# Afghanistan - Latest Tours



## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would be interested to hear what people think of the most recent tours in Kandahar (vets only please - I know that everyone has an opinion, but unless you were there in the past four years you are basically relying on the news media). I know what I think based on two tours in Kandahar. Basically, what I am interested in is if other people from recent vintage believe that we are approaching this from the right direction.


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## Trinity (8 Aug 2006)

Sure..

how about you fill out your profile so the happy people here know who you are and 
who they're dealing with because we've get a lot of people who come for less 
than good intentions.

This thread sounds like it would be a hot bed of activity and it's best that we 
are all on the level and doing it for the right reasons before starting to go down this path.

And.. of course.. OPSEC people.


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## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

Sorry,

First time forum goon. 

As far as it goes, I was on Op APOLLO and also the PRT. I have two tours in Afghanistan, both in Kandahar, both under commenad of U.S. Forces. I have been badged into the 101st Abn and the 173rd Abn, so I hope that this meets your needs.

I am interested, because I have very strong opinions on this, and I want to know if I am totally out to lunch.


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## GAP (8 Aug 2006)

With your past experience and what you are hearing now, what would you change?


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## HItorMiss (8 Aug 2006)

Apollovet

Welcome to the site were always glad to have new people.

As for your proflie what Trinity meant by filling out is that there is a tab on your screen which will read "Profile" from there you can fill your particulars out like what Unit your with and how many years you have been in.

If you need anything I'm sure the Mod's can help

Again welcome.


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## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

The way that I look at this, is that I think that we are going a little too far into the combat ops world. I think that we need to strike a balance between combat ops, and reconstruction ops. The two should be complementary, rather than in competition. If we lean too far towards combat ops, we will do a fine job of killing Taliban; the only problem is that there are too many potential recruits. What we need to do is find a way to target the mid-level leadership, and hit them while still maintaining good relationships with the locals who wish to help us.

I think that this can only be accomplished over the long term, and only if we are willing to support those who support us. I have seen interpreters who have been intimidated into quitting, local help who quit rather than risk their lives over the paycheque, and too many people who are willing to look at the body count as the sole measure of success. This is true of both U.S forces and Canadians as well.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (8 Aug 2006)

Folks,
I believe APOLLOVet  is what/who he says he is.............

All,lets keep a handle on the OPSEC with this one, please.


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## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

WRT what I would change - 

I believe that I would focus this effort a bit more. There is no way to avoid the casualties inherent to an insurgency - if you let them pick the time an place, they will always have at least some success. 

I don't mean to denigrate the exceptional efforts of the First Bn - they are doing tremendous work. I am immensely proud of what they have accomplished.

What I think we need to do a bit more is integrate our effects - First, have int (in the form of either SR, or Recce Pl, SIGINT etc) really focus our efforts. Once we have accomplished that, launch an overwhelming attack against those who require it. Once that has been accomplished, launch an aid effort crediting the local governance (particularly in terms of the local shura/police chief) with an emphasis on the fact that this aid effort was made possible due to the destruction of the local Taliban. Finally, follow it up with an additional security presence to ensure that the school/well/clinic/etc is not destroyed. You will only have success if you can show a positive improvement of the locals lives; NOT a press release from Kabul. There were so many people in 2005/6 who wanted to vote for Karzai in the NAPCE because that was who they though they were supposed to vote for that it was comical. The people in Afghanistan only know the local; they do not know anything beyond their immediate clan boundaries.


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## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Gotta go. That whole family thing rears it's ugly head. Thanks for taking the time to look at this.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (8 Aug 2006)

Don't worry, we are here 24/7....


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## TangoTwoBravo (8 Aug 2006)

I'm in too close and personal to give an objective answer right now.  I was in Kabul before and that was certainly a different tour and a different AO.

The Taliban are entrenched in certain areas.  If we don't go after them in their havens they burn down schools and police stations and ambush everyJingle truck on Highway 1.  I agree with your steps and would suggest that that is indeed our strategy.  The devil is in the execution sometimes.


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## APOLLOVet (8 Aug 2006)

2Bravo,

Agreed. I think that what you have described is our strategy in the global view, and you are certainly right that the devil is in the details of execution. 

Don't get me wrong - I think that what we did as part of OEF (and in Kabul for that matter) was the right way to go to set the conditions (both us and the US). What I think that we need to do now is begin phasing in the Afghan security forces to a greater extent. At present I do not believe that we can remove ourselves from the intelligence gathering phase, and I think that we need to remain in the direct action phase (to exactly what extent will be determined by the ability of the ANA). Where I think we need to perhaps adjust our focus is on the follow-up.

I believe that we need to provide some tangible reward to the locals in terms of development after a DA (particularly if they had helped in terms of info gathering, or simply tacit support to Coalition forces. They would not have had to do anything overt - merely not support the Taliban/AQ). This reward would have to be in terms of economic possibility or infrastructure development. It also would have to be seen to be coming from the local government (at least the local Shura and Provincial government), rather than from the Coalition or international aid agencies. 

Once this "reward" was in place, however, it would have to be protected by local security forces rather than Coalition. I believe that this is necessary in order to gradually wean the Afghan populace from dependence on the Coalition. We don't want to be there forever.

