# Esprit de Corps and Fighting Spirit



## Armymedic (10 Sep 2004)

To bad thats now a motto of a former CF...and let that be a start of a new thread;

The decrease of esprit de corp within the army...


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## pbi (10 Sep 2004)

Interesting question ArmyMedic. I raised that somewhere else in discussng the esprit of the Marines vs the general level of esprit in our Army. We certainly have lots of military achievements to be proud of, and we produce pretty damned good soldiers, so what is the problem (if indeed there is one...)

Do the US types just overdo it? Do we "underdo" it? What do you think?

Cheers.


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## George Wallace (11 Sep 2004)

We are a reflection of our society.

Gw


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## excoelis (11 Sep 2004)

IMO the roots of the matter lie in some of the same topics of recent discussion.  Light Forces doctrine, Tier 2 Bn, para capability, the bun fight between Infantry and Armoured Recce after SG04, etc.......

As a member of the SSF in 1 RCR and then subsequently in 3 Cdo CAR, I can say in my experience that it was a unit that seemed to pride itself on its capabilities regardless of trade and sub unit. A higher level of non-trade specific cohesion if you will.  Not unlike the USMC model, the Service Cdo and SSF HQ & Sigs (to name a few) appeared to hold themselves to a higher standard of core skills, and as such had a greater level of espirit de corps that matched that of those in the Commandos.  I remember cooks, military police, and various other trades that I served with that where just as hard core and gung ho for PT, exercises, and ops as the young troopers in the Airborne Regt.  I still run into those guys sometimes and they have for the most part maintained that mentality.  I dunno, maybe that is just my perception of the matter, granted I was part of the 'problem'.  Perhaps I'm confusing the issue and the reality lies in the fact that the modern soldier no longer receives the training and direction necessary to subordinate their needs to that of their vocation.  It's become more of a job and less of a 'way of life'.  If the latter is the case then perhaps some elements, trades, and such are fading into this new military ethos faster than others and that is the percieved difference.

Just me thinking out loud.  No offence intended to anyone in particular.


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## Bartok5 (12 Sep 2004)

Ex Coelis,

Bang-on.  I believe that you have hit the nail firmly on the head.  If you are serious about military SERVICE, then it is a lifestyle, not a "Mc-Job".  The former entails selfless embracement of a lifestyle which entails indeterminate sacrfice, hardship, and subordination of one's own interests to the greater betterment.

Unfortunately, there are a whole host of reasons why we have "lost" the collective combat-capability edge over the past 10 years or so.  Starting with an institution that increasingly promotes the "rights" of the individual over the needs of the group.  Since when was "the man" more important than the collective mission?  I don't know precisely where we have collectively gone so wrong, but I can see the current results -   And quite frankly, they are sickening.  

Thank goodness there are still a (very) few units where the "traditional" values hold true.  My greatest fear is that those final bastions of "selfless service" will also fall despite the best efforts of those holding the line....


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## Bruce Monkhouse (12 Sep 2004)

Excoelis,
I also concur, I spent from 78-86 in the SSF and you had to look real hard to find anyone who wasn't in good shape. This included all the CSS trades also. I went back to Pet.for the first time earlier in the summer to check out the camping and was shocked by the amount of overweight young soldiers that were on the beach there.
Back then these guys would have been the BSM/RSM's whipping children.
I remember Sergeant-major Flanagan[sp?} noticing that I was putting on a little weight and suggested that I push myself away from the table a little quicker. I had gone from a 32 waist to a 34 and that was enough to stick out then.  

gee a 34 waist....wish I had that problem now. :crybaby:


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## excoelis (12 Sep 2004)

You should have been at family day yesterday :

They should have called it 'embarrass yourself in public' day.  There was something fundamentally wrong with me watching what looked 19 or 20 yr old soldiers WALKING across the Ironman finish around the 9 hr mark. Oh well, at least they did SOMETHING.  They where still a step above the overweight slovenly types that worked the event - they used to be the exception, but they appear to be the norm these days.  In  my mind it sits in stark contrast to the very few troops that mustered the balls to show up for the pathfinder course with that 'bring it on' look on their face.  There are so few troops these days that actually understand that their physical capabilities could have a direct and proportional impact on their survivability sometime in the very near future.  I'm just glad that the troops in my 'little world' understand that there is more to fitness than aesthetics - and more to aesthetics than just 'looking good'.


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## Infanteer (12 Sep 2004)

I'm just going through a book covering the evolution of the tactics of the German _Sturmtuppen_ in World War I and I thought the following excerpt was worth posting here:

"_In most cases, the men who made up the elite assault units were volunteers.   In other instances, particularly in those formations (Landwehr and Landsturm) made up mostly of older men, the men for the assault units were chosen because of their youth, fitness, or bachelor status.   Regardless of how they found their way into the assault unit, the young stormtroopers invariably developed a spirit that was at odds with that of the line infantry.
Trench warfare had turned the ordinary infantryman into a species of labourer.   Most days were spent installing barbed wire, digging trenches, and carrying supplies.   Nights were devoted to guard duty and the often unsuccessful attempt to find a suitable spot within the trench where one could catch a few hours of sleep.   This routine was interrupted only by machine gun fire and artillery barrages, stray shells, and snipers - impersonal killers that denied the ordinary soldier the satisfaction of facing his enemies "man to man."
The stormtrooper, on the other hand, became an almost romantic figure.   Like the fighter pilot or the U-Boat sailor, he could raise himself above the seemingly purposeless suffering of the trenches to strike directly at the enemy.   While the ordinary soldier grew weary of the war and was kept in the ranks by a mixture of patriotism, coercion, and his own unwillingness to evade his duty, the stormtrooper often developed a lust for battle that the writer Ernst Junger, himself the leader of a regimental Stosstrupp, equated with that of renaissance mercenaries._"

_Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 - pp 81-82_

I've underlined some of the points in this quote that I felt were relevent to our current situation and the development of both true professional ethos and fighting spirit in a unit.

1) The Stormtroops were all volunteers.   This is important as it relies on the fact that most soldiers want to be where they are as professionals.   The notion of being a volunteer should engender a high degree of cohesion and professional capability due to the fact that they should rely on motivation rather then coercion to "switch on" and give their best effort.

