# Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves



## Yard Ape

There are three common themes that arise when discussing this topic: individual augmentation to Regular Force units, mobilisation base or specialised support units.

I would question the viability of the specialised support role, as it would require a criticle mass in each of the specialty trades before a full unit of volonteers could be mobilized for an operation.   If we had a system similar to the US, with legislated job protection, this could be a viable approach for a few units in major urban centers (ei with the population to sustain them).

Overall I would suggest that prepairing for general mobilisation should be the key role of the reserves.   Meeting this standard would ensure the reserves are capable of reacting to whatever requirements are placed on them by the future activities of the army.   It would also result in individual members being qualified to augment Regular force units, and thus diminnishes the relavence of individual augmentation as a role on to itself.   

What are some of the opinions on this topic out there?


    Yard Ape


----------



## ender

I agree with Yard Ape.

The regs are the first to deploy, and the first line of defense.  They also have high casualites.  Reserve units are there to a) replace reg units and b) the cadre to train new people.  Obviously a reservist is less expericenced than a reg of the same rank, but it takes a lot less time to get a reservist up to speed than to train entirerly new people.

The secondary purpose of the reserves is to augment the reg force with personell.  I know in my unit, the people who have been on tour and they ex-reg force people are a really valuable resource.  They have a lot of experience and they know the tricks on how to do things. (especially important in an Engineer unit)

I‘m not so big on support trades in the reserves.  For instance, my friend is in the medic company and it‘s the worst of both worlds.  He doesn‘t get the skills he needs to function in the field as a field medic, yet he isn‘t trained to the standard of a BMS type and he has no practical experience in treating patients.  Compare this to the medics who are attached to my unit who have basic field skills and have some experience treating minor injuries.  (of course, my friend might disagree with me)

I think the reserves should place a lot more empasis on deployable skills.  For instance, making a contact report is not part of the radio curreculum on QL2, yet I think this is pretty important.


----------



## bossi

If I may be permitted to go off on a tangent ...

One role of the Army Reserve is becoming increasingly evident:
To maintain an Army presence with city garrisons in urban centres (lest the Army vanish from the public eye, and memory, as it retreats to increasingly isolated bases, i.e. Shilo ...).

Sure, the rocket scientist bean-counters will claim it‘s oh so much more efficient to squirrel the Army away in remote locations, however this overlooks something quite matter-of-fact:  "out of sight, out of mind" - we shouldn‘t be too astonished when the defence budget gets short shrift in the future, since the child prodigy political geniuses in red suspenders will quickly manipulate the polls such that the voting public will turn their attention only to those things which affect them on a day-to-day basis (and, if the Army is banished to the boonies, ... you can see where I‘m going with this, I hope).

Thus, I reiterate - a role of the Reserve Army is to remind "the rest of Canada" (i.e. those locations without a large Regular Army presence).  

Don‘t be swayed by the suggestion that this could be achieved solely through aggressive marketing and public information campaigns - these activities are too easily silenced by the whim of somebody with a different agenda ...
In my humble opinion the taxpayers will all too quickly forget where their defence dollars are going, unless they see something green on "Main Street", Any-City, Canada.

Dileas Gu Brath,
M.A. Bossi, Esquire

P.S.  (as an aside, I‘d also like to point out that the "military-friendly" vote continues to be relatively diluted, even if the Regular Army consolidates into a smaller number of locations, since the majority of Regular soldiers vote in their "home" riding instead of where they live - thus, it should not come as a surprise if the military continues to be an ignored minority in the House of Commons since they have no elected "voice", whereas other special interest groups somehow manage to throw their muscle behind certain candidates ... sigh - I‘d better cut off my rant now, before I get myself into trouble).


----------



## RCA

Just to clarify a point: (and so you understand you are hitting a little too close to home with the Shilo-wilderness remark)

The Army is constanly training and Shilo is a training base wheras where do you train  mech infantry in downtown Winnipeg. Besides they still have the Air Force and they are perfectly suited to each other. 

Shilo is not in the wilderness and for once a desicion was made stricly on military matters.
 not on politics.

As to the role of the reserves, we must endevour to maintain our idently and purpose by recruiting, retaining and training to sub-unit level and meeting the required BTSs for our Corps. We must not fall into the trap in that we are only a manpower pool for Reg F for individual augmentation or Component Tranfers. (and we are slowly sliding taht way)

The reserve Company being stood up for ROTO 11 should go a long way to proving that formed sub-units are viable for us.


----------



## Yard Ape

Should *All* the same vehicles and equipment be available to the reserves for trg, as is available to the Reg Force?  LAV III APC‘s for the reserve infantry to train on, etc.  Even if this equipment was only available at area training centers and shared by all units who trained there?

If this is not the case, then what purpose does it serve to train reserves for mobilsation as there will be no equipment for them to deploy with.

 Yard Ape


----------



## Fishbone Jones

There is one major flaw with any vehs being held at ATC‘s. That is with the move to the CBO‘s (Civilian Base Operators) the storage, issue and especially maintenence of pooled vehs is absolutley atrocious. Going up on a Friday and drawing a couple of jeeps is one thing. To draw a Sqn worth of coyote or cougar, etc and ancilliary equip would take you into Sat morning, unless you pay them overtime. Then you get out to the trg area, find that because they haven‘t moved in two months the seals are dried out causing leaks and breakdowns. Now you have to wait while they call the duty recovery crew in from home (on overtime, min 4 hrs call in) to find out they will only tow the veh up top and not repair it. However, before you turn it in you must figure a way to get it to the washrack and back before they accept it. Of course the mech breakdown is charged against YOUR budget as you were the one using it when it quit. Some units must travel over six hours by bus to get to the ATC. By the time they arr Sat morn at 0230 after a 1900 hr Fri departure and leave at noon Sun to arrive home the viability of useful trg is seriously questionable. The better idea would be to give say, ea recce unit two coyotes at home for trg. If not the complete veh then at least the Brigade mount survellience gear (does not req the veh). Until DND comes up with their own sugar daddy, the idea of res units being equipped like regs (a la Nat Guard, US Army Res) is a pie in the sky we can only dream about.


----------



## Nate2

The res should absolutely have compatible equipment with the regs.  If  a major mission of the res is to augment the predominantly mech regs, they should have access to compatible equipment.  That is one reason I was against the Shilo.  Winnipeg has two res inf units and an armoured recce unit (combat arms).  These light inf units (at least one)should have been mech, and had access to the regs equipment, like LAV IIIs and TUA.  The RECCE unit should have been given its own det of Coyote, or at least Cougars with a Coyote turret.  If it is cost prohibitive to equip both res and regs with the same equipment, then money should be invested in simulation equipment.  

Regards,

Nate


----------



## Yard Ape

If the equipment does not exist, even for training, how can the reserves ever be mobalized?  An iltis will not transform into a coyote, nor a cougar into a MBT in the event that the reserves need to be mobalised.


----------



## Nate2

By simulation equipment, I meant that if we cannot kit out the reserves with additional LAVs, etc. that are for their exclusive use, then it may be acceptable to use simulators in addition to the regs equipment.  Hmm, still not to clear I guess...  

Okay, the Regs have their kit assigned, but the local reserve unit has none. Both are infantry-the regs are mech, but the res are light.  In order for the reserve inf unit to augment the regs, the majority have to be trained in mech prior to their deployment.  But the govn‘t won‘t fund the resrvs for their own mech equipment.  Ideally then, they should share the mech equipment with the regs, developing the skills to augment the regs in a timely fashion (and as a sec to plt size unit if possible).

The problem with this is that the regs may lose training time on their vehicles, as well as additional wear and tear on the kit.  To solve this, I would advocate an investment in vehicle simulators.  In this way, both the regs and reserves could practice formation and maneuver, as well as TI recognition, Comms, Nav and targeting skills, etc.  When the regs weren‘t using the actual kit, the res could get field time, and put the simulation skills into practice, and vice-versa.  Of course, the regs would get first dibs, and a good portion of the field time, but the res would also be much better prepared to augment the regs in ops overseas.

Of course, this begs the question as to what the res would use in a general mobilization, requiring them to be sent to fight.  Well, it would be nice to have stocks of surplus equipment lying around to equipment a hastily mobilized militia.  But unfortunately Canada does not have many surplus state of the art AFVs and such left over from the Cold War (like the US or Germany) to hand down to reserves.  However, The DDGM plant in London, ON currently cranks out 1 LAV per day, and could do better on a war footing.  It takes months to train a mech inf soldier to fight in high intensity combat with today‘s advanced technology.  Simulation equipment would allow the both res and regs to maintain a higher quality of training when each other are using the equipment, or when it is down for maintenance.  It works for the US (especially for the gas guzzling M1s and BFVs heavy mech units, both reg and NG).  This is also why I think that the primary mech battalions in the regs should be located near major pop centres with larger res units (the Minto armouries are far away from Shilo).

Just a thought, yours?

Regards,

Nate


----------



## Yard Ape

We would not be the only country asking GM Defence to pump out more vehicles if we found ourselves on a war footing.

 Yard Ape


----------



## Spr.Earl

We are going back in time,this was done after the war in the late 40‘s and early 50‘s making the reserve‘s an emergency responce organisation in cas of attack and didn‘t work then.

Army considers new path for reserves


KAMLOOPS (CKNW/AM980) -- An Army spokesperson says the reserve program needs a little money to bring it up to speed.

Captain Dan Thomas says the Army Reserve program needs to improve capabilities in urban search and rescue, and take on some non-traditional reserve roles to keep up with the changing times. Thomas says there would be an investment of at least $100 million required for equipment and training.

Army officials are meeting this weekend in Kamloops at the headquarters of the Rocky Mountain Rangers, to talk about the changing role of the reserves.


----------



## bossi

Well, I don‘t know who this guy is, what he actually said (vice what was quoted), and I don‘t know who he‘s a spokesman for ...

All I can say is that I was on a NATO Civil Emergency Planning course last week, and the key phrase is " ... wartime capabilities that can also be used during times of peace ..." (i.e. during an emergency or disaster like a flood, earthquake, whatever).

I can save lives with a clear conscience (just as I can contemplate doing the opposite with Al Q‘ueda).

CIMIC is Civil-Military Co-operation - it exists throughout the Spectrum of Conflict, in all Phases of War - it can be just as important as combat arms, depending on the situation.


----------



## Brad Sallows

1/ I haven‘t the dates at hand, but it sounds like this is one of the current round of LFRR "town hall" meetings.
2/ Capt Thomas is 39 CBG PAffO.
3/ "Non-traditional roles" simply means anything other than what we we considered to be business as usual in the past 30-odd years (eg CIMIC, PSYOPS, HUSAR, LRRP, etc).  It _does not_ mean we are going to swing the clock back 50 years.


----------



## humint

http://www.dnd.ca/menu/Feature_Story/2002/dec02/05dec02_f_e.htm 

Any thoughts?

========

Reserve tasks evolving

By Susan Turcotte 



ASCOT CORNER, Que. - Cpl Valérie Gignac serves Canada as a medical assistant with 55e Compagnie Médicale, Sherbrooke, while studying to be a nurse. 
Photo by CPL JEAN-FRANÇOIS NÉRON 
The Army Reserve‘s long history of serving at home and overseas continues into the new century. As the type of warfare and threats to our country evolve, so does the Reserve‘s role as part of Canada‘s Army. 

Phase I of the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) project began Fall 2000 with a central theme of the assignment of roles, missions and tasks across all phases of mobilization. 

The last major objective of Phase I began this fall and wraps up in the spring with a series of about 40 Unit Consultative Meetings (UCMs), or town hall meetings, taking place across Canada. 

"We pulled out a job or task list based on existing defence policy," said Major-General Ed Fitch, who heads up the LFRR Project Management Office. "For each stage of mobilization we have figured out how many of each type of unit we need." 

While some tasks have already been allocated through the chain of command at area and brigade level, consultations are ongoing for assignment of other missions and tasks. 

"As we look at the future threat environment, we see we need skill sets we don‘t have right now," said MGen Fitch. 

New or enhanced capabilities for the Army Reserve have been or are being developed, including Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Public Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), while others are under consideration, including Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Long Range Reconnaissance and Heavy Urban Search and Rescue. 

Army capabilities will also be required by the Air Force, Navy and homeland defence, although to date Canada does not have a homeland defence policy. Once the Army has fully analyzed these areas, it will go through a second round of allocating tasks to units. 

Phase II of LFRR, designed to accelerate the Reserve‘s growth, begins April 2003. The Army funded the bulk of Phase I from its own budget. Funding for Phase II has not been announced yet. 

"It is clear to everybody that the money for Phase II is not in the Army budget, and I believe the department‘s position is it‘s not the department‘s budget either," said MGen Fitch. "We‘re at a very critical juncture." 

For more information about LFRR, call 1-866-230-LFRR or visit www.army.dnd.ca/lfrr.


----------



## portcullisguy

I think it‘s a positive step, provided the funding is there to carry on with the further phases of implementation.

It makes sense to specialize, from an economic standpoint.

But, what happens if you are in a regiment or unit that gets assigned a role you don‘t like?  I guess I know the answer to that one...


----------



## ArmyAl

Well this is my opinion.  We all know how the CF is strapped for cash, this is my idea of what they should do to the res. I'll use 31 CBG as an example.  Here are the units in the bde:

7 x inf
2 x arty
1 x recce
1 x armored
1 x eng.
3 x service

Well here goes.  Take all 7 inf units and make them into 31 RCR for example.  Think of the money they would save by having no highlander units, and you would only have 1 CO and 1 RSM for 31 RCR.

Well chew on that, I'm sure their will be a lot of interesting comments


----------



## Jarnhamar

think of how hard it is to get stuff done at your own unit sometimes, now think of how hard it would be to use the chain of command with units spread out all over. Want something for your webbing? hour road trip to the QM


----------



## Doug VT

31 RCR??  What a joke, are you for real??
I‘m sure these units would go for it as well.  
They would like to give up their brass and heritage to all belong to the same unit combined.  Being in the same Brigade should be enough.  With the sad state of our Reserves(numbers) and our military in general, the Bde should only have a Bde RSM and the units should just have a CSM and the high ranking NCO.  Size wise and all, that seems to make more sense.  Same deal with the CO! 
HA I would love to see that!!


----------



## Recce41

All Armour Res units will be Recce by the end off 2003. Reg Force units are going Recce complete, The LdSH will be taking over the tanks in Waynewright as training.


----------



## ArmyAl

Just a thought buds.
Who‘s to say it wouldn‘t work, I hate it when people hate change or cling on things, ie the past.
Ya sure my unit kicked a$$ in that "war" but it‘s 2003, maybe it‘s that I belong to a numbered unit, I‘m more loyal to the troops then the unit when I think about it, but thats just me.


----------



## combat_medic

The regimental system is the strongest thing that the Canadian military has to offer. The traditions, uniforms, colours, songs, and other things that make a regiment unique are what allow people that sense of belonging. Even most Americans I‘ve spoken to really admire the Regimental system; it allows for far more unit cohesion that just "The 862nd infantry brgade" or whatever.


----------



## Airghardt

I belong to the Calgary Highlanders, i stand out from the crowd, especially on Remeberance day, when the reserve units in calgary get together and do a parade (we have Calgary Highlanders, KO Calgary Regt., 15 Med Bn. (det), HMCS Techumseh, 14th SVC Bn., that‘s a lot of units) now when we are on parade and we hit the town afterwards people notice ‘the guys in the kilts‘ before anyone else. and it‘s not only that, i really truly admire my regiment because we are one of a kind...i‘m not giving up my kilt to wear some pants like every other schmuck in calgary, and call myself "the Regiment Formerly known as Calgary Highlanders" the other guy was right: the Regimental system is the best thing our military has...  :sniper:


----------



## bossi

Hmmm ... I wonder ... if the challenge is "chew on this", then is the password "Bite me"?

Why destroy esprit de corps?
Why destroy regimental pride?

Why destroy any organisation that has survived the disgraceful cuts in defence spending foisted upon Canada by an irresponsible political party that makes Quisling look like a patriot?

Okay - chew on this:
The Militia mobilised, fought, and won the Second World War.  If, as you propose, we destroy the Militia - who is left?  The Regular Force?

Oh, boy - now that‘s the way to ensure we have absolutely no depth, no strength in reserve, no farm team for the big league.

Other that 3 PPCLI‘s soujourn in Afghanistan, when was the last time ANY Reg Force organisation deployed without reservists (and, yes - that includes the Dwyer Hill Highlanders).

I‘ll dig out a history book and confirm some statistics, but I seem to remember the strength of the Militia was something like 140,000 in August 1939.  Kinda makes ya wanna think, eh?

Dileas Gu Brath,
MB


----------



## Wilson601

Touche Bossi  :skull:


----------



## Recce41

Bossi
 We deployed to Somalia, the first missions to Bosnia before we went through most Regts, IFOR and the and the first SFOR. There are others, the first few mission of UNFORCYP, UNEM,etc. The Res go after the Regs go first.


----------



## Jungle

Tours without ResF participation: UNPROFOR roto 0 1992, Cambodia 1992, Somalia, Rwanda 1994 , roto 0 to Haiti 1997, East Timor 1999. That‘s just the last decade... Now this is not ResF bashing, I respect Reservists and whether some of us like it or not, we need them. But ResF pers are usually absent from Roto 0 on overseas ops.


----------



## Gunner

You know, it never ceases to amaze me that we continuously have this debate/argument in the army on Regular/Reserve issues.  A debate on the Regimental system has deteriorated into whether or not there is participation by Reservists on Roto 0‘s.    

Bossi, Recce41, Jungle, etc.  For the most part, Reservists have deployed on most operations in one form or another.  Anyone want to argue Roto 0 for UNPROFOR was any less dangerous than future Harmony/Cavalier roto‘s?  I can personally assure you that Reservists participated in Op Deliverance (Somalia) to fill out the Airborne Regiment.  They also deployed to Afghanistan on Op APOLLO (yes they were in Kandahar).  IFOR (Roto 0 and 1) and SFOR (Roto 0 and beyond) all had increasing participation by the Reserves.  I can‘t comment on Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, or East Timor as I wasn‘t involved with them, but I would be very surprised if there wasn‘t at least one there in some type of capacity.  But I have to ask?  Who cares if there is or isn‘t a Reservist on a Roto 0â€¦aren‘t we trying to accomplish a mission?

The limited Reserve numbers on Roto 0 have sweet FA on the capabilities of the Reserves.  It is simply the high readiness nature of Roto 0‘s combined with newness factor of new missions.  Large amounts of money is spent on the Regular Force to ensure its members are trained and ready to go on operations.  Why would you spend this amount of money on Reservists (or spend valuable time training them) if international operations must be mounted quickly?

Regimental affiliations mean squat if they do not reflect the overall army strategy.  I see it every day, officers and soldiers more interested in the name of the Regiment, instead of focussing on the direction of the Army.  Is the Regimental system one of our greatest strengths?  You bet, but it is also one of our greatest weaknesses.


----------



## Recce41

Gunner
 You maybe right in a way, but I was in Somalia (RCD), and on IFOR (RCD)0 and there were no Res on those as I saw. I know first Snow Goose 1-8 (Cyprus) nil, many of the first UN tours were nil Res. Why? there many a Reg to go. As for DH the first few were REG I was there for the first in 92. There are Res that show now, but are few and far. 
As for Res, I‘ve had Res crews, and they were crap! Its bad when a Gunner cannot do Driver Maintance, or a Res Sgt that could not even lead a veh Ptl. Or showed up with his damn sniper scope. But they still went. Because they were Res! Regs get fired if they don‘t cut it. I will never go on tour with a Res crew AGAIN!


----------



## Gunner

Recce41,

In the past you have made your thoughts about Reservists known to the War Diary.  I can‘t comment on your experiences with Reserve crews as you are/were in LFCA/2CMBG/RCD.  I know I have worked with excellent as well as very poor Reservists (I can say the same about other Regulars).  Within LFWA (recently for roto 11 and 12) I know very well there have been Reservists fired for not being capable of doing their job (and a Regular placed in the position).  Sometimes the Reservist simply needs an experienced Sgt to guide him on full time duty...You don‘t always have to do that for Regulars, but sometimes you do.

For Somalia, the Reserve units affiliated with the Airborne Regiment sent personnel to fill out the line commando‘s.  For IFOR, the majority of the Reserve participation was within the MNBG HQ as LO‘s etc and staff at MND(SW).  Why would they be in the Recce Sqn?  OP SNOWGOOSE, Cyprus...that was another time, my friend, when the army was alot larger than we are now and there for many Regulars aval to go.  Having said that, I know there were several reserve gunners that deployed to Cyprus in the early 80s and alot in the early 90s, just prior to the reduction in the mission.  I can‘t comment on DH, but, as the jobs are open to any trade, component or element, I don‘t doubt there are Reservists working but the majority remain combat arms. 

WRT your comment about Regs staying home while Reservists get to go overseas.  We really encountered this during Roto 11 and 12.  The soldiers are telling the leadership that the are over tasked but when there unit deploys overseas (roto 11 and 12) they are upset at the Reserve augmentation (also known as the "tour stealers").   This is further compounded by the fact most Reservists can‘t fill the more senior positions (Sgt and above) and wind up filling Cpl/Pte driver (GD type) positions.  This restricts the number of positions that young Reg F privates can fill.  I feel for the young Regular trying to make something of himself in a Regiment where Cpls often have a very hefty rack of medals.  When they don‘t get the opportunity to go overseas with their Regiment, who do they blame?  But isn‘t the army better off having a "high readiness" capability available in Canada?  

Just my thoughts.


----------



## ArmyAl

Password is incorrect!
It‘s the people in the unit that make the esprit de corps, not the unit itself.
ex.  unit that just formed a year ago where the training is tough, and they are known to be the best unit for being a$$ kickers in the field, 
or
a unit that has 150 years of battle honors a cool cap badge and a deadly mess, but they get there a$$‘s handed to them in the field because they are all fat and retarded.

So what unit would you join?
this is an example.


----------



## combat_medic

Also, with regards to certain trades like, oh I don‘t know, medic, reservists aren‘t allowed to go overseas and occupy a Med A position, and neither are QL3 qualified Reg Med As. This creates a HUGE strain on the Reg QL5 Cpls and up. A reserve QL3+QL4 is roughly equivalent to a reg QL3 and neither are able to do their jobs overseas unless they end up as an ambulance driver. How frustrating is that on both sides? To spend 6 months training and no ability to apply the knowledge. No wonder all the GD/driver/HQ tasks get filled so quickly.


----------



## Gunner

Combat_Medic,

This has been a problem within the medical world for many years.  Reserve (and Regular) medical personnel were being trained without any civilian equivalency (ie QL 3 equals EMT course).  CFMG has recognized this and (I believe) for the first time on Op PALLADIUM Roto 12 Reserve will serve overseas if they hold a civilian qualification roughly similar to the Regular qualification. I believe there are around 4 Reserve personnel who will be deploying as part of the HS Pl.

The longer term problem is making sure Reserve training actually provides the military with some type of resource it can call upon.  I‘m not sure where this lies as there are more pressing issues that CFMG must deal with....


----------



## bossi

ArmyAl - you‘re comparing apples and potatoes.

When you used the "example" of a new unit, and a unit 150 years old, you forgot to mention how many MILLION dollars the new unit received (you know what I‘m talking about, so let‘s get real).

Fat, retarded?  Hmmm ... I wonder how these personnel got by the Regular Force Recruiting Centre ... (after all, there certainly aren‘t any Regular Force personnel who fit this description, are there)?

Recce41 - as already pointed out, there were reservists in Somalia (including one from my unit)

You‘re right - the Reg Force often deploys first, especially when there is short, little or no lead time - however, as soon as the well starts to run dry, they start sending reservists ...

It‘s a necessary, symbiotic relationship.

And, as for unnecessary internal bickering - we need only to look at the Artillery, who have effectively crippled the Infantry battalions by robbing them of mortars (and, the Artillery most closely follows the example that was initially given in this thread ... hmmm ... kinda makes ya wanna thunk, eh?)


----------



## Gunner

> And, as for unnecessary internal bickering - we need only to
> look at the Artillery, who have effectively crippled the
> Infantry battalions by robbing them of mortars


Bossi, you are going to have to expand on your point because I do not agree with you at all.


----------



## Recce41

Gunner
 As for Recce postions (Armour) there is a many of Res crewman boat (Cougar) qual. In the 50-60s most Res were ex reg WW2 vets. So you cannot compare them to the Res of today. Most like my Father started out as a Res until he stayed in after WW2. Now they‘re getting a Coyote qual here or there. All I‘m saying is some of the ones that go on tour are the ones with no real job. And all the good one cannot doto this. I had a driver in my troop in Bosnia that was sent home from Cyprus in 89 with us, sent home from Bosnia in 94 with us and almost sent home from SFOR in 98, but the two of us that remembered him spoke to him. We pointed out that he was on a fine line. 
 I was in D+S Troop for Somalia, and RCD BGE HQ for IFOR. This thought will only change if the Res start to be like the ones of old, the its raining I‘m not going to play today soldiers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Airaghardt seems to think the Calgary Highlanders don‘t have any schmucks on the rolls...must not parade much....    

In any event, the original poster is merely trolling - his comment about saving money on Highland regiments is especially funny, since the majority of highland kit, etc. is purchased at regimental expense.

This too has been discussed often.

However, bear in mind that my previous comments also bear fruit - the German Army in WW II did not have regimental traditions per se, and they fought very well.  All the traditions of the "Old Army" were done away with, though an effort was made at first to retain regimental traditions in the companies and battalions of the new Wehrmacht in the 1930s.  By 1940, the last outward sign of regimental tradition - the number of the unit - was deleted from the shoulder straps.  While regiments still recruited locally, and divisions were given a regional designation (ie Berlin, WÃ¼rttemberg, Rheinland, Westphalia, Saxony, Bavarian, etc.), there were no regimental colours, uniform distinctions, or any of the other "regimental" trappings of the Commonwealth armies. 

Unit cohesion was actually drawn from the National Socialist influence - officers ate what their men ate, and were looked on usually as comrades, as class distinctions were officially being done away with.  There were exceptions, but the officers of the British Army of the time retained their caste system to a much larger degree, by way of contrast, and some Canadian officers would have preferred that as well (Crerar, Simonds...the lower ranking combat officers tended to have a more modern outlook).  The point being that the Germans placed more importance on relationships between men and units, than on ceremonial trappings.  And it paid them dividends.   

Granted, regimental distinctions are usually retained for their value in recruiting in peacetime, this is just a reminder that in action, cap badges and back flashes and coloured hosetops really count for much less than the respect between men and leaders, and confidence in each other - brought about by training and experience, not dress regulations. 

The Canadian Army dispensed with regimental traditions in many units during World War One - the numbered battalions in some cases kept the traditions of their founding regiments, but many (most?) did not.   The Calgary Highlanders‘ predecessor is a great example.  They were formed from the 103rd Calgary Rifles and the 106th Winnipeg Light Infantry.

The battalion did not adopt a single rifle regiment tradition, nor a single light infantry tradition (no blackened buttons, Sam Brownes, chin strap or rank insignia, they marched at the normal pace, they had no buglehorns or bugle band) and simply called themselves "The Tenth Canadians", and later, "The Fighting Tenth".   A wartime effort by one officer to nickname the unit "White Gurkhas" did not stick.

Their fighting reputation was second to none - and done entirely without the benefit of any "regimental traditions".  They simply created their own.

So too the other CEF units formed from several regiments in Canada.

So you could probably do away with the kilts (sorry!) and regimental traditions tomorrow and number all the units, and in six months time or a year, there would be little difference in the operational capabilities of the units.

Don‘t get me wrong - you would definitely have lost a lot in the process - but the Army would not come to a crashing halt, and we would pretty much survive.  Any Army that could survive Unification could survive anything, though some would argue we are still recovering from Unification, too.  Mostly because of the people that left, not because we stopped wearing metal shoulder titles for 15 years or so.

I don‘t know if I buy into the kilt or the pipe band as a recruiting tool in any event.  If you‘re not predisposed to the infantry, I can‘t see the incentive of wearing a kilt as being all that crucial to making the final decision.  Would be interesting to see some hard data on that, but if anyone is selecting their trade based on the uniform they are going to be wearing, I have to question their ability to make decisions like that at all.


----------



## Jarnhamar

One of my all time favourite past times when working with ‘old school‘ reg force personal is asking them "why don‘t they like reserves, because were like reg force mini-me‘s?" 

For the most part it‘s just to get a laugh and break the ice but for the most part the reasons they‘ve given in seriousness are very intellegient and very legit such as;
-Reserves charging reg force insturctors with racisim or harassment if they fail a course (i‘ve seen this personally)
-Reserves showing up on a tasking and treating it like summer camp, walking around with walkmens or asking if they have to shine their boots
-cadet and ql3 war stories ad nasium

I also think some fault of this falls on the reg force personal. When a reservists performs very poorly for some reason (from what i‘ve seen) they are given a good or  standard report anyways, be it they feel bad OR (what i suspsect) they don‘t want the hassel of justifing/showing evidence of how a soldier performed poorly.
I can understand not wanting to get involved with that crap but if the reservests unit thinks they performed well there going to send them on a tasking again.


----------



## Recce41

I have been one of the ones that have written a crap report, but it will get changed. For you CANNOT hurt their feelings, or if you go they will quit. I was DS on a JNCO course we had 15 out of 36 fail or quit, due to this we could not fail any more that was from LFCA. For Res units get money for the numbers. More numbers they put down more money they get, even if they have 200 names and only 10 show. They still get the money for 200. My wife was RSS, she had seen this first hand. This is why Res unit seem to have more money. 
 I have been told that I was harassing one of them because I had given him too many chits on one course. Or you have Res course officers that show and say they don‘t care about the students they are just there for the money. Damn one day these people may have to fight. 
 Thank goodness I‘m away from that crap. Ever other Army they Res take it seriously. I was in Bosnia and the Kiwis had a whole Res Regt. None of us even knew. But they know the differance between us. Why because some of our Res units are a joke. 
 When you see the BC of the GGs driving around with a damn Medic in the bussil bin of a Cougar going cross country. He was stopped and didn‘t think it was wrong. Now tell me thats not a joke.


----------



## Wilson601

the equation, More soldiers = More money makes sense now that you‘ve all explained it. I wish I had taken count to how many times i‘ve heard an instructor say: "Alright Bloggins, fail this test one more time and you‘re off the course... And i mean it this time."  :skull:


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Every few weeks, same ol‘, same ol‘. Oh well, vent if you must, everyone‘s entitled to their opinion  :boring:


----------



## humint

Finally, a discussion I can sink my teeth into!!

From my understanding, there are going to be some big changes with regards to militia units in terms of roles and responsibilities for intel, psy-ops, etc. I have heard that units will development their own specialists in the field.

Also, it seems that Intel Offs aren‘t the only ones that do intel work. For example, units may do their own picc (??) work -- psy-ops, intel gathering, and civil/miliatry co-operation. I am positive that NCMs do as much intel gathering as Offs. If I am not mistaken, much of the intel-ops work for the US is done by NCMs -- analysis is done by Offs.

I guess it really depends on the type of intel you are seeking -- that is, beyond sigint or humint. Are you looking at strategic or tactical intel and for what genre (i.e. counter-intel/espionage, counter terrorism, security).  

Now, I‘m not an expert at this, my area is in civ intel research/analysis.


----------



## Gunner109

Bossi....  Your comment on the Artillery taking the mortar‘s from the infantry,  I am sure was NOT an Artillery decission.  It is not at all what we do,  however it is an easy task to take over.


----------



## toms3

I am really tired of this argument.  NEVER gets solved.  Oh well.   Like someone else has already said...I have spent time with the regs and have seen reg guys that need a manual to tie their boots, so numpties (reg or res) are everywhere.  I was in the butts during a PWT 1 qualification for Kosovo (Roto 1), and I witnessed Reg troops failing their shoot...not even hitting the target...they still went over seas...gee...I want them in my trench.

Hey Recce41, I think your right...its time to punch your card and head off into the sunset...ya crusty old ba$tard. 
  :blotto:


----------



## Recce41

Digger, most Regs just don‘t give a Ratsass anymore. Yes there are loosers in the Regs too. But most of them don‘t make it past Cpl or Mcpl. 
 Most of the SNR loosers are at the Armour School, that is why I regreting going. About 70% have never been on a tour. But they think the **** they teach is right.


----------



## Paras

I heard not too long ago that some Reserve regiments might become speacialist in certain areas of combat.These are the specialties that ive been told we might get(one per regiment obviously)sycological operations,civil affairs and Long range recce.With a possibility of one more ,Urban Search and Rescue.Has anyone else heard about these speacialties and when they might be tasked?


----------



## Pikache

I think that‘s all part of Land Force Reserve Restructing plan, which is still undergoing and constantly changing.

My unit was tasked to be a NBCD unit, now apparently is a LAVIII coy.


----------



## Paras

NBCD eh ,dang that sucks.


----------



## Jason Jarvis

It‘s been a while since I last looked through the LFRR literature, but are there any plans to assign reserve regiments to urban combat roles? I only ask this because I recently stumbled across an unofficial Swedish Army site that described the reserve battalions based in Stockholm and elsewhere that specialized in urban combat.

The concept of having soldiers fight on their own turf makes sense to me, although I suppose in our case, urban combat specialists would be more likely used to augment regular force units.


----------



## Wilson601

Ours is Recce, its being implimented right now, not much a diff. from Light infantry except ya don‘t carry around as much $h!t.  lol  :skull:


----------



## Jarnhamar

Ours was suposed to be recce too. I wouldnt put much weight into that. I‘ve heard that stuff for years. "Were a machinegun regiment, were recce tasked, were tasked with fibua combat" I figure it‘s just something to throw on paper. I mean not everyone in the regiment is going to have their gunners course or recce course right? We don‘t have enough training time/dedicated troops to really stand out in a role.


----------



## Yard Ape

I'm looking for the history of how some regiments have come to exist in both the regular and reserve force.

I know 4 RCR traces its roots back to a distinct reserve regiment (I believe it was the Oxford Fusiliers).  When & why did it become 4 RCR (was it a Total Force - 10/90 Bn thing?)?

I have the same question of 4 R22eR and 6 R22eR.  How did they come to be, and were they formerly different regiments?

Both these regiments were designated as permanent force at the end of WW II (as they had been before the war), so I don't follow how they came to exist in the reserves.

In an attempt to raise moral & increase the regimental tradition, several reserve force regiments were added to the active force order of battle.  These units continued to exist in both Reg and Reserve until the regular force regiments were later stood down (FGH, Black Watch, QOR).  Was 8 CH on of the regular force regiments created this way?

12 RBC was created in the Reg Force some years after WW II in order to establish a french armoured regiment.  Did it exist in the reserve force prior to that, or was the reserve 12 RBC created later?

Is anything gained or lost from a regiment's identity by it existing in both components at the same time?


----------



## Michael OLeary

One of the best sites I've found for tracing regimental lineages is Regiments.org: http://regiments.org/?229,21

As a start point for Canadian regiments (current and historical), try these pages as a start point: 

Alphabetic list of names -  http://regiments.org/milhist/na-canada/lists/cargxref.htm

Numeric list of names - http://regiments.org/milhist/na-canada/lists/cargxrefn.htm

__________________________________________________

From "The Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army" (1964):

4 RCR antecedents were The Oxford Rifles and the Canadian Fusiliers (City of London Regiment). These two units were amalgamated on 1 October 1954 and designated at that time "The London and Oxford Fusiliers (3rd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment). It was subsequently redesignated on 25 April 1958 as "3rd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment (London and Oxford Fusiliers)"  (At the time there were only two Regular battalions, hence the 3rd Battalion designation)

4 R 22e R began as the "Voltigeurs de Beauharnois" in 1869 and the 76th Regiment "Voltigeurs de Chateauguay" from 1872. These regiments eventually became "Le Regiment de Chateauguay" (1921) and on 1 Sep 1954 was amalgamated with the R 22e R to become "Le Regiment de Chateauguay (4th Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment". Subsequently, on 27 April 1958, they became the "4e Battaillon, Royal 22e Regiment (Chateauguay)"

6 R 22e R originated in 1871 as the "St. Hyacinthe Provisional Battalion of Infantry" which was amalgamated with the R 22e R on 2 Feb, 1963, being designated the 6th Battalion.

____________________________________________________________

As for what is gained or lost, that is up to the Regiments themselves. Is it better to be amalgamated than disbanded? Perhaps even amalgamated with a 'despised' local competitor? Keep in mind that many battle honours held by our regiments were gained through perpetuation of CEF units, or later amalgamations. Done with respect, and prperly explained to regimental members, units gain through ensuring a more complete sense of our history is retained and represented by our active regiments, Reserve and Regular.


----------



## Yard Ape

My personal belief is that we loose through amalgamating reserve & regular regiments.  The history & tradition of the regular regiment will eventually overtake the reserve regiment's (which will be lost).  The LER have been able to maintain their heritage despite a PPCLI affiliation.  However, three regiments have been forever lost (The London and Oxford Fusiliers, Le Regiment de Chateauguay, St. Hyacinthe Provisional Battalion of Infantry).  I know of a long standing tradition of amalgamating reserve with reserve, and I think that the new regiment can grow from the traditions of its parents.  However, rebadging reserves into a regular force regiment will see the traditions of a regiment die.

That heritage is forever gone.


----------



## Danjanou

I tend to agree with one a point Michael made. it might be better to amalgamate thren watch a regiment be disbanded and die. 
let's be honest how many Militia Bn's and Regiments do we have that are Coy and Sqn strength. Realistically wouldn't we be better served by say some 18-20 Militia Infantry Regiments of roughly ar at least close to Bn strength (400-600 pers) and a similar reduction in Armoured, Arty and other units.

If such as thing is to happen, and I think it's a realistic possibility, then better it happen on "our" terms rather that some whim of a politician . 

Methinks I've opened the proverbial can of worms here, but then again maybe it's worthy of a debate.


----------



## stukirkpatrick

I too worry about losing regimental history - my unit may not be able to trace its lineage back as far as some, (only about 1885) but we still have served in both World Wars, and adopted a postwar Scottish title, because of some cultural origins in the Thunder Bay area.  Being the only combat arms unit in the region,and not being fairly large, would we be forced to amalgamate with a larger regiment from say, Winnipeg, becoming another coy in the Cam Highlanders or Winnipeg Rifles?  What would happen to the traditions of our unit then, would they be overridden?

Or would we remain distinct, because we are the only such regiment in Thunder Bay?


----------



## clasper

Kirkpatrick said:
			
		

> would we be forced to amalgamate with a larger regiment from say, Winnipeg, becoming another coy in the Cam Highlanders or Winnipeg Rifles?   What would happen to the traditions of our unit then, would they be overridden?
> 
> Or would we remain distinct, because we are the only such regiment in Thunder Bay?



The Brockville Rifles, while maintaining their distinct cap badge and battle honours, are administratively a company of the PWOR in Kingston.   Amalgamation of this nature preserves regimental history without too much of a problem.


----------



## Danjanou

Clasper that's probably the sort of workable amalgamation that I was getting at. Example in the Brit TA the London Regt is and Infantry Bn and each of it's 4 Rifle Coys is/was a seperate Regiment ( London Scottish, London Irish etc)


----------



## Yard Ape

I saw an argument once (that I jumped in to support) which questioned the need of sustaining every reserve regiment as a battalion.  Instead, a regiment would exist as a company (or 2, 3 , or 4 if big enough).  Battalion head quarters would be "regiment neutral" much like our current brigade HQs.  This approach could be applied to armoured and infantry regiments, and it would ensure no regiment became "lost."

The Brockville Rifles & PWOR sharing a Bn is a modern example.  An historic example would be 27 CIB, Canada's first brigade group in Germany.  It consisted of 1 Canadian Rifle Battalion, 1 Canadian Highland Battalion, and 1 Canadian Infantry Battalion.  Each company in each battalion was of a different regiment.

This becomes especially intelligent when multiple Coy sized regiments exist in the same city (eg: GGFG & Camerons of Ottawa, RHLI & A&SH, Winnipeg Rifles & Camerons, etc).

I would like to see something like this across Canada, and maybe we could even see companies of the London and Oxford Fusiliers, Le Regiment de Chateauguay, and St. Hyacinthe Infanty.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Some Regiments are better off dead.  Look at "The Highlanders" in the UK.  Blech.

The Winnipeg Light Infantry were absorbed in 1955 by the lLittle Black Devils - they were one of only three regiments to wear the oak leaf shoulder title.  None of their distinctions or honours were carried on.

I had an Italian Campaign veteran relate to me with disgust this sad story - he was in the Edmonton Regiment in Italy.  He said they carried the Patricia's through battle after battle (they were in the same brigade) and then he comes to a reunion dinner many years later, and what does he see?  "4 PPCLI" added to the end of his regiment's title!

I thought that 4 RCR and 4 PPCLI stuff was absolutely stupid, and that is just one reason why.


----------



## Art Johnson

Some years ago there was talk of amalgamating two of Toronto's Regiments the Honarary Colonel of one of the Regiments said the before that happened he would petition to have his Regiment removed from the Roll of Battle. He would rather see his Regiment die in honour than acceed to amalgamation. I back him 100 percent.


----------



## Yard Ape

Art Johnson said:
			
		

> Some years ago there was talk of amalgamating two of Toronto's Regiments the Honarary Colonel of one of the Regiments said the before that happened he would petition to have his Regiment removed from the Roll of Battle. He would rather see his Regiment die in honour than acceed to amalgamation.


Would co-existence within one battalion have been a suitable alternative in your eyes?


----------



## Coyote43D

clasper said:
			
		

> Kirkpatrick said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> would we be forced to amalgamate with a larger regiment from say, Winnipeg, becoming another coy in the Cam Highlanders or Winnipeg Rifles?   What would happen to the traditions of our unit then, would they be overridden?
> 
> Or would we remain distinct, because we are the only such regiment in Thunder Bay?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Brockville Rifles, while maintaining their distinct cap badge and battle honours, are administratively a company of the PWOR in Kingston.   Amalgamation of this nature preserves regimental history without too much of a problem.
Click to expand...


When did that happen clasper?. The reason I ask is I used to be a member of the Brockville Rifles, and when I left to join the Regs in '97 we were still our own entity and not a company of the PWOR.


----------



## clasper

That's what I was told by a member of the PWOR I knew in the mid 90's.  (I left Kingston in early 98).  You seem to be a little closer to the situation, so perhaps he was full of crap.  Sorry to mislead anyone.

Cheers


----------



## Rfn

"The Winnipeg Light Infantry were absorbed in 1955 by the lLittle Black Devils - they were one of only three regiments to wear the oak leaf shoulder title.  None of their distinctions or honours were carried on."

Mike Dorosh is right: Nothing was carried on. Very hard to find any info about the WLI.

Fitzpatrick: I dont think you have anything to worry about; when disbanding or amalgamating is discussed, the Regiments "community footprint" is considered...and in TBay the LSSR is the only (infantry) game  going.

...Unless maybe you guys _want_ to change to "B Coy, R Wpg Rif"... 

Danjanou: not sure I agree with grouping several regiments under a single Bn HQ. I've seen pictures of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Winnipeg Light Infantry _and_ the Winnipeg Grenadiers, from a time when Winnipeg was much smaller, and all of these regiments were at Bn strength. I think the current Militia strength crisis is just an unfortunate phase in it's long history.


----------



## Scott

Amalgamation of Regiments is never easy to discuss, but it would solve alot of problems when it comes to effective strength. I think that sometimes we forget that a Reserve Unit is meant to complement the Regular Force, not just uphold the history and traditions of that unit. That's how I feel anyway.

Having said that, do not touch the NSH!!! That's my pride standing out, as it does for any former member when we talk of scary subjects such as this.

Cheers!


----------



## Danjanou

Rfn;
While I would love to see all present Militia units parading at something close to full strength (that would give us what 12-15 Brigades) I seriously don't think we are ever going to see those days again.

To do so would entail a major change in our society. First of all the cost would be prohibitive and the political will just ain't there. More than that though is, where are we going to get those warm bodies to fill the newly purchased CadPat? 

Today's Nintendo generation of slackers and squeegee kids would have to be convinced to give up a couple of hours a week of their precious time and shift their cheesy and Dorito munching fat posteriors off of the couch in Mom and Dad's basement and away from their PS2 and out into the real world for a trip to the local armouries. That ain't gonna happen unless you shift them with C4 , which come to think of it isn't a bad idea.

It would take a full generation to of re-education to get that kind of commitment to public service and Country reinstated in the Canadian psyche, at the minimum. Bearing in mind even if we tried to do so the resentment from the educators and other social engineering leftist PC elites who were in charge of it would not agree with it and result in delays if not outright sabatoge. Remember the Teacher revolts against Harris for trying to introduce such concepts as community service into the secondary school curriculum.

What I was suggesting while not totally palatable to me (I was in the â Å“other regimentâ ? Art is talking about in his post re amalgamation and I know I was vocally opposed to it too), it is the lesser of two evils. 

Our present system is unworkable and top heavy in costly bureaucrats ( Just how many Militia Lt Col's does it take to "oversee" a weekend training exercise of two rifle platoons anyway?). Either we fix it or someone else will for us and given the track record of our benevolent political masters in regards to tinkering with the military, I don't want to even think about what they would do.

Scott1nsh, unless the numbers are way down with the Highlanders since I worked with them in the 1980's then I doubt there would be any amalgamation there. Perhaps a combination of the 2 Bns into one.


----------



## Rfn

Danjanou: Enjoyed your anti-youth rant ! But I think your selling the young-uns short. The high school Co-op program is very popular here, with lots of students trying to join, but CFRC is too slow, and of course there is the funding problem and lack of political will overall like you mentioned. But Many want to be free of the Nintendo culture.

Realistically though, the Rifles and Camerons usually do go on ex's together, and sometimes it isnt even  a disaster.
And we agree this is not something we want the politicians to fix.

Scott1nsh: Isnt the NSH itself the product of an amalgamation? The Cape Breton Highlanders and some other Reg?


----------



## Scott

Danjanou, you are right, the NSH is probably safe except maybe they will combine 1 and 2 Bn under one.

RFN, like alot of Regiments in Canada the NSH today IS a product of amalgamation. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders (Today 1st Battalion) was formed from: The Colchester and Hants Regiment, The Cumberland Highlanders and C Coy, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, they were then (1936) known as the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (MG) In 1941 they became known as the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, in 1954 they amalgamated with the Pictou Highlanders and and the 189 LAA  Battery, RCA to form the 1st Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders. 

As for the Capers (2nd Battalion, NSH) They were born as the Victoria Highland Provision of Infantry (Imagine the unit abbrev on the epaulets!!) in 1879, in 1880 they became the Victoria Provisional Battalion of Infantry (Argyle Highlanders), in 1890 they became the 94th Victoria Battalion of Infantry (Argyle Highlanders), 1900, 94th Victoria Regiment "Argyll Highlanders", 1914, 94th Victoria Regiment (Argyll Highlanders), 1920, The Cape Breton Highlanders, 1954 United with The North Nova Scotia Highlanders and The Pictou Highlanders to form 2nd Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders.

Most of this info can be found at the link left by a previous post (Sorry member I do not remember who put it up)
http://www.regiments.org


----------



## Yard Ape

Rfn said:
			
		

> Danjanou: not sure I agree with grouping several regiments under a single Bn HQ. I've seen pictures of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Winnipeg Light Infantry _and_ the Winnipeg Grenadiers, from a time when Winnipeg was much smaller, and all of these regiments were at Bn strength. I think the current Militia strength crisis is just an unfortunate phase in it's long history.


It would be more effecient to group multiple Coy sized regiments under one battalion, and it would preserve regimental identities.  Would people prefer to see regiments disband, or amalgamations (which may or may not preserve the identity of any of the Regiments involved?)

If the official army forms were still up, I would link to the thread where someone proposed this.  I think arguments for both sides were brilliant (usaually).


----------



## MJP

> It would be more efficient to group multiple Coy sized regiments under one battalion, and it would preserve regimental identities.  Would people prefer to see regiments disband, or amalgamations (which may or may not preserve the identity of any of the Regiments involved?)



I like this idea, and I think it would work great even for reserve units that are positioned outside of the large urban centers(IE the LSSR).  I have always wonder why reserves was organized in separate battalion organizations, when the man power was usually well below Coy strength for most exercises or parade nights.  The idea of one Bn HQ for several units is ideal, as it would save money in the long term, reduce duplication of effort and allow for more money to be spend on the troops(IMHO).   I know there would be some serious grumblings at every level for this type of model, but clearly the way reserves is organized now is cumbersome at best.


----------



## CSS Type

MJP said:
			
		

> The idea of one Bn HQ for several units is ideal, as it would save money in the long term, reduce duplication of effort and allow for more money to be spend on the troops(IMHO).
Click to expand...

Pardon my stupidity, but how would it save money in the long run? You would sitll need the armouries (the biggest cost) but you might save some minimal dollars by dropping off 37.5 days worth of LCol and CWO; however, the cost of running a standard Reserve unit is about the same cost of five Regular Force MCpls! 

How much savings do you really imagine would be gained?


----------



## combat_medic

While it may be a cost-saving alternative, I don't see it being a logistically sound idea. While our unit's BOR operates quite well, and things get processed in a reasonable amount of time, I know it's not the same for all units. Particularly in Winnipeg where you have multiple units parading out of the same armoury and sharing the same orderly room. I've heard horror stories from some of the Camerons and Winnipeg Rifles I know about the time it takes for anything to get through. They're administrating units of differnt trades, under different commands (WRT the local Med Coy), and with completely different priorities. Is it any wonder things get mixed up?

Besides, don't you think it's about time Ottawa STOPPED looking for cost cutting ventures anywhere outside of NDHQ? Don't we have more generals now than we did at the peak of WWII? Don't you think there's FAR more fat to be trimmed in that one little building than in the CF in its entirety?


----------



## MJP

> might save some minimal dollars by dropping off 37.5 days worth of LCol and CWO



I'm not talking about one Col/CWO, I'm talking the entire BN organization(CO,DCO etc etc) of 2-4 regiments, fall under on Bn organization.  Will it work?  Who knows, but several units have success running two or more Coys from different locations within a province, so it's an idea that has some merit.



Obviously capital costs like armouries, and equipment would remain constant and would be a major part of any budget.  

Combat Medic brings up a good point RE: Adminstration:

Having come from Winnipeg I all to well know the frustration of having to deal with a central support orderly room.  When I was there I hated their "I work a Tuesday night so I get Friday off attitude".  My wife work at an ASC for 41 brigade and the same attitude prevailed there too.  It's a sad day when the support staff forget that they are there for SUPPORT.

So I think every Reserve Coy would keep, a sort of Coy office(old BOR) and the first POC for administrative needs of the members would go through their coy clerk.  It can even be expanded to include a administrative officer(AO) that would assist the 2IC of the Coy with his end of the Paperwork.  But having a BOR/ASC/central OR that deals with the big administrative issues and assists the Coy clerks would be ideal.  

CQMS could be reworked for units that parade at the same location but because of the distance some units are apart from each other, I think most field stores should be held at unit/coy level. 

Recruiting would fall under the BN HQ structure with a representative from each Coy within the cell.  Of course this probably won't effect far-flung units as they usually deal with recruiting as they do now.  This has the potential to become a thorny issue. 

Training- Having a larger base of troops under one umbrella allows for leaders to actually lead full sized Pl/Coy operations.  I think most reservists can recall being on many a EX with 3 sections of 4-6 guys and a thinned out PL HQ.  It doesn't make for a fun EX, and doesn't allow leaders to exercise to themselves completely.  Having the flexibility to combine forces at certain junctures allows for more room for improvement at all levels. 

There is much more here than just saving money, I think for the most part it allows for the elimination of "duplication of effort" and allows training to be more collective.  I think having 150+ soldiers working together, on exercise is allot better than having 3 or 4 groups of soldiers working independently.  It allows the leadership to truly lead full sized Pl/and Coy Operations and lessons learned by one group isn't contained within that small group but rather through the AAR process becomes corporate knowledge.

I'll admit this is a very crude working of how it would all gel together, LOTS of things would have to be ironed out before anything of this nature took place.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

The salient point about battalion headquarters is that the Militia is supposed to provide a framework in time of war on which a fully operational field army can be raised.  While the need for battalion headquarters personnel is not apparent now, if we were ever to moblize more than a single division, the need for a framework of battalion and brigade staffs would be made more obvious.  I don't see why the conversation would go beyond that very basic point.


----------



## Infanteer

> The salient point about battalion headquarters is that the Militia is supposed to provide a framework in time of war on which a fully operational field army can be raised.  While the need for battalion headquarters personnel is not apparent now, if we were ever to moblize more than a single division, the need for a framework of battalion and brigade staffs would be made more obvious.  I don't see why the conversation would go beyond that very basic point.



If military planners think this is how we need to prepare for future conflicts, then we're already fucked.  That kind of thinking is 50 years out of date.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The salient point about battalion headquarters is that the Militia is supposed to provide a framework in time of war on which a fully operational field army can be raised.  While the need for battalion headquarters personnel is not apparent now, if we were ever to moblize more than a single division, the need for a framework of battalion and brigade staffs would be made more obvious.  I don't see why the conversation would go beyond that very basic point.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If military planners think this is how we need to prepare for future conflicts, then we're already fucked.  That kind of thinking is 50 years out of date.
Click to expand...


How do you think they are doing it in the United States?  We have close relations with the 161st Infantry Regiment, National Guard.  They were recently deployed as a unit to Iraq.    Even in peacetime, though, they tend to keep their reserve units up to strength and have the will and ability to mobilize when necessary.

I don't see that keeping battalion headquarters operating is 50 years out of date; it is going on in the US as we speak.  How would YOU mobilize a 2 division field force, if the need arose?


----------



## Danjanou

You beat me to it Infanteer. 

What is that old adage that staff weinies alsways prepare to fight the last war. We are highly unlikely to see a mobilization like 1939 again, or an army of 5-8 Divisions bulit up over a six year period.

Even if we did need such a force, then amalgamating units will not prevent that. We can always split standing units into 1st and 2nd Bns (and eventually 3rd and 4th if needed reverting back to the original Regiments if need be under a total mobilization) with a small slice being pulled from the initial Bn to be the core cadre of the forming second one.

What we probably will need (do need) is 1-2 Divisions of trained and equipped Reservists able to be quickly utilised now to support our 1 Regular Division.

As pointed out we would be eliminating a whole series of redundant Bn and higher HQ's (and thinking of some Co's DCOs and RSMs I've had to deal with in the past that's an incentive right there). That would in addition to providing a more realistic indian to chiefs ratio in the units slow the promotions rates to Snr officer and NCOs positions in the Militia as a by product (1 RSm vs 3-4, 4-6 CSMs vs 12-16 etc etc). Result a better quality (as opposed to quantity) senior leadership in militia units. Something most can agree has been perceived as a shortcoming at times. Mind there would have to be some incentive for staying if promotions slowed down across the board, like say training, pay and benefits on a par with the regulars.

This is not proposed as a cost saving measure per say, although as noted there would be some. Its more an efficency exercise that would give us viable usable units, which last time I checked was the whole point of the exercise. Were I still in, that would be enough for me to put on another cap badge if I had to.


----------



## Infanteer

> I don't see that keeping battalion headquarters operating is 50 years out of date; it is going on in the US as we speak.   How would YOU mobilize a 2 division field force, if the need arose?



*"There is no going back, in other words, to the assumption on which the traditional American nation-state was founded: that a small army, augmented by large numbers of reservists, is all that is needed to hold the enemy at bay while the civilian economic facilities are converted to wartime production.

Rather than relying on the cumbersome mobilization and massed firepower arrangements of the Cold War, this work suggests reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups positioned on the Frontiers of American security, ready to act quickly and decisively, primed to move with a minimum of preparation."

Col. Douglas MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx*

I feel this statement is very relevant to our situation as well, although in a much smaller scale.   I am a firm believer in the fact that we are best served by fielding a fully trained and equipped professional force that is rapidly deployable worldwide.   In today's fluid international environment, all contingencies along the Spectrum of Conflict require quick and decisive action; our opponents will not let us sit on the shores of Britain and build sufficient forces to re-cross the Channel (The outdated idea I was referring to).   If there are situations which require more then we can commit, then Generals and Politicians are not doing their job by ignoring the demands required of a modern and effective fighting force of a post-industrial world leader.

We shouldn't have to mobilize a two division force.   If our leaders were on top of things and figured two divisions were required of the Canadian Army to credibly serve our interests, then we should have two divisions of regular professionals standing on the wall.   Obviously, coalitions and alliances help to apportion out the responsibilities of meeting force requirements, but we can't ignore our end of the bargin and let our allies shoulder our burden of security; what I'm saying is that we probably do require two divisions.   However, I would not look to mobilizing them out of reservists when the need comes, rather we need those troops on call; forming a force that size requires considerable effort towards recruiting and retention, training, incentives and attractiveness of a military career, equipment, and a whole other myriad of issues above my pay grade.   Seems like a tall order, but isn't that what the leadership is there for?

Besides, if for some odd reason we decided to mobilize reserve units, I sure wouldn't want to be following some Reserve Colonel into battle, who at best has commanded a Platoon in dry fire training.   If Militia is to remain relevent today, we need to do what Danjanou says and tailor the reserves as a "reaction force" for supplementing the Regulars (the ROTO 11 CRIC on a more permanent level).   Face it, all the Militia does now is to act as a minor league feeder pool for the Regular Forces at best and a social club at worst.   The day of the citzen-soldier or the volunteer coming to pull Canada out of the fire is over; infact I would venture that this notion is mythical in itself as we've had to build professional forces in all our wars around the bloody lessons of unpreparedness.   A friend of mine was quite astute in pointing out that Afghanistan was the first case in which Canada sent a its Regular Forces to war.   This is a professional's game more now then it ever was.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Makes much more sense when you put it like that, thanks.


----------



## MJP

Micheal is right in stating that the reserve is to provide a frame work for mobilization.....I just happen to think they still can do it with a reduction in some upper echelon.  The primary role of the entire(air, land, sea) reserve force in general is to augment, sustain and support deployed forces.  
The roles of the militia in priority are;
        -To provide the framework for mobilization
        -To augment and sustain the regular force
        -To serve as a link between military and civilian communities

In the Land Forces there are 132 reserve units situated throughout Canada.  You can not tell me honestly they all parade at their full strength or rather train at full strength all the time(or part of the time for that matter).  The truth is the both the reserves and the Regs have way to many upper echelon for the amount of people contain within.  We can start a new subject on where the Regs could be improved but for now we are looking at reserves.  

If we ever went to full mobilization we should/would have enough warning to significantly ramp up reserve units or form new units.  Besides the numbers contains within each unit are so low right now that if full formed units were needed right away, they would probably algamate several reserve units together to meet any emergency.

I think by allowing reserve training to become more consistent, and allowing the leadership the ability and the opportunity to actually lead they can become a much better force overall and maybe we won't see such a huge training difference between reserve and reg force soldiers at all levels.


----------



## Infanteer

Since this thread seems to be leaving the realm of Military History, I'm moving it to the general discussion section.



> -To provide the framework for mobilization


I have argued that this role is out of date.



> -To augment and sustain the regular force


This is what the militia really needs to focus on.   It is only being done half-assed.   What is the point of training a reservist up to a MCpl, only to see him lose all of his qualifications and be reduced to a private?   There needs to be one type of soldier, the amount of TI should matter only in the training, not the abilities of either.



> -To serve as a link between military and civilian communities


This seems to be something thrown up for the hell of it.   The entire military is responsible for this, not strictly the reserves.



> In the Land Forces there are 132 reserve units situated throughout Canada.   You can not tell me honestly they all parade at their full strength or rather train at full strength all the time(or part of the time for that matter).   The truth is the both the reserves and the Regs have way to many upper echelon for the amount of people contain within.   We can start a new subject on where the Regs could be improved but for now we are looking at reserves.



Quite true.   Most reserve regiments on paper have company+ strength (about 200).   For training, you often see platoon+ showing up.



> If we ever went to full mobilization we should/would have enough warning to significantly ramp up reserve units or form new units.   Besides the numbers contains within each unit are so low right now that if full formed units were needed right away, they would probably algamate several reserve units together to meet any emergency.
> 
> I think by allowing reserve training to become more consistent, and allowing the leadership the ability and the opportunity to actually lead they can become a much better force overall and maybe we won't see such a huge training difference between reserve and reg force soldiers at all levels.



I believe the reserves should be structured to meet the demands required of it in the shortest amount of time possible.   Soldiers should be qualified to do their job at the level of their reg force counterparts following an intensive work up training.   Units should be built around deployable lines rather than some community or regimental one.   

Take BC for instance.   Why not forge all units into one battalion.   The four infantry units can provide a company each, the two armour units a mounted recce/direct fire support capability.   Give mortars to the arty units and have the engineers fill in a assault pioneer role, while the service battalion and the medics can form the admin company.   The battalion will have a colonel and a RSM (as opposed to the Brigade Commander/BRSM and the 14 CO's and RSM's that the Brigade has now).   All the regional armouries will be given sub-unit status and fill that TO&E (which seems to be what they are cabable of).  The fact that this battalion would be overstrength is a bonus providing that many reservists are not able to commit to 100% if the training.   I think the British Columbia Regiment would be a suitable designation for this battalion, giving everyone in the province the same capbrass and colours to support regimental pride; however I think all the other units would balk at adopting the regimental affiliation of one of the armoured units.  This battalion would receive a single training budget and would do its utmost to train as a full unit when possible.   Although efficiency is a target here, the single most important aspect of this is unity of command and effort, that tried and true concept that ensures everyone is working towards supporting the main effort.   Right now we have Reserve units training willy-nilly around the country, pissing away dollars on individual units that could be combined for something better.

Two ideas in how to incorporate this battalion into LFWA.   Make the three reserve battalions (What were 38, 39, and 41 CBG) part of 1 CMBG.   I could see advantages by being in the Brigade training loop and can lead to increased levels of reserve/reg interoperability.   However, this one sounds less plausible for a realistic fear that the reserves will be viewed as a burden to the Brigade commander and much of the reserve portion of a Brigade budget will be appropriated for the regular force units.

The other possibility is to have 2 Brigades within LFWA, 1 CMBG and 3CBG.   A reserve Brigade staff to control the units of Western Canada will be directly responsible to the LFWA commander.   If things were done right, 3 CBG could be called upon to supplement 1 CMBG during the ATOF cycle.   Take Afghanistan; 1 CMBG will be tasked to provide a battlegroup based around an infantry battalion.   The next incoming Battlegroup can be a 50/50 mix of 1 CMBG and 3 CBG.   Finally, a full 1 CBG battle group can be inserted, perhaps with certain elements of the 50/50 group remaining on to help with C2 efforts.

This may sound a bit dreamy, but I hope you can see I'm trying to work towards making the reserves a fully functioning force to augment the regular force in short order.   If the military's idea of effective augmentation is to keep the reserve units on the backburner until the Soviets cross the Elbe river, then the Militia just may as well pack it up and join the military when that time comes.   Why should 20,000 regulars handle the majority of the load during wartime (we are at war, if you all remember) when there are about 15,000 reservists, most who are willing to contribute.   But to do so effectively, they must be properly trained (one standard in qualifications), properly led (get rid of this MITCIP crap), and properly supported by the government (funding and job protection).   It may seem like a tall order, but like I said before, that's what the leadership (civilian and uniformed) is for.


----------



## MJP

> -To provide the framework for mobilization
> I have argued that this role is out of date.



Very out of date, but there will always be a "higher HQs" for reserves.  Even under your LFWA proposal, the framework is still there, and should be, should it ever be needed.  I just happen to think, like you that the fat needs to be trimmed away.



> Why not forge all units into one battalion.  The four infantry units can provide a company each, the two armour units a mounted recce/direct fire support capability.  Give mortars to the arty units and have the engineers fill in a assault pioneer role, while the service battalion and the medics can form the admin company.



I was waiting for someone to jump in with but what do you do with the armoured/medics/service Bns.  I was thinking along the same lines too Infanteer.  Can you imagine an exercise where there is actually a recce screen, an actual advancing element, arty support, service support and even medical support?  The ability for the reserves to train as a collective whole with all cbt and supporting arms is something that is vital if augmentation is to be as seamless as possible.  I have only seen one reserve exercise, where all of these have come together and even then it was a special MILCON type exercise that took a ton of planning.  Now with that being said, I've been out of the reserves since early 01 and they may have had some success in having these sorts of exercises on a regular basis since then.  But I think its the exception not the rule.  



> viewed as a burden to the Brigade commander and much of the reserve portion of a Brigade budget will be appropriated for the regular force units.



I would hope that Reserves would be recognized for what they could potentially be, which is effective augmentees to any mission the CF undertakes.  If trained properly there really should be no reason why sub units couldn't join a Reg BG as augmentees, only needing the same sort of workup that their regular counterparts endure.  Were unit members kept together for the CRIC Coy on ROTO 11 or was everyone pretty much thrown into a spot?  I ask because I think the way the CRIC coys were heading was step in the right direction, but the value of the any Coy like that would be lost initially if members that trained together, weren't kept together.  



> But to do so effectively, they must be properly trained (one standard in qualifications), properly led (get rid of this MITCIP crap), and properly supported by the government (funding and job protection).  It may seem like a tall order, but like I said before, that's what the leadership (civilian and uniformed) is for.



I think one of the major obstacles to any sort of reserve restructuring is the reserves itself.  Way to many people like their kingdoms they have built and view change as an attack on themselves.  I don't want to see the loss of regiments anymore than anyone else but the reality is that the number of troops doesn't justify the framework right now.  Danjanou's comment "Just how many Militia Lt Col's does it take to "oversee" a weekend training exercise of two rifle platoons anyway?", keeps rolling across my mind when I think of this subject.


----------



## Danjanou

Whoa, do I get the feeling I've opened a can of worms here.

Infanteer and MJP have both put more clearly some of the ideas I was trying to get at, and the inherent advantages and benefits that I saw resulting form such an amalgamation. Also thanks Infanteer for moving this.

Yes it would take a lot of work and there would be several bruised egos along the way. As noted a lot of people have built up little fiefdoms and would be most unwilling to part with them. Now I've been out of the loop for a bit, but from what I remember those same senior individuals for the most part are the ones who are part of the problem, the â Å“social club soldiers.â ?

I remember taking over as CSM of a rifle coy in Toronto (ok we hard pressed to put a platoon in the field when I took over) and having to explain to a couple of my Sergeants that no Tuesday Night Parade was not an excuse to say â Å“carry on Cplâ ? at 1930 and head for the Sgt's Mess. Some resented that and eventually found new homes, a few came around to my way of "work is work and play is play" and eventually we built a new company over a 4-5 year period that was at full or close to it strength when I left  (and I mean taking 100-140 bodies, 3xPls an HQ and an A-Ech into the field apart from the rest of the regiment), and when they got there knew what they were doing.

We can bring Reservists up to the standard that they can with minimal work up take their place on the wall beside their Regular counterparts. There are members on the board who are examples of that. We need however to make the decision to do so and part of that is realising that our present organization is unwieldy, top heavy and just bloody not working and go from there.

Amalgamation is not something new to the Militia. Just about every unit now on the Order of battle is a result of some sot of amalgamation or conversion in the past. Especially in the Infantry.	

How we go about it though as Infanteers example show will require a little thought and give and take to minimize the hurt. Do we just group the units by geographic region (the BC Regiment, The Winnipeg Regiment, The Toronto Regiment etc)? Or do we try and lump all the â Å“Highlandersâ ?, â Å“Riflesâ ? â Å“Hussarsâ ? etc into new units? Perhaps a combination of this would be best.

Then how far do we take it Will the new â Å“Toronto Highlandersâ ? three component rifle companies wear the insignia and accoutrements of the 48th Highlanders, Toronto Scottish and Lorne Scots respectively or after a while will they sport some â Å“newâ ? cap badge and tartan?

The first step just is to determine just how many Bns, Bdes etc we need. I think based on what we have now we could probably end up with 6 fairly full strength Brigades spread across the country each with 3 Inf Bns ( light and/or LAV),an armoured Regt., and attached Artillery Engineer and Svc Support units.

I think that the various CSS and support arms Arty & Engineer may be easier to do than the Infantry and the Black hats. They may find it more palatable for the present Arty units to become batteries or even troops as part of a new full strength Unit. Same for the thumpers Mind they've always been a practical lot. 

Well that's more than my two cent's worth for today.


----------



## Yard Ape

A few thoughts on structuring the reserves for mobilization & doing away with superflous battalion HQs:

1)  Most of the LCol that are reserve COs would disapear into staff jobs or carry on as the CO whatever elements of the regiment contiue to parade & train in the local armouries here in Canada.  In an army that has no divisions, reserve officers will be the most likely source to stand-up the headquarters of any formation above brigade.  In this regard, are we any worse off if we have only a quarter as many LCol, but twice as many MCSC qualified Maj & Capt?  The staff experience of these officers would also be greater.  Instead of filling the job of Ops O in a regiment with two rifle sections, a Pl HQ, and a Coy HQ, officers would have the experience of Ops O for 3 to 5 companies.  

2)  The linear chain of command in a reserve unit may breed a lack of appreciation for its necessity.  I have come across many reserve units where it is okay for anyone to visit the Ops O or the BOR to resove issuse that they should push through the Chain of Command.  In a full-up battalion structure, people will quickly learn that these people/offices do not have the time for them.  It will also ensure that leaders at more junior levels learn to deal with more of the personnel administration sooner.  

3)  Mobilization is not possible without the equipment.  We don't have enough for the regular force, so equiping the reserves is not likely.  But our allies will give us equipment you say?  Only after they have met thier own needs and if there is not enough, we will be the ones to do with out.  Recall the Ross Rifle?  The Brits would have replaced it before allowing us to go to France, but they did not have enough Lee Enfield to make this happen & Canada when to war with a rifle that is responsible for the deaths of many Canadians (but they died in good Brit boots that had replaced Canadian boots).  What about the Second World War?  Well, according to Desmond Morton "our utter lack of madern equipment kept us out of serious fighting until 1942."  Industry will not come to our rescue either, because it would take years to manufacture everyything for a modern brigade.

4)  Any future war most likely will be fought by standing forces, however the need for a military force does not end just becuase the politicians said fighting was over (look to Iraq).  The ability to mobilize follow-on forces for stability Ops would be an esential reserve capability.  

5)





			
				MJP said:
			
		

> I think by allowing reserve training to become more consistent, and allowing the leadership the ability and the opportunity to actually lead they can become a much better force overall and maybe we won't see such a huge training difference between reserve and reg force soldiers at all levels.


I Agree

6) If the reserves only operate at the battle group level, then they will not be suitable to augment higher level formations.  This is more of an issue for Arty, Engineers, and CSS who may be called upon to fill thier roll in a brigade context.  They will not be able to if they have never done this.

So, I recomend:

A)  Keep the current brigades & restructure the Infantry & Recce regiments into multi-regimental battalions.  These battalions will have full-up Admin Coy & Bn HQ.

B)  Each brigade will have one service battalion.  Multiple battalions will be reduced to one Bn HQ & various companies spread around the brigade.  There will be one maintenance company & there can be multiple S&T Coys.

C) Each brigade will have one Arty regiment.  Multiple regiments will be reduced to one RHQ & various batteries spread around the brigade.  Independant batteries will be absorbed into the regiment.  Some batteries may be mortar tasked.

D) Each brigade will have one Engineer regiment.  Multiple regiments will be reduced to one, and independant squadrons will be absorbed into the regiment.


----------



## Infanteer

Yard Ape, you state that "Any future war most likely will be fought by standing forces, however the need for a military force does not end just because the politicians said fighting was over (look to Iraq).   The ability to mobilize follow-on forces for stability Ops would be an essential reserve capability."

I agree fully, but I still can't see justifying a brigade with 500 to 1,000 soldiers meets the above requirement.   In the battalion-level structure I proposed, a reserve "Battalion Group" can train to fight as a battalion and be prepared for the "come as you are" conflicts that the Army must structure itself to fight.   If the balloon goes up and we get involved in a conflict that requires more then the regulars can commit, a reserve battalion which has trained together can be mobilized and deployed together.   I cannot see us doing so with the number contained in a reserve Brigade.

As an addition to my proposal, the hypothetical "reserve Brigade" should also have reserve units fulfilling its brigade level tasking in order to ensure that a Brigade can deploy as a whole if the situation requires.

Lets look at LFWA to flesh this out.   As it stands, LFWA contains 1 Regular Brigade, 1 CMBG, and three Reserve brigades, 39 CBG, 41 CBG, and 38 CBG, which are composed of a hodgepodge of understrength companies representing historical regiments.

My idea would organize LFWA into two Brigades.   1 CMBG would be the Regular Brigade, while 3 CBG (or whatever, I just picked the first unused number) would be the Reserve Brigade.

Here would be the breakdown.

BC (Formerly 39 CBG):
-   Provides the British Columbia Regiment (or Rifles, or Fusiliers; whatever floats your boat) consisting of 4x Rifle Companies, 1x DFS Coy, 1x Mortar Coy, 1 x Pioneer Squadron, 1 x   HQ and Admin Coy.
-   As well, provides 3 CBG Brigade Field Engineer Squadron. (44 FES in Trail)

Alberta (Formerly 41 CBG):
-   Provides the Alberta Regiment (or Rifles, or Mounted Crossbowman, or Jedi Knights; whatever floats your boat).   Same as BC Battalion.
- As well, provides 3 CBG Headquarters and Service Battalion (Edmonton).

Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the Lakes Region (Formerly 38 CBG):
-   Provides the Prairie Regiment (or the RCMP Musical Ride, or the Saskatchstanis; whatever floats your boat).   Same as other two Battalions.
-   Provides Brigade Artillery Regiment.

You could do the same with the other reserve Brigade groups throughout Canada (10) forming 3 to 4 (fully manned) Reserve Brigades.   Here is an organizational force that accommodates the manpower, equipment, and resources accorded to the Militia.   If BC saw fit to recruit and maintain 5,000 reservists, then I'd organize it as a Brigade.   But until then, we are playing with paper tigers.   Why not build an organization as you would have it fight, making it capable of deploying to the "come-as-you-are" wars that we will no doubt be required to fight in the future.


----------



## MJP

I like both plans proposed but I see some things that might have to be fleshed out better.   Yard Ape brought up things I hadn't thought about and I lean more towards his line with the retention of higher HQ units to retain "the ability to augment higher level formations".   However I think that there should only be one for each supporting arm and from there in the actual organization of the force I like Infanteer's ideas overall.

On the subject of Arty yard ape has;


> Each brigade will have one Arty regiment.   Multiple regiments will be reduced to one RHQ & various batteries spread around the brigade.   Independent batteries will be absorbed into the regiment.   Some batteries may be mortar tasked.


while Infanteer has


> 1x Mortar Coy (within each Bn) and Provides Brigade Artillery Regiment.(formerly 38 CBG)


This is again taken with LFWA as the example.

What if the Arty was all one regiment with individual batteries given to each Provincial Bn?   It would retain a higher HQ for the maintenance of the ability "augment higher level formations".   I thinkit would be mixture of mortar and 105 is needed, but not necessarily in the same "Provincial Bn".   These batteries would be integral within each Provincial Bn and could integrate with other batteries and the regimental HQ if needed.   I think we would be hard pressed to get mortar Coys on top of an Artillery Regiment as it is under Infanteer's plan, unless I read it wrong and the Coys are part of the regiment?

I think the same type of model would be undertaken for the rest of the arms; Engineer, Service Support.   I think it allows for flexibility to either train as part of the BN, train as a individual sub-unit or train to support an entire brigade.   This way reserve officers would retain the staff skills that are vital for any sort of operation and wouldn't be at a disadvantage for learning higher level staff functions as their reg F counterparts.


My apologies if I misinterpreted either one of your plans, long day much reading late at night..... 

Quick question to end this Yard ape what is MCSC? in regards to Capt and Majors for staff positions?   I'm assuming Militia something staff college but the acronym threw me for a loop.  Never mind answered my own question Militia command and staff course or college.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Send our reserves "come as you are" to fight?  Maybe we should plan to just, oh, I don't know, train up a sizeable intake of recruits while we re-invent how to equip and fight formations again.  I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.  If our response to crisis is to deploy the reserve in composite battalions as-is, we will be ridden down like the proverbial grass and have nothing but registered letters and offers from the International Red Cross to deliver packages to PoWs.

Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption.  I am still waiting.  Is there a secret time-and-motion study that was done proving that two-thirds to three-quarters of the reserve leadership and staff at the unit and brigade level is unrequired?

I have an idea.  Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year.  Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.


----------



## Infanteer

> Send our reserves "come as you are" to fight?   Maybe we should plan to just, oh, I don't know, train up a sizeable intake of recruits while we re-invent how to equip and fight formations again.


   I think doing those is part of the neccessary steps needed to ensure we can deploy a reserve formation into a modern conflict.   That is why I've advocated the organizational and command structures to better streamline the reserve system to train as they would fight.

My ideas come from a combination of research and due to my own personal experiences on the ROTO 11 Composite Reserve Infantry Company, which was all reservist (expect for a reg CSM and CQ) sub unit that deployed as D coy, 1 PPCLI.   The unit was organized roughly with a platoon from each of the reserve brigades from LFWA, with 41 Brigade also supplying a Command element.   It was a success for the most part, and showed that with the proper work up, squared away reservists are just as capable of holding the line.   Unfortunatly, at the end of the ROTO the company was broken up with the soldiers being sent back to their home units.   Any level of cohesivness and teamwork that was built up was lost.   What I am advocating is building reserve companies at the unit level, rather then planning them as some sort of Regiment, ready to unfold the colours and march to Vimy.   This way, we don't have to start from scratch when we want to build a reserve subunit to take the place of the regular force one on a deployment.



> I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.



I don't advocate trying to train reserves at the division or brigade level.   The regular force can barely accomplish that.   Unfortunately, our system is organized so we have to do so.   I say that reserve units train as a company and the former CBG runs their training as a battalion, as that is the de facto level of organizaton.   The problem is that these units _think_ they are independent, when they shouldn't be.   This way, reserves can effectivly deliver company and possibly battalion level forces to LFWA for deployment.



> If our response to crisis is to deploy the reserve in composite battalions as-is, we will be ridden down like the proverbial grass and have nothing but registered letters and offers from the International Red Cross to deliver packages to PoWs.



Well, to quote my Platoon Warrant from my platoon overseas, who spent 25 years in the Regs, did the Airborne thing and all that; "I'd put you maggots up with any of the Regular platoons I've been with...."

I thought that was probably the best complement of the tour.   Sir, if your not willing to give credit to reservists who can and have soldiered on, how are we to get anywhere?



> Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption.   I am still waiting.   Is there a secret time-and-motion study that was done proving that two-thirds to three-quarters of the reserve leadership and staff at the unit and brigade level is unrequired?
> 
> I have an idea.   Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year.   Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.



Regular force Companies seem to do OK.   I know what position you are in, so perhaps you can help better explain the additional difficulties that reserve units face so our "wild theories" can take them into account.   If you think my idea is right out to lunch, please give me a better solution, because I've taken the time and effort to put forth something for everyone to digest.


----------



## MJP

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Send our reserves "come as you are" to fight?   Maybe we should plan to just, oh, I don't know, train up a sizeable intake of recruits while we re-invent how to equip and fight formations again.   I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.   If our response to crisis is to deploy the reserve in composite battalions as-is, we will be ridden down like the proverbial grass and have nothing but registered letters and offers from the International Red Cross to deliver packages to PoWs.



We've said before we would need full wartime establishment(Stage four National mobilization), the need for it would be apparent and the establishment of new units or the expansion of existing ones would be already ramped up or in the works.   Heaven help everyone if the balloon up so fast that it wasn't as "surprise the Regs wouldn't be ready either".




> I have an idea.   Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year.   Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.



I like the idea already....    But all kidding aside. So I imagine every Reg Force Bn will collaspe any day now?   No I didn't think so, because the support beyond unit level is still there, as it would be under any sort of restructuring of the reserves that we are discussing.   I'm not advocating getting rid of all support wether it be administrative or staff.   In fact the same number of administrative staff would probably still be utilized if not more.   

Well the unit would be in "company establishment" they still would have all the support they had as they would still have a battalion HQ to plans Ops/ and assist in any administration(BOR/ASU/Whatever you want to call it) that the COY clerk cannot handle.   My clerk has no problems with supporting 125+ pers with BOR support. It just this Bn HQ would have a larger complement of soldiers under it, something reserve Bns aren't use too I'll admit.

As for your staffing comment I haven't seen too many people write reports or conduct studies that take them out of a job lately have you?
I bet you there are studies out there that prove the staffing system works and from my rudimentry level of understanding of it, I think it works to.   I just happen to think we are kidding ourselves if we think any reserve brigade is an actual brigade in sense of numbers.   Why have ten weak reserve bridgades when we can have 3 or 4 strong ones?   

As for needing more staff to ramp up additional brigades/division level HQs in case of emergency...I can think of a few unfunded project offices in NDHQ we can close.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Why would a Reg F unit collapse?  Everyone is full-time.

I have heard over the past two decades, repeatedly, two contradictory themes:

1) "It would be as easy for one full-time person to fill this appointment for three or four units, as for one unit."
2) "You part-timers don't realize how busy we full-timers are."

My point is this: there is enough _required_ work - apparently - at the unit level to keep somewhere between 5 and 8 full-time staff busy, and 5 or more part-timers in senior staff and command positions busy for more part-time than is typically budgeted.  I certainly believe there is some duplication and unnecessary busywork which can be eliminated.  I am also aware that there are certain constraints that add to administrative burdens - recruiting, and messes and institutes are two examples.  We'd better have a clear idea of what must be done and who will do it before merging three or four units into one.  I would have welcomed a very stiff broom to sweep aside much of the routine humdrum, but that promise - it has been made by more than one person - has never become reality.

I have heard no full-time staff at brigade level complain of or admit to being underworked.

There is a certain amount of situation of the estimate in each person's mind.  I realize reservists have deployed effectively.  I wonder how a battalion with, say, 40% reservists in the line slots would fare two weeks into deployment while facing down an attacking regular Pakistani armoured brigade in some sort of imaginary crisis.  Obviously that's a different expectation than having a company at whatever constitutes "reserve readiness" state to train for deployment on the next peacekeeping / peace enforcement mission.

We don't gain much from organizing and training as we intend to fight if we don't deploy as we organize and train.  It doesn't require reorganization for the existing units to train collectively, just the will and funding to do so. 

All of that amounts to secondary concerns in my view.  Forget battalion...

>What I am advocating is building reserve companies at the unit level

How many company-sized reserve units have achieved this and are ready to be amalgamated into battalions for battalion collective training?  Reorganization isn't going to wash away the need for pre-deployment (or mobilization) workups if we don't even believe the reservists should be routinely using the same equipment as the regulars.

If the role of the reserve is to be dumbed down to occasional backfill of shorthanded low intensity foreign adventures and shovel monkeys for domestic operations*, then as a taxpayer I say just pack it in and fund the regulars.

*Let them be paid as civilians, or show up as volunteers


----------



## combat_medic

A Reg F Bn would probably collapse because bringing them up to wartime strength when some Battalions are down to as little as half strength would be a HUGE undertaking. If, in 6 months to a year the CF were somehow able to recruit the thousands of people necessary to fill up all the Reg F Inf Battalions to full, wartime strength, that would mean that between a quarter and half of your entire battalion will be either untrained, or brand new. It's doubtful that there would be enough leadership (Junior, Senior, Officer or otherwise) to sustain that kind of Bn. Unless you're doing field promotions hand over fist, it's a whole lot of untrained privates to be dealing with.


----------



## Michael OLeary

> My clerk has no problems with supporting 125+ pers with BOR support.



But remember that your clerk isn't manning the potentially only "open/public access" military desk in the community, dealing with walk-in or file preparation recruiting inquiries, releases, pay, possibly day-to-day budget monitoring as the FMAS point of contact, probably backfilling the Trg WO on monitoring tasks in the CFTPO, as well all as dealing with unit-level and pers admin in support of unit activities and out of unit training, courses and tasks. 

In the Reg Force, clerks at the company level are very focused in their range of duties, and it's primarily pers support for the troops, often covering a limited number of trades and ranks. A full-time clerk with a Reserve unit, even though the number of supported personnel may be the same as the Reg Force Coy Clerk, is much more of a jack-of-all-trades, performing many functions that are transparent to the average soldier when they are being done right.


----------



## Infanteer

That's why my old reserve unit (Coy size) has six clerks (1 reg RSS, two reserves).   If the reserve units can justify a requirement for extra administrative support, we can allow for that in a TO&E.

I think we are getting sidetracked.   Why are we letting issues of a clerk or two and some paperwork alter the doctrine and force structure for the Militia?


----------



## Michael OLeary

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I think we are getting sidetracked.   Why are we letting issues of a clerk or two and some paperwork alter the doctrine and force structure for the Militia?



Because when you start to generalize remodelling collective Reserve units against a Regular Force unit model, you have to keep in mind that the workloads and responsibilities of apparently similar positions are not necessarily equal. And any new proposal still has to meet the status quo responsibilities of the existing unit(s). For example, a composite Reserve unit with sub-units in six locations has six recruiting points of contact to maintain, not one at the unit level (which is still one more than a Reg F unit).


----------



## Infanteer

Of course my ideas are elementary, attempting to devise the best framework from which to work from.

Perhaps we should start a thread on how to approach reserve recruiting then?   I've posted multiple threads on my thoughts on recruiting, and CFRC members have been good enough to offer their first hand knowledge in turn.  Is there anything else to contribute?

My experience with reserve recruiting is that it lies in the hands of the CFRC.   Reserve units of about 100-200 members can sustain efforts to get local interest, recruits through the door, etc, etc.   They go to CFRC for all their processing, merely needing a signature from the reserve unit that says "Yes, we want this guy/gal for our unit."   Am I mistaken in this perception?

This is something reserve units do now and can continue to do as a sub-unit.   I can think of many different ways of ensuring the responsibility for recruitng gets picked up at the "Armoury" level (I've seen 'em done before).

Do you see any other problems?

(PS: Does anyone know how the British TA runs their recruiting?   I believe their "Armoury" level units are company strength.)


----------



## MJP

Excellent finally got some people interested in the thread, that didn't agree.   Kinda hard to debate when the three main people all agree  .  Look forward to reading and replying when my new son(and wife) gives me the chance...back to the hospital I go.


----------



## Infanteer

Hey, congrats MJP.  If I had a big stinky cigar, I'd give it to you.

Is he going to be able to make the summer BMQ?


----------



## Scott

Infanteer, 
In the Recruiting section of the forum there was a post from a young fellow who said that his local PRes Unit offered Co-Op programs for High School students, I am sorry that I do not know the accuracy of this. I think that this is one way to approach Recruiting for the Reserves. The PRes fits well with a student's schedule, from what I remember there were alot of long weekends used for ex's, spring break, summer vacation and part of x-mas break. I think that if the PRes were to get together with the respective Dep'ts of Education and work on this that we could have some fantastic results.  This doesn't solve the problem of keeping good NCO's, but I do think it could be a starting point. Perhaps this has already been discussed elsewhere....

Or what about offering young offenders a second chance. I realize that some may not want a young criminal around them with a loaded C7 but it is worth mention is it not?

Just a thought


----------



## Rfn

MJP: Congratulations! and give your wife our best!

scott1nsh: In Thunder Bay and Winnipeg, there is a Co-op program, worked out with the school boards. It _is_ a good recruiting policy. The only problem is the slow pace of the recruiting process is excluding many students...

Infanteer & MJP, and others: To go back to the reorganization and rationalization argument, I cant argue with your logic, you have put much thought into reorganization of the militia cbgs into battle groups, and maybe this will result in a more realistically trained and more deployable and effective force.

But consider this: Imagine: 10 years from when this plan is implemented, say in British Columbia, to "improve training, cut costs, and increase efficiency" someone looks at improving on Infanteer's plan, which has been implemented, and says:

"My goodness, 39 Battle Group (or The British Columbia Regiment to use Infanteer's suggestion for a name) has four Infantry companies (the former "bn" size infantry regiments) plus squadron/troop size supporting arms. And none of them are quite parading up to full strength these days, so I propose:

"reducing all those understrength companies to platoons, and get rid of those useless coy HQs! Most of them are at platoon strength anyway, who needs all those overpriced Majors and Sergeants-Major, and those fat old CQMS's! What a waste of money, we only need pretty much one Coy HQ, for all of the reserves in BC.

"Which would mean of course, we could get rid of 39 Battle Group HQ. No use for a LCol to command a formation of so few troops....

...And we will call the new formation...."39 Combat Team!! (or the British Columbia Cbt Tm)"

...and when that new organization has some size problems 10 -15 yrs down the road, they will start looking at the plans for ..."39 Platoon Group!!...."

Anyway, my point is, maybe we need reform, but we should think long term. Changes and reorganizations based on the sick situation of the Militia today could result in the Militia being rationalized right out of existence.

'Cause it's always easy to reduce and downsize, but very hard to increase and expand. If you think the scenario above is a bit far-fetched dont forget, and I think Mike Dorosh can confirm, each PROVINCE in the West made up it's OWN brigade group (or Militia District, to use the old term), just over 10 years ago.


----------



## Yard Ape

MJP said:
			
		

> Quick question to end this Yard ape what is MCSC? in regards to Capt and Majors for staff positions?   I'm assuming Militia something staff college but the acronym threw me for a loop.   Never mind answered my own question Militia command and staff course or college.


Militia Command & Staff Course.   It is like the Toronto staff college for the army reserve.



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption.   I am still waiting.


For me, this is about a greater training opportuity (Sect Comd leading sections, Pl Comds leading platoons, OCs leading Coys, Bn staff with a Bn to look after, etc).   We could take all the PYs & class B dollars saved & put them into the new regional Bn HQs (at least as far as I care).



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> I have an idea.   Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year.   Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.


There are several reserve units that sucessfuly run off-site sub-units.   There are also several succesfull independant sub-units (though there were more before the medical branch became its own command).   Why can't this success be repeated in other Coy sized units?   Don't forget that a company can have an Ops O/BC, Admin O, Liaison O, and Trg NCO.   I would recoment the Trg NCO be added to the full time staff.

The proposal I have given my support to still keeps much more headquarters in place by retaining the existing brigades and reducing the number of battalion HQs.   In the same move Coy HQs would grow and the central battalion HQ would be larger than any of the previous regimental HQs.   One of my concernce with Infanteers proposal is that I envision independantly located platoons.   I do not think that these would have the staff resources to sustain themselves.   



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't advocate trying to train reserves at the division or brigade level.
Click to expand...

The regular force should be capable of dealing with any mission that requires anything upto & including a brigade (or two).   If the reserves are required to mobilize, I would expect we need divisions or a follow-on force to relieve the already comitted regular force.   In our Op Tempo over the last decade, there should have been no need for the regulars to rely on the reserves (the fact that that need did exist is due to fualt of the regular establishment & manning).   There is nothing wrong with raising reserve companies (or even units) for PSOs, but we have time to do this throughoully & using only volunteers.   So, our mobilization plans must make room for divisions & possibly even a Corps.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> What I am advocating is building reserve companies at the unit level, rather then planning them as some sort of Regiment, ready to unfold the colours and march to Vimy.   This way, we don't have to start from scratch when we want to build a reserve subunit to take the place of the regular force one on a deployment.


Most of our new reservists are highschool students.   You would need a new primary recruiting demographic before it will be come easy to deploy a company from a Bn spread over a province.



			
				Rfn said:
			
		

> 'Cause it's always easy to reduce and downsize, but very hard to increase and expand. If you think the scenario above is a bit far-fetched dont forget, and I think Mike Dorosh can confirm, each PROVINCE in the West made up it's OWN brigade group (or Militia District, to use the old term), just over 10 years ago.


I think any restructure should have a growth/decay formula.   If a Coy could sustain a given strength for a given period, it would be authorised to raise an addditional platoon.   If a Coy were to reach authorisation for (lets say) 6 platoons it would split to two Coys.   If a company fell belwo a given strength for too long, it would loose a platoon.   Battalions would split or merge based on the growth of thier companies, and brigades would split or merge based on growth the the battalions.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Yard Ape said:
			
		

> MJP said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quick question to end this Yard ape what is MCSC? in regards to Capt and Majors for staff positions?   I'm assuming Militia something staff college but the acronym threw me for a loop.   Never mind answered my own question Militia command and staff course or college.
> 
> 
> 
> Militia Command & Staff Course.   It is like the Toronto staff college for the army reserve.
Click to expand...


Actually , the MCSC is the Reserve equivalent to the Army Operations Course conducted at the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) in Kingston.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I continue to hold my view that reserve participation in ongoing peace operations should be limited to individual augmentation unless we choose to stand up a contingent as the Special Force.  Any crisis requiring a greater degree of mobilization of reserves should be something for which all go for the duration, and "rotation" is limited to pulling people out of the line after a tour and posting them (perhaps with a trade remuster) to a less stressful position.


----------



## MJP

> 'Cause it's always easy to reduce and downsize, but very hard to increase and expand


So true.   The reserves strength is allowable up to 18, 500 IIRC as it stands right now (what   they are allowed not what they have).   Any reorganization would have to take that into account and ensure that the reorganized role has spots on the TO&E for all 18,500 potential soldiers.   As well plans would have to be in place to ensure that if the numbers were allowed to increase, there will be a place to put them.   



> But remember that your clerk isn't manning the potentially only "open/public access" military desk in the community, dealing with walk-in or file preparation recruiting inquiries, releases, pay, possibly day-to-day budget monitoring as the FMAS point of contact, probably backfilling the Trg WO on monitoring tasks in the CFTPO, as well all as dealing with unit-level and pers admin in support of unit activities and out of unit training, courses and tasks.



Very true Michael but I think that situation is the exception not the rule as most reserve units have two or three units in an armories in most locations and therefore would have some sort of ASC(Armoury Support Center).   I could be wrong in my generalizations though as I'll be the first to admit I have no experience with reserve organizations in the East.   I base most of my thoughts on 38, 39, and 41 Brigades.     For the most part most administration is handle by ASCs which consists of several Reg force RSS clerks and quite a few Class B clerks doing most of the claims, releases as well as most other things mentioned in your quote.   My wife has worked at two units and for the most part never handled much in the way of claims, releases, recruiting except to point people in the right direction.   Now when she worked at an ASC, she handled everything that you would imagine a clerk to handle.   




> Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption.   I am still waiting.
> For me, this is about a greater training opportunity (Sect Comd leading sections, Pl Comds leading platoons, OCs leading Coys, Bn staff with a Bn to look after, etc).


I agree!




> reserve participation in ongoing peace operations should be limited to individual augmentation unless we choose to stand up a contingent as the Special Force


While the troops(Reg F) hated the CRIC organizations as they saw militia soldiers taking their spots on a tour, I like the idea and wished it was around when I was in the reserves.   It was probably one of the fews times that the reserves leadership there at all levels got to lead a full complement of sects/pls/coy with its integral ech.   I hope they plan for more of this sort of augmentation if we stay in Afghanistan for any length of time(even if it's just a reserve sect in a Reg Pl).


----------



## Yard Ape

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> I continue to hold my view that reserve participation in ongoing peace operations should be limited to individual augmentation unless we choose to stand up a contingent as the Special Force.


Generally, I agree.  There should be no need to send a full reserve sub-unit, but at the same time I don't think there is harm in sending a reserve sub-unit as part of a regular unit. 



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Any crisis requiring a greater degree of mobilization of reserves should be something for which all go for the duration, and "rotation" is limited to pulling people out of the line after a tour and posting them (perhaps with a trade remuster) to a less stressful position.


I think there could be a scale of mobilization lesser than this.  Not everyone went for the duration of the Korean War.  We could have a senario where 75% of the regulars launch to fight a war.  25 % of the regular field force (the guys in ATOF reconstitution)  remains in Canada.  This 25% and the mobilized Special Force will train individual replacments for the deployed force & int will stand-up the second rotation force (they will have 6 - 9 months to do this).  This second rotation force may arrive when the fighting has been declared over, but an occupation force is still required.  Occupation demands may require the the Special Force remain active for a few years after the wars ends.


----------



## Brad Sallows

That "lesser scale of mobilization" is what I envision as mobilization under Special Force.  Instead of overstretching our existing regular and reserve forces, I would prefer a policy wherein if the government wants to get "stuck in" to a situation for more than two rotos, it pays the price to recruit, train, and deploy additional contingents under the Special Force until the commitment ends.

Roto 0: Regular Force elements at "ready" state in ATOF cycle.
Roto 1: the next Regular Force elements at "ready", augmented by reservists (individuals, formed coy/pl groups - doesn't matter)
Roto 2+: Special Force elements - newly constituted, to be stood down at end of commitment

From Roto 2 on, Reg F elements in the "ready" state in excess of whatever we want to keep in hand for immediate reaction could certainly also be deployed.  The point is to generate temporary surges under the Special Force in order to never be in a state of having "no troops to send".


----------



## Infanteer

I don't think building units from scratch is a good way to engender trust and cohesion within a unit.

This "Special Force" system seems like it would be plagued by the same problems that affected the US Army with its individual replacement system in Vietnam.

Or are you reffering to something akin to the US Army's COHORT system, which maintain a pool of officers which where given their allotment of recruits, whom they trained and then moved into an active unit ready to be deployed.  This had the benefit of ensuring a stable manpower situation (everyone was on the same cycle), a familiarity within the unit, and previously established vertical and horizontal command relationships.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Trust and cohesion: units managed somehow during WWII and Korea.  I do not suggest everyone from the private soldiers to the CO be recruited off the street, trained, and deployed in 12 months under the colours of a unit which has never before been known to the order of battle.

I am suggesting that if we can reasonably foresee, for example, that we are going to commit two battle groups and a higher HQ ongoing for at least three and possibly more years, we should after the first year be sending elements which have been constituted above the normal strength of the CF, standing them down after their respective tours finish (regulars back to the regulars or working up for another tour, reservists back to the reserves, civilians back to the street).  The promising soldiers could certainly be offered another engagement.

COHORT: without universal conscription?


----------



## Yard Ape

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> That "lesser scale of mobilization" is what I envision as mobilization under Special Force.   Instead of overstretching our existing regular and reserve forces, I would prefer a policy wherein if the government wants to get "stuck in" to a situation for more than two rotos, it pays the price to recruit, train, and deploy additional contingents under the Special Force until the commitment ends.
> 
> Roto 0: Regular Force elements at "ready" state in ATOF cycle.
> Roto 1: the next Regular Force elements at "ready", augmented by reservists (individuals, formed coy/pl groups - doesn't matter)
> Roto 2+: Special Force elements - newly constituted, to be stood down at end of commitment
> 
> From Roto 2 on, Reg F elements in the "ready" state in excess of whatever we want to keep in hand for immediate reaction could certainly also be deployed.   The point is to generate temporary surges under the Special Force in order to never be in a state of having "no troops to send".


I think we are in agreement then.  However, depending on the size of the Roto 0, more than half of Roto 1 could be Special Force (and would have to have been drawn from the reserves).  In a situation like this full units would train and rotate into theater.  Individuals would be sent to replace casualties, but they would train with the unit before its deployment (they would have been MMO) and they would come home with the unit (even if only 1 month in theater).


----------



## Yard Ape

Infanteer,
What are your thoughts on the old 10:90 battalions.  Reviewing your ideas conjured up thoughts of returning to a simillar structure across the reserves (althought possibly at a 60:40 ratio).  It would be the most likely way to achieve the level of reserve readiness that you write about.


----------



## Danjanou

Not to jump in for Infanteer here but I think I noticed on another post he's off enjoying the wilderness for a couple of days.   :

My limited experience with 10/90 was that is was a good idea. The major shortcoming I noticed in the Militia was time needed to keep up with the F/T admin and maintenance etc. with a P/T staff. Often one found themselves (especially at the Snr NCO/Officer level) spending too many hours on a training evening doing "necessary admin" instead of training the troops!

Having a reasonable sized F/T cadre, as opposed to the understrength/overworked RSS and Class B to deal with this meant I would have been in a position to actually do my bloody job. Not that the paperwork side of the house wasn't per say my job I know, but then again I wasn't "working" with the unit 40 hrs a week, but only 6-8.

That said a 60/40 split seems a bit excessive for reserve units. When not involved in training/ex/ops what would all these extra bodies be doing? Second point where would they come from? Stealing from already understrength regular units is not on for obvious rreasonsAlso add in admin details such as housing   in urban areas that would become another burden.

Class B reservists might be an option, but one ask to ask are they readily available? Outside of ececonomicallyepressed regions can we find enenoughqualified persons" to fill the slots. Taking reservists from economically depressed areas to fill gaps in say Calgary, Vancouver, or Toronto unit may look good as a job creation project, but that's not the aim here. Besides the same admin problems of posting inin regs would exist.

Good idea Yardape, but methinks it needs to be fine tuned.

I was right I opened the proverbial can of worms with this thread, but a good debate all around.


----------



## Yard Ape

I suggested a larger ratio of regular force over reservists because this number would give the regulars enough mass to conduct their own training independent of the reserve component of the unit.

I think 10:90 was a mixed bag.  It was very beneficial to the reservists (who got better support staff, more experienced instructors, more full time leadership), but it came at to high a price to regular force capabilities.  I would prefer we not go back down that road, but I brought it up as it seemed like the way to make Infanteer's ideas work (maybe).


----------



## Infanteer

I don't know how this rumor of me camping with some girl got around here.... :-*

Anyways, to your question on 10/90 Yard Ape.

I can't comment directly on our specific experiment with 10/90, as it was before my time.  All I heard from both Reg Force and Reservists who were part of 10/90 was "It sucked ass" or "It was really great" followed by a variety of reasons (they stole our kit, Reservists/Reg Force guys suck, etc)

However, for the concept of Reservist/Regular intergration (which we called 10/90) does have some merit.  The two proposals here are interesting to look at.  

A return to a "10/90" approach would contain a certain number of regular NCO's and Officers to help run the reserve regiment.  These experienced leaders bring the "quantitative" aspect of the delta to reserve units (ie: there full time status means more time spent in training).  I think that this system would work much better if the reserves and the reg force had a single "qualitative" training plan (ie: the requirements for Sergeant, Lietenant, etc. were the same; no half-assed "militia" courses) in order to ensure that the reserve and regular force leadership elements were coming from the same foundational structure.

A "40/60" approach would bring a cadre of regular soldiers of all ranks to each reserve regiment.  I don't think this is plausible.  Do you keep the cadre together so they can train throughout the week?  Obviously, this would render any advantage of bringing the cadre into the unit useless.  Do you break the cadre up amongst the reserve companies?  What does a regular force rifleman do when his platoon commander and section 2ic only parade on Thursday?  As well, will a four year regular force private with tons of qualifications appreciate watching a reservist with 2 years in total and no extra training making corporal and (legally and theoretically) be of higher rank and responsibility (the same applies to all other ranks)? 

Both contain pros and cons, but neither would work if patched over our current system which provides for such a wide gulf between regulars and reservists.  Organizational changes to how the Reserves organize and train such as I propose are done to reduce this gulf.  If the gulf can be significantly reduced through change and support (both political and military) I don't think either should be necessary; the Militia could run its side of the house.

As an aside, I've seen that Australia incorporates both reserve and regular units at the formation (Brigade) level.  Do they intergrate at the unit level?  I remember the Australian reserve system was a key topic at a Reserve Symposium held at the University of Calgary, but I never heard or seen anything that came out of this, did anyone else?


----------



## McG

Our force generation and force employment structures do not need to be an exact match.  What is important is that the force generation structures of the regular force and for the reserves are in harmony and able to produce the desired force employmet structure.

The new engineer force generation has three sections in each regular force troop.  However, we still plan on four sections in each troop deployed on operations.  The reserves will be expected to provide that fourth section for every mission in which suitable work-up time is available.  This same approach could be taken to send every infantry BG out the door with four rifle companies.  Having formed & rigid reserve battle groups maintained at a deployable level, only to employ them a section or a platoon at a time would seem inconsistent to me.


----------



## pbi

> So, I recomend:
> 
> A)  Keep the current brigades & restructure the Infantry & Recce regiments into multi-regimental battalions.  These battalions will have full-up Admin Coy & Bn HQ.
> 
> B)  Each brigade will have one service battalion.  Multiple battalions will be reduced to one Bn HQ & various companies spread around the brigade.  There will be one maintenance company & there can be multiple S&T Coys.
> 
> C) Each brigade will have one Arty regiment.  Multiple regiments will be reduced to one RHQ & various batteries spread around the brigade.  Independant batteries will be absorbed into the regiment.  Some batteries may be mortar tasked.
> 
> D) Each brigade will have one Engineer regiment.  Multiple regiments will be reduced to one, and independant squadrons will be absorbed into the regiment



These parallel to an interesting degree the changes we have just initiated in 38 CBG now under LFRR Ph II:

-One Svc Bn from three; (approved for stage one: Grouping, order issued);

-One Arty Regt from three units; (approved for stage one: Grouping:, order issued); and

-creation of an Engineer Sqn inside the FGH Recce Regt (approved and should be underway now).

The first two represent very little saving in moneys: they were proposed after years of consideration because we simply cannot adequately sustain all the separate unit-level command appointments. The third was a compromise we reached with the Army after being told we could not raise an independent Sqn to replace 22Fd.(Flin Flon)

As to the problem of Reserve strengths being a recent one, I suggest that in fact most Reserve units are healthier now than they have been in years. I started my Reserve service in 1974 and I do not recall these supposed "golden days" of full strength units. I think that in fact these units were actually rare and their full strength a periodic thing. Understrength units were certainly the rule during my time in the Res.

Cheers.



-


----------



## Hanna144

Hi all,

I've read the previous debate with some interest as to how the training could be more efficient, but I was surprised that the recent experience here in 34 Brigade hasn't been mentioned.   Last year the infantry units all started training together in combined companies.   Last year, the Blackwatch, CGG, and de Maisonneuve formed one company - this year, its BW, FMR, and 6 R 22 R.   There are at least two other companies training in the brigade (the BW have a platoon in the other company).   The training plan builds up to company level exercises at the end of the year.   One unit supplies the company HQ for the year - last year it was the BW, for example.   I think this addresses some of the practical points brought up in the thread; I have to admit, its nice to have an exercise where the other platoons are not "notional".   I have the suspicion (not confirmed by anyone) that the long-term plan will be to combine the companies at some point for real "battalion" level exercises, ie. with the RCH, etc.   For now, we have at least 3 companies going out on exercise as companies. There is no formal regimental level amalgamation - all the regimental traditions, etc are still functioning - but the brigade is taking the operating units and deploying them in a more functional and efficient manner.

Just thought I'd pass that on...


----------



## pbi

Hanna: In 38 CBG our Arty, Cavalry and Infantry have followed this system (more or less) for several years now. we apply it for all the reasons you give. Our Arty Change Proposal for LFRR PhII is based on making this practice the basis for Arty organization. Cheers.


----------



## REZTEEN

Question for all what, what role do you all think the role of Canada's reservists be in this new century be. Cause the reg force is becoming more and more stretched. So should the reservists play a more active role at home and abroad.


----------



## NavyGrunt

Im not sure if its feesible to extend the responsibilities of reserves. If reservists were so willing and able to go trapeezing around the globe why wouldnt they just join the reg force? ???

Let me have it guys.....


----------



## REZTEEN

im just asking what the role should be


----------



## pbi

I'd say that given all of our needs, and all of our realities, we've got the three Army Res roles just about right:

-Augment the Regular Force: This traditionally meant "individuals" but in the past few years has progressed to formed sub-units and it is not at all inconceivable that we could deploy formed units (composite, of course....) if hte operational situation permits. The USARNG does it and, as I have observed numerous times before, our average Res soldier is at least as checked out as the average ARNG soldier if not more. IMHO Our Regular Force will always need a surge growth capacity for specific missions, and our Res provides the best way to do it. We should NOT have solely a "niche" Reserve: we must protect and enhance the ability of the Army Res to augment/repl the Regular Army as much as possible given the limitations we face. If we put capabilities solely into the Res, we risk being unable to force generate them adequately (or rapidly) if there is a surge: the NDA does not allow us to draw on our Res as reliably as the US can. This might be acceptable for assets that will rarely be drawn on, such as heavy artillery or heavy engineering;

-Provide a Base for Mobilization: This is closely related to the above issue, although conceptually it envisions a more advanced state of emergency than "augmentation". IMHO there may be some confusion caused by the Army decision to use the terms Mobilization Levels "One" and "Two" to refer to activities we often tend to think of as just "augmentation". Under this role we can see tasks such as domestic ops (humanitarian ops as well as Homeland Defence if that ever gets sorted out...) and mobilization for a conflict larger or more prolonged than "augmentation" can handle; and

-Connecting With Canadians (Community Footprint):  As bossi so ably pointed out, this is an important role. Millions of electrons have been expended on this website bemoaning the fact that Canadians are ignorant of their military: the widespread Army Reserve presence is an excellent way to counter this problem. Regular Army field units also do a very good job of Connecting with  Canadians, but they are only in a few locations. If this role is carried out successfully, it will make the other two easier.

As roles, I think these are fine. Under these roles we can easily fit the range of missions and tasks we ask of the Army Reserve on a constant basis. IMHO we must avoid an overly specialized Res: it needs to be as flexible and capable as we can make it. We also need to avoid undoing the very good healing process of the last few years by further separating the Res from the Regular Army in any significant way.  Cheers.


----------



## bossi

pbi said:
			
		

> We also need to avoid undoing the very good healing process of the last few years by further separating the Res from the Regular Army in any significant way.



Yup.  Inspired by the "Emma Gee's", a number of problems and possile solutions have been presented ...
http://www.ducimus.com/Archive/cafa.html


----------



## Edward Campbell

I have been retired for so long that you must take all this with a whole bag of salt, but:

o	It seems to me that the Canadian Navy Reserve is riding a winning horse with their reserve crewed minesweepers.   There are, I am told by reliable sources, problems, including too few qualified reservists for 12 ships, each needing a crew of 30+ but I am also told that some officer positions, especially CO and XO, and some PO slots may go to regulars (and no, I don't know where they will find them in an already undermanned navy, but ...).   The top of the navy is pleased with the ships and their crews and their entire reserve establishment; more than one senior serving naval officer has told me that he is now happy with the navy's 'total force' project;

o	The British Army used to have many 'specialist' units in the Territorial Army.   A special favourite of mine (about 40 years ago) were the _Mercians_ â â€œ various reserve battalions and companies of the Cheshire, Staffordshire, Sherwood Foresters, and Worcestershire regiments who, as I discovered late on dark and stormy night, were assigned to defend the 1 (BR) Corps communications system and Rear Corps HQ.   The units were specially organized, equipped and trained for these tasks â â€œ their organizations were 'tailored' to the organization of the (fairly vast) Signals establishment, the small, undermanned and essentially defenceless (without the _Mercians_) units of which occupied damned near every hilltop on the North German Plain; and

o	Another favourite was a RAOC unit â â€œ I can't remember its designation - which I 'met' during Crusader/Spearpoint 80 â â€œ it was the army level NAAFI distribution unit, full of logistical specialists from the British consumer/retail sector.   Good bunch of fellows who gave me a very good lunch while my vehicle was being repaired and convinced me that, once again, the Brits really were planning for war â â€œ the sports and social programmes being designed only to lull enemies and allies alike into the false sense that the Brits are all fun and games ...

I say let's have as many different kinds of reserves as the reserves themselves can muster â â€œ provided, only, that they make some military sense.   I remain committed to the idea that about 75% of our current policies, plans and programmes will not stand the test of a major war; I am equally certain that neither I nor any of our serving generals know which are in that doomed to fail 75%.   So: Let's try 'em all ... our reserves, it seems to me, are filled with boundless enthusiasm, incredible resilience and bags of initiative â â€œ we should exploit that.


----------



## Bill Smy

It's been a long time since I've read the Minister's statement of the roles of the Rerserve Forces, but I believe the first and primary role was to provide a base for mobilization. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the serving members of the Reserves and their supporters, the PRes has failling marks here, with no fault of itsr own.

To be an effective mobilization base, the PRes needs to be three to four times the size of the regular force it supports. History has proven that over and over again. But the numbers are just not there today. In fact, Reserves 2000 pointed out a year or so ago that with the numbers of Militia personnel on full time duty today we are past Stage 1 of mobization.

Instead of talking about a Militia of 15-18,000 strength, we really should be aiming at 45-60,000. It's not impossible, but rather a matter of political will and funding.

I believe that large civilian communities can support reserve units with strengths of 600 to 1,000 man units. They have in the past with smaller populations bases. And cities such as Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, etc, should be able to field a number of these units. Put all the naysayers aside, if the monies were there, the units could achieve these numbers.

Another of the Minister's roles for the Reserves is to be a footprint in the community. A good footprint helps both the regulars and reserves, but there are mixed marks here.


----------



## pbi

Rusty Old Joint said:
			
		

> I have been retired for so long that you must take all this with a whole bag of salt, but:
> 
> o	It seems to me that the Canadian Navy Reserve is riding a winning horse with their reserve crewed minesweepers.   There are, I am told by reliable sources, problems, including too few qualified reservists for 12 ships, each needing a crew of 30+ but I am also told that some officer positions, especially CO and XO, and some PO slots may go to regulars (and no, I don't know where they will find them in an already undermanned navy, but ...).   The top of the navy is pleased with the ships and their crews and their entire reserve establishment; more than one senior serving naval officer has told me that he is now happy with the navy's 'total force' project;



The Canadian Army Reserve is also riding a winning horse with its Reserve-crewed platoons and companies and CIMIC teams for overseas operations, as well as OP BRONZE in Bosnia which is mostly Reserve (incl the Commander), with   Reservists in all (or almost all..) of the key positions. The CLS is very pleased with the Reservists' contribution and hopes to see more of the same;



> The British Army.... into the false sense that the Brits are all fun and games



We really can't afford to assign standing "specific missions" to any of our Army Reserve units, (or most of our Regular Army, either...) because we are a very small army reacting to events in a very big world(and a huge country...). Instead we are slowly building their capability to respond to as many situations as possible, which means general purpose combat training and equipment. We are too small to afford "niche" units;



> I say let's have as many different kinds of reserves as the reserves themselves can muster â â€œ provided, only, that they make some military sense.   I remain committed to the idea that about 75% of our current policies, plans and programmes will not stand the test of a major war; I am equally certain that neither I nor any of our serving generals know which are in that doomed to fail 75%.   So: Let's try 'em all ...



I agree that most plans do not survive contact with the enemy, which is one of the main reason we need a capable, flexble Army Reserve in the first place. The problem we face is that if we don't keep our Army Reserve efforts focused and related to operational needs (as well as within our likely resources...) we will end up with a box of little bits, each of them "one-shot", and no meaningful ability to reinforce or sustain deployed forces.



> our reserves, it seems to me, are filled with boundless enthusiasm, incredible resilience and bags of initiative â â€œ we should exploit that



Believe me...we do: every day of every week. We couldn't do it without the Army Reserve, and they are constantly getting better. The Army Reserve today is NOTHING like the Militia I joined in 1974, nor do I want to see us slip back to those days. Cheers.


----------



## 48Highlander

Our main problem seems to be retention.  Unlike in the USNG, Canadian reservists can clear out any time they want.  If I remember right, reserve units lose on average 14% of their personnel every year.  That means a regiment of 300 would have to recruit 42 new soldiers every year just to break even.


----------



## foerestedwarrior

My unit HAD a big recruiting problem for the last few years, and the only peopel that came really wanted to be there, thats not a bad thing, but alot of people didnt know much about the military. We now have two new recruiters, and they are doing very good, I think in OS, we had just over 100 applicants at one point. Unfortuantly, we only actually have like 130 people on paper.


----------



## dutchie

First of all Major, you are right - the average Cdn Res unit is understrength. 
First off, to clarify.....

The CF actually doesn't want all Res units to be full Battalions (infantry). That only happened during WW1 & 2. Technically for instance, the Seaforth Highlanders are a Battalion, however, the CF has us at 1 coy, although some regiments have several Coys in several towns (the Canadian Scottish come to mind - Victoria, Nanaimo, etc). Even at this reduced strength, most units don't meet the numbers to fully staff what the CF wants. We have, off the top of my head, 200 on strength, with maybe 3 Platoons + HQ on parade for a parade night, and 2 Platoons + HQ on an ex (plus Op For) - this is pretty much best case scenario. We get less on some exs.

Interest is a problem. A lot of those interested in the Forces go to the Reg Force, and there isn't enough left over to fully staff all of the Res units.

Processing of applications is hideously long (just check out the recruiting forum on this site). I've heard of people waiting 1-2 years to get in.

Retention.The Res attracts a lot of University students (here at least) as it is a part time job that fits nicely into their schedule. Unfortunately, most University students don't aspire to a career of soldiering, so they quit after a year or two (or a week or two in some cases). I would guess that 50% of the troops cominig off BMQ over the summer don't see their 2nd year in.

There are other problems facing recruiters and senior staff, and I'll let them answer for themselves, but that's how I see it.


----------



## DOOG

Greetings..
One of the most serious problems in this end of the country is the recruiting system is a mess. The recruiters ( I mean the CFRC guys, not the unit people) have convinced themselves that they are doing a great job administering the applications and no amount of proof to the contrary will shake their beliefs. They have also managed to convince the upper echelon of the army that all is well. Bull!
The system is crap and most people who ahave been around a while know it. I recently had a conversation with a young unit recruiting officer who told me that the local CFRC went three months without testing anyone because all the pers in that det were newly posted in and weren't ready to undertake testing yet. Gee, I wish I had three months to get my shit together every time I changed jobs. Then the ere is the medical thing. Something like two (2) doctors in Borden check all the file in the country. If they have a pile of Reg Force files on their desks, the res Force files wait until they get around to them. The wait time is ridiculous. I have seen potential recruits wait 6, 8 and up to 12 months fto get in.
Another problem is inappropriate tests for MOCs. For example we had a soldier who was an infanteer and wanted to re-muster to supply. Before the OT was done the unit nominated her for a Supply Tech course. The nom went through (by mistake) and she went on the course, even though she was still an infantry soldier. She topped the course. When she finally got tested, the results indicated that she wasn't of the appropriate type (score/mindset/whatever) to transfer to supply. She only came first on the course. Makes me wonder what goofy civilian over-educated doctorate of whatever designed. the testing.

But I am not bitter.


----------



## Echo9

Doog, 

Obviously, you haven't read the SCONDVA report last year (by John Fraser- former speaker of the house and HCol of the Seaforths(?) ).

It was pretty scathing about the recruiting system as being the single biggest problem with regards to reserve restructure.  Unfortunately, little has come of it to this point (aside from the concept of conditional enrollments).


----------



## enfield

Echo9 said:
			
		

> Doog,
> 
> Obviously, you haven't read the SCONDVA report last year (by John Fraser- former speaker of the house and HCol of the Seaforths(?) ).
> 
> It was pretty scathing about the recruiting system as being the single biggest problem with regards to reserve restructure.   Unfortunately, little has come of it to this point (aside from the concept of conditional enrollments).



Col. Fraser is an amazing man, a great asset to our regiment and the Army as a whole. He came out on Cougar Salvo a few years back, but insisted in joining one of the rifle sections and did the whole 3 day final ex, FIBUA in Ft Lewis, including the Chinook assault, just like a trooper. He's heavily involved in the unit, and uses his connections and influence in Ottawa to draw attention the Reserves and the Army.


----------



## dglad

Excerating the retention and training problems already mentioned, there are too many units in the Res F, and the number of units expressed per capita in many cities is way out of whack.  A city of roughly 100,000 in Canada often has 4-6 Res F units.  While it is probably possible for a city of that size to provide an adequate recruiting base to support 1-2 units at a reasonable strength, 4-6 units will end up diffusing the available person-pool across too wide a target.  We talk about typical units actually being at coy strength, but I would venture that, except in specific parts of the country, it's more likely platoon+ strength.  The trouble is that we're dealing with a Res F model that was designed in a different era, intended to support large-scale mobilization of many battalion-regiment-sized elements.  While there is still some value to that model, it just doesn't fit well with the current environment.


----------



## pbi

I think dglad has (as usual) hit the nail on the head in identifying one of the major problems we face. 38 CBG (which dglad and I belong to) is a prime example of the poor distribution of Res units in Canada (and the strength of resistance to change). Thunder Bay, a city whose urban population is about 100,000 with a limited regional population, contains two Army Res units, one Med Res unit, one Comm Res unit and one NavRes unit. All of these units compete for that very small slice of the Canadian population in TBay that is willing (and suitable) to give its time to be citizen-soldiers.

In Regina, a city of about 200,000 including the regional population, there are three Army Res units, a Comm Res unit and a Nav Res unit. Again the same problem arises: too many units for the population base and thus only a very limited chance of ever recruiting these units even to their full Res est, never mind increasing unit size.

Yet, when we have attempted to propose significant changes this has been bitterly opposed by forces on both "sides of the fence". Reserve 2000 vigorously opposed our plans to regroup artillery and Service units, and the Army shot down our plan to formalize and expand an existing but "bukshi" troop of the SaskD. At the same time we see large Canadian centers such as Mississauga (over 750,000 people) and Burlington (somewhere in the 130,000 range) being very under-served, and very, very few units are   reaching out to tap hinterland comunities by establishing outlying elements. There have been a few changes under LFRR Ph II but it appears to me that most of   these problems remain.

As for the National Guard and Reserve, I have spoken with a few of these people currently serving over in Afgh. The job protection thing, while certainly an important factor in an operationally ready reserve, is not a panacea. I have been told that not all Reserve duty is protected, and employers in some states and in the case of the Army Res have the ability to ask the home unit why the person is being activated. Some employers (typically smaller operations) do not like to hire Res and if the Res employer presents them with enough problems, they   may seek other ways to get rid of them (since the Federal and State legislation usually prevents firing directly as a result of Res duty). Several mentioned that as the US places the highest peacetime demand ever on the ARNG and AR, some employers(and some soldiers) are beginning to feel the pinch. Res would also have to be prepared to accept the _quid pro quo_: we protect your job so we have the right to call you up any time we like for as long as we need.

Cheers.


----------



## bgreen

An interesting question as to why reserve units aren't larger than what they appear on paper.  I think you have to look at this as a problem with a series of issues that must be addressed.

First there is the issue of a "paid ceiling" whereby a unit is funded for only a certain number of soldiers which often has more to do with historical numbers then it has to do with recruiting to any particular size.  So while the CF may say it wants more reserve soldiers the units are hamstrung by being offered read as authorized to recruit only 2 to 6 soldiers per year.  If a CO were to say go over this directed limit then the only way he could pay for the training of these soldiers would be to cut the training days of the rest of his unit members.  This leads to a death spiral because as he attempts to recruit more, then the existing trained soldiers leave because there is not enough training days and training value to maintain interest.

I also think for the most part the recruiting system is not functioning for the reserves.  Not for the reasons others have listed because I believe with the "expedited" enrollment system you can get people into your unit in three weeks.  The issue goes much deeper.  Reserve soldier recruiting is about number 5 or 6 priority for CF recruiting centres.  First is Reg Force trades with critical requirements, next quotas for REG F officers then Reg Force MOCs, then Military College and then comes political national initiatives like BOLD EAGLE. Finally at the low end of the totem pole comes reserve recruitment for army, navy and air reserves.  Within that group you go to command size units such as medics, comms and then the rest of your combat arms units.  Of the above groups full time career seekers would more likely wait a reasonable time to get in whereas the part-time reservists are seeking immediate opportunities.  So historically we cause the longest wait time in the recruiting centres to those potential members who are most sensitive to wait times.  Also the reserve world only offers recruit training in two serials one in Jan and one in Jul.  So where you might think that all CFRC effort should go to meeting these two envelopes that are huge to the reserve world the result is that little effort is directed outside the above listed priorities.

Second issue in terms of recruiting is that we vacillate between unit directed recruiting and Bde directed recruiting.  The two directions in my experience are seldom complimentary.  Bde directed trg insures the recruiting effort goes to Bde issues like shoring up units that are hopelessly mired in recruiting, retention or training issues that are often beyond the control of the unit or Bde.  Issues like training craftsmen that requires 6 months of course for Service Bns.  Reserve Svc Bn members see huge obstacles to getting and keeping recruits when faced with training standards that are not in line with the two week block system the rest of the army has adopted for reservists.  So Bde Comds direct increasing recruit vacancies to units that are already in difficulty for issues outside their control in order to maintain these units viability.  The remaining units are then given 2 to 6 vacancies a year to replace soldiers lost to attrition which in many cases is a misnomer.

As a western unit we sometimes "lose" up to 6 soldiers a year who remuster to the reg force world.  Instead of celebrating this number of already trained soldiers the CF penalizes reserve units by listing this contribution as a retention issue where these individuals are statistically treated no different than quitters.  Even the Moose Jaw Warriors WHL team is given some renumeration when its members are called up into the NHL but I digress. Any reserve CO worth his salt knows where his recruiting base lies be it high school, small business, college etc.
If a CO can't or won't tap these pools then discipline the CO.  The CO knows who his best recruiters are and how best to employ them.  As an example three years ago  a small unit in the west did  some research on what recruiting was working for reserve units in other areas of Canada.  They found that in Ontario there was an initiative to give high school students both school credits and pay for entering into basic training.  Based on that knowledge the little unit that could went out and worked an agreement with local school boards that won provincial education recognition.  On their very first course they had 28 recruits; 26 who graduated.  The little unit not being greedy offered to give of its expertise freely to other units.  The little unit began to get bigger while the bigger units on paper began to get smaller.  So that after a time it became very apparent the little unit was about to get huge.  Outside the little unit other units said we want what they have.  But the other units and its HQs were not prepared to do the liaison necessary with the education systems both local and provincial and so an excellent recruiting initiative was cancelled for everyone.  As a post script the little unit still maintains itself as a big unit in a very small population area.  More a tribute to excellent training which is a cornerstone of retention.

Also I have waited for the LFRR initiative.  I know it is slowly coming together.  But the emphasis on specific tasks while good for individual members engaged in CIMIC, LO provincial emergency duties and Psyops, is not conducive to pulling the trigger on issuing op tasks or augmentation to reserve units.  Units need the op tasking and equipment that go hand in hand to augment deployment.  If we get this right I don't believe recruiting and retention will be a factor.

Lastly there is a huge funding difference even among the various reserve entities.  There are wide disparities among the number of recruits and trg days offered between reserve line units and medics and comms people.  Next comes an even bigger disparity between army and air reservists. The only comment I have on the navy reserve comes from  the published reports referred to in earlier posts where the naval reserve has been given an op tasking, equipment issued in line with that tasking ie coastal patrol vessels, and augmentation by reg navy pers in critical areas to maintain the equipment and assist in achieving the op tasking. 

