# Coherent Military Assessment of the Recent War in Lebanon



## vonGarvin (2 Sep 2006)

Found this on USENET.  Very interesting assessment:

-- A Preliminary Military Assessment of the Lebanon Conflict

http://tinyurl.com/h4hsp

(Source: defense-aerospace.com; posted Aug. 18, 2006) (Edited for style)

(© Ben Moores)

 This article explains how the war was fought, looks at key military 
applications and technological successes and failures, examines the main 
battles and offensives, Hezbollah's campaign achievements and how the 
Israeli military lost the opening battles yet recovered. Finally the article 
looks at the hard questions that both militaries will have to answer and the 
military equipment programs that are now required.



Israel Air Force Performance

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has come in for considerable criticism during 
the conflict. The majority of this has been more in relation to the 
strategic use of the Air Force as opposed to its actual tactical utility. 
However, the IAF tactical utility, for so long unquestioned in Israel, needs 
to be examined.

Despite having excellent ISTAR and a formidably short kill chain the IAF, 
primarily through the use of F-15s, F-16s (using JDAM and Paveway bombs) and 
armed UAVs, was unable to interdict the small pockets of rocket firings from 
the border area into Northern Israel. After 16 days of aerial bombardment 
Hezbollah was still quite capable of sustaining a barrage of 100 or more 
rocket firings against Israel, despite thousands of combat sorties by the 
IAF. Hezbollah is estimated to have some 1,250 launchers of all types of 
which about 300 were destroyed (or 25%). This IAF operational failure caused 
the IDF to mount a full blown invasion of the region to reduce Hizbollahs 
capability.

The IAF did have some successes in destroying some protected C2 nodes, 
re-supply convoys and larger long range missile launchers; indeed it appears 
the majority of 220mm and Fajr-3 & 5's were subsequently destroyed after 
being deployed.

However, the IAF claims of destroying two-thirds of all Hezbollah long range 
launchers should be closely examined. This is because numerous dummy missile 
firing sites with fake heat signatures were targeted during the course of 
the campaign. Furthermore is has been claimed by various Israeli sources 
that Hezbollah has retained a battery or more of either Zelzal-2 range or 
Nazeat 10-H (210 and 140 km range respectively).

The IAF didn't seem capable of degrading the capability of Hezbollah's 
Command and control or communications network. Whilst some 23 tons of bombs 
were dropped on an underground command bunker in Dahiya in south Beirut on 
July 19, it is clear from the sudden self imposed silencing of the launchers 
by Hezbollah for the July 31 ceasefire that its command and control, and 
communications network was still in place. Indeed immediately after the 
ceasefire front line units resumed pre-planned and co-ordinated firings.


UAV Applications

This conflict was the first to have both sides make use of offensive UAVs. 
Both sides actually made extensive use of Offensive UAVs during the 
conflict. UCAVs, (specifically IAI's Heron), were seen to be repeatedly 
engaging targets with Spike and Hellfire missiles. It is understood that a 
strike was carried out against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon on the 31st of 
July. It could well be that the platform used was Elbit's Hermes 450 or IAI 
Searcher II UAVs. This seems unlikely as based on information available it 
is known that both the Hermes 450 and Searcher II platforms were heavily 
engaged on ISTAR missions. Iranian UAVs were repeatedly used by Hezbollah 
and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) but were unable to repeat 
the success that they achieved earlier in the year; this is further 
discussed in detail below.

Perhaps what is most interesting about this conflict is the lack of 
excitement about the use of UAVs. The wide spread use of ISTAR platforms by 
Israel hasn't been a focus of attention, no Sunday newspaper features on the 
use of "Robot weapons from the future" tells us they have become mainstream.


Air Defence Performance

Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces only managed 
to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53 
with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on the 
17th of July were established to be a partial rocket ignition caused by 
strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had some MANPADS in 
their inventory but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With 
the IAF able to strike from 15,000 feet and without a high altitude air 
defence system there was nothing that Hezbollah could do.

