# "Adapting the British Light Infantry Section and Platoon Structure"....



## The Bread Guy (7 Jun 2009)

....into the American context.

Excerpt from Small Wars Journal paper by NZ officer (.pdf):


> .... The key argument presented is that the infantry section commander requires a more robust, adaptable organisation than currently allowed. Injecting extra soldiers into the section is, no matter how desirable, unrealistic given the difficulties in increasing soldier numbers without political involvement. Reorganisation or improvement must thus work with what is currently available to the rifle platoon in its current form.
> 
> The central concept is to re-envisage the rifle section as the sole manoeuvre unit through which all other levels of command enable. The rifle platoon should be looked upon as a service provider to the infantry section, providing the section commander with the fire support and battlefield preparation necessary for the decisive element – the section – to succeed. In much the same way, resources should be pushed down to the lowest possible level. Instead of keeping attached assets at the platoon level, there should be an easily accepted process for ‘pushing down’ various force-multiplying elements to the section itself. In this way further dispersion and independence is engendered at the section level, allowing the section to function as an independent asset within a larger plan and not necessarily being tied to the platoon or company’s physical area of influence ....


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## daftandbarmy (8 Jun 2009)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> ....into the American context.
> 
> Excerpt from Small Wars Journal paper by NZ officer (.pdf):



It doesn't matter how you organize the section. If your Pl Comd/Coy Comd/CO are all micromanaging control freaks you will continually have probelms with 'higher' supporting 'lower' via delegating decision making authority, fire support resources etc. I think that the only arm who has really figured this out is the artillery viz "coordinated at the highest level and controlled at the lowest level" http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_03/iss_1/CAJ_vol3.1_04_e.pdf

The problem isn't the infantry platoon's organization, it's infantry leadership styles that encourage over control of the poor old section commander by higher level commanders who should be thinking about bigger ticket/ longer range items. 

Whew, just about blew out the ol' soapbox on that one....


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## dapaterson (8 Jun 2009)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The problem isn't the *Army's* organization, it's *Army* leadership styles that encourage over control of the poor old section commander by higher level commanders who should be thinking about bigger ticket/ longer range items.



Fixed that for you...

Favourite quote from a previous CLS when delivering a briefing.  He looked at the slide, then asked the Army Sgt-Maj why the Cpl in the picture wasn't wearing his gloves.


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## ArmyRick (8 Jun 2009)

Interesting read.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Jun 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Fixed that for you...
> 
> Favourite quote from a previous CLS when delivering a briefing.  He looked at the slide, then asked the Army Sgt-Maj why the Cpl in the picture wasn't wearing his gloves.



Beauty. A good example of a fail safe vs. safe to fail organization. And FWIW the army hasn't cornered the market on this kind of efficiency destroying micromanagment. There are, luckily for we consultants, lots of examples in the civilian world as well.  ;D


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## The Bread Guy (8 Jun 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Favourite quote from a previous CLS when delivering a briefing.  He looked at the slide, then asked the Army Sgt-Maj why the Cpl in the picture wasn't wearing his gloves.



The small story that shows a big, not very pretty picture - thanks for sharing DP and D&B.


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