# Some questions on infantry tactics in Afghanistan



## HGCAP (18 Jul 2009)

Hello Army.ca

This is my first time posting here.  I'm curious about a couple of minor things I've seen on video and thought this would be the right place to ask.  

First, how important is spacing between individuals within a squad on patrol when contact is expected?  I've heard 10m between men is a desirable distance to maintain but in most media I see squads significantly more bunched up than that.  20m for an entire squad seems to be more close to the norm.  Is this accurate or am I getting the wrong impression?  I guessed that maybe Taliban/AQ indirect support was virtually non-existent, perhaps, and that is why spacing hasn't been stressed as much.  Does spacing play a significant role versus small arms or mostly just indirect high explosives?

Secondly, it seems like engagements are taking place outside 200m most of the time.  Does the enemy in Afghanistan avoid closer range ambushes?  They don't seem to be very effective fighters because their chosen engagement ranges are outside the effective range of the AK47.   Is this for any specific reason I might be missing?

Thanks very much for any help.


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## dangerboy (18 Jul 2009)

Spacing is a very difficult thing to explain.  There is no "textbook" set distance for how far apart people have to be.  There are alot of different factors that come into play; the type of terrain is one, if you are in a bold open field then you would be more spread out than in you were in a thick wooden field. If it is day or night, during night people are closer you can see each other for command and control reasons.

For wither you space out for indirect or small arms you want to be spread out for both.  If you are bunched together a machine gun can hit multiple people with one burst of 20 rounds; and like you were thinking one mortar round can injure several people if they are close together.

I realize that this does not really answer your question, but hopefully it explains why it is hard to answer your question.


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## Journeyman (18 Jul 2009)

Just a couple of general comments:

Our platoons have sections, not squads.

Spacing is always important, since contact is always "expected" outside the wire.

It's human nature to bunch up more in complex terrain (eg - urban, orchards); it's discouraged, but often inevitable to some degree.

Engagement ranges very with terrain (and YouTube videos can be deceiving), but personally, I'd rather let our longer-range weapons sort out the TIC rather than be "sporting" and let the bad guys get within effective AK range. 

Welcome to Army.ca; 
enjoy the <search> function and feel free to add some detail to your profile.    :nod:


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## HGCAP (18 Jul 2009)

Wow, fast replies.  Thanks!

Another one on spacing - what would be considered the upper range of space between soldiers in a section?  (ty for that correction.)  Or to put it another way, what is the maximum desirable footprint for a section?



> Engagement ranges very with terrain (and YouTube videos can be deceiving), but personally, I'd rather let our longer-range weapons sort out the TIC rather than be "sporting" and let the bad guys get within effective AK range.



Exactly   But since that is the case, why aren't the Taliban/AQ holding their fire until their enemy are closer?  

A new question:

What makes the enemy "come out to play"?  What stops them from just skulking in well hidden hole somewhere and letting the patrols go by, then coming out later?  Are they typically defending something they can't stand to lose when these firefights happen?  If so, what is it?

Thanks again.


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## George Wallace (18 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> Another one on spacing - what would be considered the upper range of space between soldiers in a section?  (ty for that correction.)  Or to put it another way, what is the maximum desirable footprint for a section?



This is determined by the type of patrol, the type and range of the weapons carried, visibility, etc.  There are guidelines for these, as has already been mentioned, which are also affected by factors like light and weather conditions, type of terrain, season, expected enemy contact, etc.



			
				HGCAP said:
			
		

> Exactly   But since that is the case, why aren't the Taliban/AQ holding their fire until their enemy are closer?
> 
> A new question:
> 
> What makes the enemy "come out to play"?  What stops them from just skulking in well hidden hole somewhere and letting the patrols go by, then coming out later?  Are they typically defending something they can't stand to lose when these firefights happen?  If so, what is it?



If we knew this info the Taliban would all be dead or defeated and the war would be over.  What made the chicken cross the street?


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## HGCAP (18 Jul 2009)

Fair enough.  I've been reading through AAR's posted by boondocksaint back in 06.  He's describing Taliban opening up at 100-200m with RPK fire.  No casualties (reported anyhow) taken quite often, which amazes me. 

I guess I'm mostly trying to figure out how it is that the Taliban seem to be losing firefights often even when they start with the initiative.  Also noticed a lot of semi fire rather than burst in the videos, that also surprised me.  I'm just an interested Canadian, I have no experience to lean on and have to get my impressions of what's happening from secondary sources.


