# With Zeal and Bayonets Only



## tomahawk6 (8 Jul 2017)

With Zeal and Bayonets Only by Matthew Spring is my latest read regarding the British Army during the Revolutionary War 1775-1783. I think the American view of the British Army in shows like Sons of Liberty and the Patriot may not give a true picture of how they operated in North America. There was a focus on British brutality,but that occurs in any rebellion. Look at how the British operated in Ireland and there are similarities. My interest in this book is to get another viewpoint. North America was primarily and infantryman's
war then as now its all about boots on the ground. You can the book just by clicking on the image of the book.Very nice. 

https://www.amazon.com/Zeal-Bayonets-Only-Campaigns-Commanders/dp/0806141522


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## Old Sweat (8 Jul 2017)

Without reading it, I can only comment after scanning the reviews. Don't forget the British Army had considerable experience in North America and had adapted to local conditions during the French and Indian Wars. (I have seen a contemporary painting of General Wolfe in a book and he was carrying a rifle.) 

Having said that, I agree that the customary image is not accurate. People, even officers, are not that stupid and will adapt very quickly to local conditions. After all, if given the opportunity to shout and wave one's sword in the forward areas, or plan to march in the victory parade, most people will opt for the latter. Again, contrary to popular belief, the British Army in the First World War, had an effective "lessons learned" system and tactics and procedures for all corps evolved very rapidly. There is nothing to suggest they did not do the same in other conflicts through the ages, and I have noted the example of the French and Indian Wars above.

Again, this applies to field operations, not selection of strategy or planning a campaign, or winning hearts and minds.


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## jollyjacktar (8 Jul 2017)

I found the other book usually bought together to be more compelling.  Reading what the common soldiers thought and experienced can be much more satisfying for me.  It has very good reviews as well.

https://www.amazon.com/British-Soldiers-American-War-Revolution/dp/1594162042/ref=pd_sim_14_1?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=1594162042&pd_rd_r=CEESQWR6TP2W8RZYMQHK&pd_rd_w=hhtPx&pd_rd_wg=y9oHj&psc=1&refRID=CEESQWR6TP2W8RZYMQHK


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## tomahawk6 (8 Jul 2017)

Thanks I will follow up with that book as well.


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## jollyjacktar (8 Jul 2017)

Let us know how you like it.


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## RangerRay (8 Jul 2017)

As with any civil war, brutalities were committed by both parties. When the Rebels occupied Loyalist areas, Loyalists were singled out for "special treatment ".  Vice versa when the Loyalists occupied Rebel areas.


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## Kirkhill (8 Jul 2017)

In a similar vein I would highly recommend Mark Urban's "Fusiliers"

It follows the tactical development of the British Army with emphasis on the role that the Howe's, Gage and Cornwallis played in countering the "Prussians" and developing the "American" system, based on a couple of hundred years of experience in Ranger and Marine tactics and creating the foundation for the Rifles.

They had been working on light tactics since before Monongahela in the previous war.



> Fusiliers: Eight Years with the Redcoats in America
> 
> by Mark Urban, Andras Bereznay (Cartography)
> 
> ...



There is also Christopher Hibbert's Redcoats and Rebels.


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## DonPictures (17 Jul 2017)

Going to see this movie for sure, Christopher Nolan never disappointed 😀


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## Kirkhill (27 Jul 2017)

Interesting commentary on the American Rebellion  ;D



> The Geopolitics of the American Revolution
> By Jeremy Black
> July 27, 2017
> 
> ...



More to Follow...

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/27/the_geopolitics_of_the_american_revolution_111909.html


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## Kirkhill (27 Jul 2017)

> Furthermore, persuading the Patriots was a matter, as the British saw it, of getting them to return to their loyalty. This goal contributed to the nature of British warfighting. To inflict so punitive a defeat on the Patriots that this return to loyalty would be grudging, and only enforced by an expensive British occupation force, seemed pointless. Instead, the goal was that of the defeat of the main American field force, with the hope that this defeat would lead the rebels to negotiate. Based on wishful thinking, this goal was confused by the further emphasis on seizing key American positions. Both policies were to be supported by a naval blockade that, it was planned, so weakened the American economy that negotiations seemed sensible.
> 
> Defeats were certainly inflicted by the British, and major cities were captured and held – New York from 1776, Newport in 1776-80, Philadelphia in 1777-8, Savannah from 1778, and Charleston from 1780 – but neither defeats nor captures was sufficient. Instead, the total defeat of a British force (that had advanced south from Canada) near Saratoga in the Hudson Valley by a Patriot army that was not the main Patriot field force indicated the limitations of the British perception of the Patriots. So also did the Patriot ability to continue fighting after cities had been captured. For example, despite the surrender of a large Patriot force when besieged Charleston surrendered in 1780, it proved impossible for the British to enforce control over the Carolinas. Despite a further victory in the South at Camden in 1780, the British could not craft an acceptable political strategy and also could not crush dispersed forces of Patriots.
> 
> ...


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## Kirkhill (27 Jul 2017)

> By stemming the tide of British success in December 1776, Washington led them to abandon much of New Jersey. This had disastrous political and military consequences for the British. The local Loyalists were hit hard, which compromised future chances of winning Loyalist support in the Middle Colonies. Militarily, the British advance on Philadelphia, the location of the Patriot Continental Congress, in 1777 was mounted not rapidly by land from Trenton, but, instead, slowly, by sea via the Chesapeake. Philadelphia did not fall until 26 September 1777. By then, General John Burgoyne’s force advancing south from Canada was very exposed near Saratoga. It was to surrender on 17 October. A speedier British victory near Philadelphia in 1777 would have put General William Howe, the British commander in North America, in a better position to mount operations that would have made it harder for the Patriots to concentrate against Burgoyne. This success would also have given substance to the plan of cutting the Thirteen Colonies in half along the Hudson Valley, a move that would have dramatically reduced the articulation of Patriot power and made it more a series of local forces, which the British could try to fight and/or negotiate with separately.
> 
> Washington’s victory at Trenton also revitalized resistance and permitted Congress to raise a new army, including many who agreed to serve for three years, a luxury Washington had never enjoyed before. Yet, it had been a gamble, a dangerous operation that was dependent on surprise and, anyway, partly miscarried. It is worth asking: what if Washington had failed to achieve surprise, if the Hessian garrison at Trenton had driven him back to Pennsylvania, or if the British had continued to garrison New Jersey? Not only is it unclear that Congress would have been able to raise a new army for 1777, but also uncertain that the Patriots, who were anyway to be defeated that year at Brandywine, could have put up a better effort earlier in the year had it been in the aftermath of a defeat at Trenton.
> 
> ...


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