_majoor

I'm going to throw out a curve ball on this:

Make all new LAV's "LAV II" chassis. This would be a vehicle like the Coyote/Bison although it should be a new build with as much commonality as possible, and come off the line with the latest in engines, ergonomics, suspensions, built in data buses etc.

The turreted version is the Coyote II, and the basis for a 25mm DFSV, SPAAG with a Blazer or similar turret, Forward observer/FOO/FAC/MFC, surveillance system and so on.

The unturreted version can be used for a whole hockey sock of missions, including APC (mounting a RWS like the Stryker), mortar carrier, Ambulance, CP, Artillery Gun tractor (if we use towed artillery) or SP (if not), ATGM carrier, Sapper/Light engineer vehicle, electronic warfare and so on. One poster even said an unmodified Bison made a good Recce vehicle.

Why the LAV II? For one thing it is smaller and lighter than the LAV III, which reduces various logistical problems, and allows you to go in places the LAV III is too large to fit. A smaller vehicle has better signature management, and some advantages in passive protection (i.e. is harder to see). The LAV II has been proved large enough to carry a Delco 25mm turret, a Blazer SPAAG turret and the surveillance system kit of a Coyote and the Emerson "Hammerhead" TOW turret. Given that, it _should_ be big enough for a 105mm Direct Fire turret and the Denal 105mm SP turret as well.

Big, lumbering vehicles like the LAV III are, I think, at the edge of the line for wheeled vehicles, and if we are going to a medium weight army, then perhaps a bit of a diet is in order. Logistics, transportation issues and operational/tactical mobility issues can be eased through the use of a smaller, lighter common chassis, and the USMC LAV 25 series, Canadian Coyote and Bison's show a wide range of useful vehicles are possible in this size/weight range.


----------



## Kirkhill

> The unturreted version can be used for a whole hockey sock of missions, including APC (mounting a RWS like the Stryker),



Or perhaps something a little heavier like the Rafael 30mm/Spike combination RCWS-30 adopted by the Czechs.  http://www.defense-update.com/events/2005/summary/LIC-protect-2.htm

Another thought, in line with your downsizing to the LAVII, Arthur, and the possible adoption of an RCWS system, is an opportunity to address armour, manpower and ability to contribute to stability operations.

Assume that we are rich in money (as a nation - not DND) but poor in man-power (at least of the "expendable" variety).  Therefore supplying tech-heavy rather than man-power-heavy units would seem to make sense.

Setting aside the light/mech infantry discussion for a second, suppose the LAV section were downsized to 7 (with a turreted vehicle) or 6 (with an RCWS equipped APC) as a matter of course.  This would allow for a smaller vehicle, potentially with heavier armour because fewer bodies means less weight.  It would also mean more sensors and heavy weapons per soldier while at the same time allowing for a 4-man fire team for debussing.  A platoon would be 4 vehicles, with 8 crew (Spike/30mm/7.62mm) supplying mobility and overwatch protection and there would be 16 dismounts in 4 teams of 4.

The BisonII with the RCWS-30 and the 2+4 crew would be more deployable than the LAVIII with the notional 3+7 crew.  Making the 1st and 2nd Battalions (LAV) conform to this structure would allow for more sub-units with less manpower and allow for manpower saved to be tranferred to the various light/airborne/CSOR/JTF units being stood up, not to mention truck drivers and sigs etc.

One other point about a smaller vehicle: the smaller surface area requires less armour of a given thickness to cover it.  Therefore it is possible to put thicker armour on a smaller vehicle than on a larger one, assuming the same power train and suspension.

And what role for the Armoured Corps.....Armoured Recce + Armoured Assault.  Somebody still needs to do it.


----------



## Infanteer

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Why the LAV II? For one thing it is smaller and lighter than the LAV III, which reduces various logistical problems, and allows you to go in places the LAV III is too large to fit. A smaller vehicle has better signature management, and some advantages in passive protection (i.e. is harder to see). The LAV II has been proved large enough to carry a Delco 25mm turret, a Blazer SPAAG turret and the surveillance system kit of a Coyote and the Emerson "Hammerhead" TOW turret. Given that, it _should_ be big enough for a 105mm Direct Fire turret and the Denal 105mm SP turret as well.



I don't recall seeing too much of a difference between the two when they were parked side-by-side on the battalion lines.  The LAV III was definitely larger, but I don't think there difference is enought to make a difference tactically - any crewmen who can substantiate or refute this?

I think the LAV III is a better choice considering their preponderance in the US orbat.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Arthur- was it not a LAV II made in London about 10 years ago that tested a 105mm arty gun which blew all the doors and hatches off when the gun fired?


----------



## a_majoor

WRT the test firing of a 105mm, I don't recall the exact details, it sounds plausible but there should certainly be enough experience around now with the various LAV programs to validate/invalidate the idea.

The USMC is a big user of the LAV 25 family, and there were some other big customers as well (Saudi National Guard for one), so we actually have a choice; all LAV II or all LAV III, as opposed to a bit of A and a bit of B. Realisticly, we will always have something of a mixed fleet, but standardizing on one thing would be good. A LAV II program has the potential for economies of scale, since not only would there be several hundred to a thousand vehicles, but current Coyotes and Bisons could be remanufactured to accept the common engines, dirvetrain, databus etc. The Marines might want to come in, and the Sauds, giving a huge economy of scale and lowering the unit price for all.

I'm not sure I am with Kirkhill about the manpower reductions (a Bisonesque APC should be able to hold MORE troops without a turret basket intruding into the hull), but the point about surface area and armour protection is well noted.


----------



## geo

funny thing.... went by the 202 workshops.  Lots of freshly painted turrets with what looks like brand new 76mm guns....  

Doesn't mean anything but.... interesting nevertheless.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Yep, got to keep those painters busy, very interesting, new 76mm guns as in longer calibre, muzzle brake or fume extractors? Wonder if anyone is making new ammo for the 76mm that we used, most Scorpion users have gone to the 90mm.


----------



## geo

76mm is not an "oddball" calibre at this time. 
Perry class Frigates use it
RSA Rooikat use it
Singapore Bionix uses it and if memory serves me right - the Belgians & the Dutch (or is that Danes) have em as well.......

Obviously not the kind of weapon to go nose to nose with a MBT but could effectively look after bunkers, such as they are in Afghanistan....


----------



## dapaterson

Or, more likely, they're off the Cougars and being refurbished as we prep the fleet for disposal.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/dgiip/ddsal/land_e.asp


----------



## geo

sure.....
then again, weren't there a bunch of Leo 1A5 on that list not too long ago?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Wouldn't the Grizzly turret fit the Bison, or could be fitted to new LAV hulls. Build the hulls to fit the larger turret, but fit the smaller turret to save costs, you would be able to increase the fleet size without a huge cost, plus they would likely have more internal space freed up for another missions, like resupply, gun tractor, comm's, CP etc?

One would think that a cargo version of the LAV would be useful, with a flat back deck to carry pallatized cargo and a small crane, sort of like a wheeled Stormer.


----------



## geo

Too many mods Colin.  you get to the point when it would be cheaper and faster to buy new...
Nothing says that a Grizz couldn't operate with LAVs & Bisons.
It isn't a Leo but bringing a 76 to bear for bunker busting duty when you need it right this instant - would be a handy resource to have in your back pocket... only ICK in that picture is that the hulls are some 30 yrs old.


----------



## HItorMiss

I honestly believe you would get better capability and firepower out of the LAV TUA then a Cougar with the 76mm gun. Plus the hull isn't 30 years old.


----------



## geo

Do we have LAV TUAs in theatre?

76mm can shoot and scoot. the TOW needs to stay on in place as the gunner brings it on target.  Then there may be an issue of range.  you can fire a 76 @ point blank range, something that isn't recommended with a TOW.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Wouldn't the Grizzly turret fit the Bison, or could be fitted to new LAV hulls. Build the hulls to fit the larger turret, but fit the smaller turret to save costs, you would be able to increase the fleet size without a huge cost, plus they would likely have more internal space freed up for another missions, like resupply, gun tractor, comm's, CP etc?


We would be better served with a LAV III RWS (It takes even less space, could be stabalised & fitted with AT missiles, and it would look exactly like the Stryker ISC)


----------



## Mortar guy

Way back during one of the many Army.ca discussions about the MGS I floated the idea of a "Super Cougar" (horrible name, I know). Basically I was proposing that the 100 Cougars still in stocks be refurbished as per the Grizzly DLIR/WLAV LE and that the turret be upgraded. The turret upgrade would either add a new thermal sight or could involve replacing the 76mm gun with a new CMI Mk 3 90mm gun. CMI offers this kind of upgrade for Scorpion turrets as shown here: http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/turrets/cmi/

Anywho, I was thinking that this would add an effective (in terms of cost and capability) light armoured direct fire support vehicle as a quick, interim solution until a more modern DFS could be developed and purchased. It could keep up with the LAVs and would be suitable for bunker busting, wall breaching, convoy escort, FOB defence etc. in Afghanistan and it's light enough to be carried in a C-130 (not that that's really important). Justan idea...

MG


----------



## boondocksaint

I like Hitormiss's idea of the LAV TUA- new vehicles with some great new rounds for it, and it would reduce any maintenance issues-parts and finding mechanics still qualified to fix them ( the cougars),  

let alone finding drivers old enough to drive them


----------



## geo

Boondock....
LAVs and Cougars are pretty much same family of vehicles.  Driving the vehicles is NOT an issue.... ant there should be some similarity in fixing things - even if the LAV is a more complex beast.

New LAVs would be nice, will be nice BUT if you order em next week, you might take delivery by.. say... 09.


----------



## HItorMiss

geo said:
			
		

> Do we have LAV TUAs in theatre



The LAV TUA hasn't been issued out to unit's yet it's still in the trial stage however the original TUA still exist. From personnel experience that TOW missile would have made a huge difference in Panjawi more so then some direct support 76mm Cougar. in fact if you check out the Combat Support Company thread I go a bit more in depth about it. I just think deploying a 30 yr old hull with a gun isn't in anyone best intrest not when I can have stand off distance and a better armour package.


----------



## Mortar guy

Boondock,

You realize that there are still hundreds of soldiers qualified to operate and maintain the Cougar, right? They were only removed from service very recently so the capability still has not faded completely.

As for the TUA - I hear you, it's a great piece of kit. However, it does not/cannot do the same things that a Cougar (or MGS, or Leopard etc.) can do. Many situations may not warrant a $70,000 missile when a $500 HESH round would do just as well. 

Cheers

MG


----------



## warrickdll

geo said:
			
		

> ...
> 76mm can shoot and scoot. the TOW needs to stay on in place as the gunner brings it on target.  Then there may be an issue of range.  you can fire a 76 @ point blank range, something that isn't recommended with a TOW.



I think that is a good point - not just minimum range, but close terrain.

While it would be nice to have the full spectrum of tools there, including the LAV TUA, won't the Leopards be covering both gaps that any LAV-Gun and LAV-TUA would fill?



Mortar guy: $70,000?! You need to shop better


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Way back during one of the many Army.ca discussions about the MGS I floated the idea of a "Super Cougar" (horrible name, I know).  Basically I was proposing that the 100 Cougars still in stocks be refurbished as per the Grizzly DLIR/WLAV LE and that the turret be upgraded.


I was sure I had seen that same name (Super Cougar) used on this site in a suggestion to upgrade the Cougar with a LAV 25 turret.  I can not seem to find it while doing a search though.



			
				boondocksaint said:
			
		

> I like Hitormiss's idea of the LAV TUA- new vehicles with some great new rounds for it, and it would reduce any maintenance issues-parts and finding mechanics still qualified to fix them ( the cougars),


We have a few TUA turrets that are not slated to be put onto LAV III.  It would be nice to see them all move over.



			
				geo said:
			
		

> LAVs and Cougars are pretty much same family of vehicles.


They are very different beasts.


----------



## HItorMiss

It's $30,000 per Missile not $70,000. Just for the record  ;D


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Our Cougars were shot gunnery-wise when we retired them (cracked mantlets, ventilation problems, turret ring problems, etc.).  The gun is, believe it or not, too powerful for the vehicle. However, even its ancient gunnery system has/had some advantages over ATGWs, including:

- comparatively short engagement time
- ability to switch between targets very quickly
- ability to fire a variety of munitions, including HESH, smoke and cannister
- a relatively simple (albeit largely restricted to daytime ops) weapons system
- no annoying wires (heh)
- the ability to fire semi-indirect at relatively long ranges
- the ability to mass and control fires (a troop or squadron shoot against a platoon position would have the potential to do significant damage - from up to 2000m away)

A 76mm round would be useless against a tank.  However, it would ruin a soft-skinned vehicle's day and would punch gaping holes in buildings and the like.  Not a bad thing, really...

The discussion's purely academic, of course - the Cougar's gone...


----------



## silentbutdeadly

the Cougar's gone...


Well said!


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Like from a tank??   ;D


----------



## McG

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Our Cougars were shot gunnery-wise when we retired them (cracked mantlets, ventilation problems, turret ring problems, etc.).


Too strong for the vehicle?  Heck, I understood the turret was not even designed for the rate of fire that we intended (our DFS role vs the recce self-defence role on the Scorpion) and we quickly exceeded its design life.


----------



## HItorMiss

Teddy that post of mine need's to be moved to the Super Cougar/LAVIII thread, so I don't want to derail this thread further....Buuuuttt

Though the Leo would have been great the day of the perticular engament I'm talking about. We may not have needed them had we had a TUA there the day before, Just would have been a huge firepower multiplier.


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

MCG said:
			
		

> Too strong for the vehicle?  Heck, I understood the turret was not even designed for the rate of fire that we intended (our DFS role vs the recce self-defence role on the Scorpion) and we quickly exceeded its design life.



The rate of fire wasn't the issue (as far as I know), the number of rounds we put down range was.  We exceeded the EFCs (equivalent full charge) on the guns years before they were retired.  We used them as a "tank" (yeah, I know : ) when the gun was orignally designed for an armoured car (the Saracen - the uprated version was installed in the Scorpion, then picked for the Cougar).


----------



## Kirkhill

IIRC when the KOCR got their Cougars back in the 80s (the same time we in the CH got our Grizzlies) they came back from their first shoot with cracked hulls.


----------



## boondocksaint

They are completely different beasts, which makes it a nightmare for everything from installing comms-new parts etc

from what I understood there was some difficulty finding sufficient LEO crews because the skill set has not been replenished since they were reduced ( I may be wrong )

the cougars have been gone for far longer, and the mechanics wont have the courses needed to run them, nor the gun plumbers

but as Homer says, 'its all moo' cuz they are not coming back


----------



## McG

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> The rate of fire wasn't the issue (as far as I know), the number of rounds we put down range was.  We exceeded the EFCs (equivalent full charge) on the guns years before they were retired.  We used them as a "tank" (yeah, I know : ) when the gun was orignally designed for an armoured car (the Saracen - the uprated version was installed in the Scorpion, then picked for the Cougar).


I think we are saying the same thing.


----------



## silentbutdeadly

Hey Boondock,

Lets take down the Centurian infront of the back entrance to CFB Edm and put a Lav turret on it. !  :blotto: Well i think its a tank, oh whatever!


----------



## McG

boondocksaint said:
			
		

> the cougars have been gone for far longer, and the mechanics wont have the courses needed to run them, nor the gun plumbers


All the more reason to develop a LAV III DFSV (not to replace tanks, but to be subservient to the infantry & coexist with tanks)


----------



## Teflon

> but as Homer says, 'its all moo' cuz they are not coming back



Thank God! never rode the couger but same beast as the grizzly,.... Nightmares returning,.... leg caught in turret basket, bounce bounce bounce, can't feel my arm!


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> IIRC when the KOCR got their Cougars back in the 80s (the same time we in the CH got our Grizzlies) they came back from their first shoot with cracked hulls.



Firing the gun would shake the s**t out of the whole vehicle, hence the cracking around the turret rings.  IIRC, entire teeth were broken out of the gearing system - all the result of fitting a (comparatively) powerful gun to a vehicle not designed for it.



> from what I understood there was some difficulty finding sufficient LEO crews because the skill set has not been replenished since they were reduced ( I may be wrong )



Tank crews aren't an issue.  Finding qualified techs is...  It's been sorted out, though.



> All the more reason to develop a LAV III DFSV (not to replace tanks, but to be subservient to the infantry & coexist with tanks)



Wouldn't that be a Stryker MGS??   >


----------



## Kirkhill

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Wouldn't that be a Stryker MGS??   >



You're a nasty man....

By the way, I posted this on the Armour board - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28961/post-451493.html#msg451493 - "Raytheon Company successfully conducted the first beyond line of sight mission with a test firing of its Mid Range Munition Chemical Energy (MRM-CE) guided projectile with digital semi active laser sensor. The projectile, fired from an Abrams M1A2 SEP (system enhancement program) tank, scored an extended-range, guided direct hit."    

I wonder if they have it in 105.


----------



## McG

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Wouldn't that be a Stryker MGS??   >


Could be.  Could be not.


----------



## gnplummer421

I worked on those Cougar Gun systems for many years, and it is definitely too violent of a recoil for that turret. The Buffer and recuperator were fairly short and small for that Calibre. 

We had one go on the range in Pet once, not a pretty sight. Sheared the pistons Bobbins off the Breech ring Yoke, and came all the way back and the barrel stop hit the mantlet cracking it. The Gunners sight also dropped down into the turret and got hung up on a cable,saving the Gunners legs. They had hot oil burns and metal schrapnel in their arms and bodies, and headaches for a while no doubt. Luckily there were no serious injuries. It turns out the expansion tank hose from the buffer had a pinhole in it , but the Hyd. fluid was soaking into the skirt and so nobody saw the leak.

Gnplummer


----------



## AmmoTech90

geo said:
			
		

> 76mm is not an "oddball" calibre at this time.
> Perry class Frigates use it
> RSA Rooikat use it
> Singapore Bionix uses it and if memory serves me right - the Belgians & the Dutch (or is that Danes) have em as well.......



Geo,

Just a point, there are a variety of different 76mm guns out there.  I don't believe any of the ones you mentioned are the "pumpkin launcher" used on the cougar.  Those are all high pressure guns, similiar to the 76mm fitted to our ships.  Fitting a similiar gun would a whole of implications as far a strenthing the turret and ammo stowage because these rounds are quite a bit larger than the 76mm AC (Armoured Car).  Given the comments already about recoil of the existing gun I would be leary of fitting anything larger.

D


----------



## Bomber

twin 35's just coming out of service, snap those bad boys onto a turretless lav chassis, BANG instant LAV 3 DFSV.  Won't kill a tank, but it will stop everything else.


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

> Just a point, there are a variety of different 76mm guns out there.  I don't believe any of the ones you mentioned are the "pumpkin launcher" used on the cougar.  Those are all high pressure guns, similiar to the 76mm fitted to our ships.  Fitting a similiar gun would a whole of implications as far a strenthing the turret and ammo stowage because these rounds are quite a bit larger than the 76mm AC (Armoured Car).  Given the comments already about recoil of the existing gun I would be leary of fitting anything larger.



