# This One's For Thucydides: Green Air Force



## Kirkhill

Like many of the forward looking articles that Thucydides points to this one stretches credulity as they often veer so far from common practice that they can appear headed past the realm of science fiction into pure fantasy.  That doesn't mean that there is anything wrong with the proposals however.

The Dragoon Concept

This is a long blog in a series of long blogs about the MOD (UK) and defense procurement.

The author has a bee in his bonnet about what he calls SMAs (Small Military Aircraft) and initially I read the article as a continuation of his special pleading.

But I have to say, as you read through the entire post, written for the Daily Mail, he marshals an effective argument.

Cheers to you Thucydides.  :cheers:


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## a_majoor

Thank you Kirkhill.  :cheers:

A quick read of the blog post is the very common "this was a great idea but no one listened" meme, which is true more often than not.

I would have to do a lot of reading to find the references, but I recall the RAF was pretty dead set against Autogyros back in the 1920's and 30's (despite thier obvious uses as helicopter analogues for liason, spotting etc.) The USAF was never keen on COIN specific aircraft like the OV-10 or Mohawk, nor supportive of the A-10 program. Other important capabilites have also been given short shift; if the USAF was serious about airlift they should have pushed both Boeing (about costs) and Congress to purchase far more C-17's, for example.

WRT the actual concept being suggested, manned ultralights are a very interesting "niche" that can fulfill some roles at a much lower cost than conventional aircraft, but we also need to balance that with the requirement for range, bad weather operations and equipment such as night/thermal imagers and comms gear. I would be thinking more along the lines of a Cessna Caravan (perhaps the putative twin engine version), which could fulfill many of the roles the Twin Otter can in the far North, as well as serving as a sort of APC (can easily carry a section of Infantry or Paratroops), surveillance craft or even attack aircraft (Iraqi Caravans are armed with Hellfire ATGM's). Gustav Von Rosen demonstrated how it is done during the Nigerian Civil War using a fleet of 5 SAAB light aircraft to attack Nigerian airfields and even destroy a few MiG fighters on the ground.

Purchasing a fleet of Caravans to replace the Twin Otters as part of the "Canada First" strategy and continuing to purchase/produce them even at a low rate would provide the skeleton and logistical muscle to develop a "green" airforce; they could gradually expand throught the service as air ambulances, FAC spotter panes, carriers for SoF troops, coastal patrol and so on. Being fairly cheap fixed wing aircraft would also provide a means to equip RCAF reserve squadrons with operational aircraft. 

Blue sky thinking for sure...


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## GAP

We loved the Cessna L-19 (later re-named the O-1) Bird Dog. Old but for it's time and place a lifesaver...


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## Kirkhill

Halfway between the Ultralight and the Caravan, and more in keeping with GAP's L-19 there is BushCaddy - all up for $111,000.

If you are heading along the Canada First Defense Strategy route then perhaps the BushCaddy (All Canadian) could be considered, as well, as an adjunct to CASARA operations in the same way that the equivalently priced RHIBs are utilized by CCGA/RCM-SAR (Royal Canadian Marine Search and Rescue volunteers.

Perhaps the government could consider funding and/or equipping and/or contributing to the supply of BushCaddies, RHIBs and (the ever popular) Bv206s for volunteer organizations like CASARA, CCGA and the Canadian Rangers under Canada First Defense Strategy.

That would increase the recce component (search) immeasurably across all of back country Canada as well as enhancing local response times and capabilities (rescue) which in turn would reduce the demand on the RCAF to maintain assets at notice to move.  It wouldn't eliminate the RCAF requirement, only allow it to refocus its efforts.

Meanwhile the light plane could be flown either manned or unmanned, with or without sensors, as a surveillance or transport system, domestically or as part of the expeditionary force (when operated by regular or reserve uniformed personnel).













Complete CFDS Volunteer Team


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## cphansen

Looking at the Bushcaddy sport I was interested by the possibility of buying a kit for around 25,000$.  I was just thinking how nice it would be for a Reserve unit to be bought the kit and have them assemble it.

I suspect it would be great for the unit's morale and the ground and air crew would wind up knowing the aircraft better than any other type.  You could buy 4 aircraft for the price of buying an assembled one.  I suspect we would also see some very interesting suggestions for adapting the plane to the unit's mission.

All we need is some way of adapting this airframe to replace the Avro Arrow and the F35, no more need to worry about cost or number of aircraft.


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## Kirkhill

SherH2A said:
			
		

> Looking at the Bushcaddy sport I was interested by the possibility of buying a kit for around 25,000$.  I was just thinking how nice it would be for a Reserve unit to be bought the kit and have them assemble it.
> 
> I suspect it would be great for the unit's morale and the ground and air crew would wind up knowing the aircraft better than any other type.  You could buy 4 aircraft for the price of buying an assembled one.  I suspect we would also see some very interesting suggestions for adapting the plane to the unit's mission.
> 
> All we need is some way of adapting this airframe to replace the Avro Arrow and the F35, no more need to worry about cost or number of aircraft.