In order to accomplish this, I think that we need to place a greater emphasis on two things (while still maintaining pressure on the Taliban/AQ). These two things are the development (or cultivation) of Afghan NGOs, or governmental bodies that could either do the post-DA development themselves completely (with funding coming from the Coalition sub rosa) or with minimal Coalition oversight. The other element is professionalizing the ANSF, and in the ANSF I include ALL Afghan security elements (Highway Police, Border Police, ANP, ANA, NDS etc). One of the huge problems that I have observed is that the Afghans seemed to view the Coalition as the "never-ending source of bounty". It seemed that they were never too concerned with protecting new infrastructure, as the prevailing attitude was that we would simply rebuild it later. Also, WRT to security element, we never seem to get beyond the most elementary levels of training. This is not because the ANSF were incapable; this was because we had such a fundamentally different approach to everything.

In any event, I don't pretend to have all the answers, and again, I certainly don't intend to downplay the accomplishments of 1 VP (and all those who worked up North). My main worry is that we get trapped in a "kill the Taliban and it will all work out" mindset. What we have begun in Afghanistan is a huge undertaking that we must succeed in. We cannot afford to let Afghanistan return to failed state status and expect to retain our credibility elsewhere in the world. This will take an incredibly long time, and will require a significant amount of inventiveness and will to stay the course.


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## captjtq (9 Aug 2006)

I think that there will be a shift in mentality as we go from OEF to the NATO-led ISAF -- while we cannot ignore the pointy-end rooting out of the Taliban, AQ (etc), there will undoubtedly be an increased focus on the 'hearts & minds' of every day Afghans ultimately allowing them to run their own country. Nothing against Americans (I married one), but my perception is that the focus of their efforts over there has been to find Osama, not on nation-building. I think (hope?) that NATO taking over will change this. My $0.02 - your mileage will certainly vary. I suppose I'll have more insight into this when I'm in the Sandbox shortly...


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## from darkness lite (9 Aug 2006)

I agree with APOLLOvet.  Although the TB has to be engaged with direct actions when required, the only true way to win this fight is through the "hearts and minds" approach. Having spent time with the PRT (R0) also, I have listened to locals and sat in on some Shuras.  Overall, the PRT learned that in the grand scheme of things the locals are tired of the Taliban and want a better life for themselves and their families.  Reconstruction ultimately is the way to go with this.  Firefights will win battles, improving the local's lives will defeat the Taliban.

FDL


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## armybuck041 (9 Aug 2006)

APOLLOVet said:
			
		

> _
> What I think that we need to do now is begin phasing in the Afghan security forces to a greater extent. One of the huge problems that I have observed is that the Afghans seemed to view the Coalition as the "never-ending source of bounty". It seemed that they were never too concerned with protecting new infrastructure, as the prevailing attitude was that we would simply rebuild it later.
> _



I tend to agree with this statement..... But I have some concerns about the kinetic end of things.

This is my first hand experience while I was attached to the "Finishing School" last year (Armymedic can chime in here as well). When the US started to send the funds it previously spent directly on the ANA to the Afghan Defence Ministry for dispersal, paycheques started to fall months behind and the Mess Hall fell drastically short of food amongst other things. I ended up having to wait 24hrs before moving to FOB BH because of a Barracks Inspection that resulted in some ANA soldiers murdering the ANA Duty Officer conducting the inspection, followed by one hell of a riot.... All because of a Teapot   I'm sure things have progressed since then but I still wonder what would happen if they were turned loose minus their ETT. 

FWIW, remarkably the DRA and its Armed Forces managed to hang on to power for a few years after the Soviets pulled out.... I hope we will be more successful.


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## GAP (9 Aug 2006)

IMO, underneath a lot of these comments is that there still is a tremendous amount of corruption within the Afghan power structure. It starts at the top and bleeds down to the lowly police officer and/or ANA member. Unless they receive their correct pay, consistently, they are no different than you. Cut your paycheque off for months at a time, suddenly you are not concerned with the mission, you are concerned with how to feed your family. 

Watch the efficiency of the unit drop dramatically within a short period.  In my time the same thing applied, to the point that we couldn't trust the ARVN at all. Even the ammo we issued them, was given to their wives who brought it back to the US bases to collect the reward money so that it did not fall into the VC hands. It didn't matter that they had little ammo to fight with, they weren't about to fight for something that was screwing them in the first place. 

The Taliban will be defeated by the people, WHEN the people feel safe with the police and army. They will never feel totally safe with the coalition, because they are short time tourists, well meaning tourists, but tourists just the same. They will leave, just like the others did.


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## from darkness lite (10 Aug 2006)

GAP:

You've hit one of the problems right on the head.  Part of the PRT's mission is to "reform" the security sector.  The RCMP are doing a great job training the ANP, but without regular pay and credibility....

One of the possible solutions of the credibility issue is to "for every success credit the Afghan security forces".  This not only builds credibility with the locals, it has the added bonus of buiding up security forces confidence and pride and eventually (hopefully) they start doing ops independant of us.

Just another form of "leading from behind"

FDL


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## APOLLOVet (10 Aug 2006)

Gentlemen,

Sorry about missing last night - AFK with family.

