# Senate Committee Report Excerpt:  "Creating Real Reserves"



## The Bread Guy (7 Oct 2006)

The report in full:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/RepOct06-e.pdf

The section on reserves:

"*Creating Real Reserves*

Canadians pay their military Reserves to parade regularly to train for combat and support roles. Most Canadians probably assume that these Reserves are therefore available for active military service in times of emergency, when for whatever reason regular forces are short of capacity to serve the nation’s needs.  

But all Reservists are not available much of the time. Some cannot get away because of family or employment obligations. Some simply do not want to go.  It is true that the Government of Canada can call up any individual, unit or any other element of the Reserves to active service by means of an Order-in-Council.  However, this mechanism hasn’t been used since the Second World War.  

As a result, Reservists who have gone on active service have done so voluntarily.  But over the past 60 years, many Reservists could not or would not respond to national emergencies to. Which raises the question:  Why are we paying Reserves to train when they may not answer the bell when their country needs them?

The Committee wonders whether it is time to consider some form of compulsory call to active service for Reservists.

*It’s a Question of Onus*

Should it be the norm that Reservists are able to ignore call-ups if they have other priorities? Shouldn’t Reservists be available for short-term active duty, as individuals or formed units in emergencies, unless there is some compelling reason they cannot be? 

In other words, the onus should be on the Reservist to demonstrate why he or she cannot serve. It should not be up to the government to invoke a special Order-in-Council to require service.

Consider that most Canadian citizens are liable to serve on a jury when called.  Such jury duty is compulsory under the law, unless the individual can show cause why they cannot do it. It should be the same for Reservists.  If the Reserve really is part of the Total Force, and if, as the Chief of the Defence Staff has stated, that the aim is to have all members of the CF available for overseas deployment, the Committee believes that fundamental changes must be considered to the way the Reserves function. 

Some of those changes might include: 
- When on duty, all Reservists should be paid the same amount as regular force personnel (Presently, Class A, and B reservists are paid 85% of the rate of pay of the Regular Force personnel in the same rank. Class C Reservists who serve on operational missions receive the same pay as the Regular Force personnel.);
- All Reservists deployed on an overseas mission should expect to be on active service for up to 18 months – to include sufficient time for theatre specific training; 6-7 months of deployed operations; and 2 or more months of debriefing and reintegration back home;
- All Reserve recruits would be required to reach basic classification qualification (Classification qualification means that the individual has achieved the basic skills required to do his/her job in the Canadian Forces.) status within three years;
- All members of the Reserve would have to be “qualified and deployable” within five years or face separation; and
- If Reservists are required to serve if called out, then some sort of job protection is essential. It would be the task of the Government to ensure job protection for all reservists who are called out to support their country.

The Committee recommends:  That the Government redefine the terms and conditions of service for Reserves taking these views into account."


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## Meridian (7 Oct 2006)

I think you'd have a lot more qualified people in the reserves at later stages of their life (ie past university), if they were able to have job-protected military leave during the summers to complete their initial training.

I agree, that if you do not pay someone in the reserves a competitive wage (or at least something relatively close to what they are losing out on in civilian life) you get the problem the senate is describing. People who dont really want to go unless they are eagerly volunteering to go.


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## Dissident (7 Oct 2006)

This seems to imply reservists bail out when it comes time to go on tour. Which from my perspective is not true. Most people I know in the reserve fight to go on tour. Those who do not, typically have other commitments that can not be ignored or changed in the time frame we are usually subjected to.


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## PPCLI Guy (7 Oct 2006)

NOT FLAME BAIT

Blah blah.

Let's not make the reserves into something that they are not.

They are well intentioned and marginally trained individuals who we are relying on to a somewhat embarrassing degree.

No slag implied - those of you who know me also know the extent to which I am invested in the Reserve experience.  I just imp;lore us, institutionally, not to indulge in wishful thinking here...

Dave


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## Dissident (7 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> NOT FLAME BAIT
> 
> Blah blah.
> 
> ...



While I can understand this line of thinking, I feel it is somewhat a self fufilling profecy.

With budget for 20-25 training days a year per troop and a lack of resources, reserve units end up existing  only to administer themselves.

Our company, with 37 training days, plus ex with the reg, class B and an exercise with 2 Iraq veteren US MP unit is showing the kind of potential that can be expected from a reserve unit with proper resources.

But hey, I figured out not to long ago that I had nothing to prove. I am just doing my best and waiting for the inevitable.


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## PhilB (7 Oct 2006)

Several things. First off I take somewhat offense to "marginally trained". First off, at a junior level BIQ reg and BIQ res are very similar, basically the res course is the reg course minus CQC B and heli.  PLQ Infantry is an integrated course with reserves and regs being trained and assesed side by side. Secondly with the tempo of deployments and releases in the regs a lot of reserves have an almost equal amount of operational experience. I just got back from Roto 1, and while over I worked with a reg section for several weeks. The entire time is was operating as a crew commander, and then later as a 2ic because I was the most experienced in the section (the majority of the troops had just completed their BIQ in Aug 05). I see the biggest difference once past the rank of MCpl. Senior NCO's in the regs blow senior NCO's in the reserves away in terms of experience, and in particular, in my opinion, day to day man managment skills. A reserve senior NCO has to deal with the day to day crap of running a section very seldomly, while it is a daily thing for a reg senior NCO.

Being a reservist who commits to tour, taskings, etc I think that all the reserves need to be more viable is a combination of job protection and the rules suggested by the senate in reference to becoming qualified. The only other addition that I would add is some more control on leadership courses. In my regiment at least, we have a lot of very experienced Cpl for life types who for whatever reason cannot, or do not go on their leadership course. In their place brand new inexperienced cpl's are being sent. This just proliferates the ongoing in experienced nco problem. 

Just my 2 cents


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## Trinity (7 Oct 2006)

In 97 we (reserves) got called out for the Red River floods (OP Assistance)

I was put in with 2 Fd Amb and served with them for 3 months.
Their comments to us were the pte/cpl's and some MCpls were good to go.
It was the senior leadership and skills that were lacking.  Now there is a greater
gap in training between reg/res medic training, IMO considerably more than
other trades (hence the recent changes in the medical system to correct that)

But a previous poster stated it was senior leadership differences and I can say
I've heard that exact saying before in an operational context.


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## GDawg (7 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> NOT FLAME BAIT
> 
> Blah blah.
> 
> ...



Don't be lumpin' the Comm Res in there  ^-^

AFAIK we've got an excellent relationship with our reg counterparts, particularly through CFJSR, and from what I've heard our QL5 course is now the same as the reg one. We also parade ALOT more than the Army reserve does. Perhaps with some tweaking and liasing the Army reserve can better fill in those empty positions overseas. 
That said I admit all branches of the reserves have their members who, for what ever reason should not be made to go overseas.


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## Garett (7 Oct 2006)

Insane turnover rates at the MCpl/Sgt and Capt level crippled my old reserve unit's effectiveness.  By the time someone moved into the MCpl/Sgt or Capt zone, it was time for them to find a good civie job and there aren't many to find in N.B. so they go to the Regs, move out of the area or go on B Class contracts.  Courses don't make you a good leader, experience does and people just aren't staying in the units long enough to become fully competent to the required levels.


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## dglad (7 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> NOT FLAME BAIT
> 
> Blah blah.
> 
> ...



Notwithstanding the fact you've warned us off as this being "flame bait", perhaps you could expand on this with something more substantial?  Are operations failing, or at least suffering, because of reliance on the Reserves?  Is there some systemic problem the use of Reserves has introduced?  What makes you believe that these Senate committee recommendations (which, frankly, I think are fraught with all sorts of implications that need to discussed) are "wishful thinking"?


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## Gunner (7 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> NOT FLAME BAIT
> 
> Blah blah.
> 
> ...



I'm not going to defend PPCLI Guy's post, he is more than capable of doing it himself.  

For those of you who consider job protection legislation is a "good thing", don't think it is going to solve all the problems currently faced by the Reserves.  It won't and I don't even consider it a "good start".  If anything, it will have a neutral effect on the Reserves as some will be able to go train for 2 weeks a year, but it will also drive away experienced reservists who need the flexibility of the current reserve system to juggle work, family and a reserve career.  These reservists are capable force generators but they can not deploy overseas.

Are Reservists well intentioned?  Vast majority are and are certainly an integral part of the CF.  But let's call a spade a spade, they are marginally trained due to lack of training time, equipment, experienced leaders, etc, etc.  This is a reflection of the system, not the individual soldier (hopefully we will move away from the bulky, bureaucratic, inefficient, archaic system it has languished in for many decades).  Consider how long (and cost) it takes to train an HLVW dvr with PLS certification or a simple LAV III dvr/gunner let alone a mechanized platoon commander capable of operating in the COE ... We have a problem within the Army with the Regulars going high tech/mechanized and the Reserves stuck in low tech/dismounted role.    

As far as the army relying on the Reserves to a somewhat embarrassing degree.  Anyone involved in force generation knows exactly what this statement means and implies.  I'll leave it there.


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## old medic (7 Oct 2006)

> - All Reserve recruits would be required to reach basic classification qualification (Classification qualification means that the individual has achieved the basic skills required to do his/her job in the Canadian Forces.) status within three years;



That's interesting. The Health Service Reserve has already moved to this, with the Reserve QL3 and QL4 courses 
for Med Techs being the Regular QL3 course broken into two parts.


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## GAP (7 Oct 2006)

As an outsider, looking in, I could never understand why Reserves should be considered anything else but p/t Reg Force and trained up to the level that they can transition in and out seamlessly. I assume it was largely budget constraints that initiated it, and then the mentality  set in, but I am probably wrong on the whys. 

What matters now, is "what happens now?"

As an aside, are you aware that Senator Kenny (L) is retiring at age 65 (I think next year), even though he could stay until age 75? What this means is that he no longer (if he ever had to) constrain himself from saying it like it is.


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## Gunner (7 Oct 2006)

GAP, there are some very good plans being discussed/implemented at the national level that will begin to rationalize what the reserve structure is and this will hopefully have a cascading effect throughout all aspects of the reserves (from IT to CT to overall quality and capability).


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## GAP (7 Oct 2006)

Gunner said:
			
		

> GAP, there are some very good plans being discussed/implemented at the national level that will begin to rationalize what the reserve structure is and this will hopefully have a cascading effect throughout all aspects of the reserves (from IT to CT to overall quality and capability).



That, I will look forward to. The present mission  and the new higher, highers are really kicking @#s when it comes to cleaning out the cobwebs and dusting everything off with a view to what to keep, what to change and what to throwaway....


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## dglad (7 Oct 2006)

Gunner said:
			
		

> I'm not going to defend PPCLI Guy's post, he is more than capable of doing it himself.
> 
> For those of you who consider job protection legislation is a "good thing", don't think it is going to solve all the problems currently faced by the Reserves.  It won't and I don't even consider it a "good start".  If anything, it will have a neutral effect on the Reserves as some will be able to go train for 2 weeks a year, but it will also drive away experienced reservists who need the flexibility of the current reserve system to juggle work, family and a reserve career.  These reservists are capable force generators but they can not deploy overseas.