Exactly.  The gun fitted to the Rooikat, for instance, is a version of the OTO Malara 76mm _naval gun_...


----------



## Kirkhill

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Exactly.  The gun fitted to the Rooikat, for instance, is a version of the OTO Malara 76mm _naval gun_...



Which, by the way and IIRC, is also the basis for the 60mm HVMS autoloading gun on the OTO Melara Hitfist turrets.  (76mm cartridge necked down to 60mm?)


----------



## Colin Parkinson

geo said:
			
		

> Too many mods Colin.  you get to the point when it would be cheaper and faster to buy new...
> Nothing says that a Grizz couldn't operate with LAVs & Bisons.
> It isn't a Leo but bringing a 76 to bear for bunker busting duty when you need it right this instant - would be a handy resource to have in your back pocket... only ICK in that picture is that the hulls are some 30 yrs old.



The Brits did something similar, when the Vixen was cancelled, they had all the turrets built and used them on a variety of vehicles. I would be curious how many mods it could be? Plate over the standard turret ring, not sure if the grizzly basket needed a pintle on the bottom. Use the standard LAV 25 power harness, with an adapter pigtail to the grizzly turret. Weight would not be an issue as the Grizzly turret is smaller. Is it perfect? no, but it's a way to get more vehicles on the ground with least cost. It is also the way many armies work, the IDF seems to have brought the practice to a fine art!!!


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

One problem:  we've loaned the 100 remaining servicable Grizzlies to the African Union.  Wonder what kind of shape they'll be in when we get them back...


----------



## 1feral1

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> One problem:  we've loaned the 100 remaining servicable Grizzlies to the African Union.  Wonder what kind of shape they'll be in when we get them back...



Laughs, and to wonder how many attrocities they'll be used in too. Can't forget that. After all, it is Africa, and we see/hear/and know what goes on there. 100 yrs from now, the voilence and corruption will continue to prosper, and power will continue to spout from the muzzle of an AKM assault rifle, just like it does here in this crappy country. Some things in life remain constant.

I don't think we'll get them back, but once they start breaking down, who's responsible for fixing the beasts? I would have little or no faith in African EME style elements, thats even a bigger joke.

Cheers,

Wes


----------



## dapaterson

My guess is that this is a loan that will be written off, eventually.  They're surplus to our needs; they will all be beyond economical repair by the time the AU is done with them, and the cost of shipping them back will be prohibitive.


----------



## boondocksaint

Im sure they're 'jingled' up nicely


----------



## Teflon

> My guess is that this is a loan that will be written off, eventually.



I Hope, does anyone really want them back?



> they will all be beyond economical repair by the time the AU is done with them



The bloody things where beyond economical repair before we where done with them


----------



## STONEY

IMHO a couple of LAV  120mm mortar carriers would have come in handy in the sandbox also.

Cheers


----------



## McG

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> One problem:  we've loaned the 100 remaining servicable Grizzlies to the African Union.  Wonder what kind of shape they'll be in when we get them back...


Then maybe it is time to order up 100 turretless LAV III to replace the Grizzly.  We could buy them with all the new hull mods & in CP variants (thereby freeing all the current LAV III CPs to be section carriers).  I recommend we get the same RWS as the RG31 (to simplify training & supportability issues).


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

That's a decent idea and sounds much like the US Stryker (note:  decidedly _not_ the MGS).  If we bought enough, we could replace the Bison in it's "APC" role (using that term loosely), and re-role that vehicle to more specialist variants...

We're short LAV IIIs, but do we really need ones with the full turret?  A point to ponder...


----------



## Nug

Without the turret basket in the way you would have a lot more room to place equipment and do a better layout of the compartment. Do you think the fact that the vehicle doesn't have the turret would draw unwanted attention?


----------



## Kirkhill

Nug said:
			
		

> ..... Do you think the fact that the vehicle doesn't have the turret would draw unwanted attention?



Probably not if there were a lot of them for General Duties and APCs - not just specialist and CP vehicles.


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Kirkhill's right.  We use the Bison now for such things, and it doesn't seem to attract undue attention.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Plus the LAV hull without turret would be a fair bit cheaper, likely it would mean that every 4-5th hull is free compared to the current turreted LAV. Less wear and tear on the hull and things for the techs to fix. However it would be a good idea to build the hull so it can accept the turret and place the weapon system on a plate over the turret ring.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Plus the LAV hull without turret would be a fair bit cheaper,


How do you come by your numbers?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I don't know the numbers for the LAV, but I have seen numbers for other AFV's and the turret,gun and FCS add up to quite a bit of the whole vehicle. to be frank the break-even point was a best guess hence the 4-5 range (turret & systems is worth 20-25% of total costs)


----------



## TCBF

"I Hope, does anyone really want them back?"

The RCHA do.  They made decent Gun Trackters.

Tom


----------



## oskarm

Colin P said:
			
		

> I don't know the numbers for the LAV, but I have seen numbers for other AFV's and the turret,gun and FCS add up to quite a bit of the whole vehicle. to be frank the break-even point was a best guess hence the 4-5 range (turret & systems is worth 20-25% of total costs)



In Polish Rosomak's IFV (AMV-360P) with Hitfact armed with 30mm ATK Bushmaster II gun the cost of turrent was 52% of the whole vehicle.


----------



## Kirkhill

TR asked if you really needed full turrets on the LAVIIIs....presumably the alternative is considered to be the ROWS.   Can I stretch that a bit farther and ask if something like the Commander's hatch on  the old Lynx would be acceptable on administrative vehicles as something between the pintle mount and the ROWS.

http://www.afvnews.ca/-media/camouflage/lynx.gif
http://anzacsteel.hobbyvista.com/Armoured%20Vehicles/Images/canadianhussarsph_1.JPG

As I recall the HMG was solenoid operated from under armour.

The Recon Optical CROWS system seems to cost about US$300,000 a copy 
(US$68,000,000/230 units -http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/08/68m-provides-remotelyoperated-machineguns-for-vehicles/index.php)

How would that compare to the cost of a Lynx hatch?


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Well, we've already mounted an RWS on the RG-31; coincidently, it's the same RWS as on the basic Stryker.

http://www.kongsberg.com/eng/kda/products/dynamicsystems/RemoteWeaponStation/

Again, the simplest thing to do would be to buy basic Stryker APCs fitted with the Kongsberg RWS.  This has the benefit of keeping the crew under armour and of having a platform that's already in CF service.  FWIW.


----------



## geo

Taking a step forward to the RWS is one thing
Taking a step back to a lynx 50 cal mount is another.

Get a common platform that is used across our vehicle fleet and be done with it.


----------



## Kirkhill

Teddy, I wasn't suggesting putting the CROWS in particular on - I merely used it as an example because I could come up with a price on it.

I brought up the price because of the mention of LAVs with turrets and LAVs without.  Just wondering if buying LAV-Bisons with a Lynx hatch vs a RWS would keep the costs down still further and still produce a useable Log/Adm vehicle.


----------



## geo

kirkhill,
On the road to the PRT in Kandahar, there really isn't any such thing as a log/admin vehicle.  The cost of the RWS isn't anything near the cost of a full blown turret


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks Geo - 

I'm expressing myself poorly.  I wasn't suggesting that log/adm moves were easy.  In fact just the opposite.  I was thinking that seeing as how all vehicles are now targets then perhaps there is a place for something like the Bison or the USMC's original LAV-Log which could be used to carry supplies to FOBs rather than using HLVWs for all the runs.  

I am not sure that the Lynx hatch would be that much cheaper than the RWS and I can well imagine the RWS to be much cheaper than a full blown turret.  That's pretty much why I was asking the question.

Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

A LAV without a turret would be smaller and lighter than one with, which would make the LAV somewhat more mobile both tactically and strategically. How much of an advantage this would be overall is a matter for debate.

 I am starting to wonder if we are getting overly wrapped around the axle over the entire vehicle thing; being tied to the roads is NOT a good thing in counter insurgency or conventional war. The destruction of GM-100 in French Indochina is a salutary example of what can go wrong, and the American experience in Mogadishu extracting TF Ranger from the snatch operation with a road bound convoy shows that although armour protection would be a plus, command and control issues are probably even more important (the convoy was under observation by a PC-3 Orion throughout the mission, but the convoluted communication chain meant that directions from the Orion were relayed to the convoy too late). An armoured vehicle disabled in the road would have stopped TF Ranger in the way disabled HMMVW's did not (they were pushed out of the way or down the road by following vehicles), but that falls into the realm of "what if".

We need to reduce the "footprint", and use our armoured vehicles more like a "cavalry" force or QRF. Our forces might take a page from Robert Kaplan who writes of American forces moving around Afghanistan in Toyota pick-up trucks.

Some thoughts


----------



## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> the American experience in Mogadishu extracting TF Ranger from the snatch operation with a road bound convoy


You are limited in your cross country movement when inside of a city.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Let's stick with the LAV III.  Pickup trucks are great until the shooting starts.


----------



## McG

From the site's photo album:


----------



## Infanteer

a_majoor said:
			
		

> being tied to the roads is NOT a good thing in counter insurgency or conventional war.



That's not neccesarily true; the South Africans had great success with their Casspirs in the bushwar insurgencies in Angola, Namibia and all those nice places.

Let's leave the Toyota's for those who play that game.


----------



## Cloud Cover

If brand new Strykers with the stickers still on the tires are needed, there are rows of them at GDLS as we "speak" along with a few  LAV with a new turret with longer 105mm tube. [the Denel variant?]


----------



## a_majoor

Red_Five said:
			
		

> Let's stick with the LAV III.  Pickup trucks are great until the shooting starts.



Not in dispute, just thinking that lumbering convoys attract the wrong sort of attention and require more and more resources in and of themselves. Since our force structure is so small, any means we have to increase the actual "boots on the ground" as opposed to bulking up the echelons and absorbing troops in the Force Protection role need to be explored.

I think I am not making my argument clearly enough, so I will drop out for a bit to rephrase and restate.


----------



## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> just thinking that lumbering convoys attract the wrong sort of attention and  . . .


http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/52565/post-471243/topicseen.html#msg471243


----------



## Eland

MCG said:
			
		

> I would have to say I‘m sitting on the fence with this one.
> I do not belive that Canada can abandon all tracked vehicles as easily as you would suggest, Brock.  Some specialized vehicles cannot be built on a LAV III chassis.  Such vehicles include the AEV, AVLB, 155 mm self propelled howitzer, and the MBT.  I do not belive that Canada should do without these vehicles either.  You have phrased it nicely yourself when you said, "LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank."  To assume that there will be no future need for a MBT is to suggest that one knows when, where, and how the next war will be fought.  This is never the case.



Agreed.



> Your argument does hold some merit however, and as I said, I‘m sitting on the fence with this one.
> The potential of the LAV III is highlighted by the recent US decision to equip its medium mechanized brigades with the vehicle.  To meet this need there are already a 105 mm FSV, Engineer section vehicle, CP, Ambulance, NBCD Recce, Mortar carrier, and other variants developed and available off-the-shelf. Additionally, the LAV III could be adapted to replace any other M113 variants serving in the CF.



The key word in your paragraph above is 'medium'. A medium brigade can cope with low-to-moderate intensity warfare, especially in a three-block-war setting where the vehicles don't get too close to insurgents with RPG7's sitting on their shoulders, or as follow-on forces after the heavy brigades have done their job in a high-intensity setting.



> BUT: the Americans were buying the right tool for the right job.  Their plan was to establish rapidly deployable brigades that could get to the fight quicker than the M1A2 Abrams.  The LAV brigades would deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US.  The MBT is not eliminated from this scheme, nor is the armoured cavalry.  A new element is added to fill the void in between.



Correct. It seems counterintuitive, but MBT's have played a crucial and even pivotal role in Iraq in situations involving FIBUA. They provide the heavy punch and take the hits that the lighter, wheeled vehicles cannot possibly provide, or survive.



> How does this apply to Canada?  If you belive we cannot afford multiple different levels of Mechanized Brigade groups (which we cannot)  then you must leave the MBT within the Brigades as they now are and deploy them as needed.  This would allow a brigade to upgrade from medium to heavy, through the arrival of its tanks, while deployed.  Alternatively, you could suggest that all the MBT be concentrated within a single regiment (LdSH, because they have more room for tanks in the prairies) and have the army restructured into two medium brigades and one heavy.  This would correct for the excessive dispersion of the current fleet of Leopards.



Actually Canada *can* afford to maintain at least two different kinds of brigade groups - motorized (based on the LAVIII fleet) 
and a mechanized brigade group (or two). We have the wealth and sufficient population to manage this kind of thing. I sense that the Harper government would like to do something like this but cannot do so until they form a majority government. Really, the issue boils down to making one of two choices - do we want to be a meaningful force on the world stage, or will we be content sitting on the margins, waiting for the day the United States absorbs us, lest we become a failed state and a liability to them?

There's a price of admission associated with the first choice -and it ain't cheap, but it's far cheaper than option two, which entails a much greater price - the loss of one's country and any claims to sovereignty we might have had. 



> Some parting thoughts:
> 1.   Why continue spending funds to train reservists the fire the 76 mm gun on the cougar when the vehicle should never se operational deployment again?  Why not replace the turret with the Delco turret of the LAV III and Coyote?  This would train reservists in the same gunnery techniques as their regular force counter parts and make it easier to integrate them in to units preparing for overseas duty.



I agree with the first part of point one. The Cougar is very long in the tooth and can't be expected to provide a realistic sense of what it is like to fight as part of a tank crew. Nor can it be used to provide a realistic appraisal of LAV gunnery technqiues, since the ballistic characteristics of a 25mm round are totally different from the 76mm used in the Cougar.

Sure, it can be used to impart basic gunnery techniques, but that's about it. Rather than go through the bother, expense and trouble of switching turrets, why not just acquire a basic version of the LAVIII (or maybe the Coyote DFSV) and issue these to the Primary Reserve - if your aim is to provide LAV/Coyote training? If your aim is to prepare reservists to crew tanks, then you're best off investing the money in simulators and allocating a limited number of real tanks for training only. 

The problem with this country is that we always expect our military to use half-measures (to save money, of course!) and then deliver  stellar results. I say, either do it right, or not at all.



> 2.  The Australian LAV-25s have the same Delco turrets as on our LAV III, except that some also have TOW launchers on either side of the turret.  If Canada had chosen those turrets for the LAV III (or at least on one per Inf Plt) it could have greatly increased tank killing capacity and thereby reduced  dependency on MBTs.



The LAV TUA (Tow-Under-Armour) project is supposed to be addressing this issue. However, neither your suggestion nor the LAV-TUA will ever reduce our need for main battle tanks. The idea behind the LAV-25 TOW and TUA systems is to provide light, wheeled forces with some chance of survival if they unexpectedly encounter a tank or two. 

It is theoretically possible to deploy wheeled vehicles mounting a TOW-type anti-armour system as primary anti-tank weapons, provided they are in well-chosen and protected defilade positions from which they can exfiltrate rapidly. The main risk in this gambit is that if your enemy has rocket artillery (like the US-made MLRS system), good air support and high-quality tanks crewed by experienced and well-trained soldiers, you are likely to lose your wheeled ATGM systems in large numbers, thus defeating their original purpose.


----------



## Blue Max

If the topic and question is still "Should Canada adopt the LAV III as its sole armoured vehicle?", then in IMHO I would say no. 

The LAV III is a good wheeled APC, but its limited off-road mobility and variants add very little to our armed forces ability to patrol and protect Canada's far north as an example. 

If our forces also had the CV90 family of vehicles in their inventory it would, IMHO add great operational ability, while staying with one family of vehicle. While the CV90 is not the most modern multi-role APC (Germany PUMA...), we could probably buy into its proven family of vehicles at a good price.


----------



## McG

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> That's a decent idea and sounds much like the US Stryker (note:  decidedly _not_ the MGS).  If we bought enough, we could replace the Bison in it's "APC" role (using that term loosely), and re-role that vehicle to more specialist variants...


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Yeah, like that!  Heh...


----------



## McG

and here is another popular idea  ;D


----------



## Nug

I see pick like that and I don't know if I should laugh or cry :crybaby: ;D


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We were discussing resupply and support of the LAV's in another thread, in specific about the carrying spares, I thought it was better to post my concept here. This may be an option to provide support to a LAV company with a vehicle capable of taking the same fire as the LAV (the picture is based on the Coyote, but it was the best I had) You could also build a similar version with dumpable fuel tanks.


----------



## Desert Fox

No, dont do it!!! one post refered to the fact that the LAV is not capable of carrying all platforms.... 
However, i think the bigger issue is mobility.... as it stands now the LAV III (as much as i love it) is having problems in Kandahar going through fields and ditches and what not. Tracks offer far greater mobility then a wheeled vehicles do. For this reason along, we need to maintain the presence of MBT.

The Stryker is a good idea.... however it is no tank, and thinking that it can act as one is nonsence
Thank god for the on going problems with styker, otherwise all of our leopards would be sold off as scrap by now...


----------



## ringo

IMHO Canada should consider procurement of Haggslunds BvS 10 tracked vehicles as used by Royal Marines.
Would be excellent vehicle for reformed Airborne (or Air-moblie) Regt. perhaps Atlantic and Pacific Marine Commando as well.
Coyote and Bison should be sent to reserves, regular forces standardize on LAV.
The Germany Puma may be an option for future Cdn army tracked vehicles.


----------



## Desert Fox

Ringo....

The P Res has barely enough keep its LS / ML running....

The regs use the Bison was to much to simply cast it off to the militia. Besides there is nothing wrong with the vehicle itself, other than the lack of wpns. But then again that why its so commonly used as an field Amb....  

Coyote? Its a fairly new piece of kit, the optics are amazing on it, and it offers the same fire power as a LAV..... far to valuable to be condemed to domesitc service only....


----------



## ArmyRick

Ringo, there are some problems with your idea.


----------



## geo

Uhh... the BISON was purchased for the reserves - NOT the Regs.  They were kept in central locations so that there would exist maintenance facilities AND a critical mass of vehicles that the reserves would need for Troop / Squadron training.

As a reg, what would you do / think about a fleet of brand new vehicles sitting in a compound all week long while your Cougars, Grizzlies were breaking down?

It didn't take more than a month that NDHQ & Reg units were taking bisons for Local training AND Eriteria mission, Somalia Mission, Bosnia mission........


----------



## vonGarvin

The BISON was purchased in the early 1990s for use by the PRes.  Due to operational requirements, it was "acquired" by the regular army (or re-allocated to them).  Since then, it has become a work horse.  It has served as an ambulance, a command post, mortar carrier and I don't know what else.  Heck, I just saw one the other day with a dozer blade on it.

The Coyote is much more than a 'similar' vehicle to the LAV III.  Other than having 8 wheels and a similar turret, it has other capabilities, and uses, that make its employment not "doable" by a LAV III.

There is a vast training bill to be qualified to work on a Coyote, too great to sustain for a reserve unit due to a variety of reasons.  The bison could be used at the reserve level quite easily, but there are only so many of them, and they have proven their worth time and time again.


