# The future of Light Arty (105 mm) (From: Mortars)



## Colin Parkinson (5 Nov 2012)

Not mortar s, but just read elsewhere that the US Army is ordering more M119 105mm Howitzers for 2013. So the 105mm is far from dead.


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## GnyHwy (5 Nov 2012)

Any the 120mm mortar has its advantages in built up areas and PGMs, but in the open terrain in a more traditional role, I'm taking a 105mm howitzer all day long.


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## Old Sweat (5 Nov 2012)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Not mortar s, but just read elsewhere that the US Army is ordering more M119 105mm Howitzers for 2013. So the 105mm is far from dead.



I trialed a development model at the school in Shilo in the summer of 1969. It was ballistically similar to the US M102 which meant a maximum range of 11,500 metres.

Edit: Here is a link to the 1969 Canadian Gunner which includes an article on the trial. The post-war Canadian Army peaked in 1969 and it was pretty well all downhill for three decades after that. A quick scan of the articles will give you an idea of what we could do back then.

http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201969.pdf


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## dapaterson (6 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I trialed a development model at the school in Shilo in the summer of 1969. It was ballistically similar to the US M102 which meant a maximum range of 11,500 metres.
> 
> Edit: Here is a link to the 1969 Canadian Gunner which includes an article on the trial. The *post-war Canadian Army peaked in 1969 and it was pretty well all downhill for three decades after that*. A quick scan of the articles will give you an idea of what we could do back then.
> 
> http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201969.pdf



So the decline of the Canadian Army ran in parallel to your career?  Now, correlation does not imply causation, but...


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## Old Sweat (6 Nov 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So the decline of the Canadian Army ran in parallel to your career?  Now, correlation does not imply causation, but...



I'm not sure which was the cause and which was the effect; it was not a lot of fun watching great hunks of the army go flying off into nothingness.


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## FJAG (7 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I'm not sure which was the cause and which was the effect; it was not a lot of fun watching great hunks of the army go flying off into nothingness.



I joined in 69 and was posted to H Bty in the Third in 70. Went on a two month course and when I came back the Bty was gone. I think we did releases and remusters to the tune of changing strength from somewhere around 4,000 to around 1600 in as little as a year.

One consequence was that most of our gun sergeants at that time were to infirm to do their jobs but blocked positions. All of J Bty's guns were run by the newly created MBdr appointments (which at that time made the princely sum of $5.00 per month more than the Bdrs). I think we had no promotions to the rank of sergeant for about five years. Morale was just peachy.


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## Old Sweat (7 Nov 2012)

Leaving all that aside, the question is whether the 105mm is still a viable round in terms of range and effect at the sharp end. Physics seems to dictate that we can't get much more that 18km in range, and that has an effect on the life of the tube and blast overpressure on the detachment. Considering that newer types of 155mm HE have safety distances and lethality about the same as the 105mm and can reach out much farther, is it worthwhile considering a light gun?


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## Colin Parkinson (7 Nov 2012)

The 105mm light gun is a good choice for reserves and adds a tool into the toolbox where a 155 might not fit. The 105 would be a poor choice to go up against the Soviet counter battery system, but I can see it playing a part in future ops where politics or logistics may block the 155. The m119 weighs in about 300kgs less than the C3. 
The 155 is just to big for the reserves based on what I have seen, needs a larger tractor, more crew and more expensive ammo. For the reserves you need a logistically easy gun and that is what the C1,2 & 3 gave them. A new 105mm gun should have the exact same (or close as possible) aiming systems as the 155 in service, this will allow for better training and easier cross training.


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## jeffb (7 Nov 2012)

In addition, there are many armouries around Canada that simply can not accommodate M777s and the associated gun tractors. 155mm for the reserves is moot anyways as I can't imagine the government committing to buying a few dozen more.


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## ArmyRick (7 Nov 2012)

At this point, the talk of getting a new 105mm light gun seems more "wish" list than anything else. With CF committing to buy several more M777s for Reg force and I could have sworn I saw a tid bit about picking up something similar to HIMARS, I don't see a new 105mm being on the shopping list anytime soon.


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## Ostrozac (7 Nov 2012)

I do agree that the Canadian Army needs a mix of indirect fire capabilities.

This could include 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars, 105mm and 155mm howitzers, and a MLRS/ballistic missile capability. But it won't, and shouldn't, include all of those capabilities simultaneously -- that capability mix would probably be unsustainable for us at our current size.

I can see the argument of having a smaller general purpose gun that has a lesser logistics footprint than the M777 -- I would like to see the capability comparision between the available 105mm and 120mm mortars. In addition, I know that I have seen the GIAT LG1 towed behind AVGP -- while I have only seen M777 towed by softskins. Is that an inherant advantage of 105mm, that they can be towed by APCs? Similarly, could you store a 120mm mortar internally in a LAV3 or TLAV? Now that we have no self-propelled arty, survivability might be a consideration for our indirect fire weapons.


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## FJAG (7 Nov 2012)

jeffb said:
			
		

> In addition, there are many armouries around Canada that simply can not accommodate M777s and the associated gun tractors. 155mm for the reserves is moot anyways as I can't imagine the government committing to buying a few dozen more.



I agree that the point is moot, but not because the government won't buy more. It's because the reg f won't commit money out of their budgets to do it. That's the same reason why reserve recce regiments use G-wagons instead of Coyotes.

Sixty years ago when life was simpler reserve units had tanks, self propelled howitzers, locating regiments, etc. We still believed in mobilizing reservists when needed. Even our forces as late as Korea were raised primarily from the reserves (including many WW2 vets)

Then the world changed and with the formation of standing commitments to NATO in Europe and we developed an attitude that wars would happen so quickly that only standing regular force units would get there. The concept of mobilizing a reserve force fell out of fashion and guess what - the reg f which became the centre of our forces in being and ran the CF and NDHQ - diverted whatever funds the government allocated to them and the reserves became less capable and subjected to ever lower levels of expectation.

That attitude is still here today. Reg F personnel have a vested interest in maintaining PYs within their respective empires. Since funding reg f PYs are built into the establishment and funding training, armoury changes, new equipment and res f pay are not, no one realistically wants to rebuild the system from the ground up. Tinker with it sure, but rebuild it? No thanks that's not in the reg f establishments vested interests.

I think I said this in another thread. First figure out what the overall army's objectives are and then determine what needs to be done by people who are there every day and what can and should be done by part timers. Then equip them, train them and house them accordingly to meet their defence objectives.

Concepts like 777's and their tractors won't fit in armouries or the C1 is a nice and simple gun that even a reservist can operate have no place in planning a defence organization that meets defence objectives. 

And just to stay on thread, I believe that there is clearly a role for the 105 in certain establishments where light easily air transportable equipment is needed and the lighter terminal effects of the smaller round and the more limited range are not a critical handicap. Much as I hated the L5, we could carry it just about everywhere and it could be lifted by a Huey -- we needed Voyagers or Chinooks for the C1s. 

The fact that there is a role for the 105 does not mean its by necessity a reserve force role simply because they currently have the guns. 

In my mind mortars are not the solution for light organization needs. Flatter trajectories, shorter times of flight and less exposure to the effects of higher atmosphere and CM radars have a definite advantage for guns over mortars. Don't get me wrong. There's a very necessary role for mortars, but in my mind that's still within the hands of the infantry - maybe even a reserve infantry role. The two are complimentary, not competitors.

 :2c:   :remembrance:


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## Old Sweat (7 Nov 2012)

Great points, Wolf.* However given the size of our defence budget, can you realistically see a hefty slice of it being alloted to buy 30-50 105mm guns mainly for the reserves, when perhaps there might be a chance of six being used in action?

* FJAG and I served together in 2 RCHA in the early seventies.


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## dapaterson (7 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Great points, Wolf.* However given the size of our defence budget, can you realistically see a hefty slice of it being alloted to buy 30-50 105mm guns mainly for the reserves, when perhaps there might be a chance of six being used in action?
> 
> * FJAG and I served together in 2 RCHA in the early seventies.



The cost of the guns would not be excessive, compared to, say, the CCV or other DND/CF pipe dreams, and would ensure the ability of the Reserves to continue to force generate gunners for operations.

Besides that, there's the additional, ceremonial requirement for gun salutes; I can't quite imagine a 21 tube salute fired by a mortar battery...


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## Old Sweat (7 Nov 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The cost of the guns would not be excessive, compared to, say, the CCV or other DND/CF pipe dreams, and would ensure the ability of the Reserves to continue to force generate gunners for operations.
> 
> Besides that, there's the additional, ceremonial requirement for gun salutes; I can't quite imagine a 21 tube salute fired by a mortar battery...



It would, however, probably come out of the meagre slice of the pie given to the artillery. Hard decisions, and not because of salutes!


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## dapaterson (7 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It would, however, probably come out of the meagre slice of the pie given to the artillery. Hard decisions, and not because of salutes!



It's a question of balancing capabilities and priorities within the overall Army priority list.

Frankly, given the institutional inability to expend the planned capital amounts, a low-rate production contract could permit the CF to but half a dozen or so a year for a decade at a low cost per year without an increase to current allocations.  Of course, stretching out production like that would more than double the cost (top of my head math), but would fill a real requirement.

Of course, getting "more of the same" isn't sexy - new and different is sexy - so I doubt we'd see that any time soon.


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## Allgunzblazing (7 Nov 2012)

The British Army employes the 105 mm light gun with their airborne forces - http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/artillery-air-defence/1511.aspx

Can this be a foreseeable use of the 105 mm Light Gun within the CF? Airborne batteries within the existing Reg Force Arty units...


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## dangerboy (7 Nov 2012)

I can't see  Canada ever going back to having Airborne Batteries.  The most I can see is having jump qual FOO parties.


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## FJAG (7 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Great points, Wolf.* However given the size of our defence budget, can you realistically see a hefty slice of it being alloted to buy 30-50 105mm guns mainly for the reserves, when perhaps there might be a chance of six being used in action?
> 
> * FJAG and I served together in 2 RCHA in the early seventies.



Not at all. You may not know but as DJAG Res/ Snr P Res Leg O I sat on the Chief of Reserves Council for some seven years or so and in my last three years I was on Class B in Ottawa with JAG. I had more arguments with people than I care to remember about how we should approach the role of the reserves in what were changing times.