No disagreement.   I think the US experience with job protection legislation is something we need to study very closely.  In solving one set of problems, it creates a whole new set.



> Are Reservists well intentioned?  Vast majority are and are certainly an integral part of the CF.  But let's call a spade a spade, they are marginally trained due to lack of training time, equipment, experienced leaders, etc, etc.  This is a reflection of the system, not the individual soldier (hopefully we will move away from the bulky, bureaucratic, inefficient, archaic system it has languished in for many decades).  Consider how long (and cost) it takes to train an HLVW dvr with PLS certification or a simple LAV III dvr/gunner let alone a mechanized platoon commander capable of operating in the COE ... We have a problem within the Army with the Regulars going high tech/mechanized and the Reserves stuck in low tech/dismounted role.



I don't really disagree with this, either.  There is, by fundamental definition, no way a Reservist is going to be trained to the same standard as a Reg F soldier.  Attempting to do so would, well, just turn the Res F into more Reg F (with the attendant cost).  We accept that, in order to have a larger pool of soldiers to draw from, some are going to be at a lower level of "readiness".  This has been the way of it for many, many years; in fact, the "citizen soldier" has been the "standard" type of warrior for most of history.  Professional soldiers have, through most of history, been a luxury affordable only by relatively affluent societies (or those who didn't give an economic damn e.g. the Soviet Union).    The price we pay for the additional man-power is less readiness and a longer lead-time getting them prepared for battle (or higher casualties and less battlefield effectiveness if they get rushed into the fray).



> As far as the army relying on the Reserves to a somewhat embarrassing degree.  Anyone involved in force generation knows exactly what this statement means and implies.  I'll leave it there.



But you can't just "leave it there".  This is an important statement, but I don't know if I'm really getting your intent, and am really interested in pursuing it.  What I'm asking is some clarification around the statement that the "army is relying on the Reserves to an embarrassing degree".  What does this mean, exactly?  Is the implication that the army shouldn't have to rely on the Reserves at all?  Okay, that gives us one structural model.  Or, is there a "non-embarrassing" degree, and if so, what is it (right now, it's about 20%, so I'm assuming this threshold is less than 20%.  But how much less)?  That's another structural model.  I am involved in force generation (intimately), so I know quite well the many challenges of producing the combat power we need, when and where we need it (this goes for Reg F and Res F).   Our combined Res and Reg F TF's generally seem to do well on ops (based only on what I've been observing, at a distance, in Afghanistan, but on my own experience in Bosnia), so I'd be really keen to hear more about this.  Is it something substantive, or more a belief that the Reg F should be able to stand on its own, without Res F augmentation, on expeditionary ops?  And do you believe this same statement would hold true for domestic ops?


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## axeman (7 Oct 2006)

i agree with what PPCLI GUY says . he and I are former reservists who then went reg and then served with the reserves as cadre. the reserves are good for basic material but in most cases they will still req more training to bringthem up to speed on the latest op tempo . we cfannot blame them as they are generally as good as the system will allow . that is to say with the training days all scattered . attendance at  the spring concenttraion camps are a good way to bring standards up and together. 

maybe you might want to PM me or PPCLI GUY and ask what qual we have to say that . its not to flame them . they are hamstrung by basic fact. some over come it and some dont


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## PPCLI Guy (7 Oct 2006)

Time to expand on my comments I guess - with a silent reminder to myself not to post after Happy Hour. :-X

First, in the Army we have a militia, not a reserve - and all that seemingly pedantic splitting of semantic hairs means.  As such, they respond well and are well suited to domestic / regional based emergencies and form an excellent base for mobilisation (not that I can see a circumstance that would overcome the political penalties of enacting said mobilisation).  A militia force is also well suited to supplementary reinforcement of the Regular Force, which we are doing now with acceptable results.

A Reserve on the other hand would be formed to allow larger scale reinforcement of the Reg Force, both in a supplementary and complementary role.  The US model is based on that approach.  A complementary role (think CIMIC et al) can be usefully assigned to a Reserve if those reserves have the sort of legislative protection that allows them to respond to a "call-out" without penalty.

Seeing as we have a militia, and not a Reserve, I believe that legislative protection is not warranted - and unlikely to come to pass (for various reasons, mostly political).  One could argue that we should separate the supplementary from the complementary and offer them protection, but an equally valid argument would be that we avoid being half pregnant - and not assign complementary roles to the militia.

Well intentioned is a given - and I believe that poorly trained is also a given (although I perhaps could have chosen a slightly less pejorative modifier than "poor").

As to the "embarrassing degree" that we rely on the militia, I simply mean that a) we have too few infantry Battalions (all of which are under-manned to a critical degree) to fulfill our assigned tasks and b) that I believe that some of the complementary roles are too important to be sole sourced from the Reserves.

The wording in my original post was blunt - but hey, so am I.

Dave


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## Bobbyoreo (7 Oct 2006)

My question it why waste money on the Res then...if you cant just up and use them why have them? If your just talking about quality well I think the Reg F and the Res F have the same quality. There are bad people on either side. Me I hope for job protection. Cause Ive had to quit two jobs to go and serve this country. Just my 2 Cents...


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## COBRA-6 (7 Oct 2006)

I agree with the idea that right now we are not getting enough "value added" for the cost outlaid on the Reserves. The Senate report is moving to address this, and that is a good thing IMHO. The devil of course will be in the details. 

If we are going to spend the amount of money that we do on the Reserves, then there should be the expectation that we can use them, and by that I mean being able to rely on them short of a GIC activation. This requires mandatory service ie: you _must_ attend all training events unless you receive prior permission (leave pass?), and the same with callouts. Of course this is not realistic without job/education protection, as it is unfair to expect a student to respond to a callout if he will fail his university semester and loose his tuition money by doing so. 

As for the training issues, other posters are correct in the fact that part-time soldiers will not be trained to the same level as their full-time counterparts. Nor, would I suggest, do they need to be. We don't need to have soldiers in Toronto or Montreal, who's primary role is DOMOPS, being able to crew a LAVIII. Chose what tasks are essential for reservists to do, and train to be able to do those tasks to a high standard. I am hopefull that with the release of the Territorial Defence Battalion conops, the left and right of arcs for the Reserve force will be more clear. 

I also believe that the way in which the Reserves conduct training currently could be greatly improved. The first step is to eliminate the present structure that has coy(-) and pl(-) sized units. This is easier said than done of course, but it looks like that is the direction in which we are heading, both through growth of the Reserves and the creation of the TDB's. Forming larger units comprised of people who _will_ show up for training will help make the training that much more effective. I completely understand the "why do I bother" sentiment expressed by some RSS staff who spend weeks organizing an exercise, only to have a pl(-) show up out of a supposed company of troops.


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## Bobbyoreo (7 Oct 2006)

Another point is for the Reg's to stop sending their problem people to do RSS postions. I know the last two ones Ive dealt with are not wanted back into their units so they sent them to the Res


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## Cdn Blackshirt (7 Oct 2006)

I'm just wondering if those with inside knowledge would be good enough to design an alternative model that you think is more appropriate given what you see as the future requirements of the armed forces.

Assume you have no restrictions re: structures/politics and that the overall armed forces budget will increase 7.5%-10% per year for the next 5-years.


Matthew.


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## COBRA-6 (7 Oct 2006)

Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> Another point is for the Reg's to stop sending their problem people to do RSS postions. I know the last two ones Ive dealt with are not wanted back into their units so they sent them to the Res



Don't paint all RSS with that brush. In my experience most of the RSS staff I've worked with have been excellent.


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## Dissident (7 Oct 2006)

COBRA-6 said:
			
		

> I completely understand the "why do I bother" sentiment expressed by some RSS staff who spend weeks organizing an exercise, only to have a pl(-) show up out of a supposed company of troops.



From my understanding, the authorized manning level of a reserve service Bn is about equal to maybe a company. So, with some people not being to attend, the Bn ends up showing a overstrenght platoon size for exercise.

15 MP coy is attached to 1 brigade. Our budget is not typical of other reserve unit and we have a higher authorized manning level. As I speak, my platoon has 52 troops on paper, 2 short of ou maximum authorized. On top of that, our attendance is excellent, we only went out once this year and we were well over 90%.

By giving our unit more money, our unit has been able to force generate an inordinate amount of troops for deployement, class B and training per dollar. 

It is tragicaly hilarious to hear reg force personnel complaining about the quality of the militia, while they ostracizing its members and deny us the support that would make us effective.


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## couchcommander (7 Oct 2006)

milnewstbay said:
			
		

> Shouldn’t Reservists be available for short-term active duty, as individuals or formed units in emergencies, unless there is some compelling reason they cannot be?



From the POV of an outsider looking in, and rehashing some of what has already been said, yes, this is fundamentally a sound judgment. Reserves that cannot be used for the purposes they were created for are rather useless. At the same time, there are major obstacles to this as well that I have been made aware of, some of which have already been pointed out. 

a) Job protection. How can you expect someone to heed the call for an emergency deployment for a few months if his or her entire livelihood is going to be destroyed as a result? It would have to be a pretty big emergency. 

b) Training. A lot of professionals CANNOT, I repeat, CANNOT no matter how much they'd like, take the time required to attend several week long courses (I'm one of those people, my job precludes it... yes I have 3 weeks paid vacation... but I only have 3 weeks vacation, no more, and even then I need to be able to leave from wherever I am on a moments notice if something happens - cost of working in a mission critical environment). Secondly, you cannot expect someone without proper training to be able to do the jobs required of them. Thus, we need a "reserves" training system that fits into the needs of the modern part time soldier, i.e. training on evenings and weekends (understanding that this is "not the same", but it would be an improvement over nothing). 

c) Issue more order-in-councils. With the above in place, the government should not be so hesitant to order reserve units to stand up in the case of domestic crises. Yes, use volunteers if possible, but when the situation warrants it, don't be afraid to use the resources. We would be able to do this because of the previously mentioned changes, namely that people will be able to return to their jobs when the crises passes, and that they will be adequately trained to respond. 

.02 from a civvie from looking in...


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## Bobbyoreo (7 Oct 2006)

You are right Cobra...not all of them are bad.


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## dglad (7 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Time to expand on my comments I guess - with a silent reminder to myself not to post after Happy Hour. :-X
> 
> First, in the Army we have a militia, not a reserve - and all that seemingly pedantic splitting of semantic hairs means.  As such, they respond well and are well suited to domestic / regional based emergencies and form an excellent base for mobilisation (not that I can see a circumstance that would overcome the political penalties of enacting said mobilisation).  A militia force is also well suited to supplementary reinforcement of the Regular Force, which we are doing now with acceptable results.
> 
> ...



Blunt is good, and I'd expect no less from an infanteer.

Thanks for the reasoned reply.  Actually, I really don't disagree with much of what you say, except maybe regarding the reserve/militia distinction.  I think our "militia" has actually taken on many of the attributes of a "reserve" (using your definitions); more problematic is whether this was by design, or the op tempo that's evolved over the past decade or so has simply caused it to happen.  I think it's some of the former, but more of the latter, myself.

