# Why Not Canadian Amphib/Marine Capability? (merged)



## Paul Gagnon (8 Dec 2002)

Not sure if this should be here or in the history forum...


At one time we had a Navy that could transport them so why don‘t we have Marines?


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## Pugil (8 Dec 2002)

Hmmm, Marines is a projection force which is a shock troop like the paras. We dont even have airplanes to transport PPCLI to Afgahnistan let alone having amphibious operation. I dont see the need for Marines in Canada, any infantry can fufill the Marines tasking which is amphibious assault with a bit of training. And also to upkeep a Marine unit is very expensive. Marines tend to develop their own ethos like the airborne and can lead to inter-unit rivalry to see which unit will see most combat which is good.


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## Korus (8 Dec 2002)

But we do have marines. If you‘re speaking in French about the Navy..


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## Jarnhamar (8 Dec 2002)

Marines need ships to use for amphibious landings. Our navy can‘t afford to sail.


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## Pugil (8 Dec 2002)

Ghost, the Navy technology wise and capabilities is the most advance of all the branchs. If Canada goes to war against Iraq, the US probaly needs more the Navy than the army or air force. The air force with their F-18 fighters is outdated because of the lack of sophisticated weapons and the comms are not compatible with our allies while the army with their logistic problems bring more trouble than benefits to the US. Example; the PPCLI had to use American Chinooks to fly in theater of operation, Yanks had to support in every aspect the PPCLI, thats a shame. Overall our Armed Forces are not self-sufficient except for the Navy.


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## Pikache (8 Dec 2002)

The Navy will probably go down the drain too, when the replenishers ships get decommissioned, Halifax needing upgrades and Iroquois also probably getting decommissioned in few years.

Or is the Liberals going to pull a Sea King on navy ships, too?


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## Spr.Earl (9 Dec 2002)

When it come‘s to supply ship‘s we should be like the U.K. as they have the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which are manned by merchant navy crew‘s and are used for commercial use and navel use.

During the Falkland‘s there was a number of merchant seaman killed when, if I remember right the Sir Galahad was hit and some of them were Hong Kong chinese.They had a few R.F.A. ship‘s down there.

 The U.S. has such a set up were they have supply ship‘s used in case of war but manned by merchant seaman but also used for commercial use to off set the cost‘s.

 The above still may be going on.
Any more input on up to date info. welcome.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Dec 2002)

Pugil, we could have aircraft carriers and seawolf class attack submarines, but we still can‘t aford to put our ships out to sea. As technoligically advanced as they may be, they still run on fuel. If a stealth bomber has no fuel to fly it‘s a 2 billion dollar paper weight.

I always thought our cf 18s were these great multi role fighter aircraft with advanced electronices and such. when did they become outdated?


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## Korus (9 Dec 2002)

It‘s been in the news recently that the communications equpiment in them is outdated. They‘re currently being (very slowly) upgraded.


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## Pugil (9 Dec 2002)

Ghost, Canada probably wont have enough personnel and money to sail its entirely fight into but it got enough for some ships. Like I said before the Navy is the only branch that is self-sufficient and the most advanced technology wise so much that one of our frigate is integrated in a US aircraft carrier battlegroup. While our CF-18 are not updated to the latest technology and comms. The US technology is advancing so fast that even other powerful countries like England cant even keep up. Canada with little money we put in the military wouldnt make much difference.
Remember our CF-18 were parcipating actively during the Kosovo air campaign? But that was 3 years ago.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Dec 2002)

I think any "help" we give will be purely for show, so it does not look like the americans are at war  but the free world or whatever is at war.

One american carrier has roughly the same amount of sailors as we have infantry soldiers in the entire canadian foces (regs). I can‘t in all honesty see us making that much of a difference.
The US would have to give us fuel to get across the atlantic so they could put a show of us "being an important role in the war on terrorisim"

The US lost the vietnam war because they had no clear mission victory objectives.  They could not gauge when they won or lost. How can we "win" a war against terrorisim? Were going to be at war with terrorists for the next 500 years. And we can use it as an excuse to invade other countries. If we really wanted to help fight terrorisim we don‘t need to send a single ship or two in a fleet of a hundred, we should make it harder for terrorists to enter the country. heh hope thats not too far off topic


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## Korus (9 Dec 2002)

You forgot to mention that a single aircraft carrier also has almost as many operational fighter and attack aircraft as we have in the CF....


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## portcullisguy (10 Dec 2002)

Ghost, the CF18, afaik, does not have air-to-ground armament (unless something changed), and is not equipped with the latest upgrades as to radar, IFF, and comms.

This "multi-role" aircraft used in the CF variant has only guns and air-to-air (AIM-9 sidewinder) missiles.  This limits it entirely to air-to-air combat.

Although not as glorious and romantic as air-to-air combat, the main role of modern military aircraft of this type is the ground attack role, and very few of the world‘s air forces possess a capable air force to counter the major powers. 

The last time this was tried was in 1982, in the Falklands war.  The Argies got a severe pasting in the air, wasting some of their most talented pilots, by sending them up in inappropriate aircraft, untrained for the air role.

Lack of IFF means that our aircraft cannot identify themselves to friendly aircraft/ground radar systems (Americans, Brits) and could result in a blue-on-blue.

Plus, the things are really on their last legs... I got an up close look at the recent Toronto air show, and I wouldn‘t want one flying anywhere near me...


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## portcullisguy (10 Dec 2002)

As to the original topic, why Canada doesn‘t have marines, I dunno... I imagine we don‘t have a modern marine force because of all the reasons others have mentioned: No troop carrying ability, and it‘s really duplicated anyway by our infantry.

Probably historically, we never needed a marine force.

There would have been a small number of Royal Marines in Canada that went where ever the Royal Navy went, but this probably ended not long after the War of 1812.  In those days, a wooden frigate WAS a troop-ship, quite often.  It was the single most powerful, mobile way of implementing foreign policy.  The Brits never built that many ships here, and the naval activities were really kept to the East Coast (until much later on).

In the interior, we needed a good militia, backed by British regulars, when they could be spared from the war in France.  The original purpose of the marines was to provide an infantry force capable of protecting the ship and it‘s crew, and was very limited in it‘s offensive role.  The whole ship‘s crew would often be used for offense, for example boarding a ship, or attacking a town or fort from the water.  The infantry was used for more serious land-based maneuvers, and could be ferried if possible, but not often used in a marine role.


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## Korus (10 Dec 2002)

> the CF18, afaik, does not have air-to-ground armament


the CF18 does indeed carry air-to-ground armament... We even helped bomb Kosovo...

Asa to my answer why Canada doesn‘t have marines? Maybe the Government never thought we needed marines? After all (especially during the UN Times..) Marines scream out war-making, not peace-keeping.

Just a thought.


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## riddleofsteel (10 Dec 2002)

> I dont see the need for Marines in Canada, any infantry can fufill the Marines tasking which is amphibious assault with a bit of training.





> it‘s really duplicated anyway by our infantry.


I disagree with the above to an extent. While the role of a Marine, once they have hit the beach, _is_ that of an Infantryman, the existence of specialized naval troops is more an issue of having people (ex: officers and landing vehicle operators) who are highly proficient in the planning and the support of an amphibious assault. Amphibious operations are some of the most difficult a force can carry out, and if there isn‘t expertise all around there will probably be a lot of dead bodies littering the beach.


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## Harry (10 Dec 2002)

We don‘t have Marines because as a nation we were born of a Garrison style military.

Look at the nations who have marines, they have historically used their navies to extend their might or defend themselves.  The marines have been a natural element of all their armada and fleet operations. 

Whereas we have had strong navies, they where not used to touch shores per se (lets not go near the beach landings-in all reality we have little experience and that that we do utilized conventional land forces).   They sailed the seas, cleared lanes of commerce and conducted coastal guard. 

Marines historically are an extension of the nations might, and historically these are nations whose might was declared on the open seas.  And to reiterate, we came of birth as a Garrisoned nation.

As for the 18‘s.  They are the original design A models (with mods) and have been predated 6 times in US inventories.  They where originally bought as an air superiority fighter for Europe.

When deployed to the Gulf in 90-91, their limitations became blazingly obvious and the US kept them out of the big game.  IE firing an AA missile at a small patrol vessel, hmm.

We deployed to the Kosovo Campaign and had to beg, borrow steal in order to meet the mission.  Goes back to the euphemism of the bagged out Iltis.  How much can you strap onto a taxed system before performance degrades?

The CF-5 served for a while in the ground attack role, but for whatever reason, the government decided to pay them off.  Hear Belgium still loves them.  Amazed some whistlehead hasn‘t posed the idea of using Herc‘s for strategic bombing roles in support of our naval operations (tongue in cheek of course).

Speaking of the absurd, what do you guys think of the Snowbirds maintaining their Tutor fleet almost into perpetuity (it would seem).  At least we would be known for having one of the best flying antique aerial demonstration teams on the world circuit.   :blotto:


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## Pugil (10 Dec 2002)

Steel, what about the invasion of Normandy, Sicily? Most of the regiments that took part were infantry. It is in their own interest and survival that marines promote amphibious assault.


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## Harry (10 Dec 2002)

Pugil, the European invasions where large scale, involved various bulky open and what not landing craft piloted by naval pers.

Amphibious only in the fact that large masses of conventional land forces got dumped into a fight.

Marines practice much more than that and are seaborne based and lodged while not fighting.  Grunts/legs/lawndarts live in hootchie hotels or rear area digs.  

Different cultures, training and roles.


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## Korus (10 Dec 2002)

Yeah, I heard they brought a couple of cf-18s to kosovo solely for canabalizing for spare parts.

A shame.


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## Soldier of Fortune (12 Dec 2002)

Well, maybe it would be better if all we had were Marines. Lets look at the American Marines, they have an army, an air force, and a navy all tied into one. I think it would be perfect if Canada did something like this, and it would be cost effective too. Integrating everything into one service would be alot better. We would also not need as many personel. With the mantality "Every Marine a Rifleman" would also weed out any softies from our forces.


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## Pugil (12 Dec 2002)

The US marine corps is as big as the entire British armed forces, it is almost an army on its own. Like the airborne the marines often develop their own warrior spirit and ethos, it is a natural thing. I dont we need a marine corps, most countries that have marines have a past colonialism history. I think we need more of a mountain operation unit, we dont hear alot about mountain operators but their are they are amongst best troops around the world. In Europe the best troops are mountain infantry, simply because the nature of their training, imagine to climb up a mountain with all your kit, rations, ropes, ammo and fight in the same time, on top of that they have to be self-sufficient. A chain of mountains is a natural defensive line, if you put a well-trained people to defend it, it will be very costly for the enemy to root out one by one all the pockets of resistance You have to be switch on because one wrong step on a steep of a hill can drag you all the way down to the bottom. I did once a mountain warfare exercise and it is just fantastic with all the tactics that evolve around it and skills.


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## Harry (12 Dec 2002)

Marines



> Well, maybe it would be better if all we had were Marines. Lets look at the American Marines, they have an army, an air force, and a navy all tied into one. I think it would be perfect if Canada did something like this, and it would be cost effective too. Integrating everything into one service would be a lot better. We would also not need as many personnel. With the mentality "Every Marine a Rifleman" would also weed out any softies from our forces.


The Marine concept of operations and deployment is a good one, but take into consideration the following:

The average gyrene, can do all a grunt can and more inclusive of airborne ops and spec ops as per training.  But their primary role in battle is seaborne ops.  We do not have the shipborne capabilities to house, transport and deploy them.  And supposedly, everyone in the CF green machine is supposed to be a leg first.

Armor.  Marines utilize a combination standard heavy armor and Marine specific armor such as the AMTRAC and Marine LAV.  As well as standard wheeled equipment, we are hard pressed at best and possess limited swim capable stuff.  Our LAVS don‘t have the pretty propeller paper weights like the old AVGP‘s do.

Air wing.  The Marines have both an integrated and separate element of seaborne air ops.  They have air wings stationed on squid aircraft carriers and have independent Marine Aviation (helicopter/Harrier) wings aboard Marine Assault carriers.  We possess neither.

And we tried the combined thing and it failed miserably.  A Marine org would have to be built from the ground up and kept separate.  It is how most militaries do it and as such, Marines have their own ways of doing things.  For example the USMC MARPAT, their orders of dress and their drill and ceremonial.

We could never afford it and the implications are too great for the average Canadian to support.  IE a rapidly deployable offensive force, hmm, visions of the CAR.  Many a Canadian still feels that the demise of the CAR was a good thing.  Based solely upon the governments Anti-PR put out prior to its closure.  

Kind of like Kyoto.  Wonder what Southern Ontarians will think when they realize it had nothing to do with particulate pollution‘s and everything to do with a theory that the father of is now questioning himself.  But I digress...

USMC


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## jrhume (12 Dec 2002)

I wonder how many Canadians are serving in the US Marines?

During the Vietnam War some 15,000 + Canadians served in various US forces and 300 or so died there.  A good percentage must have been Marines.  

I guess that means Canada does have a marine force. 

S!

Jim


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## Harry (13 Dec 2002)

Numbers vary, however, according to a pretty solid documentary on History Television regarding Canucks in Viet Nam aired during the Week of Remembrance, it is like this: 

Estimated in excess of 40, 000 Canadians served, 110 dead, 7 MIA. 

Pretty much offset the draft dodgers I would surmise. 

Here is some reading with various accounts and numbers.

Est 12, 000 

North Wall


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## jrhume (13 Dec 2002)

Harry,

Thanks for the links.  One I had seen, the other I had not.  

I think this subject has been of interest to me because I served in Vietnam with a US Army Staff Sergeant who was a Canadian.  He, like many of the non-Americans who served, became a US citizen.

That‘s one of the great difficulties connected with getting accurate numbers.  Many Canadians became US citizens, which makes it problematic to track them as Canadians once they were in the US forces.  Others remained in the service, making it a career.  Those too are difficult to pick out from the overall listings.

I think the actual number who served in US forces during the Vietnam era is probably in the vicinity of 40,000 - 50,000, with the number serving in Vietnam at around 15,000.  Remember, Vietnam service includes naval service in the South China Sea and air force bases in Thailand.

Yes, that addition to our forces more than offset the draft dodgers.  I always tell people that those who ran don‘t bother me because we got better men in return.    

Jim


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## Recce41 (13 Dec 2002)

In Windsor, Ont is the Vietnam Canada War Memorial, just under the Ambassator Bridge.


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## muskrat89 (13 Dec 2002)

I grew up in a NB border town. An aquaintance (Canadian)of my parents‘ went to Vietnam. As the years passed he became a very high-up in the American Legion, and eventually became the Aide de Camp for the Governor of Maine - the first one ever that was not American born, IIRC


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## Paul Gagnon (14 Dec 2002)

> _originally posted by Harry:_
> * We don‘t have Marines because as a nation we were born of a Garrison style military.
> 
> Look at the nations who have marines, they have historically used their navies to extend their might or defend themselves. The marines have been a natural element of all their armada and fleet operations.
> ...


Thanks. I guess since our Navy has always been defensive there really has been no need for Marines. However I was thinking that Marines might be useful for defence in some of the more remote reaches of the Canadian coastline since many if not most areas are extremely rugged and only accessible by sea.


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## portcullisguy (15 Dec 2002)

Another significant difference between the U.S. Marine Corps and their other forces, also might explain why we don‘t have/need marines in Canada.

I learned this past weekend on BMQ from our knowledgable platoon 2IC that the USMC is under the direct control of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, otherwise known as the President.  The other U.S. forces, particularly the army, are under control of Congress, as they are still known by their name in 1776: The Continental Army of Congress.

Under a Republic, the head of state and head of government are the same person (the President), and one of the usual powers reserved for a head of state is actually in the hands of the elected Congress.  That power is the authority to declare war.  The United States cannot declare war against another power without the consent of Congress.  Since the Marines are under direct control of the President, they can be deployed without Congressional authority.  That is why the Marines maintain a rapid deployment task force.

In Canada, this is unnecessary.  Here, our head of state is The Queen (as represented by the Governor-General, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces).  The head of government is the Prime Minister (the head of Her Majesty‘s Cabinet).  Although the head of government must approve of most laws, etc., and is the only authority to raise and levy taxes, etc., the Sovereign retains the power to declare war, and the oath sworn by all armed forces in Canada is to the Queen, Her heirs and successors.

This means, technically and legally, the Canadian Forces are under the control of the "Crown prerogative", should it be exercised, and the Crown has the power to declare war, Parliament does not.

However, keep in mind that we live in a Constitutional Monarchy.  The Queen cannot act without the advice of her ministers (Privy Council).  Reserved powers are rarely, if ever, used.  Functionally, the CF is under control of the government, which has the power to make the laws which affect every other aspect of CF life (who can join, what they get paid, who can give orders, discipline, what kind of weapons we will use, what our role will be, etc.).  Since the government pays us, essentially the government controls us.  God willing there will never be a case of a government that is not lawfully and democratically elected, in Canada, so that we do not have to test the Crown prerogative in that case (in removing said undemocratic government).

God Save The Queen.


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## riddleofsteel (21 Dec 2002)

Marine units are not dependent upon political systems and ideology. Even the Soviets used large amounts of naval infantry (I‘m pretty sure the Russians still do). Here‘s a small sample of countries that have Marine/Naval troops.  A lot of naval units are not even remotely as extensive as the USMC. Some of them are quite large, while others are really just subunits.

France

Marine Nationale (French Navy. I‘m not sure what their Marines are called, but they use some naval troops)
*Commandement des Fusiliers Marins Commanados (COFUSCO)
-Commando Trepel
-Commando de Monfort
-Commando Penfenyo
-Commando Jaubert
-Commando Hubert ASM (Commando D‘Action Sous Marine)

Italy
*San Marco Battalion

Netherlands
*Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
 -7 Netherlands Special Boat Squadron
 -Mountain Leader Platoon
 -23 Airborne Company
 -11th Airborne Company

Norway
*Marinejaegerkommandoen

Sweden
*Amfibieregementen (Amf 1 and Amf 4)
*KustjÃ¤garna ("Coastal Rangers")

South Korea
*Republic of Korea Marine Corps


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## Harry (21 Dec 2002)

Riddle Of Steel:

Not going to jump all over you, but just question what or where it is you had intended to go with your post.

I will break it down for you:

France, historically a Naval colonizer, their Marines where normally the only form of regular military there.  They used a system of reserves and territorial armies, but direct link to the sovereign was the Navy.

Italy, I might suggest you do a little historical review of the San Marco Battalion.  Very good read.

Netherlands, former colonizer, former strong blue water navy.  AKA-Dutch

Norway, can we say originally a seaborne nation, err Vikings.  Always had a strong marine force,

Sweden, mostly islands, was a colonizer and exerted most of it‘s presence with a blue water navy.

ROK, stands to reason, the US rebuilt their military and the Marines have always maintained the Right of the Line in the South.

All with the exception of the ROK have a historical link to using their marine type forces to extend the will of their nations as part of a naval presence.


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## riddleofsteel (23 Dec 2002)

My post was poorly worded. I was referring to the modern day and age. While I agree that marine units are largely a continuation of the naval traditions of former colonial powers, the governments in most of those countries are  _not_ the same as they once were. I doubt that we‘ll see such liberal countries as Sweden and the Netherlands exert their will as colonial powers in the future unless there is a radical change in their respective governments. 

I find it hard to accept that Canada, a nation with vast coastlines, lacks this capability. Having a capability does not mean that it must be used, however it does expands the options available to the government.  For example, when we still had the Canadian Airborne Regiment, it didn‘t put us under any obligation to launch airborne invasions at the drop of a hat.  I think Canada could set a good example for the world about the responsible use of modern military resources.  We would have both capability and the moral high ground that Ottawa values so much.


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## ArmyRick (23 Oct 2004)

Hello my brothers in arms. I have been following this web site for the last six months or so. I like reading alot of the thoughts and ideas that are floating around here. Since the CF is in a change right now, I thought I would through this one forward. Does anyone think the Royal Marines Commando 21 Orbat would be a good idea for CF Infantry? (light or Mech)? In a nut shell it consist of a HQ Company, a Logistics coy (similar to our admin coy), 2 close combat coy (very similar to our current dismounted rifle coy) and 2 stand off combat coy (consist of a 50 cal platoon, javelin platoon and a rifle platoon). The RM have really thought outside the box when they generated this orbat. 
The way I look at it, is its two fire base companys and two assault companys.
What's your ideas on this concept, troops?


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## ArmyRick (23 Oct 2004)

Woops I better clarify a few of the acronyms
CCT = Close Combat Troop (AKA a rifle platoon)
HMG = Heavy Machine Gun Troop (50s)
ATK = Anti-Tank Troop (currently milan soon to be javelin)
MOR = Mortar Troop
RAP = Regimental Aid Post (our speak its a UMS)
A Ech = A echelon troop, basically its the first line resupply troop (our CQMS)


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## ArmyRick (23 Oct 2004)

The other point I forgot to add is that the RM are using the Viking (armored BV206) and their new FCLV for support weapons and other combat support roles.
I think a similar orbat and equipment could give our light battalions a real punch and still keep them reasonably light.
Ideas? Thoughts?


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## IPC10 (23 Oct 2004)

I think there was once some discussion at one of the Light Forces Working Groups on the new Cdo orbat.

I think as far as Canada goes, if they actually create the PY to bring the light battalions up to the 'new' orbat that was approved in Oct of 2003 it should increase our combt capabilities.   Or make us much more efficent at handing our Mostovi's....


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## Kirkhill (24 Oct 2004)

I tend to look at the Commando 21 orbat as the following:

1 patrols company with heavy weapons in Landrovers and a ride-along platoon
2 rifle companies (dismounted)
1 heavy company with heavy weapons in armoured and enlarged versions of the Bv206 which includes a ride-along platoon
1 core company which includes HQ and fire support elements (mors, SF GPMGs and ATGMs)
1 logistic company (2 fwd elements and 1 rear element)

I generally like the concept.  Perhaps the Bv206 type vehicle and some of the Landrover roles could be handled by the LAVIII or Coyote and be supplemented by the open top version of the G-Wagen.


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## Fishbone Jones (24 Oct 2004)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> *...and be supplemented by the open top version of the G-Wagen.*



We don't have an open topped version. It wasn't trialed or bought. :'( Unless you mean the version with the hatch?


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## Kirkhill (24 Oct 2004)

No recceguy,  unfortunately I mean the one we didn't buy.   The one that I think would be a useful asset.   The G-wagen as purchased looks more like a staff car to me than an F-echelon vehicle.


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## rounder (31 Oct 2004)

> Recently, I've been thinking of going into the infantry.. Many reasons really, for one I would love getting paid to train to be fit and be fit itself




    Looks to me to be quite similar, in practice, as a current inf BG. I like this idea because it seems to look self sufficient.


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2004)

I salute this idea for "being out of the box"


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## ArmyRick (11 Dec 2004)

I was reading Tom Clancey's book "Marine" and I regularly snoop around on the royal marine web site. I came to a very valid question "Why don't we have a marine corps?"
We are a three ocean navy, lots of coast line.
We have been out of the heavy mechanized businees for a while (114 Leo only add up to one regiment +)
We are constantly being fast balled into new theaters of operation.
So maybe we should come up with a expiditionary battle group plan. Of course we would need new ships to support said force.
We could convert the provider or protecteur, couldn't we?
Lets face it, the Herc is not at the top of the replacement list (it should be). 
Lets hear soem ideas drom the gang here.
I have worked with USMC down at Camp lejeune in co-operative osprey '96 while I was in 2VP and it was really interesting to see how an amphibous organization some what works.
Thoughts on this? ideas? Comments? Anybody think I am right out of 'er? or just drunk?


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## RCnapalm (11 Dec 2004)

Although I would like Canada to have Marines, I think we should concentrate on other things first.
For the Army, get a better amoured force; IE not LAV's with 105's on top of them (mobile gun system)
For the navy, get what every other self-respecting country has; some sort of aircraft carrying ship; IE Aircraft carrier, or amphibious Assault
For the RCAF, give our most well known airborne performers, the snowbirds, something other then 1960's relics
I conclusion, though it would be nice to have marines, we should lay the basics down first.


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## Infanteer (11 Dec 2004)

I've argued for "expeditionary forces" to fulfill the roles performed by organizations like the USMC and the RM; it is a matter of doctrine and equipment rather then making up a new branch (naval infantry).

RCnapalm, other then buy new tanks, aircraft carriers, and demonstration teams, are you going to provide anything substantive to talk about, or are you just going to give us empty rhetoric (backed up by an empty profile).


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## Boydfish (12 Dec 2004)

I hate to point this out, but all of your Canadian-centric history education is showing very badly.

In 1859, British Columbia had a tense stand-off with the US over the US faulty interpretation of the Oregon treaty.  When the British Columbian Governor General sent forces to face down the US Army, the 61 troops that arrived on the island in question were Royal Marines from Esquimalt.

Granted, BC wasn't part of the confederation until annexation in 1871.  It may be backhanded and something that Canadians try to ignore, but the Royal Marines actions ensured that British Columbia was protected from US expansion.  At the very least, the arguement of "We have no historical connection to them" may be valid for Canada, but not for British Columbia!

Setting aside the distant historical arguements, the reason that we don't have a Royal Marine Commando is because...the CF is modelled on the USMC.  One of Hellyer's prime models for unification was the USMC.  This sort of led to two factors:  First, we don't need marines because the entire CF is supposed to be marines anyway.  Second, part of USMC organizational doctrine is to avoid, to the point of taboo, "elite" forces within the USMC.  The USMC doesn't have a SEAL/Delta/Pararescue equivilant force, instead using other infantry specialists as required.  That's a big driving concept for the MEU(SOC) concept:  It's "Special Operations Capable" aspect means that they train thier assault forces to tackle the SF missions that the Army Green Berets or Rangers/Delta are tasked with by the US Army.  

I suspect that this template thinking also kept the Canadians away from developing thier own "Special Forces" until relatively recently.  Even the manner in which the CAR was organized in concept, where troops would rotate to serve with the regiment for a few years, then rotate back to thier parent regiments, seems to be aimed at trying to prevent forming an "elite" formation.

For the here and now, I'd suspect that a Royal Marine Commando formation might not be a bad idea, especially based on the direction that the CF has been heading.  The Boarding Party tasking is a traditional Marine operation, in fact, is the _original_ Marine tasking.  If the boarding party role is expanded and developed further, creating a specific trade and calling them "Royal Marines" might not be a bad idea.  I'd avoid trying to develop a full-on, kick in the door, back-up Army, however.


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## ArmyRick (12 Dec 2004)

Reference the BC royal marine connection, cool ! I never knew...
RCnapalm, stand by your locker and prepare for the good sergeant to lay into you..
(1) We really should focus on trying to develop a more expiditionary forces (look at the East Timor Canada getting a ride with australia biz)
(2) If we do get amphibious assault ships then not having expiditionary forces to use with them is a moot point..(Like buying a condom when you are not going to be getting any..)
(3) One of the aims of the CF unification in hellyers time was for operational jointness (we have failed miserably), a CF marines or marine style battle groups (That would actually perform sea lift and insertion exercises every year) would be a benefit to the CF (they could be the first ones into new theaters when our bosses in Ottawa say Go) and it would benefit Canada's reputation as a nation.
(4) Snow birds are a show organization (Ultimately a PR trick) replacing their birds at the top of the list? This affects operations how? by the way, RIP Captain Selby..
(5) The CF now has a TAT (theater Activation team) based out of kingston..This IMO is a wasteful idea for the simple fact they should have combat arms with extra engineering and signals assets do the mission set ups...
(6) Concentrate on the basics? This IMO is more important to have than trying build large mechanized brigades when we don't have any where near the dollars or the resources for such organizations.


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## luck881 (13 Dec 2004)

Pugil,
I'm sorry but I take exception to your comment about 3VP in Kandahar: We sent a battalion group as part of a US led coalition brigade, not an independent Canadian formation.   It was that brigade's job to provide transport for its soldiers because aviation is a brigade/division responsibility, hence Chinooks flying our guy's around.   If, for some reason we had sent 408 Sqn, or all of 1 Wing for that matter they would more often than not have ended-up moving American soldiers   because they made up the majority of the brigade.   Besides, it doesn't seem the US Army had much of a problem giving us a lift anyway.   Strategic lift, on the other hand... needs some work.   

Back to topic, while I think we have the right idea in modeling our forces on the marine type organisation (everyone a rifleman first), but I don't think anyone can argue that it's actually worked out that way.   Sorry for the rant, it's late...


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## ArmyRick (28 Jan 2005)

good point


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## Sea-dog (31 Jan 2005)

I am South African ,currently living in Israel. It is important for everyone participating on this site to know that it is very difficult for governments to create new forces within a existing defence force during peacetime.
There are always those members of the government that use cost of upkeep ,higher taxes to intimidate the public and so they justify keeping the defence force small and often ill - equipped.
Canada has now the chance to take a serious look at all the forces within the defence force,and by learning from other countries that years ago had to make some very difficult decisions and learned to live with higher taxes in order to ensure security and freedom for all its people.

In view of post 9/11 and the end of the cold war it is very important for your government to take this opportunity and to draw from the mistakes and experience gained by South Africa and Israel to re-evaluate the structure of the Canadian Defence forces.
The threat will dictate the kind of forces required to achieve security.The accurate assessment of this threat ,the creation and training of those forces to combat specific threats will ultimately guarantee security for all in Canada.
The Israeli defence force is lean and mean,but we have learned the lesson years ago,.......security and freedom is not cheap !

THE FAILURE IN PEACE TIME,.......CREATE DISASTER IN WAR ! The lack of imagination and fore-sight will be measured with blood on the streets of Canada.
Train the way you expect to fight .Creating new force is only the beginning as we have learned the hard way.Forces have to be flexible,and training constantly adjusted to suite the conditions on the battle field.
Constant real-time evaluation is essential to training and creating an effective security system.


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## ArmyRick (31 Jan 2005)

Very interesting post, sea dog. I look forward to more comments from you in the near future. Cheers.


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## Bo (31 Jan 2005)

No offense Sea Dog, but I think it's fair to say that security in Canada is already guaranteed. I doubt an increase in military spending will make us significantly safer (from what threat, I don't know). Though I would like to see an increase so that we can make OTHERS safer (peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, etc.)

Israel has a formidable military. You're right, it doesn't come cheap. But then again, we don't have the US giving us F-16's, Apaches, and 3 billion dollars a year


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## ArmyRick (31 Jan 2005)

I disagree. People who think we should do nothing but peace keeping and humanitarian aid are probably speaking from no expirience.

Bo, what is your military expirience? Your profile is a little empty?

Sea Dog, once again well said.


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## Bo (31 Jan 2005)

ArmyRick,

You are correct in assuming I have no military experience. I am somewhat of a pacifist and only support offensive military action only when it is deemed absolutely necessary.

I suppose then, that it is ironic that I am currently in the process of applying for a pilot position in the CF. Perhaps my views will change during Basic Training.


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## Cloud Cover (31 Jan 2005)

Sea-dog said:
			
		

> THE FAILURE IN PEACE TIME,.......CREATE DISASTER IN WAR ! The lack of imagination and fore-sight will be measured with blood on the streets of Canada.



While nobody here would seriously disagree with your comments, [and BTW, we've had more than our share of disasters in war], the last part of your sentence has me wondering if you are privy to some facts we are not aware of, unless of course you are alluding to the real possibility we might be attacked because we are perceived to be an easy target.


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## JBP (31 Jan 2005)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This post is to clarify some incorrect information in the previous posts first off...

A Nimitz (Super carrier) class USS Aircraft carrier can hold about 90 functional aircraft, has a crew of about 3,000.*[WRONG]*NOT the equivalent of the entire Canadian Land Force (roughly 50,000+).*[WRONG]* We currently have about 65+ functional CF-18 fighters.So yes, 1 aircraft carrier has more aircraft then our entire airforce.*[WRONG]* The CF-18 is NOT state of the art by any means, we don't even have the "D" variant which the US is replacing with F-18E/F Superhornet variants. They are 2-3 times farther in generations of this 1 type of aircraft then we are.The computers in our CF-18's literally have as much computing power as commador 64's (back in the 80's).*[ARE YOU AN AVTECH NOW?]* Thier new upgrade program will see to it their about the equivalent of the american F-18D Hornet. Modern, not advanced even.

Our aircraft DO have air-to-ground capability and even the ability to use "smart" bombs (lazer guided munitions) when the aircraft is equipped with the correct hardware (an underwing electronic pod with lazer eye etc)...

As for our navy being self-sufficient, I suppose for the most part it is. If you count the only thing we can move to any part of the world and not suffer casualties is our frigates, the smallest class of warship afloat... Ohhh, shiver me timbers...   :*[YOU'RE STARTING TO SHOOT WAY OUT OF YOUR LANE NOW....]*

Let's not get into symantics folks, but to say the least we're not a sight for sore eyes.

ABOUT MARINES:

We don't have them because as someone here mentioned before, they're more of a "shock" troop *[WRONG - DO SOME RESEARCH]* and we don't (not in the last 50yrs) invade other people's countries.*[SEE KFOR, SEE OP APOLLO]* Thier an advanced invasion force, usually the first ones to hit the beach. 1 Amphibous assault carrier of the USA carries 2000 marines, with armour support, 4 Harrier fighters*[WRONG]* (eventually to be the Joint Strike Fighter (VSTOL multi-role advanced combat fighter) and 16 helicopters, 4 of which are Cobra attack helicopters. In other words, that would be the type of "transport" carrier that Mr. Harper is speaking about???...

Expensive you think? YES! Would it kickass to have something like that? YES! Do we need an assault carrier... Debatable since it can be used for exactly what we need, rapid reaction force and support of NATO ops... Can we afford it?!?!?!?!? .. .... Hell no! A small aircraft carrier like that would cost approx... about $3.5 billion each..

And that doesn't even count the aircraft or amphibious assault craft.. Yeah, exactly. No chance.

So folks, hope that helps to clear things up abit. *[CLEARING WHAT UP?]*

Joe
Ruck on!


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## Ex-Dragoon (31 Jan 2005)

Pte (R) Joe said:
			
		

> Ladies and Gentlemen,
> 
> This post is to clarify some incorrect information in the previous posts first off...


Funny thing is your post is so full of inaccurate information I was amazed you had the gall to post.



> A Nimitz (Super carrier) class USS Aircraft carrier can hold about 90 functional aircraft


A Nimitz class CVN embarks what is referred to as TACAIR Wing which consists of up to 20 F14D Tomcats (now being withdrawn from service); 36 F18E Super Hornets; 4 EA6B Prowlers; 4 E2C Hawkeyes; 6 S3B Vikings; 2 ES3A Shadows; 4 SH60F Seahawks; 2 HH60 F Seahawks. 80 aircraft according to my math and they tend not alter their air groups.
[quote} has a crew of about 3,000. NOT the equivalent of the entire Canadian Land Force (roughly 50,000+)Thats the entire CF not the Land element of the CF.


> We currently have about 65+ functional CF-18 fighters. So yes, 1 aircraft carrier has more aircraft then our entire airforce.


Hmm the last I checked our Air Force was more then CF18s. What about the Hercs, the Airbus'. the Griffons, the SeaKings, the Aurora's, the Buffalo's, the Cormorants???etc etc



> As for our navy being self-sufficient, I suppose for the most part it is. If you count the only thing we can move to any part of the world and not suffer casualties is our frigates, the smallest class of warship afloat... Ohhh, shiver me timbers...   :


Last I checked the 280s could deploy, as could the AORs and even the MCDVs have crossed the Atlantic to participate on exercises. get your facts straight please. Considering how the Chitcoutimi is still under investigation unless you know otherwise keep your comments to yourself and show some respect. It still is a raw sore down here for people that knew Chris.
Frigates are the smallest class of warship are they? Well gee thats news to me, ever here of a corvette or an OPV? Guess not. BTW our CPFs are bigger then some countries destroyers. Again please do some research.



> ABOUT MARINES:
> 
> We don't have them because as someone here mentioned before, they're more of a "shock" troop and we don't (not in the last 50yrs) invade other people's countries. Thier an advanced invasion force, usually the first ones to hit the beach. 1 Amphibous assault carrier of the USA carries 2000 marines, with armour support, 4 Harrier fighters (eventually to be the Joint Strike Fighter (VSTOL multi-role advanced combat fighter) and 16 helicopters, 4 of which are Cobra attack helicopters. In other words, that would be the type of "transport" carrier that Mr. Harper is speaking about???...


Which class of were you talking about? I find no matching amphib with your described aviation assets.


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## aesop081 (31 Jan 2005)

Joe,

   Either that or you have been reading books on the US military written by al-jazeera again.

US CVNs (thats nuclear powered aircraft carriers) have a crew of between 5000 and 6000;

US navy's LHA and LHD anphibs carry a marine battalion of around 800 troops.....not 2000;

You know jack sh** about the canadian navy;

LHA and LHD do not cost $3.5 billion dollars.....they are comparatively cheap since a brand new Nimitz class CVN costs around $4 billion USD;

Are you even aware of the differences between models of the F/A-18 ?


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## Sea-dog (1 Feb 2005)

To: ArmyRick & Whiskey601

Hi Guys, I find it very sad that some of the members have time to bicker and split hairs about things that really does not apply to your security and safety.

Prevention is always better than cure. Know your enemy,......but most of all know your own weaknesses !
This little but very important fact we in South Africa and Israel learned the hard way.
Without looking for any possible threat,you like the US pre 9/11 would not have the foresight to either take preventative action or make timely adjustments to you defence and security systems to combat specific threats.

This, as one member suggested ,does NOT necessary mean spending more money,to the contrary it might save you a tremendous amount of money cleaning up the mess, but most of all......it might save LIVES !!
Re-structuring your Defence Force and adjusting the focus of your training to meet the new threats
 based on good intelligence and knowledge gained by learning from other countries and tapping their hard earned experience.
Do not be restricted,by rules of democracies,the enemy has no rules.I sincerely hope and pray that Canada will never have to face the heardships we face day by day here in the Middle East.
Always remember : " It is always better to be SAFE,......than SORRY !


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Funny thing is your post is so full of inaccurate information I was amazed you had the gall to post.



You can say that again, one pass through with the magic-marker and I was able to find the obvious stuff.

Mr Recruit Joe, you've been around here long enough to know better then to post up stuff like this.  Stay in you lane.



			
				Sea-dog said:
			
		

> Hi Guys, I find it very sad that some of the members have time to bicker and split hairs about things that really does not apply to your security and safety.



We have a standard to maintain here; otherwise this place would quickly succumb to the hyenas....

Other then that, welcome to Army.ca.