Due to the fact that we are all volunteers, there should be a more rigorous training regimen for units, especially at the basic level where young recruits are molded into fighting soldiers.   I've advocated a basic training course for Army recruits designed along the lines of the RM Commando Training, this is one of but many ways in which we can move towards this principle of tough, realistic training.   Going on the notion that we are all volunteers, anyone who complains or can't hack it can leave, he is not forced to be a soldier.

2) The Stormtroops viewed themselves and were viewed by higher command as different from the normal footsoldier.   As such, they were often given the right to wear special insignia to signify their unique status.   The Stormtroops were the first to wear the German "coal scuttle" steel helmet (Stahlhelm) that we are now so familiar with, they were allowed to wear special patches that signified their belonging to a _Stosstruppe_ and wore uniforms specially designed for the rigours of Stormtroop tactics.   I believe this is the same phenomenon of a military unit as the "Airborne Brotherhood" that was discussed in detail in another thread; Airborne troops are not considered "elite" because they wear jump wings (just as Stormtroops where not elite for the role they were designated to perform) but rather they are considered first rate because of a few reasons:
- They perform a specialized role within an Army that requires fortitude (jumping out of a plane, infiltrating no-mans-land).
- They must volunteer (often multiple times) to get to where they are, ensuring that they naturally possess a high degree of motivation.
- The nature of their specialized role demands a high degree of training and cohesion, which is brought on through shared hardship in both rigorous training exercises and the battlefield.

That being said, in our current situation perhaps it would be advantageous to further specialize certain units in different aspects of war.   Coming from a rigorous basic training program (as proposed above) the soldiers would then begin advanced training that would allow them to develop a unique position within the Army; whether it be "Airborne Troops", "Naval Infantry", or "Mountain Fighters", these specializations will engender a higher "Esprit de Corps" within all soldiers of the unit.   What is important is that this specialization not lead to "elitism"; General Luddendorf was so keen on the development of the Stormtroops and their tactics that he moved to have the entire German Army move to this style of fighting.   The Canadian Army must be driven to constantly improve and set the bar higher, with a few select units leading the way.

3) Replace the idea of "purposeless trench warfare" with that of "aimless military with no sense of mission" and one can see that the core of the problem that faced the average German soldier (or any soldier) on the Western Front is not much different then what the average Canadian soldier faces now.   No matter how motivated they are to begin with, the burden of the bureaucracy that runs the military and the seeming ignorance of both the Canadian public and our civilian leaders to the struggle of the Army can cause a good soldier to question his reasons for continuing to serve, or at the least refrain from constantly putting forth maximum drive and effort.

The Stormtroops were imbued with a sense of mission in the seemingly hopeless stalemate of Trench Warfare.   Rather then be passive victims, the Stormtroop Officers and NCO's inculcated their soldiers to be active participants.   They were able to work with and develop doctrine that allowed them to overcome the conditions that led to static warfare through the applications of innovative tactics and weapons systems.   As such, they personified the notion of "adapt, overcome, and improvise".

This may be the toughest obstacle to overcome under the current climate.   With the Forces relying on an irrelevant strategic outlook (just look at the 1994 White Paper) and having no specific "enemy" to look towards, the notion of preparing to fight becomes harder to reinforce when there is no one to prepare to fight against in the immediate future.   The Cold War gave us the specter of the Soviets to ready ourselves against; in the "New World Order" soldiers that are not directly engaged in low-intensity Small Scale Contingencies around the globe seem to regress into the aimless mentality of the profession of arms simply being another occupation ("Mc-Job", as Mark so eloquently put it).   We need our Political leaders to develop Foreign and Defence policies that arms our Military with a sense of mission and we need our Military leaders to design a strategy and a doctrine that arms our Military with a way to achieve this mission in the best way possible. 

But lower level commanders can do certain things in the meantime to help build up the notion of fighting spirit.   Smart commanders can analyse current world trends and study the most probable sources of conflict, highlighting the enemies we may fight in the immediate future and building training around that.   This, perhaps combined with the notion of specialization mentioned above, can help to arm soldiers with a sense of mission.   As well, they can design innovative and difficult training that challenges the soldiers abilities (free play is a good example); this can be aided through the gradual "raising of the bar" through the notion that we are all volunteers.

Without adequate support from higher, both in terms of moral (sense of mission) and resources (the money and equipment to train properly), engendering "fighting spirit" throughout the Army is difficult, but it is in by no means impossible.

Looking forward to further ideas on the "Fighting Spirit".

Infanteer


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## Bruce Monkhouse (12 Sep 2004)

_2) The Stormtroops viewed themselves and were viewed by higher command as different from the normal footsoldier.  As such, they were often given the right to wear special insignia to signify their unique status_

Can you say SSF smock/boots?    I dare say that everyone wearing those loved going to another base and turning heads.
My thoughts...reward elitism and you will have more striving to achieve it, make everyone the same and you will get bland.


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## Infanteer (12 Sep 2004)

I think that is what the thrust of one of my proposals was.   However, I would warn against the notion of "elitism" as this can be harmful to the professionalism of an Army as a whole.   The rewarding of "elitism" with special clothing and badges may lead to the units adapting the attitude that "we don't have to follow the fucking rules of the rest of the Army because the rest of the Army are a bunch of pussy legs that aren't like us."   From what I've read, this was the source for much of the discipline problems that the Airborne Regiment suffered from prior to Somalia (If any of you guys disagree, please point out my errors).

How to promote fighting spirit without engendering regressive "elitism"?   My guess would be to ensure that all soldiers, regardless of their role, are taught a Professional Ethos that engenders the notion of the disciplined, professional fighting soldier.   Attitudes that promote the notion that specialized units do not need the "inferior" abilities of the rest of the army must be watched for and vigilantly stamped out by NCO's.   Soldiers in specialized roles will develop a good "esprit de corps"; we must ensure that this high level of cohesion and motivation is focussed in the right direction by promoting the notion that their specialized status fulfills a unique and required role within the greater team effort of the Army.

What do you guys think?  Does anyone have ideas on what a Professional Ethos should contain?


