# Just how much can we handle?



## Ralph (14 Apr 2006)

Most news stories in the last couple months have remarked that we're stretched thin deployment-wise. True enough. Now, the MND's come out and said we won't be deploying anywhere else "in the near future" (however long that is). 

http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/04/13/oconnor060413.html

Okay. That being said, the media doesn't bother to mention that there's 2,300 tps in Afghanistan because we're in charge until Feb 07. Does that mean that when the command element, MNB-HQ & Sigs, and the additional spt pers and even the PRT come home, the newspapers will trumpet "Troops slashed by half"? This is my question - come next year, if we kept a battle group there, could we not support an additional battle group somewhere else? The Managed Readiness Plan says we can - as of right now. Would that ugly colourful poster in the canteen lie to us?


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## Chimo (14 Apr 2006)

Ralph you make a good point but remember the Managed Readiness Plan is just that a plan. It does not take into account the fact that the 1st LOC is at more than 100% which will have impact on the 2nd LOC. Also, things that brief well on a power point slide are a little tougher to do in real life.

I guess bottom line up front is can we put two TF into the fight right now, maybe, can it be sustained indefinitely, probably not. Can we perhaps scale back the 2nd LOC to a Combat Team and deploy that? Who knows. Things are moving forward but it will take time. 

Is your poster lying? It isn't as long as there is no mission for the 2nd LOC.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (14 Apr 2006)

IMHO, Managed Readiness is broken beyond repair and they're working out alternatives right now.  There are been a great number of changes to the force generation plan over the past couple of weeks, but I won't get into detail here - others with closer knowledge may wish to.  Let's just say things are "interesting" and leave it at that.

Chimo:  with the recent changes, the nice shiny poster is very much out of date (lying is a bit strong, but...!).  Things began to unravel when we added a third inf coy to the TFA deployment and I'm not sure we could kick a second full TF out the door right now.  More to follow.


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## Gunner (14 Apr 2006)

Gents, do the math. MRP was developed to be sustainable utilizing 1000 man Task Forces for each line of operation.  As we have upwards of 23-2400 just in Afghanistan right now, so these latest developments are not surprising.  Decisions are currently being made in order to support the government's priorities and this information will be released to you shortly.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (14 Apr 2006)

> Decisions are currently being made in order to support the government's priorities and this information will be released to you shortly.



Well put...  ;D


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## pbi (14 Apr 2006)

Not much surprise, really. Way back, close to a decade ago, when the predecessor of MRP was being developed (sometimes called "The Wankel Engine" because the graphic resembled a triangle with rounded points), it was clear that the Achille's heel of it, or of any MRP the Army or the CF tries to come up with, is political intent. We are, after all, in existence as a tool of Govt policy, especially foreign policy. If the Govt of the day sees the need for a committment not envisioned in the readiness program, then the system will shudder, choke, and eventually break. We shouldn't feel too bad, though-the US military, especially the Army (IMHO) has been struggling with being over-committed and under strength for about a decade now. Just read through any recent issues of any US professional military journal and you are bound to come across references to this problem.

In a democracy, we can't tell the Govt: "No-you can't do that". All we can tell them is: "Here are the consequences of doing that. Are you ready to accept them?". This, to me, proves yet again why the education of public and politicians is so important and can never stop. A "silent military" will have nobody to blame but itself for its sufferings and neglect.

Cheers


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## Armymedic (14 Apr 2006)

I was at the press conference as it was held at my unit. See here:
MND Visit to 2 FD AMB   http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/42167/post-366131.html#msg366131

This single sound bite was the answer to larger questions about the current deployment, recruiting, and possible future deployments like in Sudan.

Basically, his response in addition to what was reported was that the best troops to teach new troops are ones with operational/combat experience. You have to take troops away from the units to teach the recruits who are coming in. Also he acknowledged the ticking bomb caused by FRP in the 90's and the loss of the experienced services people with 15-20 yrs in right now. Because of this, and our current commitments to Afghanistan the CF will not be looking for new deployments until manning levels can be increased. 

So you can infer, that come Feb, while we may still be in Afghanistan, recruiting and training will become a top priority.


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## Bartok5 (14 Apr 2006)

The "Managed Readiness Plan" never survived contact with reality.  It was devised by people fixated upon susstainability, and as such never reflected reality.  Really - who here can tell me that we can forecast an international requirement for generic Task Forces comprised of a LAV company and a Light (Patrol) Company from now until perpetuity?  I mean really.  Do the assigned mission and the theatre not determine what is required to do the job?  Apparently not....

