# What do we want from Army Doctrine and Cbt Tm in Ops?



## Haligonian (13 Jan 2019)

The Cbt Tm in Ops pam is being reviewed.  The fact that our Pams are no longer printed means that they can be reviewed and updated more frequently.  I've been asked to have a look at the pub and give my comments.  A couple thoughts have already been put forward such as making Cbt Tm in Ops an annex to BG in Ops which means much of the repetition between the books could be eliminated and it could focus on things like TTPs.  There will also be a "Degraded Ops" chapter which will account for things like EW, and maybe CBRN and operating without air superiority.

How should our doctrine be nested between books?  We have Land Ops as our capstone doctrine then we have a Bde (basically a word for word copy of the British one), BG, and Cbt Tm publication.  It seems to me that there is some repetition between them.  What stays and what goes between different Pams and where should the emphasis be at each level?  As an example, should the fundamentals be discussed again specifically how they can be applied at the Cbt Tm level, or should they just be listed like an aide memoir?  

What do you guys like about our doctine and what don't you like?  What needs to be in Cbt Tm Ops that isn't?

Some initial thoughts:
The defence portion needs to be fleshed out more and made less conceptual
It requires a chapter on direct fire control
The seven step KZ development drill must be enshrined in it
TTPs or templates for forms of maneuver other than frontal and flanking need to be discussed, such as how do we bypass (infiltrate)?
TTPs or templates for operations other than hasty attacks, such as defensive occupation, withdrawal, link up, etc.  The British standard orders cards are an interesting example of these.
An emphasis on being able to execute battle procedure rapidly
A better discussion on where to dismount
Put Reserve Demo Guard back in
Time estimates for Off, Def, and enabling ops
Staff data to support things like time estimates
Guidance on how to integrate sub sub units from different nations
A more explicit discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the Coy 2IC, SSM, Coy CQ and Tpt Sgt in the A1 and A2 echelons
A discussion on the factors that drive the composition of the echelons, particularly ammo storage.
Remove some of the more technical artillery pieces
Revise the Merry Up Checklist to include a few other items such as mission specific rehearsals
Formations, their adv and disadv
Night ops


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## Infanteer (13 Jan 2019)

Our doctrine is getting better, but still suffers from being too repetitive, too long, and too laden with valueless material and images.  It seems that, if it doesn't start of with a diagram displaying the spectrum of conflict, it isn't doctrine.  It'd be instructive to go back to the CAMT series of manuals produced in the 1950s and 60s to see what accurate, brief, and concise doctrine publications look like.

The USMC MCDP-series remains the benchmark for doctrinal publications.  They are well written, instructive in what doctrine should be (establishing the foundation), and relatively short.  The fact that they are still in use by the USMC 30 years after being published is a testament to the strength of these documents.  Compare this to the US Army, which has rewritten its capstone publication FM 100-5/FM 3-0/ADP 3-0 six times in the same time span.

I find it interesting that we are reopening Cbt Tm in Ops when the last version was published in late 2017.  Have combat team operations changed in the last year and half, or did we miss something as an institution?  In reality, we (should) have manuals for our various Corps/Branch sub-units and units.  Combat Team and Battle Group operations should be covered under a "Canadian Army Combined Arms Operations" manual.  Looking at the Table of Contents for both Cbt Tm and BG in Ops lends to this idea (I've also added my commentary in brackets).

BG in Ops:
(1) Understanding the Nature of Land Combat (this is superfluous, and is already described in the capstone pubs)
(2) The Combined Arms Grouping
(3) Employing the Battle Group (this is mostly stuff already covered in the Land Ops pub)
(4) Commanding the Battle Group on Operations
(5) Sustaining the Battle Group
(6) Offensive Operations
(7) Defensive Operations
(8 ) Stability Operations
(9) Enabling Operations
(10) Specific Operations in Unique Environments (This can be covered in manuals on these specific environments)

Cbt Tm in Ops:
(1) Command and Control
(2) Offensive Operations
(3) Defensive Operations
(4) Stability Operations
(5) Enabling Operations
(6) Cbt Tm Sustainment
(7) Hides, Harbours, and Waiting Areas

Looking at this, you could probably write a "Canadian Army Combined Arms Operations" publication with the following chapters:
(1) Combined Arms Grouping
(2) Command of Combined Arms
(3) Combined Arms Offensive Operations
(4) Combined Arms Defensive Operations
(5) Combined Arms Enabling Operations
(6) Combined Arms Stability Operations
(7) Combined Arms Sustainment

What's important is that the manual should be brief, no more than 200 pages.  If you keep it short, then you can have a realistic expectation of requiring Captains and Majors to know it cold.  One of the problems is that all of our doctrinal publications are tomes, and because they are lengthy and repetitive, they are rarely read and understood - not a good sign for the profession.  A good way to get rid of this is to get rid of the constant stream of "principles" and "fundamentals" which are fun for multiple choice tests of knowledge, but don't really add to knowledge and only take up space with needless adjectives....

