# Progress in the Army



## Sgt.Mitoff

Oh boy this guy has to watch out, 

http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/1999/terror050199.htm

go to this link and look at what this person is saying about the canadian army he needs to be silenced quicktime!!


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## AmmoTech90

You realize this article is six years old, right?


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## GO!!!

He most certainly does NOT need to be silenced!

Although condescending, he brings up a number of valid points, many of which have been addressed in the time lapse since conception and you finding the article.

Unless there are more civilians pointing out our kit and leadership deficiencies they will not get fixed. We should endeavour to publicise the ones that can be fixed - or things will stay the same.

I would argue that cadets with totalitarian tendencies are more in need of silencing...


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## BDG.CalgHighrs

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Unless there are more civilians pointing out our kit and leadership deficiencies they will not get fixed. We should endeavour to publicise the ones that can be fixed - or things will stay the same.



I agree. He does, however, need to re-evaluate his article, not so much in content but in direction. First off, why fault the troops for something they have no control over? Second, he should evaluate just why the situation was like that, and at the end of the day when you peel it back to the core of the problem, you will find him and 25 million other Canadians who were (and probably in large part still are), at best, indifferent to the CF, and certainly didn't want to see more of their tax dollars going to it.


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## Infanteer

The article had many weak points that really reduced the credibility of the author and made it seem more of a uninformed, penis-envy rant rather than a real analysis of our weaknesses.

The guy talks about the Apache's troop-carrying abilities and brags about the Air-Assault Course, which every American soldier I've talked to agrees is a short score for a badge.  As well, as GO has stated, many of these issues have or are being addressed by the Army (training, NVGs, education, etc, etc).

Other than that, are you just trying to stir the shitpot, Mr Mitoff?  Perhaps you should stick to the Cadet forums....


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## wotan

We don't "silence" people in a democratic country.  We leave that to the Communists, Fascists and assorted tin-pot dictators.

  As for the article, it is a mixture of valid points, distortion and nonsense.  If he feels so badly for the CF, send the government back the money for his university education and ask them to dedicate to the CF.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

OK, going to unlock this one as long as the flaming is done,.......Acorn had a good idea for this thread and here's the direction we will be taking.

Lets have a "where are we now" vs "where we were" - type debate,  could prove very worthy.
Thanks,
Bruce


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## Acorn

First, I agree with the others who observed that the article was flawed at the time it was written, let alone now. However, much has changed in the intervening 6 years, I'd offer not all changes for the better.

I do believe our troops are smart, well trained and motivated - for the most part. Other topics have observed some of the flaws in our trg, especially when it comes to CSS. We still have some way to go. 

I think the "plug-and-play" Army was a mistake, though borne of the desperate situation we were in - overtasked and under-manned something had to be done in order to provide deployable forces. I would argue that the stripping on the Inf of it's combat support elements, and the reduction in firepower and mobility of both the guns and the armour, is a direct result of having to "make do" with what we HAD. I would hope that the future addition of troops and equipment to the Army might reverse that trend, but I have a feeling there is a certain amount of inertia (hearing the Army CWO enthusiastically support the ability of a SAM with limited AT capability to "reach out" to 8 km has led me to believe that some in the heirarchy have bought their own snake oil).

One of the subjects of the article - education - is a good observation, though badly presented. I'm sure some NCMs here are a bit bitter about the changes to the availability of education benefits. Ultimately, we may end up with SrNCOs and WOs with Masters degrees, but not any time soon, and not under the current system. Currently, and rightly, IMO, the funding is geared towards educating the Commissioned Officers (the argument about the need to educate is best for another topic). We have limited resources, and should be concentrating those resources where they're needed: achieving the *MANDATED* educated officer corps, and providing educational opportunities to NCM *where those resources provide a return to the CF*.

In addition to the "where we are" and "where we were" we should probably consider "where we should go."

Acorn


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## GO!!!

In my opinion, we need an "up or out" policy in place to deal with the glut of officers we do have. The fresh blood coming in would have all of the education we require, as long as the proper benefits and comensurate salary were in place. 

The army should be concentrating on attracting the best talent, not trying to create it. 

ie: a 22 year Captain is not doing much to stimulate new thinking and ways of doing things. If his career was on the line, he would probably seek the requisite education to both broaden his horizons and become promotable.

Thoughts?


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## Acorn

In a way I agree. We have little more true benefit retaining a 20 year Capt than a 20 year Cpl. Present pers circumstances have forced the offer of IPS with only short-term benefit to the CF, and potential for long-term harm. It's much like the '90s FRP. Little real vision, and what vision there was could not be supported by the budget allotted. 

I don't think "up or out" is a truly viable answer, though it could be, again, a short-term solution. Certainly we could recruit the material we want though - that doesn't change. it's retention that could become the problem.

One problem I also see is a culture of entitlement. Maybe it's more obvious in the Int Branch, but the idea that "I should be promoted" seems more prominent than it was when I joined as an infanteer some years ago.

Acorn


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## SeaKingTacco

> ie: a 22 year Captain is not doing much to stimulate new thinking and ways of doing things. If his career was on the line, he would probably seek the requisite education to both broaden his horizons and become promotable



Hey- you just called my name!  I am that Captain (well, almost)- I have 20 years in this month and have been a Capt for 14 of those years.

It is not always as simple to "become promotable" as you imply.  I was an Artillery Officer for 9 years.  I sat thru Career manager brief after career manager brief in the mid 90's where the message was "zero promotions to Major this year.  Maybe one next year.  Sorry guys."

How do you "become promotable" in an environment like that?

Finally, I had enough and left the Artillery for the Air Force- not so much for lack of promotions, but that did play a part.  I had a real sense that the work we Captains were doing as a group in developing doctrine, moving things forward and generally holding the place together (being the most numerous officer rank) was distinctly undervalued by the senior Artillery leadership.  At one point, I had one very senior Artillery officer basically dare me to leave the Regiment.  I called his bluff.  About 80 other Captains did too, in a 3 year period.  Ironically, had I hung on, I would have gotten promoted and gotten my Battery Command. Eventually.

The point I'm trying to make is that the price of getting promoted was not worth it to me.  I would have had to become unbelievably careerist and ambitious.  Tell me, GO!, does this sound like what you want in your boss?  Because that is what an up or out system causes- rampant careerism- IMHO.

What I am today is a very happy MH Navigator Captain who has commanded a HELAIRDET on a Frigate.  I also speaks Army, and am able to understand the operational language of the Navy, Air Force and Army (sound handy in today's environment?).  I have friends and contacts in all three services that I regularily call on for favours and advice and vice-versa.  I keep up on doctrine.  I have written my fair share of doctrine. I am an experienced leader (my former subordinates will be the judge of my worth as a leader, however).  I am physically fit.  And I really could not care less if I am ever promoted to Major.  I am having too much fun trying to make the CF a better place- one job at a time.

Under your proposed "kill all of the old Captains" system, I would not exist.

Now, I ask you and the assembled masses here- Does it sound like a good idea to just arbitrarily cut off someone's career after 'X' amount of years, or should we maybe apply some common sense and flexibility and keep our better performers (regardless of rank and years of service)?

Cheers!


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## Bruce Monkhouse

I didn't understand then and I don't understand now, why does the military eat those who are content at being just what they are.
Why is the 20 year Captain doing a good job expenable while the 8 year Captain doing the same good job is the cats rear end?


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## GO!!!

If we had an "up or out" policy there would have been room for you to get promoted as all of those majors above you timed out. 

The main problem with the idea of keeping the better performers as you said, seems to be that anyone with any other aptitude gets out. This is certainly the case in my unit, with most keen men and officers leaving before MCpl and Major, simply because they have better prospects elsewhere. This leaves the careerists and those without civilian prospects. Hardly a common sense solution.

You said it - "eventually I would have gotten a battery" great. Just who I want as an OC. The guy that ground it out to the very end. How about a proven performer who is going places in the Military, and will undoubtedly do good things for your unit when he gets there? This is already happening in my unit, with OCs coming back as COs, to the units great benefit.

We train a massive number of OCdts every year, who see their chances at promotion limited by certain people sitting on the ladder, just like yours were. An up or out system may not be ideal, but it would eliminate the status quo that paralyses our effectiveness.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

Quote,
You said it - "eventually I would have gotten a battery" great. Just who I want as an OC. The guy that ground it out to the very end. How about a proven performer who is going places in the Military, and will undoubtedly do good things for your unit when he gets there? This is already happening in my unit, with OCs coming back as COs, to the units great benefit

RED....I take this as the guy that earned it.
BLUE....hmm, one could say that person would be say,..someone like Belinda Stronach?...I'll go with RED thank you......


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## Gunner

GO!, don't forget that you reasoning applies to both officers and NCMs that "hang around" filling a spot long after their best before date.  Yeah, a lot of very good officer get out as their prospects are much better civilian wise but we do retain some outstanding talent that our system leans upon.


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## Infanteer

Well, I'm not sure if Up or Out is the solution we want - both the United States and the United Kingdom have "Up or Out" systems to some extent, and everything I read about them is negative.

American up or out affects the Officer Corps - the single greatest criticism that I have read is that it promotes careerism by threatening to cut an officer off from advancement (and a pension) if he does not take the steps to ensure his promotion.   This is cited as a primary cause of the "zero defect" mentality that plagues training and leadership.

Donald Vandergriff writes some very good pieces on this topic, including two well regarded books - (one of those "passed over" Major's in the US Army) in which he criticizes the DOPMA (the legislation under which the Up or Out system is enacted) for being based off of a personnel structure suited for 19th century industrialized structures (which he terms Taylorism).   Here are some interesting articles summing up his views:

http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Vandergriff_110603,00.html
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Vandergriff_112503,00.html
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Vandergriff_121003,00.html
http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Vandergriff_122004-P1,00.html

From what I understand, the British also employ an "Up or Out" system to some extent.   A soldier can sign on for a Career engagement, and after that 22 year contract is up, he's done.   I haven't heard glowing remarks about this either.

