# CANADA UNDER ATTACK



## Griffin (15 Oct 2006)

CANADA UNDER ATTACK:

How Government Policies Threaten Canada's
Military, Public Safety, Sovereignty, and National Unity

Is free for downloading from the Internet in Acrobat Adobe PDF format.  The testimonial for the book was written by Major General (retired) Clive Addy.  

You will find it at:

http://members.shaw.ca/canadaunderattack


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## Colin Parkinson (6 Nov 2006)

"cough" Manifist Destiny "cough"  Sort of predates Bush don't you think?

Good luck implementing it.


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## spud (6 Nov 2006)

jonoxford said:
			
		

> Whats even more scarey is this North American Union that we've been hearing about. Bush is going ahead without even without approval of Congress or the people.
> 
> http://www.chuckbaldwinlive.com/Lou_Dobbs_transcript.html
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxCeWQ9Ge38



Love all those comments on youtube about the NWO running everything. 

Please store your containers in the overhead compartment and take advantage of the "tinfoil helmets" in the seatback in front of you. 

potato


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## George Wallace (15 Nov 2006)

Well.  A quick scan of this book shows that the author seems to have done a lot of research here on Army.ca in the Armour and other Combat Arms forums.  Most of his arguments have been posted in these forums before.


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## paracowboy (15 Nov 2006)

hey Grif, buddy, bubalah...you wouldn't perchance be involved with the selling of this book in some way, shape, or form, and are using Mike's site as free advertising, now wouldja? 'Cause that'd be shady. And rude.


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## Cloud Cover (16 Nov 2006)

I think P Cook is a frequent poster over at CCS21.org.

Cheers


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## Teddy Ruxpin (16 Nov 2006)

Well, his comments on the BC fires (p. 112) are utter tripe.  If they're indicative of the quality of his research, the book isn't worth the paper it's written on (given that's its electronic, that's saying something).


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## Griffin (16 Nov 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Well, his comments on the BC fires (p. 112) are utter tripe.  If they're indicative of the quality of his research, the book isn't worth the paper it's written on (given that's its electronic, that's saying something).



Considering you give no evidence to support your statement, while the author used extensive research throughout the book, I wonder what your hidden agenda is here.  I know you  would like to ignore the fact that in developing this submission numerous resources were used ranging from DND news releases, to the Commission of Inquiry that followed, and extensive news coverage.  The book alone has over 300 footnotes relating to research reports, etc.  Maybe you think the senior officers of the CF who supported the project were also without merit or just maybe a Liberal government apologist has just been uncovered.


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## Griffin (16 Nov 2006)

paracowboy said:
			
		

> hey Grif, buddy, bubalah...you wouldn't perchance be involved with the selling of this book in some way, shape, or form, and are using Mike's site as free advertising, now wouldja? 'Cause that'd be shady. And rude.



How about re-reading the original post.  Tell you what, I will repost the relevant part.  Note the FREE part of the comment.

"CANADA UNDER ATTACK:

How Government Policies Threaten Canada's
Military, Public Safety, Sovereignty, and National Unity

Is free for downloading from the Internet in Acrobat Adobe PDF format."


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## Teddy Ruxpin (16 Nov 2006)

OK:

I was G3 Ops LFWA for the BC fires and received the first phone call from the province (on the August long weekend) requesting assistance.  I drafted and sent the order activating the Area IRU and dealt with the first 24 hours of the IRU's deployment.  I then performed all subsequent staff action that resulted the deployment of seven further task forces to six different locations throughout southern BC and coordinated the deployment of both CFB Esquimalt's volunteers and those from 4 Wg Cold Lake.  Further, I was heavily involved in the transition of PEREGRINE from an Area operation to one run by the DCDS.

Finally, I led the R Group that deployed, for the first time ever, LFWA HQ on operations.  I established the forward command centre and took my duty staff in by helicopter to Vernon, setting up the ops centre in the BCD armoury there.  We worked on the fire for over a month, including B Coy 1 PPCLI's actions in Southern Kelowna that resulted in a unit commendation and multiple deployments of Recce Sqn LdSH(RC) to virtually every major fire location.