As for your initial thoughts:



			
				Haligonian said:
			
		

> There will also be a "Degraded Ops" chapter which will account for things like EW, and maybe CBRN and operating without air superiority. _(shouldn't this be in Land Ops?)_
> The defence portion needs to be fleshed out more and made less conceptual _(agreed - the conceptual is for Land Ops, the prescriptive, for the Arms pubs)_
> It requires a chapter on direct fire control _(not sure if its needs a chapter, but perhaps a section in the command chapter)_
> The seven step KZ development drill must be enshrined in it _(drills should go in the SOP publication)_
> ...



In essence, a Combined Arms publication should provide the fundamentals for putting together and employing all arms of the Canadian Army.  Higher order operational stuff should go in the capstone publications of _B-GL-300-000 Canada's Army_ and _B-GL-300-001 Land Operations_, while lower order TTPs, templates, and checklists should go in _B-GL-334-001 SOPs for Land Operations_.


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## FJAG (13 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Our doctrine is getting better, but still suffers from being too repetitive, too long, and too laden with valueless material and images.  It seems that, if it doesn't start of with a diagram displaying the spectrum of conflict, it isn't doctrine.  It'd be instructive to go back to the CAMT series of manuals produced in the 1950s and 60s to see what accurate, brief, and concise doctrine publications look like.
> . . .
> 
> What's important is that the manual should be brief, no more than 200 pages.  If you keep it short, then you can have a realistic expectation of requiring Captains and Majors to know it cold.  One of the problems is that all of our doctrinal publications are tomes, and because they are lengthy and repetitive, they are rarely read and understood - not a good sign for the profession.  A good way to get rid of this is to get rid of the constant stream of "principles" and "fundamentals" which are fun for multiple choice tests of knowledge, but don't really add to knowledge and only take up space with needless adjectives....
> . . .



I'm with you on all of that. As part of the generation that was there when we switched from CAMTs to CFPs our main observations at the time were that the CFPs were all too long and instead of teaching fundamental procedures or principles were teaching us how to suck eggs. In addition the 8 X 11 and bilingual formats made them more than twice as large (and heavy) then they needed to be and impractical to take into the field in battleboxes. (In the artillery we had a lovely interim process for our new CFPs whereby the English and French were published back to back rather than in side by side columns so that you could take out the part with the other official language and leave it back in the office)

I also remember that at the time that we were getting them we were comparing them to US Army FMs. Remember this was in the 1970s so we were dealing with a different US Army then. What was particularly striking was the language level and pictorial content. Basic field manuals were at a basic, easy to understand level (what I remember especially was that while our CFP stated that a slit trench had to be "609mm [or whatever now rounded up to .75 metres]" wide, the US FM said "two bayonets" wide] Higher end manuals were more complex (I think at the time the standard was that basic US Army manuals were at the grade school level, battalion and below manuals at the high school level and anything higher than that at a graduate level). In particular, they built on each other progressively. A cbt tm manual would be separate and distinct from that of the battle group and the latter would presuppose the reader had read and was conversant with the former and therefore not repeat its contents.

I should note that as part of my research for my novels, I've been reading many of the recent US Army FMs, ATPs, ATTPs etc and they no longer are as good as they used to be. Quite frankly they are terribly verbose. As an example FM 3-21.20 The Infantry Battalion goes on for some 600 pages (in only one official language) and reads like a Command and Staff Collage treatise on all phases of war and anything else that you can think of. CAMT 7-84 The Infantry Battalion in Battle on the other hand was 187 pages and in a smaller format (again in one official language)

I'm a firm believer that less is more although all too frequently my lawyer mode kicks in and I think that I'm being paid by the word.  ;D

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (13 Jan 2019)

Just going from memory here, so take it FWIW from the cheap seats:

1. Obstacles. Anything and everything about creating/ breaching obstacles etc.

2. Logistics. Ammo/Cas/ Maint. 

3. Anti-Air stuff. We're pretty thin on that everywhere in our doctrine, as I recall, but Cbt Tm Comds will probably be the lowest command level 'on the hook' for this.

4. MOUT & Complex Terrain. As I recall, anything outside of the usual 'rolling plains' scenario 'a la Wainwright' wasn't well covered.


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## ballz (13 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> A more explicit discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the Coy 2IC, SSM, Coy CQ and Tpt Sgt in the A1 and A2 echelons
> A discussion on the factors that drive the composition of the echelons, particularly ammo storage.