I have always been (and continue to be) an advocate of using our existing legislation to call-up reservists for duty similar to how the US does it. I constantly ran into a stone wall of Reg F General officers who didn't understand our legislation and believed that our reserves were purely voluntary and couldn't be compelled to go into harms way. As proof they sited that we hadn't done it in over fifty years. (That though had more to do with what we chose to do rather than what we could have done)

In short I have a firm belief that our senior leaders do not know how reservists could potentially be used, and have very little interest in learning. Even our reserve leaders are relatively content with our status quo and not about to advocate for change. As such reservists are thought of and continue to think of themselves as "limited liability part-timers" notwithstanding their tremendous contribution in Afghanistan.

That said to address your point - I see absolutely no way that anyone is about to buy any new 105s for the reserves when there are already guns around that can do whatever the job is we want reservists to do.

I actually have two separate but related points:

I think to seriously address the overall budget concerns of the forces, the reg f could easily lose hundreds of PYs by divesting themselves of all the gun lines in each regiment except one battery's worth with the remainder (including the equipment and maintainers and a core of leaders) to go to the reserves. In addition other equipment not used day - to - day but necessary in war - such as radars - to go to the reserves as well.

We should simplify our gun inventory. If the 777 is our standard piece then sufficient (and by that I mean just a few) should be available for training for reservists. I think our inventory is at 37 so we are looking at up to six six-gun or eight or nine four-gun batteries (are the M777 batteries at four guns now?)  Either way if 24 are left with the Reg regiments and the RCSA a dozen are free to give to designated res units tasked to augment designated reg f units.

I think we have about 28 or so LG1s which is enough to equip about 8 or 9 three gun troops/batteries - enough to be used in reserve regiments for initial and continuing gun number training, for saluting troops, and as the operational light gun if ever needed. The C1 is on the way out and I don't see the C3 ever being sent to war. Why keep and maintain it?

So in summary I don't think we'll get new 105s and I don't think we need them either. That said you can see what I've done here is exactly what I advocate we don't do - rationalize our establishment based on what we have rather than build it from the ground up based on what our defence needs are.  

Cheers


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## dapaterson (7 Nov 2012)

The LG1s have little life left in them.  And the M777 fleet would be insufficient to have a deployable battery "waiting on the dock" while routine training is ongoing- and, aslt I heard, the intent was to have equipment ready to roll on short notice.


As for ignorance of senior leaders about the Reserves: if it's any consolation, they're mostly ignorant about the Reg F as well...


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## Infanteer (7 Nov 2012)

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004armaments/DayII/SessionII/07Lindsey_Dragon_Fire_II.pdf

You can tow it, drop it, or load it into the back of a LAV to make it a self-propelled, armoured indirect fire system.


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## Infanteer (7 Nov 2012)

...and the counter-arguement within the Marines to move away from a Mortar and to a 105 ULWPH

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/expeditionary-fire-support-system


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## a_majoor (8 Nov 2012)

Since a lot of the argument revolves around expenses and PY's, would it not be more sensible to frame the requirement in such a way as to minimize the PY's needed?

This might move the argument away from "traditional" guns like the 105 (or whatever calibre is desired) and towards alternative systems like rockets (you can launch Hellfire or Brimestone ATGM's from a HMMVW sized vehicle), automated mortars like the Dragon fire or the FH77 Archer. 

The named systems simply give an idea of what is available and what can be done, although compatibility with existing systems (the FH77 can also fire Excalibur guided shells) or providing a complimentary capability (a ground launched ATGM gives precision attack against hard targets, but also useful DF anti armour capabilities).
The Dragon fire is a bit of an outlier, but 120mm gives sufficient range, the ability to use PGM's and the option of towed or under armour deployments, so a system built along those lines has interesting capabilities and options for the commander. 

Edit to add

The real advantage to these systems isn't so much the technical aspects of how they deliver fire; all are capable of being deployed into action with three man crews, and in the case of a ground launched rocket or the Dragonfire, they can be deployed using a relatively small vehicle like a HMMVW. So the PY footpring and potentially the purchase and O&M costs can be lower as well.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Nov 2012)

This is more like my idea of what 'light artillery' should be doing:

Their Dragon in Helmand

One-hundred and fifty miles to the north, at the most remote of the various British strongpoints scattered around Helmand province, one weapon strikes fear into the enemy.

It's not an Apache helicopter. It's not a Viking assault vehicle. It's not a Jackal armoured vehicle, It's not a Sea King helicopter. Nor is it a Lynx helicopter. It's a Dragon.

It's the Taliban's nickname for the Royal Marines 105mm field gun.

The Royal Marines gunners, 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, hauled one of their howitzers to a hilltop outside Musa Qaleh in Northern Helmand.

The peak of Roshan Tower, a couple kilometres north of the regional centre, which dominates the town and surrounding terrain.

It took four days to get a gun from 8 Commando Battery to the top of the tower and prepare the peak as a gun platform, as gunners moved not merely the two ton gun, but also its ammunition boxes, each weighing one-hundred pounds. 

http://www.modern-day-commando.com/29-Commando-RA.html


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## Colin Parkinson (8 Nov 2012)

The reserves need useful equipment to train on if they are going to attract and retain soldiers,which is how you generate good Officers and NCO's.  Not to mention a mission that does not change as often as people's underwear. We can't afford not to get equipment for all of the combat arms and support services in the Reserves. the key is to get equipment that allows them to train and feel that they are useful, all the while being as easy to maintain and support as possible.


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## jeffb (8 Nov 2012)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The reserves need useful equipment to train on if they are going to attract and retain soldiers,which is how you generate good Officers and NCO's.  Not to mention a mission that does not change as often as people's underwear. We can't afford not to get equipment for all of the combat arms and support services in the Reserves. the key is to get equipment that allows them to train and feel that they are useful, all the while being as easy to maintain and support as possible.



Maybe the problem is that artillery is just too expensive to keep as a reserve task. <hides> There is a proud and long tradition of reservist gunners but there really isn't a financially viable to replace the C3 that I can see with another 105 or 155 system. Maybe the task that makes sense is to have them concentrate on mortars (81 mm) with the task to provide the mortar platoons back to the infantry. That way mortars could be stood up for deployments and attached to Btns as the primary function of the reserve gunners. The downside of course is that there would be a large training delta that would need to be made up for reserve augmentation to gun batteries but that's maybe something we have no reasonable way of avoiding.


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## dapaterson (8 Nov 2012)

A project to acquire 60 new 105mm towed guns for the Reserves would cost at most (back of the envelope here) $200m.  Spread that over 6 years - $10M / $20M / $40M / $40M / $50M / $40M - almost a rounding error in the DSP.  I'd estimate we'd need three people, full-time, plus matrix support, to manage the acquisition for DND.

No new ammo natures, so no changes to ammo depots.  Existing infra should be usable with minor modifications.  No large training costs / conversion costs.  And reduced NP to support the fleet.


For a new platform that would last a good 25 years or more, I think it's a worthwhile investment.


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## Kirkhill (8 Nov 2012)

In the case of the CCV project, would the capital cost difference between the 108 vehicle minimum buy and the 138 outlying option be in the same order of magnitude as procuring 60x M119s?


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## Bird_Gunner45 (8 Nov 2012)

The last brief from the CIG stated that the 105mm in Canada was not even being considered.  The future was deemed to be A) 120mm mortars, B) 81mm mortars, or C) M777 in the reserves.  

That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.

The reality is that the M777 is prone to breaking, and are too expensive to be replaced.  This is exacerbated by the way that we train and the terrain we attempt to put guns into.  We would be better suited to go with a cheap 105mm training option with DGMS.

 :2c:


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## daftandbarmy (8 Nov 2012)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The last brief from the CIG stated that the 105mm in Canada was not even being considered.  The future was deemed to be A) 120mm mortars, B) 81mm mortars, or C) M777 in the reserves.
> 
> That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.
> 
> ...



Or a hybrid 105mm/ Mortar?

Love these things... they're so cute, and lethal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OTO_Melara_Mod_56


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## GnyHwy (8 Nov 2012)

I've always be partial to a 105 howitzer because if its flexibility, especially and ultra lightweight pack howitzer (ULWPH).  I also recognize some of the capabilities that a mortar brings, while still performing much of the tasks that a 105 can.  Interesting how the CIG, who got his info from DLR I assume, says that a 105 is not being considered.  Seems shortsighted to me, but perhaps DLR knows something we don't, maybe no one's building 105s in our numbers.  Or, are they just jumping on the 120mm band wagon with the rest of NATO.  I thought the reason we wrote requirements was to avoid buying equipment on the assumption that "it worked for them, therefore it will work for us".  I would think if requirements were written, that the both the 105 and 120 would pass the options analysis phase.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In the case of the CCV project, would the capital cost difference between the 108 vehicle minimum buy and the 138 outlying option be in the same order of magnitude as procuring 60x M119s?



The 119 lost to the LG1 in an evaluation we conducted in the early 90s.  Not sure why, or if improvements have been made since.  I do know that the 119 comes with networking much like the 777.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.
> 
> The reality is that the M777 is prone to breaking, and are too expensive to be replaced.  This is exacerbated by the way that we train and the terrain we attempt to put guns into.  We would be better suited to go with a cheap 105mm training option with DGMS.
> 
> :2c:



BG45, the 105mm is not a capability.  It is a piece of equipment.  A capability is the ability to hit a target from an indirect postion or provide fragmentation effects.  The requirements are hitting a target within x amount of time, or blowing up half a grid square in x amount of time, or x amount of bullets.  I suspect that those who are choosing for us maybe making the same mistake, and assuming a 105 does what it always has for the last 50 years, and a 120 does what it always has as well.  

I also wouldn't assume that beating up the 777s is too expensive.  Heck, we kept the 109s going for almost 40 years.  As long as they're still being built, I say bang away.


As for the topic at hand, unless we write the requirements and test the different weapons against them, we will never know.  Just for shits and giggles, what would be some of the requirements be?  Maybe we can get this done for DLR, and they can just cut and paste  ;D 

My hypothesis - a ULWPH takes the prize.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (9 Nov 2012)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> The 119 lost to the LG1 in an evaluation we conducted in the early 90s.  Not sure why, or if improvements have been made since.  I do know that the 119 comes with networking much like the 777.
> 
> The LG 1 won the contract because it could fire HEER rounds while the M119 could not.  The LG 1 that the French brought for trials was also brand new, while the M119 the Brits sent was beat up and had a series of mechanical issues.  My understanding is that the HEER round issue was the key though.





			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> BG45, the 105mm is not a capability.  It is a piece of equipment.  A capability is the ability to hit a target from an indirect postion or provide fragmentation effects.  The requirements are hitting a target within x amount of time, or blowing up half a grid square in x amount of time, or x amount of bullets.  I suspect that those who are choosing for us maybe making the same mistake, and assuming a 105 does what it always has for the last 50 years, and a 120 does what it always has as well.
> 
> I also wouldn't assume that beating up the 777s is too expensive.  Heck, we kept the 109s going for almost 40 years.  As long as they're still being built, I say bang away.



