# NCM Regard for Officers; Army vs RCAF vs RCN



## Lumber (7 Nov 2020)

So, after reading the thread where a Sgt claimed only officers' pensions are indexed, I decided I wanted to ask about something that's made me curious.

Bottom Line Up Front: Is there a difference in the way that NCMs regard officers between the CA, RCAF, and RCN, specifically with regard to _junior_ officers?

The long version: A junior enlisted member of the US army commented on a facebook post I saw (about what I can't even remember), but his comment read simply "Why do we even have Officers"? His follow on discussion revealed that this wasn't the usual (but not too common) question about whether we needed two distinct "cadres" instead of just having Snr NCMs become officers; rather, he really didn't see any benefit/need for officers _at all_. 

So it got me thinking about my own experience in the CAF. While not at all common, I've have seen this opinion shared within the CAF as well. The thing is, while I have heard this type of opinion expressed within the CAF, I've primarily heard it form those in the Army. I've heard it said (not literally word for word) that infantry platoons really belong to the WO, who babysits and string-pulls the next-to-useless junior officer. I've heard it said that the troops judge a platoon commander's tour not by how effective he was at leading the platoon and achieving the mission, but by how many "good ideas" they _dont't _have and by how little damage they managed to do. 

I have heard it in the Navy too, but it's not the same. I've had friends who are/were sailors who jokingly referred to me as a "paper pusher", but this was more in jest that an actual assessment of my role on the ship.

Is this something others have seen as well, or am I allowing all the war movies and TV \I've watched to cloud my perception of what it's really like in the Army in general, and the infantry especially? Or is the relationship between officers and NCMs aboard an HMC ship fundamentally that different from the army?

This is all anecdotal and I can't give you any specific examples other than the one I provided above, but I am certain I have encountered these types of questions/situations throughout my career.

Or am I way out to lunch?



(I have no real experience with the RCAF in this matter)


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## PPCLI Guy (7 Nov 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> (I have no real experience with the RCAF in this matter)



Neither do they.... ;D


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## quadrapiper (7 Nov 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> So, after reading the thread where a Sgt claimed only officers' pensions are indexed, I decided I wanted to ask about something that's made me curious.
> 
> Bottom Line Up Front: Is there a difference in the way that NCMs regard officers between the CA, RCAF, and RCN, specifically with regard to _junior_ officers?
> 
> ...


Looking forward to this discussion. 

Very outsider view: the Navy's approach to officers, and the shipboard environment, sees them substantially better trained/experienced before they're in a position to substantially and independently affect NCMs, and the ship, compared to the battalion, is of necessity an environment where most of the people you come in contact with, outside of your department, would be novices at _your_ job, however skilled they are at their own, including the CO and coxswain. Equally, the SLt NWO's job isn't done while also having to be sufficiently good as (say) a boatswain to keep up with S1 boatswains, unlike a platoon commander.


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## Pelorus (7 Nov 2020)

This is a complex question, but I think that it may be important is to look at what the core competencies required of each element are early on in their careers (1LT/SLt level). Specifically, if we were to put these competencies on a spectrum of technical skill sets vs leadership of personnel, it would probably look something like this:

Technical Competence |---- Pilots ------ NWOs -- 50/50 --------- Cbt Arms ---| Personnel Leadership

This is obviously oversimplified as it only includes a small segment of operational trades across the elements, and is really just to illustrate a point rather than set exact "distances" to each end of the spectrum.

The point being is that I think the anecdotes you offered in your post are probably more likely to be encountered somewhere like the Infantry, because the early skill sets required of a junior officer have much more overlap with the duties and responsibilities of their subordinates. Whereas an NWO will within the first couple years of entering the Fleet take charge of a warship as the OOW, which is a position unique to the start of an NWO's career and not done by any NCMs (obscure exceptions like Tender Charge notwithstanding).

Junior pilots primarily just fly planes to get their quals and hours, so are even further focused on technical skills.

My :2c:


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## Good2Golf (7 Nov 2020)

Ironically, the RCAF is the organization where placing officers in positions of responsibility and accountability including directly with NCMs, happens in its entirety, especially with potentially very young officers. If people want to dismiss, for instance, a young pilot’s skills as all technical, that reflects poorly on their appreciation of the weight of responsibility that comes with a young officer’s role as an aircraft captain, especially in crewed aircraft. A read of the QR&Os regarding responsibilities, and powers of an aircraft captain, as with a Ship’s captain, are notable for the extent of responsibility placed on potentially very young officers.  In the RCAF, they (officers) are by and large very well supported by NCMs, young and old alike, less and more experienced alike. Perhaps it’s because everyone’s life in the crew literally depends on that aircraft captain each and every flight.  Every flight could, at its worst, be everyone’s last.  That creates a tie amongst the crew that often/usually transcends rank.  I have very rarely experienced Air Force NCMs, particularly senior NCMs (Sgt-CWO) derisively critique officers, especially junior officers the way that I have personally witnessed Army senior NCMs critique, even ridicule junior Army officers.  Perhaps this is because those Army senior NCMs’ lives don’t literally depend 100% on those junior officers executing their responsibilities correctly in the regular conduct of their organization’s mission?  I don’t know for sure, but I saw it (direct or indirect derisive treatment of officers by NCMs in the Army) happen relatively regularly in some 25+ years of operating across both Air Force and Army environments.  As Air Force officers gain more experience in their career, I have seen NCMs less hesitant/inhibited to address their views to the officers if they believe there’s cause to do so. 

:2c:

Regards
G2G


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## Colin Parkinson (7 Nov 2020)

The junior infantry officer certainly gets the short straw.

He is entering a physically tough environment without a lot of experience

Their main skill is leadership, often of older, more experienced people, now many with real combat experience.