Certainly required and a lot of good can be done here, but... what _is _our doctrine on this, does it truly exist, or are you being asked to help make it up? And who is going to decide what it is if it doesn't / if there are conflicting views?

I ask because, as an example, I think we've all had numerous arguments about what a CSM does, where he should be located, and what kind of vehicle he should be in. Personally, I think he should be in the A1 echelon, with an armoured bison full of ammo, probably with a second armoured bison also with ammo, and 2x armoured bisons with a medical team in each (and no medics embedded in the platoons). He's then ready to conduct emergency re-supply and/or consolidation. But, in practice, I've seen the CSM riding around in the OC's vehicle with a medic putting both in an utterly useless position. I also know this isn't isolated to 2 CMBG as there is currently at least one mech company in 1 CMBG that has the CSM in the OC's vehicle doing.... battle tracking.... I mean, the companies received 16x LAV 6.0s and we were told the LAV 6.0 was going to be the CSM's. :stars:

I've also seen more often than not the Tpt Sgt being left in the Bn echelon where he also serves no purpose, because the Coy 2IC is not only acting as a CP but also commanding the Coy A1... and because the B fleet is usually so sparse the Tpt Sgt mostly does LAV stuff in garrison that should be the responsibility of a LAV Capt, and then that transfers over to how we operate in a field environment.

Of course, throw the armour corp's two cents into this and it might sort itself out as they seem to understand using the echelon system better than mech infantry who are still trying to figure out how to employ a LAV Captain.

The other thing to consider... is this doctrine going to be based on a square combat team with a "full" echelon and what does a "full" echelon consist of? If you go by our current pubs, it's likely none of us has ever actually employed a full echelon and so should doctrine be based off of equipment/manning we may never have?

EDIT: Also, is the Coy Ops WO going to be added since it's an entirely made up position but now seems pretty institutionalized due to our love of trackers and creating inefficient processes in garrison...


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## Infanteer (13 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> Certainly required and a lot of good can be done here, but... what _is _our doctrine on this, does it truly exist, or are you being asked to help make it up? And who is going to decide what it is if it doesn't / if there are conflicting views?
> 
> I ask because, as an example, I think we've all had numerous arguments about what a CSM does....



Part of the problem is that all of the answers on position duties and tasks are described in the Occupation Specification, but the occupation specification is 25 years out of date.  At the last Infantry Advisory Board, the ongoing Military Employment Structure review to update the document was discussed.  All these positions (CSM, Tpt NCO, 2IC, LAV Capt) are being reviewed and will have their job descriptions and tasks codified in an updated Occupation Specification.  Between this and doctrine, both approved by Director Infantry as the Army Commander's advisor on Corps matters, there should be a clear path going forward as to who does what.

All of these positions you are talking about, however, don't need to be discussed in the Cbt Team/Combined Arms publication.  They need to be in the Infantry Company in Operations publication that is currently being rewritten by the ADC/Infantry Corps.


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## Haligonian (13 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> All of these positions you are talking about, however, don't need to be discussed in the Cbt Team/Combined Arms publication.  They need to be in the Infantry Company in Operations publication that is currently being rewritten by the ADC/Infantry Corps.



I imagine by a team of 1?


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## Infanteer (13 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I imagine by a team of 1?



I can't remember, but I think a battalion had taken the lead on this, and was working with the Infantry rep at ADC.

We definitely don't do the US approach and employ reams of contractors to spit stuff out on a constant basis...that approach also has its problems.  I've heard US complaints that their doctrine is written by contractors for contractors.


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## Haligonian (13 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I can't remember, but I think a battalion had taken the lead on this, and was working with the Infantry rep at ADC.
> 
> We definitely don't do the US approach and employ reams of contractors to spit stuff out on a constant basis...that approach also has its problems.  I've heard US complaints that their doctrine is written by contractors for contractors.



You might be seeing that come in.  What I'm reviewing is a draft written by contractors from the Tactics School.


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## Haligonian (13 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> Certainly required and a lot of good can be done here, but... what _is _our doctrine on this, does it truly exist, or are you being asked to help make it up? And who is going to decide what it is if it doesn't / if there are conflicting views?
> 
> I ask because, as an example, I think we've all had numerous arguments about what a CSM does, where he should be located, and what kind of vehicle he should be in. Personally, I think he should be in the A1 echelon, with an armoured bison full of ammo, probably with a second armoured bison also with ammo, and 2x armoured bisons with a medical team in each (and no medics embedded in the platoons). He's then ready to conduct emergency re-supply and/or consolidation. But, in practice, I've seen the CSM riding around in the OC's vehicle with a medic putting both in an utterly useless position. I also know this isn't isolated to 2 CMBG as there is currently at least one mech company in 1 CMBG that has the CSM in the OC's vehicle doing.... battle tracking.... I mean, the companies received 16x LAV 6.0s and we were told the LAV 6.0 was going to be the CSM's. :stars:
> 
> ...



