# Unification is a child of the 1960s, so who is looking backward?



## old medic (9 May 2010)

Globe and Mail Opinion 
By C.P. Champion  
06 May 2010
What’s in a name? Not the navy’s rightful title 

Clinging to the adolescent anti-imperial nomenclature of the 1960s is the real backward option

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/whats-in-a-name-not-the-navys-rightful-title/article1558116/

Diehard adherents of the status quo claim that giving Canadian Forces Maritime Command back its rightful title – the Royal Canadian Navy – would be a step backward.

Those who oppose the traditional name venerate armed forces unification as the source of all that is best and “Canadian” about our military. But unification is a child of the 1960s, so who is looking backward?

In fact, Canadianization was happening long before unification. The RCN was christening vessels in honour of Canadian rivers, towns and native peoples in the 1940s. In 1959, several years before unification, the RCN decided to give submarines “Eskimo names which are readily pronounceable.”

Almost everyone agrees that Canada’s sea, land, and air commands should continue to be integrated. Indeed, most people agreed on that in the 1960s; the Diefenbaker government had already begun integration when the Liberals returned to power. But unification was about something else: merging three proud and historically distinct services (the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) into what proponents called “one mobile national task force.”

Whatever the operational merits, it was a disaster for morale. All personnel were required to wear the same neutral dark-green uniform – which remains, today, the uniform of the Land Force (the official name of the army). Unification was a deliberate attempt to purge the identity of the three services. It was only partially successful, thanks to regimental associations and veterans who stepped up to fund traditional activities from their own pockets.

Unification was a buzzword of the 1960s. It was sold to Parliament as the way to a utopian future. “A single, distinctively Canadian uniform is designed to meet the problems of a modern world – a scientific world which is growing away beyond the barriers of the past at a speed that cannot stand the slow pace of yesterday,” said Jean-Victor Allard, the general who became the unified service’s first chief of defence staff.

“Unification is on its way because it makes sense to the new generation, in or out of uniform, on the grounds of economy and efficiency in 1966 and the age of science,” said the CBC’s Ron Collister. John Matheson, a Liberal MP speaking for the government, said unification was among “the recommendations of some of the most prophetic and knowledgeable people in the military field known to our times.”

Paul Hellyer, the minister responsible, said in 1966: “We are becoming leaders in defence organization thinking, not just followers. It is something an independent Canada can do which other countries with more powerful vested interests and more powerful lobbies could not do.”

But no other country followed Canada’s “lead” by abolishing distinct navy and air force identities. They knew better.

Some of Mr. Hellyer’s legacy has come unravelled over the years. It took until 1985 to roll back the green uniform, when defence minister Bob Coates partially restored the traditional uniforms. But even that job is only half complete – many proud distinctions continue to be discouraged by an older generation fighting imaginary anti-colonial battles.

This is a generation wedded to 1960s concepts, harbouring a warmed-over anti-imperialism from decades ago. Integration was sound, but integration and unification were apples and oranges.

Lester Pearson’s government confused matters from the beginning. “We have had no definition of what the minister means when he uses the terms ‘integration’ and ‘unification,’ ” NDP House leader H.W. Herridge said in 1966. “I am not interested in semantics,” Mr. Matheson snapped. Another government spokesman, John Reid, said: “Unification or integration – call it what you will.” Apparently, the difference did not matter because the government had decided to proceed regardless.

Those fights are over. Giving Maritime Command its proper name would undo neither integration nor what’s left of unification. As historian Michael Hadley has written, “We have come a long way since then.” But clinging to the icons of the 1960s, which represent an adolescent anti-British nationalism, would be silly indeed.

C.P. Champion is the author of The Strange Demise of British Canada, to be published next month.


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## Kat Stevens (9 May 2010)

Too bad it's not up to the Canadian government to restore the Royal name.  It is an honorific bestowed by the sovereign.  It was discarded by Canada.  HRM may be disinclined to give it back.


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## ModlrMike (9 May 2010)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Too bad it's not up to the Canadian government to restore the Royal name.  It is an honorific bestowed by the sovereign.  It was discarded by Canada.  HRM may be disinclined to give it back.



Maybe so, but now would be the right time to ask.


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## pbi (9 May 2010)

Unification was a terrible mistake, foisted off on the country by dressing up penny-pinching in buzzwords. It subscribed to the worst of the 1950's "efficiency" thinking, as well as swallowing whole some of the snake-oil McNamara and his "whizz kids" were peddling to the US.  It should have gone on the same junkpile as the "pentomic" division and the Davy Crockett nuclear mortar. What we badly needed was  jointness: what we got was an aimless mess, with the same number of rats fighting over an even smaller cheese. The people who perpetrated Unification had very little understanding of the nature of a professional military force, or of  the realities of operations. (or, if they did, they were only too willing to ignore it and jump on the bandwagon.)  The damage done by Unification was pervasive and insidious, and IMHO has only really begun to recede in the last decade. The fact that no other significant military in the world followed our example should say something.

Cheers


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## Dennis Ruhl (9 May 2010)

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> Too bad it's not up to the Canadian government to restore the Royal name.  It is an honorific bestowed by the sovereign.  It was discarded by Canada.  HRM may be disinclined to give it back.



Should the Queen refuse a request from her Prime Minister we would have what is known as a constitutional crisis.  Her Majesty does not like constitutional crises. 

Other countries, the US included, have essentially integrated their armed forces without destroying anyone's identity.  They simply use common kit and use common procedures so they can work together more or less seamlessly.  Hellyer was right about the stupidity of having to redo basic training when switching forces but it really had nothing to do with the names Canadian Army, RCN, and RCAF.

As everyone tells me and I tell them, names are just names.  Calling the airforce the RCAF won't mean losing aircraft and calling the navy the RCN won't actually lead to less ships.  However it is a nice straw man argument.


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## Kat Stevens (9 May 2010)

Hardly a constitutional crisis, the honour was bestowed once and discarded.  Do you usually give the same gift twice after the first one was pissed on?  I don't.


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## Edward Campbell (9 May 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> Unification was a terrible mistake, foisted off on the country by dressing up penny-pinching in buzzwords. It subscribed to the worst of the 1950's "efficiency" thinking, as well as swallowing whole some of the snake-oil McNamara and his "whizz kids" were peddling to the US.  What we needed was  jointness: what we got was an aimless mess, with the same number of rats fighting over an even smaller cheese. The damage done by Unification was pervasive and insidious, and IMHO has only begun to recede in the last decade. The fact that no other significant military in the world followed our example should say something.
> 
> Cheers



Further to that:

•	We, DND and the CF (RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF as they were then), were just beginning to come to grips with the huge impact of runaway inflation on defence specific material – something which continues to be a serious problem in 2010. That’s the primary reason Diefenbaker killed the CF-105 _Avro Arrow_ – continuing the programme would have _eaten_ too much of the defence budget, effectively killing plans to modernize the army and most of the RCAF. It is also the primary reason Pearson told Hellyer to seek drastic means to make DND do more with less;

•	Hellyer (and Group Captain Bill Lee his principle aide and PR _guru_) got sidetracked and appear to have come back from a major US tour/briefing with _unification_ (which, in the US, gives you *joint* forces) and _integration_ (which, in the US parlance, meant _purple suiting_) all back-asswards. The Americans said: “Unification is good; integration is bad.”  So Hellyer and Lee returned and _integrated_ the CF but called it _unification_;

•	Careers were made and destroyed by supporting or opposing Hellyer and, through him, Mike Pearson and the Liberal political machine that had, deep, deep _hooks_ into the political _centre_ in Ottawa (Privy Council Office, Finance, Treasury and, in those days, Foreign Affairs);

•	Trudeau came along and took the focus off “misorganization” by making deep, drastic even _deadly_ cuts in the combat strength of the CF;

•	Mulroney promised a lot and delivered next to nothing;

•	Chrétien cut more and more and more;

•	It is only under Martin and Harper that the DND/CF leadership and senior management have been able to consider organization.


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## Old Sweat (9 May 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> Unification was a terrible mistake, foisted off on the country by dressing up penny-pinching in buzzwords. It subscribed to the worst of the 1950's "efficiency" thinking, as well as swallowing whole some of the snake-oil McNamara and his "whizz kids" were peddling to the US.  What we needed was  jointness: what we got was an aimless mess, with the same number of rats fighting over an even smaller cheese. The damage done by Unification was pervasive and insidious, and IMHO has only begun to recede in the last decade. The fact that no other significant military in the world followed our example should say something.
> 
> Cheers


As one who lived through it, and its dreary decades of aftermath, you have understated the case. No one would have seriously opposed integration of the command structure and the logistics and administrative organizations. In fact we had already amalgamated the medical system, and the postal and dental services were provided by the army for all three services. What we got was a lowest common denominator driven organization which seemed quite incapable of rational decision making. Mind you, the MND may not have had too firm a grip on the reins; check his current firm belief in UFOs and Alien visitations. Back then he had hitched his wagon to the equally dubious science of management as the cure for all that ailed the modern military.


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## jollyjacktar (9 May 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> •	Hellyer (and Group Captain Bill Lee his principle aide and PR _guru_) got sidetracked and appear to have come back from a major US tour/briefing with _unification_ (which, in the US, gives you *joint* forces) and _integration_ (which, in the US parlance, meant _purple suiting_) all back-asswards. The Americans said: “Unification is good; integration is bad.”  So Hellyer and Lee returned and _integrated_ the CF but called it _unification_;


And this came from a man who believes Aliens have come here and gave us their technology from crashed UFO's and that Stephen Hawking is full of BS.  A nutcase now and then IMHO.  Indeed, the world did not copy our institutional suicide.  My Dad always agreed with Old Sweat, in that at NDHQ level it made sense but not to go whole hog.


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## pbi (9 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Hellyer was right about the stupidity of having to redo basic training when switching forces but it really had nothing to do with the names Canadian Army, RCN, and RCAF.




And herein lay one of the many poison pills of Unification, dressed up with a shiny coat of "rationalism".  By going to a single basic training system, based on a spurious argument of "efficiency" (so often the enemy of "effectiveness") we were hellbound for the lowest common denominator, which we got. 

One of the most laughable (and ill-informed) arguments advanced by the defenders of Unification is that is was based on the USMC.  Not quite. Rather, I would say, it was based on a very superficial impression of how the Marine system works. It utterly ignored the history of the evolution of the Marine Corps, or its overwhelming combat-driven ethos of "Every Marine a rifleman". The Marines were not an artificial combination of three services smashed together  in a hurry for financial and political expediency: they evolved over two centuries from companies of shipboard soldiers: they were always, always, an Infantry-centric force. The other branches of the Marines evolved naturally over  time to meet the needs of the Corps: thus they sprang from the same ethos, heritage and sense of identity. If you ask a Marine fighter pilot or AH pilot or tanker or logistician, they will all tell you that their job is the direct support of that Marine out at the sharp end. Unification tried to sell the idea that this was its end product: anybody who has served over the last three decades (a few of us on these boards) can attest that this was absolute BS.

Our system, because it was based in ignorance, misunderstanding and ulterior motives, actually produced the opposite: a military whose support personnel were trained and socialized as technicians first and soldiers, sailors or airmen second. The fact that so many support people adapted as well as they did to the demands of going from an airbase to an infantry battalion is a credit to them personally, not the flawed system. A system for training recruits, officer candidates and support personnel that did not answer to any of the primary force generators or any operational commander: a body without a head. And, despite the glitz and "tri-service" rhetoric, a military that was arguably far less capable of true joint operations that it had been during WWII.  We're still not there, although we've made some progress.

Unification should be recognized for what it was: failed experiment that, in good Canadian form, was "made to work". As we now officially use the terms Army, Navy and Airforce on a regular basis, and our recent wartime experiences have reminded us that everyone who serves in the Army must be a soldier first and a support person second, it's time we enacted the legislation to sweep away the remaining vestiges of this mess, and turn instead to a joint force model such as we see in the US or UK.

Cheers


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## Old Sweat (9 May 2010)

PBI

You are ruining my afternoon by causing flashbacks. The training system was based on cutting non-required training as an economy measure disguised as rationalization. Thus, for the first few years there was no, repeat no weapons training taught in the recruit schools. Basic training was no more than six or seven weeks long, and it took the FLQ crisis to get training on the C1 rifle into the course. Treatment of battle casualties was dropped and replaced by the St John's Ambulance First Aid package as industrial accidents were more likely that wounds in combat. And on and on it went. The number of trades were chopped and chopped because the Minister had stated the various three service trades could be reduced to 100. The army  - oops, excuse me, the land element - was directed to stop training two up (an operational requirement) because it was CF policy to train only for the next job. The artillery very nearly lost our Instructor in Gunnery and Assistant Instructor in Gunnery course because the air element commander of Training Command could not or would not accept that there was any difference between training officers and NCMs in one of the combat arms and teaching pipeline pilots to fly. He also suggested within my hearing that in his opinion the army had too many different weapons and this complicated training, as well as making it too long.

