# Story states a new book claims Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar



## Old Sweat (23 Jun 2012)

The following story from the Toronto Star claims the Americans felt Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar. Without reading the book or the excerpts published in the Washington Post, I cannot comment on it. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

U.S. military thought Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar

Published On Fri Jun 22 2012
By Mitch PotterWashington Bureau

WASHINGTON—American reluctance to confront Canada over its weak military hold in the Taliban heartland of Kandahar province was among the costlier blunders of the war in Afghanistan, a new book alleges.

Excerpts published Friday by The Washington Post describe the rising concerns of a team of U.S. military advisers who were stunned in 2009 when an unnamed senior Canadian intelligence official in Kandahar told them, “I have no idea what’s going on inside the city.”

The sheer thinness of Canadian boots in Kandahar — only 2,830 soldiers, mostly assigned to headquarters and support roles, with fewer than 600 going on patrol — contrasted against more than 9,000 British soldiers deployed in the less populated and less strategically important neighbouring province of Helmand, Washington Post senior correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes in Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.

But when the U.S. reassessment team returned to Kabul to learn why more Canadians had not been deployed, they were told by the U.S. Maj.-Gen. Michael Tucker, then the director of operations for all NATO troops, “It is wrong to tell a (Canadian) commander, from this level, to put troops in Kandahar city.”

Sitting next to Tucker in that Kabul meeting was Andrew Exum, an influential counterinsurgency strategist and former Army Ranger platoon leader, battle-hardened by earlier deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Exum’s notes from that Kabul encounter are excoriating. “This guy is a jackass,” Exum wrote of Tucker’s hesitance to direct the Canadians. “Kandahar — not Helmand — is the single point of failure in Afghanistan.”

When Exum and his reassessment team investigated further, the book alleges, they were told by U.S. Army Brig.-Gen. John “Mick” Nicholson, that the Americans were reluctant to ruffle feathers in Ottawa.

“(Nicholson) emphasized that the Kandahar mission was Canada’s largest overseas deployment since the Korean War. Military leaders in Ottawa were reluctant to ask for more help — some were convinced that security in Kandahar was improving, others didn’t want to risk the embarrassment,” writes Chandrasekaran.

“To Exum and others on the team, however, it seemed that U.S. commanders thought that managing the NATO alliance was more important than winning the war.”

Exum, a fellow with the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, was brought on as part of a group of outside advisers convened by Gen. Stanley McChrystal when he was appointed the top commander in Afghanistan in 2009.

But the Americans had their own reasons for wanting to avoid Kandahar at the outset of the Obama administration, Chandrasekaran writes in Little America, which is based on more than 70 interviews with U.S. government and military officials directly involved in Afghan war policy. 

Foremost among them was the Pentagon’s own struggles in locating senior troop commanders willing to dispatch thousands of additional forces to Afghanistan after so many years of rolling deployment to the region.

One of the few with a “zeal for Afghanistan” was Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway. But Conway “drove a hard bargain” with his Pentagon counterparts, insisting that any fresh Marine deployment must involve “a contiguous area” where the U.S. Marines would wield total control, including support from Marine helicopters and supply convoys.

“These stipulations effectively excluded Kandahar,” writes Chandrasekaran. “The geography of the province, and the Canadians’ desire to hold on to the key districts around Kandahar city, made it nearly impossible to carve out a Marine-only area there.

“Helmand was the next best option, even if it was less vital.”

By that time, the Canadian military had already asked for help in Kandahar province, although the number of reinforcements requested was still small compared to the presence in Helmand province.

In January 2008, an independent panel led by former Liberal deputy prime minister John Manley issued a report recommending that Canada extend its mission in Afghanistan beyond February 2009, on the condition that NATO deploy a battle group of about 1,000 additional soldiers to back up Canadian troops in Kandahar.

The report also called on the Canadian government to provide troops with surveillance drones and large helicopters as another condition for extending the mission.

Canada managed to secure those extra troops – and thereby meets its conditions for extending the mission to 2011 – when the United States committed to sending 1,000 soldiers to the southern province after France decided to join the war efforts.

The Americans took control of Kandahar City in 2010 following a decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to flood southern Afghanistan with troops.

Canadians troops were left in charge of Panjawai, Dand and Daman districts until Canada ended its combat mission there in July 2011.

A spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay responded to the allegations by praising the work of Canadian troops in Afghanistan.

“Canada has played a leadership role in the UN-mandated, NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, both through the previous combat mission in Kandahar and our current training mission centred in Kabul. Working alongside our international partners, our Canadian Forces personnel have made tangible strides to improve the lives of the Afghan people, and have made great progress in helping them to increase their nation’s safety and security,” MacKay’s press secretary, Joshua Zanin, wrote in an emailed statement on Friday.

With files from Joanna Smith


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## observor 69 (23 Jun 2012)

Little America’ excerpt: Obama’s troop increase for Afghan war was misdirected
The Washington Post

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Published: June 22
Excerpted from “Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.”

The day after he arrived in Kabul in June 2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, then the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, gathered his senior officers to discuss the state of the war. They barraged him with PowerPoint slides — the frequency of Taliban attacks and their impact; the number of local security forces; and an evaluation of the Afghan government’s effectiveness in each province. The metrics were grim, the conclusion obvious: The Americans and their NATO allies were losing.



http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/little-america-excerpt-obamas-troop-increase-for-afghan-war-was-misdirected/2012/06/22/gJQAYHrAvV_story.html


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## Teeps74 (23 Jun 2012)

In reading the above post, I could not help but to think of that mini-sized, mega-ego imbecile Michael Yawn. One sided, full of holes and drafted by a team of morons. You guessed it... I will not be wasting my money on that "Only the Americans can do it right" crap.


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## PuckChaser (23 Jun 2012)

I'm wondering how this was a surprise to them in 2009, considering we had the same number of troops in 2006 when we went down there in the first place.


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## Redeye (23 Jun 2012)

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> In reading the above post, I could not help but to think of that mini-sized, mega-ego imbecile Michael Yawn. One sided, full of holes and drafted by a team of morons. You guessed it... I will not be wasting my money on that "Only the Americans can do it right" crap.



Reading the WaPo excerpt, that's not really the crux of the book - it was more of an attack on why the US planned surge deployments the way they planned. Particularly the vast quantity of troops that were surged into the sparsely populated Helmand province rather than Kandahar, and it seems there were several dynamics.

I was recently at Camp Leatherneck, the USMC base in Helmand - it's massive, with a huge force deployed there, and interestingly enough, even before seeing this book's take, several of us there were musing about why the base is there with such a massive force when there were probably other priorities.


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## Teeps74 (23 Jun 2012)

Fair enough... But from a COIN perspective, do we really want more in an area? Remember, the appearance of being an occupying force can have very strong negative consequences. We did make many mistakes in Afghanistan (different subject, I could go on and on and on....). At the tactical level though, our troops proved time and again to be amongst the best and most capable in that environment.

Perhaps an argument could and should be made that we deployed with too much tail and not enough teeth... But, how do we resolve the "teeth" question? Increase the length of tours? More reservist commitment? (Probably could get more, I know several who did multiple tours willingly.).

Maybe I will read it for a bit in Chapters then... If I am still seeing shades of Yawn, the book will not make it to the counter... (Speaking of Chapters...).


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## Redeye (23 Jun 2012)

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Fair enough... But from a COIN perspective, do we really want more in an area? Remember, the appearance of being an occupying force can have very strong negative consequences. We did make many mistakes in Afghanistan (different subject, I could go on and on and on....). At the tactical level though, our troops proved time and again to be amongst the best and most capable in that environment.



Huge bases far removed from the population would generally be considered "bad COIN". As was alluded to in another thread, a more successful approach is a smaller presence amongst the population to build relationships. The USMC presence (at least at Camp Leatherneck) doesn't really accomplish that.

I didn't read anything that criticized the work of Canadian soldiers - rather that there wasn't enough of them there to do the job, and that neither the Canadians really did enough to seek help nor the Americans do enough to provide for fear of offending them.



			
				Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Perhaps an argument could and should be made that we deployed with too much tail and not enough teeth... But, how do we resolve the "teeth" question? Increase the length of tours? More reservist commitment? (Probably could get more, I know several who did multiple tours willingly.).
> 
> Maybe I will read it for a bit in Chapters then... If I am still seeing shades of Yawn, the book will not make it to the counter... (Speaking of Chapters...).



Number of forces deployed seems more the problem vice the teeth:tail ratio, but who knows, not I. As for the book, sounds like a good plan of attack.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2012)

Redeye said:
			
		

> Huge bases far removed from the population would generally be considered "bad COIN". As was alluded to in another thread, a more successful approach is a smaller presence amongst the population to build relationships. The USMC presence (at least at Camp Leatherneck) doesn't really accomplish that.



Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?

As for the article, I don't see anything inaccurate in any of the premises.


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## Old Sweat (23 Jun 2012)

According to Amazon.ca the book is being released 26 June. I ordered a copy this morning and will let you know what it says in due course.