I actually like the way it is currently doctrinally laid out.  The 2IC should be squarely focussed on maintaining comms with higher and being prepared to take over.  He isn't commanding the ech.  The Tpt Sgt does this and in a Cbt Tm context then it's the SSM with the Tpt Sgt supporting him.  The Coy CQ is back in the BG A2 ensuring the trucks are getting loaded with the right Adrep items and what's required at the nightly DP is getting on the right trucks and doing general coordination.  He is the Coy's link with C/S 8.

The Coy CSM is a different matter and I believe he should have his own vehicle with the ability to potentially do some emergency resupply of small arms.  HIs focus is really on casualties and PW handling, however, and then the eventual reorganization of the Coy following contact as well as the integration of replacements.

These are my take aways thus far:

1. Don't repeat things from higher level doctrine.  Assume people have read that stuff and if they haven't they know which Pam to go to.
2. It should be short.  It should not be onerous to bring it to the field with you, and it should actually be useful in the field.

I think the idea of having one SOP publication is an interesting idea, however, if we accept that there should be one SOP publication, and more theoretical concepts will be discussed in the higher level Pams then what's left to talk about in the Cbt Tm pam?  As an example why would the time estimate for off/def/enabling ops be in the Cbt Tm Ops Pam and not in the SOP pam?  Same thing as formations?  Fomations are defiantly an SOP and so by that logic would belong in the SOP Pam.  

Does anyone have a digital CAMD pub I could take a look at?


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## ballz (13 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> I actually like the way it is currently doctrinally laid out.  The 2IC should be squarely focussed on maintaining comms with higher and being prepared to take over.  He isn't commanding the ech.  The Tpt Sgt does this and in a Cbt Tm context then it's the SSM with the Tpt Sgt supporting him.  The Coy CQ is back in the BG A2 ensuring the trucks are getting loaded with the right Adrep items and what's required at the nightly DP is getting on the right trucks and doing general coordination.  He is the Coy's link with C/S 8.



I agree with you, however, that is not what was practiced from at least 2012 - 2017 in our Bn and from what I can tell also not what's being practiced out west. If you ran it that way in the past year than it'd be interesting to hear how it worked but it wasn't the norm which begs the question was it truly our doctrine or was it just what was written down in a PAM no one knew / read / understood? 

And the Coy Ops WO remains a question mark and the last ORBAT I saw which was being proposed as the new ORBAT for battalions had a Coy Ops WO on it. Personally I despise the fact that we've created a position to facilitate our inefficiencies but I liked the way I Coy circa 2017 used the Ops WO in the CP with the Coy 2IC, seemed to be the most practical use and was far better than H Coy's employment.


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## daftandbarmy (13 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> I agree with you, however, that is not what was practiced from at least 2012 - 2017 in our Bn and from what I can tell also not what's being practiced out west. If you ran it that way in the past year than it'd be interesting to hear how it worked but it wasn't the norm which begs the question was it truly our doctrine or was it just what was written down in a PAM no one knew / read / understood?
> 
> And the Coy Ops WO remains a question mark and the last ORBAT I saw which was being proposed as the new ORBAT for battalions had a Coy Ops WO on it. Personally I despise the fact that we've created a position to facilitate our inefficiencies but I liked the way I Coy circa 2017 used the Ops WO in the CP with the Coy 2IC, seemed to be the most practical use and was far better than H Coy's employment.



I'm guessing that it's because, in Canada, we tend to want to put a Sergeant Major's pace stick in our Officers' rucksacks


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## Infanteer (13 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> The Coy CSM is a different matter and I believe he should have his own vehicle with the ability to potentially do some emergency resupply of small arms.  HIs focus is really on casualties and PW handling, however, and then the eventual reorganization of the Coy following contact as well as the integration of replacements.



This is one that the Corps has kicked around.  I'm loathe to simply make the Infantry and Armoured SSM and stick him in the echelon.

Having a separate vehicle has merit, especially as the company should have some dismounted fire support in it as well.  That being said, the vehicle comes at a cost - a crew of three.  Multiply that by the 18 mech companies and you have a 54 PY requirement to fill.  Where does sit on the priority list with Transport Platoons, Combat Support Capabilities, etc, etc.



> 2. It should be short.  It should not be onerous to bring it to the field with you, and it should actually be useful in the field.



