# We are driving good soldiers out of the Army



## Armymedic (3 Sep 2004)

From Lew Mackenzie:

http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/spotlight/2004/09/02/mackenzie040902.html

We are driving good soldiers out of the Army

Since my early retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces in 1993, the strength of our military has steadily declined from some 83,000 to less than 55,000 deployable personnel. The Army, which was my home for 36 years, is now 3,000 soldiers short of being able to fill the seats in Maple Leaf Gardens. The Toronto Police Services have 2,000 more police officers than the Canadian Infantry has soldiers from private to general. As a result, we have little to offer our allies when they set about taming rogue states, war criminals, ethnic cleansers, and various goons such as those immolating villages in Western Sudan.

In an effort to deal with the shrinking force pool, the previous commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, introduced a new method of preparing contingents for overseas deployments. Rather than building a contingent around an established 600- to 700-strong unit -- like the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI), which served with the United States in Afghanistan in 2002 or the 1st Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment (1R22eR, a.k.a. the "Van Doos"), which secured the Sarajevo airport in 1992 -- contingents would be created from company-sized building blocks, each one being approximately 100-soldiers strong. These companies could be plucked from units spread across the country. This method has become known as "plug and play" and came into effect in 2002.

On the day before the official announcement of the policy change, General Jeffery was good enough to include me in a conference call with his subordinate commanders. I asked the question, "If you had the budget and the soldiers you should have to do the missions you are being assigned, would you be introducing this new method of creating contingents for operational missions?" His immediate answer was a simple "no."

That did not surprise me. *Despite the fact politicians praised "plug and play" as a visionary and brilliant concept,* it compromised two sacrosanct Army principles. General Jeffery realized this fact, but had been forced to make such a distasteful decision due to a lack of resources."

The first principle to be sacrificed is that of unit cohesion. Most soldiers don't risk their lives for God, Queen or country. They do so for their buddies, particularly the ones a few metres on each side of them. Don't take my word for it; ask someone who landed on the beaches of Sicily or Normandy. And the best way to foster that intense loyalty and commitment is within a unit based on the time-honoured regimental system.

In civilian language, your regiment is your family. It looks after you, it nurtures you, it shares with you its history and obliges you to meet the standards of those who went before. In return, you might just owe it your life. The regimental names are usually reduced to acronyms and confuse TV anchors and journalists, who rarely get them right -- PPCLI, RCR, R22eR, QOR, LdSH(RC), RCD, 8CH, RCHA, CER, etc. To you, they are alphabet soup. To a soldier, they are structure, order, support, security -- just like a real family under ideal conditions. By contrast, smaller groups of 80 to 100 soldiers -- brought together from disparate sources to perform a temporary mission and then be disbanded -- could never hope to approach a high level of unit cohesion. 

The second principle to be trumped by the move was flexibility. Over the years, the Canadian military brass has been conditioned by relatively stable peacekeeping missions in places such as Cyprus, from 1964 to 2002. In such cases, Canada deployed custom-organized units that fit a specific and consistent mission. On the other hand, combat-arms units -- infantry, armoured and artillery -- have been organized since the 19th century to adapt to changing missions in volatile environments. That flexibility is squandered when we cannibalize these units to produce smaller forces with narrow roles.

For example, a Canadian contingent that just returned from Kabul was deployed without its mobile logistics company, relying instead on a static base camp manned by civilian contractors. When NATO officials requested that Canada expand its mission to include mobile operations, we had to turn them down -- proffering the phoney excuse that our soldiers were not adequately trained.

Many soldiers at the sharp end have noted the folly of the compromises. The current commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the same unit I had the pleasure of commanding in the late 1970s, has tendered his resignation after only one year in command. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Shandy Vida is an outstanding officer. You would be proud and comfortable to have your son or daughter serve under his leadership. He is a soldier's soldier and bristled at the compromises forced upon him, as he patched together a large part of the infantry component recently deployed to Afghanistan. To him, "plug and play" is not the way to send our soldiers to do dangerous work.

I have to agree, and can't help but think that if the Army had not chosen to introduce such questionable policies, officers of the calibre of Colonel Vida would not be resigning. I, for one, admire his commitment to his martial profession.

Invaluable soldiers like Colonel Vida should not be driven to this. The questionable policies motivating his decision resulted from the disconnect between the military's taskings and resources -- a strictly political failing. Over the past few years, the previous Prime Minister and the current incumbent, as well as the previous Minister of National Defence and Foreign Affairs Minister, all repeatedly promised a new Defence White Paper to replace a woefully dated 1994 document. Now, we are told we don't need one.

What a shame. Our defence policies are in serious need of review. And until reforms are implemented, our military will be at risk of losing its best and brightest.



Note to the bold print: Of course civil service pers with NO concept of esprit de corps and true teamwork would think that something like "plug and play" wouuld be revolutionary. In military terms we used to call it attachments and detachmnets....


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## teltech (3 Sep 2004)

Well... 
I hesitate to say this, but IMO, the only way the people (that is, the ones that range from "We have a military?" to "Disband the military - all we need is love and a lot of Canadian flags") are going to actually support a stronger and MORE EFFECTIVE military is to have (God forbid) a version of 9/11 in downtown TO. There could be studies up the wazoo about the requirement for this, the need for that, but unless the people demand better, we ain't gettin' nutin' but more of the same. Unfortunately, we only seem to learn these lessons after the blood has been spilt. 
Again, IMHO.


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## Michael Dorosh (3 Sep 2004)

Company sized units aren't capable of high levels of cohesion?   Tell that to the Special Forces around the world.

I agree with much of what General Lew is saying, but I think he tries too hard to sell the regimental concept; as has been discussed here before, Canadian soldiers have fought very well when taken outside the regimental structure.   Think CEF, or even FSSF.

He is right, of course, about melding company sized units into ad hoc battalions, which is the bigger point he is trying to make.   The battalions will naturally have little cohesion.   But the companies themselves are not precluded from high levels of cohesion simply because they are companies.   Cohesion is a result of training and experience, not simply issuing a cap badge and giving a lesson or two on Regimental History.


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## CanadianSIG (3 Sep 2004)

The Plug n Play concept may not work in the Reg Force - except in small special forces type teams - but IMHO it could make a difference in the Reserves - we get deployed that way right now - it would be nice to train that way as well.

By cross-training or switching up the training ex's to more closely resemble a self contained company (like 2VP) we would get a look at the bigger green machine which - we at least - do not get to see right now; and it would keep the attention - and hence RETENTION -  of the young recruits who seem to be getting bored out of the CSS trades with our current training schedule - they would get to do 'army stuff' - rather than just 'CSS stuff'.

Component training/practice is always necessary but IMO so is being able to know your place in the whole - and just like in kindergarten - learning how to play well with others. 

We do go out on support ex's but we never seem to really learn from each other (i.e we never get to leave the radios to see what other elements are doing / and they never get to leave what they are doing to see our side of the operation).


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## Lance Wiebe (3 Sep 2004)

I understand Lews point, but I do not entirely agree with him.

I am a big believer in combat teams.  In my opinion, a couple of companies of Infanteers, a squadron of Armour, an Engineer troop plus the other atts that are required (HQ, Cbt Support, etc) should be the nucleus of all of our deployments.  Everyone brings their own equipment, and specialties.

I also agree that sub-unit cohesiveness is not only possible, it most certainly exists!

Of course, Lew is not talking about our level, he is talking about CO level and higher.  Any CO wants to lead his Unit to an operation, not parts of units.  And no CO wants part of his unit attached to another for a tasking.  Lew is not talking about us peons.........


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## Kirkhill (3 Sep 2004)

From  Lance


> I am a big believer in combat teams.  In my opinion, a couple of companies of Infanteers, a squadron of Armour, an Engineer troop plus the other atts that are required (HQ, Cbt Support, etc) should be the nucleus of all of our deployments.  Everyone brings their own equipment, and specialties.



In that case Lance why not form mixed trade Regiments or Battle Groups under one CO?

The Ad Hoc Plug'Play system tries to be all things to all people but doesn't allow for the development of operational expertise as Unit/Formation level.

Single Trade Units have limited flexibility and regularly need to be fleshed out or tasked out on an Ad Hoc basis anyway, to meet demands.

Why not decide that a unit such as you describe is a viable and valuable option.  Raise it, equip it, train it (and 5 or 6 more like it)  and make those available for employment as they are.  Say to the government "this is what they can do - we can sustain it - employ them knowing their limitations".

Rather than trying to organize three half-assed brigades as we have now, organize one properly (light, mech, heavy I care not) and form the rest of the bodies into the half-dozen Battle Gps/Regiments as described under on CO and permanent staff.

It wouldn't be the old army, where we expect to line up the brigades, form a division and plug into a corps, but we haven't been able to do that since well before 1972.

It would give a firm base to hold formation skills, and a flexible, permanent, trainable structure that maintains and promotes unit cohesion.

 :-\Ranting again ain't I?  Oh well


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## Scoobie Newbie (3 Sep 2004)

I find this point astounding: "The current commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the same unit I had the pleasure of commanding in the late 1970s, has tendered his resignation after only one year in command."

I also believe this article will only have any effect with those that are already in the choir.

Lastly I have a sick feeling that if TO has nuked it would make a difference in public opinion.  A lot of voters these days are new immigrants and still have their country of origins best interests first and Canada second.  That's my opinion and it will probably come off as ignorant or racist but it is what I perceive.


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## Lance Wiebe (3 Sep 2004)

Kirkhill;

That is exactly my thinking.

A Unit should be a self-contained combat team.  Complete with artillery assets and all.  Why not?  Those of us that have more than a few years experience have worked with other arms, have friends with other arms, and know that we live, or die, because of other arms.  Because none of us can survive alone.  The Germans are great advocates of this, every Battalion, whether armoured or infantry, has the other arm attached as an integral part of its unit.  Mind you, the Germans go one step further.  Every Infantry section commander gets a mini course, and commands a tank for a few days, to include a gun camp.  Just to know the capabilities.  Every tank commander gets to command a Marder, with its section, for a while, for the same reason.  It goes up the chain, Platoon commanders, Squadron commanders, all the way.  

In my thinking, a tanker posted to the PPCLI will still be a tanker, and may even wear the black beret, but will be a member of the PPCLI.  The same for the Infanteers posted to the RCD.

I do not advocate this to smaller than squadron/company size, however.  A troop/Platoon won't do much.  A Squadron/Company sent to the opposite arm, however, will give much more flexibility to the Unit.  Not to mention the enhanced capabilities the unit will be capable of!


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## 12alfa (4 Sep 2004)

I would think that a " combat team" is a term that the goverment does not want to hear. Tanks, tracks being the others.

Unit Cohesion  is still with us, but is gettin harder to maintain under this new army.

But what do I know........


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## Scoobie Newbie (4 Sep 2004)

I think our military should seriously look at the US Marines example.  Hell we are small enough to initiate it.  One cap badge for all.  All members are Marines first and aviators, tankers etc second.


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## Michael Dorosh (4 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> I think our military should seriously look at the US Marines example.  Hell we are small enough to initiate it.  One cap badge for all.  All members are Marines first and aviators, tankers etc second.



And if that badge came down as having a crown, beaver and "22" cypher on it, would you still be in the Army the next morning?