Certainly, there should be mechanisms to cut away the dead weight and those who are sitting around collecting a cheque.   But "Up or Out" may be throwing the baby out with the bathwater by cutting away the experienced and hard-working soldiers who simply don't have the desire to be a Field Marshal or the CWO of the Canadian Forces.


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## elscotto937

GO, I would be interest to find out where this glut of Captains are, because my unit is short, the Regiment is short and I'm pretty sure most other trades out there could use and find effective employment for trained captains. In fact that rank is what retains the structure of the army, filling very senior jobs and progressing the Army. Also, I would like to see this influx of Ocdts that we are getting every year, they are definately not lined up at the Artillery's door, when there are other trades out there. 
Careerism would run rampant if we managed careers with an up or out mentality...There are some great hard working solders out there come to work everyday lead their soldiers well, are effective on operations, and will only ever be a good Sgt... You would shut this dedicated soldier's career down because, god forbide- he has "normal" potential. 

 Someone, "eventually given command of a battery" is there because he has demonstrated the required leadership and potential to command. Now GO, I suspect that you are unfamiliar with officer career progression, when you stated: "How about a proven performer who is going places in the Military", well that guy that eventually got the battery is the person going places. To be come a senior officer in the Canadian Army, is not as simple as taking a crse and your ready, 8-10 years filling all regimental positions and staff appointments is average of the development of a Captain to Major. I know that I would not want a Sub-unit commander who has 4 or 5 years as a Captain, and was promoted because they did well on a couple of crse and looks great on paper.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

Quote,
and will only ever be a good Sgt...

..I know, extra heavy on the nitpicking Scott, but this is the kind of wording that drives me banana's.
...how about "and is quite content being a good Sgt"? I can't buy any rank being an "only".


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## Haggis

Another drawback of "Up or Out" is that it may drive members up before they are personally ready for it.  Say you have a member who meets the technical/time in/ticket punched pre-requisites for promotion but is not ready for promotion due to his:

1. Personal circumstances (wife has a great civvy job and if he gets promoted he (they) will be posted);
2. Extreme job satisfaction (absolutely loves what he's doing and does it well).

Promoting this member may very well force him out by economic pressure or job dissatisfaction.  Then we lose a valuable and highly contented asset due to a policy which places a members' career progression ahead of his quality of life.  This is not a good return on the investment of thousands of training hours and hundreds of thousands of training dollars.

Some folks are perfectly happy where they are and are quite good at what they do.  Why force them to progress?

Here's a better idea:  Write PERs honestly without fear of hurting someone's itty bitty feelings or making yourself look bad because you rated your 2IC as a "bag of hammers".  If they want to change they will.  If not, an honestly written PER gives you what you need to get them out.


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## tannerthehammer

I believe that the current state of our Army is in an upswing in regards to equiptment, training etc...I think its improving itself but I think they should be more proactive in listening to its soldiers for their input more so then it does...

Doctors are told to listen to their patients right?

Why not ask the guys that are living the life on a day to day basis for their opinions and then let the brass who are nice and comfy in their air conditioned offices with their nice dress call the shots based on their experience/knowledge AND the input of the guys that should matter most...the soldier...

I think we need an army that thinks and listens but not just listens...In addition there is also a time to think and a time to listen but the option should be there...They could even do simple things like surveys and go from there...


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## GO!!!

You will notice that I only applied the "up or out" policy (hypothetically) to the officer corps. As has been well documented in other threads, we have plenty of officers and a shortage of troops. 

My principal problems with the current state of affairs are:
1) Why is my Pl Comd only around for 18 mos before being promoted and replaced? 
2) Ditto for the OC?
3) When someone is recycled back to a unit 3-4 times at the same rank, and fu(ks it up every time, why is he still there?
4) How are we in the units constantly burdened with Captains (primarily) but other ranks too, who bemoan their time there, and dance when they are posted back to Kingston/Ottawa/Toronto? 

These things tell me we have too many officers, with a dearth of placements for them. 

Would it not be more beneficial to keep the management around for 4-6 yrs, in order to properly train (and train with) their unit for war?

And before you launch on how overworked the officers are - when was the last time you saw a unit with a shortage of officers? Was it proportionate to the shortage of men?


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## GOMERPYLE

wotan said:
			
		

> We don't "silence" people in a democratic country.   We leave that to the Communists, Fascists and assorted tin-pot dictators.
> 
> As for the article, it is a mixture of valid points, distortion and nonsense.   If he feels so badly for the CF, send the government back the money for his university education and ask them to dedicate to the CF.



Nice Wo,

very nice, from gromerpyle


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## Teddy Ruxpin

GO!!! said:
			
		

> You will notice that I only applied the "up or out" policy (hypothetically) to the officer corps. As has been well documented in other threads, we have plenty of officers and a shortage of troops.
> 
> My principal problems with the current state of affairs are:
> 1) Why is my Pl Comd only around for 18 mos before being promoted and replaced?
> 2) Ditto for the OC?
> 3) When someone is recycled back to a unit 3-4 times at the same rank, and fu(ks it up every time, why is he still there?
> 4) How are we in the units constantly burdened with Captains (primarily) but other ranks too, who bemoan their time there, and dance when they are posted back to Kingston/Ottawa/Toronto?
> 
> These things tell me we have too many officers, with a dearth of placements for them.
> Would it not be more beneficial to keep the management around for 4-6 yrs, in order to properly train (and train with) their unit for war?
> 
> And before you launch on how overworked the officers are - when was the last time you saw a unit with a shortage of officers? Was it proportionate to the shortage of men?



Once again, you're launching without anything to back you up.  "Dance when they are posted back to Kingston/Ottawa/Toronto"?  Have you lost it?  I have never once, in over 16 years of service, heard an officer prefer a staff job to being with a unit.

Who do you think does all the s**ty staff jobs, who plans all the operations and deployments, who sorts out your training, your exercises, fights for more money and does a million other things - all so you can stay in the battalion and rant and rave about something you obviously have little experience with?

Yes, you've succeeded (again) in pushing one of my buttons.  There are reasons why officers have a more rapid turn over - they are required to.  99% would give their left n*t to be in a unit...count yourself lucky that you'll likely never have to leave it.

End of rant....

TR


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## Infanteer

Although the wires are crossed and I think an "Up or Out" system would lead to negative effects on the personnel system, I think GO!!! gives us a very sound rational for reducing the size of our Officer Corps.

Less Officers could mean fewer accessions and longer commands, which would be an all-around benefit; giving the Officer substantial time to get even more proficiency in his posting, allowing the Officer and the Troops to build deeper cohesion and more familiarity, and generally gives our Officers more time their boots in the mud.  I'm sure no one can find any cause to disagree with this.

Would the Army be able to handle this though?  Would Staff and Planning suffer if we reduced the amount of Officers?  I'm curious to know the ratio of Officers in Command positions:Officers in Staff, Planning, or Training appointments and whether there are ways of reducing this ratio (which would support the above concept) - certainly, much of the literature seems to indicate that this is the path an Information Age force should move to in an effort to get away from slow and clunky heirarchies.

One solution, which was mentioned in the Force Employment Concept, was that SNCO's and WO's will begin to take up more of the burden of Staff work as their Corps evolves.  This may be impossible to do with the current requirements for training required of our Sergeants and our Warrant Officers, but I definitely think that their unique and vital position within an Army can offer this function alot which it may not of benefited from before.


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## KevinB

I actually have seen some of the officer GO! refers to.

 Some seem quite content to hide out away from the BN - doing staff job's getting noticed and doing MIN time in BN.  I do undertand the need for Staff (as opposed to Command) officers - but I do think the system is flawed - for it seems to me as the objective NCO  ;D That officer that do well and are respected by the troops don't do as well as the ones who skip off to some Jammy go and do good staff work - coming back and are out of place/out of touch with the BN.

Can I see a fix - NO.  BUT I dont think that an officer that has 12 months BN duty has learned how to command troops - and despite his PER as a Staff weenie is not going to make a good coy 2I/C (or he might do a good job and be hated) - the he makes a poor OC.  Troops have to know and have faith in their officer corp (from pers experience not how well he did on his Cbt Tm Commanders course).


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## elscotto937

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Quote,
> and will only ever be a good Sgt...
> 
> ..I know, extra heavy on the nitpicking Scott, but this is the kind of wording that drives me banana's.
> ...how about "and is quite content being a good Sgt"? I can't buy any rank being an "only".



Ack.... but you sifted out what I meant


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## Edward Campbell

I do not think we are exceptionally officer/rank heavy.  Others have posted data elsewhere on army.ca which shows that we are fairly middle of the road.

What we do suffer from is _small scale_ which means that, too often, we have _cells_ of two or three officers and maybe one or two NCOs in a HQ where a reasonably sized force would have a unit â â€œ four or five officers and dozens, perhaps even hundreds of NCOs and soldiers.

The senior staff works hard to protect the small _cells_ â â€œ and there were a lot of them when I served â â€œ so that the Canadian Forces can, at least, keep monitoring some important military functions or, better, _'keep the skill alive_.'  The end effect is that many soldiers see an apparent surplus of officers â â€œ usually long in the tooth captains and majors â â€œ in HQ billets.

In some other cases staff functions â â€œ and the officers and senior NCOs who do them â â€œ which should exist in almost every HQ were centralized in one, usually Ottawa, to save on people â â€œ economies of scale.  This, yet again, creates the appearance of a too large national HQ.  The people doing those jobs would rather be dispersed but that would mean even more staff officers.

Finally, officers have to be trained too and, very often, OJT is the only way to do it.  There is, quite simply, no other way to train company, battalion and brigade commanders â â€œ they have to learn on the job as platoon, company and battalion commanders.  In order to have an adequate 'pool' of candidates for battalion, brigade, area and national command _they_ (Hillier and his minions) have to push likely officers through command positions in the field more quickly than anyone, especially the officers concerned, would like.