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## Inch (12 Sep 2004)

I didn't think an Osons thread would turn into this but since the original question was answered I don't mind being a co-conspirator in the hijack.

Infanteer, while I don't disagree with what you said there are a few points I'd like to add.   Just my opinion here, but I feel that the Elitism in the CAR that you speak of wasn't a bad thing,   but it could have been and should have been controlled by stronger and more educated officers and senior NCMs.   When you're put in a role like leading those kind of troops, you need to both encourage them to challenge themselves to be the very best at what they do and you need to exercise a little more control than you would over other troops. I think we're making steps in the right direction wrt to education with the new OPMEs and updated basic and advanced operations courses.



> How to promote fighting spirit without engendering regressive "elitism"?   My guess would be to ensure that all soldiers, regardless of their role, are taught a Professional Ethos that engenders the notion of the disciplined, professional fighting soldier.   Attitudes that promote the notion that specialized units do not need the "inferior" abilities of the rest of the army must be watched for and vigilantly stamped out by NCO's.   Soldiers in specialized roles will develop a good "esprit de corps"; we must ensure that this high level of cohesion and motivation is focussed in the right direction by promoting the notion that their specialized status fulfills a unique and required role within the greater team effort of the Army.



This comment I agree with very strongly, it's something I see everyday with the pilots vs AEREs/Techs. They always bring up, "if we didn't fix the aircraft you'd have nothing to fly" to which I reply "if I didn't break them you'd have nothing to fix".   If everybody is taught and understands their place in the grand scheme, I don't see the elitist attitude being a problem so long as it's controlled.

I hope this makes a little sense, it's been a while since I had to wrap my brain around theories like this.

Cheers

[fixed up your quote boxes for you Inch - Infanteer]
[Thanks - Inch]


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## Infanteer (12 Sep 2004)

I think "Osons" is a very good title for the subject matter we are talking about here.   8)

I don't deny that the Airborne Regiment and the larger SSF possessed a very high degree of "esprit de corps" that was able to put it over and above more conventional units.   However, when that energy is directed in the wrong direction by soldiers, what I have termed "elitism", problems can occur.   I've used it to highlight the problems that broke out in the Airborne Regiment; unfortunately the political masters at the time had the wrong outlook and viewed what was a specific problem (which I understand was sorted out by Col Kenward real quick) as a general trend and disbanded the unit.


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## Sh0rtbUs (12 Sep 2004)

All this elitism talk has brought me back to a conversation I had with someone a while ago. An issue in the CAR, was too many soldiers feeling they were so above the top, that they felt they had paid their dues, and "earned" the right to go out and do what they wanted whether it be obnoxious to civilian authority figures or simply kick the snot out of someone for no apparent reason. As twisted as this mentality is, it existed. Fighting spirit is one thing, but where do you draw the line from pride in oneself and what you stand for, and simply cocky? Because i know alot of soldiers who really dont know the difference, or at least dont recognize it.


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## Lance Wiebe (12 Sep 2004)

I was in Petawawa from 74 until 79, so I was there to experience the arrival of the SSF.  I also served there from 87-92.

But, do you know where I saw the best Esprit de Corps?  Europe, with 4CMBG.  I was there from 79 to 84.  We had the brand new tank, we were getting new fighters, we had purpose.  We had a role, a "raison d'etre", as it were.  And we were good.  On exercises, we regularly pummelled the Germans, or the Americans, whoever.  We practiced our job of mechanised warfare hard.  

And Trudeau was gone!  We all of a sudden had ammunition, and fuel!  We danced in the streets, singing "Trudeau is gone, Trudeau is gone....."

We were good.  And we had pride.  Well, at least the armour and infanteers and engineers.  We didn't associate much with the artillery.....so I won't speak for them.

It was different with the SSF.  Yes, there was pride.  Yes, we were a bit cocky.  But it was still different.  I think we took our pride and cockiness from the fact that we were FIT, by golly.  We could do the 2 X 10 in under an hour each day.  We could carry rucks all day and all night, and if need be, we would change our socks and do it again.  The SAS and the SBS and the Rangers came to go on ex with us.  But it was different, because we didn't have top notch equipment, we knew that we were, essentially, a light Brigade, which meant we were way behind everyone else when it came to nice shiny new kit.  We were, really, one big Infantry Unit, that could, given a few months, be deployed anywhere in our very own airplanes.  But despite that, or maybe because of it, we were proud.

But nothing beat Germany when we had our brand new tanks, brand new TUA, brand new MAN trucks....sigh.  Those were the days.


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## Armymedic (12 Sep 2004)

Sh0rtbUs said:
			
		

> An issue in the CAR, was too many soldiers feeling they were so above the top, that they felt they had paid their dues, and "earned" the right to go out and do what they wanted whether it be obnoxious to civilian authority figures or simply kick the snot out of someone for no apparent reason. As twisted as this mentality is, it existed. Fighting spirit is one thing, but where do you draw the line from pride in oneself and what you stand for, and simply cocky? Because i know alot of soldiers who really dont know the difference, or at least dont recognize it.



And if the CAR transformed into a current elite unit, why is that attitude not pervelent there? 

Our whole society has withdrawn from elitism, moved away from pushing themselves, away from competition, why is that?

I was in Recce Sqn in the late 80's...competion within the troops to be the best tpr, competition amongst the Para troop and the other three tps of the Sqn,  competition amongs Recce vs the Cougar troops, and bigtime competition between the Airborne, RCR, and RCD at everything.

Now is like, "ok lets just show up" and "the RCR will win anyways"....WTF?


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## pbi (13 Sep 2004)

I am very interested in this thread, but I am not sure I agree with all that has been said.

There is the complaint that we "have no mission". Well, since we have been using the USMC as a good example of a corps with very strong sense of identity and esprit, I'd like to suggest that the Marines "have no mission" either, but do just fine.