A few random thoughts on the matter:

a. the enemy strength in Kandahar was grossly under-estimated from the start. Ian Hope among others noted that the CG of 10 MD believed the main effort was elsewhere.

b. as I recall we were pretty well all aware that we did not have the numbers, and the NATO tourist principle was in effect many years ago.

c. the CF may not have been able to generate large numbers but our force did grow in both numbers and in improved kit in response to the thread.

d. at the time I had a wtf moment when the Marines went into Helmand.

d. despite the enemy strength in Kandahar our forces were being pulled to come to the aid of the Brits in the early years, especially around Sangin and FOB Robinson. Pte Costall was killed there early in 1-06 and C Coy 1 VP went to the aid of a coy of 3 Para there a bit later. The next year a tp of D Bty (actually all three tps in rotation) spent a fair amount of time in FOB Rob. In the same roto - 1-07 - we had a considerable force engaged working for the US SOF up near the Belly Button feature. Initially there was a tp of D Bty with TF 31 and then a cbt tm based on a Strathcona sqn (-) and H Coy 2 RCR (-) was also commited.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2012)

Yes to all.  2006 was essentially a force-on-force meeting engagement - it is what goes on in 2007 and after that is interesting.

I've put up a link to a document entitled "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar".  It should be read.  Of note, the Canadians are fixed in Zharei/Panjway while NATO is fixated on Helmand.  Meanwhile, the Taliban are aiming for Kandahar City the whole time.


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## The Bread Guy (23 Jun 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I've put up a link to a document entitled "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar".  It should be read.  Of note, the Canadians are fixed in Zharei/Panjway while NATO is fixated on Helmand.  Meanwhile, the Taliban are aiming for Kandahar City the whole time.


And here's the thread where the report's at.....
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/90836.0.html


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## GAP (23 Jun 2012)

link is dead


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## aesop081 (23 Jun 2012)

GAP said:
			
		

> link is dead



Worked for me


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## GAP (23 Jun 2012)

The thread link works, but the http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Taliban%27s_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf does not.


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## Infanteer (23 Jun 2012)

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/talibans-campaign-kandahar


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## GAP (23 Jun 2012)

thanks


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## Nemo888 (23 Jun 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?



Kind of why COIN has rarely worked. Insurgency starts as an idea, has some public support, and few resources. COIN usually starts with tons of resources, but has few ideas and is looked on with suspicion by the public. The attempt at legitimizing Karzai was a nice try, but most still don't buy it.  The Taliban wasn't stupid and destroyed or prevented the development aid that would have won us the war.  You would think that their commanders read their Mao and studied other successful 20th century revolutions.

IMO war fighting needed to be on a much larger scale on arrival. Then those fighters  needed to leave. Followed by massive development and peacekeepers in different uniforms holding the ground. The "mowing the grass" model was a waste of resources.

,...Or just blame the Canadians  :


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## daftandbarmy (23 Jun 2012)

I can only assume that the creators of South Park were engaged as ghost writers:

Blame Canada:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOR38552MJA


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## Redeye (24 Jun 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?



That's the difficult balance - being insulated/isolated from a population doesn't do much to built any sort of rapport, nor of course would you want to dominate their area unless as a reasonably clear path to handing over to HNSF who can further build on those relationships - that's basically the thrust of the Clear-Hold-Build concept with all the add-ons like Village Stability Ops, Stability Working Groups, etc. The sort of presence I understood was the aim in places like Zhari/Panjwaii (in part from reading about your experiences) seemed like an effort to strike the balance - to interact with the locals, to work to slowly gain some trust, and eventually to be able to have ANA and ANP viewed as legitimate. In other places the ALP has been the effort to do so, spurred from local initiatives mostly.

One of the better sets of lessons learned comes from the Australians in the Mirabad Valley in Uruzgan, who produced a series of videos about their learnings - when they actually went from living outside the green zone and simply patrolling into it to actually moving from compound to compound (which they often had to make look "forced" when they generally discreetly sought cooperation and paid for it) but being in the presence of the locals, being responsive to their needs and goals, and generally working to gain legitimacy which only comes from the populace. The problem then becomes one of transitions between rotations, but ideally as a transition process happens to a more permanent HNSF presence that gets mitigated.

3 ACR in Tal Afar isn't a bad example either - they totally isolated the town with strong population and resource controls (including an 8' sand berm around the city to force all people entering and exiting through checkpoints), and then immediately set to work on reorganizing and retraining the police force, replacing corrupt leadership with outsiders and addressing ethnic issues by bringing all three groups present into the police. I'd argue that in Iraq they had more of a foundation to work with than rural Afghanistan, however, it's still a good framework.

Nemo - WRT Afghanistan, I tend to side with the argument made by many that you can't assess COIN as a strategy here because it wasn't really done - especially not at the beginning. What the Taliban did right was simple: while "we" were busy building a government from the top down which still was reaching much of the population, "they" carried on doing what they always did from the bottom up - providing swift justice, resolving disputes, and so on. They kept their bonds with a lot of the population while GIRoA wasn't set up to do the same.


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## brihard (24 Jun 2012)

Redeye said:
			
		

> Nemo - WRT Afghanistan, I tend to side with the argument made by many that you can't assess COIN as a strategy here because it wasn't really done - especially not at the beginning. What the Taliban did right was simple: while "we" were busy building a government from the top down which still was reaching much of the population, "they" carried on doing what they always did from the bottom up - providing swift justice, resolving disputes, and so on. They kept their bonds with a lot of the population while GIRoA wasn't set up to do the same.



I'm not schooled in COIN by any means; I've read some stuff and have mulled a bit, but I won't pretend to be anything but a rank amateur.

_Intuitively_ though, your last para hints at something. If COIN is going to be in part predicated upon building a viable state, then part and parcel of that must seem to me to be a very simple, face value question- at the lowest level, the dude in the street - what are the most common interactions betwen the citizen and the state? This isn't an Afghan specific thing; it's the same question that pops into my head during a municipal or provincial election. Who are these dudes asking for my support, how do they differ from all the ther swinging dicks and what do they have to offer to my life in the real, practical sense?

I'm sure there are properly bureaucratic terms for this kind of analysis and that if I were PSYOPS or CIMIC I'd already 'get it'. You speak of the Taliban fulfilling the role of the police and judiciary. De facto, they are essentially the executive and the legislative in many areas.

Are we too focused on big picture, grand strategy, 'what-consultant-shall-we-hire-for-this' stuff to have maintianed focus on the simple reality of 'walking the walk', and 'deeds not words'? 

The discourse around counterinsurgency seems to be getting more and more in depth and complex. Frankly it seems increasingly prone to the masturbatory academia that seems to attend any effort to figure groups of people out and why they do stuff we don't like (my degree is in something along these lines. Ugh.) It strikes me that there are many with a vested interest in convincing our powers that be how things ought to be done in the context of a theoretical ideal, as opposed to simply going out and *interacting* with the populations we operate within, discerning through those interactions what *they* want- and consciously NOT trying to extrapolate.

Is COIN itself flawed in that it tries to suck strategy as high as possible as often as possible? Again, to my very amateur eyes it seems that, more than anything else we've been in, this is where intelligent, culturally aware junior leaders- company level at highest, ideally at the platoon level embedded in a community - ought to be trusted to figure out what the most local portion of the population needs, wants, and expects, and to communicate that up and to act on it as much as is possible, as locally as is possible, and as quickly as is possible. We seem to like easily doctrinalized solutions, where maybe there needs to be mroe acceptance of each situation being different, contributing under 'mission command' to a bigger intent, but with MUCH less bloody interfrence in how it's done at the local level.

Am I wrong in thinking that CIMIC, etc, have perhaps lost perspective on themselves as enablers? That, as opposed to being an end unto themselves, with the consequential upwards-sucking of authority, responsibility, command, and decision making - they ought to be pushing assets as low as is possible to leave enablers at the greatest disposal of those with the highest resolution of local 'feel'?


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## Redeye (24 Jun 2012)

Brihard said:
			
		

> I'm not schooled in COIN by any means; I've read some stuff and have mulled a bit, but I won't pretend to be anything but a rank amateur.
> 
> _Intuitively_ though, your last para hints at something. If COIN is going to be in part predicated upon building a viable state, then part and parcel of that must seem to me to be a very simple, face value question- at the lowest level, the dude in the street - what are the most common interactions betwen the citizen and the state? This isn't an Afghan specific thing; it's the same question that pops into my head during a municipal or provincial election. Who are these dudes asking for my support, how do they differ from all the ther swinging dicks and what do they have to offer to my life in the real, practical sense?
> 
> ...



I can't claim to be anywhere near an expert on the subject for the simple reason that it's morphing so fast it is almost impossible to keep up - and all while people scream "COIN is dead", no less. I do, however, have a bit of insight having been fairly well read in on the subject for quite a while (it was something that interested me even before I joined the army, actually, while I was in school), and I also work at the "Centre of Excellence" in Afghanistan which requires me to keep myself as up on current themes as best I can.