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## Sea-dog (1 Feb 2005)

Hi there Infanteer ,
                          I surf on a lot of military sights,never lower yourself to the level of others.Just report matters to your web-master and let him take the required action.
It has been my experience that by not answering you deny the person the luxury of arguing.

Thank you for your kind words of welcome, I feel very at home already ! Most of the members are serious,polite and the discussions focused.
There will always be some serious real soldiers outhere with whom to talk,do not wast your time trying to convince a small group they are wrong.
I have 13 years military experience and you are welcome to chat with me any time


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## Ex-Dragoon (1 Feb 2005)

Our problem Sea Dog is when others read their posts they might consider that information to be correct so when we see posts like this we hit them and hit them hard. As well welcome to the Board.


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## JBP (1 Feb 2005)

I'm so out of whack then check the FACTS out here: The USN Fact File, that's where I attained my info. Although lastnight I hadn't specifically went to the website and checked my responses over, they were fairly accurate. 

Here's the link: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ffiletop.htmlNavy Fact File

The assault carriers (amphib assault) do carry and air detatchment similar to what I mentioned above. WASP class carrier and they DO carry 1800+ marines, as posted on thier website and thier Nimitz class carriers do carry an assortment of aircraft like what someone mentioned earlier. Regardless the # of aircraft listed for Nimitz class carriers is 85, I said 90, you said 80, fair enough. The Nimitz class carriers also cost 4.5Billion each as per the webpage. It doesn't list the cost of the WASP class amphibious assault carriers though... Not sure how much they'd be... 2 Billion?   ???

Folks, check the area on "Surface Ships"...   :

Reason I didn't list our other aircraft is because they cannot shoot down other aircraft, I was speaking specifically about fighters. And yes, they are retiring the F-14D Supertomcats and filling the roles all with F/A-18E/F Superhornet variants! I do know the difference between some CF-18+F/A-18 variants. The F/A-18E/F (New ones) have greater payload (more hardpoints), a higher top speed, longer combat radius and the most advanced avionics possible for thier rollout date.

So according to the United States Navy's FACT sheet, most of what I quoted was correct. I was wrong about the # of people aboard an aircraft carrier though, it is about 5000.   :-X , STILL doesn't equal to our entire Combat Arms. A good portion of it of course but not all of it as someone mentioned before.

Sorry for stirring up all you Navy+Airforce types feathers+gills....   

It's safe to say that with symantics aside, if we had anything with the potential of being an assault carrier, even a small one that could only carry 800-1000 troops with helicopter support. The USA would jump all over us to use it because carrier battle groups or, CBG's are VERY VERY expensive to operate obviously and even though we might not make that big of a difference in combat terms, we'd make a big difference in thier monthly budget!


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## Island Ryhno (1 Feb 2005)

Here is an Idea, how about instead of Marines we lean towards a Ranger type military, incorporating all combat arms forces into spec ops type brigades. Then we could use the Navy and Air Force for the sole purpose of supporting missions. This is just speculation but most of the combat operations for the past 20 years or so have not had anything to do with a seaborn landing, (grenada or panama??) I guess what I'm trying to say is, if you strip down alot of extras in our forces and had an integrated elite combat arms team, with the navy providing only transport and protection force, and the air force providing only transport and protection (all updated of course) Do we need Subs? Do we need outdated CF-18's? The ridicoulous amount of money spend on those subs alone could have made a huge difference to our ground forces. Maybe I will draw the ire of Air force and Navy ppl but realistically what are we doing with those subs. I'm not sure any terrorist orgs have subs. I'd like to see the multipurpose roll combat arms become reality. Just a rant


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## aesop081 (1 Feb 2005)

Island Ryhno said:
			
		

> Here is an Idea, how about instead of Marines we lean towards a Ranger type military, incorporating all combat arms forces into spec ops type brigades. Then we could use the Navy and Air Force for the sole purpose of supporting missions. This is just speculation but most of the combat operations for the past 20 years or so have not had anything to do with a seaborn landing, (grenada or panama??) I guess what I'm trying to say is, if you strip down alot of extras in our forces and had an integrated elite combat arms team, with the navy providing only transport and protection force, and the air force providing only transport and protection (all updated of course) Do we need Subs? Do we need outdated CF-18's? The ridicoulous amount of money spend on those subs alone could have made a huge difference to our ground forces. Maybe I will draw the ire of Air force and Navy ppl but realistically what are we doing with those subs. I'm not sure any terrorist orgs have subs. I'd like to see the multipurpose roll combat arms become reality. Just a rant



I do agree with you that marines are not required.  I do agree with you as well that we are sinking money into our current subs.  But , IMHO, terorism is not the only thing we have to consider when it comes to defense. Do we need outdated CF-18s ? Until we get new fighters the answer is yes.  We need to be able to control our airspace.  If we let the US do it ( as some on this site have suggested) we lose the ability to dictate what goes on in it.  Do we need subs? Once again the answer is yes. We needed subs capable of patroling our arctic waters because others are using them without our permission and they provide training for our ASW forces. Don't get me wrong, i'm not shooting .50 cal in your direction but i beleive that there is more than terorism going on.....to me there is a need to maintain sovereignty.  As well, i do not buy into this "niche role military" idea.


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## Inch (1 Feb 2005)

Island Ryhno said:
			
		

> Maybe I will draw the ire of Air force and Navy ppl but realistically what are we doing with those subs. I'm not sure any terrorist orgs have subs.



Oh what a happy place you live in. OPSEC forbids me from telling you exactly who has subs, but believe me when I tell you, you'd be in for a shock if you found out who has them. There are lots of them out there and they're not all upstanding citizens of the human race that have them. Terrorists are the latest threat, who's to say that won't change the day we get rid of our ASW capabilities? The world is a dynamic place and just because there's no threat today, tomorrow or even the day after, that doesn't mean we should start shedding capabilities to save money because it will come back and bite us.

The best way to kill a sub is with another sub, the second best way is an Anti-Submarine helicopter.

Whether or not we see the effects of submarines everyday should have no bearing on whether or not we should get rid of the capability. Stop for a minute and think, maybe the reason there hasn't been any sub attacks or incidents is because of the ASW assets that we have. That's like saying, well there hasn't been any murders in the past year in Thunder Bay, so why do we still need cops? The point is that ASW assets are a deterant to any aggressive postures that potential enemies (both surface and subsurface) may take.


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## Horse_Soldier (1 Feb 2005)

Island Ryhno said:
			
		

> Maybe I will draw the ire of Air force and Navy ppl but realistically what are we doing with those subs. I'm not sure any terrorist orgs have subs.


Terrorist orgs may or may not have subs - but countries that support terrorists, or whose military is sympathetic to them do... Iran and Pakistan come to mind immediately.  Plus there is that large number of surplus Russian subs sitting in places like Murmansk...  So it is hardly beyond the realm of the conceivable that terrorist orgs might acquire or borrow a sub to, say, sink a cruise ship or three or depending on the ordnance they get, send a few missiles hurtling towards targets we'd rather they don't hit.


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## Island Ryhno (1 Feb 2005)

I wasn't suggesting that we save money, I was suggesting that we redirect money into the Army more than the other branches. And perhaps I do live in a magical world BUT let's just imagine for a minute that someone does decide to attack us with subs, do we have enough power to stop any of the major powers in the world with our Navy. I understand the complexities of the world, I wasn't trying to imply that we only have to worry about terrorists, that is our major concern right now. If China were to come knocking on the door with subs could we stop them, I don't know, I'm not in the Navy or have access to that info, my guess is no. The point of my post is that we are an army based force, we do Peace Keeping or Security force missions with our armies, not our subs or cf 18's. I think that if we are going to have those things they should be up to date. Is there a viable reason to have subs ? perhaps but at their cost we could have some pretty impressive upgrades in our current forces.


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## JBP (1 Feb 2005)

We may not need Marines but we sure as hell do need CF-18's and submarines regardless... 

Nations like Finland and Iceland etc... Have been disputing Artic territories with us for years, also, with the melting of the artic region there is a very large (possible) traversable route. We need to maintain soverignty (sp?) in this area to ensure only allies/allowed groups are traversing our coasts and waterways. 

As Inch said, more countries have subs than we'd probably even be happy to know. I bet there has been submarines all up and down our coasts at one time or another, just to see if they can. Maybe not with the USA defending the coasts with thier sub fleets etc. I'm not knowledgeable in the maritime partol area of things... 

Regardless, we need subs and destroyers+frigates+fighters. Not just land forces or JUST surface ships.. We need everything we've got and more of it...


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## Inch (1 Feb 2005)

Island Ryhno said:
			
		

> If China were to come knocking on the door with subs could we stop them, I don't know, I'm not in the Navy or have access to that info, my guess is no.



There is an entire thread on Submarines in the Navy/Joint forum, so my apologies for the hijack of this thread.

A submarine war isn't fought 100m apart in formed ranks. All you need is one sub in the area and it'll change all your plans with respect to traversing and operating in said area. If you don't know where it is, it can be anywhere and everywhere.

Have a read of this and if you've got anymore questions relating to Subs and their capabilities, feel free to ask.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/23673.0.html


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## Danjanou (1 Feb 2005)

As far as I know this is not violating OPSEC as it happened 10 years ago, but you'd be surprised who has subs. Ten years ago I was down in Colombia. My last day there the front page on the local papers was a picture of an old Soviet diesel sub ( can't remember the class) that was being used by the cartels to smuggle drugs and that the Colombian navy had captured.

Now from what I've seen of it and any of the Navy types can contradict me, the Colombian Navy is not really that good. The Atlantic/Caribbean squadron I saw based in Cartagena was mostly a collection of WWII era US destroyers, landing craft and smaller vessels. (Their Marine Infantry though are first rate IMO). It begs the question that if they caught one, how many more were/are the cartels running?

Good working subs are an important part of our overall defence package.

BTW I find it ironic there Island Ryhno that with your capbadge you would be so against marines and naval ops. The RNFLDR are the closest this country has ever had to a Naval Infantry/Marine type unit. I would suggest that you study a little Regimental History prior to releasing the safety and shooting from the hip.


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## Kirkhill (1 Feb 2005)

There is another aspect to this debate.   While the Marines have come to be Amphibious Assault specialists and thus are known for charging up beaches, traditionally Marines were security detachments on ships, conducting small raids and boardings in.   This doesn't require a vast amount of specialized kit.

But more to the point is the discussion about "Sea-Basing".   This is not Amphibious Assault.   This means keeping your comms, logistic support and rest and recuperation area at sea.   The Americans used the Carrier Kitty Hawk as a base for their SOF types in Afghanistan, the Brits used one of their Invincibles along with Ocean for a similar task.   In a small way Canada did something similar in Somalia with the AOR out there.

The difference in requirements between Amphibious Assault and Sea-Basing is considerable.   The Americans are considering basically using standard freighters with a flat deck on top as one option.

Canada could go along way to meeting a Sea-Basing requirement with a mix of Multi-Role Vessels of the type New Zealand is buying (8000 tonnes, ~60 crew, 285 passengers, helo deck, boat launch facility, ice-strengthened, 90 MCAD a copy),   Bay Class / Enforcer Class LSDs of the type operated by Brits, Dutch and Spanish (16,000 tonnes, 60-120 crew, up to 400 land staff and support personnel, 700 troops, 4 Cormorants, 33 Leopards or 133 LAVs at around 180 MCAD) each and maybe a RoRo or two.

The MRVs would be admirable for Sovereignty work in the Arctic as well as supplying a command platform on foreign ops while the LSDs would serve as equipment transport, hospital, maintenance facillity, recuperation centre, and if necessary a troop transport.    Both would have roles in Humanitarian Crises.    3 MRVs and 2 LSDs would set us back the princely sum of 450 MCAD and would require about 300 crew for the lot.      

If we were to take that out of the JSS project funding of 2.1 MCAD   it would still leave the Navy 1.65 BCAD for its AOR replacement project and about 300-400 regular crew.   Crew numbers might need to be bumped a bit or filled out with Reservists.

But having a Sea-Basing capability for our Regular Army types, to support missions in far-flung places, should not be a budget killer.   And, at the same time we provide a useful Humanitarian Aid capability that can be used at home as well as supplying a Sovereignty Support capability.

And like Inch with the subs, I too don't wish to hijack the thread but there are also threads on the JSS and Amphibious Vessels in the Navy forum.   However in this case Marines/Soldiers need ships to get there.


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## FSTO (1 Feb 2005)

Soldier of Fortune said:
			
		

> Well, maybe it would be better if all we had were Marines. Lets look at the American Marines, they have an army, an air force, and a navy all tied into one. I think it would be perfect if Canada did something like this, and it would be cost effective too. Integrating everything into one service would be alot better. We would also not need as many personel. With the mantality "Every Marine a Rifleman" would also weed out any softies from our forces.


(exuse me if this has been mentioned before)
Okay, I would like to clear up a misconception that is very prevelant in Canada regarding the relationship between the US Navy and USMC. The US Navy owns the USMC, and the USN reports to the Sec of the Navy. The marines are part of the Navy. The Amphibious Assault Carriers such as USS IWO JIMA, BATTAN et all are crewed by USN pers and the Marines are landed by them. The LCAC (air cushioned craft) are crewed by sailors.
If we had marines, they would be owned by the Navy, end of story.


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

FSTO said:
			
		

> (exuse me if this has been mentioned before)
> Okay, I would like to clear up a misconception that is very prevelant in Canada regarding the relationship between the US Navy and USMC. The US Navy owns the USMC, and the USN reports to the Sec of the Navy. The marines are part of the Navy.



Not to be a nit-picker, but doesn't the *Department of the Navy* own both the US Navy and the US Marine Corps?   It may not seem like much, but I think it is because both are independent branches subordinated to the same civilian department (DofN).   So, technically, the US Navy doesn't *own* the Marines, and there are no Admiral's in the C-of-C giving orders to the USMC - the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps are peers.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/organization/org-sec.html



			
				FSTO said:
			
		

> If we had marines, they would be owned by the Navy, end of story.



Well, since we are a unified force, they would technically be owned by the Canadian Forces, wouldn't they?     

I say this because I've often wondered how such a unit would be handled in our unified system.   The Navy would sure have the input for the seamanship and littoral ops, but the Army would be the one to look to on tactical employment.   As well, they are likely to use Army ranks, command structure, and career structure/courses.   Finally, a formed body of troops is likely going to be fed into the Army's readiness rotation to add more boots to the ground.

Sure the Navy will say "we have Marines", but they will really be a part of the Canadian Forces that would most likely fit under the Army organization.   It is up to us to get over our service-based bias and utilize such a force in a joint fashion under unified command (there was some good to Hellyers changes...)

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

Sea-dog said:
			
		

> Hi there Infanteer ,
> I surf on a lot of military sights,never lower yourself to the level of others.Just report matters to your web-master and let him take the required action.
> It has been my experience that by not answering you deny the person the luxury of arguing.



Ex-Dragoon and I, while not being the web-masters, are site administrators acting on his behalf.   We are taking the required action.


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## FSTO (1 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Not to be a nit-picker, but doesn't the *Department of the Navy* own both the US Navy and the US Marine Corps?   It may not seem like much, but I think it is because both are independent branches subordinated to the same civilian department (DofN).   So, technically, the US Navy doesn't *own* the Marines, and there are no Admiral's in the C-of-C giving orders to the USMC - the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps are peers.
> 
> http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/organization/org-sec.html
> 
> ...



As far as I know there has never been a Marine that has been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the CNO does (for naught of a better term) owns the marines


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

Here's the quote from the site I linked to:

_"The Department of the Navy consists of two uniformed Services: the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. "_

As you can see, they are two independent Services of equal standing, both representing by their respective Chiefs on the Joint Chief's of Staff.  The Commandant of the Marine Corps reports to the Secretary of the Navy (and his subordinates), not to the CNO.

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jcs_defn.html

As far as not being a Chairman, I remember hearing that no Marine General has assumed the role of CJCS due to convention.   I see that the evolution of the USMC into an independent Service has been gradual, as the USMC never had a full-time chair on the Joint Chiefs until 1976.   However, now there is no impediment for a Marine not to assume the role of Chairman.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/MRM.htm


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## FSTO (1 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Here's the quote from the site I linked to:
> 
> _"The Department of the Navy consists of two uniformed Services: the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. "_
> 
> ...



Fair enough but I feel it is still wrong for Canadian commontators to talk about a the Marines as if they are a Navy. Also, if we had marines, it would be more reasonable for us to emulate the Royal Marines instead of the USMC.


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

Agreed.


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## Ex-Dragoon (1 Feb 2005)

Pte (R) Joe said:
			
		

> I'm so out of whack then check the FACTS out here: The USN Fact File, that's where I attained my info. Although lastnight I hadn't specifically went to the website and checked my responses over, they were fairly accurate.
> 
> Here's the link: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ffiletop.htmlNavy Fact File
> 
> ...



Sorry Joe I go by the ships I sailed with over the past 11 years so my point still stands. I also showed your response to a USN Commander and I owe him money to dry clean his shirt. If you want accurate info go for _Janes_.


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## aesop081 (1 Feb 2005)

And i see that joe is NOT familiar with the F/A-18 family at all .


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## Island Ryhno (1 Feb 2005)

I believe that you are all taking my post out of context, I'm not saying that we don't need subs or fighter capable jets, I'm saying that the money spend on these aging wonders could be put to better use. Say for example an updated armoured corp! I'm trying to look at large problems, what's the point of having a fleet of CF 18's when we can't get our troops anywhere, couldn't the vast amounts of money being spent on the subs etc just to keep them afloat or flying be spent on say an attack helicopter or 2 really good subs as opposed to 4 mediocre ones. Also no one who replied to my post had anything to say on the Ranger idea, all that was done was an attack on an idea and a stern lecture. I'm not some half assed know it all, I was offering an opinion, and if I needed a lecture well that's what I have a wife for   BTW Danjanou, I'm not anti marine, I did not state that in any of my post's, perhaps your safety is off. I'm very proud of what the RNFLDR is and I agree that we are the closest thing to a marine unit that Canada has, I just don't see the practicality of it, we can't move infantry without hitching a ride, we sure as hell are not going to get new ships for a marine corps. Also, I own original copies of "The Fighting Newfoundlander" and "More Fighting Newfoundlanders" which came from relatives who served in both wars. I don't need a history lesson. I can't argue your experience, just don't talk at me, speak to me. I'm on your side!


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## aesop081 (1 Feb 2005)

Island Ryhno said:
			
		

> I believe that you are all taking my post out of context, I'm not saying that we don't need subs or fighter capable jets, I'm saying that the money spend on these aging wonders could be put to better use. Say for example an updated armoured corp! I'm trying to look at large problems, what's the point of having a fleet of CF 18's when we can't get our troops anywhere, couldn't the vast amounts of money being spent on the subs etc just to keep them afloat or flying be spent on say an attack helicopter or 2 really good subs as opposed to 4 mediocre ones. Also no one who replied to my post had anything to say on the Ranger idea, all that was done was an attack on an idea and a stern lecture. I'm not some half assed know it all, I was offering an opinion, and if I needed a lecture well that's what I have a wife for    BTW Danjanou, I'm not anti marine, I did not state that in any of my post's, perhaps your safety is off. I'm very proud of what the RNFLDR is and I agree that we are the closest thing to a marine unit that Canada has, I just don't see the practicality of it, we can't move infantry without hitching a ride, we sure as hell are not going to get new ships for a marine corps. Also, I own original copies of "The Fighting Newfoundlander" and "More Fighting Newfoundlanders" which came from relatives who served in both wars. I don't need a history lesson. I can't argue your experience, just don't talk at me, speak to me. I'm on your side!



Yes the money spent on CF-18s could be spent elsewhere but it needs to be spent on CF-18s because they are what we have and we MUST maintain the capability to control our own airspace.  You cannot control airspace with tanks or attack hellicopters. Yes we couls have better subs......we have to have more than 2 for it to work so the gov purchassed what it beleive it could afford ( right or wrong).  You cannot control sea aproaches with tanks or attack hellicopters.  So spending the money on the army is not "spending it on better uses".  You seem to think in a single dimension. Terrorism, as i have said before along with others , is not the only game in town. Would you say that the money spent upgarding the CP-140 aurora is money that could be better spent on new APCs ? You are presumably aware that there are other roles the military has to fullfill

BTW...i like the ranger concept......


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## JBP (1 Feb 2005)

> Sorry Joe I go by the directly from the USN itself. It's thier end-all be all "Fact File" web resource so what is incorrect in that? Janes would have probably the same info. This is just info directly from the source. Maybe that USN Commander should be dry-cleaning your shirt my friend!
> 
> As for me not knowing anything about F-18 variants, mentioned by aesop081, what did I incorrectly mention since that's exactly what I've read from my Janes All the Worlds Aircraft book+Navy Fact file?...
> 
> ...



Well, not my fault your information is out-dated and you got suckered by a USN Commander...  
I got this info


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## Ex-Dragoon (1 Feb 2005)

Joe you really don't have a clue do you? I work with this information every day, but I see you are the type of kid that has to be right all the time so there is no point arguing with you any further.



> Nations like Finland and Iceland etc... Have been disputing Artic territories with us for years


Please show me proof that we are in dispute with Finland. last I checked their only water border was with the Baltic Sea not the Arctic Ocean. The other 3 sides are taken up by Sweden, Norway and Russia. Nice try though.

I never got suckered by the Commander, I am not sure where you got that idea he spilled a drink all over his shirt from laughing at you "no clue" post. His words not mine.


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## George Wallace (1 Feb 2005)

The following Warning should be applied to all books dealing in such matters:

*Information contained in this publication MAY BE  current as of the time it was put to paper; It is to be considered OUTDATED once it has been put to print.*

GW


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## aesop081 (1 Feb 2005)

Joe...i see you can't even be bothered to read your own references........like i said, you have no clue !

But thats OK.....Ex-D and myself don't have to work daily with this kind of information....


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## Island Ryhno (1 Feb 2005)

Hey Aesop, I understand that we do have other roles and obligations. However this is a fantasy post, and as it is a fantasy post, I'd like to say that I'm going to win as CDS Hillier is on my side and there will be no more Navy or Airforce, unless you're moving something belonging to the Army...LOL  ;D A marine corps would be fun though, maybe I'd get an opportunity at a para course then  :'(


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## Infanteer (1 Feb 2005)

Joe, take your complaints/defence/vindication to the PM.   You talked out of your lane and got nailed for it - take you lumps and revert to observer status.

Unless there is any more discussion of Marines, this one seems to be coming to an end.

Back on topic, anyone?


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## Ex-Dragoon (1 Feb 2005)

The following links illustrate the comparison in aviation assets for the _Wasp_, _Tarawa_ and now decommissioned_ Iwo Jima _ classes:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lhd-1.htm(wasp)
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lha-1.htm (tar)
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lph-2.htm (ij)


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## aesop081 (1 Feb 2005)

I think a canadianized marine corps is beyond the reach of the CF.   I don't think we will ever be able to muster the resources needed to create and maintain it.   We can just as well develop an better expeditionary concept/capability for the army we already have. Sea-basing is more likely in the canadian context.   I do not forsee any need for the CF to make "forced-entry ops" onto foreign shores any time soon.

Island ryhno:

CDS Hillier asside, the world will not revolve around the army, fantasy or not.   Sovereignty demands it.   Unless we start painting auroras green to do fish pat !

EDIT : Damn you Ex-D....you beat me to it !!   :threat:


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## Island Ryhno (1 Feb 2005)

LMAO Aesop, agreed  ;D


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## Danjanou (1 Feb 2005)

ExD 

Curious were all those Iwo Jima class scrapped or just mothballed and if the later would one or two fill the need we've been talking about here and elsewhere of a dedicated troop transport/support ship for future ops (including DART style humanitarian ones)?

Presuming we're not a bit gun shy as to "buying used" from our allies again.

I remember one coming into Vancouver years back and getting a tour. Impressed this (then) young infantry type.

Rhyno PM heading your way.


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## Ex-Dragoon (1 Feb 2005)

Dan from what I remember only the _USS Iwo Jima _ was scrapped the rest are in mothballs waiting for disposal.

EDIT:
did some more research and this is the status of the Iwo Jima class.
*LPH 2   Iwo Jima        * 14 July 1993    Sold 18 Dec 1995 for scrap 25 Sept 1993    
*LPH 3   Okinawa         * 17 Dec 1992$   	Sunk as a target 5 June 2002
*LPH 7   Guadalcanal     * 31 Aug 1994$  	To MarAd 16 Mar 2001
*LPH 9   Guam*	25 Aug 1998	Stricken 11/98 retroactive to 25 Aug 98  	11/98		Sunk as a target 16 Oct 2001
*LPH 10  Tripoli         * 8 Sept 1995     Leased to US Army 26 June 1997
			15 Sept 1995	
*LPH 11	New Orleans*	1 Oct 1997	Held for donation, Suisun Bay
			23 Oct 1998
*MCS 12	Inchon*		28 Feb 2002	Pending disposal, Philadelphia			20 June 2002


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## Ex-Dragoon (2 Feb 2005)

A thought hit me and I was wondering if the more senior types could shed some light on this. IF (unlikely) Canada was to form some sort of Naval Infantry unit would it be more likely a new fresh unit or a unit that had their Colours laid up and made zero strength?


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## George Wallace (2 Feb 2005)

I suppose to do so we should get some JSS to move them around in.   What strength would you want the force to be?   Bn strength per JSS?     Make three JSS and take a Bn out of each Bde?   

Would we be smart to also create a Regt like the RAF Regt in the future, to deploy and defend forward Airfields?

GW


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## Ex-Dragoon (2 Feb 2005)

I figure a 4 Bn Regiment with the prerequisite support and headquarters elements. With 4 Bn you could have 2 ready to go or deployed, 1 Bn that is on reduced readiness and another working up for deployment.


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## Infanteer (2 Feb 2005)

Whould you split up your 4 battalions between the East and West Coast (perhaps centralizing Fleet assets) or consolidate on one (can we afford to not put all our eggs in one basket)?   What is the transit time for big ships through the Panama Canal if something should FUBAR on the wrong ocean?


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## Meridian (2 Feb 2005)

Not to burst anyone's pipe dream... but... where would the political capital for this come from?

I agree with AESOP that CDS Hillier will try to make the army front and centre, but in reality, you have to understand what Canadians in general expect from their military.

Right now, a specialized force of amphibious mounted troops is a bit much to hope for. I honestly will admit I do not know much about the topic, but coming from every-day-schmoe outlook here, if i heard that we were going to be spending X dollars creating yet another service [BRANCH, sorry] when the current three are already screaming for increased funds just to sustain what they have.....


Also, would a useful marine force   not also require a *more* useful navy?


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## FSTO (2 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Whould you split up your 4 battalions between the East and West Coast (perhaps centralizing Fleet assets) or consolidate on one (can we afford to not put all our eggs in one basket)?   What is the transit time for big ships through the Panama Canal if something should FUBAR on the wrong ocean?



The best of my knowledge for transit time is a minimum of 3 weeks at sea.

You also have to realize that with only 3 ships, you will have to take into account Work periods and refits so that at any one time up to 2 ships may be unavailable. That is why we need 4 ships min.

Now wait a sec while I secure my chin strap.

This Joint Support Ship is *DUMB, DUMB, DUMB, DUMB*!

Who is going to own this ship? The Army? DCDS? Joint Force HQ? The Frickn UN? Certainly won't be the Navy.
When the ship is on RIMPAC doing RAS will it have to run back to Esquimalt then Vancouver to load up equipment driving from Edmonton.
There are so many conflicting users of this asset that it will take a whole command to be able to schedule its itinerary.
Then there is training to run this thing, embarking the equipment and then getting it ashore. Christ we haven't done this since Normandy.

If we insist on having this capability then lets do it right.
The Navy needs new AORs. Then lets get them- 20,000 tons and HIGHLY automated (maybe even civilian crews?) 4 min.
The Army needs heavy lift, we are not (in the forseable future) going to be forcing ourselves ashore so we buy 4 Ro Ros? or
We decide that Canada we return to her place as the becon of all things good and mulitcultural (sarcasm) and we will defend human rights around the world, soooooo.
We get 2 or 3 Ocean Class LHD's and train the Navy, Army and Airforce in Amphibious ops. The Airforce gets Chinooks, Apache's and Harriers (until the JSF comes on line), the Navy gets some real landing craft and the Army gets a light and leathal.

Will that happen? 

Nope.


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## Infanteer (2 Feb 2005)

I agree with you FSTO, especially on the "one-size, fits all" JSS.

However, we can continue to plug away at ideas with our monopoly money....


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## Ex-Dragoon (2 Feb 2005)

I guess you never saw the *IF* in my post there Meridian.


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## Meridian (2 Feb 2005)

Ex-D,

I was referring to the whole thread, not you specifically


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## Sea-dog (4 Feb 2005)

whiskey 601 said:
			
		

> While nobody here would seriously disagree with your comments, [and BTW, we've had more than our share of disasters in war], the last part of your sentence has me wondering if you are privy to some facts we are not aware of, unless of course you are alluding to the real possibility we might be attacked because we are perceived to be an easy target.



Hi whiskey 601,
                  Looking at the map of Canada,and reading some of the comments on this forum,yes I am sure that you are a easy target.
The Canadian Government's policies to immigration,your "soft approach" has opened the door to who knows who.
While you guys are spending hours discussing and speculating about the pros and cons between different units ,I still have to see anyone mention or identifying some sort of threat.
With out a threat there can be no formula for the consolidation or reconstruction of your Armed Services.
Taking in to account the above, it is there fore needless to even try and establish the kind of weapons needed to arm these forces.

The topography of the land(Canada)makes it a security nightmare ! We here in Israel, woke up one morning ,rocked by a terrorist attack in the middle of one of our main cities.They left as they came without a trace,even in the face of the our exceptional security network.
It dawned on us that a new era has arrived,the terrorist organisations are now even using hired guns " foreign mercenaries "Ex -special forces" are being recruited by terrorist organisations,paid large sums of money to do their dirty work for them.
In view of this combined with the relaxed nature of the Canadian government,I believe some one could hide a hole army somewhere in the Canadian country - side and no one will be the wiser.

Protect yourself..... then worry about the rest of the world. Are you going to wait and see,like the US before you guys get of your buts and take the steps to bring your forces in line with a new enemy and new rules of engagement.When ever I read about global terrorism ,Canada's name pops up somewhere.
HELL YES I think you guys have a problem,you just do not know it,because you are to busy trying to be the 
"Nice Guys" all around the world !

It is obvious to me, that you due to a very complex coastline and rugged country-side with lots of open spaces,lakes and rivers is in desperate need of a "Marine type" force,Combat Diver,backed by a fast naval strike force and a even better air force.
Small mobile multi-role flexible force is the only way that you will have to combat an attack on your soil effectively.
My time is up.........think carefully about what I said.
"Bubbles Up"


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## Kirkhill (4 Feb 2005)

Excellent post Sea-dog.  

I think one of the reasons we don't discuss threats here is a desire not to cause offence.  Some people might feel that to discuss specific threats is to discuss specific people and this might point out differences and cause more internal strife.  Certainly some people in this country, if measures were taken to plan for particular events, would use the planning to argue that those plans were directed specifically against their constituents in order to rally their constituents behind them.

However, the security forces, especially the army, navy and air force don't need to concern themselves with the "who". That is the job of the police, the government and the intelligence services.  

The defence forces do need to plan for operational and tactical responses to specific threats.  And as you point out, a lot of mischief can be made in Canada.

So....without putting names to faces:  What types of nastiness could occur in Canada and what can the CF to prevent them and respond to them?


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## Infanteer (4 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Excellent post Sea-dog.



Here, here.

It is always nice to get a breath of fresh air from an outside observer.  It's kind of hard to check out my roofing tiles when I'm sitting in my Lazy-Boy, having a Tall-one with Kirkhill....



> So....without putting names to faces: What types of nastiness could occur in Canada and what can the CF to prevent them and respond to them?



I'll take a shot at this.  Remember the refugee vessels that showed up on our Pacific Coast a few years back.  What had happened if these boats were not just filled with people trying to flee from an oppresive poverty and political marginalization but also with foreign nationals who were acting on state or sub-state interests to cause a ruckus in North America.  Smuggling along our vast Coastline isn't too hard to do, and all one has to do to get over the border to the States is to throw their backpack over the fence at 0 Ave (or if their more organized, serve the infiltrators with a sleeper cell to provide logisitical support an attempt another attack like the guy the caught heading to the Spaceneedle).

Is this threat real and credible?

If it is, then we need more detection and interdiction capabilities on our coasts (sense and act).  As Ex-Dragoon has pointed out before, the NBP's are a good first line interdiction force, but they should have some boots-on-the ground backup in the form of Light Infantry capable of deploying by small coastal craft or helicopter (say, if the target in question makes it to the shore and manhunt begins with an RCMP/Military joint op).


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## Kirkhill (4 Feb 2005)

> It's kind of hard to check out my roofing tiles when I'm sitting in my Lazy-Boy, having a Tall-one with Kirkhill....



Speaking of nastiness....


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## Sea-dog (5 Feb 2005)

Hi there all,
              I am happy to see that eventually I managed to create some new ideas,change some of those old philosophies and maybe now we can start again discuss the kind of forces needed ,and therefore the weapons and systems needed to support these kinds of units.

South Africa after years of fighting ,suddenly came to the conclusion that like Canada we have a long and difficult coastline,and to the north 3000 km of bush and uninhabited borders that left us at the time very vulnerable , and we paid for it.
This led to the introduction of mobile Marine units ,fast naval attack craft,a coastal defence system,
supported by mobile radar units and reconnaissance air-craft for early warning and long range identification of possible targets.
Scattered all along the coast,was small integrated naval units consisting of Marines,Naval Diving units/IEOD and EOD units in support of the coastal defence system.
The inshore waters especially near sensitive sea-ports were patrolled and guarded by the Marines with fast well armed ( 12,7mm light machine guns,7,62 mm mags and shot-guns) patrole boats, in some cases we even had the famous Russian RPG (weapons we confiscated from terrorists) on board.

To day you guys are much more privileged,the selection of weapons,and high-tech systems available allows the units to be smaller,more mobile with a even more powerfull selection of weapons to choose from.

I leave it to you guys to argue the best way to go about it,as you know your surroundings much better than I do, however I will remain here down under keeping a eye and lending a helping hand where necessary.Be carefull however not to create a "Hollow Force" it only looks good on paper!
Remember...."When the going gets tough,....the TOUGH gets going !"
Bubbles Up - Divers do it the deepest 1


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## Paul Gagnon (6 Feb 2005)

Wow!

 I haven't been able to log on in a few months due to work but I am happy to see this thread still going after two years. Have't read all of the replies yet but so far it looks like we've got a great discussion going on. 

Carry on.  ;D


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## McG (6 Feb 2005)

Sea-dog said:
			
		

> It is obvious to me, that you due to a very complex coastline and rugged country-side with lots of open spaces,lakes and rivers is in desperate need of a "Marine type" force,Combat Diver,backed by a fast naval strike force and a even better air force.


I see this as an argument for a robust air deliverable ground force and a reinforced Coast Guard.  It is not so much an argument for marines.


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## Ex-Dragoon (6 Feb 2005)

Why bother with the Coast Guard? Develop a "brown water" capability for the Navy.


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## Infanteer (6 Feb 2005)

Do we want to do that?  If it means degrading from the Blue Water capability in terms of manpower and resources, would it be better to leave it to the Coast Guard (ie: not the Defence Budget) and concentrate on maintaining our blue water capabilities (ie: replacing the 280's instead of putting those sailors in little dinky coastal cutters).


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## McG (6 Feb 2005)

I think we need a "brown water capability" to support joint expeditionary capabilities (see other threads) and I think this capability could serve a secondary role in home waters. However, I think the drug runners & illegal immigrants should remain the primary concern of our security forces (RCMP & Coast Guard).  The military should not become the primary actor in these roles.


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## Ex-Dragoon (7 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Do we want to do that?   If it means degrading from the Blue Water capability in terms of manpower and resources, would it be better to leave it to the Coast Guard (ie: not the Defence Budget) and concentrate on maintaining our blue water capabilities (ie: replacing the 280's instead of putting those sailors in little dinky coastal cutters).



The question is with Hillier as CDS are we going to have much of a Blue Water Navy and capability in the next several years? It is something we can do as we have done inhore ops in the Gulf as well as soverignity patrols here in Canada. We would need to invest in FPBs, PBRs and IPVs to do the job and ask the US to take over offshore patrol duties for Canada because without new money for the CPFs, the JSS and the Single Class Combatant to replace the CPF and 280s then we become and ocean going constabluary.


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## Zipper (8 Feb 2005)

I have to agree with Ex-Dragoon to a point. If we relied on our military to do these things, we would not be able to support other areas and thus become a constabulary. It looks like our gov has been trying to do that for years now.

Many of those things mentioned can be taken care of with a properly trained and equipped coast guard. Where the hell we get the money for that, I don't know?

Now our friend of South Africa has many good points, and they make alot of sense. However Canada is also a much bigger nation and a bigger player on the international stage. Although that too is becoming more questionable. 

To take our forces to this form of strictly internal type security would hurt us even further as far as our foreign policy is concerned. Not that it doesn't need to be changed as well, and for us to take our "heads of our asses".

We must look at all threats, not just those of a particular nature (Internal).


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## gnplummer421 (8 Feb 2005)

We cannot afford Marines, we can barely keep our small force equiped properly. I did hear that the military will get more money next budget, I think it comes out April 1st...


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## Sea-dog (8 Feb 2005)

Hi there all,
               Again it is clear that all members seem to be conditioned that it is Canada's obligation and role to be a global player. This in itself is a very costly decision, and requires a completely different approach,
accompanied with a much larger defence budget !
The Canadian Defence Force should not get involved with politics,however IF it be comes a matter of policy,it is then the responsibility of the politicians to find the funds to supply ,train and support such forces operating out side of Canada's borders.

I fail to comprehend the reason for the Canadian forces to operate in the global combat field,while the Canadian Defence force is struggling to maintain those forces required to defend Canadian soil at home.
You guys are really a "nice bunch" The UN is keeping their forces at home ,while Canada is required to be out there playing the global field with the USA.This at the same time while they are lining their pockets with millions of dollars from the member states including Canada.
Canada is paying double, for such extravagant foreign policies.

To gnplummer421 : Creating a Marine type force ,must be INSTEAD of normal Infantry ground forces,NOT as a supplementary force.
This then will over time be much cheaper as a Marine Force is capable of doing Infantry work ,BUT at the same time they are very mobile and can also be integrated with the Navy to be deployed effectively as a multi-role combat force.Since one force is now effectively doing 2 jobs it will in the future be cost effective !

