# The State of Army Doctrine



## Haligonian

I'm currently attending Expeditionary Warfare School with the USMC which is their AOC equivalent.  I've had the opportunity to read a lot of USMC doctrine and a lot of US Army as well.  What has struck me is the quantity in that they actually cover off everything the force is expected to do, the quality is pretty good from my perspective, but, most importantly, people actually know it, reference it, and use it as a basis for professional discussion. In my experience Canadians don't know their doctrine and the doctrine isn't kept up to date or properly published.  A perfect example is combat tm operations.  While LGen Devlin was the Comd of the Army he stated that the combat tm and combat tm training was the center of gravity for the army.  How can our center of gravity have doctrine that has been "interim" since 2004 and spends the vast majority of its content describing the conduct of drills in great detail?

Doctrine should give us a starting point and a place to go when we are looking for answers to questions.  Before you go and ask your pl comd/OC/CO something the first thing going through our heads should be, does the answer already exist in doctrine or officially recognized TTP's.  Doctrine establishes the "box".  The Canadian Army subscribes to maneuver warfare and believes that thinking outside the box is essential, however, for our junior officers/NCOs, I would suggest knowing where/what the box is in the first place would be important before thinking outside of it.  

It also seems like a lot of our doctrine is written for officers. The assumption is that no one else will/should refer to it. The Marine's capstone publication is MCDP-1 Warfighting.  This publication is on the Commandant's reading list and expected to be read by every Marine and then conversations within units at squad and platoon level are had on it.  How does that compare to our Land Operations which I would bet that 99.9% of Canadian enlisted members have never glanced at.  You can find Land Operations here http://info.publicintelligence.net/CanadaLandOps.pdf  Compare that to MCDP-1 in terms of accessibility to junior ranks, you can find it here, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf

Perhaps most importantly doctrine establishes the vocabulary of our profession so that we can actually have professional discussions where the terms being used are recognized by all, and if they aren't they can refer to a publication that has it.  I haven't been able to find the Canadian publication that has all of our terms, perhaps an AOC grad can point it out to me if it exists.  The US has Operational Terms and Graphics FM 1-02 for the Army or MCRP 5-12A for the Marines (same pub just different numbering for the services).  Hand books from the infantry school or whatever other school aren't the same as they aren't as widely available. You can find it here to see what I'm talking about.  

http://ofp.umbr.net/Other/milpubs/Operational%20Terms%20and%20Graphics%20%20%20(MCRP%205-12a).pdf

Does anyone else see this as a problem or am I blowing this out of proportion?  Shouldn't we be devoting resources to publishing proper doctrine?  In an "interwar" period it seems to be that we should be ensuring that we are investing in our intellectual capital to ensure that we are prepared as possible for unforeseen conflicts in the future.  How can we do this without a proper doctrinal foundation?


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## Lightguns

You are seeing a problem we have had my entire military career. The fact is that we do not consider doctrine important because we are not able to experiment with anything we write down. In the main we have not been resourced to explore doctrine since the 1950s. I have spent my full career with notional heavy infantry anti tank weapons that we never purchased, notational tank destroyers that we never designed let alone built. Now we have no real AT capability, no AD, half our artillery is mortars and so many different vehicle types that we can no longer afford service them.  Discussions on doctrine are useless in a military that cannot experiment with the basics. Our doctrine should focus on platoons and platoon support because it takes the resources of the entire army deploy and support anything larger in high intensity combat.


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## Lightguns

I forgot to mention, congrats on getting Expeditionary Warfare School, that is really a prize plum for anyone interested in exploring doctrine.  The Marines are very intense in developing in their intellectual combat power.  Do well, come back, write often, argue well and make a difference in our ¨colour of the embroidery thread¨ military.


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## Haligonian

Thanks.  It's been great and getting the gazette every month for the past 4 yrs has been helpful.


The marines really believe in their intellectual capital and professional devt.  As part of the course we write papers, go on battle studies, receive visits senior ranking pers and do the normal practical exercises. In addition to the normal curriculum there is a number of additional learning opportunities.  Monthly there is a historical tactical decision lecture led by Dr Gudmundsson (author of On Infantry second edition!). There is a number of battle studies taking place every two or three weekends visiting the battlefields of the overland campaign led by a tour guid from the parks dept and there is a small group who gets together to host VIPs for supper like American ambassadors and snr generals. A lot of this is being put together by students!


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## sandyson

Haligonian: congratulations indeed, on attending such a prestigious course.
I have been reading the Marine corps Gazette since the 70's. Here is where the widest variety of doctrine (land sea, and air) is discussed and doctrine needs to be critically discussed in order for it to have life. What is most refreshing to me is that Capt X will publish a critique of higher ranked officers' opinion.  Even USMC NCO s do the same. It was my experience in the Canadian Forces that my career took a serious bad turn when providing an academic argument contrary to 'policy'.  (I wouldn't call it doctrine.) The Canadian officer corps is just too thinned skinned to get into the rough and tumble world of doctrine critique and therefore there is no life in Canadian military doctrine.
Lightguns. I agree with the inferred opinion of Canadian military equipment, which begs the question: so what should our land doctrine be, given we don't have a mechanized army? Our doctrine is set in a dream world. Our country is the second largest in land mass.  We have a huge length of coast line and so on.  I don't recall ever reading a credible national defence policy.  The scope for writing a Canadian doctrine for land operations given our resources, is unbounded.  That's the problem.  It's always been easier (and safer for one's career) to just adopt another country's.  So why bother discussing it?  One might as well critique a book of fantasy.  Or!


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## Infanteer

Unfortunately, Canadian Army doctrine is Beer, Hockey and Left Flanking - shaking us out of that will be difficult.

It doesn't help that PAMs are no longer PAMphlets but 400 page tomes that nobody actually reads because they just say the same old crap about the spectrum of conflict and the moral plane over and over again.

So, I'm in an Infantry battalion; what does it look like?  Well, _The Infantry Battalion in Battle_ was written in 1992 and has neat things like Mortar Platoons.  If we can't get this updated, I wonder what DAD, with its establishment of 1 Col, 6 LCols, 12 Majs and 1 Capt, have been doing?


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## The Bread Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ....  I wonder what DAD, with its establishment of 1 Col, 6 LCols, 12 Majors and 1 Captain have been doing?


If they're doing anything, the cynic in me pictures 19 senior officers doing a lot of pencil editing of one junior officer's writing.


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## Bird_Gunner45

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I'm currently attending Expeditionary Warfare School with the USMC which is their AOC equivalent.  I've had the opportunity to read a lot of USMC doctrine and a lot of US Army as well.  What has struck me is the quantity in that they actually cover off everything the force is expected to do, the quality is pretty good from my perspective, but, most importantly, people actually know it, reference it, and use it as a basis for professional discussion. In my experience Canadians don't know their doctrine and the doctrine isn't kept up to date or properly published.  A perfect example is combat tm operations.  While LGen Devlin was the Comd of the Army he stated that the combat tm and combat tm training was the center of gravity for the army.  How can our center of gravity have doctrine that has been "interim" since 2004 and spends the vast majority of its content describing the conduct of drills in great detail?
> 
> Doctrine should give us a starting point and a place to go when we are looking for answers to questions.  Before you go and ask your pl comd/OC/CO something the first thing going through our heads should be, does the answer already exist in doctrine or officially recognized TTP's.  Doctrine establishes the "box".  The Canadian Army subscribes to maneuver warfare and believes that thinking outside the box is essential, however, for our junior officers/NCOs, I would suggest knowing where/what the box is in the first place would be important before thinking outside of it.
> 
> It also seems like a lot of our doctrine is written for officers. The assumption is that no one else will/should refer to it. The Marine's capstone publication is MCDP-1 Warfighting.  This publication is on the Commandant's reading list and expected to be read by every Marine and then conversations within units at squad and platoon level are had on it.  How does that compare to our Land Operations which I would bet that 99.9% of Canadian enlisted members have never glanced at.  You can find Land Operations here http://info.publicintelligence.net/CanadaLandOps.pdf  Compare that to MCDP-1 in terms of accessibility to junior ranks, you can find it here, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf
> 
> Perhaps most importantly doctrine establishes the vocabulary of our profession so that we can actually have professional discussions where the terms being used are recognized by all, and if they aren't they can refer to a publication that has it.  I haven't been able to find the Canadian publication that has all of our terms, perhaps an AOC grad can point it out to me if it exists.  The US has Operational Terms and Graphics FM 1-02 for the Army or MCRP 5-12A for the Marines (same pub just different numbering for the services).  Hand books from the infantry school or whatever other school aren't the same as they aren't as widely available. You can find it here to see what I'm talking about.
> 
> http://ofp.umbr.net/Other/milpubs/Operational%20Terms%20and%20Graphics%20%20%20(MCRP%205-12a).pdf
> 
> Does anyone else see this as a problem or am I blowing this out of proportion?  Shouldn't we be devoting resources to publishing proper doctrine?  In an "interwar" period it seems to be that we should be ensuring that we are investing in our intellectual capital to ensure that we are prepared as possible for unforeseen conflicts in the future.  How can we do this without a proper doctrinal foundation?



We do have a doctrine document in "Land Forces 2021- Adaptive Dispersed Operations" which is similar-ish to the Air-Sea battle doctrine. In reality, the focus of the moment is on the creation of a structure compatable with the "Netcentric warfare" theory, which in turn is based on the Generational theory of warfare (4GW as the kids call it).

I fully agree that during an interwar period we need to focus on officer education on the nature of war and the creation of a flexible doctrine (and realistic). There's no way that anyone can predict the nature of the next war, and realistically we've been putrid at it (see WW1, WW2, Korea, Afghanistan, the fall of the Soviet Union, etc).

The key thing for us right now is to take a cold, hard look at the ADO model. What lessons of the enduring nature of warfare were learned from our experience in Afghanistan that can be applied to this model (which is essentially a Revolution in Military Affairs theory updated)? Is Canada, as a nation, ever going to be able to apply the model or should we instead focus on what we can do in line with the priorities of the Canada First Defence Strategy?

On a side note, I laugh every time I see the reference to JIMP operations... if you want a laugh look up "Jimp" in the urban dictionary.... it's sadly appropriate.....


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## daftandbarmy

An interesting Wikipedia article on the subject of doctrine.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_doctrine

I must admit, to me anyways, 'doctrine' can seem like a policy manual for the intellectually/ socially challenged which, of course, is not going to set us up well for the next war (s).

I can't count the number of times that I've heard senior people yell things like 'you did not follow doctrine and have therefore failed' which, of course, is more about their own egos than winning the war.


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## Bird_Gunner45

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> An interesting Wikipedia article on the subject of doctrine.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_doctrine
> 
> I must admit, to me anyways, 'doctrine' can seem like a policy manual for the intellectually/ socially challenged which, of course, is not going to set us up well for the next war (s).
> 
> I can't count the number of times that I've heard senior people yell things like 'you did not follow doctrine and have therefore failed' which, of course, is more about their own egos than winning the war.



As the article states, doctrine is supposed to establish the way in which the army intends to fight, or "establish the box". As a trainer, this is vital as we want our young leaders to understand the box before they begin to think outside of it. Thats the difference between making informed decisions on the violation of various principles of war and the potential consequences and people "just winging it". We like to _imagine_ that winging it is a good practice, but in reality it is not... not even close.


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## Kirkhill

Two flexible organizations:













The adaptive advantage of a flexible skeleton.  The rattler moves with purpose.  The amoeba drifts.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Does anyone else see this as a problem or am I blowing this out of proportion?  Shouldn't we be devoting resources to publishing proper doctrine?  In an "interwar" period it seems to be that we should be ensuring that we are investing in our intellectual capital to ensure that we are prepared as possible for unforeseen conflicts in the future.  How can we do this without a proper doctrinal foundation?



The Combat Team publication is indeed Interim and it is from 2004, but that does not make it a bad publication. We should not be surprised that it contains mostly drills. Combat teams will generally operate with TTPs. What more do you want in that book?  That the Army Commander made combat team training the centre of gravity doesn't mean that we need a new or bigger Combat Team Commander manual. What he did do was place the emphasis on assigning resources to make sure that we do that training. 

Our Land Ops is a bit on the heavy side and I'm not sure that we need the EBAO/Influence Activities bits in the detail that they have. Still, I see nothing fundamentally flawed with it. I would not invest much time making Troopers and Corporals read Land Ops. They should focus their time and effort on the things that they do. Now, as an OC I went over sub-unit (and branch) theory with my Sqn such as principles of employment and the types of tactical tasks that we would execute. I would not, however, get into the levels or spectrum of conflict. Do they need to know the Forms of Offence? 

I expect Captains in the field force above Platoon/Troop command to know the Land Ops book in detail. 

While the Infantry Battalion and Armoured Regiment books are quite aged, there is a new Battle Group in Operations book.

Doctrine is a great starting point, and we should indeed know when we are departing from doctrine.  I think that you are absolutely right that we should know the disposition of "the box" before we step outside of it. I can recall several times in the past few years in the field force when I was involved in head-scratching debates on issues with other Majors until one of us looked up the issue. We often found the doctrinal answer and resolved the issue (or not!). We should understand and respect our doctrine but not place it on an alter and worship/memorize it.


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## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Unfortunately, Canadian Army doctrine is Beer, Hockey and Left Flanking - shaking us out of that will be difficult.
> 
> It doesn't help that PAMs are no longer PAMphlets but 400 page tomes that nobody actually reads because they just say the same old crap about the spectrum of conflict and the moral plane over and over again.
> 
> So, I'm in an Infantry battalion; what does it look like?  Well, _The Infantry Battalion in Battle_ was written in 1992 and has neat things like Mortar Platoons.  If we can't get this updated, I wonder what DAD, with its establishment of 1 Col, 6 LCols, 12 Majs and 1 Capt, have been doing?



I assume DAD is Directorate of Army Doctrine or something like that? Seriously though what do they do? Does anyone have experience writing doctrine?  My understanding is that current infantry doctrine has been farmed out to the infantry school and has been given as a secondary duty for course officers. 



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We do have a doctrine document in "Land Forces 2021- Adaptive Dispersed Operations" which is similar-ish to the Air-Sea battle doctrine. In reality, the focus of the moment is on the creation of a structure compatable with the "Netcentric warfare" theory, which in turn is based on the Generational theory of warfare (4GW as the kids call it).
> 
> I fully agree that during an interwar period we need to focus on officer education on the nature of war and the creation of a flexible doctrine (and realistic). There's no way that anyone can predict the nature of the next war, and realistically we've been putrid at it (see WW1, WW2, Korea, Afghanistan, the fall of the Soviet Union, etc).
> 
> The key thing for us right now is to take a cold, hard look at the ADO model. What lessons of the enduring nature of warfare were learned from our experience in Afghanistan that can be applied to this model (which is essentially a Revolution in Military Affairs theory updated)? Is Canada, as a nation, ever going to be able to apply the model or should we instead focus on what we can do in line with the priorities of the Canada First Defence Strategy?
> 
> On a side note, I laugh every time I see the reference to JIMP operations... if you want a laugh look up "Jimp" in the urban dictionary.... it's sadly appropriate.....



I'm familiar with ADO and I'm using it to write a paper here on the training of infantry sections.  I agree with much of what you've said but my concern is geared more towards the current army and our ability to actually discuss issues professionally, acquire equipment, and understand how we should relate to ideas like ADO.  As Infanteer alluded to, how is it that we don't have a document that we can throw at a 2LT or Lt just joining an infantry Bn to help him understand how the unit operates?



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> An interesting Wikipedia article on the subject of doctrine.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_doctrine
> 
> I must admit, to me anyways, 'doctrine' can seem like a policy manual for the intellectually/ socially challenged which, of course, is not going to set us up well for the next war (s).
> 
> I can't count the number of times that I've heard senior people yell things like 'you did not follow doctrine and have therefore failed' which, of course, is more about their own egos than winning the war.