Yes.  The term pam is short for pamphlet.  These things literally started as 10-20 page pamphlets that were distributed in the trenches of WWI.  



> I think the idea of having one SOP publication is an interesting idea, however, if we accept that there should be one SOP publication, and more theoretical concepts will be discussed in the higher level Pams then what's left to talk about in the Cbt Tm pam?



It simply needs to describe the specifics of higher order doctrine as they apply to combined arms groupings.  For example, higher order doctrine describes forms of manoeuvre for the offence.  A Combined Arms pub can lay out current BG and Cbt Tm formations for these forms of manoeuvre.  This is why you can put BG and Cbt Tm together and why it doesn't have to be a 400 page brick.


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## Haligonian (13 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> I agree with you, however, that is not what was practiced from at least 2012 - 2017 in our Bn and from what I can tell also not what's being practiced out west. If you ran it that way in the past year than it'd be interesting to hear how it worked but it wasn't the norm which begs the question was it truly our doctrine or was it just what was written down in a PAM no one knew / read / understood?
> 
> And the Coy Ops WO remains a question mark and the last ORBAT I saw which was being proposed as the new ORBAT for battalions had a Coy Ops WO on it. Personally I despise the fact that we've created a position to facilitate our inefficiencies but I liked the way I Coy circa 2017 used the Ops WO in the CP with the Coy 2IC, seemed to be the most practical use and was far better than H Coy's employment.



Some shittery happened in the background during work up training where my CQ ran the Cbt Tm ech with the SSM mentoring him.  Not sure how that came about and I failed to shut it down but it gave him some good experience.  In Latvia we ran it as per above and it worked well.

The problem with the Coy Ops WO is that there isn't a job for him in the field.  We just made the position up, and, of course, you can always find people work but you're usually just shaving off other peoples duties and responsibilities to give to him.  There is no bona fide requirement.  It's honestly pretty ridiculous that rifle coys have now gained LAV Capts/Ops Capts and now an Ops WO all in the last 20 years.  The LAV Capt was required to fight the LAVs and had a convenient niche in garrison in Coy Ops but the Ops WO is just bloat.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Having a separate vehicle has merit, especially as the company should have some dismounted fire support in it as well.  That being said, the vehicle comes at a cost - a crew of three.  Multiply that by the 18 mech companies and you have a 54 PY requirement to fill.  Where does sit on the priority list with Transport Platoons, Combat Support Capabilities, etc, etc.



Agreed.  Probably not worth it.  It's an ideal world capability.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yes.  The term pam is short for pamphlet.  These things literally started as 10-20 page pamphlets that were distributed in the trenches of WWI.
> 
> It simply needs to describe the specifics of higher order doctrine as they apply to combined arms groupings.  For example, higher order doctrine describes forms of manoeuvre for the offence.  A Combined Arms pub can lay out current BG and Cbt Tm formations for these forms of manoeuvre.  This is why you can put BG and Cbt Tm together and why it doesn't have to be a 400 page brick.



I'll keep that in the back of my head.  I see this applying for some principles too.  A Cbt Tm doesn't achieve depth in the same way that a Brigade does.


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## Haligonian (14 Jan 2019)

What if Cbt Tm in Ops was an annex to the new Infantry Coy and Armoured Sqn manuals?  BG could be the same way for Infantry Battalion and Armoured Regiment.

I think this would cut down on the number of manuals and page count.  An infantry OC then knows he can go to one location to find information on employing his sub unit whether its task organized as a Coy, Coy Grp, or Cbt Tm.  Same for the Armd Sqn Comd and Bn/Regt CO's.


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## Infanteer (14 Jan 2019)

But the Artillery and the Engineers have a role in Combined Arms groupings too, do they not?


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## Haligonian (14 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> But the Artillery and the Engineers have a role in Combined Arms groupings too, do they not?



100%  So two options:  They refer to either the Bn/Regt in Battle or Coy/Sqn in Battle (depending if they were looking for BG or Cbt Tm) or we include the BG/Cbt Tm annex in their respective pub too.

It would be one common annex to all the requisite corps publications.  The more I think about it the more I like it.


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## daftandbarmy (15 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> But the Artillery and the Engineers have a role in Combined Arms groupings too, do they not?