In the initial months of attempts to integrate the logistics world, a senior air element officer said that in his opinion there was no need for service battalions, as base technical services could do it better from fixed locations. This included, from his point of view, 4 CMBG in the event of war.

The ignorance level (or complicity for career purposes) of *some* officers of all three former services was appaling. These people went blissfully on, ruining what had been three extremely effective little fighting forces with real operational focus.

At least you were expected/allowed to drink in those days. I sometimes wish I would wake up back in my bed in the Brownfield Barracks Officers Quarters in Camp Gagetown in 1963 and realize it all has been a terrible nightmare caused by combining raw oysters and Moosehead Beer at Happy Hour.


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## pbi (9 May 2010)

Old Sweat: these days, I find getting drunk makes things worse, not better.

What's really amazing is how shamelessly the defenders of this misbegotten system could trot out their silly, superficial arguments, as though their listeners were idiots.  Many that I have heard over the years, ad nauseam, have reflected a mentality similar to the air force flag officer who made the silly comment about service battalions.

At least we have evolved a good deal: the distinct uniforms, the return  of Garrisons and Wings instead of the amorphous "CFB", and the ability to actually use the words "Army", "Navy" or "Air Force" in official correspondence (I remember quite clearly when we couldn"t...): each perhaps a small thing in itself, but cumulative.

The whole thing reflected a very 1950's "efficiency expert" utilitarianism that didn't really understand the human side of  a military force. Basic training, for example, is only partly about teaching physical skills or technical knowledge. More importantly, it's about taking somebody who thinks  " I am a civilian"  and shaping them into somebody who believes " I am a soldier/sailor/airman". Thus the argument about going to a single basic training might make eminent sense from a utilitarian, rationalist, process-oriented point of view, while from the "stewardship of the profession" point of view it was little short of corrosive.

I hope I live to see the back of it.

Cheers


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## Old Sweat (9 May 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> Old Sweat: these days, I find getting drunk makes things worse, not better.
> 
> What's really amazing is how shamelessly the defenders of this misbegotten system could trot out their silly, superficial arguments, as though their listeners were idiots.  Many that I have heard over the years, ad nauseam, have reflected a mentality similar to the air force flag officer who made the silly comment about service battalions.
> 
> ...



As do I.

For all its faults, if it had delivered the expected efficiencies I would have embraced it wholeheartedly. Instead, it was a miserable failure, like Custer's double envelopment at the Little Big Horn. It delivered none of its promises except savings to the Treasury, while almost destroying the profession I love. Fortunately through it all, things like officers going to the back of the meal line survived! I shudder at the concept of officers eating first because they are most important, and thus it is essential to keep them well nourished. (One of the little green people who ravished us would have applauded that bit of preverted logic.)

Sorry for the hijack. Bring back the service titles.


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## rifleman (9 May 2010)

I'd prefer to see some of the issues raised fixed than waste anymore time and energy on changing names and looking different. 

 :2c:


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## Edward Campbell (9 May 2010)

The big issues were _cultural_, as alluded to by Old Sweat and pbi.

There were, and still are, all manner of _efficiencies_ that could, still can, be achieved by some organizational and management changes but the _integrators_ went much, much father - they attacked and damaged the very _fibre_ of naval and military service. _Operations_ and operational requirements and the military operational _ethos_ were forced into last place, behind a plethora of _flavour of the month_ management techniques and organizational experiments.

_Parts_ of the three services managed to retain their own operational ethos - pilots remained pilots, with all that entails, etc - but out support services suffered, and continue to suffer, mightily. And to the degree that their performance was degraded then our overall _operational_ capability was reduced concomitantly.


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## a_majoor (9 May 2010)

Frankly, the CF is still a lab full of ill concieved experiments, from external forces like reporting to Parliament on how well we are recruiting people of different ethic backgrounds or SHARP training to internal initiatives like "Transformation" which has given us a new layer of .com headquarters without managing to streamline or eliminate any of the existing layers of headquarters....

If we want _efficiency_ we need to bulldoze the existing structures of headquarters etc. and replace it with a flat management structure like WalMart (along with their internal logistic and HR tools) , but as noted the "culture" of WalMart would be quite alien to a military force. ("peacekeeping associates to the Congo please"). 

I'm not sure how this sort of structure could be grown organically from the existing "sharp end" as opposed to being imposed from above, but it seems to me the Marines had it right. Maybe the influx of Afghan veterans moving into the various staffs as their careers progress will have a positive effect.


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## rifleman (10 May 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> If we want _efficiency_ we need to bulldoze the existing structures of headquarters etc. and replace it with a flat management structure like WalMart (along with their internal logistic and HR tools) , but as noted the "culture" of WalMart would be quite alien to a military force. ("peacekeeping associates to the Congo please").


 Unfortunately that would only cause another "Greeter HQ" and all the advisors required resulting in one more task for units to accomplish ;D


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## Edward Campbell (10 May 2010)

One, *but only one* of the problems that faces the CF today, but which has its roots in the 1950s and ‘60s – the times of Paul T Hellyer –is the relationship of the soldier to society. What can and should each expect of the other?

In the late 1950s the noted political scientist Samuel P Huntington fuelled the current debate with his seminal work, _The Soldier and the State_. Huntington argued for “objective” civilian control of the military which was made possible by a highly professional military; essentially, the more professional the military the _easier_ it is to control “objectively.” Huntington noted that *Western* militaries, on the one hand, and *Western* states and societies, on the other, diverge in their _cultures_. Societies (and states) were and remain essentially _liberal_ – focused on the rights and productivity of individuals, while militaries are, perhaps increasingly, _conservative_ – concerned with the _collective_. There was, and still is, a *culture war* between soldiers and the societies they serve. Huntington reckoned it (the clash of cultures) was harmless, perhaps even healthy and, given highly professional militaries and “objective” bureaucracies and governments/political institutions, easily managed. 

(Please not that there is *no* correlation between liberal <-> conservative and political left <-> political right; liberal ≠ left and conservative ≠ right. There are many, many people, especially in the USA, who believe liberal = left etc but they, despite their PhDs and positions at the top of the media and _blogosphere_, are wrong, very wrong. )

Hellyer and his _integration/unification_ project were, relatively, unconcerned with the *culture wars* but, in that, they were offside because society, at large, and Pierre Trudeau, in particular, were deeply invested in the issue. Trudeau replaced "objective" management with a highly "subjective" variant and management of defence was amongst the files most subjectively _managed_ during his tenure.  

DND and the CF was seen by _social activists_ as a vital tool in “moving” government – the rationale was, “If the CF are on board then no one else will have an excuse not to cooperate.” Some _activists_ were, but should not have been, surprised by the relative ‘enthusiasm’ with which the CF embraced social change  – be it official languages, gender equality or gay rights. In fact the highly professional CF took, and still takes, great pride in being subservient to the civil power, to political control. If the government of the day says, “get on with it,” then the CF does just that, with vigor.

Some social change was necessary and desirable – for the whole country, including the CF.

But some changes, particularly in _attitudes_ or the _military culture_ were made _”en passant”_, almost without any rationale simply because they could be made and because they seemed to make the military more reflective of the society it serves – even though no one has ever established that “reflecting society” is desirable or even necessary.

It appears to me that most social scientists (I hate that term) agree that most attitudinal and cultural issues can be measured on the famous bell curve.







_Most_ Canadians and most Canadian socio-cultural values and attitudes are, probably, distributed pretty much as predicted under that curve. But it is not clear that good, much less the best, soldiers are found at or near the middle of the curve. Some observers have suggested, over the years, that _most_ of the career, professional CF come from under the “shoulders” of the bell curve – not from the extreme ends but not from the middle, either. If that is the case, and my *personal observations* over about a half century (some of it spent ‘observing’ from retirement) suggest that it is, then some (many? most?) of the socio-cultural changes imposed on the CF since, say, 1965, have had deleterious effects and may need to be reconsidered.

Thus, in my opinion, Paul Hellyer and his _integration/unification_ exercise, which did considerable damage to our national defence capabilities, is not the only, perhaps not even the main _bête noir_; the _integration/unification_ exercise was coincidental with an era of social change and made it easier for _activists_ to impose ‘foreign,’ liberal-individualistic, socio-cultural values on a previously healthily _conservative_ military society. Some of the problem to which Old Sweat and pbi refer were not caused by Mr. Hellyer’s policy vandalism, but they were made easier by the C2 chaos that Helllyer and his minions and supporters created.

The ‘solution,’ such as there might be one, rests, I believe, on something that has been missing from Canadian politics and society for about 45 years: *respect* for the military.

Respect does not equal affection, yellow ribbons or red T-shirts. Respect is rooted in an understanding of *why* we need and have a military and *why* it needs to have its own norms and standards. I think Canadians began to lose ‘contact’ with the _whys and wherefores_ of the military in 1960 – ten years after Korea and 15 years after the 2nd World War – when the nihilistic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) became popular (see e.g. SLBMs and Robert McNamara, again, which/who made MAD possible and popular) replaced the popularly comprehensible _trip wire_ and _massive retaliation_ strategies. Nuclear fear replaced an understanding of what the Canadian and allied military forces were doing and why they were doing it. The fear made people ignore, even denigrate their own military forces – “we” became part of the problem, not part of the solution. Of course popular _reaction_ to Viet Nam and Trudeau’s anti-nationalist leadership made matters worse and worse.

Two more cents …


Edit: typo


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## TangoTwoBravo (10 May 2010)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> If we want _efficiency_ we need to bulldoze the existing structures of headquarters etc. and replace it with a flat management structure like WalMart (along with their internal logistic and HR tools) , but as noted the "culture" of WalMart would be quite alien to a military force. ("peacekeeping associates to the Congo please").



This is the kind of thinking that got us into the mess of unification in the first place.  What works for WalMart may well not be appropriate for the military.


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## ArmyRick (10 May 2010)

Unification seem like a good intention with poor results. The road to hell is paved with good intentions...


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## Old Sweat (10 May 2010)

Unification was rushed into place without a lot of thought. The services were integrated on a national level in 1964 and a year or so later the same was done to the single service commands. Even this second step had difficulties, as the army and navy had geographic commands while the RCAF used functional commands. So, the forces were forced into a functional command structure made up of Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Training and Materiel Commands. It would have been prudent to let this all meld while taking a careful look at the whole thing. Incidentally Mobile Command, which included a fairly hefty air component but not the reserves, was built on the model of a USMC Fleet Marine Force.


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## Tank Troll (11 May 2010)

Paul Hellyer's name is still cursed here at the Halifax Rifles by the Associate members as the placement of the Regiment on the supplementary order of battle was a direct result of his political whim (the regiment had strong Conservative ties) So 44 years latter by standing back up (political or not) we put an other nail in to the unification/transformation coffin.

Another nail is the executive curl that the navy is getting back (as discussed in an other thread) though when the CDS ask to reinstate the pips and crowns he was told to basically pound salt.  ;D


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## ArmyRick (11 May 2010)

Is it confirmed yet that the navy officer ranks are getting their curls back?


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## Old Sweat (11 May 2010)

Tank Troll said:
			
		

> . . . though when the CDS ask to reinstate the pips and crowns he was told to basically pound salt.  ;D



Could you please cite the reliable source for this statement?


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## Nfld Sapper (11 May 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Is it confirmed yet that the navy officer ranks are getting their curls back?



News Room
Navy Executive Curl & Sea Service Insignia Announcements
May 3, 2010

2 May, 2010

Halifax, NS

Please check against delivery 

Thank you Lieutenant Navy Al Blondin 

Rear Admiral Paul Maddison [Commander MARLANT] 

Ladies and gentlemen, 

Good morning. 

I’m always happy to be back in Halifax – where my Nova Scotian lungs can get a good dose of East Coast salt air. 

I’m especially happy because I have some exciting news to share with you. 

To recognise the exceptional contributions of our Navy, we are reinstating the Navy Executive Curl and introducing a Sea Service Insignia. 