Many other countries share the financial problems of Canada.The South African Defence force using initiative,and imagination has been playing with a new idea. Containerised defence systems will be the answer for the future. This allows the Defence Force to use a set of standardised vehicles,ships or vessels as the basis of a multi-role defence force.
The Navy will have a standard fast strike hull vessel available ,and by manipulating these different containerized systems can very quickly change the role or function of such a vessel.
This will be very cost effective as the same forces can now be changed to suit the threat.Delays due to defects will be very short as it will only require the changing of a specific container,thus seriously effecting the combat readiness of such forces.
Mobility will not be effected , systems can be changed in the field,ensuring a high standard of fire power,while the old units are taken back to home base for repairs or maintenance.

In conclusion I say that it is not always necessary to have more money,BUT to think of ways to spend those budgets available more effectively.This can only happen if the members of the Canadian Defence force also change their old set view points,think more progressively, using your imagination to create a smaller ,meaner Defence Force.

The sky is the limit ! Bubbles Up !


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## ArmyRick (8 Feb 2005)

Gnplmmr421,
It would actually cost us less if we binned our mentality (from WWII) of trying to maintain large brigades of mechanized forces (we don't have the kit to move them) and go to a truly expiditionary force. Look at a USMC Battalion landing team (It is very similar to a full size Canadian BG) but it is designed to deploy quickly.


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## Sea-dog (8 Feb 2005)

We should not assume that by creating a new force,that it automatically means the end of another.
Creating a new type of force could mean the intergration of forces,joining the best capabilities of several units to create ONE more powerfull,flexible,combined force.

It is important to clearly define the role of the Canadian Defence force for the future in a post 9/11 era and seriously taking into account the new threat of global terrorism.
Considering the above it is vital to change old mind sets,be creative and use your imagination.

The RC factor "resistance to change" creates tunnel vision, and this can only lead to the ultimate deterioration of the whole of the Canadian Armed Forces.
A important point to always remember and the only factor to be used in the design of a new defence force is that ultimately the perpose of the Canadian Defence Force is to "PROTECT" Canada and it is not there to promote American foreign policy.

Cheers and Bubbles Up !


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## TangoTwoBravo (8 Feb 2005)

Sea-Dog,

Fresh perspectives are welcome and you are right that a military force should have its roles and tasks in mind when creating structures and obtaining equipment.  I would say, however, that the Canadian security situation is somewhat different than Israel, South Africa and many other countries.  Israel and South Africa can find potential enemies (both conventional and unconventional) close by without resorting to great leaps of imagination.  Canada, on the other hand, is defended by geography on three sides (oceans and the arctic) and the USA to our south.  This does not mean that we do not have threats, but rather that perhaps they are best dealt with by Canada's various security agencies and not primarily the military.  The military is prepared, however, to assist civil authorities in all manner of situations.

Ultimately the role of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada, of course, but I would prefer if that defence happened on foreign soil.  Our various "peacekeeping" missions may have had an altruistic flavour, but our more recent deployments have been oriented at establishing security in foreign countries to prevent a widening conflict as well as being part of the war against terror.  Another role for our forces is to go after threats overseas either before or after they strike our interests.  A force geared to prevent smuggling (drugs, people etc) will not be well disposed to mounting expeditions.

Cheers,

2B


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## Kirkhill (8 Feb 2005)

Sea dog does have a point 2 Bravo.

With the Danes chasing our shrimp, cod and oil up off Hans Island wouldn't it be nice if we could mount an expeditionary capability to Arctic Bay on Baffin Island form Halifax? Or maybe even St. John's?  A bit of sovereignty patrol, a bit of joint amphibious practice, a bit of expeditionary capability?  Heck it might all come in handy some day.

In the meantime, if the Arctic melts enough again to let the Inuit and the Vikings (Oops....I meant to say Danes - don't want to offend any Scandinavian sensibilities here) continue their wanderings, then we will be ready to lend a hand, or see them on their way as the case may be. >


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## Zipper (8 Feb 2005)

No argument about the idea of being able to project our sovereignty to the North. but we do not need a rapid response force in order to do that. its not like the Danes will be going to war with us over a chunk of small rock. However, we could take care of much of that by supplying our Navy again with proper ice breakers, as well as newer coastal patrol planes.

While I agree with 2Bravo about protecting our interests on foreign soil, Sea-dog still has a point about being able to react to insurgencies here on our own soil.

Now this may sound far fetched, but it is a possibility.

We all know, Canada is a haven for many "radical" organizations with interests abroad. Organizations that are using Canada as a safe house and a place to rest, and maybe even to train. As well, if anyone believes in the idea that things are going "according to plan" with the States and their war on terror in both Afghanistan and Iraq are rather naive. Those two places are balanced on a knifes edge, and things could go very wrong very fast. 

Also and even worse is the idea that they may want to go into Iran now. This would de-stabilize an area already under far higher stresses then we can imagine. If things should melt down quickly, we can expect not only that whole region explodes, but also organizations that are already here become active and possibly doing greats amount of damage with which we could not respond to in a timely manner.

Yes, far fetched. But we need to stay aware of the fact that Canada is a nice place, but that we're not immune to the rest of the worlds woes. We've wrapped the blanket of false security around us for to long.


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## Kirkhill (8 Feb 2005)

No argument here on the insurgency case Zipper, but I am afraid that that argues for light forces again.

As I look at Iraq, I see the evolution of an Army.

In a peaceful, ordered society where people accept their government then policemen can go unarmed.

If there are ruffians and the ruffians have knives then the policeman needs a gun

If the ruffians get a gun then the police need two guns.

If a pack of ruffians get guns then the police need machine guns and armoured vehicles - At this time they start to need paramilitary back up like the Police Commandos and the Iraqi National Guard

If the ruffians get heavy weapons then heavier weapons need to be supplied to the authorities - Now we are starting to move into light infantry and light cavalry roles

If the ruffians get armour the authorities need a functioning army with heavy armour.


I don't see the prospect of battalions of marauding anybody rampaging across Canada anytime soon, still least with Armoured vehicles and heavy weapons.  Platoon sized elements with light weapons and all sorts of nasty explosive devices and WMDs are more likely.  The counter is Coy/Bn sized forces with Light Armour (Maybe some Heavy APCs).

Roughly the same type of forces found in the UK Royal Marines.  

Practicing them on the coasts would add to sovereignty claims, thereby minimizing the chances of having to take lethal action against anybody.  At the same time they would develop skill sets that would be useful in other theatres.

Rather than trying to build up the force so that we have a little of this and a little of that and not much of anything at all - incapable of sustaining a presence when presence is needed, wouldn't it be better to determine the type of force we need to meet our domestic needs, equip and train it well to work in our environments to our purposes, then recruit more units of that type than we need.

Farm the surplus-to-requirement units out to the international community so as to make friends and influence people, generate stability so our merchants can make lots of money and pay for my health benefits, and in the meantime the troopies get lots of practical experience in distant lands and climes.  All good stuff it seems to me.

Once we have got those bases covered then we can start thinking about what else we can afford, after the day-care bills are paid, and start buying additional capabilities, starting from this premise: "What value does it give to Canada?"

And by the way, an example of such thinking might be, after the requisite numbers of light troops, helicopters, aircraft, Bv206s, LSVW replacements, EEZ patrol and SAR capabilities have been met, after all that, then look at the cost of a heavy armoured battle group to be able to support, rescue lightly armed and armoured Canadians in far-flung places.

But the way that I take Sea-dog, and I agree with him in principle if not in detail, is to do our appreciation based on domestic needs first, make sure those needs are dealt with then start considering how to get involved with the rest of the world.

The biggest threats to our security come through our seaports and airports in freight containers.  The biggest undefended zones are our the maritime approaches, the seaways, the railways and the highways.  The greatest risk is to our cities.

The answer, as in any other defensive scheme, is to channel the traffic (enemy or friendly) through the existing ports, cover the ports with security (fire) then monitor the obstacles (ice, rock, forests, barbed wire) and bind them into a fire plan (soldiers with rifles, boats with guns, aircraft with bombs and missiles, - yes even subs with torpedoes) in case someone tries to breach the obstacles.

We are going to know if somebody tries to sneak a Division into the country by air or sea.  We could probably do some significant damage to the shipping on our own just now - and no doubt we would find a friend to help us out.

The problem again is small units, covert units, and weapons without units at all, just a cell phone.

So disused fishing trawlers in remote locations, low flying civilian aircraft, bodies in cargo containers in ships docked at quayside.

The other potential risk is commercial ventures.

Like foreign scrap iron merchants at an abandoned whaling station or sealers on an island undetected coming back year after year for 2-5 years.  Making claims that seeing as how we aren't using the place, didn't know about it, didn't complain about it then they have more right to it than we do.

What happens if the decide not to move when the local mountie and his trusty DFO partner show up and they decline to move, demonstrate they are armed and request assistance from the Motherland to protect their commercial rights?

On all of these grounds I say that building a light force base CF, with a modest heavy reinforcement capability, is probably the right answer for us.

Or put it another way 3 light brigades and a cavalry brigade with a heavy armour battlegroup.  Lots of transport, air (fixed and rotary), sea and land.  A useful (what does that mean???) amount of Combat Air Support. Naval forces capable of operating in all our waters, all the time in all seasons and also being able to escort/transport our expeditionary forces.

And a credible Militia force capable of securing Vital Points, including cities, and conducting route patrols of pipelines, highways, canals and powerlines.

Cheers.


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## Zipper (8 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> No argument here on the insurgency case Zipper, but I am afraid that that argues for light forces again.
> 
> On all of these grounds I say that building a light force base CF, with a modest heavy reinforcement capability, is probably the right answer for us.
> 
> ...



You know something? I think I may just agree with you on most of it for once!! MY GOD!!!

I think we still are apart on just what kind of vehicles our gov is putting us in.

I'll still take exception to that Cavalry thingy, but otherwise I agree with you. The fact that you put in there a moderately heavy armour battlegroup surprises me. Of course, I would like to know what your interpretation of heavy is? Mine would even accept something along the lines of (Majoor's love) the CV-90.

Cheers back.


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## Kirkhill (9 Feb 2005)

Zipper you may be in need of counselling shortly.

IIRC you recently agreed with GW and now you are agreeing with me.... I fear for your sanity ;D

Now to make matters worse I will inform you that a CV90, or even heavier, platform is exactly what I had in mind as I wrote that.  The German Puma is interesting because you can ship it at about the 25 to 30 tonne mark then add another 5 to 10 tonnes of armour in theatre.

But seeing as how you have gone and agreed with me I shall now go have to have a rethink 

Kidding aside, you think it could work?


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## Zipper (9 Feb 2005)

I think hell has frozen over...or at least felt a chill.

Work?

Hell, anything could work if we actually had the money and the political will. All our disagreements and such don't mean a rats *** if those two things don't get met.

Sigh.

I would rather like to see the Armour side of things sooner then your plan. If we don't get some kind of decent Armour, then I am afraid it could mean the death knell for the Corp. Which I think would be tragic. 

Our system of doing things is actually not that bad, considering that the British seem to be moving towards it in a way. We just need the money for personal and equipment to make it work properly. How much that is going to be? I don't know. I cannot believe that the Government is just going to throw out that 5000 extra personal bone, and then leave us high and dry in the next budget again. It would be political suicide. How much their going to give? Who knows until the day (or the day of leaking).

I just know that the way we're going now with the MGS's and this DFS concept is wrong. As wrong as the LSVW.

But what do we do? We soldier on and say "yes sir", and find a way to cope.

Sigh.

Although on a high note. We do have better equipped Infantry then we've had in a long while.


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## big bad john (9 Feb 2005)

Zipper said:
			
		

> We just need the money for personal and equipment to make it work properly.



Where have I heard that before???  Oh yes, thatCenturion from the Legion down the road said it.  LOL Seriously, all you can do is to press for what you need.  Then go out and perform with what you've got.


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## Sea-dog (9 Feb 2005)

Bravo Zulu ! To all , but especially to Kirkhill ! 

I could not have said it better,the more I read your comments the more it becomes clear that Canada has a real and present danger.

It is very important to keep in mind that consolidation or reconstruction does NOT necessary mean more money but more effective expenditure.If you take the time,do your pre-planning based on previous combat experience and some real-time security evaluation to support R & D, you might just find that you have more money available to target those aspects where your security is lacking.

The British has already started the process of  consolidating and inter-phasing some of their units.I am sure as in the case of the Brits,also in Canada some members will display the RC factor( resistance to change ),afraid of losing their old identities,and traditions.
The road ahead will not be easy,however the benefits will eventually out way these losses.

Of importance to note is that the Brits,to some extent has seen the light ! 
They are strengthening their amphibious forces with the possible addition of smaller ,faster Jump-jet type air-craft carriers that will add tremendous fire-power to the Royal Marines.
Other units like the SBS,SAS and the Naval Diving Units ,proved their capabilities and will not only be maintained ,but modernized and tailored to meet the new demands of the post 9/11 era.

It is now up to you ,not just to sit here and dream or complain, BUT to go out and to spread the word.
Start by influencing those around you,changing those old out-dated perceptions, and creating awareness.

I lived all my life under threat of war,I have seen the bodies of small kids mangeled in pools of blood on the streets,while others celebrated these acts by handing out cakes in the streets of their towns and cities.
I have been out there night and day to safeguard my family and friends.It is my sincere hope that you all will take this opportunity to do the same.
Bury your differences and ,start now to put out the message ,before it is to late !  :skull:


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## ArmyRick (9 Feb 2005)

Well saud kirkhill


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Feb 2005)

I do believe that Canada needs the capability to operate on the littorals (ours or somebody else's), but I do not think that we should abandon our foreign deployments.

Threats to a nation can be seen in terms of capability and intention.   The given threat by a state or group to another state can be "assessed" as being capability to harm times the hostile intentions.   Thus a state might have a capability to harm Canada but not have hostile intentions and thus is not a threat.   Another state might will have the intentions but not the capability.   Most will fall somewhere in between.   This also ties in with probablilities and our selection of forces must strike a balance between dealing with the most dangerous and the most likely.

Looking at Canada, few nations have declared hostile intentions.   Many first world countries have the capability to attack Canada but do not have hostile intentions.   There is the arctic sovereignty issue and the CF does have an important role in establishing surveillance and demonostrating presence.   Demonstrating that we can get to our remote artic areas with military forces is important and a "marine" capability would perhaps deter other nations from casting covetous glances on our north.

Various terrorist organizations have both the intention and capability to attack Canada (and our allies).   Right now this threat should be the main focus of Canada's security forces, and I would argue that the CF is already disposed to deal with this threat.   I would argue, however, that if our conventional forces are fighing terrorism in Canada then things have already degenerated.   Our army should be prepared to go foreign countries to either deny their use to terrorists as safe havens or to prevent local conflicts from creating the conditions that breed terrorism.

My own prespciption?   Six Cavalry Task Forces and six Light Task Forces.   The Light Task Forces (or perhaps a couple of them) would have the ability to conduct littoral operations.   The Navy would maintain its CPFs but increase its ability to deploy and sustain at least company sized groups.   The air force would maintain long range surveillance and fighters but would add more heavy lift.   Most importantly, we would drop the Griffons and get Chinooks.

Cheers,

2B


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## Kirkhill (9 Feb 2005)

2 Bravo 

I don't see major disagreement.  

I also don't believe that Canada should give up on foreign involvement.  I just think that the nature of the forces that we are offering should first of all reflect our domestic needs.

To that point I will even stipulate your 6 and 6 formula for task forces.

However I might be inclined to group them this way 

3 Light Brigades of 2 Light TF/BGs and a Cavalry TF then a Cavalry Brigade of 3 Cavalry TFs  (perhaps even 2 light armoured wheeled and 1 medium/hvy armoured tracked - depending on what transport, logistics and budgets decree)

After that it is a case of choosing our fights and ensuring, to the extent possible, that we don't get over-matched.

However as Big Bad John suggested that is a problem at least as old as Caesar's Centurions.  The Romans had their armies trained, equipped and organized and were at the peak of their performance when they were over-matched by a bunch of Germanic savages in the Teutoburgerwald.  Stuff happens,  and it happens to soldiers more often than most......

Cheers.


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill/Sea-Dog (and eveyone else),

This particular thread has really got me thinking over the last few days.  It is easy to get caught in the weeds, so to speak, and it is very useful to take a step back and look at broader roles and purposes as is being done here.

We are in the middle of "transformation" so we had best try to get it right.  How do we avoid the fate of the Romans in the forest, the 7th Cav at the Little Bighorn and various little expeditions that have come to grief in far-away places?  Perhaps the key is to have an honest appreciation of our own abilities.

More to follow and cheers to all,

2B


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## Ex-Dragoon (9 Feb 2005)

2Bravo the question is what will provide area air defence for your company size groups? Without 280s or any other platform to provide area air defence your transports and escorts reapidly become sitting ducks, if you convert some CPFs to the AAD role you lose escort platforms. Hence my constant harping on concentrating on all 3 warfare disciplines for the navy.


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## Kirkhill (9 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill on an earlier post.



> Naval forces capable of operating in all our waters, all the time in all seasons and also being able to escort/transport   our expeditionary forces.



Ex-Dragoon, I will stipulate that for safe passage, the escort group needs an AAD capability. If the same vessel can also shoot down other targets and be available for other assignments so much the better.

Cheers.


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon,

Without getting too far into the Navy aspect, the answer on AAD might depend on how the littoral capability is being used (threat dependent).  For an independent Falklands-style operation it would obviously be critical.  Perhaps less so for an Arctic sovereingty demonstration or a coalition expedition.  I'd like to manage expectations here and state that independent littoral warfighting ventures in non-permissive environments would be a little difficult without our own aircraft carriers.  The history of surface ships operating without air cover is not a particularily happy one.  In our case I think that that particular ship has sailed...

All that being said I was painting with a very broad brush and when I wrote "CPFs" I was thinking that the Navy keeps its "blue-water" capability as opposed to saying "keep the CPFs and scrap the Tribals."  I like the Tribals if only for having the capability to hold two helicopters (do they still have that?).  My bad for being imprecise and believe me when I say that I am a supporter of the Navy (I was a Navy brat).  How would you economize to gain the ability to move troops within the same funding envelope (is it possible)?

Cheers,

2B


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## a_majoor (10 Feb 2005)

I hesitate to wade in here, but Marines are a form of force projection capability. Given the time and distance factors in getting around Canada (for those DOMOPS scenarios), much less getting to hot spots around the world, I would be more inclined to go the airborn route and reconstitute the Canadian Airborn Battalion as a minimum.

Modern military equipment has given airborn/light troops a punch they didn't have even a decade ago, and the medium/heavy forces can provide the backup after the jumpers have gone in and secured an airhead/railhead/beachhead.


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## big bad john (10 Feb 2005)

Personally, but I am bias here, I think that Canada would do well in emulating 3 Commando Brigade.  But not a force of Marines.  my 2 cents.


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## Ex-Dragoon (10 Feb 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Ex-Dragoon,
> 
> Without getting too far into the Navy aspect, the answer on AAD might depend on how the littoral capability is being used (threat dependent).   For an independent Falklands-style operation it would obviously be critical.   Perhaps less so for an Arctic sovereingty demonstration or a coalition expedition.   I'd like to manage expectations here and state that independent littoral warfighting ventures in non-permissive environments would be a little difficult without our own aircraft carriers.   The history of surface ships operating without air cover is not a particularily happy one.   In our case I think that that particular ship has sailed...
> 
> ...



Without having our own carriers to provide TG Air Defence, having some sort of AAD becomes all the more critical especially since the Navy seems to be involved with more and more escort ops. If we ever wish to command anything like TF 151 like we did in the Gulf to hang on to an AAD capability is even more critical. Many here feel when operating in a Coalition type of setting we really don't need that capability and have our allies assume that role but I put forth this question, is that argument not unlike half the Canadian publics view we should let the US defend us? We have this capability now, we don't have carriers and we probably will never have them again so we should retain it. The air threat is not going away. If anything its getting bigger and faster and even more destructive. 16 sea sparrows and eventually evolved sea sparrows are not going to be able to defend an HVU (high value unit i.e JSS with troops on board). I am not saying with a ship with AAD capability is going to 100% guarantee your safety either but your odds for survival will improve greatly. Without the 280s your surface combatant force goes down to just _12 ships_. Thats not many, if anything thats far too few. The loss of 1 or 2 for the Navy would prove to be catastrophic.

2Bravo to answer your question, there is still hangar space to carry 2 SeaKing but for the most part only 1 is, mostly due to the shortage of working helos. I think it was the mid 90s just after I remustered remember of hearing of a 280 with 2 CH124s embarked. One of the air types could confirm that more so.


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 Feb 2005)

I'm starting to get well out of my depth here but I am enjoying the thought exercise so bear with me.  Getting rid of the 280s would have problems (I went to the Navy thread) and once again I am not proposing that.  I've been looking at the JSS (both on this site and others) and trying to relate it to this thread.  The aim appears to be to put a battlegroup on board, but all the listed capabilties seem to talk about "lane meters" etc.  If this means that it simply carries the gear and the troops fly in and merry up in a port then perhaps the JSS is not a good "marine platform."  Perhaps we just continue to rent shipping if the aim is just to move kit around.  Looking at power projection, the problem with airborne forces is that once they land they have huge CSS problems.

I'm not committed to having Canadian Marines, but I am interested in having the capability of delivering troops to the littorals.  I see several  scenarios:

a.  arctic sovereignty demonstrations

b.  operations in the Western hemisphere (potentially involving all aspects of the three block war)

c.  operations in Africa/Pacific (less likely)

What would be required in a ship to have the following capabilities:

a.  transport one company of light forces;

b.  transport of combat support elements (Tp of Mortars, Tp of Sappers, Tp of Light Armoured Recce, AD Tp)

c.  on board UMS and Surgical Team

d.  stores for one month of deployed operations once landed (and a land CSS element to manage the on-shore bit)

e.  transport of HQ element for land forces

f.  C2 capabilities to include "reachback" to Canada

g.  four medium lift helicopters

What is the cost in "tonnage" per company of light infantry?  Getting a whole battalion group on board for more than a short hop might mean a ship that is beyond our means but I could be wrong!

The concept of ops for this force would be that it would use the helicopters (perhaps a transport version of the new shipborne helicopter) to get troops ashore (we'd need light armoured vehs that could be slung loaded) and to then handle the CSS bit.  For domestic sovereignty operations a deployment of two months could include stops at a host of islands/ shorelines to demonstrate our presence.  For operations on foreign soil this group could be the initial entry to stabilize an area (perhaps in conjuction with airborne forces).  Once again, I must be realistic here and without carriers our ability to project maritime power abroad is limited.

Would this capability have to be at the cost of a present one?   :-\

2B


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2005)

2 Bravo

I think you just listed the design criteria for the JSS as specified by NDHQ.  You also listed the design criteria for the New Zealanders Mult-Role Vessel (except they are only intending to operate a light helicopter).  Our JSS (New Zealands MRV + an AOR all rolled into one) will cost us about 700,000,000 CAD each, the Kiwi's MRV will cost them about 86,000,000 CAD, or about 12% of the price of a JSS.

To my eye "there be summat wrong 'ere".

As to the issue of air or sea.  I like Field Marshall Slim on this, and Col Stogran, especially in the Canadian context where every person is a long service volunteer and Canada has both sea and water needs.
I would ensure that parachuting was part of every light troopers training.  Paras can assault from landing-craft just as easily as they can from aircraft as the Brits did on the Falklands.  And as Big Bad John can no doubt attest, even "Booties" can be shown the door of an aircraft and fall out.  There are specialist skills associated with mounting both types of assaults but those skills are kept in specialized sub-units like pathfinder platoons, mountain and arctic cadres and assault raiders and boats companies.

Cheers.


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 Feb 2005)

Will the proposed JSS have "berths" and facilities for embarked troops?  Vehicles and kit are bulky but I think that once you get them on board a ship and secure they cease being an issue.  Soldiers need messing, bunks, ablutions, facilities to maintain fighting efficiency, recreation areas, offices and planning areas.  I'd like our ship (not that I am issuing decrees here  ) to be able to house this large company group plus or battalion group minus for long periods of time.  I'm thinking of around 250 soldiers as the minimum not including the ship's company, air detachment and HSS (Health Support Services).  

If we had three then perhaps one could always be available (along with an associated rotating high-readiness Company Group) while retaining the ability to "surge".

I'm now swimming well outside my lane and I think that I see some dorsal fins circling,

2B


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2005)

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1346
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1347

Here's the press releases from April of last year

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18459.0.html

And the thread on the JSS discussion from this board

My take on JSS is that the original design allows for your helos and vehicles and support as well as accomodation for a bunch of command and support passengers and a hospital.  The accomodation and use of landing craft still seem to be the subject of some debate.

Cheers.


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 Feb 2005)

Kirkhill,

I went through the press releases and some of the threads on this board but I have yet to see mention of having accomodations for the deployed "battlegroup."  There is mention of modular systems for refugees etc so perhaps a similar system could be designed for transporting troops.  I will leave the discussion of whether the JSS can be everything for everybody to the Navy thread.

I guess I'm merging two threads here.  I like to think in the realm of the possible, so if we're examining having a littoral capability we must devise one that is at least possible.  The JSS offers some relevent capabilities, and without the appropriate shipping there cannot be a marine capability.  

All,

Going back to the main thrust of the thread, should a dedicated marine or littoral capability be included in the CF?  I can certainly see the benefits, but if we stay in the same envelope what would we have to get rid of to make it happen?

Cheers,

2B


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## Kirkhill (10 Feb 2005)

You're right in that there is no accomodation for a "battlegroup" (700-1200 souls) but there is accomodation for a Joint staff and hospital personnel as well as a significant air det.  

I am trying to find the reference but I think I saw some place that some of the planning had allowed for as much as a combat team of 250.  There is certainly more than enough vehicle space.  

The Kiwis are managing to fit a LAV combat team complete into an 8000 tonne hull.  The JSS is a 25,000 tonne unit.

As an ice-strengthed unit working in our own littoral, and under our own land based air cover, it would have been quite able to support a deployment like last summer's arctic adventure on its own.  Perhaps with an ice-breaker and an OPV or 2 like this one http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/vessels-navires/details_e.asp?id=K-3 the Leonard J. Cowley, in support.  With a decent engine capable of driving her through the water at 25 to 30 knots and a 25-40mm on deck the Cowley wouldn't make a bad model for an OPV.http://www.masamarine.com/ship_patrol.html.

But digressing again.

The JSS could conceivably be both an AOR an a platform to support operations in domestic littoral waters.  An extra unit would probably keep the Navy and the Army happy (4 instead of 3) - but the price has to come down - If the Gov't wants Davie to build the ships and give Davie capacity it can use after the ships are built, then spend Industry Development bucks on Davie to do that.  Don't roll that cost into the price of the ships and charge it to DND.  DND should pay an internationally cost competitive price for the capability.   And that isn't 700,000,000 CAD per.

If we want to transport vehicles overseas then we could buy the Enforcer class vessels kitted out as the Brits have them.  They even have accomodations for a few hundred troops temporarily.  
If we want them to live aboard them fit them out like the Dutch have.

Or alternately we can buy or lease  a San Antonio or two from our American brethren.


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## Ex-Dragoon (10 Feb 2005)

Last indication we had the battlegroup would be embarked on the JSS and be deployed from Point A to Point B, kind of a waste if you have to fly the troops in don't you think? Then again the military changes their mind more then Infanteer changes his underwear.


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## Infanteer (10 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Last indication we had the battlegroup would be embarked on the JSS and be deployed from Point A to Point B, kind of a waste if you have to fly the troops in don't you think? Then again the military changes their mind more then Infanteer changes his underwear.



Actually, I could see the utility in this "Amphibious Base".

Watching the Senate Committee hearing on CPAC which replayed General MacKenzie's testimony.  When asked why we should develop littoral support like the JSS (although he didn't like the actual "catch-all" design), he responded that, as a soldier in the Arctic, he was taught never to leave his snowshoes and his Ruck.  Likewise, while on winter warfare, we learned that the tobaggon group was our lifeline.

I could see the same value of something like this, even for a Air deployed group.  The ship can act as a "Mother Ship" cruising the littoral while protected by appropriate surface, subsurface and aviation assets.  For the troops on the ground, they have a secure "rear area" in the ship where medevac, supplies, etc can be delivered to a force in a hostile environment - even if they deployed their some other way.  If the "shit hits the fan", the Ship should be able to offer us a way of extracting them if needs be without having to grovel to our Southern neighbours for help.  Now that's sovereignty.

If the idea was taken up a notch, as Kirkhill suggests, and a dedicated troop ship was obtained, this could help move us away from the "big base" mentality that the Army has that essentially shackles us to a limited AOR.  Like the Marine's in the early part of the Vietnam War, the troopship could act as the "Forward Operating Base", with troops deploying for a few weeks at a time on operations on the mainland when required.  The ship can offer a safe and secure "rear area" for troops to unwind - better then having your base camp mortared, rocketed, and attacked by suicide bombers - a highly stressful environment.

Just a few ideas that can highlight the utility of such a vessel - more options in the "tool belt" of capabilities.  Remember, Admiral Jackie Fisher said something like The Army is just another thing for the Navy to shoot out (or something to that effect) - working on this principle is a true *joint* task that we should be looking at.


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## Zipper (10 Feb 2005)

All this is fine and dandy, and sounds great. But with the way things are going we won't have any offensive capability, and thus the need for the above type operational capability will be moot. well just need it for humanitarian aid, transport of equipment to soft theatres, and as a Naval support ship.

Sigh.


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## Infanteer (11 Feb 2005)

Zipper said:
			
		

> All this is fine and dandy, and sounds great. But with the way things are going we won't have any offensive capability, and thus the need for the above type operational capability will be moot.



Why don't you back your pessimism up with evidence.

I'm sure the Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Tora Bora or the Shah-e-Kot valley would disagree with your statement....


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## Zipper (11 Feb 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Why don't you back your pessimism up with evidence.
> 
> I'm sure the Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Tora Bora or the Shah-e-Kot valley would disagree with your statement....



What forces did we have there? Anything that would need the level of support that is refered to above? Anything that we may have in the near future? Or was both those cases small to indivdual units with ALOT of US backing? We're capable of some offensive ops. Snipers and small units, but do any of those require a full on support ship?


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## Wizard of OZ (11 Feb 2005)

Zipper i know you are going to say you are a realist and not a pesimist, but in this world you are either moving or dying.  Sure you are right, at this time the forces is in a state of decline, moral in some areas is bad and equipment is old and in desperate need of replacement. But Infanteer is more right then wrong if you get the shinny new toys the troops will come.  Everybody likes new stuff and in order to get the numbers up you need to demonstrate your willing to back them and equip them.  It will not be an offer night success but in the span of genreation vast changes could be made.


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## Kirkhill (11 Feb 2005)

Nicely said Wizard.


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## Spr.Earl (11 Feb 2005)

Why?
Because we dont have a Navy to Transport them!!!! :


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## TangoTwoBravo (11 Feb 2005)

I am starting to sound like a broken record but I'd like to see something specific about berthing for the "battlegroup" included in the SOR/ list of capabilities.  My fear is that they are envisioning deployments along the lines of the last ten years (heck, even longer back) where the kit goes by ship and the troops go by air.  Fine if you are entering a mature theatre but not so good if you are trying to put troops into a place where you do not yet have a port and airfield.  If we are called upon to intervene/assist in an area lacking these things we may be a little embarassed if we've assumed away certain problems.  

I hope that the plan does not include the embarked troops bringing cots and IMPs and living in sea-containers.  To give a land analogy, I'd rather move troops long distance with a highway cruiser than a five ton stake truck (if I want them to arrive in any shape fit to fight).

Perhaps I am worrying over nothing!

Cheers,

2B

p.s. I'm an optimistic skeptic!  :blotto:


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## Kirkhill (11 Feb 2005)

Right about now 2Bravo, my interpretation of what little detail is in the public domain is that your stake truck analogy is  probably closer to the JSS concept than is the Highway Cruiser.

It will apparently take all three JSS units to shift the vehicles and kit of a battlegroup with some portion of the force embarked.  The rest of the force will go by air or other means.

At least that's the way that I understand it.

Yes, it would be nice to keep bodies and kit together.


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## Zipper (11 Feb 2005)

Wizard of OZ said:
			
		

> Zipper i know you are going to say you are a realist and not a pesimist, but in this world you are either moving or dying.   Sure you are right, at this time the forces is in a state of decline, moral in some areas is bad and equipment is old and in desperate need of replacement. But Infanteer is more right then wrong if you get the shinny new toys the troops will come.   Everybody likes new stuff and in order to get the numbers up you need to demonstrate your willing to back them and equip them.   It will not be an offer night success but in the span of genreation vast changes could be made.



Huh? Ok. Either I'm reading things wrong, or my messages are being read wrong, or both. I cannot agree with you more Wiz. Bring in the Toy's and more people will want to come and play. I just wish the toys were better thought out. But that is another thread.

I was making a comment on Infanteer's statement of using the ships as a "Mother ship". It sounds great. I would love for that to happen. But with the way our forces are being made into "support" only (as a BG), it makes it hard to see it as being able to be done.

Now if we were living in my perfect world (scary for some). These hopeful raises to the budget and new equipment would be the tip of the iceberg and we would be expanding back into a self sufficient force once again (with Tanks ;D).

Lets wait and see if the budget is more generous then has already been stated with the 5000 "extra" troops.

And I agree with you there 2Bravo. More info needs to come into the light on just what these new ships can do.


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## Infanteer (11 Feb 2005)

I was thinking along the lines of an Air Assault/Airborne entry into a hostile theater, creating a neccessary airhead/beachhead to allow the heavier gear to come up from the JSS ship.


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## Ex-Dragoon (12 Feb 2005)

Again I will say we (the Navy...you know the guys and gals that will be sailing and maintaining the JSS)are being told the troops will be embarked on the JSS so there will be no need for fly overs etc etc.


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## Kirkhill (12 Feb 2005)

> Again I will say we (the Navy...you know the guys and gals that will be sailing and maintaining the JSS)are being told the troops will be embarked on the JSS so there will be no need for fly overs etc etc.



Any news, indications or otherwise, of how many bodies per hull you are talking about?  And are these disembarking types or are these Command and Support types that might stay aboard if the JSS stays in Theatre waters?


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## TangoTwoBravo (12 Feb 2005)

I'll stop being a worry-wart and assume that I'll have a bunk.  As long as I have wardroom privledges I guess I don't care where they stick me (I am used to sleeping on a back deck). ;D

In an effort to refine this idea I've made the following assumptions:

   1.  The JSS will be able to move the large company group over long distances and deliver them fit to fight

   2.  It will have three to four "transport" versions of the NH-92 that can carry 22 people or at least a fully loaded 12 man infantry sect

   3.  It will be escorted by at least one 280 and several CPFs if it is going anywhere 

With four helicopters it could deliver a platoon (3 x 12 man sect plus a HQ with wpns det of ALAWs, C-6 and CASW) in one "flight."  Depending on the distance to shore it could therefore deliver the company group within two to three hours (five to six "flights").  It would be nice to have a helo from one of the escorts available for the rescue of people if things go bad.  Airforce guys please feel free to sort me out here!

This force would be useful in an unopposed sovereignty op or in a low-risk situation.  Perhaps a small state where law has broken down and the threat is small gangs.  The big problem is the lack of air cover and dedicated fire support.  Lacking these this "Marine" force will have to pick its targets very carefully!

Cheers,

2B


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## a_majoor (13 Feb 2005)

I think 2Bravo has summed it up pretty effectively. Marines (unless they are considered to be strictly shipboard troops to repel boarders and suppress mutinies) need lots of clever ways to get ashore, and to be useful, must *always* be able to make opposed landings. Rowing ashore in the ship's longboats dosn't cut it.

The USMC has many ways of getting combat power ashore, from "Amtrack" amphibious vehicles, hovercraft to swoop in carrying everything from Tanks to 21/2 tons, armadas of helicopters to ferry troops and equipment, as well as another armada of aircraft and armed helicopters to support the force afloat and ashore. The former USSR formed "Naval Infanty" units, which relied more on special ships and carrying platforms (Hovercraft and landing ships) to bring standard issue BTR's and T-72s ashore, along with amphibious PT-76 recce tanks to swim in with the first wave.

Either way involves a lot more hardware than the government is willing to invest into the CF. At least wheeled LAVs won't need "tank transporters" for the long road move from the dock to the actual AOR.....


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## big bad john (14 Feb 2005)

I've been watching this thread with much interest.  Their seems to be, unless I am very mistaken, an opinion that Marines must be the US view of Marines.  This is in no way knocking the USMC who are very, very good at what they do.

But what about the Royal Marines model which has been adopted successfully by the Netherlands and Denmark just to name two?


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## big bad john (14 Feb 2005)

Regarding "Expeditionary Ships", todays Ottawa Citizen:


Canada needs warship to fulfil top general's dream
Hillier hopes to create 'Task Force Maple Leaf' for humanitarian missions or all-out wars
   
Chris Wattie 
National Post 


February 14, 2005


TORONTO - Canada's top general says he needs a big amphibious expeditionary warship to realize his plans for a Canadian task force to take our navy, army and air force anywhere in the world for everything from humanitarian missions to all-out wars.

Gen. Rick Hillier outlined his ambitious plan for the Canadian Forces in an interview with the National Post yesterday, a plan that will require a top-to-bottom reorganization of all three services and an infusion of new soldiers and equipment.

"We're talking about taking army task forces, navy task groups and air capability ... and have it ready to deploy either in Canada, or around the world, as an entity that says 'Canadian' on it -- a Task Force Maple Leaf, if you will," Gen. Hillier said, adding with a smile: "I like that name."

Gen. Hillier, who was sworn in as chief of defence staff less than two weeks ago, said he'll need a big, new vessel to carry up to 1,500 troops, heavy equipment and new air force heavy-lift helicopters to international hotspots, and he will need it soon.

"What we're going to clearly need is the ability to project our men and women and the capabilities that they bring with them around the world," said Gen. Hillier. "We'll have to find something different that allows us to do that. We're still looking, the whole options are out there."

The general said his staff is considering expanding the navy's Joint Support Ship program to fill that role, but is also looking at larger and more expensive vessels to become the flagships of a future Canadian expeditionary force.

"What we need is something that is going to allow us to project power across the shore, from here to our next theatre of operations, whether that's in the north part of Canada, or on the coast of Canada, or around the world," he said.

"Whether our Joint Support Ships can be shaped to give us that capability is the first question we will ask."

