# Time to invest in more CAF logistics?



## McG (15 Aug 2016)

> *Logistics woes could strain military deployments
> Canada’s military is gearing up for a busy period of overseas deployments but the big task of keeping those missions supplied could stretch resources thin, experts say.*
> By Bruce Campion-Smith, Ottawa Bureau
> Toronto Star
> ...


https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/08/14/logistics-woes-could-strain-military-deployments.html

Is it time to invest more into the CAF's logistics?  This is an area where we always force the personnel to do more with less.  When resources are available for investment, there is also a tendency to invest those resources into Op functions with the idea that the CSS stuff will be sorted out later ... but "later" never happens and the logisticians are called to sp new capabilities with out new resources of their own.

In the Army, we have 4 GS Arty Regt as a Div Arty asset.  But we do not have a Division Support Group (DISGP) to provide a Div CSS asset.  4 ESR exists as a Div Engr asset, and it is posturing itself as the force generator for the JTFSC theatre opening function.  But we do not have a Joint Services Battalion to function as the CSS force generator for the JTFSC (and, CSS is the biggest part of what the JTFSC is).  Instead, we have three service battalions - each one with bi-polar responsibilities to support their brigade, support their garrison/base, provide Div CSS functions on Ex MR, and force generate the CSS to both the tactical and operational level on deployed operations.  

I don't know that we necessarily need a "J Svc Bn" but I do think we are overly thin on our CSS force generation base.  Partially this is because of the double hatting of field and garrison support personnel.

We don't have fully deployable CSS organizations because the units all retain significant garrison responsibilities.  Is that a problem?  The experiment to split field and garrison between a CS Bn and a GS Bn (~12 years ago) failed when it was not resourced adequately.  Should we try this again with an investment of PYs?

... and then there are the strat assets mentioned in the article - the airlift and sealift.


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## Infanteer (15 Aug 2016)

A few points:

1.  We do have the CF Joint Operational Support Group, but I'm not sure that's what you were looking at with your post above?

2.  I suspect we need to manage our CSS personnel a bit better as well (as part of a larger effort CAF wide).  The Service Battalions are large units, with 850+ PYs allocated to each.  If you look, they've built redundancies in these organizations.  Yet, I have spoken with people who have commanded within the Battalions and state that the rate of undeployable personnel is somewhat higher compared to other units, owing to "broken, unfit people".  I'd need to see numbers to know if it is indeed a problem, but it is something I've heard more than once.

3.  What is the problem exactly; are our Service Battalions not robust enough to handle multiple missions, or have we just not resourced them enough?


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## dapaterson (15 Aug 2016)

Svc Bns, on paper, provide second line support to the Bde gp.  But in our recent past, we've morphed them into providing first, second and third line simultaneously.  That is not workable in a conventional, force on force scenario.

They lack equipment - LSVWs were never very good, and are now self-divesting with no replacement in sight.  The MSVS SMP will slowly start to appear, but there's still no heavy lift (since the HLVW, like the LSVW, has seen its numbers slashed and those that remain lack spares and are aging out, with no replacement).  There is little to no recovery capability.  Deployable food service capability is reliant on trailers that are well past their last legs.  Fitter variants of new vehicles are rarely acquired.

Similarly, the multiple small fleets in service with the Arty, Armd, Engrs and Inf create support pressures.  Spares and tooling are required for each vehicle microfleet.  Different ammunition natures may be required as well.


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## ModlrMike (15 Aug 2016)

We will continue to do what we've always done... strip the needed folks from every unit out there. Live with the deficit at home.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (15 Aug 2016)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A few points:
> 
> 1.  We do have the CF Joint Operational Support Group, but I'm not sure that's what you were looking at with your post above?
> 
> ...



I suspect that he was talking about having an actual doctrinal Divisional support group which, according to the book, would have a Supply Bn, Transport Bn, and Fin coy. 

One of the problems for the Svc Bn's, as dapaterson stated, is that they are used to provide institutional and tactical support where they should be focused solely on tactical support.


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## Old Sweat (15 Aug 2016)

In even a semi-perfect world the Service Battalions would focus solely on tactical support. However, half a century ago to implement one of the series of annual force cuts, the bases and service battalions were merged. At the time this acknowledged that we were giving up the ability to deploy a Canadian-based brigade group. It was about this time that the Canadian-based brigade groups were renamed Combat Groups, which were officially non-tactical organizations. 

Believe me, as somebody who was there, the sixties and seventies made the decade of darkness look like a picnic.


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## dapaterson (15 Aug 2016)

The most recent round of support reductions was done in a typically Canadian manner: remote support dets were steamrollered, and the HQs that used to command them grew the number of officers to command fewer dets.

Somehow, this is considered success.  Except for the few support personnel left in situ, with twice the work.


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## Old Sweat (15 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The most recent round of support reductions was done in a typically Canadian manner: remote support dets were steamrollered, and the HQs that used to command them grew the number of officers to command fewer dets.
> 
> Somehow, this is considered success.  Except for the few support personnel left in situ, with twice the work.



The theory obviously being that more highly-educated managers and executives can compensate for a lack of resources by using them in a more efficient and effective manner.


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## dapaterson (15 Aug 2016)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The theory obviously being that more highly-educated managers and executives can compensate for a lack of resources by using them in a more efficient and effective manner.



 [lol:  [lol:  [lol:  [lol:

No.  The theory being that we've build massive, bloated HQs infested with the Cbt Arms officers who should never again be entrusted with soldiers, and the CSS needs their fair share of such places to hide branch/corps mistakes.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (16 Aug 2016)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In even a semi-perfect world the Service Battalions would focus solely on tactical support. However, half a century ago to implement one of the series of annual force cuts, the bases and service battalions were merged. At the time this acknowledged that we were giving up the ability to deploy a Canadian-based brigade group. It was about this time that the Canadian-based brigade groups were renamed Combat Groups, which were officially non-tactical organizations.
> 
> Believe me, as somebody who was there, the sixties and seventies made the decade of darkness look like a picnic.



The last I heard there was an intent to re-org the Service Battalions so that there would be a S&T Coy and Admin Coy that focussed on tactical logistics and a Garrison Support Coy that would provide the institutional support. That's what was on the last update anyway....

In general, I don't think we need to invest in more CAF Logistics (The last LOCC had 92 students on it... 92!!!!!) I think we need to use what we have more efficiently. There are more logistics officers in Canada right now than there are in the artillery branch all ranks


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## dapaterson (16 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> There are more logistics officers in Canada right now than there are in the artillery branch all ranks



False.  The Artilleryman occupation is larger than the Log O occupation.


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## MJP (16 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The last I heard there was an intent to re-org the Service Battalions so that there would be a S&T Coy and Admin Coy that focussed on tactical logistics and a Garrison Support Coy that would provide the institutional support. That's what was on the last update anyway....
> 
> In general, I don't think we need to invest in more CAF Logistics (The last LOCC had 92 students on it... 92!!!!!) I think we need to use what we have more efficiently. There are more logistics officers in Canada right now than there are in the artillery branch all ranks



There are currently 3 COAs being floated for re-org of Svc Bn.  In all COAs the Svc Bn loses the FSG PYs that Infanteer alluded to above.  How that translates and is actually done remains to be seen as a good number of those posn are actually used within the Svc Bn proper, my hope is the Svc Bn gets to absorb a good number of those PYs into the functional Coys.


COA1 Status Quo

The Svc Bn retains all both institutional and field support tasks and there is no significant changes to overall structure.

COA 2

Consolidate Tech Svcs (institutional Sp) under the Svc Bn making a Tech Svcs Coy

COA 3

Transfer a Tech Svcs Coy to the CDSGs (in essence remaking the CS/GS split)

All three have their pro and cons.  I personally prefer COA 2 because it has a clearer delineation between institutional vs field tasks.

Those with DWAN can see more here  http://acims.mil.ca/conf/ArmyG4Conf/Autumn%2015/Svc%20Bn%20Structure%20Review%20V1.pptx 

One point of observation is that the traditional S&T Coy which is very heavy T doesn't work very well with our current supply system.  On Ex MR this year we had to substantially beef up the S side to keep up with the demands of the Bde.  So we are trying out in 1 Svc to beef up the S side of the house to essentially be a Coy- with all related Supply functions when we deploy to the field.  Not all pieces are relevant dependant on the duration, location and other factors but the ability to go to an austere locations and provide ALL supply functions is a huge force multiplier.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (16 Aug 2016)

MJP said:
			
		

> There are currently 3 COAs being floated for re-org of Svc Bn.  In all COAs the Svc Bn loses the FSG PYs that Infanteer alluded to above.  How that translates and is actually done remains to be seen as a good number of those posn are actually used within the Svc Bn proper, my hope is the Svc Bn gets to absorb a good number of those PYs into the functional Coys.
> 
> 
> COA1 Status Quo
> ...



dapterson- Error found. We were briefed there were ~2400 Log O's in Canada but the number, according to the career manager site, appears to be closer to ~1600 regular force. Regular force artillery would be, then, slightly bigger.

MJP- We were briefed that COA 2 was the recommendation going forward, though COA 3 might not be a bad way of streamlining different functions. For example, COA 2 would be weird for 3 Div as you would have to find a way to include Edmonton, Shilo, Dundurn, Suffield, and Wainwright into the Service Bn. Adding a Supply Coy, Transport Coy, Foods coy, etc structure to 3 CDSG COULD allow all the different bases to be grouped based on function (All base supplies in Supply Coy for example) which would remove some of the local confusions. 

As for the S&T construct, the ability to force tailor is difficult. Talking to friends in 1 Svc Bn indicated that part of the problem was the requirement to "cobble together" a S&T Coy out of the military parts of the Svc Bn and the fit parts of that part... taking all the civilians out of the proposed S&T Coy would be a good start to improving overall readiness IMHO and allow for better field training, preparation, and development of SOPs.


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## McG (16 Aug 2016)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 1.  We do have the CF Joint Operational Support Group, but I'm not sure that's what you were looking at with your post above?


You are correct.  I am looking at the tactical level and the link that connects CF JOSG to the tactical.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  I suspect we need to manage our CSS personnel a bit better as well (as part of a larger effort CAF wide).  The Service Battalions are large units, with 850+ PYs allocated to each.  If you look, they've built redundancies in these organizations.  Yet, I have spoken with people who have commanded within the Battalions and state that the rate of undeployable personnel is somewhat higher compared to other units, owing to "broken, unfit people".  I'd need to see numbers to know if it is indeed a problem, but it is something I've heard more than once.


Agreed on this part.  I am also tracking examples where 1 Service Battalion is going short on manning to prioritize CSS manning in first line services sub-units in the other bde units.  In 2 CMBG and 5 CMBG, the first line units have civilians filling supply and maintenance roles – this creates the illusion of functioning first line CSS, but it is only an illusion as the capability is not deployable with the unit that it supports.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  What is the problem exactly; are our Service Battalions not robust enough to handle multiple missions, or have we just not resourced them enough?


I am not sure that I understand the nuance of the distinction that you are making here.



			
				MJP said:
			
		

> One point of observation is that the traditional S&T Coy which is very heavy T doesn't work very well with our current supply system.  On Ex MR this year we had to substantially beef up the S side to keep up with the demands of the Bde.  So we are trying out in 1 Svc to beef up the S side of the house to essentially be a Coy- with all related Supply functions when we deploy to the field.  Not all pieces are relevant dependant on the duration, location and other factors but the ability to go to an austere locations and provide ALL supply functions is a huge force multiplier.


How much of this problem was the result of third line functions being staffed out of the hide of the brigade?  While 1 Svc Bn was moving through the training area supporting the brigade (ie. doing its doctrinal job), it had personnel in the DSA doing the third line supply work (ie. doing somebody else’s doctrinal job) to feed itself.  At the same time, I am aware that maintenance and supply personnel were taken from first line units to do parts and supply ordering from the JTFSC location [those wanting to spin this positively will say the brigade made DRMIS work in the field, but in reality DRMIS failed in the field and its failure was hidden by a Band-Aid with landline network access from a static third line location].  Would 1 Svc Bn have had the same problems if some other organization was resourced and mandated to look after the support at echelons above brigade?



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I suspect that he was talking about having an actual doctrinal Divisional support group which, according to the book, would have a Supply Bn, Transport Bn, and Fin coy.


I don’t think an old doctrine DISGP is really what we need.  Given our dispersed geography, I think institutional requirements call for dispersed multi-functional organizations.  Layering past structures onto the present organization, it could be that we have a CS Bn in each CMBG and a GS Bn reporting to each Div.  The CS Bn is 100% focused on supporting the brigade, it can deploy to and move in the field, it is 100% military (less maybe the CO’s secretary that every unit seems to have), and it would be responsible to FG second line CSS to land operations.  The GS Bn would be mostly focused on institutional support but it would retain some deployable capability (a Fd Sp Coy?); the deployable component would be able to deploy to but not necessarily able to move in the field, and it would be responsible to FG third line CSS (ie. the JTFSC/NSE) to land and joint operations.

... and this will need more trucks, radios and canvas to make work.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> In general, I don't think we need to invest in more CAF Logistics (The last LOCC had 92 students on it... 92!!!!!) I think we need to use what we have more efficiently. There are more logistics officers in Canada right now than there are in the artillery branch all ranks.


Is this not a false dichotomy?  Can we not invest more and better use existing resources?  Fewer Log sr officers and more corporals?  Every base clothing shop that I have been through could benefit immensely from a few more corporals behind the desk.

Another thought: 1 Cdn Div is supposed to be the deployable HQ.  Does it have sufficient integral CSS to support itself through deployment, exercise and redeployment?  What about into a theatre of operations?


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## MJP (16 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> MJP- We were briefed that COA 2 was the recommendation going forward, though COA 3 might not be a bad way of streamlining different functions. For example, COA 2 would be weird for 3 Div as you would have to find a way to include Edmonton, Shilo, Dundurn, Suffield, and Wainwright into the Service Bn. Adding a Supply Coy, Transport Coy, Foods coy, etc structure to 3 CDSG COULD allow all the different bases to be grouped based on function (All base supplies in Supply Coy for example) which would remove some of the local confusions.