Hidden agenda?

His comments are tripe.  Full stop.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (16 Nov 2006)

Line by line, from the "book":



> The army was unable to deploy in a timely manner with the necessary numbers of troops,



Troops were deployed against the initial Provincial request for 75 from 1 CMBG with 24 hours.  There were, IIRC, five subsequent requests, all met within hours of being received.  Before actually fighting fires, soldiers had to undergo _Provincially required_ firefighter training in Merritt and Vernon, which created a 24 hour delay to their deployment on the line.



> heavy and medium lift helicopters, and other equipment that could have been used to stop the massive forest fires that imperilled Kelowna and other BC commuities



These were never requested by the province.  We deployed Griffons, which were requested to act in a liaison role.  How would helicopters "stopped" the fires?



> The manpower of the army was so overdeployed and short of numbers that sailors an force personnel had to be thrown into the breech



Completely incorrect.  There were still units in LFWA capable of being deployed.  We used Esquimalt's and Cold Lake's people near the end of the operation, largely to give our deployed Army forces some respite and to give them a chance to participate in the operation.  Further, the DCDS had warned many other units off - some as far away as Atlantic Area - for deployment should they have been required.



> Had the navy not been on an operational pause, many of those sailors would not have been available.



Most of the naval personnel deployed were _volunteers_ from CFB Esquimalt.  We didn't raid any ships for firefighters.

Again, the remarks on the BC Fires are laughably off base and lack even a modicum of proper background or research.  It reflect very poorly on the remainder of the document.


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## Griffin (16 Nov 2006)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Line by line, from the "book":
> 
> Troops were deployed against the initial Provincial request for 75 from 1 CMBG with 24 hours.  There were, IIRC, five subsequent requests, all met within hours of being received.  Before actually fighting fires, soldiers had to undergo _Provincially required_ firefighter training in Merritt and Vernon, which created a 24 hour delay to their deployment on the line.



In BC there was something in the order of 70-80 fires operating at the peak of the season that ranged from the Kootenays to north of Kamploops and in between.  The comments made indicated that the numbers of troops deployed initially and for weeks thereafter were inadequate considering the scope of the problem.  I also note that the author was quite complimentary about the CF personnel responding to the fire, but indicated the numbers where inadequate to deal with the crisis.  There was no dispersions placed on the military; rather an example of how the gutting of the CF was having real world impacts on Canadians at home.   



> These were never requested by the province.  We deployed Griffons, which were requested to act in a liaison role.  How would helicopters "stopped" the fires?



The Griffons did not have the lift capacity that a Chinook has, whether that is in terms of moving personnel, carrying equipment, or in dropping large fire retardant or water on fires as other military can perform.  Again this was not a negative comment on the military, but another example of how governments in the past have so denuded the forces of capability that it has negative impacts on how the military can respond at home and abroad.



> There were still units in LFWA capable of being deployed.  We used Esquimalt's and Cold Lake's people near the end of the operation, largely to give our deployed Army forces some respite and to give them a chance to participate in the operation.  Further, the DCDS had warned many other units off - some as far away as Atlantic Area - for deployment should they have been required.



Check out the press releases from DND as to the manning levels during the crisis.  When they finally reached the higher numbers - towards the end - 3 weeks after it hit the fan - a lot of damage had occurred including considerable numbers of people losing their homes.  To be sure the province was not at its best either in terms of requests for manpower, or in how the various provincial and municipal fire agencies responded, but the fact is if the CF had been called on to supply heavy lift helo's and up to a brigade to fight these fires it couldn't have met that challenge.  Again this was not a local fire but a series of interface fires that scorched huge amounts of real estate across and area bigger than some of our Atlantic provinces.  



> Most of the naval personnel deployed were _volunteers_ from CFB Esquimalt.  We didn't raid any ships for firefighters.



The comment was in terms of having additional staff available as the naval was on an operational pause at the time and their personnel were available to boster the numbers the army and air force could supply.


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## RangerRay (17 Nov 2006)

In those conditions, nothing would have stopped the fires, except for nature.  With the high winds and temperature, low relative humidity, almost 0 duff moisture content, and 100 years of ladder fuels building up under the canopy (due to 100 years of fire suppression), it is beyond human capacity to stop these fires.  These large fires create their own weather, that end up making the fire stronger, creating more wind.