So, then, he's my assessment: you're right. There was too much focus on big picture stuff at the beginning especially. All this effort to build a national government with all the trappings of a modern republic in Kabul didn't actually change anything for a large chunk of the Afghan population.  What you're hitting on is essentially the crux of the theory that underpins the NATO COIN course, and the "COIN Framework" we teach here. An insurgency comes about when three things exist - a vulnerable population (meaning a population that has real or perceived grievances that can be exploited), lack of government control (meaning the government cannot legitimately exercise its authority to influence the population or resolve those grievances, and leadership available for direction. Mao noted in On Guerilla Warfare that when the first two exist, the latter can be supplied. The insurgency gains legitimacy in the eyes of the population by addressing those prerequisites, so the Taliban gained legitimacy in the south initially in that manner, and has been able in many places to retain it. They build their links to the population by gaining the legitimacy, while the connection between the population and the government weakens.

There was such focus on this top down approach that nothing was done to alter the situation as perceived at the lowest level by many, many Afghans, particular those far from Kabul, where the connection to the central government was weak and tenuous to begin with. It was not a challenge for insurgents to connect themselves to the population. They took on the role of the executive and judiciary functions while co-opting traditional legislative functions (though I don't know if you can really classify shura/jirga concepts as "legislative", more of a hybrid, but I think you get what I'm saying. They gained legitimacy because they did what was wanted and they continue to do so. It's not for nothing that Karzai frequently was derided as "The Mayor Of Kabul" in recent times.

There was some realization that this was the case, and a lot of lofty talk about shifting focuses to address this, to actually getting a COIN focus in place. However, there then became a realization that "we" (ISAF/Coalition) couldn't really be labeled as counterinsurgents, only the Afghans could - we would just be provided them the support they need to do so (Security Force Assistance is the new buzzword, and IDAD - Internal Defence and Development). But I don't see how that's seamlessly translating into building legitimacy for GIRoA at the "local guy on the street" level yet. That's not to say it isn't, I just don't know of any good examples.



			
				Brihard said:
			
		

> The discourse around counterinsurgency seems to be getting more and more in depth and complex. Frankly it seems increasingly prone to the masturbatory academia that seems to attend any effort to figure groups of people out and why they do stuff we don't like (my degree is in something along these lines. Ugh.) It strikes me that there are many with a vested interest in convincing our powers that be how things ought to be done in the context of a theoretical ideal, as opposed to simply going out and *interacting* with the populations we operate within, discerning through those interactions what *they* want- and consciously NOT trying to extrapolate.



Agreed again. There's more money to be made writing the latest great COIN book that really only recycles old ideas - and a lot of the stuff out there is so complex and cryptic wanking that it offers little value. In my view, for COIN to really work, you have to make it simple enough that every soldier can get a grip on the mindset, which isn't actually that hard in a lot of ways. The framework we use in our lessons (I'll try to find an image to post) is simple, ANSF troops get it and get what it means to them fairly quickly. When I had the opportunity to teach at JMRC Hohenfels, we got some pushback from some people about why we had dropped a bunch of material that had previously been used. Our reasoning was simply that it was a bunch of theory that had no practical application, and thus not worth included. My training team decided to make the material simple but thorough, not adding in all sorts of intellectual wanking because it doesn't add to the course.



			
				Brihard said:
			
		

> Is COIN itself flawed in that it tries to suck strategy as high as possible as often as possible? Again, to my very amateur eyes it seems that, more than anything else we've been in, this is where intelligent, culturally aware junior leaders- company level at highest, ideally at the platoon level embedded in a community - ought to be trusted to figure out what the most local portion of the population needs, wants, and expects, and to communicate that up and to act on it as much as is possible, as locally as is possible, and as quickly as is possible. We seem to like easily doctrinalized solutions, where maybe there needs to be mroe acceptance of each situation being different, contributing under 'mission command' to a bigger intent, but with MUCH less bloody interfrence in how it's done at the local level.



That's the idea that is pushed on the COIN Leaders Course - the problem that seems to come out of Lessons Learned is that while "every soldier a sensor" is an awesome concept, processing all the information obtained becomes difficult if not impossible, and it becomes easy to then impose our own ideas about what a community needs, wants, expects. And there are myriad stories of how that goes wrong. The most common (probably apocryphal given the variations I've heard but apt nevertheless) story involves building a well in the centre of town on discovering that local women must bring water from a source a couple of kilometres away. Sounds great, right? Sure, until you roll back through a few weeks later and discover the well destroyed. By the women. Why? Because you've taken away the time they had to socialize. They didn't view the water trip as an impediment, but as a positive thing and it wasn't recognized by outsiders as such. That's the kind of problem that comes up.



			
				Brihard said:
			
		

> Am I wrong in thinking that CIMIC, etc, have perhaps lost perspective on themselves as enablers? That, as opposed to being an end unto themselves, with the consequential upwards-sucking of authority, responsibility, command, and decision making - they ought to be pushing assets as low as is possible to leave enablers at the greatest disposal of those with the highest resolution of local 'feel'?



That I can't speak to - I'm not a CIMIC dude (though that's probably, realistically, where I'm going to head), but maybe they have, or maybe the problem is that they're not being employed effectively as enablers. We have a hard task shaking off both a kinetic-only mindset (but don't mistake COIN for being non-kinetic - "hearts and minds" does sometimes mean "two in the chest and one in the mind"), and wanting to project our ideas of what's right on others. That's the whole "Afghan right" concept that we work toward here now - and it's well summarized in the Australian LL videos I mentioned by one of their officers: "If you've come up with a plan and a course of action that makes sense to you from your western perspective, then it isn't going to work, go back to the drawing board." (or something close to that).


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## Old Sweat (25 Jun 2012)

Matthew Fisher joins the debate with a critique of the book on the Canada.com website. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

Canadian Afghan mission misrepresented in new book
 Strategic errors made in Washington, not Ottawa
 By Matthew Fisher, Postmedia News June 25, 2012 12:01 PM 

Canada's military effort in Kandahar has been heavily criticized and seriously misrepresented in a new book by a reporter and associate editor from the Washington Post who also wrote the highly regarded "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" about the U.S. war in Iraq.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's "Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan" asks a reasonable question: whether the U.S. should have surged troops into Kandahar or neighbouring Helmand province.

The author is considered a heavyweight around Washington and his earlier book inspired the film Green Zone starring Matt Damon. But Chandrasekaran reveals a misunderstanding of the history of the Canadian and American deployments in Kandahar and is apparently unaware of the many attempts that the overmatched Canadian task force there and political leaders in Ottawa made to get the U.S. and other NATO allies to join them in the fight.

Citing an influential American outside adviser, Chandrasekaran says Canada was wrong to not put combat troops in Kandahar City and complains that its troops were "focused on reconstruction activities, not providing security or gathering intelligence." According to a second hand account of what an American two star general had told someone else, Chandrasekaran wrote that the U.S. was loathe to push the idea that more Canadians should have been sent to Kandahar City because, as Chandrasekaran write, he did not want to "dictate to the Canadians where to place their forces."

In fact, the Canadians did exactly what they had been asked to do by NATO in Kandahar City. This was to do what the Americans had done there before them. Acceding to requests from Brussels and Washington, Canadian reconstruction troops and civilians took over what had been a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Base in the fall of 2005 when those Americans were withdrawn as the U.S. ramped up the war in Iraq.

The truth is that Washington had been so unconcerned about Kandahar City that between early 2002 and late 2005 — as the Taliban regained strength and began to cause serious security problems — it had never sent combat troops into Kandahar City, either. Nor did the U.S. establish a meaningful intelligence capability there.

What the Americans did in exiting Kandahar was leave Canada with a mess of Washington's making in a place that was fast becoming the epicentre of the insurgency. Given this ugly backdrop, and the fact that the U.S. has vastly superior intelligence gathering capabilities when compared with those of Canada, it is disingenuous to argue that it was Canada's and not the U.S.'s strategy in Kandahar City that was faulty.

The main point Chandrasekaran made in this excerpt from his book, which ran in the Washington Post over the weekend, was that Kandahar, not Helmand was the key battleground so, since Canada was responsible for Kandahar, it should have gone into Kandahar City in a big way. It is certainly arguable that Kandahar was more important militarily than Helmand, although opium from the latter was what provided vital financing to the Taliban. But if Kandahar was more important, why did the U.S., with several hundred thousand more combat troops than Canada, hand off this crucial assignment almost entirely to its northern neighbours?

Chandrasekaran also disses Canada for only having 600 combat troops to cover Zhari, Panjwai and Arghandab. In fact, the true number of Canadians operating "outside the wire" was nearly double that figure. Nevertheless, as every Canadian and American commander I spoke to during the years that I spent in Kandahar between 2002 and 2011 — and I spoke to several of the people whom Chandrasekaran interviews — that was never nearly enough troops to gain the upper hand. It meant that all Canada could do was rush around putting out fires until the (U.S.) cavalry finally arrived. And this is what the Canadians "heroically" did, according to many U.S. colonels and generals that I have spoken to.

Overlooked in Chandrasekaran's argument that Canada should have committed more combat troops to Kandahar was it was never possible for Canada to send more troops there. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld might have said, "That was a known known." After decades of budget cuts Canada could only sustain about one brigade of 3,000 or 4,000 troops in the field at one time.