You are all exactly right from what I have seen. The RCMP are doing great things, but there are not enough of them yet. There is also a tremendous problem with ETT and RCAG as they do not have the ability to go far enough yet with their soldiers. All the ANP and ANA that I have spoken with are in the same boat - many of them (at the lower levels) want to do the job, but either lack equipment, training, leadership, etc to do the job independently, while some (not all) of the mid-level and higher are either being paid by the Taliban or the drug warlords.

Until we can implement that first successful ANP substation/ANA Bn that can act as an example (and once we find them we better make sure that they are completely equipped and well paid so that they can serve as an example to everyone else), we will continually be putting a band-aid on a sucking chest wound. Looks nice on the surface, but we seem to have a problem with the blood coming out the exit wound...

I remember an incident where a member of a PRT Security element (not ours) was thrown off the camp for some reason, and when they cleared his locker so that he could be fires they found evidence that the security member was actually Taliban. Not good, and part of the problem was that he was getting better money from the Taliban that his "real" employers.

I also remember our patrols visiting substations to find that the officers had no boots/coats/etc with winter coming on. They also did not have ammunition for their weapons This was in spite of the fact that they were theoretically being supplied by the Ministry of the Interior as well as the German Police Reform initiative. If we don't give them the tools/incentive to develop, they never will. (Our RCMP made arrangements to provide).


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## Teddy Ruxpin (10 Aug 2006)

A huge + to ApolloVet; I think he's exactly right and echoes what I've been thinking for many months.  Further, I had similar discussions with a variety of extremely qualified individuals, all of whom express a similar level of disquiet. 

I am very concerned that we've adopted an overly conservative/aggressive (a contradiction in terms) approach to force protection and operations.  A propensity to appear aggressive most - if not all - of the time and adoption of a "fortress" mentality both serve to alienate us from the locals.  On the flip side, we tend to "go kinetic" and use firepower in an attempt to minimize our casualties - a chapter right out of the US playbook1.  I believe that we are chasing our tails by engaging in rolling mechanized operations against occupied Taliban centres, winning the firefight, killing tons of enemy, then pulling out again.  As a friend of mine - with extensive experience in theatre - said last week:  it looks mighty "Soviet"...

From my POV, there are about six elements necessary for an effective COIN programme:

Actionable, reliable intelligence, gained in large part from:

*Effective rural policing*
Secure lines of communication
A quick, decisive and effective killing force
A widely communicated and understood acceptable political alternative
A means of dealing with safe havens and sanctuaries

Moreover, the above needs to be integrated with an effective command and control system that encompasses a joint operations and intelligence capability.  Right now, there isn't one in Afghanistan, where we have a huge variety of often competing interests:  CFC-A, ISAF, the Afghan Government, the UN, civvy contractors (DynCorp stirring up shit and acting like idiots doesn't help) and the like, none of which are integrated.  US "NOFORN" caveats severely limit access to actionable intelligence, as does the ineffectiveness of the Afghan National Police and our own apparent inability to properly connect with the population - partially for reasons I've noted above.

If it were me (and thank God it isn't), I would set as goals:


Reducing the force protection posture as quickly as possible without incurring undue risk to personnel.  We are in the Army, though, and the mission comes first.
Establishment of joint national and regional operations and intelligence centres - to include all players:  US/Coalition, ISAF, ANA, ANP, NDS, etc..  These centres would control all operations throughout the country, including US "independent" operations.
Concentration of training efforts on the ANP/ANA with a view to increasing rural presence - to include provision of on-call Coalition QRF to Afghan units via embedded personnel.
Improved rural presence for Coalition forces - beyond PRTs and patrols
Concentration on communicating the current political programme in a more effective way
Creation of regional Coalition QRFs - mostly, but not always, heliborne - on call to deliver "killing blows" against enemy forces identified by intelligence.  Operations have to be intelligence-driven and controlled by the Joint Regional Operations Centres.
An aggressive SF presence along the PK border, including inside PK if reqr.
Cease and desist with "OGA" ops _that aren't controlled_ by the National/Regional centres.
An aggressive anti-corruption campaign within the Afghan government, combined with mentoring at the local level - to the point where our soldiers are living with the ANP/ANA in their installations.
Resolution of pay and administrative issues surrounding ANA employment, along with an aggressive effort to make ANA service more attractive.  This should/must include an embedded education programme aimed at illiteracy.

I'll attach a slide that illustrates my operations centre concept and the C2 architecture at the strategic and operational levels.  Yes, I made this up.  8)

In my opinion, the key to success in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan government is legitimate in the eyes of the population, is proceeding with a coherent political programme and that it is seen to be taking the lead in ensuring its own security.  To accomplish the latter, a permanent, effective presence in rural areas is absolutely essential.  Coalition "kinetic" operations should be the exception, rather than the rule.  However, when we do undertake them, they must be ruthlessly decisive and be _seen_ to be in support of Afghan government objectives.

Of course, this is all quarterbacking from a comfy chair in Edmonton and it is hardly my intent to second-guess tactical decisions on the ground, which is why this post addresses mainly operational and strategic level decisions.  I should note, too, that I am hardly advocating a touchy-feely "soft power" approach to operations - quite the contrary.  However, I think that ApolloVet has raised some critical points, points that may have been lost recently.