I think I can speak for the overwhelming majority of army officers when I say I still cherish every hour of every day on regimental duty.  That's where I learned my craft â â€œ the rest (degrees, special courses, staff college and so on) was icing on the cake.  I would, day after day, year after year, have given almost anything â â€œ including giving up promotion â â€œ if it had meant going back to regimental duty.  There was important, valuable, but often deadly dull, demanding, frustrating and tiring work to be done in headquarters and we all had to do (or should have done) our share.  Some of us were rather better at staff work than others, perhaps we were better staff officers than regimental officers â â€œ in any event some of us got 'stuck' in HQ and, at a certain age (about 45, I guess) realized that we were unlikely to become CDS or even an area commander so we buckled down and did the best we could to *serve* the guys who were doing the jobs for which we could only wish.

I can, personally, confirm that a few warrant officers and chief petty officers said similar things to me over the years.  They didn't really like or enjoy HQ duties but they knew they had to be done by someone with the right mix of skill, knowledge, experience and judgement.

That's my take â â€œ prejudiced, I admit.


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## mover1

I read it and I thought wow. But then I realized that it was nearly a decade old. I was in Aviano at the time and we knew our shortcomings. A word to the wise "If you are ever approached by a senior officer and if he asks how is your equipment. DO NOT GIVE HIM THE ANSWER HE WANTS. TELL THE TRUTH AS YOU SEE IT. but only in your own area of responsability. IE if you don't work in ops but are only a lowly forklift driver, do nottalk about ops doing a bad job. 

As well remember WE ARE NOT AMERICA. Just because we are neighbours to a country that at times seems like the annoying Canadian Tire guy. "hey look what I got thats better than yours" Does not mean we have to be a carbon copy of them. A lot of our equipment although in fair lesser numbers than theirs is quite superior.
The US is very different in foreign policy and population. Don't believe everything you read. If we all took responsibility for being the best at what WE do from 9-5 and not worry about what someone else is doing 500 miles away we as an organisation would be thought of as relevant again.


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## Teddy Ruxpin

Edward:

Very, very well said.  

Your post is what I should have said last night, but I was too tired and grumpy.

Cheers,

TR


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## TangoTwoBravo

GO,

You do ask some good questions.   I do not hope to answer all of them but I will try to give some background on officer career progression.   I will describe a typical RCD officer's progression.   Each MOC is a little different, and indeed each Regiment can approach it with variations but I believe that the basics are the same.

An officer will arrive at the Regt for his first tour normally having just completed Ph IV/DP 1.   Depending on his entry program he can range from 2Lt to Capt.   The Capt bit is new and the subject of some debate.   He will spend between two and three years at the Regt during this tour.   He will most likely be a Recce Troop Leader for two years and perhaps serve a third year as a Tpt Officer or Sqn LO.   There are variations.   Again, his promotion to Capt will depend on his entry plan but he will normally get promoted after three years.

He will then get posted on an ERE (Extra Regimentally Employed).   Roughly half go to the School at Gagetown (to be staff) and the other half go RSS at reserve units.   ERE exists for a variety of reasons.   First, the School and the Reserves need young Captains with fresh Regimental experience (more so for the School).   Hopefully, the ERE will also broaden the experience of the officer.

After this three year ERE the Captain may now get posted back to the Regt.   Not all officers get posted back.   A typical "second tour" for an Armoured officer might involve something like Trg O, Sqn Battle Captain (BC), Sqn 2IC and then Adjt/Ops O, 2IC HQ Sqn over a four year period.

The officer will now get posted again, probably to a Bde HQ or some national level organization.  The lucky ones get promoted and some of those get posted back to be  Recce Sqn Comd.  After Sqn Comd (2 years), the Major will get posted again and may well come back after a few years as the CO.

Why all the postings?  In theory we could have an officer stay at the Regt for ten years non-stop and go from Tp Ldr to CO.  One problem would be that that officer would have a very narrow perspective.  Another would be that the rest of the CF (schools, HQs etc) would not benefit from having officers with recent operational experience coming through.  This is debateable, of course, but my point is that it is not the choice of the individual officer on when and where he gets posted.

In my own case I had a short (two year) tour as an Lt at the Regt.  I wasn't happy about this, but there were people coming in behind me and there was a job that needed to be filled.  I had four years as a Tp Ldr in the reserves so perhaps this played a factor.  From the day I left I was campaigning to come back.After coming back for three years I'm about to leave again (for Kingston).  I'd love to stay but you can't be 2IC HQ Sqn forever.  There are "years" of officers who move through together and it is time for me to leave.  Believe me when I say that I want to come back!  I joined to do the things I do at the Regt and I am at my happiest here.

I hope that this gives some perspective on this.

Cheers,

2B


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## GO!!!

While we may be middle of the road in terms of being top heavy, we are falling by the wayside in terms of capabilities - but anyway.

The problem to me seems to be that we are training too many officers in the first place. Several posters have made statements to the effect that "there are other people coming in" and "my time was up". Not their fault, but why were we recruiting people in the first place if they were not required?

Can I have an example of a skill that has been kept alive by staff officers? I'm at a loss - I thought most of these skills resided in the NCO corps (indirect MG fire, pathfinder ops etc.) 

In conclusion, our officer training and retention system seems to rely on the assumption that the rest of the army can be "fleshed out" in the event of war, as long as we keep a large and capable officer corps. Knowing that it takes yrs to train TOW section cdrs and LAV crew cdrs, how has this not been addressed? If anything, it takes longer to train from PteR to Cbt support Cpl, than University grad to 2Lt.

Is anything being done to address this?


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## TangoTwoBravo

GO,

It does indeed take time to train and develop all soldiers in a professional army.  The year or so of army specific training that a new officer gets is just the start.  A Tp Ldr or Pl Comd is just starting his professional development.  To get a staff qualified Captain takes longer.

Staff officers (let's say Captains with the Kingston qualification) do not really keep a specific skill alive for the army such as indirect machinegun fire.  Hopefully what we do keep resident (along with others of varying ranks) is the first level of the operational art.  This includes the various bits of knowledge, training and experience required to have Battalions and Brigades operate (The Operational Planning Process).  You can't just take a university student off the street and make him an Ops O or Bde G3 after a couple of months of training.  There are other organizational skills besides that staff officers acquire through training and experience.  The Army does not function well without a bunch of "staff" keeping things running.  Of course you can have too many staff officers, but I'm not sure that we are there. 

I don't want to get into a circular debate about who is more important or the merits and detractors of the various ranks.  I think that our Army has a good division of labour and there are bigger fish to fry right now.

If you cut back on recruitment for officers you may well end up with "bubbles" later on in the demographics.  This can result in people getting pushed up too quickly to fill the void.  

2B


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## paracowboy

never mind. I am a dumbass.  :-[


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## Bruce Monkhouse

I think we did it pretty good here,
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23230.0.html


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## paracowboy

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> I think we did it pretty good here,
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23230.0.html


uhh, yeah. That'll work.  :-[


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## Bruce Monkhouse

Actually, its a good topic and shouldn't be languishing 6 pages back.


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## 30 for 30

Hi 2Bravo,

Just to clarify, a new subaltern will normally reach the rank of captain after about three years?


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## TangoTwoBravo

RNW,

The plans are all a little different, but for the typical ROTP officer he will be promoted to 2Lt upon graduation from univserity in May (usually before completing MOC training and before he gets to his unit).  Promotion to Lt comes after one year and having completed MOC training.  The standard RMC grad will come to the unit as a 2Lt in August and get promoted to Lt in May of the following year.  Promotion to Capt comes two years after having been a Lt.  So to answer your question, most officers these days get promoted to Capt roughly three years after arriving at their unit.

A DEO officer will be promoted to 2Lt upon completion of BOTC (they already have degree).  Lt won't come until the completion of one year from the date of seniorty (generally enrollment for DEO less LWOP etc) and the completion of MOC training.  Since it can take up to two years to come through the training system he will stay as a 2Lt through training.  Once he finishes Ph IV/DP 1, however, his promotion to Lt should pretty much come automatically (he will have been a 2Lt for at least one year).  As a result, DEO officers tend to get promoted to Capt sooner after arriving at the unit, and it is not uncommon now for some Troop Leaders to be Captains.  Each case is a little different.

I have no idea about specialist officers!

Sorry if this was a little confusing!

2B


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## Infanteer

Ahh...Captain - the gimme (like "Corporal") of the Officer Corps.

Whatever happened to Officer Examinations for Rank?


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## TangoTwoBravo

Promotion exams are sometimes suggested as a cure-all for the CF's ills, but personally I think that they would just lead to a small business in promotion exam study books and would end up being somewhat of a panacea.  What would the exam consist of that is not already covered on OPME, ATOC or AOC?   

Cheers,

2B


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## Infanteer

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Promotion exams are sometimes suggested as a cure-all for the CF's ills, but personally I think that they would just lead to a small business in promotion exam study books and would end up being somewhat of a panacea.   What would the exam consist of that is not already covered on OPME, ATOC or AOC?
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 2B



True, but I think it depends upon the way the exam is given.   If we are just going to plop a multiple choice exam on the table, then yes, you're right, it would be frivolous.

However, perhaps if the exam was more qualitative and forced the Officers to use all the knowledge they've gained from staff and planning, schools (like OPME, ATOC, and AOC) and actual command in order to demonstrate that they have a clear grasp on the rank they've served at and the rank they will be moving onto.   There are many examples from the past (the Prussian/German Army is a notable one) where exams were part and parcel of professional development and served to effectively raise the bar on those who made the cut and those who didn't.

It just seems to me that there is a real difference between a Lieutenant and a Captain (at least, there should be) and that having the rank as a "gimme" takes away from that fact (I know, I know the CO *does* have to sign off on it, but this does not amount to an objective evaluation of performance).

PS: I changed the title of the thread as it was somewhat juvenile and contained spelling errors which does no justice to the fact that it is turning into a fairly decent conversation.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer,

Among junior officers appointment means more than rank, and there is a fairly good system in place to determine appointments.  Before the new armoured officer (and the other branches as well) gets his first go as Troop Leader he has been through a very rigorous training and testing process at the School on CAP and DP 1 (the old Ph II thru IV).  I found my Tp Leading hard assessment traces in Gagetown much harder than any formal exam.  Many fail and never get to a unit.