The Joint Support Ship program, a $2.1-billion plan to build three or more vessels by 2011, will combine the roles of a tanker for refuelling other warships at sea, a transport for ground troops and their equipment and an offshore command post, or hospital.

But each of the vessels, which are still on the drawing boards, will be able to carry only 200 soldiers and a limited amount of equipment. Their flight decks would be able to accommodate only four medium-sized helicopters.

So Gen. Hillier said Canada may have to acquire a ship like the Royal Navy's HMS Albion, an 18,500-tonne, 176-metre-long amphibious assault ship that can carry up to 700 Royal Marines, their equipment and armoured vehicles.

Gen. Hillier wouldn't say how much money his over-burdened troops will need from this month's federal budget to begin making his planned expeditionary force a reality, but in his first speech as head of the Canadian Forces last week he was pointedly critical of military underfunding.

He acknowledged his plans are "a little bit pre-emptive" of the government's defence policy review, expected to be unveiled this spring to outline the future direction of the military.

But he doesn't want to wait before acting and intends to start putting his proposed task force together almost immediately.

"We'll build one task force as soon as we possibly can," he said. "I want to get there sooner rather than later, I'll tell you that."

Gen. Hillier admitted the Canadian Forces' top generals have "a lot of work to do" before his expeditionary force becomes a reality and said the details of his plan have yet to be fleshed out. "I have a vision of where we need to go here, but to be able to describe it in specific detail, I'm not quite ready to do that yet," he said.

© The Ottawa Citizen 2005


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## Ex-Dragoon (14 Feb 2005)

Hey Kirkhill I guess we know what variant of the JSS they are looking at with only 200 troops embarked lol.


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## scm77 (14 Feb 2005)

big bad john said:
			
		

> Gen. Hillier, who was sworn in as chief of defence staff less than two weeks ago, said he'll need a big, new vessel to carry up to 1,500 troops, heavy equipment and new air force heavy-lift helicopters to international hotspots, and he will need it soon.



Hmmm... I believe that's what Stephen Harper said the military needed and he would acquire (if elected PM) during the last election campaign.  The dreaded "aircraft carriers" that Paul Martin criticized Harper so much for, saying there was no need for such an expensive thing.  

I wonder if he feels differently now that it's Gen. Hillier saying it.


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## Ex-Dragoon (14 Feb 2005)

[quotHmmm... I believe that's what Stephen Harper said the military needed and he would acquire (if elected PM) during the last election campaign.  The dreaded "aircraft carriers" that Paul Martin criticized Harper so much for, saying there was no need for such an expensive thing.  

I wonder if he feels differently now that it's Gen. Hillier saying it.e]
I don't recall Gen Hillier anywhere's saying *aircraft carrier*...I seen he wants something like _HMS Albion_, thats an amphib not a carrier. there is a big difference.


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## Cloud Cover (14 Feb 2005)

I know Albion can support heavy helo's, but can it embark them, maintain etc. ? Doesn't the Albion/Bulwark class usually sail with a CV or LPH for the Helo's to have access to maintenance etc? We might end up with a much larger vessel than Albion if we wish to accomplish all those roles in one ship.  

Cheers.


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## scm77 (14 Feb 2005)

I know the difference between amphib and aircraft carrier.  

During the election Harper said he would purchase the amphibious type ships.  But Martin and his campaign said Harper would cut social programs and pour money into the military to by "aircraft carries" as he called them.  Canadians (average canaidans) don't want big ships that carry jets to bomb people.  Trying to exagerrate it and scare the public into thinking Harper would buy stuff that he wouldn't.

Hope that's clearer now


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## TangoTwoBravo (14 Feb 2005)

Big Bad John,

What are the major differences (besides size/scale) between the Royal Marine and USMC model?   Are there doctrinal differences?

In my own mind I envision Light Forces deploying strategically by sea but delivered tactically by helicopter (over the horizon?) and then supported from the sea.   We can adapt our emerging "Light Forces" to fit this role without having to create new regiments.   What would be a good "battalion-sized Task Force"?

Airforce/Navy SMEs,

What kind of helicopters do you think are being envisioned here?   Could we get a "common" helicopter with CH-47 like capabilities that could deploy on ships but also operate from land bases (ie. in the middle of Afghanistan)?   I'd trade our current helicopter fleet to achieve that (don't worry, I'm not in the position to do so!).

Cheers,

2B


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## Kirkhill (14 Feb 2005)

http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/

Everything you wanted to know about the RN and the Royal Marines (or at least a good starting point)

And yes 2B the Abion is primarily a Command and Troop Transport Vessel, the Ocean brings along the Helo support and a couple of Bay Class LSD(A) bring along the heavy gear.  Four vessels, about 70,000 tonnes total for the four (4x 16-18 tonnes) and up to something like 2800 troops when jammed to the gun'ls.  More like 1400 if used for an extended sea deployment.

However the Bay's are virtually the same ship as the Rotterdam/Enforcer type used by Holland and Spain

http://www.scheldeshipbuilding.com/products.html#
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/galicia/
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/rotterdam/

These vessels are designed to carry a disembarking force of ~600 troops,  33 MBTs or 130 APCs, 4-6 Landing Craft, 6 NH-90 type Helos or 4 EH-101s (Cormorants) in a Hangar with 2 flight spots on deck, plus a Joint Command center and a Hospital.

They Dutch Vessels and the Marines Plug in to the RN/Royal Marine Task Force or can operate independently deploying Dutch Marines to the Caribbean amongt other places.

3 JSS and an Enforcer?  JSS for AOR and a domestic amphibious role with Combat Teams and Command/Hospital and the Enforcer for Overseas Deployments with just Troop/Equipment/Helo support and no Command or Hospital function?  Could the Navy leave a JSS in theatre along with the LSD?  Together they would transport a disembarkation force of 800-900 and leave on board another 1-200 Command and Support staff.


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## big bad john (14 Feb 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Big Bad John,
> 
> What are the major differences (besides size/scale) between the Royal Marine and USMC model?   Are there doctrinal differences?
> 
> ...



The Royal Marines Corps(Yes it is always Marines) is much like you envision and vastly different fromthe USMC model.  First off, we are not an "All Arms" force.  We do have our own Pilots and Helo's in a limited amount (4 Helo Sqdns), but our Artillery and Engineers are assigned as units from the Army.  We are all Commandos.  Our "Basic" training is 32 weeks.  But it takes a full 54 weeks before you are considered fully trained.  All attached units and personnel must complete the "All Arms Commando Course" which is 12 weeks at present.  

The main maneuver formation is 3 Commando Brigade.  Try these 2 sites:  http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/141.html
http://www.royalmarinesregimental.co.uk/index.shtml

They are a good primer.

Cheers


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## Cloud Cover (14 Feb 2005)

This paper by Commander Jollymore outlines the serious conundrum posed by proceeding with the JSS: primarily, the issue is numbers. A couple of ships like the Rotterdam  would probably be great additions to the JSS fleet, which are not going to be produced in suffcient numbers to be useful to the type of force Hillier seems to want. After reading his paper, I would think having dedicated amphib ships separated from the JSS would be a damn good idea. And, after all of that, where do all the sailors come from?  The CPF's? Reserves? Civvies? 

Paper:  http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/amsc7/jollymore.htm


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## Kirkhill (14 Feb 2005)

The Dutch vessels have a crew of 124, the Spanish 115 expandable to 127 or 179.
The unarmed Brit versions require a crew of 60.  The vessel is fitted for self-defense systems (Phalanx, Goalkeeper, Chaff etc)

The Dutch and Spanish are Regs, the Brits are Royal Fleet Auxilliary or full-time civvies.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/rotterdam/
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/galicia/
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/rotterdam/

The Dutch and Spanish also operate an AOR with 148 crew plus a Hangar and Deck with 3 SeaKings and an Air Det of 19.  Vessel has a medical centre.  Room on board for an additional 20 bodies.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/patino/

Three Patinos and 2 Rotterdams could be manned with a minimum crew of 3x148 = 444 + 2x60 = 120 for a total of 564 or a maximum of about 700.  Perhaps the LSDs could be manned by a mix of Regs and Reservists - One crew Regs, 2-3 crews of Reservists - perhaps Weapons Teams drawn from the Reserves?  Perhaps Civvy crews like the Brits but again with Reservists handling weapons duties?


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## Cloud Cover (14 Feb 2005)

FWIW, unless the 280 is going to be replaced, an amphib should be armed at least with 2 x CIWS and a supplied with a shit load of extra life rafts.   Lets have someone cut and paste the past few posts into the JSS thread, where I'm sure we've had this discussion before!!!


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## Ex-Dragoon (14 Feb 2005)

whiskey 601 said:
			
		

> FWIW, unless the 280 is going to be replaced, an amphib should be armed at least with 2 x CIWS and a supplied with a crap load of extra life rafts.     Lets have someone cut and paste the past few posts into the JSS thread, where I'm sure we've had this discussion before!!!



Agreed...cause the amphib won't be worth squat without AAD.


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## FSTO (14 Feb 2005)

I was really worried about the fate of the Navy when Gen Hillier was named CDS but it seems that he is now singing from the joint handbook.

As for the JSS, 
The Navy needs AORs to replace the PROTECTEUR class (their engineering plants should be in a museum somewhere)
The Navy thought that the only way to get them was to marry up with the army for sea-lift purposes (post JTS KATIE)
Budget constraints limited the purchase to 3 (don't believe the stuff about an option for 4, 3 will be all we get)
Serious questions are being raised about the feasibility of such a hybrid, who would own them, would they be enough
Hilliers musings about a more dedicated Amphib will allow the Navy (I would hope) to procure 4 traditional AORs (with modern engineering, material handling, Command and Control) that would be under Navy control.
They Amphib could be anything from a Rotterdam or San Antonio type to a Ocean, Iwo Jima type amphib carrier that would be under DCDS control

As long an we purchased the Amphib from offshore, I think this could be concept that we could make work


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## Ex-Dragoon (14 Feb 2005)

Now FSTO...if we can sell Gen Hillier on replacing the 280s then I think the Navy will breathe a little easier.


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## Kirkhill (14 Feb 2005)

The less you try to jam into the Troop Transport and the Oilers, the more money there is likely to be for the AAD, n'est ce pas?

In other words if you only spend 320 Milliion on 2 Transports with one regular crew of 60 to 120 and supplementary reserve crews, and you buy the "traditional" AORs, how much change would that leave you from the 2.1 Bn JSS project to go to the AAD project?

And by the way, I can imagine the folks on board the transports, possibly including senior army types, would be happy to see some air defence capability in the area.   With or without point defence.

You might want to spend another couple of 100 million more on helo support, Joint HQ and hospital capabilities for 1 or both vessels.


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## Zipper (14 Feb 2005)

God, this just might work.

Budget allowing of course.

Now along with what everyone is asking I think. What about the replacements for the 280's? We'll still need more air defense as well as C&C capability when working with other nations task forces if we do go this route.

And I know it will entail a groan. But the fact that we may one day see MBT's again because of their capabilities (wish, wish, wish) and they would fit into this new version of our forces.

Man this is exciting.


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## Infanteer (15 Feb 2005)

Zipper said:
			
		

> Man this is exciting.



I knew you would catch the bug, zipper....


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## Cdn Blackshirt (15 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Now FSTO...if we can sell Gen Hillier on replacing the 280s then I think the Navy will breathe a little easier.



Hey Ex,

In your mind is it viable to bypass CADRE and move directly to the Single Ship Transition Project to replace the
280's in their current role?

Additionally, how far forward do budgetting allocations take place for naval procurement?   Specifically, if the CDS
allocated $700 - $900 million per year starting in 2010, could production facilities be in place and ready to go for 
that new design in a fixed 5 year window? 

Thanks in advance,



Matthew.


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## Ex-Dragoon (15 Feb 2005)

CADRE ran its course a few years ago as I have mentioned before. The lessons learned from CADRE and the eventual replacing of the CPFs evolved into the Single Ship Transition Project. The only way I think it could be speeded up is to get rid of the red tape and bureuacracy that DND has built up over the years whenever we go into the market for new capital projects.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (15 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> CADRE ran its course a few years ago as I have mentioned before. The lessons learned from CADRE and the eventual replacing of the CPFs evolved into the Single Ship Transition Project. The only way I think it could be speeded up is to get rid of the red tape and bureuacracy that DND has built up over the years whenever we go into the market for new capital projects.



Can you elaborate on that?  
i)   Timeline for Single Ship Transition Project Development (when could it conceiveably become operational?)
ii)   Where are the roadblocks in the current procurement model and if you were advising the CDS, what would you recommend to fix it?

Thanks again,



Matthew.


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## Ex-Dragoon (16 Feb 2005)

CB I am just a working body that is too far above my pay level but like I alluded to earlier I would streamline the red tape and bureaucracy so we could get equipment within a couple of years vice generational like it seems to be now.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (16 Feb 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> CB I am just a working body that is too far above my pay level but like I alluded to earlier I would streamline the red tape and bureaucracy so we could get equipment within a couple of years vice generational like it seems to be now.



Well then you need to hurry up and get a couple of promotions so you can throw your weight around a little.

Cheers Ex-Dragoon.



Matthew.     ;D


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## GreenerThanGreen (6 Dec 2005)

I've been thinking about this, and read some of the thread. Though it should be returned to life!  >

I'll start off simple. I think Canada should begin building up a Marine Corps. We, as its been posted, work on fixing up our current forces, but creating a Marine Corps, would open up a new avenue for potential soldiers that want different experience. Also, I believe Canada should have a quick reaction force, as threats arrive so quickly now, and opportunities to destroy them are based on timing, a CF quick reaction force IMO is a huge must in modern warfare.


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## geo (6 Dec 2005)

GTG... that's what JTF2 is all about
theyre also building up some backup... so we're covered -= more or less
but!!!... the backup force they're assembling will have to come from somewhere... ergo: they're gonna have to come from the Operational Brigades... which means that it's gonna suck for a while to come

IMHO


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## plattypuss (7 Dec 2005)

GTG

Further to Geo's comments - look up Joint Action Task Force and SCTF (Special Contingency Task Force).   The SCTF will be a "marine-like" organisation once it stands up and the JATF will be a sort of special operations type support force which will be working with JTF II.   I believe there are websites for both in the CF DIN.  Here's the "marine" site.

http://navy.dwan.dnd.ca/SCTF/


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## GreenerThanGreen (9 Dec 2005)

Looks promising. This is the kind of experience I'm looking for (without having to join the US Marines and having to toss my Canadian citizenship   )


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## artsee (22 Apr 2006)

I'm not so familiar with miltary structure and organization.  I just notice that Canada has no Marine unit.  Why?


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## vonGarvin (22 Apr 2006)

artsee said:
			
		

> I'm not so familiar with miltary structure and organization.  I just notice that Canada has no Marine unit.  Why?


No history of deploying our troops overseas to fight in a littoral environment, I suppose.


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## Fishbone Jones (22 Apr 2006)

Marines, being Navy, often require ships. 

Now, look at the Canadian Navy. 

You can't have one without the other.


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## vonGarvin (22 Apr 2006)

recceguy said:
			
		

> Marines, being Navy, often require ships.
> 
> Now, look at the Canadian Navy.
> 
> You can't have one without the other.


I guess that was the obvious answer.  I didn't see the forest for all the trees


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## Trinity (22 Apr 2006)

artsee said:
			
		

> I'm not so familiar with miltary structure and organization.  I just notice that Canada has no Marine unit.  Why?



Probably because you were too tied up in other anti-war drivel to actually take the time
too look at Canadian Forces and what it means to be a soldier.

Oh wait... sorry.. that's the other thread you posted in.   :-\


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## vonGarvin (22 Apr 2006)

Good on you, Trinity.  Me? I don't have the time (or skill) to search on what others have posted.  Cheers


Garvin out


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## zipperhead_cop (23 Apr 2006)

artsee said:
			
		

> I'm not so familiar with miltary structure and organization.  I just notice that Canada has no Marine unit.  Why?



Gee, I guess since we are pawns of the American War Machine we should hurry up and form a Marine unit, right?  Then we can be hated all through the world as well, according to you  :
I call you "slinky"


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## Screw (23 Apr 2006)

Hi Artsee, while Im not a fan of your politics- its an interesting question and I wouldnt mind an answer from any of our resident historians- The Spanish, The french, the Brits and the Americans have them....and a couple smaller countries as well. Its just something we never really got into.


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## geo (23 Apr 2006)

let's identify the need, develop the doctrine and then staff the force..........
(not staff the force and then figure out what to do with it)


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## Old Sweat (23 Apr 2006)

I am not sure if I qualify as a resident historian, but marines originated in the days of sail as troops embarked on ships of the line to perform a variety of tasks such as assisting in the maintenance of discipline, engaging enemy crew from positions in the masts, forming the nucleus of landing parties, etc. In the Victorian era marines began to be employed in a expeditionary role in support of expansionist policies. As our navy was not formed until the early twentieth century and our foreign and defence policy was, until now, Eurocetric and colonial in attitude, the force planners could and would not have given marines more than a passing thought.


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## Screw (23 Apr 2006)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I am not sure if I qualify as a resident historian, but marines originated in the days of sail as troops embarked on ships of the line to perform a variety of tasks such as assisting in the maintenance of discipline, engaging enemy crew from positions in the masts, forming the nucleus of landing parties, etc. In the Victorian era marines began to be employed in a expeditionary role in support of expansionist policies. As our navy was not formed until the early twentieth century and our foreign and defence policy was, until now, Eurocetric and colonial in attitude, the force planners could and would not have given marines more than a passing thought.



I can dig it.  ;D i figured it had to be something to do with us having a youthful navy. For the record I wasnt advocating us creating such a force now. More wondering why it never happened in the past!


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## geo (23 Apr 2006)

......... old sweat's explanation is bang on WRT why we didn't have one.
we still don't have one cause we don't have a mission that would require the doctrine to be developed (nor the kit for them to work from)


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 Apr 2006)

Besides we are not alone with not having a Marine force...I don't recall Australian, New Zealand or South Africa having one either...


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## FluffyWolf (23 Apr 2006)

America is the one with a Marine Corp. (maybe other countrys but all I know)


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## Scoobie Newbie (23 Apr 2006)

Royal Marines.


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## Old Sweat (23 Apr 2006)

The Netherlands and Taiwan both have marines, as does South Korea (I believe). In Mexico I have seen troops in dark uniforms guarding naval installations, but I do not know whether these were sailors, naval infantry or marines.


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## rz350 (23 Apr 2006)

AS does Russia (naval Infanty with amphibious APC's...marines) China apperantly has some kind of Marine Unit. To name a few nations with them. I would guess Canada doesnt have them as it doesnt need them? But you could say the infantry units landing on the beachs in WWII and Korea where acting as marines, that is, INfantry units attacking from sea and forcing a landing...


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 Apr 2006)

rz350 said:
			
		

> AS does Russia (naval Infanty with amphibious APC's...marines) China apperantly has some kind of Marine Unit. To name a few nations with them. I would guess Canada doesnt have them as it doesnt need them? But you could say the infantry units landing on the beachs in WWII and Korea where acting as marines, that is, INfantry units attacking from sea and forcing a landing...



That does not make them marines though.


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## scm77 (23 Apr 2006)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marines#List_of_national_marine_corps.2C_by_country


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## rz350 (23 Apr 2006)

True, they are not really designated as, or having the equipment of a true marine unit (organic naval deployment and the like) but they where acting hand in hand with the USMC, doing the exact same role in pretty much the same way, which is why I mentioned them acting as marines. But its true, they are not a real marine unit. I was just trying to show that Canada has been invovled, (successfully at that) with "marine style" warfare.


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## geo (23 Apr 2006)

Fluffy - If you had bothered to read the above posts before jumping in you would note that the Americans, Brits, the French & Spain have Marines (of the naval infantry genre).


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## DiamondDarryl (2 Jan 2007)

I heard a small rumor last month from LFCTA Meafrod that the prospect of Canadian Marines might not be so far off. Ive heard how rumors go in the CF but we will wait and see.


----------



## Sig_Des (2 Jan 2007)

DiamondDarryl said:
			
		

> I heard a small rumor last month from LFCTA Meafrod that the prospect of Canadian Marines might not be so far off. Ive heard how rumors go in the CF but we will wait and see.



Try doing a search on the Standing Contingency Task Force, probably the source of your rumour.

BTW, congrats on bringing up an 8 month old thread without actually adding any insightful information


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## geo (3 Jan 2007)

Darryl,
The CF borrowed a ship from the US Navy to trial out some doctrine.
Will this mean a "regiment" of marines? don't think so.  Infantry battalions, Armd Reg'ts, Arty Reg'ts and CERs will get some additional new hats to fit into....


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## DiamondDarryl (3 Jan 2007)

Thanks for the sarcasm free response Geo. Sounds like a good time too me. Any idea when they were trying this out?


----------



## aesop081 (3 Jan 2007)

DiamondDarryl said:
			
		

> Thanks for the sarcasm free response Geo. Sounds like a good time too me. Any idea when they were trying this out?



ITEE was over in November IIRC


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## geo (3 Jan 2007)

Short trial with R22R Coy was in November.
Believe they are supposed to have another go at it in the Spring (feb/march) time frame.


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## TN2IC (8 Jan 2007)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In Mexico I have seen troops in dark uniforms guarding naval installations, but I do not know whether these were sailors, naval infantry or marines.



Commissionaires.... just kidding...had to say it.


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## TN2IC (8 Jan 2007)

geo said:
			
		

> Darryl,
> The CF borrowed a ship from the US Navy to trial out some doctrine.
> Will this mean a "regiment" of marines? don't think so.  Infantry battalions, Armd Reg'ts, Arty Reg'ts and CERs will get some additional new hats to fit into....




I seen parts of it... very intresting.


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## 3rd Horseman (8 Jan 2007)

TN2IC said:
			
		

> Commissionaires.... just kidding...had to say it.



That would be Commissionaros.


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## Chilme (7 Oct 2010)

Can anyone speculate as to why Canada is with a specialized Marine Force like the Royal Marines or USMC.

I think it is unfortunate that the CF must borrow equipment, facilities, and trainers from the US Marines to practice amphibious assaults.


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## dangerboy (7 Oct 2010)

> Can anyone speculate as to why Canada is with a specialized Marine Force like the Royal Marines or USMC.



I presume you meant to ask why we are without a specialized Marine Force.  If not I am not sure I understand the question.


----------



## Chilme (7 Oct 2010)

Yes it should have been without a marine force


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## aesop081 (7 Oct 2010)

Do we need one ?


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## dangerboy (7 Oct 2010)

I agree with CND Aviator.  Amphibious assaults are a rather specialized  form of reaching the objective and with the size of our army it is not worth specializing in it.  The USMC and Royal Marines are a large enough field force that they can practice it.  If Canada was to adopt it, I don't believe we would ever do it above company size and that size of formation is to small to make any sort of impact besides small SF types raids which would be handled by CANSOFCOM and you would never hear any details about.


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## Chilme (7 Oct 2010)

I would think so.  Given the amount of coastline, number of islands, and prevalence on inland waterways that could potentially demand a specialized amphibious capability.  I watched a tv show about the Vandoo's training with the USMC to practice amphibious assaults (using US vessels).  If they were training for it, I presume there is a perceived need.


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## dangerboy (7 Oct 2010)

I have to disagree, if Canada was going to be part of an assault on some country that is an island we would most likely be part of a coalition force.  The other countries that have large forces that train in this type of warfare (USA or Great Britain) would most likely be the ones to do the initial assault on  the beach and once the beachhead has been secure than they would send in the remaining forces via airlift.


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## Chilme (7 Oct 2010)

dangerboy said:
			
		

> I agree with CND Aviator.  Amphibious assaults are a rather specialized  form of reaching the objective and with the size of our army it is not worth specializing in it.  The USMC and Royal Marines are a large enough field force that they can practice it.  If Canada was to adopt it, I don't believe we would ever do it above company size and that size of formation is to small to make any sort of impact besides small SF types raids which would be handled by CANSOFCOM and you would never hear any details about.



A pondered a similar concept.  It seems like Canadian SF are depended on for a multitude of roles.  Lets just hope they are not in demand in several rolls at once.  I could foresee CANSOFCOM being overstretched quite quickly.


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## aesop081 (7 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> I would think so.



I do not. This is a niche capability that requires massive ammounts of resources. We do not have what is required to do it and we have little to no requirement for it.



> If they were training for it, I presume there is a perceived need.



You are confusing 2 issues. That does not establish a need for our own marine corps.


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## SevenSixTwo (7 Oct 2010)

Wasn't it Canadian "Land" forces that landed in WW2? If it was a coalition attack it would most likely be the same.

Also, to someone saying "there are too many islands! We need a marine force!". I disagree. 

If the enemy wants to put a large amount of troops on a tiny island with how strong airpower is and how much easier it is to transport land forces I say bomb the island or clear the seas/skys and continue forward.

Besides, we really don't need a lot of WW2/WW3 type equipment/forces at the moment as you can see by our gigantic submarine navy.


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## Oh No a Canadian (7 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> Given the amount of coastline, number of islands, and prevalence on inland waterways that could potentially demand a specialized amphibious capability.



So the CF should train to attack its own coastlines?


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## medaid (7 Oct 2010)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> Besides, we really don't need a lot of WW2/WW3 type equipment/forces at the moment as you can see by our gigantic submarine navy.



Spoken like someone of the unknowing....


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## daftandbarmy (7 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> A pondered a similar concept.  It seems like Canadian SF are depended on for a multitude of roles.  Lets just hope they are not in demand in several rolls at once.  I could foresee CANSOFCOM being overstretched quite quickly.



It's not that complicated... really. 

I mean, if you're going to pull off another Normandy sure, it's complicated. But moving Coy/Bn Gp sized units around on landing craft/ heli etc isn't that complicated, especially if you're not doing USMC style frontal assaults. Most units (probably like the Van Doos you saw) are quite capable of carrying out these operations, as well as air landing type operations, with realtively little work up training. The staff levels are the ones that really need the preparation, what with all the coordination between shipping/ aircraft, and the weather/sea conditions being so fickle.

As for specialized shipping, I've participated in quite large (Bde Gp) exercises successfully launched from leased civilian ferries. The landing craft can take you right off the car deck (following a piping hot breakfast with the latest newspaper, and a last round of shuffle board, of course).

I would also caution you against underestimating the quality of your average Canadian infantry unit. Not to denigrate our glorious allies, but our folks stack up pretty well in comparison in many cases.


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## ArmyRick (8 Oct 2010)

If future conflicts take us to repeated incidents or operations in small islands or coast lines that require frequent amphibious operations, than yes at that time, it would be appropriate to re-role some land units to take on that capability. We would also need amphibious ships and landing craft.

I do agree we should maintain a small (and inexpensive) fleet of landing craft, maybe 6-8 LCVP and 1-2 LCU. This would not gobble up much man power and allow us to do limited training in "marine" operations. One of the roles of the future JSS is supposed to be able to support a limited number of "at sea, ready to go" troops.

Watch and see, who knows.

#1, we need to see a larger threat or the potential to operate in these types of operations.


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## Jungle (8 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> I watched a tv show about the Vandoo's training with the USMC to practice amphibious assaults (using US vessels).  If they were training for it, I presume there is a perceived need.



If you are talking about the trg that took place last year, that event was part of work-up for the NEO Coy. But I see your point; I don't think we need a dedicated Marine force, but we need assets to permit amphibious operations. I have been on 2 operational deployments where the MoE was from the sea, and we are always dependent on others when it comes to maritime movement; kinda like we were with regards to helicopters in Afg.


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## Chilme (8 Oct 2010)

Jungle said:
			
		

> If you are talking about the trg that took place last year, that event was part of work-up for the NEO Coy. But I see your point; I don't think we need a dedicated Marine force, but we need assets to permit amphibious operations. I have been on 2 operational deployments where the MoE was from the sea, and we are always dependent on others when it comes to maritime movement; kinda like we were with regards to helicopters in Afg.



I'm not suggesting Canada should attack its own coastline/islands.  I'm just saying our forces should be able to operate anywhere on our soil.  I agree with ArmyRick, we don't need a dedicated Corps.  A corps is too big and that would be beyond any perceived need.  However, owning some resources to get the job done by Canadians seems necessary.  

To me it seems ridiculous that a portion of our military strategy is solely dependent on foreign resources.  One can never 100% guarantee they will be available.


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## SevenSixTwo (8 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> I'm not suggesting Canada should attack its own coastline/islands.  I'm just saying our forces should be able to operate anywhere on our soil.  I agree with ArmyRick, we don't need a dedicated Corps.  A corps is too big and that would be beyond any perceived need.  However, owning some resources to get the job done by Canadians seems necessary.
> 
> To me it seems ridiculous that a portion of our military strategy is solely dependent on foreign resources.  One can never 100% guarantee they will be available.



So instead of Winter Survival training we should begin Extreme Winter Survival training to fight those commies over our islands? 

I must admit isn't it not so cost effecient hoping that Canadian soldiers will be trained for arid, cold, air, sea, jungle, etc?

I would imagine it would be cheaper to just train small groups for cold weather, air assault, amphibious assault, mountain warfare, guerilla warfare.

However, as it stands now most Canadian infantry do get some of this training making our infantry extremely valuable, flexible and well trained in comparison to other countries.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> If future conflicts take us to repeated incidents or operations in small islands or coast lines that require frequent amphibious operations, than yes at that time, it would be appropriate to re-role some land units to take on that capability. We would also need amphibious ships and landing craft.
> 
> I do agree we should maintain a small (and inexpensive) fleet of landing craft, maybe 6-8 LCVP and 1-2 LCU. This would not gobble up much man power and allow us to do limited training in "marine" operations. One of the roles of the future JSS is supposed to be able to support a limited number of "at sea, ready to go" troops.
> 
> ...



I agree with the idea to retain some landing craft resources along with developing the expertise to run them. If we're not preparing for Tarawa-like assaults, we should also plan to make better use of civilian LC-type and 'littoral' operations resources, on contract, which abound in most coastal environments in Canada.


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## PanaEng (8 Oct 2010)

MedTech said:
			
		

> Spoken like someone of the unknowing....


spoken like someone of the unknowing of sarcasm...

lol  

cheers,


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## Chilme (8 Oct 2010)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> So instead of Winter Survival training we should begin Extreme Winter Survival training to fight those commies over our islands?
> 
> I must admit isn't it not so cost effecient hoping that Canadian soldiers will be trained for arid, cold, air, sea, jungle, etc?
> 
> ...



I'm not sure what you are trying to say about Extreme Winter Survival vs Winter Survival???  That sound like a different topic.

I would agree with you in that it is expensive and time consuming to train fighting units to fight in all environments.  Once members are fully trained, they are a highly valuable military assets.  Although I will say it would be very hard for a unit to be to excel in all environments.  Its like expecting an elite athlete to be world class at running, swimming, skiing, weight lifting. Not possible!

Although relatively small specialized units for various environments (winter, marine, desert, jungle, mountain, etc) would allow for an affordable answer.  It would give the CF an upto date and advanced capability.  It would be a tall order to expect ,for example, an RCR soldier to be highly capable at rucking, skiing, mountaineering, swimming, canoeing, snowshoeing, shooting, winter survival, desert survival, jungle survival, etc, and in tune with all differences of working in each environment.  It overwhelming.


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## SevenSixTwo (8 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> I'm not sure what you are trying to say about Extreme Winter Survival vs Winter Survival???  That sound like a different topic.
> 
> I would agree with you in that it is expensive and time consuming to train fighting units to fight in all environments.  Once members are fully trained, they are a highly valuable military assets.  Although I will say it would be very hard for a unit to be to excel in all environments.  Its like expecting an elite athlete to be world class at running, swimming, skiing, weight lifting. Not possible!
> 
> Although relatively small specialized units for various environments (winter, marine, desert, jungle, mountain, etc) would allow for an affordable answer.  It would give the CF an upto date and advanced capability.  It would be a tall order to expect ,for example, an RCR soldier to be highly capable at rucking, skiing, mountaineering, swimming, canoeing, snowshoeing, shooting, winter survival, desert survival, jungle survival, etc, and in tune with all differences of working in each environment.  It overwhelming.



It also goes hand in hand with what kind of soldier Canada wants. (Using U.S. as example). Alright, your trained as a Humvee driver go do that for 4 years and then we'll talk OR as a Canadian soldier you could get a vast range of training to do multiple jobs. Now part of this reason is because our military isn't very large. So I think for any force specific environemnts (AKA: Marines) to exist we will need to reach our current Military #'s goal of 100,000 soldiers.


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## Journeyman (8 Oct 2010)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> ....we will need to reach our current Military #'s goal of 100,000 soldiers.


Do you have a source for this?


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## FoverF (8 Oct 2010)

A lot of the reason that the Canadian Forces and the USMC are mentioned in the same sentance is that the USMC seems to be the pre-eminent single branch combined arms force in the world. Since the CF (on paper, anyways) is also trying to be a single-branch combined arms force, it only makes sense that the CF would seek to emulate them. 

But I do not think that Canada should have a specialized marine service, ala the American or British miliatries with their USMC/RM. Despite being a branch of the US military, the USMC makes it an absolute priority to be capable of operating in a combat theatre overseas with little or no support from other branches of the US military. Unfortunately (although some are perfectly happy with this) I would say that the USMC are more successful in being able to operate without the support of other American services than Her Majesty's Canadian Forces are.

So in that regard, I think the USMC is a valid role model for the CF in many ways (even though they do not concern themselves with many tasks essential to the CF, such as air-to-air combat, maritime patol, and operating surface combatants).

All of which is simply to say this: I think the CF are better served trying to BE more like the USMC in some respects, rather to HAVE a USMC-like organization within the CF.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> Although relatively small specialized units for various environments (winter, marine, desert, jungle, mountain, etc) would allow for an affordable answer.  It would give the CF an upto date and advanced capability.  It would be a tall order to expect ,for example, an RCR soldier to be highly capable at rucking, skiing, mountaineering, swimming, canoeing, snowshoeing, shooting, winter survival, desert survival, jungle survival, etc, and in tune with all differences of working in each environment.  It overwhelming.



In the SAS they operate four troops in a squadron, tasked to excel in one of four different elements viz:

"Boat troop — are specialists in maritime skills using scuba diving, kayaks and Rigid-hulled inflatable boats and often train with the Special Boat Service.[51]

Air troop — are experts in free fall parachuting, High Altitude-Low Opening (HALO) and High Altitude-High Opening (HAHO) techniques.[51]

Mobility troop — are specialists in using vehicles and are experts in desert warfare;[52] they are also trained in an advanced level of motor mechanics to field-repair any vehicular breakdown.[53]

Mountain troop — are specialists in Arctic combat and survival, using specialist equipment such as skis, snowshoes and mountain climbing techniques.[51]

In 1980 R Squadron was formed which has since been renamed L Detachment; its members are all ex-regular SAS regiment soldiers who have a commitment to reserve service."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Air_Service


The theory is that if a certain operation calls for mountain expertise, mountain troop leads, and trains the other troops up to the required standard. Everyone in the squadron gets a basic training package that prepares them for operations in a mountain environment, they just don't do it all the time. The ramp up to the required skill level is therefore pretty quick because you're not starting from scratch. 

Why not do something like this in the CF? For example, in addition to all the other things each infantry battalion has to do, each rifle company could specialize in a particular skill. We've already got a Jump Company in each Bn - there's your 'air' specialization. Task each of the other three with either boat, mobility and mountain specializations.

If there's a big drama in the maritime environment, for example, task a Bn to look after it and their 'boat company' can get them up to speed. If there's something really special required on a large scale, combine all the 'boat companies' in the infantry and off they go - as a 'marine battalion' or something.


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## SevenSixTwo (8 Oct 2010)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Do you have a source for this?



Source: Peter McKay

Granted it could have been just blowing smoke.

I can't give you a video or an article because it was during a speech he gave without media.


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## Chilme (8 Oct 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In the SAS they operate four troops in a squadron, tasked to excel in one of four different elements viz:
> 
> "Boat troop — are specialists in maritime skills using scuba diving, kayaks and Rigid-hulled inflatable boats and often train with the Special Boat Service.[51]
> 
> ...



I agree 100% with you on this.  I believe the CF should adapt a model like that.

To the comment about 100,000 Canadian troops.  that number comes out of the Canada First Defence Strategy.  The goal of the strategy is projected to be 70,000 Reg and 30,000 Res by 2030.


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## ArmyRick (8 Oct 2010)

Here is an idea. To develop an amphibious capability why not add an extra squadron to 4ESR in Gagetown? We could add in something like 2 x British LCU MK 10 (7 man crew) and 4-6 x British LCVP (3 man crews), then add in some rigid raiders for fun (Each can be manned by 1-2 man). I am looking at a squadron total of like 60 some odd troops. Manning assault landing craft in our military would be an engieer task (To permit friendly forces to live, MOVE, fight on the battlefield).

The other idea would be to have the navy man such a unit. Their would not be a huge need for the infantry to do all kinds of extra training. I have done amphibious exercise with the devil dogs before and at the grunt level its a matter of being on the right craft at the right time (Helicopter, amtrack, Hovercraft, etc, etc).

My idea is not too costly and very much do-able (providing there is the will power to see it done) and it also depends on people not overthinking it and turning it into an all singing-dancing-creative new squadron or unit (We tend to have people take a simple thing too far and end up with nothing at times). Ideas? Thoughts?


----------



## lethalLemon (8 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Here is an idea. To develop an amphibious capability why not add an extra squadron to 4ESR in Gagetown? We could add in something like 2 x British LCU MK 10 (7 man crew) and 4-6 x British LCVP (3 man crews), then add in some rigid raiders for fun (Each can be manned by 1-2 man). I am looking at a squadron total of like 60 some odd troops. Manning assault landing craft in our military would be an engieer task (To permit friendly forces to live, MOVE, fight on the battlefield).
> 
> The other idea would be to have the navy man such a unit. Their would not be a huge need for the infantry to do all kinds of extra training. I have done amphibious exercise with the devil dogs before and at the grunt level its a matter of being on the right craft at the right time (Helicopter, amtrack, Hovercraft, etc, etc).
> 
> My idea is not too costly and very much do-able (providing there is the will power to see it done) and it also depends on people not overthinking it and turning it into an all singing-dancing-creative new squadron or unit (We tend to have people take a simple thing too far and end up with nothing at times). Ideas? Thoughts?



I'd be down, that would rock my socks off!


----------



## jollyjacktar (8 Oct 2010)

Jungle said:
			
		

> If you are talking about the trg that took place last year, that event was part of work-up for the NEO Coy.



