# Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M



## dimsum (2 Feb 2016)

> ....For the last decade, he says, the army has specialized in counter-insurgency warfare because of the combat mission in Kandahar and other skill sets — once second nature to Canadian training — were relegated to the back burner.
> 
> Dorn says the complexities of modern peace operations require in-depth training and education, on subjects including the procedures, capabilities and limitations of the United Nations.
> 
> ...



Is it just me or does this report seem like a slap in the face to the OMLT, POMLT, etc folks who worked with, and trained, Afghan authorities during OPs ATHENA and ATTENTION?  I'm pretty sure we did some negotiation, conflict management and resolution there as well.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com//news/national/military-ill-prepared-for-peacekeeping-report/article28505963/?cmpid=rss1&click=sf_globefb


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## ModlrMike (2 Feb 2016)

I thought this comment was to the point:

"How can you be ill prepared for a vague activity that is poorly thought out and and ill defined by politicians trying to perform brain surgery with an axe?

The problem isn't our soldiers...it's the politicians who are writing the rules."


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## PuckChaser (2 Feb 2016)

A properly trained, equipped and disciplined first world army can peacekeep. An army equipped and trained to peacekeep cannot ever fight a war, or use force to achieve political goals in a region.

Walter Dorn is an idiot.


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## George Wallace (2 Feb 2016)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> A properly trained, equipped and disciplined first world army can peacekeep. An army equipped and trained to peacekeep cannot ever fight a war, or use force to achieve political goals in a region.
> 
> Walter Dorn is an idiot.



Even Lester B. Pearson knew that.


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## FSTO (2 Feb 2016)

Listening to the Liberal Talking Points regarding the bombing campaign, I think there is a ready audience inhabiting the Langivan Block. I think our very able Defence Minister is on Corrigidor Island right now. He is on his own and the worst thing is that there is no support on the horizon at all.


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## Strike (2 Feb 2016)

Ill prepared compared to who? The countries whose soldiers are being accused of trading candy for sexual favours.  These people really don't have any idea who is doing blue-hat duties many times now.


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## OldSolduer (2 Feb 2016)

Strike said:
			
		

> Ill prepared compared to who? The countries whose soldiers are being accused of trading candy for sexual favours.  These people really don't have any idea who is doing blue-hat duties many times now.



When I was in Croatia in 93 rumors that certain contingents were selling fuel to the warring factions. Was it true? I don't know for sure.


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## The Bread Guy (2 Feb 2016)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> A properly trained, equipped and disciplined first world army can peacekeep. An army equipped and trained to peacekeep cannot ever fight a war, or use force to achieve political goals in a region.


Have to agree - while cops do VITAL work, you don't send cops as your first choice up against an army in a firefight.

Just so we're discussing more than just a reporter's read of the report (if it was read in its entirety), attached find at least the executive summary of the report in question - full report (72 page PDF) downloadable here.


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## Journeyman (2 Feb 2016)

Published by the CCPA and the 'hating all things military' Rideau Institute, a publication by a guy whose academic background provides absolutely no justification to his 'expertise' on the topic (Dorn's Doctorate is in Chemistry), but who's benefitted repeatedly from the UN cash cow.

Rehashing the same old "war bad, UN money er, peacekeeping good."    Groundhog day indeed.   :boring:


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## PuckChaser (2 Feb 2016)

Dorn insists we strive to achieve the same standard of training as these fine examples of military excellence (number of peacekeepers deployed):



> Bangladesh	9432
> Ethiopia	8309
> India	        7794
> Pakistan	7533


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## Kirkhill (2 Feb 2016)

> “Special skills, separate from those learned in Afghanistan and warfare training, would need to be (re)learned, including skills in negotiation, conflict management and resolution, as well as an understanding of UN procedures and past peacekeeping missions,” said the report.
> 
> “Particularly important is learning effective co-operation with the non-military components of modern peacekeeping operations, including police, civil affairs personnel and humanitarians, as well as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local actors engaged in building a viable peace.”



Sounds like a job opportunity there, seeing as how the soldiery isn't up to the task.  Maybe we should hire a few and train them so they are fit for purpose.

We could call them diplomats.


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## The Bread Guy (3 Feb 2016)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> ... who's benefitted repeatedly from the UN cash cow ...


I DID notice an awful lot of focus on all the UN-ish courses/programs that _should_ be run - by who, one wonders?