Cheers,

Teddy


1  "The American way of war includes *mass, power*, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons."  FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations, Oct 04, US Dept of the Army, page vi. (emphasis added)


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## APOLLOVet (10 Aug 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin,

Just finished typing a long post in response to yours, and when the spell check finished, the draft disappeared. I agree with what you have said, and what I expounded upon was the need for specific timelines (with actual defined quantifiable goals), specific measures of effectiveness, and a specific road map as to how those at the tactical level are to expected to implement operational, strategic, and national direction. If you simply tell to me to focus on security secotr reform in order to extend the reach and legitimacy of the duly constituted governement of the IRoA, you may not like how I go about it. If I choose to equip one substation in each district, train one judge in each district, and embed one ETT in an ANA Bn, I will have focused on SSR, but I don't think that I will really be working towards the higher intent....

Similarly, if I focus EVERY effort in Kandahar City, I will eventually have a really secure Kandahar City, but I think that the rest of the province might have something to say...

Better post this now before it disappears into the ether as well.


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## George Wallace (10 Aug 2006)

The problem is that you have to start somewhere.  You can't realistically 'save' the whole country all at once.  You will have to be happy to save a small part of it, and slowly expand outward.  To do so you will need 'security'.  Our problem is how much manpower will this 'security' take up?


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## Teddy Ruxpin (10 Aug 2006)

I don't have an easy answer.  I remain convinced that the fight will be won in the countryside.  That, to me, means getting ANP into the larger villages in strength, with substantial Coalition support.  It also means an extensive (largely SF) effort to interdict Taliban communications with Pakistan, including extensive use of DAs if required - all controlled by a centralized, unified C2 structure.

Ultimately, I think my centre of gravity would focus on improving the professionalism, size and capability of both the ANA and ANP, in combination with the QRF concept I mentioned above and _focused, by exception_ kinetic operations.  I am of the opinion that individual terrorist attacks are virtually impossible to defend against.  Hell, we can't control London and New York, let alone S. Afghanistan.  However, concentrating on rural lines of communication, intelligence gathering and village control might have the effect of cutting the TB off from its support base and improving our ability to conduct intelligence-driven operations.

This puts the geographic centre of gravity almost exclusively along the S. frontier, to the point where I would likely reduce operations in the north and west. Timelines, IMHO, depend almost entirely on how quickly we get the ANA and ANP sorted out and operationally effective - a daunting task given the scope of the problem.

My 2 cents, as always.


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## APOLLOVet (10 Aug 2006)

Gentlemen,

WRT the last two posts, that is the direction that I am moving towards. While it is true that we have to start somewhere, because of domestic political considerations we have to commence with a strategy that does not extend past two-three years at first glance. The pillorying that the US has taken over the past 10-15 years over "exit strategies" has now infected us as well, even if that specific term is not used in the papers. It is not acceptable to openly state that it will take decades to finish the job, even though Cyprus went over twenty years before we threw in the towel, Yugoslavia went twenty years, and Lebanon has been going on for almost thirty.

If I remember my WW II history correctly, the Allies' "exit strategy" was to completely destroy the Axis nations ability to wage aggressive war, and to remain in situ until such time that the defeated nations were once again able to functionindependently. As it happened, once West Germany and Japan were back on their feet again they invited Allied powers to stay on to protect them from potential Soviet aggression (and I am sure that there was some back-door arm-twisting involved as well to wangle the "invitations"). We need to get back to that kind of long view in order to properly do the job.

Training the ANA/ANP is not a two-four year program, it is going to take at least ten years. As well, what we in the West often forget to consider is that they cannot use the same methods that we do. When the entire provincial record keeping system for every ministry is one guy sitting on a stool copying things by hand into ledger books, it is pretty pointless to suggest that they do economic forecasts for 4 years out and predict the impact of major infrastucture projects. I would loe to see this scribe's expression when you ask him to give you a memory stick so that you can download a PPT presentations and some spreadsheets that will help him.

I had a good (if somewhat dismayed) laugh over one of the projects that the PRT R0 did, namely the Gopvernor's LAN project. This involved a satellite connection to Kabul, installation of servers, UPS's, cabling, terminals etc in order to enable the Governor of Kandahar Province to connect his ministers to  his office, and from there to Kabul. When our boys did the research, there was exactly zero places in Afghanistan that could provide the equipment, and exactly 1 company out of Kabul who could actually bid on the project (even though all materials actually came out of the UAE). As the cost was over 50K, we were told to get three competitive bids to comply with PWGSC regulations...It is this kind of mindset that makes things harder to accomplish.

What needs to be communicated (subtly) to Canadian civilians is that Kandahar (and by extension Afghanistan) is not like a Canadian province. When the literacy rate of the average ANP recruit class is in the low teens it is hard to provide lessons much beyond the EDI method, and you certainly can't get into any skills lessons that are too complex. God knows that you can't get complex abstract techniques over at all in this manner.

Thus, not only can we not teach them how to use Western communication and decision making aids in order to streamline their operations and make them more effective and efficient, we can't even teach them how to fill out handwritten reports, returns, and requests. It definitely does make things harder when we are using digital data and communications techniques, while the people who we are supposedly training are using pen and paper if they are able to read and write at all.

