# Canada Command boss:  More equipment than needed?!?



## The Bread Guy (29 Nov 2011)

*If* quoted properly, of course - highlights mine....


> Canadian Forces are deployed in a variety of hot spots around the globe, but keeping citizens safe here at home is job No. 1, says the military commander in charge of domestic and continental operations.
> 
> Despite much talk about stretched resources in recent years, Lt. Gen. Walter Semianiw said Canada Command has the equipment it requires, and more, to successfully fulfill its critical, busy mandate. He told MPs on the defence committee Tuesday the unit is well-prepared to juggle a multitude of tasks — from fighting forest fires or terrorist attacks, to responding to disasters and search and rescue needs.
> 
> *“There are no equipment shortages. We actually have more than we need,” Semianiw said *....


Huffington Post Canada, 29 Nov 11


----------



## Towards_the_gap (30 Nov 2011)

I am left speechless......how can anyone put out a statement so obviously false??


----------



## Journeyman (30 Nov 2011)

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> ......how can anyone put out a statement so obviously false??


It's not "obviously false." 

From the perspective of the guy who will be called upon to deal with fighting forest fires or shoveling snow in Toronto, all those Leopard tanks, CF18s, or other war-fighting kit are unnecessary.


....it may even buy a few NDP votes


----------



## Haggis (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> From the perspective of the guy who will be called upon to deal with fighting forest fires or shoveling snow in Toronto, all those Leopard tanks, CF18s, or other war-fighting kit are unnecessary.



Canada Command has the ability to draw on all the resources of the CF to concentrate "combat power" within the domestic AOR.  

However, Canada Command is but one entity in the CF.  He may have sufficient equipment while the other commands/L1's do not.


----------



## Journeyman (30 Nov 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Canada Command has the ability to draw on all the resources of the CF to concentrate "combat power" within the domestic AOR.
> 
> However, Canada Command is but one entity in the CF.  He may have sufficient equipment while the other commands/L1's do not.



True, and patently obvious, but he's not speaking on behalf of the other L1s -- it says quite clearly: 


> Lt. Gen. Walter Semianiw said *Canada Command* has the equipment it requires, and more, to successfully fulfill its critical, busy mandate


 What domestic scenario do you envisage that we have insufficient resources to address? From the vantage point of NDHQ, how many Leopards and CF18s _would_ it take to evict squatters from their tentage in downtown Toronto?


----------



## Haggis (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> From the vantage point of NDHQ, how many Leopards and CF18s _would_ it take to evict squatters from their tentage in downtown Toronto?



Ontario voters had the opportunity to do that in October but re-elected McGuinty's Liberals instead. :-D


----------



## Old Sweat (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> True, and patently obvious, but he's not speaking on behalf of the other L1s -- it says quite clearly:  What domestic scenario do you envisage that we have insufficient resources to address?



A Richter Scale 8 or 9 earthquake in Vancouver or the Straits of Juan de Fuca comes to mind, even with the ability to grab the civvy plant that might still be available.


----------



## jollyjacktar (30 Nov 2011)

A problem I see with his comment is that the great unwashed will see the CF has more equipment than they need, not that one facet of the machine is doing well.  I am sure there will be more strident calls from many quarters to see a peace dividend.  I for one would not like to see a repeat of the Uncle Jean years.


----------



## X Royal (30 Nov 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Ontario voters had the opportunity to do that in October but re-elected McGuinty's Liberals instead. :-D


I'd sure like to here your explanation on how the Ontario election results has anything to do with why the protesters where in the park in Toronto or even any of the the other protests across Canada?
If anything it would be more a protest against the PC's.


----------



## Journeyman (30 Nov 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> A Richter Scale 8 or 9 earthquake in Vancouver or the Straits of Juan de Fuca comes to mind, even with the ability to grab the civvy plant that might still be available.


Fair enough. I assumed that Semianiw was speaking within the bounds of no military affording to equip for an absolute worst-case scenario.


