# Air Mobile Army



## Tuna

I was reading an article on how Afghanistan has turned the Canadian Army into a much more "air mobile" force, this means helicopters (I believe). I am not sure about the date of this article as I was just browsing the web. Also, not too long ago I watched an army news report on how engineers and artillery were for "the first time in many years" forming their own jump troops. My question is how many engineers and artillerymen are actually involved in air mobile and paratrooper training and operations? is it just a small amount of hype or has there been a large change towards air mobile/paratrooper operations among the combat arms (other than infantry)? What is the purpose of having engineers and artillery included? are the engineers there for building/demolitions or breaching minefields/recon or are they simply acting as infantry for the most part? Do the artillery bring mortars with them or are they acting as infantry as well?

And another related post that may or may not be considered radio chatter (please correct me if this is the wrong place to put these questions)
How do you feel about this change? What do you all think it means for the future CF? 

See the video mentioned here:
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=5463


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## MikeL

From what I've seen 2CMBG is really on the lead/pushing the Airborne/Air Mobile piece - 2CER and 2RCHA each have XX amount of pers jump qualified/tasked with supporting the 3RCR Jump Coy.  I know C Bty 1RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy, not sure if 1CER has a specific troop tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy though. Unless things have changed since I left 1 Bde, outside of 3VP Jump Coy no one wears Maroon berets, unlike 2CMBG where the Engineers and Arty tasked with supporting 3RCR Jump Coy are wearing the Maroon beret.

As for the Air Mobile piece that isn't something new, it's been trained with on excercises for years, and before Afghanistan.  Having Engineers and Arty supporting Infantry isn't new either, or specific to Airborne/Air Mobile operations.



Purpose of having them, off the top of my head and very simplified.. Artillery - provide the Infantry with FOO/FACs, indirect fire, etc.  Engineers enable the Infantry to get to where they need to go(ie they breach walls, doors), dealing with IED/UXO, BIP caches, etc.   Also they both can be extra rifles when they aren't doing their trade specific role when out on patrol/operation.

Yes, the Gunners can/do jump with Mortars,  Gunners aren't brought out without their kit just to be out there and not do their job.

Theres a very basic non SME answer, and I'm sure someone more qualified/experienced will come by and give a much more detailed answer/insight.

*edit
For clarity on what I'm referring to

Airborne - Paratroopers jumping out of planes/helicopters
Air Mobile/Assault - Helicopters transporting troops to a LZ


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## a_majoor

The wheel is turning yet again.

Back in the 1970's (?) the Canadian Airborne Regiment began bulking up with more jump qualified attachments, including such things as a battery of 105mm artillery firing a lightweight howitzer and jump qualified Armoured Recce (although I don't recall if the "Lynx" recce vehicles were ever parachuted in on any exercise; at least I never heard of this myself during the 1980's to 1994...). There was even a "Service Commando" to jump in to provide logistical support; the Airborne Regiment had become the heart of a small airborne battle group.

Sadly, as times changed the supporting jump troops/batteries/companies etc. were lost and the Airborne Regiment slowly morphed back into a "light" parachute battalion. We all know the rest of the story, but one thing that seems clear is the institutional support fot the Airborne Regiment had been leaking away for many years before their demise.


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## Colin Parkinson

The New Westminister Regiment was also tasked in the 80's to provide a jump qualified platoon.


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## MikeL

Colin P said:
			
		

> The New Westminister Regiment was also tasked in the 80's to provide a jump qualified platoon.



* Royal Westminster Regiment
Airborne Platoon 1985-1993
http://www.army.gc.ca/iaol/143000440001719/143000440001729/index-Eng.html

Also, Queens Own Rifles are the only Reserve unit now with the Airborne tasking; 1983 - Present
2 Platoons + Coy HQ
http://www.qor.com/history/history.html


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## OldSolduer

The word "air mobile" does not always denote "airborne".

Air-mobile, to me, means helicopters. 

Airborne means soldiers that jump out of perfectly serviceable aircraft.

SO - are we talking air mobile or airborne?


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## Old Sweat

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> The word "air mobile" does not always denote "airborne".
> 
> Air-mobile, to me, means helicopters.



Exactly.  

Afghanistan has probably made a lot of people aware of the capabilities and limitations of moving troops, equipment and supplies by helicopter. I would not describe that as an air mobile army, which means to my mind a force that is structured and trained in helicopter movement as its main means of tactical transport across the battlefield.


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## Canadian.Trucker

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Exactly.
> 
> Afghanistan has probably made a lot of people aware of the capabilities and limitations of moving troops, equipment and supplies by helicopter. I would not describe that as an air mobile army, which means to my mind a force that is structured and trained in helicopter movement as its main means of tactical transport across the battlefield.


I agree that it has not made us an airmobile army, but I would like to think that it opened the doors as to how valuable the use of helicopters in multiple roles is valuable and that we should invest more time/training/money in the pursuit of building this capability.

Forgive the run-on sentence.


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## Old Sweat

Agreed, and I have seen, heck I've written, some real doozies of run on sentences.

If the experience has raised our awareness, good. There are all sort of techniques and little wrinkles that really make moving by helicopter easy. I suspect most of them are known by most folks that have done any number of moves. Heck, there probably is a four inch thick CFP somewhere.


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## R933ex

The LERs and the Regiment du Saguenay also had jump platoons during the same time.


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## OldSolduer

Nomad933 said:
			
		

> The LERs and the Regiment du Saguenay also had jump platoons during the same time.



That's very nice. 

How often have the jump companies actually parachuted into combat lately?


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## MedCorps

It is not conducting airborne operations that is the important concept, it is the ability to conduct airborne operations.  

//start side note//

I was in a meeting not too long ago and the same questions were being asked about the need for the conventional Regular Force to be able to conduct airborne operations. It was agreed by the higher ups that this is a capability worth keeping for a myriad of reasons, some better than others. 