Understood on the capability.  The big loss of capability for us if we go 120mm mortar ENTIRELY in the reserves is that we wont have the ability to force generate reservists to augment tasks and we will need a reserve only training system (IGs/AIGs wont have any experience on them so you would arguably require reserve IGs and AIGs).

Also, the M109 is significantly tougher than the M777 which is prone to mechanical issue.  The real concern on that is that we JUST have enough to man 6, 4 gun batteries.  When one goes down it's down.  The $$$ isn't there to buy new ones, especially considering the arty alone has to procure new digital suites for the OPVs, guns, and CPs, a new AD shooter, and replacements for the beat up STA equipment.  Procuring a cheaper gun akin to the C2 would be the optimal answer... something to drag around and kick the sin out of and can be repaired quickly and cheaply, including by reservists.

As for the 120mm mortar obsession... I can't answer that one.  For what it's worth the CIG was extremely specific when he said that 105 wasn't being considered.  The concept is that the 120 can do anything that a 105 can do, minus some range, is lighter, cheaper, requires less pers to man, etc.


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## Old Sweat (9 Nov 2012)

No matter how we cut it, the first question is whether there is a 105mm on the market that is inexpensive, robust and reliable? If the answer is no, then the artillery will have to pursue other options.

Regarding the serviceability and reliability of the M777, remember it is still a relatively new piece of kit. We also experienced the same issues with the M109 and especially the L5 when they entered service in 1968-1969. At one time the L5 was known as Mussolini's Revenge, primarily because of cracked barrels. There also was a belief that we were abusing the L5 by treating it as a field gun and galloping all over the ranges doing fire and movement. Having said that, the Australians had some equipment failures with their L5s in Vietnam that were serious enough that we sold them a large number of our C1 fleet at about the time the newer equipments were coming into service with us.

The challenge is that when one pushes the limits of lightness, there is a price to be paid in robustness. That, however does not detract from the issue of a new equipment for the reserves. What are our options? There are some smart people posting here, not necessarily including me as I am well past my best before date, aka CRA. Let us be pragmatic and hard-headed.

Edit to add: I wonder how much of the serviceability issue is based on our scaling of spares, especially of major components. This was a serious factor in the bad, old days and may well continue to this day. For an example, in 1963 I was in C Battery in Gagetown. We had had a C1 in 2nd line for a panoramic telescope sight mount for something like five months. We finally got it back, did the sight tests and took it to the field. As luck would have it the gun had the first of series of prematures over three or four months that virtually grounded the artillery. In this case an HE round detonated 15 metres outside the muzzle in high angle and wounded six of the seven members of the gun detachment. A splinter also knocked our new sight mount about 15 degrees out of kilter, so back into maintenance it went for another eternity.


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## Shrek1985 (9 Nov 2012)

I'm confused; why does anyone think two different systems; a Mortar and a Gun (Howitzer? Gun-Howitzer?) are comparable?

A nail and a spear can both poke a hole in something, but they are obviously different.

Back in the 70s NATO tried to de-standardize 105mm as too small; okay sure, but it fits in a number of roles well and it's cheaper than 155, which is good for armies like ours.

But a mortar is a fish of a different colour. It's a light, mobile, high-angle weapon, but most mortars have shorter range than most gun systems.

Both systems have advantages in different conditions, I don't think you can replace one with the other and still be at your best. I feel the same way about the C16 CASW "Replacing" the 60mm mortar. It's like replacing your peanut butter with wood glue. Both are sticky and brown-ish, but obviously have different effects on the user.

Also; aren't mortars cheap and easy to make on a scale of industry we should be able to manage quite well?


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## GnyHwy (9 Nov 2012)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The $$$ isn't there to buy new ones, especially considering the arty alone has to procure new digital suites for the OPVs, guns, and CPs, a new AD shooter, and replacements for the beat up STA equipment.  Procuring a cheaper gun akin to the C2 would be the optimal answer... something to drag around and kick the sin out of and can be repaired quickly and cheaply, including by reservists.


I think the money is there, but there is no one to do the paperwork, or champion the project in order to get it up on the priority list.



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> No matter how we cut it, the first question is whether there is a 105mm on the market that is inexpensive, robust and reliable? If the answer is no, then the artillery will have to pursue other options.



The inexpensive part, definitely not.  For the requirements that we would likely write, titanium is the way to go, the same concept as the 777.  As for on the market, probably not.  I don't think industry is willing to research or stick their neck out too far with the way military purchasing will be going in the coming years.  Building a light and durable ULWPH is very doable, but at a significant cost.



			
				Shrek1985 said:
			
		

> I'm confused; why does anyone think two different systems; a Mortar and a Gun (Howitzer? Gun-Howitzer?) are comparable?
> 
> A nail and a spear can both poke a hole in something, but they are obviously different.
> 
> ...



When you look at a gun and mortar from an effects and capability based perspective, they are almost identical.  It is only when you break down the requirements that they become segregated.  As for the C-16 and 60mm, the same could be said, but I disagree with the decision, and perhaps the requirements may have been written with the C-16 in mind.


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## dapaterson (9 Nov 2012)

Do we need an ultra light weight towed 105mm howitzer?  No.  Get away from Titanium and costs drop, and maintainabiltiy goes up.

If we view the 105mm as a gun for training and ceremonial, we can save a lot of money, and have only a small delta training bill when it's time to roll out the ultra gee whiz titanium 155mm.

It's not rocket science (unless you add in rocket propelled projectiles.  And even rocket science is just "plumbing on steroids" according to John Carmack)


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## ArmyRick (9 Nov 2012)

What is the obession with a 105mm Gun/howitzer? As a 81mm mortar, I can take a semi-educated guess as to the value of the 120mm mortar. Mortars are very effective weapons. Interesting to note that our USMC friends to the south have recently adapted 120mm mortars as well (although its different than the US Army M120 Mortar).

The Mortar offers
-High angle of fire
-120mm HE is more lethal than 105mm HE
-Quick to put into action
-Relatively light compared to 105
-Does better illum than 105 

I realize 105 has more range and can do direct shoots, but me (speaking as a former mortar man) I say 120mm Mortar is fine.

Cheers


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## Kirkhill (9 Nov 2012)

An hour spent on some logistics numbers - 

I have no particular bent towards Yamaha - its numbers are readily available and the Brits (and I believe you) have already used them.

Equally I have no particular bent towards ATV/LOSVs at all.

I just note that they can take the load off of foot borne infantry allowing them to run rather than waddle.


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## Old Sweat (9 Nov 2012)

At the risk of  :deadhorse: let me mention the crazy aunt in the attic nobody wants to talk about. Actually we have to talk about auntie and Uncle Charlie who seems to spend too much time hanging around the school yard. Given the state of the defence budget, I submit it is folly to talk about buying a weapons system solely to provide the militia gunners with a training aid. This is 2012, not 1912 when the regular force was tiny and the militia was the source that would play the major role in the creation of a large expeditionary force. Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.

Okay, so we decide we need a heavy mortar and someone suggests the reserves can become operationally proficient enough in its use to field a viable mortar battery as part of force generation. I am sure they can, but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat. So, if the army wants a heavy mortar, it is more likely that it will be manned by both regulars and reserves. Perhaps cooler heads will prevail and the FOO batteries will become heavy mortar batteries with the majority of the FOOs and FACs being distributed among the three "gun" batteries.

I am being a bit of a devil's advocate here, but the argument for a heavy mortar solely for the reserves, it seems to me, is weak.

The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution!


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## Journeyman (9 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ..... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up?


Compare with the decision to put 99% of "Influence Activities" in the Reserves -- similar logic, or simply most of us don't particularly care about IA?

In an either/or scenario, I know I'd opt for the mortars.....but the question raised is the reliability of Reserve FG, beyond individual/small party augmentation, for a niche capability.

I suspect that discussion will entail splitting the thread for the inevitable    :argue:


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## Allgunzblazing (9 Nov 2012)

This is a question for those in the know - 

What is the reason that the equipment and training is different between the two components of the CF? For example - 105 mm Light Gun is only used by the Reserves vs the M777, five weeks BMQ vs the Reg Force version of BMOQ/ BMQ, etc. 

I'm just an applicant, so I don't know how things work within the organization. It just makes sense to me that if the training and equipment is the same, then the resulting force will be much more battle ready. At any given time, there will be fully trained individuals (in the Reserves) who can be called up in case of an emergency without the need for further training. 

jeffb pointed out that militia units don't have the infrastructure for the M777. One solution could be to have even one gun per brigade, which could be shared by all Res Arty units within the brigade. The same goes for all the other equipment used by the Reg Force - Coyotes, Leopards, etc. 

I make these points in this thread, because (in my opinion) the future of any piece of equipment has to be seen with respect to the big picture. Not just for any particular component.


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## FJAG (9 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ... Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.
> 
> ... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat.
> 
> ...The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution!



At the risk that you're doing this just to push my buttons I feel a need to respond.

A reserve force that no one is prepared to use compulsorily is a waste of money. The military is a force of last resort and to rely on them to come voluntarily when needed is a suicidal policy. 

If this is truly a 'political' issue then its time to get over the conscription crisis - that was so last century.

My belief is that politicians here don't even have an understanding what the existing powers are. We have the legislation in place although I admit we are woefully behind in job protection legislation, financial hardship benefits, wounded warrior support etc. 

The problem in my mind remains within both NDHQ and the CF who are stuck within a particular military model mindset. 

The US has consistently used reserve call ups to increase their force size when necessary. One can argue about how effective Nat Guard units and formations may be but they continue to form a significant role on deployed operations without the US government having paid any political price.

In the UK right now the government is increasing the Territorial Army strength from 15,000 to 30,000 while cutting the regular army by 20,000 because they understand the massive cost savings involved. They know there will be challenges not the least of which is from within the regular force leadership. Their govt is not going to pay a political price for this because the public appreciates that cost cutting measures are necessary.

I see our military leadership's timid approach to the role and utilization of reserves in the same way that the US conventional military leadership addressed the use of special forces in the 80s and 90s. It took a politician - Rumsfeld - to finally get them off the dime.

Don't sell our political leadership short on a per forma basis. If given reasonable and viable options they will most probably go the right way. At present we give them no real options and as a result we get what appear to be arbitrary budget cuts.

If the future of the reserve gunner is in doubt then I would lay that directly at the feet of the army - including artillery - leadership. I see simple and effective solutions. What I don't see is a leadership that will do it. 