Jeez, never thought about the DIY aspect for the Reserve.  Cheaper than a Jeep at that rate.

Now, as for the Arrow replacement idea ................  Forwarded here for review.


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## Journeyman

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Jeez, never thought about the DIY aspect for the Reserve.


Not just the Reserve, but if all these zombie movies and HBO future apocalypse series are right (unless all things electrical _do_ fail) ......hmmmm


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## a_majoor

DIY has lots of interesting implications (the most obvious being that I would always insist the crew chief rides with the pilot on the first flight after assembly...).

The very smallest of these aircraft resemble the SAAB Safari's that Carl Gustaf von Rosen flew during the Nigerian Civil War, and could fill roles like FAC, light ground attack and so on. Larger aircraft like the Caravan give you added capabilities like logistics and troop lift, have a longer range and are more robust to deal with flying in Canada (particularly the far north). It would be interesting to get an analysis done to see which sort of aircraft hits the "sweet spot" in terms of best overall utility for the RCAF.


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## Kirkhill

Thucydides:

I think that you might already be "situating your estimate" by deciding that the decision on these aircraft is an RCAF issue.

I'm incline to think that if the RCAF got their hands on the analysis you would quickly climb the ladder from:

"Well if an unarmed flit-about like the Dragon can get the job done then why not a Bush Caddy.  It at least looks like an airplane,";

To "If a Bush Caddy why not a Caravan"

"If a Caravan why not a Twotter"

"If a Twotter why not a Buffalo II"

"If a Buff II why not a C27J"

"If a C27J why not more Hercs"

"Oops - no money for 50 MUSD Hercs (or whatever they cost) - we'll have to call the whole thing off"

And nobody gets any capability whatsoever despite an initial solution priced at less than 25,000 CAD.

Not picking on the RCAF but the problem identified in the MOD articles is endemic in most organizations.  They start with the premise that there are certain things they do and certain things they don't do.  The things they don't do only draw money away from the things they do do.

Consequently innovation is hard.


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## cphansen

Thucydides said:
			
		

> DIY has lots of interesting implications (the most obvious being that I would always insist the crew chief rides with the pilot on the first flight after assembly...).
> 
> The very smallest of these aircraft resemble the SAAB Safari's that Carl Gustaf von Rosen flew during the Nigerian Civil War, and could fill roles like FAC, light ground attack and so on. Larger aircraft like the Caravan give you added capabilities like logistics and troop lift, have a longer range and are more robust to deal with flying in Canada (particularly the far north). It would be interesting to get an analysis done to see which sort of aircraft hits the "sweet spot" in terms of best overall utility for the RCAF.



No offense but why should this be limited to the RCAF, if ultralights can help Recce elements avoid IEDs and Ambushes, shouldn't they be integral to the Army unit?

They won't require large support facilities, should be capable of flying and landing on a dirt road. Let the air and ground crews of the ultralights live and mess with the unit they support, surely that would enhance cooperations.  Especially after the ultralights have done a few beer runs for unit smokers.  They could very easily fill the slots the Kiowas did in the old LAR concept and the old bird dogs assigned to the armoured regiments.

Maybe revisiting the LAR concept would be useful now, we do have access to vehicle families which could produce a LAR capable of more than holding it's own in both asymetrical and symetrical warfare.


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## Loachman

If this is such a good idea, why has nobody done it?

Always a valid question...


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## a_majoor

Since the RCAF has a lock on everything that flies, they are the obvious lead agency.

Kirkhill has identified the problem (mission creep) and the probable answers to Loachman's question includes lack of sexiness and "Not Invented Here". Telling Zoomies that they are destined to fly an aircraft they build themselves out of a kit might appeal to a certain percentage, but a much larger constituency will be lining up to fly the CF-35 (even if the odds are stacked towards flying the x-planes simulator on their Macbooks...)

If we were able to have an "Army Air Corps" and a "Fleet Air Arm" input into this, there would be at least three different aircraft being touted, since the needs of each service would be much different. Inviting other agencies that use aircraft (like the Coast Guard or CBSA) would also add many new requirements. A fairly large and robust aircraft that can accommodate different mission modules or carry a decent payload is the other solution (hence the Caravan idea; the big "cargo pod" that can be attached to the belly could be outfitted for lots of different military and para military missions).


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## FoverF

One issue with having the RCAF in charge of a bunch of bush planes is that they would want RCAF pilots to fly them. 

You would spend a bajillion dollars teaching a bunch of zoomies to fly on Grobs or Katanas or what have you, then teaching them to fly Harvard IIs, then teaching them to fly helicopters or multi engines or fast jets, then having them do a tour with an operational squadron, and then having them convert to fly something simpler than the Grob or Katana they started on. 

I think RCAF aircrew would, in general, be massively over-trained and over-qualified (at a shockingly high cost), especially when you could teach experienced Army NCO's how to operate the aircraft in 6 months. 