Since the point of discussion seems to be more around job legislation, I'll offer my 2 cents...as I stated above, I think we'd need to consider the U.S. model very carefully, and then examine other models around the world.  Basically, the problem with job protection is that employers stand to lose personnel--some cases, key personnel i.e. the only person in the machine-shop who can run the new computerized lathe--on short notice, and for and extended period of time.  So, you lose the support of employers...and especially small employers, who provide most of the job creation in our economy (many large employers, such my own--the Ontario Public Service--have relatively generous military leave provisions).  A way to offset this is to offer something as employer support i.e. subsidies to hire back-fills, tax incentives, or other measures to encourage employers to accept the job protection legislation that applies to their Res F employees.  The cost?  Money.  And probably a fair bit of it.  Is that feasible?  Maybe.  A lot of work needs to be done to determine EXACTLY how this could be made to work, if at all.

Part of the problem is, I think, the "all or nothing" reality of what we have now.  You are either a Reservist, or in the Reg F...you do this as a career, or for 37.5 days per year.  Recent discussions around terms of service have tossed around the idea of allowing more mobility from one state (for discussion's sake, call it "regular service") to another (call it "reserve service").  My experience has been that Reservists typically change in terms of their interest and availability as life goes on.  The kid out of high school may be willing to invest a year or two in full-time service (currently, the only way of doing that is by becoming that thing called the "militia bum"), but then goes to university and can't be a full-time soldier.  University finishes, maybe back to full-time, then marriage, family and a full-time job come along--back to part-time.   The kids get older, some financial security is obtained, and another stint of full-time ensues.  And this can be a two-way street--the soldier who starts off out of high-school as a full-timer on "regular service" decides, ten years down the line, it's time to have some kids and settle down for a bit--so he migrates into "reserve service" for a while.  I will grant that there are many, many devils in the details of this, but a "sliding scale" of readiness might be a reasonable solution, avoiding the sledgehammer approach of legislation.

And, as for your choice of words--yeah, "poor" is a bad one (I can be blunt, too).  Reservists aren't "poorly" trained; in the context of the training that they're provided, they're trained very well.  Naturally, that training can't approximate what a Reg F soldier gets (if we could train a Res F soldier to be exactly equivalent to a Reg F soldier in about 38 days a year, there really WOULD be something wrong).  Res F soldiers are, for the most part, dedicated and motivated men and women who do the best job they can.  The result is soldiers are who at a lower level of readiness than their Reg F counterparts.  Give the Res F soldier the training to fill in the missing delta, and you'll get a soldier who is close to being as good as a member of the Reg F (the Regs will always have the advantage of living, breathing, eating and sleeping in the military culture, doing all those various things that make up day to day military life, and developing that cohesion that comes from working together over long periods of time). 

I absolutely do agree with you about the undermanned state of our Reg F inf bns.  That needs to be fixed.  But we can do that, and still make and manage an effective Res F to support them.


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## tomahawk6 (7 Oct 2006)

I really agree with the Senate report. The current reserve/militia model isnt helping the OPTEMPO of the Canadian Forces. What the US has been able to accomplish in Iraq particularly,would never have been possible if we could not have deployed National Guard and Reserve units. If a nation is goig to keep small standing armies it becomes imperative to have well trained reserve units that can be called to active duty to spell regular force units. As a result of OIF the entire US Army has more combat experience throughout the force than at any time since WW2.

US reserve components transition from their "part time" status to active duty after just a few months of intensive training before shipping off to Iraq. Our part time troops train 2 weeks in the summer and 1 weekend a month so its similar to the Canadian reservist.

What the Canadian reservist needs is a job guarantee if called up. Punishable under the law. At the sametime employers need encouragement with tax breaks for supporting reservist employees. Reservists need to have a quality retirement program. 

Primary reserve units that would deploy as units [Cat I] would be brought up to full strength [3 manuever companies,HHC and CSS company]. Tier II units, the militia, would be used as fillers and for domestic emergencies. I think it would be smart to reorganize militia battalions so they would be at full strength. If it wasnt possible due to geography then battalions should be reformed as full companies.


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## Gunner (7 Oct 2006)

dglad said:
			
		

> But you can't just "leave it there".  This is an important statement, but I don't know if I'm really getting your intent, and am really interested in pursuing it.  What I'm asking is some clarification around the statement that the "army is relying on the Reserves to an embarrassing degree".  What does this mean, exactly?  Is the implication that the army shouldn't have to rely on the Reserves at all?  Okay, that gives us one structural model.  Or, is there a "non-embarrassing" degree, and if so, what is it (right now, it's about 20%, so I'm assuming this threshold is less than 20%.  But how much less)?  That's another structural model.  I am involved in force generation (intimately), so I know quite well the many challenges of producing the combat power we need, when and where we need it (this goes for Reg F and Res F).   Our combined Res and Reg F TF's generally seem to do well on ops (based only on what I've been observing, at a distance, in Afghanistan, but on my own experience in Bosnia), so I'd be really keen to hear more about this.  Is it something substantive, or more a belief that the Reg F should be able to stand on its own, without Res F augmentation, on expeditionary ops?  And do you believe this same statement would hold true for domestic ops?



PPCLI Guy has already answered your post.  The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower.  I'll have to follow this up.  Don't misinterpret my overall comments, there is certainly a place for reservists on international deployments but they are far from being the type of "reserve" envisioned by the senate report.  As you are intimately involved in force generation, I'm sure you will agree the skill sets, not the state of readiness, has become far too divergent between the reg and res.

Cheers


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## COBRA-6 (7 Oct 2006)

Gunner said:
			
		

> PPCLI Guy has already answered your post.  The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower.



I have been doing this type of research lately on the CFTPO, for A'stan rotos, the average is closer to 10%.


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## 54/102 CEF (7 Oct 2006)

The Senate Defence people are sitting on De Fence; the reserves come last of 7 items. Nor does it respect the governments emphasis in In Canada operations as Primo - a whole bunch of real neat stuff comes first.

The first 3 paras reflect a persistent something for nothing attitude from the Report writers who I suggest are not connected with the govt or DND. Senators wise up - you get nothing for nothing. Remember we have no global deployments like some other allies so should be and could be has never worked. How better to confuse the issue I do not know.

The report needs editing

Consider

Page 84 
But over the past 60 years, many Reservists could not or would not respond to national emergencies to. 

To what? This is inflammatory writing that would have got an a$$ kicking when I was writing for some favourite Senior Officers

It should not be up to the government to invoke a special Order-in-Council to require service. MAJOR CREDIBILITY PROBLEM ON THE COMMITTEE`S PART - Lets assume - OK its not - so lets ditch Confederation. Of course that won't work. So Hon Senators - put some teeth into it - accountability is required - get trained to a higher level - maintain your skills or face separation. Very good. Now follow up. Remember in Gulf War 1 – run down the US reserves – not ready – not worth it. How the worm has turned with what 40% reserves deployed? Other forces have checked their Cold War preconceived notions at the door. I believe we have too, but we are still resource poor.

But even after that - it remains the Governments role to call out the troops........ and they do mobilise well - in 2003 the fire crews in BC filled up with little or no moaning despite what this POS report says is the norm. Remember - Canadians don't support the Senate which is why I as a reservist and Canadian refuse to tolerate such slanted writing. Did the CDS comments 
“They do make the 30,000 foot recommendation and if, as the Chief of the Defence Staff has stated, that the aim is to have all members of the CF available for overseas deployment," -------- imply that he’s at the bottom of the barrel for manpower - of just combat arms? Opening the pool to all is one thing - building more capability is another - the report shies away from the real cost of these missions. Evading the bill though, is a normal bureaucratic response - where are the calls for WE NEED MORE FIELD SOLDIERS? DND and the CDS just say they will re-role recruits in the system ------ this is a short term - chase your tail response. Chasing your tail will only work for a while.

See evading the bill --- http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/06autumn/freier.htm

re write it in a Canadian context

3 questions
Since the end of the Cold War, has Canada corporately devoted the requisite intellectual and political energy necessary to truly understand its own relative position in detail and the real obstacles, risks, and costs associated with maintaining that position over time? 

Has Canada developed a consensus grand design that employs all of the enormous potential embodied in its instruments of power in order to secure its strategic position and influence effectively against direct and indirect challenges to both?

If one believes the previous two questions can be answered in the affirmative, have the nation’s strategy elite identified and articulated the principal aspects of the resultant grand design and have they assessed and accounted for the REAL COSTS associated with pursuing it in a meaningful way? Reasonable analysts will conclude that the answer to all three questions is no. 

But don’t think I am negative on the report part of the reserves - the JTF2 stuff stinks - leading questions, innuendo - spell it out - the report lays out a minefield that the government no has to plough or avoid. Read the Arctic stuff - it truly makes one’s head hurt that A - you don’t need the forces there - B - the NAVY can place sono buoys at choke points and C we can do it all from satellite surveillance.

All in all the report is 323 pages long - I have not read it all - but what I have read I see as a politically charged document by the rear guard of the Red Menace which got the CF to where it was when the current government took over.

My answer to the short fall ------ BUY MORE COMBAT POWER TROOPS AND EQPT ----- the low level market they are operating in is telling us we are not doing this properly from a resource point of view. What if two Afghanistan’s open up? And we get the level of support we are alleged to be getting from 100 plus million people east of Calais France? Some parts of this forest fire have to be allowed to burn out. 

Will there be follow up? I doubt it. I think this report was dead on the Frankenstein Table that created it.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (8 Oct 2006)

> The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower.  I'll have to follow this up.  Don't misinterpret my overall comments, there is certainly a place for reservists on international deployments but they are far from being the type of "reserve" envisioned by the senate report.  As you are intimately involved in force generation, I'm sure you will agree the skill sets, not the state of readiness, has become far too divergent between the reg and res.



I'm reluctant to wade into this discussion, partially because I have some fairly strong opinions - gained from some fairly extensive experience - on this subject.  However, with that caveat, here goes:

Gunner is exactly right.  IMHO, the initial drive to deploy PRes sub-units to Bosnia was almost entirely _politically_ driven, and only remotely linked to a real operational requirement.  The effort to mount Reserve companies was enormous and, for the second LFWA rotation (Roto 12) required a _national_ sourcing effort for a single infantry company.  This despite the fact that the skill sets required were, by and large, already resident in the Reserve Force and the training delta was minimal, partially because Bosnia was such a benign environment near the end.

Fast forward to Afghanistan.  I still believe that there are "political" reasons for assigning force generation of sub-units to the PRes.  However, the Army has come to rely on such force generation to relieve a crushing operational tempo, right at the time when the training delta is _increasing_ rather than decreasing.  Take my own Corps as an example.  The Reserve Armour Corps has abandoned any pretext of being compatible with the Regular Force and has instead attempted to adopt a niche role - Light Recce - that may or may not be useful on operations.  They cannot backfill the Regular Army without extensive retraining and have adopted a role that may or may not be required in theatre.  Indeed, we're looking to deploy "light recce" at exactly the same time theatre is examining pulling G Wagons (the primary equipment for light recce troops) off operations entirely.  