(Just as an on-point aside. I just saw a perfectly good M109A4 going up as a memorial at a local legion - how's that for a leadership decision?)


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## GnyHwy (10 Nov 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Do we need an ultra light weight towed 105mm howitzer?  No.  Get away from Titanium and costs drop, and maintainabiltiy goes up.



Perhaps not, but we really, really, really want one.  Especially the gunners in the light role that may fill the dispersed role.  



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> If we view the 105mm as a gun for training and ceremonial, we can save a lot of money, and have only a small delta training bill when it's time to roll out the ultra gee whiz titanium 155mm.



I agree.  Maybe we can build our own.  If it is just for training and ceremonial, then it doesn't have to be that advanced.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's not rocket science (unless you add in rocket propelled projectiles.  And even rocket science is just "plumbing on steroids" according to John Carmack)



I will abstain somewhat, because he is a lot smarter than me, but he doesn't have to drop a rocket next to anyone either.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> What is the obession with a 105mm Gun/howitzer?



Gunners will always be partial to howitzers, perhaps to a fault.  Asking a gunner to prefer a mortar over a howitzer is like asking a tanker to prefer an MGS to a tank.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The Mortar offers
> -High angle of fire
> -120mm HE is more lethal than 105mm HE
> -Quick to put into action
> ...



A howitzer will beat or compete in all categories above except weight.  Your last statement I put in yellow would be one of my main arguments for a howitzer.

Allgunz,  your question is valid, but your potential solution is not realistic at all.  When you get in and do some time, you will see.

Lastly, I realize the current budget dictates that we will be throwing T-flashes and arty sims for a few years, and most of us did it in the 90s.  This topic is the "Future of Light Arty", the discussion should be focused on 5-20 years


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## Petard (10 Nov 2012)

FJAG, you are so far off the mark I don't even know where to begin
The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. Artillery units have gained quite a bit of capability over the past  decade, but no PY growth, and indirectly there was a reduction in capability with the elimination of mortar capability in infantry Bn's. All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.

There will still be a need for P Res Arty units for some time, IMO, and there are many good people in these units, but the question is how much do you give them to train with before the skill level is simply not achievable because the limited training time available. The greatest gap right now, between P Res and Reg F units, is in their respective comm's systems. Reg F Artillery units are going more to networked fire control systems, and the reserves remain in the old fashioned voice system. Trying to close this gap can only be done with an increase of training time, and I would argue they're already having trouble now with availability without increasing the complexity of the system.

So the main need is to have viable P res force that can FG individuals, with as minimal training required as possible before they are deployed. The requirement to equip them with a fleet that is not necessarily deployable is a pattern we can see already with acquisition of the MilCOT fleet of vehicles. Even so, the remote possibility does exist that such a fleet could be deployed (certainly true of the Lg1). The basic intent, near as I've ever seen, is to provide P Res units with a training fleet that is less expensive to operate than the system used for full spectrum Ops, but in certain situations could be used on Ops.

I'm no longer in DLR, so some of my opinion is based on dated info, but it is a qualified one, and it's also based on what was presented during the last AAB

So here goes my  :2c: in response to some of the other comments already made:

- the decision to get rid of the M109 was made some time ago, and once in motion it was going to be difficult to reverse that decision and sustain what in world terms is an obsolete system. Giving them to P res would involve O & M, infrastructure, and tech support costs that would be well above what can be justified for the P Res purpose of FG in support of Reg F units

- 155 ammo isn't cheap, and the danger areas make it diffcult to use in many training areas that have typically multiple users and little real estate (Val Cartier, Petawawa, and Meaford). Even so, there was some research done to possibly acquiring M198 systems for the P Res since there are a lot of them on the market and do not have a high cost vehicle component like a SP system would

- there are many manufacturers tracking Canada's situation WRT replacing the C3 fleet, some of them make very good and reliable systems. These can have old fashioned optic sight, digitzed to various levels, and potentially can be deployed where the lift capability might be more strained. 

 - 105 does fit this bill better because of the pattern of activity related to a towed gun system, and the range it can achieve. This would result in P res units operating a a system which at least has some similarity to the pattern of activity in Reg F units they're FG to. IRT the possibility of operationally deploying the system, since AOR's can be potentially quite large, and fire support assets possibly more centralized, and/or held to FOBs for protection, than range is an important factor  

- I often hear the comment about how viable the 120 is, but besides the shorter range limitation, there never seems to be much mention of just how expensive it is to implement a new ammo type. I worked on a project to get a SP 120 system, and the biggest cost (and one of the show stoppers) was the ammunition cost, even the bill just to qualify its use was virtually prohibitive. Any talk about replacing 105 should also look at the massive cost to demilitarize the 105 ammo stocks (especially the considerable amounts of C132 still around).

- just about any indirect fire system can be digitized at relatively low cost. If it is a stand alone, i.e. non networked system, it does not take long to train someone on a system like this. The obvious pay off is an increased skill level for P Res deploying with Reg F unit with minimal increase in training time.  But without the networking capability it does limit its deployability. There was and, far as I know, still is a project that is intended to deliver a digitized system with whatever replaces the C3, but it would not necessarily plug into LCSS (nor should it)

- it looks like most P Res units outside of the Altantic area are going to left with 81s, which are not that new either (many, if not most, are near the end of their life expectancy). Even with some kind of sustained 81 replacement program, the system itself is very limited in what can provide in training value for soldiers that might be tasked to a towed gun Bty. These systems belong in infantry Bn's (see the miles of discussions elsewhere on this site on this topic)

This, in my mind, means the 105 is still a viable system, the 120 mortar not so much, and the 81 doesn't come even close to the over all need, but if we are to believe the primary purpose of P Res units is to FG for Reg F units then they need some project to meet this need within the next 5-10 years as their obsolete weapon systems eliminate themselves


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## a_majoor (10 Nov 2012)

Having "reserve only" capabilities seems to be part of the CF anyway, one can look at PRes armour or the RCN's use of reservists to man the Kingston class ships to see this in practice. The question of how you can reliably "force generate" units and sub units from the Reserve is a good question, although experience in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan seems to indicate there are plenty of willing people, so perhaps the answer may lie in "tweaking" existing rules and legislation rather than suggesting compulsion. 

In one thread a poster had a realistic plan for raising units and subunits out of reservists by offering a long term Class C contract (the details escape me, but I think the idea was 6 months workup, one year deployed and six months post deployment). If this measure was taken, then each year a "deployment battery" would be formed, volunteers enrolled and the process started. At the same time, a "deployment battery" that was raised two years ago would finish post deployment, turn in the cleaned and repaired kit and everyone would disperse back to their respective regiments.

Combining this with some sort of kit with a small PY and O&M footprint and I think you have a winner. My personal suggestion would be the 120mm mortar given the ability to cover long ranges, provide heavy weight of fire (and terminal effects using smart rounds) towed behind a military utility vehicle in the HMMVW class, or alternatively a BV 206 type vehicle to provide maximum ability to move cross country (the Artillery would then also have a secondary ability to provide mobility in disaster relief and DOMOPS scenarios quite apart from their ability to provide firepower). Using systems that can be deployed and fired by 3 or 4 man crews would keep the footprint small, although there might have to be a larger maintainence troop/battery to keep the systems going, so PY's may be a wash.


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## Infanteer (10 Nov 2012)

First off, this is a great, fascinating discussion about equipping artillery regiments, both regular and reserve, with many thought provoking and informed posts.  Well done.

I remain interested in the debate between a 105mm ULWPH and a 120mm mortar.  From my understanding, the 105mm ULWPH wins in all categories of effects delivered.  It appears that a 120mm mortar along the lines of the USMC EFSS has advantages in portability and crew requirements.  The EFSS can be driven around on those two prime movers with 30 rounds of ammo by 4 mortarmen.  That package can be packed into the back of a helicopter.

I guess I have a few questions here for the resident gunners and mortarmen:

1.  In looking at a 105mm ULWPH vs a 120mm mortar, how many PYs do we want to dedicate to the capability?  What's the crew size on a ULWPH?  Does crew savings mean the possibility of more manned systems (and possibly greater potential effects on target?)

2.  What is easier to deploy, especially in an expeditionary setting.  This could be the kicker.  Where would you deploy a 105mm where you wouldn't deploy a 155mm howitzer?  If a battalion went out the door on a, say, a NEO mission, it would probably be quite easy to push out a troop of 4 x 120mm systems similar to the EFSS to provide an indirect support capability in a pinch.

3.  Which leads naturally to the next question - what does a 120mm provide that an 81mm doesn't?  Using the same example, is the NEO battalion just as well served by having its own 81mm indirect capability restored?  Is there enough of a delta between a (currently nonexistent) infantry 81mm capability and the artillery 155mm capability to warrant another system?


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## McG (10 Nov 2012)

Shrek1985 said:
			
		

> Back in the 70s NATO tried to de-standardize 105mm as too small; okay sure, but it fits in a number of roles well and it's cheaper than 155, which is good for armies like ours.


So, maybe we consider drawing from markets of some newer NATO members on the Eastern side of the alliance.  If 105 mm is too small while 155 mm is too big & expensive, then maybe we look at some 122 mm options.

... Of course, such an idea needs to be addressed in the context of the following question:


			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...  Is there enough of a delta between a (currently nonexistent) infantry 81mm capability and the artillery 155mm capability to warrant another system?


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## Cardstonkid (10 Nov 2012)

If there is a decision in the near term to provide new (ish) equipment to replace the C3's it must, for budget reasons, be a newer 105 mm system. If this decision is not made soon, all or most Reserve units will become 81 mm mortar units.  

That being said, the chances of a newer 105 are slim to none, and slim is putting his boots on. The costs of using the 81 mm, the fact that it does not require arty tow qualified drivers, or gun tractors, that there is more flexibility in use of training areas, and that it pushes Reserve Arty units into a more generic soldier role more suited for UN actions, makes the 81 mm mortar solution the most likely. 

The 81 mm is also the choice if no decision is made soon. For these reasons I would suggest the direction, even if it is not planned, will be 81 mm mortars. 

As has been mentioned previously, the 120mm sounds nice, until you add up all of the costs associated with it. I suspect there is no appetite for a new weapons system that does not  increase the capability of the Army at a low cost. We have 81 mm mortars in the system, we have the ammo, we even have trained mortar members in Reserve units, so dropping the 105mm still gives reason for Reserve Arty units to exist. 