I would like to give one civilian parallel that may apply to our issue here.  I live in a community of under a 1000 permanent residents.  We have a volunteer fire department.  We have 18 members.  In any given year we lose about two as people move away.  We have a task to respond to fires and emergency care requests in a 200km2 area.  We have two fire trucks and an emergency vehicle plus the equipment we need to control fire and respond to health care emergencies.  We train on weekends to certification standards.  We receive no renumeration.  Our trg is challenging and interesting and the men and women feel we provide service to our community.  We are a happy Little lot and have one supper per year provided by our municipality.  We go crazy over new helmets, flashlights, scba and jaws of life.  Now have I put anything in this paragraph that you could not substitute soldier in for?  The solutions for the reserve world I believe are similar.

Let me conclude by saying I don't believe any of the issues we face are insurmountable.  For what its worth I believe we need CO's to recruit to fill the units manning vacancies that are a reflection of an op tasking.  We need CFRCs to step outside the walls of their buildings and meet the needs of reserve units in their locations.  We need new ways to partner with business and industry including govt departments like education. And we need great training opportunities that encourage reservists to continue to seek their challenges in the reserves.

  
Free and Fearless
BG


----------



## pbi

bgreen: good presentation of the issues. While I know (that you know...) that I wouldn't agree 100% on everything you have said, I think you have pointed out an important fact: problems with the Army Reserve are not amenable to cosmetic solutions: they are not cosmetic problems. The problems are deeply systemic and in some ways mirror what I experienced myself as a Res soldier 1974-1982. While I do believe we have made progress in some key areas (the level of professionalism is MUCH higher now, the level of op experience is considerably better, the Army Res gets used more often to do real things....) we still face the systemic problems you have identified.
Having served (briefly) as a volunteer firefighter myself, I like your parallel and I often draw similar parallels myself. It is interesting to consider that VFFs face lethal danger on a regular basis at a considerably lower level of pay than what Reservists generally receive: the last time I looked IIRC most FDs and most FFs in Canada were volunteers except for a few larger centres, so it is not unique to your VFD.

Finally (since I am a loyal staff wienie...) I want to offer a different perspective on your comments on the role of Bde HQ. Bde HQ, like any HQ, cannot satisfy all of its subordinates given the resources we have. If that were the case we wouldn't need to go through the Operations Plan process every year to try to divvy out what we are given in order to achieve the tasks we are assigned. We could just open the till and say to all the Res COs: "_Come on down_!" We get assigned so many growth positions (and, as you pointed out...) so much money to pay people. We can't recruit people whom we know we cannot pay: that is both a recipe for attrition and a morally questionable thing IMHO bordering on fraud. As you know our Bde consistently meets (or comes very close to...) the CLS-mandated 37.5 days/soldier on Class A. If and when we don't it is explained in black and white to COs and anybody else who cares why we don't. There are no "secret slush funds" anymore. In fact as long as I have been COS the Bde Comd's Res account has operated in the red as a way of sucking up our deficiencies in $$$. Class B employment is also pretty tightly controlled for the same reason.

I agree that we have not pleased people with Bde driven recruiting plan (despite endless tweaking), but I am not sure how, given our limited resources, the very conflicted recruiting ponds we face in our major centres, the sclerotic state of Indiv Trg, the shortage of instructors and the need to see that ALL of our units are kept functional and meet the tasks assigned by the CLS (an almost impossible task in some cases, I'll readily agree...).   Your unit has done very well (thanks to a great extent to your work and leadership) and it is a beacon of how well a small centre/rural unit can do. (An example that seems to be lost on some people...). If all of our units did as well as the SaskD we would be laughing. But, they don't, and we can't just abandon them to let the good units survive: remember we represent Army Reservists in three provinces who face differing problems.   I know that all of this may not mean a lot the trooper on the armoury floor but it is the reality we face. Cheers.


----------



## bgreen

You know I debated about putting in the Firefighting as equivalent to our profession of arms.  I think it has little direct comparison other than if you can get 18 folks out of a thousand then we should be able to recruit as a unit from a 50 000 pers trading area about 18 x 50 or 900 pers.

Soldiering is so much more than volunteer firefighting.  Yes you get to work on real emergencies but there the comparison stops.  When doing a tour you can't come home after a difficult day and have a shower and receive the support of caring family members.  Also firefighters are revered across nearly all cultures whereas the soldier is often called upon to do some nasty business by shear feat of arms and willpower in cultures that are openly hostile.  I also know there are lots of civil servants that like to compare themselves in terms of job equivalencies to soldiers.  Simply it is all BS.  There is no equivalent to a soldier period.

My only issue with Bde HQ is that often the size they task a unit to recruit to has little to do with the organizations we are supposed to be fielding.  You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen..  Give me a 10% overage which allows for attrition.  You want me to field an Infantry Regiment than give me the manning slate to get a Bn's worth of soldiers that can combine with another units Bn so we can have the pers to do the task assigned to that unit.

BG


----------



## McG

bgreen said:
			
		

> My only issue with Bde HQ is that often the size they task a unit to recruit to has little to do with the organizations we are supposed to be fielding. You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen ...


Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit?  Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs?  What is offered for advancement and retention?


----------



## pbi

> You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen..  Give me a 10% overage which allows for attrition.  You want me to field an Infantry Regiment than give me the manning slate to get a Bn's worth of soldiers that can combine with another units Bn so we can have the pers to do the task assigned to that unit.



bg: you wouldn't get an argument from me, if we had the resources.



> Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit?  Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs?  What is offered for advancement and retention?



McG: I agree that CSS soldiers need PD and tech supervision, but that doesn't mean we can't have CSS in Res Cbt A units. There are a couple of ways it might be done:

a) attach the CSS soldiers from the local Svc Bn to the Cbt A unit (as we now do for some Res MAs at outlying units. The employing CO is responsible for day-to-day empl and admin, the parent SvcB n CO is resopnsible for tech trg, PD and tech standards. Where this would tend to fall down would be in Cbt A units that are not  located within an easy drive of a Svc Bn: providing tech supervision could be difficult. A possible solution to that problem (which a couple of our units have applied for other reasons) is to change from weekly parade nights to parade weekends, with troops commuting in on Fri and out on Sun PM; and

b) get rid of the Res Svc bn unit level command structure (ie the CO/DCO/RSM) and reconstitute the Svc Bn as an Admin Coy of a Cbt A unit. The size, equiment, rank structures and MOC distr could remain pretty much the same as they are now  (with a probable reduction in MSE Op since Cbt A units do not normally use them...). A problem with this would be deciding which Cbt A unit would get the sub-unit, as typically most CBGs have only one or two Svc Bns for several Cbt A units. This might lead us to discussing the "A"-word, such that we have fewer, stronger Res Cbt A units with a single unit-level HQ and several sub-units instead of several units that obly appoximate a sub-unit in strength.

On top of that, the CSS world (esp the EME world) needs to keep on with its efforts to make CSS training more realistic and achievable for Res CSS soldiers by modularization and acceptance of a trg delta, the way the Army has. Of course, if the Army owned these trades we might be able to direct these changes ourselves. Cheers.

Cheers.


----------



## Pikache

pbi said:
			
		

> b) get rid of the Res Svc bn unit level command structure (ie the CO/DCO/RSM) and reconstitute the Svc Bn as an Admin Coy of a Cbt A unit. The size, equiment, rank structures and MOC distr could remain pretty much the same as they are now (with a probable reduction in MSE Op since Cbt A units do not normally use them...). A problem with this would be deciding which Cbt A unit would get the sub-unit, as typically most CBGs have only one or two Svc Bns for several Cbt A units. This might lead us to discussing the "A"-word, such that we have fewer, stronger Res Cbt A units with a single unit-level HQ and several sub-units instead of several units that obly appoximate a sub-unit in strength.
> 
> On top of that, the CSS world (esp the EME world) needs to keep on with its efforts to make CSS training more realistic and achievable for Res CSS soldiers by modularization and acceptance of a trg delta, the way the Army has. Of course, if the Army owned these trades we might be able to direct these changes ourselves. Cheers.
> 
> Cheers.



Or have this 'Adm Coy' part of the brigade admin function. Every unit would have a CSS attachment, which reports to unit CO for day to day admin, but reports to brigade CSS coy for all training purposes. (Slight modification of your idea, and I like your BN idea better)

It's not like this reserve BN idea with several 'regiments' forming a battalion. The brits do it.


----------



## McG

pbi said:
			
		

> a) attach the CSS soldiers from the local Svc Bn to the Cbt A unit (as we now do for some Res MAs at outlying units. The employing CO is responsible for day-to-day empl and admin, the parent SvcB n CO is resopnsible for tech trg, PD and tech standards. Where this would tend to fall down would be in Cbt A units that are not located within an easy drive of a Svc Bn: providing tech supervision could be difficult. A possible solution to that problem (which a couple of our units have applied for other reasons) is to change from weekly parade nights to parade weekends, with troops commuting in on Fri and out on Sun PM;


I see consolidation in the service battalions as the route to take.  However, I would ammalgamate all the Svc Bns within any given CBG (turning each one into a Coy of the new amalgamated Bn).  I would also specialize the Coys (S&T, Maint) so that there would be greater depth of technical supervision.


----------



## McG

. . . at the same time, if multiple Cbt A regiments were grouped into single battalions, I agree that each Bn should have its own Admin Coy seperate from the Svc Bn.


----------



## Rick Goebel

For all those who advocate basing the reserve force structure on what is currently in existing units, I would suggest that you are going about it backwards.

The first thing to do is to decide what reserve forces are needed.

After you determine that, you decide how to get there from the current structure.   You may need to change recruiting procedures, compensation packages, job protection legislation, individual training, collective training, and other things in addition to structure, but at least you will have a goal to gear these changes to.


----------



## bgreen

Sir...,

The thing is I don't think we will ever get the argument sorted out as to what the reserves will become in the future.  We have been having the "role of the reserve" discussion for years.  I think if we can get what we have in our units reflecting the organizations and doctrine that currently the CF is using we will at least be ready and current.  My thoughts on the Bde Recce Sqn are based on what our manning list should be to reflect upon the BTS we are trg to. 

Also in small communities like those in Sk the unit I was in had the opportunity to recruit  veh techs, gun mechs, medics and storesman from our small city and neighbouring towns that would have been unavailable to the CF because these individuals weren't prepared to travel to a unit that focused on their trade or skill in a location 100 to 200 km away.  I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit.  Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals.  As a result they are not avail to the CF now.  And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.

BG


----------



## pbi

bgreen said:
			
		

> Also in small communities like those in Sk the unit I was in had the opportunity to recruit veh techs, gun mechs, medics and storesman from our small city and neighbouring towns that would have been unavailable to the CF because these individuals weren't prepared to travel to a unit that focused on their trade or skill in a location 100 to 200 km away. I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit. Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals. As a result they are not avail to the CF now. And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.
> 
> BG



Bgreen: IMHO herein lies one of the failures of our current system to spread the "footprint" beyond the cities: the failure to develop rural units or outlying sub-units of urban units, beyond a very limited scope. This was, I thought, the "hub-and-spoke" concept articulated for LFRR Ph II but in the end I think it came to almost nothing outside Southern Ontario. Compare the current presence to the pre-Unification web of outlying coys/sqns/btys and (as you are well aware...) you will see a lot of empty areas on the map. One of the obstacles to expanding a unit's presence by broadenig its catchment area (as opposed to establishing outlying subunits) is also inherent in the current nature of the Res which focuses on "parade nights". These work well for units whose soldiers have a reasonable commute to the Armoury; they do not work well, or at all, for units whose soldiers must drive two or three hours to get to the Armoury.  As you know 116 Bty went to weekend parading years ago, as I believe 26 Fd also has. There are some drawbacks (more weekend time is taken up per month) but it does allow a much broader catchment area, until such time as we are able to convince the Army that Canadians who don't live in big cities should have the opportunity to serve in the Army Res too.


----------



## mdh

I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit.   Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals.   As a result they are not avail to the CF now.   And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.

This is an interesting comment which raises another point - albeit somewhat off topic - about recruiting "specialists" like professionals who want to serve with the reserve force.   We just don't have the same "specialist stream" designed to recruit and encourage such people to join.   I believe both the Territorial Army in the UK and reserve forces in the US actively recruits them and have created programs aimed a taking advantage of those skills.   In my case I am public affairs specialist in civilian llife but there appears to be a fairly limited scope to develop those skills in the Militia world (beyond being the UIO of course which is really an appointment not an MOC).   

Any thoughts or observations on this PBI or BGreen?


----------



## pbi

> We just don't have the same "specialist stream" designed to recruit and encourage such people to join.



You mighty want to talk with your local Res Bde HQ or Area HQ. In our Bde (38 CBG) and in LFWA I know that we have Medical Officers, Legal Officers, Public Affairs Branch Officers, Chaplains, Finance Branch Officers, etc. While not all of these positions exist on the establishment of an Army Res unit, both Bde and Area HQs, as well as Army, have positions to hold and to employ people with these qualifications.



> I believe both the Territorial Army in the UK and reserve forces in the US actively recruits them and have created programs aimed a taking advantage of those skills.



I can't speak about the TA, but last year I had a very interesting conversation with the G1 (Recruiting) of 34 Inf Div, the USARNG Div that is the parent HQ for the ARNG units located in the states south of our Bde. I specifically asked him about "targeted recruiting" for the ARNG. The answer he gave me was that, except for medical personnel, the ARNG did not target any specific civ trade in order to recruit for any specific MOC: people serve in whatever interests them. He commented that a person who drives a truck all week at their civvy job may not want to drive a truck on weekends for the ARNG for less money. He may, however, want to jump out of a helo or fire a 155mm howitzer instead.



> In my case I am public affairs specialist in civilian llife but there appears to be a fairly limited scope to develop those skills in the Militia world (beyond being the UIO of course which is really an appointment not an MOC).


Again, check out your local Res Bde HQ. In our Bde we have a Bde PAO, a PA Sgt, and an Image Tech. We have a second Bde Image Tech and two regional PAOs out in our Garrisons. These positions are in addition to our UIOs. "Connecting With Canadians" is a major role for the Army Res, and PAOs play a vital role in this. As well, any Comd worth his pay understands the value of good PA work. Our "B" Class PAO is usually busy with something all the time, ranging from supporting Unit PIOs to coverage of communty events to helping the Cmd deal with the latest "nasty" out of a unit (yes...that happens in the Res too, more often than you might think!!). Your Area HQ may have positions available, and I know that Director Land Communications (the Army PAO staff) have Res PAOs that they employ across the country, living and working in their own comunities but employed on Army-level PA projects. We have one of these officers co-loc in our Bde HQ.  Check out what is out there. Cheers and good luck!


----------



## bgreen

I almost hate to get into this as it can really choke an individual.  Let me say that this week I met two professional men a lawyer and a medical worker who both expressed an interest in the Reserves.  Let me qualify that because really they were interested in one particular unit that resides in their hometown.

I don't want to put these men on a pedestal because they didn't ask for any special treatment even though they possess specialist skills needed by the CF.  Their straight forward request was to become a part of a local unit for all the same reasons high school students want to join... challenge, camaraderie, and being part of something that has historical and current relevance.

And doesn't it seem somewhat strange that we allow civilian equivalences for law, medical, social workers, chaplains and the like but a weapons, veh, or sigs techie we can't get any recognition of civilian equivalences?

I think if we want to get a pool of specialists for the CF we had better be prepared to get the ones that have expressed interest in joining a local unit wherever that unit may be located and sort out the manning issue later.  Let them parade with the unit and build bonds with the unit so they will be encouraged to stay in and perhaps take tours. 

Why do we let our huge geography which is a great blessing get in the way of smart recruiting and soldering? 

Like pbi I had great faith that LFRR was on the cusp of doing some great initiatives.  They seem to focussing on pieces of the issue without addressing the one issue that puts everything in perspective....What role and equipment to support that role do you want the CF Army Reserve to train to.  Without answers to this question we have the units doing what they have always done and appearing like they are resistant to change.  When in fact they are working very hard without much guidance.

BG


----------



## pbi

bgreen: there are ways we can deal with enrolling folks like that (not the solution in every case, but...). Every Res CBG and each LFA has a limited number of "Military Manning Overhead" (MMO) positions that can be used to hold unique cases. As well, people can be enrolled against vacancies in other units, but "attach posted " in order to parade in their community. Finally, the CFMS in particular uses the Primary Reserve List (PRL) to hold qualified individuals who may not have a suitable Res Med unit in their location.

Part of the problem in LFWA until fairly recently was that Area HQ kept a very tight grip on the MMO positions and was reluctant to permit their use. I believe that in the last year or so the approach has been liberalized somewhat. Cheers.


----------



## mdh

Thanks PBI and bgreen for your input.

There is also a phenomenon I have noticed in the two units I have worked with which I might describe as the unofficial "specialist" second lieutenant - very often people who are highly skilled (perhaps a Fin-O or a LogO or UIOs) who cannot complete full qualifications because of their professional careers, and are content to continue on as 2LTs at that level. Unfortunately they can't get too many additional assignments or oversees deployments because they aren't fully qualified in their "official" MOCs.

At any rate for those who are interested here a link to the British TA specialist site.  http://www.ta.mod.uk/specialist/index.html


----------



## bgreen

pbi and mdh...,

Last night I watched Gen Lewis Mackenzie's presentation to the senate committee on defence.  From my perspective it was one of the most succinct and credible presentations I have ever heard free of jargon and flavour of the day NDHQ phrases.

Tired of waiting for a white paper on def he did two of his own.  One a 50 page tome back in 93 and yesterdays 700 word plan for the CF.  While acknowledging he was an infanteer first and foremost he also outlined a structure for the air and navy.  He based his plan on BGs one airborne and two in either training or reconstitution.

To summarize the navy should immediately lease Antonio class ships capable of carrying a BG worth of equipment and some men  as well as stop immediately the decommissioning of Shearwater so we have an assembly area in the east and make one on the west coast.  As well they should get 3 new major ships and coastal frigates.  The air should immediately upgrade CF 18 and smart bomb packages as well as invest in airborne troop aircraft as well as sign lease agreements with civvy airlines to move large numbers of men.

For the army he suggested raising all reg units to 110% strength.  No more plug and play send the unit and its log support folks at a BG level.  He was scathing in Canada's current posture of sending NGOs and other peace support teams before sending troops to get a grip on the militants and also provide some security for Canadian civvys overseas.  He reckons Afghanistan is ripe for some warlord having Canadian peace support workers as hostages and no plan or resources outside the US to get our people rescued.  He also stated the reserves in two provinces BC and SK should be brought up to full strength as there is no ready reg army in these provinces.  He further stated that we need a robust force capable of moving into our North on very short notice.  He gave an example of an airliner going down over the North as this area is increasingly used and the CF's only response would be to recover bodies as they currently have no way of launching any unit to provide ssoverignty or assistance to the North on an emergency basis.

He was also critical of how our current leaders are more concerned about living within ever decreasing budgets then about costing out what an operation will cost and then allowing the gov't to decide if they wish to participate or not.

I didn't get to see his whole presentation but hopefully it will be aired again.

On a side note he also stated that if all mandated bilingualism, SHARP and Human Rights training was funded by the appropriate ministries then there would be a saving of approximately 3 billion dollars which would be added to the defence budget.  Like wise with pensions that should be funded out of a different source than DND which would free up even more money as currently nearly 1/2 of the CF budget goes into non army trg and pensions.

Finally he took issue with a previous speaker a Navy Admiral who said it would take Canada nearly 3 to 5 years to get the infrastructure in place to support 5000 more soldiers.  Gen Mackenzie figured there is more than enough unfilled barrack spaces in all units to easily accommodate 5000 soldiers and 3000 reservists.  He would also cut NDHQ by 50% separate army and civvy workers with no reduction in tasking putting more soldiers in the sharp end of our forces.

Anyway like I said totally refreshing.

PS L/Col Gerry Carline was invested as Honourary Colonel of the Sask D today at a trooping of the guidon.  Didn't see any 38 Bde staff in attendance.

BG


----------



## mdh

Hi bgreen,

Fascinating stuff - if only we had some real momentum to make it happen the way someone like Lew Mackenzie envisions.  I keep hoping that it does.  Who knows, with all the continued bad publicity the military seems to be getting about aging equipment, (i.e. the latest Snowbird SAR revelation in the National Post) there may be sufficient political pressure on the Liberals to make it happen.


----------



## Rick Goebel

bgreen wrote:

"Finally he took issue with a previous speaker a Navy Admiral who said it would take Canada nearly 3 to 5 years to get the infrastructure in place to support 5000 more soldiers.  Gen Mackenzie figured there is more than enough unfilled barrack spaces in all units to easily accommodate 5000 soldiers and 3000 reservists."

If the government is dead set on creating a new brigade for some arcane reason, the navy Admiral is probably correct.  If, however, the government simply wishes to increase the capability of the Canadian Forces to do what the government has shown it wishes the Canadian Forces to do, then MGen Mackenzie is certainly correct.

I am morally certain that the regular infantry alone could absorb at least 2,000 of the proposed new troops not only with barracks space but also the existing LAVs, rifles and other infantry kit.  The other arms could absorb more still.  After all, it hasn't been a shortage of artillery pieces or mortars that has caused the move of the RCA into the mortar field but a shortage of people.

The reserve situation is the same.  It would require no new armouries or kit to increase the number of reservists by 3,000.  All that would be needed would be to increase the paid ceilings of existing units.

Sorry, that is not entirely true.  For both the regular and reserve forces, there would be a serious problem of where to find the trainers.  If, however, the shortage of sharp-end soldiers is not addressed now there will be a greater problem in the future.  Canada needs more people coming in the Canadian Forces front door now if there are to be MCpls available to train new soldiers years from now.

This is a clear case of short-term pain for long-term gain.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

What about going back and truly implementing and enforcing a 80/20 role for the infantry battalions where 3 line companies, Support and Headquarters companies were all regular and the 4th line company was reserve?

When a battalion was put into it's "deploy" status of the readiness cycle a company of reservists on Class B/C contracts would be the ones filling it.  While it's not the perfect solution, I think it's probably the most cost-effective which gives the deploying unit the extra boots it wants.


----------



## a_majoor

Having the entire fourth company as a CRIC might cause problems due to the different level of training and experience between "A" "B" "C" coy and the reserve "D" coy. As well, there will be specialist positions which cannot be filled in "D" coy (things like Rappel Master, Small Arms Instructor and so on). Having the three reserve rifle platoons added to the orbats of the other companies allows a closer working relationship to develop, especialy if the SNCO's and WO's are mentoring their reserve counterparts. Three full strength rifle companies will be better than four understrength companies.

It is my belief that the CRIC formed for ROTO 13 wouold have been more efficient (or become as efficient much faster) in pre training with the addition of Regular Force counterparts to do a bit of coaching and mentoring where needed. Since the company and the D&S platoon were separate entities, we were on our own a lot, and may have been learning bad habits as a result. "D" (Reserve) coy might fall into the same trap, depending on the climate and culture of the gaining unit.


----------



## Infanteer

I'm not to sure I'd support plunking reservists into each regular company - to what extent does integration simply become a regular unit with a different name.  It seems that you'd have a "short-service regular" as part of your company.  While I can see the value of having an extra source of manpower (the reserves) for regular units to "top up", I think the limitations are too much to make it of any value.

If it's a one year contract, what do you do if the company is deployed on operations near the end of the contract?

As well, is their any sense of career management?  As a company commander, you can't work towards developing leaders and building skill sets with your existing team, because after a year they are scattered in the wind.

I am a supporter of Reserve subunits being utilized in some form (I was a member of the trial version), however I don't think this is the way to go about it - if a soldier wants to be a regular force soldier, then let him sign his BE.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm not to sure I'd support plunking reservists into each regular company - to what extent does integration simply become a regular unit with a different name.


This may be the only way to generate PYs that the government does not want to permanently mandate.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> If it's a one year contract, what do you do if the company is deployed on operations near the end of the contract?


Contracts would be tied to high readiness and promise a year of work with an obligation to work up to an additional half year.   This would ensure that highreadiness units sit at 110% strength and deploy at 100% (with individual replacements on rear party).



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As well, is their any sense of career management? As a company commander, you can't work towards developing leaders and building skill sets with your existing team, because after a year they are scattered in the wind.


This is an argument to look at augmentation at the sub-sub unit level (or lower).  The Engr transformation plan will call on one reserve section in every field troop that deploys.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

A_Majoor,

To counter, what about putting certain positions as reg, ie. Company 2ic and Ops. WO (if that position exists at Canadian Coy. level?) along with select other "cadre" staff positions necessary.

I am interested to see what other ways could minimize the financial impact of creating a 4th rifle company within the infantry battalions that are on their 'readiness' phase.

McG,

You have some very good points.

Infanteer,

As the official Armoured Corps court jester, you again raise some good points such as a loss of identity, career management, etc.

What about the possibility of having a reserve unit (brigade level) being tasked to deploy a company during its "deploy" portion of the readiness cycle?  Obviously you'd need things such as job protection for reservists in order to have this happen.  This system is more in line with what we do in the US with alot of our activations when an entire reserve unit gets activated to augment a regular counterpart, such as how my battalion's A & B Companies were attached to 1st and 3rd LAR Battalions, respectively during OIF.


----------



## SHARP WO

re: the 10/90 company,

A good example for this was Op Snowgoose (Cyprus) Roto 59 of which I was a part of.

Although the Roto was with 2 Horse, we had 3 Reg members in our platoon(Platoon Comd, Driver and Sect Comd). With a short work up of 45 days we all intergrated well. There were personality conflicts the big one was between the Platoon Comd and WO, but at the lower levels we all worked well together.

Rural Coy (Reserve Coy) was by far the best at working and when close out came(Roto 59 was the last tour) the BN had so many resources to draw on, (carpenters, welders, contractors, etc.) and all from the Cbt arms from across Ontario.

One more point is that members from the Reserves seem to adapt faster when minimal Reg members are integrated into the Coy.

SHARP WO


----------



## KevinB

Gee, being on Snowgoose 59 in City Bty - I had a whole different outlook on the Rural Bty...  ;D


----------



## pbi

Matt: this option is something that has been debated, tried and fiddled with for years in our Army, under various names and guises: "Op Task" back in the 1980s, then "10/90" in the 1990's, with other variations floated at other times. We also have considerable practical experience with composite Reserve sub-units deploying on operations with RegF units. The deployment of the CRC (not CRIC) with 2PP to Bosnia last year was considered to be a good example of how to do it right: the leadership of 2PP observed the issues that arose during the previous CRIC with 1PP, and adjusted their plan accordingly. The 2PP CRC was formed from across LFWA's three Res CBGs(as well as other LFAs), with only a very small RegF cadre (a handful of positions). The Res leadership of the coy was brought in to 2PP eary an underwent a training and integration program that served both to develop the skills and currency of the Res ldrs, while building a stronger relationship with the bn. The troops were brought in later, then trained largely by their own Res ldrs.

As a contributing CBG to both Rotos,(which were back to back) we compared the processes and the results from a force generator's perspective and found that from the points of view of both 2PP and the Res CRC the 2PP approach was better.

By contrast, when I had C/1PP in Croatia in 94 (whoah...that was a_ long _ time ago!..) we received our Res as indiv augmentees to each coy. We had some initial problems in the pre-deployment training work-ups (fitness and skill levels-the usual two bugbears with Res soldiers...) and we had to let a few go. But, once they were into the sections, my CSM and I assessed that they fit in well and after a while it was hard to tell the difference.

Anyway--a long winded comment on integration methods.

One problem (that I think you recognize...) in trying to draw a parallel between how the Corps uses the USMC (R) and how we use the Army Res is the huge difference in terms of service. The USMC(R) ,like the other US Res components, has fixed terms of service which include obligations and liabilities for active duty. Our Res, with a few exceptions, is composed overwhelmingly of volunteer soldiers who serve with no fixed engagement and no obligation to serve on full time duty short of an Act of the Governor in Council (ie: something that hasn't happened since 1939). 

As well, we have no means of guaranteeing that the civilian job of a Res soldier will  be protected by his employer once he  goes on full time duty. The effect of these conditions, despite the excellent efforts of our Army Res to step up to the plate for Roto after Roto as indiv augmentees or as members of composite sub-units such as CRICs ad CRCs, means that the Army has to proceed cautiously with how far it integrates Res into the permanent TOE structures of Field Force units. Sadly, if we were to build an entire sub-unit out of Reservists, there is no guarantee as to how often its members would be available to train over the course of a year, and even less of a guarantee that if the subunit were needed for full time duty that it would turn out at full strength. As well, since I was a Res soldier in 1974 I have never seen a single Res unit that could generate a complete and deployable coy/sqn/bty. A platoon/troop has always been about the limit in terms of generating organizations made up of soldiers who are available, willing, fit and trained adequately for overseas duty (even with pre-depl trg which we normally mandate at 90 days of full time trg).

IIRC, the US Army experiment with "Round-Out" ARNG Bdes as integral elements to Active Army divisions was cancelled because of issues over traning levels. I believe that a "Round-Up" process was substituted, in which the ARNG Bdes were attached as increments, over and above the normal TOE. I do not know how the ARNG does it now. Any of our US friends care to comment about direct integration of ARNG into Active Army unit TOEs?

If, on the other hand, we are willing to accept the risks I mentioned, then IMHO it could be made to work. We would want to be very careful not to repeat the mistakes made during 10/90, which in LFWA at least seemed to generate boundless hatred and suspicion on both sides as to what wicked purpose the integration process was actually serving.  Cheers.


----------



## NMPeters

To get back on topic here, the Army is currently undergoing regeneration. Obviously, not being able to copy and paste the entire 300 some-odd page regeneration document here, I'll attempt to pull out the parts that are pertinent to this discussion and the Army Reserve. Here it goes:

The Army has identified several operational capabilities that are suitable for development as â Å“Reserve-onlyâ ? functions.  In addition to individual augmentation of trained ARes personnel to operations, and provision of formations from traditional capabilities, the ARes will be the single provider of the Army's CIMIC, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and dedicated CBRN force generation capability.  These new capabilities will be remain manned on a part-time basis until such time as individual soldiers or formations are generated for a specific mission requirements.  The ARes will continue to support, when required, the generation of sub-units, and sub-sub-units, from within the traditional arms in each of the Land Force Areas. Close coordination with DLFR and DCDS staffs will be necessary to determine the degree to which ARes capabilities either replace or complement Regular Force and civilian agencies as first responders in a domestic crisis situation.

3Much work in the development of new capabilities remains to be done before these specialized units are fully emplaced in the institutional ARes.  Under the guidance of the LFRR project, the Director of Land Reserve Management (DLRM), in concert with DLSP and other LS Dirs will oversee the stand-up of new ARes capabilities, and implement such establishments and funding levels as to ensure their appropriate manning and training.   The goal will be capabilities of sufficient depth to ensure their continuing ability to support the Army's continuing operational commitments whenever required.

The successful deployments of Composite Reserve Companies (CRC) to Op PALLADIUM has proven the viability of re-grouping ARes individual augmentees into formed sub-units.  These re-groupings allow for greater ARes leadership exposure to operations, and increased operational tempo relief for the Regular Force.  While no Land Force Area is currently planning deployment of a composite ARes company overseas, the ARes will remain committed to having the ability to force generate at least two composite companies per year in order to augment high Readiness forces on an individual or sub-sub unit basis.

Augmentation - Land Force Areas will continue to force generate their deployment packages as required, utilizing formed ARes sub-units when necessary and appropriate.  In the longer term, the ARes envisions a more predicable pattern of operational commitment that would permit greater lead-time for work-up training and business planning. In due course, appropriate ARes capabilities will be incorporated into the Managed Readiness Plan and will be reported on in Level 2 HQ Operational Readiness Reports. 

The raison d'etre of the ARes is it's ability to force generate individuals, sub-sub-units and sub-units for operations as required, and it will remain highly committed to augmenting the Regular Force whenever possible.  As such, the ARes will continue to provide individual augmentees when required as a priority.  Second to individual augmentation, the ARes will seek to develop deployable and employable new capabilities, either exclusively or with the Regular Force, as quickly as possible.  Thirdly, the ARes supports the re-grouping of ARes augmentees into formed sub-units for operations, and the force generation of ARes operational packages, as required by the Army's High Readiness Tasks.

ARes commitment to the CMTC at this point is still very much in development. However, it is envisaged that as that facility and trg cycle and methodology matures, the ARes will play increasingly significant roles. As a start point, the ARes will force generate up to five company/squadron group size elements each year starting in 2006 that will cycle through the CMTC workup and exercise sequence. It is currently planned that Reservists will participate in a CMTC serial in summer 06 (TF 5-06) and in summer 07 (TF 5-07).This trg cycle will culminate in the ARes company groups participation in a two-three week long trg exercise at CMTC, nominally scheduled for the later part of August in each trg year. These companies will be identified through the Managed Readiness Plan and will be force generated by the LFA in the high readiness cycle. There will also be scope for increased ARes participation in the OPFOR requirement for CMTC, details of which are still being resolved.


----------



## 54/102 CEF

The first question

What current resources do Army Reserves get and what future resources will they get.

You can't evaluate a plan without numbers.


----------



## Spr.Earl

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> The first question
> 
> What current resources do Army Reserves get and what future resources will they get.
> 
> You can't evaluate a plan without numbers.


Yes,that is a very good question because over many years we have never ever heard a clear answer.


----------



## NMPeters

Sorry. You'll have to be a bit more specific with your question. Do you want to know financial, equipment or personnel resources? Or all of the above? I can probably dig that information up for you but I won't be able to do so until the new year as I start my leave in just a few hours from now and I'm currently trying to get some things tidied up before I go.

Also, can anyone tell me if there's a way to post powerpoint slides on here? That would make my life a heck of a lot easier to answering this question.

(edited for spelling. Guess I should use that spell check more often)


----------



## SHARP WO

I would say that everything depends on finances. Being a WO and from the Argylls I see many financial constraints on the unit. Will LFCA download money to units to train for specific overseas tasks? As of right now they do not.

SHARP WO


----------



## KevinB

Mama,

 You can post individual Powerpoint slides that you save and host at an internet site - or the entire slide show hosted at a site.

For the direct attach method it may work if you resize the slide...


----------



## a_majoor

> A_Majoor,
> 
> To counter, what about putting certain positions as reg, ie. Company 2ic and Ops. WO (if that position exists at Canadian Coy. level?) along with select other "cadre" staff positions necessary.
> 
> I am interested to see what other ways could minimize the financial impact of creating a 4th rifle company within the infantry battalions that are on their 'readiness' phase.



Sorry it took so long to find this, I didn't realize it had been moved at first!

Cadre staff is also workable, and I believe it is how many Nordic Armies are organized (i.e. the soldiers show up at the warehouse during the two week training period and are met by the professional cadre who take charge and organize them into a fighting unit.) There will have to be a lot of work in determining the "right" cadre, both in terms of what positions can/should be filled by Regular Force and which can be held by Reserves. The other danger is the Cadre might be seen as a sort of "dumping ground" for the less talented members of the Battalion. My suggestion of bulking up existing rifle companies was an attempt to get around these limitations, limit the amount of extra staff required by direct mentoring, and have something to offer the Reserve as well (trained and experienced troops). The weakness' that have been pointed out will require more work to solve, but perhaps there is no "right" answer.


----------



## 54/102 CEF

George Harrison - now dead Beatle said

Its gonna take Money 

Hey Nancy - we know you are on the inside - good - you can only do your slice of the pie - my point is progress can only be measured if they show the resources   ALL 

Else - unfortunately our highly respected and able CLS is just a babe in the woods getting the warm fuzzy from his higher ups   in a town that runs on BS


----------



## Steel Badger

I agree with the increase in paid ceiling....


Many times I have hear regular force comrades scoffing at the minute size of reserve "battalions"...
What they sont realize is that even if a unit has an incredibly successful year for recruiting soliders, you cut your own throat the next years as your allowed slots is reduced.......

The reserve regiments are the strength they are because that is what Ottawa wants them to be.....

By way of example.....

In 1970 my regiment paraded 400+ soldiers on a regular basis....... and the other 3 units in my city paraded similar amounts....
And then, evils of integration were in full swing, a 'manpower cap' was placed on the reserves....Each unit was not allowed to have more than 120+/- pers (Perhaps not the exact figure but the figure that has been quoted to me by soldiers that lived through that era.)
Almost overnight my regiment had to release 300 soldiers...all due to paid ceiling,,,,,

Although the manpower cap was later lifted..(early 90's?)... the funding model served much the same purpose....
And by place the cost of training the recruits fully on the regiments, the reserves were now faced with the choice of providing trained soldiers or providing recruits....

Its a very difficult balancing act between providing excellent training (the reason troops stay in the reserve) and providing not only recruit trg but QL4's and PLQ's as well.

The units within the Hamilton Garrison could easily recruit enough soldiers to put them each at wartime strength...there is that much interest in the military and I do not think I am wrong when I say that the same sit. applies across the country....

The critical situation is the money............

Given the above, I would ask that my reg force bretheren to try and understand WHY a reserve unit calls itself a Battalion at 200+/- pers

By all means offer criticism if we (the reserves) are falling below the high standard that the regular force units set for the army, offer assistance and advice....We WANT to learn, to improve... and to be professional....

But please don't slag us because the purse strings that determine our str  are not held by us, or the even the Army for that matter.


----------



## pbi

Infanteer said:
			
		

> pbi said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.
> 
> 
> 
> I'd venture that Regimental politics has been in our blood since day 1. None of the history I read seems to look favorably on the Regimental contribution to operational efficiency in the past.
> 
> To me, it's a toss up. The change is definitely needed - it allows fragmented units to combine training assets and recruiting areas. However, amalgamation seems to balance the bad (eliminating historic units) with the good (the lineage of the units will carry on). Our path has been to put units to zero strength, which also balances the good (the units with their unique heritage still "exist") with the bad (the zero-strength units exist in stasis).
> 
> Either way, the imperative of matching the Regimental system to operational realities should be the overarching consideration - kudos to the Brits for having the institutional fortitude to do so.
Click to expand...


Infanteer: I agree with most of what you have said, although I am not sure that amalgamation necessarily leads to the complete loss of   Regtl traditions. IIRC, some of the various TA Regts of the British Army represent several former County or Volunteer Regts that were merged, but preserved a large portion of the heritage of the former units by means of allowing the resulting sub-units to keep (bracketed) desgnations and in some cases items of dress or insignia. As well, there is no reason that other traditions and customs such as special days, events, mess practices, etc. have to be dropped completely either.

What amalgamation would do, IMHO, is help to overcome the age-old obstacle that Army Reserve struggles with when it comes to producing leaders at sub-unit and unit level: the "gene pool" of the average unit is so small that selection of CO and RSM (or even OC and SM) too often becomes a question only of "the last man standing". If, instead of having to select a CO/RSM from a limited (and sometimes regrettably "inbred") pool of 80 or 100 total all ranks (actually from a small slice of even that limited total), the selection could occur from amongst the much larger pool represented by the amalgamated strength of several units. I do not see amalgamation as a veiled way of cutting strength, since the positions to be reduced are those few at the redundant unit HQs. Instead of five or six units with establishments of 120, the idea would be to have full-strength sub-units combined into something that much more closely resembles a full-TOE unit, and more importantly provides a much deeper and broader succession pool.

Of course, we can also advance the theory that the answer is not to amalgamate but to recruit all unts up to full battalion strength. Personally, and based on what I have seen in the last 30 years, this is not a realistic COA in Canada unless we were to find ourselves once again in a general war with widespread popular support. Other than that, I think that we face the same reality of unit strengths that our Res units have for most of the last century: only a few Canadians are actually inclined to (or capable of...) making the sacrifices and effort involved in beng a citizen soldier. We need, IMHO, to tailor our structure to that reality, instead of constantly searching for a return to an imagined "Golden Age" of overflowing armouries.   Cheers.

[Modified to include quote from source thread]


----------



## Kirkhill

pbi 

I think you're right on the amalgamation issue.   There is an awful lot of ways that antecedent units are commemorated in amalgamated units. Cap from one, hackle from another, collar dogs from the third, stable belts, lanyards, kilts, trews, bugles, pipes, tunes and banners, not to mention all the regimental silver.   Part of the fun and privilege of belonging to a unit is being able to draw on the history of all those antecedents.   

For those of us that are or were Calgary Highlanders we not only drew on the Highlanders WW2 heritage, we also celebrated the heritage of 10th Bn CEF as well as the 103rd, our forming unit. As well we associated with   the history of our sister unit, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which itself was an amalgamated unit with antecedents that had previously existed as numbered units.

In fact, I'll indulge myself and be a bit pedantic just now to make a point.

In 1794 the 98th (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot was raised.
In 1798 it was renumbered as the 91st (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot, reflecting a rise in precedence because the Army shrank I believe.
In 1799 the 93rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot was raised because some character name of Napoleon was making life miserable again so the Army had to re-expand.
In 1804 the 91st raised a second battalion with the 93rd raising a second in 1813.   Both 2nd battalions were disbanded in 1815 after Waterloo.
In 1809 the 91st (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot was renamed 91st Regiment of Foot
In 1861 the 93rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot was renamed 93rd Sutherland Highlanders.
In 1864 the 91st Regiment of Foot was again renamed, this time to 91st Argyllshire Highlanders.
In 1872 the 91st got a new royal patron and became 91st Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders
In 1881 the 91st and the 93rd amalgamated as the Princess Louise's Sutherland and Argyllshire Highlanders of 2 battalions. 
In 1882 the regiment was renamed Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders)
In 1920 it became The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's) and was reduced to one regular battalion.   (In WW1 and 2 a number of temporary service battalions were formed and disbanded)
In 1970 it was reduced to 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Balaklave Company (Princess Louise's) - (The letterhead was longer than the muster roll)
In 1972 it was reformed as 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)
and now, I believe it is The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (5th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland).

Conveniently I happen to have at my elbow a book The Scottish Regiments by DM Henderson that was loaned to me by a buddy.   Must remember to get it back to him.

The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards sustain the memory of 3 regiments while the Highlanders were raised as the 72nd, 75th,78th, 79th and 100th regiments of foot between 1778 and 1794.

By the way dress, accoutrements, roles, equipment and recruiting areas have all changed drastically over time.

As you say the history issues can be overcome and become a great source of pride and strength.

Setting aside the history and the emotions, operationally I might suggest a mixed system for the reserves.   In places like Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, where numbers and proximity permit I think amalgamated battalions with conventional orders of battle would probably work just fine.   In places where numbers and distance conspire against the formation of units perhaps independent companies or squadrons would be a better anwer.   For example The Calgary Highlanders might become the 10th Independent Company (Calgary Highlanders) Western Canada Field Force or some such and be constituted as a combat team complete with a 5 or 6 platoon structure and incorporating service support.

That has actually been a pet construct of mine, at least for western Canada, for some time.

Anywhooo...... Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Some of the talk on this forum has been creating amalgamated infantry/armour regiments - cue The King's Own Calgary Highlanders, eh?


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill: actually, the amalgamation could work even in areas of geographic dispersal. I give our Bde as an example: it is not uncommon for us to have soldiers drive two hours to get to the Armoury, and we already have a few COs who commute a considerable distance to their HQs. On top of that, the Bde Comd Gp is selected from across three Provinces: our Comd and DComd are from Wpg but our ACOS and BRSM are from Thunder Bay, seven hours travel time to the east.

In the case of a unit amalgamated across a wide area (as we have proposed for our Artillery and our Svc Bns) it really would not result in a huge change for the majority of soldiers, who would continue to parade at their home armoury as they do know. The people erquired to move would be those in key unit-level positions. Under this system the leadership of the component sub-units would be provided by the OC and SM (as it really should be...) with the unit-level folks concentrating on unit-level issues and dealing with Bde HQ.

Our proposals further provide for the eventual redistribution of full time staff, with the sub-units having an FTS somewhat smaller than it is now, composed mainly of Class B, while the majority of the RegF positions would be concentrated in a stronger and more capable bn HQ FTS that also included Class B.

A few of the key tenets in our approach to the issue were:

-no reduction is strength (other than unt Comd Gp posns);

-no reduction in eqpt or facilities at any location;

-no closure of any location;

-no reduction of community footprint;

-re-allocation of funding such that the increased TD costs for combned units were taken into account; and

-appropriate method of designating the unit and preserving traditions, with full input of the unit, the senate and the Branch.

All to say that IMHO amalgamation need not be the frightening monster some people seem to make it out to be. Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

The use of "civvie" contractors to support the force either in garrison or on deployment goes back to the beginning of warfare. The growth of the professional logistics corps really dates to @ the 1700s, based on the consolidation of centralized power (royal armies vs feudal levies)and the large scale introduction of firearms. The trend really took off with the introduction of mass armies in the industrial era, when the need to outfit armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions became paramount.

I think the objection to civvie contractors is based on a lack of experience, and the well founded fear they will become like the baggage train of ancient armies, requiring a fair proportion of resources to protect and hindering operations because of the sheer size and unwieldiness. If 1/3 or the force needs to stay in "Camp X" to protect the contractors, then there is a big problem. In theory, military "cooks and clerks" can also act to protect themselves, allowing the field force to carry out operations, but as the thread about the "Ombudsman having soldiers break into tears" shows, double hatting them with their day jobs and the D&S role might not work out to well either.

This is moving a bit off topic, but if we don't want to have large logistics trains or "baggage trains" of contractors dragging behind us on deployment, then we will have to make a big investment in organizational structures which do not require as much support, and technologies which are more "self sufficient". (For an example, a laser weapon will not need to be replenished with ammunition, although it will need a source of energy. A sufficiently powerful laser on an air born platform might be able to provide coverage equal to many batteries of mortars or artillery pieces, resulting in an overall logistics reduction). The practical result of this might be "fire and forget" type deployments, where troops debuss from the JSS, do the job, mount up and go home to a "superbase" where the second and third line support is done.

So where do the reserves fit in? Given the lack of money and equipment, perhaps they should be given defined tasks, in the way the Navy reserve is into MCM, harbour defense etc. Reserve DOMOPS Coy's might be a better use of resources, letting the reg units off the hook for IRU and making them the "second team", allowing them to concentrate on the expeditionary force model. We are clearly spinning our wheels under the current system, meeting obligations by shunting resources from other jobs to the detriment of long term planning and preparation. Much more out of the box thinking is needed.


----------



## KevinB

I fully agree with a_majoor in the finding a niche concept.   (I can hear Infanteer cringe)

 Like it or not our system cannot keep functioning in the current manner.   We need to lift the IRU task for domestic ops off the regular force and have a solid local system in place much like the US ARNG.   It makes no sence to ship an Artillery Reg't from Manitoba to BC to fight a fire and likewise for floods and icestorms.
 Local troops shoudl be immediately (within 12hrs) be able to be deployed towards a thread of that nature.   

Some postions Artillery for one (where the Regs are weak in numbers - three batteries for a Brigade...) are an area where Reserve troops could be fitted into a regualr force system - the FOO Partied being regulars and excersise with the reg batteries but on deployment they slide into a reserve field battery.
Many of the CSS postions could be filled for deployment by reservists as well - and fruthermore I beleive that for mature (stable) theatre where the requirement for the LAV/Coyote system was low a Battlegroup could be easily filled by 90% reservists.

However I think the LFRR must focus on identifiying some units for DOMOPS only - thus they can be tailored for certain roles (WMD taskings etc.) 
 Furthermore I think the regular force inf should be tailored light and the reserve inf units that are selected as deployable units should be fitted into an Armoured Cavalry system with 011 crew.


I detest the idea of civilian contracting - simply from my experiences in Op Athena...


----------



## Recce41

Some of my points.
 The 8CH in Gagetown was a 90/10 Sqn. Most that were with them, well it sucked. Most reses don't have the training to may a full Coy/Sqn. It is my unit is better, my unit does it this way, my unit doesn't do that. We have it on tour, in a mixed Sqn, well? 
 As for in the Boar War-Korea, it was a different time. Soldiers didn't get out of parades, or exercises. Now, we have I cannot showup because "My dog died", I have to take my mom to the store", or etc.
 We get soldiers on task here at the school. And most have more adm problems. Most don't get the full courses. Last yr there was one yng soldier, that showed up for a task. She was not ever qualified. Her unit told her, the school would give it to them. We have had Snr NCOs, showup that couldn't instruct. Or fired from tour. 
 For some tasks, yes on the Log side. But in the F ech. Res have to be there more than 3 months. I'm not anti Res. Just I have been on tour with Reserves. And some were better than Regs, but most were not.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Recce41 said:
			
		

> Just I have been on tour with Reserves. And some were better than Regs, but most were not.



Jeez Dave. Thanks for the bone :


----------



## Recce41

Dave
 Sorry, but it's kinda the truth. My gunner I got stuck with, well. I could have put a fig 13 target, in their place.


----------



## pbi

Recce41 said:
			
		

> Dave
> Sorry, but it's kinda the truth. My gunner I got stuck with, well. I could have put a fig 13 target, in their place.



Did you ask yourself why that might be? How can we expect our Res soldiers to have the same skill levels as Regulars on 37.5 days of unit trg and a few weeks in the summer each year? We have a hard time keeping up skills in Regular units as it is: To expect much more from Res under our system is IMHO not very realistic. I agree that most RegF are probably better than most Res, but then that is our job and the reason the country has us in the first place, as opposed to relying on a totally or largely Res system.

My attitude is that we need to look at Res soldiers for what they _can _ do, instead of what they_ can't _ do. Considering the obstacles in their path, overall I'd say they do pretty well. They have some unmotivated wanks who are in it for the pocket money too, but then we've got our ration thieves in the Regular Army as well. Cheers.


----------



## KevinB

pbi said:
			
		

> but then we've got our ration thieves in the Regular Army as well.



Ditto 

 IMHO We should run everyone through the deployment wringer in DLOC (well more than what we currently call DLOC anyway) - Irregardless of rank - I've seen the sash covered up to often to mention.  Recce41 I know a few 031 Sgt's I'd gladly take a Fig11 in trade for - you can at least use a Fig 11 for something...


----------



## a_majoor

Which is why the Reserve should concentrate on jobs that can be mastered in 37.5 days. 

DOMOPS Coy's is a good place to start, since a lot of the skill sets would actually be the ones the soldiers have from their "day jobs", with military organization added to get the most use out of these skills.

Line Infantry, basic Engineering, Artillery, Armoured Recce (Light) or Armoured D&M are other possible tasks as well for backfilling Regular units, so long as there are limited resources for training and equipping reserve soldiers.

We should also consider just what is going on with how we train, since during the World Wars Canadians were going "0 to 60" in about a month (from raw civilian to "trained soldier" able to take his place in a line unit). Granted these weren't at the level of "Sturmtruppen" or Waffen SS, but they did get the job done. Todays reservist is advertised as the "most educated" ever, so they should be able to handle complicated concepts like "Following direction" and so on.....


----------



## R031button

Speaking as a newbie reservist; I would like something akin to the American system for the reserves adopted. We loose our Thursday night training, and we gain a two week full field ex over the summer; or at some time during the year. Now the advantages of this are fairly obvious: 1) There is very very little one can do in three hours out side of cleaning weapons and the occasional lectures; 2) Weekends provide enough time to refresh both the practical and theoretical aspects of concepts such as bayonet fighting, and FIBUA (IE: one day spent learning theory, the other spent applying it); 3) A two week long excessive each year could provide soldier with much more then a single week long excesses, and if implemented properly could allow reserves to work at the battalion and brigade level, which is something not often accomplished.


----------



## KevinB

Unfotunately you'd lose half you reservists who can't take the time...

  IMHO there is a need to creat different tiers of reserve units/service - with those who can get more time (ideally low ranking students) getting offered more employment and operational interweaving with a regular unit.

 That way IF we need a unit in a hurry you could mobilize the reserve agmentation to it - and send it off at 100% strength.  These troops could be easily shifted to a lower level of readiness unit when they progress to full tiem employment (if ever...)

Thoughts?


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:
			
		

> IMHO there is a need to creat different tiers of reserve units/service - with those who can get more time (ideally low ranking students) getting offered more employment and operational interweaving with a regular unit.
> 
> That way IF we need a unit in a hurry you could mobilize the reserve agmentation to it - and send it off at 100% strength.   These troops could be easily shifted to a lower level of readiness unit when they progress to full tiem employment (if ever...)
> 
> Thoughts?



Me and another guy discussed that.  There could be two "classes" of reservists - one who sticks to the class "A" sign in sheet and comes when he can and another who signs a contract to do the Army thing part time.

When I was a reservist/student I would have loved the opportunity to give more time - I would have signed a contract that would have held me to more.  But the Reserve system has to hold up its end of the bargin as well.  If we are going to make a "part-time professional", they need to be guaranteed access to better training opportunities (perhaps in the Reg pipeline) and assured that they won't stand just stand around the parade square.


----------



## KevinB

I think IF the CF guaranteed it (and stuck to it) it woudl work - but you are 100% right in that they woudl have to hold to it and provide training/employment better than euchre or other cardgames...


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> When I was a reservist/student I would have loved the opportunity to give more time - I would have signed a contract that would have held me to more.


How much more exactly?  Would the more have been all four months of the summer, and then the remaining 8 months been the regular class A stuff?  The problem with such a program is that only college & university studnets would be able to take advantage of it.  So, at best you have your junior leadership and the regular force would have to shut-down to fill-out the rest (Kevin, I remember you posting about your joy at the prospect of supporting the reserve concentration that never was in 03, so I know you would not be a fan of this).


----------



## KevinB

MCG - I am a big fan of training - but I think that reg/res trg should be a two way street - the idea of being a demo (again) for patrolling or other tasks - Imagine three stands of Patrol order and all the prep again and again and again. 

 No offence but for most taskings we want the reserve junior personnel not the senior pers.  Any moron can drop the back ramp of a LAV (or admittedly do anything in a LAV crew as well...) - so such personnel could be identified and shuttled to a unit - or effectively create LAV dismounts when combined with a 011 crew.

 Or if we have them for four months guaranteed and say 1 weekday a week (plus 2 weekends/month) we could place them in the Para Coy's and train them for NEO tasks...

The added advantage is that the "normal" reserve structure will then receive a much more skilled and experienced NCO at the end of this phase (4-5years)


----------



## pbi

> Me and another guy discussed that.   There could be two "classes" of reservists - one who sticks to the class "A" sign in sheet and comes when he can and another who signs a contract to do the Army thing part time.



Isn't that really what we have now? Class A parade at the unit as they can, Class B serve where full time service is needed on a limited contract, and Class C engage for all-up ops with the RegF. You really need this mixture because I sincerely doubt you will raise an entire unit of "full-timers". If you just "cherry pick" the available full-timers out of a pool, what you are missing is that the "goose" that produces the "golden egg" of trained Res soldiers to go on ops is a healthy, properly manned Res unit with good leadership and training that offers something to everybody in the community, not just that tiny number who can't/won't join the RegF but are available for extended periods of full-time Res service.



> I would like something akin to the American system for the reserves adopted



There are some important differences between the ARNG system and our Army Reserve. One is that when an ARNG soldier starts out, he gets his DP1 equivalent by attending full-time at the RegF school of his arm/branch, training to the same CTS as a Reg soldier. Unless we are going to   a) bring in job protection; or   b) severely narrow our recruiting base, this is a non-starter for us.

After he gets to his unit, the "traditional" ARNG soldier has his uniform on one weekend a month, and a couple of weeks in the summer.
( Or, at least, that was how it worked before GWOT broke out with its very heavy demand on the ARNG and USAR.) The result of this traditional system was an ARNG soldier who, as compared to the average Cdn Army Res soldier, was often not as well trained particularly in basic soldier skills, and inevitably suffered from skill fade. I think that this opinion has been well borne out by the observations of a number of people on this board based on experiences doing trg with the ARNG or USAR. If we go to a single weekend a month, without the full time DP1 trg, we risk a severe decline in the current standards of Res trg. 

In order to maintain the same amount of training time a unit would need to parade at least two weekends/month. This has been implemented by at least one unit in our Bde and while it has some great advantages, it also resulted in attrition of individuals who were regular parade night attenders but could not make the extra weekends. The trade offs would have to be weighed, but my personal opinion is that weekend training, at the Armoury or in the field is much more productive and less "hit-and-miss" than the frantic efforts during the two or three productive hours that are actually available on a drill night. Cheers.


----------



## KevinB

PBI,

I (as you and others started out as a reservist) and this is no huge slap (just a small one) but I consider it the fair weather army.  IF we can cherry pick from it and get a viable force I am all for it.

 I was terrible unimpressed by the reserve attendance at the Fires in BC, ditto for the Flood and Ice Storms.  The current system just does not work - even for the 2 week Ex's the attendance is low (especially in the senior leadership positions)  Units have to be amalgamated just to have forces to field.

 If we can create a better motivation to employ personnel than Class C we need to jump at it. Getting a Class C can be a bitch and then unless you are sitting at the NDHQ Puzzle Palace it is only for operations.(I did a Class C tour 92/93) but we need bodies not just for set rotations - we need to be able to 100% man our units.
  The ATOF cycle mentality has to be abandond and our Army must be fit to fight at all times not just 1/3 of the time...


----------



## pbi

> but I consider it the fair weather army.  IF we can cherry pick from it and get a viable force I am all for it.



The danger of just employing and encouraging the "bayonets" (ie: using the Res as a source of cheap privates) is that it will inevitably run down the real force generators: the Reserve units themselves. Why bother becoming a leader in a Res unit if the Army sends you a clear message that they don't want you and certainly have no interest in you? What's the anwer-post in all RegF to fill the unit posns? What RegF?



> I was terrible unimpressed by the reserve attendance at the Fires in BC, ditto for the Flood and Ice Storms



But why were you unimpressed? And who is really to blame? I would say that certainly in the Red River Flood, the RegF(LFWA) did its level best to ignore the possibility of serious force generation from 38 CBG, which was in situ, despite constant offers from the Bde. During the BC Fires(OP PEREGRINE) my impression was that the Reserve turnout was very strong: in our Bde alone we raised and dispatched two full strength coys and were working on a third when we were told no more Res troops were required. Keep in mind that these soldiers had to volunteer their time with the good graces of schools or employers-there is no "magic wand" as there is in the US.



> The current system just does not work - even for the 2 week Ex's the attendance is low



If you are talking about ACTIVE EDGE, LFWA was warned over and over again that it was at the wrong time of year, and was not really a good use of Res trg resources. Some LFWA staff insisted on inflating the anticipated Res attendance in order to make the concept of the ex "look good". I think we sent about  150 folks from across our Bde. By contrast, we held our own Bde Lvl III/IV ex in Kenora in the spring and turned out around 400. The idea of these Area Cons really needs to be measured against the actual return on the dollar, especialy when so few leaders can attend. If the actual required trg can be achieved within hte Bde AO without all the logistic nightmare, so much the better.



> Units have to be amalgamated just to have forces to field.



I'm with you here. Some units should be amalgamated, period. You might be quite surprised how much support you will find for that idea in the Res world.  It is "other players" who tend to fight it.




> Getting a Class C can be a ***** and then unless you are sitting at the NDHQ Puzzle Palace it is only for operations.(I did a Class C tour 92/93) but we need bodies not just for set rotations - we need to be able to 100% man our units.



Ack, but isn't this really about manning the RegF properly, not using Res as stop-gaps?



> The ATOF cycle mentality has to be abandond and our Army must be fit to fight at all times not just 1/3 of the time...



ATOF "_per se_" never really worked and is morphing into another readiness system that will see two BGs, a Bde HQ and some sp elements ready to deploy (with some TMST...), with the rest preparing or recovering. To keep the entire Army at full readiness would, I agree, be excellent and I would love to serve in a bn or Bde like that, but it is not on our $$$ horizon. Not even the US can afford that. Cheers.


----------



## Recce41

Why are they below standard, THE F***ing MESS thats why. I was in the reserves and most went there to drink. Ask any RSS, training? Whats that? I have been down to Armouries and see more people in the mess or just sign in. When a unit has a SGT for a SSM. You know there is something wrong!
 There are soldiers out there that would showup and train. On one course I had to teach a driver to drive. I don't have time to teach a course on a course. Basic things can be taught. You don't have to go anywhere to teach weapons, drills, NBC, orders, etc. All you need is a class room and students.
 You cannot organize training when you don't even know how many people will show.


----------



## c4th

_Why are they below standard, THE F***ing _ 

I'm not sure what Recce41 is on about here.  PBI et al are spot on here, and have been gracious enough not to mention standards.  Yes, there is something wrong with a unit when a Sgt is doing an MWO's job, but it is not wrong with the soldiers or the Sgt.  If we're talking reserve armoured recce here the problem is with the availability of courses.  It is easy to get to MCpl in Armoured Recce units as all that is needed is PLQ (JLC).  6A's are 12 weeks in Gagetown on Leopards.  A Res Unit would be lucky to send one Sgt a year, and I'm sure most don't send that many.  All atrit at least one if not more Senior NCO per year.

_but I consider it the fair weather army.  IF we can cherry pick from it and get a viable force I am all for it._

KevinB, I hate to break it to you, but the REG Force DOES cherry pick from the reserves.  The PRes is the best recruiting pool of NCM's the CF has.  The reservists who are young, fit and want to soldier inevitably CT to the RegF.  Conversely, those leaving the RegF after 6/7, 20, 25 years rarely find themselves in Reserve units.  What reserve units would give for even 1 6yr cpl a year, or 1 20 year Sgt/WO a decade.

Class B contracts are not for those who want to soldier more as those jobs are RQ, HQ, CFRC taskings.  If anything they erode the quality of the soldier.

The quality of reserve soldier up to MCpl level as I have seen on operations is easily on par with their reg force counter parts.  As it has been eluded to, where the ResF is weak is at the Snr NCO / WO level.  It really takes more than 37.5 days a year to be proficient at the senior ranks.  They also lack trg in the way of advanced courses and in the infantry, Mech Ops.

Solutions:

1.  Speed up the CT and Recruiting Process.  If the PRes is the best recruiting pool the RegF has, then lets get more soldiers in, and train them.  If they choose to CT, get them over as soon as possible.  The 365 days/year the RegF needs them is more important than the 37.5 Class A days the reserves need them.

2.  For the soldier, sort out the Trg.  It takes two summers of trg to qualify a soldier to Basic Infantry.  It should take no more than one summer complete to train a soldier from Civvy to Trade Qual plus a specialized qual.  

3.  National courses should be funded nationally.  Currently all crse costs are footed by the home unit.  For 8 - 12 week advanced courses at the Sgt/WO levels, unit DCO's are not to keen to cough up the cash if it hasn't been budgeted for the year prior.  The doors have to be opened so that we have the ability to train Snr NCO's to be what they are supposed to be.  Masters in their trades.  

Soldier on,


----------



## boothrat

If you where unimpressed by the reserve attendance at the BC Fires you would of been downright depressed at the projected attendance for Active Edge (the exercise that was to have run in the same time period). I believe the reserves where able to provide 3? full companies to fight the fires and there was barely a weak company that was signed up to atend the exercise.


----------



## Recce41

C4th
 What I'm on about is most just go to drink on Tues/Thursday. Res Crewman don't do a LEO 6A,6B or 7s course. They do a iltis 6A which is 4 weeks, 6B which is 4-5 weeks and only do Mod 1 of the 7s unless they want to stay! Most 6A, 6B now called DP3 Recce Ptl Commander/DP3 Ptl C/ DP3 TpWO can each have upto 36 students. Before it was 36 for a Recce course and 36 for a Cougar course. That is 108 students. That would average about 7-8 students from each unit. A MCpl cannot CC unless he is CC qual! As directed by the ARMY.
 A National course is just that a National course. Units don't pay unless they, run only for their unit. If they run a National course and invite others, and with the School's OK. They don't pay. This helps us at the school. 
 We DS start in the field ( ie this yr. 12 Jan-March Brake (if your lucky)-24 May) then out (ie 1June -26 Aug). This is 90% of the DS. This does not course time if they are on DP3 CC,DP3Tp WO, DP4 SSM, ILQ,etc. We are hoping to get Res DS in for the summer. We now have to run every course here at the school. We now run DP1AO CC,Tp Ldr, DP3 CC-TP WO. This yr the number maybe 12-24 students a reserve course. 
 This is from first hand knowledge, being in RHQ Ops and as a  DS.  :evil: :tank:


----------



## Brad Sallows

[sarcasm]Oh, yes, of course: whenever I needed to find someone who wasn't in the usual office or classroom, the first place I would look was the mess.[/sarcasm]  OK: it's no secret that some units go through alternating periods of mastery and uselessness.  Do we need to keep beating that particular mass of unidentifiable tissue on the road?

As our modern armed forces become progressively more technically oriented, with a wider range of skills to master, I observe that the reserve threshold ("essential") falls further and further below "supplemental" and "residual".  37.5 days in 1955 could impart and maintain more of the total expected skill set than 37.5 days in 2005.  Instead of casting about for a set of skills easily maintainable (ie. minimal equipment and facilities) within some arbitrary funded-day envelope, we should first establish what a reasonable expectation of commitment is per year (37.5? 45? 60? full day equivalents), use that to set the per-soldier funding envelope, and then fit the skill sets to it with a sliding balance of "train" and "maintain".  (Presumably the more one learns, the larger the share of time one must devote to proving essential competency.)  As long as finances drive the requirements, we will suffer moving targets in everything ranging from BTS to budgets, with a commensurate waste of Class A days among the administrative and training echelon.

A senior reservist - for the sake of discussion, let's at least say the COs, OCs, RSMs, and CSMs - should be measured against the applicable job requirements of running a reserve unit, not the equivalent regular element.  This is nearly independent of unit size (eg. a battalion which is really only of company strength) because most of the administrivia does not scale linearly with nominal roll numbers.  It is on that basis of responsibility that reserve promotion is (or should be) granted.  The increasing (with rank) capability gap between a Res F and Reg F member is an obvious and continuing point of heated debate.  Has it ever been proposed that the Res F should have a rank structure in which each person has a "substantive" (all component) rank and a "while-so-employed" (reserve component) rank, such that a member might hold an elevated "WSE" rank while filling senior reserve appointments, but revert to the "substantive" rank on attachment to the Reg F or Special F for any purpose?


----------



## a23trucker

Just some thoughts (from an over tired old guy):
I think we need to look at the way we look at reserves. 
Also how we schedule crses, ex's & employ reserves
We don't all fit into one pattern; so you can't use generalizations.
-There are students that are avail during the summer but they aren't all available during march break because there is more there isn't a single march break period depending on whether your in high school, college or university.
-There are students who are not avail during the summer because of the change in schooling with the intro of non traditional semester systems and the intro of more work terms during the summer.
-There are workers that spend their vacation time every year away with the army.
-There are workers (like myself) have their vacation scheduled for them by their employers without the option of taking any other time or other LOA .
-There are those who have a willing employer who will allow them to have time off, even some that will top off their pay so that they won't be earning less money.
-There are those who are unemployed and are looking for any way to keep money coming in, and unfortunately
-you have the unemployable that if they weren't on class B or C would be at the welfare office.

The CF should also look at how they put out for taskings: 
They assign certain tasks to certain bdes who don't have a hope in hell of filling them while other bdes have more than enough pers to fill the pos'n but aren't allowed to fill (or if they are it will come in only at the last minute). Then when they can't fill the instructors they cancel the course. As an example the MSE-OP TQ 5 or 6 in Borden last summer, staff was tasked from the west without any one to fill the positions (The bde tasked had identified that they didn't have anyone) while my unit had 3 Sgt waiting for some employment....They cancelled the crse.

Another thing, they should look at giving more credit for civilian quals. 
The reserve world has a great span of civilian skills that are transferable to the CF but there is no structure for the CF to take advantage of these skills.
(I think of skills such as cartography (Engr/Arty), chemistry (POL/H2O Purification/NBCD etc). 
I'm a mechanical designer that had my own company designing equipment for vehicles the CF and other militarys but there is no accreditation for my skills in the in the EME world.

P.S. Drinking in the reserves is changing the same way has in the civy world and in the Regs.... We have trouble keeping enough revenue flowing thru the messes to even keep them open. Those who come just to drink are a waste of rations and should be dealt with....of course we don't have the scope of options to address the problem.
If a person who comes to the mess and gets "Sh** faced" doesn't get noticed as not performing the next morning because there not there. 
Getting a reservist on a abuse program takes an act of Parliament (last time I checked)


----------



## KevinB

Brad,

 Honestly I think that if the unit is only a compnay then it should have an OC not a CO, and be pruned of its entirely useless senior ranks.
I refuse to believe that a reserve company sized element can generate more admin that a regular force company - I mean we have 4-6 more days a week to get in shit...

 I think the scalpel needs to cut deep into the fat underbelly of the reserves and create operational effective units - not the current cardboard cutouts.  The idea a Reserve Bde did a good job scraping 2 amalgamted companies is ridiculous - that is a Bn(-) not a Bde sourcing. 

 I really think the sacred cows have to get slaughtered here - and while it is nice to recall past glories and dream about a mobilization army - thats tripe.  We need Effective (Combat Effective) soliders to prop up the reg force (and yes I used prop intentionally, for there are need changes in that arena too). The orginization has to be ground/grass roots operational, and everybody in the ORBAT shoudl be fit to fight (but heck it does not happen in the regs...)  I happen to think company is the highest we should organize the reserves at and have the Admin of higher headquaters done by a regular "sponsor" unit.


----------



## Poppa

The way I like to explain PRes trg vice Reg Role and trg is to use a cahir anology. Let me explain.
Think of all the things that a MOC has to do.... this is the lumber
when all of these things are put together they form a chair..capable of suppporting something.
Now the PRes has less lumber.
If we ask them to build the same sort of chair it won't work. A leg will be missing, no back...you get the picture.
Why would anyone want half a chair?
Don't expect a full size chair from us...However, we can build a smaller chair that can be load bearing.

Does this make sense? I just got back from a night out.


----------



## pbi

quote]Why are they below standard, THE F***ing MESS thats why. I was in the reserves and most went there to drink
I was in the Res too, and I have done unit RSS, and now I work with the Res again at Bde level. Your statement might have reflected the circumstances in your unit at that time, but as a general statement IMHO it is false today, not to mention pretty insulting. Most Res soldiers go to the armoury to train-the fact that they might end up in the Mess when they should be training is a leadership failure. Either not enough leaders (a much more common problem in many Res units than alot of people in the RegF seem to want to realize...) or bad leaders, which certainly exist in the Res, just as they do in the RegF. There are mess hounds in Res units, just as there are MIR commandos and oxygen thieves in Regular units. Get off the high horse.



> We have trouble keeping enough revenue flowing thru the messes to even keep them open



Glad you mentioned this: I was going to. Most messes are in our Bde are barely staying above the red line.




> When a unit has a SGT for a SSM. You know there is something wrong!



Yes, you're right, you do. We had one unit in our Bde like that until recently. This kind of thing happens for many reasons: in particular an Indiv Trg system that has until very recently IMHO failed to realize the unique demands of training Res soldiers and has insisted on a Gagetown-centric "one standard means one school" approach to life instead of figuring out how to devolve trg to LFAs or Bdes. I will not even mention CFSTG at Borden and the hash that has been made of Res CSS training over the years, effectively guaranteeing that most Res CSS units are almost completely lacking technical supervision capability, or much leadership either. A recruiting system that makes it painfully frustrating and slow to get into a Reserve unit, and is not designed to support the type of local recruit flow the Res requires, guarantees that attrition will be replaced only slowly, thus cutting into the gene pool from which a unit must grow its own NCOs. Except for a tiny RegF element, the Army will not "post in" an NCO to a Res unit -they grow their own or they don't have any. As well, as a Res soldier reaches the age at which they are typically becoming MWOs and Majs, the responsibilities of their civ lives often start to catch up with them. So what should they do? Just quit? Back to square one.



> You cannot organize training when you don't even know how many people will show.



I disagree: you can, and in the better units they do just that, with training plans that have flex built in. But, I agree that you've identified one of the biggest weaknesses of our Res system: its completely voluntary nature. But, just for a second, ask yourself what would happen in some RegF units if the CO got out on the square and said: "_OK, troops, who really feels like going to Wainwright for the 100th time? Don't wanna go? Oh, come on, please_..." Because that's what a Res CO is up against. If the unit has solid leaders and good training, they may do OK. If not, it's back to "who gets off the bus". I was a volunteer firefighter and they often face the same problems. It's in the nature of voluntary organizations: they're all about leadership and motivation.



> 6A's are 12 weeks in Gagetown on Leopards.



Really? For Res Recce NCOs? Why would that be if the Res has lost the "tank" (Cougar) role?



> Class B contracts are not for those who want to soldier more as those jobs are RQ, HQ, CFRC taskings.   If anything they erode the quality of the soldier.



_Whoah!_ Pretty broad statement there! Don't you think it depends on how they're led and managed? The Class B in the unit are under the control of the CO-no reason they can't go to the field. The Class B's at CBG HQ should be available to the units by arrangement: all the regulations say is that you can't FORCE them to parade with their home units. We encourage our Class B's in Bde HQ to take courses and to parade and train with their units.After all, they're still soldiers.



> The quality of reserve soldier up to MCpl level as I have seen on operations is easily on par with their reg force counter parts



I am   sympathetic with this but sadly it is still not completely true. We still have problems with fitness and some skill weaknesses with Res soldiers, although the fitness issue seems to be improving as more Res soldiers make fitness part of their normal daily life. If we can give them the 90 days training the Army says they are supposed to get before deployment, they are usually OK. Unfortunately, the Army has started to shave off days under pressure of op requirements: we recently mounted a platoon with about 30 days of pre-depl training.



> Honestly I think that if the unit is only a compnay then it should have an OC not a CO, and be pruned of its entirely useless senior ranks


.

A fair number of Res soldiers are not all that opposed to amalgamation, which is basically what you are referring to here. It is not so much that the senior leaders are useless (granted some are...) but that many units simply cannot generate adequate candidates in the first place, so we are back to Sgts as SSMs/RSMs, recycled COs, and RSMs extended until they are CRA.



> refuse to believe that a reserve company sized element can generate more admin that a regular force company - I mean we have 4-6 more days a week to get in crap



It is not so much that a Res unit of this size generates more  admin, _per se_. It does generate quite a bit: PERs, PDRs, summary investigations, boards of inquiry, grievances, promotions, releases, B and C contracts, screenings for overseas missions, operating biudget management, etc. are all done in Res units, using the same or very similar formats as RegF. The difference is the horsepower available to do it.A Regular sub-unit typically has a full-time 2IC or AO, CSM, a full time clerk, and usually a "company jet" or two who help out in the Coy OR. Then, over in the BOR, you have a full time Chief Clerk, a full time NCO IC, full time clerks in all the positions. There are full time officers in every company who can be tasked to do summary investigations and BofIs. Platoons have full time Pl Comds and 2ICs. It goes on...

A Reserve unit is treated as a unit by the Army and must do all of its admin with, typically, one RegF clerk and one Class B Clerk. The unit (may) have some Class A clerks but like any Class A soldiers their attendance is periodic (a few hours a week) and not totally predictable. But, the Army demands that the admin be done, on time. Of course, alot of it isn't done on time, but that doesn't lighten the load much. In our Bde, we have tried to ease the burden by creating admin pools in our multi-unit garrisons, but this has had mixed success. If you don't do the work at Res unit, you will just have to shift it somewhere else, but now you will create other problems. The burden is just too much for the horsepower, believe me. I get to see the results. The answer is either reduce the admin load (not too likely....) or make sure that we start giving Res unts an adequate full time cadre of either Regulars, Reserves or both. 



> I think the scalpel needs to cut deep into the fat underbelly of the reserves and create operational effective units - not the current cardboard cutouts.   The idea a Reserve Bde did a good job scraping 2 amalgamted companies is ridiculous - that is a Bn(-) not a Bde sourcing.



Actually 200 plus out of a total strength all ranks of 1200 _almost all of whom are Class A Reservists and thus not obligated for full time duty_, is not too bad on very short notice, considering many soldiers had been away for the summer on course and were getting ready to go   back to school or work when the call came for troops. You are right that we don't put out the full strength of a "real" Bde, but there are a whole bunch of reasons why that is. I would be careful not to blame the Res entirely for it. And, you and I have both seen a few RegF units that were a bit on the "hollow" side, haven't we.....? In the long term I am a believer in some amalgamation too: it is inevitable and useful, but it has to be done intelligently: ie: not with a sledgehammer. Cheers.


----------



## Recce41

PBI


> Your statement might have reflected the circumstances in your unit at that time, but as a general statement IMHO it is false today, not to mention pretty insulting. Most Res soldiers go to the armoury to train-the fact that they might end up in the Mess when they should be training is a leadership failure. Either not enough leaders (a much more common problem in many Res units than alot of people in the RegF seem to want to realize...) or bad leaders, which certainly exist in the Res, just as they do in the RegF. There are mess hounds in Res units, just as there are MIR commandos and oxygen thieves in Regular units. Get off the high horse.


 This is from my visits to some units in Ontario and in NB. And as for MIR Commandos, they are getting theirs now. No field, your gone. As of now. Any soldier that cannot do his job can be gone. 
 Reserves never did leadership  courses on Leos. It was Cougar or Ilitis. The only a few a Sqn, 8CH did get a drivers or gunners, the 90/10 Regt. Good ones get bored and leave or stay and get left behind and bad ones stay and get ahead. 
 Bottom line. There should be a standard, for all units. If your unit does not meet standard, you loose money, If you pass standard you get more. When a unit has good goes ie to Knox, Florida, Cal or Bragg. people come out of the would work. But if it's to go out in a cold wet field. you get 25-50 %.
 I remember my father/uncles in the Regs and Res. There would be a full Armouries. They would parade out of the Armouries and down the street then back. It was pride in the Regts. Now. I know they don't do that anymore. Dave? 

 Thats my 2 cents.


----------



## pbi

> This is from my visits to some units in Ontario and in NB.



OK-that's more like it. "Some units".



> Any soldier that cannot do his job can be gone.



What happened to the "accomodation"policy in the RegF? Anyway, MIR commandos usually never had any real long term problems: they just knew when to be sick.



> Reserves never did leadership  courses on Leos



I thought not. We have two Armd Recce units in our Bde and I had not heard of their NCOs doing Leo trg.



> There should be a standard, for all units



There is: its called the Bde Operating Plan, which is based on the Area Operating Plan, which in turn comes from the CLS annual directing (the SORD) The Bde Op Plan tells the Res unit exactly what it must achieve in the year, amd what resources it will get to do it, including what strength it is to maintain. The Unit Operating Plan that the CO signs off and briefs to his Bde Comd is his commitment to meet that direction. What happens after that is a question of the personalities involved. Some Bde Comds hold their COs feet to the fire, some don't.



> But if it's to go out in a cold wet field. you get 25-50 %.



Yes-this is still a problem in some units, and the "fair-weather" soldier thing still hurts the image of those Res soldiers who try toi be professional. It was a problem when I was a Res soldier in 1974. The answer now is the same as it was then: the kind of leadership and motivation in the unit. They're volunteers, remember: there is no obligation to serve.



> There would be a full Armouries. They would parade out of the Armouries and down the street then back



When was this, though? And where? I was in the Res in Toronto 1974-1982 and I never, never, saw one unit that could fill an Armoury by itself. The only times we ever "filled the square" was when we had garrison parades. Most units were at about the manning level they are now, or less.



> It was pride in the Regts



So Reserve soldiers aren't proud of their units anymore? Are you sure?

Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Recce41 said:
			
		

> Why are they below standard, THE F***ing MESS thats why. I was in the reserves and most went there to drink. Ask any RSS, training? Whats that? I have been down to Armouries and see more people in the mess or just sign in. When a unit has a SGT for a SSM. You know there is something wrong!
> There are soldiers out there that would showup and train. On one course I had to teach a driver to drive. I don't have time to teach a course on a course. Basic things can be taught. You don't have to go anywhere to teach weapons, drills, NBC, orders, etc. All you need is a class room and students.
> You cannot organize training when you don't even know how many people will show.



I'll add my voice to the chorus; this certainly isn't the case here in Calgary, at least not in our unit.

I'll mention again the problem of "national" courses; if they decentralized the instruction on some of these courses for Reserves, and relied more on OJT - to the point of allowing POs to be signed off - I have to believe there would be more retention and more qualified soldiers.  The "qualification" would only be as good as the instructors, unfortunately.  This is how the band system worked, and still does - the qualifications are checked by yearly inspections by a central authority.  I'd expand that system - pbi is right about senior NCO/WO/Offrs having real life burdens that increase exponentially concurrent to their rise in the military ranks.  But the problem doesn't begin at the sergeant or captain level, even private soldiers with good jobs will be reluctant to abandon families and employment for 12 weeks, or more.

I attended 4 weeks of QL3 training as RMS in Borden at CFSAL after a mandatory remuster; the course was, frankly, a joke.  The first half was done by distance learning, and was useful.  What was taught at the school was usually prefaced by "this is Reg Force admin, don't worry about remembering it, you'll never use it."   And I certainly haven't in the last 3 years.  I don't remember much about what was taught, though I do remember being put on extra duties for a wrinkled bed.  I realize it was a QL3 course and geared towards 19 year olds, but the majority of us reservists were remusters from other trades and the average age of the course was late 20s; at 31 I was not the oldest on the course by any stretch of the imagination.  Aside from age, many of the senior people on course had been employed for months if not years in orderly rooms.  Surely to God their POs could have been checked off - if the work is being done in the unit to an acceptable standard, why waste 4 weeks of taxpayer money, not to mention civvie vacation time, to "learn" stuff that you have already been doing, or else will never use anyway?

For a young troop just new to the Army, the QL3 course would have been most useful, but to us experienced remusters (most of whom were corporals with at least QL4 in another trade, some with JNCO training on top of it) it was embarrassing.

Perhaps some sort of two-tier training system needs to be in effect?

We currently train BMQ and SQ soldiers as a subunit without any kind of "centralized" course - I realize the perils of decentralization but I wonder if they aren't a necessary evil for the Reserves?  Can we not take the money that would be spent on housing and feeding reservists for 4, 8 or 12 week courses and instead appoint inspectors-general to oversee OJT within the units themselves?


----------



## pbi

> We currently train BMQ and SQ soldiers as a subunit without any kind of "centralized" course - I realize the perils of decentralization but I wonder if they aren't a necessary evil for the Reserves?  Can we not take the money that would be spent on housing and feeding reservists for 4, 8 or 12 week courses and instead appoint inspectors-general to oversee OJT within the units themselves?



This is exactly the argument we have been waging in our Bde for the last couple of years: "One Standard" does not have to mean "One School" especially now that we have established a system of Bde Standards Cells that answer to LFDTS via the Area Standards O and have access to all training in the Bde. One of the examples that we used to support the argument is that of training medical doctors. All across Canada, doctors must meet exacting standards. If they do not, people get sick, or die, and the malpractice suits fly. So, obviously, "one standard" is important. But nobody in his right mind suggests that Canada, or even a single Province, must have only one medical school.

Considering that we have the Standards Cells, we have course documents on line, and that many of the instructors come from the Bdes and units anyway, we feel that there is a case to be made for decentralizing as much training as possible, while strengthening our mobile Standards Team capability. The Schools should probably focus more on producing these standards people and instructor cadres, and get hte production moved out to the LFAs and Bdes. Otherwise I do not see exactly how we will get out from the Indiv Trg backlog mess we are facing now.  Cheers.


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Honestly I think that if the unit is only a compnay then it should have an OC not a CO, and be pruned of its entirely useless senior ranks.

It is entirely possible that some units have pools of senior ranks who stand around doing nothing; but, I reiterate one of my favourite points: before people are pruned, make certain they are redundant by proving that the remaining staff should be sufficient to run the unit or shortening some of the required work load.  As I once wrote, I would not like to be the sub-unit OC, 2I/C, CSM, or coy clk (all class A) being handed stacks of open files and terms of employment by the downsized CO, DCO, RSM, and BOR staff.  Barring a revolution in administrative practices in the reserve, a "company" is still going to require all the same job functions.  One could instead merely reduce the CO and RSM appointments each by one rank and save $3000.00 per year (plus whatever results from trickle-down of rank-capping).

>I refuse to believe that a reserve company sized element can generate more admin that a regular force company

As pbi noted, it's not the raw volume, it's the available time to deal with it.

If you want a Deployable Right Now reserve, I think it will be necessary to revolutionize the terms of service, training, and administration.


----------



## Roger

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> We currently train BMQ and SQ soldiers as a subunit without any kind of "centralized" course - I realize the perils of decentralization but I wonder if they aren't a necessary evil for the Reserves?   Can we not take the money that would be spent on housing and feeding reservists for 4, 8 or 12 week courses and instead appoint inspectors-general to oversee OJT within the units themselves?



On a other note, if you leave the forces for more than 5 years you might have to start from 0 if you come back in. For sure if you are out more than 7 years. I am a reservist now that was in the forces as a sargent and had to take BMQ, SQ1 and SQ2 and I have a couple of friends that want to join the reserves but out more than 7 years and are not interested in starting from scratch, one was in the Airborne Regiment. For me it was a waste of my time and money for the Government. The hard part was trying to stay awake through the BMQ being taight by Corporals who had to look up in referece books to answer simple questions like what was a full metal jacket. I considered my BMQ a total waste of time and more of a anger management course. I did enjoy the field portions of the SQ1 and SQ2.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Absolutely, Chop - we have an ex Infantry Master Corporal from the PPCLI who has been out for over 5 years.   He wants to come back as a piper now that we have increased paid positions once again.   They say he would have to do basic all over.   Well, the guy has wife and family and a great paying job with Calgary Transit.   He's supposed to take a massive pay cut in order to attend a course that will enable him to...recognize ranks and salute properly?   Do drill?   He's been playing with the band as a volunteer for years, I think he knows how to march, really, I do.   Another ridiculous situation which common sense should be able to sort out.

What possible benefit would there be to taking basic over again?  TOETs with the "new" weapons?  Granted, but that can be done OJT as part of Warrior Training each year.  The supporting trades do it every year also; many relearn the drills from scratch (they also seem to change every year, also) in any event, so add one more to the pile.

Changes in military law?  Again, a one day refresher might be in order.  Two weeks of drill periods doing about turn on the march by squads really doesn't seem to be a good use of time and resources, from either his perspective or the Army's.


----------



## Roger

You could imagine having to learn drill all over again, it was fun. If they are not sure what to do then make ex foces members take the SQ2 or trade course. Then you learn the weapons spend 4 weeks on course rather than 12.

But who am I to say, I am not in Ottawa with my super officer intelligence....


----------



## brin11

I would check those timings again for equivalency.  I recently obtained an equivalency for QL4 in my old trade after 8 years absence.  No basic training or SQ at all.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> What possible benefit would there be to taking basic over again?  TOETs with the "new" weapons?  Granted, but that can be done OJT as part of Warrior Training each year.  The supporting trades do it every year also; many relearn the drills from scratch (they also seem to change every year, also) in any event, so add one more to the pile.
> 
> Changes in military law?  Again, a one day refresher might be in order.  Two weeks of drill periods doing about turn on the march by squads really doesn't seem to be a good use of time and resources, from either his perspective or the Army's.



I wonder if any unit has built the proposal and staffed it upwards to conduct an abbreviated refresher course for returning members. It should be a relatively simple matter of tearing apart the CTP and identifying what will be a refresher (drill, etc.), what will be comprehensively reviewed and retested (weapon handling, etc.) and what will be taught in full (any new material - Mil Law, etc).  Such a proposal is unlikely to be developed by the training system, because they don't have the issue in their laps, but it might find support through the Chain of Command if sold effectively.


----------



## Roger

brin11 said:
			
		

> I would check those timings again for equivalency.   I recently obtained an equivalency for QL4 in my old trade after 8 years absence.   No basic training or SQ at all.



you are not the only one that I heard of, I think it has a lot to do with the recruiting officer, it pisses me off at no end when I hear it. Its true military bull&*^%^. But what do you do, take your lumps and move on.

It is 5 years you risk loosing and 7 you loose it all. If you are a trade like a dentist then you may be able to join and just get a refresher even though you where never in the forces.


----------



## Recce41

PBI
 I know between the Wind R and the E&K. They did have about 200+ pers back in the 60s/70s. And the accomodation policy is only if the soldier can recover. Or to take them to 20 if less than a yr. Why should they take a postion at the unit.


----------



## brin11

Actually it took me about a year and a half after joining again to get the equivalency and recruiting was not involved.  The equivalency came straight from LFAA.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Michael OLeary said:
			
		

> I wonder if any unit has built the proposal and staffed it upwards to conduct an abbreviated refresher course for returning members. It should be a relatively simple matter of tearing apart the CTP and identifying what will be a refresher (drill, etc.), what will be comprehensively reviewed and retested (weapon handling, etc.) and what will be taught in full (any new material - Mil Law, etc).   Such a proposal is unlikely to be developed by the training system, because they don't have the issue in their laps, but it might find support through the Chain of Command if sold effectively.


I guess the question is, how many returning ex-soldiers does the Militia have, and would it be worthwhile for brigades to run "refresher" courses.  Perhaps if you integrated these refreshers with Warrior or other standard unit training, and made them of benefit not to just the half dozen or so returning members, but for entire unit/brigade, it might be more worthwhile?


----------



## Roger

brin11 said:
			
		

> Actually it took me about a year and a half after joining again to get the equivalency and recruiting was not involved.   The equivalency came straight from LFAA.



Took me a year and a half as well to get nothing, is this not just great


----------



## a_majoor

Couple of notes:

Most of the Admin in the Regular Force is or soon will be on central database programs like "Peoplesoft" , CFTPO and so on, and a lot of Reserve admin is migrating there too. The idea of orderly rooms and clerical functions could go to the boards if this is taken to its conclusion. (Soldiers can and will do their own queries, while course reports etc. get fed in by the course staff, QM records by the QM staff, the CSM swipes every soldier's "smart card" at first parade to input pay etc).

LFRR Phase II could logically lead to the end of "units", by amalgamating the current company/squadron/battery sized "units" into actual companies/squadrons/batteries of extended units with rank and positions adjusted accordingly. Where I work, there would be a six company "31 Light Infantry Bn", 31 Armoured Recce, 31 CER (we have that already), 31 Artillery and 31 SVC BN. Historic ties and continuity would be maintained by the subunits (A Coy [Essex and Kent Scottish] 31 LIB, or C (Windsor) Sqn 31 Armd). While I am sure a lot of the "old guard" would be disgruntled by changes of this magnitude, life goes on and within five years the vast majority of soldiers would be new and "31 Battlegroup" would be the only organization they will have any knowledge and experience of (or emotional ties to).

Removing the administrative overhead of clerical work and "regimental" staffs for these units could result in more resources being freed up to raise and train soldiers. Obviously, there are certain details to work out, especially how to select and put together the higher level staff (CO 31 LIB etc.), but in the military past sub units have operated independently for long periods of time, and todays communication technologies allows for rapid passage of information to keep the subunits tied together for a common purpose.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Well and good that clerks are being eliminated from the system - so when my pay is inevitably fucked up, do I complain to the CSM, or to the Smart Card?

;D


----------



## 48Highlander

Just locate your friendly neighbourhood Hacker NCO and get him to input a few extra payments.  I'm just wondering who'd keep watch over the system in this little scenario when there's so many possible avenues for abuse.

nice double-post by the way  ;D


----------



## Michael Dorosh

At my civvie job, we actually have three seperate levels of administration...Human Resources, who tracks positions, pay incentives, etc., Staff Scheduling, who do the data input of when you worked and how long (and also replacing staff with relief, something irrelevant to the Reserve Army), and finally Payroll, who track deductions, generate the cheques, etc.

Hard to imagine the Reserve world eliminating this completely.   WE just implement Peoplesoft, by the way - wasn't a great implementation, but even once it is up and running smoothly, I've heard no rumours of jobs being lost as a result.

Not hard to imagine, mind - many officers now do their own correspondence, for example, since PCs and laptops are universal (at least at home).   But do we really think there will be no tasks remaining for orderly room clerks and company/battery/squadron clerks - like simple PA?


----------



## Brad Sallows

You think the Guardians of Information are going to let just anyone access it?  Good luck.


----------



## a23trucker

Oh and has anyone heard that Oracle has bought out Peoplesoft and has anounced that it won't be supporting the program in the future.....I hope the system won't need a fix...... :crybaby:


----------



## pbi

> Most of the Admin in the Regular Force is or soon will be on central database programs like "Peoplesoft" , CFTPO and so on, and a lot of Reserve admin is migrating there too. The idea of orderly rooms and clerical functions could go to the boards if this is taken to its conclusion. (Soldiers can and will do their own queries, while course reports etc. get fed in by the course staff, QM records by the QM staff, the CSM swipes every soldier's "smart card" at first parade to input pay etc).



A majoor: in an unusual move, I will disagree with you on this part of your post. 

This comment has been re-surfacing for years. It first emerged when the computer made its appearance in units. It basically ignores the fact that most admin work in a unit requires human input, human assessment, and human analysis and explanation of results. It also ignors the fact that pers admin is way, way more than shuffling digits around. We have had PeopleSoft for a while now and all it really does IMHO is give a better tool to manipulate information. It does very, very little to address the broad scope of the human workload, and almost nothing at all for most of the pers admin issues I mentioned in my earlier post. What is its role in a grievance, or an SI, or an HI, all three of which suck _hours and hours _ of valuable Class A time? What is its role in screening an individual for an op?  

I rank this idea along with the idea that the computer was going to produce the "_paperless office_" and greatly reduce our workloads.   Ummmmmm......right. Next pipedream, please?

IMHO the clerk is not a typist: he is a pers admin tech, like a vehicle tech. He solves problems the "user" cannot, just like the guys in the MRT solve problems that the users cannot. Just giving him a smarter typewriter doesn't remove the need for him, or his expertise. We are so burdened by mandated administration in the CF, all of which requires dedicated human involvement, that the idea of reducing admin staff will IMHO merely result in  a) admin not getting done, which translates rapidly into QOL and then morale issues; or b) some bayonet will have to do it, but without the training or background.

Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Well stated, pbi.  To address your "paperless office" comment.  When we implemented the new payroll system at my civvie job 3 years ago, we found the number of paper reports, forms, and other paperwork necessary to pay everyone properly more than doubled.  Despite the fact that submission is electronic now.


----------



## pbi

The computer is the only labour saving device that never saved any labour. Cheers.


----------



## 48Highlander

That's mainly because people don't use it properly.  If you're attempting to implement a computer database in order to reduce the ammount of paperwork, and the end result is that your paperwork doubles, it's certainly not the computers fault.  You may as well blame your wrench when your attempt at car repair causes more damage.  A computer is a tool like any other.  If used properly, it can increase efficieny greatly.  The problem is that even a large number of the university educated "experts" really have no clue how to use the damn things properly.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

48Highlander said:
			
		

> That's mainly because people don't use it properly.  If you're attempting to implement a computer database in order to reduce the ammount of paperwork, and the end result is that your paperwork doubles, it's certainly not the computers fault.  You may as well blame your wrench when your attempt at car repair causes more damage.  A computer is a tool like any other.  If used properly, it can increase efficieny greatly.  The problem is that even a large number of the university educated "experts" really have no clue how to use the damn things properly.



Yup.  I do duty rosters by hand despite the computer having all the data to generate them.  I have suggested a template for a useful duty roster for three years running, but no one seems interested in getting the IT guys to implement it....so I get a report from our software, export it to Excel, then move the cells around to get the info I need presented in the format I need.  Would take 2 seconds for a computer to do that, that's what they are supposed to be for.  Instead, for a week's worth of duty, it usually takes me about an hour and half of screwing around in Excel.  Then I print it out on hard copy, then I blow it up on the photocopier because we have to write changes in by hand during the week, then I photocopy the photocopies so that the subunit has a copy; then at the end of the payperiod I photocopy the large copies and shrink them back down so I can manually check the payroll (about 4 hours to do a week).   So I've wasted a ton of paper and about 5 or 6 hours each week doing what the computer could do in seconds.


----------



## pbi

> A computer is a tool like any other.



Exactly. Thank you. It is not a panacea, nor a replacement for humans. Cheers.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The problem with electronic media is that they discourage staff rigour.  Before electronic media became widely available, one either had to distill critical information before passing it around or endure the task of copying in bulk.  Now people simply attach every document under the sun in case each might have some relevance.  As a CYA exercise, it's great: "We provided all necessary information; it's not our fault if it was not read and heeded".  "Brevity" has ceased to be a principle of military writing, with "Clarity" and "Relevance" under substantial attack as well.  Another side effect is the proliferation of ad hoc reports and returns.  When a higher HQ staff officer has the choice of combing through available reports and returns and plans and directives for particular information, or designing a nifty template and firing it off to all subordinate HQs demanding that it be filled out with just the right information in just the right format, which course of action do you think is chosen?


----------



## Bill Smy

I believe that hierarchy of roles for the Militia (and the Primary Reserve in general) is extremely important. I do not believe that any attempt to produce a vision for the future of the Army Reserve will stand the test if it does not conform to the direction of the Minister: 1) mobilization, 2) linkage to the community, and 3) augmentation.

In the past, various attempts to define the missions and tasks to be assigned to the Militia have become exercises of â Å“cherry pickingâ ?, choosing those that were popular at the time, or which were thought to be financially viable, ignoring government policy. The VCDS paper of 26 Nov 99 (para 23d), is an example; it reverses completely the roles as stated by the Minister, in all likelihood because augmentation was the current necessity of the Regular Force, and at the time the most popular amongst the staff which was under pressure to respond to the events and crisis of the day. The result of this approach has been years of confusion, and the resultant dissatisfaction in both the Regular and Reserve community with the current status of the Reserve Army.

Some have even put forward that one role of the Reserves is to provide part-time employment (Land Force Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan of 6 Oct 00).

Perhaps the most important result of ANY restructuring plan will relate to the development of leadership in the Army Reserve. One measure of healthy units is succession. Healthy units have at least two officers trained and qualified to take command, and two senior NCOs ready to be RSM. In addition, the numbers in the follow-on ranks must be large enough to sustain that capability. That does not happen overnight. It is a fact of life that some Reservists leave their parent unit due to employment, education and personal reasons. They often transfer to other units, and in some case leave the Reserves altogether but return later when circumstances permit. Career planning is difficult, but not impossible. Any restructure plan must dictate methods which foster the development of these leaders. 

I also believe (with over 32 years experience) that too often the aim of our military training appears to be designed to result in failure, rather than success. In many cases, thousands of dollars have already been invested in the individual, and when resources are scarce this is a wasteful practice which should not be tolerated. Additionally, it most likely discards many who, with proper help and encouragement, would be assets to the Reserve. How would our civilian educational system respond if we told teachers we expected them to fail students, rather than teach, develop and pass?

If the Army Reserve is truly to be a basis for mobilization, I believe that a priority in the listing of Mission statements should be one which addresses the size of the Army Reserve. It is an acknowledged fact that a Regular Force unit is incapable of deploying its total strength to meet an operational task. â Å“Wastageâ ? is inevitable, either through age, medical fitness, personal situations, or levels of training. We need not look further than the current â Å“weeding outâ ? of Regular Force battalions as they prepare to deploy on peacekeeping. The Army Reserve has the same problems and in a new structure one not four or five times the size of the Regular Force will not have the capability of achieving its Mission on mobilization. This is a simple fact, but one which some planners refuse to address, for a variety of reasons.

Any structuring plan must reflect the necessity of creating a training system for the Army Reserve which will reflect the reality of a true Reservist who has about 40 days a year to devote to the military, whether it be on a rifle range, in a gas hut, or in a lecture room receiving sensitivity training. Units overburdened with unnecessary individual training and administrative tasks will never be able to adequately exercise their operational tasks.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

That's nice from a macro view, Bill, but what about the university student who, already devoting his time to study and exams, just wants a stable and steady source of income?  "Unncessary training and administration" as you call it translates to the individual junior soldier as another day's pay.  Getting jacked around and not knowing how many days you are likely to train from month to month does little for retention, and highlights one of the many forms of wastage - rather than "wasting" money on unnecessary training, you are wasting money on training a soldier and having him quit after the first summer because McDonald's is more flexible with hours and more generous with work opportunities...

Some people are of the opinion that the Reserves are "just" a hobby, others that whatever it is, it shouldn't be a "part time job".  But to thousands of students, that's exactly what it is.  Few can juggle school, the reserves, and another source of income on top of that.  He doesn't care about deploying as a complete company/battery/squadron, he just wants some money to buy beer with at the end of the school week.


----------



## 54/102 CEF

Hi!

I promise to behave myself for the rest of the year!     
A few points from the last few posts --

Part time Jobs? Definitely. Need at least 50% more part timers. Hire the regulars to help make it happen. And it should go to the USA or UK full pay rate model. Anything less is miserly and does not separate the deployable folks from those who will never do more than the monthly parades and summertime trips to the Bde Ex. 

Full time jobs? I believe there is not enough turnover to have a real recruiting base
See ***   http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/mds/lander.htm      **** which states in part
The ....Canadian Forces, organized and tasked as they are, with the expected level of funding available, are unsupportable.   The inevitable result is the rust out of equipment, the burn out of personnel and the continual loss of capabilities in an unplanned and incoherent manner.   It would be much better to determine the capabilities considered the highest priority to the Canadian government, concentrate the limited resources available on them and create a military that may not be capable of doing a little bit of everything, but could be world class at what it is capable of doing.   Such a military would be a powerful foreign policy tool as well as a useful force for domestic purposes, if and when the need arises.         

The other side of which is that - if we can't get into a sustained fight - then too much pension money is pouring out the door..... When the regulars are gone - as in the BE F of 1914 - we won't have the base to contribute as per Afghanistan or Iraq as the kit isn't which inevitably leads to re-rolling to kit based military activities with civvy pattern eqpt like CSS. See comparative sizes of reserves and regulars here - numbers may be down for Cdn but the relative number seems about right. See http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc29/exnh/alarie.htm

PMQ's? Go on the economy or get out http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/mds/fortier.htm   but the author suggests that DND will help you live on the economy sooner or later. ----As long as Canada does not have a robust deployment capability I am sure there is a real bell curve visible segment of the regular component that says - we probably won't get into a fist fight on a sustained basis so this is a good - low risk - steady job and pretty interesting as long as you can take a joke. 

But does it even matter - the public says prepare for peace keeping --- but the government says - go back to the top of this post - we won't be peacekeeping too much too often.... certainly to produce regular - reserve interaction as per IRAQ or Afghanistan. see http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/mds/coates.htm

Note - I don't subscribe to either regulars or a reserve being stronger or weaker - my real point - as we consider these problems is WHAT ARE THE GOVERNMENT AIMS FOR DND? Saying we reflect and reflecting sound like here you mhave all these jobs and no resources.............. BS baffles brains everytime at the Ballot box.

As a line I read today goes - What do you do? I'm in the lead delivery business.   Lets just all work in 2005 to make sure we are not in the Lead Swinging Business.

Here's a good video for you for the next time ytou have to see the RSM - CO or your troops http://www.armyrotc.vt.edu/multimedia/airborne.mpg

So - see me in the butts at the rifle range if you want to go over these points - http://www.3bn12sfga.com/_riflerange/Weapon_Range.htm

Happy New Year!


----------



## pbi

Bill Smy: that was an excellent post and could have been lifted directly from the "Commander's Intent" of our present or immediately previous Bde Op Plan. Trying to build leaders has been our main effort for the last three years, because without them nothing else matters. I get frustrated when I hear the endless rambling about "too many officers" or "too many Sgt Majs" in the Army Reserve. I don't know where it is that this situation exists, but we would love to have that situation in our Bde. Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

Happy new year everyone!

I was (properly) slagged for the remark about clerks (esp by my own "Niner Domestic", who is of that trade!), but as usual, I wasn't fully spelling things out. Programs like CFTPO, Peoplesoft etc. are tools to store and manipulate data, but many of the very basic "data entry" type jobs do not need to be done by a dedicated clerical staff. Example: If I have finished instructing a course, written the candidates course report on my laptop, had it vetted by the course officer and standards (via email), then debriefed the candidate; why should I not then email or input the final copy to the candidates personnel record as part of my staff duties? Should the candidate need to reffer to this course report years later, wouldn't it be faster and more efficient to log onto a secure system and download it? If a gaining unit wanted to check this guy out for operations, then the same would apply.

Even the idea of the CSM swiping your smart card on opening parade is an idea to remove the complex procedures in the Reserve which go from paper to electronic to paper to....well, you get the idea.

Personell administration is a very complex system with so many variables that as a non-HR person looking in, I would say it is in need of a massive overhaul and streamlining. One virtue of systems like "Peoplesoft" is implementation should be a time to take a hard look at your existing procedures. I spoke to an IT person at UWO about this once, and apparently their implementation of Peoplesoft would have been a first order nightmare, until the implementation committee saw the light and threw away decades of archaic "quiffs" and stopped attempting to hand craft the software. (This is not to say the basic version of Peoplesoft is the _only_ way to track and administer staff).

Software is a tool, and can be a great help if it is selected properly, and the user is properly trained in how to use it. Very clever people can also use software in ways the designer never imagined (like sculptors using chainsaws to create a work of art...), although I don't claim to be one of those.



> Yup.  I do duty rosters by hand despite the computer having all the data to generate them.  I have suggested a template for a useful duty roster for three years running, but no one seems interested in getting the IT guys to implement it....so I get a report from our software, export it to Excel, then move the cells around to get the info I need presented in the format I need.  Would take 2 seconds for a computer to do that, that's what they are supposed to be for.  Instead, for a week's worth of duty, it usually takes me about an hour and half of screwing around in Excel.  Then I print it out on hard copy, then I blow it up on the photocopier because we have to write changes in by hand during the week, then I photocopy the photocopies so that the subunit has a copy; then at the end of the payperiod I photocopy the large copies and shrink them back down so I can manually check the payroll (about 4 hours to do a week).   So I've wasted a ton of paper and about 5 or 6 hours each week doing what the computer could do in seconds.



Look up "iCAL" by Brown Bear software. It is a very inexpensive web based calendaring program which might do the job for you. PM me if you need more details.


----------



## R031button

pbi said:
			
		

> Bill Smy: that was an excellent post and could have been lifted directly from the "Commander's Intent" of our present or immediately previous Bde Op Plan. Trying to build leaders has been our main effort for the last three years, because without them nothing else matters. I get frustrated when I hear the endless rambling about "too many officers" or "too many Sgt Majs" in the Army Reserve. I don't know where it is that this situation exists, but we would love to have that situation in our Bde. Cheers.



 I do think there is a point at which the amount of leadership in reserve units does seem to be a bit much. Many reserve units are small and barely require the admin for a company, let alone that of a battalion. For example, my Regiment has about 25-30 regular parading soldiers. To  command this we have an Lt. Col, a Major, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, a Chief Warrent Officer, a Master Warrent Officer, and a Warrent. How is this an efficient formation? If nothing else it means that any training must go through unnecessary paper work; and it's fairly obvious that such a huge command structure is a financial burden. I do, however, recognize that you cannot have a Lieutenant in charge of the armouries; but at the same time; why not down grade units like this to company level; commanded by a Major.

 Infact; I think we should adopt the British system; in which reserves(TA) are grouped into Companies of a parent regiment. This means that they can be supported by that Regiments administration at higher levels, and get trained by members of the Regiment. It also stream lines command, as you don't have "Brigades" of 1500, or 1000 reservists using up funds on administration for the brigade.

 Furthermore; would it not be a good idea to be able to train reservist in mounted warfare? If, as some members of this forumhave suggested, Canadian units switch to the British system of rotating from mech to light roles; why not allow the "reserve battalion" of a regiment to take the opposite rotation; and have the regular force SMEs train them in certain aspects? This would also mean that reserve units could have some armour to show would be recruits at dog and pony shows; or they could legitimately claim to be trained light infanteers.


----------



## McG

The British are abandoning the practice of rotating unit roles, which doesn't suggest that it is a model that still works.

If resrves were to do mounted ops, I think the best approach would be to establish APC units like the 1 CACR or WWII.


----------



## pbi

> I do think there is a point at which the amount of leadership in reserve units does seem to be a bit much



Yes, that is true, but I do not see it in our Bde, and we cover three provinces. It may exist elsewhere, but I am not so sure that it is not just a "rant". Maybe the real problem is not that there are "too many" leaders, but that the assigned rank for them is too high for the actual strength of the organizations they lead. 



> Many reserve units are small and barely require the admin for a company, let alone that of a battalion



I disagree. The amount of admin required from a Res unit is not directly related to its size. The Army and the CF demand the same range and proportion of mandated admin from a unit of 50 as they do from a unit of 200. Do not confuse "admin" with just doing the pay and promotions of the people who parade. Look at my post on this at http://army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-141927.html#msg141927



> If nothing else it means that any training must go through unnecessary paper work;



No-not if the unit is being run properly. The conduct of most training should be between the OC and the Trg Office. If the CO is sticking his fingers in that, that is a personality problem, although it is probably true to say that he may feel "underemployed" and thus perhaps "idle hands are the devil's tools"



> why not down grade units like this to company level; commanded by a Major.



This has been discussed elsewhere, along with TA-style amalgamation. My personal take is that more and more serving Res soldiers have little or no opposition to this concept, as long as it is done intelligently and respectfully, not stupidly and blindly.We have two projects like this under way in our Bde now, but I have to admit that the support from the greater Army has been marked as much by institutional "cold feet" as by enthusiasm and support. Numerous hoops and obstacles were put in our path by various levels of command and staff.



> Infact; I think we should adopt the British system; in which reserves(TA) are grouped into Companies of a parent regiment. This means that they can be supported by that Regiments administration at higher levels, and get trained by members of the Regiment.



To the best of my knowledge, this is not exactly how the TA works. TA companies (some of them being the legacy remnants of former battalions) are not grouped into Regular battalions. They are grouped into "Volunteer" battalions of Regular Regts (but I believe some, such as the Yeomanry Regt, are "stand alone"). There is a small cadre of Regulars and full time TA at the battalion HQ (not too different from what we have, ctually...) The admin and training is done via the TA unit HQ, just as we do it. It is not, to the best of my knowledge, done by Regular battalions of the parent Regt.



> It also stream lines command, as you don't have "Brigades" of 1500, or 1000 reservists using up funds on administration for the brigade.



This is a bit of a moot point. There is a need for a properly manned HQ to coordinate the dozens of activities involved in running the Army Reserve today. Whether we call the HQ a "Brigade" or a "Battle Group"   or WTF is really immaterial: the plannning, coordination and staff work must be done somewhere. At present the horsepower simply does not exist at Res unit level to do it. You can shunt the workload around, but that is a shell game. Somebody, somewhere, has to do it. Normally, the closer to the "coal face" that planning and admin are done, the better in terms of responsiveness.



> Furthermore; would it not be a good idea to be able to train reservist in mounted warfare? If



Interestingly, during the Reserve Roles and Missions Town Hall series (RRMT) conducted under LFRR PH II, our five Inf units resoundingly rejected being assigned mech or "dismounted mech" roles in favour of being good quality generic "infantry".(NOT "Light Infantry"-that is another breed of cat in our Army today). This vote was based on previous experience with the AVGP role, and a pretty astute assessment of the amount of time available to train. I look at the USARNG Bradley unit located to the south of our Bde: its AIFV skills are good, but IMHO its Inf skills are weak. It's true that our Res do get more trg time pe year than the avg ARNG, but it is still a stretch that our units (rightly, IMHO) rejected.
Cheers.


----------



## Bill Smy

It's almost 21 years since I turned over command of an infantry militia unit, and if parading strength is an indicator of success, I guess I have something to be proud of, but I don't know whether I can claim all the credit. During my command I had a group of officers and NCOs which was second to none in the District (the Bde in those days).

Times change. I readily recongize that, so many of the things I did then would not work now. In fact, they would not be tolerated.

First, I directed that we would no longer be in the individual training business. All IT would be done at someone else's time, labour and expense. We had just completed a fall/winter recruit course which started about 30 strong, and graduated about 5 individuals. What a waste. My solution was to do all recruit training in the summer, and concentrate on collective training.

Trade progression training days in those days was the responsibility of the District.

Over the fall/winter/spring I ran an exercise every six weeks or so. I issued the aim and scope of the exercise to the training officer, and all training in that six week period was directed at preparing individuals to perform their role in the exercise. I allowed raw recruits to attend, but limited their participation.

I tried to make these exercises as exciting as possible -- escape and evasion, rapelling, airmobile assaults on the locks on the local canal, exercises with our allied regiment in Jamaica and North Carolina, an exercise in Florida (turned down until I rewrote it as a District exercise). If we went to Meaford, I would not allow any instruction to take place in buildings (that was what the local armoury was for).

I tried to vary the activities of training. For example, the basic reason for winter exercises in those days was to master the skills necessary to live in tents in winter conditions. I had the training officer design an exercise where tent commanders were given a few grid squares in which to conduct their training. They then had a list of items to accomplish   -- erection of tents, cross-country snowshoeing, map and compass, etc. But they planned and conducted the training. The officers were given monitoring and assessment tasks. One year, the main activity was cross-country skiing. But in the background were all those skills needed in living in tents in winter.

I extended that concept with a helicopter company from a New York Army National Guard company. We   flew tent groups to isolated grid references in Allegeny State Park. On dismounting, the tent group commander was given sealed orders which told him the grid reference in which to set up his tent, a RV and time the next afternoon when the platoon would come together, and then a company RV for Sunday morning where the company would be airlifted out.

The point of all this ramble is that although it might seem the CO is training his unit at the Private soldier level, he should be using that activity to train leaders. The ability to conduct a range practice should be developed long before reaching the rank of Major. I tasked my Majors to conduct live-fire manoevre exercises.

Another short war story. The local Parks Canada tourist site wanted to celebrate an event by demonstrating how the military presence had evolved over the year. The superintendant had arranged for re-enactors for the most part, and approached me for a demonstration of an activity appropriate to the Militia at that time. He basically wanted a "troop the colour" ceremony. I gave him a platoon air assault. I decided that the summer course would provide the soldiers, but suddenly the platoon commander was unavailable. I had the course sergeant conduct all the training (monitored by me, of course) and command the assault. Twenty years later he still speaks of the spark he had in that I trusted him where others would not.

When I took over the unit, we were hard pressed to put 60 people on the floor. When I left we were bumping 300 on a regular basis.

As I noted, I don't think a CO could do the types of things today that I was able to do in 1980, but certainly he can make training exciting and at the same time train the next generation of leaders.


----------



## Spr.Earl

We can discuss this till we are all nauseas,nothing will happen unless we bring in Job Protection and a I hate too say it a contract sysytem,you sign up you are in,if you break it you pay or you are in the Regs.for the rest of your contract.


----------



## pbi

> We can discuss this till we are all nauseas,nothing will happen unless we bring in Job Protection and a I hate too say it a contract sysytem,you sign up you are in,if you break it you pay or you are in the Regs.for the rest of your contract.



How come the TA functions without these things? Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> The British are abandoning the practice of rotating unit roles, which doesn't suggest that it is a model that still works.



Really, when did they do this?

What sort of system are they going to adopt now, permanent rolling of "light" or "heavy" status?


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> What sort of system are they going to adopt now, permanent rolling of "light" or "heavy" status?


Just now (part of the reorganization & amalgamation of regiments).  
http://army.ca/forums/threads/24461/post-135815.html#msg135815


----------



## Spr.Earl

As I said we can talk till the Cows come home. :
But what is needed is our system to give equal course's (Reg) and Legislation for time off.
Until then our Reserves will be ineffective.


----------



## vr

The TA & ARNG have something that the Reserves in Canada desperately need.  That is a defined role for their units.  During the Cold War every member of these orgs knew exactly where they would be going and what they would be doing when the balloon went up.  And they rehearsed it.  As an infantry reservist during this time we had know idea what was expected of us or even if we would be involved at all.

Todays Reserve units need defined roles & missions that the leadership can train towards.  Providing individual augmentation or providing blank for step # mobilization (something only my ex-DCO ever understood) is quite vague and not tremendously inspirational for soldiers.  We just end up checking off the same ELOC/BTS boxes every year with no real goal in sight.

Give each Reserve unit a mission and a defined role in the Army.  Give them a set of standards to achieve, sufficient resources, and let them get on with it!


----------



## McG

What about financial incentives for reservists that pass annual proficiency tests or attend a minimum number of training events?

I like what pbi has suggested about replacing one evening a week with one additional weekend a month.   There is a concern that some people accustom to the old way of things would not be able to adjust schedules/lifestyles to the new.   However, in a city a battalion of multiple companies could designate one company as the weekend company and the other company as the week night company.   Both companies could come together once a month for battalion training on a weekend.   And if a member's life situation changes, it would be easy to transfer between the companies.   

This set-up could work if we amalgamate regiments or if we form multi-regiment battalions.
http://army.ca/forums/threads/24463.0.html


----------



## Michael Dorosh

MCG said:
			
		

> I like what pbi has suggested about replacing one evening a week with one additional weekend a month.  There is a concern that some people accustom to the old way of things would not be able to adjust schedules/lifestyles to the new.  However, in a city a battalion of multiple companies could designate one company as the weekend company and the other company as the week night company.  Both companies could come together once a month for battalion training on a weekend.  And if a member's life situation changes, it would be easy to transfer between the companies.



That's still irrelevant for people who work swing shifts, split shifts and other irregular schedules.  If you work evenings, then days, with 4 on and 3 off, your schedule is going to be all over the place, so it is not a matter of either evenings or weekends.  No way around it in some cases; so do you encourage a guy who is rock solid in job knowledge to quit in such a case, or just accept that he might only parade twice a month?

This is why I think Bill's comments about collective training may be not clearly focussed.  It seemed like he was talking about not having OJT for individuals, and instead focus on "unit training."  That's great, if your entire unit shows up all the time.  We did that the last couple of years, with a live fire exercise having all the exercises before it as a prerequisite - PWT on the range, then pairs, then section, then platoon, finally the company live fire.  I believe "gateway training" is the term.   So in Bill's case, if I understand him correctly, for an individual who shows up for the PWT, but misses the pairs and section exercises, he is pretty much hooped for the rest of the year.  If there are no other training tasks to do, he is out of a job until the summer courses, or next September.

How important is it to have Militia infantry companies capable of conducting a live fire company attack?  Is this really the role they need to fulfill?  It is a great incentive, no doubt, for keeping troops interested in training, but it can't be the only thing on the plate.

I always thought the Militia were the guys who kept the lights on in between periods of conflict.   What good is it to teach an individual about his part in a company live fire attack during the year, if he never learns how to drive a truck, splice a signal wire, send a contact report, identify a land mine....

And what good does it do to have him miss that pairs fire and movement weekend, then quit because he needs money and there is no other training going on?


----------



## pbi

> The TA & ARNG have something that the Reserves in Canada desperately need.   That is a defined role for their units.   During the Cold War every member of these orgs knew exactly where they would be going and what they would be doing when the balloon went up.   And they rehearsed it.   As an infantry reservist during this time we had know idea what was expected of us or even if we would be involved at all



I certainly stand to be corrected here, but I think that this is an exaggeration (no doubt with good intent...). I think that for a number of years the US Army did not know exactly what to do with the ARNG as a whole, and had no "specific missions" for most of them.   IIRC most of the ARNG Divisions except those with a REFORGER role, were general reinforcement, and it is questionable how many ARNG Divs could actually have deployed efficiently as such. The greatest single focus for most ARNG personnel was, (based on comments I hear from some US Active Army types here in Afgh), to be called out for State emergencies and go to summer camp. GWOT has changed much of that, and has reportedly caused a number of people in the ARNG to re-evaluate their reasons for joining in the first place. It is worth recalling the performance of some ARNG Bdes when they were called up for the first Gulf War and sent through NTC: not too good. So, even if they supposedly had these "assigned missions" what good did it do them? And anyway, they didn't end up going where they were assigned, did they?

Again subject to correction, I think you will find that only a percentage of the TA was ever designated for BAOR tasks, which IIRC contributed to something of a "have" and "have not" situation in the TA. The lack of specific missions for specific units contributed, IMHO, to some of the reductions and re-roling that TA units have experienced over the last couple of decades.

As far as assigning "specific missions", I think we are in the same boat as the USMC: our "specific mission" is to be ready to go anywhere, to do anything. Realistically, what alternative is there? Other than our overseas missions (which change with increasing frequency), where exactly would these "specific missions" be? Trying to be "scenario based" or "specific mission based" is not really very practical given our small size, limited resources and a   national foreign policy of committing at fairly short notice to NATO, Coalition or UN ops all over the planet. Far better IMHO to be a solidly capability-based army, thus being as flexible as a small army can be. Being too specific risks "niche-ism" which IMHO is an express route to irrelevance if your chosen "niche" becomes redundant. Cheers.


----------



## SHARP WO

> I do think there is a point at which the amount of leadership in reserve units does seem to be a bit much. Many reserve units are small and barely require the admin for a company, let alone that of a battalion. For example, my Regiment has about 25-30 regular parading soldiers. To  command this we have an Lt. Col, a Major, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, a Chief Warrent Officer, a Master Warrent Officer, and a Warrent. How is this an efficient formation? If nothing else it means that any training must go through unnecessary paper work; and it's fairly obvious that such a huge command structure is a financial burden. I do, however, recognize that you cannot have a Lieutenant in charge of the armouries; but at the same time; why not down grade units like this to company level; commanded by a Major.



Well, I come from a unit that has 150 soldiers attend regular training activities, from 3 sub units, and we need the command structure. 

If you down grade a unit, will you not lose the units identity also. What happens if you get a great influx of new recruits and you go up to Coy plus then you are left lots of soldiers and not enough comd's. There are some reserve units that have 200 plus members, if a smaller unit is reduced to Coy size it would be easier to role it over and put it under a different unit, I see many problems that would arise from the mere mention of this of this point.

For example, if the RCR regs were reduced to Coys instead of Bn's and made a part the PPCLI, it might make sense in the short term, but then you lose the unit identity, the history and you make a few people upset. 

Sharp WO


----------



## Kirkhill

I think others have raised this before but isn't there more opportunity in this day and age for more individual "on-line" training with individuals getting the "class-room" work on their own time with computer instruction, even testing, and use weekday parade nights for testing/evaluation/tutoring of individuals as well as planning for exercises on Weekends.  This could fit into the type of programme that Bill Smy was using successfully in the 80's.  (As an aside ,LCol Paul Hughes (Calg Highrs) used similar strategies to Mr. Smy's as wel,l as did his successor John Fletcher and the CH recruited and paraded well in those years).


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill: You would be pleased to know that some progress is actually being made in delivering "Distributed Learning (DL)" to Reserve units, following the same concept that was used to introduce it into the RegF: to reduce the amount of time spent away from home unit. Over the last two years I have seen a module of the PLQ delivered this way, and I believe other courses are becoming available too. In each of our multi-unit garrisons (TBay, Winnipeg and Regina) we have had a computer classroom for some time now. There is more that could be achieved, but we are getting there. Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good news pbi, thanks.


----------



## KevinB

Honestly I think we are fooling ourselves by believing in computer assisted learning progrman in the military.  Very few skills can be taught or properly learned that way - the PLQ being a prime example.


SHARP WO - there is nothing stating that the overborne reserve coy's could not spin off another coy.


----------



## pbi

> Honestly I think we are fooling ourselves by believing in computer assisted learning progrman in the military.  Very few skills can be taught or properly learned that way - the PLQ being a prime example.



This really depends on what you use it to teach. If you use it to teach the wrong thing, such as drill, or how to dig a trench or do a section attack, then of course you are misusing it and wasting everybody's time. But, that is not generally how it is used. DL is normaly used to replace "book learning" theory that does not strictly require you to be together in a group with an instructor. However, the "chat room" function does give a limited capability to interact with an instructor (or other DL candidates) at certain times.



> SHARP WO - there is nothing stating that the overborne reserve coy's could not spin off another coy.



Yes, unfortunately there are several things that stop this. First of all, unless you are lucky enough to be in the Army Reserve units in Southern Ontario or Vancouver, you are apparently not permitted to raise new sub-units. We were tasked to raise an Engr Sqn under LFRR in Wpg but we ended up having to group it inside the Fort Garry Horse because we could not create any "new units" or "new HQs" even though this was blatantly being permitted in the locations I mentioned. You would also run into the fact that the Army makes it difficult (perhaps for good reasons, perhaps not...) for Res units to change their establishments, due largely to the issue of how many funded positions are actually available. I agree completely that this system needs to be streamlined so that units that have the ability to grow can do so. Cheers.


----------



## KevinB

PBI - I see your point - but from what I saw of PLQ candidates "doing" CAL - it was a total dogf*ck.

 I know during my WAL (Warrant Assisted Learning) at the RCR BSL (while nodding off during the Course Officers lectures on the role and char of the different cbt arms etc.) I picked up many points that I dont feel a computer study system can impart  ;D
Now in 11 years the methodology of teaching junior leaders (or any course) has changed but some basic problems are imparted IMHO by CAL.


The process for reserve units must be streamlined - but I guess like the entire CF the shrugged shoulders, combined with tearing ones hair out at planning for the future with no real guidance from ABOVE...


----------



## Michael Dorosh

3 years ago, the first half of my QL3 was done by computer; of course, that was RMS and consisted mainly of looking up stuff on the DIN....

It was still more useful than my month in Borden for the second half...

What would have been most useful was simply working in an office and having someone show me how to do stuff.  Having a 40 year old MCpl ranting and raving at us because we missed a question on an exam, or having an air force WO talk down to me because I had a wrinkle in my bedsheets really didn't prepare me to do anything useful back at my home unit...

The most useful trades training I got was three Saturday mornings where our retiring Chief Clerk sat us down, and off the top of his head rattled off 20 years of experience in "how to do stuff".  It was interesting, well presented, and highlighted that experienced NCOs are the answer, not unemployable junior NCOs who can't find work anywhere else but on a Militia callout for the summer at a trades school.

Those who can, do, those who can't....teach. ;D


----------



## pbi

> I know during my WAL (Warrant Assisted Learning) at the RCR BSL (while nodding off during the Course Officers lectures on the role and char of the different cbt arms etc.) I picked up many points that I dont feel a computer study system can impart
> Now in 11 years the methodology of teaching junior leaders (or any course) has changed but some basic problems are imparted IMHO by CAL.



There is a compromise that I have seen used: the class is conducted at the local armoury, by DL, but there are local instructors present to assist and (hopefully) stop the sexual relations with canines.  This still keeps the soldiers (relatively) close to home, but it is beginning to eat into some of the advantages. Cheers.


----------



## Bill Smy

pbi said:
			
		

> This really depends on what you use it to teach. If you use it to teach the wrong thing, such as drill, or how to dig a trench or do a section attack, then of course you are misusing it and wasting everybody's time. But, that is not generally how it is used. DL is normaly used to replace "book learning" theory that does not strictly require you to be together in a group with an instructor.



I recall that back in the early 1970s a new revolutionary thought permeated the CF -- programmed learning. Units received booklets which were intended to be loaned to members. The books were designed so that information was displayed on one page, the next had questions, the third answers. The student was to take them home, and when he/she believed that he/she had mastered the topic, he/she would appear before the RSS officer and take a test which would credit success or failure.

In typical CF logic, it was then decided, notwithstanding this method of qualification, that the soldier still had to attend a formal course in order that the qualification be recognized.   :threat:

Pbi is correct. It depends on what you teach. Map Using, vehicle recognition, regimental history, and dozen more POs need not consume scarce armoury time.