One of the notables from the meeting was that the propensity to conduct airborne operations currently limited by the in service parachute (CT-1).  There is some concern that due to the increased weight of paratroopers + gear that the rate of decent is pushing the limits of safety (with respect to risk of injuries and malfunctions). 

Once it was agreed upon that the retention of an airborne capability was in the cards it was decided that an interim parachute procurement should commence immediately to bridge the gap until a new parachute system is procured in 2015-16.  

Looks like we will not follow one of our Commonwealth brethren who have dropped / decreased their airborne capability. 

//end side note///

MC


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## Kirkhill

Does shipping Leos, AHSVSs and TAPVs into theatre by means of C-17s (non-tactical moves) also contribute to having an Air Mobile Army?  Or is Air Mobile strictly a tactical construct?

Edited to add:

How about Rifle Coys arriving by CC-150 and JTF2 types arriving by CC-144?


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## Journeyman

To carry on the parachute tangent....


			
				Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Airborne means soldiers that jump out of perfectly serviceable aircraft.


Actually, one doesn't jump out of a perfectly serviceable aircraft, you jump _into_ perfectly good air -- that's why, on the civie side, it's called "skydiving" and not "plane-leaving."  ;D

Besides, the more pilots I know, the more I like getting out.  :nod:




			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> There is some concern that due to the increased weight of paratroopers + gear that the rate of decent is pushing the limits of safety (with respect to risk of injuries and malfunctions).
> 
> Once it was agreed upon that the retention of an airborne capability was in the cards it was decided that an interim parachute procurement should commence immediately to bridge the gap until a new parachute system is procured in 2015-16.


I'm not sure how the weight/increased malfunction equation works. As it stands, a CT-1 parachute has a suspended weight limitation of 170 kg -- rest assured, there is some fudge-factor included in that; if a troop can carry the ruck, I'm sure the weight is within CT-1 limits without causing any specific malfunction. As for injuries, yes increased descent speed will increase injuries. However, that is likely only a factor if you're going to land with your ruck, rather than lowering it.

That being said, CFLAWC/Airborne Trials and Evaluation has been conducting trials on two replacement 'chutes: 

The SF-10A is a static-line mass drop steerable round canopy, 
assuming we'll do mass drops with troops smarter than the CT-1 parachute.  




*SF-10*

The T-11/T11R (the  Advanced Tactical Parachute System - ATPS 
[with "R" being the reserve version) is being tested as the next 
generation static-line deployed non-steerable parachute system. 



*T-11*


I now return you to your swing-wing talk, already in progress 
(...because, yes,  "airborne" = parachute; "air mobile" = helicopter)


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## GnyHwy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Does shipping Leos, AHSVSs and TAPVs into theatre by means of C-17s (non-tactical moves) also contribute to having an Air Mobile Army?  Or is Air Mobile strictly a tactical construct?



Anything by C-17 would be strategic lift, and with our current number of C-17s, it would likely be more efficient to transport by ship; unless you're only sending a Coy size element. 

Air mobile is tactical/operational.  With our 2021 concepts, we are expected to operate in full spectrum Ops in a battlespace that is likely very large and in that concept, there is not much mention of airmobile.  I think it is a major army capability that is missing.  Army/Airforce integration has a long way to go, and I'm not talking about the abilities of the troops or aircrew, I am talking about the policy to back it.

Also, from a fire supporter perspective, I hope that some day we can add air assault to this conversation.


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## Old Sweat

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Anything by C-17 would be strategic lift, and with our current number of C-17s, it would likely be more efficient to transport by ship; unless you're only sending a Coy size element.



Good post. For a blast from the past, a very long time ago I was the Battery Commander of the AMF Battery. AMF stood for Allied Command Europe Mobile Force which was the NATO "strategic reserve." It was a multinational force of battalion groups from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, UK and US. The aim was to provide a show of solidarity on NATO's flanks. Yeah, OK.

We were on seven days notice to move and kept our documentation, etc up to date. The point of this is, further to Gny Hwy's post,is that it took a ton of air lift to get us from Trenton to Bardufoss in Norway.  My recollection is that it took something like 70-75 Hercules chalks and 3-5 Boeing chalks to move the Canadian contingent. Most of the Hercules lift was carrying artillery ammunition, and our scales were not sufficient for a real shooting war. 

Having said that, we used to practice it and actually move the whole shebang for annual exercises. If anyone wants to be bored to tears, Bruce Monhouse and I can oblige.


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## Bruce Monkhouse

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Having said that, we used to practice it and actually move the whole shebang for annual exercises. If anyone wants to be bored to tears, Bruce Monhouse and I can oblige.



What? Steak again?


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## a_majoor

Some older thoughts about airmobility here:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_05/iss_4/CAJ_vol5.4_11_e.pdf


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## HeavyHooker

Just a quick step into the what-if zone here.  

Has thought been given to making 2 Brigade (or more accurately parts thereof) into a dedicated airmobile element.  I realize that the entire Combat Arms element should have this capability to some extent but I am thinking more of developing _working, current_ TTPs with the new MHLH Sqn (Chinooks).  They are standing up next summer and should be online a year or two after.  I know that these TTPs exist but they are a work in progress and their evolution was continual up until the end of the Cbt Mission in Afghanistan.  An actual "sister battalion" kind of situation with the new MHLH Sqn could only improve on those techniques.

HH


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## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> The New Westminister Regiment was also tasked in the 80's to provide a jump qualified platoon.



Hellooooooo... I'm right heeerrreee....

Good concept, flawed execution, should try it again and get it right this time.


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## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Hellooooooo... I'm right heeerrreee....
> 
> Good concept, flawed execution, should try it again and get it right this time.



I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.


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## Colin Parkinson

When 15th Fd was a tasked unit back in the 80's they airlifted the unit, guns and vehicles to Shilo for an exercise. Forget how many flights it took but 2 hercs were tasked if I recall correctly, at the time we were a 6 gun battery and I think the move was mainly prepped by our attached Reg force staff and about 5 of us Reservists, plus of course the local AMU. It was a great exercise and we learned a lot from it, not the least being the fact we were in support of the German's battle run and fired off far more ammo than we were accustomed to.