----------



## ArmyRick (30 Nov 2011)

Switching fire back to topic.

If the boss of Canada command says he has enough, than we probably do, for DOM OPS. I do agree with the comment that most Canadians will not know the difference between Canada Command and the other commands.

One journalist could easily take this and put a bad spin on it.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver (30 Nov 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> A Richter Scale 8 or 9 earthquake in Vancouver or the Straits of Juan de Fuca comes to mind, even with the ability to grab the civvy plant that might still be available.



Old Sweat is bang on with that scenario.

Here's another one: A low level terror campaign in North America. Nothing as grandiose as 9/11, but a series of small bombings spread throughout Canada and the US at say 3 to 6 weeks intervals. The defence of points of interests would stretch resources beyond current levels.

During the Troubles, the Brits had 13 batallions of infantry in Belfast alone: Your talking about a single city just a little bigger than Halifax. Where in all the CF would we find the people and equipment to provide security in, say, all the cities of half-a-million people (calculated on a metropolitan regional basis)?


----------



## Old Sweat (30 Nov 2011)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Here's another one: A low level terror campaign in North America. Nothing as grandiose as 9/11, but a series of small bombings spread throughout Canada and the US at say 3 to 6 weeks intervals. The defence of points of interests would stretch resources beyond current levels.
> 
> During the Troubles, the Brits had 13 batallions of infantry in Belfast alone: Your talking about a single city just a little bigger than Halifax. Where in all the CF would we find the people and equipment to provide security in, say, all the cities of half-a-million people (calculated on a metropolitan regional basis)?



In the 1970 FLQ crisis, the CF had a battalion in Cyprus, two battalions plus an armoured and an artillery regiment in Germany and seven infantry battalions, three armoured and three artillery regiments as well as the airborne regiment at home. Virtually every combat arms unit at home except for one battalion and odds and sods was deployed on Op Ginger (assistance to civil authority in the National Capital Region) or Op Essay (aid of the civil power) in Quebec. Imagine if a widespread series of attacks developed across Canada in the near future.


----------



## Journeyman (30 Nov 2011)

OK OK      I never liked Semianiw anyway    :surrender:


----------



## Haggis (30 Nov 2011)

X Royal said:
			
		

> I'd sure like to here your explanation on how the Ontario election results has anything to do with why the protesters where in the park in Toronto or even any of the the other protests across Canada?
> If anything it would be more a protest against the PC's.



I though the Liberals were the squatters.  My bad


----------



## Haggis (30 Nov 2011)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Virtually every Regular Force  combat arms unit at home except for one battalion and odds and sods was deployed on Op Ginger (assistance to civil authority in the National Capital Region) or Op Essay (aid of the civil power) in Quebec. Imagine if a widespread series of attacks developed across Canada in the near future.



Fixed it for you  

Two points to consider:
1. police forces of the day were less robust and had fewer tactical and operational capablilites; and
2. P Res units were not deployed on Op GINGER and ESSAY as conventional wisdom held that neither the units or individual soldiers were suitable to the task, nor were they required given the number of soldiers in the Regular Force at that time.  Contrast that with recent experience (PODIUM, CADENCE etc.)


----------



## aesop081 (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> What domestic scenario .......



Are all Canada Command operations in Canada ?

No.

I cant think of at least one case where more resources are indeed needed to (seriously) have the required effect.


----------



## OldSolduer (30 Nov 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> I though the Liberals were the squatters.  My bad



I thought your reply was humourous....in fact you owe me a keyboard.  ;D


----------



## foresterab (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> True, and patently obvious, but he's not speaking on behalf of the other L1s -- it says quite clearly:  What domestic scenario do you envisage that we have insufficient resources to address? From the vantage point of NDHQ, how many Leopards and CF18s _would_ it take to evict squatters from their tentage in downtown Toronto?