----------



## dapaterson

Further down the BISON rabbit hole:

In the 1989 Defence yearbook, it was announced that roughly $200 million would be spent to acquire 199 MIL-LAVs - Militia Light Armoured Vehcles, from the General Motors Diesel Division in London Ontario.  In addition, 26 (or possibly 24 - memory fails) M113APC Dozers were to be acquired for militia engineer units.


It would probably have been prudent to report to Parliament that the attribution of the Bison costs to the militia in 1989 and onwards should be revisited; as it is, the Public Accounts do not accurately reflect the nature of that expenditure.  And the OAG (bless her soul) is getting increasingly insistent that government departments tell the truth in their reporting...


----------



## ringo

The powertrain for Coyote and Bison are not common to LAV III, Canada is one of the richest nation's in the world 2% GNP would buy the CAF everthing it needs.

Didn't the Coyote have problems climbing hills in Balkans due to being underpowered. Transfering to reserve would see the vehicle used in fire support, while recce fit is transfered to new buikd LAV111.


----------



## George Wallace

ringo said:
			
		

> The powertrain for Coyote and Bison are not common to LAV III, Canada is one of the richest nation's in the world 2% GNP would buy the CAF everthing it needs.



I am having problems with your above 'sentence(?)'.  What is it you are trying to say?  You have three ideas, possibly three paragraphs, all tied up in one line.  It is a rather disjointed and confusing statement.  

Yes, the Coyote, Bison and LAV III are all different.  All three require separate D&M Courses due to those differences. 

Yes, Canada is one of the richest nations in the world.  (Not possessive.)  Yes, 2% of the GNP would buy the C(A)F a lot.
   


			
				ringo said:
			
		

> Didn't the Coyote have problems climbing hills in Balkans due to being underpowered. Transfering to reserve would see the vehicle used in fire support, while recce fit is transfered to new buikd LAV111.



I don't know where you heard these rumours, and really would like you to provide some back-up to that statement.  As for transferring to the Coyotes to the Reserves, I think that has been covered numerous times as to why they will not be.  Captain (Army) Scarlet just reiterated those points.


----------



## Mortar guy

Coyotes underpowered? I remember whipping along HAWK route in Kosovo in my up-armoured AVGP at 90 km/hr and being passed by some yahoo from Recce Sqn in their Coyote. If that's underpowered I suppose the next step would be to strap JATO rockets on our Coyote fleet.   :

Reference lane. Will be known as yours. STAY IN IT.

MG


----------



## vonGarvin

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Coyotes underpowered? I remember whipping along HAWK route in Kosovo in my up-armoured AVGP at 90 km/hr and being passed by some yahoo from Recce Sqn in their Coyote. If that's underpowered I suppose the next step would be to strap JATO rockets on our Coyote fleet.   :
> 
> *Refernce * lane. Will be known as yours. STAY IN IT.
> 
> MG


reference "dictionary" use it, NOT the "dickshunairee" 

(just kidding, but I couldn't resist)

But I do like the JATO rockets on the Coyotes!


----------



## geo

Ringo - what is your background?
Do you have any experience on the subject you are debating?

(Just asking)


----------



## Eland

Captain (Army)  Scarlet said:
			
		

> The BISON was purchased in the early 1990s for use by the PRes.  Due to operational requirements, it was "acquired" by the regular army (or re-allocated to them).  Since then, it has become a work horse.  It has served as an ambulance, a command post, mortar carrier and I don't know what else.  Heck, I just saw one the other day with a dozer blade on it.



No doubt, it has proved to be an amazingly versatile platform - sometimes simple things are the best.

<snip>



> There is a vast training bill to be qualified to work on a Coyote, too great to sustain for a reserve unit due to a variety of reasons.  The bison could be used at the reserve level quite easily, but there are only so many of them, and they have proven their worth time and time again.



Considering how cheap the Bisons are, we ought to be buying them by the bazillion for reserve infantry units, with engineer, signals, CP and field ambulance variants for the support units. They're so capable and versatile that they could even be a replacement for the LSVW. They would come in very handy in natural disasters or other aid-to-the-civil power situations. With all these capabilities, I could never quite understand why more weren't acquired for the reserves. It's a shame they ended up being cannibalized for Reg Force service. Then again, RF cannibalization of reserve assets is nothing new and isn't likely to end anytime soon unless Harper gets  a majority in the next election and is prepared to really put the pedal to the metal on military procurement.

As for the training bill on the Coyote being beyond PRes capacity, you're right. It's why I would favour giving PRes armoured units
a basic version of the Coyote - minus all of its sensors. This way the PRes would get a competent recce vehicle - enough to give them skills which would be transferable if they end up becoming Reg Force augmentees and need full-blown Coyote training.


----------



## geo

for light recce roles, the Coyote is big (even if smaller than the LAV or the bison)

For the Reserve Recce units to train and hone their skills, a small solid piece of kit that will allow troops to use their eyes and ears is essential.  How are troops supposed to "sneak and peek" in a behemoth?  A piece of kit like the Gwagon or (yes) even the Iltis will permit the troops to train and develop skills that can be ported to other vehicles at some later date.


----------



## George Wallace

Sorry Eland, but it is not cheaper to build a whole load of Bisons and Coyotes for the CF any more.  Those production lines are closed down and the expense of retooling would outweigh the practicality of building them.  

Even the stripped down Coyote version is too much for the Reserves to handle.  If they had trouble maintaining their wheeled fleets of Iltis, LSVW, MLVW and Milcots, how are they going to maintain any variant of Bison, Coyote or LAV?  Besides, there are currently not enough for the Regular Force, so there looks like that idea must wait until a time of conflict arises and the Reserves are mobilized.


----------



## Desert Fox

geo said:
			
		

> for light recce roles, the Coyote is big (even if smaller than the LAV or the bison)
> 
> For the Reserve Recce units to train and hone their skills, a small solid piece of kit that will allow troops to use their eyes and ears is essential.  How are troops supposed to "sneak and peek" in a behemoth?  A piece of kit like the Gwagon or (yes) even the Iltis will permit the troops to train and develop skills that can be ported to other vehicles at some later date.



You have to remember that "recce" is not always "sneak and peak". Recce is the gathering of intel, covert and non covert... while i was over on Op Athena, the RCD would often set up OP's off in the moutains and monitor movement and activity.  Frankly no vehicle is great for "sneak" and peak" ops as they tend to be easier to see  instead you utilize the optics and other survelience equipment from positions of cover, far, far, away from the actauly objective.


----------



## George Wallace

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> You have to remember that "recce" is not always "sneak and peak". Recce is the gathering of intel, covert and non covert... while i was over on Op Athena, the RCD would often set up OP's off in the moutains and monitor movement and activity.  Frankly no vehicle is great for "sneak" and peak" ops as they tend to be easier to see  instead you utilize the optics and other survelience equipment from positions of cover, far, far, away from the actauly objective.



You are describing a "Surveillance" vehicle, not a Recce Vehicle.  And the RCD, nor anyone in the CF, do not collect "intel".


----------



## Desert Fox

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You are describing a "Surveillance" vehicle, not a Recce Vehicle.  And the RCD, nor anyone in the CF, do not collect "intel".



Well that is what the Coyote and the RCD's were used for extensively....call it what u like....
and by intel i was refering to the process of gaining information, which is what "recce" is...
and i do believe that HUM INT / FST teams do in fact collect "intel" as you seem to be precieving it....


----------



## George Wallace

INTEL is not what anyone in the CF calls it be it COMINT, ELINT, EW, HUMINT, IMINT, INT, MASINT, OSINT, RECCE, SIGINT, SURVEILLANCE, TECHINT, TELINT or any other form of INT; anything but INTEL.

As for being seen, you haven't been around too much have you?  This is my vehicle:


----------



## George Wallace

Later in the day......


----------



## Desert Fox

George Wallace said:
			
		

> INTEL is not what anyone in the CF calls it be it COMINT, ELINT, EW, HUMINT, IMINT, INT, MASINT, OSINT, RECCE, SIGINT, SURVEILLANCE, TECHINT, TELINT or any other form of INT; anything but INTEL.
> 
> As for being seen, you haven't been around too much have you?  This is my vehicle:



I'm not going to argue over semantics... replace my usage of "intel" with "information" ... I hope that is now satisfactory for you?

As for you picture and the comment of me not being around much...  All I will say on this point is that i can post pictures too, however, in mine I am wearing arid CADPAT, and the pic wasnt taken in some training area.....


----------



## ringo

Geo I'm a heavy equipment operator 40 years bulldozers backhoes tractors trucks cranes etc, at one time I owned 15 powerunits, started with nothing. Managed 4 African safari's to date.

I remember reading sometime ago that the Coyote had trouble on some of the steeper grades in Balkans.

Regarding the original question should Canada adopt LAV 111 as its primary wheeled vehicle, I would agree with that statement and would standardize regular forces on LAV 111.
However IMO the 105mm gun is to much for chassis and ammo supply inadequate.
The MMEV? is another pie in the sky idea asking to much from single system the ADATS was good enough.
Canada should keep MBT's SPH's and tracked APC's.


----------



## Mortar guy

ringo said:
			
		

> Regarding the original question should Canada adopt LAV 111 as its primary wheeled vehicle, I would agree with that statement and would standardize regular forces on LAV 111.
> However IMO the 105mm gun is to much for chassis and ammo supply inadequate.
> The MMEV? is another pie in the sky idea asking to much from single system the ADATS was good enough.
> Canada should keep MBT's SPH's and tracked APC's.



Just a nit-picky point here - it's the LAV III (roman numerals for 'three') not the LAV 'one hundred and eleven'.

We got rid of the SPHs and will have a very limited fleet of MBTs and TLAVs. Could you tell us why you think Canada should keep those things? It's not that I disagree it's just you've left us with a bit of a cliffhanger there. Unless, of course, you think we should go to the PM and say: "Ringo thinks we need a tracked fleet" to which the PM will instantly agree and make it happen!  

MG


----------



## vonGarvin

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> *we should go to the PM and say: "Ringo thinks we need a tracked fleet" to which the PM will instantly agree and make it happen!  *


So THAT'S how policy is made.  ;D

I need a new hobby


----------



## geo

Don't know of any problems with Coyotes going up steep grades in the Balkans.  A couple of issues with the older AVGPs (Cougar/Grizzly) but Coyotes did just fine.  Where the Coyotes were deployed within Multinational Brigades, they were "gee whizz" assets that were on every Commanders XMass shopping list.

At present, the idea of using a 105 on a LAV / Stryker chassis (and ADATS) has been shelved by Canada - though the US Army has taken delivery of some.  Time will tell how well they do in the Stryker brigades.  From what I have read, they were thinking of embedding a MGS within every Stryker platoon.....


----------



## vonGarvin

For what it's worth, the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams were NOT intended to replace heavy units.  In fact, it was a new class of unit: "Medium".  Light units were, for the most part, upgraded to Stryker.  There was one mech/heavy brigade that downsized, but I believe that the unit in question was to become light.
The ORBAT for a Stryker Company had three MGS, manned by infantrymen, i believe.
Canada had intended for the MGS to be used as a pseudo-tank.


----------



## Mortar guy

MGS in the US Army will be manned by tankers.


----------



## Desert Fox

Captain Scarlet - i think you hit it dead on, thats the problem with the MGS, Canada has the intent of using it to replace the MBT. Where as our American friends use it with the MBT., rather then in lieu of....

And that is where we run into some murky waters as we will stand to lose another capability...

If the MGS (Stryker) had its bugs worked out, and it was proven to be stable (ie not overly top heavy) then i would fully endorse it. The LAVIII has proven itself in A-stan.... The MGS would give us a new capability... a desent balance between an MBT and a LAVIII.... the relative ease with which the MGS can be air transported is an attractive feature, however, it is not and can not and should not replace the MBT... As we see right now, the MBT is being used in A-stan... its not cause we have been out gunned by the Taliban/OMF/Al Qaeda/pick your devil.... its the fact that this bunch of fanatics is a brave bunch and frankly, 40 tons of track is a damn good show of force (i am aware that they have increasinly been conducting a standing fight at Coy level and the MBT is useful there as well)....    For these reasons we must maintain the MBT, and include the MGS (if and when it is perfected) to develop the army into a highly mobile fighting force, that this has the hardware to call on should we need to slug it out!

Lastly, if it is adopted, it better be manned by TANGO call signs.... Theres a lack of infantry as is!


----------



## vonGarvin

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> MGS in the US Army will be manned by tankers.



Thanks.  Thought it sounded odd when I heard that it would be manned by infantrymen.

Cheers


----------



## George Wallace

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> If the MGS (Stryker) had its bugs worked out, and it was proven to be stable (ie not overly top heavy) then i would fully endorse it. The LAVIII has proven itself in A-stan.... The MGS would give us a new capability... a desent balance between an MBT and a LAVIII.... the relative ease with which the MGS can be air transported is an attractive feature, however, it is not and can not and should not replace the MBT...



Those are good points to remember.  It would be another tool in the toolbox, but as you say, it fits into a place between the MBT and LAV III.  It is not a tank, and should not replace a tank (but we have gone over this so many times already.).

I will disagree with you on the relative ease with which the MGS can be air transported.  In order to meet the requirements, the MGS has had a lot of its equipment and armour removed or reduced.  I would hesitate to crew one of these now.  Add-on armour would have to be sent into Theatre and added on there, a very time consuming affair that negates the whole purpose of having an easily mobile/transportable piece of kit.  Getting it into Theatre and then not being able to use it until it is up-armoured is senseless (to be polite).  

Employment of the MGS is another question.  Do we employ it as a Tank Destroyer or as an Assault Gun?  Wouldn't either of those roles be more in line with Artillery or Infantry than Armour?  Or are we going to make Armour the 'Bus Drivers' of all LAV family vehicles?  (Again questions we have hashed out in these forums in the past.)


----------



## Desert Fox

I wasnt aware that the MGS has been stripped down to such a degree... i was merely refering to the fact that a LAV type vehicle is easier to move around then a MBT.... but from what your saying the MGS is more of a paper weight then anything else..... In terms of deployment, i'm not sure what i can be used for really, im a 031 death tech light... so things with wheels and tracks make me go   so in terms of what i can be used for, i think thats it right there, it offers versatility if anything.... Granted as it stands now, its sorta a bastard child that hasn't quiet earned a name for itself....


----------



## ArmyRick

Mortar Guy, are you sure about your statement that MGS will be manned by tankers in the US army? In the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams They list 3 MGS as part of every stryker infantry company. So basically these tankers will be posted to the Infantry?


----------



## aesop081

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> ....... i can post pictures too, however, in mine I am wearing arid CADPAT, and the pic wasnt taken in some training area.....



Aren't you special........


 :

There was an army before afghanistan there Mr bigshot.......there will still be one after too.......


----------



## tomahawk6

The Stryker has performed quite well in Iraq and has proven to be survivable in an urban environment. I think the Canadians should stick to the LAV as it suits your operational needs. The Stryker is only armed with a .50 cal which has worked fine, I would rather have the 25mm gun that is found on the Marine LAV.


----------



## Mortar guy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Mortar Guy, are you sure about your statement that MGS will be manned by tankers in the US army? In the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams They list 3 MGS as part of every stryker infantry company. So basically these tankers will be posted to the Infantry?



Yeah, it's crewed by MOS 19K R4 (armor crewmen) who are trained at Fort Knox (Armor School - Specifically 2/81 Armor of the 1st Armor Training Brigade). See here: http://www.knox.army.mil/school/1atb/

Cheers,

MG


----------



## McG

Eland said:
			
		

> Considering how cheap the Bisons are, we ought to be buying them by the bazillion for reserve infantry units, with engineer, signals, CP and field ambulance variants for the support units.


. . . or maybe buy RWS LAV III to replace the Bisons that the regular force have, then cascade those Bisons to the PRes? 



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Those [Bison & Coyote] production lines are closed down and the expense of retooling would outweigh the practicality of building them.


Are you certain?  I thought Second generation LAV were still being offered to export markets & that the USMC was considering expanding its fleet.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Even the stripped down Coyote version is too much for the Reserves to handle.


Was the Cougar too much for the PRes? 



			
				davidhmd said:
			
		

> MMEV is a moot point, that project died with the MGS.


It is still alive, but all the way back to the concept development stage (so no longer committed to ADATS on a LAV III).



			
				Mortar guy said:
			
		

> MGS in the US Army will be manned by tankers.


but not employed as a tank.



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> . . . thats the problem with the MGS, Canada has the intent of using it to replace the MBT.


Canada had the intent of replacing the MBT with a combination TUA LAV, MGS LAV and MMEV LAV.  Okay, so TUA existed along side tanks for years.  However keep in mind that the US SBCT will employ a combination of MGS and TOW.



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> Where as our American friends use it with the MBT., rather then in lieu of....


Actually, they will use it where forces would previously have gone with nothing.  Much of this project was inspired by the first Gulf War.  A division of light infantry held the farthest flank (no tanks) and, had Iraqi armour attacked, the Americans could very well have suffered catastrophic causalities.  This is why light forces were converted to the SBCTs.  The US will not use the MGS to replace tanks, but it will use the MGS & Stryker TOW where the absence of tanks would have cause great problems in the past.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Employment of the MGS is another question.  Do we employ it as a Tank Destroyer or as an Assault Gun?


The LAV TUA should be the "tank destroyer," but why not both roles (or some sub-set of both roles) for the MGS?  Don’t feel constrained by the capabilities of LAV MGS either.  The DFSV-Wheeled might be something else entirely.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The Stryker has performed quite well in Iraq and has proven to be survivable in an urban environment. I think the Canadians should stick to the LAV as it suits your operational needs. The Stryker is only armed with a .50 cal which has worked fine, I would rather have the 25mm gun that is found on the Marine LAV.


Some mix of turrets & RWS would be nice though.  Different bits for different functions, but still on a common platform.


----------



## a_majoor

Quote from: davidhmd on December 01, 2006, 08:18:11


> MMEV is a moot point, that project died with the MGS
> It is still alive, but all the way back to the concept development stage (so no longer committed to ADATS on a LAV III).



So what sort of concept are they developing now? MMEV as originally conceived seemed to be an amalgamation of 3 or 4 ideas (long range fire support, air defence, long range surveillance and battlefield network node), so it would be interesting to see which one(s) they pick.


----------



## vonGarvin

A_Majoor:
I think the "MMEV" that still exists is the "Multi Mission Effects _VEST_".  As pointed out to me, it was made to be used everywhere, but useful nowhere:
GARRISON: Can't make it a uniform load for the Sergeant-Major's Parade
FIELD: Have to bring along a LAV or an A-1 ech to have enough to live in the field
COMBAT: Can't carry enough to be effective


;D


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Quote from: davidhmd on December 01, 2006, 08:18:11
> So what sort of concept are they developing now? MMEV as originally conceived seemed to be an amalgamation of 3 or 4 ideas (long range fire support, air defence, long range surveillance and battlefield network node), so it would be interesting to see which one(s) they pick.