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## McG (3 Feb 2016)

Michael Den Tandt makes a helpful counterpoint.  I prefer to keep out ot the hair splitting on "peacekeeping" vs "peacemaking",  but I think it is a distinction that is probably useful when speaking to the average Canadian. 



> *Peacekeeping is fine, but peace-building is essential — and it works*
> Michael Den Tandt
> The National Post
> 02 Feb 2016
> ...


http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/michael-den-tandt-peacekeeping-is-fine-but-peace-building-is-essential-and-it-works


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## Oldgateboatdriver (3 Feb 2016)

A few points:

First, am I the only one who thinks that someone who works with the CCPA or the Rideau Institute should be barred (or fired) from teaching at Staff College?

Second, if the JT government wants to get back into the peacekeeping "business" (professor Dorn's own word - as if it was a commercial venture), the CAF could provide  small cadre of trainers and train a group of young Canadians in military bed making, basic platoon drill without arms, uniform pressing and how to look good in dress uniform, followed by half a day of training and range training on the C7 (no scope - too military looking) to get them scared of their own weapons, followed by 11 weeks of training in "Schoolyard Bullying De-escalation theory", "Courtroom Conflict Resolution", "Mediating the Commercial Conflict", and "Negotiation the Trump way: The Art of the Deal". then they would be ready for Peacekeeping deployment.

We could call this Youth Corp the "C.Y.S.I.S", for Canadian Youth for Self Inflicted Suicide.


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## Journeyman (3 Feb 2016)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> First, am I the only one who thinks that someone who works with the CCPA or the Rideau Institute should be barred (or fired) from teaching at Staff College?


For clarity, he doesn't work for them, but his points of view are very amenable to theirs, which means he's often published/cited by them.

As for barring him from Staff College work....it would be an interesting call.  It's much the same as the folks here who repetitively post their same left-wing drivel ...and who get beat-up immediately by those posting their self-same right-wing drivel -- should both ends of the political spectrum be banned? Sure, it would probably make for better discussion amongst those remaining, but in the end I think discussion is better informed by all opinions; some will just get filtered out sooner than others.

As for CFC in particular, it may actually be a good thing having a kumbaya cheerleader differing point of view -- some students may have become isolated from more broad reading and exposure to other considerations; for some topics, like the UN, peacekeeping, arms control/disarmament, etc, someone like Dorn is beneficial.


We just accept that we're not likely to cross many paths in our social circles.


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## dapaterson (3 Feb 2016)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> A few points:
> 
> First, am I the only one who thinks that someone who works with the CCPA or the Rideau Institute should be barred (or fired) from teaching at Staff College?



Hopefully you are.

If Staff College becomes nothing but a self-reinforcing echo chamber, where alternatives are not presented or discussed, where intellectual monoculture rules the day, where students absorb by rote Truth (with a Capital T) then it is a failure as an institution.

Do I agree with Dr Dorn?  No. But I would much rather have the leaders of the CAF exposed to such viewpoints so they can review, assess, and come to their own conclusions.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (3 Feb 2016)

I may not have expressed myself correctly here, and for that I apologize.

My point is not that point of views like Dr. Dorn should not be expressed at various military advanced teaching institutions. They should, but in my view, as visiting lecturers in seminars within the course curriculum, and not as faculty.

The reason for not having them as faculty is the standard labour rule against conflict of interest. How can you be someone basically advocating the opposite to what the institution you work for stands for itself? An analogy would be: As a country, would you employ as one of your diplomats someone who is associated and an exponent of the concept that countries should be abolished and a single world dominion established? In training of your diplomats, exposing them to such a view so they know it and learn how to deal with it is appropriate, but not employment as one of your diplomats. That's all I was saying.


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## Edward Campbell (3 Feb 2016)

I think it's OK, maybe even more than just OK in academe and in the media. It's like when Conrad Black hired Linda McQuaig to write for the (then newly founded) _National Post_. Lord Black intended it to be a _*conservative*_ voice in what he saw as a sea of _Liberal_ and NDP opinion, but he also knew he wanted (and needed) a "loony left" voice to counter and "balance" his publisher's and editors' _*conservative*_ biases. I think some universities hire some professors for similar reasons ~ to have several points of view represented, from outright Marxists to slavish adherents to the Austrian and Ayn Rand schools of thought.

One has to hope that readers and students, especially Staff College level students ~ essentially people doing or able to do graduate degree level thinking ~ can sort out the differences.