Thus, if we are going to have success in the big picture, we will have to educate our citizens as to the need for patience and staying the course. We then have to actually form and train the bureaucracy that Western diplomats, aid workers, contractors etc expect to be able to plug into. Without that, our diplomats and aid workers are playing hockey on a football field. Once we have that we can then really start going to town on development, educating the locals on democratic governance (in the Western style, which is what we are imposing), and security reform. Concurrently with this, we can make great strides with the ANA and ANP AS LONG AS WE FOCUS OUR EFFORTS VERY CLOSELY, either in terms of geographical area or level of training we wish to achieve. In any event, it will be at least 3-5 years just to prepare the ground to receive the seeds...


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## Bruce Monkhouse (11 Aug 2006)

This is the most interesting thread I have read for a long time...thanks all.


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## TangoTwoBravo (11 Aug 2006)

There's operations in the north and west?

We should remember that the style of governance must be an Afghan choice, and the progress and results should be judged by Afghan standards.

In my view, the fault line that has caused the conflict over the past 30 years has been the huge divide between urban and rural Afghanistan.  Those tensions have been there for over 100 years, but they came into focus in the 70s.  Kandahar and Gumbad are about 100 km apart in terms of distance and 1,000 years in terms of "progress."

The easy answer is to say "development", but when that development threatens traditional power structures you get problems.  This war is about ideology, not people upset about a lack of development.  The Taliban don't fight us because we haven't built schools.  They fight us because we have built schools.  They don't fight us because we haven't built roads, they fight because we have built roads.

In my own narrow view our aim should be to develop the ANSF to the point where they can stand on their own.  In the meantime, we have to buy time and space for that to happen.  We buy that time and space by fighting, and the fighting can get downright conventional out there.  I never thought I'd be in a CP setting up enablers for a combat team to cross a river under fire to liberate a town from open occupation by the enemy.

With security the other things can happen.


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## APOLLOVet (11 Aug 2006)

2Bravo,

I agree with you that development is not the whole answer, and that any lasting power structure must be in and of Afghan nature. Everything that I saw over there was structured around the clan system within villages moving outward. It appeared to me that every level of governance above the village shura was essentially something that was grafted on to the regular people's daily lives, and they really had no interest in it. Certainly the provincial and national levels had no real daily impact.

However, I believe that development will play a role - complementary in the beginning, yet moving towards greater importance as the security situation improves. Believe it or not, I agree with the 3-D approach, or the more useful term of All-of-Government. Here's why:

1.   Yes, meaningful security reform has to happen first. If everything you build is destroyed as soon as it has been completed, you never advance. Thus, SSR has to be the initial focus.
2.   However, if we really intend to prevent Afghanistan from reverting to a failed state, we have to provide it the tools whereby its citizens can influence government, and feel that they can. Right now, government is something to be endured, and if it becomes too burdensome, removed. Presently Afghanistan has all the structures of Western style democracy in place at the National and Provincial level, but they have no idea as to how to translate those structures into effects on the ground. This is a function of what I have mentioned earlier, namely that we are imposing Western expectations and forms on a culture that has neither the technical training nor tools to implement them, nor any cultural imperative to do so.
3.    Finally, the only way (in my opinion) to inoculate a citizenry against ideology is to provide them with something that they value more than that ideology. The main replacement that we in the West offer is standard of living, as we are a materialistic society. This is again a function of the fact that we are CAPABLE of being a materialistic society. It is very easy to gain adherents to a creed that states that this life is merely a test to see how well you will be rewarded in the next life when your present existence revolves around back-breaking labour for mere daily survival. Therefore, in order to replace the allure of that ideology (the worse you have it in this life, the better you will be off in Paradise in the next) you will have to make it worth their while to give up what they are being promised in Heaven. The only way to accomplish that in a manner we in the West are familiar with is through development. 

Thus, I agree with you that we have to phase our main efforts:

Phase 1 - Security
Phase 2 - Education into what we are trying to do for the country, and how they can continue the efforts without us being present in large numbers
Phase 3 - Elevation of the standard of living through development so that a less fundamentalist form of Islam can prevail.

All three phases overlap, and all three efforts overlap to a certain degree with the stated ones above being primus inter pares.

Again, this is only my opinion. I am certainly not stating that this is the best, nor the only way.

Thanks to everyone who has responded. Your interest has compelled me to actually start putting all this in a rational, logical sequence rather than the way that I generally jump from point to point and back.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (11 Aug 2006)

> There's operations in the north and west?



We're part of ISAF now, no?  It seems to me that several ISAF countries are concentrating on the "safe" (using that term loosely) parts of the country around MeS and Herat - north and west.

ApolloVet:  check your messages, if you haven't already.


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## TangoTwoBravo (11 Aug 2006)

I was having a little fun at the expense of my northern comrades.  My bad.  I was trying to make the point that the operations are taking place in the south.  

2B


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## Teddy Ruxpin (11 Aug 2006)

Heh...and my sarcasm detector's obviously broken...  ;D  We're both making the same point, of course...