Thus, we've created an enormous problem for upcoming rotations.  As indicated earlier, TF 1-08 is expecting to take approximately 400 reservists to Afghanistan.  This represents a very significant challenge:


the TO&E is likely to change, increasing the training delta and introducing even more items of equipment completely unfamiliar to Reservists.  
adoption of niche roles limits the utility of reservists (in some trades) outside a very narrow scope - unless extensive PCF training is undertaken
single Area sourcing means that all of these 400 will be expected to come from one Area.  Experience indicates that this will pose a significant force generation problem and that we're unlikely to get the numbers required
as indicated in an earlier post, the number of Reservists actually capable - for valid reasons - of deploying to _any_ operation is quite limited

So what does this mean?  First, I think that job protection legislation is a red herring.  Reservists who wish to deploy (in our purely voluntary system) tend to be younger and looking for a life experience, without relying on the approval of a civilian employer.  The older Reservist who would take advantage of such legislation is much less likely to wish to go overseas.

Secondly, I firmly believe we need to focus our efforts on the immediate problem:  bringing Regular Force units up to proper strength (the CLS recently stated he wanted Regular units up to War Establishment); anything that detracts from that effort should be regarded as secondary.  In the current operational context, the brunt of the focus will always be on Regular units and they should receive the commensurate amount of institutional support.

Finally, I've never agreed with the concept that we should be routinely deploying Reserve sub-units on operations.  To my mind, Reserves should be just that - reserves - to be utilized _en masse_ in emergency situations.  This doesn't preclude the use of Reservists on operations on an individual, voluntary basis - quite the contrary, such experience is extremely valuable and can only help the operational readiness of Reserve units improve.  However, assigning niche roles and creating the expectation that the bulk of a capability will come from a voluntary Reserve deployment is a very dangerous thing.

The Army is expecting a great deal from the Reserve Force without the accompanying commitment to compatible training and equipment.  My fear is that they're expecting too much...

Teddy


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## Rockhound (8 Oct 2006)

This thread has made many interesting points many of which I am struggling with having had some exposure to the Reserve “lifestyle”.  First let me say +1 with the bulk of the content with 54/ 102 CEF’s last post.  Second I wish to address some thoughts as to the question posed in an earlier post – “what should the reserve look like?”  The better question is WHAT broader purpose do they serve? – This is a better question for the Senate- the one I think was the intent (although it missed the mark)

My understanding of why the Militia – now Reserve, was formed, it was originally strictly as a base for mobilization.  If this is the case, it is understandable why the Government/ DND would keep the training and resources to the most tolarable minimum.  Our current construct is based on the Cold War.  In this model it would be essential that mobilization is a long way off and easily predicted – with the premise that levels of trg/readiness/ equipping would increase closer to the time required.  Is this true today?  PPCLI Guys seems to suggest Mobilization unlikely.  Is this truely the case?  Consider CSIS openly states that on the matter of a terrorist attack in Canada it is a question of WHEN, not IF.  WHEN Canada is hit,  how long will it take for the political rule book PPCLI Guy refers too, to be thrown out the window?  Just how predicable is this kind of event?  I argue not very therefore, if mobilization is the purpose of the reserve, then perhaps it is time to increase equipping and trg to account the less predictable environment.

If I am wrong and the Reserve is a “temp agency” for the Reg F, the situation we are seemingly at right now, then some comments from Cobra-6 make some sense, as do those in support for job protection.  Having a base for mobilization does not matter, and the unit/ sub-unit HQs should be consoldiated into fewer administrative HQs.  I know many would like to see this and it is already happening to varying degrees.  I believe in light of the uncertainties of the world (and Canada’s Role in it)  this perspective is VERY short sighted, driven out of the very real shortfall the Army is experiencing right now.  If this is where we are to be at then the individual needs to be given better trg – this requires more equipment, better Reg F support, and More focused low level trg (ie. BTEs for the reserves should be outlawed).  

In both cases the primary reason for the “delta” with the reserve from where they should be at is driven by the severe lack of resources, and leadership being held accountable (especially at the Sub-unit and unit level).  It is only now physical fitness is being demanded, after years of “excuses” as to why it could not be in a formal way.  

Regretfully I have not offered any real answers, but I think the following suggestions would help some of the issues raised here:

1. TERMS OF SERVICE CONTRACT – to resolve attendance, and annual certifications

This should be a year to year employment contract with expectations from the soldier to attend all parade days (perhaps with the allowance for ??3 sick days), pass the personal weapons test, the fitness test, and other IBTS requirements.  This would go a long way to battling the age old issue – “you don’t know who is coming to the ex until the Friday noght of the ex” – and go a long way to building teams (a critical element of all army trg)

2. JOB PROTECTION – not the US model, will need to have carrots, and sticks.  The business community would provide the best insight to the most effective “carrots”.  The business communities burden should be met with a commitment by the Government to the Business community to restrict call-ups outside of time of war to no more than year, every 5?? years, per soldier.  Given current tours are going beyond this length is a challenge...

3.  MORE EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES to the reserve.  Given the Army figuratively does not even have two nickles to rub together, this is a problem.  The Army is doing the RIGHT thing by putting priority of what we have to those who are in theatre or training to go next.  Uncontrollably, the net result of this situation is the delta of the reserve grows, because the resources do not exist to improve trg quality.  Unfortunately because of this and reserve demands for more resources, it results in a “protectionsist” mindset in the Reg F what we assets have, it really should not be this way, but c’est levie.  This is truely more of a political issue than an Army one – If we are to be a world leader there is a huge cost.       

I hate to post long posts, I hope there is something nugget of value in some or all of my thoughts,


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## Rockhound (8 Oct 2006)

I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.  Every older reservist I know truely wants to serve their country and do there duty in the form of a tour, but are torn with some realities they MUST consider.  One - their spouse/ wife usually did not "sign-on" to the Reg F lifestyle - so marriage may be at stake.  Two - Employers do not like prolonged absences from a career, no matter what the reason, 1 year is tolarable, more is not.  Proffessional associations may also put your standing in jeporady.  Three - If you have to quit your job (like many reservists) it MAY put your ability to be rehired in jeoporady (when other comparable candidates are considered with your application) - if this is your primary means to put food on the table for your family when you return and the Reg F is done with you - Is it not a dispproportionate burden to the reservist should they be unable to find work?    Note to that while it may only have been a couple of weeks - Several reservists answered the call to Op Perigrine in BC, 2003, despite the fact that they used ALL of their annual vacation to do it.  Same can be said for formal trg courses.  

Lastly, while there are some like myself who have not YET gone on tour, more than 90% of the Snr NCOs, and Capt/ Majors I know have.  Just how many tours do they have to do to be considered "worthy" and "contributing".  I, like others who have not yet gone, WILL go but the risks to the family must be acceptable.  In the interim, If the world falls of the edge of an abyss and plunges into a larger scale war, I stand ready to protect Canada when and if the country "REALLY" needs me.


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## dglad (8 Oct 2006)

Some very interesting discussion here.  And I appreciate the extent to which some of the previous points have been clarified.  I find it difficult to disagree with much of what's been said; what it really comes down to is a lack of clarity in what we want our Res F to actually do and be.  The Senate document offers one approach...but I don't think it really appreciates how much it will cost to enact any form of job protection that won't actually do more than harm than good.  I work with businesses of all sizes in my civ job, so I get to hear, first hand, about the challenges of running a competitive operation in today's increasingly integrated and globalized economy.  I can guarantee that new legislation that's perceived as just another instance of red tape and bureaucratic obstacle-building (i.e. a new, unfunded mandate) by the government will NOT get a warm welcome from the business community.

On the other hand, we can stay with the status quo but, as has been previously mentioned, that leaves us with a training delta that may be unreasonably large.  In this scenario, generating Res sub-units for expeditionary ops will be a real challenge--may not be worth the effort--and may be better dropped in favour of keeping up indiv augmentation.  We could "tweak" this, of course, and focus Res F deployment primarily on more benign ops, so we can focus our scarce Reg F resources on places like Afghanistan.  And superimposed on this is our need to man domestic ops--something else that should probably be the purview of the Res F more than the Reg F, again to allow the latter to keep their eye on the more demanding, high-risk ball.  I don't favour just marking time like this, myself...I think some fundamental changes are required.  Maybe not quite as radical as the Senate report, but probably more than the various institutions involved in the Res F can absorb very quickly (unfortunately).

So, agreed that the main effort probably needs to be getting and keeping the Reg F units up to reasonable strength.  But concurrent with that has to be some serious thinking about the Res F and how we want to employ it, and then action to follow.  Someone said our Res F was organized for Cold War mobilization; I'd argue it was actually organized for something more like WW1 mobilization, and hasn't changed a great deal since.    Whether we invest a great deal of money and time in following the Senate recommendations, or take some other path, we need to DO it.  The real problem is that the status quo isn't properly serving anyone properly.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (8 Oct 2006)

> I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.



Which is why I said:



> as indicated in an earlier post, the number of Reservists actually capable - for *valid reasons* - of deploying to any operation is quite limited



Emphasis added.

And if 80-90% of officers and senior NCOs in the Reserve Force already "have tours", you're in a different Army than I am.


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## PPCLI Guy (8 Oct 2006)

Rockhound said:
			
		

> I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.  Every older reservist I know truely wants to serve their country and do there duty in the form of a tour, but are torn with some realities they MUST consider.



Which may or may not be solved by job protection...



> One - their spouse/ wife usually did not "sign-on" to the Reg F lifestyle - so marriage may be at stake.


  

Job protecton can't help you there - either be an Army guy or don't - and that goes for wives too.  There is no short cut answer here that can be provided by Parliament.  Either commit, or don't.



> Two - Employers do not like prolonged absences from a career, no matter what the reason, 1 year is tolarable, more is not.  Proffessional associations may also put your standing in jeporady.


  

Granted - job protection may help here - but I doubt it.  This is not an 80's economy.



> Three - If you have to quit your job (like many reservists) it MAY put your ability to be rehired in jeoporady (when other comparable candidates are considered with your application) - if this is your primary means to put food on the table for your family when you return and the Reg F is done with you -



Simple solution - become a professional soldier.  Problem solved.  Postings paid for.  Joyous postings to Kamloops, Wainwright, Gagetown and Cornwall abound.



> Is it not a dispproportionate burden to the reservist should they be unable to find work?    Note to that while it may only have been a couple of weeks - Several reservists answered the call to Op Perigrine in BC, 2003, despite the fact that they used ALL of their annual vacation to do it.  Same can be said for formal trg courses.


  

Twice the citizen.  Suck it up - and thank you.



> Lastly, while there are some like myself who have not YET gone on tour, more than 90% of the Snr NCOs, and Capt/ Majors I know have.


  

Ahem.  Really?  How many of them are half pregnant - you know - Class B full timers...



> Just how many tours do they have to do to be considered "worthy" and "contributing".  I, like others who have not yet gone, WILL go but the risks to the family must be acceptable.  In the interim, If the world falls of the edge of an abyss and plunges into a larger scale war, I stand ready to protect Canada when and if the country "REALLY" needs me.



Good.  Well done you.  So you are a militiaman - and that is a good thing...

In the meantime, the country is at war, and as we don't have a reserve, and  we are not about to mobilise the mo, how about we stop talking about throwing money at the militia, and fill up the infantry battalions instead.