As you can imagine I disagree.  Our lack of doctrine and the resulting undisciplined procurement is what has led us to buying TAPV's and then coming up with organizations for them and buying C16's for infantry platoons that can't employ them.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> As the article states, doctrine is supposed to establish the way in which the army intends to fight, or "establish the box". As a trainer, this is vital as we want our young leaders to understand the box before they begin to think outside of it. Thats the difference between making informed decisions on the violation of various principles of war and the potential consequences and people "just winging it". We like to _imagine_ that winging it is a good practice, but in reality it is not... not even close.



Exactly.


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## Haligonian

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The Combat Team publication is indeed Interim and it is from 2004, but that does not make it a bad publication. We should not be surprised that it contains mostly drills. Combat teams will generally operate with TTPs. What more do you want in that book?  That the Army Commander made combat team training the centre of gravity doesn't mean that we need a new or bigger Combat Team Commander manual. What he did do was place the emphasis on assigning resources to make sure that we do that training.
> 
> Our Land Ops is a bit on the heavy side and I'm not sure that we need the EBAO/Influence Activities bits in the detail that they have. Still, I see nothing fundamentally flawed with it. I would not invest much time making Troopers and Corporals read Land Ops. They should focus their time and effort on the things that they do. Now, as an OC I went over sub-unit (and branch) theory with my Sqn such as principles of employment and the types of tactical tasks that we would execute. I would not, however, get into the levels or spectrum of conflict. Do they need to know the Forms of Offence?
> 
> I expect Captains in the field force above Platoon/Troop command to know the Land Ops book in detail.
> 
> While the Infantry Battalion and Armoured Regiment books are quite aged, there is a new Battle Group in Operations book.
> 
> Doctrine is a great starting point, and we should indeed know when we are departing from doctrine.  I think that you are absolutely right that we should know the disposition of "the box" before we step outside of it. I can recall several times in the past few years in the field force when I was involved in head-scratching debates on issues with other Majors until one of us looked up the issue. We often found the doctrinal answer and resolved the issue (or not!). We should understand and respect our doctrine but not place it on an alter and worship/memorize it.



I think combat teams are likely to operate with TTP's when they are in the advance to contact, likely through an enemy security area, outside of that they may find themselves operating more deliberately.  So what would I like to see in it? I think a chapter on direct fire control would be good (we have next to no doctrine on this in any of our pams, US doctrine devotes a full chapter to it from squad to Coy).  A piece on Cbt Sp to include aviation should be included. Merry Up drills should be discussed. Some further detail on the sustainment portion. How much fuel and ammo are those tanks and LAV's going to need? How about something about the strengths and weaknesses of employing dismounted forces in conjunction with the tanks/mechanized portion. Fighting in Built Up Areas. How about addressing the fact that a square cbt tm would likely be rare.  How many square cbt tms can we actually produce in a Bde?  3? So perhaps the comd creates those three or maybe he chooses to make more cbt tms by giving a trp or two to each coy. 

I applaud the detail of the drills described but they all use a square cbt tm and I think that drills have a tenancy to ossify thinking.  I have experienced it myself and maybe it is just me but often my initial reaction to a tactical problem is to throw down a mental sitemp on the map and it looks just like a cbt tm hasty attack every time and I need to give my head a shake and start fresh.  Perhaps this comes from conducting work up for and then conducting the CTCC as a Coy 2IC before coming here but I think I'm a product of the system.  I think those drills apply to very limited situations.  How often is the enemy going to throw unsupported platoons with open flanks out on key terrain?  That is what we train for with the cbt tm hasty attack and that is what is described in that Pam.

I wouldn't force Cpls/Trps to read land ops either.  But not because I don't think it's worth while for them to understand the nature of war but because that publication is not easily read nor targeted to a general audience and I think it's worth our time to be able to explain it to our junior ranks.

I assure you that Captains who haven't attended AOC have not read Land Ops.  I would put the rate at 90%.  Of that 90%, 70% don't even know it exists.

I obviously agree with your last comment.  I'm not trying to put doctrine on a shelf but as a junior captain on the verge of entering into senior 'captaindom' I've gone looking for answers or at least a guide before and I've found that it doesn't exist and I've had to go ask where I've often found the answers less than satisfactory.  On this course I've seen the power of at least having a place to go to get some guidance.  Everyone is singing off the same sheet of music and speaking the same language.


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## dapaterson

I think I read somewhere that "Doctrine provides a common start point for deviations".


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## OldSolduer

We have doctrine? Really?

Learn something new every day.....


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## MilEME09

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> We have doctrine? Really?
> 
> Learn something new every day.....



CSS Doctrines just started an update of sorts, until last year the books said traveling at night in loose packets was the safest way to deliver supplies and operate................cause we know that is so true in the days of IR and NVG's. As much as I hate to suggest a large gathering of officers, I think we need a conference or focus group to shape doctrine over the next 30 years. Many books I've seen were originally printed in the 50's with only minor paragraphs added as time went on but stayed in the context of the original document. A revamp of doctrine could also lead to a shift in training among other things within the forces, which may be for the better.


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## PPCLI Guy

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I assure you that Captains who haven't attended AOC have not read Land Ops.  I would put the rate at 90%.  Of that 90%, 70% don't even know it exists.



Your experiences is rather typical - you have had your eyes opened on your current course, and are looking around, blinking in the light, and asking where is our doctrine?  It is, in fact there - you have just not yet had cause to look for it.  The same light would have gone on if you were attending AOC.



> I obviously agree with your last comment.  I'm not trying to put doctrine on a shelf but as a junior captain on the verge of entering into senior 'captaindom' I've gone looking for answers or at least a guide before and I've found that it doesn't exist and I've had to go ask where I've often found the answers less than satisfactory.  On this course I've seen the power of at least having a place to go to get some guidance.  Everyone is singing off the same sheet of music and speaking the same language.



The actual definition of doctrine is "the body of that which is taught".  This implies that we have it, we just don't write it, 'cus no one would read it...


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## daftandbarmy

Of course, doctrine and culture are entwined in ways that make it hard to figure out how to influence one without the other. Regardless, unlike pre-WW2 France, it's important to get it right:



Culture and French Military Doctrine
Before World War II
Elizabeth Kier

When war broke out in May 1940, the French army found itself saddled
with a highly defensive doctrine that was incapable of breaking the German
assault. France used the interwar period to bolster its military and was
well prepared to fight a war against Germany-but only if Hitler fought
the war on French terms. As a result, few defeats were as rapid or as devastating
as the May-June campaign in Western Europe. 

http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-359-2011-S3_WTW/Syllabus/EReadings/02.1/02.1.Katzenstein1996The-Culture186-215.pdf


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## TangoTwoBravo

Indeed, AOC is the course where we teach doctrine, with Land Ops being a big part of the doctrinal curriculum. That is what I mean when I say that I expect a Captain to know Land Ops.  

Combat teams live in the world of TTPs - and the main ones are found in the Combat Team book. I took a six month Captains course with the US Army, and indeed they placed more emphasis on the company commander controlling direct fire than us. I am not convinced that we need to do that. Now, the Tactics School combat team quick attack against an isolated enemy platoon is a teaching vehicle. Battle Group in Operations (2011) talks about the various ways to group and fight as a Battle Group. Battle Groups deal with doctrine and TTPs. Land Ops talks about everything up to the operational level (turning movements etc). 

I do find that our manuals have gotten a bit wordy, with too many nice buzzwords and fancy adjectives.


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## Haligonian

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Your experiences is rather typical - you have had your eyes opened on your current course, and are looking around, blinking in the light, and asking where is our doctrine?  It is, in fact there - you have just not yet had cause to look for it.  The same light would have gone on if you were attending AOC.
> 
> The actual definition of doctrine is "the body of that which is taught".  This implies that we have it, we just don't write it, 'cus no one would read it...



I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.

I undestand this is the point of courses like AOC and EWS but I knew this to be an issue before attending EWS as I try to familiarize myself with our doctrine and my interest in the USMC led me to read US doctrine, EWS has confirmed my suspicions and made thd issue seem more dire.

I'll disagree with your last point. If we don't write it down then it is likely to be irrelevant. This is a relatively large institution with shifting priorities from year to year. We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!

People would read doctrine if: 1. It was Helpful 2. It was Expected that you know the basics contained therein.


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## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.



Have you looked at B-GL-321-005 _Battle Group on Operations_?



> We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!



Which generation is that?


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## TangoTwoBravo

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.
> 
> I undestand this is the point of courses like AOC and EWS but I knew this to be an issue before attending EWS as I try to familiarize myself with our doctrine and my interest in the USMC led me to read US doctrine, EWS has confirmed my suspicions and made thd issue seem more dire.



There is plenty of doctrine. Combat Team in Operations, Battle Group in Operations and Land Operations give you plenty. Add in the FSOP book and branch specific manuals and we have plenty of words giving us guidance on how to fight.


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## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Have you looked at B-GL-321-005 _Battle Group on Operations_?
> 
> Which generation is that?



I'd suggest the group of officers and NCOs that came up preparing predominantly preparing for Afghanistan.

I haven't seen the new BG in Ops.  I'll try and get my hands on that!


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## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I'd suggest the group of officers and NCOs that came up preparing predominantly preparing for Afghanistan.



Considering that generation was solely focused on generating combined arms battle groups and was intellectually trained on a stream of ATOC, AOC and CTCC, I'd argue the opposite.  Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, I spent 2 months in a battle group training in combined arms manoeuvre, employing tank/infantry teams backed with howitzers, CCA, CAS and armoured engineering assets.  While in Afghanistan I was part of numerous combat team and battle group operations, including square combat team breaching conducting deliberate breaches.  While we may have lost a bit of a sense of mobile, formation manoeuvre I'd argue that Afghanistan saved the concept of combined arms manoeuvre for the Army and averted the creation of a generation of soldiers who would have known only MMEV and the sense battle non-sense.


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## GR66

I'm a civilian so I have nothing to contribute to this discussion but I do have a question.  

In the CF's doctrines and training do you feel they realistically take into account the current state of the CF when planning for full-scale combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  Could we realistically generate and maintain in combat forces of the size and composition our plans call for?  Do we assume that currently missing capabilities (AT?  AAD?) will be somehow be generated when time comes for their employment (if our doctrine assumes these capabilities in the first place)?  Do we have enough materiel such as munitions, fuel, replacement vehicles and parts to support full-scale combat operations for an extended period of time and have the ability to get these supplies to our forces in theatre?  Or do we assume that they will be obtainable when the time comes?

I ask this because some of the early respondents seemed to be suggesting that while there may be a doctrine in place, it may not be possible to actually follow that doctrine due to the state of the CF.


----------



## McG

I believe somebody is again working on the Cbt Tm in Ops.  Within the past year, I was asked to provide comments on the 2004 draft for DAD to finally get it finished.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Haligonian said:
			
		

> We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!
> 
> People would read doctrine if: 1. It was Helpful 2. It was Expected that you know the basics contained therein.



Well, I hope that the NCOs and officers in combat teams are good at executing drills because its what they must do for the combat team to achieve its mission. Those drills are found in the Combat Team publication. You want to do a hasty attack? There is a TTP in there. You need to breach? There's a drill for that. You need to advance to contact? There are some recommended formations and forms of movement. You come to a crest? There's a Crest Drill.  You are linking up with another force? There's a chapter for that. These all come with illustrations, which is nice. This is not to say that we mindlessly execute drills - the drill is simply the framework for the low-level solution to the tactical problem. Sgts and Lts apply the TTP/drill to the situation and quickly come up with a plan to execute.

Now, we do need to revise/re-issue the Tank Troop Leader in Battle book to give a little more detail. We threw that out with the zeal of the converted in 2004/5.

With regards to junior officer PD, I tried to make sure that my Troop Leaders/Platoon Commanders (and their Ptl/Sect Comds) were conversant with combat team tactics in addition to their reconnaissance bread and butter. We'd conduct PD sessions on aspects of the Combat Team book and then do a TEWT. Combined with field exercises I aimed to make them think like combat team commanders. At the Regimental level we reviewed aspects of our applicable doctrine on cloth models/JCATs before executing in the field. 

I think that the generation that came of age as junior officers between 2006 and 2013 have a good grasp of mechanized combat team operations. Some did miss out on meaningful platoon/troop command due to arriving out of cycle for deployment or because they arrived with twelve other junior officers and only got six month command tours. Many, though, had fairly comprehensive mechanized experience. The group of subbies at my Regiment between 2011 and 2013 had very good mechanized experiences, with many participating in Bde level exercises.

One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.



The big 'challenge' in infantry doctrine that I have noticed, in the advance and attack phase of war and watching it over the past few years at the Coy level anyways, is that there is an over riding preference for the 'frontal assault' even when there is excellent cover from view/fire available. At first I thought it was merely leadership laziness but on questioning the NCOs and Officers they tell me that this is what they've been taught on their various courses: no flankings, hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle.

Is this something that has been hammered home as a result of our 'armoured infantry' doctrine? 

If so, it will get lots of people killed in other types of ground combat in the future.

The other thing that I have noticed from the depths of my armchair is that, perhaps because of an over emphasis on 'train to excite' combined with a largely 'offensive' emphasis in AFG over the years, that we have been doing almost no 'defensive phase of war' stuff (beyond patrolling) and are doing more and more 'Call of Duty' compatible stuff e.g., MOUT. The result is that if we launched a defensive phase of war focused annual training plan I'm sure that we'd see wholesale departures of one kind or another. Worse, if we had to dig in on a border somewhere, and defend against a proper attack of some kind from a real enemy, we'd likely have our hats handed to us.


----------



## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Considering that generation was solely focused on generating combined arms battle groups and was intellectually trained on a stream of ATOC, AOC and CTCC, I'd argue the opposite.  Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, I spent 2 months in a battle group training in combined arms manoeuvre, employing tank/infantry teams backed with howitzers, CCA, CAS and armoured engineering assets.  While in Afghanistan I was part of numerous combat team and battle group operations, including square combat team breaching conducting deliberate breaches.  While we may have lost a bit of a sense of mobile, formation manoeuvre I'd argue that Afghanistan saved the concept of combined arms manoeuvre for the Army and averted the creation of a generation of soldiers who would have known only MMEV and the sense battle non-sense.



That's a good point Infanteer.  I may be being overly dire.  I too hit many of those wickets when I went through Ft Irwin, and prior to that however, once deployed I conducted 2 cbt tm ops and the tanks were employed predominantly in blocking posns as we cleared through villages.  I believe you deployed between 2006 and 2009 when things were more kinetic and Cbt Tm Ops may have been more pervasive.  On my tour the sqn had a task to provide a standing blocking posn at the foot the mountain range leading out into the Reg (Kheybari Ghar?) so they weren't always free to conduct ops.  I wasn't a part of any deliberate breaches and I don't think there was any during my tour.  I'd also point out that many folks spent their time in Afghanistan in the KPRT, the OMLT, or the P-OMLT, they would not have been exposed to as much kinetic combined arms training as their BG brethren.  3 PPCLI didn't generate a BG at all so I would think there would be some atrophy there, however, I believe you're posted there and if you aren't seeing it then perhaps its not an issue.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Well, I hope that the NCOs and officers in combat teams are good at executing drills because its what they must do for the combat team to achieve its mission. Those drills are found in the Combat Team publication. You want to do a hasty attack? There is a TTP in there. You need to breach? There's a drill for that. You need to advance to contact? There are some recommended formations and forms of movement. You come to a crest? There's a Crest Drill.  You are linking up with another force? There's a chapter for that. These all come with illustrations, which is nice. This is not to say that we mindlessly execute drills - the drill is simply the framework for the low-level solution to the tactical problem. Sgts and Lts apply the TTP/drill to the situation and quickly come up with a plan to execute.
> 
> Now, we do need to revise/re-issue the Tank Troop Leader in Battle book to give a little more detail. We threw that out with the zeal of the converted in 2004/5.
> 
> With regards to junior officer PD, I tried to make sure that my Troop Leaders/Platoon Commanders (and their Ptl/Sect Comds) were conversant with combat team tactics in addition to their reconnaissance bread and butter. We'd conduct PD sessions on aspects of the Combat Team book and then do a TEWT. Combined with field exercises I aimed to make them think like combat team commanders. At the Regimental level we reviewed aspects of our applicable doctrine on cloth models/JCATs before executing in the field.
> 
> I think that the generation that came of age as junior officers between 2006 and 2013 have a good grasp of mechanized combat team operations. Some did miss out on meaningful platoon/troop command due to arriving out of cycle for deployment or because they arrived with twelve other junior officers and only got six month command tours. Many, though, had fairly comprehensive mechanized experience. The group of subbies at my Regiment between 2011 and 2013 had very good mechanized experiences, with many participating in Bde level exercises.
> 
> One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.