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## dave.jones3 (3 Feb 2016)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> The reason for not having them as faculty is the standard labour rule against conflict of interest. How can you be someone basically advocating the opposite to what the institution you work for stands for itself? An analogy would be: As a country, would you employ as one of your diplomats someone who is associated and an exponent of the concept that countries should be abolished and a single world dominion established? In training of your diplomats, exposing them to such a view so they know it and learn how to deal with it is appropriate, but not employment as one of your diplomats. That's all I was saying.



I mean, in defense of Dorn, and to counter your point a bit, "the institution" he works for takes direction from the federal government. The institution he works for stands for whatever the government says it does... If the federal government says that peacekeeping is back, that's kind of the way it breaks - even if it isn't an optimal outcome. 

As an aside, I'm currently writing a thesis on the CF, COIN and how stupid a return to the peacekeeping paradigm is, so this report has provided me with 72 pages of stuff to criticize. I'm quite happy.


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## Journeyman (3 Feb 2016)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think some universities hire some professors for similar reasons ~ to have several points of view represented, from outright Marxists to slavish adherents to the Austrian and Ayn Rand schools of thought.


Not that I've seen too often -- there appears to be a strong perception of 'hire only those like _us_.'  

Those Canadian universities that have any appreciable military programs are based on receiving funding via the Security and Defence Forum; the other faculty don't like those 'knuckle-dragging war-mongers,' but it brings in money from the equally-evil, oppressive government.


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## jollyjacktar (3 Feb 2016)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I may not have expressed myself correctly here, and for that I apologize.
> 
> My point is not that point of views like Dr. Dorn should not be expressed at various military advanced teaching institutions. They should, but in my view, as visiting lecturers in seminars within the course curriculum, and not as faculty.
> 
> The reason for not having them as faculty is the standard labour rule against conflict of interest. How can you be someone basically advocating the opposite to what the institution you work for stands for itself? An analogy would be: As a country, would you employ as one of your diplomats someone who is associated and an exponent of the concept that countries should be abolished and a single world dominion established? In training of your diplomats, exposing them to such a view so they know it and learn how to deal with it is appropriate, but not employment as one of your diplomats. That's all I was saying.



Well, we let the Bloc run as a party and sit in the HoC.  Not to mention their provincial counterparts that are working to undermine the country.


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## ArmyRick (3 Feb 2016)

Having read that article, I was kind of not sure the word, same reaction I had to seeing my five year old putting his tobbogan on top of the slide when it was covered in ice and getting ready to use it as a snow board. Not a good idea, not very well thought out or any real thought at all.

Kind of like Mr Dorn's thoughts on "peacekeeping". Or if he is CBCs latest comedian, than woops, I misunderstood the context of the article.

Progression not regression

I was also very disheartened by the comments attached to that article


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## CombatDoc (3 Feb 2016)

"Over the past decade, Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have experienced a major decline in training and education for peacekeeping operations (PKOs), also known as peace support operations (PSOs) or simply peace operations. "

An interesting melange of terminology, whereby Prof. Dorn equates PKO = PSO = peace. Certainly in my mind these are three distinct items, and the third (peace) can result from winning at war-fighting.


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## PuckChaser (3 Feb 2016)

For a staff college professor, he seems to have never heard of the Three-Block-War concept that I was taught as a young Pte/Cpl in the early 2000s.


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## dapaterson (3 Feb 2016)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> For a staff college professor, he seems to have never heard of the Three-Block-War concept that I was taught as a young Pte/Cpl in the early 2000s.



Google "Dorn Three Block War"

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/07-dornvarey-eng.asp


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## daftandbarmy (3 Feb 2016)

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Is it just me or does this report seem like a slap in the face to the OMLT, POMLT, etc folks who worked with, and trained, Afghan authorities during OPs ATHENA and ATTENTION?  I'm pretty sure we did some negotiation, conflict management and resolution there as well.
> 
> http://www.theglobeandmail.com//news/national/military-ill-prepared-for-peacekeeping-report/article28505963/?cmpid=rss1&click=sf_globefb



I would argue that this article is yet more proof that the G&M, like most Canadian media, is ill prepared to comment on anything related to Canada's military.


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## Colin Parkinson (5 Feb 2016)

I will agree that the current generation might be ill-prepared to dealing with just how useless the UN bureaucracy is.


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## Kirkhill (31 Jan 2018)

Bump

An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.




