# All Things Air Defence/AA (merged)



## krugan

How good is Canada's anti-aircraft abilities, would the equipment we use pose any kind of major defense against lets say America's airforce?  I heard aircraft technology is still years ahead before anyone can make an impact to take away the advantage with anti-aircraft capabilities.

I would think the only future solution would be some kind of laser technology that would make sense to invest heavily in, what are your opinions?


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## Da_man

I think the only thing close to anti-aircraft abilities is NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command)


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## Infanteer

NORAD is not an anti-aircraft ability, it is a military organization.

Canada has a variety of tactical anti-aircraft weapons, do a search in the artillery forum, and you will find enough about them.


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## AlphaCharlie

We have that twin 30mm AA gun, but that's only close range.


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## stukirkpatrick

*Cough*ADATS*cough*


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## leopard11

http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/2_0_29.asp?uSubSection=29&uSection=2
http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/2_0_34.asp?uSubSection=34&uSection=2
http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/2_0_47.asp?uSubSection=47&uSection=2
http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/2_0_4.asp?uSubSection=4&uSection=2

explore those links you may learn a thing or two from them
also heres some videos on air defence(as well as other pieces of equipment): http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/3_2.asp#


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## tabernac

Being an *educated*(mostly) Army forum, I'm supprised it took so long for someone to volunteer some info. (obviously Infanteer knew). Discovery had a British program that reviewed militaries and their equipment. I saw the episode where they reviewed ADATS. They rated it 3rd in the list compared with American, French (I think), and British AA equipment. They said that even though it was an old system, it was sturdy and reliable.


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## krugan

Thanks for the links, but I have already tried doing a search and looking up information.  I can't find anything about how well our AA defense would do against the top military aircraft of the world, that's why I thought I would pose the question here, where maybe some people have a more realistic idea of how well our equipment would do.

I remember watching a show awhile ago about AA defense and how it trailed behind the capabilities of the best aircraft and their defensive systems.


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## Ex-Dragoon

Cheeky....a little under 3 hours from the time the question was asked till when MARC posted the links is not a long time, unless the time space is different where you are from?


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## tabernac

Well, 3 hours is a little slow, compared to the "Combat training in Cadets" topic. This topic is no where near as controversial, so I should have expected it to be slower. The original topic was posted at 4:00, and Marc's explanation at 7:00, so me thinks it a little slow. This forum stretches across 5 time zones, so some posts can seem a little wierd. It would be 10pm here and 1am there.


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## Ex-Dragoon

ALso depends on who is interested in the topic, who is on that might be able to answer and who is on who is willing to do the research.


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## Infanteer

Also depends on who's willing to offer the answer "do a search, it's been asked a million times" for the millionth time.


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## tabernac

"ALso depends on who is interested in the topic, who is on that might be able to answer and who is on who is willing to do the research. "

Should have considered that.


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## krugan

Like I said, I did a search and if the question was asked a million times there would be no problem to post a link or answer the question whether our air defense would be effective against the top aircraft in the world?  To give the specs on the equipment does not answer if it is capable of effectively defending  our skies.


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## twohig

The problem in answering your question is that Canadian Air Defence capabilities have not been tested in actual operation.  I can tell you that with a 80% hit percentage for first-time firers on the ADATS system is pretty impressive.  Go to the Jane's web site and they can give you a lot of info on our capabilities.  And about that British show about air defense, I saw that too and the British Rapier that they had was the latest version, not the one that the troops use, and all the video clips they used to show hits were from the ADATS informational video made by Orlicon aerospace.


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## Guardian

It doesn't look like any gunners have taken a crack at this thread yet... I'll say something on behalf of my AD brethren, but bear in mind that I'm just a mudgunner and haven't had any AD training.

Canada's air defence artillery is pretty good overall. Compared to the field side, which is still using 60's era platforms like the M109 and older guns like the C3, the air defence kit we have is modern (developed in the 80's). The ADATS is an outstanding piece of kit, as it can engage both aerial and armoured ground targets, and has a good radar system. 

As well as the ADATS, the AD uses Javelin manportable missiles and 35mm guns linked to Skyguard radars. However, these systems are likely to be dropped soon in favour of a primary focus on ADATS (Javelin may be kept in a residual capacity). ADATS will be re-engineered and placed on a LAV chassis (that's the plan) and the Army wants to mix it with TOW and the MGS to make an anti-tank organization. What effect this may have on air defence training remains to be seen, but that capability will still exist.

Compared to the States... Well, the Javeling is a VERY Short Range system, while ADATS is a Short range system. Canada possesses no long range system like the US Patriot; but, on the other hand, the US doesn't really have a ground-based air defence system to cover the gap between their Stingers and their Patriot. Our ADATS fills that gap rather nicely, as I understand.... It's one of those few things that we have and they don't.

Now, manning is a big problem - like the rest of the army; lack of funds for training (live missiles are VERY expensive) and the uncertainty about the future resulting from the new anti-tank role are making life hard for the air defenders. Also, there aren't a lot of platforms - Canada only bought 36 ADATS systems, and only has one Reg Force regiment (4th Air Defence Regiment) composed of two batteries.

So in short, the equipment's good, but there's not a lot of it and the pressure on the organization is very high right now.  

If there's any birdgunners in the forum who know more than I do, please add your thoughts....


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## twohig

Well you pretty much hit it on the head.  Being a Bird Gunner, our future has always been rather uncertain.  Now with the new ADATS on LAV chasis, the closeing of Javelin units and the mothballing of the 35 mm guns, we are in a constant state of change.  You're right about the only reg force air defence unit in Canada is also the only one with ADATS being the 4 AD REGT and they are an Army, Navy and Air Force asset, they train with everybody!  

But the ADATS is one nice peace of equipment, even without taking into consideration it was developped in the 1980s.  I was on it for 7 years and I enjoyed working with it.  I actually miss it now that I'm gone.


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## 12alfa

I have always felt nervious around the adats with a signal being beamed outwards for those who hunt such signals (harm?).

Modern systems operate on thermal signatures that don't give off a signal like radar. It's ture that in the 80's this was a good system, but now thermal searching systems have overtaken radar. With soo many systems both ground and air/space based looking in that spectrum, it would seem a risk to light your self up. I may be wrong here, but after reading the capiblities of the electronic warfare units now deployed in operations abroad, I feel the Adats and such systems are not going to last long if the enemy has a good elec/warfare systems in place and knows how to use them.

Am I wrong in this thinking?


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## AmmoTech90

Actually all the ADATS in an area dont need to turn on their radars.  They can be slaved to a single ADATS and get the radar picture from that.  The missile is laser guided and tracked by FLIR/TV so no real radar is needed for that either.  Of course if it wants to operate by itself and detect targets beyond visual range then it needs to fire up the radar.  BTW, this info is all avail on Janes.


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## Ex-Dragoon

And depending on that band of the radar it might not be detected at all by opposition counter measures.


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## 12alfa

From the info I read no part of the spectrum is safe, even turning on a veh can be detected to a certian degree.


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## 12alfa

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> Actually all the ADATS in an area dont need to turn on their radars.   They can be slaved to a single ADATS and get the radar picture from that.   The missile is laser guided and tracked by FLIR/TV so no real radar is needed for that either.   Of course if it wants to operate by itself and detect targets beyond visual range then it needs to fire up the radar.   BTW, this info is all avail on Janes.



Is the sop for radar hunters to hunt down the source (radar) 1st, and them snif out others as well before sending in the a/c to there missions, protected by more anti/radar a/c within the packet?

Turning on any electromagnic equip in a given area while the hunters are around is very dangrous as the equipment in the air have a better los than ground units, or am i reading this wrong? From what I've read this has now (hunting) moved into the realm of drones/uav's now, making the task even harder to sort ot the a/c from the drones, can the adats keep up with this new tech?


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## AmmoTech90

The question is what type of threat does Canada face from electronic countermeasures such as HARM or ALARM type weapons.   Would we deploy against an enemy with those sort of assets if we didn't have air superiority?   Probably not.   Pretty much every SAM with a range of over 10km uses radar for tracking and/or guidance.   Air defence is a layered concept that uses aircraft, long range missiles, medium range missiles, and short/very short range missiles and guns.   Unless we are going to war against the US we will probably be going with them or another ally in which case our AD assets would be in intergrated with theirs.
Emission control is very difficult to implement in this day and age.   If we were to implement complete EMCON for a unit that would mean the unit in question would be operating at 1914 level.   Issue every section two tin cans and length of string and bicyles.   We would not be able to start any vehicles, GPS, PAQs, or coffee makers.   Bring back semaphore for the army.
So, basically, you have to be willing to take risks.   Is it an unreasonalbe risk to turn on all the ADATS as stand alone elements when they are the sole AD assets?   I would say yes.   Is turning on one and datalinking the rest as part of an intergrated air defense plan a reasonalble risk?   I would say yes.   One has to judge the vulnurabilities of a system or piece of equipment in a realistic scenario.   So making sure an APC can stand up against small arms fire is a reasonable scenario that you have to protect against.   Deploying ADATS as the sole AD defense asset against an enemy that has air superiority, drones, and radar seeking missiles is not.   Either that or tell the crew not to turn on the radar and depend on visual target acquisition.

Edit:spelling


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## Ex-Dragoon

12Alfa said:
			
		

> From the info I read no part of the spectrum is safe, even turning on a veh can be detected to a certian degree.



Not all can...depends on your band width.


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## 12alfa

The Us is not the only nation deploying anti-radar wpns.


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## AmmoTech90

12Alfa said:
			
		

> The Us is not the only nation deploying anti-radar wpns.



I never said the US was the only nation with those weapons.  In fact the ALARM missile I mention is manufactured in the UK.  Russia uses the Zvezda Kh-31 (AS-17 Krypton) .  What I said about the US was that unless we were fighting them, we would be allied with them thus be intergrated into the overall Air Defence plan.  I have no idea where you got the idea that I said the US is the only nation with anti-radar weapons.


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## IceHawk

12Alfa I don't think you're understanding the whole picture people are trying to say here.  What they're saying is that yes, ADATS is vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles (HARM) as long as it's RADAR is active, any air defence system is, there is no invincible/undetectable anti-aircraft system.  There is nothing that can be done about RADAR being detectable as of yet.  However, to minimize the risk to ADATS from aircraft carrying HARM style missiles, we would need to have some form of air superiority.  That is where the Americans and our allies come in.  As long as our skys aren't flooded with enemy they stand a fighting chance.  Anyother way the ADATS system mitigates the risk is by networking as mentioned earlier.  One ADATS put's itself at risk by turning on it's RADAR to feed "dormant" ADATS nearby with targeting information.  The idea being that since RADAR can see farther than the missiles shoot, having sleeper ADATS spread out gives the site a larger area of missile coverage and POSSIBLY even the ability to shoot down a HARM carrying aircraft before it comes in range itself to shoot at the active RADAR site (however that ability is purely speculation on my part, ask an Air Defence gunner to be sure).  ADATS is equipped, also mentioned earlier, with Infra-Red and other optical eqipment, however optical targeting systems are by definition limited to visual range and depending on where the ADATS is located may be somewhat usless.  Go to this site: http://www.sfu.ca/casr/101.htm if you want to learn more about Canadian anti-aircraft capabilities and other cool stuff as well, it's an interesting read.


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## MedCorps

Right...  So I was (just) taught that the wartime AD Bty has 2 x SHORAD (read: ADATS )Tps and 1 x VSHORAD (read: Javlin) Tps.  This is incorrect?  

We talked about the end of Skyguard (is Canada going to sell it or war store it?) But is the VSHORAD troops for sure going to be a thing of the past?   The troop am talking about has 6 weapons dets each in a Grizzly.   Humm... what will the Res Force AD do if they get rid of Javlin?  It seemed like a good idea for point defence.... humm... 

Cheers, 

MC


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## twohig

The Javelin system has it's uses for point defence, covering dead zones, placed in a temp kill zone, etc...  I don't necessarily agree on the reasons that it is on it's way out, but I'm just an AD gunner, what do I know.
The ADATS does give off a lot of EM emissions, but to be able to "see" farther than your optics LOS, you still need radar.  The radar is able to give you a target that may not yet have a LOS with you, and if your in C3 mode, only one ADATS is burning while the others are sitting silently scanning waiting for a target.  Our radar is also a passive radar, not a tracking radar, it doesn't lock on to a target, thats the gunners job to do it manually.  That is also why chaff or flares don't confuse the missile, because the missile is guided all the way in to the target by the operator.
The operators aren't just sitting there waiting for the radar to pick something up, they are constantly scanning the sky and the ground for possible targets.


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## IceHawk

Actually, that's a pretty clever way to defeat chaff, thanks for the info!!  I've heard rumblings from someone I know at Shirley's Bay in Ottawa that the CF is working on a true passive radar system that has no emissions and simply listens for echos off aircraft from other EM sources such as FM radio stations, TV signals and other transmissions that invisibly flood our air.  The exactly working are undoubtedly classified and I wounldn't even want to guess at how it works but I think it's an interesting concept nonetheless.


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## Petard

Interesting article, and food for thought considering Canada divested it's ground based air defence capability a few years ago, but the need for all arms air defence sure didn't go away 
http://groundedcuriosity.com/a-shared-responsibility-growing-our-understanding-of-air-defence/


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## Colin Parkinson

Sadly we won't have the capacity to build 3 positions and our guys upon seeing drones will have to resort to rifle fire to bring it down, 1939 ADA for sure.


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## MilEME09

There is a project to get us new shoulder fired AA weapons but its still in its infancy and mot expected to have anything delivered till the mid 20s

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


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## Old Sweat

Essentially we are accepting going into battle with an open flank, exposing our troops to observation and attack from above.


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## GK .Dundas

We are once again expecting someone else  to do the heavy lifting . what  will we do (aside from die in job lots? ) when they can not arrive in time to do something we should already be doing. Apparently aircraft are a product of someone  else's  vivid imagination Aircraft do not exist  or least that seems to be the official position.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

Who made the determination to eliminate our air defense and self-propelled artillery capability?


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## Colin Parkinson

Likely the same people who felt we didn't need tanks, ATGM, pioneers or heavy weapons in Infantry battalions.


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## dapaterson

The same ones who, in the 1990s, decided to keep bands and eliminate fitness instructors in the CAF.

Priorities...


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## Loachman

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Who made the determination to eliminate our air defense and self-propelled artillery capability?



This can be traced to the latter days of WWII, when the Allies had air supremacy and the Canadian Army re-roled many Air Defence troops into Infantry.

The Great Awakening in the mid-eighties saw us acquire ADATS, but the threat was once more assumed to have evaporated once the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact collapsed.

Now it's Tradition.


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## Bird_Gunner45

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The same ones who, in the 1990s, decided to keep bands and eliminate fitness instructors in the CAF.
> 
> Priorities...



Incorrect. The demise of the Ground Based Air Defence is almost entirely a self inflicted wound by the artillery branch. The decision to divest the Javelin and 35mm was driven by the desire of the branch to re-roll reserve AD units and focus resources on the ADATS, as the intent (2005/2006) was to have the ADATS moved to the direct fire squadron. Once the DFS met its fate, the intent for the ADATs changed to use the system as a low level air defence radar and integrate it into the Local Air picture via Link 16 and the ADSI for use in Afghanistan.  However, the technology used for this (which was from the MMEV project) couldn't push the local radar feed to the ADSI due to issues with the ADATS radar.

At the same time, 4 AD started to focus on ASCC and UAS deployments (Sperwer and Scan Eagle) as a means of deploying soldiers. The addition of the UAS started the move towards the transition to the "GS" regiment as the resident UAS expertise became a product of 4 AD.

So, this left the GBAD with only 1 system which was basically undeployable, mechanically unreliable, costly to run, and logistically heavy and a regiment full of SME's in STA. The cancellation of the MMEV also left no clear way forward. There was, at one time (2006) and intent to take Phalynx off of the Frigates to give them to 4 AD as a C-RAM capability, which fell through, and to have the regiment kitted with avengers for the Olympics (2010) which fell through. Moreover, the artillery branch wanted to get into HIMARs, so there was a project at getting HIMARs to fire both SS and SA missiles, which clearly also fell through. Thus, the GBAD was left with no weapon systems once the ADATS was divested in 2012/2013 and no real plan for replacement.

From discussions with many pers in Ottawa it was clearly laid out that the army was concerned about GBAD but the artillery branch was more interested in divesting the capability IOT clear PYs and money for things it deemed more important, such as STA and HIMARs.

On a side note- the RCAS GBAD cell was discussing the inherent issue with defending against a MUAS and came to the AAAD conclusion. The inherent problem with C-MUAS is that you can detect the systems but they would be extremely difficult to target the system directly. The easy solution would be to jam the video feed, rendering the system useless, but requiring some sort of jamming capability. The second option was to engage the system via AAAD, which would be extremely difficult to say the least. The third option would be to engage the control station.

The proposed SOP was that once a launch was detected the main effort would be in identifying where the control system was (since they would need a LOS and would need to be relatively in the open and within 3-5 km of the unit being targetted) based on where the detections were spotted and engaging the control system via artillery or other effect. For those being targeted, the SOP would be to adopt a posture akin to the old "actions on air attack" where the units attempts to hide or disperse before the MUAS can target it and call in their own effects.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

Regardless of what Artillery wanted to do, who was at the top while this happened?

I understand that at times the individual trades are going to try to stuff like this, but the guy at the top has to be responsible for maintaining a big picture view of what's going on.

Especially with how long it appears to take us to procure anything and re-develop a competency, to have allowed the army as a whole to have lost the entire GBAD capability while pursuing other areas of interest, is negligent.

A quick clarification....

I don't understand how air assets could be deemed the best solution for countering opposing UAS assets?  With many of opposing uas assets being COTS toys costing only hundreds of dollars, it seems like a less expensive and more immediate solution would be more appropriate - something like MANTIS in combination with just about any MANPAD-based system that we could buy off the shelf?


Thanks in advance, Matthew.


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## Colin Parkinson

What they could have done is tasked 2-3 Reserve units as AD and given them some light guns, task one Reg force artillery unit to support a Troop of Manpads and a troop of the same guns as the Reserves, using whatever Manpads are used by our allies. Their job is to maintain some expertise in this field. Because we know things fall apart and procurement fails, plus we never have enough air assets to go around.


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## daftandbarmy

Coincidentally, they're making a movie about what happens to an Army that has no adequate anti-air defence: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRtZUkAR2u4


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## FJAG

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> I don't understand how air assets could be deemed the best solution for countering opposing UAS assets?



Welcome to the better part of my artillery career in the 60s and 70s when we had zero air defence assets except our C2s and 30 cals and every exercise scenario started with the stupid phrase "we have air superiority".

As I was leaving in the early eighties we were just starting to rebuild our AD and locating capabilities but it's not hard to understand where a decade of darkness followed by a decade of fighting an insurgency which had no air resources has led to the situation we're in now.

I do agree with the question about who are the senior leaders responsible for this state of being? Leaving it up to the infantry and the artillery to sort out their own organizations within the limited permissible PYs seems to me an abrogation of responsibility within the senior army and CF leadership to develop sound doctrine and overall force structures.

 :cheers:


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## dapaterson

Gee, who commanded the Army in 2006?


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## Bird_Gunner45

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Regardless of what Artillery wanted to do, who was at the top while this happened?
> 
> I understand that at times the individual trades are going to try to stuff like this, but the guy at the top has to be responsible for maintaining a big picture view of what's going on.
> 
> Especially with how long it appears to take us to procure anything and re-develop a competency, to have allowed the army as a whole to have lost the entire GBAD capability while pursuing other areas of interest, is negligent.
> 
> A quick clarification....
> 
> I don't understand how air assets could be deemed the best solution for countering opposing UAS assets?  With many of opposing uas assets being COTS toys costing only hundreds of dollars, it seems like a less expensive and more immediate solution would be more appropriate - something like MANTIS in combination with just about any MANPAD-based system that we could buy off the shelf?
> 
> 
> Thanks in advance, Matthew.



Ahhh yes, that's the part of the story that was left out. The artillery branch advisor pushed the plan based on his preference for HIMARS to the then Army Commander, LGen Leslie, who conveniently also hated the Air Defence (he said as much at a town hall in Gagetown) and advised as such. The decision to maintain a capability gap was then decided upon for 2 key reasons:

1. The push at the time was for a Counter Rocket, Mortar, and Artillery (C-RAM) system since it was believed that an air threat outside of C-RAM didn't exist; and
2. The GBAMD project was in swing with an anticipated completion date of 2021 at that time and it was believed that it was better to wait for a more modern solution than to rush something. 

There were attempts from 2012 to today to procure an interim GBAD system, including staff checks in DLR for Stinger/RBS-90 missiles and the request from 2 VP for a MANPAD system last year. The first one was rejected as it was believed that the threat was only C-RAM and UAS in nature, which are not systems that can be readily or easily engaged by a MANPAD system. The second is still in the ringer.

Air assets ARE NOT optimal for counter UAS, particularly at the SUAS and MUAS levels. For something at the HALE/MALE level an aircraft could certainly do it, but the others are too small and slow for easy identification and generally work in the close fight.


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## Infanteer

I guess this is where 1% of the GDP gets us.... :-\


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## MilEME09

Funny how changing how assets are allocated for the airforce creates a capability gap. However not having AD for almost 10 years is not a capability gap.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


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## Eye In The Sky

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> I don't understand how air assets could be deemed the best solution for countering opposing UAS assets?  With many of opposing uas assets being COTS toys costing only hundreds of dollars, it seems like a less expensive and more immediate solution would be more appropriate - something like MANTIS in combination with just about any MANPAD-based system that we could buy off the shelf?



The systems are out there, we just are hoping someone else buys and deploys them.  This is the way we do business, its called piggy-backing.  Hell, we don't even do SFA for Christmas for the troops deployed on IMPACT, just let the USAF and DFAC do all the real lifting.  It seems to be our SOP, and our second SOP is to make excuses about why we do the first SOP.

Other people, of course, are spending money to counter the UAV/UAS/RPA threat...http://www.janes.com/article/67118/auds-achieves-trl-9-deploys-with-us-forces

The new cam and concealment on the battle field could be the IR spectrum, etc in the near future.  If you are out there, and not under cover, and someone is above you with IR or EO...good luck hiding.  Paint yourself green, scrim up...not going to matter much if someone has an IR lens on you from above.


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## Loachman

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Funny how changing how assets are allocated for the airforce creates a capability gap.



That had nothing to do with a capability gap. Somebody needed an excuse to buy anything-but-an-F35 in order to fulfill a campaign promise, no matter how ridiculous that campaign promise was.


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## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> The systems are out there, we just are hoping someone else buys and deploys them.  This is the way we do business, its called piggy-backing.  Hell, we don't even do SFA for Christmas for the troops deployed on IMPACT, just let the USAF and DFAC do all the real lifting.  It seems to be our SOP, and our second SOP is to make excuses about why we do the first SOP.
> 
> Other people, of course, are spending money to counter the UAV/UAS/RPA threat...http://www.janes.com/article/67118/auds-achieves-trl-9-deploys-with-us-forces
> 
> The new cam and concealment on the battle field could be the IR spectrum, etc in the near future.  If you are out there, and not under cover, and someone is above you with IR or EO...good luck hiding.  Paint yourself green, scrim up...not going to matter much if someone has an IR lens on you from above.



It's sad but true in this case.... when they divested the ADATS the Army commander simply said that "the US would provide any AD we needed". When he was asked why, by the same logic, we needed field artillery, armour, aircraft, or HIMARs he was less than impressed.


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## Rifleman62

As stated in another thread, Moochers.



> Thou shalt not take moochers into thy hut?
> Homer



Sooner or later Pres Trump is going to lay down the law.

https://army.ca/forums/threads/82898.1650.html

Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster (President's National Security Advisor) on foreign policy. 30 Apr 17 Extract from Fox News Sunday With Chris Wallace transcript.


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## Colin Parkinson

According to Wiki
20mm guns would give us coverage to 1600m-2600m 
35mm Skysweeper was 13,600m
Mistral SAM was a 6km range

The 20mm would be good for the reserves, smallish footprints and good for a lot of the smaller UAV/drones

The 35mm bigger footprint but better for the larger UAV's and the Mistral (or similar) would give us enough presence to deter ground attack aircraft.


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## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> When he was asked why, by the same logic, we needed field artillery, armour, aircraft, or HIMARs he was less than impressed.


He wasn't used to being questioned by his closest advisor -- his mirror.


But thank you for these posts; it's always awesome seeing informed input.   :nod:


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## NavyShooter

The 20mm would be a good start, we probably still have a pile of Oerlikon's in the system from WWII that we can put back in service, maybe not even needing to hit museums this time?


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## Colin Parkinson

and we could hire Achmed to make a Portee mount for it, if we left it to the military we would take 20 years to design a mount and then have no money left to buy them.


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## Kirkhill

Why not just portee the 25mm?  Parts and ammo are already in the system.







https://youtu.be/w-9yDsaZjGo


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## Kirkhill

Or, related.






The M230 Link Fed Bushmaster Chain Gun was integrated on to weapons stations from Kongsberg and EOS. The remote weapons stations were installed on both the Oshkosh JLTV and a Land Cruiser – showing the flexibility of a lightweight but capable chain gun on differing vehicles.

30mm RWS on a pick up truck.

http://www.orbitalatk.com/News-Room/PrinterFriendly.asp?prid=215


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## NavyShooter

In thinking about this....I think the US Secret Service probably has more AA defense capability than the CAF does....at least based on RUMINT.


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## Fishbone Jones

I don't think that I'd want to be in the cab of that pickup while the gun is overhead like that and firing.


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## Humphrey Bogart

Low flying UAVs have already met their match:  it's the helicopter and they fly in the helicopters predatory area.

Our Army currently suffers from a lack of appreciation of the three dimensional nature of the battlefield.  Successful Air Defence is all about dispersed layering and ensuring you've got interlocking arcs at different altitudes.

No VSHORAD, SHORAD, HIMAD or THAAD.  We also have no Attack Helicopters, EW Helicopters, AEWC Helicopters.

Helicopters are essentially very mobile Tunguskas.  The US actually ran an exercise in the 70a and 80s called JCATCH which looked at using helicopters in Air to Air Engagements, they even managed to shoot down jets.


----------



## Loachman

Helicopters are not good defensive weapons, as their time on station is limited. They are much more effective in offensive roles.

Small, low-altitude UAVs are hard to spot from the air, especially as one's attention is concentrated elsewhere.

Small, low-altitude UAVs are much more of a threat to helicopters, from inadvertent collision.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Low flying UAVs have already met their match:  it's the helicopter and they fly in the helicopters predatory area.
> 
> Our Army currently suffers from a lack of appreciation of the three dimensional nature of the battlefield.  Successful Air Defence is all about dispersed layering and ensuring you've got interlocking arcs at different altitudes.
> 
> No VSHORAD, SHORAD, HIMAD or THAAD.  We also have no Attack Helicopters, EW Helicopters, AEWC Helicopters.
> 
> Helicopters are essentially very mobile Tunguskas.  The US actually ran an exercise in the 70a and 80s called JCATCH which looked at using helicopters in Air to Air Engagements, they even managed to shoot down jets.



Successful Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) include army, navy, and air force assets tied together via tactical data links for IFF and real time communication from the JFACC through to the shooter systems. This isn't an army problem per say, but I would argue rather a CAF problem since all three services tend to want to stay within their own sandboxes. The RCAS was pushing through a recommendation that the CAF prepare a Joint Air Defence pub and doctrine such as the Brits and Americans have in the 2012 timeframe, but I don't know if it got much traction. There was a joint airspace control pub that was produced, but we (Army Air Defence) largely disagreed with it since it was extremely air force centric and the authors didn't really seem to understand the TAGS-AAGS system, particularly the AAGS part (Theatre air ground system- Army Air Ground System). 

That said, helicopters can certainly be used in an anti-air role, but that's not their primary role. In an IADS, the JFACC and staff will assign hostile air targets to shooter systems (army, navy, and air force) based on system type (UAS, strike, fast air, helo, etc), location, and available AD systems. This keeps the air battle from becoming a free for all and allows systems such as CAS airframes and aviation to remain outside of enemy AD areas (ground and air) and on their tasks as determined in the ATO by the JFLCC or JFC. 

AD is very much a system of systems, so we cannot just acquire a 20mm, 35mm, MANPAD, or helicopter and say we have "air defence". The C2 and BMC4I (Battlefield Management, Communications, computers, command and control and intelligence) are the critical elements of the IADS and in my opinion more critical than an actual shooter. That's why its frustrating when TACP types and other army types question why we have ASCCs... in short, they provide the BMC4I function and integration into the IADS.


----------



## MilEME09

What about something like the Danish Otomatic project, take a rapid firing naval gun, put it on a self propelled chassis with a Fire Control Radar, point at target and engage. We do have a couple guns off some destroyers recently decommissions that could be used  >


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Loachman said:
			
		

> Helicopters are not good defensive weapons, as their time on station is limited. They are much more effective in offensive roles.
> 
> Small, low-altitude UAVs are hard to spot from the air, especially as one's attention is concentrated elsewhere.
> 
> Small, low-altitude UAVs are much more of a threat to helicopters, from inadvertent collision.


I'm not thinking of helicopters loitering around looking for UAVs, I'm thinking more of attack helicopters killing UAVs as an extension of their existing combat support role.  Ahelicopter like an Apache Longbow is a potent defensive weapon when employed in a Combat Support Role to other maneuver forces.  The newest AH-64E Guardian can even control its own UAVs.  

My point on UAVs is that the small ones ground forces are worried about operate in the same airspace as helicopters.  Attack Helicopters carry enough weapons that they can easily deal with a UAV, especially the small little ones AGFs use.  A burst from a 20mm cannon should do the trick or a stinger missile carried by either the helicopter itself or the UAVs it controls.

Attack Helicopters, VSHORAD, SHORAD, HIMAD, etc all need to be taken in to consideration when creating an Air Defence Plan.  


			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Successful Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) include army, navy, and air force assets tied together via tactical data links for IFF and real time communication from the JFACC through to the shooter systems. This isn't an army problem per say, but I would argue rather a CAF problem since all three services tend to want to stay within their own sandboxes. The RCAS was pushing through a recommendation that the CAF prepare a Joint Air Defence pub and doctrine such as the Brits and Americans have in the 2012 timeframe, but I don't know if it got much traction. There was a joint airspace control pub that was produced, but we (Army Air Defence) largely disagreed with it since it was extremely air force centric and the authors didn't really seem to understand the TAGS-AAGS system, particularly the AAGS part (Theatre air ground system- Army Air Ground System).
> 
> That said, helicopters can certainly be used in an anti-air role, but that's not their primary role. In an IADS, the JFACC and staff will assign hostile air targets to shooter systems (army, navy, and air force) based on system type (UAS, strike, fast air, helo, etc), location, and available AD systems. This keeps the air battle from becoming a free for all and allows systems such as CAS airframes and aviation to remain outside of enemy AD areas (ground and air) and on their tasks as determined in the ATO by the JFLCC or JFC.
> 
> AD is very much a system of systems, so we cannot just acquire a 20mm, 35mm, MANPAD, or helicopter and say we have "air defence". The C2 and BMC4I (Battlefield Management, Communications, computers, command and control and intelligence) are the critical elements of the IADS and in my opinion more critical than an actual shooter. That's why its frustrating when TACP types and other army types question why we have ASCCs... in short, they provide the BMC4I function and integration into the IADS.



You said it better than I ever could, systems of systems  :goodpost:


----------



## NavyShooter

Isn't the F-35 the 'penultimate' system of systems integration?

I'd agree, an integrated solution makes much sense, and is where we should look to go.

However.

As a baby step, how about we buy a few hundred Stingers for the infantry battalions to have onhand for local defense, and they buy a few of the Avenger turrets and pick a vehicle to mount them on, then you have mobile as well as portable defence.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Isn't the F-35 the 'penultimate' system of systems integration?
> 
> I'd agree, an integrated solution makes much sense, and is where we should look to go.
> 
> However.
> 
> As a baby step, how about we buy a few hundred Stingers for the infantry battalions to have onhand for local defense, and they buy a few of the Avenger turrets and pick a vehicle to mount them on, then you have mobile as well as portable defence.



I agree that Stingers would be a good stop gap, but disagree that they have any place in an Inf battalion. The requirement to integrate into the IADS as well as to create the sensor to shooter link from the JFACC down is more than a secondary duty.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I agree that Stingers would be a good stop gap, but disagree that they have any place in an Inf battalion. The requirement to integrate into the IADS as well as to create the sensor to shooter link from the JFACC down is more than a secondary duty.



I sense your fear..... 

.......of an 18 year old private, with trench foot and a 3 day sleep deficit, accidentally shooting down our own aircraft.


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> .... disagree that they have any place in an Inf battalion.


Ya.  Next the recce guys would want some company...someone with some sort of anti-armour capability... some explosives and other engineering-type stuff (with beards)... hell, maybe some integrated indirect fire weapons.  

Someone could get hurt!   That's just crazy talk!


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Ya.  Next the recce guys would want some company...someone with some sort of anti-armour capability... some explosives and other engineering-type stuff (with beards)... hell, maybe some integrated indirect fire weapons.
> 
> Someone could get hurt!   That's just crazy talk!



That's not what I meant, but I _think there was sarcasm in there.

I'm all for infantry getting back AT, Pioneers, and mortars. I just don't believe that AD weapons can be easily integrated into an Inf Bn unless they are willing to create a platoon-coy of AD pers as a full time duty with the integration capabilities from JFACC to shooter. _


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> That's not what I meant, but I _think there was sarcasm in there.
> 
> I'm all for infantry getting back AT, Pioneers, and mortars. I just don't believe that AD weapons can be easily integrated into an Inf Bn unless they are willing to create a platoon-coy of AD pers as a full time duty with the integration capabilities from JFACC to shooter.
> _


_

AT and Pioneers are about providing capabilities.  Mortars are about providing a weapons system. 

The Old Army provided a "group" of mortars and a "group" of machine guns.  Those weapons provided capabilities with the machine guns being able to provide both DFS and AA fires.  Heavy caliber machine guns (starting with Nordenfeldts and Pom Poms in the Boer War) have always been part of the mix.  An ex-Cal High of my acquaintaince survived a 20mm round from an AA gun in Normandy.  In the Falklands, at Goose Green, one of the major tactical problems were the 35mm AA guns used in the DFS role.

AT can be provided with guns or missiles.  Just like AA.

So here's a thought:

Option A - Combat Support Company includes AT, AA, DFS, IFS, Engineering and Recce
Option B - Combat Support Company includes Guns, Missiles, Mortars, Pioneers and Scout/Snipers.

I propose that Option B appeals because of the benefits in training and maintenance with training being geared to using the weapons effectively against a variety of targets and all being integrated into a common defensive/offensive plan of operations.

The Mortars and Guns adjust their ammunition currently, depending on the target set.  The Missile Department is equally capable of adjusting the ordnance ejected from a common launcher, again, depending on the target set.

Infanteers with rifles used to contribute to the Anti-Air capability.  

Doesn't it all come down to a matter of Command, Control and Fire Discipline?

_


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> ... but I _think there was sarcasm in there._


_    :nod:_


----------



## Infanteer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> That's not what I meant, but I _think there was sarcasm in there.
> 
> I'm all for infantry getting back AT, Pioneers, and mortars. I just don't believe that AD weapons can be easily integrated into an Inf Bn unless they are willing to create a platoon-coy of AD pers as a full time duty with the integration capabilities from JFACC to shooter.
> _


_

As someone who knows infantry type people, I think they'd agree with this statement._


----------



## MilEME09

Which would mean one or more Support weapons Platoons with say an AA section, AT section, indirect fire section, and direct fire section (medium/heavy MG's).


----------



## Old Sweat

After E Battery gave up its para role in 1993, the Airborne Air Defence Section was posted to the Canadian Airborne Regiment and stated with the regiment until the disbandment. That may or may not be viable option, but I would prefer to see air defence sections remain part of a battery and be grouped with supported arms units as required for exercises and operations.


----------



## Lumber

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> That said, helicopters can certainly be used in an anti-air role, but that's not their primary role. In an IADS, the JFACC and staff will assign hostile air targets to shooter systems (army,* navy*, and air force) based on system type (UAS, strike, fast air, helo, etc), location, and available AD systems. This keeps the air battle from becoming a free for all and allows systems such as CAS airframes and aviation to remain outside of enemy AD areas (ground and air) and on their tasks as determined in the ATO by the JFLCC or JFC.



That's not quite how AD in the Navy works. AAD for naval units is the prerogative of the Anti Air Warfare Commander (AAWC). He determines what are hostile air targets and he alone issues take orders. In addition, individual units are free to employ point-defence AA weapons as necessary. This, of course, is all within whatever constraints/guidelines are set out by the Composite Warfare Commander.

Now, in the littoral environment, that could be a different story. There will probably be very specific guidelines on how a warship CO is allowed to employ his AAD weapons to fire on air targets over land. However, if a warship was operating in the littoral environment, say in support of an amphibious landing, then I don't think the CO would be waiting for JFACC approval to shoot down hostile FBAs or missiles directly threatening his unit.


----------



## Kirkhill

recceguy said:
			
		

> I don't think that I'd want to be in the cab of that pickup while the gun is overhead like that and firing.



Sorry to the rest of you but I wanted to address this.

My sense of how you might use this would be something along the lines of:

Gunner drives Gun-Vehicle to Firing Point.
Gunner halts Gun-Vehicle 25 m from Firing Point
Gunner dismounts Gun-Vehicle, loads ammo as required and checks weapon status.
Gunner takes cover
Gunner reverses Gun-Vehicle into battery in a prepared, covered position using a wired remote control (wired to minimize EW vulnerabilities)
Gunner traverses Gun to rear of Gun-Vehicle remotely
Gunner covers her arcs remotely
Gunner engages targets until:
       ordered to ceasefire
       runs out of ammunition
       receives effective fire
Gunner remotely manoeuvers Gun-Vehicle to Gunner's position.
Gunner mounts Gun-Vehicle 
Gunner drives Gun-Vehicle to FARP or next Firing Position and is reloaded by ammunition resupply team.
Repeat as necessary.

One gun. One vehicle. One person.   Two people with Two Gun-Vehicles make up a Team.  Vehicle size largest suitable for helo transport.  Gun size largest suitable for vehicle that can be transported by helicopter.


----------



## a_majoor

Looking at this a bit sideways, I would suspect that the place for a C-RAM system would be at the unit to battlegroup level (since incoming RAM tends to spoil your day) while GBAD is battlegroup and above to cover the larger areas of airspace. There can be a level of overlap (C-RAM weapons would certainly be deadly to small UAV's and probably capable of forcing aircraft and helicopters to divert or at least complicate any attack runs and egress routes, while GBAD should be capable of zapping UAVs that show themselves over the airspace).

Given the potential overlap of roles, there could also be an overlap of equipment, with "shooters" carrying similar weapons systems (say 25mm cannon and some sort of SAM or MANPADS on a mount), but coupled to different sensors and data links. These could be as small as "Avengers" based on utility truck chassis or as large as "Blazers" built on LAV chassis (for commonality of logistics, movement and protection).


----------



## NavyShooter

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Looking at this a bit sideways, I would suspect that the place for a C-RAM system would be at the unit to battlegroup level (since incoming RAM tends to spoil your day) while GBAD is battlegroup and above to cover the larger areas of airspace. There can be a level of overlap (C-RAM weapons would certainly be deadly to small UAV's and probably capable of forcing aircraft and helicopters to divert or at least complicate any attack runs and egress routes, while GBAD should be capable of zapping UAVs that show themselves over the airspace).
> 
> Given the potential overlap of roles, there could also be an overlap of equipment, with "shooters" carrying similar weapons systems (say 25mm cannon and some sort of SAM or MANPADS on a mount), but coupled to different sensors and data links. These could be as small as "Avengers" based on utility truck chassis or as large as "Blazers" built on LAV chassis (for commonality of logistics, movement and protection).



So, the problem there is that C-RAM is very limited in range.  (~2-3km at most I think) and very limited in magazine space (1583 rds)  so while it might cover a small bubble of battlespace, it's also not a system that I thing belongs anywhere outside of a FOB or a larger base.  It's not really designed as a field deployed system.

The *nice* thing about the C-RAM is that it's all one piece, a flat-bed with both a search and track RADAR integrated, and a built-in gun system.

-Stop-gap of Shoulder fired Stingers gets an initial capability at the tactical level.  Issue one to every LAV.

-Follow up with a short-medium range AA missile on a vehicle mount with a better sighting system, think Avenger, or Chaparral, keep this with the Battalion CP 

So far, we're not into anything integrated, just stand-alone equipment and vehicles that can be attached to give a local capability for AA.

Either of those would be a big step in the right direction, but to bring in an integrated AA suite would be the ideal....something that sockets into the 'system of systems' and gives a medium-long range capability.

NS


----------



## Colin Parkinson

All for SAM's of al types, but some guns as well, when the air threat is small drones, they can service that target and crunchies.


----------



## Kirkhill

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> So, the problem there is that C-RAM is very limited in range.  (~2-3km at most I think) and very limited in magazine space (1583 rds)  so while it might cover a small bubble of battlespace, it's also not a system that I thing belongs anywhere outside of a FOB or a larger base.  It's not really designed as a field deployed system.
> 
> The *nice* thing about the C-RAM is that it's all one piece, a flat-bed with both a search and track RADAR integrated, and a built-in gun system.
> 
> -Stop-gap of Shoulder fired Stingers gets an initial capability at the tactical level.  Issue one to every LAV.
> 
> -Follow up with a short-medium range AA missile on a vehicle mount with a better sighting system, think Avenger, or Chaparral, keep this with the Battalion CP
> 
> So far, we're not into anything integrated, just stand-alone equipment and vehicles that can be attached to give a local capability for AA.
> 
> Either of those would be a big step in the right direction, but to bring in an integrated AA suite would be the ideal....something that sockets into the 'system of systems' and gives a medium-long range capability.
> 
> NS



And I think that is where the NASAMS system comes into play



> NASAMS is renowned for its
> use of the Raytheon AMRAAM missile,
> but is furthermore operational with
> command and control of a range of guns
> and short and medium range missiles,
> such as e.g. L-70 guns, RBS 70 and HAWK.
> It has also proven interoperability with
> directed-energy weapons (DEWs) and
> longer range systems, such as Patriot.
> A total of eleven nations have acquired
> the KONGSBERG command and control
> solution adapted to their requirements.
> The Syste m
> A standard NASAMS unit has a modular
> design comprising a command post FDC,
> an active 3D radar AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel,
> a passive electro-optic and infra-red
> sensor and a number of missile canister
> launchers with AMRAAM missiles.
> Normally, four NASAMS units are
> netted in a battalion network.
> The system is tied together with a
> uniquely designed ”hard-real-time”
> communication network to ensure
> minimum latency over large distances
> for maximum performance of the
> AMRAAM missile.
> This modular design permits mission
> oriented task force organization of
> NASAMS, allowing the operators to
> maximize the effect of the components
> and tailor the system to the task



https://www.kongsberg.com/en/kds/products/groundbasedairdefencesystems/nasams/

Click on the NASAMS - Air Defence System link embedded in the link above.

