# No True Glory - Bing West



## Infanteer (26 Dec 2005)

Finished reading this a couple days ago.

http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/item.asp?Item=978073932556&Catalog=Books&Ntt=no+true+glory&N=35&Lang=en&Section=books&zxac=1

Pretty phenomenal book - reads just like some of the top-notch literature on the battle of Hue City; infact, some of the Marine units that fought the battle of Hue would be present in the battles in Fallujah and around al Anbar province 36 years later.  The book covers both battles of Fallujah; the first one launched in April of 2004 following the death and dismemberment of 4 US contractors and the second battle that occurred in November of 04 when the political solution failed and the US was forced to clear out the city block-by-block.  As well, it covers an important battle in Ramadi in the spring and some actions in the province that were aimed at supporting the US mission in Fallujah.  A few anecdotes and aspects of the fight that the book covered really stuck out:

1)  Next time somebody tells you your big knife is stupid, tell them to shove off.  One Marine entered a house and, due to his buddy being in the line of fire, couldn't shoot at an insurgent about to spring an ambush.  So he pulled out his Kukri and killed the enemy at close range.

2)  Equally valid is the high-intensity, destructive street battles that occur in city fighting.  I seem to remember some guys saying that "we don't fight in cities like we used to"; in Fallujah, different firefights required different means to victory and for some, outright destruction of the building or dynamic entries with grenades were used to root out insurgents.  Don't be fooled into believing that FIBUA is now alot less destructive and chaotic.

3)  Bing West fills in alot of the details surrounding the Marine who was filmed shooting a wounded insurgent.  It was a video clip that garnered worldwide attention and condemnation.  Seems that alot of the guys left in Fallujah were jihadists who were simply there to take as many Americans down as possible.  That action, despite the outcry of the armchair generals, wasn't really out of the context of what was happening in the battle.  There were plenty of circumstances involved with that and the press didn't seem interested in the fact that the Marine shooter was cleared of wrong-doing.

4)  The author, being a Vietnam veteran, was very critical of the US Chain-of-Command in Iraq in 2004.  He blames the US leadership for ignoring the lessons of Vietnam and ignoring British experience with colonial insurgencies and allowing the Insurgency to spiral out of control in the spring of 2004.  The separate chains of command in the military JTF and the civilian CPA were often at odds and their actions seemed conflicting and contradictory.

5)  In general, the analysis of tactics and approaches to dismounted battle in complex terrain seems to jive with the discussions we've been having here.  The articles in the Aussie Army Journal, found here, here, and here, seem to be validated by the experience in Fallujah.

6)  *Tanks* - nuff said.

7)  One of the best anecdotes from the book was about a 1st Sergeant and a PFC in a particularly tough battle.  The PFC was the company shit-magnet, and the 1st Sergeant had repeatedly dealt with him for disciplinary reasons and had busted him back to PFC due to poor behaviour.  In Fallujah, this odd couple would head into a building to help extricate wounded comrades.  The disciplinarian and the problem-child were wounded together in an ambush in the house and the book discusses how they held out, patched each other up and covered each other in a pretty bad situations.  Just goes to show that the crucible of combat welds the bonds of soldiers together - it reminded me of a line from Shakespeare's _Henry V_:



> For he today that sheds his blood with me
> Shall be my brother; *be he ne’er so vile,
> This day shall gentle his condition*



Anyways, the book is well worth the cost of admission and the time to read.  It is an account of modern close combat.  Although somewhat difficult to follow the narrative which hops from battalion to battalion, West writes in excellent prose allowing you to get right next to the Marine on point.  The book is a battle narrative, and West's goals for writing it are encapsulated in its final paragraphs:



> In World War II the Western press - believing in its cause - had extolled the Greatest Generation of Americans.  The warriors who fought in Iraq would not be called the Greatest Generation, because America was divided about the cause for which they were dying.  The focus of the press was upon their individual deaths as tragedies.
> 
> This was an incomplete portrayal.  The fierce fighting at Fallujah attested to the stalewart nature of the American soldier.  In _The Iliad_ a warrior in the front ranks turned to his companion and said, "Let us win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others."  For Greek warriors, there was no true glory if they were not remembered afterward in poem or in song.  There will be no true glory for our soldiers in Iraq until they are recognized not as victims, but as aggressive warriors.  Stories of their bravery deserved to be recorded and read by the next generation.  Unsung, the noblest deed will die.



Semper Fidelis.


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## D-n-A (28 Dec 2005)

Good review. Been thinking about picking up that book, especially after I read "The March Up"


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