----------



## dglad

I'd go a step further and say it's utter nonsense to drag Res F personnel to a Trg Centre somewhere, to have them sit in a class-room and learn something like map-symbols or the format for a SITREP.  We should be pulling Res F pers to the Trg Centers ONLY to have them conduct trg they can't conduct at unit or Bde level (mostly trg in the field, trg at levels they otherwise wouldn't be able to obtain at home units e.g. level 3 or higher, trg with specific wpn systems or vehicles, etc.).  As has been pointed out before, there is a decentralized system of standards pers that can ensure standards are maintained for unit/Bde level trg, and that can include distribution and assessment of distributed learning materials.  But we MUST get smarter about the way we conduct our trg, because the "traditional" model of shipping someone to Wainwright or Shilo or Meaford for 6 or 8 weeks, to learn everything from rank structure to military law to foot-drill to marksmanship principles, is letting us down.  We need to front-end load as much trg as possible at local level under the overwatch of LFDTS standards cells, and save the trg centres for short but intense bouts of the "high value-added" trg.


----------



## Meridian

Wow. extremely interesting post all around!

A few tidbits of info I think I can offer:

Peoplesoft sucks.  (My Civvy Payroll dept just switched too it too, sigh)
I support SAP at my civvy dayjob...(federal govnt agency) and Im told that DND actually has two SAP Systems currently. I inquired exactly what they are supporting, noone is really all that certian, although a colleague did head over there and noted they are using several modules and have a HUGE (and I mean HUGE!) support/dev team.

All this to say that while SAP here certianly provides added benefits, noone wants to use it, so it ends up being much more work. Scientists who play with plants all day and have little to no contact with regular networked PCs (or even computers in some cases) find it a hassle to log in and record time, or order stuff online, etc.  Most managers are "too busy" to attend half-day training courses, and then get frustrated when they call in for support.

Basically, if everyone actually took the time to learn the system, it would cut down a lot of grief... alas.. 



Now speaking to the reserves specifically: As an outsider (with extremely limited reg force experience) looking to join, I guess my perspective may help to aid from the recruiting perspective.

1) I think that the Reserves have to evolve to recognize that the workplace today is not the same as it was 20-30 years ago. The majority of people no longer work 9-5. Students even have ever increasingly diverse schedules, with many night courses being offered now, and summer terms increasing in popularity.

2) I get 3 weeks of vacation a year, some of which is rather mandatorily used up at Christmas. 3 weeks is a lot for someone in their early to mid twenties, at least when considering that many entry level positions at least around here offer 2 weeks of unpaid holidays (vacation pay is always there but still)...  I think part of the problem may be that an officer sitting with 4-6 weeks of paid leave a year in Ottawa may not have considered this fully.  Add on the fact that my family may want to see me for a week, and I suddenly have a lot less vacation.

LWOP is always an option from any civvy job, but many companies are leaving the traditional "indeterminate" style positions and are moving to more project/contract/work-driven requirements. I am a permanent employee, but of a large consulting firm. If there is no work, I get laid off. Permanency means I get notice. 

A huge concern for me is that if I do ask for that 2 months off in the summer to pursue training, and Im granted it... how secure am I coming back, having my employer suddenly realize they could make due without me for 2 months? I consider myself a valuable employee, and while summers are quieter...  its still a concern in a rather unstable labour market.....

Then you also have to consider just how Im supposed to convince my employer to give me the time off...  I mean many employers are accomodating, but Im sure many others would rather just not deal with it....

I understand students are great in this regard, as they often have summers free, and are looking for work/something to do.... but even students as someone else has mentioned now have work terms, placements, etc... perhaps the forces should look at integrating some sort of co-op options for university students...  working in recruiting or PAO may help the marketing degree I am completing, or with a CER to fulfill coop items on my engineering degree...

3) Recruiting is confusing. Period. 

Because I know better, I know to go to the unit to get real answers. But then those answers are just one-sided ones really, focussed on the Unit only, and thus, as someone who doesnt know jack, if I do end up at the unit, I may not be getting the best picture, or getting the best options.

Its all well and good to say "well, do your research", but for someone looking to join, if you get a good sales pitch, and the answers are all being provided, why would you immediately question them? Some may be worried about giving a bad impression to a new employer from the getgo....

Why can't I get real information as to when I can expect courses to start? Real time frames for my application? If I have so many deadlines, why dont the forces? Hurry up and wait doesn't make sense to someone not indoctrinated, and even someone who is, still things its  a dumb thing.  When I went on the Brit Army recruiting site, I was given hard deadlines for answers. Of course there are exceptions, but geez... sure makes me feel wanted, or at least appreciated and interested if I have an idea....

Recruiting is full of way to many rumours... On this here board Ive read countless times different recruiters from different areas giving conflicting board dates for the same MOC and component.

4) there is not enough information available about the day to day job... especially for officers (IMO.)

Now, I understand much of this is up to the applicant...  But why is it that I can go to the american military websites and get much more of a feel for what I would do day-in-day-out than when I go to recruiting.forces.gc.ca?

If I have no idea what Im getting myself into, but I think I do, how good of a trainee am I going to make? (No wonder there was a 5 out of 30 graduation).

5) Training.... 

I have no idea how to fix this one.. Ive tried to think out of the box, listening to all your guys ideas....  and honestly.. the decentralization option sounds the best to me.  

Here's a question: What is the value of the indoctrination....? (My experience here is primarily RegF, but my question relates to Res and Ill explain later what I mean)

I sat on IAP.. and wondered why we spent so much time sitting around doing nothing. Many of the courses could have been self-study, (we are officers to be afterall, cant we just study, test, fail, or pass)? And all the weekends off... necessary? Perhaps long-run yes, but if you asked me if Id rather be done a month earlier, or have weekends off, Id take the month earlier.

A week of administrivia is ridiculous. Seriously. Taking 3 days to get kit, hours upon hours waiting at MIR for shots and other stuff, filling out paperwork. Granted it all needs to be done. But why on course? And then the last week before the parade.. tons of wasted time?  Plenty of us mentioned wed rather see courses done sooner, get the necessary indoc on the skills required, and then get booted on out to the real world...  (I realize this is how everyone feels, and that a nice transition is necessary).

My question here is this.. I was told in the Reg For.. that BMQ/IAPBOTP. SQ/Phases/DP/etc are all built to transition everyone into miltiary mode. They make you as a soldier, they get rid of the civy mindset. buiilds discipline (this I can agree with, but still) ... they dont just teach you specific skills, but the total package.

Is this necessary in the Reserve side of things? And if not.. why not? I mean, if we want our REs soldiers to be as close to Reg soldiers in training and abilities, would it not require the same amount of indoc?

I guess this is what it comes down to... Can OJT really train properly? And at what point should OJT be used?

Im thinking from the perspective of a new recruit or OCdt here...  they want to learn, theyve just joined up...  maybe they have cadets or other mil experience.. they know how to salute, basic drill, etc...  do you sideline them? they finish BMQ...  can they learn more things OJT, or MUST they have a formal course completion?

What are the benefits to courses, I guess, is the question?


Sorry for the rambling, but so many thoughts.


----------



## pbi

> I guess this is what it comes down to... Can OJT really train properly? And at what point should OJT be used?



dglad and I are not really talking about "OJT": that is more suited to teaching specific skills to already trained soldiers, although it can also be useful. What we are referring to is running formal courses, authorized by, but decentralized from the Area TC (or even the School-we have done one of those already, for Recce Crew Comd) down to the Bdes or in some cases the garrisons, or maybe even in a particularly capable unit. This permits staff and student to remain within their local area, to use local facilities that might otherwise not be fully utilized, and can potentially draw on instructors who cannot go away for six to eight weeks. The courses would be run just as they are at the central establishments, surveyed by the Area Stds Dets located around the Bde(we have three in ours), as well as visiting LFDTs teams or School SMEs. The decentralized can be improved by use of DL or self study as Bill Smy described. Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Excellent points all around.   One further note on LWOP - that's great if the Reserves pays you more than your civvie job. If not....some civvie firms will pay the difference, but most won't.

There is no LEGISLATION to protect us....


----------



## Meridian

MD - Exactly.. I admittedly do not make that much (at least compared to other professionals) but on comparing with a "training rank" pay for a month or so, Im losing money. 

Now, sacrifices are sacrifices, and I dont think I can demand that the forces pay the equivalent of my civvy paycheque.... but it is something to budget and consider for some people..

Again, one more reason why uni students seem to be the answer.. but thats only a 3-4 year setup!


----------



## Pikache

I think this issue has been brought up before, but is it me, or is location of reserve units... irrational at times?

I just think it's ridiculous that small cities have 3 units and Montreal to have what, 6 Inf units, in same area.

Do we need to reexamine how our units are spread out all over Canada and see where are units being killed by saturation of local manpower and which areas are not being tapped?

How is Reserves doing, in terms of tapping into rural area? As much as populated Southern Ontario is, there are areas that there is no viable local reserve unit to go to.


----------



## dglad

To put it bluntly--and as I've said on here before--the current distribution of Res F units is nonsensical.  For example:

-Thunder Bay, ON (where I'm from), with a population of 120K, has 5 Res F units (2 x Army, 1 x Health Svcs Sp, 1 x Comm Res, 1 x Naval Res)
-Toronto, ON, with a population of about 4 million, has 15 Res F units (can't remember the exact breakdown)

So, for a population more than 30 times the size, Toronto only has 3 times the number of Res units.  This is repeated across the country.  We have enormous difficulty building units in Thunder Bay to any sort of decent size, while other areas that are growing explosively--such as Mississauga or suburban parts of Vancouver--have no Res F units at all.  The distribution of Res F units in Canada is a remnant of a by-gone era, when the demographic patterns and trends were completely different, and the global security environment made very different demands on Canada's military.

Yes, there are many proud unit histories to uphold, but we're doing so at the expense of a viable Res F for today.  Realistically, we should completely overhaul the Res F, so that units are located in some manner coordinated with the reality of contemporary demographics.  There should be units in suburban Toronto and Vancouver; there should also be units, or elements of units, in places like Swift Current, Sask and maybe even Fort McMurray, Alta, where untapped and growing pools of person-power exist.  The status quo is unsustainable, and that's unfortunate--but the truth often is unfortunate.  What we need to do is find ways to move past politics, embody our proud heritage of military accomplishment and, at the same time, move forward in the context of a restructured Res F that can fit Canada's modern security needs.  It can be done...one only has to look at the recent UK Army restructuring to see how so.


----------



## jmackenzie_15

The same trend occurring in the United States for decades doesnt act any different here....

huge urban sprawls like Toronto, which costs a crapload to live in, is decently filled with alot of 'rich people' or 'upper class' and for the MOST PART, the military is mainly comprised of lower-middle class working types ( excluding the officers ).So far, ive yet to meet anybody in the infantry thats been out of the ordinary wealthy. I have a 2 story mansion from the early 1900s where I live, and for as much as it costs and to heat in the winter, my family might be able to afford a small two bedroom house in toronto.

I should also point out that the majority of the military comes from the atlantic provinces.I don't remember the exact number but i think its like 60% or something.... and alot of the remainder coming out of the western provinces.Thats just what ive been told/heard anyway, and so far that sounds about right.

Maybe its just lack of interest, or lack of information, who knows....

regardless, I hope this new base that Martin wants goes right smack dab in the middle of Ontario or BC =p


----------



## mo-litia

dglad said:
			
		

> To put it bluntly--and as I've said on here before--the current distribution of Res F units is nonsensical.   For example:
> 
> The distribution of Res F units in Canada is a remnant of a by-gone era, when the demographic patterns and trends were completely different, and the global security environment made very different demands on Canada's military.
> 
> Realistically, we should completely overhaul the Res F, so that units are located in some manner coordinated with the reality of contemporary demographics.   There should be units in suburban Toronto and Vancouver; there should also be units, or elements of units, in places like Swift Current, Sask and maybe even Fort McMurray, Alta, where untapped and growing pools of person-power exist.   The status quo is unsustainable,



Excellent thoughts on this topic. As a former rural Albertan, I know of many people from my hometown who have expressed a strong interest in the PRes but are not able to commute to a major centre to train.

I was amazed when I found out that my regiment used to maintain one or two companies in small towns but that they were disbanded decades ago, not due to lack of manpower or interest; but rather in the interests of saving money at budget time.

End result; angry former rural revreservists along with rural citizens who are now unable to join the militia, the alialienation rural people who have lost their most visible link to the military other than the Legion, and the sad site of former armouries lapsing into disuse.


----------



## Blunt Object

"The regs are the first to deploy, and the first line of defense.  They also have high casualites.  Reserve units are there to a) replace reg units and b) the cadre to train new people.  Obviously a reservist is less expericenced than a reg of the same rank, but it takes a lot less time to get a reservist up to speed than to train entirerly new people."

In response to "ender" what if you have a reservist and a reg forces soldier fresh out of boot are either really prepared to be called upon to go into combat?

What about a Mcpl or a Sgt in a Reserve unit whos never seen cobat? Whould the Higher rank prehaps know more about the profession of arms that a Pvt or Cpl in a  reg force unit? 

Any soldier who has seen combat will obviously know a few"combat tricks" or more about survival in the battlefield than a soldier who hasn't. But if someones been practacing in the reserves for 6 or 7 years and another person has only been in the regs 6 months the guy thats been practicing longer will probally be more prepared to go into combat which is what really matters


----------



## Meridian

You remind me of the situation in blackhawk down (I know, I know, its the movies) where the Sgt tells his troops he's never fired at anyone before, but he's leading them anyway....  

Is it necessary that you out-experience someone to lead? And if so, does that not pretty much fly in the face of the Jr. Officer ranks?


----------



## Murdock

As I have served with both reg force and reserveists I must say that the reserve unit that I served with (the RHLI) are as ready to go into combat as some of the people that I've seen in the reg's.The men and women take there training seriously and worked just as hard if not harder then most.I am very proud of them and some of them are still serving over sea's as peace keepers and in other role's as well.I defenately think that they should be trained as there reg force counter parts and used the same way.They are a vital and important part of our military stucture and should get the respect they deserve and earn everyday.And I know that if they are ever called upon to do there job that they would do so with houner and unit pride and do us and all Canadian's proud.That's all I have to say about that(and that's probebly enough...lol).


----------



## pbi

jmackenzie_15 said:
			
		

> huge urban sprawls like Toronto, which costs a crapload to live in, is decently filled with alot of 'rich people' or 'upper class' and for the MOST PART, the military is mainly comprised of lower-middle class working types ( excluding the officers ).So far, ive yet to meet anybody in the infantry thats been out of the ordinary wealthy. I have a 2 story mansion from the early 1900s where I live, and for as much as it costs and to heat in the winter, my family might be able to afford a small two bedroom house in toronto.
> 
> I should also point out that the majority of the military comes from the atlantic provinces.I don't remember the exact number but i think its like 60% or something.... and alot of the remainder coming out of the western provinces.Thats just what ive been told/heard anyway, and so far that sounds about right.



I disagree with you on these assertions.I think you are making them from a very limited perspective.

First off, I think that your estimate is actually referring to the RegF, but even then IMHO it is wrong. Canada's military, Reg and Res, is overwhelmingly a middle class operation. IMHO the "upper class" (to the extent that we even have one...) abandoned military service as a vocation back in the early days of the last century. The old stereotype that the Army (esp the Inf...) is full of a bunch of  po' boys  (or "bys") from "down 'ome" is IMHO wrong. In my experience, while the Atlantic Provinces do contribute a large proportion of the recruits, our soldiers come from all over. Since over 80% of Canadians live in cities, it probably follows that that is where our RegF recruits mostly come from. As for social differences between officers and soldiers, I think you are also exaggerating that too. This is not the British Army: most officers and soldiers IMHO come from very clos together in the social spectrum.

Second, even if we accept that your statement might apply somewhat to the RegF, IMHO it has nothing to do with the Res, which is what this thread is talking about. How could it be true that "the majority of the military comes from the atlantic provinces", if eight of the ten Res CBGs are not in Atlantic Canada? You will find that what I said above about the RegF is even more true about the Res: in my experience there is no clear social or economic difference (or even educational difference) between Officers and ORs in the Res.

Cheers.


----------



## dglad

Meridian said:
			
		

> You remind me of the situation in blackhawk down (I know, I know, its the movies) where the Sgt tells his troops he's never fired at anyone before, but he's leading them anyway....
> 
> Is it necessary that you out-experience someone to lead? And if so, does that not pretty much fly in the face of the Jr. Officer ranks?



This would also fly in the face of practical experience.  I would suggest that more experience IN GENERAL equals better performance, but like all things human, there are as many variations on this particular theme as there are people.  History is rife with examples of Ptes (or their historical equivalents--call them legionnaires, hoplites, whatever) rising to the occasion when more experienced leaders have fallen or failed.  And I've met a well-decorated WW2 vet who was a complete a**hole who probably couldn't be trusted to lead Boy Scouts on a nature hike.  This also brings in the fact that personal experience and accomplishment, and the ability to lead, are also very different things.  Again, some individuals who live, breathe and eat things military, read Soldier of Fortune cover to cover, and absolutely excel in all the soldierly skills, make absolutely horrible leaders.  And while it's important for a leader to be a good soldier, true leadership is about a whole range of "softer" skills, focused around things like empathy, communications, commitment to a duty of care, honesty, moral courage...the list goes on.

Anyone can lead, but by no means can everyone can lead well.


----------



## bgreen

One thing that strikes me about many of the threads we discuss is not only the availability of soldiers to attend training and the distribution of units but how we can bring the two together and also build support on a Canada wide basis for our CF.

As pbi mentioned in another thread, when you study the distribution of units across Canada both Reg and Reserve there are huge gaps geographically.  I believe we are doing a better job of reaching our northern regions with the Rangers and involving local people in these units that improve the CF profile in this remote region.  I believe we are somewhat short on a reg force presence in these areas and would offer that basing some senior NCOs to support these units would also provide a basis for a sovereignty and emergency response force if a unit could not be stationed across this area.
  
Likewise I think there are areas across the southern part of our country where 80% of the population lives that could do with a reserve presence whether it be militia, naval, air, comms or medical reserve units.  I also think that population size of a community should be coupled with a look at the geographical space in determining where some new units might go.

Both dglad and pbi have mentioned Swift Current, SK as a case in point.  It is nearly 200 km from a reserve unit yet at one time was the home of the 14th Hussars (Free and Fearless) and 8th Recce.  It is a small city of about 15 000 with an equally large trading area.  The city administration has offered to rent the armoury to the CF for about 150.00$/month.  The educational administrators, MPs and MLAs as well as the local Chamber of Commerce all made presentations to the LFRR town hall meetings in the hopes of attracting a permanent reserve presence to the city.  

I tend to agree with pbi that the CF is not made of any economic class of individuals but I can tell you in smaller communities the reserve presence would be one of the few part-time activities available and IMHO you could draw a number of individuals of many skilled backgrounds from these small communities like mechanics, doctors, lawyers and padres in addition to whatever soldiers you needed to form the specific role within the unit.

I always enjoy travelling through northern Montana and seeing the armoury in nearly every small town greater than 500.  I think you win the support of local people when they know their own hometown men and women are involved in defending their country.  And if we did this right in Canada perhaps we could attract more of the different cultural groups that are located in small and large centres if they had a community reserve unit.

At the risk of someone thinking of the millions of $ this would cost in facilities I would offer that most schools are now looking at what is called Community Plus initiatives where schools are used by the community.  Why not a reserve presence here for minimal dollars?

All said I was very disappointed that LFRR has not mentioned nor addressed these issues as I was led to believe in their initial iteration that this would be done.  Regardless if we ever hope to martial the support of Canadians and their leaders we had better be in their location where they live and work.  

BG


----------



## pbi

Well said bgreen. In my opinion, LFRR didn't measure up to its publicity. Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Well said Mr Green.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19720.0.html

Here is a good thread on a failed effort to bring a reserve unit to Prince George, a community of about 100,000 people with zero CF representation....


----------



## Michael Dorosh

bgreen, I think the success of rural reserve units may have been very much tied to the social component of those units.  I wonder if today's training realities would allow such small units to flourish?  I suspect they would - my dad was a member of the 64th (Yorkton) Field Battery, RCA - the unit still exists.  His subunit in 1957 was Echo Troop, who paraded in Canora - a tiny little town 45 minutes or so from Yorkton.  They met in the basement of the Legion IIRC and drilled once a week.  in the summer, they went to gun camp in Shilo, he also took the Tech Able course.    The subunit is long gone.

In the "old days", I think the attraction was the uniform, and the social events.  The Calgary Highlanders Ball was one of the big events on the city's social calendar.  It must have been the same way in smaller communities, perhaps even moreso.  Society, unfortuantely, seems to have outgrown the military and love of pomp and circumstance.  After Vietnam, and now Iraq, I think there is a new fear of things military; our soldiers are actually in Afghanistan not wearing (gasp) blue berets.  Just when we reach the point where we need to sell the idea of a large military even more, I think the public at large may be the least receptive.


----------



## goodform

I think the idea of more rural units is a good one. I think this because I come from rural SK and lived 1 1/2 hours from my closest reserve unit (Saskatoon or Prince Albert, A and B Coy NSaskR, respectively), and the next closest units were the "Yorkton Battery" and the all the untis in Regina, both 2 hours away. Now this left quite a way for me or anyone who lived where I did to go if I were to parade with a unit, yet there is a town, now a city, of 5000 people (Humboldt) 25 minutes away. To the best of my knowledge Humboldt has never hosted any reserve unit, but being how large it is and being nearly smack in the middle of the majority of of reserve units in SK, all over an hour away, should it not be quite feasible to have at least a platoon/troop based there?
Another thing that is interesting to me is that between Seaforth, Bessborough, and BCR armoury and Abbotsford, there really isn't much of a reserve option except New Westminster. Could not a place the size of Richmond or Surrey support another Coy/Sqn/Bty, even with Richmond having the Svc Btn? What about something in the Burquitlam area? I am new to the Lower Mainland so please excuse me if I've missed something/unit.

P.S. for the rumor mill, this is totally without support, but I've heard something about an engineer troop being set up in Cranbrook?


----------



## Infanteer

Surrey is covered by The Royal Westminster Regiment, which parades in New Westminster and Langley/Aldergrove (so, Surrey is basically between the two).  The North Shore is covered by the Engineers.  I think it is the Burnaby/PoCo area that is in need of a reserve presence in the city.


----------



## McG

New start-up rural units would be excellent candidates for weekend parading.



			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> That's still irrelevant for people who work swing shifts, split shifts and other irregular schedules. If you work evenings, then days, with 4 on and 3 off, your schedule is going to be all over the place, so it is not a matter of either evenings or weekends. No way around it in some cases; so do you encourage a guy who is rock solid in job knowledge to quit in such a case, or just accept that he might only parade twice a month?


Maybe the solution here is to find a means of greater integration of the supplementary reserve with the primary reserve (or a new intermediate tier).  Members in this category would still belong to a unit, but they would not have the same parading requirements (they may even have an annual ceiling of training/administrative day similar to the CIC).  These pseudo-supplementary reservists would be permitted to participate in DOMOPS or as staff for course taught over the summer without these days counting against their total allowed.  This might accommodate members that are only able to make summer concentration exercises, or who can only attend a handful of evenings & weekends a year.

The members would get to remain in the reserve, with no loss of seniority, and train according to their schedule.  The trade-off would be that TIR would not count toward promotion for pseudo-supplementary reservists and priority for student positions on courses would always go to the regular paraders.


----------



## ArmyRick

As far as the reserves go, I happen to agree with pbi on some issues. We have far too many company sized regiments in the infantry reserves. I think amalgamating regiments together to form larger regiments is a better idea.
I would also reccomen any time an amalgamation takes place that the new regiment takes on the identity of all the old regiments that formed it. We have been through this before. My regiment was formed as it is today by combining three battle proven regiments in 1936.
Change, don't fear it, embrace it and make the best of it...


----------



## Kirkhill

Good advice Rick, might take it myself.


----------



## pbi

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As far as the reserves go, I happen to agree with pbi on some issues. We have far too many company sized regiments in the infantry reserves. I think amalgamating regiments together to form larger regiments is a better idea.
> I would also reccomen any time an amalgamation takes place that the new regiment takes on the identity of all the old regiments that formed it. We have been through this before. My regiment was formed as it is today by combining three battle proven regiments in 1936.
> Change, don't fear it, embrace it and make the best of it...



Actually, quite a number of Res regts are the products of  various amalgamations, most of which took place prior to WWII: that is sometmes conveniently forgotten.  IMHO, the current stigma attached to amalgamation in the last few decades is a result of the belief by some in the Res community that it is an evil plot by the RegF to destroy the Militia, and that if only we can make everything just like it was 50 years ago everything would be fine. This has not been helped by some of the ham-fisted, poorly thought ideas (and barely concealed hostility...) that has from time to time emanated toward the Res from the Reg side. Cheers.


----------



## JBC

Hi there, I am a reg force officer in training, I previously served as a reserve infantry platoon commander in Nova Scotia and here are some thoughts I never passed on before I departed. I believe that in order to operate more efficiently, make the best use of finances and actually train as fieldable, cohesive, STANDARDIZED Battaltion sized units, reserve infantry regiments in Nova Scotia should amalgamate to form one command.   I understand that the higher ups governing the LFRR programme entertained this idea much to the revulsion of reserve members. The disgust was justifiable on certain levels; unbreakable ties to the past, and pride in being distinct: all very important. However, I believe you can still honour the past even if it is under new colors. Would the veterans of a regiment want to see their past unit become so poorly financed and undermanned as to fold altogether? Of course not. On the less critical level units would have to put aside their longstanding rivalries, and egos,and yes, self-pride and see to what was best for Nova Scotia's and Canada's defense. The benefits would undoubtedly outweigh the growing pains. Imagine having a fully manned Battalion for a CO to lead complete with a full HQ ;   a company commander with 3 full platoons and weapons det to manoeuvre...right down to section level. The quality of leadership at all levels would improve because now many fewer positions would be available. So....if you want to keep your bars Captain so and so...you better prove that we need you, or you're back to 2Lt, or into the ranks. As for finances, administrative operating budgets would be cut dramatically to allow for spending on training and equipment (Hell, maybe even become fully mechanized) Right now, we may think that we exist as independents within 36 Brigade, but were just fooling ourselves...Lieutenant Colonels leading what? 200 troops...on paper no doubt. I can only name one who would actually be combat ready to lead a Battalion size force(LCol TBS). The rest...sorry, paper pushers, nothing more. Want to argue the present arrangement? Among other reasons, the system is in place so as to provide the framework for mass mobilization should the need arise. Well I don't think Canada will be playing a major part in any wars very soon and even if they did, in our society today, sadly, citizens would not exactly be lining up at the main gate to sign up. Better to consolidate what we have now and make it strong as steel, and then continue to grow on its foundation. Operational plan...who knows...I'm sure they would form a committee... but details are details, it the concept that has to be embraced first: The Royal Nova Scotian Regiment. PS I'll mention that this idea was originally presented to me by a Cpl in my past platoon, a Cpl who by the standards of men better than I, should be a MWO.


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

More info on Aussie reserve taskings


----------



## 30 for 30

If the British Army can successfully amalgamate historic units then surely we can do the same. It doesn't even have to involve the complete elimination of our reserve regiments as we know them now. Unit identities can still be maintained if we want to do that, with, say, a regiment like the Princess Louise Fusiliers becoming B (Princess Louise Fusiliers) Coy, 1 RNSR or whatever. You could perhaps change the capbadge and little else, and remove the LCol role from the unit, and hence keep the PLF alive much as they are now. The difference would be that the unit would now be geared towards a larger, better organized, more capable formation. Perhaps wiping out current units and starting fresh would be best for efficiency and organization, but it doesn't necessarily have to happen that way. It seems to me that a logical compromise is very much achievable. I believe 33 CBG was experimenting with a similar organization (33 LIB if I'm not mistaken), can anyone elaborate on that experience?


----------



## McG

In essence, this thread has already described grouping multiple regimental companies into single regiment neutral battalions that would be the permanent equivalent to a 33 LIB (but leaving room for 33 Rifle Bn too) : http://army.ca/forums/threads/25713/post-83671.html#msg83671


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> Are you forgeting that the whole purpose of the reserves is to be a base upon which to build a multi-battalion force? You guys are continuing to look at our forces as something that will always just be a small entity that sends a few troops here, and a few troops there with reserves to fill in the gaps. If you think that way, then we will be caught with not only our pants down, but off and downstairs in the wash when something BIG comes along. Why are so many people unable to think that something like that can never happen again?


This argument does not prove that reserve and regular regimental systems must be the same.  Our standing requirement is for a regular force regimental system that is able to sustain an on going high tempo of deployed operations and a reserve force regimental system that can sustain itself, develop trained individuals & sub-units, and mobilize in time of war.  Should mobilization ever occur, both regimental systems would undergo significant change to meet the needs of total war.  Separate systems make more sense when better suited to the needs of their respective components in â Å“peaceâ ? and they are able to transition to the needs of mobilization (without necessarily meeting those needs prior to mobilization).


----------



## pbi

As far as Infantry is concerned, I would argue that the two components already have some significant differences in the way they apply the Regimental system, such that you could almost say that they are different systems. Granted these differences are by force of circumstance, but they exist.

The Regular Infantry Regiments have three battalions each, recruited nationally. Although there were once strong links to certain garrison communities, IMHO these have been weakened in the last few years by relocations to new bases (RCR and PPCLI). Normally we do not move between Regiments except in very unusual circumstances. The key appointments in Regular battalions are almost always filled from within the Regiment: a PPCLI LCol taking command of an R22eR bn is almost unheard of. It is not common to be CO or RSM of the battalion you were serving in when promoted.

Reserve Infantry Regts, with very few exceptions, consist of a single battalion such that IMHO in the minds of many Res soldiers "Regt" and "bn" are interchangeable terms. Res units are normally recruited locally and usually enjoy a strong historical connection with a certain community. It is not at all uncommon for Res Inf soldiers to move between units, either because they move to a different community or they are seeking something their own unit does not offer. It is also not unheard of for the CO or RSM of a Res unit to have transferred in from another Regt.(or to go on and hold the same appointment twice, or in another unit later on). Normally, an individual will work themselves up from DP1 to CO/RSM in the same unit, which is almost unheard of in the RegF.

I believe that many of the underlying concepts are the same, but the systems have already begun to develop on different tracks.

Cheers


----------



## Infanteer

...and we should try our best to exploit both those unique characteristics.


----------



## GO!!!

Constructive Criticisms, and possible fixes;

1. If you are a member of a militia unit, you WILL parade xx number of days each month. If you dont show up, you are AWL = CHARGE!
    * this will take the weekend out of the weekend warrior, and enable enforceable trg and fitness standards.

2. Make all ranks above MCpl reg force RSS positions, postings so everyone is on the same page. We have surplus officers, use them to train the reserves.

3. Task each unit militia unit specifically (ie mortars, tpt, Anti armour, sigs) so that you can qualify a guy in his job, and let him practice it all the time, instead of just putting him on various courses, which he never uses again and usually forgets because he has no opportunity to practice all of his skills on a weekly basis.

4. Use the reservists all of the time for training support and administrative functions in order to free up more reg force pers for deployments. Class ABC, whatever, keep them working, so that they get better and we actually get some mileage out of them

5. Draw a big black line between the res and the regs. If you want to go reg force, you start with QL3. No more 1/2 trained quick picks that turn into disasters. 

6. Offer reservists legislated job protection, and boost their pay to what the regs get when they work. Work a day, paid a day.

7.Make it clear that reservists are not deployed outside of canada unless the war measures act is invoked. Want to get deployed? Join the regs.

8. Make militia units available to local government (provincial) so that they can be used for emergencies and take advantage of provincial funding.

Its just common sense, but I sense it will not go far in this militia dominated forum.


----------



## combat_medic

So you don't allow reservists to move past the rank of MCpl, force them to work days they are not able or threaten charges, do not allow them to go overseas, and have them do all the s*it tasks that the Regs don't want or can't be bothered to fill. 

Boy, I can see the recruits flying in.  :


----------



## Infanteer

Ok, cleaned this one up and added my comments - let's play nice people; this is one of the better threads on this forum:



			
				GO!!! said:
			
		

> 1. If you are a member of a militia unit, you WILL parade xx number of days each month. If you dont show up, you are AWL = CHARGE!
> * this will take the weekend out of the weekend warrior, and enable enforceable trg and fitness standards.



I agree with looking at some sort of contract for reservists that include some of these basic obligations (fitness standards, the Regs need it as much as the Reserves) - even if it is voluntary to start (you pledge the time, the Army guarantees the training) so as to lock down a certain number of dedicated reservists for guaranteed short-term service.

However, you can't have a zero-tolerance policy with Reservists; remember the situation many reservists are in - you are a full time soldier; what happens if you also fill in as a part-time CGA and they zap you everytime you can't make it to do someone's books?  Not going to keep the CGA business, are you?

I agree with you that we need to get rid of the fair-weather soldiers in the Reserves; we need to make it clear that lame excuses (exams, studying, yadayadayada) will not be acceptable while at the same time working around genuine issues.

I'm interested to hear from Matt Fisher - he's a USMC reservist who signed a contract; how does this contract allow him to balance military service with civilian obligations.



> 2. Make all ranks above MCpl reg force RSS positions, postings so everyone is on the same page. We have surplus officers, use them to train the reserves.



10/90 failed because nobody liked it - are you telling me that you are going to find 10 Battalions (all-arms, roughly the strength of the Reserves) worth of NCO's and Officers in the Reg Force to send to the Reserves?!?  Fat chance.

As well, you are closing off a pool of good leadership material and limiting the potential that a part-time soldier can aspire to - this will only drive away soldiers who see no real ability advance in responsibilities and to develop and use leadership abilities within the Reserves.  I'm sure you can find a glorified labour pool somewhere else.



> 3. Task each unit militia unit specifically (ie mortars, tpt, Anti armour, sigs) so that you can qualify a guy in his job, and let him practice it all the time, instead of just putting him on various courses, which he never uses again and usually forgets because he has no opportunity to practice all of his skills on a weekly basis.



Yes, I like this (it is what the reserves used to do); gives guys a focus and, if done right, can help build ties between Reserve units and the specific Reg Force unit they need to support.



> 4. Use the reservists all of the time for training support and administrative functions in order to free up more reg force pers for deployments. Class ABC, whatever, keep them working, so that they get better and we actually get some mileage out of them



What are you trying to say here?  Open up more static positions on bases and training areas to Reservists for long-term contracts?  Aren't you the one who said "if you want to play Real Army, sign up" - you tell Reservists to sign on the dotted line if they want to be the "Real Deal" and then you say if you are a Reservist, you should work full time in a supporting role?  What do you want out them?

Again, if you're looking for a glorified labour pool, look somewhere else - Reservists have far more to contribute than that.



> 5. Draw a big black line between the res and the regs. If you want to go reg force, you start with QL3. No more 1/2 trained quick picks that turn into disasters.



How about teaching Reservists who you put on contract the same thing you teach Regulars - then you know that the issue isn't what the Reservist knows, but rather how much time practicing these skills; then you only have to make up for the Training Delta (with workup) instead of reinventing the wheel.

As for "quick picks", each case is taken individually - why make a guy who goes Res-to-Reg who has two tours (one as a Section Commander), jump qualified, and wins the Mountain Man Race go do his QL3 again?  Waste of money if you ask me.  If the guy has little to no experience, sure - fire him through battle school; but if they are on a similar level with their Reg Force peers, then may as well take the chance to fill another 031 position.



> 6. Offer reservists legislated job protection, and boost their pay to what the regs get when they work. Work a day, paid a day.



Seems fair in my books - my only caution is that the job legislation must contain equal portions of coercion and incentive.  We are just going to scare civilian employment away from hiring reservists if we put legal demands on them; we must create legal incentives for them to hire and work around the odd schedules of Reserve soldiers.



> 7.Make it clear that reservists are not deployed outside of canada unless the war measures act is invoked. Want to get deployed? Join the regs.



Again, preposterous - even the United States, the single largest military power on the face of the Earth, can't do this - look at OIF III, they've given an entire AOR to a Reserve Division (42ID of the NY National Guard).  If you think Canada would have been able to meet its commitments in the last 15 years with no help from Reserve soldiers who deploy overseas, then you're talking out of your hat.

If Canada has a pool of dedicated part-time soldiers who are willing to learn and do their part, why would you ignore this asset?



> 8. Make militia units available to local government (provincial) so that they can be used for emergencies and take advantage of provincial funding.



I'm not sure of the specifics, but I think this is already done - or are you implying something different like the U.S. National Guard?  I think they have to many headaches with that setup to want to consider it for up here.



> Its just common sense, but I sense it will not go far in this militia dominated forum.



I'm not sure where you're getting the "Militia-dominated forum" idea forum.  There are soldiers from all sorts of backgrounds here - perhaps other Regulars on these forums simply don't hold such a poor opinion of Reservists as you?

As well, don't be so quick to shoot down Reservists and what they can offer Canada at both home and abroad if properly trained.  You talk the big game about signing on the fulltime line, but look to the South - while you're sitting up in Canada bitching about "Weekend Warriors", US Army and Marine Corps Reservists are deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan (some for the second time) and actually going into combat.  Certain units of 4th MarDiv (USMCR) were stood up for the initial invasion of Iraq - our very own Matt Fisher was one of them.  So before you try to impress us with the mystical powers that have been granted those who sign up for the Regs (did that before), look at Reservists close by who, professionally, are doing alot more then you right now.

If done right, a modern military can get more out of its Reserve forces then the entirely antiquated task of National Mobilization.  In order to fix the flaws to serve this end, you want to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater (which some of your ideas are tantamount to).

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## GO!!!

The major stumbling block with most of your criticisms of my plan is to "train reservists like the regs" this is impossible due to the limited time that most reservists have, and the limited funds available in order to train them. By signing them to a long contract in order to get the required hours out of them, we will have created another reg force soldier!

Also, the CF was required to staff with augmentees, and leave reg force guys at home, there was never any NEED for militia. It was a way to include the res and justify their existance and funding (not necessarily a bad thing)

The idea of having militia leadership is a good one, until you try to put your mo sect comd in charge of a section in which the youngest man has more experience. Instant underminig. Perhaps only restrict mo leaders to leading other reservists.

And as for using the reserves as a labor pool, well, yeah, thats my opinion and I believe it to be the best choice to free up the regs to do our job.

Have a good one


----------



## KevinB

There are already sections of the NDA that allow the reserve chain to charge those members who fail to report for parades.  Unless they have been stricken out in the last 12 years (which you never know...) 

Currently we dont have enough Reg Force M/Cpls and above to run training for the units and the BSL's.   Secondly due to deployments etc. I've seen reserve NCO's with as much if not more experince (and competancy) as their reg force brethern.

 I think at the WO (CQ) and above NCO level and Lt Col and above for commissioned officers is where the lack of expeirnce hurt the reserves and these positions shoud be permanent cadre regulars.

I think there are many roles for reservists - however deployment into high threat enviroment tours is not one.


Cheers


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Constructive Criticisms, and possible fixes;



I see Infanteer has addressed most of your points, so I won't take them down one by one.  Frankly, most of your "criticisms" aren't constructive - they're thinly veiled attacks that really don't have much of a valid foundation.


> 2. Make all ranks above MCpl reg force RSS positions, postings so everyone is on the same page. We have surplus officers, use them to train the reserves.



Where do you get the idea that there are surplus Regular Force officers available to do this task?  Or, worse, Sr NCOs?  The Army is so fully engaged now that there aren't surplusses of any trade.  As Infanteer pointed out, that's why more and more Reservists are deploying.



> 4. Use the reservists all of the time for training support and administrative functions in order to free up more reg force pers for deployments. Class ABC, whatever, keep them working, so that they get better and we actually get some mileage out of them.



This is patently ridiculous.  After basically saying the Reserve is incompetent, you'd trust them with managing your pay, your administration and your deployment.  Riiiight... :  Perhaps we could get them to clean the hanger floors too?



> 5. Draw a big black line between the res and the regs. If you want to go reg force, you start with QL3. No more 1/2 trained quick picks that turn into disasters.



As was pointed out, there are probably Reservists with more experience than you have (judging by your profile).  You can't tar everyone with the same brush.



> 7.Make it clear that reservists are not deployed outside of canada unless the war measures act is invoked. Want to get deployed? Join the regs.



For the love of God, why? Or are you one of those who buy the MYTH that having Reservists deploy somehow "sc**w" a Reg F soldier out of a deployment? (I can discuss the Reserve Companies in Bosnia and soldiers elsewhere at length should you wish) You haven't articulated any operational reason to restrict Reservists to Canada - aside from a basic prejudice.  I agree with KevinB that there are operations where it may not be wise to deploy large number of Reservists, but you have to take these on a case by case basis.



> 8. Make militia units available to local government (provincial) so that they can be used for emergencies and take advantage of provincial funding.



Legally, this cannot be done and flies in the face of the principle that the Army is the force of last resort.  All Army units are federal and there is a specific request procedure that provinces must follow before receiving Army units in support of provinicial requirements.  They are in place (in part) to prevent constant calls on military forces for what should be civilian tasks.



> Its just common sense, but I sense it will not go far in this militia dominated forum.



Again, you seem to have an axe to grind and it comes through loud and clear in your points.  Using the term "Mo" proves my point.  You might want to rein it in a tad...

Cheers,

TR


----------



## Infanteer

GO!!! said:
			
		

> The major stumbling block with most of your criticisms of my plan is to "train reservists like the regs" this is impossible due to the limited time that most reservists have, and the limited funds available in order to train them. By signing them to a long contract in order to get the required hours out of them, we will have created another reg force soldier!



The way I see it, there is a difference between time spent training and skills taught.   You can teach a reservist the C6, section attacks, battle procedure, etc, etc and they will have learned the skill - sure, they will be rusty on the C6 and their drills might be poor, but with refresher training and workup, we can bridge the training delta to a good degree.

No one has ever stated that in terms of time spent training that the Regs and the Reserves are on par - arguing about this is moot point.   However, I am concerned (and have witnessed) that many essential skills are not being taught to Reservists.   I understand that this has changed with the SQ/BIQ program, which is good.   There should be one level of knowledge and standards applied to the Army - the Reservists, until they ramp up with workup training, can be expected to weaker on proficiency, but all the same skill sets should be there.



> Also, the CF was required to staff with augmentees, and leave reg force guys at home, there was never any NEED for militia. It was a way to include the res and justify their existence and funding (not necessarily a bad thing)



Well, if that's what you choose to believe, then go ahead - but others who have been involved in the staff and planning process have told you that your out to lunch.   I reported to a Battalion with 2 rifle companies - the mission changed midstream and 1 company was not required, but it soon found itself deployed elsewhere.



> The idea of having militia leadership is a good one, until you try to put your mo sect comd in charge of a section in which the youngest man has more experience. Instant underminig. Perhaps only restrict mo leaders to leading other reservists.



Then again, over half the leadership in my old unit had at least one operational tour under their belt.   You're painting with a broad brush when you assume that leadership in the Militia in deficient.

I agree with Kevin that experience hurts at the senior levels of Reserve leadership because the numbers aren't there (ie: there is little actual experience leading a full company or battalion).   Reg Force Cadres may be part of the answer, especially if the structure was changed to a battalion structure (as opposed to Brigade) and the Cadre was in charge of an actual battalions worth of soldiers.

However, you also need to consider that the reserves rely alot on retired senior members who "can't get away from the game" - for example, both the CSM and RSM in my old unit were Reg Force CD2s, Airborne, etc, etc.   Two of the three Warrants in the first Reserve Company were ex Reg, while the other one was on his 2nd or 3rd deployment.   Again, I beseech people not to paint with a broad brush, as there is solid senior leadership within the ranks of the Reserves.



> And as for using the reserves as a labor pool, well, yeah, thats my opinion and I believe it to be the best choice to free up the regs to do our job.



As others have pointed out, your logic is flawed on three points:

-   You want to reservist to take on full time admin positions to free up regs for tour?   Are you expecting Reg Force Clerks, Cooks, and Techs to be needed to fill out "boots on the ground" - they have their own jobs to do.

-   The US Army found out the hard way in Iraq on what happens when you try to fight a "cabinet war" (no national mobilization) with a large percentage of your CS/CSS in the Army Reserve.   Perhaps we should consider that.

-   You constantly deride the quality of reservists, but you want them to backstop and train the Regs; these are pretty vital positions, you know that, right?

If you want to be taken seriously by your peers, you need to start making your proposals more realistic and less indicative of a bad experience with/in the Reserves.   You seem to believe that Reservists do not have the potential to be on the sharp end of things, but as I alluded to earlier, there are Reservists to the South that have Been There and Done That in Iraq.   Could you take yourself seriously and tell them what you've been telling us?


----------



## GO!!!

The comparison of Army National Guard units to Canadian Militia units is ridiculous. 

I am short of time today - but the facts remains - 

The national guard is formed for periods of emergency and used often.

The largest component of NG units is usually recently retired (and young) reg unit individuals.

NG unit trg is MANDATORY

The Guard is regularly deployed as formed units - not augmentees

Guard units are (for the most part) kitted and trained on said kit in a similar method to the regs.

If any of these applied to the Canadian Militia it would be a more credible force.

Having said all of that, the downside is that NG units take the highest casualties, have the lowest morale and the most discipline problems. They are typically used in security roles (static and convoy) and  stay in country the longest.

Not a good comparison.


----------



## Infanteer

GO!!! said:
			
		

> The comparison of Army National Guard units to Canadian Militia units is ridiculous.



I wasn't looking solely at NG units - I factored USMCR into my comparison as well.   I am making the comparison because you have consistently stated that one needs to "sign on the full time line" to be an effective soldier overseas.

I agree, in part, with some of the measures that we would most likely benefit from in Canada (training to provide more then just individual augmentees, mandatory training and attendance, stricter regulations), but lacking these does not automatically render our Reserve forces as completely deficient in what they have to offer.

As well, with regards to performance, the issues you raised may indeed be tied to the reservist issue or they may be something more structural in nature.   I know Matt Fisher is going to give us a bit of insight into his reserve experience and his time with TF Tarawa, so we'll see what that says about your ideas.


----------



## GO!!!

It's too bad my supporters are not willing to wade into this, I look forward to Fisher's input.

I am unaware of the USMC's reserves quality/capability.

SOTG training scenarios were excellent though! If this is the type of trg the USMC gets on a regular basis - no wonder they always seem to do so well


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

As I pointed out on another thread, we're dealing with apples and oranges trying to compare US ANG and Reserve (yes, they're different) with the Canadian Reserve Force.   Calling down our Reserve system (which has many self-inflicted problems) because of decisions the government and/or the CF have made is rather pointless.

So, bearing that in mind, here's my two cents:

1.   The US Army has a system - recently introduced (don't ask me when) called Total Army (sound familiar?) designed to bring the three component (Active, ANG and Reserve) closer together.   It would take an American to explain further.

2.   The ANG is deployed in both Afghanistan and Iraq in all types of operations and (if memory serves) provided a QRF company out of Bagram at one time.   The list of deployed units is enormous and is available on the ANG website.   The US regards itself as being at war and subjects its units to a mobilization regime - including readiness evaluations - that would be untenable in Canada.



> The largest component of NG units is usually recently retired (and young) reg unit individuals.



3.  Really?  Source please, as I am not sure you're correct.  Then again, as others have said, there are LOTS of former Regs in the Reserve Force - more all the time.

4.  ANG training may be mandatory, but so (in theory) is ours (KevinB is correct).  Ask any ANG coy commander how an average drill weekend is attended...you'll be surprised.  Their system has as much flex as ours.



> Having said all of that, the downside is that NG units take the highest casualties, have the lowest morale and the most discipline problems. They are typically used in security roles (static and convoy) and  stay in country the longest.



5.  You don't think that all of these might be linked?  A unit that has a crappy role and stays in country the longest wouldn't possibly have morale and discipline problems...     Again, though, where are you getting this from?

6.  I have only a small amount of experience working with the USMC Reserves - very dated - so will obviously defer to the guys actually serving with them.  However, I should add that speaking with B Coy 4th Tk Bn in the early 90s, I was struck by how similar their problems were to the Canadian Reserves.  Although they had M1A1s, they couldn't crew more than three because of a lack of qualified personnel and could only manage that number by using the Regular "Inspection/Instruction" cadre.

Again, we're trying to compare two very different systems.  I've met some great ANG guys (both at home and on ops) and guys that wouldn't make it to Pte(B) in the Canadian Reserve Force... 'Nuff said from me.

Cheers,

TR


----------



## PJ D-Dog

This thread is very interesting and many have made some very valid points.  Infanteer has covered pretty much everything.

We are all fully aware that there are problems plaguing the reserves.  This is a just a reality of life but it doesn't mean that a work around is not possible.  Go has brought up some points which I agree with, other points which are rediculous.  It is obvious that he has never been a reservist who has to juggle all the responsibilities of a civilian career and family life and still find time to train.  I would suggest that he walk a mile in a reservists shoes before he makes outrageous claims as limiting career progression and overseas deployments for reservists.

As a reservist, I have worked with Reg F soldiers with many of the same opinions and attitudes that he has expressed.  It was not an easy task.  Some of these Reg F soldiers were not stellar by any stretch of the imagination and were dumped into an RSS posting because the Reg F just didn't want them anymore.  Others were outstanding.  As to getting input from a 10/90 unit, turretmonster would be the one to shed light on what happens when a permanent Reg F cadre is present in a unit.  He is part of one of those infamous units who suffered through the 10/90 experiment.

My own experience with Reg F soldiers posted at a 10/90 unit was dismal.  Most of them hated it and they all had an inane hatred for reservists because we didnt' go to Cornwallis or didn't go to Germany.  While teaching on a QL2 in the mid 90s, I ran into these soldiers and their only goal in life was to torture reservists for being reservists.  There was no justifiable logic for this.  One Cpl had to be asked to leave the room during a Sr NCO meeting with the CSM because he felt that he "rated" being there due to his Reg F status.  At my own unit, the RSS Sgt refused to follow my direction as the TSM (troop Sgt-Maj) because, you guessed it....his statement was "I will never work for a frigging reservist".  This made for a very positive work environment.

All of this to illustrate that despite the problems in the reserves, attitude toward the reserves by our Reg F counterparts only helps to fuel the fire and make things worse.  The militia wars have been faught for many years, and not surprisingly, they continue to be faught in this forum.

As I mentioned earlier, a work around for some of the inherent limitations in the reserve system is not impossible.  At my old unit, if a soldier was unable to make it to a Thursday night training and needed to have a weapons handling test done (during the warrior training days), he would simply come in during the week and I would give him the lectures and tests and be done with it.  He'd get a half a day's pay (just like the training night that he couldn't attend) and there was no problems with the budget, he got tested/trained/remediated and we met our mission for the number of soldiers who completed warrior training.  To conduct effective training in a reserve unit, one needs to be open minded, somewhat flexible and you need to think outside the box to make it work.  Unfortunately, many RSS staff do not have the ability to be open minded about training nor do some of them have the ability to think outside the box.  This only adds to the limitations within the reserve system.  Many of them like having a quiet week without the interruption of Class A guys coming in during the day because they couldn't show up on Thursday etc..other RSS work their rear ends off and do a great job and contribute positively to the unit.  It's hit or miss.

Even here in the US, I noticed at the Reserve center where we were using a class room this week, there were some Reserve Marines who came in to get their martial arts training/testing done during the day.  They missed a drill weekend and needed to make up the time and get their training done.

As for training standards for reservists and the whole issue of how the Regs F is infinitely better than the Militia, up until the late 90s, we used to have a yearly operational evaluation called Shellburst Valley.  This is when each arty unit was evaluated by Reg F pers (usually instructors at the arty school for units near Gagetown) and they followed a check list based on the battle task standard for an arty unit.  Everything was evaluated.  There was an evaluator with each detachment, in the CP, OP and RECCE all the way up to three niner (the BC).  Comms procedures, local security etc. was evaluated.  The entire exercise was scripted and the unit underwent a collective training test.  The results would be sent to the unit at a later date with a detailed explanation of the performance of each of the areas of evaluation.  A final grade was also given to the unit.  This was a fantastic training tool which helped the CO determine where the weakneses in training were.  It also helped determine the unit's operational readiness in their primary role as a gun battery.  As a positive side effect, it helped to boost morale in the regiment as we anticipated the results of what we called "the competition".  It was a competition because the best unit in Canada would be given a trophy later that year.  We always had maximum turn out for the competition because it was something that everyone wanted to be a part of.  It was a tough exercise, we got not sleep and we felt great about doing it.

Since the regular force was the measuring stick for all things militia, I took upon myself to research the battle task standard used at the arty school for regular force training.  To my surprise, there was no difference between the battle task standard for a 105 gun battery in the Reg F and reserves.  The eval sheets used in Shellburst Valley were the same for the reg force.

This is some of what is needed more in the reserves, a collective training evaluation administered by an outside, objective entity who can really give the unit some insight as to the strength and weaknesses of the training.  Tie that in with unit pride and cohesion and it could be a winning combination.

PJ D-Dog


----------



## the 48th regulator

GO,

dude,

What's yer hard on with the reserves??   We have to listen to your militia hate rants on a regular basis;

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25613.30.html

It is getting tired man.   

dileas

tess


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I wasn't looking solely at NG units - I factored USMCR into my comparison as well.  I am making the comparison because you have consistently stated that one needs to "sign on the full time line" to be an effective soldier overseas.
> 
> I agree, in part, with some of the measures that we would most likely benefit from in Canada (training to provide more then just individual augmentees, mandatory training and attendance, stricter regulations), but lacking these does not automatically render our Reserve forces as completely deficient in what they have to offer.
> 
> As well, with regards to performance, the issues you raised may indeed be tied to the reservist issue or they may be something more structural in nature.  I know Matt Fisher is going to give us a bit of insight into his reserve experience and his time with TF Tarawa, so we'll see what that says about your ideas.



A new broom sweeps clean...our new CO has stated that his goal is to get our militia unit up to two full strength companies, capable of deploying by the time his tour as CO is up.  Perhaps all the Militia units in Canada need to step up to the plate and put up or shut up, as it were.  Step one is proving that they are capable of the job - if one really feels, as you do Infanteer, that training for individual augmentation is not enough.  I'm not personally convinced that it is, but will certainly support my CO's vision.  It is unfortunate, though, that sometimes when people of vision step up to the plate, those below and above sometimes drown in their own ennui - they figure it is easier to fight than switch.

EDITED - thanks M. O'Leary (changed "full time" to "full strength")


----------



## pbi

> This is some of what is needed more in the reserves, a collective training evaluation administered by an outside, objective entity who can really give the unit some insight as to the strength and weaknesses of the training.   Tie that in with unit pride and cohesion and it could be a winning combination.


I'm not sure about other LFAAs, but in LFWA this is the role of the teams from the Militia Training Support Centre at WATC. Each unit must hold at least one MTSC-assisted FTX each year (normally at level 3, or level 3 in a 4 setting if they can swing it). The MTSC team comes out, observes, runs (or helps run...) the AAR, and provides the unit and Bde with a feedback report. As well, we operate a Bde standards section with several regional dets who can perform this function (although they focus more on IT). Finally, for any collective exercise run by us here in Bde (ie: the annual BTE each spring), we set up an Observer Controller Organization that runs the AAR process throughout the ex. The last one we set up included folks from units, Bde HQ, MTSC and the MNARNG. Finally, access to MILES via Big Rush, Inc. has brought a whole new capability in evaluating training (when we can get our hands on the damn stuff...). We still have a way to go but we have made great progress over the last few years. The exercises may not be on the ridiculously grandiose (and unrealistic...) scale that they were in the 80's, but our ability to evaluate training, and to use the training area as a tactical classroom instead of a free for all, is IMHO much improved.

Cheers.


----------



## swanita

My thing is how i keep hearing rumours of the highland regiments being amalgamated into one or two big regiments....Now THAT would totally suck the big c*#k because then one regt's traditions/history would be gone in a flash & that would be un-Canadian. I personally love being in a highland regiment for the distiction & you can't beat marching with a pipe band & i'm sure many of you out there agree!!! 

Carry On!


----------



## Michael Dorosh

swanita said:
			
		

> My thing is how i keep hearing rumours of the highland regiments being amalgamated into one or two big regiments....Now THAT would totally suck the big c*#k because then one regt's traditions/history would be gone in a flash & that would be un-Canadian. !!
> 
> Carry On!



LOL!  I can't think of anything _more_ Canadian, to be honest, then trashing our own traditions.  Trashing traditions is a Canadian tradition.

Flush out your head gear, troop, the British just amalgamated their highland regiments.   Chicken Little we don't need on this board.


----------



## Danjanou

swanita said:
			
		

> My thing is how i keep hearing rumours of the highland regiments being amalgamated into one or two big regiments....Now THAT would totally suck the big c*#k because then one regt's traditions/history would be gone in a flash & that would be un-Canadian. I personally love being in a highland regiment for the distiction & you can't beat marching with a pipe band & i'm sure many of you out there agree!!!
> 
> Carry On!



What's a matter Swanita you don't want to be a member of the *GREATER METROPOLITAN (INCLUDING 905 BELT) TORONTO HIGHLANDERS (48TH, TORONTO & LORNE SCOTTISH)*  ;D

Don't laugh when I was in, it was a common topic in the Sgt's Mess re amalgamating with the cross town competition. Not saying anyone at FYA was for it but the topic did come up.


----------



## swanita

What's a matter Swanita you don't want to be a member of the GREATER METROPOLITAN (INCLUDING 905 BELT) TORONTO HIGHLANDERS (48TH, TORONTO & LORNE SCOTTISH)  

Don't laugh when I was in, it was a common topic in the Sgt's Mess re amalgamating with the cross town competition. Not saying anyone at FYA was for it but the topic did come up.

Funny, i nearly fell off my chair when i read that!! As long as we can each wear our respective kilts, might not be that bad  :


----------



## ArmyRick

If they do that, they had better amalgamate ALL reserve units not just the ones with kilts and balmorals...

Another note, units like the Argyls, Lornes and the 48th are larger units than the QOR, RR of C and RHLI.


----------



## Trinity

Yeah.. i'm not looking for a fight
NOR to defend Royal regt of Canada...

But they are one of the biggest in Toronto...  The Svc Bn being the biggest  :

I believe the royals have over 300 troops...  

48th is like 250
TSR was 200 in sept.. i think 230 now...


----------



## Gunner

I've never understood the Reserves staunch refusal for amalgamation of units.  We have this huge, bloated, 5 Division structure spread across Canada centred on Battalions and Regiments that are at worst, platoon sized, and at best, perhaps two companies.  Most of the units have a fairly limited history centred on WWI and WWII and most draw their lineage from other units that they merged with or amalgamated with years ago.  Until this issue is addressed, I can't see the Reserves moving forward.  If the UK can do it with units with 100s of years of real history fighting for the Empire, can't we bring our Reserve Force into the 21st century?

Stepping off my soapbox.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Gunner said:
			
		

> Most of the units have a fairly limited history centred on WWI and WWII and most draw their lineage from other units that they merged with or amalgamated with years ago.  Until this issue is addressed, I can't see the Reserves moving forward.



Two world wars represents "limited history"?  Most  units have reached or passed their centennial years, we still have 5 to go in Calgary.

Most units draw their lineage from - well, their own unit.  There was a major reorg in the early 1920s and some renaming, but as far as amalgamations go, you can see the timeline at my site at www.canadiansoldiers.com - the Regiments have been rather stable for the last 50 years.  Go into ORDERS OF BATTLE and scroll down the left til you come to the scarlet links area for infantry regiments.  The last amalgamations were in 1955 or so.  "Most" units retain the names they had in the 1920s reorg.

What benefit would there be to amalgamation?  Do you think that the individual subunits would get any bigger just because they were renamed?  Or that the units would operate any more closely?  You can accomplish that without a name change.


----------



## the 48th regulator

The UK did, with some very famous regiments of Scotland,   Sad event but a reflection of a modern army.

It would be nice to amalgamate them all under the one unit, call them the 48th Highlanders and take it from there

makes sense.

Falcon in the capbadge....

Davidson tartan.....

Already a whack of battle honors....

really neat motto...in Gaelic even...

dileas

tess

(as for the tattoo and ring, you will have to foot the bill for that yourselves)


----------



## Trinity

Thank God I already have the ring   ;D


----------



## tomahawk6

What then is the solution to understrength reserve battalions ? I would think the alternative would be to deactivate understrength units.


----------



## Redeye

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> What then is the solution to understrength reserve battalions ? I would think the alternative would be to deactivate understrength units.



That wouldn't make any sense: EVERY reserve unit is understrength, that would simply eliminate the reserve altogether, and since the Militia is the main connection for the Canadian Forces to a lot of communities, that would not work in anyone's interest.  The solution that has been working has been to put a lot of emphasis on pooling resources of smaller units wherever possible to make the training more effective.  That seems to be the best way to go at this time.


----------



## ArmyRick

Solution? i am saying merge ALL reserve units (not just highland ones). You could easily make a battalion by merging every 3-4 regiments. You would also keep the unit's histories. There are very few units today that are exactly as they were when they stood up in the 1800s. We have seen amalgamations before and guess what? The army reserve is still here.


----------



## tomahawk6

I'm sorry I didnt make myself clear. A battalion with only 40 people is a waste of resources. If a battalion cant stay at 50% it doesnt need to be kept on the rolls.


----------



## enfield

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> What benefit would there be to amalgamation?   Do you think that the individual subunits would get any bigger just because they were renamed?   Or that the units would operate any more closely?   You can accomplish that without a name change.



The names and traditions aren't the problem, its the regimental structure - which forces us into absurd formations - that is starving the reserves. 

We use the terms "brigade", "regiment", and "battalion" to describe rather miniscule non-capable formations. The administrative and command structures that go with these formations is a serious detriment to the efficiency and capability of the units. Also, keeping us as independent regiments and battalions, under our own brigades, isolates us from the Regular Army in a number of key issues - updated training, collaboration and learning, working within the bigger picture, kit issue, etc. 

Concepts like Regimental Tradition are holding us to a bloated, ineffective, unrealistic structure. 250 soldiers may be a "regiment" but it sure isn't an effective battalion, and in reality most units probably can't even field a real company. Since we probably can't get much bigger, we might as well run ourselves realistically. 

I suggest (as many others have) turning the reserve regiments into Companies within a territorial - probably provincial - Battalion. So, for BC,   it would be   "A Company (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada)", "B Company (Royal Westminster Regiment)", "C Company (Cdn Scottish Regiment)", and "D Company (Rocky Mountain Rangers) of the "British Columbia Battalion". The associated artillery, engineer, intelligence, and service units would all be combined into this BC formation to form "The British Columbia Battle Group" or Combat Team, or Task Force.

This is very similar to what we do on the major ex's and concentrations anyway (except its rare for BC to field 4 Inf Companies, we had 2 on the last concentration). So why not run ourselves like we actually are? There's no need to change the armouries or the regimental traditions, but the names and structures of the units should fit reality, and not a WW3 Mobilization pipedream. Ditch the Lieutenant Colonels, the Adj's, the RSM's, the BOR, the Brigade apparatus, and make ourselves lean.

Thus, we train and run ourselves as what we are. Training would be organized by Battalion - since a company wouldn't have the resources to plan a major ex - and would be able to field realistic combined arms training formations, since one HQ would directly plan and arrange all provincial training. 

Above this, the reserve Battle Groups would be run from Area HQ. Possibly as an Area Reserve Brigade, alongside the Regular Brigades. However, I'd be eager to see the reserve units tied as closely into the Regular Force structure as possible, since I think this would lead to all sorts of benefits for the reserves in training, administration, exercises, doctrine, etc. I know that being in Vancouver, we feel very isolated from the rest of the Army. 

The Brits run their reserves this way - each reserve inf battalion is a direct part of the a regular regiment. I don't think the PPCLI, RCR, or R22R wants the reserves tied to them like that, but its something worth considering.

One model that has interested me, but I don't know enough about it, is the Reserve MP Companies, who are run as a subunit of their Reg F formation. Reserve MP's can go on all of the ex's that the Reg's do and can get many of the same taskings. Now, the other branches are too large for this direct model, but its something to think of. Imagine if every infantry soldier in LFWA had the chance to go on every ex held by the PPCLI?


----------



## a_majoor

Enfield's post hit on one of the themes of LFRR Phase II, which from the briefing notes I saw seemed to imply the folding of units into subunits of larger Brigade wide formations. For 31 CBG, there would be a 31 Infantry Bn, 31 Armoured Regt, 31 Artillery Regt, 31 SVC BN to join the existing 31 CER and a small set of "new capabilities" (31 NBCD Coy, etc.). LFCA would be able to have one Regular Brigade and 3 light Reserve Brigades which could produce one Mechanized battle group and 3 Light battle groups.

The upside to all this would be the elimination of most of the 15 LCols, RSMs etc. that the current slate of 15 reserve units carry. The downside is the accumulated histories and traditions would be heavily diluted (the various companies, squadrons and batteries might keep historic names, but not too much else.) Running large units by "remote control" would also be challenging, given it can take 4 hr to drive from Windsor to St Catherines, but modern communications make it easier than ever, and historically, units have been separated from parent formations for days, weeks and even months communicating by pen and ink means....

Although there would be horrible outrage if this ever happened, in about 5 years, the bulk of the rank and file would consist of soldiers who have never known anything else but being in, for example, "A" Coy 31 Bn (Essex and Kent Coy) and life would go on.


----------



## Gunner

Michael, Enfield and a_majoor have both hit on points that, for the most part I agree with.



> Two world wars represents "limited history"?   Most   units have reached or passed their centennial years, we still have 5 to go in Calgary.



Yes, it is "limited history".   Most units have been bumbling around for decades with inefficient and outdated organizations waiting to fight WWII again.   



> Most units draw their lineage from - well, their own unit.  There was a major reorg in the early 1920s and some renaming, but as far as amalgamations go, you can see the timeline at my site at www.canadiansoldiers.com - the Regiments have been rather stable for the last 50 years.  Go into ORDERS OF BATTLE and scroll down the left til you come to the scarlet links area for infantry regiments.  The last amalgamations were in 1955 or so.  "Most" units retain the names they had in the 1920s reorg.



See my comments above.   The pot of money and resources is limited and the army needs to streamline and rationalize the Reserve structure.   The idea that we need 50 odd infantry battalions, etc, to meet Canadian defence aims is questionable.   I'm not adverse to a_Majoor's suggest of keeping battalion or regimental history alive at the company level.   41 CBG isn't that bad as it only has two understrength battalions (one in Calgary and one in Edmonton).   38 CBG has 5 scattered across Sk, Mb and northwest Ontario and all of them are extremely understrength.   The two Bns in Sk could easily be amalgamated into 1 Regiment of Saskatchewan Rifles.   The two battalions in Winnipeg could easily amalgamate into the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. 1 remaining bn in Thunder Bay could be a sub-unit of the RWpgR.   



> What benefit would there be to amalgamation?  Do you think that the individual subunits would get any bigger just because they were renamed?  Or that the units would operate any more closely?  You can accomplish that without a name change.



Units could work closer now but for some reason, personality or vanity gets in their way. Never understood was it so difficult to understand that an exercise is much better when you have full coys or a couple of coys exercising againsts one another.   A_Majoor makes all the good points about doing away with the redundant bureaucracy (COs, RSMs, Adjts, Ops O, etc, etc).   Get the money and resources where it is supposed to be, on the armoury floor, not in the offices.

I should point out (before all the Reserve bashers climb aboard), this isn't a slight towards the Reserves.   In a perfect world, the Reserves would be funded and resourced adequately, proper support from the Regular force, increased opportunities to work with the Regs, etc.   Obviously they can't be the same because its a part time organization but they should be able to provide a collective capability towards Canada's foreign policy.   Its not there right now and its not economically achievable under the current structure.


----------



## Infanteer

Gunner said:
			
		

> I've never understood the Reserves staunch refusal for amalgamation of units.   We have this huge, bloated, 5 Division structure spread across Canada centred on Battalions and Regiments that are at worst, platoon sized, and at best, perhaps two companies.   Most of the units have a fairly limited history centred on WWI and WWII and most draw their lineage from other units that they merged with or amalgamated with years ago.   Until this issue is addressed, I can't see the Reserves moving forward.   If the UK can do it with units with 100s of years of real history fighting for the Empire, can't we bring our Reserve Force into the 21st century?
> 
> Stepping off my soapbox.



I agree.

I'm a proponent of the "clean sweep" approach.   Our Reserve Regiments are "limited" - they mainly look back to WWI (not really as "theirs", just as numbered CEF battalions) and WWII.   Sure, reservists have individually augmented tours for the last 20 years, but these are exactly that, individual, and not regimental.

The current Reserve setup of Brigade HQ's with understrength units is built around the idea of mobilization - we are 50 years behind on this one.   I remember reading an article by LtCol (then Major) Dan Drew about readiness issues - he went over the time to build enough M1 Abrams tanks to kit out Reserve units in the case of mobilization as an example of how asinine the assumption for mobilization is and I imagine the same could be said about training times, equipping, expansion, etc for all other units and formation HQs.   I feel that we must move away from the notion of mobilization built around "Total War" mobilizing of the populace and national industry.   If this does occur, we can raise/create new units since this is what will happen anyways - having the Regiment "exist" before-hand makes no difference.

Instead, we should focus our reserves on a real structure to support the regulars in the "come as you are" wars and conflicts that we've been constantly engaged in for the last few decades.   I see "mobilization" and the units of the Army structured into 5 operational echelons, and the Reserves having a real role and place in some of these groupings:

Echelon I) Special Operations Units and Rapid Reaction Forces (either Air Mobile or afloat in a Amphibious Role) - Required to be able to project globally within days and to remain in place to establish conditions for heavier follow-on-forces.

Echelon II) Regular Force Units and Formations - These are the full-time professional soldiers who must be capable being sustained on operations overseas - usually heavier then Echelon I forces (in our case, I see the "Cavalry" format as ideal for now).   Current doctrine mandates two Battlegroups with surge capability for a Brigade.   Echelon II forces are ROTO O and next few rotations.

Echelon III) Voluntary Augmention - This is where we sit now.   This is limited use of Reservists in a strictly voluntary arrangement to help cover off on missions in mature theaters.   This can involve individual augmentees to Regular Force Units or the formation of Reserve sub-sub units or sub-units within Regular Units (as with the Composite Reserve units and D&S Platoons).   Reserve Battalions are required to be able to form a Platoon at all times as an Echelon III force (even if it is only a staff check).

Echelon IV) Reserve Activation - This is where the Americans sit now.   Entire Reserve Units and Formations are called up, given workup training, and deployed.   Obviously, quite disruptive, but it is something the Reserves should be able to do in a wartime scenario that does not call for complete national mobilization.

Echelon V) These are forces created from scratch in a National Mobilization scheme.   They can exist on paper at zero strength until the balloon goes up and the floodgates are opened for recruits.   These scratch units are filled out by soldiers from the other 4 echelons who have returned from operational duty.

The reserve units have strengths in that they are locally based and the members are usually quite familiar with eachother - if the CF could find a way to deal with attrition, job security, and service requirements (important and completely seperate issues that we've discussed lately), you would have a real pool of good, professional soldiers to rely on for Echelon III and IV tasks.

As I've said, I advocate the clean sweep approach:

-   With regards to formations, all 10 Reserve Brigades are downgraded to Reserve Battalions.   This cuts a top-heavy command structure out and streamlines C2 - we currently have more Reserve Brigade and Battalion HQs then Regular, but fewer reserve soldiers.   This means that planning is done at the unit level - for example, every month or two , units in BC will train as a unit, rather then as 6 or 7 "Regiments" that send a platoon or two out to do some willy nilly training on their own.

-   The Reserve Battalions are to be given a TO&E and are to organize as Echelon IV forces.   They should be able to train as a unit in peacetime and, if the call goes out, deploy as a unit if Echelon IV forces are required.   They will have their own DFS (Armour, organized like a USMC CAAT), Pioneers (Engineers), Mortar (Arty) and Admin and Support (CS/CSS) sub units as well as having 2 or 3 rifle companies.

-   How these Battalions are organized within the larger structure is up for debate.   We could have a hybrid Reg/Res Brigade Headquarters with some Reserve units formed as Brigade-level units (Engineers, Arty, CS/CSS).   One per area would give the Reserves roughly 3 Reg Force Brigades and 3 Reserve Brigades.   Essentially a 2 Division force.

-   Now this is where I'm going to be tagged as the Heretic.   I feel that each Reserve Battalion (former CBG) should be under 1 Regiment.   It should share a set of colours, be under the same capbadge, and be reflective of a Regional Identity (this is a common strength of some Regimental Systems like Britain and Germany - we cannot fit it into our Reg Force, but our Reserves can do it).   For example within LFWA, there would be The British Columbia Rifles (BCR is already taken), the Alberta Regiment, and the Western Regiment (or Prairie Regiment).   All the old reserve units, in an effort to prevent bickering about who stays and who goes, should be relegated to Echelon V units - the Reserve Battalions will be new units that represent Echelon IV and V units and make their own history as Canada's "Ready Reserve" of actively serving reservists.

Anyways, just some thoughts (some old, some new).

Enjoy and flame away.

Infanteer


----------



## TCBF

"remaining bn in Thunder Bay could be a sub-unit of the RWpgR."

Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.  Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away?  They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.

We need more units - not less.  More local traditions - not less.

Small units they can be, to keep alive the military culture in a town or small city.

This costs nothing - peanuts.  The extra accoutrements and so on?  Peanuts.  The Colonels pay?  Also peanuts, but bust him to Major if you wan't.

While we are at it, lets bring back those reserve units that we closed out of the small towns, and put some other units in the large cities that have sprung up in various places.


----------



## Gunner

> Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.  Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away?  They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.



And every year we don't do something with an archaic system, its money and resources that aren't be used effectively.  People join to be a member of the infantry and usually know very little about the units heritage and history.  As I mentioned, the sub-unit would retain the name.  You can call the battalion whatever you want, its just a name.



> We need more units - not less.  More local traditions - not less.



Law of diminishing returns....



> Small units they can be, to keep alive the military culture in a town or small city.



Whether a platoon, company or battalion is located in a town, I would hazard to guess that most people have no idea what the unit is - its all army.



> This costs nothing - peanuts.  The extra accoutrements and so on?  Peanuts.  The Colonels pay?  Also peanuts, but bust him to Major if you wan't.



Actually, it isn't peanuts, its a lot of money being wasted.  It is also alot of officers and NCMs being pushed by the system to be the CO or RSM when they don't have the experience to be a platoon commander much less a company commander.



> While we are at it, lets bring back those reserve units that we closed out of the small towns, and put some other units in the large cities that have sprung up in various places.



Most of those units were closed down for a reason.  You do bring up a good point about units not springing up in places that have grown since WWII.  Penticton and Prince George are two good examples out in British Columbia without military presence.

Cheers


----------



## TCBF

I would say it would cost more to reform the so-called outdated reserve structure than we would save by doing it.

Want to save money on Colonels?   Best place to do that is NDHQ, not Upper Armpit, Nova Scotia.

If you want to "increase the efficiency" of the reserves:   Limit man-days by rank.   If the LCol has only 1/10th of the soldiers he would have in a regular unit, cut his man days to one tenth.   But that would only be grossly parsimonious.   If the Res LCol loves his unit - and they do - he will show up anyway, paid or not.

No, if money is "wasted" in the reserves, it is done under Regular Force supervision: The RSSO and the Chief Clerk.   Clerks, in particular, invariably know where the bodies are buried.

No easy answers.   The units could be as big as we wanted them to be, if we increased their man-days.

So, lets ask the Militia what they think?


----------



## old medic

I'm going to be really cynical here and suggest that combining 
five reserve batallions into one unit on paper would only result in a bean
counter somewhere deciding that this new one unit only needs the resources of one
reserve unit and that four units worth of equipment and budget could
be axed from defence spending.


----------



## Trinity

Its my understanding that we have only so many line serials in peace time

And this grows ... three or four times the size in war.  So its not that we 
aren't a real brigade as much as our war time serials aren't filled.  On paper
we are if the situation arises, but this assumes that people would step up
and join the army to help fight a war...  which i don't think would happen.

I do think a revamp is totally needed.

please correct the above line serial comment if i'm wrong
(note the word correct... not flame)  : :


----------



## aesop081

Trinity,

My take on it is that you are correct. Units hava peace time establishement and a war time establishemnt.  The trouble is that mobilization plans are grossly outmoded IMHO.  modern day crisses develop too quickly to build up an army and then go fight.  it takes too long to train soldiers to fill those "wartime' positions in the establishemnt, takes too long to build the weapons to fight the conflict, for a WW2 style mobilization scheme.  It is my opinion, that it does the CF no good to have a reserve force structured like ours if it cannot be mobilized fully and rapidly. I dont think we are likely to ever require the generation of a reserve brigade for operations. So why the need to have the militia organized in a brigade structure ? Why not concentrate on creating a full-strenght ( or as close as possible) reserve force capable of being deployed on short notice to augment/replace regular force units or on an individual basis ?  To me, less units at full strenght are less of a burden that many units understrenght.  Further more, i dont think that a reserve presence in every community is all that of an important requirement.  I think this creates a spliting of limited resources we can ill aford

Modern day war is " come as you are"...if you don't have it now......you won't have it by the time the fighting stops


----------



## swanita

TCBF said:
			
		

> Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.   Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away?   They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.



Not necessarily a bad thing!!   ;D


----------



## McG

old medic said:
			
		

> I'm going to be really cynical here and suggest that combining five reserve batallions into one unit on paper would only result in a bean counter somewhere deciding that this new one unit only needs the resources of one reserve unit and that four units worth of equipment and budget could be axed from defence spending.


Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units).  If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.


----------



## McG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I'm sorry I didnt make myself clear. A battalion with only 40 people is a waste of resources. If a battalion cant stay at 50% it doesnt need to be kept on the rolls.


The problem is, the Army will not allow the regiments to grow.  Each has only been established for one or two small companies and an undersized RHQ.  Rather than shutting these battalions, it would be better to re-group their sub units into one battalion.


----------



## TCBF

No.  To easy to cut if they did that.  Convert the LSSR to 3 TSR, then five years later they close it out saying "We don't need a bn of the Tor Scots in Thunder Bay".

All of this talk - when in doubt, re-org - is just cows jostling for a nice slot on the ramp into the abattoir.  The more the Militia and Regs says it wants to change, the more those changes will be mandated by a bunch of long haired civie back door power brokers in Ottawa who will dust off Phase VII of the plan to de-militarize Canada, and out the door you all will go.

The present bloated inefficient system is flawed not because of the concept - a cadre that can expand to fifty times it's size in a PROLONGED emergency - but because the process has not been effectively led.

But we don't blame people any more, do we?  We blame organizations.


----------



## Brad Sallows

This amalgamation thing is very attractive.  Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:

- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt

...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.  Very efficient productivity gain there.  Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?  What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?


----------



## TCBF

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> This amalgamation thing is very attractive.   Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:
> 
> - 4 x CO
> - 4 x RSM
> - 4 x DCO
> - 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
> 
> ...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.   Very efficient productivity gain there.   Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?   What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?



You are being sarcastic, right?


----------



## old medic

MCG said:
			
		

> Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units).  If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.



It's not a scare, I watched this actually happen several times in LFWA in the 1990's with sub units.
They were put together on paper, a lot of equipment was lost, then remaining gear was divided up between cities.
That wiped out effective training except on major exercise. In the case of the Field Kitchens, it even wiped out 
effective use of the equipment.  (They put the kitchen trucks in Thunder Bay and the kitchen trailers in Winnipeg).

I must agree with TCBF. Don't mess with unit names or histories. That's the biggest link the CF has with most
communities in this country.  The local Officers (usually leading citizens), senates, honourary Colonels, Veterans,
past unit members all have a connection back to their unit. If you take that away, your going to wipe out your local
support.  That's exactly what happened in 1954 when they renamed all the reserve Field Ambulances.  

The biggest problem with the reserve infantry units is probably the massive unit budget cuts that took place in 1994. 
That, coupled with restrictions on parade numbers, closed establishment positions, limits and numbers on recruiting,
and only allowing each unit a tiny number of positions on BMT serials are what's brought the reserve to it's current
state. 

Restore the unit budgets and allow them to enroll new members. Then come back and decide which ones are
viable.


----------



## enfield

old medic said:
			
		

> Restore the unit budgets and allow them to enroll new members. Then come back and decide which ones are
> viable.



No reserve unit will ever be a real battalion - let alone a multi-battalion regiment - in peacetime. And, as was mentioned by Infanteer, mobilization is no longer possible and is thus irrelevant. So why maintain the bloated structures where companies pretend to be battalions and battalions pretend to be brigades? I'll bet no other army in the world so closely resembles its 1945 version. 

I'm not arguing for the histories and distinctness of the regiments to be erased. They can be maintained, just as effectively, by a Company - since that is essentially what reserve infantry units are anyways. Our job is to be relevant and effective, and administering ourselves as are is harming our ability to fulfil our duties and needs. 

Merge the operational and administrative functions of the regiments, so that they become companies and are administered and trained as such by regional battalions. Easy. Knock away the entire command apparatus above company level from each unit, and give those duties to what is now "brigade", and treat a brigade like what it really is, a battalion or battle group. Everything still gets done, but the units will have easier admin, more cohesive and meaningful training, and more bodies available on the parade square. And keep the kilts, marching paces, battle honours, museums, etc.

At present we are maintain a rank structure that is wasteful and possibly dangerous, for political reasons. No one in a reserve unit above the company level can possibly be qualified to do their job because we never operate that high in the field or garrison (in reality its even lower than that, probably platoon level). So why pretend? 

A question: if we did change things so that the units become companies within regional battalions, is there any reason the units (which would be administered as companies) could they not be called 'regiments' as well? A regiment is a family and a tradition, not a field formation, so why not keep the term?

On a separate rant....
I'm so sure this 'local connections' argument is quite so strong. Most people have no idea what the Army Reserves are or what they do, and have zero concept of their local regiments. I'm not sure what this local support is that we keep talking about - recruiting doesn't seem to indicate the presence of local support. I've served in two units, one with an exceptionally strong Association and probably the most influential Honourary Colonel in the Reserves, and the other with neither an association nor a high profile Honourary. I haven't seen any difference in recruiting, training, or effectiveness in the field.


----------



## Brad Sallows

>You are being sarcastic, right?

Yes.  While I'm sure there would be some economy of effort (fewer people attending conferences aimed at people at unit HQ level) I figure there would be between 150 and 200 person-days worth of Class "A" work to absorb into each sub-unit HQ.  If the full-time officers were left as sub-unit 2I/Cs in respective locations, then there would remain the interesting experiential jump from platoon to company command for a selected few officers without the benefit of any staff or administrative appointments.  "Congratulations, Lt.  You are promoted to Maj and hereby appointed OC B Coy."  The thing to do would be to downrank reserve sub-units to Capt and have a Lt as 2I/C and Lt or 2Lt as platoon commanders.  Nice and lean: 6 to 8 years in for officers, and then up to battle group HQ or out.  Lots of time for other hobbies.

Maybe this would work.  All I ever read about, though, are the pay savings (miniscule unless positions are eliminated entirely) and the improved sub-unit/unit collective training opportunities.  Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.  Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.  Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?

My guess is that after "mission creep" the end-state would look something like this: each former unit, now sub-unit, would have as full-timers a 2I/C, two clerks, a CQMS, and a QMSI.  Tacked onto the normal sub-unit establishment after repeated complaints and position papers would be a few supernumary officers and NCOs with appointments to deal with all the odds and sods of work that currently must be done.  Plus, somewhere in each brigade, there would be 2 or 3 or 4 new battle group HQs ("BG North".  "BG South".  "BG Island".  "BG Mainland."  "BG Interior".  Etc).  In short, the entirety of every original unit would still be there, just reduced by one rank across the board for the part-timers, with a net increase in the number of officers and senior NCOs to staff the new HQs.


----------



## Infanteer

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> This amalgamation thing is very attractive.   Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:
> 
> - 4 x CO
> - 4 x RSM
> - 4 x DCO
> - 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
> 
> ...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.   Very efficient productivity gain there.   Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?   What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?



So, how is it that a regular Force battalion can train 600 soldiers within a Battalion Command Structure while the Reserves need Bde RSMs, Bde Commanders, Brigade Chiefs of Staff, a whack of CO's and RSM's, Company Commanders, and RSS staff to boot in order to get a couple hundred reservists out for four days?

Why every reserve unit has to play to its own tune is a mystery - for example, in Vancouver's case, why do the Seaforth Highlanders and the Royal Westminster Regiment always do their own things?   Why isn't their resources pooled in order to husband resources and staffing manpower (I have a feeling the Regimental bone has a part in this)?   Heck, you could even get the local BCR armoured guys out to further increase efficency.

Others could fill me in, but I believe that Winnipeg (Rifles and the Camerons) parade in the same location - we need the Command and Staffing of 2 units for 80 guys kicking around on the same parade square?   I believe this is the case in some Ontario units as well.

I remain unconvinced that the nature of the Reserves somehow necessitates the requirement for 4 times the overhead to get things done.

I still argue that it is neccessary for the Reserves to reorganize into a realistic TO&E so as to be deployable as an Echelon IV unit (as I described above) - we should expect our Reserves to be called up for deployment at sub-unit and unit levels (as our American neighbours are doing at this moment) before we expect and plan for   National Mobilization and Total War.

PS: Interesting example of a Reserve Force structured with an actual TO&E (instead of our hodgepodge structure of independent units) is 4th MarDiv.   Not saying we could achieve the scope of the USMCR, but it does show that Reserve units can be organized, manned, and run as proper units and formations.

http://www.mfr.usmc.mil/4thmardiv/units/


----------



## enfield

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.   Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.   Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?



Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion. However, a reserve unit does not have nearly the same resources as a real battalion to run that administrative load - not as many clerks, not the various cells, not the full-time staff to do all the work that needs to be done, etc. 

Reserve units generally claim to be able to field a company. So what exactly is everyone above the company level doing? An operational Reg F company manages to run itself on one clerk, an OC, 2ic, a CSM, and a CQ. A Reserve company is run by: a CQ/RQ, Coy CoComdrCoy 2ic, CSM, RSM, CO, DCO, Adjt, Ops & Trg O, and a BOR - and all that to get guys out one day a week, one weekend a month, and in reality it probably fields a platoon.
My unit fielded the equivalent of a overstrength platoon on the last 7-day concentration. But, on any given weekday we usually have 3 people working full-time in the BOR, plus the Adjt, the RSS WO, CQ, a Recruiting Officer, and various others doing pay administration or odd jobs. The tail is definitely overwhelming the teeth. 

Plus the reality that most reserve SNCO's and Officers are not really qualified or experienced enough to do their jobs operationally - no slight on them, and they could learn the job if need be, but they just don't have the training and experience. Why maintain people in ranks and positions they aren't really qualified for?

The administravia in this model goes up - up to Battalion, to a real battalion.   The administrative structure of a battalion isn't justified for a company. So, move it up to a level where the administrative structure actually runs a battalion, which in the case of BC would mean commanding all of the army reserves in the province. Everything done in units right now by the CO, the RSM, the Adj, the RQ, Ops and Training cells, and the BOR would be done centrally for all the units in the region, and would be staffed by trained full-time personnel. It seems to work well enough for the Reg's, we might as well give it a shot. 

The reserves don't justify a 50-odd Battalion structure - not to many armies in the western world do. We do, however, justify and require a 50-odd Company structure.


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion.

It has never been my impression that reserve units run themselves like battalions.  I would describe them as depots because of all the extra baggage.  Regardless, my point is that no one has identified exactly what it is all those people do in their offices and identified how much of it can and how much can not be eliminated from each parading location.

If the full-time staff can be consolidated and reduced and still get all the work done, there is an obvious lesson there.  But perhaps they can not; we need to ask why before we do it.


----------



## enfield

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> It has never been my impression that reserve units run themselves like battalions.   I would describe them as depots because of all the extra baggage.



Perhaps not operational battalions, but they do have Lieutenant Colonels, RSMs, Adjts, Ops & Trng Cells, Transport Section, Battalion Orderly Rooms, and one or more (notional) Companies within them. That seems to fit many characteristics of a battalion structure. 



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Regardless, my point is that no one has identified exactly what it is all those people do in their offices and identified how much of it can and how much can not be eliminated from each parading location.



I believe that we can - and should - eliminate senior positions, such as CO and RSM. The table of organization for a reserve unit looks rather silly, since its is a straight line rather than a pyramid.



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> If the full-time staff can be consolidated and reduced and still get all the work done, there is an obvious lesson there.   But perhaps they can not; we need to ask why before we do it.



Each 'unit'/parade location requires the admin to keep its people happy, tasked, and placed on courses. It has to have training, both on parade nights and on weekend ex's to fulfill requirements and increase the skills of personnel. It has to have the admin and organization to provide support to the Reg F, and the possibility of call up/active service.

Why can't most of this be done by a separate central location that would take the work from each unit and do it at once? I believe that multi-subunit reserve regiments, like the C Scot R, have multiple companies run by a single battalion organization. Anyone aware of how this works out?

There is a basic level of admin/logistics/organization that needs to be done by each unit no matter how many troops it parades, and there's an increased level of basic work that has to be done as long as we pretend to be Battalions. After this point, the extra work per troop is minimal. So, pushing all the battalion-level apparatus up to a central point does not mean the same number of staff at the higher headquarters that currently sit in scattered units.
- There is a savings in personnel, which is not important in terms of money savings, but in terms of streamlining admin and ensuring that experienced RMS clerks and knowledgable Adjt's handle the work.
- Less dupduplication effort on admin, logistics, planning, and training. Why does one Armoury have two BOR's/CQ's/Lieutenant-Colonels to administer a tiny number of soldiers?
- Better training as all ex's would be bigger and combined. Why do two units in the same city train sepseparately?


----------



## Brad Sallows

Let me rephrase: over the years, in various staff positions in a unit which numbered anywhere from 50 to 100 all ranks, I had enough administrative work to keep me busy every weekly parade evening and most local HQ training days.  For each eliminated appointment, the work must go into one of the following:

1) Absorbed into the centralized appointment with no additional effort because there was an exact duplication of effort (ie. what is done for one sub-unit can be done for many with no additional time).

2) Absorbed into the centralized appointment with some additional effort, which comes out in the wash because the appointment holder was in fact always underemployed and occasionally just marking time.

3) Dropped onto the shoulders of the remaining appointments in the local (sub-unit) HQ with some additional effort, which is taken on board regardless whether the person was already fully occupied with pre-existing duties and assignments.  If the incumbent was already fully occupied, expect a new position to be created or for the wheel to eventually break.

4) Dropped into the aether because it was only pointless busywork, or is low on the scale of administrative priorities.  This works until higher HQ demands a response.

The alternative is that effectively some appointments must remain.  If it turns out that a company still needs some semblance of, say, an ops/trg cell and a log cell to function, less or nothing is saved.

My point: don't assume administrative streamlining will happen; show where it must happen.  Otherwise you are basically embarking on a gamble.


----------



## George Wallace

There is one problem you have overlooked and that is the lack of personal contact which in some cases will cause problems.  If a clerk is in Armoury X, processing paperwork on personnel in Armoury X, Armoury Y and Armoury Z, there is sometimes a tendency to concentrate on Armoury X's pers first, and overlook those in Armouries Y and Z.  This has already been a sore point a the Area Level, where taskings for Tours or Call Outs have made their way to 'select' Units; a case of favouritism by pers disseminating the Msgs, leaving some Units with no idea of what Taskings, Tours and even Crses are being loaded.

When you go to a store or bank, do you prefer to talk to a person, or deal with a machine or voice-mail?  Take away the Unit Clerks and Medics and the Administration becomes more ineffective than any 'money cruncher' can predict.  The personal touch is required, and most efficient (in the end), as well as part of Unit cohesion.


----------



## McG

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> This amalgamation thing is very attractive.   Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:
> 
> - 4 x CO
> - 4 x RSM
> - 4 x DCO
> - 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
> 
> ...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ.   Very efficient productivity gain there.   Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ?   What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?


Very few positions would be eliminated.   Instead, many would be moved to where they are more efficient.   The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).


			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> My guess is that after "mission creep" the end-state would look something like this: each former unit, now sub-unit, would have as full-timers a 2I/C, two clerks, a CQMS, and a QMSI.   Tacked onto the normal sub-unit establishment after repeated complaints and position papers would be a few supernumerary officers and NCOs with appointments to deal with all the odds and sods of work that currently must be done.


I'd predict a unit structure more like an engr sqn with an Ops O in each Coy.   The regular officer could be either Ops O or 2ic (depending on the experience level of the local reserve officers).   The QMSI/DSM is a bn level position and would not be established in each sub unit.   However, there would be a CQMS, one clerk and possibly an Ops NCO.


			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> somewhere in each brigade, there would be 2 or 3 or 4 new battle group HQs ("BG North".   "BG South".   "BG Island".   "BG Mainland."   "BG Interior".   Etc).   In short, the entirety of every original unit would still be there, just reduced by one rank across the board for the part-timers, with a net increase in the number of officers and senior NCOs to staff the new HQs.


The greatest benefit would show through increased trg and sp output from the bn HQs.   This structure would produce a greatly increased capacity for collective trg.   The sub units would continue to train their sub-sub units, however the bn HQs would train and validate sub units to operate in a bn context (as opposed the sub-unit trg and validating itself).   It takes a lot of manpower and resources to train a sub unit, and these do not currently exist in reserve units.   The sub unit should have the capacity to train its platoons/troops.   However, during my time in a reserve unit, the SHQ was always too involved in the exercise control to gain anything as part of the trg audience.   This is fixed by splitting off the bn HQ, making it more robust, and giving it responsibility for several sub units. This larger bn also needs a functioning admin element (pl/tp as the minimum, but potentially a coy/sqn) in order to support the higher level of trg that will be conducted.

There would be some efficiencies gained as well.   The battalion would share the secondary duties.   BMQ, SQ, driver, and other courses would become battalion activities (instead of the sub-units burdening themselves with each of these).   


			
				Enfield said:
			
		

> No reserve unit will ever be a real battalion - let alone a multi-battalion regiment - in peacetime. ...
> 
> I'm not arguing for the histories and distinctness of the regiments to be erased. They can be maintained, just as effectively, by a Company


Yes. A multi-regimental battalion that may or may not include both infantry and recce.


			
				Enfield said:
			
		

> Merge the operational and administrative functions of the regiments, so that they become companies and are administered and trained as such by regional battalions. Easy. Knock away the entire command apparatus above company level from each unit, and give those duties to what is now "brigade", and treat a brigade like what it really is, a battalion or battle group. Everything still gets done, but the units will have easier admin, more cohesive and meaningful training, and more bodies available on the parade square. And keep the kilts, marching paces, battle honours, museums, etc.


I would leave the Bde HQs in place in order to train the Bn HQ (or a Bn HQ each year).   The Bde should be able to put together a trg NCE and NSE in order to train a BG in a TF context.   Additionally, I don't think a bn HQ would have the staff resources to deal with the various other formations, higher HQs, and other demands that arise in a bde geographic area.

If done properly, the larger Bn HQs and the continuation of the Bde HQs should allow the reservists to train themselves without drawing on units/sub units of the regular force brigades to act as EXCON (as is typical with the Ex ACTIVE EDGE series).


----------



## TCBF

Re-organization is always attractive to those not being re-organized.  Invariably, more harm than good is done, and any economies made are fleeting.

Want to conserve resources?  Start at NDHQ.


----------



## Brad Sallows

>The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).

I would frankly be surprised if it were not required that each physical location continued to have a representative for the administrative and safety appointments.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> Re-organization is always attractive to those not being re-organized.   Invariably, more harm than good is done, and any economies made are fleeting.
> 
> Want to conserve resources?   Start at NDHQ.


"Re-organization is always bad.  We need to re-organize NDHQ to make things better"

A little contradictory, don't you think?  What is the invariable harm that would come from re-organizing the reserves?  . . . or are you just fear-mongering?


----------



## a_majoor

Reorging and streamlining the headquarters levels would have the _potential_ of saving lots of money and manpower, but is probably best left as a topic for a different thread.


----------



## TCBF

"Re-orging and streamlining the headquarters levels would have the potential of saving lots of money and manpower, but is probably best left as a topic for a different thread."

Noted.

"A little contradictory, don't you think?  What is the invariable harm that would come from re-organizing the reserves?  . . . or are you just fear-mongering?"

Contradictory?  Probably, in that if I think a re-org would hurt the Reserves, I probably shouldn't be wishing it on another org, should I ?

If we re-org to better accomplish our missions - including the traditional ones few people really understand - then yes, a properly fed and funded re-org can work.  But any re-org done to field units simply to save resources invariably costs more than it saves in the long run, and cuts the meat, not the fat.

My earlier posts reflected a stance I once took in a conversation:  "We have a big defence budget, but a tiny military budget" and "Whenever they send civilians from Ottawa out to determine which units get downsized and streamlined, the military should send officers to Ottawa to determine which programs and offices at NDHQ should be downsized and streamlined."

Defence spending is not necessarily military spending.  I don't think I am fear mongering.  The best predictor of future performance is past performance.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> If we re-org to better accomplish our missions - including the traditional ones few people really understand - then yes, a properly fed and funded re-org can work.


Well, good news.  I think this is what we would achieve by going with sub-regional Bn HQs under the existing regional Bde HQs.

More important than any gains in efficiency across the existing units (and there would be some gains) would be the increased capacity of the of the now full bn organizations to conduct and support up to level 4 training.


----------



## TCBF

The money saved in gutting local units to fund a "mega-regional battalion" would;
1. Not save any money.
2. Not put money where you and I want it if it did.

The advantages - if any - would be fleeting, the damage permanent.   T

There is nothing stopping units from banding together and conducting that training now.   Except that someone, somewhere does not want you to do it, and no matter how much money you save them, that will not change it.   Lack of money is an excuse given to not do things someone higher does not want done.   Trust me, if the CF wanted it done, they would do it.   How much does SHARP Trg cost?   How much do all of those MFRCs cost?   How much does the ombudsman cost?   How much did it cost to put me up in Guam for four days?   If they wanted you to to do level four - you would, they don't - so you won't.     Don't flush 100 years of tradition into the outhouse just to see the gleam in the eye of a sycophantic bean counter.   You and your unit will suffer in the end, and you will make nothing beter.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> the money saved in gutting local units to fund a "mega-regional battalion" would;
> 1. Not save any money.
> 2. Not put money where you and I want it if it did.


You are clearly not trying to argue against my proposal (which is not about saving money or shifting money).   The local establishments would not be gutted as most of the full-time capacity would shift to the sub unit level.   Any savings would be small (no RQMS doing the SQMS's job and the sub unit learning the false lesson that regiment will always deliver).



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> If they wanted you to to do level four - you would, they don't - so you won't.


The reserves should be able to do level 4 trg, and that is why the reserves should restructure.

. . . and you still have not defined the damages that you have promised.


----------



## TCBF

You can re-structure until the cows come home, but you won't do level four until they want you to, and it ain't money.

Leave Bn HQs where they are. If you regionalize them, but give the CO's the same responsibilities, and you won't spend time training, you'll spend it commuting, or tele-conferencing, or administeriung, or whatever.

Leave it the way it is.  If they want you to do level for, they will tell you.  If you find money to do level four, they will take it away from you.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> You can re-structure until the cows come home, but you won't do level four until they want you to, and it ain't money.


So, reserves should not restructure because "they" don't want the reserves to train above sub-sub unit (pl & tp) level?

My experiences with the linear reserve chain of command was that the RQ often became the the SQ and that the squadron often had everything delivered/handed to it.  Reserve sub units do not know their own CSS needs when in a BG/Bn context, and they will never know what goes into those requirements unless they start to interact within real Bn structures.  (Granted, the RQ likely knows what is required to support a Coy, but why not just make the RQ the CQ & stop pretending?)

Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?


----------



## Infanteer

TCBF has a point, there is no point to rearranging the deck chairs in the effort to increase efficiency or save a few bucks - the cost of rearranging is usually more in terms of cohesion and physical costs.

However, I am not advocating a rearrangement of the deck chairs, I am proposing that we tear up the deck and rebuild it, because it isn't suited to the realities on the ground - I am in effect arguing for transformation as opposed to reorganization.

A gamble?  Yes - but nobody ever one by preparing for the last war.

I address the issue here:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/30150.new.html#new


----------



## TCBF

"Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?"

Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you?  Just Ex with other units, and take turns.


----------



## a_majoor

TCBF said:
			
		

> "Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?"
> 
> Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you?  Just Ex with other units, and take turns.



The LFRR Phase II idea was to gain efficiency by doing this ALL the time, but without having the other staffs ("take turns") hanging around on the side-lines.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you?  Just Ex with other units, and take turns.


I think you would need to re-org.  For all the superfluous COs, DCOs, RSMs, etc, there are several missing bn pers from all units.  These missing pers are typically the Cpl & MCpl that fill out the RQMS staff, run the regt tpt/pol sect (and are of the same occupation as the msn element), etc.

Unlike the local battalions (which train with multiple sub units maybe 25% of the time and always lack the structure to provide the bn context in which to train any sub unit), the sub-regional battalions would train with all the elements of a unit 100% of the time and it would have the full structure to train sub units in a bn context.


----------



## TCBF

"would train with all the elements of a unit 100% of the time and it would have the full structure to train sub units in a bn context."

For which they would then pull the funds to save money, because they don't want you to do it as much as they want you to do something else.

And you are stuck with a regional Bn no one wants to join or stay in, because it has lost touch with it's roots. You think all of those keen Militia Capt s and Lt s will stay in a unit they can never LOCALLY be CO of?  Or the OR s to RSM?  Why?

It ain't the Org that's broke - it's the people.  You can't fix broken people just by re-orging.  We have very flex and traditional orgs now, best of both worlds.   Fire the losers, and promote people with immagination.

We don't have to re-org every time the cart goes off the track - we just have to provide direction and leadership.  Our present Regt System has stood the test of time - the problem is the current generation of weak leaders.


----------



## pbi

We are well into two projects in this area, under LFRR Ph II. We are tactically grouping our three arty units into a 38 CBG Arty Tac Gp, with one CO and a Gp RSM. The Gp HQ function is centred on one unit, but the staff tasks can be shared around the various HQs. Within a   month, this tactical gp will be complete.   There is one CO for all three units, with FULCOM. He is the boss.

We are also in the process of completing the tac gp of our three Svc Bns. The structure will function in a similar manner.

In both tac gps, the commanders of the subordinated   units (rank of Maj or Capt) will perform as DCOs/OCs/BCs. They will focus on the lvl 1-3 trg and local issues that really represent their major capabilities and concerns. The Gp CO will focus on Gp level issues, such as directing lvl 4 (or higher)   trg, developing and issuing a single Operating Plan for all three units, and acting as the Bde Comd's advisor and "advocate" on Arty or CSS issues. Our Bde Comd will go from trying to deal with 16 COs (incl three OPCON) to 12. There is a travel requirement for the CO and RSM but that is SOP in a Bde that stretches from Thunder Bay to Prince Albert.

The plans were developed starting about seven or eight years ago. In the case of the Arty, there was already a solid basis of joint training to build on. We were able to finally get the plans accepted under LFRR Ph II (after a lot of flak from various "Friends of the Militia" and institutional fear from the Army itself). Our own Res and our Hons bought into it-that was not the problem. It was more the "we must never change the Militia I served in" crowd who caused the problems, all from outside our Bde. We have also had an internal info battle to fight with getting the facts down to the Armoury floor, as opposed to the BS and mess rumours that tend to dominate.

We set some very strict criteria for implementing the plans:

-no reduction in overall unit strength (in fact the aim is to grow the elements to a healthy level);

-no closure of locations (we have, and intend to maintain four CSS locs and five Arty locs);

-no reduction of community footprint;

-no reduction of equipment (except as imposed by WFM, etc) budgets or trg ammo; and

-no reduction or redistribution of FTS (Reg or Res) until we have analyzed what we need (as it is, it has been years since the RCA has been able to fill all of the RegF FTS posns in our Bde).

Of course, this is not amalgamation, although if we can make tac gp work we will achieve some of the same efficiencies. The plan leaves the road open for eventual amalgamation, but only as a possible option and only based on a review of how well tac gp works. This is not likely to happen in the near future for two reasons: the Army wants to see how our projects work out, and the Army is still terrified of the "A-word" where the Res is concerned.
The plan equally leaves the road open to preserve the tac gp or to dismantle it if it no longer serves a purpose. Personally, I hope it works, and I hope that eventually we see our way to a new and stronger Res structure, which does not have dozens of little units squabbling for limited resources and recruits (ie: five units in a city of 100,000 people: suicide), or leadership positions being filled by the "Last Man Standing" promotion system, thus further aggravating attrition by miserable leadership. It would be great if our Bde and Area Comds actually had a range of good candidates to pick from for unit-levewl command and RSM, instead of scraping the bottom of the barrel or doing a retread. (No offense to some of the retreads who step up and do a good job).

Cheers.


----------



## TCBF

Exactly what we need - programs that make our present structure work.  Amalgamation would take a good idea past it's logical conclusion.  Lots of little units give us the ability to flush out or re-role in an emergency. It gives us flexibility at little or no price.  I think we should be opening new units in our new urban areas, and resurecting units we have shut down, with old traditions and new roles.


----------



## pbi

> Lots of little units give us the ability to flush out or re-role in an emergency



Well--based on our experiences, I would not say "lots of little units". Maintaining all these miniature unit structures, in which COs, RSMs and Bn HQ staffs receive very little useful training and experience  at anything above level four because they are enmeshed in sub-unit level activities, doesn't do much for us in the long run. What I would say is a healthy, rational  Res structure with "lots of Reserve presence" is the way to go. The presence can be provided equally well by batteries, coys and squadrons-we do not need a full unit HQ in each location. That presence is IMHO better provided by a functional 90 or 100 mbr sub-unit than a dysfunctional "battalion" of the same size.

Cheers.


----------



## TCBF

I would like the "cadre" concept we presently have to be accepted for what it is.  We have 'little' units because we do not fund the units that could be much larger, and we have put other financial and institutional barriers in the way of military efficiency. 

we have non-trained RHQs because we demand an ever increasing administrative product from them for no noticeable gain.  Military effectiveness is not measured in the volume of e-mails sent, yet that is the sort of activity rewarded and funded by our system. If we got rid of some RHQs to give each unit 8 sub-units each, someone at those sub-units would invariably have to take off wear the disbanded RHQ left off, and start filling the recycle bins to keep the green machine happy. 

I see no benefit to tearing the guts out of a system we have merely because we fail to use it properly.  I don't scrap my car every time it runs out of gas, or needs an oil change.  Simplistic solutions, poorly thought out, executed without a true knowledge of the social institutions of the  Army, merely hide the problem, not solve it.


----------



## pbi

> If we got rid of some RHQs to give each unit 8 sub-units each, someone at those sub-units would invariably have to take off wear the disbanded RHQ left off, and start filling the recycle bins to keep the green machine happy.



No-not necessarily. What you would want to do is restrict the sub-units to looking after sub-unit level things only, plus local community footprint. The majority of the more complex pers admin, budget mgt, etc would be done at the unit HQ where you could concentrate a greater percentage of your full time staff. OC/BCs and their people would be focused on leading the soldiers in their armoury and training to level three. The unit HQ would look after the level four and almost everything else. The Operating Plan, etc would be written and managed from the unit HQ. This is essentially the way the USARNG works, with normally only one or two full time ARNG in outlying sub-units, and the majority of the full time ARNG in the unit HQ. Admittedly they do not train as often as our Res does, but I believe that it can be made to work quite well. I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures.

Cheers.


----------



## TCBF

"I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures."

They maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency.  Odds of that happening soon?  Remote.  But, we don't disband fire departments because we havent't had a fire in a while.

The structure we have now works, if we let it.  Lets sort out the people who don't, first.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

TCBF said:
			
		

> ...we don't disband fire departments because we havent't had a fire in a while.



Yes, but these rural volunteer fire departments are geared and structured to deal with the threat they are most likely to see.   You don't have hypothetical training on using ladder trucks to fight fires in high-rise buildings (ie. how until recently Canadian reserve armoured units were training to fight the Soviet hordes) and within a rural fire department you don't have a command structure that is more suited to that of a fire department that has multiple units/stations, etc. (ie. how a regiment that can only field a sub-unit of company minus size has a full battalion headquarters and headquarters company command element).

As pbi noted, the issue of disbanding units wasn't a concern.   Quite the opposite, the growth of sub-units and specialty units is something that is a goal.   However, streamlining an antiquated, redundant and inefficient regimental hierarchy is something that needs to be addressed.


----------



## pbi

TCBF said:
			
		

> "I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures."
> 
> They maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency.   Odds of that happening soon?   Remote.   But, we don't disband fire departments because we havhaven'td a fire in a while.
> 
> The structure we have now works, if we let it.   Lets sort out the people who don't, first.



TCBF: One of the specific points in our tactical grouping process (and one which would be largely respected should amalgamation eventually occur) is that there is to be no reduction in community footprint. We also specified that there was to be no impact on unit heritage or identity. However, if we were to go to amalgamation, we could still probably respect heritage and identity. I would use the Volunteer battalions of the British Army (TA) as a very good example. Some time ago the Brits found that they could not sustain a large number of little "battalions" each parading only about a coy or two of soldiers, and having great difficulty generating suitable COs and RSMs. So, they engaged in a series of amalgamations. Instead of four understrength little battalions, with four miniature command structures, a single battalion exists, but with each company carrying the parenthetic traditional title after the coy designator.   So, instead of the decrepit and non-effective "Duke of Numptyshire's Light Infantry" you might have " B Coy/Fourth (Volunteer) Battalion The Light Infantry (The Duke of Numptyshire's Light Infantry)". The sub-unit (IIRC) preserves as much of its heritage as is compatible with the new structure, and keeps its ties to its former communities. But, instead of a hopelessly undermanned and ineffective "battalion", they have a properly manned and much more effective company, and a much broader and more competitive base from which to select COs and RSMs. This, IMHO, is the way we should go. We could strengthen our actual (as opposed to our imaginary...) capabilities, reduce unneeded and largely unsustainable command structure, introduce healthy competition and selectivity into succession for CO and RSM, but preserve much of what is good about our Reserve system. If we compare the Army Reserve to a tree, sometimes it is necessary to prune the branches in order to keep the trunk and the roots strong. A simplistic analogy, I know, but it gets my point across. And, I think, you might find an increasing number of Res soldiers who believe this too.

Cheers.


----------



## TCBF

I agree with the logic both you and Matt have presented.  I think it just may end up going a notch to far.  We have understrength units because they have been given an artificially low strength and man-day ceiling, no funds for unit collective trg, and no command or tactical framework in which to function as a unit, even if they were at full strength.  We have mini-regts because we want them that way, not because of a failure in the regimental system. If we wanted them to be full strength functioning units they would be, but we (Canada) do not.

Simply restrict each present regt to company size, and add a few extra to do 'Local' and away you go.  The kit/accoutrements/tradition aspect of it is a minor administrative price to pay, and cheap dollar wise.  The sub units can function as 'primary role is to provide a lt inf coy trained to level(?), as B Coy, Manitoba Inf Rdy Bn' or some such.  Then, if we decide we need an NBCD Coy, that Regt could raise a second Coy.  Need a CIMIC Coy?  Another Regt gets to raise it.  A building block approach.

Ammalgamation saves no money and reduces flexibility.

In the early 1980s, before we started building up for Lahr, the 8CH(PL) in Petawawa was established at 327 all ranks, and manned at 229.

A few years later, in Lahr, we were at 528, all ranks.  We did it by lifting the restrictions imposed on our structure when we needed to.  That's how the system works.

I think of this as an aquarium.  We have had the water mostly taken out, and the remaining fish are doing poorly.  Do we just add water?  Or buy a dog instead, because the aquarium is obviosly failing due to it's antiquated structure?

Tom


----------



## Infanteer

I doubt, with the limited obligation required of our reservists, that a unit that was a "full strength" battalion would actually be one - I remember my Mo unit, at just over 200 boots, could put a platoon or two on the parade square or the field.


----------



## pbi

TCBF: your mistrust of "good ideas" about Reserve restructure is fully understandable and well-founded. The history of inflicting "good ideas" on the Army Reserve has, unfortunately, often demonstrated that they were not good ideas at all but were actually poorly thought out and harmful. To a great extent, this was (IMHO) due to the imposition of these "good ideas" on the Res with very little understanding of, or input from, the Class A Reserve world. Too often they were dreamed up either solely by Regulars or by a few "token" Reservists who typically had spent years on Class B and C away from the armoury floor and knew not whereof they spoke. These measures were regarded with suspicion and fear by the Res and to a great exent I think were the fuel for groups such as Reserve 2000, etc.

I can see plainly that although we are not fully out of the woods yet, that environment has changed. The role, involvement and voice of Res leadership within the Army (as opposed to standing out on the institutional sidewalk carping) is far, far beyond where it was when I joined the Militia in 1974, or even when I left it in 1982. I believe that this provides certain checks and balances to help guard against excesses such as "Snakes and Ladders", "Op Tasking", "10/90", etc, etc.

Further, it is important that these initiatives be guided by the CLS Intent, but developed by Reservists. This is definitely the case for our two Tac Gp initiatives in 38 CBG. The only RegF person intimately involved in the process was me, in a staff  capacity as "scribe" for the proposals. The development and implementation, and the conduct of the info operations to support the implementation, are wholly Reserve, supported by Honoraries. In fact, in a number of our locations there has been talk for some years of going beyonf tac gp to amalgamation: these Res do see the point of it, and certain advantages.

You are probably correct that in absolute terms, amalgamation would not save much money: only six or eight senior posns per Branch per CBG, which overall is not huge $$ in Class A terms. There is a very important advantage to tac gp and amalgamation: they reduce the pressure to source an inordinate number of COs and RSMs, which is a perennial problem, at least in our Bde. Only a small percentage of the soldiers in the unit have the drive, time and qualities to be good COs and RSMs (the same is largely true in the Reg Army...), but as things stand now we must constantly dip well below the quality line just to fill these slots. I have seen clearly what the results of this can be on a Res unit: disastrous. Reservists come to the unit after a day at work or in school because they are motivated to do so. One of the greatest single motivators is the quality of leadership that they receive that keeps them coming back. If you have filled your senior positions (assuming that you can even fill them...) with the "last men standing", you will probably not get this leadership.



> Simply restrict each present regt to company size, and add a few extra to do 'Local' and away you go.  The kit/accoutrements/tradition aspect of it is a minor administrative price to pay, and cheap dollar wise.  The sub units can function as 'primary role is to provide a lt inf coy trained to level(?), as B Coy, Manitoba Inf Rdy Bn' or some such.  Then, if we decide we need an NBCD Coy, that Regt could raise a second Coy.  Need a CIMIC Coy?  Another Regt gets to raise it.  A building block approach.



This is almost exactly what exists now, across the Army, if we speak in absolute numbers (ie: a subunit should be 100-200 pers) vice apparent structural size: a "battalion" with one or more "mission elements". There is no institutional desire to make the Res smaller: quite the opposite. At the moment, and for the last few months, our recruiting limits have been lifted and we are doing very well in some locations, not so well in others, but overall we are showing progress.

Cheers.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I enter this thread at my peril but here I go anyway.  I served in an Armoured unit in the Reserves from 1989 to 1996.  When I joined we had A Sqn, C Sqn, HQ Sqn and RHQ.  My first Tp had twelve people on the nominal roll, but five were NES and had been so for a year prior to being in my Tp.  They were, in effect, paper soldiers.  On exercise my Tp would be lucky to muster three Iltis and six soldiers, including me.  We were spread so thin that my Tp WO had to drive his own Iltis (with a GMT soldier in the jeep with him).  This extended across the Regiment.  

Several years later the Warrior program and Combat Readiness Evalutions came along like a hurricane.  As we recovered from the Warrior run we were given the warning that we would be evaluated as a Cougar Sqn in a tactical setting in a couple of months.  I sat down with the Ops WO (I was now a Lt on Class B) and started to fill the TO&E for a Sqn to include three Troops, SHQ and an A1 echelon.  By collapsing all three Sqns into one we could field a proper Sqn without any NES troopers filling slots.  The CO took a look at our proposal and we went with it.  We re-organinzed into B Sqn which was split between two locations. There was some grumbling at first but the Sqn worked well and it showed during the evaluation.  In my fourth and last year as Tp Ldr in the reserves I had a full Troop (four crews) who were there for every training event.  I had one factory worker for whom we were flexible about parade nights but he made every exercise and gun camp.  I might end up out on a limb here, but I do think that MGen Vernon transformed the militia in LFCA for the better.  

I think that there is definately merit in having Reserve units focus on fielding one good sub-unit rather than trying to maintain the pretense of a unit.  Perhaps we turn the CBG HQs into Unit HQs and draw the command staff from the units.  It will take some jiggery for the different combat arms units but it could certainly be done.  I worked with a USMC Reserve Battalion and I was impressed with their structure.  It was an honest to goodness Battalion that we would call a Brigade.  It had a large footprint but good cohesion.

I think that some form of tactical grouping is the the way to go.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Infanteer

2Bravo said:
			
		

> I think that some form of tactical grouping is the the way to go.



...hence my proposal a few pages ago that advocated just this organization.

The more you post, the more I like you 2B....


----------



## TCBF

PBI, Infanteer, and 2B: 

 You have converted me from radically opposed to cautiosly optomistic.  I would, however, guard against a 'good' plan being adopted, approved, and contorted so that the un-doing gets undone, but the doing never gets done, if you gets my meanin'.

The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.  Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.  I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.  Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.  Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?  A company each from many units?  I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...

If we HAD to amalgamate, I think it might be best to reduce to nil strength the other affected units, rather than amalgamate them.  That would allow an expansion later.  

Is Sam Hughes laughing in his grave?

Tom


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.   Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.   I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.   Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.   Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?   A company each from many units?   I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...


This is what is suggested.  A battalion with multiple regiments grouped within it as companies (or possibly even as platoons).  

However, I am still not convinced that we could down-grade all the CBGs to battalions.  Within the Ontario CBGs, I think new groupings would see two to three battalions within each of the existing CBGs.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

My experience with the Reserves in LFCA is getting somewhat dated, but 3 to 4 Infantry Battalions, a Recce Regt, an Arty Regt and a Svc Bn seems about right based on what comes out to the annual exercises.  For the non-infantry units this would admittedly mean a wide geographic dispersion.  

This has been stated before, but have one CO/RSM for each tactical grouping and the other "units" have Majs/MWOs in addition to their sub-unit leadership to run the garrison aspects of each armoury.  We'd keep the RSS and daystaff at the armoury locations.  Have one Reserve Bde HQ per Area.  Perhaps the whole LFA concept needs to be looked at as well.  

My next thought is perhaps a little controversial.  I was never very impressed with what we got out of "training" nights.  I might have been warped by my exposure to a USMC reserve battalion but they just had weekends.  This meant that people could travel long distances to keep active.  Some even flew.  If applied to our system, the CO and RSM would not have to live in the same city as the HQ.  Units would have one training weekend a month (which would hopefully be in the field or on the ranges).  The unit day staffs would need to be intimately involved in planning these exercises, but my own experience was just that.  This would also mean that specialists would not need a local unit to join (they could belong to some holding unit in Toronto, Halifax etc).  It would certainly hamper mess life.  

The USMC Reserve battalion that I trained with did not have a mess per se.  They did have an annual mess dinner.  They had an annual training calendar published in advance and they stuck to it.  They also went for annual two week exercises in places like the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre in Bridgeport, Bn combined arms live fire training at 29 Palms, amphib training at San Diego and even winter warfare in Norway.  They also deployed as a Battalion for six months during GW I (and probably places since).  The last part would need some legislation to enact in Canada, but the rest is within our power for our Reserves if we ruthlessly prioritize.  

Cheers,

2B


----------



## pbi

2B:  Because of the very dispersed geography in our Bde (Thunder Bay ON  to Prince Albert SK) we deal with long commutes to units on a pretty regular basis.We have two units that went to parading on weekends for the very reason you mentioned, with only key staff in during weeknights. It is a great way to let a unit (especially in a smaller centre) recruit from a "wide" recruiting area when a "deep" one (like the GTA or Lower Mainland) is not available. It also allows key appointments to come from a wider area.  I think the main reason that it hasn't caught on more in our Bde is just a culture shift issue.

In both our Arty Tac Gp and our CSS Tac Gps, the Gp CO and RSM will be selected from across all three units. They will be "mobile", focusing on "unit"(ie: Group)-level issues and dealing with Bde, while the "DCOs/OCs" in each location will provide local leadership and focus on issues at Lvl 4 and below.

We are not imposing a new level of command-there is still only one level between the btys/coys and the Bde-it is just that now people can focus where they should, instead of having COs and RSMs mired in minutiae.

Cheers.


----------



## RCA

The Arty tactical grouping is simply formally putting in place what was informal before. Instead of 3 CO's informally agreeing to certain aspects of training, it will have 1 CO calling the shots. Moving to weekend trg also made better use of trg time. Being Artillery, we have to trg at Bty level or greater, just by our nature, so grouping the guns was a logical step. As well lineage is with Battery so indiv Regt identity isn't as great an issue.

 The biggest impediments are resistance to change and Regimenatal turf. Before moving ahead these must be overcome, sometimes by strong direction. Some people fight change for the sake of fighting change as opposed to seeing the logic of the matter. Group together or wither on the vine. I see the armoured already moving in this direction (within 38 CBG), but the infantry barley talk to one another.

  As for the way ahead,the Tac Group will be moving into uncharted terroitry because it is the first, but I can say regarless of the nay-sayers, it will never go back to the staus quo.


----------



## McG

What is the general opinion on the scale of these "tactical groupings"?  I tend to think that the existing CBGs should be left in place with the component regiments grouped into fewer battalions.  Others seem to believe that the CBGs themselves should be down graded to Bn size.  A potential middle ground might see the number of CBGs reduced and new Bn groupings being formed inside of these (as an example, Ontario and Quebec could each be reduced to two CBGs of multi-regimental battalions).  I'm particularly intrested in thoughts from some of the others that have spent any time in a CBGHQ.


----------



## pbi

I will give you my perspective as COS of a Res CBG after three years on the job. We are somewhat different from other CBGs in some ways, so my perspective may be unique. 

It really varies from Bde to Bde, as well as on the circumstances in each Bde. Some CBGs do not need to make this move, and not evey unit necessarily needs to be tac gp. However, in our case, as RCA posted, we had a long history with the Gunners in our Bde so it has been a "natural" move for them. The CSS have not trained together as much, but they have been discussing tac gp/amalgamation for several years now, and they have similar concerns to the Arty. Their tac gp will require a bit more work, but we will have the Arty model  to build on. Tac gp for the Armoured Recce and the Inf hasn't really been looked at yet. We have an interesting form of "tac gp" with our new "38 CBG Fd Engr Sqn": it is being raised inside the FGH in what we call the "incubator option".

At present in 38 CBG we see no need to go beyond Branch-level groupings to a single Tac Gp instead of a CBG: that would be a bit premature IMHO.

As far as the continued existence of the CBGs vice going to a "mega-Tac Gp" or "BG" HQ, I think that while that is certainly possible, CBGs have continued usefulness for three reasons:

-they provide the first level in the Army Res at which there is truly adequate full time trained staff horsepower to plan, develop and coordinate to the degree now required in our Army Res. This horsepower simply does not exist at Res units at present;

-the increasing involvement of the Army Res in Dom Ops (a fully appropriate and necessary move that I support 110%) requires a strong regional command and control capability, as well as the ability to generate forces locally at short notice while maintaining a comprehensive liaison footprint. The Res CBGs are naturals for this, as LFCA recognized some time ago and LFWA is now recognizing under CONPLAN PORTAL; and

-the Res CBG offers a transition point for Res leaders (both offrs and CWOs) from the somewhat narrow "four walls of the Armoury" view of life that tends to prevail at unit level, to the much broader concerns, needs and priorities at CBG, Area and Army levels. I have watched with interest as the eyes of some Class A folks widen as they enter "the Dark Side" and see how big a waterfront the Bde Comd, BRSM and staff cover, how many issues are on the burner, and that the particular private concerns of their own home units are actually NOT the be-all and end-all of the Bde's existence. By encouraging our Class Bs and our Class A's to stay active with their parent units as much as possible, we provide an interchange between the two levels. The issue to me is not just "more braid for the boys": but one of educating and developing our Res ldrs.

Could we get rid of CBG HQs? Yes, probably we could, But, I suggest that we think carefully before doing so, and ensure that whatever we replace them with provides the same positive effects.

Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

Another way of forcing the move to Tac Groups is the evolution of "task force" structures to deal with the confused securety environment of a "three block war" AKA "full spectrum ops". In LFCA we should start seeing some movement in 06 when the summer concentration changes to reflect "Full Spectrum Ops".

Although I have not seen any official direction, my guess is the composite LIB, AAR, FLG and Artillery formations we have been creating for training purposes will morph into one or two Task Force HQs, which may be Infantry heavy, but have elements of all the arms and services integral to its operation. Since we already stand up and train with the composite formations during the training year, raising a Task Force HQ and training with a composite Task Force during the training year is not a big change.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

While I am getting a couple of echelons above my comfort level, I think that a good structure would have four or five Reseve Brigade Groups HQs across the country, each with four or five composite units in them.  The unit and bde HQs would be commanded by reservists but have a heavy infusion of Reg F staff to manage day to day operations. 

We may find that the reserve voice in the army actually strengthens.  There would be twenty or so COs and four or five Comds.  They would actually have units and bdes under them.

One lower level question is whether to have combined arms "unit groups" or keep pure units.  There are advantages and disadvantages to both. 

Cheers


----------



## TCBF

So, we keep a 'social' structure - with all of it's advantages - as we have it now, but train and exercise in a quasi 'mobilization' structure: tac groupings - with all of it's advantages.  Yes?


----------



## Horse_Soldier

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Another way of forcing the move to Tac Groups is the evolution of "task force" structures to deal with the confused securety environment of a "three block war" AKA "full spectrum ops". In LFCA we should start seeing some movement in 06 when the summer concentration changes to reflect "Full Spectrum Ops".
> 
> Although I have not seen any official direction, my guess is the composite LIB, AAR, FLG and Artillery formations we have been creating for training purposes will morph into one or two Task Force HQs, which may be Infantry heavy, but have elements of all the arms and services integral to its operation. Since we already stand up and train with the composite formations during the training year, raising a Task Force HQ and training with a composite Task Force during the training year is not a big change.


LFQA milcon this summer is going to run on a TF basis, with each of 34 and 35 Bde forming an all arms TF (heavy on inf).  Should be interesting.


----------



## old medic

TCBF said:
			
		

> The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.  Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.  I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.  Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.  Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?  A company each from many units?  I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...
> 
> Is Sam Hughes laughing in his grave?
> 
> Tom



Tom, It was very short lived, but your thinking about 27 CIBG, the PANDA brigade for NATO.

I don't know if he's laughing, but it is amusing that M.D.10 (now 38 CBG) did have a Field Artillery HQ to direct it's then 7 artillery
units. Everything old is new again.