Unveiling these here is all the more meaningful today, during the Battle of the Atlantic commemorations. 

Halifax, of course, was at the forefront of Canada’s Second World War effort, with hundreds of thousands of service personnel passing through – bound for Europe or the vast expanse of the Atlantic. 

It was a last look at these shores that served as a fond farewell to so many. 

Today we remember the courage and fortitude of Canadian men and women during those dark years of the Second World War… 

…when they played a crucial role in the Battle of the Atlantic – protecting the vital convoys carrying the life-blood of the Allied war effort in Europe. 

It was during this time that our Navy acquired its sense of purpose – and identity – that have carried into the present day. 

Canadian Naval Centennial 

Ladies and gentlemen, our men and women in uniform sacrifice so much and they deserve our thanks. 

What better time to show our appreciation than during the Navy’s Centennial year? 

This anniversary offers us an excellent opportunity to recognise the vibrant heritage of our Navy, while we help to, as their Centennial motto says, “Commemorate, Celebrate and Commit.” 

Throughout the year, we will see many of the world’s navies come together off our shores. 

There will be port visits on the east and west coasts, and celebrations across the country. 

As we celebrate the Navy’s distinguished past, we recognise the Navy’s continuing commitment to serve Canada and Canadians. 

We need only look to the sailors who supported the RCMP with surveillance patrols, port security and clearance diving, to secure the Vancouver Olympic Games. 

And the men and women of HMCS Halifax and Athabaskan who worked so hard to deliver aid to the victims of the earthquake in Haiti. 

And HMCS Fredericton – now on its way back home – which was engaged in NATO counter-piracy and counter-terrorism operations off the Horn of Africa. 

People from coast to coast to coast have good reason to be proud of how our Navy has flown Canada’s flag around the world. 

Tonne-for-tonne – and sailor-for-sailor – it is among the best in the world. 

The Navy Curl and the Sea Service Insignia 

It is with great pleasure that I share two pieces of exciting news with you today. 

I would like to give credit to my clleague, Mr. Guy Lauzon, MP for Stormont-Dundas-South Glengarry, who in 2009 introduced a Private Member’s Motion in the House of Commons to reinstate the Navy Executive Curl. 

This motion received unanimous support from the House, and today I am pleased to see the reinstatement of the Navy Executive Curl move forward. 

The Executive Curl is a ring above a naval officer’s gold lace or braid insignia. 

It has a proud history, and is thought to date back to the Crimean War in the mid-1800s… 

It is an important link to our Navy’s past… 

It was part of a Canadian naval officer’s uniform from the official founding of the Royal Canadian Navy in 1910, right up until the unification of Canada’s armed forces in 1968. 

Up until today, it remained only as a part of the naval officer mess dress. 

That is about to change. 

By June of this year we can look forward to seeing the Executive Curl at the West Coast International Fleet Review. 

The Curl will play an important role in reinforcing identity and cohesion within the Navy… 

…distinguishing the more than 5,000 naval officers in the regular and reserve forces. 

Because it’s important to recognise the exceptional work our sailors do on our behalf. 

This brings me to my second piece of news: the introduction of a Sea Service Insignia to recognise the uniqueness of maritime service. 

All CF personnel are potentially eligible for this Insignia because, as an integrated military, our Navy, Army and Air Force work together to accomplish our missions. 

Our sailors – and soldiers and air personnel – who sail on HMC Ships, are separated from their loved ones for long periods of time as soon as they leave port. 

Unfortunately, often they do not qualify for length-of-service decorations that do not take into consideration time spent getting from Canada to their destination. 

That’s not good enough. 

The Sea Service Insignia is Canada’s way of saying “thank you” to all members of the Canadian Forces who have spent at least 365 days at sea… 

…a year away from home. 

It is a visible and formal recognition of the key role that naval operations play in Canadian security at home and abroad. 

Whether participating in search and rescue operations… 

…protecting Canada’s ocean approaches… 

…conducting Arctic sovereignty exercises, or… 

…patrolling the world’s oceans to keep them safe for all to use. 

Ladies and gentlemen, our Navy’s dedication and maritime contributions to international security are well recognised on the world stage… 

…as much for its labours in peace as those in war. 

Conclusion 

And people are the heart of our Navy’s success – sailors with the support of their families. 

In March’s Speech from the Throne, this Government reiterated our continued pledge to stand up for the Canadian Forces. 

And today’s announcements follow on that pledge. 

The Navy Executive Curl and the Sea Service Insignia are much deserved recognition for the men and women who are out there in harm’s way for us every day. 

The men and women who will proudly carry our Navy into its next glorious century. 

Thank you.


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## Edward Campbell (11 May 2010)

Tank Troll said:
			
		

> Paul Hellyer's name is still cursed here at the Halifax Rifles by the Associate members as the placement of the Regiment on the supplementary order of battle was a direct result of his political whim (the regiment had strong Conservative ties) So 44 years latter by standing back up (political or not) we put an other nail in to the unification/transformation coffin.
> 
> Another nail is the executive curl that the navy is getting back (as discussed in an other thread) though when the CDS ask to reinstate the pips and crowns he was told to basically pound salt.  ;D




*Buttons and bows!* I used to use a picture of Sir Frederick Middleton as my avatar here because, in part, that doughty old soldier captured one of the great failings in the Canadian militia. They were, he suggested _circa_ 1885, too concerned with "full dress and feathers" and not enough concerned with the hard business of soldiering.

While I think the current rank system is a fair bit less than _appropriate_ for an army we do not need to revert to pips and crowns. If, perhaps when, we make changes to our uniforms it ought to be with a combination of some sense of our history - which makes dark, rifle green uniforms very appropriate for the Canadian Army (see Butler's Rangers, etc) - and of our unique Canadian identity.

I, too, welcomed, the return of the _executive curl_, which is used by several navies, not all of them in the British Commonwealth, because it made our Canadian Navy officers more recognizably Navy. I would welcome a new system of army ranks, too, if it made our Canadian Army officers more recognizably Army. There are alternatives to crowns and pips. But it's not something that ought to preoccupy the CDS.


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## jollyjacktar (11 May 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Is it confirmed yet that the navy officer ranks are getting their curls back?



There is a CANFORGEN on the subject of the Curl and SSI.  Just finished reading it.   The Curl will commence on the 11th June at the IFR at Esquimault for selected Officers due to short supply of correct fabric braid.  It will be instituted in stages.


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## a_majoor (11 May 2010)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> This is the kind of thinking that got us into the mess of unification in the first place.  What works for WalMart may well not be appropriate for the military.



As I noted. However, WalMart and similar organizations are able to handle rapidly changing global logistic chains with thousands of items and billions of dollars in cash flow, quickly hire and train staff, pay them quickly and accuratly regardless of full or part time status, and like most organizations with "modern" management structures, seem to have only 5 layers of heirarchy.

Compare that to how well "we" can get new boots to the soldiers (never mind tanks and AFV's) or the endless difficulties reservists have with their pay to name two well known examples and you can see why a flat heirarchy with nimble management and robust logistics and HR tools might seem rather attractive...


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## Tank Troll (11 May 2010)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Could you please cite the reliable source for this statement?



An off hand remark made at the Armour Corp Confrence


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## Old Sweat (11 May 2010)

Thanks. So it falls in the definite maybe category. This is not an attack on you, but I wondered why it had not surfaced before. I would think there would have been some discussion about restoring the old officer rank badges, even if informally, through the giant green grapevine.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (11 May 2010)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Is it confirmed yet that the navy officer ranks are getting their curls back?



Just so we don't derail this thread,  here  is 21 pages and counting.............


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## Michael OLeary (11 May 2010)

There's something about a navy man in curls.    ;D


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## exspy (11 May 2010)

I was thinking about the issue of renaming Maritime, Land Forces and Air Commands with the names previously used by the three military Services of Canada, and I've come to the conclusion that it cannot be done, at least not in the manner that it's supporters would like to see.

January 31, 1968, was the last day of existence for Canada's three armed Services.  The next day the Canadian Armed Forces came into being as Canada's one and only military Service.  Immediately below the new Service headquarters was the Command, the titles of which are the point of consideration here.  Now, NDHQ can name a Command anything they want, but these Commands will not be Services.  To use a name previously used by a Service for a Command would, in my opinion, denigrate the name.  The closest that could ever be used is Canadian Navy Command, Canadian Army Command and Canadian Air Force Command, and to my knowledge no Command of any military Service has ever received the prefix 'Royal' (ie. Royal Bomber Command or Royal Central Command).

The renaming advocates want to transform Commands into Services and this cannot be done simply by an order from NDHQ.  When the three Services unified the old titles were lost and they are not coming back.

In short, Maritime Command can never become the Royal Canadian Navy.  The same with Land Forces Command and Air Command.  For those who want a separate Service called the RCN you will have to try to get Parliament to undo Unification.  Good luck in your endeavours.

Cheers,
Dan.


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## pbi (11 May 2010)

As usual, tons of good commentary going on here. A few observations:



> Respect does not equal affection, yellow ribbons or red T-shirts. Respect is rooted in an understanding of why we need and have a military and why it needs to have its own norms and standards



I agree fully with this. While we are experiencing a great outpouring of public support and affection, it is generally directed at concern for the safety of soldiers as individuals, the tragedy of their deaths, and the suffering of their families. While these are very important (and were, in my experience largely absent in past decades), they are NOT the same as an intelligent respect for the profession of arms and its role in a civil society. I would offer  though, that we are not alone in facing this problem: professions in this country in general are facing a great decline in public  respect, for a number of reasons.



> Nuclear fear replaced an understanding of what the Canadian and allied military forces were doing and why they were doing it. The fear made people ignore, even denigrate their own military forces – “we” became part of the problem, not part of the solution. Of course popular reaction to Viet Nam and Trudeau’s anti-nationalist leadership made matters worse and worse.



Very true: by way of illustrating this, I recall distinctly about 20 years ago arguing with my uncle, an educated and successful professional, about his contention that  "now that we have nuclear weapons we don't need armies". Fear about nuclear war eclipsed intelligent discussion about the use of armed forces.



> Incidentally Mobile Command, which included a fairly hefty air component but not the reserves, was built on the model of a USMC Fleet Marine Force.



When was the Militia made part of Mobile Command, then? When I joined the Militia in 1974, we wore MobCom badges on our CFs and these were also painted on the doors of our SMP vehs. As for the USMC reference: (actually I think a MAGTF not FMF...) it just illustrates the point I made about superficial transference of other people's  ideas and practices, without overall coherent thought: what good is a MAGTF structure when your Navy has no interest in (or capability for...) amphibious operations, and most of your AirForce has little or no capability of expeditionary operations?



> I would think there would have been some discussion about restoring the old officer rank badges, even if informally, through the giant green grapevine.



As Adjt of 1 PPCLI, in 1992 I attended a working group at FMC St Hubert to consider what was then called TASK: Trade Advancement for Skill and Knowledge: the return of the pre-Unification Trades Group badges. (The work eventually resulted in the arm badges we see on DEU today). One of the things we talked about as a side issue for consideration was rationalizing the Army rank structure. The instructions preceding this discussion included the point that NDHQ had directed the Army that the existing rank badges were to be left untouched: in particular pips and crowns were out. The reason we were given was that with the reinstatement of distinctive uniforms, the CF rank badges were on of the last visible signs of unification.


Cheers


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## quadrapiper (12 May 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> The reason we were given was that with the reinstatement of distinctive uniforms, the CF rank badges were on of the last visible signs of unification.


It's depressing that anyone would explicitly want to retain visible signs of the biggest military-administration disaster to befall our forces.

With the curl coming back, there's at least a foot in the door for rank alterations.


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## Tank Troll (12 May 2010)

The reserve Officers are allowed to wear pips and crowns on their mess dress.


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## Edward Campbell (12 May 2010)

I don't mean to keep beating up on "full dress and feathers" but neither the executive curl nor a return to pips and crowns will do *anything* at all to address the real, serious problem faced by the CF. Those are morale issues and, if I may say so, probably fairly minor morale issues to officers who have never worn crowns and pips.

The biggest problem that faces the CF in 2010 is exactly the same one that faced the three services (RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF) in 1960, the very same problem Mr. Hellyer wanted to solve through his organizational vandalism: *the defence budget is inadequate*.

The main reasons for an inadequate defence budget have not changed very much either:

1. Canadian rarely _like_ to spend on defence - according to most of the polling I have seen, over the years, the CF ranks down there with symphony orchestras and opera houses on the public's list of spending priorities; and

2. There is not a well understood threat to Canada. You can argue that radical, _jihadist_ Islam has declared war on us but the Canadian people do not see it. They, Canadians, are not at war and they are not afraid, either.