I'm tracking what's in the Cbt Tm Pam.  While I agree that drills are very important for a cbt tm and as I've said before the level of detail of the drills in the Pam is excellent, I still think that the drills are focused on the cbt tm in the advance to contact and it could benefit from a broader treatment to include many of things I've already mentioned.

I applaud your efforts to develop your subordinates.  I just haven't had this experience.  Most of my time was spent going through work up training that was pretty regimented and then on my second unit tour we sat down as a coy to discuss TTP's twice.  Once before deploying to the field for live fire coy attacks and then again prior to CTCC. Both times focused on the drills we've already discussed in the Cbt Tm Ops pub. I never did TEWT's or cloth model problems with my CoC.  Would you say that your experience is more typical than mine?  I hope!  

Completely agree with your last point.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The big 'challenge' in infantry doctrine that I have noticed, in the advance and attack phase of war and watching it over the past few years at the Coy level anyways, is that there is an over riding preference for the 'frontal assault' even when there is excellent cover from view/fire available. At first I thought it was merely leadership laziness but on questioning the NCOs and Officers they tell me that this is what they've been taught on their various courses: no flankings, hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle.
> 
> Is this something that has been hammered home as a result of our 'armoured infantry' doctrine?
> 
> If so, it will get lots of people killed in other types of ground combat in the future.
> 
> The other thing that I have noticed from the depths of my armchair is that, perhaps because of an over emphasis on 'train to excite' combined with a largely 'offensive' emphasis in AFG over the years, that we have been doing almost no 'defensive phase of war' stuff (beyond patrolling) and are doing more and more 'Call of Duty' compatible stuff e.g., MOUT. The result is that if we launched a defensive phase of war focused annual training plan I'm sure that we'd see wholesale departures of one kind or another. Worse, if we had to dig in on a border somewhere, and defend against a proper attack of some kind from a real enemy, we'd likely have our hats handed to us.



Your last point on the defense is bang on.  On the up side I believe 2 RCR just finished an exercise where they covered a number of defensive BTS.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The art of the defence has certainly been neglected over the past ten years. The defence has been worked into the last two MAPLE RESOLVE exercises, and I think that is a good thing. 

Cloth model work and TEWTS should be part of every sub-unit and unit's officer PD program. JCATS and VBS are accessible to most manoeuvre units and also allows young officers to practice their craft and go over TTPs (as long as it doesn't become too gamey). In the 90's my Brigade organized these sessions for all junior officers (usually on a Friday), which was complemented by sub-unit and unit programs. These seemed to tail off during the war but now appear to be returning.


----------



## Old Sweat

How things have changed, and I don't mean today's tendency to produce training manuals written on the principle of never using one word, when ten will do. In the sixties I remember seeing written direction, and I don't recall if it was in Germany or Gagetown, that the Canadian Army was not to train in offensive operations. The rationale was that External Affairs was working to better relations with the Soviet Union and did not wish to create the impression that we were planning to attack them. I am not making this up.

p.s. Our original TOW purchase was held up by Treasury Board because the documentation included the detail that it could be used to support counterattacks, and participating in offensive operations was contrary to national policy.

It's probably a good thing they didn't see the CTCC in the field.

Of course one has to practice the defence, along with the other phases of war. This is as true at division and brigade as it is at the coal face.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

What doctrine discussion would be complete without a Clausewitz reference.... Saint Carl delivering doctrine to all the good boys and Girls!!!!

http://blogtarkin.com/2012/12/24/santa-clausewitz/

Santa Clausewitz

Twas the night before battle, when all through the base.
The sentries were posted, the standards were cased.
The rifles were stacked by the tent flaps with care,
In the hopes that Saint Clausewitz soon would be there.

The majors were nestled all snug in their beds,
While flanking divisions danced in their heads.
Sergeant Major in his kerchief and I with my map,
Had just settled down for a long bivouac.

When out on the field there arose such a clatter,
I sent out patrols to see what was the matter.
Away to the front line I flew like a flash,
To rally the sentries to police up their trash.

The illum on the breast of the new fallen snow,
Removed fog of war from objects below.
When what to my wondering eyes should appear,
but a Prussian war theorist and eight tiny reindeer.

That wily old general, medals layered thick,
I knew in a moment in must be Clausewitz.
More rapid than hussars his coursers they came,
And he whistled, and shouted, and called them by name!

“On Reason! On Chance! On Passion and Friction!
On Chaos! On Fog! On Flanking and Blitzen!
To the center of gravity! Where their defenses disjoint!
Unleash your attack, find the decisive point!”

As dragoons that before the columns do fly,
When they meet the defense and mount to the sky.
So up to the parapets the coursers they flew,
With a sleigh full of theory and Saint Clausewitz, too.

And then in a twinkling he told me the truth,
That with a good strategy, plans are bombproof.
As I drew in my lines and was turning about,
he bounded the trenches and jumped the dugout.

Though he was squared away in his dress uniform,
He was not here to drink, just to teach and inform.
“Trust your coup d’oeil when deploying your means,
You’ll achieve all your ends, if you use your Marines.”

“You do not need principles, nor geometry,
Or you’ll meet with defeat, like that fool Jomini.
Study On War to improve on your judgement,
So your enemy’s will can be surely outspent.”

Then he sprang to his sleigh, to his team gave a whistle,
And away they all flew like the path of a missile.
I heard him exclaim as he looked ‘cross the scenes,
“Remember that war is just politics by other means!”


----------



## jeffb

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The art of the defence has certainly been neglected over the past ten years. The defence has been worked into the last two MAPLE RESOLVE exercises, and I think that is a good thing.



The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.


----------



## Old Sweat

jeffb said:
			
		

> The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.



JeffB

A number of gunner questions come to mind:

a. was there as CB and or/air threat, or was the major threat ground attack?

b. were there troop, battery or even, shades of Normandy, regimental gun positions;

c. who organized the local defence of the gun positions if the BK is employed as FSCCO;

d. how were the gun positions laid out, in a box with TLAVs/Bisons/etc on the conners like in the remote gun positions in Afghanistan or in the more traditional one found in "the book;"

e. how did the DF planning and coordination go at company, battalion and brigade; and the old stand by

f. how about defence of the wagon lines - archaic gunner talk for the echelon - and the ammunition resupply?


----------



## Old Sweat

And further to the above, how were the mortars and guns employed, and what lessons were learned re the FOO Bty?


----------



## Haligonian

jeffb said:
			
		

> The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.



Very interesting.  Can you tell us a bit more about the conduct of the ex?  Length? Was it difficult to motivate the troops?


----------



## jeffb

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> JeffB
> 
> A number of gunner questions come to mind:
> 
> a. was there as CB and or/air threat, or was the major threat ground attack?



It was awhile ago but I seem to recall that there was a limited CB threat and no air threat. 



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> b. were there troop, battery or even, shades of Normandy, regimental gun positions;
> 
> c. who organized the local defence of the gun positions if the BK is employed as FSCCO;




There was a Regt'l gun position sited by the 2I/C. BKs were coordinating the local defense of the Bty with the 2I/C overall in command. 89er sited C/S 8, which was fully deployed, and had a mean local defense. They successfully repelled several attacks at both the guns and against the echelon.  When was the last time that you saw clearance patrols going out from C/8? 
BKs act as BKs again are are usually on gun positions coordinating local defense in the field. They are also no longer just some junior Joe doing admin. BK's at, a 2RCHA at least, are back to being the 2I/C of the Bty. 


			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> d. how were the gun positions laid out, in a box with TLAVs/Bisons/etc on the conners like in the remote gun positions in Afghanistan or in the more traditional one found in "the book;"



By the book. There was a asymetric threat in the form of some sort of insurgency/SOF (can't remember which) but the primary threat was a En BG operating in a more near-peer environment. 



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> e. how did the DF planning and coordination go at company, battalion and brigade; and the old stand by



I didn't have much exposure to this other then to say that I know the ATGs were pushed out and 9er was very active in developing the Bde DF plan as per normal. 



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> f. how about defence of the wagon lines - archaic gunner talk for the echelon - and the ammunition resupply?



If you scroll down on the 2RCHA website, http://www.2rcha.net/, you'll find the story about Ex Spartan Bear II. Of note, it involved a road move from Petawawa to Meaford with most of the Bde. The move involved two or three river crossings and a lake crossing. Once there, the Engineers came by and dug, wait for it, gun pits of all things!  The Bde Comd at the time, a gunner himself, described E Bty's position as "the best defense of a gun position that I have ever seen." My job didn't have me at the gun positions, I was employed at Bde, so I can't really comment on the morale of the troops other then to say that there were doing a lot of digging and patrolling so I'm sure there was probably some sore soldiers at the end of that Ex. All in all, it was a great Ex.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I was on Ex Spartan Bear II with the RCD. For us it was about three weeks. We conducted a zone recce from Parry Sound to Meaford, with an emphasis on the recce of routes and waiting areas to support the multiple crossing sites for the Bde move. We then acted as the movement control headquarters for the Bde Road Move. The final part was the defensive FTX at Meaford. One sqn put in a screen, another conducted RAS for the Svc Bn and the third was OpFOR (Port au Prince Guard).

For the defence we went quite conventional with our CPs tucked away in woods with cam, noise and light discipline etc. The ex was good for getting back to some formation-level warfighting basics. Stuff that is easy in JCATs (like a Rearward Passage of Lines under pressure by a recce sqn through 1 RCR) was harder on the ground at night. Speaking of doctrine, in the lead-up to the ex we had several occasions where we had to break out the doctrine manuals and review something.

Someone from 1 RCR would be better placed to comment on morale and interest in the trenches, but my impression was that there was plenty of enemy activity throughout which is necessary to keep interest up in the defence.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

What was the state of the digitization on the last FTX in Pet? Was the HQ using Battleview, digital fire missions, etc?


----------



## daftandbarmy

And just because no discussion on Doctrine is complete without a message from Doctrine Man:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuVc2SDZd9Q

You can like him on Facebook now!


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> What was the state of the digitization on the last FTX in Pet? Was the HQ using Battleview, digital fire missions, etc?



2 CMBG was going through high readiness training from fall 2011 until spring 2012. During that period the Bde HQ and reporting BG HQs were on LCSS (Battleview etc). Ex Maple Resolve 11, two CAXs and Ex Spartan Bear were digital at the Bde level. BG HQ talked to its sub-units with radio and used paper maps/talcs (digital divide). At BG level we planned with maps and then a BV duty officer turned it into BV graphics to send up.

I'm out of the Bde now, but I imagine they will start using LCSS again now that they are re-entering the road to high readiness.


----------



## Haligonian

Sounds like some interesting training.  I'm sure I'll have my chance to experience this once I get back to Canada.  Now back to the doctrine/drills conversation!

As I've stated I don't think there is anything wrong with the drills, or having them in the publications.  My issue is with only having drills in doctrine or over emphasizing them, which I would suggest we do.  From Cpl to Maj we assess our leaders on the execution of the hasty attack drill.  The limitations of this have been discussed in other places on this form.  The drill becomes more complex as you move from sect to platoon to coy/cbt tm but it remains a drill nonetheless.  When executing a drill the thought process swings towards executing the steps in the correct order in the correct timing and the conditions to be achieved for follow on actions are usually friendly centric.  I think a more effective means of conducting operations is to approach things from a conditions based approach but our drills don't lend themselves to such an approach.  

All combat tm drills take the framework of Warning, Security, Recce, Plan, which is a solid way to ensure that those basics get covered off but I think a better one might be Suppress, Assess, Move, Kill, at least in terms of an attack.  The focus needs to be on the enemy.  My experience with our offensive training at sect, platoon, and cbt tm, is that the enemy is just a place holder for the attack which goes on around it.  Now, with us getting back to some of the larger exercises perhaps we'll see some force on force activities where my thoughts will be put to the test and I look forward to that, but I'll point out again, and please someone tell me if I've got this wrong, our cbt tm hasty atks are designed to be executed in an enemy security area where he has posted platoon reinforced sized combat outposts. Speed is emphasized as we are trying to maximize momentum and prevent the enemy from delaying us.  Outside of this or a similar enemy situation, the cbt tm will have to operate more deliberately and while the drills may still provide the framework for execution they will have to be adjusted to the prevailing conditions.


----------



## Infanteer

I've always seen "Warning, Security, Recce, Plan" as an Armoured Corps thing - they are the only folks I've seen using it.



			
				Haligonian said:
			
		

> but I think a better one might be Suppress, Assess, Move, Kill, at least in terms of an attack.



What about the core functions?  Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit?  Those work well in all phases of war and there is a reason they are quite universal.



			
				Haligonian said:
			
		

> Now, with us getting back to some of the larger exercises perhaps we'll see some force on force activities where my thoughts will be put to the test and I look forward to that, but I'll point out again, and please someone tell me if I've got this wrong, our cbt tm hasty atks are designed to be executed in an enemy security area where he has posted platoon reinforced sized combat outposts. Speed is emphasized as we are trying to maximize momentum and prevent the enemy from delaying us.  Outside of this or a similar enemy situation, the cbt tm will have to operate more deliberately and while the drills may still provide the framework for execution they will have to be adjusted to the prevailing conditions.



If you are thinking in terms of the Combat Team Commander's Course, then yes, the "DS Scenario" tends to be a pesky Motorized Platoon with a tank and a few obstacles.  But you'll find that the CTCC is quickly breaking that mould.  When you move to actual BG/Bde training, it is far more dynamic.  Tango2Bravo and I were involved with a previous MAPLE RESOLVE serial which saw a Bde (-) going head on with a BG (-) and resulted in an excellent, dynamic, force-on-force environment that saw all phases of war executed and significant lessons learned.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.

Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation.  

When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.
> 
> Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation.
> 
> When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.



I wonder if one of our main problems is that we don't have something like this... http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf

...to prepare against, hence we may be suffering from some 'doctrine drift'?


----------



## Kirkhill

But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.

That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.

How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?

Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.

2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.
> 
> That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.
> 
> How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?
> 
> Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.
> 
> 2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.



Swarming it is then! Everyone's already telling me to buzz off all the time anyways, so I should be qualified  ;D


Military swarming is a behavior where autonomous, or semi-autonomous, units of action attack an enemy from several different directions and then regroup. Pulsing, where the units shift the point of attack, is a part of military swarming. Swarming is not limited to the human military realm. As the name suggests, it comes from insect behavior, although social insects, such as bees, wasps and ants, also use its principles in nest building, food gathering and reproduction.

Military swarming involves the use of a decentralized force against an opponent, in a manner that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy and coordination or synchronization.[1] Historically military forces have used the principles of swarming without really examining them explicitly, but there is now active research in consciously examining military doctrines that draw ideas from swarming. In nature and nonmilitary situations, there are other various forms of swarming. Biologically driven forms are often complex adaptive systems, but have no central planning, simple individual rules, and nondeterministic behavior that may or may not evolve with the situation.[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swarming_(military)


----------



## Kirkhill

Funny you should mention swarming as an alternative to the WW1 counter-siege construct.

If you look back at the Field Service Regs and General Service Orders promulgated between 1915 and 1917 you can conclude that "swarming" was the game plan.  

Battalions were organised into All-Arms Divisions to control them but technology, in particular comms, worked against that organization.  The solution was to turn the Division into a swarm of "All-Arms Platoons", point them in the general direction and have them report in when the shooting stopped.