In ignorant defiance of reality, we had a bunch of "bean counters" determining our force structure for the foreseeable future.  And then, during the first Strategic Recce of the current Afghan theatre it became  immediately apparent that the long-established "rule of three" still applies.  Yes, big surprise, a third rifle company is required for the current Afghan theatre.  Just as it was during Op APOLLO back in 2002.  We've apparently regressed, as the lessons learned during APOLLO have quite clearly been ignored.....    

The Managed Readiness Plan is in total disarray.  Is anybody at the "coal-face" the least bit surprised that the elaborate plan for sustainability has fallen to pieces prior to the Line of Departure?  No.  Everyone with a basic "shmeck" knew that the MRP was flawed from the outset.  It was clear to all concerned that the new "wonder plan" was untenable.  But the "grown-ups" apparently didn't get it.  I'm not sure whether the current situation is more pathic or scary.  Both in equal parts, I suppose.  Our Army's "Master Plan" was dead before it lived.  And the "grown-ups" didn't see it coming?  How sad/scary is that?

Time to take down your shiny "Managed Readiness Plan" posters - the plan was dead before the ink was dry.  TF 2-07 has been stood down.  The "Second Line of Operations" has now become the "strategic reserve" (formerly the third line).  The R22eR will hold the  bag in "high readiness" for a full year.  After which point, TF 4-07 (LdSH) will pick up the strat reserve task....Maybe....  Who knows?  

In the interim, 3 PPCLI, 39 CBG and the elements of 1 CMBG tasked as TF 2-07 are shut down as of last week.  As you can imagine, morale is NOT high.  Indeed, I would go so far as to say that "the system" has just screwed 3 PPCLI royally, and the results (in terms of releases) will very soon manifest themselves.  

Thanks for coming out....


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## Ralph (15 Apr 2006)

Awesome. Lucky someone tells us what's going on - if the standdown is O Gp-grade material, then I'm going to skip CMTC 06 and get loaded on to that "Painting With Watercolours" course at the local community college.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (15 Apr 2006)

Now that Mark's unleashed the beast...

I have to agree with him 100%.  We took an American idea designed for a very large army and tried to implement it in an army with nine battalions and three armoured regiments.  We obviously didn't learn from the massive failure of ATOF, which collapsed (as Mark indicated) when we added the third rifle company to OP APOLLO.

Because MR is predicated on knowing well in advance the exact missions we're going into, it situates the estimate regarding force structure.  MR dictated - god help us - that every mission would consist of an LPV coy, a LAV coy, a Coyote troop (!) and other elements.  Worse, LS added a bizarre "capability release" aspect that dictates that any force the Army deploys under MR will be tied to a Fixed Operating Base, with limited ability to push out into the boonies.  This was a deliberate attempted to limit tactical mobility and was Kabul-centric from the outset.  We're now in the position where every time we deploy something that doesn't fit the template developed by the MR gurus, the plan goes out the window.  Adding a company for force protection?  The Army's strategic plan gets scrapped - across the board.  Want another troop of Coyotes?  It's likely to come from outside the mounting Area.  Want mortars AND guns?  Well, good luck to you...

To try to manage this nightmare, the beancounters have decided to pennypacket everything by company (or worse, by platoon!).  We are now in a situation where we never deploy a cohesive battle group; instead, companies and other sub-units are picked up from across the Army in a mad scramble to fill requirements.

The entire system is designed to add stability to a business that is inherently unstable and to predict the unpredictable.


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## warrickdll (15 Apr 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> ...
> To try to manage this nightmare, the beancounters have decided to pennypacket everything by company (or worse, by platoon!).  We are now in a situation where we never deploy a cohesive battle group; instead, companies and other sub-units are picked up from across the Army in a mad scramble to fill requirements.
> 
> The entire system is designed to add stability to a business that is inherently unstable and to predict the unpredictable.



There are probably few who would disagree on the uncertain nature of Task Force ORBATS; I think the ability to form the deployment force from sub-units is exactly the mechanism required from a military the size of the CF. 

And, I would emphasize, from that same quote *-We are now in a situation where we never deploy a cohesive battle group-* that this is precisely the problem as well as the lesson learned over the last 15+ years. Each deployment may have its own mixture of sub-units - so why shouldn't we be able to grab rifle companies, surveillance troops, artillery, engineers, logistics, etc., from all over Canada based on readiness instead of on cap badge or brigade patch?

