# Light vs Medium forces



## Kirkhill

This may generate a tangent here but the thought occurs to me that one of the problems with both the Light Infantry and the Cavalry units and there searching for roles and clarification is actually the Mech Infantry Battalions.

The LIBs actually can justify their role fairly easily,  the only real question is "how light is light" and what scale of kit can be transported to a particular location with them.

The Cavalry function should rightly be a no-brainer as an Armoured Corps job.  

The problem seems to me to revolve around the Mech Infantry.

The Mech Infantry evolved from Light Infantry in trucks to keep up with the Cavalry,  to Light Infantry in APCs to keep up with the Tanks in close combat and assaults.  Perhaps the seeds of the problem can be found in the General Purpose, Multi-Functional Combat Arms decision to purchase the LAV-III.

As the Aussies  and the USMCs can arguably demonstrate, it is a Cavalry vehicle with the dismounts being secondary to its primary missions.

The Mech Infantry has become the Cavalry.

SO.....if we take the Light Infantry out of the Vehicle mounted Light Infantry aspect of our General Purpose Mech Battalions and hand them to an "Elite" Light Infantry force, and we take the Cavalry aspects out of our GP Mech Bns and hand them back to the Armoured Corps - What exactly do we envisage the other 6 combat arms units (the current Mech Bns) doing?

Cavalry to the Armoured.  All Infantry Light, 6 with vehicular support - maybe even some LAVs and 3 para-qualified airtransportable.


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## McG

As I see the future being in mixed arms units, it would not break down into light infantry and mech cavalry.  Instead there is light manoeuvre battalions (spawn of current light infantry battalions) and medium manoeuvre battalions (spawn of a union of mech cavalry and mech infantry units).  The two potential ratios that I would support, of light units to medium units, are 3:9 or 6:6.


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## Kirkhill

And here was me trying to solve the problem and keep the peace amongst capbadges... ;D 

Oh well, back to the drawing board.. 

On the other hand McG - let me focus for a second on your use of the word "union" in the "union of mech cavalry and mech infantry" and that brings me back to a long held position which is in some sense an outgrowth of your position on Light Infantry being independent of platform.   If they are to be independent of platform why could one of their platforms be the LAV.

A light infantry structure that, as you say, could operate... 



> ... out of LSVW, BV206, Supacats, LOSV & tobbagin, mules, or nothing.   We must be able to insert them by air, sea, or land.   Once inserted, they manoeuvre and fight dismounted with all or most integral vehicles operating in support roles (DFS, wpns tractor, CSS).



could just as easily operate out of the back of a Bison/Stryker type of armoured truck.

With the armoured truck it could keep up with and reinforce the Cavalry, but it would not be Cavalry.   At the same time it would still be possible for those light units to operate from other transport with no change in doctrine or TTP.

Likewise, the "elite" para-qualified battalions would be trained and organized along the same lines and could operate either in their jump role or from armoured trucks.

Thus we end up with 9 Battalions usable across a wide-spectrum of conflicts, 3 deployable anywhere at all, and we also create a credible Cavalry force, distinct from the Infantry but capable of working with the Infantry.   Either attaching a Troop to a mission that requires a Light Infantry force or having a Coy attached to a Squadron (after the fashion of the Aussies ) to create a more robust Cavalry force.

And all sorts of other combinations and permutations.   

The LAV dismounts, that apparently need specialist training to operate from the back of the LAV IIIs, would be integral Black hat infanteers - serving the additional purpose of supplying more, all together now - "boots-on-the-ground".

Cheers.

Final thought, courtesy of Infanteer's post on the Aussie Cavalry, the author mentioned that the Squadron could "almost" lift a Light Infantry Company in a pinch.  How about if the Squadron added an Armoured Transport Section with Bison/Strykers with out all the fragile kit in back.  When not transporting Infantry bodies they Cavalry no doubt could find a use for them handling logistics and resupply.


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## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> As I see the future being in mixed arms units, it would not break down into light infantry and mech cavalry.   Instead there is light manoeuvre battalions (spawn of current light infantry battalions) and medium manoeuvre battalions (spawn of a union of mech cavalry and mech infantry units).   The two potential ratios that I would support, of light units to medium units, are 3:9 or 6:6.



Agree 100% here.  Now, to get General Hillier on-board.


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## big bad john

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> This may generate a tangent here but the thought occurs to me that one of the problems with both the Light Infantry and the Cavalry units and there searching for roles and clarification is actually the Mech Infantry Battalions.
> 
> The LIBs actually can justify their role fairly easily,   the only real question is "how light is light" and what scale of kit can be transported to a particular location with them.
> 
> The Cavalry function should rightly be a no-brainer as an Armoured Corps job.
> 
> The problem seems to me to revolve around the Mech Infantry.
> 
> The Mech Infantry evolved from Light Infantry in trucks to keep up with the Cavalry,   to Light Infantry in APCs to keep up with the Tanks in close combat and assaults.   Perhaps the seeds of the problem can be found in the General Purpose, Multi-Functional Combat Arms decision to purchase the LAV-III.
> 
> As the Aussies   and the USMCs can arguably demonstrate, it is a Cavalry vehicle with the dismounts being secondary to its primary missions.
> 
> The Mech Infantry has become the Cavalry.
> 
> SO.....if we take the Light Infantry out of the Vehicle mounted Light Infantry aspect of our General Purpose Mech Battalions and hand them to an "Elite" Light Infantry force, and we take the Cavalry aspects out of our GP Mech Bns and hand them back to the Armoured Corps - What exactly do we envisage the other 6 combat arms units (the current Mech Bns) doing?
> 
> Cavalry to the Armoured.   All Infantry Light, 6 with vehicular support - maybe even some LAVs and 3 para-qualified airtransportable.



It almost sound like you are talking about Dragoons in the old days.  Cavalry That would fight from a dismounted position.


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## Kirkhill

That's about right Big Bad John.


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## big bad john

IMHO that is Mech or Motorized Rifles in Soviet parlance.  I think that it is the way we should go as opposed to "Heavy" formations.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> On the other hand McG - let me focus for a second on your use of the word "union" in the "union of mech cavalry and mech infantry" and that brings me back to a long held position which is in some sense an outgrowth of your position on Light Infantry being independent of platform.   If they are to be independent of platform why could one of their platforms be the LAV.
> 
> A light infantry structure that, as you say, could operate...
> 
> could just as easily operate out of the back of a Bison/Stryker type of armoured truck.
> 
> With the armoured truck it could keep up with and reinforce the Cavalry, but it would not be Cavalry.   At the same time it would still be possible for those light units to operate from other transport with no change in doctrine or TTP.
> 
> Likewise, the "elite" para-qualified battalions would be trained and organized along the same lines and could operate either in their jump role or from armoured trucks.
> 
> Thus we end up with 9 Battalions usable across a wide-spectrum of conflicts, 3 deployable anywhere at all, and we also create a credible Cavalry force, distinct from the Infantry but capable of working with the Infantry.   Either attaching a Troop to a mission that requires a Light Infantry force or having a Coy attached to a Squadron (after the fashion of the Aussies ) to create a more robust Cavalry force.



I still side with McG and support a 6+6 role.   Independent of transport means that Light Forces should be able to use a variety of methods to get to work (parachute, helicopter, truck/jeep) dependent on the terrain but their doctrine, tactics, and training will focus around fighting the Light battle, most likely in adverse terrain (Like the "Whale").

I see the Cav/Mech function as fundamentally different.   I don't pretend to be a subject matter expert on either, but the general impression I get from most of the Infantry NCO's and Officers around here is that the LAV (or any IFV) presents us with a entirely different ballgame.   These forces will have doctrine, tactics, and training that will focus on the mechanized battle, which sees dismounts fighting hand-in-hand with their Mechanized Platforms.

To me, these seem to be Apples and Oranges.   Both have their utility (As Afghanistan and Iraq have recently demonstrated) and neither are supposed to be "elite", there is just a suitability to for either/or (or both) to differnet terrains/theaters.   It would be a bad idea to stick 3 Commando Brigade in the back of Warriors, just as it would be a bad idea to take First Armoured Division and drop them into Tora Bora (as Max Hastings noted in the Falklands War, the Welsh Guards, a mech unit, dropped out of the Goose Green battle because, as one of their officers said, they were not "Bergan Soldiers".)

If I'm off kilter, then by all means point me in the right direction.   It just seems to me that we may not get the best result if we have our soldiers (our infantry in particular) try to do everything decently but nothing well.   I think the 6+6 proposal, where 6 maneuver elements work towards fighting the Light Battle and the other 6 maneuver elements (a mixture of the remaining three infantry battalion and the three armoured battalions) look to focusing on the Mechanized battle (as per the Canadian Cav concept or perhaps more inline with the Aussies), is the best option as it allows us to give a specific mission set to each capability while providing each with a equal level of sustainability, readiness rotation, etc, etc.


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## big bad john

Infanteer, you are right.   I just see that a lot of people seeing Mech Forces as LightFighters.   I see the Marines or the old 7th ID USA as the true model.   Light tracks or wheeled vehicles.   See below for Light Arty for example.  One from Para Arty and one from 29 Cdo RA.


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## Infanteer

Thanks BBJ.

I see Light Forces, as McG pointed out, as being independent of their transport.   If they can call fast air or a battery of light 105 in, then great - but don't always count on it.   Mech forces, I feel, build their tactics and techniques around the fact that while riflemen get off the vehicles and fight, they are only part of a total system that brings in Missiles, Heavy Artillery, 25mm Chainguns and direct cannon fire.

I've often given thought about the US Marines and the way the approach things.   They do have a "split" between their forces as well.   The Infantry seem to be largely "Light Fighters", they can rely on Armoured Amphib vehicles to bring them up to the battle, but these things are not really intended to fight a Mech Battle (read about the Ambush at An Nasiriyah in The March Up).   As well, they are able to deploy from light wheeled vehicles (BLT 1/6 in Afghanistan, CAAT) or to go "air assault" from helicopters.

Marine Mech Forces lie in the Tank Battalions and the LAV equipped LAR Battalions.   These units bore most of the fighting in Iraq with their larger weapons until fights moved into the city and, as per the diagram I put up, the terrain favoured a suitable employment of both Marine 0300's fighting the Light Battle with mechanized support coming from Marine Mech Forces.  My intention was to give a Canadian Mech Force a little more independence by giving it a CAV capability which contains intergral dismounted support in the form of scouts.

As I said earlier, I think you'd waist alot of energy and skill sets by training 42 Commando to get into Warriors.  We don't drive M113's anymore.   Apples and Oranges.


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## McG

Kirkhill,
Yes, an APC could be used as the means to insert light forces and it could even remain with the force during the conduct of the operation.   However, the light force structure would not be optimized to act as mechanized dismounts   (because it would be optimized for the light role).   The Engrs and CSS of a light force would not be capable of supporting a mech force (thus we deploy parallel support elements or accept that the deployed force will only operate in the medium role).    

The light infantry section sizes likely could be larger than what is needed for mech infantry.   Thus the LAV III would not be suitable without a major reorganization prior to deployment (so the infantry will now be asked to fight in a fashion other than how they have trained) or we will have to buy new APCs along the lines of turretless LAV III.

I believe it was you that argued once to split the infantry MOC into light and mech based on the different skill sets and tactics employed in the two types of operations.   The fact is that the MOC does not need to be split as long as the infantry is grouped in sub-units that are purpose structured for light or mechanized operations.   It is also essential that these sub-units train rigorously on the tactics of their specific roles.   

The difference of tactics, skill sets, and optimal organizations just don't lead to the conclusion that the optimum force generation structure is an dual-role infantry battalion.   Overall, for for force generation, we should group all our light forces into a single formation so that even the support elements have a structure optimized for light operations.


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## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> Yes, an APC could be used as the means to insert light forces and it could even remain with the force during the conduct of the operation.   However, the light force structure would not be optimized to act as mechanized dismounts   (because it would be optimized for the light role).   The Engrs and CSS of a light force would not be capable of supporting a mech force (thus we deploy parallel support elements or accept that the deployed force will only operate in the medium role).



Again, I concur.   I think that we need to make the important distinction between an APC (like the BVS10 that the RM has adopted) and an IFV (like the LAV III, the Warrior, and the CV90 series).   I don't think that APC's really need any special doctrine for employment, other then finding a Zulu harbour once they've done their job.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> I believe it was you that argued once to split the infantry MOC into light and mech based on the different skill sets and tactics employed in the two types of operations.   The fact is that the MOC does not need to be split as long as the infantry is grouped in sub-units that are purpose structured for light or mechanized operations.   It is also essential that these sub-units train rigorously on the tactics of their specific roles.



Well, I based that idea on the notion that Infantry would supply soldiers to the Light Formations (a la the USMC 0300 series) and "Mech Infantry" roles would be filled out by a new MOC along the lines of the American 19D (Cav Scout).   I guess the question is whether you are going to have sharp differences on the Mech Side between "Mech Infantry" and "Armoured Crewman" or have a ubiquitous "Cavalry Soldier" type MOC (a fusion between the current blackhatter and the mech inf), which would allow for intergration of capabilities (and career patterns) down to the crew/vehicle level.


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## Kirkhill

What I am arguing is that we build the entire Manoeuvre concept around the Cavalry.  That the Cavalry becomes the home of the LAV-25 (with accompanying specialist dismounts) and that they become the focal point for Arty and Engr attachments to support the Manoeuvre battle.  This would result in larger Squadrons than now, capable of acting independently, or of being used as a Regimental team.

If the job calls for more Infantry support, then by all means add more infantry.  Get them to the fight in suitable transport - and one form of suitable transport is the Stryker/Bison type of vehicle.  

I quite agree that the manoeuvre battle in open terrain is different to the battle in close or complex terrain.  It does require different skills and training.  That is why I think that the Infantry should concentrate its resources on learning how to dominate the close battle and leave the manoeuvre battle to the cavalry.  I don't see why it wouldn't be possible to have 3 battalions in a formation, one jump qualified and two leg, with one of the leg battalions tasked to airmobile ops and the other tasked to, for want of a better phrase, cavalry support ops.  

The Cavalry would be the SMEs on the manoeuvre battle.  Infantry would be attached for things like holding operating positions, protecting flanks, defensive positions, possibly even some line-of-communication work but in honesty that seems to be better handled by Cavalry themselves.

The Aussie Cavalry Squadron is already a fairly good sized Squadron with in excess of 36 vehicles just in the Patrols (24 LAV-25 and 12 LAV-PC or Bison III/Strykers) and has 48 dismounts but can apparently carry up to an additional 100 to 150 bodies "just short of a company" IIRC.  Well why not make sure they have enough transport to carry a full company by adding a Transport/Log section of 8 carriers.  Together with a Coyote surveillance section 8 vehicles, 8 MGS, 4 MMEV and 4 LAV-Mor (AMOS) that would create a manoeuvre element capable in its own right.  Essentially it would become a small Unit - more on the size of an American Squadron than a British/Canadian Squadron with 80 vehicles and about 250 bodies including Blackhat dismounts but not including any additional Infantry that might be attached.

Essentially what I am proposing looks more like a 9:9 structure. 9 Battalions, (3 jump qualified) and 9 Independent Squadrons.

Strangely enough if you multiply 9 Squadrons by 80 vehicles we come up with 720 LAV variants which is well within the order of magnitude of vehicles currently available.  Also 9 x 250 = 2250.  This might mean adding another thousand or so bodies to the Armoured Corps but that would still leave lots of bodies to fill out 9 infantry battalions.


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## McG

Now what you are proposing is to have infantry whose sole purpose is to support the mech cavalry, but you are keeping them is seperate homogenious units.   Integrate the two arms.   If the function of a specific infantry unit is to operate out of the back of a LAV III, then it does not make sense to have all its lift in another unit (when do they train together?   How often will the infantry have the option to train in thier mounted roll?).

Integration of infantry and cavalry would change your proposal to 6:9 (6 x light Bn and 9 x mech Sqn).


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## Kirkhill

> Now what you are proposing is to have infantry whose sole purpose is to support the mech cavalry, but you are keeping them is seperate homogenious units.  Integrate the two arms.  *If the function of a specific infantry unit is to operate out of the back of a LAV III,* then it does not make sense to have all its lift in another unit (when do they train together?  How often will the infantry have the option to train in thier mounted roll?).



No, I'm continuing to explain things poorly.  I am not proposing that Infantry operate out of the back of the LAVIII. I am proposing that Blackhat Assault Troops/Dragoons operate out of the back of the LAVIIIs.

I AM proposing that the Blackhats have the organic capability to lift infanteers in support of their operations - not necessarily to fight the manoeuvre battle themselves but to take and hold ground in support of the manoeuvre battle. That's why I refer to the Stryker/Bison type of vehicle - essentially a turretless armoured truck.

The infanteers would operate out of the Blackhats lift vehicles in the same way that they would operate out of the helicopters assigned to them or to the Bv206s assigned to them.  I am not proposing that the infanteers be employed to go haring off across country chasing the enemy.  Let the Cavalry do that.

My only reason for suggesting that one of the Battalions in a formation be tasked to co-operate with the Blackhats was an extension of the rationale that would see one of the other Battalions tasked to work with the Helo squadron attached to the brigade or to the Air transport squadron available to drop the 3rd battalion.

Having said all of that, if the man-power limits decision making then I don't have a problem with the 6:9 formulation of 3 Infantry Regiments of 2 light Battalions and 3 Armoured Regiments of 3 Independent, unit-sized Squadrons.

Lessee now - 9 infantry LCols become 6, 3 armoured LCols become 9.  I am sure that could be sold to the Armoured Corps ;D


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## George Wallace

Kirkhill 

That sounds a bit like The 1st Canadian Armoured Carrier Regiment, (the Kangaroos) of WW II.

GW


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## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I am not proposing that Infantry operate out of the back of the LAVIII. I am proposing that Blackhat Assault Troops/Dragoons operate out of the back of the LAVIIIs.


Okay, so this is about transforming the mechanized infantry battalion into a Cavalry MOC thing?   Otherwise, why are we converting the dismount positions from infantry (the dismounted fighters) to crewmen (the mounted fighters)?   This would also mean establishing 3 or 6 new manoeuvre units.   The manpower that would be required to do this would mean that none of the 5,000 new positions would be available to bring existing units up to strength (in fact, the new units would likely be just as under strengthed as our current predicament).