To blame CF or Forest Service actions for those fires is ludicrous in the extreme.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (17 Nov 2006)

> The comments made indicated that the numbers of troops deployed initially and for weeks thereafter were inadequate considering the scope of the problem.  I also note that the author was quite complimentary about the CF personnel responding to the fire, but indicated the numbers where inadequate to deal with the crisis.



You obviously have no idea how domestic operations work.  The CF cannot do anything unless requested to do so by a provincial government.  The CF, in this case, delivered *exactly* what was requested.  Moreover, soldiers can only be trained to tackle certain types of forest fires - the more dangerous ones are left to professionals.

There was nothing from BC asking for more troops or for soldiers to fight additional fires.  As it was, we were engaged throughout S. BC and provided - at one point - the bulk of the assets engaged against the fires in Kelowna.



> The Griffons did not have the lift capacity that a Chinook has, whether that is in terms of moving personnel, carrying equipment, or in dropping large fire retardant or water on fires as other military can perform.



Which is irrelevant to this "discussion".  Heavier aircraft were never requested.



> Check out the press releases from DND as to the manning levels during the crisis.  When they finally reached the higher numbers - towards the end - 3 weeks after it hit the fan - a lot of damage had occurred including considerable numbers of people losing their homes.



I know exactly how many soldiers were deployed and when.  During the first week of September 2003, we were the largest CF operations - including those overseas.  We deployed _exactly_ what was requested by the Province of BC _exactly_ when they requested it.  Again, soldiers can only fight certain types of fires - structural fires are left to professionals, although B Coy 1 PPCLI found itself fighting structural fires in Southern Kelowna.



> The comment was in terms of having additional staff available as the naval was on an operational pause at the time and their personnel were available to boster the numbers the army and air force could supply.



There was _no requirement_ for additional numbers.  NDHQ had warned units across Canada for deployment, but they were not required.  As it was, our units on the ground spent the last week of the operation "cold trailing" - a waste of CF resources - and we withdrew shortly thereafter.

I will state this again, categorically:  the Army met every request for soldiers from the Province, which employed them as required against fires in the Okanagan and Barriere/McClure with great effect.  I have never heard one word of complaint from any quarter about the numbers deployed or the equipment utilized - and I attended the Provincial Fire Symposium in the Fall 2003 where the entire season was revisited; the operation was described by the DCDS as "textbook".

If the "author" is using OP PEREGRINE as an example of a "failed" domestic operation, he is being intellectually dishonest.

PS:  I happen to be _from_ Kelowna and would have heard an ear-full from my parents should the operation have been the least bit inadequate.

Edited to clean up some abysmal punctuation.


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## KevinB (17 Nov 2006)

And for what its worth B Coy wanted to keep fighting the structural fires...

I had some cool pic of us riding on the top of fire trucks that first night.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (17 Nov 2006)

Yup.  I actually had _one_ complaint from the BCFS:

"Your guys want to run _towards_ the fire, even when we tell them to run away from it!"


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## STONEY (17 Nov 2006)

Of all the weighty subjects covered in this book, BC forrest fires, it would seem to me to hardly rate even a mention but that ,like the rest of the book is only the authors opinion and many points made are open to dissagreement but that maybe the authors intention , to foster discussion.
Cheers.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (17 Nov 2006)

I understand, but the author uses the fires as a primary example of the Army's inadequacies.  I would suggest that if his first analogy is so seriously flawed, the remainder of his arguments are open to question as well.


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## Brad Sallows (17 Nov 2006)

There are large numbers of fires in BC every year.  As to the effectiveness of large quantities of military manpower and equipment, one should explore the question of why California loses so many homes to fires.  Tool.


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## Griffin (19 Nov 2006)

STONEY said:
			
		

> Of all the weighty subjects covered in this book, BC forrest fires, it would seem to me to hardly rate even a mention but that ,like the rest of the book is only the authors opinion and many points made are open to dissagreement but that maybe the authors intention , to foster discussion.
> Cheers.