To lead properly they must use their NCO wisely, but eventual must take the reins. This is a skill that does not come easily to young males, learning how to make your NCO your ally and able to respect your authority.

You have many demands put on you by the higher ups that your platoon do not see or hear about, taking you away from your time with them, which diminishes their respect for you without the fault being you.

D&B just did a talk and mentioned in the Para's ruckmarches he made sure his pack was heavier than the men's and to lead all the marches. I would think that a junior officer who shows up to do the hard stuff. Respects their NCO's but is willing to take lead and make mistakes and own them. Makes an effort to know everyone and what their issues are and is willing to protect "their people" from crap, will earn respect, but it won't be easy.


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## FJAG (8 Nov 2020)

That's a great question and worthy of a deeply researched book. Keeping it simple, however, I have a few thoughts.

Historically in our western society (well after tribal society at least), officership had originally been tied to class status. A good example is the Roman system where the senior leaders, legates and tribunes were in fact political appointments generally reserved to the senior social classes, the patricians and the equites, as part of their climb through the cursus honorum by which high political office was earned. Under the Marian system armies were commanded by either the consuls or proconsuls of a province who picked their legates (commanders of legions) and tribunes (legion staff officers) from these two classes for any given campaign. Leadership in the ranks came from the centuriate who were professional soldiers who rose through the ranks to ultimately the tactical leadership of a 6,000 man legion under the "supervision" of a legate. Along the way a lower caste Roman in the army could hold numerous leadership positions which we could consider NCOs from tent group commanders (the equivalent of a section) to standard bearers, musicians, optios (second in command to centurions), and others. The lowest level of centurion commanded 80 fighting men (and 20 non-combatants although the number varied greatly - hence "centuria") and hence would probably be considered the equivalent of a company commander in our system. The centurions commanding a cohort (i.e 6 x centuria) would be the equivalent of a battalion commander and of the legion (10 x cohorts) the equivalent of a brigade commander. What's noteworthy, again, is that every centurion had risen from the ranks and his entire schooling learned on the job. Similarly there were no formal schools for legates and tribunes although some had informal education in tactics and warfare through tutors and gained some experience as they worked their way up the cursus honorum. 

Cut to the post-Roman era where feudal systems created a different form of ruling class which also formed the backbone of the military leadership of any given kingdom.  Again, military studies were an informal regime of studies of books (for those who read), tutors (for those who couldn't read) and practical experience. There were few standing armies (in fact for much of it's history, Rome didn't have standing armies either, raising and disbanding legions as needed) most being raised as needed from the various subject nobility that owed its allegiance and status to the king and hence these nobles formed the leadership. In many cases the various nobles would hire mercenaries experienced in war to form a loose subordinate leadership structure. 

Cut again to the end of the middle ages and the demise of much of the feudal system and we find a the king cut out the middle men issuing officer appointments directly by way of a commissioning system whereby the individual officer swore his allegiance not to some lord in the feudal chain but to the king directly. A more formalized rank structure, independent of the feudal structure, became set. Notwithstanding the fact that military leaders were not required to be nobles, in almost every country, the nobility did form the vast majority of the commissioned officer class in large part because of their higher education, in part because most nobilities passed to the eldest sons and therefore younger sons needed to find employment, and in some cases because commissions needed to be purchased and only the high borne could afford the expense of being an officer.

With time, and industrialization, formal military education by way of war colleges found their way into the systems of most countries. While some countries retained the need to be "upper class" for it's commissioned officers for quite some time, others turned more to merit especially as commoners started to receive public education and were found to be the equals of their upper class peers.

For the most part, the rest of the world went through similar stages as western society.

Currently the main division as between commissioned officers and the other ranks is their respective education levels and other competence evaluation systems. While some countries require university degrees for commissioning, others still accept candidates from lower level, usually matriculation levels, but then put them through a formal officer commissioning education process (such as Sandhurst)

So. Why does the army take newly commissioned officers and make them platoon commanders. Simple. To give them the experience they need to round out their formal leadership training. At every leadership stage for Army officers, there is a formal education component coupled with a practical experience component up to and including battalion command.

Would warrant officers make better platoon commanders. In all probability, absolutely. But then where does the junior commissioned officer get his experience? One example would be the officer training regime in the German inter-war Wehrmacht. Individuals who were evaluated and selected for officer training would take the same basic training as other recruits and subsequently train for, attend schools for and serve in several layers of ranks which were the equivalent of specific NCO ranks (and in units alongside regular NCOs) all the while being evaluated for their leadership abilities. At any time they could be found wanting and remain "in the ranks". It is only after having gone through this lengthy schooling, training and experience and probation (roughly two years) and being considered acceptable that the candidate would be commissioned as a second lieutenant.

In many ways, those units had many more troop leadership positions for NCO and in fact most platoons would be led by NCO. German infantry regiments (typically three infantry battalions of three rifle companies and a machine gun company each, a close support artillery battery, a close support anti-tank battery, a signal platoon, two motorcycle platoons and a pioneer platoon) would have on their establishment only 48 officers but 316 NCOs and 1,644 privates. In effect, a rifle company had two officers and 140 other ranks. The officers consisted of one captain as company commander and one lt/2ndLt who commanded the first platoon and deputy to the company commander. 

The lesson here quite simply is that you can easily staff many of the battalion level leadership positions with NCOs as long as you are willing to accept a lower ratio of officers to ORs (which also means a lower quantity of officers at the myriad of higher level staff positions - a situation which could be remedied by having more NCOs at higher level staff or a higher level of CFR'd officers there - both of which IMHO are desirable but are contradictory to the current "most commissioned officers must have degrees" policies) Again IMHO, considering how bloated our officer corp is, there is little appetite to change the system.