(NB - I Simplify   :nod: )

I think it can be argued that Fuller and Liddel-Hart (and Guderian) merely - and perhaps counter-productively - codified a singular and particular way of war,  a way of war that has likely run its course as of the Gulf Wars.

Now, like a fencer that no longer sees avenues of attack to exploit, it may be appropriate to recover to the en garde and centre and prepare for anything and everything.

Edit: I must be up to a nickel now - and further out of bounds ( or should I say piste off)


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I  agree that comms were primitive and not very effective, but those divisions in WW1 still had a structure and a plan. Using the attacks of 1917/18 as an argument for swarming is a huge stretch. Swarms don't have rehearsals and complex fire plans laid out ahead of time. 

In any case, a swarm risks defeat in detail by a smaller but more coordinated force.


----------



## Old Sweat

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I  agree that comms were primitive and not very effective, but those divisions in WW1 still had a structure and a plan. Using the attacks of 1917/18 as an argument for swarming is a huge stretch. Swarms don't have rehearsals and complex fire plans laid out ahead of time.
> 
> In any case, a swarm risks defeat in detail by a smaller but more coordinated force.



Very much so. The offensives of 1917 and especially 1918 (on both sides in the latter year) were carefully planned with tailored forces and were not a mob effort. Given the circumstances and the poor communications, the attacks were highly sophisticated and well orchestrated, within the limitations of the technology. It is interesting that in the Spring of 1918 during the last great German offensive in the West, the Canadian Corps was not involved in the defensive battles; instead it was practicing offensive operations. The much maligned Haig saw an opportunity to end the war in 1918, while just about every other member of the high priced help was looking forward to a massive offensive in 1919. Huge over simplification here on my part, but the unit tactics in the last two years of the war were not based on swarming as much as they were based on fire and movement tailored to the ground, at least in the better Allied formations.

Swarming went out with Culloden, or maybe the 1898 River War in the Sudan.


----------



## 54/102 CEF

Great thread all

My take - having done not bad on AOC Res pre Kingston and finishing with a shredded butt post Final Drive is as follows:

1. Its not rocket science - Reg Army has a tough job just staying ready to start deployment trg.
2. Future enemy likely to be able to disperse at will with western ROE favoring them vs us after an initial phase of us using mass forepower to force the other side to a standstill as in B52 in Bosnia/early Afghan. Then the protected sanctuary comes into play that we can't cross except with drones.
3. Any supposed allies won't force their ethic linked family miscrants into a caldron battle like Falaise Gap or Sri Lanka.
4. So small is good - Small Wars are the way to go. These will be on foot / light vehs / helo driven if they are aval, or some sort of Force in Deep to beat the enemy, (because our allies or Host Nations can't or won't) into the KZ.
5. Repeat for about 5 years until the eqpt craps out again as it will and did in Bosnia / Afghan - not to mention you can't use Reg Force indefinitely. Political support will last maybe 2 or three years. That's the effects on the ground side of things in my view - perhaps through a straw but we have modern historical records that show we never deploy indefinitely like say - Brits in Malaya.
6. Unfortunately there is nothing like hitting the books. So no time off for AOC students. Perhaps we need a Coles Notes primer on doctrine as it affects ground and air ops in the Battle Gp. Getting the screen play into the soldier's heads and his leaders is the supposed question above. I see a company given a contract to produce simple multi media graphics to illustrate the many variations of the Mission Verbs with their Logistic and Support side implications. Can`t be done you say? I see plenty of kids playing multi player Playstation Games far adavnced to what the Pucksters were producing just 2 years ago. Marry hi tech movie techniques with the Puckster Mindset and perhaps you have a way forward to show them a Youtube movie clip - TTPs on IED recovery procedures come to mind. So a series of see do training followed by field practical ex's to confirm. But we are not confirming the soldier in the corps - its the soldier in his team and the officer in his leadership role in his Arm or Service - which leads us to the Battle Group. And that`s the AOC product. Even then - the AOC training takes a while to sink in for the full time staff - as it does in any professional field - new medic offrs can set broken arms - surgeons rebuild the effects of trauma. Are we medics or surgeons? 
7. I suggest we can only aspire to be medics because the high intensity armies of days gone by were there to do a job - be it get to Dunkirk from the Ardennes in 1940 - or run for Berlin in 1942. (if thats an obscure reference see below)  The rest is the General Staff who will never be trained except those seniors who go to War Colleges.
8. So! Once again - work hard and enjoy your great postings to follow. 

para 7 ref ---- "Lost Victories by German Field Marshall Eric Von Manstein" about how they had few cutting edge troops but trained up as they went into France - screened off the French by troops well below what we would call pros. Same as they pushed into Russia and SE Ukraine. A great story except for the conveniantly overlooked use of his CSS to tpt unfortunates SS death squads, and his subsequent conviction as a war criminal. There is also a book called Field Marshal Von Manstein, a Portrait: The Janus Head http://www.amazon.ca/Field-Marshal-Von-Manstein-Portrait/dp/1906033021


----------



## PPCLI Guy

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> Great thread all
> 
> My take - having done well on AOC Res pre Kingston and finishing with a shredded butt post final drive is as follows:
> 
> 1. Its not rocket science - Reg Army has a tough job just staying ready to start deployment trg.



Ummm....okay



> 2. Future enemy likely to be able to disperse at will with western ROE favoring them vs us after an initial phase of us using mass forepower to force the other side to a standstill as in B52 in Bosnia/early Afghan. Then the protected sanctuary comes into play that we can't cross except with drones.



One of many possible scenarios, and by no means the only one



> 3. Any supposed allies won't force their ethic linked family miscrants into a caldron battle like Falaise Gap or Sri Lanka.



I have no idea what an ethic-linked miscrant is - but I sense they are neither white nor Western



> 4. So small is good - Small Wars are the way to go. These will be on foot / light vehs / helo driven if they are aval, or some sort of Force in Deep to beat the enemy, (because our allies or Host Nations can't or won't) into the KZ.



Hmm.  Thucydides said a lot of things about why nations go to war (okay, three actually), but the size of the war wasn't one of them.



> 5. Repeat for about 5 years until the eqpt craps out again as it will and did in Bosnia / Afghan - not to mention you can't use Reg Force indefinitely.



So we obviously did not go to the same wars with the same people and equipment.



> Political support will last maybe 2 or three years. That's the effects on the ground side of things in my view - perhaps through a straw but we have modern historical records that show we never deploy indefinitely like say - Brits in Malaya.



So it is a small war that doesn't last very long that we need then?  Got it.



> 6. Getting the screen play into the soldier's heads and his leaders is the supposed question above. I see a company given a contract to produce simple multi media graphics to illustrate the many variations of the Mission Verbs with their Logistic and Support side implications. So a series of see do training followed by field practical ex's to confirm. But we are not confirming the soldier in the corps - its the soldier in his team and the officer in his leadership role in his Arm or Service - which leads us to the Battle Group. And thats the AOC product. Even then - the AOC training takes a while to sink in for the full time staff - as it does in any professional field - new medics can set broken arms - surgeons rebuild the effects of trauma. Are we medics or surgeons?



I understand the meaning of every word in this paragraph, but that did not help me one bit.



> 7. I suggest we can only aspire to be medics because the high intensity armies of days gone by were there to do a job - be it get to Dunkirk from the Ardennes in 1940 - or run for Berlin in 1942. (if thats an obscure reference see "Lost Victories by German Field Marshall Eric Von Manstein" about how they had few cutting edge troops but trained up as they went into France - screened off the French by troops well below what we would call pros. Same as they pushed into Russia and SE Ukraine. The rest is the General Staff who will never be trained except those seniors who go to War Colleges.



Ummmm....???



> 8. So! Once again - work hard and enjoy your great postings for all high achievers.



What?



> There is only so much gravy to go around in the full time big base Army paid for by the tight fisted taxpayer who has certainly done his bit over the last ten years.



Again, what?

Thanks for coming out.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Swarming went out with Culloden, or maybe the 1898 River War in the Sudan.



Not so, if you are to believe the tenets of Adaptive Dispersed Operations. Utilizing data links and "information superiority" we are going to overwhelm the enemies OODA loop, utilizing dispersion to counter against increased precision and fire power.

That said, these tactics worked well in the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to win a strategic victory. Iraq in particular suffered from lower numbers of troops which weakened the US COIN efforts. And a Canadian BG in Kandahar province, in retrospect, seems doomed to succeed in a COIN environment.

I agree with the earlier statement that we'd be best to maintain "pure" units. The nature of the future war "should" determine our response to it, not how we want/hope to fight it. Assuming Network Centric warfare will always work negates the will of the enemy and how he/she wants to fight... swarming vs an insurgency has been ineffective.


----------



## Kirkhill

Somebody round here, I recall, said something about us not playing football, but playing rugby.  

Compared to football rugby is a swarming game.  The play develops on the field in real time.  Yes the players are trained, and they run drills, away from the field.  But on the field the game is not just a series of drills. It is a free-flowing game that depends on individuals making their own decisions, based on their own appreciations.

This is the way that I see WW1 - to quote a chap name of Byng, after a RMAS paper by a Dr. Christopher Pugsley:



> The largest unit that, under modern conditions can be directly
> controlled and manoeuvred under fire by one man is the Platoon.
> The Platoon Commander is therefore in most cases, the only man
> who can personally influence the local situation. In fact, it is not too much to say that this is the Platoon Commander’s war.
> 
> Realizing this, it becomes the duty of the Company Commander to
> see that each Platoon is trained by its leader to act either with
> independence or as a component of the Company



My inference from that is that, like the rugby coach, the primary role of the higher officers to prepare their junior officers to cooperate with each other the same way they did on the rugby field (or the soccer field) and to handle their small all-arms formations (the platoon) so as to overrun the objective.

This is swarming.  It is not mobbing.  There is intelligence in swarming.  There is none involved in swinging a claymore and yelling at the top of your lungs.

Certainly there was training and preparation, as SS109 states :



> 1. The time available for divisions when out of the line to train as divisions is short. It
> is necessary that the utmost use should be made of it, and that the object of the
> training should be clearly understood by all concerned.
> Success depends on preparations for all the phases of an attack, viz.:
> a. The organization of our trenches for the assembly of the attacking force;
> b. The artillery bombardment;
> c. The crossing of the area between our front trenches and the enemy's;
> d. The capture of the enemy's defensive systems and artillery positions, and
> the consolidation against counter-attack of ground won;
> e. Exploitation of success.
> The training ground must be carefully reconnoitred, beforehand, and a detailed
> programme of the whole period must be prepared. If possible, every brigade
> should be exercised in each form of training.
> 2. The training of the division can be conveniently divided into two categories:
> a. Training for the attack from trenches against a hostile system of trenches
> and strong points, including the consolidation and occupation of the system
> won;
> b. Training for exploiting a success when the hostile systems of defence have
> been broken through.



At the same time "Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action" says this:



> The organization of a platoon has been decided in G. H. Q.
> letter O. B./1919, dated February 7, 1917. The guiding prin-
> ciples of this organization are that the platoon shall consist of
> a combination of all the weapons with which the Infantry are
> now armed, and that specialist commanders for Infantry are
> undesirable.
> 
> In O. B./1919/T, dated February 14, 1917 (S. S. 144), a nor-
> mal formation for the attack, of which the platoon is the unit,
> has been laid down. The adoption of a normal formation for
> the attack has been necessitated partly by the shortness of the
> time which is available for training, and partly by the lack of
> experience among subordinate commanders.
> 
> This pamphlet has been drawn up with a view to assisting
> platoon commanders in training and fighting their platoons.
> It is not possible to lay down a correct line of action for all
> situations which may arise on the battle field, but it is hoped
> that a careful study of the instructions herein contained may
> assist subordinate commanders to act correctly in any situa-
> tion.



Emphasis added is mine.

My sense of the platoon structured as an all arms grouping, as effective as it is in many situations, is not necessarily the right solution for all occasions,  and the people that drafted the instructions that generated the modern platoon seem, in my opinion, to have been of the same view.

Their doctrine was generated to solve one particular problem.  Breaking the siege lines.

Their doctrine was largely generated between July 1916 and April 1917 in the face of the enemy.


----------



## Haligonian

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I've always seen "Warning, Security, Recce, Plan" as an Armoured Corps thing - they are the only folks I've seen using it.
> 
> What about the core functions?  Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit?  Those work well in all phases of war and there is a reason they are quite universal.
> 
> If you are thinking in terms of the Combat Team Commander's Course, then yes, the "DS Scenario" tends to be a pesky Motorized Platoon with a tank and a few obstacles.  But you'll find that the CTCC is quickly breaking that mould.  When you move to actual BG/Bde training, it is far more dynamic.  Tango2Bravo and I were involved with a previous MAPLE RESOLVE serial which saw a Bde (-) going head on with a BG (-) and resulted in an excellent, dynamic, force-on-force environment that saw all phases of war executed and significant lessons learned.



Great point on Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit.

I worked the CTCC in April and it stuck pretty close to the mold.  There were 4 or 5 atks that were executed on some seriously compartmentalized terrain or were allocated aviation but that was it.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.
> 
> Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation.
> 
> When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.



Any way I can get my hands on the new BG in Ops and Act manuals that we've been discussing while I'm down here?

Great to hear from both you and Infanteer that the Maple Resolve ex's really seem to be quite dynamic and result in solid lessons learned.  Look forward to being involved with those.

I think we're in agreement here. Cbt tm attacks certainly have an element of originality.  After my last post I was laying in bed thinking that there is defiantly some originality in there that I've probably over simplified!  Two separate commanders attacking the same enemy could have completely different plans.  There can be variances in form of maneuver, posns for attack posns, support by fire posns, task org for assault elements and the firebase, and differences in the fire plan.  It is the framework for the attack that doesn't really change and what allows it to be conducted so quickly with little coordination, which is also its strength. Having said that I *think* we both agree that they are not the best method of training but it appears that our Bde Ex's are pitting our units against thinking adversaries forcing us to come up with creative, unique, solutions to unique problems (this is what I would argue a hasty attack does not achieve.) So let's get back to the doctrine.

In my first post I mentioned the US' Operational Terms and Graphics pub.  No one has really commented on my assertion that we should have something similar.  I would argue that this would be our doctrine's greatest failing, for all the reasons I've laid out thus far, and probably the easiest to remedy.

Lets look at the concept of the main effort.  I've come to see the main effort as the natural expression of a force's Center of Gravity. At the tactical level my center of gravity should be a unit, not a phase, or action. This should cause the commander to conduct an analysis of both himself and the enemy to determine his CoG and his enemy's CoG and Critical Vulnerability (CV) and lead him to weight the ME to be able to take decisive action.  Weighting the ME can come in many forms such as attaching enablers or putting them is DS, giving priority of fires, or even giving enablers to supporting efforts allowing the ME to focus on their sole task while the SE's shape the battle space for the ME. We use an effects framework (Marines consider it a Battle Space framework akin to Deep, Close, and Rear) of Shaping, Decisive, and Sustaining operations. I will often overlay this on my phasing of the operation.  During the Decisive phase my main effort should be attacking the enemy's CV.  All other efforts are a supporting effort to the ME. 

After reviewing Land Ops I had a look at page 4-28 on the Main Effort which emphasizes that the ME should be a an activity vice a unit. To me this seems to disconnect the concepts of the ME and the CoG as Land Ops on page 6-9 defines CoG's as tangible things.  Now before we start saying "who cares" in my experience this causes for some different ways for the two forces to operate.  Canadians like to put two units on the obj in the assault.  2 platoons on the cbt tm hasty attack, 2 sects on the hasty pl attack.  This works with the decisive event being the assault and the ME being the assault itself as opposed to one of those platoons on the assault.  For the Marines, in my time with them, you'll rarely see two units on the assault.  You'll see a single unit, it'll be the ME, and it will likely have been Task Organised in some way to ensure its success. This lines up with their perspective that the CoG is a unit and thus it should be the ME and all other units should support it.  I've struggled with this myself as my instinct is to think "I need to get some damn bodies up on that obj... two coys up!" 