We, the broad military family, need to help Canadians understand that an *effective* military (and that means operationally effective and cost effective, too) is their insurance policy. None of us ever want to have to use our insurance policies; we don't want to be in car accidents and we don't want our houses to burn down but we buy insurance anyway, just in case circumstances beyond our control arise. The federal government collects over $7,000.00 for every man woman and child in Canada; about $125.00 of that - $400.00 for the _average_ family - goes for national defence, the national _insurance_ policy.

That's my  :2c:   I'm glad the executive curl is back; I wore crowns and pips on a khaki uniform - and I was pleased and *proud* to do so, and I would not object to seeing them or, preferably, some new, more _Army_, rank badges for officers, *BUT* that's not the solution to any of our the CF's really big problems.


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## jollyjacktar (12 May 2010)

I'm afraid that with the planned pullout of the Sandbox we are going to head into another "Peace Dividend" as we did at the end of the Cold War.  The Gov't won't give us the funding we need to re-equip the Navy or Air Force for some time I'll wager to bet.  For all the noise that the Gov't has made these past years about doing right by the CF it has been mostly noise, misdirection and sleight of hand.  Here we are 11 years since I was told by Ottawa types that there would be 4 AOR replacements by 05.  Still waiting and forget about the 280's or even thinking of the CPF replacements.  I am sure the Air Force needs more than they have received too, but I am not a Zoomie.  The Army also I am sure needs to be thinking of new equipment to replace the things worn out from the past 9 years.  Perhaps ER the Curl and SSI could fall under the parlor tricks to misdirect attention.


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## Edward Campbell (12 May 2010)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> I'm afraid that with the planned pullout of the Sandbox we are going to head into another "Peace Dividend" as we did at the end of the Cold War.  The Gov't won't give us the funding we need to re-equip the Navy or Air Force for some time I'll wager to bet.  For all the noise that the Gov't has made these past years about doing right by the CF it has been mostly noise, misdirection and sleight of hand.  Here we are 11 years since I was told by Ottawa types that there would be 4 AOR replacements by 05.  Still waiting and forget about the 280's or even thinking of the CPF replacements.  I am sure the Air Force needs more than they have received too, but I am not a Zoomie.  The Army also I am sure needs to be thinking of new equipment to replace the things worn out from the past 9 years.  Perhaps ER the Curl and SSI could fall under the parlor tricks to misdirect attention.




I don't think I would go *quite that* far, but nothing much would surprise me after 35+ years of service, including the '60s, '70s, '80s and part of the '90s, too. I did the "decade*s* of darkness."


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## jollyjacktar (12 May 2010)

I do hope we never go back to the Decade of Darkness days.  But I see much noise and little substance WRT replacements for the fleet.  My time is almost done and I know that I won't ever set foot on the deck of a new AOR or 280 for example unless I am doing it as a retired Sailor.  Money talks and BS walks and so far there has been a great deal of line dancing.


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## Dennis Ruhl (12 May 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> That's my  :2c:   I'm glad the executive curl is back; I wore crowns and pips on a khaki uniform - and I was pleased and *proud* to do so, and I would not object to seeing them or, preferably, some new, more _Army_, rank badges for officers, *BUT* that's not the solution to any of our the CF's really big problems.



So why does tradition always seem to be discussed together with underfunding when they have no relationship?  Whether it's crowns and pips on khaki or pink jumpsuits the budget is the same.


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## Colin Parkinson (12 May 2010)

Ask any civilian what the Maritime command is  and I bet you get lot's of interesting but wrong answers. Ask what the navy is, they will respond correctly. using names like maritime command, etc is like pisssing up hill, it requires more work and does not have the desired effect.


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## pbi (12 May 2010)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> I'm afraid that with the planned pullout of the Sandbox we are going to head into another "Peace Dividend" as we did at the end of the Cold War.



If there is one thing we have learned as Canadian soldiers it is that politicians, in the end are just politicians. Doesn't matter what stripe: we can be done in as quickly as expediency requires. Our aim has to be what it has always been: try to keep the flame alive for "next time".

Which, if history tells us anything,  will definitely come.....

Cheers


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## Tank Troll (12 May 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> If there is one thing we have learned as Canadian soldiers it is that politicians, in the end are just politicians. Doesn't matter what stripe: we can be done in as quickly as expediency requires. Our aim has to be what it has always been: try to keep the flame alive for "next time".
> 
> Which, if history tells us anything,  will definitely come.....
> 
> Cheers



Hear Hear


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## FSTO (13 May 2010)

I think that there is a Kipling poem that sums up the entire attitude of the general public towards the military.

But I just cannot find it.


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## ModlrMike (13 May 2010)

FSTO said:
			
		

> I think that there is a Kipling poem that sums up the entire attitude of the general public towards the military.
> 
> But I just cannot find it.



You're thinking about Tommy


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## dapaterson (13 May 2010)

Tommy truly was a child of the 60s...


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## Infanteer (13 May 2010)

Okay, so I've read 4 pages about how unification is a disaster and that we all seem to agree on.  All we've seen for fixes is some cosmetic changes to the uniform (which E.R.C. has stated is simply that - cosmetic).

Does anyone have a solution to the disaster?

How about everyone posts their top 3 ideas on "deunification" that would make the forces more effective and operationally relevant.


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## quadrapiper (13 May 2010)

Top three, in no particular order.

[list type=decimal]
[*]De-civilianize everything between the CDS and the blank-sleeved Basic candidate, and employ whatever civilians _are_required (cleaners, high-powered engineering types, whatever) as Canadian Forces employees, vice Department or Ministry of National Defence. Whatever staff the Minister might want are all good - but get them out of the chain of command.
[*]Scrap every command that doesn't currently have manned "home" units under it: so MARPAC and LANT, , the LF areas, and whatever the AF force-generation/home command(s) are. Rebuild as required. Fold reserve activities back into their respective elemental chains - is there a need for a separate NAVRESHQ, for example, or could the staff functions be accomplished by pers working within the appropriate bits of MARCOM? Come up with a simple overseas structure of operational/planning commands (Canada, which might be the place to stash "common" training functions, Combat, and "DART missions/peacekeeping/UN non-combat missions/relief/whatever," maybe?).
[*]Give, with encouragement to use it, the respective elemental heads the authority to erase/replace/fix all visual and verbal indicators of unification, including rank titles, CF-anything, uniforms, insignia, etc, and stand up a one-month working group on a stationery-and-gate-signs re-adoption of the Service names.
[/list]


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## Dennis Ruhl (13 May 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> How about everyone posts their top 3 ideas on "deunification" that would make the forces more effective and operationally relevant.



I really don't want to tick everyone off BUT.  And I have only one BUT.  While the nature of the air force demands the specialization of many to support the few at the sharp end, the army is largely the opposite.  A little more cross-training in the army providing for many troops to have a field trade and a garrison trade might more efficiently employ soldiers and cut down on some make-work.  And yes I mean peeling spuds and mopping floors.


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## Tank Troll (13 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> I really don't want to tick everyone off BUT.  And I have only one BUT.  While the nature of the air force demands the specialization of many to support the few at the sharp end, the army is largely the opposite.  A little more cross-training in the army providing for many troops to have a field trade and a garrison trade might more efficiently employ soldiers and cut down on some make-work.  And yes I mean peeling spuds and mopping floors.



Ummmm We all ready mop flours (on Course) and peel potatoes in the field. Do you mean in Garrison??? If I do that who fixes my vehicles? How do I do continuation training. How Do I retain my soldiers?  Sorry Sir My troop isn't available to do anything this week because some jack ass has them cleaning the shacks this week and then they will be washing dishes next week. Oh yeah on an unrelated note half them quit  and the other half have OT's in.

Really? I don't know what your back ground is but that won't work. Contrary to popular belief we don't just sit around in Garrison and make up shit to do because we are bored.


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## Dennis Ruhl (13 May 2010)

You are obviously well employed in garrison.

The decline in strength of the army has almost been matched by the increase in civilian employees and contractors.  I think the system would be better served were these bodies part of the system.  We could also take 850 clerks and odds and sods at NDHQ be handed rifles and spend a month or two playing infantry every year.  Reservists do it with full time jobs.

In the days prior to unification, regiments were pretty much self-sufficient doing their own recruiting, training, cleaning, whatever.  As far as make-work goes it's all the stuff that comes down the chain that you have to read, respond and send back up the chain.  It's all the stuff you did when not fixing your tank or operating it.


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## Infanteer (13 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> In the days prior to unification, regiments were pretty much self-sufficient doing their own recruiting, training, cleaning, whatever.



Ah yes, the old days - should we throw the computers out as well?


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## dapaterson (13 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> In the days prior to unification, regiments were pretty much self-sufficient doing their own recruiting, training, cleaning, whatever.  As far as make-work goes it's all the stuff that comes down the chain that you have to read, respond and send back up the chain.  It's all the stuff you did when not fixing your tank or operating it.



Self sufficient?  Wow.  So there were no REME officers and NCMs to do maintenance?  No Pay Corps personnel to pay soldiers?  No RCASC providing support?

Wow.


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## a_majoor (13 May 2010)

1. Agressively de-layer HQ's. So much money and manpower is being sucked up into the various vortex's it isn't funny (and as an aside, it's odd how when the Reserve and especially Class"B" positions were cut earlier this year, the HQ's lost their clerks and other OR positions, but very few officer positions.) We already have 20th century HR tools like Peoplesoft, lets use them properly (you can pay your pers using Peoplesoft, no need for RPSR and the various teams supporting that as an example).        

2. Look carefully at how we are employing civilians and ensure their employment isn't detrimental to military "culture". There are other purposes besides hygene for having the course or troops clean the shacks (teaching and enforcing attention to detail and prioritizing work comes to mind).

3. Get away from the bureaucratic mentality that drives spending decisions today. I have been asked in the past if I could spend $50,000 in a month to expend year end funds (on IT equipment). I'd much rather have taken the money and gone to the range, and early in my career the fiscal year end *was* celebrated with a "firefest" of ranges rather than a purchasfest of Corcan desks and chairs (most of which seem to replace perfectly serviceable Corcan bought within the last five or so years...). Working on point one will probably have this as a follow on effect.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (13 May 2010)

My top three would be:

1) Scrap the "Defence Team" thingy: I am sorry, but I have never, ever felt that the civil servants from the Department were on my team. On top of that, its not their job to defend Canada: its the people in uniform's job. So get all the people in uniform in Ottawa, and get them to work at a Headquarter under titles and job descriptions that are military (such as S.O. or S.S.O. strategy, plans, policy, intelligence, etc.) - and put all the civil servants in another building with the Deputy Minister and let them do civilian things (such as audits, contract management, historical records, statistics, etc.). When we had the Somalia Inquiry Show, It amazed me that not a single journalist wondered why people in uniform that appeared before the Commission were in Assistant-deputy Ministers' position. This point here also means that we have to scrap the ridiculous idea of always having to establish a correspondence in "rank", pay, benefits, etc. between the uniformed personnel and the civilians - which led to a huge bloating and inflation of higher ranking officers (particularly generals) not needed from a military point of view.

2) Scrap unified Basic: Give everyone a common set of minimal general military knowledge required of all in uniform and then let each element provide its own appropriate supplement to it and freedom to administer such basic training as they see fit. The requirements of the various elements are too diverse for a single basic as we have now: The army, where every officer is as much a soldier as the soldiers he leads, needs more stringent leadership, self-discipline and physical training which is easier to incorporate from the start at the regiment level (plus you can indoctrinate into regimental aspects right away, which makes you deployable to places like the sandbox much faster); The Air force, where officers do not lead others into combat except other pilots and the crewman are usually techs that work for the warrant officers, would probably be satisfied with the minimal requirements so that the techs get to the shop soonest with the minimal baggage needed to avoid military "faux pas" and insist more, in the officers, on training that instil probity and moral courage; Finally, the Navy, where the officers need to lead within the confinement of a ship people that have better and more thorough knowledge of their trade than the officer ever will , needs a basic course that introduces its people to the harsh environment of the sea and the personal skills relating to the close quarter living on ships from the beginning.