Canada took responsibility for the most vital districts in the Taliban heartland — as well as the rest of Kandahar — in 2006 after Washington, with scores of regiments, decided it had exactly ZERO conventional combat troops available to fight there. Other than a limited number of American, British and Canadian Special Forces soldiers, the only combat troops in the province when a battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry arrived from Edmonton early that spring were a handful of French air force commandos tucked up in mountains north of Spin Boldak near the Pakistan border.

Chandrasekaran asserts that one of the reasons the U.S. surge began with the Marines going to Helmand rather than to Kandahar, where he says they were more badly needed, was because the U.S. did not want to hurt Canadian feelings while the British in Helmand were more open to a partnership.

"Ottawa was reluctant to ask for more help," he wrote, because some Canadians "were convinced the security in Kandahar was improving, others didn't want to risk the embarrassment. . . . The geography of the province and the Canadians' desire to hold on to key districts around Kandahar City, made it nearly impossible to carve out a Marine-only area there" so the Marines were sent to "the next best option, even if it was less vital."

It is true that a super-strength brigade of U.S. Marines, under the command of Toronto-born and raised Brig.-Gen. Larry Nicholson, was sent to Helmand where it did an excellent of taking on the Taliban in places where the similarly overstretched British troops had had grave problems. But the idea that Canada sought to keep control of the most important areas around Kandahar City and had somehow kept the Americans out of the city and province is dead wrong.

The independent blue ribbon Manley report to Parliament in 2008 — which was accepted in its entirely by the Harper government and the Liberal opposition — demanded that Canada should leave Afghanistan altogether if the U.S. or other NATO partners did not urgently send troops to help them out. It was in response to Manley's 'no hold's barred' account of the weaknesses of the Canadian mission and a direct request to NATO and to Washington that the U.S. finally began to surge troops into Kandahar starting in 2009 with a single infantry battalion which went to Zhari where it operated under Canadian command.

When the full surge was finally ordered by President Barack Obama in December, 2009, half a dozen U.S. combat units and an intelligence regiment headed for Kandahar and, at long last, Kandahar City. In a relatively short time these Americans and the Canadians, now with the much smaller, more manageable combat zone that they had long sought, quickly turned the security situation around.

There had been foot-dragging by Brig.-Gen. Dan Menard in 2010 about when to hand over formal control of parts of Kandahar to U.S. forces. But this bit of theatre disappeared quickly when Menard was abruptly replaced by then Brig.-Gen. Jon Vance. Within a few days of returning to Kandahar for his second tour in late May of that year, Vance sat down at the Provincial Reconstruction Base in Kandahar City with a group of American combat colonels and told them that by July 4th the U.S. would have total responsibility for and command of the city. In fact, it was on July 1, Canada Day, and not Independence Day, that the Americans finally resumed responsibility for a battle space they should never have never left and, for the first time committed large numbers of combat troops to tackle the Taliban there.

So, why is Canada somehow to blame for the very late arrival of U.S. combat forces in Kandahar City and Kandahar province? Sure, Canada made mistakes. It overreached. It lacked helicopters of its own early on. As was widely known, it never had the means to deploy enough combat troops to defeat the Taliban there. But it was Washington that pressed Ottawa to go to Kandahar because it didn't want its ground troops there. Except for fighter jets, the Canadian Forces went over with everything it had. More than 150 Canadians died fighting the Taliban in Kandahar at a time when the U.S. was pursuing grander ambitions in Iraq. Strategic errors about how and where to fight the Afghan war were made, but they were made at Washington's behest, not Ottawa's.

© Copyright (c) Postmedia News


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## daftandbarmy (25 Jun 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Matthew Fisher joins the debate with a critique of the book on the Canada.com website. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.
> 
> Canadian Afghan mission misrepresented in new book
> Strategic errors made in Washington, not Ottawa
> ...



Fantastic job Matt  

And I suppose that this recent Canada bashing has nothing to do with the upcoming US election? Things that make you go Hmmm....


----------



## Infanteer (25 Jun 2012)

Good critique by Mr Fisher - he is right about KC.  It was vital ground, but that doesn't really mean you need to occupy it; the key terrain of the outlying districts was where to be.  If anything, the NDS were capable of dealing with KC.


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## CombatDoc (25 Jun 2012)

i think that history will show that the CF held the vital ground around Kandahar City.  If this area had been lost, I suspect the entire coalition effort in southern Afghanistan would have been lost.  Although the CF was significantly  under resourced, the US was a) very slow to differentiate Afpak vice Iraq as the centre of gravity and b) slow to surge troops into the area.  It wasn't until around 2010-2011 that the major surge around KC occurred.


----------



## Redeye (26 Jun 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Good critique by Mr Fisher - he is right about KC.  It was vital ground, but that doesn't really mean you need to occupy it; the key terrain of the outlying districts was where to be.  If anything, the NDS were capable of dealing with KC.



And there was much success for Canadians there. Interestingly, the Canadian strategy in Dand district features prominently into a USMC publication I was just reading yesterday as we clean out our library.

Mr. Fisher's recap jogged my memory about things like the Manley Report etc, and seems to be about spot on.


----------



## fake penguin (26 Jun 2012)

I'am curious from form members on here that have done multiple  tours in kandahar. Did you see a big difference between 2006-2009 and after 2009 when the surge happened?


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## fraserdw (26 Jun 2012)

Re-visionist BS, history will remember us.


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## Loachman (26 Jun 2012)

fake penguin said:
			
		

> I'am curious from form members on here that have done multiple  tours in kandahar. Did you see a big difference between 2006-2009 and after 2009 when the surge happened?



Yes. Huge - Big Picture-wise at least.


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## Armymedic (26 Jun 2012)

It is my opinion that we held our own in Kandahar province and kept K City from falling back into Taliban control. 

But I could not credibly argue the point that with only 2000 troops in a small portions of the province that we made a substantial difference in the entire area (the Marouf region was largely ignored); esp when debating against the American view of how much better conditions turned out to be a mere 6 months after the US surged in troops (albeit several yr to late) into the area.


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## Old Sweat (2 Jul 2012)

Here is a link to an oped piece in the Chronicle-Herald regarding the book. Note that it appears, I say again appears, to be based on the excerpt that appeared in the Washington Post and not on analysis of the whole book. (I heard part of an interview with the author of the book last week and the conversation was solely about the interplay between the various factions in the US establishment. I have ordered a copy from Amazon and will post a review in due course.)

http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/113008-taylor-new-book-shows-rewriting-of-afghanistan-war-story-has-begun


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## cupper (2 Jul 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Here is a link to an oped piece in the Chronicle-Herald regarding the book. Note that it appears, I say again appears, to be based on the excerpt that appeared in the Washington Post and not on analysis of the whole book. (I heard part of an interview with the author of the book last week and the conversation was solely about the interplay between the various factions in the US establishment. I have ordered a copy from Amazon and will post a review in due course.)
> 
> http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/113008-taylor-new-book-shows-rewriting-of-afghanistan-war-story-has-begun



I heard a couple of interviews on NPR while traveling last week and the Canadian angle was only a brief mention. The majority of time it was critical of the political decisions and higher ups at the Pentagon over ruling or ignoring the advise of the ground commanders.


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## dogger1936 (3 Jul 2012)

"Another bone of contention raised by the Americans was Canada’s woeful teeth-to-tail ratio for those troops actually deployed in theatre. According to the book, barely 600 Canadians out of a contingent of 2,830 were sent on combat missions outside the wire. The rest of our soldiers presumably relaxed safely inside the perimeter, enjoying Tim Hortons coffee and playing street hockey."

We barely had enough to do OP duty at times. We collapsed COP's we couldn't support manpower wise or with materials effectively. We went out on operations to places we would leave in a week and never return during roto. 

Anyone remember Hadji, Zangabad, Mushan? 

Remember leaving one roto and coming back to see 50m of route fosters paved on your next deployment? What a total waste of manpower and money.

Sure we got some great TIC's in with some good body counts at the end of a OP...but then what? We would leave and go back to the FOB. Abandon the area which was destroyed by maneuver damage for the Taliban to come back in and exploit.

I never seen any improvement aside from the ANA's ability.

We did what we could with the troops we had. The running joke of "I AM SPARTA" (i.e 300 men) wasn't far fetched.


----------



## dimsum (3 Jul 2012)

dogger1936 said:
			
		

> "Another bone of contention raised by the Americans was Canada’s woeful teeth-to-tail ratio for those troops actually deployed in theatre. According to the book, barely 600 Canadians out of a contingent of 2,830 were sent on combat missions outside the wire. The rest of our soldiers presumably relaxed safely inside the perimeter, enjoying Tim Hortons coffee and playing street hockey."



I find it ironic that the American military, of all organizations, are slagging another country's teeth-to-tail ratio.  I'd be very surprised if 1 in 5 US military personnel are the "teeth".


----------



## dogger1936 (3 Jul 2012)

Dimsum said:
			
		

> I find it ironic that the American military, of all organizations, are slagging another country's teeth-to-tail ratio.  I'd be very surprised if 1 in 5 US military personnel are the "teeth".



They still put a Stryker brigade where we had less than 600 men. A few more teeth.


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## Old Sweat (13 Jul 2012)

I am posting this story from the Winnipeg Free Press, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act, here because it seems to build on the attempt to blame Canada. If, in particular, UK General Richards is quoted correctly, then he either has been saddly misinformed or his recollections were incorrect.



