# The Sinking of the Canadian Navy - Macleans



## dimsum

Ouch.  



> Many Canadians know that, at the end of the Second World War, the Canadian Navy was the fifth-largest in the world. Fewer realize that it has been so badly neglected for so long, it’s now effectively reduced to a coastal defence. Our rusting fleet sits out of sight of most Canadians, over the horizon, but not too far from shore; the sailors aboard struggling to keep the aging ships afloat; the admirals ashore juggling to constantly do more with less. And no one is proposing to fill the massive funding gaps. And replacement vessels remain nothing but unreliable plans on paper.
> 
> Meanwhile, in the upcoming election, like they did 10 years ago, the politicians will pose in front of shipyards, talk passionately about Arctic sovereignty and the proud reputation of the Royal Canadian Navy, and re-announce long-promised ships with ever receding launch dates.



http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sinking-of-the-canadian-navy/


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## Humphrey Bogart

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Ouch.
> 
> http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sinking-of-the-canadian-navy/



A picture is worth a thousand words

Canadian Carrier Task Group, circa 1960s







Canadian Task Group today


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## cupper

What ever you do, don't tell the Navy. 

They'll start asking for new offshore patrol vessels that are capable of working up north, new supply vessels, and replacements for the frigates.

Oh, wait….


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## Ludoc

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> A picture is worth a thousand words
> 
> Canadian Carrier Task Group, circa 1960s
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canadian Task Group today


What an amazing advance in technology. One ship that can do a job that used to take all those ships and aircraft. I look forward to the day when the entire RCN is based out of one ship.  : 

But which coast will get it?


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## jollyjacktar

I never really felt piss-ant until my first visit to Norfolk.  Then, I felt like I was part of a Banana Republic Navy or the like.


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## Humphrey Bogart

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> I never really felt piss-ant until my first visit to Norfolk.  Then, I felt like I was part of a Banana Republic Navy or the like.



Don't worry the feeling in the Army is mutual


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## cupper

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> I never really felt piss-ant until my first visit to Norfolk.  Then, I felt like I was part of a Banana Republic Navy or the like.



I get that sense too every time I drive by the Philadelphia Navy Yard. And those ships are mothballed.


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## jollyjacktar

Yeah, I've got green time behind me too.  I remember hearing the 1HQ and Pigs guys relate the hoots of laughter and disbelief from the Armoured guys out of Knox at seeing our CP/vehicle radio sets (they had on display in a museum on base).  Hell, just watch any of the War Amps postings of the Canadian Army Newsreels and see what we once were and how far we've wandered off the path of our former presence (CA, RCN, RCAF).  We make anorexic folks look obese.


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## jollyjacktar

Oh yes, the red face at answering the Yank who asked me while were berthed at the Carrier piers what was our biggest ships, only to find it was PRE.  His face was a picture of shock, pity, scorn and puzzlement all at once.


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## Monsoon

From the article:


> According to retired officers and naval experts, the RCN has objectively deteriorated to its lowest capability in over 40 years.


Can that possibly be true? The fleet wasn't much to behold in the early-90s prior to the introduction of the Halifax class and TRUMP. We were operating 1960s combat systems technology at a time when the state of the art had progressed a great deal in the previous fifteen years. Our principle class of surface combattants were propelled by steam engines, FFS. And of "coastal defence" back then (since the article spends a fair amount of time excoriating the Kingston class), the less said the better: converted yard trawlers and wooden 1950s-era minesweepers that couldn't minesweep.

Don't disagree that the fleet needs new ships, like, 10 years ago, but it doesn't do much to help our case to overstate things.


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## Eland2

The author of the Macleans article has a point. A valid one. A major, First World, industrialized country like Canada should not have an effectively non-functional navy like it does now. I am still gobsmacked by the fact that it took us twenty years to get the used subs we bought from the UK to a state where they are minimally operational. That is simply unacceptable, and it points to a massive systemic failure. If we saw something like this happening in the US Navy, heads would have rolled from top to bottom.

The blame for the Navy's sorry state of affairs (and the military's in general) can be laid on three things:

1. Apathetic Canadians and their refusal to provide the military that is supposed to serve them with adequate and stable (but not piecemeal) funding. Canadians persist in their belief that somehow it is the responsibility of the United States to pony up the assets, manpower, and money to defend us. The fact that Canada doesn't have the wherewithal to do an all-encompassing job of defending the country does not mean it should not be doing its utmost to do all that it can 
do given limited resources. Sadly, the 'Canada is too small to have an adequate military' excuse is used by too many Canadians. Canadians want to live free from the threat of attack by foreign countries, and they want Canada to have a significant role on the world stage, but they won't pay the freight to make sure that happens.

2. A dysfunctional and ineffective military procurement system that creates such significant bottlenecks such that materiel that does get procured is often a decade or more late or out of date, and costs much more than it should. It should not take the publication of an Urgent Operational Requirement to ensure the military gets proper kit within a reasonable time frame. 

3. Politicians who, if they don't have a deep-seated dislike of the military, have no interest in the military beyond what it can do to serve their political and partisan interests - namely photo ops and pork-barrelling in their ridings when election time swings around, or greasing the palms of their friends in the corporate sector.

Until we firmly address these three issues, problems like the navy rusting out will happen over and over and over again. The biggest question is, do Canadians have the political will and the desire to change things? Or would they be happier lowering the Canadian flag and applying for statehood?

</rant mode off>


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## FortYorkRifleman

Despite all this we somehow are able to produce excellent soldiers, sailors and airmen. That, in itself, is amazing. I won't get into what I think about the article as many of the posters above me have done a good job in doing just that but I like to think that the organization I am applying to will provide me, along with the other applicants, with the skills, knowledge and leadership to make me the best soldier I can be.


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## Edward Campbell

Eland2 said:
			
		

> The author of the Macleans article has a point. A valid one. A major, First World, industrialized country like Canada should not have an effectively non-functional navy like it does now. I am still gobsmacked by the fact that it took us twenty years to get the used subs we bought from the UK to a state where they are minimally operational. That is simply unacceptable, and it points to a massive systemic failure. If we saw something like this happening in the US Navy, heads would have rolled from top to bottom.
> 
> The blame for the Navy's sorry state of affairs (and the military's in general) can be laid on three things:
> 
> 1. Apathetic Canadians and their refusal to provide the military that is supposed to serve them with adequate and stable (but not piecemeal) funding. Canadians persist in their belief that somehow it is the responsibility of the United States to pony up the assets, manpower, and money to defend us. The fact that Canada doesn't have the wherewithal to do an all-encompassing job of defending the country does not mean it should not be doing its utmost to do all that it can
> do given limited resources. Sadly, the 'Canada is too small to have an adequate military' excuse is used by too many Canadians. Canadians want to live free from the threat of attack by foreign countries, and they want Canada to have a significant role on the world stage, but they won't pay the freight to make sure that happens.
> 
> 2. A dysfunctional and ineffective military procurement system that creates such significant bottlenecks such that materiel that does get procured is often a decade or more late or out of date, and costs much more than it should. It should not take the publication of an Urgent Operational Requirement to ensure the military gets proper kit within a reasonable time frame.
> 
> 3. Politicians who, if they don't have a deep-seated dislike of the military, have no interest in the military beyond what it can do to serve their political and partisan interests - namely photo ops and pork-barrelling in their ridings when election time swings around, or greasing the palms of their friends in the corporate sector.
> 
> Until we firmly address these three issues, problems like the navy rusting out will happen over and over and over again. The biggest question is, do Canadians have the political will and the desire to change things? Or would they be happier lowering the Canadian flag and applying for statehood?
> 
> </rant mode off>




Actually, your first "thing to blame" explains the other two.

Popular apathy, or, perhaps, _*popular passion*_ is what drives politics. Canadians, broadly and generally, are "passionate" about a few things; those few things are, pretty closely, related to their direct, personal, pocketbook/bank account/pay stub interests. They want lower taxes and more spending on things that directly benefit them ... except in some very, very rare circumstances (two or three times in the past century) it's damned hard for any political leader to put defence on the list of Canadians' "passions."

Scott Gilmore has penned an excellent, passionate _cri de coeur_ that, directly, calls for two things:

     1. Better political/bureaucratic decision making and processes (maybe even a _grand strategy_ for Canada); and

     2. Some popular passion about how we act on the global stage. (Implicit in this is a bigger, better managed defence budget.)

_My guess_ is that there are three groups of very smart people in Ottawa who are interested in this issue.

The first group of really smart (and powerful) people, all of whom wear business suits, none of whom have much, if any, direct experience with the military, agree, very broadly, with Mr Gilmore's analysis; they've been saying much the same thing for years. They have laid emphasis on two elements:

     1. Poor judgement and _weak_ top level leadership in National Defence Headquarters. There is a serious disconnect, they believe, between what the military, especially, says and
         what it can and will deliver. They are dismayed that admirals and generals routinely cry wolf (rust-out) and then manage to cobble together a response to a political demand.
         They think that the military either lies to the government, a venial sin, or to itself, a mortal one.

     2. Political realities. These smart people acknowledge that increased defence spending ~ a necessary element of any solution to Canada;'s military dilemma ~ is politically difficult, maybe even impossible, right now. They argue, however,
         that it is better to spend a bit more (a very few billion more each year) in a controlled manner than to have to spend many of ten of billions more (almost all "off shore") in an emergency situation.

The second group of smart people are younger and have even less contact with or interest in the military. They, however, have their fingers quite firmly on the pulse of public opinion ~ even on fine slices of public opinion. They oppose new defence spending ~ announcements are nice, actual spending is dangerous, they believe, lest it expose the government to a deficit, something which Canadians actually (albeit irrationally) fear. This group's influence is always a (frequently useful) counter balance to the opinions and recommendations of the first group.

The third group is larger and very diverse. It actually has a significant "pro-defence" segment, but, mostly, it represents a wide range of "single interests" (which includes national defence as just one of many). It's role is to bring all those "single interests," individually, to the attention of politicians  and senior bureaucrats and political advisors and the media. This group likes to call its members _"opinion makers"_, and sometimes that's accurate. How _efficient and effective_ each "single interest" opinion maker might be depends, in part, on how _popular_ the "interest" might already be ... and defence is a narrow and, generally, unpopular interest. (As I have said, over and over again, popular support for the military _might_ be a mile wide (red t-shirts and yellow ribbons and so on) but it is less than an inch deep and it, that puddle of public support, will evaporate completely when exposed to the heat and light of e.g. economic and social interests.)