3) Institute a military wide "General Staff" corpus of officers, European continental style. This would be composed of officers identified early on for their strong intellectual capacities, processed through leadership positions a little faster early in their careers so they could then attend advanced military studies before reporting to headquarters where they would be the ones working on plans, strategy, long term planning and doctrine, before returning to senior field commanders headquarters to serve as their chiefs of staffs or similarly senior positions - providing these field commanders, strong in tactics and logistics, with the strategic thinking and detailed knowledge of national plans. Such a corps would provide the CDS with  a corporate memory he currently lacks, which would make him much more capable, regardless of personal career history, of providing properly thought through military advice to the civil leadership (the PM).

Just my thoughts.


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## Edward Campbell (13 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> ...
> In the days prior to unification, regiments were pretty much self-sufficient doing their own recruiting, training, cleaning, whatever.  As far as make-work goes it's all the stuff that comes down the chain that you have to read, respond and send back up the chain.  It's all the stuff you did when not fixing your tank or operating it.




I was there in "the days prior to unification," as a soldier and as an officer. The 'self sufficiency' was pretty much confined to unit level administration - we had regimental clerks and storemen and that sort of thing but they existed at the end of _professional_ A&Q 'tails' that extended all the way up to AHQ.

As to 'busywork,' there was a fairly substantial crew of cleaners, who worked in soldiers' barracks and offices and kitchen helpers. We did, now and again, do some 'extra' waxing and polishing in barracks - including on the brass in the urinals, but that was not a daily or, as I recall, even a weekly task. But yes, in preparation for a major event of one sort or another, I remember paining the curbs in three colours but, mainly, my days and those of my mates, were filled with training and sports and the occasional parade.


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## Tank Troll (13 May 2010)

Save Money in these ways

1) Buy off the shelf if it exist some where else buy don't try and build it here or "Canadianize it" by getting it to do more things than it did before.
2) If it is broken, blown up, or BLR, buy a new one IE; don't spend 10 million to rebuild a tank or plane when a new one only Cost 2 million (this happens a lot)
3) Make all personal fly in coach/cattle class if you want to up grade go ahead but it comes out of your pocket. (this should apply to all MPs as well)
 :2c:


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## dapaterson (13 May 2010)

(1)  Move to PLQ(L) as the CF standard, and have all trades and environments mixed on the course.  Institutional leaders need exposure to the rest of the institution; even when looking at Cpls we need to give them a better understanding of the big, multi-coloured machine so as they progress they have better knowledge and understandingof their peers.

(2) Remove NDHQ from the appointment to MS/MCpl.  Unit COs be given the sole authority to appoint / strip Cpls/LS of their leaf.

(3) Restore Lt as a working, vice a training, rank.  No promotions from 2Lt or A/SLt until an individual is occupationally qualified.  And, related, erturn Capt to being a competitive rank - no more "Three years as a Lt, bottom third all along, promoted with your peers".


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## ModlrMike (13 May 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (1)  Move to PLQ(L) as the CF standard, and have all trades and environments mixed on the course.  Institutional leaders need exposure to the rest of the institution; even when looking at Cpls we need to give them a better understanding of the big, multi-coloured machine so as they progress they have better knowledge and understanding of their peers.



I don't disagree in principle with a "single source" PLQ, however I think that it should be a CFPLQ. Having everyone do the PLQ(L) does little to level the playing field, and only serves to give members an understanding of the big, green machine. There is little long term value in teaching sailors and air personnel infantry battle procedure they'll discard almost immediately after they graduate.


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## McG (13 May 2010)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (1)  Move to PLQ(L) as the CF standard, and have all trades and environments mixed on the course.  Institutional leaders need exposure to the rest of the institution; even when looking at Cpls we need to give them a better understanding of the big, multi-coloured machine so as they progress they have better knowledge and understandingof their peers.





			
				ModlrMike said:
			
		

> I don't disagree in principle with a "single source" PLQ, however I think that it should be a CFPLQ. Having everyone do the PLQ(L) does little to level the playing field, and only serves to give members an understanding of the big, green machine. There is little long term value in teaching sailors and air personnel infantry battle procedure they'll discard almost immediately after they graduate.


I disagree on both.  There should be three standards that should exist at the recruit and PLQ levels: 

hard sea occupations standard
hard air crew occupations standard
Army standard

Why are the standards based on jobs and not colours of uniforms?  Well, the Air Force has several occupations that work exlusively or primarily on the ground - if these pers ever find themselves in a fight it will be on the ground (attached to the Army or in a BDF role).  Purple occupations will be in the same position (a fight will be on the ground) if they find themselves in either the Army or Air Force.


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## ModlrMike (13 May 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> I disagree on both.  There should be three standards that should exist at the recruit and PLQ levels:
> 
> hard sea occupations standard
> hard air crew occupations standard
> ...




Where does that leave the purple trades?


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## aesop081 (13 May 2010)

ModlrMike said:
			
		

> Where does that leave the purple trades?



Last sentence in the post you quoted....



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Purple occupations will be in the same position (a fight will be on the ground) if they find themselves in either the Army or Air Force.


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## Dennis Ruhl (13 May 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Ah yes, the old days - should we throw the computers out as well?



Sure.  Mailing in paperwork might cut down on micromanagement.  It might mean the cheque is always late.

Whose idea was it that leaders of men should be sitting at a desk with paperwork up the yang instead of leading men?


----------



## aesop081 (13 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Whose idea was it that leaders of men should be sitting at a desk with paperwork up the yang instead of leading men?



The paperwork was always there for the most part. If i didnt have a computer, i would still have PERs to write, training statistics to keep and training reports to write. i would still have to take care of administrative measures such as IC/RW/C&P.....


----------



## McG (13 May 2010)

ModlrMike said:
			
		

> Where does that leave the purple trades?


Same place as Air Force ground crew occupations -> the Army Standard


----------



## Snakedoc (14 May 2010)

I personally like the idea of having one CF standard for basic in all three elements.  However, I think that unlike how Basic is currently conducted (being completely army-centric), this should be a truly tri-service course that provides military indoctrination, trains, and introduces the member to all three elements as it is not uncommon for members to have to work with or in elements outside of their own in an _integrated_ CF.  The same basic skillset that BMQ and BMOQ strive to develop can be developed while also developing a familiarity in all three elements (by perhaps having scenario's conducted involving the various elements etc).  The advantage of a standard basic as we've already seen is inter-operability and also a common standard when switching between elements (not having to redo courses etc.).

Further indoctrination into a specific element can then be done by the current elemental courses (ie CAP/SQ, NETP/NETP-O, and not sure what the Air Force equivalent is).

Hopefully this isn't considered 'looking backward' but its my  :2c:


----------



## aesop081 (14 May 2010)

Snakedoc said:
			
		

> and not sure what the Air Force equivalent is).



BAEQ - Basic Air Environment Qualification


----------



## SeaKingTacco (15 May 2010)

> (1)  Move to PLQ(L) as the CF standard, and have all trades and environments mixed on the course.  Institutional leaders need exposure to the rest of the institution; even when looking at Cpls we need to give them a better understanding of the big, multi-coloured machine so as they progress they have better knowledge and understandingof their peers.



I don't think this will work.  The Navy and Air Force candidates would not have the cultural background nor physical fitness requirements (no matter how much you wish it) to satisfy the Combat Arms.  The result: since both the Air Force and Navy require qualified junior leaders, the tactical standard would have to be watered down below what would satisfy the Army.  Also, the bill for instructional staff would fall largely on Army.  Are you telling me that the Army wants the role of being the leadership academy for the whole CF?  I would much rather see a Navy PLQ where the candidates spend long hours doing force protection exercises (in a shipboard context), small boat handling or at damage control school leading damage control parties- these are difficult things to do well.  Similarly, let the Air Force run a PLQ that focuses on force protection type activities in an airfield environment.

I would cut aviation back to the Army and Navy- they would each be responsible for their own tac aviation needs, including paying for it.  There should be a joint helo school, centrally located.  Probably also a joint UAV school.  Airworthiness for the CF would be managed by an office in NDHQ staffed by all three services. Same with the Flight Safety Office.  The Air Force would focus fighters, transport, long range patrol (both manned and unmanned).

Cut headquarters brutally.  Reverse the explosion in rank inflation.  I'm not sure why a Bde HQ needs more than 2 Majs and about 12 Captains.  Where did all of these LCols come from?


----------



## Infanteer (15 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I don't think this will work.  The Navy and Air Force candidates would not have the cultural background nor physical fitness requirements (no matter how much you wish it) to satisfy the Combat Arms.  The result: since both the Air Force and Navy require qualified junior leaders, the tactical standard would have to be watered down below what would satisfy the Army.  Also, the bill for instructional staff would fall largely on Army.  Are you telling me that the Army wants the role of being the leadership academy for the whole CF?  I would much rather see a Navy PLQ where the candidates spend long hours doing force protection exercises (in a shipboard context), small boat handling or at damage control school leading damage control parties- these are difficult things to do well.  Similarly, let the Air Force run a PLQ that focuses on force protection type activities in an airfield environment.
> 
> I would cut aviation back to the Army and Navy- they would each be responsible for their own tac aviation needs, including paying for it.  There should be a joint helo school, centrally located.  Probably also a joint UAV school.  Airworthiness for the CF would be managed by an office in NDHQ staffed by all three services. Same with the Flight Safety Office.  The Air Force would focus fighters, transport, long range patrol (both manned and unmanned).
> 
> Cut headquarters brutally.  Reverse the explosion in rank inflation.  I'm not sure why a Bde HQ needs more than 2 Majs and about 12 Captains.  Where did all of these LCols come from?



I like you and all you say.


----------



## Loachman (15 May 2010)

So do I.


----------



## Nuggs (15 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I don't think this will work.  The Navy and Air Force candidates would not have the cultural background nor physical fitness requirements (no matter how much you wish it) to satisfy the Combat Arms.  The result: since both the Air Force and Navy require qualified junior leaders, the tactical standard would have to be watered down below what would satisfy the Army.  Also, the bill for instructional staff would fall largely on Army.  Are you telling me that the Army wants the role of being the leadership academy for the whole CF?  I would much rather see a Navy PLQ where the candidates spend long hours doing force protection exercises (in a shipboard context), small boat handling or at damage control school leading damage control parties- these are difficult things to do well.  Similarly, let the Air Force run a PLQ that focuses on force protection type activities in an airfield environment.
> 
> I would cut aviation back to the Army and Navy- they would each be responsible for their own tac aviation needs, including paying for it.  There should be a joint helo school, centrally located.  Probably also a joint UAV school.  Airworthiness for the CF would be managed by an office in NDHQ staffed by all three services. Same with the Flight Safety Office.  The Air Force would focus fighters, transport, long range patrol (both manned and unmanned).
> 
> Cut headquarters brutally.  Reverse the explosion in rank inflation.  I'm not sure why a Bde HQ needs more than 2 Majs and about 12 Captains.  Where did all of these LCols come from?



Great post


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Cut headquarters brutally.  Reverse the explosion in rank inflation.  I'm not sure why a Bde HQ needs more than 2 Majs and about 12 Captains.  Where did all of these LCols come from?



I think, and I could be wrong, that much of the rank inflation and buildings full of colonels passing memos back and forth with each other is the extension of a military career into a lifetime career.  There's not enough use of the 20 year handshake.  I think a simple test would be to count how many soldiers are under your command and if it's over say 500 you're a LCol..  Then double it for staff and administration positions and live with it.  Another point is that it doesn't take a captain to command a platoon.  The equivalent commonwealth rank of wing commander commands a squadron in Canada.  There is a helicopter company in my community that operates about 60 helicopters that I suspect average more airtime than the Canadian forces ones so they operate the equivalent of 5 squadrons of aircraft including maintenance and outside sales with "200 friendly employees"  I can't say it's a model for the military but it is food for thought.
http://www.airbornesolutions.com/Careers/tabid/58/Default.aspx


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The equivalent commonwealth rank of wing commander commands a squadron in Canada.



Sqn COs that i have met from the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were Wing Commanders. The rank of "Wing Commander" is equivalent to our LCol rank. Canadian Sqns are commanded by LCols.

Whats your point ?


----------



## McG (15 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I don't think this will work.  The Navy and Air Force candidates would not have the cultural background nor physical fitness requirements (no matter how much you wish it) to satisfy the Combat Arms.


The same could be said of candidates from many Army occupations.  I agree with separate standards for hard sea and aircrew occupations, but that is about where it stops.  Everyone else should be trained to the Army (not Combat Arms) standard because "on the ground" is likely where they will find themselves should they ever be in a fight.

