# The Situation in Afghanistan



## Old Sweat (9 Nov 2007)

The following assessment appeared this morning on orbat.com, a site that has some expertise in regional matters. As can be seen, it was authored by a person apparently residing in Kabul. The contribution of the site and the author is acknowledged, as is the permission to reproduce it.

Can anyone comment on the assessment from a position of knowledge? The author does venture onto dangerous ground when he cites western motives, but I am more interested in his views on the Taliban's strengthes, aims and status. I am also aa bit leery of his views on the ANP.

Afghanistan Situation Report

Major A.H. Amin (Retired) in Kabul

(You may quote from this report crediting the author and Orbat.com)

Area Under Taliban Control

Ghazni (Andar,Muqur Districts) (At least 30 % of the province by day and 60 % night) 

Zabul (At least 75 % of the province) 

Uruzgan ( At least 55 % of the province) 

Helmand (At least 80 % of the province) 

Paktika (At least 10-20 % of the province) 

Khost (At least 20 % of the province) 

Farah (At least 55 % of the province) 

 Kunar (At least 20 % of the province) 

Laghman (At least 20 % of the province) 

Kapisa (Tagab district) 

Kandahar ( at least 45 % of the province ) 


Lines of Communication 

Kabul–Torkham Highway is 90 % safe but there have been incidents of attacks on oil tankers. Many of these are however insurance frauds done by owners of oil tankers coming from Pakistan or by their crew who first sell the fuel and then put the tankers on fire. 

Kabul-Kandahar Herat Highway :-- It is unsafe for any kind of civilian traffic between Muqur in Ghazni till Shahr e Safa in Kandahar and from Maiwand in Kandahar Province till Farah Rud and Adraskan in Herat Province in between 1600 in the evening till dawn. 

Kandahar-Spin Boldak Highway :-- Safe during daytime but unsafe after 1600 till dawn. 

Kabul-Mazar Hairatan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies. 

Kabul-Kunduz Bandar Sher Khan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies. 


The USA and its NATO allies appear to have the following strategy 

Control the key airfields of Afghanistan with minimum strength. 
Hold Kabul in strength. 
Show piece patrolling in Southern Provinces giving the impression that the ISAF/NATO is active but in reality avoiding pitched battles or any heavy troop copmmitment. 
Rebuild the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. This may take many decades. Actual fighting indicates that both the ANA and ANP have extremely limited value while operating independently. Thanks to US insistence the Afghan Army was destroyed effectively in the period 1989-92 and building a effective army may take many decades. 
It appears that the long term strategic purpose of Afghanistan was to dominate the regional states as well the resources by occupying airbases which would enable the USA to attack targets of its choosing , may they be WMDs or other installations. Effective countermeasures by President Putin of Russia however severely limited US influence in the Central Asian Republics. 
Pressurise/armtwist Pakistani into destroying the main Taliban bases in Waziristan and North Balochistan. 
The Taliban strategy is as following 
Harass Kabul Herat Road disturbing container movements. 
Cause attrition on British-Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar the Pashtun heartland thus demonstrating to all Pashtuns in Afghanistan that the Talibans are a major player. 
Dominate the major drug production areas in the south and the main drug export routes thus financially sustaining the ongoing war. 
Carry out continuous suicide and IED\bombings in Kabul and surrounding area sapping morale Of anti Taliban forces and demoralizing civilians. 
Carry out selective IED/Suicide Attacks against US Forces and US Civilians 
Targeting the Afghan National Police. which did not completely disintegrated in 1988-92.The Taliban know that the hard core of the Afghan Government is the ANP trained by the indomitable Sayyid Gulabozai. The Afghan National Police has at least 25 % officers trained in ex USSR and is very professional as well as patriotic. Thus the attacks on Afghan National Police by the suicide bombers as well as IEDs.


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## tomahawk6 (9 Nov 2007)

I guess technically unless you have an FOB setup in every district you dont "control" the district and thus a province. However, who is to say the taliban have a presence throughout the country. In the former northern alliance region the taliban are not very welcome and that extends to the province's along the Iranian border. I also disagree with the Major's analysis of NATO strategy. The focus of the US effort is somewhat like the Vietnam strategy which was to patrol until contact was made then fix and destroy the enemy. It isnt desireable from our standpoint and that of NATO to occupy Afghanistan. The Russians made that mistake and paid a stiff price. The real fighting is being done in the former heart of the taliban movement and with pretty good results so far. It is hoped as ANA units stand up they can actually occupy these provinces so that ISAF/NATO can act as a fire brigade as needed. In effect the strategy is attrition, at least thats my opinion.


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## Journeyman (9 Nov 2007)

Well math has never been my strong suit, but I don't see this as a zero-sum game. 
Where ANSF/coalition may not control an area doesn't automatically mean the Taliban do. 
There's all kinds of "wild west" in Afghanistan where no one "controls" the territory -- and the Taliban can be just as unwanted as the West.

As for NATO/ISAF, "in reality avoiding pitched battles" -- I don't think so. Conventional, combined arms battles are a NATO strength (whether or not they're relevant is a separate discussion). It's the Taliban who avoid the big battles -- there tend to be two or three per "campaign season," per province, and the Taliban always come out second best.

And as for a strategy of occupying airbases.....
this may be more a natural outcome of a technology-centric coalition, increasingly seeing airpower as a more domestically-acceptable contribution to the fight than boots on the ground and attendant ramp ceremonies -- rather than some nefarious US scheme to forward stage against other regional targets.


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## tomahawk6 (9 Nov 2007)

Airbases are the lifeline for logisitical support. If Afghanistan had a port life would be alot easier.


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