It is a distributed modular system that links dispersed gun and missile modules over a wide area.



> Defends a large geographical area
> 
> The radar and launcher elements can be
> deployed over a large area separated by
> up to 25 kilometres, providing an extended
> coverage with few elements.
> 
> Dispersed elements increase its survivability against
> enemy air and ground attacks.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile - the counter to a high tech air defence network:

A bunch of low cost spoofers

http://www.businessinsider.com/watch-navy-locust-launcher-fire-drones-2017-4

Edited to add the correct link.


----------



## a_majoor

C-RAM based on CIWS is most certainly a "fixed" application, but I seem to recall the ADATS/SKYSWEEPER combo was supposed to be capable of limited C-RAM in the 1980's (and a 35mm cannon firing AHEAD ammunition would spoil anyone's day).

So I am thinking Avenger or Blazer type vehicles with highly accurate short range sensors could be distributed across the AO to deal with that threat. The same vehicles could also be purchased and distributed to GBAD units and linked to different sensors and an integrated AA network to deal with other threats (maybe changing out the missiles in the missile pod for longer range weapons, or having different missiles in each pod to get around enemy countermeasures, much like the Israeli "Spider" system has 4 radar guided missiles and 4 IR guided missiles).


----------



## Underway

Air defence is definitely is not an infantry specialization.  The equipment, doctrine, and use are very specialized and need to operate independently to function properly like armour or artillery do.  

If the army is getting back into AD then they need to put it as an artillery asset and deploy it properly.  IIRC (and I'm sure someone here with more experience can attest) AD troops were usually deployed way out from the main effort in the battlespace.  The ADAT's were deployed far from the armour and infantry (*edit: from a reference online 6 ADATS up to 20km from each other) in order to interdict air attack before they got into MANPADS range of those assets.  Then inside that outer defence square were the MANPADS positions, then inside that was the  Skyguard 35mm.  Classic layered defence system.  All of these were integrated into their own comms net, command and control system, sensor etc... 

So if you are going to do it within the old doctrinal structure, I think at a minimum an ADAT's type system with an addition of MANPADS position troops and integrated Link 16.  If the doctrine needs to be different then maybe an ADAT's type system is fine.

The C-RAM is basically the Skyguard, which is really only useful for very close range stuff (as Thucydides pointed out).  If bullets are important you could do an LAV-AD system like the USMC instead which combines vehicle launched MANPADS and a 20mm Gatling "Equalizer" gun, which has the same ammo as the F-35 (and F-18 IIRC) for drone shooting.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Underway, the infantry can and have used Manpads and HMG’s to ward off attacks on themselves. These would be a Coy asset with the CO determining the best location and whether they use their HMG’s in ground defense or air. So the Manpad detachment would get their comms from the Coy HQ who would have to coordinate any ceasefires for friendly attacking aircraft in the sector. But you are correct that the vehicle borne system are rightly an artillery system and would be tied into a network (hopefully).


----------



## Kirkhill

I think it disconcerting to be watching missiles etc incoming and having no way to counter them beyond picking up a handset and....

"Operator? Can you put me through to the nearest Air Defence Detachment?..... Yes.  I'll hold."


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I think it disconcerting to be watching missiles etc incoming and having no way to counter them beyond picking up a handset and....
> 
> "Operator? Can you put me through to the nearest Air Defence Detachment?..... Yes.  I'll hold."



Mind you troops have had to contend with wayward bombs and bullets with no handset to use......


----------



## Underway

Colin P said:
			
		

> Underway, the infantry can and have used Manpads and HMG’s to ward off attacks on themselves. These would be a Coy asset with the CO determining the best location and whether they use their HMG’s in ground defense or air. So the Manpad detachment would get their comms from the Coy HQ who would have to coordinate any ceasefires for friendly attacking aircraft in the sector. But you are correct that the vehicle borne system are rightly an artillery system and would be tied into a network (hopefully).



That makes some sense as an individual Coy asset for point defence, really no different then elevating the LAV turret and blasting away.  But what I was referring too was a specific MANPADs section that is detached specifically for Battle Group air defence.  No reason you can't do both, especially as the field artillery and armour would probably appreciate the assist.

AD against drones seems to be a big problem as well.  I would expect that the best way to deal with most civi spec drones is EW, with either a jam, fry or take over control possibility as their electronics are not hardened.  Milspec drones might still be able to be jammed or fried.  Detecting them quickly and then dealing with them seems to be a hard part.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

With all the EW stuff that is going to be going on in the near future, there may be some wisdom in a having a gun and a good optical sight as part of the plan. Low flying attack aircraft woulds still be at risk from it.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Thucydides said:
			
		

> C-RAM based on CIWS is most certainly a "fixed" application, but I seem to recall the ADATS/SKYSWEEPER combo was supposed to be capable of limited C-RAM in the 1980's (and a 35mm cannon firing AHEAD ammunition would spoil anyone's day).
> 
> So I am thinking Avenger or Blazer type vehicles with highly accurate short range sensors could be distributed across the AO to deal with that threat. The same vehicles could also be purchased and distributed to GBAD units and linked to different sensors and an integrated AA network to deal with other threats (maybe changing out the missiles in the missile pod for longer range weapons, or having different missiles in each pod to get around enemy countermeasures, much like the Israeli "Spider" system has 4 radar guided missiles and 4 IR guided missiles).



ADATS was never designed for a  C-RAM capability though it had the capacity to engage Cruise missiles. The Gun/Skyguard (not skysweeper) was designed with some C-RAM in mind, but this was to be more of a vital point defence against larger munitions vice artillery and mortar rounds. The US trialled the Gun/Skyguard in Gagetown in the summer of 2006 for that purpose and never went forward, choosing to use the CIWS instead as it was deemed more capable at that time.

If you're talking about C-RAM than an avenger has zero capability as the missile has to be actively locked onto the target by the gunner and isn't radar guided. Further, the stinger missile isn't a feasible C-RAM weapon as it has a delayed impact fuze, meaning it would have to contact the incoming round. The system was designed to engage low level aviation and air, not missiles or other munitions. 

Finally, "Swapping out" the missile is easier said than done as it would need to have the same guidance and control systems within the vehicle.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> With all the EW stuff that is going to be going on in the near future, there may be some wisdom in a having a gun and a good optical sight as part of the plan. Low flying attack aircraft woulds still be at risk from it.



You mean like the 'Gimpy on a Stick' we used to practice with?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teDnN9OJzlg

These were fun to shoot.... especially the gi-huge ammo allocation that cam along with the LLAD package, seen here in Hongers...


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Underway said:
			
		

> Air defence is definitely is not an infantry specialization.  The equipment, doctrine, and use are very specialized and need to operate independently to function properly like armour or artillery do.
> 
> If the army is getting back into AD then they need to put it as an artillery asset and deploy it properly.  IIRC (and I'm sure someone here with more experience can attest) AD troops were usually deployed way out from the main effort in the battlespace.  The ADAT's were deployed far from the armour and infantry (*edit: from a reference online 6 ADATS up to 20km from each other) in order to interdict air attack before they got into MANPADS range of those assets.  Then inside that outer defence square were the MANPADS positions, then inside that was the  Skyguard 35mm.  Classic layered defence system.  All of these were integrated into their own comms net, command and control system, sensor etc...
> 
> So if you are going to do it within the old doctrinal structure, I think at a minimum an ADAT's type system with an addition of MANPADS position troops and integrated Link 16.  If the doctrine needs to be different then maybe an ADAT's type system is fine.
> 
> The C-RAM is basically the Skyguard, which is really only useful for very close range stuff (as Thucydides pointed out).  If bullets are important you could do an LAV-AD system like the USMC instead which combines vehicle launched MANPADS and a 20mm Gatling "Equalizer" gun, which has the same ammo as the F-35 (and F-18 IIRC) for drone shooting.



an Intergrated Air Defence System (IADS) is a "system of systems" designed to counter a wide range of air threats based on which systems are best suited to engage said threats. From a GBAD perspective, GBAD was not intended to be the primary defensive Counter Air (DCA) capability- fighters were. So, for GBAD the primary DCA tasks going forward would be counter UAS, counter Aviation, counter munitions, and then SOME counter fast air/strike. Depending on what the doctrinal model decided going forward is will determine what system is needed. For example, if GBAD is to focus on a airfield or point defence (FOB say) capability than it would be focussed on C-RAM gun skyshield type capability with a back up missile capability to defend against UAS (if needed) or if there was an aviation or fast air threat to said vital point. If it is to be deployed to support manoeuvre, than you need something more mobile to guard against aviation and UAS. So, it's not as easy as throwing out systems and hoping that they meet the intent. Realistically, for there to be a successful Canadian IADS we need integration with air and navy sensors (Link 16/Link 11) and with air and army shooters and sensors. We would also require potentially multiple systems to counter the plethora of threats. For example, if we were to procure a C-RAM system with a CIWS shooter than we would have no capability to engage anything other than munitions.

As for the ADATS... it didn't always deploy far from infantry or armour, nor did it have to. GBAD has 4 tactical tasks- Direct Support, General Support, Reinforcing, or General Support Reinforcing. If the ADATS were deployed in a DS role than they were given their AD priorities from the supported commander, so could be tasked to defend a defensive position, AA, etc. If they were GS, they were given priorities by the AD commander based on the Area Air Defence Plan. If they were reinforcing, they were given their priorities and tasks by the reinforced AD commander, and if they were GSR they were given priorities and tasks by the AD commander with a secondary task to reinforce the other AD units. To whit- generally, javelins were DS to manoeuvre units or they were given to the ADATS unit as reinforcing to cover gaps in the coverage. As a young ADATS Tp Comd I can remember being co-located with other arms and doing coord with the local commander. Finally, even if we were tasked OPCON to a manoeuvre unit with a GS task, we would/could find ourselves occupying or taking the same ground as other arms.


----------



## NavyShooter

A System of Systems is what we *SHOULD* be deploying.

Long range SAMs (Patriot?) + Mid-range SAM/Gun + Short-range Point-defense + C-RAM Capable system for fixed positions/bases, all tied together with Link for an integrated picture.

Right now, we have none of that.

So, let's look at the art of the possible.

Procurement of a new SAM system is a long process, unless we're in a war and sole-source it, or the procurement system gets stood on its head.  So, that knocks out the LR and MR options...along with the integrated system capability.

We're left with short-range point defense.

Options there would be the HMMV based AA system, or buying a bunch of Stingers and giving them out to the troops.

I don't think we're going to buy a HMMV based system....again with the procurement.

Let's consider the TOWs that are coming into the stream....a man-portable AT missile system that seems pretty easy to use.

Suppose we brought some Stingers in by simply mis-spelling AT as AA?  I know the Ammo Techs would probably flip when they opened the shipping crates, but I think in terms of the "art of the possible" looking at the relatively recent sourcing of TOWs could be applied fairly simply to Stingers.

The minimal infrastructure required to bring 'just a missile' into our supply stream would be much easier than any of the other systems....and while it is also the least capable of the systems of systems, it's also the one that'd get into the troops hands the fastest.

My suggestion:  Buy a few hundred Stingers, deploy one per LAV, anytime the troops park and setup, one LAV gets designated as the AA Guard and they unpack their Stinger.   

Follow that with the system of systems concept, aiming for a medium range system with Link....something that can talk to our F-35's that we'll get at around the same time.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> A System of Systems is what we *SHOULD* be deploying.
> 
> Long range SAMs (Patriot?) + Mid-range SAM/Gun + Short-range Point-defense + C-RAM Capable system for fixed positions/bases, all tied together with Link for an integrated picture.
> 
> Right now, we have none of that.
> 
> So, let's look at the art of the possible.
> 
> Procurement of a new SAM system is a long process, unless we're in a war and sole-source it, or the procurement system gets stood on its head.  So, that knocks out the LR and MR options...along with the integrated system capability.
> 
> We're left with short-range point defense.
> 
> Options there would be the HMMV based AA system, or buying a bunch of Stingers and giving them out to the troops.
> 
> I don't think we're going to buy a HMMV based system....again with the procurement.
> 
> Let's consider the TOWs that are coming into the stream....a man-portable AT missile system that seems pretty easy to use.
> 
> Suppose we brought some Stingers in by simply mis-spelling AT as AA?  I know the Ammo Techs would probably flip when they opened the shipping crates, but I think in terms of the "art of the possible" looking at the relatively recent sourcing of TOWs could be applied fairly simply to Stingers.
> 
> The minimal infrastructure required to bring 'just a missile' into our supply stream would be much easier than any of the other systems....and while it is also the least capable of the systems of systems, it's also the one that'd get into the troops hands the fastest.
> 
> My suggestion:  Buy a few hundred Stingers, deploy one per LAV, anytime the troops park and setup, one LAV gets designated as the AA Guard and they unpack their Stinger.
> 
> Follow that with the system of systems concept, aiming for a medium range system with Link....something that can talk to our F-35's that we'll get at around the same time.



Stingers have little value in an anti-UAS role due to the target acquisition capability,  particularly anythung below TUAV. As such it negates the 2 largest GBAD threats today - munitions and UAS. It would provide a counter aviation capability but that's about it. So I would suggest Stingers provide a very limited capability and certainly nothing long term.

Also keeping "1 per LAV" isn't a good solution and ad weapons need to be centralized to allow for proper weapon use.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Stingers have little value in an anti-UAS role due to the target acquisition capability,  particularly anythung below TUAV. As such it negates the 2 largest GBAD threats today - munitions and UAS. It would provide a counter aviation capability but that's about it. So I would suggest Stingers provide a very limited capability and certainly nothing long term.
> 
> Also keeping "1 per LAV" isn't a good solution and ad weapons need to be centralized to allow for proper weapon use.



And it's always better to use captured SA-7s against their own aircraft too...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Hate to burst all your bubbles, but NATO won't let us anywhere near a battlefield if Canada were to issue shoulder launched SAMs on an ad hoc basis, without them existing within a proper and formal AD Command and Control system.

The risk of "blue on blue" is just too great.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The Blowpipes teams were a detachment from the Artillery as I recall in a 5/4 ton fitted with spare missile storage racks. They were parceled out to support other arms as required. So a Coy Hq, Tank Squadron or Artillery Battery Commander and with the detachment commanders advice, would choose the best spot to defend the host unit from attack and the host unit responsible for the the ground defense of the detachment. The location of the detachment and defensive arcs would be passed on up to HQ who would pass that information to the Officer responsible for tasking aviation assets. I am assuming it would be their job to advise back down to the AD detachments of a airstrike in an area defended by our ADA and which routes in and out they will fly, so as to avoid being shot at?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Not quite.

The Cdn Blowpipe and Javelin Dets were never "parcelled out" to anyone. They existed within their Troop structure and were always under the command of and within a qualified AD C2 hierarchy. It is true though, that they often shared terrain with other arms units, usually to directly protect them from air attack. The easiest piece in AD is firing the weapon. The hardest piece is the C2 structure and the understanding of the airpace control plan/SPINs/etc that goes with it.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Not quite. The Cdn Blowpipe and Javelin Dets were never "parcelled out" to anyone. They existed within their Troop structure and were always under the command of and within a qualified AD C2 hierarchy. It is true though, that they often shared terrain with other arms units, usually to directly protect them from air attack. The easiest piece in AD is firing the weapon. The hardest piece is the C2 structure and the understanding of the airpace control plan/SPINs/etc that goes with it.



Excellent post! That's why we maintained the ASCC (GBAD C2). Shooting is easy, coordinating is hard, particularly if you went into an EW environment where procedural coordination measures were the rule of the day... ASCMs and such. Having infantry have MANPADs in each LAV would mean that each LAV would also need a complete trace of the valid ASCMs and proper training on IFF procedures. Not feasible IMHO nor even something that should be considered, particularly as a secondary duty.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> The Blowpipes teams were a detachment from the Artillery as I recall in a 5/4 ton fitted with spare missile storage racks. They were parceled out to support other arms as required. So a Coy Hq, Tank Squadron or Artillery Battery Commander and with the detachment commanders advice, would choose the best spot to defend the host unit from attack and the host unit responsible for the the ground defense of the detachment. The location of the detachment and defensive arcs would be passed on up to HQ who would pass that information to the Officer responsible for tasking aviation assets. I am assuming it would be their job to advise back down to the AD detachments of a airstrike in an area defended by our ADA and which routes in and out they will fly, so as to avoid being shot at?



By parcelled out I assume that you mean they were attached Direct Support to a manoeuvre unit but remained with the GBAD C2 structure? The Role of the field BC in AD was basically a matter of convenience- the AD rep in a BG was a Tp Comd (lt or jr capt) while the field rep was a maj. Brigade AD rep was a major with a LCol Field rep, etc etc etc. So, as the AD pers was junior the field commander often "spoke for them" in O groups but were not directly involved in planning. Nor should they be.... they lack the expertise. When the Blowpipe troop was attached to an armour or infantry unit DS, the supported commander chose the AD priorities which tasks were derived from. That said, the AD officers job was to advise on what the priorities should be based on some form of CVR analysis (Criticality, vulnerability, recuperability or CVR-T at the higher levels, with the T being "threat"). So, same as field arty where the FOO can advise on a target and the commander can decide.

Finally, you are correct that they would pass up LOCSTAT and coverage but it was to the AD COMMANDER (and ASCC) not to aviation. This would then be amalgamated into a complete trace of all AD systems to create an ADA which would be promulgated to aviation and air users as an ACM. The ASCC then tracked ACMs and ADA units, changed WCS and AD warnings, etc based on higher threats or local observations.


----------



## Old Sweat

The only exception to the above was the AB AD Tp. When E Bty gave up the para role, the tp was transferred to the CAR and became 16 Pl in the Combat Support Commando. When the AB Regiment was disbanded, the members of the tp were posted to the AB Holding Unit and then went to the three total force AD units.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

sorry when I said "parceled out" I did mean "attached"


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Hate to burst all your bubbles, but NATO won't let us anywhere near a battlefield if Canada were to issue shoulder launched SAMs on an ad hoc basis, without them existing within a proper and formal AD Command and Control system.
> 
> The risk of "blue on blue" is just too great.



particularly a "fire and forget" system like the stinger.... The RCAF wasn't comfortable with an AD MBdr/Sgt firing a guided missile that could be taken off target, so I can only imagine the reaction to giving infantry a whole bunch of weapons that can't be taken off target.

The fire and forget, in case anyone is wondering, basically rules out the stinger as anything but a stop gap measure.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

But the RCAF is fine with us having no AD at all?


----------



## NavyShooter

Well, as I was trying to say, within the realm of the possible, procuring a medium or long range air defense system will be 5, or more likely 10 years down the road from the time someone decides we need it.

Options are to go without and trust that we'll have sufficient fighter plane type air cover, or get some sort of stop-gap.

I'm suggesting the stop-gap.

Is my suggested distribution of one per LAV going to work?  I'm guessing not based on the negative responses to that.  So, let's concentrate the with some AD gunners, give them some vehicles to work from and deploy them as necessary to support as a stop-gap tied into the AD plans.  Then we at least have *something*

Right now we arguably have less integral AA Defense than our troops had during WWII, because at least back then most vehicles had a .50 Cal for AA Defence....we don't even have .50's on vehicles anymore.


----------



## NavyShooter

For those with DIN access, there is an entry in the CID, number C.001420 that's worth a look.


----------



## dapaterson

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> For those with DIN access, there is an entry in the CID, number C.001420 that's worth a look.



Last annual SRB was well over a decade ago, so I'm thinking this project is not particularly active.


----------



## NavyShooter

Um, I'll double check but there's some documents from late 2016 in there, so it's not that far on the back burner.  One of the notes discusses Latvia.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The only exception to the above was the AB AD Tp. When E Bty gave up the para role, the tp was transferred to the CAR and became 16 Pl in the Combat Support Commando. When the AB Regiment was disbanded, the members of the tp were posted to the AB Holding Unit and then went to the three total force AD units.



That was a temporary exception that proves the rule. In any case, the Ab AD Tp weapons (Javelin) were still commanded and controlled within the ADA structure, if push came to shove in a conflict. I was once pretty familiar with the problem....


----------



## suffolkowner

where do these fit in?

http://www.vanguardcanada.com/2015/07/29/canada-acquires-israeli-radar-system/


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Um, I'll double check but there's some documents from late 2016 in there, so it's not that far on the back burner.  One of the notes discusses Latvia.



There's a current UOR for low level GBAD


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> where do these fit in?
> 
> http://www.vanguardcanada.com/2015/07/29/canada-acquires-israeli-radar-system/



The radar is a key component of the future GBAD. Basically, an IADS has 3 components: sensors, shooter, and C2. With that, canada has 2 of 3, with the 2 most complicated portions covered


----------



## suffolkowner

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The radar is a key component of the future GBAD. Basically, an IADS has 3 components: sensors, shooter, and C2. With that, canada has 2 of 3, with the 2 most complicated portions covered



Thanks it just seems strange as a stand alone purchase


----------



## Underway

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> Thanks it just seems strange as a stand alone purchase



It seems like these radar systems are designed to detect enemy munitions as well.  If it works as advertised you get to early warn troops to get under cover, pinpoint more accurately where the enemy artillery is coming from and then take appropriate action to deal with it.  No GBAD shooting parts necessary to be useful at least in this case.


----------



## Petard

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> There's a current UOR for low level GBAD


Keeping in mind the U in UOR stands for unforecasted, not urgent, it says a lot


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Underway said:
			
		

> It seems like these radar systems are designed to detect enemy munitions as well.  If it works as advertised you get to early warn troops to get under cover, pinpoint more accurately where the enemy artillery is coming from and then take appropriate action to deal with it.  No GBAD shooting parts necessary to be useful at least in this case.



That's very true. The radars are Multi-mission radars designed to fit into the STA and AD streams (why they are residing in 4 Arty Regiment (GS)). A C-RAM system has a detection, warning, and engagement element, so the radar works both to link in a warning and detection element for C-RAM as well as to provide a low level air picture for promulgation to the Common Air Picture through Link 16.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Petard said:
			
		

> Keeping in mind the U in UOR stands for unforecasted, not urgent, it says a lot



Indeed. When we were first presented "artillery transformation" we quipped how divesting all GBAD functions showed poor strategic understanding within the Corps... it seems to be proven founded.


----------



## Petard

SHORAD training stepping up in US now, seems they too let the act capability of GBAD (as Gen Leslie once described it) to "whither on the vine"

http://swoknews.com/local/stinger-school-emerges-army-priority-sill


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Might be good to pipe some of our own through their school.


----------



## Fabius

Petard said:
			
		

> SHORAD training stepping up in US now, seems they too let the act capability of GBAD (as Gen Leslie once described it) to "whither on the vine"
> 
> http://swoknews.com/local/stinger-school-emerges-army-priority-sill



Very interesting that they are doing what seems to me to be the exact same thing suggested earlier in this thread for Canada, aka arming infantry with MANPADs.  When this idea was raised earlier there were a host of reasons brought forward why that was not ideal but also unacceptable from an AD perspective.  Do those reasons hold true for just us and don't apply to the US? It looks to me like the US has decided that the risk with arming infantry MOSs within their  IBCTs with MANPADS is acceptable (no idea what mitigation they may employ), and that their need to provide some air defence capability NOW based on the threat, trumps spending time working out the perfect solution.

Thoughts?


----------



## NavyShooter

Fabius said:
			
		

> Very interesting that they are doing what seems to me to be the exact same thing suggested earlier in this thread for Canada, aka arming infantry with MANPADs.  When this idea was raised earlier there were a host of reasons brought forward why that was not ideal but also unacceptable from an AD perspective.  Do those reasons hold true for just us and don't apply to the US? It looks to me like the US has decided that the risk with arming infantry MOSs within their  IBCTs with MANPADS is acceptable (no idea what mitigation they may employ), and that their need to provide some air defence capability NOW based on the threat, trumps spending time working out the perfect solution.
> 
> Thoughts?



Wait....someone else is arming their infantry with MANPADS....?  Who said that before?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Wait....someone else is arming their infantry with MANPADS....?  Who said that before?



As a short term solution. The article also doesn't cover their efforts to integrate the shooters into an IADS.


----------



## NavyShooter

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> So, the problem there is that C-RAM is very limited in range.  (~2-3km at most I think) and very limited in magazine space (1583 rds)  so while it might cover a small bubble of battlespace, it's also not a system that I thing belongs anywhere outside of a FOB or a larger base.  It's not really designed as a field deployed system.
> 
> The *nice* thing about the C-RAM is that it's all one piece, a flat-bed with both a search and track RADAR integrated, and a built-in gun system.
> 
> -Stop-gap of Shoulder fired Stingers gets an initial capability at the tactical level.  Issue one to every LAV.
> 
> -Follow up with a short-medium range AA missile on a vehicle mount with a better sighting system, think Avenger, or Chaparral, keep this with the Battalion CP
> 
> So far, we're not into anything integrated, just stand-alone equipment and vehicles that can be attached to give a local capability for AA.
> 
> Either of those would be a big step in the right direction, but to bring in an integrated AA suite would be the ideal....something that sockets into the 'system of systems' and gives a medium-long range capability.
> 
> NS



See above....from page 2...."stop-gap of shoulder fired Stinger..."


----------



## Fabius

So if the US is doing this, again why is this not an interim option for Canadian manoeuvre battlegroups ? 
I get that a layered IADS with capabilities against ballistic missiles, air, avn, munitions on terminal approach and UAS is the ideal solution.  However that is likely unrealistic for Canadian GBAD given PY constraints, and money and even if we can square those items, it still won't be a rapid fielding of the capability.
How do we deal with the very real problem that exists now, given the resource realities we have?


----------



## Lumber

Fabius said:
			
		

> So if the US is doing this, again why is this not an interim option for Canadian manoeuvre battlegroups ?
> I get that a layered IADS with capabilities against ballistic missiles, air, avn, munitions on terminal approach and UAS is the ideal solution.  However that is likely unrealistic for Canadian GBAD given PY constraints, and money and even if we can square those items, it still won't be a rapid fielding of the capability.
> How do we deal with the very real problem that exists now, given the resource realities we have?



Short term solution? Deploy with a larger force that does have IADS.

Long term solution? Deploy with a larger force that does have IADS.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Fabius said:
			
		

> So if the US is doing this, again why is this not an interim option for Canadian manoeuvre battlegroups ?
> I get that a layered IADS with capabilities against ballistic missiles, air, avn, munitions on terminal approach and UAS is the ideal solution.  However that is likely unrealistic for Canadian GBAD given PY constraints, and money and even if we can square those items, it still won't be a rapid fielding of the capability.
> How do we deal with the very real problem that exists now, given the resource realities we have?



Well, first, the stringer offers limited capability against the threats we are expecting to face. The recognized threats are Munitions (Cruise missiles, RAM, etc), UAS, and aviation. The stinger is really only useful against one of those, being aviation, with little to no ability to engage a UAS due to the targeting system and zero capability in a C-RAM role. Further, the stinger is "fire and forget" which will not be considered unless its an absolute 100% stop gap temporary solution. If we are procuring MANPADs there are better options than the stringer, with the RBS-70 Bolide being a primary one. Better TA system, laser guided, integrated BMC4I suite for the det commander, etc etc etc

Also, I disagree with procuring an AD system for the infantry. They're not a secondary duty, so unless the Bn's have enough extra bodies in them to man up AD platoons than the capabilities are better centralized in 4 AD for a variety of reasons (force generation, currency training, Aircraft recognition, collective training, etc). They tried to give the Bn's MUAS and look how that worked out


----------



## Fabius

I will admit that I am particularly interested in this from a BG perspective. I accept that a Stinger may not be the best MANPAD available, and I would definitely like the RBS-70 Bolide BUT if I can have Stingers NOW via UOR delivered from the USA with training delivered via the US Army (ala Chinook 2009) while waiting on the procurement system to pick the perfect system 5 years from now I am good with that.  

With regards to recognized threats, do you mean that that is what the CAF wants to be able to counter? Are we wanting a system that does all three things at once? I can't see how that will work in the immediate term as the three threats as you have laid them out are not threats that can be countered by the same system as you have already indicated. 

Specifically CUAS is being conducted by assets and systems that are almost wholly unrelated to AD in so far as Canada understands that term (as far as I know) and will likely never be fielded by 4 GS and more likely by 21 EW if we were to decide to go down that route. C-RAM while useful, I would suggest would be unlikely to ever be fielded by Canada at the BG level. Given the number of systems we would likely ever be able to FG, their mobility, and effective ranges, those assets would likely be focused on Bde level assets.

All of that to say, it seems that the recognized threat of most relevance to a manoeuvre BG right NOW is aviation and that is what our largest ally is focused on with this reinvigoration of MANPADS.  
Is that not the same realization the Canadian Army has come to?


----------



## Loachman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Also, I disagree with procuring an AD system for the infantry. They're not a secondary duty, so unless the Bn's have enough extra bodies in them to man up AD platoons than the capabilities are better centralized in 4 AD for a variety of reasons (force generation, currency training, _*Aircraft recognition*_, collective training, etc).



Guaranteed: They'll shoot first and identify later, then wonder why they're not getting any helicopter rides anymore.

And our Southern Cousins tend to pay less attention to AFV and aircraft recognition than we do.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Off the shelf? 

https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/air_defence_systems/mobile_air_defence/index.php

 I think I read that original Skranger turret has already been fit onto Piranha III and IV so that should simplify integration into LAV 6 chassis.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loachman said:
			
		

> Guaranteed: They'll shoot first and identify later, then wonder why they're not getting any helicopter rides anymore.
> 
> And our Southern Cousins tend to pay less attention to AFV and aircraft recognition than we do.



You are 100% correct. I recall running my troops around Farnborough airfield during the airshow AFTER some pretty intense aircraft recognition training (using a big wheel of slides!) and, as a group, they probably got 1 out of 5 correct-ish.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Dumb question but are all NATO aircraft (including helicopters) not equipped with IFF?  

Would the more advanced GBAD systems not be able to make that proper identification?


----------



## Fabius

Would not battlefield airspace control measures like Standard Army Aviation Flight routes (SAAFRs) and Low Level Transit Corridors (LLTC) paired with weapon control states also work to provide de-confliction?  
Seems like a better approach than relying on 100% accurate aircraft recognition by troops of any MOC after days and weeks of combat under intense time pressure against fleeting things half seen in the airspace.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Fabius said:
			
		

> Would not battlefield airspace control measures like Standard Army Aviation Flight routes (SAAFRs) and Low Level Transit Corridors (LLTC) paired with weapon control states also work to provide de-confliction?
> Seems like a better approach than relying on 100% accurate aircraft recognition by troops of any MOC after days and weeks of combat under intense time pressure against fleeting things half seen in the airspace.



You have put your finger exactly on the problem. The troops holding the Stinger have to know that they are under or in a region where such things exist. They have to understand the shoot/no shoot implications. This implies that they be properly trained in such matters and that they exist in an IADS. Hence why, IMHO, issuing ifanteers Stingers on a "one per LAV" , just in case basis is probably a bad idea.


----------



## MilEME09

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You have put your finger exactly on the problem. The troops holding the Stinger have to know that they are under or in a region where such things exist. They have to understand the shoot/no shoot implications. This implies that they be properly trained in such matters and that they exist in an IADS. Hence why, IMHO, issuing ifanteers Stingers on a "one per LAV" , just in case basis is probably a bad idea.



In that case would having a dedicated AA section within a weapons det requiring a specialized course to teach all these things make more sense?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

yes, but I suspect having a dedicated ADA Troop in the artillery is the better way to go with our small military, That troop can provide cover for units exercising and on real deployments. As mentioned in this thread, we seem to have the radar and networking assets, now we need some form of actual firepower. I still support a light gun and Manpad arrangement for now, then add larger assets later. Not to mention Simulators, including a traveling simulator that a small team of reg force guys could take across the country to teach a introduction course to Reserve units.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> yes, but I suspect having a dedicated ADA Troop in the artillery is the better way to go with our small military, That troop can provide cover for units exercising and on real deployments. As mentioned in this thread, we seem to have the radar and networking assets, now we need some form of actual firepower. I still support a light gun and Manpad arrangement for now, then add larger assets later. Not to mention Simulators, including a traveling simulator that a small team of reg force guys could take across the country to teach a introduction course to Reserve units.



yes, but we used to have specialists in the infantry (which going back into the mists of time included dedicated anti-air and anti-tank practitioners as well as machine gun and mortar folks - and pioneers just so they don't feel left out). The role of the specialist NCOs in those outfits was as much planning the coordination of the fires as it was commanding the troops assigned.  The CO always had Sgt/WO Suchandsuch with 20 years in, the right courses under his belt, and whom the CO had personally put in that position because he trusted him, in his hip pocket to advise him and help create the plan. And a subby to relay messages.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chris your speaking to the converted, right now I would say get the infantry focused on rebuilding the heavy weapons and AT platoons, for mortars, MG and ATGM's. Let the artillery provide the AD for now, other than providing the infantry with a mount and optic to use their HMG at high angle to tackle small UAV/drones overhead.


----------



## GnyHwy

Just wondering, after the Infantry takes on all these roles, how many rifles will they have left? Serious question. Wasn't that part of the reason we are at where we are today?

I do agree that Inf should have AD, and I also agree they need AT, Pioneer and IDF, but none of these are secondary tasks all require extensive training. 

If there is an Infanteer reading, please prioritize.


----------



## Kirkhill

Serious response:

20 platoons of rifles organized into 5 companies.  All platoons of the same size.  Senior riflemen grouped in two companies double hatted with specialist skills.  Recce (1) Pioneer (2) Transport (3) Machine Gun (4) Anti Tank (5) Anti Air (6) Mortar (7) Mortar ( 8 )  or some such variant.

Rifle Coys of 3 rifle platoons and a 4th platoon of identical size and organization but equipped with support weapons.

Start from the premise that a platoon is a platoon is a platoon.  And at the end of the day that platoon, under its commanders, can be tasked with anything Her Majesty desires, down to and including sweeping streets.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Just wondering, after the Infantry takes on all these roles, how many rifles will they have left? Serious question. Wasn't that part of the reason we are at where we are today?
> 
> I do agree that Inf should have AD, and I also agree they need AT, Pioneer and IDF, but none of these are secondary tasks all require extensive training.
> 
> If there is an Infanteer reading, please prioritize.



They did do all these tasks before, I am sure it was a struggle at times, I guess it is a case of prioritizing PY's to the Combat trades and those that directly support them.


----------



## GnyHwy

Colin P said:
			
		

> They did do all these tasks before, I am sure it was a struggle at times, I guess it is a case of prioritizing PY's to the Combat trades and those that directly support them.



It is all about PYs today. 


			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Serious response: 20 platoons of rifles organized into 5 companies.



Serious rebuttal, lol.  ;D , but is that a big Bn or a small Regt? Or are we freelancing?

Edited to add: Still digesting the other 8 secondary tasks. I take them seriously, but have doubts.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/history/2Para1982.pdf

I think, if you count the "platoon" sized entities on that orbat you will come to something like 19 (excluding Bn but including Meds and Sigs).  And 2 Para was closer to 500 bodies on strength than 600 if memory serves correctly.

The thing is, I am not presupposing the size of the platoon.  I am assuming that all those platoons, with their specialist skills, come in handy.  Therefore I would take the number of bodies available to me (500 or 600) and then divide them amongst my 20 platoons and not worry if the platoon had 25 or 30 bodies apiece.


----------



## Old Sweat

Our theoretical battalion of 500-600 will have something around 100-125 of its strength made up of non-infantry personnel. Think of medics, clerks, RCEME, sigs, MPs, Sup Techs, postal and probably a few others.


----------



## daftandbarmy

In the UK, to my knowledge, Infantry never used SAMs (apart from Special Forces of course).

For example, in this description of the Falklands Orbat, the Blowpipe Troop of 43 Air Defence Battery was Arty.

With the exception of 3 Cdo Bde, which had Air Defence Troop with 12 x Blowpipe Missile launchers, manned by Royal Marines.

I know a former Royal Marine who served in this troop. They were part of the normal Bde Orbat I believe, and had extensive training from the RA before being integrated into the overall AD plan for San Carlos Water. He shot at lots of Argie aircraft but has never admitted to hitting one.

He wasn't a big fan of Blowpipe - a nose on device vs. a tail pipe chaser - as you had to stand up facing the oncoming attacking aircraft (which is hard, apparently, when the whole of 2 PARA is blatting away at the thing and you are in the same postal code  ).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_ground_forces_in_the_Falklands_War


----------



## GnyHwy

It comes down to what the manouevre force wants to do. 

The Inf can soak up tasks, which is fine, but as I said before, they will run out of rifles; and we haven't even got into comms and coord yet. 

Having a single corps manage and train all the tasks mentioned is unmanageable at best, unattainable at worst.


----------



## Kirkhill

Can the Expert Corps then guarantee that they will then supply a platoon sized permanent attachment of their Corps to each infantry battalion that the Bn CO can employ as he/she sees fit?   

Because that is the flexibility that has been lost.  Mortar platoon, Pnr Platoon, ATGM platoon - all could be employed as just another platoon when the situation demanded it.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Can the Expert Corps then guarantee that they will then supply a platoon sized permanent attachment of their Corps to each infantry battalion that the Bn CO can employ as he/she sees fit?
> 
> Because that is the flexibility that has been lost.  Mortar platoon, Pnr Platoon, ATGM platoon - all could be employed as just another platoon when the situation demanded it.



I dont know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.

First, keeping the weapons integral to an Inf Bn minimizes their flexibility in relation to the overall battle. With this logic, the armour, field artillery, engineers, logistics, etc would all need their own AD weapons. When one does a Criticality, Recuperability, Vulnerability (CVR) analysis, infantry is generally the lowest priority since it is the most survivable and recuperable of the assets. Therein, dependent on the air threat, the priority is normally with Artillery, MLRS/HIMARS, armour, and the BSA (logistics) rather than individual battalions or companies of infantry.

Keeping AD weapons centralized maximizes the flexibility of the brigade/div/corps commander to use them where they are deemed the most useful in a complex battlefield. If the commander wants an Inf bn to have AD protection than he has the ability to attach the weapons to the Bn Comd Direct Support. The Bn comd can then choose priorities. however, if the priority is defence of the Bde HQ and the BSA, than the inf bn commander gets briefed an AAAD and moves on. As such, this idea of giving them to Bn's as another platoon is, imho, extremely short sighted and reduces flexibility.

For the question on GBAD in a battle group. Doctrinally, this is a troop task as GBAD is not normally deployed below brigade for very good reasons listed above. The 4th could force generate a troop of GBAD to deploy to Latvia if tasked, so there's no benefit to having the inf take the task- only limitations.

Further, the concept of coordination was mentioned by flavius earlier. ACMs such as SAAFRs are considered to be procedural airspace control while the Air Defence Systems Integrator (ADSI) provides positive control (near real time +/- 5 seconds radar IFF feed of all aircraft via multiple sensors (AWACs, J-STAR, naval radars, ground radars). how would an Inf Bn receive the ACMs, monitor them, and update them? In Afghanistan the ATO was literally thousands of lines long. There is no reasonable way that an Inf Bn trying to monitor a battle could also provide the C2 to monitor airspace in a procedural environment. In a positive environment, who is monitoring the ADSI? The Infantry going to learn about tactical data links? Not to mention how they would plan on getting links into a mobile HQ forward deployed.

The concept of AD in Inf Bn's isn't workable nor desirable.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I don't know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.



I have to agree. In well run Armies, the Infantry should have all the support it needs to be successful including, especially at the Divisional/ Corps/ Army Group level, AD assets. 

Mortars, Anti-Tank and Pioneers? Sure. That's all stuff the CO needs at the 'grab the other guy's belt buckle' level. AD is a Div/Corps/Army Gp asset mainly because, and allow me to explain this in Infantry terms, "jets go fast"  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

The corollary being "everything that flies is a jet"?  Understood.

But where in the spectrum of things is CRAM (Counter Rocket Artillery and Munitions) or Active Defense systems like Trophy? Or defence against the low and slow like micro, mini and small UAVs or helicopters, or even OA-X type aircraft?

The issue about making infantry capable of managing a variety of weapons systems goes to the heart of having infantry in the first place. 

Infantry is supposed to be flexible.  Infantry is supposed to be  Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Infantry allows Her Majesty's Government to respond to any crisis any where any time with minimal planning.  

Infantry is not defined primarily in its utility on the armoured, nuclear battlefield.  In fact that is where infantry has least utility...... a fact which prompted infantry for Europe to become panzer-grenadiers lest they be left behind.

But all over the rest of the world, places other than Europe, there has always been a shortage of infantry - so much so that in Iraq and Afghanistan the Americans have worried about wrecking their army as they assign Tankies and Gunners to "mere" infantry roles.

The thing about infantry is they should be able to be inserted into a low threat environment, as a marker, on the basis that they can hold the line in an escalating situation until the rest of the army shows up if needed.  Thus "better a battalion in time than a division too late" - or - "a stitch in time saves nine".

In low threat, enduring, environments life is boring.  Everybody does nothing for a long time.  Excitement is often enough dealing with escaped prisoners, the occasional riot and other Aid to the Civil Power.  That needs to escalate to chasing terrorists in muddy fields, deserts, jungles, rivers and oceans before the infantry runs out of tasks, or even is at risk of threats that are not locally effective but are extremely dispersed.

For most of the "deployment" just sitting in bars NOT getting into fights with Russians is a demonstration of government intent.  Helping out the local constabulary with patrols is another.  But the day may come when the battalion is challenged by a platoon with modern weapons, or even a company of challengers.

Do we really have to send the entire brigade group over, to sit in bars.  Or are we better sending a well equipped battalion,  and keeping the Heavy Weapons back at home, where they can be maintained with minimal abuse and where training can occur and have them ready to be deployed as an entity for concentrated effect?