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## Scoobie Newbie (4 Sep 2004)

The way to go is to go under a new name, badge, colours (whatever you want) to prevent that sort of hostility and animosity.  I'm not saying it would be easy to drop the current system but something needs to be done.


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## Bartok5 (4 Sep 2004)

At the risk of sounding contentious, many of you are missing the fundamental essence of LCol Shandy Vida's resignation and what it says about the state our Army as a whole.   It is all well and good to talk about permanent "Combined Arms Teams" within the Canadian Army, and perhaps that is the direction that we should be heading.   We all know people who preach that the Armour Corps should be crewing the LAV 3 because they are the vehicle crew and gunnery experts.   Given that the Canadian Armour Corps lacks any other viable role (aside from medium recce) under the new "Interim Army" construct, I would be heartily inclined to agree with the concept of permanent combined-arms "panzer-grenadier" battalions.   Indeed, I have been arguing that very point (as a corps heretic) for several years now, but heaven forbid that we should upset the various Corps "rice-bowls".   Except for the fact that the Canadian Armoured Corps can finally see the writing on the wall, and they don't particularly like what they're reading.....   

Hmmm - now where did that "Panzer Grenadier" term come from - has somebody somewhere done this before with a quantifiable degree of success???   But I digress...let's get back to what is going on within the Army as a whole.

To put it bluntly, the Canadian Army is currently experiencing an unstoppable hemorrhage of experience and talent.   LCol Shandy Vida is merely the most recent "high profile" example of the ongoing mass exodus that has been occurring "under the radar".   And suddenly this is news?

Two years ago, the CLS (Gen Jeffries) stood in front of 3 PPCLI Battlegroup in Kandahar, and told us quite candidly that his single biggest fear - the thing that kept him up at night - was the "bow-wavÃƒÂ«" of talented releases that would gut the Army over the next 5 years.   Well, here we are 2 years later, and the "talent exodus" is just getting underway.   So what is responsible for this situation?   To understand the current "talent crisis" you have to look back a few years - 20 years to be precise.

Back in the early to late 1980s, the CF had 80.000+ troops.   We had a war-strength brigade group in Germany, and an identfiable enemy (the Soviets).   Back then, the CF was still on a hiring kick, and we were taking in folks hand over fist.   That all ended around 1987, when the Cold War definitively ended and the long, slow decline of the CF ensued.   Over that period we went from 80,000 to 53,000 all ranks.    Needless to say, in the early to mid-1990s the hiring ceased and the personnel reduction began commesurate with an overall reduction in the CF budget.   It was the "Peace Dividend", dont'cha know....

Well, flash forward to 2000-whatever.   Here we are, with a "bubble"   of personnel hired during the "good old days" of the Cold War, who are now hitting their pensionable 20 years of service.   Behind this "bublble" of experienced WOs, MWOs, Sr Capts, Majs and LCols, is .......frightenly little in terms of sheer numbers and experience/ability.   Because during the late 1980s our Defence Policy was cast aside in deference to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the "Cold War", and a purported era of global peace and harmony.   So, cashing in on the "Peace Dividend" our political masters (Conservative and Liberal alike)   started slashing the CF.   What had been a hiring boon in the mid-to late 1980's became "zero entry" recruitment.   Heck, we even went so far as to financially "encourage" a lot of our most experienced follks to take an early retirement.   We called it the "Force Reduction Plan", or FRP.   

So following behind this "bow wave" of hiriing in the mid 1980's to late 1990s, there is .....nobody!   We recruited doodly-squat for new blood, because we were busy down-sizing the CF.   The focus was on Bringing home 4 CMBG from Germany and disolving the positions, a few years later we eradicated the SSF and then the Airborne Regiment, etc.    The Canadian Army was   down-sizing with a vengeance and reaping the (whoops!   non-existent) "Peace Dividend".    LIttle did we know what the early 1990's would bring in terms of operational deployments to the Balkans, and the never-ending litany of deployments since.....

Turning back to the CF manning situation, we had a large "bubble" of personnel moving through the system who had been hired in the early to late 1980's.   I suspect that anyone reading this can do the math.   Yes, that very same "bubble" of personnel now constitutes your Army's WOs, MWOs, CWOs, Capts, Majs, and LCols - all of whom served in the Canadian Army when we still had a focus and a war-fighting brigade group overseas.   And all of whom have since served during the slow but steady demise of our military.   This same group has been subjected to an endless litany of "peace support" deployments in the Balkans, Africa, etc, only to come home and find that they are "tasked" for something or other because the army is 40% smaller than it used to be......

Well, you can guess what is happening with "the bubble" of our Army's experienced tactical leadership.   Yes, that's right - an inordinate amount of them are opting to leave at the 20 year end of their "Intermediate Engagement" (IE) with a miminum pension.    There are as many reasons for doing so as there are action-items in my in-basket.   But at the end of the day, the net result is that the Canadian Army is currently undergoing a hemmhorage of its most experienced and talented personnel.   For those of you who hadn't noticed, this started about 2 years ago, and is projected to continue for another 3 years or so.   The "bubble" is hitting "20", and there ain't no reason to stay....   Hence the former CLS's "sleepless nights".

Which brings us to LCol Vida's release and relinquishment of battalion command (the pinnacle!) a year into his 2 year tour as a Regular Force CO.   Is this anything new?   Not really.   Is it unusual for a Battalion CO to say "screw this?"   Yes, but I am willing to bet money that he will not be the last.   I have several friends who are currently serving as Reg Force unit CO's, and they are NOT happy for a whole host of reasons.   Not the least of which is the fact that they have been relegated to sub-unit (read company) "Force Generators" vice unit commanders.   What is the point of being a CO, if you are never able (or allowed) to train as a unit because all that your unit consists of (in the eyes of the Army leadership) is a collection of companies and platoons that can be plucked out of your organization to form ad-hoc abortion units for operational deployments?   Now there's some rewarding "command", eh?

Reasons for the current 20-year "bubble" of officers and NCOs to leave the CF varies by individual.   But in a nut-shell, we can consider the following:

a.   Loss of Focus.   Right or wrong, these people served when Canada had a defined enemy, and had a committed war-establishment combat brigade ready to face that threat.   Neither of the above currently exists, and even if it did there is wide-spread doubt that our nation would exercise the political will do anything substantive.

b.   Loss of Capability and Credibility.   These same folks have seen the CF go from 80,000 to 53,000, with a commensurate loss of definable purpose.   Now we are pursuing a deliberate degradation of our combat capability while pretending that it is a "good thing" based on ISTAR-driven "perfect Situational Awareness" and the "Direct-Fire System of Systems".   We're the only Army in the Western World headed down those particular combat-capability paths despite what all of the current operational experience of our Allies suggests.   But evidently we know better....

c.   Increased Tempo.   Commensurate with the force reduction from 80K to 53K personnel, the "bubble"   folks have "held it together" throughout the 1990's and into the new century with cobbled-together units deployed on seemingly endless cycles of "peace support operations".   Often launched with inadquate unit cohesion, equipment, mandate, ROE, etc, etc.   These same folks kept holding it all together, and now they are   both frustrated and tired.

d.   Loss of Capability.   Many of the "dinosaurs" from the "good old days" have a fundamental disagreement with the direction that the "interim" Canadian Army is headed.   They don't believe the "spin", and know that the ongoing degradation of combat power is a function of funding - not forethought.

e.   Institutional "Correctness".   While this is a comparatively minor consideration in contrast to the others, there can be no mistaking the fact that the "degreed officer corps" and bilingualism requirements have proven to be a significant dissatisfier for "the bubble".   Nobody likes having the goal-posts moved half-way through the game, yet that is precisely what has occurred to many of the "bubble" folks in terms of career progression.

f.   Limited Opportunity.   This dissatisfier goes hand-in-hand with the above, but is distinct.   What we're talking about here is the fact that unit CO's no longer command a unit that they can take to the field and perhaps command on operations.   Within today's resource-deficit-driven operating evironment, COs get to "manage" and "force generate" companies/squadrons/batteries that will be taken away from them to cobble together a disjointed and dysfunctioal operational entity dispatched on an overseas mission.   Of course, this does nothing for the sub-unit in question, and leaves the parent unit fumbling through its training cycle under-funded and missing one or more critical components.

g.   ATOF versus the Command Cycle.   We have a system wherein units supposedly undergo a 3-year cycle of "Reconstitution", "Pre-Deployment Training", and "High Readiness" (ready for deployment).   Yet we have a 2-year command cycle, where an exceedingly competent CO such as LCol Vida can take his unit trhough the "reconstitution cycle" (read, nobody home because they are all on career courses or Army-level taskings) and "pre-deployment" training (if you get the training resources), only to be replaced by a new CO when the unit reaches its "high-readines" (read deployment) cycle.   As a CO, you get to train the unit, and then hand it over to a new guy who wasn't there for the work-up, doesn't know the troops, and is expected to deploy with the unit on a operational tasking.   Or at least he did, until we adopted "plug and play", where the unit CO is now merely a "force generator", existing solely to surrender his trained sub-units to form ad-hoc "units" for national operational taskings..... Even more reason to aspire to the lofty position of CO, eh?

There are numerous addtional reasons" for the ongoing exodus of "20 year talent", but I suspect that I have made my point.   It is not a pretty situation, and it is only going to get worse.   I would predict that we will hit the institutional low-point in about 3 years time.   By 2007, the exodus of talent will be complete, and the Army will be scrambling to fill the experience/competence void.   The fundamental problem being that you can't simply promote competence.   And you can't create experience overnight.

We are already seeing the deletorious effects of the ongoing exodus CF-wide.   Using Infantry officers (a subset which I happen to know) as an example, 10 years ago we used to promote 3 or 4 Captains to Major across the entire corps each year.   For the past 6 years, we have been promoting increasing numbers of Captains to fill vacant Major positions due to attrition.   Someone correct me if I am wrong, but last year we promoted 27.   The year before was 25.   And the year before that was similar.   The average time in rank for a Captain promoted to Major in the Infantry has seen a commesurate drop from 10 years to 6.   Can you say dipping into the bottom of the gene-pool just to fill demand? And did I mention that the Infantry Corps is apparently "short" well over 100 Captains across the corps establishment?   So just where are we "dipping" from, and who are we leaving behind to do all of those Captain jobs?   The answer is........

Perhaps now you can truly begin to appreciate the manning crisis that we find ourselves in.   The problem is not recruits, regardless of whether or not we can manage to train them.   the true crisis is in experienced leadership at all ranks.   The Army is currently akin to a hemophiliac in a Weed-Whacker factory.   And the situation is only going to get worse over the next 3 years as the last of the late-80s "hiring bubble" says "thanks, but Ãƒ?'ve had enough".   

what's that old Chinese Proverb?   "May you live in interesting times"?    Well, interesting is certainly one way to look at it.......

The good news is that we still manage to train world-class soldiers and officers within the Canadain Army.   There may be a few "lean years" where folks are forced to prematurely step up to the plate, but I am conficent and hopeful that those new leaders will carry the day.   If they don't (or can't), then there are some very dark days ahead....

And on that happy note, I will sign off for this evening...


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## KevinB (4 Sep 2004)

Well said Sir.