The Navy has a similar, albeit later, history as the Army. For most navies, however, navigation and sailing was, in many ways, a much more complex art than soldiering and there was an earlier drift towards education, especially navigation, than the Army. Post industrialization many of the same factors vis a vis an educated commissioned officer corp dictate the division between such officers and other, more technically oriented and skilled tradesmen other ranks.

I've never understood why the Air Force has every aircraft operated by one or more commissioned officers. We used to have flight sergeants and quite frankly I think that we still should and flight warrants could easily handle small tactical groups. We certainly do not need that many to feed the staff pyramids. More and more Air Force rank seems to be tied to pay and occupying the same mess rather than any leadership component. I presume much of it comes from the history of the formation of the air forces from volunteers amongst the numerous cavalry etc officers during WW1. Technical skill can easily be rewarded with pay supplements rather than rank while sufficient leaders to feed the system could be done through a limited number of flying status commissioned officers or through commissioning from the ranks.

425 Tac Fighter Sqn has 22 officers and 141 other ranks for give or take 12 aircraft; 436 Tpt Sqn has some 77 officers and 338 other ranks for give or take 17 aircraft; and 408 Tac Hel Sqn has 70 officers and 223 other ranks for give or take 16 aircraft. To me, that makes very little sense although I'm quite sure I'm about to get a heavy lecture on why an Air Force squadron needs more officers then the average infantry battalion (who are also already bloated).

Let the bun fights commence.

 :cheers:


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## Halifax Tar (8 Nov 2020)

I have been really struggling lately with something akin to this.  

I have 20+ years in the CAF now.  Multiple deployments at sea and on land.  I have done and excelled at my trade in all scenarios.  But an early 20 something year old is my boss.  Who not only lacks the "life experience"  but lacks the professional experience as well. 

The conundrum that rolls around in my brain is this; no PD or FD out there would take a 20 something off the street with some education and put them in charge of anything.  There is a long road of experience and competency that must be gained and proven to be put in those positions of leadership.  Yet we in the CAF poo poo on that and still trump experience with education.  I understand and appreciate the tying of Snr NCOs and Jr Officers together to help guide and train the youngins but that is only because that is the system we use, neigh inherited from the Britain. 

I find this is evident in the Naval Logistics world where our Officers will spend very very little time in operational positions (HOD or AHOD) and then spend the rest of their careers driving the Naval Logistics world.  Its my opinion the further away they get from their time as a HOD or AHOD the less relevant their experience becomes.  And yet these are the folks deciding policy and making decisions that have huge operational impacts on our fleet.  And the policy is poor IMHO.  

Personally, I dont think we need Naval Log Os to join through RMC or direct entry and any other avenue.  And I would like to see us go the route that the Med Tech world *did* and commission from the ranks soley as a means of officer production.  

I am in my first "staff" job, and its killing me.  Too long on ships and in the field I think.  I recently had a long an animated conversation about how my position isn't required and should be downgraded in rank.  I was told that Snr Officers wont listen to a PO2 or below and this is why we are staffed with PO1s and CPO2s.  I found this befuddling.  And I think screams that we do not take the experience and ability of ORs as we should and tie way too much to some thread on an epaulette, vice ones ability, knowledge and expertise.  

As for the cultural differences, neither service holds the prize of producing the best or worst officers.  Its completely individual, but I have to say from my limited dealings with RCAF officers they seem more inclined to use the experience of their Snr NCOs and show a greater interested in the lives of the non-commissioned ranks.


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## SeaKingTacco (8 Nov 2020)

In the RCAF, most officers (the smart ones, anyway- there are dolts everywhere) take the word and opinion of their NCMs quite seriously and treat them with respect. They are the ones repairing and maintaining our aircraft. They quite literally hold our lives in their hands.

I have had more than one occasion where, on the say so of a Cpl (obviously backed up and fact checked by the Det Chief- but the Cpl is the SME usually), I have gone to the CO of a ship and broke bad news or good news that has had a major impact on the ship and it’s operation. On occasion, I have brought the Cpl to the CO’s cabin with an offending part and asked them to explain the problem directly without any filter. It is good for both sides to do that. The Cpl gets to see the impact their actions have and the CO gets to see just how smart and capable most of our techs are.

This is quite literally the definition of a strategic Cpl.


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## Navy_Pete (8 Nov 2020)

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Looking forward to this discussion.
> 
> Very outsider view: the Navy's approach to officers, and the shipboard environment, sees them substantially better trained/experienced before they're in a position to substantially and independently affect NCMs, and the ship, compared to the battalion, is of necessity an environment where most of the people you come in contact with, outside of your department, would be novices at _your_ job, however skilled they are at their own, including the CO and coxswain. Equally, the SLt NWO's job isn't done while also having to be sufficiently good as (say) a boatswain to keep up with S1 boatswains, unlike a platoon commander.



Don't forget about NTOs; a big part of my OJT was effectively learning how to do the roundman and watchkeeper jobs by shadowing the ODs, LS and MS (S3, S1 and MS now I guess). Technical competence was part of it, but basically got the bulk of my training from the NCMs and NCOs, so they generally took time to actually mentor you, and that went beyond just how systems worked. I wouldn't have passed my board without the help I got from the CERA and some of the PO1s, but also learned all kinds of things from them about how to actually make the department work that made the actual leadership position a lot easier, while also winning a bit of trust by jumping in and volunteering to do the really dirty jobs alongside them while a subbie. That also made it much easier to call BS about someone saying it was too hard, couldn't be done, or would take longer then it should, while also appreciating why some things will take a lot longer then you think or maybe shouldn't be done at sea.

