# Pakistan & the Taliban



## The Bread Guy (5 Oct 2006)

Good tidbits on how well prepared the bad guys were, too!  Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409

*Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid*
Ahmed Rashid in Kabul, Telegraph.co.uk, 6 Oct 06
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/06/wafghan06.xml

Commanders from five Nato countries whose troops have just fought the bloodiest battle with the Taliban in five years, are demanding their governments get tough with Pakistan over the support and sanctuary its security services provide to the Taliban.

Nato's report on Operation Medusa, an intense battle that lasted from September 4-17 in the Panjwai district, demonstrates the extent of the Taliban's military capability and states clearly that Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI) is involved in supplying it.

Commanders from Britain, the US, Denmark, *Canada* and Holland are frustrated that even after Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf met George W Bush and Tony Blair last week, Western leaders are declining to call Mr Musharraf's bluff.

*"It is time for an 'either you are with us or against us' delivered bluntly to Musharraf at the highest political level," said one Nato commander.*

After the September 11 attacks in 2001 America gave Mr Musharraf a similar ultimatum to co-operate against the Taliban, who were then harbouring Osama bin Laden.
*
"Our boys in southern Afghanistan are hurting because of what is coming out of Quetta," he added.*

The Taliban use the southern province of Balochistan to co-ordinate their insurgency and to recuperate after military action.

The cushion Pakistan is providing the Taliban is undermining the operation in Afghanistan, where 31,000 Nato troops are now based. *The Canadians were most involved in Operation Medusa, two weeks of heavy fighting in a lush vineyard region, defeating 1,500 well entrenched Taliban, who had planned to attack Kandahar city, the capital of the south.*

Nato officials now say they killed 1,100 Taliban fighters, not the 500 originally claimed. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements in pick-up trucks who crossed over from Quetta – waved on by Pakistani border guards – were destroyed by Nato air and artillery strikes.

*Nato captured 160 Taliban, many of them Pakistanis who described in detail the ISI's support to the Taliban.*

Nato is now mapping the entire Taliban support structure in Balochistan, from ISI- run training camps near Quetta to huge ammunition dumps, arrival points for Taliban's new weapons and meeting places of the shura, or leadership council, in Quetta, which is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group's leader since its creation a dozen years ago.

Nato and Afghan officers say two training camps for the Taliban are located just outside Quetta, while the group is using hundreds of madrassas where the fighters are housed and fired up ideologically before being sent to the front.

Many madrassas now being listed are run by the Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam, a political party that governs Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province. The party helped spawn the Taliban in 1994.

"Taliban decision-making and its logistics are all inside Pakistan," said the Afghan defense minister, General Rahim Wardak.

A post-battle intelligence report compiled by Nato and Afghan forces involved in Operation Medusa demonstrates the logistical capability of the Taliban.

*During the battle the Taliban fired an estimated 400,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades and 1,000 mortar shells*, which slowly arrived in Panjwai from Quetta over the spring months. Ammunition dumps unearthed after the battle showed that the Taliban had stocked over one million rounds in Panjwai.

*In Panjwai the Taliban had also established a training camp to teach guerrillas how to penetrate Kandahar, a separate camp to train suicide bombers and a full surgical field hospital. * Nato estimated the cost of Taliban ammunition stocks at around £2.6 million. "The Taliban could not have done this on their own without the ISI," said a senior Nato officer.

Gen Musharraf this week admitted that "retired" ISI officers might be involved in aiding the Taliban, the closest he has come to admitting the agency's role.

fpress@telegraph.co.uk


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## Trinity (5 Oct 2006)

Couldn't we just do the occasional strike on key areas in Pakistan.