By "no mission" I mean what I assume posters mean when they say we  have "no mission":   no nice, chunky, delineated, focused task on a certain piece of ground against a certain foe, _ala_ 4 CMBG in the old days. Well, the Marines as a Corps don't really have that either: they are America's fire brigade. They are assigned to the various CINCs, and of course they are fightng in places like OIF and here in OEF, but that is specifically mission dependent. As a past Commandant once said: "America doesn't need a Marine Corps-It wants a Marine Corps" It doesn't need a Marine Corps because they are not really wired to any specific long-term mission: that is overwhelmingly an Army task. The Marines are not focused on doing A mission: they are focused on doing ANY mission, and not all of those are conventional warfighting by any stretch of the imagination.

I would argue that fixation on a certain mission is not necessarily healthy at all. It could be said that it cramped the thinkin of our Army in a manner that we have only recently begun to shake off. As well, armies (especially small armies) that become overly focused on one mission actually become of limited use for anything else. The Scandinavian and Swiss armies are IMHO good examples of this. They are very heavily (almost exclusively) focused on territorial defense operations, with highly developed and focused schemes giving certain battalions specific tasks, etc. Very focused, and very inward-looking. Their collective combat experience, or even ops in high-risk areas, since WWII is minimal to none. Whatever else can be said about us, you cannot say that. Although, having said that, I am leery of this endless prattle that we need to fixate on peacekeeping missions. 

And, IMHO, you cannot say it simply because we have not been wired to one job (Germany aside, and even then...). We have (in a haphazard way) been expeditionary and often "firefighters". I would submit to you that there are very, very few armies as small as ours that are as flexible and capable (at low levels), or have the same "can do" that I see in our little force as compared to others of its size.(Or, even bigger...) Now, we also know that sometimes this "can do" kicks us in the ***, but we have it all the same.

For my vote, I do not want to see us specialize, or tie ourselves to one nice, intellectually and doctrinally digestible mission or role. I   believe that we need to build an Army very much like the USMC, with all the good attributes that various posters here have identified in that Corps, set within a truly joint Armed Forces that can mount, project, sustain, protect and recover modest but capable Army forces. In other words, do what we have been doing, but better.

To be a truly expeditionary force requires an esprit and an ethos that sustains the force no matter what the mission, especially when (just like the USMC) it may be difficult to identify an immediate threat to our sovereignty, but we are going to risk Canadian lives anyway. That, IMHO still requires some building in our force, but it must be done in an intelligent way, not just by sucking up all US methods lock stock and barrel. I do not believe our soldiers would respond to some of these measures such as running around singing, etc. but that is just my opinion. Cheers.


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## Slim (13 Sep 2004)

I must pop my 2 cents in at this point (can't resist!)

I served in the LdSH(RC) Recce starting in 1989. Between then and now I have seen a world of change. In recce the skills of a soldier were a source of pride. PT was done every day and we worked very hard indeed in the field.

In 1996 I left the service, and then returned in 2000 as a reservist.

I felt like I had joined another army completely! Gone was the "can-do" attitude, to be replaced with training levels and codes of behaviour that were disgusting. I left three years later, not being able to put up with it any longer.

I am at a loss for what happened in the mean time, what allowed our once internationally respected forces to slide so badly. I do think that the world we live in and the people who populate our country are partially to blame...Certainly the media for one!

Allot of people claim that it starts with our leadership...I don't necessarily believe they are solely responsible. Officers and NCO's can't do their jobs properly if they are so afraid of going to jail because little Timmy doesn't like to be yelled at. Or some young lady screams sexual harassment at a given training activity simply because she doesn't know any better.

I know that my life and career are not worth giving up to a harassment investigation that is nonesense from the beginning. And not being able to fail people...Why bother to train at all with that kind of thinking?

 How can you properly train troops for war-fighting when the govt. is consistently stuffing that garbage  down the brass's neck? 

Sorry all, just my 2 cents

Slim 

As for the CAR-The govt. disbanding them was a huge crime. And if Cretien were dying of thirst in the dessert I would not be handing out glasses of water that day! Maybe he was scared of them...?


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## Lance Wiebe (13 Sep 2004)

PBI, what has happened in the USMC is a fairly recent development, and one I think can be somewhat defined.

I was on exercise with the Marines in 1974, Ex Potlatch.  Their morale was arguably much lower than ours.  Conscription, the way they were used in Viet Nam, whatever, they were not really a force anyone would talk about in the same manner they are talked about today.

So what has changed?  To my mind, it is the upper leadership.  The Canadian Forces has received little direction, and less leadership.  There is no focus, nobody knows why we are training, all we know is that ammunition is scarce, range time is scarce, and most of our vehicles are going to disappear to Wainwright, of all places, and nobody knows why.

Remember the phrase "the commanders intent"?  Nobody knows it.  And most think the commander doesn't know it either.  It seems like the mantra now is "Is it cheaper?  Then let's go for it."

And, you cannot dismiss the morale and Esprit de Corps we had in 4 CMBG so lightly.  We did have focus, we were well led.  It seems you are trying to say that we should not have joined NATO, we should have stayed home.  To try and claim that it hurt the army is ludicrous.


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## Infanteer (13 Sep 2004)

Well, in light of pbi's post, perhaps I will amend the notion of "have no mission".



> There is the complaint that we "have no mission". Well, since we have been using the USMC as a good example of a corps with very strong sense of identity and esprit, I'd like to suggest that the Marines "have no mission" either, but do just fine.
> 
> By "no mission" I mean what I assume posters mean when they say we have "no mission":   no nice, chunky, delineated, focused task on a certain piece of ground against a certain foe, ala 4 CMBG in the old days.



We in the Army know exactly what we kit up for; to fight and win wars.   However, perhaps the notion of "have no mission" would be the disjunction that exists between the mission we train from day one and the way the Canadian public perceives us and the Canadian government chooses to use us.

Despite the fact that we train to fight wars, and by all accounts of our allies, are very capable when we are fielded to do so, the Canadian public still views the CF as some sort of Peacekeeping Force.   In order to pander to public perceptions of the Military, the government puts out defence policies that advocate "peacekeeping brigades", purchases equipment that is vital for "peacekeeping missions", and tends to avoid warfighting in Iraq or in the Pashtun mountains and instead ops to be the police force for the Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai.