The "defence community," which includes many of us, here on Army.ca who serve, did serve or are interested in national defence, is small, poorly organized, _weak_ (indecisive and divided) and, largely, leaderless. Yes, "we" have our own lobby groups within that big, broad "third group" described above, and yes, we have our own PR group, but how do these compare with other groups and other PR leaders? My answer is: poorly. And it's understandable why DND, itself, and its own pet lobby group are less than effective: for one thing their job is to "toe the _party line_," not to actually _promote_ national defence. Meanwhile, other groups, some with very evident anti-military agendas are not so constrained and can be, therefore, more effective.

So, we, the "military community," are _weak_, divided, quiet and, generally, "outgunned" and "outmanoeuvred" in the battle to capture public _"passions"_ and so our budgets and systems and management remain inadequate ... because that's the way Canadians have "directed" their political servants.


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## Colin Parkinson

The spending on the military needs to be grown in small slices, so it does not become a target. I would keep most of the current ship building policy, but order a couple of new hulls from overseas (Berlins), there is enough work to keep Irving and Seaspan busy for years. Regardless of what some people here think, I still like the idea of the Mistrals coming over and I suspect France would be very willing to work some interesting fiscal arrangements that spreads the costs over many years. We have the crews to man them and it will fit well with the Northern focus for now. It would also instill some morale improvement in the Navy who could use it.
By the time all the other ships come on line, the Mistrals would need a refit and the Halifax's will be due for replacement, which could be done on a slow continuous build program.


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## FSTO

Another reason why is that the 3 political parties cannot agree on a coherent defence policy that would allow buy in from the Canadian public.


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## Colin Parkinson

Very true, although with Paul Martian and Bill Graham followed by the CPC we were getting close to having 2 parties more or less aligned.


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## TCM621

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Actually, your first "thing to blame" explains the other two.
> 
> Popular apathy, or, perhaps, _*popular passion*_ is what drives politics. Canadians, broadly and generally, are "passionate" about a few things; those few things are, pretty closely, related to their direct, personal, pocketbook/bank account/pay stub interests. They want lower taxes and more spending on things that directly benefit them ... except in some very, very rare circumstances (two or three times in the past century) it's damned hard for any political leader to put defence on the list of Canadians' "passions."
> 
> Scott Gilmore has penned an excellent, passionate _cri de coeur_ that, directly, calls for two things:
> 
> 1. Better political/bureaucratic decision making and processes (maybe even a _grand strategy_ for Canada); and
> 
> 2. Some popular passion about how we act on the global stage. (Implicit in this is a bigger, better managed defence budget.)
> 
> _My guess_ is that there are three groups of very smart people in Ottawa who are interested in this issue.
> 
> The first group of really smart (and powerful) people, all of whom wear business suits, none of whom have much, if any, direct experience with the military, agree, very broadly, with Mr Gilmore's analysis; they've been saying much the same thing for years. They have laid emphasis on two elements:
> 
> 1. Poor judgement and _weak_ top level leadership in National Defence Headquarters. There is a serious disconnect, they believe, between what the military, especially, says and
> what it can and will deliver. They are dismayed that admirals and generals routinely cry wolf (rust-out) and then manage to cobble together a response to a political demand.
> They think that the military either lies to the government, a venial sin, or to itself, a mortal one.
> 
> 2. Political realities. These smart people acknowledge that increased defence spending ~ a necessary element of any solution to Canada;'s military dilemma ~ is politically difficult, maybe even impossible, right now. They argue, however,
> that it is better to spend a bit more (a very few billion more each year) in a controlled manner than to have to spend many of ten of billions more (almost all "off shore") in an emergency situation.
> 
> The second group of smart people are younger and have even less contact with or interest in the military. They, however, have their fingers quite firmly on the pulse of public opinion ~ even on fine slices of public opinion. They oppose new defence spending ~ announcements are nice, actual spending is dangerous, they believe, lest it expose the government to a deficit, something which Canadians actually (albeit irrationally) fear. This group's influence is always a (frequently useful) counter balance to the opinions and recommendations of the first group.
> 
> The third group is larger and very diverse. It actually has a significant "pro-defence" segment, but, mostly, it represents a wide range of "single interests" (which includes national defence as just one of many). It's role is to bring all those "single interests," individually, to the attention of politicians  and senior bureaucrats and political advisors and the media. This group likes to call its members _"opinion makers"_, and sometimes that's accurate. How _efficient and effective_ each "single interest" opinion maker might be depends, in part, on how _popular_ the "interest" might already be ... and defence is a narrow and, generally, unpopular interest. (As I have said, over and over again, popular support for the military _might_ be a mile wide (red t-shirts and yellow ribbons and so on) but it is less than an inch deep and it, that puddle of public support, will evaporate completely when exposed to the heat and light of e.g. economic and social interests.)
> 
> The "defence community," which includes many of us, here on Army.ca who serve, did serve or are interested in national defence, is small, poorly organized, _weak_ (indecisive and divided) and, largely, leaderless. Yes, "we" have our own lobby groups within that big, broad "third group" described above, and yes, we have our own PR group, but how do these compare with other groups and other PR leaders? My answer is: poorly. And it's understandable why DND, itself, and its own pet lobby group are less than effective: for one thing their job is to "toe the _party line_," not to actually _promote_ national defence. Meanwhile, other groups, some with very evident anti-military agendas are not so constrained and can be, therefore, more effective.
> 
> So, we, the "military community," are _weak_, divided, quiet and, generally, "outgunned" and "outmanoeuvred" in the battle to capture public _"passions"_ and so our budgets and systems and management remain inadequate ... because that's the way Canadians have "directed" their political servants.


Re: point 1. Gen. Vance in one of his first interviews continued the trend saying we have more than adequate resources to do what is asked of us. We all know it isn't true.  I'll post the source as soon as I remember where I read it.


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## blackberet17

Could it be this?

From <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/general-jonathan-vance-on-stopping-sexual-abuse-our-biggest-threats-and-his-plans-for-the-forces">here</a>



> Q. Does Canada have the budget and manpower for what it is doing overseas right now?
> 
> A. We can continue with what we are doing now, indefinitely. Whether we do or not is a matter for the government to decide. But our capacity in terms of trained personnel and our equipment is entirely appropriate for the current mission sets we are undertaking. And I would say we have the ability to do more if required. So, yes, can conduct training operations, support to Ukraine with the Canadian army and others and at the same time (be able to) respond to support Canadians. I cannot underrate the fact that it is Canada first. It is Canada and our territory that we defend first. Nothing we are doing overseas is effecting our ability to achieve anything in the NORAD environment nor to do anything that we can foresee us having to do to support Canadians.


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## Good2Golf

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Could it be this?
> 
> From <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/general-jonathan-vance-on-stopping-sexual-abuse-our-biggest-threats-and-his-plans-for-the-forces">here</a>



That was how I read it:  OP IMPACT and OP REASSURANCE specific.

   :2c:

G2G


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## CBH99

I find the statements from Gen. Vance somewhat misleading - albeit certainly not intentionally or with malice.

Can we continue to do what we are doing now, given the resources we have?  Yes.  But only if our requirements continue to be the odd single ship here, single ship there.  A 6-pack of fighter jets, and a company+ of troops to conduct training & liaison operations in Ukraine.

We can do all of that given the resources we have.  We can also muster up a fair number of troops that can be used domestically for natural disasters (floods, forest fires, etc) - as was recently proven with the relatively quick deployment of 1400 members to assist in firefighting efforts.

Can we do more than that, though?  I'm skeptical.   

I'd be curious from people who are still in, and in-the-know, if we could mobilize for another Afghanistan given the resources we have?  Or ramp up for operations in Ukraine (just for example) if required?  

Legitimate curiosity is all.


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## Humphrey Bogart

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I find the statements from Gen. Vance somewhat misleading - albeit certainly not intentionally or with malice.
> 
> Can we continue to do what we are doing now, given the resources we have?  Yes.  But only if our requirements continue to be the odd single ship here, single ship there.  A 6-pack of fighter jets, and a company+ of troops to conduct training & liaison operations in Ukraine.
> 
> We can do all of that given the resources we have.  We can also muster up a fair number of troops that can be used domestically for natural disasters (floods, forest fires, etc) - as was recently proven with the relatively quick deployment of 1400 members to assist in firefighting efforts.
> 
> Can we do more than that, though?  I'm skeptical.
> 
> I'd be curious from people who are still in, and in-the-know, if we could mobilize for another Afghanistan given the resources we have?  Or ramp up for operations in Ukraine (just for example) if required?
> 
> Legitimate curiosity is all.


We could ramp up for a war again, so long as the adversary we are going up against is armed only with sticks and sharpened bits of fruit, like the Taliban, who still caused us enough problems with booby traps, a few small arms and some RPGs, that we left with our tails firmly between our legs and that's exactly what we did in 2011.  Combat Operations in the Ukraine would be completely out of the question given our total lack of Air Defence, Anti Armour, Combat Mobility(think bridging, mineplows, etc), severe shortage of actual Artillery, lack of trucks for CSS, No Attack Helicopters, very little Armour, little to no ISR or Targeting capability, no UAVs.  

Our Army is no more than a very well armed constabulary and if thrown in to a Ukraine type conflict against a peer enemy we wouldn't do so well and would probably suffer a horrific defeat.  Does that answer your question?

Let's not even talk about actual war though, let's talk about Haiti 2010 and the Earthquake.  We would not be able to get ourselves there to help because we have no ships to do so.  Our Supply Ships are gone so what exactly are we going to bring?


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## CBH99

That's pretty much exactly what I was thinking, I just didn't want to be the one to verbalize it.  I was hoping I was wrong.


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## Humphrey Bogart

CBH99 said:
			
		

> That's pretty much exactly what I was thinking, I just didn't want to be the one to verbalize it.  I was hoping I was wrong.



It is what it is, no need to hide it.  It's not like it isn't known to our adversaries and allies either.


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## Navy_Pete

PRE wasn't involved at all in Haiti; that was ATH and HAL.  PRE was in the 18 month refit at the time.

We aren't capable of independently deploying, but realistically we, and most of our allies, aren't capable of any serious action without operating alongside other navies.  Ships cost a lot of money to build.  Spending money on single assets is not politically popular, so not sure why this article's by line isn't signed by Capt. Obvious.