OM


----------



## Rifleman62

It was only a matter of time, and the time is now. The Army Reserve needs transformation. We have far too many Reserve units that cannot be sustained. Too many Reserve units that cannot sustain leadership at all levels, especially at the MWO/CWO and Maj/LCol ranks. Unit sucession is difficult. Too many units with less than 75 effective personnel that have a CO, DCO, Adjt, RSM, Trg O, Orderly Room, Unit QM, etc. How many bayonets does that leave? Do we need all this unit infrastructure that we cannot sustain? Our Reserve units have not fought as a unit for over 60 years, and never will ( mobilization is dead, therefore the theory of why we need so many units is dead).In our CBG we have the following in a city of less than 115,000: a Nav Res stone frigrate; an Army Res Inf Bn and Svc Bn; a Coms Res Sqn; and a CFMG Fd Amb.The local area cannot sustain this many units, nor produce the senior leadership. We need to tacticaly group units, and in some cases all the P Res units in location. Why not a LCol or Cdr commanding all five of these units, with one OR, and a  Navy and Army Trg O's.  Sure cuts down on the infransture.  Sure sounds familiar.



Project Management Office
Land Force Reserve Restructure
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON 	K1A 0K2
	Bureau de Gestion de projet de la
Restructuration de la réserve de la force terrestre
101, promenade Colonel By
Ottawa (ON) 	K1A 0K2
1901-6 (PD LFRR)
	1901-6 (DP RRFT)
24 Jun 05
	Le 24 jun 2005
Distribution List
	Liste de distribution
WARNING ORDER
	ORDRE D'AVERTISSEMENT
SITUATION
	SITUATION
1.  	The current Army Reserve Establishment (ARE) dates back to its implementation date of 1 Apr 00 and provides for 25,585 positions in the Human Resources Management System (HRMS). They were developed through a two-year consultative process and are based on the recommendations of the LFRR task forces, which were reviewed by the LFRR Structure Working Group and Command Consultative Working Group. It has received annual incremental changes through the Army Reserve Working Group (AResWG) and Army Reserve Advisory Group (AResAG) but has not been subject to a fundamental review since its inception.
	1.  	 Le TÉRAT actuel remonte ÃƒÂ  sa mise en Ã…â€œuvre du premier avril 2000 et fournissent 25,585 positions dans le Système de gestion des ressources humaines (SGRH).  Ces tableaux ont été développés suite ÃƒÂ  une consultation étendue sur deux ans, ainsi que sur les recommandations du comité d'étude de la RRFT, et ont été révisés par le groupe de travail sur la structure RRFT et le groupe de travail de consultation du Commandement.  Certains changements annuels ont été implantés ÃƒÂ  travers le groupe de travail de la Réserve de l'Armée (GT RésA) et le groupe consultatif de la Réserve de l'Armée (GC RésA), mais n'ont jamais subi une révision fondamentale depuis leur création.

2.  	With the announcement of the Federal Budget 05 and the Defence Policy Statement we know that the intended strength of the Army Reserve for the foreseeable future is 18,500 soldiers. Of this number, 1,100 are allocated to the Medical Reserve (MedRes) and a further 100 are planned to be filled by the Communications Reserve (CommRes) to provide balanced support to a larger Army Reserve.
	2.  	Avec l'annonce du budget fédéral 2005 et la déclaration sur la politique de la Défense nous savons que l'effectif envisagé dans le futur immédiat pour la Réserve de l'Armée est de 18,500 soldats.  De ce nombre, 1000 positions sont octroyées ÃƒÂ  la Réserve Médicale (RésMéd), et nous planifions d'octroyer 100 positions ÃƒÂ  la Réserve des communications (Rés Comms) afin qu'il nous fournisse un soutien proportionnel ÃƒÂ  la grandeur de la  Réserve de l'Armée.

3.  	The Army Regeneration Plan, the Managed Readiness Plan, and CF Transformation are placing demands on the Army Reserve, the full extent of which is not yet known in sufficient detail.
	3.  	Le plan de regénération de l'Armée, le plan de gestion des niveaux de préparation, et le plan de transformation des FC exercent des demandes sur la Réserve de l'Armée dont les détails restent ÃƒÂ  être précisés.

AIM
	BUT
4.  	The aim of the ARE Review is to ensure that the Army Reserve establishment reflects the best mix of units and mission element types, and locations to force generate Reservists to fulfill the Army Reserve role.
	4.  	Le but cette révision des TÉRATs est de s'assurer que les établissements de la Réserve de l'Armée reflètent le meilleur mélange d'unités, de type d'éléments de mission et d'emplacement afin de générer suffisamment de réservistes pour remplir le rôle de la Réserve de l'Armée.

METHODOLOGY
	MÉTHODOLOGIE
5.  	The review will be conducted on two parallel tracks, the results of each being brought together to produce the revised ARE:
	5.  	La révision prendra deux avenues parallèles.  Le résultat de chacune sera combiné ÃƒÂ  l'autre afin de produire des TÉRATs révisés.
a.	Track 1. An analysis of defence policy documents will provide a precise measure of the CF expectations of the ARE. All Army Reserve roles and tasks must be considered including:
	a.	Première avenue.  Une analyse des documents contenant la politique de la Défense fournira une mesure précise des attentes des FC envers les TÉRATs.  Toutes les tâches de la Réserve de l'Armée doivent être considérées, comprenant :

i.	framework for mobilization;	i.	cadre de la mobilisation;
ii.	connect with Canadians;	ii.	créer un lien avec les canadiens
iii.	expeditionary operations;	iii.	opérations expéditionnaires;
iv.	domestic operations;	iv.	opérations domestiques;
v.	institutional Army Reserve (to include HQs, training, administration, etc); and
	v.	la Réserve de l'Armée institutionnelle (comprenant les QG, l'instruction, l'administration, etc); et

b.	Track 2. An analysis of existing units and mission elements, along with an understanding of where Canadians are best prepared to support Army Reserve units, will help to determine where Army Reserve units and mission elements should best be located.
	b.	Deuxième avenue.  Une analyse des unités et éléments de mission existantes, avec la compréhension des emplacements ou les canadiens sont prêts ÃƒÂ  soutenir une unité de la Réserve de l'Armée, afin d'aider ÃƒÂ  déterminer les meilleurs endroits ou les éléments de mission et unités de la Réserve de l'Armée devraient être situées.

6.  	With respect to Track 1, stakeholders will assist in ensuring that the task list is complete. With respect to Track 2, stakeholders will contribute to determining the criteria from which we can best understand the suitability of a location to sustain an Army Reserve unit/mission element. Criteria to be applied must be objective and verifiable by all concerned.
	6.  	Dans le cadre de la première avenue, les parties intéressées sont sollicitées afin de s'assurer que les listes des tâches sont complètes.  Quant ÃƒÂ  la deuxième avenue, nous sollicitons la participation des parties intéressées afin de déterminer les critères par lesquels l'efficacité des sites ÃƒÂ  soutenir un élément de mission/unité de la Réserve de l'Armée sera jugé.  Les critères sélectionnés devront être objectifs et vérifiables par tous.

CONCLUSION
	CONCLUSION
7.  	There is no need to reply to this message. This message will be followed, in Jul 05, with a draft directive detailing how the Review will be conducted. All stakeholders will have the opportunity to comment on the methodology and criteria of the Review. It is my intent to table a draft report of the completed ARE review at the 26 Nov 05 CCAG along with deduced recommendations for how to apply the remaining 1500 positions of unallocated LFRR growth (Ph 2c & 2d). The final report recommending the new ARE to CLS should be tabled at the Mar 06 CCAG. Once reviewed, we can expect that the revised ARE will be subjected to further periodic reviews at an interval (3-5 years?) as determined by CLS.
	7.  	Aucun besoin de répondre ÃƒÂ  ce message, car ce message sera suivi, en juil 05, par une ébauche d'une directive déterminant comment la révision sera effectuée.  Toutes les parties intéressées auront l'occasion de commenter sur la méthodologie et les critères utilisés pour la révision.  C'est mon intention d'avoir une ébauche de la révision des TÉRATs complétée pour le GCC du 26 nov 05, ainsi que les recommandations déduites pour la détermination des 1500 positions de croissance RRFT (Ph 2c & 2d) non attribuées.  Le rapport final recommandant les nouveaux TÉRATs au CÉMAT devra être complété pour le GCC de mars 06.  Une fois examiné, nous pouvons anticiper que les TÉRATs révisés seront réviser périodiquement ÃƒÂ  un intervalle (3 ÃƒÂ  5 ans) déterminé par le CÉMAT.

O.S.B.
E.S. Fitch
Major General 
Project Manager
Land Force Reserve Restructure

Distribution List

CLS
ACLS
DGLS
DGLandRes
LFA//Comd//DComd//COS
LFDTS Kingston//Comd//COS
Land Staff Directors
Council of Honourary Colonels
Reserves 2000

INFO

DGSP
CBG//Comd	CÉMAT
ACÉMAT
DGÉMAT
DG Rés FT  
SFT// Comdt//CmdtA//CÉM
SDIFT Kingston//Cmdt//CÉM
Directeurs EMAT
Conseil des Colonels Honoraires
Réserves 2000

INFO

DGPS
GBC//Comdt


----------



## Michael Shannon

The vast majority of good training militia soldiers get comes on Class B & C opportunities when the resources, personnel and time are available. Class A is usually a waste of time and drives away successful people who don't have time or the patience to be at the armoury two or three days a week. Since the CF has no intention of creating effective reserve units such as the US Army National Guard has we might as well face up to it and make it as good an individual force generator as possible. 

The Plan

   There are no units as such. There is no Class A service. Individuals join the reserve and are assigned to a trade with available training slots. They undergo intensive training centrally. For example all officer training is "RESO", in this system you don't need a mess sec or CLO. Training "for the armoury floor" is dead. 

   Everyone is assigned to a Reserve Centre. This HQ administers the member, conducts bounty training (see below) and sources training and employment opportunities. A centre has no part time rank structure. The staff report to area HQs. Area Battle Schools for junior officers and NCMs are held regularly for each trade. i.e The infantry would get together for three battle schools annually: Winter, Spring and Fall. The emphasis in all would be battle fitness, patrolling and weapons training for 2 weeks. Everyone must attend one battle school annually. Senior officers could attend two week long TEWT/CPXs annually. The centre maintains a web site to keep everyone updated.  Reserve soldiers apart from bounties are only paid Class C. 

Promotions are based on qualification (on the same courses as regulars), time in rank, successful attendance at the last two bounty weekends, employment in current rank at four battle schools and recommendation by the OIC Reserve Centre. Operational tours in trade could be substituted for the battles schools. The rank structure would be very flat. Senior Officers would be rare.

  What happens during a domestic disaster and the reserve is called out? The same as happens now. Everyone gets together to see who has showed up and the senior man takes control and we try to get to the disaster in rented buses and pickups. The new name for this ad hoc system is called forming a "task force". 

   The reserve is going nowhere if something drastic isn't done to raise the quality of training of it's members. Leadership training and physical standards must be the same as the regulars (which are already low).

     Worrying about footprint in the community, battle honours, the band and mess functions and who's going to command the "Regiment" that's actually 20 good troops, 10 befuddled recruits and 60 hangers on will only lead to more decay. Combine the ludicrous notion of maintaining the structure of 10 brigades with virtually no access to modern AFVs and the failure of being able to hold part timers to any fitness standard and it adds up to a joke.




   * Bounty training: each trained member of the reserve must report to a training area for 1 weekend in May and October annually. They go through a DAG, fire the PWT for rifle, LMG and pistol, TOETs on the other weapons, run the "new army fitness test" (see below) and have a first aid refresher. They are paid a bounty of $ 300 for the weekend and a bounty of $ 1000 for shooting marksman on the rifle and another $1000 for passing the fitness test and scoring in the top 25 percentile on the fitness test march. Tuition assistance is based on attendance at both bounty weekends and a battle school.

    * The New Army Fitness Test: 13 km carrying 35 Kgs of weapon and rucksack in 2 hours and 28 minutes. 100m firemans carry, 40 m sprint in fighting order with rifle in 12 seconds. Unassisted climb over a 2 m wall. This fitness test is designed to discourage the physically inactive from being in the army.


----------



## old medic

There is already 20 pages worth of debate on this issue here:


The Reserve Force Regimental System (Restructure & Merger)
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713.0.html

Reserve Restructure Information on the Web
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/14202.0.html

Reserve Restructure
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/21338.0.html

<This, and the above 2 posts merged in from another thread.>


----------



## pbi

Old Medic: thanks for pointing that out.Alot of electrons have been spilled on this already.

Michael Shannon: I'm just wondering how current and intimate your knowledge of the Army Res is-you seem to have an unrelentingly negative impression. Your profile doesn't give us much indication as to what knowledge base you speak from. There are certainly a number of weaknesses in our Res, but I can hardly imagine that the "slash and burn" approach you advocate, such as was applied to the Militia in the 1960s, would achieve much. Change is required, but throwing out the baby with the bathwater has been too often the Canadian way.

Cheers.


----------



## McG

Michael,
Your proposal seems (as I understand it) to eliminate the PRes (by rolling it into a Sup Res) and then establishing mandatory annual trg for the Sup Res.  Sup Res mbrs would belong to a regional HQ, attend an MLOC weekend twice a year, and attend summer courses.  Does that about sum-up your vision?



			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> * Bounty training: each trained member of the reserve must report to a training area for 1 weekend in May and October annually. They go through a DAG, fire the PWT for rifle, LMG and pistol, TOETs on the other weapons, run the "new army fitness test" (see below) and have a first aid refresher. They are paid a bounty of $ 300 for the weekend and a bounty of $ 1000 for shooting marksman on the rifle and another $1000 for passing the fitness test and scoring in the top 25 percentile on the fitness test march. Tuition assistance is based on attendance at both bounty weekends and a battle school.


Where do you see reservists maintaining all the other essential soldier skills?  Would there still be weekend exercises?


----------



## Michael Shannon

It's a bit beyond a Sup Res because it requires quite a bit from the individual. My proposal is that if the "unit" is simply an individual force generator then the reserve should be optimized for individual augmentation. We should reinforce success: operational tours, battle schools and courses and minimize the drag: non deployable personnel, unnecessary HQs and elements. 

    I actually know quite a bit about the reserves and over many years have seen no real movement to reform. There is simply no will to organize the militia into cohesive units capable of carrying out independent missions. That requires the ability to involuntarily mobilize units. It requires access to first line vehicles and equipment. It requires a massive training outlay to catch up on years of neglect. 

   After nearly 10 years of LFFR the unit I'm most familiar with has 50% fewer troops and trains less often and less intensively than it did before LFFR started. Things are getter worse not better despite the extra money spent.

   I suppose there is another future for the militia; creation of large units and assignment of home defense roles. Second responders to radiological attack or natural disasters etc. Sort of a part time fire department/ medical clinic/ grocery store. Who knows maybe a lot of people would like to part of a homeland defence force.


----------



## Infanteer

Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> I suppose there is another future for the militia; creation of large units and assignment of home defense roles. Second responders to radiological attack or natural disasters etc. Sort of a part time fire department/ medical clinic/ grocery store. Who knows maybe a lot of people would like to part of a homeland defence force.



Didn't they try that in the '50's with the end result being a huge flop, driving all the WWII/Korean War vets away?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Didn't they try that in the '50's with the end result being a huge flop, driving all the WWII/Korean War vets away?



_Ooooohmigawd!_  National survival!  <makes signs to ward off _evil eye_, etc>


----------



## pbi

Michael Shannon: The last part of your post tends more towards what I see as the best course of action: preservation of the unit construct, for all of the benefits that it provides(and there are many), while reducing unsustainable command structure as Rifleman has suggested. Rifleman is very familiar with this concept because in 38 CBG we have already tactically grouped our Arty units under one CO, and are in the process of doing the same for our Service battalions. While our plans specifically state that amalgamation is only a possible option and not a guaranteed outcome, I see it as the best COA in some cases. I have believed this (as did many of my Res peers) since I was a Militia soldier in Toronto back in the '70s and '80s. Amalgamation, if intelligently done, allows us to keep the same presence in our communities, to keep (or even increase) our level of capabiity and strength, and to provide more unity of leadership. Unit traditions and heritage need not be destroyed (see the UK TA approach to this-they amalgamate as often as they change their socks) It also allows us to be more selective as to who will occupy the positions of CO or RSM, as opposed to searching desperately for names to put in the unit succession list, or resorting to other measures that unfortunately tend to result in attrition as a result of poor leadership. Done in a stupid, callous or ill-informed way (as many Res people fear it would be) it would be destructive and disruptive.

Cheers


----------



## Rifleman62

THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Monday, June 6, 2005

This was posted today on the Committee's website. The Chief of Reserves and Cadets was giving evidence.

http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/42484-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76


----------



## Rifleman62

This evidence also has considerable info on housing and PLD.


----------



## linus

home defence


----------



## Edward Campbell

This is from today's _National Post_.

http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/issuesideas/story.html?id=923b66b1-8549-4af7-ba69-a28b6246e336 


> What if it happened here?
> 
> Thomas S. Axworthy
> 
> National Post
> 
> Friday, October 14, 2005
> 
> Saturday's terrible earthquake in Pakistan once again demonstrated the massive destructive power of natural disasters. The same was true of Hurricane Katrina. In that case, the breakdown of law and order equally demonstrated the perniciousness of human nature.
> 
> Order -- the maintenance of rules to prevent anarchy -- is the starting point of civilization. Freedom is not free. It depends on human tolerance and responsibility, and when these collapse, as they did in New Orleans -- with lawless gangs looting and shooting at police -- the state must restore order before it can do anything else. Indeed, the city began to recover only once the National Guard and the regular U.S. military finally arrived.
> 
> George W. Bush belatedly recognized the role of the military in emergency preparedness by appointing an admiral to replace the disgraced head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency as federal co-ordinator in New Orleans. He also recently mused about the potential need for thousands of troops to quarantine regions of the United States that might be hit by Avian Flu.
> 
> What can Canada learn from Katrina and South Asia's earthquake? The lesson has to be that, although Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf were slow to send in their armies, at least they had troops to deploy. Canada's reserves have almost no capacity to respond effectively to a national or continent-wide emergency like Avian flu. We need to invest in our reserves now before such a crisis is upon us.
> 
> The militia, consisting of part-time soldiers, were once the backbone of the Canadian military. In the 19th century, the militia fought against American regulars from 1812 to 1814, repelled Fenian invaders in mid-century, fought Louis Riel in 1885 and served as the organizational spine for the great manpower buildups of the First and Second World Wars.
> 
> But in the nuclear age, when a war might have been over in hours, the focus changed to well-trained regular forces able to deter aggression, not a potential mass mobilization base.
> 
> From being the centre of defence policy, our reserves became a sideshow. In 2000, the army established the Land Force Reserve Project, with a goal of 18,500 reservists by 2005. But, the recent Senate Report, Wounded: Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect, reported that by Sept. 1, 2005, the army reserve was only 13,053 strong. More people are leaving the army reserve than are being recruited.
> 
> Why is this happening? Approximately 40% of the total reserve force consists of students and another 40% have civilian jobs. The retention rate for students after graduation is poor, and employers do not give civilian reservists adequate time off to train, nor guarantee employment if a reservist is sent on a long mission overseas.
> 
> The Senate report also identifies a lack of equipment and training for the reserves. For large weekend exercises, two or three units sometimes fight to use the same equipment.
> 
> General Rick Hillier, the most dynamic Chief of the Defence Staff in years, is promising a transformation of the Canadian military. He should start with emergency preparedness and the role of the reserves.
> 
> In these regards, we might look to the U.K. The British Territorial army has made emergency preparedness and aid to civil authorities its core functions. We should do the same with the Canadian reserves. The reserves should be manned, trained and funded for homeland emergencies. There should be at least 50,000 in the reserves (and 90,000 in the regular forces), enough to provide boots on the ground in case of emergency.
> 
> In the ice storm crisis of 1998, for example, 4,000 reserves were called out in eastern Ontario and Quebec. But the Department of Defence had to rely on American C-17 transports to move them. In a continental Avian Flu crisis, the U.S. may not have transports to lend. We desperately need air and sea lift, and we need it now.
> 
> It is especially important that the reserves be trained in nuclear, biological and chemical defence. Containment of contaminants and rapid assistance to help first responders are vital roles.
> 
> Moreover, legislation should be passed, as in the United States, ensuring that reservists do not lose their jobs. Indeed, employers should encourage reserve activity, and give them extra benefits, not penalties.
> 
> As in the 19th century, we need a large part-time army of volunteers to be available to aid our civilians should disaster strike. Katrina shows that the danger is real. Avian flu may be just around the corner.
> 
> In Canada's international policy review, much was made of "the responsibility to protect." The first responsibility of the Martin government is to protect Canadians at home.
> 
> Thomas S. Axworthy is chairman of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen's University. ( http://www.queensu.ca/csd/axbio.htm )
> 
> © National Post 2005​



Yet another key Liberal policy wonk heard from.

I'm not sure that our _reserves_ - as currently structured - could be made ready for emergency response tasks and it all smacks, faintly of _national survival_, remember that?  Back in the early '60s?  _National survival_ might, I think, have been a worn dagger used to emasculate an effective reserve force; if so it was but one of many.

It seems to me, from afar, I hasten to point out, that our reserves are not organized, equipped or prepared ÃƒÂ  la the US National Guard.

Is Axworthy on to something or is this just a diversion from the main aim which ought to be to prepare a _*total*_ force which can conduct a whole range of global missions, including emergency response at home?


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Well Edward, speaking for myself there would be no reason for me to go into the reserve unit here in Guelph the way things are now. This isn't a dig, but  I have to ask myself what exactly would, or could, I get out of being a gun number/ CP wog at 45 years old?...and really, what would they get out of me....deployment factor, zero....sleep in a bag in Meaford factor, zero, etc...
However if there were more "emergency" training as opposed to "war" training I would be more than happy to do it.The problem I forsee is it would take over the aim of the militia and we could become something useless to both sides.....

Am I close?


----------



## Craig B

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> The problem I forsee is it would take over the aim of the militia and we could become something useless to both sides.....
> 
> Am I close?



On the button .

I was in on the icestorm and the Militia did pretty well for not having much equipment or " Emergency Training " . We mostly did cleanup work , removing downed trees and helping out civilian's where we could . We left the specialised work to the specialists ( Hydro crews dealt with the powerlines , etc ) .

As for the " potential need for thousands of troops to quarantine regions of the United States that might be hit by Avian Flu. " . Enforcing a quarantine zone ( with the emphasis on _force_ I'm sure ) will not be a  nice photo op, touchie feelie type of operation . ( " Gunner Bloggins , if anyone tries to leave the quarantine zone you will stop them by any means including the use of ....... "  I'll leave the last two words to your imagination's .)

Craig


----------



## Donut

I think that I'll just point out this article comes from _Thomas _ Axeworthy, not his more infamous brother, Lloyd.

Thomas Axeworthy has had some insightful, and productive, critiques of the CF and our foreign policy over the years.

DF


----------



## pbi

My response to this is that you can only slice the Reserve cake so many ways. The reason for this is the key limitation of time. Under our system (or the UK Territorial System, or the USARNG system...) we only ask for a fraction of a citizen's time. If we start pushing that limit too much, we encounter attrition amongst those (usually older and more settled, with more responsibilities at home and at work) who simply cannot make the time. The USARNG has experienced this to a significant degree as a result of OIF/OEF: enough to cause some considerable worry in the US Army.

So, we only we have so much time to train a Reservist, right? OK; so, the next thing is that we have to decide just what it is we are going to train them to do. In our case (and in the TA and the ARNG, for the most part) this focus has historically been on warfighting. The only exception was a brief period in the late 50s and early 60's during which we tried to focus the Militia onto National Survival (post-strike recovery ops after the Big One). The Militia hated this re-roling and still recalls it in its cultural memory as the "Snakes and Ladders" period because of the training with ladders, rescue tools and block and tackle, etc. Combat training suffered, but that was considered to be OK, since at that time we had largely abandoned the idea that large land forces had much value on the nuclear battlefield.

Is it OK now? Haven't we seen in the last few years, in OEF/OIF, that modern combat operations are VERY people-intensive, and especially in lots of good quality infantry, combat engineers, and combat-capable CSS? If we want a Reserve that can contribute to those typoe of ops, we better train them to be ready.

If, on the other hand, we just want them as an adjunct to the civil emergency services (since Canada no longer has the Civil Defence volunteer organization of the old Cold War), well--maybe that's OK. Let's train them for that, if anyone would care to define just what it is we should teach them.   The only thing is, once you've used up most of their limited time teaching them to fill sandbags and set up food distribution centres, or handle a firehose or rig block and tackle, don't expect much military value out of them without A LOT of re-training, much more, I would submit, than the currently mandated 90-120 days of pre-deployment training.

If we want to raise a Civil Defence force, let's do that, and populate it with willing citizens who don't want to join the Reserve. Or, failing that, they can join their local Red Cross, St John's Amb, police auxiliary or volunteer fire dept (I have done the latter myself).

Using a combat trained force to help out in civil emergencies, as we do with the Army Reserve now, is one thing. In a way, we get to have our cake and eat it, too. Converting the Res to a CD  force might be a turn down a road that we cannot get back from in a hurrry.

Cheers.


----------



## Mark Antony

pbi,  you are absolutely right.  If there were a formed civil defence force that was either volunteer or paid a small amount for training, I would bet that it might find many people willing to join.  A possibility is to amalgamate all other groups (St Johns Ambulance etc.) into one single national group that works together to common aims.  For those not willing to pick up a rifle, it would be a good opportunity to serve the public.

Reserves should be left in the warfighting role so if something does go bad at least there is a a backup (small as it is) that might make some sort of difference.


----------



## shanks

I cann not speak for the rest of the reserve world but my unit, the West Nova Scotia Regiment (Infantry by trade) are doing a lot of training under the umbralla of the 'three block war' concept. In case there are any that are not very familiar with this, it consists of three very different types of ops taking place in a small area (possibly even all three within one city block)
The three types of operations are: humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and warfighting. 

The idea is that all three of these ops will take place in a very small area and likely performed by the same people as you advance.

With this in mind, I think that if we focus on more 'three block war' that we would be able to perform as a short term civil defense force without comprimising our war fighting cabability.

However, as was previously mentioned, we only have so much time available to train and the more things we train to do the less effective we will be. I don't know what the right answer but this is a point to keep in mind

Cheers


----------



## Infanteer

"Three-Block War"?  What kinda concept is that?  Who comes up with this stuff?


----------



## ImanIdiot

Infanteer said:
			
		

> "Three-Block War"?   What kinda concept is that?   Who comes up with this stuff?



Frankly, it sounds made up.


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

"three block concept" sort of makes sense  but called the wrong thing.

not sure what  it should be called

if you look at current Ops in the middle east  you can see how it can be done or considered

all thoughts are just for thought not policy  or war planning

take a routine patrol  

walking from base camp 

first block or so it is very friendly  and very  normal setting, people getting on with being a normal town,  people work, wandering the streets, kids playing in the streets
soldiers stop and chat  exchange information, candy bars, water, smokes, and just meet and greet people , maybe spend a few bucks on stupid stuff they really do not need but it makes the people happy. People up close and personal with the soldiers, low level of danger

second block or middle of patrol zone

people require a little more help and a lot more watching
first aide is offered, food and water supplies are dealt with, people more on the guard for some thing wrong or waiting for it to happen.
less people getting close to the soldiers on patrol. medium level of danger

3rd block or end of range of foot patrol

ememy troops close by, streets are less populated , no one getting close to the troops,  fire exchanged often enough that  troops are more alert, weapons are carried with finger on the trigger guard. more combat damage to the area then in other patrol areas.  more searches conducted for non friendly  persons, weapons, traps etc.


never been in hostile country ( just what  CNN shows)
but i can see how the 3 block training concept could be looked at for training.

not agreeing 100 percent with the idea but with some training is better then no training


----------



## kincanucks

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_4_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&

Three block war.   Perhaps it is time to do a little reading as Transformation is coming.


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

i read it, very  interesting ideas.  i was guessing what  it was like or the concept. guess i got some of it right. just used the wrong terms and  ideas


----------



## McG

Bill Smy said:
			
		

> I believe that hierarchy of roles for the Militia (and the Primary Reserve in general) is extremely important. I do not believe that any attempt to produce a vision for the future of the Army Reserve will stand the test if it does not conform to the direction of the Minister: 1) mobilization, 2) linkage to the community, and 3) augmentation.
> 
> In the past, various attempts to define the missions and tasks to be assigned to the Militia have become exercises of "cherry picking", choosing those that were popular at the time, or which were thought to be financially viable, ignoring government policy.


Is mobilization even a realistic roll today?  Maybe domestic mobilization, but the equipment does not exist for Reserve mobilization to fight beside the Regular Force on foreign ops.  I think the augmentation roll is still viable at the individual and up to sub-unit level for both domestic and international operations.  So perhaps the first roll should be "mobilization for domestic operations".  I know that the National Survival roll did not work in the past, but maybe its time has come?



			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> I fully agree with a_majoor in the finding a niche concept.   (I can hear Infanteer cringe)
> 
> Like it or not our system cannot keep functioning in the current manner.   We need to lift the IRU task for domestic ops off the regular force and have a solid local system in place much like the US ARNG.   It makes no sence to ship an Artillery Reg't from Manitoba to BC to fight a fire and likewise for floods and icestorms.
> 
> Local troops shoudl be immediately (within 12hrs) be able to be deployed towards a thread of that nature.
> 
> ...
> 
> However I think the LFRR must focus on identifiying some units for DOMOPS only - thus they can be tailored for certain roles (WMD taskings etc.)
> 
> ...





			
				Michael Shannon said:
			
		

> I suppose there is another future for the militia; creation of large units and assignment of home defense roles. Second responders to radiological attack or natural disasters etc. Sort of a part time fire department/ medical clinic/ grocery store. Who knows maybe a lot of people would like to part of a homeland defence force.



If we want local troops to continuously be available at a high notice to move, it is conceivable that we could achieve this with a return to another failed experiment: the 10/90 battalion.  This time, the regular force component would have the additional roll of being the vanguard sub-unit to any local DOMOP.


			
				Recce41 said:
			
		

> The 8CH in Gagetown was a 90/10 Sqn. Most that were with them, well it sucked.





			
				pbi said:
			
		

> We would want to be very careful not to repeat the mistakes made during 10/90, which in LFWA at least seemed to generate boundless hatred and suspicion on both sides as to what wicked purpose the integration process was actually serving.


So, how could the Forces go about making new 10/90 battalions work? Are there any other ideas that could be included into any such radical transformation?



			
				Yard Ape said:
			
		

> I saw an argument once (that I jumped in to support) which questioned the need of sustaining every reserve regiment as a battalion.  Instead, a regiment would exist as a company (or 2, 3 , or 4 if big enough).  Battalion head quarters would be "regiment neutral" much like our current brigade HQs.  This approach could be applied to armoured and infantry regiments, and it would ensure no regiment became "lost."


These ideas are compatible with 10/90 battalions (especially if the bn were entirely based in one city).  Consider the Winnipeg Battalion which would consist of Wpg Bn HQ, A Coy (Reg F),  B Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles), C Coy (The Queens own Cameron Highlanders of Canada), and D Coy (Winnipeg Grenadiers) [yes, I know the Grenadiers are not currently active].  The FGH could even be an element if the Bn does not have to be branch pure.   The Bn HQ would be a mix of regular and reserve pers.


----------



## Journeyman

Once upon a time, I was posted into a Toronto Reserve unit as the "RegF guy." 
I looked around and asked why they didn't amalgamate units. I suggested creating a "Toronto Regiment," which still allowed perpetuation of unit histories: a "Rifles Coy" with a "Queen's Own Pl" and a "Royal Regiment Pl," a second company - - a "Scottish Coy" of a "48th Highlander Pl," a "Toronto Scottish Pl," and a "Lorne Scots Pl," etc.....

Man, having those nails driven into your palms and feet really stings!  

Any change that will make a unit more effective (ie - more realistic training) will be supported by the majority of the troops. Most changes, however, face resistance from those that see the Reserves as a social club, the regimental mafias, and to a lesser degree, the Honouraries. They will have to be brought on side, or otherwise de-fanged. Otherwise the Reserves will just go through the motions, figuring whoever is trying to implement the change will be posted on soon, and can be out-waited.

As mentioned earlier though.....this has been posted upon frequently - - with little progress to show for it. Let's see what the March 2006 report has to offer.


(Edited for apparently typing with mittens on)


----------



## rifleman

How do we make anything work? We just do. Set aside the predudice, self-interest and follow the commander's intent and carry out the mission. Unification was fought at all levels by all elements, however now it is embraced as fact. (transformation- unified force with an integrated approach).

10/90s did not work, cause noone wanted it to work.


----------



## McG

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I looked around and asked why they didn't amalgamate units.  I suggested creating a "Toronto Regiment,"


I've heard many arguments on why reserve regiments should maintain thier Bn structures & not be grouped within other regiments in one battalion.  So far, I have not been convinced that it would be bad to have several company sized regiments within one battalion.  I'm even more convinced that this approach would work in big cities, and especially where multiple regiments already reside in the same building.


----------



## ArmyRick

I find it interesting that the British army has no problems amalgamating several regiments to form larger multi-battalion units. Some of these regiments are older and have far more history to them than any CDN REGT. However talk about doing that here then all the REGT asociations start whining and things like LFRR don't get taken seriously. Too bad, our loss. Lets continue having 140 man regiments with LT COL as COs and CWO as RSMs...


----------



## McG

Are you saying that the 10/90 Bn concept could have been an effective force structure that would have given greater flexibility, efficiency, and/or capability to the Army (or at least to the Army Reserves)?  Or, are you saying that the 10/90 Bns maybe were not the right force structure, but they could have been forced to work imperfectly if everyone made the effort?


----------



## TCBF

" Lets continue having 140 man regiments with LT COL as COs and CWO as RSMs..."

- Well, if the govt would stop wasting money on (fill in your own choice here) and increase the budget for 'man days' and auth strength for the units, perhaps we could see units of 500 or so.  In the meantime, if we insist on limiting our Mo units to 75 or 150, then by all means form semi-perm Tac groupings to train, but maint the historic Regt structure with it's potential to expand to a much greater size if needed.

Best of both worlds.

Tom


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> Are you saying that the 10/90 Bn concept could have been an effective force structure that would have given greater flexibility, efficiency, and/or capability to the Army (or at least to the Army Reserves)?  Or, are you saying that the 10/90 Bns maybe were not the right force structure, but they could have been forced to work imperfectly if everyone made the effort?



yes


----------



## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> Are you saying that the 10/90 Bn concept could have been an effective force structure that would have given greater flexibility, efficiency, and/or capability to the Army (or at least to the Army Reserves)?  Or, are you saying  that the 10/90 Bns maybe were not the right force structure, but they could have been forced to work imperfectly if everyone made the effort?



Now rifleman responds with:


			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> yes


So......As MCG asked........Which is it?


----------



## rifleman

I was commenting on how we make things work. It was not to comment on the effectiveness of any commander's decision.


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> I was commenting on how we make things work.


When you suggested that 10/90 did not work because lower levels worked against it, you seem to imply that 10/90 was a good plan that should have been a success.

Consider the emphasis on "effect" that has recently found its way into our manoeuvre command based vernacular.  If the lower levels can see that a plan will not achieve the desired effects, then there should be some constructive criticism pushed back up.

So, I'll re-state my original question: how could the CF go about making new 10/90 battalions improve the overall capabilities of the Regular and Reserve Forces (or at the very least improve the capabilities of the Reserve Forces with out eroding from the capabilities of the Regular Forces)?


----------



## Kirkhill

> So, I'll re-state my original question: how could the CF go about making new 10/90 battalions improve the overall capabilities of the Regular and Reserve Forces (or at the very least improve the capabilities of the Reserve Forces with out eroding from the capabilities of the Regular Forces)?



By adding the bodies necessary for the 10% to existing resources.  By definition your question of eroding capabilities suggests that there are current, existing capabilities to erode.  If they are maintained they are not eroded.

If new resources were ONLY directed to 10/90 (or in the CPC proposal 20/80) battalions/units/task forces then current capabilities could be maintained.  Therefore any capabilities supplied by the 10/90s would be in addition to those supplied by the existing force structure.  In addition, relieving existing force structure of responsibilities would allow them to concentrate efforts on other areas.

However the proposal is not to maintain existing resources for existing capabilities but to increase the resources for existing capabilities while adding resources for the 10/90s.

As to making the 10/90s effective - add resources.  Improved facilities to permit effective local training with qualified instructors.  Improve the equipment base (one of the problems with the 10/90s was the shared equipment sets with only 4 training centres scattered across the country).   The Windsor Armouries seem to be a better model than MTSC Meaford in terms of improving the quality of the Militia.  It allows for useful individual and small unit training.  Meaford is useful for concentrations but then again so are existing Reg Force exercise areas.  

Also improve the quality of the leadership cadre - the Militia doesn't lack for spirit.  It does lack experience.

Rant off. ;D


----------



## a_majoor

Although I was never personally in a 10/90 Bn, I recall at the time that 3 RCR was all over the map in terms of preceived utility and effectiveness, even from people serving in the unit itself! Even today, talking to former 3 RCR members from the 10/90 period, there is a wide range of assessments.

My take on this was the powers that be were trying to create an actual mechanized battalion with a "Swedish" style structure. Most Swedish units are similar to a 10/90 battalion, a small full time cadre lives and works in a warehouse like base going through the equipment maintainence cycle, and for two weeks a year the actual riflemen fall in on the kit and roar off into the woods. Since the Swedes make this work with fairly advanced equipment (Leopard II tanks, CV-90 IFVs, FH-70 artillery etc.) there does not seem to be any conceptual reason we could not do this either. In fact, since our Reserves have more continuation training during the year than either the Sweds or the US ANG, they should be able to do amazing things given the right support.

Back in the real world, the lack of equipment "sets" to support training and the administrative headaches (administrivia like who wears what cap badge to intigrating multiple pay systems to imagining how you would mobilize a battalion made up of 90% reservists who have no job protection....) probably did more to kill the concept than any inherent problems with the concept. Today I could se a 10/90 or 20/80 Bn of light Infantry, with most of the 10 or 20 going to support coy where training and experience counts the most, but until the resource and administration "friction" is addressed, no fractional unit will ever be able to work.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If new resources were ONLY directed to 10/90 (or in the CPC proposal 20/80) battalions/units/task forces then current capabilities could be maintained.


I tend to think that if new resources are ONLY directed to creating 10/90 battalions, then we would be neglecting existing deficiencies of the regular force in order to create these battalions.  If you intended to say that ONLY new resources are directed to 10/90 battalions, then I would agree that such a move would not erode from the regular force structure (not the same as regular force capabilities).

While it was not my intent to dissect the Conservative proposal, I think you have identified one element that would be required for 10/90 that did not exist in the previous experiment: political support to grow the structure (not just re-allocate from existing structure).



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> Today I could se a 10/90 or 20/80 Bn of light Infantry, with most of the 10 or 20 going to support coy where training and experience counts the most,


If the intent of the 10/90s is to be firefighter battalions, this would likely be the be one of the best options.  Far better than a regular force rifle company sitting outside the managed readiness cycle.  Sure, it does not provide for the high readiness vanguard sub-unit.  However, this would ensure that capable CSS support for a unit would be available in the location of the 10/90 Bn (able to support regular IRU troops or local reservists) & that the local CO would know how to use it (this was an occasional frustration on PEREGRINE where CSS did not seem to be understood at the unit level).


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Like AMajoor I was not in a 10/90 Battalion but I was in the Reserves at the time (early/mid 90s).  I worked at District (then CBG) for a year after the 10/90s had been stood down and at least one former 10/90 unit was in our District.  This unit seemed to be "stronger" at the time than those that had not, but perhaps there were other reasons.  

The 10/90 concept took advantage of the removal of regular force units from 4 CMBG and their subsequent draw-down.  This was during the big cuts of the time and it allowed for these units to be kept on the books without having alot of soldiers.  The infantry 10/90 Battalions were then reconstituted in 1995/96 (in my recollection) as part of the modest increase in "bayonets" at the time (the RCD also got a C Sqn for a brief time again).  This took away the pool of people that had been assigned to the 10/90s in the first place.

I think that the 10/90 concept could certainly work.  A modified concept could be the one that I witnessed with a USMC reserve battalion.  It was a honest to goodness battalion with full companies to include unit level CS and CSS.  It had many active duty Marines on staff, including a LCol.  Each company had a Captain, the equivalent of a CSM, several NCOs and also several CSS personnel.  This meant that planning and coordination for unit training was carried out the full-timers, although the senior reserve leaders were certainly involved.

We could adopt a similar model, but it would take an investment of regular force NCOs.  Sgts and WOs are in pretty short supply and are needed in lots of places!  In addition, to really work it would probably require a re-examination of having units with one sub-unit.  Looking at Ontario, LFCA could probably generate three or four such units.  This would give an improved Dom Ops response capability while also, perhaps, offering the possibility of a "surge" capability.


----------



## Bobbyoreo

I know this has been said, but you need to have job protection. People always say well no one is going to higher you if you have to go away. I've done it twice and held a job. 

Next get some standards, ONE standard and keep it ...at least for a year!!! Then train the unit for what it well be doing on tours. Not for what it may do. Train them to the same standard as the Regs. It can be done, just need the proper leadership to do this. Then send them away as a plt or company and let them work together or with other groups. Make units more useful...IE  constrution engineers, grunts, MSEOPS, V TECHs and other civy jobs that the forces need. I know being a grunt is not a civy job, but it is low cost training. Dont need millions of bucks to train people to shoot.

We all know the equipment is not there, so train around this problem. I know my unit was told to ship away the Iltis, two months later after not getting the G wagons they asked for the old jeeps back to do some driver training. 

These are just a few ideas. I know with a few of you, your rolling your eyes, but I've served in the reserves for 9 yrs and have watched good people leave cause the training is going down the drain. Now all I see is kids coming in for some money to use towards school. Not really caring if they show up next weekend or not. We really have to sit down and find out what you want these units to do and then train them for that.

My two cents!!!


----------



## Brad Sallows

From anecdotes, I came to believe that the junior soldiers and officers responded well to 10/90 because they responded well to being led and trained by experienced full-time officers and NCOs.  If there was lukewarm to negative response, it seemed to reside in the middle and senior rank levels.  Is there anyone who was directly involved at the time who can reinforce my perception one way or the other?

If that perception were borne out, then 10/90 or some other fractional arrangement might be the most successful reserve restructure we never really tried, provided we could afford the full-time staff and the equipment pools.  In the end, while some of the part-time middle and senior leadership at the time of initiation might be shunted aside, it would be reasonable to expect the next crop of reserve leaders to be at least a little bit better for having been trained by, and worked alongside, a sizeable critical mass of regulars.

The train wreck I observed from a distance was that at least one reserve unit dumped a portion of its middle and senior rank levels which were felt (rightly or wrongly, I don't know) at the time to be unnecessary and underperforming, and then was in turn dumped from 10/90 when the battalion withdrew - taking with it not a few component transfers, and supposedly leaving with a slightly more complete CFFET than it brought to the party - leaving the unit shorter of soldiers, leaders, and kit.  Note that the only decision I criticize was the one to prematurely eject the former senior leadership; component transfers are a valuable source of already-committed soldiers and it is axiomatic that the deployable forces have first call on deployable kit.  The lesson is that if we try it again, we must stand behind it for a decade or more rather than changing fashions with the next change of government or senior NDHQ appointments.


----------



## McG

Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> Then train the unit for what it well be doing on tours. Not for what it may do.


Would we start deploying reserve battalions if they were 10/90?


----------



## Bobbyoreo

We should be. Why would we train anyone in the forces if we never planed to deploy them? LIke buying a car and never driving it!!!!


----------



## McG

We don't deploy reserve battalions now, but individual reservists still get deployed.

This gets to another question.  What is the roll/function of a 10/90 battalion (in relation to domestic operations, international operations, and force generation)?  Is to to provide better trained soldiers & sub-units to augment regular force deployments, or is it to proved a battalion sized surge capability?  Should a 10/90 battalion be providing the vanguard sub-units to IRU calls within its AO, or should we continue to generate that vanguard from the regular force while expecting the 10/90 Bn to provide the comd & CSS to the vanguard and then add follow-on sub-units from itself?


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> We don't deploy reserve battalions now, but individual reservists still get deployed.
> 
> This gets to another question.  What is the roll/function of a 10/90 battalion (in relation to domestic operations, international operations, and force generation)?  Is to to provide better trained soldiers & sub-units to augment regular force deployments, or is it to proved a battalion sized surge capability?  Should a 10/90 battalion be providing the vanguard sub-units to IRU calls within its AO, or should we continue to generate that vanguard from the regular force while expecting the 10/90 Bn to provide the comd & CSS to the vanguard and then add follow-on sub-units from itself?



In the context of the Conservative idea, a 10/90 battalion (actually a 20/80) would exist as a DOMOPS force, but would also provide a cascade effect for the other tasks that the Army is expected to do. I would expect that (given the size) the 20/80would be the vanguard and be able to provide command and CSS to follow on forces arriving from other places. The soldiers in the 20/80 would do both MLOC training to maintain their soldiering skills, as well as contingency training for the various tasks they may undertake in the AOR (some of which would be quite military in nature, in case you are thinking of "rescue columns" again).

The Regular troops would have a breather from operations while posted in the 20/80, and be better off in other ways (spouses in cities will have a better chance of getting employment, for example), while once the Reserve soldiers ended their Class "B" contracts, they will be at a higher level of training if they want to augment a TF, or provide a better level of skill and leadership back in their parent units. For that reason, it might be wise to limit contracts to one year and encourage a flow of reserve troops through the 20/80 (although not a mass turnover of 50% or more).


----------



## McG

So, you are assuming the Total Force Battalion would consist of all full-time reservists?  Could this unit still do both the vanguard (12 hr NTM) and CSS to a full unit if the reserve companies were part time?


----------



## Bobbyoreo

If we had Job protection ...you could do 12 ntm....just like the states!!


----------



## Haggis

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The Regular troops would have a breather from operations while posted in the 20/80...


Some posters on these forums would argue that the Reg F neither need nor want a breather from operations, DOMOPS included.



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> it might be wise to limit contracts to one year and encourage a flow of reserve troops through the 20/80 (although not a mass turnover of 50% or more).



Staggered 2 year contracts would ensure there isn't a mass turnover every year.  Properly using the CFPAS would allow units to cut low performers after one year or grant high performers a year extension (to a max of three years).



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> So, you are assuming the Total Force Battalion would consist of all full-time reservists?



Then it may as well be Reg F.



			
				Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> If we had Job protection ...you could do 12 ntm....just like the states!!



Hasn't happened.  Ain't gonna happen.  Canadian business and industry has not and will never support the idea.  Get over it.


----------



## Bobbyoreo

Hasn't happened.  Ain't gonna happen.  Canadian business and industry has not and will never support the idea.  Get over it.


Never been asked. One or two companies. Every company I've ever worked for in Winnipeg supported me when on tour. I've never seen one paper passed to see if it was what people wanted. Most companies dont even know what reserves are.

If anyone has any proof on this matter....it would be nice to see. I've looked everywhere and never seen any work or papers on Job protection for the reserves.


----------



## Haggis

Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> Never been asked. One or two companies. Every company I've ever worked for in Winnipeg supported me when on tour. I've never seen one paper passed to see if it was what people wanted. Most companies dont even know what reserves are.



Since your profile is somewhat lacking in detail, I cannot speculate as to your unit, expereince or your employer.  Maybe you're senior enought to be able to do it or have union protection through a strong collective agreement.

In any case, consider yourself lucky.  I know many Reservists who have had to choose between the Reserves and their civvy job.  Some lost their jobs because their employers didn't want divided loyalty in the business.   At least two I know personally were fired when they approached thier employers for time off.  Another was told he was disqualified from seeking employment with ************** as he "already had an employer".



			
				Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> If anyone has any proof on this matter....it would be nice to see. I've looked everywhere and never seen any work or papers on Job protection for the reserves.



For starters use the "search" function.  Then chat with someone from CFLC and ask about thier collective experiences with legislation as well as their successes/failures with voluntary employer support.

There is recently enacted job protection for Reservists who are *called out* during an emergency. (If you volunteer, however, you are NOT protected.)  This requires that the government pass an Order in Council.  The chances of that happening are historically slim to none.  Maybe under a Conservative government.....?


----------



## Kirkhill

Perhaps the entire battalion doesn't have to be at 12 NTM.   Perhaps a dedicated sub-unit, on rotation.  Or something like the Royal Marines where their old Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre were double-hatted as instructors and also the Brigade Recce element.  Perhaps some of the reservists could be equipped with pagers like Volunteer Firemen for callout.


----------



## dutchie

I'm enjoying this discussion, but thought I'd add a side note re:job protection for reservists. 

Job protection for reservists would be a double-edged sword. Sure, you'd have a job to come back to, but you also may be denied employemt in the first place if the employer knows your a reservist. I understand that this happens regularly in the US. If you are employed by the Canadian Fed Gov, you will not only likely be able to go and keep your job, but you will get all of your raises upon return.

Employers are funny people, and entreprenuers are even funnier - they don't like to be told that they HAVE to hold a job for someone who goes on tour of their own volition. 

I myself had no problem holding my job when I went on tour, but some of my buddies did. I kept my employer informed right from the point that I put my name in. I had a job to come back to, and they even gave me a raise/promotion upon return. BTW, I wasn't working for the Gov either.


----------



## Bobbyoreo

I know about the USA's problem with it as I have a buddy who was working with Target...went away ,..came back and was given a lower job. 
I do know of problems. ie Might not get a job, might not get the same job when I get back. I know of the problems, but we are not the USA are deployments are not the same as theirs. The US still gets their men and women to join and even with the fact that job protection is not 100%.

I've USED the SEARCH button....I'm not that slow big guy. I'm looking for a piece of paper...proof that the government even asked people if this was a good idea....or was it just a person saying ...naaa..won't work. As that is what I think it is.

Didn't know I had to add all my jobs on this site....by bad. Ill try and fix that one up.


----------



## Haggis

Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> The US still gets their men and women to join and even with the fact that job protection is not 100%.


American society is more historically supportive of their military and, IMO, far more patriotic.



			
				Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> I'm looking for a piece of paper...proof that the government even asked people if this was a good idea....or was it just a person saying ...naaa..won't work. As that is what I think it is.



Then talk to your CFLC rep.



			
				Bobbyoreo said:
			
		

> Didn't know I had to add all my jobs on this site....by bad. Ill try and fix that one up.



You don't have to but it helps other participants appreciate the level of training, experience and life skills that you bring to the forums.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Perhaps the entire battalion doesn't have to be at 12 NTM.   Perhaps a dedicated sub-unit, on rotation.


Yes.  That lead sub-unit is referred to as the vanguard.



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> Then it may as well be Reg F.


Your right.  However, I think it is a waste of resources to have a full time battalion (regular or reserve) that has as its sole roll the DOMOPS.  Generally, all that is required of an IRU sub-unit is manual labour (not a skill set which would warrent a full bn trg full time to prepare for).


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> Yes.  That lead sub-unit is referred to as the vanguard.
> Your right.  However, I think it is a waste of resources to have a full time battalion (regular or reserve) that has as its sole roll the DOMOPS.  Generally, all that is required of an IRU sub-unit is manual labour (not a skill set which would warrent a full bn trg full time to prepare for).



Although I am not 100% for the Conservative DOMOPS battalion idea, there are some elements worth examining. DOMOPS encompasses a wide range of potential tasks, and I am fairly sure the proposal was this unit was there to assist in all contingencies, from an Ice Storm to an FLQ type crisis. (Nukes and WMD mean all bets are off). After MLOC, soldiers in these batalions would be training up for various contingency plans, and I am presuming this is a full time formation so they do have the time to do lots of contingency training. Like I said, this can flow through into the P Res units which feed the DOMOPS Bn, so provides a source of junior leaders and instructors. Perhaps a 500 man 20/80 is a bit much, if they are to be the Vanguard, Command node and CSS backbone for the local units and arriving Regular Force units to rally around, then a 50/50 of about 200 men might do.

WRT job protection, most people are either in the collectivist mind set (you WILL do this for the greater good), or the military mind set (you WILL do this), without looking at this from the employer's perspective. There must be some sort of immediate compensation for the loss of a valuable(?) employee, particularly for prolonged periods. We can speak of long term benefits about training and experience, but the employer needs to meet his quarterly targets, and might not see how letting Bloggins go on course or deployment helps HIM in either the short long term. Probably the simplest idea I ever came across was to offer employers a tax credit for every servicemember they employed. If the credit was matched to the soldier/employee's salary, there would be less incentive to keep the guy in the mail room or drop him in seniority after deploying.

Of course we shoot ourselves in the foot on a regular basis; courses cancelled or amended at the last minute and other administrative nightmares leave the poor soldier stranded (after negotiating time off months in advance) and the employer looks at the CF as a totally cluster f****d organization, not worth supporting or thinking about.


----------



## GO!!!

Caesar said:
			
		

> I'm enjoying this discussion, but thought I'd add a side note re:job protection for reservists.
> 
> Job protection for reservists would be a double-edged sword. Sure, you'd have a job to come back to, but you also may be denied employemt in the first place if the employer knows your a reservist. I understand that this happens regularly in the US. If you are employed by the Canadian Fed Gov, you will not only likely be able to go and keep your job, but you will get all of your raises upon return.
> 
> Employers are funny people, and entreprenuers are even funnier - they don't like to be told that they HAVE to hold a job for someone who goes on tour of their own volition.
> 
> I myself had no problem holding my job when I went on tour, but some of my buddies did. I kept my employer informed right from the point that I put my name in. I had a job to come back to, and they even gave me a raise/promotion upon return. BTW, I wasn't working for the Gov either.



This is a good point. 

I am aware of an entrepreneur here in Edmonton who had a reservist as a clerk in his company. She went to Bosnia, and he held onto her job, staffing it with temps and lower quality transient employees in order to keep her job for her when she came back. He said he thought it was his duty - the same as paying taxes or voting. She came back, worked for 3 months, went on maternity leave and quit the day her benefits ran out. He is now understandably leery of hiring reservists. He loves the idea, but this is the third or fourth one that has left hime swinging in the breeze after he went to alot of time, money and effort to accomodate them. This is a pretty big deal in a company of less than 20 employees. If reservists had legislated job protection, I doubt he would ever hire another one.

Different members of my extended family run their own companies too, and they all have a "golden staffing rule" No women under 40, men under 20, or anyone who thinks they can just work a few weeks when they need the money. Not very enlightened, but as a small business owner, you cannot run a business when your employees are rotating in and out on someone elses time table.


----------



## Haggis

GO!!! said:
			
		

> If reservists had legislated job protection, I doubt he would ever hire another one.



Around the time of Gulf War 1, a friend of mine ran a small company in Ottawa (he's retired now).  Even though he has no military experience, he hired just about every Reservist/ex Reg that has applied (some didn't have the requisite job skills).  He adored the discipline, work ethic and team attitude they bring to his shop. That being said, the prospect of job protection legislation scared the heck out of him.  Although he supported his guys, he was afraid that 1/3 of his workforce could be ordered to pack up and go.



			
				GO!!! said:
			
		

> you cannot run a business when your employees are rotating in and out on someone elses time table.



Which is what happens in the US. Granted, they are at war (so are we, but that's a topic for another thread) but in many cases an employee is now on his second or third tour in four years.  That's a lot to ask of even the most fervently patriotic employer.


----------



## Kirkhill

This is the reason that I have difficulty accepting that "Foreign Service" should be anything other than a Reg Force commitment, with supplementation from individuals in the Militia that are willing and able to make a similar commitment, even if it is for a limited duration.  

Volunteers, Regular and Militia, paid for out of the public purse are a budgeted expenditure. It doesn't come as a shock to the treasury, or to the economy at large.  It is planned. 

On the other hand taking a bunch of Militiamen that are contributing to the economy out of that economy can have dire consequences.  It doesn't make sense to me to plan to routinely pull 400 to 500 bodies out of a local economy and despatch them to places unknown.

BUT.  It does make sense, when the local economy is disrupted and needs to be put back on firm footing as quickly as possible, to take those same 4 or 500 bodies ( who can't go to work in any case) and put them to work in getting their community back to normal as quickly as possible.

A solid core of planners, trainers and enablers (don't just love the jargon ie Regs) available full time, coupled with a central core of B and C callouts working 10 to 40 hours a week on training and maintenance (as well as being at x NTM for Vanguard duties along with the local Regs), coupled with a large body of Class As that are able and willing to perform when ably led seems to me to be a reasonable use of public funds and available PYs.


----------



## darmil

Well if your worried about a job when you come back. Get a good education a degree or trade.Something that will not limit you too one employer.Working at a place that doesn't give you a qualification of some sort is a waste of time I think.It does help if you have a good union,I'm in the boilermakers union yes its a trade. But it pays good and when I want to go on tour. I'll have a job when I get back.I think reservists have to pick civvy jobs carefully.The civvy world doesn't care about military..CONSERVATIVE.. will hopefully help us.Right now its 1 man 1 kit.


----------



## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> DOMOPS encompasses a wide range of potential tasks, and I am fairly sure the proposal was this unit was there to assist in all contingencies, from an Ice Storm to an FLQ type crisis.


a_majoor,
About the only DOMOPs roll that could justify a Bn in full-time trg is aid-to-civil power.  Do we need full time battalions in every major city for the event that they need to be employed against the citizens?  I think that is a waste.  The likely needs can be met by part-time pers, and there are enough regular force if we ever need to call on this.


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> a_majoor,
> About the only DOMOPs roll that could justify a Bn in full-time trg is aid-to-civil power.  Do we need full time battalions in every major city for the event that they need to be employed against the citizens?  I think that is a waste.  The likely needs can be met by part-time pers, and there are enough regular force if we ever need to call on this.



Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea. A 200 some odd 50/50 would be a fine compromise, able to serve as a command node and support element for the arriving IRU and follow on forces. The remainder of the time can be split between MLOC, contingency planning/training and perhaps providing continuation training or support for the local P Res units (many P Res units have support issues, so there is a good training fit there). 

We need to get out of the box and look around some more, maybe there is something which can be made of the Conservative's notion (besides unintentionally funny interviews of Paul Martin trying to explain election ads), or maybe not.


----------



## Donut

Several pages ago Mr Sallows asked if there was anyone here with first-hand experience of the 10/90 experiment, and I’ve got to say that I was there.  I’d kind of tuned this thread out, and hadn't noticed the topic come up. The experience was mixed, I suspect, for all parties, but I’ll tell what I can recall; It’s a worms-eye view, for sure.  

I was the only Pte in the 10, on Cl C from the tour to nowhere.  I went there from 1RCHA, after the tour was scrubbed in September/October.  We’d spent the time from May to August working up with 3VP in Dundurn before splitting up for Winnipeg and 2VP and Shilo with 1RCHA.

In addition to the workups, I participated in several exercises with the 39CBG units that comprised the 90, including Cougar Salvo.  Fundamentally, I think Mr Sallows is correct, the reserve NCMs and jr leadership greatly benefited from, and enjoyed, the chance to work under professional, full-time, been there done that leadership.  All of the training was to a higher standard.  NBC?  Taught by a man who’d been slimed in the post-gulf war cleanup.  Range Ex?  Bring the Snipers.  Comms course?  We had full time Jimmies, techs and operators.  Maintenance was better, scales of issue were excellent.  We had a Res Tow pl, Recce, Mortar, and Pioneer capabilities.

We had 2 full time medics in the Btn, and 6 ambulances, 2 ML with trailers, 2 Ilti, and an LS for the UMS, to be staffed by 11 and 12 Med Coys. I can’t really speak to what the rifle coys had, except during the workups when I was lumped in with R West Regt and the Engineers and additional odds and sods, but it was the first, and last, time anyone asked me accomplish anything in NVGs, or do a crack-thump range, or get in really top-notch shape, or run with a ruck (gasp!)

Several other reservists were on Cl B or C at the Btn, many ended up Reg F, but lots of others went over after the tours were cancelled, or the seeds were sown for it then.  Most Res units involved had a high number of CT’s afterward, and most were solid, long-serving reservists.

Now, I understand that the Reg F 10% viewed this as a slow, lingering career death, but I can’t really speak to that.

DF

Edit:  I just want to add, for fairness sake, that several members of 3VP stayed in the lower mainland, and I still see one or two on occasion in uniform.  Since this experiment ended 10 years ago, that's not too bad.


----------



## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea.


I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves.  DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it.  

As mentioned above, such a 10/90 organization would be complimentary to proposals (seen in the Reserve Regimental restructure thread) to combine multiple coy sized regiments within one battalion structure.  The HQ & HQ Pl could be a 50/50 structure, the Admin Coy could be a 80/20 structure, and the rifle coys could just see a reinforced RSS manning.  This would allow the reserves to start better developing battalion level staff (with field experience at that level) outside of the summer concentrations. 

Every DOMOPS capability, that might be gained from a DOMOPS focused 50/50 company, could also be gained from a 10/90 battalion that was primarily part-time.  However, that same 50/50 company would not provide a comparable trg benefit as a 10/90.


----------



## a_majoor

a_majoor said:
			
		

> Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea. A 200 some odd 50/50 would be a fine compromise, able to serve as a command node and support element for the arriving IRU and follow on forces. The remainder of the time can be split between MLOC, contingency planning/training and perhaps providing continuation training or support for the local P Res units (many P Res units have support issues, so there is a good training fit there).





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves.  DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it.
> 
> As mentioned above, such a 10/90 organization would be complimentary to proposals (seen in the Reserve Regimental restructure thread) to combine multiple coy sized regiments within one battalion structure.  The HQ & HQ Pl could be a 50/50 structure, the Admin Coy could be a 80/20 structure, and the rifle coys could just see a reinforced RSS manning.  This would allow the reserves to start better developing battalion level staff (with field experience at that level) outside of the summer concentrations.
> 
> Every DOMOPS capability, that might be gained from a DOMOPS focused 50/50 company, could also be gained from a 10/90 battalion that was primarily part-time.  However, that same 50/50 company would not provide a comparable trg benefit as a 10/90.



If the 50/50 is considered as part of the overall Reserve Brigade structure, then it could represent a concentration of effort brigade wide to improve training, support DOMOPS etc. Indeed if we looked at a Brigade as a 10/90 or whatever structure, then it would make more sense to roll the Regular Force staff together to provide the horsepower in a few key areas, and use these as "pivot points" around which we improve training, streamline administration, conduct higher level planning and so on. There is a whole world of possibilities opening before us, but we have to get out of the "perpetuating the units of the CEF" box to take full advantage of them.


----------



## Kirkhill

a-majoor and MCG:

Agree with both of you  

Especially this:



> There is a whole world of possibilities opening before us, but we have to get out of the "perpetuating the units of the CEF" box to take full advantage of them.


----------



## 3rd Horseman

I have found that having the Reserves as part of reg formations was the best end result.

  My example would be the Guns for that example when 3RCHA would train it would expect that the 4th Bty would be the reserve unit that would flush out the regt to 4 full Btys. We all gain benefit from this relationship. It would be reasonable to expect that if the Unit was rotated to War or Ops then the 4th Bty would go or flush out the shortages in the other three. The only place that this would break down would be with Reserve units that are too far away from Reg formations to make it log reasonable. To try and build the Reseves on there own as stand alone units and formations is a flawed strategy.


----------



## pbi

As a general comment, I believe that the climate for thinking about real change is here. My impression is that most of the people in the Army Reserve today are far more operationally oriented,  and enjoy a much better relationship with the Regular Army, than was ever the case in previous decades. They are also far more used to being part of the big picture than was the historic case. I have personally experienced that Res leadership is ready to consider, develop and implement real change, even in the teeth of rabid defenders of the status quo who depict themselves as the "Friends and Protectors of The Militia". So, the mental climate exists, now.

I think  a  discussion of first principles and fundamentals needs to precede any discussion of what technical structure or detailed roles the Army Res will eventually take on. In other words, the "Why" before the "What". A few caveats for such a discussion:

-Stay the hell away from a "Dom Ops" focus. There is IMHO a huge risk that this will bite us in the ass someday, big time. Our own experience with Snakes and Ladders, and the sorry state that the USARNG descended into pre-Gulf War I, should be strong reminders to stay focused on soldiering. We respond to domestic emergencies as a secondary function of who and what we are. Get too "stuck in" to Dom Ops and we will find it is a tar baby that prevents us from doing what we need to do to be soldiers. If Canada needs a reserve of volunteer emergency workers for domestic response, maybe it should bring back the Civil Defense, or raise an Auxiliary Fire Service as the UK did in WWII, or something along those lines;

-Trim Res command structure, but maintain numbers of troops and community presence. Call 100 troops a squadron battery or company, but keep it healthy, and let it establish outlying sub-units. IMHO there are very few Res CBGs in Canada where the current command structure can actually be sustained without far too many examples of retreading, rebadging, under-ranking or employing the utterly unsuited and undeserving to lead our citizen soldiers. There are just too many positions for the available stock of leaders, so "last man standing" is far too often the deciding criteria. One CO and one RSM for every 500 soldiers (let's say...) would not only introduce some possibility for selectivity, but would also provide a sufficiently large "breeding stock" to produce the leaders we need;

-Stop tip-toeing around the idea of amalgamation. A number of the Res units on the order of battle today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA has done it frequently for decades. For the great majority of Res soldiers (IMHO) the pain would be brief if the issue were managed properly;

-Examine why we have so many units in communities that cannot support them now, have not supported them for decades, and whose ability to support them in the future is declining. Thunder Bay and Regina are two examples that come to mind. Each has at least five Res units of various types, (all of them struggling), against a declining demographic;

-Consider whether or not full time duties in units really have to be done by Regulars. The USARNG does not do this. Why should we? Is the shortage of Regulars to fill full time positions a limitation we should accept as ironclad? Some Regulars are of great value, no doubt, but shackling the improvement of the Army Res to the manning capability of the Regular Army may not be the best way to go. I have had the pleasure to work with some full time Res officers, WOs and NCOs who were easily as capable (if not better...) than anybody I ever met in the Regular Army.

In the end, it can no longer be about cap badges and preservation of the past at all costs: that is the job of a museum, not a living military force that has to deal with the real world. We have to salvage the strengths in the Army Res, but consider what is the best way to generate a healthy, sustainable Res that is not just a bunch of cut-rate emergency responders or a "puppy mill" for the Regular Army.

Cheers


----------



## dutchie

pbi said:
			
		

> -Stop tip-toeing around the idea of amalgamation. A number of the Res units on the order of battle today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA has done it frequently for decades. For the great majority of Res soldiers (IMHO) the pain would be brief if the issue were managed properly;


This has to be done very carefully if we hope to maintain regimental pride, esprit de corps, etc., but it CAN be done, IMHO. A number of regiments today were created as an offshoot of another regiment. The Candian Scottish and the Seaforths are an excellent example. The CScotts were created from the men and officers of the Seaforths. Only later did they become the Canadian Scottish. You could amalgamate those 2, retaining each name but one CO/RSM/HQ. A CSM/OC for each Coy, etc. The uniforms would not have to change, which admitidly doesn't fit with 'amalgamation', but there is no financial or organizational reason to do so. Why mess with something unnecesarily?


----------



## dapaterson

The current reserve system produced the current reserve leadership.  How many of them will stand up and say "The system that produced me is broken"?  Couple that with outside organisations determined to perpetuate readiness for Sept 1939 as the sole raison d'etre for the Army Reserve, and you've got the current situation.

The overwhelming majority of Reserve units field less than a trained company.  Quickly looking over November's attendance stats, only six units surpassed 200 pers parading, with the largest (in numbers) being 55 Svc Bn in Quebec City.  Even among those six units, what proportion of their soldiers are occupationally qualified and employable?  With a unit of 90 including privates who have not completed their MOC training, how can anyone justify a LCol in command (or, for that matter, even a Maj - but now I'm getting REALLY heretical)

As PBI wrote, we need to maintain community presences.  That does not translate into "we need to maintain LCols and CWOs".  One pillar of the developmental process is experience - a LCol who commands a rump platoon of trained soldiers lacks the requisite experience at that rank level (and likely at the Maj level as well).

But why not have several companies (differently badged) feeding into a Bn HQ - with all those elements manned with trained soldiers?  What a concept!  So instead of claiming "An Army Reserve with 51 infantry battalions etc etc and a strength of 17 300" to a chorus of guffaws, the Army Reserve could be defined as presenting a real set of military abilities today - with the widespread community base providing an ability to expand in the future if required.  And with a structure filled with trained and qualified soldiers, the ability to expand is enhanced as you're building on a solid foundation.

Just a few thoughts for a Friday afternoon...


----------



## Kirkhill

Tying this back into the original proposition:

Is there any reason to believe that the "100/400" battalion proposed has to be a combat arms battalion?

Could we not stipulate that the greatest need in time of civil crisis is the very thing that the Reserve is weakest in and that is logistic support and C4I?

Suppose this battalion were a Service Battalion with most of the adm and maint types being Regs, along with much of the command structure, and most of the drivers and other log types being reservists.  Wouldn't that fit the need of both the emergency response type and more broadly the operational capability of the Reserves/Militia?

They could then become the core element around which a Task Force could be built with the combat arms elements being supplied by reservists.

With that in mind - suppose money were made available to permit more frequent parading - say to the level of commitment your average teen-ager makes to a part-time job at MacDonalds.  5-10-20? hours a week.  Could local training be provided to generally raise the quality of the Reserves?

It seems to me that part of the problem with the Reserves was not that the young troops found the obligation to onerous.  In fact it was the opposite.  Loss of youngsters was in large part due to a lack of activity.

If youngsters could be retained long enough and trained hard enough and well enough while they are still keen could they be made into an effective reserve force?


----------



## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is there any reason to believe that the "100/400" battalion proposed has to be a combat arms battalion?


When I have seen Service Battalions strip Cbt Arms troops from Cbt Arms Units to fill Driver positions and such for a ROTO (because their people refused to go - it might be too dangerouse), I would say "NO!" to this proposal.  I would think that an Engineer Unit would be much more in line of what is required.  After that, I would say a Sigs Unit, to provide Comms to any 'Relief' efforts that may take place.  Service Battalion Truckers and that would not be as useful as these two.


----------



## dapaterson

At the national level, resources are assigned to the areas to provide for one night a week, one weekend a month of training for the period of Sept-May every year (Four nights at 1/2 day each, 1 weekend at 2 1/2 days).  (December is funded for 3 nights only, since most folks have other plans for Christmas than freezing in Meaford or Wainwright).  This makes the famous 37.5 days of training per year.  For a Pte, 37.5 days @ $77.90 per day (lowest IPC) plus 9% PILL would be $3184 for the training year, not that bad for something part-time (Ancillary benefits such as the $2000/year in tuition support are excluded from this calculation, as is any full-time training during the summer).  The 37.5 days commitment is less than McDonalds, but does provide a regular framework to promote attendance.

The estimated number of days is adjusted upwards for MCpl and up since such ranks have supervisory responsibilities.  However, the reality is that many personnel do not attend all scheduled parades, so an attendance factor is applied, assuming differing participation rates at different ranks.

Perhaps the question isn't "Should we ask for a greater commitment" but rather "How can we ensure that the funds intended for in-unit training actually get to the units"?


----------



## rifleman

I agree that units should be training together to get a critical mass and actually train higher than individual level. I always have said that Tradition can't get in the way of getting the job done. However I don't believe you have to totally throw out the old to get that job done.

I usually find the people who propose cutting Regiments also propose how their Branch/ Unit can maintain their relevancy during the change. Lets face the facts. Service Bns have a hard enough time looking after themselves to even consider looking after other units. After doing all the basic soldier skills, maintenance of their own gear, what more time do they have? They could become a CSS Coy. We are already seeing armour take over direct fire and arty take over indirect, Throw them into a Company as well. Oops forgot the Field Engineers they can go in there too. This of course would eliminate the need for Reserve Brigade Commanders too. Back to LCol

As for unit affiliations and cap badges.   If it isn't such a big deal just look at the CSOR. Here is a unit that is going to have many elements, branches and units thrown together and everyone wants another cap badge, another colour beret. They have to be special. Why? The CSOR will be another CF Unit that has a different role. It may have different requirements for entry as it will be at a higher readiness level. If it is going to be a composite unit, leave all the different affiliations alone. Issue the unit with a shoulder title.  Cripe, We don"t even trust a Col with his old cap badge run a brigade because a logistics Col just can't care about an infantry soldier. The Regs can't get rid of the old either. If we are going to have Tanks any more, get rid of the Armoured. Does Canada have enough soldiers to sustain 9 Bns, Perhaps the PPCLI will volunteer to fold so each of the other reg force units can have 4 companies and 4 Bns per.

Then there is the "Reserves have to be trained better" well, you get what you pay for... And even the Regular Force doesn't always send qualified people to teach courses. Post a MCpl to the school and he can get qualified Sgt and start teaching his peers. They promote people before they are qualified too, so they can get paid more.

Sorry for what seems like a rant but keep some of the old and tweak it , instead of totally messing with it.  

NEXT: Don't even get me started on turning the Reserve into a sandbagging and Firefighting Brigade.


----------



## GO!!!

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The current reserve system produced the current reserve leadership.  How many of them will stand up and say "The system that produced me is broken"?



I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!

Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."

Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?


----------



## rifleman

GO!!! said:
			
		

> I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!
> 
> Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."
> 
> Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?



Sgt: "And Cpl you know enough to know that I didn't need to spell Battalion then, but you do now. Sucks to be you..oh and give me twenty"


----------



## old medic

dapaterson said:
			
		

> At the national level, resources are assigned to the areas to provide for one night a week, one weekend a month of training for the period of Sept-May every year (Four nights at 1/2 day each, 1 weekend at 2 1/2 days).  (December is funded for 3 nights only, since most folks have other plans for Christmas than freezing in Meaford or Wainwright).  This makes the famous 37.5 days of training per year.



For the sake of discussion,  where did these numbers stand 20 years ago, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, etc ?


----------



## enfield

GO!!! said:
			
		

> I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!
> 
> Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."
> 
> Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? _And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?_


Oh no...  coffee all over the desk...crap....
 ;D

(italics added)


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill: the problem is not so much getting the young Pte/Cpls out for more training. Traditionally, this group has usually been available for more training time than the Army Res could fund. The real problem is finding time for the Res leadership, who tend to have more demanding civilian jobs and, eventually, families. You can only demand so much from these people before you reach a point at which a Reservist is not a Reservist anymore but has become a "part-time Regular". One of the strengths of the Army Res (and, by the way, of the USARNG and Army Res in the US) is supposed to be that it represents the productive, solid members of the community. Once upon a time ( a long long time ago) it also may have represented the leadership of the community. Unfortunately, the more you demand, the less these people can deliver (although God knows many of them struggle to do so, often at greater personal cost that many Regulars realize). Volunteer fire departments often struggle with the same issues, as training a firefighter becomes more and more demanding, and communities demand faster response times and better protection. 

This problem of "dipping the well" too often is not uniquely Canadian. Since GWOT/OIF/OEF, the demand on the US Army's Res component has been huge. While I was in Afgh in 2004, the then-Chief of the US Army Reserve voiced a fear that the demands for active service would turn the Res into a "refuge for the chronically unemployable" (or words to that effect). And that is in a country with well-established job protection laws.

Cheers


----------



## Kirkhill

Point taken pbi.

I allowed myself to drift towards considering a Reserve Force consisting of lower rank part-timers and higher rank full-timers and that generally implies regs.  You make a valid point about how that would stretch attachments to the community.  Can that gap be bridged with "full-time" Reservists on call-out?  Can training and experience be gained at a local level?


----------



## Brad Sallows

My estimate of the maximum "tempo" of the part-time reservist from Sep through May is 45 days: one evening per week, one weekend per month (less Dec and any month in which a concentration might be held), and one full day (Sat or Sun) session per month. (The full monty would be slightly more than 45.)

To that can be added at least one conference per year for selected appointments, and several conferences for COs and RSMs.

On top of it all there are winter (weekend) courses to be staffed.

Finally, one may consider what the annual calendar of activity must be for some people in units which are short a hand or two of filling all key appointments.  I hear and read a lot about the waste of overborne reserve units, but not much thought about how underborne units fare under the weight of administrivia.


----------



## gnplummer421

I was reading a column out of a Renfrew paper, which stated that not only Reg Force soldiers could try out for the new regiment in Pet, but also Reserves. My question is; the 3RCR will supply the initial batch of soldiers, and then the selection/training phase begins in April. With these units being shortstaffed already, will the new recruits come fast enough to fill up the ranks of the remaining Infantry Regiments? Or do you think that we will be even more severly understaffed...Am I just lulled into a false belief that our military is finally going to get some much needed money and troops?

As an ex-soldier, I find myself excited about the prospect of our miltary finally getting some attention...but..I've also been let down too many times by our politicians..Is this really going to be the start of a new era for our troops?

To all you Reserve soldiers..strive to be good enough to pass the test and join an elite group of soldiers in Petawawa, you will have to be at your absolute best. The time is now to narrow the gap between the level of skills between Reg and Res. We need a large crop of new soldiers and we want them to be top notch.... time to go Reg. Force


----------



## pbi

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> I hear and read a lot about the waste of overborne reserve units, but not much thought about how underborne units fare under the weight of administrivia.



I suppose that there may be regional differences, but my impressions (and certainly my recent experiences in 38 CBG) suggest very strongly to me that we have very, very few units today with too many officers, WOs and NCOs. I think that the opposite is more often the case: units struggle to fill key appointments with anybody at all, let alone the best person for the position. I think the image of a typical Reserve unit having overstocked Officers' and Sgts' Messes is probably ten to twenty years (or more...) out of date. What does still exist, in my view, is a "legacy" command structure whose billets can no longer be filled properly.

Cheers


----------



## skydiver

I know that most units around here are hurtin at some rank level. It sure was better in the early 90s. I can remember over 30 WOs and Snr NCOs from our Regt sitting around the gunnery round table at the mess in Gagetown on a gun camp weekend. Back then it was nothing to see 3  or 4 guys promoted top Sgt in a batch. Now..1 every 3 years maybe?

Then we got totally forced and they even had people reduce in rank if they wanted to stay in. It was a no-no to have too many of whatever rank for the positions available. 

Now we can't buy a Senior NCO or an Lt.

Wah!

Doog


----------



## Kirkhill

Adding grist to the mill.  From National Defence Magazine.



> January 2006
> 
> With an Overstretched Military, U.S. Should Create 'Home Guard'
> 
> By David Abshire and Jonah Czerwinski
> 
> The United States holds an enormous stake in Iraq. Although initiated to counter a perceived terrorist threat, the U.S. presence in Iraq has in many ways made near-term gains in the war on terror more difficult and thrown America's homeland security into question. But a creative solution with roots reaching far back into American history may be the answer.
> 
> Today, the presence of coalition troops in Iraq provides terrorists with a virtually constant training ground to develop battleground experience. As when Mujahedeen battled the Soviets in Afghanistan 20 years ago, which spawned Al Qaeda's evolvement through the 1990s, Iraq today has itself become a "cause for Jihad."
> 
> In fact, Iraq has eclipsed Afghanistan as a terrorist seedbed. A recent CIA report suggests that the urban nature of the war in Iraq affords assailants opportunity to learn how to carry out assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and other kinds of attacks that were never a staple of the fighting in Afghanistan during anti-Soviet campaigns.
> 
> Today, insurgents in Iraq average 90 attacks daily - the highest amount since Saddam Hussein was overthrown.
> 
> The length of engagement and nature of daily conflict provide rich propaganda for terrorist recruiters - especially al-Qaeda and its associates - to use in the all-important battle for hearts and minds among the youth of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.
> 
> The advent of the Internet ignited terrorist communications. The CIA's National Intelligence Council finds that terrorists are enabled to converse, train, and recruit through the Internet, and their threat will become "an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters." According to a study by Gabriel Weimann, a professor at Israel's University of Haifa, terrorist websites have increased from around a dozen to 4,500 in the last four years.
> 
> The July bombings in London further bolster the notoriety of terrorist organizations. British engagement in Iraq was among several reasons cited by those claiming responsibility. This sort of propaganda upends the notion that by fighting terrorists in Iraq, we avoid facing them in the streets of New York, Atlanta or Los Angeles.
> 
> The stresses are internal, too. While America's military in Iraq struggles in this context, it is composed largely by an overstretched National Guard and Reserve Force. Repeat call-ups, extended tours, low recruitment and re-up rates, and poor supply reflect a massive crack in the system. The Army National Guard recruitment for 2005 missed its goal by more than 12,000 and the Army Reserve recruitment was off by more than 5,000. Moreover, troops at home are not fully equipped for homeland security scenarios because the inventories from non-deployed units are being sent overseas.
> 
> The original purpose of the Guard has transformed - so should its organization, supply, and support. If the military draft was the Achilles' heel to the Johnson war effort, the overextension of Reserves and National Guard may become ours today.
> 
> A home-front strategy is perhaps the most important aspect in a layered defense, regardless of how Iraq fares. President Bush should convene a group of bipartisan best minds to increase credibility with the public and Congress about the looming crisis in our military. Recognizing that we never anticipated and prepared for the new kind of warfare that came with 9/11, this bipartisan group will review home-front capabilities, mobilization, tactics and strategy. This bipartisan group should collaborate with the Commission on National Guard and Reserves, recently established by Congress.
> 
> Without waiting for the commission, however, the president should dramatically reinforce the National Guard.
> 
> This is not just a matter of changing policy and practices. The National Guard touches every community in the nation, their small businesses and families. A strengthening of the National Guard and Reserves should include their support groups, families, small businesses, the wounded, and the children and spouses left behind. An emergency grant from Congress matched with a review of existing laws and programs should provide better support structures, such as medical services to those most affected by deployed National Guard units.
> 
> The president also needs to make a call for national service. Doing so requires creating a voluntary, well equipped, well organized, congressionally funded and locally based corps. A non-expeditionary "Home Guard" is a strategic solution rooted in American history. Today's application should be composed of citizens from the community, who wear uniforms, train on weekends, and help prevent the chaos from a natural disaster or a weapon of mass effect. In the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, there would be an immediately deployable group of trained citizens from each community under control of the state governors ready to share the burden with the Red Cross, police, FEMA, local fire departments and National Guard.
> 
> A Home Guard would help mobilize the nation as we did during the Second World War. In some communities, where a percentage of first responders are in Iraq, such a trained force would help manage the shock following a terrorist attack or major natural disaster. Trained in the elements of security, engineering, civil affairs, and basic medicine, the Home Guard would recruit citizens already possessing these critical skills as well as individuals retiring out of the National Guard, active military and the Reserves. For the shorter term, enlistments in the National Guard could be followed by extended duty in the Home Guard. Citizens would have the opportunity to shift experience while retaining earned rank. Even more efficient would be the use of medically discharged or disabled veterans, who can still offer knowledge, skill and low-intensity service.
> 
> The untapped talent in the Civil Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary could serve as a starting point for building the Home Guard. Along our border, it would become a constructive outlet in place of ad hoc voluntary militia attempting to provide border protection in some states. Leaders drawn from their local communities would be trained in crisis communications and crowd control.
> 
> Hurricane Katrina proved the lynchpin role played by the National Guard and Reserve. The poor federal response underlines the need for a Home Guard. The aftermath also gives America some idea of the necessary preparation to react following an attack with a weapon of mass effect. This Home Guard would connect the first responders with the very people they serve. In fact, the Home Guard would become a highly organized group of newly recruited first responders
> 
> David Abshire is president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. Jonah J. Czerwinski is senior research associate and director of homeland security projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency.


----------



## Echo9

First a couple of disclaimers:
1.  there's absolutely no chance whatsoever of something like this happening, so it's for discussion purposes only
2.  I'm wading deep here, in an attempt to stir up some poop, but here goes:


There are a few things that we know right now about coming force structures:
1.  There's an additional 25k pers coming between reg and reserve.
2.  Much of that added pers is going to have to go to the pointy end, specifically, outside of Ottawa, and 
3.  There are a number of "new" potential battalions:
  - 3-4 rapid reaction battalions
  - CSOR (and Para Regt?)
  - 8-12 "city" regiments, combined between reg and res
  - LFRR growth
  - unspecified other growth (though this is more likely to fill out the hollow army)
4.  The above units (less the CSOR and Paras) will want to be affiliated with one of the Infantry Regts, as I would think that they're going to be primarily based around the Infantry.  

Now, for my more controversial bits:
1.  Rather than simply make a 4th or 5th battalion of the current regiments, the regiments that were stood down in the 60s (QOR, RHC, CG?) could be revived.  Some of this might mean that existing battalions are renamed- 2 RCR becomes 1 RHC again, 2 VP becomes 1 QOR- to build up some of a base of personnel.
2.  The city units, with combinations of reg/ res, are going to be unholy messes of cap badges in many places (think of Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, or Vancouver).  These should also be affiliated (and badged) under one of the regiments.
3.  With the above and LFRR also combining unit HQ's, it's finally the time to put a bunch of cap badges out to pasture.  While the collected Honourary Colonels won't let this happen lightly, one way of potentially defusing the issue- partially- would be to badge under the regular regiments- I get the impression that almost as much of the resistance to merging is the refusal to wear the hat badge of the cross town rival as it is to see theirs go down.
4.  If that's a step too far, you could even allow what the Brits have done in their re-org and allow battalions to carry distinctive titles that bear witness to their histories ie. 7 RCR (Lincoln & Welland).

The end result- you have probably 2-3 regular battalions and perhaps 3-4 reserve battalions per Regiment, with a total of 5 (or more) Regiments.  Because of the growth, you have no large change in the career management pool for each Regiment. 

I think that you lower the barriers between reg and res, since you're all wearing the same hat badge.  For those who dismiss this point, I'll note that there's generally much better relations in my own trade (engineers), which I think is at least partially a result of the family aspects of showing up wearing the same accoutrements.

You still have the benefits of the regimental system, while eliminating it's shallow end of the gene pool.  For those who note that you're doing away with the pride of the regimental histories, my immediate suggestion is that a regiment that parades 50 isn't doing much to support those histories itself.  We have the units and force structure that we have now because the WW2 ORBAT has been set in aspic since the armistice (with some nibbling away).  Most other armies have done this kind of re-org, and I think that we haven't gone down this route yet because we haven't mattered enough.

In other posts, I've noted that I'm generally against changes unless there's a big operational improvement.  Well, I think that there's just such an improvement here- from the perspective of more seemlessly operating between reg and res.  Those who believe strongly in the regimental family should allow their thoughts to carry to the logical conclusion- if it's good for cohesion, then it's good for cohesion.  With the amount of reserve augmentation going on right now, that's something useful. 



The down side?  Well, the RCR would need a new alphabet....


----------



## dglad

Two thoughts--

1. While your idea has merits, I think you're underestimating the likely resistance to such sweeping change, as well as the considerable resources and tenacity of those who would mount such resistance; and

2. I think you're overestimating the "friction" that exists between the Reg F and Res F in the cbt arms (I presume you're referring to inf and armd primarily, since those two branches are the most obvious place for cap-badge wars to occur).  Back in the late 70s and into the early 90s, I agree that there was an almost institutional bias across the Reg F towards Res F members (which was, in various respects, both deserved and not deserved).  However, with the impressive and essentially seamless performance of Reservists (especially lately), a great deal of that friction has eased.  Certainly, there are individuals in both components that remain "difficult", but Reservists are suffering hardships and spilling blood beside their Reg F comrades.  From experience, cap badges very quickly "disappear" in an operational setting, leaving only soldiers.

There will be change, but it will likely be much more incremental and will probably be more organizational in the context of existing cap-badges e.g. rather than merging units, grouping them in some fashion to streamline the number of actual unit HQs (since our important force generation in the Reserves involves soldiers and junior leaders, not unit-level resources)  and reduce the hollowness of the Res F as a whole.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

dglad said:
			
		

> There will be change, but it will likely be much more incremental and will probably be more organizational in the context of existing cap-badges e.g. rather than merging units, grouping them in some fashion to streamline the number of actual unit HQs (since our important force generation in the Reserves involves soldiers and junior leaders, not unit-level resources)  and reduce the hollowness of the Res F as a whole.



Echo9 had some interesting points, but I believe that dglad has hit upon the answer - functional and geographic groupings.  When the SD&G Highlanders hit the beaches of Normandy, they had an SD&G HQ and a coy, the PWOR had a coy, and the Brocks had a coy - sounds like a natural grouping to me...

Dave


----------



## McG

Much has been touched on geographic groupings here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713.0/all.html

One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.


----------



## big bad john

MCG said:
			
		

> Much has been touched on geographic groupings here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713.0/all.html
> 
> One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.



In the UK  Companies have kept regimental traditions alive in a post amalgamation world.  It is a common fact of life there.  Battalions are doing it in the new Super Regiments.


----------



## dglad

MCG said:
			
		

> One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.



Quite true.  The trick is going to be reconciling this fact with the interests of--among others--Honouraries and Senates.

Another important point to note is that even if the Royal Highland Polar Bear Regiment ends up being a sub-unit grouped under another infantry RHQ, that doesn't mean the RHPBR's own HQ has to cease to exist.  It can simply be zero-manned, and remain available to "reinflate" in time of national requirement.  There are those that will argue that you can't easily reconstitute a unit from a sub-unit in time of emergency--at least with any degree of cohesiveness--but I would counter that the Res F is currently incapable of filling its bill of COs, RSMs and unit HQ staff anyway, so we're already playing a shell game with our Res units.  If we can only generate a portion of the LCols and CWOs we need for our current structure, then the current structure obviously needs to be changed.  It's within the detailed nature of that change where the devil resides.


----------



## McG

One additional recommendation (discussed in the linked thread) was to zero-man all regimental Bn HQs and create regional Bn HQs free of regimental affiliation (so neither the RHPBR nor the Kootney Highlanders can complain about being under the other's HQ).


----------



## Brad Sallows

The proposal to create new 20/80 (give or take) battalions provides a way to make an end run around obstacles to change.  Support the new establishments, and let the old ones wither on the vine if they don't meet expectations (don't reinforce failure).  If in a city/district there is a 20/80 battalion with high standards of administration and training, doing useful things and with access to interesting resources and training activities, what young recruit will prefer to join a 5/95 militia regiment to do endless cycles of MLOC (or whatever it is being called now)?  The supporting "establishments" outside the chain of command will have two options: bitch about the competition (never seemly), or rise to the competition and lean on the current unit leadership cadres to make the units well worth joining, supporting, and perpetuating.  In fairness, this would mean providing resources commensurate with expectations to the measurably successful 5/95 units.


----------



## Echo9

I do recognize that this concept would represent radical change, and that there would be substantial friction in accomplishing it (hence my original comment that there would be no chance in hell of it occurring).

Also, I'll note that the ideas of reducing hat badges to single companies with merged (or neutral) Bn HQ's is actually the currently planned approach.  So, the idea of the SD&G, PWOR and Brock is actually the most likely course of action.

I guess my stir of the pot is that this seems to be a typically Canadian dodge, and that there may be valid reasons for going a step farther.  I think that the Reg/Res integration has more to it than simply at the soldier level- something that I think we're going to see is something much more like the US terms of service, where people go to active or reserve status with relative ease- you sign a contract for continuous service for a period, and then revert to reserve terms of service at the end of contracts.  In such a scenario, the ability to maintain a constant regimental affiliation becomes much more attractive, and actually provides value to the CF in terms of maintaining soldier belonging to the organization.  If the transition means changing your uniforms, you're less likely to do it than if you can simply transfer from the 1st Battalion, RHPBR to the 4th Battalion.

I would suggest that with a single company, particularly an understrength company, isn't really doing much to perpetuate the honour of the regiment, and that without a certain critical mass, the regimental identity will not be maintained.  And hey, perhaps that ends up being the genius of the current approach- merge the units first, get rid of some of the honouraries and senates, and then go with the bigger plan.


----------



## pbi

> get rid of some of the honouraries and senates, and then go with the bigger plan.



Based on my experiences with our LFRR proposals in 38 CBG in 2003/2005, this is an unfair generalization. In particular, we proposed to amalgamate our three Gunner units into a single large unit, and our three Svc Bns in a similar manner. The Army got "cold feet" over the "A word" so we sucked back a bit an proposed "tactical grouping". We issued the orders and started the machinery moving.(Since I left the Bde, this has moved ahead to some degree...dglad could probably give us an update). We engaged the affected Honoraries from the get go, and we had their willing support throughout. I was sometimes surprised by their frank assessments of their units' actual conditions (particularly the horrible and widespread succession problem for COs and RSMs). They never obstructed us, once. The obstruction and fear-mongering came from Res 2000, who waged a particularly ill informed and (IMHO) unsavoury campaign to try to stop us.

Honoraries, in my opinion, are very important. This is why the Govt takes such an interest in who they are and how they are appointed. If you get the right person, you get a great supporter for the unit in the community. If the Bde Comd and HQ make the effort to keep them well informed, bring them into the fold, and consult with them as appropriate, I believe you will get much more back than the little they cost DND. We always did this with our Hons: they were regular attenders at all Bde Comd Confs. 

In the past history of our Army, all too often, the only people outside the Res unit who even cared about it at all were the Honoraries. It certainly wasn't the Regular Army, and sometimes not even the Militia's own hierarchy. If the Hons became somewhat parochial and defensive, maybe that is understandable.

Cheers


----------



## WLSC

In the 60's and 70's almost half of the reserve units in Québec were almalgamated.  Today, we are still facing the same problem plus one more.  In the Montréal island, their is 5 inf units, 1 armd, arty and eng each.  In the immediate subburb, 2 more unit.  Each of these units parade around 130 pers/month.  We have, in SQFT 2 Brigades group (34 and 35) of around 9 units.

  Their is however a big succession problem mostly with the RSM.  I do not think that an another set of amalgamation will not help very much but a neutral bn HQ might do.  You have to consider that each of those regimental coy would have to keep their recruting cell and probably their Colors.  As for building, you have to keep some were they are to keep the link with the population.


----------



## paracowboy

I think you are over-estimating the actual numbers that will be available, anyway. The numbers that are being touted will not reflect reality when you consider the number of personnel leaving the Forces and the numbers that will be recruited and not trained, spending their entire BE in PAT Platoons across the nation or simply get tired of the wait and leave before their BE is complete. This talk of multiple new battalions is just that: talk.


----------



## McG

Echo9 said:
			
		

> I guess my stir of the pot is that this seems to be a typically Canadian dodge, and that there may be valid reasons for going a step farther.  I think that the Reg/Res integration has more to it than simply at the soldier level- something that I think we're going to see is something much more like the US terms of service, where people go to active or reserve status with relative ease- ...  If the transition means changing your uniforms, you're less likely to do it than if you can simply transfer from the 1st Battalion, RHPBR to the 4th Battalion.


This is the concept that differentiates this thread from the other Reserve regimental restructure thread (and in a way bridges the gap to the Regular Force Regimental formation thread).

Effectively, each Reg battalion would be a different regiment but each of these regiments would include several reserve battalions (some possibly being 20/80 battalions).  In this vision, would the regiment replace the CBGs as that reserve formation?  31 CBG would become the Royal Canadian Regiment (three sticks on the map symbol) with 1 RCR being regular force, 2 RCR being Hamilton, 3 RCR being Windsor, and 4 RCR being London.  Outlying regions likely would contain a company or platoon of one of  these battalions.


----------



## Echo9

fair comment on the honouraries- they are often the one point outside of the regiment itself that cares.  They can also do a lot to get things for the army as a whole that the generals are unable to.  The Downsview (Denison) armouries are a prime example of this- they were largely built off the efforts of the honouraries in setting the stage with the government of the time.

I would, however, take issue with using the example of the amalgamation of 3 arty units, and largely for the reasons that I put forward in my original posting.  The key difference between the success of that endeavour and the task that's upcoming for the infantry is exactly the issue that I was suggesting needed to be addressed head on- that of hat badge.  Those of us wearing a corps cap badge already take advantage of the benefits.  I myself have been in 3 different units, without much impact through the change- again, the hat badge remained the same.  

There just doesn't seem to be the same propensity to carry over in the infantry.  I could be wrong- my sample size is relatively small- but that's the hunch that I get.


----------



## dglad

Echo9 said:
			
		

> I would, however, take issue with using the example of the amalgamation of 3 arty units, and largely for the reasons that I put forward in my original posting.  The key difference between the success of that endeavour and the task that's upcoming for the infantry is exactly the issue that I was suggesting needed to be addressed head on- that of hat badge.  Those of us wearing a corps cap badge already take advantage of the benefits.  I myself have been in 3 different units, without much impact through the change- again, the hat badge remained the same.
> 
> There just doesn't seem to be the same propensity to carry over in the infantry.  I could be wrong- my sample size is relatively small- but that's the hunch that I get.



There's a world of difference, however, between the relative mobility that a common corps badge may allow for its members as they move among units, and actually amalgamating those units.  In my experience, the guns are just as unit-proud as the infantry.  The concept of tactically-grouping some units, so that several share a unit HQ--has been implemented in 38 CBG and has been reasonably successful.  The artillery in 38 CBG, represented by two regiments (each with an outlying battery) and an independent field battery already had a culture of working together, simply because a troop- or battery-level exercise is of very limited use to the guns; the best training is at regiment level or higher.  It was recognized by the artillery leadership early on that exercising together (even though it means travelling literally hundreds of km in 38 CBG) was the only feasible way to train collectively.  As a result, when the tactical grouping occurred, it was essentially seamless, as it just formalized a practice that had been occuring anyway.  BUT--and this is a significan but--those units still remain distinct, with their own UICs and budgets.  So, even in the artillery, there is a profound desire to maintain unit integrity.

The infantry presents the greatest challenge, because the concept of those units training collectively has only been introduced fairly recently (at least in 38 CBG).  Inf training in 38 CBG (and, I suspect, in most other units) is typically conducted locally at platoon or, on occasion, company level.  Once upon a time, there were MILCONS that allowed training at company or even battalion level, but these were annual affairs that were not well-integrated with unit training and really did little more than stoke the fires of unit rivalry once a year (again, this was my experience in the old Prairie Militia Area.  Other Areas' mileage may vary).  It has now been generally recognized that it really is beneficial for the Royal Regina Rifles, the North Saskatchewan Regiment, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada and the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment to train together, under a single command structure, and as often as possible.  However, I said concept at the outset of this paragraph, not culture, because it's not a culture yet for the 38 CBG inf to train together.  But there probably are definite advantages to group some or all of these five units in some fashion; the collective training and cohesion-building among their soldiers and leaders has to continue to smooth the way, as it did for the artillery.


----------



## Mountie

I've discussed this in other threads so I won't go into too much detail.  But why not re-organize the under strength Militia brigades into full strength battle groups.  Each brigade group would become a battle group with each battalion/regiment reduced to sub-unit size and maintained as a sub-unit. (I would split 38 & 39 CBGs into two battle groups each for ease of organization.  I don't know if the increased personnel numbers that are promised would support this or not.)  This is just for conversation sake:

38 Canadian Battle Group
- 38 CBG Headquarters (non-unit specific)
- Royal Winnipeg Rifles (rifle company)
- Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (rifle company)
- Lake Supior Scottish (rifle company)
- Fort Garry Horse (recce squadron)
- 26th Field Regiment (artillery battery)
- 116th Independent Field Battery (air defence troop)
- 38 Field Engineer Troop
- 17 Service Battalion (service company) 
- 17 Field Ambulance (medical platoon)


----------



## COBRA-6

That's pretty much the idea/structure of the proposed Territorial Defence Battalions.


----------



## McG

COBRA-6 said:
			
		

> the proposed Territorial Defence Battalions.


Is that the name being applied to the Conservative's big city emergency-responce battalions?


----------



## Haggis

MCG said:
			
		

> Is that the name being applied to the Conservative's big city emergency-responce battalions?



i've heard the term "Territotial Defence Battle Groups", inferring a combined arms team.  Not quite sure if the Army Reserve is ready to be referred to as "Tee-Dee-Bee-Gee".  Sounds pretty '70's to me....


----------



## George Wallace

Haggis said:
			
		

> ......referred to as "Tee-Dee-Bee-Gee".  Sounds pretty '70's to me....



So that is why BG's went out of fashion.   ;D


----------



## Gunner

Haggis said:
			
		

> i've heard the term "Territotial Defence Battle Groups", inferring a combined arms team.  Not quite sure if the Army Reserve is ready to be referred to as "Tee-Dee-Bee-Gee".  Sounds pretty '70's to me....



I believe the correct name is Territorial Defence Battalions (TDBNs).


----------



## McG

Sounds like an unrealistic role.  I like the idea of regional 10/90 BGs for the addition it will provide to our overall force capability, but I don't think that "territorial defence" is a likely requirement a traditional BG in a regional capacity.  "Regional Battle Group" would be more accurate (me thinks).


----------



## Gunner

I wouldn't use the "battle group" moniker as it is as unrealistic as calling reserve formations "Brigade Groups".  Territorial Defence is perhaps also a misnomer as you state.  "Regional Domestic Response Battalion (RDRB)" would probably be a better title.


----------



## Haggis

TDBG
TDBn
RBn
RDRB
CBG

It's all just more ABL used to obscure the fact that nothing is happening in LFRR.


----------



## McG

Gunner said:
			
		

> I wouldn't use the "battle group" moniker as it is as unrealistic as calling reserve formations "Brigade Groups".


Well, there is a CANLANDGEN that says we (the army) must use “battle group” for combined arms manoeuvre units.  I’d rather go with “battalion group” but that was also ban from use.

As a work around, let’s go with “Standing Regional Contingency Force (city name here).”


----------



## dglad

The term being used is "Territorial Defence Battalion".   They're still a work-in-progress.


----------



## McG

dglad said:
			
		

> The term being used is "Territorial Defence Battalion".


Yeah, we've already got that.  The name needs some fixing.


----------



## dglad

MCG said:
			
		

> Yeah, we've already got that.  The name needs some fixing.



Ah...my bad.  I thought there was some uncertainty around what the name was, not that we're looking for a better one.


----------



## McG

This is Army.ca.  We fix the important & trivial as though they were both important (and as though we were army council).  ;D


----------



## dglad

Rather like the way we prioritize things i.e. this item is priority 1, and this item is...well, it's priority 1 as well, and so's this one...and this one, well it's not quite priority 1, but it's pretty close, so let's call it priority 1a....


----------



## pbi

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Once upon a time, I was posted into a Toronto Reserve unit as the "RegF guy."
> I looked around and asked why they didn't amalgamate units...
> 
> Man, having those nails driven into your palms and feet really stings!



Funny that you got that reaction. I served in the RRegtC 1974-1982, leaving as a WO. Many were the times my fellow Sgts and I stood around the bar in the WOs &Sgts holding forth on how there should just be one decent sized Res Inf Bn in Toronto instead of five understrength "company equivalents". It made sense to us then, and I bet that it makes sense to a lot of Res today, who are not as bound by old thinking, and do not see a RegF devil behind every tree.

Cheers


----------



## Danjanou

pbi said:
			
		

> Funny that you got that reaction. I served in the RRegtC 1974-1982, leaving as a WO. Many were the times my fellow Sgts and I stood around the bar in the WOs &Sgts holding forth on how there should just be one decent sized Res Inf Bn in Toronto instead of five understrength "company equivalents". It made sense to us then, and I bet that it makes sense to a lot of Res today, who are not as bound by old thinking, and do not see a RegF devil behind every tree.
> 
> Cheers



Ah what a difference a decade makes. Less than 10 years later when I arrived across the floor at FYA as a transfer in to the Tor Scots, I had that same conversation in that same Mess with those same WOs (now MWOs and CWO for the most part I'd bet). they went looking for the nails and lumber that they'd used on JM.  ;D


----------



## Donut

39 CBG is adopting a "Tactical Grouping" plan that will see (I believe) all of our Cbt Arms units under "Shared HQ's" until they achieve a 200 pers parade state, i.e. the Rocky Mountain Rangers and Seaforth will share a HQ until one or the other parades 200 pers, at which point they will regain their independant HQ.  Same for the Arty, Armd (are they just Recce now?), and Eng.

As for us in the HS, we've got a LCol, Maj, CWO, MWO, among others, for a unit that has 83 names on the nominal roll (not regular paraders).  Our sister Fd Amb in Victoria has about the same.  Efficient, no?

DF


----------



## Haggis

pbi said:
			
		

> Funny that you got that reaction. I served in the RRegtC 1974-1982, leaving as a WO. Many were the times my fellow Sgts and I stood around the bar in the WOs &Sgts holding forth on how there should just be one decent sized Res Inf Bn in Toronto instead of five understrength "company equivalents". It made sense to us then, and I bet that it makes sense to a lot of Res today, who are not as bound by old thinking, and do not see a RegF devil behind every tree.
> 
> Cheers



For this to be even rationally discussed, certain ground rules must be in place:

1. No cap badges wil disappear;
2. Command will be based on merit and qualifications ONLY;  If you're not good, you're not next.  We can, and will, look outside.
3. If you want to progress as leaders you must keep up with the times.  WW2 and the Cold War are over.  Get with that.
4. Tactical and technical proficiency will be rewarded more readily than efficiency, although both will be realisitically weighted in determining the future of any one unit/sub-unit.

I put no. 1 there on purpose.  But, ,in reality, it matters little because in helmets we all look the same anyways.  That is what we should look for.


----------



## Infanteer

Haggis said:
			
		

> 1. No cap badges wil disappear;



Pourquoi?  As Rick said earlier, the British seemed to do be able to do so with Regiments that just got a battle honour last year, let alone 60 years ago.

But as you say, the "tactical" organization (helmets) is more important than the "tribal" organization (funny hats) - but are these two mutually exclusive?  I can't help think that they are, and "tribal" organization would interfere with things like accession, share of tasks, etc, etc.  But I also suspect that even if we went to a common capbadge people would simply find other ways to differentiate themselves (those Island guys, or those Interior clowns, etc, etc)


----------



## Remius

I think it's because that kind of compromise would be more acceptable to regimental assoc., honouraries vets etc.  They would be able to accept the changes without feeling that their regimental existance is gone.


----------



## big bad john

Crantor said:
			
		

> I think it's because that kind of compromise would be more acceptable to regimental assoc., honoraries vets etc.  They would be able to accept the changes without feeling that their regimental eexistenceis gone.



In the UK we have found that the key is that the Regimental existenceas you put it continues.  For example, look at the new Royal Regiment of Scotland.  The Battalions have continued the traditions of the founding regiments:  

(From the Regimental website  http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/regts/scots/the_battalions/index.htm)

"The Royal Scots Borderers, 1st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland

The Royal Scots Borderers (1 SCOTS) are the product of a merger between two famous antecedent Regiments, The Royal Scots and The King's Own Scottish Borderers, carrying on celebrated traditions and maintaining a reputation for excellence. The Battalion has inherited a broad range of infantry skills for all types of operations but particularly specialising in jungle warfare and fighting in built up areas. As well as that, its rugby players are currently the Army's Premier Rugby League and Rugby Sevens champions.  1 SCOTS is the local Battalion for the Lothians, Borders and Lanarkshire, and is based in Dreghorn Barracks, Edinburgh.



The Royal Highland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland

The Royal Highland Fusiliers (2 SCOTS) have a proud heritage dating back to 1678 that included fighting in every major campaign the British Army has ever been involved in. Since the Second World War, the Battalion has deployed on operations all over the world, most recently in Iraq. 2 SCOTS are the local Battalion for Glasgow and Ayrshire and are based in Glencorse Barracks, Penicuik, where they are training to become the Army's quick reaction Spearhead Battalion, on standby to be sent at short notice to any troublespot in the world.



The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland

The Black Watch (3 SCOTS) is one of the most famous army units in the world and traces its origins to six independent companies formed in 1725 to police the Highlands. Their first battle was at Fontenoy in 1745 and they have served with prominence and distinction all around the world since then, including America, Waterloo, both World Wars, Korea and Kosovo. They were the last British Battalion in Hong Kong and served in Iraq for the invasion and for their high profile deployment to Camp Dogwood supporting the US Marines. The Black Watch are the local Battalion for Perth, Dundee, Angus and Fife and are based near Belfast in Northern Ireland.



The Highlanders, 4th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland

The Highlanders (4 SCOTS) came into being in 1994 as an amalgamation of The Queen's Own Highlanders and The Gordon Highlanders and have since served with distinction in Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Bosnia and trained in places such as Gibralter and Belize. In 2004, they became an Armoured Infantry Battalion as part of 7th Armoured Brigade, the world renowned 'Desert Rats'. 4 SCOTS are the local Battalion for the Highlands and are based in Fallingbostel, Germany and are at the forefront of the army as soldiers, skiers and sportsmen.



The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 5th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 

The 'Argylls' (5 SCOTS) are over two hundred years old and have a record second to none as a fierce fighting unit, most famously nicknamed 'The Thin Red Line' for their defeat of the Russian Cavalry at the battle of Balaklava in 1854. They continue to demonstrate this ferocity as Scotland's Air Assault Battalion, working alongside elements of the Parachute Regiment and Army Air Corps, being ready and trained to deploy to any trouble spot in the world, at very short notice. The Argylls are the local Battalion for the west of Scotland and are based in Canterbury.



52nd Lowland, 6th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland

52nd Lowland (6 SCOTS) has a long and illustrious heritage as the descendant of Territorial units that fought in both World Wars. Nowadays it is a Light Role Infantry Battalion, which means it can specialise in anti-tank missile systems, mortars and machine guns as well as the normal infantry role of defeating the enemy. The Battalion recruits from all over the lowlands with TA Centres in Ayr, Bathgate, Dumfries, Edinburgh, Galashiels, Glasgow and Motherwell. 6 SCOTS frequently deploys soldiers on operations with Regular Battalions to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans and has trained in recent years on exercises in the Ukraine, America, Belgium and Slovakia. 



51st Highland, 7th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 

51st Highland (7 SCOTS) is the descentant of the famous 'Fighting 51st' Highland Division which fought on France's Western Front in the First World War and in El Alamein and Normandy in the Second World War. It is a Light Role Infantry Battalion, which means that it is highly skilled with the same weapons as its Regular counterparts and trained in the tactics of a modern infantry unit. 7 SCOTS has deployed soldiers on operations to Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans and has trained in recent years on exercises in Romania, Canada, Kenya and Cyprus. The Battalion recruits from all over the highlands and has TA Centres in Aberdeen, Dumbarton, Dunoon, Dundee, Inverness, Keith, Kirkaldy, Lerwick, Peterhead, Perth, Stirling, Stornoway and Wick. "

This is an example of preserving your regimental traditions in an amalgamation and by no means is this the only way.  In the UK alone we have done it numerous other ways ourselves.

I hope that this helps.


----------



## Journeyman

pbi said:
			
		

> Funny that you got that reaction.



But you cut out my next line....


			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Any change that will make a unit more effective (ie - more realistic training) will be supported by the majority of the troops. Most changes, however, face resistance from those that see the Reserves as a social club, the regimental mafias, and to a lesser degree, the Honouraries. They will have to be brought on side, or otherwise de-fanged.


The troops tend to be onside, and see the logic of having a unit large enough to do realistic AND.....dare I say.....fun, training. But you cannot deny there are impediments to militia evolution.  :


----------



## TCBF

Two Questions:

One:  Why now, when we have the money, are we planning on getting rid of hat badges?  We have lost too many over the last eighty years, and I don't believe amalgamation solves any problems at all.  Perhaps in U.K. but here our population is too spread out to have local interest in a Regiment from a city hundreds of miles away.  Rationalize where you can, but do NOT strike Regiments from the Order of Battle.  Even 'Reduction To Nil Strength' is better than that - you can always bring them back. 

Two:  Why does Toronto - the center of the known universe - not have the largest militia Regiments in Canada?  There are 4,558,800 people in Toronto,  and 4,168,123 people in British Columbia.  Who parades the most Reservists?


----------



## R031button

TCBF said:
			
		

> Two:  Why does Toronto - the center of the known universe - not have the largest militia Regiments in Canada?  There are 4,558,800 people in Toronto,  and 4,168,123 people in British Columbia.  Who parades the most Reservists?



Maybe because there's more regiments in Toronto then in BC...


----------



## TCBF

Count'em.

http://www.cflc.forces.gc.ca/provinces/on/on-who_e.asp


----------



## Spr.Earl

R031button said:
			
		

> Maybe because there's more regiments in Toronto then in BC...


Er let me think there is C.4th's ,Can Scot's,B.Cr's,15th Field RCA,5 Tribe RCA,Rocky Mountain ram buggers and not last but the best,6Fd and 44Fd Sqn CME.,oh and not lets forget 12Svc,12Med and that same on the Island,the only reason we are good is because we on the left coast make do with what we get from Upper Canada!

 You lot down east are so pampered when it comes to funding ,we get jack shit and make do with what we get and we work hard with what we are given and over the years in my own ipinion we produced bloody good soldiers who have gone on into the Reg.'s

Don't come the old quantity crap with us.


----------



## pbi

> 1. No cap badges wil disappear;



Why, though? If I'm not mistaken, a goodly number of the Inf Regts that exist today are the results of rebadgings and amalgamations that occurred mostly in the first half of the 20th century. So what? As long as the battle honours are preserved, and there is some reasonable way of respectfully perpetuating key traditions of the former units, and a strong connection is maintained with the local community (probably the most important factor), IMHO no real harm is done. The regiment (under whatever name) long outlasts those who served in it at a particular time under a particular badge.


My point would be: don't get rid of cap badges willy-nilly, or "just because"; but don't let capbadges become an unnecessary obstacle for change that is needed.  If we accept that badges and traditions have any real value at all in building identity and cohesion (i.e.: they serve some purpose other than passing historical interest), then if we create new structures we have to create an identity that supports that structure and makes it strong, by whatever the smartest and most effective means is.

Cheers


----------



## Rifleman62

Well, I have been around for a long time ( as pbi can attest to ), and I strongly advocate the tactical grouping of units. There are tons of reasons to do so, and few sound reasons not to do it. May unit succession go to the most worthy, not the last person standing. Our PRes units have not won a battle honour since 1945! The CLS will wisely, cut through the chaff and do it. It is long past time that we in the Reserve got on with transformation. Do I want my capbadge to disappear. No, but it won't with tactical grouping as we have done in 38 CBG with the Arty and Svc Bns.


----------



## Gunner

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Well, I have been around for a long time ( as pbi can attest to ), and I strongly advocate the tactical grouping of units. There are tons of reasons to do so, and few sound reasons not to do it. May unit succession go to the most worthy, not the last person standing. Our PRes units have not won a battle honour since 1945! The CLS will wisely, cut through the chaff and do it. It is long past time that we in the Reserve got on with transformation. Do I want my capbadge to disappear. No, but it won't with tactical grouping as we have done in 38 CBG with the Arty and Svc Bns.



+1

(to the points you raised and for being around for a long time!)


----------



## darmil

We had a briefing on Wednesday night on what is going to happen to some of the reserve units across LFWA.Also a brief touch on the Territorial battalions that are active now which all reserve units belong to now.Most units are being merged together like for example two Artillery units in one province will only have one CO, same for service batt .For the armoured units in 41 BG(Alberta) its not clear whats going to happen because reserve armour never goes over seas a tankers and so forth.The army wants more INFANTRY so you never know.As for the Calgary Highlanders and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment these two units are being left alone for now because they are augmenting the reg force.It seems that the units that have poor numbers are being merged together which makes sense, my CO showed this on the power point.Its going to be interesting on whats going to happen in the next few years. Watch and shoot!


----------



## TCBF

"...and a strong connection is maintained with the local community (probably the most important factor),"

- It is the most important factor - but the one that was not considered.  Look at the towns who lost their units and armouries in the last fifty years.  There are now only cadets in those towns, and the Armoury is a restaurant or similar.  You can't expect people outside of the mega cities to drive two hours to parade.  We have lost the concept of community armouries.  No wonder those of us in uniform appear an alien race to our universities.


----------



## darmil

I agree about the towns losing the armouries, that came up on Wednesdays briefing.Hopefully they have a plan to bring sub units out to rural areas.There was someone on this site that was trying to get a infantry coy to Prince George can't remember who that was.Anyways places like PG should have reserve coys even for domestic stuff like forest fires and such.Maybe this might be an idea in the Territorial battalions.


----------



## pbi

> You can't expect people outside of the mega cities to drive two hours to parade.



Really? That was quite common in 38 CBG: we had lots of soldiers making long hauls to get to their units in SK, MB and NWON. Some units even changed to parading on weekends so soldiers could drive in on Fri night and home on Sun afternoon. Still, I agree with re-establishing outlying sub-units in areas that are not currently served by a local Reserve unit.

Cheers


----------



## ArmyRick

Does anybody have a link for LFRR web sites (public or DIN)?


----------



## Brad Sallows

>As for us in the HS, we've got a LCol, Maj, CWO, MWO, among others, for a unit that has 83 names on the nominal roll (not regular paraders).  Our sister Fd Amb in Victoria has about the same.  Efficient, no?

And how many Res F Capt, Lt, WO, and Sgt in the same unit?

(My point: the HS reserve has a manning/rank problem right now as it makes the transition from a 'we recruit and train' to a 'we recruit the trained' force.  Right now I suppose most HS reserve units either have a couple or few old hands who have achieved high rank and a gap in the middle leadership, or just a few leaders at middle rank levels if the old hands have already left.  Imagine what the reserve infantry units would look like if they were trying to recruit primarily ex-regs and members of police SWAT teams.  What would the aforementioned unit look like in 3 years if it had change of command and RSM right now and the new appointees subsequently turned over and left 3 years hence?)


----------



## Donut

As usual, Mr Sallows, you're bang on.

It's not like anyone else is trying to hire health care providers, and this 95% employment in general isn't going to hurt us at all!   :-X


----------



## retiredgrunt45

While these ideas all have merit, no one had addressed the most important equation.

 "Were will we get the manpower to fill these new battalions, companies"?

 We can barely fill positions in the existing regiments, let alone 4 or five new battalions. We can ask reservists to transfer to these new  reg force inits, which maybe a few will but i'm sure many won't because of prior commitments, civilian jobs etc. Can't say i would blame them. Or we can authroize huge signup bonus's to new recruits, but i'm sure the treasury department would balk at that idea.

 The Americans are having the same problems with manpower shortages, only on a much larger scale. National Guard units tours in Iraq are being extended 2 or 3 times just to keep enough boots on the ground. Many of their soldiers have done 2 or 3, 1 year tours in Iraq since 2003. Even though their civilian jobs are protected back at home, it doesn't diminish the fact that these troops are tired and wore out.

 I feel the government has bit of abit more than what they can chew by extending the operation until 2009. Most of our troops are going to see 4 or 5 tours, maybe more, before its over and it's headed right in the same direction the American's are at right now. "Tired and worn out troops".


----------



## PhilB

Another quick thought/question. I have been hearing a lot lotely about the reserve battalion possibly being set up in calgary/victoria etc. I know a lot of guys in my unit are seriously considering this as an option, incl trained guys that have been deployed on roto 1. As its in their area it means less of a change or for whatever reasons they have. This could be a large pool of troops to deploy. They would have more current training and could be thrown into the mix. After my experience on my last tour I would in know way advocate sending them under reserve leadership, however if they trained together as a formed body for long enough it might be one more cohesive force to deploy. Just a thought


----------



## dglad

PhilB said:
			
		

> Another quick thought/question. I have been hearing a lot lotely about the reserve battalion possibly being set up in calgary/victoria etc. I know a lot of guys in my unit are seriously considering this as an option, incl trained guys that have been deployed on roto 1. As its in their area it means less of a change or for whatever reasons they have. This could be a large pool of troops to deploy. They would have more current training and could be thrown into the mix. After my experience on my last tour I would in know way advocate sending them under reserve leadership, however if they trained together as a formed body for long enough it might be one more cohesive force to deploy. Just a thought



I think you may be referring to the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups that are being considered for formation in various major urban centres across the country.  These are not "new" units; they are intended to be groupings of existing Reserve units tagged for force employment in domestic ops.  As such, it's likely they'll see additional training in things related to domestic ops, and could deploy in whole or in part on domestic ops under CanadaCom.  But I doubt that they would constitute organizations that are deployable on expeditionary ops.  If that's the understanding that you and your buddies have, it's probably unrealistic.  You may want to discuss the matter with your chain of command for further details.


----------



## PhilB

In reference to the territorial batt. I understand the current plan of employment for the planned unit. My point is that here is a group of obviously keen reservists that are volunteering for a full time contract. Now many reg force members here are saying, and I agree, thats reservists need a higher level of trg in order to be deployed. The new unit would be a perfect opportunity to provide said trg. Further more Im sure that many troops would be willing to deploy from this porposed unit, and aside with the new canforgen re active/inactive service tecnically couldnt they be made to?

Just and idea, if im off base in my understand of the propsed unit please let me know


----------



## sgtdixon

Oh dang... this isnt cool in the least...

So Im going to have to share a command Structure with the KOCR's....

 :-X


----------



## Remius

dglad said:
			
		

> I think you may be referring to the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups that are being considered for formation in various major urban centres across the country.  These are not "new" units; they are intended to be groupings of existing Reserve units tagged for force employment in domestic ops.  As such, it's likely they'll see additional training in things related to domestic ops, and could deploy in whole or in part on domestic ops under CanadaCom.  But I doubt that they would constitute organizations that are deployable on expeditionary ops.  If that's the understanding that you and your buddies have, it's probably unrealistic.  You may want to discuss the matter with your chain of command for further details.



Well nothing is concrete about how these units are going to work. There will be a significant number of troops on Class B though.  most of them will be dagged green.  The army has hinted that these units could be used to fill any shortfalls for operational tours overseas.  Yes the main focus is domestic ops but don't kid yourself about the need for more troops on the ground and what the CF will need to do to get more of them there.


----------



## dglad

Crantor said:
			
		

> Well nothing is concrete about how these units are going to work. There will be a significant number of troops on Class B though.  most of them will be dagged green.  The army has hinted that these units could be used to fill any shortfalls for operational tours overseas.  Yes the main focus is domestic ops but don't kid yourself about the need for more troops on the ground and what the CF will need to do to get more of them there.



As you said, nothing is concrete about this, including there being a "significant number of troops on Class B"--certainly outside of unit-level HQ elements.  We should probably wait until some more water goes under the bridge before trying to make any definitive statements about these things.  That's why I used a lot of weasel words in my original post i.e. "being considered", "intended to be", "likely they'll see", etc.  I've been briefed on these things quite recently, and they're still very much works-in-progress. 

The one thing I would say, directed to PhilB and Crantor both, is that expectations about large-scale, full-time employment for Reservists should probably be reigned in, at least for the time-being.  These TDBGs could very well end up being simply groupings of existing Reserve units that, under some circumstances, could be placed under the command of TDBG HQs for domestic ops.   In this case, the TDBG HQs would be new, and could end up employing something like a couple of dozen class B Reservists as staff officers, clerks, info tech people, etc.  But the only difference the grouped units may see would be be some more emphasis on dom ops trg in their trg plans and a few more days of class A per soldier each year.   As I said, your chain of command should be able to update you on this as it develops.


----------



## dglad

retiredgrunt45 said:
			
		

> While these ideas all have merit, no one had addressed the most important equation.
> 
> "Were will we get the manpower to fill these new battalions, companies"?



If you're talking about the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups, then we're probably not talking about new units or sub-units.  These are still works in progress, but they're probably just going to be groupings of existing Res F units that would be employed, as needed, for domestic ops under TDBG HQs.  These HQs might be new organizations, but we're talking maybe a few dozen full-time staff for all of them, across the country.  The units, however, would just be the same units we have now, with some dom ops training added to their trg plans, and maybe a few more days of class A pay per soldier.

Obviously, the messaging about these TDBGs is getting very muddied.  There seem to be lots of folks who are thinking these are going to be new, standing/full-time/Reg F organizations.  But based on a briefing I had recently, that's not really what's being considered (unless there have been some VERY recent and quite dramatic changes!)


----------



## COBRA-6

dglad said:
			
		

> Obviously, the messaging about these TDBGs is getting very muddied.  There seem to be lots of folks who are thinking these are going to be new, standing/full-time/Reg F organizations.  But based on a briefing I had recently, that's not really what's being considered (unless there have been some VERY recent and quite dramatic changes!)



+1, until the Government makes an announcement it's all speculation. I expect a number of new full-time positions, but not the addition of several-hundred PY's _initially_.


----------



## PhilB

Roger that sir, in my unit we still havent heard basically anything about this aside from the fact the they are in the works, it was just a thought. Thanks for the clarification


----------



## RangerRay

ParaMedTech said:
			
		

> 39 CBG is adopting a "Tactical Grouping" plan that will see (I believe) all of our Cbt Arms units under "Shared HQ's" until they achieve a 200 pers parade state, i.e. the Rocky Mountain Rangers and Seaforth will share a HQ until one or the other parades 200 pers, at which point they will regain their independant HQ.  Same for the Arty, Armd (are they just Recce now?), and Eng.



Very interesting.  When I was in, I always pondered about the RMRang and BCDs amalgamating to become either the Rocky Mountain Dragoons, or the British Columbia Rangers, depending on which trade won out.  Mind you, switching trades for most of the troops probably wouldn't have been very popular!

Is there any talk of full amalgamation into the "Seaforth Rangers" or the "Rocky Mountain Highlanders"?

(oh, as if the sheep jokes weren't bad enough now!  ;D)


----------



## dglad

RangerRay said:
			
		

> Very interesting.  When I was in, I always pondered about the RMRang and BCDs amalgamating to become either the Rocky Mountain Dragoons, or the British Columbia Rangers, depending on which trade won out.  Mind you, switching trades for most of the troops probably wouldn't have been very popular!
> 
> Is there any talk of full amalgamation into the "Seaforth Rangers" or the "Rocky Mountain Highlanders"?
> 
> (oh, as if the sheep jokes weren't bad enough now!  ;D)



There are some very good reasons not to do this.  There will be enormous push-back from some potentially very influential stakeholders (Honouraries, Senates, Old Boys/Veterans Associations, etc.)  Also, if you actually eliminate a unit HQ, it's gone.  It's generally considered easier and better for all concerned to zero-man the HQ of the Royal Polar Bear Highlanders, and then group them as a sub-unit under the HQ of the Queen's Own Caribou Rifles across the pde square.   The RPBH still has its traditions, history, insignia, Senate, Regimental Days, etc.; however, for training and admin purposes, it is subordinate to the QOCR HQ.  Succession to unit HQ can be drawn from either Regiment.   And, if it ever becomes necessary, the zero-manned HQ is still there on the OoB, ready to be reconstituted.  It means fewer billets for LCols and CWOs, but I think most will agree that's a minor problem compared with trying get unity of thought and effort instilled in our Res F training.