 
We haven't heard anything going fwd as of yet but that doesn't mean a decision hasn't been made.  I dislike COA 3, mainly it duplicates PYs & effort for various functions.  It also limits the depth for FG, by that I mean we lose those IS people that we could reach into to fulfill operational deployments (ie MCpl fluffy can't go but a customer service MCpl can so we just switch them).  It is great to ensure IS is always fully manned but many of those PYs are nice to haves rather than musts.  For example Edmonton Supply IS bare minimum is roughly 51 pers including C2 with some degraded services and full functionality is around 80-90ish mark but many of those additional folks have dual field and IS tasks.  By field I mean they support the Bde units as much as they do lodger units.  If the Svc Bn was able to absorb all the PYs from the folding of the FSG then I don't dislike COA 3 as much but without knowing that number I can't in good faith say it is good.

The other issue as you alluded to is all the other bases out here in 3 Div.  It is less of an issue as they all have their own integral support structures and C2 (less Wx which falls under Edmonton).  It is however muddy out here in 3 Div who exactly does what for who and when though.  There are a ton of informal and legacy support pieces that aren't formalized.  It is great when people know who to call, less than ideal when they don't.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> As for the S&T construct, the ability to force tailor is difficult. Talking to friends in 1 Svc Bn indicated that part of the problem was the requirement to "cobble together" a S&T Coy out of the military parts of the Svc Bn and the fit parts of that part... taking all the civilians out of the proposed S&T Coy would be a good start to improving overall readiness IMHO and allow for better field training, preparation, and development of SOPs.


 
We force/task tailor all the time and have for years and years.  One of the major issues is actually making the structure fit what the mission is.  Ex PR/MR exposed huge deficiencies in the S&T construct because it is stuck in 4 CMBG mode.  Supply is much more in-depth and infinitely more complex than 20-30 years ago.  Scaling for vehs is more complex, contracting is more prevalent (and the rules to follow more strictly enforced), and DRMIS is a beast that has huge ramifications on both supply and maintenance sides of the house.  Included in that is the need for proper oversight of the supply process on both the material and systems side plus overall C2 of all parts.  If anything breaking the S from the T to form two functional Coys is the answer.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> How much of this problem was the result of third line functions being staffed out of the hide of the brigade?  While 1 Svc Bn was moving through the training area supporting the brigade (ie. doing its doctrinal job), it had personnel in the DSA doing the third line supply work (ie. doing somebody else’s doctrinal job) to feed itself.  At the same time, I am aware that maintenance and supply personnel were taken from first line units to do parts and supply ordering from the JTFSC location [those wanting to spin this positively will say the brigade made DRMIS work in the field, but in reality DRMIS failed in the field and its failure was hidden by a Band-Aid with landline network access from a static third line location].  Would 1 Svc Bn have had the same problems if some other organization was resourced and mandated to look after the support at echelons above brigade?



This was an interesting discussion that was had last week with a number of our officers at 1 Svc some with a great deal of national level experience in operational support.  Essentially the JTFSC was a mashing together of odds and sods from all over Canada.  It also did 3rd line for the enemy force and was the integrator for all foreign visiting units and camp supporter for the very large P12 contingent (Ex staff, some En force and other pieces).  It also did 3rd line for the PTA and I deliberately left that last because quite frankly it just took some Bde folks plus some additional augmentees and added another layer to the supply chain with very little value added.   Case in point 2nd line gave their LPO section to JTFSC stripping the Bde of their ability to conduct LPO (not that CMTC would allow it anyway). Another example while not exactly the same is RPPL essentially just did JTFSC’s job for them with no real additions, there was no JTFSC RPPL to draw parts from. 

The DRMIS issue and the café, I would almost consider as separate from JTFSC as there were a number of things that contributed to its failure.
•	TSS/HCLOS bandwidth was lacking
•	Bde IT Infrastructure was lacking
•	Bde DRMIS knowledge on both Supply and Maint was lacking or non-existent 
•	No set SOPs for DRMIS IE: everyone had a different work around for ordering against a WO 
•	DRMIS Offline procedures poorly understood
•	DRMIS architecture delineating support  dependencies weren’t done properly or in many cases poorly understood

The DRMIS café solution was the only real way to get support to the unitsand it really was a band aid.  The net effect with the SMEs from Ottawa being there increased marginally the overall DRMIS knowledge but that was the only real win from the concept.  

If Svc Bn didn’t have to provide people to man above 2nd line I think it is doable.  Some pieces especially the DRMIS beast it will be re-tested during 1 CMBG’s fall trg but at the end of the day without a national/Div support element, pieces of the/a Svc Bn will always be hived off to provide that level of support.








			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Another thought: 1 Cdn Div is supposed to be the deployable HQ.  Does it have sufficient integral CSS to support itself through deployment, exercise and redeployment?  What about into a theatre of operations?


Hahahahahaha  Short answer is no and hell no.  They are only deployable if they are allowed to piggy back and CFTPO their way out of real issues and thought.


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## Infanteer (16 Aug 2016)

MCG said:
			
		

> I am not sure that I understand the nuance of the distinction that you are making here.



The article seems to indicate that the CSS of the Army, specifically the Service Battalions, are going to be stretched to support elements in Latvia, Ukraine and somewhere in Africa.  Is the Service Battalion model itself not able to handle multiple missions, or is the organization sound and we've simply resourced it inadequately?



> The CS Bn is 100% focused on supporting the brigade, it can deploy to and move in the field, it is 100% military (less maybe the CO’s secretary that every unit seems to have), and it would be responsible to FG second line CSS to land operations.  The GS Bn would be mostly focused on institutional support but it would retain some deployable capability (a Fd Sp Coy?); the deployable component would be able to deploy to but not necessarily able to move in the field, and it would be responsible to FG third line CSS (ie. the JTFSC/NSE) to land and joint operations.



Most bases have robust tech services companies as they do not host a Service Battalion.  Edmonton, Valcartier and Petawawa seem to be the only ones that have this double-hatted role.  How about cutting the tech services function away from the Service Battalions and "civilianizing" it.  If not 100%, then perhaps 20%mil/80% civilian.  Managing a garrison stores counter seems to be something suited to a civilian who isn't moving.

This would give us civilian Tech Services Companies in each garrison, tailored in size to the demand, while each Brigade has a Service Battalion dedicated to training for operations and not shuffling people to fix the base bus or issue socks.

While we are at it, move the Field Medical Coy to the Service Battalion as well and we can rid ourselves of excess units (the Field Ambulance).  Last I checked, Medical was one of the four pillars of Sustainment.


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## PuckChaser (16 Aug 2016)

Is it a manning issue, or a kit issue? I can't get mad at Clothing Stores (or even Svc Bn) for not having been properly resourced boots/ammo/rations from the upper levels of NDHQ. I have a feeling that's where we're going to feel the crunch: equipment and supplies are going to run out quickly because there's been no money to properly run a sustainment plan.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (16 Aug 2016)

MJP said:
			
		

> We haven't heard anything going fwd as of yet but that doesn't mean a decision hasn't been made.  I dislike COA 3, mainly it duplicates PYs & effort for various functions.  It also limits the depth for FG, by that I mean we lose those IS people that we could reach into to fulfill operational deployments (ie MCpl fluffy can't go but a customer service MCpl can so we just switch them).  It is great to ensure IS is always fully manned but many of those PYs are nice to haves rather than musts.  For example Edmonton Supply IS bare minimum is roughly 51 pers including C2 with some degraded services and full functionality is around 80-90ish mark but many of those additional folks have dual field and IS tasks.  By field I mean they support the Bde units as much as they do lodger units.  If the Svc Bn was able to absorb all the PYs from the folding of the FSG then I don't dislike COA 3 as much but without knowing that number I can't in good faith say it is good.
> 
> The other issue as you alluded to is all the other bases out here in 3 Div.  It is less of an issue as they all have their own integral support structures and C2 (less Wx which falls under Edmonton).  It is however muddy out here in 3 Div who exactly does what for who and when though.  There are a ton of informal and legacy support pieces that aren't formalized.  It is great when people know who to call, less than ideal when they don't.
> 
> We force/task tailor all the time and have for years and years.  One of the major issues is actually making the structure fit what the mission is.  Ex PR/MR exposed huge deficiencies in the S&T construct because it is stuck in 4 CMBG mode.  Supply is much more in-depth and infinitely more complex than 20-30 years ago.  Scaling for vehs is more complex, contracting is more prevalent (and the rules to follow more strictly enforced), and DRMIS is a beast that has huge ramifications on both supply and maintenance sides of the house.  Included in that is the need for proper oversight of the supply process on both the material and systems side plus overall C2 of all parts.  If anything breaking the S from the T to form two functional Coys is the answer.



I guess the question then would be is, "What is the tactical function of the Service Battalion"? To me, there needs to be a split between the IS and the tactical support. By doctrine, the Svc Bn should be focused solely on providing second line support to the Brigade only. By that logic, there should be an organization solely focused on that tactical field function (The doctrinal S&T Coy). The doctrinal S&T Coy works in the construct of a CMBG within a Div with a Div support group on top of it. In that case, the Div support group should be doing the majority of the contracting function. Second line, then, would focus solely on bringing materiel from third line to first line and managing it in between. For this, supply needs to manage the materiel and transport needs to deliver it. 

The problem is we try to do third line and second line with some IS thrown in. If we want to be serious about having a fully deployable second line than there needs to be an actual deployable third line support element to provide the higher level support (unlike our JOSG).

I'm also a fan of taking most base IS functions and making them mostly civilian where it makes sense. For example, there's no reason why base supply, food, and transport in Shilo couldn't be mostly civilian. Ammo and finance still need some military presence, mostly due to the needs of the trades, and maintenance would need some military due to the training requirements for military assets (Leopard 2's for instance).

As for DRMIS... It's a beast that was never designed to see the field.


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## Lumber (16 Aug 2016)

Kind of out of my arcs, but:

Maintenance on base? Fleet Maintenance Facility. Mostly civilians with military as well.

Maintenance in the "field"? Combat-Systems and Marine Systems Engineering Departments. 100% military.

If you need to make major repairs that can't be conducted by ship's company (like changing out a Gas Turbine), you fly the civilians from the FMF to wherever your ship happens to be.

I'm not sure if the parallel with what you guys are talking about really exists, but incorporating civilians into your structure shouldn't be too much of a stretch.

 :2c:


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## CBH99 (17 Aug 2016)

I am brutally out of my lane here guys - regardless of element.  I'm very unfamiliar with the details of how things work in regards to CSS stuff & Svc battalions, etc these days.  

One quick question though...and forgive me if I am talking about something completely different.


Question - I thought one of the major goals of streamlining things was to get rid of excess civilian contractors?  

I understand that people from Lockheed Martin, for example, are going to be needed for high-end systems, IT support, etc.  But contracting out some of the services on base - is this not what the CF just tried to get rid of?  (Or am I thinking of something different?)


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## MilEME09 (17 Aug 2016)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Question - I thought one of the major goals of streamlining things was to get rid of excess civilian contractors?
> 
> I understand that people from Lockheed Martin, for example, are going to be needed for high-end systems, IT support, etc.  But contracting out some of the services on base - is this not what the CF just tried to get rid of?  (Or am I thinking of something different?)



Some Civilian involvement is unavoidable, for while I can't speak for Log, on the Maintenance side anything under warranty we cannot touch thus some civilian from company X has to fix it. We also are tasking Service Battalions to do first, second, and some third line work, with Workshop 202 in Montreal being the only 3rd/4th line shop in the country. If something goes there, don't expect it back for 8 months at the earliest in my experience. I agree that base services, and the tactical level service battalion needs to be separate. Can a Service Battalion still help out? yes if base support services is overwhelmed with work of course lend a hand but the primary role of the CSS unit is the tactical support for the Brigade, or division (though we have no division assets, or a deployable division for that matter)


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## Edward Campbell (17 Aug 2016)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The article seems to indicate that the CSS of the Army, specifically the Service Battalions, are going to be stretched to support elements in Latvia, Ukraine and somewhere in Africa.  Is the Service Battalion model itself not able to handle multiple missions, or is the organization sound and we've simply resourced it inadequately?
> 
> The CS Bn is 100% focused on supporting the brigade, it can deploy to and move in the field, it is 100% military (less maybe the CO’s secretary that every unit seems to have), and it would be responsible to FG second line CSS to land operations.  The GS Bn would be mostly focused on institutional support but it would retain some deployable capability (a Fd Sp Coy?); the deployable component would be able to deploy to but not necessarily able to move in the field, and it would be responsible to FG third line CSS (ie. the JTFSC/NSE) to land and joint operations.
> 
> ...



OK, helmets on ...  :warstory:

Back in the 1960s I had some, limited (junior officer), involvement with the EBSB (Experimental Brigade Service Battalion) in Gagetown and I observed the "stand up" of 4 Svc Bn in North Germany. Later, in the 1970s, I had some (still slight) involvement in helping to organize the "re-casting" of 1st Cdn Sig Regt, then deployed to Ismailia as the lead unit of UNEF II, into 73 Sig Sqn and 73 Svc Bn.

The initial (1960s) idea was for an organization that could support a brigade group on the West German _nuclear_ battlefield ~ _*more*_ effectively and _*more*_ flexibly, because the brigade Ordnance Field Park, brigade S&T Coy and brigade Field Workshop were already doing good jobs. The organizational structure was fairly obvious, I think, but there were, doctrinally, some concerns about the duties of the service battalion command team and 'regimental' staff and the brigade SQ (admin and logistics) staff. My _personal_ observation was that things worked quite smoothly in 4 CMBG on the North German plain: the division of planning and resource control (brigade staff) and conduct of logistics operations (battalion staff) was easy to manage on the ground, but I'm told (did not observe, myself) that things fell apart, abit, when the brigade moved to CENTAG and the staff system/structure changed.

It was very, very obvious, very, very soon after deployment that UNEF II needed more than just Canadian Signals support. The CO of 1CSR (then LCol, later BGen George Simpson) had more "signals" than UNEF II really needed, but he soon found himself tasking his Sp Sqn to provide logistic support to others. He reinforced his support squadron (with Signals people hastily retrained as apprentice supply tech, etc) and then recommended, and Ottawa (DCDS, I suppose) agreed, that what was really needed was a signal squadron, rather than a regiment, and a logistics battalion, rather than a company sized unit. My memory says ~ and I'm happy to be corrected ~ that Simpson handed over to two units at the end of Roto 0: 73 Sig Sqn and 73 Svc Bn.

The point is that the basic structure of a service battalion: a supply element, transport element, maintenance element and other elements, is infinitely flexible and can provide 2nd and 3rd line support. In 1980 we concluded, in a FMC HQ study, that a Canadian division of three brigade groups, each with its own service battalion, would still need some div troops and they would need a small div troops service battalion but, in fact, we would actually need a *big* div troops service battalion because it would provide both 2nd line support to div troops and 3rd line support to the brigade group service battalions.