This is a level of professionalism that the CF should aspire to, and take pride from.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (15 Apr 2006)

> And, I would emphasize, from that same quote -We are now in a situation where we never deploy a cohesive battle group- that this is precisely the problem as well as the lesson learned over the last 15+ years. Each deployment may have its own mixture of sub-units - so why shouldn't we be able to grab rifle companies, surveillance troops, artillery, engineers, logistics, etc., from all over Canada based on readiness instead of on cap badge or brigade patch?
> 
> This is a level of professionalism that the CF should aspire to, and take pride from.



But we _should_ deploy cohesive battle groups.  One of the many strengths of our system is that it was always predicated on the basic premise that soldiers who lived, worked and trained together during peacetime deployed together during wartime.  Today, we have a situation where the estimate is situated.  A force structure that is entirely resource-driven is imposed upon commanders well before the actual tactical situation on the ground is known.  Then, once the true situation on the ground is known, additional forces are added, _regardless of their readiness level_, in a mad scramble to adjust the structure to meet the actual requirement.  Cap badges and the like has little to do with it, nor does professionalism.

Case in point:  for APOLLO, the requirement for a recce sqn and a third rifle company was well-known long before the mission actually deployed.  Yet, despite this, the organization was politically restricted to two companies and a recce troop by Ottawa.  In Jan 02, the mission changed, the strategic recce insisted on a full sqn and a third coy.  Even then, the deployment of the third coy was held up while everyone dithered at the additional commitment.  Finally, it was a coy from 2 PPCLI that ended up deploying - two weeks after the main body began to depart Canada.  If 1 CMBG had not leaned forward and prepared both the additional recce and that third coy, we would have been hurting.

Once upon a time, units in 1 CMBG operated using a battle group structure, with each battalion having affiliated batteries and squadrons.  Perhaps that's a hint as to how force generation should work at the national level...  After all, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.


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## warrickdll (15 Apr 2006)

> the organization was politically restricted to two companies and a recce troop by Ottawa



But isn't that reversing how things work - the structure as dictated by Ottawa IS the organization so how can it be *politically restricted*. 

And, as has been pointed out as the problem with the Management Plan - since Ottawa does not feel politically restricted to sending the Battle Group (as organized in Canada by the CF) why not concentrate on improving the Army's ability to use non-affiliated sub-units?

Most soldiers exist within their company/platoon structure - professional soldiers should be quite capable of handling a mixed sub-unit environment (especially since the CF expects reservists to operate as individual augmentees).


After all, the Navy doesn't get to send only its preset Flotillas; neither does the Air Force its preset Squadrons/Wings.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (15 Apr 2006)

> But isn't that reversing how things work - the structure as dictated by Ottawa IS the organization so how can it be politically restricted.



You're obviously missing the point.  The politicians will often set artificial limits on manning that has a dramatic impact on how we generate organizations.  For instance, the PM will blurt out a number (say 1000) that bears no relationship to what the actual requirement is on the ground.  Then, after the recces go in, and the actual requirement is validated (typically with the force generators saying "I told you so"), there's a mad scramble to generate the additional forces.  The current ARCHER deployment is a perfect example:  artificially limited (in this case by the Managed Readiness Plan) to 1 light and 1 LAV company with a Coyote troop, it was far too light to conduct operations in Kandahar province and required an additional company at the last minute.

We're barely at the point now where we can barely generate effective companies without mixing and matching.  The problem isn't with the soldiers when dealing with mixed structures, the problem is with training and force generation.  Moving battalions may be of limited visibility to a Cpl/Pte on the line, but creates havoc with the force generation process, as Areas are forced to transfer sub-units out of their normal chain of command, retrain them (as they are - more than likely - from a lower readiness formation), and then integrate them into new units.  Add the fact that this can only really be done between the RCR and PPCLI (due to language difficulties) and you run out of options mighty fast.

Again, this has nothing to do with professionalism at the soldier level.  We've taken a system that has worked for many, many years, shattered it, and replaced it with a pretty coloured Excel spreadsheet that has never, ever worked.

Finally, you can't compare the way the Navy and AF force generate with the way the Army does; it's totally different:  no one suggests taking the Engineering Division from HMCS Halifax and tranferring it to HMCS Vancouver and sending the new crew to the Gulf with zero notice, yet that's what the Army constantly does.