This is what I was aiming at with no mission.   I don't doubt that many good soldiers have questioned their commitment to the forces due to the fact that they see their mission of warfighting, their sense of purpose, constantly overridden by an oblivious Canadian public and a docile Government.   I bet you guys have said, "Why the hell should I give a rats ass about staying fit and practicing platoon fighting drills, I'm just getting deployed to Bosnia for ROTO 31 to go sit in coffee shops..."   Of course this is an exaggeration, but there are many in the Forces, especially in the CS and CSS, that probably do not possess the requisite stamina and capabilities to operate beyond a mature theater in a peacekeeping mission (Case in point: I remember a news story about the trouble 1 SVC Battalion was having prior to deployment on OP APOLLO).

This is where we need the "sense of mission"; we need the views of the fighting soldier (we exist to fight battles and win wars) and the Canadian government and public (we need the military to further our national interests in all contingencies along the spectrum of conflict) to become more inline to ensure that our soldiers no that what they are training for is in line with what they will be utilized for.



> Well, the Marines as a Corps don't really have that either: they are America's fire brigade. They are assigned to the various CINCs, and of course they are fighting in places like OIF and here in OEF, but that is specifically mission dependent. As a past Commandant once said: "America doesn't need a Marine Corps-It wants a Marine Corps" It doesn't need a Marine Corps because they are not really wired to any specific long-term mission: that is overwhelmingly an Army task. The Marines are not focused on doing A mission: they are focused on doing ANY mission, and not all of those are conventional warfighting by any stretch of the imagination.



They have a sense of mission, that of the fire-brigade.   The term "Send in the Marines" had to come from somewhere .   The United States Marine Corps is blessed with numerous factors that engender a high degree of "esprit de corps" within their units:
-   They have traditionally searched for missions that the Army wouldn't take in order to prove to the Pentagon that they were still relevent, this sense of having to show that they were different then the Army in order to avoid being rolled up has led to the Marines being able to identify themselves as a unique part of the American Defence establishment.
-   They are American's "Naval Infantry", their existence is still centered around littoral warfare and their organization (the MEU/MEB/MEF) is formulated with the notion of Amphibious Operations.
-   Also, as Naval Infantry, they, like the Royal Marines, possess a very acute sense of history and identity and have the (IMO) damn finest dress uniforms of any Armed Force in the World   .

What have these characteristics given the USMC?   I would argue that being a Marine is a mission in itself.   My buddy who just joined the US Army said most recruits he met were intimidated by US Marines because they were "hardcore".   The Marines, like US Army Rangers and Navy SEALs, are glamorized by the US public and for the most part US Marines (and servicemen in general) are treated well when they are in the public in uniform.

Due to the amphibious warfare background that engenders them as the "go-to-guys", I would argue that the Marines in particular know that they are at the tip of the spear of US foreign policy.   What is also important is that the US public knows this, respects this, and supports this.   I would argue that this characteristic is not as strong in Canada, even though we operate under the same sort of "fire-brigade" role.



> I would argue that fixation on a certain mission is not necessarily healthy at all. It could be said that it cramped the thinkin of our Army in a manner that we have only recently begun to shake off. As well, armies (especially small armies) that become overly focused on one mission actually become of limited use for anything else. The Scandinavian and Swiss armies are IMHO good examples of this. They are very heavily (almost exclusively) focused on territorial defense operations, with highly developed and focused schemes giving certain battalions specific tasks, etc. Very focused, and very inward-looking. Their collective combat experience, or even ops in high-risk areas, since WWII is minimal to none. Whatever else can be said about us, you cannot say that. Although, having said that, I am leery of this endless prattle that we need to fixate on peacekeeping missions.



I agree that "niche rolling" the Forces is the wrong direction.   The more you specialize your force to some target, the more irrelevant it becomes in the face of contingencies other then that which one's niche.   As well, this increases the variety of asymmetrical vulnerabilities present in ones force structure, giving potential badguys more ways of of striking at us   (Tanks, we are peacekeepers, who needs tanks?!?).

However, I put forward the notion of specialization in order to bring forward the idea that different parts of the Army would focus on different aspects of warfighting.   As opposed to the USMC or the RM, the Canadian Army must maintain a broader outlook due to the fact that it is the nations ground-fighting force.   Some sort of specialization could give different units of the Army an extra-incentive to building a higher degree of capabilities and thus forming greater cohesion.   If units were specialized to some extent, they could do so with the knowledge that they were "unique" within the Army and are the "go-to-guys" if Canada is required to send troops in that capacity.   This specialization does not even have to be permenant, it can be a revolving tasking.   This is what the British Army does; when I was in Bosnia I trained with the 1st Battalion, the Royal Scots.   They were just coming off a cycle as a "Jungle Warfare" unit spent training in Brunei and Belize (plus four days R&R in Cancun during American Spring Break   ).   They had just converted to a Mountain Ops Role, hence the "Mountainous and Difficult Terrain" Cadre was hosted by them and I was fortunate enough to attend.   Here is how the Brits task their infantry:

http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/organisation/roles.htm

Anyways, just throwing an idea out under the notion of further developing "esprit de corps".   Not everybody can be an Airborne soldier, but perhaps we can let them be something.



> And, IMHO, you cannot say it simply because we have not been wired to one job (Germany aside, and even then...). We have (in a haphazard way) been expeditionary and often "firefighters". I would submit to you that there are very, very few armies as small as ours that are as flexible and capable (at low levels), or have the same "can do" that I see in our little force as compared to others of its size.(Or, even bigger...) Now, we also know that sometimes this "can do" kicks us in the ***, but we have it all the same.
> 
> For my vote, I do not want to see us specialize, or tie ourselves to one nice, intellectually and doctrinally digestible mission or role. I   believe that we need to build an Army very much like the USMC, with all the good attributes that various posters here have identified in that Corps, set within a truly joint Armed Forces that can mount, project, sustain, protect and recover modest but capable Army forces. In other words, do what we have been doing, but better.



I'm a big fan of the way the Marines do things as well.   They are a truly joint force (what the CF tried and failed to do with Unification) that intergrates land, naval, and air assets into a combined arms warfighting team.   The MEU(SOC) offers a combined arms approach that perhaps the CF could guide its force structure off of.