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## eeyore063 (18 Aug 2006)

Was just wondering if this is a dead thread since no one has posted in it in a while.
A question to ApolloVet though. In your initial post you stated that you thought we were focusing to much on combat ops and not enough on the restructuring campaign. Now after some of the posts that were made by 2Bravo and the others I was wondering if you were reconsidering that statement. To my knowledge the PRT is still conducting business as usual, albeit there is a greater need for security for any tasks they go on. They are still focusing on mentoring programs for the ANP and on helping the local gov't modernize itself and work towards the goal of gaining the trust of the people.Projects such as rebuilding the bridges and dams, or road improvement plans are going to be affected by security issues, but the fundamental creation of a working and respected infrastructure within the gov't can still be achieved. Yes the media has given a lot of attention to the Combat operations Canada has become involved in but I am sure the people that are there can attest to the fact that there is a lot of work being conducted behind the scenes to establish credit for the GoA that the media is not interested in because it doesn't sell the way violence and controversy does.


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## APOLLOVet (18 Aug 2006)

Eeyore,

Just a quick one, as my family is calling me away - I will go into more detail later.

I can't speak to the effect of the PRT R1, as I was not there for it. I can, however, speak to the PRT R0 and the other agencies that were operating there at the time (USAID, DynaCorps etc).

MTF when I get the chance to type. Sorry about the delay...


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## APOLLOVet (19 Aug 2006)

Eeyore,

Here is the more detailed reply that I promised...

Yes, the PRT is continuing on with reconstruction ops, and yes, they are ensuring that the "Afghan face" is maintained (thus gaining face for the Gov't of Afghanistan). As far as media coverage goes, I am sure that the local media is getting the word out, and we are just not hearing it in Canada.

The problem with the reconstruction effort that I saw (and have heard nothing to make me believe that the situation has changed) is that it is focused to our needs, not the Afghan's needs. All the smaller projects were very much "intelligence driven" wherein we stated that we would provide something in exchange for information in a specific area. It was not part of a coherent overall strategy.

WRT the large projects, they were very much too large. For example, if USAID (to name only one agency) wanted to have an effect in an area, they might build a fruit cannery. However, before they could build the cannery, they would have to build a road to get to the area, and they would also have to change the crops over to fruit from whatever was originally being grown. Finally, they would have to train the locals in how to operate it.

Well, since all these projects were "nested", what seemed to always happen was that all elements would be started, but they would not be carried through to completion. This was not the fault of the developing agency; this was merely a function of the facts that there were not enough agents, and their attentions were soon required elsewhere (usually for a small intelligence driven project). Thus, the locals never saw the complete benefit, and in the case of farmers who switched over crops, they often were actually harmed because they could not get any money from their new crops.

A further difficulty with the "large project" strategy was that there were very few contractors who could actually do the work. Many of these larger contractors were either inherently corrupt, or got all of their projects through nepotism. There were cases where contractors were provided with heavy machinery for a specific purpose (road construction), and rather than work on the road, the contractors would cite "security concerns" and then use the machinery somewhere else for personal gain. Obviously, this did not provide the desired effect with the locals.

Finally, I still feel that we are imposing too much of a Western flavour on the whole process. People always go with what they are familiar with. We know how to operate in the Western fashion, and the people with whom we are most comfortable dealing are those who speak English and understand how we conduct ALL our business in the West. These people, however, may not be the ones with whom we need to deal. Since Afghanistan is still a tribally dominated culture, we need to find those personnel who have real influence in their tribes, districts, religious sects, etc and deal with them. They may or may not be those personnel who have been elected or appointed to government positions (usually not in my experience).

If I had my druthers, we would approach Afghanistan in one of two ways (although with the understanding that the West would have to provide the main security umbrella while either of these two process were carried out):

1. We take the next generation and FULLY educate them in the Western political, economic, military, and governance functions; or
2. We create a cadre of personnel who will remain in Afghanistan until the job is done and fully educate them in the Afghan processes.

What I see now is that we have grafted a Western flavour on Afghanistan that is a mile wide and an inch deep. The Afghans as a whole do not understand what we are trying to do, and since they have not quickly seen concrete results do not support our actions. What we have are a number of people who have lived in the West who can take advantage of our presence simply because we can easily speak to them. Conversely, the people we have there now generally do not understand the Afghan way of doing things (and I do not pretend to be an expert myself) who are trying to go about their business in the way that they know how.  

Overall, I think that we are aiming our reconstruction strategy too high. Rather than trying to impose the control of the central government, and then raising the standard of living through the (apparent) actions of the government, I think that we should raise the general standard of living immediately (and credit the government as being a partner in the process rather than trying to say that they are responsible. The Afghans know that the aid is coming from the West, not Kabul) and then try to extend the influence of Kabul. Happy people with full bellies will not shelter the Taliban - people who are being promised "pie in the sky, by and by" will soon lose their belief.