U.S, British criticism of Canada's military efforts in Afghanistan 'wrong'

 By: Colin Perkel, The Canadian Press

 Posted: 3:01 AM

American and British criticism of Canada's long and often bloody military efforts in Afghanistan has a ring of revisionism that ignores key facts, experts say. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Colin Perkel

TORONTO - American and British criticism of Canada's long and often bloody military efforts in Afghanistan has a ring of revisionism that ignores key facts, experts say.

In particular, they say, the notion that blithely optimistic Canadians were reluctant to ask for outside help as they struggled alone in Kandahar province, which had been abandoned by the Americans in favour of Iraq, is ludicrous.

"The war (in Afghanistan) isn't exactly going well, so people look around and try to fix blame wherever they can," said Canadian military historian, Jack Granatstein.

"The Americans and Brits are good at this historically."

In his recent book "Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan," Washington Post author Rajiv Chandrasekaran criticizes Canada for only having about 800 on-the-ground combat troops to cover the province.

He cites one U.S. adviser as saying Canadian soldiers were "focused on reconstruction activities, not providing security."

The author also writes the U.S. didn't push Ottawa to send more troops into Kandahar city because it didn't want to "dictate" to the Canadians or embarrass them, and that Canada was "reluctant" to ask for help.

"That's wrong," Granatstein said. "We tried repeatedly to get assistance. Basically, no help came."

In fact, a secret communique from then-U.S. ambassador in Kabul Ronald Neumann to Washington brass in September 2006 — amid Canada's bloody battle known as Operation Medusa — notes Canadian Brig.-Gen. David Fraser appealed for more troops.

The Wikileaks-published cable cites Fraser as telling a delegation of the North Atlantic Council about the troop juggling that was already going on.

"If I were king for a day, I'd request several battle groups," Fraser said. "We can balance forces, but not forever."

Promised French help never materialized, and although the U.S. did send in some troops, it would take several years — when President Barack Obama finally turned his attention to Afghanistan — that an American "surge" began to offer relief to the Canadians.

A senior Canadian commander, who asked not to be identified, said Canada had been looking for partners, and the eventual flood of American troops into the province underscored the crying need for added strength.

"The U.S. shift from Iraq to Afghanistan put sufficient forces into play to begin to do a better job of counter-insurgency," the commander said.

"No amount of criticism or 'woulda, shoulda, couldas' even comes close to the game-changing nature of the surge."

In another book on the war, author Sandy Gall cites British Gen. David Richards — who commanded allied forces in southern Afghanistan in 2006-2007 — as suggesting under-resourced Canadians were never up to the Kandahar job in the first place.

According to the book, British forces only ended up in neighbouring Helmand because Ottawa wanted the "prestigious" role of taking on Kandahar province.

David Bercuson, who with Granatstein authored a paper on the lessons of the war, said in an interview the British were "wildly under-strength" in Helmand, and their tactics were "little short of stupid."

Canadian forces struggling to keep a tenuous grip on Kandahar — key Taliban territory — were forced to rescue British troops in Helmand on several occasions.

Granatstein and Bercuson — senior research fellows with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute — conceded Canada made mistakes.

For one thing, they argue, Canadians were poorly prepared for their first shooting war in 50 years because they simply didn't know what they were getting into in Kandahar.

The strength and determination of the insurgency caught the Canadian military leadership by surprise. Nevertheless, the troops managed — if barely — to stop the insurgency from overrunning the province.

"The Canadians fought well, didn't have enough troops (but) did a good job nonetheless holding Kandahar province, which was a critical area for the Taliban," Granatstein said. "We stopped it from falling."

In his memoir, Britain's former Afghan ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles notes Canada's unrelenting and seemingly misguided optimism — particularly on display by Chris Alexander, his Canadian counterpart and now a Conservative MP.

Granatstein called the optimism — also displayed by successive Canadian commanders — as a "transparent PR move" given the increasing antipathy in Canada toward the Afghan war effort.

Alexander did not respond to a request for comment.

In reality, it is still early days in gaining the solid perspective only time — and the release of mounds of documents that remain under wraps along with information from still reticent key players — can bring.

In the interim, Bercuson said, Canada risks having its mission defined by others.

"There's a danger that will happen," Bercuson said. "Until we start getting stuff out of our own, we won't be able to define our mission there."


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## observor 69 (13 Jul 2012)

Interesting article, Thanks OS.


----------



## Old Sweat (13 Jul 2012)

I am going to offer an opinion about the attempts to blame Canada and the response by Granatstein and Bercuson. 

This was nothing new and it was particularly in favour in some British circles when Montgomery's generalship and command style began to come under attack. The gist of the arguments was that it wasn't really his fault; instead the Canadians undermined him with their incompetence. While we were not above reproach, this largely tended to ignore some quite notable clangers like Villers-Bocage on 13 June and Goodwood on 18 July. The Brits had also fired one corps commander and at least two division commanders and declared one division non-effective and disbanded another. It was quite interesting that none or at least most of our detractors did not cite any Canadian sources or seek to interview any of the players who were still alive. For the most part, it successfully deflected criticism of Montgomery onto Crerar et al.

I suggest that in the case of Kandahar province, examination of sources and citations may show something similar. As the book has yet to become available in Canada (I have a copy on order) I may be in incorrect here. If so, I apologize in advance. One example - Rajiv Chandrasekaran cites an American civilian expert who claimed we had no more than 600 troops outside the wire, but apparently did not attempt to confirm this from Canadian sources. That is not good intelligence analysis, journalism or historical research.

Just as I would not be afraid to compare Totalize to Goodwood, I would welcome an objective analysis of the early British operations, tactics and equipment in Helmand against the performance of TFs 1-06 through 3-07.


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

dogger1936 said:
			
		

> They still put a Stryker brigade where we had less than 600 men. A few more teeth.



I have to agree.  The problem wasnt with the individual Canadian troops.  They wanted to fight.  The problem is the lack of aggression and risk adverse nature of some of our leadership.  Argue what you want, but its true.  We are very much a logistics-based army.  Too many pencil-pushers, not enough fighters.
Hate away....


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## SeaKingTacco (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> I have to agree.  The problem wasnt with the individual Canadian troops.  They wanted to fight.  The problem is the lack of aggression and risk adverse nature of some of our leadership.  Argue what you want, but its true.  We are very much a logistics-based army.  Too many pencil-pushers, not enough fighters.
> Hate away....



Actually, the problem is exactly the opposite of how you have described it.  If anything, we have far too few logisticians and our "fighters" pay lip service to logistical planning.


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Actually, the problem is exactly the opposite of how you have described it.  If anything, we have far too few logisticians and our "fighters" pay lip service to logistical planning.



2, 800 troops in Kandahar. 600-800 fighting troops.  Im curious as to how you can claim that?


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## Sythen (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> 2, 800 troops in Kandahar. 600-800 fighting troops.  Im curious as to how you can claim that?



Maybe first you can fill in your profile a bit so we will know what your experience is, and where your knowledge comes from.


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## SeaKingTacco (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> 2, 800 troops in Kandahar. 600-800 fighting troops.  Im curious as to how you can claim that?



I meant that both in the context of KAF and globally in the CF.

Much of that Kandahar tail was not, as I understand it, logisticians.  There were legions of Staff Officers,  medical folks,  Signallers, morale and welfare people, aircrew and MPs in addition to the logisticians.  Some of the people on the list are useful (in the right quantities)- others, not so much.

Globally, the CF is crappy at Logistics.  We treat support trades as a dumping ground for those who cannot "make it" in the Combat Arms or other operator occupations.  We talk down to them and often denigrate their contributions.  We cut their establishments to save bayonets and then wonder why no one can fix trucks or deliver ammo on time.  We almost never do a proper support estimate for an operation or exercise and then wonder why things are such a shambles when we deploy. 

That is what I mean.


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## Fishbone Jones (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> I have to agree.  The problem wasnt with the individual Canadian troops.  They wanted to fight.  The problem is the lack of aggression and risk adverse nature of some of our leadership.  Argue what you want, but its true.  We are very much a logistics-based army.  Too many pencil-pushers, not enough fighters.
> Hate away....



And in all your worldly experience, do you have even the most basic clue on how many people it takes to support one combat soldier?

Wait, let me answer that for you.

Obviously not.

However, I'd bet that you'd be one of the first to spout off, piss and moan if you didn't get your bullets, beans or gas, missed your leave, didn't get paid, had no med or mechanical support amongst a myriad of other things that all those other people do so that combat soldiers can concentrate on doing their job without worrying about that 'other' stuff.


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## Infanteer (13 Jul 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Just as I would not be afraid to compare Totalize to Goodwood, I would welcome an objective analysis of the early British operations, tactics and equipment in Helmand against the performance of TFs 1-06 through 3-07.



They are starting to pop up - I've seen a few on RUSI.  They aren't particularly endearing.  The UK got caught with its pants down in '06 - there were Canadian sub-units that had to fight their way into British TI as the Paras were fixed and in danger of being overrun.


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## Old Sweat (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> 2, 800 troops in Kandahar. 600-800 fighting troops.  Im curious as to how you can claim that?