Most of the folks I worked with in the Navy seemed to hold the view that it was their chance to make a juniour officer into a decent one. You had to take the advice with a bit of a grain of salt and figure it out for yourself, but almost never saw the same kind of thing you hear about in the army (with the exception of some complete soup sandwhiches that didn't listen to advice or direction from anyone and were just dangerous to be in charge).

Suspect it's highly trade dependent and really will vary with how it runs everyone's training, but generally found the NCOs in other departments did the same when I was working with them.

I popped out the other end with the idea that I'm responsible for the people in the org chart below me (vice they work for me). Lead to some sleepless nights worrying about if I was dropping the ball, but I think generally made me a better leader. Not really sure I'd have had the same attitude if I was getting undercut or belittled while I was going through training, and probably wouldn't have gone out on a wing to the detriment of my own career on a few occasions as a result .


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## dimsum (8 Nov 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> In the RCAF, most officers (the smart ones, anyway- there are dolts everywhere) take the word and opinion of their NCMs quite seriously and treat them with respect. They are the ones repairing and maintaining our aircraft. They quite literally hold our lives in their hands.
> 
> I have had more than one occasion where, on the say so of a Cpl (obviously backed up and fact checked by the Det Chief- but the Cpl is the SME usually), I have gone to the CO of a ship and broke bad news or good news that has had a major impact on the ship and it’s operation. On occasion, I have brought the Cpl to the CO’s cabin with an offending part and asked them to explain the problem directly without any filter. It is good for both sides to do that. The Cpl gets to see the impact their actions have and the CO gets to see just how smart and capable most of our techs are.
> 
> This is quite literally the definition of a strategic Cpl.



This is even more evident with NCM aircrew.  Pilots and ACSOs learn to trust their AESOPs, FEs, SAR Techs, and Loadies, regardless of rank.


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## BurmaShave (8 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I've never understood why the Air Force has every aircraft operated by one or more commissioned officers. We used to have flight sergeants and quite frankly I think that we still should and flight warrants could easily handle small tactical groups. We certainly do not need that many to feed the staff pyramids. More and more Air Force rank seems to be tied to pay and occupying the same mess rather than any leadership component. I presume much of it comes from the history of the formation of the air forces from volunteers amongst the numerous cavalry etc officers during WW1. Technical skill can easily be rewarded with pay supplements rather than rank while sufficient leaders to feed the system could be done through a limited number of flying status commissioned officers or through commissioning from the ranks.



Well, the "doctrine" reason for that is fairly simple, and isn't pay or WWI tradition. It comes down to formal authority. Aircrew exist to take aircraft over the horizon and do the Queen's (very indirect) bidding. That requires authority for decision making beyond arms reach of the CoC, which "by the book" is the role of an officer. In theory, this could be a guy in the back (and is with ACSO Mission Commanders), but it makes more sense to vest authority for the aircraft in the aircraft experts vice the systems experts.

I'm also going to echo G2G and note that pilots are in leadership roles from very early stages. I'm the closest thing the RCAF has to a "flight sergeant", a young technical specialist pilot. My "degree" was just 2 years of dubiously related academics tacked on to make a "4 year bachelor's" when combined with flight training. Despite that, in a scant few years (assuming I continue to not suck), the system expects that I'll be an aircraft captain. I'll be expected to sign for an aircraft with a dozen souls onboard, and go forth to "do", with associated responsibility (and trust in my NCM experts). So you could, I suppose, make me a flying Cpl as an FO, but then will you commission me when I upgrade to AC? We could make a special category for pilots, like the US Army Aviation Warrant Officer, and vest that category with the aforementioned authority to command aircraft. Of course, they'd have to be paid appropriately (otherwise Air Canada comes knocking, a unique pressure of the trade), so really you're not changing anything. It solves "officer bloat", and replaces it with "AvWO bloat", while limiting your selection pool for promotion and command.


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## Lumber (8 Nov 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I have been really struggling lately with something akin to this.
> 
> I have 20+ years in the CAF now.  Multiple deployments at sea and on land.  I have done and excelled at my trade in all scenarios.  But an early 20 something year old is my boss.  Who not only lacks the "life experience"  but lacks the professional experience as well.
> 
> ...



I think this would be a solid justification for warrant officers within the engineering and logistics world.


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## Halifax Tar (8 Nov 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> I think this would be a solid justification for warrant officers within the engineering and logistics world.



Its funny you say that.  I have been thinking similar paths as well.  To expand on that further, with the creation of the CPO1/CWO Occupation and removal of said ranks from their former trades there has been a loss of practical and technical trade knowledge that was previously relied upon, while no reinforcement of the CPO2/MWO has happened.  Perhaps the creation of Warrant Officers akin to those used by the USN for the Eng and Log branches would go a long way in improving the technical oversight and governance of those trades and operations.  Does the USN employ these folks as HODs ? 

I do have admit my knowledge of the USN's employment of Warrant Officers is rudimentary at best.  But my thought is that they lay somewhere between an NCO and an Officer.


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## blacktriangle (8 Nov 2020)

What about something akin to the USN Limited Duty Officer (LDO)?


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## dimsum (8 Nov 2020)

reveng said:
			
		

> What about something akin to the USN Limited Duty Officer (LDO)?



What is the difference between LDO and "standard" officers?


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## SupersonicMax (8 Nov 2020)

reveng said:
			
		

> What about something akin to the USN Limited Duty Officer (LDO)?



The only difference is that they are commissioned from the ranks, don’t need a degree and cannot command (although this is changing).

Not sure what we would gain from it.  We don’t have a shortage of interested applicants for the jobs.  We have a shortage of experienced operators.  This would not fix that issue.


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## PPCLI Guy (8 Nov 2020)

The degree thig.  Sigh.  I commanded a lot of troops in two different Armies and on operations before I got  a degree....