Syrian Air Defences did much better. On the 29th of July they managed to 
shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to "paint" Syrian 
re-supply convoys. After a couple of decades of air defence ineptitude the 
Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop IAF 
performing low pass flights over Syrian Presidential Palaces as a reminder 
of their military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost, 
two AH-64a's to a collision and a AH-64D to what seems to be Israeli 
artillery fire.

These small losses confirm that Hezbollah and the IRGC (Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps) were unable to interdict the massed Israeli 
heliborne advances in the past week or even deter strike or reconnaissance 
operations. Considering that Iran deployed a number of high-prestige weapon 
systems into southern Lebanon it can be assumed that they also deployed its 
most effective air defence systems. This poor performance would put pressure 
on Iran to procure S-300s and M1-Tors because it seems to confirm their 
indigenous and Chinese-supplied air defence systems are ineffective against 
[Israeli] airborne electronic warfare [equipment]. When these systems might 
be delivered is unknown as Rosoboronexport recently confirmed that any 
future orders for S-300s could only be delivered from 2011 onwards, due to a 
huge backlog and a lack of qualified technicians.

Israeli air defences would appear to be relatively competent against 
airborne platforms. Earlier this year Hezbollah was twice able to make 
return flights with an Iranian Mirsad UAV (or maybe an Iran Aircraft 
Manufacturing Industries (HESA) Ababil-3) into Israeli airspace. However, 
during this conflict Iran was unable to repeat this earlier success. Three 
Hezbollah UAVs were shot down by IAF Python V air-to-air missiles whilst 
attempting to enter Israeli airspace. Two of these UAVs, according to some 
sources, were carrying bomb loads. It would appear that all attempts to 
cross the border were at night-time, suggesting that Iran has added an 
infrared application modification to the standard television camera.

Israeli air defences seemed to be less capable against rocket and missile 
fire. Despite large-scale investments none of the three key air defence 
systems (MTHEL, Arrow & PAC-2) engaged targets, although that is arguably 
because Hezbollah decided not to strike at Tel Aviv. It seems that MTHEL was 
not deployed, which is worth noting, as it was specifically designed to 
counter exactly the low altitude strategic rocket threat. It is understood 
that the number of batteries needed to meet the threat and operational cost 
made deployment cost-prohibitive.


The Rocket Campaign

Before the conflict started Hezbollah was armed with some 12,000 rockets 
supplied by Iran and Syria. Some 10,000 of these were the Iranian 107 mm and 
122mm rockets which have a range of less than 20km. Syria supplied a limited 
number of 220mm rockets with the longer 30km range. Iranian Fajar-3 and 
Fajar-5 rockets used from the second week of the war onwards (43 and 75 km 
range respectively) had not been used against Israel before and caused 
proportionately more damage and casualties than the 107mm and 122mm rockets.

The effectiveness of the Hezbollah rocket campaign against Israeli civilian 
targets is fairly difficult to quantify, except in terms of absolute 
casualties. Whilst some 4,000 rockets were fired they managed to cause only 
a limited number of casualties. In comparison, Iraq's blitz of Teheran in 
the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, using fewer Scuds, caused much higher 
casualties and disruption. Indeed, more casualties were caused by Iraq's 
pre-emptive Scud bombardment prior to Operation Desert Shield.

It was widely reported that Israel seemed incapable of stopping rocket 
attacks. But upon closer examination it is clear that certain strategy 
dynamics employed by Hezbollah changed over the campaign. At the beginning 
of the campaign Hezbollah was merely countering IAF strikes with short range 
rockets, as part of a "tit-for-tat" strategy. By the second week of the war 
Hezbollah was using the long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets in order to 
place political pressure on Israel. By the final week of the campaign, with 
its forces being surrounded and with Israel not responding to cease fire 
initiatives, Hezbollah was forced into committing whatever rockets it had 
remaining in forward areas. So, it appeared that Hezbollah was escalating 
their campaign, with the Israelis unable to prevent them, but it was 
actually the opposite. Hezbollah's escalation was simply an attempt to gain 
some utility from stocks that were out flanked.