... /war stories


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (17 Aug 2016)

MCG said:
			
		

> https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/08/14/logistics-woes-could-strain-military-deployments.html
> 
> Is it time to invest more into the CAF's logistics?  This is an area where we always force the personnel to do more with less.  When resources are available for investment, there is also a tendency to invest those resources into Op functions with the idea that the CSS stuff will be sorted out later ... but "later" never happens and the logisticians are called to sp new capabilities with out new resources of their own.
> 
> ...



I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.

I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.

Where we tend to run in to issues WRT sustainment is at the tactical level, I think part of this problem is due to trainingisms, I wouldn't use Ex MR as a gauge for how well/not well we do tactical level sustainment.  MR is a glorified dog and pony show and isn't resourced or designed to really set the Bde up for success.  Politically speaking, it's the Army's way of showing the Political Mandarins in Ottawa that we are capable of moving a large body of troops and equipment over a large distance and then doing something with them.  The most important piece of that exercise is the Deployment Order, what happens after that is of less concern.  

I'm about halfway through Colonel John Conrad's book called "What The Thunder Said" which has to do with logistics support to TF Orion in Afghanistan.  Colonel Conrad pinpoints two problems which he believes are responsible for our logistical woes in the CAF:

1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.

Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.

Bottom line:  We've got combat arms officers that haven't been properly taught to know when they are taking risks against the capacity of our supply chain.  We've also got Logistics soldiers that have not been held up to the right standards of, as Colonel Conrad put it, weaponeering, fire and tactical training.


----------



## Halifax Tar (17 Aug 2016)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.
> 
> I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.
> 
> ...



Great book HB.  The highlighted area is without a doubt a major problem and its not strictly an Army issue.  We have similar problems in the RCN as well, when it comes to logistic functions and importance.


----------



## Lumber (17 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Great book HB.  The highlighted area is without a doubt a major problem and its not strictly an Army issue.  We have similar problems in the RCN as well, when it comes to logistic functions and importance.



Just stop hoarding all the Coke Zero for the JR's Mess, and we won't have any reason to not respect you. It's that simple.


----------



## Halifax Tar (17 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> Just stop hoarding all the Coke Zero for the JR's Mess, and we won't have any reason to not respect you. It's that simple.



1)  I am not a member of the JRs; and
2)  Storesman don't look after pop and chips, stewards do; and 
3)  Commissary supplies are hospitality and not a logistic function; and 
4)  Stewards are not members of the Logistics Branch; and 
5)  Thank you for reinforcing my point that the RCN does not grasp logistics lol


----------



## SeaKingTacco (17 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> 1)  I am not a member of the JRs; and
> 2)  Storesman don't look after pop and chips, stewards do; and
> 3)  Commissary supplies are hospitality and not a logistic function; and
> 4)  Stewards are not members of the Logistics Branch; and
> 5)  Thank you for reinforcing my point that the RCN does not grasp logistics lol



I am pretty sure that the stewards are part of the Department on a ship, that is headed by the person called the LOGISTICS Officer....


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (17 Aug 2016)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I'm about halfway through Colonel John Conrad's book called "What The Thunder Said" which has to do with logistics support to TF Orion in Afghanistan.  Colonel Conrad pinpoints two problems which he believes are responsible for our logistical woes in the CAF:
> 
> 1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
> 2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.
> ...



Number 2 is a big problem within the Logistics branch and there are a lot of "civilians in uniform" who have no desire to do field logistics type work. Mix in the fact that it is a purple trade where soldiers aren't allowed to develop field/sea skills over the course of a career (Sup Techs posted to Svc Bn may learn field skills at a low level, be posted to ships and air bases, then come back as a WO and be expected to site a field platoon) and CFLTC has no NCM courses that teach tactical skills and the problem becomes exacerbated. 

Finally, there is a disconnect in the logistics world to combat arms matters as well (due to the civilian in uniform mentality of some and other factors) where you often hear "that's combat arms stuff" when discussing any field related skill. Even leadership principles were once described by a Logistics person to me as being "combat arms things" since the Logistics "works differently".


----------



## Halifax Tar (17 Aug 2016)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I am pretty sure that the stewards are part of the Department on a ship, that is headed by the person called the LOGISTICS Officer....



You are correct.  Having said that, they do not wear the LOG Cap Badge, get coursing through CFLTC or belong to the LOG Branch.  They belong to D Nav Pers.  Their belonging to the Log Dept is a legacy issue.  Ask them how their future looks  Maybe they should have stayed with LOG. 

Firefighters fall under the engineering dept, does that make them naval engineers ? 

Sorry for the derailment I will back away


----------



## SeaKingTacco (17 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> You are correct.  Having said that, they do not wear the LOG Cap Badge, get coursing through CFLTC or belong to the LOG Branch.  They belong to D Nav Pers.  Their belonging to the Log Dept is a legacy issue.  Ask them how their future looks  Maybe they should have stayed with LOG.
> 
> Firefighters fall under the engineering dept, does that make them naval engineers ?
> 
> Sorry for the derailment I will back away



Further derail- the firefighters are almost all gone and have been replaced by hull techs. So, yes!


----------



## Colin Parkinson (17 Aug 2016)

I did a stint with 1 Svc Battalion in Germany in 1986, what an eye opener, a good 50% of the NCM were ex-combat arms. All of them were very dedicated to providing excellent support to the frontline units. Quite changed my impression of Svc Battalions. Some cross pollination I think is in order to break down the walls.


----------



## MilEME09 (17 Aug 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I did a stint with 1 Svc Battalion in Germany in 1986, what an eye opener, a good 50% of the NCM were ex-combat arms. All of them were very dedicated to providing excellent support to the frontline units. Quite changed my impression of Svc Battalions. Some cross pollination I think is in order to break down the walls.



I agree, more so in the reserves, problem is, doctrine makes proper CSS in the PRes next to impossible. By this i mean units are to keep 72 hours worth of stores on hand, that covers your weekend exercises, so only on a brigade EX would they need resupply, so that is one time a year they need the service battalion. Which always is a gong show because they do not practice any of the procedure for ordering supplies.


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Aug 2016)

A modest proposal for a new department in National Defence -

Invite WalMart and Amazon to compete for Logistics Support 
Task them with remote, timely delivery.

Then build the CAF around that spine.

Walmart will deliver anything in their inventory anywhere - and they don't own the stuff they ship.


----------



## AmmoTech90 (17 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> A modest proposal for a new department in National Defence -
> 
> Invite WalMart and Amazon to compete for Logistics Support
> Task them with remote, timely delivery.



Done, to a certain extent.  I was in Haiti when one of the guys on gate guard came in and said DHL was at the gate with some ammo.  Turns out that was a cable cutter or fire extinguisher cart for one of the Griffons.  The part had been automatically delivered to where the aircraft was, DHL got it in to PAPIA two days after the airport reopened.

I guess it's part of the procurement contract.  Not sure if it works work for C7 ammo...


----------



## MJP (17 Aug 2016)

Great discussion!



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I guess the question then would be is, "What is the tactical function of the Service Battalion"? To me, there needs to be a split between the IS and the tactical support. By doctrine, the Svc Bn should be focused solely on providing second line support to the Brigade only. By that logic, there should be an organization solely focused on that tactical field function (The doctrinal S&T Coy). The doctrinal S&T Coy works in the construct of a CMBG within a Div with a Div support group on top of it. In that case, the Div support group should be doing the majority of the contracting function. Second line, then, would focus solely on bringing materiel from third line to first line and managing it in between. For this, supply needs to manage the materiel and transport needs to deliver it.


That is the doctrinal answer unfortunately the PYs don’t exist to calve off the IS pieces and do the tactical ATT.  



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The problem is we try to do third line and second line with some IS thrown in. If we want to be serious about having a fully deployable second line than there needs to be an actual deployable third line support element to provide the higher level support (unlike our JOSG).


Again it comes down PYs too maintain that 3rd line capability and not created it every deployment on the back of the Svc Bn or stealing from the IS.  



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I'm also a fan of taking most base IS functions and making them mostly civilian where it makes sense. For example, there's no reason why base supply, food, and transport in Shilo couldn't be mostly civilian. Ammo and finance still need some military presence, mostly due to the needs of the trades, and maintenance would need some military due to the training requirements for military assets (Leopard 2's for instance).


You’ll hear little argument from me for many IS but it comes with the understanding that you limit employability with civilians (IE changing job desc, work hours etc).  The plus side is generally because they don’t have military admin commitments their overall productivity is usually greater.  A civilian mechanic is turning wrenches 70-80% productive (direct and indirect labour) if not more in a work day.  A military mechanic rarely hits 60% day in day out due to the military component of the job.



			
				Lumber said:
			
		

> I'm not sure if the parallel with what you guys are talking about really exists, but incorporating civilians into your structure shouldn't be too much of a stretch.


It isn’t and we have a good number already.  



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> Question - I thought one of the major goals of streamlining things was to get rid of excess civilian contractors?
> But contracting out some of the services on base - is this not what the CF just tried to get rid of?  (Or am I thinking of something different?)


Completely different things.  The civilians being discussed here are fully employees of the Dept of National Defence.  But even there we have to be careful, some contracting makes sense.  We had a contract with SNC-Lavalin for mechanics, most of the guys were ex-military with a great deal of quals and experience.  They were more productive than military pers for reasosn stated above and they helped keep some of our fleets running because they had the expertise.  They were cut in the name of “getting rid of evil contractors” and our VOR climbed exponentially.  Not all pigs are the same.



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Some Civilian involvement is unavoidable, for while I can't speak for Log, on the Maintenance side anything under warranty we cannot touch thus some civilian from company X has to fix it. We also are tasking Service Battalions to do first, second, and some third line work, with Workshop 202 in Montreal being the only 3rd/4th line shop in the country. If something goes there, don't expect it back for 8 months at the earliest in my experience.



A Svc Bn will always do 1st line work, they need to take care of their own equipment just like everyone else.  In my experience they don't and shouldn't do 1st line work for other units however the Res side of the house may be different.  2nd line is a given and the 3rd line piece while small is that natural piece that needs to be picked up when Svc Bn is doing the IS on top of field tasks.




			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.
> 
> I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.
> 
> Where we tend to run in to issues WRT sustainment is at the tactical level, I think part of this problem is due to trainingisms, I wouldn't use Ex MR as a gauge for how well/not well we do tactical level sustainment.  MR is a glorified dog and pony show and isn't resourced or designed to really set the Bde up for success.



Agreed about the strat level, but it goes back to our greatest strength is we always get things done and our greatest weakness is we always get things done.

Ex MR is not perfect but is highlighted some deep flaws in our CSS thought processes, knowledge and equipment.  Regardless if it is Ex MR or a deployment in Africa, maintainers need to order parts against a work order and Sup techs need to hand out/order a new part and take in the old parts for return to the system.  We weren’t able to do that very well for a variety of reasons.  The tanks and LAVs still ran but it took a ton of collective effort that wasn’t very efficient or effective and much of that boiled down to lack of solid processes and knowledge to use tools (not maint tools) properly.



			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> 1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
> 2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.
> 
> Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.
> ...



Great book and a great guy to talk too.  Both points are bang on in my experience, fixing it is the issue.


----------



## dapaterson (17 Aug 2016)

MJP said:
			
		

> Great book and a great guy to talk too.  Both points are bang on in my experience, fixing it is the issue.



He is at least some part the problem; Col Conrad (like no small number of Cbt Arms officers) seems to take some pleasure in never serving in Ottawa.  "I don't want to go solve the problems or at least understand them better, I'd rather sit on the sidelines and snipe."

#Tangent Beyond a certain point, senior officers and SNCOs should become custodians of the institution.  That means making efforts to make changes that will happen long after your tenure, and taking a perspective beyond next week / next year.  It may also mean taking positions that are less glamorous, but more capable of influencing change - and might involve getting a phone number in the 613 area code.*


*Or possibly in the 343 overlay


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Aug 2016)

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> Done, to a certain extent.  I was in Haiti when one of the guys on gate guard came in and said DHL was at the gate with some ammo.  Turns out that was a cable cutter or fire extinguisher cart for one of the Griffons.  The part had been automatically delivered to where the aircraft was, DHL got it in to PAPIA two days after the airport reopened.
> 
> I guess it's part of the procurement contract.  Not sure if it works work for C7 ammo...



So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?


----------



## Lumber (18 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?



Hey, if DHL/Wal-Mart is willing to deliver to Chicago, Flint, Detroit and _Milwaukee_, then they brave more danger than most members of the CAF.

Bring 'em on.


----------



## Edward Campbell (18 Aug 2016)

Ref Amazon and WalMart and so on ... one might want to consider that the last really great revolution in logistics occured in the USA, mainly, but, thanks to CD Howe, in Canada, too, and it was driven by "dollar-a-year men" who were business/industry executives who came to Washington (and Ottawa) during World War II to help the government _integrate_ the national industrial base and a reformed (largely by better (civilian) management) military logistics system to create a (relatively) seamless, modern logistics system that used both "pull" (user demands) and "push" (data driven) techniques to ensure that _Pte Bloggins_ had (roughly) what he needed when he needed it. It was a quite amazing thing and those same business leaders, in the 1950s, revolutionized American (and later European and Japanese) industry, too, based upin their "lessons learned" from the wartime exercise.


----------



## PuckChaser (18 Aug 2016)

DHL was flying into Kabul.... If they can get it that far, why can't our logistic chain take over?

Meanwhile, I could get things through US APO from Amazon in under a week to a small outpost outside of Kabul, but mail through the CAF system took 2 months. Granted the US has a heck of a lot more strat airlift capability, but even mail to Kandahar was a lot quicker.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (18 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I agree, more so in the reserves, problem is, doctrine makes proper CSS in the PRes next to impossible. By this i mean units are to keep 72 hours worth of stores on hand, that covers your weekend exercises, so only on a brigade EX would they need resupply, so that is one time a year they need the service battalion. Which always is a gong show because they do not practice any of the procedure for ordering supplies.



I think in part a lack of imagination on the units parts and coordination. The Res Svc Battalions should get the funds and task to support units in the field, even if it's a truck (2 in case of breakdowns) to deliver IMP's and blank or dummy ammo or field defense stores. The combat arms unit deploys on it's exercise, the Svc Battalion dispatches the trucks to meet them at a grid square in a tactical setting and the units exchange stores. Perhaps start with dummy and non-critical stores at first and then as things sort themselves out, add new elements like a tactical vehicle recovery and repair.