What are people's thoughts on this? I lean towards the ME being connected to the CoG concept and therefore it is a thing and not an event.  It is the thing that will achieve the decisive event but not the event itself. I would suggest considering the ideas of setting the conditions for the ME to do its work which will lead to a successful operation and more concretely, if we look at some of the stuff written in the past few years regarding the importance of suppression in combat, specifically infantry combat, what role does that play in how we task, task organize, and establish the ME.  Do we need two coy's on the obj if we have a heavy enough weight of fire to suppress the posn?

Sorry folks.  No idea why that is all underlined.

Thanks to dapaterson for sorting this fool out with his underlining.


----------



## dapaterson

To close the underline you need to use [ /u ] (without the spaces).  You used [ u ].


----------



## Haligonian

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.
> 
> That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.
> 
> How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?
> 
> Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.
> 
> 2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.



I think that is an interesting idea.  I'm for whatever provides us an abundance of flexibility to react to the unexpected.

I have yet to hear a convincing description of what swarming might look like and more importantly how the units that would fight that way would be organized. Perhaps I need to read "Crisis in Zefra" or whatever the new one coming out is?  Until then it's all pie in the sky and I'd say our "old school" force on force exercises that the Bde's are apparently now executing are more important.


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> In my first post I mentioned the US' Operational Terms and Graphics pub.  No one has really commented on my assertion that we should have something similar.  I would argue that this would be our doctrine's greatest failing, for all the reasons I've laid out thus far, and probably the easiest to remedy.



Have you looked at B-GL-331-003 _Military Symbols for Land Operations_?  It is a list of all of our graphical symbology and mission task verbs.  There is a doctrine terminology database as well, but I can't find it off the top of my head.



> Lets look at the concept of the main effort.  I've come to see the main effort as the natural expression of a force's Center of Gravity. At the tactical level my center of gravity should be a unit, not a phase, or action. This should cause the commander to conduct an analysis of both himself and the enemy to determine his CoG and his enemy's CoG and Critical Vulnerability (CV) and lead him to weight the ME to be able to take decisive action.  Weighting the ME can come in many forms such as attaching enablers or putting them is DS, giving priority of fires, or even giving enablers to supporting efforts allowing the ME to focus on their sole task while the SE's shape the battle space for the ME. We use an effects framework (Marines consider it a Battle Space framework akin to Deep, Close, and Rear) of Shaping, Decisive, and Sustaining operations. I will often overlay this on my phasing of the operation.  During the Decisive phase my main effort should be attacking the enemy's CV.  All other efforts are a supporting effort to the ME.
> 
> After reviewing Land Ops I had a look at page 4-28 on the Main Effort which emphasizes that the ME should be a an activity vice a unit. To me this seems to disconnect the concepts of the ME and the CoG as Land Ops on page 6-9 defines CoG's as tangible things.  Now before we start saying "who cares" in my experience this causes for some different ways for the two forces to operate.  Canadians like to put two units on the obj in the assault.  2 platoons on the cbt tm hasty attack, 2 sects on the hasty pl attack.  This works with the decisive event being the assault and the ME being the assault itself as opposed to one of those platoons on the assault.  For the Marines, in my time with them, you'll rarely see two units on the assault.  You'll see a single unit, it'll be the ME, and it will likely have been Task Organised in some way to ensure its success. This lines up with their perspective that the CoG is a unit and thus it should be the ME and all other units should support it.  I've struggled with this myself as my instinct is to think "I need to get some damn bodies up on that obj... two coys up!"
> 
> What are people's thoughts on this? I lean towards the ME being connected to the CoG concept and therefore it is a thing and not an event.  It is the thing that will achieve the decisive event but not the event itself. I would suggest considering the ideas of setting the conditions for the ME to do its work which will lead to a successful operation and more concretely, if we look at some of the stuff written in the past few years regarding the importance of suppression in combat, specifically infantry combat, what role does that play in how we task, task organize, and establish the ME.  Do we need two coy's on the obj if we have a heavy enough weight of fire to suppress the posn?



1.  I've always thought the idea of a Centre of Gravity was played up by folks to sound smart.  Centre of Gravity is a concept that was pulled from Clausewitz and, in line with a lot of U.S. doctrinal discussions, dogmatized in the 1980s.  Clausewitz used the term Centre of Gravity throughout _On War_, but generally applied it in a strategic sense.  I don't think an OC or a CO should be sitting in a CP, staring at a map and trying to figure out "where is that dang centre of gravity?" 

2.  Main effort is, to me, a control measure.  It's where the focus or weight of effort needs to be - it is a control measure that can shift the focus of a fighting element without having to give explicit orders to everyone.  As well, it is a control measure that, when combined with a proper statement of intent, gives subordinates a good idea of what needs to be done once everyone is in the thick of combat.  I've seen commanders often give main efforts for the sake of giving a main effort (and they know it is the third part of a Concept of Operations) without really understanding what they are communicating to their subordinates.  I can't remember where, but I once read a fascinating set of German Divisional orders which showed how the commander used the main effort, moving it as the battle progressed.  I generally try to couch my main effort in two parts.  The first is designating an effect as the main effort, the second is who lies on that effect.  

So, "my main effort is on the retention of the bridge, A Company is on the main effort".  My main effort is the effect of retaining the bridge, and A Coy's task is where the weight of everyone else's tasks should support.  This tells everyone that if something unexpected comes up that they should try to do things to support the A Coy and the retention of the bridge, even if it means straying from the original task I assigned them (the true essence of mission command).  Thus, if A Coy's retain task is under threat from an air assault, B Coy supports the main effort by launching a counterattack into the LZ, even if it means largely abandoning his block task to the south.

As a control measure, main effort can be used to reorient forces.  If "my main effort is on the clearance of Town, C Coy is on the main effort" is what I originally gave (for whatever reason), but then all of the sudden a large enemy guard appears to the east and starts seriously pressing my flank guard (threatening to bottle up C Coy in the town and destroy my whole force) I can give a quick Frag O orienting assets on the threat and indicating "my main effort is on the destruction of the enemy probe, B Coy is now on the main effort".  This should tell A Coy, who was holding a route to support C Coy (as my previous main effort) to start looking the other way to back up B Coy (who is my new main effort).  It should also tell C Coy to quit worrying about the town.

Here is one of my favorite articles on Main Effort (in its original German):

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070228_art014.pdf


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I have yet to hear a convincing description of what swarming might look like and more importantly how the units that would fight that way would be organized. Perhaps I need to read "Crisis in Zefra" or whatever the new one coming out is?  Until then it's all pie in the sky and I'd say our "old school" force on force exercises that the Bde's are apparently now executing are more important.



Don't read Crisis in Zefra; it's silly fiction.

What Kirkhill is describing as "swarming" and what the military discourse understands as the concept of swarming are two different things.  What Kirkhill is calling swarming is simply freedom to conduct independent action due to organization and equipment.  I'd disagree with his assessment that this constitutes swarming as echelons were still used in a coordinated and synchronized manner, especially in the First World War where, even though platoons had the ability to conduct tasks independently, they were utilized in linear fashion.

Swarming in the modern sense is a concept with heavy ties to the "revolution in military affairs" and all that stuff.  It was first really enunciated by John Arquilla at Rand.  You can have a read of it here (click the PDF link for a free copy)

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html

The broad premise with swarming is that technology will enable us to loosen the shackles of synchronization and reduce the need for coordination - units would become like a swarm of bees, circling an enemy and striking as opportunities arise.  Problem is, it briefs well but never really works - command and control has evolved the way it has for a very good (human) reason.  The US Marine Corps experimented with a form of swarming a few years back but it lost steam - look up Effects Based Operations (EBO) and how they tried change up the platoon and company to be more of a swarming organization.


----------



## Haligonian

Interesting.  I'll put some thought on you philosophy on the main effort and I'll read that article.

EBO is not popular here.  We watched a great video of General Mattis tearing it apart. Like I said, I'm going to need to see some concrete data before I start jettisoning the concept of synchronization!


----------



## Haligonian

And thanks for the military symbols Pam.  I'll try and track it down.


----------



## Infanteer

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Interesting.  I'll put some thought on you philosophy on the main effort and I'll read that article.
> 
> EBO is not popular here.  We watched a great video of General Mattis tearing it apart. Like I said, I'm going to need to see some concrete data before I start jettisoning the concept of synchronization!



Sorry, mixed up my crazy buzzwords (although you are right on EBO as dumb).  The Marine swarming concept was Distributed Operations (DO).  It spawned a follow on concept of Enchanced Company Operations (ECO).  DO is dead, and I am unsure of the status of ECO.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I expressed my own doubts about "swarming" in this thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/98149.0.html

I remain extremely skeptical, although I am all for initiative and subordinates finding a way to muddle through when comms fail and its gets messy.

I hope that we get away from incorporating fads and buzzwords in our doctrine. I am leery of doctrine cooked up "out of contact." Theory not grounded in practice or reality is a big risk to adopt as doctrine. 

I would be careful about turning the Combat Team publication into a full blown doctrine manual. I think its fine to focus on simple TTPs and leave the Doctrine to the higher level publications.


----------



## Old Sweat

Surely the doctrine - in the terms of how we fight at the battle group and below - depends upon whom we are fighting. For example, there are different ways to defend a position. The Second World War Germans held a position with a few troops to define how the attack was developing and force the attackers into fighting onto the objective, but then launched a quick local counterattack to drive tired, short on ammunition back off the objective before they could organize. Other armies denied the objective to the attackers by holding it tenaciously with lots of supporting fire. A third option, that of the weaker, less formally organized force, was to abandon the position before the attackers could close with it and live to fight another day. It seems to me that an one size fits all doctrine is suspect, and it behooves us to think before we cast anything in stone for a generic threat.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I expressed my own doubts about "swarming" in this thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/98149.0.html
> 
> I remain extremely skeptical, although I am all for initiative and subordinates finding a way to muddle through when comms fail and its gets messy.
> 
> I hope that we get away from incorporating fads and buzzwords in our doctrine. I am leery of doctrine cooked up "out of contact." Theory not grounded in practice or reality is a big risk to adopt as doctrine.
> 
> I would be careful about turning the Combat Team publication into a full blown doctrine manual. I think its fine to focus on simple TTPs and leave the Doctrine to the higher level publications.



I agree with this and I don't personally think their is a problem with our doctrine.  What I do feel we have a problem with is a lack of understanding of TTPs, especially in the infantry.  This is mostly due to a lack of education amongst the officer corps and a failure to actually open up "The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle" and take on what is written in that book, which for an infantry-centric army should be our holy bible.

Let's face it, not very many guys are like Infanteer and take the time to actually open up the books and educate themselves (Although if they want to call themselves professional soldiers they should really start).  If guys don't take the time to learn the basics and apply them properly when they are first starting out how do we expect them to apply thingsw properly at a higher level.

Coming from a LIB I have seen our poor grasp of the basics first-hand and with no vehicles to tie us down we should be the masters of this stuff but it's not so.  This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.

While we have had a revolution in communications and weapons are generally more precise and destructive, the principles of warfare and how war is fought since the Second World War remains the same.  Thus, I see no need to change the way we do business, what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps so they are able to grasp the basics while they are young.  This will set them us up for success in the long-term.


----------



## dangerboy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.



One point it is the job of the Pl 2IC and Sect Comd to advise the Pl Comd and that of the CSM to advise the OC.  If the Pl or Coy are not following basic field craft then the NCOs should be advising the Pl Comd, now if the officer chooses to ignore the advice that is another issue.  So not only officers should be reading  "Section and Platoon in Operation" (it was updated this year) but all pers in Comd positions.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dangerboy said:
			
		

> One point it is the job of the Pl 2IC and Sect Comd to advise the Pl Comd and that of the CSM to advise the OC.  If the Pl or Coy are not following basic field craft then the NCOs should be advising the Pl Comd, now if the officer chooses to ignore the advice that is another issue.  So not only officers should be reading  "Section and Platoon in Operation" (it was updated this year) but all pers in Comd positions.



Agree 100%, wasn't even tracking the name change, I still refer to the old one which I hold in my PAM's library on my personal computer (yep I am that much of a nerd).  Will update accordingly


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps



From what I see [very much on the outside mind you] the 'machine' thinks that involves more tax-payer paid university courses.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> From what I see [very much on the outside mind you] the 'machine' thinks that involves more tax-payer paid university courses.



For some perhaps... The military also (at least the units I've been in) need to make better use of Professional Development for Junior Officers and more emphasis needs to be placed on intellectually challenging Jr Officers than on mindless administration. Things like CMXs are starting to come back now that we're out of A-Stan, and will help get the young officers more "up" on tactics, doctrine, and procedures prior to hitting the field. 

IMHO, if leadership emphasizes education, not necessary formal education, through unit sponsored PD, CAX/CMX, and TEWTs than the CAF would achieve a better level of knowledge without the cost of sponsoring endless masters degrees.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Coming from a LIB I have seen our poor grasp of the basics first-hand and with no vehicles to tie us down we should be the masters of this stuff but it's not so.  This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.
> 
> While we have had a revolution in communications and weapons are generally more precise and destructive, the principles of warfare and how war is fought since the Second World War remains the same.  Thus, I see no need to change the way we do business, what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps so they are able to grasp the basics while they are young.  This will set them us up for success in the long-term.



I agree. 

Which is why each Division should probably set up it's own equivalent of 'Tiger Land' and rotate BGs through on a regular basis to brush up on basic skills before launching on larger formation level concentrations, where the emphasis is generally on everything _but _ the basics.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ... each Division should probably set up it's own equivalent of 'Tiger Land' and ...


Is there really a requirement to create new organizations which will demand re-allocation of PYs from somewhere (precedent suggests that somewhere will be from the field force)?
Is there any reason the CMBGs cannot manage this level of training internally with existing force structures?


----------



## Infanteer

Agreed.  If a CO cannot have his battalion "brush up on basics", he should be fired.


----------



## Kirkhill

Is "Tiger Land" an organization or just a venue?

Are trainers required or just a place to train?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Agreed.  If a CO cannot have his battalion "brush up on basics", he should be fired.



Well, if they 'don't know what they don't know', or never get a chance to hammer home the basics because they're dancing to someone else's tune, it might not be the right move.


----------



## CombatDoc

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is "Tiger Land" an organization or just a venue?
> 
> Are trainers required or just a place to train?


It's a movie about a training venue to prepare soldiers for war, starring Colin Farrell IIRC.


----------



## Kirkhill

CombatDoc said:
			
		

> It's a movie about a training venue to prepare soldiers for war, starring Colin Farrell IIRC.



Oh.  :facepalm:  :-[

Never mind.


----------



## Old Sweat

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Oh.  :facepalm:  :-[
> 
> Never mind.



I had no friggin' idea either, and my care factor is measured in microgiveash.ts about it.


----------



## pbi

Ahhh, doctrine mongering.. where is my old DS hat? Here it is, under these empty beer cans and pistachio bags...Oh, wait--that's a dunce cap...

I think  part of the problem is that we have a mix-up in terminology, or maybe in useage. "Doctrine", at least as I understand it, concerns itself with fairly broad things such as "Infantry and Armour Will Cooperate in Offensive Operations" or "The Force in Place Will Provide Fire Support for the Assault Force".

Fairly high level stuff that is based in common sense, doesn't really have to be changing every five minutes, and provides for a common start point for understanding. After all, if you're going to change the way you conduct a type of operation, its useful to know the start state you're changing *from*.

IMHO, doctrine allows people who don't always work together to have a shared idea of how to go about something. It's a guideline, not a set of handcuffs. Armies that treat it as the latter probably won't do well.

Also IMHO, what happens at unit level and below, is really much  more about TTPs. TTPs can and should evolve very quickly (even during an operation) and will always change with the type of equipment and weapons, the training level (Kitchener's New Army couldn't be relied on to do what the 1914 BEF could do...), nature of the enemy, etc. TTPs may vary from unit to unit, and to be honest I don't think it makes all that much difference if they do. So what if 2 RCR does a BG attack different from 1 PPCLI? As long as the actions of the unit conform to the higher commander's intent, and are coordinated with whoever cares, so what?