It does not stop there.  The Sqn OC/BC and the young officer's Tp WO continue to train and develop new Tp Ldr, be he a Captain or a 2Lt.  While there is no formal test for officers departing after their first Regimental tour to see who comes back as a BC, you can bet that the chain of command looks at the officer's performance to date to make that determination.  I don't think that a formal test would add anything that a year or two of close observation in garrison, exercises and operations does not already do.  

To come back as a Sqn Battle Captain you have usually taken ATOC and perhaps even AOC.  To be one of the "big three" (Adjt, Ops O, 2IC HQ Sqn) you should have completed AOC (Kingston) and have been a BC/Sqn 2IC.  To come back an OC you must first get promoted and then take the Combat Team Commander's Course (although I think that they changed the name).

I guess my point is that we already have some rather rigorous "gateways" in place that, in my opinion, do more than a formal exam would.

All this being said, the issue of "instant" Captains is indeed a debateable one, and one often heard in the officer's mess among the Lts.  

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Edward Campbell

I lived through the promotion exam era.

I remember them with distinctly mixed feelings â â€œ those of who wrote (and passed) shared a real sense of accomplishment.  The examinations (Part 1 â â€œ written/theoretical, Part 2A â â€œ 'practical' (a TEWT) which was common to all corps, and Part 2B â â€œ mostly practical which was special to corps) were difficult and, I suppose, they really did 'prove' that those who succeeded could, at least, recite (regurgitate) the _canons_.  They were also hideously expensive â â€œ small battalions of retired colonels had to be recruited every year to mark the written exams and brigades and garrisons ground to a halt every year while senior officers DS'd the Part 2s.

I really do not have a firm grasp of the current system â â€œ my _sense_ of it is that there is a mix of required OPME courses and the _'gates'_ 2Bravo described.  I think those 'gates' are better than the old Part 2 exams.

I think there might be _some_ room for a couple of 'tests' (of some sort) to ensure that all army officers understand (can explain?) those _canons_ (which still exist in some form or another).  Maybe OPME and whatever else does that.  I think OPME, if I understand it (at all, much less correctly) is good for important subjects like Military History and _Modern Great_ type subjects like geography, politics and economics.  I just wonder if we have a good way â â€œ like the Navy's sea command exams â â€œ to ensure that officers really do know the nuts, guts and feathers of administration and logistics as well as _tactical_ or _operational_ principles and until level staff procedures.

I remain convinced that we have got the 'time' wrong.  I think we need to extend the time available to junior officer to 'learn their craft' â â€œ which is, I suggest, best done as a lieutenant so that the captain rank is not, in fact and in the eyes of too many people, a _gimme_.  I would like to see lieutenant lengthened to four, maybe even five years â â€œ with a big pay raise after, say, a couple of years of fully satisfactory service.  Those senior lieutenants (in jobs like Recce Pl Patrol Det commander (are they still officers?), Pioneer Pl Comd and IO) are 'trained' but still being 'seasoned' as officers, I think.  Maybe there isn't 'room' for that any more.


----------



## Infanteer

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> I suppose, they really did prove that those who succeeded could, at least, recite (regurgitate) the _canons_.



I would hope that competitive exams would not be structured in a way that promoted _regurgitation_ as opposed to _thinking_.   If they are, then we were probably not doing something right as they are probably no different than the "multiple choice" exam that I pointed out above as being frivolous.

(This rationale also justified my reasoning for not really studying at all in University - I was pleased with my marks because they were based upon what I learned and not what I remembered.... )

Anyways, the "gateways" 2Bravo alluded to a very real indeed - my only caution is that these gateways may tend to be technical and only cover half the story.   What I'm alluding to with exams is perhaps "higher order" thinking - ie: the Canadian Army espouses the "two levels up" approach to leadership in order to support the notions of "mission command" and "commanders intent" - perhaps potential Captain's should be examined on matters pertaining to unit command, etc, etc.

I'm not saying that the more technical aspects of combat leadership (battle procedure, combat estimate, etc, etc) are any less important because they are indeed vital.   However, I believe that we do need to emphasise "higher order thinking" in the Army, especially the Officer Corps, to ensure that we are maximizing professionalism.   This was valid in the Prussian Army of the 19th century which built its professionalism around the _Kriegsakadamie_ which all other standing Armies attempted to replicate in some form.   It still is valid today; I remember Enfield telling me a story about his University professor who used to do work with the US Executive Branch - during a lecture he recalled that of all the government officials he dealt with, Air Force officers were probably the most impressive people he met because of their combination of real-world military experience (the "technical" side of the profession) along with general intellect (stemming from high US military standards for education, I believe the US Airforce sets the bar even higher in this regard).   To me, it appears that competitive exams may be a way to further this end.

Anyways, there are many different references to competitive exams for promotion.   Some tend to be off the cuff (such as the ones that you alluded to) and some tend to be a little more solid (for example, Martin van Crevald suggests competitive examination as an objective tool for determining who should attend Staff College).   I'm sure with all the military papers, journals and articles out there, someone has explored to concept in greater detail.   I'll look around and see what I can dig up.

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...
> Martin van Crevald suggests competitive examination as an objective tool for determining who should attend Staff College ...
> 
> Cheers,
> Infanteer



In my day - when the earth was still cooling, etc - Capt to Maj exams were also Staff College entrance exams - thus sparing us a third set which had plagued our seniors.


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## TangoTwoBravo

A good, meaty discussion!  Before I paint myself into a corner here I'll say that I am all for having well-educated officers who have earned their ranks/appointments through merit and rigorous training. 

I've had a few exams in my reserve/regular time so far, although none have been "promotion exams."  I'd say that the first few exams were more practical in nature (hard assessments in Gagetown).  These weed out the folks who cannot think on their feet or handle simple tactical problems.

The next one was the old ITC 1 exam.  This multiple choice exam tested all sorts of combat team/battlegroup knowledge.  I did the old ITC(M) course as a reservist in Gagetown.  The "test" there was to conduct an estimate on a TEWT and present to the syndicate.  I'm told that the old FOE exams were harder.

I went to the US Armor School to take their Advanced Course, which qualifies US Captains to be company commanders and perform staff duties.  This had TEWTS, eight hour written estimate exams, CAXs with appointments and a series of knowledge tests.  The Kingston course follows much of the same pattern.

My point is that we have lots of exams already.  OCs and COs also get a pretty good look at their junior officers during training.  The subbies who arrived at the Regt when I came back as a Capt had a pretty challenging couple of years (BTE, op tours).  This was much more rigorous than any staged exam.  I guess we could add an exam for Lt to Capt to make sure that they remember everything, but once again I'm not sure that it would make the newly minted Captains any better as officers. 

I do agree, however, that we should not try to speed up junior officer progression, and we could even slow it down.  The "speed captains" thing is fairly new.  New officers still get at least two years of Troop Leading regardless of promotion to Captain, however, and many get three.

Cheers,

Iain


----------



## aesop081

Gents,

All this talk of examinations got me thinking and i would like to hear people's opinions on this.

In my MOC we have to complete anual category writen examinations as well as practical check rides with standards personel to ensure that we know the theory and practical procedures required to do our job. This applies to ( i beleive) all aircrew MOCs, officers and NCMs alike.

In my previous MOC we had no such system.  This always puzzled me because of the volume of knowledge we were expected to have ( in my case at the QL6A level). I always though that some sort of annual or bi-annual system of  ( at least written) examinations would keep people curent on the information they need to know. Now i am applying this to  the 043 trade but i was currious what others think about it and how it could apply to other trades in general ( not just combat arms).

Could this be beneficial ?


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## Teddy Ruxpin

I'll pop up for a sec, at the risk of steering this (now) excellent discussion off on a tangent...



> The next one was the old ITC 1 exam.  This multiple choice exam tested all sorts of combat team/battlegroup knowledge.  I did the old ITC(M) course as a reservist in Gagetown.  The "test" there was to conduct an estimate on a TEWT and present to the syndicate.  I'm told that the old FOE exams were harder.



They were much harder and their elimination is indicative of how the standard has changed.  FOE, for the uninitiated, consisted of two eight hour written exams - Administration and Tactics.  Both consisted of "short answers", multiple choice and a full written estimate for a battle group.  You did an admin estimate for (in my case - it changed every year) a battle group deliberate attack , then on the Tactics test we did a full written estimate for a battle group in the defence.  I wrote mine in the same session, with one day between, and it nearly killed me!  I learned a helluva lot though...FOE required months of study and you ended up knowing more about (for instance) the medevac system than you ever thought possible!

I honestly believe that doing them made me a better officer, as I got to know - fairly early - about other trades.  We don't (IMHO) do that enough now.

My 2 cents.  I'll now return you to your regular programming.


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## SeaKingTacco

Aesop-  I can speak for the Air Defence Artillery soldiers of the mid-90s.  There was a requirement to pass a aircraft recce exam annually.  One also had to keep up on trainer runs with the Blowpipe and later Javelin, IIRC.  On the field side, I recall while at the 2 RCHA, all of the field gunners writing fire discipline exams at least annually, if not more often.  Not quite a checkride or an semi-annual exam, but better than nothing.

I am a fan of checkrides and fairly frequent exams for the Air Force because we have a fairly large body of knowledge and skills to maintain (I once estimated that to be a Detachment Commander, I had to know cold about 400 pages of regulations and orders and procedures (AOIs/SMG, CADORDs, CFP 100, Wing ords, FLOPS, SHOPS), some of it conflicting, and be able to at least know where to find another 2000-3000 pages of informations (ie all of theTACNOTES). The consequences of not knowing some of the stuff could be serious and could result in loss of life. That said, I don't recommend doing checkrides where it is not warranted.  I lived thru LFCA's Warrior program in the early 90's and while that was a "checkride" of sorts and had some real good intentions, I'm not sure it was really worth all of the pain it caused.  Maybe the Army could consider checking a unit or sub-units skills on an annual basis- at WATC or something like that.  Checking each individual soldier on all of his skills each year would be a major logistical nightmare.  The flying portion of the Air Force is much smaller than the Army and it can still be a challenge every year to get all of the Checkrides done.