My 20 platoon battalion allows for a 5 shift, 24/7 rotation to man the local bars.  It also allows each platoon to contribute to the defence of the battalion by having a particular set of skills to allow the CO to effectively manage his environment when things get a bit nastier.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The corollary being "everything that flies is a jet"?  Understood.
> 
> But where in the spectrum of things is CRAM (Counter Rocket Artillery and Munitions) or Active Defense systems like Trophy? Or defence against the low and slow like micro, mini and small UAVs or helicopters, or even OA-X type aircraft?
> 
> The issue about making infantry capable of managing a variety of weapons systems goes to the heart of having infantry in the first place.
> 
> Infantry is supposed to be flexible.  Infantry is supposed to be  Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Infantry allows Her Majesty's Government to respond to any crisis any where any time with minimal planning.
> 
> Infantry is not defined primarily in its utility on the armoured, nuclear battlefield.  In fact that is where infantry has least utility...... a fact which prompted infantry for Europe to become panzer-grenadiers lest they be left behind.
> 
> But all over the rest of the world, places other than Europe, there has always been a shortage of infantry - so much so that in Iraq and Afghanistan the Americans have worried about wrecking their army as they assign Tankies and Gunners to "mere" infantry roles.
> 
> The thing about infantry is they should be able to be inserted into a low threat environment, as a marker, on the basis that they can hold the line in an escalating situation until the rest of the army shows up if needed.  Thus "better a battalion in time than a division too late" - or - "a stitch in time saves nine".
> 
> In low threat, enduring, environments life is boring.  Everybody does nothing for a long time.  Excitement is often enough dealing with escaped prisoners, the occasional riot and other Aid to the Civil Power.  That needs to escalate to chasing terrorists in muddy fields, deserts, jungles, rivers and oceans before the infantry runs out of tasks, or even is at risk of threats that are not locally effective but are extremely dispersed.
> 
> For most of the "deployment" just sitting in bars NOT getting into fights with Russians is a demonstration of government intent.  Helping out the local constabulary with patrols is another.  But the day may come when the battalion is challenged by a platoon with modern weapons, or even a company of challengers.
> 
> Do we really have to send the entire brigade group over, to sit in bars.  Or are we better sending a well equipped battalion,  and keeping the Heavy Weapons back at home, where they can be maintained with minimal abuse and where training can occur and have them ready to be deployed as an entity for concentrated effect?
> 
> My 20 platoon battalion allows for a 5 shift, 24/7 rotation to man the local bars.  It also allows each platoon to contribute to the defence of the battalion by having a particular set of skills to allow the CO to effectively manage his environment when things get a bit nastier.



I'm sorry, but I dont understand what you are trying to get at here.If there is a shortage of infantry to the point that tankers and gunners were used as infantry, why would one want to take AD away from the experts at an EXTREME loss in IFF, C2, and actual flexibility just to take more infantrymen out of the infantry tasks they need to do? I think your understanding of GBAD is insufficient in that you think the Bird Gunners just sit around waiting for air stuff to  happen. There's a tremendous amount of coordination and movement for a well organized AD battery as it moves through the battle. If you're talking about defending a FOB, than sure, it's a lot of sitting around. In conventional war than the infantry probably stay static more than we do.

I would also argue that infantry alone doesn't give "her majesty" the ability to deploy anywhere with minimal planning- the combined arms team does. 

Giving the weapons to an Inf Bn, as already noted, takes it away from the units that are actually more at risk than an Inf Bn, being HQs, logistics nodes, tanks, and artillery. There is absolutely zero benefit for anyone, particularly the Bn, through doing this. By your logic why dont we just put all weapons systems into Inf Bn's?


----------



## Kirkhill

Actually I am arguing that Experts, of all fields, are critical to warfighting.  And that, as a resource, they should be husbanded so that they can hone their skills to meet critical demands.  They shouldn't be "wasted" unnecessarily.

I agree entirely that Ground Based Air Defence is a specialist skill set.  And it is a required skill set.  I have argued that 4 Regiment (whatever incarnation it is in now - it is hard to keep up with all the name changes and structural re-orgs it has endured and which are suggested) ... that 4 RCA is a critical part of an independent force precisely for the reasons you suggest.  

The point of disagreement, I believe, is that I don't like the notion of all deployments of the CAF being seen as preludes to the Armageddon of WW3.  

There is much that has to be accomplished before things go that wrong.

And that often just means putting bodies in place under the flag.

I am not arguing that the infantry should be operating Skyshield or NASAMs.  

I am arguing that if, in addition to swatting jets out the sky we are also contemplating knocking bullets out of the park, if tankies have their own personal CRAM system (TROPHY detects, locates, identifies and destroys incoming HEAT rounds) then why is it unreasonable to assume that infantry can't be given access to tools that will protect their "stationary tanks" - we used to call them bunkers and trenches.

I will accept that a 5 km missile needs coordination in a congested battlefield.   But what if your trench is the only trench in 5 km, or 50 km or 500 km?  Is it not reasonable to suggest that buddy in the trench has the tools available to defend himself?  Especially if they are available and (relatively) cheap?

This is not about managing complexity.  Experts are indeed needed to manage that.  This is about maximizing capabilities with the least commitment of resources.

This is about helping the infantry battalion's machine guns successfully tackle UAVs in their area.  This is about the "missile troops" - that Anti-Tank types and the Carl-Gustaf types successfully engaging the occasional helicopter (Blackhawk Down as seen from the ground force point of view).  This could be about parking self-powered Trophy systems on top of trenches.

This is not about Patriots for the PPCLI.


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I dont know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.


I'll give it a shot.

_Perhaps_..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy."  

But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just _maybe_....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either. 

Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?

In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.


----------



## GnyHwy

The CRAM and AD against fast movers must remain with the Arty, for many reasons, but sadly, even if we did have the equipment, our PY strength would probably be barely enough for point defence (in a sustained Op), certainly not a dispersed Op.

Counter UAV is a different story, which I can make an argument for Inf having, mostly because it needs to be proliferated.


----------



## MilEME09

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'll give it a shot.
> 
> _Perhaps_..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy."
> 
> But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just _maybe_....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either.
> 
> Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?
> 
> In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.



I agree that the infantry needs limited ability in those other capabilities, this frees up those other trades as well for the bigger fish, Pioneers free up engineers to do major tasks like bridging, an Anti-Armour platoon free's the black haters from trying to engage every enemy tank where it appears. Limited AA support within the infantry would free up any AD units we might have to protect high value assets like HQ's, Central DP's, etc... Some of you say it makes no sense, but really with such a small force like the CF, making our infantry regiments as swiss army knife as possible if probably our best bet. If they can look after them selves against the smaller threats, then the other regiments and units can worry more about the bigger picture.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Is the arty command structure willing to piecemeal out it's AD assets like a Manpad troop to protect a infantry battalion here and another one over there? If so good stuff, if internal army politics gets in the way of protecting our people, then it is not good.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'll give it a shot.
> 
> _Perhaps_..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy."
> 
> But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just _maybe_....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either.
> 
> Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?
> 
> In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.



I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.

As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands. 

Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.
> 
> As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands.
> 
> Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back



There you go Journeyman.  The infantry can't be trusted with big boys' toys.   [


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> There you go Journeyman.  The infantry can't be trusted with big boys' toys.   [



Well, if the crashed MUAS are any indication....

The point is that they don't require to handle them. If there is a GBAD element and the infantry require support over other elements on the battlefield they would get it. If they don't, than they don't.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.
> 
> As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands.
> 
> Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back



It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:

"The new doctrine listed five requirements:

Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2


----------



## SeaKingTacco

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:
> 
> "The new doctrine listed five requirements:
> 
> Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
> Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
> Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
> Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
> Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2



And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.

We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.

The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:
> 
> "The new doctrine listed five requirements:
> 
> Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
> Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
> Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
> Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
> Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2



"The Soviets did it so so should we"

                             - no NATO person ever


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> "The Soviets did it so so should we"
> 
> - no NATO person ever



I could be wrong, but I'm pretty sure that we dumped the 7.62 long guns in favour of the M-16/ 5.56mm weapon systems as a belated response to the Soviet AK 47 'assault rifle' family of weapons.. which they stole from the Nazis, of course.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

:goodpost: :goodpost:





			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.
> 
> We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.
> 
> The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.



Great post. Infantry controlling MANPADs doesn't make sense in terms of doctrine, training, or integration. It's a non-issue


----------



## NavyShooter

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> :goodpost: :goodpost:
> Great post. Infantry controlling MANPADs doesn't make sense in terms of doctrine, training, or integration. It's a non-issue



No, I think the point is *UNTRAINED* infantry not integrated into the AD network/system is unwise.

I have learned a bunch from this thread, and the realization that AD consists of a lot more in a land battle environment than just handing a soldier a missile is something I *should* have realized before....and do now.

NS


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> "The Soviets did it so so should we"
> 
> - no NATO person ever



Makes for a good stand-off weapon for things like subs, which the Soviets do...just 'cause they're Soviets doesn't make them stupid.  If they're so stupid, why are they putting Yasen's to sea with MANPADs while we have hand me downs diesel boats that probably don't have a freakin' potato gun?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Makes for a good stand-off weapon for things like subs, which the Soviets do...just 'cause they're Soviets doesn't make them stupid.  If they're so stupid, why are they putting Yasen's to sea with MANPADs while we have hand me downs diesel boats that probably don't have a freakin' potato gun?



It was a joke. But Soviets worked their GBAD knowing they would likely be the weaker air side and they wanted to essentially create a wall o' GBAD to shoot down anything.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.
> 
> We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.
> 
> The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.



Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Colin P said:
			
		

> Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"?



The experts in this realm is most decidedly not Canada. There is hardly anyone in the Cdn Army left that truly understands this stuff, and they have owned the mission since the 80s. That is a failure of both the Artillery to educate and failure on the part of the rest of the Army to actually have enough intellectual curiousity to understand the roles it has been assigned.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Colin P said:
			
		

> Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"?



The army had an effective GBAD capability which was gradually reduced due to the artillery branches preference for guns. It was the same story with STA.

The expertise for GBAD within NATO as a whole fell off in the 1990s and in that regard Canada is certainly not unique in NATO. I was talking to British and German AD instructors in 2015 and they lamented the same issues- shifting of AD units to STA/guns due to the perceived air superiority on the fall of the Soviet Union and the need for STA/OPs for A-stan and Iraq (in the British case).

The RCAS still maintains GBAD SMEs and 4 GS still maintains the ASCC, which is the key planning/coordination element of the IAD and allows us to at least plug into a coalition IAD. In fact, Canadian AD pers established the TADL for Kuwait, so I would say that that capability has been pretty "effective".

The missing link is the shooter system, which is the easiest part of the entire IAD. 

In my experience, people in the artillery question the "experts" less because of their knowledge and more because of their own pre-conceived notions of Air Defenders and the air situation. I have heard more than my fair share of field majors/LCols categorically state that we didn't need AD since we had air superiority, than be unable to explain what that meant or understand that there were systems to flew that weren't F/A jets.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

So why do we have to reinvent the wheel ourselves?

Why can't we identify an ally and say: "Hey we see you guys are still doing this with ______ gear, and we'd like to need bring a unit up to speed asap.  Can we send a team to you to get trained up on your systems?"


 ???


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The army had an effective GBAD capability which was gradually reduced due to the artillery branches preference for guns. It was the same story with STA.
> 
> The expertise for GBAD within NATO as a whole fell off in the 1990s and in that regard Canada is certainly not unique in NATO. I was talking to British and German AD instructors in 2015 and they lamented the same issues- shifting of AD units to STA/guns due to the perceived air superiority on the fall of the Soviet Union and the need for STA/OPs for A-stan and Iraq (in the British case).
> 
> The RCAS still maintains GBAD SMEs and 4 GS still maintains the ASCC, which is the key planning/coordination element of the IAD and allows us to at least plug into a coalition IAD. In fact, Canadian AD pers established the TADL for Kuwait, so I would say that that capability has been pretty "effective".
> 
> The missing link is the shooter system, which is the easiest part of the entire IAD.
> 
> In my experience, people in the artillery question the "experts" less because of their knowledge and more because of their own pre-conceived notions of Air Defenders and the air situation. I have heard more than my fair share of field majors/LCols categorically state that we didn't need AD since we had air superiority, than be unable to explain what that meant or understand that there were systems to flew that weren't F/A jets.



And how long to provide us with the pointy sticks? Let’s say we sent our units to Africa in 6 months from now and one of the groups we are “peacekeeping” against starts dropping bombs from UAV’s and kills someone, how long before we have the ability to identify and shoot one down before they get into range? What if we suddenly found our guys facing a more sophisticated enemy with military grade UAVs and attack aircraft, much less trying to use AD against a Grad strike from system firing from behind a robust AD screen. With our current procurement system I doubt anyone has any confidence in getting anything quickly and while my firsthand knowledge is purely discussions with Blowpipe operators. Training people to be effective with Manpads takes time, even more if you want 3 or 4 detached detachments to plug into an IAD in areas with limited comms and perhaps against an enemy that will be able to reach back behind your lines and pulverize any radio transmission source. Given that the average range of a Manpad system and the need to protect the frontline, chances are your AD detachment is in range of counter battery fire. When was the last time we exercised AD detachment in a full spectrum war scenario, where radio discipline and counterbattery fire was considered, not to mention a robust enemy? 
While I agree that keeping the corporate high level knowledge  alive is important, we have done it at the cost of losing the on the ground knowledge and the ability to actually do something. Where reality and the enemy will play havoc with best laid untried plans. We should have Manpad detachments out there now even with those field simulators so the day to day stuff of deploying, managing and protecting that resource can become part of the corporate knowledge.


----------



## Old Sweat

Indeed, as one who was serving, albeit as a teen-aged gunner, in the regular force when 1 LAA Regiment, RCA was still on the order of battle in Camp Picton, ON, I have seen our air defence resources mostly ebb with the odd flow. It was a litany of false starts, dead-ends and missed opportunities, more often budget driven than initiated by a parochial field branch artillery.

I did have some experience in the Blowpipe program as I was the CIG in the school and air defence wing - all four or five guys - reported to me. As I recall, we began to run Blowpipe operator courses in late 74 or early 75, once the Chief of Construction and Properties lit a fire under the BCEO to get our simulator room and range constructed. (The line the Sapper MGen used was to the effect that the CDS had promised NATO we would have our airfield air defence at Lahr and Baden operational by x date and he did not want to have to tell Gen Dextraze that we could not meet that date because the BCEO in Gagetown would not get off his butt. Very effective.) Anyway, then it was running course after course, once we got a target system. Believe it or not, the first try by NDHQ failed so we used 105 mm illuminating rounds for a couple of years.

p.s. If anyone has seen the video of the first Blowpipe round fired in Canada, it is my voice that blurts after the second stage ignited and propelled the missile downrange "F... me, I thought the son-of-a-b.... had thundered in for sure."

The whole airfield AD program took several years, but at least we have some trained and experienced people to call on, unlike the early seventies when the bird gunners had not plied the craft for over a decade.

And don't get me going on the joys of small arms in air defence.


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The experts in this realm is most decidedly not Canada. There is hardly anyone in the Cdn Army left that truly understands this stuff, and they have owned the mission since the 80s. That is a failure of both the Artillery to educate and failure on the part of the rest of the Army to actually have enough intellectual curiousity to understand the roles it has been assigned.



I imagine it is hard to drum up any enthusiasm when there are no radars, launchers, guns, missiles or CPs.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile, the targets....



> The small, multi-prop drone can be fitted with an assault weapon, a grenade launcher or a sniper rifle mounted on a rotating gimbal. The military website Defense One says that the TIKAD has a proprietary stabilization system that compensates for recoil when weapons are fired from it remotely.
> 
> The Duke website says the “technology also allows us to shoot remotely and potentially disarm a situation without ever deploying a ground presence.”
> 
> Defense One quoted Duke co-founder and CEO Raziel Atuar as saying: “I can mount an M4, SR25, a 40-millimeter grenade launcher … I can carry up to 22 pounds and [the system] will stabilize the drone and allow me to get an accurate shot.”



http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2017/07/07/New-Sniper-Drone-Could-Be-Future-Urban-Warfare




> In early November, Iraqi special forces broke through to East Mosul, where the Islamic State’s resistance stiffened markedly. The use of suicide car bombs rose steadily, as did coalition airstrikes on more than 100 ISIS factories producing them.
> 
> But the advance also yielded troves of intelligence. Iraqi troops seized the TV station and began digesting new information on car-bomb factories, artillery caches and a new weapon: armed off-the-shelf commercial drones.
> 
> By 2016, many militant groups had already put consumer drones to use for surveillance and reconnaissance, but the battle for Mosul marked the first use of armed drones by a nonstate actor. And even as ISIS was pushed from East Mosul in January, their drones grew deadlier.
> 
> It was also an easy tactic to copy.
> 
> Within weeks, Iraqi federal police had armed drones of their own. Like the ISIS versions, these were rigged to drop 40mm grenades fixed to badminton-like birdies that steadied the munitions as they fell.



http://www.defenseone.com/feature/mosul-largest-battle-decade-future-of-war/



> China has launched a record-breaking swarm of 119 fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles, authorities said on Sunday.
> 
> The feat broke the previous record of a swarm of 67 drones, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) said.
> 
> The 119 drones performed catapult-assisted take-offs and formations in the sky.
> 
> According to the CETC, "swarm intelligence" is regarded as the core of artificial intelligence of unmanned systems and the future of intelligent unmanned systems.
> 
> Zhao Yanjie, an engineer with CETC, said that since drones were invented in 1917, intelligent swarms have become a disruptive force to "change rules of the game".
> 
> Reports in the Chinese official media in the recent past said Chinese military is also testing to launch mass armed drones as a new technique in battle



http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-launches-drone-swarm-of-119-fixed-wing-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-117061100388_1.html


----------



## FJAG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Indeed, as one who was serving, albeit as a teen-aged gunner, in the regular force when 1 LAA Regiment, RCA was still on the order of battle in Camp Picton, ON, I have seen our air defence resources mostly ebb with the odd flow. It was a litany of false starts, dead-ends and missed opportunities, more often budget driven than initiated by a parochial field branch artillery.
> 
> I did have some experience in the Blowpipe program as I was the CIG in the school and air defence wing - all four or five guys - reported to me. As I recall, we began to run Blowpipe operator courses in late 74 or early 75, once the Chief of Construction and Properties lit a fire under the BCEO to get our simulator room and range constructed. (The line the Sapper MGen used was to the effect that the CDS had promised NATO we would have our airfield air defence at Lahr and Baden operational by x date and he did not want to have to tell Gen Dextraze that we could not meet that date because the BCEO in Gagetown would not get off his butt. Very effective.) Anyway, then it was running course after course, once we got a target system. Believe it or not, the first try by NDHQ failed so we used 105 mm illuminating rounds for a couple of years.
> 
> p.s. If anyone has seen the video of the first Blowpipe round fired in Canada, it is my voice that blurts after the second stage ignited and propelled the missile downrange "F... me, I thought the son-of-a-b.... had thundered in for sure."
> 
> The whole airfield AD program took several years, but at least we have some trained and experienced people to call on, unlike the early seventies when the bird gunners had not plied the craft for over a decade.
> 
> And don't get me going on the joys of small arms in air defence.



Ditto. I still recall that the "Air" para of every exercise Op Order stated: "We have local air superiority." It was funny then too.

When I went to the RCSA in Shilo in 69, the last of the locating, AD and missile batteries had stood down although some of their gear--launchers, erectors, radars--still littered the base.

Towards the end of my tour with 2nd Horse in Petawawa, we started standing up the regimental Blowpipe batteries which everyone was quite cynical about as we all knew that the only reason they were coming on line was so that we could get NATO money for Baden and Lahr on the promise that we would stand up air defence at those bases (which consisted of the hard-standing 40mms and the Blowpipes). Never being air defence I had no actual experience with them but anecdotally my understanding was that the batteries were not altogether fond of the weapon or their roles with it.

It was actually quite interesting to see how quickly the expertise in these specialty artillery trades diminishes. We had few people left with practical AD experience in the seventies and by the time they were resurrecting locating, I think we were down to four folks who all ended up at the school in Gagetown as IGs and AIGs.

 :cheers:


----------



## Old Sweat

Good point, FJAG. When I hit the school as CIG in June 1974, the regiment was trying to resurrect locating aka STA. The Commander CTC came out to a firing point to see a demonstration of sound ranging. As it happens, besides our locating IG and one AIG, I was the only other person in the school who could use the plotting board to determine a hostile battery location, and I had learned it on my IG course in the Spring of 1968.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Colin P said:
			
		

> And how long to provide us with the pointy sticks? Let’s say we sent our units to Africa in 6 months from now and one of the groups we are “peacekeeping” against starts dropping bombs from UAV’s and kills someone, how long before we have the ability to identify and shoot one down before they get into range? What if we suddenly found our guys facing a more sophisticated enemy with military grade UAVs and attack aircraft, much less trying to use AD against a Grad strike from system firing from behind a robust AD screen. With our current procurement system I doubt anyone has any confidence in getting anything quickly and while my firsthand knowledge is purely discussions with Blowpipe operators. Training people to be effective with Manpads takes time, even more if you want 3 or 4 detached detachments to plug into an IAD in areas with limited comms and perhaps against an enemy that will be able to reach back behind your lines and pulverize any radio transmission source. Given that the average range of a Manpad system and the need to protect the frontline, chances are your AD detachment is in range of counter battery fire. When was the last time we exercised AD detachment in a full spectrum war scenario, where radio discipline and counterbattery fire was considered, not to mention a robust enemy?
> While I agree that keeping the corporate high level knowledge  alive is important, we have done it at the cost of losing the on the ground knowledge and the ability to actually do something. Where reality and the enemy will play havoc with best laid untried plans. We should have Manpad detachments out there now even with those field simulators so the day to day stuff of deploying, managing and protecting that resource can become part of the corporate knowledge.



We exercised this at the battery level until 2012, while the 4th still practices those skills using the MANPAD simulator. In reality, the threat you noted at the beginning of your post, being UAS in an African scenario, would be more in line with a gun system vice a MANPAD as the MANPAD would have extreme difficulty acquiring a target smaller than a TUAS. As the future system MAY be a MANPAD, C-RAM, or medium system or a combination of the 3, MANPAD training would provide "some" usefulness, but would be akin to training field gunners on a 105mm and then throwing them into 155mm detachments or a HIMARS det and being like, "meh, close enough, you get the principles".

Further, the "need to protect the front line" may not really be that whatsoever- AD priorities are based on types of air threat, systems in the IADS, and Criticality/Vulnerability/Recuperability of the target. GBAD is part of the IADS, which is a true "system of systems" so MANPAD very well may not be the appropriate system for engaging the anticipated threat. If the Air Defended assets are more in the rear (Fd Batteries, MLRS, BSA/DSA, etc) than the true planning factor becomes "line of weapon release" AKA, where the aircraft needs to be to use the projected weaponry it has (AT missiles, guns, etc). If the Stand off of a Hinds weapons is 10 KM and the AD system has a range of 8, than the AD system needs to be 2km in front of the asset to actually defend it.

MANPADs, in and of themselves, are no magic bullet and provide in most ways a very limited capability with some significant advantages (short range relative to the line of weapon release, generally poorer TA systems, more difficult to integrate into a positive IADS vice flexibility, economy (they're cheap), and mass). As the future threats are anticipated to be 1) UAS 2) Munitions 3) aviation than it doesn't make sense to buy just a MANPAD which isn't especially effective against threat 1 and 2, but good at 3.

As for plugging into the IADS, that is done via the ASCC, so I am not entirely sure what a MANPAD system would do to change anything whether we are in a high comms or low comms environment (Positive (high comms) vice procedural (low comms). I can _*guarantee *_that both are part of the current AD WO and AD Officer courses being taught at the RCAS.


----------



## Old Sweat

BG45

Could you please give us your estimate of the threat from the family of UAVs from the minis manned by the field regiments right up to the long range systems that can carry some pretty nasty stuff? How do we deal with each member of the family and which do we ignore or accept as too difficult? What are the troop safety and air space control implications of allowing the forward troops to blaze away at a UAV when it appears near them? What are the chances of this "weapons free" (to misuse a term) policy actually achieving anything?


----------



## Kirkhill

And, while you're at it:

Please explain, on the spectrum of air defence systems, where Trophy/Arena type Active Protection Systems lie.







http://www.businessinsider.com/us-army-tanks-strykers-and-bradleys-getting-active-protection-systems-2017-6

See, to my superannuated, molitia, ground-pounder's skull that Active Protection System looks an awful lot like a local Counter Rocket Artillery and Missile system and I find myself wondering if they can mount those things on tanks and APVs why they couldn't mount them in a UTV trailer or on a Tripod to accompany the infantry.

And the next question would be:

If they can knock an incoming RPG round out of the sky while it is moving at 295 m/s how much more difficult (or easier) is it to knock out a RadioShack drone with an underslung 40mm grenade attached to a badminton shuttlecock acting as a stabilizing drogue?

Or will the artillery give the ground pounders local air superiority against MUAVs so that they can do their job?

I can agree that $38,000 Stinger MANPADs or $78,000 Javelin MANPADs may not be cost effective against a swarm of 119 40mm grenades on auto-pilot but please tell me you have a better answer than "get used to it".


----------



## Infanteer

I think your confusing coordination levels.  Just as an M203 grenade launcher doesn't fall under the FSCC, an active defence system does not fall under an IADS.


----------



## Kirkhill

No Infanteer,  I am not confusing co-ordination levels.

On the other hand co-ordination is at the heart of this discussion.

The environment is target rich in ballistic missiles, guided missiles, autonomous missiles, Micro-Mini-Maxi UAVs, vertical take of and land and fixed wing, single use and recoverable - and I haven't mentioned traditional threats like Helos and Fast Movers.

BG45s GBAD battery is going to be deployed 8 km forward of the High Value Asset that he is defending.  I hope for his sake that there is an infantry battalion between him and the ATGM gunner targeting him.  And that they can do their job rather than having to hunker down under their SKOP kits waiting for the skies to clear.

I get that life is messy but the issue is one of managing to accomplish mission in spite of alligators rather than waiting for the swamp to drain.

I don't consider it an acceptable response to say that you lot in the front line should not have an effective means of protecting yourself against threats directed your way.  Space is zero.  Time available is comparable.  Waiting for someone to prioritize the immediate threat to your mission, your men, your machines and yourself does not, on its face, appear to me to be an effective course of action.    There aren't enough Infanteers as it is.  Let alone allowing the available numbers to be attrited by smart, cheap munitions.

The reaction time needs to be reduced - and apparently the technology exists to reduce the reaction time to 0.5 milliseconds.  Can you squeeze the PTT button in that length of time?  Let alone form a complete sentence, have it acknowledged, discussed, prioritized and a decision taken as to whether to spend the money to protect you, and allow you, your machines and your men to carry on with the mission, or hold on in case the Brigade CP is actually threatened by a Fast Mover - some day.

See, I actually think that a sky clear of fast movers is infinitely more likely than a sky clear of 40mm grenades on autopilot.

At the coal face those decisions, that process of getting inside the enemy's OODA loop, demand localized decision making ability and also demand localized response capabilities.


----------



## Kirkhill

WW1 - SE5A - 880 kg - 222 km/h - 1x 81mm mortar bomb hand delivered - piloted 

WW2 - Typhoon - 6010 kg - 663 km/h - bombs, rockets and bullets - piloted

Cold War - Su24 - 43,755 kg - 1315 km/h - bombs, rockets and bullets - piloted

Or, if you prefer

Cold War - A-10 - 23,000 kg - 706 km/h - bombs, rockets and bullets - piloted

Current - F35A - 31,800 kg - << 1930 km/h - bombs, rockets and bullets - piloted

And that is the threat evolution that the Air Defence Community, in my opinion, has been focusing on. With consideration given to other stuff like helicopters and SSMs.

In the meantime technology is making it possible to eliminate that type of platform entirely from the enemy's arsenal and still leave him with ability to target you with PGMs launched from 500 m or 5  km or 500 km or intercontinentally.  And do it cheaply and often.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We exercised this at the battery level until 2012, while the 4th still practices those skills using the MANPAD simulator. In reality, the threat you noted at the beginning of your post, being UAS in an African scenario, would be more in line with a gun system vice a MANPAD as the MANPAD would have extreme difficulty acquiring a target smaller than a TUAS. As the future system MAY be a MANPAD, C-RAM, or medium system or a combination of the 3, MANPAD training would provide "some" usefulness, but would be akin to training field gunners on a 105mm and then throwing them into 155mm detachments or a HIMARS det and being like, "meh, close enough, you get the principles".
> 
> Further, the "need to protect the front line" may not really be that whatsoever- AD priorities are based on types of air threat, systems in the IADS, and Criticality/Vulnerability/Recuperability of the target. GBAD is part of the IADS, which is a true "system of systems" so MANPAD very well may not be the appropriate system for engaging the anticipated threat. If the Air Defended assets are more in the rear (Fd Batteries, MLRS, BSA/DSA, etc) than the true planning factor becomes "line of weapon release" AKA, where the aircraft needs to be to use the projected weaponry it has (AT missiles, guns, etc). If the Stand off of a Hinds weapons is 10 KM and the AD system has a range of 8, than the AD system needs to be 2km in front of the asset to actually defend it.
> 
> MANPADs, in and of themselves, are no magic bullet and provide in most ways a very limited capability with some significant advantages (short range relative to the line of weapon release, generally poorer TA systems, more difficult to integrate into a positive IADS vice flexibility, economy (they're cheap), and mass). As the future threats are anticipated to be 1) UAS 2) Munitions 3) aviation than it doesn't make sense to buy just a MANPAD which isn't especially effective against threat 1 and 2, but good at 3.
> 
> As for plugging into the IADS, that is done via the ASCC, so I am not entirely sure what a MANPAD system would do to change anything whether we are in a high comms or low comms environment (Positive (high comms) vice procedural (low comms). I can _*guarantee *_that both are part of the current AD WO and AD Officer courses being taught at the RCAS.



I mentioned the Manpads as they have the smallest “Footprint” in regards to procurement, storage and vehicles. I would like to see a gun system to provide coverage for the frontline for smaller threats and deny the area to hostile UAV systems. The .50cals are likely all we have at the moment and perhaps issue AA sights and high angle mounts for non RWS guns is the baby step for now.
I see 2 gun systems that seem offer a layered approach and not sure which missile system would compliment that. I have previously argued that some Reserve units should be tasked as AD units, starting out with smallish guns 20-35mm guns and Manpad simulators.

 Both can be fitted on a LAV by the looks of it.
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/skyranger.htm

This system would also useful to provide coastal defense to a remote naval base, making it more deployable
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/draco.htm


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

The CV90 has a 40mm AA turret 
 and the Koreans have an interesting turret called K30 Biho which has a gun-missile combination, which might be options depending upon max turret weight on the LAV 6.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> The CV90 has a 40mm AA turret
> and the Koreans have an interesting turret called K30 Biho which has a gun-missile combination, which might be options depending upon max turret weight on the LAV 6.



Let's just hope the bad guys haven't watched this movie yet  

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHq3y20HhRk


----------



## Kirkhill

> o at the Army USA Show in Washington DC EOS unveiled its new R-400S remote
> weapon system, as shown in Figure 2. The R-400S has been specifically developed to
> provide 30 mm firepower in a high precision weapon system, weighing less than 350 kg.









http://media.abnnewswire.net/media/en/docs/76134-ASX-EOS-764562.pdf

Could something like that not be married to the Trophy system to respond to incoming aerial threats?  Or linked with a local EO or Radar detection system?

Purpose of the exercise to upgrade the Battalion's heavy machine guns to give precise fire control, improve anti-air capabilities, improve ground fire support and increase the survivability of the gunner by separating the gun from the gunner.

350 kg in Self Propelled mode - light enough to be transported in a CH-146.   Remove the power pack for the wheels and mount on a trailer for towing behind a UTV and it will be lighter and more deployable yet.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> http://media.abnnewswire.net/media/en/docs/76134-ASX-EOS-764562.pdf
> 
> Could something like that not be married to the Trophy system to respond to incoming aerial threats?  Or linked with a local EO or Radar detection system?
> 
> Purpose of the exercise to upgrade the Battalion's heavy machine guns to give precise fire control, improve anti-air capabilities, improve ground fire support and increase the survivability of the gunner by separating the gun from the gunner.
> 
> 350 kg in Self Propelled mode - light enough to be transported in a CH-146.   Remove the power pack for the wheels and mount on a trailer for towing behind a UTV and it will be lighter and more deployable yet.



And if I was the OC of the local defense rifle company I'd ride it around smiting things like an avenging angel


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> http://media.abnnewswire.net/media/en/docs/76134-ASX-EOS-764562.pdf
> 
> Could something like that not be married to the Trophy system to respond to incoming aerial threats?  Or linked with a local EO or Radar detection system?
> 
> Purpose of the exercise to upgrade the Battalion's heavy machine guns to give precise fire control, improve anti-air capabilities, improve ground fire support and increase the survivability of the gunner by separating the gun from the gunner.
> 
> 350 kg in Self Propelled mode - light enough to be transported in a CH-146.   Remove the power pack for the wheels and mount on a trailer for towing behind a UTV and it will be lighter and more deployable yet.



If I was on the ground, I think I would be a little hesitant to have that much unfuzedsolid ammo going up in the air, knowing gravity would dictate it also would come back down.  I'd much rather programmable 35mm or 40mm ammo going up and smaller tungsten pellets coming back down. 

By the way, was poking around the Thales website and they've got some really interesting pre-configured integrated systems which include sensors and multiple weapons including 40mm gun and multiple low-level missile alternatives, where you could buy off the shelf and away you go.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> No Infanteer,  I am not confusing co-ordination levels.
> 
> On the other hand co-ordination is at the heart of this discussion.
> 
> The environment is target rich in ballistic missiles, guided missiles, autonomous missiles, Micro-Mini-Maxi UAVs, vertical take of and land and fixed wing, single use and recoverable - and I haven't mentioned traditional threats like Helos and Fast Movers.
> 
> BG45s GBAD battery is going to be deployed 8 km forward of the High Value Asset that he is defending.  I hope for his sake that there is an infantry battalion between him and the ATGM gunner targeting him.  And that they can do their job rather than having to hunker down under their SKOP kits waiting for the skies to clear.
> 
> I get that life is messy but the issue is one of managing to accomplish mission in spite of alligators rather than waiting for the swamp to drain.
> 
> I don't consider it an acceptable response to say that you lot in the front line should not have an effective means of protecting yourself against threats directed your way.  Space is zero.  Time available is comparable.  Waiting for someone to prioritize the immediate threat to your mission, your men, your machines and yourself does not, on its face, appear to me to be an effective course of action.    There aren't enough Infanteers as it is.  Let alone allowing the available numbers to be attrited by smart, cheap munitions.
> 
> The reaction time needs to be reduced - and apparently the technology exists to reduce the reaction time to 0.5 milliseconds.  Can you squeeze the PTT button in that length of time?  Let alone form a complete sentence, have it acknowledged, discussed, prioritized and a decision taken as to whether to spend the money to protect you, and allow you, your machines and your men to carry on with the mission, or hold on in case the Brigade CP is actually threatened by a Fast Mover - some day.
> 
> See, I actually think that a sky clear of fast movers is infinitely more likely than a sky clear of 40mm grenades on autopilot.
> 
> At the coal face those decisions, that process of getting inside the enemy's OODA loop, demand localized decision making ability and also demand localized response capabilities.


We'll start at the start...

1. Yes, obviously if a GBAD element was deployed in front of the defended asset (8 km was the example) in the case of a BSA, DSA, airfield, etc than there would be a force protection element there. That's why "normally" GBAD is deployed TACON to infantry bns... they coordinate local defence and the Bn commander can, if he or she chooses, put assets in the larger bubble. That said, the detachments will defend themselves (hence the "AT" on the end of ADATS... the AT function was designed to improve survivability not as an actual secondary capability).

2. Priorities are based on threat, criticality, vulnerability, and recuperability. The threat is key as the primary objective of GBAD is to defend against non-fast movers but to provide a "back-stop" to the fast movers (countering jets of all varieties are the primary function of the Air Force and these can be engaged relatively far out in a positive IADS as airfields will be identified in the Air IPB process. The reason infantry tend to be lower on the priority list is because they tend to score lower in vulnerability and higher in recuperability, in that infantry can hide from a threat easier than a field battery and are more replaceable than guns, CPs, MLRS, etc.

3. You seem to be focussed on the fast mover aspect of this discussion, which to be honest, isn't the foreseeable priority. UAS, munitions, and aviation are the largest threats to the field force. UAS of all natures are the primary threat, imho, with munitions being next and aviation being the most dangerous. 

4. It's the localized decision making that is the basic problem of giving untrained infantry units MANPADs. Unless they have the integration into the IADS, the training to identify friend or foe, and the ability to establish an effective AD protection area, than it wouldn't be effective and would likely endanger friendly aircraft (The RCAF doesn't even like the idea of qualified AD Sgts conducting engagements let alone a sort of qualified infantry Cpl). Further, how would IFF work for a UAS threat? How could someone in a trench line with no radar tell if a small or mini UAS was friend or foe? in your example, they would need to hop on a radio and ask the Bde HQ or would need to be tracking all of the ASCMs associated with their area. Your solution would actually greatly increase the time needed, not reduce it.

5. I agree with infanteer that you are confusing active defence of an AFV with air defence.


----------



## NavyShooter

As a sidebar, I was out at Shearwater looking at one of the laydown areas the other week (looking for some RAS equipment with an LCMM) and came across 5x 40mm Bofors guns sitting, packaged/preserved on the tarmac for future disposition.

Need a bunch of recycled 40mm guns for Air Defence again?

;-)


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We'll start at the start...
> 
> 1
> 4. It's the localized decision making that is the basic problem of giving untrained infantry units MANPADs. Unless they have the integration into the IADS, the training to identify friend or foe, and the ability to establish an effective AD protection area, than it wouldn't be effective and would likely endanger friendly aircraft (The RCAF doesn't even like the idea of qualified AD Sgts conducting engagements let alone a sort of qualified infantry Cpl). Further, how would IFF work for a UAS threat? How could someone in a trench line with no radar tell if a small or mini UAS was friend or foe? in your example, they would need to hop on a radio and ask the Bde HQ or would need to be tracking all of the ASCMs associated with their area. Your solution would actually greatly increase the time needed, not reduce it.



I suspect the infantry will learn to respond to any UAS over them after suddenly having bomblets dropped on them or accurate artillery fire, after which any UAS will be targeted with everything they have. So you can plan on having something to protect them or have everything that can point up shooting at the UAS anyways.


----------



## Kirkhill

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> If I was on the ground, I think I would be a little hesitant to have that much unfuzedsolid ammo going up in the air, knowing gravity would dictate it also would come back down.  I'd much rather programmable 35mm or 40mm ammo going up and smaller tungsten pellets coming back down.
> 
> By the way, was poking around the Thales website and they've got some really interesting pre-configured integrated systems which include sensors and multiple weapons including 40mm gun and multiple low-level missile alternatives, where you could buy off the shelf and away you go.



Actually, that is a 30mm auto-cannon.  I believe it used to be called the ASP.  So fused ammunition is not impossible.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> I suspect the infantry will learn to respond to any UAS over them after suddenly having bomblets dropped on them or accurate artillery fire, after which any UAS will be targeted with everything they have. So you can plan on having something to protect them or have everything that can point up shooting at the UAS anyways.



Thumbs up on that one.

Integration. 

In land operations, as I remember it, coordination starts in two-dimensions.  The x and y axis.  The OPI is given responsibility for everything in his/her arcs, boundaries, lanes.  Call them what you will. But one does not encroach on one's neighbour's boundaries.  Only Higher gets to do that.

Is it too much to ask that you stay out of "my" airspace without asking my permission? Apply the same rules to the z axis as are applied to the x and y axis. Frankly, I would prefer to see nothing in the skies over my head rather than trying to figure out if this one is shootable or that one is going to have chunks falling of its wings.

With respect to the AFV vs Corps discussion:  I would argue that the it is the same discussion but at the micro-level vs the macro-level.

What is the impact on Combined Armed operations if the infantry accompanying the tanks suddenly have the tanks detonating incoming rounds over the heads of the infantry?  Or do the AFVs have to give up their "right of self-defence" when they are working with the infantry?

The issue becomes one of overlapping bubbles and who is responsible for what goes on in that bubble.

My inclination is along the lines of Colin.  You don't want to be shot out of my sky stay out of my bubble - unless you ask permission.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Colin P said:
			
		

> I suspect the infantry will learn to respond to any UAS over them after suddenly having bomblets dropped on them or accurate artillery fire, after which any UAS will be targeted with everything they have. So you can plan on having something to protect them or have everything that can point up shooting at the UAS anyways.



If they A) know the UAS is there and B) can see the UAS. 

Realistically, a MUAS would be launched from 3-5 km away by a recce or other infantry/armour unit as an intelligence gathering asset and would not be, itself, used to direct artillery fire. Assets above MUAS (SUAS to HALE/MALE) would be detectable on radar and would be pushed as targets to GBAD via the ASCC. As the majority of these systems require runways (particularly above SUAS), move slowly, and move in predetermined patterns (generally straight to a target and then loiter in a circular pattern) they could be engaged from anything from GBAD to Fast Air.

In general, the planning factor would see MUAS as the primary UAS that would target infantry type units with SUAS and higher being used more for Counter battery and other fires. 

Having an entire battalion of infantry firing into the air doesn't seem particularly tactical since the noise alone would give away the position. It would seem that taking passive measures would be more optimal with warning provided by the ASCC (as per doctrine).


----------



## Old Sweat

And we may be resurrecting Air OP tactics of loitering behind cover, popping up to identify a target and/or observe fall of shot and evading fast air by manoeuvring behind cover. It was possible for a fixed wing light aircraft to survive and even more so for a light helicopter in a hostile air environment.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

So just to re-cap:
1.  Individual Infantry with unintegrated MANPADS is a non-starter.  By definition then, we need to start looking at an integrated-networked system as a base.
2.  There is general agreement that small UAS providing targeting information is a far greater threat than fast movers like enemy jets.

In the above context, is it not possible to focus on what systems make the most sense, what numbers we'd need them in order to resolve the agreed-upon threats, and how they would best be deployed in our forces?




