# Student Mistakenly Ejects From Harvard II



## crazyleggs (5 Apr 2007)

From the Moose Jaw Times Herald

http://www.mjtimes.sk.ca/index.cfm?sid=21165&sc=3

A student NATO Flying Training in Canada pilot training program was ejected from the Harvard II aircraft he was in as it was on the ground at 15 Wing Wednesday morning.
    The student and an instructor — both Canadians whose names have not been released — were on the ground preparing to taxi when the incident occurred at 8:57 a.m.
    “The (ejection) seat worked as advertised,” said Lt.-Col. Paul Goddard, acting commander for 15 Wing. “The parachute opened and (the student) landed here on the ramp.”
    The instructor remained inside the plane.
    Both were taken to Moose Jaw Union Hospital with minor cuts and bruises and were released shortly after noon.
    It is not yet known what caused the student to eject, but Goddard said he was new to the NFTC.        
    “He was just beginning Phase 2 (of military pilot training) and it was his first flight in the aircraft.”
    The student, who completed Phase 1 on the Grob G-120 in Portage La Prairie, Man., last fall, has about 40 hours of combined experience on single-engine military and civilian aircraft, said 15 Wing spokeswoman Lt. (Navy) Petra Smith.
    He would also have had four practice flights in a CT-156 Harvard II simulator, as well as extensive emergency and ejection training, before Wednesday’s flight, she confirmed.
    The only damage to the aircraft was caused by the student detonating an explosive cord to blow apart the canopy and propel his ejection seat into the air.
    None of the surrounding aircraft were affected.
    A Canadian Forces Flight Safety team is currently investigating the incident, the first ejection by a 15 Wing student pilot since May 14, 2004.        
    It is not yet known when, or if, the student will return to the NFTC training program.
    “While the incident is certainly unfortunate, I think it highlights the excellent equipment and reliability and outstanding maintenance that goes along with the assets here that support the (NFTC),” said Goddard.
    All flights on Harvard aircraft were suspended after the incident and pilots were to remain grounded until at least 9 a.m. today.
    Snowbirds pilots, as well as students and instructors flying the CT-155 Hawk trainer, resumed normal operations around 1 p.m. Thursday.


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## 284_226 (5 Apr 2007)

"Hmmmm....what's this button do?"


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## gaspasser (5 Apr 2007)

Well...that blows!


From the report, it looks like it might have been a malfunction.
Whether human or mechanical is up to the BOI.
But one thing is "fur sur".....ooops!
........do over? op:


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## dardt (5 Apr 2007)

Well I'm glad everyone is OK, that must have been one hell of a ride.


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## Journeyman (5 Apr 2007)

Probably joined to be airborne...and got stuck with pilot; hitting the 'exit' button is as close as he's going to get.

But now he's got a "jump story," so at least his sex life will pick up   ;D


Commence dogpile ;D


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## Zoomie (5 Apr 2007)

I wonder if that mishap qualifies him for entry into the Martin-Baker tie club...


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## Barracuda13 (5 Apr 2007)

that's really unfortunate, if it was a malfunction, too bad for the technicians i guess , if it was student's mistake too bad for him. 
I actually watched the video of the 2004 ejection yesterday , a bird flies into the hawk's engine intake , it is on youtube.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuLcVkW4YVg


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## Jammer (5 Apr 2007)

...the yellow handle ISN'T to set the brake!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


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## gaspasser (5 Apr 2007)

That was kind of cool in a sick morbid curiositic way?!?!


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## Mike Baker (5 Apr 2007)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Probably joined to be airborne...and got stuck with pilot; hitting the 'exit' button is as close as he's going to get.
> 
> But now he's got a "jump story," so at least his sex life will pick up   ;D
> 
> ...


  :rofl: :rofl:


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## Smurfjet (5 Apr 2007)

Will this earn him the callsign eject?


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## kratz (5 Apr 2007)

I know it is a training accident, but I have to ask, what is the cost of the error? How much to get the ejection system (seat/canopy ect) reset for the next use? and all other costs for this error?

Edit: This is a rhetorical question. I was trying to get people thinking about how much an "oops" can cost even in training.