Stoney, thank you for the reasoned comments.  

How anyone could suggest that pointing out government failures to support the CF was an attack on the troops is utter nonsense.  Indeed by the time any reader had reached that portion of the book should have readily seen the support being given to the CF by pointing out government failures to properly fund, equip and man the CF. The suggestions of dishonesty, etc. are in exceptionally poor taste.  I guess they think Major General (retired) Clive Addy who wrote the testimonial for the book doesn't know squat, Major General (retired) Lew MacKenenzie who reviewed at least one draft and encouraged the author to proceed doesn't know his stuff, Col. (retired) Howie Marsh who supplied some graphs on funding for the book is not to be trusted either, nor does Jack Granatstein and many others who saw the drafts before it was published for FREE on the Internet as a public service. 

I will move to other topics, and hope that repetition of this behaviour isn't the norm.  Oh yes, to some of the doubting Thomas's, I started viewing this board when I joined.  That is how I have worked on the Internet in military, police, and other forums since the late 1980's, including being on various forum staff.  If I have used words that may have offended some through miscommunication, then I apologize.  Enough said.


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## armyvern (19 Nov 2006)

Griffin said:
			
		

> Stoney, thank you for the reasoned comments.
> 
> How anyone could suggest that pointing out government failures to support the CF was an attack on the troops is utter nonsense.  Indeed by the time any reader had reached that portion of the book should have readily seen the support being given to the CF by pointing out government failures to properly fund, equip and man the CF. The suggestions of dishonesty, etc. are in exceptionally poor taste.  I guess they think Major General (retired) Clive Addy who wrote the testimonial for the book doesn't know squat, Major General (retired) Lew MacKenenzie who reviewed at least one draft and encouraged the author to proceed doesn't know his stuff, Col. (retired) Howie Marsh who supplied some graphs on funding for the book is not to be trusted either, nor does Jack Granatstein and many others who saw the drafts before it was published for FREE on the Internet as a public service.
> 
> I will move to other topics, and hope that repetition of this behaviour isn't the norm.  Oh yes, to some of the doubting Thomas's, I started viewing this board when I joined.  That is how I have worked on the Internet in military, police, and other forums since the late 1980's, including being on various forum staff.  If I have used words that may have offended some through miscommunication, then I apologize.  Enough said.



Your post reveals quite a bit about your own reasoning here. In that apparently you believe that only those who agree with your point of view are capable of forming and voicing "reasoned comments" and that the rest are doubting Thomas' with behaviour you hope isn't the norm.

That's very interesting seeing as how the comments are coming from some very reasoned pers who were very involved with and quite intimate of the goings-on regarding Op Peregrine who have questioned the authors judgement of that event. That is reasonable. Especially if the author's judgement is flawed in it's reasoning.

You, on the other hand, seem to be quite intimate with the goings on regarding this book...are you the author perchance? Maybe not the author, but your posts certainly seem to lead me to the belief that you were involved in it's production somehow and thus, may be holding a bias in it's favour.

My .02 worth.


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## zipperhead_cop (19 Nov 2006)

Griffin, since you seem fairly familiar with this book, could you relay some of the support-to-the-CF parts which you were mentioning?


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## Griffin (19 Nov 2006)

zipperhead_cop said:
			
		

> Griffin, since you seem fairly familiar with this book, could you relay some of the support-to-the-CF parts which you were mentioning?



The book is about 440 pages in length, including photo's and graphs, and covers not only shortcomings in government policy, but also makes a wide variety of comments concerning manning levels, funding, and new equipment of sufficient quality and number to return the CF back to prior levels of capability. This has included everything from getting new Leo's and Puma's, increasing the number of LAVIII, to getting on board with the JSF, getting US built and tried and proven Amphibious warfare vessels, etc.,  and of course obtaining a large increase in manpower to run things, etc.  