P.S.  With VTUAV's that can pop-up to obtain target information and then drop out GBAD ranges, I'm wondering if we shouldn't be integrating a MALE UAV like Predator B with light air-to-air missiles (in addition to their more traditional Hellfires) so that enemy UAV's are being spotted from both above and below.  I believe early model Predators were actually tested with Stingers, so it most likely can be done, if it is deemed a requirement.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> _*2.  There is general agreement that small UAS providing targeting information is a far greater threat than fast movers like enemy jets.*_



ISIS, and other naughty middle eastern based chaps over the past decade or so, may disagree with you, especially right after a 2000lb JDAM strike


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ISIS, and other naughty middle eastern based chaps over the past decade or so, may disagree with you, especially right after a 2000lb JDAM strike



I meant "to us". It's more of a threat "to us".   :warstory:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> If they A) know the UAS is there and B) can see the UAS.
> 
> Realistically, a MUAS would be launched from 3-5 km away by a recce or other infantry/armour unit as an intelligence gathering asset and would not be, itself, used to direct artillery fire. Assets above MUAS (SUAS to HALE/MALE) would be detectable on radar and would be pushed as targets to GBAD via the ASCC. As the majority of these systems require runways (particularly above SUAS), move slowly, and move in predetermined patterns (generally straight to a target and then loiter in a circular pattern) they could be engaged from anything from GBAD to Fast Air.
> 
> In general, the planning factor would see MUAS as the primary UAS that would target infantry type units with SUAS and higher being used more for Counter battery and other fires.
> 
> Having an entire battalion of infantry firing into the air doesn't seem particularly tactical since the noise alone would give away the position. It would seem that taking passive measures would be more optimal with warning provided by the ASCC (as per doctrine).



There is lots of video out there of how other “less organized” armies are using UAV, drones in combat, generally they are either overhead or within 1,000m of the battle. They are being used to direct infantry, vehicles or artillery in real time to maximize their attacks. The response must be very immediate, literally you have about 10-20 minutes to destroy the drone to prevent it from carrying out its mission and at a cost of $500-$1,000, they might have multiple ones ready to go if one is shot down and the mission is worth it. Now the commercial drones can be disrupted by jammers for now, but it won’t take long for someone to work around that, so one needs to assume that we will have to shoot them down, while at the same time working on electronic suppressors. While the .50cal could be used in a twin or quad mount, likely better to have 20mm-25mm as a minimum to get the reach and hopefully some proximity fuzed rounds, to improve hit rate.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Colin P:  "While the .50cal could be used in a twin or quad mount, likely better to have 20mm-25mm as a minimum to get the reach and hopefully some proximity fuzed rounds, to improve hit rate."

Me:  Just looking at effective ranges, those types max out at about 2,000 m, while the 35mm and 40mm are good for 4,000 m.  Depending on the environment, I'm thinking that extra range may be worth the larger dedicated platform.


----------



## Infanteer

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Is it too much to ask that you stay out of "my" airspace without asking my permission? Apply the same rules to the z axis as are applied to the x and y axis. Frankly, I would prefer to see nothing in the skies over my head rather than trying to figure out if this one is shootable or that one is going to have chunks falling of its wings.
> 
> ...
> 
> The issue becomes one of overlapping bubbles and who is responsible for what goes on in that bubble.
> 
> My inclination is along the lines of Colin.  You don't want to be shot out of my sky stay out of my bubble - unless you ask permission.



If I have the doctrine right, there is only one sky and one piece of air space, and it belongs to the joint force commander.  He appoints the Area Air Defence Commander (AADC), who ensures that friendly airpower (arguably the biggest strength of NATO/Western forces) can operate without getting blasted out of the sky by friendly forces.

Read JP 3-30 if you want to understand the system.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> There is lots of video out there of how other “less organized” armies are using UAV, drones in combat, generally they are either overhead or within 1,000m of the battle. They are being used to direct infantry, vehicles or artillery in real time to maximize their attacks. The response must be very immediate, literally you have about 10-20 minutes to destroy the drone to prevent it from carrying out its mission and at a cost of $500-$1,000, they might have multiple ones ready to go if one is shot down and the mission is worth it. Now the commercial drones can be disrupted by jammers for now, but it won’t take long for someone to work around that, so one needs to assume that we will have to shoot them down, while at the same time working on electronic suppressors. While the .50cal could be used in a twin or quad mount, likely better to have 20mm-25mm as a minimum to get the reach and hopefully some proximity fuzed rounds, to improve hit rate.



Forget guns.... there's a golden opportunity to reintroduce 'combat falconry' to the Art of War!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhDG_WBIQgc


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Infanteer said:
			
		

> If I have the doctrine right, there is only one sky and one piece of air space, and it belongs to the joint force commander.  He appoints the Area Air Defence Commander (AADC), who ensures that friendly airpower (arguably the biggest strength of NATO/Western forces) can operate without getting blasted out of the sky by friendly forces.
> 
> Read JP 3-30 if you want to understand the system.
> 
> http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm
> 
> http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf



You have it correct. Normally COM JFAC manages airspace issues in the JOA on behalf of the JFC through the Airspace Control Plan (ACP). There is only one airspace and only one plan. That said, sub areas can be delegated to whomever it makes operational senses to do so. Often, control of the airspace below a certain altitude will just be passed to the LCC because it just makes sense to do so.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Colin P said:
			
		

> There is lots of video out there of how other “less organized” armies are using UAV, drones in combat, generally they are either overhead or within 1,000m of the battle. They are being used to direct infantry, vehicles or artillery in real time to maximize their attacks. The response must be very immediate, literally you have about 10-20 minutes to destroy the drone to prevent it from carrying out its mission and at a cost of $500-$1,000, they might have multiple ones ready to go if one is shot down and the mission is worth it. Now the commercial drones can be disrupted by jammers for now, but it won’t take long for someone to work around that, so one needs to assume that we will have to shoot them down, while at the same time working on electronic suppressors. While the .50cal could be used in a twin or quad mount, likely better to have 20mm-25mm as a minimum to get the reach and hopefully some proximity fuzed rounds, to improve hit rate.



The .50 cal is out of service, so that might be an issue.

As for the UAS, yes, you are right and that is exactly what had been discussed previously. However, there is an infinitesimal chance of a MUAS being visually seen and SUAS can stand off up to 2 km away (Scan Eagle as an example could do 2 km comfortably) so is unlikely to be seen by an inf coy or other sub-unit, let alone engaged. AAAD is still a thing, but people need to be realistic about this- without a radar/ADSI any firing unit would be of dubious value, if not a danger to friendly assets. SO unless early warning is pushed down to the sub-unit by the ASCC via the IADS than there's little to no chance of detecting these AVs.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Infanteer said:
			
		

> If I have the doctrine right, there is only one sky and one piece of air space, and it belongs to the joint force commander.  He appoints the Area Air Defence Commander (AADC), who ensures that friendly airpower (arguably the biggest strength of NATO/Western forces) can operate without getting blasted out of the sky by friendly forces.
> 
> Read JP 3-30 if you want to understand the system.
> 
> http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm
> 
> http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf



 :goodpost:


----------



## Kirkhill

Article about the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II with its new active radar seeker increasing its effectiveness

Given that the missile is compatible with the Navy's MK41 VLS and a variety of other launchers, including the NASAMs GBAD MML I thought it would be worthwhile putting the info into the Joint community rather than a Service stove pipe.  What is the closest compatible Air Force variant?  



> Watch The Navy Fire Its New Evolved Sea Sparrow Block II Missile For The First Time
> This new version of the Sea Sparrow features its own active radar seeker that will make fending off swarms of cruise missiles much more plausible.
> 
> BY TYLER ROGOWAYNOVEMBER 2, 2017
> THE WAR ZONEAIR DEFENSEANTI-SHIP MISSILESBLOCK IIESSMEVOLVED SEA SPARROW MISSILEFIRST LAUNCHQUAD PACKRIM-162RIM-7SAMTEST LAUNCH
> 
> TYLER ROGOWAY
> 
> The NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium is decades old and still going very strong. The highly maneuverable RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) has been protecting allied surface combatants and their escorts for nearly 15 years now around the globe and is seen as a huge success. Before that, the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow, itself an adaptation of the AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile, had served since the mid 1970s, protecting everything from American supercarriers to allied frigates from airborne threats and short to medium-ranges. Now the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II is on the way, with its first test firings having occurred last Summer and the Navy just recently released video from these milestone events.
> 
> 
> 
> By Tyler Rogoway
> Posted in THE WAR ZONE
> 
> The ESSM Block II's first two test launches occurred aboard the Navy's test ship, the modified Spruance class destroyer USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964), last June off the coast of Southern California. Both tests appear to have been successful.
> 
> 
> 
> The ESSM Block II has much in common with its progenitor, including its ability to be quad-packed into a single Mk41 vertical launch system cell. It can also make use of "legacy" launchers like the Mk29 box launcher that still adorns American supercarriers, amphibious flattops, and other allied vessels. The Block II uses the Block I's rocket motor and thrust vectoring hot section, but its seeker is much more capable.
> 
> 
> 
> USN
> A RIM-162 ESSM is seen fired from an aircraft carrier's Mk29 launcher, below are the radar illuminators used to guide the missile to its target
> Instead of relying on semi-active radar guidance, where one of the ship's radar illuminators has to "paint" the target for the missile to guide toward and eventually detonate nearby, ESSM Block II features both active and semi-active radar seekers. This dual-mode seeker setup combined with a datalink allows the missile to be fired at targets without ever having the ship illuminate the target at all. The missile gets mid-course updates from the ship via a datalink for longer distance engagements, or it can be launched "fire and forget" for shorter engagements. Fire and forget mode can be used for longer-range shots too, with the missile flying out to its best guess of where the target will be on its own inertial guidance system before turning on its active radar seeker, but the chances of a successful intercept will decrease the farther the missile flies without the benefit of mid-course updates.
> 
> 
> USN
> The physical changes between the Block I and Block II ESSM are minima but the tactical impact that the Block II's new guidance section will have will be major. Range will likely stay about the same on paper, about 30-45 miles depending on the source, but adjusted flight profiles due to the missile's new terminal guidance system may allow for longer, more efficient engagements.
> This dual mode setup solves a huge problem for the ESSM Block I, as ships have limited capacity to defend themselves due to a finite number of illuminators available to guide each individual missile through their separate terminal attacks. Even though ESSMs could be rippled off quickly at many targets, there simply isn't enough illuminator guidance capacity to support them, even when illuminator time is tightly managed.
> 
> This is no longer an issue with ESSM Block II, giving ships much greater capacity to defend themselves against a multi-missile swarm attack, and especially ones emanating from different vectors with missiles flying disparate attack profiles. Additionally, the Block II can still leverage the older style of guidance, using the ship's illuminators to paint the target, which may be advantageous in some instances, and by using both seekers the probability of a kill would likely increase.
> 
> 
> USN
> The original RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Missile served for decades, with it being best known for providing the second to last layer of defense around American flattops. Here you can see one being launched out of the Mk29 box launcher. Note the missile's folding fins, a major difference between it and its air-launched cousin.
> Also, in a networked battlespace, ESSM Block II can intercept sea skimming anti-ship missiles at greater distances, even when shipborne illuminators, or even radars of any type, are unable to detect or paint the low-flying targets. The ESSM Block II can leverage third party sensor tracks (from another ship, aircraft etc) under the Navy's cooperative engagement initiatives and fly out towards its target at altitude, and then dive down on it from above, using its own active X-band radar seeker to lock up the target and destroy it. This will be especially useful when opening up the missile's secondary surface attack functions in littoral environments.
> 
> All told, RIM-162 ESSM Block II offers a lot of extra capability without having to redevelop the entire missile. And for the US Navy in particular, which fields large amounts of these missiles on its destroyers, cruisers, amphibious flattops, and aircraft carriers, this capability is badly needed. Not just that, but it's also a real value. The ESSM program is funded cooperatively between the US and allied nations that are part of the consortium. The split is roughly 40% United States and 60% foreign partners. So the US Navy gets an updated ESSM with critical new capabilities for 40% of the cost of developing it alone.



http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15718/watch-the-navy-fire-its-new-evolved-sea-sparrow-block-ii-missile-for-the-first-time


----------



## NavyShooter

I've observed the LEAP forward in capability that the RIM-162 has given the RCN as compared to the RIM-7.

Hearing that there's a block II that's even better?

Woohoo!

Please bring it on!


----------



## Kirkhill

Bump 

Some thoughts on what a General Support Regiment might end up looking like - if an American option prevails.



> Is the Army ready to transform its missile defense force?
> 
> WASHINGTON — The Army is coming out with a new missile defense strategy this summer and the Pentagon is expected to release an overarching missile defense review in short order. Combined, the initiatives will guide the way the future air-and-missile defense force will operate.....
> 
> The Army needs to think about more distributed AMD operations as it faces new threats, according to Tom Karako, one of the authors of the CSIS report and director of the Missile Defense Project at the think tank.
> 
> Sign up for our Daily News Roundup
> The top Defense News stories of the daySubscribe
> Karako proposes several operational concepts to direct the services toward more distributed air and missile defense from enabling launch- and engage-on-remote capabilities and better networking systems to dispersing elements of missile defense batteries over a wider area.
> 
> He also suggests designing launchers to accommodate mixed loads of interceptors that he calls “layered defense in a box.”
> 
> The Army should also consider offense-defense launchers that can be used for both missions and containerized launchers that can be better concealed, as well as a “passive defense shell game” where numerous “dummy launchers” with optical, thermal and electronic signatures would be in some containers while real launchers would be in others, increasing the guesswork for the enemy.
> 
> “Such deployments could impose costs on an adversary, as well as present them with new dilemmas, such as the expenditure of resources on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or the wastage of precision-guided munitions,” the report states.
> 
> Vince Sabio, the program manager for the hypervelocity gun weapon system at the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office, said the current AMD force is inflexible, only designed for ballistic missile threats, and is expensive.
> 
> He said new capability needs to be able to defend a 360-degree area of coverage and handle threats coming from many trajectories. The AMD force needs to be able to engage multiple



https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/01/26/is-the-army-ready-to-transform-its-missile-defense-force/

And a related article about knocking down missiles with 155s and 4.5s



> $86,000 + 5,600 MPH = Hyper Velocity Missile Defense



https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/86000-5600-mph-hyper-velocity-missile-defense/


----------



## a_majoor

The big problem in thinking about anti air defence is there are so many possible "engagement bands" to cover. Dealing with long range missiles and bombers requires a far different set of equipment than dealing with tiny quad copter UAV's.

Layering up air defence systems is pretty time and resource intensive, and the former Soviet Union and current Russian doctrine embraces doing that mostly because they are much weaker in offensive air power. Soviet/Russian CAPs would not be anywhere near as effective as NATO USAF air cover.

Still, we have been asleep at the switch in Canada since the end of the Cold War, having no air defence capability whatsoever. Possibly a good short term solution would be to arm selected LAV's with a missile pod, much like the USMC "Blaser" or US Army "Linebacker" (a conversion of the M-2 where the TOW launcher was replaced by a 4 missile Stinger pod), which would at least address the most glaring deficiency against attack helicopters and low flying attack aircraft.

Farther in the future, looking at laser and microwave weapons for anti UAV/UCAV and C-RAM missions is probably worth while, I doubt we have the resources or manpower base to expand anti air much further than local protection frommthe platoon to the battlegroup level. Dual purpose weapons like 50mm auto cannon with guided rounds may be worth while, the extra firepower for ground elements will be welcomed.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Nice to hear that the Canadian Army is looking at reviving its Ground-based AD Capability.



> Air Defence: Reacquiring a vital capability
> Jun 27, 2019 | News, Procurement
> By Ian Coutts
> 
> There is a classic cartoon by Bing Coughlin from the Canadian Army’s old Maple Leaf newspaper featuring Herbie, his archetypal Canadian soldier of the Second World War. In it, Herbie, cowering with his pals in a crude shelter in the midst of a fiendish bombardment, looks up and notices an astounding selection of objects hurtling overhead – a steel rail, a big pipe, a stove and, as he remarks incredulously, “Even the kitchen sink!”
> 
> There must have been times when it felt like that. And indeed, times today when it still does. A modern soldier looking up in the battlespace might see a bewildering array of objects passing overhead: Not merely fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, but mortar shells, cruise missiles, surface-to-surface rockets and even, potentially, swarms of drones. All intent on doing him or her harm.
> 
> Hopes are the Army’s new Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system will help to counteract all of these threats, by sometime in the middle of the next decade. In the not-so distant past, the Army could field a selection of weapons capable of engaging low-flying aircraft, ranging from shoulder-launched Javelin missiles to a radar controlled Oerlikon-Contraves GDF 35mm twin cannon, to Aerospace Oerlikon’s combined air defence anti-tank system. The last of those air defence capabilities was retired in 2012.
> 
> Canada wasn’t alone in neglecting these systems. As Major Bruno Di Ilio, the lead on the GBAD project, pointed out, “There was a big downturn on the West’s part in terms of air defence capability because we always thought we had air superiority, so we didn’t need it.”
> 
> However, said Di Ilio, experiences with mortars and surface-to-surface fire in Afghanistan, along with recent conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere, have led to a reappraisal of air defence. As well, there is a growing awareness of the dangers posed by drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
> 
> For all these reasons, after a gap of several years, the search for a new ground air defense system was listed in Strong, Secure Engaged, the government’s June 2017 defence policy, as one of the Army’s key priorities.
> 
> When Di Ilio, himself a gunner, discusses GBAD, he talks about it as “a system of systems.” At heart, it involves four key components: A sensor system using both radar and electro-optical or infrared components – the new medium range radar will contribute part of that; an air defence management component to identify aerial threats; and a communications system.
> 
> Fourth and finally, he said, “If there is a threat, we need an effector capability to neutralize and/or defeat the threat.” This is where GBAD gets interesting. The system may depend on “hard kill” options, the so-called “kinetic” weapons like guns or missiles, or “soft kill” weapons, of which high-energy lasers or electronic jamming might be prime examples.
> 
> In fact, the system might rely on both. That’s reflective of a major shift in targets, which previously emphasized an anti-aircraft response.
> 
> “Our primary target set is the RAM [rocket, artillery, mortar] projectiles,” said Di Ilio. “The other category that fits into the primary target set is air-to-surface munitions, essentially those delivered from helicopters or fixed-wing platforms.”
> 
> Beyond that, GBAD will also prioritize UAVs, “mainly the small unmanned systems and the Class II systems, which are up to about 500 kilograms in weight.”
> 
> Dealing with such a selection of threats is a daunting task. As Di Ilio put it, “a mortar shell is very small and very difficult to take out.” But not impossible. In August 2018, as part of the options analysis phase of the GBAD project, Di Ilio and his colleagues sent out a request for information to potential suppliers outlining the project’s goals.
> 
> “We ended up receiving over 15 packages,” he said. “Some of them were just specifically focused on missile systems, some were on gun systems. All of them, though, provided a complete package of sensors, communications, command and control and the effector platforms.”
> 
> He and his colleagues are also looking at what allies have adopted or are considering. “We’re not looking at going into development to build a system that is one-of,” he said. “Whatever the UK or the US are planning on procuring, we’re very much interested. There are savings to be had if we have commonality of fleets.”
> 
> He cautioned, though, that it is still early days. “You have to consider that we are not procuring this for at least another five years. What we’re doing right now is evaluating the different systems. Some of them are operational and some are systems that are in development.”
> 
> Di Ilio said that whatever the Army acquires, it must be capable of providing air defence for a brigade, whether it is involved in peacekeeping or in a conflict zone, which means the area to be protected could vary greatly in size. The Army will also need enough systems to provide cover for two separate deployments at the same time.
> 
> The precise structure of the units operating the system hasn’t been determined but, he said added, “We’re going to have a structure based on troops and batteries similar to the organization that we have in the artillery now.”
> 
> The Army pegs the cost at between $250 million and $499 million, but that is very much an estimate. The goal is for an initial operating capability by 2025. After which, who knows, maybe they’ll even be able to shoot down that kitchen sink.



Link includes photos.


----------



## daftandbarmy

All I can say is 'Thank Gawd.... finally....'


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Since we have "Vapourware, killnothing system" a set of over and unders would be a step up.


----------



## DeweyB

When do you think they'll be able to pull this off realistically?


----------



## a_majoor

Given the recent attacks on the Saudi AMOCO facility by Iranian drones or cruise missiles, it looks like one key issue is to find a system or architecture which can realistically respond to swarms of inexpensive air vehicles. Of course today the threat has expanded dramatically from "low and slow" to hypersonic boost/glide vehicles, so this is going to be a long and arduous process.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well you have Reserve Artillery with almost no guns, select a number of them to become AD and form a battery. Buy some Manpad simulators. I get you could build a mount for the 25mm used in the LAV as a AD gun for small drones. That could be done here in Canada. Start somewhere and build the knowledge base again.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

Maybe we should keep the 76mm guns from the Iroquois fleet and use them as a GBAD training tool. There are some very interesting ammunition natures for this system, and  it has also previously been mounted on a tank chassis as a SPAA system (proof of concept) so its certainly possible to use it this way.

First link removed per site guidelines.
https://army.ca/forums/threads/99046/post-1015747.html#msg1015747


https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=951


----------



## tomahawk6

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dsei/2019/09/11/raytheon-anticipates-international-boom-in-counter-drone-sales/


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Well you have Reserve Artillery with almost no guns, select a number of them to become AD and form a battery. Buy some Manpad simulators. I get you could build a mount for the 25mm used in the LAV as a AD gun for small drones. That could be done here in Canada. Start somewhere and build the knowledge base again.



Funny thing is some Reserve Arty were AD units, 20th Independent Field Battery in Lethbridge used to be 20th Air defense battery until just after I got in. While I'd support getting such a capability back to the PRes, lets make sure we have a strong Reg F element first in the AD realm.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Given the recent attacks on the Saudi AMOCO facility by Iranian drones or cruise missiles, it looks like one key issue is to find a system or architecture which can realistically respond to swarms of inexpensive air vehicles. Of course today the threat has expanded dramatically from "low and slow" to hypersonic boost/glide vehicles, so this is going to be a long and arduous process.



Maybe we should start with a system that could defeat a squadron of fanatical Piper Cub pilots armed with hand grenades.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Lot's of pictures of Reserve arty units using the US 90mm gun with radar and predictor, generally doing shoots at Albert Head as I recall. funny how we used to be able to maintain complex equipment in the Reserves.....


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Funny thing is some Reserve Arty were AD units, 20th Independent Field Battery in Lethbridge used to be 20th Air defense battery until just after I got in. While I'd support getting such a capability back to the PRes, lets make sure we have a strong Reg F element first in the AD realm.



There were actually a number of reserve artillery units that served in the air defence role using the Javelin missile from roughly 1992 to 2006/7 or so. Each unit was a mix of both regular and reserve soldiers. 18 AD Regt RCA in Lethbridge (previously and afterwards 20 Ind Fd Bty RCA); 1 AD Regt RCA Pembroke ON (subsequently 42 Fd Regt (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish)) and 58 AD Bty, 6 Fd Regt RCA Levis, PQ.

Prior to their formation in roughly 1980 or so (I could be out a year or two) each RCHA Regt had a Blowpipe missile (which was a Brit piece of sh*t) AD Bty added to it. Those were closed out when the three mixed Reg/Res Regts/Bties were formed. We did keep a Reg F 4th AD Regt for quite a while until it became 4 GS Regt.

I was long gone from the guns by the time all this started to shut down so do not know what the reasons were. I presume the change over from the RCHA bties to 1AD, 18 AD and 58AD were an attempt to save RegF PYs while maintaining the AD capability. I'm going to contact a friend of mine who was in the AD business and find out why the thing shut down in 2006. My guess again is PYs and $.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> There were actually a number of reserve artillery units that served in the air defence role using the Javelin missile from roughly 1992 to 2006/7 or so. Each unit was a mix of both regular and reserve soldiers. 18 AD Regt RCA in Lethbridge (previously and afterwards 20 Ind Fd Bty RCA); 1 AD Regt RCA Pembroke ON (subsequently 42 Fd Regt (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish)) and 58 AD Bty, 6 Fd Regt RCA Levis, PQ.
> 
> Prior to their formation in roughly 1980 or so (I could be out a year or two) each RCHA Regt had a Blowpipe missile (which was a Brit piece of ****) AD Bty added to it. Those were closed out when the three mixed Reg/Res Regts/Bties were formed. We did keep a Reg F 4th AD Regt for quite a while until it became 4 GS Regt.
> 
> I was long gone from the guns by the time all this started to shut down so do not know what the reasons were. I presume the change over from the RCHA bties to 1AD, 18 AD and 58AD were an attempt to save RegF PYs while maintaining the AD capability. I'm going to contact a friend of mine who was in the AD business and find out why the thing shut down in 2006. My guess again is PYs and $.
> 
> 
> money I am sure, ADATS got too costly to maintain, I wouldnt be surprised if the other kit did too
> :cheers:


----------



## FJAG

I've had one response from my friend on the Javelin issue and he indicates that the missile reached the end of it's life cycle without any replacement being looked into which also leads me to the costs issue as the main culprit. I'm not even sure what "life cycle" means to a weapons based capability; it's not like the best before date on a carton of milk.

That kind of argument always infuriates me. You either have a need for a weapon system when you go to war or you don't. If you give up a system that you need without replacement or reserve contingency it's the equivalent of saying you won't go to war with what you have left or saying we'll go to war anyway and just live with the consequences or let someone else look after that issue. At least when the US downsized their SHORAD capability, they transferred much of the capability to the National Guard and put the rest of the excess Avenger systems in storage. Many of those are currently being reactivated while the US builds up a newer and better capability to replace it.

My concern with GBAD is that it's specifications are all singing and dancing. Hopefully it will look more towards a system of off-the-shelf systems that will each do a part well rather than one massively expensive system that does everything.

To get back to the reserve issue. Systems like this, which for the most part are not needed every day, should be in the reserve inventory so that the O&M costs and wear and tear on the equipment are kept reasonably low. It strikes me that whenever another headquarters expands and robs PYs from the RegF field units the first things to go are the more esoteric systems that are only needed in time of major conflict (tanks, self propelled artillery, mortars, pioneers, air defence - the list goes on and on - you know, the stuff that keeps you alive on the battlefield)

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> To get back to the reserve issue. Systems like this, which for the most part are not needed every day, should be in the reserve inventory so that the O&M costs and wear and tear on the equipment are kept reasonably low. It strikes me that whenever another headquarters expands and robs PYs from the RegF field units the first things to go are the more esoteric systems that are only needed in time of major conflict (tanks, self propelled artillery, mortars, pioneers, air defence - the list goes on and on - you know, the stuff that keeps you alive on the battlefield)
> 
> :cheers:



But seriously what responsible army, since about 1939 when the Luftwaffe rolled up the Allies in Europe, has _never _deployed on a 'conventional' war fighting operation, or exercise, without some sort of GBAD system integral to its capability (and not just shuffled off to the Reserves)?

I assume that it should be as much of an SOP as carrying a respirator....


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But seriously what responsible army, since about 1939 when the Luftwaffe rolled up the Allies in Europe, has _never _deployed on a 'conventional' war fighting operation, or exercise, without some sort of GBAD system integral to its capability (and not just shuffled off to the Reserves)?
> 
> I assume that it should be as much of an SOP as carrying a respirator....



It should be although when I served with the Reg F from 69 to 81, we considered ourselves a "responsible army" (we had tanks and APCs and SPs and everything) but had zero AD capability until the last year or two of my service (and that was only to provide AD protection to our airfields in Europe for which NATO paid us and for which we resuscitated 40mm hard iron sights Boffins from the scrapped Bonaventure and the that POS, Blowpipe.

I don't think that it is "shuffling off" of a capability to the reserves when you take a capability that is only needed in a major combat role (like tube and rocket artillery, air defence or even large scale service support) and give it to units that have a large (but properly organized and trained) reserve component. It maintains the capability at a lesser day-to-day O&M cost that we might otherwise not find the money for using just the RegF. The key here is that the reserve force needs to be structured in a way other than the "come-when-you-feel-like-it" model that we have now. Quite frankly, considering the budget pressures we are under, I can't see Canada regaining a proper combat capability without extensive use of reserve forces. The RegF we want is financially unsustainable and it's time we recognized that.

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

The thing is, I believe, the Canadian Army in Germany, would have been operating under an allied air-defence umbrella.  The Canadian Brigade's contribution would likely create as much confusion as anything else.  Its patch of sky would have been masked by neighbouring divisions, corps and armies.

The only reason a brigade would need its own air defence capability is if it, like an RCN warship, were operating in glorious isolation from its neighbours.  And we are assured by our politicians that that is never going to happen.


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The thing is, I believe, the Canadian Army in Germany, would have been operating under an allied air-defence umbrella.  The Canadian Brigade's contribution would likely create as much confusion as anything else.  Its patch of sky would have been masked by neighbouring divisions, corps and armies.
> 
> The only reason a brigade would need its own air defence capability is if it, like an RCN warship, were operating in glorious isolation from its neighbours.  And we are assured by our politicians that that is never going to happen.



Once Canada stood up it's air defence contingents, they became part of the NATO's Integrated Air Defence system (now the Integrated Air and Missile Defence System). NATO AD resources have worked on an integrated basis for some time, however, to call it an umbrella is not quite correct. It's more like layers of systems that interlock and overarch. Low level (or short range) air defence is one of those layers and requires resources collocated within the brigade's areas of operations and sustainment. For us those were Blowpipe and later Javelin batteries which only reach out to a few thousand meters while ADATS reached out to only 10km. (the US Avenger system [based on Stinger missiles] has a slightly shorter range)

4 GS Regt RCA maintains a capability to deploy both Air Space Coordination Centres and Surveillance and Target Acquisition Control Centres for a deployed brigade (or even a division) which will integrate with NATO resources. That said, a Canadian brigade's assigned short range air defence resources (whether Canadian or allied) would not be "masked" by neighboring formations but rather be integrated, as a layer, into the whole.

As drones become an ever increasing danger, LLAD/SHORAD located within the bde's most forward areas (and highly coordinated with the brigade's manoeuvre elements) becomes even more vital.

I've discussed the issue of reserves using the Javelin with my old AD friend and was told that the 15 years of having ResF AD units was actually quite successful. After we ran out of funding Javelin replacements, there was quick consideration for devolving ADATS to the reserves but this was considered impractical because of the high cost of maintaining the ADATS systems which the army (mired in Afghanistan at the time) wasn't prepared to fund. While air space coordination and the control systems for air defence are complex, operation at the weapons detachment level (especially for a fire and forget system like Avenger/Stinger) is quite within a reservist's minimal training skill set. A perfect system for an integrated Reg/Res unit. A wheeled, fire and forget system like Avenger is also relatively light on maintenance needs compared to what was needed for a tracked system like ADATS.

 :cheers:


----------



## GK .Dundas

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The thing is, I believe, the Canadian Army in Germany, would have been operating under an allied air-defence umbrella.  The Canadian Brigade's contribution would likely create as much confusion as anything else.  Its patch of sky would have been masked by neighbouring divisions, corps and armies.
> 
> The only reason a brigade would need its own air defence capability is if it, like an RCN warship, were operating in glorious isolation from its neighbours.  And we are assured by our politicians that that is never going to happen.
> [/quote  Speaking of glorious isolation,I note that the Army's political masters will most likely be nowhere near that brigade if they just happen to be wrong in their wisdom.


----------



## tomahawk6

At least at the light infantry level should be MANPADs. Mech infantry battalions should have something like ADATS.


----------



## tomahawk6

Next year the UK is replacing RAPIER with SKY SABER which would be able to deal with threats on todays battlefield. 

hhttps://www.army-technology.com/features/sky-sabre-inside-uks-missile-defence-system/


----------



## Kirkhill

So for GBAD, 

Are we looking at an Area system or a Point Defence system?
And if a Point Defence system are we looking at a centralized training system that collocates all assets with 4 GSR for tasking out as required?
Or is the technology available to support a distributed training system with centralized control of assets with the assets tasked out as required?

Also, even if the defence system is a point defence system does the system require an area threat warning system to alert the point defence forces?
And if so, does it make sense to take out some of those incoming targets as the approach the local points?

And how much money is in the bank?


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So for GBAD,
> 
> Are we looking at an Area system or a Point Defence system?
> And if a Point Defence system are we looking at a centralized training system that collocates all assets with 4 GSR for tasking out as required?
> Or is the technology available to support a distributed training system with centralized control of assets with the assets tasked out as required?
> 
> Also, even if the defence system is a point defence system does the system require an area threat warning system to alert the point defence forces?
> And if so, does it make sense to take out some of those incoming targets as the approach the local points?
> 
> And how much money is in the bank?



Not sure one can answer those questions without being part of the project team. The project overview on the government web page is notoriously broad and general:



> Objective
> The GBAD system will provide tactical air defence protection to friendly forces and vital installations during expeditionary and domestic operations against the increasingly diverse air threat.



http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=940

There's a bit more here starting at page 9:

https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/2018/08/23/ebcfdb62c2e7090e77b81872d0b088e5/ABES.PROD.PW__BK.B383.E26950.EBSU000.PDF

and here:

https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/2018/10/02/bbc9fbfce389c8b4369e0ecd1aa58c8f/ABES.PROD.PW__BK.B383.E26950.EBSU002.PDF

This slightly dated paper at the CF College gives a fairly good understanding of the issues in a nutshell albeit the CDS risk authorization re JIMP ops at para 24 seem a tad over-the-top:

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/318/192/deneau.pdf

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As I said stand up some Reserve AD troops, buy/lease ManPad simulators, which I believe we have some already for training the Air Force.  Invest in a 25mm gun system using as many components of the LAV gun system as possible and the RWS systems we use currently for targeting. I suspect we could lease a couple of systems like the modernized Skyguard or the Mistral missile system for a Reg Force Troop. Then you can start rebuilding the knowledge base and skill sets and incorporate the concepts into the army training and experience real ground friction as part of the learning curve as opposed to mythical units providing mythical protection.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks for the links FJAG.

Some nice threads to pull on.


----------



## Spencer100

Not really know what I'm talking about could we not just put a couple of Mk 41 to VLS tubes on a truck.  A radar on different truck and gen set and computer to tie it together?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

After a scan thru the project documents, and looking at the very small amount of money allocated ($500 million), I would suggest we are looking to buy a very simple,  point defence VSHORAD system. Probably about Battery's worth. For reference, that would be something like RBS70, stinger or skyguard.

You don't get Area Air Defence for $500 million.


----------



## a_majoor

If the intent is to defend installations like airfields, FOBs and bases, maybe something evolved from the Israeli "Iron Dome" system will fill the bill. This is more of a C-RAM system, but it likely could be adapted to deal with drones. Helicopters and attacking aircraft would likely need something different, but that could be "Phase II", and a mobile system for protection of tactical assets in the field.

Iron Dome could be the Reserve system, since it only needs a few trucks to move it around and then set up, while mobile systems become Regular Force assets due to O&M costs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> If the intent is to defend installations like airfields, FOBs and bases, maybe something evolved from the Israeli "Iron Dome" system will fill the bill. This is more of a C-RAM system, but it likely could be adapted to deal with drones. Helicopters and attacking aircraft would likely need something different, but that could be "Phase II", and a mobile system for protection of tactical assets in the field.
> 
> Iron Dome could be the Reserve system, since it only needs a few trucks to move it around and then set up, while mobile systems become Regular Force assets due to O&M costs.



Based on the principle of 'walk before we run' or 'every little bit counts', is there a suite of air defence sight/ mounting options that can be added to the .50 cal/ C6 these days? 

At the very least, we should be able to mount these on vehicles, or a ground mount of some kind.


----------



## Kirkhill

Rheinmetall Oerlikon Quebec.

Skyshield - Specifically a C-RAM system capable against RPAS and in range Helos.







Interesting that the docs provided by FJAG depicted a mobile, armoured, tracked missile launcher as aspirational exemplars for the concept of operations.

As to the dollars,  perhaps some of the dollars could be ssssstrrrreeeetched by virtue of noting that the Elbit Area Radar has already been purchased from Rheinmetall under a separate project and that AIM 9s,  AIM 120s and ESSMs, all compatible with ground launch Air Defence, are already in inventory.





https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/raytheon-aim-9x-sidewinder-nasams/





https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/national-advanced-surface-to-air-missile-system-nasams/

AMRAAM groundlaunch Norsk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhz4ZQMHeDw

ESSM groundlaunch
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KmHh37312zQ


















Edited to add image of in-service MMR





https://www.army-technology.com/news/canadian-army-acquires-medium-range-radar-rheinmetall/


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Based on the principle of 'walk before we run' or 'every little bit counts', is there a suite of air defence sight/ mounting options that can be added to the .50 cal/ C6 these days?
> 
> At the very least, we should be able to mount these on vehicles, or a ground mount of some kind.



How about something like these?

Common to C9/C6/HMG/AGL and CG-84.  

http://soldiersystems.net/2019/03/12/us-military-buys-aimpoint-fcs-13-re-fire-control-system/


----------



## Kirkhill

One other point from FJAG's submissions that I had not known before:

Distributed Ops Area for a Brigade - 7500 km2

That translates to a circle with a radius of 49 km.



> The detection range of the Air Surveillance mode is up to 250 Km, with capacity for up to 1,200 targets. MMR offers long-range detection with high angular accuracies and resolutions. Moreover, adding an extra power generator can increase the detection range.May 29, 2013
> Multi Mission Radar – the ideal solution for the Canadian ...
> 
> https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com › publicrelations › pressemitteilungen




Max effective range Millenium 35mm - 5 km
Max effective range (ground launch) AIM-9X - 5 km ?? 
Max effective range (ground launch) AIM-120 - 25 km
Max effective range (ground launch) ESSM - 50 km

Rheinmetall apparently also produces a MANPADs system (AMADS)









https://rheinmetall.ca/en/rheinmetall_canada/systemsandproducts/airdefence/air-defence.php#AMADS

M777 ranges for counter-battery capability

M107 24 km
ERFB 30 km
Excalibur 40 km

Is the M777 Vulcano compatible? (Edit: Answer - BAE says yes)  - Range out to 60 km with 100 km possible with a 52Cal ERCA M777
https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/3150941/OTO_Vulcano_155_LQ_mm08723_.pdf?t=1538987711480
https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/vulcano-precision-guided-munitions


----------



## Kirkhill

So what would it look like with

NASAMS fire control?

An MMR or 2 providing 250 km surveillance (in service)
An SUAV Troop of RQ-21 Blackjacks (in service)
A troop of ESSMs providing 50 km coverage (ESSMs in service - launcher required)
A battery of M777-52 ERCA with Vulcanos providing 100 km counter-battery (M777s in service - ERCA mods and ammo required)

3 batteries of M777-39 (in service)

3 Skyshield troops armed with Millenial Ahead 35mm or the DS30M  (extend the purchase of whatever the RCN is buying for the Type 26)
3 Troop armed with AMADs or similar MANPADS system.


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Based on the principle of 'walk before we run' or 'every little bit counts', is there a suite of air defence sight/ mounting options that can be added to the .50 cal/ C6 these days?
> 
> At the very least, we should be able to mount these on vehicles, or a ground mount of some kind.



Like Chris, I also enjoy "catalog shopping", and believe there is a low cost solution for Canada to get started by modifying the Avenger system:

Phase 1: Mobility improvement. The HMMVW platform is pretty old, but can be rebuilt with a new suspension from OSHKOSH and replacing the ancient drive train with a comparable one dropped in from a modern high capacity Ford, GM or Chrysler pickup truck. As an alternative, the vehicle can be rebuilt to the SCTV standard.

Phase 2: Increasing close in firepower by replacing the M2 with the STK .50 HMG. The weapon is almost half the weight, has a dual feed system (allowing loading two belts and having twice the ready ammunition) and a modern quick change barrel. The firepower would need to be complimented by a  TrackingPoint computerized sight to allow for more accurate engagements of UAVs at maximum range.

Since adding something like a TrackingPoint sight would also benefit ground mounted HMG's, GPMG's and automatic grenade launchers, as well as designated marksmen, these could be purchased in bulk, gaining economies of scale for the Armed Forces as well.

Phase 3 would include modern radios and computers to integrate the Avenger into the local AD system and the protected unit.


----------



## Kirkhill

The bizarre thing is that our procurement system discourages catalogue shopping by demanding the reinvention of wheels.

Catalogues invariably list existing solutions to our problems.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So what would it look like with
> 
> NASAMS fire control?
> 
> An MMR or 2 providing 250 km surveillance (in service)
> An SUAV Troop of RQ-21 Blackjacks (in service)
> A troop of ESSMs providing 50 km coverage (ESSMs in service - launcher required)
> A battery of M777-52 ERCA with Vulcanos providing 100 km counter-battery (M777s in service - ERCA mods and ammo required)
> 
> 3 batteries of M777-39 (in service)
> 
> 3 Skyshield troops armed with Millenial Ahead 35mm or the DS30M  (extend the purchase of whatever the RCN is buying for the Type 26)
> 3 Troop armed with AMADs or similar MANPADS system.



Sorry, Chris. I am going to burst your bubble.

In the AD game, the adage that "he who defends everything, defends nothing" is a first principle. The battlefield is not billard table flat- there are defiles and dead zones everywhere. When you say ESSM has a 50km range, that might be true at sea in blue water ops, but it would be effectively true anywhere on land. If one tries to even space AD systems across a (say) BDe area, you risk defending nothing, because you must achieve interlocking weapons system coverage. A better aproach is to do an estimate to determine what you must defend (ie, what our side cannot afford easily to lose) and then establish an all-round point defence of that area. It may be worth owning a few longer range AD systems just to really mess with an enemy's day. My sense is that we are probably going to need some sort of gun/missile mix (with maybe a laser option) to deal with all the threats out there today from UAS, to helicopters to jets to missiles and artillery shells.

I would further suggest that trying to do counterbattery work with an M777 (or any towed gun) will get you dead, fast. Today, you probably need rocket artillery to do CB work effectively. I would even suggest that the M777 is probably not mobile enough to survive anything other than low intensity conflict and should be replaced with either a tracked or wheeled gun system that can shoot and scoot. I guarantee that, if we were to fight a modern enemy, their CB rounds would be on the way to our gun positions, even before our rounds landed.


----------



## dapaterson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I would further suggest that trying to do counterbattery work with an M777 (or any towed gun) will get you dead, fast. Today, you probably need rocket artillery to do CB work effectively. I would even suggest that the M777 is probably not mobile enough to survive anything other than low intensity conflict and should be replaced with either a tracked or wheeled gun system that can shoot and scoot. I guarantee that, if we were to fight a modern enemy, their CB rounds would be on the way to our gun positions, even before our rounds landed.



You're missing the priority: Having an impressive looking cannon to start the Army Run!


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Rheinmetall Oerlikon Quebec.
> 
> Skyshield - Specifically a C-RAM system capable against RPAS and in range Helos.



And you could compliment it with with the Oerilikon/Rheinmetall Skyranger 35mm air defence system. 

Or may be the South Korean  K30 Biho SPAAG  which is a combined gun-missile system mounted on a tracked chassis. Two 30mm guns (3 km range), four SAMs (6 km range). Each system comes with it an integrated radar (21 km range. According to the Wikipedia they cost $12.1 (USD) million each. So, according to my calculations with $500 million ($372 million USD) Canada could buy 24 systems, plus extra for spares, training, etc. 