If Pakistan gets mad at us for doing it they'd have to admit that
there was a legitimate Taliban target that they either failed to
take out or were promoting.......

of course the media would say the target was all civilians  :


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## dglad (6 Oct 2006)

Musharraf truly is between a rock and a hard place.  If he leans too far one way, his government--a relatively small minority of secular power-mongers--gets toppled by an impoverished and undereducated majority whipped into a frenzy by extremists.  Too far the other, and he's suddenly isolated from Western support and, worse, may find Western interests lining up more firmly behind the great Pakistani rival, India.  Either way, a nuclear power is potentially destabilized, dramatically threatening (at the very least) the entire region.

Either way, Musharraf will need better moves than Tony Hawk to avoid a really nasty spill...


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## couchcommander (6 Oct 2006)

Unfortunately, from watching the interviews recently, I've gotten the distinct impression he is no longer afraid of western power. Right after 9/11, as has been heavily publicised, and according to him, he was threatened into action. One has to wonder, 5 years later, how big that threat is in his mind? He sees us ("the west") stretched thin over Afghanistan and Iraq, and knows we are in no position to open up another front without drastically escalating the war.

Of course we could always put pressure on him via India or airstrikes, but then it becomes a question of who can do the most damage, him to our goals or us to his goals? 

On the other hand, as was pointed out, he does have an immediate and real threat internally.

.02 anywho


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## Jarnhamar (6 Oct 2006)

We should promote you Trinity


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## Colin Parkinson (6 Oct 2006)

Time to say, take control of the Tribal areas or we will use force to destroy any infastructure used to support the Taliban. Drop leaflets in the tribal areas so they also know.


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## Bigmac (6 Oct 2006)

South Asia

Oct 7, 2006  
  
By Syed Saleem Shahzad 

KARACHI - With trouble on the battlefield, US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist has recommended, for the first time since September 11, 2001, the need to bring the Taliban into the Afghan government. At the same time, Pakistan is secretly playing its own game of carrot and stick in Afghanistan to influence events to its liking. 

However, two quick warning signals to Islamabad this week convey the unmistakable message that regardless of what Washington or Islamabad might desire, the Taliban are the ones who will decide which carrots and which sticks to play. 

Last month could prove to be pivotal in determining the ultimate fate of the Taliban and Afghanistan, and even the United States' "war on terror". 

The Taliban, after the success of this year's spring offensive, have drawn up a blueprint for an Islamic intifada in Afghanistan next year in the form of a national uprising and an internationalization of their resistance. 

This followed a "peace" deal between the Pakistani Taliban in the Waziristan tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan in which Islamabad agreed to release some al-Qaeda suspects in return for the Taliban stopping cross-border activities. 

President General Pervez Musharraf then went to Washington, where he announced that foreign forces in Afghanistan would be given the right of hot pursuit into the tribal areas. He also said the authorities would take action against former army officials associated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for supporting the Taliban. 

That all is not well with this agreement is illustrated by two events this week. First, a missile landed in Ayub Park, the highest-security zone in Rawalpindi, just a few hundred meters from Musharraf's official residence at Army House. The next day, several rockets apparently linked to a mobile phone for firing were found near parliament in Islamabad. 

Asia Times Online has learned that the incidents were a clear show of disapproval in Waziristan over Musharraf's basking in "Washington's charm", and that he had not implemented a key aspect of the peace accord - the release of al-Qaeda suspects - despite numerous promises. 

In other words, the Pakistani Taliban are using their own stick to keep Islamabad in line. 

The sore point, as mentioned, was the release of "al-Qaeda-linked" Pakistani militants arrested in Pakistani cities. The Pakistani authorities did release many, but a few, whose arrest was also known to US intelligence, were not. Musharraf said they would be freed once he returned from Washington, but this did not happen. Negotiations were still taking place when an incident happened that angered the Pakistani Taliban. 

Progress arrested Shah Abdul Aziz of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a six-party religious alliance, is a member of the National Assembly from Karak in North-West Frontier Province. Though his direct party affiliation is with the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam led by Maulana Samiul Haq (the father of the Taliban), his real status derives from his being a veteran mujahideen from the days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He vocally supports the Taliban, Arab militants and Osama bin Laden, and his fiery speeches on these topics are compiled into compact discs that are popular among the Pakistani Taliban. 