----------



## Lumber (18 Aug 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I think in part a lack of imagination on the units parts and coordination. The Res Svc Battalions should get the funds and task to support units in the field, even if it's a truck (2 in case of breakdowns) to deliver IMP's and blank or dummy ammo or field defense stores. The combat arms unit deploys on it's exercise, the Svc Battalion dispatches the trucks to meet them at a grid square in a tactical setting and the units exchange stores. Perhaps start with dummy and non-critical stores at first and then as things sort themselves out, add new elements like a tactical vehicle recovery and repair.



...

They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...


----------



## MilEME09 (18 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...


We have tried, successfully with a couple arty units to do such an EX. It proved eye opening and successful. As for what we do on EX, hide and harbour drills, DP's, CP's, over and over without a unit to actially work the other end.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Colin Parkinson (18 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...



The connections at your level are far more important and successful, then the formal agreements. In our area, all the QM's helped each other on a regular basis, a little honey, knowledge makes the world go smoother.  [


----------



## dapaterson (18 Aug 2016)

The problem is generally time constraints that result on supported units not wanting CSS but rather glorified GD personnel to do the crappy,  dirty jobs.


----------



## Ostrozac (18 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?



US experience from Iraq suggests that corporations are willing to go extremely far forward and their employees are quite willing to wear armour and carry weapons. But it'll cost you.

The jury is still out as to whether using KBR et al to provide the equivalent of the US NSE for the Iraq War was the way of the future or an expensive boondoggle.


----------



## Kirkhill (18 Aug 2016)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> US experience from Iraq suggests that corporations are willing to go extremely far forward and their employees are quite willing to wear armour and carry weapons. But it'll cost you.
> 
> The jury is still out as to whether using KBR et al to provide the equivalent of the US NSE for the Iraq War was the way of the future or an expensive boondoggle.



And if it really comes down to a situation of all other parameters zeroing-out and the only issue is dollars then that truly is a decision appropriate for accountants - and may vary mission by mission.

But I suspect, based on my read of history and in particular the histories of the Royal Waggoners and the Royal Waggon Train, as well as the Commissariat, that, at some point behind but close to the firing line, it is better for soldiers to assume the duty to assure security of supply.  Contracts and Unions can be problematic.

Deliveries to Kabul and Port aux Princes by DHL sounds reasonable.  And perhaps even into Basra and Baghdad.  I am not sure about KBR convoys on the Basra-Baghdad MSR.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (18 Aug 2016)

MJP said:
			
		

> Great discussion!
> That is the doctrinal answer unfortunately the PYs don’t exist to calve off the IS pieces and do the tactical ATT.
> Again it comes down PYs too maintain that 3rd line capability and not created it every deployment on the back of the Svc Bn or stealing from the IS.
> 
> ...



It is a great discussion. It's amazing how rational these can be when politics don't get involved  [

The way I see the Service Battalions is that they should be 100% military, doctrinal beasts to fill that doctrinal requirement like any other unit in the Brigade. My SOH tells me that the Svc Bn should have 847 PY based on the Germany construct (39-106-702) to support a CMBG including 7-13-161 for Maint Coy (Not including RCEME in Admin Coy). For 3 x Svc Battalions that would mean a total of 2541 pers (117-318-2106) of which the Logistics requirement is 96-279-1623 for the three front line battalions. 

If the IS functions went to mostly civilian or DHS/JIT system and military PYs were centred in the battalions this seems feasible based on current troop levels (if not more manageable since there would be less requirement to post people to Logistics hinterlands such as Shilo or Wainwright). The Svc Bn, then, would focus on provision of second line only, with third line provided by base/IS and POSSIBLY a real third line support element (we could likely combine all the CDSG PY into 1 x Div support unit with geographical "companies").


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (18 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And if it really comes down to a situation of all other parameters zeroing-out and the only issue is dollars then that truly is a decision appropriate for accountants - and may vary mission by mission.
> 
> But I suspect, based on my read of history and in particular the histories of the Royal Waggoners and the Royal Waggon Train, as well as the Commissariat, that, at some point behind but close to the firing line, it is better for soldiers to assume the duty to assure security of supply.  Contracts and Unions can be problematic.
> 
> Deliveries to Kabul and Port aux Princes by DHL sounds reasonable.  And perhaps even into Basra and Baghdad.  I am not sure about KBR convoys on the Basra-Baghdad MSR.



Anything is possible if the right amount of money is thrown at the problem.

That said, if DHL delivered to a main support hub and the companies acted like the "third line" than that's where the service battalion would take responsibility for the movement and accounting of supplies from said main supply hub, essentially making it a Replenishment Point (this could be civilian-military as well, since the hub would resupply multiple organizations). Once the supplies are picked up at the RP than what happens to them after is the purview of the Brigade. This would also help to centralize contracting and other functions


----------



## GR66 (18 Aug 2016)

DHL or KBR might be OK for conflicts like Afghanistan/Iraq where airspace isn't contested and they can get into theatre without too much risk, but will they be able to deliver to Warsaw while it's under artillery attack and the international airport has its runways cratered?  How will your FedEx 767 manage entering contested airspace?


----------



## mariomike (18 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?





			
				Lumber said:
			
		

> Hey, if DHL/Wal-Mart is willing to deliver to Chicago, Flint, Detroit and _Milwaukee_, then they brave more danger than most members of the CAF.



Second Chance is an American body armor manufacturing company and was the first one to use kevlar for body armor. The company was founded in the early 1970s by former U.S. Marine and pizza delivery owner/driver Richard Davis. Davis developed the idea of a bulletproof vest after shooting three armed robbers in self-defense during a delivery.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chance_(body_armor)


----------



## Kirkhill (18 Aug 2016)

mariomike said:
			
		

> Second Chance is an American body armor manufacturing company and was the first one to use kevlar for body armor. The company was founded in the early 1970s by former U.S. Marine and pizza delivery owner/driver Richard Davis. Davis developed the idea of a bulletproof vest after shooting three armed robbers in self-defense during a delivery.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chance_(body_armor)



Wow!

Well, I guess if you are willing to deliver pizzas to crack-houses for minimum wage and tips,  maybe KBR doesn't look so bad after all.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (18 Aug 2016)

Interestingly, a Brigade Support Battalion for a US infantry brigade combat team has 65/17/795, 58/14/698 for a SBCT, and70/17/1265 for a ABCT. By the book, 4 Svc Bn has 39/106/702.

Distribution Coy (our S&T Coy) has only 5/2/135 for a  ABCT compared to 11/61/305 for S&T Coy, which makes me wonder if the US system is effective, and if so, why we have almost 2 x more pers....


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## Fixate (18 Aug 2016)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A few points:
> 
> 1.  We do have the CF Joint Operational Support Group, but I'm not sure that's what you were looking at with your post above?
> 
> ...


The resources are not there i think


Sent from my SGH-I337M using Tapatalk


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## Lumber (18 Aug 2016)

Ok, I've been following this thread for a while and just ignoring some ignorance, but I can't ignore it any longer.

What is CSS and what is S&T?

Thanks

Navy-Guy


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## Humphrey Bogart (18 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> Ok, I've been following this thread for a while and just ignoring some ignorance, but I can't ignore it any longer.
> 
> What is CSS and what is S&T?
> 
> ...



CSS = Combat Service and Support

It's essentially the Wagon Train that follows the fighting troops around making sure they get all the bullets, beans, water, fuel, spare parts, etc... To ensure the fighting troops can do there jobs.

S&T =  Supply and Transport

Basically the Army's version of a Replenishment ship.  All the trucks and stores required to keep the big machine moving.


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## Lumber (18 Aug 2016)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> CSS = Combat Service and Support
> 
> It's essentially the Wagon Train that follows the fighting troops around making sure they get all the bullets, beans, water, fuel, spare parts, etc... To ensure the fighting troops can do there jobs.
> 
> ...



So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?


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## MilEME09 (18 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?



S&T is part of a Service battalion which would also have your maintenance assets, depending on the tactical situation we deploy differently, Typically though we are in a harbor several Km back from the front. The job of S&T is to push supplies out to the A echelon elements of the combat arms, maintenance will push forward MRT's (Mobile repair teams) as needed to repair or recover damaged equipment. It should also be noted by doctrine the Service Battalion is responsible for rear area security, so we have to be close, but not too close to make sure supplies don't take to long to deliver, and so we don't find our selves over stretched.


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## Infanteer (18 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> 70/17/1265 for a ABCT. By the book, 4 Svc Bn has 39/106/702.



Be careful, those U.S. numbers include the Forward Support Companies that act as "Admin Companies" for the battalions.


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## Infanteer (18 Aug 2016)

Lumber said:
			
		

> So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?



Combat Service Support (CSS) is a land operations concept, nothing more.  Combat Manoeuvre is stuff that shoots and moves to take ground.  Armour and Infantry.  Combat Support is stuff that directly supports that manoeuvre.  Engineers, Artillery, Signals, Intelligence.  Combat Service Support is stuff that sustains it all.  Logistics, Maintenance, Health Support, Personnel Support.

Supply & Transport is an actual type of land operations sub-unit, normally part of a Service Battalion.  The Supply & Transport Company is responsible for stockpiling and moving supplies from the rear to the CSS sub-units of the Brigade's Battalions and Regiments (normally called Administration Company or Headquarters Squadron/Battery).  They are essentially the "link-man" in land operations sustainment and are thus considered "second line".


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## Kirkhill (18 Aug 2016)

GR66 said:
			
		

> DHL or KBR might be OK for conflicts like Afghanistan/Iraq where airspace isn't contested and they can get into theatre without too much risk, but will they be able to deliver to Warsaw while it's under artillery attack and the international airport has its runways cratered?  How will your FedEx 767 manage entering contested airspace?



Didn't see this one earlier GR66.

The issue would then be getting them to deliver as close as possible.

For example - If they can't/won't deliver to Warsaw perhaps they can deliver to Cologne instead.  In that case even a small fleet of C17s and C130s flown by uniformed personnel could shift a lot of tonnage eastwards in short, frequent round trips - Just like the old Berlin Airlift.

The uniformed personnel needs to be there to do the stuff the civvies won't.  In my opinion it makes little sense having uniformed personnel do stuff civvies will.


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## MilEME09 (18 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The uniformed personnel needs to be there to do the stuff the civvies won't.  In my opinion it makes little sense having uniformed personnel do stuff civvies will.



Depends on the quality of the work, I am a Red Seal qualified Chef in civilian life, and I shake my head at many of the civilians I see working in CF kitchens. I am all for offloading un necessary positions to civilian contracts but we must have checks in place to make sure we are getting bang for our buck.


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## PuckChaser (18 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Depends on the quality of the work, I am a Red Seal qualified Chef in civilian life, and I shake my head at many of the civilians I see working in CF kitchens. I am all for offloading un necessary positions to civilian contracts but we must have checks in place to make sure we are getting bang for our buck.



Sometimes we don't have that option to retain military members in positions. Remember our hard cap of PYs, and don't we have the same number of bases we had 50 years ago (minus Calgary, Winnipeg), with a lot less PYs to throw around into those cook/mess manager/etc positions.


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## Kirkhill (18 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Depends on the quality of the work, I am a Red Seal qualified Chef in civilian life, and I shake my head at many of the civilians I see working in CF kitchens. I am all for offloading un necessary positions to civilian contracts but we must have checks in place to make sure we are getting bang for our buck.



Regardless of who is providing the service they need to be held to the contracted standard.  I am sure that in your civvy job you have had to haul up suppliers and tell them to get their act together - or find a new supplier.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (18 Aug 2016)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Be careful, those U.S. numbers include the Forward Support Companies that act as "Admin Companies" for the battalions.



True. I had to go back through the Org charts to see how the numbers for the BSB lined up since the sub-unit numbers were similar to the numbers for IBCT/SBCT's.

Also, the US BSBs do include the hospital company as part of their overall numbers. It does make one wonder why the Canadian numbers are so high and the US numbers so low when they are logistically as dependent as we are (and we are very dependent).


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## MilEME09 (19 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Regardless of who is providing the service they need to be held to the contracted standard.  I am sure that in your civvy job you have had to haul up suppliers and tell them to get their act together - or find a new supplier.



Yes, it is also why I have 5 different suppliers. It's great to have standards, but who is holding them to those standards, and how often are they checked on?


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## Halifax Tar (19 Aug 2016)

I think using DHL, for example, to move mass amounts of stores into a theatre is not a terrible idea.  It can augment the air bridge, or replace it, quite effectively.   

Call me a Canadian but I don't agree with arming civilians and sending them to the front to deliver supplies, MRTs ect.  That is a soldiers job.  A soldier must obey orders, follow ROEs, and any soldier can be used to take an hold ground in an emergency.  I think you will find you will get a better "fighting spirit" from the uniformed logistician.


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## Humphrey Bogart (19 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I think using DHL, for example, to move mass amounts of stores into a theatre is not a terrible idea.  It can augment the air bridge, or replace it, quite effectively.
> 
> Call me a Canadian but I don't agree with arming civilians and sending them to the front to deliver supplies, MRTs ect.  That is a soldiers job.  A soldier must obey orders, follow ROEs, and any soldier can be used to take an hold ground in an emergency.  I think you will find you will get a better "fighting spirit" from the uniformed logistician.



Colonel Conrad agrees with you  :nod:

It's at the FEBA where civilian business practices don't really apply.  I'm of the opinion that comparing what Walmart does to what the military does in a medium-high intensity conflict zone is essentially comparing fruits and vegetables.   IMO it's a useless exercise.

The business world has the advantage of being able to be incredibly deliberate in how they go about doing things.  We do not have that luxury, although we sometimes think we do because of our highly scripted training practices.


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## Kirkhill (19 Aug 2016)

Obviously I am inclined to be of the contrary position.

Any company that is not light enough on its feet to react to markets that vary day by day is going to go out of business.  Hence the success of Walmart and the demise of Zellers.  Walmart holds no inventory.  It builds local Replenishment Points and feeds with other peoples' goods from central distribution points.  It supplies to the market what the vendors wish to have supplied.  If the market doesn't like what the vendor is selling that is on the vendor, not Walmart.

Walmart, together with a multiplicity of civilian transport companies, including DHL, merely supply a means for distributing materials.  They could equally be the CAF's materials - assuming the CAF/DND/PSPC/TB/PMO can figure out what that material is supposed to be, how much of it they want, where they want it and when.

I don't disagree with the need for a solid uniformed logistics system at the FEBA/FLOT.  The issue I have is how far behind the FEBA do the uniforms have to extend.