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## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> Okay, so this is about transforming the mechanized infantry battalion into a Cavalry MOC thing?   Otherwise, why are we converting the dismount positions from infantry (the dismounted fighters) to crewmen (the mounted fighters)?   This would also mean establishing 3 or 6 new manoeuvre units.   The manpower that would be required to do this would mean that none of the 5,000 new positions would be available to bring existing units up to strength (in fact, the new units would likely be just as under strengthed as our current predicament).



I am not following you here.   Why would this mean establishing 3 to 6 new manoeuvre units?


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## McG

He is talking about 9 of each (vs the 12 we currently have combined).


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I AM proposing that the Blackhats have the organic capability to lift infanteers in support of their operations - not necessarily to fight the manoeuvre battle themselves but to take and hold ground in support of the manoeuvre battle. That's why I refer to the Stryker/Bison type of vehicle - essentially a turretless armoured truck.



This is why I proposed that the any Light Formation have its own organic transport (BVS10, tac air) if the mission requires it - let the Cav guys focus on their game instead of worrying about being glorifed taxi guys.

As McG said, different TO&E's make for a hard time of just loading a Light Force unit onto a Cav Force structure for a ride.


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## Kirkhill

No actually I am talking about regrouping what you have.

Move the Infantry types currently crewing LAVs over to the Cavalry establishment to continue driving the same vehicles but with a different cap-badge.   The "Scale of issue" of dismounts in an independent Squadron would be 48 (following the Aussie model) or 144 per Regiment (1 Coy equivalent) or 432 per Armoured Corps.

By my rough reckoning each Squadron would require about 200 to 250 bodies, excluding the Mortar guys which I would attach from Arty.   Assuming 250 bodies per that means a total of 2250 for 9 Squadrons.   Lets say the Armoured Corps can come up with about half those bodies from their existing structure.   The other half would come from the New 5000.   That leaves 3500-4000 to parcel out amongst the infantry battalions.

For the Infantry, if we used Big Bad John's old mob as a model then 9 lightish battalions require, at about 650 each, 5850 bodies all told, including HQ and CSS types.   Lets say that we have to allocate all 3500-4000 New non-armoured bodies to the Infantry, that would mean that we would have to find 1800 - 2200 bodies from the existing infantry battalions.   Or roughly 200-250 people per battalion.

Now I understand you have manning issues just now, but please, otherwise I will cry, don't tell me that our current 9 battalions are down to an all up strength of less than 250 each.


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## Kirkhill

> This is why I proposed that the any Light Formation have its own organic transport (BVS10, tac air) if the mission requires it



So, you are suggesting that a separate Light Brigade have its own Transport, either Helo or something else.  Fair enough, but what do you mean by "if the mission requires it".  Does the transport get attached for the mission, is it permanently attached or do you create an all singing all dancing Transport Coy where the drivers will drive trucks one day and BVS10 the next?  Does the transport get attached permanently at the Unit or Formation level?

I was responding to McG's point that the Light Force is going to be expected to pick up the slack in all those operations that our general purpose Mech/Cavalry forces couldn't operate.  And from where I sit that means that the Light forces are going to be awfully busy and have to be extremely talented, switching from one mode to the other in time for the particular deployment.

What I am suggesting instead is that the structure be built from the Infantry Section up with transport treated as a separate entity.  Depending on the transport mode it could be a section per platoon or company, a platoon per battalion or a company per Brigade.  

At the same time the Cavalry will concentrate on the Patrol with whatever Direct and Indirect Fire Support organization fits their needs.


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## big bad john

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Kirkhill
> 
> That sounds a bit like The 1st Canadian Armoured Carrier Regiment, (the Kangaroos) of WW II.
> 
> GW



Panzer Grenadiers


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## Kirkhill

I suppose actually both BBJ and GW ARE right to some extent.  

I actually was thinking about incorporating a Section of Bisons in each Cavalry Squadron that would primarily be used to supply logistic support to the Squadron in its primary duties but could be used, as the Aussie suggested, "in a pinch" to be able to boost the carrying capacity of the Squadron so that it might be able to transport a light company with it for a short period.  eg Shift the 4 scouts out of their dedicated PC and stuff them 2 each into the back of the LAV-25s, leaving the PC in the patrol to carry 8 Light Infanteers. With 12 Patrols and 12 PCs  that would be 12x8 or 96 infanteers, with an additional 8 Logistics Bisons then room could be found for say another 64 bodies.  96+64 =160 and a light company is expected to be on the order of 130-140 bodies.  Enough to relocate a company if required.

Again, this is not a desired evolution, this is a possible evolution.  

The Cavalry should have the ability to meet their own dismount needs internally.

The Infantry will practice doing their job by what ever means of transport is available.

Having said that maybe there is a role for a dedicated Bison Troop in a Cavalry Regiment, designed primarily to operate with the infantry.


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## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Now I understand you have manning issues just now, but please, otherwise I will cry, don't tell me that our current 9 battalions are down to an all up strength of less than 250 each.


I'm a bit concerned with your math.   You are increasing the number of manoeuvre units by 50% and dumpping all increasing the manpower by at least 30%.   But you've not considered the increased that would be required for the Engr, Arty, and CSS units to support this.

Would your Cavalry Sqn have enough infantry to gets its own AOR on a deployed operation?



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The Infantry will practice doing their job by what ever means of transport is available.
> 
> Having said that maybe there is a role for a dedicated Bison Troop in a Cavalry Regiment, designed primarily to operate with the infantry.


No! No! No!

Your mechanized force needs mechanized infantry.   Those infantry should be trained and organized for mechanized operations.   Your Cavalry Bn requires Mech Rifle Coy(s).   This should not be something thrown together on the way overseas.


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## Zipper

Wow. All that sounded very cool. And I like you idea's Kirk. They do sound very "old school" dragoonish, or even as BBJ said, PGish.

Well, its seems that MCG asked the same thing. But I'll post it anyway. 

However can I ask if you thought about the numbers well enough? I think you assuming that those 5000 are going to just combat arms and "army" allocation? Are they not getting spread out amoung all the branches? As well as the need to fill in alot of the CS and CSS holes?

By the sounds of it, it may take quite a few years to build up to such a set of formations, and is probably where you are thinking. But I thought I'd ask.


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## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill,

Very thought provoking - even if the whole idea does give me the willies.

Basically, much like we the infantry can whistle up choppers from the AF to get us to where we are going, we could whistle up LAV 111's from the Armoured?  Either for transport to the dismount area, or as direct fire support vehicles?  

Help me out here...

Dave


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## Kirkhill

That's basically where I am going Dave.

And McG, Infanteer and Zipper, I accept the concern over the advantages of dedicated Mech Infantry.  But as to the question of "enough" infantry - 48 "dismounts" per squadron is comparable to what you would find in a US Mech Inf Coy.  The number of vehicles and number of personnel that I am contemplating in an Independent Squadron reinforced with a Mortar Troop from Arty would be comparable in span to a US Combat Team of a Mech Inf Coy, a Tank Coy, with mortars, FOO, Scout platoon and logistics with about 40 to 50 dismounts.  If you prefer, think of my Independent Squadron as being larger than a current Squadron but smaller than a Regiment, a Squadron Combat Team if you like.

These Squadrons could be employed together as a Regiment in their own AOR,  with or without Infantry support,  as Independent Squadrons in support of an Infantry Battalion in a Task Force, or even as independent Troops where only very light scales of support are required/possible.

Infantry would be built much along the lines of BBJs Marines.  I know you'll jump in when I screw up here BBJ but as I understand the Cdo21 formula the Commando is split into 5 coys with 8 rifle troops/platoons divided amongst them.

The HQ coy comprises recce troop with sniper section, a GPMG troop, an ATGM troop and the mortar troop.
There is a Landrover based patrol company with an MG troop, an ATGM troop and a rifle troop
There is a Viking based reaction company with an MG troop, an ATGM troop and a rifle troop 
There are two Close Combat companies, each foot, helo, boat or truck borne with 3 rifle troops.

The section and troop structure is common regardless of mode of transport.  TTPs are presumably common to all members of the Commando.

What I am saying is that you build from the common section/platoon architecture so that the infantry can be utilized as widely as possible and "close with and destroy the enemy, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain".  We only have 9 battalions with a total of 27 companies.  If the toothfairy comes we might end up with 36.

The Government wants to supply 2 Task Forces, and sustain them. That means that we need to have at least 8 Battalions, 10 would be better, in order to maintain that level of effort.  If we have specialized units then we end up having to constantly renegotiate our role in any allied effort.  

If we build around 9 General Purpose Battalions, after the fashion of the Royals, and add 9 Independent Squadrons then we CAN maintain the pace and continue with the same taskings.

Conversely the 3 Cavalry Regiments could act in concert with one another and possibly with an Infantry battalion in support.  Maybe it is rooted in place to defend an operating base or airfield. Maybe it is conducting heliborne ops in support of one or two Cavalry Regiments.  Maybe the infantry are required to move with the Cavalry.  In that case the Cavalry could be responsible for finding the armoured transport - or maybe the transport in the Infantry Battalion is organized separately from the rifle elements but integral to the battalion and they can change over from driving GWagens to LSVW, to Bv206s to Bisons.  I don't know honestly.

In any event they would not be Mechanized Infantry.  They would not be out following Panzers around the countryside.  

There would be somethings we could not do.

But in a large number of situations we could seize ground, hold it and dominate the surrounding area over a very large area.  

Now on the issue of transport generally,  which is easier? To train 1 driver to drive a number of vehicles tactically - in which case I would suggest that if you want your infantry to keep up with the Cavalry then have the Battalion transport platoon practice driving Bisons along with their Bv206s and LSVWs.  On the other hand if there is a different set of skills necessary to operate and maintain different vehicles then perhaps it would be better if all the LAV/Bisons were crewed and maintained by one organization, the Cavalry and their only role with respect to the Infantry would be to supply armoured infantry carriers.  The infantry in the back would have nothing to do with the mounted fight.  That is strictly a Cavalry job.  If the want the infantry in on the game they are going to have to let them get out.

As you say Dave, just like a TacHel Sqn.  Transport by the experts. Nothing else.

Canada could still contribute across a wide spectrum of conflicts, up unto the "flanking, screening, rear area security, lines of communications or economy of effort" activities described in the DFS squadron paper. Two Armd Regiments with a light infantry battalion, either road or helo or both transported, would have made a highly credible addition to Iraq.  Likewise a battalion organized along the lines of the Royal Marines with an Independent Cavalry Squadron attached would be a very useful core on which to build a taskforce for Kabul, or Kandahar or Darfur.

For the life of me, with the limited number of units we have I don't see how you can support a variety or specialties with a high degree of capabilty in all fields and at the same time meet standing commitments that are going to require you doing the same thing over and over again.  It seems virtually unanimous that the plug'n'play system is being panned as being detrimental to unit cohesion.  You want to be able to see your families on occasion, NDHQ wants to be able to plan on the longterm not on an ad hoc basis and the government wants to know what you can do for them.

Short answer for me is you can't afford a high degree of specialization.  Also Mech Forces are useless across most of Canada, you can't get them there and can't support them.  And in fact they don't address any credible domestic risk.  If we can't deploy them in Canada then we sure as heck can't deploy them overseas.

Light, well trained, general purpose forces, after the fashion of the RM, backed up by a useable Cavalry force and suitable helo support would serve Canada exceptionally well across a broad, broad spectrum.  And as to para capability - teach one battalion in three how to fall out of aeroplanes.

As Dave said, in terms of the helo discussion, Air Assault is a lot different than just jumping out of the back of a helicopter onto some unoccupied ground.  Likewise parachuting onto unoccupied ground is not an airborne assault.  But in Canada's case, the Assault capability is a lot less critical than just the ability to get people into remote locations rapidly.

9 GP Infantry battalions built on light scales - vehicles in the 3 to 7 tonne range to allow for air transport or helo transport.  3 of them jump qualified.  May 3 are tasked for Naval Cooperation and 3 tasked for Cavalry cooperation but all of them built and trained to the same standard with respect to ground combat.

And along with that 3 Cavalry Regiments that can form 9 Independent Squadrons.

Joint exercises with Infantry would be the norm.

If organized identically to the RM in Cdo 21 then each battalion would be 692 all ranks, 9 battalions would be 6228 infanteers. A few less if we continued to detach the Mortars, maybe a few more if you increased the number of platoons or adopted a more traditional triangular structure. Either way a very effective general purpose unit could be built around 650-700 all ranks.  The Cavalry Squadrons would be about 200 to 250 all ranks.  Lets say 700+250 for 950.  The core of a Task force.  Add another 150 engineers, 150 gunners and 250 CSS and you have a 1500 person task force.

9x1500 =13,500 all ranks

Engineers and arty, like the Cavalry would form Regiments at brigade level just as they do now but each regiment would be split to form dedicated teams that would train with a particular infantry battalion and Cavalry squadron.

CSS handled likewise.

Air support, as currently, outside of the Brigade command structure but permanently attached.

 ^-^"If I ruled the world, every day would be the first day of spring......"


----------



## Zipper

Wow and Wow!

How long have you been thinking about this? And do you get any work done during the day? ;D 

I like it. I may be only an arm chair soldier now, so it probably means sh!t. But it makes sense, and if you combine the ideas that are in the works on the Light forces thread posted by Eyre with this model for the Cavalry sqns, it would be a very useable plan.

What do you guys think of the chances of us once again getting airborne capabilities? Especially a regiments worth of them? Is this a feasable idea? Could we afford the extra vehicles this plan asks for?


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## Kirkhill

I believe this plan could be done now, with the vehicles in inventory.

Continue to use the Leo or the Cougar until the MGS comes on line.

A lot of the kit, like trucks, needs upgrading, but the job could be done.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So, you are suggesting that a separate Light Brigade have its own Transport, either Helo or something else.   Fair enough, but what do you mean by "if the mission requires it".   Does the transport get attached for the mission, is it permanently attached or do you create an all singing all dancing Transport Coy where the drivers will drive trucks one day and BVS10 the next?   Does the transport get attached permanently at the Unit or Formation level?



Yep.   I was implying that at the Formation Level, a Light Brigade possesses a pool of transport that could be attached to a Battlegroup upon deployment.   If they need LUVW's for a PSO or, like the RM, BVS10's for Iraq, they can have them attached.   Since these vehicles will not be integral in combat tactics, I figured we can use an "all singing-driver" (if not the Light Force soldier himself) because he, unlike a LAV crewman, doesn't have to learn to fight with the dismounts as a Zulu callsign.   The vehicles fulfill more of an admin function.

As for the proposal idea above, good and cohesive, but I will dispute a few things.

First off, I'm not really liking the numbers, especially relying on a huge portion of the 5,000 soldiers that the government keeps waving around.   Even if these 5,000 were likely to appear in the pipeline, they need to be spread Forces wide and not concentrated in the combat arms.   If you're going to make the proposal off of what is on hand (which is a very good way to go about starting things), then you need to focus on the numbers we roughly have, not what we are promised.

As well, you predicate the need for "lowest common denominator" Infantry Battalions (that's what I'm going to call them   ) based upon the fact that we can't afford to specialize for both fiscal reasons (no resources) and for readiness reasons (too much strain if general capability is lost).   I'm going to argue to opposite.   With our small army, we need to focus and hone our efforts to make the best out of what we got.   The "Generalist" approach to Infantry (doing everything but nothing well) isn't really what is needed in today's operations.

I'm going to argue that putting our highly trained soldiers, our "center of gravity" as some have termed it, into specialized capabilities is what we must do to ensure that we get the "most bang for our buck" with our defence dollars.   Although the following quote pertains more to general defence issues, I think that much of it applies to the notion of designing Army Forces to hang around waiting for every and all possibilities: 



> "The reality is that "Canada has never had a full range of flexible defence capabilities."...Perpetuating the idea that a balanced force defeats uncertainty simply robs Parliament of its responsibility to make choices among competing institutions and encourages planners to sing "the siren song of the status quo."
> 
> The idea behind a general-purpose force presents Canadians with other dangers for national defence besides usurping the responsibilities of governments.   It can misdirect funds to unwanted to unwanted tasks and capabilities and reinforce institutions, missions, and organizations whose purposes have passed.   A defence policy based on a general-purpose force is impossible to define in terms of capability and equipment.   It is an idea that encourages and rewards bottom-up planning and the status quo, while punishing decision and change.   Most deadly of all, general-purpose force planning acts as a slow poison to government policies of restraint by loading ever increasing demands onto the defence program in the name of the ever elusive balanced force.
> 
> The point is that Canada's uniquely secure geopolitical situation presents governments with every opportunity to choose where and when the CF will be deployed and what missions they will accept.   Furthermore, these choices can be made largely before any crisis occurs.   Therefore, deciding what missions the CF will accept and what military capabilities the Canadian people should pay for is the essence of Canadian defence policy.   Any government accepts unconditionally recommendations for a so-called general-purpose force is allowing itself to be pre-empted by military opinion often founded on the special interest of the services."
> 
> Douglas Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces - pp 270-271



There are many capabilities that we can't do.   Deep battle, due to our lack of any weapons systems (MLRS, Attack Hel, etc), is chasing a pipe-dream; we are a Close Battle Army.   Heavy Forces have been off the menu for longer then we'd care to admit - no point keeping Mech Infantry around for Combat Team attacks if the other three parts of the Combat Team are gone.   By leaving some skimpy mechanized force (going from 9 mech units to 3 beefy ones) and putting all our guys on their boots waiting for anything that comes around (most likely some boring PSO) will only lead to capability loss and lack of any sense of mission.   It will just give our Government the ability to say "gee, we don't have that capability - sorry" the next time the flag goes up.   

If we focus our maneuver forces (and behind them, our support) onto capabilities, then we can assuredly say that "yes, we can do this and we can do it well".   As the quote states, we are blessed in Canada with the ability to pick and choose where to commit our resources.   We may as well pick and choose spots where we can best tailor our Forces to provide maximum impact.   Sure, this may be niche rolling, but as Bland points out, we simply can't afford to chase the "All singing, all dancing" force structure like the US for a variety of reaons.   Your proposal is one way to get around this this - it is one I don't really like.   Turn the Infantry into "general purpose" soldiers and keeping a small mechanized capability to back them up - to me this leads down the path to "Constabulary" or "Rental Army".   The other is to niche - not stupidly by chasing "missions" like "Peacekeeping", but niche our limited forces into capabilities that will be in demand across the spectrum of conflict.