As opposed to the ideas I proposed above, perhaps the "fire-brigade specialization", such as the USMC's role, could help to further a "sense of mission" and esprit de corps within the Canadian Forces.   There is a bit of a discussion about this starting over in this thread:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18919/post-99968;topicseen#msg99968

As well, Maj Lizotte (another attendant of Quantico) wrote an article in a recent Doctrine and Training Bulletin that argued for forming the CF around a MEU(SOC) capability.

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_6/ADTB_vol6.2_e.pdf

Anyways, perhaps our military could take this path.   Looking at the MEU(SOC) roles provided by Colonel Daniel Bolger in Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle I see twenty-two capabilities:
- Amphibious Assault
- Amphibious Raid
- Limited Objection Attack - Deception Raid
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Security Operations
- Military Operations in Urban Terrain
- Seizure/Destruction of Offshore Platforms
- Reinforcement Operations
- Show of Force Operations
- Humanitarian Relief Operations
- Civic Action Operations
- Mobile Training Teams
- Specialized Demolitions Operations
- Initial Terminal Guidance
- Fire Support Control
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, Equipment and Personal
- Clandestine Recovery Operations
- Clandestine Reconnaissance and Surveillance-Counterintelligence
- Signal Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations
- In-extremis Hostage Rescue

Proficiency in these roles involve every unit of the Army, from a Service Battalion to the JTF.   These missions also incorporate Naval and Air assets as well.   I believe the kicker is that these are to be specialized in an expeditionary setting.   This is relevent to Canada because we have been an expeditionary force since the Boer War.   Moving in this direction would involve big changes in the way all three branches of the CF, both Regular and Reserve, operate.   This would require closer, joint doctrine between the branches of the of the CF to ensure a maximum level of cohesion and interoperability between Naval, Air, and Ground assets.  As well, the government would have to commit itself in foreign and defence policy to staying away from "mission-creep"; to have rotating cycles of expeditionary units locked down in the Balkans seriously hampers the flexible, global nature of such a force.   A re-rolling of Army, Navy, and Air Force tasks could look something like this:

Army:   Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycle of expeditionary readiness.   Workup involves preparing for capabilities required while serving as "Canadian Expeditionary Force" (where have we heard that before?) such as 22 MEU(SOC) capabilities defined above.   The Army Reserve assumes a dual role of Homeland Defence and Sustainment and Follow on Forces (perhaps deployment in mature theaters?) which means that alot of the heavier capabilities will reside with them.

Navy:   Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycle of expeditionary readiness.   Cycles of Naval Task forces must be ready to provide worldwide support as the Naval Component of the standing "Canadian Expeditionary Force"; they provide fire support (?), logistics and sustainment, offshore command and control, transportation, and as a possible mobile base for initial entry of CEF land components into conflict area.   The Naval Reserve assumes Homeland Defence role and conducts sovereignty patrols and works with Coast Guard for border enforcement.

Air Force:   Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycles of expeditionary readiness.   Cycles of Air Expeditionary Forces must be ready to provide global support as Air Component of standing CEF; the Air Force provides Tactical Air Superiority and CAS (hopefully from a Naval Asset), Strategic logistics and sustainment (hopefully with C-17), and initial entry of Ground Forces into conflict area (Airborne drops, Air Assaults from friendly airbases, etc, etc).   Hopefully, the combination of the VTOL JSF and a suitable attack helicopter can provide the required close in support that the Ground Component of the CEF would require; High Flying Air Superiority Fighters like the CF-18 can be left to the reserves.   The Air Reserve will have the task of Homeland Defence (eg: patrols over Canadian Airspace with F-18).

Corresponding readiness cycles that incorporate all CF units will give the CEF Commander a wide variety of resources to react to any contingency that affects the national interest of Canada.   In a situation like Afghanistan, he can deploy Ground/Air Forces to support coalition efforts while using naval logistical support in the Indian Ocean.   The next cycle may require that a Canadian Naval-borne task force appear of the Coast of Africa to evacuate an embassy and deploy a force to prevent violent civil war.   The next cycle may have to commit a landing force to Iraq, relying on forces inserted and supported from Naval and Air assets (think Umm Qasr and Basra).   The point is that this is a truly flexible force structure with a doctrine that supports this expeditionary nature.

Why does this proposal fit into our discussion on fighting spirit?   A structure like this can arm our military, from top to bottom, with "sense of mission"; that of the "fire brigade".   Every soldier, regardless of their trade, knows what he is preparing for; the Canadian public and the government, well aware of who is tasked as Canadian Expeditionary Force, has a clear notion of the forces available for commitment and what they are trained to carry out.   Highly visible expeditionary forces send the image of a military that aggressively pursues the national interest, whether it be a sudden humanitarian operation or acting with coalition forces in the "War on Terror".   As well, the reserves are given a definite and unique mandate of Homeland Defence to focus their efforts towards; no more of this ad hoc, "farmteam" for badly-stretched Reg Force units.

I am sure you guys have you own ideas on how to rebuild "esprit de corps" through organizational reform and restructure; I'd be delighted to hear your input.



> To be a truly expeditionary force requires an esprit and an ethos that sustains the force no matter what the mission, especially when (just like the USMC) it may be difficult to identify an immediate threat to our sovereignty, but we are going to risk Canadian lives anyway. That, IMHO still requires some building in our force, but it must be done in an intelligent way, not just by sucking up all US methods lock stock and barrel. I do not believe our soldiers would respond to some of these measures such as running around singing, etc. but that is just my opinion. Cheers.



Agree.   We must build our Forces to fit our uniquely Canadian situation.

Anyways, I'm starting to babble.   I'll turn the mike over to the floor for comments.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Infanteer (13 Sep 2004)

> So what has changed?   To my mind, it is the upper leadership.   The Canadian Forces has received little direction, and less leadership.   There is no focus, nobody knows why we are training, all we know is that ammunition is scarce, range time is scarce, and most of our vehicles are going to disappear to Wainwright, of all places, and nobody knows why.
> 
> Remember the phrase "the commanders intent"?   Nobody knows it.   And most think the commander doesn't know it either.   It seems like the mantra now is "Is it cheaper?   Then let's go for it."