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## Cloud Cover (8 Nov 2020)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> The degree thig.  Sigh.  I commanded a lot of troops in two different Armies and on operations before I got  a degree....



A graduate of the University of Adversity.


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## SupersonicMax (8 Nov 2020)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> The degree thig.  Sigh.  I commanded a lot of troops in two different Armies and on operations before I got  a degree....



I am not saying I am an advocate of a degree to pursue the Officer route but rather that the system is not worth changing towards and LDO avenue given it would not fix our issues.


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## PPCLI Guy (8 Nov 2020)

I know that I am an outlier, making it to LCol with Gr 11 Quebec.  I get that.  But still.  

Not sure it makes much of a difference in every case.  My BA was a degree in tick in the box from RMC - I did a 3 year BA in 10 months by correspondence as a prerequisite for command.  Not sure I learned a whole bunch in that time...and that same RMC refused to accept their own degree as a prerequisite for my Masters.  Fortunately, I got one from a really good university instead.

Just saying


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## Brash (8 Nov 2020)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not sure it makes much of a difference in every case.  My BA was a degree in tick in the box from RMC - I did a 3 year BA in 10 months by correspondence as a prerequisite for command.  Not sure I learned a whole bunch in that time...and that same RMC refused to accept their own degree as a prerequisite for my Masters.  Fortunately, I got one from a really good university instead.



You did a three year BA in 10 months.
Between 30-42 credits of classes in 10 months.
That doesn't fit.

What degree exactly was this?


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## PPCLI Guy (8 Nov 2020)

A BMASc with a lot of PLAR.

The last two months of that 10 month BA were spent in the field standing up a TF to go to AStan.  I took a day off just before the final ex to write 4 exams.  Like I said - I am an outlier.


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## blacktriangle (8 Nov 2020)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> The only difference is that they are commissioned from the ranks, don’t need a degree and cannot command (although this is changing).



To be fair, those are pretty big differences...and it doesn't have to be done the exact same way as they do it.

I was merely suggesting that something along those lines might do a better job of providing an experienced leader/technical manager to fill certain positions, and that might have knock-on effects with the retention of experienced operators & techs. 

But at the same time, you're probably right. Not worth pursuing, and even if it was, not likely to happen.


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## Navy_Pete (9 Nov 2020)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I know that I am an outlier, making it to LCol with Gr 11 Quebec.  I get that.  But still.
> 
> Not sure it makes much of a difference in every case.  My BA was a degree in tick in the box from RMC - I did a 3 year BA in 10 months by correspondence as a prerequisite for command.  Not sure I learned a whole bunch in that time...and that same RMC refused to accept their own degree as a prerequisite for my Masters.  Fortunately, I got one from a really good university instead.
> 
> Just saying



I think most CFRs retire at two ringer or two and a half; usually an age thing. Have learned a lot from some of them, but numbers wise for the most part them switching to officers would just leave us short of PO1s and up, while we can fill the eng/log jobs with uni grads easily enough. I think the fact that we have a mix of CFRs, UTPNCMs and ROTP/DEOs is healthy, but can't see any reason why you wouldn't listen to a MS or juniour public servant actually doing the job if you are doing something policy wise. In a related note, think everyone should have to work some kind of retail/customer service job early in life; nothing like being at the bottom of the hill to figure out how not to treat people.


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## FJAG (9 Nov 2020)

BurmaShave said:
			
		

> ... We could make a special category for pilots, like the US Army Aviation Warrant Officer, and vest that category with the aforementioned authority to command aircraft. Of course, they'd have to be paid appropriately (otherwise Air Canada comes knocking, a unique pressure of the trade), so really you're not changing anything. It solves "officer bloat", and replaces it with "AvWO bloat", while limiting your selection pool for promotion and command.



I'm actually quite a fan of the warrant officer concept as its used in the US Army.

Pay wise, the US Army W1 to W5 classifications are roughly on par with the O1 to 05 pay categories (i.e 2nd Lt to LCol) Aviation WOs are entitled to the same aviation incentive pay as commissioned officers (USD 125 to 1,000 depending on years of experience [as a side note AvIP decreases after 22 years of aviation service]). Their rank puts their authority above all enlisted members and below all commissioned officers. They can enroll with a high school education and are immediately put through a warrant officer qualifying course and then aviation training. 

What I like about the concept is that it allows individuals to obtain major technical skills and expertise and continue to be employed throughout their careers in that field without frequently being hived off on staff appointments or courses designed for general leadership or administrative or academic upward movement. It allows the force to balance it's leadership arm between those requiring a high degree of technical skill and knowledge and those required to acquire broader service knowledge to prepare them for higher office.

We could have many uses for the rank structure over and above aviation such as higher paid technical specialist which could be recruited from the street for such things as cyber warfare, antonymous and semi antonymous weapons and sensor systems operators, criminal investigation services, equipment maintenance services etc.

I would think as well, with a US style WO system there would be a lesser need for low level command positions to develop the large herds of officers that we now put through the system and therefore provide a greater opportunity for Snr NCOs (for convenience sake lets call them staff sergeants) to be put into platoon commander positions within battalions and regiments.

As an OCTP graduate myself (who earned his professional degree after commissioning and several years of service) I've never truly understood the current degreed officer requirement. Yup. I've read the rationale and understand fully what it says but I find it unconvincing. There are significantly better ways to develop officers then by having them take what is essentially a four year mostly civilian degree program. All the marching around the parade square in a red uniform and doing beast barracks (or its subdued equivalent) does not create an officer. It's the DP1 summer course and time with the troops that does that. WIMHO, we're essentially wasting some very valuable formative years on "could knows" rather than "must knows".