Yes but, like the Infantry, doctrinally speaking, should probably be subordinate to/ in support of the armoured units :

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN DOCTRINE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL AND ITS APPLICATION TO SUPPORTING

"Liddell Hart deserves credit for recognizing that infantry, including paratroops, would play a significant part in a future war despite the growing importance of tanks and aircraft. He wanted infantry units provided with trucks or armored cars for increased mobility. Thus, he was more realistic than Fuller, but still behind Guderian who developed the combined arms principle to its full potential by adding substantial engineer and signal support to the armored nucleus. Guderian developed the tactics which the German Army would employ so effectively in Poland and France during 1939 and 1940. He would have all units advance at the maximum speed. Instead of slowing down the speed of tanks to the pace of infantry as the French High Command advocated, he would speed up the advance of infantry by mechanized means to keep pace with the armor. He would not assign tanks to infantry divisions; rather, he would organize armored divisions to include motorized infantry and all the other supporting arms. Tanks would play the primary role
in these formations, but the cooperation of all arms was the essential feature. In these armored divisions the infantry and artillery would function as subordinate, but not "second line" troops as envisaged by General Fuller. Guderian's armored division would be an
elite unit of the combined arms relying primarily on the speed and shock action of tanks for maximum initial effect."

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242215.pdf


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## FJAG (15 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> But the Artillery and the Engineers have a role in Combined Arms groupings too, do they not?



Not so sure about this question. With artillery we're talking apples and oranges a bit. FSCC and observer resources are grouped with their supported arms generally to company level and thereby there is a small issue which may need to be discussed in your manual. e.g. does a rifle company being attached to an armored battalion take it's FOO with them or receive a new one from the armd regt's allotment and what happens when a combat team is formed e.g. the FOO stays with his sqn/coy headquarters.

On the other hand the allocation of fire support is a whole different matter that really happens above the cbt tm and will vary from case to case and the supported units overall tactical mission. Does a combat team manual/annex really need anything further there than already set out in the master manual.

Engineers are a bit more complex because there may be more physical regrouping required but again wouldn't the overall issue be addressed at the master manual level. Are there any significant engineer differences to be discussed in a manual/annex for a combat team that aren't already covered in the battalion/regimental manual for a company or squadron?

Incidentally (I'm not sure if I've posted this before) here's US ATP 3-90.1 Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (ie the equivalent of our Combat Team)

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp3_90x1.pdf

And ATP 3-90.5 Combined Arms Battalion (all US ABCTs no longer have separate armored and mechanized infantry battalions but combined arms battalions with a mixture of tank and mechanized infantry companies - note that the establishment has changed slightly from what is in the publication)

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp3_90x5.pdf

Having Battalions that are already a mixture of integral tank and mechanized infantry companies makes the whole concept of forming combat teams (company teams) much easier at both the bn and coy level.

 :cheers:


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## Infanteer (15 Jan 2019)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Not so sure about this question. With artillery we're talking apples and oranges a bit.



Note, I said combined arms groupings.  Battle groups frequently have artillery and engineer elements attached.


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## Old Sweat (15 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Note, I said combined arms groupings.  Battle groups frequently have artillery and engineer elements attached.


It is also quite possible that a combat team may have other artillery attached, such as UAV and/or AD assets.

Speaking of AD, our doctrine should include a mention of our open flank, the one above us. If is possible that STA devices could be nearby or in location, especially in the defence.


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## FJAG (15 Jan 2019)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Note, I said combined arms groupings.  Battle groups frequently have artillery and engineer elements attached.



Mea culpa. That was either too subtle for me or I just haven't gotten used to this concept of deploying single battle groups into a theatre. I'm an old guy remember. When I started all out TEWTs and staff training involved corps and divisions and the real world had a whole brigade deployed overseas and another for follow-up to the north flank.

I'm still a firm believer that any operational mission, if conventional, should be nothing less than a brigade and if not that then it's a role for special operations forces.  ;D

 :cheers:


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## Haligonian (15 Jan 2019)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It is also quite possible that a combat team may have other artillery attached, such as UAV and/or AD assets.
> 
> Speaking of AD, our doctrine should include a mention of our open flank, the one above us. If is possible that STA devices could be nearby or in location, especially in the defence.



AD and the lack thereof is mentioned.  Not getting any reviewing done in this 10 man tent tonight!


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## Infanteer (15 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> AD and the lack thereof is mentioned.  Not getting any reviewing done in this 10 man tent tonight!



Have each stove watch shift review a chapter.


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## Haligonian (18 Jan 2019)

Still plugging away here.  With the annexes the offence chapter is over 100 pages.  I have eliminated a lot of stuff thus far based on not repeating stuff from higher doctrinal manuals and that SOPs should be in the SOP manual.

I've been asking myself what do we want from this thing?  Above I stated that we want it to be able to go to the field with us but is that what we really want?  If we want SOP's and drills in an SOP manual then do we really see sub unit comd's referring to this thing in the field?  Maybe the typical aide memoir is more appropriate for such uses?  And if it isn't required to fit in your day bag or tac vest then we could expand the page count to deal with more types of operations and to give the sub unit commander "one stop shopping." 