Ground Operations

The performance of the opposing ground forces is difficult to rate because 
of the different strategies that were used in the different stages of the 
war. A review of events is followed by analysis of the operations.

The first significant battle was at Bent Jbail which began on July 24 and 
finished on the August 1. Skirmishes continued through to the 8th of August 
presumably as pockets of infantry were flushed out or attempted to 
manoeuvre. The initial fighting was characterized by Israeli forces 
struggling to fight their way into fortified positions with small teams of 
infantry and penny packets of tanks. Bent Jbail was manned with some 200 
skilled ATGM (Anti-tank guided missile) operators and fighters. They had 
large stocks of forward placed rockets and knew exactly where to hit even 
Merkava MK4's. These early engagements allowed Hezbollah to focus their 
forces against the IDF. This concentration of forces gave them an unexpected 
firepower and combat capability; with them able to kill over 15 IDF 
soldiers. Parallel with operations at Bent Jbail was the Battle of Maroun 
al-Ras where three Merkava's were penetrated between July 19 and July 22.

The inability of the IDF to win decisively at Bint Jbeil, combined with the 
failure of airpower to rein in Hezbollah rocket strikes, forced the Israeli 
government to commit significant forces to a full scale invasion of Lebanon, 
abandoning its cross-border raids and air power demonstration strategy in 
the process.

The IDF quickly reacted to these events with some 15,000 reservists being 
called up on July 28 and by July 31. Five brigades struck North East into 
Lebanon blocking off the Syrian border to the region and placing the army in 
a position to move to the Litani river. This drive also cut off Hezbollah 
forces operating south of this point. By August 1 there was heavy fighting 
at Aita el-Shaab, Al Adisa, Kfar Kila and Taibe with further fighting in the 
north at Marjayoun. For the next five days the battles of Aita el-Shaab and 
Taibe continued with Israeli forces suffering significant armoured losses at 
Taibe on August 5 and August 6.

By August 9 the IDF was at least nine miles into Lebanon. A slow advance 
across the length of the southern border began with fighting being renewed 
at Bent Jbail Aita-el-Shaab and Dibel as the IDF attempted to clear out 
enemy fighters. On August 10 Marajaoun fell, allowing Israeli forces to move 
north up to the Litani river. It would appear that this obligated Hezbollah 
forces to maneuver and fierce fighting erupted the length of the frontline. 
Later than night airborne forces moved on to the Litani river line with the 
largest Israeli military airlift in 30 years.

By August 13 Israel had all but surrounded remaining Hezbollah forces in 
southern Lebanon. Knowing that ceasefire lines always follow the final 
frontline both sides spent the final day of the war heavily engaged in what 
was the bloodiest day of the conflict. The IDF lost 24 dead in a number of 
different engagements with around 100 or more casualties. Hezbollah 
casualties are unknown but can be presumed to be equal or higher as their 
earlier advantages of local knowledge, surprise, prepared positions and 
superior local firepower were now lost.

Thus there are three distinct phases of the campaign. The first stage it is 
arguable that the strategy and tactics let down the IDF. With limited 
resources and operational scope against a well prepared and motivated 
opposition the IDF struggled, particularly at Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail. 
The second phase is the move to bypass Hezbollah positions and maneuver to 
the north East through Marajaoun. This second phase confirmed that the 
Israeli reserve call up system is as sharp as ever with large numbers of 
reservists being called up and quickly deployed into operations. There is a 
clear failure to effectively finish off Hezbollah force concentrations in 
the border region, leading to further conflict and rocket attacks. The third 
phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they managed to 
maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing 
the fight.