Yowza, that popped up while I was writing my novel.   I'm pretty sure I can identify the source of that change you've brought up.   It would most likely be the combination of General Al Gray and Secretary of the Navy James Webb (A Marine Officer in Vietnam).   These two, and those that followed them, worked hard to remodel the Marine Corps; Al Grey's introduction of FMFM 1 - Warfighting (which I just got a hold of   ) was seen as giving the Marine Corps a "sense of mission".   It introduced new thinking about tactics and operations and opened up Marine Corps doctrine to the notions of "maneuver warfare" that the Germans developed in the World Wars.


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## pbi (13 Sep 2004)

Infanteer: that was a very fine post. I must admit that I have had to do a bit of thinking (but only a bit.....it's quite strenuous...).


After my post (the one you quoted), I got to wondering how accurate my thoughts about the USMC were. I called the Senior Marine here in the HQ(a Col of Marines), and went to see him for a bit to chat about all this. I feel confident now that I am pretty close to the mark. Regardless of that, I believe you have made some excellent points, which I will comment on.



> Despite the fact that we train to fight wars, and by all accounts of our allies, are very capable when we are fielded to do so, the Canadian public still views the CF as some sort of Peacekeeping Force.  In order to pander to public perceptions of the Military, the government puts out defence policies that advocate "peacekeeping brigades", purchases equipment that is vital for "peacekeeping missions", and tends to avoid warfighting in Iraq or in the Pashtun mountains and instead ops to be the police force for the Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai.



I think you are right. The shameful attempt to hide Medak Pocket exemplifies this at its worst.(However, I believe that has since been more than put right by Her Excellency the GG.)  WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.



> This is what I was aiming at with no mission.  I don't doubt that many good soldiers have questioned their commitment to the forces due to the fact that they see their mission of warfighting, their sense of purpose, constantly overridden by an oblivious Canadian public and a docile Government.  I bet you guys have said, "Why the heck should I give a rats *** about staying fit and practicing platoon fighting drills, I'm just getting deployed to Bosnia for ROTO 31 to go sit in coffee shops..."  Of course this is an exaggeration, but there are many in the Forces, especially in the CS and CSS, that probably do not possess the requisite stamina and capabilities to operate beyond a mature theater in a peacekeeping mission (Case in point: I remember a news story about the trouble 1 SVC Battalion was having prior to deployment on OP APOLLO).



OK-I'm with you now. On the latter point I talked specifically with the Col about the Marine claim of "every Marine a rifleman". While he stated that a Marine Infantryman go on to take more training after Basic, he was confident that CSS marines could fight and not just in perimeter defense. What they could _not_ do, he said, would be to be highly proficient in Infantry tactical leadership if they were, say, a truck company or a supply unit. However, he expected that they could fire all the company weapons and execute basic tactics. He also pointed out that the US Army, after the Jessica Lynch incident, has embarked on a crash course of combat training for its CSS troops; something the Marines would not have to do.



> Due to the amphibious warfare background that engenders them as the "go-to-guys", I would argue that the Marines in particular know that they are at the tip of the spear of US foreign policy.  What is also important is that the US public knows this, respects this, and supports this.  I would argue that this characteristic is not as strong in Canada, even though we operate under the same sort of "fire-brigade" role.



You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.



> I agree that "niche rolling" the Forces is the wrong direction.  The more you specialize your force to some target, the more irrelevant it becomes in the face of contingencies other then that which one's niche.  As well, this increases the variety of asymmetrical vulnerabilities present in ones force structure, giving potential badguys more ways of of striking at us  (Tanks, we are peacekeepers, who needs tanks?!?).



This is the false belief that the world will only demand of us what we are ready and willing to give.



> I'm a big fan of the way the Marines do things as well.  They are a truly joint force (what the CF tried and failed to do with Unification) that intergrates land, naval, and air assets into a combined arms warfighting team.  The MEU(SOC) offers a combined arms approach that perhaps the CF could guide its force structure off of.



In my chat with the USMC Colonel today, we agreed that although the USMC is four divisions strong, its operational focus is the MEU(SOC) or in other words a battle group. So, we can play in that game too, if we have the will, and we focus on the goal.



> This is relevent to Canada because we have been an expeditionary force since the Boer War.



My point exactly.



> Agree.  We must build our Forces to fit our uniquely Canadian situation.


And I believe we can do it. Some will immediately lean back from the precipice, protesting: "Oh-the politicians will never allow that". I say we can do it , intelligently and with well thought out justifications, and actually get them onside. This is a huge leadership challenge, but we are getting a higher percentage of our senior leaders with op experience, including with our Allies, than at any time for decades. Cheers.


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## Lance Wiebe (13 Sep 2004)

Good novel, Infanteer!

One other thing that the Marines have done well is market themselves.  You never see the US president going off Air Force 1, or his helicopters, without Marines around.  They are at every US embassy.  I'm sure that, in your travels, you've seen US embassies, compare that with the Canadian embassies.  They are everywhere, in the very fine looking Blues.  (Hm, maybe we should have kept our patrols?)  While we in the last few years seem to change our uniforms to darn often, the Marine dress uniform has endured.

The Marines have one more thing that we seem to lack.  They have an identifiable commandant, front and centre.  Even more, he is front, centre, in your face, and leading by example.  Every Marine has a standard to maintain, something like our "universality of service" which is not universal in our army.  How many fat, out of shape Marines have you ever seen?  Compare that with what you see leaving NDHQ or Louis St Laurent at the end of a working day!

The Marines have much to emulate, that is sure.  Just how much, is the question.  

Our unification plan under given us by Hellyer would not work, how much does a submariner identify with the Vandoos?  Should he even try?  The Marines do all have a purpose, seperate from the army, navy and air force.  And while they own their own army, navy and air force, they are structured to support the ground element, unlike our forces.  So, I don't think that reforming our Forces into the Marine model would work, there is a whole bunch of stuff that would work.


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## pbi (13 Sep 2004)

Lance Wiebe: I also do not think that a complete repeat of Unification under the guise of emulating the Marines would work. What I do believe is that our Army should adopt some of the good traits we have all commented on. Cheers.