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## Rigger (6 Apr 2007)

Apparently the pinky is stronger than anybody thinks... Glad to here he is OK. In the old days an accident like that would have written of the A/C. Replace the canopy and seat (and 2 pair of underware) and shes good to go. Way cheaper than a multi million dollar plane.


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## SupersonicMax (6 Apr 2007)

RiggerFE said:
			
		

> Apparently the pinky is stronger than anybody thinks... Glad to here he is OK. In the old days an accident like that would have written of the A/C. Replace the canopy and seat (and 2 pair of underware) and shes good to go. Way cheaper than a multi million dollar plane.



The thumb you mean 

Are you sure it's only a matter of replacing the seat and the canopy?  I'm *guessing* there is going to be a lot of inspections involved for overstress and all the systems in the cockpits (because of the heat generated by the rockets).  

Amazing how Martin Baker makes good ejection seats...  I was talking to the guy 2-3 hours after the incident...  

Max


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## Bograt (6 Apr 2007)

Wait until the initial report is released. SP and IP are fine. DFS has cleared the aircraft for Tuesday to resume training flights.

Seat works as advertised.


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## BernDawg (6 Apr 2007)

Remember the order will be eject, eject, eje...... What the fu.....  ;D


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## skinnadoor (17 Apr 2007)

Wonder how loud it sounded to the instructor.......


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## Inch (18 Apr 2007)

IIRC, it's a pretty substantial pull to get the seat to go, something in the neighbourhood of a 40 lb pull on the handle, you really need to be pulling it to get it to go.

I recall many times trying to get my safety pin in only to realize I was hanging on to the handle while searching for tiny hole the safety pin went into.


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## Bograt (18 Apr 2007)

Inch, Zoomie Dewy et al, I would keep an eye out for the next Flight Directorate.

It appears that the SP accidentally looped the communication cord through the handle then attached it to his crew 60. As he rotated his body right to left to pick something off his left lap, the tension was such enough to set the chair off.

Coms cords in the Harvard have since been "leashed" so that there isn't 18 inches of slack.

Imagine, first flight, with helmet mask (that inhibits view)- winter kit, stress of your first flight... and an extra long coms cord. 

Lesson learned.


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## Inch (18 Apr 2007)

We've been flying Harvards for 7 years now, never has this been a concern. Many, many people have gone before this guy with out having a problem. To blame it on equipment and not improper strap in technique is a little off the mark. When I went through, you made sure that everything was out of the way so you wouldn't have a problem when ejecting. My first flight was in Jan of 03, in full winter kit, and you know my build... I was like the StayPuff marshmallow man walking out to the aircraft. 

I never had a problem with comms cords getting in the way. The only thing I ever did was try to push the ejection handle out of the way so I could see the hole for the safety pin, quite difficult when you don't have a neck like the one I lack, in a winter flying jacket, with an LPSV on and strapped into a parachute harness.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not against making things safer. I'm just against saying it was an equipment fault when 1000+ students before this guy strapped in with the same kit on, and in the first couple years, more kit (ie G-Pants), without so much as a hiccup. Perhaps Bombardier is dropping the ball in egress and strap in procedure training?

Having said that, Flight Safety will decide the cause factors and the rectification so I digress.


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## Bograt (18 Apr 2007)

Interesting that you mention that... when the folks for Ottawa strapped into a cockpit of another Harvard they noticed that the the comms cord naturally fell on the investigators lap. He was apparently stopped from accidentally making the same mistake that the SP made. They photographed the incident then looked for signs that it could have happened in the accident. Apparently they discovered a small piece of the comm cord embedded into the ejection handle.

So in the span of 48 hours, this incident happened twice. Apparently during the first flight test of the Texan 2, the test pilot made the same mistake. Texan 2 coms cords have no slack (that is to say there isn't anything left past the connection for the Oxygen hose). In our aircraft before the accident we could have 18 inches or so of slack.

The SP had to strap in at least 6 times prior. It has been recommended that all SPs have to be supervised until CH4/IF1.


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## Bo (18 Apr 2007)

I worked with this guy during OJT. Gonna get his autograph when I get to Moose Jaw  ;D

Charlie: [to Eject] So you're the one. 
Eject: Yes ma'am.