Speaking of which, has anyone seen "Rocketman" recently?  My recollection he was an Oerlikon guy who occasionally dropped in to tell us all of the wonders that would be the MMEV....

Honestly, there's got to be some creative vehicles that could be built on the LAV-III platform that haven't been built yet.  Based on the counterinsurgency work going on now, a UAV (surveillance) grouping seems like it would be interesting....

One of the concepts I just thought of now was as follows:
1)  Two LAV-III's with Flat Beds and small cranes.  Each carries (2) Seamos-equivalent VTOL UAV's (prerequisite is they must carry thermals and be able to calculate GPS positions with their sensor array - of note, I suggested the Seamos layout just because it doesn't have the tail rotor of the Firescout which takes up space and could reduce carrying capacity per vehicle from 2 to 1).
2)  Two Integrated LAV-III's to act as control centres.  One specializes in flight control, whilst the other specializes in data analysis (Note - you then need to build a datalink to a satphone PDA or equivalent so anything relevant can be beamed to the commander-in-charge in realtime).  Based on his call, you then datalink into your fire control which then feeds into your M777's or HIMARS depending upon range from base.
3)  An add-on group could composed of two LAV-III with automated mortar system.  To me the AMOS makes the LAV-III too top-heavy like the MMEV was, but there were pics of the new German Mortar app (I think it was for Weisel) that had all the bits to the rear of the vehicle that looked very interesting.  In such a fashion as long as you gave appropriate authorization to the commander of that grouping, they could provide immediate fire suport on any identified target rather than having to wait for M777 or HIMARS fire to arrive.

In terms of operational use, you could use the UAV's in a couple of ways:
1)  Perimeter patrols using thermal imaging to ensure no Taliban are laying mines in areas adjacent to the bases in the middle of the night
2)  Patrol Escort.  That is have them lead the ground patrol into an area and keep overwatch should any Taliban try to maneouvre around the patrol.

I should add, I went with (4) as a base number of UAV's per unit, because I thought that would be about right in order to keep one in the air at all times, should the situation warrant it.


Matthew.


----------



## ArmyRick

As far as the LAV 120mm mortar? There is the GDLS demo version with a turret but there is also the Stryker Mortar Carrier with a 120mm mortar in the back. It holds approximately 62 rounds (Don't go by the info found on combatreform.com).

Its not top heavy and would be good to go.

Speaking of MGS, did anybody cacth the recent story on army.mil about the 1-38th testing their MGS on live fire exercises?

go to http://www.army.mil/-news/2006/12/08/897-crews-test-latest-stryker-vehicle/


----------



## vonGarvin

"It's going to be a good asset for the brigade as an *infantry-support vehicle*." (my emphasis)

This from the article.  TAKE NOTE: this is NOT a tank.  SOMEONE please remind the liberals and NDP this when they finally stumble across this article and scream in the House of Commons "Why are we sending 30+ year old relics to fight when we could have these wonder machines?"


----------



## McG

Captain Scarlet said:
			
		

> "Why are we sending 30+ year old relics to fight when we could have these wonder machines?"


Why can't we have both?  Each has its own role.


----------



## vonGarvin

MCG said:
			
		

> Why can't we have both?  Each has its own role.


Two words why we can't have both: limited resourced (read: money)


----------



## McG

Captain Scarlet said:
			
		

> Two words why we can't have both: limited resourced (read: money)


Well, we already have the tanks (sunk cost), and we had money for the MGS last summer . . .  so it seems money is not the barrier . . .


----------



## vonGarvin

Well, to be honest, in our case, it's an either/or situation.  The tank is more versatile than an MGS.  The Leo C2 is superior in terms of Firepower, Mobility and Protection
FIREPOWER: both have 105mm gun, but the leo carries more ammo and can fire faster
MOBILITY: the MGS can go faster on roads, but that's it
PROTECTION: no contest.


----------



## a_majoor

There really is a need for a fire support vehicle to compliment the LAV III, and Air Defence remains a gaping hole in our force structure, so some sort of DFSV and SPAAG or Integrated AD system on a LAV III chassis is arguably a good idea.

There are workable turret systems which can be dropped into a LAV III chassis, and the Blazer SPAAG system was in service with the USMC until fairly recently (I understand they have replaced them with something based on the HMMVW chassis), so there are working proof of concept vehicles out there. Indirect fire is also lacking, and once again, the LAV family has lots of available proof of concept vehicles, ranging from 81mm mortar carriers on the Bison to 120mm mortar carriers with power operated turrets and a 105mm SP also built on a LAV III chassis.

This is not to say that tanks, 155mm howitzers and all the other tools of war are not needed, but given the core of the force is built around the LAV III, supporting vehicles should also be similar from a logistical and operational perspective, which the heavy equipment available to use once the light/medium forces have shaped the battlefield and isolated the enemy.


----------



## Kirkhill

Is it still reasonable to consider the LAVIII/Helo force as a manoeuvre force for controlling the "Spaces between"  while the Armour supplies the spine to Infantry based assault forces?

As Arthur has suggested before - the LAV III team, especially when equipped with heavy direct supporting fire, indirect fire support (mortars? helos? CP-140s with JDAMs? HIMARS with GMRLS?) and its own air defence bubble, all of which can keep up with the LAVs would make a great cavalry team - especially in conjunction with a still lighter "constabulary" force as discussed elsewhere.


----------



## a_majoor

Make the distinction by calling the medium force a Cavalry team and a heavy force an Assault team.


----------



## vonGarvin

I like bastardising German Terms:
Jäger for medium dudes
Panzergrenadier for heavy dudes


----------



## Kirkhill

Captain Scarlet said:
			
		

> I like bastardising German Terms:
> Jäger for medium dudes
> Panzergrenadier for heavy dudes



Entschuldigen sie mich gnadige Kapitan, aber sollten das nicht "Panzerjagern" fur die mitteltruppen sein? Es ist mir leid aber hier habe ich keine umlaut.


----------



## vonGarvin

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Entschuldigen sie mich gnadige Kapitan, aber sollten das nicht "Panzerjagern" fur die mitteltruppen sein? Es ist mir leid aber hier habe ich keine umlaut.


OK, someone on here corrected my ENGLISH grammar, so (tongue in cheek, naturally) is my chance to wreak havoc! *evil laugh*
"Entschuldigen Sie" vice "Entschuldigen sie".  "Sie" is the Second person, formal ("Vous" in french when applied to one person).  "sie" is the third person, singular, female ("she" in english), or third person plural ("they" in english).
"mich" should be "mir".  Both mean "me" in english, but "mich" is the accusative case (direct object) and "mir" is dative case (indirect object).  "Entschuldigen" is a reflexive verb and uses the subject of the sentence as the object and the person/thing being apologised to as the indirect object.  A literal translation would be "Apologise you me" or "Forgive you me".  But, of course, that's just WRONG in english, so....
"sollten das..." should either be "solle das..." or "soll das...".  One is a weird subjunctive case, the other is a strict use of a "modal" verb.
Also, don't forget to capitalise ALL nouns: proper or not.


Anyway, sorry bout that, but yes, I imagine that Panzerjäger could be used.

HINT: if you cannot find the umlaut, use the vowel "e" after the to-be-umlauted vowel.  For example
Panzerjaeger = Panzerjäger


----------



## Kirkhill

I asked for that.  BOHICA.  ;D

It has been darn near 15 years since I learned the words to "Die Lorelei" in Herr Dart's class.

Check that:  I was 15 at the time - 35 years ago............ :'(


----------



## geo

hehe....
Got my german training from Frau Schenker.  But she was Swiss german - it worked but at times, people would give me strange looks (nope - it can't be my flawless use of the language).  Was told it was something akin to a regional patois.... like a yank from the south or a Newf from out east


----------



## vonGarvin

Switzerland, Baden and Alcase and Lorriane make up the so-called "Dreieckland", or the "triangle" region.  They speak a dialect of German known as "Allemanisch", from the french word for "German".  To Germans from Swabia, Bavaria and to Austrians, they understand it just fine and know that you are from there.  To northern Germans, they will know that you are not Bavarian, but may mistake a German "Dreiecker" as Swiss or Swabian.  Happened to me in Berlin.

I learned German the "easy" way: I was an exchange student for a year just outside of Lahr, in Seelbach.  It is more than a patois, it has different rules of grammar.  Remember the Accusative case in German?  "Allemanisch" doesn't have it, so instead of saying "Ich sehe den Mann", you would say "Ich sehe der Mann".  Just a minor example, but there are others (some nouns have different genders in Allemanisch than in German).

Then I got a degree in it at UWO.  I felt like I was cheating, but then after first year the grammar lessons ended and we started reading Goethe and others!  Ugh!  It stopped being fun!


----------



## proudcanadian

well i can surely say the answer is yes since my brother is in 1 p.p.c.l.i. and is a lav III driver and he said it is fairly safe against road side bombs so i think yes is the answer!


----------



## McG

geo said:
			
		

> Time will tell how well they (MGS) do in the Stryker brigades.


Final US acceptance trials on the MGS were delayed becuase the unit with crews trained on the vehicles liked them so much, they deployed with the vehicles.  Just under 30 are in Iraq now.  We should hear how the MGS performs on Ops soon.


----------



## tomahawk6

No vehicle is mine proof, not even a tank. A big enough bomb will kill any vehicle. I have been amazed at how much of a lick these vehicles have taken and still soldiers have survived the blast - which I think is more important than the loss of the vehicle.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070513/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_strykers_struggle

BAGHDAD - A string of heavy losses from powerful roadside bombs has raised new questions about the vulnerability of the Stryker, the Army's troop-carrying vehicle hailed by supporters as the key to a leaner, more mobile force.

Since the Strykers went into action in violent Diyala province north of Baghdad two months ago, losses of the vehicles have been rising steadily, U.S. officials said.

A single infantry company in Diyala lost five Strykers this month in less than a week, according to soldiers familiar with the losses, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to release the information. The overall number of Strykers lost recently is classified.

In one of the biggest hits, six American soldiers and a journalist were killed when a huge bomb exploded beneath their Stryker on May 6. It was the biggest one-day loss for the battalion in more than two years.

"We went for several months with no losses and were very proud of that," a senior Army official said in Washington, speaking on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to comment publicly. "Since then, there have been quite a few Stryker losses."

"They are learning how to defeat them," the Army official said of Iraqi insurgents.

The Army introduced the $11 billion, eight-wheeled Stryker in 1999 as the cornerstone of a ground force of the future — hoping to create faster, more agile armored units than tank-equipped units, but with more firepower and protection than light-infantry units.

But the Army and the Marines are already looking for something different that can survive big roadside bombs — the main threat to soldiers in 
Iraq — meaning the Stryker's high-profile status as the Army's "next generation" vehicle may be short-lived.

"It is indeed an open question if the Stryker is right for this type of warfare," said Michael O'Hanlon, a senior analyst with the Brookings Institution. "I am inclined to think that the concept works better for peacekeeping. But based on data the Army has made available to date, it's hard to be sure."

Supporters of the Strykers, which have been used in Iraq since late 2003, say the vehicles that carry two crew members and 11 infantrymen offer mobility, firepower and comfort.

Lighter and faster than tracked vehicles like tanks, each Stryker can rush soldiers quickly to a fight, enabling commanders to maintain security over a wide area with relatively fewer troops. Humvees can carry only four soldiers — and are more vulnerable to bombs even when their armor is upgraded.

"I love Strykers," said Spc. Christopher Hagen, based in Baqouba. "With Strykers, you're mobile, you're fast. You can get anywhere anytime. They bring a lot of troops to the fight."

But some analysts have long questioned the wisdom of moving away from more heavily armored tracked vehicles like tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to wheeled transports, like the Stryker.

They say that is especially true in Iraq, where powerful bombs — not rocket-propelled grenades or small arms fire — are the main threat.

"The Stryker vehicle was conceived at a time when the Army was more concerned about mobility and agility than it was about protection," said Loren Thompson, a military analyst from the Lexington Institute. "Stryker was the answer to that need."

The Stryker's vulnerabilities have become increasingly apparent since a battalion of about 700 soldiers and nearly 100 Stryker vehicles from the Army's 2nd Infantry Division was sent to Diyala province in March to bolster an infantry brigade struggling to restore order there.

Trouble started as soon as the Strykers arrived in Baqouba, the provincial capital of Diyala.

U.S. commanders ordered the vehicles into Baqouba's streets at dawn the day after they arrived. The hope was that the large, menacing vehicles — armed with a heavy machine gun and a 105mm cannon — would intimidate insurgents and reassure local residents. 

Instead, insurgents hammered the Strykers with automatic weapons fire, rocket-propelled grenades and a network of roadside bombs. By the end of that first day, one American soldier was dead, 12 were wounded and two Strykers were destroyed. 

Losses have since mounted. The May 6 attack that killed six soldiers and a Russian journalist was followed a few days later by another blast. Soldiers scrambled out of the Stryker and took cover in a house while they watched the vehicle burn. Several of them were injured but none seriously. 

Lt. Col. Bruce Antonio, who commands a Stryker battalion in Diyala, said he and soldiers still have confidence in the Strykers and noted they had survived many bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive device or IEDs. 

But Antonio said some insurgents had found "the right mix of explosives and IED positioning to inflict severe damage on the vehicle." He also noted that tanks had also proved vulnerable too. 

The insurgents also apparently are becoming better at hiding the devices — the IED that killed the six soldiers and the journalist was believed hidden in a sewer line. To add potency, insurgents surrounded the device with cement to channel the blast force up into the tank, according to soldiers familiar with the investigation. 

Supporters of the Strykers say all that proves that it's the lethality of bombs in Iraq — not the Strykers themselves — that are the problem: The bombs are now so powerful that even Abrams main battle tanks are vulnerable to some of them. 

"I'm not sure if it's any reflection on the (Stryker) but rather on how things are getting worse" in Iraq, according to a senior Democratic congressional staffer who tracks Army programs, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly. 

Stryker soldiers said that when they were based in Mosul in the north, roadside bombs weren't so big — often, little more than pipe bombs. In Baqouba, the bombs are bigger and buried deeper, making them difficult to detect. 

"With what we got hit with the other day, it wouldn't have mattered what we were in," said Spc. John Pearce, speaking of the May 6 bomb. "We were going to take casualties, regardless." 

Either way, the Army and Marine Corps already are pushing for new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, or MRAPS, whose V-shaped hulls are designed to deflect bomb blasts outward, rather than through the vehicle. 

The 
Pentagon has requested nearly 7,800 of the new vehicles at a cost of $8.4 billion and is considering ordering thousands more to give soldiers better protection. 

Such moves, however, serve only to reinforce the views of critics, who believe the Army opted for a vehicle that was useful in Balkan peacekeeping or other "low threat" missions but is inadequate in so-called "asymmetric warfare," where a weaker opponent devises simple tools to exploit a strong opponent's weak points. 

"As long as the Stryker-equipped light infantry was used ... against lightly armed insurgents, there was no problem," said retired Col. Douglas Macgregor, who writes on defense issues. 

"Now, they are being tossed into the urban battle where only tracked armor can survive." 

__ 

Reid reported from Baghdad and Flaherty from Washington. Associated Press reporters Todd Pitman in Diyala in Iraq and Pauline Jelinek in Washington also contributed to this report.


----------



## KevinB

> "Now, they are being tossed into the urban battle where only tracked armor can survive."



WTF over...

   I'd like to know that Col's background in Urban Combat


----------



## old medic

Quick google result:

http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/


----------



## tomahawk6

This goes back to the heavy vs medium debate we had when Gen Shinseki decided that we needed a medium weight force. There is a a prejudice against the stryker. I am a bit more open minded in that there is room in the force for light/medium/heavy forces. No doubt about it Diyala is the last real bastion of AQ and they are fighting tooth and nail to survive. I agree with I6 that MacGregor is off base on this subject.


----------



## KevinB

The Good Col. has his head up his ass in this respect in my opinion.

The US Army still has a lot of Bradleys here (and M1A2's) -- they use them at checkpoints -- since tracks don't do to well meandering up and down roads over and over and over again.

  The Force Protectionists have to understand that 1) You can ALWAYS build a bigger bomb 2) Its war - people die. 
I hate to sound callous - but a leaders job is to complete the mission - ideally with the least waste of resources (troops, ammo kit etc).
  I have faith (from what I see here) that the US Military is doing its damnedest to follow its mission -- and also minimize casualties -- but not the point of not accomplishing the mission.


----------



## vonGarvin

I can hear it now: "We coulda had the MGS!"
Sure, I'd reply, 66 of them, or 100 Leopard 2A6s for the same price!  Do the math! ;D


----------



## geo

who knows.... maybe it wasn't the hunk of junk that everyone made them out to be.....

who woulda thought?


----------



## vonGarvin

geo said:
			
		

> who knows.... maybe it wasn't the hunk of junk that everyone made them out to be.....
> 
> who woulda thought?


Let me repeat myself: THEY AREN'T TANKS!  The MGS is being used by the US military for MEDIUM weight forces by infantry units for direct fire support.  Canada was going to use them as tanks.  In tank units.  Big difference.  Note that the US was planning on using MGS in conjunction with tanks (not in the same units, but different units at different times)
100 Leo 2A6 for the price of 66 MGS.


----------



## geo

well..... if very senior tankers were planning to use em that way then same said senior tankers should be taking the heat (or at the very least rewriting doctrine), no need to jump down a poor sapper's throat


----------



## McG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> But the Army and the Marines are already looking for something different


and for more of what they have.  The USMC is still having LAV 25 built new.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> By the end of that first day, one American soldier was dead, 12 were wounded and two Strykers were destroyed.


Sounds like a statistic that could happen to any unit at war.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> In one of the biggest hits, six American soldiers and a journalist were killed when a huge bomb exploded beneath their Stryker on May 6. It was the biggest one-day loss for the battalion in more than two years
> 
> The May 6 attack that killed six soldiers and a Russian journalist was followed a few days later by another blast. Soldiers scrambled out of the Stryker and took cover in a house while they watched the vehicle burn. Several of them were injured but none seriously.


I’ve heard through unclass channels that until ~ 2 weeks ago there had not been a single soldier killed by IED or enemy fire while inside a Stryker (guys had been killed in hatches, but no soldier fully protected in the vehicle had been killed).  Five soldiers died in the incident that first killed occupants of a Stryker.  Considering the number of vehicles in Iraq & the amount of time that the vehicles have been there, I think that is a pretty good record.  

Stryker & LAV III are both good vehicles.


----------



## tomahawk6

I agree. The Stryker is about as survivable as can be made. I remember the pic of Stryker after a 500Ilb bomb went off. The crew survived. I think the true test of a vehicle is whether the troops who operate it like it.

http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/2004101123.aspx


----------



## geo

> There were four soldiers in the Stryker, and none were hurt (aside from a ringing in the ears...).



Perfect!

Am positive it irritated the Insurgents to no end   :warstory:


----------



## McG

The LAV III has been an excellent vehicle and back when this thread was started it would have been an excellent platform to replace all AVGP and Bison in the CF inventory.  However, with the Future Family of Combat Vehicles project, I think we can aim for a new platform that uses improvements in technology to avoid many of the trade-offs that were required in the LAV III.