Promotion exams-  Not sure about this.  I do not like "gimmee ranks" at any level.  This is a constant irritant to me where we use a rank system to reward financially those with a higher level of education (in the case of DEO Officers).  Couldn't we just pay DEO Officers more, but keep them as 2Lts for the appropriate amount of time rather than jumping them straight to Capt?  
As for qualifying people for ranks- I think the best way is to use the various course already in place as the gates for promotion- ie you aren't eligible for a given rank until you pass all of your course, be it specific to your branch or OPME, whatever.

Infanteer- as an Artillery Officer, I actually learned my trade "3 or 4 up", not "2 up".  Most Capts in the Artillery attend the Artillery Staff Duties course.  This misleadingly titled course actually teaches the Artillery Battle up to the Divisional/Corps level. I played the part of the CDA (a BGen) for the final ex- it was one of the best courses that I ever attended.  I also attended the Battery Commander's Course where one has to learn the CO's job in order to be an effective BC.  Good training!  My point is that, at least on the officer side, the trg is (was) in good shape to develop Captains well beyond what they would be developed in almost any other Army in the world.  This was borne out to me when a I went to Ft Bliss Texas in 1997 at the end of my Instructor-in-Gunnery Course.  We were given a scenario in their Janus down there where we (8 Capts) had to plan and execute a Bde advance to contact and assault on a dug in MRB in about 1 hour.  We were so well trained and drilled at that point that we appointed a Bde Comd and all of the unit COs out of our Course, did a 15 minute estimate, gave orders and executed the battle.  We won- much to the astonishment of the American Staff who viewed this particular scenario as "unwinnable".

Cheers!


----------



## aesop081

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Aesop-   I can speak for the Air Defence Artillery soldiers of the mid-90s.   There was a requirement to pass a aircraft recce exam annually.   One also had to keep up on trainer runs with the Blowpipe and later Javelin, IIRC.   On the field side, I recall while at the 2 RCHA, all of the field gunners writing fire discipline exams at least annually, if not more often.   Not quite a checkride or an semi-annual exam, but better than nothing.
> 
> I am a fan of checkrides and fairly frequent exams for the Air Force because we have a fairly large body of knowledge and skills to maintain (I once estimated that to be a Detachment Commander, I had to know cold about 400 pages of regulations and orders and procedures (AOIs/SMG, CADORDs, CFP 100, Wing ords, FLOPS, SHOPS), some of it conflicting, and be able to at least know where to find another 2000-3000 pages of informations (ie all of theTACNOTES). The consequences of not knowing some of the stuff could be serious and could result in loss of life. That said, I don't recommend doing checkrides where it is not warranted.   I lived thru LFCA's Warrior program in the early 90's and while that was a "checkride" of sorts and had some real good intentions, I'm not sure it was really worth all of the pain it caused.   Maybe the Army could consider checking a unit or sub-units skills on an annual basis- at WATC or something like that.   Checking each individual soldier on all of his skills each year would be a major logistical nightmare.   The flying portion of the Air Force is much smaller than the Army and it can still be a challenge every year to get all of the Checkrides done.



Agreed. I also suffered the years of the LFCA warrior program.  Good idea, bad execution IMHO. I realise that a type of "checkride" would be a logistical problem for the army on an individual basis but written exams would not be that difficult to administer.  If anything they would force individuals to keep up on the knowledge that they gained on  career courses and force them back into the pubs.  I often found that after some time, individuals do not retain what they were taught on course.  Would a regular system of written test not help keep everyone current as to what they need to know.  I realise that this does nothing for practical skills, thats a whole other bag of tricks, but i certainly think it could not hurt


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## TangoTwoBravo

The IBTS tests are a good concept, although it is about as dry as a bowl of sand in its usual iteration.  In my militia days we had an annual Worthington competition to test a broad range of skills across several rank levels.  If annual refresher training for basic skills can be disguised as something else it can be a little more interesting.  We had a "Cav Cup" competition here at the Regt last year.  It tested a whole range of skills from weapons handling up to Tp Level recce tactics in a Sqn setting.

Going back to promotion exams, John English certainly came out in favour of them in Lament for an Army.  The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism.  This book was written at the nadir of the Army's esteem in the 90s.  LCol English puts much of the blame for the "professional regression" in the officer corps to the termination of army qualification exams in 1966.  My take is that he sees problems with a system by which COs judge the merit of their officers on their own and he prefers having a "check" of some kind administered by a General Staff.  The Regimental system, for all its merits, can have the evil of trying to push promising officers too fast in an effort to produce generals for the Regt.  I can see how exams might mitigate favouritism.

This book makes many good points and I read it intently as a subbie when it came out.  While I found it somewhat galvanizing, at the time I found the focus on promotion exams somewhat strange.  I think that there was more than a lack of promotion exams that lead to the morale crisis in the 90s, and that it would take more than exams to fix the problem.  Will exams be able to test for ethics?  How does an exam test leadership? 

Having a General Staff outside of the Regimental system is certainly an interesting idea, and that may have more real impact than a promotion test.  I personally think that some officers make outstanding staff officers but not so great regimental officers.  The inverse is often true as well.  Recognizing this early on and putting people where their talents lay might have some benefit.

Cheers,

Iain


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## a_majoor

The ideal result of all this is we want Captains (and all the other ranks) to be adept, well versed in their jobs, cut a dashing figure in uniform, be irresistible to the opposite sex and generally be superlative human beings. 

Testing is a nice to have, but it is possible to "cram" or set up some sort of "boot camp" to ensure the testee has the best possible chance of passing the test, without actually making a better candidate. We also have all experienced "book smart" people who can quote at endless length from pubs and manuals, but would be hopeless as actual leaders. To use the latest buzz words, what we are really looking for is people who have integrated "data" and "information" into "knowledge". Since what we want is the knowledge of arms, the best way to test people is through "free play" exercises where they have to use their knowledge and experience to achieve definable goals, similar to the US Army's use of the national test centre or our eventual use of the MTC in Wainwright. Since this is bound to be rather expensive, JANUS and J-CATS simulations should also be considered as a medium for testing, and a real test against a determined, free play enemy rather than some "set" scenario where the red team conveniently drives into the KZ so the hot wash up is finished by 1800. If you don't know your stuff, or get unhinged under stress, it becomes appallingly obvious, but only electrons are getting killed.

My two cents.


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## Infanteer

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The ideal result of all this is we want Captains (and all the other ranks) to be adept, well versed in their jobs, cut a dashing figure in uniform, be irresistible to the opposite sex and generally be superlative human beings.



Funny, I had that on my PER once.... 8)



> Since what we want is the knowledge of arms, the best way to test people is through "free play" exercises where they have to use their knowledge and experience to achieve definable goals, similar to the US Army's use of the national test centre or our eventual use of the MTC in Wainwright.



All the better examples of proposals for exams include free play exercises in some way, shape or form.


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## pbi

I came up under the system of professional exams and I am not at all certain that they had much lasting value once you walked out of the exam room. I wrote both FOEs (Ops and Admin), passing both (one with honours). I read every single manual in the study list (you were issued- -literally--boxes of them), and I did a pre-exam review and study process on my own, religiously.

In retrospect, the great majority of what I stuffed into my head was of little value to begin with. Certainly, within a day or so of the exam, I had forgotten most of it. These exams were based on the typical view of officer training in that era: that the brain was really an info warehouse rather than a thinking device. It was considered very important to know the "what", ad nauseam, with a much lesser requirement to demonstrate proficiency in "how". The brain was to be stuffed with data: lists of principles, tables of factors, how many water trailers in the Corps Support Command. You could see this same paradigm in staff college and in the Infantry School.

As for the assertion that the old exams made us somehow "more professional": I disagree completely. That is, in my opinion, a fairly shallow appreciation of what professionalism is. The same officer corps that English appears to laud for its "professionalism" suffered IMHO with some very serious issues concerning ethics and morals and true respect for military professional education as opposed to brain-stuffing. Many officers did not IMHO take FOEs seriously, and even fewer took the "purple" OPDP program seriously. We didn't engage in these exams to learn-we engaged in them because we had to.The bare minimum effort to pass was made in most cases. Are we better as an Officer Corps in that regard today? I am not 100% certain, but I do believe that as an Army we now have a much greater respect for true learning, for professional development and for the intellectual side of our profession than we did then.

Today, (and for years now) I don't even have manuals in my office: my bookshelf contains professional reading stuff. If I take over an office that has manuals on the shelf, I get rid of them. If I really need to get hold of some crunchy factoid, as opposed to understanding a situation, I will go to a manual or on-line source, or better yet ask the guy who really knows. I would certainly never bother trying to memorize data, as our old system seemed to encouraged. I am paid to think, to reason, to develop solutions amd courses of action, then to see that they are implemented. I am paid to understand and apply commander's intent, to provide some kind of leadership role model, and to manage crises (hopefully before they explode with alligators all over the place...)

Do we need some quantifiable way of testing our leaders? Yes, definitely. I am all for the recent changes in our training system, as long as we remember what it is we are trying to do and don't fall into the "checklist" mentality that bedevilled the US Army in the days of ARTEP that preceded NTC. Simulation being, I agree, a great tool in this process, and one that in some ways can be made far more demanding we could ever afford to make an FTX at a comparable level. I would design a system that places much more emphasis on effective results within commander's intent, and much less on brain-stuffing or rote responses, The factoids should not be ends in themselves: they should be utilized in the development of effective results which are then demonstrated in a very visible and practical way, as opposed to sitting a four hour exam.