Shah Mehboob Ahmed is a younger brother of Shah Abdul Aziz and also enjoys a great deal of respect among local as well as Afghan Taliban for helping the mujahideen. 

The story starts when Mehboob hosted a British-born Pakistani, known only as Abdullah, who was on a list of wanted people. Abdullah then went to Islamabad and met with the biggest Taliban-supporting cleric, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, at Lal Mosque. As Abdullah left the mosque, he was picked up by intelligence agencies. One of the leads acquired from Abdullah was that he had been hosted by Mehboob. So Mehboob was also detained. 

Shah Abdul Aziz, the member of parliament, contacted ISI high-ups about his brother's arrest and was informed that he would be released soon after formal investigations. However, neither Abdullah nor Mehboob was released. 

This took tension between the Pakistani Taliban and the authorities to boiling point, with the former charging that not only had Islamabad not fulfilled its promises to release all Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, but it was violating the agreement and arresting such people as Mehboob and Abdullah. 

Islamabad responded that the two were part of Indian intelligence's proxy network, and that was why they had been held - not because of any possible links to al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban did not buy this and made it clear that as the authorities had violated the agreement, they should be ready to face the Taliban's music. 

At this point Musharraf said in an interview in the US that some retired ISI officials could be assisting Taliban insurgents, adding: "We are keeping a very tight watch and we will get hold of them if that at all happened. I have some reports that some dissidents, some retired people who were in the forefront in the ISI during the period of 1979 to 1989, may be assisting the links somewhere here and there." 

This set off heated debate in Pakistan, leading some people to speculate that Hamid Gul, one of the most popular Islamist generals and Musharraf's immediate boss and close associate before September 11, 2001, might be arrested. Speaking to Asia Times Online, Gul termed Musharraf's statement a reflection of his "impulsive nature" and said he was in danger of opening up a "Pandora's box". 

The upshot of all this, according to signals reaching this correspondent, is that Musharraf has been put on notice. The first two incidents this week caused no damage. That was possibly the intent. This is unlikely to be the case with the next ones. 

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.


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## Blakey (6 Oct 2006)

Link http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ07Df01.html


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## Babbling Brooks (6 Oct 2006)

> Time to say, take control of the Tribal areas or we will use force to destroy any infastructure used to support the Taliban. Drop leaflets in the tribal areas so they also know.



My gut agrees with this sentiment - stop giving safe haven to these creeps or we'll deal with them ourselves.  But my head says Karzai's idea about a bi-national jirga drawn from the tribal areas in question makes more sense, at least as a first step - any victory or even concession achieved voluntarily in this type of conflict will always be more long-term effective than a coerced one.


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## Zell_Dietrich (6 Oct 2006)

It is funny how well people can try to play both sides of the fence.  The leaders inside of Pakistan are on the edge of a rather large cliff,  if they openly fight against the Islamic militants they will plunge their country into civil war.   If they openly support them  they will quickly be over run by fanatical jihads who would topple the government and plunge the country into civil war. (civil war being good for a group of thugs that do well in anarchy) So what do they do,  they crack down on the ones they have to, the ones that threaten them and the ones that will make them look good, while making sure they're not enough of a nuisance to incur full infidel status.  I can't blame them one bit for walking carefully in a mine field.  I think they are likely doing more to help us than most of us know.  I think they are doing their best to root out elements in their country that are supporting the Taliban while keeping some semblance of civil order.

Edited to apologise for using to many analogies in one paragraph
Sorry.


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## Colin Parkinson (6 Oct 2006)

It is a very tough call, but from what I see, the Taliban/AQ control the tribal areas and have effectively silenced the tribal leadership. It has to be shown that support the Taliban and AQ comes with a heavy cost, without them having to pay that cost, they will not come to the table. 