That's my take anyways. Worth what you paid for it.


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## Loachman

There are lots of countries that have Army Air Corps/Army Aviation Branches which are similarly disinterested, and for equally valid reasons. These suggested aircraft are severely limited, in usefulness rather than "sexiness".


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## a_majoor

I fully agree with the assessment WRT ultralights, but small/medium sized utility aircraft can fill many niche roles, and modular systems allow these sorts of aircraft to fill more niches. COIN operations have highlighted the need for specialized aircraft repeatedly, with the USMC developing techniques during the Banana wars and the RAF being used for pacification duties in Mesopotamia in the 1930's. 

SOE and other proto "Special Forces" needed the services of special aircraft like the Westland Lysander, while the Germans used the Fieseler Fi 156 Storch (including Otto Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini). The Americans created all kinds of specialized aircraft over the years, and pressed other types into service for COIN operations (including transport aircraft like the Dakota and eventually C-130 as gunships, purpose built aircraft like the OV-10 and even adapted trainers like the A-37 Dragonfly). Even the Tutor of "Snowbirds" fame has an armed variant, which served in the Royal Malaysian Air Force.

The "Green Airforce" that Kirkhill refers to in the opening post is an idea broached in an earlier thread that perhaps we needed some sort of aircraft or series of aircraft that had a much smaller footprint and could operate much closer to the troops for COIN operations than the high performance aircraft favoured by airforces today. An added benefit which occurs to me is that if the enemy is able to penetrate the local defenses and destroy several aircraft on the ground (such as happened in Afghanistan recently, wiping out essentially an entire USMC Harrier squadron), it would be less of a hit since the aircraft are a lower value target than high performance aircraft.


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## SeaKingTacco

Call me crazy, but do not whole families if UAVs exist to do the role you see filled by an ultralight, but without risking a dude?


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## Kirkhill

You're not wrong SKT.  Nor is Loachman.

But I think I wouldn't have to go far to find people arguing that the situational awareness of an aerial observer with Eyeball Mk1 is greater than the view of the world gained "through a straw".

Equally I recall seeing discussion on these boards about the relative merits of being closed down inside an AFV while being reliant on viewing the world through sensors versus being able to stick a head outside the hatch and "sniff the wind".

Is the level of risk associated with Ultra Light or Bird Dog operations different than that associated with LOH operations?   I don't know.  I'm just interested, both in the concept as laid out in the article (and apparently endorsed by some Brits with T-shirts) and the advantages it might offer to the conduct of operations.   Maybe the idea doesn't make sense when people are shooting at you but perhaps it could have merit in operations when they are not.

I don't see many Ultralights in military (or para-military service). I do see a lot of "SMAs" and "Caravans" (or Britten Islander/Defenders-UK AAC and Partenavia P.68s - Italian Carabinieri) in COIN-Paramilitary-Police roles.  










Edit to correct typos and also to add: Many countries that do not have first-line air forces use small aircraft for tranport and surveillance and even those that are flying aircraft like F16s employ small single and twin propeller aircraft for transport, ISR and Ground Support.


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## dimsum

Tangent ahead:

I'll agree that it's generally better to have a wide view v. the "straw", but besides flight safety SA, what can't a camera pod do in a wide field of view (and if the operator isn't fixated on something)?  I believe that people blow the "straw" problem out of proportion; it would be no different than flying with NVGs.  

Besides, some UAVs (like the Heron) have a panoramic camera as well for forward view for the Pilot as well as the sensor pod.  It's not great, but it's there for quick SA of approaching weather, etc.


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## Loachman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> small/medium sized utility aircraft can fill many niche roles,



We do not have the luxury of filling "niche roles" with multiple fleets of capability-limited aircraft.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> SOE and other proto "Special Forces" needed the services of special aircraft like the Westland Lysander, while the Germans used the Fieseler Fi 156 Storch (including Otto Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini).



That was all that they had. Helicopters do this far, far better.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> The "Green Airforce" that Kirkhill refers to in the opening post is an idea broached in an earlier thread that perhaps we needed some sort of aircraft or series of aircraft that had a much smaller footprint and could operate much closer to the troops for COIN operations than the high performance aircraft favoured by airforces today.



What "need"? Any aircraft that can perform a useful role is going to have a significant "footprint". What prevents high performance airtcraft from operating "much closer to the troops"? Those aircraft have long endurance, move faster, carry a greater variety of weaponry, and have sensor systems. What can they not do, now, that you think a cheaper, less-capable aircraft, can do?

"Closer to the troops" also means "closer to the enemy" - generally greater risk for no benefit. 

If something is useful under the worst circumstances, ie all-out, total warfare, it will generally function quite well in a lower-threat environment such as Afghanistan. That does not work both ways, however.

Why does the Army need tanks and LAVs? Wouldn't lightly-armoured and lightly-armed trucks and SUVs be cheaper and have a smaller footprint?