Cheers


----------



## Edward Campbell

2Bravo said: _â Å“... English certainly came out in favour of them _(exams)_ in Lament for an Army.  The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism.  This book was written at the nadir of the Army's esteem in the 90s.  LCol English puts much of the blame for the "professional regression" in the officer corps to the termination of army qualification exams in 1966.  My take is that he sees problems with a system by which COs judge the merit of their officers on their own and he prefers having a "check" of some kind administered by a General Staff.  The Regimental system, for all its merits, can have the evil of trying to push promising officers too fast in an effort to produce generals for the Regt.  I can see how exams might mitigate favouritism.â ?_

I have talked around this issue before, but 2Bravo gets to the root of one of my major concerns when he talks about that: _â Å“...evil of trying to push promising officers too fast in an effort to produce generals for the Regt.â ?_

Exams or lack of same are not the problem and I disagree with Jack English on their overall utility (but I agree they do _check_ the CO's views â â€œ I was a CO, too and I am only too well aware of the fact that they have blind spots and prejudices and, being totally human, can practice favouritism â â€œ even without really understanding it themselves).

We, that great big 'we' which goes all the way back to around 1947, devised systems which _reward_ services, branches, corps and regiments which can _featherbed_.  My own _bête noir_ remains the decision to put all air crew in the air force â â€œ there was never one tiny scintilla of an operational requirement for this and the _common training and logistics_ argument was always weak and never rested on anything like hard data.  It was _featherbedding_, pure and simple â â€œ on a par with having firemen in diesel locomotives.  The goal was to keep the air force numbers up â â€œ guaranteeing them a large share of the senior billets.  We, in the army, did it to ourselves when we decided that operational effectiveness â â€œ as influenced by unit cohesion and manning (personnel) flexibility â â€œ should be sacrificed on the alter of the gunners' cap badge.

We all take intense and justifiable pride in our individual regiments, branches and services and the men and women serving continue, in 99.9% of the cases, to give us just cause for that pride.  It is only natural that we would want to preserve and promote our regiment's _positions_ in the military â â€œ especially at the senior rank levels.  We, my generation, were willing, too willing, too often to put obstacles in the path of a pure merit system in order to advance the interests of our regiment or branch or service; I plead guilty as charged.  In mitigation I offer that I was following the herd â â€œ there were a few voices in the wilderness back in the '80s and '90s but most of us _played the game_ even as we decried the effect of it on our armed forces.

Somehow, it seems to me, we have to make merit more important in selection for senior appointments (commands above regiment/battalion and all senior staff appointments).  It creates a huge risk: we might end up with no artillery generals (that actually happened back in the late '70s, if memory serves â â€œ no gunners above brigadier, no engineers and signals above colonel â â€œ _something like that_) or, even more shocking, no R22R generals.  The cap badge politics is both fierce and bloody when those sorts of situations obtain.

Worse is the PML (do they still call it that?  Permissive Manning Levels) which _reward_ branches (with a certain number of branch specific senior appointments) for sheer numbers.  There were (15+ years ago) too many Director of Aerospace This and Director of Land That and a top heavy personnel _management_ bureaucracy designed, I am convinced, to guarantee a certain number of 'tied' (to cap badge) four stripe positions â â€œ which means enhanced opportunities for _entrée_ into the flag/general officer ranks - for various groups.

<end another rant>


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I enjoy free-play exercises (JANUS, JCATS, SIMNET, MILES), but if we fired officers for bad results in them I would have been summed up a long time ago.   I've had Tps and Sqns get blown up spectacularily, and I've also had some pretty cool victories.   Sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you.   As long as we learn and apply lessons then the simulations are achieving their objectives.   A zero-defect mentality from these will lead to a risk-averse officer corps.

You can also learn some weird lessons from free-play scenarios.   In JANUS, indirect fire ruled and dug-in tanks were invulnerable to direct fire.   I "learned" as a Tp Ldr that if I fired indirect 105mm HESH from my tanks I could knock out dug-in T72s.   Did it work?   Hell yes.   Was it realistic?   I don't think so.    In SIMNET we "learned" to fight our tanks from woodlines, since we could fire from the edges and move around inside the woods at speed (the computer made woods like a big circus tent).

Helmets on.

Now, I've been thinking and we could do more at the Lt level.   When I was an Lt, our Bde Comd gave the subbies a day to run the JANUS exercise.   We were put in teams of three (one Armd Lt, one Inf Lt, one Arty Lt in each) and pitted against each other with square combat teams on a map of Suffield.   The objective was to destroy the enemy CP, which could only be in a small "goal" area in the opposing teams start line.   You could only kill the CP with direct fire.

Most teams opted for having the infantry guard the CP and send the tanks down a "board edge" to kill the CP.   Most "runs" were a revolving door, with both CPs destroyed and victory going to the fastest team.   Since the infantry could not dig-in the tank sqns could pretty much mow through them in the open.   Our solution was a little different.   We sought a meeting engagement with the aim of destroying the enemy's ability to destroy our CP.   We could then hunt down the enemy CP at our leisure.   We used our Coyotes and Leopards as bait.   We advanced with recce and tanks, found the enemy armour and promptly retreated.   The enemy Sqn chased our tanks right into the four TOW that had been following up behind.   With the enemy Leopards destroyed by our TOW we unleashed our own Leopards into a Platoon of LAV IIIs.   Our own arty focused on the enemy TOW.   We then tracked down the enemy CP and destroyed it.   Our own CP was never in danger.

We took some flak for seeking a meeting engagement, but I felt that the results spoke for themselves.   We tried something different and it did not end our careers.   If our careers had been on the line we might have taken a more standard solution.   Something like this might be a good exercise for Lts to take before becoming Captains but not as a "pass/fail."    Use it as a way to show how the different arms interact.   Give the Lts several "runs" of the simulation and have good AARs between each.   Give them the freedom to lose as long as they take the thing seriously and apply lessons learned.

Sorry, enough war stories...Helmets off.

2B


----------



## Jed

Edward C.   - Roger that ! I appreciate your well expressed view point wrt to over the hill officers etc. This perspective does not come out very often as the younger hard chargers often see things from their current line of site. A few hard years generally brings people around !


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Edward,

Outstanding post.  I guess we were writing at the same time.  My JANUS bit looks a little silly after yours!

I can see how having higher rank positions tied to branches and regiments can lead to problems.  Branch and capbadge parochialism are problems that I see from time to time.  Perhaps it is partially a function of the competition for resources (and roles) that the CF engages in.  I think that Unification just hid the battles.   My impression is that the Regimental system came under attack in the 60s, and perhaps the extremes of regimental behaviour were the result of a siege mentality.  

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Haggis

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Branch and capbadge parochialism are problems that I see from time to time.



Perhaps this was part of the catalyst behind the fairly recent conversion of all Bde Comds and Sgts Maj to "vanilla" cap badges? Good idea IMO.  No perceived favouritism or bias based on first glances.


----------



## Spctr

I am going to be attending BMQ this summer, so I am zero experience and all of what I will be saying is based entirely on my own opinions of what I have read/seen.  So please forgive me if I am way out to lunch.

I am joining with the intention of making a career out of the forces.  Unlike most of the new generation, I have no patience with switching job careers/companies 4 or 5 times in my life.  I have a family and I want to ensure that my job has long-term security.  That was a factor in my joining the forces, job security and also I have a deep sense of pride in being Canadian and want to contribute to my country in a more concrete way than by working in the "Business" world where loyalty to country doesn't play a part at all.  As a result of all this, I am unlike the average new recruit who seems to have the impression of joining because of what the forces can give them, and not what I can do for the forces.

Anyways, that's my background for why I am joining, now onto my larger concern, promotion and advancement.  I am firmly of the opinion that a promotion should be based on merit.  I do not want to be promoted unless I have proven, time and time again, that I have the skills/training/ambition to do the job properly.  This means that someone will go has far up the ladder as he/she wants to, through demonstrating the skills and ambition for the respective position they want to remain at or pursue.  I believe that if someone does a good job at being a Captain, but doesn't want to move any further (due to politics, job, etc.) then that should be an option, with one condition.  As long as that Captain demonstrates time and time again that he is effective at his job.  I am going to be NCM so in my case I do not want to become a Corporal just because it is a "gimme" rank, I want to learn and develop the necessary skills before that promotion comes up.  I also want to be continually evaluated and encouraged to improve, even if that improvement is simply in becoming better at doing my current ranks job, a better Corporal/Private, etc.  

Ok, if you even understood half what I wrote, good for you!   

Basically, I have a motto of "Continuous Improvement."  Meaning, even if I get to the rank of Corporal and stay there for 10 years, at the end of 10 years I will be an outstanding Corporal because each year I have added to my abilities/knowledge and skills, I hate the idea of not improving myself either professionally or personally on a continual basis.  There always needs to be a goal to strive for, better education, higher rank, personal goals, etc.  Without some kind of ambition, a person will end up being a mediocre person, not living up to his/her potential, ultimately ending up unsatisfied/unhappy.  Now just in case I didn't make this clear enough, the length of time in a position does not indicate ambition/goals, someone in a single position can always strive to become better in that same position always.

Still with me?

Finally, as a new recruit, what can I look forward to as far as evaluation and advancement is concerned.  From what I am reading here, some of the earlier promotions happen almost automatically, and as far as the higher levels, is there any kind of stronger motivation than money?  What kind of encouragement can I expect at the lower end for improvement/advancement?  From what I hear, it doesn't seem like there really is a lot of motivation to get a promotion except money, and no real standard beyond a CO's "feeling" for a member's performance.  I understand a little of this as I am in charge of promoting/hiring/firing people at my company, and when a promotion or hiring is based on feeling or 1 persons opinion, too often it turns out to be a mistake. 

Anyways, this isn't a criticism as such, since I have no experience with which to draw upon, but more of a concern in my future career, is there effective evaluations and encouragement throughout a military career to improve oneself, as well as opportunity to prove oneself's abilities and skills?

Thank you for your patience with a lowly recruit.


----------



## KevinB

Spctr said:
			
		

> I am going to be attending BMQ this summer, so I am zero experience and all of what I will be saying is based entirely on my own opinions of what I have read/seen.   So please forgive me if I am way out to lunch.