 The retirement of Col Vida came as a shock to those of us in 1PPCLI serving in Afghanistan.   For all the reasons that both Gen MacKenzie and Maj. C have mentioned it really should not have been.

 Some thought perhaps that since Lt. Col Vida had been in Kabul as part of an observer mission before, and his troops (1VP) composed the largest portion of the combat arms soldiers deployed, that he would have been the logical choice for TF/NCE commander.   Securing an urban centre is (at least in all other armies) a task reserved for Infantry troops (with Armoured support) not vice versa.

However Canada chose to send an Armoured Recce (read surviellance) Sqn as its flagship presence and awarded the NCE postion to an Armoured officer.

I looks like the next few mission will get Engineer and Artillery commanders - talk about putting the cart ahead of the horse.   I guess is the kinder gentler fresher smelling army of today we must round robin command positions despite tactical requirments or general common sense.

I can't wait till the mission commanded by a Dentist for it was simply his/her/its turn   :'(



-Later


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## Armymedic (4 Sep 2004)

Mybe not a dentist, but it may well be a pilot/infantry/mars candidate dropout who then became a Health Care Adminstator...

Lets hope not.

Mark C,
That bow wave of recruitment you discussed, thanks to the freezes in promotions in that FRP period extends down to the MCpl and Sgt level as well. Its when those middle NCO pers leave the greatest vacuum of experience will happen.


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## George Wallace (4 Sep 2004)

Armymedic

It is even worse....It is down to the experienced CPL level, which we suffered through during the last deployment in the Sqn that was left behind.

Very well put Mark C

Just a point for Michael Dorosh, not all CEF were hodge podge collections of units, many went over on the various CEF as "Regiments" and maintained that Regimental family.  The FSSF was comprised of volunteers from all Cdn Units, and when joined by their American counterparts, became a Regiment and a very fine and closely knit one.  That 'Band of Brothers' still maintains close ties and celebrate "Menton Days" passionately.  

This all makes this 'dinosaur' sad. :'(

GW


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## Gunner (4 Sep 2004)

> his troops (1VP) composed the largest portion of the combat arms soldiers deployed



True, but without getting into details of the current deployed contingent, there is an even larger portion of 1 PPCLI soldiers left back in Canada who need their CO.   There were a number of LCols in LFWA with a big lip on because they were not chosen to lead it.   The chain of Comd chose the current Comd for a reason and their reasons for not chosing LCol Vida are probably just as valid.



> Securing an urban centre is (at least in all other armies) a task reserved for Infantry troops (with Armoured support) not vice versa.



Hmm, you and I are both serving in the same location. Who's doing the securing right now?   Who's in support?   No details please due to OPSEC.



> However Canada chose to send an Armoured Recce (read surviellance) Sqn as its flagship presence and awarded the NCE postion to an Armoured officer.



Irrelevant.   Op PALLADIUM Roto 0 the main contribution was an Infantry BG and the Comd NCE was artillery.   Roto 1 the main contribution was an Infantry BG and the Comd NCE was again a gunner.   Comd NCE are their for their capability, not their capbadge.   

I'm not trying to bust your balls about your reply Kevin, but the army has to get away from these cap badge games.   Personally, I'd rather be lead by an extremely competent HCA officer who will successfully accomplish the mission vice an incompetent Infantry Offr, who is going to get me killed.   LCol Vida left for personal reasons.   Maybe he is dissatisfied with the way the army is going, at least he did the honourable thing and retired instead of sticking around being an obstacle to "Progress".   

Good Retirement LCol Vida.   End of mission.


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## KevinB (4 Sep 2004)

Gunner,
I play ground hog day in the QRF tent...

The Op Palladium Roto's the Inf Bn's that formed the Btl Gp's had CO's.  The continegent commander which we have renamed as NCE was more of an administrator then - the CO 'fought' his unit.

The 1VP 031's are FP assets - realistically if we wanted to patrol the city the Roto would have been much more 031 heavy.  Ask MarkC for an honest assement/feedback of Coyote usefulness is this neck of the woods.

As a Patrica I am extremely sad to see Lt Col Vida go he is the best CO I have served under since I joined some 17+ years ago
 Though 'Super Dave' Chupick is runner up when he had 2 RCHA (92-93)...

 No offence the Artillery trade (I saw the light in 94  ;D) - but the only two trades that really should command Btl Gps are Inf and Armd - and historically command has gone to the unit that that has the heavy presence (which in this Roto would have been Inf).

 Several NCO's and Officers in 1VP that have their 20, have 30 day released since Lt Col Vida tendered his resignation.  This year I feel the unit is really going to take a kicking - and the CF/Gov't hopefully will realise that the reasons are exactly what MGen Mac stated...


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## Bruce Monkhouse (4 Sep 2004)

Several NCO's and Officers in 1VP that have their 20, have 30 day released since Lt Col Vida tendered his resignation.  This year I feel the unit is really going to take a kicking - and the CF/Gov't hopefully will realise that the reasons are exactly what MGen Mac stated...


I've stated this before, my biggest fear for the military is those who serve with honour and are respected by the
TROOPS [cause this is what really matters especially once your long retired] will "fall on their sword" and who does that leave behind?
Yep, the politicians bagboys. :-X  and the  inexperienced


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## Michael Dorosh (4 Sep 2004)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Just a point for Michael Dorosh, not all CEF were hodge podge collections of units, many went over on the various CEF as "Regiments" and maintained that Regimental family.  The FSSF was comprised of volunteers from all Cdn Units, and when joined by their American counterparts, became a Regiment and a very fine and closely knit one.  That 'Band of Brothers' still maintains close ties and celebrate "Menton Days" passionately.



But you only prove my point.  The FSSF went from scratch to a superbly melded, highly trained and motivated combat unit capable of performing great deeds (la Difensa, for one, or the sizeable frontage they held at Anzio while opposed by Fallschirmpanzerdivision "Hermann Goering") in a matter of months.  They didn't need a silk flag with the names of ancient battles on it, or a flashy cap badge.  Traditions can be created out of whole cloth instantly.  We did the same thing with the Canadian Guards.  If we have to, we can do it again and again.

I doubt we'll call them "Panzergrenadiers", of course. ;-)

But why not merge the armoured and infantry regiments, if you are serious about intermixed battalions, with squadrons of armour and companies of infantry under the same COs?

You'd have the traditionalists' heads spinning on what to name the new amalgamated units and what hats they should wear....


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## Scoobie Newbie (4 Sep 2004)

Now I'm sure I will come off as being stupid for asking this but are the guys at the top (LCol, Col etc) voicing their concerns as well as making statements such as leaving what many officers aspire to (CO) early?
I would argue that not only should be combine the armoured and infantry but all trades under one new regiment (or whatever you want to call it).  When units train, they all train together.  Problem being training area's and such.


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## Gunner (4 Sep 2004)

> I play ground hog day in the QRF tent...



Kevin, I know where you work and I don't envy the task that has been given your coy.



> The Op Palladium Roto's the Inf Bn's that formed the Btl Gp's had CO's.  The continegent commander which we have renamed as NCE was more of an administrator then - the CO 'fought' his unit.



Yes, however, we don't have a Btl Gp conducting operations on Roto 2.  Our declared assets to ISAF are minimal.



> The 1VP 031's are FP assets - realistically if we wanted to patrol the city the Roto would have been much more 031 heavy.  Ask MarkC for an honest assement/feedback of Coyote usefulness is this neck of the woods.



Patrolling the city is not our role.  If it was we would look a lot more like Roto 0/1.



> As a Patrica I am extremely sad to see Lt Col Vida go he is the best CO I have served under since I joined some 17+ years ago
> Though 'Super Dave' Chupick is runner up when he had 2 RCHA (92-93)...



I think everyone has expressed sorrow over the loss of LCol Vida and I think some of the reasons raised by Mark were part of his decision.  Army members want an real army role in their nations foriegn policy, not to be portrayed as boy scouts.  The decision by the government not to become involved with the US in Iraq was a slap in the face to many (ie LGen Cam Ross).  A nation should not be embarrassed, real or perceived, over the use of the military to further its foriegn policy.



> No offence the Artillery trade (I saw the light in 94  ) - but the only two trades that really should command Btl Gps are Inf and Armd - and historically command has gone to the unit that that has the heavy presence (which in this Roto would have been Inf).



No offence taken.  In a world of limited budgets and limited political will, the artillery doesn't place high on the priority list for scarce resources.  I don't disagree with you, however, I again point out that we do not have a BG in Afghanistan.  Look at what has been declared to ISAF and then relook at your logic.



> Several NCO's and Officers in 1VP that have their 20, have 30 day released since Lt Col Vida tendered his resignation.  This year I feel the unit is really going to take a kicking - and the CF/Gov't hopefully will realise that the reasons are exactly what MGen Mac stated...



As mentioned in other posts, it is too bad that this is happening.  I don't necessarily agree with the way the army is going however I understand why LGen Jeffery puts the transformation into effect and why we are heading in the direction we are.  The onus falls on me to to support these decisions.  If I can't, I will have to consider release as well.


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## commando_wolf63 (4 Sep 2004)

```
I think our military should seriously look at the US Marines example.  heck we are small enough to initiate it.  One cap badge for all.  All members are Marines first and aviators, tankers etc second.
```


Back in the late 60's early 70's the three branches of the Canadian Armed Forces were unified under a single uniform and Cap bagde it didnt work. Most units went back to wearing their unit's capbadges prior to Unification. Then in 84 The Progressive Concervitve Party as an election promise, promised the Forces new uniforms according to what Branch of the forced they represented. Unification under one Cap badge didnt work the first time.


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## Infanteer (4 Sep 2004)

> No offence the Artillery trade (I saw the light in 94  ) - but the only two trades that really should command Btl Gps are Inf and Armd - and historically command has gone to the unit that that has the heavy presence (which in this Roto would have been Inf).



Guderian was a Signals Officer before he got into the theory and application of Armoured Warfare.  Kesselring was an Air Force General and was able to conduct a brilliant delaying campaign in Italy.

Point is, no one trade holds the monopoly on military excellence.  Any military Officer who has a thourough understanding of the profession of arms should do.


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## Scoobie Newbie (4 Sep 2004)

commando_wolf63  why did it not work?


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## commando_wolf63 (5 Sep 2004)

It's hard to say really but how'd you feel if you were standing outside a civilian airport in full dress uniform with all army insignia and have someone come up to you and ask "How long have you been in the Navy" or Airforce for that matter


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## KevinB (5 Sep 2004)

Gunnar,

 Furthering my point - declared ISAF assets versus in theatre ISAF assets...
Putting 1/2 of the cbt arm force under KMNB and the rest with no real mandate outside CJ was incredibly stupid...


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## Gunner (5 Sep 2004)

> Furthering my point - declared ISAF assets versus in theatre ISAF assets...



No there are declared ISAF assets and non-declared CANADIAN assets.  Canada is responsible for all of us here in Afghanistan, not NATO.



> Putting 1/2 of the cbt arm force under KMNB and the rest with no real mandate outside CJ was incredibly stupid...



On the infantry side, there are not enough of you to do anything besides what you are doing now.  Whether or not you are declared to ISAF, your role would be the same.  I would even hazard to guess that if we declared more of our assets to ISAF we could actually have a smaller contribution then we do now.