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> An added benefit which occurs to me is that if the enemy is able to penetrate the local defenses and destroy several aircraft on the ground (such as happened in Afghanistan recently, wiping out essentially an entire USMC Harrier squadron), it would be less of a hit since the aircraft are a lower value target than high performance aircraft.



There have been remarkably few aircraft, or anything else, lost on the ground on major bases in Afghanistan over many years. As in any war, sometimes the opposition get lucky. The benefit of having militarily capable aircraft around, despite the cost and slight risk, outweighs the cost and risk of having more cheaper and less capable aircraft cluttering up available ramp space.

One modern aircraft can do more than hundreds of WWII-era, or even Vietnam era, aircraft, with much less risk to aircrew and civilians around targets.

Regardless of what operations are being conducted in the hellhole-du-jour, those modern aircraft are still going to be necessary, and their crews still need to train. They could do that back home while the cheapies fly and die overseas, or they could do their flying in theatre for almost the same cost while negating the need for the cheapies in the first place.

So, again, what real benefit is there to this, sadly, undying proposal?

_- mod edit to fix quotes -_


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## Loachman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> DIY has lots of interesting implications (the most obvious being that I would always insist the crew chief rides with the pilot on the first flight after assembly...)



I always liked to take "hostages" along on flights anyway. It doesn't have to be a post-initial-assembly flight to give a tech some incentive.

Not that I ever really thought that they needed any. They are professional enough, and there are decent checks in the system. I have never had less than full confidence in our maintainers.


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## Loachman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I would have to do a lot of reading to find the references, but I recall the RAF was pretty dead set against Autogyros back in the 1920's and 30's



Perhaps for good reason.

If there was any real benefit to autogyros, there would be several manufacturers producing them for commercial sale. Why are none doing so, despite James Bond?



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> (despite thier obvious uses as helicopter analogues for liason, spotting etc.)



They are not helicopters. They cannot hover. They rely on forward movement for flight, thereby combining the limitations of seized-wing aircraft with the complexities of rotary-winged ones.


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## Loachman

SherH2A said:
			
		

> Looking at the Bushcaddy sport I was interested by the possibility of buying a kit for around 25,000$.  I was just thinking how nice it would be for a Reserve unit to be bought the kit and have them assemble it.



Having spent eighteen years in a Reserve-heavy unit, "nice" would not be my first choice of adjectives, although most choices higher up the list would have the same number of letters.

It's not like our techs have too little to do as it is.



			
				SherH2A said:
			
		

> I suspect it would be great for the unit's morale



You suspect wrongly.

Better for morale, by far, is a useful role and _*suitable*_ equipment to perform it.



			
				SherH2A said:
			
		

> the ground and air crew would wind up knowing the aircraft better than any other type.



And we do not know our aircraft well enough now? Have you ever seen a Griffon in mid-600 hour inspection? There's not much that can come off without a chainsaw that doesn't come off during one of those.



			
				SherH2A said:
			
		

> I suspect we would also see some very interesting suggestions for adapting the plane to the unit's mission.



I agree. First get a useful mission and then a useful aircraft with which to do it.


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## Loachman

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But I think I wouldn't have to go far to find people arguing that the situational awareness of an aerial observer with Eyeball Mk1 is greater than the view of the world gained "through a straw".



Chances are that none of those people have ever used modern EO/IR systems on an aircraft.

I've done the strictly-eyeball thing, a blend of both with police helicopter flying, and a tour with just a "straw".

One can see a lot with just an eyeball, in daylight, but not in really useful detail. What one sees cannot be transmitted to a ground commander or other interested parties in multiple locations. There is no night capability. The Kiowa that I used to fly would be of any value, in its original configuration, in today's world.

EO/IR systems have good zoom capabilities. One can scan wide areas, or narrow right in. They function during most times of the day or night in most environments. This is why manned aircraft have them, too.

"Straw" is not an accurate depiction at all.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is the level of risk associated with Ultra Light or Bird Dog operations different than that associated with LOH operations?



Yes. Much. Such seized-wing aircraft cannot use terrain masking when necessary, and have to keep moving which is tactically limiting.

Imagine the usefulness of a Coyote that could not park in one place, but had to keep driving around in circles at about 120 km/hr.

I would typically spend much of my time on a recce mission sitting on the ground at idle when able, conserving fuel and relaxing a little while still monitoring the tactical situation, plus I could dismount my Observer when necessary. An L19 Observer might object a little more to such a suggestion.


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## Kirkhill

Thanks.


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## dimsum

I'll add another  :2c: about the Flight Safety SA thing.  If there was a way for UAVs to get TCAS and a way of "slaving" (automatically pointing-to) a selectable target on the TCAS, that may solve a lot of the issues of Flight Safety SA.  Or, similarly, with a radar instead of TCAS.  

The thing with UAV/RPA tech right now is that it's much like in the early days of manned flight.  Lots of things to be worked out, and eventually they will be.


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## Kirkhill

Hand up in the back of the class here Dimsum.