Unfortunately, I couldn't find anything on how much the Skyranger system costs.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You're missing the priority: Having an impressive looking cannon to start the Army Run!



Jesus wept- then borrow one of 2 RCHA's cermonisl 25 pounders, put a blank round in and let rest of the Artillery move back into relevance.


----------



## FJAG

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Sorry, Chris. I am going to burst your bubble.
> 
> In the AD game, the adage that "he who defends everything, defends nothing" is a first principle. The battlefield is not billard table flat- there are defiles and dead zones everywhere. When you say ESSM has a 50km range, that might be true at sea in blue water ops, but it would be effectively true anywhere on land. If one tries to even space AD systems across a (say) BDe area, you risk defending nothing, because you must achieve interlocking weapons system coverage. A better aproach is to do an estimate to determine what you must defend (ie, what our side cannot afford easily to lose) and then establish an all-round point defence of that area. It may be worth owning a few longer range AD systems just to really mess with an enemy's day. My sense is that we are probably going to need some sort of gun/missile mix (with maybe a laser option) to deal with all the threats out there today from UAS, to helicopters to jets to missiles and artillery shells.
> 
> I would further suggest that trying to do counterbattery work with an M777 (or any towed gun) will get you dead, fast. Today, you probably need rocket artillery to do CB work effectively. I would even suggest that the M777 is probably not mobile enough to survive anything other than low intensity conflict and should be replaced with either a tracked or wheeled gun system that can shoot and scoot. I guarantee that, if we were to fight a modern enemy, their CB rounds would be on the way to our gun positions, even before our rounds landed.



All very good points. The one about the M777 really resonates with me.

I understand from current gunners that the M777 is a good piece of kit ... BUT ... when I left the RegF in 1981 my battery was an M109 one and we were just getting into the game of dispersed deployments, shoot and scoot and all those other buzz words because we knew that surviveability, even in tracked, armoured M109s, depended on it. I know that many of those tactics and procedures are still in play today but I still can't understand how you can design the medium weight LAV3/6 force we have with artillery that has the mobility issues that the M777 has. (And yes I know that the Stryker Bde Cbt Team uses M777's as well - but they're looking at changing that see eg: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24663/army-tests-low-recoil-155mm-howitzer-small-enough-to-fit-on-the-back-of-a-truck)

You're comments about the factors involved in deploying air defence systems are also very correct. I was there when we were resurrecting air defence back in around 1980 and it always struck me that one of the most critical skills that air defence gunners and officers had to learn was the ability to sight their systems so as to provide the maximum protection possible. This was particularly challenging when supporting a fast moving armoured force. IMHO this calls for light weight rapid fire weapons integrated with combat arms element to provide intimate protection against drones and helicopters and the like and a heavier layer to protect units and formations from air, missile, rocket and even mortar and artillery projectiles. Now we're talking sophisticated equipment heavy on command and control and maintenance needs and ammunition usage. In fact one of the greatest issues for me with the $500 million budget is that while we might be able to buy sufficient systems to cover one brigade, what will we do for war stocks for ammunition and its replacement during a conflict? 

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> A better aproach is to do an estimate to determine what you must defend (ie, what our side cannot afford easily to lose) and then establish an all-round point defence of that area. It may be worth owning a few longer range AD systems just to really mess with an enemy's day. My sense is that we are probably going to need some sort of gun/missile mix (with maybe a laser option) to deal with all the threats out there today from UAS, to helicopters to jets to missiles and artillery shells.



I hated doing endless exercises based on Bridge Demolition Guards, except for getting to gawk at all the cool toys encrusting the general area, including Rapier etc...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I hated doing endless exercises based on Bridge Demolition Guards, except for getting to gawk at all the cool toys encrusting the general area, including Rapier etc...



That was like my favourite type of operation when I was in the Army!


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I hated doing endless exercises based on Bridge Demolition Guards, except for getting to gawk at all the cool toys encrusting the general area, including Rapier etc...



"Cool toys" and "Rapier" were mutually exclusive terms long ago when it was optically guided and fair weather only. I gather they've come a long way since then but are up for replacement in the not too distant future.

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> "Cool toys" and "Rapier" were mutually exclusive terms long ago when it was optically guided and fair weather only. I gather they've come a long way since then but are up for replacement in the not too distant future.
> 
> :cheers:



When you are engaged in an organization where the height of technology includes puttees, a camouflaged scarf, and a 7.62 version of the Bren Gun, Rapier looks pretty Star Wars


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> When you are engaged in an organization where the height of technology includes puttees, a camouflaged scarf, and a 7.62 version of the Bren Gun, Rapier looks pretty Star Wars



 :rofl:


----------



## tomahawk6

My dad was an ADA type during Vietnam commanding a Nike Hercules battalion in the LA air defense. Prior to that he was a Field Artillery officer. He had to go to FT Bliss to attend a course at the ADA school. We spent a year in LA which saw wild fires approaching some of dad's firing batteries. Then he would get called out at odd hours for drills and tests. Fortunately the only missiles that were fired were at Ft Bliss at White Sands. The battalion of course had nuke warheads in the event of an all out attack by the Russians. Over time the Nike sites were turned over to the National Guard and then were shuttered post Vietnam to save money. I was in Alaska when the last Nike sites were closed and the nukes were flown out of State in the capable hands of the USAF.


----------



## FJAG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> My dad was an ADA type during Vietnam commanding a Nike Hercules battalion in the LA air defense. Prior to that he was a Field Artillery officer. He had to go to FT Bliss to attend a course at the ADA school. We spent a year in LA which saw wild fires approaching some of dad's firing batteries. Then he would get called out at odd hours for drills and tests. Fortunately the only missiles that were fired were at Ft Bliss at White Sands. The battalion of course had nuke warheads in the event of an all out attack by the Russians. Over time the Nike sites were turned over to the National Guard and then were shuttered post Vietnam to save money. I was in Alaska when the last Nike sites were closed and the nukes were flown out of State in the capable hands of the USAF.



You may not know that there was a US Air Force competitor to the Nike Hercules called the CIM-10 Bomarc which was also nuclear tipped. Canada bought and deployed two squadrons of them as part of the NORAD system from 1963 to 1972 at North Bay Ontario and La Macaza Quebec. We also flew fifty-four F 101 Voodoo fighters which were armed with AIR-2 Genie nuclear rockets from 1963 to 1984 in the air defence role.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Inventory_of_Canada's_nuclear_armaments

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> You may not know that there was a US Air Force competitor to the Nike Hercules called the CIM-10 Bomarc which was also nuclear tipped. Canada bought and deployed two squadrons of them as part of the NORAD system from 1963 to 1972 at North Bay Ontario and La Macaza Quebec. We also flew fifty-four F 101 Voodoo fighters which were armed with AIR-2 Genie nuclear rockets from 1963 to 1984 in the air defence role.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Inventory_of_Canada's_nuclear_armaments
> 
> :cheers:



Ah yes the Bomarc, the missile the replaced the Avro Arrow. Back to the main topic, Could we create a cheap gun and/or missile system to put on the LAV 6? new turret for a higher angle of attack plus a couple stingers maybe? Or as FJAG has suggested take a light Utility truck if we ever say replace the LS and put a small missile or gun system on the back.


----------



## Old EO Tech

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ah yes the Bomarc, the missile the replaced the Avro Arrow. Back to the main topic, Could we create a cheap gun and/or missile system to put on the LAV 6? new turret for a higher angle of attack plus a couple stingers maybe? Or as FJAG has suggested take a light Utility truck if we ever say replace the LS and put a small missile or gun system on the back.



I'm sure we could do a more modern version of the LAV-AD using a LAV6 chasis, and what ever is the best missile/chaingun/FCS on the market today.

https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-ad.htm


----------



## MilEME09

Old EO Tech said:
			
		

> I'm sure we could do a more modern version of the LAV-AD using a LAV6 chasis, and what ever is the best missile/chaingun/FCS on the market today.
> 
> https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-ad.htm



What abut take a page from Russian AA design? larger turret and give it Twin 25mm Chain guns, plus missiles? I am no expert but I feel like with the right radar/FCS that such a vehicle could keep the skys clear of drones, and rotary wing aircraft easily


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Sorry, Chris. I am going to burst your bubble.
> 
> In the AD game, the adage that "he who defends everything, defends nothing" is a first principle. The battlefield is not billard table flat- there are defiles and dead zones everywhere. When you say ESSM has a 50km range, that might be true at sea in blue water ops, but it would be effectively true anywhere on land. If one tries to even space AD systems across a (say) BDe area, you risk defending nothing, because you must achieve interlocking weapons system coverage. A better aproach is to do an estimate to determine what you must defend (ie, what our side cannot afford easily to lose) and then establish an all-round point defence of that area. It may be worth owning a few longer range AD systems just to really mess with an enemy's day. My sense is that we are probably going to need some sort of gun/missile mix (with maybe a laser option) to deal with all the threats out there today from UAS, to helicopters to jets to missiles and artillery shells.
> 
> I would further suggest that trying to do counterbattery work with an M777 (or any towed gun) will get you dead, fast. Today, you probably need rocket artillery to do CB work effectively. I would even suggest that the M777 is probably not mobile enough to survive anything other than low intensity conflict and should be replaced with either a tracked or wheeled gun system that can shoot and scoot. I guarantee that, if we were to fight a modern enemy, their CB rounds would be on the way to our gun positions, even before our rounds landed.



You burst my AD bubble!    :'( :'( :'(

Up in flames again.  ;D

So the M777 isn't the CB answer.

How about the Truck Mounted Launcher with a NASAM/MML/HIMARS type box launcher?  One launcher for AIM9, ESSM and GMRLS.

As for the number of launchers, missiles and vital points... back to the number of bucks in the bank.


----------



## FJAG

Old EO Tech said:
			
		

> I'm sure we could do a more modern version of the LAV-AD using a LAV6 chasis, and what ever is the best missile/chaingun/FCS on the market today.
> 
> https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-ad.htm



The US is working on an update of that called the IMSHORAD







https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/06/28/us-armys-interim-short-range-air-defense-solution-crystallizes/

It includes a pod of Stingers, another of Longbow Hellfires, an M203 chaingun and a 7.62 mm machine gun.

I like it.

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> The US is working on an update of that called the IMSHORAD
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/06/28/us-armys-interim-short-range-air-defense-solution-crystallizes/
> 
> It includes a pod of Stingers, another of Longbow Hellfires, an M203 chaingun and a 7.62 mm machine gun.
> 
> I like it.
> 
> :cheers:



That would perfect for bachelor parties.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Nice thing about that is we already make and use the chassis, so it's the weapon system your buying. Build a towed/truck mounted version for the Reserves, starting with the comms, gun and optics.


----------



## Underway

So what is it? Close in air defence or anti-tank/bunker busting missile carrier.  Doesn't really fit into our doctrine or experience does it?  Tanks are for the direct fires in the Canadian Army, not LAV's.  The lessons on that seem pretty clear (see Tanks in Afghanistan).  I suppose if you did the double Stinger pod but then you're waiting for an enemy aircraft to literally fly directly over you at very low altitude.

I would suspect that something like the CAMM system being used by the UK would be much better for AD.  Better ranges, active RF seeker, cold launch etc...  Stingers are just seem so short ranged...


----------



## Kirkhill

Sorry for popping up again 

But I knew I'd seen it somewhere.

Pg 37 of the GBAD presentation - GBAD Concept of Operations - M777s providing Counterbattery fire.

Also, a fixed Command Centre within the Brigade Area of Operations with manoeuvre elements working under an Airspace Coordination bubble.

I am guessing that the AD requirements would be different at Suffield, Pet and Gagetown, or for that matter Kananaskis Country.  Which do you plan for?  Knowing that whatever you choose the enemy will do the other thing.

And for the record - I thought we looked at this thing before - and were less than impressed.  MMEV?







GBAD Concept of Operations
GBAD primary mission is to defend Canadian Armed Forces of incoming Brigade level and lower air attacks
•	Canada will likely deploy as part of a coalition
•	Depending on scenario expectation is to operate over extended distances (Adaptive Dispersed Operations for Brigade coverage of 7500 sq kms)  Edit 49 km radius FTR
•	Robust defences and well-practised reversionary modes
•	Entire area is not required to be covered
•	GBAD will be given priorities to defend
•	Able to concentrate force at decisive point/time
•	Defend themselves
•	An autonomous capability against multiple simultaneous threats
•	Networked Command and Control system able to operate (with), interoperable with allies
•	Early warning of an Indirect Fire and/or Remotely Piloted Aerial System attack via localized audio/visual warning to troops
•	An increased ability to synchronize and integrate joint effects
•	Given roles: Air Surveillance and Weapon Locating
•	Mobility versus Range Coverage
•	Field Headquarters that are mobile, protected and expandable  (Phew - originally read that as expendable)
•	A sustainment system that is robust, responsive, connected and protected
•	Be resilient (able to operate after losses)
•	A training system to improve individual and collective effectiveness	36


----------



## tomahawk6

Stryker variant.

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/army-anti-aircraft-stryker-can-kill-tanks-too/ 

How fast is that schedule?

September 2017: The Army conducts a SHORAD “shoot off” of potential systems.
February 2018: Army issues a Directed Requirement for what they call an “initial material solution” for SHORAD.
April: The Army holds an industry day with interested companies.
May: An Army panel evaluates companies’ White Paper proposals and selects Leonardo DRS for the weapons, turret, and electronics (the Mission Equipment Package); Raytheon for the upgraded Stinger Launcher (which the government then provides to Leonardo); and General Dynamics to integrate everything on the Stryker.
August 31: The Army’s target date to award contracts.
Mid-2019 (3Q FY19): First prototype to be delivered.
2020: First IM-SHORAD battery deployed.
2022: Up to four IM-SHORAD battalions fielded.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We want the allseeing, alldoing, wunderweapon and will spend millions and years testing and talking, with the end result of zip. Start small and work up.


----------



## MilEME09

The MMEV was a good idea, but in testing the LAV 3 flipped when the missile was fired at a 90 degree angle to the vehicle. If anyone has any of the older issues of Canadian Defense Review I believe it was one of the 2015 issues that covered the tests. Would it work on a LAV 6 which is heavier, longer, and wider? maybe but it would have to be tested. Another option would be to heavily mod the Chassis cut out the crew compartment and lower the turret into that area.


----------



## a_majoor

Two things to say about a LAV 6 based GBAD system:

1. Make it GBAD and stop adding other s**t to it. If the system illustrated has two pods, then one could be Stingers and the other a different sort of SAM. This will provide a means to deal with different or difficult targets, and also give enemy air commanders more problems to deal with, since they now are sending their assets against a system that has three modes of attack (Stinger, cannon and second missile system). I'll leave what the second missile should be to the experts.

2. A large, top heavy system might not be the best COA. The LAV also comes in a "pickup truck" version. While you might not get a full 360 traverse, the turret mounted low on the chassis makes the overall vehicle more stable and less prone to tipping or rollovers. The major disadvantage to this is the "pickup truck" is a new hull for the system, but so long as all the other automotive systems are rationalized to match the LAV 6 fleet, this should not be a huge issue. The illustration has the usual "lets have AA and Anti Armour missiles mounted" porn. See point 1


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Looks very nose heavy


----------



## tomahawk6

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2018/03/28/armys-short-range-air-defense-system-will-be-under-contract-by-august-prototyped-by-spring/


----------



## edlabonte

Well, I'm going to be the radical opinion in this thread but here i go.

The army doesn't need an ADATS/GBAD/MMEV.  They already have an Anti take system, it's called the tank. It is not the job of the Army to fight the battle in the air, that's what the Air Force is for. 

Counter-Proposal: Establish an ADATS/GBAD/MMEB capability for the RCAF. They are best served to protect an Airfield anyway.  Lots of the previous AD Regiments were attached to the Air Force so why not just make them an Air asset. Build up a Sqn at every Wing, or a Flt at the Sqns, with weapon systems and train the airmen to provide defensive capabilities in theater on the airfield.
      I'm sure commanders would appreciate the help of airment well trained in field-craft and small arms in their Readiness Training Flights and GSAR teams allowing for more technicians to return to the flight line.  Likewise with other training institutions (RCAF Academy, CFLRS) would benefit from these kinds of airmen and not ATIS Techs and Air Traffic Controllers who can clearly serve the CAF better in their primary roles.


----------



## garb811

edlabonte said:
			
		

> Well, I'm going to be the radical opinion in this thread but here i go.
> ...


It's not a radical opinion, but it is an uneducated one that vastly over estimates the ability of the air force, not just ours but every air force, to counter and destroy every airborne threat to ground forces. Kind of like the over confidence some people had that strategic bombing alone could win a war...


----------



## daftandbarmy

garb811 said:
			
		

> It's not a radical opinion, but it is an uneducated one that vastly over estimates the ability of the air force, not just ours but every air force, to counter and destroy every airborne threat to ground forces. Kind of like the over confidence some people had that strategic bombing alone could win a war...



Also, a bright airforce blue APC, towing a luxury 5th wheel, would stand out a few miles away. 

Just sayin'


----------



## SeaKingTacco

edlabonte said:
			
		

> Well, I'm going to be the radical opinion in this thread but here i go.
> 
> The army doesn't need an ADATS/GBAD/MMEV.  They already have an Anti take system, it's called the tank. It is not the job of the Army to fight the battle in the air, that's what the Air Force is for.
> 
> Counter-Proposal: Establish an ADATS/GBAD/MMEB capability for the RCAF. They are best served to protect an Airfield anyway.  Lots of the previous AD Regiments were attached to the Air Force so why not just make them an Air asset. Build up a Sqn at every Wing, or a Flt at the Sqns, with weapon systems and train the airmen to provide defensive capabilities in theater on the airfield.
> I'm sure commanders would appreciate the help of airment well trained in field-craft and small arms in their Readiness Training Flights and GSAR teams allowing for more technicians to return to the flight line.  Likewise with other training institutions (RCAF Academy, CFLRS) would benefit from these kinds of airmen and not ATIS Techs and Air Traffic Controllers who can clearly serve the CAF better in their primary roles.



So...no.

Your appreciation of history is terrible. 128 and 129 AD Batteries at Baden and Lahr in Germany were units of the Royal Canadian Artillery (ie the Army). They were not attached to the Air Force (there was not RCAF in those days), rather they worked for Canadian Forces Europe, thru 4 AD Regt. In some Air Forces, airfield air defence and even medium and high level AD is owned by an Air Force, but there is no universal model. I can think of no examples where an Air Force owns the SHORAD capability that then protects an Army.

Air Defence is not soley owned by the Air Force. It is a joint battle. Otherwise- what would be your solution for the Navy? The Air Force owning the SAMs on the ships and staffing half the Ops Room with RCAF personnel?


----------



## edlabonte

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> So...no.
> 
> Your appreciation of history is terrible. 128 and 129 AD Batteries at Baden and Lahr in Germany were units of the Royal Canadian Artillery (ie the Army). They were not attached to the Air Force (there was not RCAF in those days), rather they worked for Canadian Forces Europe, thru 4 AD Regt. In some Air Forces, airfield air defence and even medium and high level AD is owned by an Air Force, but there is no universal model. I can think of no examples where an Air Force owns the SHORAD capability that then protects an Army.
> 
> Air Defence is not soley owned by the Air Force. It is a joint battle. Otherwise- what would be your solution for the Navy? The Air Force owning the SAMs on the ships and staffing half the Ops Room with RCAF personnel?



Thank you kindly TACCO, examples are always helpful.  AD Regts do technically fall under Army history and they don't teach very much of that to the Air Force.

Would it be fair to say that all three, Short, Medium and Long range AD assets would be beneficial for the CAF in the event of conflict with an Air Force and not just focusing on one type?

Also, the Navy already does their own AD. They are armed to defend themselves against Exocet (Or Exocet like) attacks.  I assume you have spent more time with the navy than you care to admit and have better insight into their AD capabilities.  I believe the Winnipeg set a record once for repelling the most simultaneous Exocet attacks by a frigate during an exercise.


----------



## Good2Golf

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Stryker variant.
> 
> https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/army-anti-aircraft-stryker-can-kill-tanks-too/
> 
> How fast is that schedule?
> 
> September 2017: The Army conducts a SHORAD “shoot off” of potential systems.
> February 2018: Army issues a Directed Requirement for what they call an “initial material solution” for SHORAD.
> April: The Army holds an industry day with interested companies.
> May: An Army panel evaluates companies’ White Paper proposals and selects Leonardo DRS for the weapons, turret, and electronics (the Mission Equipment Package); Raytheon for the upgraded Stinger Launcher (which the government then provides to Leonardo); and General Dynamics to integrate everything on the Stryker.
> August 31: The Army’s target date to award contracts.
> Mid-2019 (3Q FY19): First prototype to be delivered.
> 2020: First IM-SHORAD battery deployed.
> 2022: Up to four IM-SHORAD battalions fielded.



Just debuted at AUSA 2019. :nod:

Hmmm...that chassis sure looks familiar, eh?


----------



## tomahawk6

Drones are so cheap even terror groups have them. Some of the SHORAD solutions include a laser. I have seen these solutions mounted on Hummers so I could see these at battalion level. A brigade might have a battery and the division would have a battalion. No doubt that the USAF could put up an umbrella over the battle space but that leaves cruise missile's and drones to be dealt with by ground forces.


----------



## a_majoor

Everything is there to meet the time line, just please put a different second pod on there without the Hellfires....

(Mistral, Starstreak, RBS 70, Spyder or Stunner....)

Lasers, even solid state lasers are power hogs because the coupling of input energy to light emission is very poor. A capable GBAD laser design is currently being created by Lockheed on the chassis of a FMTV, but uses the turbine engine of a scout helicopter as the power source, producing about 300 kW of power which (due to the inefficient nature of generating laser light) becomes a 100 kW output beam:
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/05/16/dynetics-lockheed-team-beats-out-raytheon-to-build-100-kilowatt-laser-weapon/

Filling the back of a LAV with a gas turbine engine and all the electronics, power management and heat management systems is doable. no doubt, but might not provide the optimal laser weapons platform. The US army demonstrated a 5 kW laser on a Stryker, so there is a bit of a gap.


----------



## tomahawk6

Then we have the USMC's drone killer that was used recently while at sea using microwave tech.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Mod note:  Merged several AA threads into here - will also continue to consolidate more AA stuff here.

Bumped with the latest:


> The audacious attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq refinery and the Khurais oil field last September sent shivers down the spines of some Canadian military planners.
> 
> The stunning damage caused by a swarm of drones and cruise missiles — launched either from Iraqi or Iranian territory — proved to be an almost perfect illustration of the kind of vulnerability the Canadian Army faces in the rapidly evolving modern battlefield.
> 
> It's been seven years since the army retired the last of its ground-based air defence systems. By all indications, it will be another eight years before the Department of National Defence acquires a replacement system.
> 
> The Liberal government's defence policy talks about buying new anti-aircraft equipment — and perhaps now anti-drone technology — but the project is still only in what defence officials call the "options analysis" phase.
> 
> The commander of Canada's army said restoring that anti-aircraft defence is one of his top priorities.
> 
> "Air defence is right at the top of the pile of stuff I want to get in," Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre told CBC News earlier this month.
> 
> "It is a capability shortfall right now. And as you see the emerging threats out there, it is one that concerns me."
> 
> _*'An emerging threat'*_
> 
> Eyre, who recently served as deputy commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, described the technology used to attack the Saudi facilities as "an emerging threat" that Canada's soldiers need to be prepared for, especially "the swarming tactics of unmanned aerial vehicles."
> 
> For more than 15 years, Canadian military planners — hip-deep in fighting a counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan — were unconcerned about updating Cold War-era equipment meant to shoot down low-flying aircraft. The Taliban had no air force.
> 
> The last of the Canadian army's air defence equipment — the Oerlikon Air Defence Anti-Tank System (ADATS) — was retired in 2012 after an aborted attempt to modernize the vehicles. At the time, the federal government under then-prime minister Stephen Harper was cutting $2.1 billion out of the defence budget ...


----------



## FJAG

The article itself is innocuous basically telling us that the Army is putting air defence on the front burner but that procurement will be a "long haul" process.

For me the real interesting part about the CBC's article is the hundreds of comments that have come in. If you want a quick lesson in how stupid the Canadian public is when it comes to defence and security issues then you should give this a read. Have a few shots of a good single-malt close at hand, however.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/anti-aircraft-canadian-forces-1.5399461

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Mod note:  Merged several AA threads into here - will also continue to consolidate more AA stuff here.
> 
> Bumped with the latest:



Last month I had a beer with a guy who got blown up in an Iltis, or an equivalent soft skin vehicle, in AFG when we thought that technology would be 'good enough' for a real war zone. A few years later we deployed Leo II. 

As usual, we'll likely have to get a bunch of people hurt before we do the right right thing .... a few years later.  :


----------



## Rifleman62

FJAG


> For me the real interesting part about the CBC's article is the hundreds of comments that have come in. If you want a quick lesson in how stupid the Canadian public is when it comes to defence and security issues then you should give this a read. Have a few shots of a good single-malt close at hand, however.



Reading stupid, cheap comments, especially on CBC, deserve only a drink of cheap booze or CWW (Cheap White Wine).


----------



## The Bread Guy

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> FJAG
> Reading stupid, cheap comments, especially on CBC, deserve only a drink of cheap booze or CWW (Cheap White Wine).


At best ...


----------



## FJAG

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> FJAG
> Reading stupid, cheap comments, especially on CBC, deserve only a drink of cheap booze or CWW (Cheap White Wine).





			
				milnews.ca said:
			
		

> At best ...



:surrender:  I bow to your superior wisdom in this matter. 

I do have a bottle of Sherry left over from when my sister-in-law visited. I'll just do with that although I expect that I'll need a lot more of it. ... I don't like Sherry. :boke:

 ;D


----------



## dimsum

FJAG said:
			
		

> :surrender:  I bow to your superior wisdom in this matter.
> 
> I do have a bottle of Sherry left over from when my sister-in-law visited. I'll just do with that although I expect that I'll need a lot more of it. ... I don't like Sherry. :boke:
> 
> ;D



Or don't read those comments?  

Masochist  :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

Happy New Year from Shanghai

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zh3-Mvrp1Lc

Maybe

https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3044513/shanghais-drone-show-welcoming-2020-reportedly-never-happened-new-years-eve

On the other hand, Singapore

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmpB3SEZ2Rk

Either way - swarms are a reality - what can you do with them on the battlefield?  What do they mean for persistence and networking?


----------



## FJAG

This video of swarming nano copter capability demonstrations is seven years old.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2la4pIyXOEQ

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Already non-state actors have used anti-ship missiles twice and the Saudi oil facility attack used drones from a quasi-state. I foresee domestically made drone using components sourced from recreational drones being used more and more. Recreational drones could be sent using pre programmed waypoints and then only switching on their radio connection on target approach, so there would be very little time to notice the approach via RF transmissions and it may have a preprogramed target as a backup if RF is jammed. With a little work you could get a two stage drone that flies slowly to the target area, picks up radar transmissions and then within X distance, goes into high speed mode in an attempt to take out the defending radar.

So for $2000USD, a terrorist group can buy a DJI drone that gives them all the software controller and camera needed. Motor, RC model controls and body components likely another $500USD. Warhead is a PD fuze from a mortar with plastic explosive or similar, likley another $500usd in costs to them. labour is cheap, another $250USD maybe.  So they spend $3500 for a good size long range attack drone, bit less for a recce drone, even less if they use the DJI to drop 40mm rounds.


----------



## a_majoor

While DIY drones, UAV's and UCAV's are a pretty scary thought, conceptually it could be even more difficult to defend against these if they become "self contained" in the sense that they need no external signals to operate or coordinate.

Flocks of birds or schools of fish are not full of individually intelligent actors, but can still carry out complex actions by having a few very simple "built in" rules. I recall an article many years ago where scientists modeled and recreated the behaviour of a flock by giving each "agent" in the computer program some very simple rules to follow, which were essentially "stay no closer to any other agent than "x" distance, but never get further than "y" distance from any other actor". There is obviously a bit more to it than that, and I can't find the article at the moment, but programming a very simple AI into each member of a UAV swarm could elicit similar behaviour.

I suspect that a sort of "hunting" behaviour can also be programmed into a UAV or swarm member, by teaching it things like how we use terrain to mask our movements, or to look at a field and calculate probable weapons emplacements (where would you put a machine gun to cover an approach from this axis of advance?) They then go looking for probable areas where targets may be located, and flock or swarm to cover an area, evade enemy fire and attack from all angles and directions.

For the moment, this would still be high level contractor equipment, but small, cheap computers like Raspberry Pi's and the widespread knowledge of high level computing, neural networks and so on could lead to home built devices much like the $3500 UAV upthread in 10 to 15 years.

Something to ponder.


----------



## brihard

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While DIY drones, UAV's and UCAV's are a pretty scary thought, conceptually it could be even more difficult to defend against these if they become "self contained" in the sense that they need no external signals to operate or coordinate.
> 
> Flocks of birds or schools of fish are not full of individually intelligent actors, but can still carry out complex actions by having a few very simple "built in" rules. I recall an article many years ago where scientists modeled and recreated the behaviour of a flock by giving each "agent" in the computer program some very simple rules to follow, which were essentially "stay no closer to any other agent than "x" distance, but never get further than "y" distance from any other actor". There is obviously a bit more to it than that, and I can't find the article at the moment, but programming a very simple AI into each member of a UAV swarm could elicit similar behaviour.
> 
> I suspect that a sort of "hunting" behaviour can also be programmed into a UAV or swarm member, by teaching it things like how we use terrain to mask our movements, or to look at a field and calculate probable weapons emplacements (where would you put a machine gun to cover an approach from this axis of advance?) They then go looking for probable areas where targets may be located, and flock or swarm to cover an area, evade enemy fire and attack from all angles and directions.
> 
> For the moment, this would still be high level contractor equipment, but small, cheap computers like Raspberry Pi's and the widespread knowledge of high level computing, neural networks and so on could lead to home built devices much like the $3500 UAV upthread in 10 to 15 years.
> 
> Something to ponder.



A lot of the small off the shelf commercial drones have the ability to 'return to sender' if they lose signal; they plug in a GPS coordinate to return to and land safely. This would not be something that would be very difficult to reprogram in order to allow recreational drones with a small payload to be 'fired' at point targets. Think stuff you can get an accurate 8 figure MGRS grid off Google Earth and that would be vulnerable to a small payload; fuel storage tanks, etc. Hell, potentially large aircraft parked in known spots on an apron.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It will be interesting to get a engineer to dig into a DJI drone and see which areas in China are hard wired geo-fenced. Geo-fencing means that the drone is programmed at the factory not to take off or enter those areas. So all major airports in the US and Canada are geo-fenced already within the retail software, that can be turned off for advanced used. I suspect however that the Chinese government would hardwire the geo-fencing of some areas, some would be obvious, but others might be quite interesting.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Looks like the recent missile attacks in Iraq may have shaken up some people in Ottawa. 



> Iran attack underscores need for new air defences: Canadian Army
> 
> By Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press — Jan 8 2020
> 
> OTTAWA — The launching of Iranian missiles against a base housing Canadian soldiers in Iraq has highlighted a long-standing deficiency for the Canadian Army: the inability to defend against air attacks such as aircraft, rockets and drones.
> 
> Iran on Tuesday fired missiles at two military bases in Iraq, including one near the northern city of Irbil that has housed Canadian troops for more than five years as part of the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
> 
> No one was injured in the missile attack, which was in retaliation for the killing of Iranian Maj.-Gen. Qassem Soleimani by a U.S. drone last week. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed Wednesday that Canadian soldiers were at the base at the time of the Iranian attack.
> 
> Canadian troops in Iraq and elsewhere are routinely deployed with allies who have what are called "ground-based air defences," or GBADs in military parlance, which can include everything from missile interceptors and anti-aircraft guns to electronic jamming devices and lasers.
> 
> But Canadian Army spokesperson Karla Gimby said the Iranian missile attack nonetheless demonstrated why a new air-defence system is one of the army's top procurement priorities.
> 
> "Iran launching missiles underscores the need for militaries — and the Canadian military — to have GBADs," Gimby said Wednesday, though she added: "It is too early to tell if recent events will impact the GBAD procurement timeline."
> 
> Successive Canadian Army commanders have raised the lack of air defences for frontline troops since the military retired the last of its anti-air weapons in 2012.
> 
> However, efforts to acquire a new system have been stuck in neutral for years. The Department of National Defence is not expecting delivery of a new system until at least 2026, which is projected to cost between $250 million and $500 million.
> 
> Officials have previously suggested that part of the problem is trying to figure out exactly what threats the system will be designed to counter, particularly given rapid advances in technology.
> 
> In a recent interview with The Canadian Press, Canadian Army commander Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre referenced Iran's use of drones to attack Saudi Arabia's largest oil facility in September as one new airborne threat on the battlefield.
> 
> "No army in history has gone to war with all of the resources that it wanted, all the capabilities that it wanted," Eyre said. "That being said, GBAD is one of the ones that I am most concerned about because it is not just a capability shortfall, it's a capability gap. We don't have it."
> 
> When the Canadian military put away the last of its anti-air weapons in 2012, it was on the assumption that Canada and its allies would have air superiority in any battle and not have to worry about airborne attacks, said defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
> 
> "The Taliban never had any of that kind of stuff. (ISIL) really didn't have any of that kind of stuff," Perry said. "So we've been deploying in places where it hasn't been a problem."
> 
> The Iranian attack demonstrates the importance of Canadian troops on the ground being able to protect against airborne threats, he said.
> 
> This report by The Canadian Press was first published on Jan. 8, 2020.
> 
> Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press



 Link


----------



## tomahawk6

I think if you face a swarm of drones or missiles bring on lasers.


----------



## Journeyman

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> Looks like the recent missile attacks in Iraq may have *shaken up* some people in Ottawa.


Did you mean "waken up"?


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Did you mean "waken up"?



You're right, "waken up" sounds better.


----------



## tomahawk6

The Pentagon has become more aware that the Army needs more Patriot batteries. The bases in Iraq had none they are in SA. More THAAD would also help. Of course the USN could provide an umbrella of sorts. We have become used to adversaries with no aircraft. If we have to deal withChina or Russia then a more robust ADA capability would be needed.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> As an aside, there was a thread around here awhile ago suggesting that the "easy" solution to the Cdn Army's current lack of an AD capability was to just give AD weapons systems to infantry units. This incident illustrates why that is not a good idea. The easy part is part is firing the missile. The hard part is understanding the overal airspace control structure and situation. It takes years of expertise to effectively command and control an air defence unit.



Strongly disagree. While completely abdicating Air Defence to the Infantry isn't a solution to the overall capability gap, infantry very much need an integral SHORAD capability. With proper training and control measures MANPADS (or perhaps LAV mounted systems) are an appropriate weapon system for infantry and would pose minimal risk to civil aviation. It would greatly enhance the ability to suppress enemy attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft along the FEBA in a peer conflict. Relying only on integrated higher level air defence systems is a recipe for system failure. Integral/ intimate SHORAD capability with the infantry (not reliant on fully functioning higher level C2 networks) is an important layer to the AD cake.


----------



## NavyShooter

I was the one who suggesting the MANPADS as an interim solution....in reading the doctrine points that were provided....I concur with them.  Having a weapon without a proper, effective means to employ them within our doctrine is...not a solution.


----------



## daftandbarmy

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> I was the one who suggesting the MANPADS as an interim solution....in reading the doctrine points that were provided....I concur with them.  Having a weapon without a proper, effective means to employ them within our doctrine is...not a solution.



The British, thrust directly from a 'theoretical peace time Anti-Air mode' (kind of like us now), were rudely surprised by the realities imposed upon them by Argentinian air force, which very nearly cost them the war. Sound joint services doctrine, backed by the right training, weapons and other gear, at all levels, is clearly essential:

"The Battle for San Carlos lasted 21 to 25 May. The British called the waters around the landing area and the beachhead “Bomb Alley” because of the aggressive Argentine air attacks. Flying just above the wave tops, the Argentine based attack aircraft made repeated attacks on the British Task Force with bombs and Exocet anti-ship missiles.

The Argentine air attacks proved devastating. From 21 to 25 May the Argentine air attacks sank one British destroyer, 2 frigates and one container ship (Atlantic Conveyor). Additionally, two more destroyers, three frigates, and three logistic landing ships were damaged.

In addition to the air attacks on British fleet, the Argentine air force attacked the beach head which was defended by Rapier surface to air missiles. The Rapiers were also intended to protect the British naval ships around San Carlos. Once ashore, three Skyhawks dropped twelve bombs on the brigade maintenance area, killing six men, wounding twenty-seven, and starting a major fire in 45 Commando’s heavy weapons ammunition dump. Brigadier Thompson visited the area, profoundly alarmed. The entire brigade’s operations had been planned on the assumption of keeping its logistics afloat. The [Argentine’s] air assault had forced them to instead to create huge dumps [on land] at Ajax Bay.  Where else could they go? …The answer was nowhere. It was fortunate for the land force that the enemy never attacked Ajax again after inflicting the one, deadly fright.

Effects of the air attacks immediately impacted the British land forces timeline. Establishing the British Army Falklands Beach Support Area took much longer than expected because after the initial attacks at San Carlos the various stores ships were withdrawn with only those unloading allowed in the area. Enemy action had an effect on the build up in a way that was simply not envisaged.

These delays meant naval vessels had to endure more punishment in Bomb Alley and ammunition dumps established at various locations which because of the slow build up were vulnerable. Clearly, the inability to build up the Beach Support Area at speed was having a very real impact on losses and if the Argentine commander was sharper and used this delay to counter attack who knows what would have happened."

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/area-denial-falklands-war-lessons-learned-implications-for-land-warfare-2030-2040-after-the


----------



## tomahawk6

I suppose it depends on what the AD is to defend, INF/Armor or static locations like air fields or supply dumps. In the case we would see MANPADS at the lowest level then Patriot and above that then THAAD. Its probably time to field the Iron Dome to protect static targets from drones and cruise missiles.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> Strongly disagree. While completely abdicating Air Defence to the Infantry isn't a solution to the overall capability gap, infantry very much need an integral SHORAD capability. With proper training and control measures MANPADS (or perhaps LAV mounted systems) are an appropriate weapon system for infantry and would pose minimal risk to civil aviation. It would greatly enhance the ability to suppress enemy attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft along the FEBA in a peer conflict. Relying only on integrated higher level air defence systems is a recipe for system failure. Integral/ intimate SHORAD capability with the infantry (not reliant on fully functioning higher level C2 networks) is an important layer to the AD cake.



I see. Tell me, if you don't mind, what your specific experience with Air Defence systems and airspace control are?


----------



## tomahawk6

In the US we have an AD branch from MANPADS to THAAD. The US Army used to combine FA and ADA in one artillery branch. Then in the late 60' s the branch was split into 2 separate branches.


----------



## Old Sweat

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> In the US we have an AD branch from MANPADS to THAAD. The US Army used to combine FA and ADA in one artillery branch. Then in the late 60' s the branch was split into 2 separate branches.



Originally there were two branches, one of which contained coastal and anti-aircraft. At some time circa the sixties, this branched merged with field, and then as T6 noted, they split again.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> I see. Tell me, if you don't mind, what your specific experience with Air Defence systems and airspace control are?



Although we don't know each other, at a guess I'd say it's about equivalent to your experience in the infantry... happy to be corrected otherwise.

I don't see why infanteers couldn't be adequately trained to safely employ SHORAD systems for point defence. This seems to be the approach the Americans are taking as an interim solution. 

I certainly get that there is more to this than giving Cpl Bloggins a short brief on how to operate a stinger missile and turning him out on the battlefield, appropriate control measures would be especially important. What I don't get is unless these lower level systems are with the infantry how do we promptly protect them (especially light/ airborne/airmobile infantry) from enemy CAS (or UAVs)? Relying on complex systems seems like a recipe for inherent delayed responses due to the extensive command and control networks that they must rely on.

Who (and how) do you believe should employ MANPAD systems?


----------



## Cloud Cover

In the Gulf War 1.0 the Blowpipes on HMCS were manned by army gunners, not bosuns, even though the Navy has anti aircraft missiles and guns. So, there is clearly an art and skill to it that is more than a few weeks training.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> Although we don't know each other, at a guess I'd say it's about equivalent to your experience in the infantry... happy to be corrected otherwise.
> 
> I don't see why infanteers couldn't be adequately trained to safely employ SHORAD systems for point defence. This seems to be the approach the Americans are taking as an interim solution.
> 
> I certainly get that there is more to this than giving Cpl Bloggins a short brief on how to operate a stinger missile and turning him out on the battlefield, appropriate control measures would be especially important. What I don't get is how to promptly protect infantry (especially light/ airborne/airmobile infantry) from enemy CAS (or UAVs) without relying on complex systems that may have inherent delayed responses due to the extensive command and control networks that they must rely on.
> 
> Who (and how) do you believe should employ MANPAD systems?



You would probably be surprised about both my Infantry and AD experience. The reason that I asked you the question about your experience was not to make you feel small, but to frame my response so as to not insult your intelligence.

There is alot more to AD than just handing out MANPADs, as you acknowledged, above. In the NATO/ABCA construct, allAD weapons (ground and aerial based) operate within an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) that is governed by a theatre Airspace Control Plan (ACP), promulgated (generally) by the senior Air Force HQ. Within the ACP, the physical structure of the airspace is divided up (who can operate where and when). This is gospel and applies not just to aircraft but also artillery projectiles, rockets and missiles. This document is digested at Corps, Div, Bde and BG level by each applicable Airspace Control Centre (ASCC) which is staffed by the specialist AD personnel at each level- at the BG level, the AD Troop CP becomes the BG ASCC, at Bde it is the Battery ASCC, etc on upward. At each level, they work closely with the  FSCC (provided by the Guns at each approriate level) and advise the supported commander together on airspace usage/deconfliction, which (almost more importantly than protecting from air attack) prevents "blue on blue incidents". In the event of aerial attack, ideally there is a theatre level sensor network which can provide rapid cueing down to the Det level (AD weapons without sensors or cueing are next to useless) to ensure rapid and accurate engagements.

The cap badge of the guy holding a MANPADs (or gun or laser) is irrelevant (although, in Canada, they are Gunners), but the weapon itself is the merest tip of the iceberg. The C2 structure behind it cannot be ad hoc, or you literally do not get to play- the theatre commander will not risk air assets around uncontrolled AD weapons. It takes years of training and experience to be good at this stuff. Unfortunately for Canada, the Army threw away most of that experience in the mid-1990s because they did not value the capability, nor fully understand it. It will take a solid decade (or more) to get it back. Hopefully, nothing bad happens, while we rebuild.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

CloudCover said:
			
		

> In the Gulf War 1.0 the Blowpipes on HMCS were manned by army gunners, not bosuns, even though the Navy has anti aircraft missiles and guns. So, there is clearly an art and skill to it that is more than a few weeks training.