Reg or reserve - I will jump to the assumption it is reg from you next comments



> I am joining with the intention of making a career out of the forces.   Unlike most of the new generation, I have no patience with switching job careers/companies 4 or 5 times in my life.   I have a family and I want to ensure that my job has long-term security.   That was a factor in my joining the forces, job security and also I have a deep sense of pride in being Canadian and want to contribute to my country in a more concrete way than by working in the "Business" world where loyalty to country doesn't play a part at all.   As a result of all this, I am unlike the average new recruit who seems to have the impression of joining because of what the forces can give them, and not what I can do for the forces.


   In a way with the job security - you are joining for what it gives you...   
   I believe most people join the CF (maybe I am naive) with a goal of serving Canada



> Anyways, that's my background for why I am joining, now onto my larger concern, promotion and advancement.   I am firmly of the opinion that a promotion should be based on merit.   I do not want to be promoted unless I have proven, time and time again, that I have the skills/training/ambition to do the job properly.   This means that someone will go has far up the ladder as he/she wants to, through demonstrating the skills and ambition for the respective position they want to remain at or pursue.   I believe that if someone does a good job at being a Captain, but doesn't want to move any further (due to politics, job, etc.) then that should be an option, with one condition.   As long as that Captain demonstrates time and time again that he is effective at his job.   I am going to be NCM so in my case I do not want to become a Corporal just because it is a "gimme" rank, I want to learn and develop the necessary skills before that promotion comes up.   I also want to be continually evaluated and encouraged to improve, even if that improvement is simply in becoming better at doing my current ranks job, a better Corporal/Private, etc.
> 
> Ok, if you even understood half what I wrote, good for you!



Cpl is a gimme rank at 4 years   - BUT just cause it is a gimme does not mean you can't strive to earn it and excel at your job.



> Basically, I have a motto of "Continuous Improvement."   Meaning, even if I get to the rank of Corporal and stay there for 10 years, at the end of 10 years I will be an outstanding Corporal because each year I have added to my abilities/knowledge and skills, I hate the idea of not improving myself either professionally or personally on a continual basis.   There always needs to be a goal to strive for, better education, higher rank, personal goals, etc.   Without some kind of ambition, a person will end up being a mediocre person, not living up to his/her potential, ultimately ending up unsatisfied/unhappy.   Now just in case I didn't make this clear enough, the length of time in a position does not indicate ambition/goals, someone in a single position can always strive to become better in that same position always.
> 
> Still with me?



 FWIW I agree with you I am a CPL (4) [max incentive - I kinda liked the idea of CPL (10) but no one else went along]   I tend to beleive that I am a VERY strong CPL (my PER's bear that out skillwise - we won't go into allegations my conduct...) 



> Finally, as a new recruit, what can I look forward to as far as evaluation and advancement is concerned.   From what I am reading here, some of the earlier promotions happen almost automatically, and as far as the higher levels, is there any kind of stronger motivation than money?   What kind of encouragement can I expect at the lower end for improvement/advancement?   From what I hear, it doesn't seem like there really is a lot of motivation to get a promotion except money, and no real standard beyond a CO's "feeling" for a member's performance.   I understand a little of this as I am in charge of promoting/hiring/firing people at my company, and when a promotion or hiring is based on feeling or 1 persons opinion, too often it turns out to be a mistake.
> 
> Anyways, this isn't a criticism as such, since I have no experience with which to draw upon, but more of a concern in my future career, is there effective evaluations and encouragement throughout a military career to improve oneself, as well as opportunity to prove oneself's abilities and skills?
> 
> Thank you for your patience with a lowly recruit.



 Promotion to CPL can be held back if the CO (thru the chain can justify it -- I've seen it done, although the member eventually did get it 1.5yrs later than time woudl dictate)
 My advice for a young recruit would be to consentrate on getting through his courses and get posted to a unit.   Once you are in a unit you can truly start learning and mastering your craft.   Senior Cpl's, M/Cpl' and Sgt's have a duty to mentor the junior members (though this seems to be forgotten these days)   Depending upon your trade there may be extracurricular training that you can take to excel at your job.

 Secondly I advise EVERYONE to take their JNCO and get promoted with their peers -- NO ONE likes a bitter old Cpl who feels (and is perhaps justified given courses, and training time) that he can runs things better than some of his NCO's and offciers...

As for that promotion beyond the rank of Cpl - you are meritted in with your peers - CO's discretion is not specific (although he could ensure you are not high on the merit listings, but odds are the CO would not be alone and you would not be high on the merit list anyway)  Is the system perfect - definitely not - but I am unsure how to fix it...

Just my $0.02


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## Scoobie Newbie

"I believe most people join the CF (maybe I am naive) with a goal of serving Canada"
I think you may be a bit.

I have heard from quite a few Jacks who wish they hadn't bothered with the course to get promoted.   To each his own I guess.


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## GO!!!

Spctr said:
			
		

> I am unlike the average new recruit who seems to have the impression of joining because of what the forces can give them, and not what I can do for the forces.Anyways, that's my background for why I am joining, now onto my larger concern, promotion and advancement.



So you are joining because you are unlike everyone else, and only for what you can do for the nation/forces etc. Except your primary concern is promotion and advancement....

With logic like that - you are going places!


----------



## Spctr

GO!!! said:
			
		

> So you are joining because you are unlike everyone else, and only for what you can do for the nation/forces etc. Except your primary concern is promotion and advancement....
> 
> With logic like that - you are going places!



Hmm, put that way it does sound a bit off... 

I guess I should rephrase what I meant.  Most of the potential army recruits that I have talked to, as well as a few of those who have been in and come out (admittedly my sphere of influence/aquantances is small) I have observed a trend.  It may not be reflective of the majority, but simply only in those that I have seen.  When I say what they can get from the army, I mean they want the free medical, free education, the cheap rations/housing while being trained, and then get out after the first contract to go into the civilian world.  This seems to be consensus as to what the military is for, learning a trade then leaving to exercise that trade in the civilian world, no loyalty for the country/people who trained you.  I can't believe how many people are surprised when I tell them that I am going for a career in the forces, most everyone I told to (family, friends, fellow workers, etc.) all assumed that I would join, learn my trade then leave.  That, in my opinion, is entering the army without thinking about actually serving, I believe it is a self-centered concept.  

In contrast, I believe that someone who is willing and able to put in the full career, or even 10 years, is thinking less about what he/she can get out of the military, but more on what he/she can contribute to the forces.  I say this because if I stayed in the civilian world, I would make more money, have better benefits, easier job, etc.  I have all that stuff right now and am willing to give it up in order to serve my country.  Do I look forward to advancement and promotion, yes, would I still join if there was no advancement/promotions, yes.  I consider advancement/benefits, etc to be perks, not necessarily job requirements. 

Hope that explains my view a little clearer.  I just don't like the idea of the forces simply being a trades training ground for people who ultimately don't care about the country or serving it.  Hopefully, this is only common in my small area of knowledge, and not actually indicative of recruitment in general.

Thanks for listening.


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## KevinB

I think you are over thinking it.

For me I find the military gets in your blood - you need it like air  it is you (corny I know maybe I just lost my identity after my divorce and adopted the Army)

 I think some people join with a 3 year intent and some join with life long dreams - however neither survive 100% in contact with military reality.  Some will ove it and re-sign - some will hate it and get the F out as soon as they can.  Everyone is impacted differently and it totally can also depend upon what unit you go to - and what they are doing for that three years, and how you are employed.

A year ago I would have said I would have done another 10years - today - I'd be out tomorrow if I could.


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## Scoobie Newbie

And who knows in a year.


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## Edward Campbell

KevinB said:
			
		

> ... some people join with a 3 year intent ...   Everyone is impacted differently and it totally can also depend upon what unit you go to - and what they are doing for that three years, and how you are employed...



Kevin is dead on target, Spctr, you are over thinking it.

I joined, as a private soldier in The Royal Canadian Regiment, for a bit of a lark, maybe a bit of adventure, and as a bit of late adolescent rebellion - to avoid making a _serious_ long term life/career decision.   My firm plan on enrolment was to leave after three years.   I discovered, to my surprise, that I really liked the army and, more amazing, it liked me.   To make a long story short, when I retired, as a fairly senior officer, after nearly 37 years of service it was with very, very few regrets about what the army had done for (and, now and again, to) me and a few more regrets that I had not done more for the army.

There were some would-be career soldiers in my recruit platoon - I don't recall that many served 20 or more years.

Welcome to _our family_ Spctr.   Do your best.   Work hard. Have fun. If you like being a soldier and if you're a good soldier then, by all means, stay in and make it a career; if you don't like it or if it doesn't like you then leave with no ill will and no bad feelings.   Don't worry the thing to death before you start.


----------



## GO!!!

Spctr,

Sorry if I misread you. I have a suggestion though. Print off a copy of this thread until this point and put it somewhere safe, and in 2.5 years, when you are up for re-engagement, read it over and see if the forces was everything you hoped it would be. 

I'm a bit of a cynic, but I expect your patriotic fervor will have cooled a bit by then. 

No - one here can tell you the "right"reasons for joining, but you are in for a letdown if you go in with stars in your eyes. I don't know a single man in my whole company (100 men) who is sure he is sticking around for at least 20 yrs. They know what it is like, and given the choice, many would have organised their careers differently if they could do it again. 

The attitude that you see, that of people wanting a trade which can be used in the civilian world is a good one. The army needs people like that, because it provides turnover and incentives for better pay and further training to keep the army on the cutting edge. The "lifers' are'nt always the most motivated people in a unit, having job security and a pension in the future. The guys who want to keep civilian qualifications are the ones who are committed to changing things for the better.

Anyhoo, you'll see for yourself, good luck!


----------



## Gunner

GO!!!

That was probably the best posting I have ever read from you - it was concise, intelligent and had a point.  Try to keep your other posts in the same vein and you will "GO" far.

Cheers


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## Spctr

Thank you all for some good advice, I have often been told that I "over-think" too much.    :-\

I may just take your advice GO!!! and print out this thread, overall it has been very good.  Perhaps as you say,
in a few years my patriotism and idealism will have dulled, but then again, I have been out of school and in the
civilian workforce for over 10 years now and I am still as idealistic as when I started, perhaps owing to my sheer 
stubborness, things can always improve, even if it takes 10 to 20 years...     ;D

I could try to explain my position on the general lack of commitment that our society as a whole seems to lean towards
nowadays, but I think that this threads topic is starting to stray too much, so to bring it back on topic I want to pose
a question to those who have been in the forces for a good number of years and can answer from experience:

Which would be better, a lot of incompetent officers who were pushed ,before they were ready, into a rank, or a few
excellent officers who proved themselves to be ready, willing, and able to fill the ranks?  