 :cheers:


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## Good2Golf (9 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm actually quite a fan of the warrant officer concept as its used in the US Army.
> 
> Pay wise, the US Army W1 to W5 classifications are roughly on par with the O1 to 05 pay categories (i.e 2nd Lt to LCol) Aviation WOs are entitled to the same aviation incentive pay as commissioned officers (USD 125 to 1,000 depending on years of experience [as a side note AvIP decreases after 22 years of aviation service]). Their rank puts their authority above all enlisted members and below all commissioned officers. They can enroll with a high school education and are immediately put through a warrant officer qualifying course and then aviation training.
> 
> What I like about the concept is that it allows individuals to obtain major technical skills and expertise and continue to be employed throughout their careers in that field without frequently being hived off on staff appointments or courses designed for general leadership or administrative or academic upward movement. It allows the force to balance it's leadership arm between those requiring a high degree of technical skill and knowledge and those required to acquire broader service knowledge to prepare them for higher office.



FJAG, care to guess which Mess a WO1 through CW5 is a member of? 

I agree that for a highly specialized, technically demanding operator MOSID, the US Army Aviator WO program is an excellent variant to the standard Officer-only or Officer-NCM blended MOSIDs.  I suspect, however, it would never be looked into seriously by Canada for three reasons: 1) Canada would most likely be inclined to us the UK Army Air Corps model of existing NCM ranks; 2) Canada’s existing NCM rank structure already have several degrees of warranted and petty officers, where as the US Army has only a plethora of Sergeant grades, so there was no confusion as to where the WOs sat in the pecking order; and 3) it only works because the US Army has an aviation branch of its own, unlike Canada.  My experience with US Army Aviator WOs has been outstanding. There is minimal ‘us-them’ type of interaction in any form across the three rank groupings (Offr/WO/NCM) and the universal near-reverence of the CW5 at unit-level up to the CSA is impressive to see in action. 

Regards
G2G


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## Journeyman (9 Nov 2020)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> My BA was a degree in tick in the box from RMC


Did you buy a ring from the kit shop so people would respect you more?


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## Old Sweat (9 Nov 2020)

This true story illustrates a bit of the officer/NCM relationship, at least as it was 50 years ago. 

Scene: the Canadian Forces School of Artillery (daren't use Royal anymore) in its last months in CFB Shilo. I had just finished instructing on the 6B course and had moved across to assist on the final phase of the IG Course. Break time, and I had just finished a coffee in the stand easy area and was waking my cup in the adjacent recycled old laundry tubs/entrance area.

I heard a party of three or four AIsG Warrants and Sergeants enter the stand east. This is a short time after the devastating 1970 force cuts and three year budget freeze had been announced. The Land element (use of the terms navy, army, and air force were verboten.) was loosing maybe 25% of its establishment, and the gunners were hit harder than that. Morale was lower than whale poop, and the future of the forces and of our regiment was very much in doubt. DArty had just sent out a missive full of gloom and doom, suggesting member should consider remustering so as to preserve their careers.

I was about to join them, when a voice I recognized said, words to the effect, "This is really bad. I've never seen anything like it. We are really going to have to bear down and work our butts off to get the artillery through this" and the others agreed. "Oh no" thinks me, "if they knew an officer had heard them, there would be mass suicides". So, I reached behind me, opened and shut the entry door, scruffed my feet, and entering the stand easy said "Any coffee?" This provoked a predictable burst of bitching about the system, and how it had let them down, and if they had any brains, they would get out, etc, etc, etc. 

I had known the sergeant who started the exchange since I was a second lieutenant. He was very good at everything he touched, even with a reputation as a world class motor mouth. He went on to be BSM of the Airborne Battery in 1974 in Cyprus and RSM of 2 RCHA. Hopefully he is still happily bitching away on one hand, and providing an example of dedication and integrity on the other.


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## Halifax Tar (9 Nov 2020)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> This true story illustrates a bit of the officer/NCM relationship, at least as it was 50 years ago.
> 
> Scene: the Canadian Forces School of Artillery (daren't use Royal anymore) in its last months in CFB Shilo. I had just finished instructing on the 6B course and had moved across to assist on the final phase of the IG Course. Break time, and I had just finished a coffee in the stand easy area and was waking my cup in the adjacent recycled old laundry tubs/entrance area.
> 
> ...



Kind of like "Treat officers like mushrooms, feed them Sh!t and keep them in the dark" ?

I dont like that method.  But I have def heard it thrown around in the C&POs messes.


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## PPCLI Guy (9 Nov 2020)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Did you buy a ring from the kit shop so people would respect you more?



I did think about getting one made with a giant zirconium so I could knock it loudly....


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## Navy_Pete (9 Nov 2020)

I've only ever seen that once; the guy got laughed out of the weirdroom and roundly ridiculed.

Was pretty funny, didn't realize people thought that was a real thing.


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## FJAG (9 Nov 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> FJAG, care to guess which Mess a WO1 through CW5 is a member of?



They're members of the Officers' Club on post. Although my understanding is that Officers' Clubs themselves are dying out and being replaced by all ranks' clubs on most posts.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I agree that for a highly specialized, technically demanding operator MOSID, the US Army Aviator WO program is an excellent variant to the standard Officer-only or Officer-NCM blended MOSIDs.  I suspect, however, it would never be looked into seriously by Canada for three reasons: 1) Canada would most likely be inclined to us the UK Army Air Corps model of existing NCM ranks; 2) Canada’s existing NCM rank structure already have several degrees of warranted and petty officers, where as the US Army has only a plethora of Sergeant grades, so there was no confusion as to where the WOs sat in the pecking order; and 3) it only works because the US Army has an aviation branch of its own, unlike Canada.  My experience with US Army Aviator WOs has been outstanding. There is minimal ‘us-them’ type of interaction in any form across the three rank groupings (Offr/WO/NCM) and the universal near-reverence of the CW5 at unit-level up to the CSA is impressive to see in action.
> 
> Regards
> G2G



I sincerely doubt we'll do it either for the same reason.