That being said, I think the Navy has a particularly strong case that its purple trades need to know what to do in a fight at sea.  Here, there may be a strong case to establish sub-occupations for support occupations that serve on ships (from cooks & clerks to the maritime aviation groundcrews shipcrews).  For these sub-occupations, members would to the Army standard BMQ/BMOQ, their MOS basic, and a NETP/NETP-O.  At that point, the member would be considered a hard sea occupation and would therefore do the PLQ - Navy.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Sqn COs that i have met from the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were Wing Commanders. The rank of "Wing Commander" is equivalent to our LCol rank. Canadian Sqns are commanded by LCols.
> 
> Whats your point ?



You're right, they are now.  My point is that more rank provides no better leadership.  If so the Congo had the best army in the world in 1960 when all the privates were promoted to sergeant.


----------



## Infanteer (15 May 2010)

A Squadron is a unit.  A battalion is a unit.  They are both commanded by LCols.

What's your point?


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> You're right, they are now.  My point is that more rank provides no better leadership.



Further to my last, US Navy sqns are commanded by individuals holding the rank of "Commander" and that is equivalent to our LCols. So we are in keeping with what is done by all our major allies.




> If so the Congo had the best army in the world in 1960 when all the privates were promoted to sergeant.



I'm not sure what that has to do with anything.


----------



## GAP (15 May 2010)

I don't know how relevant this would be now, but in my day the Corps put everybody through basic....16 weeks at that time....the physical standards were met, everyone had weapons training, military ethos stuff, etc. . During the period everybody was assessed and asked what they preferred. NO ONE had a guarantee, only that their wish would be granted if the assessment agreed. 

I, obviously full of piss and vinegar, wanted to be a grunt, in the worst way. After all the tests, they assigned me to be a ground radio technician. I requested mast all the way up to General Hockmouth (?), the then CO of MCRD San Diego. All he would promise me is that upon completion of my electronics training I would be guaranteed orders to FMF PAC ( Viet Nam), as a ground radio technician. 

I later found out ways to be the grunt I always aspired to, but that came with experience of the system. 

What I am pointing out is that everybody was assigned "to the benefit of the Corps", not somebody's vision of being John Wayne II...


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 May 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> A Squadron is a unit.  A battalion is a unit.  They are both commanded by LCols.
> 
> What's your point?



Just an example of rank inflation.  If the Airforce determines that it takes a major to command 3 other pilots in battle, fine by me.


----------



## Loachman (15 May 2010)

A US Army Helicopter Battalion, commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel, is the equivalent to a Canadian Tactical Helicopter Squadron.

So you've also got the US Navy and US Army with people holding the equivalent ranks commanding equivalent units.


----------



## SupersonicMax (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Just an example of rank inflation.  If the Airforce determines that it takes a major to command 3 other pilots in battle, fine by me.



Actually, you could have a Capt leading a LCol, and 2 Maj in battle.


----------



## Infanteer (15 May 2010)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Actually, you could have a Capt leading a LCol, and 2 Maj in battle.



Could you explain how this all works for Mr Ruhl and the rest of the 17th Alberta Light Dragoons?


----------



## SupersonicMax (15 May 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Could you explain how this all works for Mr Ruhl and the rest of the 17th Alberta Light Dragoons?



If you send, for example, a 4-ship of Hornet, there will be a Flight Lead, an Element Lead, and 2 Wingman.  You need certain quals to lead certain mission as a 4-ship and to be an Element lead.  Even more mind blowing, you could have a Capt leading the whole Air Package (unimited number of aircraft in the sky), which could include several LCols, Cols, Maj, etc.  Again, it's all dependant on Qualifications.

Unlike the Army, Maj don't necessarily lead Capts in flight.  It depends on the Quals you have.  

On the "admin" point of view (ie: on the ground) there is a Structured CoC based on rank.  In the air, it depends on who is assigned as Lead, Element Lead, Wingman, Package Commander and that will depends on what qualifications and experience you have.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl (15 May 2010)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Could you explain how this all works for Mr Ruhl and the rest of the 17th Alberta Light Dragoons?



That would be 19th Alberta Dragoons.  They flew horses for 4 years in France and Belgium.  I guess I was wrong and the airforce musn't suffer from inflated ranks.  Yes, even WWII aircrew had mixed ranks with a pilot likely to be a a a a sergeant?


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> That would be 19th Alberta Dragoons.  They flew horses for 4 years in France and Belgium.  I guess I was wrong and the airforce musn't suffer from inflated ranks.  Yes, even WWII aircrew had mixed ranks with a pilot likely to be a a a a sergeant?



Yes, to your last question. Sergeant pilots, like George Frederick "Buzz" Beurling DSO, DFC, DFM & Bar, RCAF, the best of the lot, were common in the 2nd World War.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> That would be 19th Alberta Dragoons.  They flew horses for 4 years in France and Belgium.  I guess I was wrong and the airforce musn't suffer from inflated ranks.  Yes, even WWII aircrew had mixed ranks with a pilot likely to be a a a a sergeant?



Why dont you just admit you have little to actualy say and move along.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Yes, even WWII aircrew had mixed ranks



Aircrews today still consist of mixed-ranks ( by that i assume you mean both NCMs and Comissioned officers) on most of our aircraft.

The British army air corps stands as one of the very few outfits employing non-comissioned members as pilots.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (15 May 2010)

> For these sub-occupations, members would to the Army standard BMQ/BMOQ, their MOS basic, and a NETP/NETP-O.  At that point, the member would be considered a hard sea occupation and would therefore do the PLQ - Navy.



MCG- Once again, I must ask- are you prepared for the Army to be the CF's Leadership academy?  Are you prepared to see tens, if not hundreds of Cbt Arms Sgts and WOs, teaching infantry tactics to members of the CF who are unlikely to ever use them to the extent that you seem to think they will?  This is not the USMC- no matter what people wish it to be.  If you believe every man in the CF is a rifleman first, I believe you are repeating the Unification error- we are not all basically the same.  I might add, since it is equally likely that infantry soldiers may, at some point be carried on HMC Ships, they should all go to damage control school while at Battle School.  Or take flight safety lectures, because they will fly on CF aircraft.

What a propose is that we post a few Cbt Arms Sgts and WOs to Air Force and Navy schools to act as SMEs and help improve force protection training in a manner that makes operational and logical sense to the Service of trade involved.  It would cost less, achieve more and frustrate way fewer people.


----------



## McG (15 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I might add, since it is equally likely that infantry soldiers may, at some point be carried on HMC Ships, they should all go to damage control school while at Battle School.  Or take flight safety lectures, because they will fly on CF aircraft.


Why would you come to this illogical conclusion?  I have not suggested that aircrew or sea trades train to the Army standard?  Trades that fight in thier environment (Infantry, Pilot, Boatswain, etc) would train in thier environmental stream.  I've even allowed room for sub-occupations from all the purple trades that serve on ships.

For all those Air Force occupations that serve thier careers on the ground - a fire fighter, a Construction Engineer, a cook or MSE Op in blue uniform, etc - they all need the same skills as the cooks, clerks, MSE Ops, etc that find themselve in a FOB/base/airfield under attack.  That standard should not be diluted for uniform colour - because an enemy won't care.



			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> MCG- Once again, I must ask- are you prepared for the Army to be the CF's Leadership academy?


Why would we need to?  The Infantry does not have to do this all for the Army.  Everyone would be trained to the standard, and (much as is already done at CFLRS) a instructor indoc can be a required training step for all pers at such a training instutute.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> Why would you come to this illogical conclusion?  I have not suggested that aircrew or sea trades train to the Army standard?  Trades that fight in thier environment (Infantry, Pilot, Boatswain, etc) would train in thier environmental stream.



What about hard sea/air trades , since over the last few years we have seen even those, deployed to Afghanistan ?

For example, my MOC is a hard aircrew trade, yet we send members to fill CHUD billets and others in Afghanistan.


----------



## McG (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> What about hard sea/air trades , since over the last few years we have seen even those, deployed to Afghanistan ?
> 
> For example, my MOC is a hard aircrew trade, yet we send members to fill CHUD billets and others in Afghanistan.


The Navy is in the same position with Divers filling out EOD teams.  There will have to be environmental indoctrination courses that exist as a package and can be pulled off the shelf and run as a pre-deployment thing when those rare cases arise.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> when those rare cases arise.



I'm sorry but those are not that rare. far from it actualy. Thus, if this can simply be adressed by pre-deployment indoc, then why have air/land attend the same PLQ ? Just seems like you are contradicting yourself.


----------



## Loachman (15 May 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> For all those Air Force occupations that serve thier careers on the ground - a fire fighter, a Construction Engineer, a cook or MSE Op in blue uniform, etc - they all need the same skills as the cooks, clerks, MSE Ops, etc that find themselve in a FOB/base/airfield under attack.  That standard should not be diluted for uniform colour - because an enemy won't care.



So why leave the aircrew out? They spend far more time on the ground than in the air, and should also be prepared to leave the air at extremely short notice to operate on the ground individually or as part of a very small group, likely with significant injuries. They also need to thoroughly understand the roles of those whom they exist to support, and understand the conditions under which they operate.

Tac Hel units, in conventional situations, live in the field with their associated formations, and are expected to be able to defend and administer themselves just the same as any ground-bound unit, except nobody is trained to do so.

I also believe that Tac Hel, for these reasons, should be moved back into the Army from whence it came, and that all of its Officers should undergo the same training that their ground brethren undergo, at least up to Phase II or whatever it's called now (CAP?).

And the US Army has far more non-commissioned pilots than the British Army.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

Loachman said:
			
		

> And the US Army has far more non-commissioned pilots than the British Army.



US Army warrant Officers are not non-comissioned members. They are specialist comissioned officers.

From the US Army itself :

http://usawocc.army.mil/whatiswo.htm



> Candidates who successfully complete Warrant Officer Candidate School are appointed in the grade of Warrant Officer One. When promoted to Chief Warrant Officer Two, warrant officers are commissioned by the President and have the same legal status as their traditional commissioned officer counterparts. However, warrant officers remain single-specialty officers whose career track is oriented towards progressing within their career field rather than focusing on increased levels of command and staff duty positions.


----------



## McG (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> ... if this can simply be adressed by pre-deployment indoc, then why have air/land attend the same PLQ ?


It cannot be addressed in an indoc alone - having an indoc would be a risk mitigation thing for the few occupations not doing the Army standard at BMQ & PLQ.  



			
				CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I'm sorry but those are not that rare. far from it actualy.





			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> So why leave the aircrew out? They spend far more time on the ground than in the air, ...


Okay.  If the hard air crew occupations are more likely to operate on the ground, then we will have two standards: Army and Navy.

I still think there could be sub-occupations to recognize air & ground crews for maritime aviation. These pers would do a Navy indoc after/during basic MOS and then the PLQ - Navy.


----------



## McG (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> US Army warrant Officers are not non-comissioned members. They are specialist comissioned officers.


Actually, they are neither NCM nor comissioned officer.  Even your quote points that out.


----------



## aesop081 (15 May 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> Actually, they are neither NCM nor comissioned officer.  Even your quote points that out.



No, i am quite correct and my quote supports that. Further to that, the US Army CW2 i worked with in Ft. Leonard Wood explained it to me the same way quite clearly.

Single-speciality comissioned officer, period.


----------



## jollyjacktar (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> What about hard sea/air trades , since over the last few years we have seen even those, deployed to Afghanistan ?
> 
> For example, my MOC is a hard aircrew trade, yet we send members to fill CHUD billets and others in Afghanistan.



And for my last tour in the Sandbox I was sent with the green people to learn to do green people things with green people.  Otherwise, it is wasted on the Navy.  I am a Sailor not Soldier and do not do the same things.  The PLQ should be orientated towards your service needs.  If they want to you lean other stuff they will send you where you can do so as needed like I did.  Anything else is a waste of resources that can better be spent elsewhere.

SeaKingT,  you were bang on for my bucks, well said.


----------



## Loachman (15 May 2010)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> No, i am quite correct and my quote supports that. Further to that, the US Army CW2 i worked with in Ft. Leonard Wood explained it to me the same way quite clearly.
> 
> Single-speciality comissioned officer, period.



It was pointed out to me by a few many years ago that they held Warrants rather than Commissions, and that although they went to the Officers' Club, they were not entitled to a salute.

Perhaps something has changed, but I am not certain.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (15 May 2010)

Nope- you've got it right.

Anyhoo- sorry about the tangent that I think I may have caused.

