# Wm. S. Lind - 4GW Perspective on Air Power, Insurgency, and Afghanistan



## devil39 (28 Jun 2006)

Below is a very opinionated (as Lind always is) view of operations in Afghanistan from the 4GW perspective.  I offer this article as food for thought and to generate some discussion, not as a personal commentary or criticism of current operations in Afghanistan.  There is certainly some truth in what Wm S Lind has to say, but reality likely would temper his point of view.

http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,101835,00.html

Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409



> *Aaugh!
> William Lind | June 19, 2006*
> 
> This Sunday's sacred ritual of Mass, bagels and tea with the Grumpy Old Men's Club was rudely disrupted by the headline of the day's Washington Post : "U.S. Airstrikes Rise In Afghanistan as Fighting Intensifies." Great, I thought; it's probably cheaper than funding a recruiting campaign for the Taliban and lots more effective at creating new guerrillas.
> ...


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## GAP (28 Jun 2006)

Sad   
Unfortunately, a lot of the people who read this do not know better, and believe this rubbish. This is how to take a few facts, change slightly, forget a bunch of contradicting facts, add no experience, and Voila!!! instant opinion.


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## Zarathustra (28 Jun 2006)

Why do you think he is wrong ? It's not a rhetorical question, I have no experience and I'm trying to make my mind on this subject.


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## pbi (28 Jun 2006)

Thanks for that devil39. Good to see you back here: sorry I missed you and the others at grad.  

I have to admit that while Lind is quite possibly not in the loop of exactly what is happening in Afgh, there is some merit to his points. I do wonder at the actual value of air power in a situation like Afgh, other than on those rare occasions when the enemy is stupid enough to assemble in large numbers. I know that on several occasions when I was over there, it did prove useful, on others it got there too late or had little value. _If_ it is killing civilians as often or (worse...) more often than it kills baddies, maybe it should be reconsidered.


The points Lind raises about counter-insurgency are IMHO historically valid where Western armies are concerned (perhaps other conventional armies as well...) and we forget them at our peril. However, I know the CO of the PPCLI battlegroup, and he is not a stupid fellow. If anybody would learn from the lessons of history, it would be him. I doubt that he engages in too many operations on a mindless basis.

In the end, though, it is not up to Canada, nor even the US, to "win" in Afgh, because "we" can't. Only the Afghan govt, and those forces for progressive change, supported by the the Afgh people can win it in the end. We can set the conditions as best we can, and that should probably be our end-state. If the capacity to reach that end state is being developed (and I believe that great efforts are being made...) then we are on the right track. If, on the other hand, the Coalition carries the can for everything, and falls into the trap of believing that "just one more big sweep" will win, with no clear end-state, we may be headed for trouble.

But men much better and braver than I are trying very hard to make this work:second-guessing them feels a bit uncomfortable.

Cheers


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## GAP (28 Jun 2006)

Because he is being simplistic....take a few facts, and build whatever you want. He is leaving out far more than he is saying.


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## GAP (28 Jun 2006)

excellent answer...better and more articulate than mine....


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## devil39 (28 Jun 2006)

Lind argues from his 4GW theory perspective.  If anything he is consistent, and at times has been rather prescient, if you read his archived "On War" series of articles.   Lind's 4GW perspective is in line with commentary from the likes of Anthony Cordesman, Andrew Krepinevich and the Malaya perspective of Briggs and Robert Thompson.  

It is theory however... and things are different where the rubber meets the road.


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## pbi (28 Jun 2006)

> Lind's 4GW perspective is in line with commentary from the likes of Anthony Cordesman, Andrew Krepinevich and the Malaya perspective of Briggs and Robert Thompson.



I just read Cordesman's book on the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. Even given that he might be grinding an axe (and I really don't know if he is or not...) if half of what he says is true, the actual effectiveness of the Allied air campaign was grossly, (he implies maliciously) overstated by various interested parties such as the USAF. I have read similar commentary concerning the air efforts in  both GW I and II. Cordesman seems to provide some pretty solid supporting evidence for his view of things. If you believe Cordesman, things in Kosovo did not go nearly as well as claimed, many of the "lessons learned" were not, and some things were just quietly shuffled off.