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## George Wallace (5 Sep 2004)

Kevin B

At the sounds of it you don't understand the role you are supposed to be filling.  The Recce Sqn there now is defining that role and our 'politicians' are redefining it also.  It is of great interest to some of us who are in the process of replacing you in the next Roto.  Hopefully by then there is a 'final solution' and well defined task to be filled.

I am assuming that the Inf Coy is 'security' for the ISTAR Recce element.

Government waffling and indecision shows between the lines in their public statements and todays young soldiers, having higher educations that their forebearers, can very plainly see it.  It has an effect on morale and consequently troop strengths as they seek other employment.

GW


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## Michael Dorosh (5 Sep 2004)

commando_wolf63 said:
			
		

> Back in the late 60's early 70's the three branches of the Canadian Armed Forces were unified under a single uniform and Cap bagde it didnt work. Most units went back to wearing their unit's capbadges prior to Unification. Then in 84 The Progressive Concervitve Party as an election promise, promised the Forces new uniforms according to what Branch of the forced they represented. Unification under one Cap badge didnt work the first time.



No they didn't.   The only ones to get a "unified" cap badge were recruits, who wore the Tri Service badge.   All units retained their cap badges but bear in mind that at the same time Unification went through, the corps and services were replaced by branches.   For example, the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps and Royal Canadian Army Service Corps were disbanded and in their place came the Logistics Branch.   

Don't confuse the CF Uniform and unification of the services with what they did with the cap badges - individual regiments and branches still retained their identity from the start.


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## Scoobie Newbie (5 Sep 2004)

The Marine Corp model is more then one uniform.  All members pound the ground first and formost.  This provides a commonality throughout so the Harrier pilot knows what the Infanteer is going through etc.  I realize that we have a lot of people that are comfortable in their little role so perhaps intially the combt arms elements and new recruits (of all branches and trades) would be indoctorined.  I realize by going this route it would take a long time to have everyone on the same net.  However its got to start somewhere and somehow.


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## logau (5 Sep 2004)

My two cents --- 

Even if we get more kit and personnel - it may not matter. 

The CF is likely now a back burner armed forces. What they do is done well and the standards are high but back burner is back burner.

More on this line of thinking at   

Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy
http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol5no2.pdf

In my view there are a few key lessons for all 

1. The long service regular is going to be increasingly rare and hassled by the back to back deployments. No one will help him.

2. As long as the Army doesn't have an internal slowdown the government will continue sending out troops and the release rate at the other end will be as described above.

3. How it was in the old days of CFE or the 80,000 person CF is irrelevant. There is a problem that needs to be fixed and no one is fixing it. You don't hit harder without muscle inside your Cadpat sleeves.

4. The regular Army draws from a   limited pool that can't adequately get its hands on extra manpower from either the civilians or the reserves.

5. If the government see's itself clear to improve this it will come between 2005 and 2007 - if not the trend line is down. The longer its not fixed the worse it gets when Osama or some hopped up group gets its hands on a hockey rink full of innocent spectators. 

6. By improving it I mean having the kit and troops to deploy Battalions/Regiments with their full command structure and support elements from engr sqns to recce units to the whole battle group shopping list - and do this indefinitely every 6 months. But if we look at the US - maybe the 6 month time scale overseas is doing more damage? I see year long tours being done by our US friends while we stick to the 6 month mantra. The standard is join to serve for the duration - but if we accepted that - we accept that its a war and not a tour.

PS: (Whoever coined that term tour should be covered in honey and feathers)


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## Scoobie Newbie (6 Sep 2004)

The reason for year long tours (and I may be reading this wrong) is that the US gov't didn't want to rotate fresh troops into a war zone and have more battle hardened troops (more experience) rotated out.  Also it is believed by some that it was a quasi-type of draft where members who would have normally been done in there contract served another 6 months that they didn't count on.  Anyone please correct me if I'm wrong.


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## Scoobie Newbie (6 Sep 2004)

I also think year long tours may serve to further degrade the morale around here.  Your gone nearly a year with the work up training plus the tour as it is.  Quite a few people have families and would rather be home then spending another 6 months in some hole.  As it is the gov't needs to seriously see the weakness in our military and realize that we can't sustain the tempo that we are currently on.


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## canuck101 (6 Sep 2004)

I was just wondering the same thing are you talking about turning the CF into a marine force.  I think everyone that joins should should do a two year stint pounding the ground before going to there trade school.  By doing this we enlarge deployment available personnel.  They will have at least one overseas mission under there belt, this being a six month mission.  the airforce for the most part can be merged into a marine corp. 

 In Canada i don't think we would have the need for a carrier but a ship like HMS Ocean would be ideal or a ship like an Enforcer 13000 that the dutch have. I guess it would be like unification again but different.  

Just a thought i had. I will keep my head down  :warstory: 

cheers


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## onecat (6 Sep 2004)

A 2 year stint on the ground before going to your trade... are you crazy.  Many people who join the CF have no desire to be a grunt, and doing that would make recruiting that much harder.  Take me, I'm 34 and joined FSC because I wanted a good trade and a good career... but if for a second I thought I would have run around and do infantry BS for two years before I got to my trade.. that would be it.  I would never of signed up for 3 years.  As a tech I can do better in the civi world.  What's the point of training of a cook or clerk to use the C-6 and do section attacks when they are never going to use them.. its just wasted resourses.  and the CF does have that much money to burn.  man they even count the paper clips.

The problem with the CF isn't that they need more combat arms guys, its that they need more of everyone.  People who join combat arms do so because like the lifestyle, and its not for everyone, even if you like army and all the BS and cock they feed you.

Now if Canadian actually voted in a party that supports teh military maybe things would change.  But the way things are right, its feeding on it's self.  The more experienced people leave and the smaller the armed services get that worst its getting.


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## George Wallace (6 Sep 2004)

radiohead said:
			
		

> A 2 year stint on the ground before going to your trade... are you crazy. Many people who join the CF have no desire to be a grunt, and doing that would make recruiting that much harder. Take me, I'm 34 and joined FSC because I wanted a good trade and a good career... but if for a second I thought I would have run around and do infantry BS for two years before I got to my trade.. that would be it. I would never of signed up for 3 years. As a tech I can do better in the civi world. What's the point of training of a cook or clerk to use the C-6 and do section attacks when they are never going to use them.. its just wasted resourses. and the CF does have that much money to burn. man they even count the paper clips.
> 
> The problem with the CF isn't that they need more combat arms guys, its that they need more of everyone. People who join combat arms do so because like the lifestyle, and its not for everyone, even if you like army and all the BS and **** they feed you.



Grouse me out.  Where did you come from?  Getting an education or a trade for free sounds like Welfare to me.

Personally, I sort of looked at the CF as resembling the USMC, in that we have Airmen, Sailors and Soldiers all in one unified military.  Sorry to burst your bubble Radiohead, but you better get used to being a Soldier first and a tradesman second, or you will not have a happy career.  You are going to be posted to a Cbt Arms unit to do that trade and you will have to do all that "grunt" stuff.  

You remind me of some of the Reservists I ran into in Gagetown this summer, who wanted the paycheque, but didn't think they had to do anything for it.  If you don't like it, pay your own way through school and get that trade you wanted and don't waste the CF's time and money.

GW


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## canuck101 (6 Sep 2004)

how hard do you think it would be changing the CF into a USMC or Royal marine kind of force. I don't see to much need to change either of the three services much to fix a Canadian version of the USMC.  The only thing that i think would be different would be that we would not have any planes based on amphibious ships maybe helo's.  Then we could setup the CF as a medium force without mbt but with maybe lighter vehicles like the CV90 TRACKED ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLE and the variants that they offer.


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## Infanteer (7 Sep 2004)

> A 2 year stint on the ground before going to your trade... are you crazy.   Many people who join the CF have no desire to be a grunt, and doing that would make recruiting that much harder.



That "infantry BS" you so casually refer to happens to be the bread-and-butter of soldiering; not sitting in some office in Kingston thinking of neat prowords and the like.



> Take me, I'm 34 and joined FSC because I wanted a good trade and a good career... but if for a second I thought I would have run around and do infantry BS for two years before I got to my trade.. that would be it.   I would never of signed up for 3 years.   As a tech I can do better in the civi world.



You wonder why the Combat Arms guys ride the REMF's so hard.   That is the biggest pogue attitude I've ever seen towards the profession of arms.



> What's the point of training of a cook or clerk to use the C-6 and do section attacks when they are never going to use them.. its just wasted resourses.   and the CF does have that much money to burn.   man they even count the paper clips.



Because the next time you are sitting comfortably in the rear area using your fancy trade skills and the local Pashtun warlord decides he is going to cut your head off, you and the rest of your CSS buddies better be prepared to fight.

There is a report on by a US Logistics Officer on the steps that the CS and CSS trade needs to take due to the unnecessary casualties they are sustaining in Iraq, a war with no front lines, due to being unprepared or simply ignorant of the rigors of combat.   I'll try to find it and post it here.

I'd suggest you reevaluate your statement radio man; one day you might not have the big-bad infantryman around to save your skin.



> People who join combat arms do so because like the lifestyle, and its not for everyone, even if you like army and all the BS and cock they feed you.



What Army are you in?   If you think that BS Cock is what my line of work is all about you should turn in your kit and sign your release to find all that money in the civilian market.   The training that the Combat Arms receives is not about people who "like the lifestyle", it is about instilling the proper attitudes and mindset in soldiers in order to enable you to effectively survive occasions when other groups of people are trying to kill you.   If you think that Support types are immune to this, you've got you head in the fucking clouds.   

Read some of the other threads around here discussing the issues of training, maybe you'll get a better understanding from real soldiers on the way things work.


See you later Pogue....


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## PuckChaser (7 Sep 2004)

I've heard this a couple times throughout my short career, and its always hit home. Soldiers first, tradesman second.  I'm not the strongest guy in the world, but I don't mind the infantry stuff, hell I admire the guys that can do it day in and day out. Everyone in the CF should be combat ready, be it able to fire a weapon, or man a defensive position, or participate in a section attack. War doesn't just hit the front line boys and girls, the battlefield is always changing. What you once thought was a rear-ech position, could be within a few hours the new front line. How fast can you tear down your TV/VCR setup and get the hell out of dodge?

If we lose a few soldiers because of this, fine. They don't have the soldiering attitude the CF needs. And for those that join expecting a desk job? Basic is a rude awakening.


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## Michael Dorosh (7 Sep 2004)

radiohead may have the wrong attitude but he makes some good points.  If someone wants to sign up to learn how to repair radios or learn an actual trade he can use on civvy street when his BE is up, you are not going to entice him with the promise of 2 years of pepperpotting, first, before he ever touches a radio or any tool of his chosen trade.

Do CSS troops need to know soldier skills?  Yup, Jessica Lynch (good example) taught us, once again, just that.  But there is a  line to be drawn.  

Anyone who thinks that Canada can successfuly institute a Marine Corps model of 'rifleman first' is mistaken, and I seriously doubt that even the Marines have been able to successfully institute such a policy. Are we so sure they don't have as many so-called "pogues" as anyone else?  A friend of mine married a girl who joined the Marines on the strength of her treaty card; I don't recall her doing many hard core infantry exercises - I believe she was a rad op as well. 