The FFCV should have the tactical mobility of a tank and the operationa & stratigic mobility of the LAV III.  However, given that both the US (with FCS) and the UK (with FRES) are still working on the solution to this platform requirement, I think we should be cautions in rushing ahead to introduce a new vehicle now.  Yet, I understand there is a desire to push forward quickly so that FFCV can head-off problems that may (if the current tempo continues) eventually come from LAV fleet attrition.

As I've said, the LAV III is a very good vehicle.  If attrition rates require we replace lost LAV II and LAV III, then I would recomend an interim LAV III purchase (does attrition replacement have to be considered a major capitol project or can we consider it O&M?)  GDLS & LAV users have been learning from operational use of the LAV III & Stryker.   A new 5.5 suspension system will allow these vehicles to carry much more weight in armour, and GDLS has developed a LAV IIH (effectively a next generation) that will take advantage of the 5.5 suspension to allow for a greatly increased survivability package.  Other companies have other solutions to increase the max vehicle weight potential of the LAV III.

As it is clear the vehicle still has life in it, we should continue to rely on the LAV III (or IIIH) until the right platform is available for FFCV.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Would that be the 10x10 LAV I have seen as a prototype? Rather than wait for the "super special AFV that can do everything, I will be happy with an upgraded LAV III or IV (if they are making those) Of course it's easy for me to make these recommnadation as I am not riding in them.

The LAV 10x10 with the GIAT turret and 105mm gun seems like a good fire support vehicle (in addition to the Leo2's) Has anyone actually seen that prototype?


----------



## McG

It is not the 10 x 10.  The hull is modified, but unless you get out the measuring tape, you will not see a difference between the III and the IIIH.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> As I've said, the LAV III is a very good vehicle.  (does attrition replacement have to be considered a major capitol project or can we consider it O&M?)



Sidebar:

The acquisition of additional LAV II would be a capital acquisition, not O&M.  I do not know whether or not it would be consisdered a major crown project or not - that depends on a number of issues.  It might be possible to work the acquisition system to purchase replacements from a sole-source vendor; the total dollar value usually dictates whether a project is designated as "Major Crown" or not.



> A project is deemed to be a Major Crown Project (MCP) when its estimated cost will exceed $100M and the TB would assess the project as high risk. TB may direct that projects with total projected cost less than $100M but with a high risk assessment be managed as an MCP. Further TB reserves the right to require any project exceeding the minister's delegated project approval authority to be managed as an MCP.



If we purchase additional LAV III, since the infrastructure is in place the acquisition cost would be significantly lower per unit - no new barns to build, no change to ammo natures or types, no new training to develop... so with a limited buy we might be able to sneak in under the MCP cap.  There would stil be significant work required.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The acquisition of additional LAV II would be a capital acquisition, not O&M.


but you would only be _maintaining_ the already approved fleet strength.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> but you would only be _maintaining_ the already approved fleet strength.



Nice try, but no.



> The Capital Equipment component of the DSP aggregates all projects valued over $5M that are created for the acquisition of new equipment / systems (assets), for the life extension (beyond one year) of existing assets and for the enhancement of capabilities of existing assets.



"New" equipment does not refer to capabilites previously not resident in the CF, but rather to anything shiny and new off the assmebly line (or shiny and refurbished).

Capital vs O&M is a red herring in this instance; there are still contracting regulations etc that come into play whether you spend vote 1 (O&M) or vote 5 (capital) funds.  This would be vote 5 since the equipment has a useful life measured in years and exceeds certain thresholds.

Capital vs O&M is an accounting question that doesn't really impact on process; it's the dollar values that cause headaches and process bloat.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson:

How many LAV IIIs could you buy for 99 MCAD?
How many UORs can the CDS issue annually?
Would an annual discrete, unbudgeted, buy of 99 MCAD worth of LAV IIIs every year for the next five years be considered an MCP?

I love looking for ways to beat accountants.


----------



## McG

To add to my previous thoughts on keeping the LAV III until the right vehicle is ready, everything that goes through re-fit in Edmonton should be upgraded to the 3.5 suspension (for now but to the 5.5 suspension when it is available).  This will give us the option of more up-armour on what we already own (and no need to remove important things like turrets to do it).



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Nice try, but no.


What about as an MR?  We could re-order individualy as LAV (any generation) are declared BER.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Would an annual discrete, unbudgeted, buy of 99 MCAD worth of LAV IIIs every year for the next five years be considered an MCP?


Anything over $ 30 million must go to Treasury Board for approval.  The CLS can only okay $ 1 million projects (and I think the CDS has the same limit)


----------



## dapaterson

Lots of fun ideas.  But $99M per year over 5 years constitutes a $495M contract - well into MCP territory.  Splitting into 5 contracts would be considered "contract splitting" and not get through the system - and would incur tremendous amounts of additional work, and possibly increase cost, as the supplier would have 5 contracts to manage.  Volume tends to get slightly better pricing as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

More info on the Stryker and its survivability.

This article is by Michael Yon.  The Stryker story starts about half way down. Insurgent video of the attack is included.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/superman.htm


----------



## Allen

FYI:

http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/08-03-2007/0004639056&EDATE=

Not really new, but chassis formerly intended to be TUA.

Interesting that they are putting RWS on these ones instead of a turret.


----------



## McG

The information I have received was that these would be hulls intended for MMEV (which died) and not TUA.



			
				Allen said:
			
		

> Interesting that they are putting RWS on these ones instead of a turret.


Not so surprising when you consider that we need vehicles with the extra room in the back which only comes from not having a turret.  It is why we still have Bison in Afghanistan.  Interesting (or perhaps frightening) is listening to people suggest we should replace the turrets with RWS on section carriers (so that we can increase the weight of armour).

These LAV III RWS are good news.  Making the whole fleet RWS would be stupid.


----------



## WLSC

> These LAV III RWS are good news.  Making the whole fleet RWS would be stupid.



Yap... +1 on this


----------



## prom

General Dynamics Awarded CAD$49 Million Contract to Supply LAV III Infantry Section Carriers to Canadian Forces 
  
  
(Source: General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada; issued Aug. 3, 2007)

Link 
   
  
 LONDON, Ontario --- The Canadian Department of National Defence has awarded a CAD$49.2 million (approximately USD$46.3 million) contract to General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada to provide 33 LAV III Infantry Section Carriers. General Dynamics Land Systems, the Canadian company's parent corporation, is a business unit of General Dynamics.  

Under this contract, General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada will modify 33 existing LAV III chassis to an infantry section carrier configuration and integrate a Remote Weapon Station on to the converted chassis. The LAV III chassis were originally manufactured under a previous contract for LAV III TOW Under Armour (TUA) vehicles. Rheinmetall Canada of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, will supply the Remote Weapon Station, which will feature a universal gun cradle capable of mounting 5.56, 7.62 and 12.7 mm armaments and a cooled thermal sight system.  

Dr. Sridhar Sridharan, senior vice-president of General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada, said, "As Canada's leading armoured vehicle manufacturer, our workforce is committed and proud to support the Canadian Forces. The modification of these LAV III vehicles will provide the army with additional capability as they conduct their challenging overseas missions."  

The delivery of the LAV III Infantry Section Carriers will occur from June 2008 to March 2009. 


reproduced under fair dealings etc.


----------



## dapaterson

These are not new vehicles - read the release.  we're just converting some existing chassis to the Infantry Section Carrier configuration.  So we're merely moving the holes in the fleet from one type to another.


----------



## McG

Command-Sense-Act 105 said:
			
		

> The next question, when are we going to expand our number of LAV IIIs to properly flesh out the units where one three companies are sharing one company's worth of LAVs?


I have been told that we will not do this.  We will put the infantry vehicle at the head of priorety for FFCV & get an all new vehicle in sufficient numbers.  At least, that was the plan being pushed from DLCD to DLR.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> These are not new vehicles - read the release.  we're just converting some existing chassis to the Infantry Section Carrier configuration.  So we're merely moving the holes in the fleet from one type to another.


We are not moving 'holes.'  These hulls were bought through the TUA project in anticipation of the MMEV project.  MMEV fell through and now there were hulls with no future or 'hole' to fill.


----------



## geo

DAP,
I believe CSA105 was making reference to the number of LAVIII troop carriers that have become BERd.  The "addition" of formerly designated TUA LAVs to the troop carrier fleet should just about top us up to original troop carriers.
Valid question though is:.... with the push to grow the combat arms - pointy end of the stick - where is the rolling stock for them to use?  The fleet management system that rotates LAVs, APCs and anything else you care to think about, from one unit to another is probably responsible for wrecking more vehicles than it's saving.  Vehicles with assigned drivers/crews fare a lot better in the long run VS pooled vehicles where drivers don't give a rat's a$$

of course..... IMHO!


----------



## dapaterson

McG:  There were other options on the table for those chassis besides making them into ISCs; ultimately we're still shuffling deck chairs while the orchestra plays "Autumn".

Geo:  We're stuck with what we've got; our options then become permanent have/have not units, or a bothersome rotation system, where units prepping for operations get equipment and others do not.  I  think you'd be hard pressed to find anyone who thinks the stastus quo is optimal; unfortunately, without new vehicles, we're locked into a "least bad" paradigm.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ultimately we're still shuffling deck chairs while the orchestra plays "Autumn".


Aren't you just full of the pesimistic drama today.  Go back to my comment on the FFCV.  That is not deck chairs.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> Aren't you just full of the pesimistic drama today.  Go back to my comment on the FFCV.  That is not deck chairs.


Maybe I shouldn't post without sufficient caffeine in my system.

But I'm always leery of promises that future projects will fix all our problems and make everything good.  Given the US experience with FCS and the Brits with FRES, I'm not at all sanguine that FFCV will arrive on time, on target, or with all the pieces promised.  We may instead get another IRIS - late, over budget, and less equipment than planned.

See, for example, the DID feature articles on FCS and FRES:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/fcs-rolls-on-boeing-receives-another-219m-01249/

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uk-issues-several-fres-transformational-armored-vehicle-contracts-01130/


----------



## a_majoor

The real answer is probably a little of "A" and a little of "B".

There is no question we need more AFV's in the here and now, to top up battlefield casualties, replace worn out equipment and to build to fleet to the point we are not constantly shuffling the deck. Certainly we can improve upon what we already have, MCG has pointed out various product improvements that can be made to the LAVIII family, and adopting product improved LAV's is certainly fast, easy to accomodate through the system (training, logistics etc), and not too far out of line with our allies capabilities. The US uses the Stryker and LAV 25 (both close relatives to the LAV III), and the British FRES project is trialling the MOWAG LAV, BOXER and one other vehicle which are pretty similar to the LAV III as well.

MCG's point about FFCV makes sense, but I'm afraid the need for AFV's is too pressing now to wait, and like some others, I suspect that the advanced features desired on FFCV, FRES and FCS will put them farther into the future than we will like. In the Canadian context the FFCV could be introduced as the LAV III is on its last legs or rushed into service full of teething problems in a mad scramble to meet an urgent operational need.

Given much of what these programs promise revolve around the electronic systems rather than the hulls, I really think the best way is flowing through with LAV III+ to top up the fleet,continue building LAV 3.5 to get enough vehicles to be where we really want to be, then introduce the computer systems and electronic bits in an incrimental fashion while transformational hull technologies are developed.


----------



## McG

I'd push for the LAV IIIH.  Slightly more elbow room in the back but a much greater max vehicle weight & apparently better mobility.  But put it through its paces up at TPOF first



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> MCG's point about FFCV makes sense, but I'm afraid the need for AFV's is too pressing now to wait,


I don't dispute this & have made comments to this effect myself:





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> If attrition rates require we replace lost LAV II and LAV III, then I would recommend an interim LAV III purchase



However, as we know the FFCV project is intended to resolve the long term vision, I don't agree that we should rush out to fill all of our vehicle desires with new LAV today.  We should buy what we need to be sustainable with managed readiness (despite all its problems) & have some safety room for losses.  If we were to get the LAV fleet right today, then politicians & bureaucrats would point to all the money spent there and use that as leverage to minimise funding to FFCV.

.... now, if the initial FFCV options analysis suggests that the LAV III (or IIIH) is right platform for future . . . .


----------



## a_majoor

Fair enough, we don't want to eat the seed corn by meeting today's needs. On the other hand, my impression is programs like FCS, FFCV and so on are looking at a total package, so the LAV III architecture would be entirely replaced by a new hull, perhaps a serial electric machine like the SEV, using advanced material science to reduce weight to the magic "C-130 transportable" and advanced electronic, computer and communications technologies to work within a battlefield internet.

If you subtract the automotive and material science parts, much of what is wanted "could" be achieved through incrimental upgrades to the FCS, communications suite and so on. If that is the case, then upgrading existing vehicles "would" suffice, although in our context there are not really enough vehicles to upgrade _and_ expand our capabilities. (with the best will in the world, "Managed readiness" is only a short term solution to a critical resource shortage).


----------



## Mountie

Just curious why converting the whole fleet of section carriers and command posts to the RWS is a bad idea?  The US Army is planning to mount the XM307 25mm weapons system on the RWS used on its Strykers in the not to distant future.  The XM307 is a 25mm weapon weighing only 50 pounds.  It can be changed to a .50 calibre machine gun in two minutes by changing four parts.  The US Army is also updating its RWS with stabilization and laser range finders.  Would this final product not be equal to the fire power found in the current turret?  This would provide room for two additional troops and additional armour.  The US Stryker carries a crew of two and nine dismounts and will soon mount additional armour.  

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m307.htm


----------



## Jammer

Read:
Canadian Stryker (kinda).


----------



## Jammer

It's possible that these 33 vehs could be used in specialist roles.
FOO, EW (don't tease me!), or convoy escort specific dutes to free up the gun LAVs


----------



## Petard

FOO's do not use normal gun LAV, they have an OP Variant that has a more accurate navigation system, amongst other things, so don't see them replacing them with this type. In any case it's better if the FOO looks like one of the others.
Might be worth looking at for the Gun Det vehicle, or at least upgrade the TLAVs with that type of RWS.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Petard said:
			
		

> FOO's do not use normal gun LAV, they have an OP Variant that has a more accurate navigation system, amongst other things, so don't see them replacing them with this type. In any case it's better if the FOO looks like one of the others.
> Might be worth looking at for the Gun Det vehicle, or at least upgrade the TLAVs with that type of RWS.



T-LAVS already have an RWS Platform.


----------



## Petard

Some have one, but it is a Oerlikon - Rafael PWS fitted by DEW engineering, and it is not the same as the Kongsberg one on say the RG31, others have the old 1 metre turret with 50 and C6, and all the other foibles that go with that system

I'm referring to the RWS with a stab FCS; that would be a good upgrade


----------



## Donut

Jammer said:
			
		

> It's possible that these 33 vehs could be used in specialist roles.
> FOO, EW (don't tease me!), or convoy escort specific dutes to free up the gun LAVs



LAV Ambs...get my brethren out of their Bison     8)


----------



## McG

Mountie said:
			
		

> The US Army is planning to mount the XM307 25mm weapons system on the RWS used on its Strykers in the not to distant future.


As soon as you swap the barrel and feed sprocket, it is called the XM312.  The "X" in both means experimental and therefore not something we can use as argument to start removing turrets today.  

Initally the XM307 was funded under the FCS project.  The .50 cal conversion was developed by the project team as the ammunition was less expensive & more available to support certain design testing.  The US infantry became interested in the .50 cal and so started funding the XM312.  Budget cut back have since seen the FCS project stop its funding to the XM307 and the US infantry is expressing a lack of intrest in funding the 25 mm weapon.  Therefore, it is not likely that the XM307 will see the operational light of day any time soon.  My source for the information is the US project team responsible for these wpns, and this information is only one month old.


----------



## tomahawk6

A couple of recent Stryker pic's from Diyala province Iraq.


----------



## tomahawk6

I ran across this LAVIII hit piece today from the folks at combat reform. Its the old tracks vs wheels debate. The idiots must never have seen a tracked vehicle stuck in the mud I guess. :

http://www.combatreform.com/aesindex.htm


----------



## George Wallace

Just opened up that link and right away looking at the title "LAV-3/Strykerrs fail in Afghanistan; Canadians ditch their own wheeled trucks for more mobile and better armored tracks! Enter Leopards and M113 MTVL Gavins!"  I know it is one of SPARKY'S websites.   :


----------



## Haletown

"the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne)"    aka "Sparky".

Infamous at Tanknet over many years of wheels vs tracks debates.

Inventor of the "Gavin:


----------



## Rayman

I also found a Yahoo Group off that page. Interesting for a read. Especially where it says:



> Taliban Targets Wheeled Trucks not Tracked tanks; 22 dead Canadians



http://groups.yahoo.com/group/LAV3STRYKERFUBAR2/


----------



## Franko

:rofl:

Sparky....just when I needed a laugh today.

Regards


----------



## GK .Dundas

Recce By Death said:
			
		

> :rofl:
> 
> Sparky....just when I needed a laugh today.
> 
> Regards


 yup I used to laugh at Sparky too............up until I started receiving the e-mails near incoherent rantings and what could be construed as threats.Now I don't find him as funny as I used to.Currently  I'm working on the theory that I'm relatively safe if his sense of direction is anything like  his sense of reality it could be decades before he figures out just where Canada is


----------



## Franko

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> yup I used to laugh at Sparky too............up until I started receiving the e-mails near incoherent rantings and what could be construed as threats.Now I don't find him as funny as I used to.Currently  I'm working on the theory that I'm relatively safe if his sense of direction is anything like  his sense of reality it could be decades before he figures out just where Canada is



Exactly the point, hence my laughter. He may try to mount an all out Gavin offensive!

Saw what he sent you (at least I believe it was you) on another site dedicated to the legend of ol' Sparky. He is quite out there in the either....

Regards


----------



## GK .Dundas

Recce By Death said:
			
		

> Exactly the point, hence my laughter. He may try to mount an all out Gavin offensive!
> 
> Saw what he sent you (at least I believe it was you) on another site dedicated to the legend of ol' Sparky. He is quite out there in the either....
> 
> Regards


Don't think so I've never made those e-mails public, deleted them long ago 
They sure gave me an "interesting " look at how that gentleman's mind works.


----------



## Franko

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Don't think so I've never made those e-mails public, deleted them long ago
> They sure gave me an "interesting " look at how that gentleman's mind works.



Must have been someone else from TN then. He did post them for all to see and made a site dedicated to the death nil of the Gavin.

Can't remember the site for the life of me though.

Regards


----------



## George Wallace

TankNet has this:

Sparky found me which has a lot of details and goes on to track many of Sparky's endeavours.

His (Fitz) Website is M113 Armored Personnel Carrier – DON’T CALL IT THE GAVIN is the one that Sparky found.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Sparky must have set some sort of record for being bounced banned and otherwise told to get lost  by more on line forums then any other person in history .It's kind of like watching a train wreak .You don't want to look but you just can't help yourself.
 I was amused to see how his view on Canadian troops did a 180 degree turn . To think all we had to to do in order to become superior troops in his vaunted opinion was readopt the M113 GAVIN!
 Perhaps we should continue this topic in CAPS,  in his honor of course!