----------



## Desert Fox

Danjanou said:
			
		

> I tend to agree with one a point Michael made. it might be better to amalgamate thren watch a regiment be disbanded and die.
> let's be honest how many Militia Bn's and Regiments do we have that are Coy and Sqn strength. Realistically wouldn't we be better served by say some 18-20 Militia Infantry Regiments of roughly ar at least close to Bn strength (400-600 pers) and a similar reduction in Armoured, Arty and other units.
> 
> If such as thing is to happen, and I think it's a realistic possibility, then better it happen on "our" terms rather that some whim of a politician .
> 
> Methinks I've opened the proverbial can of worms here, but then again maybe it's worthy of a debate.



I agree with you fully on the pratical application of it... However how do you decide who gets chopped? In some areas it might be easier then in others. In 32 CBG we have 6 infantry "regiments" which = 6 CO's, 6 RSM's, probably 20 CSM's, and maybe 500 trigger pulling soldiers....   

Its a top heavy system, but the reserves it has to be, due to the nature of our service and fact that not every Sr. Mbr will be there every week/weekend you need to have an over supply of them to keep the big picture running - ie have some one step up, without having too much of a negative impact on platoon level leadership.

Ie. It's almost like a 2 tiered system where u have the training audience which is typically up to the Pl Cmd (or Coy Cmd) those who take part in the training.... and then theres the whole other side of organizing/ running / administering trg.... typically consisiting of Ex- RSM who have CFR, or CSM with 30 years in who have a wealth of knowledge and administrative use, but serve little use in the actual leading / flight..... we all know the type.....

I'd love to see the system get streamlined, and the excess fat trimmed off, literally... but good luck doing it, and good luck keeping up moral of those pers who served in the units that get absorbed by say a larger/ more effective one....   Im sure you know as well as i do what happens when 2 units work together, u get 5 diffrent "by the book" ways of doing somthing..... Prehaps it could get done by geographic lines, or almost at random where people get assigned.... once again, moral killer, but in the end could make us more effective? Like u said... Can of Worms....

Just my $0.02


----------



## The Rifleman

It seems that you are getting shafted the same way the TA (Territorial Army) infantry has been in the UK. Originally, we had volunteer regiments, that became battalions of a parent regular regiment. But those battalions got messed around with endlessly. Inf changed to Engineer, then Arty, then Signals, then back to Inf. Some went to Engineer, then Arty, then Signals, back to Inf - and then Logistics. Some went Inf, Tanks, Signals, disbandment. The lucky ones were reduced down to company or platoon strength.

We did have 7 years of hybrid regiments - that is a regiment made up by multiple cap badged units based on geographical boundaries- and it was a complete mess. For example, the London Regiment was made up by companies with the following cap badges - Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, Royal Green Jackets (x2), London Irish Rifles, Princess of Wales Royal Regiment and the London Scottish. Now, with the regular army going through a massive re-badging exercise, the TA battalions are now back to being part of a larger regular regiment, with a single identity. The Londons however, remain an oddity and have been brigaded with the Guards (less the 2 RGJ companies who will join the Rifles)


----------



## Desert Fox

Wow, Riflemen, that souds more messed up then what we have...

However, due to the geographic vastness of Canada, vary few Res. units are located in the same area as a Reg unit. There is a big disconnect of the Res and Reg in those terms. This is not to say we don't/can't work in cooperation. But we only come together for deployments and thats about it. The only standing presence of Reg pers within a Res. unit is the attachment of a few pers. typically 1-3 from my expereince with my Regiment. They tend to fill vital roles such as OP's WO. 

We've been lucky in terms of Regiments not rebadging in recent times. However we do have a history of some unit doing the change as you desribed. 

Now, when you say "Company" do you actaully mean a 120 troops?  Because in our case, every Res. unit is called a regiment, however, for the most part they are at about company strengh. My "Regiment" has three "Coy"  which average just over platoon strenght.  It is my understanding that in the UK a TA Company is actually a fully manned company... can you please clear this up for me?  

Cheers!


----------



## Fishbone Jones

For all the people willing, and advocating, the termination of the top (LCol, RSM, etc) of Reserve Regiments, a question (or a few, if you will). What do you envision the status of these people, that put in 20-30 years with the Reserves? Do you tell them they'll never progress past Maj/ MWO? They'll never have the opportunity to take their Command courses, and be allowed to put these lessons into practice? That after serving faithfully for all those years the best they can ever hope for is Pltn Commander/ WO? With the growth that's being bandied about, (doubling the strength of the Res Regiments), is it so far fetched to expect these positions to remain?

Before everyone jumps in with "It's like that in the Regs", we *know* we're comparing apples and oranges.

Just a thought, but before you decide these persons careers, you have to look at all aspects of your decisions.


----------



## dapaterson

Recceguy:  most Reserve LCols never will command a battalion. They never put those lessons into practice because they command, at most, a rump company.  You can count on one hand the number of Reserve units that parade over 200 soldiers - and have fingers to spare.  (well, if you round up the one unit with 197 parading for the month, you'll have a finger to spare).

That experiential delta is a key problem in the Army Reserve - LCols have no bn command experience because they do not command bns; RSMs are actually CSMs (or, for some particularly weak units, Pl WOs on steroids).  We do people no favour by fostering this situation and mindset.  Commanders need comand experience.

Why not have a system that lets Majors command full-strength companies, where they can gain experience and possibly (gasp) go outside ther regiment for 2-3 years to work at the CBG, or work with CIMIC or some other endeavour, broadening their military experience.  The current unseemly haste to breed the next CO leads to a diluted gene pool, where far too often the last man standing is promoted.  And god forbid someone from outside the unit be appointed CO or RSM.

Truth in Advertising - an Artillery regiment that parades 49 people is not a regiment (side note: since 1998 that unit's maximum parade strength was 53).  Sticking around for 30 years should not guarantee someone a promotion to CWO or LCol in a unit that can field at best one gun det.


----------



## Desert Fox

Simpley put, we have to many chief and not enough indians. My unit, a Res. Infantry Regiment has the following (roughly)

1 LCOL, 3 Maj, 6 Capt, 6 Lt/2Lt and 1 CWO, 4 MWO, 2 WO, and countless Sgt...

However, we have the junior ranks to field a company. We like every other Res unit are top heavy. Yes Recceguy you are very correct in pointing out the fact that these people have knowledge and expereince and are exteremly valuable in an admin. function. But a significant degree of high ups in the Reserve world are living in the days of the Cold War still, they have no knowledge or expereince of of the current RMA. Until just a few years ago the focus of our training was advance to contact across the flats of meaford. 

At the same time, there is a number of people within higher who do seek info on the contemporary nature of what we do, there are those who are in tune. This is not intended to be a bashing session of Sr NCO/Officers.   

But from a business stand point, do you forsee a civilian company with 100 workers having 20 executives and senior management types? 
The structure of the Res units in terms of higher has the staffing to support full size battalions. So in terms of economics we need to boost the ranks, or trim the top. The two are out of proportion, as dapaterson put it, there are "CSM" out there filling the role of PL WO's on steroids.....

There are greater systemic issues that prevent the realization of this trimming. Such as the voluntary nature of the job, we need to be top heavy because we need people to plug holes at the top, as frankly you would be left with MCpl commanding Pl if we did not have the surplus at the top. Its a catch 22. Like i said before, its a can of worms.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Personally, I would only accept that if every, in our case, Res Armoured Regt in Ont, became an outlying Sqn of the RCD. With their badge, etc, and everything that goes with it. Equal opportunity amongst all for training, equipment, deployment, et al. The government would have to be ready and willing, financially and morally, to fund and equip us all. The Regs would have to be ready to accept it with no caveats or animosity. If this can't be met, we're just blowing smoke up each others asses.



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> Simpley put, we have to many chief and not enough indians. My unit, a Res. Infantry Regiment has the following (roughly)
> 
> 1 LCOL, 3 Maj, 6 Capt, 6 Lt/2Lt and 1 CWO, 4 MWO, 2 WO, and countless Sgt...
> 
> However, we have the junior ranks to field a company. We like every other Res unit are top heavy. Yes Recceguy you are very correct in pointing out the fact that these people have knowledge and expereince and are exteremly valuable in an admin. function. But a significant degree of high ups in the Reserve world are living in the days of the Cold War still, they have no knowledge or expereince of of the current RMA. Until just a few years ago the focus of our training was advance to contact across the flats of meaford.
> 
> At the same time, there is a number of people within higher who do seek info on the contemporary nature of what we do, there are those who are in tune. This is not intended to be a bashing session of Sr NCO/Officers.
> 
> But from a business stand point, do you forsee a civilian company with 100 workers having 20 executives and senior management types?
> The structure of the Res units in terms of higher has the staffing to support full size battalions. So in terms of economics we need to boost the ranks, or trim the top. The two are out of proportion, as dapaterson put it, there are "CSM" out there filling the role of PL WO's on steroids.....
> 
> There are greater systemic issues that prevent the realization of this trimming. Such as the voluntary nature of the job, we need to be top heavy because we need people to plug holes at the top, as frankly you would be left with MCpl commanding Pl if we did not have the surplus at the top. Its a catch 22. Like i said before, its a can of worms.



The Reserve units have been given the mandate to grow. In some cases, IIRC, by 100 %. You're going to require these people to oversee that mandate and administer the influx.


----------



## Desert Fox

You are correct, the mandate has been given to grow, and until my "Coy" sized Regiment doubles we're still looking at a very very top heavy system. We're one of the larger ones, and we still IMHO do not justify the amout of "higher ups". This manade has been in effect for a while. I have not seen much growth. Rention is a big issue. I would love to have hit the size where we parade a fully manned company at each of our locations. As it stands now, I'm a section commander with a section that resembles a 4 man recce det rather then a proper infantry section... Its hard to maintain the intrest of new Pte. and teach them section level tactics when 1-2 of my fire teams are notional. Bring us back down in terms of organization to reflect our numbers will allow us to train properly at the section level. 

Interms of augmenting the reg force, its done mainly through section sized or smaller contributions from a single reserve unit. Res CSM, PL WO, COY CMD do not deploy in those roles. 


My CSM has two 60% manned platoon to worry about. Granted he has the NES dead beats to deal with as well. So i guess that bring him up to having almost 2 full platoon. 

My RSM over looks a total of 4 undermaned platoons....     

I would love for us to get the resouces and funds required. However they simply are not there. All the extra cash is getting funneled towards a place in South West Asia, that rightfully so must be the focus.


----------



## George Wallace

A question about that mandate "To grow"; is there the money to back this up?  Reservists parading now are budgeted very tightly as to the amount of time they can parade, and that allows for very few training nights or weekends.


----------



## Desert Fox

George, im not sure as to the specifics regarding growth, but the current government has stated a few times they that wish to increase the reserves so to increase the presence of the military in communites across the Canada, as i'm sure you already know.

_Do you think that means the realization of Liberals fears of "troops with guns, in our street, in Canada" oh lordy, silly campaign ads... btw, wasnt it Trudeau that enact the War Measures Act...   [SARCASM]_

Back to the point at hand, they wish to have the reserves play an increasing role in augmenting the regular forces, which also is old news. So im sure they have somthing set aside... or at least hope so... But in terms of actual #'s or figures I am not aware of the details. 

Although speaking with my Units recruiting NCO he has been mandated to recruit above what is needed for sustainment, in other words he has been authorized to expand us, not sure by how much....But I still doubt that my CSM will have a full company anytime soon...

Interms of restricted training, I think that problem has been soloved to a degree????  I've heard the stories of the times when my unit paraded one a month, and did one ex a year and so on... But as far as i know, the units in southern ontario are doing alright on this point. I do believe a few of the northern units had this problem in recent years (heard somthing from someone to the effect) Anyone outside of southern ontario with info regarding reduced training by res units in there area?  ( its a bit off topic, but still relevent, links back to top heavy structure, fund allocation etc etc)


----------



## Haggis

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> In terms of augmenting the reg force, its done mainly through section sized or smaller contributions from a single reserve unit. Res CSM, PL WO, COY CMD do not deploy in those roles.



Careful about generalizations. Reserve OCs, CSM's, Pl Comds and Pl WOs do deploy.  It's been done before.  It's being done now (KAF D&S Pls) and it will be done again, quite possibly on a much larger scale than we're accustomed to seeing.



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> My CSM has two 60% manned platoon to worry about. Granted he has the NES dead beats to deal with as well. So I guess that bring him up to having almost 2 full platoon.



A lot of Reg F rifle coys aren't much better off these days.


----------



## Desert Fox

Haggis said:
			
		

> Careful about generalizations. Reserve OCs, CSM's, Pl Comds and Pl WOs do deploy.  It's been done before.  It's being done now (KAF D&S Pls) and it will be done again, quite possibly on a much larger scale than we're accustomed to seeing.
> 
> A lot of Reg F rifle coys aren't much better off these days.



Ok, you are right. of the 2000 Canadian in Afghanistan apx 200 or so are reserve, and you've sited that the D+S PL WO is Res. (I have buddies in that platoon right now)

Thus far my generalization is pretty accurate. 1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity.

Roto 13 in Bosnia is an exception as well, when a Res Coy went over... and on the point you make refering to it likley more common in the future... we're looking at a Coy of Res at a given time... so again.... 1 Maj, a few Capt/Lts 1 CSM and 3 WO.....   or about 1/3 of my Res Units higher ups.... multiplied by the countless res units out there... drops in the bucket....


----------



## George Wallace

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> Thus far my generalization is pretty accurate. 1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity.



Actually, not to nit pick, you are way off in your generalization of 1 for 2000.  There are not 2000 WO's in theatre.  Perhaps there are between 25 and 50, and that is being very generous.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

There's also a lot of agumentees, (CIMIC, PHSYOPS, HUMINT, etc) that are WOs' and above filling those spots.


----------



## Desert Fox

George, you have greatly mis-quoted me...

I said THERE ARE *"2000 CANADIANS"* IN AFGHANISTAN  which is actually very close to the true figure, as there is about 250 deployed to Camp Mirage in support of TFA, give you the total of 2200-2300 

So we have 2000 Canadians in A-stan, and going along with the point raised by Haggis, regarding the D+S PL having a Res Force PL WO... 

What I said was that, even with 2000 Canadian in Afghanistan right now, there is probably 1 (heck lets push it, maybe 2, even 3) *WO from the Res * Force who are currently filling the position of *Pl 2IC*.

As i stated before, there is many Res Force members there now, and probaby a handful of WO, however they are not in PL 2IC positions, as this relates back to earlier discussion regarding top heavy reserve units and higher ups not serving the "typical" function of there rank overseas..

Ie. Res Lt. who would normaly be a Pl Cmd in the Res world go as CIMIC ops, or staff officers, etc etc... and  not as Pl Cmd.....  




I know damn well the army is top heavy... but not that damn heavy....


----------



## Fishbone Jones

If you got rid of all the people at the top, you lower guys would have to take the responsibility for all the fuck ups. Instead of blaming it on the highers, for a change.  ;D


----------



## Desert Fox

I'm not advocating a Stalin inspired purge of the army's leadership.... im not that bitter.... LOL....


----------



## The Rifleman

Desert Fox

A TA battalion is made up the same way as a regular battalion - Fire Support Company (anti tank, mortar, recce & machine gun platoons), HQ Company (signal & MT platoons, sections of assault pioneers, cooks, provosts, int cell, admin. etc) and three (sometimes four) Rifle Companies.

However, the Rifle Companies are only allowed to recruit two of three platoons as the third is intended for regular reserves if called up in a time of emergency. The Company does have a full HQ and is also allowed to recruit "spare" SNCOs (reserves do not always turn up for exercises due to other commitments (family & work) and it ensures proper command & control - you can never have enough sergeants!)

The London Regiment is now the only oddity in that the companies are named after Regiments - City of London Fusiliers, London Irish Rifles, London Scottish and Queens Regiment.

As for unit locations, sometimes a Drill Hall (I think you call them Armouries?) will only have a Platoon. This is so that TA centres keep local (Territorial) and reduces travel costs. It also ensures that the buildings are kept on strength as they are valuable real estate assetts.


At present in Iraq & the Stan TA Force Protection Companies are deployed to carry out some of the more mundane tasks such as guarding HQs, escorting civvies & aid agencies, and carrying out vehicle check points. These companies are usually made up from volunteers from whole battalions. Some TA soldiers do volunteer to make up the numbers in regular battalions and are normally well recieved. TA Signals & Engineers also provide company strength units, but Yeomanry (the old Gentleman Cavalry Volunteers) provide IRs (individual Replacements) as they are trained as crewmen for tanks or recce vehicles.


----------



## GAP

Canada's reservists to be eligible for pension
Updated Thu. Dec. 21 2006 11:06 PM ET CTV.ca News Staff
Article Link

Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor announced today that Canada's reservists will be able to contribute to and receive pension plan benefits starting in the new year.

As many as 8,500 reservists may now qualify to be included in the Canada Pension Plan and establishing reservist pensions has been an issue many of them have been fighting for. 

"This is the CPP (Canada Pension Plan) that every worker in Canada pays into and, as a result, is able to collect upon retirement," CTV's David Akin, who was first to report the news, told Newsnet from Ottawa. 

In a news release, O'Connor is quoted as saying that the government made this change "because we believe that all Reservists should be able to collect a pension that will allow them to build for retirement and provide their families with basic financial protection."

"Canada's New Government is proud of the brave men and women who serve our country daily and this amendment is another example of our commitment to support them."

Gen. Rick Hillier, the Chief of Defence Staff, called the announcement "excellent news" for reservists. "Whether Canadians choose to serve full-time or part-time in the CF, they will be able to start building upon their CPP pension and create a more secure future," he added.
More on link


----------



## George Wallace

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> George, you have greatly mis-quoted me...



Sorry.  I quoted you directly from this:



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> Ok, you are right. of the 2000 Canadian in Afghanistan apx 200 or so are reserve, and you've sited that the D+S PL WO is Res. (I have buddies in that platoon right now)
> 
> Thus far my generalization is pretty accurate. 1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity.
> 
> Roto 13 in Bosnia is an exception as well, when a Res Coy went over... and on the point you make refering to it likley more common in the future... we're looking at a Coy of Res at a given time... so again.... 1 Maj, a few Capt/Lts 1 CSM and 3 WO.....   or about 1/3 of my Res Units higher ups.... multiplied by the countless res units out there... drops in the bucket....



It is plain as the nose on your face that you said, refering to WO's; "1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity."  I pointed out that there were more likely 25 to 50 WO's, tops (again not the 2000 that you claimed above).   So the percentage of Reserve WO's is much greater than what you are complaining about.  It indeed looks like there is a very high percentage of Reservists filling higher ranks, if you look at percentages by rank, not as you have done, by total Force.

You are crying and bending stats to make your point.  I am saying your point is false due to your faulty use of statistics.


----------



## Haggis

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> Roto 13 in Bosnia is an exception as well, when a Res Coy went over... and on the point you make refering to it likley more common in the future... we're looking at a Coy of Res at a given time... so again.... 1 Maj, a few Capt/Lts 1 CSM and 3 WO.....   or about 1/3 of my Res Units higher ups.... multiplied by the countless res units out there... drops in the bucket....



The Reserve Coy started out at 120 all ranks with another 30 in the HQ Sqn D&S Platoon and 13 detached to CIMIC etc..  If you look beyond the Cbt A, almost 30% of Roto 13 was Reservists with one LCol, several Majors, Capts, Lts and at least three MWOs that I know of personally in quite senior and important positions.  Roto 14 approached 50%.

Presently there are Reserve Majors, Capt, Lts, a CWO, WOs and Sgts (note I used pluralisms) serving in Afghanistan.  In order to be objective you must look beyond just the Battle Group to see the whole pictuire of Reserve augmentation on any mission.

There is more than one mission going on.  If your unit's "higher ups" want to deploy, they can probably get a spot on a mission.


----------



## The Rifleman

Well the UK Reserves (all services) don't get a pension - or medical care & dental care (unless they are mobilised). If they are wounded on ops they are repatriated - discharged - and they have to make an appointment with the local hospital for after care (or in some cases for further operations)


----------



## Haggis

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> Well the UK Reserves (all services) don't get a pension - or medical care & dental care (unless they are mobilised). If they are wounded on ops they are repatriated - discharged - and they have to make an appointment with the local hospital for after care (or in some cases for further operations)





Well that certainly sucks!!


----------



## Desert Fox

Yes Georege it is clear, you quoted directly, however you missed my point.... 

1  Reserve WO in the role of PL2IC 
Even thou there are 2000 troops on the ground.....
Even thou there are several Res higher ups there, few are in command position...

When i was in Kabul in 2005... there was a plethora of Res Force WO/Officers filling vital tasks, CIMIC, FST, Staff Officer Positions....

However they did not deploy as Infantry platoon cmd/2IC, or Company Cmd.... There was a LCol who was the CO of a Toronto Area Regt who was part of CIMIC, who dropped in rank to Maj and commanded the 12 person CIMIC team....      Majors normally command more then 12 people....   



[Inserted after initial post]

RIFLEMAN

- Thanks for the info, Cheers!


----------



## George Wallace

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> When i was in Kabul in 2005... there was a plethora of Res Force WO/Officers filling vital tasks, CIMIC, FST, Staff Officer Positions....
> 
> However they did not deploy as Infantry platoon cmd/2IC, or Company Cmd.... There was a LCol who was the CO of a Toronto Area Regt who was part of CIMIC, who dropped in rank to Maj and commanded the 12 person CIMIC team....      Majors normally command more then 12 people....



I am still not that impressed with your arguments.  To me they really are insignificant and irrelevant.  The examples you are quoting are for one Tour, but do not cover the wider timeframe.

As for a LCol taking a drop down to Maj to do a Tour; is that anything new for Reservists?  No.  It happens at all rank levels.  As for a Major commanding 12 people; that is also an irrelevant issue.  He commanded a CIMIC Team.  What was that team made up of?  Could most of them have been Capt's, Lt's, and MWO's, most of, if not all, them being Reservists.  

I really see nothing substantial in your arguments.  There are Trades that are filling 50% or more of taskings on Tour.  Your example of the Convoy Comd and his Escort was 100% Reservists.  Get over it.


----------



## Desert Fox

We're looking at the issue from two diffrent angles, and i see no point on continuing with it.

My point related back to previous comments regarding CWO/RSM and Maj/Coy Cmd from Res force never/very seldomly deploying in such a capacity. 

CIMIC is a Reserve task, meaning that the norm is that all CIMIC pers are Res Force. (I'm sure there could be the odd exception to this)


----------



## Haggis

Desert Fox said:
			
		

> My point related back to previous comments regarding CWO/RSM and Maj/Coy Cmd from Res force never/very seldomly deploying in such a capacity.



The point others are trying to make (me included) is that there are presently limited opportunities for for senior Reservists to deploy in their rank and trade in the Combat Arms.   For those that want to go, there are out-of-trade oppourtunities in CIMIC, PsyOps, HUMINT, J Staffs, OMLTs etc. etc. as well as in over a dozen other missions than Afghanistan.



			
				Desert Fox said:
			
		

> CIMIC is a Reserve task, meaning that the norm is that all CIMIC pers are Res Force. (I'm sure there could be the odd exception to this)



As George mentioned, some capabilities (such as CIMIC) are wholly or overwhelmingly Reserve.

Lastly it's unfair and misleading for you to state that that Reserve LCols/Majs/CWOs/MWOs never deploy.  They do and they will continue to do so.  It's been shown to you already and you're just not getting it.


----------



## captainj

Great thread. Let us also not forget those LCol/Majors/CWO's/MWO's "who will never deploy" are indeed contributing to the mission as gatekeepers. They are the leadership/administrators of the Reserves who do indeed deploy and do so often when called upon without any question. Indeed most area HQ's are manned with 30%-50% (depending on the Area) reservists getting the TF out the door and yes repatriatiing the casualty's. As pointed out many who deploy take a drop in rank, indeed many take a drop in pay not only leaving a civilian job but also some loose a pay grade or two just to deploy thanks a bunch. 

You know it is funny as we sit here hammering good old Desert Fox. I am an AO to a really badly wounded Reservist and with him is a really badly wounded Reg. These two chaps come as a pair kind of like kittens. They support each other and have a bond that is amazing. I do not see any difference all I see is two troops fighting hard to stand up. I think we should keep our eye on the ball.

Desert Fox face it the Regs need the Reserves as much as the Reserves need the Regs. Things have changed we are all in it together this sort of us and them serves no one. While I agree perhaps the Reserves need some tuning be careful for what you wish for it may come true. I wonder what would happen if every Reservist on contract both deployed and holding positions especially at HQ's were to give their notice. How much mayham would that cause. Don't worry it will never happen because those guys that work side by side with their Reg counterpart (not getting PLD and 15% less) have way too much character. By the way I was one of those guys who with PBI way back when had similar ideas re folding units. Age gives you wisdom


----------



## captainj

I know you didn't really mean hammer him poor choice of words on my part. I fully agree with you re command selection. Clearly a case of avocation vs vocation. I guess what I am really saying is when these kids are knocked down they are all the same Reg or Reserve and the bonding is at its very best. I only wish some of the Reserve Reg bashers and indeed the Reg Reserve bashers could see these fellows at their most venerable. It puts it all in perspective that we are a small Army that need each other especially now. 

In point of fact when I was a MWO it was hard, real hard to get a tour. Now that I am a Capt there are tours a plenty. Everyone points to ROTO 13 as the example. I would suggest we would have been pooched even more so on ROTO 14 if it wasn't for those Reservists. I know I was asked would you go, within 12 days I was in theatre (didn't even get embarkation leave oh well). Sometimes it is all about time and space. Often you see Reg force LCol/Col/MWO's/CWO's with little or no gongs except for the SSM and CD. This isn't because they didn't want to deploy again a issue of time and space. Gee I wonder how many Reservists are doing the Biz back home teaching Reg BMQ's,  Battle Schools and doing the trenchwork in Borden looking after those poor devils we call Pat's. My point is the Army is like a orchestra we all have our instrument to play and we cannot afford to be fighting each other these days.


----------



## Haggis

captainj said:
			
		

> Everyone points to ROTO 13 as the example. I would suggest we would have been pooched even more so on ROTO 14 if it wasn't for those Reservists.



Rotos 11 through 14 also proved that we, as an Army, don't adequately prepare our soldiers medically, dentally or administratively.  DAGging those rotos took a disproparionate amount of time, effort and money which could have bneen spent on training.  This isn 't the fault of the Reservist or the Reserve units as thay have little say in what, if any, support is granted to them by the support bases.  In most cases, the support base will not give you kit, a permanent I card, shots, a medical or dental until you have a tasking message to show.  You don't get a tasking message until you DAG green.  You can't DAG Green until you have your shots, I card, dental, etc. etc.  Catch 22.


----------



## captainj

Couldn't agree more it was like pulling teeth just to get kit and I DAGGED Green. It is really difficult as a individual augmentee from outside the area basically you are on your own at times.


----------



## Haggis

captainj said:
			
		

> Couldn't agree more it was like pulling teeth just to get kit and I DAGGED Green. It is really difficult as a individual augmentee from outside the area basically you are on your own at times.



(Rhetorical question)
The Air and Naval Reserves seem to be able to do it.  Why can't the Army?


----------



## captainj

Good Point

Perhaps they are sailors and airman/women first. The Regimental system has some great vertues but...........................................

I wonder how many Reserve augmentees from the L Eddys, Seaforths 48th etc were offered a Ortona cocktail a few days ago.


----------



## Haggis

captainj said:
			
		

> Perhaps they are sailors and airman/women first.



And that has what to do with how their supported by their Reg F support base?



			
				captainj said:
			
		

> I wonder how many Reserve augmentees from the L Eddys, Seaforths 48th etc were offered a Ortona cocktail a few days ago.



The answer may surprise you.


----------



## captainj

To the first I would suggest it has more to do with training by that I mean the Navy/Airforce crses are more in line with their Reg Force counterparts.

To the second I assume the non RCR types had in a little drink as well. If this is the case I say great we have come a long way. I have been to Pachino Day celebrations where 48th and Hast PER were excluded. This is not a exclusive RCR battle in point of fact the brunt of the fighting was taken by the other two unit of the 1 Bde 1 Cdn Div. I guess I am being a little argumentative for fun now.

Cheers


----------



## Haggis

captainj said:
			
		

> To the first I would suggest it has more to do with training by that I mean the Navy/Airforce crses are more in line with their Reg Force counterparts.



They are indeed.  However they are subject to the same DAG machinations as the army, yet they deploy more often and in proportionally greater ratio than we do.  So, how do they do it?



			
				captainj said:
			
		

> I guess I am being a little argumentative for fun now.



Not a good idea with a guy watching "Patton" between posts.  ;D


----------



## captainj

Patton I am waiting until my wife goes to sleep so I can watch Sex in The City ha ha ha...............................

Then I will watch my number one movie "The Hill" or "Tune of Glory" but Patton I don't know a little too American for me and a little too anti Brit in general.


----------



## Nug

Winnipeg, the government just spent a load of money on Shilo so that 2VP could move there! So are they really thinking of spending more money to move them back or is this going to be a mystery battalion. Or maybe some form of Pres formation.


----------



## garb811

My guess is if you think along the lines of the 10/90 Bns you'd be in the ballpark.


----------



## PMedMoe

I just love how they close all these bases and then want to open more.  Do you think they'll just rent a big office/warehouse in most cases?  Also, Victoria and Vancouver?  Aren't they close enough to share?  ???


----------



## MarkOttawa

Also from the story:



> ...the Conservative strategy calls for the regular force "footprint" to be increased across the country. A Northern Sovereignty Support Centre will be established in Goose Bay, N.L., and the 439 Combat Support Squadron at Canadian Forces Base Bagotville, Que., will be expanded and redesignated as an "expeditionary" unit to better support domestic and international operations [with only Griffon helicopters? Maybe they will get some of the new Chinooks - MC]. In particular, the squadron would support deployments of the military's rapid-reaction Disaster Assistance Response Team...



This is clearly an effort to fulfill the Conservatives' campaign pledges to base regular Army "rapid reaction" battalions in Goose Bay and Bagotville (as well as Trenton and Comox). These units would hardly be the same thing and I have no idea how effectual this basing would be in military terms.

Given the headline for the story, perhaps the Liberals should start re-running that attack ad from the last federal election campaign:



> Military wants more troops in cities



And it's not the military who want this, it's the Conservatives.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## JackD

You mean - Chilliwack will open again?? Wahoo.. once a month I visit google earth and cry..... (whimper, gnash teeth, curse you Chretien...)


----------



## Kat Stevens

You and me both, Jack.  At least you were spared pain of the farewell parade and move of the regiment.


----------



## BKells

Uplands or Connaught? Hmm..


----------



## dapaterson

Redleafjumper's efforts were for Prince George, not Prince Rupert.  

And a minor correction:  TDBG full-time Res F personnel would be on class B, not class C service.


----------



## Mortar guy

On these new units in the cities: I recommend everybody watch and shoot and don't get your hopes up too much. Don't start thinking that you're going to see new units stood up with new bases opening and all that. The "city" battle groups will look very much like the reserve units we have now, along with their RSS reg force personne. For example, the Ottawa BG may look a little something like this:

BG HQ - GGFG or CHofO CO plus HQ staff from several units (including RSS)
A Coy - GGFG
B Coy - CHofO
C Coy - GGFG
Arty Bty - 30 Fd Regt
Engr Sqn - 3 FES
Recce Sqn - R de Hull (maybe OPCOM from 34 Bde)
CSS Coy - 28 Svc Bn/28 Med Coy

Nothing really new here in terms of organization. However, command relationships will be formalized and this BG will be given specific tasks to train and prepare for in sp of domestic ops.

Hope this helps.

MG


----------



## Staff Weenie

Again, one of the questions is.....are these 'new troops', or are we going to rob them from existing units. What I've seen in Ottawa, is that the Bn will have a full time cadre, and pull it's troops from existing local units for approx 3 FTX per year or so. So.........do we have a new capability here, or just another HQ? It's almost like being in the Berlin Bunker at the end of the war - lots and lots of little pins on the map, but none of them mean anything anymore.

The implementation of this plan begs a whole pile of CSS questions (usually the ones that are most often forgotten until the last instant) - where do they get their 'offices/base', where do they get their 1st & 2nd line maint, their Health Services, what about PMQ's or kitchen? Since, I'm assuming, these folks would live off the local economy, we'll pay a fortune in PLD etc.

What about equipment? Do dilute the already almost non-existent resources even further? Will trucks magically appear?

I have no problem with the concept in broad terms, but I think that in the current status of the CF, implementing it will not be easy to say the least.


----------



## John Nayduk

The Director of Armour spoke at our mess dinner in December.  He mentioned the TDBG and said something to the effect that existing reserve units would supply the bulk of the troops when the emergency happens.  It would be a metter of Canada Command taking over and tasking the troops.  Of course he said this at a mess dinner so I may be a little foggy on details  ;D.


----------



## Staff Weenie

Yep, I vaguely remember a mess dinner where I got told at the last minute that I had to introduce the Guest Speaker, while I was already tanked....forgot his name and said he was "Somebody who had done some interesting things in lots of interesting places"....CO, HCol and his wife didn't seem too impressed - go figure  :blotto:

I know the plan is to pull the troops in for training and as needed - but then all these things are, is another HQ - why bother having all the different Regiments with their HQ's....perhaps this is the first innocent looking step towards amalgamation......


----------



## garb811

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Redleafjumper's efforts were for Prince George, not Prince Rupert.


Thanks for the correction.  I should have done a search prior to posting in order to refresh my recollections.


----------



## beach_bum

PMedMoe said:
			
		

> I just love how they close all these bases and then want to open more.  Do you think they'll just rent a big office/warehouse in most cases?  Also, Victoria and Vancouver?  Aren't they close enough to share?  ???



Although Victoria and Vancouver look close on a map, there is a lot of water and an hour and a half ferry ride between the two.


----------



## JackD

By the way kat, have you ever gone back there? Lots of places in which I used to wander about  seem to be built over... It sure would have been a good place to put these new dream units they speak of. Oh well, time passes, time changes.... stupidity marches on. i can remember the hops fields that used to be in the area - and you can get the Chilliwack Gazette or what everit is called - on line. Oh, does the regiment ever exercise its right to the fredom of the city?


----------



## observor 69

davidhmd said:
			
		

> The way it looks like we're doing things in Halifax is basing the TDBG on the existing reserve units with a small full time (part reg force part class c) HQ structure. IMHO the way to look at this is like we're giving the reserves a more national guard like capability.



Ya that's what I keep thinking.  A la National Guard in the states, each unit has enough gear to be mobile, means buying more gear, means money....Hmmmm  we got enough bucks for all this ??


----------



## Samsquanch

According to my map it's only a few millimeters away. ;D


----------



## Staff Weenie

In addition, a lot of estimates show that should 'The Big One' hit BC, the ferry terminals, harbours, rail lines into BC and Vancouver International Airport will be heavily damaged, if not destroyed. If it ain't on the Island in advance, it ain't getting there for several critical days..... (based on 8 to 8.5 sustained over 30 to 60 sec).

Plus, it just seems like one spot folks would like to be posted too - I'm sorry Soldier - but you're going to Victoria...

Other than the high cost of living, I think it might be the dream posting (ever since CFS Bermuda closed).


----------



## JBP

Also keep in mind folks, this plan is suppose to be effective as of 2016, so I imagine, by that time, we'll have boosted the numbers of troops in PRes and Reg Force, as well as probably more equipment... 

Again... I imagine that's how it'll be... Because it won't even work any other way without more equipment!


----------



## PMedMoe

beach_bum said:
			
		

> Although Victoria and Vancouver look close on a map, there is a lot of water and an hour and a half ferry ride between the two.



Well I guess they should have one in Charlottetown or Summerside, PEI and maybe Stephenville, NF as well.   Might as well cover all bases.....no pun intended....well, maybe a bit.   ;D


----------



## beach_bum

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> In addition, a lot of estimates show that should 'The Big One' hit BC, the ferry terminals, harbours, rail lines into BC and Vancouver International Airport will be heavily damaged, if not destroyed. If it ain't on the Island in advance, it ain't getting there for several critical days..... (based on 8 to 8.5 sustained over 30 to 60 sec).





			
				PMedMoe said:
			
		

> Well I guess they should have one in Charlottetown or Summerside, PEI and maybe Stephenville, NF as well.   Might as well cover all bases.....no pun intended....well, maybe a bit.   ;D



I believe the first post there is the reason.  I don't know if the east coast is expecting an earthquake as well?


----------



## brihard

The 33CBG commander visited us on our last weekend of PLQ earlier in the month, and one of the things he talked about were these new territorial defence battalions. When describing it, he said that the one here in Ottawa would likely comprise 30ish class B reservists from the GGFG and CHofO, and would be supplemented by about a hundred people on class A to train for contingencies. It seems almost exclusively civil disaster type stuff. He was describing it to us, and told us it would pretty much exclusively be unarmed work- say, helping Ottawa police do roadblocks or traffic control, etc etc.

Those of us on the course were talking about it later, and the consensus is that there is little to no interest at our level to sign up for this if it's going to take us from our regiments on some of the Thursday nights. If they need us that bad, they'll call up the regiments proper on aid to the civil power, but as is very few of us are willing to sacrifice any potential infantry specific training to train for aid to the civil power. I've got no problem working if the unit itself is called up, but if it's as been described, few of us are interested in taking time out of regimental duties and training for this when they go looking for class A volunteers... I'm sure a number of people will be interested in the class B work, though.

Now, it's possible I was mistaken in how I interpreted the talk we got... If we do train for armed domestic response to security threats and such, that's entirely different- but a lot of that could be incorporated into our normal infantry training anyway.


----------



## George Wallace

Brihard said:
			
		

> Now, it's possible I was mistaken in how I interpreted the talk we got... If we do train for armed domestic response to security threats and such, that's entirely different- but a lot of that could be incorporated into our normal infantry training anyway.



I would tend to think that this is the case.  You would be conducting 'military' training, not what you might have thought.  You would also still be available to attend your regular Parade nights.  This is where your dedication is really shown, when you also attend regular Parade nights.  (As you would be on a Class B, you would not be entitled to sign a Class A Pay Sheet as you are already being paid for that time.)  There is a lot more to the plan than what you have envisioned.


----------



## brihard

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I would tend to think that this is the case.  You would be conducting 'military' training, not what you might have thought.  You would also still be available to attend your regular Parade nights.  This is where your dedication is really shown, when you also attend regular Parade nights.  (As you would be on a Class B, you would not be entitled to sign a Class A Pay Sheet as you are already being paid for that time.)  There is a lot more to the plan than what you have envisioned.



Seen.

In that case, what sort of class A opportunities would be available that would still preserve my ability to parade on Thursdays?

I envision that there would be some scheduling difficulties here, given that we have the GGFG and CHofO parading on Tuesday and Thursday respectively. I may be mistaken, but I think at least one of the Ottawa units parades on Wednesdays, and added to that each unit generally has an admin night on a totally separate day, often with leadership o groups and such...

Or is this envisioned as a class B committment where class A pers will only be called up when needed, given kit, and told what to do?


----------



## COBRA-6

I would suggest everyone take a step back and breathe for a minute. The TDBG working group had its _first_ meeting only last week. Any "details" at this point are moving targets at best...


----------



## brihard

COBRA-6 said:
			
		

> I would suggest everyone take a step back and breathe for a minute. The TDBG working group had its _first_ meeting only last week. Any "details" at this point are moving targets at best...



Ah, OK. The info we got gave the impression that plans were advanced far beyond that...


----------



## George Wallace

Brihard

Obviously you should have a sit down with someone from the OR and have them explain how you are paid.  Classes A, B, and C are all paid differently.  You should also realize that each covers different time frames in how your wages are calculated.  Class A for instance pays you one of two ways; for a full day, anything over six hours, or for a half day for anything under six hours.  Class B and C pay you at monthly rates.  A RMS Clerk can sort out all your questions, and hopefully not confuse you any more.


----------



## COBRA-6

Brihard said:
			
		

> Ah, OK. The info we got gave the impression that plans were advanced far beyond that...



There has been a fair amount of "big hand small map" concept development done, but the devil is in the details of implementation. Mortar Guy's explanation of the general concept was very good.


----------



## Mortar guy

Damn straight!

I'm correct so infrequently that I'm going to have to ask the moderators to lock this thread so that I may bask in that comment for evermore.

 8)


----------



## George Wallace

OK

Done/Undone.  

Was that long enough?


----------



## Mortar guy

Yeah, that should do. My CO just said to me "Y'know Ops O, you're not as big an idiot as you appear to be." So I'm well above my quota for compliments this month.

With all this praise coming my way, I might not fit my head in my car (certainly not with my beret on...).

 8)

MG


----------



## Pikepusher

Mortar Guy,

your suggestion of how a TDBG might be organized in Ottawa, for instance, reminds me of a chat the COS and the SO2 Ops&Trg of Central Militia Area HQ had around 1975 on how to organize the units of Toronto Militia District, for instance, in a useful way.  Perhaps the good Colonel was only a few decades ahead of the times.

By the way, I got a copy of CAMT 2-92, Basic Training (1961), off e-bay a few months ago as a reminder of a National Survival Course I took in 1963.  Happy to lend that to anybody involved in reinventing the wheel who might be interested in how similar problems were considered once upon a time.


----------



## Long in the tooth

This sounds a lot like 'civil defence' of the 60's, not in my mind a bad way to go.  However, it is lot like rearranging deck chairs - TMD/OMD are relabelled to CBGs.  Same people, same resources, different name.

The 10/90 concept will take a lot of CPR to revive after the fiascos of the third bns (Inf) in the 90s.  A lot of troops got boned out of that, and the miracle is that the branch was able to reconstitute itself.  Not that having more RSS in res units is a bad thing, but reserve participation is always indeterminate as many of the most dedicated members are already police, fire, medics.

DART has always been a chimera when not a griffon (gryphon?).  Composed of units all across Canada with no dedicated Tn and only an HQ as a permanent fixture it's always been hit and miss.  I do believe this should be beefed up with a solid core of subunits tasked for a year long period.


----------



## nsmedicman

The word from our CofC is that we will be tailoring much of our training resources towards Domestic Operations; preparing for the next natural or man-made disaster. Not sure if that is a coincidence, or as part of a larger plan.


----------



## JackD

So does that mean for the sappers out there a return to learning how to build bridges -  both prefabricated - ahh yes - the beloved Bailey -  and improvised? Does that mean re-equipment with the necessary tools for disaster relief - 'light' heavy equipment and such - does that also mean that many units will be re-rolled into the Engineer branch or logistics branches, oh and more coordination with local authorities?


----------



## enfield

This has been talked about a little at my unit, and was addressed by the CO at the Christmas dinner. He's already fighting to have our unit (local Inf) assigned as the lead for the TDBG. Everything circulating from 'informed' sources says it will be a core of Class B guys, maybe some Reg F, who will train full-time on disaster relief and SAR - learning how to use chain saws, power tools, etc. They could then pass on the simpler skills (like using a chainsaw) in an emergency, be experts/supervisors in other areas. 

The greatest weakness I see in this plan is the lack of vehicles in Reserve units. Most barely have enough trucks to support their own training, let alone provide relief to a city. These TDBG's will need not only personnel, but a lot of equipment and gear that simply does not exist now. The techs and mechanics to maintain all the standby gear could account for many of these Class B positions on their own. 

On that same theme - are there any plans to make Reserve Medical units employable/deployable? As I understand it, they are very limited on what they can do due to their training (ie, they aren't parademic-qualified). However in a disaster scenario they would be one of the most useful Reserve units. 

All in all, it seems like an excellent opportunity for people who want to be Mo-bums for a year or two, although I question if the Class B system is the best way to maintain such a unit. 



PS: edited for spelling and grammar


----------



## Long in the tooth

Ah yes, vehicles...  When the reserve COs were at one time clamouring for the same scale of issue as RegF units I would ask them one question -

Where is your maint platoon to keep up this new kit?

The math is simple.  1 mech can maint 5 vehs.  

No mech, no veh.


----------



## enfield

On the topic of vehicles, I was thinking of the US military convoy that rolled into New Orleans - a huge column of (American versions of) HLVWs, some Deuce and a halfs, a lot of Humvees. News reports put one of the first convoys at 50 vehicles - that's a lot of trucks, just to carry supplies and troops. If we factor in the needs of an earthquake zone or a blizzard - snow removal, earth moving, recovery vehicles, tracked/armoured vehicles, etc - that's a lot of specialized, high-maintenance gear. Not every TDBG would need all of it, of course, but where such things (and the personnel) were located would be key. Trucks would be essential to each unit, however. Maybe introduce the G-Wagen or BV206's into the Militia?

A TDBG seems to be right up the alley of specialists like Engineers, Medics, and Service Battalions - and Combat Arms aren't much use for anything but labour and drivers. Does this mean re-focusing resources towards more applicable units? Sound's like it's time to circle the Regimental wagons!  ;D

I'm still not convinced that emergency/disaster response should be a key role for the Military or the Reserves, and I don't believe it should be an area to focus resources on. A well equipped and trained military (say, a Reserve force that had well fully stocked, well trained Medical and Engineer units in every city) should be capable of a wide range of disaster response in assistance to civilian authorities. For instance, if we do get new vehicles to provide a disaster response force, should we paint them green or orange? Do they need to be mil-spec? Can we forgo pretending we'd ever mount weapons on them?


----------



## DG-41

The rumours I have heard - and keep in mind that we're talking rumours here - is that the TDB task would be a secondary duty for the local units to fill.

The idea being that if you have 3 units in a city with a TDB in it, each unit would detach people to fill their share of the class B positions, and these people would (could) rotate back and forth between the F echelons and the TDB positions every couple of years.

The class B slots would be leadership/HQ and a fully manned subunit, and then the remaining TDB slots would be filled by the class A parts of the unit, activated and slotted into the TDB ORBAT if required.

For example, if a given unit is responsible for manning A Sqn of the TDB, they'd detach a Sqn HQ and a troop as class B, and then the other troops of the TDB squadron would be notional. But if the balloon went up, the activated class A troops would slot in under the existing TDB class B leadership structure.   

So using the Kootanay Highlanders, who today parade A Coy with 1, 2, and 3 Platoons, plus an RHQ, they might be tasked to provide C Coy of the Castlegar Territorial Defense Battalion. They would fill C Coy HQ and 7 Platoon as Class B, and would be responsible for manning 8 and 9 Platoons of C Coy from the manpower pool of A Coy.

A Coy KyH would still parade normally just as they do today, and there would be movement between A Coy and the active Class B positions they fill in C Coy.

It's not a bad concept - you spread the load out, you've got an immediate rapid reaction force (provided by the respective Class B subunits) for handling the small stuff, and you've got a plan for filling the larger units plus their leadership, ready to go if you need that much manpower to tackle the problem at hand. And most importantly, you're not locking entire units into "snakes and ladders" mode, which history has shown utterly demoralizes units and kills recruiting.

Where I have questions is where are all these new people going to come from, and where are we going to put them?

DG


----------



## brihard

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Brihard
> 
> Obviously you should have a sit down with someone from the OR and have them explain how you are paid.  Classes A, B, and C are all paid differently.  You should also realize that each covers different time frames in how your wages are calculated.  Class A for instance pays you one of two ways; for a full day, anything over six hours, or for a half day for anything under six hours.  Class B and C pay you at monthly rates.  A RMS Clerk can sort out all your questions, and hopefully not confuse you any more.



I know you're not generally condescending, so I'm going to assume I misspoke in such a way that I made myself look like an idiot. I'm aware of how the pay system works, as well as the nature and vagaries of the various classes of employment.

What I meant was, if I as Cpl. Bloggins, CHofO want to step up for this new unit as a class A soldier, would there be training scheduled on the same night as normal unit parade nights, or would I just be a name on a list that might be called up once or twice a year to practice an activation? If I were class B, would I still have my Thursday evenings available to go to my regiment?

I must have phrased it awkwardly, but in either case RecceDG seems to have answered most of my pertinent questions.


----------



## cplcaldwell

So if I read RecceDG's interpretation of the rumours, _and yes they are only rumours..._

This whole thing is really just nothing more than a DRU (with a different name of course)... and a Class B headshed ... and more RSS.

Too bad it started out sounding like a solid idea.. now it's a re-package of an existing idea with a bunch of Class B's thrown in and Regular units rifled _for even more _ RSS... Gawd knows, we need more of that sort of thing... :


----------



## DG-41

> So if I read RecceDG's interpretation of the rumours, and yes they are only rumours...
> 
> This whole thing is really just nothing more than a DRU (with a different name of course)... and a Class B headshed ... and more RSS.



Well.... no, I don't think so.

Assuming these _rumours_ play out exactly like this, what you've got is a series of fully-manned Class B subunits (platoon/troop sized) per city, plus the skeleton organization to immediately expand these units to full Coy/Sqn size (by calling out the associated Class A troops) should the situation dictate. And because your Class B subunit is Class B, they can do all the training to keep themselves current on all their usual soldiering skills, plus whatever skills are deemed useful for Aid to Civil Power missions in that area. Probably a lot of first aid and rescue skills, but perhaps crowd control and border security and vehicle searches and the like.

I actually think it is a solid, workable plan - much better for these sorts of missions than our current structure. Your formed Class B subunits are there for QRF, and you've got a trained organization (with pre-existing, pre-rolled plans ready to go) to manage the process of a more general mobilization. 

But at the same time, you also don't trim back or re-role units out of their primary combat functions - 'cause let's face it, we need all the augmentees  we can to backfill Reg Force positions on international ops. It's a way to have your cake an eat it too. Which, assuming there are corresponding increases in manning and funding, is Sweet Crunchy Goodness.

BTW, don't look for much, if any, RSS. There's none to be had.

If *I* were CDS (put your helmets on folks) here's how I would organize the Army:

1) Three brigade group sized Expeditionary Brigades, one formed on the PPCLI/Strats, one formed on the RCR/RCD, and one formed on the 22eme/12RBC

2) The three Schools are fully manned at all times - maybe with a large proportion of Reservists - but in any case, the schools cannot afford to be cutting courses for lack of manning.

3) When we go into an operation, the first two rotos come out of the formed EBs

4) The third roto - and maybe more - is 90% filled by Reserve units. You've got two roto's worth of time to stand them up and get them trained, and you've got fully staffed schools to bring them up to speed. I'd *love* to see entire Reserve units stood up, but that's probably not doable... but in any case, every effort should be made to stand up formed subunits. Roto 3's Recce Sn might be a WR troop, a 1H troop, a QYR troop, and a GGHG troop, with a Ont R SHQ... but whatever. The bottom line is the roto is manned almost entirely with Reservists.

5) The "extra" EB is just that - an extra; a rapid reserve should you need to go someplace else in a hurry - so if Sudan, or Haiti, or wherever suddenly goes up in smoke you have the ability to respond.

6) Depending on how many Reservists you can sustain, your rotos now look like Reg A, Reg B, Reserve, Reg C - and something like Reg A, Reg B, Reserve, Reg C, Reg A, Reserve, Reg B, Reg C, Reserve should be completely doable - more time for the Regs to recover between rotos, less burnout, less sensitivity to recruiting, and you actually USE Reservists as A RESERVE.

DG


----------



## COBRA-6

Worn Out Grunt said:
			
		

> Ah yes, vehicles...  When the reserve COs were at one time clamouring for the same scale of issue as RegF units I would ask them one question -
> 
> Where is your maint platoon to keep up this new kit?
> 
> The math is simple.  1 mech can maint 5 vehs.
> 
> No mech, no veh.



Valid point. However I don't envision units being issued LAVs or APCs. With the continued trend towards MILCOTS (MIlitary Commercial Off The Shelf) eqpt and vehs, such as the Silverado and the future MLVW replacement, a good deal of routine maint could be contracted out to local dealers/garages. You would still need "green" maint and recovery for contingency operations of course, but it would minimize the requirement for a large, full-time org. Ideally some of the civilian mechanics working at these garages would be your class A veh techs in the Svc Bn's.


----------



## Fraser.g

Mountie said:
			
		

> I've discussed this in other threads so I won't go into too much detail.  But why not re-organize the under strength Militia brigades into full strength battle groups.  Each brigade group would become a battle group with each battalion/regiment reduced to sub-unit size and maintained as a sub-unit. (I would split 38 & 39 CBGs into two battle groups each for ease of organization.  I don't know if the increased personnel numbers that are promised would support this or not.)  This is just for conversation sake:
> 
> 38 Canadian Battle Group
> - 38 CBG Headquarters (non-unit specific)
> - Royal Winnipeg Rifles (rifle company)
> - Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (rifle company)
> - Lake Supior Scottish (rifle company)
> - Fort Garry Horse (recce squadron)
> - 26th Field Regiment (artillery battery)
> - 116th Independent Field Battery (air defence troop)
> - 38 Field Engineer Troop
> - 17 Service Battalion (service company)
> - 17 Field Ambulance (medical platoon)



For arguments sake,

you are forgetting all of the Saskatchewan units and some of the Ontario units as well in your org.

16 Fd Amb (Med Coy)
17 Fd Amb (Med coy)
18 Fd Amb (Med Coy)
16 Svc Bn (Svc Coy)
18 Svc Bn (Svc Coy)
RRR ( Inf Coy)
N Sask R (Inf Coy)
and the list goes on...

GF


----------



## blacktriangle

RecceDG said:
			
		

> Where I have questions is where are all these new people going to come from, and where are we going to put them?



Well for younger reservists just graduating high school/university, it would be a great option for many who haven't secured good civilian jobs, or are arent ready to make the jump to the regular force...

I certainly hope something like this happens in the near future.


----------



## Mortar guy

I believe that's why he said he would split the Bde. The Sask units would form another BG. (Am I close?)

MG


----------



## cplcaldwell

RecceDG: Thanks for your clarification at Reply #83 on: Yesterday at 22:33:56.

What you are outlining does make a lot more sense than what my read of the situation was...

I appreciate your sorting that out...


----------



## Fraser.g

The problem with the re org of the units based on Province is that you will be setting up more HQs. It will not effect Alberta or BC but Sask, Manitoba, and the Atlantic provinces. those provinces do not have the populations to support such an organization IMHO.

PEI, NS, NB, Sask, and Manitoba will be the most hit by this change.

We already have the reserve Bde orgs. Use them, don't make more HQs!


----------



## pablo

A big hairy roger to that.  How do you know that your CO was not kidding?  Perhaps he is just playing with you mortar dude.

Pablo"the mexican sensation"

PS What colour are your eyes?


----------



## DG-41

> RecceDG: Thanks for your clarification



Just remember: R - U - M - O - U - R - S.  

I take no credit - or blame - for how things actually pan out.

DG


----------



## Mountie

Thanks MG.  The example I used did split 38 CBG into a Manitoba battle group and a Saskatchewan battle group.  And again it was just an example for discussion sake.  I don't know if each province could sustain a battle group of its own.  However, if the Reserves were expanded surely the province of Manitoba with 1.1 million (or whatever the population is now) could sustain a battle group of 600-800 troops.

With regards to more headquarters, you would have additional battle group (former brigade group) headquarters but you wouldn't have any regimental headquarters.  So significantly less Lieutenant Colonels and senior officers and NCMs and more junior ranks.  There would only be one LCol and one RSM in the whole province.  That was the whole concept.  Each unit would be maintained only as a sub-unit, rather than a unit heaquarters with only one sub-unit.


----------



## COBRA-6

Lots of good points being raised.



			
				Mountie said:
			
		

> With regards to more headquarters, you would have additional battle group (former brigade group) headquarters but you wouldn't have any regimental headquarters.  So significantly less Lieutenant Colonels and senior officers and NCMs and more junior ranks.  There would only be one LCol and one RSM in the whole province.  That was the whole concept.  Each unit would be maintained only as a sub-unit, rather than a unit heaquarters with only one sub-unit.



I'd be very surprised if that ever happened. No one wants to walk through the Regimental minefield, the recent press over the SD&G's/ Brocks tactical grouping illustrates why...

The CBG's could be reworked if needed, but there are advantages to keeping the Regimental unit structures. Let the Company OC concentrate on collective training and operations. The "unit" can take care of recruiting, running individual training courses, pay, admin, unit budget, armoury matters, RQMS, etc etc...


----------



## McG

COBRA-6 said:
			
		

> I'd be very surprised if that ever happened. No one wants to walk through the Regimental minefield, the recent press over the SD&G's/ Brocks tactical grouping illustrates why...


Why should some retired CO's be driving decisions on what is best for the CF now?  We've addressed the idea of regional battalions several times here.  We could, IMO, improve the reserves with regional battalions (though I would not go so far as to replace the CBGs).

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713/post-76789.html#msg76789


----------



## redleafjumper

I enjoyed reading this thread, there are many thoughtful comments on it.

As far as Territorial Defence Battalions go, I think that change for the sake of change without a real effect is not worth it.  The problem seems to be quite simple:

1.  There aren't enough troops to do all the work, now or planned
2.  There isn't enough gear for the troops that are already in place
3.  The troops that are in don't stay when they figure out that there is too much or not enough work for their particular trade and that most of what they have to do is not challenging
4.  Potential troops don't join or stay when there is either no unit to join, or the unit that they join doesn't challenge them enough

Problem identification is easy.  What's the solution?  More money would help, but money targeted to solving retention problems.  Retention is solved by having more people to do the work so that someone doesn't get sent on a tour, come back to see their family for a month or less and end up heading out for another 6 months a short time later.  Unhappy families mean poor retention of soldiers.

More trucks to move troops for more local training, better gear and more of it, and a more involvement of the military in the community.  There are so many things that would make a real difference and it boggles the mind that none or few of them seem to be a priority.

More people to do the work helps to fix part of the retention problem.  Forming new units where there are supportive populations helps to meet that need (and yes, that is a bugbear of mine...).

Solving the disaster of the century cannot be the main role of the military, but as we well know, as soon as the flying excrement hits the rotating propeller, the local military is what gets called.  That role is one which the reserve and regular units should have as something in the background.  It would be a tertiary role rather a primary or even a secondary one, but a serious role nonetheless.  Others on this thread have also made some good points, it just seems a shame that the thinking tends to be short-sighted rather than long-term.


----------



## vangemeren

I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60782/post-565168.html#msg565168


----------



## pbi

van Gemeren said:
			
		

> I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.
> 
> http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60782/post-565168.html#msg565168



I don't think it's really a question of "merging" so much as it is a question of a command and control grouping. The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit. This grouping is usually foreseen as temporary, but depending on the causes of the weakness, it could be for years. The "under command" unit does not give up its capbadges, MOC training, nor anything important like that. What it gains is the support of a functioning command and control structure than can provide all the "life support" functions that keep a Res unit healthy and functioning. And, let's face it, 80% of those functions have little or nothing to do with MOC or capbadge.

In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks.

Personally, I have come to believe that this is the way ahead for the Army Res: it is just getting far too difficult to grow unit-level leadership. You need a deep and healthy gene pool, not a little puddle of 50 people, from which to truly be able to select the best, and keep on selecting them over years and decades. Where this not possible because of demographics and local economics, units have been struggling and in some cases gradually shrivelling and dying, as troops without effective leaders simply stop coming down to train, thus further attriting the unit and further reducing the pool from which to draw potential leaders. It can be a death spiral.

Making things worse, we are now demanding so much of our senior Res leaders that fewer and fewer suitable people can actually find the time to do it. After all, a Res officer/NCO has a family, a job, possibly ongoing post graduate or professional education, and perhaps other commitments as well.  While I was COS 38 CBG, I attended a USARNG event in Minnesota with my Comd. His ARNG peers were shocked to realize how many days a year he was giving to commanding his CBG and all the myriad of activities that entails. Our Res unit COs face very similar demands, as guys like dglad can readily tell us.

The old model has gradually been running down for years (it was not much better off when I joined the Militia in 1974: I read exactly the same complaints on these pages today as we had 33 years ago...) and now in some places it is failing altogether. We have to preserve what is good and useful about our Army Res system, but get on with developing something that will survive and regenerate itself, with the best people leading our troops. The "last man standing" approach to promotion is a guarantee for continuing decline.

Cheers


----------



## McG

pbi said:
			
		

> The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit.


That is how I always saw it done (but I'm going back half a decade now).  At the time, there were often complaints from those in the "under command" unit that they were often given second class treatment in that there was a perception that good courses & tasks went to those in the "commanding" unit.

I don't know it the preferential treatment were real or if it were just perception, but it is a problem either way.

I suspect the problem could be mitigated if the HQ were shared.  If units are close, one location could be selected for HQ pers to commute to.  If units are far apart then the HQ learns to work with MSN messenger, VOIP, mIRC, and other electronic conversation/conferencing tools.


----------



## vangemeren

So what happens to 26 Service battalion? They have their HQ in North Bay, but one of its coys is located in Sault Ste Marie. 



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> ...In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks.  ...



Do you think think that all the units in North Eastern Ontario (26 Service, 2nd Irish, 49th, and the Algonquins) will be "tactically grouped" together?


----------



## pbi

I have no real idea of what will happen in 33 CBG: it depends on the local conditions, the will of the Bde Comd, the cooperation of the COs and units and the support of the Honoraries. Fortunately in 38 CBG we had all of these things when we set up the Arty Tac Gp and the Svc Bn Tac Gp.  The way we handled the detached company of 16 Svc Bn (located in Saskatoon, with Bn HQ in Regina) was not to change anything much at all. We just treated it like a sub-sub-sub unit (it was barely parading a platoon anyway, so there was no loss of resources, etc). Same for the detached field batteries in Prince Albert and Portage La Prairie: they were treated as sub-sub-units of their parent units (which were really functioning as sub-units within the 38 CBG Arty Tac Gp). 116 Ind Bty in Kenora  was treated as a sub-unit, because it had been an independent unit in its own right before the tactical group happened: it had no parent RHQ. Maybe 33 CBG wil do something similar: I can't speak for them.

Cheers


----------



## pbi

I recently attended the Canadian Infantry Association Conference in Edmonton. Amongst various topics for study/presentation by working groups, was the TDBG concept and where the Infantry might fit into it. I was a member of the TDBG working group-the other members were all Res. Although we had some interesting discussions, I came away with the following impressions:

-The concept is not well understood. While most people seem to understand that the TDBG represents very little (or no...) real change to the strength and organization of Res units, and little diversion from the warfighting focus of training, others believe very strongly that there will be re-groupings, extensive new kit (with a "dom ops" flavour) and training focused on dom ops. I don't think that we are all on the same sheet here, at all;

-I don't know if the Army actually knows what it wants to achieve with creating TDBGs, as opposed to just improving the existing CBG-based system for Res force generation in civil emergencies. Nor is it clear that the staff who drafted the TDBG concept were familiar with the extent to which various LFA's have already written the Res into their domops CONPLANS. In some ways, I think the TDBG concept has already been overtaken by reality;

-I'm not clear on the expectations about TDBGs being a source of force generation for deployed ops. The "party line" seems to be that this isn't the intent, but some discussion pointed out that this might actually be a consideration. Again, I don't see where TDBG would really be any significant improvement over the current CBG-based system, unless we are going to give units fully manned BORs, QMs full of deployment kit, and Med/Dent/Chap folks to do DAGs; and

-I think that the "D" in TDBG is causing problems of interpretation: some folks clearly have confused "dom ops" (the apparent focus of TDBG) with "continental defence ops"  which  doesn't really seem to form part of the TDBG concept, but which some are taking to be the actual mission.

Cheers


----------



## Harris

As I'm scheduled to be one of the Coy Comd for my local TDBG (at least that's what we're still calling it), I've gotten a bit of the brief.  Basically my Unit will see an increase of one full time person.  In our case that will be the Coy 2IC.  This will be a B or B/A (I forget which) from within the Brigade.  Otherwise all of my Units troops involved will be the same troops doing Unit trg.  Currently the following trg is scheduled above and beyond Unit trg:  2X Recce wknds for Commanders, 2X PD Trg wknds for Sect Comd and up and 2X FTX wknds for the entire Org.  I fully expect that to change between now and Sept.


----------



## pbi

The training regime you describe is pretty similar to what was discussed in our WG, and what seems to be in place elsewhere. There was good consensus that as Res units have little enough time to train for their primary military tasks, we must reduce time spent on dom-ops mission specific trg to training those key leaders and LOs who need to know enough to deal effectivelly (and legally) with civil authorities, and then maybe one annual ex for the troops. Nobody wanted to see a return to tht "snakes and ladders" of the 1960's.

Cheers


----------



## sgtdixon

Young Troop Straying out of his lane, but with a pertinent question.

This Year, 41CBG Managed to recruit, in Edmonton, 45 new Members, 15 of which will be joining B Sqn SALH, the BG also ran a Higschool co-op BMQ SQ, that saw close to half the Troops release after SQ as "they only wanted to try the army", coupled with the LER's Releasing 55 No Hook, SQ Qual'd Only troops, that leaves you a fair number of people who are now out or on their way out of the PRes Orginization.

So where do all these troops come from to fill out these new re-orgs and so on.

IMHO, and Very Humble at that, based on what I have seen, Why are we not Concentrating on Training the Soldier rather than Slapping down new letter heads on everything we can, I mean, we can get the troops in the door, polish em through BMQ then SQ... but then it stalls and languishes, DP1's abd BIQ's get binned for lack of instrs (Understandably, all the instrs are heading back to or are in the sandbox right now). The Same is happening at the JNCO and SNCO level with men and women with many years of experience leaving because theres either, No challenge, No Motivation or their Unit is being poorly run and its MLOC after ELOC after IBTS after BTS weekend.

My very Naive .2 bits


Now If youll excuse me, a run and packing for DP1 which i found out is back on, awaits.

Dixon


----------



## geo

Fabled Regiment could suffer mortal blow 
John Ivison, National Post 
Published: Friday, May 02, 2008 
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada survived the mud of the Somme and the pebble beaches of Dieppe but concerns are being raised that one of this country's most storied regiments might not be around to celebrate its 100th anniversary in two years because of a drive to merge it with another Winnipeg reserve infantry unit. 

In the First World War, Captain Robert Shankland was awarded the Victoria Cross for service in the unit. In the Second World War, it was one of two Canadian regiments that landed on the beaches of Dieppe, where 76 of its number were killed. 

Yet, the Canadian Forces believe the regiment's failure to recruit soldiers has reduced its strength to untenable levels. Under a process known as "tactical grouping," it is proposed that the Camerons effectively merge with another unit of 38 Canadian Brigade Group in Winnipeg. The Camerons already form part of 38 CBG's combat capability but the regiment has operated as a standalone unit to this point. 

The St. Andrews Society of Winnipeg, which has close ties to the Camerons, has written to General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, expressing its concerns that the regiment has been barred from recruiting new members and that the commanding officer and regimental sergeant-major have been removed to serve with another reserve group, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. 

A letter from Vernon Ness, president of the St. Andrews Society, quoted a member of the Camerons' advisory board, who complained to the commanding officer of the 38 CBG: "We are banned from recruiting, and if we did, there would not be the budget to pay the salaries of the new members. If we got them, there would be insufficient qualified personnel to train them." 

Mr. Ness said the Camerons are being penalized for contributing to the Canadian army's operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. "The support given to the Canadian army by providing soldiers for overseas postings over the last several years, while applauded then, now earns criticism because of the reduced numbers in the regiment. [This] in turn, is partially caused by the Camerons' success in providing those volunteers. It sounds to us like they are being punished for doing their job well," he said. 

Mr. Ness said his Society intends to work diligently to prevent the demise of the regiment, whose Colonel-in-Chief is Prince Philip. 

Colonel Robert Poirier, commander of the 38 Canadian Brigade Group, said the decline in the number of trained officers has made it difficult to conduct adequate training. The Camerons have serious gaps in senior and junior leadership, while the Royal Winnipeg Rifles lack top-level leadership, he said. 

"Since the Camerons of Canada and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles are both infantry units and reside at the same location, Minto Armoury, it was a logical decision to invoke time and energy-saving measures to improve the training and capacity within these units, solidifying the leadership focus and direction," he said. 

The commanding officer and regimental sergeant-major of the merged units come from the Winnipeg Rifles but Col. Poirier said that in future, they may be Camerons. He said there has been no downsizing, changes to existing structures or reclassification of the Camerons of Canada. 

Bill Blaikie, the NDP MP from Winnipeg, was a Cameron Highlander from 1967 to 1972 and said he would be very sad if the regiment disappeared. "I don't think it's necessary if proper recruiting takes place." 

He said he fears the same fate awaits the Camerons as met the Winnipeg Grenadiers, which faced severe cutbacks before being placed on the supplementary order of battle in 1965. This alternative to disbandment is a list of regiments whose existence is deemed no longer relevant. 

The Camerons' history goes back to 1910, when the regiment was formed as the 79th Highlanders of Canada by descendants of the original Selkirk Settlers from Scotland. During the First World War, the Camerons served with distinction at Ypres, the Somme and Passchendaele, where Capt. Shankland won his Victoria Cross for repulsing an enemy counter-attack after capturing a strategic position.


----------



## McG

geo said:
			
		

> Under a process known as "tactical grouping," it is proposed that the Camerons effectively merge with another unit of 38 Canadian Brigade Group in Winnipeg.


We went through this same emotional silliness in the media about the Brockville Rifles last year.  It is not helpful to the needs of the Army.

Where there are two infantry regiments both operating out of the same Minto Armouries, why should we waste resources providing each of them a seperate Bn HQ when combined they do not add up to a Bn?  The existence of a cap badge does not independently justify the need for a full unit structure.

Tactical Groupings make sense.  One battalion with the sub units wearing different capbadges.


----------



## McG

Here is a whole thread supporting tactical groupings: http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/25713.0.html


----------



## willy

I would suggest going even further: amalgamate all the Reserve units (all types) in a particular geographical area to form Reserve Battle Groups.  One HQ, one CO, one shared pool of resources, and the different sub units can retain their distinctive dress if they wish.


----------



## geo

Heh... IMHO, they should consider forming a NEW Regiment that does not have the hsitorical/political baggage of the former.
Assign coy names that in themselves will perpetuate the old former Battalions.

Eg: new unit....
The Ping Pong Fusiliers of Winnipeg
A Coy, Camerons
B Coy, Devils
C Coy, Grenadiers

Time to think about reducing the units to NIL Strength and starting anew.....


----------



## McG

willy said:
			
		

> I would suggest going even further ...


Go read the other thread.  That is exactly what was proposed.


----------



## geo

The problem with retaining distinctive dress is that, as an example 
Maj Soandso the OC of A Coy Camerons is moved to C Coy Grenadiers.... so in your scenario, he'd have to change all his uniforms
WO Bloggins is a Pl WO in C Coy Grenadiers - is moved to A Coy Camerons.... so WO Bloggins has to start wearing a Kilt... and the works....

It would be 100% impossible to manage such a structure.... IMHO


----------



## Infanteer

Get rid of 'em all and make a new unit.  Nobody recruited after that point would give a shit and the new unit would make it's own history.  Time to quit tieing our hand behind our back because of emotional ties to something doesn't exist (mobilized battalions of the reserve going to war).


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Get rid of 'em all and make a new unit.  Nobody recruited after that point would give a shit and the new unit would make it's own history.  Time to quit tieing our hand behind our back because of emotional ties to something doesn't exist (mobilized battalions of the reserve going to war).


Agreed.  Though history and tradition are important, throwing good money after bad isn't worth it.  Amalgamate the units if need be, preserve the characteristics and/or traditions that pay proper respect to those units, but in the end, a "unit" with a few soldiers is indeed wasteful.  Both in time and in effort.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

The Brits do it all the time, with more famed Regiments:

http://www.army.mod.uk/rac/main_battle_tanks/royal_scots_dragoon_guards.htm

*Brief History of The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards*
The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards are Scotland's senior Regiment and her only Regiment of cavalry.  The Regiment was formed in 1971, as a result of the amalgamation of two very distinguished Regiments; The Royal Scots Greys and the 3rd Carabiniers.  The 3rd Carabiniers themselves constituted from the 1922 amalgamation of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards).   

I've spent the odd occasion with these guys and there is never any untoward talk or animosity of the amalgamated units. They just carry on with business as usual.


----------



## The Bread Guy

And even famouser....
http://www.army.mod.uk/blackwatch/

now The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS)


----------



## 1feral1

Save the Camerons!


----------



## Kat Stevens

I guess it's pretty easy to call it silly, until it happens to you.


----------



## dapaterson

I'm looking forward to seeing the CDS reply to this letter... I suspect it may touch on the strength of the unit over the past several years, point out that it's been done successfully with other units (one CO and RSM for more than one unit), and will probably conclude by thanking groups like the St Andrew's Society for their interest in the CF.

But then, what do I know?


----------



## Old Sweat

dataperson,

Is there anything in the NDA or regulations that prohibits an individual being appointed to command more than one unit at the same time? Taking it to an insane level, I supose the super star could also be the brigade commander and recommend himself (for his performance commanding more than one battalion) for accelerated promotion, the order of military merit  and even appointment as CDS.


----------



## Michael OLeary

I believe that part of the problem is that there hasn't been a serious reexamination of unit distributions in decades.  Up to about the 1950s, it seems that there were rounds of amalgamations, reductions to nil strength, relocations and renamings of units every decade or so.  Many have forgotten that an evolving Army organization matching demographic capabilities to man units, with reconfirmation of requirements for types and numbers of units, and changes to units roles, names and numbers used to be the status quo.  The last five decades or so of stagnation has been a failure to evolve, not a confirmation of a continually workable plan.


----------



## aesop081

Kat Stevens said:
			
		

> I guess it's pretty easy to call it silly, until it happens to you.



Its happened to me. I think its silly.


----------



## Mountie

I think all reserve brigade groups should be reorganized as battle groups.  They are closer to battle group size anyway.  Therefore, each sub-unit could maintain their regimental history and traditions.   This would not only allow most reserve regiments to be maintained as well as bringing a few back from the supplementary order of battle.  

38 Canadian Battle Group
Battle Group Headquarters
Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Rifle Company)
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Rifle Company)
Winnipeg Grenadiers (Rifle Company)
Fort Gary Horse (Reconnaissance Squadron)
26th Field Artillery Regiment (Artillery Battery)
38 Combat Engineer Squadron
17 Service Company
17 Field Ambulance Platoon

Likewise the South Saskatchewan Regiment could be stood up to give a third rifle company to form a Saskatchewan Battle Group.  Similar consolidations could be made of all the brigade groups.


----------



## rifleman

Ullamh


----------



## Kat Stevens

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> The Regimental system, while "nice" is a throwback to our past, an anachronism and the seagull around our necks.  "Train as you Fight"?  Not as long as we keep slavishly following an organization directly descended from "form hollow square, fix bayonets, beat back the fuzzy-wuzzies".
> 
> Get rid of it altogether?  Absolutely.  Tomorrow, please.



I guess I just find it hard to understand how the Regimental System is an albatross.  Call yourself the 504th bicycle grenadiers if you want, what's wrong with a sense of history and continuity?  Forming hollow square is antiquated, remembering those who did it and perpetuating that memory is not, IMHO.  Whatever, every time I get into one of these, it ends up somehow being about not being British at all costs,and forgetting that we ever were, so I'll just leave you guys to it.


----------



## rifleman

A regimental system is much more than form square, and if it is so old and antiquated, try refering to a Regiments' Colours as just a flag and see how casual they are about it.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Let's not confuse the _regimental system_ with any particular system of regiments.  The strengths of the regimental system are not dependent on the perpetual existence of specific cap badges. 

The Regimental System



> To enter the fray with the sole objective to save one’s own Regiment through an era of Army reorganization, perhaps at the expense of a stronger Army, is to set aside the soldier’s higher moral obligations.
> 
> The continuance of the regimental system, in and of itself, is not sufficient justification to defend the continued existence of any particular regiment. Disbandment, amalgamation, or re-roling of one or more regiments does not threaten the existence of the regimental system. The regimental system and regiments themselves are not, nor should they be, considered synonymous entities. Regiments are an organizational entity. The regimental system is a mutually supportive personnel management structure that emphasizes a sense of belonging (in our collective military experience, to a military unit structure). Though symbiotic in nature as we have become accustomed to them, regiments or a variation of the regimental system can each exist without the other.


----------



## rifleman

No lesson intended. I'm just saying that every time, they talk about removing a unit, the argument comes out about how the regimental system is antiquated and gets in the way. There is a lot more re-org needed in the Army reserve than just looking at one unit. 

As for not taking colours, standards, silverware and stuff overseas, I don't see the relevance? btw I respect the colours, etc of units that have one, just never had to deal with it.


----------



## Michael OLeary

I would suggest that it is _the argument_ (that restructure attacks the regimental system) that gets in the way of evolution and modernization.  Defending any unit on the premise that since it has existed for "X" years and carries "X" battle honours that it should therefore exist forever is a weak argument against Army restructuring for greater efficiency (don't we usually attack anything perceived as inefficiency here?).


----------



## rifleman

I can agree on not keeping a unit for the sake of keeping them, however the arguement that a regimental system is antiquated and serves no purpose in modern militaries is crap


----------



## Michael OLeary

rifleman said:
			
		

> I can agree on not keeping a unit for the sake of keeping them, however the arguement that a regimental system is antiquated and serves no purpose in modern militaries is crap



I agree, but that also doesn't mean that the regimental system shouldn't be critically examined and evolve as well as the organizational structures it supports.

The Regimental System



> It’s time to define and establish a common understanding of the concept and role of the Regimental System in the Canadian Army of 2000 and beyond. We must be prepared to completely and honestly divest ourselves of any historically perceived aspects of the Regimental System which do not support current Army missions. Some things will remain, some may go, to many observers, the outward signs of our Regiments may never change. But it is time – it was once unthinkable not to carry Colours in combat, for they were the embodiment of the Regiment’s history and honour. The Regimental System got over that too.


----------



## cavalryman

The Gods of the Regimental Senates are going to frack me for this but:

If the mother of the Canadian Army, the British Army, to whom we owe pretty much all of our traditions, especially the Regimental system, can reorganize its regular regiments the way they have, for greater efficiency all the while being engaged in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan (not to mention more traditional stations), there is no reason the Canadian Army reserve cannot override the politics of the "cap badge" for greater efficiency.  Where is it written in stone that Canada cannot allow the four armoured units in LFQA, each of them able to field a squadron at best, to be amalgamated as the 5e Régiment Canadien de Cavallerie Blindé (or 5th Armoured Cavalry Regiment for you anglos) with squadrons in Sherbrooke, Trois-Rivières, Montréal and Hull?  Or do the same in Ontario by creating the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, with squadrons in Oshawa, Toronto, London, Aurora and Windsor.....  I could go on in this vein, but the idea is there.  If the British Army can do it, we have no justification to maintaining hollow (and sometimes hollow-rotten)  facsimiles of Regiments when amalgamation is the correct idea.

*bows to the Honorary Colonel*  Please sir, make the beheading swift and painless


----------



## a_majoor

Let's see, the Grey and Simcoe Foresters have been Infantry, Armoured and Artillery before becoming Infantry again. 31 CER used to be the Elgin Regiment (RCAC).

As pointed out, there is nothing inherently right or wrong with the regimental system, it is an organizational tool which can be used as well or poorly as you can imagine. I could conceive of a future where composite units have many of the attributes of today's armoured, infantry and artillery units, there would be no functional difference between 1 RCR and the LdSH(RC), but they would still be distinct units with "personalities" and histories.

Units exist to provide capabilities for the commander to plan and execute his mission, so units which are no longer able to provide a required capability need to be "adjusted" until they do provide the capabilities or eliminated to free up resources. If the Camerons are no longer a viable regiment, then LFWA must make a decision to either provide resources to bring them back to viability, amalgamate them with a viable unit to preserve existing capabilities or use the regimental placeholder to create a new capability (The Queen's Own Cameron Webmasters of Canada, fabled Cyberwarriors of LFWA?)

The pain will be short lived; the normal rate of turnover suggests that five years after the cutover, there will be all new personnel manning the unit anyway, who have no memories of the time before.


----------



## Michael OLeary

rifleman said:
			
		

> No, its been discuss before, you either support it, or you don't I find



Since there is no "unified theory of the regimental system", I think it is very problematic to simply expect people to declare themselves "for" or "against" it.  Unless some attempt is made to actually define the beast and establish what is (and therefore what is not) the regimental system, most debates on it circle emotive rather than practical descriptions and solutions.


----------



## Kat Stevens

cavalryman said:
			
		

> The Gods of the Regimental Senates are going to frack me for this but:
> 
> If the mother of the Canadian Army, the British Army, to whom we owe pretty much all of our traditions, especially the Regimental system, can reorganize its regular regiments the way they have, for greater efficiency all the while being engaged in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan (not to mention more traditional stations), there is no reason the Canadian Army reserve cannot override the politics of the "cap badge" for greater efficiency.  Where is it written in stone that Canada cannot allow the four armoured units in LFQA, each of them able to field a squadron at best, to be amalgamated as the 5e Régiment Canadien de Cavallerie Blindé (or 5th Armoured Cavalry Regiment for you anglos) with squadrons in Sherbrooke, Trois-Rivières, Montréal and Hull?  Or do the same in Ontario by creating the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, with squadrons in Oshawa, Toronto, London, Aurora and Windsor.....  I could go on in this vein, but the idea is there.  If the British Army can do it, we have no justification to maintaining hollow (and sometimes hollow-rotten)  facsimiles of Regiments when amalgamation is the correct idea.
> 
> *bows to the Honorary Colonel*  Please sir, make the beheading swift and painless




Yes, but in the UK regional regiments were amalgamated, sharing a common theme, ie Highland Regiments, Welsh Regiments, Rifle Regiments, Guards Regiments, et al.  We're not really talking the same thing here.  Put them all under one admin and command umbrella, by all means, officers is officers.  Bust the COs down to a Major's position and call him the OC of the Highland Company then.  As an aside, if dismantling regiments is just part of army growth, why is there such resentment here for the demise of the Airborne Regiment?  Nothing personal, just business.  After all, the last mass drop of paras was some time around '45 wasn't it?  Now, that's an antiquated concept too then, isn't it?


----------



## TCBF

- Anytime there is talk of tinkering with the regimental system, one should understand that it is not about cost.  A CF-18 on afterburner for two minutes burns the money that could keep the Camerons afloat for a weekend exercise.  I jest, but you get my meaning.  We spent $750,000 changing flights for a Maple Guardian exercise awhile back, after someone realized a year into the planning that their troops would miss Easter with there families.  Any money saved buying one less pattern of kilt would be squandered elsewhere.

- That's right: No amount of tinkering will save any money that won't be pissed away somewhere else by someone else.  Re-organizing is not done for efficiency, it is done to pad PERs and build careers.  Any organization is as efficient or inefficient as one allows it to be and changing the structure while keeping the policy makers who hobbled the structure to cause it to fail in the first place is lunacy.  Keep the Regiment - fire the idiots who won't let it bloom.

- Keep the Regiments - we may need them someday (we sure could use that Regular Armoured Regiment that we cut in the nineties right about now).  Failure to recruit is not a regimental failure, it is a systemic failure.  Trying to save money on kilts, hackles and balmorals is a joke.  We flew back rotten tentage from Kandahar at a shipping cost of $5 a pound in 2002.  Still want to save money by hanging a set of colours up to rot?

- Need money for the Militia?  Stop buying bottled water for the CF.  Send all Class Bs back to the Armoury floor - if you want a full-time job, you know where the recruiting center is.  Give the man days back to the units.    

- Then, look at where the population is NOW: bring back long disbanded units or create new ones and put them in new population centers.  Get a proper recruiting program with educational incentives. At the same time, clean out the deadwood: START AT THE RECRUITING CENTERS.  Impose ceilings on rank numbers, then brutally enforce it: stop creating positions just to "look after" people.  Stop rank-inflating jobs, promote when a vacancy exists, not by time or qualification.

- Want a Major in your unit?  Better have 100 people first.  Want a LCol? Better have 500.  Open up recruiting for the reserves.  If a regiment can recruit over a thousand, they get a second bn.  Incentive.


----------



## Kat Stevens

Piper said:
			
		

> I'm going to chime in with a question here; I guess the question is what is more important? Operational Readiness/Effectiveness or Tradition? Will having one larger unit isntead of two smaller ones (with one being small to the point of being ineffective) help improve the readiness of those soldiers to train and prepare for deployment (which ultimatly is the role of every reserve unit, as they do not deploy as a formed unit) and therefore further better the operational readiness/effectiveness of the army? And is that more important then tradition.
> 
> Coming from a reserve reg't in my short-lived 'Mo days (and a highland one at that, we all know those units have ALOT of pride in their traditions) I can say that reg't traditions are important, but I still say that amalgamating ineffective reserve units is the best course of action. And re: your comment about respecting those who formed a hollow square under that regiment's colours...isn't that what we have DHH and museums for?
> 
> Tradition and pride should never come before the needs of the army as a whole. If the brigade and the army as a whole will be better served by the QOCH being amalgamated with the Winnipeg Rifles, then there should be no hesitation to do so. IMO.



So it's your opinion that during a time of war, it is to the Army's advantage to rearrange the deck chairs while the scuppers are overflowing?


----------



## geo

> For your edification, some Regiments carry Standards and some Guidons - usually the more senior and distinguished Regiments in our given Army.  Let's not forget our comrades in the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, for whom their guns serve as their Colours.



And let us not forget the dirty old engineer who opens the way to the army..... who carries his one immense battle honour "UBIQUE" (everywhere) on his cap badge.

(Note that this is not to be confused with the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, for whom their guns serve as their Colours and who carry their one immense battle honour "UBIQUE" (All over the place) on their cap badge


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Anytime there is talk of tinkering with the regimental system, one should understand that it is not about cost.  ... That's right: No amount of tinkering will save any money that won't be pissed away somewhere else by someone else.  Re-organizing is not done for efficiency, it is done to pad PERs and build careers.  ...


That's a little below the belt there.  If you don't agree that regiments should not be re-organized then you are a careerists trying to pad their own PER?  Lets not be silly & start trying to approach this a little more objectively. 

Re-organization is about efficiency and effectiveness (two different things).  Yes, bringing multiple regiments of the same arm into a single unit will save some dollars here & there (and those dollars will add up).  But, in an army that is hurting for full time soldiers, tactical groupings could reduce the demand for a few PYs here & there.  With multiple tactical groupings, these PYs add up and allow the army to better put full time pers where they will bring us greater benefit.  That's about all we gain for efficiency.

Effectiveness is the biggest pay off.  How effective is a platoon sized regiment when it comes to developing company and battalion skills?  How effective is a vertically linear chain of command when it comes to producing CWO, Maj & LCol?  If tactical groupings only serve to ensure reserve battalions are regularly able to put real companies in the field on a weekend ex, then we will have introduced a significant improvement in effectiveness of force generating capabilities.


----------



## TCBF

MCG said:
			
		

> ...Effectiveness is the biggest pay off.  How effective is a platoon sized regiment when it comes to developing company and battalion skills?  How effective is a vertically linear chain of command when it comes to producing CWO, Maj & LCol?  If tactical groupings only serve to ensure reserve battalions are regularly able to put real companies in the field on a weekend ex, then we will have introduced a significant improvement in effectiveness of force generating capabilities.



- Right, then group them TACTICALLY all we can, but retain the Regiments as a basis for future expansion if needed - which is what the Militia was designed for to start with.  We don't need to disband, amalgamate or reduce to nil strength local units to group their sub-units or sub-sub-units tactically.  We merely need to introduce a disciplined structure - a "Peacetime Establishment" if you will.

- Being a Regular, I am amazed at the amount of Reservists who would again gut the Militia, when few - if any - modern guttings have done the Militia any good at all. 

- Regular units in their trg areas have a difficult time bonding to their local areas.  We need local units and cadet corps to keep the Army and the people as one.  There are still a lot of young Canadians who know their ancestors served in the local unit - even if they themselves are not in it.


----------



## Monsoon

TCBF said:
			
		

> Send all Class Bs back to the Armoury floor - if you want a full-time job, you know where the recruiting center is.  Give the man days back to the units.



That's right. And we can staff the full-time manning requirements of reserve units with our vast regular force personnel surplus, because all those class B folks will sign up for seven year engagements (including a substantial demotion, of course) because we told them to. Fortunately the Canadian labour market is so flexible these days that it's easy to force skilled workers to do things they don't want to.  :


----------



## TCBF

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> That's right. And we can staff the full-time manning requirements of reserve units with our vast regular force personnel surplus, because all those class B folks will sign up for seven year engagements (including a substantial demotion, of course) because we told them to. Fortunately the Canadian labour market is so flexible these days that it's easy to force skilled workers to do things they don't want to.  :



- Noted.

 ;D


----------



## geo

Retaining old regimental; NAMES for when they can be used again ???

As a soldier / sapper / crewman / gunner, do I feel prouder belonging to a Regiment of 100 odd sould OR belonging to a Regiment of 400 - 600 odd souls ???
What are the chances or probabilities that the regiment can or would be required to be raised to such a force ???

Once the Winnipeg Grenadiers were reduced to nil strength on the '60s - what are the chances of them EVER being resurected AND what kind of pertinence would they have for the future?  If recruiting prospects in the Winnipeg region are such that they can only support ONE battalion, then I would suggest that...
They be massed into ONE battalion of the Winnipeg Regiment
A Coy Camerons
B Coy Rifles
C Coy Grenadiers
D Coy C&S

If at some time in the future there is a need to expand the forces in the Winnipeg region AND the Winnipeg region is capable of supporting such an expansion then they could raise a Second and later a Third Battalion.
At that time, the Battalions could "adopt" the names of the Regiments that once formed their Unit.

... Anecdote :warstory:
In 1914, when the Canadian militia was forming the 1st Canadian Division for overseas service, Storied regiments dating back to confederation didn't have the capacity to field full battalions. 
In Montreal, The Victoria Rifles of Canada, the Canadian Grenadier Guards and the Les Carabiniers Mont Royal were all ready to deploy overseas but none had the full complement required....
A new unit was formed: the 14th Bn CEF, The Royal Montreal Regiment.  Each unit contributed 3 Coys to the endeavour and, after training in Valcartier, off they went overseas with the 3rd Inf Bde of the 1st Cdn Div.  They made their own history & upon their return to Canada in 1919, the 23rd Westmount Rifles, an old Militia regiment volunteered to be struck off the order of battle so that the RMR could take it's place.

You aren't doing a unit any favour by retaining them as rifles company.  You aren't doing someone a favor by stretching a career and making him a LCol or CWO to lead a Company.  Matter of fact, you are hindering him AND, for those who dream of having a reserve Coy or Battalion deploying on Operations - it won't happen cause, the leaders have never benefited from doing it at home.

:warstory:


----------



## Old Sweat

Piper

Something along the lines of your suggestion was done in 1951 to mobilize our army contribution to NATO. It was decided to deploy a brigade group in Germany with another brigade training in Canada. At the same time a brigade was fighting in Korea with another preparing to replace it and a third being formed. The six battalions for the NATO force were created by directing selected militia regiments to mobilize a company for each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Canadian Infantry, Canadian Highland or Canadian Rifle Battalions. In the case of the rifles, the selected regiments (with company in brackets) were the Victoria Rifles of Montreal (A), the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (B), the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (C), the Regina Rifles Regiment (D) and the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Support). Something similar was done for the rest of the force, except for the RCAC which stayed with two regiments for the next few years.

Thus the army went from three infantry battalions in 1950 to 15 in a year and a bit. It was not quite a general mobilization, but was not far off the number called to the colours in 1939. The plan worked because the concept relied on Second World War veterans, who were still young and fit, voluntarily re-enlisting and because there was enough kit in the supply system to equip and arm them. I will leave it you to decide if it woud be possible to do it today.


----------



## AJFitzpatrick

geo said:
			
		

> ... Anecdote :warstory:
> In 1914, when the Canadian militia was forming the 1st Canadian Division for overseas service, Storied regiments dating back to confederation didn't have the capacity to field full battalions.



But didn't the Ad Hoc method of mobilization adopted by Sir Sam Hughes without reference to the existing mobilization plan cause this situation?


----------



## vonGarvin

I've read that the existing plans could have seen 25000 soldiers mobilised in very short order.  Sir Sam buggered that up, but that's another story.


----------



## Michael OLeary

AJFitzpatrick said:
			
		

> But didn't the Ad Hoc method of mobilization adopted by Sir Sam Hughes without reference to the existing mobilization plan cause this situation?



Yes.  Anecdotes about the existing Militia marching off to war are great regimental lore, and neatly disguised by poor general understanding of perpetuation after the war, but the CEF was Sam Hughes' construct, and not a direct evolution of the existing Militia.


----------



## Infanteer

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> "Colours shall not be taken overseas during active operations, including United Nations, NATO, international and other peacekeeping type operations, and units serving overseas at the outbreak of hostilities shall immediately return their Colours to Canada",



Didn't 1 PPCLI take their colours overseas in 2006?

As for the "get rid of the regimental system" bunfight - don't equate wanting to change the way two militia units parading minimal amounts of soldiers with wanting to eliminate the regimental system.  As well, let's not assume that the preservation of the regimental system rests upon how many units with kilts we have left in Canada.


----------



## Old Sweat

Michael is absolutely correct. Sam Hughes described his mobilization approach as carrying a flaming torch through the Scottish Highlands or the Irish countryside in the old days. The result was about as uniform in dress and everything else and less cohesive than a gathering of the clans.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Didn't 1 PPCLI take their colours overseas in 2006?



But were they officially authorized to do so? And were they ever carried on the field of battle?



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As for the "get rid of the regimental system" bunfight - don't equate wanting to change the way two militia units parading minimal amounts of soldiers with wanting to eliminate the regimental system.  As well, let's not assume that the preservation of the regimental system rests upon how many units with kilts we have left in Canada.



I think CSA's comment, and the degree of frustration it lends voice to, is the exact counterpoint to those who cry that the existing "regimental system" is an all or nothing deal.  Anything which might affect any regiment is decried as being destructive to the regimental system, therefore it cannot be rationally discussed or supported at any level.

It is the staunchly misguided defenders of that _regimental system status quo_, no matter how great the perpetuated inefficiencies, that have presented this as a "good vs. evil", "black vs. white" dilemma over and over again.  No one can accuse me of not being a fan of regiments and the regimental system, but if we cannot acknowledge any need to examine and guide the evolution of that system, along with the organization itself, then credible arguments can be put forth to set it aside as a factor in any discussion of Army modernization.

Those who would defend the anachronistic elements will bring the death of the regimental system if it happens, because they will force an "all or nothing" choice, and may well lose that battle to the detriment of us all.


----------



## TCBF

Piper said:
			
		

> ...
> TCBF;
> 
> I don't forsee any time in the future where we will need reserve units to act in the role you describe them in (being there to be filled out in time of war). It will never happen again, it's not WW2 where soldiers can be trained quickly and shipped over. We could have a 150,000+ size army if we filled out ALL the reserve units to max strength, and that will NEVER happen, much less happen quick enough to justify having all these LCol run platoons hanging around. ...



- How many times in the Military history of this planet have people said "It will NEVER happen again.."?

Recall that WW1 was the war to end all wars...

- I wrote earlier of 'ruthlessly' enforcing ranks to positions, and not getting a Major until the unit has 100 people, and not getting a LCol until it has 500.  You may have missed that.  We can still ruthlessly squash the over-ranking and feather-bedding of positions without disbanding regiments.  THE TWO PROBLEMS ARE UNRELATED.  But remember, if no one has the nuts to stop corruption of the old (present) organisation, they won't have the nuts to prevent corruption of the new one.  The house has to be cleaned BEFORE it is re-organized, not after.

- By all means, tactically group effective sub-sub units and sub-units into units.  All four or five regiments can compete for the combined command positions, and may the best leaders win.  We STILL don't need to disband units to do that.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - By all means, tactically group effective sub-sub units and sub-units into units.  All four or five regiments can compete for the combined command positions, and may the best leaders win.  We STILL don't need to disband units to do that.



So, in this model we would be left with the Rinky-Dink Fusiliers, of platoon strength, organizationally under command of the Notional Highlanders (who provide two platoons and get a Major's position because they have the RDF under command for the numbers).  The NH/RDF Company parades under command of the Regional Rifles, who have a Colonel's and RSM's position because of their accumulated 500 positions filled by a dozen or so units.  But,  because we're not actually disbanding any units to do this, the Platoon Commander of the RDF gets to be a Commanding Officer IAW the NDA, and the platoon has its own set of Colours to parade.  And how many orders of dress will we keep for this?


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> So, in this model we would be left with the Rinky-Dink Fusiliers, of platoon strength, organizationally under command of the Notional Highlanders (who provide two platoons and get a Major's position because they have the RDF under command for the numbers).  The NH/RDF Company parades under command of the Regional Rifles, who have a Colonel's and RSM's position because of their accumulated 500 positions filled by a dozen or so units.  But,  because we're not actually disbanding any units to do this, the Platoon Commander of the RDF gets to be a Commanding Officer IAW the NDA, and the platoon has its own set of Colours to parade.  And how many orders of dress will we keep for this?



- The key is tactically group.  Like we do know on exercises and like was done on MILCONS of days of yore.

- The rest of the time, units would carry on as before.  Most could muster a hundred, and retain a Major.  There is no need for units commanded by captains or majors to come under the day to day command of a unit with an LCol just because it has an LCol.    If 4 MP Pl was led by a Captain and 4 CMBG HQ and Sigs Sqn was led by a Major, that did not mean they came under command of the 8 CH(PL) because it was commanded by an LCol - all of those elements had their own distinc relationship with their parent Brigades.  Same-same the NH and the RDF.  Grouped tactically during operations as directed.  Otherwise, function as different sized elements in a Brigade.

Why is this so hard?


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> Why is this so hard?



I suppose it doesn't have to be, as long as one agrees that every estimate must be situated to save each and every existing regiment.

And that is exactly the mindset that will see the regimental system set aside as an inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued.

The diehards will be hoist on their own petards.


----------



## tomahawk6

Regiments that cannot recruit to sustain its numbers need to be deactivated as they waste valuable resources.
Their personnel can be transferred to a nearby unit. Our Guard units may have a battalion with hq company and a manuever company in a large town/city with other manuever companies located in neighboring smaller towns. The state of Virginia has something like 48 national guard armories supporting units anywhere from a company to multiple units.

I guess what I propose is to make cuts in the militia to strengthen the Pres. Make the rest of the militia a volunteer unpaid force that report to the provincial government for interoperable communications, less-than-lethal security, emergency medical triage, traffic control and general manpower support of the Pres. I would configure,man and equip a Pres unit to be able to deploy in the event of war or other emergency.


----------



## TCBF

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Regiments that cannot recruit to sustain its numbers need to be deactivated as they waste valuable resources....



- Interesting standard - let's hold all units to it, regular and reserve.  Let's put all regular units in competion with other units to see how well they can recruit and retain, then offer them the same future the Camerons face if they can't compete..

p.s: I'm a Reg.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Interesting standard - let's hold all units to it, regular and reserve.  Let's put all regular units in competion with other units to see how well they can recruit and retain, then offer them the same future the Camerons face if they can't compete.


You are makeing an apples to oranges comparison.  Regular Force pers get posted to & from units.  Reservists do not get posted and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)


----------



## dapaterson

TCBF said:
			
		

> - By all means, tactically group effective sub-sub units and sub-units into units.  All four or five regiments can compete for the combined command positions, and may the best leaders win.  We STILL don't need to disband units to do that.



The QOCH has not been disbanded, nor is there a plan to do so.  There will be one RHQ manned for both units, but there will still be two units extant - it's just that one individual will be appointed as CO of both units (and another appointed as RSM of both).  So, should the units grow and prosper (or should there be the need) we can see two LCols and two CWOs again.

No disbandment.  No permanent casing of the Colours.  Just a company-minus (or maybe, better, a platoon plus - and has been such for a decade at least) that's started third-parties on a misleading letter-writing campaign.


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> I suppose it doesn't have to be, as long as one agrees that every estimate must be situated to save each and every existing regiment.
> 
> And that is exactly the mindset that will see the regimental system set aside as an inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued.
> 
> The diehards will be hoist on their own petards.



- Here is my short list of "... inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued."

1.  The tank.  (Ooops, they got that wrong).
2.  The A1, A2 and B Echelons (oops, now that we are projecting force outside the wire, we sort of miss those, too).
3.  Medium lift helicopters. (Bye Chinooks! ... Hi Chinooks!)
4.  the QOCHofC...

- Okay, I actually DO agree that we need to exact some efficiencies here and there.  We have, in Canada, amalgamated/converted/reduced to nil strength/disbanded/struck off the order of battle units before and will no doubt do so again.  However, blaming units for poor recruiting when the entire recruiting, training, corporate pay and benefits package is out of their hands is intellectually dishonest.  If we need to save the equivalent of some  LCol's wages, lay off the guys and gals flying the long mahogany bombers somewhere near an OC Transpo route, unless THEY can come up with a revitalization plan to recruit and retain reservists into the presently existing units.  Naturally, it will take political will at a higher level.  It will be much more difficult than slashing a cap badge and claiming victory.


----------



## TCBF

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The QOCH has not been disbanded, nor is there a plan to do so.  There will be one RHQ manned for both units, but there will still be two units extant - it's just that one individual will be appointed as CO of both units (and another appointed as RSM of both).  So, should the units grow and prosper (or should there be the need) we can see two LCols and two CWOs again.
> 
> No disbandment.  No permanent casing of the Colours.  Just a company-minus (or maybe, better, a platoon plus - and has been such for a decade at least) that's started third-parties on a misleading letter-writing campaign.



- Now THAT makes sense to me...


----------



## tomahawk6

Maintaining nominal regiments just to keep them on the rolls isnt worthwhile from a financial and a manning standpoint.This practice doesnt make sense when the CF is short on manpower and money.Furthmore keeping a two tier reserve/militia system is wasteful.Either do away with the militia altogether or make them a volunteer unpaid force.I would favor disbanding the militia and move personnel into the Pres.


----------



## TCBF

MCG said:
			
		

> You are makeing an apples to oranges comparison.  Regular Force pers get posted to & from units.  Reservists do not get posted and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)



- "Reservists do not get posted" - Sure they do, just not by the military, but they come and go just as much.  How many RESO officers stay in their same unit after they get their degree?  They follow the job offers to other cities (and hopefully, other units).

- " and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)" - Agreed, but we should not hold a knife to their throats by holding them responsible for falling numbers when the falling numbers are the results of nationally imposed restrictions, cuts and short-sighted policies.


----------



## TCBF

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Maintaining nominal regiments just to keep them on the rolls isnt worthwhile from a financial and a manning standpoint.This practice doesnt make sense when the CF is short on manpower and money.Furthmore keeping a two tier reserve/militia system is wasteful.Either do away with the militia altogether or make them a volunteer unpaid force.I would favor disbanding the militia and move personnel into the Pres.



- An interesting - but unnecessary - move.  The CF Primary Reserve is colloquially called "The Militia".  Before WW2, the Canadian military (as distinct from the RCN/RCAF) consisted of the Permanent Active Militia (colloquially called "The Permanent Force") and The Non-Permanent Active Militia", or NPAM.  In other words, 'Regular' or 'Reserve', in 1938, we all would have been Militia of one form or another.  NDA 1949, I believe, changed that.

- Units without people cost little, unless we count the infrastructure, in which case we disband the unit and close and sell the Armoury.  Happenned a lot in the early to mid 1960s, when we lost a LOT of rural and small city units and sub-units.  Something about only forces-in-being needed for the inevitable nuclear war.  We sure could use the soldiers those rural units could have been developing today if they were still with us.  I guess the 'hats were wrong about that too!


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Here is my short list of "... inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued."
> 
> 1.  The tank.  (Ooops, they got that wrong).
> 2.  The A1, A2 and B Echelons (oops, now that we are projecting force outside the wire, we sort of miss those, too).
> 3.  Medium lift helicopters. (Bye Chinooks! ... Hi Chinooks!)
> 4.  the QOCHofC...



So, the basis of your argument is, since some decisions have been reversed when the situations changed, we should not change anything else in case it becomes necessary to reverse that too?




			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> However, blaming units for poor recruiting when the entire recruiting, training, corporate pay and benefits package is out of their hands is intellectually dishonest.



At no point have I suggested that a regiment should be disbanded because of poor recruiting.  If any number of units in an area are not up to strength and historically do not maintain a strength close to their authorized number of positions, to me the logical assumption is that they are dividing the potential number of recruits.  This results in a number of weak units where one or more strong ones might be maintained.  This is not essentially a failure to recruit unless you want to suggest that reserve recruiting is nothing more than a contest between co-located units.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - " and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)" - Agreed, but we should not hold a knife to their throats by holding them responsible for falling numbers when the falling numbers are the results of nationally imposed restrictions, cuts and short-sighted policies.



So please enlighten us, under exactly what conditions would you find it appropriate to disband, reduce to nil strength or amalgamate any Reserve unit?


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> So, the basis of your argument is, since some decisions have been reversed when the situations changed, we should not change anything else in case it becomes necessary to reverse that too?



- No.  I am saying that perhaps if a proper estimate of the situation had been done in the first place, those decisions would not have been made.  However, once made, they must be reversed if needed.  At least we can do that nowadays, without fear of embarrassing certain senior mandarins.



			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> At no point have I suggested that a regiment should be disbanded because of poor recruiting.  If any number of units in an area are not up to strength and historically do not maintain a strength close to their authorized number of positions, to me the logical assumption is that they are dividing the potential number of recruits.  This results in a number of weak units where one or more strong ones might be maintained.  This is not essentially a failure to recruit unless you want to suggest that reserve recruiting is nothing more than a contest between co-located units.



- I agree with you.  Others have implied that a failure to recruit and retain should be considered along with a unit's future.  As for filling only one unit by having only one unit to fill, I fear that we underestimate the attraction/repulsion young men and women may feel for a local unit because of who or where their ancestors served or lived.  Children absorb a lot of standards and beliefs from their parents and the tendency of sons and/or daughters to join a unit because their parent(s) were or were NOT in it (or captured by it!) has not been studied.  Limiting a choice in units may actually lower the number of applicants.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - I agree with you.  Others have implied that a failure to recruit and retain should be considered along with a unit's future.  As for filling only one unit by having only one unit to fill, I fear that we underestimate the attraction/repulsion young men and women may feel for a local unit because of who or where their ancestors served or lived.  Children absorb a lot of standards and beliefs from their parents and the tendency of sons and/or daughters to join a unit because their parent(s) were or were NOT in it (or captured by it!) has not been studied.  Limiting a choice in units may actually lower the number of applicants.



This is another unsubstantiated premise used to defend the existence of existing regiments. How many units reported recruiting difficulties because of this specific reason after any past reorganization?  No-one has yet produced data that proves or disproves this opinion.  How many Reservists simply would not have joined the Reserves if their "father's regiment" did not exist when they were ready to try the army themselves?  Unless it can be proven that this is a significant factor then it is only one more red herring.


----------



## dapaterson

Sigh. The "County Regiments" are great history, but not such great recruiting any more - since Canada is an increasingly urban nation.  Keeping a presence in many far-flung communities is a great idea - but make them platoons or companies of larger units, and bring them together to train in numbers that make it worthwhile.

Last time I checked there was only one unit in all of the Army Reserve that routinely parades at or above 300 personnel on a monthly basis.  That's a solid 2 companies plus a small HQ.  That leaves how many others struggling to field a single company - at best?


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> So please enlighten us, under exactly what conditions would you find it appropriate to disband, reduce to nil strength or amalgamate any Reserve unit?



- Offhand, I can't think of any at the moment, possibly outside of obliteration in combat, and then only as long as necessary.  I do know, however, that none of the reasons mentioned on this thread are sufficient.  

- But, you know me, I always like to keep an open mind.  If you came up for a reason for any of the above radical changes to a unit that made sense to me, I would be more than happy to agree with you.

- However, as it stands, disbanding a unit merely because it (and or other units) are understrength strikes me as more of a fashion statement than the result of any long term, thought-out study.

- I type this knowing full well what an emotional issue this is.  Every change has unforeseen reactions. The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) decided to become the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment in 1949, to help recruiting in an area with a lot of Scots blood.  Twenty-five  years later, we joked that we may have gotten more recruits in the seventies as The Lake Superior Finnish/Italian/Ojibway (pick one) Regiment,  but one never knows...  times change.


----------



## TCBF

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Sigh. The "County Regiments" are great history, but not such great recruiting any more - since Canada is an increasingly urban nation.  Keeping a presence in many far-flung communities is a great idea - but make them platoons or companies of larger units, and bring them together to train in numbers that make it worthwhile.
> 
> Last time I checked there was only one unit in all of the Army Reserve that routinely parades at or above 300 personnel on a monthly basis.  That's a solid 2 companies plus a small HQ.  That leaves how many others struggling to field a single company - at best?



- You raise a good point, as our population shifts, so should some of our Armouries - or, at least build new ones.  Perhaps a system where people in a town with no Armoury could join the SupList reserve, take recruit and trades trg, go on tour, etc.  They cannot parade every week, but they can do call-outs.

- As for a units 'Strength": units have been hobbled by low manpower ceilings and lack of man days for so long that it would be complete folly to even dream of blaming them for low numbers. That does not even hint at results of the "National Climate of Political Leadership" which can deter recruiting by disbanding regiments, delaying incentive pay, closing interesting bases/postings, retiring unique aircraft/ships/vehicles/equipment that young people were interested in working on....   This ain't like Abitibi closing down another paper mill.  The results are much more subtle.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Offhand, I can't think of any at the moment, possibly outside of obliteration in combat, and then only as long as necessary.  I do know, however, that none of the reasons mentioned on this thread are sufficient.
> 
> - But, you know me, I always like to keep an open mind.  If you came up for a reason for any of the above radical changes to a unit that made sense to me, I would be more than happy to agree with you.
> 
> - However, as it stands, disbanding a unit merely because it (and or other units) are understrength strikes me as more of a fashion statement than the result of any long term, thought-out study.



When the population of an area doesn't produce enough recruits to sustain the units in that area, why is that not a valid reason to examine unit structures and groupings and, if a logical analysis supports the decision, to reduce or amalgamate?

If you cannot imagine any reason to eliminate or amalgamate any unit, then there is no use continuing this debate since you have already decided to dismiss any argument.


----------



## rifleman

I'd say disbandment of a unit, reg or res, could be determined if there is no reason to have them and there would actually be some sort of savings. I believe that tactical groupings are a long time coming.


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> When the population of an area doesn't produce enough recruits to sustain the units in that area, why is that not a valid reason to examine unit structures and groupings and, if a logical analysis supports the decision, to reduce or amalgamate?
> 
> If you cannot imagine any reason to eliminate or amalgamate any unit, then there is no use continuing this debate since you have already decided to dismiss any argument.



- I won't dismiss that argument, as it is a good one.  However, where has the population fallen?  Rural Saskatchewan, maybe a few other places.  Winnipeg had a population of 179,000 in 1921, and 633,000 in 2006.  Perhaps a recruiting and retention problem, but certainly not  a shrinking recruiting base.  As a percentage of population, Winnipeg may have a higher military participatory rate than the GTA.

- The REAL problem, is why won't Canadians join - and stay - in their local Militia units? (or the Regular Force, for that matter).  There has to be a national, holistic solution to this.  Dismantling the organization bit-by-bit strikes me as an admission of failure before we have even started to try and solve the problem.


----------



## TCBF

rifleman said:
			
		

> I'd say disbandment of a unit, reg or res, could be determined if there is no reason to have them and there would actually be some sort of savings. I believe that tactical groupings are a long time coming.



- If there is no longer a military function to be performed by a unit in it's present role, then it should be re-roled.  In WW2, The Fourth Canadian Infantry Division became The Fourth Canadian Armoured Division.  In fact, some Canadian Infantry regiments got tanks before some Canadian cavalry regiments did.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - I won't dismiss that argument, as it is a good one.  However, where has the population fallen?  Rural Saskatchewan, maybe a few other places.  Winnipeg had a population of 179,000 in 1921, and 633,000 in 2006.  Perhaps a recruiting and retention problem, but certainly not  a shrinking recruiting base.  As a percentage of population, Winnipeg may have a higher military participatory rate than the GTA.
> 
> - The REAL problem, is why won't Canadians join - and stay - in their local Militia units? (or the Regular Force, for that matter).  There has to be a national, holistic solution to this.  Dismantling the organization bit-by-bit strikes me as an admission of failure before we have even started to try and solve the problem.



Attraction, recruiting and retention may be a national problem which equally affects Reg and Res, but that doesn't eliminate the immediate issues of understrength units competing for recruits.

In an earlier post you brought up the concept of decisions being reversed when situations changed, and supported that idea in a subsequent post seeking clarification.  Don't pass off changes to the Reserve structure now as "dismantling" and "admission of failure" when reversal is always possible.  Unless, of course, the argument is again going to get hung up on protecting cap badges rather than positions for soldiers.


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> ...  Unless it can be proven that this is a significant factor then it is only one more red herring.



- Agreed.  Bring on the consultants and operational analysts and let the study begin.  I can live with the unbiased results, whatever they end up being.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Agreed.  Bring on the consultants and operational analysts and let the study begin.  I can live with the unbiased results, whatever they end up being.



And hopefully they will not end up beached on the same shoals as previous viability studies.

And in the interim, we cannot expect the chain of command to simply postpone any and all decisions while waiting for study results in the hope that all will agree to them, because that's never going to happen.  Supporting the idea of studies for their own sake has an way of being used to postpone decisions in the hope that the perceived "enemy" will move on before an unwelcome decision is reached.


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> Attraction, recruiting and retention may be a national problem which equally affects Reg and Res, but that doesn't eliminate the immediate issues of understrength units competing for recruits.



- No it does not.  So let's get going and take effective national action, instead of ineffective local action. 



			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> In an earlier post you brought up the concept of decisions being reversed when situations changed, and supported that idea in a subsequent post seeking clarification.  Don't pass off changes to the Reserve structure now as "dismantling" and "admission of failure" when reversal is always possible.  Unless, of course, the argument is again going to get hung up on protecting cap badges rather than positions for soldiers.



- We should make potentially damaging changes without scientific study and not worry about the results because we can always change it back if it does not work?  I disagree.  Ideally, we don't make the damaging changes to start with.  Making them and having to change back later is a worst case scenario, not a rational 'Plan B'.

- The symptoms are poor recruiting and retention.  What is the illness?  Do we treat the symptoms or the illness?


----------



## rifleman

In the case of Winnipeg are they really fighting for recruits? or are they getting twice the number? Some people might be swayed by the chance to wear a shirt? ( I know its a kilt - just some old rivarly dies hard ;D)


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> And hopefully they will not end up beached on the same shoals as previous viability studies.
> 
> And in the interim, we cannot expect the chain of command to simply postpone any and all decisions while waiting for study results in the hope that all will agree to them, because that's never going to happen.  Supporting the idea of studies for their own sake has an way of being used to postpone decisions in the hope that the perceived "enemy" will move on before an unwelcome decision is reached.



- Well, dammit, yeah...

- So: What is the DS solution?  Without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Evolution, not Revolution?


----------



## tomahawk6

> - Units without people cost little, unless we count the infrastructure, in which case we disband the unit and close and sell the Armoury.  Happenned a lot in the early to mid 1960s, when we lost a LOT of rural and small city units and sub-units.  Something about only forces-in-being needed for the inevitable nuclear war.  We sure could use the soldiers those rural units could have been developing today if they were still with us.  I guess the 'hats were wrong about that too!



I agree.That is the strength of our National Guard and Reserves.We still have those small town armories.


----------



## Michael OLeary

TCBF said:
			
		

> - So: What is the DS solution?  Without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Evolution, not Revolution?



It is very unlikely that there is a rubber-stamp "DS Solution".  More likely, there are a dozen possible solutions depending on different local circumstances, each of which could result in a stronger organization.  These could include, but not be limited to:

* Reduction to nil strength
* Amalgamation
* Dispersal of sub-units to viable recruiting areas
* Move of units to viable recruiting areas
* Re-roling
* Creation of new units/sub-units to match population demographics

I would suggest a comprehensive solution addressing various local problems across the country might involve any and all of these possible solutions.


----------



## dglad

Okay...I've been off these means for a long time (for a variety of reasons).  I drop back in and, wham, here's a topic that's near and dear.

Interestingly, the tone of some of the posts in this thread seem to suggest the Camerons are "going away".  They aren't, in any way, shape or form.  They are going to be tactically grouped with the RWR's, which for the most part means they are going to share a common C2 superstructure.  The advantage is the collectivization of training between the two infantry units in Minto Armoury; this will result in greater numbers involved in training, and economies of scale in training administration.  A similar situation currently exists in Saskatchewan where, for some time now, the Royal Regina Rifles and North Saskatchewan Regiment have been tactically grouped under an N Sask R unit HQ.  Likewise, the artillery units in 38 CBG (10 Fd Regt, 26 Fd Regt and 116 Ind Fd Battery) have been tactically grouped for several years in the 38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group (ATG).  Both of these latter examples are highly successful.  I just attended Ex Prairie Defender 08 in Dundurn, and was witness to the impressive results achieved as a result of the Saskatchewan inf grouping.  All of the inf from 38 and 41 CBG on the ex performed well, but the Saskatchewan units' performance was exceptional, in no small part because of the advantages of training larger number of infantry soldiers together, under a common C2 infrastructure, through their IBTS and other gateway training that led up to Prairie Defender.  I would note that the RRR are still very much alive and well in terms of their Regimental identity, in spite of being grouped with the N Sask R.


----------



## TCBF

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> It is very unlikely that there is a rubber-stamp "DS Solution".  More likely, there are a dozen possible solutions depending on different local circumstances, each of which could result in a stronger organization.  These could include, but not be limited to:
> 
> * Reduction to nil strength
> * Amalgamation
> * Dispersal of sub-units to viable recruiting areas
> * Move of units to viable recruiting areas
> * Re-roling
> * Creation of new units/sub-units to match population demographics
> 
> I would suggest a comprehensive solution addressing various local problems across the country might involve any and all of these possible solutions.



- I know which ones I would try first, but that is a good start to a comprehensive list.

- dglad's post is heartening.


----------



## a_majoor

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I agree.That is the strength of our National Guard and Reserves.We still have those small town armories.



I would suggest this is an example of the American culture of _Civic Nationalism_ in action. Canadians for the most part are not motivated by the same sort of ideas of community, duty and civic responsibility as our American cousins (especially Americans who live outside the major urban centres). This may be one of the systemic reasons our Reserve system has recruiting and retention issues; "we" think the solution is to better compete with McDonald's for bodies when the sort of person who we should be looking for thinks of service in the military as a vocation rather than a part time job.


----------



## TCBF

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... Canadians for the most part are not motivated by the same sort of ideas of community, duty and civic responsibility as our American cousins...



- Not to sure about that.  I DO know we don't articulate it all that well.


----------



## RangerRay

As someone who prefers the British/Canadian "regimental system" and spent my short militia career in a unit that was lucky to muster a full platoon for training, I have to reluctantly agree that re-orgs/amalgamations/nil strengths/disbandments should be something to consider.

I am proud of the history of my regiment in the Interior of BC, and would hate to see it amalgamated or disbanded, but sometimes those are the proper options to take.  The regimental system here and in the UK has been constantly evolving over the centuries.

I had read earlier in this thread that the RMRangs and the Seaforths were tactically grouped under a single HQ.  Is this the way of the future?  Or amalgamation?  I would hate to see my old regiment disappear, but the regimental system must evolve to the present realities if it is to survive.

My 0.94 Afghanis...

EDITTED TO ADD:  My old regiment was created by amalgamating several independent rifle companies throughout the Kootenays and Okanagan.


----------



## ArmyRick

I agree. I don't agree with this tactical grouping business. I think we should just amalgamate the regiments. Platoon and company size units are ridicolous.


----------



## dglad

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I agree. I don't agree with this tactical grouping business. I think we should just amalgamate the regiments. Platoon and company size units are ridicolous.



Tactical grouping is, by far, the more palatable option from a wide number of points of view.  Amalgamation, disbandment, etc. are certainly other options, but they involve much more "friction" in implementing.


----------



## ArmyRick

Sometimes the truth hurts. I look at pretty much all of our regiments. They have changed in few or many ways since their first ancestory units came about. Sometimes the changes are super ficial like cap badges being modified or in other cases, They amalgamate and form new regiments. 

Look at the Lorne Scots, formed 1936 from 3 other units. Those units had proudly fought in the first world war and many volunteers had served in the Boer war. Did we dishonour their sacrifice by amalgamting them into a new regiment? No, not at all.

Our reserve regiments need to get off this holy-er than though can not touch our regimental heritage business and accept changes. Amalgamation is the best process in my opinion because it keeps alive the tradition of the existing units (Like a marriage) when they form a new one.

I think simply disbanding or reducing to nil strength some units would be a greater sin.

Lets move forward, shall we?


----------



## blacktriangle

MCG said:
			
		

> Effectiveness is the biggest pay off.  How effective is a platoon sized regiment when it comes to developing company and battalion skills?  How effective is a vertically linear chain of command when it comes to producing CWO, Maj & LCol?  If tactical groupings only serve to ensure reserve battalions are regularly able to put real companies in the field on a weekend ex, then we will have introduced a significant improvement in effectiveness of force generating capabilities.



I had my last weekend ex as a reservist this weekend...

I would agree from what I saw with everything you just said, as watching a company attack done by people who were only used to platoon minus tactics proved to be a slaughter- even when they were only up against a section of OPFOR.

From my observations, there were often companies composed of platoons from 2-3 different regiments. Many of the soldiers were so fresh that they had barely done platoon level training, and it was clear that the different sub-sub units had not had time to practice enough together. They basically all fought their own little section or platoon level battle, uncoordinated.

Maybe time to start training us all together a little more often, whatever way it has to be done. An extra weekend a month wouldn't hurt either..a few hours prep for the year doesn't do much...

Blah two cents from a maggot...


P.S There were enough Snr Officers and RSM's kicking around to lead a REAL brigade, at least we have one thing right!  ;D


----------



## dapaterson

popnfresh said:
			
		

> P.S There were enough Snr Officers and RSM's kicking around to lead a REAL brigade, at least we have one thing right!  ;D



No, we're not doing it right.  How many of those LCols have actually commanded a Bn - or even a real Coy?  And for how long?  A weekend doesn't cut it - there's all kinds of shortcuts we take on a weekend ex that would leave the platoon / company / bn in a world of hurt if we tried the same things on a longer time period - that's especially true in the support aspects of the jobs.  So let's ask the same of the "RSM"s and their past - have they been a real CSM for a prolonged period of time?

We do experience on the cheap for senior leaders, leaving them without the experience to be effective leaders.  But because we must constantly meet the churn every 3 years for another LCol and another CWO we promote the last one standing, or people without enough practical experience at their rank level.

But then we have the dilemma - those who reach senior ranks came through that system, so it must work, because they made it, right?

No names, no pack drill:  When a full Colonel can't bother to learn how to pronounce the name of the individual he's appointing as the CO of one of his units he's surpassed by far his maximum level of incompetence.  But those events occur and recur because no one is willing to say "51 Infantry Bns in the Reserves?  Bullspit!" and take appropriate action to ensure a system and structure that fits our numbers.  If the government wants a Reserve Force of X thousand soldiers, build a structure to fit, with appropriate leadership - and don't perpetuate every unit and its brothers just because at some point in the past 200 years they may have done something.


----------



## blacktriangle

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No, we're not doing it right.  How many of those LCols have actually commanded a Bn - or even a real Coy?  And for how long?  A weekend doesn't cut it - there's all kinds of shortcuts we take on a weekend ex that would leave the platoon / company / bn in a world of hurt if we tried the same things on a longer time period - that's especially true in the support aspects of the jobs.  So let's ask the same of the "RSM"s and their past - have they been a real CSM for a prolonged period of time?



Sorry sir, I guess my sarcasm wasn't as easy to detect as I had hoped, but your thoughts have summed up what I meant.


----------



## rifleman

How is removing cap badges going to increase the amount of time reservists train? or the level which they train? 

As for moving forward, the appears the reserves have...tactical groupings


----------



## Michael OLeary

How long does a "tactical grouping" have to remain in place before people admit its an amalgamation in all but name?  If tactical groupings are created because certain units have been unable to maintain personnel numbers or a credible line of succession and have no foreseeable way to recovery, than what is the point in dancing around the issue to please the "protect the badges" crowd?  How few cap badges need to be present to still say there's a second unit there at all?


----------



## rifleman

As long as it works I guess


----------



## dglad

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> How long does a "tactical grouping" have to remain in place before people admit its an amalgamation in all but name?  If tactical groupings are created because certain units have been unable to maintain personnel numbers or a credible line of succession and have no foreseeable way to recovery, than what is the point in dancing around the issue to please the "protect the badges" crowd?  How few cap badges need to be present to still say there's a second unit there at all?



What difference does it make?  If the units' collective training is improved, soldiers are able to experience training in more meaningfully-sized organizations, overhead is reduced and, yet, unit identities are retained, then how does this not represent a good compromise solution to an otherwise thorny issue?


----------



## Michael OLeary

dglad said:
			
		

> What difference does it make?  If the units' collective training is improved, soldiers are able to experience training in more meaningfully-sized organizations, overhead is reduced and, yet, unit identities are retained, then how does this not represent a good compromise solution to an otherwise thorny issue?



It is a good compromise solution.  Is it expected to be the permanent solution in every case where it is implemented?  Or might it turn out to be an intermediate objective in some cases?


----------



## geo

Ummm... a tactical grouping means that we combine units for the short term... always deferring to someone else the need to deliver the unpleasant message that.... the current system does not work AND WE MUST change things to make them better.

3 Plt of A Coy of the Ping Pong Fusiliers does not a battalion make and just because a plt WO is the most senior person in the Battalion does not make him qualified to be a CSM or shudder... a RSM.

And that poor Plt LT training with 30 men does not develop his abilities towards becoming the leader of a Battalion - and all that it means.

Amalgamation is a system that has been done in Other Commonwealth countries over the centuries... what makes a Canadian Militia unit so...... untouchable ???


----------



## ArmyRick

Here is my opinion based on 18 years of regular/Reserve service.

This tactical grouping works for weekend exercise and sure everybody keeps their cap badges but I don't agree that it works.

When people WEAR a common cap badge, they do come together as more of a family. It is why the regimental system works. Human nature will always have that they're different mind set. I once worked on a weekend exercise with another unit, I was a section commander brought in to lead another unit's section on a brigade exercise (my unit had a surplus of SR NCOs go figure) and the boys had to get a bit of an ass kicking from me because they dragged their heels and what not. I asked them why and they were told on the side to not give me the time of day. I earned their respect through competence and I hate to say it, but fear.

How often does sh*t like this happen when units mix? More than you think. Yes it is stupid and immature, it actually reminds me of that Dr Seus cartoon with the cartoon critters getting stars on/off their bellies so they can be different.  However in the real world it happens.  

Now my time in the REG F and on several tours, I find a stronger bond with the soldiers in a battalion. Yes true, they take augmentees under the wing. However all in all, they are a stronger cohesion. It is the same cohesion I see that works when you operate at your own unit. Everybody is part of the same family. I can't fully explain the mindset, but it is there.

The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO. 

Once again I stand by opinion that tactical grouping is a temporary measure at best. I am a strong beleiver in moving forward with amalgamation of many units.