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## Humphrey Bogart

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> PRE wasn't involved at all in Haiti; that was ATH and HAL.  PRE was in the 18 month refit at the time.
> 
> We aren't capable of independently deploying, but realistically we, and most of our allies, aren't capable of any serious action without operating alongside other navies.  Ships cost a lot of money to build.  Spending money on single assets is not politically popular, so not sure why this article's by line isn't signed by Capt. Obvious.



I just rechecked this and you're right.  Weren't Army folk dropped off in Jamaica and ferried over to Haiti by ship?  That must have been a pleasant voyage crammed into a frigate 😄


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## Lumber

I have a few problems with this article and its conclusions:


1. "Pirates off the coast of Africa? Assisting migrant refugees in the Mediterranean? Evacuating Canadian nationals from a foreign war or disaster? Responding to the growing military tension in the South China Sea? Supporting a United Nations peacekeeping mission? The Canadian Navy is no longer capable of mounting any of these missions without significant help from others."

Our frigates are more than capable of conducting these missions without "significant help". The only help we need is with refuelling, and even then, it almost makes more sense to do it the way we've been doing it; using USN tankers. Why deploy one of your own AORs when the USN already has a ton of them sailing around? Just to show that you can? Other than refuelling at sea, our Frigates have all the capability they need to accomplish these missions.

2. "The frigates are smaller, have a crew compliment of 220 sailors, carry one helicopter, have shorter-range radar, less firepower and far less capable command abilities."

The frigates are longer and wider, and only 300 tons lighter. The fewer crew needed, the better. They have improved, modern 3D radars, have ASuW and ASW capabilities that the 280s lacked completely, and they have _superior _ command capabilities (Link 16). Yes, they lack the Area Air Defence capability of the 280s, and this is something that we sorely need. However, this article makes it sound like the CPFs are a bunch of shore patrol boats.

3. "According to retired officers and naval experts, the RCN has objectively deteriorated to its lowest capability in over 40 years."

I would like to echo what others have said before. Before the first gulf war, Canada had no guided-missile capability. Our weapons and sensors and command capabilities are far beyond what they were 40 years ago. One of our greatest capabilities, which isn't mentioned in this article, is one which is a corner stone of modern navies; interoperabiltiy. Between the technology (Link 11/16), common practices, and frequent joint exercises, RCN units mesh seemlessly with USN task groups. 

4. "The loss of the destroyers means the Navy can no longer defend a formation against long-range threats, nor can it provide effective command and control. Without replenishment ships, it’s now impossible to sustain the fleet with the necessary supplies, ammunition and fuel over any distance."

I won't get into tactics, i'll just say it again: interoperability. We _can_ provide effective command and control, so just STFU Maclean's. Finally, the last sentence is also a load of horse crap. It is entirely possibly to provide the necessary "supplies, ammunition and fuel", and I say it again, interoperability.

5. the "Todd/Lindberg classification system"

This list a poorly researched ranking system. Indonesia doesn't have an AORs and has fewer major surface combatants than the RCN. Bangladesh has a few small in-harbour tankers and a small ageing AOR that I doubt they could deploy over seas. It's like they just scanned the internet and looks at the number and type of vessels each navy has, without looking into the more important details: training, capability, and state of repair.

6. this one doesn't really have to do with the article but people quotes in it: "...claims that fixing the Navy would be “just about the top priority” for a Liberal government." and "...Harris promised that improving Canada’s Navy would be a priority of an NDP government."

Yea, we'll see about that after the election.

7. "Many Canadians know that, at the end of the Second World War, the Canadian Navy was the fifth-largest in the world."

I hate hearing this one. Most of that Navy was corvettes and frigates with little to no ASuW or AAW capability. Within about 30 days of the end of the second world war, almost the entire fleet of corvettes and frigates were decommisioned, dropping us much, much, much farther down the list. 

/end

I won't go on about what I think we could do to improve the situation. A governemnt department as big as Public Works is not something someone like me can look at from the outside and figure out how to do it better. I will say, that this country lacks the public _passion_ for defence which would enable politicians to take defence spending and procurement seriously.

As I once heard it said, it took us less time to liberate a continent than it has taken us to move NDHQ to a new building 15km away.


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## McG

Lumber said:
			
		

> One of our greatest capabilities, which isn't mentioned in this article, is one which is a corner stone of modern navies; interoperabiltiy. Between the technology (Link 11/16), common practices, and frequent joint exercises, RCN units mesh seemlessly with USN task groups.


So, we are the USN farm team and can provide ships to support US goals?
What is the answer when our concerns do not mesh with something the US is willing to throw a task group at?


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## Good2Golf

So no area/TF-AD (does ESSM in the Mk48s really count?) and no integral replen isn't a bad situation?  ???


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## dapaterson

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> So no area/TF-AD (does ESSM in the Mk48s really count?) and no integral replen isn't a bad situation?  ???



No AD and no resupply.  Are we talking about the Navy or the Army?


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## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No AD and no resupply.  Are we talking about the Navy or the Army?



Touché!


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## Humphrey Bogart

MCG said:
			
		

> So, we are the USN farm team and can provide ships to support US goals?
> What is the answer when our concerns do not mesh with something the US is willing to throw a task group at?



Haha USN Farm Team!  I love it!

Royal Canadian Navy, Johnstown Chiefs of World Navies








			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> So no area/TF-AD (does ESSM in the Mk48s really count?) and no integral replen isn't a bad situation?  ???



Will have to let the Russians know we have no AD next time we enter the Black Sea so they stop incessantly buzzing us with those jets of theirs!


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## jollyjacktar

Lumber, the USN has it's own challenges in meeting their own needs without us riding on their coat tails like a leech.  We need to be able to stand up on our own two legs.


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## Oldgateboatdriver

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> (does ESSM in the Mk48s really count?)



WTF ??? ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles) are considered point defence systems, not area air defence. But the Mk48? It's a heavy torpedo, which we don't even carry on ships, only submarines. On ships we carry the Mk46 light torp. So unless I am missing something here, the Mk48 don't carry their own ESSM  :nod:


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Touché!



He is clapping way too fast!  That one deserves a slow clap!









			
				jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Lumber, the USN has it's own challenges in meeting their own needs without us riding on their coat tails like a leech.  We need to be able to stand up on our own two legs.



This is exactly what we have been talking about wrt us being our own worst enemy.  Lumber is looking to add another bar I think, even if it means lying about how awesome our gear is.


----------



## Good2Golf

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> WTF ??? ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles) are considered point defence systems, not area air defence. But the Mk48? It's a heavy torpedo, which we don't even carry on ships, only submarines. On ships we carry the Mk46 light torp. So unless I am missing something here, the Mk48 don't carry their own ESSM  :nod:



I know, OGBD, that was the content of the parentheses.    

I should have also been clearer...I meant the Mk.48 vertical launcher for the CPF's SSM/future ESSM.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> ...Will have to let the Russians know we have no AD next time we enter the Black Sea so they stop incessantly buzzing us with those jets of theirs!



 :nod:

Well...there is SHORAD (SSM/ESSM to come) and CIWS, but as far as being the TF designated AD capability, that's no longer in our inventory.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I know, OGBD, that was the content of the parentheses.
> 
> I should have also been clearer...I meant the Mk.48 vertical launcher for the CPF's SSM/future ESSM.
> 
> :nod:
> 
> Well...there is SHORAD (SSM/ESSM to come) and CIWS, but as far as being the TF designated AD capability, that's no longer in our inventory.



I don't really count SHORAD as real AD.  At least not against a real Air Force.  Beside, effective Air Defence is all about layering of effects.  We can do no such thing.

Edit:  I know 80%+ Aircraft are usually killed by SHORAD systems but that's because you have other weapon systems that force the plane to come that low and also because smart-munitions didn't exist.  GPS guided bombs and missiles mean they have less utility because aircraft have more stand-off.


----------



## dapaterson

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> I don't really count SHORAD as real AD.  At least not against a real Air Force.  Beside, effective Air Defence is all about layering of effects.  We can do no such thing.



All arms air defence is the next layer - the boarding party firing their MP-5s at the inbound missile.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dapaterson said:
			
		

> All arms air defence is the next layer - the boarding party firing their MP-5s at the inbound missile.



Lol I can see it now "Sir, I have organized my Air Defence into two layers, 8km and 100m". 

You would think we might have learned something from one of our sister navies with recent combat experience (by Naval standards).





HMS Sheffield hit by Exocet Missile fired by Argentinian warplanes, Falklands War


----------



## NavyShooter

I'll roll in for a moment on this one...seems almost in my lane.

The original RIM-7 Sea Sparrow was truly a Point Defense only missile.  That means it'd be capable of shooting down a missile (or aircraft) that's pointed at our ship.

The upgraded RIM-162 ESSM is a much more capable system that is more capable against all types of targets.

Does that make it an AREA air defense capable system?  Nope.  Not in the least.  However, the Wikipedia (open source) info on ranges are as follows:

RIM-7 : 10 nm (19km)
RIM-162 : 27+ nm (50+ km)

Additionally, if we bought in, the RIM-162 has the ability to be put in a quad pack, instead of the single cell missiles, so instead of 16 cells holding 16 missiles, you could get 16 cells holding 64 missiles.  BIG leap.

All that said, the ESSM is faster, longer ranged, and more capable than the Sea Sparrow, but it is not considered an area defense capability such as the SM-2 missiles provided.  
(Note the SM-2's open source range is listed as 40-90 nm, (74-167 km) or 65-100 nm for the ER version)
NS



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-162_ESSM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-7_Sea_Sparrow
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-66_Standard
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-67_Standard


----------



## daftandbarmy

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Ouch.
> 
> http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sinking-of-the-canadian-navy/



Indeed.

The best part? Only one small paragraph about the submarines, for a change  :nod:


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

You need a WDS and S-band data uplink (basically SM-2 capability) and a specific version of RIM-162 to get the full range out of it. Otherwise it's just a better Sea Sparrow.