Hope this answers your question


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## boondocksaint (29 Aug 2006)

i found a martini henry rifle in a mud hut we searched a few months ago....in working condition, why is this idiot writing about an ancient british rifle in this thread you ask?

this country and its problems are not gonna be solved by do gooders in our lifetime, no way no how, not by giving them little radios or wells or holding all the shura's in the world, they have LONG memories, we have very short ones, i dont know where my house keys are, but these dudes had a 130 yr old rifle, that worked

however, 'fighting solves everything', and in my opinion here is why

certain areas we operated in are now almost empty of taliban because we wiped em out, they are having to centralize their efforts to stay alive, leaving the rest of their former areas abandoned to us to rebuild or look after, we built a reputation of being tough fighters and fair ambassadors

not the other way around for once, when the locals in some areas accepted that we could actually beat the taliban we got more outta them then we ever did by drinking tea with them

im a simple guy, its why i like the infantry, i know there a myriad of high end details that go with making a new country, but fighting does solve everything when its all they understand, the details will work themselves out once the bad guys are gone


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## silentbutdeadly (29 Aug 2006)

Yeah why are are you , i ask? ;D


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## geo (29 Aug 2006)

?????????


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## JackD (30 Aug 2006)

Boondocksaint: Did you ever get a chance to ask the story behind the rifle?I'm rather curious - it being well maintained means it's a treasured artifact. I hope it wasn't confiscated - or if it was - some nitwit doesn't destroy it. Aid projects are most often a travesty - witness Africa. A good one is this wind-up radio  that is being trumpeted - nice idea but - there is such a thing as a crystal radio - way low tech and works. That's what is needed - workable low tech - for example - nice to fund a woman's sewing shop - donate 20 or so sewing machines - but if they are the electric model - where do you get the electricity from - there are the old fashioned third world trundle operated ones - things like that are what's needed - and are what's overlooked.


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## silentbutdeadly (30 Aug 2006)

I the rifles were transported back to Canada, not destroyed. Will most likely see them in the near future in the PPCLI museum in Calgary. The story being that they took them off a dead brit soldier back in the 1867.


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

Some Martini Henry rifles are / were working copies made by gunmiths in Afgh.... 

(the story of the rifle being taken from the grasp of a dead brit soldier would certainly be a tale that anyone would want to tell..... no drama in a story that said... oh - gramps picked this MH out of a crate that was in an abandoned warehouse.)

There are probably more Japanese Samurai swords in the US as souvenir war prizes than there were officers in the Japanese army in WW2..... go figure.


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## boondocksaint (30 Aug 2006)

i found it in a hut during a search, the old fella (like yoda old) had it hanging by its original sling on his wall, and the story i got from the village elder was that it was taken off a dead soldier and was used to fight the brits, their verbal history being filled in by several elders at this point, it was the real deal, had the british factory markings, we looked up the markings on the internet, we did find sevearl enfield type copies, but this one was an original

i woulda left them the rifle but he didnt want it do to the fact it still had the last cartridge it had fired stuck in it, those that no about martini henry's and the rolled brass ammo know they were prone to split cartridges, as was the case here, used a c-6 cleaning rod to pound out the round, a half bottle of wd-40 later and the action freed up and worked damn near like new

being a history geek i was pretty damn excited, i passed it off to an RCR guy when i left cuz i didnt have time to get the paperwork on it done, but i got to play with the rifle that 'with a bayonet and some guts behind it' helped shape the 'empire'

my previous rambling hopefully isnt too confusing/all over the place, i just think until the fighting is over the locals dont really trust us enough to replace the TB

mho


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## silentbutdeadly (30 Aug 2006)

The ones we found were stamped with the symbol, ie crown, of Queen Victoria with the date 1867 on it.


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

It's not a matter of trust IMHO
(locals don't want to be seen as collaborators - bad for their health if some TB or AQ come a visitin)


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## geo (30 Aug 2006)

silentbutdeadly! said:
			
		

> The ones we found were stamped with the symbol, ie crown, of Queen Victoria with the date 1867 on it.


NP - was just pointing out - as you said Enfield copies abound in the sandbox


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## Teflon (30 Aug 2006)

What is this "sandbox" shit, must we come up with stupid names for places,... The seven months I was there no one I worked with called it the sandbox, hell except towards the red sands desert, I saw far more shit rock then sand, the place is just a pile rocks of various sizes!

Sandbox my ass!


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## Teddy Ruxpin (2 Sep 2006)

It's a Yank thing that's crept in...like "down range"...  Heard both _ad nauseum_ on Apollo...


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## tomahawk6 (2 Sep 2006)

Its alot easier to type. ;D


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## darmil (2 Sep 2006)

more like litter box I would be excited to come across the rifle. That's an incredible find guys.


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## Good2Golf (2 Sep 2006)

returning to the thread...

Points made by Apollo, Teddy, et Co. are all good.

Some thoughts after seeing various levels of things working in AFG and how our assistance to AFG should continue:

- it must respond first and foremost to Afghans,
- pride is a big thing with Afghans, it must be absolutely clear it's their solution...we're just helping them, 
- it must not be turned into a project that Candians can parade to feel good about ourselves, 
- it is a long-term effort, 15-25 years easily,
- Afghans want SECURITY, not just physical, but food, infrastructure, culture,
- balance between DA and reconstructive ops...I too feel there is a bit more room for balance (both visible/press and actual)"
- ANA but even more so ANP are HUGE elem of the "feeling secure" thing, RCMP, ETT are excellent value added to the effort,
- Justice system, local gov't, etc... need continued assistance/pressure to clean up
- clear understanding of how fragile the hearts and minds is, and how quickly reversion to "old ways" will occur if Afghan men can't look after their families (i.e. real quick, yet still with a smile to your face)
- strive to not "equalize" Afghan society across the country, but reduce the "chasm" between Kabul and major cities, and the small villiages that are, as noted earlier, "thousands of years behind the present",
- disparity between city and villiage starts about a few hundred meters after the last "subdivision" in Kabul
- increased cultural awareness (not just the 1/2-day PTSC blurb) and consideration of it in operations and development activities.
- realization that at best, it will have an Islamic Republic structure with a democratic flavour, strive to maximize the flavour but not at the cost of threatening the Islamic mindset...this is without doubt probably the most delicate balance that must be made, it'll never be another Western country nestled within an Islamic region

...food for thought...