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## Journeyman (19 Apr 2007)

Inch said:
			
		

> Many, many people have gone before this guy with out having a problem. To blame it on equipment and not improper strap in technique is a little off the mark.


Outside my lane,* but it _sounds_ like you're suggesting people should be responsible for their behaviour. Too funny.


* The more pilots I know, the more I prefer being under a parachute   ;D


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## I_am_John_Galt (19 Apr 2007)

Bo said:
			
		

> I worked with this guy during OJT. Gonna get his autograph when I get to Moose Jaw  ;D
> 
> Charlie: [to Eject] So you're the one.
> Eject: Yes ma'am.



That was some of the best flying  Run-Up Checks I've seen to date - right up to the part where you got killed Ejected.


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## Loachman (19 Apr 2007)

Inch said:
			
		

> We've been flying Harvards for 7 years now, never has this been a concern. Many, many people have gone before this guy with out having a problem. To blame it on equipment and not improper strap in technique is a little off the mark.


This doesn't surprise me at all. One can probably come up with several examples of people getting away with something for years until it catches up to some poor sod.

Hercs had been doing Battle Breaks for almost ever until the Air Force Day flypast in Edmonton in 1985, when two out of three collided and killed ten guys.

True, that was perhaps mainly procedural rather than equipment-related, but the lack of critical upward visibility from the cockpit was a major contributing factor.

Technique can compensate for design flaws, but sooner or later the flaw is going to win. If something can go wrong, it will. Maybe not in the first seven years, but the eighth perhaps.


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## observor 69 (19 Apr 2007)

You just know somebody was going to say the following:

Murphy's law is a popular adage in Western culture that broadly states that things will go wrong in any given situation, if you give them a chance. "If there's more than one possible outcome of a job or task, and one of those outcomes will result in disaster or an undesirable consequence, then somebody will do it that way." It is most often cited as "Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong" (or, alternately, "Whatever can go wrong will go wrong, and at the worst possible time," or, "Anything that can go wrong, will," or even, "If anything can go wrong, it will, and usually at the most inopportune moment"). The saying is sometimes referred to as Sod's law. Finagle's law, which can be rendered as "Anything that can go wrong, will—at the worst possible moment," is a variation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murphy's_law


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## childs56 (19 Apr 2007)

Just because 1000 people before this student didnt have a problem with the procedures or equipment doesn't make the incident any less of safety issue. 

When I was fixing the F18 I noticed more then a few situations that have been ongoing for 20 years or so with these A/C. It was deemed safe untill some one hurts themselves. All issues were brought up as were the replys that have been given after proper paperwork to fix the situation was returned. 

Personalle responsibilty has to come into play at some time in scenerio. But as a student these should be minimized to the fullest.  

Flight Safety is everyones responsibilite, from the newest Private up to the CDS. 

Unfortunalty this one cost about $250,000. But this really is a drop in the bucket for mistakes that are made daily fixing and operating these and the other inventory of CF A/C. 

Never fool yourself. If it happened it is safety issue. If it happens again in a short time frame it is a training issue. 
If the same student makes the same mistake it is a training failure. They didnt get it. They wont get it. Dismiss them and carry on.


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## Inch (20 Apr 2007)

I figured I'd get piled on for that post.

My point of view is one that probably comes with being a cocky new AC on a 40+ year old helicopter. Our last Sea King crash was pilot error, plain and simple. Technique put that aircraft into the water, not equipment, heard that first hand from the guy who had his hands on the controls. NVG's would have probably helped, but they're not an option on the Sea King without extensive modifications that just aren't going to happen before we start converting to the CH148. 

All aircraft have some flaw of some sort, that's unavoidable. Technique, training and proficiency are what keeps us from getting killed or injured every time we take an aircraft flying. It's impossible to mitigate all risk, humans are prone to error, from those designing the aircraft, the builders, the maintainers and the pilots. At some point there will be an incident, I don't know of any aircraft that went it's whole life without taking the life of some poor sod.

So my point was simply that, as an aviator, we all want to blame the equipment instead of ourselves when things go wrong. Sometimes it is the equipment, but the majority of the time the cause factors in an incident are more human related than equipment flaw related. Sometimes you just have to say, "Yep, I screwed up". 

I know you've heard the saying, "there are two types of pilots, those that have and those that will."