You also need a Mk 41 launcher for the quad-pack. If you have a Mk 48 launcher you can only use single and IIRC dual packs.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-162.html


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> I'll roll in for a moment on this one...seems almost in my lane.
> 
> The original RIM-7 Sea Sparrow was truly a Point Defense only missile.  That means it'd be capable of shooting down a missile (or aircraft) that's pointed at our ship.
> 
> The upgraded RIM-162 ESSM is a much more capable system that is more capable against all types of targets.
> 
> Does that make it an AREA air defense capable system?  Nope.  Not in the least.  However, the Wikipedia (open source) info on ranges are as follows:
> 
> RIM-7 : 10 nm (19km)
> RIM-162 : 27+ nm (50+ km)
> 
> Additionally, if we bought in, the RIM-162 has the ability to be put in a quad pack, instead of the single cell missiles, so instead of 16 cells holding 16 missiles, you could get 16 cells holding 64 missiles.  BIG leap.
> 
> All that said, the ESSM is faster, longer ranged, and more capable than the Sea Sparrow, but it is not considered an area defense capability such as the SM-2 missiles provided.
> (Note the SM-2's open source range is listed as 40-90 nm, (74-167 km) or 65-100 nm for the ER version)
> NS
> 
> 
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-162_ESSM
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-7_Sea_Sparrow
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-66_Standard
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-67_Standard



The ranges of the RIM-162 seem impressive until you consider that some of the latest anti-ship missile ranges are three to four times that.  Exocet Block 3 missiles have a range of 97 nautical miles and are GPS guided which enables them to alter their direction of attack.

Interestingly, in 1982 HMS Sheffield was out front of main fleet looking for the Argentinians when it was hit by an Exocet.  It anticipated that it would see the Argentinians on radar before any missile launch was detected, which did not occur.  The Argentinians had detected the Sheffield via patrol aircraft and monitored it for about three hours before Super Etenards struck the Sheffield.  The only thing they picked up was the missile which impacted their ship five seconds after detection.  

We may be adequately prepared for some things we are doing now, i.e. Fisheries patrols, counter-narcotics, etc... But we aren't prepared for war which is what we should be focusing on.  Our Army and Navy are little more than a very well armed constabulary Atm.


----------



## Lumber

In response to those who think I don't see the importance in Area AD and fleet-replenishment capability, let me clarify.

I don't disagree with the general theme of the article; the Canadian Navy has lost important capabilities and need to do something to get them back.

I was more arguing with how dire they make the situation look, and about some of the inaccuracies of their claims.

They say many things are impossible, but we are in fact doing them right now. During mission turnover, we have two ships deployed thousands of miles from home at the same time, with other ships conducting local/regional exercises or training. We have effective command and control. We have a limited capability (vice no capability) of defending a task group, thanks to the ESSM. 

Is there work to be done? Absolutely. Are we hamstrung and relegated to patrolling our own waters? Absolultey not.


----------



## NavyShooter

Back in the 90's the German Navy life-cycled their Exocets and upgraded to a newer version.

They cycled their old ones through a depot, removed the warheads and fueled them to fly 37 miles.  

Then they sent a group of ships down to the US Missile range at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, in Peurto Rico.  They had some subs down at the same time too doing torpedo firings.  

They setup and fired their Exocets against a line of US/CAN/GER ships that were at a range of 40 miles from the launching unit (note the 3 mile buffer)

Memory is foggy but I think there were 30-40 Exocets fired, and each ship in line got a chance to fire back, some ships several times.  Pretty neat stuff.

Having longer range missiles is also only *REALLY* useful if you can identify a valid target that you can engage at that distance.  (Think USS Vincennes) 

I've stood on the bridge of the USS Stark after she was rebuilt following her Exocet hit(s).  An interesting experience.

The retirement of our Destroyers has left us with a huge gap in air defense, but the upgrades to the Frigates have made them a much more capable platform.  Would it be nice to still have a long range AD capability?  Yup, fer sure!  Hopefully with the next generation of surface combattant we'll see that capability return.  

I'd like to think that we're more than just a well armed constabulary, but it's tough to find good arguements against that point.


----------



## McG

Lumber said:
			
		

> In response to those who think I don't see the importance in Area AD and fleet-replenishment capability, let me clarify.
> 
> I don't disagree with the general theme of the article; the Canadian Navy has lost important capabilities and need to do something to get them back.
> 
> I was more arguing with how dire they make the situation look, and about some of the inaccuracies of their claims.
> 
> They say many things are impossible, but we are in fact doing them right now. During mission turnover, we have two ships deployed thousands of miles from home at the same time, with other ships conducting local/regional exercises or training. We have effective command and control. We have a limited capability (vice no capability) of defending a task group, thanks to the ESSM.
> 
> Is there work to be done? Absolutely. Are we hamstrung and relegated to patrolling our own waters? Absolultey not.



So, would you agree with the article's idea that the RCN cannot independently conduct operations to support this nations interests?  Your entire counter-point was a defence around the idea that we can assist and be supported by a USN Task Group.

There was a time that we could do our own thing according to our own national prioreties.  I think he article is right.  That time is gone.


----------



## Lumber

MCG said:
			
		

> There was a time that we could do our own thing according to our own national prioreties.  I think he article is right.  That time is gone.



And when have we, ever, acted alone according to our own national priorities? Wether it was the Allies or NATO, the RCN has always worked in consort with other navies. I would love to be sailing as part of a Canadian task group with an AOR, an assault/helicopter carrier as HVU, an Area Air Defence unit serving as goal keeper, and a screen of ASW/ASuW ships. When we had the 280s and AORs working, we could do this. But how often _did_ we ever do this? The largest task group that I can find that actually deployed (and I'm not claiming this is the only one or the biggest), was in 2001 when we deployed a CPF, a 280 and an AOR all together to the middle east. But wait, did they act alone, according to "national priorities". No, they worked in cosort with a multinational task group. My point? It's nice to be able to (theoretically) do anything and everything by ourselves. In reality, that's very expensive, and we've never actually done it before. Think we could pull off a Falklands conflict RN style? Never. Better to be good at one thing than mediocre at a whole bunch of things. Maybe?


----------



## McG

We do not have to do everything alone, but we should be able to exercise our interests independantly.  If the purpose of the RCN is to provide ships to the USN, then we do not have a navy ... we just fund a USN farm team (and secede some sovereignty)

But what happens when Canada wants to do something and the US is disinterested, busy or opposed?  Consider our involvement to resolve the Suez Crisis.  Consider the first Gulf War where the Canadian task group had its own AOR.  Consider arctic sovereignty where some of our conflict is with the US.


----------



## Lumber

MCG said:
			
		

> Consider arctic sovereignty where some of our conflict is with the US.



...you want to go toe-to-toe with the USN over arctic sovereignty? 

:clubinhand: vs.  anzer:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

they will show up with their wunderboat LCS, for sure  ;D


----------



## jollyjacktar

:clubinhand:  ??  more like    :nana:   or     :surrender:


----------



## McG

Lumber said:
			
		

> ...you want to go toe-to-toe with the USN over arctic sovereignty?
> 
> :clubinhand: vs.  anzer:


No. 

But, what happens when a more aggressive Russia requires greater Navy resources in the Arctic?  If we need to ask the USN to do any heavy lifting in our waters when it comes to sovereignty in conflict areas with Russia, then we basically conceded to the US that we cannot secure those areas we contest with them.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MCG said:
			
		

> No.
> 
> But, what happens when a more aggressive Russia requires greater Navy resources in the Arctic?  If we need to ask the USN to do any heavy lifting in our waters when it comes to sovereignty in conflict areas with Russia, then we basically conceded to the US that we cannot secure those areas we contest with them.



And they disagree with our interpretation of the law we make for our Arctic claims.  So there is no guarantee they would side with us and if they did we would probably need to make concessions.


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> Better to be good at one thing than mediocre at a whole bunch of things. Maybe?



The reason we used to hit above our weight is we didn't just bring a Frigate to the fight.  We brought C2, replenishment, area AD, robust helo support.  Now we bring none of that.

Now we just bring the Frigate, and ask for support.  Our allies notice...  

I was on the vanguard (Halifax) in 2001... nobody cared.  We followed up with two more frigates, a 280, and an AOR; people cared.  We were contributing to the effort, not a drain.

You say we have C2; in 1991 we commanded the replenishment force; can't do that with A Frigate.  We can only C2 ourselves.

I was in NORTH COM for Martina. .. the US had to send a tanker out to bring us in.  Think they were impressed? The one ship they were impressed with was the CCG buoy tender marking channels for them. ..

So what exactly are we good at?
C2: nope, no robust Command ship
Reple ishment: nope
AD: OK, we've put a lot of effort into if over 20 years; it's been our warfare ficus.  But when we lost the 280s a lot of that went poof.
ASW: nope
Soft power projection: we can show the flag with best of them, but deliver an effect?
ASuW: got the missile,  but who targets it.  We're not even interoperable with our own air...
Robust Navel air: nope, not for a while yet.
Mine warfare: not really
Hard force projection: is strike... nope

So what is it we provide our allies.  Sure we're interoperable, so they can support us.  Think that makes them happy???


----------



## jollyjacktar

:goodpost:

If I could give the hand clap gif too I would.  BZ.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Baz said:
			
		

> The reason we used to hit above our weight is we didn't just bring a Frigate to the fight.  We brought C2, replenishment, area AD, robust helo support.  Now we bring none of that.
> 
> Now we just bring the Frigate, and ask for support.  Our allies notice...
> 
> I was on the vanguard (Halifax) in 2001... nobody cared.  We followed up with two more frigates, a 280, and an AOR; people cared.  We were contributing to the effort, not a drain.
> 
> You say we have C2; in 1991 we commanded the replenishment force; can't do that with A Frigate.  We can only C2 ourselves.
> 
> I was in NORTH COM for Martina. .. the US had to send a tanker out to bring us in.  Think they were impressed? The one ship they were impressed with was the CCG buoy tender marking channels for them. ..
> 
> So what exactly are we good at?
> C2: nope, no robust Command ship
> Reple ishment: nope
> AD: OK, we've put a lot of effort into if over 20 years; it's been our warfare ficus.  But when we lost the 280s a lot of that went poof.
> ASW: nope
> Soft power projection: we can show the flag with best of them, but deliver an effect?
> ASuW: got the missile,  but who targets it.  We're not even interoperable with our own air...
> Robust Navel air: nope, not for a while yet.
> Mine warfare: not really
> Hard force projection: is strike... nope
> 
> So what is it we provide our allies.  Sure we're interoperable, so they can support us.  Think that makes them happy???











We used to be at least good at this, now we can't even do that anymore!