I recognize that this changes the training and interoperability relationship between Reserve gunners and their Reg force counterparts, but I suspect this will be dealt with more easily than investing in a new 120mm mortar system. The 81 mm offers the lowest possible cost, even if the 81mm needs to be replaced with a newer model. What this means for interoperability is a significant question, but I suspect it will be secondary question to the overall cost issue. 

As for new 105's, the M119 is likely the only realistic 105mm option for Canada. It is in production through 2013, it is well suited to cold weather, and the latest model has the inertial navigation system. If we are going to get a new gun, I think this will be it. I don't think it is going to happen, but I am hoping. Maybe someone could tell slim to hold on for a bit.


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## FJAG (10 Nov 2012)

Petard said:
			
		

> The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. ... All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.



Sorry Petard but don't your observations prove my point?

Since Korea, we have stood up a large and expensive regular army/artillery which never went to war until Afghanistan. Even during the first Gulf war we did not send artillery to participate. Our will to commit conventional combat forces was and remains low yet we, as taxpayers, we pay a significant amount to still maintain an arguably large branch which sees, and is predicted to see, only minor operational commitment. 

In Afghanistan many branches had large reserve components and they all had long work up sessions before deployment. In my mind that is very much part of the new model of operational deployment and it leaves room to take reservists with fundamental skills to the level needed for operations.

I don't believe in reserve unit mobilization. That's capability hasn't existed since the early 1960s. 

I'll go further. In my mind there should be no reserve 'units'. Units are regiments and while we use the term for our reserve organizations they are in fact frequently undermanned and over ranked batteries.

What I see are reserve battery gun lines headed by a regular force captain and a cadre of regular force personnel for maintenance and key leadership positions. (No BC, no FOOS, no FSCC - leave those with the reg f) These batteries would come under the command of the existing regular force regiments and are to be administered and trained by them and plug into their overall establishment and operational role. 

Why keep Reserve LCols and Majs many of the Capts, CWOs and MWOs in reserve units that rarely exceed a hundred all ranks. How many of them went to Afghanistan? Not enough to justify a career structure. Not to denigrate them but they are frequently in civilian employment that makes deployment difficult and their skill levels aren't up to the tasks they would need to do in combat. Get rid of these ranks and you can fund another twenty or thirty gunners per battery.

My reg v res model has always been to identify those jobs that you don't need day-to-day and build a viable reserve system around them. Reservists should have only a very minor career path. They should be doers. If they want a 'career' in the military they should component transfer. Young reserve gunners do not join with the aim of being the RSM. They join to fire the guns and get their hands on cool gear. Give them that and give them good leadership and their skill levels will blossom.

I don't for a minute believe there is any equipment we have which is too complex for reservists as a group to use. Its all a matter of the right training and exercise model. If comms systems are really that complex now then leave those as a reg f job.

My approach is one based on redoing the model from scratch based on what so far is an operational deployment model that rarely exceeds a battle group and that always has time for work-up training. If we do need a true quick reaction force as part of our defence mandate then that can be pure regular force. My guess is that it will never exceed a BG either so the one battery gun line per ref f regiment is more than adequate for that need - in fact with that model you could QRF a whole three gun regiment if needed.

As for the M109s, I didn't advocate those for the reserves per se. I think we should have kept them in storage as a strategic resource or leave one Brigade (and its reservists) fully equipped with them so that we do not loose a heavy capability. I know at the time we were getting rid of tanks and Chinooks as well and look what happened there. We've also gotten much better with heavy strategic airlift since then. Quite frankly if the operational environment becomes less permissive, and the armoured and infantry have tanks and LAVs or whatever the CCV may be, do you really want to have towed 155s? Personally I'd rather have them take a few weeks to get them out of storage than go to PWGSC to go rent us a bunch.

I know 155 ammo is not cheap. With that in mind we need better and more realistic simulation at the gun end. Why don't we have training ammunition that lets the gun line do all their drills but without a projectile actually leaving the barrel. Live firing is very important but much basic and refresher training can be done without it.

My point isn't that there is a political mindset against the reserves. (Although there is. The whole Limited Liability v Unlimited Liability fiasco is evidence of that) My point is that there is a mindset that can't see beyond the existing reg/res structure because that's what they've been used to their entire careers and they don't want to lose their existing reg f PYs.

The time for tweaking a poor system has expired. Governments have to deal with massive deficits and are having a hard time seeing why it costs us billions and billions of dollars every year to be able to keep one battle group in the field. We need to come up with innovative ideas that will reduce costs and yet still allow us to field a credible force when required.

If I can be honest, this whole business with 155s v 105s  v mortars, old v new strikes me as almost unseemly for what has always been the King of Battle. 

We have artillery with guns so that we can quickly mass fire across a large front of the battlefield while infantry battalions had mortars for fast guaranteed fire within their immediate areas. Guns and mortars in their specific place have been proven by battle over and over again for over a half century.  They are complimentary weapons systems. 

Moving mortars out of battalions and giving them to the artillery is, IMHO, PY counting/bean counting at its worst. I only pray that there aren't going to be a whole bunch of grunts that will pay the ultimate price at some time because the fire support they needed wasn't there. (Take a look at Op ANACONDA for an example of what happens when grunts go in without guns and mortars)

The argument as to which weapon delivery system we should use should never be primarily predicated on how easy is it to use, do we have ranges to use it on, will it fit in the armoury etc. It should be based on what will the supported arms be needing in the way of fire support and what terminal weapon's effects do we have to put in the target area to fulfill that need. Once we determine that, everything else will logically fall into place.

Haven't got this worked up over artillery issues for almost three decades.    Nice to be chatting again with people that actually know the difference between a gun and a mortar. The legal branch has been a bit boring.


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## McG (10 Nov 2012)

FJAG & others,
Let's keep this on the topic of light artillery.  If you want to talk reserve roles, orgs & purposes, then we have a whole other thread for that:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html

Cheers,
The staff.


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## Petard (11 Nov 2012)

Leaving aside the "what shall we do with reserves" tangent, and that possibly it is a good idea to keep a towed artillery capability in our P Res units, here are a few options (fodder for this discussion) 

Chile has a version of M101/33, or C3 as we call it, in service. Their gov't workshops are able to sustain theirs and do not have any problems with manufacture of recoil components (a major obstacle in sustaining our fleet). They have 92 in use, they might be able to assist in sustaining our fleet, or even possibly selling them should they become surplus
http://articles.janes.com/articles/jdu2000/Chilean-M101-33-howitzers-in-service.html

There are countries with surplus L118/119's, they might be a possibility too, albeit they would be second hand and in most cases not the improved version the US has in service (parts would not be as easy to come by) A good prosepct might be Australia as they complete transition to the M777
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-a-450m600m-land-17-artillery-replacement-gets-goahead-01928/

Nexter still makes the LG1, in fact they recently sold an improved version, the digitzed Mk III, to Columbia.
www.armyrecognition.com/france_french_army_light_and_heavy_weapons_uk/105_lg_mk_iii_nexter_systems_digital_towed_artillery_canon_howitzer_french_france_technical_data_she.html
P Res units in LFAA will be using this gun for some time now that servicing agreement worked out with GD OTS

South Africa has an excellent gun system too, although it fires a unique ammunition that would be diffcult to qualify and support
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1940.html


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## FJAG (12 Nov 2012)

I've had a long look at the options and the current organization in order to see whether there is a continuing role for light artillery. 

Firstly the options. 

In my view artillery needs to standardize on guns and not get involved in mortars. As I've mentioned before, the ability to mass fire over large areas is paramount. The range guns offer and the ability to concentrate fire while dispersing guns makes this possible. Terminal effects of rounds is also critical. Round for round a 105mm HE offers two to three times the weight of steel and high explosive as the 81 and 105. While mortars might increase the amount of fragment output through increase burst rates, the projectiles do not offer the same penetration power into fortifications. Lower angles of fire, shorter times of flight and even direct fire capabilities are also a distinct advantage.

As far as guns are concerned, in my mind the best option is to standardize on the 155 mm M777. It provides range, a sophisticated ammunition mix and air transportability. Standardization is the best administrative solution as we would have only one training, maintenance and ammunition supply chain to deal with. On the down side, is the cost of the additional guns and training ammunition costs. - I'll give a nod to the nay sayers and admit that these two items will probably make this a option a non starter. If we won't get more M777s then there is no need to consider any other 155 gun for the same reasons.

That leaves us with a 105 mm solution by default.

How do the primary 105 mm options compare? Range is one issue but they are negligibly different with the L118/M119 having a small edge. Weight for air transportability is the second key factor. Here the LG1 comes in at appx 1,500kg and the C3 at 2,500kg the heaviest. I won't get into digitization or ease of use. All these choices are capable of improvement.

When we look at the means of transport we have the Griffon with at best a 2,000kg load and the Chinook with a 12,700kg. I have no experience with Griffons lifting LG1s but assuming we have done that then I would presume we would need three choppers for 1 for the gun, 1 for the crew and 1 for a pallet of ammo. (I've done that with L5s and the old Hueys and C1s with the old CH113 Voyageurs and CH47s - believe me the Voyageur was the better vehicle and the Chinook the vastly superior choice) I would think using Griffons to move guns would be the exception rather than the rule and that Chinooks would be our standard airborne gun tractor in which case any of the three guns (and the M777) are airmobile.

Do I really see an airmobile role? I guess I do. 

Quite frankly the current organization of the regular force leaves me puzzled. Rather than organizing two mech brigades and one light brigade, we've gone egalitarian and ensured that every infantry regiment gets two mech bns and one light bn while our tanks are also penny packeted around the country. In short while there is a light role it doesn't seem to be organized at the brigade level meaning artillery support at each brigade must be capable of support to mech and light. (I've already made my feelings known about the demise of the M109 and won't beat that dead horse again). The M777 can adequately support both mech and light (again a clear signal for standardization)

Do we need a 105 mm for operational support? No. The M777 can provide both mech and light operational modes. Do we need more M777s for operational deployments? Only if we deploy more than a brigade. We will have the ability to field at least 4 batteries of M777s operationally. I doubt if we will ever deploy more than a brigade based on our past experiences.

Where does that leave us? Ceremonial and basic training needs. The C3 is adequate for that. Its the no new capital funds solution.

So. Unless someone can find a new Defence of Canada role that can't be met by existing M777s, LG1s or C3s, I think we're stuck with what we got.

Doing mortars is a big mistake. Yes the thing goes bang but you are dumbing down all of the artillery skills that make artillery what it is. While having artillery personnel man mortars in Afghanistan may have been fine - we had only a few people there and could pick up the slack for the grunts, a less permissive environment could lead to disaster when we can't find the people to man both mortars and all the arty stuff like guns and CM radars and UAVs and forward observers and FSCCs and air defence etc etc.