Could you tell us where you got those figures? My reading is that we had about 2800 troops overall including those not at KAF. Besides the three companies with the battle group, there was another with the PRT. Add on the two armoured squadrons, the field squadron and the artillery - guns and STA both - as well as the OMLT and the SOF and the loggies, etc who regularly ventured out, and the situation looks a lot different from what you painted.

As for tooth to tail ratio, we now have nine battalions out of a regular force of under 20,000. When I joined we had 13 battalions out of a regular army of 48,000. We probably are too lean, but I don't know how to fix it, or if it is fixable.


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## GAP (13 Jul 2012)

We had a 1 - 9 tooth to tail ratio way back when....I don't think the CF is anywhere close....


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

recceguy said:
			
		

> And in all your worldly experience, do you have even the most basic clue on how many people it takes to support one combat soldier?
> 
> Wait, let me answer that for you.
> 
> ...



Support staff dont win wars or hold ground.  Combat troops do.  
I never meant to slag supprt staff/logistics.  Every military needs them...and I mean that, we NEED them.  But they will not "win" the war.

As for the figures and where I got them, the figures are drawn from that article/book.  If the figures are skewed and I am incorrect I apologize.


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## aesop081 (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> But they will not "win" the war.



The war will not be "won" without both.

The war *WILL* be lost, without effective logistics.


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> The war will not be "won" without both.
> 
> The war *WILL* be lost, without effective logistics.



True.  However, I can just as easily replace "effective logisitics" with "effective combat troops" and the quote would still ring true.  

So, we established that we NEED both.  Without security you cannot conduct your logisitics and vice-versa.
But the problem being stated here is we tried to do too much with too little.  And the author highlights the example of the Brits in Helmand.  The fact is, we needed more combat troops (which we could not supply...and if we did have them that would = more logisitics troops) and a more agressive posture (which our leadership didn't have).  

Debate on, I appreciate everyones input.  Some great things being said on here.


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## SeaKingTacco (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> Support staff dont win wars or hold ground.  Combat troops do.
> I never meant to slag supprt staff/logistics.  Every military needs them...and I mean that, we NEED them.  But they will not "win" the war.
> 
> As for the figures and where I got them, the figures are drawn from that article/book.  If the figures are skewed and I am incorrect I apologize.



John 11:35
 :facepalm:


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> John 11:35
> :facepalm:



?
Should I dig up a bible somewhere?


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## Infanteer (13 Jul 2012)

Wars will also clearly be lost without the civilian staff required to man the Tim Hortons, the numerous civilian clerks on call to ensure everyone gets a 3 week holiday in Australia in the middle of the war, and the multiple Visits staff required due to the fact that every second day features people coming to get their boots dirty in the BSA (despite the fact that visits are simply a distraction on leadership and staff - Monty had it right by banning all visits to 8th Army)....


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Wars will also clearly be lost without the civilian staff required to man the Tim Hortons, the numerous civilian clerks on call to ensure everyone gets a 3 week holiday in Australia in the middle of the war, and the multiple Visits staff required due to the fact that every second day features people coming to get their boots dirty in the BSA (despite the fact that visits are simply a distraction on leadership and staff - Monty had it right by banning all visits to 8th Army)....


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## Journeyman (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> Some great things being said on here.


 Yes, notwithstanding the great divergence in post quality between those who know what they're talking about, and those who are he who is back-peddling.



			
				Sythen said:
			
		

> Maybe first you can fill in your profile a bit.....


No need. From a quick read of his posts.....he doesn't know what the Infantry qualification badges are, yet he's an expert on what SOF Assaulters/Operators think, how Task Force leadership in operations fails to meet his standards of aggressiveness, and claims he's "been there multiple times."  : 

His profile would merely read, "talks out of his ass."



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> ....to ensure everyone gets a 3 week holiday in Australia in the middle of the war...


Not me; I did military tourism in Vietnam   ;D


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## dapaterson (13 Jul 2012)

[off topic]



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Not me; I did military tourism in Vietnam   ;D



I heard you were originally thinking about Thailand, but ultimately just said "Phuket."

[/off topic]


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## GAP (13 Jul 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Not me; I did military tourism in Vietnam   ;D



Great place to visit, but wouldn't want to live there...... ;D


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## LieutenantPrivate (13 Jul 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Yes, notwithstanding the great divergence in post quality between those who know what they're talking about, and those who are he who is back-peddling.
> No need. From a quick read of his posts.....he doesn't know what the Infantry qualification badges are, yet he's an expert on what SOF Assaulters/Operators think, how Task Force leadership in operations fails to meet his standards of aggressiveness, and claims he's "been there multiple times."  :



Am I starting to make too much sense that it hurts to hear? Sorry


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## SeaKingTacco (13 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> ?
> Should I dig up a bible somewhere?



No.  Just use Google.


----------



## dimsum (14 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> *Am I starting to make too much sense that it hurts to hear?* Sorry



Despite the fact that this is an unofficial Internet forum about the CF, some (I'd say the majority) of members are people with significant amounts of time in.  I can personally vouch for SKTacco and CDN Aviator (although I really don't want to in the case of the latter... ) that they know what they're talking about.  I'm sure that some of these people have had to think about this "issue" you're talking about as part of their actual job, not flapping their Internet gums in a forum.

Debate is good and highly encouraged, just know where the boundaries/lanes are and when one has overstepped them.


----------



## ModlrMike (14 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> Am I starting to make too much sense that it hurts to hear? Sorry



I believe it hurts to hear for quite the opposite reason.


----------



## Popurhedoff (14 Jul 2012)

I was in SOTF-58 Roto 0, and now work as a PSD and Security Manager in Afghanistan and have approx 18 months on the ground here, and I can tell you I am not impressed by the Americans...

The Taliban have not won this war, but rather that America have lost it... The endless press of burning the Quran, video's of American troops posing over dead Taiban, urinating on dead taliban, Hunting civilians for sport, going on shooting rampages against defenceless civilians... and the list goes on and on.  They are the poster children of how "Not to win a Coin", and "how to lose a war."

For the most advance military in the world, the machine is so large that it cannot control themselves... they have lost the war and are not making it any easier on the other countries. It is only natural that they lash out at others rather than face the reality of where they have failed. Their arrogance is their achilles heel.

Most know that not many other armies can stand up to them head to head, so the enemy is playing by their rules and making America/NATO/ISAF pay dearly. 

The Afganistan locals who I talk to daily admit that they admired the Canadian Military, they say that we are professional, fair, and helpfull, and say that the Canadians have made a difference where ever they have been. For them to admit that they actually respect the Canadian Military is a positive sign. Sure we have our short comings, but we also have the ability to succeed against the odds.

For all the might, the firepower that the Americans have, they cannot compare with the compassion, dedication and professionalism of the Canadian soldiers in the field when dealing with the local populations. I spend a lot of time directly interacting with the Afghanistan people, their Guard force, local villagers, merchants and elders. I have earned their respect and they get it right back.

Yes sir, I am not impressed with the Americans on some issues either.

Cheers
Pop


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## George Wallace (14 Jul 2012)

:goodpost:



I think you hit many important points squarely on the head with that concise post.


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## dimsum (14 Jul 2012)

Exactly.  As I usually tell people, we are a small force so we can't do a lot, but what we do, we do well.


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## Jarnhamar (15 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> Support staff dont win wars or hold ground.  Combat troops do.
> I never meant to slag supprt staff/logistics.  Every military needs them...and I mean that, we NEED them.  But they will not "win" the war.
> 
> As for the figures and where I got them, the figures are drawn from that article/book.  If the figures are skewed and I am incorrect I apologize.



You sound really stupid right now and your credibility is pretty shot.


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## LieutenantPrivate (15 Jul 2012)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> You sound really stupid right now and your credibility is pretty shot.
> [/quote
> 
> I love how instead of refuting my point you choose to personally attack. Did I strike a sensitive nerve?


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## LieutenantPrivate (15 Jul 2012)

...and my figures were correct.


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## fraserdw (15 Jul 2012)

Regardless of who won or who lost, this war will soon be another Hollywood war to be won and won and won over and over again.  I agree with Pop's assessment of the Yanks.  They are too much of an inward looking people to practice COIN doctrine.  According to my staff college training, we are light on the ground in terms of support but we were definitely light on the ground in terms of combat troops.  Our TF should have been brigade sized with 2 even 3 battlegroups.  We should mobilized the P Res and sent 3 50-50 battlegroups and kept them there until every Pasto in Kandahar could sing O Canada in French and English!  Heck, if we mobilized the P Res and kept them there, the war would be over because those guys would know there is only one way home.  Hindsight is always 20-20.


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## Fishbone Jones (15 Jul 2012)

fraserdw said:
			
		

> Regardless of who won or who lost, this war will soon be another Hollywood war to be won and won and won over and over again.  I agree with Pop's assessment of the Yanks.  They are too much of an inward looking people to practice COIN doctrine.  According to my staff college training, we are light on the ground in terms of support but we were definitely light on the ground in terms of combat troops.  Our TF should have been brigade sized with 2 even 3 battlegroups.  We should mobilized the P Res and sent 3 50-50 battlegroups and kept them there until every Pasto in Kandahar could sing O Canada in French and English!  Heck, if we mobilized the P Res and kept them there, the war would be over because those guys would know there is only one way home.  Hindsight is always 20-20.