----------



## Halifax Tar

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> We used to be at least good at this, now we can't even do that anymore!



Outstanding






We are f-'d


----------



## blacktriangle

Let's just disband the RCN and spend the savings on social programs!


----------



## Halifax Tar

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Let's just disband the RCN and spend the savings on social programs!



Lets disband the RCN and just provide those saved funds to an ally for their Navy in return for Naval services... Wait didn't we contemplate that before ?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Lets disband the RCN and just provide those saved funds to an ally for their Navy in return for Naval services... Wait didn't we contemplate that before ?



I think we are doing it now

Thanks Chile!


----------



## jollyjacktar

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> We used to be at least good at this, now we can't even do that anymore!



Sadly so true, so true.   We're a floating Billy Graham crusade nowadays  :'(


----------



## suffolkowner

It seems that work is underway regarding a stopgap AOR capability so that should remedy/alleviate that issue to some extent.

But a replacement for the Tribals seems a long way off (2025-2030 ?). What possible remedies are there other than a more extensive refit of some the Halifax class?


----------



## FSTO

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Sadly so true, so true.   We're a floating Billy Graham crusade nowadays  :'(



Isn't that the depressing truth.


----------



## Seyek

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> It seems that work is underway regarding a stopgap AOR capability so that should remedy/alleviate that issue to some extent.
> 
> But a replacement for the Tribals seems a long way off (2025-2030 ?). What possible remedies are there other than a more extensive refit of some the Halifax class?



A 10 year lease on a Burke? Assuming the US was willing to give up a destroyer for that long. Or just buy one of the older models and the US can use the money towards buying adding another Flight III


----------



## FSTO

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Scott Gilmore has penned an excellent, passionate _cri de coeur_ that, directly, calls for two things:
> 
> 1. Better political/bureaucratic decision making and processes (maybe even a _grand strategy_ for Canada); and
> 
> 2. Some popular passion about how we act on the global stage. (Implicit in this is a bigger, better managed defence budget.)
> 
> _My guess_ is that there are three groups of very smart people in Ottawa who are interested in this issue.
> 
> The first group of really smart (and powerful) people, all of whom wear business suits, none of whom have much, if any, direct experience with the military, agree, very broadly, with Mr Gilmore's analysis; they've been saying much the same thing for years. They have laid emphasis on two elements:
> 
> 1. Poor judgement and _weak_ top level leadership in National Defence Headquarters. There is a serious disconnect, they believe, between what the military, especially, says and what it can and will deliver. They are dismayed that admirals and generals routinely cry wolf (rust-out) and then manage to cobble together a response to a political demand. They think that the military either lies to the government, a venial sin, or to itself, a mortal one.
> 
> 2. Political realities. These smart people acknowledge that increased defence spending ~ a necessary element of any solution to Canada;'s military dilemma ~ is politically difficult, maybe even impossible, right now. They argue, however, that it is better to spend a bit more (a very few billion more each year) in a controlled manner than to have to spend many of ten of billions more (almost all "off shore") in an emergency situation.
> 
> The second group of smart people are younger and have even less contact with or interest in the military. They, however, have their fingers quite firmly on the pulse of public opinion ~ even on fine slices of public opinion. They oppose new defence spending ~ announcements are nice, actual spending is dangerous, they believe, lest it expose the government to a deficit, something which Canadians actually (albeit irrationally) fear. This group's influence is always a (frequently useful) counter balance to the opinions and recommendations of the first group.



Mr Campbell, I would like to focus on these two groups of "smart people". In the mid 90's when the Frigate building program was nearing its end, did any of these people look at the amount of money invested, the time it took to get the program up and running and all the political capital spent to receive (from St John Shipbuilding) only 9 ships and wonder; "Is this a good investment of the Crown's Treasure?" Were they not able (even though they had little or no military/naval experience) to look at our fleet in being (not just the RCN but Coast Guard as well) and think; "We already have a shipyard, and experienced and capable workforce and a fleet that needs to be replaced/upgraded at regular intervals. Is it cost effective or even ethical to allow all this to disappear only to have to rebuild it all in 15 to 20 years at a rate of inflation of 2%(low I admit)."
There had to be somebody (an accountant?) who could have crunched the numbers and delivered it to the DM? Right?

If nobody in TB thought to do this I could maybe forgive them for being obtuse, if nobody in PGWGC thought of this I could maybe forgive them for being lazy, if nobody in the Navy did this then they are goddamn cowards and prove your assertions above.

I feel in my bones that Canadians are not as stupid as our people in Ottawa think they are. That if the government of the day would have laid out the costs spent, the future needs of the nation and the projected costs coming down the road if we allow (which we did) the Frigate program to be the last build for a decade or more. I think a majority of Canadians would have supported a reasoned and cost effective process of continuous rebuilds of our government fleets.

I predict that this current attempt at getting a longterm shipbuilding program off the ground will be the last time we try. If this doesn't work then we will certainly be purchasing everything offshore.


----------



## Edward Campbell

When those (bad) decisions were being made the second group ~ _"younger and have even less contact with or interest in the military. They, however, have their fingers quite firmly on the pulse of public opinion ~ even on fine slices of public opinion"_ ~ were in near total control and they had one objective: vote buying in Quebec.

I can guarantee you that some eyes (above gold encrusted dark blue uniforms) were blazing with anger, but the first group, the really smart "suits," just shrugged and said, _"c'est la vie."_

There is, usually, a lot of _tension_ and _friction_ between the _policy_ and _political_ agencies: usually it's both healthy and, sometimes, productive. Sometimes mutually agreeable compromises can be reached; at others times ~ as with the (silly) decision to kill _St John Shipbuilding_ ~ no compromise was possible and one side or the other had to win and take all; in that case it was the _political_ side. The Navy was furious but, by and large, the permanent, _institutional_ bureaucracy accepted their defeat with good grace and went, quietly, along to the next battle.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Very few politicians think beyond their 5 year term. I deal with bridge permits and when you begin to talk about the effect of a major bridge for the next 60 years, the politicians and senior managers eyes glaze over, what do they care, not their problem. the Reality is that shipyards need a certain number of new builds to recapitalize their yards keeping them up to date. To key is to allow enough protection so they can compete for those new builds, while still allowing enough competitiveness that they don't get lazy and inefficient. I would say Seaspan is in that place, but needed a tad more protection to make offshore bids a bit more costly.


----------



## Lumber

FSTO said:
			
		

> I feel in my bones that Canadians are not as stupid as our people in Ottawa think they are.



I was hanging out with one of my oldest friends (who I only see once or twice a year). He knows damn well I'm in the Navy and even his father was as well (clearance diver who retired when my friend was very young, but still). 

So, while hanging out, he asks me if Canada's navy actually has major surface combatants? (I think his words were something like "real, actual, big, warships").

When you're political career might only be 4 years long, and the people you represent know nothing about the Navy, how are you suppose to make it a high priority?


----------



## FSTO

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> When those (bad) decisions were being made the second group ~ _"younger and have even less contact with or interest in the military. They, however, have their fingers quite firmly on the pulse of public opinion ~ even on fine slices of public opinion"_ ~ were in near total control and they had one objective: vote buying in Quebec.
> 
> I can guarantee you that some eyes (above gold encrusted dark blue uniforms) were blazing with anger, but the first group, the really smart "suits," just shrugged and said, _"c'est la vie."_
> 
> There is, usually, a lot of _tension_ and _friction_ between the _policy_ and _political_ agencies: usually it's both healthy and, sometimes, productive. Sometimes mutually agreeable compromises can be reached; at others times ~ as with the (silly) decision to kill _St John Shipbuilding_ ~ no compromise was possible and one side or the other had to win and take all; in that case it was the _political_ side. The Navy was furious but, by and large, the permanent, _institutional_ bureaucracy accepted their defeat with good grace and went, quietly, along to the next battle.



Thanks for the answer. Not fault to you, but my blood is just boiling at the thought of the amount of money pissed away for no purpose.

Was this battle fought during the Chretien/Martin civil war? If it was then this whole sorry mess was just collateral damage.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

FSTO said:
			
		

> if nobody in the Navy did this then they are goddamn cowards and prove your assertions above.



Don't blame the Navy. It has been advocating the need to build warships in Canada and at a constant rate to meet what it has ALWAYS propounded as the peace time Navy it needs: A "destroyer" Navy with some attached command, support and mine warfare elements. And, under the "old" Naval Board" and the the Marcom planning cell once re-established after unification and since, it has always planned for all the construction it needed. It is the politicians that have consistently refused these programs or accepted them then cancelled them.

Between the St-Laurents and the 280's, two programs were put up for continuation of the maintenance of the fleet and its shipyard base: The "Vancouver" class frigates and the GP frigates. They were shot down by the government of the day. After the 280's were built, plans for a batch two (improved 280's) and then the first plan for the CPF's went out, both shut down until the CPF were belatedly resuscitated. In the meantime, the subs turn was up and a plan for their replacement put up. Minister Nielsen turn the plan down and insisted that the Navy put up a plan for nuclear subs instead, which the Navy dutifully did and was then shut down again by the same government (Mulroney). 

To get the nuclear sub, the Navy had to renounce the six Batch III CPF's, which were to be stretched, carry more and better AAW missiles, better radar and be equipped to take over the C2 role of the 280's they would replace. The Mulroney government cancelled the nuclear sub, but did not reinstate the original plans for diesel subs and the Batch III CPF's. 

Reinstating the Batch III would have provided St. John Shipbuilding with eight more years of work, at which time the AOR's turn for replacement would have been up and the mid-life of the CPF's Batches I and II  carried out, providing another 6 years of work until the replacement of the CPF's on a one by one basis would have been up … and so forth.

The Naval Board even agreed to adapt its plans according to the requests of serving Ministers if they made sense and could be incorporated into the real needs of Canada for naval defence. For instance, the general plans, in accordance with our Nato obligations, in the mid 60's was for four ASW groups, including one centred on an aircraft carrier (Bonnie) as hunter-killer support group. When minister Hellyer decide that the forces would be unified and that the Navy would have to do more to support the Army, the Navy obliged and offered to reorganize around three groups, one centred on the carrier, re-equiped to carry aircraft that could provide air cover to the Army, and two groups, each centred on an American Iwo Jima class assault ship. This was accepted by the minister but cancelled before implementation by the new PM, Trudeau.