I think that air power (by which I mean, in this case, CAS) does have certain _very limited _ uses in operations like Afghanistan. But they are _limited_. The greater value of the air element probably lies in providing ISTAR, mobility, logistics, casevac and EW support. Of course, perhaps this is why all this talk of "Three Block War" and "fighting snakes" is viewed with suspicion and even a bit of fear in air (and naval) circles: their favourite high-priced, high-profile "big bang" systems are really only bit players to this type of conflict, except in very measured doses. For example, when the CDS recently adressed the graduating C&SC and NSCC classes here at the College, he pointed out that  much of the "CAS" being flown recently for BGen Fraser's  ground forces in Afgh is being generated by armed Predator, not by manned AC. That must be a bit disturbing to the Air Force community, seing as there is no real requirement for a UAV to be operated by a person in any particular colour of uniform: the ground station operator could easily be an artillery NCO with the necessary training.

I am not an Army Luddite urging that we scrap the Air Force: rather I am  very willing to believe that we (and especially the US...) can get dazzled by false ideas of its value. In most cases a good rifle platoon led by smart leaders will go much farther towards "real" victory in a place like Afgh than any number of 500 pounders. (But, I will admit, there are those moments....)

Cheers


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## GAP (28 Jun 2006)

pbi said:
			
		

> Cheers



All US forces use the "never die" mentality to one degree or another. It's great for motivating, but I have seen stuff get glossed over or outright dismissed, rather than admit that it was a wrong move. 

I can see where Air Power in Afghanistan has to be severely limited and very, very precise. Not so in my day. That was not the mentality, and while the accuracy was appreciated when it occurred, nowadays, it is expected.


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## TangoTwoBravo (29 Jun 2006)

When troops get into contact they immediately request airpower.  That firepower is precise and lethal.  It is a key enabler, and those that want to take it away can come here and explain it during a TIC.

I agree that collateral damage is a huge issue in counter-insurgency.  Any kinetic operations can have negative effects on support for the coalition and GoA.  

I'm also a little tired of references to the Malayan campaign.  Totally different situation with a solution that would not work here.

With regards to the "ink spots", coalition forces are indeed located throughout the country in Platoon Houses and FOBs. 

2B


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## Infanteer (29 Jun 2006)

I generally like Lind's writing, even if I don't agree with it.  To deride him as a civilian is cheap, especially when you consider that he has real credibility in the military theory department; one only has to flip through the operational doctrine of the US, British, and (especially) Canadian armies.  B-GL-300-001 reads like Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook at times (whether this is a good thing is debatable).  His "On War" archive and his writing at DNI are worth the read, if anything.

On 4th Generation Warfare: it's been taking it's lumps of late in the academic circles, both in our own Army Journal with Vincent Curtis' The Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare and in the US with Antulio J. Echevarria's Fourth Generation Warfare and Other Myths.

As for Airpower in Afghanistan, Stephen Biddle's paper is always worth the read to deal with the ardent air power enthusiasts.  However, as 2Bravo has said, it doesn't mean that we should necessarily go in and take it away.

Anyways, there's some food for thought.


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## Navy_Blue (29 Jun 2006)

Why do we need to bomb everything.   Accuracy of a large area effect weapon is almost an oxy-moron.  If you drop a 500lb Bomb in a villiage made of mud and brick its going to do major damage.  If you drop 10000lbs of bombs on a mountainside who cares.  We train our Infantry in FIBUA let them use it.  Our casualties will shoot way up but the Alternative is letting the Taliban gain more and more support for every civi we kill by mistake.  Historically American strategy has been "if we bomb it we will win."  Now we have seen many instances where this is not at all true.  Now 2Bravo doesn't like the comparison to Borneo but we might just have to get back to basics and fight this at they're level with extensive use of locals.  No one in history has ever won a gorilla war fighting with conventional tactics.


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## Zarathustra (29 Jun 2006)

While we are at it, I found Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War rather interesting and a bit disturbing. Lind mentioned it a few weeks ago in an article. Basically the authors are saying many things went wrong in that war but the solutions proposed are too optimists and would probably fail too. 

"For certain purposes, like the creation of a liberal democratic society that will be a model for others, military power is a blunt instrument, destined by its very nature to give rise to unintended and unwelcome consequences. Rather than “do it better next time,” a better lesson is “don’t do it at all.”"