As wrong as it may be, or as dangerous should a real conflict come up, you are not going to get guys to join the Army to learn how to cook, by making them serve in infantry sections before their trades training.  

Does any Army in the world actually do that?


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## Michael Dorosh (7 Sep 2004)

SuperSlug said:
			
		

> I've heard this a couple times throughout my short career, and its always hit home. Soldiers first, tradesman second.  I'm not the strongest guy in the world, but I don't mind the infantry stuff, hell I admire the guys that can do it day in and day out. Everyone in the CF should be combat ready, be it able to fire a weapon, or man a defensive position, or participate in a section attack. War doesn't just hit the front line boys and girls, the battlefield is always changing. What you once thought was a rear-ech position, could be within a few hours the new front line. How fast can you tear down your TV/VCR setup and get the hell out of dodge?
> 
> If we lose a few soldiers because of this, fine. They don't have the soldiering attitude the CF needs. And for those that join expecting a desk job? Basic is a rude awakening.



But is it realistic to expect anyone to do this for two years as is being suggested, before taking any trades training?  Good luck with your recruiting and retention.

I love how easy it is for people to say "hey, we don't need people like that."  Last time I checked we were critically short of a lot of skilled tradesmen.   What about padres, dentists and doctors?  Shall we have them commanding rifle companies to "earn" their rank?  That ought to entice a doctor making 150,000 a year or more on civvie street to sign up for half that.


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## Jungle (7 Sep 2004)

radiohead said:
			
		

> ... but if for a second I thought I would have run around and do *infantry BS* for two years before I got to my trade.. that would be it.


Be careful with that language here... When (or if) you are nominated on a PLQ, I would like you to tell the instructors you don't need all that Infantry BS. You should be excused from leading Recce patrols, section attacks etc.. because you are WELL ABOVE all this, you are a technician !!!  :
Well guess what tech, bullets don't discriminate, and the enemy don't care what trade you are. Be ready to defend yourself and those around you, the Infantry can't always be there for you... we have other BS to take care of. And work on that attitude...


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## George Wallace (7 Sep 2004)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> But is it realistic to expect anyone to do this for two years as is being suggested, before taking any trades training? Good luck with your recruiting and retention.



Don't agree with you at all, especially with the current situation in Borden where people are in PAT Plt for two or three years (Their complete first BE) doing garbage sweeps and any other odd job because the courses are so backlogged they can't be course loaded for that long.  Send them to Meaford and teach them Infantry skills, and better prepare them for their PLQ courses that they will have to take in the future to advance.

Paying a Recruit to sit on his arse in Borden for three years is WELFARE.

GW


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## Infanteer (7 Sep 2004)

Michael

Two issues at point:

1) The fact that Support Guys need more Combat Training.

2) The proposal that all soldiers do a stint in a Combat Arms unit first.


Point 1)   At least you insist on the fact that the CS and CSS needs more fighting skills; that is what the thrust of my response to Radiohead was.   It would be best that these skills were inculcated early, as Matt Fisher and I have explained here:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18947.15.html

Point 2)   This is something I believe in that may, under the current way of looking at things, fall into the "nice to have" catagory along with all officers serving in the ranks first.   Although I feel this one would be a harder sell, I see no reason that anyone who was genuinely interested in the Army could not serve out a couple years at the tip of the spear.   In my experience, the best mechanics, cooks, or intel guys I've run into have always had some sort of combat arms background.

Next time a guy wants to join to be a mechanic, tell him to work on a vehicle and then lob some mortars at him and see if he still thinks the Army is a great place to be a tradesman.   If he doesn't, obviously his idea of "a good trade and a good career" doesn't mesh with the reality on the ground.

Irregardless of that idea, the fact remains that CS and CSS are not trained to operate in a hostile environment.   I've seen some pretty bizarre things first hand, and I am sure we could fill a thread with stories about clueless guys in the rear.   Even with the current organization of branches and careers, I feel that the Army as a whole could benefit from the proposal I had in the above link.

Like I said earlier, all the attitude of "Why should we learn the C-6?" and "the usual Combat Arms BS cock" leads to is fat ass wogs in uniform, Jessica Lynch, and dead soldiers who didn't know what hit them.




> Does any Army in the world actually do that?



The Royal Marines would probably be the best example.   One of the RM Commandos (Battailons) that fought its way into Basra had a RSM whose trade was a clerk; but he was a Marine first and was able to fill the role of top NCO in a fighting unit in a wartime operation.


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## Michael Dorosh (7 Sep 2004)

Jungle said:
			
		

> Be careful with that language here... When (or if) you are nominated on a PLQ, I would like you to tell the instructors you don't need all that Infantry BS. You should be excused from leading Recce patrols, section attacks etc.. because you are WELL ABOVE all this, you are a technician !!!  :
> Well guess what tech, bullets don't discriminate, and the enemy don't care what trade you are. Be ready to defend yourself and those around you, the Infantry can't always be there for you... we have other BS to take care of. And work on that attitude...



Jungle, you highlighted the wrong part.  He said "for two years" before learning his trade!  Do you agree that all tradesmen need two years of intensive infantry training before learning their chosen trade, or disagree?

From some of the infantry training I've seen in my tiny corner of the CF, I'd be inclined to think it BS too, though I wouldn't be dumb enough to say so in a public forum.  I've seen way too many scripted exercises where guys pepperpot over open prairie, no artillery support, no AFVs...is this really an effective expenditure of resources - for *two years*?

Teach a trade first, then ensure that all supporting units do realistic exercises, yes, including the defence of their own positions, patrols, etc.  But I think - and apologize if I am misreading him - that the original supposition, no matter how poorly phrased, was that doing things in reverse will only continue to chase away decent applicants.

Infanteer - how many of those "tip of the spear" clerks, mechanics and MSE Ops have you actually met?  I don't doubt you list the most desirable option, but how realistic is it?

The Royal Marines are a very small elite, so your example is not particularly meritorious.  I am referring to the entire armed forces of any given nation.  You can point to the Army Rangers for clerks (check out the one in Blackhawk Down) and one of our ASC clerks has his para wings.  That's not why most CSS types join, for right or wrong.  

I personally enjoy going to the field with my unit; I'm not great at it but I do what is asked of me and try and learn something each time I go out.  I've also noticed with chagrin that many clerks seem to have chits about field service.  Their loss, I think, I know the FOA comes in handy and the entire reason we have these support trades is to directly support the infantry.  There is simply no other reason for any trade in the army to exist were it not for the infantry.

But I don't fancy myself being one of them - I get the feeling they would prefer it that way too.


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## Jarnhamar (7 Sep 2004)

I think George Wallace has an excellent point. We have guys sitting out their whole 3 year contracts without getting a trade. It's army welfare. How long to marines do the infantry stuff before switching to a trade? I thought once their qualified they go off an do it, not sit as a grunt for 2 years? I'm not sure though.

Raidoheads attitude probably pisses off most people on this forum but you can't fault his honesty. Personally I think it's a bad attitude and in operations it will get people killed but that attitude is common place in the CF wether we like it or not. I read the post and an example comes to mine. A soldier walking around camp with a stuffed bear from home poking out of her pocket. Yes i'm sure it has centimental value but theres a place for it and carrying it around base like a mommy kangeroo isn't one of them. She somehow even made her cadpat uniform seem un-military.

It's a brutal attitude and it's one that will get people killed. Thats not us comming up with shit thats lessons learned from the US. But it's a brutal attitude that is deeply ingrained into the Canadian Forces.  I don't blame people like Radio head for their tradesman first soldier last attitude, i blame the CF for allowing  it. These guys are allowed to join so they do.


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## Jungle (7 Sep 2004)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Jungle, you highlighted the wrong part.


No, I did not.


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## PuckChaser (7 Sep 2004)

The PAT Platoon idea is excellent. Those soldiers could be much more effective learning other soldiering skills. Perhaps 2 years before trades training is too much? Maybe more attention in the individual units needs to be spent on soldiering skills, and not so much rehashing old trades info. I'm sure there is room to fit a week of MLOC every couple months into the training cycle.


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## Michael Dorosh (7 Sep 2004)

Ghost778 said:
			
		

> I think George Wallace has an excellent point. We have guys sitting out their whole 3 year contracts without getting a trade. It's army welfare. How long to marines do the infantry stuff before switching to a trade? I thought once their qualified they go off an do it, not sit as a grunt for 2 years? I'm not sure though.
> 
> Raidoheads attitude probably pisses off most people on this forum but you can't fault his honesty. Personally I think it's a bad attitude and in operations it will get people killed but that attitude is common place in the CF wether we like it or not. I read the post and an example comes to mine. A soldier walking around camp with a stuffed bear from home poking out of her pocket. Yes i'm sure it has centimental value but theres a place for it and carrying it around base like a mommy kangeroo isn't one of them. She somehow even made her cadpat uniform seem un-military.
> 
> It's a brutal attitude and it's one that will get people killed. Thats not us comming up with shit thats lessons learned from the US. But it's a brutal attitude that is deeply ingrained into the Canadian Forces.  I don't blame people like Radio head for their tradesman first soldier last attitude, i blame the CF for allowing  it. These guys are allowed to join so they do.



I think there is a big difference between a complete oxygen thief, and someone who simply wants to learn a trade first and not, as you point out, "sit as a grunt for two years."

There's nothing for anyone to get pissed off about.  I agree that ALL soldiers regardless of trade need to know how to survive in the field.  That includes weapons training.  MLOC is a start.  But how much stuff do even the "grunts" not do?   Are we even allowed to dig anymore?  I've not seen as much as a shell scrape since basic training.  The first thing I noticed about pictures of truckers from Iraq was that they dug in every night.  I'm all for realistic combat training for everyone, but two years?  I don't even remotely fathom that.  It should be ongoing once a soldier is trained in his trade and parading with his unit.

I notice even the infantry are trying to make do with training without such things as tanks and artillery by calling themselves "light infantry".  I notice these year my unit will be focussing on lots of missions you would see "light infantry" carrying out.  But I think there is still a BS quotient there - you really want to demand a guy take two years to do infantry training, and then only have him do half of what he would really do in a war anyway (no digging, no co-ordination with supporting arms, no armoured vehicles, blah blah blah)?  And expect him to stick around for two years hoping to learn something he is actually interested in?

This is why corporals don't run the army.


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## Infanteer (7 Sep 2004)

> From some of the infantry training I've seen in my tiny corner of the CF, I'd be inclined to think it BS too, though I wouldn't be dumb enough to say so in a public forum.   I've seen way too many scripted exercises where guys pepperpot over open prairie, no artillery support, no AFVs...is this really an effective expenditure of resources - for two years?



No, but the fact that you've seen unoriginal leaders conduct piss-poor training exercise doesn't invalidate the claim that service in an effective combat arms unit will be helpful to any soldier?



> how many of those "tip of the spear" clerks, mechanics and MSE Ops have you actually met?   I don't doubt you list the most desirable option, but how realistic is it?



A base mechanic who used to be a gunner in E Battery in the Airborne Regiment; a (former Infantry) Intel MCpl who stayed in an Iltis in the middle of figgen nowhere because some idiot decided to get stuck in a minefield; a Photo tech who ruined his knee in the Infantry and still wanted to serve.   I could keep going on; I've actually met quite a few.