----------



## Lumber

:goodpost:


----------



## FSTO

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> *Don't blame the Navy.* It has been advocating the need to build warships in Canada and at a constant rate to meet what it has ALWAYS propounded as the peace time Navy it needs: A "destroyer" Navy with some attached command, support and mine warfare elements. And, under the "old" Naval Board" and the the Marcom planning cell once re-established after unification and since, it has always planned for all the construction it needed. It is the politicians that have consistently refused these programs or accepted them then cancelled them.


In my heart I never will. It just so soul destroying to see what might have been if there was just some common bloody sense being used by the people we elect and the people we depend on to make our country's bureaucracy work.


----------



## Edward Campbell

FSTO said:
			
		

> Thanks for the answer. Not fault to you, but my blood is just boiling at the thought of the amount of money pissed away for no purpose.
> 
> _Was this battle fought during the Chretien/Martin civil war?_ If it was then this whole sorry mess was just collateral damage.




Yes, but it was *not*, _I believe_,  part of that civil war. I think both Prime Minister Chrétien and (then) Finance Minister Martin were in agreement on the _politics_ of the decision.

The decision was made in 2003, after I retired, but the problems started during the Mulroney era and there were _rumours_ in the mid to late 1990s about us having one too many yards. As I (very imperfectly I hasten to point out) understood the debate, in the '90s, the PMO, the main political agency, perceived a need for, only: one East Coast yard and one West Coast yard and one Quebec yard. _I think_ the _Mandarins_ agreed that we had too much capacity although I doubt they would have made the same geographic/_political_ calculation. The Navy, I think, was fed up with Davey ~ after the TRUMP fiasco (which we called "one no trump" when there was serious discussion of paying Davey to not finish the work on the fourth 280) ~ and very much wanted any warship building strategy to be built around _Saint John Shipbuilding_. Suffice to say that the PMO was focused on national unity, in the late 1990s, not warships, and the decision to, eventually, pay _Irving Shipbuilding_ to close its biggest (and best?) yard was an easy one,_ I suspect_.


----------



## FSTO

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Yes, but it was *not*, _I believe_,  part of that civil war. I think both Prime Minister Chrétien and (then) Finance Minister Martin were in agreement on the _politics_ of the decision.
> 
> The decision was made in 2003, after I retired, but the problems started during the Mulroney era and there were _rumours_ in the mid to late 1990s about us having one too many yards. As I (very imperfectly I hasten to point out) understood the debate, in the '90s, the PMO, the main political agency, perceived a need for, only: one East Coast yard and one West Coast yard and one Quebec yard. _I think_ the _Mandarins_ agreed that we had too much capacity although I doubt they would have made the same geographic/_political_ calculation. The Navy, I think, was fed up with Davey ~ after the TRUMP fiasco (which we called "one no trump" when there was serious discussion of paying Davey to not finish the work on the fourth 280) ~ and very much wanted any warship building strategy to be built around _Saint John Shipbuilding_. Suffice to say that the PMO was focused on national unity, in the late 1990s, not warships, and the decision to, eventually, pay _Irving Shipbuilding_ to close its biggest (and best?) yard was an easy one,_ I suspect_.



I always suspected that the Quebec question had a massive hand in all the pain and heartache that went into Frigate program (and its aftermath). I just never would believe that it was that overt and all consuming of common sense. 
Maybe if the Mulroney and later Chrétien and Martin had delt with Quebec like they delt with the west (benign neglect) then our country would likely be much better off. I know that idea was impossible since those 3 could never ever wrap their heads around the idea of treating Quebec like the rest of the country.


----------



## Lumber

So, two days and 3 pages later, we can conclusively blame the current state of the RCN on... Quebec?


----------



## Eland2

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Don't blame the Navy. It has been advocating the need to build warships in Canada and at a constant rate to meet what it has ALWAYS propounded as the peace time Navy it needs: A "destroyer" Navy with some attached command, support and mine warfare elements. And, under the "old" Naval Board" and the the Marcom planning cell once re-established after unification and since, it has always planned for all the construction it needed. It is the politicians that have consistently refused these programs or accepted them then cancelled them.
> 
> Between the St-Laurents and the 280's, two programs were put up for continuation of the maintenance of the fleet and its shipyard base: The "Vancouver" class frigates and the GP frigates. They were shot down by the government of the day. After the 280's were built, plans for a batch two (improved 280's) and then the first plan for the CPF's went out, both shut down until the CPF were belatedly resuscitated. In the meantime, the subs turn was up and a plan for their replacement put up. Minister Nielsen turn the plan down and insisted that the Navy put up a plan for nuclear subs instead, which the Navy dutifully did and was then shut down again by the same government (Mulroney).
> 
> To get the nuclear sub, the Navy had to renounce the six Batch III CPF's, which were to be stretched, carry more and better AAW missiles, better radar and be equipped to take over the C2 role of the 280's they would replace. The Mulroney government cancelled the nuclear sub, but did not reinstate the original plans for diesel subs and the Batch III CPF's.
> 
> Reinstating the Batch III would have provided St. John Shipbuilding with eight more years of work, at which time the AOR's turn for replacement would have been up and the mid-life of the CPF's Batches I and II  carried out, providing another 6 years of work until the replacement of the CPF's on a one by one basis would have been up … and so forth.
> 
> The Naval Board even agreed to adapt its plans according to the requests of serving Ministers if they made sense and could be incorporated into the real needs of Canada for naval defence. For instance, the general plans, in accordance with our Nato obligations, in the mid 60's was for four ASW groups, including one centred on an aircraft carrier (Bonnie) as hunter-killer support group. When minister Hellyer decide that the forces would be unified and that the Navy would have to do more to support the Army, the Navy obliged and offered to reorganize around three groups, one centred on the carrier, re-equiped to carry aircraft that could provide air cover to the Army, and two groups, each centred on an American Iwo Jima class assault ship. This was accepted by the minister but cancelled before implementation by the new PM, Trudeau.



You've just incisively described why we need to get the politicians out of the military procurement process. Let the military decide what it needs and determine how it will be obtained. The only thing the politicians should be allowed to do is decide how big the annual defence budget will be, and what foreign policy aims the military needs to meet.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Eland2 said:
			
		

> You've just incisively described why _we need to get the politicians out of the military procurement process_. Let the military decide what it needs and determine how it will be obtained. The only thing the politicians should be allowed to do is decide how big the annual defence budget will be, and what foreign policy aims the military needs to meet.




I have addressed this on several occasions, usually in these terms. It is neither possible nor, in a liberal democracy, desirable to take politics out of defence procurement. It is not the "military's" job nor its right to "decide what it needs:" that is the sole and exclusive prerogative of civilians ... in any democracy worthy of the name. Anyway, in my (lengthy) experience the military neither knows what it needs not understands how to buy anything that is not on the shelf at Canadian Tire. Our defence procurement system is a mess but putting the military in charge would do absolutely nothing to clean up that mess. Until we elect politicians who care about national defence, until, in other words, we, citizens of Canada, care about national defence, the system will remain what it is ... what we deserve.


----------



## FSTO

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I have addressed this on several occasions, usually in these terms. It is neither possible nor, in a liberal democracy, desirable to take politics out of defence procurement. It is not the "military's" job nor its right to "decide what it needs:" that is the sole and exclusive prerogative of civilians ... in any democracy worthy of the name. Anyway, in my (lengthy) experience the military neither knows what it needs not understands how to buy anything that is not on the shelf at Canadian Tire. Our defence procurement system is a mess but putting the military in charge would do absolutely nothing to clean up that mess. Until we elect politicians who care about national defence, until, in other words, we, citizens of Canada, care about national defence, the system will remain what it is ... what we deserve.



Totally agree.
The civilians tell us what we can do, where we can go, and gives us the means to do it. But IMHO I don't think our government has really done this in a coherent manner since Louis St. Laurent. So we in the military have been wandering around aimlessly trying to figure out what we are supposed to do with a mishmash of policies and equipment provided to us. But in the governments defence, I don't know if we (CAF) have done a really good job of providing a unified picture of capabilities, wants and needs to our civilian overseers.


----------



## McG

FSTO said:
			
		

> ... in the governments defence, I don't know if we (CAF) have done a really good job of providing a unified picture of capabilities, wants and needs to our civilian overseers.


Between internal conflict for resources, the pursuit of "shiny", and use of amateur requirements staff, we have not done a good job of providing this picture to our political masters.


----------



## Lumber

MCG said:
			
		

> Between internal conflict for resources, the pursuit of "shiny", and use of amateur requirements staff, we have not done a good job of providing this picture to our political masters.



Dear Governemnt of Canada.

I would like the following capabilities in a navy:

i. Area Air Defence
ii. Over the Horizon Anti-Surface
iii. Over the Horizon land-attack
iv. Stand-off ASW
v. Tactical Data Link
vi. LRPAs capable of ASW and SSSC
vii. Helicopters capable of ASW and SSSC
viii. Replenishment at sea
ix. sufficient ships that while the fleet will require regular deep maitenance periods, it will nonetheless maintain the ability to deploy all of the above cabilities at any given moment (i.e. A destroy, frigate and AOR, or a really-really good destroyer and AOR)

There, done. Now they know. If they want some ideas on what exactly to order (specific weapons systems, specific platforms), I'd be more than happy to come up with a list.


----------



## McG

So break that down into requirements.  What must AAD do?  How many times must it do it? Under what conditions?  Within what constraints?

Your list of products will not make it to PWGSC.  You must describe performance.


----------



## Lumber

MCG said:
			
		

> So break that down into requirements.  What must AAD do?  How many times must it do it? Under what conditions?  Within what constraints?
> 
> Your list of products will not make it to PWGSC.  You must describe performance.



Challenge Accepted.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MCG said:
			
		

> So break that down into requirements.  What must AAD do?  How many times must it do it? Under what conditions?  Within what constraints?
> 
> Your list of products will not make it to PWGSC.  You must describe performance.



Is there an existing NATO standard for any of those requirements?


----------



## Lumber

Colin P said:
			
		

> Is there an existing NATO standard for any of those requirements?



It's frustrating but I get what MCG is saying. You can't just go to the government and say "The SM-6 is the best AAD weapon available. The Astair 30 is close, but buying the SM-6 from the US would make logisitics easier."