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## vonGarvin (15 Apr 2006)

This whole managed readiness plan is bunk _as far as the units were distributed_  For example, as most will know, a reserve is, by definition, uncommitted troops.  Why then, does the strat reserve have subunits deployed?  When did the reconstitution occur?  
Also, check out the LdSH (RC) being tagged as one of the TFs.  Not only that, but also slid into the ORBAT for the SCTF and probably other stuff.  3 units to make 1 (+1?) is just, well, I dunno, not much sense.  Too many pretty pictures with ink that was still fresh that altered their senses?  I dunno.
I mean, even the brigade HQs didn't have units that came from their brigades? Here's a possible alternative:
Form brigades around units and make those brigades homogenous.  (don't know if I'm using the correct word, but basically the structure of all three brigades are identical: three infantry units, one cavalry, one artillery, one engineer, one service, etc).  Then, assign Brigades (or make affiliated to them) a number of reserve brigades (areas?).  So, we have 5e Brigade, 2 brigade and 1 brigade (from east to west).  Suppose that 5e brigade is "high readiness", 2 brigade is "work up" and 1 brigade is "reconstitution", and all that those imply.  (Don't ask me how to manage the unforgiving nature of 2 RCR, 4 ESR etc sitting by themselves in Gagetown: maybe I'll come back to that).  That way, units wouldn't have to travel so far just to conduct "marry up" drills.  I think that once battalions/regiments became force generators for COMPANIES that we had jumped the shark.
So, whither 2 RCR, 4 ESR and the rest of the lodger units at CTC?  Perhaps take them out of the loop?  But what about 2 CMBG, now minus one battalion of infantry?  CSOR is there, but not part of it (I don't think: CANSOFCOM, correct?).  Perhaps move 2 RCR to Pet?  (Can you spell "release?")  Or, perhaps "form" a "2nd battalion" in Pet, and rebadge those in Gagetown to another unit (black watch?  ;D)  The point is this: if you want to have a brigade of multiple units, it makes perfect sense to have them at least fairly closely located (geographically).  I don't know about the PPCLI, but would Edmonton be better for 2 VP than Shilo?  I mean, it must be nice to have a training area virtually to yourself, but....
Now, as for the armour  cavalry corps, we currently have two Coyote regiments and one regiment that is "hybrid".  If we make all three regiments "homogenous", do we then stand up a fourth to be the DFS regiment?  (Anyone say "8CH"?).  
So, imagine an army with three brigades as outlined above (3 Inf, 1 Cav, 1 Arty, 1 Engr, 1 Svc, etc).  They rotate through the operations (and suppose that the infantry units are one mech and two light: no more fleet management?) as per "reconstitution->workup->high readiness".  Then, in Gagetown is the 1st Bn, RHR Can Battlegroup (heavy).  A four-company battalion of infantry (armoured), complete with "old school" support platoons (couldn't care less if the mortars say "Ubique" on them or not, and the Pioneers are really engineers), an armoured Regiment (Leo C2 for now, Leo 2A6 soon), SP Arty Regt, etc etc.  Then, the army would have its three brigades actually working together.  Then the army would have at least a battlegroup-sized heavy force, perhaps deploying by sea "if needed" (a la SCTF), whilst the medium units are flown in ahead of them to secure the "beach-head" until the heavies arrive.

Now, the big limit to this is* $*, but does this make sense to anyone but me?



Garvin out


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## Kirkhill (15 Apr 2006)

One of the things that I have noticed is that earlier Orders of Battle used to keep the infantry in groups of three (eg 3 battalions in the brigade) while the "supporting arms" (apologies to the Armoured Corps) would be supplied with 4 sub-units to support 3 battalions (4 Squadrons/4 Batteries).  This seemed to leave open not only the possibility of supplying the Brigade Commander with a reserve of a Squadron and a Battery after the other Sqn/Bty/Bns had been formed into Battle Groups but also left open the possibility of cross-posting one Brigade's "Reserve" to another Brigade.

That way a "Light" Brigade could be fattened up by attaching (eg) a "Combat Team" of a Sqn of MBTs and a Battery of Guns that were used to working with each other.

Does this allow for something like two light brigades and a medium/heavy brigade to be formed and managed successfully?


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## TCBF (15 Apr 2006)

"The Managed Readiness Plan says we can - as of right now. Would that ugly colourful poster in the canteen lie to us?"