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## Gramps

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Anything by C-17 would be strategic lift



CC-177s can do tactical and strat airlift. Just a point of interest, not really what this thread is about.


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## Cloud Cover

Were there any Canadian paratrooper drops in Afghanistan, even for practice?


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## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.



As always, if these things are properly supported they work well. We had minimal to zero support from 2 Cdo, yet still managed to do the jump and hump. Of course we could have done better, but I won't go into what I saw at the CAR that made me think twice about going back  there!

I recall being envious of 10 PARA back when I was in 1 PARA. The TA Abn Bn would rock up on a Friday night with 400 bods, emplane, lob into Germany that night, work hard for two days then jump back in the UK and then head home for tea and medals on Sunday night. They got more jumping than we did (we being a tad busy in places like NI etc). That was a good example of how a well supported reserve unit could make the airborne thing work well.


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## a_majoor

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.



I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place" for details)

As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.


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## FoverF

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... defined requirement...



Augmenting understrength airborne units?


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## aesop081

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> That was a good example of how a well supported reserve unit could make the airborne thing work well.



It was also at a time where the RAF could support things like that. These days...not so much. The RCAF's transport fleet is small and busy and would, IMHO, also be hard-pressed to support any increase in demand for parachuting by either the RegF or Pres.


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## dapaterson

FoverF said:
			
		

> Augmenting understrength airborne units?



Haven't defined that requirement other than "we've done it for so long, let's keep on doing it".


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## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place for details)
> 
> As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.



I have to agree there. We have ample time to build a pretty good 'mission focused' reserve force. Call me crazy, but it might even help with recruiting and retention.


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## a_majoor

There should be no argument that building an Air Mobile Army is impossible (it is clearly is very possible, and the CAR Battlegroup of the 1970's proves that even we can muster the resources and manpower to do so, if we want); rather the discussion should be on why we should build such a thing, or why not?

There are plenty of arguments for an Airborne/Airmobile capability in the Canadian Forces, including time and space (distances _inside_ Canada would be considered strategic in most other places in the world), sovereignty (how else could we get to the far North quickly and with a wide variety of capabilities), doctrine (airmobility is the epitome of manoeuvre warfare) and force projection (everywhere we have been told to go in the past two decades is halfway around the world).

There are also plenty of arguments against, including cost, diversion of resources from other worthy causes and the amount of "effects" an airborn/airmobile force can actually generate on its own once on the ground. The history of airborne and airmobile operations is mixed, with plenty of examples of spectacular victories and defeats to choose from.


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## Good2Golf

Canada's Army has for the last century or so, been an airmobile army.  

It never ceased conducting airmobile operation training, but it certainly was constrained by available air and aviation resources and training opportunities for both Army and Aviation/Air Force personnel, particularly in the early-90's to the late 2000's.  Sometimes a bit too much is read into what constitutes airmobility or airborne, so a the following definitions are provided to confirm the conceptual simplicity of airmobile operations and airborne forces.  These are the official terms that Canada has endorsed/ratified as a NATO member (the AAP-6 is NATO's Glossary of Definitions) and that are contained within applicable current Canadian Army and RCAF doctrine. 

*Airborne* - An adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out operations, either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement.  (NATO AAP-6, 2001-10-01)

*Airmobile operation* - An operation in which combat forces and their equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6, 1992-11-01)

*Airmobility* - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)

*Air movement* - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)


The Commander of the Army has described the plan  by which the emphasis on airmobile operations and the use of airborne forces will be developed within the Army.  It will be the product of capabilities that have been developed, both technical/materiel and personnel as well as the training and maintenance of proficiency that would facilitate the use of such capability sets.

Appropriately, such capabilities should include not just the F-echelon, but appropriate portions of other echelons to ensure that the capability can be employed and sustained as necessary.

 :2c:

Regards
G2G


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## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... force projection (everywhere we have been told to go in the past two decades is halfway around the world).


If you are talking airmobile, then we will not be getting the improvements to strategic reach that you suggest - even if we go with exotic  tilt-rotor aircraft instead of helicopters ... at least, not unless we want to develop a whole new aircraft to do this.


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## dapaterson

We need air-transportable forces.  Which can be sustained.  A Bridge Too Far is an excellent example of the fundamental problem with airborne drops - resupply.


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## a_majoor

Airborne force projection was demonstrated by the US 82nd Airborne division when it flew a battalion directly from Fort Benning Georgia to the Ukraine for a drop using air to air refuelling, the longest direct deployment in history. (this is recounted in Homer-Dixon's The Ingenuity Gap). While probably not the best way to do things, it demonstrates what is and is not possible, given the right resources.

Airmobile forces are tactical and operational, and despite decades of development are still in a relatively primitive state (once separated from their aircraft they are light infantry with limited mobility and organic firepower). *We* need to develop General Senger und Etterlin’s main battle air vehicle concept: _The main battle air vehicle uses ground tactically without relying on it for mobility_ for airmobile forces to reach the next level of usefulness. For sustainment we need to develop something along the lines of the LAMV concept (Light Air Mobile Vehicle); essentially a flying machine that can be flown by ordinary soldiers rather than highly trained pilots (with the option to fly autonomously or by remote control), a flying supply truck.

WRT what is and is not possible, Canadian troops could probably be trained and equipped to be Airborne much more quickly and will have a much greater ability to carry out the orders of the GoC than Airmobile forces, the sticking point is the purchase of sufficient strategic airlifters to carry the troops and sustain them. Airmobile forces would need both the organic air vehicles (helicopters currently) to move and fight, as well as a means of deploying the troops and helicopters strategic distances (an LHD would be ideal in this case). Strategic airlift can be used for other purposes such as disaster relief, so there will be less resistance to going that route if planed and sold properly.