They would want to know first what our definition of AAD is, and specifically what we want it do be able to do. I.e. Engage this many missiles simultaneous, at this range, going this speed, with the aspect, with this percentage likelihood of sucess, etc. It doesn't matter that there really aren't a lot of options out there, they'd need the list of requirements, then release and SOR and see who can fill it.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

NATO could do all it's members a favour by agreeing on minimum standards for various definitions and equipment requirements perhaps by classes

example:
Close in naval AD weapon Class 1
- Must be able to engage 3 incoming targets in quick succession using it's own guidance out to 4nm.

so when writing a spec you can reference the existing standard, rather than creating a new one everytime.


----------



## Lumber

Colin P said:
			
		

> NATO could do all it's members a favour by agreeing on minimum standards for various definitions and equipment requirements perhaps by classes



I.e. 

Destroyer Requirements:
AAW: Class 1A
ASuW: Class 2
ASW: Class 1
CnC: Class 2L
etc.

I guess the next part would be proving to PWGSC as to WHY we need those classes.


----------



## Baz

Lumber said:
			
		

> It's frustrating but I get what MCG is saying. You can't just go to the government and say "The SM-6 is the best AAD weapon available. The Astair 30 is close, but buying the SM-6 from the US would make logisitics easier."
> 
> They would want to know first what our definition of AAD is, and specifically what we want it do be able to do. I.e. Engage this many missiles simultaneous, at this range, going this speed, with the aspect, with this percentage likelihood of sucess, etc. It doesn't matter that there really aren't a lot of options out there, they'd need the list of requirements, then release and SOR and see who can fill it.



Unfortunately, it's not that simple either.

If it's something the government wants and understands, it can be as simple as a couple of pages.  The C-17 SOR was pretty simple, from what I understand.

If they don't understand it that it can get complex.  The MHP SOR is complex, but still doesn't convey how we intend to use it to support government defence roles (well, it does, but it's so complex it goes back to them not understanding it).

It boils down to what ERC says, procurement should be and is driven by government, to get results they find acceptable.   It doesn't matter what we want or how we think we should get it.  Our job is solely to advise what we think is required to meet the stated defence goals, and the risk associated with employment beyond our capabilities.

The government has also plenty of experience of the military talking out of both sides of it's mouth, empire building, presenting only those facts we think gets us what we want, etc, etc.  Why would they trust us blindly?

Bottom line, there are a lot of people not convinced we need these "toys," and telling them they don't understand isn't going to convince them.  If they are right and buy them anyway, we waste a of of money.  If they are wrong and we don't have them, we have other problems.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> NATO could do all it's members a favour by agreeing on minimum standards for various definitions and equipment requirements ...


There are STANAGs that do this.  However, when it comes time to buy, sometimes they are ignored for convenience (either by the government or by the CAF) or necessity.  If the military believes in the STANAG, it still has to convince government of the requirement.


----------



## Eaglelord17

One thing they also didn't pick up on (fortunately for the RCN) is how we barely have the crews for the 5-7ish (haven't looked up the total numbers, and that doesn't differentiate between those ships that have completed refit and trials) ships that can sail at the moment. It is nice to say we should have 'x' amount of ships of 'x' type, but as our Navy has shown we aren't maintaining the numbers required to sail what few ships we have, we are losing it slowly.


----------



## jollyjacktar

That was exactly a counter point put out by my LCdr in a chat at the office yesterday with respect to things such as the "Mistrals" etc.  We can't even do with what we have to man already, never mind getting new platforms above and beyond what we're already expecting (new AOPS/AOR) etc.


----------



## PuckChaser

Is the manning issue one out of cuts, but can be mitigated by having new ships that can be run with smaller crews due to technology efficiencies?


----------



## Ostrozac

Agreed that the J1 stuff (manning, retention, career paths, pay, allowances) is the elephant in the room that no on in the Navy really wants to talk about, probably because so many of the solutions are held outside the Navy at CMP and Treasury Board. What will the effect on the Navy be of Arctic patrols? If they do go ahead with Coast Guard style crew swaps for the 430 class, as has been hinted at by the CMS, that means in effect two crews per ship, exacerbating manning needs. And the RCN having only the two main bases means a potentially huge vulnerable point should a PLD review ever be especially harsh on Halifax or Esquimalt. The Army can always move some units out of Edmonton if they ever have to in the future -- same thing with the Air Force and Cold Lake -- but moving one of the fleets is pretty much impossible.

Frankly, does the Navy even understand as an institution why it currently has a manning problem? If it doesn't know what the problem is, then finding a solution is going to be difficult.


----------



## Stoker

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Agreed that the J1 stuff (manning, retention, career paths, pay, allowances) is the elephant in the room that no on in the Navy really wants to talk about, probably because so many of the solutions are held outside the Navy at CMP and Treasury Board. What will the effect on the Navy be of Arctic patrols? If they do go ahead with Coast Guard style crew swaps for the 430 class, as has been hinted at by the CMS, that means in effect two crews per ship, exacerbating manning needs. And the RCN having only the two main bases means a potentially huge vulnerable point should a PLD review ever be especially harsh on Halifax or Esquimalt. The Army can always move some units out of Edmonton if they ever have to in the future -- same thing with the Air Force and Cold Lake -- but moving one of the fleets is pretty much impossible.
> 
> Frankly, does the Navy even understand as an institution why it currently has a manning problem? If it doesn't know what the problem is, then finding a solution is going to be difficult.



MCDV's trialed the crew swap in the Arctic a few years ago to see if it would work for AOPS, so I would imagine it is being looked into a possible option. Sending a crew to the Arctic for months on end would be detrimental to manning. Should there be allowance for Arctic operations?


----------



## McG

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> ... the RCN having only the two main bases means a potentially huge vulnerable point should a PLD review ever be especially harsh on Halifax or Esquimalt. The Army can always move some units out of Edmonton if they ever have to in the future -- same thing with the Air Force and Cold Lake -- but moving one of the fleets is pretty much impossible.


Let's not be silly.  Nobody is going to have the option of moving a unit because they think the PLD climate is more favorable to members' pockets at another base.


----------



## Ostrozac

MCG said:
			
		

> Let's not be silly.  Nobody is going to have the option of moving a unit because they think the PLD climate is more favorable to members' pockets at another base.



I respectfully disagree. I have seen some proposals from (what was then) LFWA HQ that talk about exactly that, as a proposed long-term solution should Edmonton continue to be an endless pit of attrition. "Rebalancing the brigade's units" I think was the term used. Strictly in the good idea fairy world right now, but if the troops continue to vote with their feet, who knows?


----------



## PuckChaser

Chief Stoker said:
			
		

> MCDV's trialed the crew swap in the Arctic a few years ago to see if it would work for AOPS, so I would imagine it is being looked into a possible option. Sending a crew to the Arctic for months on end would be detrimental to manning. Should there be allowance for Arctic operations?


Pretty sure it's called sea pay. Army isn't looking for extra for Op NANOOK.


----------



## McG

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I respectfully disagree. I have seen some proposals from (what was then) LFWA HQ that talk about exactly that, as a proposed long-term solution should Edmonton continue to be an endless pit of attrition. "Rebalancing the brigade's units" I think was the term used. Strictly in the good idea fairy world right now, but if the troops continue to vote with their feet, who knows?


It would be great if we could shut down a base and move for operational reasons.  But, it is political reasons that decide when bases close or stay.  Members don't like the PLD rate?  That will never fly as a case to close a base.  Maybe if the government does not like the cost of PLD it will move pers to lower rate areas, but that is for the federal budget not the members.


----------



## MilEME09

In regards to the manning issue in the navy. Is it just a case of not enough intake as compared to attrition? or is it deeper then that?


----------



## FSTO

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In regards to the manning issue in the navy. Is it just a case of not enough intake as compared to attrition? or is it deeper then that?



I don't know about the rest of the nation, but here in Saskatchewan, CFRG is broken. We have lots of interest but the recruiting bottleneck has turned off a majority of the candidates.
For a generation used to instant responses, the archaic way we get people into the pipeline is a self-fufilling prophecy on why our numbers are going down.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Meanwhile what has happened to the crews of the Protecteur-class and the destroyers--and the frigates that are refitting?  Any surplus numbers there?  RCN’s REGULUS program surely not a full solution:



> It’s said that a ship is only as strong as its crew: skills, experience and proficiency are critical for all ranks and sea trades and for the operational excellence of a navy as a whole. When the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was anticipating limited at-sea experience for some sailors as the Halifax-class Modernization (HCM) program was kicking into gear, they looked to the REGULUS program.
> 
> “REGULUS is about getting young men and women of the RCN to sea during a period of reduced sailing opportunities,” said Lieutenant (Navy) Arthur Halpenny, REGULUS Personnel Coordinator. Through personnel exchanges with friendly navies around the world, Canadian sailors hone their skills and gain valuable international experience while working on board foreign vessels, strengthening the RCN’s core competencies.
> 
> Since the REGULUS’ inception in 2010, more than 150 RCN personnel have been sent abroad to countries such as the United States, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Chile. “The exchanges are mutually beneficial. If possible, we’ll place our sailors in billets that the partner navy may have trouble filling. Partner navies, in turn, often seek RCN training once they witness the talent and professionalism of our sailors.”..
> http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=regulus-program-keeps-sailors-skills-sharp/i3yaqqud



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MilEME09

FSTO said:
			
		

> I don't know about the rest of the nation, but here in Saskatchewan, CFRG is broken. We have lots of interest but the recruiting bottleneck has turned off a majority of the candidates.
> For a generation used to instant responses, the archaic way we get people into the pipeline is a self-fufilling prophecy on why our numbers are going down.



CFRG is broken nation wide, last time i talked with people in the know we were looking at averages of over 10 months to get people in the door. If i told you I had will hire you in 10 months you would go somewhere else for work. In the case of officers they will pick a university before RMC can even get back to them. Thats a different debate though for a different thread.


----------



## PuckChaser

CFRG needs a ground up rebuild of processes and personnel redistribution. Anything else is a bandaid in a dam. When I joined the PRes in 2002, I started the process mid-April and was sworn in Mid-June. That's just how long it takes to get paperwork acknowledged now. Unacceptable.


----------



## MilEME09

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> CFRG needs a ground up rebuild of processes and personnel redistribution. Anything else is a bandaid in a dam. When I joined the PRes in 2002, I started the process mid-April and was sworn in Mid-June. That's just how long it takes to get paperwork acknowledged now. Unacceptable.



better then mine, I started the processes beginning of February 2009, sworn in end of September.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Two weeks from when I applied to when I had my date for Cornwallis.