Give the Pak government the winter to meet our demands, drop the leaflets telling the tribes, stop the support or pay the price. If they don't.

Step up aerial attacks on all known Taliban infrastructure in the tribal areas.. 
Increase the amount of long range artillery that can fire into the Tribal areas, use it to pound any suspected position.
Only cross into the tribal area's in force and with short ranged objectives, they will fight and fight hard, you don't want people getting cut off or overwhelmed.
Step up Border controls, reduce traffic flow, hire local labour to build obstacles to prevent smugglers from using vehicles to cross the borders, start on the most comman areas close to main roads communities first.

The above steps will have a severe economic impact on the tribal areas and may create a groundswell of resentment against the Taliban/AQ. It may also backfire and make things worse, but with the present situation it is impossible to win against the Taliban as long as they have a safe haven. It will also force the Taliban/AQ to move their infrastructure away from the border, making life a bit more difficult for them.
I hope that our troops are capable of carrying on the fight throughout winter, allowing the fight to dwindle is more in their favour than ours.

Ah, yes life in the Command Couch where all is clear!!! Now if I can just get the wife to stop nagging me, I can control the world from it!!  ;D


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## Lost_Warrior (6 Oct 2006)

> The Taliban, after the success of this year's spring offensive, have drawn up a blueprint for an Islamic intifada in Afghanistan next year in the form of a national uprising and an internationalization of their resistance.



Success?  Last I heard, NATO killed thousands of them, took major strong holds and ran them back into Pakistan for the winter.   Am I missing something here?


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## Brad Sallows (6 Oct 2006)

Yeah, there's a new paradigm.  Strategically, it's always been a "success" for irregulars if they repeatedly survive to fight another day.  Now that concept has been pushed down to the tactical level: if they pick a fight and lose without being killed to a man, it's a "success".


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## Lost_Warrior (6 Oct 2006)

Then I guess they really showed us...  :


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## Kirkhill (6 Oct 2006)

Lost Warrior: 

Ask GAP and Tomahawk6 about Tet.  The only thing that matters is what comes over the boob tube.

The good news?  Fewer people are watching.


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## dglad (6 Oct 2006)

couchcommander said:
			
		

> Unfortunately, from watching the interviews recently, I've gotten the distinct impression he is no longer afraid of western power. Right after 9/11, as has been heavily publicised, and according to him, he was threatened into action. One has to wonder, 5 years later, how big that threat is in his mind? He sees us ("the west") stretched thin over Afghanistan and Iraq, and knows we are in no position to open up another front without drastically escalating the war.



I'm not suggesting overt military action against Pakistan.  That would be risky in the extreme, given that they're an Islamic nation with nuclear weapons.  Rather, there are other levers that can be pushed...particularly diplomatic and economic.  The mere fact that he recently did the talk show circuit in the West to promote his book shows how westernized he is and, in a strange way, how much he seems to crave Western approval.  If you check out the CIA World Fact Book, you'll find that the US is Pakistan's major trade partner for exports; 23% of the country's exports are to the United States.  Given the fragile state of the Pakistani economy (it's growing at a remarkable 7%, but that's not likely sustainable without massive inflation--already running at 9%--and serious environmental problems; 32% of the population lives below the poverty line, while its public debt is 54% of the country's GDP), alienating the West would be an economic disaster.  So Musharraf has to continue playing ball with the developed world, simply to maintain the current standard of living in Pakistan.


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## Babbling Brooks (6 Oct 2006)

> So Musharraf has to continue playing ball with the developed world, simply to maintain the current standard of living in Pakistan.



Let me play devil's advocate for a moment: that assumes he gives a rodent's hindquarters about the average Pakistani's standard of living.  Examples abound of dicators around the world who care nothing about alienating the U.S. to the detriment of their own populations' economic health.  No matter what the West does to them, they remain the big fish in their own little pond, and it's good enough for them.