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## ArmyRick (12 Nov 2012)

FJAG

"..pick up the slack for the grunts.." . What? We had mortars taken away from us in protest. Believe me, arty and infantry can agree on one thing. In a perfect world, arty mans guns and infantry mans mortars. We want our tubes back, but thats another story.

Penny packing the tanks? Last I heard, they are being concentrated in Edmonton and some at the school in Gagetown.


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## Infanteer (12 Nov 2012)

Good post FJAG, and I concur with most of your points.  At this point, Occam's Razor indicates the best course of action.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> Quite frankly the current organization of the regular force leaves me puzzled. Rather than organizing two mech brigades and one light brigade, we've gone egalitarian and ensured that every infantry regiment gets two mech bns and one light bn while our tanks are also penny packeted around the country. In short while there is a light role it doesn't seem to be organized at the brigade level meaning artillery support at each brigade must be capable of support to mech and light. (I've already made my feelings known about the demise of the M109 and won't beat that dead horse again). The M777 can adequately support both mech and light (again a clear signal for standardization)



Yup - Force 2013, trying to please everybody by doing everything half-heartedly and nothing well.  Our Army is conceptually fixed by the Afghanistan battle group.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Penny packing the tanks? Last I heard, they are being concentrated in Edmonton and some at the school in Gagetown.



1/3 of the armoured force is in Gagetown while the rest of it is consolidated in Edmonton, and yet promised to everybody around the country (meaning that the LdSH will continue to be a capability manager).  We need to admit we only have enough tanks for a single Brigade, figure out what that means and sacrifice the Combat Team Commander's Course to the cut-back gods.


----------



## FJAG (12 Nov 2012)

Apologies ArmyRick. I didn't know the details of what happened there. I'm still in shock that it's going on at all. I remember the Airborne Battery used to have L5s and 81s but that was a very special situation.

My understanding was that there was a PY struggle with a need for more rifles with the sections and something in the Bns had to go. I didn't mean that the infantry in general was desiring to give them up but that somewhere in the back halls of Ottawa a decision was made that the infantry leadership signed off on. In retrospect the term "picking up the slack" isn't even suitable for that thought.

Re tanks: The latest documents I read still indicated a squadron going to each of Pet and Val. If the tanks are concentrating with the Strathconas I'm glad to hear it.


----------



## Infanteer (12 Nov 2012)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Re tanks: The latest documents I read still indicated a squadron going to each of Pet and Val. If the tanks are concentrating with the Strathconas I'm glad to hear it.



A squadron is going to Gagetown and it'll be a composite 12 RBC and RCD squadron....


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## Infanteer (12 Nov 2012)

...and, quite on time, the Journal of Military Operations delivers an article concerned with the future of British artillery.  (Sign up is free)

https://www.tjomo.com/article/8/Down_The_Tubes_A_View_on_the_Future_of_Field_Guns_Using_United_Kingdom_Artillery_as_the_Example/

The author essentially states:

1.  Everything the 105mm can do the 155mm can do better;

2.  The 155mm howitzer like the M777 is the best "middle-ground" weapon - more deployable than a SPH but more effective than a 105mm ULWPH.

3.  Old artillery structures (3 Batteries with Gun Troop, HQ, and Observation elements) may be obsolete.  FOOs may be concentrated in their own regiment and may not consist of exclusively gunners.

Interesting read.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (12 Nov 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> FOOs may be concentrated in their own regiment and may not consist of exclusively gunners.



I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.


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## ArmyRick (12 Nov 2012)

The aussies are going with a single and large gun battery in each regiment, plus 2-3 OP/FOO batteries. Whats everybody's take on this? Gunners, your thoughts?


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## George Wallace (12 Nov 2012)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.



Agreed.  Part of TQ3 (really dating myself) Armour was to call in Fire Missions.  It was also part of Armour Officer Phase Trg.  The use of puff tables (and later their new fangled electronic big screen imagery version) in the Arty School was always part of those courses.  

At the same time, FAC trg was also introduced on Officer Phase Trg, with the acknowledgement that a more formal crse and qualification would be necessary to be a FAC.  There is no need for a FAC to be Arty or Pilot.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse (12 Nov 2012)

My thoughts??  We only talk about others doing more with less [positions], when it comes time for us to walk the walk...........I can't see it.


EDIT: I should state "we" implies to any trade/ job/ etc.


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## GnyHwy (12 Nov 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and, quite on time, the Journal of Military Operations delivers an article concerned with the future of British artillery.  (Sign up is free)
> 
> https://www.tjomo.com/article/8/Down_The_Tubes_A_View_on_the_Future_of_Field_Guns_Using_United_Kingdom_Artillery_as_the_Example/
> 
> ...



Statement 1 is pretty bold.  I guess he must be excluding rate of fire, reaction to near ground targets, simplicity, air mobility, etc.

Statement 2 also seems too convenient.  Comparing in 2 categories, but to 2 different systems.  One could as easily say that the 777 is less deployable than a 105, and less effective than a SPH (autoloader).

Statement 3 I can get on board with. Having experienced eyes everywhere would be very valuable, but I doubt our current regimental system would allow for too many postings outside the trades.  We do this already to some extent.  FACs can be any cbt arm, and the current OP batteries have Os from other trades.  I would argue that there should be more NCMs though, because Os only use that skill for a few years whereas an NCM can use it for several.



			
				Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.



I guess it depends on your definition of large.  I'll make an assumption that you mean at least BG, but I would argue that Cbt Tms need them too.  I think most SACs would say the same, and if they don't, they probably had a crappy FOO.  Your absolutely right that calling a fire mission is not hard.  The only thing wrong with that statement is, calling in the mission is the smallest and easiest part of being a FOO.  The simple shooting is only about 1/10 of the training.  One could easily say that, shooting is easy, just like kicking doors, crew drills, and digging tank ditches, but if you don't do it all the time, you won't be very good at it.  I've seen our army's elite call in fire missions after being trained.  It's not pretty.  As well as some of the junior Os that I have trained that don't think they need drills, or have a better way of doing something they know nothing about, or "what is this bracketing thing"?  Attitudes like that are why the wrong people get killed.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The aussies are going with a single and large gun battery in each regiment, plus 2-3 OP/FOO batteries. Whats everybody's take on this? Gunners, your thoughts?



I do like the FOO Bty concept, and we are doing it somewhat, although half arsed IMO.  I think if we did one battery properly, it would produce good results.  2-3 per Regt i.e per Bde seems a little overkill, and by what Bruce has said above, I think he would agree.  Some more recent conversation on this is at http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/108115.0.html

You will get many mixed opinions within the Arty about this topic.  Simply put, the FOO guys think it's good and everyone else can't see why its good.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Agreed.  Part of TQ3 (really dating myself) Armour was to call in Fire Missions.  It was also part of Armour Officer Phase Trg.  The use of puff tables (and later their new fangled electronic big screen imagery version) in the Arty School was always part of those courses.
> 
> At the same time, FAC trg was also introduced on Officer Phase Trg, with the acknowledgement that a more formal crse and qualification would be necessary to be a FAC.  There is no need for a FAC to be Arty or Pilot.



Again, calling in fire missions is easy, and we put gunners on this as long they have a comms course.  There suppose to have a PLQ, but that is waived more than not.  FACs aren't just Arty or Pilot.  Every cbt arm can be a FAC, and there is a representation within the school and the FOO btys.  Too bad it's not a good career move for them. 



			
				Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> My thoughts??  We only talk about others doing more with less [positions], when it comes time for us to walk the walk...........I can't see it.
> 
> EDIT: I should state "we" implies to any trade/ job/ etc.



I agree here.  In order for us to have the multitude of capabilities that higher echelon wants of us, we have had to water them all down.


----------



## rampage800 (12 Nov 2012)

> Quote from: Bruce Monkhouse on Today at 14:54:40
> 
> I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.



Pretty bold statement isn't it Bruce, while I agree that the Arm and Inf should be proficient in the AACFF (and most are) there's a fair stretch between doing it on a range in Wx or Gagetown when the rounds are landing 1.5km + and doing it in operations where most engagements are considerably closer. Obviously its been done before but I'd be willing to bet that if you asked each person who did it would they rather have had a Qualified Observer conduct the mission I'm certain it would be a resounding yes. 

For Controllers all being Arty or pilots I'd agree that there is some empire building going on within the Arty but one of the biggest reasons is economy of effort for training. Its a lot easier to train guys, keep currencies, put on exercise if everyone is centrally located and belongs to 1 CoC, then there isn't competing priorities, taskings, personal opinions, exercises, etc.  Lets not also forget that there are other trades with the FAC Qual and every Arty Regiment has 2 spots for an Inf and Arm pers and spots at the School so they do exist.

Anyhow....my 2 cents


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## FJAG (12 Nov 2012)

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.


Let me start with the most obvious point which is that leading a company or a platoon is a full time job. You don't want to be spending your time doing the fine points of getting into a tactical position from where you can call and adjust fire, manage the airspace between incoming rounds and aircraft, judge battle damage, negotiate for more resources etc etc while your troops are all sitting around waiting for a decision from you. 

Any reasonably intelligent person can be taught to adjust fire on the ranges but - guess what - on operations the job is a full time one which requires expertise, a touch of talent and the ability to juggle several resources simultaneously. 

Indirect fire support, including aviation and air is becoming more complex what with integrated lasers, GPS, dedicated data links etc which requires a dedicated and skilled crew to operate and maintain - and be able to fall back to a map with a grease pencil when the system goes down. 

Could someone other than an officer do these jobs? Probably. You should note though that in the artillery we used to have great arguments about whether FOOs should be experienced captains (like in Brit based armies) or whether they could they be 2nd lieutenants (like the US and several other countries do) and should FACs be arty or air force and if air force should they be pilots or something like ETACs etc. I don't want to sound pedantic here but for us the question generally came down on the side of having experienced individuals up front that have the ability to analyze the situation and had the authority to 'call for fire' specifying nature of ammo, volume of fire and several other technical matters rather than simply 'requesting fire'. In armies that use low level ranks to request fire its the fire direction centres at the gun regiment/battalion or battery level that make those decisions. Letting the guy at the site of the contact call the shots is a very good thing in my mind. Having more senior gunner officers up front makes this happen.

As to the concept of separating FSCC/FOO personnel from the gun batteries all I can say is that observers have primarily been (but not always) part of the batteries for over a century and I think its pretty much time to change that. 