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## Good2Golf

Thucydides, I don't disagree with you that airborne forces could potentially be generated more quickly than airmobile forces at the moment; however, I believe that airborne forces could potentially be more susceptible to sustainment dependencies than would airmobile forces.  

Current (and increasing) focus on heliborne airmobile forces provides a significant opportunity to ensure provision of combat enablers and ongoing sustainment of the deployed airmobile forces until partial or complete link-up with associated ground forces can be accomplished.


Regards
G2G


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## Old Sweat

The limiting factor in providing airborne or air mobile forces is the ability of the RCAF to generate aircraft with qualified crews to drop or deliver the troops and equipment and then to resupply and/or extract them. When last I had anything to do with this sort of thing, planning for airborne forces was based on the use of 12 CC130s, which could drop what was called a Commando Group with its slice of support weapons, gunners, sappers and logistics. This force could hold an airhead and construct an airfield for the fly in of follow on forces. That pretty well was the concept of ops for much of the Defence of Canada operations, which were based on a hollow threat that had not existed since perhaps the 1950s.

I think we could generate a small power projection capability using either airborne or air mobile forces, but to do so means cutting back on other tasks for the aircraft we would use. Still, it's possible and for a given scenario, any competent staff officer should be able to come up with an estimate and plan for a viable solution.  

As for cramming troops into airplanes, if you want to do a mass bare arse drop, you can lift a whole bunch of jumpers, but all they can do is form up in three ranks with their personal weapons on the DZ. Similarly for a heliborne display, you can cram a bunch of troops into the aircraft, but they are kitless.


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## Good2Golf

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ...Similarly for a heliborne display, you can cram a bunch of troops into the aircraft, but they are kitless.



OS, my note earlier regarding heliborne forces was an assessment of potential near-term development based on incoming capabilities (heavy lift and slightly further, possibly rationalized armed recce capabilities) to support sustainable airmobile ops within a BG-level with certainty and Bde-level with reasonable likelihood of success.  As with airmobile ops conducted in AFG (albeit a relatively small AO), the appreciation and acknowledgement of the need to include enablers and sustainability within an airmobile operation has been captured and messaged to Army leadership, aligning closely with the CLS' stated intent for airmobility within the larger Army force development context.


Regards,
G2G


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## Fishbone Jones

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place" for details)
> 
> As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.



Their tank units, etc are staffed with an exceedingly large full time staff that does the maint and everyday stuff needed to support a once a month crew, including maintenance that we have to ship our stuff off for months at a time to get done. Their day staff numbers often equate to our part time numbers. Their equipment also stays at the unit. It doesn't get dragged off to a place like Meaford, Gagetown, etc for pooling, where it spends 2/3 of the year that the Unit can't use it. They also don't spend all of their time trying to fulfill stuff like IBTS only to complete it in time to start again. Let's quit trying to equate what they do and what we do. It's two different worlds.


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## dapaterson

It's also worthwhile to look at the work-up training done prior to deployment - not only our own, but that of other allies.  PRacticing skills =- good.  Needing 18 months work-up to deploy?  There are problems in the system.


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## Kirkhill

This may be a tangent to the intent of this thread.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> *Airmobility* - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)
> 
> *Air movement* - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)



To focus on this half of the equation for a moment:   Strategic Mobility

In the debate about projecting power we keep running up against Big Honking Ships as we try to recreate the capabilities of June 6 1944.

What happens instead if we were to focus on the period of 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949 - The Berlin Airlift?

Instead of building floating warehouses for a Billion dollars a pop, or having to find them, charter them, deliver them, load them, move them, unload them, inventory the contents, distribute the contents......

How about using the money to buy an additional 2 to 4 CC-177s at around $200,000,000 a piece?  I assume that we have already bought the infrastructure necessary to support them.

Additionally we could also convert the FWSAR budget into additional CC-130s.  Again I assume we already have the infrastructure.

With a fleet of even 6 CC-177s flying 10 hours a day we would get a conveyor that could shift some 40 loads a week on a 10 hour round trip. 40 loads equates to some 240 160 (Edit to manage the unintentional overload) Bisons or 120 CH-146s.

Equally with a fleet of 32 CC-130s (17 Js and 15 FWSAR Js) also flying 10 hours a day the conveyor would shift over 200 loads a week.  Even at 10 tonne loads (half loading) that moves 2000 tonnes of material.

The existing fleet of 5 CC-150s carrying 194 troops a time would only require 8 round trips of 10 hours to stage 1500 troops forward - leaving 20 to 25 trips available for moving cargo.

I think I am in the ballpark here and perhaps some of the lurking Loadmasters and Pilots can straighten out my numbers.

But.....

If you take those conveyors in conjunction with our new hubs (Jamaica, Spangdahlem, Dakar, Kuwait, Mombasa, Singapore, South Korea) and add to them Trenton and Comox as fixed bases..... see what Barnetts Gap looks like when you draw a 5 hour circle round each of them.

Staging an intervention force forward to a secure Forming Up Point within, let's say, 1000 km of a crisis zone should be well within our capabilities.  From that point on it becomes a question of tactically delivering troops, CH-146s and Bisons into the theatre, possibly contested.  I don't think the risk to Canadian troops would be greater than that experienced during an amphibious assault.

And yes, I am back to having fun with numbers  ;D >

On the other hand somebody just recently commented on the folly of commenting without being able to do arithmetic.....


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## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are problems in the system.


But is it the training system, or the need for every layer of command to ass-cover for every remotely conceivable contingency?


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## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> But is it the training system, or the need for every layer of command to ass-cover for every remotely conceivable contingency?



Yes to both.

We under-train in the right things, requiring remedial pre-deployment training to get to where our skills should have been in the first place (this applies equally to the Reg F and the Res F).  We over-train doing IT instead of reducing the IT burden to permit soliders to hone and develop those skills in a collective traiing environment.

We engage in CYA for low-probability instances and ignore lower cost, higher pay-off training becasue it's different from what we've historically done.  We'll continue sending officers on Korean language courses to go to the Korean staff college; we've sent no-one on year-long intensive Dari or Pashto courses in the decade we've been in Afghanistan.