Besides, what if he plays ball with the West, and it gets his domestic opponents angry enough to unify against him and topple him?  Then you have a bunch of Islamist fanatics controlling nuclear weapons.

Again, I don't know that any of that is the case, but if we're going to try to pressure him, we have to look at what his _real_ pressure points are, not just what they'd be for us.


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## dglad (6 Oct 2006)

Babbling Brooks said:
			
		

> Let me play devil's advocate for a moment: that assumes he gives a rodent's hindquarters about the average Pakistani's standard of living.  Examples abound of dicators around the world who care nothing about alienating the U.S. to the detriment of their own populations' economic health.  No matter what the West does to them, they remain the big fish in their own little pond, and it's good enough for them.



I don't for a moment believe he has much emotional energy invested in the well-being of the average Pakistani.  But that's not the point.  More to follow...



> Besides, what if he plays ball with the West, and it gets his domestic opponents angry enough to unify against him and topple him?  Then you have a bunch of Islamist fanatics controlling nuclear weapons.



And that's kinda my point.  To stay in power, he both HAS to play ball with the West AND appease his domestic opponents.  Hence my original statement, about rock-and-hard-place.



> Again, I don't know that any of that is the case, but if we're going to try to pressure him, we have to look at what his _real_ pressure points are, not just what they'd be for us.



I'm not sure what you mean by that.  The West's best leverage is economic and diplomatic, because it's easier to apply and escalate in a controlled fashion.  If fully one-quarter of Pakistan's export market is the U.S., then sudden application of duties to certain goods applies pressure, but doesn't necessarily destabilize the country.  More duties, more restrictions on imports from Pakistan...more pressure.  If the Pakistani economy collapses under a sudden surge of recession, then there's a good chance Musharraf will be ousted--and he's not a stupid man, he knows that.  Hence, incentive to give some consideration to Western demands (but, I admit, not to simply cave in.  That will bring him down as well).

Immediate resort to military action against Pakistan would, I think, be much riskier and carry a much greater opportunity for backfire.  If Musharraf puts up a front of nationalist outrage as a response, he could actually rally the country around him.  I'm not a despotic dictator, myself (and I don't even play one on TV), but I'd wager it's easier to whip up support from people who see U.S. bombs falling on their soil, than people who have lost their jobs because of convoluted supply-chain issues related to export tarrifs, countervailing duties, GATT disputes, blah-de-blah-de-blah.


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## Kirkhill (8 Oct 2006)

Further to dglad's point about putting pressure on - 

Two other pressurizing alternatives:

NATO to invite India to offer troops for service in Afghanistan.
NATO/UN to offer to relieve Musharraf of his burdens by supporting the creation of new borders along the lines of the "logical" "blood" borders suggested by Ralph Peters.  How much more restless can the tribal areas become?

And an incidental - is there any cultural affinity between the Balochis and the Omanis across the Arabian Sea?  I ask that because apparently a good chunk of the Sultan's forces were/are Balochis and he has proven a good friend to the west and fairly moderate by the standards of the region.


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## Bigmac (9 Oct 2006)

> by Max Boot - LA Times
> 
> Monday, October 09, 2006
> 
> ...



   It is interesting how the timing of renewed attacks on troops and an upsurge in the number of Taleban closely followed the release of prisoners from Pakistan. But perhaps I am wrong as well??


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## GAP (9 Oct 2006)

> President George W Bush needs to tell Musharraf that US support will be jeopardized if he does not do more to curb the Taleban.



And if Musharraf call George's bluff, what then? Musharraf already has enough trouble in Balochistan area, he's not inclined to stir up a hornets nest by actually doing something.


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## Bigmac (9 Oct 2006)

Here is a little fuel to the fire for Musarraf.



> NATO commander to confront Musharraf on Taliban
> 
> 
> LONDON (AFP) -- The commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan is to fly to Islamabad on Monday and confront President Pervez Musharraf over Taliban operations in Pakistan, The Sunday Times newspaper said.
> ...