A similar question is: how many bodies does the CQ need and where does he need them?  Does he need a section forward with F and section back with A or can he get the job done with a Clerk at B just managing the paperwork and relying on B to move his Company's needed goods forward?


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## Bird_Gunner45 (19 Aug 2016)

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Colonel Conrad agrees with you  :nod:
> 
> It's at the FEBA where civilian business practices don't really apply.  I'm of the opinion that comparing what Walmart does to what the military does in a medium-high intensity conflict zone is essentially comparing fruits and vegetables.   IMO it's a useless exercise.
> 
> The business world has the advantage of being able to be incredibly deliberate in how they go about doing things.  We do not have that luxury, although we sometimes think we do because of our highly scripted training practices.



But, as mentioned before, when major conflicts have broken out it has been the cooperation between the heads of industry and military that allowed for an effective logistics system to be created, not a pre-standing system. Civilian ships, transport system, and manufacturing processes all established the military machine that won WWII.

Is there no reason why we couldn't have a similar "melding of the minds" in 2016 to come up with an effective industry-military solution?

I would also argue that the military has the luxury of being deliberate for the 98% of the time that it isn't in medium-conflict scenarios (conventional warfare). Even Afghanistan, post 2006/2007 had the ability to be VERY deliberate in logistics. Business on the other hand needs to be more flexible since they rely on customers who can be fickle, so need to constantly evolve or die. The military is a conservative organization generally stuck in it's ways and slow to change. That's why our doctrinal "service battalion" still has ~800 pers while an American one has 363 (not including logistics pushed to front line units for Admin Coys) INCLUDING a health services Company.  :2c:


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## sandyson (19 Aug 2016)

A considerable difference between civilian supply services and military is that e.g. Walmart thrives on just-in-time delivery.  In war, the military depend on  the logistics of redundancy.  On the first logistics course, this was a heated point of argument between the air force on one side and the army and navy on the other.  Efficiency demands one organization while redundancy demands another and so on with deployments. Current patterns are obsolete other than that they are dendritic.  In general war the battle field will encompass the whole area of the warring factions but unlike World War Two supply interdiction will occur at the manufacturing end--indeed at the energy source.  (Yes Germany was bombed but it it increased military output in spite of that.) So I wonder on the nature of logistics and in particular of supply.  How much lead time is necessary to  create the redundancy needed and to where is it distributed? and will electronic warfare allow communicating demands to the supply system?
For 'peacekeeping', 'war against terror', and humanitarian assistance our current system will make do.  It won't do in a general war. Something new is needed.


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## Kirkhill (19 Aug 2016)

In which war did the military have redundant supply chains?

My understanding was that in WW1 the Brits couldn't get trench coats, rifles or shells out of the factories fast enough to be able to feed an expanding army and maintain operations.  In fact, if I remember correctly, operations were put on hold in 1915 due to a lack of shells being produced.

And in WW2 the Brits were buying anything that flew and anything that looked like a tank to keep the Mediterranean theatre going while Slim in Burma was having parachutes locally made from jute.  

Yes, in Normandy, after a 3 year build up, supplies were available - but that was one very special situation.  

I was under the impression that the biggest logistical problem of both of those wars was getting things as expeditiously as possible from the factory gate to FEBA.


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## Old Sweat (19 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> In which war did the military have redundant supply chains?
> 
> My understanding was that in WW1 the Brits couldn't get trench coats, rifles or shells out of the factories fast enough to be able to feed an expanding army and maintain operations.  In fact, if I remember correctly, operations were put on hold in 1915 due to a lack of shells being produced.
> 
> ...



Exactly, and it took a major shock to get people to understand the magnitude of the logistics challenge. Heck, how do you get enough field bakeries built and organize the yeast and flour and all the rest to feed the massive armies being recruited? As a gunner officer I spent much of my career wondering how the supply world was going to deliver the ammunition needed to fight even a thirty day war to the gun positions. Now multiply that by the Canadian Tire Catalogue and consider the harassed logistics officers with inadequate budgets and a delivery system that would have frustrated Oliver Cromwell.


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## a_majoor (20 Aug 2016)

While the speed, flexibility and responsiveness of massive organizations like WalMart have a lot to teach us about logistics and administration, there is one massive difference between them and us. As noted upthread, WalMart gets a lot of its efficiency and responsiveness by being "just in time", however, we have to be more like the fore department and have everything on hand "just in case".

One thing which makes me shudder os the prolonged procurement process for getting everything from boots to F-35's. In WWI and WWII, we were able to ramp up the industrial machine to build ever increasing quantities of material and push the designs ahead generations in a very short time. Can you imagine if the RCAF was sent into a hostile environment and started getting aircraft shot down by SAMs or other threats? besides the political ducking and covering, it would take years if not decades to replace the combat losses. We don't even buy enough aircraft, tanks or boots to support a sudden "surge" should we have to deploy in multiple theatres. 

Imagine if Eastern Europe suddenly gets "hot" and the situation in the Middle East boils over because everyone there thinks they can make their move while NATO is distracted? Extra men and equipment to deal with all that and maintain a reserve for DOMOPS or to keep an eye on the South China Sea? Good luck with that. And of course that does not even take into account the complete hash we have made of recruiting, and the time it takes to enrol people, much less train them.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Aug 2016)

Actually governments, even huge ones, can be quite nimble when good "management" is allowed (forced?) to rise to the occasion.

It started, in modern times, I would suggest, with Pitt the Younger who, actually, did more to defeat the French than Nelson and Wellington combined ... in our own times (well, a couple of us were alive, albeit in knee pants) we saw Beaverbrook and CD Howe bring order and even innovation out of a slothful, slumbering bureaucracy.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (20 Aug 2016)

Part of the problem that seems to be cropping up is the inherent different between the lines of support, particularly when we discuss "Just in Time" logistics. 

Civilian contractors have no place in second line logistics, which is the purview of the Service Battalion. That's where the majority of the danger is going to lie. However, for all intents and purposes, second line is "just in time" logistics, since it relies on first line requests and maintaining the second line "maintenance load". The trick for service battalion then depends on how big the maintenance load needs to be (how much supply) and how long are the supply lines (transport required).  

Fourth line and third line logistics is where civilian integration could provide significant benefits to us (Canada) and take strain off of the military system. Third line is essentially all about creating DOS (days of supply) for the second line to draw upon. To this end, third line can be heavily civilianized to provide stock, which a civilian contractor could provide.

Having seen the Canadian Tire warehouse, the difference in efficiency between civilian organizations and the military is amazing. From a centralized warehouse, they can provide JIT to all their stores in Eastern Canada based on requests. As everything is automated it requires minimal personnel. Since the Canadian Tire model (Centralized warehouse with DOS) providing JIT to stores (our second line) it seems to be a natural fit.


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## Kirkhill (20 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Part of the problem that seems to be cropping up is the inherent different between the lines of support, particularly when we discuss "Just in Time" logistics.
> 
> Civilian contractors have no place in second line logistics, which is the purview of the Service Battalion. That's where the majority of the danger is going to lie. However, for all intents and purposes, second line is "just in time" logistics, since it relies on first line requests and maintaining the second line "maintenance load". The trick for service battalion then depends on how big the maintenance load needs to be (how much supply) and how long are the supply lines (transport required).
> 
> ...



This is not the Canadian Tire Warehouse but - What does it mean for the military if Warehouses, Ships and Trucks are robotized?  I am going to leave automated fire support systems off the board just now.


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## PuckChaser (20 Aug 2016)

Those robotized shelves would sure be great, but we don't have the budget to stock them and make use of it. Civilian just in time shipping seems so appealing because we're constantly grabbing things HPR/IOR that should be well stocked at Depot in Montreal.

Stock outs of popular size clothing or common use parts should never happen, but it's our status quo.


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## Kirkhill (20 Aug 2016)

PC:   I think the argument is that you shouldn't be paying for those shelves and system.  You should be paying for the boots that could be on those shelves.


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## Old Sweat (20 Aug 2016)

Just in time works really well, as long as the enemy agrees to give you lots of notice before you have to cope with a run on stuff like 155mm HE and 5.56mm ball and everything in between.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (20 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> PC:   I think the argument is that you shouldn't be paying for those shelves and system.  You should be paying for the boots that could be on those shelves.



 :goodpost:

That's where I see it. The purpose of third line (for Canada at least) is to keep a Divisional level stock of supplies to distribute to second line service battalions. That's where trying to make a Service Battalion a third-first line all inclusive beast falls apart. It'd be akin to telling 1 RCHA that it has to be the Brigade level DS Regiment as well as the Divisional Level GS Regiment, and maybe provide some mortars for the Battalions in case.

Militaries are best at killing things... why not focus our limited resources on the skills needed to kill, and/or supply those who do so, and allow our massive commercial and industrial base to fill in the remainder? We always talk about tooth to tail and how we need to reduce it. This would be a good place to start (there are 1600 logistics officers in Canada after all).


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## dapaterson (20 Aug 2016)

We can contract out combat arms as well. Xe, Executive Outcomes... so how far do we go?

Or, another perspective, most cbt arms training is takes less time to conduct and maintain than most CSS.  Shouldn't we spend our full time positions on the skillets that take longer to develop and maintain?


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## PuckChaser (20 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> PC:   I think the argument is that you shouldn't be paying for those shelves and system.  You should be paying for the boots that could be on those shelves.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (20 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> We can contract out combat arms as well. Xe, Executive Outcomes... so how far do we go?
> 
> Or, another perspective, most cbt arms training is takes less time to conduct and maintain than most CSS.  Shouldn't we spend our full time positions on the skillets that take longer to develop and maintain?



The time for skillset development is debatable but the point was that combat skills are the entire point of having an army. I'm only suggesting contracting or using PS where it makes sense- third line, static, Canadian outlets, and in secure theatres. There will always be a need for a militarized Service Battalion (and only military, no civilians). If we want less tooth to tail than we need to look into how we do it in a rational sense. Our combat arms units are basically at where they need to be to support what the government wants, which means we either get more tail or less tooth.


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## dapaterson (20 Aug 2016)

Disagree re: combat arms. We have a structure designed to maintain a balance of terror between regiments and branches, not to optimize combat abilities.  We engage in decision-based evidence making to arrive at a requirement for nine infantry battalions and everything else (for one example).


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## Bird_Gunner45 (20 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Disagree re: combat arms. We have a structure designed to maintain a balance of terror between regiments and branches, not to optimize combat abilities.  We engage in decision-based evidence making to arrive at a requirement for nine infantry battalions and everything else (for one example).



I will whole heartedly agree that the Regimental structure is the reason for a number of problems in the CAF. However, we need to be able to provide 1 x Brigade group for NATO, so you need 3 to make that happen on a far less than optimal schedule of deployment. To get 1 x BG into Afghanistan required massive amounts of Reserve and other augmentation. 

Logistics does this too... that's why there's L1 Foods Majors whose main role seems to be to pass messages and make busy work like instituting the NSCM


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## Kirkhill (21 Aug 2016)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Just in time works really well, as long as the enemy agrees to give you lots of notice before you have to cope with a run on stuff like 155mm HE and 5.56mm ball and everything in between.



Been thinking about this, and the antipathy to J-I-T.

On one hand, I get it.  That is particularly true of ammunition.  But on the other hand the attitude is the creator of your own misfortunes.

I get that you want everything on-hand when the shooting starts.  But all that stuff on hand is stuff you have to carry all the rest of the time.   

The result is 120lbs of kit on your back.  10 tonne trucks in the lines.  Mechanics and drivers and shops to maintain them.  Warehouses full of stuff that gathers dust or goes obsolete or is never purchased.

And frankly, even on the ammo front, the British army had ammunition depots in 1915.  They weren't big enough.

Reliance on a system that stops in a warehouse is a nonsense.  The warehouse has to be replenished.   Ideally, in my opinion, the warehouse, and the trucks and the rucks should be small.

My sense of the ideal soldier of the future is Captain James T. Kirk - a decent pair of boots, pants and shirt, sidearm and a communicator - a communicator attached to the wrath of God, a rapid transport system and a secure base.

No axes just in case you might need to knock down a door someday.

J-I-T or J-I-C.   Just in time or Just in case.

Neither answer is one hundred per cent right.


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## MilEME09 (21 Aug 2016)

I can see your argument Chris, but at the end of the day we do need to keep a limited stock pile, now I would think we scale off Afghanistan, how much supplies need to be on hand to sustain a battle group long term in terms of days to facilitate the smooth movement of supplies? lets say you need X tons of everything stored to support 8 months of operations, have on hand 6 months of supplies, because in that time the supply chain should keep a steady enough flow to keep the warehouse stocked.


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## McG (21 Aug 2016)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Interestingly, a Brigade Support Battalion for a US infantry brigade combat team has 65/17/795, 58/14/698 for a SBCT, and70/17/1265 for a ABCT. By the book, 4 Svc Bn has 39/106/702.
> 
> Distribution Coy (our S&T Coy) has only 5/2/135 for a  ABCT compared to 11/61/305 for S&T Coy, which makes me wonder if the US system is effective, and if so, why we have almost 2 x more pers....


Is Dist Coy the same as S&T Coy, or is it Tn Coy?


			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Be careful, those U.S. numbers include the Forward Support Companies that act as "Admin Companies" for the battalions.


There are a lot of "be careful"s in that comparison.  The Americans have and deploy Sustainment Brigades at the Div level to provide CSS that Canada keeps at the Bde level.  Because we do not have deployable third line, we have capabilities doctrinally within the Svc Bn that the US keeps at higher levels.  We do maintenance at second line that the US would push back to third line.  Laundry, bath and CBRN Decon are not Bde capabilities in the US, but they are capabilities of the doctrinal Cdn Svc Bn.


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## Kirkhill (21 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I can see your argument Chris, but at the end of the day we do need to keep a limited stock pile, now I would think we scale off Afghanistan, how much supplies need to be on hand to sustain a battle group long term in terms of days to facilitate the smooth movement of supplies? lets say you need X tons of everything stored to support 8 months of operations, have on hand 6 months of supplies, because in that time the supply chain should keep a steady enough flow to keep the warehouse stocked.



We do need to keep a limited stockpile.  Agreed.  No qualifiers.

Key word: limited.

"Limited" needs to be defined - in the manner you are suggesting.

But the issue has to be recognized that that is a plan for a world operating according to your/our wishes.  We also need a plan B that accommodates the world doing as it ruddy well pleases and us having to operate according to its wishes.  

In my opinion that means a plan predicated on working with what is available and not what you want.  Most of the military revolutions of the past have not been driven by government programmes but by enemies looking for cheap, assymetric advantages from the market place.