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## a_majoor

The question is still "what do we really want to do?"; once that is answered then everything else fall into place.

The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that this is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).

The upside is you can get large numbers of light troops in quickly for any of the "three block war" deployments, the downside is these troops are "light" and getting the logistics and enablers to bulk them up or sustain them for prolonged deployments is a long and drawn out process. Still, the ability to deploy a battalion suddenly across the lines of communication or a vulnerable flank, or insert into a humanitarian disaster within hours or days of the event can still be a very potent addition to the commander's toolbag.

If we would rather concentrate on tactical mobility and flexibility, then airmobile forces are the way to go, with all the various issues that arise from taking that option. In the ideal world, we would be able to deploy airmobile forces directly from Canada (Globemasters filled with helicopters?), but this would require allocating resources on a scale far beyond our willingness and ability to pay; consider the United States only has two airborne divisions and the former USSR had six; this is with all the resources that superpowers can muster.

Based on this rather limited assessment; I personally would consider the recreation of a capability like the CAR Battlegroup to be the desired endstate, the ability to project forces across strategic distances seems to be much more useful and in line with the Government's demonstrated preference over the last two decades.


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that this is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).


What is the "this" that has been demonstrated as the preferred option?  We did not use Airborne operations in any of these places.


----------



## GnyHwy

I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> *Airborne* - An adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out operations, either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement.  (NATO AAP-6, 2001-10-01)
> 
> *Airmobile operation* - An operation in which combat forces and their equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6, 1992-11-01)
> 
> *Airmobility* - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)
> 
> *Air movement* - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)



Those definitions are pretty loose.  One could even read them as, transporting a rifle squad by Cessna to a fight would qualify by those definitions.

I think the reality is, we will not see a BG size air mobile or airborne force unless WWIII breaks out.  We are more likely and hopefully going to see Cbt Tm size elements, which I believe is in reach.

I question our policy though.  Understanding that the Airforce is already tasked, but if they weren't, would an Army Comd be able to task them anyway?

Bde Comds have aviation wings right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,  maybe even a few 100 metres away from the office, but I doubt they could task them.  The doctrine supports it, but our current situation and policy does not.

Can an Army Comd even accept responsibility for aviation or does that lie with 1 Can Div? 

If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.


----------



## Good2Golf

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.
> 
> Those definitions are pretty loose.  One could even read them as, transporting a rifle squad by Cessna to a fight would qualify by those definitions.



GH, yes they are indeed rather "loose", but that's what you get when you need to get agreement amongst all nations within an alliance, and to be honest, there's no reason to have a doctrinal definition any more precise, as the specifics of the execution of such capability will necessarily depend upon the specifics of the operation.  Yes, a rifle squad dropped into a battle on a Cessna Skymaster would indeed be an airmobile operation, as would be the discrete insertion of a long range patrol by helicopter somewhere within the battlespace.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I think the reality is, we will not see a BG size air mobile or airborne force unless WWIII breaks out.  We are more likely and hopefully going to see Cbt Tm size elements, which I believe is in reach.



I agree.  

For the foreseeable future, we would likely never see a full-size BG airmobile using our own assets, and even if we were operating in a theatre with more airmobility assets, the likelihood of a situation requiring the specific benefits of air mobility weighed against the risks of doing so, would be pretty rare indeed...Div-level deliberate crossing?  Maybe.  What would be the odds of that? 



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I question our policy though.  Understanding that the Airforce is already tasked, but if they weren't, would an Army Comd be able to task them anyway?
> 
> Bde Comds have aviation wings right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,  maybe even a few 100 metres away from the office, but I doubt they could task them.  The doctrine supports it, but our current situation and policy does not.
> 
> Can an Army Comd even accept responsibility for aviation or does that lie with 1 Can Div?



Indeed, they (most Bde Comds) can task Tac Hel units.  The respective G3 Avn's at each brigade can task the associated Tac Hel Sqn directly (less 2 CMBG which cannot task 427 SOAS directly), per existing command relationships between 1 Wing and its units and the Army's brigades.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.



I'm not sure it has to, to be honest.  With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"


Cheers
G2G


----------



## SixFishSticks

-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> From what I've seen 2CMBG is really on the lead/pushing the Airborne/Air Mobile piece - 2CER and 2RCHA each have XX amount of pers jump qualified/tasked with supporting the 3RCR Jump Coy. * I know C Bty 1RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy, not sure if 1CER has a specific troop tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy though*




So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts. 
I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha

p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha


----------



## MikeL

SixFishSticks said:
			
		

> So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts.
> I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha
> 
> p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha



OK so my info was a bit outdated it looks like, when I was with 1 Bde(atleast last I heard about C Bty) and before you were a Gunner, C Bty 1 RCHA did have casual jumpers and did work with the Jump Coy.
http://www.mdn.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=2579

If it's not C Bty now, does 1RCHA have any troops within a Bty that are jumpers to support 3VP Jump Coy?  I know 1RCHA is still sending guys on Basic Para, I would assume they still want/need guys qualified to jump in with the Jump Coy when needed, but I guess it could be just to allow guys to get their wings and nothing more.



> Although the majority of candidates were from 3 PPCLI, there was still a great deal of representation from within 1 CMBG including 1 CER, 1 RCHA, and 1 Fld Amb, due to the fact that there is a push to qualify a great deal of enablers for Ex Arctic Ram,


http://www.army.gc.ca/iaol/143000440001977/143000440001978/index-Eng.html


----------



## McG

MCG said:
			
		

> What is the "this" that has been demonstrated as the preferred option?  We did not use Airborne operations in any of these places.





			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.


It does appear he is talking about Airborne forces, but that cannot be what "this" referrs - it would be axiomatically wrong if his statement were re-written to insert "Airborne" in place of the pronoun "this."


			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that *Airborne* is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).