----------



## Rayman

Probably out of line but they call themselves the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne). For some reason the first part sounds like a desk job then they add airborne on the end. Are they even a real military unit? Anyways I like the part where he crosses out the Engineers findings with his own opinions. The report is probably more in his favour than anything and he blows it to crap talking about the M-113 with Band Tracks.

One thing that does bug me is everywhere I go from that site they always seem to put an emphasis on "The Canadian built..." It almost seems like some of them are taking a knock at it being built in Canada or the fact its built by us Canadians. Like its trying to make it seem like it would be better if it were built in the U.S. or us Canadians don't do as good a job as the U.S. could.


----------



## a_majoor

Back to more practical matters: spent some non quality time watching CTV Newsnet and listening to the commentators declaring the LAV II is "top heavy" in response to the accident which claimed two lives. While I have no more details than anyone else, the inference that I got was the vehicle dropped a wheel into a hidden ditch or gully due to the muddy conditions, something which will flip or tip almost any vehicle that I know of (from personal experience with a car, BTW).

I had a recent visit to the GDLS plant, and there is work on various beefed up RWS to provide the firepower of the current Delco turret; the LAV 3.5 (for want of a better name, sounds better than "Gavin" anyway  ) could possibly go into battle packing a 25mm and GPMG coax with much less weight and a lower profile in addition to various other improvements based on experience and lessons learned. (Sorry, no hover feature yet....). Future Canadian LAV's may resemble US Strykers with spaced armour and no turret, although I suspect the basic shape may be submerged by various sensor systems and antenna as well. It seems to me the primary issue with product improvements of the LAV will be to find ways to reduce ground pressure, otherwise mobility will suffer.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Top heavy beats the last time some media type decried the LAV for this supposed problem, the technical term used was I believe "tippy"? :


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As vehicle weight climbs, I guess the next question is: Will every vehicle require the same turret or RWS? Could you have a mix of turret and RWS MG in troop/platoon?


----------



## Command-Sense-Act 105

Why not?  Other militaries do it.  The US Army's Cav Sqns used to be an excellent example of this - 2 or 3 air troops (Coy size elms) - mix of OH 58D Kiowa and Apache, coupled with a ground troop (Coy size elm) of HMMVW mounted scouts, mix of .50, 40mm AGL and TOW mounted on their vehs, with ability to act mounted and dismounted flexibly and deal, integrally to the platoon, with a wide range of targets.


----------



## ArmyRick

I am willing to bet in the near future, that RWS (like the German's Puma) will ditch 40mm Mk19 and 50 cal and they will have more impressive weapons such as 30mm chain guns. Have a look at the German Puma IFV, its RWS is fairly small (compared to a similar armed 2 man turret on say the Ulan IFV).


----------



## tomahawk6

Rayman said:
			
		

> Probably out of line but they call themselves the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne). For some reason the first part sounds like a desk job then they add airborne on the end. Are they even a real military unit? Anyways I like the part where he crosses out the Engineers findings with his own opinions. The report is probably more in his favour than anything and he blows it to crap talking about the M-113 with Band Tracks.
> 
> One thing that does bug me is everywhere I go from that site they always seem to put an emphasis on "The Canadian built..." It almost seems like some of them are taking a knock at it being built in Canada or the fact its built by us Canadians. Like its trying to make it seem like it would be better if it were built in the U.S. or us Canadians don't do as good a job as the U.S. could.



I dont think its a knock per se. The Leo is German bult. Abrams in US bult and so on. The US Army historically has selected tracks over wheeled vehicles as being the best for the varied types of terrain the US Army would operate in.There was alot of institutional resistance from the armor officers when Shinseki forced the Stryker into service over the strong objections of the armor community. The Stryker's combat performance has silenced the critics.Getting the Stryker to the fight has been the only drawback - it goes to theater by water just like the MBT's and Bradley's.

The Vietnam era air cav squadron assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division as CSA stated was a unique organization. The division's air cav squadron was the 1/9 Cav and was responsible for half the enemy killed by the division, an amazing statistic. More so considering that each of its air cav troops had just one infantry platoon which was supported by the troop's 6-8 UH-1D/H aircraft, 8-9  Cobras and 8-9 OH-6's.My first troop assignment in the Army we still used Vietnam tactics. A pink team consisting of a LOH and 1-2 Cobras would seek contact with the enemy.Then a platoon that was orbiting the AO would be vectored in to fix the enemy. Then the gunships went to work and if the enemy force was sizeable then an infantry company or battalion would be airlifted in to destroy the enemy force.


----------



## McG

As seen in Canadian Defence review, GDLS Canada introduces the new LAV H:


----------



## a_majoor

Another picture I lifted from the CASR site; not sure if it is still there, but shows what a hypothetical LAV 3.5/LAV H might look like.


----------



## Mortar guy

Wow. Putting the feed chutes on that bad boy would be a biatch!


----------



## Command-Sense-Act 105

I can feel my fingers sliced up already just thinking about it!


----------



## tomahawk6

Saw this engineer varient of the Stryker online.


----------



## NL_engineer

MCG said:
			
		

> As seen in Canadian Defence review, GDLS Canada introduces the new LAV H:



Does it come with a remote weapon system,  like the RG31?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

NL_engineer said:
			
		

> Does it come with a remote weapon system,  like the RP31?



What the heck is an RP31?  Think you mean RG-31 and if they do put a RWS system on the LAV 3.5/H I hope they put something more powerful that a C-6 :-\



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Saw this engineer varient of the Stryker online.



Seen a few LAV III ENGR varients (I guess that's what they are called) in Gagetown last summer, to me it just seems wrong to have a dozer blade on a LAV.


----------



## NL_engineer

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> What the heck is an RP31?  Think you mean RG-31 and if they do put a RWS system on the LAV 3.5/H I hope they put something more powerful that a C-6 :-\



a typo


----------



## McG

NL_engineer said:
			
		

> Does it come with a remote weapon system,  like the RG31?


It is the next generation of LAV, so it could come in all the variety that already exist (turret, RWS, low profile turret, external gun, TUA, etc).



			
				NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> ... and if they do put a RWS system on the LAV 3.5/H


LAV 3.5 is the term often used to describe the Stryker suspension.  We already have 3.5 in the LAV Engr & some FOO vehicles.  The LAVH is the generation beyond Stryker & allows the vehicle to carry a significantly heavier load (for armour or whatever).


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Learn something new everyday, thx MCG


----------



## McG

From AUSA 2007, here is more on the LAV H:





> General Dynamics Land Systems introduced a major upgrade for the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) design, which could be implemented as a mid-life upgrade for US Army Stryker as well as LAV 3s, currently operational with the US Marine Corps and the armies of Canada and New Zealand. The upgrade designated 'LAV-H', is proposed to be undertaken as part of major post-combat reset reconditioning. Under the process, the vehicle's automotive and power plant systems will be upgraded to support a 25% Gross Vehicle Weight increase from the current 42,000 to 55,000 lbs. (25 tons). The vehicle's curb weight will be 29,000 lbs (13.2 tons). As part of such upgrade, GDLS intends to install a Caterpillar C7 engine and Allison 3200SP transmission.
> Addressing the growing demand for on-board power, a new 500 Amp alternator will be installed, coupled with an expandable and scalable solid-state power distribution and control system. An optional Lithium-ion battery pack could nearly double electrical power storage capacity on board, with the same space claim as the standard vehicle battery pack. The crew will be able to exhaust nearly all battery power without having engine restart failures, relying on the 24V Capacitive Start System offering power reserve for the engine starter, independent of the main battery. The vehicle was demonstrated at AUSA 2007 with a Protector Weapon station mounting a heavy machine gun and a Javelin missile launcher.
> The upgrade also includes a significant increase in protection, with the introduction of enhanced belly protection, hull modifications include reshaped V profile for improved blast resistance. Externally, large appliqué armor modules and redesigned hatches are introduced, improving protection and minimizing vulnerability, caused at the seams between armor modules. Externally and internally, the vehicle has better protection against IEDs, for example, with the introduction of blasts absorbing mine resistant seats (or benches).



Also from AUSA 2007, here’s why we can no longer claim our Coyote is a generation ahead of the US LAV 25.  





> General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada delivered the first LAV-A2 to the US Marine Corps, The A2 is an updated version of the Marines' Light Armored Vehicle series, which has been in use since the 1980s. In February 2006 GDLS Canada was awarded a contract to upgrade 157 LAVs in six variants, into A2 version. These variants included LAV-25, anti-tank, command & control, logistics, mortar and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS). The upgraded vehicles are fitted with an improved suspension, and are readied to receive enhanced armor protection. New safety precautions include an automatic fire suppression system for crew protection.



Pictures available with full article here:  http://www.defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/ausa07afv.htm


----------



## Stryker_11A

Rayman said:
			
		

> One thing that does bug me is everywhere I go from that site they always seem to put an emphasis on "The Canadian built..." It almost seems like some of them are taking a knock at it being built in Canada or the fact its built by us Canadians. Like its trying to make it seem like it would be better if it were built in the U.S. or us Canadians don't do as good a job as the U.S. could.



I have never heard anyone in my battalion say anything negative about the Strykers being manufactured in Canada. Of course, they all know my wife and son are Canadians.



			
				NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Seen a few LAV III ENGR varients (I guess that's what they are called) in Gagetown last summer, to me it just seems wrong to have a dozer blade on a LAV.



Not only do they have mine plows, but you can also put on SMP-Surface Mine Plow, MR-Mine Roller, SOB - Straight Obstacle Blade, and AMP – Angled Mine Plow 

Sparky is trying to associate himself with the Asymmetric Warfare Group, a group of high speed types running around Iraq/Afghanistan coming up with the latest doctrine for COIN.


----------



## McG

Stryker_11A,
I've read in a handful of Rand reports that the key advantage of the Stryker Brigades is the vehicle network based on a data radio (which we have by another name) and your command and control software.  Would you agree that this is true?


----------



## Stryker_11A

MCG said:
			
		

> Stryker_11A,
> I've read in a handful of Rand reports that the key advantage of the Stryker Brigades is the vehicle network based on a data radio (which we have by another name) and your command and control software.  Would you agree that this is true?



100%. The situational awareness that the entire C3 provides is invaluable. I am not sure if you are familiar with the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2). This is a tactical network system which will display friendly units, identified enemy units, and other information on a GPS overlay. You can also send standardized reports like call for fire (CFF), logistics, situation reports. There are other capabilities within the brigade which integrates and digitizes the CFF process, increasing accuracy of the rounds, reducing time on target, and decreasing adjustments.

Data flows rapidly from the trucks in the line platoons to battalion and brigade TOCs, giving the commanders all the information the need to quickly asses the situation and react. It clears up allot of the fog of war, which is invaluable.


----------



## McG

Stryker_11A said:
			
		

> I am not sure if you are familiar with the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2).


I know exactly what the software & radios are supposed to do & how they are supposed to do it.  However, I've never seen either put to field use and that is the only important feedback.

Your statement shows that "network enable operations" (NEO) and "network centric warfare" are more than just fancy buzz-phrases.  Too bad the CF is not there yet.

I'd be interested in your thoughts on the turret & 25 mm cannon that our vehicles have.  Experience in Afghanistan has pretty much cemented the opinion that we would not trade our LAV III for the few additional dismounts that your vehicles provide.  At the same time, many accept that a mixed fleet with turrets & RWS would be a good thing (and others have suggested we could have the 25 mm or larger in an external gun configuration).  What do you think of these options in the perspective of a Stryker Brigade?


----------



## Stryker_11A

There are several graphical views in FBCB2 (1:50,000 maps, Satellite imagery) over which you can display fire control measures, sector boundaries, strip maps, along with blue positions. I relied on this piece of equipment in Iraq, it was by far the most useful piece of gear that I used. My platoon did over 500 missions and never got lost. A platoon leader never getting lost is unholy!

I am always about having more firepower. A motorized platoon with 2 Stryker infantry carriers, 2 LAV-III ISC, and 2 MGS would be packing some serious heat. The remote weapons station can currently be fitted with an M-2 12.7mm and MK-19 40mm, but they are working on a more modular RWS which is adaptable to M-307 12.7/25mm and Javelin missiles. By moving to a more modular system, you can tailor the vehicle for each mission in order to effectively bring the appropriate firepower to bear. I don’t know if I like the idea of giving up a squad, but I do like having that firepower. I would drop a fire team for 2 ISC in a heartbeat though.

You probably won’t ever see an ISC in the SBCT, but you probably see a 25mm on the RWS real soon.


----------



## ArmyRick

So far it sounds as though the Stryker series is a real hit with the troops (plus the command and control software). Did you guys work with the MGS at all?


----------



## Stryker_11A

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> So far it sounds as though the Stryker series is a real hit with the troops (plus the command and control software). Did you guys work with the MGS at all?



We are being fielded them this fiscal year. Right now the MGS crewmen, who are 19K MOS tank crewman, are training as infantrymen. My only experience on the MGS is from briefings and a Leadership seminar. I am a qualified Stryker infantry platoon/company and Stryker battalion mortar officer.


----------



## George Wallace

Superman is a good read.  It is one of Michael Yon's Blogs.  Interesting videos accompany his narrative, including a terrorist video of a IED attack on a Stryker and the reports afterward of how the all the crew survived.


----------



## Royal

Couple of points here;

1.  I heard back in October, that the Marines were being fielded 2 Company's worth of MGS directly to Iraq for trials and eval.  Probably not the best scenario to find out if something is broke, but they believe the numbers and have worked all the development kinks out on-line rather than on dust.

2.  Canada is seen as a world leader in the LAV world.  This is due, dare I say it, to the AVGP!  There, it is out.  We are considered by the ABCA nations to be 30 years down the LAV road.  This explains the comments about "Canadian made" otherwise it wouldn't be any good.

3.  What is the main problem then with our LAV fleet and doctrine?  Well for starters, we didn't buy enough of them, and then we planned on everyone getting them.  Too little spread too thin.  Now, we are wearing them out and can't get a procurement plan off the ground to buy the necessary replacements.  we don't want to invest more into them, but we need more of them.  Kinda makes me feel like chasing our tails.

There was another thread, (honestly, I do not know where to find it or how to search) written by "Alex" that discussed a possible organization for the land forces.  It hinged on 4 Brigades of two BGs per and an additional Li Inf/Airmobile force of Bn strength.  I thought it was a good read and is not fixed onto a platform.  I also noticed another thread in this box from a guy in Sweden, trying to convince Army.ca that we should buy CV-90 across the Cf as the next fleet.


----------



## McG

Royal said:
			
		

> What is the main problem then with our LAV fleet and doctrine?  Well for starters, we didn't buy enough of them, and ...


and we did not buy the support fleet: LAV MRT, LAV Amb, LAV unit/sub-unit  CP, LAV EW, etc.


----------



## T.S.Rea

The LAV is a descendant of the MOWAG Piranha, itself an indirect descendant of similar WWII German types.  These vehicles were never designed with anything vaguely related to the FCS types being promoted by the major arms corporations.  Length to beam, suspension/hull type and form, etc., are all ill-suited for expanded development.

Examined AFV-W types along with similar APC-T's in depth for years/decades, came to the conclusion the need to improve on some of Christie's concepts.  After some intensive mental gymnastics, devised a gearing system that would do the job (compact 32-1 98% efficient involute CVT), but I am not suicidal enough to go forward with that.

However, something similar could be developed with acceptable weight/volume/cost/efficiency compromises with conventional mechanical/hydraulic/electrical technologies.  The problem is the arms corporations are not even remotely interested in quality product, they just want to sell the most expensive and least practical junk they can get away with.

Already have significant numbers of LAV's, they should be balanced with half to two-thirds as many MTVL's, since neither type alone would be entirely satisfactory.  I see no great difficulty with vehicle type organized battalions of the three infantry regiments and a similar organization for the tank/recce/arty/eng/CSS squadrons and batteries, since they could shift and flesh out the units most suited to the operation.  Most of the non-drivetrain related equipment could be shared in common with the entire fleet.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Any experiments done to see what is the biggest gun the current LAV turret could safely take, say in the form of a low pressure 90mm or such? Might make a nice HESH delivery system. I also wonder if a single barreled AMOS type system could be maximized for direct fire using a HESH and HE round?


----------



## George Wallace

Colin P said:
			
		

> Any experiments done to see what is the biggest gun the current LAV turret could safely take, say in the form of a low pressure 90mm or such? Might make a nice HESH delivery system. I also wonder if a single barreled AMOS type system could be maximized for direct fire using a HESH and HE round?



Colin

If it weren't for this being a LAV thread, I'd ask if you may be Mike Sparks in disguise for this comment:   ;D



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> I also wonder if a single barreled AMOS type system could be maximized for direct fire using a HESH and HE round?



The MGS has the 105.  I think there was some contemplation of larger, but it was then a question of ammo storage and ammo load.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

> _If it weren't for this being a LAV thread, I'd ask if you may be Mike Sparks in disguise for this comment: _




Them's fighting words!  ;D

Funnily enough there is another post here in this thread that made me think that "he who shall not be named" was visiting us again.

Having watched the AMOS video's the round is actually quite short, basically a mortar round. IF a direct fire version could be made I think could have a very short case, as you are basically lobbing it at the bad guy. The MGS suffered from having a big high pressure gun firing full sized tank ammo. Mind you the Centurio could carry up to 40 rds if I recall correctly. With the MGS I think they were just asking to much of the chassis and trying to make use of the extra 105mm barrels lying around. Mowag did experiment with the 105mm GIAT turret on a 10x10 LAV III chassis which seems a more logical route if one feels the need to have both a direct fire and AT capability in a LAV chassis..


----------



## T.S.Rea

The LAVIII was built as an air defence platform with the 5 barrel 25mm GAU-12 (and missiles), which has a recoil load of a little over 5000 pounds, a few hundred pounds less than a 120mm mortar.  I don't know if the turret rings are identical, but it probably would not be really difficult to swap out the 25mm Bushmaster for a 120mm mortar in perhaps one in every five or ten vehicles in order to give LAVIII battalions an organic HE support weapon.  There is probably enough space in the turret to fit five to eight rounds in the turret near the breech of the weapon in a protected enclosure so the commander can load projectiles in a couple of seconds with the loader/rear machinegunner keeping them replenished from another thirty or so in the hull.  Might as well be possible to adapt Leopard II HE shells with a small propellant charge for direct fire, although they might require some addiional modifications for the shells to be stable in flight at lower velocities (or change the shot size/packing in a canister round).  Taken further, could even develop a sabot round that can defeat any armour apart from tanks.  In indirect fire, the mortar would have enough range to cover the operational area of a battalion, so they would always be on call for fire support.