Observations on the ground campaign

Hezbollah proved that they had mastered positional warfare, absorbed modern 
weapon systems and had the organization and morale to withstand being 
surrounded and overrun. Hezbollah will have lost many of their best units 
and weapon systems during this conflict but enough have survived to rebuild 
again. Furthermore Iran will quickly move to re-supply Hezbollah with more 
of "what worked" and less of "what didn't". Given a breathing space 
Hezbollah ought to come out of this conflict technically more capable and 
with veteran cadres.

The high casualty rates suffered by Hezbollah can be traced to the second 
week of operations when Hezbollah failed to appreciate that the operational 
tempo had increased. Nor does it appear that they were prepared for this or 
able to change as Hezbollah were seen adding finishing touches to bunkers 
and sowing mines rather than falling back. Although it could be argued they 
had no plans to fallback And the troops had no interest in falling back to 
fight another day.

Israeli heavy armoured forces seem to have suffered a series of setbacks 
with some 30 tanks damaged, although only 10 appear to have been either 
badly damaged or destroyed. Most of these casualties were caused by long 
range man-portable anti tank missiles such as the Kornet-E 9P133, Metis-M 
9M131, the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 
'Spigot'). It is understood that over 500 missiles were fired with around 50 
hits on Israeli armoured vehicles. This was clearly been a surprise to 
Israeli commanders, who committed penny packet armoured forces in unsuitable 
roles. With tank crewmen taking half of IDF casualties it will act as an 
early warning to the Israeli military that even their powerfully armoured 
Merkavas are vulnerable.

Israeli special forces launched two known large scale raids. August 2 saw a 
large airborne raid on the Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek some 62 miles 
behind enemy lines. Whilst the original mission to capture a high ranking 
Hezbollah figure failed due to complications and quick defensive reactions, 
Israel did manage to withdraw successfully with 5 captured soldiers. August 
the 5th saw a second raid with Naval Commandoes raiding an apartment in 
Tyre. It seems likely that this was another airborne raid but the outcome is 
unknown.

Israeli ground force casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and 
long range anti-tank missiles. The scale of Israeli ground force casualties 
can be attributed to the some 40 Hezbollah and IRGC command bunkers and 
their numerous associated firing position entrenchments, their tactical 
decision to stand and fight, as well as their relative professionalism. This 
was compounded by Israeli strategic policy early in the war. Around 50% of 
Israeli casualties can be attributed to anti-tank missiles, 25% to small 
arms and mines, around 10% to friendly fire, 10% to rocket fire and 5% to 
accidents. Historically the majority of casualties are caused by artillery 
so it makes for interesting statistics.

Neither side released exact Hezbollah and IRGC casualties, and the precise 
number will probably never be known due to the fog of war and political 
reservations. It is expected that Hezbollah and IRGC casualties were high. 
The reasons for this are that the Israeli persistent surveillance assets 
deployed over the combat zone allowed Israeli commanders to immediately 
identify significant enemy manoeuvres. This forced Hezbollah and the IRGC to 
remain in static positions. This combined with a Hezbollah determination to 
stand and fight rather than melt away into the remaining population would 
have made for a high casualty environment. The Israeli heliborne capture of 
the South side of the Litani river would have further increased casualties 
through interdiction amongst those enemy forces attempting to retreat north. 
Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900 
Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting.


Naval Operations

Perhaps the most discussed topic on defence related blogs and forum boards 
has been the C-802 strike against the Israeli Navy Corvette Hanit. Indeed 
news that the missile was not a UAV was broken on blogs and forum groups 
days before it made the mainstream press; an interesting phenomenon that we 
will surely see more of in the future.

The turbojet-powered C-802 has a range of up to 120 km. and a 155-kg 
blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile was fired by either Hezbollah or 
the IRGC using a Lebanese coastal radar. This would appear to be confirmed 
as following the C-802 strike there was a subsequent destruction of the 
Lebanese coastal radar network by Israeli forces.