While there is some benefit in keeping BCs and Tp Comds with the battery like administration, command experience, and development of interpersonal relationships between the gun line and the guys up front, the jobs on operations are quite distinct. Effectively the BC and FOO can spend months separated from the gun line except by radio link. In garrison, the forward elements and the gun line train together only a few times per year to the extent that live ammo permits. Others may disagree but in my mind there is no loss of proficiency in separating these elements into two separate batteries. On the contrary I think the BC and FOOs could probably spend more time on their skills and be with their supported arms.


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## George Wallace (12 Nov 2012)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Let me start with the most obvious point which is that leading a company or a platoon is a full time job. You don't want to be spending your time doing the fine points of getting into a tactical position from where you can call and adjust fire, manage the airspace between incoming rounds and aircraft, judge battle damage, negotiate for more resources etc etc while your troops are all sitting around waiting for a decision from you.
> 
> Any reasonably intelligent person can be taught to adjust fire on the ranges but - guess what - on operations the job is a full time one which requires expertise, a touch of talent and the ability to juggle several resources simultaneously.
> 
> ...



This is a great big "EXCUSE ME?"

In all my time in Recce, when it came time to call down fire, we did not have the luxury to call an officer forward to our OP to conduct a Fire Mission, nor did we have time to find and wait to call a "Gunner" forward.  Let me just end this here by saying that there are "Professionals" in other places than the officer corps of the RCHA who are more than capable of calling in a Fire Mission.  

At the same time there are numpties sitting in Artillery CPs who seem to have the impression that everyone travels around with a Met Tech.  (Like the idiot who requested the fol of me during a Fire Mission: Wind Speed, Air Temp, etc. at my loc and target loc......friggin get serious.)


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## FJAG (12 Nov 2012)

rampage800 said:
			
		

> For Controllers all being Arty or pilots I'd agree that there is some empire building going on within the Arty but one of the biggest reasons is economy of effort for training. Its a lot easier to train guys, keep currencies, put on exercise if everyone is centrally located and belongs to 1 CoC, then there isn't competing priorities, taskings, personal opinions, exercises, etc.  Lets not also forget that there are other trades with the FAC Qual and every Arty Regiment has 2 spots for an Inf and Arm pers and spots at the School so they do exist.



I don't have a strong opinion on this rather an observation from experience. When I was a FOO, I was also trained as and became a qualified FAC. Doing an attack run requires much concentration and involves you full-time from the moment the aircraft is on station until it clears the battle space. During that interval you have no time to do anything else and the tactical situation may well require you observe and engage other targets, communicate with the supported arm etc.

If I had my way I'd want an ETAC within arms reach to control the air, have my arty tech engage any other gun targets necessary, an MFC run his mortars while I quarterback the whole ball of wax and make sure everything ends up on the enemy. Everybody doing what they do best. Probably not what the PY counters want to hear though.


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## rampage800 (12 Nov 2012)

Actually FJAG most Controllers nowadays are NCO's and can work either with FOO Parties or independently.


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## ArmyRick (12 Nov 2012)

I think some here are getting the AACFF confused with the extensive and well planned out fire missions that FOO are capable of. When I was in Mortar platoon (I only have the basic not the advanced course), there was many different ways to set up fire missions to get effects on the ground (screen, neutralize, destroy, illuminate, etc, etc).

I don't think we should be naive enough to believe that anybody (REGARDLESS of what they did in the past and what worked on ex) can handle more complex fire mission planning. I can do a basic AACFF but I would not feel comfortable doing it if there was civies close by or friendly troops moving into an assault position. Thats what FOOs are for, let them handle it.


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## Infanteer (12 Nov 2012)

Having worked with a FOO attached to the company in Afghanistan and, at times, pushed up to my platoon for certain operations I concur with the previous posts.  The AACFF is great in a pinch, but it doesn't replace having a guy plugged into the gunner net who's looking specifically at how effects can be brought onto the enemy while I focused on maneouvre.  The fact that the NCO beside him was a FAC talking to the TACP made it all the better.


----------



## FJAG (12 Nov 2012)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is a great big "EXCUSE ME?"
> 
> In all my time in Recce, when it came time to call down fire, we did not have the luxury to call an officer forward to our OP to conduct a Fire Mission, nor did we have time to find and wait to call a "Gunner" forward.  Let me just end this here by saying that there are "Professionals" in other places than the officer corps of the RCHA who are more than capable of calling in a Fire Mission.
> 
> At the same time there are numpties sitting in Artillery CPs who seem to have the impression that everyone travels around with a Met Tech.  (Like the idiot who requested the fol of me during a Fire Mission: Wind Speed, Air Temp, etc. at my loc and target loc......friggin get serious.)



George. You've misread what I said in a number of places. 

In the first place I know there are numerous "professionals" out there that can call down fire. I've worked with great NCO arty techs and Infantry MFCs as well as recce crews - in fact in my day I taught quite a few RCR and VIII CH NCOs and officers how to shoot and watched them do very well indeed. 

As to calling a FOO forward, that's rarely necessary as a good FOO puts himself where the action is on his own initiative. Admittedly that's sometimes hard on a recce screen which covers more area than a single FOO, even with a split team, can handle. 

Your example about the "idiot" in the Arty CP asking you dumb questions proves my point. I can tell you that as a FOO I've never been asked a dumb question and immediately got the rounds I demanded. That's the point of my statement. With a FOO, I call the gun line direct and the front end gets what's needed ASAP. When the "request for fire" comes from others its probably routed through your command net, picked up by the FSCC, gets analysed and interpreted and routed to whatever guns are available. People vet what you ask for and you may not get what you need when you need it.

If you reread my post more slowly you may find I'm actually on your side about the  fact that there are lots of folks out there that can shoot a good mission but there's more to the job then that and that frequently the supported arms guys have a lot more to do then adjust a fire mission.

For rampage800. Re controllers. Mortar Fire Controllers were NCOs in my day too. When I researched Op ANACONDA this year I learned about USAF ETACs and knew they were NCOs.  We trained our Arty Techs for that as well. Are there other air controllers in the Canadian system that are NCOs?

As an aside re ANACONDA there were over twenty ETACs etc deployed in a six kilometre square area when you count up the ones with the special forces and the two 'companies' worth of conventional troops all of whom had to fight with the dysfunctional air tasking system. I've read both the USAF's after action report and several other analyses (Sean Taylor in particular) and if you ever want to see a battle where people screwed up the planning of indirect fire support (no guns, only one mortar with the initial lift, quickly attrited aviation and unbelievably uncoordinated air) this is the one for you.


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## rampage800 (12 Nov 2012)

FJAG

My earlier post may have been ambiguous, when I said Controller I indeed meant FAC (the more commonly (unofficial) used name now is JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller, even though its a US term). The short answer to your question is yes, most are NCO's mainly because they hang around the units a lot longer then the officers do so the CF gets a little more bang for their buck.

Sorry for the slight hijack


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## FJAG (13 Nov 2012)

rampage800 said:
			
		

> FJAG
> 
> My earlier post may have been ambiguous, when I said Controller I indeed meant FAC (the more commonly (unofficial) used name now is JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller, even though its a US term). The short answer to your question is yes, most are NCO's mainly because they hang around the units a lot longer then the officers do so the CF gets a little more bang for their buck.
> 
> Sorry for the slight hijack



At the risk of being way off topic one more time, I see the term JTAC in US usage as well. Looks identical to an ETAC so probably just a terminology change.

One final question. It looks to me like the Cdn JTACs are combat arms rather than primarily air force as in the US. Are there any Cdn JTACs from the Cdn air force or are they all combat arms?


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## jeffb (13 Nov 2012)

There are RCAF FACs as I know several first hand.


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## Petard (13 Nov 2012)

Somewhat back on topic, a 105 is a better system for FAC training since it has faster time of flight than a mortar for a given range, and certainly a lower max ord. The operating costs, in a training enviornment, are cheaper as well compared to 155

In the remote chance it were used for SEAD during actual Ops, it has the advantage of range over a mortar, although not the 155 for range or effects


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## MikeL (13 Nov 2012)

FJAG said:
			
		

> At the risk of being way off topic one more time, I see the term JTAC in US usage as well. Looks identical to an ETAC so probably just a terminology change.



Just from my own readings,  it seems like ETAC is an out of date term.  But a ETAC/JTAC is the same thing,  just ETAC specifically refered to enlisted pers(NCM) doing the JTAC job.




			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> One final question. It looks to me like the Cdn JTACs are combat arms rather than primarily air force as in the US. Are there any Cdn JTACs from the Cdn air force or are they all combat arms?



Like jeffb said,  there are RCAF pers trained as FACs.   Pilots, ANAVs and AECs can attend the course if they will be posted into a position that requires it.  I know there are postings for them in the Bde TACP and at the school.  I am unsure if they are actually employed as a FAC/JTAC attached to a Cbt Team,  as I've only heard about/seen Combat Arms pers in that job.


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## ArmyRick (13 Nov 2012)

Just going back to 105mm gun vs 120mm mortar, yes artillery dudes I know you don't like comparing, but I wanted to re-hash something from earlier. Someone was pointing out that a 105 is better than a 120 in all aspects (can't remember who), how ever, a couple of points
1. From what I understand 120mm HE mortar has a greater lethal radius than a 105mm HE (its like 60-65m, I will dig up my source for that, give me a bit)
2. For illumination, can anybody challenge a mortar? Its high angle of fire allows better illum missions in my opinion

I realize 105 can do direct shoot (Gunners, can a 155 do that?) and has longer range (if range was the key issue than 155 beats both systems hands down).

Gunners, if you were forced to choose between an 81mm or 120mm mortar and lets say 105 was not even an option, which would you go for?


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## Petard (13 Nov 2012)

I think this thread meanders enough dontcha think?

Let's not forget that for any given range a 105mm gun system has a smaller PER than a 120mm mortar
But  there are 105 ammunition types that have greater range than even glide type 120mm mortar ammunition, can deliver both lethal and non lethal effects to that range, and have the potential to be fitted with PGK

One exmaple: the Rheinmetal-Denel M11130 and M1131 series of 105mm howitzer ammunition. This family of 105mm ammunition can achieve ~30km in avg MET conditions, and deliver non lethal effects including multi spectral smk, Smk HC, Illum and IR Illum, as well as lethal effects. They claim the lethal effects approximate the M107 155 mm rd (I've attended their arena tests of this, and for their VLAP ammunition, they're not blowing smoke, so to speak). Therefore 105mm light arty certainly can exceed std 120mm ammunition not only in range, but in effects and accuracy as well. That a mortar fires high angle is a non issue; any modern 105 system can fire high angle too

Other ammuntion manufacturers are pursuing these same goals

Our current 155 non lethal  ammunition cannot achieve those ranges by the way

post edit: the M777 can, and has in Ops, fired direct


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## jeffb (13 Nov 2012)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I realize 105 can do direct shoot (Gunners, can a 155 do that?) and has longer range (if range was the key issue than 155 beats both systems hands down).
> 
> Gunners, if you were forced to choose between an 81mm or 120mm mortar and lets say 105 was not even an option, which would you go for?