> No one was sure at first the concept would work--not in the summer of 1966. The village of Binh Nghia, in Quang Ngai province, was a battleground. The district chief at Binh Son was responsible to the province chief for the state of affairs at Binh Nghia and several other villages. He estimated that, during the past several years, 750 young men from that village had joined main-force VC units. Two independent VC companies and one full battalion were roaming the district. Of the 4,575 persons in the villages, 600 were known VC sympathizers. So the decision by the 7th Marines to establish a Combined Action Company in Binh Nghia was not made without an acknowledgement of the hazards involved.
> 
> Something had to be done. The morale of the local Popular Forces platoon was low and ebbing fast. They had been hit by the VC so often that their confidence was shattered. The enemy held the offensive and controlled the daily lives of the civilians. The guerrillas worked and lived at home, banding together at night for military excursions and political activities. Full-time regulars of the Viet Cong main force units entered Binh Nghia at will to seek supplies or hold meetings. Marine patrols and ambushes, operating from remote combat bases, made contact often, killing many soldiers and disrupting movements of large forces. But that alone was not enough. The villager scurried about with averted eyes, and the PFs clung to the shallow safety of their fort. It was obvious who controlled Binh Nghia.
> 
> ...



http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fast-rifles-0


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## pbi (31 Jan 2018)

Having worked at CFC when Walter was one of a very small crew of academics there, I can say that despite his endless UN cheerleading he is in the long run fairly harmless. The students there are at the rank of Maj/LCdr at least (higher in the senior courses) and one would hope capable of judging Dr, Dorn on his merits (or lack thereof). IMHO much of what he says is rubbish, but that is just me.

Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors. If you ever wonder  about military leadership in this  country, look at the place that produces them. 

I was always glad that I was a graduate of Quantico and not Toronto. Ar least the Marines are not ashamed of being warfighters.


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## Journeyman (1 Feb 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors.


Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")


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## Piece of Cake (1 Feb 2018)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")



Could you please show me this fine print. 

In Canada, the Senate of an University has legal authority to grant degrees.  In the case of CFC / RMC it is federal authority from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959. The Master of Defense Studies is an accredited degree, however it may be viewed as a professional degree - ie MBA, MPA, MD, LLB, JD ect - as opposed to an academic degree - ie BA, BSc, MA, MSc, PHD, ect -.


**** correction **** In the case of CFC / RMC it is provincial authority - the province of Ontario - from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959


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## Journeyman (1 Feb 2018)

Piece of Cake said:
			
		

> Could you please show me this fine print.



I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits _may_  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)

Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.

I stand corrected.....

[edit] maybe.  Re-reading, it appears that they are only referring to the _potential_  acceptability of MDS credits to other RMC/CFC programs, and do not speak for civilian universities.


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## Piece of Cake (2 Feb 2018)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits _may_  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)
> 
> Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.
> 
> ...



It is difficult to get into a PhD program at any university with a professional Master degree.  This is partly due to most professional Master are course based and not thesis based.  While there is a directed research option with the MDS, most universities would not consider this option as meeting 'independent thinking' that comes from a thesis based Master. With this being said, it is possible if one's undergrad GPA was high and in the same course of study of the PhD one was looking to pursue.


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## daftandbarmy (2 Feb 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Bump
> 
> An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.
> 
> ...



Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?

Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.


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## Kirkhill (2 Feb 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?
> 
> Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.



My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).

That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.

Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.


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## pbi (2 Feb 2018)

I bitterly resist the school of thought that tries to depict peacekeeping as some kind of military black art requiring that the initiates partake of the grail of "Specialist Peacekeeping Training", or something.

IMHO (and after three UN PK Ops in the Good Old Days) this is just rubbish. But, of course, quite useful rubbish if you are touting for a course or a training establishment built around that idea.

Granted there may be a few TMST skills that need to be trained up, but I am firm in believing that well disciplined, combat trained professional soldiers who know their business (and LOOK like they know it...) are your best bet for any PKO.  The experience and common sense that a long-service Army brings to these ops is what, in my opinion, makes all the difference.

And, I think, many of the skills needed for successful COIN translate quite nicely to PKO as well.

What I would invest my training time in (other than good soldier skills) is making sure that all ranks have a solid understanding of the situation in the AO, who the players are, and how things got the way they are. That knowledge is, in my opinion, worth the time spent on it.

Let's avoid "niche-ism" at all costs.