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## Enzo (29 Jun 2006)

Navy_Blue said:
			
		

> No one in history has ever won a gorilla war fighting with conventional tactics.



Damned skippy. It takes banannas to sway the females away from the alpha male and boots on the ground to roust that big fellow.

Sorry, couldn't resist Blue. Those damned dirty apes just grind my cud.  ;D

As for PBI's comments... +1 buds.


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## devil39 (29 Jun 2006)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> I'm also a little tired of references to the Malayan campaign.  Totally different situation with a solution that would not work here.
> 
> 2B



Whoaaa!  What are you trying to say.... that segregating all of the ethnic Chinese rubber workers and tin miners in Afghanistan and Iraq into relocation villages will not solve the problems?

The value of Malaya is not necessarily in the TTPs (by definition tactical) of the Malayan situation, but in some of the counterinsurgency fundamentals at the operational and strategic level that were elucidated by the likes of Frank Kitson and Sir Robert Thompson.    

Good article by Major Adam Strickland USMCR from the Small Wars Journal site on this subject.

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v2/strickland-jul05.htm


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## TangoTwoBravo (29 Jun 2006)

Devil39,

There it is!

Still, as you say there are some fundamentals.  The aim in counter-insurgency should be to isolate the insurgent from the population.  The old British way was to do so physically, which is neither practical nor moral.  Now, we need to do that psychologically.

Navy Blue,

We don't "bomb everything" and we work hand in hand with Afghan National Security Forces (mainly ANA and ANP).  

2B


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## Navy_Blue (30 Jun 2006)

I'm not talking ANA I'm talking locals...Poppy farming sheep herding locals.  Worry about the coke once we get the other crap over with.  I know we don't bomb everything but one bomb kills someones kids and you instantly become the bad guy for 10 to 20 more people.

 :warstory:


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## TangoTwoBravo (30 Jun 2006)

We're not involved with poppy eradication.  The idea of a local militia has merit, but it also has practical limitations.  The enemy intimidates isolated locals.  You need a presence to make that work and we can't be in every village.   The ANA and ANP capabilities need to be developed first in my estimation.

Upon reflection, unfair question which could be easily turned around was removed. My apologies.

2B


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## Zarathustra (2 Jul 2006)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> On 4th Generation Warfare: it's been taking it's lumps of late in the academic circles, both in our own Army Journal with Vincent Curtis' The Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare and in the US with Antulio J. Echevarria's Fourth Generation Warfare and Other Myths.



I read those critics and I've seen a few others. It seems to me they are directed more at the historical side of the theory, especially the idea of generations of warfare. They don't critic the strategy for winning proposed by Lind and others so much. This strategy isn't tightly related to history. So in this way, I find Lind is still interesting to read. I focus on the advices and leave the rest alone. Whether it's 4GW or guerrilla or small wars is too academic for me.


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## tomahawk6 (2 Jul 2006)

I find that leftists posing as "military experts" are rather odd. They hate the military and yet spend a career second guessing DOD. If they had their way there would be little money spent on national defense. To the left the military should be used like an armed peace corps. Humanitarian relief efforts funded from the DOD operating budget. I bet that sounds familiar here. 

In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan the insurgency has attacked the civilian population which alienates them which work to our advantage. Recently the taliban burned down a health clinic because it was seen as a threat. Hardly a hearts and minds campaign. The population has not forgotten what life was like under the taliban. We are making progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan and success is measured one day at a time. The more that coalition forces and the local security forces are seen to be friends the Taliban and Iraqi terrorists lose. Every time an Iraqi or Afghan father brings a child to a base for medical care we win. Any time we get a tip from a civilian we are one step closer to winning. This isnt headline grabbing stuff but it is something that the troops that are doing the work see for their own eyes and they feel good about the mission. This is reflected by our very high re-enlistment rates and number of troops willing to go back in theater for tour after tour - despite the personal risks. Our troops ARE making a difference and each man and woman in theater SEE success.


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## TangoTwoBravo (2 Jul 2006)

I'd like to take ten slef-proclaimed counter-insurgency experts, put them out in a remote village and tell their leader:

"Well Skippy.  Here are your humanitarian assistance supplies.  Arm the locals as you see fit.  If you get into trouble don't worry, we won't drop any bombs in your support.  You can rely on your marksmanship and your Small Wars Manual.  Have a nice ********* war."


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