I'm going to go out on a lark here and promulgate my ideas on what I can see being done to maximize the resources we have on the ground right now (with a wee bit of fudging) and how we can dedicate these forces to capabilities that will ensure that they have a place "alongside the best, against the best".

*Light Forces:*   These are in demand.   The 3PPCLI Battlegroup was an excellent "Light Force" addition to TF Rakkasan and performed extremely well in fighting a non-contiguous battle against Al Qaeda/Taliban forces in multiple operations.   As well, Light Forces are able to "pony up" with their own organic transport to conduct PSO's, as was witnessed with the first two rotations to OP ATHENA by 3 RCR and 3 VANDOO.   Clearly, with "4th Generation Warfare" on the rise, highly trained, physically fit and lethal Light Forces will be the "soup de jour" for some time to come.   As LtCol Eyre pointed out on the other thread:



			
				eyre said:
			
		

> The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training.   Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.



This is where the Light Forces will focus.   Because they have focused on "Light Capability", figuring out what is needed is much more obvious then if we leave Infantry in the "General Purpose" doldrums (again, LtCol Eyre gives us a good overview of the immediate "needs" to achieve this capability; training, firepower, and transport.   

*Cav Force:*   These forces are also in demand.   Reading LtCol Roger Noble's article *"Australian Light-Armoured Vehicles (ASLAV) as Mounted Cavalry: Vanguard for the Hardened Army* (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/AAJ_Winter_2004.pdf) breathed new life into the concept that we've been buzzing about for a few months on these boards.   I really like how the article attacks two key myths of a LAV based Cavalry force:

1) The Myth that they are unprotected and useless.
2) The Myth that they are only useful in the Recce role.

To me, this spells out the fact that their is so much more that we can accomplish by "honing in" our mechanized capability into a "LAV CAV" force.   LtCol Noble points out that the US Marines used their LAV equipped LAR's to great success in Iraq while the Stryker Brigades managed to successfully rotate through there as well.   He points out that LAV CAV was put to work successfully by Australia in East Timor.

Clearly, LAV CAV has utility beyond Reconnaissance (or being parceled out as glorified transport for Infantry) and is in demand in missions that are cropping up around the world.   Since we have a hard time strategically transporting our stuff, the LAV makes a good mechanized platform as it is relatively light.   Like a "Light Force", a "Cav Force" is suitable for expeditionary forces projection into missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.

I would like to see the Armoured Units (which are focussing on Armoured Recce) and the Mechanized Infantry units (which have no more combat team) to form a sort of "hybrid" Cav capability - much like we've discussed on the Armoured Cav thread.   A unit would consist of a Cav squadron (something like the Aussies with 3 LAVs/4 Dismount Patrol bricks), a Recce Squadron (based around Coyote/LUVW 7 car patrols), and a Support Squadron which consists of Cav Arty (Mortars) and Cav Engineers (Assault Troops).

These two capabilities together should give Canada an Army that is "honed" into a specific niche of combat power - the Cav Forces should be capable to contribute to *"Son of Iraq"* type missions while Light Forces are demanded for *"Step-Child of Chechnya"* operations (as LtCol Eyre said, _"Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects."_).   Clearly, we won't be able to do everything with "niched forces" in either of these types of conflicts - we can't throw Cavalry into the maw of the Hammurabi Republican Guard Division and we can't expect our Light Forces to perform independent Air Assault missions (as PPCLI Guy caught me, Air Assault and Air Mobility are Apples and Oranges) - but we will be able to contribute, to "punch above our weight" on a variety of missions and conflicts.   As well, if required, both types of Force capabilities can "Gear Down" (or "Pony Up") for Bosnia/Haiti/Kabul type PSOs.   Clearly, these capabilites give us flexibility across the spectrum of conflict.

How to go about gaining these two capabilities in a manner that provides depth and sustainability?

As touched on before, 3 additional Infantry battalions would be re-rolled as "Light Infantry".   The remain 3 Mech Battalions would be merged with the 3 Armoured Battalions (with swapping of soldiers and vehicles back and forth) to give us 6 Hybrid Cavalry Battalions.   How we want to organize these formation-wise and with regards to Regimental affiliation is up in the air, but for now, until more troops and resources come down the pipeline, we can have each Brigade Group manage 2 Light Force and 2 Cave Force maneuver units.   Ideally, I would like to see extra resources dedicated to forming four Brigades (2 Light/2 Cav) with the appropriate support - this wouldn't be a huge hurdle because the Maneuver units already exist and would be better as the integral Engineer/Artillery, CS and CSS assets can also hone in on either "Light" or "Cav" doctrine, tactics, and support.

This should give us 6 Light Force maneuver units and 6 Cavalry Maneuver units.   Putting each capability in an 18 month readiness-rotation cycle, you would see:

Work Up      Readiness/Deployed                 Draw Down
2 Light                             2 Light                           2 Light
2 Cav                               2 Cav                             2 Cav
(If we were to gain more units, I would like to see a 24 month readiness cycle that gives the Army a strategic reserve to fall back on; another discussion)

This gives us four potential battlegroups in the breach - it also ensures that both capabilities we've decided to niche into (Light/Cav) have equal forces at all stages of the readiness cycle.   You can put one maneuver battalion of each capability as the "Go" unit and one as the "Ready Reserve" if something comes up.   If only a sub-unit is required from each to form a mini-battlegroup, then so be it (we still maintain two full units ready to go).   Pending that we don't deploy more then two battlegroups at a time, this should mean that in a 3 year period of two readiness cycles, a maneuver unit can expect to be deployed once.   I don't think leaving Canada for 6 months out of 36 is too much to ask in the current climate.   Granted, there will be times when we need to deploy more then 2 Battlegroups, but this Force Structure and Readiness cycle allows for it.   If the demand is straining this simple setup, then the problem is political (with a commitment-capability gap) rather then organizational.

Anyways, enough postulating from me.   These are just some ideas that have been bouncing around in my head from discussions in the last few days.   To conclude:
1)   We have to niche, its the only way to maintain relevance.   It's all about picking the right Niche (which I feel Cav/Light is)
2)   This should be fairly "doable" with the troops the Army has on hand at this current moment.
3)   This promotes light and flexible forces suitable for expeditionary abilities across the spectrum of conflict.   By focusing on both Cav and Light capabilities, we are ensuring that there is a roll to play in multiple types of conflict (from low to high intensity).

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## McG

Infanteer,
Well said.  This brings us back to the 6:6 ratio which was one of the acceptable end states that I spoke of at the begining of the thread.

How very convenient that this force structure would also mesh nicely with the new regimental system that has been proposed on this board.
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24461/post-174236.html#msg174236


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## Infanteer

Yes.  I think the Regimental structure you proposed is one very suitable way of organizing this capability split (There are a few others on my mind as well).  I would wager that most of the Army's share of the promised 5,000 spots would, aside from filling out maneuver TO&E's, be focused on CS and CSS troops to ensure that both capabilities can be sustained through the readiness cycle above - no point having fancy maneuver battalions if your signallers and cooks are burnt out.

As well, Enfield and I decided, in the effort to avoid petty regimental squabbling with regards to Force Transformation, that all Regiments and battalions of the Army will be "Rocky Mountain Rangers" - either that or "1", "2", "3"....


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## pbi

Infanteer: great work. At the beginning of all of this Cavalry/Light Inf/etc discussion, I was against the concept. Now, in particular as a result of the work that you and others have done on this site, I have swung around to being more or less a supporter. I still remain skittish about "niche" forces but I agree wholeheartedly that high quality Light Infantry (as we now envision our Canadian LIBs today-as SOC forces not just "Mech Lite") are probably just about the best kind of niche forces to have: they are likely to be useful in every type of op, and capitalize on our greatest strength: people.

Now it is time for you to graduate from Army.ca and get this idea onto the pages of the CAJ. You have done the core work already, and there are some other great thinkers here as well who can help you assure a quality product: Army.ca functions as a kind of informal "murder board" for ideas. Go ahead and get a draft together and get it in. I am pretty sure that the new editor, Maj Andrew Godefroy, would be happy to give it a run.  Good Luck!

Cheers.


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## big bad john

pbi said:
			
		

> Infanteer: great work. At the beginning of all of this Cavalry/Light Inf/etc discussion, I was against the concept. Now, in particular as a result of the work that you and others have done on this site, I have swung around to being more or less a supporter. I still remain skittish about "niche" forces but I agree wholeheartedly that high quality Light Infantry (as we now envision our Canadian LIBs today-as SOC forces not just "Mech Lite") are probably just about the best kind of niche forces to have: they are likely to be useful in every type of op, and capitalize on our greatest strength: people.
> 
> Now it is time for you to graduate from Army.ca and get this idea onto the pages of the CAJ. You have done the core work already, and there are some other great thinkers here as well who can help you assure a quality product: Army.ca functions as a kind of informal "murder board" for ideas. Go ahead and get a draft together and get it in. I am pretty sure that the new editor, Maj Andrew Godefroy, would be happy to give it a run.   Good Luck!
> 
> Cheers.



I agree Infanteer, it is time that you published!


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer and McG:

From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry   and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.

All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.   That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.

One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.

The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.

I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.   From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.   The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.

At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.   These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.

Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.   They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.   They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.

The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.   They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.   That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.   But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).

The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.   They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.

Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.   The Royal Marines are not Special.   They don't have much in the way of Special kit.   Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.   They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.   They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.   They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.   And they can mount raids. They are not Special.   They are Generalists.   Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.

However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.

They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.   This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.

So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.   Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.

The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.   It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.   It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.   

Now if you are offering me, the Canadian taxpayer , a choice between 6 Ranger Battalions and 6 Lt mechanized infantry Battalions operating as Cavalry or   6 Royal Marine Commandos and 6 Lt Mech Inf Bns operating as Cavalry then I'll take the 6 Cdo option and say fill your boots.

My own preference, as stated, would be otherwise.   9 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments.   Perhaps there is a need for additional boots in the Cavalry and manning limits don't allow the 9:3 structure to produce viable sized units.

Then maybe the answer is to transfer and additional company's worth of bodies from the Commandos to each of the Cavalry and give them an integral infantry company, in addition to their 3x48=144 Scouts/Dragoons/Dismounts/Assault troopers.

That would leave 8 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments capable of producing 9 Squadrons each of which would have a hundred or so dedicated dismounts - or a full company. 1 Commando + 1 Squadron would supply 4 coys with a lot of fire power, range and mobility as well as quick reaction capability.

So, at heart, when we are looking at this discussion, as in all others it is necessary to define terms and expectations.

I use the term Light in contrast to Heavy.   You appear to be using the term Light in a sense that it gaining popularity over on this side to define a Special Forces type of Raider force.   

If that is the case then I can understand why you wish to focus so much manpower on the Mechanized force.

Personally I think that is wrong. That the net result will be tailoring your force too narrowly to meet the needs of today.   IMHO a Generalist force will cover both much of today's needs and be in a better position to deal with the unexpected.   One of the reasons we are having this discussion today is that Canada withdrew from a Generalist approach and ended up specializing as a Mech Infantry force.   Now we find that the Mech Infantry force doesn't meet the needs of the situation and you are having to jump through hoops reinventing yourself.   And it is not just a money thing.   When the Forward Edge of the Battle Area moved away from the Gates at Lahr and Baden-Baden to everywhere else the old structure became obsolete.

The reason I keep harping on about the Royal Marines is because they are living proof that a Generalist force does not have to be a sub-standard force.    Although, in the past Conscripts have been shoved into Generalist forces and thus given the concept a bad name, the Marines prove that a Generalist force can also be an "Elite" force.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Infanteer and McG:
> 
> From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry   and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.
> 
> All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.   That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.



My main point of contention with what you proposed is based on two factors:

1)   The "General Capabilities" framework in which you expect both forces to operate in - the Infantry kick around waiting for a job that may or may not require them to "mech up" with the Cavalry (which many Infantry types have said isn't tactically sound with an IFV) while the Cavalry kicks around looking for any job - in the process designating a significant chunk of its resources to driving around Infantry (meaning sacrifice of "Cavalry" capability at the expense of a taxi tasking).

2)   The uneven capabilities mean that the Cavalry side is liable to burn out faster then the Infantry if both are required on a consistent basis.   You've attempted to address this by making 9 independent squadrons available for Infantry assignments.   Having only a squadron of Cav available for a reasonable readiness-rotation cycle doesn't do us much good if a significant mechanized capability is required (say, Kosovo).




> One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.
> 
> The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.
> 
> I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.   From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.   The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.
> 
> At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.   These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.
> 
> Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.   They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.   They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.



I cannot fathom how you've come to this outlook.   As many of the Infantry Officers and NCO's have pointed out in the Infantry forum, Light and Mech are Apples and Oranges.   As the Falklands showed, there is a difference between training and maintaining a "Bergen Soldier" and a "Mounted Soldier".   The "Bergen Soldier" fights on his own, taking support from man-portable or Joint force assets if possible, but ultimately he is responsible through tactics, fitness, and tactical ability to get on top of his objective.   The "Mounted Soldier", of which Infantry skills forms a vital part of the whole, is an all-arms battle in which a dismounted forces serve only as one platform in which firepower is delivered from.   There are different degrees in weight of both firepower and protection, but the principle is the same.   

Looking back on history, I think the last of the "Plain Infantry" went out of style with the Wehrmacht and its 75% Horse-Drawn units or with elimination of National Service/Draftee soldiers in Britain, France, America and Germany.



> The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.   They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.   That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.   But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).



No.   Strykers are not meant to fill some "Standard Middle Ground" between "Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces" - it is an interim Table of Organization and Equipment that the US Army is using as it transitions from "Legacy Era" Heavy Forces meant for high-intensity, total war between superpowers to a light and flexible expeditionary capability based around the FCS.   At least this is what I got from reading General Shinseki's mission statement with the *Interim* Brigade Combat Team.



> The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.   They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.



Again, I'll disagree - the British Army has always maintained "specializations" or "niche capabilities" (not Niche Roles).   Their Infantry would rotate through various "capability sets" such as Jungle, Mountain, Armoured Infantry (Warrior), Mechanized Infantry (Saxon), Airborne, etc, etc.   As was mentioned on a thread on these boards, the Brits are moving away from rotation to a fixing "niche specialities" amongst units in the Army due to the problems associated with skills loss in constant reroling.

So, sure the Brits would rotate a unit to a "general purpose" or "constabulary" role, especially for units rotating through North Ireland.   But with our small resource base, this is not something I want to see us "niche capabilied" with, rather I'd focus on the two tasks (Light/Cav) which a far more relevent to combat capable forces.



> Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.   The Royal Marines are not Special.   They don't have much in the way of Special kit.   Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.   They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.   They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.   They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.   And they can mount raids. They are not Special.   They are Generalists.   Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.
> 
> However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.
> 
> They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.   This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.



I will whole-heartedly disagree here. The Royal Marines are in no way "General Purpose" - they are specialized as a SOC capable, strategically deployable Light Force.   As I've stressed many times, putting a RM Commando in Warriors and expecting them to do a Combat Team attack is foolhardy - they are "Bergen troops".   They didn't do this in Iraq, it was left to Heavy Force units to fight with Challenger IIs and Warriors.

The RM is a "niche capability", all-arms unit focused on Light Amphibious Ops.   Their extremely rigorous "Commando Course" is demanding enough that, along with a Focus on Light Force capabilites (Commando 21 reflects this) and their intimate support of British Tier II and Tier I SOC units (the SAS, the SBS, and the 3 Cdo Bde Recce Troop) would qualify them as as a Tier III Special Operations Capable Unit (akin to US Army Rangers).   The latest edition of the CMJ has good overview of SOC capabilities 

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/home_e.asp

Clearly, stating that their "Generalists" is selling the RM short on what they can do and attributing to them things they can't do.



> So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.   Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.
> 
> The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.   It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.   It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.



Clearly, as the article by LtCol Wayne Eyre (which I linked to in the other Light Force thread) points out, there is a middle area where Light Force and Mech/Heavy Force capabilites can be complement eachother in the tactical or operational setting.

However, this doesn't mean that we should mix and match these two unique and seperate capabilites.   As I argued above, the RM in no way sits on some middle ground - they, like other Light Forces (such as the US Rangers in Mogadishu) can use vehicles for a administrative purposes (to move soldier, kit, weapons systems, or supplies if possible) but they in no way rely on the vehicles as a vital factor for tactical employment.



> Now if you are offering me, the Canadian taxpayer , a choice between 6 Ranger Battalions and 6 Lt mechanized infantry Battalions operating as Cavalry or   6 Royal Marine Commandos and 6 Lt Mech Inf Bns operating as Cavalry then I'll take the 6 Cdo option and say fill your boots.



1)   As I've stressed above, RM and Rangers would both be Tier III SOC units, so they're one in the same.

2)   I'm not offering "Lt Mech Inf Bns" - as I said before, Mechanized Infantry, with the loss of the tank and the combat team, really has no utility for us anymore; we can't fight the heavy battle.   I'm argueing for a hybrid Cavalry force that performs a different set of tasks and offers us a different capability set then "Mech Inf".

3) I really don't want to offer the Canadian Taxpayer a "general purpose" force that does a bit of everything but nothing well.   I believe this will only marginalize our capabilities towards "Constabulary", which is clearly undesirable to the professional soldier.   As per the Bland quote I put in above, Canada would be better served by choosing an area we can best contribute and going from there.



> My own preference, as stated, would be otherwise.   9 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments.   Perhaps there is a need for additional boots in the Cavalry and manning limits don't allow the 9:3 structure to produce viable sized units.



Again, what happens if the need arises for a significant mechanized/cavalry requirement?   This uneven allotment will just burn the Cavalry out.   As well, we will face undesirable skill loss if we cram our Infantry into LAV's for any period of time and insist that our Light Force Engineers, Artillery, and CSS get involved in Mechanized battle.



> Then maybe the answer is to transfer and additional company's worth of bodies from the Commandos to each of the Cavalry and give them an integral infantry company, in addition to their 3x48=144 Scouts/Dragoons/Dismounts/Assault troopers.
> 
> That would leave 8 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments capable of producing 9 Squadrons each of which would have a hundred or so dedicated dismounts - or a full company. 1 Commando + 1 Squadron would supply 4 coys with a lot of fire power, range and mobility as well as quick reaction capability.



Now we're just getting helter-skelter with regards to organization, cohesion, capability, and sense of mission.   Pulling parts from around the Army to prepare for any inevitability will just create the same problems as plug-and-play (ruining us at the unit level) and throw a wrench into a simple and easy Readiness cycle (which is one of the factors in my logic of making the proposal in this way).