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## MikeL (18 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> I guess I'm mostly trying to figure out how it is that the Taliban seem to be losing firefights often even when they start with the initiative.



We are better trained than Taliban.. theres more of us, and we have overwhelming firepower just to name a few.    Plus when a small group of Taliban open up with small arms and maybe an RPG against a column of LAVs yea.. the 25s will always win.  Or when Taliban try attacking a COP/Strong Point they can do some damage with RPGs but again we have overwhelming firepower.. an CAS usually shows up an takes them out. On my tour the US Army Kiowas really f*cked up the Taliban.



			
				HGCAP said:
			
		

> Also noticed a lot of semi fire rather than burst in the videos, that also surprised me.



Again this goes to our training.. we take aimed shots  emptying a mag on auto won't do you any good.


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## HGCAP (18 Jul 2009)

Are the Taliban emptying mags on full auto?  I'm really curious about how they fight.  

Even with all the training and firepower, superior numbers etc... I'm not sure how our guys manage not to take a few casualties in the initial ambush.  Another question comes to mind - are the Taliban anywhere near running out of ammunition?  Are they being supplied?


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## Franko (18 Jul 2009)

My question for you, before there is anymore disclosure of information (me being a vet of that shyte hole and having buddies ont eh ground right now) is why do you want to know all this information?

*The Army.ca Staff*


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## GAP (18 Jul 2009)

You Know what....this is an open forum and most of these questions are strictly newby stuff that the person will have answers to in the first few minutes of a TIC...he can wait...


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## HGCAP (19 Jul 2009)

The short answer is that I feel a strong desire to understand and know what goes on in combat, particularly at the small unit level, but because of real life obligations (caring for a family member with a long-term illness) I'm not able to go and find out on the ground.  So I do a lot of research at the University of Toronto and on the web and try to keep up to speed on it all as much as I can from here.  

The longer answer delves into psychology, as in "Why do you have the desire to know?"... and I'm not sure you're asking for that.  Both my grandparents served in the British forces in WW2 and I got lots of stories from them as a child.  As I grew up I felt like it was important to know these things.  I feel like I'm irresponsible if I don't.  It's strange, and I know most people don't have that feeling and are happy to ignore what goes on.  It's almost like keeping fit.  Some people just have this desire to reach as far as they can in their circumstances.  

More specifically to my question, I read Infantry Attacks back many years ago when I first started university.  Rommel wrote (paraphrasing here) something like "Whoever fires first tends to win".   In Afghanistan that doesn't seem to be the case.  

Generally, I don't understand what's going on, so I thought the best people to ask about this stuff were the vets.  

I'm in the whitby area if any of you want to meet for a coffee at tim's or something and check me out


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## Franko (19 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> More specifically to my question, I read Infantry Attacks back many years ago when I first started university.  Rommel wrote (paraphrasing here) something like "Whoever fires first tends to win".   In Afghanistan that doesn't seem to be the case.



It just lets us know EXACTLY where the bad guys are....so we can hammer them.


 :tank2:




> I'm in the whitby area if any of you want to meet for a coffee at tim's or something and check me out



Not necessary, but thanks for the invite.    

Regards


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## HGCAP (19 Jul 2009)

Any time


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## HGCAP (20 Jul 2009)

How about this one... what size are Taliban patrols typically?  Do they operate in teams over mutually supporting distances or tend to travel all together in a single unit?  I realize there are no hard and fast answers, I'm looking for ballpark/rough info.


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## George Wallace (20 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> How about this one... what size are Taliban patrols typically?  Do they operate in teams over mutually supporting distances or tend to travel all together in a single unit?  I realize there are no hard and fast answers, I'm looking for ballpark/rough info.



I know you are curious, but this is army.ca; perhaps you should try http://www.taliban.af/


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## HGCAP (20 Jul 2009)

Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.


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## George Wallace (20 Jul 2009)

You are looking for specific answers for which there are none.


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## TCBF (20 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.



- I understand your frustration, but any detailed information given here would be viewable by all, and people who know the details are generally cautious about giving out information which, when coupled with other open source information, could provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

- If you read "Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop" by Antonio Giustozzi, you will find that there is a very wide range of motivation and training among the Taliban, partly because of who, where and why they join, and partly because of the harsh realities of life as an insurgent.


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## 40below (20 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.



The Taliban are not commission-holding graduates of any accredited military college and they don't have a 'doctrine' the way you are phrasing your questions. You only have to look at how their tactics have changed in even the past year based on what the blue side is doing. Part of it is that insurgency tends to be fluid, particularly when one set of tactics is getting their a$$ kicked, part of it has to do with availability of different arms, number and experience of fighters, time of year, terrain – Afgh is not a uniform rock-strewn desert – and about 100 other factors, including the fact that without air or armour, they are always going to be opportunistic fighters. 