So- three quick things to fix the CF.  Discuss.


----------



## Brasidas (19 May 2010)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> So- three quick things to fix the CF.  Discuss.



CANFORGEN to use powerpoint as a tool to show content-supporting visual images rather than cue card walls of text?


----------



## Rifleman62 (21 May 2010)

Substitute Army.ca for CANFORGEN etc.


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## murray b (10 Aug 2010)

Greetings from a retired and completely civilian 'computer guy' in Edmonton. 

The unification idea was pretty silly and I have seen nothing to suggest it saved much money.  It reminded me of a city saying that they were going to save money by having all the police, fire, and ambulence people wear the same uniforms, have the same kit, and drive the same vehicles.   No city would ever really do something that foolish.

Of course this problem can be easily solved by replacing all the military junk with a kind of combination flying jeep-tank-ship with invisibility.  [My nephew had a model of one of these when he was a kid.] Then unification would make some sense.


----------



## armyvern (10 Aug 2010)

murray b said:
			
		

> The unification idea was pretty silly and I have seen nothing to suggest it saved much money.  It reminded me of a city saying that they were going to save money by having all the police, fire, and ambulence people wear the same uniforms, have the same kit, and drive the same vehicles.    No city would ever really do something that foolish.



Hmmmm interesting comment, but the CF wasn't that silly either. We ended at uniforms (& have since corrected that). We still have ships, planes, trucks etc etc ...


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Aug 2010)

I am always mildly amused that so many people seem to think that Unification was only about uniforms (and only the dress uniform at that).


----------



## McG (10 Aug 2010)

murray b said:
			
		

> It reminded me of a city saying that they were going to save money by having all the police, fire, and ambulence people wear the same uniforms, have the same kit, and drive the same vehicles.   No city would ever really do something that foolish.


No, but some cities have gone to a unified emergency responce organization for fire and ambulance - still with different vehicles & the right tools for specific jobs, but within a unified force.


----------



## Trooper Hale (10 Aug 2010)

I find this whole debate fascinating and I agree whole heartedly on the subject of separating "Services". My identity as a member of the Australian Army and Royal Australian Armoured Corps is hugely important to me. 
There is great power, pride, history and tradition in a name. And I think those four things are some of the most important things for a soldier to have.

The issue of your PLQ is interesting too. Over here, each service trains its own people in what they need to know. The Air Force recruit training is infinately different to the Army Recruit training and the same obviously goes for Navy. The same then goes for your Junior Leaders courses.
We have a Chief of Defence Force (who's currently Air Force) and below him, the various service Chiefs. The system works and I would never want to see it changes as dramatically as was forced upon the Canadian forces.
When looking for a model why not look no further then the British Army or Australian Army? Our Army especially is quite similar to yours in size.


----------



## The Bread Guy (10 Aug 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> No, but some cities have gone to a unified emergency responce organization for fire and ambulance - still with different vehicles & the right tools for specific jobs, but within a unified force.


....and some have (for a little while, anyway, and unsuccessfully) had the police and fire services come under the command/admin of a single boss.


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Aug 2010)

Digger Hale said:
			
		

> When looking for a model why not look no further then the British Army or Australian Army? Our Army especially is quite similar to yours in size.



Isn't it rather silly to suggest the modern Australian Army as a model to follow in a thread about changes to the Canadian Department of National Defence and the three services of the Canadian Forces *forty years ago*?

Then again, perhaps not for those who haven't moved on and now deal with today's issues.


----------



## Trooper Hale (10 Aug 2010)

My mistake, I should have written "Australian Defence Force". However, I dont think its silly at all to use our model or the British model if you were to look at changing your "Land Command".
 I dont think its too hard for you to join the dots and figure out what I meant.


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Aug 2010)

Digger Hale said:
			
		

> My mistake, I should have written "Australian Defence Force". However, I dont think its silly at all to use our model or the British model if you were to look at changing your "Land Command".
> I dont think its too hard for you to join the dots and figure out what I meant.



This is a thread about *Unification*, in trying to stay with one topic I wasn't looking to connect with random "dots." If we start talking in a different thread about reorganizing the CF today, please feel free to add your vote for us to follow your preferred model.

If you believe the "Australian Defence Force" of the 1960s was a valid model to copy at that time, then feel free to  offer all of your detailed reasons way that might have been a valid course of action.

But, according to Wikipedia (please correct any errors you see), in the 1960s, there was no "Australian Defence Force" - they had three separate services, which were "unified" in the 1970s:



> The importance of 'joint' warfare  was made clear to the Australian Military during World War II when Australian naval, ground and air units frequently served as part of single commands. Following the war, several senior officers lobbied for the appointment of a commander in chief of the three services. The government rejected this proposal and the three services remained fully independent.[13]  The absence of a central authority resulted in poor coordination between the services with each service organising and operating on the basis of a different military doctrine.[14]
> 
> The need for an integrated command structured received more emphasis during the Australian military's experiences in the Vietnam War.[14] In 1973, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Arthur Tange, submitted a report to the Government  that recommended the *unification* of the separate departments supporting each service into a single Department of Defence and the creation of the post of Chief of the Defence Force Staff. The government accepted these recommendations and the Australian Defence Force was established on 9 February 1976.[15]



Maybe the solution of the "Australian Defence Force" was copied from the Canadian example?


----------



## Michael OLeary (10 Aug 2010)

This article appeared in the Australian Defence Force Journal. (Link is a pdf file of the journal issue.)

Task Force on Review of the Unification of the Canadian Forces

Published a few years after the Australian Defence Forces' own unification, they were no doubt very carefully looking at the areas of success or failure of the Canadian example. The article provides a detailed look at the criticisms of unification as seen at the time, but it is one-sided in that respect.


----------



## Trooper Hale (10 Aug 2010)

I'm offer my apology. I must have misread the past 8 pages and misinterpreted every previous post. I thought there was definate suggestion about possible future changes but obviously I'm wrong. 



			
				Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Maybe the solution of the "Australian Defence Force" was copied from the Canadian example?


If it was then they took what the CF had done and ignored the vast majority of it. For a start, 40 years later theres no talk about the dramatic changes to the entire Defence structure that many of the people on this board are talking about.
The restructure of the ADF in the '70's following our experiances in Vietnam was a great success and has put our Army, RAN and RAAF in a good postion for the future.
I only hope that if the CF decided to carry out a restructuring that it is allowed the same success. But thats obviously for different threads.


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## Edward Campbell (10 Aug 2010)

There is nothing especially "right" or "wrong" with having a single, _unified_ military force, _viz_ the Canadian Forces. The problems come, or go away, when one tackles the internal structure: joint (unified) commands? 'single service' (sometimes called _specified_) commands? some mix of both?

I believe that it is a fact that men and women have some difficulty in 'seeing' themselves as members of a single, cohesive purple force; most are much more likely to self-identify as sailors, soldiers and so on. Thus, despite having a legally _unified_ entity, the CF, we do well to recognize that we have, _de facto_, a Navy, an Army and an Air Force - each with its own customs and traditions and standards. Some members are required to move between services during their careers, most do so with relative ease, bringing the best of their 'parent' _identity_ to each task; many members spend their entire career, save, perhaps for a tour or two in a HQ or recruiting centre, in one service or _environment_; and a few have real difficulties moving between environments. The top level organizations cannot, generally, help the few who have difficulty adapting but they can exacerbate the problems by emphasizing the differences between members rather than the things all members share.

The CF, _per se_, is not the problem; such problems as exist are organizational within the CF.


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## Halifax Tar (10 Aug 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> There is nothing especially "right" or "wrong" with having a single, _unified_ military force, _viz_ the Canadian Forces. The problems come, or go away, when one tackles the internal structure: joint (unified) commands? 'single service' (sometimes called _specified_) commands? some mix of both?
> 
> I believe that it is a fact that men and women have some difficulty in 'seeing' themselves as members of a single, cohesive purple force; most are much more likely to self-identify as sailors, soldiers and so on. Thus, despite having a legally _unified_ entity, the CF, we do well to recognize that we have, _de facto_, a Navy, an Army and an Air Force - each with its own customs and traditions and standards. Some members are required to move between services during their careers, most do so with relative ease, bringing the best of their 'parent' _identity_ to each task; many members spend their entire career, save, perhaps for a tour or two in a HQ or recruiting centre, in one service or _environment_; and a few have real difficulties moving between environments. The top level organizations cannot, generally, help the few who have difficulty adapting but they can exacerbate the problems by emphasizing the differences between members rather than the things all members share.
> 
> The CF, _per se_, is not the problem; such problems as exist are organizational within the CF.



You know you hit nail on the head with this one. I personally am a Purple sailor (Sup Tech) and one of those types who has identified himself as a sailor, all stop. I think to solve this issues one of 2 things would need to happen:

1) Create a new and unique Tri-Service uniform for 3 element trades
or
2) Just simply do away with the Tri-service roles for 3 element trades

I know doing away with the Tri-service roles gets some people fired up, but we can continue to train jointly (I.E. CFSAL) and as for augmenters for a land deployment coming from non Army roles, it can be done. As we see now the NSE R9 is something in the neighborhood of 40-60% augmentees most coming from Air and Naval backgrounds with little to no "land" experience, and the job is still getting completed. 

I think it is unreasonable to expect a sailor, soldier or airman not to develop a fierce allegiance to the environment they the serve when the walk, talk and act the same as the "hard Navy, Air, and Army" people they work for, with  and support. And I don't think this is something that afflicts Naval and Air personnel alone. In my year (and counting) with the NSE R9 so far I have met some very proud and fiercely Army personnel who have no interest or wish to go to Sea or to an Air Base, I applaud them in that as I think its good to draw an affiliation to your uniform, it builds pride and discipline.


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## McG (10 Aug 2010)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> 2) Just simply do away with the Tri-service roles for 3 element trades


Some where earlier in this thread, someone might already have suggested creating sea sub-occupations for some of those purple trades that serve on ships (like cooks & Sup Tech).  
That would generally achieve what you suggest with "hard" Navy sub-occupations doing Navy career courses, while the remainder of the occupation (which live and work on the ground) would be trained to an Army standard (because if they ever find themselves in a fight, it will be on the ground).


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## Edward Campbell (10 Aug 2010)

Even in the ear;y '60s, before we _integrated_ and/or _unified_ or whatever the 'exercise' really was, we had tri-service units and agencies - not just in HQ in Ottawa. 

Some (a lot) of the purple organizations make good sense and we need good people in them. The trick is to serve, well, wherever one is needed, being proud of one's service and, always, doing the best job possible. I think it is, as I said, a matter of getting the organization right and of convincing every member that they are a valuable and valued part of the team - their service team and the bigger, CF team, too.

I know that sounds like a warm, fuzzy platitude but, after 35+ years of service, I believe it is true.


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## murray b (12 Aug 2010)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Hmmmm interesting comment, but the CF wasn't that silly either. We ended at uniforms (& have since corrected that). We still have ships, planes, trucks etc etc ...



It was the government that was silly they have always saved a penny and then wasted $5.  It was sill to try to save money on defence since the military has always been frugal.  It is not really possible to save much money without doing some kind of harm.  It is also far easier to justify spending taxpayers' money for things they understand like Army, Navy, and Air Force.  Many civilians think that there is just the Army now and funding should be minimal.  Some people do not understand why Army guys even want aircraft or ships and they already have tanks so they don't need any of those.  

Military funding debates have always reminded me of when I used to work as a computer guy and tried to explain the threat from viruses.  At the time there were 130k known viruses and X unknown viruses and the best security software could deal with 90% of the known viruses.  This meant that there was still a threat from 13k known viruses and most of X unknown viruses.  You would not believe how many bureaucratic types demanded to know exactly how may unknown viruses there were.  They did not even understand how stupid the question was.  

It is the same thing for defence.  No one can know in advance exactly how many future threats there will be but there will not likely be much time to mobilize to meet them.  That means having an adequate force trained and in place to deal with whatever comes up.  Methinks for Canada that could be as little as 100k soldiers providing they have the best affordable equipment but, sadly, I don't think this will happen any time soon.