Look.  I am not being rude here.  I spent 8 proud years in the militia as a soldier and an officer, 3 years RSS, 2 years 10/90, and 2 years dedicated to providing the best training the militia has ever seen (Im Not so Humble O) as a senior staff wallah in an Area HQ. 

I have no interest whatsoever in igniting a res vs reg flame war - cus lets face it, they are boring, and add little to the debate.

Lets just stop deluding ourselves, okay?  The reserves (truely, a milita) as they stand, can FG individual replacements of an astoundingly high quality.  

Great.  

Thanks.  

How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.

But what do I know...

Dave


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## dglad (8 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.
> 
> But what do I know...
> 
> Dave



Sheesh, I wish you'd stop being so coy and oblique, and just come out say what you mean.

(yes, there should be a smiley after that line, but I really hate the damned things)

I think you're right.  We have to get the inf bns up to strength--and keep them--there as our main effort.  That's a challenge on many fronts, not least of which is going to be recruiting and training these new soldiers efficiently.

However, as I said above re the Reserves (or militia, if you prefer that term), the status quo is not a reasonable option.  The system is doing okay force generating indiv augmentees, but in many ways, that's in spite of, rather than because of, the way the Res F is currently organized.  In fact, it's really a testament to the supreme efforts of a subset of certain soldiers and leaders, who work much more than 37.5 days, on TOP of a full time civ job or school.  Since you've worked with Reservists, I assume you know what I mean; there are the nearly NES types who show up for the odd parade night, certainly, but there are also the ones who come in over lunch from their civ job, work off evenings or weekends or even take army work home, to school or to work with them to do, often without signing in.  Maybe these folks should become professional soldiers, sure, but not all of them have that option, for various reasons, at that point in their lives; their choice is to be a Reservist, or just not be a soldier at all.

In tandem with the main effort of beefing up the inf bns, we need a supporting effort of reorganizing--in fact, in many ways, redesigning--the Reserves.  It doesn't necessarily require new $, because the issues largely aren't $-driven.  It's a job that's going to require close cooperation between the Res and Reg F leadership, because a properly functioning Reserve, that reflects a focus on the modern security environment rather than the remote possibility of 1914-style mobilization, will be to everyone's benefit.


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## Dissident (8 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.



I dissagree. More resources equals more deployable troops. At a cost cheaper than a reg force counterpart. Again, 15 MP Coy is showing what could be expected from the reserve, if they had proper support and resources. And that is over 3-4 year span since the Coy was stood up.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (8 Oct 2006)

Dissident said:
			
		

> I dissagree. More resources equals more deployable troops. At a cost cheaper than a reg force counterpart. Again, 15 MP Coy is showing what could be expected from the reserve, if they had proper support and resources. And that is over 3-4 year span since the Coy was stood up.



Well, before you hoist 15 MP as the paragon of all that the Reserves could be, remember that they're filling a very specific role, with _very_ specific limitations.  Could 15 MP deploy en masse - tomorrow - to an operational theatre to conduct policing duties?  I suggest not.

By the way, you earlier suggested that there's a relationship between 15 MP Coy and 1 CMBG.  There isn't.  15 MP Coy works for 1 Area Support Group and is the only Reserve Force unit in that formation.


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## Dissident (8 Oct 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Well, before you hoist 15 MP as the paragon of all that the Reserves could be, remember that they're filling a very specific role, with _very_ specific limitations.  Could 15 MP deploy en masse - tomorrow - to an operational theatre to conduct policing duties?  I suggest not.
> 
> By the way, you earlier suggested that there's a relationship between 15 MP Coy and 1 CMBG.  There isn't.  15 MP Coy works for 1 Area Support Group and is the only Reserve Force unit in that formation.



That's not exactly what I am saying. I am not trying to say that we are the end all be all. My point is that with resources and commitment, there is disproportionally more that can be done with militia units, not just 15 MP coy. But then, asking a reservist to drop everything for a possible year long commitment at the drop of a hat is at the crux of the misemployement of the reserve. With enough warning(a year and a half?) I guesstimate that our company could generate the manning for a platoon, for a roto. As far as "policing" duties goes, I will not comment on that, as it seems everyone as a different opinion on the definition of "policing".

And yes, that was a mistake, I did mean ASG, not brigade.


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## Echo9 (9 Oct 2006)

So, let me get this straight Guy- you don't mean to flame, yet you state things in the most blunt and offensive manner possible.

OK.  Reg/ Res flame wars are counter productive, but there are a few items that I want to correct from your jeremiad:

1.  Training for reservists is not poor.  I would say that it's uneven.  The quality of training that's received by a reservist in one unit can be markedly different from that in another.  I would suggest that from my experience, there are some Areas that are conducting training that is completely relevant, others not.  There's also the impact of parading differences- guys who miss training are obviously below the curve.  One word of warning that I would give you is that things have changed substantially since you were reserve, and probably changed since you were RSS.  Be open to that possibility.

2.  The delta is not the same for different trades.  Clearly, where the reserves are going with the armoured  cavalry is concerning, in that they are developing a skill set that may be useless in the current environment.  I've had gunners mention to me that the delta for tube arty is almost negligible between reg/ res.  The one key delta that exists that is not easily bridged is that of physical fitness.  

3.  The comment about relying on the reserves for force generation is a fair one.  However, I'd suggest that if you're looking for the budget vs. deployability balance, you've got bigger fish to fry.  If I look at a recent piece in the army journal (who knows, you may have even written it), the Reg F ratio is around 60% (HQ) to 40% (deployable) to 10% (deployed). Not really a huge difference, particularly when you consider that the Res non-deployable number costs a heck of a lot less than Reg F HQ.  Oh, and I should note that the 60% number doesn't include green suits in purple chairs, and doesn't include the huge cost of DND IT systems, which were designed by consultants looking to maximize the feed off the public teat (that's my area of civy expertise, and it burns me that we waste so much there).

4.  The workup training serves to even out most of the delta between Reg and Res skill sets.  Yes, there's an experience and leadership gap, but it's not unbridgeable.  My own unit has had Sgts, WOs and a MWO on op tour in Afghanistan, a couple of whom returned home with commanders commendations.  



Look, we'll both agree that the army is underfunded for the jobs that it's being asked to do.  That shows up in the number of pers in the field force, the number of vehicles (losing regimental fleets is an embarrasment), doctrinal disasters (pioneer/ mortar), high levels of res augmentation for regular achievement of op tasking.  No question, there needs to be probably at least 2-4 more regular infantry battalions, and the existing battalions need to be rounded out to full strength to just maintain the current pace.  Add to that probably 4 int companies and 2-3 engineer regiments (or 8-9 squadrons).  Let's not even get started on the mess that is the logistics trade these days.


Ultimately, I guess that where this ends is whether you believe that there's a place for anything other than a standing full-time, professional army to achieve the defence needs of the country.  Nothing that I'm going to say is likely to change an opinion once formed.   The thought that I'll leave you with is that there are three major wars with a lot of evidence that the part timers can make all the difference.


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## SuperTrooper (9 Oct 2006)

PPCLI guy, I think you should state what trade is weak in the resF, the arty is equal in most respects.

As for job protection, well that sounds great, but I don't think it works for the guys who are self employed or run they're own biz.

My beef with some guys in my unit are the ones that are to scared/can't get a real job who end up being class b, but, not enough nerve to go reg, that part I just don't get.

I know for a fact that when your all gung ho and doing your part, they love ya, soon as you get your life together and have a civ job, they can't be bothered with you.

RSS staff being bad, I would disagree, I would say 99 % were and are an excellent bunch that I came across.

Reg vs Res, well its black and white to me, I look at it like the NHL vs Farm team, some people have to untwist they're panties and come to grip.

I don't speak for all but these are my observations of 14 years res which totals 4 yrs 123 days reg, + or - a couple.


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## Infanteer (9 Oct 2006)

Echo9 said:
			
		

> The thought that I'll leave you with is that there are three major wars with a lot of evidence that the part timers can make all the difference.



I thought we got rid of the Militia myth?  CEF or Special Force doesn't really equal "part-timers".  Can we focus on "now" and not a 50 years ago during national mobilization....


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## Gunnerlove (9 Oct 2006)

So I get called up for a year, push back my retirement by a year, take a huge pay cut and tank my career. 

So, what's the down side? Oh right my unit is down an instructor while I am deployed.

Check please.


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## Echo9 (9 Oct 2006)

OK, so I vented last night, here's my thinking on the original proposal.

On the whole, I think that it's pretty uncontroversial.  The 18 months for a tour isn't really a big change- we're already pretty much doing that.

Some of the suggestions would be helpful for us in simply managing our less committed soldiers- the max time to get trained and such.

Employer protection is a mixed bag.  If you want to be able to compel reservists to go on ops, then it's a must.  If we maintain the volunteer approach, then it's utterly unnecessary.  In my experience with being compelled to be on ops, employer issues were non-existent.


Oh, and Infanteer- while you're absolutely correct that the bulk of the troops were callups off civi street, the leadership *was * formed from the part timers.  I'll leave it as an open question whether those lessons still apply- I'm just not as prone to dismissing it as you.  
I also wouldn't compare it to NHL vs farm team.  In that case, there's a clear talent difference.  The comparison only makes sense if there are NHL caliber players who choose to play on the farm team for reasons other than the on-ice factors.


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## SuperTrooper (9 Oct 2006)

OK, how about ice hockey vs field hockey then.


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## John Nayduk (9 Oct 2006)

We will be kicking this kind of thing around for ever and not everyone will agree, ever.
How about this, we train the reserves on all the basic soldiering skills to give a solid foundation.  Then, when needs are identified, they fill a spot and get the mission specific training during the work up that the whole Task Force goes through anyway.  Of course they have to go through the trade training but with all of the basic soldiering skills required (including advanced first aid, patrolling, force security, FIBUA, weapons handling, etc) there is more then enough things to train in the 37.5 days allotted for the average reservist.  Since we will not be deployed on formed sub-units but only as individuals, why not concentrate on solid training to give a solid foundation to build on?


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## Rockhound (9 Oct 2006)

Some have questioned my stats of 80-90%... this is what I am familar with

In the King's Own Calgary Regiment (an armoured regt) - By all those of a said rank who have NOT done at least one tour:

Sgt - 1/ WO- none (several have done 2 tours)/ CWO, MWO - none (ex reg too)/ Capt -1 / Maj - 1 (1 has done 3 tour, another has done 2/ the one who has not been overseas was a Coy Comd for Op Perigrine)

I won't get into a breakdown of how many of each rank we have but suffice it to say my percentages are low.

When I look across the parade square to the Calgary Highlanders, the percentages may be lower due a larger influx of new people in each rank, but not much...

My arguement may breakdown with a walk through 41CBG HQ, or another unit, but I am keeping my arcs on what I know...


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## Teddy Ruxpin (9 Oct 2006)

Right, and I can point to units where none of the officers and/or Sr NCOs have a tour.  The KOCR - a unit I'm familiar with - has had some success (for a variety of reasons) getting senior personnel overseas in staff positions, but they're hardly indicative of the Reserve Force as a whole.