> So, at heart, when we are looking at this discussion, as in all others it is necessary to define terms and expectations.
> 
> I use the term Light in contrast to Heavy.   You appear to be using the term Light in a sense that it gaining popularity over on this side to define a Special Forces type of Raider force.
> 
> If that is the case then I can understand why you wish to focus so much manpower on the Mechanized force.
> 
> Personally I think that is wrong. That the net result will be tailoring your force too narrowly to meet the needs of today.   IMHO a Generalist force will cover both much of today's needs and be in a better position to deal with the unexpected.   One of the reasons we are having this discussion today is that Canada withdrew from a Generalist approach and ended up specializing as a Mech Infantry force.   Now we find that the Mech Infantry force doesn't meet the needs of the situation and you are having to jump through hoops reinventing yourself.   And it is not just a money thing.   When the Forward Edge of the Battle Area moved away from the Gates at Lahr and Baden-Baden to everywhere else the old structure became obsolete.
> 
> The reason I keep harping on about the Royal Marines is because they are living proof that a Generalist force does not have to be a sub-standard force.     Although, in the past Conscripts have been shoved into Generalist forces and thus given the concept a bad name, the Marines prove that a Generalist force can also be an "Elite" force.



I can't for the life of me figure out where you got this "Average Infantry that does a bit of everything and holds the ground" concept from.   Perhaps it was relevent in WWII or holding the Fulda Gap as a Heavy Force, but other then that, I see no relevence of the principle to what is required today as either Light Force or Cavalry are capable of "holding ground" in today's come-as-you-are, non-contiguous battlefield.   For example:

UNPROFOR: Cav Forces would have been very suited to this, probably more so then our guys who cruised around in dinky M-113's.   A more flexible and heavily armed Cavalry unit (as I've sketched out earlier) could project much greater combat power in the area.

IFOR/SFOR: Being a PSO, any force would have really did the trick - boots on the ground is the key.   My company cruised around in LPV's while the other company used the LAV III (with no dismounts) to patrol.   This is a contingency (like other PSO's) that either capability I wish to see us "niche" towards could fulfill.

Kosovo:   Clearly, a Cavalry capability could have fit in well here.   Perhaps, it could have been augmented with airmobile Light Force capability to allow for rapid shifting in a very rugged AO.

Op Apollo:   No denying that Air-Assaults into the Pashtun mountains to battle it out with insurgents and terrorists required a Light Force "Bergan Soldiers".   The other task of securing the base at Khandahar was ably aided by "ponyed up" Light Force soldiers in Humvees and an attached Recce Squadron.

Op Athena:   Like UNPROFOR, this is a dangerous PSO that requires boots on the ground, like UNPROFOR it can, and has been, sustained by both capabilites.   PSO is a mission, not a capability.

If we wished to dedicate forces to the Invasion of Iraq, a Cavalry Force as presented here would be extremely useful - it could have been added to the USMC as an additional LAR battalion or it could have served with a US Army or British Formation in the LAR function.   A light force added to this could have grouped up with US forces that dropped into Northern Iraq and linked up with the Kurds.

If we are going to move out of the ISAF PSO mission to either a PRT or with OEF in Khanadar, the Light Forces would be suited to the dispersed and non-contiguous tasks that would be required.   Again, to quote Mr Eyre (who did wonders in reinforcing my outlook), _"High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges.   Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â â€œ counter-insurgency â â€œ a task that has historically fallen to light forces."_

You are right, the definition of capability is important.   Basically, we can look at capability in terms of what it can accomplish in a View 1 Conflict (War).   Operations in View 2 Conflicts (OOTW) really don't need any force kicking around for it - all that is required is well-trained soldiers which in Canada is one of the things we've been lucky to retain.   So, we should hone in on View 1 capabilites knowing that we can "gear down" if required, but still be ready to enter a warfightin situation.   There are a wide variety of capabilities that could be required in a View 1 conflict - for example:

- Air Assault
- Mountain Ops (Alpinejager - sorry, had to find a spot for the Germans somewhere   )
- Jungle Ops
- Armoured Heavy Battle
- Stand-Off Deep Battle
- Mechanized/Cavalry Combined Arms
- Counter-Insurgency
- Littoral Warfare
- Direct Action/Raiding/Combat Patrolling

You get the point.   Since we can't, like the Americans or the British, hope to give each unit its own specialization, we must pick a few of these and work on them.   Perhaps my term of "Niche Capabilities" is a bit misleading - when I look over these and look on my proposal, we will in essence be retaining the "spirit" of the generalist approach that Canada has always maintained as our Light Forces and our Cav Forces will still have to focus on a variety of roles and tasks in their respective fields as they cannot afford to specify tasks like "Airborne" or "Mountain" and maintain reasonable readiness and sustainability.   So yes, the Light Soldier will still be a bit of a generalist * in the spectrum of Light Force tasks*, but he will in no ways be a pure "Raider" as you're assuming.   For example, the ideal requirements of an all-arms Light Force were layed out earlier:

_every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must._

Likewise, our Cavalry will specialize in winning the ISTAR battle, mounted patrolling, gunnery, heavy weapons, screening and flanking larger formations, DFS to Light Forces in a multi-capability envioronment, rapid reaction, and scout infiltration.

Capabilities cannot be "general purpose" and decided from the ground up.   Especially when restricted by resources, we must look down from the top and decide where we can best employ our forces in View 1 type conflicts (anything will do for View 2 policing).   I've claimed that the two most likely forms of View 1 conflicts that we should prepare for are *"Son of Iraq"* and *"Step-Child of Chechnya"*.   The Cavalry capability fits comfortably in the first one and the Bergan-carrying Light capability fits nicely in the second.   Both of these Force Capabilites suit Canada's needs as they are Light, Flexible, well suited to the tasks they will adopt, tactically and strategically mobile and expeditionary in nature.   

Sure, there is much that we will be unable to do on our own (Air Assault, Littoral Warfare, Deep Battle, Armoured Heavy Battle), but within the coalition environment that we tend to gravitate towards, I'm sure we'll find a spot for our "niched capabilities".

Whew, that was alot.   I guess I really want to underline the fact that finding "Niche Capability" for our combined arms teams, as opposed to trying to whip up a "one size, fits all" lowest common denominator force, is the way to go.   There is alot of opposition to the idea of "Niche Roling", whether it be towards "Peacekeeping" or "Special Operations - and opposing this can be a very valid complaint.   However, it is clear that we must adopt some form of specialization if we want to remain relevent in the highly demanding environment of non-contiguous, come-as-you-are wars that demands the services of a fully professional force.   The spectrum of capabilites, missions, and requirements in View I conflicts is vast and Canada can simply not afford to cover all the bases.   We can try, meaning mediocrity in the end (like trying to do a Combat Team attack with a Light, wheeled vehicle and no tanks) but I feel we'll be better off to pick a few and put our eggs in those more effective baskets.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill,
It seems we are all taking the approach that our forces be created in order to achieve a defined spectrum of tasks through the full spectrum of conflict.  We need to specialise, but not over specialise.

As Infanteer stated, the infantry are our centre of gravity.   That is, they are the element that gives us the flexibility to perform in a broader spectrum of roles under a braoder spectrum of conditions.   I see your proposed Cavalry force as being the overly specialised entity that you've suggested mech infantry is.   Its narrow scope of operation has even been identified in the Armd Cav thread (security to a higher formation in war fighting, and security or reaction force in stability and peace support operations).   However, by including mechanized infantry sub-unit(s) (with a structure optimized to that role), you greatly increase the flexibility of the cavalry organization to take on broader tasks.   These dual-arms mechanized units would be permanent constructs that train together, establish strong unit cohesion and interoperability below the sub-unit level.

Another thing that you are not doing is looking beyond the pointy end at the tails of each organization.   Support elements designed to meet the needs of light forces will not meet the needs of mech forces.   Conversely, the support elements of mech forces cannot meet the needs of light forces deployed in a light role.   In many of these roles it it not simply a matter of "today you are light, and now tomorrow you will be mech."   You've asked about the light force drivers being qualified on the spectrum of potential vehicles.   Consider the conundrum of the dual force sappers that must maintain currency on an incredible amount of kit in one roll alone.   You'll be asking gunners to maintain readiness on both light and medium systems at the same time.   Maintainers need to be current on both medium weight armoured vehicles and light air deployable vehicles.   The service battalions will have to be proficient in logistical operations of both the medium force and an air inserted force which cannot be reached by trucks integral to the force.   The other option is that you maintain parallel CSS systems in Canada with one optimised to support the infantry in a light role and the other optimised to support the infantry when in a medium role.


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## Kirkhill

All right then.   It is time to get up off the canvas here....




> Quote from: Kirkhill on Today at 09:06:16
> 
> 
> 
> Infanteer and McG:
> 
> From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry   and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.
> 
> All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.   That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.
> 
> 
> 
> My main point of contention with what you proposed is based on two factors:
> 
> 1)   The "General Capabilities" framework in which you expect both forces to operate in - the Infantry kick around waiting for a job that may or may not require them to "mech up" with the Cavalry (which many Infantry types have said isn't tactically sound with an IFV) while the Cavalry kicks around looking for any job - in the process designating a significant chunk of its resources to driving around Infantry (meaning sacrifice of "Cavalry" capability at the expense of a taxi tasking).
> 
> 2)   The uneven capabilities mean that the Cavalry side is liable to burn out faster then the Infantry if both are required on a consistent basis.   You've attempted to address this by making 9 independent squadrons available for Infantry assignments.   Having only a squadron of Cav available for a reasonable readiness-rotation cycle doesn't do us much good if a significant mechanized capability is required (say, Kosovo).
Click to expand...


Ok.   At what point did I say anything about the Infantry and the Cavalry kicking around looking for jobs.   My basic premise is that working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet.   I also accept that close co-operation between guys on their feet and turreted vehicles requires constant practice and training.   That is precisely the reason that I AGREE with you that the Mech force needs to be distinct from the Light force.   For traditions sake I felt that the Mech Force is arguably a Dragoon Force and a Dragoon Force is a Cavalry Force and the Cavalry became the Armoured so let's back up and let the Armoured do its original job.   So we agree on that.   I think.

The next issue is numbers. You say 6 + 6. I say 9+3.   You want to take 3 regiments with 9 miscellaneous squadrons and combine them with 3 battalions with 9 companies.   I want to take 3 Regiments with 9 Squadrons and add a useable dismount force.     The Aussies say for their cavalry operations they can get away with only 4 dismounts per patrol or 48 dismounts per Squadron.   An American Armoured Infantry company gets the job done with 54 men according to Bolger in Death Ground.   If we supplied these new bodies from the New 5000 we would still only be using up some 450 of those bodies.   At the end of the day I want to have created 9 Independent Squadrons of if you like 9 Permanent Combat Teams?   How many combat teams do you get out of combining 9 companies and 9 "tank" squadrons? 9 Isn't it?

So after all our hemming and hawing I want 9 combat teams and you want 9 combat teams.   Or do you want 18 mech infantry companies?   

As to the availability of the Cavalry, I accept that at some point in the greater scheme of things we are going to run out of bodies.   No matter how you organize this that day will come.   And with the small number of bodies available it will come sooner rather than later.

You say you needed the mech capability, as in Kosovo.   Correct me if I'm wrong but weren't the Paras and the Marines in Kosovo as well?   And the Paras were doing patrols on Supacats of all things.   Just because we might be out of suitable mech/cav forces, doesn't mean that we couldn't make a useful and welcome contribution with "Light" forces.







> Quote
> One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.
> 
> The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.
> 
> I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.   From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.   The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.
> 
> At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.   These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.
> 
> Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.   They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.   They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I cannot fathom how you've come to this outlook.   As many of the Infantry Officers and NCO's have pointed out in the Infantry forum, Light and Mech are Apples and Oranges.
Click to expand...



I AGREE.   See above.   



> As the Falklands showed, there is a difference between training and maintaining a "Bergen Soldier" and a "Mounted Soldier".   The "Bergen Soldier" fights on his own, taking support from man-portable or Joint force assets if possible, but ultimately he is responsible through tactics, fitness, and tactical ability to get on top of his objective.   The "Mounted Soldier", of which Infantry skills forms a vital part of the whole, is an all-arms battle in which a dismounted forces serve only as one platform in which firepower is delivered from.   There are different degrees in weight of both firepower and protection, but the principle is the same.


  

I AGREE. See above. 



> Looking back on history, I think the last of the "Plain Infantry" went out of style with the Wehrmacht and its 75% Horse-Drawn units or with elimination of National Service/Draftee soldiers in Britain, France, America and Germany.



Here I disagree.   Field Marshall Slim had it right mate.   And the proof of that is to be found in 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne and the Stryker Brigades, in the USMC MEU (SOC) and in the entire British infantry corps.   

The British Infantry Corps is built on a standardised Infantry Battalion structure
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/search.cgi?search=1&perpage=30&sort_order=1,abc,forward&marknew=1&lfield2_keyword=THE%20INFANTRY

The baseline battalion in peacetime is 620 all ranks, sufficient for Light Role tasks and for Security duties (if fully recruited).   When that unit is converted to MECHANIZED in the British sense it is issued with an armoured truck and allocated an extra 47 bodies to man them and maintain them.   These are just trucks, transport, not fighting vehicles, not LAVs.   In the terms of what BBJ was saying earlier in the thread they are what the Soviets would have called Motorized.   When they get to the far end, they get out and go to work on foot.   In the Brits case the Transport Platoon of 47 bodies is incorporated right into the battalion.

In the case of the USMC MEU the battalion is allocated a platoon of 13 Amphibious Armoured Carriers, enough to lift a company at a time, if the company isn't being transported by helicopter, landing craft, truck or Shank's Mare.

So there is precedent for having a separate facility to lift light troops, under armour so that they can keep up with an armoured force.   

When the Brits reroled as Armoured Infantry, with Warriors, then the authorised strength of the Battalion jumped from 620 All Ranks to 771.   They effectively had to add a company and a half to their structure and as you point out fighting in association with a fighting vehicle is not going to be the same as fighting with what you have on your back.   This leads to again say that I AGREE with you on the need to keep those that serve vehicles with their vehicles. And God Bless 'Em.

However the Brits have created Heavy (Armoured), Medium (Mechanized) and Light brigades.   Their Armoured Brigades are all tracked.   Their Light Brigades are the Marines, 16 Air Assault and a new one forming.   

I want to focus on the Medium or Mechanized Brigades. They comprise 1 Armoured Regiment, 1 Armoured Infantry Battalion in Warriors and 2 Mechanized Battalions or Light infantry in armoured trucks.   Their TO&E is identical to the footborne troops.   They are Light troops and with their trucks they can maintain a reasonable rate of advance with the tracks.   In fact the probably deploy faster than the tracks and have to wait for them to catch up.

This is just to demonstrate that Light Forces, may operate to advantage with Heavy Forces.   

If you were to create 9 Independent Squadrons, what is to prevent the creation of a lift element, after the fashion of the Marines Amphibious Assault platoons to give a Light Force a lift and let it keep up with the Cavalry. No turrets. No guns.   Just protected transport.

The reason that I included the 82nd, 101st and Strykers is that these too are all Light Infantry - the Stryker Brigades describe themselves as such and Gen'l Shinsecki described them as such.   At the section and platoon level they all work from the same structure.   82nd and 101st are the same up to battalion level.

Getting back to the Brits with their 620 person Infantry Battalions for light roles, I agree that working in different environments requires different skills and training - but we went through that every year practicing for Winter Exercises.   A lot different that operating in the Summer. But we didn't have to change the entire structure.






> Quote
> The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.   They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.   That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.   But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No.   Strykers are not meant to fill some "Standard Middle Ground" between "Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces" - it is an interim Table of Organization and Equipment that the US Army is using as it transitions from "Legacy Era" Heavy Forces meant for high-intensity, total war between superpowers to a light and flexible expeditionary capability based around the FCS.   At least this is what I got from reading General Shinseki's mission statement with the Interim Brigade Combat Team.
Click to expand...


I believe you are right with respect to Gen'l Shinseki's comments.   But with respect to the way that Gen'l Schoomaker is using them, the way that he is reorganizing as a more "infantry centric" force, the way that he is calling for all units to be able to put more boots on the ground, the way that he has put the entire FCS on indefinite hold, suggests that current policy is not what it was.   They need infantry.   Not necessarily Special Forces Tier 1,2, 3 or whatever.   They just need infantry and the only infantry they have is some pretty high priced help - 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault - it has cost an awful lot to train just those troops.   Gen'l Shinseki, IMHO, was trying to reverse a trend that occured with Clinton's downsizing - all of the Light Forces like the 7th ID were considered too light to fight.   And Armour was preserved.   Armour and specialist Infantry.   25th ID was probably next on the chopping block unless he could come up with a specialization for it.   He found it in the Stryker.   And preserved some pretty valuable Light Infantrymen


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## Zipper

Kirk - you go BOY! ;D

These are all great thoughts. And with my basic thought patterns, they do seem rather close together in many areas.

But once again I have a question.

All of these theory's sound great. But what is the reality of it? 

It seems to me that the Armoured Regiments are going recce (Coyote/Gwagon) and DFS (MGS/TUA/ADATS). The infantry seems to me at present to be trying to stay mechanized (LAV III). And God knows what the Arty boys are doing except teaching the Armoured kids to play with their toys. So how could your ideas of Cavalry work with the MGS included? With the TUA and ADATS? Would you hand them to the Arty to use as DFS?

As well. The idea of us going to light forces and thus having 3 battalions as air droppable (is that a word?) again seems like it flys in the face of the government. Wouldn't you be just recreating the Airborne regiment again? And is going to fly in Ottawa.

So I ask. What are the chances that any of these ideas will make it beyond journal status? Because I like these concepts much more then the way we seem to be headed. They make more sense and they make us into a faster, more deadly force in my opinion.


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## Kirkhill

> Quote
> The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.   They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Again, I'll disagree - the British Army has always maintained "specializations" or "niche capabilities" (not Niche Roles).   Their Infantry would rotate through various "capability sets" such as Jungle, Mountain, Armoured Infantry (Warrior), Mechanized Infantry (Saxon), Airborne, etc, etc.   As was mentioned on a thread on these boards, the Brits are moving away from rotation to a fixing "niche specialities" amongst units in the Army due to the problems associated with skills loss in constant reroling.
Click to expand...