The ideas were sound enough for Clive Addy to make the following Testimonial, which is on its own hyperlink on the book's web site:

"I have read Paul Cook's "Canada Under Attack" not once but twice.  It is the best compendium of what a loss Canada has suffered in capacity, sovereignty and credibility among its allies and its own citizens through the wilful neglect of it armed forces.  But criticism is one thing, proposing positive, and credible solutions is far more important and, thoughout, Paul shares with us his comprehensive research and expertise in all elements of military capabilities and their pertinent organization for the security of Canadian interests.  He has opened and filled much of the serious debate about the role and future of our Canadian Forces.  It is not just a good read, but an excellent and required read for those who profess to call themselves informed and concerned Canadians."

I think Clive put it best when he said one needs to read the entire document.  The author quite clearly states he is not an author by profession, and would readily agree that many elements of the book would be up for debate and some may have chosen to add this or that, or take this item or that item out.  However, the intent was to get Canadians engaged in understanding the military, understanding how politics directly affects the forces and potentially their welfare, and how an informed public may be less gullible when a Prime Minister troddles out the statement that we don't need strategic transport aircraft, like Jean Chretien did post the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.  

One only need to read the Acknowledgements page to understand the author's deep desire to support the CF.  Throughout the book comparisons are made with other military as to equipment we should get the CF, and Chapter 7 goes into more detail as to rebuilding the CF.  Some of the items will be controversial and that was also the intent so as to garner further debate and thought and hopefully gain more public support for the CF.


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## Journeyman (19 Nov 2006)

So, in response to... 


			
				zipperhead_cop said:
			
		

> *could you relay some of the support-to-the-CF parts which you were mentioning?*



...you require five paragraphs to say 





			
				Griffin said:
			
		

> *I think Clive put it best when he said one needs to read the entire document.*



In other words, you found it easy to post a snippet, which was pointed out as mistaken, in a rational non-attacking manner by the way, by people intimately familiar and directly involved in the operation. Yet, you cannot find a _single_ similar quote to respond to a request to show some CF support? The only option is for interested parties to wade through the entire "440 pages in length, including photo's and graphs."

Does this mean any "support" is so deeply buried and/or convoluted that you just can't find it.....or would posting it here be counterproductive to the book's apparent purpose of merely muckraking?

You claim that the book's intent is to "garner further debate." Hmmmm.....so debate is understood to mean those who agree provide "reasoned comments"; anyone who points out it's shortcomings is a "Liberal government apologist"....  :



			
				Griffin said:
			
		

> *Enough said.*


Hope springs eternal.


~JM (apparently _incapable_ of reasoned comment, since I've seen no evidence to contradict the doubting Thomas' camp).


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## Teddy Ruxpin (19 Nov 2006)

> How anyone could suggest that pointing out government failures to support the CF was an attack on the troops is utter nonsense.  Indeed by the time any reader had reached that portion of the book should have readily seen the support being given to the CF by pointing out government failures to properly fund, equip and man the CF. The suggestions of dishonesty, etc. are in exceptionally poor taste.  I guess they think Major General (retired) Clive Addy who wrote the testimonial for the book doesn't know squat, Major General (retired) Lew MacKenenzie who reviewed at least one draft and encouraged the author to proceed doesn't know his stuff, Col. (retired) Howie Marsh who supplied some graphs on funding for the book is not to be trusted either, nor does Jack Granatstein and many others who saw the drafts before it was published for FREE on the Internet as a public service.



No one has suggested an "attack on the troops"  What utter nonsense.  Moreover, no one made suggestions of "dishonesty" - intellectual dishonesty, yes.  There _is_ a difference.



> I think Clive put it best when he said one needs to read the entire document.  The author quite clearly states he is not an author by profession, and would readily agree that many elements of the book would be up for debate and some may have chosen to add this or that, or take this item or that item out.