Do you plan on ceasing operations when you run out of bullets and planes - a viable course of action - or will you continue fighting with any means available to you?

Churchill was reduced to pikes, sticky bombs, Blackard bombards and sten guns for a while.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (22 Aug 2016)

MCG said:
			
		

> Is Dist Coy the same as S&T Coy, or is it Tn Coy?There are a lot of "be careful"s in that comparison.  The Americans have and deploy Sustainment Brigades at the Div level to provide CSS that Canada keeps at the Bde level.  Because we do not have deployable third line, we have capabilities doctrinally within the Svc Bn that the US keeps at higher levels.  We do maintenance at second line that the US would push back to third line.  Laundry, bath and CBRN Decon are not Bde capabilities in the US, but they are capabilities of the doctrinal Cdn Svc Bn.



Dist Coy=S&T Coy

The BSB for the US includes a medical company which is larger than the LBD platoon. I'm not arguing that the Service Bn vis a vis BSB aren't different, the question is which is a more effective second line? Service Battalion's ought to be focussed on second line only, which is the crux of the third line JIT/civilianized argument... if we can make a fully military, tactically focused service battalion and push the third line and institutional functions to either a Div or civilian organization could we find efficiecy's and adopt a better second line?


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

What you have to remember about the Canadian Forces Supply System (CFSS) is that it is the Supply System (SS) for the RCN, CA, RCAF and any other plethora of organizations that are with in the CAF. 

Before unification you had each element with its own depots; shipping and receiving parts for that element.  A concentration of force in a supply sense if you will, good Army term eh ?  [Xp  

Now we have 2 true depots 25 CFSD (Montreal) and 7 CFSD (Edmonton) (Not including Ammo) to support the entire CAF and all of its missions, business and deployments.  

You also have to take into account that the 2nd and 3rd lines you talk about are expected to support the RCN and the RCAF, not just he Army.  Both of those elements are nothing without their ships and planes.  And if they aren't properly supported then those two elements simply cease to be able to even attempt the wishes and whims of the Canadian public and government.  

When discussing the CAF Logistics or CFSS you cannot simply make changes for one element without consultation and agreement of the others because the impact will be felt and the training will need to done across the board so all Loggies can continue to pretend like we are purple.  Unless of course we went back to the elements owning their LOG functions and people.


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

walid said:
			
		

> As an ex-member of the Communist Party of Canada and an ex-Cuban mole this I have to say based on the intelligence I have gathered while rubbing elbows and playing footsies with their members:
> 
> Communist agents in the Conservative, Liberal, Green and NDF Party table bills for or suggest bills for CAF logistics only on non-opportune moments when budget is wanting with the expectation that the bill would not be passed for the same reasons. Just like economic saboteurs who knew of the 'implausibility' of pipelines of Alberta the Political Left are responsible for tabling their legitimacy knowing their weak justification only to be vetoed because of fear of possible oil spillage. Then they appear as heroes. Eating the cake and having them too.



 :stars:  WTF was that ?  I am sure I have read that opening line before...


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## Edward Campbell (22 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> :stars:  WTF was that ?  I am sure I have read that opening line before...




(S)he's, pretty clearly, your average "operator" expressing her/his considered opinion on combat and service support.  :


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## MJP (22 Aug 2016)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> (S)he's, pretty clearly, your average "operator" expressing her/his considered opinion on combat and service support.  :



Would you go as far as saying they are a "bus" operator?


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

Never mind the flies. Let's get back to the beer.

A good part of what you are talking about, in my opinion, is inventory management.  It is an ongoing discussion for most businesses.  The demand for inventory goes up and down on an irregular basis.

Stock is not held unless there is a good need for it.  In other words, in the event of an anticipated sales campaign then inventory will be created for a short period of time and moved expeditiously  At the other end inventory can creep up on you if it isn't moving out as fast as anticipated.  In which case a sales campaign is instituted to get rid of the material.

No company would contemplate holding inventory for a year let alone multiples of years.  For one thing they would put their suppliers out of business.  For another their products would be out of sync with market demands and current technology.

The real question for you, again in my opinion, is how quickly can your supply chain move goods to you to meet your needs.  The faster that happens the less inventory, the less warehousing, the less rolling stock you will need and the more agile you will become.

Having said that real transactions take real time - time that you won't have if you are in contact.  So you need some inventory.  The next question is: how long does it take to get a Day of Supply from the factory to FEBA?


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Never mind the flies. Let's get back to the beer.
> 
> A good part of what you are talking about, in my opinion, is inventory management.  It is an ongoing discussion for most businesses.  The demand for inventory goes up and down on an irregular basis.
> 
> ...



Ahhh yes inventory management.  Something I am up to my eye balls in now.  

I will sum you up, Supply VS Demand. 

This makes great sense when looking at it from a civilian business.  The problem is are not that.  We have to have large amounts of stores to sit and collect dust at the CFSDs to wait for the possibility that they may be required.  We cannot get manufacturers to fill our demands fast enough.  Many times if we go back to  the manufacturer to get a part made it takes months.  Which does not help the Truck/Tank/Ship/Plane that is now sitting idle and required for action. 

In our business model supply must/should out weigh demand, vastly.  The movement of physical good from a depot to a end user can happen in 1 day this is all built into our High Priority Requisition (HPR) process.  If the end user is deployed or at sea this will be dependant on when the ship is next in port, the severity of the parts requirement, and the departure of the next sustainment flight.  For the RCAF and CA just remove the "next in port" part and the rest is the same. 

From my experience with Army, once the beans and bullets are on ground in the theatre its just a matter of loading them and moving them to the FEBA.  The request for XXX can be done by as simple a means as an ADREP.  I know in AFG ammo and combat vehicle parts to precedence over all other stores on the CLPs that dispatched every day to the various FOBs and other outposts the NSE supported.  

From the factory to the FEBA, it could be weeks.  Especially in a situation like AFG.  A land locked country.  Stores loaded onto ship in Montreal, sail to Pakistan, loaded onto Jingle Truck and shipped through the Khyber Pass to KAF then distributed to the end users by the NSE.  That process can take some time.


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## jollyjacktar (22 Aug 2016)

Even on a high priority TAV as I was involved in at KAF in 07 we had to wait a month for additional supply needs to be flown in from Canada.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Ahhh yes inventory management.  Something I am up to my eye balls in now.
> 
> I will sum you up, Supply VS Demand.
> 
> ...



I'm not yanking chains HT.  I get the point. But I have the sense that some opportunities are being missed by not taking a wider view of the problems that you are forced to cope with on a daily basis.

Cheers.


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## dapaterson (22 Aug 2016)

Since the crown no longer owns the IP behind our systems, we are constrained in our ability to source from multiple places.  Thus, the limited number of suppliers worldwide means that in a time of international crisis demand will spike with few sources of supply.

Thus a need to stock excess widgets - because if we need them immediately in a warfighting scenario, not having them may be catastrophic, and the additional time to procure them through the sole source of supply that has many orders from others for the same widget is unacceptable.

It's a question of risk management; for some commodities it is entirely acceptable (for example, we no longer stock box after box of dried up markers in warehouses to ship to units, but order from the economy); for others, well, Wal-Mart doesn't stock LAV transmissions, and Costco only has them in packs of twelve...

Even now, Defence is looking at ways to improve.  Part of that is looking at stocking more, not less spare parts, to improve maintenance productivity.  See, for example, http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=defence-renewal-optimizing-maintenance-of-vehicles-and-equipment-critical-to-military-success/i6mj1gn5.


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## dapaterson (22 Aug 2016)

Chris, we posted at the same time. 

You ask "Why does so much of the fleet have non-standard/obsolete parts that are not readily available and must be manufactured?"

Several reasons. First, combat vehicles are dissimilar from other vehicles.  Oilsands trucks don't carry 120mm cannons, for example.  Second, we retain fleets of military vehicles longer than most businesses would, meaning that spares are not always readily available on the market.  Third, the CAF's fleets are relatively small.  The acquisition of 1300 MilCOTS MSVS trucks represented a few extra shifts on the line; were they not militarized civilian vehicles, few manufacturers would see an advantage in maintaining a supply chain for such a small fleet, thus necessitating early acquisition of spares while the production lines are still open, or hefty costs later to retool to begin producing whatever item(s) had an unexpectedly short life and needed more spares.

Buying in common with allies is one way to reduce costs and (hopefully) keep the supply chains open longer.  But it's not guaranteed, our requirements may be different, and sometimes it does come down to "announceables" for the government of the day, or jobs in a desired location (cough Griffons cough).

There is no one perfect solution; unfortunately, in a world dominated by MBAs without common sense, minimum cost tends to win out regardless of the downstream impacts, since future costs are someone else's problem.


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm not yanking chains HT.  I get the point. But I have the sense that some opportunities are being missed by not taking a wider view of the problems that you are forced to cope with on a daily basis.
> 
> Cheers.



Chris, 

No worries at all mate.  No chain yanking perceived.  



> Why does so much of the fleet have non-standard/obsolete parts that are not readily available and must be manufactured?


That's a question for the for the NSPS thread.  Ask anyone who owns a Ford Model A how easy it is to maintain and find spare parts.  The older the platform the harder it is to maintain.  Especially when you drive them like you stole them, like we do.  Its what's killed the tankers and destroyers. 



> Supply always needs to be greater than demand.  No argument.  Vastly - a debatable valuation that is best defined by a number.


We are supposed to plan for +10%.  This is light in my eyes. 



> Agreed that from the factory to FEBA it could be weeks.  In fact I will say that for some things it could be months. And that is the real purpose of warehousing and inventory management.  The question remains though: How long to replace?


That is all speculation and relies on many variables.  Age of the platform being the huge factor.


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Aug 2016)

If we got rid of trucks sooner and replaced them with newer, we have less problems. You could have one factory in Canada, using existing designs to build MSVS type vehicles, proper medium and heavy tactical trucks and LSVW replacement. If you kept the replacement rate at a slow pace, they could literately stay in business full time. I know people will bring up the Iltis, LSVW and MLVW as why this won’t work well, but it’s likely the most politically acceptable solution and would actually give us vehicles. The idea would be that you have several lines set up for each type and the workers move from line to line as required. Some points in the line can be combined like the paint shop. You could also have a refurbishment facility on site using the same group of workers.


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> If we got rid of trucks sooner and replaced them with newer, we have less problems. You could have one factory in Canada, using existing designs to build MSVS type vehicles, proper medium and heavy tactical trucks and LSVW replacement. If you kept the replacement rate at a slow pace, they could literately stay in business full time. I know people will bring up the Iltis, LSVW and MLVW as why this won’t work well, but it’s likely the most politically acceptable solution and would actually give us vehicles. The idea would be that you have several lines set up for each type and the workers move from line to line as required. Some points in the line can be combined like the paint shop. You could also have a refurbishment facility on site using the same group of workers.



I have heard the same idea passed around for ship building.  A continuous production cycle.  No ship to last longer than 20 years.  Its interesting, I would like to see a cost analysis of it.  Sounds expensive and expensive isn't really the adjective the Canadian Public is willing to describe their support of us with.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

Just clarifying HT.   

WRT the +10% - that strikes me as something of a scattergun approach.  I could see the need for some components to be +100% - especially when dealing with non-standard/obsolete gear.  And of course that drives up your cost of doing business which either has to be accommodated in your business plan or else you need to be looking at other ways of doing business.

On the other hand some items you might be able to reduce that 10% to 0%.  How difficult would it be to arrange with Danner to supply 10,000 pairs of boots a year from their existing catalogue?  That would mean them shipping 30 to 40 pairs of boots a day with a 3 to 5 day delivery. For Example.

WRT the trucks Colin.  

I accept there will always be a need for specialization but that comes at a cost.

Suppose a less rugged commercial standard were accepted.

Jeep puts out 250,000 Wranglers a year.  There are something like 2.5 Million Light Trucks in the 1500 range manufactured and probably the same again in the 2500-3500 range.  I have no idea what the numbers are for Mediums and Heavies.

But at what point does it make more sense to get a custom built truck with long lead components rather than just buying a dozen bog-standard units off the line and keeping a couple of them in theater as immediate replacements for the other 10 units that are on operations?


And HT - you are right to ask to see the numbers.  That is the real purpose of doing a life-cycle valuation.  It may work out in the long run to plan on replacing 1/3 of the fleet every seven years or 1/2 every 15.


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## dapaterson (22 Aug 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> If we got rid of trucks sooner and replaced them with newer, we have less problems. You could have one factory in Canada, using existing designs to build MSVS type vehicles, proper medium and heavy tactical trucks and LSVW replacement. If you kept the replacement rate at a slow pace, they could literately stay in business full time. I know people will bring up the Iltis, LSVW and MLVW as why this won’t work well, but it’s likely the most politically acceptable solution and would actually give us vehicles. The idea would be that you have several lines set up for each type and the workers move from line to line as required. Some points in the line can be combined like the paint shop. You could also have a refurbishment facility on site using the same group of workers.



Given the small numbers Canada buys, this isn't viable.  Our full purchase of a single type of vehicle represents a week or two of work for a proper factory.  What's the benefit to having the People's Glorious Military Truck Factory #17 in Chatham NB, where the cost per unit is extremely high and production rates are slow?


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

Hi DAP

Points taken - agreed strongly that, unfortunately, there can never be a one-size-fits-all solution.  The problem is always a matter of getting bogged down with the 20% which creates 80% of the aggravation while the other 80% gets ignored.


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## Halifax Tar (22 Aug 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Just clarifying HT.
> 
> WRT the +10% - that strikes me as something of a scattergun approach.  I could see the need for some components to be +100% - especially when dealing with non-standard/obsolete gear.  And of course that drives up your cost of doing business which either has to be accommodated in your business plan or else you need to be looking at other ways of doing business.
> 
> ...



The +10% is just a general rule.  But you are correct, some things could be +100% or 0% over stock.  

As for a contact like the boots, how did they creep in here  , That is more complicated as it has to go to PWGSC and all kinds of hoops must be jumped and many votes will need pandering.  

Ideally our fist task would be to de-politicize the defence procurement process.  Not meaning to remove government oversight but meaning to remove the political necessity of buying goods from places and companies to prop up business and buy votes.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (22 Aug 2016)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> The +10% is just a general rule.  But you are correct, some things could be +100% or 0% over stock.
> 
> As for a contact like the boots, how did they creep in here  , That is more complicated as it has to go to PWGSC and all kinds of hoops must be jumped and many votes will need pandering.
> 
> Ideally our fist task would be to de-politicize the defence procurement process.  Not meaning to remove government oversight but meaning to remove the political necessity of buying goods from places and companies to prop up business and buy votes.