----------



## PuckChaser

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Two weeks from when I applied to when I had my date for Cornwallis.


Which goes back to the RCN manning issue, CFRG can't fill courses because it takes a year to get in the door. Technical trades are drowning because of their inability to make those timings.


----------



## Eaglelord17

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In regards to the manning issue in the navy. Is it just a case of not enough intake as compared to attrition? or is it deeper then that?



It is much deeper than a simple intake to attrition issue. That is part of the problem (if I recall correctly the intake for last year was half of what the releases were and apparently that was a banner year for recruiting), but the length of time to train people to a actual useful point is another issue. Since so many people have left the trade and the length of time required to retrain people to the standard lost, it is increasing the workload significantly for those that stay, and they get burned out from being asked to do more for less reward. There is a reason people have been leaving steady for years at this point, and I have never heard of anyone getting back in the trade or regretting leaving. 

Certain trades have excellent civilian qualifications (For example, if you complete your 5s as a Stoker and you can challenge your millwright ticket) and when you can get paid more, and deal with less BS, on top of doing the job you signed up for, its a no brainer for most people.



			
				MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> Meanwhile what has happened to the crews of the Protecteur-class and the destroyers--and the frigates that are refitting?  Any surplus numbers there?  RCN’s REGULUS program surely not a full solution:
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa



For the trades that are needed there are no surplus numbers. Some trades are so far in the red, if the release trend was to stop immediately for some reason, it would take 50 years to recover (about as long as we have been unified as the CAF). The other issue is even when you put those crews from those ships on to a frigate for certain trades your training is ship specific, so you need to retrain those seamen on the new ships.


----------



## PuckChaser

Is there restricted release for stokers for a period of time after they get qualified? Should be a little bit in there if we're losing experience right away.


----------



## Pat in Halifax

No there isn't unless your are NCM STEP or METTP. It is slowly killing the Navy's ability to maintain ships. Yes, FMF and contractors exist (and a version of ISSC is coming with future fleet) but you can only spread these work crews so thin before they become ineffectual. And keep in mind that FMF (like the CF) is a cross section of society meaning about 10-12% of your workforce is not really 'into it' combined with the 15-18% who are unavailable for various reasons at various times. Just to put things into perspective,  a recent engine change out in theatre on a deployed frigate (This engine came with an ISSC by the way) involved over 50 military and civilian DND staff as well as a good portion of ship's technicians and support personnel(on top of contractors) JUST to do the engine swap. All this with an in service support contract on said engine. Don't get me wrong, it was a challenge that was successfully completed and is well documented in an issue of the Maritime Engineering Journal but that is a huge chunk of our workforce ...for one ship...for one component...
Unfortunately as eluded to here somewhere, our technicians don't really do what we spend years training them to do. Only about 20% of a technician's work on a given day (and YES that is supported with data as some still serving can attest to and if not, PM me and I will tell you who to contact to get this info-It IS on the DIN) is spent 'turning wrenches'...getting their hands dirty...call it what you want. These trades (Mar Eng, ETech, HTech, Bosn, WEng and to a degree LOG), have one job and one job only when the ship is alongside and that is to conduct PM and CM OR to support the conduct of PM and CM in preparation for being deployed. I liken this to you taking your car in for service and for every hour billed, the mechanic spends only 12-15 minutes under your hood. The rest of the time he is painting the shop, sweeping the floor, helping out at the front desk, helping out a garage down the road who is short handed....I think you see where this is going. How long do you think this 'business' would stay afloat? We need some MAJOR culture change in my beloved Navy and until that happens, we will continue to sink to lower and lower readiness levels.
I don't know what the answer is but I am fearful that that Navy's proficiency and reliability and hence ability to complete it's mandate is in serious trouble and I dare say that there very well (and very likely) WILL be a incident of sorts in the coming months which will make this clear. I just hope it does not involve personal injury of any kind. 

Plane and simple, someone senior somewhere needs to say "No" to someone more senior somewhere else.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Training is also an issue.   The various schools can only handle so many students at a time and some of the technician courses are lengthy.   My trades 5A is around 18 months, more or less with a loading of 8.  It is challenging to get everyone through in a timely fashion.  Now to add a few thumbscrews to the mix they're planning to merge in the not too far distant future all three marine engineering trades similarly to what CSE experienced recently.


----------



## Pat in Halifax

I still haven't fully grasped the long term benefits of amalgamation except as a management tool. We will lose specialization in the end I believe and yes I have been part of the discussions the past year so am in a position to make that statement. Could one person theoretically isolate power to a piece of kit, do some hot work and then replace and test? Yes but is that really what this is all about? They (The big heads in Ottawa) also want to combine all the operator trades too. As I said, things may look good on paper but I look to the Pay and RMS trades who apparently are splitting again. As it is now it is a little much for one person to be a master of his/her  trade-Now they want to increase the knowledge baseline essentially 3-fold (and role in a strategic Reserve trade to boot). For the countless people who have spent time working this and too many sleepless nights planning this, I hope it does work. I know discussions have been had with RNZN, RAN and RN counterparts and many are pointing out problems. Lets make this a "Lesson Learned' and not  'Lesson Missed' exercise.

I am actually surprised that the article in Macleans still has relatively tame comments!


----------



## MilEME09

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Training is also an issue.   The various schools can only handle so many students at a time and some of the technician courses are lengthy.   My trades 5A is around 18 months, more or less with a loading of 8.  It is challenging to get everyone through in a timely fashion.  Now to add a few thumbscrews to the mix they're planning to merge in the not too far distant future all three marine engineering trades similarly to what CSE experienced recently.



Of course with a lack of people in the trade comes lack of instructors to teach, might get enough for one course, you get three times that number release. The cycle then continues, in the case of the technical trades in the CAF would we not be able to bring in civilian contractors as instructors? we could run more courses and avoided situations i've heard of, people waiting years on PAT platoon to go on their 3's. I think if we can solve the training back log, perhaps there is hope to keep people in if there is a effort to lessen peoples work load by injecting more people in a timely fashion. Especially for trades were in takes 18 months, we need to get people on course as quickly as possible once they are in the system.


----------



## George Wallace

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Of course with a lack of people in the trade comes lack of instructors to teach, might get enough for one course, you get three times that number release. The cycle then continues, in the case of the technical trades in the CAF would we not be able to bring in civilian contractors as instructors? we could run more courses and avoided situations i've heard of, people waiting years on PAT platoon to go on their 3's. I think if we can solve the training back log, perhaps there is hope to keep people in if there is a effort to lessen peoples work load by injecting more people in a timely fashion. Especially for trades were in takes 18 months, we need to get people on course as quickly as possible once they are in the system.



Using civilian MSE OPs to teach Air Brake Crses have been done for years in Pet.  Using Contractors to run ranges and Sims has been done for years.   This is nothing new for the CAF.  I am sure it can be expanded upon, given the knowledge and skills held by recently retired CAF members who could be attracted to come back as contractors.


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## jollyjacktar

Pat in Halifax said:
			
		

> I still haven't fully grasped the long term benefits of amalgamation except as a management tool. We will lose specialization in the end I believe and yes I have been part of the discussions the past year so am in a position to make that statement. Could one person theoretically isolate power to a piece of kit, do some hot work and then replace and test? Yes but is that really what this is all about? They (The big heads in Ottawa) also want to combine all the operator trades too. As I said, things may look good on paper but I look to the Pay and RMS trades who apparently are splitting again. As it is now it is a little much for one person to be a master of his/her  trade-Now they want to increase the knowledge baseline essentially 3-fold (and role in a strategic Reserve trade to boot). For the countless people who have spent time working this and too many sleepless nights planning this, I hope it does work. I know discussions have been had with RNZN, RAN and RN counterparts and many are pointing out problems. Lets make this a "Lesson Learned' and not  'Lesson Missed' exercise.
> 
> I am actually surprised that the article in Macleans still has relatively tame comments!



I don't honestly know of anyone (who is not being PC as situation demands), including myself, who actually believes this is a good idea and will not turning to a trainwreck.  I may be wrong, but IIRC the RN and RAN attempted this some years ago and have since abandoned the lunacy as it turned into a shit show.  My time left is limited and therefore I don't expect I will see much of what is to come but it will be painful for all involved I fear.  Maybe this Frankenstein's monster creation will live and breathe but I wouldn't be surprised to see the Peasantry out with pitchforks and torches one day.


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## Pat in Halifax

Why pay a 'recently retired CAF member' when a 'billet' exists for a uniformed person to teach (even if the billet is never full). It is indeed a snowball effect and no one wants to say "No Sir, (or Mr Minister), we CANNOT do that at this time."

Oh and the Navy DOES employ civilian instructors. Unfortunately when training involves specific pieces of equipment, the MS or PO2 posted straight off the ship is worth his/her weight in gold to ensure training is up to date and relevant. As well, the shore positions are required to maintain the sea-shore ratio so after that MS does a 4 year tour on a ship, he/she can 'relax' on their 'shore' posting. Unfortunately (again), we are so short that shore postings see some doing MORE sea time than those actually posted to ships!!! I know of at least 2 stokers who took inland postings because they needed that emotional break away from ships. We are eating our own...and at an alarming rate!


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## George Wallace

Pat in Halifax said:
			
		

> Why pay a 'recently retired CAF member' when a 'billet' exists for a uniformed person to teach (even if the billet is never full). It is indeed a snowball effect and no one wants to say "No Sir, (or Mr Minister), we CANNOT do that at this time."
> 
> Oh and the Navy DOES employ civilian instructors. Unfortunately when training involves specific pieces of equipment, the MS or PO2 posted straight off the ship is worth his/her weight in gold to ensure training is up to date and relevant. As well, the shore positions are required to maintain the sea-shore ratio so after that MS does a 4 year tour on a ship, he/she can 'relax' on their 'shore' posting. Unfortunately (again), we are so short that shore postings see some doing MORE sea time than those actually posted to ships!!! I know of at least 2 stokers who took inland postings because they needed that emotional break away from ships. We are eating our own...and at an alarming rate!



My answer was to the statement that there was a "shortage of serving pers to instruct", due to the amount of releases affecting manning slates.  The use of civilians across the CAF has been a practice that has been going on for quite some years, and as you state not always possible due to specialized equipment and/or clearances required in certain areas.


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