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## OldSolduer (2 Feb 2018)

pbi I will agree.

The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days. 

We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.


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## pbi (2 Feb 2018)

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> pbi I will agree.
> 
> The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days.
> 
> We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.



Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.


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## daftandbarmy (2 Feb 2018)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).
> 
> That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.
> 
> Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.



One of my COs had been in the Malayan job with the Royal Marines. His secret of success? 

It went along the lines of: "We starved them out then hunted them down."

The US could never separate the guerilla from access to resources in the same way they could in Malaya.


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## Kirkhill (2 Feb 2018)

> *By October, the action had slackened. The unrelenting pressure on the guerrillas was telling*. Consistency is a primary ingredient for a successful pacification, and every single night the Marines and PFs would set out a least three ambushes in Binh Nghia. Their full attack of Fort Page did not bring the enemy the respite they had anticipated. In fact, it had precisely the opposite effect. Not only did the enemy continue to encounter pressure form the CACO unit within the village, but, in addition, his sanctuary to the south across the river became the favorite hunting ground for two Marine rifle companies.
> 
> Acceptance
> 
> ...



The article I quoted seems to address the need for, and the means to achieving, separation of the community from the guerillas.  It also addresses the notion of a quick-fix.  There isn't one.  It requires a long term commitment by all participants - and it requires soldiers, not social workers.  But the soldiers need to be extraordinary in their abilities - self-disciplined, motivated, capable and willing to work with the locals.

By the way - re concussion - I assume that that infers no Marine had yet been hit over the head with a two by four.


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## OldSolduer (2 Feb 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.



For FRY we went to Fort Ord. It was needed and necessary. A few of the troops used that training in Sep 1993.


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## Colin Parkinson (6 Feb 2018)

What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London.


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## daftandbarmy (7 Feb 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London.



And it took 20 years, and was one of the reasons that Britain delayed giving up 'National Service' post WW2. 

And it's still not 'over', over. Seriously. 

Regardless, this is a good read by Rand: 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf


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## Edward Campbell (7 Feb 2018)

My favourite book on the topic is Brig Richard Clutterbuck's "The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam" published back in 1966. 

As I recall it was a gift from and older, much more senior officer who was, probably, tired of my questions about the nature of counter-insurgency (a subject about which he had more than just a passing familiarity). Many, many of us were fascinated with what was happening in Viet Nam in the mid 1960s but we had too few experienced Canadian officers to guide us.

I am not happy with the notion that _Malaya = Viet Nam_ or even than _Malaya ≈ Viet Nam_; they were both insurgencies but, there, especially after the French left with their tails between their legs, most similarities ended. That being said, how one "sees" an insurgency (top down or bottom up) matters, and I believe that the Brits, from Templar on down, understood what they really meant by "winning hearts and minds." Clutterbuck, for example, gives special emphasis to the role of the (native) village police constable as the very beating heart of a successful COIN campaign and he explains why the Army's job is to support and protect that constable ~ not the other way 'round. I'm far less convinced that "hearts and minds" was ever anything for than a slogan, to be repeated mindlessly, to e.g. Maxwell Taylor and William Westmorland. 

At the very top, at the US president/UK prime minister level, I believe that John F Kennedy was more interested in the use of power than in the fate of Viet Nam or in America's interests in Asia. In London, however, Clement Atlee (1945-51) and Winston Churchill (1951-55) had many other more difficult issues than an insurgency in a far distant colony and they let their career civil servants, e.g. Sir Robert Thompson, and generals, e.g. Briggs and Templar, to sort things out ... the central government contented itself with supporting them, politically and logistically, as best it could. That may have been more good luck than good management but, I believe, it was a _*the*_ key difference in the two campaigns.

A second fundamental difference, in my opinion, was in the nature of the two _proconsuls_: I remain convinced that Maxwell Taylor was, at best, a second rate general who just happened to have "good" political connections and a keen sense of self promotion while Gerald Templar was a solid, albeit unspectacular officer who a) inherited the basics of a good plan from Briggs; b) got GREAT strategic and policy guidance from Thompson and c) understood the very nature of that particular insurgency, which is to say that he actually understood and even somewhat sympathized with the legitimate grievances of the Malay-Chinese.

My  :2c:  the 1960s were long, long ago but 'The Long, Long War' is still worth a read.


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## Colin Parkinson (7 Feb 2018)

I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.


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## daftandbarmy (7 Feb 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.