I like the variety of uses of WOs in the US Army. For example, in my more recent book series which involve a Florida detachment of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) a number of my key characters are WOs. Within CID none of the investigators are "MP officers". Each battalion has an "MP officer" as CO who essentially does command and administrative functions (as do other MP officers on the staff) however, all investigations are handled by WOs or NCOs (or civilian) special agents. Detachments are commanded by WO2s or 3s and the overall OiC of investigations in the battalion is the Ops O who is a WO, generally a WO4 with a WO5 generally being the Ops O for a CID Group. (Note that there are also MP NCOs in non-investigation staff positions up to and including a battalion or group Command Sergeant Major)

There are WOs in some 21 branches in the US Army from special forces, to artillery, to the JAG, to military intelligence, to the cyber corps etc.

I like that system.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (10 Nov 2020)

Lumber said:
			
		

> A junior enlisted member of the US army commented on a facebook post I saw (about what I can't even remember), but his comment read simply "Why do we even have Officers"?



I discovered the answer to that question in 1982, in Northern Ireland.

I was posted there fresh out of training and took over a platoon that was, well, p*ssed off, tired and a little bit scared.

The previous Pl Comd had been 'reassigned' for performance issues unknown to me, and they had been driven like cattle by an Acting Pl Comd, the Pl Sgt, who was a bully and had also, apparently, stolen the Platoon Fund. On a previous tour, a very busy one not too many months previously, a few had been blown up by a moderately sized RCIED (no serious casualties fortunately). 

So I started off by going first and last. All the time. I went through every hedge first and got on every extract chopper/ covert vehicle pickup last. On permanent VCPs I was the first one to start picking up garbage left around by the locals ('could be booby trapped sir!') and basically shamed them into doing the same until the place started looking good. This also removed any possible obvious cover for IEDs. I took the crappiest shifts on patrol and search programs and, on route clearance ops, I was the first to clear any suspicious pieces of flotsam that looked a bit dodgy, and forced everyone to wade through rivers and swamps where they were less likely to be nailed by an IED. Pretty soon, no surprise, others took their turns going first too. I was the last one to go on leave (which wasn't such a big deal as I got there about three weeks late).

I ignored the Pl Sgt (when I finally got around to watching 'Platoon' I noted that he was the spitting image of Sgt Barnes) and led through the Section Commanders who were all very capable, experienced and ethical/honourable men. I elevated several of the best Private soldiers to 'brick commander', our standard four man team, and asked them and the other leaders for input before we issued the patrol programs or conducted other tasks, 99% of which were routine.

I don't know if they liked me or not and couldn't really care less. I tried not to play favourites, drove everyone pretty hard, made my fair share of mistakes and owned up to them and learned, and just kept moving forward.

No one died. No was injured. No one even got sick which, in the Northern Irish cow pastures/ rain forest, was more of a miracle than the IRA not trying us on. We accomplished every task we were handed. I even managed to talk the OC into letting me take the platoon on a hill walking adventure training exercise for a couple of days in the Mourne Mountains, a particularly surreal little excursion to undertake in the middle of a war (that required every soldier to already walk hundreds of miles as part of their daily jobs  ). 

I was 21 years old. I'm pretty sure most of my colleagues were doing pretty much the same thing as I was.

So that's how I figured out what Officers were for. Going first, and last, mostly.


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## SeaKingTacco (10 Nov 2020)

Junior Officers in the Army provide a useful combination of youth, energy and eagerness that most Pl/Tp WOs no longer possess.

Harnessed and channelled correctly and in combination with the wisdom and experience of good Sgts/WO to provide advice and guidance, it can be a force for good.


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## FJAG (10 Nov 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Junior Officers in the Army provide a useful combination of youth, energy and eagerness that most Pl/Tp WOs no longer possess.
> 
> Harnessed and channelled correctly and in combination with the wisdom and experience of good Sgts/WO to provide advice and guidance, it can be a force for good.



Ran into that in the late 70s when I was a battery captain and had to sort it out. At the time we had a battery consisting of herds of new junior officers and young fresh gunners but a senior NCO group on the gun line who'd been around since the late 50s and had seen it all dozens times over.

Their lack of interest in doing anything on the gun position beyond the bare minimum to get rounds downrange was palpable. Took a few quiet cups of coffee with the BSM at the battery's field kitchen to sort it out.

 :cheers:


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## hattrick72 (10 Nov 2020)

I've have seen, this is why we have officers. They need to communicate effectively


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## MilEME09 (10 Nov 2020)

hattrick72 said:
			
		

> I've have seen, this is why we have officers. They need to communicate effectively



In my experience its not that they don't communicate, it is that they do not ask the right questions. I have seen a fair number of bad officers become good ones because they started asking the right questions to their Jr and Snr NCO's. 

"In regards to officer training, the role of the NCO is to advise the the officer on issues that effect non commissioned members. If the officer is unwilling to act, or listen it is time to find a new officer" -  J. D. Pendry, The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs


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## rmc_wannabe (10 Nov 2020)

My experience with officers and NCOs has been one of 3 distinctions: Leadership, Responsibility, and Command Authority.

Firstly, leadership is a trait we instill in all CAF members from day one. Being a good follower is part of being a good leader. Motivating peers, Course Senior, all of it lends to developing leadership and followership in every rank from Pte to General. Some are better than others, however, this is especially crucial for Officers and Snr NCOs.