No, he saw the Truth Duty Valour episode that covered the exercises off Camp Lejeune in 06.  We rented/borrowed USS GUNSTON HALL in order to learn how to land a small force from the sea.  At this time we in the Navy were starting to make small steps towards getting into this capability.   You might remember General Rick's "Big Honking Ships"?  It was later set aside and put back into the tickle trunk for another time.  A shame as there were quite a number of us who were greatly interested in getting on board with that project.

Could we use this ability?  Yes, we damn well could.  I'm not talking about revisiting D Day either.  Humanitarian relief would be much easier if we had the gear, training and ships to land the necessary items from the sea to a place as hmmmm.... Haiti for starters.  Not everywhere will have a nice harbour and facility to come into and land gear ala JSS.


----------



## lethalLemon (8 Oct 2010)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> No, he saw the Truth Duty Valour episode that covered the exercises off Camp Lejeune in 06.  We rented/borrowed USS GUNSTON HALL in order to learn how to land a small force from the sea.  At this time we in the Navy were starting to make small steps towards getting into this capability.   You might remember General Rick's "Big Honking Ships"?  It was later set aside and put back into the tickle trunk for another time.  A shame as there were quite a number of us who were greatly interested in getting on board with that project.
> 
> Could we use this ability?  Yes, we damn well could.  I'm not talking about revisiting D Day either.  Humanitarian relief would be much easier if we had the gear, training and ships to land the necessary items from the sea to a place as hmmmm.... Haiti for starters.  Not everywhere will have a nice harbour and facility to come into and land gear ala JSS.



That, and not every location in the world will have serviceable airfield to land the Globemasters on (although a Herc can pretty much land anywhere, anytime). So for large humanitarian projects like Earthquake relief in Haiti, Pakistan, Chile; amphibious capabilities would only increase your operational abilities by a *minimum* of tenfold.


----------



## Haligonian (8 Oct 2010)

I like this idea.  How would this work though with qualifications?  Would we need to create a new "Basic Marine Ops", and "Advanced Marine Ops" courses?  The mountain coys, would  every troop have to be basic mountain ops qualified with NCO's and maybe officers AMO qualified and if so do we begin to pigeon hole our troops into remaining in one coy for their whole careers iot maximise the use of their qualification?  How does this work with mech units and their all mighty PCF cycle?


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## ArmyRick (8 Oct 2010)

No, no, BIG NO to the idea of a Basic Marine Ops. As I have said, at the basic grunt level, there is very little thinking. In fact the ground level grunt does more in our current assault boat drills than he would with powered water craft. It would take a day or two of having rehearsals down pat and knowing the emergency water drills. The real thinking comes at the leadership level. 
They have to break down the manifest (similar to loading hercs for a TALEX)
They have to decide how to secure beach, port, harbour, etc.
They have to decide actions on once on the ground.

Basically they would have to put into their estimate and I see WO and CSMs being busy planning the loading. Or you create a unit NCO similar to Unit emplanning NCO who would do up manifest. That manifest BTW would not just be troops but gear as well and deciding who /what goes in what waves.

DO NOT MAKE a basic qualification out of it or it will get retarded. I have done amphibious ops and there is very little ground pounder work to it but participating in rehearsals and knowing what drills they have to do and when. You start making yet another course/qualification and too many things will **** it up (money, standards, time, etc, etc).

I would reccomend a "Unit Amphibious Operations Advisor" Qualification because as I said, it the real thinking is at leadership levels not the troopy levels. We would also need to make a specialist course for engineers posted to my fictional squadron at 4ESR. So the engineers would need a qualification for it to operate the watercraft I am talking about.

The LCU MK10 can transport 120 troops or 1 x MBT or equivalent loads (So for combat or humanitarian releif, its got uses)
The LCVP can transport 35 troops or light vehicles or equivalent

The various models of the rigid raiders can lift anywhere from 8-16 troops and they are fairly fast.

Again, do not over think this or make it into something overly grand, Keep it simple and effective.


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## Pusser (8 Oct 2010)

I think that the RM and USMC continue to exist largely because they are old and established.  The RM was established because the Royal Navy saw a need for soldiers that the British Army could not provide (their history can be traced back to an era where the British were very reluctant to form a standing army).  Marines were first used for the hand to hand fighting when boarding enemy ships and as sharpshooters in the rigging).  Their role expanded to on board security and amphibious operations over time (and let's not forget the band).  The USMC was established because the USN was modeled on the RN, so marines were a logical component and, in 1797, they were still useful in their original role.  None of the later Royal navies (RCN, RAN, RNZN, etc.), which were all established in the age of steam, included marines and they've all done just fine without them.  We've always used the army for all amphibious operations and they've proved very capable.  In short, the British and the Americans have marines because they've always had them and to disband them would be start a huge fight with traditionalists (think what we went through with unification).  We've never had them and so we accomplish the same tasks with other units.  It's more a question of how we organize our armed forces than one of whether we have the "right kind" of forces.

On an interesting side note, the USMC has done some serious thinking lately as to whether they should continue with their amphibious role, at least as far as full on beach assaults are concerned.


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## ArmyRick (8 Oct 2010)

I don't think anyone is advocating the creation of an actual Canadian Marines but more the capability to the amphibious operations (not the full on D-Day landings either, we simply at this time do not have the threat nor the ability to match it).


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## Kirkhill (8 Oct 2010)

It must be the quality of scotch I'm drinking these days but I am starting to like the idea of ArmyRick for CDS.....Is there a write-in somewhere?

And Field Marshall Slim would agree with him.

If the Navy can't find the bodies to run small boats then the Engineers seem like a good option.  Don't the Engineers run those bumper boats use by the logging companies on the west coast when the army wants to hold a pontoon bridge in place?

LCUs and LCVPs (and perhaps, maybe, pretty please....some of those Swedish Combat Boats) operated by the naval reserve would still be a good option I think.

As far as big boats are concerned, as D&B points out we could always by Marine Atlantic a couple of spare Maersk ferries .... NATO has regularly used Maersk ferries in the Baltic and points beyond.

Daft.... Is there a shuffle board serial somewhere that one needs to sign up for?  Or is the training just what is expected of the well rounded bootie?


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## Armymedic (9 Oct 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The theory is that if a certain operation calls for mountain expertise, mountain troop leads, and trains the other troops up to the required standard. Everyone in the squadron gets a basic training package that prepares them for operations in a mountain environment, they just don't do it all the time. The ramp up to the required skill level is therefore pretty quick because you're not starting from scratch.
> 
> Why not do something like this in the CF? For example, in addition to all the other things each infantry battalion has to do, each rifle company could specialize in a particular skill. We've already got a Jump Company in each Bn - there's your 'air' specialization. Task each of the other three with either boat, mobility and mountain specializations.



Once the CF is done with Afghanistan and actually spent time training for operations, and not just training to finish all the checkboxes for the one specific operation, we can let our Light Battalions ( if they even exist anymore) return to that function that was so well served by the old Airborne regiment model doing almost exactly what was described above.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (9 Oct 2010)

Pusser makes an excellent point: Marines were never meant to exist as a full army model. They were protection force/raiders for the Navy as their core mission. In the UK, they still are: the RM commandos are just that - commandos. In the US it is only after WWII that they retained a bigger size that lets them do more than limited foreign ventures.

Historically, the largest amphibious assaults have been the purview of the armies, not marines, with the larger ships operated by the navies. Even today (little known fact) the largest amphibious assault fleet is operated by the US Army, not the marines.

The training required of the soldiers to carry out a landing is not so complicated that it can't be done within a few rehearsals and the underlying concept (the beach is a kill zone - when the door opens get off the beach asap and move inland) is straightforward for otherwise well trained soldiers.

As for the operation of landing crafts and boats, this is done by the Boatswain trade and it is part of their training already. Yes, because we have landing crafts: the AOR's each carry two and Provider's are on the beach on wood chucks somewhere (so I've been told).

The real talent involved in amphibious assault is logistical. Anyone who has seen "A Bridge Too Far" will recall the scene where the paratrooper rushes into no man's land to pick up a container of what they expect to be ammunition, only to be shot there and reveal that it was a container of berets. That is the trick with Amphibious assaults because loading and unloading a ship can only be done in a certain order and with a certain speed. Thus, you have to plan things just right so that when the troops on the beach need C4, that is what they get handed, not a typewriter! 

That is a naval task however and the USMC has an excellent "Combat Logistics" course for Navy and Marines logistics officers and "Amphibious Operations Staff Officer" course for the navy line officers about to serve on board the amphibious assault ships. They are quite willing to train other nations in this and some Canadian naval officers have attended these courses in the past (even some naval reserve officers). Should we acquire the Big Honking Ships, it would be fairly easy to ensure that the Combat Officers and Sea Log officers serving on those are rotated through the USMC courses before their posting.

I agree with ArmyRick on the land side of things: Once training for Afg only is over, all that is needed is to assign each infantry Battalion a specific fighting environment in which to keep at least one Coy at readiness (be it mountain ops, desert ops, amphibious, etc) Should the need arise, this would provide one "ready" force to deploy in such environment right away while follow on forces get themselves trained up to it.  

This leaves only the acquisition of "the Ships". And on that count, there may be an opportunity coming up (just speculating here at this time based on leaks in England) for Canada if the government is bold enough to seize it: In the current British Military Budget Review going in the coalition government, the Navy has offered to lay up its amphibious fleet. This would render the two Albion class LPD available, possibly even HMS Ocean, the assault helicopter carrier. They all have lots of life left in them, especially if something could be negotiated BEFORE they are left along the wall for eight years to rot.

So do we need this capability? Well its not an essential one, but it would be a damn useful one. We could have used it in Haiti, in Newfoundland and Labrador  just weeks ago, in Somalia, when an AOR was all we had for troop support, to extract Canadian citizens from Lebanon a few years back (the government had to hire merchant ships), would be useful to have when the big one hits Vancouver, and it would most definitely be usefull in Arctic sovereignty operations. Any one who has been up there on ops knows that the most useful thing for the army support is helicopters and the most difficult thing to forward base and support there is ... helicopters! These type of ships would resolve that.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Oct 2010)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> It also goes hand in hand with what kind of soldier Canada wants. (Using U.S. as example). Alright, your trained as a Humvee driver go do that for 4 years and then we'll talk OR as a Canadian soldier you could get a vast range of training to do multiple jobs. Now part of this reason is because our military isn't very large. So I think for any force specific environemnts (AKA: Marines) to exist we will need to reach our current Military #'s goal of 100,000 soldiers.



Friend of mine has been in for 4 years and has 2 years as a LAV driver.  He'd get a real kick out of your "vast amount of training" comment.


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## George Wallace (9 Oct 2010)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Friend of mine has been in for 4 years and has 2 years as a LAV driver.  He'd get a real kick out of your "vast amount of training" comment.



You and your "friend" don't have much time in do you?


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## SevenSixTwo (9 Oct 2010)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Friend of mine has been in for 4 years and has 2 years as a LAV driver.  He'd get a real kick out of your "vast amount of training" comment.



He'd also get a real kick out of how specific U.S. Military jobs are. What's that? You want to do laundry and fix clothes? 

WELL, guess what! The U.S. Military has that too! The Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist!

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/administrative-support/shower-laundry-and-clothing-repair-specialist.html


What's that young chap? You don't want to load the artillery gun you just want to do the data control which, would normally be a course in the Canadian Forces? Well guess what! That's too hard for everyone to learn so we made three seperate occupations just to manage one gun.

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/field-artillery-automated-tactical-data-system-specialist.html

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/field-artillery-firefinder-radar-operator.html

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/fire-support-specialist.html


Do I need to illustrate myself more? In the Canadian Army one could be trained to eventually do all of these jobs. 


You MAY NOT think your training is vast but when the U.S. Military trains a gunner in 15 weeks and the Canadian Military trains a gunner in 24 weeks (I don't know how long DP1 Artillery is). You don't think something is up?


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## George Wallace (9 Oct 2010)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Pusser makes an excellent point: Marines were never meant to exist as a full army model. They were protection force/raiders for the Navy as their core mission. In the UK, they still are: the RM commandos are just that - commandos. In the US it is only after WWII that they retained a bigger size that lets them do more than limited foreign ventures.
> 
> Historically, the largest amphibious assaults have been the purview of the armies, not marines, with the larger ships operated by the navies. Even today (little known fact) the largest amphibious assault fleet is operated by the US Army, not the marines.



If you are only looking at the European Theatre during WW II then I would agree with you.  The South Pacific, however, was not so.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Oct 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You and your "friend" don't have much time in do you?



Nope not at all, we're a bunch of noobs.

George can you tell me about what kind of training and courses LAV drivers get in the battalion?


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## George Wallace (9 Oct 2010)

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Nope not at all, we're a bunch of noobs.
> 
> George can you tell me about what kind of training and courses LAV drivers get in the battalion?



Not being at a Bn I can't tell you.  I can tell you that they will not spend their whole career as a LAV driver.

What a LAV driver does at a Sqn or Reg't, I can.  (S)He will be doing D&M on not only the LAV, but probably on the whole range of B Vehs in the unit.  (S)He will also be doing Comms training, First Aid Trg, and the full range of training on wpns from C7/C8, C6, C9, M72, Carl G, M203 Grenade Launcher, Grenades, etc.  They will be taught Tactics.  Within a few years (s)he will likely get on a 25 mm Turret Operators Course, or a Surveillance Course.  One does not remain a LAV driver for very long, before progressing on to another job.  Not only that, all members of the crew must have a basic understanding of what each member's job is. 

But your friend should have told you all this.


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## Old Sweat (9 Oct 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> If you are only looking at the European Theatre during WW II then I would agree with you.  The South Pacific, however, was not so.


There was an article in the old Canadian Army Journal in the early sixties by then LCol (later LGen and then Senator) SC Waters who was the CFLO at Quantico re the Marine Corps. He noted that despite the fact that the US Army conducted more amphibious operations than the USMC in the Second World War, the latter was firmly fixed in the public's mind as the force that did all the landings in the Pacific. The army had conducted two landings in the Aleutians (one of which included 13 CIB), several in New Guinea and the Philipines and of course Okinawa. There were also some landings which included both army and marine formations.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Oct 2010)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> He'd also get a real kick out of how specific U.S. Military jobs are. What's that? You want to do laundry and fix clothes?
> 
> WELL, guess what! The U.S. Military has that too! The Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist!
> 
> http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/administrative-support/shower-laundry-and-clothing-repair-specialist.html



Is this your attempt to try and make fun of the US Military?   Someone who does a support task like laundry and tailoring clothing isn't important in an army of hundreds of thousands of soldiers.  That it's somehow less honourable? The US war machine is gigantic, I'd actually rate laundry and tailoring as pretty damn important.  What's the longest you've went in the same set of combats SevenSixTwo?  Hygene probably isn't a big deal though. You figure grunts should cross train to be laundry dudes?



> What's that young chap? You don't want to load the artillery gun you just want to do the data control which, would normally be a course in the Canadian Forces? Well guess what! That's too hard for everyone to learn so we made three separate occupations just to manage one gun.
> 
> http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/field-artillery-automated-tactical-data-system-specialist.html
> 
> ...



More LOLz 
Instructor-student ratio is one of the biggest issues in the CF.  Considering the size difference between us and the US, plus the soldiers they loose to civilian jobs, private security, injury and death do you think the US faces the same kind of issues we do?
Because of their size Americans will send a soldier or 2 from a company on NBCD training and that soldier turns around and brings that know how back to their respective companies, sound familiar?

I know what point you're trying to make. A US mechanic might be trained to fix humvees and that's what he does, a Canadian mechanic might be trained on LAV3s, T lavs, RGs or whatever (Might, that's not always the case).  But to say our soldiers get a vast amount of training and make us soundd light years ahead of the US? We still have guys in the battalions who sit around as a lav driver for 2 or 3 years who don't get much in the line of courses. Their a lav driver so that's what they'll do until told otherwise.


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## George Wallace (9 Oct 2010)

True.  Kiska in the Aleutians was the first test of the FSSF.  I am not saying that the Marines were the sole units used in the South Pacific, but they did contribute more than what was implied prior to the end of WW II.


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## Jarnhamar (9 Oct 2010)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Not being at a Bn I can't tell you.  I can tell you that they will not spend their whole career as a LAV driver.


 I agree they won't spend their whole 20 year career as a LAV driver, usually. In Pet there was a tanker corporal who spent his whole career driving tanks. He loved it and was happy there.



> What a LAV driver does at a Sqn or Reg't, I can.  (S)He will be doing D&M on not only the LAV, but probably on the whole range of B Vehs in the unit.  (S)He will also be doing Comms training, First Aid Trg, and the full range of training on wpns from C7/C8, C6, C9, M72, Carl G, M203 Grenade Launcher, Grenades, etc.  They will be taught Tactics.  Within a few years (s)he will likely get on a 25 mm Turret Operators Course, or a Surveillance Course.  One does not remain a LAV driver for very long, before progressing on to another job.  Not only that, all members of the crew must have a basic understanding of what each member's job is.
> 
> But your friend should have told you all this.


George I can tell you that US soldiers aren't simply told how to drive a vehicle, handed an M16 and then given a pat on the back. Just like us they get trained on M16s, Pistols, C9/C6, grenades.  They get taught tactics not to mention first aid.  Sometimes (apparently) theres screw ups and some dude won't know how to do anything BUT their job but you're kidding yourself if you don't think they get crossed trained too. I remember hearing that 14 years ago in basic training.  Americans suck they don't cross train!

I had an RCR sgt ask me to program his CI for him in his LAV and and an American Sgt I worked with had what must have been dozens of courses, and was as cross trained as an Canadian.

That's getting off topic though.


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## CombatDoc (9 Oct 2010)

The idea of a CF "Marines" is not going to happen for one simple reason, and that is lack of money.  Currently, we are significantly "under-resourced" financially and the recent 15% budget decrement (aka Strategic Review) doesn't help.  The Air Force is going to purchase a new fleet of next-generation fighters, find a fixed wing SAR bird, bring the maritime helicopters online and refurb the herc fleet.  The Navy has to recapitalize their AORs, destroyers, do the mid-life frigate refit as well as bring the Arctic patrol vessels online (not to mention find the crews for these vessels).  The Army  - to start with - has to refurb its armoured vehicle fleet after Afghanistan, purchase the new CCV, etc.  Where is the money for amphibious ops/training going to come from?

Although I would like to see closer integration between land/sea/air capabilities in the CF similar to that found in the USMC, as others have said we are too small and poor to create this as a niche capability.


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## Blackadder1916 (9 Oct 2010)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> There was an article in the old Canadian Army Journal in the early sixties by then LCol (later LGen and then Senator) SC Waters who was the CFLO at Quantico re the Marine Corps. He noted that despite the fact that the US Army conducted more amphibious operations than the USMC in the Second World War, the latter was firmly fixed in the public's mind as the force that did all the landings in the Pacific. The army had conducted two landings in the Aleutians (one of which included 13 CIB), several in New Guinea and the Philipines and of course Okinawa. There were also some landings which included both army and marine formations.



Some excerpts from that article (in CAJ Vol 18, No. 1, 1964) by then Col Waters.



> A Story of the U.S. Marine Corps - Marine Magic
> 
> by COLONEL S.C. WATERS, CD*
> (* The author is Director of Administration at Army Headquarters, Ottawa, and is a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal. - Editor.)
> ...


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## daftandbarmy (9 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> It must be the quality of scotch I'm drinking these days but I am starting to like the idea of ArmyRick for CDS.....Is there a write-in somewhere?
> 
> And Field Marshall Slim would agree with him.
> 
> ...



A colleague of mine used to command this outfit: 1 Assault Group. I think, with some modification for Canadian 'littoral needs', that this would be the only specilazed amphibious unit we would require.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1_Assault_Group_Royal_Marines

Ideally, we should have an LPD of some kind, like the Fearless,  to operate with STUFT (Ships taken up from trade) shipping, to cross deck troops from ferries etc on to the flight deck for airmobile landings on tough stretches of coastline where it would be impossible to land a LCVP or LCU, which pretty describes much of Canada's coastline. This would also provide the Bde/BGp HQ:

http://www.axfordsabode.org.uk/pdf-docs/fearles7.pdf

But we might be able to find a suitable coast guard or navy vessel to fill the 'flight deck'/TOC role. However, having flown from the Fearless a few times it was a pretty darn slick setup. From start to finish, we were able to cossdeck a full rifle company, with all weapons and bergens, from a Danish ferry to the flight deck and lift them into an LS, all in about an hour. Of course we had the most excellent Sea King to fly on, which was roomy, powerful, all weather and accurate!


And as for the PO check on the shuffle board, it would be essential to lease the Danish ferries we often deployed in, which always came fully equipped with lovely stewardesses, full shuffle board rig, theatres, fitness facilities, and excellent bar facilities which never seemed to close regardless of the sea state!


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## ArmyRick (9 Oct 2010)

My earlier proposal for an "Assault Landing" Squadron at 4ESR is very similar to 1 Assault Group RM (much smaller though)


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## Kirkhill (9 Oct 2010)

Rick and D&B:

Is this close to the skill set you could amplify?

Soldiers, boats and waterjets.


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## lethalLemon (9 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Rick and D&B:
> 
> Is this close to the skill set you could amplify?
> 
> Soldiers, boats and waterjets.



Ooooohhh that looks like fun.

We can all dream of having a "Marine Force" but the thing that pulls people to the USMC... is the history.


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## ArmyRick (9 Oct 2010)

I personally find the Royal Marines more fascinating. The truly are the few, the elite and definately the proud. Not to mention there cap badge loooks really cool.

Some of the RM I have met (No not including Big Bad John) were pretty switched on and good guys to work/party with.


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## daftandbarmy (9 Oct 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I personally find the Royal Marines more fascinating. The truly are the few, the elite and definately the proud. Not to mention there cap badge loooks really cool.
> 
> Some of the RM I have met (No not including Big Bad John) were pretty switched on and good guys to work/party with.



I would suggest that the RM doctrine (land where the enemy is not) is closer to our own than that of the USMC (land head on at the enemy). It's cheaper too, in more ways than one.


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## Chilme (9 Oct 2010)

I think it is safe to say that a Canadian "Force" mirror around that of the USMC would be far beyond Canadian resources and needs.  I think it is also pretty safe to say that a small specialized marine force that is uniquely Canadian is something the CF could benefit from having (Keeping in mind that the term "Force" has no size designation assigned to it).  Size should be based on all possible factors.  One must also not underestimate the benefit of having a specialized elite group (like the RM) for a particular role, whether it is Marine or anything else.  People want to be part of something important, something specialized, something elite. Look at how many people aspire and work their tails off to have a chance at JTF2 


In the end, Canadian troops shouldn't have to depend on loaned equipment to operate in a number of places within our own borders and abroad.


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## aesop081 (9 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> In the end, Canadian troops shouldn't have to depend on loaned equipment to operate in a number of places within our own borders and abroad.



In the same breath, we cant have everything either. A realistic requirements assesment decides if investing in amphib equipment is needed. Is there a realistic threat to Canadian teritory that requires and amphib response ? How likely are we to carry out an amphib forced-entry operation abroad and how likely is it that we would do it without US involvement ?


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## ArmyRick (9 Oct 2010)

Your probably 5 times more likely to do an amphibious operation (NOT the WWII D-Day scenario) than you are an airborne (static line parachute) operation

Yet we retain the para capability?

If you read my earlier post, my suggestions would be pennies in a bucket out of the defence budget BUT no, we have too many people throwinng in their brillant ideas.

Please keep it simple. BTW, did we not send ships down to Haiti? That would be an amphibious operation

Did we not send a ship to rescue canadians stuck in Lebano in 2006? Amphibious op

Somalia, we had a ship off shore as support to the Airborne Regiment, not exactly amphibious op, but the support measure there (over the horizon).

In Yugoslavia, it would have been nice to have a means of extracting our pers if things got really ugly (luckily they didn't).

I emphasize again, I beleive we are far more likely to do an amphibious op than an airborne op. A very limited size engineer squadron with landing craft and rigid raiders would give us that capability with minimal expense and few pers required (expand the engineer trade by 60 pers?). I also reccomended only an unit advisor/instructor course and NO basic course.

No, lets not go making this into some elite unit or we risk turning this something getting out of control.

Let me sum up. If we do this, it must be at minimal fuss and mess. KEEP IT SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE!!!

Thinking is encouraged but over thinking must be discouraged.


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## Kirkhill (10 Oct 2010)

> "This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree".


 Field Marshall Slim Commander 14th Army Burma.

The man is my personal hero because he made do with what he had........... and succeeded.


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## Chilme (10 Oct 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> In the same breath, we cant have everything either. A realistic requirements assesment decides if investing in amphib equipment is needed. Is there a realistic threat to Canadian teritory that requires and amphib response ? How likely are we to carry out an amphib forced-entry operation abroad and how likely is it that we would do it without US involvement ?



Here are a few recent example: Haiti, Op Nanook,  Op Lama in NFLD


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## Sprinting Thistle (10 Oct 2010)

In order to develop and maintain a marine capability you will have to figure how to get the Army and the Navy to work together willingly.  The environments don't work together in a joint manner unless deployed; and then that is only in an adhoc manner (not deliberate).  

On offer, the parachute capability.  The idea that the three light infantry battalions have three full up and ready to go para capable companies is a myth.  Indeed they rarely get access to aircraft to conduct individual refresher jumps not to mention collective training at the platoon and company level.  The problem is access to aircraft.  Take Petawawa as an example.  Trenton is just down the road so to speak yet the last 3 - 4 jumps scheduled since August with Hercs have been cancelled.  The AF has its own set of priorities and parachuting is not one of them.  However the Army needs the AF to parachute.  If an urgent operational requirement popped up which required parachuting a company into another country for some reason it would happen but the execution wouldn't be pretty.

So, unless the CF puts a priority on joint force generation, this marine capability will slowly sink beneath the waves.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (10 Oct 2010)

Chilme, to be fair to CDN Aviator, the examples you give are not "forced-entry".

And perhaps, to enlighten the discussion, here are a few pointers on current amphibious ops.

Fist of all forget your WWII movies of D-day and Marines landings in the Pacific. The more recent and appropriate examples of  large amphibious ops are Grenada, by the US Marines, the Falklands, by British RM's and the Army, the Marines landing in Mogadishu and the "threatened" landings of the Gulf war (first).

Their common points: 

1- No "wall" to breach or atoll Fortress to attack head on. because there are no situation out there that currently involves huge armies fighting each other to death in a world domination struggle. And there is little chance of that in a foreseeable future. If it came to that, we would have time to observe and note it and build up the response forces.

2- use of modern tools to carry out the operations, which means not just landing on a flat beach with "Higgins" boats. Vertical envelopment is used massively (helicopters), air-cushion landing crafts that give you speed and capability to disgorge away from the beach itself, and AAAV's that can motor to shore and turn into a "LAV" right away etc. These give the capacity to pick spots away from the defended portions of the coast, select your "landing" area from a wider type of appropriate terrain and to carry out inland raids (via vertical env.) in support of other type of operations. 

ArmyRick mentions Somalia and Yugoslavia. In Somalia, the Navy was on the ground before  the Airborne! They landed at the airfield in Sea-King helicopters before anyone else to ensure the airfield was capable of accepting the landing planes and to set up comms and radars. In Yugoslavia, you may remember that the US had a pilot shot down over the wrong side. Who got him out? Yes, the Marines operating with their helicopters from an offshore amphibious ship. In Lebanon, we Canada did not use warships, as we did not have them, but many other nations did.

So yes, there is a requirement for such support (so much so that there is a huge revival in the type in France, Germany, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, Australia, Korea and Japan) for the army. And in Canada our two main purpose for such ship would be Support ops abroad and, most importantly as mobile base of operations in the Arctic archipelago. These are the only things that will provide you, in one place, with instant barracks for 500 soldiers, a fully equipped airfield for about 12 to 16 helicopters, a second echelon hospital and all the comms/ops room you need for staff. The whole thing is mobile so you can go from point A to B without repacking everything and shipping it over everytime.

ArmyRick is both correct and wrong in his last post: it is not sufficient to have a few extra engineers with boats. Landing crafts and raider bots don't travel by themselves to their destination over long distances. You must have a way to deploy them and that way is amphibious ships - which means the Navy - and since the Navy already has people (Boatswains, Marengs and sigs) that know how to operate these boats, there is no need to train anyone else. That is the wrong part.

What he got right, however is that there is no requirement for any specialised unit: The army unit that would be embarked can very quickly be taught whatever little extra knowledge they need to have to successfully carry out their job (for instance, in a heliported landing, they already know how to get on or off a helicopter from their basic training, all you need to do is teach them the routes to take on board so they don't end up in the way of air pers or Navy pers or go the wrong way and get their head cut off). Similarly, airforce personnel requires little in terms of extra training before they can safely operate from an amphib.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (10 Oct 2010)

ST: Getting the Navy to work on this would be much simpler than getting access to aircraft. The problem with aircraft, if I may say so, is that the ones you jump out from are multipurpose - they are used for transport of materiel, troops, etc. so there is a priority list unfortunately. The ships required for amphibious ops are dedicated ships -  if we had them and the army has no need for them, they stay in harbour, but if you want us to sail them 300 days a year, we would be glad to. I can't make any promises about the air force but again, I suspect that at least the Griffons and Chinooks are army dedicated assets and they would go where the army wants them.


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## aesop081 (10 Oct 2010)

Chilme said:
			
		

> Here are a few recent example: Haiti, Op Nanook,  Op Lama in NFLD



We had to force our way in to these ? 

 :

OP LAMA ? You mean to tell me that you think that the CF currently had no single capability to get troops and equipment into Newfoundland without having amphib assests of its own ?

OP HESTIA ? Us sending supplies by ship does not make it an amphib operation. The fact that we airlifted supplies and troops into the country shows to me that , even without landing crafts, we had the capability to intervene already.

OP NANOOK ? You know thats a fancy name for an exercise right ?


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## Kirkhill (10 Oct 2010)

OGBD, at the risk of sounding facetious, again, wouldn't the degree of enthusiasm depend on who is buying the gas?

It always seems to come down to an issue of core missions.  These "bridging" capabilities that jump gaps between elements always seem to be among the first casualties when budgets get cut.

From here it looks like the amphibious force should own their own transport, if you are going to have a dedicated amphibious capability, just like heliborne troops should own their own helicopters and airborne troops should own their own aircraft.  The alternatives, air forces owning the fallschirmjaeger and navies owning marines seem to breed a constant tension between core missions of the sponsoring service and the "joint" capability.

Given that Canada (nor Britain, the US, Russia and even China) can't afford to do everything with Specialists perhaps we should focus on expanding the capabilities of our Generalists.

If we marry up all our Light Troops in a single brigade and put their helos under the command and control of the Brigade Commander then could they not be employed both from ships as well as from land?  If you supply ships with big enough landing pads for Chinooks and space for a reinforced company of passengers in spartan accomodations wouldn't that meet a much larger envelope of needs than we can currently fill without having to build a completed amphibious fleet?  As you note yourself vertical envelopment is the key driver in changing the assault paradigm from "hey diddle diddle right up the middle" in Higgins boats to a more nuanced approach of deciding not to land in front of that machine gun position over there.

Additionally, if the Bosns were given a better assortment of ships boats that were designed for something other than towing liferafts and tying up to mooring buoys, then the perhaps we could expand the envelope a little farther without having to spend mega bucks.

Having said all of that, once we get those AORs bought, I really would like to see at least one floating warehouse with a flat deck on which you could land Helos.   But, if we're not recreating Guadalcanal, and our allies are using aluminum catamarans (JHSV) to transport troops to shore and support them offshore, do we really need a billion dollar hull for that type of task?  What would be wrong with the Bay/Enforcer class type of Transport Ship in its simplest most stripped down fashion - no Joint HQ, no Hospitals or Role 3 maintenance?  Just a floating warehouse with a flat deck.

Those other capabilities could be included in the AORs (as they are) or in the SCSC programme (Joint HQ anyway) as they should be.

Beyond all of that grafting on a watercraft squadron of engineeers to the Light Brigade would seem to be a no brainer for a country with as many lakes and rivers as we have and where the navy will never operate.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (10 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill: I'll be facetious: We run on Navy Distillate, not gas  .

Seriously though, I must be expressing myself badly:  You say:



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If we marry up all our Light Troops in a single brigade and put their helos under the command and control of the Brigade Commander then could they not be employed both from ships as well as from land?  If you supply ships with big enough landing pads for Chinooks and space for a reinforced company of passengers in spartan accomodations wouldn't that meet a much larger envelope of needs than we can currently fill without having to build a completed amphibious fleet?
> 
> [...]  do we really need a billion dollar hull for that type of task?  What would be wrong with the Bay/Enforcer class type of Transport Ship in its simplest most stripped down fashion - no Joint HQ, no Hospitals or Role 3 maintenance?  Just a floating warehouse with a flat deck.



And that is exactly what I am saying also: You do not need specialized trained troops and the air force can do this with little preparation time. 

I do not want a whole fleet of amphibious assault ships - but a ship with a flat top big enough for Chinooks and a reinforced company of troop - is an amphibious landing ship of some sort. They are NOT $B ships. The French Mistrals or Spanish Juan Carlos (the Australians are buying two of those - so cut the catamaran crap as support ships) are merchant ships designs. They are not that expansive to build and they have a small Navy crew.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Additionally, if the Bosns were given a better assortment of ships boats that were designed for something other than towing liferafts and tying up to mooring buoys, then the perhaps we could expand the envelope a little farther without having to spend mega bucks.



You should not comment on what you do not know (I thought that was a strong suggestion of these forums). The various types of Navy boats are NOT used to tow liferafts or to just assist the ship coming to a buoy. We have all sorts of boats and they are used in landing shore parties, carrying out boardings at sea - unopposed and opposed - search and rescue, harbour security and force protection, diving support, covert ops, humanitarian assistance, cargo delivery, etc. The various types we carry include LCVP's, carried on board the AOR's (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel - for those not in the know). The Boatswains are trained and highly skilled in the operation of these boats for all these uses.


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## Kirkhill (10 Oct 2010)

I sit chastised across the board OGBD. 

WRT the troops themselves - violent agreement seems to be the watchword on this site.  It's a wonder that humanity has lasted this long given the propensity to misunderstand each other.

WRT the Chinook and a reinforced company, and at the risk of wandering outside of lanes here, it was my understanding that 6000 tonne class vessels along the line of the Svalbard and the Type 45s could embark, although not support, heavy helicopters of the CH-47 class.  Equally a reinforced company (whatever that may be 60-200) is not beyond the lift capability of vessels of the Absalon type, or for that matter the Type 45.  I appreciate clarification if I misunderstand the situation.

WRT the Bosn's boats - I apologise for expressing myself over simplistically.


I am aware that the Navy has a wide variety of small boats on strength, including LCVPs.  My point though, referred to the boats carried aboard frigates and in particular the SCSC, and I should have made that point clear.  Rather than just supplying those vessels with RHIBs, as sea worthy as they are, could the vessel not also embark something along the lines of the LCPs (Landing Craft Personnel) operated by the Danish navy from the Absalon's and their new Arctic OPVs Knud Rasmussen as utility boats, SAR boats and landing boats.  Boats that  are similar in form and design to the Dockstarvarvet CBH-90 and used to land troops on rocky islets and skerries similar to the waters of the Gulf Islands, the West Coast gernerally, the Thousand Islands and off Newfoundland, all places that like the Swedish archipelago I have had the pleasure of visiting.


I guess, in part, this comes down to what Canada wants from the SCSC..... does it want an ASW escort or does it want a Global Corvette (both of which need dedicated AAW variants Ex-D)?


Cheers, and thanks for assisting me in clarifying my understanding OGBD.


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## Ex-Dragoon (10 Oct 2010)

Being in a country that operates in both the North Pacific and the North Atlantic is some of the most difficult weather conditions faced by any navy, I think the idea of having ships that cannot support organic aircraft not only puts unnecessary risk to the aircraft but to the crews of the aircraft and ships crew as well.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (10 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill: Re: The Chinooks: They cannot be accommodated on board the type 45's (called the Daring class, BTW) and I very much doubt they could be accommodated on the Svalbard either (the helo decks are too small).

You must compare apples with apples. The Frigates and in the future the SCSC are front line warships. The similar warships of other countries are no more capable than they are of carrying troops (BTW there is no room for even an embarked command staff on board a Daring class destroyer- the Brits put their command staffs on the carriers or the Amphibs as required) and they all carry just RHIB's nowadays, even the Danish frigates. 

If you incorporate their Absalon or Knud Rasmussen class, which are capable of carrying small troop contingents and land them, into the picture then you must incorporate our AOR's in our picture and our future AOPS, which will also be capable of doing so. You cannot look at SCSC and the current DDH/FFH types only.

BTW the SCSC is not an ASW escort - it is equivalent to a destroyer and will be either a general purpose or command ship/Area Air Defense type (the only two variant being considered). In either case, they will be larger than either the current FFH or DDH. There is on the other hand no such thing as a "Global corvette", but if there was it would be, by definition smaller than what we currently operate.


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## Ex-Dragoon (10 Oct 2010)

OGBD...the Global Corvette was basically part of the MoD search for the RN Future Surface Combatant which has evolved into their Type 26 frigates that are on their drawing board.


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## Kirkhill (10 Oct 2010)

Ex-D and OGBD, 

I take the point about the difference between landing a Chinook and landing and accomodating a Chinook safely in all seas.

I guess my confusion derives from publications like this one

It seems to be stating:



> The flight deck
> and aviation facilities are designed to operate
> LYNX or MERLIN helicopters. The flight deck
> area is four times that of a Type 42 destroyer
> – big enough to land a CHINOOK.



And



> The Type 45 is designed to operate a MERLIN
> HM1 or LYNX HMA 8 helicopter, armed with
> Stingray anti-submarine torpedoes and Sea
> Skua anti-ship missiles. Her flight deck is large
> ...



And



> Aviation
> T45’s war fighting capabilities will be enhanced
> with the inclusion of an embarked flight
> that is currently scaled to comprise a single
> ...



While on the issue of embarking "passengers"



> Embarked Military Force (EMF)
> An EMF increases the range of maritime and
> joint operations with which the T45 may be
> tasked. An EMF may support Power Projection
> ...





> Habitability
> T45 will operate with a crew of 191, each with
> their own berth in well-appointed cabins. For
> the first time on board a destroyer, there are
> ...



And



> Command Hosting
> T45 provides the planning space, IT facilities
> and communications to host a 1* Maritime
> Battlestaff, Tailored JFACHQ or SF Component
> ...



And



> Even without taking
> additional emergency measures, T45
> design provides for accommodation
> margin of 45, taking into account
> ...



Apologies if my misunderstanding has misled anyone.

Cheers.