> The Royal Marines are a very small elite, so your example is not particularly meritorious.   I am referring to the entire armed forces of any given nation.   You can point to the Army Rangers for clerks (check out the one in Blackhawk Down) and one of our ASC clerks has his para wings.    That's not why most CSS types join, for right or wrong.



Well, if we insist on calling ourselves "mediocre" and "conventional" as compared to a "very small elite" then we will be exactly that; mediocre and conventional.   There is nothing wrong with raising the bar.   If you have to winnow away the chaff to get the good soldiers of any trade or branch, then so be it.

Perhaps Wesley could answer this a bit better, but I see the Australian Army has some sort of way of incorporating support trades into their combat arms branches.   Going to an Army website and drawing up a file regarding Infantry career structures, I see "Combat Clerk" and "Storeman" incorporated under the Infantry branch.   Perhaps this approach (melding the tradesmen with a combat arms regiment) can provide an effective middle ground to the proposal?

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/stayarmy/Index.htm
    


> I personally enjoy going to the field with my unit; I'm not great at it but I do what is asked of me and try and learn something each time I go out.   I've also noticed with chagrin that many clerks seem to have chits about field service.   Their loss, I think, I know the FOA comes in handy and the entire reason we have these support trades is to directly support the infantry.   *There is simply no other reason for any trade in the army to exist were it not for the infantry.*
> 
> But I don't fancy myself being one of them - I get the feeling they would prefer it that way too.



I think you're underestimating your contributions.   The main thrust of the proposal is that it will allow a good number (hopefully, a critical mass) of support pers to gain the sort of perspective on combat, their role in it, and the Army in general that I highlighted in your post.  A first posting seems to be the most obvious and effective way of doing so (other forces have done it) but I am willing to accept other ideas (such as a variation of the Australian one I posted above).


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## Infanteer (7 Sep 2004)

> There's nothing for anyone to get pissed off about.  I agree that ALL soldiers regardless of trade need to know how to survive in the field.  That includes weapons training.  MLOC is a start.  But how much stuff do even the "grunts" not do?   Are we even allowed to dig anymore?  I've not seen as much as a shell scrape since basic training.  The first thing I noticed about pictures of truckers from Iraq was that they dug in every night.  I'm all for realistic combat training for everyone, but two years?  I don't even remotely fathom that.  It should be ongoing once a soldier is trained in his trade and parading with his unit.
> 
> I notice even the infantry are trying to make do with training without such things as tanks and artillery by calling themselves "light infantry".  I notice these year my unit will be focussing on lots of missions you would see "light infantry" carrying out.  But I think there is still a BS quotient there - you really want to demand a guy take two years to do infantry training, and then only have him do half of what he would really do in a war anyway (no digging, no co-ordination with supporting arms, no armoured vehicles, blah blah blah)?  And expect him to stick around for two years hoping to learn something he is actually interested in?



Remember, two years in a combat arms unit would most likely see an operational deployment.  It is not the training that we are looking for in the proposal, it is the inculcation of a fighting soldier that just doesn't seem to be present within a great percentage of CS and CSS troops (As Radiohead so ably proved).


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## Jarnhamar (7 Sep 2004)

I never thought support guys should do two years of infantry, i was asking how long marines do the rifleman stuff before they get their trade.

i know canada wouldn't be able to do what the marines do, i would suggest an infantry minded course between basic training and their trade school. thats it.
Don't make a clerk spend   years as a grunt BUT give them the skills and training to save their own ass AND mine.

If theres one thing we've learned i';s that support trades will see the same type of fighting, ambushes and enemy soldiers as combat arms do. No way around that. If they are not prepared for it they will die and cause others to die.


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## George Wallace (7 Sep 2004)

I don't know where the two (2) years of doing "Grunt Stuff" came from, but I do know that there should be a "Basic" course that all will take prior to any Trades training, be it Armour, Fire Fighter, MSE OP, AESOP, FCS Tech, LCIS Tech, Postie, whatever; that will give a basic Infantry training.   By the time any "Tech" is an ACTING LACKING MCpl, they should have some 'ground pounding' experience.   They will be much better prepared for their PLQ if they did.   For the last few years, we saw all people nominated for a CF CLC Crse that were on a Land Establishment, no matter what their Branch or trade, have to do a common Crse with Infanteers, Gunners, Sappers and Troopers.   Unfortunately, this year we are going back to our old ways, and Trades people are getting a very watered down, simplified version (a disgrace).

I am sure that a three to six month indoctrination for Trades people would be more than adequate to train them to defend themselves.   It would be nice if we could fill the Cbt Arms and then use them as the pool for people to LOTREP/OT/Medical Remuster to a Trade thereby having "Field" trained and experience people going into the Trades.   Let the "Pointy End" have some opportunities to get a Trade for Retirement. 

GW


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## Matt_Fisher (8 Sep 2004)

In my company our CS Marines (Veh. tech's/radio operators/corpsmen) were attached to the individual platoons where applicable and took on riflemen roles primarily and when their particular skillset was needed did their job, then went back to being riflemen.  Actually, we had a Lance Corporal in our headquarters section who was an admin clerk, but during OIF served as a spotter for one of our sniper teams.  This is more an exception than it is the norm in the case of the clerk gone spotter.

The Marine Corps is far from perfect in alot of ways, and we do have our share of pogues, however they generally tend to handle themselves better in hardship/combat environments than their US Army and CF CS/CSS colleagues.

The reason for this I think?  Marine recruit training puts you in such crappy situations everyday, yet you learn to persevere and carry on to get the job done.  By the time you get into combat you're like "This situation is pretty bad, but you know what, I've been scared/dirty/hungry/tired before in boot camp and I got through this and I'm there for my friends and they are there for me.  And unlike at Boot Camp where you couldn't get back at the Drill Instructors, I can shoot back at the enemy here!"   ;D


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## ackland (8 Sep 2004)

For a good reason as to why CSS trades need feild training look at history. The Marines in the philpines when you had pilots acting as rifle men in trenches. I think that is all the justification for this that we need. Get them trained in teh basics and make them employ it. Instead of weapons training MLOC stands make them participate in a full out grunt style exercise once a year. help them maintain their skills better than knowing how to fire a C-7.


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## logau (8 Sep 2004)

A lot of nonesense in this thread.

Unfortunately for both regualrs and reserves - these skills are subject to fade - if you don;t do them on a regular basis as you are not as good as you once were and the whole team decreases in capability - whatever your trade or skill.

The skill is probably ighest in the sodlier with 3-5 years field experience.

After that he/she/it is either promotable or stuck like some of us tend to be through being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

All that said check out this - the only person going to train you for the next war is YOU and your own curiosity 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_04-13_toc.htm

SANK YOU! as they say in the Japanese Navy   ;D


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## KevinB (9 Sep 2004)

I think several hit the nail on the head here.  

And added bonus of forcing CSS pers into the CBT ARMS first was the undersatnding they are in the ARMY.  I can speak from experience overseas, that half of this army thinks it is on a holiday ath the gov't expense - while the 0trades are out beign run ragged doing the job.

 The best CSS types I have met are ex 0 trade folk - for they have an underastanding of what we do and thus the desire to participate as part of the team.


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## Satelliteslayer (9 Sep 2004)

All mbrs of the Army MUST have the skills reqd to operate and defend themselves in the field; therefore everyone requires the requisite training.

While I do not agree w/ Radioheads view as to what he is in the Army to do, I do think that we must temper this with a sense of realism.

All pers must know how to dig a slit trench for pers protection, They should also know how to dig a fighting posn to stage 6; however It is not likely that a CSS trade is going to be manning one for long periods of time in a def posn.

The fact is CSS are there to do their trade, YES they must be able to perform as a Cbt soldier but they must also be good at their trade. This is were balance comes in.

I think what infuriates the vast majority of Cbt Arms is the lack of willingness on the part of some CSS troops to even gain a modicum of skill in tasks that will lead to their own survival. This puts pressure on Cbt troops to not only save themselves but also their CSS brethren as well.

I also agree that fmr Cbt soldiers that xfer to CSS trades are, by and large more switched on. As a fmr 011 Recce who is xfering to CSS all I can say is, "try and take my wpn away from me, I dare ya".


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## IPC10 (9 Sep 2004)

Well I guess sooner or later I would try to add to the conversations around here....

The resignation of the CO of 1 PPCLI will hopefully draw attention to the worsening problems in our forces.   In particular our Combat Arms is slowly becoming emancipated.   Couple of points to ponder.....

A while back in this tread Michael Dorosh made the comment:

â Å“Company sized units aren't capable of high levels of cohesion?   Tell that to the Special Forces around the world.â ?

Apples and Oranges I believe.   A quick search of the internet reveals some interesting facts on our new army transformation.   There is a startling large amount of similarity in the various PowerPoint presentations between the US Army and the Canadian ones.   This goes down so far to a number of the bullet points are identical.   The issue here is that the US Army gets to play with it's new Units of Action â â€œ brigade sized while the under-strength leadership in the CF has to make due with Company sized formations to achieve the same results.   Do Coy sized units lack cohesion â â€œ on their own no.   The Australian Army has been down this road though.   It deployed company sized units on a number of different tasks.   The problems that they encountered wasn't with cohesion within the company it was upon re-integration with the parent units.   A study reported that this action had a huge detrimental effect on the espirit d'corps of the parent units (Bn sized).   The Aussie's say it doesn't work, why do we think it can (then again they bought tanks)

The Canadian Army is not set up to operate this way.   Last year the big travelling road show that was going to sell this concept to all of us had an great example where they took a HQ Elm, Rifle Coy and Admin Coy from a Light Bn, a LAV Coy from a Mech Bn, a Recce Sqn from an Armd Regt, and a gun bty from the Guns.   Does anyone really think that an Admin Coy from a Light Bn has the wherewithal to supply LAVs, Coyote's and gunners.   Does an Armd Ech understand how to supply an light formation.   (Problem was apparently solved by fixing the offending slide)

A couple of posts later Lance Wiebe made the comment:

â Å“A Unit should be a self-contained combat team.â ?

They were, we called them Infantry Battalions and Armoured Regiments.   These units had all of the different pieces to fight and win.   Now we've taken the Assault Troops away from the armoured and the Combat support platoons away from the infantry.   Before we had an Infantry Bn with its own guaranteed intimate indirect fire support, guaranteed intimate direct fire support, guaranteed intimate pioneer support.   Not now.   Infantry lost mortars â â€œ the arty cannot pick up this task of guaranteed intimate indirect fire support.   If they do, who does the traditional arty tasks â â€œ you know like counter battery and such?   If the engineers have to busy themselves with task normally performed by the infantry pioneers â â€œ who is doing their engineer tasks?   (I understand that the Engr currently don't have much to do so they must be looking for more work....)


As for the whole CSS in combat issue, the Force Employment Concept clearly states:

â Å“Combat Service support (CSS) soldiers must have the weapons, sensors, communications and combat skills to protect themselves and their resources....In short, CSS units must learn to think and train like combat units.â ?

The kicker to all this was following a presentation by a couple of Platoon Commanders with combat experience (CF had to bring them in from Britain and the US) a Field Grade Officer made the comment that it was good to listen to the presentations as it validated our training.