----------



## rifleman

Its not that its untouchable, for me its 'who cares?' The removal of Cap Badges doesn't do anything to address all the issues with reserves. Its time to accept the fact, that they aren't full time, however are making it possible for us to carry out current operations without the cost of employing all reservists full time.

I guess it will be a problem as long as Colonels have to wear a 'generic' cap badge because they can't so their job while wearing their unit/branch accroutements, 
as long as we have to change colour of berets because of the branch/ element we work with,
as long as we have to form a new regiment, with new acccroutements when it could be a joint unit, with a multiple of existing trade/ unit members.


----------



## geo

> The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO.



Wrong....

The advantage of merging / combining units into formal full strength battalions is that Ptes, Cpls, MCpls, Sgts, WOs, MWOs, CWOs AND DITTO for Lts, Capts, Majs and LCols who will develop experience training as a full battalion and not as a cheap immitation of one.


----------



## rifleman

geo said:
			
		

> The advantage of merging / combining units into formal full strength battalions is that Ptes, Cpls, MCpls, Sgts, WOs, MWOs, CWOs AND DITTO for Lts, Capts, Majs and LCols who will develop experience training as a full battalion and not as a cheap immitation of one.



If you don't have the numbers, you will never achieve that aim, even if you had one cap badge. Having a battalion structure in the reserves can almost be considered Battalion TEWT. There is still a benefit.


----------



## Michael OLeary

rifleman said:
			
		

> Its not that its untouchable, for me its 'who cares?' The removal of Cap Badges doesn't do anything to address all the issues with reserves.



But if finding those solutions results in changes to cap badges as one of the parts of a workable solution to build stronger units . . . oh, wait, I get it, you were trying to trivialize the whole cap badge thing so people would nod and agree with that simplistic view, and there I was trying to bring the discussion back to reality.   I'll quit now and just wait to see what solutions the Army develops.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Human nature will always have that they're different mind set.


I've seen this problem cause friction between reservist elements of the same cap badge from different units, and I've seen different cap badges come together and work outstandingly.  More important that what people are wearing on their foreheads is that they must regularly be trained to work as a team.  If you get that regular training as a team, the soldiers will get past the cap badge thing.  If you don't have that regular training as a team, then the soldiers are going to have problems even if they all wear the same badge.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO.


This same advantage would come from standing permanent tactical affiliations.


----------



## dglad

The cap-badge thing is, frankly, a red-herring.  We are witnessing the evolution of a generation of soldiers who, if used to working together, will do so without particular regard to cap-badge.  Again, to take the Royal Regina Rifles and North Saskatchewan Regiment as an example, young soldiers from both those units were quite blunt that they work and play together so much that they don't really distinguish one unit from the other.  The Camerons and Royal Winnipeg Rifles are in much the same situation.  For that matter, all five of the 38 CBG units work together enough that they have developed a significant cohesion.

I've been in the Reserves for 31 years and am extremely proud of my Regiment.  However, I've come to realize that these young soldiers really are pointing the way forward.  You go on exercise with someone, share a trench with someone, go on patrol, get wet and cold, drink too much, etc. etc. with someone, and you develop a cohesive bond that transcends cap-badges.  We see this on operations all the time; I commanded Roto 0 of Ops Bronze and Boreas in BiH and had essentially 100 odds and sods wearing about 40 different cap badges and, you know what?  Within a month, it was an integrated team working for a common purpose.  This isn't to say that Regimental identity isn't important, but frankly, I think our TROOPS are capable of attaching exactly the appropriate amount of weight to it, in what amounts to an instinctual way.

Are tactical groupings a permanent solution?  Maybe they are, and maybe not.  Perhaps the more important question is, do they achieve the end-state of an improved and more efficient training experience for our soldiers?  So far, it appears that they do, while allowing us to focus other energies on designing and delivering said training.  The day may come when we need to take the issue of amalgamation, disbandment, or whatever, head on.  In the meantime, however, tactical groupings are doing an effective job of training our soldiers more effectively.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller. 

Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.

True, the British amalgamated several times but it doesn't seem to help with getting the numbers up. You could even argue that, as units with close identities to geographical regions close down, the army becomes even further distanced from its true support base: the public.

If a private sector business wanted more market penetration, they'd open new stores. We should do the same. Given the apparent stress levels in the Reg F re: manning levels, it would also seem to make more sense to diversify our risk and spread the load across more units, or even consider (shock, horror) mobilizing a few reserve infantry units to help take the strain.


----------



## dglad

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.
> 
> Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.
> 
> True, the British amalgamated several times but it doesn't seem to help with getting the numbers up. You could even argue that, as units with close identities to geographical regions close down, the army becomes even further distanced from its true support base: the public.
> 
> If a private sector business wanted more market penetration, they'd open new stores. We should do the same. Given the apparent stress levels in the Reg F re: manning levels, it would also seem to make more sense to diversify our risk and spread the load across more units, or even consider (shock, horror) mobilizing a few reserve infantry units to help take the strain.



I don't think we are contemplating making it smaller, actually.  We're attempting to make it more efficient and effective in terms of its ability to train Res F infantry soldiers.  The theory is that two units each of, say, 100 personnel (each a company minus) that are located close together, or even co-located, will provide better training as a single unit of 200 personnel (a company plus).  The specific point to make is that, being tactically grouped, the two units remain two units from a Regimental identity point of view, but are grouped as a single unit for training and admin purposes.  So...no reductions in size or "community footprint".  In fact, the better training for the soldiers can actually increase both attraction (since we know our best attraction mechanism is word of mouth) and retention.

Standing up new Regiments?  Now, that's an interesting idea.  There are quite populous parts of the country (for example, Mississauga) that have no Res F presence at all.  It's a long and cumbersome trek from Mississauga to Moss Park Armoury, so there's a large potential market for recruits that's, at least arguably, going "untapped".  Perhaps, rather than talking about amalgamation or dissolution, we should be talking about MOVING units from where they're struggling to recruit from a stagnant or even shrinking recruiting base (often in competition with other Army Res units, Naval Res units, etc.), to one that is completely unexploited.


----------



## dapaterson

There are ongoing initiatives to grow existing units in underserved communities.  Getting the approvals to build new facilities in those communities, however, remains a bit of a gordian knot.

Right now the Army Reserve is at or over its target strength.  So most units will be in a mode to recruit for sustainment.  That's just the simple reality - and it's the Government's role to decide and set the desired strengths for the CF.  Certainly, DND/CF can quietly advise behind the scenes, but decisions are made by Government.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Great idea.

Or have existing units open company/ squadron armouries in rapidly growing areas of the country. E.g., The Fraser Valley is apparently the fastest growing region in Canada with an anticipated population of well over 1 million within in 10 years yet, apart from the Westies who have a company in Abbotsford, and 6 Fd Sqn who has a sub-unit in Chilliwack, there is little military presence there. 39 CBG units could each be tasked with standing up a sub-unit there. Many of those who parade in downtown Vancouver based units live there anyways. Despite having a population of over 80,000, there are no military units in Prince George "The Capital of Northern BC". Why? No idea. 

Other Bdes could easily do the same I mean, seriously, there are probably enough Newfies in Northen Alberta right now to stand up a Bn of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment  ;D


----------



## dglad

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are ongoing initiatives to grow existing units in underserved communities.  Getting the approvals to build new facilities in those communities, however, remains a bit of a gordian knot.
> 
> Right now the Army Reserve is at or over its target strength.  So most units will be in a mode to recruit for sustainment.  That's just the simple reality - and it's the Government's role to decide and set the desired strengths for the CF.  Certainly, DND/CF can quietly advise behind the scenes, but decisions are made by Government.



I'm aware of this.  But units in some parts of the country are having difficulty even offsetting attrition.  There are many reasons for this (focusing on demographics that just aren't themselves growing, and may even be shrinking; too many units for the available recruiting pool; problematic recruiting strategies; etc.)

The ceiling for Army Res strength is another debate.  Perhaps there are some capabilities we don't need in the Res F, which would allow us to strengthen the ones we do.


----------



## geo

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.
> 
> Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.


Problem in Canada is with the concentration of "like" units in urban regions... consider that in Montreal, there are( RMR, R de Mais, Fus MR, BW and CGG) a total of 5 infantry units that are all within 5 miles from each other... probably less.  It doesn't make sense.  The largest is at about 250 Pers... the smallest fluttering at 100.

They have the makings of a decent sized battalion and they all live in the same general area - making it eminently possible to train together all the time - should the training stores and training area be able to handle them.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.


Absolutely nothing is getting smaller.  A lot of these too small units don't have much authorized room to grow.  If you think of  it in the sense of two 24 boxes of beer that are both half full.  If you move all the bottles to one box, you still have as much beer.  However, in reserve case there are a bunch of boxes with only a dozen to half dozen bottles each, but we keep them in thier boxes so that each brand has the glory of keeping its own mostly empty box.

There is also absolutely no latent potential in the existence of a cap badge.  The existence or lack of a cap badge will not affect our ability to force generate additional battalions for war (should the requirement ever come).  That capability comes from our total trained and experienced soldiers.  If we gain more experienced soldeirs from a process that sees few cap badges, we will actually increase our capability.

Regiements are important, but cap badges are are only the deck chairs in developing the Army's future.  A proper force structure is the foundation, and that must be done right even if it upsets a few cap badges.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Seen. 

It's just bizarre that here we have authorized units, many based in the largest urban concentrations in the country, who are struggling to find and keep people. It's like we're dying of thirst in the middle of a lake because we can't seem to get to the water. And I don't buy the oft quoted argument that the youth of today don't find the military a popular career option. 

Of course, members of individual units will tell you that "we're doing better than those other units" with all the joyful competition that creates, but in general it seems like a bit of a train wreck when it comes to finding and keeping people.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's just bizarre that here we have authorized units, many based in the largest urban concentrations in the country, who are struggling to find and keep people. It's like we're dying of thirst in the middle of a lake because we can't seem to get to the water. And I don't buy the oft quoted argument that the youth of today don't find the military a popular career option.



Some of the problems may lie in the lack of access to the Armouries.  As cities grow, the downtown Armoury is further and further from the young Recruits.  Spending a couple hours on public transit, with the problems of no transit after a Parade night, can have detrimental affects on a Units Nominal Roll.  DND has to move some of these Armouries out of the downtown core and out to where the population is.  People really don't want to travel an hour or two through the city to parade, and then the same amount of time to return home.   Some metropolitan areas have transit services ending too early for members to get home.  Long distances in city traffic and lack of parking are also a factor.  

Yes, DND owns some marvelous historic buildings on "Prime Real Estate" in many cities, but if these locations are becoming less accessible to the members of the Units housed in them, then they are becoming derelict.  Money has to be spent to "move out to where the members are".


----------



## geo

Those historical buildings have a multitude of problems when trying to bend them to current military life.....

- QMs down in the bassement - with little or no handling equipment to get said goods from one floor to the next....
- No loading docks to facilitate the loading and unloading of vehicles...
- Classrooms & office space for one company.... 
- etc, etc, etc.....

Time to hand over those old historical buildings to DHH... time to build or sublet buildings where we need them and in a size / configuration that we need.


----------



## Harris

Not to mention the huge cost to maintain, heat, etc..... vs a modern energy efficient building.  The Armouries in Halifax for example have had a wooden pedestrian roof around parts of it for years as pieces keep falling off the building.


----------



## GunfighterSB

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Some of the problems may lie in the lack of access to the Armouries.  As cities grow, the downtown Armoury is further and further from the young Recruits.  Spending a couple hours on public transit, with the problems of no transit after a Parade night, can have detrimental affects on a Units Nominal Roll.  DND has to move some of these Armouries out of the downtown core and out to where the population is.  People really don't want to travel an hour or two through the city to parade, and then the same amount of time to return home.   Some metropolitan areas have transit services ending too early for members to get home.  Long distances in city traffic and lack of parking are also a factor.
> 
> Yes, DND owns some marvelous historic buildings on "Prime Real Estate" in many cities, but if these locations are becoming less accessible to the members of the Units housed in them, then they are becoming derelict.  Money has to be spent to "move out to where the members are".



As a long time lurker and someone who has not posted for a dog's age, let me write on what I know. Metro Toronto is the biggest Metropolis in Canada in terms of population.  The Downtown Armouries are within walking distance of several Resident Neighborhoods and High Rises. and several Subway Stations with Light Rail and Bus Stops. The Downsview Armoury is at the Tip of the Avenue Spadina Subway line and a has an entire Base that can be used as an extention of its already large civilian parking lot. 

32 BDE has Weekend QL2 Course, Co Op QL2 Courses, Summer QL2 Courses all through the year.

The Problem from my view lies in three forms: Poor advertising and poor intake issues and poor retention.

Let me discuss them in detail. Please correct me if I am way out of my lane or Orbit.
1) Poor Advertising: The best advertisement we as Soldiers have are ourselves. There are alot of citizens of Toronto (most especially the downtown core residents) that are ignorant about us (IE: they do not think we exist or that in joining the Army you are signing your life away to fight for Capitalist War monger non-Pinkos who oppress baby seals -- I am not kidding, I am speaking from personal experience).

If the Members are more vocal (in a positive way, as in "I did something incredible demanding this weekend, and it was GREAT. Let my Neighbors, Co Workers and Friends outside of the Army look at these pictures that were taken by me and my WARRIOR buddies!!!! It was difficult but man when it was finished, it was worth every effort. Go ahead squeeze my bicep!!")  then we can at least influence those around us that being in the Army (Reserve) has alot of benefits. Believe me when I say that most (Male)Cube Drones want to experience a chance to do what we do. 32 Bde needs to win the "Hearts and Minds" of Toronto.

2) Poor intake. I do not know what the average wait time is to join the Army (Reserve) but from my perception, it takes too long to recruit them, and send them to Depot for training - at least in Toronto. There are cases for very long wait time in this forum. 

What we need in Toronto is a quick way to get them in the door, a quick and efficient way to do background checks and all the other tests and then, load them quickly into a BMQ course - weekend, weekdays or Summer. Perhaps we can use Private Detectives to help with the Background checks - please instruct me if I am way out to lunch. We cannot afford to have a Candidate finish all his/her tests and languish waiting for a BMQ. (or for that matter SQ, QL4s, CLCs, QL5s, QL6A/B).

3) Poor Retention. The Army(Reserve) competes with your time. For those married with Kids and a demanding Job Schedule, every Weeknight or Weekend is time spent away from your Lovely Spouse(who has a frown because he/she has not heard you snore beside him/her for two weekends in a row) and your adorable kids (who cry everytime you leave them for the weekend because they are brainwashed that they will never see you again and that you are off murdering Baby Seals). You work like a dog on your High Stress, over Taxed job that you cannot quit because, the kids need braces, shoes, education...etc that you as a Breadwinner must provide (Unless you want to incur the wrath of Child Services). Then to top it off, the Army Pay bumps you just enough into the dangerous Tax Bracket zone, to make you work harder for just the same amount of net pay. 

I do not know how to solve this one. Perhaps if the Army pay can be Tax Free, or if the Govt of the Day can lower all our taxes, (The elimination of the Gouge and Screw Tax will mean a nice 5% savings on most of my family expenses) I can afford to get a less paying but less demanding job. And my wife can complain less about the weekends since I will work Crazy Hours instead of Insane ones and more have more time to be around her and the kids...

So in conclusion I think I have viable solutions for 1 and 2. Its logistics that will be the trick. How do you inspire your Soldiers (who are Students, unemployed, skill trade oriented, or Office Drone) and yourself to draw in your Non-Army peers (many of whom come from cultures and countries where Soldiers are seen as brutal thugs to be avoided - this is Toronto)? How do you solve the Intake of new recruits and send them to boot camp before a human resource hungry economy consumes all other their time?


----------



## Haggis

MCG said:
			
		

> Absolutely nothing is getting smaller.  A lot of these too small units don't have much authorized room to grow.  If you think of  it in the sense of two 24 boxes of beer that are both half full.  If you move all the bottles to one box, you still have as much beer.  However, in reserve case there are a bunch of boxes with only a dozen to half dozen bottles each, but we keep them in thier boxes so that each brand has the glory of keeping its own mostly empty box.



An excellent analogy and quite easy for any Canadian to understand.


----------



## tank recce

Haggis said:
			
		

> Quoth Geo, "Absolutely nothing is getting smaller.  A lot of these too small units don't have much authorized room to grow.  If you think of  it in the sense of two 24 boxes of beer that are both half full.  If you move all the bottles to one box, you still have as much beer.  However, in reserve case there are a bunch of boxes with only a dozen to half dozen bottles each, but we keep them in thier boxes so that each brand has the glory of keeping its own mostly empty box."
> 
> 
> An excellent analogy and quite easy for any Canadian to understand.



The issue for some of us is neither bottles of beer nor boxes, but the number of coasters upon which to rest your beer. If we have problems getting sufficent (serviceable) vehicles for an 8-car troop, then combining us and the various other jeep-jockeys into the GTA into A/B/C/D Sqn 2 RARR solves little.

We need kit. We need vehicles - real AFV / Armoured cars, not these plastic farces. We are in the process of (if we haven't already) minting crew commanders who joined after the last Cougar gunnery courses were run, and for whom the evocative cry of, "Muzzle ends clear, driver's hatch closed!" means .... nothing. Radios - my god do we need radios. A previous CO called "Recce without comms is just a road rally." Well, we do a lot of road rallies.

We need real, interesting training. Sitting in a hole on sentry for an hour used to be part of the price you paid to do the interesting part of the exercise. On more than one occasion, sitting in the hole for the entire weekend WAS the exercise.

History aside (and I'm not disagreeing that this IS a major consideration), Ptes Schmidt, Ahmed and Jablonski of the A&SHof C (guid Scots all) would benefit greatly from tactical amalgamation; it's what we do (sort of) on most of the Iron Talons. Certain other trades have problems far beyond mere undersizing.

Having said that - CSA105 shot holes in a suggestion of mine in an earlier thread, regarding the use of R011s (or WTF the MOC code is these days) to operate 3RCR's LAVs on weekend ex's, allowing their usual crews to practice & maintain light inf skills. I had to agree with his point that A&B Sqn GGHG, OntR, whomever, simply couldn't field enough bodies to float the boat. Ok, we can't do it, nor the QYR, nor... What about 2RARR? Could that organisation field sufficient troopers to make it worthwhile not only for the black hats, but the Reg infanteers? This would not only get us back into AFVs (which would help with the personnel haemorrhage), but also make us more relevant for overseas deployment (which would ALSO help the personnel haemmorhage).

*scratching head* I may have just convinced myself. This needs more thought. With more beer, in however many boxes...


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> Absolutely nothing is getting smaller.  A lot of these too small units don't have much authorized room to grow.  If you think of  it in the sense of two 24 boxes of beer that are both half full.  If you move all the bottles to one box, you still have as much beer.  However, in reserve case there are a bunch of boxes with only a dozen to half dozen bottles each, but we keep them in thier boxes so that each brand has the glory of keeping its own mostly empty box.



I personaly would go to the party with both cases, therefore I have a choice of brands and the potential of having two cases of beer.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> There is also absolutely no latent potential in the existence of a cap badge.  The existence or lack of a cap badge will not affect our ability to force generate additional battalions for war (should the requirement ever come).  That capability comes from our total trained and experienced soldiers.  If we gain more experienced soldeirs from a process that sees few cap badges, we will actually increase our capability.



If there is no potential in Cap Badges, then lets just get rid of them all. The issue, I raise, is that its not the number of units that are limiting the number of recruits.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Regiements are important, but cap badges are are only the deck chairs in developing the Army's future.  A proper force structure is the foundation, and that must be done right even if it upsets a few cap badges.



Why upset a few cap badges, when you can achieve your aim without upsetting anyone?


----------



## aesop081

rifleman said:
			
		

> I personaly would go to the party with both cases, therefore I have a choice of brands and the potential of having two cases of beer.



You dont have 2 seperate brands. You have 2 units offering the same thing.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> You dont have 2 seperate brands. You have 2 units offering the same thing.



Hmm... there are those who would argue that point with you!


----------



## aesop081

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Hmm... there are those who would argue that point with you!



I'm well aware of that


----------



## rifleman

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> You dont have 2 seperate brands. You have 2 units offering the same thing.



I'll bite 8), Guiness and Coors light are both beer, but dang I love Guiness.


----------



## geo

GunfighterSB said:
			
		

> As a long time lurker and someone who has not posted for a dog's age, let me write on what I know. Metro Toronto is the biggest Metropolis in Canada in terms of population.  The Downtown Armouries are within walking distance of several Resident Neighborhoods and High Rises. and several Subway Stations with Light Rail and Bus Stops. The Downsview Armoury is at the Tip of the Avenue Spadina Subway line and a has an entire Base that can be used as an extention of its already large civilian parking lot.
> 
> 32 BDE has Weekend QL2 Course, Co Op QL2 Courses, Summer QL2 Courses all through the year.
> 
> The Problem from my view lies in three forms: Poor advertising and poor intake issues and poor retention.


I would contend that Toronto region included, our armouries are in the wrong places.  In the GTA you have two large armouries in the centre of Toronto and not much once you go outside of GTA.

In Montreal, you have close to 10 armouries in the centre of Montreal (no super armouries) - nothing on the east or west ends of the Island of Montreal, One Service Battalion on the South shore and one infantry unit on the North shore... armouries have to be located where your recruiting basin is located - not to do so is only inviting mediocrity or failure in the long term.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Recognizing that the reserves are a 'distributed workforce' vs. a concentrated group like a Reg F unit in barracks, it would also be a good idea to connect people in other ways e.g., through online discussion groups like this. It's important to meet the communications needs of those in the 21st century to forge stronger unit loyalties, which isn't always possible using the management tools and buildings developed in the 19th.


----------



## Michael OLeary

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Recognizing that the reserves are a 'distributed workforce' vs. a concentrated group like a Reg F unit in barracks, it would also be a good idea to connect people in other ways e.g., through online discussion groups like this. It's important to meet the communications needs of those in the 21st century to forge stronger unit loyalties, which isn't always possible using the management tools and buildings developed in the 19th.



I'm not sure that "unit loyalty" is a concern, if anything it is the friction against which any plan to change the organization must strive.


----------



## geo

Unit loyalty?..... that's something dinamic that will be developed - even by a new unit.

Take a look at JTF2 and CSOR... in only a short time, they have built on something new......


----------



## tank recce

geo said:
			
		

> Unit loyalty?..... that's something dinamic that will be developed - even by a new unit.
> 
> Take a look at JTF2 and CSOR... in only a short time, they have built on something new......



I'm not sure you can compare the members of either of these units - elite organisations formed of high-quality volunteers - with your typical weekend warrior. Plus, the morale and motivation of an individual who chose (and possibly kicked, screamed, and fought) to join a unit he REALLY wanted to join is completely different from someone being told that his unit is no more, he's now part of a generic mob with ... that OTHER unit ...


----------



## geo

Who said anything about being a member of a generic mob ???

If a new regiment is raised eg: The Rick Hillier Rangers in your area and several small understrength units are amalgamated into same said unit to form A, B, C, D anc C&S Companies - I do not see why new soldiers would feel that they are being deprived of anything.


----------



## tank recce

Isn't that the heart of the argument part of this discussion - that the EXISTING troops will get upset about losing "their" capbadge, and wearing the same badge as "that" unit? (I do agree that Norman Newguy fresh off the street won't know or understand what the fuss is about)

Right or wrong, reasonable or otherwise - it's going to get some people upset. The point I was making was that the JTF2 and CSOR types volunteered to put up a different capbadge, in the willing expectation of something new and wonderful. That ain't gonna happen with Res units amalgamating into 1st The Royal Canadian Tabarnacs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

tank recce said:
			
		

> Isn't that the heart of the argument part of this discussion - that the EXISTING troops will get upset about losing "their" capbadge, and wearing the same badge as "that" unit? (I do agree that Norman Newguy fresh off the street won't know or understand what the fuss is about)
> 
> Right or wrong, reasonable or otherwise - it's going to get some people upset. The point I was making was that the JTF2 and CSOR types volunteered to put up a different capbadge, in the willing expectation of something new and wonderful. That ain't gonna happen with Res units amalgamating into 1st The Royal Canadian Tabarnacs.



I'll think you'll find that alot of people consciously choose to join one unit or another BEFORE they head to the recruiting office for various reasons, at least that's what my troops used to tell me. We ignore this fact at our peril.


----------



## ArmyRick

Yes people may get upset. Get over it. 

I am going to use the Lorne Scots as an example. When they were formed in 1936 do you think all the member ot the halton rifles said "screw this" and left? Sure some people were probably disgruntled but we MUST move forward. The Lornes went on as a newly amalgamated regiment and fought well in the second world war BTW.

A couple of things I look at with amalgamting units  Yes feelings will be hurt. Fewer LT CO and CWO. Oh well. At least we will have 300-500 man size REGIMENTS. Not companies masquarading as regiments. If you really look at the history of all the infantry units in canada that existed prior to 1900, you will notice with every one of them their is either big or small changes. Changes are part of military life. 

You swore loyalty to the Queen and country and lets not forget that. With new regiments, new loyalties will be formed. If you can not be mature enough to adopt, this is a volunteer army, feel free to leave.

Lets focus on the BIG PICTURE, be relevant to today's needs.

How come we don't have machine gun companies any more? Where did the tunnelling corps go? Oh wait, times changed and we ahve to move on.

Another thought (and this going to p*ss some people off). We don't have nearly enough AFV for every reserve armoured units. How about re-roling some armoured unitd from back to infantry (Several armoured units were re-roled from infantry a long time ago).


----------



## geo

> I am going to use the Lorne Scots as an example. When they were formed in 1936 do you think all the member ot the halton rifles said "screw this" and left? Sure some people were probably disgruntled but we MUST move forward. The Lornes went on as a newly amalgamated regiment and fought well in the second world war BTW.


I remember somewhere that the Lorne Scots were scheduled to be employed as the Defence unit/coy of the 1st Cdn Army HQ for the Normandy Invasion... 
Also remember reading that the Royal Montreal Reg't ended up as the Defence unit of the 1st Cdn Army HQ through to the end of the war....  :warstory:


----------



## TCBF

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> ...  Another thought (and this going to p*ss some people off). We don't have nearly enough AFV for every reserve armoured units. How about re-roling some armoured unitd from back to infantry (Several armoured units were re-roled from infantry a long time ago).



- When the Fourth Infantry Division became the Fourth Armoured Division, and other changes before and after then happenned, there was much friction.  Recall that 'Tank' 'MG' and 'Cavalry' units were at one time separate.  Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades fought in WW1, and the First and Second Canadian Tank battalions were on the way to the front when the armistice was declared.  Hence, Canadian Cavalry was NOT the initial source of Canadian Armour.  Our first late 1930s designated 'tank BATTALIONS' were not based on cavalry regiments.

http://mikan3.archives.ca/pam/public_mikan/index.php?fuseaction=genitem.displayItem&lang=eng&rec_nbr=135378&print_version=yes&

"The origins of today's Royal Canadian Armoured Corps lie in a 1936 reorganization of the Militia which made the modest addition of two armoured car regiments and six tank battalions. The Canadian Tank School, a training facility for the Canadian Armoured Corps, was established in London, Ontario, and later moved to Camp Borden. As a result of its actions during the Second World War, the Corps became the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) on 2 August 1945."

Remember: The Father Of The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps was a PATRICIA!



In 1943, Second and Third Armoured Bdes 'competed' in England to see who would remain an armoured brigade.  For some reason, the army decided they had one armoured brigade too many (in fact - they did not). The Second Armoured Brigade commander fought this, was removed from an Officer's Mess under arrest and posted to a reinforcement unit 'for disposal'.  Third Armoured Brigade them became the Second Armoured Brigade.

Note: 1945, and the changes to today:

http://www.rcaca.org/En/indexLM.asp?ID=11 
  
1st Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons) 
2nd Armoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona's Horse [Royal Canadians]) 
3rd Reconnaissance Regiment (The Governor General's Horse Guards) 
4th Reconnaissance Regiment (IV Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) * 
5th Armoured Regiment (8th Princess Louise's [New Brunswick] Hussars) 
6th Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)  
7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) ‡   
8th Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars) * 
9th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Dragoons) 
10th Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) 
11th Armoured Regiment (Ontario Regiment) 
12th Armoured Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment) 
14th Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) 
15th [Reserve] Armoured Regiment (6th Duke of Connaught's Royal Canadian Hussars) ‡ 
16th [Reserve] Armoured Regiment (7th/11th Hussars) ¥   
17th [Reserve] Armoured Regiment (The Prince Edward Island Regiment) 
18th Armoured Car Regiment (12th Manitoba Dragoons) * 
19th Army Tank Regiment (The New Brunswick Regiment [Tank]) * 
20th Army Tank Regiment (16th/22nd Saskatchewan Horse) * 
21st Armoured Regiment (The Governor General's Foot Guards) † 
22nd Armoured Regiment (The Canadian Grenadier Guards) † 
23rd Army Tank Regiment (Halifax Rifles) * 
24th Reconnaissance Regiment (Les Voltigeurs de Québec) † 
25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)  
26th Army Tank Regiment (Grey and Simcoe Foresters) † 
27th Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment) ¥  
28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment) 
29th Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment) § 
30th Reconnaissance Regiment (The Essex Regiment [Tank]) €  
31st [Alberta] Reconnaissance Regiment (15th Alberta Light Horse) § 
32nd Reconnaissance Regiment (The Royal Montréal Regiment) † 
1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment * 
A27 Canadian Reconnaissance Training Centre * 
A33 Canadian Armoured Corps Training Centre *  


* Later to the Supplementary Order of Battle (inactive) or disbanded
† Later reverted to infantry
‡ - § - ¥ Later amalgamated
 Later converted to field engineers
€ Later renamed


Notes: 

1. The designation 13th was not used during the war years. In a post-war reorganization, that number was transiently assigned to the British Columbia Regiment.

2. Army Tank Regiments were designed to work with infantry and had a smaller establishment. By 1944, all had been converted to armoured regiments or broken up to provide reinforcements.


----------



## daftandbarmy

geo said:
			
		

> I remember somewhere that the Lorne Scots were scheduled to be employed as the Defence unit/coy of the 1st Cdn Army HQ for the Normandy Invasion...
> Also remember reading that the Royal Montreal Reg't ended up as the Defence unit of the 1st Cdn Army HQ through to the end of the war....  :warstory:



One RMR Coy was effectively wiped out at the South Beveland Canal crossing in October 1944 - after petitioning heavily for the opportunity to be released from HQ defence duties so they could get into the fight. Having walked the ground they covered (carrying 500lb assault boats over a double canal into a frontal assault against heavy defences) 20/20 hindsight would probably have kept them at the HQ. Regardless, this brought them great credit for their fighting spirit.

And this is a good example of how stories like these will always be important to the formation and sustainment of strong, individual regimental identities that will always stand us in good stead when we need to forge competent fighting formations from enthusiastic novices.


----------



## geo

D&B  South Beveland Canal ???  You MUST mean the Leopold Canal - where it was attached to the Regina Rifles

Maj Schwob was their Coy OC... Met him when he was an Honorary many years later.... a real Gentleman


----------



## daftandbarmy

geo said:
			
		

> D&B  South Beveland Canal ???  You MUST mean the Leopold Canal - where it was attached to the Regina Rifles
> 
> Maj Schwob was their Coy OC... Met him when he was an Honorary many years later.... a real Gentleman



Of course... so many canals that tour, so little time.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And this is a good example of how stories like these will always be important to the formation and sustainment of strong, individual regimental identities that will always stand us in good stead when we need to forge competent fighting formations from enthusiastic novices.


But it is not an illustration of why any one reserve regiment should exist into perpetuity simply because it exists today.


----------



## GunfighterSB

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> A couple of things I look at with amalgamting units  Yes feelings will be hurt. Fewer LT CO and CWO. Oh well. At least we will have 300-500 man size REGIMENTS. Not companies masquarading as regiments. If you really look at the history of all the infantry units in canada that existed prior to 1900, you will notice with every one of them their is either big or small changes. Changes are part of military life.



I think the problem is not small units, but personnel. We need more personnel. That 300-500 man size REGIMENTS will shrink due to simple math: We are not gaining (and retaining) faster than we are loosing people. (at least in Toronto). We need to attract people and retain them for better ROI.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Lets focus on the BIG PICTURE, be relevant to today's needs.
> 
> How come we don't have machine gun companies any more? Where did the tunnelling corps go? Oh wait, times changed and we ahve to move on.
> 
> Another thought (and this going to p*ss some people off). We don't have nearly enough AFV for every reserve armoured units. How about re-roling some armoured unitd from back to infantry (Several armoured units were re-roled from infantry a long time ago).



We already did that. The Elgins became a Combat Engineer Unit last decade, all the Reserve Armour became Recce. We don't have enough AFVs - thats fine - we had the G Wagens - opps not anymore as most of them ended Wainright and still waiting to be returned (probably never). You want us to re-roll in to Infantry, fine we'll do it - send us on Infantry courses, we can become Black Hatted Infantry(again).

ArmyRick, the BIG PICTURE is that we need significant investments in the Armed Forces to make up for the decades of neglect and apathy. I am doing my part by being a shining example of a soldier and a human being to my non-army friends, neighbors and co-workers. I even help recruit some of them into the Regular Force and the Reserve. But my Bandwidth is only so much, I can only help turn the tide with others help.


----------



## geo

GunfighterSB said:
			
		

> I think the problem is not small units, but personnel. We need more personnel. That 300-500 man size REGIMENTS will shrink due to simple math: We are not gaining (and retaining) faster than we are loosing people. (at least in Toronto). We need to attract people and retain them for better ROI.



Ummm....

If I look at the Reserve unit I 1st joined umpteen years ago (1970), we were some 140 souls on the parade square.
We were limited by the total number of mandays the unit was allocated.  For the next 25 some years, guess what, the unit lost +/- 25% of it's personnel each year and recruited +/-25% ... in 1998 they were still at +/- 140 souls... Why, because they couldn't pay for more.

Over the last couple of years, the area commander has gotten a slightly larger pay envelope and he's passed it down to his formations.... down to the units.

My old unit is up to 225 - 240 souls.   the training is (relatively) hard and Morale is good.

They have attracted & the Recruiting system has +/- gotten out of 1st gear.


----------



## blacktriangle

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Another thought (and this going to p*ss some people off). We don't have nearly enough AFV for every reserve armoured units. How about re-roling some armoured unitd from back to infantry (Several armoured units were re-roled from infantry a long time ago).



I don't think my unit has had an actual AFV for decades...and we don't even have enough G wagons as echoed by others, so I'm all for it. Thankfully I'm off to better pastures where batallions have enough vehicles for almost a company!!  :


----------



## GunfighterSB

geo said:
			
		

> Over the last couple of years, the area commander has gotten a slightly larger pay envelope and he's passed it down to his formations.... down to the units.
> 
> My old unit is up to 225 - 240 souls.   the training is (relatively) hard and Morale is good.
> 
> They have attracted & the Recruiting system has +/- gotten out of 1st gear.



An excellent example. I am assuming this Unit is not in Toronto, what is the personell cap for the Unit? Is it allowed to go higher than 50% of its allotted wartime establishment? Are most (80%) of the 225 - 240 Soldiers qualified in their positions? What is the demographics of the Unit in question, do most of its members live within 10 Km of the Unit? How much of the 225 - 240 show up regularly on Excercises? (I'm assuming its very high since morale is high).

Now, how many of your Old Unit members will stay in the Reserves if the Unit is Disbanded and the members scattered to feed other (really)Under strength units?
(Because I'm guessing that none of the members will quit if other (really) Understrength Units will be disbanded to feed your Old Unit).

So long as your unit is gaining more than it loses; BZ to you old Unit.


----------



## geo

For years, the unit (RMR) (Montreal) was authorized only one mission element and that was about it... regardless of what the unit outhorized strength was, it was a question of how many mandays the area & the Brigade allocated that decided how strong the unit could be... so approx 140 for some 20 odd years.  Then they took away recruiting from the individual units and that coincided with a whole bunch of red tape in the enrollment process.... strength plumetted for a bit - unit had to claw back from the brink - everyone had aq tremendous fear of being axed while the Reserve restructure scare was going around... oddly enough - retention of soldiers increased - leaders actualy had to take care of their troops (do their jobs so to speak)...
New management in the area and the area & brigade commanders figured it was time to "reward" the units that did a good job of doing what they do... so, units that can't bring em in are having their budgets cut & the units that are able to bring em in and keep em in are being rewarded - with larger budgets to feed the new troops... not rocket science by any means but - it's effective.

From what I can gather, the main problem they have right now is that as soon as junior leaders are trained.... they are being enticed into going class B or C - to take up jobs in the Schools, HQs &/or within Combat arms units...


----------



## dapaterson

Geo:

Without going into too much detail, the number of Reserve senior leaders employed full-time is a known issue; the CLS is regularly updated about the current state of affairs.  For all ranks MCpl through MWO, and Capt and Maj, over 45% of the parading members of the Army Reserve are on some sort of full-time service.  There are some occupations where more than two thirds of the personnel are on full-time service.  The support being provided by the Reserves to the CF writ large is substantial; the question is whether it is sustainable...


----------



## Old Sweat

That is getting close to eating the seed potatoes.


----------



## geo

Sustainable..... ???

I think both you and I know what the answer is to that question


----------



## TCBF

MCG said:
			
		

> But it is not an illustration of why any one reserve regiment should exist into perpetuity simply because it exists today.



- No, but is is a window into the culture of our regimental  system.  We tinker with it at our peril, and we must always heed the law of unintended consequences.


----------



## TCBF

geo said:
			
		

> Sustainable..... ???
> 
> I think both you and I know what the answer is to that question



- My conclusion: The Reg F is consuming the Res F, faster than the Res F can reconstitute.


----------



## geo

But should they be "sacred cows" ???


----------



## ArmyRick

Yes all the regiments and corps have a glorious history but there are no sacred cows IMO. Should I list the regiments as they existed in WWI or even the boer war? They fought valiantly too.


----------



## McG

GunfighterSB said:
			
		

> I think the problem is not small units, but personnel. We need more personnel. That 300-500 man size REGIMENTS will shrink due to simple math: We are not gaining (and retaining) faster than we are loosing people. (at least in Toronto). We need to attract people and retain them for better ROI. ...
> 
> ArmyRick, the BIG PICTURE is that we need significant investments in the Armed Forces to make up for the decades of neglect and apathy.


But, do we need a larger Army Primary Reserve?  As we should not be growing the PRes for the glory of its regiments, please demonstrate a role or capability requirement that justifies a larger primary reserve.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> The Reg F is consuming the Res F, faster than the Res F can reconstitute.


A disturbing trend.  Do you think the PRes should be large enough to meet the current manpower demand on a sustainable basis?  The alternate might be that the Regular Force needs to be suficiently larger so as to sustain the current tempo without putting such a large demand on the PRes.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Yes all the regiments and corps have a glorious history but there are no sacred cows IMO.


Exactly.  We should not be expanding regiments for their own glory.  We should grow (or reduce) our formations, units and sub units based on the established needs of the organization.



			
				GunfighterSB said:
			
		

> I think the problem is not small units, but personnel. We need more personnel. That 300-500 man size REGIMENTS will shrink due to simple math: We are not gaining (and retaining) faster than we are loosing people. (at least in Toronto). We need to attract people and retain them for better ROI.


Here, it appears, you are either arguing growth for the glory of the regiment or you are suggesting there is a broader CF requirement for a larger Army Primary Reserve.  I believe you are suggesting a higher CF requirement exists.

In order to control the scope of this thread (or at least try), I have split off some discussion of the need/potential for growth and merged it with a related thread on PRes capabilities:  http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html

Within the currently given limitations on roles & maximum funded unit sizes, permanent tactical groupings or regimental mergers appear to me as the most appropriate path to get the most effectiveness out of the PRes.


----------



## dapaterson

It's not just size - it's structure as well.  There are ranks and trades where everyone is getting ready to go on their third tour in Afghanistan, and others where no one has gone at all.  But some of those represent capabilities we need, but not in this theatre of operations.  So the question, perhaps, isn't "Does the Army need to be bigger" or rather "How should the Army be structured".  That question applies to both the Reg F and the Res F, and needs the engagement of good staff from the G3 and G1, and from the "future force" folks.

Once we figure out how we should be structured, we look at where we are and how to move from one to the other.  Not easy, but necessary.  And also a situation that may upset some cast iron rice bowls - perhaps the number of infantry bns required in the Reg F isn't an even multiple of 3!


----------



## TCBF

- With all of the money nowadays, we should be maxing out the Militia to 1,000 man bns, if they can recruit that high.


----------



## geo

If I use Montreal as an example, there are 5 Reserve / militia infantry battalions in the downtown core (RMR, BW, CGG, FMR & R de Mais... plus a Med coy, CER, Armd, Guns and Navy   - all within a 2-4 mile radius... How on earth can anyone expect all these units to recruit let alone train AND retain new troops.
(I'm pert sure that the GTA is in the same boat)...

There will come a time when we will have to pare down and reinvent the wheel...


----------



## aesop081

TCBF said:
			
		

> - With all of the money nowadays, we should be maxing out the Militia to 1,000 man bns, if they can recruit that high.



I would say you have serious misconceptions about the amount of money thats available. Unless of course you were being sarcastic.


----------



## Kendrick

geo said:
			
		

> If I use Montreal as an example, there are 5 Reserve / militia infantry battalions in the downtown core (RMR, BW, CGG, FMR & R de Mais... plus a Med coy, CER, Armd, Guns and Navy   - all within a 2-4 mile radius... How on earth can anyone expect all these units to recruit let alone train AND retain new troops.
> (I'm pert sure that the GTA is in the same boat)...
> 
> There will come a time when we will have to pare down and reinvent the wheel...



I'm right there with you on that one.  But we both know how hard it will be to get the old ones to give up, or put aside, all the regimental traditions and history each have.  Will they agree to give up the hackle, the kilt, the forage cap, the busby's, and everything else, to merge into a new unit with new traditions?  It would be the smart thing to do, but a hard battle to be fought I think.  Will all these regiments ever be able to compromise?


----------



## Michael OLeary

Kendrick said:
			
		

> I'm right there with you on that one.  But we both know how hard it will be to get the old ones to give up, or put aside, all the regimental traditions and history each have.  Will they agree to give up the hackle, the kilt, the forage cap, the busby's, and everything else, to merge into a new unit with new traditions?  It would be the smart thing to do, but a hard battle to be fought I think.  Will all these regiments ever be able to compromise?



It's happened before.  Can anyone name an existing unit that has never been amalgamated or re-roled, or changed name, equipment, dress or organization since its original authorization?


----------



## aesop081

Kendrick said:
			
		

> I'm right there with you on that one.  But we both know how hard it will be to get the old ones to give up, or put aside, all the regimental traditions and history each have.  Will they agree to give up the hackle, the kilt, the forage cap, the busby's, and everything else, to merge into a new unit with new traditions?  It would be the smart thing to do, but a hard battle to be fought I think.  Will all these regiments ever be able to compromise?



"agree" ?

This is the military right ?


----------



## Remius

Some units can grow but are hindered by establishment numbers and how many spots they can get on courses.  

Certainly you can merge some units into larger battallions.  Ottawa has two infantry units with two more in outlying areas, Cornwall and Brockville.  Merge them under one command structure.

Get rid of trades that can't perform or are not up to regular force standards.  Like reserve MPs (not the air ones) and med techs and possibly even armoured recce (I mean they drive G-wagons for god's sake).  none of those trades get any skilled standing when they CT anyway. Turn those into specialist or advanced training for the infantry guys. 

Concentrate numbers in the infantry/CERs/arty units and support trades that are viable like MSEops, Supply techs, RMS clerks as well as the Sigs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Crantor said:
			
		

> Some units can grow but are hindered by establishment numbers and how many spots they can get on courses.
> 
> Certainly you can merge some units into larger battallions.  Ottawa has two infantry units with two more in outlying areas, Cornwall and Brockville.  Merge them under one command structure.
> 
> Get rid of trades that can't perform or are not up to regular force standards.  Like reserve MPs (not the air ones) and med techs and possibly even armoured recce (I mean they drive G-wagons for god's sake).  none of those trades get any skilled standing when they CT anyway. Turn those into specialist or advanced training for the infantry guys.
> 
> Concentrate numbers in the infantry/CERs/arty units and support trades that are viable like MSEops, Supply techs, RMS clerks as well as the Sigs.



You're assuming that there's a properly resourced master plan for the reserves somewhere beyond 'fill up the rifle sections of reg force units when required' that would drive this decision making.  :


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> You're assuming that there's a properly resourced master plan for the reserves somewhere beyond 'fill up the rifle sections of reg force units when required' that would drive this decision making.  :



I don't assume that at all.  otherwise this thread wouldn't exist


----------



## blacktriangle

Crantor said:
			
		

> Some units can grow but are hindered by establishment numbers and how many spots they can get on courses.
> 
> Certainly you can merge some units into larger battallions.  Ottawa has two infantry units with two more in outlying areas, Cornwall and Brockville.  Merge them under one command structure.
> 
> Get rid of trades that can't perform or are not up to regular force standards.  Like reserve MPs (not the air ones) and med techs and possibly even armoured recce (I mean they drive G-wagons for god's sake).  none of those trades get any skilled standing when they CT anyway. Turn those into specialist or advanced training for the infantry guys.
> 
> Concentrate numbers in the infantry/CERs/arty units and support trades that are viable like MSEops, Supply techs, RMS clerks as well as the Sigs.




Makes sense to me. My armoured unit hardly does mounted ex's and when we do, they are in G wagons. However, the soldiers in the unit are very good and could do awesome jobs in something else. Most of us younger folks wouldn't care, and those who don't feel like walking can quit.


----------



## daftandbarmy

A good explanation of why we're at where we're at now. It's all a recruiting ploy within the context of a small peacetime organization that needs to staff up quickly in time of general war. 

How do we fix it to meet the needs of an age when it's unlikely we'll ever have to 'mobilize' and deploy an entire army rapidly? (I hope) Not sure. Maybe we should go back to numbered battalions, like we did in 1914?



The British system

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/stuff/british_regimental_system.htm

There are numerous reasons why the British Army deviated from the Regimental system practiced by the rest of Europe.  Some were practical, the British Army has historical been a small force by European standards and in many cases it would have been impossible to fill out three Battalions in peace time, without severely reducing the number of Regiments maintained.  That in turn would have an impact on the recruiting grounds they used.  While there was no doubting the efficiency of the Continental system, the heavy French influence (a nation who the British Army spent the best part of the 1700s locked in combat with) made a straight copy more than pride could stand.  Instead, what evolved over the centuries was a flexible system, which despite its faults continues in use today.

The key divergence between the British and Continental use of the Regiment was that the British did not attach a tactical significance to the Regiment.  *In the British view, the strength of the Regiment lay in its recruiting power.  * The practice of referring to a Regiment by the name of its current Colonel ended in 1751, and in 1782, the now numbered Regiments were linked to a county, and some counties were able to support more than one Regiment (the 44th East Essex and 56th West Essex Regiments for example).  This helped fuse a sense of belonging and history between an ephemeral body such as a Regiment, and its recruiting base.  When war came, as so often it did, men would flock to their 'local' Regiment, in which other members of their own family had very likely served.


----------



## TCBF

Crantor said:
			
		

> ... and possibly even armoured recce (I mean they drive G-wagons for god's sake).  none of those trades get any skilled standing when they CT anyway. Turn those into specialist or advanced training for the infantry ...



- Eventually, the skills we develop during our current "Rear Area Security" operations in Afghanistan may be used in Canada.  When that happens, lightly equiped and highly mobile Reserve "Recce" regiments will be used in economy of force operations on urban cordons, checkpoints, border crossings and sundry surveillance tasks.


----------



## TCBF

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I would say you have serious misconceptions about the amount of money thats available. Unless of course you were being sarcastic.



- I was/am serious.  These are not the lean 90s.  If someone high enough wants the money spent - it is spent.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> - With all of the money nowadays, we should be maxing out the Militia to 1,000 man bns, if they can recruit that high.





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> - I was/am serious.  These are not the lean 90s.  If someone high enough wants the money spent - it is spent.


Okay, what is the requirement for growing by this much?  What is the lacking capability that we would be provided?


----------



## TCBF

- Let me get this straight.  Some people claim that reserve units should be restructured/amalgamated/etc for a failure to achieve critical mass.  I then state that money could be found to allow some units to achieve critical mass.  You ask me why.   My first answer is:

"Why - to avoid being disbanded, of course!"

 ;D

My second answer is: "Because we desparately need those soldiers to train reservists in other units that cannot maintain a critical mass because they have too many officers and NCOs filling holes in the Reg F."

In other words - logically speaking - we cannot punish a unit for not doing that which we will not fund it to do.

Right?

- Kindly see other threads relating to this.


----------



## McG

So, it is your belief that we should grow for the glory of the regimental system.  Military requirements of the nation & CF objectives should not be the guiding factor in how we organize & structure?


----------



## TCBF

MCG said:
			
		

> So, it is your belief that we should grow for the glory of the regimental system.  Military requirements of the nation & CF objectives should not be the guiding factor in how we organize & structure?



- I swear to Pete, if jumping to conclusions was an olympic sport, you would be national team captain.

- I have made it quite clear on this and other threads what I believe.  Go put words in other people's mouths now, if you please.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> - I swear to Pete, if jumping to conclusions was an olympic sport, you would be national team captain.


I asked a question, and you failed to communicate your full thoughts in the answer yet this is my fault?  If you want people to connect the dots, you'd better make sure you've put all the dots out there.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> I have made it quite clear on this and other threads what I believe.


Not really.  You've presented two reasons for growth.  The sarcastic reason was so that regiments don't have to amalgamate or be deactivated.  The serious  reason was so regiments better able to fill their ranks could take on the job of babysitting regiments that were understrength.  You have presented absolutely zero in the way of a military requirement for every reserve unit to be given a 1000 person manning authorization.  This would be between a nine and tenfold growth!

If you are not proposing growth for the sake of the regiment, then what is it?


----------



## TCBF

-  Some posters on this and other threads have implied that reserve units are in danger of being 're-orged' if they cannot keep up their strength.  My point is that in many cases they cannot keep up their strength because they are limited to a certain strength or man-day limit.  With their increasing loss to fill vacancies on tours and into what once would have been Reg F positions, these units now have few officers and NCOs to teach their own armoury-floor sustainment BMQs.  Hence the cancellation of Maple Defender this summer.  

- My regrets for not expressing myself quasi-concisely on the same thread.  This is a subject-group we are chasing all over the site.  A Hydra.  

- No, I do not believe the glorification of all things past should be the main point of effort of any renewal.  I do, however, believe that the automatic assumption that we must reorganize is situating the estimate.

- We started by talking about units being understrength.  Are they?  Lift their limits on recruiting and courses, and subtract all of the pers they have on Class B and tours from their establishments - they should not be punished for providing full-time help to the CF.  That may help us see if their failure to recruit and retain was a result of nationally mandated policies or local conditions.

- We should retain a regimental structure because of it's flexibility.  The Brits have a combined NBC regiment consisting of 1 RTR and an 27 Sqn RAF Regt.   You can re-role a regt and retain it's customs, history and local affiliation.  The GGFG have gone from Infantry to Tank and back to Infantry.  Need a bunch of reserve Mess Tin Repair Bns?  Re-role A Company of the The Foreskin Fusileers, and a company from a bunch of other units, too..  keep the other companies infantry.  Need more mess tin guys?  Give some of the infantrymen in B Company a second trade.


----------



## rifleman

TCBF - Now you are talking sense. There is no need to throw out the baby with the bath water. 

But now we can get back to the strawman..... amalgamate units


----------



## McG

... and still, the only reason I see for your proposal to grow is to ensure the preservation of every regiment.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> Some posters on this and other threads have implied that reserve units are in danger of being 're-orged' if they cannot keep up their strength.  My point is that in many cases they cannot keep up their strength because they are limited to a certain strength or man-day limit.


Yes, reserve units do have manning ceilings but, we should not open the flood gates for them to get as large as they want/can.  The issue is not about punishing units because they are small.  The Army reserve as a whole is only funded for so many pers.  If that manning ceiling is right (and there is room to debate that) then we don't gain by growing units.  In fact, it may only serve to the greater detriment of the CF as a whole.

If we don't need to grow & there are significant potentials available through amalgamations & tactical groupings, then we'd only be hurting ourselves not to take advantage of that.  If the Army reserve is the right size, then it would be irresponsible to grow regiments just for the sake of making them viable.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> No, I do not believe the glorification of all things past should be the main point of effort of any renewal.  I do, however, believe that the automatic assumption that we must reorganize is situating the estimate.


Are you not situating the estimate by suggesting that we still require all the regiments of old?



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> We should retain a regimental structure because of it's flexibility.


I'm not suggesting we dump the regimental system.  However, no individual regiment should be untouchable.  If an amalgamation or tactical grouping improves our overall effectiveness (note: no talk of efficiency) then that is a good thing for the CF.

Now, if you want to come back and discuss CF requirements for a larger Army reserve, then you'd be laying the ground work for suggesting bigger units.  Bigger units for the sake of making regiments viable is not a CF requirement; it is cap badge welfare.


----------



## rifleman

If its manning levels that are a problem, although I would hazard a guess that its not prevalent across the board. The reason would be to increase recruiting. There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and signing 5 years of your life away is preventing the from joining. Going to a reserve unit, would increase the number of potential deployable soldiers and even potential reg force members.


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> The reason [that the Army reserve needs to grow] would be to increase recruiting.


Is this what really you mean to say?


			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and ...


I'm sorry but no.  The reserves do not exist to be the adventure camp for people who fancy they want a taste of the military .... it's like suggesting hospitals should exist for the primary benefit of those who want to be doctors as opposed to existing for those who need medical help.

I am not saying that the reserve should or should not be larger.  However, I do reject arguments based on the need to keep cap badges viable or based on providing assured employment for those looking to fill a curiosity.  Neither of those are requirements of the CF.


----------



## rifleman

Unlike others, I have learnt to not just think about my organization but its affect on the overall plan. I was commenting on those who believe that the reserves are being held back from recruiting more. Some units may have that problem, but for the most part, I do not think thats it.

As for the 'taste'. I know that there are many people who are concerned about commiting 5 years of there lives to a job that they may not like. The Reserve is not only a introduction to those people, it can translate into an component transfer later down the road. As well, instead of them waiting until they finish school to join the regs and do basic, they can be doing the training while finishing school.

As a side if you are going to quote someone, you should use the entire context, not just the part that supports you arguement
"There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and *signing 5 years of your life away is preventing them from joining.*


----------



## dglad

Except, perhaps, in a very few specific cases--probably in the largest urban centres--I don't believe that recruiting limits are a significant issue and are, in fact, a red herring.  I think most Res F units could recruit like hell and all they functionally end up doing is offsetting attrition.  In other words, we could remove recruiting limits completely and we wouldn't see a major explosion in the size of the Res F.  When I was the CO of a Res F infantry unit, I never paid any significant attention to my paid ceiling; it simply wasn't an issue.  Attrition generally ate up whatever I was bringing into the unit.  This is the reality of living in a mid-sized city with a university and college...we would generally have a soldier from the time he/she joined at about 17 or 18, until he/she left to pursue a career elsewhere in the country/world at about 22 or 23.

This whole debate hides a deeper and much more important issue--it isn't how many people we're recruiting, it's WHO we're recruiting.  The Res F still leans heavily across the country on the young, white male demographic, but in many areas (both urban and rural), that demographic is actually dwindling as a percentage of the population.  When we crack other, higher potential demographics in our recruiting, THEN I suspect numbers are going to become more of an issue.


----------



## cavalryman

My unit appears to be one of those specific cases (we're in a large urban area).  We've exceeded our established positions, filled all of our 5000 series positions, have borrowed positions from other units in the brigade and have people on the rolls with no position numbers.  We have recruits coming in a steady flow and were told last winter to stand-down our recruiting for the rest of the fiscal year since we're so far over establishment.  Right now, the only way I can bring in new blood is by shifting people on Class B outside the unit to the PRL, encouraging marginal, i.e. one night a month participation only, troops to consider handing in their release, etc.  Make of that what you will


----------



## dglad

cavalryman said:
			
		

> My unit appears to be one of those specific cases (we're in a large urban area).  We've exceeded our established positions, filled all of our 5000 series positions, have borrowed positions from other units in the brigade and have people on the rolls with no position numbers.  We have recruits coming in a steady flow and were told last winter to stand-down our recruiting for the rest of the fiscal year since we're so far over establishment.  Right now, the only way I can bring in new blood is by shifting people on Class B outside the unit to the PRL, encouraging marginal, i.e. one night a month participation only, troops to consider handing in their release, etc.  Make of that what you will



What I'd make of this is that you're in a fortunate and obviously successful unit.  Sadly, this isn't true for most Res F units in Canada.


----------



## TCBF

- Talking with a friend about this topic a few years back, he thought that raising the age for enlistment for the PRes from 16 to 17 cost them a lot of retention.  Pers joined later - if at all - and did not necessarily have time to develop in a primary group before coming under the scattering effects of further education.

- As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?

- My experience with older recruits regular as well as reserve - is that they can come with too much baggage. Too many previous physical and mental injuries, too many family and business commitments, etc.  Perhaps, as a former CFRS Cornwallis instructor, I was spoiled: we would pick up 130 recruits for a Platoon and the average age would be maybe 18 - if that.  Young, uninjured, no baggage, eager and keen.  Blank slates on which to draw the character of a soldier. 

- The other advantage of young students is you have the summer to train them.  Reservists with full-time jobs get comparatively little time off for courses - even less if their employers are Canadians of convenience whose primary loyalty is not to Canada.


----------



## dglad

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Talking with a friend about this topic a few years back, he thought that raising the age for enlistment for the PRes from 16 to 17 cost them a lot of retention.  Pers joined later - if at all - and did not necessarily have time to develop in a primary group before coming under the scattering effects of further education.
> 
> - As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?
> 
> - My experience with older recruits regular as well as reserve - is that they can come with too much baggage. Too many previous physical and mental injuries, too many family and business commitments, etc.  Perhaps, as a former CFRS Cornwallis instructor, I was spoiled: we would pick up 130 recruits for a Platoon and the average age would be maybe 18 - if that.  Young, uninjured, no baggage, eager and keen.  Blank slates on which to draw the character of a soldier.
> 
> - The other advantage of young students is you have the summer to train them.  Reservists with full-time jobs get comparatively little time off for courses - even less if their employers are Canadians of convenience whose primary loyalty is not to Canada.



This is all very true.  We had some phenomenal young men and women attending university and college in Thunder Bay who became excellent soldiers and leaders.  Unfortunately, most of them didn't stick around, because Thunder Bay is one of those places young people to come to for school (both the university and college here are very good), and then leave to pursue their fortunes elsewhere.   My position on this quickly became, ah, well, this can't really be avoided...so let's find a reason to celebrate it.  I spent some time tracking soldiers who moved away from Thunder Bay, keeping tabs on whether they stayed in the system or not.  I was quite gratified to find that more than 50% (I think it was 55% of the 40 or so soldiers and officers I followed up on; don't recall exact numbers now) stayed in the system, joining other units in Toronto or Vancouver or Montreal or wherever life had taken them.  So, in that sense, my unit's training was successful in itself, and in a strategic sense as well insofar as it created soldiers who went on to contribute to other units.  When you look at this strategically, it was beneficial for the army as a whole, so that's a good thing.  It's another reason to be less concerned about cap badges and to try to adopt the "longer view".  We're all in this together, after all, and all I really care about is that we have well-trained soldiers ready to deploy on domestic or expeditionary ops with the minimal amount of prep.


----------



## cavalryman

TCBF said:
			
		

> - As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?



This is an interesting point, because the demand is there, and as far as I know, there is no formalized system in place, but there should be.  We've greeted with open arms members of other units (both armoured and non-armoured) who moved to our corner of the great white north for school for a year or two, and who wanted to keep parading but not transfer from their parent unit/branch.  A friendly exchange of emails with the parent unit was all it took to let them keep their kit, status, etc, but get paid by us, train with us, etc - without actually being transferred to our establishment.  It's been a bit of a regular thing to see different cap badges in our ranks, but what the heck, its troops who want to work and since we're short of positions, it gives us extra troops without impacting on the available position squeeze.  A few of them end up transferring in the end anyways when they find themselves working around here after school.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> It's another reason to be less concerned about cap badges and to try to adopt the "longer view".  We're all in this together, after all, and all I really care about is that we have well-trained soldiers ready to deploy on domestic or expeditionary ops with the minimal amount of prep.



I spent a few years with 1 AD Regt (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish) in the early 90s.  I had the good fortune to work for an enlightened CO who had this precise outlook.  We knew that we would recruit the vast majority of our soldiers while they were in High School; lose half of them in a 1-2 years to university and most of the rest after that.  We weren't overly worried about losing NCOs- being so close to Petawawa, we had a waiting list of qualified ex-Reg Force personnel from Cpl to MWO wanting to join the unit- the entire WO and Sgts Mess was Ex-Regular Force.  The thing was, we really encouraged and facilitated unit transfers.  If I found out that a troop was going to university in Toronto (for instance), I would find out through his chain of command which unit he/she might like to serve with there- I would phone that unit and set up a transfer.  Mostly, the troop actually stayed with the PRes, because we took the long view that  all PRES units were in it together. 

My thoughts- look beyond your own unit.  If a troop is leaving your geographical area for whatever reason, find him or her a unit to go!


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> You're assuming that there's a properly resourced master plan for the reserves somewhere beyond 'fill up the rifle sections of reg force units when required' that would drive this decision making.  :



Every time such a plan is created the hue and cry have it destroyed - "How dare you do X to unit Y?", ignoring the fact that unit Y hasn't paraded more than 80 people for a decade, or that X would meet a need.  The Buckshot Fusiliers in all their glory must be preserved and promoted to the detriment of any other unit.

Multiply that across the dozens of units across this country and you have a recipe for a slow spiral of decline.

There's also a blindness in the Reserve community, a refusal to admit that all functions in the Regular Force cannot be effectively done in the context of part-time service.  High cost skills (those that take too much time and/or money to build) do not lend themselves to our Reserve model of voluntary service.  So combat divers and jumpers make no sense.

Right now Government has set the strength limits for the Reserve Force.  But instead of optimizing within that limit we continue to perpetuate dozens of small, inefficient, unneeded units.  I'm all for maintaining and increasing community presence; but let's call a group of 120 folks a company, not a regiment (with the staff and clag that attaches to a regiment).  A unit of 120 can be a viable company - but make it a Regiment and you've suddenly taken another 10-20 people out of the line and into staff.  Multiply that across the current structure and you've got a lot of fat to trim.

The mobilization myth needs to be busted, and perhaps realistic plans for any future expansion need to be drafted before any wholesale reform is conducted.  But the status quo is unsupportable.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Agreed. 

My firm belief is that the main reason why the status quo hasn't changed in the last 100 years is primarily because there has been no firm vision, with the leadership and will required to achieve it. Remember 10/90 and all those other half baked, short term schemes to 'reform' the reserves? Well, they all collapsed due to a 'drive by' approach to leading change. The reserves quite simply can't make the shift to a new operating method without someone on high selecting and maintaining the right aim over a 5 to 10 year period and. quite naturally, revert to the former methods when the vision wanes.

Ironically, in peacetime, we can't seem to practise what we preach for wartime success.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I love being portrayed as a ponti masquerader


----------



## TCBF

- Of the last 100 years, the status quo worked until the cold war, when many reserve units were given a another role: "National Survival".  They kept their general mobilization roles (why not? not costing anything) but now also trained for re-entry operations into nuked cities.  Remember: we sent soldiers to experience nuke blasts in the USA.  Sixty pers from 1 RDU attended the Apple II blast in May 1955, occupying trenches 3 km from ground zero of a 29 kiloton shot (Hiroshima was 13 kt, Nagasaki was 21 kt).  So, the RCN, Cdn Army and RCAF were into the nuke business in a big way, and needed reserve units to develop re-entry skills AS WELL AS their normal common to corps functions.  They adapted.

- If the past is any guide, a major mission of the reserves appears to be "to survive' in whatever state it is in in order to be available to provide whatever is needed next. 

- They key is: "First - Do No Harm."


----------



## blacktriangle

Well said.

I made the same point a few pages back, in that those who wish to serve will continue to do so in other capacities. 

 Lots of people are CT'ing out of the res trade as it is, and those left behind don't even have adequate vehicle numbers...talk about lame.

Is there any possibility of having reserve armoured units focus soley on assault troop tactics? Are the Reg F units still without assault troops? What about having reservists train to form echelons for the Reg units?

Workable or no?


----------



## ArmyRick

CSA 105, I agree 100% with what you said.

We need to put the NEEDS of the army first and the desires of Regimental/corps loyalty second. End story.

I see a big oppurtunity to expand the infantry and engineers by re-roling the g-wagon units.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I'm sure if you went to the C lines and told everyone to take down their black beret, and badge, cross the road to the crystal palace and they were all RCR tomorrow, you'd get much the same reaction.

It's not like we didn't/ haven't been asking for PCF courses for years. We had bisons, they disappeared. Soon, we'll be left with two G-wagons in the compound. Our single Milcot was VMO'd, likely never to be seen again. Yes we're at war, and the equipment has to come from somewhere, but don't blame us for not being able to maintain qualifications. We've been screaming for years for the Corps to define a role we could work within, to no avail. 

Ignorance is bliss when it comes to the Corps and its Reserves.

I've said before, we should all be outlying Sqns of our closest Reg force Unit (RCD in Ontario). At least things would be done somewhat equitable, and then at least, they may give a damn instead of treating us like the red headed step child.

Death by a thousand cuts.


----------



## TCBF

- Fallex 88, 1 RCHA offered Recce Sqn some flyovers.  They wanted to broaden their experience partways through the Ex, I guess.  I later joked that they gave us a mix of guys who could not stay awake on sentry and guys who were so keen that they drove everybody nuts asking questions.  We were darn glad to have them, though, as an extra warm body in a tracked recce patrol means more hours of badly needed sleep  for each of the other members.

Later, in Lahr, I met a bunch of Armoured reservists who had been on Fallex, but everywhere BUT with Recce Sqn.  They went nuts listening to the stories the young Arty reservists were telling.

One asked me how he could have a shot of working with Recce Sqn on the next Fallex.  "Easy" I said, "Join the Artillery!"

We kept asking for them, but were told they were not 'available'.  They didn't need to be able to drive a Lynx or fire a fifty - we would teach them enough so they could contribute.  But - never happened.


----------



## dapaterson

As long as folks like Arms Advisors (Hello, Col Spike!) insist that all Res units must be the same, and won't entertain having, say, the R de Hull train on kit from the RCD and train with the RCD, with similar arrangements in Valcartier, Edmonton and perhaps Gagetown, this problem will continue.

[war story]

Armd Advisor:  "I know if you look nationally we don't have enough troops to sustain this task, but if you look at each area individually we do!" - I guess that's Black Hat Math 101.

[/ war story]


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin

For my 2000th post, I feel like unloading, as this is a subject that has caused me much angst over the years.

_IMHO_


There is a generation gap within the Reserves that is increasing in scope and complexity as more junior soldiers and leaders gain warfighting experience, leaving their seniors far behind.  The new generation is much more comfortable and conversant with Regular Force issues and does not generally have the "baggage" so often seen with older folks.
Reserve senior leadership remains populated in small part by the blindingly incompetent who have arisen to their current positions based entirely on longevity and availability.  While this is sometimes seen in the Regular Force, it is not nearly as prevalent. Many of these people are now falling all over themselves to get on tour in an effort to catch up with their soldiers and to get a "real" medal.  The time to retain personnel simply because they're "good guys" is long past and is something we can ill afford
Honoraries and organizations like Reserves 2000 hardly help the case of the "new" Reservists who are not harkening back 60 years when addressing operational issues.  They muddy the waters, make issues emotional and are not grounded in the operational reality.  The recent tempest in a teapot regarding Reserve units in Winnipeg is a perfect example of how destructive this gang can be. Get rid of the lot.
The Army needs to come to grips with what it wants the Reserves to do.  Armoured Recce has been cited in the posts above.  _There is no current operational role for "light" recce.  Why are we structured to produce this in vehicles that cannot deploy?_  Reserve units will never deploy as formed units in the current operational context - why do we continue to pretend they will?  Moreover, there seems to be an abject failure to realize that if the PRes is limited to "commercial off the shelf" equipment and the like, it increases the training delta when force generating for operations.
One of the first things I would do would be to get the PRes out of the NPF business - the running of messes, mess accounts and the like.  This serves no real operational purpose and eats away at unit admin capabilities.  I've known some COs (no names, no pack drill) to devote the _majority_ of their time to mess/NPF issues.
While we might retain cap badges, colours and the like, there is no reason for the command and control structure to be on a regimental/battalion basis.  The LCols and RSMs should go for 80% of units and the entire system restructured to reflect reality - on a sub-unit basis.  Downrank the whole structure by one if need be.
The Reserves need to be realistic as to what can be accomplished given their training limitations and the operational reality.  Operations are _never_ going to be structured around PRes availability or the length of time Reservists can get away from work/school.  Learn to live with it - the system is not designed to get _you_ on tour.  Similarly, course lengths within very technical trades or on complex equipment is not going to be reduced to the traditional two week window.  If "part-time" Reservists cannot train on equipment in the traditional length of time, they should not expect to be issued with it.
Our employment model for Reservists is outmoded and in desperate need of replacement.  It was designed for an Army that served very routine rotations in places like Cyprus, where there was no requirement for lengthy work-up training and where rotation dates could be predicted years in advance.  This is no longer the case.  We are an Army at war and need Reservists who can be available for _years_ in some cases.  As it is now, the Army would collapse without full-time PRes staff.  It is time to acknowledge this and to give the "Class" system a hard shake.
Efforts to focus the Reserves on domestic operations are doomed to failure unless the system changes dramatically.  In my experience, most large domestic operations have required an _immediate_ deployment of soldiers.  Moreover, there remain some ALEA-type domestic ops (prison security springs to mind) that will force the Regular Force to maintain a short-notice domestic response capability, no matter what is done with the Reserve Force.  The PRes focus (vice the Army's, where it hardly registers) on TBGs and the like is entirely misplaced and entirely poltically driven - our efforts are elsewhere and we cannot afford to have role-specific units awaiting the once-every-ten-years domestic ops event.

/rant.  Flame away...

The above and a buck fifty might get you a small Timmies... 

TR


----------



## dapaterson

Teddy:

From my lofty perch in NDHQ I can see little to disagree with:

The generation gap is real and will hopefully lead to change sooner rather than later;

Some senior Reserve leaders are Last Man Standing, or at least Loudest Man Standing - kept around well beyond their capability level, competence or best-before date;

The "Gotta Get A Gong" show is real - though from here it seems to be an equal-opportunity affliction, with Reg F members also scrambling for meaningless behind the wire jobs to get that tick in the box;

The "Old-timers" like certain HCols and the R2k crowd (whose name now truly shows that they are behind the times) are in my opinion part of the "Mess as #1 priority group - I'd go so far as to say that certain units (no names or pack drill here, either) view the Reserves as a federally-subsidized social club with automatic weapons;

If we are to have a Reserve force of 19,000 under the Army (including the field signals) we need a realistic model, with limited redundancy, to optimize it - and ensure we have what we need - somehow I don't think that 97 Infantry LCols are really needed in a force of that size.  If we assume 4000 folks will be not yet occupationally qualified at any one time, that leaves 15K trained troops to allocate; if they are all rolled into generic bns of 300 troops  (too small, but let's use that figure) we have a need for 50 LCols - all cap badges and trades - without having any C2 above the unit level (the usefulness of the current CBG construct is another topic for another time);

A quick review of the CFDS announced today seems to show that TBG didn't make the cut - it will be interesting to see what happens next...  at least they got those Suburbans with the look-cool factor.


Hmm... your post reads almost like something my former boss would have written...  >


----------



## dglad

Likewise, I find little to disagree with in this.  However, I would add one point...that IN SPITE of its shortcomings, we are producing, in the Res F, effective soldiers and officers who are deploying on operations and are carrying their weight.  The system that's producing them may be clunky and outmoded in many respects, but producing them it is.  I will note that it's straining at the seams to do so, and it's not clear that it can do so indefinitely.  But let's make sure that in critiquing the system we don't, in the process, inadvertently send the message to these fine men and women that they are a deficient product of that system.

And...it's in these folks that the answers may lay.  All of the change that many may wish to impose on the P Res may very happen organically, as these soldiers become more and more senior leaders in the same system.


----------



## George Wallace

dglad said:
			
		

> Likewise, I find little to disagree with in this.  However, I would add one point...that IN SPITE of its shortcomings, we are producing, in the Res F, effective soldiers and officers who are deploying on operations and are carrying their weight.  The system that's producing them may be clunky and outmoded in many respects, but producing them it is.  I will note that it's straining at the seams to do so, and it's not clear that it can do so indefinitely.  But let's make sure that in critiquing the system we don't, in the process, inadvertently send the message to these fine men and women that they are a deficient product of that system.
> 
> And...it's in these folks that the answers may lay.  All of the change that many may wish to impose on the P Res may very happen organically, as these soldiers become more and more senior leaders in the same system.



I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.

TFs are taking, in more ways than one, a toll on PRes regeneration.  Not only are the "Instructors" that are direly needed for training deploying, but on return, many will CT to the Regular Force.  This wouldn't be a bad thing, if there were strong cadres of Instructors to continue on, but there aren't.  One solution is to put more Reservists onto Regular Force courses, and that doesn't restrict them to Leadership and Career Crses, but also on the most basic of Crses to include BMQ, SQ, and Crses like Dvr Wheeled.  There is a need to make this old "Total Force" concept, exactly that - Total Force.

The biggest problem other, than that, with the Reserves is Administration.  Too much "Dead Wood" in the RMS staffs of many Reserve Units, failing to get even the most basic of Administration done in a timely manner.

Sorry.  Did I rant there.......


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Yes and No there George  ;D

A prime example of the lack of Instructional Cadre for the Reserve Serial, CFSME is cutting contracts for any length this summer to accomodate the availability of instructors.


----------



## daftandbarmy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.



What do you mean? We've been allocated 2 x BMQ spots this summer. That's certainly enough to sustain an infantry unit these days, isn't it?  Well, if it comes down to it, I used to be pretty good on the C6. They still have bayonet attachments on those quick change barrels don't they?

Pass the Kool Aid please....


----------



## dglad

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.
> 
> TFs are taking, in more ways than one, a toll on PRes regeneration.  Not only are the "Instructors" that are direly needed for training deploying, but on return, many will CT to the Regular Force.  This wouldn't be a bad thing, if there were strong cadres of Instructors to continue on, but there aren't.  One solution is to put more Reservists onto Regular Force courses, and that doesn't restrict them to Leadership and Career Crses, but also on the most basic of Crses to include BMQ, SQ, and Crses like Dvr Wheeled.  There is a need to make this old "Total Force" concept, exactly that - Total Force.
> 
> The biggest problem other, than that, with the Reserves is Administration.  Too much "Dead Wood" in the RMS staffs of many Reserve Units, failing to get even the most basic of Administration done in a timely manner.
> 
> Sorry.  Did I rant there.......



Unless I'm missing something, it sounds like you're proposing to...make more Reg F soldiers.  There's nothing inherently wrong with that, but loading Reservists onto Reg F BMQ, SQ, trade and leadership courses is just making Reg F soldiers, but at a reduced rate of pay and sans a lot of benefits.  Unless, of course, they simply become Reg F soldiers, in which case, they aren't Reservists.

The problem is a complex cascade.  The Reg F has come to rely on the Res F to fill out its TF CFTPOs, so Res F soldiers are being drawn into TFs, *so Res F force generation falters*, meaning fewer Reservists are available to fill TFs, meaning that those that ARE available are stretched even more.  If we're going to make a Total Force that means rolling the Res F into the Reg F...then fine, let's just say that.  But I don't think that, for a lot of reasons, this is going to work particularly well, either.

Note the highlighted and underlined bit above.  That's where the key to all of this sits.   I'm of the opinion that the Res F really doesn't lack for capacity or capability, it's just poorly and inefficiently organized for what it's being asked to do.   I maintain that it's producing good soldiers, but I can't really deny that it's reaching its limits.  Clearly, some substantial reform is going to be required.


----------



## rifleman

Why don't we just consider this 21 century mobilization for the CF with no end in site. I believe in that context, it lends to tactical groupings with combined administration for those on reconstitution. When or if this every ends, the reservists on Class C and B'A' will need a place to go back to, when the regular force is looking for places to hide again.


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> As a side if you are going to quote someone, you should use the entire context, not just the part that supports you arguement
> "There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and *signing 5 years of your life away is preventing them from joining.*


You were not taken out of context.  You little extra bolded bit makes absolutely no difference.  The purpose of the reserves is not to provide the national hobby service.  If the reserve provided no capability to the larger CF, it would not exist to fill the role of adventure camp or hobby club.  The purpose the reserves is not to be the employer for the people you’ve described; the reserves uses those people (and others) as a human resource for it to fill its actual purposes:


*Individual augmentation to Regular Force units*
This is the provision of individual soldiers to fill out units, sub-units & HQs.  Reservists providing this capability are both on operations overseas & here in Canada backfilling for regular force soldiers on ops, parental leave or whatever.

*Add to force generation depth (sub-unit augmentation to mobilization base) *
This is the provision of formed sub-sub units or larger organizations.  Reservists are capable of doing this depending on the role & mission.  However, the nature of modern combat and our way of procurement will ensure that this never occurs above the Coy level (and even this will only be in relatively permissive environments).  Despite the speed at which new equipment is arriving, Afghanistan is showing that there are serious delays & challenges when you wait until everyone is at war before trying to buy what you need.  The international market is having trouble meeting the demand for some product while we wait.

*Add to force generation breadth (specialized capabilities)*
The CF reserve can provide specialist capabilities or skills which do not exist in the regular force.  I believe CIMIC is done this way.

*Provide the Canadian Forces with a community footprint*
The reserve force provides visibility of the military in Canadian communities.  In other words, reserve units serve to remind Canadians that the CF exists, to “win hearts & minds” domestically, and to communicate locally with the public.

So, when deciding how to organize it is the above list that should be the guiding factor as far as what number, size and type of units we should have.  Demographics should only be used to help guide where we physically place the units.


----------



## George Wallace

dglad said:
			
		

> Unless I'm missing something, it sounds like you're proposing to...make more Reg F soldiers.  There's nothing inherently wrong with that, but loading Reservists onto Reg F BMQ, SQ, trade and leadership courses is just making Reg F soldiers, but at a reduced rate of pay and sans a lot of benefits.  Unless, of course, they simply become Reg F soldiers, in which case, they aren't Reservists.



No.  I am not proposing to make more Reg F soldiers, although in some units up to 50% of their trained members do CT to the Reg F.  What I am saying, is that due to the shortage of Instructors, it is time to start putting Reservists onto Regular Force BMQ and SQ Crses to generate enough pers to fill the gaps that we will soon see when the current rush to train Instructors is over.  Currently the Reserves are seeing BMQ, SQ and Dvr Wheeled Crses cancelled due to the lack of Instructors and resources to hire Privately (such as Calian).  Reservists are being employed in St Jean and Borden to Instruct Reg F BMQ and SQ Crses.  This is yet another strain on the Reserve Instructor Pool.  Reservists must receive the same qualifications as their Reg F counterparts, and some Trades are doing just that.  Time to start putting more Reservists onto Reg F Crses.  

Just because a Reservist is on a Reg F Crse doesn't mean (s)he is going to be Reg F.  It does give them a fixed period of Trg to receive the same quality of Trg as their Reg F counterpart.  It promotes "networking" and familiarity in how each other operates, making it much easier to integrate Res F pers on operations.  In the end, the Reservist will return to their parent unit much better trained and more experienced.  Should they decide further down the road to make it a full-time career, so be it; but they will be able to enter the Reg F already qualified in their Trade.



			
				dglad said:
			
		

> The problem is a complex cascade.  The Reg F has come to rely on the Res F to fill out its TF CFTPOs, so Res F soldiers are being drawn into TFs, *so Res F force generation falters*, meaning fewer Reservists are available to fill TFs, meaning that those that ARE available are stretched even more.  If we're going to make a Total Force that means rolling the Res F into the Reg F...then fine, let's just say that.  But I don't think that, for a lot of reasons, this is going to work particularly well, either.



There are already some Trades and Crses that are facilitating Reg/Res mixed Crses.  As stated above, it standardizes the training of both Reg and Res F pers.   Subliminally, it adds to the "Total Force" integration.



			
				dglad said:
			
		

> ......... I'm of the opinion that the Res F really doesn't lack for capacity or capability, it's just poorly and inefficiently organized for what it's being asked to do.   I maintain that it's producing good soldiers, but I can't really deny that it's reaching its limits.  Clearly, some substantial reform is going to be required.



Yes I agree with it being poorly and inefficiently organized.  It is producing some excellent soldiers.  Some do stay on in the Reserves.  Many move on to the Regular Force.  Current Deployments and taskings such as St Jean and Borden to augment the Reg F Trg System have brought the Reserves to the Breaking point.  It is time for them to stop trying to do their Trg on their own, but to integrate themselves into the Reg F Trg System.  Maintaining a number of small Trg facilities at Units is inefficient.  Time to concentrate our Instructors and Staffs into one or two permanent locations.


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> Why don't we just consider this 21 century mobilization for the CF with no end in site. I believe in that context, it lends to tactical groupings with combined administration for those on reconstitution. When or if this every ends, the reservists on Class C and B'A' will need a place to go back to, when the regular force is looking for places to hide again.


I'm not tracking.  Are you suggesting permanent use of Class C & B to keep the regular force field units at 100% for the duration of our Afghanistan mission or are you suggesting tactical groupings of reserve units should only last until the Afghanistan mission ends (or slows)?


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> I'm not tracking.  Are you suggesting permanent use of Class C & B to keep the regular force field units at 100% for the duration of our Afghanistan mission or are you suggesting tactical groupings of reserve units should only last until the Afghanistan mission ends (or slows)?



Both, it all depends on the situation at the time


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> You were not taken out of context.  You little extra bolded bit makes absolutely no difference.  The purpose of the reserves is not to provide the national hobby service.  If the reserve provided no capability to the larger CF, it would not exist to fill the role of adventure camp or hobby club.  The purpose the reserves is not to be the employer for the people you’ve described; the reserves uses those people (and others) as a human resource for it to fill its actual purposes:



I'm not suggesting it be a hobby service. I'm saying I know lots of reg force members that joined the reserves first to see whether they would like it, instead of commiting to a BE. Although its a good thing that there were weekend warriors during the bleak years, as it appears they are needed now


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> Both, it all depends on the situation at the time


Given that the need for amalgamations or tactical groupings was identified in this thread well before the current operations in Kandahar, I don't think it is a temporary measure that can be reverted as soon as the Op tempo subsides.  Unless someone identifies a CF requirement for a larger Army reserve, there is no argument to grow units.  There are currently too many units to efficiently & effectively make use of the soldiers authorized to the system as a whole.



			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> I'm saying I know lots of reg force members that joined the reserves first to see whether they would like it, instead of commiting to a BE.


So, you are proposing the reserves also have the role of a pseudo farm team in that the reserves recruits people into the CF and eventually transfers many to the regular force?


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> Given that the need for amalgamations or tactical groupings was identified in this thread well before the current operations in Kandahar, I don't think it is a temporary measure that can be reverted as soon as the Op tempo subsides.  Unless someone identifies a CF requirement for a larger Army reserve, there is no argument to grow units.  There are currently too many units to efficiently & effectively make use of the soldiers authorized to the system as a whole.
> So, you are proposing the reserves also have the role of a pseudo farm team in that the reserves recruits people into the CF and eventually transfers many to the regular force?


I've never agreed that amalgamations was the issue even back then. 

The reserves in the past 20 years have already been a farm team for the regs.


----------



## Harris

Speaking as a Company Commander who normally only commands 35-45 people on a weekend Ex, I'm all for Tactical groupings.  I had 140 pers in my Company on South Bound Trooper, and it was great to actually have pers to do the jobs needed, and to give orders to more than one Pl Comd.

While I hear that some Units are at their max, unfortunately that isn't the case for the majority of Units where I'm located.  My Unit can barely keep up with the CT's and transfers, yet alone increase in size.

Should Units be retained to keep their capbadges?  No!!!  Can we keep a Company of the Highland Balloon Fusilers as part of the Mountian Goat Regiment, Yes!!!  Then the Platoon commanders will command a proper Pl, I will command a proper Coy, and the CO will command a proper Bn.  Currently only the Pl comd gets to do this if he's lucky.

Perhaps that will also eliminate the "last man standing gets to be CO" problem.


----------



## TCBF

combat_medic said:
			
		

> While it may be a cost-saving alternative, I don't see it being a logistically sound idea. While our unit's BOR operates quite well, and things get processed in a reasonable amount of time, I know it's not the same for all units. Particularly in Winnipeg where you have multiple units parading out of the same armoury and sharing the same orderly room. I've heard horror stories from some of the Camerons and Winnipeg Rifles I know about the time it takes for anything to get through. They're administrating units of differnt trades, under different commands (WRT the local Med Coy), and with completely different priorities. Is it any wonder things get mixed up?
> 
> Besides, don't you think it's about time Ottawa STOPPED looking for cost cutting ventures anywhere outside of NDHQ? Don't we have more generals now than we did at the peak of WWII? Don't you think there's FAR more fat to be trimmed in that one little building than in the CF in its entirety?



- I think we should look a this 'post from the past' before we tinker so much that we break something.


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> - I think we should look a this 'post from the past' ....


It has been addressed.  For one, the driving reason for tactical groupings would not be efficiency (cost savings) it would be effectiveness (better collective training & leader development).  Another observation might be that common orderly rooms exist, they have existed for some time now, and they exist even without tactical groupings.  Even in regular force "super bases" you will find certain administrative functions are centralized.  But as I said, your question from the past has been addressed to varying degrees in the past:


			
				Yard Ape said:
			
		

> There are several reserve units that sucessfuly run off-site sub-units.   There are also several succesfull independant sub-units (though there were more before the medical branch became its own command).   Why can't this success be repeated in other Coy sized units?   Don't forget that a company can have an Ops O/BC, Admin O, Liaison O, and Trg NCO.   I would recoment the Trg NCO be added to the full time staff.
> 
> The proposal I have given my support to still keeps much more headquarters in place by retaining the existing brigades and reducing the number of battalion HQs.   In the same move Coy HQs would grow and the central battalion HQ would be larger than any of the previous regimental HQs.   One of my concernce with Infanteers proposal is that I envision independantly located platoons.   I do not think that these would have the staff resources to sustain themselves.





			
				MJP said:
			
		

> the same number of administrative staff would probably still be utilized if not more.
> 
> Well the unit would be in "company establishment" they still would have all the support they had as they would still have a battalion HQ to plans Ops/ and assist in any administration(BOR/ASU/Whatever you want to call it) that the COY clerk cannot handle.   My clerk has no problems with supporting 125+ pers with BOR support.





			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I might suggest a mixed system for the reserves.   In places like Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, where numbers and proximity permit I think amalgamated battalions with conventional orders of battle would probably work just fine.   In places where numbers and distance conspire against the formation of units perhaps independent companies or squadrons would be a better anwer.   For example The Calgary Highlanders might become the 10th Independent Company (Calgary Highlanders) Western Canada Field Force or some such and be constituted as a combat team complete with a 5 or 6 platoon structure and incorporating service support.





			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Kirkhill: actually, the amalgamation could work even in areas of geographic dispersal. I give our Bde as an example: it is not uncommon for us to have soldiers drive two hours to get to the Armoury, and we already have a few COs who commute a considerable distance to their HQs. On top of that, the Bde Comd Gp is selected from across three Provinces: our Comd and DComd are from Wpg but our ACOS and BRSM are from Thunder Bay, seven hours travel time to the east.
> 
> In the case of a unit amalgamated across a wide area (as we have proposed for our Artillery and our Svc Bns) it really would not result in a huge change for the majority of soldiers, who would continue to parade at their home armoury as they do know. The people erquired to move would be those in key unit-level positions. Under this system the leadership of the component sub-units would be provided by the OC and SM (as it really should be...) with the unit-level folks concentrating on unit-level issues and dealing with Bde HQ.
> 
> Our proposals further provide for the eventual redistribution of full time staff, with the sub-units having an FTS somewhat smaller than it is now, composed mainly of Class B, while the majority of the RegF positions would be concentrated in a stronger and more capable bn HQ FTS that also included Class B.





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> Most of the Admin in the Regular Force is or soon will be on central database programs like "Peoplesoft" , CFTPO and so on, and a lot of Reserve admin is migrating there too. The idea of orderly rooms and clerical functions could go to the boards if this is taken to its conclusion. (Soldiers can and will do their own queries, while course reports etc. get fed in by the course staff, QM records by the QM staff, the CSM swipes every soldier's "smart card" at first parade to input pay etc).


(A few years later & today the PS can do their own leave passes on-line.  In reality, the Coy clerk will not be replaced, but perhapse some admin will start happening over greater distances & with less effort.)


			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.   Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.   Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?





			
				Enfield said:
			
		

> Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion. However, a reserve unit does not have nearly the same resources as a real battalion to run that administrative load - not as many clerks, not the various cells, not the full-time staff to do all the work that needs to be done, etc.
> 
> Reserve units generally claim to be able to field a company. So what exactly is everyone above the company level doing? An operational Reg F company manages to run itself on one clerk, an OC, 2ic, a CSM, and a CQ. A Reserve company is run by: a CQ/RQ, Coy CoComdrCoy 2ic, CSM, RSM, CO, DCO, Adjt, Ops & Trg O, and a BOR - and all that to get guys out one day a week, one weekend a month, and in reality it probably fields a platoon.
> My unit fielded the equivalent of a overstrength platoon on the last 7-day concentration. But, on any given weekday we usually have 3 people working full-time in the BOR, plus the Adjt, the RSS WO, CQ, a Recruiting Officer, and various others doing pay administration or odd jobs. The tail is definitely overwhelming the teeth.





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Very few positions would be eliminated.   Instead, many would be moved to where they are more efficient [or effective].   The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).


If you've got a particular point that you want to make, then make it.  You don't need to dredge up 4 year old posts as an excuse to remind us the sky will fall if anyone dare evolve "_break_" the regimental system as it currently exists in the Army reserve.


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> It has been addressed.  For one, the driving reason for tactical groupings would not be efficiency (cost savings) it would be effectiveness (better collective training & leader development).  Another observation might be that common orderly rooms exist, they have existed for some time now, and they exist even without tactical groupings.  Even in regular force "super bases" you will find certain administrative functions are centralized.  But as I said, your question from the past has been addressed to varying degrees in the past: If you've got a particular point that you want to make, then make it.  You don't need to dredge up 4 year old posts as an excuse to remind us the sky will fall if anyone dare evolve "_break_" the regimental system as it currently exists in the Army reserve.



Its no different then those who say that we have to re-invent the wheel in order to get anywhere. Sorry but we were discussing that 20 years ago, and I'm sure that it was discussed before that. 

btw, the superbase consolidation of services aren't exactly for effectiveness, its because their trades are short too.


----------



## McG

rifleman said:
			
		

> I've never agreed that amalgamations was the issue even back then.


Well, I am quite convinced that it has been required for going back over a decade.  It is the fault of neither the reserves or reservists.  It is simply a matter of authorized manning.  We do not have enough positions authorized in the reserve to justify the number of units that currently exist.



			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> The reserves in the past 20 years have already been a farm team for the regs.


Movement goes both ways between the components, but ...
My question was not whether people transfer to the Regular Force from the Reserve.  My question was, do you think this should be a formally recognized role of the reserves.



			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> btw, the superbase consolidation of services aren't exactly for effectiveness, its because their trades are short too.


I never suggested the purpose for consolidated services at bases.  I only mentioned that it happens to illustrate that it has nothing to do with either the regimental system or tactical groupings.



			
				rifleman said:
			
		

> Its no different then those who say that we have to re-invent the wheel in order to get anywhere. Sorry but we were discussing that 20 years ago, and I'm sure that it was discussed before that.


It is not that there should be no repeat of discussion (especially if resolution of a concept is not reached).  However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case). 



			
				Harris said:
			
		

> Should Units be retained to keep their capbadges?  No!!!


At the same time, we can remove units without removing any cap badges.  This may be an easier option for some to swallow.


----------



## rifleman

MCG said:
			
		

> Movement goes both ways between the components, but ...
> My question was not whether people transfer to the Regular Force from the Reserve.  My question was, do you think this should be a formally recognized role of the reserves.


 sure why not. I did forget that the reserves is also a retirement plan for double dippers



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> I never suggested the purpose for consolidated services at bases.  I only mentioned that it happens to illustrate that it has nothing to do with either the regimental system or tactical groupings.


I'd say it is basically a tactical grouping of administrative/ logistic services



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> It is not that there should be no repeat of discussion (especially if resolution of a concept is not reached).  However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case).


 okay got ya


----------



## TCBF

MCG said:
			
		

> ...However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case). ...



- I did not say it had gone unanswered.  I just don't like the tone of some of the answers.  A bit strident, bordering on situating the estimate.  Another few pages and this 're-organization' will almost qualify as it's own occult religion. 

Anyway, I said:

"- I think we should look a this 'post from the past' before we tinker so much that we break something."

... and I still think that.  "First - do no harm."


----------



## McG

TCBF said:
			
		

> I just don't like the tone of some of the answers.  A bit strident, bordering on situating the estimate.


I honestly believe that you’ve situated the estimate toward a notion that absolutely nothing of the regimental system must change (except to maybe add more regiments).  Several posters in this thread have outlined specific benefits ranging from improvement of collective training, better leader development, and improved focus on mission tasks vs administrative overhead.  That’s several steps better than cryptic warnings of vague doom awaiting anyone who brings change to the regimental system:


			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> … before we tinker so much that we break something."





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> "First - do no harm."





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> They key is: "First - Do No Harm."





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> Re-organization is always attractive to those not being re-organized.  Invariably, more harm than good is done, and any economies made are fleeting.





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> We tinker with it [our regimental  system] at our peril, and we must always heed the law of unintended consequences.


Yes, there is a requirement to do a thorough estimate and there always will be unknowns.  However, if we are paralyzed with fear & decisions are not made, then far more damage will be done through stagnation & inaction.  But, I see you've raised a few more points which may have been inadequately addressed, so I'll try to add a little more for you now.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> Exactly what we need - programs that make our present structure work.


No.  We need a structure that meets the needs of the CF & Canada.  That is the structure that we need to make work.  It is very unlikely that the present structure is the one which meets the needs.  Its deficiencies (including & going beyond the grossly undersized units) have already been well laid out by several posters (



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> Keep the Regiments - we may need them someday





			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> If we HAD to amalgamate, I think it might be best to reduce to nil strength the other affected units, rather than amalgamate them.  That would allow an expansion later.


The number of cap badges has no bearing on our ability to force generate or expand.  If the Army reserve needs to double it’s size in 10 years, it could choose to add a second battalion to each regiment (including the Armd Regts).  Specific cap badges are not required for this.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> We need more units - not less.


Do we?  We don’t need units for the sake of having units, so why? How many & what size?



… Maybe we’re not talking the same language.  For the purpose of this thread, let’s stick with:
Regiment ≠ Unit
Regiment ≈ Military family/clan of non-specific size
sub unit < unit < formation
Company (or Squadron) ≤ unit ≤ Battalion
Sub unit ≤ Company

At the moment, all regiments exist as units (battalions) not because we’ve specifically determined these units are required but because we’ve been attempting to preserve all the regiments (and preserve them as battalions too).  This is backwards.  This is the regimental system driving force structure as opposed to the needs of the CF & Canada.  Proposing to grow every regiment so that it can be a full viable battalion is working from this same backward end.

By defining an employment concept & the capabilities required, we can then determine the number type and size of units required.  If the existing regimental system can be made to fit this organization (and I see not reason of the top of my head why it could not fit) then it can be kept.  This may mean that regiments have to accept sub unit status as opposed to full unit status.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> They [little unit-level command structures] maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency.


A Pl under a LCol is going to provide very little of value in time of general mobilization.  

Given the mobility of our society today, how close are those “historical ties” to towns?  More and more often (and with the exception of the big cities) you will find that the town in which one was raised is not the town in which they go of to school (college or university) and it is not the place they eventually settle down for a career.  Going a step farther, I tend to support the implied reality of this rhetorical question:


			
				Milnet.ca said:
			
		

> If Reserve soldiers join "a Regiment" rather than seek jobs, and esprit
> de corps is "so high" because of the "Regimental System", why is there such
> a high attrition rate?


----------



## JRMacDonald

Having read through most of this and watching TCBF have his lucid , and occasionally, wry comments jumped on, I felt I had to re sign in after 4 years. 
TOM-  i think most of your commentary is bang on.  Of course, I used to understand your conversation when we were in the hallway, rigging ruckksacks , drinking strawberry wine.
SO, what ever happened to Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)????  The "miracle" program for the Reserve. Wasn't it supposed to "sort out " exactly what we're chatting about? We got through Phase 1+2, but Phase 3 died fm lack of will, bad politics, and eventually lack of $$$$!
JRM


----------



## TCBF

Jim,

- It wasn't strawberry wine, it was a Zinfandel.  Since neither of us augered a ruck in from 1000 feet - the wine must have helped us do a good job.

- I think I have been a bit obstinate in some ways, but it's not from a fear of the THEORY of change, but past EXAMPLES of change.  Anyway, I am going to give this a rest for awhile, and look out my office window at the glow of a burning Wainwright training area!


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's an alternate definition of a Regiment: a Club.

A Club much like the Kiwanis or the Knights of Columbus.  A voluntary association of individuals in a community that come together for a social purpose.

The difference between the ...... Highlanders and the Kiwanis is that the ....... Highlanders are offering themselves for military service to their community and their government.

Their government will decide how many of the Volunteers it will choose to employ and in what role and how they are to be organized.

But the ....... Highlanders supplies a willing pool of support and a body of bodies that can be supplied with a sufficient minimum of training that would permit the government to entrust resources to them rapidly in the event of a crisis: local, national or international.

The wealthier the government is the more volunteers it can afford to train, equip and deploy.   The more, and more varied, crises it can respond to.

The key value of the local Regiment is that it supplies a locus of concentration, a place where supporters of the government and the community can concentrate their efforts to demonstrate their willingness to serve.

The Regiment can comprise Regulars (individual and formed), Reservists (individual and formed), Cadets, Auxilliaries, Honouraries and released, trained members, some with useful skills.   

IMHO the Regiment should be primarily a locally funded organisation, after the fashion of the Scouts or Cadets, with some government support.  It is ultimately an expression of local civic mindedness.

If the government chooses to have the Regiment supply a platoon or a brigade then it is incumbent on the government to supply the tools and resources to make that happen.

But there is no reason at all why the Regiment cannot continue as a living entity regardless of the government's demands on it.

Paychecks for ten people to organize a community is fairly small potatoes.  

Rather than focusing on platoons per CO and Regiment perhaps it would be more advisable to ask how many Regiments a community needs.  Is it impossible to see a Warkworth Regiment and a Toronto Regiment with the Warkworth Regiment supplying a section of truck drivers and the Toronto Regiment supplying and all arms brigade?


----------



## dglad

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Rather than focusing on platoons per CO and Regiment perhaps it would be more advisable to ask how many Regiments a community needs.  Is it impossible to see a Warkworth Regiment and a Toronto Regiment with the Warkworth Regiment supplying a section of truck drivers and the Toronto Regiment supplying and all arms brigade?



These questions are not mutually exclusive, and are linked.  The more unit there are in a community (yes, in this context, unit = Regiment.  Unit also equals Ind Fd Bty, Sig Sqn, Fd Amb, Nav Res unit, etc. i.e. anything that has its own UIC and unit comd and will be drawing on the recruiting pool to fill its ranks), the fewer tps will be available per CO (or OC, in the case of ind sub-unit-sized elems).  For example, in Thunder Bay, my home town, there is an inf Regt, a Fd Amb, a Svc Bn, a Sig Sqn and a Nav Res unit.  That's five units for a city of 115,000 (give or take).  Frankly, that's a disproportionately high number of units for the size of population...about 1 unit per 20000 people.  Winnipeg, a city of 653,000 (or about 713,000 if you consider the entire metro area; this comes from http://www.winnipeg.ca/cao/pdfs/population.pdf), has seven units (two inf Regts, one Armd Recee Regt, a Sig Sqn, a Svc Bn, a Fd Amb and a Nav Res unit.  Technically, the two inf Regts are being tactically grouped, but are maintaining separate Regt identity; there is also a Fd Engr Sqn being formed, but seven is still the working number).  That's about 1 unit per 100000 people.    Now, all units in Thunder Bay and Winnipeg are hungry for recruits, but some much more so than others.  The trouble is that when you divide the available pool of potential recruits up this way, some units are inevitably going to suffer in terms of "platoons per CO".

The solution, if we want to make units with sufficient "critical mass" to provide effective and efficient training for our soldiers?  Increase the number of soldiers per unit.  That means either increasing the number of recruits (to paid ceilings, anyway), or reduce the number of units (either fully, by eliminating units, or "virtually", by grouping them in some fashion).  There really aren't any other options.


----------



## geo

dglad... it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.

IIRC that "service battalion" amongst other things is about the size of a platoon.


----------



## McG

dglad said:
			
		

> The solution, if we want to make units with sufficient "critical mass" to provide effective and efficient training for our soldiers?  Increase the number of soldiers per unit.  That means either increasing the number of recruits (to paid ceilings, anyway), or reduce the number of units (either fully, by eliminating units, or "virtually", by grouping them in some fashion).  There really aren't any other options.


Exactly.  From my perspective, a unit with a single sub-unit (regardless if this sub-unit is full size or not) is below critical mass for most types of units (particularly all the combat arms).  Extrapolating from your two options we could raise the paid ceiling of every unit to allow for a full Bn, or we can group like units which are only established for a single company sized "mission element."

The option of making every unit a full battalion is unrealistic for several reasons.  Politically, the funding for infrastructure, equipment and pay will never happen.  From a CF perspective, I do not think we have a need for an Army reserve that is so large (though I do think there is a requirement for something larger than we have now).  Lastly, I do not think the Canadian population could fill (and keep filled) the ranks of a reserve force that large.



			
				geo said:
			
		

> it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.


It is both and neither.  We need to ask how many units (and sub-units) can be sustained by a region, and this number will be derived from the number of individual reservists that can be sustainably generated from that region.   If a region is home to more units than it can sustain, then some must be closed, moved or reduced to sub-units.

If a region is unable to sustain a unit but can sustain a sub-unit, then we could have a Coy/Sqn (retaining a Regt identity but with no HQ above the Coy) that reports to a Regt neutral Bn HQ in a neighboring region.  

Therefore, I believe the reserve structure will require selectively targeted growth & reductions (with only growth happening at the aggregate level), some unit relocations (maybe), and permanent groupings of companies within larger inter-regional battalions.  The individual companies can retain regimental identities, and there is value in ensuring they do.


----------



## TCBF

geo said:
			
		

> dglad... it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.
> 
> IIRC that "service battalion" amongst other things is about the size of a platoon.



- About 1965 (when the Fort William Armoury burnt down), Port Arthur/Fort William (now Thunder Bay) had HMCS Griffon, LSSR: two companies in Port Arthur and two in Fort William, The Port Arthur Service Bn, 118 Bty Fort William (until 1955), etc.  After the FW armoury burnt down, The LSSR concentrated in Port Arthur.

- The LSB (Lakehead Service Bn - started as the Port Arthur Service Bn, re-named in 1966): after the crunch of 1970, only 138 Tpt Coy RCASC was left.  Then, 18 Thunder Bay Svc Bn was created in 1975.

- Comm Res: The first recruits for 3 Tp 735  Comm Sqn were trained by the LSSR in the spring of 1973. They became 736 Comm Sqn a few years later.

- So we have a long history of units getting smaller/bigger/ disappearing etc.


----------



## kratz

I was driving into the base today. I have to admit, traffic on a Sunday is light. Stopping at the traffic light my eye caught the lone Armour flag. While I have not served under their colour, we all serve our contry. In these days leading to the nation's remembrance let's remember all the contributions to our freedomes.


----------



## ArmyRick

Kratz, 

yes we do have to honour ourselves and the previous war vets on Nov 11, 

However what does your post have anything to do with this topic?


----------



## McG

Article Link: TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS: CAN THEY WORK?

I understand there was significant push-back when some units were assigned purely domestic missions back during the cold war (I believe it was called national survival).  What if every unit were assigned two roles from the national level: one domestic role and one fole for international operations?

There is not a lot of requirement for FOO parties and howitzers on Dom Ops.  However, there is a need for liaison parties to come from somewhere.  Traditional Artillery units could all share a Army directed domestic liaison role.  Thoughts?


----------



## tango22a

MCG:

The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that you will be snowed-under by VRs which seems to be behind most themes over the last 30-40 years. I seem to get the feeling that many RegF personnel would rather be done with PRes, since they feel monies could be better expended elsewhere.

It's a little bit like when an army formation returns from overseas..." Oh good, now we can get back to real soldiering!!"  I can assure you that even if the PRes soldier has lived and soldiered for years on a shoe-string   ( BTDT ) that they are as fiercely proud of their Roles and Regiments as the RegF are.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that you will be snowed-under by VRs which seems to be behind most themes over the last 30-40 years.



Really?

How many people actually walked away when the Elgin Regiment became 31CER?

Does anyone know?

Maybe the cry of mass VRs is really just a myth used to argue against changes to units.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

Can't answer the question, but I do Know there were more than a few transfers to both I H and WindsorR.

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs. It takes a certain kind of perverse person to put up with the kind of BS
that the PRes has to put up with,but most PRes regiments/battallions have this in Spades.I know that many times we gave up training money,equipment etc. so the RegF was fully kitted. How about all the money that was spent out of the PRes budget to rebuild Meaford Trg Area? As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.

tango22a


----------



## Edward Campbell

tango22a said:
			
		

> ... I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.



Nonsense!

About 20% of the Afghan mission establishment is being filled by Reserve Force members. Only an idiot (and there are some, I grant you, in each component) would want to damage the Reserves.

But, is e.g. _recce_, as taught/practiced in the Primary Reserve RCAC today, a useful skill for the sorts of operations we are likely to face in the next generation or should we be rethinking roles and tasks?

I don't think asking the question is a bad idea. But, I hope, I do understand the frustration so many Reserve Force members must feel as they look back on so many missteps and just plain dumb ideas.


----------



## Haggis

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> About 20% of the Afghan mission establishment is being filled by Reserve Force members.



True, Edward, and that number approached 40-45% on the final big rotos in Bosnia.  However there are still members of the Reg F who see the operational employment of Reservists as a political rather than strategic initiaitive.  In short, I've often been told that there are Reg F soldiers being left at home "so a Reservist can have a tour".

Rubbish??  You bet!  But to a homebound Reg F soldier who sees a Reservist "deploy in his place", it a favourite axe to grind.  On the other side of the coin, once deployed, you can't tell the diference between them because "there ain't no hatbadge on a helmet"!


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> 
> I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs. It takes a certain kind of perverse person to put up with the kind of BS that the PRes has to put up with,but most PRes regiments/battallions have this in Spades.



First it's "snowed-under" now its "more than a few".  Surely someone, somewhere has real numbers for this.  It can be quantified and then we can dispense with allusions to swarms of soldiers turning in their kit.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> I know that many times we gave up training money,equipment etc. so the RegF was fully kitted.



When exactly were each of these years of plenty for the Reg F, I don't recall them.  Which vehicle fleets didn't the Reg F also run into the ground before getting replacements.  Were we not all subject to the same pay freeze during the dark days of no money for anyone?



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> How about all the money that was spent out of the PRes budget to rebuild Meaford Trg Area?



Odd, I seem to remember a lot of PRes units taking advantage of what Meaford had to offer.  As the Range Control Officer (RCO 1996-1999, then other staff positions, posted out in 2000) there I saw some units regularly.  I also recall meeting other Reservists who simply told me that "their unit" doesn't go to Meaford.  Sounds like a unit choice whether or not that training facility was used to its possible extent.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.



Personally I find that to be very very narrow and very negative view.  At my current P RES unit I keep hearing that for many positions on upcoming overseas deployments, eligible Reserve applicants will be given priority over Regular Force candidates.  The very rational explanation is that the service acknowledges that a Reservist may only get one opportunity to put the rest of their life on hold and deploy. while at the same time it economizes on the Reg F soldiers for future missions.  That hardly sounds like a plan to stamp out the P Res.


----------



## tango22a

ERC:

The problem is that due to over-tasking the RegF cannot train people from PRes to a standard useful to deploy in an ARMOUR trade. Most PRes Armour soldiers end up being employed outside their trade.They still deploy and do a good job, but I am sure many would prefer to be employed as Armoured soldiers. Lack of money, lack of training and mainly a lack of WILL to remedy this situation  will lead us into careering around in ever-decreasing circles until we finally bite ourselves on the a**.IMHO the system is badly strained and the only solution is an increase in funding which I can't see happening with today's economic situation.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

Michael:
I won't get in a flame war with you as I have been retired for over 20 years and am not really current in present-day situations. I do KNOW for example that my old unit was to have received 4 AVGPs in the early 80s. I also attended the second PRes Gunnery course and was staff on the third course. Instead of 4 pristeen AVGPs we got two (2). One had been loaned to the USMC for user trials and it had bullet strikes all over it. Also the hull was so twisted that the back doors would not close properly. After about six months or so they all disappeared to MTC Borden.  The only time we ever saw them after that was at Borden,for Gunnery or D/M courses or at summer concentration. You must admit it's hard to remain current on a vehicle when you don't have even one (1) to play with. I am willing to admit I am biased towards the PRes, having BTDT with nothing for years. Have you ever done road recce in a 3-ton Stake?...I have because you train with what you got!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a,

Neither am I looking for a flame war, but you are generalizing current Reg F/Res conditions based on your own experience which you admit is limited to Armoured Recce, and ended 20 years ago.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

You win I Quit.

I still have ties to my old Regiment and to family members that are serving soldiers both RegF and PRes.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

When it comes to the Training Delta between Regular and Reserve Force Armour Corps soldiers, it has been discussed in quite a few forums already.  It started back in the days when the Lynx was being retired, the Cougar was on its last legs and kept alive by the Reserves, and the arrival of the Coyote.  Followed soon after by the disappearance of the LEO 1 C 1 and the gap continued to spread.  No longer could Reservists train on Tracks, and fill positions in Light Track or Tanks.  The cost of training Reservists on the Surveillance Suites and Turret Gunnery alienated them from the Regs.  Manpower cutbacks, the loss of a Regular Force Regiment, cut down on employment opportunities for Reservists in the Reg Force Regiments.  

That being said, there is still a requirement for "Mud Recce" skills, as the Coyote is not a true Recce Veh, but a Surveillance Veh.  The Reserves need the tools (Vehs and Radios) to conduct this training.   Perhaps, they may luck out and have Coyotes cascaded down to them, if the Reg Force units upgrade to a more 'robust' vehicle, and they will gain some of the Surveillance skills that will make them more employable in a Armour role overseas.

Of course, not only will the decision makers in the Corps have to want this, but DND will have to win the LOTO to fund these ideas/dreams.


[EDIT TO ADD:  Conversion to TCCS Radios was a costly venture as well, and severely limited Reserve Armour training, in the lack of addequate numbers being alloted to not only Reserve Armour Units, but all Reserve MOCs.]


----------



## aesop081

tango22a said:
			
		

> Have you ever done road recce in a 3-ton Stake?...I have because you train with what you got!



I had to run my engineer section out of an LSVW and that was in a RegF regiment. Whats your point again ?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I had to run my engineer section out of an LSVW and that was in a RegF regiment. Whats your point again ?



Ouch now that sucks.


----------



## George Wallace

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I had to run my engineer section out of an LSVW and that was in a RegF regiment. Whats your point again ?



You did tactical Route Recces in an LSVW?


----------



## aesop081

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You did tactical Route Recces in an LSVW?



Yup.......for IRF(L) training no less.


----------



## George Wallace

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Yup.......for IRF(L) training no less.



As attachment to a RECCE TROOP doing a Route Recce?


----------



## tango22a

CDNAviator:

At least you had a Loud Squeaky Vehicle, Wheeled. As I said before I Quit!!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## aesop081

George Wallace said:
			
		

> As attachment to a RECCE TROOP doing a Route Recce?



As an attachement to recce platoon...doing route recces to detemine trafficability for the BG and site obstacles ( explosive and non-explosive)


----------



## George Wallace

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> As an attachement to recce platoon...doing route recces to detemine trafficability for the BG and site obstacles ( explosive and non-explosive)



Quite a bit different from being the lead Patrol.  

At least the LSVW was capable of moving cross country to some extent.  A far cry from the capabilities of a 3 ton Stake, and perhaps the MILCOT.


----------



## aesop081

George Wallace said:
			
		

> A far cry from the capabilities of a 3 ton Stake, and perhaps the MILCOT.



I would have taken the 3 ton steak truck. At least then i would have had room for all the troops, their kit, the section stores, weapons, explosives, field defensive stores.......yadi yadi yada....

My point is, RegF or PRes, we all have to make due with alot less than the ideal. Making due is not a PRes issue.


----------



## tango22a

George Wallace:

PM inbound!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> My point is, RegF or PRes, we all have to make due with alot less than the ideal. Making due is not a PRes issue.



The "Making do" part has cascaded down to the PRes quite fine.  They are "Making do" with much less that their Reg Force counterparts, who are "Making do"  with much more (as it should be or our government would really be screwed.).  Perhaps this makes the Reservists much better at "Making do with less".   ;D

It is the result of the Public wanting the Peace Dividend every year since 1953 and the end of the Korean War.  Canada's Military has been constantly cut in manpower, equipment, infrastructure and funding since the Korean War, and the John Q Public hasn't let up with his cries for the "Peace Dividend".


----------



## aesop081

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Perhaps this makes the Reservists much better at "Making do with less".   ;D



Perhaps it does indeed. It never cease to amaze me the ingenuity of Canadian service members when compared to those of other nations.




> It is the result of the Public wanting the Peace Dividend every year since 1953 and the end of the Korean War.  Canada's Military has been constantly cut in manpower, equipment, infrastructure and funding since the Korean War, and the John Q Public hasn't let up with his cries for the "Peace Dividend".



I agree 100% George. Beleive me, i would love to see Leos and things parked at reserve units ready for use. But does anyone think its realistic ?


----------



## McG

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I had to run my engineer section out of an LSVW and that was in a RegF regiment.


I've also seen regular engineer Recce Sgt operating out of the back of LSVW attempting to support BGs ... and we do attach Recce Sgts to Recce Sqn from time to time.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that....


I was not proposing a forceful re-rolling of units.  Instead, I was presenting the idea of maintaining a combat role while adding a second domestic role.  That being said, if the combat role of a unit is not relevant to operational requirements then the CF is not getting a good return for any investments made into that unit.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs.


Maybe but if we are hypothesizing that the reserve armd recce role is not relevant to operational requirements, then the interests of the CF are best served by re-rolling to something which is relevant.  We will just have to accept that some pers may choose to leave because their hobby is not in line with the military's needs (and that's okay because the military is not a federally funded hobby club).



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> The problem is that due to over-tasking the RegF cannot train people from PRes to a standard useful to deploy in an ARMOUR trade.  Most PRes Armour soldiers end up being employed outside their trade.They still deploy and do a good job, but I am sure many would prefer to be employed as Armoured soldiers. Lack of money, lack of training and mainly a lack of WILL to remedy this situation  will lead us into careering around in ever-decreasing circles until we finally bite ourselves on the a**.IMHO the system is badly strained and the only solution is an increase in funding which I can't see happening with today's economic situation.


This drives right to the heart of defining relevance to operational requirements.  It is not enough to show that a capability is required on the battlefields of today or tomorrow (though if the capability is not required for either that would be a clear indicator of no relevance to operational requirements).  For a reserve capability to be relevant to operations, we must be able to employ the reservist within his occupation.  We must also be able to properly train and maintain that capability internal to the reserves (ie. no expectation of reg force training cadres coming down to do it).  We must be able to provide whatever equipment this requires (recognizing that there are resource limitations regardless of component).

For as long as I can recall, the government has never funded procurement of sufficient AFV to meet the requirements of the regular force (it is possible that M113 purchases were adequate but that is too far before my time).  This under-resourcing is unlikely to change, and it would be irrational to degrade the already limited regular force capability in order to carve out the charity case vehicles to sustain that capability in the reserves.  The CLS has stated that he will not be seeking multi-million dollar vehicles for the reserves (it is only affordable at the expense of an operational regular force capability).  Cascading Coyote to the reserves will not resolve the problem either.  When Coyote is replaced, there will be a new vehicle with new fires & sensor systems and the Coyote trained reservist will still not be employable in regular force armd recce.

It was not my recent intent to discuss the utility of various reserve type units, but as Armd Recce was brought up: perhaps those units would better serve the CF through providing combat engineers (for which there is a high demand for reservists to deploy in their role), CIMIC or some other capability.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> I seem to get the feeling that many RegF personnel would rather be done with PRes, since they feel monies could be better expended elsewhere.





			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.


Some might feel that.  I've seen a summary of a report done by finance pers in Ottawa showing that the reserve Bde as a collective were significantly more costly than the regular brigades.  Could we do better putting all our money into the regular force?  I don't know, but I suspect such a move would do more harm than good.  As it is, the report that I previously mentioned certainly did not study enough detail to allow anyone to answer this question either.  There were too many details which could not be broken down further for any refined insight.

Reserve units with operationally relevant mission tasks (both domestic and international) are what the Army and the CF needs.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Haggis said:
			
		

> True, Edward, and that number approached 40-45% on the final big rotos in Bosnia.  However there are still members of the Reg F who see the operational employment of Reservists as a political rather than strategic initiaitive.  In short, I've often been told that there are Reg F soldiers being left at home "so a Reservist can have a tour".
> 
> Rubbish??  You bet!  But to a homebound Reg F soldier who sees a Reservist "deploy in his place", it a favourite axe to grind.  On the other side of the coin, once deployed, you can't tell the diference between them because "there ain't no hatbadge on a helmet"!


I bet if they suddenly told the Reg forces guys that due to manning shortages they will be pulling 1 year tours and those with speciality skills are subject to stop loss clause on their contracts would be wishing for any relief after completing their tour and hoping to spend a little time in Canada with their families. I have noted that much of the Reg vs Res stuff is fading thanks to the work and sacrifices of Reservists overseas, I hope the lessons learned from all of this are applied and not quickly forgotten again.

I would love to see a couple of Leo C2's sent to some of the larger armoured units where young troopers can learn some basic skills like track changing, etc. The Svc Bat can use for training as well, swapping engine packs and such.


----------



## aesop081

Colin P said:
			
		

> I would love to see a couple of Leo C2's sent to some of the larger armoured units where young troopers can learn some basic skills like track changing, etc. The Svc Bat can use for training as well, swapping engine packs and such.



So that we can then hear the laments of young and not-so-young reservists about how they are forced to use cast-offs from the RegF that are at the very end of their useful lives ?

Is the bill of dispersing small fleets of old vehicules worth a negligeable training gain ?


----------



## Haggis

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> My point is, RegF or PRes, we all have to make due with alot less than the ideal. Making due is not a PRes issue.



In my "day job" I recently spent a couple of days watching REGULAR FORCE  recruits and officer candidates field training at CFLRS.  Guess what?  They're short, too!  Wearing one pair of Mk 3s, carrying nuke bags and 82 butt packs in place of small packs, wearing more mixed ICE/IECS than most Reserve units and carrying C7 (not A1 or A2s).

So, "big deal.. they're recruits", some would say.  My point is this:  We're fighting a war on a budget.  Everybody is short of everything and there no new kit/toys/equipment on the horizon.  The cupboards are almost bare and our credit card is maxed out.  What I saw at CFLRS is symptomatic of that.  But, y'know what?  They still turn out a pretty damned good product.  And those instructors are Regular Force AND RESERVISTS!  (Yes, Virginia, there are Reservists teaching Regular Force recruits.)



			
				CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> So that we can then hear the laments of young and not-so-young reservists about how they are forced to use cast-offs from the RegF that are at the very end of their useful lives ?



And they should be damned glad they're still allowed to parade and are getting paid.  Some of the "not-so-young" should remember those days.  They weren't all that long ago.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> I would love to see a couple of Leo C2's sent to some of the larger armoured units where young troopers can learn some basic skills like track changing, etc. The Svc Bat can use for training as well, swapping engine packs and such.


I know, the Leopard C2 is still around.  But it is going.  So, why would we send equipment to reserve units for those units to learn how to maintain systems which are no longer operationally employed?  We may as well waste time & money teaching M4 Sherman and Centurion maintenance.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> (Yes, Virginia, there are Reservists teaching Regular Force recruits.)



And Commissionaires as well...


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> I know, the Leopard C2 is still around.  But it is going.  So, why would we send equipment to reserve units for those units to learn how to maintain systems which are no longer operationally employed?  We may as well waste time & money teaching M4 Sherman and Centurion maintenance.



There are still AEVs around which require maintenance; a few old Leo C2s in the svc bn lines would permit some EME techs to develop some familiarity with the family (unless some black hat snuck in and made off with the vehicle...)

But some of this should be task-tailoring for Reserve units.  If you're close to a Reg F base (350 kms?) you can train on their kit and provide augmentation; if you're farther afield you'll train in other skillsets with different kit.  Every unit will be different.  Get over it.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And Commissionaires as well...



True, but this thread isn't about Commissionaires.

I was also impressed by the opinions voiced about the contribution these Reservists (and Commissionares) make to CFLRS.  In short, they provide the staff continuity and have greatly contributed to the positive changes in BMQ and basic officer training.


----------



## geo

In Montreal there are still a bunch of C2s hanging around in the 202 yards... but, they've started to dispatch them to various museums & armouries - to become lawn ornaments.


----------



## tango22a

Alright Gentlemen:

After reading some of the posts I have come to the conclusion that the majority of posters feel that the PRes is of dubious  use other than supply GD personnel to the RegF. If it's any consolation to you I can remember being told years ago that the ElginR were given the choice of either re-badging or dis-banding.Speaking for MYSELF only. I either would have transferred out, or pulled the pin and VRd. I must point out that I joined to be an Armoured soldier not an Engineer. I feel that a large number of RegF members would object strenuously if they were compulsorily retraded .It's a little different when you're the one getting screwed isn't it? 

Maybe the answer is to reduce the PRes to nil strength and hope that large numbers will CT to RegF....Good Luck!

tango22a

Edited to add: It would sure help the manning problem!


----------



## Kirkhill

> Writer(s): Styne/Cahn
> 
> 
> It seems to me I've heard that song before
> It's from an old familiar score
> I know it well, that melody
> 
> It's funny how a theme
> Recalls a favorite dream
> A dream that brought you so close to me
> 
> I know each word, because I've heard that song before
> The lyrics said: "for evermore"
> For evermore's a memory
> 
> Please have them play it again
> And (Then) I'll remember just when
> I heard that lovely song before


----------



## aesop081

tango22a said:
			
		

> I can remember being told years ago that the ElginR were given the choice of either re-badging or dis-banding.



I was in Chilliwack when the first of them arrived for training in the new trade. None of them were complaining too much. You are traying to make an argument based only on your personal axe to grind.

But yeah...the RegF doesnt know what its like to be re-badged or re-traded right ?

PERI = Gone
500 series trades..........amalgamation anyone ?
Signals trades.......amalgamation on the horizon ?
Ocean Op.......amalgamated
AD Tech.......amalgamated with ATC Tech
FEE Op........amalgamated


----------



## McG

tango22a said:
			
		

> After reading some of the posts I have come to the conclusion that the majority of posters feel that the PRes is of dubious  use other than supply GD personnel to the RegF.


You have come to the wrong conclusion.  



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> If it's any consolation to you I can remember being told years ago that the ElginR were given the choice of either re-badging or dis-banding.


I was in the regiment at the time.  That is not how I remember it.  In fact, I understand that certain leadership from the regiment had specifically pushed for the opportunity.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> Speaking for MYSELF only. I either would have transferred out, or pulled the pin and VRd. I must point out that I joined to be an Armoured soldier not an Engineer.


If the capability the unit provides is not relevant to operations (current or future), then we should not keep it as-is just to avoid hurting peoples emotions.  If a reservist feels the CF owes him a hobby and is less concerned with what the CF actually needs, then he may well leave.  We will get on & be better for it.


----------



## Michael OLeary

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> But yeah...the RegF doesnt know what its like to be re-badged or re-traded right ?
> 
> PERI = Gone
> 500 series trades..........amalgamation anyone ?
> Signals trades.......amalgamation on the horizon ?
> Ocean Op.......amalgamated
> AD Tech.......amalgamated with ATC Tech
> FEE Op........amalgamated



From the infantry:

Pioneers ...... gone
Mortars ...... gone
Armour Defence ....... gone 

I know exactly what it's like to have years of personal training and experience suddenly be made irrelevant.  My preference that mortars to remain in the infantry was insufficient to protect my interests.


----------



## aesop081

Oh wait......dont forget the CAR


----------



## tango22a

MCG and CDNAviator:

The person who told me that had been ElginR before transferring. I don't have an axe to grind as I am no longer active. All I can say is if I am wrong in my assumption(making a huge a** of myself)...Sorry about that!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Gary D. in SK

Greetings gentlemen.  First off this is my first post (on a stale thread), and I readily admit my long term participation on these forums has a lot to do with my decisions in the next week.  That said this seems to be a great board and I appreciate the civil and heated discussions, kudos to you all.  Now as to the decision I am speaking of is in regards to joining the Part Time Reserves (and potentially full time or reg forces in the future if it can be financially viable).  20 years ago I had two paths before me, the armed forces or the forestry service.  I chose the forestry service, yet as life seldom works out as we plan it, I didn't end up with a career in that field anyway.   Fast forward to the present, I have a family and a good career as an Electrician, but the call to serve my country and continue to  honour and uphold the commitment of my grandfathers hasn't quieted in my mind or heart.  But the fact remains anything short of a messy divorce will not give the ability to join the regular forces and provide for them as I am now able to do.  Which is where the reserves come in, and how I came to reading this discussion.  God knows I am not looking for another hobby (I have plenty of those and will likely need to make some hard decisions in which to discontinue- including my small business which has been a major factor in placing me where I am now- if I pursue the reserves), but am earnestly looking to do my best to fulfill my duty to my country and my family.  

As it turns out the only reserve unit in my vicinity is an armoured recce unit, the crux of this discussion.  If volunteering to such a unit is of little value, is it worth me making the sacrifices I would need to make in order to do so?  And if so would be joining as an officer be more relevant than as a NCM in the grand scheme of things?  This thread has been interesting, enlightening, and somewhat disheartening.  Any thought would be appreciated.  Thanks.

Gary


----------



## Haggis

Welcome, Gary.