G2G


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## pbi (14 Oct 2006)

Apollovet: Glad you are safe back in Canada. Great posts. I must start out by saying that it is quite interesting to compare your observations to the perspectives of some of the very senior types we bring in as guest speakers here at CFC. All the things that you identify as what we should be doing all seem to be the things that they say(in more general terms) we actually are  doing. And yet, we see almost nothing in the media about Canadian reconstruction efforts. To a certain extent this can be blamed on "if it bleeds it leads", but yet there are other kinds of stories that do come out of Afgh via Cdn media (Timmy's got quite a bit of coverage, for example, and I saw a piece on Cdns training the Afgh fire service). So, maybe we really aren't doing enough significant reconstruction. I'm not there right now, (last there in 04-05) so I don't know. And, like Teddy, I am very loath to second-guess the folks on the two-way range (there's another dumb term...).

Still, it's pretty clear to me that fighting, while necessary (hopefully to a declining degree over the next few years) is not the panacea in the long run. In fact, there probably isn't a panacea for Afghanistan. It will probably live with factionalism and political violence to some degree for a long time. But then, so did the UK, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and a lot of other places we have long considered relatively stable. The fix, if there is one, IMHO is to have the Afghan people choose peace and stability most of the time in most of the country, until it really takes root, and (cynically) personal prosperity, comfort and a desire for a better life overcome the desire to pick up an RPG.

I also share some of your concerns from what I can perceive about the course of events there, but in a slightly different way. I believe that the combat ops that have been conducted thus far were all necessary, even if they were surprisingly different from what we were all expecting to see in 3BW (One report I read compared Panjwai to fighting in the Normandy bocage, only worse). I think that the CF (esp the Army) is doing its part, and probably much, much more. What is missing is a really concerted and well funded effort by the other two legs of the "3D" tripod": DFAIT and CIDA. Now, I am hearing more and more that these two are gradually becoming more organized and effective, but IMHO they are just as important as the troops: perhaps even moreso in the long run. We are not going to significantly change Afghan culture, and we should not bother. Instead, we need to give the GOA the tools and infrastructure to run the country. I agree fully with your bottom up approach to rebuilding and improvement, but it cannot be confined to that, IMHO, or we will build a headless creature with no nervous system.

However, I will add this. I am on side with those who are uneasy with what sometimes seems to be a focus on body count, terrain "taken" and saying things like "we have the Taleban on the run", etc. No doubt these things are all factual, at the instant they are said and as far as they go. But, sometimes I wonder how far they really go. I do not like the historical echoes I sometimes think I hear. At the same time I have to wonder how much is coming through a mirror clouded by the media focus of the moment, and how much is well-intended as being for "home consumption", but tends to create a triumphalist impression that has no useful place in counter-insurgency and nationbuuilding in the face of a determined, fanatic and patient foe.

Cheers


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## Spooks (18 Oct 2006)

APOLLOVet

PM away


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## APOLLOVet (22 Oct 2006)

Gentlemen,

Thanks for all the well thought out posts. Sorry about the long time between posts - was out of country for a while.

I recently had the chance to speak with another country that was doing PRT ops in another province in Afghanistan. They appeared to be approaching the problem in much the same manner as we are, but since their province is more secure than Kandahar, they are not so focused on DAs. It will be interesting to see how things transpire.

Since there seems to be relative consensus on the "way ahead" (another overused buzzword), I will not rehash everything again. I will add more thoughts if new items pop up. What I will say in response to some of the posts that I missed while I was away is that

1. Security is paramount, and security consists of physical security (ie fighting the TB/AQ to makew them go away), economic security (opportunity to provide for your family etc), religious security (we are not going to force the locals into Western behaviour patterns that will send them to Hell) etc
2. Western approaches to governance do exist in Kabul, but they have certainly not percolated down to the provincial level and lower. The institutions exist as shells, but there is no constructive work going on at the lower levels. This is why I believe that "bottom up" is required to meet the existing "top down" institutions
3. All efforts must be aimed at the local level of tech, education, etc (the sewing machine example is a good one). We have to remember that Afghanistan is DIFFERENT from Canada
4. We all have to remember that there is a big difference between what is happening at the tactical level and what is briefed to the honchos. Interpretation is everything, and nobody wants to be the one presenting bad news. If a fire department has one broken truck, and we fix it while giving them another we can then trumpet the fact that we have increased the fire department's capability by 200%. This is true, even if we have conveniently forgotten to mention that they cannot even crew the first one, and they are afraid to roll them to fire calls due to ambush. One interpretation does sound a lot better though.

Again, thank you all for your time and thought.


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