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## aesop081 (20 Apr 2007)

As a cocky newly apointed Lead AES Op, will take the ballanced position here......if i may

I agree with Inch about the tendency to blame the gear rather than blame ourselves as individuals.  I think it is a natural human reaction. Human factors is a complicate affair when it comes to aviation ( HPMA training asside) and like Inch said, most occurences are "human error".

That the oxygen hose is too long does not releive the person in the seat from ensuring that he/she properly straps on the aircraft. I can only assume that this problem is widely known in MJ.

BTW...My aircraft is only 27 years old


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## observor 69 (20 Apr 2007)

Bograt said :

"So in the span of 48 hours, this incident happened twice. Apparently during the first flight test of the Texan 2, the test pilot made the same mistake. Texan 2 coms cords have no slack (that is to say there isn't anything left past the connection for the Oxygen hose). In our aircraft before the accident we could have 18 inches or so of slack."

Does this mean that there was a technical problem with cord length and that it has since been rectified?


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## Loachman (20 Apr 2007)

As a cocky 40+(++++++++++)-year-old pilot on a 10-year-old helicopter with a few hours and a few funerals behind me (none of my own, but close) I'd like to emphasize what CTD said.

In this case, it appears that, again, a recognized problem existed that went uncorrected until some poor kid exploded from his aircraft and was lucky enough to survive. This problem could, apparently, have been fixed pretty simply and for much less than $250,000.

Part of the human error in this case was not correcting the equipment in the first place and whoever didn't report the potential problem and/or whoever didn't take corrective action bear more responsibility than the student.


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## Inch (20 Apr 2007)

When you put it that way, I do agree with what you're saying.


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## Loachman (20 Apr 2007)

Thanks. If only my wife was so reasonable.


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## ChrisG (22 Apr 2007)

Coincidence.

This months aviation safety letter, (civil) has an article about the safety culture and explains (and I paraphrase because I read it and then 'filed' it) that in the past we looked for the cause of an accident and if it was found to be pilot error then we just said 'pilopt error.'  However the new safety culture must then ask, "so why did the pilot make this error?"  Assuming that we are all trying to be sensible and all trying to stay alive,  short of disastrous circumstances beyond our control (which presumably would not be pilot error)  we should look into why the pilot made the error and rectify the lack of training or the mindest or the lack of safety culture that allowed the circumstances themselves to occur.

In all the years of the harvard 11 no one has noticed the risk prone com cord,  and if they did,  how was it allowed to continue.  When pilots,  and all other operators, are compensating for  unnecessary risk factors ( and we do it all the time) we may avoid,  for a long time,  that risk but we are also putting ourselves at risk in other ways because of the increased work load.


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## aesop081 (22 Apr 2007)

If this was a well-know issue with the Harvard II....was there not an AIF out on it ?


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## Zoomie (22 Apr 2007)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> If this was a well-know issue with the Harvard II.



Couldn't have been too well-known.  I don't recall ever having an issue with the comms cord.  

I remember hooking up my helmet and then forgetting about it.  

The handle was always there but never really an issue - should be an interesting Flight Safety report.


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## Bograt (22 Apr 2007)

Obviously the pilot's strap in lead to the ejection. This strap in was the result of a number of possible factors including:

nervousness- first flight jitters
poor visibility as a result of winter kit and mask interfering with line of sight
late walk, and subsequent rush 

Contributing factors may include:

Coms cord length

The purpose of flight safety is to not assign blame to an individual but rather identify the factors and causes of incidents that may lead or have lead to incidents- and make recommendations so that these occurrences could be minimized in the future.

There is now an AIF for SP to strap in. Also, I believe there will be a recommendation regarding eye protection on the ramp for all ground crew and aircrew (CFS sure packs a punch)- never believed to be a problem in the past, but now it has been identified as a risk factor.

The Flight Safety System is extremely important. If it was to assign blame to specific individuals, there would be much less reporting of minor events like gear overspeeds, close calls, etc... If the SP was deliberately neglectful or reckless there is the "Summary investigation" that are can lay blame and charges. Obviously that wasn't the case in this incident.

Stupid mistake from the result of inexperience and the opportunity to make the mistake (ie a long coms cord).

Cheers,


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