Obviously, my bias is to this arrangement, partly owing to the practicality of a similar 120mm mortar constructed of titanium/composites with an integral carriage that would weigh in somewhere around 400/450 pounds, including a lightweight battery or fuel cell to propel the weapon along at walking speed for several kilometres.  Ammunition weight would be more of an issue than the mortar itself.  A mid bore pivot and support on the tube could allow the weapon to be loaded from the breech end at waist level while standing or kneeling, eliminating the exposure of loading rounds through the muzzle seven feet from the ground.  If the blast effects were acceptable, the base plate could be mounted as a shield and the weapon employed as a short range recoilless infantry gun.  Evolving the concept further, the tube might be interchangeable with a low pressure/velocity 155mm rifled tube, allowing the use of a greater range of projectiles matched to whatever is immediately available or better suited to a particular fire mission.

I am sure others might have different views on the matter, but I think the 120mm/(155mm) mortar/gun would fit well between the 155mm howitzers and lighter 40/60/81mm.

Nonetheless, I hope the information concerning what kind of recoil loading the LAVIII can reasonably tolerate is helpful, and as you probably were aware the bigger 105mm tank gun proved to be big with a recoil loading that I would quickly estimate here as being three times or more greater than this.


----------



## Mortar guy

T.S.Rea said:
			
		

> The LAVIII was built as an air defence platform with the 5 barrel 25mm GAU-12 (and missiles)



Oh really? Not that it matters, but when I read this line, I realized I had no interest in anything you subsequently wrote. You might want to check your facts.

MG


----------



## geo

TSR... your profile is still blank.
Would you mind filling in a bit of the details so everyone can have a better idea of who we're talking to?


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> The MGS suffered from having a big high pressure gun firing full sized tank ammo.


Colin,
Your sentence reads as though you believe the MGS to be a failed idea that died away.  If you go visit the LAV III MGS thread, you will see that it is still alive, serving operationally in Iraq, and apparently doing well.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27491/post-668869.html#msg668869


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As a DF support weapon I suspect it does a decent job, but I don’t consider it a terribly successful design, very limited ammo load, top heavy, lacking good situational awareness. I suspect that other issues will crop up as the vehicles get used. The saving grace for the design is that the US army is using it as a support weapon and not as a tank replacement. Had the designers cast off the need for a high pressure gun, and fitted a LP gun of similar calibre they would have solved a lot of the above mentioned problems and still have the DF capability.


----------



## Kirkhill

First Principles - as I understand them.

The units using the Stryker were/are Light Units.  Light Infantry and Light Cavalry.
The infantry were expected to fight on their feet.
They needed to transport the tactical sub-sub-sub-unit that the US Army had determined was necessary to win the local fight: 9 troops.

Vehicle designed to carry 9 troops with their kit to the area of operations.

Support weapons to be carried on the same vehicle to simplify road moves, maintenance and logistics.  Support weapons to include 60/81/120mm mortars as well as  ATGM and 105mm DF weapons.  Other DF weapons in 7.62-40mm mounted on Inf Carriers.

None of these weapons are for the Heavy Fight - That fight to be handled by the Heavy Units with Abrams and Bradleys.

The Stryker is a Battle Taxi, or an Armoured Deuce and a Half. The vehicle is sufficiently robust that it can also carry a Heavy DF weapon which comes in handy when the Tankers aren't around to add some tone to the discussion.
Situational Awareness develops at the pace of the dismounted infantryman - not the mounted cavalryman.

From all accounts the MGS is meeting the needs of the US Infantry quite nicely.  What the Stryker Cavalry thinks of it I haven't heard.  As a replacement for the Leo II or the Abrams?  Well it is probably better than a Leo in the hangar at Gagetown when you are deployed but not quite as good as a Leo rumbling along beside you.

Can we leave the MGS as "FUTank" discussion alone and consider it on its merits for what it CAN do as opposed to what it was never meant to do?

I'm with MCG on this one Colin.

Chris.


----------



## ArmyRick

Kirkhill, well said.

The Stryker MGS is part of the Stryker Infantry battalion. Its a DFS assett, pure and simple. Yes a MBT can do so much more but it can not travel 100 KM/H plus to keep up with the other vehicles.

If you want I can put up a bunch of youtube links of the MGS in action in Iraq doing what it was intended to do.

Personally, I really think Canada should forget CV90 or Puma or any of that and get on board with the US army MGV prgram as part of the FCS. The NLOS C is supposed to be officially unveiled at the US Army ball this year. Everything I have read and looked at concerning the US Army FCS program seems very much a good idea. Keep in mind the systems are due to be ready by 2015, by then our LAVIII fleet may very well be ready for reserve service.


----------



## a_majoor

While a wheeled DFS is a great idea, the primary difficulty with the MGS is the turret, with all the various flaws that have been pointed out in the preceding 44 pages and in other threads. There is no question that other turrets exist which can be mated to the LAV III chassis, and many address issues that the MGS in its current form does not.

That being said, one issue we do need to be aware of is the issue of logistics and costs; is it really worthwhile to spend a vast sum of money for a system which is unique to Canada? How much of an advantage would we get being able to tap into the vast economies of scale gained by using equipment which is similar to or identical to our largest ally?

My personal opinion (FWIW) is the MGS in its current form is not the answer to our DFS needs, and it would be worth the cost to investigate and integrate a different turret for a LAV III based DFS vehicle. However (and this is an even bigger however), given we are looking towards the next generation of vehicle with the FFCV program, it may be more sensible to hold off and see what comes down the pike. Armyrick has pointed out the American FCS as one potential solution, others have suggested everything from the Swedish CV-90 family, the Swedish SEP program, ex American M1 and M2's, German PUMA's and other more exotic solutions.

Maybe what we need is an entirely fresh thread on the Future Family of Combat Vehicles (FFCV), remembering the issues ultimately boil down to logistics (including purchase and O&M costs), doctrine (what do we want them to do?) and flexibility (can you do the same things with the FFCV in Wainwright as you do in Gagetown? Darfur?, the Fulda Gap? the Panjawii district?).


----------



## ironduke57

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ..., the Swedish SEP program,...



Just a side note. SEP is dead.

Oh and PUMA FTW!  ;D

Regards,
ironduke57


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While a wheeled DFS is a great idea, the primary difficulty with the MGS is the turret, with all the various flaws that have been pointed out in the preceding 44 pages and in other threads.


Keep in mind that many of the accusations of fault were baseless, speculation &/or not correct in regards to the production model.


----------



## Franko

MCG said:
			
		

> Keep in mind that many of the accusations of fault were baseless, speculation &/or not correct in regards to the production model.




Stryker MGS: Problems in the Field

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Stryker-MGS-Problems-in-the-Field-04731/

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQNWUyZEyOn8


----------



## McG

I am not saying that there are not problems.  Only that many of the problems reported & accepted as true within this thread are pure BS.


----------



## geo

Umm... Mods
shouldn't we be discussing the MGS in the MGS thread?....
(before this thread gets polluted like some of the others)


----------



## Spencer100

The british have picked the Piranha 5 for their new program.  


GD Vehicle Picked for FRES 
By andrew chuter 
Published: 7 May 16:25 EDT (12:25 GMT)  Print  |    Email

LONDON - General Dynamics UK will be confirmed May 8 as the winner of Britain's Future Rapid Effects System armored vehicle competition, sources said.


The Future Rapid Effects System program has decided to develop the Piranha V. (General Dynamics) The government is expected to announce in Parliament that the company has beat out rivals Nexter and ARTEC to become the provisional preferred bidder to develop the utility variant of the multi-billion-pound FRES family of medium-weight wheeled vehicles.

Related TopicsEurope 
Land Warfare 
GD UK will receive a two-year development contract for the Piranha 5, a proposed version of its big-selling Piranha line of vehicles, sources said. 

Neither the MoD nor General Dynamics could be contacted before this story went to press. 

Up to 2,000 of the vehicles are expected to be built as the cornerstone of the British Army's air-transportable armored forces.

The vehicle was to enter service in 2012, a date that may slip as much as two years due to funding constraints. 

The decision will come as a bitter blow to Nexter. French government and industry officials mounted a major effort in recent weeks to turn around the Army's preference for Piranha. They even offered to give Britain 120 VBCI vehicles due to be delivered to the French Army next year, should London want to procure vehicles early under an Urgent Operational Requirement while it awaited development work on the FRES platform.


----------



## Spencer100

A couple questions for those in the know.....What is the difference between the LAV line and the Piranha line and also is there a difference between the new LAV-H and the Piranha 5?  Is it just Europeon drivelines?


----------



## McG

Spencer100 said:
			
		

> A couple questions for those in the know.....What is the difference between the LAV line and the Piranha line and also is there a difference between the new LAV-H and the Piranha 5?  Is it just Europeon drivelines?


This has been answered a many times if you search.

Piranha was the Swiss MOWAG product.  GM Diesel (London ON) bought rights to build it as AVGP (and then later LAV).  LAV is Piranha in most regards, however it is redesigned to make use of North American parts/suppliers as opposed to European.  You will also notice that the generations do not develop uniformly.  Piranha III still has a few notable features of Piranha II/LAV II that were gone by the time of LAV III (have a look at driver hatches as a start point).


----------



## Spencer100

Thanks, I was looking more about the diferences with LAV-H and Piranha V.  Plus GD has now purchased both Mowag and GM-D London.  Is GD developing them together or are they being developed on diferent paths.   Also with GD Piranha as the base for FRES would help us if we go with LAV-H?


----------



## McG

Spencer100 said:
			
		

> Plus GD has now purchased both Mowag and GM-D London.


Not quite.  GM Diesel became GM Defence & it purchased Mowag.  GDLS later bought GM Defence.


----------



## ArmyRick

I beleive general dynamics owns Mowag now as well.


----------



## geo

MCG said:
			
		

> Not quite.  GM Diesel became GM Defence & it purchased Mowag.  GDLS later bought GM Defence.





> Posted on: Today at 07:53:22Posted by: ArmyRick
> Insert Quote
> I beleive general dynamics owns Mowag now as well.



Ummm... if GM Diesel becomes GM Defence
and GM Defence and buys Mowag
and GDLS buys GM Defence....

Unless GM Defence sold Mowag prior to being sold to GDLS
or GDLS sold Mowag after buying GM Defence....

YES, GDLS owns Mowag


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The British will require that it uses a mix of Whitworth and metric bolts, although at least 2% of the fasteners will have to Imperial as well. All screws will need to be flat bladed. Lucas will supply the electricals (and the smoke) The vehicle will have a reduced ammo load to for more boiling vessels and storage of mushy peas and bangers. The vehicle will also require a trailer to carry the new and improved Clansman radio. Also the Brits will demand that a special turret be designed to fit their diminishing stocks of the Radan Gun, which they will not have enough to fit all vehicles, which will then require a mod to take a .50cal in it's place.   ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

I does luv mushy peas and bangers - with nice bit of cider vinegar for the peas.  Don't forget to supply necessary storage for the vinegar. ;D


----------



## Spencer100

I guess I deserve that :'(   Ask a question like that and get an answer that will at least make you laugh....that is why I like this site.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I does luv mushy peas and bangers - with nice bit of cider vinegar for the peas.  Don't forget to supply necessary storage for the vinegar. ;D



... and brown sauce, of course


----------



## a_majoor

Mike Sparks must be foaming at the mouth over this one:

http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2008/07/25/u-s-army-to-retire-m113-apcs-not-suitable-for-current-wars.aspx



> *U.S. ARMY TO RETIRE M113 APCs: NOT SUITABLE FOR CURRENT WARS*
> 
> My colleague Kris Osborn at Defense News has an interesting article about the U.S. Army’s plans to retire the Fox reconnaissance vehicle and M113 Armored Personnel Carrier and replace them with Stryker and Bradley fighting vehicles.
> 
> According to an Army power point presentation on future combat and tactical vehicle strategy, the 111 20-ton Fox vehicles, which will reach the end of their useful life by 2012, will be replaced by the Stryker Nuclear Biological, Chemical and Reconnaissance Vehicle.
> 
> This is what Kris writes:
> 
> The 6,000 M113s are “not suitable for an era of persistent conflict” due to “survivability shortfalls and space, power, weight constraints,” the Army document notes.
> 
> “All alternatives [referring to Bradley, Stryker, JLTV, FCS vehicles] have better reliability than the M113,” the documents say.
> 
> The retirements of the Fox and M113 will begin immediately, if the Army’s plan is approved by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England and the Pentagon comptroller after it is presented.
> 
> The M113s in 15 heavy brigade combat teams would be replaced with 1,455 Strykers and 240 Bradleys, while the ones in Echelons Above Brigade, units higher than brigade combat teams such as the division or corps level, will be replaced with 2,471 Strykers, the document states.
> 
> Retiring the M113s will save the Army at least $691 million through 2030 in operational and maintenance costs, according to the service’s analysis of its gas efficiency, electricity and power requirements. It costs the Army $38.20 to drive an M113 one mile, more than double the $14 figure for the Stryker.
> 
> Newer vehicles are also designed to require less maintenance and fewer specialized parts.
> 
> This move in the U.S. is in contrast to the Canadian Army’s decision to upgrade a number of its M113s (see my previous post on the TLAV) and use them in operational theatres such as Afghanistan, where they have been getting rave reviews.



Of course the US Army is far wealthier than we are, and can afford to forego recycling M-113's for lack of a suitable replacement.


----------



## Franko

Ha ha ha....Sparky is having a heart attack!!!

That is too freakin' funny!

Regards


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well I am glad I was recently personally honoured by Mikey with the title "FU*KTARD"  ;D

He most have been in a good mood as he only capitlized a few words.




> from dyanmicpara:
> _You go ahead and keep on making rationalizations for wheels, keep on getting blown up. Maybe someday you'll wake up to the laws of physics on planet earth, maybe not. Its highly likely you'll stick to your prejudices regardless of the facts, that's what weak ego arrogant types which populate volunteer, western militaries do.
> 
> In the meantime, we'll call our light M113 tracks Gavins, and keep on deleting your relativistic, defeatist comments.
> 
> 
> We are SOLDIERS and we call M113 Gavins.
> 
> That's more than one, moron.
> 
> So don't even dare say not one Soldier you fu*ktard.
> 
> Your comments have been deleted and you are blocked.
> 
> BY A SOLDIER.
> 
> Did I call you a fu*ktard?
> 
> Yes I did._


----------



## a_majoor

Here is a version of the LAV shown at Eurosatory 2008. This is the Pirahna EVO with the Lance turret package, the LAV-H from GDLS will look similar so far as the hull is concerned; I have no knowledge of any upgraded or new turrets being considered (indeed, replacing the turret with an RWS may actually be the wave of the future; but that is just speculation on my part):


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... the LAV-H from GDLS will look similar so far as the hull is concerned ...


As opposed to speculating on appearance, we've already had a picture of a LAV-H posted in the thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28681/post-659097.html#msg659097


----------



## jeepsport

[quote author=NFLD Sapper]
What the heck is an RP31?  Think you mean RG-31 and if they do put a RWS system on the LAV 3.5/H I hope they put something more powerful that a C-6 :-\

Seen a few LAV III ENGR varients (I guess that's what they are called) in Gagetown last summer, to me it just seems wrong to have a dozer blade on a LAV.
[/quote]

Actually, I didn't mind that mine had a C-6 mounted instead of a .50 in Afghanistan. Reason being was that a C-6 will give you a higher rate of fire, plus you can fit a lot more rounds in the ammo can of the RWS. Granted the .50 has more stopping power, but would come in handy for uparmoured Ins vehicles .... if there were any.

Yeah those Eng Lavs are different looking eh, they come with an RWS system in them as well.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MCG said:
			
		

> As opposed to speculating on appearance, we've already had a picture of a LAV-H posted in the thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28681/post-659097.html#msg659097



Wouldn't a RWS with a similar size gun just push more equipment stuff down into the hull using up more volume?


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Wouldn't a RWS with a similar size gun just push more equipment stuff down into the hull using up more volume?


Actually, you can get more space inside the hull by doing this.  There are remote weapon stations with 30 mm cannon, 7.62 mm coax, 2 x SPIKE (or similar sized AT missile), and MBGDs.  All of this sits on-top of the hull and the requirement for a turret basket no longer exists.


----------



## ArmyRick

The Samson (Israel) 30mm RWS is just such a peice of equipment. It uses up nothing on the interior of the vehicle. I think it would be the ideal system except I beleive it should have some type of shielding to protect the mechanism of the chain gun and the crew when they re-load. 

Its too easy for timmy taliban to RPG the hell of the RWS. Its been done before.


----------



## Doucet3

Personally i think Canada still needs tanks, I think it would help out our cause if the LAV III and the Leopard went out on Patrols together, The LAV's could flank and be fast movers while helping the Infantry clear the Villages, and the tanks would stop any escaping talib's or even have to destroy those grape drying huts that the talibs use as good cover


----------



## MikeL

Doucet3 said:
			
		

> Personally i think Canada still needs tanks, I think it would help out our cause if the LAV III and the Leopard went out on Patrols together, The LAV's could flank and be fast movers while helping the Infantry clear the Villages, and the tanks would stop any escaping talib's or even have to destroy those grape drying huts that the talibs use as good cover



This is based on all your experiance with combined arms and tours in Afghanistan to know what the land is like, etc? Stick in your lane, which is observing/reading and that is all.


Also, your signiture line is BS


----------



## Franko

Doucet3 said:
			
		

> Personally i think Canada still needs tanks, I think it would help out our cause if the LAV III and the Leopard went out on Patrols together, The LAV's could flank and be fast movers while helping the Infantry clear the Villages, and the tanks would stop any escaping talib's or even have to destroy those grape drying huts that the talibs use as good cover



Please don't tell us that your experience is MW2 or Bad Company 2.

As for Canada still needing tanks, glad you agree with the leadership of the CF and Government...seeing as we just purchased some Leo2s and have been using Leo2A6M in Afghanistan for quite some time now.

Not even going to touch the LAV BS....so many things wrong with that. If it were a house Mike Holmes would walk away.

A small suggestion....keep your settings on receive for a while.

Regards


----------



## TN2IC

-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> Also, your signiture line is BS




Truckers Lead the Way.... to the beer store.


----------



## MaDB0Y_021

Der Panzerkommandant.... said:
			
		

> Please don't tell us that your experience is MW2 or Bad Company 2.



I laughed big time when I read that.


----------



## demillion

Just a quick comment. As I see it is is a judgement between commonality  and speciality of equipment. An age old problem of any military.  i would have to favour the adoption of a family of vehicle approach. With the vehicle being as diverse a platform as is possible ,while still providing a re sonable level of all round performance . IE the LAV's.  This offers the forces the desired commonality for logistics and the various units that receive the vehicles the most wide range of combat capabilities and force protection. How ever i do not believe that any single weapon system can be relied upon to provide "all things for all situations" Some consideration must be given to the purchase of limited numbers of vehicles from outside the primary family of vehicles. IE The Leo's, The CC V's the MP V's etc.....
The exact numbers of these vehicles purchased would be limited by budget constraints and tactical considerations. But it would be a prudent decision to have a least a niche operational capability , which could be expanded when required. In my opinion anyway...........