So we agree we disagree.   

Look, my read of the Brits, with their new structure, means that they will have 7 Warrior Battalions, 2 Parachute Infantry Battalions and maybe 1 or 2 Air Assault Battalions.   They might even dedicate some specialized medium battalions (6-9).   That means 7 armoured infantry, 9-13 Light Infantry with a particular transport specialization and 12 to 16 other Light Infantry battalions.   Any and all of those units will no doubt be involved in training for operations in different environments.   But the base-line unit is still the Light Infantry unit for all but the Armoured Infantry.



> So, sure the Brits would rotate a unit to a "general purpose" or "constabulary" role, especially for units rotating through North Ireland.   But with our small resource base, this is not something I want to see us "niche capabilied" with, rather I'd focus on the two tasks (Light/Cav) which a far more relevent to combat capable forces.



But stability ops are precisely the ops that your combat capable forces are going to be deployed on.   That means that like a USMC MEU (Special Operations Capable), fighting the proverbial 3-Block war, you are going to be required to work across the entire spectrum of conflict.
MEU Missions (per Clancy: Marine)

Assaults - amphibious,   Raids (8 different kinds), Covert Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Specialized Demolitions, Fire Support Coordination, Guiding other units in, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, Security Operations (crowd control), Show of force, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Relief Operations, Civil Support and Training.... and I may have missed a few.   This Special Operations Capable force has such a wide range of Special Capabilities that it is Generally useful, regardless of the situation.   These are concurrent capabilities of a USMC Light Infantry Battle Group (which gets around by whatever means are available - helos, trucks or armoured tracks.   The skills are not lost, they are constantly practiced and confirmed prior to being designated SOC and allowed to deploy.




> Quote
> Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.   The Royal Marines are not Special.   They don't have much in the way of Special kit.   Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.   They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.   They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.   They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.   And they can mount raids. They are not Special.   They are Generalists.   Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.
> 
> However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.
> 
> They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.   This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I will whole-heartedly disagree here. The Royal Marines are in no way "General Purpose" - they are specialized as a SOC capable, strategically deployable Light Force.   As I've stressed many times, putting a RM Commando in Warriors and expecting them to do a Combat Team attack is foolhardy - they are "Bergen troops".   They didn't do this in Iraq, it was left to Heavy Force units to fight with Challenger IIs and Warriors.
Click to expand...


See the argument above relative to the USMC MEU SOC.   Specialized skills that cover the entire range of operations that overlap with each other makes the RM and the USMC GENERALLY useful.   It is precisely because they can do so many things so bloody well that they are so valuable to their governments and their allies.




> The RM is a "niche capability", all-arms unit focused on Light Amphibious Ops.   Their extremely rigorous "Commando Course" is demanding enough that, along with a Focus on Light Force capabilites (Commando 21 reflects this) and their intimate support of British Tier II and Tier I SOC units (the SAS, the SBS, and the 3 Cdo Bde Recce Troop) would qualify them as as a Tier III Special Operations Capable Unit (akin to US Army Rangers).



They are NOT a "niche capability".   Mention any operation in any environment that the Brits have been in since World War 2 and the Marines have been in it. Falklands, Malaya, Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Iraq.   Every job that any British Army infantry unit has done the Marines have done - including keeping the strife to a minimum in places like the Bogside by patrolling the streets.

You can't say that for the US Army Rangers.   THEY have their niche, and they stick to it.

The Marines are Generalists, and as I said if not the best then definitely among the best.   I will admit that they do indeed have a niche capability, and that capability defines them. It does not, however, restrict them.
   


> The latest edition of the CMJ has good overview of SOC capabilities
> 
> http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/home_e.asp
> 
> Clearly, stating that their "Generalists" is selling the RM short on what they can do and attributing to them things they can't do.



I do not sell them short.   Nor do I expect them to launch an armoured assault - I would expect them to cooperate with armoured forces, as they just did in Basra to clear out the town.




> Quote
> So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.   Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.
> 
> The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.   It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.   It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clearly, as the article by LtCol Wayne Eyre (which I linked to in the other Light Force thread) points out, there is a middle area where Light Force and Mech/Heavy Force capabilites can be complement eachother in the tactical or operational setting.
Click to expand...


We all agree.



> However, this doesn't mean that we should mix and match these two unique and seperate capabilites.



Maybe not mix and match, but having complementary capabilities that nest with each other in the middle zone will increase the combat power available over a larger range of applications. 



> As I argued above, the RM in no way sits on some middle ground - they, like other Light Forces (such as the US Rangers in Mogadishu)



They are not like US Rangers at all, as argued above. 



> can use vehicles for a administrative purposes (to move soldier, kit, weapons systems, or supplies if possible) but they in no way rely on the vehicles as a vital factor for tactical employment.


 Precisely

The RM may not sit on the middle ground but they cover the field.   And that is the true indication of their excellence. Not that they are capable of filling a niche role, but that as a Light conventional Force they can excel at so many tasks and still be specialists in their primary niche capability.

It is relatively easy to train an individual to perform a single task, you can even train some people to handle a number of tasks, but to excel widely, that is a gift.

I believe that the CF in general and the infantry in particular is capable of excelling widely.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Ok. At what point did I say anything about the Infantry and the Cavalry kicking around looking for jobs. My basic premise is that working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet. I also accept that close co-operation between guys on their feet and turreted vehicles requires constant practice and training. That is precisely the reason that I AGREE with you that the Mech force needs to be distinct from the Light force. For traditions sake I felt that the Mech Force is arguably a Dragoon Force and a Dragoon Force is a Cavalry Force and the Cavalry became the Armoured so let's back up and let the Armoured do its original job. So we agree on that. I think.


So, you've identified that "working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet" and based on that argument you have removed the infantry from the crew and replaced them with cavalry crewmen.   Then based on nostalgia, you replace the infantry in the back with crewmen as well and produce a nice new little empire for the armd corps.   Have I followed correctly?  Doesn't putting crewmen in the back run counter to your argument for putting crewmen in the turret?


----------



## big bad john

You all knew that I would jump in here didn't you!

First off, the RM is classified as a Special Operations Unit officially.   That is our primary task.   We have a number of specialized SO units within the RM, the SBS, Assult Squadrons, ect..   Our secondary task is as Light Infantry.   We are primarily tasked as LI in Iraq and Afghanistan, though there is the occasional SO tasking.   The SBS is tasked only as a SO asset.   

Now as examples of the LI role, look at the "Great Yomp" 45 Cdo made across East Falkland.   As an example of SO that is public knowledge, the support and training of the Kurds in Iraq.

I am not being very clear or coherent as it is late and I just sat through 4 hours of wedding planning.   They think the detainees in Gitmo have it rough, I never want to see anything to do with Bridesmaids dresses again.   I will review this once more and write something clear and detailed in the morning.

Kirkhill;

Maybe it is because of the hour, but you lost me halfway through your last post.   It was not clear to me when you were quoting or "speaking".


----------



## Infanteer

I see we agree on alot of basic principles here, so were off in the right direction.

A few points before carrying on:

1)   The numbers game is really irrelevant, as long as we both agree on capabilities (which we seem to).   Work with your numbers and make a proposal, I'll work with mine, and we'll let the court of popular opinion decide.   

2)





			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Here I disagree.   Field Marshall Slim had it right mate.   And the proof of that is to be found in 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne and the Stryker Brigades, in the USMC MEU (SOC) and in the entire British infantry corps.




82nd is not "normal infantry" - they are tasked as Airborne and are all Jumpers.
101st is not "normal infantry" - they are all Air Assault Qualified
Stryker Brigades are not "normal" infantry - that are well-trained, mechanized, combined arms team.
(I know you know all this, but I am doing it to prove a point)

What I gather (and correct me if I'm wrong) is that you are proposing to maximize the number of Infantry Battalions available for any task; as you said, some can fall out of planes, some can walk or drive a jeep, and the Armoured Corps can pick some up if need be.   By doing so we can ensure that the maximum amount of Forces are prepared for whatever task comes up.

I've disagreed with this "rotating" or "general purposing" - the Brits are moving away from it and the Americans haven't done it for decades (their Forces are focused on capability - airborne, air assault, armoured, cav, etc).   We, unlike the Brits and the Americans, cannot afford to cover all the bases - so we focus on those that we can make the biggest impact on.   I had hoped that the quote from Bland made it apparent that dedicating a small Force to such a wide array of tasks across the spectrum of View 1 Conflicts was an endless and unsatisfactory approach.

We focus in on "Light Force" and "LAV CAV" capabilities (which are both suitable for a variety of different roles and tasks)   In my limited time in the Army, I've worked with British, Dutch, and Americans (NG) in both Training and on Operations and one thing I know we have as our "center of gravity" is a very highly trained soldier.   I am confident that we can turn out the highly trained Light Soldier (and his Cav counterpart) as LtCol Eyre described earlier.

The main intention of this "focusing" is that we'll turn out two very different doctrines, tactics, techniques, skill sets, Tables of Organization and Equipment, etc, etc.   Light Force doctrine cannot be built with the intention of making sure sections can fit into carriers for tactical battle - just as Cavalry doctrine cannot be built around being a transport organization (its a fighting organization).   As well, McG has pointed out that we can't expect our support assets to jump between capabilities.   Of course, interoperability will be required for certain missions (the Aussie article has good examples of the ASLAV Cav working with the SASR and the Commando Regt) - but each Force has its own "game" to worry about.

This is a fundamental principle in designing my principal (I've certainly expounded on it enough here) and the fact that a variety of people here from across the spectrum of rank and experience seem to support it to some degree is encouraging me to stick to my guns and further develop the idea.

For now, I guess we can agree to disagree on this matter and continue on.   There is no point in turning this thread into a "Spin Cycle" of what Infantry do.   ;D

Since we DO agree on the fact that Infantry and Cavalry are two different skill sets, perhaps we should move this thread along into identifying the differences that eachside will have to focus on and what the limitations and applicability of these differences means for Force Employment

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## Kirkhill

Not crewmen McG - Cavalrymen. Cavalrymen that ride in vehicles that other Cavalrymen crew and that fight alongside each other daily.   Isn't that what you said you wanted, intimate relations between the Mounted and the Dismounted?

All I have done is handed the entire task over to the blackhats. You Sappers will then have to organize yourselves to support 3 infantry battalions and a cavalry regiment and put your mobility gear into the cavalry support squadron.

And its not "nostalgia".   Its trying to find a path through this thicket of brambles hung with different coloured berets and badges.   It may be a blackhat empire but is that what this is really all about? Protecting Rice Bowls as somebody put it?   Or making sure that everybody gets a shot at the next operation?

Because if it is then gawdelp the lot of you.   I am sure there is enough to go around to keep everybody happy.

Big Bad John, Congratulations and Condolences.   I will try to go back and clean up the submission.

Night.


----------



## Infanteer

Ok. This is getting silly.

First off, thanks BBJ for proving me right with regards to the RM.   They, like the Rangers, are a SOC unit.   Just because the British Government chooses to use them a bit more liberally then the US doesn't change their role and their organization.

Other then that, I think we're starting to ruin this thread with gargantuan spin cycle posts, so I'm not going to keep on arguing on these matters.   What I will do is follow the advice of PBI and BBJ and form my rantings into a cohesive proposal.

The court of public opinion can then be the judge and move the thread along.

Infanteer


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Not crewmen McG - Cavalrymen. Cavalrymen that ride in vehicles that other Cavalrymen crew and that fight alongside each other daily.   Isn't that what you said you wanted, intimate relations between the Mounted and the Dismounted?


You are playing word games.   Have you kicked the all the infantry out of the LAV and replaced all the infantry with different cavalry MOC pers (because working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet), or do you have both crewmen and infantrymen in the LAV (but refer to them as cavalrymen based on a regimental identity)?   The second option is consistent with your arguments.   The first option is not.


----------



## Kirkhill

I have armoured MOCs in the front and infantry MOCs in the back all wearing the Cavalry capbadge and a black beret.


----------



## McG

Well, with that little bit of clarity, we really are not that far appart.  There is universal agreement that we need dedicated light and medium mechanized forces (though we debate that the ratio should be 3:9, 6:6, or 9:3).  There is universal agreement that the medium force needs both infantry and cavalry (crewmen) elements (though the ratio of sub-units is not necessarily agreed on).  I also see a role for a light cavalry in the light force, but have not put much thought into its size or organization.


----------



## Zipper

My god, I think its close to concensus ;D

I think the "General purpose" is getting to mixed up with the "specialized".

Can not a specialized soldier do a general tasking? As the RM's do?

And as for the Armoured vs Infanrty in the vehicles (LAV's). I think we drop both those names for now, adapt the black beret, and call them Calavry. I would even add in the RCHA boys to make sure everyone felt included. 

As for the idea of light Cavalry in the light forces, I'm not sure I understand? Is that somthing like the British Para's and their use of light vehicles? If so, then yes. They would need that capability for sure.


----------



## big bad john

We have consensus!!!   Next problem...


Any specialist Marine also does General Duties.  Everything from LI to teaching to cutting the grass.  

For Wheeled vehicles you gentlemen had me 3 pages back.


----------



## Zipper

Heh. I have a buddy in the RM. I'm more then sure that when he gets home on leave, he'll be doing more then just the grass. ;D

Ok, I'm going to ask this again. What is the chance of all this talk being considered higher up?

I ask this because I see that the Army is not going in any of these directions. I see us forming DFS and recce regiments for the Armoured. I see the Infantry still trying to be mechanized in light vehicles without tank support. Thus generalized. I see us getting rid of our mechanized Artillery.

So if we look at what has been discussed here with 6:6 and 9:3 and such. Wouldn't our army look more like 2:1:3:6? 

2 Armd recce/1 DFS/3 light coy/6 mech inf coy doesn't seem to me to be sustainable if presented with a prolonged deployment?

Maybe I'm wrong with the above numbers. But it still doesn't seem to work. 

Considering how far I've come as far as understanding and acceptance of alot of the ideas here, I would like to hope that some of the above in this thread is possable as it presents a very bright light to the end of the tunnel.

Thanks


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> Ok, I'm going to ask this again. What is the chance of all this talk being considered higher up?


I think the best thing in favour of all these proposals (in all their differences and similarities) is that the additional soldiers are not critical to implementation.  However, more soldiers would make the proposed forces more successfull.


----------



## Zipper

MCG said:
			
		

> However, more soldiers would make the proposed forces more successfull.



Considering the fact that our forces are well below there "offical" on paper strength anyway. The addition of 5000 on top of that number would mean your actually trying to recruit say from 7000-11000 new troops. Wouldn't you say?


----------



## Infanteer

Both McG and I have been making our proposals along lines of what we have on hand, right now.

If we were to get the go ahead for extra numbers, I think that they would go to filling our the existing TO&E's and shoring up supporting assets (from Combat Engineers to CSS) to provide more depth to the "2 Task Forces Deployed Indefinitely with a surge capability for a Brigade".

Strengthing our current units would be far better for enhancing capability then raising a handful of new, and equally hollow, ones.


----------



## Zipper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Strengthing our current units would be far better for enhancing capability then raising a handful of new, and equally hollow, ones.



Agreed. Cannot wait to see your papers.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So, as I was suggesting to McG, in a Cavalry Regiment you would have graduates of the Infantry School and the Armoured School combined into a Regiment independent of either school. Likewise the Regiment would incorporate gunners as members of the Regiment, trained at the Artillery School. Similarly with the Engineers and Service Support.


Would Cav "Dismounts" necessarily be Infantry?   Since they are working on the Cavalry, I had something more in line with a new MOC, similar to the US 19D "Cav Scout".


----------



## McG

Is that not just effectively a mechanized infantry MOC?
As long as our light forces are not grouped in the same regiment, I would not recommend splitting the infantry MOC into a light MOC and a mech MOC.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> Is that not just effectively a mechanized infantry MOC?



The American Army sees them as two different creatures (One is Infantry and one is Cavalry):



> Cavalry Scout (19D)
> 
> The Cavalry Scout is the commander's eyes and ears on the battlefield. When information about the enemy is needed, they call on the Scouts. They are responsible for reconnaissance and you will learn about various weapons to include explosives and mines. Cavalry Scouts engage the enemy with anti-armor weapons and scout vehicles in the field, track and report enemy movement and activities, and will direct the employment of various weapon systems onto the enemy.
> 
> Here are a few of the duties of a Cavalry Scout:
> 
> - Secure and prepare ammunition on scout vehicles
> - Load, clear and fire individual and crew-served weapons
> - Perform navigation during combat
> - Serve as member of observation and listening posts
> - Gather and report information on terrain, weather and enemy disposition and equipment
> - Collect data to classify routes, tunnels and bridges
> - Employ principles of concealment and camouflage



They used to have a specific 11M MOS code for Mech Inf, but now they are all 11B Infantry - however, the distinction remains the same:



> Infantryman (11B)
> 
> The infantry is the main land combat force and backbone of the Army. It's equally important in peacetime and in combat. The Infantryman's role is to be ready to defend our country in peacetime and to capture, destroy and repel enemy ground forces during combat.
> 
> The following are some duties expected of Infantrymen:
> 
> - Perform as a member of a fire team during drills and live combat
> - Perform hand-to-hand combat
> - Aid in the mobilization of vehicles, troops and weaponry
> - Assist in reconnaissance missions
> - Operate two-way radios and signal equipment
> - Process prisoners of war and captured documents
> - Learn to use, maintain and store various combat weaponry (rifles, machine guns, anti-tank mines, etc.)