This approach would see the manual vesting as much information onto the commander as possible with the expectation they absorb as much of it as possible prior to operations/training.  Once in the field they rely on the SOP/Drill manual and typical aide memoirs that we all carry.

Just red teaming this thing on a Friday night.


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## Old Sweat (18 Jan 2019)

I passed the CTCC in 1972 with a pretty good course report. It was an attended course back then, and it was not until a decade later that the Commander FMC told me there were "coded phrases" in it that indicated the letter grade. (I also had passed promotion exams, so I at least had some theoretical knowledge along with a bit of experience as a FOO. In those days the FOO was known as one of the "holy trinity" along with the infantry and armoured sunrays.)

Leaving that aside, I don't recall a lot of voluminous reference material telling us how to command a combat team as our previous training supposedly grounded us in the principles.  Keep it simple, anybody who gets to the level of subunit command in the combat arms probably has avoided making a habit of crapping in the cornflakes. A few exercises with competent constructive debriefings are worth a ton of "how to fight good" verbiage.

OK, I'm older than dirt and the army has changed, but just maybe this will help.


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## ballz (18 Jan 2019)

I don't personally see the need/desire for this to be able to go to the field. That is what aide memoires are for and the Combat Team Commander course provides a pretty hefty one.

Old Sweat's comment about having the experience is more important than having sound doctrine made me think about when we were digging through PAM after PAM trying to figure out the defense... how all this institutional knowledge had been lost and not written down anywhere, and now we needed it... we didn't have any true experience to draw on, and neither did the institution as a whole, not that we could find anyway... so we *had* to fall back on the doctrine as a start state. We were looking for things as basic as how to do range cards, which 20 years ago I'm sure no one would believe could be forgotten.

We can't predict the future... we don't know if the next conflict is going to make us ignore this basic stuff for 5, 6, or 10 years... I'm not saying we're experts at combat team operations now but imagine if we didn't touch conventional combat team ops for 10 years because we were focused on a different style of warfare or different threat that consumed all our resources for that time period (like Afghanistan did)... and then 10 years from now, someone needs to dust off the books and get back into this... what will the book they dust off tell them?

Hopefully more than our current pubs told us about defensive ops...


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## daftandbarmy (19 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> I don't personally see the need/desire for this to be able to go to the field. That is what aide memoires are for and the Combat Team Commander course provides a pretty hefty one.
> 
> Old Sweat's comment about having the experience is more important than having sound doctrine made me think about when we were digging through PAM after PAM trying to figure out the defense... how all this institutional knowledge had been lost and not written down anywhere, and now we needed it... we didn't have any true experience to draw on, and neither did the institution as a whole, not that we could find anyway... so we *had* to fall back on the doctrine as a start state. We were looking for things as basic as how to do range cards, which 20 years ago I'm sure no one would believe could be forgotten.
> 
> ...



It's all been replaced by Army.ca or a virtual equivalent... or should be


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## Haligonian (19 Jan 2019)

ballz said:
			
		

> I don't personally see the need/desire for this to be able to go to the field. That is what aide memoires are for and the Combat Team Commander course provides a pretty hefty one.
> 
> Old Sweat's comment about having the experience is more important than having sound doctrine made me think about when we were digging through PAM after PAM trying to figure out the defense... how all this institutional knowledge had been lost and not written down anywhere, and now we needed it... we didn't have any true experience to draw on, and neither did the institution as a whole, not that we could find anyway... so we *had* to fall back on the doctrine as a start state. We were looking for things as basic as how to do range cards, which 20 years ago I'm sure no one would believe could be forgotten.
> 
> ...



Ballz, thanks for the reminder.  I'm reviewing the defensive chapter now.

On top of the list I mentioned at the start of this is there anything else you like to see explicitly discussed in the pub?


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## Haligonian (19 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Ballz, thanks for the reminder.  I'm reviewing the defensive chapter now.
> 
> On top of the list I mentioned at the start of this is there anything else you like to see explicitly discussed in the pub?



Another principle by which I'm approaching this thing.  We must explain why we do certain things and the inherent assumptions behind them.  By explaining why and the assumptions used our doctrine will be able to be much more instructive for those who lack experience in any particular area.  As Ballz noted above the defence is the perfect example.  We went several years paying lip service to the defence and often not practicing it at all.  We then have a generation of leaders with no experience of it and so they don't understand the why behind certain TTPs.  Those same leaders then start teaching at schools and can't provide required background to their students and we wind up in a vicious cycle where we have to regain precious institutional knowledge through experience.  If doctrine explains the why and the assumptions those can be re-examined to see if they're still valid and will enable people to better understand any particular TTP, it's importance, and how to modify it based on the situation.