The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)

The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.


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## Blackadder1916 (7 Feb 2018)

An interesting discussion.  A couple of shorter pieces that may be of interest to the topic are:

Extracting Counterinsurgency lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan
https://rusi.org/commentary/extracting-counterinsurgency-lessons-malayan-emergency-and-afghanistan

And from DARPA/Rand circa 1972 (some interesting perspectives as the USA was still in Vietnam)

The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf

Plus,

Comparison of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War and Application of Lessons to Solve El Salvador Problems and Appropriate U.S. Military Assistance    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a182811.pdf

While not a very in-depth analysis, it does add a perspective of a Malaysian officer (my assumption due to his name) attending a US Army staff course in 1987.  It caught my attention because a few short years later, I had occasion to attended a US Army course where two of my fellow international (read foreign) students were a Malaysian Capt (doctor with Special Forces battalion) and an El Salvadoran Capt (Med Svc Corps but former Inf who transferred after being wounded).  During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.

And this which was reviewed favourably in Canadian Military Journal several years ago.
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl, University of Chicago Press, 2002


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## Cloud Cover (7 Feb 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  :
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)
> 
> The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.



Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?


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## daftandbarmy (7 Feb 2018)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?



A lot, their jungles just aren't very close to their main enemy, and the primary threat to Australia's sphere of influence in that area: Indonesia.

They have an interesting alliance with Singapore too.


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## pbi (8 Feb 2018)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.



Last year I was part of a team from CASC which delivered a Campaign Planning Course at several international locations, in support of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation. One of the places we did the course was at the Colombian Army's Combined Arms Centre in Bogota. I had the opportunity to work closely with a Col of Artillery of the Colombian Army  who shadowed us on behalf of their CAC.

Apart from being an extremely knowledgeable and professional officer with bags of combat experience (both as a Gunner and "dismounted" in the Inf Role) he was very knowledgeable about COIN, specifically the nasty war against FARC and the FLN. Not only was he fully versed in the tactics of it, but he clearly understood the strategic and political implications in the Western Hemisphere. It was a real honour and professional experience to have met him. (and had a few drinks...!!! [cheers]

I was so impressed by him that I felt he would be an excellent speaker on COIN at CACSC, if only to break the habit of Brit or US speakers. I suggested his name to the Cmdt of CACSC, who received it well but I'm not sure what happened after that. There are many perspectives on COIN and they aren't all from the Anglosphere.


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## pbi (8 Feb 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> A lot, their jungles just aren't very close to their main enemy, and the primary threat to Australia's sphere of influence in that area: Indonesia.
> 
> They have an interesting alliance with Singapore too.


Yes: they used to call the Indonesian-based enemy  "Mesaurians".


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## daftandbarmy (8 Feb 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> Yes: they used to call the Indonesian-based enemy  "Mesaurians".



I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.


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## jollyjacktar (8 Feb 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.



Go big or go home?


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## daftandbarmy (8 Feb 2018)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Go big or go home?



Definitely. They had M79s apparently but were usually instantly outgunned, so they apparently took to launching an immediate assault so they could close the distance quickly before the mortars could range on them.

I heard similar experiences from guys who faced enemy troops equipped with AK 47s in the jungle. Up close, 7.62 x 39mm is the same caliber and has a pretty similar capability as a C6, so they had to develop drills where the C6 was near the front of the 'snake' so they could match the bad guys' firepower and close quickly.


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## Colin Parkinson (9 Feb 2018)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.



Clearly they didn't get the memo that infantry run mortars are obsolete........


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## TangoTwoBravo (9 Feb 2018)

Tangent. I went through the original article, which was fun to do after two years.

I recently served for a year in a UN mission. I was an unarmed patroller for four months (great fun) and then Chief of Operations for eight months (hard work). We were a small observer mission OPCON to a much larger armed mission (a divisional structure with 10,000 troops, a helo sqn and a naval task group). I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.

UN peacekeeping has evolved since the 90s. Our experience in Afghanistan would not be a hindrance in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Tough, disciplined, well-led and well-equipped troops will always be an asset to the UN wherever they come from. Three of the battalions in the force that I worked alongside were from NATO nations with long-standing commitments to Afghanistan. I was always happy to see them. I reflected at the time that a Canadian BG would have done extremely well, as would a Canadian Bde as a Sector HQ and our Div as the core of the Force HQ. The BG would have to go through a training program that would start with conventional combined arms training and culminate in a realistic UN-based exercise, but we are very good at generating and training battle groups. 