Another Recce Guy:  +1


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## Echo9 (9 Oct 2006)

Trying to get the thread back to the topic at hand here-

One idea that should perhaps be considered is a greater level of integration reg/ res, so that what is currently a component transfer and is very administratively heavy becomes more of a "sign the dotted line" type of affair.  The bigger gain, to my mind, is the reg to res CT, since it serves to maintain at least some of the experiences within the core knowledge.  This kind of thing would also mean that the notion of the class B bum would disappear- as soon as you've signed on to an extended contract, the terms of service are the same reg & res.  Reg F service would be seen more in terms of a contracted service period (I know, it already is) rather than a distinct entity from Res service.

The reason that the above is becoming attractive to my mind is that there is already a class of reservist emerging that's more Op Tour experienced than many Reg F.  I've got a handful of people in my unit alone who have been on multiple tours (one got 3 in a period of 2.5 years).  The other key factor, of course, is the hemorrhaging of the Reg F field units.  

The other side of this is increasing the "stickiness" of res F service following a Reg F contract.  While most sign on to the sup res, that doesn't really do much good in any foreseeable scenario these days.  It also has the potential of bolstering what is currently the greatest weakness of res units- senior leadership.  There are relatively few units that don't have succession problems (even if they have succession, it's a straight line, without much choice).  Greater stickiness would have the potential of addressing this problem, and at the same time increase the level of proficiency of those who go on tour.


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## Osotogari (10 Oct 2006)

Much of this navel gazing comes from the fact that post-Cold War and pre-9/11 the CF was gutted by Mulrooney and then Chretien as part of the so-called  peace dividend.  May both of those fine gentlemen rot in hell under unmarked graves.  As a result there wasn't a big mission to take to the Canadian people, and as a result the first thing to suffer in budget cuts was training, specifically reserve training.  

The biggest problem is the CF is the only part of the federal government that is on a war footing, but that does not imply that the entire CF is itself on a war footing.  Put in a damn order in council and organize this thing properly instead of making commitments and then trying to find the guys, and get the entire system behind it.       

As far as reserve augmentation goes, it is still being done the same way since the 1980s, ie., the extemely long pre-training that is characterized by inactivity and cap badge politiking that makes it a relief to actually step on the plane to go to theatre.  As an NCO with a family and a mortgage, that entire pre-training bladefest is more of a disincentive for me than any thought of getting wounded overseas.  In my mind that is the big issue, not job protection.  I am a tradesman from Alberta, I can find work when I get back no problem, even in the unlikely event the price of oil dips below $35/barrel.    

As far as the integration of reservists goes, I have courses that were under the "Total Force" concept as well as integrated Reg/Res PLQ Mod 6 and DP2B Inf, so I assume that in a tour I could at least keep my rank.  The problem goes higher in that with my DP3 level, I have no option but to take watered down reserve courses.  This seems to me that the reserves are still perceived as a threat by someone in Ottawa  and that institutionally the regular force still wants to preseve the caste system in which we continue to work.   To be another blunt infantryman, the message that sends to me is that reservists are fine as 2ICs but don't bother if you want to be anything more.


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## John Nayduk (10 Oct 2006)

Further to my last.
As far as job protection goes, why can't the government use a system that is already in place.  They ensure  job protection for new parents.  Why not do the same for a reservist?  When all is said and done, the reservist needs about a year for work up training, the tour and repatriation.  The argument that no one will hire a reservist, in my opinion, doesn't fly because every new hire is a potential new parent and they still get hired.  I think that employers have accepted the paternal leave issue so for the small number of reservists it would not be a major issue in a vast majority of the cases.  
Couple the training to give the reserves a solid foundation to build on during work up training and a protected year off for the tour and you can get reservists that you can use where and when you need them.
And yes, I acknowledge that there must be a way for reservists to train in their trade and advance through the ranks.  And since we talking about a way for every reservists to do a tour, why not also make a tour a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant or major.  This will ensure that the leadership of the reserves has course knowledge AND real tour experience.  I also think that the army should be able to call up reserve members and give them the "shit or get off the pot" option.  Go on tour or get out.  That will leave the people who are useful and not just in for the beer money.  In the end, we'll have a reservse force that is flexable, usable, and in time, experienced.


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## Bobbyoreo (10 Oct 2006)

I like it!!!


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## cplcaldwell (10 Oct 2006)

Echo9 said:
			
		

> The other side of this is increasing the "stickiness" of res F service following a Reg F contract.  While most sign on to the sup res, that doesn't really do much good in any foreseeable scenario these days.  It also has the potential of bolstering what is currently the greatest weakness of res units- senior leadership.  There are relatively few units that don't have succession problems (even if they have succession, it's a straight line, without much choice).  Greater stickiness would have the potential of addressing this problem, and at the same time increase the level of proficiency of those who go on tour.



I think there is another thing to look at here. This is a bit of lateral thinking in a way (or a thread hijack if you prefer...), as it illustrates this concept of Res/Reg integration.

Too often we think of Res/Reg integration as a way to get the Reserve tradesman 'up to speed' on gucci Reg force kit/methods. It's a 'move the Reservist up' mentality not a 'Move the Regular down' mentality (I know, that's a flawed analogy... bear with me...)

The point made above is that Res F units often suffer from succession problems, and that even if sucession does exist it's linear. This means that too often (Cl A) Maj Longname gets the corner office at his Res F Regt even if he's a bag. The outcome is virtually assured.

*On the other hand.* My unit has been extremely successful in the last little while, not in spite of succession 'problems' but rather because of them. A couple of rather senior Majors retiring in the last six or eight years may have seemed to have been leading 'us' to a rut.

Now I understand from my position of lowly grandeur that my perception of this may be skewed but I would rather like to dwell on this following point...

'We' have been extremely fortunate, at my unit, to have had talented _serving_ Reg F LCols appointed to command. The knowledge and presence of such individuals greatly enhance the Res F unit. In addition the 'knock on' effect of having a 'pro' at the helm greatly enhances the Cl 'A' types (at all levels). 

When one couples this, with as Echo9 precisely pointed out, ex Reg members, and again my unit is very fortunate to a have couple of these folks as well, the effect is really quite something to behold.

*So how about it?* how many Reg F officers are out there, chained to a desk, who would like to 'downgrade' for a quick posting to a senior position at a Res F unit?

How would such a phenomenon enhance the Res F?


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## Brad Sallows (11 Oct 2006)

The question of employment protection is answered by the earlier posts which underscore the meaning of "militia".

If we don't have a reserve capable of providing formed elements and the political will to deploy them as such, then regardless of the "delta" the requirement for employment legislation doesn't reasonably exist.  To select individuals and invoke a legislative provision to mobilize each while protecting his job passes a threshold of ridiculousness.

Whatever our formed mobilization base militia gains us, it isn't a useful standing augmentation force for expeditionary operations short of national mobilization.  For those, we work within the means of our Regular Forces.  If we need more of that capability, then we need more Regular Forces.  We know the vast majority of useful reserve augmentation to meet operational needs is found at the ranks Pte-MCpl and Lt, and is by individuals.  I grant there are also domestic administrative needs which chiefly require higher rank levels.

The "delta" between the 37.5 day part-timer and the regular is much vaster than it was in 1989, let alone 1939.  I expect there are potential Curries and Hoffmeisters out there in the senior militia leadership, but they are much more likely to be the officers and senior NCOs with at least one operational deployment under their belts.  There is too much on the plate now for it to be otherwise: the professionally-minded militia officer or senior NCO should be striving to learn and retain at least a basic familiarity with operations from peace to war, domestic to foreign, national to combined, elemental to joint.  There is more than just a canned GenForce enemy to consider.  It will of necessity be almost entirely theoretical.  All of it is on top of mastering and applying the institutional administrative burden applicable to militia units, and arguably not less important than the latter despite what the institutional system formally and informally measures.

It adds up to a militia that could be suited to immediate employment for (and only for) Public Welfare emergencies and limited roles in Public Order emergencies, depending on organization and equipment.  Otherwise, the militia functions pretty much as just a screening service for potential regulars, a holding pen for a few deployable people who like to move between full-time and part-time service, its own bureaucracy, and the organizational equivalent of a heritage building that is almost impossible to renovate.  If those alone are not worth the cost, then the militia should either be scaled down to what is worth keeping or beefed up to standard for the aforementioned domestic emergencies.


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## dapaterson (11 Oct 2006)

Cpl Caldwell:

Why does your unit need a LCol?  Unless you're 55 Svc Bn you're never fielding more than a Coy worth of trained soldiers - most reserve units, if tasked to provide a single trained coy, would fail, lacking the regularly parading soldiers to do so.  Keep in mind that a significant portion of the Army Reserve at any time is not yet DP1 qualified, and thus not employable militarily.

Perhaps the Army Reserve needs to take a long hard look in the mirror, and ask why 200 LCols parade regularly to command 16000 (all ranks).  Maybe we can (gasp) admit that Majors can command - and let them command.  The Comm Res has had some success in instituting reality on its units, having appropriate ranks to command their units.

The constant push to get "the next CO" means that Reserve officers often lack experience in their ranks, and also means they never get true command experience; a LCol in command of a company (no matter how it is grouped) is still just a company commander.

The CLS provides a very limited pool of Reg F officers to a small number of reserve units that have succession problems.  But it's the same units time and again that draw on that pool.

Maybe it's time to admit that Canada's Army Reserve doesn't really have 51 Infantry bns, and downsize the RHQs in consequence.  Keep the cap brass, but admit that the unit is a company, and group it under some new HQ element.  This would also let us thin out our 10 CBGs - how about seven: two out west, two in Ontario, two in Quebec (with one of those two picking up the NCR units) and one down east.  Hell, we could increase the size of the CBG HQs by 40% and still be ahead.

But as long as we try to maintain our illusions of regiments on the ground, we'll keep on having the illusion of leaders .


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## 17thRecceSgt (11 Oct 2006)

GAP said:
			
		

> As an outsider, looking in, I could never understand why Reserves should be considered anything else but p/t Reg Force and trained up to the level that they can transition in and out seamlessly. I assume it was largely budget constraints that initiated it, and then the mentality  set in, but I am probably wrong on the whys.
> 
> What matters now, is "what happens now?"
> 
> As an aside, are you aware that Senator Kenny (L) is retiring at age 65 (I think next year), even though he could stay until age 75? What this means is that he no longer (if he ever had to) constrain himself from saying it like it is.



Late comer to this thread, and haven't read it all but I wanted to put this in here.

In '95, I was in Ft Knox for SIMNET stuff.  We were using the mess with the Armd Cav troops, on their "QL3" course (sorry, not sure what the Yanks call it...).

I was a MCpl at the time, unable to get an AVGP qual because our unit didn't have them (tell that to your Tp MCpl at TSS the summer before...head scratchin' and "wha?" was the response...).

I was talking to the Cav troops at our table.  One across from me was a "Reg Frce" guy, the guy next to him was a NG type.  Both on the same course (M1 gunner or something like that).  Same course.  Same standard.