I couldn't make it through the entire document.  However, I did make an attempt at the army portion (in the tradition of staying in my lane) and this is hardly a scholarly paper or analysis, as has been made out.  My random notes as I was reading:


No discernable primary source material.  It relies almost exclusively on press reporting, which, as you can see on this site, is deeply flawed.
Represents opinion as fact.  (Page 118 for example)
The Stryker is not the equivalent of a LAV III – only the hull is the same.
Conclusions regarding wheeled versus tracked vehicles without any analysis or justification.  No operational comparison of either.
Erroneous and simplistic comparison of the Bradley and LAV III. 
Discussion of platoon and company structure doesn’t make sense.  Author fails to prove why the current structure is inadequate.
Confuses US and Canadian terminology.  Incorrect use of “NCM”…uses the term Regiment as a manoeuvre unit.
Takes single source material as gospel – Stryker vulnerability, for example.  Extrapolates US “experience” to comments on LAV III.  Wild extrapolation of data in support of heavy tracked vehicles.  Argument for tracked vehicles not made based on any operational input.
Erroneous claim that the M109 was replaced by 81mm mortars.
Artillery (unless using special munitions) does not have a “devastating effect” on tanks.
Aardvark of “incredible use” in Afghanistan?  How?  What source leads to this conclusion?
Ridiculous use of the BC Fires as an example of the requirement for an airmobile unit.  Accuses the military of “putting communities at risk (!!)” (page 151)
Unjustified comments on temperate CADPAT based on no primary sources.
Ridiculous blaming of the friendly fire deaths on the lack of Canadian CAS.
Single line comments on equipment without background or data, aside from a single media report.
Much Liberal bashing and quoting of editorials.
Comments on MGen Ross without sources.
States the ISAF mission was "woefully short" of resources, without sourcing or justification.  Brainless analysis of the threat in Kabul.

This is not an academic paper, despite Griffin's claims of extensive academic consultation.  It is so riddled with errors and erroneous extrapolations that it cannot be taken seriously as an analysis of defence issues.



You don't happen to be a member of the Legion of Frontiersmen, do you Griffin?


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## armyvern (19 Nov 2006)

Very reasonably put Mr Bear and JM,

I am still interested in an answer to this question posed earlier which is being evaded:



> You, on the other hand, seem to be quite intimate with the goings on regarding this book...are you the author perchance? Maybe not the author, but your posts certainly seem to lead me to the belief that you were involved in it's production somehow and thus, may be holding a bias in it's favour.



Griffen, exactly what is your connection to the production of this?


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## zipperhead_cop (20 Nov 2006)

The Librarian said:
			
		

> Griffen, exactly what is your connection to the production of this?



Kinda curious about that myself.  

Plus, if you just want to get across "Liberals suck and are no friend of the CF" you could probably put that on a flyer.  We know the quandary we are in and the lack of many resources that we need.  Does the book offer any suggestions or solutions to the issues we face?  With all that research and analysis I would think that one could come up with a few new ideas?


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## paracowboy (21 Nov 2006)

I tried to wade through that pile of utter and complete crapola. I gave up pretty quickly and went to something more accurate and realistic: a Batman comic.  : Actually, a graphic novel. Pretty cool, too! It's the one with the "Hush" storyline, and Jim Lee's artwork is outstanding. The best part of the whole thing was seeing Krypto the Superdog hovering in mid-air, with his eyes glowing red. 

Anybody else read anything worthwhile?


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## STONEY (22 Nov 2006)

Well i have finally managed to wade through the entire 440 pages and would like to make a few points also IMHO.
1. The author certainly seems to have a serious axe to grind and must have put a lot of time into the project but the results are disappointing to say the least.
2. Some points are valid but a lot of others he appears to be on crack, and he gives bizare solutions to solve problems that are worse than the one's he accuses the Gov. of.
3. If Gen. Addy did indeed read this book twice why didn't he inform the author that there were hundreds of errors of fact & inaccuracies
throughout the book or didn't he know.  Maybe the author should have gotten a few people with a broad range of military knowledge to proof read it or specialists to check each section.
4. The conclusions he reaches from the shaky evidence he lists defy reason.
5. To most of the unwashed masses with little or no knowledge of the subjects discussed it might have been an impressive tome. Conspiracy theory anyone. 
6. Could have gotten his point across in a lot less than 440 pages , about 430 less.
7. I can't use spellcheck as this rant shows.

Cheers


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## Journeyman (22 Nov 2006)

STONEY said:
			
		

> ...he gives bizare solutions to solve problems that are worse than the one's he accuses the Gov. of..


Could you provide an example or two? (you know...so your comment doesn't appear to be without any more justification than the original author's assertions)


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