From what I can discern, the Australian ASLAV Cavalry do it the same way as well:



> Crewman Australian Light Armoured Vehicle
> (ECN063)
> Army
> 
> Job Description
> The Crewman Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) is employed in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) which provides armoured mobility and firepower on the battlefield. It is equipped with a range of tracked and wheeled armoured fighting vehicles, which provide mobility, communications, endurance and combat power.
> 
> There are currently three types of Armoured Corps unit:
> 
> The Tank Regiment operates the Leopard main battle tank. The Regiment's manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. Its main role is to provide close combat protection.
> 
> The Cavalry Regiments operate the ASLAV and M113A1 family of vehicles. A Cavalry unit's manning and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks ranging from medium reconnaissance and surveillance through to providing security and conducting offensive, defensive or delaying actions.
> 
> Armoured personnel carrier units provide armoured mobility and protection for infantry soldiers and are equipped with M113A1 tracked armoured personnel carriers.
> 
> The Crewman ASLAV is a soldier who drives and helps to maintain the ASLAV in tactical situations and operates the communications equipment in the vehicle.
> 
> Employment Training
> Crewman ASLAV Course: 56 days (Full-time Entry)
> 
> After completing military (recruit) training, you will undertake a 56 day Crewman ASLAV course which will consist of Corps Indoctrination, Communications phase followed by Driving and Servicing at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria.
> 
> Course Duration - Reserve (Part-time Entry)
> 
> There are three options available for the completion of training:
> 
> 1. 56 days continuous (as per Full-time Entry) at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria;
> 2. Complete one or more modules of training within the 56 day continuous course at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria, and the remainder conducted continuous/non-continuous (as per local training program), undertaken regionally; or
> 3. All training conducted as per local training program, all undertaken regionally.
> 
> *After a period of service as a driver in a Cavalry Regiment you will be eligible to be trained as an ASLAV Crewman Specialist Gunner or Crewman Specialist Dismounted / Crewman Specialist Surveillance Operator.*



Now, these represent two approaches to training "Cavalry Dismounts".   The Americans grant them a specific MOS Code as part of the 19-series, allowing Cavalry Drivers to focus on vehicles.   The Aussies have trained "Cavalry Soldiers" who should be able to do all aspects of the Cav trade.   I am willing to bet that the Aussie position is the better and more viable route to take, especially in our position.

I was figuring that since we, in a proposal, are separating Force Capabilities into "Light Force" and "Cav Force", we may as well let the "Cav School" focus on training Cavalry tactics and doctrine and letting the "Infantry School" (of which Light Force is based around) focus on light tasks - this will allow the "Cav" officer to be the phased into the "Maneuver NCO" that we've discussed on these threads, while the Infantry Officer can forego Phase IV and focus on Light Force leadership capabilities.   Trades that support these two maneuver functions, whether they be Combat Arms (Engineer, Arty), CS, or CSS will get a "Regimental Indoc Course" upon being posted to their "Regimental Formations, which will focus them on the specific "Light" or "Cav" environment that they will operate under.

If the Army were to readopt tracked vehicles and tanks and we were to move back to "Combat Team" attacks and Heavy Battle capability, then I could see diversifying the Infantry to fill out "Mech Infantry" tasks - until then, I see maintaining the idea of "Mech Inf" as superfluous for our Army right now - a Cav function is much more appropriate.

Infanteer


----------



## Infanteer

Disclaimer:   I realize the American 19D doesn't list the following roles that Mech Infantry perform:

- Perform as a member of a fire team during drills and live combat 
- Perform hand-to-hand combat 

Under my "Every soldier a Rifleman First" Principle, this is a task that is in the job descriptions of every soldier, regardless of trade; it should be something that every soldier is taught on Basic, refreshed yearly in "Soldier First" exercises, and maintained by a CS/CSS "Force Protection NCO" which Matt Fisher once proposed (I'll try to find it and post it).

Naturally, the maneuver arms of the Army, the Cav and Light force units, will focus on these skills and be more trained and proficient with regards to tactics, techniques, drills, etc, etc.


----------



## McG

So, you envision that the medium forces would not have the ability meet the enemy in a dismounted fight?  I know Mark C will confirm for me, if you get mounted forces caught in close contact with a dismounted enemy, that mounted force will be killled if it does not have a dismounted force to protec it.

Looking at the Canadian infantryman description, the only task that I could see removed from what a mounted force needs in its dismounted soldier is "participate in airborne operations."


> Infantry Soldiers are responsible for closing with and destroying the enemy.   Infantry Soldiers have the following primary duties:
> 
> -     Expertly operate and maintain a wide range of personal and section-level weapons, including rifle (with and without bayonet), hand-grenades, light, medium and heavy machine-guns; and anti-tank weapons;
> -     Use sophisticated equipment for field communications, navigation and night-vision surveillance;
> -     Inspect and maintain weapon systems, vehicles and equipment (including clothing, survival gear and personal defensive equipment);
> -     Participate in airborne operations;
> -     Operate with support elements such as fighter aircraft, tactical helicopters (troop-carrying and reconnaissance) and artillery;
> -     Engage in unarmed combat;
> -     Employ fieldcraft and battle procedures including camouflage and concealment, assault, defence, and escapeand- evasion tactics;
> -     Patrolling operations; and
> -     Infantry section and platoon tactics, including offensive, defensive and transitional operations.


----------



## Kirkhill

A question:

What is the current effective all-up strength of the three Brigades?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Great discussion!

Given roughly the same resources as we have today I would like to see an Army consisting of six Cavalry units and six Light units.  The army would have one of each in "high readiness" or deployed at all times with the rest in rotation.  Brigades would be primarily administrative groupings with perhaps one deployable formation HQ in the Army (perhaps based on the JSR in Kingston).

The Cavalry units would be mounted and would share an MOC that includes vehicle skills and dismounted skills.  It would have similarities with both the current Armoured and Infantry MOCs.  Cav soldiers would start out as "dismounted scouts" with close combat training.  The Light units would be similar to USMC or RM infantry battalions.  Both would have associated supporting arms.

The Regiments they could be applied to this system although this is where the problems start.  The "sticky wicket" would be the three additional Cavalry units and three less "Infantry Battalions."  The 3rd Battatlions of each infantry regiment could be rolled into Cavalry, perhaps even keeping their beret colours and cap badges.  Alternatively a fourth Cavalry Regiment could be formed with two units, giving the Army six Regiments with two units each.

The big problem with my proposal is the whole cap badge issue.  I'm sure it would be seen as a "land grab."  Perhaps we water it down and have three "LAV" battalions in the Army that have associated Armoured regiments that together form Cavalry Task Forces.  The vehicle crews would all be "crewmen" and any dismounts would be infantry.  Three existing LAV battalions would convert to light forces.  I think that this option is the most feasible and the easiest to implement.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> So, you envision that the medium forces would not have the ability meet the enemy in a dismounted fight?   I know Mark C will confirm for me, if you get mounted forces caught in close contact with a dismounted enemy, that mounted force will be killed if it does not have a dismounted force to protect it.



Of course not!

As I said in my disclaimer, I think that, staying consistent with the "Every Soldier a Rifleman First" mentality, all Army soldiers in general need to develop a better understanding for small-unit tactics.   Most won't be SME's, but they should be able to maintain personal weapons and perform small unit fire-and-movement.   Cavalry Forces getting tagged will be no different in requirement then Engineers getting bumped on a task, Truckers getting ambushed, or a rear-area attack on an Artillery position, a headquarters, or a UMS - we all need to know how to fight.   Like the Royal Marines, I think there should be an "Army Basic Course" that puts all soldiers, regardless of trade, up to Platoon Live Fire.

However, that is a bit of a shift, for now, the two maneuver branches can focus in on dismounted, small unit tactics following their SQ when they attend a "Infantry" course or a "Cavalry" course.

Now, the main reason I'm arguing that we merge Mech Infantry and Armoured into a Cav trade to supply soldiers for Cav positions is that we do not, in reality, need either.   We don't need Armour and Mech Infantry designations because we won't be doing Combat Team attacks or breaches into the teeth of enemy defences.   As 2Bravo said in his intro to his Cavalry concept:



			
				2Bravo said:
			
		

> I believe that a force equipped solely with LAVs, Coyotes, LAV TOW and even the MMEV (ADATS) and MGS cannot try to function as a normal "heavy" mechanized battlegroup.   It cannot manoeuvre in the face of the enemy and cannot conduct breaches or mounted assaults against prepared defences without sustaining heavy casualties.   US and UK forces can take hits from enemy anti-tank fire with a much more reduced chance of fatalities than a force with only LAVs.   With the tank gone we must adapt and find a role that we can do with our mounted forces.



I don't think that the Cavalry Force needs to bring across the Mechanized Infantry wholesale into its TO&E - it may not suit the new doctrine we are attempting to create.   Just because the Cav force may do some dismounted fighting doesn't mean that these guys have to come from the Infantry - the Armoured Corps seem quite capable of providing itself with Assault Troopers.   It seems like stating that "Any dismounted fighting shall be done by the Infantry MOC" is akin to the turf wars that say "DFS assets should go to the Artillery".   Mechanized Infantry organizations seem to be suited for the Combat Team - which we don't do anymore, so I'm not sure we need to maintain the capability.

Rather, I envision a entire new organization for the "Dismount/Scout" side of the Cavalry.   Right now, I really like the Aussie organization of "Brick" or "Patrol" of 2 DFS LAV's (loaded with stores and weapons) and 1 Command LAV with a 4 man dismount team in the back.   These dismounts use the LAV's as "Armouries" taking from them a Javelin, a 60mm mortar, a C-6, or their rifles to get out to do dismounted scout duties.   They got some serious horsepower behind them with a few 25mm chain-guns.   The Aussies have 4 of these Cav "Patrols" in a Troop and three Troops in a Squadron.   Combine 1 or 2 of these "Scout Squadrons" with our fancy new Coyote-based (add LUVW) "Recce Squadron" and spice it up with Arty and Sappers, and I think you have quite a unique and flexible Cavalry Organization.

My hope with a fusion towards a Cavalry MOC which works both with the vehicles and dismounts (somewhat like our current Mech Inf) is to make a seamless career structure.   The Cav Officers take a "Cavalry" Phase III and IV which allow them to master both mounted and dismounted tactics - they become like the "Maneuver Officer" MOC we talked about.   The Cav NCM can work in both tasks (perhaps with additional skills train QL4's for either role) - as 2Bravo says *"The Cavalry units would be mounted and would share an MOC that includes vehicle skills and dismounted skills.   It would have similarities with both the current Armoured and Infantry MOCs.   Cav soldiers would start out as "dismounted scouts" with close combat training"*.   I think if we muddied the waters with a Armour-derived "Cavalry" MOC and a bastardized "Mech Infantry" trade in the Cavalry units, it may confuse rank progression, responsibilities, career patterns, etc, etc (Who commands a Cav unit - Infantry or Armoured Cav?   A split MOC organization may leave only half the accession opportunities, with stagnation as a outcome).   A single, well-trained trade would help to focus on the "Cav" mindset.

The reason I'm saying this is that I feel that with the medium weight "Cavalry" force we are aiming for is something completely different then a simple "scrambling" of Light Armour and Mechanized Infantry.   There will have to be new doctrine, tactics, SOPs, etc.   Again, this is one of the reasons why I don't really want to see traditional "Mech Inf" plugged into a Cav Force - it may not be the right tool for the job.

That being said, I'll restate my earlier caveat that if, by some chance, a nice fleet of Bradley/M1's, Marder/Leo 2's, or Warrior/Challenger 2's (or some sort of tracked FCS system) were to end up on our laps then I would support the traditional "Heavy Combat Team" orientation.   I could see it being added to a Cavalry Army in a few ways.

1.   New "Heavy Force" gets its "Crewman" from the Cavalry MOC and its "Mech Inf" from the Infantry MOC - they are given a "Heavy Force Indoc" when they are posted to their Heavy "Regimental Formation".   They assume unique "Heavy" career patterns and are distinct from their "Light Force" and "LAV CAV" brethren.

2.   A new "Panzer/Panzergrenadier" MOC is created, which, like the hybrid Cavalry MOC, turns out Heavy Force soldiers and crewmen - only these soldiers will focus and train towards "meeting engagements, breaches, and battlefield maneuver under the tactical mobility, firepower and protection of their fighting vehicles".

Anyways, since I don't see that kind of gear coming our way anytime soon, I figure we can just tuck that idea into our pockets and focus on our "Light Force" and "LAV CAV" that we can get right here, right now.

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## Kirkhill

I  was just mucking around with some numbers - and I know how you all like the numbers game but here goes. :dontpanic:


An Aussie style LAVCAV patrol has 3 vehicles and 12 crew (3+3+2 Crew + 4 Dismounts).  A Canadian Equivalent, with Coyotes might be assumed to have 14 personnel with 3 vehicles, including the 2 extra surveillance ops.

The Aussie Squadron has 4 patrols.  Lets assume 4 Canadian patrols per troop.  4x14=56.
56 bodies per troop, including Troop leader and 2ic and 12 vehicles

The Aussie Squadron has 3 troops.  3x56=168
168 Bodies per Recce Squadron and 36 vehicles.

Before we get into C4I and CSS.

This gives us lots of sense but no act.

Now lets add a LAV company to this mix, after the fashion of 2B Cav Task Force.

14 LAVs with 3 crew per. 3x14=42
42 Bodies and 14 Vehicles.

Lets assume an average loading of 12 of those vehicles with 6 bodies each for dismount.  6x12=72
72 Bodies.

We are now up to LAV and Recce combined, 36+14=50 vehicles and 168+42+72=282 bodies including 48+72=120 dismounts.

Now add in 6 MGS with 6x3=18 crew, 4 TUA with 4x4=16 crew and 4 MMEV with 4 spt vehs and 4x6=24 crew, for a total of 58 bodies and 18 vehicles.

A ASLAV-Cav Recce Squadron plus a LAV Company with attached DFS elements results in a field force with 68 F Echelon wheeled armoured vehicles and 340 F Echelon personnel including 120 dismounts.

What numbers of C4I and CSS staff would be required to support such a force in the field?

My guess is it would be something like a large Armoured Regiment with 56 tanks or a Mech Inf Battalion with 43 LAV plus support elements.  And those formations number in the 700 level All ranks.

Would that be close?

If we added a Light Battalion at 620 all in UK model, an Arty Battery with an Observation troop for another 100 and an Engineer Squadron for 100  we have 700+620+100+100=1520.  Adding another 250 CSS and Command = 1770.  Add another 1-200 for Helo support and we have 1870-1970 total strength.

Lets call it 2000 bodies to field a Recce Squadron, a LAV combat tm, a Light Inf battalion, an Arty Bty, an Eng Squadron and a Helo Squadron with CSS.

Roughly speaking a Kabul size force.

As I understand it the Government wants to keep two such forces in the field on the basis of 1 tour on 3 tours off.  Or better yet 1 and 4.

At a 1 and 3 rate that means 2x4 Task forces or 2x4x2000=16,000 deployable bodies from the brigades.  With a 1 and 4 rate and assuming no reserves then the number is 2x5x2000=20,000 deployable bodies from the brigades.

Lets make the assumption, for fun and frivolity that all of the 5000 new bodies are going to go towards making this possible and they will be assigned to the army exclusively.  Lets also assume that we are going to work with the higher 1 and 3 tempo so we only need 16,000 bodies total.  16,000 -5,000=11,000.  You need to find 11,000 deployables in the existing structure or 3,666 current effectives per Brigade including the attached Helo Squadron.

Back to the question I asked a little while back.  But in a slightly different manner.

Can each existing brigade find 3,666 deployable effectives in order to meet the Government's 2 Task Force standard, even after reinforcement by the new 5,000?


----------



## Infanteer

Whew, that's alot of number, bud!   



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> This gives us lots of sense but no act.



I'd want to be careful with this - what exactly do you want the Cavalry to do for "Acting".   Again, is a mechanized company desired, since it was intended to "Act" under the auspices of a mechanized/armoured assault (which the Cavalry should NOT attempt to do).

The Cav Scout Squadron that you layed out (following the ASLAV model) has 12-14 LAV III's and 16 dismounts in a Troop that could be taken in by either the Troop Warrant or the Troop Commander.   I think that this gives the "Cav Scout" Troop a decent amount of "Acting" power if required - read Daniel Bolgers account in Death Ground of an 18-Man Dismount Platoon taking the Al Mutlaa Police Post in the Gulf War during a combat team attack - they had covering fire from 25mm's and TOW's on the Bradley's and 120mm on the M1's.   I feel that our LAVCAV, if provided with LAV III 25mm and an assortment of other loadouts (TUA, 90mm DFS, Brimstone, 120mm Breach-loading Mortar) could achieve the same sort "Act" considering the Cavalry vehicles provide a good supply of suppresive fire..

As for giving the LAV CAV unit a bit more teeth, I figured thats what the attached Engineers were for.   I remember looking at TO&E for the Armoured Squadrons - they had Assault Troops attached to them.   My understanding is that, like Assault Pioneers, Assault Troops were stripped away and the task was given to the Engineers.   Is the Assault Troop role a good one for Engineers attached to our "LAVCAV" regiments?   I don't know, perhaps some input from some Engineers or Ex-Assault Troopers would shed some light on this.   Anyways, I felt that you could take those assault troops (who ever fills the spots) and form them into an "Assault Squadron".   Is the "Assault" Role required by the LAV CAV?   It's always nice to have the extra teeth.

My guess is that a LAV CAV battalion would have 1 or 2 "Scout Squadrons" (like the ASLAV) which are multi-purpose Cav units.   As well, Cav Battalions would have a "Recce Squadron" like our current one, which is more of a "Sense" unit.  Finally, it would have an "Assault Squadron" which, for the time, may have to be attached from an affiliated Combat Engineer Regiment; this Squadron would be oriented to "Combat Mobility" - "Acting", I guess.   HQ Squadron and perhaps an attached battery of LAV mortars (81mm Wolf or the proposed 120mm Breechloader) or LAV artillery (with that snazzy Denel 105mm - if it works).   I'm sure, if you scrounged up the PY's and the kit, you could find places for LAV DFS, BRIMSTONE, etc, etc.

How does that fit into your number-cruncher, Kirkhill.... ;D


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> If the Army were to readopt tracked vehicles and tanks and we were to move back to "Combat Team" attacks and Heavy Battle capability, then I could see diversifying the Infantry to fill out "Mech Infantry" tasks - until then, I see maintaining the idea of "Mech Inf" as superfluous for our Army right now - a Cav function is much more appropriate.





			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Now, the main reason I'm arguing that we merge Mech Infantry and Armoured into a Cav trade to supply soldiers for Cav positions is that we do not, in reality, need either.  We don't need Armour and Mech Infantry designations because we won't be doing Combat Team attacks or breaches into the teeth of enemy defences.
> 
> ...
> 
> The reason I'm saying this is that I feel that with the medium weight "Cavalry" force we are aiming for is something completely different then a simple "scrambling" of Light Armour and Mechanized Infantry.  There will have to be new doctrine, tactics, SOPs, etc.  Again, this is one of the reasons why I don't really want to see traditional "Mech Inf" plugged into a Cav Force - it may not be the right tool for the job.
> 
> That being said, I'll restate my earlier caveat that if, by some chance, a nice fleet of Bradley/M1's, Marder/Leo 2's, or Warrior/Challenger 2's (or some sort of tracked FCS system) were to end up on our laps then I would support the traditional "Heavy Combat Team" orientation.