Also, most of this thread has concerned itself about the officer side of the forces, is there a similar problem on the NCM side?

Thanks again for all the good comments,


----------



## mdh

> A year ago I would have said I would have done another 10years - today - I'd be out tomorrow if I could.



KevinB,

If you don't mind me asking - why the disenchantment?? I would have thought with the proposed expansion of the CF - especially army - that there would be inducements to stay?  ???

cheers, mdh


----------



## Infanteer

mdh said:
			
		

> KevinB,
> 
> If you don't mind me asking - why the disenchantment?? I would have thought with the proposed expansion of the CF - especially army - that there would be inducements to stay?   ???
> 
> cheers, mdh



Oh, if you only knew what Kevin has to say.... ^-^


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Spctr said:
			
		

> Also, most of this thread has concerned itself about the officer side of the forces, is there a similar problem on the NCM side?



At the risk of stirring the pot  ;D I believe there is a similar problem on the NCM side.  For every 15-year Captain dragged kicking and screaming back to a unit, there are three unpromotable Cpls who have "turned down" leadership training, is difficult to post, is "broken", is "reluctant" to deploy overseas, or (because they can't be trusted to do anything else) is best employed sweeping the hanger floor.  Don't believe me?  Have a look at the sick, lame and lazy populating some of the less "operational" postings.

My point is:  floppers (that's the army nickname for people of dubious use) exist at all levels.  I've seen flopper infantry soldiers, clerks, senior NCOs, junior officers, senior officers and, yes, general officers (Mo Baril, one step forward!   ) - regulars and reservists.  They exist for a variety of reasons, in part because the CF is so short-handed that we're reluctant to let people go for fear of not getting a replacement.  We're also reluctant (IMHO) to evaluate people properly - partially out of fear of the complaint system(s).  All too often, personnel are given inflated assessments which do no one any good.  The result?  They stick around forever, are given positions of deceasing responsibility and eventually end up in some comfortable niche somewhere, filling a slot.  Is it wrong?  Yes, but as I said, we're so short in some areas that sometimes having a weak guy available to operate the gate to the range is better than taking a good soldier right out of a battalion.  Ideally, the two are interchangable, but in our tiny army they're often not.


----------



## KevinB

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> At the risk of stirring the pot   ;D I believe there is a similar problem on the NCM side.   For every 15-year Captain dragged kicking and screaming back to a unit, there are three unpromotable Cpls who have "turned down" leadership training, is difficult to post, is "broken", is "reluctant" to deploy overseas, or (because they can't be trusted to do anything else) is best employed sweeping the hanger floor.   Don't believe me?   Have a look at the sick, lame and lazy populating some of the less "operational" postings.



Me to a T


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## Scoobie Newbie

To be fair Teddy and I suppose I'm biased but there are 15 year Cpl's who run the BN are highly motivated and trusted with many important issues.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Which is very true, but I think what he was trying to show is that there are life-long Captains who do great jobs also but someone with no military knowledge reading most of this thread would think they were the disease of the army.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Seen.


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

Exactly.  Thanks Bruce!


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Well I guess were all on the same page now.


----------



## a_majoor

2Bravo said:
			
		

> I enjoy free-play exercises (JANUS, JCATS, SIMNET, MILES),* but if we fired officers for bad results in them I would have been summed up a long time ago.*  I've had Tps and Sqns get blown up spectacularily, and I've also had some pretty cool victories.  Sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you.  As long as we learn and apply lessons then the simulations are achieving their objectives.  A zero-defect mentality from these will lead to a risk-averse officer corps.
> 
> You can also learn some weird lessons from free-play scenarios.  In JANUS, indirect fire ruled and dug-in tanks were invulnerable to direct fire.  I "learned" as a Tp Ldr that if I fired indirect 105mm HESH from my tanks I could knock out dug-in T72s.  Did it work?  heck yes.  Was it realistic?  I don't think so.   In SIMNET we "learned" to fight our tanks from woodlines, since we could fire from the edges and move around inside the woods at speed (the computer made woods like a big circus tent).



While nothing is perfect, the various simulation exercises can be done over a period of time with a "sliding scale" to take the learning curve into account (I did J-CATS once acting as a LAV platoon commander, and it was fairly baffling at first), and also with multiple evaluation factors, from tactical skill, achieving the aim, casualty ratios, logistics considerations to try to balance out both "gaming" the particular simulation, and to keep players creative rather than conservative. Using multiple systems also keeps the player's minds flexible, as you point out, what works in one game does not work in another, but once you average these factors out, you should see either an understanding of the art of war, or not.

Over a period of time, the evaluators should be looking for a steady progression, going down in flames is part of learning, but if it happens on a regular basis, then perhaps it is a symptom of a bigger problem...


----------



## Kat Stevens

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Which is very true, but I think what he was trying to show is that there are life-long Captains who do great jobs also but someone with no military knowledge reading most of this thread would think they were the disease of the army.


I once had a fresh out of the box Troop Comd say to me after my CD presentation, "12 years in and still a Cpl? What's the matter with you?"  I replied " Talk to me when you get your CD, sir." Saluted, did a smart about turn and marched away.  On parade 9 years later,, the same officer slouched out like a sack full of hammers to receive his CD, a Captain.  Couldn't resist a parting shot across his bow.. "12 years in and still a Captain, eh, sir?....."  guess the rest....
  Not relevant to the topic, I know....

Kat


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

sweet!


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

AMajoor,

Perhaps we could design a set of JCATs scenarios to put a Lt or junior Captain through his paces.  I'd be reluctant, however, to base promotion on success or failure at the scenarios.  They are a lot of folks out there who excell at computer games but who would be absolute disasters as field commanders!

A scenario similar to the one I described (the square combat team with three "players" from different arms) would be a useful primer for Lieutenants to take before becoming Captains.  My aim, however, would be to demonstrate the value and application of combined arms as opposed to weeding out people.  

My thought is that if we base promotion on success or failure in simulations we will end up with an officer corps that avoids risk and learns to jump through prescribed hoops.  

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Edward Campbell

2Bravo said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> My thought is that if we base promotion on success or failure in simulations we will end up with an officer corps that avoids risk and learns to jump through prescribed hoops.
> ...



That was, I think, one of the major objections to written tactics examinations and to the carefully constructed Part 2 TEWTs - too much regurgitating of the _principles_ laid out in the manuals, nothing to indicate that the candidate (for promotion) could think or lead.

Full circle?


----------



## Haggis

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Perhaps we could design a set of JCATs scenarios to put a Lt or junior Captain through his paces.   I'd be reluctant, however, to base promotion on success or failure at the scenarios.   They are a lot of folks out there who excell at computer games but who would be absolute disasters as field commanders!



Agreed.

Have 'em do it in JCATS until they get it right.  Then strap a ruck on 'em and have them do it for real as a "hard assessment"

Once done, the results must be reported objectively and in detail.  This is how some marginal leaders at all levels slip throughn the net.  Documenting success is easy and it makes the reporting officer (for lack of a better term) look good.  Documenting failure is more difficult and more politically damaging to all involved.

One way to approach writing the assesment is to ask yourself "would I want this person leading my troops.... or me?"


----------



## a_majoor

Haggis is quite correct that there are no substitutes for hard assessments in the field, and perhaps I have been very unclear in my posts as well. Multi factored simulation exercises seem to be a fairly simple and flexable way of finding out if the person under evaluation knows his stuff. Arranging twelve company level "Urban Ops" missions in a three year period like LCol Kilcullen was able to do (as described in "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat" Australian Army Journal Vol 1 No 1 pg. 29-39) would be very difficult to pull off, and of course only evaluates the commanders and troops in Urban Ops conditions.

With simulation you can do this many times, imput different terrain and climactic variables, have "Red Teams" to simulate the PLA, Al Qaeda, the Martians, the Marines or what ever sort of opponent is thought to be most important. By playing around with the variables, candidates can be evaluated in terms of application of knowledge rather than their ability to "game" a particular simulation system. Spreading out a series of evaluations over the candidate's posting should allow the examiner/evaluating officer to see a progression as time goes by. (A candidate who flames out three years in a row might have some issues affecting their ability to lead at the next higher level). What I would suggest is using simulation exercises *in conjunction* with FTX and perhaps written examinations (unless you can do Mil Law with J-CATS  ) in order to evaluate the candidate in his application of knowledge in the art of war. Putting everything on a single "pass/fail" simulation is unfair, and will lead to the type of risk adverse behavior that you are rightfully concerned about.


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## TangoTwoBravo

I said it earlier, but junior officers today are indeed put through some "hard assessments" in the form of BTEs, night live exercises and operational deployments.   I think that OCs and COs have ample opportunity to judge the abilities of their junior officers in trying circumstances and I think that they do so.   We also have   "observer/controllers" on exercises to provide some outside looks (I've been on both sides of that one).

PERs are certainly an interesting subject.   Honesty should, hopefully, be the norm.   We do tend to be reluctant to slam people in PERs, but one can also be "damned with faint praise."    Mistakes should not be hidden, but neither should they be automatically career-ending.

If anything, this discusion is forcing me to have another look at our new officer professional development system.  It was changing so often in the last few years (I did the "old" OPDP) that I lost track of just what new officers must do!

Cheers,

Iain Clark

p.s. LCol English mentions the sytem of regimental godfathers and regimental Mafioso WRT promotions in Lament for an Army.   Exams on staff data and the conduct of a TEWT on their own will not, in my opinion, slay those particular dragons.  Do we need checks on the Regimental System?  If so, what would be the most suitable kind of checks?  I would argue that the problems in the 90s that prompted the book were of an ethical as opposed to tactical nature.


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