No it didn't....it validated theirs....


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## Lance Wiebe (9 Sep 2004)

An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team.  Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own.  

The ideal is to follow either the German lead, or the new US Unit of Action lead, where the mix of combat arms Units are moved from the Brigade level down to the Battalion level.  Then, if a Unit deploys, it deploys with its own armour, infantry, CSS etc.  Especially as it is extremely remote that we will be moving Brigade size forces anywhere, but we will be depoloying combat teams.


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## Infanteer (9 Sep 2004)

I've started a new thread for the lowering of the combined arms organization

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html


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## Lance Wiebe (9 Sep 2004)

I missed it!

Ok, let me try to gather my thoughts in to a reasonably coherent process, and I will respond to that thread....but give me some time!


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## Kirkhill (9 Sep 2004)

By Satelliteslayer



> All pers must know how to dig a slit trench for pers protection, They should also know how to dig a fighting posn to stage 6; however It is not likely that a CSS trade is going to be manning one for long periods of time in a def posn.



Is that a true statement if we assume an expeditionary mindset?  If the CF starts doing more Kabuls, Eritreas, Qandahars, Kosovos, Bosnias, Rwandas..... (Maybe you have already started?).....aren't the Sigs and the CSS trades likely to find themselves isolated in neutral/hostile territory and subject to bombardment, sniping, mining etc.  

If the Forces are organized and deployed as Battle Groups, Regiments, Demi-Brigades, Field Forces, Brigades, Brigade Groups, how much distance is there between the Front Line Own Troops and the BMA?  I can't see there are many opportunities for concrete buildings, fluorescent lights and a coffee-pot.

Cheers


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## Lance Wiebe (10 Sep 2004)

Now I'm curious.

You made the statement 





> Lew's a great guy, but has lost touch with reality...



What is your basis for this statement?


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## KevinB (10 Sep 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> Now I'm curious.
> 
> You made the statement
> 
> What is your basis for this statement?



DITTO


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## Bruce Monkhouse (10 Sep 2004)

She was on at 1600 hours today but...........


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## IPC10 (12 Sep 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team. Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own.



Sorry, that was my point.  An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.  So instead of creating a combat capable force by forming a Battle Group we are merely creating a formation that, as you identified, cannot be expected to stand on their own.


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## Kirkhill (12 Sep 2004)

Quote from IPC19



> Quote from: Lance Wiebe on September 09, 2004, 08:42:46
> An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team. Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own.
> 
> 
> Sorry, that was my point.  An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.  So instead of creating a combat capable force by forming a Battle Group we are merely creating a formation that, as you identified, cannot be expected to stand on their own.



But I think Lance's point is that Infantry Battalions in particular were never deployed without support from other trades.  Either they were deployed as units in a Division or a Brigade Group and had access to the services of the other arms on a demand basis (at the discretion of the formation commander) or else they were beefed up to form a BattleGroup.   

The net effect is that although an Infantry commander had his own Arty (the mortars), his own Engineers (the Pioneers), his own Direct Fire Support (TOW) and his own light cavalry (vehicle mounted recce) he never deployed with just those assets.  He was always augmented by trades dedicated to those crafts.  The proposed reorganizations based on formalized Battle Groups merely codifies those relations and stipulates that Arty tasks will be performed by gunners, Engineering by sappers, DFS and mounted recce by Blackhats.  Now we can talk about manning levels and trying to create these formations on the cheap by reducing 4 sapper/pioneer  troops/platoons to 2 (1 squadron + 1 platoon to 1 squadron minus) as an example, and you won't get an argument here.  But the notion of creating standing battle groups or regiments formed from all arms is a good thing, as Martha would say.

It has often been brought up that the Battalion CO will be losing control over the mortars, pioneers, recce etc.  But....... where the Battalion is the lead element in a BattleGroup deployment isn't he gaining direct control and the dedicated support of an Arty Battery as well as his mortars,  a squadron of Engineers instead of his platoon of pioneers, armoured recce and fire support?

I may be dense but I fail to see how the Battle Group commander will be worse off with sub-units of other trades attached on a permanent (at least for the duration of the deployment) basis than he would be with integral sub-sub-units and having to beg for support from higher.

Now as I said earlier, if the attached sub-units are made up of the same numbers that made up the sub-sub-units and just designated sub-unit commands, then I see folly.  But if you actually exchange a mortar platoon of arty trained infanteers for an arty batter with an integral troop of mortars, all manned by gunners then I would be all for it.

Cheers.


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## KevinB (12 Sep 2004)

Kirkhill,

 Unfortunately that is not the way it plays out.

Pioneers and Mortars were not job skillsets that the Engineers nor Artillery really did.  We have foisted upon them a role they did not want nor relish.  Futhermore you have dimished the combat power of the Bde - buy cutting up Bde assets and pushing them down to the Btl Gp's to fill them out to their previous power.

Worse with the eventual removal of Recce and TOW Pl's from the Bn you will be left with rifle coy's - now as a solider do you want to spend your 20 (or 25 for those joining us now) years in a Rifle coy?

The CF is going to have to take a very hard look at itself - for the current system in crumbling and the newest changes are not for the better.


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## Lance Wiebe (12 Sep 2004)

Unfortunately, Kevin is correct.

While the Infantry lost integral, direct, immediate close support, they did not really reap the rewards.  The Battalions are still not at full strength, despite having less positions to fill.  The Engineers and Artillery did not gain any positions, they just got new tasks hoisted upon them.

There are two reasons that this happened.  The main reason is that the highers have decided that Battalions will never deploy as a Unit, ever again.  Which means, of course, that Brigades will never deploy, either.  Instead, as has been pointed out elsewhere, sub-Units will be sent, to join up with other sub-units, to form some kind of Battle Group capable (hopefully) of completing their tasking.  The other reason is much more mundane.  Simply, too small an army, to many empty positions.


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## Kirkhill (12 Sep 2004)

OK Kevin and Lance

I fully understand your points about manning levels and how playing musical chairs with diminishing number of chairs isn't going to build a new army.

I guess I'll have to lurk on Infanteer's thread http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html to get the DS solution .


Kevin, you asked on another thread that we first define what we want the army to do for us.  Well this taxpayer would like to see us able to sustain a Kabul mission indefinitely, while still being able to take on a similar mission for a limited duration - 1 or 2 rotos.  At the same time I would like to see a force that could insert a light company team anywhere in Canada and also be available to support an evacuation of nationals as well as repeat what 3VP did in Afghanistan (not necessarily all concurrently).  Finally I would like to see us maintain a medium/heavy capability that could participate in a short campaign.  If the campaign went long term then some of the other capabilities would have to be retrained/reconfigured.

Based on that I was suggesting a Medium/Heavy Cavalry Brigade (Unit of Action now I guess), an Airborne Regiment to backstop JTF2 green ops and then 6 BattleGroups/Regiments designed for long deployments on peace support and stability operations - basically static ops as far as I can gather rather than manoeuvre ops.  The 6 Battlegroups would still be organized under 3 Brigades but the Brigades would also train with up to 3 militia Battle Groups (designed for domestic security ops primarily).

Anyhow I guess the real world sees more need for a light brigade and only 1 or Zero Cavalry battle groups along with an indeterminate number of sub-units organized on an ad hoc basis into an indeterminate number of commands performing an indeterminate number of tasks for an indeterminate purpose.  

Glad somebody knows what's happening.  

Cheers,   ;D


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## KevinB (13 Sep 2004)

Kirkhill,

  I fully support your force concept - however unless the Canadian Public demands it no one is goign to pony up the cash.

Currently we barely have enough kit to outfit a Bn+ sized battlegroup - the results of this is a monsterous steep learning curve once in theatre with the kit.  

  Before I were to allocate funding or line serials for medium forces (which currently I doubt our gov't would have the fibre to deploy)  I would build up the 3 current brigades to fully kitted out Light units - with Light Armoured Support (LAV and Coyote).    The CF needs to find a niche market as it were and go from there -- Realistically with the calibre of our troops - I would recommned a Rapid Deployment Force (Light) .  Simply have a goal of being able to place a BN anywhere in the World in 48hrs and a Bde within 2 weeks. 

 We can leave the long dragged out Cyprus and FYR tours to the Eurpoean "rental" armies.


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## Infanteer (13 Sep 2004)

> The CF needs to find a niche market as it were and go from there -- Realistically with the calibre of our troops - I would recommned a Rapid Deployment Force (Light) .   Simply have a goal of being able to place a BN anywhere in the World in 48hrs and a Bde within 2 weeks.



I don't know if I would want to see the Forces "niche roled.   My rock-paper-scissors analogy to me indicates that we need capabilities across the spectrum in order to properly serve out the interests of the government.   However, I can see a specialization of the Regulars with other capabilities being organized in the Reserves or some sort of shared setting (kind of like the Air Defence).

I like the idea of the Rapid Deployment Force.   Gives us maximum use out of our limited assets, plus, as much as I hate to say it, the glamorous ROTO 0's do so much more in the eyes of public support for the CF then the forgotten ROTO 13s in Cypress and Bosnia.

This would mean that priority purchase number 1 would be 4-8 C-17 Globemasters and priority number 2 decent tactical helo aviation for the Army/Navy.   If that big Support boat of the Navy comes on line, then I could see initial deployment supported by Air Force C-17's with the JSS cruising in to provide more support when it can.



> We can leave the long dragged out Cyprus and FYR tours to the European "rental" armies.



Ha.   Agree with you there.   Under the leadership of France and Germany, they were sure eager to stick a finger in the eye of the US to prove that they were no longer dependent on the US defending the Free World.   Let them handle their own backyard for now on.

(PS: I've introduced a proposal for a "fire-brigade" role for the CF here: http://army.ca/forums/threads/19234.15.html)


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## KevinB (13 Sep 2004)

I would consider that a NICHE BTW  ;D


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## Kirkhill (13 Sep 2004)

I could accept your plan as well Kevin.   At this juncture, some plan, any plan that we could afford and EXECUTE would be welcome and I think your plan is reasonable.



> This would mean that priority purchase number 1 would be 4-8 C-17 Globemasters and priority number 2 decent tactical helo aviation for the Army/Navy.



Infanteer, while I can see your point about the C-17s I take issue with your point about TAC Hel.   TAC Hel seems to be as hard to deploy, if not harder than Heavy Armour, especially if we are talking about Cormorants, Cyclones or God forbid Chinooks.   1 Helo/AC.   A Battle Group would require, what?, 6-8 MSHs?   That's your entire lift and would take a day or two of flights.   How do you get the beans, bullets and bandages into the field at the same time? Not to mention the trendy little John Deere "Gators"?   

Alternatively you could carry three Lynx type LUHs, complete with ground support, or something like the Kiowa/LOH, or maybe a couple of Griffins.   But is that what you mean by TAC Hel?   

While I am a supporter of more helicopters for the CF, in particular the Cyclone or the Cormorant for Domestic Land Forces or for the Long Stay foreign operations, (and I support Up-Engining the Griffins to the UH-1Y standard - which would effectively double their lift capacity), I can't see Helos used in a Rapid Deployment Force.   I am assuming a Rapid Response (12-96 hours Notice To Move) over strategic distances (intercontinental) as opposed to an in-theatre Rapid Reaction Force.