How a C-802, a relatively mediocre anti shipping missile, managed to hit the 
most modern ship in the Israeli fleet is of obvious interest. The Israeli 
position is that the Hanit had its automatic defences off because of an IFF 
conflict with IAF forces operating in the area. Two missiles were fired; one 
hit the Hanit and the other hit an Egyptian "trawler" that was fishing 
nearby. This would go someway to confirm claims that the missile has "98% 
effectiveness". However, this is not matched by the missile's ability to 
distinguish targets or actually arm its self properly, as the missile that 
hit the Hanit failed to go off. This non-detonating strike caused only a 
minor fire in the flight deck and with the ship out of repairs after 14 days 
according to an Israeli Defence Spokesperson.


Conclusions

Hezbollah have proven themselves to be a professional, dedicated and 
organised force, whose prime position, equipment and personnel seems to have 
been squandered for two captives.

The Israeli military also seems to have been misused for two of the three 
weeks of the conflict. The air force attracted much negative publicity for 
expending large amounts of ordinance for little apparent gain. The regular 
army forces were initially committed to attacks against superior forces that 
were dug in- for no apparent strategic gain.

There are a number of technical military questions that have come out of 
this conflict. The failure of Hezbollah in the air war asks questions about 
the quality of Iranian air defence capability.

The Israeli army needs to examine exactly how it lost so many tanks and will 
presumably speed up and increase the size of the current program for armour 
self-protection suites that is being fought between Rafael with Trophy and 
IMI with Iron Fist.

IFF has shown itself to be of vital importance with an Israeli warship, 10 
Israeli soldiers and an AH-64D all apparently lost due to poor IFF (the bill 
for this alone would pay for an IFF program)

Another interesting question is why, with Hezbollah using Iranian Electronic 
Industries 1950s era analogue VHF radios, Tadiran jammers were not able to 
break down Hezbollah command and control.

Finally, a review of the MTHEL and ballistic missile defence programs needs 
to be made as none of them were able to influence the outcome of this 
conflict [nor even to shoot down any incoming rocket-Ed] -- a significant 
expense for no apparent gain.



Ben Moores is a defence analyst with a specialisation in European defence 
electronics and Iranian military capability.


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## The Bread Guy (2 Sep 2006)

Also, here's a compilation of a series of assessments:

*Iran-Syria vs. Israel, Round 1: Assessments & Lessons Learned*
Defence Industry Daily, 28 Aug 06
http://tinyurl.com/f9tlh

''In the aftermath of the recent fighting between Iran/Syria proxies Hezbollah and Israel, a few after action reviews and assessments have begun to trickle in. While war is inseparable in practice from political strategy, and the Olmert government's interference in military planning & operations was significant and negative, DID has searched for analyses that offer more of a techno-tactical assessment. Details have been far sketchier than one is used to for American conflicts, but a hazy picture is beginning to emerge and evaluations are being made of the two forces' effectiveness. Hezbollah can safely be characterized as a state within a state and was aided by Iranian forces. Accordingly, this conflict featured most of the accoutrements of full state conflicts: Armed UAVs (apparently used by both sides), air and missile strikes with corresponding air defense activity, anti-ship cruise missiles, tanks vs. advanced anti-armor missiles (incl. AT-13s and Milans), et. al . . . . ''


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## warpig (4 Sep 2006)

I don’t want to have this jump into a political discussion when it rightly should stay at the tactical/on ground analysis level, but this well presented work signifies that Hezbollah is indeed more than a terrorist agency, if it can plan large scale battles and have air/land assets co-ordinated in operations against the best force in the region with all the intentions of winning strategically. That being said, and with the un-questionable fact that Hezbollah still stands, and still “claims ownership” of south Lebanon, can the Israeli Government and it’s Western Supporters continue to say Hezbollah is generally speaking the same as the Badder Meinhoff Gang? I mean, can you compare a dozen radical rich-kid intellectuals with what fought the Israelis for two weeks with more success than Jordan ever did? Can you compare Hezbollah to the 2001 Al Qaeda? 