- No plan survives first contact with the Treasury Board.

- We have waaaaay too many people who have never served in the field as part of a unit in a brigade in a division in a corps on a free play exercise against another corps.  They think our traditional OOBs were inflexible because they were never actually IN one. Had they experienced Fallex 88 (100,000 people on the exercise) or similar, they would have learned a lot about the traditional reasons for our 'Westwern Desert 1942' force stuctures and just how fast they CAN move.  They would not have gotten much sleep in a HESKO'd camp, however... 

-When you want your car modified, you take it to someone who knows all about cars - not an accountant.  When you want your army modified...


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## TangoTwoBravo (15 Apr 2006)

Not that it matters, but I think that it is better for us to do one theatre of operations well rather than two with "economies."  We only have much "ancillary" stuff to spread around between deployments.   Concentration of force and all that.

With one line of operations we can sustain a full recce sqn, and maybe even have four infantry sub-units.  Maybe we even have some HLTA redundancy built in.  All with the fixed costs of the NCE and NSE already paid for.


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## pbi (16 Apr 2006)

I can attest to the arbitrary nature of the "bean counter" approach to deployed force structure. During the spring 2004 recce for ATHENA 02, I was responsible to assess the force protection requirement at Kabul. At the time that we visited, the R22eR stated that the task of securing  CJ and maintaining local patrols required at a minimum a rifle company. My assessment matched this: it was a no-brainer once you took a look at the situation, and TF commander-designate, who led the recce, agreed with it. We also knew that 1 CMBG was prepared to generate the company.

Once we got to NDHQ to brief the staff, the knives came out. We ended up with basically two platoons, plus a few of the key people from Coy HQ who were embedded in other jobs in the camp. We were told that that the Army "could not afford" the additional platoon and coy personnel. As well, in an earlier briefing to the MND of the day, an arbitrary "cap" figure had been mentioned: the MND subsequently repeated it publicly. Of course, after that, nobody was going to go forward and say we needed more troops, even less than a company's worth.

We were not asking for another battalion, or for anything out of the ordinary. Instead, we were stating a requirement based on our professional assessment. That was, I thought, the reason we were sent. Perhaps not.

In the end, as far as I can see it makes little difference how the Army is organized, or what force generation limits we think we can impose on the Govt.(or on the world that makes periodic and often unexpected demands on us...). I can't think of one major committment that this country has ever gotten into, under any stripe of Govt, in which the decision was significantly influenced by the Army's ability to generate forces, or the Army's assessment of what was required.

The answer is hard to divine. The best measure I can think of is to train and build healthy, cohesive units, probably with the priority going to Infantry. Those are the "geese" that lay the golden eggs of force generation. Good sub-units do not just pop into existence on their own, and then function in a vacuum. the leaders of those sub-units also need to be led, and they need to have mutual trust and understanding with their CO and with the Bn HQ staff. The unit needs to function as a team, including the CSS sub-unit and the Cbt Sp sub-unit (assuming a meaningful one exists) Destroy that for apparent short term gain and you will find, I bet, that in the long run we have damaged the force. The US Army learned the vital importance of unit cohesion in Vietnam and the years since, and have implemented a number of measures over the decades to try to achieve it.

Cheers


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## SeaKingTacco (16 Apr 2006)

I must say, after having left the Army in 1997 for the greener (blue-er?) grasses of the Air Force, that I have looked over in wonder and bewilderment.  I have watched cohesive, well-balanced and well-trained units (possibly the only thing that has held the Army together over the past 30 years) be dismantled in some MBA inspired rush to managed readiness and "plug and play" Task Forces.

Stripping Infantry units of Support Company, Armoured Regiments of Assault Troops and Tanks, Artillery Regiments of Guns- how did any of this make the Army "better"?  Cheaper, to be sure, but better?

How do you tell the Privates/Gunners/Troopers in your unit that, because you had to the misfortune to be posted to a low readiness formation, you will specialize in hangar floor sweeping for the next year?  Sure ammo, POL and field time are expensive... so is replacing soldiers who released out of boredom or worse, died on deployment because they never really learned their craft well.

Stripping units of their vehicles and centralizing it all is cheaper...on paper.  How expensive, in the long run, is a generation of soldiers who never learns to care for a vehicle because he/she is personally responsible for it?

von Garvin had it right- once COs became mere force generators for sub-units you have to ask, where will it stop?  In 2010, will OCs be mere "force generators" for Platoons or even Sections, to sent on operations in some cobbled together monstrosity of a Task-force with troops from 20-30 units?  Why bother having units at all?  