It is not that simple, though.

We argue logistics here as if it was peace time civilian. But like every thing else military, you have to factor in wartime - even when you are not seeing a war coming. In WWII for instance, we bought the plans for corvettes and frigates (even for Tribal class destroyers), but their weapons (actual system - not the ammo) and sensors and burgeoning "electronics" more often than not had to come from the UK or the US, who were also at war. Who do you think always got first dibs? For instance: by the end of 1942, all British ships - corvettes included - were equipped with gyrocompasses, some (larger ones) even had two. Yet only 15% of Canadian corvettes were so equiped.

For many things we store, matters have not changed. Take for instance the Mk46 torpedoes. We have the stocks we carry on the ships, plus whatever is at the ammo depots in Halifax and Victoria.

When I was in, we made a quick calculation of the numbers available and then, using not the data derived by the genius in operational research in Ottawa, but the actual expenditures the Brits experienced chasing only two effective Argentine diesel boats in the Falkland (hint: ASW ammo is the only item they almost ran out of), and figured that when the balloon went up with the ruskies, we would have stock on hand for two convoys (3 weeks). You tell me where we can get 46's in three weeks. Well, the airmen may not like the Griffon, but if it keeps a helicopter plant going in Canada, that can quickly go back to producing helicopters in Canada for the CAF, instead of getting Blackhawks six months too late because we were at the end of the American queue, then so be it: It is as much a strategic decision as it is a political one.

But similarly, at the beginning of WWII, volunteers went for months drilling in their civvies because no uniform where on hand. Again, if we now have say 55,000 CAF members that require the Army CADPAT, shouldn't we have another 55,000 on hand for "emergency" issues in time of rapid expansion - and if you rotate these extra ones with the ones used and due for replacement and accept a dipping in the "war" stocks from time to time, then you should never have a shortage in peace time. And if changes to the uniform means a whole bunch gets destroyed and replaced from time to time, then so be it - but when the need suddenly occurs, they are on hand.


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

But - equally

Why are you wasting money stocking things that can be readily procured from production lines currently operating at capacities far beyond your current or projected needs?

Why make life hard on yourselves by writing detailed specs for customized equipment (MilCOTS MSVS and Milverados come to mind) when you could just as easily buy commercial vehicles and adjust your procedures to accord with their maximum capabilities?  

Then you can save both your dollars and your projecting resources for the stuff that isn't readily available.


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## dapaterson (22 Aug 2016)

Some confusion on your part there - MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS were very open-ended to industry, with a minimum of customization, and are maintained by dealer networks that also stock parts.

You can best view army vehicles as three families:

Blue fleet.  Off the dealer lot.  No customization.  Managed like any other commercial fleet.  Maintained on warranties, disposed of in a normal lifecycle.

Semi-green fleets.  Bought from a manufacturer of civilian vehicles, largely a civilian pattern vehicle, but with minor customizations (power systems for radios, blackout drive for example).  Maintained by dealer network.  Support training, but cheaper than green fleet.  For example, MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS.

Green fleets.  Bought from defence contractors.  Maintenance can either be in-house or via contract.  Vehicles that can be uparmoured if necessary, and perform a variety of roles.  Focus is on expeditionary uses.


Thus, there's already an attempt to leverage best too for best job.  Different fleets for different purposes, at different cost points, with different maintenance methods.


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Given the small numbers Canada buys, this isn't viable.  Our full purchase of a single type of vehicle represents a week or two of work for a proper factory.  What's the benefit to having the People's Glorious Military Truck Factory #17 in Chatham NB, where the cost per unit is extremely high and production rates are slow?



Jobs in an area that has a lot of people trained and experienced in that area. You don't need a full out shift and they can work at a slower pace, you could also bundle in automotive component refurbishment for the wheeled armour as well. I shall call it the National Truck Procurement Strategy (NTPS) and base it in Ontario. Fancy name, good voting harvesting location, technical decent paying jobs, longterm, lots of opportunity for PR announcements and by the way trucks for the military. A quick look at Wiki provides an estimated 10,000 vehicles on the books, which means at 660 vehicles a year they will replace the fleet every 15 years. So roughly 2 vehicles a day. It's not much but then you won't need a big staff either.


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## CBH99 (22 Aug 2016)

I don't mean to derail the thread, so forgive me.  I'm sure the initial concept of the thread was more along the lines of improving logisitical capabilities, even at the strategic level (i.e. C-177 Globemasters, etc)

I don't mean to dive too far into the truck idea posted by ColinP - but just to further inquire about that idea.  (Since honestly, it seems like a good one.)

The trucks that come out of that little factory, where would they go?  To a depot, and then be distributed to units as needed?  Or stocked until a fleet replacement is required?  Or...??

The idea of a little "make work" factory producing a few trucks a week isn't a bad idea if it can produce them at a decent price & it keeps our truck fleets in better shape.      :2c:


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## Kirkhill (22 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Some confusion on your part there - MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS were very open-ended to industry, with a minimum of customization, and are maintained by dealer networks that also stock parts.
> 
> You can best view army vehicles as three families:
> 
> ...



Thanks for the clarification - 

Then I would be asking the question of why isn't there more exploitation of the blue fleet?

And my second question would be why did it take so long to create an RFP that resulted in one, single, solitary, unique, individual bidder for a the MilCOTS MSVS?

And that resulted in 6 separate variants?

Couldn't the 895 trucks with extended cabs and tarps, the 128 trucks with extended cabs and cages and the 100 extended cabs with flatbeds, all have been procured and maintained under blue fleet rules?

I don't perceive any major modifications from a standard truck in those vehicles.

Did they have to be purchased as a fleet or could they have been reasonably procured as an ongoing standard?


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## McG (22 Aug 2016)

From CFJP 4-0, the four lines of support are:


> a.  First line support. Support capabilities that are organic or allocated to a ship, unit or squadron.
> 
> b.  Second line support. Support capabilities that are organic or allocated to a formation.
> 
> ...


There have been discussions about where commercial service providers can inject services to deployed operations or which is the most forward line of support that civilians can deliver.  From an Army perspective (maybe not from a navy or air perspective), the cut-off is the operational to tactical divide.  The divide is at third line by the definitions above, and it will probably always be at the JTFSC.
For a BG deployment with an FSG that is a sub-unit of the JTFSC, the operational divide is internal to the JTFSC with the FSG reaching into the tactical level while the remainder of the unit is operational.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the second line (JTFSC).
If Canada deployed a land formation, the operational divide would be between the service battalion and the JTFSC.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the third line (JTFSC).
In the improbable event of a major conflict with a deployed Canadian Corps, the Corps could be an operational level HQ and civilian delivery might bypass the JTFSC for delivery to the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) ... but don't expect we will ever see that.



			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> What you have to remember about the Canadian Forces Supply System (CFSS) is that it is the Supply System (SS) for the RCN, CA, RCAF and any other plethora of organizations that are with in the CAF.
> 
> ...
> 
> ...


Generally, I agree.  Any changes to CAF logistics must support all environments.  But, change should not be contingent upon unanimity across the L1s.  The CDS and VCDS can give orders to move in a direction that is best for the CAF, even if it leaves someone a little grumpy because new ways of support are not that person's comfort zone.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Why are you wasting money stocking things that can be readily procured from production lines currently operating at capacities far beyond your current or projected needs?
> 
> Why make life hard on yourselves by writing detailed specs for customized equipment (MilCOTS MSVS and Milverados come to mind) when you could just as easily buy commercial vehicles and adjust your procedures to accord with their maximum capabilities?


Because civilian trucks break on the first day of exercise and we cannot afford trucks as consumables.  Because civilian trucks do not have black-out drive and we need to operate discreetly in the dark.  Because civilian trucks are not designed with NATO standard power and so cannot support military radios.  Because civilian trucks don't have hard points to mount a machine gun.  Because civilian trucks do not have CARC paint and so cannot be decontaminated from a chemical attack.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Chris, we posted at the same time.
> 
> You ask "Why does so much of the fleet have non-standard/obsolete parts that are not readily available and must be manufactured?"
> 
> ...


This is an area where we could do a little more to help ourselves.  Retention (or acquisition) of micro-fleets that offer nothing unique in the baseline platform.  We retain several generations of LAV, the M113A3/TLAV family, and Cougar MRAP when the roles of all of these vehicles could be satisfied by one common platform.  Not only would this reduce the number of equipment management teams on the payroll in Gatineau, it would reduce the variety and absolute quantity of parts sitting on shelves in all levels of warehouse.  It might also give us a little more clout to keep supply chains open and to address obsolescence issues.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Second, we retain fleets of military vehicles longer than most businesses would, meaning that spares are not always readily available on the market.


This is another area where we must do better.




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Never mind the flies. Let's get back to the beer.
> 
> A good part of what you are talking about, in my opinion, is inventory management.  It is an ongoing discussion for most businesses.  The demand for inventory goes up and down on an irregular basis.
> 
> ...


I think it might be easier to understand the problem if you try to answer (and quantify) what is a Day of Supply.  The question has been asked before including by Col Conrad (who has already been referenced in this thread).  Some things are easy to quantify.  If you know the number of soldiers, then you know the number of breakfast, lunch and supper required.  But for most everything else (including consumption requirements of spare and replacement parts to equipment casualties) the enemy gets a vote.  For ammo, 1 DOS must be greater than the average day's consumption because, if your unit only carries what it will consume on an average day, you can expect to run-out often.  Is your 1 DOS based on the 95th percentile, so you only expect to run out of ammunition about five days in every three months?  That still seems too often to accept.

We need our supply system to have the capacity to meet the spike demand and the surge demand (a spike with endurance) that we were unable to predict on a calendar.  We cannot consume ammunition at a rate to sustain war time production levels without a war, but the multi-year stockpiles gives us a large quantity of nebulously defined DOS so that we can fight while industry ramps itself to wartime production.  At a national level, we could reduce the age of our stock and increase capacity of our peace time ammo production by doing more range training with live ammo (less simulation), but I don't think we should start shooting at our trucks to increase the demand for peace time parts production.


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## dapaterson (22 Aug 2016)

If we want vehicles that soldiers can use to practice military things like blackout drive, and use of radios (and yes, there's a disconnect due to ongoing shortages of radios) then we have to get some minor customization.  That is the point of MilCOTS - it's almost off the shelf and therefore should be cheaper and faster to buy.  Manufacturers will charge an arm and a leg (instead of just one leg below the knee) to mod small numbers of vehicles each year, rather than have the line do it for a fleet buy (even one as small as 1300), thus the inclination to buy a fleet all at once.  I do think that a cyclical buy could work; it might be worthwhile to mod the vehicles in-house through 202 Workshop (though I'd have to see a cost/benefit and business case analysis to determine the best method).  That could also provide flexibility to grow or shrink fleets as requirements change over the life of the fleet.

As for the length of time for MSVS MilCOTS: I don't have the timeline handy, but often delays are due to aligning a purchase with when funds will be available.  There was only one bidder due to DND's checkered past in some procurements.  I suspect other potential bidders weighed the cost of bidding against the probability of success, and figured out that the potential profit did not outweigh the potential PITA.


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## GR66 (23 Aug 2016)

I'm curious.  There are other, much larger militaries that have the same general military requirements as we do, but do them in sometimes different ways.  Ideally, were money no object we'd have our uniquely Canadian way of doing things that best suits OUR national requirements and have the money to be able to supply that specific equipment.  

Unfortunately we don't seem to be willing as a nation to supply the money required to equip our military that way.  At what point does it become better overall in terms of military capability to shift our methods to match readily available equipment rather than ordering unique equipment to suite our methods and maybe not being able to afford enough to truely be effective?

Who decides when a "Canadianization" is worth the extra cost over what we could buy piggy-backed on the orders by a larger military?


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## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2016)

McG:

That was a better answer than I probably deserved.

However -  ;D

With respect to the provision of modifications - You will have to work harder to convince me that none of the varieties of options that come of civilian lines on a daily basis are incompatible with military usage.  And, by the way, breaking vehicles on the first day of issue is neither restricted to military drivers nor civilian vehicles.  It might be indicative of drivers not trained to manage within the capabilities of their vehicle. 

And if I can't get the solution direct off of a Chrysler/Ford/GM line then, before I have to build my own mod shop, as DAP suggested, there are a number of firms like these guys at Intercontinental that can work with the production line solutions and adjust to requirements.  And they are just one of many.  But, again as DAP suggests, the real test is whether it pencils out on a spreadsheet.

Some up front costs may be higher.  Some compromises will be required (they always are in every design). But.  Availability may be improved. Maintenance costs may be reduced. Logistical burden to support the fleet should be the goal so that more of that effort can be directed forward.

I don't know that this is a viable course of action.  I continue to suggest that effort should be invested in seeing how much can be done with readily available, standard tools rather than having to invent wheels peculiar to our needs.   And sometimes, listening to the conversations here, I get the strong impression that we get fixated on working with Formula One cars and don't spend enough time figuring out what can be accomplished with a Chevy.

Are TTPs that heavily ingrained that it is easier to create the perfect piece of kit than adjust the TTPs?


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## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2016)

http://army.ca/forums/threads/87547/post-1451042.html#msg1451042

Doesn't this play into this discussion as well?  Even when we keep the same kit the kit is not the same?  I could also point to your issue rifle - which started life as the M16, became the M16A1, the A2, the A3, the C7, the C7A1, C7A2, C7A3, C7CT, the C8, the C8A1, C8A2, C8A3, C8CT, not to mention M4s and LSW variants.  And the change in ammunition standards along the way.

Or even the benighted question of boots and what makes a perfect pair.

Officially, in all cases, and for public consumption, we/you are still using "my grandfather's axe".  Reality is a much more confusing mess and uniformity seems to something relegated to Napoleon's armies - except that his armies weren't uniform either.