You know, we have a sarcasm smilie.
 :sarcasm:


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## Infanteer (15 Jul 2012)

fraserdw said:
			
		

> Our TF should have been brigade sized with 2 even 3 battlegroups.  We should mobilized the P Res and sent 3 50-50 battlegroups and kept them there until every Pasto in Kandahar could sing O Canada in French and English!



Or maybe it should have consisted of 5-6 OMLTs, letting the Afghan government worry about Battle Grouping and Provincial Reconstruction....


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## Jarnhamar (15 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate said:
			
		

> I love how instead of refuting my point you choose to personally attack. Did I strike a sensitive nerve?



I didn't feel your point was even worthy of debating. If we were in the mess right now I would shush you.  Most people here have already begun ignoring you, I feel bad for you and am responding in the hopes that you pull your head out of your butt and your posting style changes because I think you could really be a decent contributor.

Trying to get a response out of me, or anyone else, with your childish "did I strike a nerve" approach isn't going to get you anywhere. All the CF members on this forum have proven themselves, trust me when I tell you getting smart or lipping off over the internet isn't going to strike a nerve with anyone.  It's just childish dude.
Start reading about the Romans and logistics then reevaluate your comment.


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## fake penguin (15 Jul 2012)

LieutenantPrivate you said your figures were correct.But like old sweat pointed out there is 4 infantry companies in afghanistan at one time.Plus correct me if i'am wrong but also a recce platoon.Is that not atleast 600 men alone?. That is only counting infantry what about CLP's and other men outside the wire.Just really curious how your figures are correct?.


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## Infanteer (15 Jul 2012)

I think the beatdown of LieutenantPrivate is done.  Anyone care to change the subject.

The Staff.


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## fraserdw (15 Jul 2012)

That 600 number comes from that Yankee reporter that had a hate on for the way Canada was running the war in Kandahar...Micheal something or other often used 600 combat troops in his reports.


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## slayer/raptor (15 Jul 2012)

While I don't agree with the comments from the American book.  I think it is time that the CF starts being critical about its efforts in Kandahar.  Yeah I think it's great that Generals go from base to base saying to all the soldiers how great of a job we did...cause its true we did great over there on the tactical level...maybe even on the operational level.  I for one saw great change in our small battle space of mushan/zangabad/bazzare-e-panjway.  But on a strategic level did Canada hold its own?  Could it be that we were too optimistic in thinking that we could hold and control Kandahar province by ourselves?  I just think that we should start being more critical of ourselves if we are to get better for next time.

As for the Americans, well many US soldiers told us on our RIP that they could never match what we did, and that in general our soldiers were much more competent and professional than they were.


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## LieutenantPrivate (15 Jul 2012)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> I didn't feel your point was even worthy of debating. If we were in the mess right now I would shush you.  Most people here have already begun ignoring you, I feel bad for you and am responding in the hopes that you pull your head out of your butt and your posting style changes because I think you could really be a decent contributor.
> 
> Trying to get a response out of me, or anyone else, with your childish "did I strike a nerve" approach isn't going to get you anywhere. All the CF members on this forum have proven themselves, trust me when I tell you getting smart or lipping off over the internet isn't going to strike a nerve with anyone.  It's just childish dude.
> Start reading about the Romans and logistics then reevaluate your comment.



Fair enough. Point taken mate


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## daftandbarmy (16 Jul 2012)

Popurhedoff said:
			
		

> I was in SOTF-58 Roto 0, and now work as a PSD and Security Manager in Afghanistan and have approx 18 months on the ground here, and I can tell you I am not impressed by the Americans...
> 
> The Taliban have not won this war, but rather that America have lost it... The endless press of burning the Quran, video's of American troops posing over dead Taiban, urinating on dead taliban, Hunting civilians for sport, going on shooting rampages against defenceless civilians... and the list goes on and on.  They are the poster children of how "Not to win a Coin", and "how to lose a war."
> 
> ...



I rememebr trying to explain our operations Northern Ireland to some USMC Officers in the mid-80s. They just shook thier heads and laughed and said something like 'There is no way we could do anything like that successfully'. There are many others who agree with you, including this US Army Lt Col: 

FIGHTING INSURGENTS--NO SHORTCUTS TO SUCCESS

"The good thing about Kitson’s approach to waging a counterinsurgency campaign
strictly within the rule of law is that it generally works. The downside is that such an
approach to counterinsurgency and intelligence takes a long time, and success is
measured not in any dramatic terms but in small, local, and incremental victories. It
should be no surprise that some of our intelligence personnel and leaders might
instinctively opt for the Trinquier approach with its promise of quick and decisive
results, when our military doctrine is filled with adjectives such as “rapid” and
“decisive” to describe the American mode of warfare. Yet the traditionally successful
counterinsurgency doctrines are peppered with adjectives such as “methodical,”
“systematic,” and “long-term.”

The core of the problem is that few in the U.S. armed forces have a real
understanding of insurgencies, what motivates insurgency or how to successfully
combat insurgencies. One of the primary effects of the Vietnam War upon the U.S.
military was a corporate attempt to cut the study of counterinsurgency and small wars
from the mainstream U.S. military education and training. From the late 1970s to the
1990s, the U.S. Army dealt with the failure of Vietnam by not dealing with it. For the
Army and the Air Force, the post-Vietnam doctrinal reforms consisted of a singleminded
emphasis on fighting the big conventional war."

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub666.pdf


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## CombatDoc (16 Jul 2012)

slayer/raptor said:
			
		

> While I don't agree with the comments from the American book.  I think it is time that the CF starts being critical about its efforts in Kandahar.  Yeah I think it's great that Generals go from base to base saying to all the soldiers how great of a job we did...cause its true we did great over there on the tactical level...maybe even on the operational level.  I for one saw great change in our small battle space of mushan/zangabad/bazzare-e-panjway.  But on a strategic level did Canada hold its own?  Could it be that we were too optimistic in thinking that we could hold and control Kandahar province by ourselves?  I just think that we should start being more critical of ourselves if we are to get better for next time.
> 
> As for the Americans, well many US soldiers told us on our RIP that they could never match what we did, and that in general our soldiers were much more competent and professional than they were.


 If we are discussing "strategic level", the endemic corruption within the Afghan governance and ANSF is THE major problem.  Until that is fixed, nothing that is done within the military domain is going to have a lasting effect.  Corruption and lack of improvement in the common citizens' lives is the major reason why the Taliban still have influence within AfPak.

As for your suggestion that US soldiers during the RIP stated that they "could never match what we did" and that Cdn troops were "more competent and professional than they were", that certainly does not sound like any US soldier that I have met.  One of the drawbacks of being the sole remaining superpower is that you begin to believe your own press.  While I agree that our soldiers are amongst the most competent and professional, it would be out of character for our US counterparts to state/admit that.


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## dimsum (16 Jul 2012)

CombatDoc said:
			
		

> If we are discussing "strategic level", the endemic corruption within the Afghan governance and ANSF is THE major problem.  Until that is fixed, nothing that is done within the military domain is going to have a lasting effect.  Corruption and lack of improvement in the common citizens' lives is the major reason why the Taliban still have influence within AfPak.



Exactly.  The more I read into it (I wasn't really "ground level" so I didn't exp it first-hand), it seems like the situation with the Taliban isn't too far unlike the Mafia, except with the added religious aspect.  Essentially, the situation was/is so crap that they "fix" things faster than the authorities can/do. 



			
				CombatDoc said:
			
		

> As for your suggestion that US soldiers during the RIP stated that they "could never match what we did" and that Cdn troops were "more competent and professional than they were", that certainly does not sound like any US soldier that I have met.  One of the drawbacks of being the sole remaining superpower is that you begin to believe your own press.  While I agree that our soldiers are amongst the most competent and professional, it would be out of character for our US counterparts to state/admit that.



I'd agree if the RIP was purely a line US-only unit.  However, I've met some US folks who've had exchange experience (or working in an int'l HQ) and in many cases, they hold the Canadians in high regard.


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## Journeyman (16 Jul 2012)

CombatDoc said:
			
		

> While I agree that our soldiers are amongst the most competent and professional, it would be out of character for our US counterparts to state/admit that.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


I too have heard more than a few US military leaders speak highly of Canadian capabilities, and from knowing the particular officers, it didn't come from "the polite/political thing to say" to coalition partners.


Mind you, in a couple of instances of having seen the sausage-making process from the inside, I wasn't sure how _anyone_ could compliment us on the final result.   ;D


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## Old Sweat (16 Jul 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Mind you, in a couple of instances of having seen the sausage-making process from the inside, I wasn't sure how _anyone_ could compliment us on the final result.   ;D



I think you have highlighted a major challenge for us, the trait embedded in our military DNA that concentrates on perfecting the process, and believing that good results automatically flow from perfect process. In other words, garbage in, perfection out.