PS I do note that the Darings are not in the 6000 tonne class.  They are actually 25% larger and displace 7500 tonnes making them displace about 2750 tonnes more than the Halifaxes or about 50% larger.  But then again the Svalbard "Corvettes" are in the 5000 to 6000 tonne range.

PPS Ex-D you were correct about my reference to the Global Corvette.


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## Jungle (11 Oct 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> OP HESTIA ? Us sending supplies by ship does not make it an amphib operation. The fact that we airlifted supplies and troops into the country shows to me that , even without landing crafts, we had the capability to intervene already.



There were Troops brought in via amphibious means; about 20% of the entire Task Force was brought in by ship, and taken to the beach via those:





Ths Ship in the background is Athabaskan, where the Troops came from on that particular lift. They were flown to Jamaica, but because of airspace congestion could not be flown into theater.

I agree that OP Hestia was a permissive environment, but without amphib movement the deployment would have been an even bigger nightmare.

We need something to move Troops, vehs and supplies to a coast from the sea, without necessarily having to do "amphib assaults" or taking a piece of beach from the enemy.


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## Edward Campbell (11 Oct 2010)

Jungle said:
			
		

> There were Troops brought in via amphibious means; about 20% of the entire Task Force was brought in by ship, and taken to the beach via those:
> 
> 
> 
> ...




I hope this is not an unfair question, but: What kind of vessel is that, Jungle, and from whom did we you borrow it?


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## GAP (11 Oct 2010)

Looks like an LST, probably from the Marines....


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## Oh No a Canadian (11 Oct 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I hope this is not an unfair question, but: What kind of vessel is that, Jungle, and from whom did we you borrow it?


Its a Landing Craft Utility from USS Bataan

Here are two more pictures from the CF Combat Camera website.

http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca/netpub/server.np?original=16397&site=combatcamera&catalog=photos
http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca/netpub/server.np?original=16398&site=combatcamera&catalog=photos


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## Edward Campbell (11 Oct 2010)

Thanks very much.


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## a_majoor (11 Oct 2010)

To develop an effective "marine" capability would involve having the proper ships more than changing the Army. A helicopter "Destroyer" or an LHD woud be needed to bunk the troops, carry the equipment and embark enough helicopters or landing craft to quickly and effectively land the troops ashore. If you want to use a Chinook, then you also need a big ship as well.
  
Thinking back a long way, the RN had impressed a bunch of cargo ships and converted them with makeshift landing pads during the Falklands war (remember the Atlantic Conveyor?) which might do in an emergency, but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.

Either way, a great deal of effort and energy is needed to get this capability, and until there is a large change in public attituds towards the CF, funding and sustaining things for the long term, I don't see this as happening.


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## GAP (11 Oct 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Thanks very much.



Actually, I should stand corrected....the ships would be supplied by the Navy....at least in my experience, the Marines always hitch rides with the navy.... ;D


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## Chilme (11 Oct 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> To develop an effective "marine" capability would involve having the proper ships more than changing the Army. A helicopter "Destroyer" or an LHD woud be needed to bunk the troops, carry the equipment and embark enough helicopters or landing craft to quickly and effectively land the troops ashore. If you want to use a Chinook, then you also need a big ship as well.
> 
> Thinking back a long way, the RN had impressed a bunch of cargo ships and converted them with makeshift landing pads during the Falklands war (remember the Atlantic Conveyor?) which might do in an emergency, but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.
> 
> Either way, a great deal of effort and energy is needed to get this capability, and until there is a large change in public attituds towards the CF, funding and sustaining things for the long term, I don't see this as happening.



Drumming up support for the Canadian Forces is definitely the key filling the gaps in Canadian capabilities.  The publics perception of the military is generally very different then it is.  I know mine preconceived thoughts on the CF changed rastically after I became involved


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## Jungle (11 Oct 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I hope this is not an unfair question, but: What kind of vessel is that, Jungle, and from whom did we you borrow it?



As stated, they are US Navy landing crafts; we also used a smaller model:





We borrowed them because we had no way of getting the Troops from ship to shore; actually, we also re-learned that using a destroyer or a frigate for troop transport is far from ideal !!


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## Snakedoc (11 Oct 2010)

Jungle said:
			
		

> We borrowed them because we had no way of getting the Troops from ship to shore; actually, we also re-learned that using a destroyer or a frigate for troop transport is far from ideal !!



Yup, definitely not what they're made for!


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## GAP (11 Oct 2010)

"Why couldn't we have borrowed some of them thar canoe's from Chretian's museum?


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## daftandbarmy (12 Oct 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Thinking back a long way, the RN had impressed a bunch of cargo ships and converted them with makeshift landing pads during the Falklands war (remember the Atlantic Conveyor?) which might do in an emergency, but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.



And the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by an Exocet before it even reached the AO, along with all the Chinooks, nicely demostrating the problems with using STUFT shipping (which has no self-defence weaponry) in a shootin' war.


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## Kirkhill (12 Oct 2010)

> ...but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.



But that is effectively the key to Danish naval procurement.  Their weapons systems are built in containers that can be slotted into spaces on their ships.  This allows three things: them to fit the weapons they need for the mission; to purchase the weapons they need as, and when they need them and can afford them; and to upgrade weapons easily.

The key issue though is one of space and I note that that is one of the development trends with all of the following vessels: Absalon, Iver Huitfeldt, Knud Rasmussen, Type 45 Daring, Future Surface Combatant (RN), the Littoral Combat Ship and the KVS Svalbard.  All of them have been designed with large, unallocated/flexible space on board for Helicopters, UAVs, boats and Embarked Military Forces. 

If the Single Class Surface Combatant were to incorporate a "Mission Bay" with the ability to carry and launch small boats of the 10 to 20 tonne range and an enhanced hotel space, while at the same time the AORs retained even their current abilities then the Navy could lift usefully sized small packages (sub-unit/sub-sub-unit) of troops.  It could also more effectively respond on humanitarian operations, or act as a mother-ship to support armed patrol boats, or carry naval payloads or just be better positioned to upgrade their capbilities in the future.

The reason that current frigates and destroyers, as both Jungle and OGBD attest, are such poor candidates for lifting troops or anything else is that there is barely room for the sailors on board.    These days it seems, judging from the tendency of crews to get smaller, while vessels get bigger, both in the civilian world and in the military world that space is no longer as costly as it once was.


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## cphansen (12 Oct 2010)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But that is effectively the key to Danish naval procurement.  Their weapons systems are built in containers that can be slotted into spaces on their ships.  This allows three things: them to fit the weapons they need for the mission; to purchase the weapons they need as, and when they need them and can afford them; and to upgrade weapons easily.



Is that not the same policy the Americans were following in their LCS where they discovered a slight flaw in their idea of swapping modules to handle the mission.

The flaw was discovered during simulation where they were setup to perform one task but the threat changed as a result of enemy action whereby the threat became a swarm of small boats. The problem was the weapons needed to destroy the small boats were not part of the mission load. They had to retire and return to port to mount the needed weapons which of course was not possible in the face of the attack.

If we had modular design ships we would have to have really good intel on what we were going to meet


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## drunknsubmrnr (12 Oct 2010)

You'd need to carry whatever module you plan to deploy with through at least pre-deployment WUPS in order to effectively use it. Switching modules in the middle of a deployment isn't likely.

You can whip up a simulation to make any idea look bad. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea outside that sim.



> The reason that current frigates and destroyers, as both Jungle and OGBD attest, are such poor candidates for lifting troops or anything else is that there is barely room for the sailors on board.    These days it seems, judging from the tendency of crews to get smaller, while vessels get bigger, both in the civilian world and in the military world that space is no longer as costly as it once was.



If you made the CSC big enough, you wouldn't even need the AOR's.


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## Kirkhill (12 Oct 2010)

drunknsubmrnr said:
			
		

> If you made the CSC big enough, you wouldn't even need the AOR's.



You know what, I bet if you called them a [urlhttp://www.btinternet.com/~warship/Today/invincible.htm=]Through Deck Cruiser [/url] you could even make them big enough to land a small squadron of F35s on board  > ;D

But perhaps we don't need to go there.  Something in the 5500 to 7000 tonne displacement range, with the kit you could squeeze into a 4500 tonne hull, would probably get the job done.

If nothing else the extra hull would give you a longer water line and more tankage, equalling, if I understand dynamics correctly,  more speed and more endurance, which in turn means fewer stops at the AOR.

FWIW


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## PanaEng (13 Oct 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I would suggest that the RM doctrine (land where the enemy is not) is closer to our own than that of the USMC (land head on at the enemy). It's cheaper too, in more ways than one.


Like during the Operation Just Cause when a bunch of SEAL were dropped off the beach/muck in front of the Paitilla Airport, swam to the end of the runway and decided to assault Noriega's hanger straight down to the other end of the runway?


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## daftandbarmy (13 Oct 2010)

PanaEng said:
			
		

> Like during the Operation Just Cause when a bunch of SEAL were dropped off the beach/muck in front of the Paitilla Airport, swam to the end of the runway and decided to assault Noriega's hanger straight down to the other end of the runway?



Well, knowing the SEALs, they probably only did that because they missed their daily workout and needed to keep up their VO2 Max scores


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## PanaEng (14 Oct 2010)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well, knowing the SEALs, they probably only did that because they missed their daily workout and needed to keep up their VO2 Max scores


On average their score actually went down as 4 of them got killed... stupid move!


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## Chilme (24 Jan 2011)

Apparently Lt-Gen Peter Devlin is looking into progressing a Marine capability:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/SOMNIA/3708752/story.html


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## Ex-SHAD (24 Jan 2011)

Why Canada doesn’t have a corps of marines or any sort of naval infantry is an age old debate, and can be especially prevalent among naval reservists, who will give you long and drawn out dissertations backed by slide shows and reams of other historical information which may or may not even be relevant to the debate.
That being said, here’s the short form (according to how it was taught in NAVRES when I was in).

Historic usage of marines:

During the era of wooden ships and iron men, discipline aboard vessels of most navies was enforced through the lash, and the iron will of its Master-at-Arms who with his ship’s corporals (senior ratings assigned to provost duties) along with a detachment of marines to ensure that law and order were maintained aboard naval vessels.

The primary function of most marines was relegated to being a fighting provost and they were employed at both shore establishments and aboard ship to ensure that order was maintained.
Now the marine also held a secondary duty of being trained in boarding techniques, and would be the tip of the spear when it came to naval warfare of that era (which emphasized the use of boarding whilst at close range).

However, with the advent of the ironclad and move towards the screw driven warship, marines for the most part lost the opportunity to engage in boarding’s, but instead were now tasked as part of naval brigades, which have a strong tradition in their own right, and from which comes the tradition of the “gun run”.

At the dawn of the 20th Century, debate had occurred across the Dominion in regards as to whether our nation should have a navy of its own, or if we should continue to rely upon the Royal Navy for the maritime defense of Canada. In 1910, the supporters of the idea of forming an independent naval service got their wish, and the Canadian Naval Service was established (gaining the title Royal Canadian the following year).

In the pre war era, though Canada began to show the flag, using her new navy, she did not engage in any major conflicts prior to the First World War. Due to this, and moreover budgetary concerns, it was felt that the ships police, along with dockyard and Dominion Police (the federal agency responsible for dockyard protection during that era) could handle any disciplinary issues, and there was no considerable need for a marine force.

During the First World War, Canada’s Navy made an honorable showing, but for the most part was used as a manpower tool for the RN, with a high percentage of Canadians joining the RN, rather than the RCN.
In the post WWI era, defense cutbacks were prevalent, and according to what I can best describe as a “naval reserve legend” in regards to selfless service, it is remarked upon that many ratings and officers of the RCNVR went without pay, to help preserve the institution of the navy, which had went up upon the chopping block.

During the Second World War, the RCN built up to fight the Battle of the Atlantic and for the first time in Canadian History they had the opportunity to field their own specialized landing force RCN Beach Commando W....unfortunately though, the RCN Beach Commando never landed during the Normandy invasion, but instead were landed after the beachhead had been secured. In the Pacific theater, HMCS Prince Robert mounted a few shore parties, but yet again no significant landing action on the part of the RCN.

The Cold War brought about changes in defense policies in Canada, and the role of the RCN had changed as well. However yet again, it had seemed that there was no concerted effort to build a marine landing capable force, but instead it was felt that the Army should have primary responsibility for all landing operations, while the navy did do some shore party training, it was often times limited and scope, and was primarily undertaken by the RCN(R) (and later the RCNR).
I
In the post Cold War era, the navy faced severe cutbacks, and aside from minor and often times scattered unit level training, there was no concerted effort to train either a marine landing force, or even shore parties.

Present:

In the wake of 9/11 and the emergence of the threat of international terrorism, the navy began a focus upon force protection, and protecting the fleet, with a definite drive towards training professional and competent boarding parties. The reserve force took over the role of defending naval  yards(I won’t go into this at length, since there’s too many mixed feelings on the issue), and the creation of the Port Security Unit was deemed the best defensive measure in protecting naval assets.

In conclusion, I see now potential for the developing of a large scale marine landing force in the near future, as though it would be a great capability to have, the creation of the infrastructure and support system needing to establish and maintain a marine landing force, might outweigh its value. Now that being said, if an elected government in the future were to go into a massive defense spending increase then there’s an opportunity to open up the debate on creating a proper Canadian Marine Corps, but until such time, it will simply be a dream, better left to defense analysts and fiction writers.


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## Pusser (24 Jan 2011)

Ex-SHAD said:
			
		

> However, with the advent of the ironclad and move towards the screw driven warship, marines for the most part lost the opportunity to engage in boarding’s, but instead were now tasked as part of naval brigades, which have a strong tradition in their own right, and from which comes the tradition of the “gun run”.
> 
> 
> it was often times limited and scope, and was primarily undertaken by the RCN(R) (and later the RCNR).



Although Royal Marines would make up the bulk of landing parties, they really only provided the infantry portion.  Sailors using the ship's guns taken ashore, would provide the artillery portion.  The Gun Run tradition is about sailors moving and firing guns, not marines.  William Hall VC, for whom the Gun Run Trophy is named, was an RN petty officer decorated for staying with his gun and continuing to fire it at Lucknow, during the Indian Mutiny.

Small point:  The RCNR came first.  After WWII, the RCNR and RCNVR were combined to form the RCN(R).


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## Ex-SHAD (24 Jan 2011)

Pusser said:
			
		

> Although Royal Marines would make up the bulk of landing parties, they really only provided the infantry portion.  Sailors using the ship's guns taken ashore, would provide the artillery portion.  The Gun Run tradition is about sailors moving and firing guns, not marines.  William Hall VC, for whom the Gun Run Trophy is named, was an RN petty officer decorated for staying with his gun and continuing to fire it at Lucknow, during the Indian Mutiny.
> 
> Small point:  The RCNR came first.  After WWII, the RCNR and RCNVR were combined to form the RCN(R).



Yes you're correct, with reference to the gun run, and I should have known better in regards to that....just what happens when you're out of the service long enough I suppose.

Though I thought that it intitally began as the Royal Canadian Navy(Reserve) and then during the 60's changed to the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, though I'll defer to your experience, since it dwarfs my own.


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## Journeyman (24 Jan 2011)

Chilme said:
			
		

> Apparently Lt-Gen Peter Devlin is looking into progressing a Marine capability:
> http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/SOMNIA/3708752/story.html


The actual quote is, "there would also be more mountain warfare training and a taste of amphibious operations because Canadian troops had to go ashore in Haiti and in Timor." 

I hardly think "a taste" equates to "a capability"....kind of like playing Call of Duty: Black Ops to get your  Assaulter qualification for JTF2.


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## Infanteer (24 Jan 2011)

Canada has, for the last two iterations, attached a Company to the USMC to take part in amphibious operations in Exercise RIMPAC.  This is, hopefully, the start of some regularity in exposure to these types of operations.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (24 Jan 2011)

I think Infanteer just hit the right term: "exposure".

Canada has never had a "Marine" force, but has participated in numerous opposed or unopposed landings. They were always carried out by the army and quite competently. All that is needed, as for any other military skill, is exposure to the process and techniques from time to time to keep the skill set at a reasonable level.

Even if Canada was to acquire the infamous "big honking ships", there would be no need for Canadian Marines, as the army is perfectly competent to carry out amphibious warfare.


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## Old Sweat (24 Jan 2011)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I think Infanteer just hit the right term: "exposure".
> 
> Canada has never had a "Marine" force, but has participated in numerous opposed or unopposed landings. They were always carried out by the army and quite competently. All that is needed, as for any other military skill, is exposure to the process and techniques from time to time to keep the skill set at a reasonable level.
> 
> Even if Canada was to acquire the infamous "big honking ships", there would be no need for Canadian Marines, as the army is perfectly competent to carry out amphibious warfare.


The other side of this is the requirement for the navy to also develop some expertise in planning and conducting amphibious operations. Putting troops in landing craft and/or helicopters and moving them between  ship and shore is only part of the equation. There also is the tasks involved with managing the landing in the areas not involved in actually assaulting, clearing and securing the beach head. For example, how do we control the flow of traffic ashore and manage the build up on the beach? Who takes charge of the combat supplies and getting them from the ships to the beach head? How about the collection and handling of casualties and perhaps POWs?

At the risk of playing armchair general, climbing into landing craft and going ashore is no more than exposure to amphibious operations. It is important, and it gets all the publicity, but it is a bit like the duck on the pond. Most of the action is out of view.


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## Blackadder1916 (24 Jan 2011)

As noted, the conduct of amphibious operations (or even training) by the Canadian Army and Navy (and also the Air Force) is not new.  As seen in this excerpt from a DLSC research note, amphibious operations were an aspect of many Defence of Canada exercises during the 60s and 70s.  We didn't need a "Marine Corps" back then other than occasionally partnering with the USMC. 


Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
DLSC Research Note 01/02
Homeland Defence by Sean M. Maloney, PhD  JANUARY 2001

Available to download as a PDF here



> 6. Defence of Canada Operations 1960-70
> 
> The Mobile Striking Force, as a formation, ceased to exist by the 1960s.
> The continental defence commitment, however, still existed though the threat
> ...



I was on the last exercise mentioned, KERNAL POTLACH II.  The 3 PPCLI battalion group embarked aboard the Canadian ships and sailed to San Diego where we crossed to the USN amphibious ships. We had a few days of familiarization training on the Mike-boats before heading to the northern end of Vancouver Island for the amphibious landing phase of the exercise.  Along the way, we did a practice landing on the beaches at Camp Pendleton.


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## dapaterson (24 Jan 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Canada has, for the last two iterations, attached a Company to the USMC to take part in amphibious operations in Exercise RIMPAC.  This is, hopefully, the start of some regularity in exposure to these types of operations.



The fact that it's a side trip to Hawaii is a little bonus for the company.  And the bn HQ folks that come to see what's happening.   And the Bde HQ folks who need to see it as well.
(CO 1 CMBG crashed my honeymoon.  Not that I'm bitter...)


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## Journeyman (24 Jan 2011)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> CO 1 CMBG crashed my honeymoon.  Not that I'm bitter...


Yet your wife has never complained....   >


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## Infanteer (24 Jan 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> At the risk of playing armchair general, climbing into landing craft and going ashore is no more than exposure to amphibious operations. It is important, and it gets all the publicity, but it is a bit like the duck on the pond. Most of the action is out of view.



You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).

The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).

Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.


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## daftandbarmy (24 Jan 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).
> 
> The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).
> 
> Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.



They also need specialized ships to command these operations, which cost a fortune and means we are unlikely to ever purchase.


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## FSTO (24 Jan 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> They also need specialized ships to command these operations, which cost a fortune and means we are unlikely to ever purchase.



If you are looking at a WASP class amphib carrier (and the ancillary equip) yes. A Mistral, San Guisto, Dodko may be somewhat cheaper and more in our budget range.


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## FSTO (24 Jan 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).
> 
> The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).
> 
> Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.



Agree completly, this would not be an outfit you cobble together for a couple of weeks a year.


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## daftandbarmy (24 Jan 2011)

FSTO said:
			
		

> If you are looking at a WASP class amphib carrier (and the ancillary equip) yes. A Mistral, San Guisto, Dodko may be somewhat cheaper and more in our budget range.



Too bad we didn't grab the Intrepid or Fearless before they made it to the breaker's yard. The again, they were pretty old:

http://www.clydesite.co.uk/clydebuilt/viewship.asp?id=2509


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## FSTO (24 Jan 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Too bad we didn't grab the Intrepid or Fearless before they made it to the breaker's yard. The again, they were pretty old:
> 
> http://www.clydesite.co.uk/clydebuilt/viewship.asp?id=2509



No way....they were beyond salvagable. Would be like buying a 92 Hyundi Pony and paying 100,000 to make it drivable vice buying the 70,000 loaded BMW.


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## jollyjacktar (24 Jan 2011)

USS GUNSTON HALL or one of her Sisters would do just fine.


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## Edward Campbell (24 Jan 2011)

If, and it's a big *IF*, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:

1. An amphibious _capability_, of some sort, is highly desirable; but

2. It is an expensive proposition requiring -

a. *dedicated* and highly trained naval units, and

b. trained and, at least, earmarked, army units; and

3. The business of crewing *new* amphibious ships and their necessary escorts would be very, very difficult impossible today.


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## jollyjacktar (24 Jan 2011)

Yup, and that is why the adults shut the project down a couple of years ago.  At least on the Navy side of the house here in Halifax.  Maybe one day it might be looked at again, but Mother Hubbard's cupboard is bare for all of that stuff.  Except for those Sailor's such as myself that would give their right one to get in on the concept.  We are still around although getting smaller in number as time goes on and we leave the CF.


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## FSTO (25 Jan 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> If, and it's a big *IF*, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:
> 
> 1. An amphibious _capability_, of some sort, is highly desirable; but
> 
> ...



Agree with 1 and 2 but what escorts are you talking about? New AOR's will be operational by the time this capability would come on-line and the current frigates and their proposed replacements would handle the rest.


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## Kirkhill (25 Jan 2011)

Perhaps, instead of focusing on the USMC, Tarawas, Harriers, Ospreys and EFVs, (all of which the US is questioning whether it can afford them) and concluding that we can`t afford that level of capability, we could backtrack and determine what level of capability we can afford.

Could we start from the position of ensuring that we have a suitable range of connectors to move STUFF, at any speed, from ship to shore?  We have 2 to 3 AORs in our future.  We have 6 to 8 AOPVs in our future.  All of which have the capability to move goods.  The current AORs have the capability to deploy Landing Craft.  The AOPV has had and on-again-off-again relationship with Landing Craft.  And I would continue to argue for at least some portion of the CSC fleet (2-4 out of the 12-16) to be configured in a manner similar to the Absalon so that it can launch Landing Craft.

You don`t need well-decks to launch a landing craft. You don`t even need dedicated davits.  A good multi-purpose crane and scrambling nets will still suffice for many applications.

Helicopters are brilliant but they are likely to be heavily engaged and not capable of moving everything.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (25 Jan 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> If, and it's a big *IF*, I have understood what I've been reading here (Army.ca and its muti-hued sisters), it seems that:
> 
> 1. An amphibious _capability_, of some sort, is highly desirable; but
> 
> ...



I also agree with 1.

I have reservations about 2 (more on that below).

I disagree with 3.

First of all, and I can sympathize with Infanteer being impressed by the US Marines MAGTF concept of operation, the US Marines Model is not what is required in Canada. Remember that the USMC is not an amphibious force, its an expeditionary corps whose task is to basically be able to take and deploy a scalable force up to the size of the whole CF anywhere in the world and support it for months at the time, if not years. So, sure, they have their ACE, CLE, CE and so forth, but so do we when you look at the equivalent whole CF. Our CE element is called Canada Command, or CEFCOM and is completed by a local appropriate HQ where deployed, our CLE is made up of our purple trades and CANOSCOM, our ACE is the Air Force, and so forth. So we need not reinvent the wheel, just use and adapt what we already have to one more situation.

Its not that complex or expensive.

Moreover, we are talking about a much smaller scale, probably in the same order as the French, Italian, Spanish and most comparable Australian scale: one or two ships capable of landing and supporting between 600 and 900 soldiers and their equipment and carrying about a dozen tactical helicopters.

The knowledge base and organizational structure to do that already exists in the CF, especially now, after years of deployed combat in Afghanistan.

Addressing now the "dedicated and highly trained naval units".

First of all, "A ship is a ship" (dixit Admiral -then busted to captain- Kirk). From a naval point of view, there is no more difference between operating an amphibious ship vice a frigate that there is between operating an AOR vice a destroyer. Each type of ship in the Navy has a dedicated crew: That is, the crewmen qualified in individual trade first, then trained individually to type on the class of ship they serve on and then, the whole crew trains to operational standards on all the specific tasks and operations of their individual ship to pass their readiness qualification. There is no difficulty for the Navy in learning the specifics within the time frame that would be provided between the time we decide to purchase amphibious ships and the time the ship is turned over to the Navy from the builders. 

As for  the expensive part generally, the most likely types of amphibious ship Canada would get are ships like the French Mistral, the Korean Dodko, the Spanish Juan Carlos I or its Australian derivative Canberra. These ships cost about the same as a frigate and are crewed by smaller Navy crew than a frigate. The cost differential  is a wash.

Finally, I disagree completely with point three. The Australian Defence Forces will soon man and operate two LHA's of the Canberra class, about a dozen destroyers and frigates plus a slew of mine warfare crafts and patrol boats with a Navy that is smaller than ours.

In my opinion, the element that would have the greatest learning curve is probably the Tactical Helicopter squadron to be embarked - not because the pilots would have to fly differently, but because contrary to their Maritime Helo brethren, the "ground" crew of those squadrons would have to learn to work and operate in the very tight confines and within the restrictions of a ship before they could become as effective as they would like to be.

This is just MHO, but I would love the opportunity to put together the Navy crew that would prove me right, if Ottawa calls ...


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## Infanteer (25 Jan 2011)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> First of all, and I can sympathize with Infanteer being impressed by the US Marines MAGTF concept of operation, the US Marines Model is not what is required in Canada. Remember that the USMC is not an amphibious force, its an expeditionary corps whose task is to basically be able to take and deploy a scalable force up to the size of the whole CF anywhere in the world and support it for months at the time, if not years.



If we developed any capability like this for Canada, it would be expeditionary as well.



> So, sure, they have their ACE, CLE, CE and so forth, but so do we when you look at the equivalent whole CF. Our CE element is called Canada Command, or CEFCOM and is completed by a local appropriate HQ where deployed, our CLE is made up of our purple trades and CANOSCOM, our ACE is the Air Force, and so forth. So we need not reinvent the wheel, just use and adapt what we already have to one more situation.



Wrong.  the components of a MAGTF are various task force elements, similar in design with our Task Force NCE/NSE/BG construct, not our national force generation/employment organizations.

My description of the various fucntions and links of a MAGTF wasn't to point out that we didn't have anything like them (I alluded that we do); it was only to show how complex employing a unit of soldiers in an amphibious environment is.  As Old Sweat said, it isn't simply a matter of loading bayonets in boats and sending them to shore - there is a great amount of unique planning and logistics that requires a degree of corporate knowledge.  This isn't something that comes immediately following the purchase of an amphibious vessel.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (25 Jan 2011)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> If we developed any capability like this for Canada, it would be expeditionary as well.



I apologize for being unclear. 

Of course any Battle Group, air element and ships that would be deployed in any Canadian amphibious force would be out on an expedition. In the case of the Marine Corps, I was referring to the fact that the totality of the Corps (all 200 thousand or so and 40 thousand reservists) is entirely dedicated to being deployed as an expeditionary force. The MAGTF is the structure they use to do this. It is scalable and, while you appear to have seen it at the Battalion Landing Team level, I do not know in which scale you saw it. The Marines can deploy a MAGTF that is only at the Expeditionary Unit level [MEU(SOC)] of approx. 2500 all the way up to a Expeditionary Force of approx. 100,000 based on multiple Marine Divisions. When a Marine Division ships out, you are hard pressed to find anyone left in uniform on the base. And being an integrated force, they carry and control internally to the Corps  their stores, administration, air support, armour and artillery, etc. 

This is where my comparison to the whole CF came from: The Corps need not look outside its own structure for anything as it is already integrated. Even the ships of the "Gator" Navy are by their nature already separated from the main fleet and assigned to support the Marines on an ongoing basis. The only thing left out, but which in any event does not require specific amphibious training, is the provision where circumstances warrant of escort vessels to the Marine force being deployed. 

Purely on a side note here, as I don't know if this was the case in the Army or Air Force before Afghanistan, in the Navy, we have been working under the TF/TG/TU/TE system ever since the end of the cold war - so the corporate knowledge of such organizational structure is well entrenched by now.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> there is a great amount of unique planning and logistics that requires a degree of corporate knowledge.  This isn't something that comes immediately following the purchase of an amphibious vessel.



First here, between the time we "purchase" any such ship and it hits the water and become available to the Navy, we are talking four to five years. I can guarantee you we can develop the knowledge required in that time frame. The Australians are doing it, so are the Italians and the Spaniards. I'd like to think our military is just as smart and professional. 

Second of all, we must include concept of operation in here and distinguish (again) from the Americans. The US has a "forward deployed" policy for its armed forces. As such, the US Marines have, at any given moment, between four and eight MEU(SOC) deployed around the world onboard amphibious groups. The Marines on those ships live onboard for months at a time without a specific mission or tasking and the stores they carry must last them that long plus "combat" consumption rate even if hostility start on the last day. These stores must be carried with the amphibious group and, without knowing the exact order in which they will be required, must be easily reachable usually in reverse order they are required (least likely used buried at the back, most likely used in front). 

In Canada, we do not permanently forward deploy, and just like the French, Italian, British and Australians, the natural state of any amphibious ship would be alongside Halifax or Esquimalt except for short sailings on training and exercises. The soldiers would not be embarked unless they were being sailed to a specific exercise or actual operation, for which they would have trained in advance. The Army's logistics personnel would have planned their projection for consumption of stores in both quantities and order of consumption. They would then meet with their Navy counterpart who would be responsible for storing the items onboard the amphibious ship in reverse order of expected use.  At that point it becomes a cargo handling exercise and the Navy already knows how to do that. Moreover, by the time we get phibs, many Sea logistics officers and MARS officers can be run through the US Marines Combat Logistics Officer course or the Amphibious Assault Staff Officer course. When I retired ten years ago, the Navy regularly sent officers on those courses, even reserve officers, and we did not even envisaged having phibs in those days. They were just considered "good to know" courses - just in case. 

So, on the small scale that would exist in Canada, and with the more limited embarked time for Canadian soldiers only for specific exercises or operation, many of the complexities that  attach to the US Marines methods would not be required. When US Marines deploy, without specific task, for four to six months, they become part of the ship's crew, thus the need to come under the XO, and must take part in constant drills and phys. ed. training to keep their edge, and their command element must , when tasked while at sea, do its own planning of the operation.

Canadians embarked only to and from their landing area on a specific mission would be acting more like passengers (though liaison between the Adjutant and the Coxn's staff and Regulating PO  would be necessary for the maintenance of good order and safety of the soldiers) and their command element would be sailing with its mission plan already "in the pocket". 

In fact, with ships like the Mistral or Canberra that are equipped with "plug-and-play" ready Embarked Force HQ and ops room for a staff of about 100, the likely organization of a Canadian  amphibious operation would likely see an embarked Task Force Commander (either a Commodore or a Brigadier General) and her staff in overall command, with the Battle Group as one Task Group, the amphibious ship another Task Group, the air element as another TG, the integrated logistics group another and finally, any escort ships as a final TG.

We already have all the knowledge to organize something like that. We just need to practice it from time to time (just like a "Division HQ", I guess).

I note your interesting tag line, infanteer. And I bid all here to think of the same for any Canadian amphibious capability: Don't overcomplicate it.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Jan 2011)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Agree with 1 and 2 but what escorts are you talking about? New AOR's will be operational by the time this capability would come on-line and the current frigates and their proposed replacements would handle the rest.




My appreciation is that IF one has, because one needs, an important and vulnerable ship like a major amphibious ship then it needs escorts that must be manned and ready to sail with it.  understand that hey already exist but it means, to me, that enough people must be available to crew all those ships, almost all the time.

I am not suggesting new, additional frigates.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Jan 2011)

While a ship may, indeed, be just a ship, an amphibious _force_ is another thing. The force commander is, conventionally, the naval commander, and, as Old Sweat suggested, he has a great deal of responsibility, including the messy business of fighting and winning the "battle on the beach." He, the naval commander, does not, generally, give the army commander free reign until after the landing has succeeded. This might be the major land "battle" of an operation and it is a naval officer's job to fight and win it, from the bridge if his ship. This is a sort of military operations that requires specialized training- which is (or was 20_ish_ years ago) provided to UK and US naval officers selected for amphibious forces.


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## ArmyRick (25 Jan 2011)

I would like to jump back into this one. Points to ponder.

1. I said it before and I say it again. The biggest hurdle (from a soldier's perspective) on doing amphibious ops is a LEADERSHIP issue. We do lack expirience in that regard. For the soldiers, it is a simple matter of learning ship drills, disembarking/embarking onto a landing craft/assault boat/helicopter/hovercraft, etc. Soldiers I find pick this up really fast.

But the commanders (at all levels) would have to become drilled and profficient in planning and executing ampbibious operations. The service support and the lift annexes would be considerable (I am imagining a CSM and PL WOs hashing out the loading manifest of troops, equipment and supplies as well as prisoner/civilian/casualty extraction loading plans). FOOs would be probably very busy coordinating all aspects of fire support (air, artillery, naval, etc). Coy and Battalion commanders would have to really hash out their COAs for whatever mission they are undertaking. 

2. What is the most realistic amphibious operations we as canadians would do?
-NEO Extraction (Canadians stuck in the middle east in 2006 perfect example)
-Participating in larger amphibious operation (alongside big brother America and Britain) this would be the ONLY way I fore see us doing a large scale amphibious op
-Warmer months of the year, soverein ops in the North (From ship and working with the Rangers)
-Smaller scale intervention missions
-Maybe Counter piracy ops (Pursuing pirates in Somalia and taking them down on the water or on land)

3. We will definately need new technology, but I will let the experts bark about that (Hint Landing Craft for troops is something we could get and start training on in very short time and not much cost)

4. Where would we load these forces up? Halifax or Esquimalt or would it be mission dependant?

My thoughts, cheers.


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## jollyjacktar (25 Jan 2011)

Rick, for #4.  Prior to it being jagged in the plan was to have an Amphibian Unit based out of Shearwater.  Pongo's in Battalion strength IRRC, and the BHS.  Something similar in Esquimault.  They were going to be intended as a rapid deployment force to go wherever needed on short notice.  With humanitarian missions foremost in mind ala OP Hestia in Haiti.  At least this was how it was explained on our end.  They went so far as to stand up a small starter Det of Sailors who were to form the nucleus of the crew for the BHS.  When we "borrowed" USS GUNSTON HALL these guys sailed on her for shadowing purposes and more was to come from it.  When the project was shelved, all the guys came back to the fleet.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Jan 2011)

Well, if we're looking for something meaningful for the TDBGs to do that is both 'territorial' and 'defensive', perhaps we should find a way to inter-operate with the Coast Guard's fleet. They got a bunch of ships that might be useful in their Ice Fleet, for example. Of course, I'm well out of my _depth _ here (pun intended):

http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/Ice_Fleet

Heavy Icebreakers

•CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent
•CCGS Terry Fox 

Medium Icebreakers

•CCGS Amundsen (dedicated to Science in the summer)
•CCGS Des Groseilliers 
•CCGS Henry Larsen 
•CCGS Pierre Radisson 

Light Icebreakers

High Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels

•CCGS Ann Harvey
•CCGS Edward Cornwallis 
•CCGS Georges R. Pearkes 
•CCGS Griffon 
•CCGS Martha L. Black 
•CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier 
•CCGS Sir William Alexander 

Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels

•CCGS Earl Grey
•CCGS Samuel Risley
•CCGS Tracy 

Air Cushioned Vehicles

•CCGS Mamilossa
•CCGS Sipu Muin


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## chrisf (26 Jan 2011)

If you're suggesting any sort of arming, or militarization of those vessels, it's been discussed before, I can assure you, it wouldn't work very well.

That being said, a great deal of coast guard employees are nearing retirement age, if you started slipping things in slowly, as they were replaced, you might get away with it.

My suggestion would be to include mounts for light armament on all new vessels (Mounts, just mounts, not the weapons), as well as a multi-use compartment large enough to uncomfortably embark a platoon of troops, plus stores. Option to use for embarked RCMP/DFO/Sea Cadets/Cargo as required, on replacements for the 1100/1200/1300 class ice breakers.

Down the road, embark start conducting arctic soverignty ops from the CCG vessels that head north for the summer. Simple stuff, plant flags, visit northern communities.

Would be a good excuse to operate at least one vessel in the north in the winter as well, I'm guessing you'd have multiple scientific organizations more then willing to back such winter operations as well.

As the coast guard becomes more comfortable with the idea of working with the military, you can start arming the vessels as required when troops are embarked, weapons to be operated by embarked troops.

Several of the vessels listed carry "barges" for operations in the arctic. Not suitable for any sort of opposed landing, by any means, but more than sufficient to land a platoon with kit on an arctic island.


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> If you're suggesting any sort of arming, or militarization of those vessels, it's been discussed before, I can assure you, it wouldn't work very well.
> 
> That being said, a great deal of coast guard employees are nearing retirement age, if you started slipping things in slowly, as they were replaced, you might get away with it.
> 
> ...



So what would you use the large compartment for when you don't have troops embarked? You cannot just put something like that in a new built ship and just save it. There is no such thing as wasted space onboard ship and when you put said platoon onboard with gear where does the gear that was stored or other personnel go?



> And I would continue to argue for at least some portion of the CSC fleet (2-4 out of the 12-16) to be configured in a manner similar to the Absalon so that it can launch Landing Craft.


Then you would have a frigate that can only do both roles at best adequately. If we are serious about amphib ops lets be serious about getting them at least an LPD and lets not bastardize other warships and support vessels for the job. You won't be doing the Navy nor the Army any favours.


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## chrisf (26 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> So what would you use the large compartment for when you don't have troops embarked? You cannot just put something like that in a new built ship and just save it. There is no such thing as wasted space onboard ship and when you put said platoon onboard with gear where does the gear that was stored or other personnel go?



I know. I'm on a ship right now. Physically on a ship as I type this. One of those ships on that list in fact.