They were actually Javelin Missiles. The missile Troops were provided by 119 AD Bty in Chatham NB. The Troop Commanders and Troop WO stood watches in the ship's ops rooms, while the Dets had fifring locations around each ship. PROTECTEUR, for example had 4 firing points (having the fewest installed AD weapons) while ATH and TER had fewer (having more inherent AD capabilities). Their role was to control the fire of the missiles, in the event of aerial attack, as part of the ship's overall layered defence capability.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Yes those missiles. Lol.


----------



## Baz

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> They were actually Javelin Missiles. The missile Troops were provided by 119 AD Bty in Chatham NB. The Troop Commanders and Troop WO stood watches in the ship's ops rooms, while the Dets had fifring locations around each ship. PROTECTEUR, for example had 4 firing points (having the fewest installed AD weapons) while ATH and TER had fewer (having more inherent AD capabilities). Their role was to control the fire of the missiles, in the event of aerial attack, as part of the ship's overall layered defence capability.



Since I think SKT is being modest... please correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't you the Troop Commander of the PROTECTEUR Troop?

I also seem to remember that experience helped inform your choice to switch to ANav.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

Tracking. Thanks for the explanation. 

I think the issue is I'm thinking about and advocating a much lower lever of capability; both in terms of reach (MANPADS or other very short range systems) and how devolved the capability is (combat teams and BGs vs. Bdes).



> AD weapons without sensors or cuing are next to useless



What about for self-defence against an aircraft that is actually attacking you? 

I understand that these things work best in a system and ideally there is a theater level of airspace control (is this why we bought Iron Dome?) but that might not always be realistic. Especially in places like the Baltics where in a conflict anything emitting radio waves is likely to be the recipient of an MLRS strike which turns the surrounding grid square upside down. Having some type of limited AD capability which is not reliant on "the network" seems like a good idea.

This is the article I read that prompted me to think about these types of systems for the infantry;

https://www.army.mil/article/223209/devil_brigade_soldiers_showcase_air_defense_capabilities


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> Tracking. Thanks for the explanation.
> 
> I think the issue is I'm thinking about and advocating a much lower lever of capability; both in terms of reach (MANPADS or other very short range systems) and how devolved the capability is (combat teams and BGs vs. Bdes).
> 
> What about for self-defence against an aircraft that is actually attacking you?
> 
> I understand that these things work best in a system and ideally there is a theater level of airspace control (is this why we bought Iron Dome?) but that might not always be realistic. Especially in places like the Baltics where in a conflict anything emitting radio waves is likely to be the recipient of an MLRS strike which turns the surrounding grid square upside down. Having some type of limited AD capability which is not reliant on "the network" seems like a good idea.
> 
> This is the article I read that prompted me to think about these types of systems for the infantry;
> 
> https://www.army.mil/article/223209/devil_brigade_soldiers_showcase_air_defense_capabilities



I don't think that you are tracking me.

You are not permitted to use airspace, unless the Theatre Commander says you can.

That means no AD weapons, unless you are part of the ACP.

I am telling you, from personal experience, AD weapons without sensors and cueing are next to useless.

The fact that we are operating in EW challenging environments today is nothing new- us Cold Warriors cut our teeth on the threat of having your entire grid square flipped upside down by a BM21 strike, if you got careless. We just spent the last two decades being sloppy, because it does not take much effort to beat up on cavemen.

We need to relearn EMSEC, instead of complaining about the rules of the games.


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> We just spent the last two decades being sloppy, because it does not take much effort to beat up on cavemen.



The British learned all about that the hard way during the South African War when 'Johnny Boer' handed the great British Army its hat. Decades of campaigning against various, near neolithic, tribes prepared them poorly for a face off against the original Commandos...


----------



## Infanteer

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> We just spent the last two decades being sloppy, because it does not take much effort to beat up on cavemen.



Quote of the day.


----------



## FJAG

We tend to cycle through this stuff. AD was relegated to the Militia after WW2 and then revived into the Reg Army when we expanded it for NATO in the early fifties. By the late sixties we were shutting down the AD (and Honest John nuclear missiles) and by the time I transferred from the Reserves to the Reg Artillery in 1969 we were all going on exercises where the "air situation" was cynically described as "We have air superiority" thus negating the need to think anti aircraft.

In the seventies we were faced with having to defend our European airfield bases (so that we could get some NATO funding) and we dragged old 40mm Bofors guns (saved from the Bonaventure) out of storage and supplanted them with British Blowpipe MANPADS. Hence the rebirth of the air defence trade within the artillery. By 1986 we went more modern with the acquisition of the ADATS which entered service in Germany. When Germany closed down and the Russians became our "friends" for a decade or two, the systems came home to Canada but slowly faded out of use and were finally binned in 2011 when upgrade costs were considered too low a priority. 

The problem that we as a military have is that we can easily justify costs for one more GO/FO and all his staff to carry out administration at headquarters but we can't justify the costs of the equipment and training/maintenance costs that are required for weapons systems that would only be of use in a high intensity war. That was the way of air defence and self propelled artillery and infantry fighting vehicles and almost the tanks. Bit by bit we are organizing ourselves to be incapable of ever being able to be a serious contender in high intensity conflict. We describe our brigades as medium weight ones but quite frankly with the capability gaps we have that is probably a stretch.

 :2c:


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Here we go again with that little Urban Legend.

The boffins used for air defence in Europe in the 70's did not come from Bonnie.

First of all, Bonnie had precious few of them (6 only). Her AA was mostly comprised of 3inch50 guns, not Bofors 40 mm. Second, she was still in service when the decision was made to give Europe AA and it was a surprise when her decommissioning was announced - so there was no plan to use such guns.

The Bofors for CF Europe came from the Navy stock, which was mostly made up of the old WWII corvettes and frigates stock, completed by the 19 guns from HMCS Magnificent. 

If you want to "repeat" the legend, at least refer to Maggie.


----------



## NavyShooter

When the 40mm boffins were re-activated again for the MCDV's, I was walking through FMFCS and observed several of the receivers for them (stripped down) ready to go for metal cleaning and re-finishing.  They were, at the time, painted OD Green.

The dates on all of the receivers were between 1942-1944.

Interesting tale that they came from Maggie.  Sources at the time told me they were from a WW2 Air Defence regiment that got re-roled onto an aircraft carrier (Bonnie - but I guess the Maggie) then went to the AD guys again until they got their 35mm Oerlikons, then they went back into storage until they got pulled out for the MCDV's.

NS


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Here we go again with that little Urban Legend.
> 
> The boffins used for air defence in Europe in the 70's did not come from Bonnie.
> 
> First of all, Bonnie had precious few of them (6 only). Her AA was mostly comprised of 3inch50 guns, not Bofors 40 mm. Second, she was still in service when the decision was made to give Europe AA and it was a surprise when her decommissioning was announced - so there was no plan to use such guns.
> 
> The Bofors for CF Europe came from the Navy stock, which was mostly made up of the old WWII corvettes and frigates stock, completed by the 19 guns from HMCS Magnificent.
> 
> 
> 
> If you want to "repeat" the legend, at least refer to Maggie.



The Bofors at the 15th FD RCA museum, came from Pat Bay, DFO had it brand new in the box, it was meant for one of their post war Cutters. We acquired it and I helped unbox it. Wish I had taken pictures, will have to find the date of manufacture.

The 3"/50 started replacing the Bofors late WWII as it accommodated the proximity fuze and had a greater range. I believed that the 3"/50 and the US 5" guns accounted for the majority of Japanese aircraft shot down in the Pacific.


----------



## Old Sweat

When I was the chief instructor at Artillery Department of the Combat Arms School in Gagetown in 1974-1977, we had a Boffin in Air Defence Wing. When I first arrived, I spent some time familiarizing myself with it, including reading the equipment manual and the gun history book. Our Boffin was manufactured in 1943 and had been mounted on a ship (can't recall the name, but it wasn't Magnificent or Bonaventure) before going into storage. I later fired one of the 40s in Shilo, which was a lot of fun, and interesting.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

A number of the River Class and Tribal Class had them as well.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Looks like there are quite a few upgrades available to the venerable 40mm L70:

https://www.armyrecognition.com/sweden_swedish_military_army_light_heavy_weapons/l/70_l70_l-70_bofors_40mm_automatic_anti-aircraft_gun_air_defence_system_technical_data_sheet.html


----------



## Lancaster

Last August/2/2019, I wrote a letter to MP Harijan Sajjan about do we need
quote “Do we need a Canadian long-range missiles like the Patriot, in NATO 
against potential Russian aggression  in the Baltic’s?" Mr. Sajjan did not respond
but his Defence Corporate Secretary- did respond. No details of  NATO missiles
 plan but Latvia troop’s presence and ship's in area.
See below attached letter.

RE: Do we need a Canadian long-range missiles like the Patriot, in NATO against 
potential Russian aggression  in the Baltic’s?
Date August/2/2019
To  Defence minister Honourable MP Harijan Sajjan,  Harjit.Sajjan@parl.gc.ca
CC   MP James Bezan,    ottawa@jamesbezan.com

To:  Defence minister Honourable MP Harijan Sajjan,

 According to recent New York times article ”NATO Considers Missile Defense 
Upgrade, Risking Further Tensions With Russia”, quote: ”...But the alliance is 
considering new air and missile defenses, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
announced last week without revealing detail” reference #1. The Canadian
military does not have long-range missiles defense systems but we have Air 
Defense Anti-tank system (ADATS), but is a “low-level air defense capability”
is that enough ?  reference #2. NATO countries like Germany, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania and Spain, and US. have Patriot systems but the systems 
are not in Baltic countries see reference #3. Spain has a Patriot system,
and as a partner nation in Latvia reference #4. Do you think Canada should 
depend on Spain for its protection of it troops ? Don’t you think Canada should
get its own Patriot system from potential Russian aggression in the Baltic’s?

  In 2017 Quote in defensenews.com, Baltic states push US on Patriot missile
defense deployment, Reference #5. In June /2019 "Lithuania needs more air 
defense capabilities, President-elect Nauseda told NATO chief" and “Lithuania
has short-rangeair defense systems and is purchasing medium-range air
defense systems but cannot afford long-range missiles, like Patriot, capable
of downing aircraft and ballistic missiles.” reference #6.

  In Feb/2/2016. I sent my emailed letter to Honourable Stéphane Dion
former Foreign Minister but no response from him, and CC to you Defence
minister Honourable MP Harijan Sajjan of my concerns of Ukraine, Russia 
conflict and defense of Baltic countries and Poland. Several months later on
July 9, 2016, quote from MP Harijan Sajjan , “Canada will send a battle 
group of soldiers to Latvia by early 2017 as part of a NATO plan to counter 
fears of Russian aggression in eastern Europe’’ Reference #7.

  In 2018 our Canadian battle groups moved into Latvia and in 2019 
should be looking for a  long-range missiles defence system like Patriot, to
protect these Baltic countries. Other NATO countries and their battle groups
moved into Baltic countries. NATO involvement is hugely appreciated and 
prevented a Russian aggression and World War 3. I am  retired 
manufacturing designer and lived all my life in Toronto.  I would 
appreciate a timely response .

A . K. Email: 

Reference #1
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/world/europe/nato-nuclear-missile-defenses-russia.html
Reference #2, From  Canadian Defence Review 2009 February issue, ADATS article   page 16, “low-level air defence capability” 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Anti-Tank_System
Reference #3
. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot
Reference #4
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl_cooperation/spain/
Reference #5
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/05/26/baltic-states-push-us-on-patriot-missile-defense-deployment/
Reference #6
https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuania_needs_more_air_defense_capabilities__president-elect_nauseda_told_nato_chief/
Reference #7
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harjit-sajjan-nato-defence-spending-1.3671430


----------



## FJAG

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Here we go again with that little Urban Legend.
> 
> The boffins used for air defence in Europe in the 70's did not come from Bonnie.
> 
> First of all, Bonnie had precious few of them (6 only). Her AA was mostly comprised of 3inch50 guns, not Bofors 40 mm. Second, she was still in service when the decision was made to give Europe AA and it was a surprise when her decommissioning was announced - so there was no plan to use such guns.
> 
> The Bofors for CF Europe came from the Navy stock, which was mostly made up of the old WWII corvettes and frigates stock, completed by the 19 guns from HMCS Magnificent.
> 
> If you want to "repeat" the legend, at least refer to Maggie.



 :surrender:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

What we can do with the resources at hand is create a AD Troop, using Manpads and simulators (both indoor and portable) That allows you to practice all the field craft stuff and gets people used to the resource and creates the knowledge base. Start with a NATO ally training standard and adapt it. Start getting Commanders used to the resource and how to counter the threat and incorporate into the battle space. Lease the systems so we don't have to go through a painful and long procurement process.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> What we can do with the resources at hand is create a AD Troop, using Manpads and simulators (both indoor and portable) That allows you to practice all the field craft stuff and gets people used to the resource and creates the knowledge base. Start with a NATO ally training standard and adapt it. Start getting Commanders used to the resource and how to counter the threat and incorporate into the battle space. Lease the systems so we don't have to go through a painful and long procurement process.



I kind of agree except for the scope. I think we need a full regiment so that all the essential command and control elements are present. IMHO the regiment ought to be a relatively simple system such as the US Avenger. Until very recently US Army Avenger battalions were all allocated to the National Guard. With the recent revival of an interest in all things air defence, several Active Army Avenger battalions are being formed.

The Regiment could have a mixed Reg F/ResF RHQ with a fully equipped and Reg F manned Bty HQ and a Reg F platoon (troop) or two with the remaining batteries being Res F fully manned and trained but minimally equipped until funding is available. Typically, an Avenger battery (two platoons of six systems each plus two Sentinel radars) supports a brigade while a platoon supports a battalion/battle group.

That way you would be able to learn and exercise all the C&C aspects and deploy an element to support current battle group level deployments.

The last foreign purchase of Avenger systems I found was in Egypt for 25 firing systems plus associated equipment,etc for US$126 million.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/TWQ-1_Avenger

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp3_01x64.pdf

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/126m-in-avenger-air-defense-systems-for-egypt-0774/

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Except, they create the command structure, promotes some people into, create staff positions, add a support section in NDHQ, in the schools and neglect to buy equipment and have no troops trained or training to use it in the field. Sticking to a troop level for now means they can use the existing resources and have a Captain/Lieutenant command the Troop and Major advising the Brigade of the AD assets and deployment. once you sorted out the structure, add a troop to each Reg force artillery unit, also select and tag one Reserve unit as well (Likely one co-located to a reg force unit and has sufficient strength.)


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Colin P said:
			
		

> Except, they create the command structure, promotes some people into, create staff positions, add a support section in NDHQ, in the schools and neglect to buy equipment and have no troops trained or training to use it in the field. Sticking to a troop level for now means they can use the existing resources and have a Captain/Lieutenant command the Troop and Major advising the Brigade of the AD assets and deployment. once you sorted out the structure, add a troop to each Reg force artillery unit, also select and tag one Reserve unit as well (Likely one co-located to a reg force unit and has sufficient strength.)



That did not work awesome in the 1980s. The RCHA COs generally made no effort to learn Air Defence and generally the AD batteries ended up as either a dumping ground for the gun batteries or as a manning pool to top up the gun dets.

FJAG has it right: get 4 AD Regt fully up and running again, with some reserve units feeding it. We are a rich nation and can afford it.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

One could start changing mindsets by having the undefended artillery units taken out by enemy air in the exercise and CP's wiped out in the first hours. That may drive the lesson home?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Colin P said:
			
		

> One could start changing mindsets by having the undefended artillery units taken out by enemy air in the exercise and CP's wiped out in the first hours. That may drive the lesson home?



Please.

I can assure you that never worked.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Avenger is hardly a big-cost high/hi risk investment, although DND is perfectly capable of making it so.  Why is such a difficult decision?


----------



## FJAG

CloudCover said:
			
		

> Avenger is hardly a big-cost high/hi risk investment, although DND is perfectly capable of making it so.  Why is such a difficult decision?



And it would integrate easily into the big US umbrella.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

https://militaryleak.com/2020/04/02/us-army-to-soon-wrap-up-early-testing-of-short-range-air-defense-system/

Maybe a future system for us?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

If we needed a demonstration of how vulnerable a unprotected armoured column is to UAV's equipped with weapon systems, then we can just look what the Turks did to the SAA recently.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://militaryleak.com/2020/04/02/us-army-to-soon-wrap-up-early-testing-of-short-range-air-defense-system/
> 
> Maybe a future system for us?


I'd be happy if we just started with a battery or two of Avengers to tide us over.







 :cheers:


----------



## OldSolduer

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Please.
> 
> I can assure you that never worked.



A lot of the big thinkers say "we should do something about that" and that's about as far as it goes.

PLUS the ones who want to and try to do things are posted before anything happens.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

What happens to undefended armoured units in the modern battlespace 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Q3vKrdGhxA


----------



## OldSolduer

Colin P said:
			
		

> What happens to undefended armoured units in the modern battlespace
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Q3vKrdGhxA



Gulf War 1 - What was the term they used when they literally bombed the crap out of the Iraqi Army in 191?

The Highway of Death


----------



## daftandbarmy

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Gulf War 1 - What was the term they used when they literally bombed the crap out of the Iraqi Army in 191?
> 
> The Highway of Death



Dunkirk was kind of like that too... as was the Falaise pocket


----------



## FJAG

Provocative.



> Who’s GBAD is it anyway?
> by Hugo April 12, 2018
> 
> This article is a sequel to Hugo’s first article: “The Alliance vs The Bear – Some Fundamentals of Why Russia Won’t Win”
> 
> Last time we looked at the British Army’s ability to fight another land force on its own, and the accepted logic that it wouldn’t have to.  In part 2 of my Rant Trilogy, let’s look at the ability / will of the RAF to support the land forces…
> 
> The RAF’s priorities are pretty clearly laid down in AP3000 – the RAF’s cornerstone doctrine.[1]  The highest priority is air superiority; destruction of strategic targets is next on the list.  Supporting land forces in a battle is the lowest priority, just after making Army people sit in random air bases across the world for undisclosed periods of time without telling them why.
> 
> The Army will be expecting the RAF to support them in the ground battle to reduce land force casualties.  Since the RAF’s ability to conduct close air support or air interdiction for ground forces is firstly based on the provision of air superiority, land forces won’t see an F-35 unless loads of Typhoons are deployed to protect them.  Since there aren’t that many Typhoons, and last time we showed that losing an F-35 is a non-starter,[2] the Army is unlikely to receive (Close Air Support) CAS in a conventional battle.  We learnt bad lessons from Afghan (again).
> 
> So if our fighters are somewhere else, what’s to stop our enemy conducting air attacks on our ground forces?  This is where the answer should be: GBAD.  But it’s a well-known deficiency of the British Forces[3] – not least due to some horrifically complicated capability ownership internal politics.  So what do we do?  Again, step in conventional wisdom – we borrow it from another nation…
> 
> On a ‘recent’ exercise in Fort Leavenworth I witnessed combined joint planning with our US counterparts with representatives from across the US Armed Forces and some coalition nations. Prior to that exercise I had conducted multiple planning cycles that almost always included the phrase “GBAD? Don’t worry about that, we’ll borrow it from the Dutch”. I asked a Dutch Officer of his opinion on this and his response was that they borrow it from the Americans. So imagine my surprise therefore when on said exercise in the USA a USMC Major made the assumption that they would borrow our GBAD because that’s what they always assumed! I’m sure you can see the problem…
> 
> How has this happened?  While we were knee deep in a Counter-Insurgency operation, what were all our partner nations doing?  Oh that’s right…  they were there too!
> 
> So we can’t assume that we can just borrow a capability we lack from another nation.  We must be able to stand independently.  We must sort out our internal bickering and bureaucracy and come up with some better ways of protecting our force.  Make one service responsible for the funding, manning and provision of the GBAD might be a start.  But let’s go further than that.  Why is it CAS platforms can only act where there is air superiority?  The risk to the pilot and the highly expensive platform…  So, with the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles, why are we still spending billions of pounds on a platform that must be manned (by a bloody expensive pilot)?  By using a cheaper, unmanned platform we’re reducing the cost of a loss in both treasure, and eliminating the cost in blood…  Sounds logical to me…
> 
> In the first instalment, we assumed that we were already in a conflict and therefore the Sun Tsu approach wouldn’t work.  Let’s revisit that.  Hands up those who think we’re not already in a conflict with Russia…  All those with your hands up read this.[4]  So it’s too late.  We’re constantly telling the world we’re terrified of Russia then doing nothing about it.  Time to change that!
> 
> In the final part of the trilogy I will rant some more, focusing on this “say-do gap” and offer a way towards a solution for many of our self-generated issues.
> 
> The views expressed within individual posts and media are those of the author and do not reflect any official position or that of the author’s employees or employer. Concerns regarding content should be addressed to hi@wavellroom.com
> 
> [1] Air Staff.  AP3000: British Air and Space Power Doctrine.  4th Ed.  (London:  Ministry of Defence) P.7
> 
> [2] https://wavellroom.com/2018/01/26/the-alliance-vs-the-bear-some-fundamentals-of-why-russia-wont-win-part-1/
> 
> [3] Gen Barrons quoted in the Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/cuts-have-left-army-20-years-date-forces-not-fit-purpose/
> 
> [4] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf



See article here

 :stirpot:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Provocative.
> 
> See article here
> 
> :stirpot:



Nailed it. We’ll be in a similar situation without the ability to interact seamlessly with F-35 equipped allies.


----------



## a_majoor

Another sideways digression, but while reading an article on the US Navy's quest to replace the LCS with a frigate design, I was a bit surpirsed to see the selected design uses a "through tube missile" as it's primary air defence weapon:

*US Navy scuppers flawed Littoral Combat Ship fleet*

https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/us-navy-scuppers-littoral-combat-ship-program/



> The Italian FREMM type is equipped with two optimized 76mm super rapid guns that can fire the DART missile. DART is a type of guided ammunition housed inside a standard 76mm ammunition canister.
> 
> When DART is fired, the outer housing drops off and the missile, with a special fragmentation warhead, can fly considerably farther than a standard 76mm round. More importantly it has control fins and can be steered to intercept a target such as an incoming missile.



While a 76mm mounted on an armoured chassis isn't impossible, it would be rather large and unweildy. It would be interesting to see how small this could be shrunk, I've seen articles of things like 50mm "Chain Guns" which could be mounted on a LAV chassis, and having something like the "Dart" shrunk down to that size would be useful. A fire support LAV with conventional 50mm ammunition and linked to a fire control system could also add in using something like AHEAD ammunition, filling the sky with fragments, and being a useful ammunition against unarmoured ground targets.


----------



## FSTO

FJAG said:
			
		

> Provocative.
> 
> See article here
> 
> :stirpot:



Our CAF doctrine is based on borrowing from our allies. Does the Minister know this? :rofl:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While a 76mm mounted on an armoured chassis isn't impossible, it would be rather large and unweildy. It would be interesting to see how small this could be shrunk,



It's been done http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product4507.html


----------



## a_majoor

Colin P said:
			
		

> It's been done http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product4507.html



Well then - the 100% solution is already here. Now we just need to coordinate the planning and political will to actually get the thing....


----------



## CBH99

I would think jumping onboard the American IM-SHORAD vehicle, based on the Piranha / LAV chassis, would be our best vehicle-based solution.  

Hop on the production line.  Our numbers would be fairly limited anyway, as would the American order compared to the numbers of things they usually order.

Only thing I'd like to see is perhaps a gun system on one side, rather than missile systems on both sides.  A missile might be a wee bit overkill and brutally cost inefficient if your just taking down a small drone, for example.  (Didn't the ADATS have a gun system, in addition to the missiles?)

Vehicle commonality with our existing fleet.  Commonality with spare parts, training, vehicle support infrastructure, etc etc.  Could introduce the vehicle to the Army fairly easily, and provide an extremely important capability.



I would also be satisfied, even if just in the short term, of a MANPAD system.  Some of the current MANPAD systems out there are extremely potent and deadly, and can kill drones/helicopters/low flying aircraft with ease.  (Which is what the vehicle based system would be engaging also.)    :2c:


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I would think jumping onboard the American IM-SHORAD vehicle, based on the Piranha / LAV chassis, would be our best vehicle-based solution.
> ...
> Only thing I'd like to see is perhaps a gun system on one side, rather than missile systems on both sides.  A missile might be a wee bit overkill and brutally cost inefficient if your just taking down a small drone, for example.  (Didn't the ADATS have a gun system, in addition to the missiles?)
> ...
> I would also be satisfied, even if just in the short term, of a MANPAD system.  Some of the current MANPAD systems out there are extremely potent and deadly, and can kill drones/helicopters/low flying aircraft with ease.  (Which is what the vehicle based system would be engaging also.)    :2c:



I think IM-SHORAD incorporates a 30mm cannon and a 7.62mm machine gun just for that purpose. I agree having the system on our fleet of vehicles would have several advantages; local manufacture and maintenance; vehicle system compatibility; weapon/sensor/control system integration with future US AD systems.

My thought on an interim measure is a bit different and goes to renting one or two Avenger batteries from the US to provide training and experience using vehicle born and networked AD solutions. If we did that we could also lean on the US system for trg and lessons learned as they upgrade from Avenger to IM-SHORAD.

 :cheers:


----------



## GK .Dundas

FJAG said:
			
		

> I think IM-SHORAD incorporates a 30mm cannon and a 7.62mm machine gun just for that purpose. I agree having the system on our fleet of vehicles would have several advantages; local manufacture and maintenance; vehicle system compatibility; weapon/sensor/control system integration with future US AD systems.
> 
> My thought on an interim measure is a bit different and goes to renting one or two Avenger batteries from the US to provide training and experience using vehicle born and networked AD solutions. If we did that we could also lean on the US system for trg and lessons learned as they upgrade from Avenger to IM-SHORAD.
> 
> :cheers:
> 
> 
> As I recall didn't GDC also build the USMC's Air defence system based on LAV 25 ?
> Using the GAU 25 Equalizer and dismounted Stingers.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> I think IM-SHORAD incorporates a 30mm cannon and a 7.62mm machine gun just for that purpose. I agree having the system on our fleet of vehicles would have several advantages; local manufacture and maintenance; vehicle system compatibility; weapon/sensor/control system integration with future US AD systems.
> 
> My thought on an interim measure is a bit different and goes to renting one or two Avenger batteries from the US to provide training and experience using vehicle born and networked AD solutions. If we did that we could also lean on the US system for trg and lessons learned as they upgrade from Avenger to IM-SHORAD.
> 
> :cheers:



Very much agree, then we avoid the dogs breakfast that is our procurement system.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

FJAG said:
			
		

> I think IM-SHORAD incorporates a 30mm cannon and a 7.62mm machine gun just for that purpose. I agree having the system on our fleet of vehicles would have several advantages; local manufacture and maintenance; vehicle system compatibility; weapon/sensor/control system integration with future US AD systems.
> :cheers:



Info sheet for the IM-SHORAD:


----------



## a_majoor

Just to play devils advocate, the 76mm cannon used to fire the Dart SAM can also fire programmable munitions (think of AHEAD ammunition) which are much larger and more lethal than any 30mm cannon round - the gun can take on adversary attack helicopters if needed and probably at a longer range as well. You also have the option to use this against ground targets, one again with greater range and effect than a 30mm cannon. This is one singular weapons system which does not need separate launchers and guns.

I think the essentiall simplicty of the 76mm cannon and only two natures of ammunition (DART and AHEAD) should be considered as a positive when studying the trade offs between systems.


----------



## FJAG

A low velocity radar guided gun that fires proximity fuzed flechette rounds would probably be effective too against helicopters and UAVs and put much less stress on the carriage/vehicle.

If that's a new idea then I claim intellectual property rights.  ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:
			
		

> A low velocity radar guided gun that fires proximity fuzed flechette rounds would probably be effective too against helicopters and UAVs and put much less stress on the carriage/vehicle.
> 
> If that's a new idea then I claim intellectual property rights.  ;D
> 
> :cheers:




As far as I know, you are the only lawyer here.  If anybody knows who to actually do that, it's you.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:
			
		

> As far as I know, you are the only lawyer here.  If anybody knows who to actually do that, it's you.



Been there; done that; got the T-shirt:

Halford v Seed Hawk and Simplot Canada Ltd. Fed Ct of Appeal 

I was counsel for Simplot Canada. Long case - eleven years. Really long trial - spread over four years.  :facepalm:

 :cheers:


----------



## Old Sweat

FJAG said:
			
		

> A low velocity radar guided gun that fires proximity fuzed flechette rounds would probably be effective too against helicopters and UAVs and put much less stress on the carriage/vehicle.
> 
> If that's a new idea then I claim intellectual property rights.  ;D
> 
> :cheers:



I don't know about originality, but it is a good idea. It, however, has one drawback, and that is the limited direction of a flechette round, unless you are thinking about launching them in all directions. The number of flechettes, as opposed to splinters from a fragmentation round detonation, would be limited. When we first took delivery of the Blowpipe missile back circa 1975, NDHQ had neglected to procure a decent target system. While we eventually got a very good device, for the first couple of years training operators, we used 105mm illuminating rounds as targets. A few students would get lucky and their missile would pass close enough to the round to initiate the missile's proximity fuze, but the number was certainly less than one per course serial. I wonder how many illuminating canisters descending under a parachute would have been hit by a flechette.


----------



## Spencer100

This

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2020/08/05/armys-interim-short-range-air-defense-system-on-track-despite-minor-hiccup-in-tests/


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We could jump on this by adding another 15 LAV 6 hulls to be fitted with the AD system and take part in their training. That way we use their learning curve, missile buys and can easily integrate into their AD plan.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> We could jump on this by adding another 15 LAV 6 hulls to be fitted with the AD system and take part in their training. That way we use their learning curve, missile buys and can easily integrate into their AD plan.



Unfortunately we already have the Ground Based Air and Munitions Defence project which will probably take 10 years to figure out that defence systems against drones, aircraft and "munitions" are very different things than what IM-SHORAD will deliver and that no one system will do it all and that the only suite of solutions for the protection of a brigade will costs significantly more than the $250-499 million estimates and will miss the 20125 IOC by a half a decade.

Or, maybe I'm being unfair. Maybe.

 :waiting:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well i think a all in one Canada designed system would be perfect, by the way can you get it to kill tanks as well?


----------



## FSTO

FJAG said:
			
		

> Been there; done that; got the T-shirt:
> 
> Halford v Seed Hawk and Simplot Canada Ltd. Fed Ct of Appeal
> 
> I was counsel for Simplot Canada. Long case - eleven years. Really long trial - spread over four years.  :facepalm:
> 
> :cheers:



Farmers can be stubborn SOB's if they feel that they've been screwed over. Especially if its a neighbour. I see that SeedHawk was bought out by a Swedish ag company but are still a successful producer of farm equipment. Vale just built a massive shop outside of Indian Head SK to manufacture material handling equipment and parts for the John Deere Air Seeder.


----------



## FJAG

FSTO said:
			
		

> Farmers can be stubborn SOB's if they feel that they've been screwed over. Especially if its a neighbour. I see that SeedHawk was bought out by a Swedish ag company but are still a successful producer of farm equipment. Vale just built a massive shop outside of Indian Head SK to manufacture material handling equipment and parts for the John Deere Air Seeder.



It's a dynamic industry. At the time that Vale and Seed Hawk were start-ups everyone else in North America was using big discers and stuff from the more established companies that needed a lot of horsepower to pull. The air seeders really made a difference but still had a hard time penetrating the market. While Seed Hawk was bought out, Norbert, the guy behind the Seed Hawk opener formed a new company in 2002 called SeedMaster which is still independent and where he is still inventing new high technology solutions. I particularly like this foray into the field of autonomous farm machinery. https://industrywestmagazine.com/cover-story/autonomous-farming-reaches-infinite-horizons-seedmaster-manufacturing-inc/

I remember in court describing the opener as an "elegant" device. They're still doing it that way.

 :cheers:


----------



## Cloud Cover

FJAG said:
			
		

> Been there; done that; got the T-shirt:
> 
> Halford v Seed Hawk and Simplot Canada Ltd. Fed Ct of Appeal
> 
> I was counsel for Simplot Canada. Long case - eleven years. Really long trial - spread over four years.  :facepalm:
> 
> :cheers:



This line from 2 centuries back is still one of my favourites in patent litigation: "It is seldom that the infringer does the thing, the whole thing, and nothing but the thing claimed in the Specification."


----------



## FJAG

CloudCover said:
			
		

> This line from 2 centuries back is still one of my favourites in patent litigation: "It is seldom that the infringer does the thing, the whole thing, and nothing but the thing claimed in the Specification."



Unless you are a Chinese manufacturer. But we digress  :highjack:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

This is timely and points to the need of a multi-layered AD system

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/libya-is-turning-into-a-battle-lab-for-air-warfare/?fbclid=IwAR1Tao20i2ZnsOUW0tlCygv2auqrf0w2BxwnCJzJTvlrry5AFhdcFEhTtTk


----------



## Kirkhill

What would history have looked like if these two beasts were sold for the RCA instead of the RCAC?












I figure the MGS would make an excellent FOO/FAC vehicle.  Operate close to the front.  Deal with pop up targets on its own.  Mark with tracer or smoke.  Call in heavier support.  And fire flechettes at UAVs.  Might have to add a radar.


----------



## FJAG

The MMEV was cancelled in 2006 because ... well the Taliban had no airplanes and who'd ever think we'd be facing Russians again.

Re the MGS - we've got a pretty decent LAV FOO/FAC vehicle from what I've been told. And it blends in better with the rest of the LAVs in the company.






 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> The MMEV was cancelled in 2006 because ... well the Taliban had no airplanes and who'd ever think we'd be facing Russians again.
> 
> :cheers:



Bit more to it then that, in testing the MMEV flipped the LAV after firing a missile at a perpendicular angle to the hull. Full test notes were published in a article by Canadian Defense Review in 2012.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Bit more to it then that, in testing the MMEV flipped the LAV after firing a missile at a perpendicular angle to the hull. Full test notes were published in a article by Canadian Defense Review in 2012.



That could be solved with hydraulic arms that extend down like a backhoe. That system and hull modification could carry over to a SPG version of the LAV 6 as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Bit more to it then that, in testing the MMEV flipped the LAV after firing a missile at a perpendicular angle to the hull. Full test notes were published in a article by Canadian Defense Review in 2012.



Spades, like Colin suggests, Or..... don't fire missiles perpendicular to the hull.  Isn't that a matter of siting and setting of arcs?   These things aren't expected to try snap-shooting on the move are they?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG, what would you think of a Coy Spt Tp consisting of one of our current FOO/FAC LAVS, an MMEV variant loaded with something like 70mms and Hellfires,  and a pair of MGS.  I am still convinced that the MGS is a direct fire artillery weapon, no different in role than the old 13/18 pdrs.  The MGS could also act as an extra pair of spotters instead of, or in addition to, MFCs.

MMEVs could also be brigaded in AD Tps if loaded with appropriate missiles.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> FJAG, what would you think of a Coy Spt Tp consisting of one of our current FOO/FAC LAVS, an MMEV variant loaded with something like 70mms and Hellfires,  and a pair of MGS.  I am still convinced that the MGS is a direct fire artillery weapon, no different in role than the old 13/18 pdrs.  The MGS could also act as an extra pair of spotters instead of, or in addition to, MFCs.
> 
> MMEVs could also be brigaded in AD Tps if loaded with appropriate missiles.




MMEV also had a CRV-7 Pod, which as a precision guided version  where a spotter can laser a target and use the rockets in an indirect mode. Thus making it a very multi role vehicle.


----------



## dapaterson

MMEV is proof that concepts should begin in AutoCAD, not Photoshop.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> MMEV is proof that concepts should begin in AutoCAD, not Photoshop.



Disagree.  Concepts can begin anywhere.  The first design iteration should take a run through AutoCad.  With a little bit of arithmetic as well.


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> FJAG, what would you think of a Coy Spt Tp consisting of one of our current FOO/FAC LAVS, an MMEV variant loaded with something like 70mms and Hellfires,  and a pair of MGS.  I am still convinced that the MGS is a direct fire artillery weapon, no different in role than the old 13/18 pdrs.  The MGS could also act as an extra pair of spotters instead of, or in addition to, MFCs.
> 
> MMEVs could also be brigaded in AD Tps if loaded with appropriate missiles.



Not a fan.

I'm a child of the 1970s and 80s when we had a cold war enemy and systems (kind of) to deal with that. That's a benefit in that my mind hasn't been corrupted by all the post cold war doctrine issues but also a handicap in that I don't have personal experience with a lot of the more recent kit.

Case in point is ADATs. I could just never cotton on to the idea that air defence and anti-armour could be done by the same equipment/organization. They are very different skill sets needing specialized equipment and tactics which were not easy to switch between (and which might be needed concurrently) This also makes me a bit nervous when it is stated that the Hellfires on IM-SHORAD also gives them an anti-armour capability. I'd rather they keep their attention on the air threat (including itty-bitty UAVs) and let some specialized anti-armour force take care of the incoming tanks.

IMHO, infantry battalions need their own small arms, anti-armour and indirect fire mortars but that everything else comes from specialized brigade resources which are somewhat removed from having to deal with the close in fight and are able to think and act across a broader spectrum of the brigade front (or even further if Div resources). Each of UAV surveillance, long range anti-armour, air defence, depth artillery/arty observation/FACing are skills in their own right needing specialized expertise, tactics and coordination/communication systems. As a simple example the requirements for siting of AD assets is completely different from the requirements for siting anti-armour assets. Those differences are amplified further during the different phases of war.

To me the MGS is not a good fit anywhere because it was designed as a close in support weapon for the battalion (in fact in its initial ORBAT three of them were organic to a Stryker rifle company) and was considered lacking even in as permissive an environment as Afghanistan. Now they are organic to the Stryker cavalry squadron where they play somewhat the same role as the tank company plays in a ABCT cavalry squadron, (direct fire support for the scouts in a pinch) Note the MGS's ammo available is restrictive as direct fire artillery and each vehicle only carries 18 rounds on board:



> The MGS's 105 mm cannon can fire four types of ammunition: the M900 kinetic energy penetrator to destroy armored vehicles; the M456A2 high explosive anti-tank round to destroy thin-skinned vehicles and provide anti-personnel fragmentation; the M393A3 high explosive plastic round to destroy bunkers, machine gun and sniper positions, and create openings in walls for infantry to access; and M1040 canister shot for use against dismounted infantry in the open.



I'm a fan of real tanks whenever possible. For much the same reason as SP guns although to a different degree: firepower, mobility, crew protection.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

What if we just utilize IM-SHORAD Differently, okay it can do AD and AT, that's fine but XX Air defense Regiment will only use AA missiles while vehicles given to the dragoons will only be AT. We shouldn't exclude a vehicle because it can be multi role. Just gotta use it how we want.


----------



## FSTO

FJAG said:
			
		

> It's a dynamic industry. At the time that Vale and Seed Hawk were start-ups everyone else in North America was using big discers and stuff from the more established companies that needed a lot of horsepower to pull. The air seeders really made a difference but still had a hard time penetrating the market. While Seed Hawk was bought out, Norbert, the guy behind the Seed Hawk opener formed a new company in 2002 called SeedMaster which is still independent and where he is still inventing new high technology solutions. I particularly like this foray into the field of autonomous farm machinery. https://industrywestmagazine.com/cover-story/autonomous-farming-reaches-infinite-horizons-seedmaster-manufacturing-inc/
> 
> I remember in court describing the opener as an "elegant" device. They're still doing it that way.
> 
> :cheers:



Derailing the thread a bit. My brother farms south of about 50 miles Shilo (as a kid I remember hearing the guns of the Germans refighting the Battle of Kursk every summer, "Zdamit, ve vil git tem damn Ruskis for sure sis time!") and when that seed/fertilizer banding device came on the market, it was a game changer. Overnight all those John Deere/Case IH hoe drills became scrap metal.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> What if we just utilize IM-SHORAD Differently, okay it can do AD and AT, that's fine but XX Air defense Regiment will only use AA missiles while vehicles given to the dragoons will only be AT. We should exclude a vehicle because it can be multi role. Just gotta use it how we want.



But there's already a perfectly usable (and probably cheaper) TOW under armour version of the LAV











And a Stryker M1134






I think we converted 33 of the 71 we ordered into infantry section carriers around 2007. I'm not sure if we actually hold any in inventory still. I think not.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

the turrets were all put in storage, why we don't put them on LAV 6 chassis's is beyond me.


----------



## MJP

Ignore for some reason I read ADATS not Tow.  ITAS is something we could do.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Isn't it just a TUA in which case the missile guidance system could do with an update along with the optics, but the metal and mechanical bits would be pretty straight forward?


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Isn't it just a TUA in which case the missile guidance system could do with an update along with the optics, but the metal and mechanical bits would be pretty straight forward?



I'm not a hundred percent sure of this but in reading an article in the 2007 Strathconian, at pg 45 about LDSH's E Company and the basic TOW course which makes it clear that they are operating the TOW ITAS (Improved Target Acquisition System). TOW ITAS (which came out in 1999) is, to the best of my knowledge, still the standard improved version of the launcher/guidance system.

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> What if we just utilize IM-SHORAD Differently, okay it can do AD and AT, that's fine but XX Air defense Regiment will only use AA missiles while vehicles given to the dragoons will only be AT. We shouldn't exclude a vehicle because it can be multi role. Just gotta use it how we want.



What he said.

The Hornet is a F/A-18.  The difference between the F-18 and the A-18 is the load out hanging from its wings.

The Boeing F/A-18A/B/C/D family has nine weapons stations:

1 & 9, at the wingtips, have a single rail launcher for an AIM-9 type store.
2, 3, 7, & 8, located under the left and right wings, have mounting points for SUU-63A or SUU-63A/A pylons. The pylons in turn support a BRU-32/A ejector rack, to which various stores or launchers are attached. These stations may have a bomb loaded directly upon them, or have a multiple-ejector rack with several stores, or various rail-type launchers for air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles:
A LAU-115 rail-type launcher for an AIM-7;[4]
A LAU-115 with two LAU-7 or LAU-127 launchers, one bolted to either side, for two AIM-9 or AIM-120s;[5]
A LAU-117 for an AGM-65 Maverick;[6]
A LAU-118 for an AGM-88 HARM [7]
4 & 6, which are located on the sides of the fuselage, are LAU-116 ejector-type launchers for AIM-7 and AIM-120 missiles. Station 4 can also support a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod for detecting and marking targets.
5, which is on the centerline underneath the fuselage, mounts a smaller SUU-62/A pylon and a BRU-32 rack, and many of the same stores as the wing pylons. The exception is anything rocket-powered, to avoid endangering the nose landing gear.[citation needed]
3, 5, & 7, are 'wet' feed fuel to and from external fuel tanks.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Not sure if our systems are wire guided or wireless? 