From this article, I judge that Israel didn’t make that mistake, and fought them like conventional forces, though with results that can be debated for success for other reasons that that. What I want to stress is that to have success fighting an enemy, and Hezbollah is that, you must understand it correctly. Is the Harper government in it’s roll as second banana to George Bush doing that?


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## PPCLI Guy (4 Sep 2006)

If ever there was a "non-state actor", it is Hezbollah...


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## tomahawk6 (4 Sep 2006)

You dont want to make a political statement but you did with the statement: Is the Harper government in it’s roll as second banana to George Bush doing that?

The lack of a successful resolution was the fault of the Olmert government. In this case the political leadership sent confusing mixed signals to the IDF. 

Second, the IDF were not prepared for the type of fighting they saw in Lebanon. There was a failure of intelligence to identify the extent of Hizbollah's defensive preparations. The IDF were unable to interdict their communications because of their fiber optic cable. The reserves were poorly equiped, due to years of budget constraints. The Israeli units lacked situational awareness which caused problems for them in several key battles and there were a number of friendly fire incidents between ground units. Israeli artillery shot down one of their Apache gunships. The IDF was expecting another Gaza and got something far more sophisticated. The next time the IDF goes into Lebanon they will use different tactics.


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## cardinal (6 Sep 2006)

milnewstbay said:
			
		

> Also, here's a compilation of a series of assessments:
> 
> *Iran-Syria vs. Israel, Round 1: Assessments & Lessons Learned*
> Defence Industry Daily, 28 Aug 06
> http://tinyurl.com/f9tlh



Among the reports listed at this link, there is a draft version of a Center for Strategic & International Studies report Preliminary "Lessons" of the Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony H. Cordesman  which takes a more strategic view of the war. 

The paper reviews Israel's war aims, and whether they were achieved.  Some of its conclusions are particularly relevant to our own situation:

*Clear, Hold and Build*

One key lesson here is much the same as the lesson the US should have learned from
Vietnam and Iraq. The only way to actually defeat such an enemy is to clear the area and
hold it indefinitely, sealing off possible exit and dispersal routes, and conducting a
constant rear area security effort. "Clear, hold, and build," however, tends to be a
remarkably vacuous tactic in practice. It simply requires too many men for too long at too
much cost with too much vulnerability, plus a scale of civic action and civil-military
efforts that are easy to call for, but almost impossible to implement. (p 6)
___________________________________________________________________________

*Netcentric Warfare*

Like insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan-and in Arab states like
Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other states threatened by such groups-the Hezbollah
showed the ability of non-state actors to fight their own form of netcentric warfare. The
Hezbollah acted as a "distributed network" of small cells and units acting with
considerable independence, and capable of rapidly adapting to local conditions using
media reports, verbal communication, etc.

Rather than have to react faster than the IDF's decision cycle, they could largely ignore it,
waiting out Israeli attacks, staying in positions, reinfiltrating or reemerging from cover,
and choosing the time to attack or ambush. Forward fighters could be left behind or
sacrificed, and "self-attrition" became a tactic substituting for speed of maneuver and the
ability to anticipated IDF movements.

Skilled cadres and leadership cadres could be hidden, sheltered, or dispersed. Rear areas
became partial sanctuaries in spite of the IDF.(p21)
__________________________________________________________________________


... and then there are some discussion points of more general interest:


*Combat Readiness of Land Forces*

[Israel's] overall quality of readiness, training, and preparation for a possible war seems to have
been dictated by the fact that it did not want to fight another land war in Lebanon, rather
than the fact it might well have to fight such a war.