There are several excellent treatises on the Taliban, including several that go into detail on how they have fought over the years going all the way back to the 1970s when today's Taliban leaders were the mujhadeen. You're be better off reading those books, or books on insurgency and COIN in general, and understanding the larger picture than demanding answers about a doctrine that does not exist.

Cheers.


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## Old Sweat (20 Jul 2009)

I have not been in theatre but I am a student of military history. One general account of fighting in what was the North-West Frontier of then British India in the period between the two world wars made the point that the tribesmen were adaptive and skillful. That is, they observed their opponents carefully and were quick to pick up patterns of behavior. They then would adapt their tactics to exploit their enemy's perceived soft spots. I have been told by some who have fought in Afghanistan that the Taliban do the same sort of thing today.


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## vonGarvin (20 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.


HGCAP:
I understand your frustration, and I hope we don't lose you.  You show a genuine interest; however, due to the nature of the internet and the enemy we are currently fighting, we *must* show a reluctance to talk about specifics.
There are many aspects of any infantry battle (today, yesteryear, a millenium ago, etc) that are constant.  Men are trying to get the upper hand on other men.  They are vying for an advantage, and in that sense, nothing has changed.  Hannibal had elephants, so Scipio adapted his tactics and defeated Hannibal.  Germans had dug in defences in depth, so we invented the tank to overcome it.  The Germans mastered the use of the tank, so we adapted to overcome it in the next war. And so on it goes.

To see some (IMHO) pretty good open source "stuff" on small unit infantry tactics, go to ebay and find yourself a copy of Avalon Hill's "Squad Leader".  It's an old table-top game, and if I could find the e-version of the notes, I would post them here.  This game was designed by civilians with no military background, but they nailed it.  Everything from employment of machine guns to attacking complex defended localities.

Anyway, I hope that this helps.  And I do feel your frustration; however, as stated, there's not really much more we can say.

Cheers


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## The Bread Guy (20 Jul 2009)

For a range of open source goodies on Taliban tactics, try this:
http://is.gd/1Flfi



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> .... any detailed information given here would be viewable by all, and people who know the details are generally cautious about giving out information which, when coupled with other open source information, could provide aid or comfort to the enemy.





			
				Midnight Rambler said:
			
		

> I understand your frustration, and I hope we don't lose you.  You show a genuine interest; however, due to the nature of the internet and the enemy we are currently fighting, we *must* show a reluctance to talk about specifics.



While the earnest interest in getting informed is appreciated, anything posted in detail here _can_ end up in the hands of the bad guys - and if you think the bad guys don't read the papers and other open sources, see attached - they do.


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## Gunner98 (20 Jul 2009)

As stated there are a lot of open source articles and books available by typing "Taliban tactics" in to Google or Amazon such as:  Taliban tactics take new direction By Murray Brewster, THE CANADIAN PRESS 
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2009/03/24/8870411-cp.html

or for a UK perspective: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/11/taliban-tactics-analysis


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## Rinker (20 Jul 2009)

um just my opinion, I think a thread such as this should be locked up


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## Jarnhamar (23 Jul 2009)

HGCAP said:
			
		

> I'm in the whitby area if any of you want to meet for a coffee at tim's or something and check me out



pics plz


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## observor 69 (25 Jul 2009)

NEW YORK TIMES

July 26, 2009
Iraq Veterans Find Afghan Enemy Even Bolder 
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
NAWA, Afghanistan — In three combat tours in Anbar Province, Marine Sgt. Jacob Tambunga fought the deadliest insurgents in Iraq.

But he says he never encountered an enemy as tenacious as what he saw immediately after arriving at this outpost in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. In his first days here in late June, he fought through three ambushes, each lasting as long as the most sustained fight he saw in Anbar.

Like other Anbar veterans here, Sergeant Tambunga was surprised to discover guerrillas who, if not as lethal, were bolder than those he fought in Iraq.

“They are two totally different worlds,” said Sergeant Tambunga, a squad leader in Company C, First Battalion, Fifth Marines.

“In Iraq, they’d hit you and run,” he said. “But these guys stick around and maneuver on you.”

They also have a keen sense of when to fight and when the odds against them are too great. Three weeks ago, the American military mounted a 4,000-man Marine offensive in Helmand — the largest since President Obama’s troop increase — and so far in many places, American commanders say, they have encountered less resistance than expected. 