Well..here's a forest fire situation for you. Talking with some US Forest Service staff who were dealing with a fire outside of Ren, NV.  24,000 acre fire (10,000 ha) had 25,000 people associated with the fire from 13 different agencies, 5 states, and 3 federal departments.

Or the fact that Idaho, Montana and Colorado put out warnings last year regarding helicopter availability as the National Guard unit that provided those states with aviation support was deploying overseas and they were unable to hire sufficent numbers of suitable aircraft locally.  Virgina Hills fire in 1998 had 170 helicopters working on it...that's a large part of Canada's civilian fleet.

In Alberta by the end of May this year we had close to 2,000 people deployed on fires which represented almost all resources for Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.  Additional support came from NB, NS, Nfld., Parks Canada, and Mexico.   Armed Foreces staff were on flood duties in Manitoba and Quebec while the Air Force was invloved with evacuations in Saskatewan.  

A couple of bad fires close to communities or other natural disasters and it's very easy to deplete the provincial resources available.  Keeping in mind that although we tend to focues on forest fires we also respond to floods, tornados etc. as part of the mandate of emergancy response.  People consistently underestimate weather and the efforts/cost needed to try to control situations so having an "over equipped" Armed Forces in your back pocket is a good thing as you can then blend equipment and manpower if required.

Anyways...a civilian's take on what Domestic Operations could look like.
foresterab


----------



## ouyin2000 (30 Nov 2011)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Switching fire back to topic.
> 
> If the boss of Canada command says he has enough, than we probably do, for DOM OPS. ....


Sure we may have enough on the books. But some units have up to an 80% VOR rate on their heavy lift vehicles right now...


----------



## brihard (30 Nov 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Fixed it for you
> 
> Two points to consider:
> 1. police forces of the day were less robust and had fewer tactical and operational capablilites; and
> 2. P Res units were not deployed on Op GINGER and ESSAY as conventional wisdom held that neither the units or individual soldiers were suitable to the task, nor were they required given the number of soldiers in the Regular Force at that time.  Contrast that with recent experience (PODIUM, CADENCE etc.)



Our experiences on CADENCE along with the thrust of the recent TBG exercise suggests to me that 'ability to engage with Canadian civilians without screwing everything up' is one of the unstated training goals of the TBG construct, which of course would be the force generation mechanism for such a security-oriented DOMOP. I'd also throw in that the institutionalization of the IA capability and the very heavy reserve presence therein has built up a modest but critical core of reservists in most of our regiments with experience in CIMIC and somewhat fuzzier let's-deal-with-civilians tasks.

If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.


----------



## Old Sweat (30 Nov 2011)

Some very good points, indeed. Remember that Ops Ginger and Essay were no notice operations and things happened very quickly. Recent domestic operations had the advantage of time to plan and prepare, which would not necessarily be the case in the event of a natural disaster and perhaps not in case of civil striff such as a series of attacks. However, I agree that overall the CF is in much better shape than in 1970, and a large part of that is because our reserves are of much higher quality than way back then.


----------



## dapaterson (30 Nov 2011)

Brihard said:
			
		

> If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.



Challenges:

(1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;

(2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist; and

(3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.


And, finally, the devil's advocate: Remember, the Chinese had to bring in soldiers from far, far away to clear Tianamen Square of protesters.


(Old Sweat:  Back in '98 we didn't have much time to prepare.  (And, by sayng "Back in '98" I realize that I am now, officially, on the road to old coot-dom.))


----------



## Fishbone Jones (30 Nov 2011)

I still haven't got my Territorial Battalion ATVs yet ullhair: Two years and counting :dunno:


----------



## kratz (30 Nov 2011)

Here's my take on the challenges mentioned:





> (1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;


Agreed, to a point. Most units I have been in those first repsonders only represent a fraction of the 100% that could be called up. Looking at other reserve units in the community and local area, this challenge is not an issue IMO.