Having not used airborne operations in any of the identified palces, they have not been demonstrated as the prefered option.  Even where we have used air movement as the reach into a theatre of operations, there has always been a significant amount of staging that takes place at the air head.


----------



## GnyHwy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I'm not sure it has to, to be honest.  With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"
> 
> Cheers
> G2G



Yes, that is a good thing, and good to hear.


			
				SixFishSticks said:
			
		

> So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts.
> I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha
> 
> p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha



Don't just hack him.  Give him the right answer.  I'm sure there are plenty of jumpers/helops guys kicking around.   What Bty are they in?


			
				-Skeletor- said:
			
		

> OK so my info was a bit outdated it looks like, when I was with 1 Bde(atleast last I heard about C Bty) and before you were a Gunner, C Bty 1 RCHA did have casual jumpers and did work with the Jump Coy.
> http://www.mdn.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=2579
> 
> If it's not C Bty now, does 1RCHA have any troops within a Bty that are jumpers to support 3VP Jump Coy?  I know 1RCHA is still sending guys on Basic Para, I would assume they still want/need guys qualified to jump in with the Jump Coy when needed, but I guess it could be just to allow guys to get their wings and nothing more.
> http://www.army.gc.ca/iaol/143000440001977/143000440001978/index-Eng.html



You are correct with the above statements.  I am not sure about the current capabilities of 1 RCHA to support 3VP, but I am sure there a few guys kicking around that are qualified and at least thinking about it.


----------



## rampage800

What Skeletor mentioned was absolutely correct but that was a little while ago (6 years or so). Z Bty provides the jump FOO/JTAC capability now for 3VP (and almost all the jumpers for the exercises and cas-para events) and the Mortar Tp is going to be a combined effort from A and B Bty much in the same context as C-Bty did before.


----------



## Loachman

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Bde Comds have aviation wings



Squadrons



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,



They are not doctrinally parts of brigades, although they exist to support them with one notable exception: 427 Squadron has belonged to SOFCOM for the last few years, and support to 2 CMBG is rarely provided by 427 Squadron. Even under older and better doctrine of the mid-eighties, there was only a dotty line between Tac Hel Squadrons and Brigades. 444 Squadron was the sole exception, as it was actually a 4 CMBG unit.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.



Yes. Tac Hel would have to be liberated from the a** f**ce and restored to the Army.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Indeed, they (most Bde Comds) can task Tac Hel units.  The respective G3 Avn's at each brigade can task the associated Tac Hel Sqn directly (less 2 CMBG which cannot task 427 SOAS directly), per existing command relationships between 1 Wing and its units and the Army's brigades.



Not anymore. CMBG submissions for support come to 1 Wing HQ for tasking.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"



Under mid-eighties doctrine, Chinooks were a Corps-level resource, and would not have been employed in airmobile operations in the sense of delivering troops into combat - they would not have survived near the FEBA. Even our Twin Hueys were restricted to administrative moves on our side of the FEBA due to lack of AH and CAS support.

In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they would not be.

They were, unfortunately, bought for "the" war rather than for "a" war.


----------



## Good2Golf

Loachman said:
			
		

> Not anymore. CMBG submissions for support come to 1 Wing HQ for tasking.



Okay, the CMBG G3 Avn passes the HELQUEST direct to 1 Wing HQ which failing any reason to say no to using the CMBG's allocated YFR, says yes.




			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> Under mid-eighties doctrine, Chinooks were a Corps-level resource, and would not have been employed in airmobile operations in the sense of delivering troops into combat - they would not have survived near the FEBA. Even our Twin Hueys were restricted to administrative moves on our side of the FEBA due to lack of AH and CAS support.



Using doctrine a third of a century old, yes, MTH = Corps asset.

Using current Army and Aviation doctrine, however, the MTH is a formation-level resource that can be assigned to unit-level operations.



			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they *would not be*.



Airmobility has a place in all parts of the spectrum of operations, up to, and including major combat operations (MCO).  Where required, the appropriate enablers would be assigned/coordinated to support an airmobile operation.



			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> They were, unfortunately, bought for "the" war rather than for "a" war.



Totally unfounded statement.  Not the case at all.


Regards
G2G


----------



## Tuna

> In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they would not be.



I am not sure about that statement, however from my knowledge of how the Chinooks have been used in Afghanistan they are somewhere between a mini Hercules and a flying LAV. If this is true  then we shouldn't have much of a problem finding a use for them in the future.  :2c: ... please correct me if I am wrong on that one


----------



## aesop081

Tuna said:
			
		

> If this is true  then we shouldn't have much of a problem finding a use for them in the future.



He didn't say we wouldn't have a use for them, just that we likely would not be able to use them in the way we have in Afghanistan. There is a difference there.


----------



## Zoomie

Plenty of use for Hooks in Canada.  We are trying to expand our use of the Arctic - heavy helo lift will be in short supply up there.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Zoomie said:
			
		

> Plenty of use for Hooks in Canada.  We are trying to expand our use of the Arctic - heavy helo lift will be in short supply up there.



I'm pretty sure that heavy helis will be the main reason why we can claim to 'own' our own piece of the arctic. Without them, there's precious little else to get enough of us, with our gear, into remote places from distant bases at short notice.


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I'm pretty sure that heavy helis will be the main reason why we can claim to 'own' our own piece of the arctic. Without them, there's precious little else to get enough of us, with our gear, into remote places from distant bases at short notice.



Getting there from remote bases like Trenton or Edmonton reqires the range and speed of fixed wing aircraft; another squadron of C-130j's or C-17's and enough infrastructure to at least land, offload and fly out.

The Chinooks would be a great addition to existing formations/bases already in the arctic, and to provide tactical and operational mobility to units operating in theater, but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.


----------



## Zoomie

Thucydides said:
			
		

> but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.


I don't think that QRF Hooks are in the future - especially out of Pet.  But....  we tend to plan our Ops well in advance, it would only take 2 days to get a fleet of Hooks flown up to Resolute (maybe three).  