I might add, the Air Force is no better.  No squadron, that I am aware of, has enough people or aircraft to pull off a deployment on it's own anymore.


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## TCBF (16 Apr 2006)

"Once we got to NDHQ to brief the staff, the knives came out. We ended up with basically two platoons, plus a few of the key people from Coy HQ who were embedded in other jobs in the camp. We were told that that the Army "could not afford" the additional platoon and coy personnel. As well, in an earlier briefing to the MND of the day, an arbitrary "cap" figure had been mentioned: the MND subsequently repeated it publicly. Of course, after that, nobody was going to go forward and say we needed more troops, even less than a company's worth."

- The cap is not our problem, how we balance our force is.  We seem to be more and more 'tail heavy' as the careerists all want a high paid gong-show behind the wire, with their moaning troops unable to do their jobs by day AND pull a sentry go at night (the old 4 Svc Bn would eat these wimps for breakfast).  Meanwhile, Cbt A are sleep deprived and beat to a pulp because they have to inherit the defensive tasks that the HESKObites should doctrinally be doing - but can't (or should I say: 'won't').

Tom


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## GO!!! (16 Apr 2006)

TCBF said:
			
		

> - The cap is not our problem, how we balance our force is.  We seem to be more and more 'tail heavy' as the careerists all want a high paid gong-show behind the wire, with their moaning troops unable to do their jobs by day AND pull a sentry go at night (the old 4 Svc Bn would eat these wimps for breakfast).  Meanwhile, Cbt A are sleep deprived and beat to a pulp because they have to inherit the defensive tasks that the HESKObites should doctrinally be doing - but can't (or should I say: 'won't').



I can vouch for this one - having lived that particular experience.

There really is no feeling like returning from an 8 hr patrol, getting 2 hours of sleep, then forming a work party to assemble a kitchen tent, while on the way there, walking past a section plus of cooks playing volleyball and tanning.  

My personal favorite was to be told by an air force CSM that we were to "shut up, my troops are sleeping" while trying to get a QRF coy ready to respond to an issue in the dark. It was all the better when she was awarded a bronze star for it.


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## TCBF (16 Apr 2006)

"My personal favorite was to be told by an air force CSM that we were to "shut up, my troops are sleeping" while trying to get a QRF coy ready to respond to an issue in the dark. It was all the better when she was awarded a bronze star for it."

- Well, she did risk her life in confronting you...

 ;D


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## Echo9 (16 Apr 2006)

Something to remember is that MRP wasn't viewed as THE answer by the staff either.  It was the concept for how the army could best attain what the government was asking it to do, with the resources that it had.  It was realized that it probably wouldn't last past the first few rotations due to some key personnel shortages (particularly int, cbt engr, EME)- there are only about 1/9 the number of int ops required, and only 1/3 the number of engrs.  That doesn't even start to look at the equipment requirements.


Again, these shortfalls are not the fault of MRP.  All that MRP looked to do was minimize the impact of those shortages.  In a certain manner, it did its job very well- it made obvious the fact that the army couldn't keep up with what the government wanted it to do.  To put things in perspective, MRP was so badly stressed that in some cases, the army commander knew that Sgt Bloggins was sick and was going to have to pull out, because Sgt Bloggins didn't have a backup- that's how stressed MRP was even from the start.

Now, if you're looking at what it would take to actually support two constantly deployed battalion sized task forces, you're probably looking at needing to double the size of the current field force.  Incidentally, this would put us at a roughly similar ratio of force size to population as  Britain and the US (excluding Marines).  As you can imagine, this growth largely would need to be in the trades listed above, but would also likely end up with a lot more infantry, perhaps a little armour, and virtually no extra arty.


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## warrickdll (20 Apr 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> You're obviously missing the point.  The politicians will often set artificial limits on manning that has a dramatic impact on how we generate organizations.  For instance, the PM will blurt out a number (say 1000) that bears no relationship to what the actual requirement is on the ground.  Then, after the recces go in, and the actual requirement is validated (typically with the force generators saying "I told you so"), there's a mad scramble to generate the additional forces.  The current ARCHER deployment is a perfect example:  artificially limited (in this case by the Managed Readiness Plan) to 1 light and 1 LAV company with a Coyote troop, it was far too light to conduct operations in Kandahar province and required an additional company at the last minute.
> 
> We're barely at the point now where we can barely generate effective companies without mixing and matching.  The problem isn't with the soldiers when dealing with mixed structures, the problem is with training and force generation.  Moving battalions may be of limited visibility to a Cpl/Pte on the line, but creates havoc with the force generation process, as Areas are forced to transfer sub-units out of their normal chain of command, retrain them (as they are - more than likely - from a lower readiness formation), and then integrate them into new units.  Add the fact that this can only really be done between the RCR and PPCLI (due to language difficulties) and you run out of options mighty fast.
> ...