From wiki
_The TOW ITAS consists of three new line replaceable units: the target acquisition subsystem (TAS), the fire control subsystem (FCS), and the lithium battery box (LBB); a modified TOW 2 traversing unit; the existing TOW launch tube and tripod; and a TOW Humvee modification kit. The TAS integrates into a single housing the direct view optics and missile tracker, a second-generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) night vision sight (NVS), and a laser rangefinder. TAS electronics provide automatic boresighting for these components, eliminating both tactical collimation and 180-day verification requirements. The integral cooling system for the IR optics is a modern SADA-II electrically powered cryocooler, removing the need to carry a supply of high-pressure coolant gas cartridges as was necessary for the previous AN/TAS-4 and AN/TAS-4A night sights.

The most recent addition to the ITAS system is the ITAS-FTL (far target location), which incorporates a new module called PADS (position attitude determination subsystem), a device that attaches to the top of the ITAS sighting unit and uses differential GPS tracking to relay precise coordinate data to the operator.[17]_

I note the Dutch are replacing their TOW's with GILL. I wonder if perhaps give our infantry companies something like Spike -SR or similar (with Carl G as well) for the short ranged stuff, then the TUA is either armour or Artillery to provide longer range support. This keeps them more mobile. 

Currently it makes sense to have separate AD and AT elements based on the LAV 6 for any light or Heavy brigade. We should also look to a smaller platform similar to what we had with the TOW mounted on jeeps(m151) to support lightweight missions where the LAV won't be going. Also a lightweight MANPAD system that can be mounted like the Mistral missile with the Simbad dual mount on smaller vehicles (be good for small RCN ships as well)


----------



## Kirkhill

As an alternative to the LAV based MMEV type launcher there is also this concept which could be mounted on our new armourable 10 tonne trucks







More of an RCA system than the LAV based unit - launching straight from the limber

And you can always just drop off the limber.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> .... We should also look to a smaller platform similar to what we had with the TOW mounted on jeeps(m151) to support lightweight missions where the LAV won't be going. Also a lightweight MANPAD system that can be mounted like the Mistral missile with the Simbad dual mount on smaller vehicles (be good for small RCN ships as well)



In the US Army, only the light infantry battalions have a weapons company which provides the battalion with it's heavy direct fire systems.






Note that there are four platoons in the company and each platoon has five HMVWWs; a platoon commander and two sections of two vehicles each. Within the platoon are two vehicles capable of mounting the platoons 2 X TOW ITAS (or using them dismounted). In addition the platoon has: two Javelins; two .50 HMGs and two Mk19 grenade launchers. This gives the platoon some flexibility to configure itself for specific missions. There is also a mortar platoon but with the Headquarters company which has four 120mm and four 81 mm mortars but only enough personnel to operate four tubes at a time. Again providing task specific flexibility. Each of the three rifle companies has a 60mm mortar section while each of the company's three rifle platoons has a weapon's squad with two Javelins and two MMGs.

Neither the Armoured Infantry nor Stryker Infantry battalions have a weapons company. Until recently, each Stryker rifle company had a three gun MGS platoon, however, these have been withdrawn and a few given to the Stryker brigade's cavalry squadron. There are Javelins within the battalion but the heavier anti-armour force is at the SBCT brigade level where there is an anti-armour company of three platoons each of three Stryker anti-armour variants with TOW. Armoured infantry in the ABCT is organized into combined arms battalions of mixed M1 tanks and M2 Bradleys so no need for a weapons platoon. Each Bradley has a 25mm and a TOW launcher.

Note as well that generally at the brigade level there are no organic AD resources. The standard system of AD is by way of an Avenger Bty assigned into the brigades AO but, like everything else during the War on Terror, the US basically reassigned most Avenger battalions to the National Guard. They are making a big interim comeback until IM-SHORAD starts deploying. Similarly the use of ManPADs has been mostly put aside but is slowly making its way back into the system at the manoeuvre brigade level.

This really is the problem when we talk anti-armour and air defence. Once you take the skill set out of the army, it takes a maximum effort to build it back up which can last several years. It's not only the weapons operator that needs training but the need to reestablish the doctrine and TTPs back into the system. It's like machine guns. You can pretty much teach anyone to shoot a machine gun but it takes a major effort to teach people how to "employ" them properly for maximum effect.

And I'll say this again: air defence and anti-armour are not things you need every day but when the time comes you'll want a bunch. Perfect role for reserves. If necessary, where there are some high tech or knowledge aspects to the job, then make the units hybrid ones with a small core of RegF folks.

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

To be honest I would not look to hard at the US system of AD, they have been rather negligent themselves. Perhaps the French or even the Russian would be a better model to study, not so much their equipment, but the type of equipment and where/how it is used.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> To be honest I would not look to hard at the US system of AD, they have been rather negligent themselves. Perhaps the French or even the Russian would be a better model to study, not so much their equipment, but the type of equipment and where/how it is used.



Pretty sure if we took the time, and investment we could get a small turret of AA missile's on to a TAPV, G-wagon or other light vehicles, maybe build it into the g wagon/ milcot replacement, or the LSVW Replacement.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I don't know how capable this system is, but it seems very popular and could be used for ships and the army, even with slight modification onto the LSVW or a Milcot. https://www.mbda-systems.com/product/mistral-atlas/


----------



## blacktriangle

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> As an alternative to the LAV based MMEV type launcher there is also this concept which could be mounted on our new armourable 10 tonne trucks
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> More of an RCA system than the LAV based unit - launching straight from the limber
> 
> And you can always just drop off the limber.



The top photo looks like the MML developed in-house by the US Army for the IFPC program. It seemed like they were trying to replicate the flexibility of VLS found on surface combatants. I think they've since decided to go a different route and split up some of the capabilities, but it was an interesting concept nonetheless. Bottom one is NASAMS I'm guessing?


----------



## a_majoor

The USMC's Blazer conceptually has most of what we want, and by focusing on GBAD it is relatively straightforward to get, train crews and operate. As a practical matter, we might want to stick with a 25mm chain gun as opposed to a 25mm Gatling gun (the ammunition expenditure alone would be pretty extreme), and while the Marines had two "Stinger" pods, there was one version offered for sale which had radar guided missiles (French Mistral).

Given the operating environment, a "Blazer" type vehicle mounting one pod of radar guided missiles and a second pod of IR or laser guided missiles, backed with an automatic cannon should be able to deal with many types of threats, including ground threats.

For Chris, the more specialized FOO/FAC vehicle actually needs specialized optics. If you want to go all out the FOO/FAC would probably look more like the SBCT's reconnaissance vehicle, but with more antenna.


----------



## a_majoor

Well this is certainly well out of the box thinking:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/09/06/sci-fi-awesome-a-us-army-howitzer-just-shot-down-a-cruise-missile/#cc924fd209e5

*‘Sci-Fi Awesome’—A U.S. Army Howitzer Just Shot Down A Cruise Missile*
David Axe
Aerospace & Defense



> A U.S. Army self-propelled howitzer firing a Mach-5 shell just shot down a cruise missile for the first time.
> 
> It’s a big deal. Imagine, in some future war, Army howitzers ringing a strategic air base in the western Pacific, swatting down incoming missiles so the base’s planes can take off and land unmolested.
> 
> The shoot-down took place at the White Sands missile range in New Mexico on Wednesday. An M-109A6 Paladin tracked howitzer fired a 155-millimeter-diameter hypervelocity shell at an incoming BQM-167 target drone, blasting it to pieces.
> 
> “Tanks shooting down cruise missiles is awesome—video-game, sci-fi awesome,” said Will Roper, the U.S. Air Force’s top scientist.
> 
> The cannon-based air-defense was part of a two-day trial of a new command system the Air Force is developing. The Advanced Battle Management System is an artificial intelligence that takes sensor data from a whole bunch of different sources—satellites, stealth fighters, blimps, ground-based radar installations—and combines it.
> 
> What results is a digital picture of a whole battlefield. The A.I. then identifies the friendly forces that could destroy a particular target and gives commanders a menu from which to pick a shooter.
> 
> ABMS is big, ambitious and controversial. The Air Force wants it—and is willing to give up existing command planes in order to free up the money. Congress is skeptical the new control system will work as well as the Air Force insists it will.



More at link. Obviously a powered turret would make this far more effective, and an autoloader of some sort would provide the "burst" fire required for GBAD engagments. An armoured, self propelled chassis completes the picture. The Swedish FH-77 "Archer" seems like a logical starting point, being magazine fed and would only require the datalink to accept target information and perhaps a revised T&E mechanism to increase its ability to track targets.

As a bonus, getting this system would solve a lot of our self inflicted artillery woes as well


----------



## quadrapiper

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The Swedish FH-77 "Archer" seems like a logical starting point, being magazine fed and would only require the datalink to accept target information and perhaps a revised T&E mechanism to increase its ability to track targets.
> 
> As a bonus, getting this system would solve a lot of our self inflicted artillery woes as well


Also designed by people with most of (all?) the same obstacles to movement and delightful weather found in Canada.

Might also be a diplomatic purchase to smooth things over should Gripen not be picked.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Also designed by people with most of (all?) the same obstacles to movement and delightful weather found in Canada.
> 
> Might also be a diplomatic purchase to smooth things over should Gripen not be picked.



We should use caution when looking to neutral countries for examples to follow, militarily or otherwise


----------



## Dale Denton

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We should use caution when looking to neutral countries for examples to follow, militarily or otherwise


 
Yes, self-sufficiency, true independence, a strong reserve force and a successful defence industry. God forbid.  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

LoboCanada said:
			
		

> Yes, self-sufficiency, true independence, a strong reserve force and a successful defence industry. God forbid.  ;D



And the whole Aryan race/Nazism thing, which is awkward, and breathtaking in a horrible way when you actually see it in action  

"The Sweden Democrats may have moved on from their neo-Nazi past, but Sweden is again grappling with rising support for neo-Nazi groups. One openly racist party, Alternative for Sweden, is campaigning on sending home immigrants who have Swedish citizenship. Another new party, Borgerlig Alternativ, is attempting to gather center-right voters who wish to see tighter immigration policy. These two groups, as well as the left-oriented Feminist Initiative party, are gaining attention but have little hope of passing the 4 percent threshold to enter the parliament. Yet on the extreme left, the Left Party, which is already in parliament, could very easily continue to do so. At the moment, nearly one in 10 voters is supporting this former Communist Party in the polls. It campaigns on socialist distribution policies and on ending the ability of private firms to provide publicly funded education, health, and elder care services."

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/05/so-long-swedish-welfare-state/


----------



## CBH99

Hey, it isn't neo-nazi stuff if we CALL IT something else!  Pfffttttt...

All countries have their internal political nonsense.  Political parties, by their very nature, say absurdly stupid things in order to attract absurdly stupid voters.  This exists on both the right and left, in almost every country.



Militarily though?  You have to hand it to them.  For a country of their size, they certainly have created a robust arms industry & capable military.


----------



## CBH99

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxsDOIqTZ9Y


A video from our very own, Mr. Matsimus.

Honestly lots of really good points made that I either hadn't thought of, or had kind of forgotten about.  Figured some of you may enjoy  :nod:


----------



## GR66

It would be nice to see us hop on the US Army's SHORAD-IM program and get a LAV-mounted Air Defence system.

The system also opens up some other interesting possibilities.  The turret for the SHORAD-IM is the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated Weapons Platform (RIwP) which has common base system elements and a range of reconfigurable weapon options.  The spec sheet (https://www.moog.com/content/dam/moog/literature/Space_Defense/Defense_Literature/RIwP_datasheet.pdf) says it's light enough to be mounted on tactical vehicles and there are numerous pictures showing it installed on Joint Light Tactical Vehicles.

I'm wondering if the same turret as the SHORAD-IM could be mounted on a TAPV to provide a Reserve AD platform with weapon commonality with the Reg Force LAV-based units.

Moog/Leonardo also shows a dual-TOW missile launcher as one of the weapon configuration options.  We could possibly use the same RWS as the SHORAD-IM but swap out the quad Stinger launcher for a dual TOW launcher as an anti-armour vehicle (2 x Hellfire and 2 x TOW).  It could be mounted on a LAV for the Reg Force armoured regiments and possibly on a TAPV for the Reserves.


----------



## a_majoor

The US Army is working a a variety of systems, this one "may" be related to a current air to air missile system (Peregine), and provides coverage out to 25km. The article has a few other interesting snippets, including the purchase of a ground launched version of the Navy SM-6 missile, although that is supposedly for use as a surface to surface missile. However the SM-6 was designed as a surface to air missile, so there is the possibility of secondary use as well.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37532/army-offers-glimpse-of-new-low-cost-surface-to-air-missile?utm_source=spotim&utm_medium=spotim_recirculation


----------



## MilEME09

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The US Army is working a a variety of systems, this one "may" be related to a current air to air missile system (Peregine), and provides coverage out to 25km. The article has a few other interesting snippets, including the purchase of a ground launched version of the Navy SM-6 missile, although that is supposedly for use as a surface to surface missile. However the SM-6 was designed as a surface to air missile, so there is the possibility of secondary use as well.
> 
> https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37532/army-offers-glimpse-of-new-low-cost-surface-to-air-missile?utm_source=spotim&utm_medium=spotim_recirculation



The SM-6 is a rather large missile, vehicle mounted i could see something like the ADATS on a LAV 6 or even a cheap launcher on a truck. Cost is the issue as its several million a unit, a block buy would sink a lot of money really fast in our budget and love fire wouldn't be cheap.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

GR66 said:
			
		

> It would be nice to see us hop on the US Army's SHORAD-IM program and get a LAV-mounted Air Defence system.
> 
> The system also opens up some other interesting possibilities.  The turret for the SHORAD-IM is the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated Weapons Platform (RIwP) which has common base system elements and a range of reconfigurable weapon options.  The spec sheet (https://www.moog.com/content/dam/moog/literature/Space_Defense/Defense_Literature/RIwP_datasheet.pdf) says it's light enough to be mounted on tactical vehicles and there are numerous pictures showing it installed on Joint Light Tactical Vehicles.
> 
> I'm wondering if the same turret as the SHORAD-IM could be mounted on a TAPV to provide a Reserve AD platform with weapon commonality with the Reg Force LAV-based units.
> 
> Moog/Leonardo also shows a dual-TOW missile launcher as one of the weapon configuration options.  We could possibly use the same RWS as the SHORAD-IM but swap out the quad Stinger launcher for a dual TOW launcher as an anti-armour vehicle (2 x Hellfire and 2 x TOW).  It could be mounted on a LAV for the Reg Force armoured regiments and possibly on a TAPV for the Reserves.



Do you think that config provides enough range given what we've seen in Libya and then Armenia with the Turkish Baktayar (sp?)?

Based on my limited knowledge that system wouldn't give you the required range to protect our troops.

To throw another alternative, given we are sourcing them for the frigates, why not order pre-existing CAMM components("Land Ceptor?") and mount onto CF trucks?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21139/british-armys-new-land-ceptor-sam-system-blasts-its-first-aerial-target


----------



## SeaKingTacco

I think, if the Army is smart, they look to what the RCN is about to do with CSC. A whole bunch of new missiles and ammo types will have to be qualified. Don’t be clever. Share missile and gun types with the Navy.


----------



## MilEME09

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Do you think that config provides enough range given what we've seen in Libya and then Armenia with the Turkish Baktayar (sp?)?
> 
> Based on my limited knowledge that system wouldn't give you the required range to protect our troops.
> 
> To throw another alternative, given we are sourcing them for the frigates, why not order pre-existing CAMM components("Land Ceptor?") and mount onto CF trucks?
> 
> https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21139/british-armys-new-land-ceptor-sam-system-blasts-its-first-aerial-target



What about a truck mounted Iron Dome style system? Create an invisible curtain around our troops to intercept munitions and UAVs.


----------



## GR66

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Do you think that config provides enough range given what we've seen in Libya and then Armenia with the Turkish Baktayar (sp?)?
> 
> Based on my limited knowledge that system wouldn't give you the required range to protect our troops.
> 
> To throw another alternative, given we are sourcing them for the frigates, why not order pre-existing CAMM components("Land Ceptor?") and mount onto CF trucks?
> 
> https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21139/british-armys-new-land-ceptor-sam-system-blasts-its-first-aerial-target



They are two different classes of air defence systems.  The RWS system would cover the lower end of the air threat spectrum.  I don't think you're going to want to expend a CAMM missile on a quad copter drone but with an RWS you could use the cannon/MG or a less expensive Stinger missile.

As you noted though, with the RCN getting CAMM (SeaCeptor) missiles for the CSC it would make great sense for us to get CAMM (LandCeptor) systems for a mid-range AA system.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I think, if the Army is smart, they look to what the RCN is about to do with CSC. A whole bunch of new missiles and ammo types will have to be qualified. Don’t be clever. Share missile and gun types with the Navy.



Nor that it's any time on the near-horizon, but could the Army start looking ahead to the Mk48 VLS,  57mm Bofors and Phalanx systems that will become available as the Halifax class are retired? With current CSC schedules there should be lots of time to look at towable options for each, if those systems are not already spoken for to be retrofitted into AOPS, etc.  That is of course assuming the Halifax will not be resold to intact upon retirement.


----------



## dapaterson

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Nor that it's any time on the near-horizon, but could the Army start looking ahead to the Mk48 VLS,  57mm Bofors and Phalanx systems that will become available as the Halifax class are retired? With current CSC schedules there should be lots of time to look at towable options for each, if those systems are not already spoken for to be retrofitted into AOPS, etc.  That is of course assuming the Halifax will not be resold to intact upon retirement.



One of the major challenges in any resale would be that the majority of the weapons systems are American, and thus subject to US export regulations (ITAR).  Most manufacturers would rather sell new, and thus might fight efforts by Canada to resell...


----------



## Cloud Cover

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> What about a truck mounted Iron Dome style system? Create an invisible curtain around our troops to intercept munitions and UAVs.



What did we buy? https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-november-13-2015-1.3317292/canada-invests-in-iron-dome-to-fend-off-rocket-attacks-1.3317346


----------



## SeaKingTacco

We just bought the radar.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Planes without radars and radars without kinetics. Good grief.


----------



## GR66

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> What about a truck mounted Iron Dome style system? Create an invisible curtain around our troops to intercept munitions and UAVs.



While I think the elements of the Iron Dome system are "mobile" I don't think they are mobile in the sense of being suitable for providing air defence for maneuver units.  More "relocatable" rather than "mobile".


----------



## MilEME09

GR66 said:
			
		

> While I think the elements of the Iron Dome system are "mobile" I don't think they are mobile in the sense of being suitable for providing air defence for maneuver units.  More "relocatable" rather than "mobile".



Right so best for ports and airfields, got it. Still could make it a useful tool at the corp and division level to protect the supply train.


----------



## suffolkowner

CloudCover said:
			
		

> What did we buy? https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-november-13-2015-1.3317292/canada-invests-in-iron-dome-to-fend-off-rocket-attacks-1.3317346



for some reason i thought we bought these for counter battery?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Right so best for ports and airfields, got it. Still could make it a useful tool at the corp and division level to protect the supply train.



Israel, in their strategic context, don’t really need much in the way of mobile AD systems.


----------



## Cloud Cover

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> for some reason i thought we bought these for counter battery?



Counter battery with what?


----------



## suffolkowner

CloudCover said:
			
		

> Counter battery with what?



You got me there. But can they not provide the targetting information to the M777?


----------



## FJAG

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> You got me there. But can they not provide the targetting information to the M777?



This is one of the capabilities the Canadian Army actually has. 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) fields the AN/MPQ 405 Medium Range Radar for the counter mortar/gun/rocket role. The radar can also survey the skies for air traffic from UAVs to jets.

See here.







 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Actually this is one of the capabilities the Canadian Army actually has. 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) fields the AN/MPQ 405 Medium Range Radar for the counter mortar/gun/rocket role. The radar can also survey the skies for air traffic from UAVs to jets.
> 
> See here.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> :cheers:



My Dad was with 4th LAA Regiment in the 3rd Div during WW2. I wonder if this unit is their successor....


----------



## tomahawk6

Buy IronDome.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> My Dad was with 4th LAA Regiment in the 3rd Div during WW2. I wonder if this unit is their successor....



In short, no. It's linage is:



> This Regular Force regiment originated on 9 May 1905. 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support), RCA,
> originated in CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick, on 11 June 2014 through the amalgamation of the “4th Air
> Defence Regiment, RCA” and “4th Field Regiment (Self-propelled), RCA”.1



The full lineage (too long for here) is set out at page 5-20 of Part 2 of the RCA Standing Orders but note that 4th AD Regt does NOT trace back to 4th LAR and was created as a new entity in 1987.

http://rca-arc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/rca-standing-orders-2015-vol2.pdf

The Canadian Archives list the following with respect to 4th LAR:



> Authorized and placed on active service. Composed of 32nd, 62nd, 69th and 100th Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries, 1 January 1941.
> Disbanded, 13 November 1945.



See here at page 84 and 85

Generally the artillery traces lineage through batteries.

32nd LAA Bty created 17 Feb 42 traces lineage back to 32nd Kingston Fd Bty and was eventually converted to infantry 1 Dec 1959 (Brockville Rifles) (see above pg 752-4);

62nd LAA Bty created 1 Mar 43 traces lineage back to 62nd Fd Bty (Duncan BC) disbanded 1 Mar 44 converted to ATk Bty (SP) 1 Apr 46 (41st ATk Regt) and eventually converted to infantry 17 Oct 54 (C Coy C Scot R) (see above pg 856-8);

69th LAA Bty created 1 Jan 41 traces lineage back to 69th Fd Bty (Sault St Marie, ON) and continues in Simcoe, ON with 56th Fd Arty Regt (see above pg 870-1);

100th LAA Bty created 1 Jan 41 traces lineage back to 100th Fd Bty (Listowel, ON) reduced to nil strength 1 Oct 70 (see above 919-20);

4th RCA (GS)'s current batteries are 127, 128 and 129 GS Batteries (as an aside, 127 and 128 btys for part of their lineage were designated 1 and 2 Surface to Surface Missile Bties armed with Honest John nuclear missiles).

You might be interested in these two articles:

http://www.thememoryproject.com/stories/2733:/

https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=62232

 :cheers:


----------



## Cloud Cover

FJAG said:
			
		

> This is one of the capabilities the Canadian Army actually has. 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) fields the AN/MPQ 405 Medium Range Radar for the counter mortar/gun/rocket role. The radar can also survey the skies for air traffic from UAVs to jets.
> 
> See here.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> :cheers:



Is that the top or bottom half of the AAD glass?


----------



## GR66

Found this interesting article from last summer on the RAND site.  Seems like in some cases some existing AAD systems are not as effective as advertised.  

https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/drone-era-warfare-shows-the-operational-limits-of-air.html

Certainly doesn't mean we should not make the urgent investment in badly need AAD systems, but definitely something to keep in mind when looking at the overall "system of systems" when balancing our offensive and defensive capabilities.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Found this interesting article from last summer on the RAND site.  Seems like in some cases some existing AAD systems are not as effective as advertised.
> 
> https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/drone-era-warfare-shows-the-operational-limits-of-air.html
> 
> Certainly doesn't mean we should not make the urgent investment in badly need AAD systems, but definitely something to keep in mind when looking at the overall "system of systems" when balancing our offensive and defensive capabilities.



The best anti-air systems are like Ogres: they have layers


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> The best anti-air systems are like Ogres: they have layers


Besides the complete lack of any layers in Canada, the emergence and prevalence of guided munitions as a system to take out high value targets has really opened up the fact that there is a lack of a layer to deal with the small, inexpensive and swarming things that now fill the sky. As far back as Gulf War 1 most of our doctrine called for a an opening phase where we took out air defence systems so that our superior air power had full play. While once that might have been the role of aviation, special forces, specialized air delivered munitions and other long range deep strikes, we haven't changed our strategy much while other, smaller countries with smaller budgets, have become inventive.

My understanding is that GBAD which at best was set for a 2026 delivery has been pushed back substantially from that date.

I've said it before, we should at least lease some Avengers from the US so that we can revive our GBAD skills, knowledge and technical C&C base with these as training aids until the new systems come on line. By 2030 or whatever, there won't be an AD gunner left in the CAF.

Quite frankly looking backward at how we have squandered time and resources at preparing for the wrong type of conflict shedding capabilities and corporate knowledge left and right ever since we left our role in Europe, I see very little hope for the future. It's a good thing Canada has a very large moat around it. 

🤔


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Besides the complete lack of any layers in Canada, the emergence and prevalence of guided munitions as a system to take out high value targets has really opened up the fact that there is a lack of a layer to deal with the small, inexpensive and swarming things that now fill the sky. As far back as Gulf War 1 most of our doctrine called for a an opening phase where we took out air defence systems so that our superior air power had full play. While once that might have been the role of aviation, special forces, specialized air delivered munitions and other long range deep strikes, we haven't changed our strategy much while other, smaller countries with smaller budgets, have become inventive.
> 
> My understanding is that GBAD which at best was set for a 2026 delivery has been pushed back substantially from that date.
> 
> I've said it before, we should at least lease some Avengers from the US so that we can revive our GBAD skills, knowledge and technical C&C base with these as training aids until the new systems come on line. By 2030 or whatever, there won't be an AD gunner left in the CAF.
> 
> Quite frankly looking backward at how we have squandered time and resources at preparing for the wrong type of conflict shedding capabilities and corporate knowledge left and right ever since we left our role in Europe, I see very little hope for the future. It's a good thing Canada has a very large moat around it.
> 
> 🤔



Speaking of the 'deep strike' thing, MLRS delivered drones sound like a pretty good idea for stripping away those enfor GBAD assets:


"If Cluster Swarm drones have EFP warheads similar to existing weapons, then each MLRS missile would release about ten drones. Each M270 MLRS vehicle fires twelve missiles in a salvo, for a hundred and twenty drones. So a battery of nine launch vehicles would deliver a thousand killer drones over the target area, enough in theory to stop an entire armored division in its tracks."









						U.S. Army’s New Drone Swarm May Be A Weapon Of Mass Destruction
					

The Cluster Swarm project is developing a warhead to dispense a swarm of drones that fan out to automatically locate and destroy vehicles with explosively formed penetrators. It seems likely to be able to inflict an immense amount of harm but inable to distinguish civilians from military targets.




					www.forbes.com


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Until the Armoured division AD battery fires fires off similar munitions with 2,000 Drone hunter drones. Eventually it will be drones hunting each other and when they are done, we continue our war.


----------



## Weinie

daftandbarmy said:


> Speaking of the 'deep strike' thing, MLRS delivered drones sound like a pretty good idea for stripping away those enfor GBAD assets:
> 
> 
> "If Cluster Swarm drones have EFP warheads similar to existing weapons, then each MLRS missile would release about ten drones. Each M270 MLRS vehicle fires twelve missiles in a salvo, for a hundred and twenty drones. So a battery of nine launch vehicles would deliver a thousand killer drones over the target area, enough in theory to stop an entire armored division in its tracks."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> U.S. Army’s New Drone Swarm May Be A Weapon Of Mass Destruction
> 
> 
> The Cluster Swarm project is developing a warhead to dispense a swarm of drones that fan out to automatically locate and destroy vehicles with explosively formed penetrators. It seems likely to be able to inflict an immense amount of harm but inable to distinguish civilians from military targets.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forbes.com


So how do you stop a drone swarm? With an anti-drone swarm. Put several loitering mother ships with killer seekers around your armour and then your GBAD evolves into another capability. (Loitering Anti-Drone Defence). The idea that we can counter this on the ground is ludicrous.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Weinie said:


> So how do you stop a drone swarm? With an anti-drone swarm. Put several loitering mother ships with killer seekers around your armour and then your GBAD evolves into another capability. (Loitering Anti-Drone Defence). The idea that we can counter this on the ground is ludicrous.



Well, there is the time honoured tradition in some countries of using 'human shields', of course


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Speaking of the 'deep strike' thing, MLRS delivered drones sound like a pretty good idea for stripping away those enfor GBAD assets:
> 
> 
> "If Cluster Swarm drones have EFP warheads similar to existing weapons, then each MLRS missile would release about ten drones. Each M270 MLRS vehicle fires twelve missiles in a salvo, for a hundred and twenty drones. So a battery of nine launch vehicles would deliver a thousand killer drones over the target area, enough in theory to stop an entire armored division in its tracks."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> U.S. Army’s New Drone Swarm May Be A Weapon Of Mass Destruction
> 
> 
> The Cluster Swarm project is developing a warhead to dispense a swarm of drones that fan out to automatically locate and destroy vehicles with explosively formed penetrators. It seems likely to be able to inflict an immense amount of harm but inable to distinguish civilians from military targets.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forbes.com


An interesting concept and if not viable at the moment, it will be in time.

As to: Is it a WMD? The answer is no, buttercup, but depending on how it's target resolving AI works, it may become a weapon with unacceptable collateral damage consequences.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

"Technological Leap" Israel Puts New Upgraded Iron Dome To The Test
					

Israel just significantly upgraded and updated their legendary Iron Dome missile defense system, and has released an impressive test video showing the system successfully shooting down several unmanned aerial vehicles, missile salvoes, and rockets.




					funker530.com
				




Israel has upgraded the iron dome to now intercept drones as well. Interesting


----------



## CBH99

Extremely useful system in almost any theatre.  

Iron Dome has traditionally been used to engage incoming missiles, moving faster and (I imagine) higher than drones.  I would have thought that Iron Dome could have already hit drones without the upgrade?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Maybe optimized for lower angles and slower speeds? Also could mean a wider range of munitions to take out cheaper drones at less cost.


----------



## Kirkhill

According to Shekhar Gupta Azerbaijan converted its obsolete and "useless" fleet of Antonov 2s into  single use drones with massive Radar Cross Sections and flew them towards the Armenian lines.  The Armenians interpreted the massive radar incursion as a clear threat and activated their tactical defences.  Loitering Harop anti-radiation munitions took out the active air defence net.

From 11:30






F16 Drones from the Boneyard.









						How the U.S. Air Force Turns an F-16 Fighter Into a Drone
					

Unsurprisingly, it’s relatively easy to turn a computer-controlled fighter into a drone.




					www.popularmechanics.com
				




And the potential for drones launching drones.


----------



## Kirkhill

After watching the videos of the F18s deploying a swarm from 5 canisters






and watching a swarm manoeuver through trees (you can skip the planning and directly to the field observation at the halfway mark if you like)






I became aware that the Australian company (DefendTex) that is supplying the Brits with these









						British Troops Get Small Swarming Drones They Can Fire From 40mm Grenade Launchers
					

The tiny drones can carry various payloads, including video cameras and explosive warheads, and fly together as a swarm after launch.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Also holds the patent on this





__ https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=779110639118024
			






As Brihard and FJAG (I apologize if I have got the accreditation wrong) seem to be arguing, the best counter to a swarm is another swarm (or Big Wing).

A group of MetalStorm projectors launching something akin to those 40mm drones might be the only reasonable counter to those F18 deployed swarms

Every day is a miniature September 1940 with mini Spitfires and Messerchmidts fighting for dominance while mini Hurricanes fight to shoot down mini Junkers, Heinkels and Dorniers.


----------



## FJAG

Well, it looks like some folks can get a capability into operational use in less than a decade: First short-range air defense systems deploy to Europe By: Jen Judson    4 days ago


> The 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (5-4 ADA), 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, is the first unit in the Army to receive the Mobile Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) system. (Photo by Capt. Jordan Allen/U.S. Army)​
> WASHINGTON — The first unit in Europe has received the Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) systems, according to an April 23 statement from Army Futures Command.
> The 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, a subordinate unit under the 10th Army Air-and-Missile Defense Command, in Ansbach, Germany, is the first to receive the vehicles and will continue to test the M-SHORAD system.
> The M-SHORAD is a Stryker A1 combat vehicle-based system that includes a mission equipment package designed by Leonard DRS. That mission equipment package includes Raytheon’s Stinger vehicle missile launcher. General Dynamics Land Systems is the lead integrator and received a $1.2 billion contract to build and deliver the system in October 2020.
> The first battalion of 32 vehicles will be fielded in September 2021 using prototypes already built to fill it out.
> The system was rapidly developed in record time. It took just 19 months from the time the service generated the requirement to the first delivery of a platform for testing, answering an urgent call in 2016 from U.S. Army Europe to fill the short-range air defense capability gap.
> 
> Then-U.S. Army Europe commander, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, told Defense News in an interview flying above Poland during the country’s Anakonda military exercise, that his biggest worry was countering unmanned aerial vehicles and the Army needed to quickly get capability that could tackle the problem, particularly swarms.
> The M-SHORAD capability is designed to defend against unmanned systems as well as rotary- and fixed-wing threats.
> The service received the requirement to build the system in February 2018.
> 
> After a shoot-off in the desert of White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and subsequent evaluations of vendors, the Army selected a Stryker combat vehicle as the host system with the Leonardo DRS mission equipment package.
> The Army will field 144 systems to four battalions beginning this year, followed by an enduring capability for additional battalions.
> 
> Future variants of the system will include other kinetic interceptors and a directed energy capability that will not only defend against UAS and manned aircraft but also rockets, artillery and mortars.
> The Army has awarded a contract each to Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to build a 50-kilowatt-class laser weapon for Stryker combat vehicles for the SHORAD mission. One of the laser weapon systems developed could be integrated onto a platoon of four Stryker vehicles in fiscal 2022. But the Army is leaving competition open to any vendors that did not receive an OTA contract to compete using their own internal research and development dollars



Well done, Yanks!


----------



## MilEME09

One could hope being LAV based, that we jump on this quickly. A Regiment of these to start would go a long way to plugging our AD gap.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> As Brihard and FJAG (I apologize if I have got the accreditation wrong) seem to be arguing, the best counter to a swarm is another swarm (or Big Wing).
> 
> A group of MetalStorm projectors launching something akin to those 40mm drones might be the only reasonable counter to those F18 deployed swarms
> 
> Every day is a miniature September 1940 with mini Spitfires and Messerchmidts fighting for dominance while mini Hurricanes fight to shoot down mini Junkers, Heinkels and Dorniers.



It seems we could learn alot from ISIS on how to do this:


From 2018...


Russia Offers New Details About Syrian Mass Drone Attack, Now Implies Ukrainian Connection​
The Russian military’s top officer in charge of drone development has offered new details about apparent first of their kind mass drone attacks on its forces in Syria in an official briefing at the country’s Ministry of Defense. The presentation reiterated the Kremlin’s assertion that terrorists or rebels could not have conducted the operation without significant outside support, now implying a possible Ukrainian connection, but significant questions remain unanswered.

Speaking from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s briefing room, amid examples of the drones and their munitions that the country recovered after the attacks, Major General Alexander Novikov, head of the Russian General Staff's Office for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Development, gave the most detailed and complete official description of the incident to date. He said that unspecified terrorists utilized a total of 13 improvised drones, each carrying 10 bomblets, sending 10 to Russia's Khmeimim air base in Latakia governorate  and the other three to its naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean Sea. The munitions each had an explosive charge weighing nearly one pound, as well as strings of metal ball bearings or BBs glued together as pre-formed shrapnel, which would have made them most effective against individuals out in the open.









						Russia Offers New Details About Syrian Mass Drone Attack, Now Implies Ukrainian Connection
					

Though no group has taken responsibility, Russian authorities continue to insist the attackers needed outside support.




					www.thedrive.com


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> Well, it looks like some folks can get a capability into operational use in less than a decade: First short-range air defense systems deploy to Europe By: Jen Judson    4 days ago
> 
> 
> Well done, Yanks!


While they have their share of failed or derailed projects like the rest of us - I’m always impressed at how quickly they can field a new capability when it becomes necessary.

30mm turret on Stryker deployed to Europe?  Done.  Stryker based AD variant? Now done.  

Good on them with this project 😊👍🏻


----------



## FJAG

It's an interesting cycle they work with - kind of like us. The Avenger system was put together in 10 months in 1984. The US Army tested it for a bit and put in contracts for initial delivery of 325 systems for 1987 in time to deploy operational for Gulf War 1. Orders went up for another 679 systems for a total of 26 battalions but with the "peace dividend" and Iraq/Afghanistan thing, these were reduced to two active and seven National Guard. Then again, post Afghanistan and the Russians getting pushy in the Ukraine, the US started hauling them out of storage, reactivating active AD battalions, sent them to Europe and started a program for a new and advanced system.

I'm a great fan of the Avenger. IMHO it's a perfect interim system for Canada while we flounder around with our own SHORAD project. It's simple to operate and maintain and well within a reserve unit's capability to operate. It would make an absolutely perfect training aid to get our organization and doctrine sorted out and my guess is we could get surplus ones from the US on loan with our costs being primarily for training and operational missiles.

Like you, I'd like to see the M-SHORAD as an eventual operational system. It's there, it can be put on a Cdn LAV and it could be assembled in Canada. What would be simpler.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

And add a PRES UAV Troop as well using Civilian Drones at first which allows both Troops to practice against each other. The UAV Troop just needs 1-2 Milcot pickup trucks or even a Milcot Jeep, 3-4 members per detachment, a TSM and Troop officer.  

The nice thing about the Avenger system is that they can practice with the .50cals when there is a shortage of practice missiles. These two Troops would be popular with the younger soldiers, who would be technically adept at keeping things working and figuring out tactics and even practice targets. UAV troops could have yearly competitions to build and flying homemade drones to complete certain tasks which would attract some good talent.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> It's an interesting cycle they work with - kind of like us. The Avenger system was put together in 10 months in 1984. The US Army tested it for a bit and put in contracts for initial delivery of 325 systems for 1987 in time to deploy operational for Gulf War 1. Orders went up for another 679 systems for a total of 26 battalions but with the "peace dividend" and Iraq/Afghanistan thing, these were reduced to two active and seven National Guard. Then again, post Afghanistan and the Russians getting pushy in the Ukraine, the US started hauling them out of storage, reactivating active AD battalions, sent them to Europe and started a program for a new and advanced system.
> 
> I'm a great fan of the Avenger. IMHO it's a perfect interim system for Canada while we flounder around with our own SHORAD project. I*t's simple to operate and maintain and well within a reserve unit's capability to operate*. It would make an absolutely perfect training aid to get our organization and doctrine sorted out and my guess is we could get surplus ones from the US on loan with our costs being primarily for training and operational missiles.
> 
> Like you, I'd like to see the M-SHORAD as an eventual operational system. It's there, it can be put on a Cdn LAV and it could be assembled in Canada. What would be simpler.
> 
> 🍻


Some issues we'd need to work out:

1. Simulators (we suck at that)

2. EME Support (we suck at that too)

3. Ammo and training areas (no way are we set up for LLAD requirements AFAIK)

4. Courses (e.g., we can't even get spaces on Recce courses when the unit is Op Tasked for Recce)


----------



## suffolkowner

Could have put this in the Reserve thread as too









						HAVE LOITERING MUNITIONS MADE TANKS OBSOLETE?
					

By Nicholas Drummond Graphic images of Armenian T-72s being obliterated by Azerbaijani loitering munitions or “kamikaze drones,” as the media prefer to call them, suggest that the modern battlefiel…




					uklandpower.com
				




and from the article



			https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/02/CSD-Loitering-Munitions.pdf
		


With regard to M-SHORAD would it be advantageous to stick with the 25mm due to commonality. Obviously you lose in firepower and range but our LAV's are already outfitted with them, while the US looks to be adding and settling on the mk44 Bushmaster II to the previously berefit Strykers as the new standard.

Programmable munitions look like they are available









						Programmable Munitions: Projectiles 'Evolved' For The Modern Era - Overt Defense
					

Programmable munitions are increasingly important for engaging air and ground targets. But how do they work? We take an indepth look.




					www.overtdefense.com


----------



## Colin Parkinson

That all looks very expensive, particularly at the rate of fire of the smaller autocannons. If I recall correctly, most of the current auto cannons cannot flick a switch to change ammunition type in the feed tray, it`s possible that they won't have it loaded when needed or one vehicle in a Troop would be loaded with it and dedicated to AD overwatch.
The Bofors 57mm cannon used on the ships have a very effective round and ROF to defeat antiship missiles and would likley make a good SPAAG. 57mm gives you a lot more room for fuze, shrapnel and bursting charge. 57mm Naval Gun System. Although this gun is popular with Navies, it has yet to make it's way into the ground role.


----------



## suffolkowner

Colin Parkinson said:


> That all looks very expensive, particularly at the rate of fire of the smaller autocannons. If I recall correctly, most of the current auto cannons cannot flick a switch to change ammunition type in the feed tray, it`s possible that they won't have it loaded when needed or one vehicle in a Troop would be loaded with it and dedicated to AD overwatch.
> The Bofors 57mm cannon used on the ships have a very effective round and ROF to defeat antiship missiles and would likley make a good SPAAG. 57mm gives you a lot more room for fuze, shrapnel and bursting charge. 57mm Naval Gun System. Although this gun is popular with Navies, it has yet to make it's way into the ground role.



The article seemed to suggest that switching between ammunition types was commonplace. Can we do this with our M242 Bushmaster? 

The Bofors 57mm does seem like a natural fit, but maybe too much for LAV 

"The heaviest weapon will be a Bofors medium-calibre 57mm Mk 110 Mod 0 gun which is already in service with the US and several other navies. It can deliver up to 4 rounds per second and has a range of about 17km. The whole system, including 1,000 rounds weighs around *14 tonnes.* This is a very different weapon to the much heavier 114mm (4.5”) Mk 8 that delivers a single shell every 2 seconds and has equipped the majority of RN frigates since the 1970s."


but what about it's little brother, the 40mm?

"The Type 31 will not be fitted with 20mm Phalanx CIWS but instead will mount two Bofors 40mm Mk 4 guns. These lightweight *2.3-tonne*, non-deck penetrating mounts can deliver 5 rounds per second out to about 12.5km and are designed to respond rapidly at a wide range of elevations. By delivering heavier shells further away from the ship the Mk 4 is superior to Phalanx in some ways. They provide defence against air and missile attack but use the same sophisticated 3P type ammunition as the 57mm so can quickly change to engage small boat or UAV threats. 100 rounds are held in the gun ready to fire with the ability to shift between different types of ammunition."

above quotes from 








						More details of the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate emerge | Navy Lookout
					






					www.navylookout.com
				




of course integration of the above choices would probably be more work and money versus the IM-SHORAD. I just wondered about the choice of the 30mm over the 25mm already in service


----------



## suffolkowner

Moog turrets have been mentioned before and seem to have quite a few combinations to fit the need



			https://www.moog.com/content/dam/moog/literature/Space_Defense/Defense_Literature/RIwP_datasheet.pdf


----------



## FJAG

A slight tilt on calibres, I'm a fan of the Rheinmetal NBS Mantis/Millenium systems which are in 35 mm. It's not those extra five or ten millimetres but the fragmenting AHEAD ammunition with an automated fuze setter that works well as an anti-missile system. As an aside there is also a range of anti-armour projectile which will take out pretty much any APC/IFV in the inventory.