Secondly, responsibility is something anyone put in a position of authority must maintain. Ultimately, being put in charge of people, whether its a fireteam or a Brigade lends itself to having good leadership qualities that are not mutually attributable to Officer or NCO alike.

Where it comes down to the major difference, I have to say its the burden of command authority. When things go completely south, someone needs to be able to step forward and say "I told them to do it. I will take the heat." The RSM has responsibility, he's a leader in his own right, but he doesn't have Command Authority. The CO does. Any decisions or orders passed can have the advice and input of the RSM, but ultimately, its the CO that is putting his own personal capital forward and signing his name to it. That is the major difference I see. Having aptitude to command, much like D&B said, is taking one for the team, and taking ownership for the shortcomings of your team. Some do it very well, others do not.


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## SeaKingTacco (10 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In my experience its not that they don't communicate, it is that they do not ask the right questions. I have seen a fair number of bad officers become good ones because they started asking the right questions to their Jr and Snr NCO's.
> 
> "In regards to officer training, the role of the NCO is to advise the the officer on issues that effect non commissioned members. If the officer is unwilling to act, or listen it is time to find a new officer" -  J. D. Pendry, The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs



I disagree with your quote, because it is incomplete. In most units, NCOs are the repository of both corporate knowledge and technical expertise. So, it is not (narrowly) advising officers on issues affecting non-commissioned members (which sounds a bit like a shop steward) that is the really important bit, it is the other two.

In units that I have seen that seem to run like a swiss clock, the constant is a deep respect between officers and NCOs and easy, frank communication. It is not that NCOs always get their way: it is that they always feel that they were heard.


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## MilEME09 (10 Nov 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I disagree with your quote, because it is incomplete. In most units, NCOs are the repository of both corporate knowledge and technical expertise. So, it is not (narrowly) advising officers on issues affecting non-commissioned members (which sounds a bit like a shop steward) that is the really important bit, it is the other two.
> 
> In units that I have seen that seem to run like a swiss clock, the constant is a deep respect between officers and NCOs and easy, frank communication. It is not that NCOs always get their way: it is that they always feel that they were heard.



My fault for not providing context, in this case training is referring to learning not day to day operations. I agree the knowledge base is important as your NCOs are subject matter experts in their respective fields. The argument made by the book can be summed up by saying that as SME if someone isn't willing to listen to your knowledge and experience, they might not be worth investing your time in.


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## Furniture (23 Nov 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> In units that I have seen that seem to run like a swiss clock, the constant is a deep respect between officers and NCOs and easy, frank communication. It is not that NCOs always get their way: it is that they always feel that they were heard.



I agree 100% with this. 

I think the issue comes from a small number of officers who think they know best, and a small number of NCOs who dislike being told no. Over the span of nearly 20 years I have had the displeasure of working for only  q few officers who were too self important to listen to anyone below them. 

One even tried to explain to me how to use a Regional 4 panel chart to "forecast" the weather... Literally stood in front of the ships weather forecaster and tried to explain a chart he didn't understand.


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## dimsum (23 Nov 2020)

Furniture said:
			
		

> I agree 100% with this.
> 
> I think the issue comes from a small number of officers who think they know best, and a small number of NCOs who dislike being told no. Over the span of nearly 20 years I have had the displeasure of working for only  q few officers who were too self important to listen to anyone below them.
> 
> One even tried to explain to me how to use a Regional 4 panel chart to "forecast" the weather... Literally stood in front of the ships weather forecaster and tried to explain a chart he didn't understand.



I heard a story that one of the officers on a multi-crew aircraft which name rhymes with "Schurora" was trying to micromanage the sensors.  So, the sensor operators just left and went to the galley and had their meal.


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## Furniture (24 Nov 2020)

Dimsum said:
			
		

> I heard a story that one of the officers on a multi-crew aircraft which name rhymes with "Schurora" was trying to micromanage the sensors.  So, the sensor operators just left and went to the galley and had their meal.



I'm sure the message was received lol.  ;D

In my case I just started explaining what all the squiggly lines he was pointing at were called, and how they are used in forecasting... my message didn't get through.  :facepalm:


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## SeaKingTacco (24 Nov 2020)

Furniture said:
			
		

> I'm sure the message was received lol.  ;D
> 
> In my case I just started explaining what all the squiggly lines he was pointing at were called, and how they are used in forecasting... my message didn't get through.  :facepalm:



Isobars?

Not just another pretty face...  ;D


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## Kat Stevens (24 Nov 2020)

I was an AVLB operator for a looong time, and had a rep as being the fastest bridge in the west, within the limits of the machine. We were doing our umpteenth combat team attack of the ex, rotating field troops, and therefore troop commanders, through the obstacle breaching portions. 1 and 2 troop TCs were more than happy with me telling them I needed four minutes from rolling up to the obstacle to me being out of the way and the crossing open. The 3 troop commander insisted I do it in three, despite being told it wasn't mechanically possible. At the commander's mud map meeting, which our crews attended as SMEs, the TC went through how the breach was to be conducted. He promised 9er three minutes to breach. He raised his eyebrow, looked at me and asked if that was accurate. I didn't want to throw the young guy under the bus, so shuffled my feet and hemmed and hawed a bit. Sadly the TC took it out of my hands by opening his mouth. That and a couple of other brain farts ensured he didn't stay in the regiment long.


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## Furniture (24 Nov 2020)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Isobars?
> 
> Not just another pretty face...  ;D



Indeed, at least on one of the four pannels. Apparently you did listen when I was briefing.  ;D


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## SeaKingTacco (24 Nov 2020)

Furniture said:
			
		

> Indeed, at least on one of the four pannels. Apparently you did listen when I was briefing.  ;D



Once in a while...my life depended on it!


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