The Army is already divided up in a, more or less, rational manner. Brigade Groups having Battalions with associated support (forming Battle Groups). These cohesive Battle Groups should be the basis for Task Force deployments, and when they're not - it strains the system. So I agree with much of the point being made. 

Perhaps the Army could be restructured better but, given the available resources, the same problem would exist:
	- There is no magic orbat that would accommodate every contingency, every transport limitation, or every feckless decision maker.

If we accept that the Army's basic formations in Canada are structured correctly (though too small) for mid/high intensity conflicts (Korea/WWII), it shouldn't mean that we can't accept dynamic force structures being formed to deploy overseas to the nearly endless no/low intensity conflicts. 

More resources should be concentrated on keeping as many units as possible in higher states of readiness, and in being able to work together with short notice. I think this would be more cost effective than adding additional units.





			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> ...
> Again, this has nothing to do with professionalism at the soldier level.  We've taken a system that has worked for many, many years, shattered it, and replaced it with a pretty coloured Excel spreadsheet that has never, ever worked.
> ...



This Army is no more than a Division in size (okay, Div+) so no matter how things are cobbled together we're still operating with units of the same Division. But somehow we've managed to end up with no more across-the-board cohesion than we would with any random coalition partner - the system might have worked for many years but it has been detrimental in at least this aspect.

Given the limited size of the Army we shouldn't be falling apart from a lack of cohesion, or from differing training methods/standards. It should be a natural fit to have a Task Force comprised of sub-units from across Canada, Reg and Reserve, English and French. This can't be accomplished by wishful thinking, but I think it can be done.





			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> ...
> Finally, you can't compare the way the Navy and AF force generate with the way the Army does; it's totally different:  no one suggests taking the Engineering Division from HMCS Halifax and tranferring it to HMCS Vancouver and sending the new crew to the Gulf with zero notice, yet that's what the Army constantly does.



No analogy survives first contact.


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## Daidalous (21 Apr 2006)

My personal opion is that the Brass and Government has tried to run the military like a business.. It's not,  The main purpose of a military is to defend the government intrests.  Not look good on paper or be cost efficient.  On my QL3's  we had a British Maj who had just spent a tour in NATO Command  that told us that the proper division of personal assets that has been used by the British Army is 2 support soldiers ( cooks, driver, supply, pay, HQ etc...) per 1 Combat arms Soilder(Inf, Armor, Arty, Cbt Eng)  If you have to many Cbt Arms  the system will colapse under the strain and people will starve and freeze, and everyone dies on the battle field.   If you have too many support troops you burn out your combat arms and everyone dies on the battle field.  And from the numbers I just crunched, were out to lunch, or my math is.  I could start on how i would fix it, but I would get flammed.


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## Scoobie Newbie (21 Apr 2006)

That's what Nomex is for.


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## aesop081 (21 Apr 2006)

Daidalous said:
			
		

> I could start on how i would fix it, but I would get flammed.



Well then why dont you just speak your mind and present your idea.  If it makes any sense there will be a good discussion and if its stupid.....THEN you will get flamed.

See my point ?


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## Colin Parkinson (24 Apr 2006)

Interesting I am reading Cobra II and it speaks to the lead up of the invasion of Iraq with only 50,000 troops as envisioned by Rumsfield!!

A good read for anyone involved at the army meets politician end.

Comment from things I picked up on the news regarding reservists. As stated by another poster, the army expects the reservist to drop into any vacant spot and adapt. While I am sure that most do that very well, there is concern about their loved ones (wives, kids) not getting the same support as spouses of regular soldiers who have access to the base facilities and other spouses from the unit. Also having these soldiers depart individually from the unit they served in reduces the effectiveness of peer to peer counselling for potential post traumatic stress syndrome, it would be better that they rotate in and out with the same unit. This will be more of an issue with this current deployment than some of the previous ones.


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