# Ruxted on Afghanistan Post-2009



## ruxted (27 Aug 2007)

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Afghanistan Post-2009

In a recent _Globe and Mail_ column Christie Blatchford succinctly describes a strategy the Government of Canada needs to make its own. She quotes Canadian Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) commander Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Eyre as saying, “We're teaching them to function on their own … we've got to create something that's going to last after we depart. And we have to leave some time." That sums up the next phase of Canada’s military mission: helping the Afghans build lasting security as a preparatory step to securing the victory and bringing the troops home.

It is evident that there will be no consensus in Canada’s parliament for continuing the current commitment of a battle group in combat operations in Kandahar, despite the fact that this is a just war, as we have said, a good war. Too few politicians have any real concern for Canada’s vital interests – not compared to gaining short term political advantage.

Despite the overblown political rhetoric, most Canadians want to continue helping with Afghan development, they want us to keep the commitment we made to the Afghans. The work Canadians want to do is being done by CIDA and the military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, but it must be clear that unless the Canadian battle group is replaced by another which is just as capable then the Taliban and the other insurgents will prevent that. Few NGOs are willing to go to Kandahar to do their good works even with one of the toughest, most effective military forces in the world providing the security. The few who are there will cut and run if the Canadian battle group is replaced with a less capable force – as most ISAF forces will be.

The Canadian Forces and Canadian diplomats, aid workers and police officers can win the war in Afghanistan but we are very likely to be defeated in Canada, by Canadians – if we are forced to withdraw. We can win if the mission evolves – as most military planners apparently think it is doing – but we cannot win if we run away and hide.

If the Parliament of Canada refuses to renew the combat mission then the best possible solution is for the British, or someone very like them, to move in to Kandahar to pick up the combat role and for Canada to radically expand its PRT and OMLT.  Both need increased combat power:  the PRT needs more combat power to protect its project teams and the OMLT needs formed sub-units to integrate into and work with the Afghan _kandaks_ (battalion sized units) to continue to strengthen their effectiveness so that, sooner rather than later, they can carry most of the security burden in Kandahar – without too much Canadian help. There is an old saying about nothing succeeding like success. Our mission will be accomplished when the Afghan national Army (ANA)  succeeds. It is more likely to do that sooner if it has some integral Canadian combat support – maybe artillery, tank, engineer, infantry, reconnaissance and command/control communications  support.

There are also plenty of functions inside the wire at Kandahar Airfield which should stay in place to support the Canadians PRT and mentors and the Afghan National Army units.

We need to reduce the total numbers in Afghanistan so that we have adequate numbers of military personnel available in Canada for the 2010 Winter Olympics. At the same time we need to integrate our forces more tightly with the ANA and we need to improve the cooperation between a better trained ANA and a steadily improving, Canadian mentored Afghan National Police (ANP) in Kandahar. In essence we need a combined AFCAN brigade – mostly ANA units with a few hundred Canadians, in formed combat sub units and as individuals, ‘seeded’ throughout the headquarters staffs, combat units and logistics units. Our soldiers need to ‘live rough’ with the Afghans – depending upon a much smaller National Support Element (NSE). But: our sophisticated equipment still needs to be supported and maintained; the fuel and ammunition need to flow; and excellent medical care – from rifle platoon medic through to base hospital - needs to be available, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week). An educated _guess_ is that we could do the job, in and after 2009, with 1,500 troops in the AFCAN brigade, the PRT and the national Command and Support Elements. There will still be fighting; there will still be casualties; but the cause is just and the war is winnable. Initially, in 2009/2010 we will still have tanks and LAVs in theatre. Gradually, as the ANA improves – as it can improve under firm tutelage – our heavy weapons and combat soldiers will come home, followed, later, by light infantry soldiers and combat service support personnel and the command and control elements.

Prime Minister Harper should tell parliament that he will not seek a resolution to extend the current combat mission past February 2009; he should tell NATO that, too.  He should also tell Canada’s parliament and NATO that, subject to NATO providing acceptable security forces in Kandahar, Canada will beef up both its PRT and OMLT to conduct the next phase of its mission – the phase focused on strengthening the Afghans’ abilities to manage their own affairs in their own way.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (27 Aug 2007)

Let's not tear down Afghan gains

Aug 27, 2007 04:30 AM 
Rosie DiManno 

Just four months ago, I stood on the crest of Ghundy Ghar, in the company of Canadian snipers, surveying a valley that was lush, thriving and, in the context of Southern Afghanistan, remarkably calm.
Our troops held the high ground, firmly.