If you'll go back and re-read, and pay attention this time, I specificed multi-use, and listed several uses. Similar in concept to the auxillary accomodations compartment on the australian armidale class patrol ships. (not going to lie, I've been watching episodes of "Sea Patrol" but bare with me)

I also said uncomfortably. Right now, most of those listed ships have extremely comfortable accomodations (Especially compared to naval standards). Two to a cabin is common, one to a cabin is not uncommon. One multi use room, with triple bunks against the wall would suffice for what I suggest, or perhaps a removable bunk system, say contructing from tubing, sort of triple stacked cots.



The coast guard embarks all sorts of other parties now. Scientific parties, DFO, the RCMP, during the summer several ships carry sea cadets. Also gives the ship the option of additional space for SAR casualities, or additional space to convert for scientific laboratory space, depending on task.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> I know. I'm on a ship right now. Physically on a ship as I type this. One of those ships on that list in fact.
> 
> If you'll go back and re-read, and pay attention this time, I specificed multi-use, and listed several uses. Similar in concept to the auxillary accomodations compartment on the australian armidale class patrol ships. (not going to lie, I've been watching episodes of "Sea Patrol" but bare with me)
> 
> ...



I do pay attention, I have been sailing for 17 years and when someone mentions bringing a platoon onboard ship with gear I tend to pay attention. When someone talks about multi use spaces I pay attention so I do have an inkling of what I am referring to.


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## chrisf (26 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I do pay attention, I have been sailing for 17 years and when someone mentions bringing a platoon onboard ship with gear I tend to pay attention. When someone talks about multi use spaces I pay attention so I do have an inkling of what I am referring to.



On navy ships perhaps? Civillian shipping, or the coast guard at least, isn't nearly as tight for space. Not even close. Pretty much every crew member gets a private cabin on the larger vessels.

Most of the vessels, 1100s and larger at least, in the above list already have multi use spaces, of varying size depending on the ship and task, which are unoccupied for the majority of the year. Unfortunately, none are suitable for accomodations, as they were never envisioned as that in the design. Different scientific parties usually occupy these spaces when the vessel is tasked.

While it's not feasible to add such a space to any existing vessels, replacements are coming (eventually). It could be incorporated into the design.

Of course, unless the ship has inherent offensive capabilities, it still remains nothing more then a taxi, and not much use for anything other than arctic soverignty, so the same role could likely be accomplished more effectively by air craft, but still, I'm confident it could be done.


----------



## chrisf (26 Jan 2011)

Actually, forget about the logistics of it for a second, the original point I meant to make is that any sort of militarization of a coast guard vessel is not going to work. At best, you'd be able to hitch a ride for occasional arctic soverignty operations.

Any sort of "marine" force, either for foreign deployment, or even domestic, would need dedicated vessels.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Jan 2011)

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> Actually, forget about the logistics of it for a second, the original point I meant to make is that any sort of militarization of a coast guard vessel is not going to work. At best, you'd be able to hitch a ride for occasional arctic soverignty operations.
> 
> Any sort of "marine" force, either for foreign deployment, or even domestic, would need dedicated vessels.



And here's some folks hitching a ride for a sov photo op. Can I hot bunk with the one on the far right?


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## Journeyman (26 Jan 2011)

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> Unfortunately, none are suitable for accomodations, as they were never envisioned as that in the design.


I had to chuckle at that. 
Swamps and arctic tundra aren't particularly suitable for accommodations either, but some of us have managed to live in them. Here you're talking about walls and a roof -- and they don't even flap in the breeze.  :nod:

Mind you, while some are building a complete amphibious force, LGen Devlin did only use the phrase "...there would also be ...._a taste_ of amphibious operations..." I don't think he's planning on taking over the Coast Guard just yet


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## Kirkhill (26 Jan 2011)

Suppose the space involved weren't considered primarily as a space to carry Leos around but rather pallets of bullets, paper and Timmies?  A warehousing, or at least an onboard loading dock, accessible by ramp from the stern and elevatator from the helo deck, that would be used to increase endurance and speed of loading - embarked forklift bringing pallets or containers over the stern rather than swaying them on board.

Then, the trade off would be embarked force or endurance.


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## GAP (26 Jan 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And here's some folks hitching a ride for a sov photo op. Can I hot bunk with the one on the far right?



Well, if that ice shelf gives way, you may have to warm her up first........... ;D


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## Oldgateboatdriver (26 Jan 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The force commander is, conventionally, the naval commander, and, as Old Sweat suggested, he has a great deal of responsibility, including the messy business of fighting and winning the "battle on the beach."



In my (albeit limited) experience, the naval commander has nothing to do with the "fighting" on the beach. Her responsibility is to make the final local call on whether to proceed with the landing or not (based on various factors such as was surprise achieved, did the pre-landing bombardment achieve its breaching effect, in view of the relative importance of the mission do the weather conditions preclude proceedings, are support forces in position, etc.). Once the call to go is made and the Army hits the beach, the directing and control the fighting on the "beach" is fully in Army hands. The naval commander's responsibilities are not finished however: For one thing, he must deliver the support expected from the ships involved in the op; for another, she also, based on reports from the "beach", makes the call to either send the next wave in  - or to withdraw the landing force. The naval commander making that call, regardless of specialized training you mention, is quite unlikely to have knowledge of amphibious assault. In the US case, its likely the admiral in command of the carrier group in overall command - a naval aviator by trade who has never set foot (unless very unlucky) on a gator. When the Brits fought the Falkland war, the overall command of the landing force rested with Commodore "Sandy" Woodwards, a submariner whose sole exposure to something other than subs was command of the destroyer Sheffield. 

[p.s.: I'm putting "beach" in quotation marks because nowadays, with AAV's, LCAC's and tactical helicopters, landings take place less and less often on an actual beach.]

All this said, we are not talking about Ottawa deciding to get in the amphibious business in the morning, getting the ship in the afternoon and staffing it the day after with soldiers, airmen and seamen that have never trained for it and sending it to breach the Atlantic wall right away. There will be time to train up to what we have to do. My points were always that, contrary to what is propounded, achieving some reasonable amphibious capability is both financially feasible within the fiscal constraints of Canada and within reasonable training in the techniques, tactics and strategies of amphibious warfare considering the the current experience and knowledge base available in the CF.

The specialized training required of naval officers serving on any amphibious ship would be part of their pre-posting training, just like we currently do for instance, in the case of the navigation officers, combat officers and any other officer in a specialized tactical position, and the Sea logistics officers of course.

I agree with the list of likely tasks of ArmyRick for such force - and that means that, if we were ever facing a "breach-the-atlantic-wall" scenario, we would be doing it in company of allies with the extra experience  and materiel (combat aircrafts) necessary.

I have one more probable task (or at least possible): with speeds of 22 Kts available to Dodko/Canberra types likely for Canadian selection, you can load them with eight to ten Maritime Helicopters when not in use on amphibious operations and turn them into a useful ASW platform for convoy escort. But this is something the MH community and Navy already knows how to do.


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

I wonder how hard and what the legalities would be to say buy an LPD, convert it into a hospital ship during peacetime operations then convert it back to an assault transport in times of war.


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## kratz (26 Jan 2011)

Now there is an idea politicians could bite into.

We would have the humanitarian capability in peacetimes, and a relevant combat capability during conflict. There a many examples of ships being repurposed in the past, so I would not think there would be too many hurdles, but cost would be one of the first that would have to be answered. The ticklish part, in my mind, would be the perception from belligerents of that ship (pre, during and post conflict). No doubt there would be potential accusations that would have to be hammered out before such an idea could take shape. Still, a hospital (peacetime) turned assault ship (conflict) would be an interesting, uniquely Canadian concept.


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## Journeyman (26 Jan 2011)

I suspect that, once it's configured as a hospital, we'd leave it as a hospital during conflict as well -- Role 3 afloat.

Not only is the Canadian military a great fan of inertia, it would be a way to get the NDP _et al_ to buy into supporting an operation; "look, we're humanitarian good guys." And while it may actually be a very useful contribution, it doesn't help this amphibious warfare discussion.


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I suspect that, once it's configured as a hospital, we'd leave it as a hospital during conflict as well -- Role 3 afloat.
> 
> Not only is the Canadian military a great fan of inertia, it would be a way to get the NDP _et al_ to buy into supporting an operation; "look, we're humanitarian good guys." And while it may actually be a very useful contribution, it doesn't help this amphibious warfare discussion.



I wonder if we could get two LPDs. One as a dedicated Hospital Ship and the other as a dedicated amphib.....


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## PuckChaser (26 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I wonder if we could get two LPDs. One as a dedicated Hospital Ship and the other as a dedicated amphib.....



Maybe they're charging for parking in Halifax so they can buy both.  ;D


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Maybe they're charging for parking in Halifax so they can buy both.  ;D



Possibly...I wish it were so.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I wonder if we could get two LPDs. One as a dedicated Hospital Ship and the other as a dedicated amphib.....



Instead of owning these types of ships, why not lease them from a ferry company or something? If you specify in a long term lease arrangement that they need to be configured thus and so, they could be pulled in for annual exercises etc.


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jan 2011)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Instead of owning these types of ships, why not lease them from a ferry company or something? If you specify in a long term lease arrangement that they need to be configured thus and so, they could be pulled in for annual exercises etc.



The problem with that is your ships do not have the redundant water tight bulkheads, damage control gear etc all over the place like you have on a warship. If the Falklands taught us anything is the need for redundant damage control.


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## Journeyman (27 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> If the Falklands taught us anything is the need for redundant damage control.


....and don't transport all your helicopters on one ship.  :-\


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## medicineman (27 Jan 2011)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> If the Falklands taught us anything is the need for redundant damage control.



Pity it didn't teach us to have a decent sized merchant marine or fleet auxilliary to be able to call up ships in time of need. 

MM


----------



## Phantomman (12 Jul 2011)

Simple, Canada doesn't have the infrastructure and the logistics to field marines and Canada doesn't need a large expeditonary amphibious assault force quite frankly. Although I do support a small expeditionary amphibious army.


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## Loachman (12 Jul 2011)

You resurrected a thread that had been dormant for four and a half years to post that...?


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## Fishbone Jones (12 Jul 2011)

Phantomman said:
			
		

> Simple, Canada doesn't have the infrastructure and the logistics to field marines and Canada doesn't need a large expeditonary amphibious assault force quite frankly. Although I do support a small expeditionary amphibious army.


Points already covered in the other 8.5 pages.
Thankyou Capt Obvious.


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## Calvillo (28 Jan 2016)

Hello,

Long time lurker, first post. I have question about the Army's capabilities.

From what I understand about how the Canadian Forces is organized, Canadian military can not have some kind of Marine or Naval Infantry forces (Marine as in Marine Corps, not Navy _en français_). Everything related to ground warfare is the responsibility of the Canadian Army. With that, does the Canadian Army have any amphibious  warfare capability at all? CMIIW, but looking at the inventory of Canadian Army equipment, I can not find amphibious assault or landing vehicles typically found on Marines units. Looking at the other end, on the Royal Canadian Navy side, I can not find any kind of active amphibious assault vessel.

If my question violates OPSEC, I apologize. I am asking just for general knowledge.


----------



## ken.w2402 (29 Jan 2016)

Calvillo said:
			
		

> Hello,
> 
> Long time lurker, first post. I have question about the Army's capabilities.
> 
> ...



http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=van-doos-keep-their-cool-in-brazilian-jungle-heat-at-unitas-2015/ijpbmxuz


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## Colin Parkinson (29 Jan 2016)

Had Canada ended up with the Mistral class, then we would have tasked units to maintain some of the skill sets. The Van Doo did recently exercise with the French Mistrals

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI


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## McG (29 Jan 2016)

The Army regularly participates in RIMPAC aswell.


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## daftandbarmy (29 Jan 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Had Canada ended up with the Mistral class, then we would have tasked units to maintain some of the skill sets. The Van Doo did recently exercise with the French Mistrals
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI



The most important skill sets for amphibious operations are at the BGp level and higher and involve operational planning and logistics coordination that can be very tricky, to say the least e.g., coordinating a Bde Gp landing at night along a coastline with wicked tides, or in really bad weather, for example.

The troops? If you have a well trained Coy Gp/ BGp operating in a dismounted role you can bring them up to speed in 2 or 3 days. Again, it's mostly all about 'get on/ get off the landing craft/ helicopter without forgetting your rifle' kind of stuff.

That, and making sure that we give the navy and air force heart attacks and aneurisms as we miss timings, argue with them about trivial things in a way that makes it seem that we know more than they do about this stuff, and destroy their fragile and fancy equipment with our big rough hands


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## a_majoor (6 Feb 2016)

The Canadian Military Journal has an interesting article on the subject here:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no1/page54-eng.asp

Of course the primary factor in understanding why we _don't_ have this capability always boils down to $$$$ and how much/little the taxpayers are willing to spend.


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## The Bread Guy (15 May 2017)

Yes, we should, according to this from the NATO Association of Canada, shared IAW S.29 (Fair Dealing) of the _Copyright Act_ ...


> Member States that are part of both the G7 and NATO – namely the US, UK, Italy, France, Germany and Canada – share their military capabilities, including amphibious operations. These operations are crucial to offensive military assaults, and bring together air, army and navy branches of the armed forces to fight in a range of different hostile territories, beaches, mountains or defensive fortifications.
> 
> The G7-NATO member countries have a highly specialized, efficient, and skilled division within their militaries designed for such an offensive operation, known as the Marines. This special force are often deployed overseas, to conduct training exercises with partner countries, or during military offensives. In Afghanistan for instance, NATO established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), where in most cases, it was the Marines and other elite forces that were sent (PDF file) to tackle al-Qaeda and the Taliban. More recently, a small contingent force of approximately 400 US Marines, alongside other special forces, are being deployed in Syria to combat ISIS.
> 
> ...


About the author ...


> Ananda Narasimhan is originally from Switzerland and India and recently moved to Canada to study at the University of British Columbia. Earning a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History, focusing on South Asia and military history, he is now currently enrolled at the University of Leicester completing a Master of Arts in International Security Studies. Ananda has previously been involved in multiple humanitarian projects overseas. Ananda joined the internship program at the NATO association of Canada to help achieve a better insight into institutional activities promoting security within Canada. Ananda plans to continue to deepen his knowledge in international affairs through academia and apply what he has learnt, by getting involved with major organizations such as CSIS, OCHA or the Red Cross.


Pretty broad strokes, there ...


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## Humphrey Bogart (15 May 2017)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Yes, we should, according to this from the NATO Association of Canada, shared IAW S.29 (Fair Dealing) of the _Copyright Act_ ...About the author ...Pretty broad strokes, there ...



We tried this once, it was called the Standing Contingency Task Force.  The government and military loved it until the saw the price tag and it died just as quickly as it was stood up.



> Royal Canadian Marine Corps
> Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF)
> 
> Canada does not have a Marine Corps. Nor, unlike Australia, does Canada even have Army units that are preferentially tasked to conduct amphibious operations. Indeed, despite the fact that it has one of the world's most powerful navies, Canada has no amphibious capabilities whatsoever, not even the sort of modest maritime special operations capability such as maintained by a country such as Israel. The Canadian Army did participate in a number of amphibious operations in World War II, but since then the Canadian Forces have managed to get along without any discernable naval infantry capability. For a brief period in the 2005-2007 timeframe, the Canadian government flirted with establishing a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) which would have implied the creation of a Naval Infantry, if not a Marine Corps. But as with so many other Canadian ambitions, nothing came of this brief excursion.
> ...



http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm


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## daftandbarmy (15 May 2017)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The Canadian Military Journal has an interesting article on the subject here:
> 
> http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no1/page54-eng.asp
> 
> Of course the primary factor in understanding why we _don't_ have this capability always boils down to $$$$ and how much/little the taxpayers are willing to spend.



It would be tough for us to pay for, and even the Royal Marines are struggling to justify their existence.

Royal Marines cut by 200 as armed forces face staffing crisis  
https://www.ft.com/content/8a6e2752-1ec7-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c


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## Kirkhill (15 May 2017)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It would be tough for us to pay for, and even the Royal Marines are struggling to justify their existence.
> 
> Royal Marines cut by 200 as armed forces face staffing crisis
> https://www.ft.com/content/8a6e2752-1ec7-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c



On the other hand..... Currently available.  A 200 man cadre of individuals experienced in Marine operations.....  All that is missing is a budget.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (15 May 2017)

What is the cost differential of a marine vs army infantry?


M.


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## dimsum (15 May 2017)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> We tried this once, it was called the Standing Contingency Task Force.  The government and military loved it until the saw the price tag and it died just as quickly as it was stood up.
> 
> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm



Geez.  You know an article is getting old when they say that Canada has "one of the world's most powerful navies".   :-[


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## daftandbarmy (15 May 2017)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> What is the cost differential of a marine vs army infantry?
> 
> 
> M.



Seriously... a the pointy end, just take our Light Infantry Units and give them some training in getting on and off landing craft etc, and carry on. If you want, you can run some kind of Royal Marines type selection, but it's all just good old fashioned grunt work, mostly. It takes about a week to get pretty good at this stuff at the BGp level and below.

The expensive stuff is the equipment/ships (landing craft/ LCAC, aircraft/helicopter carriers  etc), integrated fire support (we don't do NGS in the Canadian Navy) and C&C infrastructure (think LPD type ships, Cormorants etc) required to make it all work together properly. There's also strategic recce, like SEALs/SBS, but we may be able to pull that together through JTF2 type resources.

However, we'll never, ever spend what is required to do that properly.


----------



## Underway (15 May 2017)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Seriously... a the pointy end, just take our Light Infantry Units and give them some training in getting on and off landing craft etc, and carry on. If you want, you can run some kind of Royal Marines type selection, but it's all just good old fashioned grunt work, mostly. It takes about a week to get pretty good at this stuff at the BGp level and below.
> 
> The expensive stuff is the equipment/ships (landing craft/ LCAC, aircraft/helicopter carriers  etc), integrated fire support (we don't do NGS in the Canadian Navy) and C&C infrastructure (think LPD type ships, Cormorants etc) required to make it all work together properly. There's also strategic recce, like SEALs/SBS, but we may be able to pull that together through JTF2 type resources.
> 
> However, we'll never, ever spend what is required to do that properly.



There was a push under Hiller to try it out and it was in the 2006 draft of the Canada First Defence Strategy.  They did a large study to see if amphibious operations were something that Canada wanted to try.  I worked with a number of sailors and soldiers who did the trials in South Carolina borrowing a US amphib ship (Gunston Hall IIRC).  Divers did the beach recce, MCDV's cleared lanes, and then the Vandoo's went ashore using US equipment.  There were a number of COA's examined.  It looked like they were going to do a Medium Battle Group type formation.  Company of Infantry, attached engineers, 3-6 guns, LAV's, MGS perhaps...  all in all about 200-350 pers depending.

There were visits to the USMC, UK Marines, Netherlands and Australia.  The report I read stated that it was going to take 10 years to get trained up and acquire all the equipment, along with the "Big Honkin Ship" to move it all.  But as per normal the price tag and internal CAF politics killed the idea.  CANSOFCOM got bigger, we bought Chinooks and C-17's and basically we spent all the money on air deployable instead.

Couple of articles that pretty much say what I said here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Commando_Regiment

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol3num2/vol3num2art4.pdf

*edit: Some of the Marine Commando Regiment proposed mandate has been taken over by the new Enhanced/Advance Boarding Party teams, and some of it still lies with JTF2.  However, the combat power concept of an MCR with artillery and armoured vehicles is not held by anyone.


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## daftandbarmy (15 May 2017)

Underway said:
			
		

> There was a push under Hiller to try it out and it was in the 2006 draft of the Canada First Defence Strategy.  They did a large study to see if amphibious operations were something that Canada wanted to try.  I worked with a number of sailors and soldiers who did the trials in South Carolina borrowing a US amphib ship (Gunston Hall IIRC).  Divers did the beach recce, MCDV's cleared lanes, and then the Vandoo's went ashore using US equipment.  There were a number of COA's examined.  It looked like they were going to do a Medium Battle Group type formation.  Company of Infantry, attached engineers, 3-6 guns, LAV's, MGS perhaps...  all in all about 200-350 pers depending.
> 
> There were visits to the USMC, UK Marines, Netherlands and Australia.  The report I read stated that it was going to take 10 years to get trained up and acquire all the equipment, along with the "Big Honkin Ship" to move it all.  But as per normal the price tag and internal CAF politics killed the idea.  CANSOFCOM got bigger, we bought Chinooks and C-17's and basically we spent all the money on air deployable instead.
> 
> ...



Of course, a lot of your organization, training and equipment will be driven by your doctrine, viz:

USMC Doctrine:? Kick in their front door and kill them in their living room as fast as possible with maximum violence. P.S., Wreck their house too.

UK Doctrine?: Land where and when they won't expect you, then sneak through their back door and stab them in the back while they're on the loo. 

Not sure what our doctrine is, but whatever we do would likely look a little more British than 'murrican I would guess.


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## FSTO (16 May 2017)

My two cents. 
Do we want to do Juno Beach or continue to use a rhib and zodiac deployed from a Frigate for all of our "Amphib" ops? For some strange reason we get in our heads that its all or nothing and we usually default to nothing. But we don't have to get an Iwo Jima class amphibious assault carrier to do what we as a maritime nation should be able to do at a minimum.
I say we just get an amphib capable ship(s) with these requirements; large flight deck, hangar, well deck, accommodations, C2 and a hospital. We start with baby steps and go from there. The Italians have a class of small amphibs that are about the size we could manage right now (get the drawings and build new). From there we could build our doctrine and capabilities that would make Canada more useful around the world. Like the C17's we will wonder how we operated without that capability. 

Here is one built for the Algerians in 2012
<p><a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BDSL-474.png#/media/File:BDSL-474.png"><img src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/BDSL-474.png" alt="BDSL-474.png"></a>
By <a href="//commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Messaoud_Mesbouk&amp;action=edit&amp;redlink=1" class="new" title="User:Messaoud Mesbouk (page does not exist)">Messaoud Mesbouk</a> - <span class="int-own-work" lang="en">Own work</span>, <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0" title="Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0">CC BY-SA 4.0</a>, <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=48019494">Link</a></p>


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## GR66 (16 May 2017)

Maybe we don't need a "Marine Corps" in the sense of an amphibious assault type force, but just the ability to transport a useful sized and equipped force from ship to shore.  Maybe a helicopter carrier to ferry troops to the shore with some landing craft to transport heavier supplies and a Ro-Ro manned by Naval (Reserve?) personnel is enough for what we need to do.


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## Infanteer (16 May 2017)

I'll crib the notes I posted over on ER Campbell's blog.

I’ll argue for amphibious capability, but it doesn’t need to be an extravagant one like the US (and only the US) maintains. It can be something conventional like a mid-size landing platform dock (LPD), which countries like The Netherlands and Spain possess, or something a like a tender (“expeditionary sea base” in modern parlance) which is essentially a converted tanker that can push out and support amphibious forces – I think Davie is developing an ability at making use of tankers….

A few of these ships would require somewhere in the ballpark of 300-500 sailors. On top of this, there would be a requirement for some development in joint command and control, a process the Aussies are well into with the commissioning of their amphibious ships. Add another 100 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel or so for this.

The real investment needs to go into the ship-to-shore or ship-to-objective “connectors system”, which demands a few niche capabilities. First is the “combat cargo network” which is soldiers and sailors who understand how to pack ships for amphibious disembarkation. Next is the landing craft themselves, which can be crewed by Navy (US approach) or Army/Marine (UK approach) personnel. Next up is the beach party unit, which is the amphibious equivalent of a DZ controller, making sure beaches aren’t congested. Beachmasters control the surf to the end of the beach, and from the beach on is the domain of the shore party, which would be specially trained Army logisticians who get stuff off the beach and into a support area. The final piece would be some sort of aviation asset: perhaps cargo variants of the CH-148? So add another couple 200 or so RCAF personnel to increase our Maritime Helicopter capacity.

So, while a few extra platforms and a couple hundred sailors may get your amphibious force to an operational area, amphibious capability demands probably and extra 500 or so personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force – along with some specialized platforms and equipment – to run the connectors system.

All this is to say that, while I am a proponent of such capability, even a modest one will come at some cost.


----------



## FSTO (16 May 2017)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'll crib the notes I posted over on ER Campbell's blog.
> 
> I’ll argue for amphibious capability, but it doesn’t need to be an extravagant one like the US (and only the US) maintains. It can be something conventional like a mid-size landing platform dock (LPD), which countries like The Netherlands and Spain possess, or something a like a tender (“expeditionary sea base” in modern parlance) which is essentially a converted tanker that can push out and support amphibious forces – I think Davie is developing an ability at making use of tankers….
> 
> ...



Not to poo poo your post, but the ship you are proposing is in the IWO JIMA range and would not be considered at all by the L1.
The ship I proposed above has a complement of:	17 officers, 163 ratings which is a pers bill that we could swallow. As I said baby steps and if the effects of climate change are correct, it will be a busy little asset with just taking care of disaster relief.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 May 2017)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Not to poo poo your post, but the ship you are proposing is in the IWO JIMA range and would not be considered at all by the L1.
> The ship I proposed above has a complement of:	17 officers, 163 ratings which is a pers bill that we could swallow. As I said baby steps and if the effects of climate change are correct, it will be a busy little asset with just taking care of disaster relief.



From personal experience, one of the 'disasters' you'll need to relieve is the perception by the deep water Navy that their role is being changed from Strategic Players on the big stage, swooping grandly around the world's oceans, to include babysitting a bunch of grunts in a very dodgy situation (e.g., close to rocks and bad guys on land), as they commute to and from work. To be fair, constant pressure on limited resources leads the bigger player in the great scheme of things, Jack, to prioritize differently on a constant basis.

It was a constant struggle, even in the UK's 3 Cdo Bde with all the attendant history and infrastructure, to keep the Navy 'on mission' so a strong joint warfare/ combined operations doctrine, and supporting resource package, needs to underpin all these amphibious dreams.


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## Old Sweat (16 May 2017)

In 1973 I participated in the Norwegian Army's Brigade North annual FTX. Part of the deployment into the exercise area was by LST. That obviously was a very long time ago, but one thing that still is vivid in my mind was the use of engineer plant to continually work on the beach as the tide changed the waterline on the beach as the LSTs "landed." 

P.S. At one time we had an embryonic marine corps, but that was in the 1860s in the form of "Naval Brigades" such as the Dunnville Naval Brigade. Its CO referred to his men as Marines in his report on the unit's part in the Battle of the Fort Erie Docks (the forgotten cousin of The Battle of Ridgeway) against the Fenians on 2 June, 1866.

The naval brigades did not survive much past confederation.


----------



## GAP (16 May 2017)

Everybody is all enamoured with a proposal from a wannabe academic who has never done diddly except spout off rhetoric 

 :stars:


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## Colin Parkinson (16 May 2017)

Had we gotten the Mistrals then we would be learning to adapt to the new reality. Their base crew was slightly smaller than Tribal class, so crewing would not be a problem. I would see Canada's Amphibs more as a strategic assets where we would support our allies and use them to earn international Brownie points. Parking a Mistral off of Somali would have an interesting effect as the pirates would have to worry about a seaborne assault on their bases, whether or not it happens. Training the army and navy to work off the ships together would happen far faster than us acquiring proper helicopters for them. They could carry a mix of landing craft and perhaps a smallish Griffon Hovercraft. 
It is likely for the first few years we would have to embark helicopters from another nation to be able to use them to full effect.


----------



## FSTO (16 May 2017)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Had we gotten the Mistrals then we would be learning to adapt to the new reality. Their base crew was slightly smaller than Tribal class, so crewing would not be a problem. I would see Canada's Amphibs more as a strategic assets where we would support our allies and use them to earn international Brownie points. Parking a Mistral off of Somali would have an interesting effect as the pirates would have to worry about a seaborne assault on their bases, whether or not it happens. Training the _*army and navy to work off the ships together*_ would happen far faster than us acquiring proper helicopters for them. They could carry a mix of landing craft and perhaps a smallish Griffon Hovercraft.
> It is likely for the first few years we would have to embark helicopters from another nation to be able to use them to full effect.



And the highlighted is the crux of the overall problem.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (16 May 2017)

I think the inter service issues could be resolved at the operational/ship level by the choice of Captain and Ground Force Commander. They have to fight their respective commands to keep the stupidity from interfering to much.
I personally think acquiring the right helicopters would be a far greater struggle. The smart move would to be to buy more Cyclones, with at least 2 per ship being equipped with the ASW suite and 4-6 being mainly troop/cargo transport. I would also opt for some smaller helos such as the Bell 429 (recent acquired by the CCG and Australian navy for training ) for recce, training,  landing on smaller vessels and personal transfers. (More Cyclones would be nice, but doubt the budget would handle it) 

Mistrals would have made the summer arctic exercises far more interesting and important. You could actually then bring tanks or LAV’s to the North which would have been quite the learning experience.


----------



## FSTO (16 May 2017)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I think the inter service issues could be resolved at the operational/ship level by the choice of Captain and Ground Force Commander. They have to fight their respective commands to keep the stupidity from interfering to much.
> I personally think acquiring the right helicopters would be a far greater struggle. The smart move would to be to buy more Cyclones, with at least 2 per ship being equipped with the ASW suite and 4-6 being mainly troop/cargo transport. I would also opt for some smaller helos such as the Bell 429 (recent acquired by the CCG and Australian navy for training ) for recce, training,  landing on smaller vessels and personal transfers. (More Cyclones would be nice, but doubt the budget would handle it)
> 
> Mistrals would have made the summer arctic exercises far more interesting and important. You could actually then bring tanks or LAV’s to the North which would have been quite the learning experience.



The Mistral's were an opportunity missed for sure.

Maybe the new Defence Paper will address this issue?

Oh who am I kidding, it will be a lot of noise and not much action.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 May 2017)

FSTO said:
			
		

> The Mistral's were an opportunity missed for sure.
> 
> Maybe the new Defence Paper will address this issue?
> 
> Oh who am I kidding, it will be a lot of noise and not much action.



Well, what we really need is a floating helicopter carrier, which our new logistics ships could provide (I guess?). We also need a way to transport our landing craft and troops. Troops can go by any means if we are doing an 'unopposed' approach. Not sure how we'd transport the LCs, but that's above my pay grade.

Based on my experience in Norway, we would be shuttled from leased Danish RO-RO ferries by landing craft to the LPD (either Fearful or Insipid  ), get off in the internal dock, climb the gangway to the helipad on the back, then hop on the next Sea King (they were stacked up in cab rank) that dropped down to shuttle us us onto the shore somewhere. Don't be late!

We don't necessarily need a 'HMS Ocean' type solution which, based on the recent British attempts to sell it off, suggests that they have come to similar conclusions...
Meanwhile, Jack was around and overhead providing the anti-ship/air cover.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 May 2017)

Couldn't we just lease something like this for starters and see how we get on?

Edit: Faster on the trigger than me D&B.

Pretty similar to Maersk RoRo Ferries.  In fact she is a RoRo ferry converted by Maersk.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (16 May 2017)

Would be a good task for Davie


----------



## Eland2 (16 May 2017)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Had we gotten the Mistrals then we would be learning to adapt to the new reality. Their base crew was slightly smaller than Tribal class, so crewing would not be a problem. I would see Canada's Amphibs more as a strategic assets where we would support our allies and use them to earn international Brownie points. Parking a Mistral off of Somali would have an interesting effect as the pirates would have to worry about a seaborne assault on their bases, whether or not it happens. *Training the army and navy to work off the ships together *would happen far faster than us acquiring proper helicopters for them. They could carry a mix of landing craft and perhaps a smallish Griffon Hovercraft.
> It is likely for the first few years we would have to embark helicopters from another nation to be able to use them to full effect.



Maybe the answer to the conundrum is a naval infantry unit? Royal Canadian Marines, perhaps? Or Royal Canadian Marine Regiment? Such a unit need not be corps size, but maybe somewhere in the battalion range, and more like the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) in the British Army than the USMC.

It's a shame we didn't jump in and buy a Mistral (or two) when we had the chance. The Mistral could potentially be the JSS we've been looking for all along.


----------



## Infanteer (16 May 2017)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Not to poo poo your post, but the ship you are proposing is in the IWO JIMA range and would not be considered at all by the L1.
> The ship I proposed above has a complement of:	17 officers, 163 ratings which is a pers bill that we could swallow. As I said baby steps and if the effects of climate change are correct, it will be a busy little asset with just taking care of disaster relief.



That's not what I was trying to propose.  What I was getting at was that there were multiple options for amphibious shipping, ranging from the traditional LPD/LHD ($$$) to something a little more offbeat like a expeditionary dock based on a converted container ship ($$).  The crew size I gave was for a couple ships of a smaller class.

Even a converted ferry or RORO would work ($).  I watched the HMNZS Canterbury pull into port once and debark a Coy+ of Aussie and Kiwi soldiers.  If tiny NZ can field an amphibious capability, it is certainly within our capacity to generate something modest.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMNZS_Canterbury_(L421)


----------



## FSTO (16 May 2017)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's not what I was trying to propose.  What I was getting at was that there were multiple options for amphibious shipping, ranging from the traditional LPD/LHD ($$$) to something a little more offbeat like a expeditionary dock based on a converted container ship ($$).  The crew size I gave was for a couple ships of a smaller class.
> 
> Even a converted ferry or RORO would work ($).  I watched the HMNZS Canterbury pull into port once and debark a Coy+ of Aussie and Kiwi soldiers.  If tiny NZ can field an amphibious capability, it is certainly within our capacity to generate something modest.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMNZS_Canterbury_(L421)



Okay got it.

In the end there has to be government (read caucus) will to see this type of capability as something that Canada should procure and a Defence Minister (with the backing of TB and Foreign Affairs) to say to the L1s that this will happen and you can play nice with each other or find new jobs.


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## Underway (17 May 2017)

The army and navy can and have worked well together.  The navy is far more operational focused than the army on a day to day basis as all our training happens in a real operational environment.  If the army needs navy support to get ashore, if the communication lanes are open, the navy at the tactical level won't be a problem.  The navy on a strategic level knows that the littorals are currently where it's at, hence the new focus on supporting forces ashore creeping back into the doctrine and equipment (Harpoon Block B, requirements for 127mm on new ships).  But with limited budgets, the navy has to focus on blue water defence of Canada stuff, like subs and AAD etc...  Money diverted from those would be considered an expensive mistake.

Secondly, the AOPS will have a very limited amphib capability.  20-40 pers max it seems with the covered launch boats and large boarding party boats.  Far below what we are talking about here, but just working on a platoon sized level will help increase the corporate knowledge base in improve coordination/cooperation between the elements and operation of landing craft.  This might work well for a "commando" or SOF marine element.


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## Infanteer (17 May 2017)

FSTO said:
			
		

> In the end there has to be government (read caucus) will to see this type of capability as something that Canada should procure and a Defence Minister (with the backing of TB and Foreign Affairs) to say to the L1s that this will happen and you can play nice with each other or find new jobs.



I'm not letting the DND off that easy.  We can't, and shouldn't, expect the Government to come out and say "we need X and Y."  It's up to the DND to shape that environment through presenting a feasible, affordable and useful operating concept.  Do we do this well as a joint force, or do we in Defence create an environment where service silos dominate the playing field, and the government is given a bunch of competing slices of single-service capabilities to figure out what to do with?


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## Colin Parkinson (17 May 2017)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's not what I was trying to propose.  What I was getting at was that there were multiple options for amphibious shipping, ranging from the traditional LPD/LHD ($$$) to something a little more offbeat like a expeditionary dock based on a converted container ship ($$).  The crew size I gave was for a couple ships of a smaller class.
> 
> Even a converted ferry or RORO would work ($).  I watched the HMNZS Canterbury pull into port once and debark a Coy+ of Aussie and Kiwi soldiers.  If tiny NZ can field an amphibious capability, it is certainly within our capacity to generate something modest.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMNZS_Canterbury_(L421)



What I get from that Wiki link is that the RO/RO design she was based off of created significant limitation in what sea states she can handle and limits on her stability which effects carrying capacity. I can’t think of any “commercial vessel” with a flooding welldeck, which basically leaves us with the Mistral class which seems to blend commercial standards and military needs as well as can be expected at a fairly decent price.


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## Underway (17 May 2017)

Colin P said:
			
		

> What I get from that Wiki link is that the RO/RO design she was based off of created significant limitation in what sea states she can handle and limits on her stability which effects carrying capacity. I can’t think of any “commercial vessel” with a flooding welldeck, which basically leaves us with the Mistral class which seems to blend commercial standards and military needs as well as can be expected at a fairly decent price.



You could remove the well-deck requirement and just go for air-deployable from the sea.  Light air deployable infantry units already exist, CSOR already exists, and the Chinooks already exist.  If you did a conversion like the Aster and made it and LHP, with large side davits to drop down larger landing craft then you could conceivably do a simple, cheap and relatively flexible marine mobile force.  Larger davit launched/recovered landing craft would be useful from a disaster response capability and might be able to move small light vehicles (trucks, GWagons etc...).  If this was important then get the 8 speculated/rumored "Commando" cyclones as medium lift platforms.  Oddly enough this might be cheaper and easier to implement.  It also means that when not being used for "amphib ops" this LHP could operate as a large blue water navy platform for ASW helo's/  UAV's, helo AEW etc... and buff up a TG.  (I guess I just said we should get an aircraft err... helicopter carrier didn't I...).


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## Colin Parkinson (17 May 2017)

LOL  [lol: For the cost, I don’t see giving up the well deck as good bang for the buck, the Mistrals could still give you the Helicopter carrier effect and LPD. 
Now a commercial conversion could be take one of these designs, remove/reduce the mud tanks, but a tilting ramp on the back, have two sets of rollers so you can have 2 landing craft side by side, it could launch and retrieve landing craft/floating dock sections to support a larger operation, however it would not be able to carry the troops and only limited supplies and be slower than the rest of the fleet. Likely by the time of the conversion you could buy a Mistral.

http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Norway-STX-Confirms-Two-Platform-Supply-Vessels-Contracts-from-Island-Offshore.jpg


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## Kirkhill (17 May 2017)

Underway said:
			
		

> You could remove the well-deck requirement and just go for air-deployable from the sea.  Light air deployable infantry units already exist, CSOR already exists, and the Chinooks already exist.  If you did a conversion like the Aster and made it and LHP, with large davits side davits to drop down larger landing craft then you could conceivably do a simple, cheap and relatively flexible marine mobile force.  Larger davit launched/recovered landing craft would be useful from a disaster response capability and might be able to move small light vehicles (trucks, GWagons etc...).  If this was important then get the 8 speculated/rumored "Commando" cyclones as medium lift platforms.  Oddly enough this might be a cheaper and easier to implement.  It also means that when not being used for "amphib ops" this LHP could operate as a large blue water navy platform for ASW helo's/  UAV's, helo AEW etc... and buff up a TG.  (I guess I just said we should get an aircraft err... helicopter carrier didn't I...).