----------



## The Bread Guy

.... from the CF/DND Info-machine:





> The recent experiences of the Canadian Forces and our allies in Afghanistan and other operational theatres continue to demonstrate the ongoing requirement for a highly protected, yet highly mobile Light-Armoured Vehicle.  The use of mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and anti-armour weapons has become more prevalent, posing a greater risk to personnel.
> 
> The LAV III Upgrade project will capitalize on existing and evolving technology to improve the protection, mobility and lethality of the LAV III fleet.  The project will modernize a portion of the existing LAV III fleet to ensure it remains a highly protected, operationally mobile and tactically agile combat vehicle that will remain the backbone of domestic and expeditionary task forces, extending the life span of the LAV III to 2035.
> The following upgrades will be performed on the LAV III:
> 
> Upgrade of mobility systems such as powertrain, suspension, running gear and brakes;
> Upgrade of the weapon system; and
> Installation of additional armour, heightening its protection against increased threats.
> The LAV III Upgrade project will upgrade 550 vehicles with an option for an additional 80.  Initial operational capability is scheduled for 2013.
> 
> In October 2011, the Government of Canada announced a $1.064 billion contract, awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada (GDLS–C) of London, Ontario, for the implementation phase of the LAV III UP project. This phase consists of upgrades to the mobility systems, the weapon system, and installing additional armour and improved seating, strengthening its protection against increased threats.


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> .... from the CF/DND Info-machine:



Sure... but is there a fridge for the giant sized jar of cheez whiz? Oh, wait a minute, you don't need to refrigerate cheez whiz...


----------



## The Bread Guy

Lookit all the news releases this week!

Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (China) (no, not THIS China, this China (pronounced KEE-nuh) Steel)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Kelowna)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Mississauga)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Hawkesbury)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Cambridge)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (White City)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Waterville)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Saint Jean-sur-Richelieu)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Orangeville)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Tillsonburg)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Woodstock)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Toronto)
Government Of Canada Invests In Canadian Jobs And The Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet Of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Milton)


----------



## The Bread Guy

MOAR announcements!

Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Brampton)
Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Hammonds Plains)


----------



## The Bread Guy

Even _MOAR_ announcements....

Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Carignan)


----------



## McG

Why do all these releases say that the Canadian Army is getting a "new and improved fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III"?
It is the same old fleet of LAV III and only some of the vehicles will be improved.


----------



## KevinB

MCG said:
			
		

> Why do all these releases say that the Canadian Army is getting a "new and improved fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III"?
> It is the same old fleet of LAV III and only some of the vehicles will be improved.



Your only supposed to read the headline silly...


----------



## The Bread Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> Why do all these releases say that the Canadian Army is getting a "new and improved fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III"?
> It is the same old fleet of LAV III and only some of the vehicles will be improved.


Ah, but the group of LAV III's that are being upgraded can be considered, as a group, a "fleet" of "new and improved" vehicles, right?  It doesn't say the WHOLE existing "fleet" is being improved - fleets within fleets ....









			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> Your only supposed to read the headline silly...


OK, that too.


----------



## McG

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Ah, but the group of LAV III's that are being upgraded can be considered, as a group, a "fleet" of "new and improved" vehicles, right?  It doesn't say the WHOLE existing "fleet" is being improved - fleets within fleets ....


Even looking at it as a fleet within a fleet, we have improved but not new.


----------



## The Bread Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> Even looking at it as a fleet within a fleet, we have improved but not new.


Repeat after me "as good as new, as good as new...."




 ;D

Meanwhile....

Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Stratford)
Delivery of the first upgraded Light Armoured Vehicle III (London) today


----------



## The Bread Guy

The latest timeline estimate from the DND Info-machine (see attached Backgrounder if link doesn't work)


> .... On January 24, 2013, the Government of Canada announced the on-schedule delivery of Canada's first upgraded Light Armoured Vehicle III, in London, Ontario. The next steps will be to conduct a comprehensive test and evaluation program to ensure their performance, and put in place the necessary logistics support to allow fielding to operational units in fall 2013.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Even MOAR LAV III news....
"Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III (Ottawa)"


----------



## DirtyDog

Anyone have pictures other than the one released here:






Just curious to see it....


----------



## Tango24B

More images of the new LAV-UP....

http://www.network54.com/Forum/169232/thread/1359659835/LAV+III+UP


----------



## DirtyDog

I already see one major fault.....

With no external headlight pods, there's nowhere to rest the 25 barrel once removed from the extension.


----------



## AC 011

DirtyDog said:
			
		

> I already see one major fault.....
> 
> With no external headlight pods, there's nowhere to rest the 25 barrel once removed from the extension.



You're not the only one to notice.

It's being fixed.


----------



## George Wallace

DirtyDog said:
			
		

> I already see one major fault.....
> 
> With no external headlight pods, there's nowhere to rest the 25 barrel once removed from the extension.



Not only that, but a couple problems I see with this "designer upgrade":

1.  How do you change the headlights when required?

2.  Do these lights create a weakness in armour protection/weak point in armour hull?


----------



## AC 011

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Not only that, but a couple problems I see with this "designer upgrade":
> 
> 1.  How do you change the headlights when required?
> 
> 2.  Do these lights create a weakness in armour protection/weak point in armour hull?



George,

Without going into any real detail:

1.  The light clusters can be removed through the front of the bumper to change the lights.

2.  No.  The lights are in the bumper.  Like the (old?) LAV3, the bumper is separate from the hull.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Squeezing mo' blood from that LAV III announcement stone....

"Government of Canada Invests in Canadian Jobs and the Canadian Armed Forces' Fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles III"


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bumped with the latest ....

At least one Canadian officer has been taking part in an American summit on "whither the Stryker?" - this from the Pentagon Info-machine (highlights mine)....


> Leaders from various Stryker units gathered at the Stryker Leader Summit at the I Corps Headquarters Nov. 15 to discuss the capabilities and future of the vehicle.
> 
> According to Lt. Gen Robert Brown, commanding general, I Corps, the ability to share the ideas on training is extremely important, especially with the changes the Stryker community has coming in the future.
> 
> During the one-day summit, troops listened to experts, witnessed the evolution of the Stryker and viewed five different configurable Stryker vehicles.
> 
> “The forum provided newer members of the community the opportunity to gain invaluable knowledge on new equipment,” said Maj. Juan A. Vega, executive officer, 404th Army Field Service Battalion.
> 
> (....)
> 
> According to David Dopp, project manager, Stryker Brigade Combat Team, double V hulls provide the troops inside the vehicle with increased blast protection from a detonation.
> Another point of the summit focused on the future of the older flat-bottom Stryker vehicles. The better protection afforded by the double V Strykers has rendered the flat bottom version obsolete.
> 
> However, budgeting constraints are affecting the effectiveness of creating a better vehicle for rapid deployment of troops at the front lines, said Col. Chuck Heimann, Department of the Army, Land and War Net.
> 
> Therefore, the Army is saving money by taking the current fleet of flat bottoms and stripping them of useful parts and assembled into a new double V hull structure, said Gordon Stein, vice president, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Programs.
> 
> “This creates a 30 percent cost effective swap,” he added.
> 
> In addition, the panel discussed the future of the Stryker brigades. The Army of 2020 is going to incorporate a Brigade Engineer Battalion into current BCTs, said Capt. Stephen C. Von Jett, Dark Horse Company commander, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga.
> 
> *“The forum is the center gravity that goes a long way in synchronizing aspects of the community marching forward,” said Lt. Col. Kevin Ng, Canadian army* ....



Lt. Col. Kevin Ng, Canadian army, discusses the improvements to the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle platform with a member of General Dynamics Land Systems, during an equipment display as part of the Stryker War-Fighter Summit at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., Nov. 15, 2013. The summit brought leaders together to discuss the future of the Stryker vehicle program. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Christopher Prows, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment/Released)


----------



## McG

A lengthy but interesting article on LAV 6.0 here:  http://vanguardcanada.com/lav-6-0-protected-mobile-and-lethal/



> But the modernized version rolling into service over the next five years is a far cry from the LAV III that returned battered and bruised from Afghanistan. Built on the lessons of that campaign, the Balkans, and domestic operations, the LAV UP, or LAV 6.0 as it is being called, is predicated on what Major Pierre Larrivee, the program director for the Director of Land Requirements, calls the “perfect triangle” of protection, mobility and lethality.





> Before the LAV III was deployed to Afghanistan, its baseline weight was about 36,000 pounds; with add-on armour, payload and personnel, it topped 42,000. Following the LAV Operation Requirement Integration Task (LORIT) program in 2009 to address the threat of IEDs, which included new belly and side armour, an enhanced weapon station and attenuating seats, the vehicle weighed in at a top-heavy 52,000 once personnel and kit were piled on.
> 
> The LAV 6.0 begins at a baseline weight of 45,000 pounds and climbs to 55,000 once it is fully kitted. With the full combat package of protection and ammunition, it reaches 63,000.
> 
> “Mobility is also protection,” Larrivee noted. “If you go fast, you are better protected. So we asked General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada, give us at 55,000 pounds the same performance of a baseline LAV at 36,000. That was the challenge.”
> 
> …
> In October 2011, General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada was awarded a $1.064 billion contract to upgrade 550 of the LAV III vehicles in four variants, an infantry section carrier, a command post, an observation post and an engineer vehicle. That contract was modified in September 2012 to include 66 more for reconnaissance, valued at $151 million.





> The double V hull is one of the most notable differences to the LAV 6.0. During the definition phase of the project, the army explored a number of options to enhance survivability. When GDLS-C suggested the double V, the army conducted both performance and cost analysis to determine the suitability, said Garth Ray, DND project manager for the LAV UP. “The Americans were interested in that similar type of protection; after doing our analysis it looked like a pretty good solution.”


Getting back to the title of this old thread: Canada will be better off with all LAV as opposed to a mix of LAV and CCV.  It is good that we are going in this direction.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Considering we have no idea what the next war will be, I like the heavy and light mix. If you are going with a CCV, stop mucking around and go with a track. Slowly upgrade the LAV fleet and have a rolling replacement/upgrade program that never really stops.


----------



## MilEME09

Some news on the LAV Front, via Canadian Defense Review



> The Government of Canada has awarded a CDN$287 million contract to General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada for the provision and integration of an enhanced surveillance suite on the Canadian LAV III Upgrade vehicles, known as LAV 6.0.
> 
> The upgraded surveillance system will include a 10-meter retractable mast, an Operator Control Station and a surveillance suite inclusive of radar, thermal/day and image intensification sights, laser range finder and GPS mounted on a stabilized platform. These enhancements will allow for superior detection ranges, on-the-move operation, integrated silent watch power management and the transmission of images through the communications system.
> 
> "General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada continues their 37 year partnership with the Government of Canada," said Danny Deep, vice president of General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada.  "More than 20 years ago, we designed and delivered to the Canadian Army the Coyote vehicle which at the time was the best reconnaissance/surveillance vehicle in the world. We are now privileged to deliver the next generation of advanced surveillance capability to the Canadian soldier."
> 
> Deliveries of LAV 6.0 vehicles equipped with the upgraded surveillance suite will commence in December 2016.


----------



## McG

It looks like Israel will follow so many western armies and introduce an 8x8 APC of its own.   

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/2016/08/01/israel-unveils-wheeled-actively-protected-armored-carrier/87907090/

Looking to our own fleets, I wonder, could the Army upgrade its LAV 2 and older (so, Bison, Coyote, and any remaining AVGP in stocks) to the LAV 6?  Yes, we will be really getting all new vehicles but that is also true of the LAV 3 to LAV 6 upgrades.  Then we could get some of the support platforms that we need and it would not involve a whole nasty procurement.


----------



## PuckChaser

Sure would streamline repairs and logistics for SPSS if Recce, EW, Comms and Amb were all the same platform.


----------



## Kirkhill

All you really need is the VIN tags off the vehicles - or whatever the military equivalent is - then you can build a whole new vehicle around the tag.


----------



## a_majoor

Israel has developed an 8X8 vehicle platform which is designed for a combat weight of 35 tons. While this seems pretty enormous for a wheeled vehicle (and completely opposite of the sort of thinking behind the 8 ton "Combat Guard" prototype), it is probably the logical endpoint to current thinking of wheeled IFV's:

http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/08/israel-eitan-armor-personal-carrier.html



> *Israel Eitan Armor Personal Carrier uses commercial auto parts for lower cost but has upgraded protection*
> 
> Israel unveiled the first prototype of the Eitan, a new 8×8 armored personnel carrier developed by the Ministry’s Tank Development Program Directorate (Mantak), as a possible successor for thousands of American-made M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) Israel has been operating since the 1970s. The new APC is said to be more protected, efficient and affordable than foreign off-the-shelf alternatives, and would be available at half the cost of the Israeli Namer Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).
> 
> Eitan uses commercially available automotive components. This enabled the designers to develop an APC that will cost half as the tracked Namer, and less than similar wheeled APCs available in the world market. The hull was developed in the country, along with the weapon systems, survivability and protection systems used. According to Mazliah, the need for a wheeled armored vehicle such as Eitan evolved from lessons learned in recent combat operations in Gaza. The Eitan complements the Merkava and Namer, as it can transport infantry squads on roads, without relying on tank transporters. Eitan has a maximum road speed of +90 km/h (56 mp/h).
> 
> Israel’s new Eitan 8×8 wheeled armored personnelo carrier has entered developmental testing. Two more prototypes are in production and will begin testing soon. Photo: Israel MOD
> 
> Similar to Merkava and Namer, Eitan does not rely only on ballistic armor for protection but uses a combination of survivability systems for to enhance the survival of the crew, passengers, and the entire vehicle. Designed for a gross vehicle weight of up to 35 tons (77,000 pounds), Eitan provides sufficient base protection for common battlefield threats. Using the Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS), the vehicle can effectively avoid high-level threats without proportionally increasing the weight of its armor. To protect the occupants from blast effects, of mines and IEDs, Eitan has been designed with protected, relatively high floor. The tyres are fitted with runflat inserts meaning they can continue to function even after suffering multiple hits. The passive protection provided by modular armor is applied to the vehicle’s front and sides, while equipment modules add to its security. The vehicle will be initially produced at the Israel MOD AFV plant, at an annual production rate of several dozens of vehicles, as is the case with the Namer ICV.
> 
> The vehicle is designed as a common, modular platform that can be configured into different variants by replacing hull modules. Variants typically include APC and command vehicles equipped with remotely operated .50 Cal machine gun, and weapon carriers, to be fitted with remotely operated turrets mounting 30/40mm automatic cannon. The turret will also have accommodation for several missile launchers.
> 
> While most 8×8 APCs evolved from lighter platforms, the Israeli APC was designed from scratch for 30-35 tons, which is the upper limit of similar designs. All 8x8s are designed for similar roles – they are designed as modular, role configurable platforms, in a weight range of 18-30 tons, each carrying 8-11 troops.


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> It looks like Israel will follow so many western armies and introduce an 8x8 APC of its own.
> 
> http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/2016/08/01/israel-unveils-wheeled-actively-protected-armored-carrier/87907090/
> 
> Looking to our own fleets, I wonder, could the Army upgrade its LAV 2 and older (so, Bison, Coyote, and any remaining AVGP in stocks) to the LAV 6?  Yes, we will be really getting all new vehicles but that is also true of the LAV 3 to LAV 6 upgrades.  Then we could get some of the support platforms that we need and it would not involve a whole nasty procurement.



It makes perfect sense to have one basic platform rather than a hockey sock off mini fleets. By some counts we should have 1000-1400 LAV class vehicles (which would cover all the various variants and replace Bisons, Coyotes, TLAVs, TAPV's etc.), which would also solve all sorts of logistical, training and support issues. In the ideal world I'd like to see the LAV 6 go on a diet as well, since the huge increase in weight compromises nobility (especially cross country mobility), but many "platform" variants will be without a turret, which should save a considerable amount of weight right there.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thucydides said:
			
		

> It makes perfect sense to have one basic platform rather than a hockey sock off mini fleets. ...



Within limits.   I agree that there should be as much commonality as possible.

But.

There needs to be a variety of classes that conform to the variety of environments (and modes of insertion) likely to be encountered.

eg half tonne GVW, 3 tonne GVW, 7 tonne GVW, 15 tonne GVW, >15 tonne GVW  (CH-146, CH-148/9, CH-147, CC-130 and CC-177/Rail/Sea/Road.)
and vehicles for firm ground and those for soft going (including water).


----------



## tomahawk6

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Israel has developed an 8X8 vehicle platform which is designed for a combat weight of 35 tons. While this seems pretty enormous for a wheeled vehicle (and completely opposite of the sort of thinking behind the 8 ton "Combat Guard" prototype), it is probably the logical endpoint to current thinking of wheeled IFV's:
> 
> http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/08/israel-eitan-armor-personal-carrier.html



The Israelis dont have to fly their heavy equipment as we do.As a result they can uparmor their vehicles to their hearts content.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

A turretless LAV for some Reserve units with a plate over the turret ring and Commanders hatch in it would work. You could cycle high use hulls to training and move turrets as required.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Colin P said:
			
		

> A turretless LAV for some Reserve units with a plate over the turret ring and Commanders hatch in it would work. You could cycle high use hulls to training and move turrets as required.


 Which sadly given our history will turn out to be another vehicle the reg force wont have to pay for ..


----------



## Colin Parkinson

No it won't be deployable........ [lol:


----------



## Kirkhill

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Which sadly given our history will turn out to be another vehicle the reg force wont have to pay for ..



Part of the problem is that the RESERVE Force / Militia doesn't have to pay for those vehicles, or their weapons or their boots.  They have no budget.  They live on sufferance.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Part of the problem is that the RESERVE Force / Militia doesn't have to pay for those vehicles, or their weapons or their boots.  They have no budget.  They live on sufferance.


For this reason I think either the PRes needs its own dedicated budget or we need a unified one army strategy, I dont give a rats ass about the reservists will never use it arguement, are you going to trust some one on a vehicle or weapons system that someone only had workup training to learn? When the reserves stop being the ugly step child getting the left over scraps, maybe then we van get some where productive.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## a_majoor

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Within limits.   I agree that there should be as much commonality as possible.
> 
> But.
> 
> There needs to be a variety of classes that conform to the variety of environments (and modes of insertion) likely to be encountered.
> 
> eg half tonne GVW, 3 tonne GVW, 7 tonne GVW, 15 tonne GVW, >15 tonne GVW  (CH-146, CH-148/9, CH-147, CC-130 and CC-177/Rail/Sea/Road.)
> and vehicles for firm ground and those for soft going (including water).



Given our very small size and the multitude of environments that we need to operate in, then yes there is a need for several different classes of vehicle. OTOH, we also need to keep focused on logistics, commonality and costs.

I could suggest that the Canadian forces needs at least three classes of vehicle; a CCV for heavy forces (ideally a family like the CV90 or PUMA), a LAV class as the general purpose workhorses and a MTV for the north and other difficult terrain conditions. Numbers and allocations can provide an endless number of arguments, not to mention which specific variants should be purchased.

Of course, as suggested in other threads, the first thing that needs to be done is to have a clear doctrine to establish numbers and types, then we can have a coherent conversation. Maybe in 2019?


----------