We don't necessarily do that here in Kanada-cain.  Like I said, I was in TSS in '94, a MCpl told me me "hop in that Cougar, we are moving it out of the hangar".  I had to tell him I wasn't AVGp qual'd and couldn't be because my unit didn't have AVGP so I couldn't be trained on it.

Its the mindset that needs to change.  No a Res soldier will not be as competent and trained as a Reg guy, how could he be??

But we are "trained" to a certain extent, and can be further trained.

I find the "tours" in the Reg frce units, they will take the "troops" from the Res but not the NCOs.  Not that they should.  Everyone should be lead by the best in theatre, right?

But...there are spots that we (Res NCOs) can and are filling.  CIMIC...PhyOps...etc.


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## 17thRecceSgt (11 Oct 2006)

axeman said:
			
		

> i agree with what PPCLI GUY says . he and I are former reservists who then went reg and then served with the reserves as cadre. the reserves are good for basic material but in most cases they will still req more training to bringthem up to speed on the latest op tempo . *we cfannot blame them as they are generally as good as the system will allow * . that is to say with the training days all scattered . attendance at  the spring concenttraion camps are a good way to bring standards up and together.
> 
> maybe you might want to PM me or PPCLI GUY and ask what qual we have to say that . its not to flame them . they are hamstrung by basic fact. some over come it and some dont



Thanks for that Axeman, seriously.  Every troop is only as good as the time and training that they get.  We Res ones typically get way less (32 days a year IIRC) funded training.  Not bad on the basics, but the basics don't cut it in places like the sandbox.

Nicely put IMHO.  I appreciate it when someone who came from the Res can appreciate our challenges, and know first hand the delta that exists in training and capabilities.


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## dapaterson (11 Oct 2006)

There are unfortunately still a large number of folks who don't want one army, one standard for courses - and most of them are senior reservists.  "Too long"  "Too hard to recruit folks for those courses" or, my favourite, "RESO officers are too much like the Reg Force".

I fail to see the logic in piecemealing out courses in two week chunks, so we can recruit who?  That's right, the folks who lack the time to commit.  Perhaps it's just me, but why create a training system designed to bring in folks who lack the time to effectively commit to the Reserves.

There will always be experiential deltas between Reg and Res.  But especially at the DP1/DP2 levels we can create a training system that delivers the same quals to both Reg and Res.  It may mean we'll have to abandon some trades in the Res F as being not cost-effective due to the training burden.  But we will end up with a much more solid base to build on - so that the core skill sets are the same.

Nationally the areas are funded for about 37.5 days per soldier in the Sept-May timeframe.  Unfortunately, Areas are rarely challenged when they spend those funds in other areas.  It's the same with Indiv training funds - the money disappears into a black hole at the Area level (though some holes are blacker than others).

Enough rambling for one night...


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## Jed (11 Oct 2006)

Dapaterson I entirely agree with you but it is probably my Reg F bias coming out.

Mud Recce Man I definately see your points as well. There are many good roles for Res F to fill, provided the training is complete ie: CIMIC and PSYOPS.

I do not want to sidetrack this but, I personally do not agree with the Res F filling a role like CIMIC and PSYOPS at 100%. Maybe a 90 - 10 split would be better. If we are to be Total Force how can you effectively take an entire capability out of the total mix? Reg F and the Res F have to work together whatever the final orbat of the Res F winds up being. Currently, CIMIC and PSYOPS do not integrate well with the whole CF individual and collective training experience. Many Reg F pers do not know how to use these assets properly and many Res F do not know how to work within a combined arms setting in combat operations.

We are currently in combat cperations in Afghanistan were the campaign can not be won with only the application of kinetic force. Killing 1000,s of taliban will do no one any good unless we win or gain moral ground using the PRT assets and capabilities. The outcome will only be won with the application of non kinetic assets through the PRTs.


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## 17thRecceSgt (11 Oct 2006)

Another Recce Guy said:
			
		

> We will be kicking this kind of thing around for ever and not everyone will agree, ever.
> How about this, we train the reserves on all the basic soldiering skills to give a solid foundation.  Then, when needs are identified, they fill a spot and get the mission specific training during the work up that the whole Task Force goes through anyway.  Of course they have to go through the trade training but with all of the basic soldiering skills required (including advanced first aid, patrolling, force security, FIBUA, weapons handling, etc) there is more then enough things to train in the 37.5 days allotted for the average reservist.  Since we will not be deployed on formed sub-units but only as individuals, why not concentrate on solid training to give a solid foundation to build on?



This sounds alot like what then CLS Gen Hillier said to "us" in his brief to 36 CBG before he took over as CDS.

His words?

"We, the Reg Frce, need you in the years to come to fulfill our tasks that our Government will set upon us".

Let's get over the delta between the Reg and Res force.  There is one.  We accept it as Res guys.  You fear it as the Reg guys that may end up deployed with us, cause you want the best beside you.  We can be that.  With the training and help of our Reg Frce brothers and sisters that know more than us.

The Senate Commitee Report is NOT going to solve the issue being hammered on here.

Maybe some will help, job protection, etc.

But after reading thru this, the issue isn't that.

Its whether or not "we" can do the job.  I get that.  We can relate.

We are trained to a certain extent.  As much as "the system" allows.  Guys, we know that.  We are in the Res, we know we aren't trained to the standard you are.  We don't eat/live/breath together the way you do.  We can't.  We aren't 24/7.

BUT...but...

We can fit in and do the job.  Give us the trng, the benefit of YOUR experience.  We will listen.  Sponges.  Fill us up.  

Christ, we did it before.  How many Battle Honours do we have in the Res Frce units?  Not perfect, but willing.

We are all the same.  As good as our training...our leadership...and our committment.  Its not the uniform or the cap badge after all...its the man or woman wearing it.

And the training we give them.

Oh, I hear the Mod's saying "sum up MRM!"

Last point...

We're all on the same team...lets fight the enemy.  Not ourselves.


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## skydiver (12 Oct 2006)

Another Recce Guy..
Interesting idea about making a "tour" a prerequisite to promotion. Would that apply to Reg Force too? What about non Cbt Arms?

Methinks your suggestion might open up several cans of worms.

Another prob..all reservists are not deployable because their trade specs are not equivelant to the Reg F (not their fault..the Army made the choices).
Kinda hard for a Reserve Cpl to get a task as a Coyote gunner when he has never been in one and never will be. Or a Reserve Weapons Tech or Veh Tech to get a slot with a Tank Sqn Echelon or Recce Sqn since he isn't qualified on the kit. And of course when we are talking about soldiers other than maybe Infantry, the numbers of Reg Force in certain orgs is low enough on each roto that there is no way that unit is going to leave soldiers back to make way for a Reservist. I am talking Armoured Corps here. As I look at the CFTPO I see lots of generic jobs and Infantry jobs. Not so in al ot of other trade specific areas.

Keep on keepin on
Doog


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## PhilB (12 Oct 2006)

A lot of good points being brought forward in this thread. I have several points, being a reservist who just came back from 1-06 in a reserve org. Training wise the difference, at least tecnically between res light inf and reg inf is minimal. There are not many specialized skills that res is lacking. Proficiancy and experience yes but the the basic knowledge no. Mech is a whole different story. 

I think that deploying reserves in reserve organizations is a flawed concept. From my experience the troops suffer for the lack of experience of their leaders. I think reserves augmenting on an individual basis and quite successful even in the challenging theater of afghanistan.

A common misconception in my opinion is "having a tour". It seems that in the reserves as long as you have a tour, any tour, you are considered relativly proficient. I completely disagree. How many Senior NCO's and officers went on their tours as pte many many years ago. How many of those tours were Cyprus, later Bosnia roto's, the golan? Not to talk down someones acheivments in other theaters and operations but there is a huge difference between a cyprus tour and a current afghanistan roto. Senior NCO's in the reserves in most cases are not experienced enough in modern tactics, and equipment to effectivly lead soldiers on operation.

Sorry if this is somewhat rambling, I just rolled out of bed.


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## KevinB (12 Oct 2006)

Whats wrong with Cyprus  ;D - Fuck my liver will never be the same...

They cancelled my GF's ex this w/e since they had 6 troops (and a shit load of officers - Res Med unit)
  
I'd say they need to make functional units that can train -- maybe not be deployed as a unit -- but have the ability to be deployed as one...

Right now I'd say 75% of Class A MWO and Maj positions are oxygen theifs -- and 99.9% of CWO and LCOL (and above) res positions...



Secondly before people think I am res bashing - my old roomate CT'd as a Sgt to the reg's -- he was quite able to fill the role of a 031 Reg Sgt (though they intially made him a Cpl -- he was qual'd to be a reg Sgt)


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## John Nayduk (12 Oct 2006)

skydiver:
Since this thread is about the reserves, that's where my points are aimed.  A tour in the regular force is almost a given these days.  There are so many jobs that need to be done "over there" that even non-combat arms people should be able to go.  Currently we have 5 over there right now, two are involved with CIMIC, one is a staff officer, one work in an CQMS shop and one is with J3.  None of them have anything to do with R011 but they are getting some benefit from being overseas.  There is a lot to learn being on an operation in an active theater.  
PhilB:  Right you are about "having a tour", not all are big shows but having someone go through the operational deployment training and experience is better than having someone in a senior leadership position that has only been on course and summer concentrations.  I agree that you are not proficient because you had a tour, you are more experienced because you had a tour.  You get more proficient with training and it should never stop just because you get promoted.  This is why I advocate training in good solid soldier skills along with the trade training in what ever trade you are in.  In my case, I'm in a reserve RECCE unit.  We should be able to fill 37.5 training days with lots of good solid training (we're not but that's another issue/rant). It will take imagination and planning but it can be done.  If you dived up an evening parade into say three classes, you should be able to fit in basic soldier skills and a class on trade training.  No one says you have to cover every aspect of RAPZ in one evening but you could take a class and teach/review lateral drills, road block drills, etc.  When the weekend FTX comes along, put the soldier skills and the trade stuff together as a "confirmation".  Then cover something else and confirm it at the next FTX.  When the unit gets to the summer FTX, they have trained everything that they  need to cover the focus of the exercise.  Next year, keep up the soldier skills and move onto the next phase of the three block war or what is mandated by higher as the focus of the next summer concentration.  Keep the training challenging and operationally focused.
Since the reserves are not going away, let's keep discussing how to make us more useful to the army and the country, and yes, I know that these ideas will be discussed here and eventually die here but it's therapeutic.  ;D


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## 54/102 CEF (12 Oct 2006)

A while back I looked at the deployment times of major activities from Boer War up to 1948 and the re-deployment to Europe.

From the time it came on the scene as a political issue in Ottawa to the time the troops sail its usually about 6 months. 

Now that's not to say its 6 months until the troops meet the other side - its even longer.

This supports idea of the long work up trg and not deploying more than we have in the past which looks like about 25% of  the regular field troops who will go toe to toe with the Ruskies et al.

Where the entire rear link falls absolutely flat in my mind - is what if 2 Afghanistans open up? And certain NATO forces don't kick in......... the real answer may be its always political but by word, deed and body language I don't see us even acknowledging that could happen. 

A business as usual attitude is a dangerous attitude.