 :goodpost: [cheers]

Add in a AH/UH combo (Apache/Blackhawk or Viper/Venom) and you have a combination that could deploy usefully independently, or could be a useful reserve to a deployed medium brigade group.

The tailgate on the RoRo would allow for a medium battle group to deploy from the hull across a dock (fixed or floating).

It may not meet the need for armageddon in sea state 9  but it would probably serve in less fraught situations.  Or more situations than we can currently address.

Just for reference, the ship I posted above is the ex MV Cragside, now the MV C Ocean Trader (633 ft and 20,000 tonnes - Resolve is 600 ft and 26,000 tonnes)  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_C_Ocean_Trader
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-navys-getting-a-big-secretive-special-operations-mothership-12801da6f353

Ocean Trader is a close relative of the Point Class RoRos chartered by the MOD in the UK for moving kit (633 ft and 23,000 tonnes)


> Capacity:
> 14,200 dwt
> 2,650 linear metres of space for vehicles
> 130 armoured vehicles and 60 trucks and ammunition or 8,000 tonnes of vehicles
> ...



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-class_sealift_ship






And further to the issue of needing a well deck :  HMS Ocean


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## Kirkhill (17 May 2017)

A really good article, demonstrating, once again, that I am a dollar short and a day late.   [

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/a-ship-that-still-isnt-a-frigate/multilift/

Apparently the going rate for a similar ship is around 49 MUKP - or about 86 MCAD.  About the same price as the original NoCGV Svalbard.


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## ringo (17 May 2017)

Shame Harper didn't pull the trigger and buy the 2 Mistral's building in France for Russia, sold to Egypt for a bargain.

HMS Ocean is apparently on the sales list.


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## Humphrey Bogart (17 May 2017)

ringo said:
			
		

> Shame Harper didn't pull the trigger and buy the 2 Mistral's building in France for Russia, sold to Egypt for a bargain.
> 
> HMS Ocean is apparently on the sales list.



Here is what I find funny, we were close to buying the Mistrals, very close from what I hear.  The French got a better deal from the Egyptians so they turned around and turfed us out.  Now they want us to go to Mali with them.... "Should have cut us a deal buds"


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## jollyjacktar (18 May 2017)

The RN was getting rid of their Bay class Amphibs for a song too a few years back.  They would also have been a good choice.


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## Baz (18 May 2017)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> The RN was getting rid of their Bay class Amphibs for a song too a few years back.  They would also have been a good choice.



Only one of the four: RFA Largs Bay was sold to Australia to become HMAS Choules for A$100m.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay-class_landing_ship

Edited to add: My *opinion* is these wouldn't be the best ship's for us; they are meant to be part of a larger amphibious group that has dedicated aviation ships (ie Ocean, being supplanted by the QEII Class), and as such don't have a hangar.  Even though they are based on the Enforcer (like Rotterdam, Johann de Witt, Galicia, and Castillia), the British choose not to have the hangar unlike the other's; it seems to be a singular choice as it isn't common for modern amphibious forces.

Historically the US equivalents (Austin [now for all intents gone], Whidbey Island, Harpers Ferry) also did not have hangars, but the San Antonio's do; from what I understand to make them more flexible.  Notably the US removed the well deck from the Wasp design for America (LHA-6) and Tripoli (LHA-7), but are probably putting it back in for LHA-8.

In any case, Bay Class type ships wouldn't be a good fit for Canada; they are really for "kick in the door" type stuff with other aviation amphibs.  If we were to get something (which I highly doubt), a Mistral or Juan Carlos (Canberra, Anodula) (also Dokdu is similar) would be at the top end, but something smaller like an Absalon or the conversions discussed more manageable.  Something like an Enforcer with the hangar would also work (still probably too much), but I'd remove the well deck before I'd sacrifice aviation (like Ocean, Izuma and Hyuga [both have extra berthing], et al).

We've gone around this a lot and although it makes for great chit chat (I also wish we had got the Mistrals, put the AOR's RAS gear starboard side, and sailed them heavily as training ships for now), is any of it realistic?


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## FSTO (18 May 2017)

The only way this is realistic is if the CAF L1's can put their petty differences on the back burner and fully support this capability. A unified front from them would go a long way to convince the government of the day to authorize a step in this direction.


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## a_majoor (2 Jun 2017)

On a different thread we talked about a semi amphibious force which could operate in Canada's arctic/Hudson bay region, moving around on hovercraft, helicopters or various landing craft (depending on who was posting) and having ground mobility with various MTV's like the Bronco. Certainly a force like that would have the wherewithal to actually operate off ships and land on other shores besides the Arctic ocean.

WRT moving and supporting a force for amphibious operations, if we wanted to go the air/helicopter only route the Japanese Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer would be a good basis to start, having the ability to carry up to 18 UH-60 class helicopters and should have the ability to house troops and equipment below decks. If it was outfitted exclusively for this sort of duty, then realistically you should be able to put a small combined arms unit aboard, especially one configured for the light role. The larger Izumo class helicopter destroyers can hold, 400 troops and 50 3.5 ton trucks (or equivalent equipment). The flight deck has 5 helicopter landing spots that allow simultaneous landings or take-offs.

As always, this would involve a pretty heavy investment in manpower and equipment, but it's nice to know that with sufficient will, these things are indeed possible...


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Jun 2017)

WE could do it like the Aussies did, have the Mistrals or the Spanish Canberra version 3/4 done over there and then lifted to here with Davie finishing the vessels. Task Davie with getting us 2 ships (must be a design in use by our allies) in a fairly short timeframe, with a fixed cost and they will handle the bidding for which design and how much is done overseas and here.


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## daftandbarmy (2 Jun 2017)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> On a different thread we talked about a semi amphibious force which could operate in Canada's arctic/Hudson bay region



Or we could invest in a more responsible, longer lasting and relevant option of upgrading our air and port infrastructure in the north to serve all Canadians, including military units/ships that might make use of them from time to time.


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## Stoker (2 Jun 2017)

Colin P said:
			
		

> WE could do it like the Aussies did, have the Mistrals or the Spanish Canberra version 3/4 done over there and then lifted to here with Davie finishing the vessels. Task Davie with getting us 2 ships (must be a design in use by our allies) in a fairly short timeframe, with a fixed cost and they will handle the bidding for which design and how much is done overseas and here.




I hear the Russians are selling these cheap.....


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## Kirkhill (2 Jun 2017)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Or we could invest in a more responsible, longer lasting and relevant option of upgrading our air and port infrastructure in the north to serve all Canadians, including military units/ships that might make use of them from time to time.



I think it is a bit of some of this and some of that.  There are more landing places than communities in the north.  Heck there are more islands than people in the north.

While infrastructure needs to be upgraded the spaces between the colonies also needs to be managed.  Primarily with air transport, fixed and rotary, but marine transport fills a need as well.


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## Scuba_Dave (2 Jun 2017)

As for ship design, I do not think it would take a large design overhaul. We do not have the vehicles or landing craft to employ a large amphibious force. However, the training AND the training areas are already in place to conduct amphibious assaults. A small slant bay kind of like the VDS well on ships such as the HMCS Algonquin, would be large enough to launch zodiacs aft. If planned properly I am sure you could even recover said zodiacs at a fairly quick rate. That being said. In order for this idea to be successful at all, those at the top need to start realizing that the Battalions should be moving their Recce Pl to the coasts. The infrastructure to house them are already in place, for example CFB Workpoint in Esquimalt...The old home of 3vp. We already have the training areas available at places such as CFB Rocky Point and CFB Albert Head on the West Coast. It truly would be a quick swap and the training value would be integral to having a true Amphibious capability. One of which I know has been of interest in Ottawa for quite some time. I think the only thing holding this idea back is 1. Money and 2. A solid plan to implement the capability.


----------



## daftandbarmy (3 Jun 2017)

Scuba_Dave said:
			
		

> As for ship design, I do not think it would take a large design overhaul. We do not have the vehicles or landing craft to employ a large amphibious force. However, the training AND the training areas are already in place to conduct amphibious assaults. A small slant bay kind of like the VDS well on ships such as the HMCS Algonquin, would be large enough to launch zodiacs aft. If planned properly I am sure you could even recover said zodiacs at a fairly quick rate. That being said. In order for this idea to be successful at all, those at the top need to start realizing that the Battalions should be moving their Recce Pl to the coasts. The infrastructure to house them are already in place, for example CFB Workpoint in Esquimalt...The old home of 3vp. We already have the training areas available at places such as CFB Rocky Point and CFB Albert Head on the West Coast. It truly would be a quick swap and the training value would be integral to having a true Amphibious capability. One of which I know has been of interest in Ottawa for quite some time. I think the only thing holding this idea back is 1. Money and 2. A solid plan to implement the capability.



Vancouver Island has a Navy Base, and Air Base, training areas with waterfront, infantry/ other army guys and gals etc etc. 

I've been calling it 'Commando Island' for years but no one seems to be paying attention. Maybe it's because I wear a kilt and, to them, commando means something different


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## Cdn Blackshirt (3 Jun 2017)

Even if we started out with just a small LCAC's fleet per coast, that would certainly be a step in the right direction and could be framed under "emergency preparedness" dual-roling.


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## Journeyman (3 Jun 2017)

Scuba_Dave said:
			
		

> I think the only thing holding this idea back is 1. Money and 2. A solid plan to implement the capability.


3.  A demonstrated need (more pressing than "wouldn't it be cool if...").
4.  Inter-service parochialism.
5.  Greater funding/PY priorities.
6.  Broken procurement system
7.  Government understanding that not all military investments are regional slush-funds.


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## Kirkhill (3 Jun 2017)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> 3.  A demonstrated need (more pressing than "wouldn't it be cool if...").
> 4.  Inter-service parochialism.
> 5.  Greater funding/PY priorities.
> 6.  Broken procurement system
> 7.  Government understanding that not all military investments are regional slush-funds.



Not to worry, all will be revealed next week.....


----------



## Colin Parkinson (5 Jun 2017)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Even if we started out with just a small LCAC's fleet per coast, that would certainly be a step in the right direction and could be framed under "emergency preparedness" dual-roling.



Hovercraft are great machines but require a lot of maintenance to keep them going. I would stick to 2x Landing craft and perhaps 2xCB-90's. Eventually the RCN could buy a couple of AP1-88/400 (same as the CCG machines) and run them in the Arctic.


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## Scuba_Dave (7 Jun 2017)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> 3.  A demonstrated need (more pressing than "wouldn't it be cool if...").
> 4.  Inter-service parochialism.
> 5.  Greater funding/PY priorities.
> 6.  Broken procurement system
> 7.  Government understanding that not all military investments are regional slush-funds.



lol yes to all of those things less #3. 40% of the worlds population currently lives within 100km of a coastline. The very fact that 71 percent of this entire planet is water should show enough of a need to have an Amphibious capability lol


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## Scuba_Dave (7 Jun 2017)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Vancouver Island has a Navy Base, and Air Base, training areas with waterfront, infantry/ other army guys and gals etc etc.
> 
> I've been calling it 'Commando Island' for years but no one seems to be paying attention. Maybe it's because I wear a kilt and, to them, commando means something different



HA! It has never made any sense to me why part of the Battalion hasn't moved back to the coast. Prime training areas which are being under utilized. So much so that they are starting to turn land back over to the civilian sector. Royal Roads University up until a few months ago, was still on lease to the now civilian University. That parcel of land alone is worth its weight in gold for something like amphibious assault training. None of this has to be done on a large scale at this very moment. It would be nice if they came out and said "Hey why not do it" and moved 100 troops to the coast to stand it up and start ironing out the wrinkles. Small boats, small numbers, small growing pains.


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## Colin Parkinson (7 Jun 2017)

They only see land as something to sell off to make money, "divesting" is still the theme of the day in government.


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## Kirkhill (8 Dec 2019)

Bump

Fewer excuses for Her Majesty's Canadian Government not to have its own sea-borne infantry.  The Americans are accepting, as have the Brits, that not all vessels have to be Death Stars.  

Back to the days of Cutting Out* expeditions.



> New fleet needed: Marines could go to war on small carriers, commercial vessels



https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/12/05/new-fleet-needed-marines-could-go-to-war-on-small-carriers-commercial-vessels/



> ...[Commandant Gen] Berger’s planning guidance, released in July, looks to move away from the unfeasible 38-amphib ship goal and instead use a mix of amphib ships, smaller expeditionary sea bases, fast transport ships and even commercial ships to move Marines.
> 
> ....
> 
> ...



*A cutting out boarding is an attack by small boats, preferably at night and against an unsuspecting, and anchored, target. It became popular in the later 18th century, and was extensively used during the Napoleonic Wars. This heralded the emphasis on stealth, and surprise, that would come to dominate future boarding tactics. An example is the successful cutting out of the Hermione which took place at Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, on 25 October 1799.

In modern warfare, boarding by military forces almost always involves stealth, and usually takes place at night. It may involve the use of small submarines or submersibles, or inflatable boats, or by frogmen. All involve scaling the sides of the ship. When stealth is not as important, helicopters may be used to carry troops to the deck of the ship.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_boarding


----------



## a_majoor (13 Dec 2019)

Of course even "small" carriers are pretty expensive assets. The USS America has been trialled as a "Lightning Carrier" with a small air component of F-35B's and both Japan and the ROK seem to be considering this class of ship as well, with the Japanese Izumo carrier (technically a "Helicopter Destroyer" according the the JSDF) being a possible conversion. The USS America displaces 46,000 tons and costs about $3.5 billion dollars, while the Izumo is much smaller and cheaper, displacing 27,000 tons and costing about $1.2 billion. 

For this sort of plan to work we would really need to recreate the CVE's of WWII fame, and crank them out at about the same pace as the USN did in the 1940's. While a real CVE couldn't carry a F-35B wing very well, it could carry UAV's, helicopters and so on. CVE's of that era were between 7000 to 13000 tons displacement, still larger than a modern Frigate. A modern CVE would need to be able to move with the rest of the fleet and provide cooperative data and sensor coverage to really be a force multiplier.

The other thing that would really be needed is some sort of program to build large numbers of fast transports like the Spearhead class expeditionary fast transport. These ships are much smaller and cheaper than Helicopter Destroyers or America Class ships (1500 tons displacement and a cost of $180 million/unit). These would provide the sort of "swarming attack" platforms needed to invest large numbers of targets at once to keep the enemy off balance and spread thin. Each individual ship of this class can carry a mechanized company with all its kit or a dismounted battalion. The current version has many limitations, but it seems capable of evolution into a much more capable vessel, so use this more as a thought experiment for the idea.

As for Canada, we likely don't have the political will to support even a Helicopter Destroyer, but something along the lines of the Spearhead class looks like the basis for a versatile platform for many different roles (the flight deck can handle helicopters and some types of UAV) to compliment the RCN's frigate fleet, including transporting troops and equipment overseas, if needed, and even landing them at austere piers and quay walls. While not "amphibious" in the usual sense, it certainly provides the CF with far more options about getting troops and equipment around.


----------



## daftandbarmy (13 Dec 2019)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> As for Canada, we likely don't have the political will to support even a Helicopter Destroyer, but something along the lines of the Spearhead class looks like the basis for a versatile platform for many different roles (the flight deck can handle helicopters and some types of UAV) to compliment the RCN's frigate fleet, including transporting troops and equipment overseas, if needed, and even landing them at austere piers and quay walls. While not "amphibious" in the usual sense, it certainly provides the CF with far more options about getting troops and equipment around.



What would we use it for? Seriously?

Amphibious forces are generally tasked with 'invasions'. Countries like the UK and France justify their offensive-capable amphibious forces largely as a way to deal with residual obligations in their current and/or former colonies.

Apart from being able to collaborate with other allies, I don't know what rationale we'd use for spending the time and money required  to mantain such a capability.


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## CBH99 (13 Dec 2019)

Agreed.

Far better off using both our limited financial resources and limited personnel to generate & reinforce a decently strong fleet of frigates, coastal patrols ships, and submarines.


This is a capability we don't need, can't afford, and wouldn't use even if we did somehow manage to acquire it.


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## FSTO (13 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> What would we use it for? Seriously?
> 
> Amphibious forces are generally tasked with 'invasions'. Countries like the UK and France justify their offensive-capable amphibious forces largely as a way to deal with residual obligations in their current and/or former colonies.
> 
> Apart from being able to collaborate with other allies, I don't know what rationale we'd use for spending the time and money required  to mantain such a capability.


We certainly could have used a San Giusto type flat deck during Somalia, East Timor, Haiti (many times), New Orleans (Katrina), Newfoundland, when the west coast has its mega quake. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_ship_San_Giusto

Many times the CAF has been deployed to coastal areas to assist and have to wait around for room at the airport and then have to set up a base which taxes an already taxed infrastructure. To have a floating base offshore would be a massive asset in these situations.

My 2cents.


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## Dale Denton (13 Dec 2019)

Maybe something the size of a Mistral or Juan Carlos Class may be too much for us, as we don't even have enough extra Cyclones for it, but something more modest like HMS Albion/Bulwark, Damens LPD 13000 or Fincantieris LHD 20000t. Would be that perfect Peace Support Ship. Something to use for DART/HADR in the Caribbean with a side capability of being able to launch a small Marine group. Train up a small force like the Australian 2BN RAR. Not too big to throw Davie a contract for. 




			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> Agreed.
> 
> Far better off using both our limited financial resources and limited personnel to generate & reinforce a decently strong fleet of frigates, coastal patrols ships, and submarines.
> 
> This is a capability we don't need, can't afford, and wouldn't use even if we did somehow manage to acquire it.



Part of me says you're wrong, we are a G7 nation and can afford one of these, Nigeria recently bought an LST - anything is possible. Other part says we have to replace everything, so buying a brand new capability should go on the back end of the line.


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## Underway (13 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> What would we use it for? Seriously?
> 
> Amphibious forces are generally tasked with 'invasions'. Countries like the UK and France justify their offensive-capable amphibious forces largely as a way to deal with residual obligations in their current and/or former colonies.
> 
> Apart from being able to collaborate with other allies, I don't know what rationale we'd use for spending the time and money required  to mantain such a capability.


Agreed.  Currently our geopolitical realities are such that we have no requirement to make/use amphibious forces.  If we are going to use a big honking ship then it should be used for naval task group operations.  So a helicopter carrier would be better.  Support task group operations with increased Cyclone coverage for ASW and investment into RPA's for recognized maritime picture and/or early warning of an attack using a RPA AEW system.  And the medical evac, resupply capabilities would be increased as well with more available aircraft.

Such a vessel would be able to land our current special operations forces (JTF, CSOR) and light infantry using rotary wing or small boat insertions in much larger numbers than currently available.  No marines needed. No special landing craft or well deck required.  It uses basically what we have already and increases their flexibility.

This would fit into our current strategic framework, and our geopolitical realities where we can pick our fights and don't really have to project power.  

The issue that killed the original JSS (Joint Support Ship) was that the Army didn't buy in.  From the Army's perspective they will always get where they need to be.  It's someone else's problem and if they really need to get somewhere it will be made to happen.  Their problems happen in packing and on arrival.  So this is why the JSS turned into a tanker replacement.  The Army wasn't interested in an asset they didn't own to do a job they didn't need.


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## Kirkhill (13 Dec 2019)

Realities.

We currently use troops overseas.  (We seldom use them at home)
We currently deploy troops with just their personal weapons.
We currently also deploy them with vehicles.
We currently deploy them in small packets.
We currently deploy them over time.
We currently recover them, and their kit, in the same way.
We currently do all this with available assets supplemented by civil assets.

We currently do not crash ashore (Historically we are 1 for 3 - Normandy was a pleasant memory, Dieppe and Gallipoli (Newfs were there) not so much).

As FSTO points out we have not been idle in the absence of flat-tops but flat-tops would certainly have added value to actual operations.  

I agree that we don't need specialized marines - our existing battalions should be capable of being deployed from the sea - The largest expansion of the Royal Marines came in the 1730s when 25% (10 battalions out of 40) of the line infantry was raised, and deployed, for sea duties.  Until WW2 all naval supported invasions were conducted by Army forces.  Even in WW2, aside from the Pacific, all invasions were army shows with naval support.  Even the Commandos were originally predominantly army troops with the Royal Marines taking over the role, and the title during the war.  They maintained their Commando designation (commandos being light raiding forces) long after they had added heavy support to their bag of tricks.

I've said it before and I'll say it again.

We don't need these:











Or even these:






Something like the San Giusto, or even the Absalons - based on the same hull as the CSCs - would be useful additions, if expensive.












My preference still tilts towards a couple of sisters to the Asterix configured like the RN's Littoral Support Ship 






That, in turn, is a knock off of the US conversion of a Maersk container ship  The Cragside became the Ocean Trader







Too often we seem to fall into a trap of our own devising.  If we can't afford "the best" then we can't do anything at all.  

And yet, we are noted for, and along with many other forces, including both Royals and US marines, for working with the tools available to hand.

A "marine capability" does not necessarily mean this:






It can mean this:






  

Army troops with "marine" skills.


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## Colin Parkinson (13 Dec 2019)

A working, deployable, 105mm Howitzer? That's crazy talk.....


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## MarkOttawa (13 Dec 2019)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Realities.
> ...
> We currently do not crash ashore (Historically we are 1 for 3 - Normandy was a pleasant memory, Dieppe and Gallipoli (Newfs were there) not so much)...



1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade took part in successful invasion of Sicily, July 10, 1943--so two for four:
https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/second-world-war/canada-Italy-1943-to-1945#cansicily

You know, the D-Day Dodgers:



> "Look around the hillsides
> 
> Through the mist and rain
> 
> ...



Mark
Ottawa


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## a_majoor (13 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> What would we use it for? Seriously?
> 
> Amphibious forces are generally tasked with 'invasions'. Countries like the UK and France justify their offensive-capable amphibious forces largely as a way to deal with residual obligations in their current and/or former colonies.
> 
> Apart from being able to collaborate with other allies, I don't know what rationale we'd use for spending the time and money required  to mantain such a capability.



Flexibility. The Spearhead class or analogue could bring our 450 man battlegroup to Latvia (or any European shore) with equipment in 4 lifts, or with a convoy of four ships. One ship could deliver the 200 or so advisors to Ukraine or SoF contingent to the Middle East. Given the size of the Helicopters, maybe 2 or 3 would be needed to move the mission to Mali. Missions for disaster relief such as Haiti or the US Gulf coast after a hurricane would also require between one and four ships, depending on what sort of package you want to send (450 Engineers with all their kit might max out 4 ships, or a small medical component and several ships full of aid and trucks to deliver it, or anything in between). This also allows Canadian troops to be deployed along most of our coastline, even Hudson Bay and part of the Arctic in the summertime.

This is using maritime power as the Force Projection component, and allowing us to bring men and equipment at the time and place of our own choosing. We would not be dependent on secure airheads (although being able to count on that is nice and adds additional flexibility to our response).

The actual "Amphibious/Marine" capability would be more along the lines of understanding shipborne operations and logistics, understanding how to load and offload and being able to plan landings, including alternates, to put your package ashore. An "amphibious" headquarters or staff courses to prepare, and regular training (such as RIMPAC) to keep current and learn from other navies and marine forces. The actual troops debarking the ships are just ordinary army troops, with some workup training to be able to move their stuff on and off the ship without causing problems and issues. Enhancing capabilities like buying amphibious vehicles like Broncos or the US ACV would be icing on the cake, but not a 100% necessity.


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## Infanteer (13 Dec 2019)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> We currently do not crash ashore (Historically we are 1 for 3 - Normandy was a pleasant memory, Dieppe and Gallipoli (Newfs were there) not so much).



Both Gallipoli landings were considered a success as far as amphibious landings go; the Brits never did anything after they landed.  You also forgot Husky.


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## daftandbarmy (13 Dec 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Both Gallipoli landings were considered a success as far as amphibious landings go; the Brits never did anything after they landed.  You also forgot Husky.



And Op Cottage https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cottage


----------



## Cloud Cover (13 Dec 2019)

Kiska. 

 A HADR multi role ship is more desirable than a dedicated amphib. Obviously such a ship could transport people (and “things”) and connect from sea to shore including by air.  The ship doesn’t even have to be an HMCS- for example the RFA Bay class model could be an option.


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## daftandbarmy (13 Dec 2019)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Kiska.
> 
> A HADR multi role ship is more desirable than a dedicated amphib. Obviously such a ship could transport people (and “things”) and connect from sea to shore including by air.  The ship doesn’t even have to be an HMCS- for example the RFA Bay class model could be an option.



On the NATO Northern Flank exercises we deployed the elite Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines Commando in....

.... leased Danish sea going DFDS car Ferries.

I think that was the 'General War' plan too, which is slightly worrying.


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## Kirkhill (13 Dec 2019)

Ok 

(OK, before I go any further, who has been playing around with this site?  I got stuck on my third keystroke on my phone and had to come back to my computer! - but back to our game)

OK, so I forgot one or six.  But I will still stand by my base points.  We should be able to do maritime support of existing land forces.  And, we shouldn't have to break the piggy bank to do it. We could add a lot to our capabilities with some readily available civilian platforms with an open deck and a crane or two.

And as for the Paras going to war in Maersk ferries from Denmark - you lot also went to war in the Falklands in the commandeered luxury liner Canberra (admittedly 2 Para had to follow in another RoRo , the Norland.).


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## daftandbarmy (14 Dec 2019)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Ok
> 
> (OK, before I go any further, who has been playing around with this site?  I got stuck on my third keystroke on my phone and had to come back to my computer! - but back to our game)
> 
> ...



So....I'm guessing that any competent military organization can organize enough leased shipping to do what we need to do (e.g., nothing approaching the Normandy Invasion) without trying the build a CanUSMC capability.

In the meantime, I suppose we can fly our troops into theatre in air conditioned comfort in big passenger jets.


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## tomahawk6 (14 Dec 2019)

Canadians stormed ashore in France during WW2 so that might demonstrate a limited amphibious capability without having major amphibious ships.


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## Kirkhill (14 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> So....I'm guessing that any competent military organization can organize enough leased shipping to do what we need to do (e.g., nothing approaching the Normandy Invasion) without trying the build a CanUSMC capability.
> 
> In the meantime, I suppose we can fly our troops into theatre in air conditioned comfort in big passenger jets.



Personally I am not in favour of embarked troops floating around the oceans.  I am in favour of floating warehouses with attached accommodations and flat tops parked at docks in operational support hubs (Koeln-Bonn, Kuwait, Jamaica, Dakar, Mombasa, Singapore, Busan) with holds full of bullets, beans and bandages and decks loaded with sets of vehicles and guns.

The troops can fly in and marry up with the gear.  The Navy can escort the warehouses.  The Air Force flies the aircraft and the helos.  The government gets a rapid response capability across the full spectrum of operations.


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## FJAG (14 Dec 2019)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Canadians stormed ashore in France during WW2 so that might demonstrate a limited amphibious capability without having major amphibious ships.



Here's a little primer on Canadian landing craft in WW2. At Normandy there were enough of these to land an infantry division in the first assault wave. The US and UK each landed two divisions that day.

https://www.junobeach.org/canada-in-wwii/articles/the-ships/landing-crafts/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juno_Beach

For the time, these were the basic amphibious ships in service with other countries although the US efforts in the Pacific were naturally on a completely different scale.

The issue for Canadian amphibious resources nowadays is that there just isn't that much call for the capability. Currently there are no threats (even in the Arctic) for which a full-time amphibious capability is needed. One can envision numerous scenarios where a force might be needed but none of those justify the building and maintenance of a "marine" or "naval infantry" force. Our current light infantry battalions are organized and equipped to be capable of various missions including air assault (even limited para) and ship-borne operations.

IMHO, what we're really missing are the naval components to transport, support and supply a mechanized expeditionary force. The fact is that since there is no full-time threat, the role of equipping, manning and training the naval component of such a part-force could and should be primarily a naval reserve force one. 

Again, IMHO, our first and foremost need is to have ships of sufficient capacity to transport heavy equipment and supplies to Europe. RORO capabilities such as the numerous classes of medium and fast speed ships currently with the US Military Sealift Command or US Reserve Fleets would provide a capability to preposition and support mechanized expeditionary forces if and when required. 

Obviously such ships do not support over-the-beach amphibious operations such as what Amphibious Assault Ships or Landing Ship, Dock do, but quite frankly that capability is neither strategically necessary for Canada nor even remotely in the capital spending capability of the Canadian Navy. I sincerely doubt if they would be prepared to fund even one Naval Reserve RORO ship (much less an LSD) as long as Canada can lease that capability from the civilian market as needed. I'm not sure we can count on a civilian lease system in the event of a major European (and thereby North Atlantic) conflict which is why I'd like to see a Naval Reserve capability instead.

 :cheers:


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## Blackadder1916 (14 Dec 2019)

FJAG said:
			
		

> . . .  I sincerely doubt if they would be prepared to fund even one Naval Reserve RORO ship (much less an LSD) as long as Canada can lease that capability from the civilian market as needed. I'm not sure we can count on a civilian lease system in the event of a major European (and thereby North Atlantic) conflict which is why I'd like to see a Naval Reserve capability instead.



Back a few (or more) decades in the last century, I recall during  a long, quiet night on radio watch leafing through one of the green covered pubs in the CP van.  Can't recall the actual title of the CFP, or it's number, but it was related to movements.  In the section dealing with sea movement, it listed by name and included diagrams of the vessels (with capacity of mil vehs) that were in the CN Marine fleet.  I was most familiar with the ferries on the Newfoundland service.  Back in those days, CN was a crown corporation so it made sense that if we had to move troops and equipment to Europe, the ships already owned by the taxpayers would be the ones used.  When CN was privatized, the ferry business was split off as Marine Atlantic and remains a crown corporation.


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## Cloud Cover (14 Dec 2019)

There must have been some plans for moving the CAST brigade? (The Kremlin should have a website where NATO Cold War plans are available. They knew more about that stuff than anyone.) 
Also, at some point in the 80’s as part of the REFORGER exercises,  Canadian and US ships once escorted an actual convoy all the way to Europe. The premise being there would still be a port in NATO hands that wasn’t glowing green. I think most of those ships were USNS and RRF fleet units but there were some Canadian and other vessels.


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## Underway (14 Dec 2019)

Don't need it and won't use it.  There are far far far more important things we need to invest time and energy into.  Things that will add more capability and bang for the buck than an amphibious capability.  How about a proper submarine fleet?  Or more fighter aircraft than what's currently on the table. Or an AEW / AWAC fleet.  Or new maritime patrol aircraft.  Or new helicopters for the army to replace the Griffons.  Or recce helo's. More heavy lift aircraft (as those are always useful and being used).  Or a 3rd AOR for the navy (above the current iAOR and 2 JSS).

I could go on.  So many more priorities that are much more important.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Dec 2019)

Underway said:
			
		

> Don't need it and won't use it.  There are far far far more important things we need to invest time and energy into.  Things that will add more capability and bang for the buck than an amphibious capability.  How about a proper submarine fleet?  Or more fighter aircraft than what's currently on the table. Or an AEW / AWAC fleet.  Or new maritime patrol aircraft.  Or new helicopters for the army to replace the Griffons.  Or recce helo's. More heavy lift aircraft (as those are always useful and being used).  Or a 3rd AOR for the navy (above the current iAOR and 2 JSS).
> 
> I could go on.  So many more priorities that are much more important.



What could be more important than justifying a wholly anachronistic and unsupportable focus on an Atlantic centric maritime warfare policy that assumes we will, once again, be the second largest Navy in the world responsible for escorting convoys East to liberate an occupied Europe (for the third time). 

 :sarcasm: :sarcasm: :sarcasm:


----------



## Michael OLeary (14 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> What could be more important than justifying a wholly anachronistic and unsupportable focus on an Atlantic centric maritime warfare policy that assumes we will, once again, be the second largest Navy in the world responsible for escorting convoys East to liberate an occupied Europe (for the third time).
> 
> :sarcasm: :sarcasm: :sarcasm:



But now that we have pips and crowns back, we're ready to be that army again. It's only right that the Navy gets on board with the _Back to the Past_ franchise.


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## FJAG (14 Dec 2019)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> There must have been some plans for moving the CAST brigade? (The Kremlin should have a website where NATO Cold War plans are available. They knew more about that stuff than anyone.)
> Also, at some point in the 80’s as part of the REFORGER exercises,  Canadian and US ships once escorted an actual convoy all the way to Europe. The premise being there would still be a port in NATO hands that wasn’t glowing green. I think most of those ships were USNS and RRF fleet units but there were some Canadian and other vessels.



Back in the early 70s I was in 2 RCHA which had a battery as part of the ACE Mobile Force dedicated to Norway and basically a rapid deployment force (primarily deployed by air) that would precede the CAST Bde Gp which essentially came from 5 CMBG.

My recollection of things was that CAST would deploy using ROROs supplied by Norway, however, the details were never really worked out in any serious manner or ever (to the best of my knowledge) exercised at that time. Note that Norway wouldn't allow us to preposition the equipment in Norway a la Reforeger.

I lost all interest in CAST when I was posted back west in 1976, but I do believe that the whole thing was exercised once in 1986 under Exercise BRAVE LION using primarily civilian Norwegian ROROs. While the exercise was called a success at the higher levels (and smoke and mirrors by the lower ones), the whole concept was shelved in 1987 as being wholly impractical. (Interestingly, at the time Canada spent 2.2% of its GDP on defence at which point we were, nonetheless, the second lowest NATO spender) 

Here's an article about BRAVE LION https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1986/9/15/thunder-out-of-the-north#!&pid=10 and https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1987/2/23/retreating-from-norway (see pg 12 re Norwegian ROROs)

and the stand down of CAST https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1987/2/23/retreating-from-norway. Note though that rather than committing CAST to Central Europe we ended up pulling everything out.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (16 Dec 2019)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Back in the early 70s I was in 2 RCHA which had a battery as part of the ACE Mobile Force dedicated to Norway and basically a rapid deployment force (primarily deployed by air) that would precede the CAST Bde Gp which essentially came from 5 CMBG.
> 
> My recollection of things was that CAST would deploy using ROROs supplied by Norway, however, the details were never really worked out in any serious manner or ever (to the best of my knowledge) exercised at that time. Note that Norway wouldn't allow us to preposition the equipment in Norway a la Reforeger.
> 
> ...



I was with 3 Cdo Bde when Canada announced it was pulling CAST out of the picture and, at the time, thought it a bit weak. But, in hindsight, it underlines  the enormously complicated, and vastly expensive, military logistical challenge of moving large numbers of troops by sea within any type of conflict scenario. Canada's military was (and is) just too small to be able to support that kind of capability effectively so, if they couldn't ante up enough resources to do it right, the decision to cancel the commitment was the right one. 

The US military are the current masters of the art, of course, largely becasue they invest enough time and resources to get it more right than most.


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## Colin Parkinson (16 Dec 2019)

Ships like the Mistral or the Canberra class, do offer Canada a lot of geo-political flexibility. Such a ship can support a variety of ops beyond just a amphibious landing. Everything from a naval presence, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster response, anti-piracy and transporting our army and equipment, along with moving other allied troops and equipment. Not to mention conducting summer ops in the arctic.


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## Underway (16 Dec 2019)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> What could be more important than justifying a wholly anachronistic and unsupportable focus on an Atlantic centric maritime warfare policy that assumes we will, once again, be the second largest Navy in the world responsible for escorting convoys East to liberate an occupied Europe (for the third time).



Justifying an anachronistic and unsupportable focus on Marine forces that require logistical capabilities Canada can't provide for responsibilities we don't have apparently.



> :sarcasm: :sarcasm: :sarcasm:


Wait, were you being sarcastic?   ;D



Things that I listed were not entirely maritime, nor Atlantic focused.  Submarines are far more valuable in the Pacific.  MPA's (which in Canada's case are also LRPA) are extremely valuable over all our maritime domains (arctic included) and in overland operations (Iraq for example).

I could go on but frankly, if the Government were to spend the (check price on 2 Mistrals...) 1.6 billion (which would probably be double for Canada) on MPA's, UAVs or renewed army helicopter fleet that would be great.

We need to get what we do right now right and worry about new capabilities when those are properly taken care of.


----------



## FJAG (16 Dec 2019)

> *PM's maverick aide Dominic Cummings 'will overhaul wasteful Ministry of Defence spending' after branding £6.2billion aircraft carrier project 'a farce'*
> - Tory manifesto promised to review the armed forces' capability and equipment
> - Claims Dominic Cummings wants to overhaul procurement process at MoD
> - No10 aide previously branded the £6.2billion aircraft carrier project 'a farce'
> ...



https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7796581/PMs-maverick-aide-Dominic-Cummings-overhaul-wasteful-defence-spending.html

Cummings seems to have a fairly big say in the PM's office. This could be interesting.

 :cheers:


----------



## a_majoor (16 Dec 2019)

While a bit sideways to the topic, and a US example as well, the basic principles apply for our military and bureaucracy, and likely that of the UK and many others as well. Streamlining the "back end" provides savings which would answer the question of "how do we fund these things"? While maybe not clear in this article, I have seen related ones which suggest these savings can be had without laying off a single service member or parking a tank, ship or airplane.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html

So before we start on the doom and gloom about not being able to afford these capabilities, there is probably _a lot_ that could be done to free up funding. OF course having a doctrine to determine what it is we actually need, and a political establishment that actually understood the world as it is would help a lot as well. At this rate I should probably also wish for everyone to get a pony...


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## FJAG (16 Dec 2019)

The problem is that when bureaucracies look for savings they send in bureaucrats with fine tipped pencils to nibble away at the problem. What's really needed is to send in a five-year old with a wide-tipped Sharpie to slash away randomly.

 :stirpot:


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## Colin Parkinson (16 Dec 2019)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While a bit sideways to the topic, and a US example as well, the basic principles apply for our military and bureaucracy, and likely that of the UK and many others as well. Streamlining the "back end" provides savings which would answer the question of "how do we fund these things"? While maybe not clear in this article, I have seen related ones which suggest these savings can be had without laying off a single service member or parking a tank, ship or airplane.
> 
> https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html
> 
> So before we start on the doom and gloom about not being able to afford these capabilities, there is probably _a lot_ that could be done to free up funding. OF course having a doctrine to determine what it is we actually need, and a political establishment that actually understood the world as it is would help a lot as well. At this rate I should probably also wish for everyone to get a pony...



Here you go https://media3.giphy.com/media/TJN2AG0ke5hza/giphy.gif?cid=790b76117b293130c1f6529f2059dbbb7d3df06c2e2129e8&rid=giphy.gif


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