If you haven't done so already, take a trip down to your local Reserve unit.  Talk to the recruiters and ask them to allow you to talk to the troops.  Take some time to observe the training and then decide.

Be warned, though, getting recruited can be a long process.  The process can be accelerated by delivering all your documents on time and completed legibly and fullly.  You are not the only applicant the recruiters will be processing and their efforts will, rightfully, go towards thouse who meet the deliverables.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Where do I draw my ATV? Yee hawwwww.....


Military readies reservists for threats to 'domestic front'



 The Canadian military has embarked on a wide-ranging plan to turn its reserve soldiers into focused units trained and equipped to respond to a nightmarish array of domestic threats, including terrorist “dirty bomb” attacks, biological agent containment, Arctic catastrophes and natural disasters.


The creation of seven units within each region of the country -- including unusual all-terrain vehicle (ATV) squadrons and perimeter security teams to cordon areas of potential devastation -- prepares reserve soldiers for operations on the “domestic front” while freeing regular force soldiers to concentrate on foreign battlefields.


“There is a recognition, certainly within the military and we have heard the government say, that domestic security is the number one priority. A number of these conclusions come from the post-9/11 world we live in,” said Brigadier-General Jean Collin, commander of the army in Ontario, during an exclusive interview with the National Post.


“The reality is an army needs to train, an army needs to equip itself and an army needs to be ready.”


The remodeling of the reserves will see the development of specialist units in four of the military’s regional divisions -- Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and the West. The units will include perimeter security teams prepared to cordon off an area if there was an atomic detonation, nuclear accident or similar source of wide contamination and “Arctic response” groups that are trained and equipped to live and operate in the far north.


The changes highlight both a renewed focus on domestic security and the increased role of reservists, who are part-time volunteer soldiers augmenting the ranks of full-time soldiers, who are referred to as the “regular” forces. The place of reserves in the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan was shown yesterday when one of three soldiers killed by a roadside bomb was a reservist from Ontario.


“Some of the stuff we are now asking the reservists to do is because we need them; because the regular force simply does not have sufficient people, sufficient resources, to do it on their own,” said Brig-Gen. Collin.


“And the reservists have certainly demonstrated that they have the capability to do all this and more.”


Brig-Gen. Collin, who has served in Bosnia and Afghanistan, has also been a special advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff on homeland security issues.


The military divides operations into two broad divisions: away missions, such as the action in Afghanistan, called “expeditionary operations,” and home missions, such as helping with floods in Winnipeg, called “domestic operations.” 


“The lead -- the main contributor -- for expeditionary operation is the regular force. They form the core for expeditionary operations and are augmented by reservists,” said Brig-Gen. Collin.


“What we have now said is that for domestic operations, the core will actually be provided by the reserve force, augmented by the regular force.


The reserves take a dominant role in domestic operations in the future, once they are properly equipped and trained to do so.”


The remodeling of the reserves, ordered at the start of 2009, is expected to take two to three years to complete.


The remodeling will also likely see the reserves play a larger role in domestic security situations, including the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in

Vancouver and the G8 summit of world leaders that has been announced for 2010 at a resort in Huntsville, 220 kilometres north of Toronto, he said.


The national plan places the reserves at the forefront of grim scenarios that are the stuff of apocalyptic Hollywood movies.


“We all know the threat from dirty bombs, chemical contaminants. This is certainly one of the more dangerous situations that can arise,” said Brig.-Gen. Collin.


“You can certainly get it from a terrorist act. You can also get it from a man-made disaster. You can get nuclear contamination from a nuclear power plant -- Three Mile Island, Chernobyl.


“We are training to establish a perimeter. Do I see a scenario when we might be obliged to keep people in? Probably. You need to be trained to be able to make sure that you don’t become a casualty in the process of doing that security.”


The Arctic units -- companies of about 120 people in each region, that can come together as a single force if needed -- poses a challenge of a different sort, primarily training for the harsh conditions of the far north.


“We are going to have up to an entire battalion of soldiers who are prepared to go live and operate in the north and that entire battalion will come from the reserves. We are having them trained now, as we speak, to operate in the north,” said Brig.-Gen. Collin, who himself just returned from a visit to several remote aboriginal communities where he suffered though the deep cold in a military-issue tent.


“It was bloody cold… But you can dress, equip and operate up there if you know what you’re doing,” he said.


Currently, about 120 reservists from southern Ontario are involved in Exercise Polar Warrior, a week of training in Arctic warfare and survival in Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, a First Nations community on Big Trout Lake. To equip the ATV Squadron, the first commercial vehicles are arriving in the coming months. They will not be armed or painted in camouflage and are not intended for combat use. They could be deployed in rural and remote areas to traverse wooded ravines or in an urban setting that has suffered devastation, such as an earthquake or massive explosion.


The plans also call for turning over responsibility for the force’s Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units -- mobile, high-capacity machines for cleaning water to drinkable standards -- to the reserves. The machines have been used abroad, in Sri Lanka helping victims of the 2004 tsunami, and also domestically in Kashechewan, Ont., when the community’s water supply was tainted by E. coli bacteria in 2005.


David Bercuson, director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, said the changes make sense given the current global security situation.


“Reserves are all local and spread out across the country. It seems to me the people best situated to help the first responders would be the

reservists. It makes a lot of sense. Also, the regular force is so stretched and stressed right now,” said Mr. Bercuson.


Mr. Bercuson was surprised to hear, however, of envisioned scenarios that might require a form of constabulary or policing function for reserves in civilian containment and security.


“People in Ottawa sometimes forget that the reserves are volunteers. If you try to change the reserves in ways they don’t want to change, they just might not show up.”

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971


----------



## 1feral1

In some ways is the old Militia National Survival Training from the 1950s and early 60s coming back?

That was a fizzer.

OWDU


----------



## WLSC

I can see good things to give to the reserve operational task.  What can be dangerous his to get back to that big gap between the Reg and the Res.  About 25 years ago, when the decision was made to retrain the reserve for combat, we had lost tank, and even machine gun in the units.

In my unit, we  had only 5 X FNC2 and 1 X GPMG.  Not even enough to equip 1 platoon and even less a coy.  We had even not enough ruck-sac and sleeping bag to equip everybody.  This his the path that I can see comming real fast...for the sake of ''economy of ressource''

We really dont want that...again


----------



## George Wallace

Deja ju.

OWDU and FusMR have expressed legitimate concerns.  The Reserves should be considered for this, but not loose in the process.  The loss of warfighting skills will create a larger training delta between Reg and Reserve than already exists.  Even Prof Bercuson has made some valid points about commitment of volunteer Reservists.  Many Reservists hold civilian jobs and don't have Government support in their taking Leave of Absence from those jobs.

Lack of resources and quantities of compatible equipment to operate with the Regular Forces is currently a problem.  This is a problem, not only overseas, but domestically.  

Civilianizing the equipment that Reservists get issued can lead to problems in the future.  Commercial ATV's not militarized, or even painted with CF colours, is a small point that may lead to serious security problems in an emergency.  It will give the impression to the public that the Reserves are nothing more than AirSofters.   

Over the past year, or two, or three, we have seen many of these grandeous plans, and seen implentation on some fronts; all hamstrung by lack of Treasury Board support and funding.  We have seen the robbing of Peter to pay Paul in order to give the impression to some big wig that things are happening and progress is being made.  It is a Romanov trick.  The turkey dinners are not on every villager's dinner table, but only one that is being moved from household to household through the back doors as the Czar moves through the front doors.  Should he have taken a drumstick, he would have known.  It is time for the CF, as a whole, not just the Reserves to stop reinventing "Transformation" and start "Reconstruction".  This means "Equiping" all Elements to the proper scales, and building a large War Reserve (equipment).


----------



## dapaterson

It means it's time to do a long, hard look:  With 19K reservists in the Army, what is possible?  Plans must be built on that resource base - not a pie-in-the-sky dream of growing to 30K next week.

In fact, it's many less than 19K - take out those not yet qualified, and a slim C2 slice (much less than the bloat we have today) and you're probably looking at a trained strength on the order of 11-12K available.

So what can we expect in terms of skills maintenance from a primarily part-time organization?  A Reserve infantryman, in the time available, cannot maintain the same breadth of skills as their Regular Force counterpart (infantry as an example - it's the same in every trade).  What other abilities are already in the CF that perhaps don't need to be duplicated elsewhere (hint: the Air Reserve already does ROWPU work)?  What areas will require greater depth than can be provided by the Reg F?  What things is the CF still doing that we never use (hint: look for the colour Maroon)?

MilCOTS equipment is a good thing, properly done.  It reduces support costs when we can drop the trucks off at the local dealer, vice maintaining DND/CF capacity that is significantly more expensive.  Properly flag it as CF (matte olive drab paint).  We will not get away from training pools of equipment; giving every location everything they may want is unaffordable and unnecessary.

We do need to be smarter managers, and need to dis-intermediate a lot of our C2 structures - CBGs, at the very least, are, slow, inefficient mailboxes that only serve to redirect and delay communications.  Modern IT should have brought a revolution in streamlined C2 - instead we've moved our old, egocentric, "I'm the top dog so all must flow through me" mentality processes onto computers.


----------



## dapaterson

One more note to add:

There was significant funding given to improve and fix and increase capacity, largely frittered away.  It wasn't a blank cheque - "Fix your bloated structures".  And since a certain MGen refused to do anything but make wild-eyed promises, never built solid plans, and began estimates by saying "We won't touch HQs" we got, frankly, more than we deserved.

If the Army had been willing to modernize the Reserves a decade ago, willing to confront the old farts brigade and say "One hundred soliders is a company - commanded by a major", we'd be much farther ahead.

As long as we argue and fight to maintain succession plans that are not even one deep, LCol positions because "You need a LCol to talk to the mayor", and cap-badges are more important than capability, the Reserves will continue to muddle along.  New plans are slapping a coat of paint over the rust, rather than grinding the rust away, patching, priming, then painting.


----------



## Old Sweat

DAP, Do you feel better now?

I'm not sure the situation is fixable, except by working from the grass roots up.

There have been all sorts of solutions proposed over the years for as long back as I can remember. Remember total force and claiming we could mount a combat ready organization in thirty days, despite all sorts of evidence to the contrary. It must have been possible because a senior general decided it was our policy. 

At least no one has mentioned vital point protection, at least yet. At one stage a couple of decades ago the army was actually talking about tasking a huge number of militia (30,000 comes to mind, but I ain't sure) for vital point protection units. And this was on top of the war tasks to fill out the division for Europe.

To recall it, is to weep.


----------



## WLSC

In my opinion, a fairly good reserve unit, train for war can do most if not all the task of domestic ops.  A cordon his a cordon.  The idea to train unit with specialist role (NBC and other) his not bad, we would see a move of pers between unit because of the prefence of individuals.  I dont quite see why we should have specialize unit for the arctic, we are a northern country and everyone should be able to do this !!

If they keep combat units, NBC unit etc, it might, might work


----------



## dapaterson

Feel better?  Hmm... not really.  But thanks for asking....

Ultimately, part of it is trying to work a cultural shift from being local militias to being the Army's Reserve (to borrow the terms used by another MGen who I have all the time in the world for).

Perhaps step one is to build an Army or CF identity - then go from there.


----------



## WLSC

DAP, you may be wright !  I like the historic sense of the word ''Militia'' but it kind of put it to a ''bunch of armed guy'' level.  Army reserve realign this a little !


----------



## Civvymedic

There are also many Reservists who have obligations in there Civillian jobs that also may require them to act in a domestic Emergency in there Civillian jobs......I.E. Police,EMS, Hydro workers, the list could be long.


----------



## WLSC

Civvymedic said:
			
		

> There are also many Reservists who have obligations in there Civillian jobs that also may require them to act in a domestic Emergency in there Civillian jobs......I.E. Police,EMS, Hydro workers, the list could be long.



That's true.  One option his to specialised a entire unit.  If one unit his vital point protection/NBC management unit and you are a EMS, firemen or police, you can choose a unit


----------



## George Wallace

FusMR said:
			
		

> That's true.  One option his to specialised a entire unit.  If one unit his vital point protection/NBC management unit and you are a EMS, firemen or police, you can choose a unit



Some of that was tried in the past, with certain Reserve Units being tasked as D&S for CMBG HQs.  How long did that last?


----------



## George Wallace

Right now the CF as a whole has a more serious problem: the Training System is broken.  Recruiters are doing their job.  Recruiting is meeting its goals.  Unfortunately, the Training System in the whole of the CF is unable to train people in a timely manner.  It is totally unacceptable to have people waiting up to three years, sometimes longer, to become fully trained in their Trade.


----------



## WLSC

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Some of that was tried in the past, with certain Reserve Units being tasked as D&S for CMBG HQs.  How long did that last?



I dont know, I dont remember having see this    What a do remember his what happen when the decision have been made to give the CIMIC and PSYOPS to reservist.  There was 2 option, to put a CIMIC sub-unit inside an existing unit or to create a temporary unit when need it.  What happen, permanent unit have been create with from what I heard, cap badge in the comming.  So more units...

Give a unit a role.  Tell them you are now a Vital point unit.  But it need to come from NDHQ (ORBAT), not from secteur has a wish.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Right now the CF as a whole has a more serious problem: the Training System is broken.  Recruiters are doing their job.  Recruiting is meeting its goals.  Unfortunately, the Training System in the whole of the CF is unable to train people in a timely manner.  It is totally unacceptable to have people waiting up to three years, sometimes longer, to become fully trained in their Trade.



I dont see why both cant happen in the same time.  Since the reserve his highly employed in the process, a sgt would stay a sgt and still be double tasked.  Even with a new role for ihs home unit.


----------



## dapaterson

One hypothesis tossed around a few years ago was that any domestic response from the ERserves would be by units from outside the local area.  The assumptions were that local units would (1) have members tasked to respond with their civilian jobs and (2) have their pers taking care of themselves and their families.

Of course, being able to move 500 km into another AOR implies a whole other set of potential tasks, and support issues- and the Reserves have traditionally been bad at CSS.


As for the training system: again, we have poor internal comms.  At a recent national meeting of COs, one school announced that they would not be offering a QL3 Franco serial because there was  no demand.  The unit COs from SQFT who stood up and announced their numbers lead to what I'm told is a memorable deer-in-headlights look...


----------



## Hotspur

From the slightly expanded story at National Post.com

http://www.nationalpost.com/related/links/story.html?id=1354437&p=3

NEW RESERVE UNITS

A sweeping plan to remodel the military reserves will create seven new units in four regions across Canada to deal with domestic threats, from terrorists to natural disasters. The change sees part-time, volunteer soldiers training for dark scenarios already envisioned in apocalyptic Hollywood movies:

ATV SQUAD
Estimated size Four squads of 20 vehicles

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE

ARCTIC RESPONSE
New unit Arctic Response Company
Estimated size 600 to 800 personnel

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Estimated size Unknown

CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION TEAMS
Estimated size Four teams of two to five
Nightmare scenario Soldiers and civilians need to work closely together to defeat enemy

ENGINEERS TEAM
New unit Engineers Team Estimated size Unknown 

POTABLE WATER SUPPLY TEAM
Estimated size
Enough personnel to run 22 clean water machines


----------



## McG

MCG said:
			
		

> What if every unit were assigned two roles from the national level: one domestic role and one fole for international operations?


Hmm.  I wonder if someone might have been foreshadowing back in December ….

In any case, here is what we get from the deep thinking at the National Post today:



> NEW RESERVE UNITS
> A sweeping plan to remodel the military reserves will create seven new units in four regions across Canada to deal with domestic threats, from terrorists to natural disasters. The change sees part-time, volunteer soldiers training for dark scenarios already envisioned in apocalyptic Hollywood movies:
> 
> 
> ATV SQUAD       CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE       ARCTIC RESPONSE       PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS       CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION TEAMS       ENGINEERS TEAM       POTABLE WATER SUPPLY TEAM   Estimated size: Four squads of 20 vehicles
> Nightmare scenario: Desperately need to get across rubble of destroyed buildings or heavily wooded ravine
> Movie it suggests: Daylight starring Sylvester Stallone      Estimated size: Unknown
> Nightmare scenario: Cordon off wide area after calamitous contamination strikes
> Movie it suggests: Outbreak starring Dustin Hoffman      New unit: Arctic Response Company
> Estimated size: 600 to 800 personnel
> Nightmare scenario: Airliner crashes in the High Arctic
> Movie it suggests: Alive starring Ethan Hawke      Estimated size: Unknown
> Nightmare scenario Why don't these people realize we're here to help??
> Movie it suggests Operation Dumbo Drop starring Danny Glover      Estimated size: Four teams of two to five
> Nightmare scenario: Soldiers and civilians need to work closely together to defeat enemy
> Movie it suggests: Independence Day starring Will Smith Estimated size Various      New unit: Engineers Team
> Estimated size: Unknown
> Nightmare scenario: Must rebuild crucial bridge lickety-split
> Movie it suggests: Bridge On The River Kwai starring Sir Alec Guinness      Estimated size: Enough personnel to run 22 clean water machines
> Nightmare scenario: Our water is poison!
> Movie it suggests: Batman Begins starring Christian Bale


----------



## medicineman

Something tells me that the white powder on this guy's Special K is not sugar...

MM


----------



## George Wallace

Hotspur said:
			
		

> ATV SQUAD
> Estimated size Four squads of 20 vehicles



Squads?  80 ATVs.  Where?  Range Controls?




			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,



Major centers already have formed their own Chemical/Biological/Nuclear Response Teams.  This is rather redundant, unless they are to augment the CRBN Teams in Trenton as despersal warehouses.



			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE



Part and parcel with the Chemical and Biological answer above.




			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> ARCTIC RESPONSE
> New unit Arctic Response Company
> Estimated size 600 to 800 personnel



600 to 800 pers from where?  The Coy being formed in Yellowknife would be lucky to get 100.  It has been mandated.  Are seven more Coys to be mandated, in locations such as Goose Bay, Dawson, etc.?  Or does this now count all the Rangers in some creative accounting scheme?



			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
> Estimated size Unknown



Has the mandate been signed off by the Minister and Treasury Board?  Where does the Equipment come from?  Where do the Pers come from?




			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION TEAMS
> Estimated size Four teams of two to five
> Nightmare scenario Soldiers and civilians need to work closely together to defeat enemy



CIMIC already exists.  Do we now create positions in every major city that has a Bde for a "Liason Team" to be formed?  Is this not another scheme to create top heavy HQs with too many senior officers?



			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> ENGINEERS TEAM
> New unit Engineers Team Estimated size Unknown



Has the Minister and Treasury Board signed off on this and the resulting requirements for specialized Engineer Equip purchases?  What about Training required for these skills?





			
				Hotspur said:
			
		

> POTABLE WATER SUPPLY TEAM
> Estimated size
> Enough personnel to run 22 clean water machines



22 Clean Water Machines.  From where?  Just like the specialize equipment required for CRBN Response Teams, these are specialized pieces of equipment.  Where does the money to purchase the kit and training come from?

Did Treasury Board just give DND the winning numbers for the next fifteen years of LOTO 649?


----------



## dapaterson

Much of the kit exists and will just be moved from gathering dust and rust in Reg F lines to gather dust and rust in Res F lines.

Other items are already in the capital plan, and when delviered will be diercted to the units tasked to operate them.

Remember, however, that a lot can change - and if we end up not deployed en masse anywhere post 2011, expect to see equipment and tasks repatriated to the Reg F to keep them entertained.


And so the circle of life continues...


----------



## TimBit

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Has the mandate been signed off by the Minister and Treasury Board?  Where does the Equipment come from?  Where do the Pers come from?



PsyOps already exist, got briefed on them way back in 2003. Link on an exercise:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=4511

I know at least one unit that has this role.


----------



## Michael OLeary

I envision Dom Op unit HQs with skeleton staff based on the few pers that other organizations are forced to let go to this new priority manning task.  Unit line serials will be filled _a la_ 10/90 double-hatting.  Large issues of smoke, mirrors and paper will make the appearance of new units, simulated by lots of message traffic between these new HQs and already busy units which will nod and smile as another local HQ sends them orders, instructions and requirements for their troops to get trained to fill their Dom Ops responsibilities.

So, will "Operates an ATV" now be added to IBTS?

(I also predict this thread will be bookmarked by a number of reporters and news researchers.)


----------



## McG

George,

ROWPU -  The National Post indicates that this capability (including already owned equipment) will be cascaded from the regular force.

CB & RN – These would be CBRN, not two separate capabilities as quoted above.  If we really want to stay ahead of the curve, they should probably be CBRNE (where ‘E’ = explosive).  Just like CJIRU, these would be secondary or tertiary responders in a domestic situation.  For deployed international operations the role could be CBRN Recce & support to mass decontamination.

Engrs – I suspect a regiment for every Bde, and more satellite squadrons for the existing regiments.  While great for domestic stuff, this is also important in meeting of force generation requirements for current international operations.


----------



## George Wallace

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> So, will "Operates an ATV" now be added to IBTS?
> 
> (I also predict this thread will be bookmarked by a number of reporters and news researchers.)



IBTS.  You had to bring up that.  IBTS at the expense of all other training.   ARRRRRRGH!


----------



## WLSC

In SQFT, a group was form that include inteligence, CIMIC and PSYOPS.  We lost member to these units.  So, yep, it's real, not a paper invention...


----------



## George Wallace

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Much of the kit exists and will just be moved from gathering dust and rust in Reg F lines to gather dust and rust in Res F lines.
> 
> Other items are already in the capital plan, and when delviered will be diercted to the units tasked to operate them.
> 
> Remember, however, that a lot can change - and if we end up not deployed en masse anywhere post 2011, expect to see equipment and tasks repatriated to the Reg F to keep them entertained.
> 
> 
> And so the circle of life continues...



Yes a lot of this kit exists, and as you say the circle continues......robbing Peter to pay Paul.  I am in a unit that has been mandated two years ago to grow to 120 from 24.  We still only have 24 rifles, one Milcot sans radio installation, and one 8 PAX van.  We are stopping/slowing down our recruiting as we are now at 82 pers.  No signature on the necessary docs giving final authorization to this mandate.  No increase in kit and facilities.  Too many Catch 22's to get our Recruits on BMQ and SQ Courses.  Too many new caveates from LFC, LFCA and the School as to Trades Training and Clearances required.  Slow processing of Clearances required through DPM Secur.   A serious shortage of trained RMS clerks.  And yet another "REORG" coming in 30 days at LFCA Area Troops to OSG or whatever.  This is rediculous.

In all likelihood some units are going to have to give up equipment to newly formed or enlarged units.


----------



## George Wallace

FusMR said:
			
		

> In SQFT, a group was form that include inteligence, CIMIC and PSYOPS.  We lost member to these units.  So, yep, it's real, not a paper invention...



This is the plan to make all Area ORBATS to be exactly the same.  It is real.  It is paper.  Where are the facilities, personnel and equipment?


----------



## WLSC

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is the plan to make all Area ORBATS to be exactly the same.  It is real.  It is paper.  Where are the facilities, personnel and equipment?



From what I know, they are at Longue-Pointe.  They have a CO, BOR and all.  For the equipment and all, surelly a case of Peter rubbing Paul.  But yes, it's up and running since 2/3 years.


----------



## Haggis

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> So, will "Operates an ATV" now be added to IBTS?



No, it's a separate qualification requiring the Canada Safety Council ATV Rider Course.  Then, you'll get "G18" added to your DND 404.


----------



## HItorMiss

Haggis ATV is G18 but that really isn't the point

Look lets call a spade a spade, Reserve units can barely manage a couple of 2 Pl Coys on huge area concentrations does anyone here really think anything this is more then a pipe dream, I sure don`t.

As for a Res CBRN(E) unit why double up on a capacity that already exist within the CF under the Umbrella of CANSOFCOM I don`t see CJIRU wanting people they don't trust playing in their sandbox and  honestly neither would I.


----------



## Haggis

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Haggis ATV is G18 but that really isn't the point



Yeah, you're right.  My bad... a typo.



> Look lets call a spade a spade, Reserve units can barely manage a couple of 2 Pl Coys on huge area concentrations does anyone here really think anything this is more then a pipe dream, I sure don`t.



It's a capacity issue rather than a capability issue.  As noted earlier the CF can recruit until the seams burst.  The training system cannot keep up with demand.  It's not a Reg or Res problem, it's a CF problem.



> As for a Res CBRN(E) unit why double up on a capacity that already exist within the CF under the Umbrella of CANSOFCOM I don`t see CJIRU wanting people they don't trust playing in their sandbox and  honestly neither would I.



If you form a similar Reserve unit (even a PRL), it not only adds capacity but also aids in retaining capability since it gives expensively trained and experienced Reg F members a place to go once they decide to hang up the Reg F career.


----------



## dapaterson

For CBRN, past concepts have had different skill sets in the P Res than in the CJIRU - and not as high maintenance skills.  Complimentary, vice duplicate skillsets.

And some "direction" that has gone out is woefully incomplete, or had dramatic insubordination at its root - unit COs don't go to CLS directly, circumventing their chain of command.  Or at least, they shouldn't... as it makes implementation difficult when the chain of command learns about what happened after the fact and then tries to get engaged, or when proper development work was never done to support the request that circumvented the chain of command, leaving staff to ask fundamental questions as they try to backtrack the intent.  Not that any unit would ever do that, of course...


----------



## HItorMiss

Haggis said:
			
		

> It's a capacity issue rather than a capability issue.  As noted earlier the CF can recruit until the seams burst.  The training system cannot keep up with demand.  It's not a Reg or Res problem, it's a CF problem.



Thats why I say it's a pipe dream overall. Plus institutionaly if you can only get so few numbers to show up for scheduled Ex's how are they going tpo get these new units to have the porper numbers to do anything?


----------



## McG

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> Thats why I say it's a pipe dream overall. Plus institutionaly if you can only get so few numbers to show up for scheduled Ex's how are they going tpo get these new units to have the porper numbers to do anything?


Maybe you re-role units instead of creating new.


----------



## HItorMiss

MCG said:
			
		

> Maybe you re-role units instead of creating new.



And that changes what in terms of manpower


As per my above post when you can barely get a Pl of pers to turn out for an Ex do you really think they will have the manpower turn out for any of this?


----------



## McG

Re-rolling would avoid creating new manpower & infrastructure demands on the reserves (at least to some extent if not entirely), and it would reduce the new equipment demends.

If your question is 'how do we get units to turn out in strenght' then the answer is (as stated several times through the life of this thread) combine multiple regiments under a single unit HQ with a common role.


----------



## the 48th regulator

MCG said:
			
		

> Re-rolling would avoid creating new manpower & infrastructure demands on the reserves (at least to some extent if not entirely), and it would reduce the new equipment demends.
> 
> If your question is 'how do we get units to turn out in strenght' then the answer is (as stated several times through the life of this thread) combine multiple regiments under a single unit HQ with a common role.



Uhm,


Neat idea, but that sure as hell will not bring out the troops.  The average troop could care less about the mechanics of how his fan out is created, and what building his paycheque has been signed.

These new roles are the incentives that will, and our current economic times, bring out the troops.

Mark my word

dileas

tess


----------



## HItorMiss

My point is this.

As a reservist you can't be compeled/ordered to show up for anything you can simply just not show up, you have work or school or studying to do etc etc. I am not slagging the system here it's just how it is.

You can have paper strength of 600 but only 50 show up for parade what is the point?


Tess: It might at first because it sound much more glamarious then it really is. In the end the situation will revert to the current status quo. And when it comes to such task as CBRN that status quo is simply unacceptable IMO.


----------



## dapaterson

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> Neat idea, but that sure as hell will not bring out the troops.  The average troop could care less about the mechanics of how his fan out is created, and what building his paycheque has been signed.



Exactly why s**t-canning HQs will have no impact (despite the claims of some) and instead free up funds for more, better training.  Scaling back to, oh, 7 Bde HQs (with limited deployability), each with say seven subordinate units (all in multiple locations) would free up a lot of funds - and maintain the current footprint - or maybe even expand it.


----------



## WLSC

The issue of strenght his a difficult one.  Each unit from a region/city parade a a different strenght.  More the unit his isolated, more difficult it is to have a big unit.

Re-role wont remove the root problem but solve some other.


----------



## WLSC

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Exactly why s**t-canning HQs will have no impact (despite the claims of some) and instead free up funds for more, better training.  Scaling back to, oh, 7 Bde HQs (with limited deployability), each with say seven subordinate units (all in multiple locations) would free up a lot of funds - and maintain the current footprint - or maybe even expand it.



That would work.  And you might re-role so specialities would be spread over the country.


----------



## the 48th regulator

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Exactly why s**t-canning HQs will have no impact (despite the claims of some) and instead free up funds for more, better training.  Scaling back to, oh, 7 Bde HQs (with limited deployability), each with say seven subordinate units (all in multiple locations) would free up a lot of funds - and maintain the current footprint - or maybe even expand it.



Right, 

And you are reducing the manning level of the higher ranks.  With no incentive to move forward in rank and position, what would make me want to even bother taking any courses.  What would even make want to do any advancement, with the reserves?

Seems to me, we would rather dumb down the reserves, and eliminate many senior people, to free up a budget. A budget I see disappearing from the reserves, who would have less of a senior rank and file to fight for it.  Chia, that would really make the reserves come out... :

I say, go in the direction of the Past, enact a combined regimental unit (Similar to MCG's plan), _and then_ deploy them operationally.  Manned from top to bottom with reservists.  I am sure we have had enough in every position, or close there to to be able to do that, that have operational experience to help out.

This will infuse more experience within the rank and file.  This will be the incentive for people to go want to parade.  Knowing that they are a valuable part of themilitary, that does not have to "supplement" their big brothers of the reg force by being part of their bat tallions.

Make the reserves a valuable, visibly valuable, part of the Canadian Military.  

BM,

I hear ya bro.  But I can bet you my bottom dollar, our economic situation in the world will beef up the ranks.  It happened in the early '90s.

dileas

tess


----------



## McG

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> Neat idea, but that sure as hell will not bring out the troops.  The average troop could care less about the mechanics of how his fan out is created, and what building his paycheque has been signed.


It [multi-regimental battalions] would not bring out more troops, but it would leave remaining units with a larger pool of the troops that come out.


----------



## the 48th regulator

So one full strenghth reserve unit.

Hmm, may work out, now I see what you mean.  So instead of brigades, we change the name to regiment, and problem solved...

ATTENTION THIS IS NOT A FACETIOUS STATEMENT

In fact, we should look at the complete military as a whole.  Do we really need three undermanned regular force battallions for each regiment?  I can see more budget being freed as well there.

dileas

tess


----------



## WLSC

MCG said:
			
		

> It [multi-regimental battalions] would not bring out more troops, but it would leave remaining units with a larger pool of the troops that come out.



I like that very much.  I would go up to ammalgamation.  Not a easy one to sell, I know


----------



## WLSC

From a Montreal persperctive, were most of the unit are concentrated on the island, you could keep the brig HQ and do 3 bn with the 7 units I count the 2 outside Mtl).  Would not put more troups on the ground but would makea more logic ballance.

If you wish to re-role, well then, you have 7 units to play with.


----------



## Michael OLeary

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> My point is this.
> 
> As a reservist you can't be compeled/ordered to show up for anything you can simply just not show up, you have work or school or studying to do etc etc. I am not slagging the system here it's just how it is.
> 
> You can have paper strength of 600 but only 50 show up for parade what is the point?



For someone who is claiming not to be "slagging", you're not providing any input other than reiterating what everyone here knows are limitations of Reserve service and employment.  How about offering something useful.


----------



## dapaterson

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> So one full strenghth reserve unit.
> 
> Hmm, may work out, now I see what you mean.  So instead of brigades, we change the name to regiment, and problem solved...
> 
> ATTENTION THIS IS NOT A FACETIOUS STATEMENT
> 
> In fact, we should look at the complete military as a whole.  Do we really need three undermanned regular force battallions for each regiment?  I can see more budget being freed as well there.
> 
> dileas
> 
> tess



Not arguing the point.  If we can have multiple cap-badges in a Bde, why not in a Bn?

On the Reg F side:  The rule of 9 is suspect logic, driven by the desire for a multiple of three regts, all being equal.  My solution is to remove 2 R22eR, take the positions and spread them among the other 8 Bns.  Then rebadge 2 RCR and 2 PPCLI to 1 and 3 RHC (The Black Watch).  Then, while all that hub-bub is going on, create a few regional regiments in the Reserves, where the cap-badges stay, but at the Coy level.


And re: Cutting senior positions in the Reserves.  If we could get a ratio of 1 LCol to every 100 trained soldiers in the Reserves I'd be ecstatic.  (I'm talking parade strengths, not paper strengths).  Right now, we're closer to half that ratio.  So don't feed me bumph that we need all those senior spots for aspirational reasons - let's crank down a bit and push the cream to rise to the top, vice having the last man standing step into the chair.  The number of units that routinely parade more than 200 soldiers (trained or untrained) can be counted on one hand.


----------



## the 48th regulator

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Not arguing the point.  If we can have multiple cap-badges in a Bde, why not in a Bn?
> 
> On the Reg F side:  The rule of 9 is suspect logic, driven by the desire for a multiple of three regts, all being equal.  My solution is to remove 2 R22eR, take the positions and spread them among the other 8 Bns.  Then rebadge 2 RCR and 2 PPCLI to 1 and 3 RHC (The Black Watch).  Then, while all that hub-bub is going on, create a few regional regiments in the Reserves, where the cap-badges stay, but at the Coy level.
> 
> 
> And re: Cutting senior positions in the Reserves.  If we could get a ratio of 1 LCol to every 100 trained soldiers in the Reserves I'd be ecstatic.  (I'm talking parade strengths, not paper strengths).  Right now, we're closer to half that ratio.  So don't feed me bumph that we need all those senior spots for aspirational reasons - let's crank down a bit and push the cream to rise to the top, vice having the last man standing step into the chair.  The number of units that routinely parade more than 200 soldiers (trained or untrained) can be counted on one hand.





My point is,

The bumph you are promoting, is counter productive to retention.

You want to a) eliminate people from the military and b) allow for those that are in no goals to acheive.  Why not offer a solution that promotes the recruitment of soldiers, as opposed to getting rid of people and drive to acheive? 

I know this idea is an old one, but a 10/90 battallion /Regiments might be the key? Or more so 50/50 unit, that has the capabillity to be thrown into the tour rotation, and be able to give the break to other regular force units.

Really, changing names and staffing, is a good idea, but not angle we are needing to promote recruitment and retention within the reserves.

dileas

tess


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

What career asprirations are closed for reservists by amalgamation? There will still be COs and RSMs. There would be less of them, but they would have much larger commands. It would also slow down progression to a point where Captains/Majors can spend some time at lower levels instead of being sucked into the vacuum.

I started out in a Reserve Regiment that had an RHQ, two Sabre Squadrons and a HQ Squadron. My Troop, however, consisted of six people that parade and six who were NES from before I had them. A couple of years later we combined the squadrons into one element and the training experience was much better. My Troop was twelve guys who showed up for everything, and the Sqn had an echelon. 

You could have taken that process further to the other Armoured Regiments in the Area and come up with a Recce Regiment. That CO and RSM would have some 600 personnel under them. That would be a real command.


----------



## the 48th regulator

My point is a biased one, I will admit.

We are all arguing for the same goal.

However, it is too quick to say, amalgamante the reserves.  As I pointed it out, lead by example and start with the military as a whole.  Cut, slash, and merge everything.  I will use the infantry as an example, as this is what I know;

Create 3 completely fully manned, Regular Force Battallions.
Create 3 50/50 Battalions
Amalgamate, or merge reserve units.  To maintain local military foot prints.

How would this work for everyone?

dileas

tess


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The nine Regular Force infantry battalions are smaller than they were circa 1989, but they are still much much larger than a reserve battalion. If Reserve Regiments were all parading 500 effective soldiers I would say keep them as they are in term of COs/RSMs. Otherwise, streamline the overhead to get better quality across the board.


----------



## dapaterson

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> My point is,
> 
> The bumph you are promoting, is counter productive to retention.
> 
> You want to a) eliminate people from the military and b) allow for those that are in no goals to acheive.  Why not offer a solution that promotes the recruitment of soldiers, as opposed to getting rid of people and drive to acheive?



No goals?  Please.  With my 1:100 LCol ratio there would still be 140 LCol positions to aspire to.  Which would be meaningful command roles with more than one understrength sub-unit.  If we use 3:1, that's 420 Majors, and 1200+ Capt/Lts.  Then we could build a proper NCM corps with the extra positions and funds.

Right now recruiting is not a problem.  I say again, recruiting is not a problem - the Army Reserve is at or slightly above its target strength.



> I know this idea is an old one, but a 10/90 battallion /Regiments might be the key? Or more so 50/50 unit, that has the capabillity to be thrown into the tour rotation, and be able to give the break to other regular force units.



Until there is a political will to mobilize and oblige Reservists to serve (and there isn't) that is a non-starter, unless we build 50:150 units - half Reg F, and 3x the number of Reservists, hoping we can find 1 of 3 people willingand able to volunteer.  But it could be an option writ larger (though drawing down all units in one location degrades yor response capability in the event of a national disaster).  But still a concept worth exploring further.



> Really, changing names and staffing, is a good idea, but not angle we are needing to promote recruitment and retention within the reserves.



Breaking old mindsets and freeing up considerable training dollars needed to make Col Blimps to instead build clicked-on Sgts and WOs strikes me as a very worthwhile effort.  Without capable Jr leaders on the floor we've got nothing.


----------



## the 48th regulator

Tango2Bravo and dapaterson ,

Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.

I am sure you would come up with a bigger bag of gold coins than nit picking at the reserves.  Maybe I am losing the focus of the goals in our thread.

AS for the 50/50 concept, it exists right now.  It may not be that percentage, however how long is a reservist away from home?  I am talking about the time he lands on the ground to start the pretraining, until he comes home in clean clothes and is restocking the shelves of Sobey's?  is that not over a year?  Does that not in essence make him a full time reservist, as in the concept I broached?

Is the priority to find more money, or Gather all the sheep under one to make the crowd look like a bigger reserve military?
If we do anything, it must be a complete restructure of the Military, not bits and pieces.

dileas

tess


----------



## WLSC

> Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.



Do you meen that you CO's and RSM's were full time...???  If yes, I thing we should compare things.  I see graet diddiculties to have a cummon idea when the basis of the discution might be off.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I am _not_ talking about saving salary money, nor about cutting people. I am talking about amalgamation of units to have realistic spans of control for a CO/RSM and their staff. This would let people spend more time in platoons and companies instead of racing upwards to fill succession plans. A Reserve unit with twelve officers parading would still have twelve officers, except that there wouldn't be a CO/DCO among them. They could still aspire to be a CO/DCO, and coming a little later in their reserve career (and having less) we wouldn't then have to wonder what to do with them after unit command. There could also be training efficiencies when you pool those resources under one CO.


----------



## dapaterson

Of course any change must be Army (and preferably CF) wide.  But the savings would be more than just 6 LCols & CWOs - the numbers are well out of whack nation wide.  And it's also a top down sign that change is coming.

And T2B:  Exactly!


----------



## Old Sweat

I fear we are going nowhwere fast, and are having a blast going over old ground. Now, the dilemma as I see it is that we have a militia structure that first developed at the time of the Crimean War. It eventually morphed post Boer War into a structure designed to support the mobilization of an expeditionary force for a general war in Europe as part of a larger British army. Looking at militia lists of a century ago and you will see militia brigades under a regional command structure, but these were not designed to be mobilized, unlike the US national guard and the British territorial army. All the major reorgnizations of the militia did not meddle with this basic premise.

We fought the two major wars of the last century and built up the army for Korea and NATO using this structure, and while the situation has changed, the militia organization and layout has not. We are now faced with the requirement to support forces fighting on civilization's frontiers on a more or less continual basis, if the experience of the last two decades is any indication. But I suggest much of our thinking and structure is based on supporting an expeditionary force mobilized for a specific threat and a relatively short period of time.

So what, as the DS say at staff college? How do the reserves contribute most effectively to this, while still maintaining their cohesion and ties to their local communities?  

Whatever else we do, to even consider eliminating regular force battalions or regiments is not the way to go. It is a lot easier to increase the size of an existing unit with its own corporate identity and culture than it is to start from scratch.


----------



## the 48th regulator

The example of Co and RSM goes back to my argument of revitalizing the regular force regiments.

They do collect a salary, as a regular force personnel.  Now if the argument is to save money, just by using those six people, how much do we save?  And by doing so, how much more effective would a fully manned regular force regiment be, as opposed to a regiment staffed by 3 undermanned battalions?

I have been swayed by the argument of merging reserve units, however some of the arguments are weak.  Meaning that, unless you want to do this across the board, I just see it as this modern sway where people see no use for a historical regimented unit.

It is easy to point to the guy wearing the red pom pom on a funny hat, but the military as a whole is guilty of creating position, to maintain retention of numbers.

dileas

tess


----------



## dapaterson

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> So what, as the DS say at staff college? How do the reserves contribute most effectively to this, while still maintaining their cohesion and ties to their local communities?
> 
> Whatever else we do, to even consider eliminating regular force battalions or regiments is not the way to go. It is a lot easier to increase the size of an existing unit with its own corporate identity and culture than it is to start from scratch.



If I may (slightly) disagree:  we need to take a holistic CF view of what we requrie, then determine what parts of that vest best in the Reg F, and what parts vest best in the Res F. That must be cap-badge agnostic; if we decide we need two STA regiments, one rocket regiment, and three field artillery regiments, but only seven infantry battalions, so be it.  We can't afford to keep everything "because we may need it sometime."  By that logic we should have kept the veterinary corps following WWII - since we now use some donkeys in Afghanistan.

An honest assessment must figure out what end-state we want, then put everything on the table, warts and all, and figure out a roadmap from here to there.  The various Reserve Restructures never did that, and "CF Transformation" never transformed anything - it just grew new things.

Massive organizational change is very hard - but mission failure becuase of a failure to change is even worse.


Tess:  I've never called to eliminate the funny red pom-poms.  Do what they did with the London Regiment in the UK - all the component companies perpetuate the lineage of the former independant units and retain their accoutrements.

The problem isn't one unit - one or two folks here or there in the Reserves are inexpensive.  But a large group of inexpensive adds up.  Everyone knows it's a  model that isn't working.  But no one has the moral courage to stand up and say "This needs to be fixed - and I'll go first.".

So instead, we muddle along... how many pages on this thread already?


----------



## the 48th regulator

dapaterson,

Very true Very True.

But, to sum up my point, we do an overhaul of everything, and go forward.  Starting witht he Regular force, then moving down to the local reserve units.

dileas

tess


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I'll tell you all something right from the coal face. It's where I live. Let's use SW Ontario as an example. Amalgamate units and you're going to lose a lot of people. Including Officers and Snr NCOs. Go ahead and use the axiom that those people weren't worth keeping anyway, which is bullshit, but go ahead. The loss would be bad enough if you took the guidon & badge from one and made them go under another. Then the CO & RSM would have control over say, 3 Sqns, but have to travel all over SW Ontario, three different locations, to show themselves to everyone. You're not talking young piss and vinegar types with families. You're talking old dog eared types that are retired and can afford the time and travel.

So the other option is to keep the units at home but form all the garrison into a single unit. Infantry, Armoured, Svc Btn all one unit. You'll lose even more pers and be no better off than when you stated except instead of having three 100 man units doing different roles, that you can draw on, you'll have one 150 man unit with everyone pissing on each other. Higher up will be jockying for position and the others will see it and follow suit. Unit loyalties will win out.

It'll take years to make a cohesive outfit from this type of mishmash. It ain't pretty and it doesn't fit your pretty little cookie cutter designs, but it's a big elephant in the room that you can't ignore. It also has the largest capability of sewering any plans for roling in units and making your newest Mo experiment work.

Reservists are a fickle bunch and you have to understand how to sell them on the plan, because they are not a bunch of morons without any other means of employment or fall back. Most do it because they like it, not because they need a job. Fuck with what they like and don't offer a better alternative, they'll vote with their feet.


Whatever is planned, there better be a lot of buy in, consideration, and consultation. Show up and tell them they are all part of the 51st Dog Sled Mushers, here's your new badge, and you've lost before you even start.

Make all the grandiose plans you wish, but if you don't include or get inclusion from, that young troop on the floor, you've simply lost the best asset you ever had.

But hey, what do I know. Just tossing out random thoughts.


----------



## the 48th regulator

eff me.

That was what I wanted to say, but I just blathered on.

Thank you RC.

Plus one on that post.

dileas

tess


----------



## George Wallace

Amalgamation is a very short term and short sighted fix.  In a few years, the amalgamated units will have dropped in numbers, just as current units have seen.   Many of the reasons for this have already been stated by recceguy and others. 

Recruiting in the Reserves and the CF is cyclic.  The thing that isn't cyclic, is funding.  When Unit strengths decrease, so does funding.  When they again increase in strength, funding does not.  This becomes a morale issue and Units loose people.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Can anyone come up with specific instances of past amalgamations being marked by mass releases of Reserve soldiers?

Also, can anyone confirm how many Reservists released directly as a result of the rerolling of the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish or The Elgin Regiment?

I believe that many Reservists join because they want to serve (more so than that they want to serve only as _"insert trade here"_), and the choice of units and trades is often based on local unit availability.  I'm an not certain that mass releases is much more than a perpetuated myth to warn politicians of the hazards of not protesting against the amalgamation of units in their constituencies.

I will be quite happy to reconsider that opinion on provision of hard data.


----------



## tango22a

recceguy:

BRAVO ZULU!!!

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

Michael

If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Michael
> 
> If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?



Are you blaming all loses of positions in the Reserves on past amalgamations?

Don't you think there may be other factors at play over the past few decades?

Can't total position numbers be protected and still allow amalgamations?


----------



## dapaterson

For the past 5+ years there's been a single CO commanding the Res Svc Bns in Winnipeg and Regina.  Units are doing as well as the other CBG units.  We moved to a single Res Engr unit in each CBG (less 38 CBG) - so now there's a CO commanding Trail, Chilliwack and North Vancouver.  It's working.  It's happening now with the Svc Bns in LFCA - one Svc Bn per CBG AOR, with multiple locations (less Toronto).  So are CSS types and Engineers inherently more capable than the other combat arms?  Much as I'd like to say yes, they're not.  If it works with REMFs and sappers, it can work elsewhere.


Yes - there has to be buy in.  There were millions pissed away or lost under LFRR that could have been very effective carrots and sticks to enable such transformations - "Hey!  More money!  Better tasks! And one or two less senior officers around."  We let that opportunity go by.  So now it may be more difficult.


One thing that has not been discussed:  the need to get more people employed extra-regimentally earlier in their careers.  When your first employment outside the unit lines is post RSM/post-command it's too late.  (And summer training does not count - it needs to be for a normal tour of 2-3 years).  Broadening minds, giving people exposure the the wider Army around them is a good thing, and helps break down some of the asinine internal barriers that exist (and maybe a few Guardsmen would learn proper drill  > ).  A broader base of experiecne and knowledge is a sine qua non to be an effective leader - but when all you've ever known is the Buckshot Fusiliers, how can you effectively command 94th CBG?


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Michael
> 
> If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?



I used to be the LFC HQ guy tracking the Reserve attendance.  The numbers parading increased from 1998-2008.  La nombre de personnel qui se presente pour la formation est superieure maintenant qu'en 1998.  (In both official languages - don't know how much clearer I can make it)

We have yet to fully define what we want - unit establishments are no indication of that.  The Army Reserve establishment is larger than the target strength (and over the CFP 219 limits, but that's another issue).  It's a cookie cutter, all units the same approach to keep the hounds at bay - "Everyone is equal".  Rather than reinforcing success, we drag all units down to a common denominator.

Keeping what we have because we always had it would mean we re-role the Ont R to a mounted unit, horses and all.  Goodbye C7, hello Ross Rifle.  We moved on from those.  We need to change our structures as well.  And dragging a long tail of LCols who've only ever commanded rump companies who trot out, consuming oxygen and rations and funding for little/nothing in return does nothing to build institutional credibility.

The Reserves are capable.  But most leadership above Capt / WO is suspect at best.  Improve the conditions for their development and selection and that will in time generate higher quality leaders.


Or, one simple question:  Is there a Sir Arthur Currie in the Reserve Army today?  I don't think so.



(Though maybe we'll know once the mess audits are done...)


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Also, can anyone confirm how many Reservists released directly as a result of the rerolling of the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish or The Elgin Regiment?



Go back to what I said Michael. It'll work if you have a better alternative and buy in from the floor. The Elgins would have never survived the switch if it had been forced, without thought for the men. They were given an option and the reasoning and explanation was solid, forthcoming and properly explained. They were also given ownership. It became their project. They also held on to a large part of their hierarchy and history. Which is everything I stated. I can't speak for the L&R.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

dapaterson said:
			
		

> One thing that has not been discussed:  the need to get more people employed extra-regimentally earlier in their careers.  When your first employment outside the unit lines is post RSM/post-command it's too late.  (And summer training does not count - it needs to be for a normal tour of 2-3 years).  Broadening minds, giving people exposure the the wider Army around them is a good thing, and helps break down some of the asinine internal barriers that exist (and maybe a few Guardsmen would learn proper drill  > ).  A broader base of experiecne and knowledge is a sine qua non to be an effective leader - but when all you've ever known is the Buckshot Fusiliers, how can you effectively command 94th CBG?



Great, a whole new bunch of Cl B Bumbles that want the military for a career but won't go Reg. A klarge swath of Reservists are already doing just that. Moving around the country backfilling Reg positions. Pretty soo Cl A Reservists will only constitute 1/4 of the Reserves with your plan ;D



> But most leadership above Capt / WO is suspect at best



Good thing for you I'm still a WO


----------



## tango22a

DA Paterson:

Suppose X number of Officers and WOs were posted to the reserve regiments (and I don't mean SCRAP that can't hack it or are deemed surplus at their home Regts or Batts) sort of a Super RSS?  It would re-inforce the RegF need to control the PRes and eventually the Pres would wither away and die...."oh goody we finally got rid of those Weekend Warrors!!!" But wait, because there are no more PRes then  the funding levels WILL drop!.

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Are you blaming all loses of positions in the Reserves on past amalgamations?
> 
> Don't you think there may be other factors at play over the past few decades?
> 
> Can't total position numbers be protected and still allow amalgamations?



I guess you aren't getting what I am trying to say.  In the past we have seen large numbers in our Militia Regiments.  As numbers fell in the 1970s, they did away with some of their outlying Rural Sqns and Coys.  Come to the present, their numbers are once again down, and there is talk of amalgamation to solve the numbers problem.  Where will we be in the future (not the near future) when the numbers drop again?  

A totally different question:  Is there the potential of reversing amalgamation further down the road if numbers rise drastically.........should there be funding to do so?


----------



## Monsoon

Just an unsolicited observation from a NAVRES guy: the Naval Reserve seems to have managed alright having different people of different trades working together. The units are fewer and further apart, but we've had no difficulty keeping things rolling. Our numbers are fewer, but I imagine the number of people to whom it would occur to join NAVRES is substantially smaller than the number of people that would consider the militia.

And our COs and Coxswains (that's RSMs to you fellas): LCdrs and PO1. Promotions are made based on a national merit list much like the reg force. It causes headaches of its own, but it's far better than waving a wand to turn a 35-year-old into a CWO so he can be an RSM of a unit of 100 people. Almost all of the meaningful training and employment happens outside of the units - again, this causes problems of it's own, but the organization exists for reasons other than the proper manning of the class A establishment. If the senior guy around is a Lt(N), then he's the CO - it's happened (for brief periods) and it ain't the end of the world. And the Cooks, Communicators, NCIOPs, Boatswains, Divers, etc don't "get in each other's way" - it works surprisingly well.

To my mind the militia could do worse than to reorganize itself into garrisons and drop the position-based ranks. God knows it's big enough that it could carry it off more easily than NAVRES.

I shall now back away slowly.


----------



## tango22a

Michael O'Leary:

IF an attempt is made to IMPOSE the "Snakes-And-Ladders" on the PRes than I am sure more people will leave just like when it was tried in the 60's.

It may surprise you that when I joined, I CHOSE my Regiment because I wanted to be an ARMOURED soldier.

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

hamiltongs

I don't think you can legitimately compare the NAVRES with the PRes, as you can not compare the Navy to the Army, when you look at their organizations and functions.


----------



## Monsoon

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I don't think you can legitimately compare the NAVRES with the PRes, as you can not compare the Navy to the Army, when you look at their organizations and functions.



Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.


----------



## George Wallace

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.



Not all CO's are LCols.  It depends on the type of Unit.  There are units that have Majors as their CO's.  

At the same time there are some Units that have CO's who are Regular Force.


----------



## the 48th regulator

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.



Numbers maybe....

dileas

tess


----------



## Monsoon

I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.


----------



## davidk

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.



51st Svc Bn has an LCol - but he was a major in the fall, and still CO. If I remember correctly, 34 CER is made up of the old 3 Fld Eng Reg't and 9 Fld Eng Sqn in Rouyn-Noranda. I remember hearing something about them sharing a CO - may have already happened, may be in the works, not entirely sure.


----------



## Brad Sallows

If the point is to simply down-rank the senior members one level, not much money will be saved.  If the point is to eliminate their positions entirely, some money will be saved.

If realistic rank levels are desired, a 100+ person organization doesn't need more than a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and MWO in the command group.  Cutting two levels from the status quo will necessitate a very healthy up and out (to supernumery or other positions for the competent and deserving) flow and ensure the candidate pool for command group members is broad.

A complementary across-the-board cut at the Res CBG level would serve well, also.  LCol comd, CWO Bde RSM, Maj G3 (Bde Maj), everyone else Capt or under.


----------



## George Wallace

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> If realistic rank levels are desired, a 100+ person organization doesn't need more than a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and MWO in the command group.  Cutting two levels from the status quo will necessitate a very healthy up and out (to supernumery or other positions for the competent and deserving) flow and ensure the candidate pool for command group members is broad.



Realistically remembering my time, every Sqn I have been in, in the RCD, has numbered just over 100 pers, and was commanded by a Major, with a SSM holding the rank of MWO.  2 i/c and Battle Capt were both Captains.  Troop Leaders were Lt or Capt in the majority of cases.  I am sure that other Reg Force Cbt Arms had similar examples.

Right now my Acting CO is a Capt, but the position is a Major's.


----------



## the 48th regulator

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.



So to clarify,

You suggest the PRes, go with a national merit board, with regards to rank and position, simmilar to that of the the naval reserve.

You know when I meant numbers, I was talking overall, not individual units.

But, before I comment further, I just want to make sure I am reding you right.

dileas

tess


----------



## McG

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> In fact, we should look at the complete military as a whole.  Do we really need three undermanned regular force battallions for each regiment?  I can see more budget being freed as well there.





			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> However, it is too quick to say, amalgamante the reserves.  As I pointed it out, lead by example and start with the military as a whole.  Cut, slash, and merge everything.





			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.
> 
> I am sure you would come up with a bigger bag of gold coins than nit picking at the reserves.  Maybe I am losing the focus of the goals in our thread.
> 
> ...
> 
> Is the priority to find more money, or Gather all the sheep under one to make the crowd look like a bigger reserve military?  If we do anything, it must be a complete restructure of the Military, not bits and pieces.





			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> But, to sum up my point, we do an overhaul of everything, and go forward.  Starting witht he Regular force, then moving down to the local reserve units.


Tess,
1.  The goal is a more effective & capable reserve force.  Money savings (if any) would be small & not part of the objective.  Therefore, searching for cost savings in other parts of the CF is a red herring & distraction from the real discussion.
2.  The _compress the regular force structure_ discussion is alive and well in other threads.  Try taking it here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html
3.  Improvements to the reserve structure & improvements to the regular force structure are not mutually exclusive.  Suggesting that nothing can happen to the reserves until it has happened to the regular force is a farce.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Amalgamation is a very short term and short sighted fix.  In a few years, the amalgamated units will have dropped in numbers, just as current units have seen.   Many of the reasons for this have already been stated by recceguy and others.
> 
> Recruiting in the Reserves and the CF is cyclic.  The thing that isn't cyclic, is funding.  When Unit strengths decrease, so does funding.  When they again increase in strength, funding does not.  This becomes a morale issue and Units loose people.





			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Michael
> 
> If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?





			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> In the past we have seen large numbers in our Militia Regiments.  As numbers fell in the 1970s, they did away with some of their outlying Rural Sqns and Coys.  Come to the present, their numbers are once again down, and there is talk of amalgamation to solve the numbers problem.  Where will we be in the future (not the near future) when the numbers drop again?
> 
> A totally different question:  Is there the potential of reversing amalgamation further down the road if numbers rise drastically.........should there be funding to do so?


In following this thread, it has often been presented that reserve numbers are (for the most part) not a problem of recruiting or retention.  As a collective whole, the reserve force is hitting its manning ceiling.  If the manning ceiling needs to be raised, that can be done as part of a coherent restructure.  However, if he CF has the manning ceiling right (or as good as it's going to get with available funding) then our structure should intelligently match that personnel size limit.  Currently, it does not.

At the same time, you are correct that any reduction of units to to match the authorized manning levels should be done with an understanding of the growth mechanism should the day come that it is required/possible.



			
				recceguy said:
			
		

> Whatever is planned, there better be a lot of buy in, consideration, and consultation.


Absolutely.  However (and despite not fully knowing the plan which prompted the article on the new roles), I think buy-in should be possible .... especially if units which must re-role are given some flexibility in selecting that new role from what capabilities need to be established.

If reducing the number of units & establishing multi-regimental battalions is part of the plan, I also think this can be sold to reservists.  In fact, this is exactly the type of change I wanted to see while I was in the reserves.  

That being said, if a unit provides a role which is not required by the Army then that unit must accept a new role.  Some people may quite because they can no longer be MOSID X.  Some of these people might have been outstanding NCO or officers.  Their loss will be unfortunate, but in the end the reserve force does not exist for the entertainment of its members.  Reserve units must be relevant to the CF.


----------



## the 48th regulator

MCG said:
			
		

> Tess,
> 1.  The goal is a more effective & capable reserve force.  Money savings (if any) would be small & not part of the objective.  Therefore, searching for cost savings in other parts of the CF is a red herring & distraction from the real discussion.





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Re-rolling would avoid creating new manpower & infrastructure demands on the reserves (at least to some extent if not entirely), and it would reduce the new equipment demends.
> 
> If your question is 'how do we get units to turn out in strenght' then the answer is (as stated several times through the life of this thread) combine multiple regiments under a single unit HQ with a common role.



So your idea is to reduce the senior staff as they demand manpower and infrastructure demands.
By doing this, we will increase the number of troops on the ground.  

An effective plan, to say the least.  As Recceguy stated, and when I started chiming here, unless you give a reason for them to show up, people would rather go to the local chess club.  Eliminating a few senior positions, is not going retain people.  Are you then willing to eliminate a bulk of soldiers, and rebuild the entire reserve system?  My comparison to the Regular force structure, _was_, if we are not going to take this action with undermanned regular force units, why would we attempt to do this with the reserves?



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> 2.  The _compress the regular force structure_ discussion is alive and well in other threads.  Try taking it here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html



So what you are saying, the two have nothing in common, and since it is distracting your goal here, I should take my thoughts elsewhere…nice.  I think I stated my reason for bringing up the Regular force structure.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> 3.  Improvements to the reserve structure & improvements to the regular force structure are not mutually exclusive.  Suggesting that nothing can happen to the reserves until it has happened to the regular force is a farce.



Why.  


I will tell you why I believe that is a statement I can not agree on.

Because the two go hand in hand.

We man all of these fanciful regular force battalions, all undermanned, and then supplement with a hodge podge of reservists that volunteer to go.  All of it a random lottery on who puts their name in, and how fast the Regular force unit can get them up to speed, in the sense of gelling with the rest of the Battalion.  Reserve regiments scramble, and then are left weakened because elements of their experienced members are gone, supplemented to another unit.

You want to create amalgamated units, reducing the senior staff, but all you are doing is gathering all the troops under one roof.  Create a regular force structure that is self sufficient, and they will not interfere with the training and reserve for missions.  If you want to have reservists that want to go operational, you do one of two things.  Create a concept, where your amalgamated units are thrown into the rotations of tours, or ask the individual reservist to then make a choice, regular or reserve.

You wnat to make them relevent, then proceed to integrate what the future plan is for them.  As I said, cutting/slashing/merging is not the end all and be all.  

So, before you give me the back handed swipe and tell me to trundle along, lay out a plan that is overall more effective, and present it properly. Using a fancy phrase like rollover to answer every post, just does not cut it.


dileas

tess


----------



## tango22a

MCG:

Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!" 

tango22a


----------



## McG

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> So your idea is to reduce the senior staff as they demand manpower and infrastructure demands.
> By doing this, we will increase the number of troops on the ground.


Absolutely not.  My idea is to ensure that every Section Commander has a full Section, every Pl Comd has a full Pl, each OC has a full sub-unit, and each CO has a full unit ... and at each level the full headquarters complement also exists (which is not there in the skeletal unit & sub-unit HQs today).



			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> ... unless you give a reason for them to show up, people would rather go to the local chess club.  Eliminating a few senior positions, is not going retain people.


I have not suggested that creating more fully sized battalions is supposed to be a mechanism to improve retention.  It is to improve capability & improve training.



			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> Create a regular force structure that is self sufficient, and they will not interfere with the training and reserve for missions.  If you want to have reservists that want to go operational, you do one of two things.  Create a concept, where your amalgamated units are thrown into the rotations of tours, or ask the individual reservist to then make a choice, regular or reserve.


The regular force interferes with the training of reserves for missions?!  If I understand you right, you are suggesting that formed reserve units should be part of the tour rotation (unlikely as a realistic/feasible option), or they should be divorced from operations (in which case the reserves becomes irrelevant)?



			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> So what you are saying, the two have nothing in common, and since it is distracting your goal here, I should take my thoughts elsewhere…nice.  I think I stated my reason for bringing up the Regular force structure.
> 
> ...
> 
> Because the two go hand in hand.


Yes, the two structures should be complimentary.  However, you are trying to deflect suggestions for improvement to the reserves by demanding changes to the regular force in isolation. 

We can have a nine battalion regular force or a six battalion regular force.  Either way, the requirement from the reserve for will be basically the same for international operations:  individual augmentation & (occasionally) up to formed sub-units.  In the nine regular force battalion concept there may be a greater need for the individual augmentation.  That is an argument for a higher manning ceiling which might result in a few more companies within the multi-regimental battalions.  A _do nothing until the regular force are done_ argument is purely a distraction to avoid discussing the reserve topic (which you will notice is the theme of the thread & not just 'my goal'). 

The Army wants to give a greater responsibility for lead of domestic operations to the reserves.  A more capable reserve force structure (such as what I've suggested) would also put the force in a good position to take on that role.



			
				the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> Reserve regiments scramble, and then are left weakened because elements of their experienced members are gone, supplemented to another unit.


More robust unit structures will be better able to accommodate the temporary loss of individuals to operations.


----------



## McG

tango22a said:
			
		

> Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!"


I don't doubt this.  I know reserves are capable of much.  I don't think we should be hampering them toward this end by leaving in place a sub-optimal reserve force structure.


----------



## George Wallace

tango22a said:
			
		

> MCG:
> 
> Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!"
> 
> tango22a



Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.


----------



## dapaterson

Bill Gates ate my last attempt at a post.  Here's a recap:

By Extra-regimental employment I mean class A employment for Sgt-MWO and Capt-Maj.  TRaining positions - for a three year posting you will work for the Bde delivering training - and that's all - no unit double or triple hatting.  Some planning staff (still part-time) for exercises etc.  Getting broader experience and broader exposure to the rest of the Army is an incredibly valuable experience.  Plus, it provides more leader positions, broadening the base to draw upon.

Experience is a key pillar of development we deny too many leaders - we rush them through to meet the grind of a new LCol every 3 years.  Give more time, and more breadth of experience, and we will get a better product.

Better leaders build better soldiers.


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.



As I said - there was money; we wasted the opportunity.  There is still money for some things, but it's a harder sell now - "We gave you money to restructure - what did you do with it?"


----------



## George Wallace

Money for vehicles and radio installations?  Money for infrastructure?   Money for equipment X, Y and Z?


----------



## tango22a

MCG, dapaterson, Michael O'Leary:

You aren't going to change your minds about the PRes and I won't change mine about this thread, so I guess that I'll just leave Tess and George Wallace to carry on.

Tess and George keep up the good fight!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Realistically remembering my time, every Sqn I have been in, in the RCD, has numbered just over 100 pers, and was commanded by a Major

I realize by tradition (and by template) sub-units are commanded by Majors in our military culture, but I question the necessity for reserve sub-unit-sized elements.  Everything in the essential unit administration tool kit for a reserve officer is learned (formal training) or accumulated (experience) by the time captain-qualifying courses are complete, unless the officer hasn't been carrying much in the way of regimental duties.  While there may surely be exceptions of which I am unaware, the higher level post-captain courses (ACT/MCSC to my last knowledge) are almost, if not entirely, focused on operational command/staff matters at the sub-unit/unit level (ACT) and then the unit/higher HQ level (MCSC).  If there are not a lot of places on reserve establishments to hold majors, and fewer to hold LCols, then not very many will be held; unless the higher adults are pleased to play patronage games, not very many should be undeserving or advanced on the basis of completing training and maintaining a pulse.


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> It may surprise you that when I joined, I CHOSE my Regiment because I wanted to be an ARMOURED soldier.
> 
> tango22a



It wouldn't surprise me at all.  It does tell me you joined in an area where you had a choice of units.

If you didn't have that choice, would you have never joined?


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> MCG, dapaterson, Michael O'Leary:
> 
> You aren't going to change your minds about the PRes and I won't change mine about this thread, so I guess that I'll just leave Tess and George Wallace to carry on.
> 
> Tess and George keep up the good fight!
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> tango22a



You do realize that I began my career as a Reserve NCM and I parade as a Class "A" officer now, right?

Don't be so quick to categorize my opinion as anti-Reserve just because I don't agree with you.

Edit to add - my 5-hour break in posting was because I parade an hour's drive from my house.  My property backs onto the ASU London fence-line, I parade in Stratford because I was asked to fill a shortfall there.  

So please, put away the Militia martyr act.


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.



As long as the argument keeps coming back to _"just give us [the Reserves] more money but don't try to change our organization"_ it's all a waste of time trying to identify more effective ways to employ the available resources.

It was stated above, it takes "buy in" at the grass roots level.  For the Reserves to find more effective structures and approaches, the ideas will have to come from the Reserves to get the support they need.  Mourning lost companies in towns that no longer exist is not a recipe for future success.


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Money for vehicles and radio installations?  Money for infrastructure?   Money for equipment X, Y and Z?



Vehicles - Yes.  No requirements definitions were done.  We did slightly increase the number of G Wagons bought for the Reserve armoured recce units

Radios - No.  Production lines for TCCCS were closed; only off the shelf products would have been possible.

Infra - Yes.  Beginning construction now, once PWGSC resolved issues with acquisition of land.

X, Y and Z - if defensible requirements had been identified and developed, yes.  Lacking those, nothing was done.


The canine was engaged carnally.  Key work was never done.  And funding was never spent - or, in many cases, never even requested, even though it was in a protected reserve to support Reserve Force Expansion.  In part, the problem was too many people not knowing or caring to know the DND/CF systems - and by not engaging them ("We're different!") things didn't get done.  There are rules to follow when you want to spend nine figure amounts, whether you like it or not.


PS = just back from parading class A.  I want to improve the institution I've spent the past 20 years working in.  And status quo is not a viable option.


----------



## Monsoon

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> You suggest the PRes, go with a national merit board, with regards to rank and position, simmilar to that of the the naval reserve.
> 
> You know when I meant numbers, I was talking overall, not individual units.


I see what you meant now - I thought you were talking about unit sizes.

I suppose the meriting could be done by Brigade Group or Land Force Area if doing it nationally would be too much of a logistical challenge.


----------



## Infanteer

Interesting sparring match - my only comment pertains to RC's comment below which has become a bit of a peeve of mine:



			
				recceguy said:
			
		

> Make all the grandiose plans you wish, but if you don't include or get inclusion from, that young troop on the floor, you've simply lost the best asset you ever had.



I heard the same arguement over the latest round of amalgamation in the British Army.  The fact of the matter is that every young kid who joins the day after (and others mentioned, there are lots of those who just want to serve) really doesn't feel that "Fall on My Sword!" mentality for the old capbadge that many have stated exists.

A good reading on the Regimental System over the last 150 some odd years shows that the system can constantly undertake change in order to remain relevant and survive as a local institution.

Some will quit, but many others will just say "heh, let's see how it goes" and keep on putting on the uniform.


----------



## Michael OLeary

The boogeyman of mass releases gets called up time and again to ward off discussion of change.  It's been a favoured approach because politicians can be swayed to believe in it and make political noise over suggested changes to force structures and localizations. 

The Army has evolved over many decades to meet changes in demographics, population and perceived force structure requirements and it's still here today.

Militia units were disbanded when the towns that held their companies dried up in the face of industrialization of farming and men moved to towns.  Town units reduced in size as the balance between available funding (NO, NOT BECAUSE THE REG F STOLE IT), willing manpower and national need for numbers and size of units evolved.  And the Reserves are still there.

Amalgamations have happened, sometimes even in mass with changes of unit names, locations and strength ceilings.   And the Reserves are still there.

Reg F units have been moved from place to place.  Despite the cries of mass resignations, both 1RCR and 2 PPCLI still existed after their moves.

Most soldiers, Reg or Res, probably can't give an accurate synopsis of the amalgamations, perpetuations, moves and structure changes to their own Regiment, so how can we say that only an unchanging structure will be supported by the soldiers on the parade square?  The structure has never been completely static and we are probably the first generation to serve full careers with minimal changes to the units we served in or with.  The past 30-40 years has been the anomalous period, not the standard.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Speaking of roles, here's something on the latest attempt to reintroduce the 'hook and ladder' brigades to the reserve world. I'll have to watch 'Outbreak' again to remind myself how to cordon off an infected city...

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971


----------



## R. Jorgensen

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Speaking of roles, here's something on the latest attempt to reintroduce the 'hook and ladder' brigades to the reserve world. I'll have to watch 'Outbreak' again to remind myself how to cordon off an infected city...
> 
> http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971



That makes some sense. Think about it, Reservists are part-time and usually "State-side" (just like the US National Guard) so it would be the smart thing to train Reservists in Homeland Defence and Security. Thing is, would they be "action ready"? Could reservists be counted on to immediately respond to a domestic threat at the drop of a pin? I dunno...

It's like Aid to the Civil Power. Is it something that is really necessary? They are trained to know how to be able to do it right? Then I guess it is necessary.

My father remembers Aid to the Civil Power exercises when the Strathcona's were still in Calgary. 

So the question is "Why participate in Local threats, but not all domestic threats?"


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Speaking of roles, here's something on the latest attempt to reintroduce the 'hook and ladder' brigades to the reserve world. I'll have to watch 'Outbreak' again to remind myself how to cordon off an infected city...
> 
> http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971


Didn't you already share this? http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-818356.html#msg818356  ;D


----------



## George Wallace

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> >Realistically remembering my time, every Sqn I have been in, in the RCD, has numbered just over 100 pers, and was commanded by a Major
> 
> I realize by tradition (and by template) sub-units are commanded by Majors in our military culture, but I question the necessity for reserve sub-unit-sized elements.  Everything in the essential unit administration tool kit for a reserve officer is learned (formal training) or accumulated (experience) by the time captain-qualifying courses are complete, unless the officer hasn't been carrying much in the way of regimental duties.  While there may surely be exceptions of which I am unaware, the higher level post-captain courses (ACT/MCSC to my last knowledge) are almost, if not entirely, focused on operational command/staff matters at the sub-unit/unit level (ACT) and then the unit/higher HQ level (MCSC).  If there are not a lot of places on reserve establishments to hold majors, and fewer to hold LCols, then not very many will be held; unless the higher adults are pleased to play patronage games, not very many should be undeserving or advanced on the basis of completing training and maintaining a pulse.



Are you proposing that the Reserves no longer match the CF structure of command?  That we have two seperate command structures for two identical organizations?

I find your "patronage games" comment out of line and offensive.  All officers, Reg and Res, must qualify for their promotions and appointments.


----------



## George Wallace

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> As long as the argument keeps coming back to _"just give us [the Reserves] more money but don't try to change our organization"_ it's all a waste of time trying to identify more effective ways to employ the available resources.
> 
> It was stated above, it takes "buy in" at the grass roots level.  For the Reserves to find more effective structures and approaches, the ideas will have to come from the Reserves to get the support they need.  Mourning lost companies in towns that no longer exist is not a recipe for future success.



Michael

I am in an organization that is being restructured and has been for the last two years.  We have limited space, wpns for only 1/4 of the troops, limited Troop Lift, no Comms equip, etc.  It is frustrating when we do our part successfully, and are held back by a signature for two to three years on the document at the bottom of a file basket on a Senior Officer's desk that should have been given to the Minister two years ago.  Yes, funding is an issue, and it isn't always as you have stated above.  We have had to stop/slow down at 75% of the mandated size as our resources in equipment, infrastructure, and Trained pers are maxed out. 


Brad, this increase in size and organization, keeps the CO's rank at Major.


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Michael
> 
> I am in an organization that is being restructured and has been for the last two years.  We have limited space, wpns for only 1/4 of the troops, limited Troop Lift, no Comms equip, etc.  It is frustrating when we do our part successfully, and are held back by a signature for two to three years on the document at the bottom of a file basket on a Senior Officer's desk that should have been given to the Minister two years ago.  Yes, funding is an issue, and it isn't always as you have stated above.  We have had to stop/slow down at 75% of the mandated size as our resources in equipment, infrastructure, and Trained pers are maxed out.
> 
> 
> Brad, this increase in size and organization, keeps the CO's rank at Major.



George:  Not wanting to get into a pissing match, but that particular doc was utterly incomplete when it made it to the CLS outside the chain of command.  The staff who handled the file then had to spend considerable time getting the necessary information - and got labelled the bad guy by (1) the unit CO, pissed that his end-run wasn't working fast enough and (2) the Area staff, pissed that approvals had been given without their involvement that directly affected them.  Doing it right (that is, through the chain of command) woud have taken longer initially, but would have lead to a complete file that could have been actionned.  Branch mafia have no command authority - something that some groups should be intelligent enough to understand (pun intended).

Doing things wrong slows down the process - which is what much of this thread is about.


----------



## George Wallace

Don't appologize for the pun.  I realize that there are serious problems there.  Fact is, there are a lot of people in high places not talking to each other which makes life difficult for the worker bees.  It is one thing to be directed to do something, be successful in doing it, and another to find that there are serious problems it being actioned at the top.

On point (1) it is their job to clarify these things, and an exercise in frustration in the process.  (2) have been a disappointment to say the least.  Will (3) be any better, or SSDP?


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> Didn't you already share this? http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-818356.html#msg818356  ;D



Yes, but the mess tins made me do it twice. :nod:=


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

recceguy said:
			
		

> I'll tell you all something right from the coal face. It's where I live. Let's use SW Ontario as an example. Amalgamate units and you're going to lose a lot of people. Including Officers and Snr NCOs. Go ahead and use the axiom that those people weren't worth keeping anyway, which is bullshit, but go ahead. The loss would be bad enough if you took the guidon & badge from one and made them go under another. Then the CO & RSM would have control over say, 3 Sqns, but have to travel all over SW Ontario, three different locations, to show themselves to everyone. You're not talking young piss and vinegar types with families. You're talking old dog eared types that are retired and can afford the time and travel.
> 
> So the other option is to keep the units at home but form all the garrison into a single unit. Infantry, Armoured, Svc Btn all one unit. You'll lose even more pers and be no better off than when you stated except instead of having three 100 man units doing different roles, that you can draw on, you'll have one 150 man unit with everyone pissing on each other. Higher up will be jockying for position and the others will see it and follow suit. Unit loyalties will win out.
> 
> It'll take years to make a cohesive outfit from this type of mishmash. It ain't pretty and it doesn't fit your pretty little cookie cutter designs, but it's a big elephant in the room that you can't ignore. It also has the largest capability of sewering any plans for roling in units and making your newest Mo experiment work.
> 
> Reservists are a fickle bunch and you have to understand how to sell them on the plan, because they are not a bunch of morons without any other means of employment or fall back. Most do it because they like it, not because they need a job. frig with what they like and don't offer a better alternative, they'll vote with their feet.
> 
> 
> Whatever is planned, there better be a lot of buy in, consideration, and consultation. Show up and tell them they are all part of the 51st Dog Sled Mushers, here's your new badge, and you've lost before you even start.
> 
> Make all the grandiose plans you wish, but if you don't include or get inclusion from, that young troop on the floor, you've simply lost the best asset you ever had.
> 
> But hey, what do I know. Just tossing out random thoughts.




Given that units are having a hard time generating successession plans I am not sure what the issue would be by having amalgamated RHQs for branches. An reserve Recce Regiment in Ontario would still keep people in the branch they are serving, and if capbadges are that big of an issue then the squadrons can keep them. The CO and RSM would not have to have a face to face O Group every Thursday night with all the Sqns. We have pretty good technology to help with that and a monthly trip on VIA 1 to one of the other garrison locations would keep them in contact, plus ranges/exercises. For the infantry units it would be even simply since we could form amalgamted battalions with units quite close to each other.

As an aside, when I was in the Reserves I often wondered what the utility of Thursday nights was. I did an exchange with a USMC Reserve Battalion that trained for one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. There training was pretty good and also had lots of variety. Since you only had to come to the unit once a month (with a schedule a year in advance), people could travel from quite far to be in the unit. Anyhoo.

With the pressure of succession removed, a new officer could spend four or five years as a Troop Leader, four or five years as a BC and so on. The same could hold true for NCOs.


----------



## dapaterson

I think many on this thread (myself included) have been talking at cross purposes.  Massive change (whether Reg or Res) does require communictaion and information passage.  Too often people attempt to do things fast by fiat, and fail.

Change has to be understood at all levels.

Some of the disucssion here, meant at a theoretical level to come up with options and ideas is being interpreted as people saying "Let's do wholesale change tomorrow!" and countered with "You'll destroy everything" - and those proposing theoretical change toss back "You're a dinosaur."  Perhaps a lesson to all involved on listening, and trying to understand their position.

PLus, the added problems of written vice person-to-person communication - it can be too easy to misinterpret written words, lacking non-verbal cues (and sometimes we forget to add "lol" or  )


----------



## tango22a

Sarge:

"would you mind crossing your feet?....we only have three nails!"   (lol)

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

Could one of you SMEs on PRes Reorg please explain to me WHY the PRes ALWAYS gets lumbered with the tasks that the RegF either doesn't WANT to do, WON'T do or CAN'T do... In other words " Give it to the PRes it's right up their alley". Of course we will have to re-org them so they can fit in the useless niche we want them to occupy. If we stomp them into a job they DON'T want maybe they will just disappear and "we can get back to REAL (RegF) soldiering"

tango22a

PS: Contrary to popular belief I don't consider myself to be a MARTYR, just a little bit put upon.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I don't see how the Armoured reserve regiments picking up convoy escort for deployed operations and close recce plus CRBN recce for domestic operations is a bad thing. They fit into the envelope of traditional tasks (the close recce bit is arguable I suppose) and there is nothing to say that those would be the only tasks that Reserve recce regiments would perform.


----------



## tango22a

T2B:

Not against picking up those jobs, but it will require RE-Equipping with a SUITABLE vehicle and RE-Training in its use. There seems to be this mis-begotten feeling that (as usual) the PRes can do the job with NO comms, NO vehicles, No wpns and above all NO support...e.g. NO MONEY,  "They've done all we asked on a shoe-string, let's see if we can make them dig a little deeper!"

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

To paraphrase Winston Churchill " Give us the equipment and WE will finish the job"


tango22a


----------



## dapaterson

Task assignment:  At branch gatherings recommendations for such things are decided, then passed on to the Army Commander.  Many of the more off-the-wall options have come from the mouths of Reservists, not the Reg Force.  But most of these things are recommended by branches - if the Armd Reserve is unhappy, talk to Spike.

The G-Wagon is adequate (if not ideal) for practicing convoy escort duties.  Practicing skills and drills is possible. In addition, there's no clear decision about a future CF platform for such tasks; the RG-31 in theatre was a UOR; no guarantees it will be kept or continued to be used.  Given that in another scenario we may well adopt another platform, unortunately much of the training wil be just-in-time prior to deployment.  That's the Reg F reality now as well - vehicles are made available 6-12 motnhs before deployment.

Comms gear is an Army-wide failing.  I don't have a solution (other than reducing the number of Jimmies involved in procurement of it to provide tech advice, but not final decision-making and control)  Attempts to acquire additional radios require competition with other nations with the same needs - and our buys are generally smaller - so we tend to be bumped to the end of the line.


Again:  There were funds available that were never used.  When the Army Reserve grew by about 19% they received nearly 25% more operating funds (baseline increase).  Capital funds were mostly unused because there was no plan.  There was no evil Reg F plotting.  Just a failure to plan.


----------



## tango22a

PRes:

Hypothetical Situation:

Gentlemen:
We( RegF )want you to give up your Combat Arms jobs and re-train in a role quite divorced from what you are used to be doing. If we need augmentation (?) we will re-train you in GD duties. Since we don't want to be bothered with re-training ourselves to perform these candy-a$$ tasks ("They're not REAL  soldiering") they're all yours, so make the best of it! Any Questions?


tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> PRes:
> 
> Hypothetical Situation:
> 
> Gentlemen:
> We( RegF )want you to give up your Combat Arms jobs and re-train in a role quite divorced from what you are used to be doing. If we need augmentation (?) we will re-train you in GD duties. Since we don't want to be bothered with re-training ourselves to perform these candy-a$$ tasks ("They're not REAL  soldiering") they're all yours, so make the best of it! Any Questions?
> 
> 
> tango22a



Well, perhaps if you get off your "woe is me the poor suffering reservist" horse, this could be a conversation instead of a pissing match.

Where are your real world suggestions for change in the modern environment, other than "throw money and let us do more of what we're doing."


----------



## dapaterson

The Armd Recce situation is entirely a product of the Armd Corps.  If any black hatters want to bitch and complain, look in a mirror, and go to the annual branch gabfest, and vent there. It's not the Army, it's not the Reg Force - it's the Armoured Corps doing things to itself.

Self inflicted situations get no sympathy from me.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:
I didn't intend it to become a pissing contest. But you must admit coming to PRes from RegF must have been a bit of a shock to you, not having all those little goodies available that RegF take for granted. I have been retired from the CF for over 20 years but sill maintain contact with my old unit and with other friends in other units I made over the years I was active and the feedback I get is "SIERRA SIERRA, DELTA DELTA"  Seems things haven't changed much over the years! I may be wrong but I can see a great need for improvement in both PRes and RegF attitudes towards each other.I am just looking back over my own experiences and don't see much change over the years I have been retired.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

tango22a said:
			
		

> PRes:
> 
> Hypothetical Situation:
> 
> Gentlemen:
> We( RegF )want you to give up your Combat Arms jobs and re-train in a role quite divorced from what you are used to be doing. If we need augmentation (?) we will re-train you in GD duties. Since we don't want to be bothered with re-training ourselves to perform these candy-a$$ tasks ("They're not REAL  soldiering") they're all yours, so make the best of it! Any Questions?
> 
> 
> tango22a



I don't see this in the current discussion. The convoy escort task is expeditionary and it is combat. It is also a fairly standard recce sqn/tp task, so it is not like you are being asked to abandon armoured recce (it is more of a focus for collective training than anything else). I wouldn't call the domestic operations tasks candy-ass either.


----------



## dapaterson

The Reg F is not the land of milk and honey that so many assume that it is.  A Reg F friend of me had a recent posting as a Battery Commander.  For his Reg F artillery battery, he had two LSVWs.  That's it.  No other vehicles.  No guns.  And that is increasingly the Reg F reality:  If you're slotted for high readiness training, six to twelve months in advance you'll get some of the vehicles and equipment you need to train.  Otherwise there is a small pool that's shared, that has milage limitations that make training and proficiency maintenance difficult.

You spend your time sending troops off on tasks, even though they're supposed to be recovering post-deployment.  Some are being stripped away from you to fill out deploying units.  Yet you are still responsible to maintain individual and collective skills, missing many junior leaders stripped for augmentation tasks, and lacking equipment.

It's not all gloom and doom in the Reg F, but there are definite challenges there as well - many which are probably familiar to the Reserves.


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> I didn't intend it to become a pissing contest. But you must admit coming to PRes from RegF must have been a bit of a shock to you, not having all those little goodies available that RegF take for granted. I have been retired from the CF for over 20 years but sill maintain contact with my old unit and with other friends in other units I made over the years I was active and the feedback I get is "SIERRA SIERRA, DELTA DELTA"  Seems things haven't changed much over the years! I may be wrong but I can see a great need for improvement in both PRes and RegF attitudes towards each other.I am just looking back over my own experiences and don't see much change over the years I have been retired.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> tango22a



Sorry to disappoint but it wasn't a shock at all. I have retained connections within the Reserves throughout my Reg F career, served as RSS twice (once RSS and once RFC), had a posting as Training Centre staff among others.  I knew exactly what I was coming into.

Maybe you need to critically examine where your feedback is coming from.  There are many who have built their own opinions for years on a foundation of criticism and who aren't looking for workable solutions.


----------



## tango22a

T2B:

If you want to do convoy escort in a G-Wagon in AFGHANISTAN feel free! I sure wouldn't!

tango22a

P.S. Please refer to reply #1031

PPS: Using G-Wagon for Convoy Escort (Dom Ops ) in Canada...NO problem


----------



## McG

tango22a said:
			
		

> If you want to do convoy escort in a G-Wagon in AFGHANISTAN feel free! I sure wouldn't!


Okay.  It is now clear you are just being argumentative for your own ammusement, and playing vicitm for your own self-gratification.  Otherwise, you might show some indication that you are fully reading the replies that are being made to you.

Nobody suggested the PRes do convoy escort in Afghanistan with G-Wagon.  It was suggested that it was an adaquate vehicle for training in Canada especially when compared to the fact that even the regular force do not have the vehicles used overseas.


----------



## Haggis

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> I didn't intend it to become a pissing contest. But you must admit coming to PRes from RegF must have been a bit of a shock to you, not having all those little goodies available that RegF take for granted. I have been retired from the CF for over 20 years but sill maintain contact with my old unit and with other friends in other units I made over the years I was active and the feedback I get is "SIERRA SIERRA, DELTA DELTA"  Seems things haven't changed much over the years! I may be wrong but I can see a great need for improvement in both PRes and RegF attitudes towards each other.I am just looking back over my own experiences and don't see much change over the years I have been retired.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> tango22a



Even though this post wasn't aimed at me, I cannot let this pass.

I have seen monumental positive changes in the training and employment of Reservists of all stripes (Army Navy and Air Force) in the past 20 years.  I have also seen a widespread acceptance of Reservists by the rank and file and most of the leadership of the Regular Force.  Yes, there are institutional dinosaurs but they are becoming extinct.

In my opinion, the Big Thick Black Line between Reg F and Res Fis now gray and scuffed.

Are we where we each want us to be?  Hell NO!

Are we moving in the right direction as an institution?  Not entirely.

Are we trying to steer this thing in the right direction?  Yes.  But it's a big ship with a little engine and a mismatched crew with an almost maxed out gas card.

Personally, as a Reservist, I find your attitude towards change exasperating.  I understand that your experience is dated and I'm afraid you're simply the purveyor of "bad data" from your former comrades.  Your former unit is but a small sample of the CF Reserve of today.  Look outside that petri dish at the wider Reserve community to see what's been accomplished.


----------



## dapaterson

And this is why little gets done for some parts of the Reserve community.  Those who will settle for nothing but Leo 2A6s in Windsor and refuse to budge on their demands get heard, and ignored.

Is the G-Wagon an adequate training vehicle?  Yes.  Perfect?  No.  Better than an Iltis?  Yes.  Can sldiers in such a vehicle practice skills that are applicable to other platforms?  Yes.

Are there systemic, Army (Reg and Res) wide issues with a lack of comms gear?  Yes.  Do the Regular Force have a secret hidden stockpile, where people with a secret handshake can gather and cackle at their ill gotten stash, and gloat about how they are withholdign the gear from those who need it to train?  No.  (Or if they do, I've never learned the handshake)


----------



## tango22a

Haggis:
I am not against change but am against change just for the sake of change. If armoured recce soldiers are employed on roto where do they end up? CIMIC, GDuties, PSYops, etc. Not in their trade. Why? Because they cannot get access to trg opportunities to keep them current on modern equipment. This is a failing right across the board as even RegF people have trouble keeping current due to lack of trg time, eqpt and above all MONEY. The trickle-down theory seems to have failed the PRes again. Say for example if the 1300 trucks on order are not followed up by a larger order for SMP vehicles  for the RegF, how many of these will trickle-down to PRes? Not many! Please remember what happened to the AVGP family and especially the Bison. Change is great ...if the change does not interfere with the ability to do the job...whatever it is.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Fishbone Jones

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Armd Recce situation is entirely a product of the Armd Corps.  If any black hatters want to bitch and complain, look in a mirror, and go to the annual branch gabfest, and vent there. It's not the Army, it's not the Reg Force - it's the Armoured Corps doing things to itself.
> 
> Self inflicted situations get no sympathy from me.



100%. We've been asking the Corps for years to define the role & doctrine for Reserve Armour. They won't. Why? I can't say. I have my ideas, but.....

Anyway, without a defined role and doctrine, we can't process and gain an entitlement to a proper TO&E. Without that we're simply in a holding pattern and a pool of bodies to draw on with some very basic black hat skills. What equipment we are given has nothing to do with a specific job, but are just more shiny trinket to keep ourselves occupied for awhile. We are the original red headed step child.

I have no problem with a re-role. It will be the Corp's loss and they can stew in their juices. All I'm saying, and this also goes back to Infanteer's post, is that you have to let the smart, young, intelligent troops on the floor in on the ground floor of this. Don't blindside them. They want to be included. Knowledge is power. Don't do all the planning and paper signing, and then turn around and say "When you come in next Thursday, you'll find ROWPUs where your Gwagons were parked, and the vehs are gone cause you're not armoured anymore". Oh, "And you'll damn well like it!"

Don't treat them like mindless morons.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And this is why little gets done for some parts of the Reserve community.  Those who will settle for nothing but Leo 2A6s in Windsor and refuse to budge on their demands get heard, and ignored.
> 
> Is the G-Wagon an adequate training vehicle?  Yes.  Perfect?  No.  Better than an Iltis?  Yes.  Can sldiers in such a vehicle practice skills that are applicable to other platforms?  Yes.
> 
> Are there systemic, Army (Reg and Res) wide issues with a lack of comms gear?  Yes.  Do the Regular Force have a secret hidden stockpile, where people with a secret handshake can gather and cackle at their ill gotten stash, and gloat about how they are withholdign the gear from those who need it to train?  No.  (Or if they do, I've never learned the handshake)



Bullshit. It's not the attitude here in Windsor, nor has it been. I strongly resent the fact that you've not only implied this of us, but are trying to reinforce your stupid and pitiful stance, with us at the heart of your example. You obviously know nothing about us. Please desist from your crap theories and stick to the many other things that you actually know about and expound on well.


----------



## tango22a

dapaterson:

I am not advocating Leo 2A6 in Windsor. There is no place to train with it and maintenance would be a real B****h. What I am advocating is the purchase of a common-to-corps Recce Veh that both the RegF and PRes could train on. It ain't gonna happen so we will just continue muddling along until Armoured Recce is no longer a PRes trade and re-role or dis-band the PRes armored Regiments.

tango22a

FENNEC anyone?


----------



## dapaterson

I chose Windsor because of the participants here, and made the "Leo 2A6" comment precisely because it was way out there and no one would take it seriously (besides, we all know that the GGHG are the ones who really need heavy armour protection and 120mm guns, being just a few clicks from Jane and Finch).  It was not a slam against everyone in Windsor by any stretch of the imagination - if taken that way, I apologize.

But there are stubborn unyielding attitudes that are almost to that extreme that attempt to prevent any change or progress.  Generally, in a change process you've got two choices: Get engaged and have some control over your own destiny, or stall, stop and delay until something gets forced upon you.  Too much of the Reserve community fights any change tooth and nail and then ends up behind the eight ball. 


Is there a need to be smarter?  Yes.  Is there a need to build some better Reg/Res commonalities (and not only in the Armd world)?  Of course.

A common to corps Armd recce veh is fine in theory, difficult in practice depending on weapons systems (ranges required) and maintenance requirements.  It woould probably end up consolidated in a few select locations to ensure a critical mass available to train (vice each unit having one or two); most units would prefer to have equipment in their lines.  I don't have a simple, magic solution for this (other than, perhaps, returning to the old model of having different type of Armd units - those close to Reg F bases with the equipment could train on the kit and be tasked to augment those Reg F units, other units would train on other kit for other tasks.  That proposal was shot down by D Armd in 05 or 06.)

What's the answer for the Armd Corps?  I do not know.


----------



## Michael OLeary

recceguy said:
			
		

> Bullshit. It's not the attitude here in Windsor, nor has it been. I strongly resent the fact that you've not only implied this of us, but are trying to reinforce your stupid and pitiful stance, with us at the heart of your example. You obviously know nothing about us. Please desist from your crap theories and stick to the many other things that you actually know about and expound on well.



recceguy,

The point being made really had nothing to do with "Leo 2A6s in Windsor" specifically.  It was an allusion to the fact that there are many who are fixated on a specific, or sometimes not so specific, solution, and any attempts to find a workable option are met with derisions, scorn and a lack of cooperation.

Remember the plan that saw limited numbers of AVGP spread out to garrisons with no effective plan to share them for collective training and as each went VOR because of a lack of local maintenance they sat in compounds.  That was declared by some to be a failure to support the Militia even though available equipment was distributed on the time-honoured but ineffective "everyone gets the same sized slice of pie" approach.

When that didn't work people came up with pool vehicles in the LFA TCs, supported by the local maintenance structure.  That didn't work because units didn't want to cooperate fully  on the sharing requirements and complained that the vehicles weren't in their home garrisons for training.  And that was a failure because some said that the Reg F "controlled" the resource.

And now we see here that in lieu of Iltis, G-Wagons aren't good enough for training because that's not what's used in A'stan.  When the entire Army is struggling to meet its equipment requirements, what, exactly, is a workable solution that will satisfy EVERY Reserve unit (and every Reservist in all three Messes)?  Someone will always be ready to express their personal dissatisfaction and claim to represent a larger body.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

OK, before this goes any further and we keep going around in circles with the misconception that we need RG-31.........._or Fennecs_ and this is the prevailing attitude in the current Mo, especially in Res Armour, please go and have a hard look at tango22a profile. His is not the prevailing attitude, nor has it been around here for quite some time. Notwithstanding the avatar, and his long, honourable association as part of the Regimental family, he does not speak for us. Nor has he for quite some time. His opinions are his alone.

Sorry to throw you under the bus brother


----------



## tango22a

recceguy:
No Problems....the view was fantastic!!

Guess I'll have to change my avatar.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Fishbone Jones

tango22a said:
			
		

> recceguy:
> No Problems....the view was fantastic!!
> 
> Guess I'll have to change my avatar.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> tango22a



Nope, you can keep it. You earned it.


----------



## tango22a

recceguy:

Think I better change it....I don't want to bring down the Wrath of God on my old Regiment with my out-dated babbling.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Are you proposing that the Reserves no longer match the CF structure of command?  That we have two seperate command structures for two identical organizations?

No.  The structure is still Sub-sub-unit Comd/Ldr, Sub-unit OC, Unit CO.  Rank is not a qualification or appointment.  If a sub-unit has a healthy parade sheet with lots of bona fide and filled positions for Lts and a few Capts, then a Maj may very well be in order.  But if the structure is kept deliberately lean on the top end to focus "reserve PYs" on the rank-and-file positions, then a rank level ceiling curtails the temptation to promote prematurely.  I'd rather see 3 platoon commanders and a company 2I/C - all Lts - competing for one OC (Capt) slot than 3 platoon Lts competing for one 2I/C (Capt) slot, and the 2I/C rising automatically to the OC's (Maj) slot.

>I find your "patronage games" comment out of line and offensive.  All officers, Reg and Res, must qualify for their promotions and appointments. 

Qualify != merits advancement/appointment/promotion.  If there were no patronage games, the LFRR wouldn't have met so much resistance from centres of patronage and political games.  You may never have observed the "whose turn is it" mentality, but I have.


----------



## George Wallace

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> No.  The structure is still Sub-sub-unit Comd/Ldr, Sub-unit OC, Unit CO.  Rank is not a qualification or appointment.  If a sub-unit has a healthy parade sheet with lots of bona fide and filled positions for Lts and a few Capts, then a Maj may very well be in order.  But if the structure is kept deliberately lean on the top end to focus "reserve PYs" on the rank-and-file positions, then a rank level ceiling curtails the temptation to promote prematurely.  I'd rather see 3 platoon commanders and a company 2I/C - all Lts - competing for one OC (Capt) slot than 3 platoon Lts competing for one 2I/C (Capt) slot, and the 2I/C rising automatically to the OC's (Maj) slot.



I really don't see anything radical, new or different here.  It is already a fact in places.  As for "automatically rising to Major", that is fiction.  No one is rising automatically to Major.  They have to become qualified.   If the Training System passes them on their AOC and all their other courses, then they must soon be ready.......Unless you want to say that the Training System isn't maintaining high enough standards....


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I really don't see anything radical, new or different here.  It is already a fact in places.  As for "automatically rising to Major", that is fiction.  No one is rising automatically to Major.  They have to become qualified.  * If the Training System passes them on their AOC and all their other courses, then they must soon be ready.*......Unless you want to say that the Training System isn't maintaining high enough standards....



I guess when numbers are small enough that the line of succession past a certain point is a single file, then you get to consider passing of courses the only criteria for promotion.

Funny how we only seem to talk abut officers in these conversations, though, isn't it?


----------



## George Wallace

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> I guess when numbers are small enough that the line of succession past a certain point is a single file, then you get to consider passing of courses the only criteria for promotion.
> 
> Funny how we only seem to talk abut officers in these conversations, though, isn't it?



You know Michael, your little "funny how we only talk about officers bit" is getting a little tiring.  

As for passing courses being the only criteria for promotion, perhaps you would like to enlighten us as to where we can get promoted without any courses.

Lighten up!


----------



## aesop081

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Funny how we only seem to talk abut officers in these conversations, though, isn't it?



Yup, it is all people seem to talk about. The reality however is that the same goes on in the NCM side of the house.

We all know someone who shouldnt have passed their PLQ/ILQ/ALQ/whatever........



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> You know Michael, your little "funny how we only talk about officers bit" is getting a little tiring.



It may be tiring but hes correct.


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You know Michael, your little "funny how we only talk about officers bit" is getting a little tiring.
> 
> As for passing courses being the only criteria for promotion, perhaps you would like to enlighten us as to where we can get promoted without any courses.
> 
> Lighten up!



As tiring as your junior officer with a map barbs?

Shall I explain the entire career management system for you?


----------



## the 48th regulator

Guys c'mon,

Let's not get dang petty.

There have already been too many pot shots, I am guilty of it too in the last day.

Let's try to keep this clean.

Listen, I was fired up.  Fuck, I am and will always fight for the reserves.

it's who I am.  I have to admit, MCG and Dap, bring some good points.  I live in a town where we have 4 infantry regiments, and four God damn armouries!!!

That, I will concede is downright ridiculous.  However, and I have already touted this, this is an army cross board affliction.

Let us look in my area alone (I live in the GTA).  The Lorne Scots are an excellent example (before the armouries for the QOR and TorScots)

They (LS) have been able to control and area, with three armouries all on their own.  Always good troops, from the bottom to the top.  If this is not an example where an area can be commanded by a single command, over long distance, well one needs to just see the quality of phenomenal troops that come from them.

We in Toronto do not need 4 infantry, and three armoured regiments.  Okay, I concede.  However, I will stand on my pedestal and say this once again.  If the Army as a whole is broke, with regards to manning and the amount of regiments, why start at the red headed step child??  Go for the Foster Parents I say!  We all need a change and reason to reorganize.

The Brits did it, the amalgamated all of the regiments in Scotland in to the Highland brigade, and that included Regs and Reserves.

Either way, let us stop the petty jabs please….

BTW, for the Reg force guys, there is no life like it, cuz there no life in  it!!!   :nana:

dileas

tess


----------



## Kat Stevens

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> BTW, for the Reg force guys, there is no life like it, cuz there no life in  it!!!   :nana:
> 
> dileas
> 
> tess



...and fuck all after it.


----------



## Brad Sallows

People rise automatically in many places where single file succession exists.  I suppose most reservists with a good chunk of time-in know a buffoon or two who made it to MWO or Maj (and sometimes beyond) on the strength of "met standard on courses", "attended regularly", and "sole candidate".

Past certain rank levels, "qualified" isn't enough.  Passed courses and accumulated time-in can not elevate a person past his maximum level of competence.  When there is only one candidate, there can be no objective comparison; an objective assessment of one person's skills and aptitude is more difficult than a comparison among candidates.

Some sub-unit OCs undoubtedly merit Maj rank; but, we should eliminate the cultural expectation that all OCs should be Maj.  Start the bar at Capt, and promote outstanding performers (observed and measured, not predicted) to Maj.

I am not sure of the best criteria to measure candidates for advancement beyond, say, Capt/WO; but "in single file, one pace forward: march" isn't it.


----------



## George Wallace

Brad

I can tend to agree with you on this as a generalization.  

If I may try again (reference your previous post); this is already happening in various locations.  If one looks at the CFTPO and Msgs coming out, positions are advertised to be filled on various taskings, Domestic and International, as well as Backfills.  Most have a rank desired, and list a rank or two lower as being acceptable if they meet the criteria.  Some even list that a higher rank can apply to fill the posn if they revert to the lower rank.  

I don't think we need to change the Reserves too drastically, but taking the amalgamation idea to heart we can see a compromise of what you and some others have proposed.  Existing Regiments keeping their hatbadges, but basically becoming Coys/Sqns of a larger 'amalgamated Regiment'.  Their COs would be Majors and their Sergeant Majors would be MWOs.  This would still keep much of the existing Col/CWO positions commanding the Bdes, LCol posns in command of 'amalgamated Regiments' and Majors commanding Coys/Sqns.  It would maintain Senior officers for Staffing, CWOs and MWOs for guidance and discipline and Junior officers, WOs, Sgts and MCpls for Training.  If amalgamation would have to be reversed, the building blocks would still be in place to do so.  

Many "Acting/Lacking" appointments exist today, and many confuse them for 'actual' appointments.   Don't forget that many in those positions have time constraints as to how long they may hold that position or rank before they must get the proper qualifications or are required to revert back to their previous rank.   The system is not perfect, but has come a long way.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I find it odd that anyone wants to reduce the footprint of regiments across Canada, given the many and increasing demands on the Forces these days. Amalgamation smacks too much of 'retreat' and defeatism. I've seen the negative impacts of this in the UK. 

I'm all for going on the maketing 'offensive' and building up the strengths of all our regiments through improving recruiting and retention. 

We used to have 100 soldier companies during the time of Vietnam and the immediate aftermath of general military negativity. Why not now when the image of Canada's military is so positive (and you can bet that it is far more positive compared with the 70s)? 

We just need to get better at marketing to new and more savvy audiences, and making sure that we have first class leadership at the senior levels in all units. From what I've seen of some of the people we have at the Capt/Lt?WO/Sgt level right now, we're in good shape to achieve long term growth if we get it right at the LCol/Maj/CWO/MWO level now.

On les auras!


----------



## dapaterson

But we're at the strength the government has mandated now.  That is a key limiting factor in any calculation - what's the top limit paid strength?

The R2K crowd who want every unit on the ORBAT (and some to be brought back to the ORBAT) to parade 400+ ignore the government's direction on strength.  To parade 400 at each unit (ignoring the demographic challenge in some smaller communities that are shrinking as Canada becomes more and more urban) would need a paid strength of roughly 50000, or over 2 1/2 times the current paid strength target.

We need to temper "perfect world" desires with cold hard realities.  And maybe make some hard choices - how much should we invest in a location if they steadfastly refuse to parade more than 35 people month to month, year to year - should that really be a unit, with 6 or so full-time staff that could better be used to support something else?

As long as we insist that all is fine and no units have problems we can't seriously request any additional funding - if we can piss away funds and personnel to support a dozen places like the one above, we're obviously over-resourced.


----------



## tango22a

Gentlemen:
First of all please excuse my babbling, but don't you think that if each PRes Regiment/Battalion was able to support one(1) Sqdn/coy fully manned PLUS a fully manned echelon that this would solve a lot of problems? I think that in today's times this is reasonable and affordable. Mind you there will be a need for more vehs, wpns and above all the horrible word...MONEY. If this plan was carried out I can see eventually that the better-situated Regt/Batt could double in size. If absolutely necessary you might group these sqdn/coy/bty into arms-specific ad hoc Regt/Batt groupings while retaining cap badges/honours/affiliations. How does this sound to you?

Babbling away, I remain

tango22a


----------



## George Wallace

Without the Echelon, that was more or less what I was getting at.  A great number of the Regiments are basically at manning levels of Sqn/Coys now.  I think a fully manned Echelon for each Sqn/Coy would be a goal, but not in the cards at the moment.  It would give these units a bit more breadth in recruiting, as they would now be recruiting "Purple" Tradesmen as well as Cbt Arms.  That could be the solution to past problems of not having maintainers and support for equipment held locally.  But again, we are back to the question of funding, and that is what will dictate if these ideas are plausible.

daftandbarmy

These amalgamations wouldn't reduce any footprints currently held, other than doing away with a good number of LCol and CWO positions and reduction in Major and MWO positions as some Coys and Sqns merge.   I am sure that many of these MWOs and Majors will then be moved to HQ, and other Staff and Training positions initially.


----------



## daftandbarmy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Without the Echelon, that was more or less what I was getting at.  A great number of the Regiments are basically at manning levels of Sqn/Coys now.  I think a fully manned Echelon for each Sqn/Coy would be a goal, but not in the cards at the moment.  It would give these units a bit more breadth in recruiting, as they would now be recruiting "Purple" Tradesmen as well as Cbt Arms.  That could be the solution to past problems of not having maintainers and support for equipment held locally.  But again, we are back to the question of funding, and that is what will dictate if these ideas are plausible.
> 
> daftandbarmy
> 
> These amalgamations wouldn't reduce any footprints currently held, other than doing away with a good number of LCol and CWO positions and reduction in Major and MWO positions as some Coys and Sqns merge.   I am sure that many of these MWOs and Majors will then be moved to HQ, and other Staff and Training positions initially.



Sounds good to me. You could even (sharp intake of breath) use the spare officers and NCOs to run locally established courses to get people qualified faster, or shuffle them over to units that need people at that rank level. After all, in the militia, a Major's job is pretty much the same whether you're a grunt or a gunner.

I'd also like to finally see the Service Battalions tasked with providing echelon support for units, but that one is way above my pay grade...


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ...... You could even (sharp intake of breath) use the spare officers and NCOs to run locally established courses to get people qualified faster, ......



That is something that I have always wondered about.  Why don't the various Bdes or Areas have a Fulltime Battle School staffed to run through candiates on BMQ/BMOQ, SQ and PLQ courses?  It would probably be more efficient and cost effective that how things are running currently.  Just wondering?


----------



## MJP

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That is something that I have always wondered about.  Why don't the various Bdes or Areas have a Fulltime Battle School staffed to run through candiates on BMQ/BMOQ, SQ and PLQ courses?  It would probably be more efficient and cost effective that how things are running currently.  Just wondering?



38 Bde has full time staff for running courses, a few of my friends are living the class B life teaching away.  Certainly makes sense and allows for IMHO better instruction all around.


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Why don't the various Bdes or Areas have a Fulltime Battle School staffed to run through candiates on BMQ/BMOQ, SQ and PLQ courses?


I'd be happy to create Bde Trg Coy concurrent with consolidation of regiments into larger (fuller) units.


----------



## mariomike

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> I live in a town where we have < snip > four God damn armouries!!!
> tess



I don't think having four armouries ( Moss Park, Dalton, Fort York, Denison and HMCS York ) is unreasonable. Many reservists take transit.  
Armouries can also be used as quasi community centres in case of emergency such as the 2008 propane explosion.


----------



## geo

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That is something that I have always wondered about.  Why don't the various Bdes or Areas have a Fulltime Battle School staffed to run through candiates on BMQ/BMOQ, SQ and PLQ courses?  It would probably be more efficient and cost effective that how things are running currently.  Just wondering?


A lot of reserve Bdes do have thier own schools.... that are subserviant to the Area schools.  However, the Area schools limit the bde schools to some very basic courses - turf wars IMHO
(in LFQA at least)


----------



## kratz

mariomike said:
			
		

> I don't think having four armouries ( Moss Park, Dalton, Fort York, Denison and HMCS York ) is unreasonable. Many reservists take transit.
> Armouries can also be used as quasi community centres in case of emergency such as the 2008 propane explosion.



As an added note, you are not able to merge Army Reserve, ARAF and NRDs training goals in most communities to the point where it is logical to have on reserve building. ARAF needs to be near an airport, NRDs need to be on the water. This discussion is about the changes to the Army Reserve, so adding in the NRDs (not armouries)  into the discussion is not useful at this point.


----------



## George Wallace

kratz said:
			
		

> ............., NRDs need to be on the water.



 ;D


Been to the Naval Reserve in Calgary or Saskatoon, or any other Naval Reserve in the Prairies?

Now back to our regularly scheduled programming.


----------



## ltmaverick25

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That is something that I have always wondered about.  Why don't the various Bdes or Areas have a Fulltime Battle School staffed to run through candiates on BMQ/BMOQ, SQ and PLQ courses?  It would probably be more efficient and cost effective that how things are running currently.  Just wondering?



I was under the impression that we were already doing this.  I know the Toronto Bde and the London Bde (forget the Bde numbers) both have battle schools that do just that.  They each run one PLQ on weekends throughout the year, a few BMQs and at least one BMOQ.  I think they even do some LFC Driver Wheeled courses and basic comms courses.


----------



## daftandbarmy

In the west, it comes and goes in a dreary  'flavour of the month' type procession. There is a constant battle between the 'centralist forces' who insist on everyone congregating at the 'Centre of Excrescence' in Wainwright, and the 'decentralist forces' who want to run it all on the West Coast, so the staff can go home to their families, look after their grow ops etc on the weekends.

IMHO you can run everything you need to train infantry in BC, making use of the field firing areas in Washington State - of course - where appropriate. But then you'd be contradicting the Principles of Micro-Management which seem to hold sway over most things Infantry these days.  ;D


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> 'Centre of Excrescence'



 :rofl: :rofl:
Thank you! I learned a new word today!


----------



## Haggis

kratz said:
			
		

> As an added note, you are not able to merge Army Reserve, ARAF and NRDs training goals in most communities to the point where it is logical to have one reserve building. This discussion is about the changes to the Army Reserve, so adding in the NRDs (not armouries)  into the discussion is not useful at this point.



At the BMQ and PLQ level (mods 1-5), why not?  The QS is the same, regardless of uniform.


----------



## dapaterson

Nav Res and ARAF do the full Reg F BMQ, so it will not work there.  Besides, ARAF annual ab initio training can be measured on one or two hands; it is overwhelmingly populated by former Reg F members.


----------



## Haggis

I know.  In fact the Air Reserve only accepts Reg F qualifications.  However, as noted a few pages back, the IT&E system is in need of overhaul.  Perhaps it's best to start the fix at the BMQ level.


----------



## geo

The Air, Nav & Comms were Reserves .... while everyone else (Arty, Armd RECCE, Engrs, Infantry, Svcs) were all "militia".  Air, Nav & Comms would all take the regular BMQ in St Jean... VS the BMQ/SQ courses given by local CBG schools throughout the training year.  

Now that Comms command has been tossed into the Militia basket & Medical types have been spun out - into their own command, not sure what standards are being applied.


----------



## Monsoon

geo said:
			
		

> The Air, Nav & Comms were Reserves .... while everyone else (Arty, Armd RECCE, Engrs, Infantry, Svcs) were all "militia".  Air, Nav & Comms would all take the regular BMQ in St Jean... VS the BMQ/SQ courses given by local CBG schools throughout the training year.



Actually, NAVRES (along with some AirRes) runs its own BMQ school in Borden just like the CBGs. The only difference is that the NAVRES/AirRes course has CDA certification as meeting the reg force BMQ standard, which they manage to do by making a bit of the training (first aid, SHARP, etc) modular and run at the unit before the summer courses. Also gives flexibility so that NAVRES/AirRes guys can get sent on the St-Jean courses if there's space available during the winter. I've never understood why the militia hasn't troubled to get CDA certification; guess it's a case of "different ships, different cap tallies."


----------



## dapaterson

Because, after assessment, there's a lot of "fluff" on the Reg F course not needed by the average Reservist.

This does speak to a much larger problem:  today's corruption of the Reserves into a "Reg F lite" organization, with thousands upon thousands of Reservists employed on a continuing full-time basis, performign ongoing, continuing tasks related to the Defence of Canada.  That is the role (and legal definition) of the Regular Force.

A Reserve is held back and committed to decisively defeat the enemy - and once committed is a new reserve is rebuilt.

Today, we have the Air Reserve committed and unable to surge to provide aditional augmentation.  That Reserve is spent.

The Nav Res has ongoing defence of Canada tasks in manning the MCDVs.  That represents over 10% of their paid strength (or about 15% of their paid trained strength).  Throw in management of the formation plus twenty odd NRDs and there is a very limted surge capability remaining - particularly in key leadership ranks (*), which have over 50% of their pers on full-time service.

The Army Reserve has about 1/3 of its paid strength on full-time Service; at key leadership ranks close to 50% are on full-time service.

The commitment of the Reserves was made on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis, without an overriding national plan, meaning low-priority tasks are being performed at the expense of higher priority activities.  We have no plan to reconstitute a reserve, leaving the CF without any significant surge capability.

It's time for a long, hard look at how we are abusing the spirit and letter of the law vis a vis Reg and Res F.  It's time to be honest:  if we need permanent full-time personnel to perform a function, that is the role of the Regular Force - and if we lack the reg F PYs to perform a task, we either get out of the business, drop a lower priority item, or go to government to get priorities.  No more "Reg F on 85% of the pay" - unless we move to a different Reg F paradigm, with sliding pay scales depending on post-ability (if that's a word) and deployability.


But right now, we've broken things badly - and no one wants to 'fess up, or try fixing the mess.

(*) For these purposes, MS/MCPL through CPO2/MWO, and Lt(N)/Capt and LCdr/Maj


----------



## geo

well said DAP
Saw the CLS last night on the news.... Broken vehicles, broken army.... broken reserve/militia.... might as well line up our ducks and look at talking to our political masters about fixing em all at the same time.


----------



## Monsoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Because, after assessment, there's a lot of "fluff" on the Reg F course not needed by the average Reservist.


Agreed. In fact, I would argue that there's a lot of "fluff" on BMQ that isn't needed by most people in the Reg F, either.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> This does speak to a much larger problem:  today's corruption of the Reserves into a "Reg F lite" organization, with thousands upon thousands of Reservists employed on a continuing full-time basis, performign ongoing, continuing tasks related to the Defence of Canada.  That is the role (and legal definition) of the Regular Force.


I'm not going to go there - suffice it to say that the powers that be have decided what the role of the reserve will be in the Canada, regardless of historical (and legal) definitions.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Nav Res has ongoing defence of Canada tasks in manning the MCDVs.  That represents over 10% of their paid strength (or about 15% of their paid trained strength).  Throw in management of the formation plus twenty odd NRDs and there is a very limted surge capability remaining - particularly in key leadership ranks (*), which have over 50% of their pers on full-time service.


Actually, it's closer to 50% of TES for all ranks, at the moment.


----------



## Kirkhill

So what you seem to be suggesting to this ex-Militiaman is that the Regs should be handling the expeditionary commitments, the standing patrols in defence of Canada and all the administrative burden.

The Militia would be focused on supplying people with pointy sticks, people to serve the guns and various drivers. ie, not a full slate of soldierly skills but people with a narrowly focused set of skills that are required when things go pear-shaped.

In the meantime, they are more valuable for their civic commitment than for any of the more esoteric military skills they might have.

Seems like a reasonable prescription to me.


----------



## Haggis

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Actually, NAVRES (along with some AirRes) runs its own BMQ school in Borden just like the CBGs. The only difference is that the NAVRES/AirRes course has CDA certification as meeting the reg force BMQ standard, which they manage to do by making a bit of the training (first aid, SHARP, etc) modular and run at the unit before the summer courses. Also gives flexibility so that NAVRES/AirRes guys can get sent on the St-Jean courses if there's space available during the winter. I've never understood why the militia hasn't troubled to get CDA certification; guess it's a case of "different ships, different cap tallies."



An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.


----------



## Monsoon

Haggis said:
			
		

> An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.


CDA certification is certification by the CDA to grant the same MITE code for the qualifications - my understanding is that the MITE codes were differentiated between militia and regular force BMQ, though I could be mistaken. Is what you're saying that the completion of SQ along with militia BMQ grants the same MITE code as regular force BMQ and SQ?


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So what you seem to be suggesting to this ex-Militiaman is that the Regs should be handling the expeditionary commitments, the standing patrols in defence of Canada and all the administrative burden.



Should there be a surge need (for skills scarce in the Reg F, or to meet unplanned expeditions) make a conscious decision to bring the Reserves on line.  Or, better yet, for a situation like A'stan today, stand up the Special Force - bring a BG together for 3 years: 12 mos training, 6 mos deployed, 6 mos recovery / confirmation trg, 6 mos deployed, 6 mos leave - and get two tours out of them vice the one we get now.



> The Militia would be focused on supplying people with pointy sticks, people to serve the guns and various drivers. ie, not a full slate of soldierly skills but people with a narrowly focused set of skills that are required when things go pear-shaped.



A part-time organization cannot maintain the full skillset - it's not cost or time effective to do so.



> In the meantime, they are more valuable for their civic commitment than for any of the more esoteric military skills they might have.
> 
> Seems like a reasonable prescription to me.



Indeed, it's worked well historically.

The decision to "Regular-ify" the Reserves must be revisted - if we need limited deployabilty full-time pers ("Post me and I release!"), make it a Reg F subcomponent.  If the Reg F refuses a task because it's not sexy enough, start firing General and Flag officers until you get one who will obey an order.


(Edit for typos)


----------



## Haggis

Hamiltongs:

What I'm saying is that if an Army Reservist CTs to the Reg F and has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ s/he will be granted Reg F BMQ (AINT).  This will likely be accomplished through a PLAR.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

geo said:
			
		

> well said DAP
> Saw the CLS last night on the news.... Broken vehicles, broken army.... broken reserve/militia.... might as well line up our ducks and look at talking to our political masters about fixing em all at the same time.



Exactly what he is trying to do.  A lot of thought went into that speech, and the testimony.   The Press conference not so much - that was an ambush scrum pure and simple.

Bottom line - he spoke truth to power.


----------



## geo

(a play from the Codfather's play book ?)


----------



## PMedMoe

Not sure if this belongs here or not.

Army looking to overhaul reserves through amalgamation

The Canadian Armed Forces are set to amalgamate some of the current 140 regiments into a smaller number of bigger units, CBC News has learned.

The changes would come into effect after Canada concludes its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011.

"We are going to mess with the basic structure of the army reserve," Brig.-Gen. Gary O'Brien, the head of the army reserve, told CBC News in an interview. "It isn't about closing more locations or getting smaller — it's about getting more efficient."

Many of the army's reserve units have about 100 soldiers each, and those regiments are often too small to train for large operations, O'Brien said.

He also said it's hard to find qualified soldiers to lead units, and creating a smaller number of larger units is an attempt to address that problem.

More on link.


----------



## ltmaverick25

Well I guess that settles our debate!  If it is implemented well, I think this could be a very good thing for the army reserves.


----------



## dapaterson

PMedMoe said:
			
		

> Brig.-Gen. Gary O'Brien, the head of the army reserve, told CBC News in an interview.



No, he isn't.  He's the senior advisor to CLS on Reserve issues, but there is no formation "The Army Reserve", unlike Nav Res.

Army Reserve units are part of formations (usually CBGs) which in turn are part of Land Force Areas, which in turn report to the Army Commander.

BGen O'Brien is staff, not line.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No, he isn't.  He's the senior advisor to CLS on Reserve issues, but there is no formation "The Army Reserve", unlike Nav Res.
> 
> Army Reserve units are part of formations (usually CBGs) which in turn are part of Land Force Areas, which in turn report to the Army Commander.
> 
> BGen O'Brien is staff, not line.



Sounds like piss poor reporting by the MSM.


----------



## Haggis

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Sounds like piss poor reporting by the MSM.



And that surprises you how, again?


----------



## PMedMoe

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Sounds like piss poor reporting by the MSM.



As usual.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Haggis said:
			
		

> And that surprises you how, again?



Never said it did  ;D


----------



## cavalryman

PMedMoe said:
			
		

> The Canadian Armed Forces are set to amalgamate some of the current 140 regiments into a smaller number of bigger units, CBC News has learned.



Cue the honoraries and regimental mafi...er, senates in three.... two.... one....


Hope they have a good plan to carry it through the inevitable political s***storm that's coming down-range.  We're way overdue for rationalisation


----------



## geo

well... things should be interesting for the next little while

Here I am sitting on the sidelines op:


----------



## Shec

Just out of curiousity does anybody have any insights into the effect of  the recent Brit Army unit amalagamations upon esprit d'corps and the regimental family.  Or closer to home, the effects upon morale  of rolling up the QoRC, Canadian Guards, RHC, and FGH into the PPCLI, RCR, and LdSh back in the Trudeau era?


----------



## Haggis

Shec said:
			
		

> Just out of curiousity does anybody have any insights into the effect of  the recent Brit Army unit amalagamations upon esprit d'corps and the regimental family.  Or closer to home, the effects upon morale  of rolling up the QoRC, Canadian Guards, RHC, and FGH into the PPCLI, RCR, and LdSh back in the Trudeau era?



Umm, I think we've fared OK.  Ask the Taliban if amalgamation has affected the Canadian Army's ability to destroy them in detail.  Clients provide good feedback, y'know.


----------



## Shec

Touche


----------



## geo

The big changes that happened back in the late 60s resulted in the trashing of the Blue, black & khaki uniforms.  That's what got a lot of people spinning in a tizzie & resulted in old salts bailing out.  The decommissionning of ships, the closing down of Air squadrons & the amalgamation of Regiments/Batallions is all part of a military's life cycle.


----------



## daftandbarmy

It will be interesting to see how the Conservative Government reacts to a frontal assault by the Conservative Honouraries. Hey, is that a piper I see marching through the high street and gathering the clans?  iper:


----------



## noneck

D&B - Led by an Ex Speaker of the House of Commons no doubt!


----------



## Old Sweat

It may very well be, said he talking through his hat, that general approval from the honouraries has been obtained. It also may be, still using his chapeau as a mouthpiece, that a certain BGen has either spoken too soon or has launched a pre-emptive strike against CLS. 

My rationale for the first suggestion is the example of the 1936 reorganization of the militia by the grandfather of CLS when he was the Chief of the General Staff. It had been conceived in 1932 in order to support an expeditionary force of one cavalry and six infantry divisions for a war in Europe, but it took until 1936 to convince the militia hierarchy that it was a good thing. It may be that the emergence of the Fuhrer may have focussed the attention of the honouraries, but that is just a guess.

My rationale for the second option is good, old-fashioned paranoia.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Well, there has been rather more stringent political oversight on appointments of honoraries in the past few years, hasn't there?


----------



## dapaterson

I do not see this as a preemptive strike against the CLS - I have some knowledge of both men, and BGen O'Brien is loyal and would not work to undermine his boss.  He's also a bit of a pit bull and enjoys a challenge.  I think a dedicated communication plan will follow, to ensure honoraries and communities understand that there is no intent to remove the military presence from communities, but rather to streamline some of the C2 arrangements, and if anything make the force more responsive and able to assist when called upon.


Without telling tales out of school:  there has always been significant political oversight on the appointment of honoraries; it may be that recently the curtain was pulled back a bit and people are more able to see the work of the great and powerful Oz.  There are also, on occasion, nominations submitted that the sponsors should reasonably have known would never fly - almost to the point of "We'd like to nominate John Wilkes Booth as the honorary for Lincoln's Footguards".


----------



## Michael OLeary

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are also, on occasion, nominations submitted that the sponsors should reasonably have known would never fly - almost to the point of "We'd like to nominate John Wilkes Booth as the honorary for Lincoln's Footguards".



I can see that on the checklist of items to determines units most likely to be amalgamated:

_"Does this unit consistently nominate inappropriate persons to be their honoraries? (Inappropriate nominations will include political assassins, porn stars, raving lunatics and Liberals/NDP/Bloc/Conservatives (delete current ruling party).)_


----------



## daftandbarmy

noneck said:
			
		

> D&B - Led by an Ex Speaker of the House of Commons no doubt!



Yes, and who also happens to be trained in battle group attacks with CAS provided by P51 Mustangs - luckily :dileas:


----------



## len173

So how exactly does this work? They are talking about closing down many reserve units, I gather? Or does this simply mean, they lose their identity, and become part of a bigger unit? I guess what I'm asking is, will they close down a bunch of armouries? And how does that make any sense, because will it not cost many jobs, as many will leave the reserves. How do you properly train on a regular basis, if you have to travel a great distance to the armoury? How do you parade every week, when people have to travel from all around to be there?

I'm curious, because my application is in right now for the reserves, and I would hate to see the armoury here closed down in 2011, which would be right as I was finishing up my MOC training.


----------



## Michael OLeary

There are some locations where armouries and units are not widely separated, even of units of the same type.  There are other places where relative strengths could see a joining of units into an amalgamated unit organization leaving the same number of locations, armouries and troops, but a more streamlined command structure.  Economies can be made without losing positions.  It's the emotional barriers to change that are hardest to overcome.


----------



## gwp

Defence policy is not about, nor should it be concerned with, preserving units, perpetuating units, services, traditions, and so on. National defence policy is about defending Canada.” Douglas Bland (mid 1990's)

This document is worth reading particularly Chapter Six

http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/B-GL-300-008-FP-001.pdf

This historical perspective 

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo3/no2/doc/5-12-eng.pdf


----------



## geo

Len,
I do not see armouries being closed down or the number of boots on the ground changing much BUT, the distribution by rank will change over time.
Do you really need a LCol & CWO to oversee a unit that parades 100 troops on a good day ?
100 troops = a good company.... led by a Maj & MWO.