What is TCAS?


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## SeaKingTacco

Traffic collision avoidance system.  Works on mode 3 IFF to prevent aircraft collisions.


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## Journeyman

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Traffic collision avoidance system.  Works on mode 3 IFF....


Ah....explains acronym by using more acronyms.   ;D


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## SeaKingTacco

Hey dude, last time looked, google worked for everyone on the Internet....

 ;D


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## Journeyman

Just teasin'  --- I'd actually heard of IFF somewhere before


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## Kirkhill

Google returns the following:

Tricyclic Anti-Depressants
Student Accomodation Management Systems (by TCAS)
Transactions on Circuits and Systems
Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems.

I was just wondering why three wheeled landing gear would incur depression and so I sought clarification.

My apologies for the lack of google-fu this evening. ;D


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## GR66

Loachman said:
			
		

> We do not have the luxury of filling "niche roles" with multiple fleets of capability-limited aircraft.



We certainly can't IF we also wish to maintain a full range of military capabilities.  However, if we were to make the conscious decision to focus on a few niche roles and do them well at the expense of being fully capable across the spectrum then some of these lower-tech, lower-cost solutions might be very viable choices.  Perhaps there is something to be said for having a capability that is different and complementary to the capabilities and equipment of our allies (especially the United States).

I'm not saying that this is a path that Canada SHOULD take but it is possibly a path that Canada COULD take.  The biggest problem and fear that I have (if history is any guide) is that we would likely purchase less capable equipment to save money without truly accepting/acknowledging that fact and acting in a way that recognizes the self-imposed limitations we've placed on our military.   You can't trade in your F1 for a VW Beetle and expect to stay in the Grand Prix circuit.  That however is what we'd likely try to do...at the expense of military effectiveness and unfortunately the lives of our service people when we throw them into a type of conflict for which they are not properly equipped.


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## quadrapiper

On the other hand, depending on the "niche role," might there be benefits to maintaining some "less capable" platforms, on the same basis as land transport runs the gamut from blue fleet through MilCOTS to APCs and the like? Whether the bottom-end capability should look like a Herc, a Beaver clone, or a leased Boeing or Antonov cargo-hauler is beyond me.

With the occasional murmurs of maintaining/expanding our Arctic presence, would there be some utility in a "bush pilot auxiliary?" Consider the Rangers, WWII militarization of fishing vessels, CASARA, and similar examples, and apply it to light aviation support in the North?


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## observor 69

Loachman said:
			
		

> I always liked to take "hostages" along on flights anyway. It doesn't have to be a post-initial-assembly flight to give a tech some incentive.
> 
> Not that I ever really thought that they needed any. They are professional enough, and there are decent checks in the system. I have never had less than full confidence in our maintainers.



And we thank you for that Sir.    :bowing:


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## Colin Parkinson

The whole thing seems vaguely familiar   

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vV427haEN2k


As for people telling a world that won't listen, just remember the armoured exercises in england interwar, well at least some Germans were listening.


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## Kirkhill

I've been trying to figure out where I am coming from on this issue myself.  I guess I am primarily in data gathering mode.  Which seems appropriate.

There is the Canadian Army and there is the Canadian government.  The two are not the same although one works for the other.

Sometimes the Army is tasked by HMCG to work overseas in places where people shoot at it.  Other government departments, exclusive of the RCN and the RCAF are seldom tasked in that fashion.

Sometimes the Army (or the RCN or the RCAF) is tasked by HMCG to work within Canada.  Very occasionally this is because they may get shot at but usually it is just because the existing domestic agencies are temporarily short of manpower or lack a capability held by the CF.

When the CF works overseas or domestically it needs data to conduct operations effectively.  The more data (arguably) the more efficient operations can be.  They won't necessarily be more efficient but they can be.  It is probably easier to stipulate that a lack of data will guarantee an inefficient and ineffective response.

When data is not readily available (intelligence is readily available data) then the CF has to go out and find it for itself (conduct reconnaissance and surveillance).

It seems reasonable that if that recce and surveillance has to be conducted in a "non-permissive" environment then the equipment provided should ensure to the greatest extent possible that its operators will come home safely to the wife and kids.   No argument on that from this corner.

But there are two other aspects to this discussion:

1. Canada doesn't have to operate overseas at all.  It chooses to operate overseas.  It chooses, to a great extent, the threat environment in which it wishes to operate.

2. Canada does have to operate domestically.

HMCG decides IF Canada is going to operate overseas, IF it is going to operate in a "non-permissive" environment and what level of threat they are willing to manage.

Those decisions are driven strictly by how much money HMCG believes they can extract from the Canadian Taxpayer.

ERC's Two Harolds (Wilson and MacMillan) have more to say about domestic operations.   Domestic operations are event driven and occur at short notice.  HMCG is required to react in a timely and effective fashion.  

The Canadian Taxpayer demands that their money be used first to meet the domestic need and only secondarily to meet expeditionary needs.