As I read this thing I'm more and more convinced that it should become an annex in the Coy/Squadron in Ops pams.  I'm reading about the importance of a reverse slope position which clearly belongs in the Coy pam.  I've cut a lot so far but so much more could go if this were just sitting in the back of those two pams.


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## SeaKingTacco (19 Jan 2019)

A pet hobby horse of mine in the defence has always been the importance of siting machine guns properly (enfilading fire from defilade; overlapping and mutually supporting arcs of fire; tgt registration) and tying them into the overall defensive fireplan.

If we want to have any hope of surviving a Russian MRR, reverse slope siting of mutually supported defensive positions, overhead cover, and camouflage all have to be stressed and backed up with first principle reasoning.


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## Kirkhill (19 Jan 2019)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> A pet hobby horse of mine in the defence has always been the importance of siting machine guns properly (enfilading fire from defilade; overlapping and mutually supporting arcs of fire; tgt registration) and tying them into the overall defensive fireplan.
> 
> If we want to have any hope of surviving a Russian MRR, reverse slope siting of mutually supported defensive positions, overhead cover, and camouflage all have to be stressed and backed up with first principle reasoning.



Agree.

But why limit yourself to that template for machine guns?  Why not for other direct fire, line of site weapons?  Like Anti-Armour weapons?  You'd get a higher percentage of flanking shots and tend to obscure the launch signature.  And be better able to manage the fire of what are essentially single-shot weapons.

It worked for the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo against the French Cavalry.  Why not against Russian tanks?


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## daftandbarmy (19 Jan 2019)

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Another principle by which I'm approaching this thing.  We must explain why we do certain things and the inherent assumptions behind them.  By explaining why and the assumptions used our doctrine will be able to be much more instructive for those who lack experience in any particular area.  As Ballz noted above the defence is the perfect example.  We went several years paying lip service to the defence and often not practicing it at all.  We then have a generation of leaders with no experience of it and so they don't understand the why behind certain TTPs.  Those same leaders then start teaching at schools and can't provide required background to their students and we wind up in a vicious cycle where we have to regain precious institutional knowledge through experience.  If doctrine explains the why and the assumptions those can be re-examined to see if they're still valid and will enable people to better understand any particular TTP, it's importance, and how to modify it based on the situation.
> 
> As I read this thing I'm more and more convinced that it should become an annex in the Coy/Squadron in Ops pams.  I'm reading about the importance of a reverse slope position which clearly belongs in the Coy pam.  I've cut a lot so far but so much more could go if this were just sitting in the back of those two pams.



OK, now you've got me thinking.

Once upon a time, pams were just an 'Aide Memoire'... literally just a memory jogger for things you did alot anyways. 

Now that skill fade is so prevalent in a variety of conventional war - and other - battle tasks, and turnover seems pretty high, we may need to re-conceive the whole purpose of pams that contain our doctrine.

And backing up our hard copy pams with this kind of YouTube product (well, not EXACTLY like this, but you get my drift) might be really, really important https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qBG_vZ0zDs


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## SeaKingTacco (19 Jan 2019)

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Agree.
> 
> But why limit yourself to that template for machine guns?  Why not for other direct fire, line of site weapons?  Like Anti-Armour weapons?  You'd get a higher percentage of flanking shots and tend to obscure the launch signature.  And be better able to manage the fire of what are essentially single-shot weapons.
> 
> It worked for the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo against the French Cavalry.  Why not against Russian tanks?



Fair point. All crew served weapons need to be sited by the OC and protected by riflemen.


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## Old Sweat (19 Jan 2019)

The challenge the army faces is beyond being solved by a set of new pamphlets. However, while it takes time, it can be done. The first step is to understand the issue and make and follow a plan.Think TEWTS, study groups and formal instruction as well as a lot of down and dirty FTXs, and the good, old brigade summer concentration that got us away from the garrison crap and thinking about fighting.


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## Kirkhill (20 Jan 2019)

PLAY

A four letter word that nobody wants to utter.

But a key element in creating a flexible mind that reacts well to adversity.

You can issue all the pams, aides, guidances and principles you like but you can never generate a manual that will cover every eventuality.  As soon as you write down your plans the enemy will discern them, if not immediately from seeing them then over time from watching you implement them, and immediately do the other thing - the one not covered by any of the plans.

You need to develop the resilience in your troops to keep doing, to keep trying, even when the plans fail.

Fighting, in a cage or in the field, is not about the plan.  It is about never losing focus on winning.  And that means you keep doing things until you find something that works.

And that is facilitated in peace time by expensive, time-wasting, inefficient experimentation.

Also known as PLAY.


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