The "Main Effort" discussion is an interesting one. I always taught that ME (at least at the Op/Tac lvls) is best expressed as "Somebody" doing "Something".

IMHO, ME is about achieving the critical result (or effect, if you want..) that is necessary for the success of that particular part of the operation. If you can't achieve it, that bit will fail and, quite possibly, the entire op will fail.

So, by identifying "somebody", you do two things:

a) tell Bloggins that it's him and his force that will achieve that critical result; and
b) tell everybody else that Bloggins is "it", and in the failure of any further guidance tey will act to support Bloggins in his task.

By identifying "something", you tell Bloggins (and all the rest of them) what it is that must be achieved. This gives Bloggins a good idea of what his most essential task must be, as opposed to magically divining it, or inventing his own that doesn't support the bigger picture. It tells everybody else what the task is, so that a) they can take it over if Bloggins and Co. get waxed or b) they can understand best how to support it.

So, IMHO it's not "In Phase 1 Main Effort is the Bridge at XYZ"

It's not "In Phase 1 Main Effort is  2 PPCLI"

But it probably should be "In Phase 1 Main Effort is 2 PPCLI capturing the Bridge at XYZ"


----------



## PanaEng

:goodpost: 

... a baseline for common understanding but not a ready-made structure for our templating by the enemy.

I would add, regarding the ME, It definitely makes sense to identify the task and unit/sub-unit; but at the very least the actual task for situations where you have a unit with a task of 'Follow and Assume/Support'


----------



## pbi

PanaEng said:
			
		

> :goodpost:
> 
> ... a baseline for common understanding but not a ready-made structure for our templating by the enemy.
> 
> I would add, regarding the ME, It definitely makes sense to identify the task and unit/sub-unit; but at the very least the actual task for situations where you have a unit with a task of 'Follow and Assume/Support'


Yes. In the end , it's about clarity of communication and shared understanding. There's nothing to say that one force element couldn't be the ME throughout, in all its major tasks, but I think this could get confusing and would risk diluting the meaning of ME. You could also say that the ME is just a "Something" and not specify a "Somebody" (I guess...) but that could result in the ME either never being achieved, or a mass "convergence" on trying to achieve the ME.

As usual, there is no replacement for the human factors: a bunch of skilled commanders who know each other, have worked together, led by a commander who understands and trusts them all, but sets clear guidance. Wargame and ROC drill are also (IMHO) vital to ensure a common grasp of ME.


----------



## Kat Stevens

So many buzzwords and AcRoNyms... I miss the days when DOCTRINE was whatever the f*ck my section commander told me it was.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> So many buzzwords and AcRoNyms... I miss the days when DOCTRINE was whatever the **** my section commander told me it was.



Agreed!

Luckily, he's been immortalized on You Tube  ;D

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pzxb2sxbDU


----------



## a_majoor

Doctrine needs to be more than buzzwords, or even a well written document. It should accuratly reflect the "culture" of the organization that uses it as well.

We use "Manouevre Warfare" doctrine in theory, but despite mountains of .ppt slides saying so, the organizational culture runs towards massive headquarters to "command" diminutive field forces and total fear of failure; resulting in micromanagement and a very "Directive Command" structure being in place and used in actuality.

There are very good reasons to use "Manouvre Warfare", including the need for highly dispersed force structures, adaptation to local conditions and the sheer impossibility of running complex operations from the top in "real time" due to the "Local Knowledge Problem", but if it is "culturally impossible" to use, then it is only a series of nice graphics and slides.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> We use "Manouevre Warfare" doctrine in theory, but despite mountains of .ppt slides saying so, the organizational culture runs towards massive headquarters to "command" diminutive field forces and total fear of failure; resulting in micromanagement and a very "Directive Command" structure being in place and used in actuality.



I would argue that this ridiculously self-defeating 'fail safe' approach has resulted from us being too closely associated with a US military that is paranoid about being called on the carpet by a fussy, hopelessly parochial Congress and Senate.

I think we should swing back to aligning our world view and general approach to that of the British. They've got their problems, for sure, but I was never micromanaged to the extent I see and hear from the US (and now by extension Canadian) experience, especially when my job involved being at the sharp end of taking out bad guys. 

And besides, if we're putting the pips and crowns back on.... 

http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf


----------



## Edward Campbell

You might want to consider the very real differences in British versus _continental_/US views of command and staff relationships.

The British came from a maritime _strategy_ and a colonial empire that, of necessity, empowered local commandeers and devalued HQ staffs in London. The result was a C2 _philosophy_ that said ~ still says? ~ commanders decide and order while staffs _manage_ and _facilitate_.

One emblem of the British and, formerly, Canadian Army staff structure was that the most senior staff officer in any HQ, including AHQ in Ottawa, was never, under any circumstances, senior in rank to the principle subordinate commanders and, generally, was lower in rank.

(Thus, while Gen Harry Crerar, commanding 1st Canadian Army in Europe in 1944/45 was a four star general, LGen John Murchie was in Ottawa as Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Canadian Army and the officer responsible to _manage_ the Army in war, all over the world. That was how it should have been. The Royal Canadian navy got it all back-asswards in that war: while the most senior officer with a sea command was the estimable RAdm Leonard Murray ~ the only Canadian to command an allied theatre of war ~ the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa, VAdm Percy Nelles, who should have been in a supporting role, was in fact senior in rank and used his rank to interfere with Murray's command. Fortunately, in early 1944, he was posted to a largely administrative (almost ceremonial) job in London with no authority over naval matters and was promoted to Adm to keep him quiet.)

The point of the former Canadian Army system was that there was absolute clarity about the chain of *command*, while able staff officers are allowed to shine by demonstrating their expert military and management skills in a vital supporting role. This was not how Napoleon or Clausewitz/Jomini and the Americans saw things: they had a far different _tradition_, one in which central command and control was useful, perhaps even desirable ... perhaps.

Personally, I think one of the major flaws in the continental/US system is that it allows for the _institutionalization_ of erroneous doctrine and bad leadership and management. I think Marshall and Eisenhower managed and commanded so well because, principally, George Marshal was a genius, on several levels, and Dwight Eisenhower was an extraordinarily able man, again on many levels. But I think the system is more likely to produce Ferdinand Foch, Maxwell Taylor, William Westmorland and Wilhelm Keitel. The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 _philosophy_.


----------



## quadrapiper

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 _philosophy_.


Could that be in part due to a system that may have forced the dunces into independent action much earlier in their careers, encouraging a filtering of those unsuited for command somewhere around Captain-Maj or Lt-LCdr, and polishing the command skills of the good ones at an earlier stage?


----------



## Edward Campbell

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Could that be in part due to a system that may have forced the dunces into independent action much earlier in their careers, encouraging a filtering of those unsuited for command somewhere around Captain-Maj or Lt-LCdr, and polishing the command skills of the good ones at an earlier stage?




That's certainly possible. I'm guessing that was the Royal Navy's idea back in the age of sail. That service _appears_ to have valued and rewarded independence of thought and action ~ within the limits imposed by some pretty general orders ~ and punished caution (consider the unfortunate Admiral Byng after the Battle of Minorca) and according to some historians (see e.g. Nicholas Rodger's _The Command of the Ocean : a Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1649-1815_ (2004)) it (Byng's execution) was responsible, in some large measure, for the very real aggressiveness of Royal Navy captains and admirals.

Perhaps, in the same era, colonial service ~ which also frequently put an officer far, far away from political control ~ exercised the same function for the British Army.

As far as I can tell the _idea_ of a clear chain of command, with small_ish_, quite low ranking staffs was common in the East India Company's army in the 18th century as well as in the British Army proper. Of course, *real* staffs didn't appear until after there Napoleonic wars and British staff work was not famous for its quality in either Crimea or South Africa. It appears, to me, to have improved somewhat in 1914-18 ~ see, especially, the excellent (largely British) staff of 1st Canadian Corps who under LGen (later FM) Byng planned and executed, _inter alia_, Vimy Ridge and which included e.g. then LCol (also latter FM) Alan Brooke. Staff work seems to have gotten a lot better in 1939-45 and after, based, largely, I assume on lessons learned in 1914-18 and in subsequent colonial skirmishes. In any event, by the time I saw it, I concluded, based on observation of several armies, that British and Canadian Army tactical staffs (brigade through corps) were smaller in number, lower in rank and markedly better in doing what staffs need to do (supporting their commander in the functions of command, by _controlling_ and looking after details, and helping subordinate commanders to execute their tasks, by _managing_ resources, including time).

One marked difference between British and Canadian staffs, on one hand, and American, French and German staffs, on there other, was that relatively few officers in the British/Canadian system were _tied_ to their commanders, while one often saw commandeers and several principle staff officers move from one command to the other in the latter cases. That's a bad practice because it encourages "yes men" and deprives an incoming commander of some needed _institutional knowledge_.


----------



## daftandbarmy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> You might want to consider the very real differences in British versus _continental_/US views of command and staff relationships.
> 
> The British came from a maritime _strategy_ and a colonial empire that, of necessity, empowered local commandeers and devalued HQ staffs in London. The result was a C2 _philosophy_ that said ~ still says? ~ commanders decide and order while staffs _manage_ and _facilitate_.
> 
> One emblem of the British and, formerly, Canadian Army staff structure was that the most senior staff officer in any HQ, including AHQ in Ottawa, was never, under any circumstances, senior in rank to the principle subordinate commanders and, generally, was lower in rank.
> 
> (Thus, while Gen Harry Crerar, commanding 1st Canadian Army in Europe in 1944/45 was a four star general, LGen John Murchie was in Ottawa as Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Canadian Army and the officer responsible to _manage_ the Army in war, all over the world. That was how it should have been. The Royal Canadian navy got it all back-asswards in that war: while the most senior officer with a sea command was the estimable RAdm Leonard Murray ~ the only Canadian to command an allied theatre of war ~ the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa, VAdm Percy Nelles, who should have been in a supporting role, was in fact senior in rank and used his rank to interfere with Murray's command. Fortunately, in early 1944, he was posted to a largely administrative (almost ceremonial) job in London with no authority over naval matters and was promoted to Adm to keep him quiet.)
> 
> The point of the former Canadian Army system was that there was absolute clarity about the chain of *command*, while able staff officers are allowed to shine by demonstrating their expert military and management skills in a vital supporting role. This was not how Napoleon or Clausewitz/Jomini and the Americans saw things: they had a far different _tradition_, one in which central command and control was useful, perhaps even desirable ... perhaps.
> 
> Personally, I think one of the major flaws in the continental/US system is that it allows for the _institutionalization_ of erroneous doctrine and bad leadership and management. I think Marshall and Eisenhower managed and commanded so well because, principally, George Marshal was a genius, on several levels, and Dwight Eisenhower was an extraordinarily able man, again on many levels. But I think the system is more likely to produce Ferdinand Foch, Maxwell Taylor, William Westmorland and Wilhelm Keitel. The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 _philosophy_.



Excellent synopsis, thanks!

I have been fascinated (and horrified) to watch LCol COs and LCol COS's play the 'big balls in cowtown' game. Unfortunately, we seem to have set up our most senior Staff Officer (at Bde level anyways) as a de facto A/Bde Comd. 

This can work fine where the personality of the incumbent suits the situation. Where this is not the case, everyone suffers.


----------



## pbi

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Excellent synopsis, thanks!
> 
> I have been fascinated (and horrified) to watch LCol COs and LCol COS's play the 'big balls in cowtown' game. Unfortunately, we seem to have set up our most senior Staff Officer (at Bde level anyways) as a de facto A/Bde Comd.
> 
> This can work fine where the personality of the incumbent suits the situation. Where this is not the case, everyone suffers.



Then if this isn't what the Comd wants, the Comd needs to change it. If it was what he wants, the CO's will have to suck it up.

Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.

The COS should never obstruct the CO/Comd relationship, but he can certainly help to foster it. By putting an experienced officer in as COS, one who complements the Comd, it gives both the Comd and the CO's a "foil". The COS, if he has the wherewithal, can take a CO aside before he blunders into the Comd's office, and offer something like this:

"_Y'know, John, before you run headlong into the Boss with that issue, here's a couple of things you might want to think about_".

He can also say (again, relationship dependent):

"_Actually, Comd, that might not be a very good idea. LCol Bloggins will object violently to that because XYZ. Perhaps....._"

I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.


----------



## daftandbarmy

pbi said:
			
		

> I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.



Why have an organization so large and complex that you need another very senior guy to help run it?

We've got a huge Bde overhead these days. At last count there were 9 'G' shops in ours. Do we really need that amount of (resource sucking) brass at Bde level?


----------



## Infanteer

pbi said:
			
		

> Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.



That is the Prusso-German model, one that would be very hard to implement due to our institutional genetics.  In the Prusso-German model, the line between command and staff was blurred, with the COS acting almost as a co-commander.  In our Commonwealth heritage, command and staff are distinct, and it'd be very difficult in my view to graft something like this on considering the cultural conventions that led to this development.

As for COSs in general the very existence in our Commonwealth history is what I call the "Montgomery School" - Monty was the first senior British Commander to start to utilize a COS (de Guingand) and brought him from 8th Army to 21st Army Group as the COS.  Since the Monty School was created, it's grown (in conjunction with our adoption, through osmosis, of the Continental Staff system) within the Commonwealth through a very ad hoc manner.

The other school, which I call the Slim School (after FM Slim, who discusses the idea in Defeat...) is the traditional British model of no COS.  Rather, staff is segemented into G (Ops), A (Pers) and Q (Log) departments, with A&Q being combined at most levels.  The senior G and the senior A/Q officer each speak directly to the Comd; generally, the senior G is considered _primer inter pares_, but they are both of the same rank.

I'm of the latter school - chiefs of staff are a needless appendage if we use the effective G, A and Q structure.  What's more, when the COS model is combined with the Continental model we've adopted, it leads to rank inflation.  A LCol Chief of Staff and bureaus headed by Majors (generally 7-10 of them) does what 2 Majors once accomplished.  The working rank of the Bde staff has shifted up from Captain to Major.  The same thing has occured at every echelon of command.



> I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.



I've spoken to the COS above, but the idea of the 2IC is interesting.  at the sub-unit and unit levels, they have real tactical roles as Coy and Bn commander can easily become casualties and/or Rear Parties/LOB are always required.  However, the formation level is different.  Field Marshal Lord Carver made an interesting observation in an old edition of the British Army Review:



> Above all, deputy commanders must be avoided.  Nothing must get between the commander and his chief of staff.  I have served under US Armoured Divisions where there were deputy commanders.  They were either miserable or a nuisance, or both.  They were introduced into our armoured brigades after Operations CRUSADER in the desert in November 1941, on the grounds that it was needed to allow the commander to get some sleep.  They did not prove necessary and became a haven for promoted COs of armoured car regiments.  I found an elderly cavalry colonel installed as one when I took over command of 4th Armoured Brigade in the middle of a battle in Normandy, its previous commander having been killed.  Sensibly the colonel had not attempted to exercise operational command, but left it to the senior CO.  He left very soon afterwards to sighs of relief from all, including himself.



The Field Marshal's views are certainly coloured by his own experience and the way Deputies were appointed, but I think it highlights the thinking between the Commonwealth principle of formations selecting alternate commanders from subordinates instead of having a Deputy.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

pbi said:
			
		

> Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.



I have been in a number of jobs where I have been able to closely observe the realtionship between a Comd and his COS.  I have seen good, bad, and indifferent approaches.  The highlights were both with Engr Comds who had real Combat Arms  > Chiefs of Staff.  Their approach was that they would command the organisation, and the COS would run it.  This empowered the COS to get on with the day to day nausea, while allowing Comds freedom to get out there and command.  COs would influence things the way they are meant to - straight to the Comd, unless it was to their advantage to use the COS as a conduit.