IMHO?   RDF equals Air Deployable equals no TAC Hel. (At least no Troop Tpt / Air Assault type forces)
TAC Hel is for entrenched, deployed forces operating from static bases or for early entry forces operating from ships (mobile static bases if you like)

Anywho.....

Chris.


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## KevinB (14 Sep 2004)

I would like TAC heli - MH-60's ideally (failing that an Upgraded Griffon that can actually carry troops) as part of the RDF - but they can come in in the next chalks - the primarily 031 assets can seize a airhead [by para insertion in nec] and then vehicle and air assets can be flown over as space arrives - thus we could expand our operating radius.

 But I think the key is to get troop on the ground ASAP - then increase mobility.  Troops many times need a few days to acclimitize anyway - so hopefully it would not be nec to conduct combat ops on deployment day.

However the inserion of a Bde sized force would likely have the resutl of hopefully stabilizing a situation - if not we are going to need the light/medium mech/motor weight forces that woudl haver to come off a RO/RO type ship.


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## McG (18 Sep 2004)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I don't know where the two (2) years of doing "Grunt Stuff" came from, but I do know that there should be a "Basic" course that all will take prior to any Trades training, be it Armour, Fire Fighter, MSE OP, AESOP, FCS Tech, LCIS Tech, Postie, whatever; that will give a basic Infantry training.


There is such a course.   It is called the Soldier Qualification.   All Army trades do this course after graduating the Basic Military Qualification (and before trades training).



			
				IPC10 said:
			
		

> Sorry, that was my point. An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.


An engineer squadron has always deployed with each infantry battalion that has deployed overseas (even 12 years ago).   Force Transformation did not create this requirement.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> It has often been brought up that the Battalion CO will be losing control over the mortars, pioneers, recce etc. But....... where the Battalion is the lead element in a BattleGroup deployment isn't he gaining direct control and the dedicated support of an Arty Battery as well as his mortars, a squadron of Engineers instead of his platoon of pioneers, armoured recce and fire support?
> 
> I may be dense but I fail to see how the Battle Group commander will be worse off with sub-units of other trades attached on a permanent (at least for the duration of the deployment) basis than he would be with integral sub-sub-units and having to beg for support from higher.
> 
> ... if you actually exchange a mortar platoon of arty trained infanteers for an arty batter with an integral troop of mortars, all manned by gunners then I would be all for it.


Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.   To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.   This did not happen.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Now as I said earlier, if the attached sub-units are made up of the same numbers that made up the sub-sub-units and just designated sub-unit commands, then I see folly.


Then folly you should see.   All DFS assets will be inserted on a sub-sub unit (or smaller) basis from the LdSH for all Canadian deployments.   Roto X of Op SOMETHING needs a TOW section?   The LdSH will provide.   Another Op needs an MGS Pl?   The LdSH will provide.   Same for ADATS/MMEV.   DFS is not the only element that will be pieced together like this.   As was already noted, the Admin Sqn will be a composite of the units from which sub-units are drawn (this too has always been the case).   A Mech Bn does not have Leopard techs (nor will it have techs for TUA, MGS, ADATS, Engr hy eqpt, etc).   



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> No offence the Artillery trade (I saw the light in 94 ;D) - but the only two trades that really should command Btl Gps are Inf and Armd - and historically command has gone to the unit that that has the heavy presence (which in this Roto would have been Inf).


Command of the Battle Group has been chosen that way.   The mission command has never been dependant on such things.   Op ATHENA no longer has a BG and it is the worst possible incarnation of "plug-and-play" for that reason.   The "plug-and-play" concept called for an existing Bn/Regt HQ to be augmented by supporting arms to form the BG HQ.   With no BG, all of a sudden we have a soup of various sub units (and sub-sub units) under a thrown together HQ with the selected CO coming from a staff officer job.

. . . curious here, did a rifle coy HQ deploy with the infantry platoons or did we stick to the original Ottawa plan of having platoons dedicated to specific tasks and under different leadership through the NCE and the Recce Sqn?


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## Scoobie Newbie (18 Sep 2004)

"Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.  To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.  This did not happen."

So if I read that right your saying that there is still no one manning the mortar or doing PNR specific tasks because the Artillery and Eng don't have the manpower?


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## devil39 (19 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> "Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.   To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.   This did not happen."
> 
> So if I read that right your saying that there is still no one manning the mortar or doing PNR specific tasks because the Artillery and Eng don't have the manpower?



CFL,

As an advanced mortarman, I cannot personally agree with the way we have gone.   

However, based on the frequency of Arty deployments, they can absorb the additional mortar role.   

They may not be manning the mortar full time, however as an ex R021 Artilleryman and Infantry Advanced Mortarman, there is not a whole lot of difference when it comes to providing bombs on target, be they 105 or 81mm.

Bottom line is that the Arty has the manpower, the infantry does not when one starts to spread the Army PYs around.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

Well devil39 I hope that there won't be a time when we need both at the same time and if so the manpower/equip is in place.  P.S.  You'd be surprised as to how many made up jobs there are in my BN and the personal that left TOW, Mortars, PNR's rarely ended up in the colonies, I mean rifle companies.


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## devil39 (19 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> Well devil39 I hope that there won't be a time when we need both at the same time and if so the manpower/equip is in place.   P.S.   You'd be surprised as to how many made up jobs there are in my BN and the personal that left TOW, Mortars, PNR's rarely ended up in the colonies, I mean rifle companies.



I might be somewhat surprised... but I doubt it.   I have just spent 6.5 of the last 7 years in Bn.     I certainly am willing to listen though.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

OC's (cmbt support) LAV gunner/LAV driver/LAV CC, but what no LAV nor will he get one anytime soon.  I could go on but its getting late.


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## devil39 (19 Sep 2004)

I guess it is what you are established for. 

However, Cbt Sp should have the full complement of LAV quals in my opinion.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

I think all members should have some LAV component regardless of station job.  That said only Sigs has them (9er, 9A, 0) and the simulators aren't up to keep current.


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## McG (19 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> So if I read that right your saying that there is still no one manning the mortar or doing PNR specific tasks because the Artillery and Eng don't have the manpower?


The Op Tempo for the Gunners has been low enough that they could have rerolled a gun troop to mortar to meet the needs of recent missions.   The Op temp for Engineers has been far to high for the corps to meets its commitments and fill jobs formerly done by 9 pioneer platoons and 3 assault troops. (http://army.ca/forums/threads/2128.0.html)



			
				CFL said:
			
		

> OC's (cmbt support) LAV gunner/LAV driver/LAV CC, but what no LAV nor will he get one anytime soon. I could go on but its getting late.


Well, with only recce and sigs left in Cbt Sp, I understand that Army is now examining the need for a Cbt Sp Coy.   Cut the Coy HQ PYs and put the rest directly under the COs control.


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## Lance Wiebe (19 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> I think all members should have some LAV component regardless of station job.   That said only Sigs has them (9er, 9A, 0) and the simulators aren't up to keep current.



Not trying to hijack the thread, but the simulator statement caught my eye.  Can you clarify?  Do you mean that the sims cannot keep personnel current, or that they are not "up", ie they are broken?


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

If used enough they should keep the troops (except drivers) current.  Nothing like doing it live though.


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## Scoobie Newbie (20 Sep 2004)

Just as an after thought McG, the reason I believe we need a redundancy of PNR's (eng) and Mortar man (Arty) can be illustrated in the following.  During a FIBUA ex in Edmonton at the old barracks none of the Eng det made it to the objective without having to be re keyed and the only people allowed to blow walls were Eng and Pioneers (this was prior to PNR disbandment).  In a lot of cases the Pnr det or members who had the pnr course end up blowing the walls as the hallways were either kill zones or impassable.  With this redundant factor we were able to carry on with the mission with little delay.


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## Kirkhill (20 Sep 2004)

Think you should get that info out to Human Resources ASP CFL.  Perhaps they can run a recruiting drive around it.  

Sounds like just the stuff to boost enrolment. ;D


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## KevinB (20 Sep 2004)

CFL said:
			
		

> They haven't been put together since we just moved to Shilo.   If used enough they should keep the troops (except drivers) current.   Nothing like doing it live though.



The LAV sim is not a great system - but it does keep the Gunner/CC "in the game" until they can get out and do it live.

IF they were to post 041's and 021's into an Inf Bn to keep the CBt Spt functions alive - I would not have the same ammoutn of animosity that I current have to this restructuring.

Unfortunately due to the nature of the recent deployments we are getting into a poor mindeset and simply assuming that we will have enough of these arms sitting around at the 031 beck and call.  If we deployed in a Bde or larger nature we would receive a nasty kick in the ass when they capabilities were needed and unavailable.

Given the nature of the plug and play system I woudl argue it would have been wiser to pull the LAV's from the Bn's and use 011's as Dvr/CC/Gnr's if the LAV was needed (3R22eR did this with a Coy for RotoI)  This would free up 031's for the Pnr and Mortar roles and as well they could be used as 'normal' 031's if the tube etc were not needed.


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## jlshone (20 Sep 2004)

Impressively thoughtful remarks, Mark C.; thanks.

This issue of a back-end solution to a front-end problem - that is, low manning leading to hyper-specialisation, plug-and-play, deterioration of unit identity & cohesion, and a stripping of the authority normally tied to the responsibility of command - is also a problem in the Militia.   On the up side, hemorrhaging of the Reg F can lead to some experienced people joining the P Res.   Whether they will ever become true Class A reservists is, however, another question.

That being said, the trend we are seeing is a continued split between the force generators and the force employers, and this is not good.   One reason it is not good is that it is incoherent.   An example is Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR).   This project can't figure out whether it exists to remove redundancies from the Militia, increase the Militia's capabilities in the area of domestic operations, or provide capabilities to the deployable field force.   This lack of coherence is evident in the fact that LFRR seeks to: (1) increase the size/manning of select infantry units (with a view to vital point security) while (2) re-roling armoured units as CBRN recce - without the equipment or mandate to conduct such operations - and (3) standing up new capabilities, specifically PsyOps, which are wholly deployable assets (we can't use PsyOps on Canadians!!).   How this seems rational to anyone is a mystery to me.


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## McG (21 Sep 2004)

McG said:
			
		

> . . . curious here, did a rifle coy HQ deploy with the infantry platoons or did we stick to the original Ottawa plan of having platoons dedicated to specific tasks and under different leadership through the NCE and the Recce Sqn?


Too answer my own question, it seems that we did stick to the original plan (or something like it) for the most part.  However a Coy HQ was established in theater at the expense of the platoons.

Even more that not basing the mission on a Bn, I think this would have pushed any infantry officer's buttons.


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## KevinB (21 Sep 2004)

Originally we had a Platoon that was over 60 pers. (the D&S Pl) - It had 6 sections...  When Ottawa chopped the OP Sections from the 3rd (20 guys gone) it went down to the 4 section Pl that was deemed nec to operate the gate.

The QRF PL was a standard PL as was the late approved Mission Draw Down Pl.  Now once in theatre it became obvious that the PL's would have to rotate or the Gate PL would become psychotic within a few weeks.

Coy Hq was setup for no one on the NSE or NCE side was eqipped to do our CQ or other HQ tasks. 


All of B Coy belongs to NCE now (phew)
however it does not belong to KMNB


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