Military forces must prepare for the wars they may have to fight, not for the wars they
want to fight. They must also prepare knowing that nothing about the history of warfare
indicates that peacetime planners can count on predicting when a war takes place or how
it will unfold. (p 23)
___________________________________________________________________________

*Airpower as Intimidation  * 

It has also been clear from Douhet to the present that the advocates of airpower tend to
sharply exaggerate its ability to influence or intimidate leaders and politicians, and act as
a weapons of political warfare. There certainly is little evidence to state that such IAF
strikes did more than make Lebanese leaders turn to the international community for
support in forcing Israel to accept a ceasefire, provoke Hezbollah leaders to even more
intense efforts, and produce a more hostile reaction in the Arab world. The advocates of
escalation to intimidate and force changes in behavior at the political level are sometimes
right; far more often, they are wrong. More often than not, such attacks provoke more
hostility and counterescalation. (p 22)
___________________________________________________________________________

*Accountability of Senior Officers - Reaction to problems and reverses*

What is interesting about the Israeli approach ... is the assumption by so many
Israeli experts that that major problems and reverses need immediate official examination
and that criticism begins from the top down. Patriotism and the pressures of war call for
every effort to be made to win, not for support of the political leadership and military
command until the war is over.

The US, in contrast, is usually slow to criticize and then tends to focus on the President
on a partisan basis. It does not have a tradition of independent commissions and total
transparency (all of the relevant cabinet and command meetings in Israel are videotaped).
Worse, the US military tends to investigate and punish from the bottom up. At least since
Pearl Harbor (where the search for scapegoats was as much a motive as the search for
truth), the US has not acted on the principle that top-level and senior officers and civilian
officials must be held accountable for all failures, and that the key lessons of war include
a ruthless and unbiased examination of grand strategy and policymaking. (p 10)

_____________________________________________________________________

The paper also has a discussion of weapons used in the war, results and their implications for the future.

If I were going to Staff College this year, this is one paper I'd like to have in my files!

c


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## vonGarvin (6 Sep 2006)

cardinal said:
			
		

> If I were going to Staff College this year, this is one paper I'd like to have in my files!


I am going to Staff College this year, and I will take this paper with me.  Thanks


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## geo (6 Sep 2006)

Is it possible that the IDF suffered some of the same problems the US Army suffered in Vietnam with too much political / gov't involvment in the day to day running of the campaign?

The Israeli gov't was somewhat concerned with it's image, meddled continuously in the daily running of the campaign.  From an interview I watched on the tube, some junior leaders were strongly critical of the continuing, by the hour changes to their mission.  That is not to say that troops must be able to react to changing situations BUT, when there is no clear "commander's intent" where are you going to go?


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## warpig (6 Sep 2006)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> You dont want to make a political statement but you did with the statement: Is the Harper government in it’s roll as second banana to George Bush doing that?



You misquote me when you imply I didn’t want to make political statements…I didn’t want the thread turning to political sparing. I have no problem stating political points that are relevant, any time, any place. Sorry if the image of George Bush holding a rather small, un-ripened banana offends you. 
I think what offends all military people is civilian incompetence in directing military leadership. Need we debate how relevant that is to someone who flies the Stars and Stripes these days?

To tweak your point that the Omert Government was at fault for not having a successful resolution, I would have to qualify your statement because you were right, the IDF was not prepared to fight this war. As soon as Omert chose the mistaken Lebanon option, he would have had an unsuccessful resolution because of the mistakes of his military. How was he going to have a successful one, given what we now know? And before you answer, remember his Military leadership must have mislead him as to their abilities to root out Hezbollah and how strong Hezbollah was. It is unlikely that had his Generals stated there was minimal chance they could effectively route out Hezbollah and a very likely chance nothing positive would be accomplished, Omert would have given the green light to the war. So having a flawed, unprepared military to rely on, the civilian leadership would have likely failed in its goals. I think the Israelis should thank their forces for having the skills needed to adapt quickly and make some gains. After they sack some generals. I believe that the Omert government asked for solutions, chose what they thought was the best solution, and got sand-bagged by the IDF. 