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## xFusilier (23 Aug 2016)

Chris:

I apologize for not quoting the specifInc parts of your post that I am responding to:

When suggesting that we buy off the shelf and then modify via a second contractor you fail to take into account that this no necessitates two procurement process from RFP through to purchase and delivery one for the truck and another for the modifications, and also two separate instances of producers mark up being applied.  There is also more work on the part of PWSGC to ensure that the vehicles are phased from the manufacturer to the modifier. To give you a simple realize example a unit I recently worked with procured five 3/4 ton trucks, some modifications were require in order to make them more suitable for driving on unimproved roads and ice roads.  It took a year before all five of those vehicles were kitted in accordance with the required specifications because of the legal requirements of the contracting system


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## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2016)

xFusilier said:
			
		

> Chris:
> 
> I apologize for not quoting the specifInc parts of your post that I am responding to:
> 
> When suggesting that we buy off the shelf and then modify via a second contractor you fail to take into account that this no necessitates two procurement process from RFP through to purchase and delivery one for the truck and another for the modifications, and also two separate instances of producers mark up being applied.  There is also more work on the part of PWSGC to ensure that the vehicles are phased from the manufacturer to the modifier. To give you a simple realize example a unit I recently worked with procured five 3/4 ton trucks, some modifications were require in order to make them more suitable for driving on unimproved roads and ice roads.  It took a year before all five of those vehicles were kitted in accordance with the required specifications because of the legal requirements of the contracting system



Apologies unnecessary.

I take your point of the complications of process - but isn't that the issue?  The process?  When the paperwork takes longer than the time necessary to deliver a solution then the problem, in my view, is with the paperwork and the process.


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## Colin Parkinson (23 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> If we want vehicles that soldiers can use to practice military things like blackout drive, and use of radios (and yes, there's a disconnect due to ongoing shortages of radios) then we have to get some minor customization.  That is the point of MilCOTS - it's almost off the shelf and therefore should be cheaper and faster to buy.  Manufacturers will charge an arm and a leg (instead of just one leg below the knee) to mod small numbers of vehicles each year, rather than have the line do it for a fleet buy (even one as small as 1300), thus the inclination to buy a fleet all at once.  I do think that a cyclical buy could work; it might be worthwhile to mod the vehicles in-house through 202 Workshop (though I'd have to see a cost/benefit and business case analysis to determine the best method).  That could also provide flexibility to grow or shrink fleets as requirements change over the life of the fleet.
> 
> As for the length of time for MSVS MilCOTS: I don't have the timeline handy, but often delays are due to aligning a purchase with when funds will be available.  There was only one bidder due to DND's checkered past in some procurements.  I suspect other potential bidders weighed the cost of bidding against the probability of success, and figured out that the potential profit did not outweigh the potential PITA.



The 5/4 tons were a mix of commercial and tactical. Likely we could repeat them, although it was imperfect.


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## dapaterson (23 Aug 2016)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The 5/4 tons were a mix of commercial and tactical. Likely we could repeat them, although it was imperfect.



Same as the LUVW and MSVS MilCOTS - commercial trucks, painted green, with added electrical systems and radio mounts, and gun racks.  It's a viable model to follow; the "militarization" is fairly minimal and permits dealer maintenance (and dealer supply chain for parts).


As for the MSVS MilCOTS timeline Chris was asking about: First Approval of omnibus project (including MilCOTS and SMP variants, shelters and kitting of shelters) : Mid 2006. MilCOTS RFP issued: Late 2007. MilCOTS contract issued: Early 2009.  Final delivery for 1300 MilCOTS trucks: Late 2012.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (23 Aug 2016)

MCG said:
			
		

> From CFJP 4-0, the four lines of support are:There have been discussions about where commercial service providers can inject services to deployed operations or which is the most forward line of support that civilians can deliver.  From an Army perspective (maybe not from a navy or air perspective), the cut-off is the operational to tactical divide.  The divide is at third line by the definitions above, and it will probably always be at the JTFSC.
> For a BG deployment with an FSG that is a sub-unit of the JTFSC, the operational divide is internal to the JTFSC with the FSG reaching into the tactical level while the remainder of the unit is operational.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the second line (JTFSC).
> If Canada deployed a land formation, the operational divide would be between the service battalion and the JTFSC.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the third line (JTFSC).
> In the improbable event of a major conflict with a deployed Canadian Corps, the Corps could be an operational level HQ and civilian delivery might bypass the JTFSC for delivery to the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) ... but don't expect we will ever see that.
> ...



I agree that the operational divide in support is between third line and second line. Second line should by definition be a solely military function, while third line can be a mix of civilian and military, possibly heavier on the civilian side to take advantage of their inherent organizational and technological advantages. For all intents and purposes, third line is the divide between the services as well. 

Asa for defining a day of supply, it should in theory be the amount of materiel needed to support the supported unit for 1 day based on the estimated quantities of use. The Staff Data Handbook (B-GL-331-002-FP-003) provides general planning figures that would be used (for example, fresh rations are calculated on a basis of 2KG/Pers/Day). As you say, it is a nebulous number. However, third line should be maintaining significant amounts of DOS to maintain ops even if there are delays. On Jointex 15 most RPs were stocked with 14-21 DOS.

Finally, when discussing third line I think it is useful to break down third line into garrison and operational functions. For garrison, there is an argument to be made that third line (Base supplies, base transports, Base foods, etc) would be more efficient if civilianized. Third line IS functions don't deploy, and we don't have enough Sup Techs, MSE Ops, etc to provide second line and third line functions. So centralizing all PY's into Service Battalions, Replenishment Squadrons, and fleet support has some merit. For a deployable, operational, third line, we will always be with a larger partner so our deployed third line should be focussed on integrating into a multi-national third line and providing Canadian specific support (which is where doing things like buying stand alone systems hurts- it limits our ability to piggy back on larger nations for support. For more info, see System, Air Defence Anti Tank). So, there could be some value in maintaining an operational third line that focusses on provision of third line support in ops rather than IT.


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## Kirkhill (23 Aug 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> As for the MSVS MilCOTS timeline Chris was asking about: First Approval of omnibus project (including MilCOTS and SMP variants, shelters and kitting of shelters) : Mid 2006. MilCOTS RFP issued: Late 2007. MilCOTS contract issued: Early 2009.  Final delivery for 1300 MilCOTS trucks: Late 2012.



Thanks DAP.  I guess I allowed myself to get lost in the discussion and intermixed the MilCOTS and the SMP procurement timelines.

The good news, for me, is that there are a lot of process "tools" out there that can be used.  The frustration might be that they are not used as often or as beneficially as I, me, myself, would like. 

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (24 Aug 2016)

Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?


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## GK .Dundas (24 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?


 Look ,you've been warned before about talking sense if this keeps up I would not be surprised if the mods get involved . 
All joking aside why aren't we doing this  ?


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## OldSolduer (24 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?



Because it wouldn't benefit the local trucking firm


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## MJP (24 Aug 2016)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?



Zero benefit

99.9% of material that leaves the depot goes on the national freight run which is managed by/through the National Material Distribution System NMDS using a mixture of CAF and civilian resources.  It goes this way because most stuff is routine replenishment (max/min thresholds) or low(er) priority demands and it costs significantly less.

Older article but still relevant

http://www.logisticsquarterly.com/issues/7-3/article4.html

The airfield alone would cost in the ten to more likely the hundreds of million to bring it to full operational status and would impact all base training.  Using our tac and strat lift in that manner is an opportunity cost, if they are doing that then what comes off the table?  Those fleets are already pretty damm busy doing mission sustainment, training and support to domestic things.  Adding sustainment flights for routine crap is not more efficient nor a good use of limited funds......we have badges to pay for.


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## Happy Guy (5 Sep 2016)

I used to work at CMSG (this org owns to the supply and depot depots).

The use of RCAF or commercial aircraft to support regular domestic sustainment ops is not viable for the fol reasons besides for what MJP already stated:

- exorbitant cost of air transport as compared to road.  In general compare how to travel by car / bus as compared by air.

- unpredictability of RCAF to provide aircraft for this type of ops.  RCAF have limited airframes and requirement to sp many type of forecasted and unforecasted ops.

- how much time will you save in comparison to the cost incurred for air travel?  Depending on where you are and where the item needs to go, perhaps two day?  Unless it is an HPR required for an operation / critical aircraft readiness / critical warship readiness / critical A veh readiness does two days really matter?  More of the materiel delivered on the NFR arrives on time.

- multi-modes of transportation: ground transport to aircraft; transport on aircraft; and ground transport from aircraft to depot. The more you handle cargo there is an increased chances of breakage / lost and more subsequently more cost and time lost.  

- substantial higher cost for preparing (time) and packing materiel for air transport.  Requirement for highly trained teams, packing materials and aircraft pallets. The depots do not maintain these types of specialized skills.  If needed, they will ask for MAMS sp from the RCAF.

As for trucking firms making huge profits and influence on how we deliver materiel - nope.  With the downturn in the Oil Industry there is cut-throat competition now.  Anecdotal information is that many small and medium size firms are barely surviving.

All of this is balanced by the following:

- is it an ops or not?  This determines mode of transportation and cost.
- when does it have to get there as listed on the CARF / WBSL.  This determines the mode of transportation which determines cost.  

Hope this answers your questions.


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## Happy Guy (5 Sep 2016)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Some confusion on your part there - MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS were very open-ended to industry, with a minimum of customization, and are maintained by dealer networks that also stock parts.
> 
> You can best view army vehicles as three families:
> 
> ...


Not wishing to sound pedantic, but you have used the incorrect terminology.

Green fleet is commercial pattern fleet which in this case you are calling it a blue fleet.  I'm not sure where this blue fleet terminology is coming from.  Think of the tractor trailers, buses and cars that you normally find on a base.

MILCOTS.  This is what you are calling semi-green fleet.

Standard Military Pattern (SMP).  These vehs are all mil specs like the US HUMMV.  This does not include A vehs.

Cheers


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## Kirkhill (5 Sep 2016)

As the instigator of the problem I thank both of you for clarifications.

Ultimately, thinking about the situation further, I believe that my suggestion is that more use be made of civilian pattern utility and off-road vehicles to supply capability.  Once it has been determined what the limitations of those vehicles are then Military Standards kick in and vehicles built to the higher, more rugged standard, purchased to fill the capability gap.  I am guessing/hoping that the same rationale applies when transitioning from soft wheeled to soft tracked and from soft wheeled to armoured wheeled and soft tracked to armoured tracked.

Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions?


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## McG (5 Sep 2016)

Happy Guy said:
			
		

> Green fleet is commercial pattern fleet which in this case you are calling it a blue fleet.  I'm not sure where this blue fleet terminology is coming from.  Think of the tractor trailers, buses and cars that you normally find on a base.


I have never seen this.  "Blue Fleet" is the term used to describe government owned civilian pattern vehicles.  It makes sense because the government seems to prefer buying vans and pick-up trucks in the same shade of dark blue.  Conversely, militarized vehicles (both SMP and MilCOTS) are usually bought in a shade of olive green.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions?


Probably yes.  There are aspects of this equation that are harder to quantity though.  Every new fleet adds a unique training burden to a unit, so an additional SMP or two can be worth the cost as opposed to a few orphan MilCOTS.  First line maintenance should be happening far enough forward to hear the shots of the battle, and more fleets means more parts have to be carried in the MRTs and on the back of the SPSS elements; in this case more types of trucks means more total trucks required to support them.  

Much as we determined there is a cut-off line for civilians in the battle space, there is a cut-off line below which only SMP should be allocated.


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## Kirkhill (5 Sep 2016)

MCG said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> Much as we determined there is a cut-off line for civilians in the battle space, there is a cut-off line below which only SMP should be allocated.



No argument on that.  And I cheerfully accept that there is a cut off line for civilians in the battle space.  A cut of line that is situational depending on the needs and nature or the battle space.  Some times it might be Third Line but rarely Second Line.  Fourth Line seems a definite civilian opportunity.

WRT the vehicles 

Situations, Estimates and Intents isn't it?

If the Government wants only a small, highly buffed and capable prestige force that intervenes internationally forcefully but only occasionally then that suggests one set of expectations and kit.  
On the other hand if the Government wants a general duties force of odd job men for domestic employment then that might suggest a different set of kit.

In one instance Leos and HIMARs may be the order of the day.  In the other instance Ford Pickups and beasts like the Bv206/Beowulf may be acceptable given the low risk of running into anything more lethal than hail.

In both instances, in my opinion, there is no excuse for not having a strong government fleet of helicopters, airlifters and logistics vessels.


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## Daidalous (5 Sep 2016)

Interesting read.

http://www.truth-out.org/article/item/76:troops-or-private-contractors-who-does-better-in-supplying-our-troops-during-war

A good cut and paste.

"There is an inherent authority problem. The contractor must perform according to the scope of work in the contract and not in accordance with the military commander's directions. This relationship is outside of the Army command and control structure. The Army and the contractor have inherently different interests. The managers of the contractor have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders to maximize profits or minimize losses. This may conflict with providing the Army exactly what they want or need, when the contract is ambiguous about the requirement. Use of a contractor will not ensure that that the military commander gets the performance he wants in the same manner as placing an organic Army unit under his control, especially during times of hostile actions."



The problems I have seen over the years with using a private logistics companies over seas are:

The local commander loses troop strength,  no LOGS for guard duty, GD's or to augment depleted sections.  This has to be picked up by the Cbt arms. Unless you hire contractors to do guard duty and GD duties. 

Domestically and deployed:

The contractor will only provide what is stipulated in the contract, if the contract states they need to provide up to 8 LAV tires within 1 hour and up to another 8 available in 24 hrs.  You will not get tires 9-16 until the end of the 24hr window, even if you can see the tires on the shelf.  (Just ask 450 how they are doing with Boeing and the parts contract)


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2016)

One thing I think we need to see more of is like with the MSVS SMP programs up armour kits, more protection when the situation requires it rather then two fleets, one armoured, one not. In our CSS ability though, we need the ability to transport and transfer a lot of supplies quickly. Hydraulic cranes are bulky, and loud, in a tactical situation we need something a bit faster I think.


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## Colin Parkinson (6 Sep 2016)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> As the instigator of the problem I thank both of you for clarifications.
> 
> Ultimately, thinking about the situation further, I believe that my suggestion is that more use be made of civilian pattern utility and off-road vehicles to supply capability.  Once it has been determined what the limitations of those vehicles are then Military Standards kick in and vehicles built to the higher, more rugged standard, purchased to fill the capability gap.  I am guessing/hoping that the same rationale applies when transitioning from soft wheeled to soft tracked and from soft wheeled to armoured wheeled and soft tracked to armoured tracked.
> 
> Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions?



Each reserve unit had at least 1 truck and 1 van for day to day usage, straight civy pattern. This reduced wear and tear on the deuces and the 3 ton stake didn't bulk out as fast as the tactical trucks. Parts were easy to find and we did most repairs at our own unit. Keep these trucks for 7-10 years and replace, use the existing purchase agreements and keep the training simple (Truck, civilian pattern), if they already have tactical truck on their 404's make it automatic addition to their vehicle list.


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