The good news for HMCG is that domestic operations generally occur in a permissive environment where people are not shooting.  If there is a data shortfall (lack of intelligence) then reconnaissance and surveillance operators have a reasonable expectation of coming home to the wife and kids.  This suggests that the platforms used to conduct recce and surveillance domestically do not have to be as robust as those that are deployed overseas.


But.

Domestically HMCG expects to have a detailed intelligence picture on a continuous basis throughout the national territory.  That means the government needs to employ many eyeballs on an ongoing basis.  Not all of those eyeballs need to be in the military.  Not all of those eyeballs need to be in protected platforms.

HMCG can employ civilian suppliers of intelligence.
It can employ civilians on a part time basis, like the Canadian Rangers, to keep their eyes open as they go about their daily lives.
It can employ people in CSIS, CSCE, the RCMP and the Coast Guard to keep their eyes open and act within approved limits in low threat environments.
It can employ people in the CF to use available resources, even if they are overkill for the task on hand to add to the intelligence picture.
It can employ the Militia and CASARA and the CCGA and similar agencies to keep their eyes open for a short period of time during a crisis.


Where am I going with this?

It is about sensors not platforms.

It is more important that HMCG's spending priorities focus first on providing Binoculars, Night Vision Devices, EO/IR turrets, Acoustic Detection Systems and Radars to provide intelligence than focusing on the platforms that carry the observers.

A user of the intelligence doesn't particularly need to know, or concern themselves with, how the intelligence was gathered, only that it is available so that they can plan and act.

If taxpayers are only giving HMCG a limited number of dollars to work with, and they expect a domestic focus, then HMCG is quite within its rights to focus on supplying lots of sensors to people who can employ them domestically from their jeep, their ATV, their snowmobile, their boat or their ultralight.

If it needs additional sensors for the domestic gaps then it seems to me it is valid to mount those sensors on the least expensive platform available so that more sensors can be bought and deployed.   

Once those needs have been met (although the probability of those needs ever being met is equivalent to meeting the health care needs of Canadians), once those needs have been met then residual dollars can be spent on the expeditionary role.

Because the expeditionary role is a discretionary item then there is no reason why Canada couldn't decide to limit its contribution to the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance to a single, massively armoured and well armed mobile observation post, or a single well defended ship or a satellite surveillance system.

HMCG doesn't have to do anything overseas.  It doesn't have to send a Division, Brigade Group, Battle Group or Combat Team.  

But if it chooses to send something overseas, in harms way, then it has a duty of care to ensure that it is the most survivable system available.


I don't think that the kitting problem can be addressed first by looking at the discretionary requirements of an expeditionary force.  I think that it is critical to focus on the domestic requirement first,  that that requirement be met with the least cost expenditure on systems, that the expertise gained by meeting the domestic need be made available to the international community, and that the funds made available for expeditionary purposes be allocated on the basis of protecting that expertise so that it can be returned, intact, to Canada and the wife and kids.


In this particular case this would result in HMCG ensuring that the Canadian Rangers, CASARA, Coast Guard, Mounties and Militia were well equipped with sensors.  That those same sensors would be mounted on cheap platforms for use by those agencies domestically.  That those same sensors would be utilized on better protected systems for use by the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Those portions of the CF that focus on domestic ops, like the Militia, could be equipped with the same sensors and cheap platforms to learn transferable skills that could be employed with the expeditionary troops.

Which would you rather have?  100,000 pairs of binos and cameras (with radios) reporting from multiple locations or a single Global Hawk cruising over a limited area, occasionally and looking at a series of points.


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## aesop081

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Which would you rather have?  100,000 pairs of binos and cameras (with radios) reporting from multiple locations or a single Global Hawk cruising over a limited area, occasionally and looking at a series of points.



The Global Hawk. 100 000 binos with cameras and radios cannot even begin to provide the coverage and perspective, peristance and day/night capability, 24 hours + that a GH can. Them i can relocate my GH to anywhere in the country faster should the need arise.

[sarcasm]
Let's talk about the Army while we're at it. I think the CA should concentrate on "niche" roles. let's get rid of the CMBGs and concentrate on C-IED and SF. Stop trying to have capabilities in everything.
[/sarcasm]


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## Kirkhill

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> [sarcasm]
> Let's talk about the Army while we're at it. I think the CA should concentrate on "niche" roles. let's get rid of the CMBGs and concentrate on C-IED and SF. Stop trying to have capabilities in everything.
> [/sarcasm]



We are not of the same opinion.


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## daftandbarmy

We had the equivalent of 'Dragoon' operating over us in NI in Belfast and elsewhere way back when. Usually a 'top cover' Gazelle, with two crew, hovering at 5000ft (SA-7 y'know) over foot patrols protecting PC Plod doing his job.

Three patrols per company per day, at about 1 hour per patrol, were the usual 'ration' of heli hours. We ran triple that number of 'programmed' patrols daily, but only about 3 were covered by heli.