> (2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist; and


I agree again, but use the plans and organization for Y2K as an example. These issues can be pre-planned to be dealt with in most scenrarios through CanCom can be greatly mitigated by accounting for this very issue.



> (3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.


Three for three, I agree with noticing this challenge, but again there are ways to mitigate it. With the current CanCom (ROEs - ie: Op CADENCE), the concern is as low as can reasonably be.


----------



## GnyHwy (30 Nov 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> From the vantage point of NDHQ, how many Leopards and CF18s _would_ it take to evict squatters from their tentage in downtown Toronto?



1 Leopard with 1 canister round should do it.  If they don't leave for good, they'll at least  have to go home to change their pants.


----------



## gun runner (30 Nov 2011)

Kratz...have you seen some of the territory that some units have to deal with? Take the Reserve battery in my hometown, the next unit available is in either ThunderBay( five hours away), or Winnipeg( two and a half hours away). The 116 would be the first responder for a district that is the entire size of Southern Ontario, or Labrador! Northern Manitoba is no better, same for Saskatchewan.... !


----------



## Haggis (1 Dec 2011)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Challenges:
> 
> (1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;


The number of first responders in Reserve units is surprisingly small, with the largest percentage being in Health Services units.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> (2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist;



As was the case with the 1998 Ice Storm (I was one - a victim, along with my extended family - but also CSM of a QRF Company for our AOR).  The advantage is that the Reservist is also uniquely capable of providing a link to the community when the external IRU and follow-on forces arrive, as was the case in 1998



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> (3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.
> 
> And, finally, the devil's advocate: Remember, the Chinese had to bring in soldiers from far, far away to clear Tianamen Square of protesters.



The role of Armed Assistance to Law Enforcement (which is what I beleive you are alluding to here) has, in the past traditionally fallen to Category "A" forces - Regular Force manaouever units.  However, Op CADENCE and, to a lesser extent, Op PODUIM have shown that the Reserves (all of them) are up to the task of ALEA.  Regarding the second and third order effects, they have been considered.  If the scenario called for it, I wouldn't be surprised to see forces from 34 CBG, for example, deployed in 31 CBG's AOR and vice-versa.


----------



## Haggis (1 Dec 2011)

Brihard said:
			
		

> Our experiences on CADENCE along with the thrust of the recent TBG exercise suggests to me that 'ability to engage with Canadian civilians without screwing everything up' is one of the unstated training goals of the TBG construct, which of course would be the force generation mechanism for such a security-oriented DOMOP. ......
> 
> ......If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.



I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE prep training in Meaford where Reservists (and Regulars) went through stands to prepare them for "population encounters".  I know what the intent was, and I support it.  I just think there was a better way to accomplish the aim than to have soldiers playing civilians dealing with soldiers.


----------



## Nfld Sapper (1 Dec 2011)

And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,


----------



## aesop081 (1 Dec 2011)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,



....and we've been hearing about it ever since  ;D



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE



I still chuckle when people use CADENCE as an example of how things should be done.


----------



## OldSolduer (1 Dec 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE prep training in Meaford where Reservists (and Regulars) went through stands to prepare them for "population encounters".  I know what the intent was, and I support it.  I just think there was a better way to accomplish the aim than to have soldiers playing civilians dealing with soldiers.



Agreed. Soldiers do not play civilians very well.

I think a presentation from the local constabulary on how to deal with civilians would be far more beneficial.


----------



## Nfld Sapper (1 Dec 2011)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> ....and we've been hearing about it ever since  ;D



 :clubinhand:

 ;D


----------



## chrisf (1 Dec 2011)

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,



And brought *everyone*... including the band for some reason...


----------



## Haggis (1 Dec 2011)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I still chuckle when people use CADENCE as an example of how things should be done.



I NEVER said that.  In fact I have a well established history of ranting against using the CADENCE model as a template for future routine DOMOPS.