I have a problem with the argument that we should transform because our kit does not match how we used to fight, and that with heavier kit we could just go back to the old way of doing business.  This does not take into account that the threat has changed, and that the environment we will fight in has changed.

I anticipate that to be relevant most of our potential future missions will require a significant number of boots on the ground.  Infantry companies and platoons will not be an exclusive requirement of light operations.  They will be needed in theatres conducive to mechanized operations as well.  The real world is composed of mixed terrain.  The cavalry force would be expected to move from open country, through wooded areas, and even in small towns to cities.  It cavalry is to be relevant, it must have enough infantry to project force into closed and complex terrain that it operates through.  

In the end, the soldiers that do project this force in the dismounted roll could be called mechanized infantry, dragoons, cavalry assaulters, or GIBs.  What matters is that they are included in the force structure and organized so as to be able to project dismounted force when required.

Kirkhill,
Generally, I like your force structure.  However, I still think your light infantry should be mechanized.  You have permanently assigned the troop lift, so permanently assign the troops.  This would allow their training and organization to be optimized for the mechanized roll.  Sections could be smaller to fit in the LAV, DFS Pls would no longer be required at the Coy level.  Essentially, all these elements become wasted PYs once there are stripped away to mechanize the Bn.

The Engr and Arty sub units that would have been available to support the light battalion can also be left home (more wasted PYs) because you will need to bring mech engrs and mech arty (well, maybe you APC Coy could include gun tractors and heavier guns without crews).  Better plan to have a sub-unit of each to support cavalry deployments.

However, by permanently integrating the infantry into the mech force you can get grid of PY wastages.  Your mech force sub-units' structures are optimised for the mech fight (either dismounted or mounted as appropriate to their roll).



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As for giving the LAV CAV unit a bit more teeth, I figured thats what the attached Engineers were for.


You can use engineers as infantry.  However, if you base your planning around this, you had better not expect them to be available to do engineering tasks when you need those done.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> I have a problem with the argument that we should transform because our kit does not match how we used to fight, and that with heavier kit we could just go back to the old way of doing business.   This does not take into account that the threat has changed, and that the environment we will fight in has changed.



Yeah, maybe I can work on this argument.   I just feel that we're trying to shoe horn an Organization that was designed to, in conjunction with tanks, fight a high-intensity battle against a fully mechanized opponent on the European Plains (those damn Grenovians).   I have a feeling this is not the opponent or the environment we are aiming our LAV CAV towards, so I feel that we may want to take a look at the organization and mission of the "Mech Inf" who will now become a LAV CAV dismount/dragoon team.



> I anticipate that to be relevant most of our potential future missions will require a significant number of boots on the ground.   Infantry companies and platoons will not be an exclusive requirement of light operations.   They will be needed in theatres conducive to mechanized operations as well.   The real world is composed of mixed terrain.   The cavalry force would be expected to move from open country, through wooded areas, and even in small towns to cities.   It cavalry is to be relevant, it must have enough infantry to project force into closed and complex terrain that it operates through.
> 
> In the end, the soldiers that do project this force in the dismounted roll could be called mechanized infantry, dragoons, cavalry assaulters, or GIBs.   What matters is that they are included in the force structure and organized so as to be able to project dismounted force when required.



Very true - boots on the ground is important, especially if a Cavalry unit is required to form a Task Force for a View II conflict - OOTW - where having boots on the ground in the constabulary function is the main effort.

Perhaps, taking the ASLAV variant and "beefing it up" with an extra 4 dismounts per patrol brick may give a "Scout Squadron" the teeth it needs.   This means that a "Scout Troop" will have 32 dismounts, a "Scout Squadron" - 96.

How do you feel about the mounted/dismounted "Cavalry MOC" I and 2Bravo alluded to?



> You can use engineers as infantry.   However, if you base your planning around this, you had better not expect them to be available to do engineering tasks when you need those done.



I might be rightfully accused of proposing to get the Cav Engineers to do too much.   What will be their role in augmenting an Armoured Regiment with no Assault Troops now?   Do you think the ideal arrangement would have the Cav Battalion with its Integral Assault Troops (for close assault work) and an Attached Cavalry Engineering Squadron to focus on the engineering tasks?

I must really admit that I don't know much about the Assault Troops - other then that they have a cool name.      Would they be needed in a Cavalry Force?


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yeah, maybe I can work on this argument.  I just feel that we're trying to shoe horn an Organization that was designed to, in conjunction with tanks, fight a high-intensity battle against a fully mechanized opponent on the European Plains (those damn Grenovians).


The basic building blocks of the infantry were devised well before mechanized warfare.  They are proven and can be optimized to different ways of fighting through adjusting the number of people in a section, the number of sections in a platoon, the number of platoons in a company, and the type & location of support weapons.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Perhaps, taking the ASLAV variant and "beefing it up" with an extra 4 dismounts per patrol brick may give a "Scout Squadron" the teeth it needs.  This means that a "Scout Troop" will have 32 dismounts, a "Scout Squadron" - 96.


This is certainly getting better.  Roughly a platoon available in each tp, and a coy available in a sqn.  If you plan on using the LAV as the firebase, cut-off, and anti-armour, you can probably get away without dedicated fire sp det in the pl HQ.  Maintaining a selection of sp wpns available when/if needed in the LAVs for the dismounts would also offset risks of no fire sp det.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> How do you feel about the mounted/dismounted "Cavalry MOC" I and 2Bravo alluded to?


Mechanized infantry have shown this can work.  My only concern is that the dismount positions are established and organized intelligently.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> What will be their role in augmenting an Armoured Regiment with no Assault Troops now?


Same role we fill for everyone else.  We can offer mobility through breaches, obstacle crossings, route repair, route clearance, etc.  We may have passed the days of breaching through an obstacle to destroy the enemy on the other side, but not every obstacle denotes a fire sack.  Rivers are obstacles that we can get our forces across.  A point obstacle in a short defile may be part of the enemy's delaying battle (in which case just being slow to breach it means that its mission was a successes).  Dismounted infantry/dragoons/cavalry/guys-with-rifles can secure the far side and the engineers can punch through.  We are the mine/counter-mine warfare guys.  We are the camouflage & non-electronic deception guys of the army (potentially useful in a force that is fighting to win the information/recce battle). 

As far as the assault troop, all their pioneer tasks have fallen to the engineers.  Their roll of dismounted fighter has gone to the infantry.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> The basic building blocks of the infantry were devised well before mechanized warfare. They are proven and can be optimized to different ways of fighting through adjusting the number of people in a section, the number of sections in a platoon, the number of platoons in a company, and the type & location of support weapons.



Yes, you're right.   Adjusting the numbers is the key so as to make the a Groundfighter force "fit", both doctrinally and organizationally, into the type of force structure we're aiming for.   I think by "beefing up" the Scout Patrols will achieve this.



> This is certainly getting better. Roughly a platoon available in each tp, and a coy available in a sqn. If you plan on using the LAV as the firebase, cut-off, and anti-armour, you can probably get away without dedicated fire sp det in the pl HQ. Maintaining a selection of sp wpns available when/if needed in the LAVs for the dismounts would also offset risks of no fire sp det.



Getting robust.   Playing the numbers game, I can see that something like this would have a "Scout Patrol" of:

3 x LAVIII - (9 Pers)
2 x Dismount Scout Teams (8 Pers)

Giving the Scout Patrol 17 Pers/3 LAVIII

4 of these Patrols plus a Troop HQ (1 Lav - Troop Commander and Troop Warrant: I'm unsure of where the Troop Warrant is supposed to go) makes:

Scout Troop of 72 pers/13 LAVIII

That is a pretty big troop, and although very robust, it may not meet the requirements of fitting into our current manning levels.   Perhaps, going off of our current numbers, we may be forced to drop a "Brick" leaving a Troop of 55 Pers in 10 LAV III with a dismount capability of 24 guys (3 x 8 scout sections).   These 8-man sections could maneuver off of the firepower off of the 10 LAV's in the Troop.

Going from there, 3 X Troops would equal 165 pers / 30 LAVIII - add Sqdn HQ and Admin and we may be at 180 / 35 vehicles with a dismount capability of 72 Scouts (3 x 24) with a very significant firebase of 30 or so LAV's.

If you can get 2 of these in a Cavalry Battalion, I think you're doing okay.   Add a Recce Squadron with Coyotes and LUVW's and a HQ/Admin Squadron and you have a Cavalry Battalion that weighs in at about a bit over 500 pers (144 Cav dismounts - there is your Rifle Company) and some 100 or so vehicles.   This is just a Scientific Wild-Assed guess, but I don't think my Ballpark figures are that out to lunch.

What are the rough numbers for three of our Mech Battalions and our 3 Armoured regiments - I'm wondering if we could fuse them together to get 6 Units of 2 x Scout Squadrons, 1 x Recce Squadron, and HQ and Admin.   I think the vehicle pool is possible if we are converting three "Mech Battalions" to "Light Battalions" to achieve a 6:6 unit ratio of Light and Cavalry Force Capabilities, its the manning numbers I'm worried about (I think our Mech Battalions are a little understrength and our Armoured Regiments are smallish).   Are we going to squeeze 3000 troops from those 6 Units, or are we going to come up short and hope for the "5,000" troop promise?

Add an Engineer Squadron (Cavalry) and a Artillery Battery (Cavalry) and ISTAR and expanded support assets as needed and you have a pretty potent Cavalry Battlegroup for deployment on a variety of operations.

Workable?   If not, it sure was fun waving my wand for once.... ;D



> Mechanized infantry have shown this can work. My only concern is that the dismount positions are established and organized intelligently.



Yep.   As I said, the Americans and the Aussies do this, so I think it is achieveable.   I have seen a few journal articles arguing for dedicated "mechanized Infantry" career paths - I'll see if I can dig those up and find some good information on where to start. 



> Same role we fill for everyone else. We can offer mobility through breaches, obstacle crossings, route repair, route clearance, etc. We may have passed the days of breaching through an obstacle to destroy the enemy on the other side, but not every obstacle denotes a fire sack. Rivers are obstacles that we can get our forces across. A point obstacle in a short defile may be part of the enemy's delaying battle (in which case just being slow to breach it means that its mission was a successes). Dismounted infantry/dragoons/cavalry/guys-with-rifles can secure the far side and the engineers can punch through. We are the mine/counter-mine warfare guys. We are the camouflage & non-electronic deception guys of the army (potentially useful in a force that is fighting to win the information/recce battle).
> 
> As far as the assault troop, all their pioneer tasks have fallen to the engineers. Their roll of dismounted fighter has gone to the infantry.



Okay, confirms my feelings.   Sounds like we want to avoid forcing the engineers to act as "Fire and Maneuver" Cavalry elements - lets let them focus on mobility/counter mobility tasks and obstacle destruction (like the good old Funny Tanks of WWII).


----------



## Kirkhill

Well I was kind of predicating this on something like a Kabul or Bosnia situation.   A Force is in place to supply security for a particular region with dispersed locales needing protection and spaces between needing patrolling.

My working premise is that the focus of any Canadian Force will be a Light Infantry presence that would be adaptable to any terrain, with or without Cavalry support.

My second premise is that it used to be held that the strongest all round defense posture was a triangle because it was harder for an attacker to find and split seams.   Thus a 3 company light battalion.

I also figured that regardless of terrain there will be a heavy need for engineering resources so a full   Squadron of engineers, not necessarily with mobility gear but certainly with construction and EOD capabilities.   

Also my working assumption was that any force, but especially a light force will require fire support thus the battery of arty.   And at this point I would like to put in a plug for long range arty.   There are two reasons I see to have lots of tubes on hand.   One is for weight of ordnance on target, a good thing.   The other is to cover a large area, in which case you need to disperse the guns.   A 30 km Gun can cover about 2800 km2 of ground.   A 15 km Gun can only cover about 700 km2 of ground.    To cover the same ground that 1 30 km gun can cover from one gun position you need at least 4 separate guns at 4 separate positions with 4 separate commands and 4 separate ammunition dumps.   In the cases where weight of fire is not as important, both from operational need and also from the increasing effectiveness of the bullets and the accuracy of the guns, then 4-30km guns or a half battery,   can be as effective as   16 or more 15km guns like the C3.   ie a Troop can replace the best part of   a Regiment when weight of fire is not the issue.   As seems to be the case on most stability ops.

The longer range also allows fire in support of a fairly wide ranging patrolling effort.

Which brings us to the Cavalry.

Looking closer at the ASLAV-CAV I sense that they came at the equation from the SASR direction rather than from the US Armd Cav direction.   Their vehicles are "undermanned" by most standards.   12 people in 2 "LAV-25" and a "Bison" that could carry 28-30.   That leaves a lot of room for beans, bullets and bandages on board.   Suggesting an ability to range very widely independently.   Also their is a distinct lack of heavy supporting weapons.   Suggesting that this particular Cavalry is intended more for Sense than Act, except perhaps as the SASR act.

The 4 scouts per patrol would, I think, only be scouts although they have an anti-tank capability with the Javelin, possibly another indicator of a dispersed operating mode.   Not a high expectation of encountering armour but an effective capability exists just in case.

As you point out Bolger does make note of the 18 man assault from 4 Bradleys and their success.   But he also is at pains to point out that there are "too few rifles" in the US army at large and the Armoured forces in particular.   In fact, IIRC, that is the entire premise of the book.

Also, if the Patrols are going to be operating in a dispersed fashion then how quickly will it be possible to gather a sufficiently large number together to create a useful force?

Finally, Scouting, Pioneering and Infanteering are three very distinct tasks I believe and while all can put in an assault I think that an Infantry platoon will probably be more effective than 8 Scout/Pioneer teams.

Thus I don't expect the Recce element of the Cav to do much more than Sense.

Having said that I have now created a protected area secured by a number of defended locales operating under an umbrella of artillery fire support.   The area between the defended locales is being vigorously patrolled by the Recce element.

What happens if Action is required outside of the defended locales but under the arty umbrella?   A Quick Reaction Force is required - both to get quickly to a threatened defended locale and also to react to what ever the Recce bumps into.   Thus the LAV Company.   This also answers for the 4th company that people have been asking to be reassigned to the battalions.

And because we don't know what we are going to run into thus the additional elements from the DFS Squadron to thicken the LAV Company up and turn it into a pretty effective Combat Team.

Then there is your question McG of why not turn all 4 companies into mech companies.   Well I guess it boils down to costs and manpower and flexibility to me.

As I noted a Light Unit can find employment in many different environments.   Thus it is very flexible and employable even in terrain that Light Cav couldn't get to, let alone LAVCav.   So I am still beating the drum to base our force around Light Infantry.

Conversely, to paraphrase Infanteer a Mech Soldier and a Bergen Soldier are different.   How quickly can a Mech unit be converted to Bergen duties so that they can be effective in a Light environment? On the other hand a Light Infanteer, given a lift by any means can co-operate with any systems on any battlefield, or so it seems to me.  I am not suggesting that Light Troops can replace Mech Troops.  They can't. But a battalion of light troops still offers a task force commander a number of tactical options.

As well, there is the issue of administrative deltas.   

The Brit Light Battalion has   620 bodies.

When they are issued Saxons so that they can get to the fight protected from shrapnel and rifle bullets they get 24 section vehicles and 48 drivers and co-drivers essentially.   The authorized battalion strength goes up to only 667   bodies.   They add on a Transport Platoon to the battalion if you like.

When they are re-roled to Warriors then the 24 sections get lifted in 24 Warriors with 72 crew.   Essentially 2 full platoons worth of Armoured specialists.   As well they add on another 105 bodies that are just for CSS, maintenance and resupply.

Those extra 177 bodies are the reason I dont want to Mechanize the Light Battalion in the Task Force.   8 Task Forces would mean an additional 1416 person years, which if you did convert the Mech Forces back to Light Role, would essentially be surplus to requirement.

Conversely I can lift an entire battalion on its own transport   or I can harden F-Echelon a bit by adding a Armoured Transport Platoon and have it more available to co-operate with armoured element or even hand Quick Reaction duties.   The Aussies are doing this by supplying their air-conditioned armoured bus, the Bushmaster.   No armaments at all, just nice comfortable seats and big "bullet-proof" windows and cold water.   Just the thing for jogging around Suffield or Shilo in the middle of August.

If wishes were horses time... 

If Manpower allows it I would prefer to see 9 task force sets, 3 per brigade.   That would allow 9 light infantry battalions, 9 Recce Squadrons, 9 LAV Companies and 3 DFS Squadrons.

2 of the Light Battalions would be Domestically assigned as Ready Forces.   At least one available for sovereignty taskings, the other available in an emergency for foreign assignments.
Normally they would go from be Domestic Ready status to working up for Foreign deployments and cooperation training.

2 more Battalions would deployed along with a Recce Squadron and a LAV Company and a DFS "Troop" each.

2 more similar teams would be on work up to deploy

2 more similar teams would be on recovery having just returned

That leaves 1 Light Infantry battalion, 3 LAV Companies, 3 Recce Squadrons and a DFS Squadron in reserve conducting Formation Training and ready to be dispatched to a coalition effort in a High Intensity Conflict conducting screening.


But for these wishes to become horses the structure needs 9x2000 bodies or 18,000 deployable effectives plus 3 Brigade HQ and Support elements as well as a Contingency Support Group.   Call it 25,000 for the Field Army alone?

So I doubt if my gypsies will be riding anytime soon.

Unfortunately.


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## McG

> Those extra 177 bodies are the reason I dont want to Mechanize the Light Battalion in the Task Force.  8 Task Forces would mean an additional 1416 person years, which if you did convert the Mech Forces back to Light Role, would essentially be surplus to requirement.


Those soldiers still have to exist somewhere if they are to be available when it comes time to mechanize a battalion.  How do you see this saving on PYs?



> I also figured that regardless of terrain there will be a heavy need for engineering resources so a full  Squadron of engineers, not necessarily with mobility gear but certainly with construction and EOD capabilities.


However, the equipment and skills to support a light force are not the same as the equipment and skills to support a mech force.  There is some overlap, but a dual purpose infantry battalion would require a pool of engrs that sp light ops, a pool of engr that sp mech ops, and a pool of engr that could sp either.  Currently, these manpower adjustments are done in the CER and not seen by the supported unit.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Well I was kind of predicating this on something like a Kabul or Bosnia situation.   A Force is in place to supply security for a particular region with dispersed locales needing protection and spaces between needing patrolling.