We had 4 companies. That's 12 patrols per day, at least, with a state of the art chopper overhead. In addition, of course, to a network of permanent and heavily fortified high tech OPs atop the highest buildings in town, stuffed with all the latest and greatest high tech observation gizmos. And this went on for decades. I can't imagine the costs invovled.

Did it help? Sure, but the IRA still ran hundreds of operations against us. Most they called off for various reasons, but they still took us on and, when they did, usually did the business about 50% of the time; top cover or no top cover.

Drones and other small aircraft for overwatch? Great. Good tactics and enough troops and police combined with a long term, war winning, fully integrated politico-military strategy supported by a first class intelligence network? Even better. ;D


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## Kirkhill

D&B,

Bernadette notwithstanding:  NI was/is a Domestic Operation.

Also, disregarding Martin's Tommy Gun and nasties in culverts, do you think that the threat level to the Squaddie rose to the level of Afghanistan?  How about Iraq?  Would you have been able to fully utilize the capabilities of Warriors, Challengers and AS90s in Derry?  On second thought, don't answer that.    You probably would.

Better question, while it would have done wonders for your morale, would it have either reduced the threat or hastened the glorious Millenium that is upon us?  (The odd knee-capping and bombing aside).

As miserable as NI was, it was a police action with emphasis on mobility, light infantry, light cavalry and intelligence.  N'est ce pas?


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## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> D&B,
> 
> Bernadette notwithstanding:  NI was/is a Domestic Operation.
> 
> Also, disregarding Martin's Tommy Gun and nasties in culverts, do you think that the threat level to the Squaddie rose to the level of Afghanistan?  How about Iraq?  Would you have been able to fully utilize the capabilities of Warriors, Challengers and AS90s in Derry?  On second thought, don't answer that.    You probably would.
> 
> Better question, while it would have done wonders for your morale, would it have either reduced the threat or hastened the glorious Millenium that is upon us?  (The odd knee-capping and bombing aside).
> 
> As miserable as NI was, it was a police action with emphasis on mobility, light infantry, light cavalry and intelligence.  N'est ce pas?



Yes, pretty much. The 'bad old days' of the 1969-80/81 period were, as far as I can estimate, on par with a Baghdad type situation, but on a much smaller scale, with far more troops per capita to deal with it all. It's all ugly when you're in the middle of it, of course.

As for the effectiveness of the 'overwatch' I found that it was interesting to see what effect it had on people.  Some disregaded it and relied mainly on their own tactics and knowledge of the terrain, leaving the pilots to get bored out of their skulls. Others relied heavily on it and wandered around as if God Himself was casting his benevolent gaze upon them and enveloped them in HIS loving protection. Others actually blended the two, and got the pilots involved fully in every patrol, and put police and others (int cell types etc) onboard with the pilots. 

We tended to do the latter, and sent multiple 'int' tasks up to the pilots who provided us with all kinds of other informaiton as well as providing overwatch on the patrol. We also encouraged the taking of zillions of photos.Note: the pilots were expert observers, unlike grunts like me, and added alot of value from that perspective.

I'd still prefer a division of 'snitches' to a thousand 'gizmos', as that's the kind of int you really need to be proactive and deal with the root of the problem. But, yeah, if you had some small drones that could be used by foot / mobile patrols, great. I'm not sure that the CSM in an ultralight is the way ahead though as you still tie down manpower.... even if it's only the CSM  ;D


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## ArmyRick

Just curious and throwing it out there. What are the resources we are protecting up north and what are the threats (most likely and least likely)? I can guess at a few but those in the know may have some light to shed.

My guess as to our resources is
1. Land
2. Fresh clean water
3. Animals 
4. Mineral/metal deposits?
5. Wood (in some areas)?
6. Is there oil up north?

Threats? I have to admit beyong criminal activity I am not sure of what the threats are. Anyone?


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## cphansen

There is oil up there, but you did miss at least 1 item from your list i.e. people.  The forces seem to fly quite a few SAR missions for missing lost snowmobilors.

Also there is more than 1 diamond mine up there.

At the current rate of ice melting there will soon be an open water summertime northern passage.


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## a_majoor

I don't see this as entirely either/or.

We already have some "light" capabilities in our airforce for such tasks as operations in the far north and SAR (using Twin Otters and Buffalo), so an aircraft like the Caravan (or different platform, but I'll use the Caravan for simplicity) is needed anyway. If we choose the platform intelligently, then we can also use it for other roles, some of which are complimentary with existing capabilities and some of which might be "new".

Looking at the Caravan we see a rugged transport aircraft with a limited "footprint" so it can operate in austere environments and out of small(ish) airfields. It has demonstrated the ability to act as a transport, carry parachutists, act as a weapons platform and a sensor platform. If we simply buy enough to replace the elderly airframes then we don't loose anything and have the potential to shift them for other uses the current fleet cannot do if there should be a need. If we buy more (say for the Air Reserve) then we gain additional capabilites that we don't already, at a relatively modest cost.