The senior leadership and staff officers would benefit from some professional development (PD) regarding UN integrated missions and the vital role of UN civilian staff on such missions - nothing too difficult for leaders trained in the comprehensive approach for Afghanistan. Some officers and NCOs would benefit from more detailed PD (those in the G9 world) but again, nothing too complicated. If I was able to navigate the integrated HQ then anybody can. 

It would be an adjustment to be an impartial UN peacekeeper, but there is a road to deployment to allow you to get in the mindset. I am not saying that we should or should not do this, but rather that our leadership and troops would excel at it. 

Back to talking about mortars in the Malayan jungles...


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## pbi (12 Feb 2018)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ... I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.
> 
> UN peacekeeping has evolved since the 90s. Our experience in Afghanistan would not be a hindrance in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Tough, disciplined, well-led and well-equipped troops will always be an asset to the UN wherever they come from.
> 
> It would be an adjustment to be an impartial UN peacekeeper, but there is a road to deployment to allow you to get in the mindset. I am not saying that we should or should not do this, but rather that our leadership and troops would excel at it.



I am also 100% sure these observations are correct, even though I am well past my best-before date. These were always my observations on my UN missions. I really don't see how anything else can be true. I recently read an article concerning the UN's intentions to improve the security of it's peacekeepers.The article included this paragraph:



> These include (1) changing mindsets so that personnel are aware of the risks and empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks; (2) improving capacities so that the mission and personnel are equipped and trained to operate in high-threat environments; (3) achieving a “threat sensitive mission footprint” that is aligned with mission mandates and limits the exposure of the mission to threat; and (4) enhancing accountability to ensure that those able to take actions to prevent fatalities and injuries live up to their responsibilities.



Or, in other words, pretty much what you would expect from a disciplined professional army with a solid basis in combat training (as T2B suggests), but with the usual TMST to orient to the task at hand.

IMHO it is very important to consider the approach and mindset that Prof Dorn (and others like him...) likely come from.  I will hazard a guess that this includes a visceral opposition to the Afghan War; a dislike and suspicion of the US military; and an almost religious view of the UN. I could be wrong but I bet I'm not.


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## daftandbarmy (12 Feb 2018)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Tangent. I went through the original article, which was fun to do after two years.
> 
> I recently served for a year in a UN mission. I was an unarmed patroller for four months (great fun) and then Chief of Operations for eight months (hard work). We were a small observer mission OPCON to a much larger armed mission (a divisional structure with 10,000 troops, a helo sqn and a naval task group). I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.
> 
> ...



Our military has always been prepared however, as we've seen in places like Somalia and FRY, our political masters - and the Canadian public to whom they answer - are not.

As this article suggests, one caution about Malaya (if I can head back into the green vomit briefly) is that:

"To attempt to borrow lessons from the Emergency is to ignore the fact that many of the strategies practiced by the British would be considered abhorrent by Western liberal sensibilities today, including the forcible resettlement of populations."

http://warisboring.com/were-getting-the-malaysia-counterinsurgency-all-wrong/


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## pbi (12 Feb 2018)

> As this article suggests, one caution about Malaya (if I can head back into the green vomit briefly) is that:



It's probably also worth repeating that Malaya presented a set of unique circumstances which probably won't be repeated exactly again, and which IMHO tended to work in favour of the British. But, definitely one of the very key factors that aided the British was an army consisting either of units which were composed wholly of professionals; or of National Servicemen led by cadres of professional officers and NCOs.


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## Colin Parkinson (12 Feb 2018)

Not to mention with that resettlement came a path of citizenship and land rights, which few of the people moved enjoyed prior to Emergency.


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## pbi (15 Feb 2018)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Not to mention with that resettlement came a path of citizenship and land rights, which few of the people moved enjoyed prior to Emergency.



Definitely: it pulled some of the rug out from under the guerillas, along with the announcement of independence.  A few more:

-the guerillas were mainly ethnic Chinese, who were not well liked or trusted by the Malay people: it was not really a "popular uprising" of Malays;

-the land mass of Malaya was relatively easy to isolate, thus making resupply and safe haven more difficult for the guerillas; and

-the British already had a long-standing colonial administration including police structures. This  was disrupted by the Japanese occupation, but it gave the Brits a solid base of  corporate knowledge and understanding which was an advantage.


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