----------



## aesop081 (1 Dec 2011)

Haggis said:
			
		

> I NEVER said that.



I never said you did.


----------



## Good2Golf (1 Dec 2011)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Are all Canada Command operations in Canada ?
> 
> No.
> 
> I cant think of at least one case where more resources are indeed needed to (seriously) have the required effect.



Indeed.  :nod: 

To quote the Canada Command website (ref: link) [*Emphasis* mine, to note the responsibility elements of Canada COM as noted by CDN Aviator above]


> Canada Command stands on guard for Canada. It maintains a 24/7 watch over the country, ready to respond to threats and crisis in an area of operations that spans more than nine million square kilometres, 240,000 kilometres of coastline and almost 9,000 kilometres of borders. In addition to *covering Canada *  and *continental North America and the approaches*, Canada Command pays close attention to *other areas of the world where threats to Canada may exist*, for example, it has also *conducted operations off the coasts of Africa and South America*.



Technically, as a "force employer" Canada Command presently has standing headquarters and attached under operational command, SAR assets including squadron, JRCC and CMCC personal and equipment. (ref: SAR in Canada)  All other capabilities are the responsibilities of the various "force generators (FG)" (RCN, CA, RCAF, other CF elements) to provide.  If the situations requiring the FG organizations' capabilities outstrips their ability to respond, then that would mean that at the moment, it is they that wouldn't have enough resources, not Canada Command.  I understand that LGen Semianiw seemed to be technically accurate in what he said, but the manner in which the statement was provided seemed not to help provide the additional context of the technicalities of the force employer/force generator relationship within which existing and future capability requirements is viewed.  


Regards
G2G


----------



## Journeyman (1 Dec 2011)

> ...example, it has also conducted operations off the coasts of Africa and South America.


Now that is completely news to me. What ops, and why weren't they CEFCOM?


----------



## dapaterson (1 Dec 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Now that is completely news to me. What ops, and why weren't they CEFCOM?



I would assume that those operations would be related to air and martime surveillance of Canadian approaches - for example, watching for smugglers with a Canadian destination.




...or maybe an aircrew wanted to work on their tans...


----------



## The Bread Guy (1 Dec 2011)

Another bit from G2G's shared link:


> .... to support the Government’s policy on Canada and the Americas, *Canada Command guards against and deals with threats and hazards originating in Mexico and other parts of the Western hemisphere.*


----------



## aesop081 (1 Dec 2011)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> What ops,



The part about "South America" is OP CARIBBE.


----------



## Journeyman (1 Dec 2011)

I'd heard of that; I just assumed that it was CEFCOM. I stand corrected


----------



## Grapeshot (2 Dec 2011)

Canada Command has nothing, owns nothing, its just a hollow shell of HQ across the country full of staff officers planning for whatever may come around. CANCOM borrows from all the other environemental commands when it needs troops and/or equipment! Thus his statement may be somewaht correct, however, in reality if that soldier or piece of equipment is not available, he's SOL!


----------



## SevenSixTwo (2 Jan 2012)

Haggis said:
			
		

> Fixed it for you
> 
> Two points to consider:
> 1. police forces of the day were less robust and had fewer tactical and operational capablilites; and
> 2. P Res units were not deployed on Op GINGER and ESSAY as conventional wisdom held that neither the units or individual soldiers were suitable to the task, nor were they required given the number of soldiers in the Regular Force at that time.  Contrast that with recent experience (PODIUM, CADENCE etc.)



According to the book I am reading many reserve *"UNITS"* were deployed on ESSAY and GINGER. Notice, how I said units and not reservists.


----------



## Journeyman (2 Jan 2012)

SevenSixTwo said:
			
		

> According to the book I am reading many reserve *"UNITS"* were deployed on ESSAY and GINGER. Notice, how I said units and not reservists.


Could you tell us the name of the book (with bonus points for the relevant page number)? Thanks.


----------