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## vonGarvin (9 Oct 2006)

As an initial side note, I found this line interesting:
_But even 70,000 troops would not be enough to protect a nation of 31 million._

Funny, where have I heard those numbers before?

Anyway, Pakistan should be looked at long and hard re: Taliban.  If I understand things correctly, the Taliban was able to do as well as they did due to influence from Pakistan in the first place, no?


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## Fishbone Jones (9 Oct 2006)

Bigmac said:
			
		

> It is interesting how the timing of renewed attacks on troops and an upsurge in the number of Taleban closely followed the release of prisoners from Pakistan. But perhaps I am wrong as well??



Pakistan feels it has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose should Afghanistan become a full blown prosperous democracy. It SEEMS pretty obvious they're subverting any attempt to have that become a reality.


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## Bigmac (10 Oct 2006)

This is an article from earlier this year. Pakistan is going to continue to support the Taleban while claiming they aren't. By playing both sides of the political fence Pakistan's President is ultimately sealing his fate. But if he prefers the devil he knows then maybe he should come out and say it so the international community can deal with his country. Do you think India would be interested with that plan? 



> Where the Taleban train
> Quetta serves as training ground and staging post for insurgents on their way to Afghanistan.
> 
> By Abdullah Shahin in Quetta for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2/3/06)
> ...


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## Kirkhill (10 Oct 2006)

> “People think Pakistan is our friend, but it is not true,” he said. “Pakistan is an ally of America, not of the Taleban.”
> 
> The Taleban had no need of foreign bases, he insisted, adding, “The Taleban are sons of Afghanistan. They are in Afghanistan and they will fight in Afghanistan.”



Perhaps this isn't a lie.  The Pashtuns/Taleban believe that the hill country of Pakistan is also Taleban country and that Taleban country is Afghanistan. They don't recognize the Durand Line border.
Nor do they necessarily believe that all of Pakistan is with them.  Therefore, from their point of view they are still in their country fighting against both Pakistan and the Karzai government.


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## tomahawk6 (15 Oct 2006)

Musharraf lucked out. A Pakistani Air Force officer caused a premature launch of a rocket aimed at his home.
Security forces located the rocket and found the cell phone number in the activating mechanism causing the officer to be arrested. No doubt some ISI elements were involved. 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ14Df02.html



> Musharraf also instructed that a list be compiled of all retired officers who had been involved in any significant intelligence operations and who were suspected of still being sympathetic towards the Taliban.
> 
> At the same time, he began to backtrack from an agreement Islamabad had made with the Pakistani Taliban in the Waziristan tribal areas for the release of al-Qaeda-linked people detained in Pakistan. Instead, more were arrested, including Shah Mehboob, a brother of former jihad veteran and member of parliament, Shah Abdul Aziz. Also arrested was a British-born suspected member of al-Qaeda, known as Abdullah.



http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/10/nato-pakistani-intelligence-ai/


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## Colin Parkinson (16 Oct 2006)

Hopefully this will give him an excuse to clean out the worst of the rats nest called ISI.


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## Zell_Dietrich (16 Oct 2006)

Kind of off topic but,

     You know a country has issues when it reverts into a dictatorship and civil rights increase!  According to Pakistani friends Musharraf has done more to promote woman's rights, civil order and basic human dignity in Pakistan than anyone else.  I'm heard them imply that his fundamental nature makes him ideologically opposed to the Taliban.   Personally I think he is simply grinding down the undesirable elements in his country slowly,  controllably.  

     Think of it like letting the air out of a balloon slowly insted of popping it.  Remember who does better in civil disorder?  Who would benefit by regions of Pakistan suddenly becoming not just unstable but riotous.  