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## McG (12 Aug 2010)

murray b said:
			
		

> It was the government that was silly they have always saved a penny and then wasted $5.  It was sill to try to save money on defence since the military has always been frugal.  It is not really possible to save much money without doing some kind of harm.  It is also far easier to justify spending taxpayers' money for things they understand like Army, Navy, and Air Force.  Many civilians think that there is just the Army now and funding should be minimal.  Some people do not understand why Army guys even want aircraft or ships and they already have tanks so they don't need any of those.
> 
> Military funding debates have always reminded me of when I used to work as a computer guy and tried to explain the threat from viruses.  At the time there were 130k known viruses and X unknown viruses and the best security software could deal with 90% of the known viruses.  This meant that there was still a threat from 13k known viruses and most of X unknown viruses.  You would not believe how many bureaucratic types demanded to know exactly how may unknown viruses there were.  They did not even understand how stupid the question was.
> 
> It is the same thing for defence.  No one can know in advance exactly how many future threats there will be but there will not likely be much time to mobilize to meet them.  That means having an adequate force trained and in place to deal with whatever comes up.  Methinks for Canada that could be as little as 100k soldiers providing they have the best affordable equipment but, sadly, I don't think this will happen any time soon.


You are trying to defend your previous outlandish statement with this wildly off-topic post?


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## pbi (12 Aug 2010)

> I know doing away with the Tri-service roles gets some people fired up, but we can continue to train jointly (I.E. CFSAL) and as for augmenters for a land deployment coming from non Army roles, it can be done. ...I think it is unreasonable to expect a sailor, soldier or airman not to develop a fierce allegiance to the environment they the serve when the walk, talk and act the same as the "hard Navy, Air, and Army" people they work for, with  and support. And I don't think this is something that afflicts Naval and Air personnel alone. In my year (and counting) with the NSE R9 so far I have met some very proud and fiercely Army personnel who have no interest or wish to go to Sea or to an Air Base, I applaud them in that as I think its good to draw an affiliation to your uniform, it builds pride and discipline.



I agree 100% with this. What (IMHO) we need is a true concept of "jointness", that lets each service bring its strengths to the game, but doesn't ***** about with the culture, traditions, training or force generation business of each of them. The USMC provides a very good example of this with their medical services: the "Corpsman" in a Marine unit is a sailor. This has worked fine for generations, with nobody trying to bastardize anything. This (again, IMHO) was what we should have aimed at in the first place, not the dog's breakfast we got, as a result of which countless wheels were spun, energy wasted, and good people left the Forces in disgust. "Purple" is fine, as long as it's a temporary colour created by specific operational needs, from the palette of brown, light blue, and dark blue.

Cheers


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## George Wallace (12 Aug 2010)

pbi said:
			
		

> I agree 100% with this. What (IMHO) we need is a true concept of "jointness", that lets each service bring its strengths to the game, but doesn't ***** about with the culture, traditions, training or force generation business of each of them. The USMC provides a very good example of this with their medical services: the "Corpsman" in a Marine unit is a sailor. This has worked fine for generations, with nobody trying to bastardize anything. This (again, IMHO) was what we should have aimed at in the first place, not the dog's breakfast we got, as a result of which countless wheels were spun, energy wasted, and good people left the Forces in disgust. "Purple" is fine, as long as it's a temporary colour created by specific operational needs, from the palette of brown, light blue, and dark blue.
> 
> Cheers



If I may, we already see some of this within the Army on a less grander scale.  Look at the Cbt Arms.  Members of the Cbt Arms are just as fiercely proud of their Trade that they will not change to another.  Still they are also very good team members when it comes to actually fighting with the other Arms as part of a Cbt Team.   

The people I have worked with from the Purple Trades, as fiercely proud of their Trade they may be, have never failed to be Team players in supporting their Cbt Arms brethren. 

Are we creating a tempest in a tea pot?


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## pbi (12 Aug 2010)

> Are we creating a tempest in a tea pot?


Yes, to a certain degree. (But then, if one casts even a cursory look across these pages, one can probably see many tempestuous tea pots...)

I'm an unrepentant Unification-hater. I will never agree with it, or sympathize (much) with the rationalizations used to justify it. That said, I would be dishonest if I didn't admit that natural institutional evolution has done much to heal many of the wounds. I can very clearly remember when it was not permitted to use the proper noun "Army" in any official correspondence: we've come a long way since then. In many ways I think we are approaching just about the best place we could be, barring the De-Unification of the Forces. And that, I have to admit, is a very unlikely development and potentially just as disruptive as Unification was. That is why, as much as I believe in strong and vibrant unique-service cultures, I don't have much time for ideas like scrapping the current rank badge system in favour of bringing back the old pre-Unification system.

Cheers


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## murray b (12 Aug 2010)

MCG said:
			
		

> You are trying to defend your previous outlandish statement with this wildly off-topic post?



Sorry about that but I was really talking about unification.  It was supposed to save money but we never found out if it did.  It should have been a simple matter to have an accountant determine how much was saved.  It could not have been much since the military was already a pretty frugal organization.  If the government wants to save money then they should look at things like ending subsidies to replace cheap disposable incandescent bulbs with expensive disposible fluorescent ones that contain mercury.  There is plenty of fat to trim in Ottawa but there has never been very much of it in the military.  This unification did little to improve Canada's abiltiy to deal with future threats.  It just seems like change for the sake of change to me.

Unification also creates the illusion that the military can operate with far less money.  This makes cutting budgets much easier politically because most voters think it will do little harm.  They believe that most cost reductions will come from improvements in efficiency granted by things like unification.  The idea is if we paint everything the same colour then we can get the paint wholesale sort of thing.


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## FSTO (24 Aug 2010)

Unification (I have to wash my mouth after saying those words) was a basterized dream thought up by Paul Hellyer due to a couple of reasons:
1. His experience during WWII where he was forced out of the RCAF and forced into the Army.
2. His desire to become the PM of Canada and he needed something to create a big splash to counteract the first inklings of Trudeaumainia that would later sweep the nation.

I feel his biggest mistake was thinking that the USMC (his supposed model) was the be all end all of a unified force. People still make that mistake.  What he should have used was any Navy that has marines or naval infantry . The Navy/Marine team gives you the flexiblilty, commonality and tradition that would have made unification a lot simpler and less tramautic than the model Hellyer foisted upon us. It wasn't embraced then and we have spent the last 30 plus years unembracing it since.

Disclaimer - These opinions come from a person with a definite Navy bias.


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## Pusser (25 Aug 2010)

There were a lot of good things that came out of Unification.  The sad part was the unneccessary destruction of pride and tradition and the fact that many of the "problems" that Hellyer believed existed either didn't really exist or were never solved in the process.  For example, if cost reduction and simplicity were really a problem, why were there more orders of dress with the common green uniform thatn there had been in the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF combined?

A common supply system, common pay system, common medical services, etc. are all things that make a lot of sense.  However the former separate services were already moving in that direction anyway.  Hellyer pushed it way too far.  We should have done what the Australians eventually did, which was to combine into one Canadian Forces (with commonality where commanality made sense), with three separate services.


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## linkinarmy (21 Jan 2011)

Would Canada ever change the Canadian Forces to Something similar of the Australia Defence Forces?


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## Edward Campbell (21 Jan 2011)

linkinarmy said:
			
		

> Would Canada ever change the Canadian Forces to Something similar of the Australia Defence Forces?




There's no need; we already have rid ourselves of most of the worst organizational _clusterf*cks_ that Mr. Hellyer's minions perpetrated and, as Pussre said, there were, also some good things that we kept.

Many (most?) of the organizational and administrative problems we you have today are, I would argue, post-unification/post-Hellyer, self inflicted wounds - many caused by obstructed vision which is, in turn, caused by too many senior officers' heads being up too many American arses.

The US DoD is a wonderous thing to behold; it is vast and compelling; but it is not a paragon of organizational or administrative virtue, and things that _may_ (appear to) work there may not be good ideas for different, smaller forces.


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## moirtrevor (16 Aug 2011)

I am an older Aussie, an we down under still have a Royal Australian Air Force, A Royal Australian Navy and a Royal Australian Army Corps.
We are proud of our English heritage and whilst there have been discussions on becoming a republic and changing our flag (which is one quater the Union Jack) nearly 70% of Aussies do not want a change.
Good on you Canada for bringing back the Royal to your fine forces.
Queen Elizabeth 11 is also the Queen of Australia as well as Canada.


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## tomahawk6 (16 Aug 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> There's no need; we already have rid ourselves of most of the worst organizational _clusterf*cks_ that Mr. Hellyer's minions perpetrated and, as Pussre said, there were, also some good things that we kept.
> 
> Many (most?) of the organizational and administrative problems we you have today are, I would argue, post-unification/post-Hellyer, self inflicted wounds - many caused by obstructed vision which is, in turn, caused by too many senior officers' heads being up too many American arses.
> 
> The US DoD is a wonderous thing to behold; it is vast and compelling; but it is not a paragon of organizational or administrative virtue, and things that _may_ (appear to) work there may not be good ideas for different, smaller forces.



I dont know,you guys have adopted our .com structure. :camo:


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## jeffb (16 Aug 2011)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I dont know,you guys have adopted our .com structure. :camo:



And you guys will someday adopt Royal once you realize how heart broken you are over the loss of the monarchy. That is a Tea Party plank isn't it?


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## ProudNewfoundlander (16 Aug 2011)

I dont like the aestetic changes that were made because of unification, but seeing as most, if not all, have been reversed its a moot point. However, I agree with the structural changes. JL Granstein said it best in "Who killed the canadian military" when he said "The arms of the military should *work together* . I also read that the change may have been motivated by hellyers expereince in WW2, whereas he joined the RCAF, was not taken for whatever reason and was instead sent to artillery training in the army, and had to do basic training all over again, and eventually missed the war.


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## Edward Campbell (16 Sep 2011)

Pusser said:
			
		

> Sorry for going off tanget here, but I have to jump in.  No RSM has the authority to lay on extras.  That would be considered punishment and no one can be punished without first being charged, tried, found guilty and sentenced to said punishment.
> 
> Now, before the dogpile starts - I am well aware that RSMs, XOs, Adjts, etc often assign extra duties to all and sundry for a variety of reasons.  My usual advice to minor miscreants is to suck it up and do it because once it's done, it's done.  All is forgotten and we all get on with out lives.  This is often preferable to having a formal charge on record.  However, the fact remains that no one has the authority to punish without a trial.




Slightly off topic but I'm posting this here (because I think it falls into the “funny story about the old days”) rather than in the thread in which is was originally posted by Pusser:

About 45 years ago everyone was reorganizing (if that's the right word to describe chaos) everything; some were trying, usually in vain, to make everyone fit into some sort of purple mould which often seemed more suited to the girl guides than a fighting unit.

Anyone, one sub unit had a middle aged plus sergeant major – a tall, quiet and, actually very pleasant, even kindly man with a pretty spectacular World War II resumé that included parachuting behind enemy lines (before 1944). The sub unit was housed in some old temporary buildings, with which many of us were (fondly) familiar. At one end of the HQ building was stores – with the QMS and storeman and who ever else could hide there, at the other was the OC's office. In the middle was the OR (with a counter to separate the clerk and his helper from the great unwashed) and offices for the sergeant major and the 2IC – leading to the OC's office.

But the highlight of the OR was a big board – everyone had big talc covered boards in those days, but this one was better than most: nicely painted in the unit colours, proper, near professional lettering, and “data fields” that were large enough to be read, easily, from the counter. The title was *“Sergeant Major's Shit List”* and the columns were (roughly) name, reason, from, to, remarks. Thus a soldier could walk into the OR, look at the wall and see:

Bloggins    Boots       16 Sep   21 Sep   Paint B4
Smith        Weapon   16 Sep   25 Sep   Wash Vehs

It was a pretty good system, well understood by everyone up and down the unit's chain of command and, while _open_ to abuse (as ALL systems are) it was, as far as I knew, properly and fairly managed.

In any event, one of the _agents of change_ from some higher, but unknown, HQ came for a visit – in order to impose the purple/girl guides standards on a not especially receptive unit. Of course that _agent of change_ saw the sergeant major's board and, very nearly, squeeled and peed his pants. “You cannot have a *'Shit List,'* he said to the sergeant major, this is the modern era, we treat our people with respect.” (I suspect he (the _agenct of change_) couldn't bring himself to actually say 'soldiers.') The sergeant major answered, quietly and politely: “Of course you are correct, sir. I will get with the programme immediately.”

Later that day the board was revised. All the data remained the same and the intention was abundantly clear, but the title said, in very nice lettering: “Sergeant Major's *S*hould *H*ave *I*ntensive *T*raining List.”

Everyone from the CO on down – except the _agents of change_ – was pleased, and everyone - including that _agent of change_, I guess - went on about the Queen's business, as well as they understood it.


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