In the case of MAJAID - the initial onslaught of HE and crunchies from Trenton and other SAR MOBs would be enough to sustain the effort until follow-on Hooks (and Shags) made their way north to help.  Op Hurricane (Op Nevus?) originally used Hooks when we had them, they would be a welcome sight back in Eureka no doubt.


----------



## Good2Golf

It's only 14.7 flight hours from CYWA to CYLT, or two hops, with a fuel stop at CYIO or CYCY.  Two crews could get a Hook up to Alert in less than 24 hours if push came to shove.


Overall in the North, the Hook would be one capability within a "system of systems", including as others have noted, 130Js, 17s, AOps vessels, etc...


Regards 
G2G


----------



## a_majoor

Given the financial meltdown in Europe, we should consider picking up a few used ones and stationing them in Resolute Bay or some other northern location so we don't have to worry about pushing helicopters north in an emergency.

Solves our issue and some European nation gets a bit of cash to pay down the debt...


----------



## Kirkhill

As I see it, it isn't difficult to get men and material into the North (including ground transport).

Journeyman has the answer to that problem.  We've been able to do that since Arnhem.  Just let gravity do its thing.

The problem, in my mind, is getting them back out again.  Or relocating them if the target and point of aim fail to coincide.
Then you need an anti-gravity device.

Knowing that a Hook is 12 hours behind me would be a lot more comforting for me than having to wait for Brian Horrocks to bring XXX Corps along to get me out of the situation in which I find myself.


----------



## Jammer

It isn't too difficult to get men an materiel into the North....provided you take into account the following factors:

Weather, time of season, suitable airstrips for whatever you're planning to use for A/C, fuel.....the list goes on.

No, no problem at all. Now that you've managed to get them there in one piece you have to sustain them....takingin to account the following factors

Weather, time of season, suitable airstips for whatever you're planning to use for A/C, fuel....the list goes on.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Getting there from remote bases like Trenton or Edmonton reqires the range and speed of fixed wing aircraft; another squadron of C-130j's or C-17's and enough infrastructure to at least land, offload and fly out.
> 
> The Chinooks would be a great addition to existing formations/bases already in the arctic, and to provide tactical and operational mobility to units operating in theater, but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.



I wasn't suggesting that they deploy from 'below 60'. It's far enough from Iqaluit to Pangnirtung, Qikitarjuuaq or Tanqueray Fjord!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Given the financial meltdown in Europe, we should consider picking up a few used ones and stationing them in Resolute Bay or some other northern location so we don't have to worry about pushing helicopters north in an emergency.
> 
> Solves our issue and some European nation gets a bit of cash to pay down the debt...



If we were smart, buy up all of the Chinooks, leopard 2's, Challengers tanks, CV-90s, ship them for storage to Nevada and resell them later at higher prices when they realize they cut to deeply.  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> If we were smart, buy up all of the Chinooks, leopard 2's, Challengers tanks, CV-90s, ship them for storage to Nevada and resell them later at higher prices when they realize they cut to deeply.  ;D



Now there's a plan  ;D

Just need to hold on a wee whiles longer.  The Euro is just starting to fall.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Now there's a plan  ;D
> 
> Just need to hold on a wee whiles longer.  The Euro is just starting to fall.



Be careful what you wish for... Europe provided us with the subs (and De Chastelaine)


----------



## Kirkhill

Aye but Colin's plan says nothing about the CF (beggin' yer pardon zur - the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) actually using this stuff: just buying it low in depreciating Euros and selling it back to them at a higher Canadian Dollar price.

And if they don't want it I am sure Pakistan is always on the look out for a deal.....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Aye but Colin's plan says nothing about the CF (beggin' yer pardon zur - the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) actually using this stuff: just buying it low in depreciating Euros and selling it back to them at a higher Canadian Dollar price.
> 
> And if they don't want it I am sure Pakistan is always on the look out for a deal.....



I sense a thrifty Scot may be lurking somewhere behind this calculated act of commerce. :dileas:


----------



## a_majoor

If we follow that plan all the way we could fulfill virtually all of our "wish list" of new(er) equipment as well;

Leopard 2 tanks (for example Greece has a pressing cash problem and 353 Leopard 2 tanks in stock), and CV-90s of various descriptions for the CCV and CCV family of vehicles
Ships of virtually every description from Frigates to tankers. 
Aircraft: We would want Chinooks and C-130's for our first choices, but surplus fighters can be had (we would be getting F-16's from most of the European Air Forces, rather than Hornets or CF-35's, but they will do in a pinch). I'd also be on the lookout for cash strapped air forces that use the C-17...

The biggest follow on costs would be translating all the manuals and training materials  , and of course in the real world we also have to incorporate the ongoing O&M costs, but I'm willing to bet even with those costs we would be saving billions of dollars and years of time to eliminate the rust out of the forces.

Someone should be thinking about this in a serious manner.


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting article in NBF on personal flying vehicles. This is a civilian counterpart to the LAMV idea; an air vehicle which can be flown by people with minimal training rather than highly skilled pilots. For an airmobile force, having vehicles which can be flown by troops rather than pilots removes a lot of manning bottlenecks, and frees up pilots for tasks which really do require higher levels of skill and training.