Others had fought for it, the previous autumn and winter, but the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Recce squadron, had made the crucial vantage point habitable, secure, battening down the hatches and clearing the approach road of mines. They had eyes on, through the telescopic sights of rifles and surveillance radar. Regularly, in convoys, they patrolled the larger area – a crucial chunk of Zhari district criss-crossed by dirt trails used to hustle out opium and muster in fighters. It was this Canadian presence that had the insurgents on their heels. They couldn't tyrannize at will.
Last week, two Van Doos were killed trying to retake that position.

What happened, in so brief a span? Short answer: Canadian troops left.

They turned Ghundy Ghar over to Afghan national security forces – an Army encampment at the bottom of the hill, Afghan police checkpoints along the arterial road on the northern bank of the Arghandab River. Gift-wrapped it for the Afghans. And they couldn't hold it. Couldn't even prevent insurrectionists from planting massive improvised explosive devices right inside what had been the Canadian compound.

"It just goes to show, in this complex country, in this complex terrain, how easy it is for insurgents to slip back into an area and intimidate the locals, in a short period of time,'' Gen. Rick Hillier told the Star on Friday.
"We've countered that in a variety of ways. Long term, the most important way is to grow the Afghan army and police. We're light years ahead of where we were last September and not as far advanced as we will be come Christmas. But there's a long way to go.''

Two Afghan battalions have been trained, one already in the field. They've certainly showed willing, more so than Afghan police who are notoriously corrupt but also infrequently paid. Neither army nor police are properly equipped.
Ghundy Ghar is a microcosm of the peril that Afghanistan faces when, as seems increasingly certain, Canadian troops depart combustible Kandahar in early 2009, hard-won military successes crushed on the anvil of domestic politics back home.

It happens repeatedly, all over the southern provinces where the neo-Taliban has been most resurgent. Villagers come back, when they feel NATO troops have pacified the environment, rural life is resurrected, families start sending their children to school, the local economy begins to percolate. Then, NATO withdraws from a location, either because they have pressing assignments elsewhere – Recce squadron was rotated to Spin Boldak – or because somebody decides the time is ripe for handoff to Afghan forces.
It was Afghan civilians who'd pleaded for Canadians to return last week.

Transferring security to Afghan forces, as long-term masters in their own house, has been promoted as the best pullout strategy for foreign troops. But the long-term is disastrously short-term, with political pressure in Canada – and other NATO countries – guaranteed to dismantle the incremental gains. Politicians, with their eyes on opinion polls, lack the backbone of soldiers. A great many Canadians have grown weary of the whole involvement, because Afghanistan is far away, theoretical, not worth Canadian lives.
Some, I think, perversely covet defeat, dead soldiers exploited as little more than ideological clubs with which to batter the mission.

Abandoning Afghanistan prematurely, on some arbitrary deadline, really will mean that those Canadians died in vain.


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## Brockvegas (27 Aug 2007)

"Politicians, with their eyes on opinion polls, lack the backbone of soldiers."

This is the most accurate description of our current situation I have ever read. Someone needs to put that on a bumper sticker.


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## forcerecon85 (28 Aug 2007)

two great articles. I really hope somehow our government will let our troops finish the job. Its sad to think that some politicians rather be re-elected if it means their countries troops have die in vain. Lets finish the job.


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## MarkOttawa (28 Aug 2007)

A damn' interesting proposal--but as long as there is a significant combat function (esp. with tanks and artillery) I just can't see the opposition parties supporting it--esp. at a troop level of 1,500.

Mark
Ottawa


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## Edward Campbell (4 Sep 2007)

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> A damn' interesting proposal--but as long as there is a significant combat function (esp. with tanks and artillery) I just can't see the opposition parties supporting it--esp. at a troop level of 1,500.
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa



IF Prime Minister Harper was serious when he said, a few months back, that he hoped the opposition would _see the light_ and support a sustained mission in Afghanistan then it seems to me that he can and should try to _finesse_ a revised mission through parliament - not a full battle group conducting combat operations but, rather, a more robust PRT - able to defend its projects in a dangerous area, and an _integrated_ AFCAN security force - with the Canadian component diminishing as the Afghans gain capabilities.

He should say, loudly and clearly, that he will not leave a defenceless Canadian PRT to do nothing but act as targets for the Taliban.  If they cannot have beefed up security then they withdraw - at the Liberal Partyt's behest - with the battle group in early 2009. 

He should say, equally loudly and clearly, that unless we make the Afghans capable of securing their own country for their own, elected government then we will have failed and done nothing more than wasted 70 lives for Liberal politics.

This would put the Liberals in a bind and they might have to support a robust _development_ mission or risk being tarred with causing a total failure and a waste of lives.


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