I also look at aircraft more as platforms these days, since many aircraft (of all types) can be fitted with "kits" that allow them to do missions that they might not have been designed for. The F-22 can be made to carry bombs, and the USMC has a kit that turns the C-130 into a gunship at a fraction of the time and cost of creating a AC-130 Spectre. Once again, using the Caravan as the example, there are many airforces which have created "kits" to turn the Caravan from a simple cargo hauler into something else. Given the climactic conditions and ranges that need to be covered in Canada, there will be a certain minimum size and capability that is needed to fly safley and do useful work (specialized drones being the exception).


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## GR66

I think the risk is doing the job in half measures.  There is no doubt that it is possible to have a small fleet of Caravans along with the kit to modify them for a wide variety of roles.  It that enough airframes though to do ANY of those roles very well?  Is having a such a small fleet spread across our huge geography, with the support required for the fleet AND all the various specialty equipment very cost effective?  Can we afford both this light fleet AND the major platforms to do all the other "primary" tasks in this environment of shrinking budgets?

My take on the article is that they are suggesting that you can REPLACE the high-priced, cutting edge platforms with a larger quantity of cheaper platforms so that you can actually EXPAND your capabilities in many areas.  More, cheaper, low(er)-tech, lower overhead platforms providing maybe the 70-80% solution in much higher volume than a few, expensive, hi-tech, hi-overhead platforms providing the 90-95% solution are able to do.

Don't get me wrong.  If Canada has a need for a Caravan (or insert alternate airframe here) then by all means make it as flexible as possible so that we can get the most bang for the buck out of it.  I just don't think that having a few "light" aircraft to supplement our "heavies" is in any way doing what the article is suggesting.  To do that we'd need far more light aircraft (at the expense of heavy/hi-tech aircraft) and a completely new set of strategies and tactics to make effective use of them.


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## ArmyRick

How would a brand new Twin Otter fair out if Viking built them in terms of price and operational capability? It seems the Twin Otter has a proven record of success for operating in the far north. Thoughts? Ideas?

I also agree that UAVs (Part of JUSTAS?) will be needed to provide more effective situational awareness up north.


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## Kirkhill

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/US-SDAF-Buying-Cessna-C-208B-Caravan-Light-Planes-07419/

The link references a US government purchase of 4 Caravans with training for overseas operators maintainers.

The purchase price is given as 12 MUSD for the complete package.

Assume  a least cost price of one Global Hawk at 35 MUSD, or an F-35 at 60 MUSD.  Is it worth reducing a Global Hawk purchase by one aircraft (from 5 to 4 for example) or one F35 (from 65 to 64 a/c) to buy 12 to 20 Caravans?

Is the availability of the primary platform greatly disadvantaged?
Do the numbers of the less survivable (when bullets fly) a/c add resources that could be exploited domestically and release the more capable a/c for the harder environments?

With Thucydides, I am not proposing either/or.  I am wondering if there is a different mix of platforms that presents a better option.

I am not in favour of a mixed fleet of (for example) Super Hornets and F35s as their prices and capabilities are too similar.  But perhaps foregoing a couple of F35s to buy a couple of dozen Caravans might produce a useful outcome.

And even Global Hawks / BAMS / Maritime Predators have their role and I agree they are required in the Canadian mix.  But.  Do they need to be supplied by "Unlimited Liability" personnel?  Or can the service be supplied by civilian contractors flying out of Ottawa, Goose Bay or even Nevada?


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## Kirkhill

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> How would a brand new Twin Otter fair out if Viking built them in terms of price and operational capability? It seems the Twin Otter has a proven record of success for operating in the far north. Thoughts? Ideas?
> 
> I also agree that UAVs (Part of JUSTAS?) will be needed to provide more effective situational awareness up north.



I like both ideas.... assuming the price is right.   Viking would be worth supporting as a strategic asset on a par with Bombardier, Irving and Washington Marine.  The Twin Otter is proven.  Assuming they can build good ones.... Why not?


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## a_majoor

Here is a article about the French experience with creating and using a "green" airforce during the end of the colonial period. The primary issue for the French turned out to be a lack of suitable platforms. There were never enough aircraft to do all the things French COIN theory of the day called for, and the aircraft the French were able to get their hands on were generally not the right kind to do the job. 

Superannuated WWII figher planes were the first wave in Indochina, and were not designed for "low and slow" flight from austere airfields (maintainence issues were a large part of the problem). Other issues included insufficient range or weapons loads that were not appropriate. The French had similar issues in Algeria, especially with the jet aircraft the Armée de l'Air operated during the period. The most capable aircraft turned out to be the Skyraider and re engined T-28 trainers.

The ultimate fate of the French COIN philosophy was failure. The doctrinal underpinnings were weak, and the examples of French scrambling to source aircraft to support the actual work on the ground suggests that there were never enough resources committed to do the job either.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

Related link about "Combat crop dusters", a little known branch of COIN aviation:

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n3/articles/ayres.html


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