The 81mm hands down. The 120mm mortar in my view loses out on one of the key advantage of the mortar over gun howitzers, namely, their portability. The 81mm mortar can be relatively easily jumped with, transported in a small vehicle like a LUVW or man packed. Good luck doing a dismounted operation with a 120mm mortar. There is a place I think for 120 mm mortars but if it is an either/or type situation, 81 makes more sense to me. 

And yes, any gun/howitzer can be fired in a direct role. A gun by definition is able to engage targets directly or at least using relatively flat trajectories. In addition, the 105mm guns that we have in service (LG1, C3) can fire high angle. The C3 does require a pit to be dug but that's all part of the drill. We usually don't fire high angle as the probable error in range goes up. (It's less accurate).


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## GnyHwy (13 Nov 2012)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Just going back to 105mm gun vs 120mm mortar, yes artillery dudes I know you don't like comparing, but I wanted to re-hash something from earlier. Someone was pointing out that a 105 is better than a 120 in all aspects (can't remember who), how ever, a couple of points



I don't mind comparing at all, and I can offer plenty of good things about the 120.  I can also offer many good things about the 105.  At the time it seemed the argument was getting lopsided toward the 120.  I believe you are remembering me as saying that the 105 was better in all categories.   What I said was a howitzer will beat or compete in all categories that you mentioned, except weight.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The Mortar offers
> -High angle of fire
> -120mm HE is more lethal than 105mm HE
> -Quick to put into action
> ...





			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> A howitzer will beat or compete in all categories above except weight.  Your last statement I put in yellow would be one of my main arguments for a howitzer.





			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 1. From what I understand 120mm HE mortar has a greater lethal radius than a 105mm HE (its like 60-65m, I will dig up my source for that, give me a bit)



With conventional ammo yes, mostly because of their steep angle of fall provides a more circular fragmentation pattern.  Some potential problems with that could be, do you want the fragments to comes backwards?  Also, as Petard has mentioned the PER/CEP is larger for a mortar.  I will also add that mortars are much more susceptible to wind. 



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 2. For illumination, can anybody challenge a mortar? Its high angle of fire allows better illum missions in my opinion



Current 120 shells are better than 105 for candle power and length of effective illumination (hang time), but once again the 105 will offer more range.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I realize 105 can do direct shoot (Gunners, can a 155 do that?) and has longer range (if range was the key issue than 155 beats both systems hands down).



Yes a 777 can fire direct, but not nearly as effective as a 105.  A 105 can be manhandled quite easily, therefore making it easier to react to targets not directly in front of you.  Also, they can be manhandled in to positions that you could not bring a 777.  Much like daftandbarmy's example. 



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is more like my idea of what 'light artillery' should be doing:
> 
> Their Dragon in Helmand
> 
> ...





			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Gunners, if you were forced to choose between an 81mm or 120mm mortar and lets say 105 was not even an option, which would you go for?



It would depend on the size of the manoeuvre force.  If it was cbt tm size expeditionary, or air mobile, I would want 81s, or even 60s (oops, I didn't mean to say 60s).  If it was BG, I want 120s.  If I could only have one to try and do everything, then it would have to be the 120, mostly because of range.

Although I am mostly likely subconsciously partial to a howitzer, I really am trying to be impartial.  If the conversation was lopsided toward the 105, I probably would defend the 120, just to keep the debate even.  I can make arguments for both.  I don't take any of this personal, and rather enjoy the debate.


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## Old Sweat (13 Nov 2012)

E Battery on TF 3-06 used a 120mm mortar that was loaned to them by the US SF. It would be interesting to find out what they thought of it. The CO of 2 RCHA and two of the BCs ( D Battery and the OP Battery) were on that TF, so perhaps JeffB or someone else from the regiment could ask them.

Canadian gunners also were equipped with the 4.2in Mortar in the early fifties and then again from about 1964 to 1969. In the fifties the Canadian based field regiments had a light battery of, I think, three troops each of four tubes. One of the batteries - Z - was a para battery. These batteries were re-equipped with towed 155 howitzers circa 1956 or 1957. When 2 CIBG in Petawawa became a light brigade in 1964 4 RCHA traded its C1s for 4.2in Mortars and kept them until they were replaced by L5s in early 1969.

Here is a link to a site: 

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/smallarms/4pt2.htm

I had occasion to fire the 4.2in on officer training (unofficially as one of our AIGs was an airborne gunner and he found us some ammunition) and then on the IG Course, It was not very sophisticated, but was fairly accurate and produced a big bang at the sharp end. I would not want to manpack it or its ammunition. On reflection if given the choice of mortars to take to a combat zone, I would opt for the 81mm for ease of operation, ammunition portability and a fairly effective round.


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## jeffb (13 Nov 2012)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> E Battery on TF 3-06 used a 120mm mortar that was loaned to them by the US SF. It would be interesting to find out what they thought of it. The CO of 2 RCHA and two of the BCs ( D Battery and the OP Battery) were on that TF, so perhaps JeffB or someone else from the regiment could ask them.



I will do just that!


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## FJAG (13 Nov 2012)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 1. From what I understand 120mm HE mortar has a greater lethal radius than a 105mm HE (its like 60-65m, I will dig up my source for that, give me a bit)



When I was researching the comparable effects of different rounds I came up with that 60-65m lethal radius figure for the 120 mm as well but I think that was a misstatement that has been repeated a number of times. I saw several US mortar manuals and effects manuals where the figure is stated as a 60m diameter which is in my mind the more logical figure. The 105 mm has a 70 m diameter which is also logical seeing that the projectile has a higher Composition B/ TNT quantity than the 120.

I also want to note GnyHwy's comment re the more circular pattern of the 120mm. This pattern is as a result of the angle of descent and the material that makes up the ground at the impact site. In general the steeper the angle of descent the more circular and even the fragment distribution. As the angle of descent becomes flatter the pattern becomes more of a butterfly wing pattern that spreads further out. In other words fragments going back towards the weapon are blown downward into the ground and therefore don't fly back as far and ones flying forward and outward are flying higher and therefore further. Assuming the gun or mortar is shooting over our friendlies heads, a shallow flying round can be brought in closer. BUT in environments where there are no fixed lines guns and mortars may fire from flanks or even head on. The effect there may in fact necessitate a greater danger close distance.

What must also be kept in mind is that the development of the lethality of rounds is an ongoing process and from time-to-time there may very well be cross-overs as new types of ammunition are introduced for a given weapon system. Similarly ranges may vary with developments but in general guns will have the edge because of the stronger barrels, longer barrel length and mass. As mortars are made heavier to increase range etc they take on the disadvantages of the gun.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Gunners, if you were forced to choose between an 81mm or 120mm mortar and lets say 105 was not even an option, which would you go for?



That all depends on the environment. Usually infantry do not have to worry about distant targets and artillery covers that. In that situation I would prefer the 81 mm because of its low weight, easy transportability, high rate of fire and the closeness that the round can be brought to our own troops. 

On the other hand, If there is an absence of artillery, a need for range (such as with multiple distributed patrol bases or a wider patrol area) and less need for portability then the 120 mm would be the choice.

Afghanistan has taught us (and by us I mean coalition forces, not just Canadians) several false lessons as to indirect fire support. Some of these are the results of what we were permitted to deploy with. My natural tendency to stay conservative and flexible is to ensure both capabilities are available (perhaps even within the same platoon)  so that we can adapt to the circumstances presented rather than being left without something we need. (I understand - but can't swear to it - that when we bought automated grenade launchers Treasury Board insisted that we divest ourselves of the 60 mm mortars. To me that's not too bright. There are things to 40 mm can do that the 60 mm can't and vice versa. The option should be available to the guy on the ground even if it stresses the supply chain a bit)


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## ArmyRick (13 Nov 2012)

Another note and I am talking from years ago. I remember talking to a US Army stryker mortar grunt (in the US army, mortar man are almost a sub trade in the infantry) and do seem to remember him saying that 120mm mortar bombs were around 30-35 lbs. I do not know how much of that is RDX/Comp B/etc, but if I remember correctly an 81mm HE bomb was 10 lbs (4.5 KG) and had a 30m lethal radius, so 60-65m for a 120mm mortar is not likely exaggerated. 

I still wish it was a case of both guns and mortars. You know like our American and British friends (we must know something they don't). I think it should be
-arty manning 155mm and after listening to discussions maybe maintaining a minimal reg force/heavy P Res 105mm capability (Never know what comes up)
-Infantry should have 81mm (for light/dismounted) and 120mm in strykers for LAV equipped battalions 

Another point, WHY must it be a case of one or the other? Can we not have our reg f gunners keep both 155mm and 105mm guns going? It would be like a tool box, mission demands and restrictions would dictate what gun gets used. I imagine it would be easier for a chinook to fly a 105 into high mountainous terrain than say the M777?

BUT you can wish in one hand and crap in the other and see which one fills first....


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## McG (13 Nov 2012)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Gunners, if you were forced to choose between an 81mm or 120mm mortar and lets say 105 was not even an option, which would you go for?


 :stop:
There is a whole other thread dedicated to discussing this very question.  If you want to take mortars out of the equation, then take your discussion back to the mortars thread.
 :shooter2: :highjack:

I now return you to the light artillery discussion.

Cheers,
the staff


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## Petard (13 Nov 2012)

A lot of the comparisons in this thread are using dated, non-IM, ammunition specs

This is a link to a presentation on Rheinmetal-Denel's 105, with some useful info on a more modern ammunition system
www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004armaments/04_Vickory_105mm_Indirect_Fire.pdf
Even so, the presentation is somewhat dated (circa 2004 I think), but the important thing to note is the range the gun can achieve with all types of ammunition, and that it can fire the older M1 family of projectiles as well.

Before this flies off onto another tangent, I'm well aware of new 120mm mortar ammunition with improved lethality, the point is 105mm is still a useful calibre and could have a future if the need were more clearly defined, and options should not be limited to older ammunition limits 

Post edit: Besides higher fragment hit probability than some legacy HE ammunition (including 120mm), note that the LEO can fire a LAHAT missile, for much better antitank capability (both direct and indirect) than HESH or standard 155 HE


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