An important caviet remains; LAMV or PAVs need to be much cheaper to buy and operate than helicopters or fixed wing aircraft in order for this concept to make sense. Still, even if this becomes the equivalent to a MLVW rather than a LAV, it still provides a huge benefit to the force. MSR's are freed of traffic; resupply can happen far faster and since the echelon can move without reference to terrain (if needed) then it becomes much more difficult to interrupt the resupply system. I would like to see the concept extended to actual fighting vehicles. This would take us in the direction of the main battle air vehicle concept: _The main battle air vehicle uses ground tactically without relying on it for mobility_. Once we can get to that level, the commander can use the ground or avoid it to suit his own tactical plan.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2012/08/eu-mycopter-project-to-develop-personal.html



> *EU Mycopter project to develop a personal air transportation system *
> 
> 
> The myCopter project aims to pave the way for PAVs to be used by the general public within the context of a personal air transport system (PATS)
> 
> PAVs will be designed and implemented on unmanned aerial vehicles, motion simulators, and a manned helicopter. In addition, an investigation into the human capability of flying a PAV will be conducted, resulting in a user-centred design of a suitable human-machine interface (HMI). Furthermore, the project will introduce new automation technologies for obstacle avoidance, path planning and formation flying, which also have excellent potential for other aerospace applications. This project is a unique integration of technological advancements and social investigations that are necessary to move public transportation into the third dimension.
> 
> The myCopterproject will investigate
> * User-centered design of human-machine interface for PAVs
> * Novel training techniques for the inexperienced 3D driver (PAV pilots)
> * New technologies for vehicle automation and control
> * Social and technological impact of a PATS
> 
> Automation of aerial vehicles
> Some automation will be required for the average human to fly a PAV
> 
> Approach
> *Control and navigation of a single PAV (ETH)
> *Vision-aided localization and navigation
> *Vision-aided automatic take-off and landing
> *Navigation in the air (EPFL)
> *Mid-air collision avoidance
> *Vision-based relative positioning
> *Formation flying
> *Evaluation of automation and HMI on FHS (DLR)
> 
> 
> Social and economic impact (KIT)
> PAVs have been discussed already for many years, but the impact on society and the social expectations have not yet been evaluated
> 
> Main questions
> *How can PAVS be integrated into existing global transportation systems
> *Requirements on infrastructure and transport
> *Adaptation of the legal framework
> *What degree of autonomy needs to be developed
> *How does automation interact with the HMI
> *What are the perspectives and expectations of a PAV user (Questionnaires and Interviews)
> 
> Posted by brian wang at 8/08/2012


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The concept is pretty much that of the "Glider Regiments", except with the ability to return.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glider_Pilot_Regiment


----------



## Kirkhill

Let's see:

Paratrooper:  Skilled pilot of a single manned glider.
Buddy drop:  Paratrooper piloting a single manned glider with a screaming 250 lb pay load strapped to him
JPADS drop: Computer pilots single unmanned glider with a suspended pod of screaming 250 pounders to a precision landing somewhere in the general vicinity of the assigned target.  Vehicles dropped somewhere else
Helicopter: Anti-gravity device to recover the pieces

How many steps to Dropships?.


----------



## a_majoor

Glider regiments are more akin to paratroops than airmobile forces, since they are essentially "light" infantry once they disembark from the glider, with all the limitations that implies. They are able to carry somewhat more than paratroopers, and gliders allow sticks of troops to land together with minimal dispersion (so long as the glider actually makes a safe landing on the target zone), but gliders are a supplement to paratroops, not a replacement.

Air vehicles like the LAMV or helicopters provide mobility in three dimensions, and helicopters (and the presumptive Main Battle Air Vehicle) can also act as fighting platforms in their own right to support the troops on the ground. Soviet (and now Russian) helicopters like the Hip and Hind were designed with this sort of fighting in mind, and we are familiar with various Western gunships to escort our transport helicopters and soldiers. As far as airmobility goes we still are not quite there yet; the troops on the ground need to be able to move and fight under protection which is only possible now by using an airplane or helicopter to carry a lightweight vehicle for the troops to ride in (the BMD, Wiesel, and Viking are three current representatives of this type of machine). 

You could make a case for _unprotected_ mobility, landing troops with ATV's or Jeeps (as was done in the past) to assist in carrying the load, providing extended mobility and acting as gun platforms in a pinch. There are lots of lightweight vehicles and even specially designed vehicles for this purpose, and some interesting arguments could be made for protected vs unprotected mobility in both airborn and airmobile forces. The full evolution of airmobility (in my mind anyway) will come when the troops can move and fight in three dimensions from the same platform.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I would have to say that gliders were the only technology available to address the realized shortcomings of paratroopers. They were able to deliver jeeps, comms vehicles,  AT guns and even light tanks to provide the Airborne with some ability to resist armoured counter attacks and as you mentioned increased mobility and supplies. In German hands Gliders morphed into the roles now carried out by the Herc.

To me the shortcomings of airborne forces has not really changed, they have better AT weapons, but still their ability to hold is totally dependent on the ability to resupply and to relieve in a timely fashion. What has changed in their favour is the ability to call in supporting fire and to receive timely intelligence in their local area from other sources.

The strength of Airborne/airmobile forces today seems to be an ability to act like a rapid response expeditionary force, to allow politicians to act quickly to respond to a situation which likely they should have responded to much earlier. The danger is to see airborne forces as a self sufficient force in itself to hold key areas without further reinforcement. I think most military planners understand this, not sure the political leadership does.


----------



## Good2Golf

Colin P said:
			
		

> The strength of Airborne/airmobile forces today seems to be an ability to act like a rapid response expeditionary force, to allow politicians to act quickly to respond to a situation which likely they should have responded to much earlier. The danger is to see airborne forces as a self sufficient force in itself to hold key areas without further reinforcement. I think most military planners understand this, not sure the political leadership does.



 :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

Perhaps the Air Mobile types might want to offer the politicians (and Foreign Affairs) a copy of Saint-George Saunders's book.

There could be an accompanying reccomendation on how not to do things (Primasole and Arnhem), what's possible (Bruneval and Tunisia) and the effects of keeping Light Troops in the field for too long (Tunisia).  

As a follow up they might also want to consider Wilson's "Cordon and Search" and reflect on the invidious effects of the  application of "Airborne Initiative" on the availability of ground transport in accompanying battalions if Light Fingered Troops find themselves lacking in goods they consider critical.


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## Colin Parkinson

Read a book.....Seriously? 

If it's longer than a Briefing Note, not in point format and the right font, they aren't going to read it. They are to busy responding to their blackberries. It not that they are stupid, but they believe they are far to important and have to little time to stop and weigh the price of their decisions.


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