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## Greymatters (16 Jul 2012)

CombatDoc said:
			
		

> As for your suggestion that US soldiers during the RIP stated that they "could never match what we did" and that Cdn troops were "more competent and professional than they were", that certainly does not sound like any US soldier that I have met.  One of the drawbacks of being the sole remaining superpower is that you begin to believe your own press.  While I agree that our soldiers are amongst the most competent and professional, it would be out of character for our US counterparts to state/admit that.



Most US civilians think Canadian soldiers are buffoons, mostly because we are hardly ever mentioned in major entertainment streams, therefore we must be insignificant.  

Most US soldiers think Canadians are less capable, mostly because many of them have never worked with Canadians before.  

Those who have worked with us have both negative and positive things to say, as our soldiers and military culture are a bit different from theirs.  

In general almost every US soldier I worked with admitted Canadians are 'as good as they are', but not neccesarily better than they are.


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## CombatDoc (16 Jul 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I think you have highlighted a major challenge for us, the trait embedded in our military DNA that concentrates on perfecting the process, and believing that good results automatically flow from perfect process. In other words, garbage in, perfection out.


The process of Garbage In, Perfection Out is so much more desirable that the converse process of PIGO.   ;D


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## Old Sweat (2 Aug 2012)

This piece bears on the issue raised in the book, but does not exclusively deal with it. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.


After Kandahar, the history war 


David Bercuson 

Special to The Globe and Mail


Published Thursday, Aug. 02 2012, 2:00 AM EDT

Last updated Wednesday, Aug. 01 2012, 5:31 PM EDT

Virtually every significant war in history is followed by another, smaller war: the bloodless war among historians, journalists and veterans to set the historical narrative of the war that just ended. That’s what the former Athenian general Thucydides was doing when he wrote his account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. And now we have Afghanistan, still being fought, with the postwar accounts already appearing, written mostly by journalists – including a few very good ones by Canadians – and generals and diplomats.

Canada has not fared well in many of the accounts by non-Canadians – in particular, recent books by respected Washington Post correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran, British General David Richards and Britain’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, Sherard Cowper-Coles.

Mr. Chandrasekaran’s book is not a memoir; it is based fundamentally on interviews, as most recent journalistic accounts are. That’s not a criticism of the book, because the real evidence of what happened in the war, from the highest political and diplomatic levels to the almost daily encounters between the soldiers at the sharp end and the Taliban, is mostly still classified and will remain so for years to come.

Nonetheless, a clear picture is beginning to emerge from these three books, and others, of a Canadian war effort that was confused, somewhat amateurish, overly optimistic and, in many parts of Kandahar province, simply ineffective. Mr. Chandrasekaran, for example, relates the disappointment of some U.S. commanders at Canada’s failure to actually occupy and secure the city of Kandahar, concentrating instead on keeping the main roads open and attempting to secure corridors from Kabul to Kandahar and from the Pakistani border at Spin Boldak to the Panjwai and Zhari districts, about 25 kilometres west of Kandahar city – the heart of the insurgency.

General Richards is particularly critical that Canada opted to take on Kandahar province instead of Helmand, where the British fought, because there weren’t enough Canadians for the job. The British had roughly three times the number of troops in Helmand (immediately to the west of Kandahar) than Canada had.

There is much truth to these evaluations of Canadian accomplishments in Afghanistan and they have recently been written about by Canadians as well. But there is also much truth to the old Chaucerian remonstrance that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. It applies equally to writers judging the conduct of other nations in war as it does to life in general.

Consider the British effort in Helmand province. The United Kingdom sent troops there equipped with Land Rovers that could not stand up to Taliban IEDs. They tended to place their operating bases inside villages that were controlled by the Taliban and wound up being constantly shot at, especially at night. Though equipped with Chinook helicopters, the British positions were so vulnerable that they were often under siege. In the summer of 2006, the road-bound Canadian Battle Group led by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope was forced to leave its position in Kandahar province to rescue an important British position in Helmand.

Now, none of these failures are of themselves indicative of the overall British effort in Helmand. Rather, they are indicative of the very real fact that everyone who fights wars makes mistakes and that shortcomings can be found throughout a campaign and at all levels of command. Some British journalists, military historians and veterans too often write as if the British invented war and are the best at it. And that attitude is too often reflected in their observations of how Canadians performed, especially in the Second World War.

As for the Americans, it can only be said that the biggest blunder made by any country in the Afghan campaign was made by the United States, in virtually abandoning the necessary war there for the optional war in Iraq. Was Canada too weak on the ground in Kandahar? Without a doubt. But Canada was there between 2006 and 2008 – and the Americans were not. And U.S. mistakes were made at all levels, from the White House and the Department of Defence to the Korengal Valley in northeast Afghanistan, where dozens of American soldiers died trying to hold an indefensible area from forward bases far removed from close support. They abandoned the Korengal after about a year.

Whatever Canada may or may not have accomplished in Kandahar, one fact is indisputable: The Taliban could not seize it. The British and Americans have much to evaluate regarding their own performance. As do Canadians.


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## Good2Golf (10 Aug 2012)

OS, a relatively good piece by Bercuson, but he failed to qualify this statement:



> But Canada was there between 2006 and 2008 – and the Americans were not.



He should have said, "- and the Americans were not there, however, in any substantive numbers."

His statement, while surely intended to be comparative to Canadian forces present at the time, is factually incorrect, and thus weakens an otherwise reasonable article.


Regards
G2G


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## Old Sweat (11 Mar 2013)

I am reviving this thread because I just finished the book. Suffice to say the Canadian media made the Hindu Kush out of a molehill. The Canadian presence is mentioned a total of 14 times in a 333 page book. The theme is the mishandling of the war by the US Government. The following extracts from the final chapter illustrate my point:

. . . Our government was incapable of meeting the challenge. Our generals and diplomats were too ambitious and arrogant. Our uniformed and civilian bureaucracies were rife with internal rivalries and go-it-alone agencies. Our development experts were inept. Our leaders were distracted.

and

For years we dwelled on the limitations of the Afghans. We should have focused on ours.


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## dapaterson (11 Mar 2013)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I am reviving this thread because I just finished the book. Suffice to say the Canadian media made the Hindu Kush out of a molehill. The Canadian presence is mentioned a total of 14 times in a 333 page book. The theme is the mishandling of the war by the US Government. The following extracts from the final chapter illustrate my point:
> 
> . . . Our government was incapable of meeting the challenge. Our generals and diplomats were too ambitious and arrogant. Our uniformed and civilian bureaucracies were rife with internal rivalries and go-it-alone agencies. Our development experts were inept. Our leaders were distracted.
> 
> ...



You sure they're talking about the US in those last two quotes, and not the Canadians?


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## jollyjacktar (11 Mar 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You sure they're talking about the US in those last two quotes, and not the Canadians?


Ouch.  in vino veritas


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## Old Sweat (11 Mar 2013)

For starters, check why the Marines went to Helmund and why they did not report to ISAF. And there is a whole chapter dumping on the Brits that must have the Duke of Wellington rolling over in his grave.


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## The_Falcon (7 Apr 2013)

So it's a good read then ??


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## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2013)

Hatchet Man said:
			
		

> So it's a good read then ??



It is a good general military/political history that focuses on the bigger picture. Reading between the lines, and it is not too difficult, the command and control arrangements in theatre sucked.


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## Ostrozac (7 Apr 2013)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It is a good general military/political history that focuses on the bigger picture. Reading between the lines, and it is not too difficult, the command and control arrangements in theatre sucked.



Oh yeah. That certainly happened. The US Unified Combatant Command system is supposed to be THE cornerstone of how the US fights wars -- but the US kept flip-flopping on whether they wanted Afghanistan to be a Central Command war (and therefore run through Tampa) or a European Command war (and therefore run through NATO). The compromise, where Commander ISAF reported to both chains, wasn't a great one.

And in addition to the NATO/US C2 confusion -- we never did manage to put coalition forces and afghan forces under the same tactical command -- I can't remember seeing ANA units actually being TACON or OPCON to ISAF formations. Or vice versa.


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## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2013)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Oh yeah. That certainly happened. The US Unified Combatant Command system is supposed to be THE cornerstone of how the US fights wars -- but the US kept flip-flopping on whether they wanted Afghanistan to be a Central Command war (and therefore run through Tampa) or a European Command war (and therefore run through NATO). The compromise, where Commander ISAF reported to both chains, wasn't a great one.
> 
> And in addition to the NATO/US C2 confusion -- we never did manage to put coalition forces and afghan forces under the same tactical command -- I can't remember seeing ANA units actually being TACON or OPCON to ISAF formations. Or vice versa.



The national caveats also entered into the equation. Furthermore, as I noted above the USMC established a separate chain of command for its contingent, reporting to a Marine general in Central Command, thus bypassing in theatre commanders.


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## Journeyman (7 Apr 2013)

I noted that this was the consensus in Helmand....


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## Old Sweat (7 Apr 2013)

The arrow could go both ways.


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## Good2Golf (7 Apr 2013)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The arrow could go both ways.



Right to left w, the arrow's text could be "I'm with arrogant, self-important, over-the-hill type."   :nod:

Never let it be said that senior Brits ever thought anything but that they were the 'bee's knees', and that everyone else could still take a few lessons from them.  This from the folks who put their QM on another mountain than their Garrison...well done, POHMs!


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