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## Infanteer (13 Sep 2004)

> WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.



Sorry, that was the biting sarcasm of a late night post aimed at our National policies, it was in no way aimed at the guys with their boots on the ground.   Perhaps this is what angers me more though; with our limited resources our government has put our soldiers into an extremely dangerous job that is on the peripheral of the War on Terror, and we've done the job admirably and lost very good men in the process of doing so.   I would rather see our small commitment at the main effort with the Americans as we were in Op APOLLO instead of being "tucked away" (in an equally dangerous location, no leass) for political reasons.   In a political sense, Afghanistan democracy is a farce; when ISAF is all said and done with and Afghanistan regresses back to the tribalism that it has been for millenia, I really don't want to say "what was that for?".

However, we in the military will remember that even when the cards were not in our favour, we performed our duties honourably and I think we can live with that.



> You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.



Ha.   If only they knew.   We in Canada are the definition of "public neither understood nor supported them."



> This is a huge leadership challenge, but we are getting a higher percentage of our senior leaders with op experience, including with our Allies, than at any time for decades. Cheers.



I'm with you on this one.   One thing I can say is that, to Scott Taylor's lament, I am continually impressed by some of the senior leadership that I have come into contact with in my relativly short career.   We are starting to see guys get promoted up with six or seven gongs on their chest, indicating that our leadership has a vast amount of real operational experience.   All hope is not lost yet!

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## PPCLI Guy (28 Sep 2004)

Interesting thread - I wish that I had found it earlier.   The MEF or CEF idea is not a new one - in fact it was proposed as a viable option for the re-write of the Strategic Operating Concept - and sadly not accepted.   A few comments:

Infanteer said:


> But lower level commanders can do certain things in the meantime to help build up the notion of fighting spirit.   Smart commanders can analyse current world trends and study the most probable sources of conflict, highlighting the enemies we may fight in the immediate future and building training around that.   This, perhaps combined with the notion of specialization mentioned above, can help to arm soldiers with a sense of mission.   As well, they can design innovative and difficult training that challenges the soldiers abilities (free play is a good example); this can be aided through the gradual "raising of the bar" through the notion that we are all volunteers.



In the planning for the BTE (03), it was directed that the scenario and exercise design "look an awful lot like a Canadian Brigade or Battle Group securing the flank of an American or British Division advancing into Iraq", which is essentially exactly how we wrote it.   The exercise was designed to be as challenging as possible within a rather narrow margin of safety.   As it turned out, the troops that were declared OPRED on that exercise (from a warfighting perspective) went somewhere else - but the point is that the Comd had identified a probable scenario, and trained to it.   What is even more impressive is the fact that he did so against the counsel of many of his peers and certainly of many members of the LS - I know this because we spent an inordinate amount of time in Jan 03 on the 19th floor justifying the exercise.   So do not dispair - their are a number of enlightened commanders out there who know what needs to be done, and have the willpower and fortitude to see that it is done.

Infanteer also said:


> How to promote fighting spirit without engendering regressive "elitism"?   My guess would be to ensure that all soldiers, regardless of their role, are taught a Professional Ethos that engenders the notion of the disciplined, professional fighting soldier.   Attitudes that promote the notion that specialized units do not need the "inferior" abilities of the rest of the army must be watched for and vigilantly stamped out by NCO's.   Soldiers in specialized roles will develop a good "esprit de corps"; we must ensure that this high level of cohesion and motivation is focussed in the right direction by promoting the notion that their specialized status fulfills a unique and required role within the greater team effort of the Army.



One of the problems of elitism is that it is relative; you need someone to compare yourself to.   It is hard to judge how good you are without others with whom to compete.   And there is the rub.   How do you engender that sense of pride without it coming at someone else's expense?   The line is very fine.   I served in 3 VP from 98-00, and it was a kick*** unit.   We had trained very hard under a demanding and professional CO who had quite frankly turned the unit around in a very short period of time.   We were good, and beginning to realise it.   In retrospect, I now realise that I found myself looking to other units in a less flattering light - and beyond the normal "track toad" type of stuff that comes with the territory.   Perhaps I am more venal than most, or perhaps I misread the situation, but then again perhaps not.

So how does one develop esprit de corps whilst avoiding the pitfalls of elitism?   I quite frankly don't know.   I do however realise that the line must be found.


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## LowRider (29 Sep 2004)

Mark C said:
			
		

> Ex Coelis,
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, there are a whole host of reasons why we have "lost" the collective combat-capability edge over the past 10 years or so.   Starting with an institution that increasingly promotes the "rights" of the individual over the needs of the group.   Since when was "the man" more important than the collective mission?   I don't know precisely where we have collectively gone so wrong, but I can see the current results -     And quite frankly, they are sickening.




Instititution that promotes the rights of the individual over the needs of the group?You just described Canada.The whole problem lies within our extremely socialist government.A generation worth of social engineering has taken it's toll,it was only a matter of time before it spread into the CF as well.
If you want to fix the morale problems in the CF,our political leadership must be fixed first.


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## PPCLI Guy (29 Sep 2004)

LowRider said:
			
		

> Instititution that promotes the rights of the individual over the needs of the group?You just described Canada.The whole problem lies within our extremely socialist government.A generation worth of social engineering has taken it's toll,it was only a matter of time before it spread into the CF as well.
> If you want to fix the morale problems in the CF,our political leadership must be fixed first.



Hang on a second - surely the military will always, to some degree (and one could argue over what degree is appropsiate) reflect the society that it is charged with defending?


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## LowRider (29 Sep 2004)

That is true PPCLI guy,but i'm sure you will agree that military service takes a differnt sort of mindset than the typical Canadian.I may not be full time,but i would consider my personal values and beliefs outside the typical Canadian norm.
My point is that typical "Canadian values" are for the most part a reflection of Liberal propaganda.
If you ask the average Canadian what makes them proud to be Canadian,you will get the typical CBC response(multiculturalisim,health care,tolerance..etc.),stir in a smug sense of moral superiority and anti-Americanisim and you have the average Canadian eh!
Anyway i'm getting to a point here.You can't blame leadership in the CF because the problem starts at the top.


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