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## AJC (12 Oct 2006)

Interesting comments and some of the same old comments.
But I bit the end of my tongue off, must  comment:
- Job protection is not as important to those in the militia as some would have us think. This spectre gets raised, in my opinion, by those that wouldn't go anyways. If it came to be, great. Those that want to go overseas will go whether or not their job is there when they get back. 
- The number of old senior NCO's and officers from the old days where the mess was a training venue, are few and far between. There are a few of them left but not many. Having said that, according to a couple of posts here, I am one and just didn't realize it. Most NCO's (excluding Reg F transfers) I know in the reserve units have tours. Out of 19 Sr NCO's in KOCR, 16 have tours, and the total is 23. Yes some of them are old, but any overseas deployment is good experience. The reality is that once you get promoted to Sgt the likelihood of being deployed drops dramatically. Not that the volunteers don't exist, but the posns don't.  

The issues are:
1. There is not a realistic expectation, mission statement, aim, objective for a reserve unit. There has to be defined mission, a defined organization to fill out and the resources to meet them if it wants to work. That's complicated and expensive so the status quo will stay around.
2. 37.5 days a year is not enough, and never has been the way we do things. Allthough the National Guard has its issues, they can crew tanks on their reserve time. I don't think they are that much smarter than us, having equipment around on which to gain experience just might be the answer. 
3. The Reg F is the standing army and every effort should be made to fund it up to strength and fill it up. The militia should be not normally be relied on for formed units, that's called mobilization. Using augmentees from the militia is a huge benefit to the units. Their experience brought back can be used to help train those around them. The arguement that we "lose too many to the Reg F" is BS as that is part of our function.
4. The experience, or lack of it, issues that are evident with us militia senior NCO's are directly related to two things, neither of which are our fault. Funding, which we all know has been inadequate since time began, and a lack of sufficient current equipment big and small. If you want or expect a Sr NCO that can do the job fairly well, you first train him and then you provide him with meaningful practice. That practice involves men and equipment. The same equipment as the Reg F. Start buying equipment or quit bitching. Those that can't or won't do it can be fired.
5. LFRR can not come quick enough. I love history and know all the battalion names and who did what in the war, but its time for some reality. The model  that the British TA has adopted has merit. Res Svc Bn's provide little or no service, the Inf is neither "Light" (specialized) nor mechanized, Light Recce in a pick up or even a G-Wagon is not Light Recce. 3 trucks and 20 guys does not a Sqn make.
6. I knew 2 NCO's that quit due to first gulf war because they we're scared to be called up in case the whole army got involved. Both of them were sh&%pumps anyways. I haven't seen anyone quit due to Iraq / Afghan. One of the reasons that the militia can't fill all posn's allocated to CRIC's and WATC is that, there isn't very many of us around. The economy is good, you have to make it worth someones while for them to get/stay involved.

Solution
1. BFT all reservists. Bring back testing and competitions. Bring back marksmanship. Trade courses on the current corps equipment (this can still be done in blocks) CMTC validations. Bring back Milcons (at CMTC) 
2. LFRR - Make a Bn a Bn and a Coy a Coy. Amalgamate, tactically group or whatever, do something.
3. Fund the system for IT, Collective Trg and procure enough equipment to go around. Ammunition vice "Bang, Bang," he said sharply to the enemy. Real training with real equipment and ammunition will aid retention more than anything else.
4. Make it financially or some how beneficial for: a) a reservist to join up; b) an NCO to stay in and be fit / deployable; and c) Reg F mbrs to transfer over to PRes when they leave RegF. Full medical / dental for PRes after initial engagement. Yes, contracts and signing bonuses.

Another hour well spent.


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## skydiver (12 Oct 2006)

Greetings AJC and all..
I am one of those old buggers. I just passed my 36 TOS day. 
Was around for the FLQ thing. Did 2 Fall Exs during the good ol Cold War, was on Op Salon in Quebec and some did some other NATO and ABCA stuff. But no gongs. No "been shot at" stories.
Perhaps the Germany stuff has been a help. I think it was. Now I am a staff weenie on full time service and I know I couldn't do a troop WOs thing on an Op. I am not up on the equipment, the tactics or the vehicles. I could work at the "higher" no problem cuz that is what I do.
But I ramble..
I agree with most of what you say but I am in Atlantic Canada and we have had ARCONs/MILCONs forever. Next year it is shit canned. The fact is it cuts into Indiv Trg too much. Yeah I know, ya gotta do the Collective/Combined Arms stuff. But the courses are too damned compressed to make way for the exercise at the end of the summer.
There have been a lot of ideas bounced around down here lately about which we need more of right now.
One thing that most agree with is that units actually get better turn outs for their sexy out-of country stuff (and sexy in country stuff too) than for ARCON. 36 CBG goes to Fort Pickett VA every year. 8CH and PEIR had some pretty good trips to Fort Knox etc. The Newfs have done the Pickett thing too. Great facilities and no snow.
The ARCON Ex in late August gets a lot new soldiers who were trained that summer but then again a lot want the week off before going back to school (can't blame them). There is always a bunch of the old hands to run the thing but the fact is, it is not that easy for a lot of people to get off that time of year. When units do a big away trip it is usually in March. They have had the whole trg year to get ready and to make preps. Lots of available students and the working guys can usually swing a week in March. So why not take the collective trg $$ and give them to the COs. Then just say to them "run an exercise, alone or in conjunction other units when it works best for your soldiers".
As for the equipment..well that is definitely the thing is really screwing the Res part of the Corps. When we were cougar mounted we were relevant (sort of). Once the Reg F dropped them, we had lots to train on but we were becoming a dinasaur mounted org. Now...G-Wagen?
If the Army wants to be LAVIII mounted then give us LAVs. If they want to be NYALA based, fine. Give us NYALAs. Hell, give us horses, but gives us enough.

Slow night.
Doog


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## ArmyRick (12 Oct 2006)

As a link in the training chain of infantry soldiers I agree with binning MILCON/guardian/what ever it is called. I have too often seen quality training sacrificed for quanity. I beleive the reserve training cycle should go as such
Summer block = Career development/staffing courses and task
Fall block = Unit DLOC training (Individual skills up to section)
Winter block = Winter warfare skills and platoon operations
Spring block = platoon and company level exercises (the unit has been training together for several months now).

I would also suggest running the end of summer event for those not participating in career or staff training that summer.  It would be a lower key exercise than what people try and make it these days. I would also keep march break exercise alive for those availible.

Reserve battle group or brigade level exercises IMO is not worth the trouble.

One of the WORST expiriences I have had in the past was at Stalwart Guardian 2004 in Petawawa. There was such a cram job to get numbers that people didn't seem to care. I was given a section of soldiers of wich only 3 of us were QL3/dp1 infantry qualified. The other 6 guys were only reserve SQ qualified. They barely knew how to do section attacks and recce patrols. I told my platoon commander (an arrogant arse fresh off officer training who knew d*ck) and I was told "make it work, sergeant". A good cop out at best.

Keep in mind this ex had little time for battle procedure let alone time to teach guys how to do fighting patrols, urban operations and other operations better suited for QUALIFIED infantry troops with expirience. The troops were confused and trying to drink from the fire hose so to speak. It was too much for my new troopies. But hey the rush to get bodies out on ex was all important. 

Good thing, Bravo Company, 1 RCR threw a good urban combat scenario (for those who more expirienced).


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## PPCLI Guy (13 Oct 2006)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> . I told my platoon commander (an arrogant arse fresh off officer training who knew d*ck) and I was told "make it work, sergeant". A good cop out at best.



Or perhaps the young lad was mistaken in his believe that sometimes, you have to make it work, and the one guy that probably can is his Sgt.

You sure showed him, huh?

 :brickwall:


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## charlesm (13 Oct 2006)

Actually, I find that the reserves are their own worst enemies. We have a lot of smart people in different positions, but we also have the Old boys club, that tell the politicians that in my day we did this or we did that or we had this many troops on an Ex.

As for having a reserve force like the National Guard or American Reserves, I can't see it happening. We would have to boost the Reg first before we could even think about anything else. Also since the reserves are not getting the same Kit as the Reg's we don't train too the same level.

My suggestion for the Infantry is that the reserves are for Mobilization and footprint in the community (Like apple pie and Motherhood), but the real reason is to support the Regs. To do this I would suggest for Example, that Delta Coy in 3PPCLI would now be a reserve COY that would be flushed out by all of LFWA Inf Reserve Units. When a reservist goes there it would be on a 1-3 year class "C" contract. They would train with the battalion. Also when 3PPCLI runs PCF courses there would be extra money to send other reservists on these courses. In the summer they maybe tasked to help at WATC if there isn't battalion training going on. The reason I picked the 3PPCLI is because it is a LIB. We could pick 2 PPCLI, but how long do LAV gunners and Drivers stay in their position before they move up or out?

Also when a tour comes up this reserve Coy that has trained together could go as a formed sub-sub-unit. Reserve Capt, Maj and SNR NCO's could get very valuable experience doing this.

But the other important thing is that when the Reg no longer want to do things Full-time and want a different career, there should be some sort of bonus for joining the reserves. IE you serve with a reserve unit for a year and get $2,500 or so. Serve another 2 years get another $5,000. This way the reserves get better trained and more experienced people in.

My 2 cents worth


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## Haggis (13 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Or perhaps the young lad was mistaken in his believe that sometimes, you have to make it work, and the one guy that probably can is his Sgt.
> 
> You sure showed him, huh?
> 
> :brickwall:



 ;D




			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> One of the WORST expiriences I have had in the past was at Stalwart Guardian 2004 in Petawawa.



I was there, too.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Keep in mind this ex had little time for battle procedure let alone time to teach guys how to do fighting patrols, urban operations and other operations better suited for QUALIFIED infantry troops with expirience. The troops were confused and trying to drink from the fire hose so to speak. It was too much for my new troopies. But hey the rush to get bodies out on ex was all important.



Yes, people freaked about douing three "ops" in six days.  "Too much!!" they screamed.  But when the time came to do Battle Procedure, there was a lot of sitting around bitching about "the pace" at the expense of BP.  Were lessons learned?  Yep!!.  Some good.  Some bad.  But lessons WERE learned.

T'weren't that bad, IMO.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Good thing, Bravo Company, 1 RCR threw a good urban combat scenario (for those who more expirienced).



Charles Coy IIRC.


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Oct 2006)

> One of the WORST expiriences I have had in the past was at Stalwart Guardian 2004 in Petawawa.





			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> ;DI was there, too.



Hey!  So was I!!!  Who was the clown in charge of that ex, anyway?


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## SeaKingTacco (14 Oct 2006)

> Hey!  So was I!!!  Who was the clown in charge of that ex, anyway?



Do I detect some irony here?


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## PPCLI Guy (14 Oct 2006)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Do I detect some irony here?



Me?  Sarcastic?  Never.  :


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## Haggis (15 Oct 2006)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Hey!  So was I!!!  Who was the clown in charge of that ex, anyway?



Some big redheaded guy who has a habit of punching me in the shoulder when I'm not looking.  Seems I remember him as a "outside the box" kinda guy, in several ways.

Hey, how's your hand??


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