I also can’t believe that the Israelis are poorly equipped due to budget constraints. I saw only the best hardware on TV, and tell me what army has everything. They had enough as compared to Hezbollah. The conclusions of the posted article would suggest that “next time” for Israel will be under far more practical and realistic expectations and with a real need, as opposed to just a phoney window of opportunity.


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## tomahawk6 (15 Sep 2006)

The Olmert government has yet to come to grips with IDF prosecution of the war. They have resisted a commission to study failure/shortcomings. Lebanon may have the same effect that Vietnam did on the US military. Not moving to overhaul the iDF so it can fight Hizbollah effectively will not improve their chances for success should there be a next time.

http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/09/15/060915090025.837dg77j.html

A general resigns, a colonel is disciplined and a military command battered by an unrelenting storm of criticism: the Israeli army is in disarray as it struggles to cope with the failures of the war in Lebanon. 

A month after the 34-day war against Shiite militia Hezbollah ended, nothing has halted the flood of criticism against the military and political leadership over their handling of a deadly conflict that failed to achieve its main aims. 


Two days after Israel's northern army commander resigned, it emerged that embattled army chief Dan Halutz disciplined the head of an armoured brigade for criticising a superior in front of his subordinates during the war. 

Colonel Amnon Eshel, head of the seventh brigade, reportedly complained that his immediate boss, General Gal Hirsh, was "completely cut off from realities on the ground" as his badly-prepared men battled to counter Hezbollah rockets. 

Halutz "severely reprimanded" Eshel for disrespecting the military hierarchy and suspended him from promotion for two years, an army spokesman told AFP. 

The latest incident, revealed two days after General Udi Adam resigned, underscored the level of disarray in the military. 

The war left 162 Israelis dead and failed to achieve either main objectives of retrieving two soldiers captured by Hezbollah in a raid on July 12 or halting the guerrillas' barrage of more than 4,000 rocket attacks on the north. 


Israel has also weathered heavy criticism abroad for its devastating use of force in Lebanon, where more than 1,200 people were killed and thousands of homes and infrastructure targets were bombed. 

Adam's departure as the first official to step down as done little to quell discontent amid calls for further heads to roll calls such as for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Halutz and Defence Minister Amir Peretz to go. 

In an interview published Friday, former chief of staff Moshe Yaalon urged them to step down, charging that the entire conflict was misconceived and mismanaged from start to finish. 

"Going to war was scandalous and he is directly responsible for that. The management of the war was a failure and he is responsible for that," Yaalon was quoted as saying in the Haaretz daily when asked if Olmert had to resign. 

"The final operation was particularly problematic and he was directly involved in that. He was warned and he did not heed the warnings. Therefore he must resign," Yaalon said. 

"Halutz created lack of clarity that rattled the forces in the field, caused a loss of trust and generated chaos. He did not give the commanders in the north backing... He managed the campaign arrogantly and shallowly," he added. 

On Sunday, cabinet ministers are expected to approve a five-man government commission into the war, chaired by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd and made up of two university professors and two retired major generals. 

"It is high time that a commission of inquiry gets underway," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told army radio from Washington, amid unease over the late start to a proper investigation. 

The committee is to examine how the government and defence establishment dealt with the Hezbollah threat in the years before the war as well as during the conflict from July 12 to August 14. 

But its powers fall short of a state commission, Israel's most authoritative inquiry that could subpoena witnesses and order police searches. 

Last week, up to 30,000 Israelis in Tel Aviv called for a state commission, but Olmert has said such an inquiry would "completely paralyse" the leadership at a time of serious threat, including from arch-foe Iran. 

An interim report drawn up by a parliamentary sub-committee has accused the government and homefront command of serious failures in everything related to the care and protection of civilians in the north.


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