Yet it is also clear to many Marines and villagers here that Taliban fighters made a calculated decision: to retreat and regroup to fight where and when they choose. And in the view of troops here who fought intensely in the weeks before the offensive began, fierce battles probably lie ahead if they are to clear the Taliban from sanctuaries so far untouched. 

“It was straight luck that we didn’t have a lot more guys hit,” said Sgt. Brandon Tritle, another squad leader in Company C, who cited the Taliban’s skill at laying down a base of fire to mount an attack.

“One force will put enough fire down so you have to keep your heads down, then another force will maneuver around to your side to try to kill you,” he said. “That’s the same thing we do.”

In other parts of Helmand the Taliban have been quick to mount counterattacks. Since the offensive began, 10 Marines have been killed, many of them south of Garmser in areas thick with roadside bombs. In addition, British forces in Helmand, who often travel in lightly armored vehicles, have lost 19 men, all but two from bombs. 

All told, Western troops have died in greater numbers in Helmand this month than in any other province in Afghanistan over a similar period since the 2001 invasion. 

It is unclear whether the level of casualties will remain this high. But the Taliban can ill afford to lose the Helmand River Valley, a strip of land made arable by a network of canals that nourish the nation’s center for poppy growing. 

“This is what fuels the insurgency,” said Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine brigade leading the offensive.

For now, the strategy of the Taliban who used to dominate this village, 15 miles south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, is to watch and wait just outside, villagers and Marines here say.

“They all escaped,” said Sardar Gul, a shopkeeper at the Nawa bazaar. Mr. Gul and others who reopened stores after the Marines arrived estimate that 300 to 600 Taliban fled to Marjah, 15 miles to the west and not under American control, joining perhaps more than 1,000 fighters.

Marine commanders acknowledge that they could have focused more on cutting off escape routes early in the operation, an issue that often dogged offensives against insurgents in Iraq. 

“I wish we had trapped a few more folks,” the commander of First Battalion, Fifth Marines, Lt. Col. William F. McCollough, told the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who visited Nawa. “I expected there to be more fighting.”

When the full battalion arrived in Nawa in early July, the Taliban “knew we were too powerful for them” and left, said Staff Sgt. Michael Placencia, a platoon sergeant in Company C. 

But he predicted the Taliban would stand and fight if Marines were to assault Marjah, describing them as a “more efficient” foe than the insurgents he saw as a squad leader in Anbar in 2005 and 2006.

“They will come back, and they will try to take this back and pin us down,” said Maj. Rob Gallimore, a British officer who trains Afghan soldiers here. He hopes that the Marines do not spread themselves too thin and that they focus instead on building a deep bond with locals in places they occupy, a classic counterinsurgency tactic.

So Marines are bracing for a fight against guerrillas who, they discovered in June, are surprisingly proficient at tactics the Marines themselves learned in infantry school. “They’d flank us, and we’d flank them, just like a chess match,” said Sgt. Jason Lynd, another squad leader in Company C.

In June the Marines ended up in sustained firefights the first four times they left their outpost. The Taliban were always overmatched — attacking the Marines with only one-third the number of men — but they pressed the fight, laying complex ambushes and then cutting off Marines as they made their way back to base.

One fight began after Marines stopped three vans, which they let go. Fifteen minutes later they took fire from two homes near where they had been pursuing a suspicious man they wanted to question. They cleared both buildings, but were then attacked by gunmen behind the homes, some of whom, the Marines believe, had been in the three vans, a few disguised in burqas.

Somehow, none of the Marines were hit in the secondary ambush. “They tried to suck us in, and their plan worked,” Sergeant Tritle said. “They just missed.”

No Marines were killed in the two weeks they were here in June. 

In contrast to Iraqi insurgents, the Taliban do not seem to have large artillery shells and other powerful military munitions that Anbar fighters used to kill hundreds of Marines and soldiers. The bombs found so far have been largely homemade with fertilizer, though they have still killed more than 20 British soldiers and United States Marines to the north and south of Nawa.

“If they had better weapons, we’d be in real trouble,” said Lance Cpl. Vazgen Matevosyan.

What the Taliban lack in munitions they make up for in tactics, even practicing “information operations” and disinformation, Marines say. Knowing the Marines listen to their two-way communications, they say, the Taliban describe phony locations of ambushes and bombs.

“They’re not stupid,” said Lance Cpl. Frank Hegel. “You can tell they catch on to things, and they don’t make the same mistake twice.”


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