I wouldn't want to predicate Force Capability on Kabul or Bosnia.   These are View II Operations that require boots on the ground, well trained soldiers, rather then "Combat Capability".   Heck, the Company that replaced ours in Bosnia was cobbled together from Reservists from all of the Combat Arms trades - I took out two Armoured Recce guys and a Bird Gunner to oriente them to the AO.   It doesn't take much to watch Bosnians fornicate in their cars on the LZ.   

Kabul, although much more dangerous, still didn't require any specific skill sets, it required skilled soldiers who could get out and make the ISAF a visible symbol to reinforce Karzai authority - in our model, it wouldn't really matter if these were Light Force soldiers patrolling in Jeeps or Cavalry Soldier patrolling in LAV's (or, probably best, a combination); it's about presence.

Better to define your organization by the View I Operations where they will be expected to operate as a cohesive unit/battlegroup rather then a bunch of dispersed "peacekeepers" in which any unit can gear down towards.   For what it's worth, I was basing my organizational thoughts on "Son of Iraq" - inserting a LAR-like unit into a coalition invasion, or a "Step-child of Chechnya", sending 3 VP into Tora Bora (or other disagreeable terrains where 4th Generation Enemies like to hide) to clear mountains and caves out.



> The 4 scouts per patrol would, I think, only be scouts although they have an anti-tank capability with the Javelin, possibly another indicator of a dispersed operating mode.   Not a high expectation of encountering armour but an effective capability exists just in case.



Agree here.   As I said above, the dismounts would load up the DSV LAV as the "Patrol Armoury" - there should be a whole variety of iron available to these guys.



> As you point out Bolger does make note of the 18 man assault from 4 Bradleys and their success.   But he also is at pains to point out that there are "too few rifles" in the US army at large and the Armoured forces in particular.   In fact, IIRC, that is the entire premise of the book.



Yes, I was using the example to point out that smaller Infantry Platoons can maneuver successfully if given a decent weight of mechanized firepower.   I feel that a "Scout Troop" can provide this to its dismounts.



> Also, if the Patrols are going to be operating in a dispersed fashion then how quickly will it be possible to gather a sufficiently large number together to create a useful force?



That's why we have to practice, refine, and master a new doctrine, isn't it?   



> Finally, Scouting, Pioneering and Infanteering are three very distinct tasks



Are they?   Seems to me the Infantry Battalions had their guys doing all these jobs in-house.   That being said, I think you're pointing out that a small-unit shouldn't be multi-tasked with these, which I agree with to an extent.



> Thus I don't expect the Recce element of the Cav to do much more than Sense.



In View 1 type conflicts, yes - they must perform there Recce tasks.   But in View II (OOTW) where presense is needed, they are more then capable of providing extra "boots on the ground".   I believe that the Strats Recce Squadron had, for a time, an assigned AOR in the 1 VP BG overseas.



> Conversely, to paraphrase Infanteer a Mech Soldier and a Bergen Soldier are different.   How quickly can a Mech unit be converted to Bergen duties so that they can be effective in a Light environment? On the other hand a Light Infanteer, given a lift by any means can co-operate with any systems on any battlefield, or so it seems to me.



Try and make a difference between Mechanized Infantry (3rd Inf Division destroying the Republican Guard) and Motarized Infantry (Paras in North Ireland barreling out of Saxons).   I have no complaints against Light Forces being motarized in a pinch if required - heck, I'd even like to see them have thier own integral transportation if possible.   Nothing wrong with keeping a few trucks around and it doesn't take a specialist to drive them.



> But for these wishes to become horses the structure needs 9x2000 bodies or 18,000 deployable effectives plus 3 Brigade HQ and Support elements as well as a Contingency Support Group.   Call it 25,000 for the Field Army alone?
> 
> So I doubt if my gypsies will be riding anytime soon.
> 
> Unfortunately.



Oh-oh.   Back to the drawing board, Kirkhill.


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## Kirkhill

Simpler solution.  6 Taskforces instead of 9.  8 month tours instead of 6.  1 tour every two years.  

Force Requirement drops from 25,000 to 16,000.

Problem solved.


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## George Wallace

So simple on Paper....  ;D


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Simpler solution.   6 Taskforces instead of 9.   8 month tours instead of 6.   1 tour every two years.



Less time at home training and more frequent trips to watch Bosnians fornticate.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> So simple on Paper.... ;D



Isn't it always that way?


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## Kirkhill

Every plan starts on paper and regardless of "no plan surviving contact with the enemy", "prior planning prevents piss poor performance" and "failing to plan = planning to fail". ;D 

Doncha just love military maxims?  People have been doing this for so long they are like Hallmark cards, "one for every occasion".

Cheers ;D


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## Kirkhill

Just took another look at the back of the envelope.

Another way to get down to the 15 - 16,000 level.  Other than longer tours and less down time.

My Task Force is predicated on one of 2 Bravo's or the Aussie's Recce Squadrons, a LAV Combat team, a Light Battalion, a Battery of guns and a Squadron of Engineers. With a minimum desire for 8 such forces, preferably 9.

An alternate proposal would be to say we can't do that, likely and supply 4 Light TFs, with a Battalion, a Battery and a Squadron of Engineers with C4I and CSS as well as 4 Cavalry TFs with One Recce Squadron, a LAV Combat team, a Battery and a Squadron of Engineers.  Again with C4I and CSS.

So 8 TFs each with arguably less than half the Combat Capability of the 8 Cav/Light TFs.  Unfortunately the Support, C4I and CSS requirements wouldn't mean half the Manpower.  

Instead of 25,000 bodies it would still require 15,000 or so. 60%, maybe 2/3s. 

The only other alternative I can see is to say that we can only afford 12,500 bodies and supply 4 Cav/Light TFs and that's your lot World.  Carry on.

1 TF at a time.


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## NCRCrow

If u were at the CDS Brief today, the future looks like a Tier 2 Force securing the perimeter and the JTF doing the inside work.

The Army is the place to be in the next 5 years.


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## Zipper

Wonder when that brief is going to be posted somewhere?

I need to ask.

Why are you assuming we are going towards a Aussie type structure for the Cav? I wonder why you would want to have only 3 LAV's per trp, when a tank trp has 4 and a recce trp has up to 10? I think we would need much more in the way of vehicles per trp, as well as sqn. Also, why would we need an Assault troop? If we were a recce squadron, yes. But why set yourself up so light? 

As far as engineers are concerned, you can have a LAV engineering/dozer/mine clearing vehicle in your SHQ. Then you can have a engineering trp as part of your regimental formation. Same with your MGS/TUA and mortar/arty. Either have them assigned within each of the F ech trps, or have them attached at the RHQ level. 

Myself, I would have the mortar/arty attached as a separate trp, and incorporate the MGS/TUA in the F trps. In fact, I would do away with many of the TUA's and have the TOW mounted on the turrets. But thats just me.


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## Kirkhill

Zipper said:
			
		

> Why are you assuming we are going towards a Aussie type structure for the Cav? I wonder why you would want to have only 3 LAV's per trp, when a tank trp has 4 and a recce trp has up to 10? I think we would need much more in the way of vehicles per trp, as well as sqn. Also, why would we need an Assault troop? If we were a recce squadron, yes. But why set yourself up so light?



3 cars per patrols
4 patrols per troop

3x4=12 cars per troop.

[since my original gaffe got moved, I edited this to answer Zipper's question - Infanteer]


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## Zipper

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> 3 cars per patrols
> 4 patrols per troop
> 3x4=12 cars per troop.



12 cars per troop? So 4 troops per squadron? Thus 48 plus the BC and the OC? So 50 cars per Squadron? Thats 200+ LAV's per regiment! Yikes.

My question would be why are you going to patrols? Why not stick to the troop as the smallest unit? Unless you are considering the fire team (2 vehicles) as the smallest? Are you expecting to create a Scout unit? Why? 

Might I suggest something else? How about sticking closer to what we have already except actually creating a fire team? 2 per troop? Thus 6 LAV's per troop. I would also incorporate the MGS. 

Thus you have:

 4 LAV III's (hopefully with TOW on turret) + 24 dismounts (6 ea.)
 2 MGS

Thus a trp would have plenty of firepower, and good coverage for cover and movement.

You can have 2 or 3 of your trps in this formation and 1 or 2 of your trps looking like this:

2 LAV III (coyote package) + 8 dismounts
2 LAV III (TOW) + 12 dismounts
2 MGS

This would cover your scouting needs within the squadron.

Squadron BC and OC would also be in LAV III's with dismounts, albeit only 4. 

You would have SHQ with a LAV C&C and LAV engineer/dozer and LAV APC for the Liason (19E).

You would also have your RHQ recce troop with 10 Gwagons that could be supplied by the reserves and attached to the lower elements depending on deployment needs. Attached to RHQ would be your engineering trp as well as a Fire support LAV Mortar/arty and/or TUA trp.

Thus your only dealing with 26 LAV's per squardon F ech of which 8 are MGS, plus the other 5 LAV's in SHQ for a total of 31 per squardon. You could bump that up a bit depending on what style of LAV (supply, recovery and ambulance) you would want in your A1 or A2 ech.

This would be much easier to supply vehicle/personal wise and would give us the punch and recce abilities we would need to do the job.

I dropped the MMEV (ADATS) as it totally slows down the mobile nature of the Cavalry with its 15 minute set up time. It could be a sperate trp attached to brigade level for BHQ protection.

I am writting up a formation at the moment as to what I think a good cavalry unit would look like Canadian style. Its based heavily on our own armoured and recce style units with dismounts added. The basic's are above. I'll post it later.


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## Kirkhill

3 squadrons times 48 cars is 144 actually.    About what the Aussies are using.

Reason for selecting the Aussies?  It is a real world format that one of our allies with our kit is using.  Starting point for the numbers game.


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## Zipper

Ok, I'm basing my figures off of 4 squadron doctrine rather then the 3 squadron reality we have now. Even so with those numbers, you would be able to make up a 4th squadron (although I'm not sure about a ful ech).

Yes the Aussies is a nice place to start, but I think something closer to what we already know would be better as it has more punch. The Aussies have their Armoured units to bail them out, where we do not.

Oh, I forgot to mention that the dismounts would of course have AT weapons access as well.

Yes I know. I've railed on the MGS, and I'm still not convinced of it. But if we're going to get it, then lets see it used in a fashion that really supports things.


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## Zipper

Ah...

Any feedback on the above? Does it work? Is it crap? Short sighted? Etc...


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## Kirkhill

Outagas here ;D


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## ArmyRick

First off, the ideas be passed around on this thread are excellent.

Now in my world, lets promote me to General and declare me as CDS. Here is my structure.

The overall concept would be 
1st CMBG (Western Area)
2nd CMBG (Gagetown)
5th CMBG (Valcartier)
4th CLBG (Light Brigade) Petawawa.

Each CMBG would basically have 
-Brigade HQ and Sig SQN
-Armored REGT
-2 x LAV INF Battalions
-Arty REGT (re-roled)
-ENG REGT
-SVC BN
-FD AMB

The armored regt would now consist of HQ Squadron, Admin SQN and 3 x Combat Squadrons
There are two ways we can group them 
(1) a Squadron Of Recce (Coyote surveillance), Squadron of Cavalry (Coyote plain varaint with 2 dismounts per vehicle) and a DFS Squadron (with three troops of "8 packs" wich is 4 MGS, 2 TUA and 2 MMEV) OR
(2) Three equal Squadrons of Recce Troop (Coyote surveillance), Cavalry Troop (Coyote plain varaint with 2 dismounts per vehicle) and DFS Troop (8 pack structure again)...
The armour could best decide which is the best way to structure the above.

The MECH INF would be similar to what we have with HQ Company, 3 x LAV Companies and an ADMIN Coy. We make MECH INF a hard trade IMO because of the skill sets involved in crewing LAVIII.

The ARTY in a MECH BDE will have that truck mounted C3 and the UAV Batteries.

Now for the Light Brigade (and this will depend on us getting medium lift choppers) we have
-BDE HQ and SIG SQN
-3 x LIBs (one from each REGT)
-Aviation REGT (or TAC HEL GRoup, call it whatever)
-ARTY Battery (yes a battery only)
-Engineer Squadron
-SVC BN

The LIB will be structured for light, airmobile, mountain and amphibious operations. They will be similar in role to the RM Commandos of the UK. I would say keep Parachute capabilities to one company each (its too costly to train and equip all three battalions).

The LIB will be the early entry and possibly theatre QRF (with choppers) while the MECH forces will be the stay and fight/conduct operations type of forces.

In one scenario here is what I see.

Country X has gone to heck in a hand basket.
NATO plans intervention.

We committ our stand by LIB (wich has a company at all times on 48 hours notice to move) to the multi-national intervention force. They are light, quick and ready. During the early days of the mission they engage in minor fights but defeat the insurgents T55s, T62s and BTR60s using their .50s, Javelin ALAWS and Light or medium mortars. Their mission is to clear and secure 25 KM around City Y abandoned airfield long enough for heavier forces to arrive. The secondary task with assistance from the navy is to secure the harbour in said city. 

2-3 months later a complete Canadian Battle group arrives on a JSS and airlift to boost up the strength and releive the LIB BG. There role is to actively pursue and drive out insurgent forces and then begin stabilization phase of the mission.

What do you guys think ?


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## Zipper

Not bad.

Two things though.

One, your still thinking in cold war terms with the Armour and Mech infantry. Mech Infantry is not supportable without tanks, and Armour split up your way would not be sustainable for more then a couple of tours.

Two, we have to make up plans for what we have already. Your plan means a lot more Vehicles and Soldiers, both of which may not be supportable by the budget at this time.

Otherwise nice...


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## ArmyRick

Actually if you add up the vehicles, we have/will be getting that many. 
66 MGS = 12 per REGT x 3 + 30 (split between waiting deployment, training and CMTC)
I am not sure how many TUA or MMEV we are getting but my numbers put only 6 of each in a regiment.

I can not remember how many coyotes we have but it is an impressive amount (enough to do what I am talking about).

As for the idea of this being cold war? Not really, my formations would be wiped out in a flash by a russian tank division.

We will still have to do some plug n play because of each mission having its own specific requirements.

I could see a deployable LAV (I will use that term instead of Mech) BG consisting of a LAV Battalion with a composite Armoured Squadron attached (The type I mentioned combining all three troops in above post) as well as the engineers, arty assetts.

Now if we conducted a larger scale operation then I could see both a armoured BG and an LAV Infantry Battle group.

My one problem with putting all LAV assetts in one unit (LAVIII, Engineer, Arty OP, MGS, MMEV and TUA) is that it could become quite complicated in terms of training and development of the crews. So there fore I leave the LAVIII with  Infantry battalions and the other LAV assetts with the armoured.

Would there be a requirement in the future for an armoured heavy BG? I would say yes.

If we tackle on missions that involve alot of convoy escorts than I could see the security force for a typical convoy being a LAVIII Platoon mounted and an MGS Troop with the convoy. The Recce screen would consist of TUA and Coyotes. Keep in mind this one example of what I am talking about.


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## Zipper

Sounds workable. But how does this fit the all arms concept? If we go that way that is...

Of course, everything we talk about on these boards is nothing but wishing. Although a couple of people around here actually write articles for our military journals, so they must have some kind of impact on the decision making? Don't know.

What about the Gwagons? Everyone seems to forget we're getting these things? Or is it militia only and thus ignored?


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## PPCLI Guy

The system is actively pinging right now, trying to track down "good ideas" to be considered by the two Action Teams that the CDS put together.  If you have a fleshed out idea, PM me - I can see that it gets to the right place - and it can be attributed, or un-attributed.

Dave


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## Zipper

Which two action teams? I'm sure you'll get swamped by ideas once we have a better idea of who or what that is.

Thanks


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## PPCLI Guy

One of the first things that the new CDS did was to create two planning action teams, each led by a MGen, and staffed with selected pers from across the force (mostly from NDHQ - likely a cost / culture thing).  I believe their remit is to flesh out the org and doctrine side of the CDS's transformation plan.  One of them is led by the ACLS - and it is his full time job right now.

I am NOT part the action teams. I do however have a direct line to one of them, based on previous work relationships.  Basically I am offering to be a conduit for fleshed out ideas - ie ones that have been written up and are coherent, complete ideas.  I make no guarantees that they will be read etc - just that they will get to the right place.  

I hemmed and hawed about making this offer, but I think that there is some truly original thought going on in Army.ca, and realise that people can be frustrated by a sense that "no one is listening".  Well, people are listening, and events have conspired to create a small (and closing) window of opportunity.

So, if you have an original and fleshed out idea that is easily forwarded (Word or long e-mail will do) PM me and I will forward it to the right place.

Dave


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## Zipper

Thanks for that Dave... 

Now I've been asking myself for some time on this board why our forces are gearing so heavily towards recce type units and vehicles. Even the discussion about Armoured Cavalry, which in my mind could be a vaible combat force if equipment and doctrine were adapted properly. But even here, the idea of scout and recce Cav operations seemed to be the focus.

Now I know why. I was on a world affairs website and I found this statement. And I quote...



> For a long time now, the CF has been asking how to stay effective given its relative size and budget (or lack there of).
> 
> There are some conclusions
> 
> 1) Land Force will always fight as part of a Coalition.
> 2) Land Force is obligated by law (North Atlantic Treaty) to provide a battalion group within 10 days of a NATO or UN request, three battle groups or a brigade group within 30 days.
> 3) Land Force is committed to the Immediate Reaction Force
> 
> Given these conditions, Land Force geared itself more towards a recee role. Knowing the enemy before he knows you is nine-tenths of the battle.
> 
> Under Coalition conditions, LF wants the recee bde role for the div.
> 
> As such, the concepts of tanks, while still very valid, don't quite fit into this new doctrine.



So there is my answer that I'm sure everyone else knew before hand. As usual I am the last to have this leak through my thick skull.

Our entire exisitance as a military force is now and I guess has been for some time now, totally dependant upon being the scouting boys for the bigger boys. We are no longer being considered a "fighting" Bull dog if you will, but as a beagle or sight hound. Yes we have teeth, but they only come out when we're cornered. Otherwise we look for the bad guys and bay out warning for our larger masters to come in for the kill.

Melodramatic? Yes...        ...but that is the short of it.


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