----------



## little jim

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Their approach was that they would command the organisation, and the COS would run it.  This empowered the COS to get on with the day to day nausea, while allowing Comds freedom to get out there and command.  COs would influence things the way they are meant to - straight to the Comd, unless it was to their advantage to use the COS as a conduit.



I have observed occasions where it is extremely effective to have the COS running what the CG Commands; commanders cannot command sitting behind a desk.  Even with technology in the US at the Division level the CG is in his jump most of the time, or our doing battle field circulation so the COS is a bit of a constant.  This has to be a very well discussed and almost formal arrangement as when the Boss is out and the staff is speaking on his behalf they might be caught unaware of decisions made out in the field at the commander to commander level.  This perhaps is one of the factors when senior US commander’s pick their team.  It allows them to have people whom they trust and more importantly know how they think.  I have witnessed this with a Division Commander bring the officer who was his S3 at the brigade level as his Div G3.  I cannot count how many times the G3 was able to predict and convey to the subordinate commanders on how the CG was likely to go on various issues. 

Another thing the COS gives you at the division level is a bit of an informal mentor.  I know the DCG’s are the formal mentors for the brigade commanders but the COS as a post command Colonel also gives that near-peer person that the brigade commanders can call and bounce ideas off of.  

With respect to the issue of deputies at both staff and command level I have observed that it allows for an escalation of force almost for issues.  A brigade DCO can call the deputy G3 or DCOS in order to sound out how an idea from a subordinate commander might be viewed by the higher commander before bringing it up.  This seems to be a bit more of a trust issue as at times as the staff will have knowledge of discussions that took place and be able to provide some advice.  I have witnessed this go horribly wrong with a sub-ordinate brigade commander who unfortunately decided that the ‘well your staff feel the same way’ was his best course of action over a command decision.  The staff need to acknowledge that what is part of their day-to-day discussion is almost never visible to subordinate formations.  

At brigade level I would suggest that if the COS is a pre-Command LCol then his lanes are more defined in terms of his interaction with the subordinate commanders, almost akin to the relationship in a battalion with a pre-Command Major as the Ops O with the Company Commanders.  It is interesting to watch a commander who understands when he should go to the staff and when he can go straight to the higher commander.  This can be witness almost daily in Canada at the company levels when the platoon commanders go to either the 2IC or the OC.

At the brigade level the US has started to fill their DCO positions with a pre-command LTC and their brigade XO’s remain a Major.  I would be interested to hear what one of our Australian brothers would chime in on their Brigade Major vice COS.


----------



## pbi

I think that the idea of having a Bde Maj alone, or having the G3 act as the _primus inter pares_ or de facto COS (as it was when I joined) both belong to a day when the Bde was a lesser manouevre element of a Division, and probably not expected to do much more than organize its bit of the Div plan. Independent or autonomous operations by bdes were not as well accepted as I think they are today.

IMHO, the last decade of operations, both our own in Afgh, and those of the US in both OIF and OEF, have created a different expectation of what a Bde-sized force (regardles of what it may be called) can and should be expected to do. This was probably exemplified by the US Army shift to a "Bde-based" force, where the Div becomes much more of a framework for employing various mixes of Bdes to do specific things. This requires some more meat in the Bde C2 structure.  

Now, I think you could probably get by with just a DComd OR just a COS: both may not be necessary, but I think the better bet is to have both. They are actually best employed to do two different things. The COS will probably be totally consumed acting as the ringmaster for the staff, while the DComd gives the Comd not only a better chance for R&R, but a senior commander who is not tied to job of commanding a battalion, who can assist the Comd in all sorts of ways.

Admittedly, it is more of a US or Continental idea to have a Bde DComd, and not a British one, but those are actually irrelevant considerations. What matters more, IMHO, is what is needed to make things work, not whose idea it is. And, don't forget, that up until around the late 1980's (IIRC) we did have Bde DComds, usually employed as Base Comds.


----------



## dapaterson

Perhaps in the interest of "getting it right" Canada should cease farting around with Bde and Div structures, and instead ask the key question: Why, with a Reg F trained strength of 55K (+/-), was the sustainment of a mere battlegroup all but impossible?

Doctrinal arguments over Bde / Div, and tactical / operational (if such a level exists) / strategic are all moot when a G8 nation is unable to sustain 2K troops in the field.


----------



## Infanteer

pbi said:
			
		

> I think that the idea of having a Bde Maj alone, or having the G3 act as the _primus inter pares_ or de facto COS (as it was when I joined) both belong to a day when the Bde was a lesser manoeuvre element of a Division, and probably not expected to do much more than organize its bit of the Div plan. Independent or autonomous operations by bdes were not as well accepted as I think they are today.
> 
> IMHO, the last decade of operations, both our own in Afgh, and those of the US in both OIF and OEF, have created a different expectation of what a Bde-sized force (regardles of what it may be called) can and should be expected to do. This was probably exemplified by the US Army shift to a "Bde-based" force, where the Div becomes much more of a framework for employing various mixes of Bdes to do specific things. This requires some more meat in the Bde C2 structure.
> 
> Now, I think you could probably get by with just a DComd OR just a COS: both may not be necessary, but I think the better bet is to have both. They are actually best employed to do two different things. The COS will probably be totally consumed acting as the ringmaster for the staff, while the DComd gives the Comd not only a better chance for R&R, but a senior commander who is not tied to job of commanding a battalion, who can assist the Comd in all sorts of ways.



This briefs well, but your argument suffers from some leaps in logic.  Arguing that higher ranking and more staff is required as brigades do more and do it independently these days is fallacious.  What vast difference exists between issuing commands to 3-5 subordinates in 1944 and issuing commands to 3-5 subordinates now?  Was 2 Cdn Inf Bde's task to fight three battalions plus tanks and engineers through Ortona any less complicated than the First Marine Regiments push into Fallujah in 2004?  Probably not, considering the Germans of 1944 had far greater combat power than insurgents in Iraq.  Both commanders (a) took orders from a boss and (b) gave orders to subordinate battalion commanders.  How come one needed 2-3 times the staff?

Yes, some staff functions have devolved downward (e.g. fire planning was largely a divisional responsibility in 1944 while air coordination rested at Corps level), but the downward movement of these capabilities has come with things like the FSCC and the TACP.  Nothing in this tells me that the downward migration of these functions - meaning the expansion of the G (Ops) function - requires a senior ranking officer to stand over the shoulders of the BM/G3 or umpire his talks with the Sustainment guy.  More horsepower *IN* ops to coordinate?  Sure.  More horsepower *ON TOP OF* ops to coordinate?  Nope.

What's more, if brigades do more, do divisions do less?  How come there has been parallel growth, if not more growth at high echelons.  Divisional staffs, led by 2 LCols and a staff of just over 20 inflated to about 90 pers by the 1980s.  If we're arguing that Brigades shoulder more of the load, why have divisions grown and inflated by almost 5 x?

As to bringing more to the staff, the substantive difference between a COS and a G3 in a modern Brigade, once you take away individual characteristics, is close to nil - both are post-Toronto Combat Arms officers that have not commanded a battalion.  Often, the only difference is a year of seniority.  So, there is generally minimal experiential difference between a COS and a G3; hence a "ringmaster" doesn't really bring much to the fight except another layer of staff and signatures and briefings (the G3s job is to ringmaster things anyways).

Finally, having a DComd to act as an "assistant" is some pretty high priced help that was never required (as per Carver's remarks) back when Bde commanders can and did become battlefield casualties.  Often, I've seen the idea of more people (COS, DComds) between the subordinate and superior commander (at any echelon) to be as much of a hindrance as a boon - these folks can often interpose themselves into the chain of command, or the subordinate commanders will often defer to talking to their boss and go to a staff guy/Dep.  The strongest relationships I've seen is where subordinate and superior commander talk directly with each other.

You are right in the fact that it irrelevant as to where the origin of the idea comes from.  But it is important to understand the root and essence of the idea.  The institution as a whole generally has a poor understanding of how and why we got to where we are today and little comprehension of the careful equation of how to balance staff inputs and outputs to assist the commander.  Generally, we just add more (and higher ranked) people to the problem, unaware of the consequences this brings to procedure and process.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Perhaps in the interest of "getting it right" Canada should cease farting around with Bde and Div structures, and instead ask the key question: Why, with a Reg F trained strength of 55K (+/-), was the sustainment of a mere battlegroup all but impossible?
> 
> Doctrinal arguments over Bde / Div, and tactical / operational (if such a level exists) / strategic are all moot when a G8 nation is unable to sustain 2K troops in the field.



Bean counters said that between 1919 and 1938 and, when we had to learn the lessons again, it was in war and not peace and the soldier in the mud paid for it.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I _think_ that before discussing appropriate numbers and ranks we ought to confirm the *duties* of the staff.

I learned that the duties of the staff are to:

     1. Assist commanders in the function of command by relieving them of detail; and

     2. Assist subordinate commanders in the execution of their tasks.

I have no memory of there being a "by" in the second duty statement but I recall that we learned that they, the staff, were, primarily, in the resource _control_ business and _resources_ included the obvious things - ammunition, fuel, and so on, but also things like time and space.

If those two simple statements of the duties of the staff are correct then I do not see any argument against a low ranked staff. Nothing in either "relieving the commander of detail" or "controlling resources" requires that staff officers are equal to or higher in rank than subordinate commanders.

As to the function of deputies. It has always seemed to me that deputies were provided when:

     1. The likelihood was high of commanders (of platoons, companies, battalions .. whatever) were in some danger of being killed or, intentionally, left out of battle; or

     2. The command had a geographic or function duality - think about admin echelons or, even, the MG group in a section; or

     3. Both.

We did lose a couple of brigade commanders in battle 70 or so years ago, is that a valid reason to provide brigades with a deputy commander now?


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I learned that the duties of the staff are to:
> 
> 1. Assist commanders in the function of command by relieving them of detail; and
> 
> 2. Assist subordinate commanders in the execution of their tasks.



You are all keenly aware of the many things I don't know but ...  ;D

During my brief time in that strikes me as a succinct description of the duties of a 2iC at any level of command.

Is it fair to say that the first staff officer positions are Coy 2ic and DCO?

My understanding of my duties as 2iC were to make sure the Boss's troops had what they needed to get the job done and to fill in the details.

My secondary duties were to make sure I understood the Boss's plans well enough to continue implementing them when he did an H Jones.

I'm getting the sense these days that the 2iC, Deputy, Asst whatever, is divorced from the staff effort rather than leading the staff effort.  

Or am I all wet as usual?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You are all keenly aware of the many things I don't know but ...  ;D
> 
> During my brief time in that strikes me as a succinct description of the duties of a 2iC at any level of command.
> 
> Is it fair to say that the first staff officer positions are Coy 2ic and DCO?
> 
> My understanding of my duties as 2iC were to make sure the Boss's troops had what they needed to get the job done and to fill in the details.
> 
> My secondary duties were to make sure I understood the Boss's plans well enough to continue implementing them when he did an H Jones.
> 
> I'm getting the sense these days that the 2iC, Deputy, Asst whatever, is divorced from the staff effort rather than leading the staff effort.
> 
> Or am I all wet as usual?



As a Coy 2IC I had a great time, basically acting as the stand in OC when he was away on course or whatever (which was fairly often) and running all Coy Ops and Training. I led some fairly big and exciting operations/ exercises and generally got tons of command experience.

Alternatively, it seems to me that DCOs get all the crummy jobs and 'special projects' that the CO doesn't want to do, or has to be seen to be acting on for political reasons but doesn't have time for. Or maybe that was just because it was me when I was a DCO  ;D


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You are all keenly aware of the many things I don't know but ...  ;D
> 
> During my brief time in that strikes me as a succinct description of the duties of a 2iC at any level of command.
> 
> Is it fair to say that the first staff officer positions are Coy 2ic and DCO?
> 
> My understanding of my duties as 2iC were to make sure the Boss's troops had what they needed to get the job done and to fill in the details.
> 
> My secondary duties were to make sure I understood the Boss's plans well enough to continue implementing them when he did an H Jones.
> 
> I'm getting the sense these days that the 2iC, Deputy, Asst whatever, is divorced from the staff effort rather than leading the staff effort.
> 
> Or am I all wet as usual?



A sub-unit 2IC is not a true staff officer, and neither is a unit Deputy Commanding Officer. Our doctrine separates Deputy Commanders from staffs, and makes it clear that Deputies are not Chiefs of Staff. It also lays out that the COS is not the Deputy. 

In a Battalion/Regiment I would argue that there are two Staff Officers: the Adjutant and the Operations Officer (and their assistants if they have them). I would not consider the DCO or any of the Coy/Sqn 2ICs as Staff Officers. 

Now, as a Sqn 2IC I did a lot of staff work and I had dotted lines going from my desk to the Adjt and Ops O. I was still not a staff officer - I was part of the Sqn chain of command. As a DCO (Regimental 2IC) I also did a lot of staff work related to certain duties as assigned by the CO, but I was not the unit COS. There were times that I provided some oversight/direction to the Ops O and Adjt but for the vast majority of the time those two cats reported to the CO and were _his_ staff officers. On exercise I would sometimes look at future plans with a skeleton planning team so that the CO and Ops O could focus on the present fight, but I was not the Plans O. 

Our doctrine offers that the unit Operations Officer functions as the COS for a unit (battalion/regiment).


----------



## Infanteer

That's how I see it too.


----------



## OldSolduer

Infanteer said:
			
		

> That's how I see it too.



That is how it is.


----------



## Old EO Tech

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> A sub-unit 2IC is not a true staff officer, and neither is a unit Deputy Commanding Officer. Our doctrine separates Deputy Commanders from staffs, and makes it clear that Deputies are not Chiefs of Staff. It also lays out that the COS is not the Deputy.
> 
> In a Battalion/Regiment I would argue that there are two Staff Officers: the Adjutant and the Operations Officer (and their assistants if they have them). I would not consider the DCO or any of the Coy/Sqn 2ICs as Staff Officers.
> 
> Now, as a Sqn 2IC I did a lot of staff work and I had dotted lines going from my desk to the Adjt and Ops O. I was still not a staff officer - I was part of the Sqn chain of command. As a DCO (Regimental 2IC) I also did a lot of staff work related to certain duties as assigned by the CO, but I was not the unit COS. There were times that I provided some oversight/direction to the Ops O and Adjt but for the vast majority of the time those two cats reported to the CO and were _his_ staff officers. On exercise I would sometimes look at future plans with a skeleton planning team so that the CO and Ops O could focus on the present fight, but I was not the Plans O.
> 
> Our doctrine offers that the unit Operations Officer functions as the COS for a unit (battalion/regiment).



In the CSS Svc Bn there is actually a "long term planner officer" called the SLOO, Senior Logistics Operations Officer.  Were as the Ops O does short term planning, the SLOO does the 3-5 year plan or even longer.  Now he does in doctrine get out from behind his desk on Ex/Ops, he does have the role of Commanding the FLOC, Forward Logistics Operations Centre, which is basically a mini Log Ops used for step ups when a Svc Bn is on the move.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

In an Inf Bn or Armd Regt there can be more staff officers than the Adjt/Ops O. There could be several officers working for the Ops O, and they would be staff officers. In my last regimental tour we were blessed with two AOC grads in the Ops Shop. 

Now, the Signals Officer is not a staff officer. He has a small command to whom he gives orders. He is a specialist advisor to the Commanding Officer, so in that light he could be seen as staff. Still, his command responsibilities make him different from a G6. The same would apply, in my mind, to the QM and Maint O. They provide specialist advice to the CO, but they also command troops who do things besides plan/coordinate. The Transport Officer does lots of staff work, but he is not a staff officer. He gives orders to subordinates who move around the battlefield. 2IC HQ Sqn completes a blizzard of staff work and operational planning and could perhaps be seen as Staff Officer, but he is part of a Sqn chain of command that directly moves soldiers and equipment around.

As for the SLOO, he sounds like a staff officer (super Ops O), but I could be wrong. I imagine that Arty and Engr units may have some additional officers that could be seen as staff officers. Bde HQ, though, is where the lion share of the true staff officers reside within the field force.