A bit much for most drones but I'm sure that that can be adapted by a fire control system and/or an accompanying smaller calibre side arm.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> A slight tilt on calibres, I'm a fan of the Rheinmetal NBS Mantis/Millenium systems which are in 35 mm. It's not those extra five or ten millimetres but the fragmenting AHEAD ammunition with an automated fuze setter that works well as an anti-missile system. As an aside there is also a range of anti-armour projectile which will take out pretty much any APC/IFV in the inventory.
> 
> A bit much for most drones but I'm sure that that can be adapted by a fire control system and/or an accompanying smaller calibre side arm.


For a 35mm gun with various types of ammo available, that thing is one unbelievably nasty little gun.  When it first elevated to engage an air target, I wasn't expecting it to just unleash hell like that.  Looks like a great weapon to slave to a C-RAM radar over the traditional 20mm Phalanx.


----------



## NavyShooter

ZSU-57-2 - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




The Ruskies seemed to think that the 57mm wasn't too big, though they used a T-54 tank chassis for theirs.  Though, the ZSU-23 seems to have been their more long-standing solution.

Note, the 1000 rounds of 57mm ammo puts us on somewhat uneven terms of discussion.  Yup, a naval mount having 1000 rounds (HMC Ships carry about 1800) is reasonable...the thing is at 19 pounds per cartridge, the 14 tons is mostly ammunition weight.  If you took just the 120 rounds that normally fill the turret, you'd have a total system weight of 5.6 Tons.  Putting another 120 rounds to double the basic load would add just over another ton.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> A slight tilt on calibres, I'm a fan of the Rheinmetal NBS Mantis/Millenium systems which are in 35 mm. It's not those extra five or ten millimetres but the fragmenting AHEAD ammunition with an automated fuze setter that works well as an anti-missile system. As an aside there is also a range of anti-armour projectile which will take out pretty much any APC/IFV in the inventory.
> 
> A bit much for most drones but I'm sure that that can be adapted by a fire control system and/or an accompanying smaller calibre side arm.




Back to the future FJAG?









						35MM Oerlikon Skyguard SWE - The Royal Canadian Artillery Museum
					

First developed in the late 1950s, the Oerlikon 35mm is one of the most widely used modern anti-aircraft guns. Used by the Canadian Army 1989 to 2005, the guns provided low-level air defence for two Canadian NATO airfields in Germany. Normally controlled in pairs by a Skyguard radar, the GDF-005...



					en.rcamuseum.com
				












						Skyshield - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						Nächstbereichschutzsystem MANTIS - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						Flakpanzer Gepard - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






			CV9035 DK - Danish Army Vehicles Homepage
		


Both the Dutch and the Danes opted for a 35mm cannon (admittedly a Bushmaster instead of an Oerlikon) on their CV-90s.

Rheinmetall-Oerlikon has a lot of history on the short game.

Kongsberg's NASAM for Area Defence?









						NASAMS - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

And while we are at it 















						Deadly Quick Danish Anti-aircraft Artillery
					

Another great anti-aircraft system for the Royal Danish Navy. The Oerlikon Millennium 35mm Naval Gun System is a Close-in weapon system designed by Oerlikon (a Rheinmetall subsidiary) for mounting on ships. It is based on the new Oerlikon 35 mm revol




					www.military.com
				




Please tell me that the RCA GBAD/LRPFs team is talking to the RCN CSC team.

Is there any reason they can't use the same suite of missiles, cannons, and fire control?  Sensors might need a bit of tweaking - maybe


----------



## Kirkhill

The role of Artificial Intelligence in enhancing Boyd's OODA loop - Observing, Orienting to Plan, Highlighting Threats and Courses of Action.  Decide and Act are left in human hands.  Although one decision could be "Weapons Free".









						Royal Navy tests artificial intelligence against supersonic missiles - Naval News
					

The Royal Navy is using artificial intelligence for the first time at sea in a bid to defeat missile attacks.




					www.navalnews.com
				




Physical capabilities









						French frigate downs supersonic missile in NATO exercise
					

A missile traveling at about 5,000 miles per hour was destroyed by a French frigate during NATO exercises off the Scottish coast, the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet said.




					www.upi.com
				




EW risks to the strategy.









						Missile defense test fails off Kauai after appearance by Russian spy ship
					

A U.S. missile defense test that an official said was delayed off Kauai earlier this week due to the presence of a Russian surveillance ship was carried out today with a salvo of SM-6 ship-fired missiles failing to intercept a medium-range ballistic missile target.




					www.staradvertiser.com
				





How would these work alongside the LRHVM "Theatre"?



> Given these standards I suggest that Canada (5514 km East-West by 4634 km North-South on land - add 400 km EW for EEZ and 200 km NS) is a Theatre and the appropriate defence capability is SM6/Tomahawk/LRHW.
> 
> I further suggest that the Theatre support a single Corps with a single Division.
> That the Theatre be an entirely domestic command.
> That the Corps be an Allied Corps (we are wealthy and tech savvy but short on bodies - we should be prepared to support our allies in depth - 1st Canadian Army as model)
> That the Division be a permanent reaction force tasked to the defence of Canada but capable of hiving off Brigades, Battle Groups and Combat Teams to support allies.
> 
> Special Forces to work with Long Range Strike (Arty, Rotary and Air - manned and unmanned)
> 
> Holding ground with live infanteers - the last political move.











						Swarms
					

Swarms of Small Diameter Bombs dropped from F16s/F18s to decoys to deep sea gliders.  https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38604/the-age-of-swarming-air-launched-munitions-has-officially-begun-with-air-force-test...




					army.ca
				




 And Russian (and Chinese) Sixth Generation Warfare?









						Sixth Generation Warfare - Russian Strategy
					

Non-Contact Warfare.  Little Green Men and LRPGMs.    Sixth-generation wars will be radically different from all previous ones. Their main distinguishing feature will be the use of weapons of a new type, high-precision strike,[9] and defensive weapons of various bases of the conventional type...




					army.ca


----------



## MilEME09

US Army tests first combat-capable laser weapon in a Combat Shoot-Off
					

The Army is fielding next-generation capabilities to advance its Multi-Domain Operations and create standoff.




					www.inceptivemind.com
				




Emerging technologies being put into action, can we get one on a LAV 6?


----------



## Battlemac

I was an AD gunner for 10 years (86-96), served in 119 Bty Chatham, 128 AAD/128AD Bty/4 AD Regt Germany, Y Bty/2 RCHA and 1AD Regt Pembroke.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> US Army tests first combat-capable laser weapon in a Combat Shoot-Off
> 
> 
> The Army is fielding next-generation capabilities to advance its Multi-Domain Operations and create standoff.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.inceptivemind.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Emerging technologies being put into action, can we get one on a LAV 6?


It would be interesting to know if the gunners it took "days" to train were already AD gunners and if so, which weapon specialty and whether Active Army or ARNG.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

"recommending going to commercial game controllers" Likely they trained on Call of Duty and other video games, not a huge leap to the real world as far as eye and hand coordination goes. The US has the same advantage with tech savy recruits, that they did with automotive savy recruits in WWII.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> It would be interesting to know if the gunners it took "days" to train were already AD gunners and if so, which weapon specialty and whether Active Army or ARNG.
> 
> 🍻


I’d be curious also, but in this case I don’t know if it would really matter.  

I would imagine it is more a matter of training the soldiers on how to operate a user-friendly system, than training them on how a complex C2 network would work in regards to air defence, integration of other AD assets at different levels, etc.  It is a short ranged system after all.

It sounds like the radar and sensors detect the threat, and automatically point the laser in the direction of the contact.  The soldiers then decide whether to lock & track the contact, and whether to engage.  

Pushing a few buttons to switch between IR, thermal, regular optics, how to zoom in and out, how to lock and track the contact, and which button to push to fire phasers.  



(I’ve made some assumptions about the system, which are baseless as I obviously have no experience with it.  But I do remember how simple and user friendly the surveillance suite was on the Coyote, which really boiled down to changing from night vision to thermal, zooming in and out, and rotating the cameras.  

Systems have only become more user friendly since then, and that wasn’t a hard system to become decently proficient on.)


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> I’d be curious also, but in this case I don’t know if it would really matter.
> ...
> Systems have only become more user friendly since then, and that wasn’t a hard system to become decently proficient on.)


I always look at these things from life cycle cost and on a PY basis.

The regular force artillery has been heavily hit by PY issues. The reason it is down to a handful of guns and no air defence comes muchly from having to shift PYs to STA/ASCC and OP/FSCC batteries during Afghanistan. Quite frankly it can't be pared down anymore to re-man air defence without giving something else up - and there's nothing left to give up.

Similarly weapon acquisition costs are now heavily influenced by life cycle costs which depend very much on the service life of the system and the annual cost for crews and ammo - crew costs are a big factor especially for a system like this where ammunition costs do not seem to be an issue.

Since AD is one of those specialties which sees very little utility in peacetime the curmudgeons which make decisions on allocating funds and PYs would be loath to devote much of either for such a system.

If, on the other hand, much of the manning could come from reservists, and the systems remain on stand-by for much of their life cycle, acquisition of a reasonable number of systems is much more likely as overall costs are significantly lower. 

This is also why I favour more modern SP systems because much of the gunline can be converted to fewer and less expensive reservists.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Since AD is one of those specialties which sees very little utility in peacetime the curmudgeons which make decisions on allocating funds and PYs would be loath to devote much of either for such a system.


I think that anyone looking at any recent conflicts should realize that AD will see very significant utility in almost all future operations.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I think that anyone looking at any recent conflicts should realize that AD will see very significant utility in almost all future operations.


You'd think so wouldn't you. 

My cynicism, however, hasn't abated.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

GR66 said:


> I think that anyone looking at any recent conflicts should realize that AD will see very significant utility in almost all future operations.


laser weapons likely in the future will be able to track and engage faster then conventional munitions, especially drones. With relatively no defense created yet


----------



## Kirkhill

London Olympics 2012





Kananaskis G8 2002




From Iron Dome to C-RAM it seems to me Air Defence is an asset with a great degree of utility.  If for no other reason than it has Defence in its name.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> I always look at these things from life cycle cost and on a PY basis.
> 
> The regular force artillery has been heavily hit by PY issues. The reason it is down to a handful of guns and no air defence comes muchly from having to shift PYs to STA/ASCC and OP/FSCC batteries during Afghanistan. Quite frankly it can't be pared down anymore to re-man air defence without giving something else up - and there's nothing left to give up.
> 
> Similarly weapon acquisition costs are now heavily influenced by life cycle costs which depend very much on the service life of the system and the annual cost for crews and ammo - crew costs are a big factor especially for a system like this where ammunition costs do not seem to be an issue.
> 
> Since AD is one of those specialties which sees very little utility in peacetime the curmudgeons which make decisions on allocating funds and PYs would be loath to devote much of either for such a system.
> 
> If, on the other hand, much of the manning could come from reservists, and the systems remain on stand-by for much of their life cycle, acquisition of a reasonable number of systems is much more likely as overall costs are significantly lower.
> 
> This is also why I favour more modern SP systems because much of the gunline can be converted to fewer and less expensive reservists.
> 
> 🍻


I totally agree with you.  Life cycle costs and PY availability are at least just as important (one can argue they are MORE important) as the acquisition costs.  If the system is absurdly expensive to operate, or needs regular costly maintenance because it is 'fragile' - those things need to be thoroughly considered before the system is acquired.  And obviously, we need PYs available to operate whatever system is acquired.

If something like this was mounted on a LAV 6, I imagine the life cycle costs would be fairly low.  Not a lot of moving parts, no violent explosions happening inside the system being funneled through a barrel, subsequent recoil, wear & tear, etc.  Perhaps some hydraulic motors for turret rotation, and some high-tech sci-fi things that make a laser powerful enough and focused enough it is weaponized.  (Which now that I write that out, are probably more expensive than I realize.)


Just some random thoughts/questions:

- In regards to PYs, is it possible to have some of the gunners/personnel in the RCA able to operate both?  Do we need personnel exclusively trained on the M777, and others exclusively trained on this system if it is user-friendly enough?  Depending on the deployment, PYs that are trained on the M777 could operate this kind of system if their M777s aren't deployed.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> I totally agree with you.  Life cycle costs and PY availability are at least just as important (one can argue they are MORE important) as the acquisition costs.  If the system is absurdly expensive to operate, or needs regular costly maintenance because it is 'fragile' - those things need to be thoroughly considered before the system is acquired.  And obviously, we need PYs available to operate whatever system is acquired.
> 
> If something like this was mounted on a LAV 6, I imagine the life cycle costs would be fairly low.  Not a lot of moving parts, no violent explosions happening inside the system being funneled through a barrel, subsequent recoil, wear & tear, etc.  Perhaps some hydraulic motors for turret rotation, and some high-tech sci-fi things that make a laser powerful enough and focused enough it is weaponized.  (Which now that I write that out, are probably more expensive than I realize.)
> 
> 
> Just some random thoughts/questions:
> 
> - In regards to PYs, is it possible to have some of the gunners/personnel in the RCA able to operate both?  Do we need personnel exclusively trained on the M777, and others exclusively trained on this system if it is user-friendly enough?  Depending on the deployment, PYs that are trained on the M777 could operate this kind of system if their M777s aren't deployed.


I've actually been wondering as to whether or not the TAPV might be of use for something like air defence. Such a system generally doesn't need a large crew but should be armoured. The issue for most systems is the ability to carry enough ammunition (or in the case of a laser like this, power cells)

It's not impossible to be double hatted but I think it's impractical. I go back to the 1970s when we introduced the Blowpipe and Boffin air defence systems and it was quite an effort to get people trained, especially officers and NCOs who had to deal not just with the operation of the weapon but its tactical employment doctrine. Essentially all gunners started with basic training as gun numbers and then went on to specialties. Eventually the branch split into specialties after I transferred to the legal branch and I do not know if they continued on with this. My understanding is (and I could be wrong) that we still train everyone to be a field artillery gunner/officer first and then they go on to such things as STA specialties. 

Again, I've settled into the viewpoint that most senior NCO and officer appointments in the artillery these days have a level of complexity that they need to be full-timers, but that many of the weapon system operators could easily be reservists (assuming that a proper training regime is set up for them). Essentially most gunline jobs and system operator jobs, including many NCOs and junior officers there, should be reservists while there should be just enough full-timers to be able to fill quick reaction deployments and to create a sufficiently large enough base to allow for sustainable experience development for the more senior ranks. 

This is why I think Force 2025 could be a very valuable tool if and only if it brought us to the realization that with PY and funding limitations the Army needs to determine, from the ground up, what is necessary to maximize its capability outputs by rebalancing its human resources and to define and acquire the equipment which is necessary to properly meet its defence missions. There was a brief time during the Afghan mission where there seemed to be a forward looking plan but that just seemed to collapse. For the artillery, the focus turned entirely to configuring batteries to support counterinsurgency type missions and IMHO it continues to be organized, equipped and trained to fight the last conflict and not the next one.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> I've actually been wondering as to whether or not the TAPV might be of use for something like air defence. Such a system generally doesn't need a large crew but should be armoured. The issue for most systems is the ability to carry enough ammunition (or in the case of a laser like this, power cells)
> 
> It's not impossible to be double hatted but I think it's impractical. I go back to the 1970s when we introduced the Blowpipe and Boffin air defence systems and it was quite an effort to get people trained, especially officers and NCOs who had to deal not just with the operation of the weapon but its tactical employment doctrine. Essentially all gunners started with basic training as gun numbers and then went on to specialties. Eventually the branch split into specialties after I transferred to the legal branch and I do not know if they continued on with this. My understanding is (and I could be wrong) that we still train everyone to be a field artillery gunner/officer first and then they go on to such things as STA specialties.
> 
> Again, I've settled into the viewpoint that most senior NCO and officer appointments in the artillery these days have a level of complexity that they need to be full-timers, but that many of the weapon system operators could easily be reservists (assuming that a proper training regime is set up for them). Essentially most gunline jobs and system operator jobs, including many NCOs and junior officers there, should be reservists while there should be just enough full-timers to be able to fill quick reaction deployments and to create a sufficiently large enough base to allow for sustainable experience development for the more senior ranks.
> 
> This is why I think Force 2025 could be a very valuable tool if and only if it brought us to the realization that with PY and funding limitations the Army needs to determine, from the ground up, what is necessary to maximize its capability outputs by rebalancing its human resources and to define and acquire the equipment which is necessary to properly meet its defence missions. There was a brief time during the Afghan mission where there seemed to be a forward looking plan but that just seemed to collapse. For the artillery, the focus turned entirely to configuring batteries to support counterinsurgency type missions and IMHO it continues to be organized, equipped and trained to fight the last conflict and not the next one.
> 
> 🍻


Agreed on all points.  Just to add to your last point, militaries all over the world do tend to be reactionary in nature, and always seem to be preparing for their last conflict and not the next one.  And we, unfortunately, with mediocre leadership at best from our MND and PM (regardless of person/party) won't be the ones to ambitiously look ahead, and mould ourselves into excelling at the next conflict.


-  I agree that having anybody employed in any capacity in the artillery should start with gunline jobs.  Being able to receive an urgent communication, and shortly afterwards have ordinance landing in a grid up to 60km away with deadly accuracy, gives artillery personnel a very real and constantly exercised skill when it comes to maps, grids, proficiency in locating certain grids, proper radio comms between units and HQ, etc.

^ Gunline jobs, and positions within an artillery battery, really do lay a great foundation for all kinds of skills.  Again, being able to quickly load the appropriate rounds, charges, warheads, etc etc and have that ordinance land in the grid you want it to, is such a valuable foundation when it comes to so many other positions.  



Counter-Point:  Traditionally, artillery units fire their guns from one grid, and the rounds land in another grid a fair distance away.  *The main point I am making here is that regardless of distance, there are rounds landing on the other end - and because of that, making sure the right effects are being employed on the proper grid is paramount.  

But in the case of solid-state lasers (and other energy weapons) we are now directly engaging a threat, with no fear that physical rounds will be landing downrange with physical consequences.*  With the Blowpipe and Boffins, both systems fired physical ammunition that was going to land 'somewhere'.  With energy weapons such as this, which can only be used in a 'line of sight, direct fire' capacity, we don't have those same concerns.  

It does not need a large gun crew constantly grabbing a new round, applying the proper charge, readjusting the gun's elevation, confirming with downrange friendlies that our rounds and landing where they want them to, etc.  Nor are we hooking it up to a gun tractor and towing it to another position.


Since we won't be deploying all of our M777s at once, and a modern laser system is more akin to a video game in regards to 'push button to track' or 'push button to change from normal vision to IR', etc - I don't know if having personnel trained on both would be a burden, nor would it take away from one system to operate another.  (I could very well be wrong on this?)


For younger soldiers, systems like these are not all that different from some of the video-games being played on consoles once they get home.  A quick refresher and they would be good to go.  (I imagine any of us who play DCS would find DCS substantially more technical/challenging.)  That the US soldiers who trialed the system recommended going to an X-Box controller I think reinforces just how user friendly some of these newer systems are.


 🍻


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Agreed on all points.  Just to add to your last point, militaries all over the world do tend to be reactionary in nature, and always seem to be preparing for their last conflict and not the next one.  And we, unfortunately, with mediocre leadership at best from our MND and PM (regardless of person/party) won't be the ones to ambitiously look ahead, and mould ourselves into excelling at the next conflict.
> 
> 
> -  I agree that having anybody employed in any capacity in the artillery should start with gunline jobs.  Being able to receive an urgent communication, and shortly afterwards have ordinance landing in a grid up to 60km away with deadly accuracy, gives artillery personnel a very real and constantly exercised skill when it comes to maps, grids, proficiency in locating certain grids, proper radio comms between units and HQ, etc.
> 
> ^ Gunline jobs, and positions within an artillery battery, really do lay a great foundation for all kinds of skills.  Again, being able to quickly load the appropriate rounds, charges, warheads, etc etc and have that ordinance land in the grid you want it to, is such a valuable foundation when it comes to so many other positions.
> 
> 
> 
> Counter-Point:  Traditionally, artillery units fire their guns from one grid, and the rounds land in another grid a fair distance away.  *The main point I am making here is that regardless of distance, there are rounds landing on the other end - and because of that, making sure the right effects are being employed on the proper grid is paramount.
> 
> But in the case of solid-state lasers (and other energy weapons) we are now directly engaging a threat, with no fear that physical rounds will be landing downrange with physical consequences.*  With the Blowpipe and Boffins, both systems fired physical ammunition that was going to land 'somewhere'.  With energy weapons such as this, which can only be used in a 'line of sight, direct fire' capacity, we don't have those same concerns.
> 
> It does not need a large gun crew constantly grabbing a new round, applying the proper charge, readjusting the gun's elevation, confirming with downrange friendlies that our rounds and landing where they want them to, etc.  Nor are we hooking it up to a gun tractor and towing it to another position.
> 
> 
> Since we won't be deploying all of our M777s at once, and a modern laser system is more akin to a video game in regards to 'push button to track' or 'push button to change from normal vision to IR', etc - I don't know if having personnel trained on both would be a burden, nor would it take away from one system to operate another.  (I could very well be wrong on this?)
> 
> 
> For younger soldiers, systems like these are not all that different from some of the video-games being played on consoles once they get home.  A quick refresher and they would be good to go.  (I imagine any of us who play DCS would find DCS substantially more technical/challenging.)  That the US soldiers who trialed the system recommended going to an X-Box controller I think reinforces just how user friendly some of these newer systems are.
> 
> 
> 🍻


The single biggest problem I see with direct energy weapons is in fact it's line of sight capability because it means the platform has to be located somewhere where the target is open to it --- which means that the platform is also open to the target. That brings into play a whole new line of tactical employment amongst a force that would rather stay hidden. The problem was similar to what Blowpipe faced where detachments would move from hillock to farmhouse or whatever which let them cover their arcs. With Blowpipe the advantage was that its primary targets generally flew a little higher and were easier to acquire than much of what we could be facing now. There are times when I'm quite glad that someone else has to work out the details. Hopefully there are still enough AD gunners around to do that.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

This is on par with our current level of AD




__ https://www.facebook.com/IndiaToday/posts/10161430750177119


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The single biggest problem I see with direct energy weapons is in fact it's line of sight capability because it means the platform has to be located somewhere where the target is open to it --- which means that the platform is also open to the target. That brings into play a whole new line of tactical employment amongst a force that would rather stay hidden. The problem was similar to what Blowpipe faced where detachments would move from hillock to farmhouse or whatever which let them cover their arcs. With Blowpipe the advantage was that its primary targets generally flew a little higher and were easier to acquire than much of what we could be facing now. There are times when I'm quite glad that someone else has to work out the details. Hopefully there are still enough AD gunners around to do that.
> 
> 🍻




Which is why any such system is not worth armouring and shouldn't be mounted on a crewed vehicle.  It should be built cheaply, mounted on a pallet and delivered by a PLS truck.  Like most of the rest of the artillery.

Oh... and remotely operated.


----------



## CBH99

Colin Parkinson said:


> This is on par with our current level of AD
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __ https://www.facebook.com/IndiaToday/posts/10161430750177119


When I first saw this post, before watching it, I chuckled & thought it was some sarcastic humour.  

Then I realized you aren’t wrong, and it is still sarcastic humour 😐


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> When I first saw this post, before watching it, I chuckled & thought it was some sarcastic humour.
> 
> Then I realized you aren’t wrong, and it is still sarcastic humour 😐


It is somewhat funny in both the simplicity of the gung-ho band aid solution and the "rah-rah" reporting. Although in a lot of ways it shows the same can-do attitude we take pride in amongst our own soldiers but without the accompanying cynicism. 

The Indian Army actually has an Air Defence Corps of some 90,000 soldiers with a variety of antiquated and more modern (and mostly Soviet/Russian) equipment. ... and that's what bothers me about Canada ... we tend to prefer to go without any capability whatsoever rather than maintain that capability in a lower priority category (such as by passing it on to a very small core of full-timers with the reserves fleshing it out). We totally prefer to staff yet another directorate of paper pushing cubicles in Ottawa than maintain combat capabilities.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

1941



1939


----------



## Kirkhill

And, courtesy of Canadian Soldiers, I found the grandfather of the Indian solution



Ca 1915


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> . . . the Indian solution



The Hollywood solution


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Meanwhile in the UK, using the same missiles as our CSC will if I understand it correctly?









						The British Army’s Got Its Hands On Its New Sky Sabre Air Defense Systems
					

Using the same missiles as Royal Navy warships, the Sky Sabre is a much-needed replacement for the veteran Rapier missile.




					www.thedrive.com


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:


> Again, I've settled into the viewpoint that most senior NCO and officer appointments in the artillery these days have a level of complexity that they need to be full-timers, but that many of the weapon system operators could easily be reservists (assuming that a proper training regime is set up for them). Essentially most gunline jobs and system operator jobs, including many NCOs and junior officers there, should be reservists while there should be just enough full-timers to be able to fill quick reaction deployments and to create a sufficiently large enough base to allow for sustainable experience development for the more senior ranks.



I disagree with the view of Snr appointments need to be be Full Timers.  What truly needs to be done is the full timers need to change their view point of the Reserve Force and get on with practical training as a whole. 
Many Officers and Snr NCOs  and NCMs in Reserve Units are in positions of Authority in their Business life. They can make many excellent decisions both for their Companies and for the Military if given the tools and guidelines to succeed.   
The issues are nothing changes because nothing is driven from higher. 
Units are given the same task every year with a reduced budget. Running out of money. ammo, gear  and training space. 

If Reserve Unit CO and his staff are fighting and figuring out  how to train their unit on the basics tasks for the year with little to no assets. That time could be better spent doing table top exercises and or planning for unit level training in the training areas. When you spend a large portion of your time trying to rob paul to pay peter to get even the basic Soldier skill quals done, it takes away from their ability to train themselves at a higher level. Now add in they are doing this Part time it makes it even worse. 
They have to use their field training time long weekends etc often to cover off their Training courses such as Artillery trades, FOO tech, Det 2ic etc. Which takes away from their regular training and possible advanced training process. 

Put the money and process in place and things will change. Keep doing the same thing and nothing will change. 

Employ your Soldier within their Capabilities,   Which I think the Military fails at miserably. 




FJAG said:


> 🍻


----------



## KevinB

childs56 said:


> I disagree with the view of Snr appointments need to be be Full Timers.  What truly needs to be done is the full timers need to change their view point of the Reserve Force and get on with practical training as a whole.
> Many Officers and Snr NCOs  and NCMs in Reserve Units are in positions of Authority in their Business life. They can make many excellent decisions both for their Companies and for the Military if given the tools and guidelines to succeed.
> The issues are nothing changes because nothing is driven from higher.
> Units are given the same task every year with a reduced budget. Running out of money. ammo, gear  and training space.


Sorry snarky comments coming below


childs56 said:


> If Reserve Unit CO


So an Outrageously over ranked Platoon commander


childs56 said:


> and his staff


because that Platoon needs staff...



childs56 said:


> are fighting and figuring out  how to train their unit


 The platoon - while burning class A days that could be used actually teaching that platoon.



childs56 said:


> on the basics tasks for the year with little to no assets. That time could be better spent doing table top exercises and or planning for unit level training in the training areas. When you spend a large portion of your time trying to rob paul to pay peter to get even the basic Soldier skill quals done, it takes away from their ability to train themselves at a higher level. Now add in they are doing this Part time it makes it even worse.
> They have to use their field training time long weekends etc often to cover off their Training courses such as Artillery trades, FOO tech, Det 2ic etc. Which takes away from their regular training and possible advanced training process.
> 
> Put the money and process in place and things will change. Keep doing the same thing and nothing will change.
> 
> Employ your Soldier within their Capabilities,   Which I think the Military fails at miserably.


Right now Canada should just abolish the Army Reserves.
   They can't field formations that justify the ranks they have for their establishments - and need to be folded - or burned down and remade from scratch.

The fact that Res class A days are burned at a insane rate by Maj and Above - just leads to further issues.


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## FJAG

childs56 said:


> I disagree with the view of Snr appointments need to be be Full Timers.  What truly needs to be done is the full timers need to change their view point of the Reserve Force and get on with practical training as a whole.


I agree fully that full-timers need to change their view point of the Reserve Force.


childs56 said:


> Many Officers and Snr NCOs  and NCMs in Reserve Units are in positions of Authority in their Business life. They can make many excellent decisions both for their Companies and for the Military if given the tools and guidelines to succeed.


While true, the ability to operate successfully as a military leader requires both the requisite training and a period of time of practicing the skills in realistic settings. Res F officers and Snr NCOs receive neither the time nor sufficient experience to get proficient at their jobs.


childs56 said:


> The issues are nothing changes because nothing is driven from higher.
> Units are given the same task every year with a reduced budget. Running out of money. ammo, gear  and training space.


True and lamentable but does not address the basic competency issue. Even if given the budgets, the vast majority of the officers and senior NCOs do not have the time to take the required training nor gain the required experience.


childs56 said:


> If Reserve Unit CO and his staff are fighting and figuring out  how to train their unit on the basics tasks for the year with little to no assets. That time could be better spent doing table top exercises and or planning for unit level training in the training areas. When you spend a large portion of your time trying to rob paul to pay peter to get even the basic Soldier skill quals done, it takes away from their ability to train themselves at a higher level. Now add in they are doing this Part time it makes it even worse.
> They have to use their field training time long weekends etc often to cover off their Training courses such as Artillery trades, FOO tech, Det 2ic etc. Which takes away from their regular training and possible advanced training process.
> 
> Put the money and process in place and things will change. Keep doing the same thing and nothing will change.
> 
> Employ your Soldier within their Capabilities,   Which I think the Military fails at miserably.


Let me put it this way. With my thirteen years as a full-time artillery officer with an advanced gunnery qualification, the Army Command and Staff Course and the Combat Team Commanders Course, if you put me in the turret of an OPLAV right now I would have a basic understanding of the fundamentals but zero knowledge of how to use the equipment or act as a JTAC and do many of the other vital tasks. With all my past learning and experience I would have a very steep learning curve before I would stop being a handicap to my detachment. While fully trained and experienced for the job in the past, I doubt that I could provide effective fire support coordination support at either the battlegroup or brigade these days without some lengthy training.  Most Res F officers and NCOs these days have only the most basic of training.

I can easily see a Res F junior officer who goes through a four year RESO program being able to fully perform a gun line officers function. I can even see a Res F sergeant who has taken a conversion course on the M777 perform the functions of a detachment commander but I have difficulties in seeing a Res F captain or WO and above perform all of the functions required of them because their training and experience simply isn't good enough. Even if more money was thrown their way, the vast majority of them wouldn't have the time to gain the full training and experience become good enough to do the job. That's simply the function of part-time service.

I would think that with an effort both by the system and by a very few select individuals some could devote the time to progress to become useable captains and WOs and maybe even in very special circumstances majors and MWOs but certainly not to LCol or RSM.

Our current Res F system is an anachronism to a far earlier time when senior leadership mostly revolved around personal courage, an ability to motivate people and the ability to master very simple technical and tactical issues. The Res F system needs great reform and part of that requires an understanding of what is possible and what simply is not achievable even if better resourced. Simply put there is a need to integrate Reg F and Res F personnel at the unit and above level where each can perform together with the requisite training and experience each brings to the job.

If that thins out the boys club in the officers and senior NCOs mess than so be it - it is not the role of the Res F to provide a cushy career path to Col and CWO. If the Res F's 15-18,000 members need to be reorganized from 150 some odd 100 man battalion sized units into 30 some 600 man ones then so be it. If we need to enhance our CSS capabilities at the expense of infantry then so be it. There are numerous ways to greatly enhance the capabilities of the Res F so that every member can progress to a job where his level of skill and experience could be fully used and not wasted.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Spot the difference?

Short Range
Line of Sight
Forward Edge Battle Area
Air and Ground Targets
Point Defence

...... and Mobile.


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I would think that with an effort both by the system and by a very few select individuals some could devote the time to progress to become useable captains and WOs and maybe even in very special circumstances majors and MWOs but certainly not to LCol or RSM.
> 
> 🍻



My experience is solely with the Reserve Infantry, but I believe that we can train good dismounted Sections and Platoons withing the existing training and logistics infrastructure.

The existing technical and leadership courses, despite all the whining we do about them, are actually pretty good at turning out well trained soldiers and good junior leaders.

The problem is that the training aims change like a menopausal chameleon and, to be successful, the Reserves need a long term commitment to a 'main effort' to foster a predictable training program that won't change with each Army/ Div/ Bde Commander.

Unit COs also need a high degree of accountability for 'keeping the plot' and meeting the training goals as opposed to, you know, devoting about 2/3rds of the training plan to ceremonial events (yes, at least two of the COs I served under did that without anyone taking them to task on that).

Recently I had a discussion with a unit CO who I think is actually a good guy who's doing the right things (he should be - I trained him ) and he said that he only spoke to the last Bde Comd, on the phone, once over a two year period. He never saw him in person except at the occasional Bde Conference or social function.

Which means that Bde Comds also need a rocket up their asses to make sure that they get out and ensure things are happening the way they should.


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## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> My experience is solely with the Reserve Infantry, but I believe that we can train good dismounted Sections and Platoons withing the existing training and logistics infrastructure.
> 
> The existing technical and leadership courses, despite all the whining we do about them, are actually pretty good at turning out well trained soldiers and good junior leaders.
> 
> The problem is that the training aims change like a menopausal chameleon and, to be successful, the Reserves need a long term commitment to a 'main effort' to foster a predictable training program that won't change with each Army/ Div/ Bde Commander.
> 
> Unit COs also need a high degree of accountability for 'keeping the plot' and meeting the training goals as opposed to, you know, devoting about 2/3rds of the training plan to ceremonial events (yes, at least two of the COs I served under did that without anyone taking them to task on that).
> 
> Recently I had a discussion with a unit CO who I think is actually a good guy who's doing the right things (he should be - I trained him ) and he said that he only spoke to the last Bde Comd, on the phone, once over a two year period. He never saw him in person except at the occasional Bde Conference or social function.
> 
> Which means that Bde Comds also need a rocket up their asses to make sure that they get out and ensure things are happening the way they should.


My experiences in the Militia are years gone by, back then 30 RCA could field a full 6 Gun Bty, 2 FOO Teams a FSCC, two CP's, Recce Party and support.  So it could have justified the BC Major, and with Admin Bty, HQ Bty, and Training Bty - could almost have made a case for the CO.
  When it became 10/90 it have done more - but was restricted to a single field battery, these days I hear it can field 2 guns - more for saluting than in the field, as for salutes they don't need CP's and FOO parties.

A rationalization needs to occur in the reserves for them to be actually viable.
  As @FJAG and you have pointed out - the viability beyond Platoon starts to drop - and yet the reserves still have Battalion or Regimental positions for ranks.
   The argument the Reserves have always used for "a Mobilization" construct is such a farce these days - as there isn't anyone to train those who would join to fill them out in Mobilization.

Now I place a lot of blame for the situation on the Regular Army - but also the Res Regimental Senates etc who refuse to admit their old unit is gone - a Platoon minus with the name of a Battalion/Regiment does no one any good.

The Reg Force isn't going to make the Res viable - the Reserves need to have a come to Jesus meeting with themselves and come up with a plan to streamline and make them relevant that the Reg force will need to pay attention to - as quite frankly the Reg force is pretty thin these days and needs the Militia even if they don't want to admit it.


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## Rifleman62

Will never happen. Agree with you 100%. Top rank in the PRes  unit should be a MWO/Maj whose purpose is doing all the Admin/Sup tasks leaving Pl Comd free to command and train.


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## Kirkhill

Rifleman62 said:


> Will never happen. Agree with you 100%. Top rank in the PRes  unit should be a MWO/Maj whose purpose is doing all the Admin/Sup tasks leaving Pl Comd free to command and train.



Top rank in the PRes  unit should be a MWO/Maj whose purpose is doing all the Admin/Sup tasks leaving Pl Comd  the Capt/WO free to command and train and the Lts free to learn their trade with their Platoons


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## CBH99

daftandbarmy said:


> The problem is that the training aims change like a _menopausal chameleon_…


A menopausal chameleon? 😂

Oh how I wish I had a more creative mind & could think stuff like that up on my own 😅😋


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## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> A menopausal chameleon? 😂
> 
> Oh how I wish I had a more creative mind & could think stuff like that up on my own 😅😋



Be careful what you wish for


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## FJAG

Started this post yesterday and then went to bed. Added a few things.



daftandbarmy said:


> My experience is solely with the Reserve Infantry, but I believe that we can train good dismounted Sections and Platoons withing the existing training and logistics infrastructure.
> 
> The existing technical and leadership courses, despite all the whining we do about them, are actually pretty good at turning out well trained soldiers and good junior leaders.


I can easily see that. With the new Reg F arty structure of having batteries that are basically gunlines, a battery of FOO dets and a surveillance and target acquisition battery I can easily see the reserve force forming complete gun line batteries and the vast majority of STA batteries but be very limited in providing FOO dets and FSCCs (which would require a predominant number of Reg F folks) That's a very doable concept where you have a regiment with a majority Reg F RHQ and FOO battery and maybe one Reg F gun battery and have the reserves provide two additional gun batteries and an STA battery. You'd have a full sized regiment (not the stubbies we have right now) and at half the PY cost. Put the Reg F CO in charge of the whole shebang's training and Bob's your uncle.


daftandbarmy said:


> The problem is that the training aims change like a menopausal chameleon and, to be successful, the Reserves need a long term commitment to a 'main effort' to foster a predictable training program that won't change with each Army/ Div/ Bde Commander.
> 
> Unit COs also need a high degree of accountability for 'keeping the plot' and meeting the training goals as opposed to, you know, devoting about 2/3rds of the training plan to ceremonial events (yes, at least two of the COs I served under did that without anyone taking them to task on that).


This is where I get back to the 30/70 and 70/30 concept where battalion HQs are predominantly Reg F with direct responsibility for the development of both their Reg F and Res F components to a standard training model for each of the arms. I can see a Reg F CO running a 30/70 battalion, having it count as a command tour, being held accountable and assessed on the development of the entire battalion and even being liable to have his bn HQ and Reg F company augmented by Res F volunteers for an operational deployment. The big change needed for that is to have a whole different training model which ensures that the battalion is active year round, concentrating on training its Reg F components during the winter months and the Res F component in the summer (with due allowances for the APS and summer leave (last time I looked there were two hard-core summer months (July and August) and one should be able to pull together 25-33% of the Reg F folks on the ground throughout the summer to train the reservists.



daftandbarmy said:


> Recently I had a discussion with a unit CO who I think is actually a good guy who's doing the right things (he should be - I trained him ) and he said that he only spoke to the last Bde Comd, on the phone, once over a two year period. He never saw him in person except at the occasional Bde Conference or social function.
> 
> Which means that Bde Comds also need a rocket up their asses to make sure that they get out and ensure things are happening the way they should.


For 18,000 reservists we only need four-five brigades (two manoeuvre; two to three support). The leadership there should also be predominantly Reg F with responsibility and accountability for their units and capable of doing deployment rotations.

I'm a bit heavy into interviews this week but maybe over the weekend I'll put some pen to paper on this - it's about time I updated "Unsustainable At Any Price".



KevinB said:


> ... A rationalization needs to occur in the reserves for them to be actually viable.
> As @FJAG and you have pointed out - the viability beyond Platoon starts to drop - and yet the reserves still have Battalion or Regimental positions for ranks.
> The argument the Reserves have always used for "a Mobilization" construct is such a farce these days - as there isn't anyone to train those who would join to fill them out in Mobilization.
> 
> Now I place a lot of blame for the situation on the Regular Army - but also the Res Regimental Senates etc who refuse to admit their old unit is gone - a Platoon minus with the name of a Battalion/Regiment does no one any good.


The mobilization construct died officially as well as practically with the switch to a role of "augmentation" of the "forces in being" and the "de-equipping" of the reserves which started as a process in the 1960s and for all intents and purposes was complete well before the last round of army transformation started at the turn of the century.

There is actually a good book that traces the process called "Relentless Struggle: Saving the Army Reserve 1995-2019". The book was commissioned by Reserves 2000 as a history of their activities and is quite tilted to support the viewpoint that those regimental senates etc are the good guys. Notwithstanding that clear bias, the book itself is very well researched and provides a wealth of detail that makes it easy to read between the lines. In short, there are good guys and bad guys on both sides. I was on CRes&C Council for much of the 2000-2009 time frame and it was quite clear that they, and not just the Reg F, saw Reserves 2000 as the enemy. At the same time I was watching things happening within CRes&C and the Reg F that was clearly highly destructive of the Res F (mostly the denigration of the Class A system in favour of Class Bs and Cs - something that I tend to call the "what have you done for me today?" full-timer syndrome which IMHO is tremendously short-sighted and glosses over the potential cost savings and expansion potential that a properly structured reserve force can give you.)



KevinB said:


> The Reg Force isn't going to make the Res viable


I agree with this


KevinB said:


> - the Reserves need to have a come to Jesus meeting with themselves and come up with a plan to streamline and make them relevant that the Reg force will need to pay attention to - as quite frankly the Reg force is pretty thin these days and needs the Militia even if they don't want to admit it. ...


I don't with that. I don't think that the Res F will ever come to Jesus. Their official leadership is in the Reg F pocket and their unofficial leadership is living in a fairyland. What is needed is a minister and a government that has a proper understanding of the reality of the situation, has a vision for a future which will make a far-better use of part-time resources and the guts to sort out the plague in both houses. Not holding my breath.

🍻


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I don't with that. I don't think that the Res F will ever come to Jesus. *Their official leadership is in the Reg F pocket *and their unofficial leadership is living in a fairyland. What is needed is a minister and a government that has a proper understanding of the reality of the situation, has a vision for a future which will make a far-better use of part-time resources and the guts to sort out the plague in both houses. Not holding my breath.
> 
> 🍻



Actually, the location of their noses is somewhat further to the rear of that location


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## Colin Parkinson

THREAD on how Armenian multi-layer air defence on Karabakh was suppressed. Operation Karabakh Coffer 


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1455425514617909259


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