     Personally I feel allergic to any dictatorship that has the bomb,  epically unstable dictatorships with run away inflation and crumbling infrastructure. *meh* there are scarier things in the world. (but not many)


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## tomahawk6 (18 Oct 2006)

This could be an encouraging sign in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

From strategypage.

Jihadi Go Home! 

October 18, 2006: In Afghanistan, staunch Islamic conservative tribes that formerly welcomed al Qaeda's "foreign fighters" into their regions, appear to be having second thoughts. Most religiously conservative tribes just want to be left alone to do things the way they've always done them. If this means fighting the government (as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or elsewhere) then so-be-it. But so long as the government doesn't meddle in local affairs, the tribesmen generally aren't particularly interested in whether or not the rest of the country adheres closely to Islamic tradition or is wallowing in sin. Al Qaeda's "Global Caliphate" agenda thus often clashes with that of the local tribes. Lately there's been some evidence that the tribes are getting annoyed.

In the Waziristan region of Pakistan, al Qaeda seems to have committed two particular blunders. The first was trying to take on the Pakistani government, which led to retaliation in force, most of which ended up landing on the tribes rather than al Qaeda's minions. At the same time, some al Qaeda, apparently unhappy over the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the tribes for global jihad,  tried some strong-arm tactics. This included harassing, and in some cases killing, tribal leaders. These actions annoyed the tribes. One result was the recent agreement between the Pakistani government and tribal leaders, that left the latter in charge of policing their own areas, if the government agreed not to harass them. In addition, some of the tribes have been taking action against "foreigners." How much action, is as yet unclear, but regional al Qaeda leaders reportedly "apologized" for the actions of some of their followers. 

A similar situation is unfolding in Iraq's Anbar province. There, the pro-Baathist, or merely nationalist, Sunni tribes were rather heavily defeated by government and coalition forces earlier this year, and decided to lay low. This pretty much left the terrorist activity in the hands of al Qaeda. Miffed at being left to fight on alone,  al Qaeda initiated a program of intimidation and murder against tribal leaders. This led to the recent agreement between the Sunni tribes and the government that established a tribal elders council to help police the province. As a result, Sunni tribesmen are now working with government police to patrol roads.


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## a_majoor (18 Oct 2006)

More on the Madrasses from Strategy Page:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20061006.aspx



> *The Untouchables *
> October 6, 2006:
> 
> The most frequent source of Islamic terrorists is a place that counter-terrorism organizations have a very difficult time reaching. That would be the thousands of madrasses (religious schools) that teach the Wahhabi (and related) interpretation of Islam. Wahhabi's believe that infidels (non-Moslem's) are the cause of all the world's problems. The solution is to convert or kill all the infidels. That's it. A simple message. All the rest is just lots of anecdotes reinforcing the basic message. The radical madrasses don't teach terror, which makes them hard to shut down, but they do emphasize the need to struggle, even die, in order to serve Islam as best you can. Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism developed in the 18th century, tries to get the madrasses faculty to lighten up a bit, and at least point out that terrorism is un-Islamic. Not surprisingly, many of these madrasses teachers refuse to back down when it comes to delivering a hard core message. They are on a mission from God. Saudi Arabia has dismissed some of the more extreme teachers, and even jailed a few. But those who can no longer teach openly, while on the government payroll (Saudi Arabia pays the salaries of all clergy and religious teachers), do it on the sly. In other countries, attempts to shut down pro-terrorist madrasses has been difficult, because the religious teachers scream persecution, and accuse the government of being an enemy of Islam. Since these madrasses don't teach logic or critical thinking, they can usually get their students out in the streets, to protest the closure efforts.
> ...



Some form of counter message is needed which is more attractive than Wahhabi Islam, and just as satisfying for the people. Islamic scholars and clerics will have to take the lead on this, with the full support of Ilamic leaders, tribal chiefs, community groups etc. The alternative is they will end up swinging from lamp posts as the hard liners convert a larger and larger fraction of the local population base, so there are very big incentives for them to get on board.


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