Bear in mind that going out on exercise does not make the determination between Staff Officer and non-Staff Officer. An Ops O might spend months in the field and an OC might stay in garrison. The nature of their duties is what make the determination.

A tank troop leader might spend weeks at a time at his desk doing administration related to his troop, but he is not a staff officer. He is a commander - if a very junior one still learning the ropes.


----------



## Kirkhill

Can I ask for clarification on the RN (RCN?) system, and those of the US Army and Marines where at Coy, Bn and Bde/Regt levels the 2ic is explicitly referred to as the Executive Officer and, I believe, is also explicitly considered as a staff appointment?

I also seem to recall that back in the 80s the Ops O was the OC Cbt Spt Coy who routinely had all his troops farmed out when the unit was engaged.

Now that you don't have Cbt Spt Coy worth the name (- Mortars, - Pioneers, - Anti-Tank) do you really need an OC Cbt Spt Coy AND a separate Ops O?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Can I ask for clarification on the RN (RCN?) system, and those of the US Army and Marines where at Coy, Bn and Bde/Regt levels the 2ic is explicitly referred to as the Executive Officer and, I believe, is also explicitly considered as a staff appointment?



The unique history of the RCN and RCAF's staff evolution can be read here:

http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol1-2008/Iss2-Summer/Sections/05-Staff_Systems_and_the_Canadian_Air_Force-Part1_e.pdf

http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol1-2008/Iss3-Fall/Sections/05-Staff_Systems_and_the_Canadian_Air_Force-Part2_e.pdf

Executive Officers may or may not have different functions then our Deputies - I'm not entirely sure.  But it is somewhat irrelevant - the U.S. Army Executive Officer's terms or reference need to be considered within the context of the American version of the Continental System.  U.S. Battalions have senior S3/Ops Os who outrank company commanders while the SNCO role in resupply works slightly different.  The U.S. Executive Officer "works' because it fits with the rest of the system - we couldn't lift it wholesale for import.



> Now that you don't have Cbt Spt Coy worth the name (- Mortars, - Pioneers, - Anti-Tank) do you really need an OC Cbt Spt Coy AND a separate Ops O?



Absolutely not.  The Company still has 100+ personnel in Signals, Recce and Snipers.  An operations officer is too occupied coordinating the battalion's efforts to also act as an OC.  I had a friend saddled with these two hats and it wasn't a pleasant experience.


----------



## ballz

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Bear in mind that going out on exercise does not make the determination between Staff Officer and non-Staff Officer. An Ops O might spend months in the field and an OC might stay in garrison. The nature of their duties is what make the determination.



Purely out of curiosity, what would you consider a LAV Captain? He acts as the Coy Ops O for the most part, but does have a role to play in the field that involves commanding, but really he is just making sure the details of the OC's scheme of manouevre is accomplished.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

ballz said:
			
		

> Purely out of curiosity, what would you consider a LAV Captain? He acts as the Coy Ops O for the most part, but does have a role to play in the field that involves commanding, but really he is just making sure the details of the OC's scheme of manouevre is accomplished.



Great question. I hadn't thought about him.

Looking at the armour organizations from which the concept of the LAV Capt was initially taken, a tank or recce sqn Battle Captain is certainly not a staff officer. He is third in line to succeed the OC and takes over during the immediate battle if the OC goes down (the 2IC is too far back). 

At first blush I would not view a LAV Captain as a Staff Officer. I believe that he is in the chain to take over command before a Pl Comd. He can command tactical groupings in contact. This makes me think that he is not a true Staff Officer. Having said that, I can see the argument to say that he is usually acting as a Coy Ops O. I believe that Engr Sqns now have Operations Officers - I suppose they could be seen as Staff.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... U.S. Battalions have senior S3/Ops Os who outrank company commanders while the SNCO role in resupply works slightly different.


Adding to that, the US Battalion also has both an S6 and a Signals Pl Comd, both an S4 and a Logistics Pl Comd, and the HHC in place of Admin Coy.  It is not the same as a Canadian Battalion.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I have been re-reading two WW2 classics about the USMC in the Pacific: 'Goodbye Darkness', by William Manchester and 'With the Old Breed' by Eugene Sledge.

Terry Copp has also done some work on Canadian casualties in Normandy, which exceeded British levels and seem equivalent to the USMC rates: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1491&context=cmh

It's a sobering reminder that the casualty rates of for combat arms, especially Infantry, in high intensity warfare are astronomical. If for no other reason than leadership continuity, it's a good idea to have a few extras hanging around.


----------



## Kirkhill

This info may be a bit dated but it is available in the public domain

http://library.enlisted.info/field-manuals/series-1/FM7_20/APPB.PDF

Bn XO



> The XO is second in command and the battalion
> commander’s main assistant. As the second in
> charge, he must be prepared to assume the duties
> of the commander.
> a. The XO, as the coordinator of the
> battalion staff, establishes staff operating
> procedures. He ensures the commander and
> staff are informed on matters affecting the
> command. To coordinate and synchronize the
> plan, the XO assembles and supervises the staff
> during the decision-making process. He
> establishes the required liaison. Unless
> instructed otherwise by the commander, all staff
> officers inform the XO of any recommendations
> or information they give directly to the
> commander or any instructions they receive
> directly from the commander. When required,
> he represents the commander, supervises the
> main CP and its operations, and provides for
> battalion logistical support.



A publication B-GL-322-003 seemed to be quite clear that the OC Cbt Spt Coy was Ops O as the platoons of CS Coy were parcelled out or under the direct control of the CO.  The Pl Ldrs and Recce Officers were tasked to the TOC as Duty Offrs.

The DCO was located at the Main CP (AOC at A Echelon) with the OC Adm Coy with 3 primary tasks:

1.  assuming command in the absence of the CO
2. responsible to the CO  for overall administration (AOC supplied by OC Adm and the Adm Coy HQ)
3. planning future ops when Ops O (OC Cbt Spt) is committed

I admit to being dense but I am not seeing a huge gulf between the duties of a DCO and an XO.

Also, I am having difficulty understanding why you need more officers to organize battalions of 500 than you needed to organize battalions of 1000.  Why do you need a OC Cbt Spt Coy and a Ops O?

Surely "Staff" is merely the addition of supernumary personnel to assist Line Command in delivering the necessary services?  They may be capable of assuming command, they probably have had command billets prior to their staff appointments, but regardless of rank, surely they shouldn't intervene in the chain of command?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill,

You are comparing US and Canadian positions - and I must confess that I am not sure what your point is. I have been trained and worked in both systems - a US battalion S3 is not a Canadian Ops O, and a US XO is not a Canadian DCO.

Is your argument that a Canadian Battalion Ops O could be OC Cbt Support?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> A publication B-GL-322-003 seemed to be quite clear that the OC Cbt Spt Coy was Ops O as the platoons of CS Coy were parcelled out or under the direct control of the CO.
> ....
> Also, I am having difficulty understanding why you need more officers to organize battalions of 500 than you needed to organize battalions of 1000.  Why do you need a OC Cbt Spt Coy and a Ops O?



This has never been the case.  OC Cbt Spt (previously OC HQ Coy) is a position that predates the Second World War.  It has always been a "spare OC" and there has never been a codified tactical role for this officer.  I have Army Journal correspondence dating from the 1960s arguing about the utility of keeping OC HQ Coy as the "spare prick at the wedding" for numerous tasks that would pop up (LO, cas replacement, etc).

The Ops O is a creation of the 1970s; previously, assisting the CO with battle management and planning was a function of the Adjutant but, with the growth in pers admin policy the Adjutant became completely dedicated to pers admin and Ops Os were created to handle the battle management/planning and orders drafting part.

At times, due to shortages in officers, it has been acceptable to double tap 59r and 9B as you could afford to do it due to the lack of a tactical role of 59r.  However, this is not a very good thing to do - OC Combat Support is dedicated to ensuring there is a guiding hand to the training of Snipers, Recce and Signals while the Ops O is dedicated to the Battalion as a whole.  I can tell you from first hand experience that merging these two duties would entail large risks to the effort that can be put to these two distinct, and vital, tasks.  Finally, OC Cbt Spt is still the "untasked guy" when you hit the field, making him very valuable for all those odd tasks that come up (LO, ISTAR Coord, spare C2, etc).

Finally, I am not sure where you are getting your assumption that Canadian Battalions have larger staffs than U.S. ones.  An American Bn S-3 shop at the battalion level is larger than a Canadian Inf Bn Ops section.


----------



## Kirkhill

T2B

To be honest I don't know what my point is.

I sense that you, the CAF, are moving from large battalions in large brigade groups, a particularly Canadian construct,  to small battalions and at the same time are moving from a British-Canadian command and control system to an American-Canadian system.  By that I mean that you are starting to adopt Americanisms in your terminology (S1, S2, S3, S3 .....) but yet you don't seem to be accepting the rest of the system that spawns those terms.

Complicating my understanding is that the Americans seem to be struggling with their own systems at the same time you are fighting your way through trying to decide what you can do with the reduced resources that you have in hand.

Some of the things the Americans seem to have done is provide additional berths by supplying planning personnel that are divorced from the units providing the support.  The British-Canadian system generally relied on the supporting entities supplying both the planning advisors and the support.
I can be all wet, as I said......

But at the same time we are reducing the size and number of units, and I am hearing people expressing concern about the size of staffs at NDHQ, we seem to be adding staff billets, like the dedicated Ops O.

I have to be thinking that the emphasis should be the other way, on paring staff billets for officers and leaving them in line positions, even if it means reducing the size of the commands.

For example, retaining the fourth rifle coy in an inf bn, as an operational and training construct, even if it means reducing all rifle coys to something in the 60 to 80 PY range.  Also, retaining skills like MORs, Pnrs, DFS (HMG/GMG/GPMG-SF) even if it means reducing mors to 4 tubes and only 23 PYs as found in a US battalion.

I have been looking for the skinniest organizations and trying to understand what their limitations are.  Needless to say trying to understand the Staff part of the equation is ........perplexing.

And I have rambled enough.  Sorry.   :-[ :-\


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer, just to address your points before going silent:

I'm not arguing that the Canadians have more Staff than the Americans,  in fact I believe the opposite to be true.  But... I am sensing that even though Battalions have been downsized here in Canada the number of officers per battalion has not.   That seems to have resulted in jobs that were Duty positions of Line officers having become full time planning positions.

I am thinking specifically of the Pioneer, Armd Def, Mor Pl officers, and the 4th Rifle Coy officers as well as the OC Cbt Spt Coy.

An Infantry School Student Handout "The Organization, Characteristics, and Role of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion" issued in 1983 on Phase 2
said this:

"The Operations Centre.  The operations centre is the focal point for planning, control and co-ordination of unit combat operations.  When the commanding officer is present it may be referred to as the unit command post.  The staff consists of the operations officer (the officer commanding combat support company), the intelligence officer,  a number of duty officers drawn from the combat support company and intelligence clerks, drivers and signallers."

"Combat Support Company

28. This company does not operate as a tactical sub-unit.  It comprises a headquarters, mortar, reconnaissance, anti-armour and assault pioneer platoons.  It has a total strength of 9-171 and while this  is the largest company in the battalion organization, it is never deployed in its entirety as a tactical sub-unit."

B-GL-322-003/fp-001

"Section 2, Battalion Headquarters

Command Post Section

10. The command post (CP) is the focal point for the planning, control and coordination of unit operations.  The staff consists of the Operations Officer (Ops O), the Intelligence Officer (IO), a number of duty officers drawn from the combat support company and intelligence clerks, drivers and signallers."


"Section 4, Combat Support Company

General

24.  Combat Support Company does not operate as a tactical subunit in operations.  Rather its platoons (mortar, reconnaissance and assault pioneer) operate as independent platoons under the direct command of the CO.  Out of battle, the company may operate as a sub-unit for ease of administration and training.....

Headquarters Combat Support Company

25.  The company is commanded by a major who usually also acts as the Battalion Ops O, working out of the battalion CP.....

26.  Combat Support Company headquarters personnel provide administrative support to the Battalion Headquarters.  Normally in operations this administrative support group is commanded by the Combat Support Company sergeant major."

"Section 2

Combat Support Company

Organization and Command

3. Combat Support Company normally operates as a  sub-unit for ease of administration and training when out of battle.  In battle its platoons operate as independent platoons under the direct command of the CO.  The platoons are organized and equipped to conduct their own replenishment from A echelon (or AI echelon).  They may receive some assistance from the company quarter-master sergeant (CQMS).

4. The company commander acts as the Battalion Ops O in the battalion CP. The routine company administration of the combat support platoons is performed by the Company 2IC, if and officer can be spared for this job, or by the senior combat support platoon commander, when the company is out of battle and the company commander/battalions Ops O is occupied planning future operations.

5.  The Company headquarters personnel provide administrative support to battalion headquarters.  In operations this support is provided under the company CSM....."


"Annex A 

Battalion Headquarters Responsibilities of Key Personnel

3. Operations Officer (Ops O).  The Operations Officer is responsible to the CO for the functioning of the Battalion Headquarters.   His duties include:

a. responsibility for all operational staff work;
b. assisting the CO in the preparation of tactical plans;
c. Coordinating all patrol activity (he may be the battalion patrol master)
d. Coordinating support from the other arms and services;
e. Coordinating all unit in-theatre training
f. assuming command if the CO becomes a casualty during the absence of the DCO."


I can also cite similar instructions issued as SOPs for Calg Highrs when they were assigned to supply a D&D platoon to 1 PPCLI.  The SOPs were copies of 1 PPCLI SOPS circa 1980.

But I probably misunderstood the situation....


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## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ... you are starting to adopt Americanisms in your terminology (S1, S2, S3, S3 .....) but yet you don't seem to be accepting the rest of the system that spawns those terms.


The "S staff" terms were picked-up by some BGs in Kandahar with the argument that it would be easier for US Army allies to understand who they were speaking with in the BG HQ.  Few individuals have continued to use the terms in Canada because it sounds cool; this is not correct practice.  There has been no formal adoption of these unit staff titles in Canada.


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## TangoTwoBravo

We should be careful comparing and contrasting US and Canadian units. We did indeed start calling our Bn level staff by US designations, but as MCG states this was to be cool in a US theatre. We didn't really change our structure besides adding some CCs.

In a US unit, the sub-unit commanders are Captains. In Canada, they are Majors. A typical US unit has two Majors - the XO and the S3. The Ops O has much more relative power compared to a Canadian Ops O. This holds true even if the Canadian Ops O is a Major since he is pre-command. A US Bn XO has a different relationship with the Company Commanders than the Canadian DCO does. When I was tracking the details fifteen years ago (on a US course and on exchanges), the XO ran the TOC and oversaw the MDMP. The S3 of a tank battalion had a tank and would often be forward. He might even command two company teams. We would instead have a large combat team with one or two of the OCs running the show. I am not saying that one is better. To change would be a massive deal and I am not sure what the benefits would be.

The OC of the combat support company position pre-dates the most recent reductions in Bn size, so its not a conspiracy to preserve a Maj (and CSM) billet. In any case, a Battle Group organized for expeditionary operations is actually quite large.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Infanteer, just to address your points before going silent:
> 
> I'm not arguing that the Canadians have more Staff than the Americans,  in fact I believe the opposite to be true.  But... I am sensing that even though Battalions have been downsized here in Canada the number of officers per battalion has not.   That seems to have resulted in jobs that were Duty positions of Line officers having become full time planning positions.
> 
> I am thinking specifically of the Pioneer, Armd Def, Mor Pl officers, and the 4th Rifle Coy officers as well as the OC Cbt Spt Coy.



I've read and understand superseded PAMs.  I've answered your question on the two appointments twice but you've never read/addressed my response.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer:

Obviously I failed to understand the import of your responses,  a problem exacerbated by my very poor understanding of the issue at hand.  All the more reason for me to go silent here.

 

My apologies to the board for straying well outside of my lanes.


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