If we borrow a page out of the British army's reorganisation and "canadianize" it, I would see something like this happening:

The Vanier Regiment
A coy, The Black Watch
B coy, The Royal Montreal Regiment
C coy, The Canadian Grenadier Guards

Le Régiment De Salabery
A coy, Les Fusiliers Mont Royal
B coy, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
C coy, Le Régiment de Chateauguay (aka 4 R22R)

The point here is - does Montreal need 6 small understrength battalions ?
When they train together, the Montreal units already shake out and make up composite Infantry battalions... doesn't it make sense to make the arrangements permanent ?


----------



## WLSC

geo said:
			
		

> Len,
> I do not see armouries being closed down or the number of boots on the ground changing much BUT, the distribution by rank will change over time.
> Do you really need a LCol & CWO to oversee a unit that parades 100 troops on a good day ?
> 100 troops = a good company.... led by a Maj & MWO.
> 
> If we borrow a page out of the British army's reorganisation and "canadianize" it, I would see something like this happening:
> 
> The Vanier Regiment
> A coy, The Black Watch
> B coy, The Royal Montreal Regiment
> C coy, The Canadian Grenadier Guards
> 
> Le Régiment De Salabery
> A coy, Les Fusiliers Mont Royal
> B coy, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
> C coy, Le Régiment de Chateauguay (aka 4 R22R)
> 
> The point here is - does Montreal need 6 small understrength battalions ?
> When they train together, the Montreal units already shake out and make up composite Infantry battalions... doesn't it make sense to make the arrangements permanent ?



You're forgetting 6 R22R.  There's 7 inf unit in the Montreal region.

I would suggest 

The ??? Regiment
A coy, The Canadian Grenadier Guards
B coy, The Black Watch
C coy, The Royal Montreal Regiment
C&S

Le 5 R22R
cie A 4 R22R (Laval)
cie B 6 R22R (St-Hyacinthe)
C&S

Le régiment de ???
Cie A Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
Cie B Le régiment de Maisonneuve
C&S

I know, 2 bn with 2 coy but I thing the pills would be easer to swallow like that.  The brigade would have 3 inf regt, like's it suppose to be.


----------



## tango22a

The only problem that I can see surfacing is the fact that it is being IMPOSED from on high and there is NO attempt at engaging PRes buy-in. IF it is done this way it's gonna lead to a lot of resistance IMHO.

Still babbling away,

tango22a

In other words there is going to be a big can of worms decaying and stinking up a large number of Armouries. Mark my words People!


----------



## WLSC

tango22a said:
			
		

> The only problem that I can see surfacing is the fact that it is being IMPOSED from on high and there is NO attempt at engaging PRes buy-in. IF it is done this way it's gonna lead to a lot of resistance IMHO.



I remember in the 90's when the 10/90 bn were form.  The Reg F complain that not a lot of reservist showed up at their exercices.  What was missing was good marketing from there part.  Nobody knew what they were so nobody showed up.  Marketing as been tried but since the 10/90 staff did not fully comprehend what was happening, well the succes was...weak

It's a nice wish but it will be push by above.  Because it is the way business his done.  Then, feed back and then, 2 step back...under a new name.


----------



## cavalryman

tango22a said:
			
		

> In other words there is going to be a big can of worms decaying and stinking up a large number of Armouries. Mark my words People!



Being in the middle of things, my take is that the awareness the current system is unsustainable is getting pretty widespread among the younger officers and troops - they're ready to listen to ideas that will give them better, more valid training under more solid leadership.  Most of the decaying and stinking will likely come from the old dinosaurs who still have a bit of the "social club" mentality (and every unit has at least one of those - useful in a narrow sense, but no longer living in the current reality), and the retired COs or honoraries whose grasp of the reality on the armoury floor is tenuous at best.

Watch and shoot.

This will be interesting, and an opportunity to forge a better army.  If our mother army, the British one could do it with regular regiments whose battle honours pre-date European settlement in Canada, then surely we can rationalise 100 man "battalions" like soldiers instead of perpetuating the old Militia sensitivities that earned us (deservedly) so much scorn from the professionals in the past.

iper:


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> In other words there is going to be a big can of worms decaying and stinking up a large number of Armouries. Mark my words People!



The big cans of worms are already there, and have been for a long time.  They're the ones who have consistently resisted any change that might have improved the training environment for Reserve soldiers.  The complete lack of "grass roots" buy in and proposals for change over decades have led to the inevitable - top down command direction.  Gee, what a concept for an ARMY to use.   It's long time that we got past those remnants of any era driven by a perception that change could only occur if all the regimental mafias agreed.


----------



## tango22a

Gentlemen:
Will be off this means for approx. five (5) days due to other commitments (visiting new granddaughter).
Please carry on trashing my babbling. You aren't going to change your minds and I won't change mine.

See you all next week,

tango22a

Proud member of Regimental Mafia!


----------



## Haggis

Hello, everybody.  My name is Haggis and I am a Dinosaur.

However, I have no desire to follow in the footsteps of my Jurassic predecessors and become extinct at the hands of some bureaucrat.

I think it's time for everyone, young and old, in the Army Reserve to suck back and prepare to engage in a constructive and positive manner.

Past attempts at "restructiring", as dapaterson astutely pointed out, have crashed in the ditch and burned because people were driving emotionally rather than skillfully.  Lets not waste a ton of time, resources and energy by doing that again (it was soooo much fun last time).

TANGO22A: See?  Old dogs can learn new tricks!


----------



## McG

len173 said:
			
		

> So how exactly does this work? They are talking about closing down many reserve units, I gather? Or does this simply mean, they lose their identity, and become part of a bigger unit? I guess what I'm asking is, will they close down a bunch of armouries? And how does that make any sense, because will it not cost many jobs, as many will leave the reserves. How do you properly train on a regular basis, if you have to travel a great distance to the armoury? How do you parade every week, when people have to travel from all around to be there?


Your questions likely can only be answered with speculation.  If you read back through the entirety of this thread, you will see that it is possible to ammalgamate unit level command structures without closing locations, destroying unit identities, or compromising capabilities.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> The only problem that I can see surfacing is the fact that it is being IMPOSED from on high and there is NO attempt at engaging PRes buy-in.


You don't know this.  Just because it has not been consulted down to the level of every Cpl/Pte does not mean that discussion has not occured ... decisions perhapse shaped by conferences with the reserve Comds & RSMs of the CBGs.  Even if lower input has been limited (or not there) that does not mean this need be the case for fleshing-out the implementation.  One should expect that consultation will percolate downwards as the plan develops.  COs of unit (including independant sub-uints) along with the Comds of CBGs would hopefully see participation in defining the plan as as the areas begin developing thier strategic visions within the Army's arcs.



			
				FusMR said:
			
		

> Le 5 R22R
> cie A 4 R22R (Laval)
> cie B 6 R22R (St-Hyacinthe)
> C&S


Given that '4' & '6' are battalion numbers and not regimental identity, wouldn't this be Le 4 R22R

Cie A (Laval)
Cie B (St-Hyacinthe)

... alternately, (Ref Here) it could be Le 4 R22R

Cie A (Le Regiment de Chateauguay)
Cie B (St-Hyacinthe Infantry)


----------



## geo

5 R22R was already issued to the Fusiliers du St Laurent.
They accepted the designation up to the moment they were told they had to replace their Cap Badge & "wear the beaver"..... NOT going to happen!

Anyway, there are enought Vandoos already - thank you very much


----------



## Kirkhill

tango22a said:
			
		

> ...... You aren't going to change your minds and I won't change mine.....



A situation that by definition demands arbitration.

Arbitration: the making of an arbitrary decision by someone, anyone.


----------



## Rifleman62

I posted this here previously on: June 24, 2005, 22:54:58 

It was only a matter of time, and the time is now. The Army Reserve needs transformation. We have far too many Reserve units that cannot be sustained. Too many Reserve units that cannot sustain leadership at all levels, especially at the MWO/CWO and Maj/LCol ranks. Unit sucession is difficult. Too many units with less than 75 effective personnel that have a CO, DCO, Adjt, RSM, Trg O, Orderly Room, Unit QM, etc. How many bayonets does that leave? Do we need all this unit infrastructure that we cannot sustain? Our Reserve units have not fought as a unit for over 60 years, and never will ( mobilization is dead, therefore the theory of why we need so many units is dead).In our CBG we have the following in a city of less than 115,000: a Nav Res stone frigrate; an Army Res Inf Bn and Svc Bn; a Coms Res Sqn; and a CFMG Fd Amb.The local area cannot sustain this many units, nor produce the senior leadership. We need to tacticaly group units, and in some cases all the P Res units in location. Why not a LCol or Cdr commanding all five of these units, with one OR, and a  Navy and Army Trg O's.  Sure cuts down on the infransture.  Sure sounds familiar.



Project Management Office
Land Force Reserve Restructure
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON    K1A 0K2
   Bureau de Gestion de projet de la
Restructuration de la réserve de la force terrestre
101, promenade Colonel By
Ottawa (ON)    K1A 0K2
1901-6 (PD LFRR)
   1901-6 (DP RRFT)
24 Jun 05
   Le 24 jun 2005
Distribution List
   Liste de distribution
WARNING ORDER
   ORDRE D'AVERTISSEMENT
SITUATION
   SITUATION
1.     The current Army Reserve Establishment (ARE) dates back to its implementation date of 1 Apr 00 and provides for 25,585 positions in the Human Resources Management System (HRMS). They were developed through a two-year consultative process and are based on the recommendations of the LFRR task forces, which were reviewed by the LFRR Structure Working Group and Command Consultative Working Group. It has received annual incremental changes through the Army Reserve Working Group (AResWG) and Army Reserve Advisory Group (AResAG) but has not been subject to a fundamental review since its inception.
   1.      Le TÉRAT actuel remonte ÃƒÂ  sa mise en Ã…â€œuvre du premier avril 2000 et fournissent 25,585 positions dans le Système de gestion des ressources humaines (SGRH).  Ces tableaux ont été développés suite ÃƒÂ  une consultation étendue sur deux ans, ainsi que sur les recommandations du comité d'étude de la RRFT, et ont été révisés par le groupe de travail sur la structure RRFT et le groupe de travail de consultation du Commandement.  Certains changements annuels ont été implantés ÃƒÂ  travers le groupe de travail de la Réserve de l'Armée (GT RésA) et le groupe consultatif de la Réserve de l'Armée (GC RésA), mais n'ont jamais subi une révision fondamentale depuis leur création.

2.     With the announcement of the Federal Budget 05 and the Defence Policy Statement we know that the intended strength of the Army Reserve for the foreseeable future is 18,500 soldiers. Of this number, 1,100 are allocated to the Medical Reserve (MedRes) and a further 100 are planned to be filled by the Communications Reserve (CommRes) to provide balanced support to a larger Army Reserve.
   2.     Avec l'annonce du budget fédéral 2005 et la déclaration sur la politique de la Défense nous savons que l'effectif envisagé dans le futur immédiat pour la Réserve de l'Armée est de 18,500 soldats.  De ce nombre, 1000 positions sont octroyées ÃƒÂ  la Réserve Médicale (RésMéd), et nous planifions d'octroyer 100 positions ÃƒÂ  la Réserve des communications (Rés Comms) afin qu'il nous fournisse un soutien proportionnel ÃƒÂ  la grandeur de la  Réserve de l'Armée.

3.     The Army Regeneration Plan, the Managed Readiness Plan, and CF Transformation are placing demands on the Army Reserve, the full extent of which is not yet known in sufficient detail.
   3.     Le plan de regénération de l'Armée, le plan de gestion des niveaux de préparation, et le plan de transformation des FC exercent des demandes sur la Réserve de l'Armée dont les détails restent ÃƒÂ  être précisés.

AIM
   BUT
4.     The aim of the ARE Review is to ensure that the Army Reserve establishment reflects the best mix of units and mission element types, and locations to force generate Reservists to fulfill the Army Reserve role.
   4.     Le but cette révision des TÉRATs est de s'assurer que les établissements de la Réserve de l'Armée reflètent le meilleur mélange d'unités, de type d'éléments de mission et d'emplacement afin de générer suffisamment de réservistes pour remplir le rôle de la Réserve de l'Armée.

METHODOLOGY
   MÉTHODOLOGIE
5.     The review will be conducted on two parallel tracks, the results of each being brought together to produce the revised ARE:
   5.     La révision prendra deux avenues parallèles.  Le résultat de chacune sera combiné ÃƒÂ  l'autre afin de produire des TÉRATs révisés.
a.   Track 1. An analysis of defence policy documents will provide a precise measure of the CF expectations of the ARE. All Army Reserve roles and tasks must be considered including:
   a.   Première avenue.  Une analyse des documents contenant la politique de la Défense fournira une mesure précise des attentes des FC envers les TÉRATs.  Toutes les tâches de la Réserve de l'Armée doivent être considérées, comprenant :

i.   framework for mobilization;   i.   cadre de la mobilisation;
ii.   connect with Canadians;   ii.   créer un lien avec les canadiens
iii.   expeditionary operations;   iii.   opérations expéditionnaires;
iv.   domestic operations;   iv.   opérations domestiques;
v.   institutional Army Reserve (to include HQs, training, administration, etc); and
   v.   la Réserve de l'Armée institutionnelle (comprenant les QG, l'instruction, l'administration, etc); et

b.   Track 2. An analysis of existing units and mission elements, along with an understanding of where Canadians are best prepared to support Army Reserve units, will help to determine where Army Reserve units and mission elements should best be located.
   b.   Deuxième avenue.  Une analyse des unités et éléments de mission existantes, avec la compréhension des emplacements ou les canadiens sont prêts ÃƒÂ  soutenir une unité de la Réserve de l'Armée, afin d'aider ÃƒÂ  déterminer les meilleurs endroits ou les éléments de mission et unités de la Réserve de l'Armée devraient être situées.

6.     With respect to Track 1, stakeholders will assist in ensuring that the task list is complete. With respect to Track 2, stakeholders will contribute to determining the criteria from which we can best understand the suitability of a location to sustain an Army Reserve unit/mission element. Criteria to be applied must be objective and verifiable by all concerned.
   6.     Dans le cadre de la première avenue, les parties intéressées sont sollicitées afin de s'assurer que les listes des tâches sont complètes.  Quant ÃƒÂ  la deuxième avenue, nous sollicitons la participation des parties intéressées afin de déterminer les critères par lesquels l'efficacité des sites ÃƒÂ  soutenir un élément de mission/unité de la Réserve de l'Armée sera jugé.  Les critères sélectionnés devront être objectifs et vérifiables par tous.

CONCLUSION
   CONCLUSION
7.     There is no need to reply to this message. This message will be followed, in Jul 05, with a draft directive detailing how the Review will be conducted. All stakeholders will have the opportunity to comment on the methodology and criteria of the Review. It is my intent to table a draft report of the completed ARE review at the 26 Nov 05 CCAG along with deduced recommendations for how to apply the remaining 1500 positions of unallocated LFRR growth (Ph 2c & 2d). The final report recommending the new ARE to CLS should be tabled at the Mar 06 CCAG. Once reviewed, we can expect that the revised ARE will be subjected to further periodic reviews at an interval (3-5 years?) as determined by CLS.
   7.     Aucun besoin de répondre ÃƒÂ  ce message, car ce message sera suivi, en juil 05, par une ébauche d'une directive déterminant comment la révision sera effectuée.  Toutes les parties intéressées auront l'occasion de commenter sur la méthodologie et les critères utilisés pour la révision.  C'est mon intention d'avoir une ébauche de la révision des TÉRATs complétée pour le GCC du 26 nov 05, ainsi que les recommandations déduites pour la détermination des 1500 positions de croissance RRFT (Ph 2c & 2d) non attribuées.  Le rapport final recommandant les nouveaux TÉRATs au CÉMAT devra être complété pour le GCC de mars 06.  Une fois examiné, nous pouvons anticiper que les TÉRATs révisés seront réviser périodiquement ÃƒÂ  un intervalle (3 ÃƒÂ  5 ans) déterminé par le CÉMAT.

O.S.B.
E.S. Fitch
Major General 
Project Manager
Land Force Reserve Restructure
   
Distribution List
   
CLS
ACLS
DGLS
DGLandRes
LFA//Comd//DComd//COS
LFDTS Kingston//Comd//COS
Land Staff Directors
Council of Honourary Colonels
Reserves 2000

INFO

DGSP
CBG//Comd   CÉMAT
ACÉMAT
DGÉMAT
DG Rés FT  
SFT// Comdt//CmdtA//CÉM
SDIFT Kingston//Cmdt//CÉM
Directeurs EMAT
Conseil des Colonels Honoraires
Réserves 2000

INFO

DGPS
GBC//Comdt


----------



## tango22a

Gentlemen:

Due to "friction de guerre" will not be gone until tomorrow.

Haggis: agreed

Micheal and Dap: I have nothing against becoming "brigaded" with say 1H as long my OLD regiment retains its cap badge/honours/affiliation.

e.g.: A Sqdn 1H London
        B Sqdn WindsorR Windsor    > Composite Armored Recce Regiment
        C Sqdn 1H Sarnia

How does this strike you?

Babbling away,

tango22a


----------



## McG

tango22a said:
			
		

> Micheal and Dap: I have nothing against becoming "brigaded" with say 1H as long my OLD regiment retains its cap badge/honours/affiliation.
> 
> e.g.: A Sqdn 1H London
> B Sqdn WindsorR Windsor
> C Sqdn 1H Sarnia
> 
> How does this strike you?


This is basicly the type of grouping which has been suggested all along.  To further protect sensitivities, this organization could be known as 31st Armour (or Cavalry) Battalion.



			
				FusMR said:
			
		

> There's 7 inf unit in the Montreal region.  I would suggest
> 
> The ??? Regiment
> ...
> 
> Le 5 R22R
> ...
> 
> Le régiment de ???
> ...


Again, protecting sensitivities by avoiding the word "regiment" in naming the amalgamated HQs, I would go with:

1 Bn, X CBG
2 Bn, X CBG
4 R22eR, X CBG

... and the current size/boundaries of existing CBGs should also not be considered untouchable during a restructure.  Maybe we have too many or too few CBGs.


----------



## tango22a

Kirkhill:

I am not against arbitration as long as it is not imposed ... "You will lose your identity, whether you like it or not...so assume the position... and SMILE!!... this will hurt you more than it will me, but it WILL be good for you!

Still babbling,

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

MCG:

31st RECCE REGIMENT...Please

More babbling,

tango22a


----------



## McG

... but the regiments will be in the sub-units.


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Micheal and Dap: I have nothing against becoming "brigaded" with say 1H as long my OLD regiment retains its cap badge/honours/affiliation.
> 
> e.g.: A Sqdn 1H London
> B Sqdn WindsorR Windsor    > Composite Armored Recce Regiment
> C Sqdn 1H Sarnia
> 
> How does this strike you?



Hmmm, first can you tell us which period of your regiment's history is effectively your "OLD" regiment for the purpose of this discussion? What happened to the cap badge of the Essex Regiment (Tank)?  Are we talking about the period before or only after the "Windsor" naming was adopted in 1949?  

You are aware that honours and affiliations are not discarded in amalgamations, right?


----------



## dapaterson

Five years ago I built, over an afternoon, a quick paper structure for the Reserves, starting at the bottom and building up.  Obviously, a paper model would need much tweaking to fit the actual terrain, but the quick and dirty check suggested something on the order of 100 full-up trained companies organized into 25 bns of various types (with HQ and some admin), grouped into 5 brigade structures (with HQ sigs), plus a training setup with the recruits and personnel to provide their DP1 training and administration would all fit within the current paid strength limit for the Army Reserve.


Of course, when reaching formation level, is it necessary to have "pure" Reg and Res formations, or could we mix both Reg and Res units within a formation?  All interesting questions...


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

Just to poke the fire a little... I don't see your Regiment (oops sorry!) Battalion being asked to give up its cap badge.

Really Babbling,

tango22a

P.S.:
As I noted before I don't mind being under another regiment for admin...Done it many times at Milcon... I Just don't want to give up my identity ... Be it The Essex Regiment (Tank) or The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) even if I am no longer active. Even if retired I am still proud of having once been a WINDSOR.


----------



## dapaterson

Actually, 4 RCR gave up its identities many amalgamations ago.  but at this time, removal of cap-badges isn't on the table - having one HQ with multiple badges beneath it is the concept (and what has been done in London (England)).

And re: Naming:  I prefer "31st (Iron Fist) Recce Regiment"


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> 
> Just to poke the fire a little... I don't see your Regiment (oops sorry!) Battalion being asked to give up its cap badge.
> 
> Really Babbling,
> 
> tango22a



Ever hear of The Canadian Fusiliers or The Oxford Rifles?

http://www.theroyalcanadianregiment.ca/history/general_history/perpetuation.htm


----------



## tango22a

MCG:

The regiments may be in the structure... Just as long as BSqdn 31st Recce Regiment retains its cap badge.

Babbling away,

tango22a


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

Sure did , Was on course with many of them. They always  called themselves 3RCR or 4RCR with London and Oxford Fusiliers in brackets after either 3RCR or 4RCR.

The Babbler,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> 
> Sure did , Was on course with many of them. They always  called themselves 3RCR or 4RCR with London and Oxford Fusiliers in brackets after either 3RCR or 4RCR.
> 
> The Babbler,
> 
> tango22a



Yup, and they survived changes of name and cap badges and soldiered on proudly.  Just like the soldiers in your "old" regiment will if it happens to them.  

The point is, we're not just talking about "your" regiment, amalgamations and changes have happened to others and it hasn't killed their history or their pride.


----------



## Command-Sense-Act 105

X


----------



## tango22a

dapaterson:

Agreed as long as cap badges are retained and The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) does NOT become B (Windsor) Sqdn 1H

Really, really babbling,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Agreed as long as cap badges are retained and The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) does NOT become B (Windsor) Sqdn 1H



And, what if it does?


----------



## McG

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> What is this "PRes buy-in"?
> 
> Where are we - a marketing seminar trying to convince Generation Y to buy new iPods or switch brands of toliet paper?
> 
> I was always under the impression that PRes personnel are all soldiers, therefore subject to the Code of Service Discipline and all Res units subject to following orders and direction from their requisite formation and higher commanders.  Whatever happened to orders being issued, then followed, even if it means hanging up the colours/standard/guidon?


To be fair, I’ve seen more than a few plans/initiatives fail in the regular force because those who were supposed to implement (leaders including senior leaders) did not accept the direction, dragged heels, avoided the issue, became passive-aggressive, and generally displayed insubordination related to the contested topic.


----------



## geo

MCG said:
			
		

> To be fair, I’ve seen more than a few plans/initiatives fail in the regular force because those who were supposed to implement (leaders including senior leaders) did not accept the direction, dragged heels, avoided the issue, became passive-aggressive, and generally displayed insubordination related to the contested topic.



Been to any aromured corp meetings ?

have a couple of friends who have attended those over the years - much ado about nothing.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> To be fair, I’ve seen more than a few plans/initiatives fail in the regular force because those who were supposed to implement (leaders including senior leaders) did not accept the direction, dragged heels, avoided the issue, became passive-aggressive, and generally displayed insubordination related to the contested topic.



I'll second that.  There have been direct orders ignored due to a claimed lack of resources, while other iniitatives not directed were pursued instead.  Or branches doing their own thing, confusing technical advice with command authority.

The Reg F posting cycle of 2 or at most 3 years in a job exacerbates problems, as few people are around long enough to be held accountable for their actions - by the time impacts are felt or noted, "Well, it was the last guy - I'm just making the best of a bad situation."

Add to that the PowerPoint briefing, which shows everything in ADD-friendly chunks but provides no holistic understanding and you've got the current issues.


----------



## Old Sweat

Gang,

It probably will come as no surprise, but this sort of stuff went on before power point was a gleam in somebody's eye. Heck, it went on before the inventor of power point was a gleam in somebody's eye. 

The whole dang thing was and is exacerbated by the ability of the system to outlast ideas, good and bad, that do not have wide spread acceptance. The only exception is when the person reforming inspite of corporate (k)oncerns (pr.ck) is of sufficient rank and energy to ramrod the project through the system. In fact even one detractor can derail a project by application of dynamic inertia. Given the tendency of people to come up with flashy, apparently brilliant concepts out of thin air that can not withstand sober second (or perhaps first) thought this is not always a bad thing.

In this case, however, it seems that the proposal has been studied to a death of feline proportions.


----------



## McG

The way to protect against this sort of subversion of orders, at least outside of operational environments, is for commanders to include the commanders 1-2 levels down in the development of institutional strategy ... coincidentally, this practice would also protect the CF from 'good idea fairies' imposing bad/inappropriate practices while in search of that leading change point on the PER.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

Sometimes I can be led to think:  " why bother with him"  but then I remember an old saying: "never RPT never get in a pi$$ ing contest with a skunk"  And as I (SUPERSKUNK) will again tell you that If this idea of rebadging ( which you seem to support) carries on that I would counsel you (and various others) not be in the back-blast area when this whole gigantic can of worms explodes.

Cheers.

tango22a (SUPERSKUNK)


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> 
> Sometimes I can be led to think:  " why bother with him" but then I remember an old saying: "never RPT NEVER get in a pi$$ ing contest with a skunk"  And as I (SUPERSKUNK) will again tell you that If this idea of rebadging ( which you seem to support) carries on that I would counsel you (and various others) not be in the back-blast area when this whole gigantic can of worms explodes.
> 
> Cheers.
> 
> tango22a (SUPERSKUNK)



I notice you like to hint at significant reactions when your readiness to participate in logical debate fails.  What are you suggesting? A military coup because someone decides to rebadge your regiment?

Yeah, silly suggestion, isn't it?

I guess as a retired member you really have two main choices when your "old" regiment is amalgamated

Option 1 - You can be an aggressive element in a new combined regimental association to ensure that all existing and new soldiers learn to honour the important aspects of your shared past histories.

Option 2 - You can sulk in a corner with a dying "old regiment" association group, refusing to acknowledge anything after the date of amalgamation until, eventually, the last man dies and you are forgotten.

It's a simple choice, and neither of them include getting in the way of the Army's process to be more efficient at what it does, i.e., training soldiers.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

" It ain't over until the fat lady sings"  and I will not sit  solemnly in a corner crying in my beer or other sort of beverage. Admittedly I lack the experience of RegF insight, but I can recognize when a bum deal is presented to me. I am positive that more than a few others feel the same way I do.Mindless attention to orders is not one of my bad points.

Superskunking to my best ability,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> " It ain't over until the fat lady sings"  and I will not sit  solemnly in a corner crying in my beer or other sort of beverage. Admittedly I lack the experience of RegF insight, but I can recognize when a bum deal is presented to me. I am positive that more than a few others feel the same way I do.Mindless attention to orders is not one of my bad points.



What does that even mean?  What are your realistic courses of action, since you seem to believe you have some?


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

If you think that I am rock-headed, wait until they try to re-badge The Essex & Kent Scottish as 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment!

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael:
> 
> If you think that I am rock-headed, wait until they try to re-badge The Essex & Kent Scottish as 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment!
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> tango22a



Uh, we've already got a 4th Battalion.  And changing the subject doesn't make the unanswered questions go away.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

There's not really much this battered old  PRes soldier can do but indicate my opposition to this travesty.
Especially since this re-badging has your obvious support. 

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Monsoon

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> In our CBG we have the following in a city of less than 115,000: a Nav Res stone frigrate; an Army Res Inf Bn and Svc Bn; a Coms Res Sqn; and a CFMG Fd Amb. The local area cannot sustain this many units, nor produce the senior leadership.


I assure you do NOT have a Naval Reserve unit in your CBG. And since that looks like Victoria I'm going to have to point out that MALAHAT has had no difficulty generating command and admin staff, and parades over 130.


----------



## GDawg

I haven't read the entire thread, has anyone mentioned the Comm Res experiment? I know that 73 Comm GP amalgamated into an Alberta Comms Regiment, but has since disintegrated back into 3 separate squadrons. Now my understanding is that the Comm Res is being dismantled, transferring to the army, and amalgamating into some type of grouping of Int, Sigs, and Psyops units. The official name escapes me but I've referred to the concept units as "nerd herds". Any plan to scrap HQ's is a step forwards in my books...but I'm jumping ship to the Reg force so I have no personal stake in the matter of reserve restructure.


----------



## tango22a

Michael:

Maybe it could happen that 4RCR would re-badge to become  a Coy of  The Western Ontario Sottish Regiment. How would you feel then? Nah, never happen The Royal Canadian Regiment is TOO entrenched in the order of battle.

Cheers,

tango22a


----------



## Rifleman62

hamiltongs

Correct. 

Thunder Bay was the loc. In 38 CBG's *AOR * there are stone frigates in the cities of Saskatoon. Regina, Winnipeg and Thunder Bay for a total of four.


----------



## Michael OLeary

tango22a,

You are defending the idea of never again changing a unit that has changed its badge and name before.  What is it about your personal period of service that was so significant that the unit should never undergo any further evolution?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

<stirs pot>

how about 31 CER

 ;D


----------



## 2 Cdo

Folks the Regular Force went through this years ago with troops being rebadged against their will and they all survived. So will you.


----------



## bLUE fOX

What really is the concern here? each unit should have the same level of training in their specific element right? The First Hussars are armored, the Windsor regiment is armored, can it not be concluded the troops serving in both regiments should have similar levels of training and skill in their job? and should perhaps even be interchangeable between the two regiments? Isn't that the point of the reserves anyway? to produce a soldier who is interchangeable with his regular force counterpart? If this is the case then what does it matter what badge the soldier is operating under, so long as he is still doing his job? Or perhaps speaking out of my lane

Cheers


----------



## Michael OLeary

bLUE fOX said:
			
		

> What really is the concern here? each unit should have the same level of training in their specific element right? The First Hussars are armored, the Windsor regiment is armored, can it not be concluded the troops serving in both regiments should have similar levels of training and skill in their job? and should perhaps even be interchangeable between the two regiments? Isn't that the point of the reserves anyway? to produce a soldier who is interchangeable with his regular force counterpart? If this is the case then what does it matter what badge the soldier is operating under, so long as he is still doing his job? Or perhaps speaking out of my lane
> 
> Cheers



Training standards aren't the issue being discussed here.  The issue is whether emotional attachment to regimental badges, names and traditions should take precedence over Army intentions to reorganize, amalgamate, or even disband units, in order to create a more efficient and effective force.


----------



## tango22a

Michael and NFLD Sapper:

MY Regiment was the first in Canada to be established as an Armoured Regiment from the ground up. We were also the first wearers of the Black Beret in the Canadian army. We have won many awards as the BEST PRes  Armoured Regiment in Ontario and have won The Worthington Trophy as the best PRes Armoured Regiment in Canada.

As for the 31st CER (The Elgin Regiment) I still don't agree with what was done to them, which is probably what will eventually happen to my old Regiment...31st ROWPU Regiment (The Windsor Water-Tenders)

tango22a


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Could be worst you could be an ONT R

 ;D


----------



## George Wallace

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael and NFLD Sapper:
> 
> MY Regiment was the first in Canada to be established as an Armoured Regiment from the ground up. We were also the first wearers of the Black Beret in the Canadian army. We have won many awards as the BEST PRes  Armoured Regiment in Ontario and have won The Worthington Trophy as the best PRes Armoured Regiment in Canada.
> 
> As for the 31st CER (The Elgin Regiment) I still don't agree with what was done to them, which is probably what will eventually happen to my old Regiment...31st ROWPU Regiment (The Windsor Water-Tenders)
> 
> tango22a



I have to side with Michael here and say that you are way off base and just being an "Alarmist".  I sure hope you are not playing in the Stock Markets.

First off, the Elgins have changed role several times in their history, as has Regiments like the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish.  This is something that you should actually look into, the Regimental histories of all of Canada's Army Units, not just the PRes.  You will be quite shocked, if what you have posted so far is any indication of your knowledge of history.

As for the Windsor's becoming A Sqn or B Sqn of the 1H, then I think you are totally out to lunch on that as well.  Perhaps it will be A Sqn the SOR (Windsor Regiment) and B Sqn the SOR (1H) - (South Ontario Regiment), but highly unlikely that you would become a Sqn of the 1H or any other Regiment.  The SOR would only be a RHQ, made up of members wearing the hatbadge of the Windsor's and Hussars.   Probably with a rotation of COs from between the two "Sqns".  It may even not involve a new hatbadge.  It would be an "Administrative Formation" created for Peacetime, but dissolved at time of mobilization.  

Perhaps ?


----------



## Fishbone Jones

tango22a,

Jebus H, will you knock it off! I alluded earlier that yours is not the prevailing mindset around here. We had good times doing what we were doing and we'll have just as good a time, doing whatever they ask us to do in the future. We take the Queen's shilling and do what we're told, so we might as well enjoy ourselves. Heck, if I do learn ROWPUs I'll have a hell of a lot more deployment opportunities than I do now. This old dog can still learn new tricks and maybe it's time to quit sleeping in the dirt after all


----------



## tango22a

George:

I am trying not to be an alarmist, but I really hope you are right in your prediction.

Cheers,

tango22a

Recceguy: will take your advice....I'm THROUGH with this thread!!


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Don't worry. We'll still invite you to the Mess dinner. I'm sure the 76mm Club will still prevail.


----------



## Kirkhill

tango22a said:
			
		

> Michael and NFLD Sapper:
> 
> MY Regiment was the first in Canada to be established as an Armoured Regiment from the ground up. We were also the first wearers of the Black Beret in the Canadian army. We have won many awards as the BEST PRes  Armoured Regiment in Ontario and have won The Worthington Trophy as the best PRes Armoured Regiment in Canada.
> 
> As for the 31st CER (The Elgin Regiment) I still don't agree with what was done to them, which is probably what will eventually happen to my old Regiment...31st ROWPU Regiment (The Windsor Water-Tenders)
> 
> tango22a




And the Royal Scots were the oldest regiment in the British Army (1633).  Amalgamated with the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and redesignated, "Royal Scots and King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland".


Change is.


----------



## cavalryman

Gents,

I'm probably placing my cojones on the Corps chopping block here, but truly - who gives a damn about the capbadges when the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (Cavalry) is a joke outside of its three regular regiments.

Taking, oh... what the heck... LFQA as an example.... the Corps needs to take four fairly useless "Regiments" who can't field a full 8 car troop unless WWIV is at the door and form something called the "5e Régiment de Cavalerie" with four squadrons and and RHQ at a central location to which we will assign the codename of "Montreal".  For those who are wondering about nomenclature... LFQA's regular formation is 5 CMBG and every brigade or area level unit has a "5" as its first digit....

During Ex Noble Guerrier 09, the four cavalry "regiments" in LFQA could barely man a four troop squadron, with precious little experience or depth among the senior ranks.  From where I sit, in the frustrating situation of trying to train a credible force and failing, especially in light of the new "tasks" coming down the road, the last thing I really give a damn about are cap badges.

Tango 22a - with all due respect to your service, you are out of line, time and reality.  If I'm no where near worried about my regiment disappearing in a rationalisation that will produce a better army - and I'm a serving officer - I really don't give a damn about the sensitivities of retirees worrying about the WestBumFrack Regiment of Horse disappearing.  I have bigger worries, like how to fill a NBCR role with no training or gear.

Word from the coalface on a Friday night....


----------



## Infanteer

Thank goodness someone finally said that....


----------



## geo

cavalryman said:
			
		

> Taking, oh... what the heck... LFQA as an example.... the Corps needs to take four fairly useless "Regiments" who can't field a full 8 car troop unless WWIV is at the door and form something called the "5e Régiment de Cavalerie" with four squadrons and and RHQ at a central location to which we will assign the codename of "Montreal".  For those who are wondering about nomenclature... LFQA's regular formation is 5 CMBG and every brigade or area level unit has a "5" as its first digit....


LFQA formations are 5 CMBG, 5 ASU, 35 CBG and 34CBG.... 

WRT reserve armoured RECCE units...
R de Hull,
RCH,
Sher H,
12 RBC(TR) (the old Three River Tank Reg't)

Yes - it certainly would make more sense to roll em into one 
During Milcons, these 4 units always form up into one composite unit called:
Régiment Blindé du Secteur Québec (aka RBSQ)

They are used to train in this manner - not a great stretch of the imagination to rename it permanently IMHO


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And the Royal Scots were the oldest regiment in the British Army (1633).  Amalgamated with the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and redesignated, "Royal Scots and King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland".
> 
> 
> Change is.



And I was a Company Commander in a fabled regiment of very storied history in the British Army - and as of 3 years ago, it no longer exists.  

Times change - so do capbadges.


----------



## McG

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> The Army Reserve needs transformation. We have far too many Reserve units that cannot be sustained. Too many Reserve units that cannot sustain leadership at all levels, especially at the MWO/CWO and Maj/LCol ranks. Unit sucession is difficult. Too many units with less than 75 effective personnel that have a CO, DCO, Adjt, RSM, Trg O, Orderly Room, Unit QM, etc. How many bayonets does that leave? Do we need all this unit infrastructure that we cannot sustain? Our Reserve units have not fought as a unit for over 60 years, and never will ( mobilization is dead, therefore the theory of why we need so many units is dead).In our CBG we have the following in a city of less than 115,000: a Nav Res stone frigrate; an Army Res Inf Bn and Svc Bn; a Coms Res Sqn; and a CFMG Fd Amb.The local area cannot sustain this many units, nor produce the senior leadership. We need to tacticaly group units, and in some cases all the P Res units in location. Why not a LCol or Cdr commanding all five of these units, with one OR, and a  Navy and Army Trg O's.


Generally, I agree with what you are saying here except that I think you are proposing going too far.  With differing training goals and missions, I do not think the three environments can exist within a single effective unit.  Even within the land environment alone, I don't think everything in a single geographic location can be lumped together without regard for role.  You might get outstanding efficiency with clerks & administration but your operational effectiveness of the unit's component parts would be sacrificed, and you would likely see a similar reduction in the effectiveness of collective training & oversight of skills.

Given modern communication systems, span of control is less impaired by distance than by differences of unit/sub-unit roles.


----------



## McG

tango22a said:
			
		

> As for the 31st CER (The Elgin Regiment) I still don't agree with what was done to them ...


As someone who was an Elgin at that time, I think you've either misread the situation or failed to understand how much of that change was driven from within the regiment itself.



			
				tango22a said:
			
		

> As I noted before I don't mind being under another regiment for admin...Done it many times at Milcon... I Just don't want to give up my identity ... Be it The Essex Regiment (Tank) or The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) ...





			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> It would be an "Administrative Formation" created for Peacetime, but dissolved at time of mobilization.


To be clear, I am not suggesting administrative groupings or "under for admin."  I am suggesting existing sub-units (with their existing regimental identities) come under full command of new  (regimentless) battalion HQs.

I propose new battalion HQs primarily to avoid emotional resistance entrenched around: "Why is my regiment being subjugated under that regiment X?!  This is just the first step to making us all regiment X!  Our regimental pride doesn't allow us to be under another regiment!" At the same time, if there are reserve regiments which are large enough to sustain a battalion (with all its companies) then we could allow that battalion to addopt the regimental identity.  (Conceivably, this could be done by combining the two reserve battalions of R22eR or the battalions of R NFLD R).



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> As for the Windsor's becoming A Sqn or B Sqn of the 1H, then I think you are totally out to lunch on that as well.  Perhaps it will be A Sqn the SOR (Windsor Regiment) and B Sqn the SOR (1H) - (South Ontario Regiment), but highly unlikely that you would become a Sqn of the 1H or any other Regiment.


I would recommend against combining the existing sub-units into new named regiments while retaining regimental identities at the sub-unit level.  

It does not hurt us to retain identities at the sub-unit level (perhaps identities that span to more than one sub-unit within a battalion), and doing this would minimize opposition/friction against moving to a more sensible structure.  

However, for the future, if sub-units each had a unique identity & the unit itself had a named identity, then I could see competing identity issues of the two levels complicating force structure issues of the future even more than they already are today.  Imagine that we come to a day where the Army reserve is growing and the 'South Ontario Regiment' needs to become two battalions, well all of a sudden the two historical identities start clamoring for their own unit status while others show up allowing us to do whatever we want as long as we don't touch the identity of _their_ 'South Ontario Regiment.'

Unless all the sub-units share the linage, then keep the word 'regiment' and the named identities at the sub-unit level within the reserves.


----------



## geo

Unfortunately - this will never result in making a bunch of happy campers.
This is a no win situation - with regards to Regimental pride & esprit de corp.
We'd be proud of our unit lineage - even if we were down to the last section - cursing the CF recruiting system for not bringingin / enrolling all those prospective candidates that were sent their way (regardless of if true or ...not)


----------



## Michael OLeary

geo said:
			
		

> This is a no win situation - with regards to Regimental pride & esprit de corp.



How so, which units are currently still suffering from their last amalgamation?

Units do and always have survived amalgamations.


----------



## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> To be clear, I am not suggesting administrative groupings or "under for admin."  I am suggesting existing sub-units (with their existing regimental identities) come under full command of new  (regimentless) battalion HQs.



That is more or less what I was thinking of when I said "Administrative Formation".



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> I would recommend against combining the existing sub-units into new named regiments while retaining regimental identities at the sub-unit level.





That is where the "Administrative Formation or Grouping" would come in, or as you described above; but eventually these entities become named, officially or unofficially.




			
				MCG said:
			
		

> It does not hurt us to retain identities at the sub-unit level (perhaps identities that span to more than one sub-unit within a battalion), and doing this would minimize opposition/friction against moving to a more sensible structure.



Sounds fairly much as what we are suggesting.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Unless all the sub-units share the linage, then keep the word 'regiment' and the named identities at the sub-unit level within the reserves.



We haven't suggested that the Units that hold "Regiment" in their title loose that.  We have suggested that they hold the Sub-Unit Title in the Administrative Formation: ie.  B Sqn, The Windsor Regiment, SOR and A Sqn, 1st Hussars, SOR.  This maintains these two Unit lineages, and possibly creates a third.


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That is more or less what I was thinking of when I said "Administrative Formation".



Which could go something like this:

_Soft amalgamation

Year 1 – Unit A and Unit B will be administratively joined under a single unit HQ.  CO to come from unit A, RSM from unit B, positions to be rotated in each command team.

Year 3 – New command team takes over.

Year 5 – Soldier X moves from town A to town B, asks permission to retain original cap badge, unit HQ authorizes change, it supports the member.

Years 8 – Soldier recruited in town A, requests permission to wear cap badge of town B unit because that is the badge his father and grandfather wore.  Unit HQ approves, it supports regimental connections and heritage.

Year 11 – CO/RSM rotation out of synch, unit B doesn't have an NCO ready to be RSM, while unit A does.  Compromise accepted, both CO and RSM from same unit for first time.

Year 12 – Pre-soft-amalgamation level of participation by Unit A in supporting Afghanistan missions results in award of Battle Honour (under "new" rules modeled on South African War awards).  Unit B not eligible.  Troops unhappy.

Year 13 – Command team investigates possibility of full amalgamation to resolves sense of unfairness expressed by members who perceive themselves as a single unit which is now separated by that battle honour, which is from before most serving members joined the unit.

Year 15 – Soldier asks section commander, "Why does our unit have two cap badges?" Section commanders response, "I don't know, it's always been that way."_


What, exactly, are the long term advantages to this type of situation over a formal amalgamation of units?


----------



## George Wallace

I suppose we could just as easily ask the same questions about the "rotation" through the posn of CDS.

You examples could be fortune telling, they could be "bang on", or they could be utter tripe.  We are only bouncing ideas around and creating best case/worse case scenarios.   It is interesting what twists and turns we can put into the process.

I am not going to loose any sleep over it, as I suspect neither will you.......and most others.


----------



## Michael OLeary

George Wallace said:
			
		

> *You examples could be fortune telling, they could be "bang on", or they could be utter tripe.*  We are only bouncing ideas around and creating best case/worse case scenarios.   It is interesting what twists and turns we can put into the process.



Yup, they could be, but if we're not ready to "wargame" the courses of action then we're not applying anything describable as a realistic process to determine best COAs.  Simply writing it off scenarios as possibly being "tripe" only invalidates the whole thought process, doesn't it, and easily avoids real consideration of the options?

Actually, my final question was serious.  With the idea of "administrative groupings" being put forward as the potentially "acceptable" solution, what are the long term advantages?

The "corporate memory" isn't really that long within the serving portion of any unit, and in many units/regiments (including my own), the "known history" isn't always that accurate especially when dealing with past changes to unit organizations, amalgamations, etc.  What are we really supposing ourselves to be protecting if we soft-pedal into this with administrative groupings?

Surely that can be examined if they are being offered as a "workable option".


----------



## geo

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> How so, which units are currently still suffering from their last amalgamation?
> Units do and always have survived amalgamations.


Not arguing - but they all did a lot of bellyaching while on their way to the alter.
and yes.... units & corps will survive - irrespective of the moaning & groaning


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> We haven't suggested that the Units that hold "Regiment" in their title loose that.  We have suggested that they hold the Sub-Unit Title in the Administrative Formation: ie.  B Sqn, The Windsor Regiment, SOR and A Sqn, 1st Hussars, SOR.  This maintains these two Unit lineages, and possibly creates a third.


I think you've misread me.  I'm not suggesting units loose "regiment' from their names, and I don't think anyone else was suggesting that.  However, you have proposed creating The South Ontario Regiment within which Windsors & 1 H would be placed.  I am saying it should be 31 Armoured Battalion (or 31 Cavalry Battalion) in which the companies keep the old identities.  The other option is that the regimental identities are also merged to create The South Ontario Regiment and there no longer is either Windsors or 1 H.

Either way, it is not an administrative structure.  It is one unit; a complete union of the command chains.  The leadership is selected through merit list & not by who's-turn-is-it.  I think we are in agreement on this point, but I am insisting on language stronger than the word 'administrative' because of the weak command linkage it implies in our doctrine.


----------



## dapaterson

Distance does remain an issue, as soldiers need face time with their leaders.  If we give leaders too great a span of geographic control, particularly part-time Reservists, there may be problems just because the time/space equation won't let them keep any semblance of personal life together with their professional life and military life.

Example: Let's give a single CO responsibility for Reserve Infantry units in North Bay (The Algonquin Regiment), Sudbury (2nd Bn, Irish Regt of Canada) and Thunder Bay (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment).  If he is to have face time with the two outlying parts of his command even once a month that will mean a least two days a month off from his civilian job for travel.  That's about 16 working days per year he or she must negotiate away from work - either unpaid leave, damaging their seniority, or using up vacation, damaging their personal life (wife and kids might like to spend some vacation time with him, too).

Remember, most senior Reservists are balancing full-time work with military service, plus trying to maintain a semblance of a personal life.  Giving a part-timer an 800 km span of control and you'll risk burning him or her out if they're trying to do their job right.  Mitigations? Make sure the RSM/DCO are also tapped for the traveling road show; limit the distances between sub-units; and ensure that an honest appreciation of time and space is conducted before giving a "Go!".


----------



## daftandbarmy

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> What is this "PRes buy-in"?



Well, we have seen dozens of various 'flavour of the month' type initiatives come down the pike and, without exception, they've all faded off into the ether leaving us to pick up the pieces in their wake (remember 10/90 anyone?). 

Like any other solider we're happy to fix bay'nets and head over the top, we just need to know what the mission is. Unfortunately, 'downsizing' or 'amalgamation' not a mission. It's part of the Execution: Org and Tasks paragraph. If the Army Commander can explain the Commander's Intent, Main Effort and the Mission paragraphs, issue orders, and lead the charge, just like we learn in our courses, then we'll race you to the LD. Until then we'll hang out in the assembly area (or armoury) going through our battle procedure as per SOP.

Dang, me starboard puttee needs rewrapping again...  ;D


----------



## TimBit

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Distance does remain an issue, as soldiers need face time with their leaders.  If we give leaders too great a span of geographic control, particularly part-time Reservists, there may be problems just because the time/space equation won't let them keep any semblance of personal life together with their professional life and military life.
> 
> Example: Let's give a single CO responsibility for Reserve Infantry units in North Bay (The Algonquin Regiment), Sudbury (2nd Bn, Irish Regt of Canada) and Thunder Bay (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment).  If he is to have face time with the two outlying parts of his command even once a month that will mean a least two days a month off from his civilian job for travel.  That's about 16 working days per year he or she must negotiate away from work - either unpaid leave, damaging their seniority, or using up vacation, damaging their personal life (wife and kids might like to spend some vacation time with him, too).
> 
> Remember, most senior Reservists are balancing full-time work with military service, plus trying to maintain a semblance of a personal life.  Giving a part-timer an 800 km span of control and you'll risk burning him or her out if they're trying to do their job right.  Mitigations? Make sure the RSM/DCO are also tapped for the traveling road show; limit the distances between sub-units; and ensure that an honest appreciation of time and space is conducted before giving a "Go!".



Good point! However there are some examples already today of such organizations which apprently work well, most notably Les Fusilliers du St-Laurent. Granted, the three companies span 200 km, not 800, but as I understand it the CO's of each unit can eventually become CO of the Regiment. Personally, I did participate in full companies exercises with the MIlitia in Montréal, after the reorg, and found them much more engrossing and challenging with three whole platoons from three regiments than with a barebone company from one, hard pressed to put 15 infantrymen per platoon.
Just my  :2c:


----------



## Michael OLeary

A thorough estimate could recommend that the best course of action may be to have a certain number of independent sub-units in specific isolated locations.  The potential for this doesn't detract from the possible advantages of amalgamations and command  level rationalizations based on size of units.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Distance does remain an issue, as soldiers need face time with their leaders.


Agreed.  That is why, if you go back through this thread, you'll find that I've typically argued a middle ground between those defending the status-quo & those advocating amalgamations until there are no understrength units remaining in the reserves.  Multi-regimental battalions need to be designed considering span of control from both a geographic and a unit size perspective.  As soon as one tries mixing multiple roles into a single reserve unit (lets say Infantry, Artillery and Medical) then the span of control issues become far more complex even without large numbers & geography.

I think the Army reserve will inevitably have a higher command overhead than the regular force brigades.  However, that command overhead can be a lot more streamlined than it is now and doing this streamlining properly can lead to a more effective Army reserve.


----------



## dapaterson

Oh, I fully concur - just want to remind folks that not everyone lives in Montreal, Toronto or Ottawa.

Fixing C2 also gives a more realistic ability to respond in the event of a disaster, with fewer floppers to co-ordinate to take action.  Another little side benefit.


----------



## Haggis

MCG said:
			
		

> I think the Army reserve will inevitably have a higher command overhead than the regular force brigades.  However, that command overhead can be a lot more streamlined than it is now and doing this streamlining properly can lead to a more effective Army reserve.



For the purposes of this discusssion, I define "Command Overhead" as the ops/training, admin and logistics staff (full and part time) in each Reserve Armoury/Unit location.

As long as the decision makers are Class "A" soldiers, there will always be a need for a more robust "command overhead" in the Army Reserve to ensure that key decisions, for which authority cannot be delegated down, do not have to wait 5-7 days for a response.

Another driver behind "command overhead" is the amount of administration that the system requires of the Army Reserve.  There's absolutely no possible way that a Class "A" command tream can keep pace with demands generated by a Class "B"/Reg F HQ in terms of returns and deliverables.


----------



## geo

.... There is after all an Engineer Regiment that is also known by it's old name  "The Elgins"


----------



## Fishbone Jones

geo said:
			
		

> .... There is after all an Engineer Regiment that is also known by it's old name  "The Elgins"


Sorry Geo. Did we wake you up?  We've talked about thenm a half dozen times already ;D


----------



## geo

Really ?  coulda fooled me - just goes to prove that a unit can go by more than one name at one time.  Have your cake and eat it too ;D


----------



## kratz

Haggis see that rare octagonal object, red if you see it fast enough...STOP.

All the forum members have weighed off of this thread and taken pot shots from shore at the Naval Reserve as if the Stone Frigates and the role of NavRes was secondary to the fight.  Nobody(with the exception of Daptaperson)  is listening to the fact that Naval Reserve has listened to the changes in the winds. If you read the current NavRes 2010 plan, there remains 24 NRDs within the framework of the CMS (Cheif Maritme Staff). Command of the NRDs is now expected to be at the Lt(N) or LCdr level vice the old LCdr / Cdr. and the Coxn is now expected to be a CPO2 vice a CPO1 in the NRDs under the 2010 plan.  So...instead of reinventing the wheel and demanding that others join your version of the party, consider that other commands have their house in order and have their own plan.

Dammed...there is a Navy and they are fighting for the same people we are, we should. Naval Reserve has it' own plan and most of it is already in place....74 pages discussion after ....

Rifleman62 , Haggis , dapaterson , tango22a, 2 Cdo, MCG , , George Wallace , Miichael O'Leary, 
geo

Someone asked who is living with the after effects of amalgamation or the effects of 1967? The Naval Reserve Units that have been reactivated NO LONGER HAVE HONOUR!!! I called my Coxn one day and informed him of such and bore his wrath.....I was right. DHH does not recognize a naval unit that does not carry the same affiliation with the origonal ship.

Set that aside, since you are all willing to set small home town army units aside....

There is 30,000 aremy reserve and that is why I ask Haggis to stop. There is only 2000 NavRes. While the Admin and supply benifits are obviouse in a merger, there are intrinsic opertational goals that DO NOT merge between the elements.


----------



## Michael OLeary

kratz said:
			
		

> Someone asked who is living with the after effects of amalgamation or the effects of 1967? The Naval Reserve Units that have been reactivated NO LONGER HAVE HONOUR!!! I called my Coxn one day and informed him of such and bore his wrath.....I was right. DHH does not recognize a naval unit that does not carry the same affiliation with the origonal ship.



No longer have "HONOUR"

or

No longer have "HONOURS", possibly because they were recreated with different ship names and therefore different historical backgrounds.

Are you sure you're talking about the same thing we are?


----------



## kratz

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> No longer have "HONOUR"
> 
> or
> 
> No longer have "HONOURS", possibly because they were recreated with different ship names and therefore different historical backgrounds.
> 
> Are you sure you're talking about the same thing we are?



Actually I am talking about the same two things. I knew one would get his attenton and I knew one would get action. Sadly, in the contect that somone asked how does this affect army unit amalgamations....it's anathem to losing their identiry.


----------



## Michael OLeary

kratz said:
			
		

> Actually I am talking about the same two things. I knew one would get his attenton and I knew one would get action. Sadly, in the contect that somone asked how does this affect army unit amalgamations....it's anathem to losing their identiry.



Amalgamation includes the combining of historical backgrounds and honours (battle honours and other), it is not a loss of identity except for those who refuse to accept evolution.


----------



## kratz

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Amalgamation includes the combining of historical backgrounds and honours (battle honours and other), it is not a loss of identity except for those who refuse to accept evolution.



PM onbound....I know what I am talking about.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haggis said:
			
		

> As long as the decision makers are Class "A" soldiers, there will always be a need for a more robust "command overhead" in the Army Reserve to ensure that key decisions, for which authority cannot be delegated down, do not have to wait 5-7 days for a response.



I'm not sure if you were aware of this or not, but all the Class A' COs I know are attached to a Blackberry these days. Consequently, I haven't had anything like the problems getting quick responses these days as compared to 10 years ago. This, and other demands on their time that did not exist 10 years ago, helps to make sure that the 'part time' commitment of a Class A CO can approach a 40 hour week, on top of their other job/life.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I'm not sure if you were aware of this or not, but all the Class A' COs I know are attached to a Blackberry these days. Consequently, I haven't had anything like the problems getting quick responses these days as compared to 10 years ago. This, and other demands on their time that did not exist 10 years ago, helps to make sure that the 'part time' commitment of a Class A CO can approach a 40 hour week, on top of their other job/life.



Which is criminal.  There are higher formations with ample full-time staff to deal with crap before it intrudes on the lowest level units.  There are precious few things that require a Reserve unit CO to be on call 24/7 with their TardBerry.

The C2 at formation level needs a good shake - to make timely decisions, not to sit on documents for weeks and impose impossible turn-arounds on units (3 weeks in the G3 inbox, 3 days for the unit to reply).  And to know what they are talking about - I'm currently informing the higher HQ about national funding to pay for something they insist the unit should cover.

Hopefully, any rejigging of C2 will fix the sucking chest wound that is the CBG HQs.


----------



## tango22a

dapaterson:

Bravo Zulu for your last post!

tango22a


----------



## Rifleman62

DAP, fully agree. As you know I worked at Bde HQ. Many times Area or Bde would request info they already had in another format. Sometimes it was a lazy staff person, sometimes it was lack of coord within the HQ. As you pointed out Staff often forget that a 3 weeks to a full timer is ofter 3 parade nights to a part timer.

Our ancestors sometimes had an answer for Bde Hq:

*8th Bn, 90th Winnipeg Rifles War Diary*
19 – 25 Jun 17 - In Line

21st   BGen F.O.W. Loomis came up to Headquarters in the morning, the result of which the Battalion Headquarters was severely shelled. Orders were issued as follows: “In future All Ranks who come to Battalion Headquarters in daylight will be arrested.
…………
24th   Some Brigade personal that visited Battalion Headquarters were put under arrest.


----------



## George Wallace

kratz

I think you got caught up in a "Generalization" in this discussion.  Most of this discussion is over the "Army" Reserves and any implications that any amalgamation will include bring both Air and Naval Reserves into the same amalgamated unit with Army Reservists would be a far stretch.  From what I have seen, the NavRes has kept a firm grip on its organization and MO.  I highly doubt that we will see any amalgamation of NavRes, Air Reserves and Primary Reservists into amalgamated units to mirror the CF within our life times.  We may, however, see individuals filling Class B or Class C posns in the other Elements, within occupations that may permit it.

The Comm Reserve becoming part of the Primary Reserve, is a 'natural' move; both being 'LAND'.


----------



## Journeyman

George Wallace said:
			
		

> kratz
> I think you got caught up in a "Generalization" in this discussion.....


Although it's a perfect example of the....excitability....that this topic _always_ creates. 

With little beyond the initial "change is coming; wait out" message, we've already got the full spectrum of responses -- from 'about time' to 'we'll all quit.'



I'm still trying to work Hitler and the NDP into this    ;D


----------



## Rifleman62

My earlier post re the situation in Thunder Bay, pop 115 K with 5 Reserve units was to point out that the Thunder Bay of today cannot sustain 5 reserve units. If the Navy (TB is a logical loc for a NavRes unit), Army, Comms Reserve and CFMG are not going to give, then a possibile course of action to save overhead was to tactically group . Unlikely though.


----------



## DannyITR

geo said:
			
		

> If we borrow a page out of the British army's reorganisation and "canadianize" it, I would see something like this happening:
> 
> The Vanier Regiment
> A coy, The Black Watch
> B coy, The Royal Montreal Regiment
> C coy, The Canadian Grenadier Guards
> 
> Le Régiment De Salabery
> A coy, Les Fusiliers Mont Royal
> B coy, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
> C coy, Le Régiment de Chateauguay (aka 4 R22R)
> 
> The point here is - does Montreal need 6 small understrength battalions ?
> When they train together, the Montreal units already shake out and make up composite Infantry battalions... doesn't it make sense to make the arrangements permanent ?



I know your making up an infantry battalion but where would 34CER (formerly 3 FIELD in Westmount) come into play? I don't know how many soldiers our unit has but would it be combined with other engineering regiments to form an engineering battalion in your scenario? Are there even enough engineering regiments to form a battalion?


----------



## DannyITR

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Our Reserve units have not fought as a unit for over 60 years, and never will ( mobilization is dead, therefore the theory of why we need so many units is dead).



Can you elaborate on what you mean? Do you mean that our reserve units are degraded to the point where they have become non operational in the field? I look at the US who deploy their National Guard like its nothing and wonder if Canada has the same capability. Is it just a matter of funding for the proper equipment or our organization and training practices not effective?


----------



## Rifleman62

It has to do with population: USA 304 million, Canada 33 million which translates to recruiting base and tax base to support the payroll/equipment etc. Almost all of the USA has a land mass that can support human life, industry, agriculture, Canada has not. I believe the USA has a different mindset regarding the military than Canada, examples of which are numerous. 

In 2006, Thunder Bay had a population of 8280 people age 15 -19, the core of Reserve recruiting. There were a further 8050 in the 20 - 24 age group that may join/remain in the Reserves after attending university/community collage/working full time. There must be an economic base to support young people to remain in the area. In Thunder Bay the trend is downward. You cannot support 5 Reserve units with these demographs.

Please, this is not a shot at Thunder Bay.


----------



## Monsoon

kratz said:
			
		

> All the forum members have weighed off of this thread and taken pot shots from shore at the Naval Reserve as if the Stone Frigates and the role of NavRes was secondary to the fight.


In fairness to the other forum participants, I haven't seen anyone say that. And it seems there's a general consensus that what NAVRES does is rather too different to be integrated with the militia as part of the same unit (as opposed to two separate units sharing facilities). We do fall under a separate L1 and have a whole different set of governing regulations at a fairly high level: MARCORDs, MARCOM SSOs, NAVRESORDs, etc. Trying to merge SOPs would be a recipe for disaster.



> Command of the NRDs is now expected to be at the Lt(N) or LCdr level vice the old LCdr / Cdr. and the Coxn is now expected to be a CPO2 vice a CPO1 in the NRDs under the 2010 plan.


That's not the 2010 plan - those are the arrangements as they've existed since the mid-nineties. The only Cdrs commanding NRDs these days are those who have already commanded another unit first (and taken the staff course, and fulfilled staff roles, etc). And I haven't seen a CPO1 at an NRD since... ever. In 12 years at some large units, I have never paraded with a CPO1.



> There is 30,000 aremy reserve and that is why I ask Haggis to stop. There is only 2000 NavRes.


Well, the numbers are about 20,000 and 3,500 in current strength (as opposed to funded manning level), but I take it your point is that there are more than enough militia units with more than enough problems unique to the militia to straighten out before there should be any talk of merging units from distinct elements. And that I agree with.


----------



## DannyITR

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> It has to do with population: USA 304 million, Canada 33 million which translates to recruiting base and tax base to support the payroll/equipment etc. Almost all of the USA has a land mass that can support human life, industry, agriculture, Canada has not. I believe the USA has a different mindset regarding the military than Canada, examples of which are numerous.
> 
> In 2006, Thunder Bay had a population of 8280 people age 15 -19, the core of Reserve recruiting. There were a further 8050 in the 20 - 24 age group that may join/remain in the Reserves after attending university/community collage/working full time. There must be an economic base to support young people to remain in the area. In Thunder Bay the trend is downward. You cannot support 5 Reserve units with these demographs.
> 
> Please, this is not a shot at Thunder Bay.



Are our reserve units deployable in their current condition in your opinion? Would they be deployed as battalions comprising of the example companies example post quoted above? Could a single regiment be deplooyed (overseas or local)?


----------



## Rifleman62

Danny, read the thread and you will be enlightened and come to the logical answer to your questions.


----------



## Michael OLeary

DannyITR said:
			
		

> Are our reserve units deployable in their current condition in your opinion? Would they be deployed as battalions comprising of the example companies example post quoted above? Could a single regiment be deplooyed (overseas or local)?



In short, no, but I also encourage you to read this thread and others on Reserve organization and capabilities.


----------



## geo

DannyITR said:
			
		

> I know your making up an infantry battalion but where would 34CER (formerly 3 FIELD in Westmount) come into play? I don't know how many soldiers our unit has but would it be combined with other engineering regiments to form an engineering battalion in your scenario? Are there even enough engineering regiments to form a battalion?


Danny
3 FER and 9 FES were amalgamated into one unit - 34 CER.
34 CER is composed of 4 FES, 9 FES & sorta 16 FES.
Current doctrine has it that each Brigade has it's own Engineer Reg't.... Reserve CERs have a tendency to be very poor in the equipment department.

You have to understand that, to form an Infantry bn, you need more than one company.
To form an Engineer Reg't, you need more than one squadron.

If practical terms, Engineer units seldom deploy into the field as once complete unit - Squadrons & troops are dispatched hither & yon to make the other Combat arms units work better 8)

Between the Squadrons in Rouyn Noranda & Westmount, 34 CER car really and truly be considered a Regiment... though it is challenged in the tools and resources needed to do the work.


----------



## geo

DannyITR said:
			
		

> Are our reserve units deployable in their current condition in your opinion? Would they be deployed as battalions comprising of the example companies example post quoted above? Could a single regiment be deplooyed (overseas or local)?



Reserve units are currently not deployable.  The Cheif of Land Staff is not looking to change our mission - which is to provide individual and sub-sub-sub unit augmentation to the regular force (aka Section).

During the 98 Ice storm, 3 FER was able to field a full Squadron in support of domestic operations... Way more than anyone believed them capable of - feather in their cap for having accomplished the near impossible.


----------



## CBH99

The Calgary Highlanders deployed a 75 person sub-unit a year or so ago, and right now about 90% of my regiment is deployed.  (18 Air Defense).

Out of the 31 members that regularily parade, 19 are in workup for Afghanistan and 2 are in workup for Haiti.

Quiet parade square these days...


----------



## geo

CBH.... The Calgary Highlanders deployed 75 troops.

Of those 75... how many were in the same section/platoon/company?
Methinks they served - spread throughout the entire TF.  Don't get me wrong, I don't intend to "diss" them - but to say that a sub-unit was deployed is a slight exageration IMHO.

WRT the troops of 18 AD, those 19 troops are probably not part of the same gun det if at all in the same battery.


----------



## aesop081

geo said:
			
		

> WRT the troops of 18 AD, those 19 troops are probably not part of the same gun det if at all in the same battery.



Of course they are not on the same gun team......they dont man guns to begin with.


----------



## dapaterson

Actually, 18 AD was re-roled to field guns a while ago; the name change is still sitting on a desk somewhere in Ottawa.  In a former life, the file crossed my desk.  No idea where it stands today (applies equally to 1 AD (The L&R Scots)).


----------



## aesop081

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Actually, 18 AD was re-roled to field guns a while ago; the name change is still sitting on a desk somewhere in Ottawa.  In a former life, the file crossed my desk.  No idea where it stands today (applies equally to 1 AD (The L&R Scots)).



I stand corrected, thanks for the update.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Actually, 18 AD was re-roled to field guns a while ago; the name change is still sitting on a desk somewhere in Ottawa.  In a former life, the file crossed my desk.  No idea where it stands today (applies equally to 1 AD (The L&R Scots)).



An interesting observation.

I suddenly flashed on a half-remembered song from WW2 (learned second hand - you'll have to go to Old Sweat for verification).

"We are poor little lambs who have lost their way, bah, bah, bah.
Damned from artillery to infantry, bah, bah, bah.
Gentlemen gunners who've lost their guns.
Nothing but small arms to shoot at the Huns.
Lord have mercy on such poor ones, bah, bah, bah."

The Lanarks have been through this rebadging, re-roling a number of times.  

And as I recall, once upon a time the Calgary Highlanders and the KOCR  (aka Calgary Tanks) were both the Calgary Regiment, and the 10th and 50th Bn CEF and 103rd Regiment (Calgary Rifles).

To quote the Whiffenpoofs: bah, bah, bah.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Kirkhill,

I was at the Lanarks for 1992 re-roling from infantry to 1 Air Defence Regiment.  On the whole, the young troops took it well.  So did the Snr NCMs who were, almost to a man, retired regular force.  The problem- a Major, a couple of Capts and a Lt or two.  They were worth their weight in trouble.  By my count, that had been the 5th reroling between Artillery and Infantry the L&R Scots had undergone since WW2, so it happens all the time.

Of course, the whole re-role  & total force experiment might have worked better if someone at a FMC (at that time) had spent more than 10 minutes thinking about the budgetary, equipment, CFOO, CFET, infrastructure and career progression model implications of the experiment before dumping 32 Regular Force and about 100 Reservists unsupported into no-man's land to figure out what to do next...


----------



## geo

(considering the proximity of Pembrooke to Gagetown, the L&R Scots could have been reroled to pert much anything - the only problem I see is that it continues to go on - ad nauseum - without rhyme or logic.

At least the 58th AAD was a bty of 6 RCA before.... and after.... 
VS infantry to artillery to infantry... hard to maintain an identity IMHO


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> considering the proximity of Pembrooke to Gagetown,



Surely you mean Petawawa.

Identity was not an issue.  The Regiment's history was easily traceable 150 years back.  Traditions carried on much the same, whether it was an infantry or artillery unit.  Obviously uniforms changed, but the battle honours stayed cased just outside the officer's mess; officers carried claymores on parade vice artillery pattern swords; Bobby Burns Day was celebrated with as much gusto as St Barbara's day.  It seemed to work.


----------



## Michael OLeary

geo said:
			
		

> ... hard to maintain an identity IMHO



I would suggest that that is an internal unit responsibility, once the order to re-role has been given.  As noted above, it's the sort of thing that is easily undermined by those few malcontents who refuse to accept the order and set a leadership example by getting on with business and lack the personal commitment to decide they can't soldier on under the new unit role and then do the honorable thing.


----------



## dapaterson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Surely you mean Petawawa.
> 
> Identity was not an issue.  The Regiment's history was easily traceable 150 years back.  Traditions carried on much the same, whether it was an infantry or artillery unit.  Obviously uniforms changed, but the battle honours stayed cased just outside the officer's mess; officers carried claymores on parade vice artillery pattern swords; Bobby Burns Day was celebrated with as much gusto as St Barbara's day.  It seemed to work.



Hmm.... giving a unit twice as many reasons to celebrate and drink...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Ahhh, you see the genius in the system.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bobby Burns.  Strewth.  Rabbie  iper: (looking for an excuse for that one  ;D )

Surely one crew-served weapon is much like another when it comes to ethos or identity?

C6, CG-84 or Field Gun.

Every weapon in the battalion has been brigaded and upsized, or if you prefer, every weapon in the brigade has been dispersed and downsized.


----------



## McG

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> If the Navy (TB is a logical loc for a NavRes unit), Army, Comms Reserve and CFMG are not going to give, then a possibile course of action to save overhead was to tactically group .


The Comms Reserve no longer exists.  It is now part of the Army reserves.  

As I stated earlier, merging units across different environments is a bad idea.  It does not help that the phrase 'tactically group' is relatively meaningless despite frequently being used.  It seems to imply some sort of temporary command relationship on ops or training, but it is not something that is defined anywhere.  We could 'administratively group' entities across environments such that they would share orderly staff, recruiters, and other administrative overhead.  However, as a command relationship, this does not work as span of control is too great with the differences in roles, methods of operation, training, etc.



			
				geo said:
			
		

> Reserve units are currently not deployable.  The Cheif of Land Staff is not looking to change our mission - which is to provide individual and sub-sub-sub unit augmentation to the regular force (aka Section).


Actually geo, if you go back a few pages you will see the media hinting toward a plan to provide the Reserve with a leading role in domestic operations:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-818356.html#msg818356

Having listened to the CLS speak on his vision, I know it is his intent to see the reserves take that leading role for domestic operations  ...  This is a rather substantial change to the current way of doing business, and it will require creation of full & effective unit headquarters (not the current skeleton HQs).  In the end, every unit will have clearly defined both a role in support of international operations (I suspect generally what is done now) and a role for domestic operations.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

You mean like how the Engineer units have certain roles for what they are providing for Domestic Responses?

Ex. 56 ES would be bridging and water supply (in addition to the normal skill sets we bring to the table)


----------



## CBH99

WRT to 18 Air Defense...we are a gun troop.  We have a support troop and a gun troop, that uses the C3 105mm's.

There was a lot of speculation when they re-rolled us from Air Defense.  First they were going to make us an MP unit, due to the large Criminal Justice program down here at the college.  Then we were going to be re-rolled as a mortar unit, even had mortar systems shipped to us & everything.  Then, they decided to role us into a field artillery unit instead - and that is how we stand now.

No word yet on name change either.  Was going to be a detach. of 20 field battery...but word is they want to keep the '18' in our title because everybody around here knows us as 18 AD.  Interesting to see how it'll pan out.


----------



## Rifleman62

MCG

I stand corrected. The original post was written in Jun 05 and I carried forward the term tactically grouped to new posts. Administratively grouped would be more appropriate, although where is the available gene pool to produce/retain/renew leadership in TB for five units? And that's the problem, and it is not only in TB but elsewhere in areas where the population is not substantial. As DAP stated "just want to remind folks that not everyone lives in Montreal, Toronto or Ottawa".

38 CBG AOR covers 3 provinces, at times 3 time zones therefore the Bde Comd has to be careful when he says teleconf at 1900 hrs.  If the Bde Comd wanted to have all units participate in an exercise in Shilo the cumulative distance travelled would be 3000 km; to Dundurn it is 4300 Km.

38 CBG has been in the forefront tactically grouping Bde units starting with the 3 Arty units, followed by the 3 Svc Bns  (now 2), RRR and NSaskR, RWpgRif and Camerons of C, and then the LSSR and 18 Svc Bn. That was the situation shortly after I retired.

Some of the rational for this was to stop the last person standing syndrome at various rank levels. IMO success depends greatly on the abilities of the key: the CO. 

Command is the fulfillment of a soldiers’ career. As history tells us, not everyone can achieve the requirement. Being the CO is the level of command where success can be achieved by the sheer will and determination of soldiers following a CO in whom they have absolute faith, confidence and trust. 

A Commanding Officer is just as good, or just as bad, as the Soldiers under his command make him.


----------



## McG

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> ... where is the available gene pool to produce/retain/renew leadership in TB for five units? And that's the problem, and it is not only in TB but elsewhere in areas where the population is not substantial. As DAP stated "just want to remind folks that not everyone lives in Montreal, Toronto or Ottawa".


Should all of these units actually be units?  Could some be sub-units (or even sub-sub-units) of units in other locations?  Could others be independant sub-units?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Like the Engineer Sqn within the FGH.


----------



## McG

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Like the Engineer Sqn within the FGH.


No.  That would be the mixing of roles within one unit which I've suggested is a very bad idea for span of control.

An example of what I propose is the satalite company of 4 RCR or the satalite squadron of 31 CER or: 





			
				geo said:
			
		

> 3 FER and 9 FES were amalgamated into one unit - 34 CER.
> 34 CER is composed of 4 FES, 9 FES & sorta 16 FES.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Gotcha kinda like what the Engineer Units are doing through out Canada.

For the record, 37 CER will be standing up soon with RHQ and One Sqn in St. John's and a second SQN in Fredricton (supposedly starting this Sept).


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> A Commanding Officer is just as good, or just as bad, as the Soldiers under his command make him.



And soldiers are often just as good as their COs enable them to be


----------



## Rifleman62

MCG

"Should all of these units actually be units?  Could some be sub-units (or even sub-sub-units) of units in other locations?  Could others be independant sub-units?" I was going for the juggular. Reduce the number of reserve units. And not just in TB, and not just the "militia".


----------



## McG

At the end of an honest assessment, it may well turn out that some locations currently have a number units that exceeds even the number of sub-units that can actually be sustained in that location.  If that is the case, and it is determined that no unit can be 'down-graded' to a satellite platoon of a unit located elsewhere, then we may have to be prepaired to reduce the spectrum of capabilities currently found in those smaller populations.

We should also be communicating between the various environments to ensure that there is no destructive competition for manpower in population centres too small to support all the reserve presence the CF is trying to establish.


----------



## bwatch

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> Well I guess that settles our debate!  If it is implemented well, I think this could be a very good thing for the army reserves.



Gary O'Brien was once with the Black Watch and was in it during the Disbandment of the 1st and 2nd Reg Force Units. So he should know first hand what this move will do for morale. I can tell you now, if that man ever shows up at the regiment, the Pipes and Drums will be waiting to Pipe him right back out.


----------



## Rifleman62

*You* think so. Somehow I doubt it.

Is it not complementary to be piped out in the Highland Infantry?


----------



## Rifleman62

Public news, but not news to the Brigades and units I would think.


----------



## geo

Ugh... link to Wikipedia... here is the link to the unit's web site:

http://www.voltigeursdequebec.net/


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> This oughta be good - units prognosticated for providing Arctic troops by the _Ottawa Citizen_.



I can see the Russian bear and Uncle Sam cringing in fear even now....  :


----------



## Journeyman

As if the militarization of the arctic with those death-dealing commandos, the Canadian Rangers, wasn't bad enough...   


Sorry, the voices in my head were channelling some left-wing freaks; I've readjusted my antenna and upped my meds again. ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

I wonder if the KGB units will be as elite as our folks? They'd be easy to tell apart anyways: Canucks in red shirts vs. Russians in long leather jackets.

Russia plans elite Arctic army unit to protect interests in ice-cold war

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1165318/Russia-plans-elite-Arctic-army-unit-protect-interests-ice-cold-war.html


----------



## McG

> *Battle cry over joining forces - Don't merge reserves, critics say*
> Aldo Santin
> Winnipeg Free Press
> 30 Mar 08
> 
> Manitoba's military reserve community is bracing for another assault on the country's civilian-soldier tradition.
> 
> Reserve supporters wonder if recent comments by the head of the military's reserve system that small reserve units will be merged in 2012 spell the end to the tradition-bound military reserve units.
> 
> Robert Darling said he doesn't know what prompted Brig.-Gen. Gary O'Brien to tell CBC Radio recently that small reserve units will be merged for efficiency reasons after Canada concludes its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011.
> 
> "We are going to mess with the basic structure of the army reserve," said O'Brien, known for his blunt manner. "It isn't about closing more locations or getting smaller -- it's about getting more efficient." "Who told him to say this?" asked Darling, the Manitoba representative of a lobby group dedicated to preserving the reserve system and a former honorary colonel to an Ontario-based reserve unit.
> 
> A Canadian Forces spokeswoman said O'Brien would not be available to speak to the Free Press about the issue.
> 
> There are six army reserve units in Manitoba, including three of the country's most storied units -- the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and the Fort Garry Horse.
> 
> Membership in these units is well below their authorized strengths, in some cases less than half, most ranging between 60 and 80 members.
> 
> The problem is that many of the key personnel from these units -- the warrant officers, master warrant officers, sergeants and corporals -- have volunteered to join the regular army for rotations in Afghanistan. Without them, the reserve units can't conduct necessary training.
> 
> Murray Burt, the secretary to the Camerons, said combining reserve units for training purposes makes sense, and points to what happened to the Camerons and Rifles a year ago when the two were tactically grouped for training purposes.
> 
> Unlike the changes O'Brien hinted at, the Rifles and Camerons maintain their separate identities.
> 
> Burt said it's this loss of identity that reserve proponents fear, along with the resulting disconnect from the community: "There are suspicions they'll eliminate the names of the reserve units and replace them with numbers." O'Brien's comments may simply be a trial ballon, Darling said, sent afloat by O'Brien's boss, Gen. Andrew Leslie, the chief of land staff and commander land forces command.
> 
> Darling said he thinks military top brass is trying to determine the depth of the opposition to the merger plan and how the politicians will react to pressure from reserve supporters.
> 
> "Gen. Leslie has stated that he doesn't need a second war, one over reserves restructuring," Darling said. "We must try to show him that it would not be worth his while."


It seems to me that Robert Darling has lost sight of why the reserves exist.  He shows this by casting his full support solely behind regimental identities and tossing threats of making organizational improvement a fight not worth the military's while. 

The Primary Reserve does not exist for the glory of its regiments.  The Primary Reserve exists as an element of meeting the military needs of the nation.  

As I’ve stated before, I think that it is possible to amalgamate units and fully preserve regimental identities.  However, if the regimental protectionists do not constructively involve themselves in this process and if they consistently insist on circling wagons & becoming obstructionists at any/every hint of change, well then they will in fact do more harm than good for the regimental system.  If the protectionists deny all evolution to the force structure they will have successfully made the regimental system irrelevant and a hindrance to be done away with.  

I’d personally like to see the regimental system stay.  That means people need to stop using it as an obstruction to change.  Those who want the regimental system should show how it can fit our needs today.  I propose numbered battalions in which the companies may have shared or unique regimental identities.


----------



## Michael OLeary

> Should any regiment’s continued survival be primarily dependent on the degree of activism of its supporters?
> 
> To enter the fray with the sole objective to save one’s own Regiment through an era of Army reorganization, perhaps at the expense of a stronger Army, is to set aside the soldier’s higher moral obligations.
> 
> The continuance of the regimental system, in and of itself, is not sufficient justification to defend the continued existence of any particular regiment.



The Regimental System


----------



## Rifleman62

Bob Darling is a gentleman who obviously was prompted to be the spokesperson. There is a fair bit of opposition in Wpg to change amongst the old guard. I have a fairly good knowledge of the situation and the players due to the positions I held or hold in Wpg. I do not know everything. I believe some of the information in the article is incorrect.

IMO, the opposition is mainly with the Regt Senate of the Camerons of C, some retired members of the FGH, and a member of the RWpgRif Regt Senate. They live in the pass, and some of them think they are important. They also think that the Honoraries and Senates have power and influence. Sorry, the truth is they do not. Not anymore and not for several decades. 

Last year, the RWpgRif and Camerons of C were officially tactically grouped. For years prior they were doing almost all of their training together. When it became official, the Camerons Senate woke up, and went to the media as they are doing now. If a person had some knowledge of what was really going on, that person would wonder what planet the Camerons Senate was on. Their "message" was incorrect and convoluted. Their "message" was also ignored after the initial run by the media, as this one will be.

There are a couple of members here who can post how things are going, but may not as they may feel that posting info is circumventing the chain of command.

As I stated before, success depends on the key, the CO. He may be well-intentioned, but his execution may be flawed. CO's come and go, but The Regiment is always there.

I do not want my regiment to go, and I am sure retired members of the Camerons feel the same. I personally think that the Camerons of C are being saved at the expense of the RWpgRif. Since the 1960’s, Wpg has not, and today cannot support two Reserve infantry units. It is the only city East of Toronto with two Reserve infantry units.

Without going into details, several fundamental “Rifle regiment” traditions have been mistakenly done away with. Some are obvious. How are the individual soldiers taking it?

I don’t know, and how do you ask/survey in a neutral manner so that the Army’s authority to tactically group and the CO is not undermined?

IMO, you don’t. Soldiers will vote with their feet. Sooner, rather than later, the corner will be turned, with or without the old guard. 

Tactically grouped is far different from amalgamation. If the Army decides "to do away" with my regiment, so be it. It is not a decision that the Army will take lightly.


----------



## Biggoals2bdone

ummmm NO...DP1 = BMQ+SQ+BIQ (for inf ex example.)



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Biggoals2bdone said:
			
		

> ummmm NO...DP1 = BMQ+SQ+BIQ (for inf ex example.)
> 
> 
> 
> Haggis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An Army Reservist who has completed the Army Reserve BMQ and SQ (AKA DP1 BMQ (L)) since 2003 will be granted the equvalency of Reg F BMQ. That is a CDA certification.
Click to expand...


Just a little bit off

DP1 Complete is BMQ + BMQ(L) [SQ] + BIQ [OR what ever trades course you do]

_All these courses have DP 1 in the title of the TP. This is to just indicate where in the developmental period the course is ran._

What Haggis is stating is that,

PRes BMQ + PRes BMQ(L) [SQ] = Reg Force BMQ Course.


----------



## George Wallace

Please read the whole thread before adding incorrect information.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Biggoals2bdone
> 
> Do we have to place you under maximum supervision on this site?  It seems we are constantly following you around, finding you posting well outside of your lanes with incorrect information.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues.  

Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.

The numbers escape me now but some years ago I did a calculation on the pay of the cost of pay in a reserve regiment compared to the pay of 4 regular force staff supporting the regiment.  The regiment had about 60 reliable members working an average of about 50 full days or 3,000 full days or about 8 full years.  At the time reserve daily pay seemed to be based on 1/365 of regular force pay.  The regular force staff were a CAPT, WO, SGT, and CPL.  Their pay rates were above the reserve regiment average so I estimate that the cost of personnel to the regiment was somewhere between 33 and 40 % regular force.  These guys were invaluable and I do not criticize them, just pointing out an anomaly.

What is needed is someone's butt to be in a sling for failure of the reserves to maintain numbers and operational capability.  Blaming the reserves for failure of the reserves makes no sense as most of the potential elements leading to success are out of their hands.  A study needs to be done to determine job satisfaction issues to find out why MacDonalds is a slam-dunk choice for young people compared to the reserves.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues.
> 
> Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.



Do you have a source for your numbers which might give us a glimpse into the methodology? 

In any case, most of the discussion here has focused on improvements to training and organization by rationalizing units. This is different that a simple money saving exercise. The arguments for amalgamation have centred on having realistic sub-unit and unit sizes that could execute realistic training. Individuals could slow their career progression down a little as they would be forced upwards to quickly to fill the succession plan demend created by single sub-unit regiments.

Be careful throwing around examples from the US. I conducted an exchange as a Reservist with a USMC Reserve Battalion. This battalion had four full companies drawn from four major urban centres in two States. The Marines did the same training as their Active Duty counterparts and they had to come to the monthly training session. The officers were all ex-Active Duty. The focus was on training - no Thursday night mess fun. Is this what you had in mind?


----------



## dapaterson

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Why is no-one held responsible for the terrible state of the army reserves?  The reserves have no control over their own budgets, equipment, pay, and most job satisfaction issues.



Interesting assertions.

Utterly baseless and without merit, but interesting nevertheless.

Budgets:  Within the army, funding for the Reserves is allocated though a funding model that is accessible on the DWAN; anyone with a DWAN account and view it and work through it to see how allocations are calculated.

Equipment:  All DND equipment is purchased by PWGSC (less minor items under $25K or or those bought through standing offers negotiated by PWGSC).  The Reserves 2000 friendly LFRR initiative failed to assemble a coherent equipment plan for the Army Reserve, leading to The Reserves (as you'd put it) leaving millions of dollars in equipment funding untouched.

Pay:  Treasury board, in negotiation with DND / CF, sets military pay rates.  Other benefits are similarly set by TB, as they are for all personnel employed by the Crown.



> Close to half of American troops in Iraq are reservists because of cost savings.  The all-inclusive annual cost of the Canadian regular force is about $400,000 per member.  The annual cost of a reservist is about $10,000.  On face value that's a 40 to 1 cost differential.  We could juggle some numbers that could be perceived as unfair and maybe we could lower the differntial to 20 to 1 or 10 to 1 but it isn't going away.  Trying to save money at the expense of the reserves is false economy.



I'd love to see a source for those figures.  DP1 training for reservists consumes significantly more than 10K even for the shortest of courses - it's over 80 training days for most BMQ/SQ/DP1 training; add pay and O&M (to say nothing of course overhead) and you're already over $10K without parading class A.

And the value of that differential is reduced by the reduced availablilty of Reservists vs Reg F members, and the training deltas that Reservists are required to make up prior to deployment.  Of course, increasing training would reduce those deltas, but increase the cost of the Reserves.



> The numbers escape me now but some years ago I did a calculation on the pay of the cost of pay in a reserve regiment compared to the pay of 4 regular force staff supporting the regiment.  The regiment had about 60 reliable members working an average of about 50 full days or 3,000 full days or about 8 full years.  At the time reserve daily pay seemed to be based on 1/365 of regular force pay.  The regular force staff were a CAPT, WO, SGT, and CPL.  Their pay rates were above the reserve regiment average so I estimate that the cost of personnel to the regiment was somewhere between 33 and 40 % regular force.  These guys were invaluable and I do not criticize them, just pointing out an anomaly.



Reserve units do not pay a cent in Regular Force pay.  Regular Force pay (with the exception of capital projects) is entirely funded by a central account.  In certain attribution exercises pro-rated shares may be assigned to groups to estiamet costs of activities, but no Reserve unit pays a cent of Reg Force pay.



> What is needed is someone's butt to be in a sling for failure of the reserves to maintain numbers and operational capability.  Blaming the reserves for failure of the reserves makes no sense as most of the potential elements leading to success are out of their hands.  A study needs to be done to determine job satisfaction issues to find out why MacDonalds is a slam-dunk choice for young people compared to the reserves.



Define the operation capability required.  That's the first step.  On the topic of nubmers, the Army Reserves writ large met or exceeded their target strengths through the past several years.  Our problem, as often discussed, is too many units - if you are allocated 19K in target strength, but have units that would require over 25K to all be full strength - which 19K do you fill?  Going over that target would disobey the government's direction.

As for job satisfaction, it may be worthwhile to look at some indicators - length of tenure with the organziation, rates of volunterrism for deployments and tasks, and component transfers.  What are we trying to measure?


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Do you have a source for your numbers which might give us a glimpse into the methodology?
> 
> In any case, most of the discussion here has focused on improvements to training and organization by rationalizing units. This is different that a simple money saving exercise. The arguments for amalgamation have centred on having realistic sub-unit and unit sizes that could execute realistic training. Individuals could slow their career progression down a little as they would be forced upwards to quickly to fill the succession plan demend created by single sub-unit regiments.
> 
> Be careful throwing around examples from the US. I conducted an exchange as a Reservist with a USMC Reserve Battalion. This battalion had four full companies drawn from four major urban centres in two States. The Marines did the same training as their Active Duty counterparts and they had to come to the monthly training session. The officers were all ex-Active Duty. The focus was on training - no Thursday night mess fun. Is this what you had in mind?



Total defense spending $20 billion - 50,0000 members - $400,000 per - mixes soldiers with frigates but informative.  The militia numbers came off a regimental website showing a $1 million budget and a bit over 100 members.  I can't find it at the moment.  I wouldn't think it an unreasonable number.

I was thinking state guard units as opposed to USMC reserve units.  In any unit I was in the mess fun started after the training ended.


----------



## dapaterson

Apples and oranges.  $20B is P,O&M and capital across the CF.  $1M is a slice of P,O&M only for one unit, where they don't pay many of the costs associated with operating - units don't pay for infrastructure, equipment, ammo, IMPs, Reg F pay, base support...  in short, the numbers can't be compared.

There is a significant difference between the costs of Regs and Res, but 40:1 is RTFO.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Total defense spending $20 billion - 50,0000 members - $400,000 per -* mixes soldiers with frigates* but informative.



And base infrastructure and schools and a variety of things used by both Reg and Res units.

See: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/1/index-eng.asp



> The cost of increasing military strength by 1,000 regular personnel is about $150 million annually – and this does not include the associated equipment, infrastructure and training. Overall, just over 50 per cent of National Defence’s budget is spent on personnel.



By those figures, the costs of Reg F personnel exempt of infrastructure is $150,000 per person on average.

$150,000 / 365 days = $410 per person per day

Your figures for a Reserve unit offer $1,000,000 for 100 pers = $10,000 per person.

Reserve units are funded historically at about 35 days per person (someone can correct me if they have new figures.)

$10,000 / 35 days = $285 per man per day

So, we're spending about 70% per person in the Reserves of what we do on a Reg Force member.  The major difference is likely in the benefits that Reserves aren't entitled to as Class "A" soldiers - i.e. full time medical, etc.


----------



## aesop081

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Total defense spending $20 billion - 50,0000 members - $400,000 per - mixes soldiers with frigates but informative.



Not even informative as you take an overly simplistic view of unrelated statistics.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Dennis Ruhl:
If you don't start backing up your claims with facts...i.e. credible links... then you will be introduced to the Warning System for passing false information which is contrary to the forum guidelines. So in a nutshell back up your claims or withdraw your comments....

Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## dapaterson

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> $150,000 / 365 days = $410 per person per day
> 
> Your figures for a Reserve unit offer $1,000,000 for 100 pers = $10,000 per person.
> 
> Reserve units are funded historically at about 35 days per person (someone can correct me if they have new figures.)
> 
> $10,000 / 35 days = $285 per man per day
> 
> So, we're spending about 70% per person in the Reserves of what we do on a Reg Force member.  The major difference is likely in the benefits that Reserves aren't entitled to as Class "A" soldiers - i.e. full time medical, etc.



Depending on which LFA the unit posting those figures was from, and when that funding was granted changes things considerably.

The national funding model assigns 37.5 days (Sept-May) plus 7 days collective training (summer or other) to each LFA for each soldier in their class A target strength, plus CLDA (old FOA), plus O&M, plus some full-time Reserve positions.

Regional variations make it difficult to compare units in two different LFAs (or sometimes within the same LFA).  Different levels of decentralization between LFAs and CBGs leads to differing unit funding levels that may or may not be material - for example, units in 38 CBG have full-time Reservists paid by the CBG HQ, not the unit; in 33 CBG the units hold that funding.  So 38 CBG units appear to have smaller budgets than their peers in 33 CBG, but it's an accounting artifact.

The "simple" version of the funding for a unit would be:

Auth class A strength * (37.5 days per person + 7 days per person + CLDA for some trg events + O&M factor) + Auth class BA strength * (365 days per person + CLDA + O&M)


LFDTS holds individual training funds, which would be on top of the funding above.


LFAs and their subordinate ASGs may, of their own volition, download other funds to units to pay for expenses such as utilities or rented transportation - this skews some reporting, as again, there isn't a uniform standard nor reporting framework.


Frankly, DND's chart of accounts and financial reporting are both a mess - but that's much larger than just a Reserve force issue.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Total defense spending $20 billion - 50,0000 members - $400,000 per - mixes soldiers with frigates but informative.  The militia numbers came off a regimental website showing a $1 million budget and a bit over 100 members.  I can't find it at the moment.  I wouldn't think it an unreasonable number.
> 
> I was thinking state guard units as opposed to USMC reserve units.  In any unit I was in the mess fun started after the training ended.



Others have already responded very well to the methodology behind your numbers, a methodology that is highly suspect for all the reasons given. Once you actually find a number that is based in some reality you will need to find a "so what" for that ratio. How do you measure effectiveness per dollar spent? Once you have done that, I am still wondering what the point of your exercise is. I don't want this to be an issue of Reg vs Res, while it seems to me that it is your start point and end state.

What is your experience with National Guard or Army Reserve units? You might just find that they are organized along the lines suggested by those advocating amalgamation.

My point on mess nights was that for the seven years I served in the Reserves I felt that the point of the training night was oriented more towards the social aspect. We certainly trained for three periods and had O Gps, etc, but the point seemed to be to maintain contact as opposed to training. That aspect (the social bonding) is indeed important in a volunteer organization, but I noted that the USMC unit I worked with got by without any training nights - they only drilled one weekend a month and one two week exercise. They also deployed en masse and could be counted on to do so. A side bonus was that the individual Marines could travel long distances to the monthly drills, with some of them even flying. This would not be practical for weekly training nights. As a reserve BC and Ops O I felt that we got much more value out of weekends than on the equivalent number of training nights.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> As a reserve BC and Ops O I felt that we got much more value out of weekends than on the equivalent number of training nights.



That's because those that run things try to make a Fri night to Sun aft encompass six days of training : They constantly forget that most of those people (Cl A) have already worked an 8-12 hr shift before they showed up, then drive 6 hours each way to\from camp and have to head back to work when they return, some on midnights. After a half dozen IMPs and six hours sleep spread over the weekend.

But for some that are on Cl B and get the following Monday off (Brigade CTO) and spend the weekend in 'planning centres' (dry heated mod or CPs), it's no big deal is it?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Even a simple weekend training event spent at the Garrison location on weapons training could reap more dividends than four evenings with the same material. Regading your remarks on those running things I seem to recall that the CO and/or OC were the ones deciding on the training plan for an exercise. The commander should be the ones setting the schedule and the tempo. The day staff then works to iron out the details but the commanders are in command. 

That being said I do recall some exercises where we did indeed try to do too much in one weekend (or in a single week exercise). This can happen in any organization.

Resentment over CTO could, perhaps, go to another thread.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I agree. Just venting


----------



## Nfld Sapper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The national funding model assigns 37.5 days (Sept-May) plus 7 days collective training (summer or other) to each LFA for each soldier in their class A target strength, plus CLDA (old FOA), plus O&M, plus some full-time Reserve positions.
> 
> The "simple" version of the funding for a unit would be:
> 
> Auth class A strength * (37.5 days per person + 7 days per person + CLDA for some trg events + O&M factor) + Auth class BA strength * (365 days per person + CLDA + O&M)
> 
> 
> LFDTS holds individual training funds, which would be on top of the funding above.
> 
> 
> LFAs and their subordinate ASGs may, of their own volition, download other funds to units to pay for expenses such as utilities or rented transportation - this skews some reporting, as again, there isn't a uniform standard nor reporting framework.
> 
> 
> Frankly, DND's chart of accounts and financial reporting are both a mess - but that's much larger than just a Reserve force issue.



Slight tangent to this, how does class B at the schools factor into this (if any)?


----------



## c4th

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Even a simple weekend training event spent at the Garrison location on weapons training could reap more dividends than four evenings with the same material. ...



Of course it could.  The PRes is very good at utilizing 18-20 hours of a 24 hour day.  Whereas, a well utilized four hour training night is still a four hour training night.  That being said, the dividend would only be budgetary.  Based on the training facilities that are available at most Reserve armouries I would think the time would be better spent in the field.   

This wheel has already been invented and discarded.  Personally I was in a PRes unit (Total Farce) in the early to mid 90's that stopped parade nights in favour of a one Saturday per month scheme.  It failed.  If a res soldier misses one training night, typically it isn't a big deal.  If he missed a Saturday, he would probably be NES.  The demographic of PRes troops is probably best trained in the way that it has been trained for about 90 odd years.  

Personally I am impressed with the quality of PRes soldier that continue to augment line units and those sub units that are raised entirely by the PRes.  As long as their system continues to send the best soldiers to operations I don't see why it needs to be changed in some ill-conceived experiment to improve the bottom third non paraders.

If the roll of the PRes is taken seriously then they will continue to produce good citizen soldiers.

TNO


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

You are running out of time Mr Ruhl


----------



## dapaterson

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Slight tangent to this, how does class B at the schools factor into this (if any)?



Depends.  Most schools have a permanent Reserve establishment, year round class B positions.  There are also incremental summer positions, where LFDTS holds the funds as part of the overall Reserve indiv trg allocation.  Finally, there is the individual training cadre backfill funding, an interim measure where the VCDS has provided the Army with money to hire reservists to backfill Reg F positions vacant due to op tempo.  That is new money for the Army, but for a limited time.  As it's for indiv trg, again, it's money in LFDTS' hands.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Trust No One said:
			
		

> Of course it could.  The PRes is very good at utilizing 18-20 hours of a 24 hour day.  Whereas, a well utilized four hour training night is still a four hour training night.  That being said, the dividend would only be budgetary.  Based on the training facilities that are available at most Reserve armouries I would think the time would be better spent in the field.
> 
> This wheel has already been invented and discarded.  Personally I was in a PRes unit (Total Farce) in the early to mid 90's that stopped parade nights in favour of a one Saturday per month scheme.  It failed.  If a res soldier misses one training night, typically it isn't a big deal.  If he missed a Saturday, he would probably be NES.  The demographic of PRes troops is probably best trained in the way that it has been trained for about 90 odd years.
> 
> Personally I am impressed with the quality of PRes soldier that continue to augment line units and those sub units that are raised entirely by the PRes.  As long as their system continues to send the best soldiers to operations I don't see why it needs to be changed in some ill-conceived experiment to improve the bottom third non paraders.
> 
> If the roll of the PRes is taken seriously then they will continue to produce good citizen soldiers.
> 
> TNO



I was also in a PRes unit in the early 90s. What I found as a Troop Leader was that my soldiers who had real civilian jobs could commit to the weekends if we got them the training calendar early enough but the weekly evenings were a burden. We then let them miss the Thursday nights as long as they made the weekends. Those weekends were either in the field or at the IMR conducting gunnery. Getting an interesting training calendar out in September that stayed firm seemed to be the best attendance helper.

I agree that field time is a better use of resources than a garrison weekend - my point was that you still get more out of a weekend than a series of evenings regardless of field or not. In my USMC Reserve example that was exactly how they operated - IIRC ten weekends and a two week exercise. The ten weekends were generally spent on the range (Camp Grayling or something like that) with the two week exercise at a different training centre each year (amphib, mountain, Norway etc). No training nights, just training.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Depends.  Most schools have a permanent Reserve establishment, year round class B positions.  There are also incremental summer positions, where LFDTS holds the funds as part of the overall Reserve indiv trg allocation.  Finally, there is the individual training cadre backfill funding, an interim measure where the VCDS has provided the Army with money to hire reservists to backfill Reg F positions vacant due to op tempo.  That is new money for the Army, but for a limited time.  As it's for indiv trg, again, it's money in LFDTS' hands.



Gotcha Paterson thanks for the info.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Having experienced both Canadian and USMC reserve training models, I'd say that something in the middle would be of greater benefit.

Within the Canadian context, many weekly parade nights were of little training value, but as mentioned, good for maintaining social contact, and building the bonds at the crew/section/troop/platoon level.
On the USMC side of things, our drill weekends tended to be trying to stuff 10 pounds of sh*t into a 5 pound bag.  Not only did we try to do some field training, but were constantly bombarded with the other 'check in the box' type stuff, i.e. sexual harassment briefings, suicide prevention, annual counter-intel briefing, etc. which would eat up alot of otherwise valuable training time.  If it was a garrison weekend we'd generally show up on friday night, train until 1 or 2 in the morning with lectures and such, reveille at 0500 saturday, PT, then train until 1 or 2 on sunday morning, 0500 sunday reveille, PT, then train sometimes up until dismissal which might be anywhere from 1630-2330 sometimes.  There was often ALOT of dead/down time due to lack of organization at the company level in terms of who was doing what, or waiting for a guest lecturer to turn up from another organization, etc.

What is interesting to note is the attrition level between the two organizations.  I don't have any official numbers, but I'd be willing to say that most Canadian reserve units lose most of their new recruits within 1-2 years.  If somebody can make it past that 2 year marker they're likely going to be in it for a relatively long period of time, lets say 5-7 years, before another gradual round of attrition happens when they transition from being students to having careers and families, and find those activities conflict too much with their reserve schedule.  Within the Marines, because you're held on contract, there is little loss within the 6 years of the average reservists contract, however there's almost an 80-90% release rate after those 6 years.  A big factor is that you don't form the same social bonds, especially because there's no mess organization for people to unwind in after training is a big issue I think, although its such a foreign concept to the Marine Corps (and US military in general) that trying to explain how it builds cohesion and esprit de corps for guys who only see each other once a month doesn't meet much success or acceptance.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Matt,

Good perspectives on both systems. I should make the point here that I do believe that Parade nights have value and I am not saying we need to cut them. Even it the primary value was reinforcing contact between the individual and the unit that is a good thing in and of itself. I enjoyed the mess life and it did help cohesion. The time was also valuable for getting ready for a weekend exercise or passing information/checking kit. I raised the USMC model in response to Dennis Ruhl's point about the US employment of Reserves in Iraq to make the point that you need to go into the details when making comparisons. As an aside I do recall remarking that I found the weekend drills very full - and I was used to the "train all five phases of war in 36 hrs" we sometimes saw at home. The annual training event was, however, an excellent training opportunity and something we could look to. 

You are probably very close on your estimate for Reserve retention. When I worked at an Area Training Centre I found it slightly disheartening to see the system jump through hoops to train people but then loose them quickly. We looked for ways to offer a more interesting "second summer" to keep graduates of the first summer interested but the priority was always given to Recruit/QL3 training. I wondered if we could have used an NCM-RESO program that offered four summers of full employment right off the bat - as long as you remained active in your home unit. The first summer would be DP1 training.  The second summer would be DP2 courses to include PLQ-L (bit of a rush but there you go). The third and fourth summers would be spent instructing. Anyhoo!


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Dennis Ruhl:
> If you don't start backing up your claims with facts...i.e. credible links... then you will be introduced to the Warning System for passing false information which is contrary to the forum guidelines. So in a nutshell back up your claims or withdraw your comments....
> 
> Milnet.ca Staff



The website mentioning a militia unit with slightly over 100 soldiers and a budget of $ 1 million was, I believe, The Algonquin Regiment.  The website is down at the moment but I'll get the link ASAP. I think it may be an old version of the site so I will have to do a Wayback Machine search.  

The total defence budget in 2008 was over $18 billion and in 2009 over $19 billion.  I don't think that that would be contentious.  I believe the strength of the Canadian forces is now something over 60,000 so my initial ratio of $400,000 per may be closer to  $330,000 per.

There was no intent to deceive and my point that the cost of each individual reserve soldier is comparatively very small doesn't change.  It's a gross analysis and mixes apples and oranges but often gross analyses are the most informative.  

Presuming I can verify my $1 million cost for a 100 member reserve unit I would use as a defence that in real world accounting, a budget or other financial report would be inclusive of all costs that can reasonably be apportioned.  The military may legitimately not be concerned with apportioning all costs on a unit basis because of the cost of preparing data may exceed the gain from having the data available.

There was no intention to feed any rivalry.  I believe a strong regular force helps world security as does a strong reserve.


----------



## aesop081

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The total defence budget in 2008 was over $18 billion and in 2009 over $19 billion.  I don't think that that would be contentious.  I believe the strength of the Canadian forces is now something over 60,000 so my initial ratio of $400,000 per may be closer to  $330,000 per.



You can adjust the numbers all you want, your reasoning is flawed and your methodology fundamentaly out to f'ing lunch.


----------



## dapaterson

Thank you for the clarification, but the data remains utterly spurious.  You've taken all DND expenditures, on DND and CF elements, Reg, Res and civ, and atrritubted 100% of it to the Regular Force to arrive at the $330K figure (Public sources place the Reg Force around 64K at the end of FY 2008).

You then take only a small portion of that same amount that is allocated to one unit for a small portion of its expenses to come up with a comparison - without considering what is and is not included, and draw wild conclusions (40:1).

DND's accounts are somewhat opaque, unfortunately.  But a good grounding in them is neccessary to make informed comment.  Using spurious figures or those that are easily refuted only damages your cause.

And, ultimately, the Reserves are overly fixated on dollars and roll calls; to my mind, the focus needs to be on capability output - what can they provide?  When leaders (at all levels up to and including LGens) are given concrete data indicating capability they get very attentive and supportive.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> What is your experience with National Guard or Army Reserve units? You might just find that they are organized along the lines suggested by those advocating amalgamation.



I've driven around the western states a lot and armouries and Guard recruiting offices are everywhere.

Montana - about 1 million pop

163rd Infantry Regiment is in 16 locations.  It fought as a unit in the Pacific in WWII.  Perhaps it could be the model for a revitalization in Canada.  While built around the Bradley AFV it seems to include all trades.  If we want to economize on colonels, perhaps a regiment like the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could have an MP Platoon, Medical Company, Engineering Squadron, and Communication Squadron etc. under their umbrella for administrative purposes while keeping their branch identities.



Alberta - about 3 million pop

The Loyal Edmonton Regiment and B Sqn. The South Alberta Light Horse - 1 location

The Kings Own Calgary Regiment and The Calgary Highlanders  - 1 location

The South Alberta Light Horse - A Sqn - 1 location

Other units - 4 more locations


----------



## cavalryman

A quick real-world $ break-down for a reserve unit of my personal acquaintance....  about 100 Cl A effectives, plus the usual number of in-unit Cl B paid out of the unit budget... $800K for the year total allocation; 1/3 of that amount is spent on actual training (incl. IBTS, crew served weapons ranges & field trg), the remainder on admin, Cl B salaries, etc.  Make of that what you will.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Thank you for the clarification, but the data remains utterly spurious.
> 
> And, ultimately, the Reserves are overly fixated on dollars and roll calls; to my mind, the focus needs to be on capability output - what can they provide?  When leaders (at all levels up to and including LGens) are given concrete data indicating capability they get very attentive and supportive.



I do realize that sailors need something to ride on as do pilots.  Reality is that reserve units do not have ships, fighter planes, helicopters, tanks etc.  To ignore the gross cost of these items would also create some unrealistic numbers.  Not everyone is light infantry like most reserve units.

Reserves are fixated on dollars and roll calls because it is a perceived measure of efficiency.  Smarter people than me have attempted to measure efficiency in governmental organizations and lacking a bottom line, all have failed miserably.  You can set objectives and try to determine whether the objectives have been met but the process quickly becomes subjective.

Canada was on the winning side in WWII so we could say the objectives were met.  That much we know.  The rest?


----------



## aesop081

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> I do realize that sailors need something to ride on as do pilots.  Reality is that reserve units do not have ships, fighter planes, helicopters, tanks etc.  To ignore the gross cost of these items would also create some unrealistic numbers.  Not everyone is light infantry like most reserve units.



You still,cant seem to grasp why your reasoning is flawed and steadfastly refuse to adress the reasons that have been posted. Nice going.


----------



## Rick Goebel

Tango2bravo, I think your comment "I wondered if we could have used an NCM-RESO program that offered four summers of full employment right off the bat - as long as you remained active in your home unit. The first summer would be DP1 training.  The second summer would be DP2 courses to include PLQ-L (bit of a rush but there you go). The third and fourth summers would be spent instructing." is one of the best possible ways of improving the general efficiency of the army reserve.  I lost count of how many times in how many places I suggested this when I was still serving.

Unfortunately, I no longer have access to a lot of the figures I used to support the proposal, though it did seem easy to support.

I would encourage anyone with access to retention and training cost numbers to look at this and to recommend it anywhere any time you can.


----------



## dapaterson

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Canada was on the winning side in WWII so we could say the objectives were met.  That much we know.  The rest?



Ouch.  Dupuy would disagree; arguably, the Allies wasted resources in profligate manner - including the lives of their sons and daughters.  Unfortunately, victors tend not to learn the lessons they need to know.

But that's a whole other rabbit hole...


Cavalryman:  That $800K includes no infrastructure costs for the facility; no payments in lieu of taxes for the facility; no acquisition costs for vehicles or weapons; no life-cycle support for those vehicles or weapons; no ammunition; no support from bases (and please leave out the gratuitous CFSU(O) jokes); no pay for the Regular Force members posted in; no individual training for the soldiers; no IMPs; no benefits (including the dental plan, disability compensation, now pension benefits, CPP and EI contributions (employer's share), RFRG...); individual clothing and equipment... 

But the $18B figure does include those amounts.  So we can't reconcile the two.  Indeed, we can't even stand up a new unit using the $800K as an estimate, as there are so many other costs involved.

That's the main critique here - the starting numbers are so dissimilar that they are not comparable at all.


----------



## dapaterson

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> Tango2bravo['s comment] is one of the best possible ways of improving the general efficiency of the army reserve.  I lost count of how many times in how many places I suggested this when I was still serving.
> 
> Unfortunately, I no longer have access to a lot of the figures I used to support the proposal, though it did seem easy to support.
> 
> I would encourage anyone with access to retention and training cost numbers to look at this and to recommend it anywhere any time you can.



The devil is always in the details, though, and such a program would have to be individually tailored to each soldier - depending on their availabilities for training and sync with courses.

As well, and this is a CF dirty little secret, year one attrition is about the same for the Reg F and the Res F.  Most of the folks who leave at 0-11+ months of service are those who discover the Army/CF just isn't for them.  (Reg F attrition isn't noticed because it takes place in the recruit school and during DP1 training, so line units never see it, except as "What happened to XXXXX who was on our recruit course?")

The challenge is the year 2 (and, to a lesser extent) the year 3 attrition.  A "NCM Entry Scheme Trial" (NEST - how about that for an abbreviation?) would need to address that - and would have to be portable, from unit to unit, as young soldiers move for school or work.

Indeed, perhaps that's a first place to look for efficiency - streamlining the process for soldiers to parade with other units.  Could we even (gasp) permit COs to talk directly, and info their higher HQ that Bloggins will be parading with them, vice the current useless system of CBG and LFA HQ mailboxes transferring information in a less than timely manner.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The devil is always in the details, though, and such a program would have to be individually tailored to each soldier - depending on their availabilities for training and sync with courses.
> 
> As well, and this is a CF dirty little secret, year one attrition is about the same for the Reg F and the Res F.  Most of the folks who leave at 0-11+ months of service are those who discover the Army/CF just isn't for them.  (Reg F attrition isn't noticed because it takes place in the recruit school and during DP1 training, so line units never see it, except as "What happened to XXXXX who was on our recruit course?")
> 
> The challenge is the year 2 (and, to a lesser extent) the year 3 attrition.  A "NCM Entry Scheme Trial" (NEST - how about that for an abbreviation?) would need to address that - and would have to be portable, from unit to unit, as young soldiers move for school or work.
> 
> Indeed, perhaps that's a first place to look for efficiency - streamlining the process for soldiers to parade with other units.  Could we even (gasp) permit COs to talk directly, and info their higher HQ that Bloggins will be parading with them, vice the current useless system of CBG and LFA HQ mailboxes transferring information in a less than timely manner.



You are correct that little details can sometimes be quite major obstacles that scuttle a plan!

I would see this plan as being offered to Reservists who are enrolled (or enrolling) in a post-secondary institution. I was a RESO guy and benefited from three full summers, and I think that we could broaden the arcs somewhat. Univeristy and college calendars have a centre of visible mass in terms of calendars which could be used as the baseline. We would certainly need to allow for individuals to transfer between units - which might mean that this program would need central funding.

As an aside, I watched de-centralized funding kill officer training and production in the Reserves. When RESO was centrally funded units could recruit six officer cadets in the hopes of getting three Troop Leaders. Once funding was de-centralized I saw units suddenly stop asking for RESO vacancies and opting for the cheaper MITCP (I was a CBG G3 IT at the time) to save a couple of bucks. They would also only hire one or two and then wonder why they had no junior officers. Anyhoo.

I don't think that we would need any obligation except that to qualify for subsequent summers the individual would need to have paraded at his unit. I think that the prospect of interesting training (offer challenging DP2s) combined with guaranteed employment for three to four months would be a good draw for the average post-secondary student. When I was a unit Ops O the Ops WO worked hard to find full summers of employment for our Troopers/non-CLC Cpls and this was very hard. We could only make it work for a few and the rest would then seek employment elsewhere (can't blame them). Once a guy got CLC he had more work than he could handle, so the trick is to have a good second summer.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> Having experienced both Canadian and USMC reserve training models, I'd say that something in the middle would be of greater benefit.
> 
> Within the Canadian context, many weekly parade nights were of little training value, but as mentioned, good for maintaining social contact, and building the bonds at the crew/section/troop/platoon level.



We've always had the best results when training nights were part of battle prep for the exercise. Issue a warning order for the ex on D-30 days (ish) then work up to the 'operational deployment' during the following 3 or 4 evenings. This gives the PM training purpose, just like any battel prep evolution. It works great, as long as you maintain the aim and are not seriously sidetracked by some of the usual mo-lisha clutter - which is also a feature of any regular army unit.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We've always had the best results when training nights were part of battle prep for the exercise. Issue a warning order for the ex on D-30 days (ish) then work up to the 'operational deployment' during the following 3 or 4 evenings. This gives the PM training purpose, just like any battel prep evolution. It works great, as long as you maintain the aim and are not seriously sidetracked by some of the usual mo-lisha clutter - which is also a feature of any regular army unit.



I agree here.  Too many Canadian militia training nights were done on an ad hoc basis, with little serious thought given to how the training plan tied into our monthly FTXs and annual transition from individual to collective training.  I'd say we could probably eliminate 2 training nights without any real damage to the standards, and use that money for an additional week long concentration sometime towards the end of the training year, before units stand down, and most importantly, before they send their members off for summer taskings and courses.

I still think a contract method would be the best way to ensure that units get consistent numbers, even if it is only an annual or bi-annual contract.  Make the contract renewal a public parade whereby members who are renewing get to sign on via the CO in front of their mates and families.  That puts alot of face-saving pressure on those who are pondering not signing on for another year, and again, strengthen bonds within the unit.

For members who don't opt to sign on to the contract, they're moved away from 'deploying tier 1' positions within the unit, i.e. the 4th rifle company within the affiliated battlegroup, whereby a serious commitment to training and physical fitness have to be maintained; separate what I would classify as the professional reservist from the social club/dad's Army type.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> I agree here.  Too many Canadian militia training nights were done on an ad hoc basis, with little serious thought given to how the training plan tied into our monthly FTXs and annual transition from individual to collective training.  I'd say we could probably eliminate 2 training nights without any real damage to the standards, and use that money for an additional week long concentration sometime towards the end of the training year, before units stand down, and most importantly, before they send their members off for summer taskings and courses.



The onus is on the leadership (i.e., those at my pay grade and above) to plan far enough in advance, of course. Then the Jnr Offr/SNCO network can kick into gear and get down to the details needed. I think if we get the planning and 'certainty' right, we can dispense with other forms of coercion and bribery. I mean, if you can't plan well enough to fill the armoury every night with keeners who want to blow things up and shoot things, then you lack imagination.  :camo:


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

For my first three years in the Reserves (90 to 93) the training was fairly marginal. We lacked access to equipment, training funds were tight and with the exception of a brief ACP phase in 1991 we also seemed to lack focus. My own unit had three Squadrons, but each Troop began with half of its strength on long-term NES.

A new Area Comd in 1993 changed all this and while his measures were broadly unpopular with the old guard the new focus on training and associated accountability for it gave us resources and focus. We were given new powers to sweep out the NES folks. Our first year under the new program had some fits and starts but by the second year I think that we were rolling.

With the guidance of the CO and 2IC and a fairly clear District Annual Training Directive that expressed goals, the Ops WO and I sat down for a month in the summer and hammered out a training plan. The CO made some final tweaks and we made some other adjustments when consulting with District and the other units (deconflicting resources like Cougars and range timings). By the middle of August we had an approved plan and the Ops WO booked everything. We handed the soldiers a calendar in September that laid out the year.

I was double-hatted as a Troop Leader, and my Troop had 100% attendance for the training weekends. I think that led to this was that the training looked fairly interesting and they had the schedule in time to make arrangements. Our year had a focus that was given to us by higher command, and it was one that everyone could buy into. We repeated this the following year.


----------



## dapaterson

Selection and maintenance of the aim - who'd have thought?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> With the guidance of the CO and 2IC and a fairly clear District Annual Training Directive that expressed goals, the Ops WO and I sat down for a month in the summer and hammered out a training plan. The CO made some final tweaks and we made some other adjustments when consulting with District and the other units (deconflicting resources like Cougars and range timings). By the middle of August we had an approved plan and the Ops WO booked everything. We handed the soldiers a calendar in September that laid out the year.
> 
> I was double-hatted as a Troop Leader, and my Troop had 100% attendance for the training weekends. I think that led to this was that the training looked fairly interesting and they had the schedule in time to make arrangements. Our year had a focus that was given to us by higher command, and it was one that everyone could buy into. We repeated this the following year.



Let me take a wild assed guess here: recruiting and retention skyrocketed, right?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Recruiting was stable, but retention was very good. We had an oustanding core of about twenty-five Troopers who had joined in '93 and they stuck together for about three years as a group. It think it was partially that they all enjoyed each other's company but also that we offered them something that was challenging and somewhat consistent (they joined to serve as Crewmen on Cougars and they actually got to do that). Some then went on to other things but some are indeed still in.

I think that what made this possible was the firm direction from the Area Commander. 

Bringing this back to the thread, if I was suddenly a Reservist again and in charge of a Recce Squadron I could probably make something work if the CO came in and said:

"Tango2Bravo, when you are done searching the Internet for pictures of the green-skinned red-head from Star Trek would you mind reading my Annual Training Directive that I sent you last week? In there you may find some direction that you are to train your Squadron for Convoy Escort tasks. You have your one Troop of LUVWs to stretch across three Troops for the Fall, but for the April to June period the other COs and myself have pooled our resources. You will get two weekends with a full Squadron and there will be a Convoy Escort BTS evaluation at the end. There will be Troop of LAV RWS worked in as well so you need to get some guys trained up on that. Brief me next Thursday."

"Don't worry sir, the SSM and me went through it on the weekend and we have a rough plan. Once I've downloaded this last picture I can brief you. The BC and Ops Sgt are already working on the details. Can I get a live-fire 360 degree Troop convoy escort live fire range in March?"


----------



## Haggis

T2B, I find this very interesting.  Just how did you bypass the DWAN Firewall to get those photos downloaded?

But seriously, folks, the absolute key to successful training nights and weekends is to get *commitment*.  The ONLY way to get commitment is to plan innovative, relevant, interesting training on firm, fixed dates and then deliver on this, each and every time the troops show up.


----------



## ArmyRick

Well said. Ad hoc = chaos = troops not wanting to come out.


----------



## Long in the tooth

I recall training on weeknights and weekends on at least three ambitious combat related courses that took a huge commitment.  About three quarters of the way thru on each we were told "course cancelled due to 1.  We haven't recv auth to give the qual;  2.  We don't have the ammo; or 3.  We've run out of money."

And then during the summer we would have to take rifleman in a demo coy and watch everyone else with those quals get the jammy jobs.

One reason why I left the reserves... and I'm not slagging the members, it's just the nature of the beast.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Otto Fest said:
			
		

> I recall training on weeknights and weekends on at least three ambitious combat related courses that took a huge commitment.  About three quarters of the way thru on each we were told "course cancelled due to 1.  We haven't recv auth to give the qual;  2.  We don't have the ammo; or 3.  We've run out of money."
> 
> And then during the summer we would have to take rifleman in a demo coy and watch everyone else with those quals get the jammy jobs.
> 
> One reason why I left the reserves... and I'm not slagging the members, it's just the nature of the beast.



I'm guessing that at least one of those courses was Basic Recce, AWT or Driver Wheeled. They look good on paper, troops love them, but they're a huge effort for a reserve unit.

Nevertheless, I've seen courses like these run well by reserve units; they just need to make sure that they get the planning right.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

We usually had good ideas and imagination, but were short on resources. Running really cool courses and exotic exercises sounds great, but it can fall flat on its face when the resources are not there. As a Reserve G3 IT I saw some minor disasters when units tried to run advanced courses without having access to the advanced resources necessary to run them through to their conclusion. Hurt feelings ensue and credibility suffers.

Linking this back to the role and capabilities piece, I really think that the senior commanders have a huge role to play. They control the resources and they allocate the tasks/missions. Missions and tasks don't necessarily have to be glamourous - they do need to be resourced.

The current proposed tasks offer units the opportunity to execute training for tasks that are relevent and resourced. An OC can then brief the training year to the troops with some expectation that what he is saying will actually happen. The imagination and initiative of the junior leadership can then be used to make that training interesting and exciting within the lane set by the higher commander.


----------



## dapaterson

Problems, however, can arise when senior commanders (and their staffs) are RTFO when considering what is possible within the time constraint reservists have (class A reservists, that is).  It's not merely a case of throwing more money at the problem; as people rise up in a Reserve career they have other factors at play that limit the time they can commit to the Reserves.

When, say, an LFA Commander makes decisions that are fine for full-time personnel but place an inordinate burden on part-time personnel to execute, he sets things up for failure - either key things won't get done because the unit leadership follow the most recent direction to the detriment of more important responsibilities or people burn out because they can't maintain a work/military/homelife balance.

(Mind you, we need to breed better officers, more willing to rise up on their hind legs and say "No, that's stupid, here's why."  Too often it's "What a great idea sir!")


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (Mind you, we need to breed better officers, more willing to rise up on their hind legs and say "No, that's stupid, here's why."  Too often it's "What a great idea sir!")



Ah yes, the infamous WAGI and WARGI. 

A WAGI is ' what a good idea' and usually involves a standard level of foolishnes e.g., dress as nuns, get in a red cross van and dismount behind enemy lines to conduct raiding activities. A WARGI, however, is a truly wonderous idea to behold, involving things like the transcendence of the space time continuum, the redefinition of the laws of physics, chemistry and biology, compounded by an overwhelming sense of confidence fuelled by dreams of glory e.g., invade Iraq with a couple of divisions and hope to rely on 'shock and awe' for success...


----------



## Grognard73

So, let me rejuvinate this topic given whats going on today.  For the last 5 years the Reserves have provided substantial augmentation to the the mission in Afghanistan.  They have become an active resource for domestic operations from running MCDVs to Land operations.  They are an important part of the CF's operational capability.  On top of this there are approx 10,000 "full time" Class Bs working in the CF keeping it functioning day to day.  In fact many of the departments and branches could not function without them.  This dynamic accounts for almost one in three Reservists are working full time. This is an operational Reserve.  What is missing is the policy and systemic work to enhance this capability to allow for effective management of the resource. 

At the same time, the CF has left he National Mobilization concept clearly behind.  The Strategic role of the Reserves and it is a very important one is the critical link to our communities across the country.  One could also argue that the basic structures of the Army Reserve and Navres provide a strategic expansion structure if required. 

The pressures on the Reserves now have fundamentally changed its nature.  Sure reservists still parade on weekends and nights at their locations and sure there is a part time reality to the Given all of this and the fundamental change to the nature and use of the reservesservice but this reality has been impacted by large numbers of "Combat veterans" who are demanding more than the usual tuesday night parade.

As a direct result of these new roles, training and military education has moved to new levels of harmonization.  The Air Reserve and the NavRes now complete the same training as their regular components while the Army has made substantial advances to the same objectives.

Given all of this and the fundamental change to our understanding what should be the future?  What does the Reserve gain or lose by moving to a purely strategic resource or embracing a more operational role?

grognard73


----------



## McG

Grognard73 said:
			
		

> What does the Reserve gain or lose by moving to a purely strategic resource or embracing a more operational role?


I'm not sure that I am tracking the intent of your question?  Are you asking for opinions in what you see as polar opposite ways forward?


----------



## TCBF

Grognard73 said:
			
		

> ... almost one in three Reservists are working full time.
> ...
> At the same time, the CF has left he National Mobilization concept clearly behind.  ...



- If one in three reservists are doing full-time military service, I would say we are just about mobilized now.


----------



## McG

I am curious as to what number of those full time reservists are deployed & preparing to deploy, what number are working full time to support/plan/enable the part-time reserve, what number are working full time to provide reserve representation at various HQ levels, and what number are working full time just to fill positions which the Reg Force cannot (including HQ bloat).


----------



## TCBF

- Is "Bloat" an Action Verb?  What's the Map Symbol for "Bloat"?


----------



## The Bread Guy

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Is "Bloat" an Action Verb?  What's the Map Symbol for "Bloat"?



Don't know the map symbol, but it is, indeed, a verb, bud:
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/bloat


----------



## Haggis

MCG said:
			
		

> I am curious as to what number of those full time reservists are deployed & preparing to deploy, what number are working full time to support/plan/enable the part-time reserve, what number are working full time to provide reserve representation at various HQ levels, and what number are working full time just to fill positions which the Reg Force cannot (including HQ bloat).



Tracking the number of Res F on full time service is problematic at the best of times.  This is partly because the automated systems (HRMS, CFTPO, Monitor MASS, RPSR, CCPS) don't record and report similarly (nor do they "talk" to each other).

On average, though, about 9,000 Res F members are on some type of full time service.  Numbers vary seasonally (i.e. much higher in the summer) so this a yearly average.  This comprises 40% of the Reserve strength.


----------



## Grognard73

Just counting Army Reservists is a real problem.  The Official count of Army reservists includes all Reservists serving in the Army, Class A, B, and C.  It doesn't relate to structure just number of "pay checks" basically.   Even the authorised structure is in question.  The ARE forms the basis of the establishment recorded in the Automated Establishment report AER and it has had little oversight from a strategic Reserve point of view, meaning no one really monitored the growth of Reserve positions over the ARE.  So now for discussion purposes the Army Reserve is, say around 21,000 "effective" soldiers, (approx 25,000 in HRMS).  Of those 21,000 about 4,000 in training, 5,000 working full time and that leaves about 12,000 Class A effective and trained soldiers on our armouries floors.  The directed strength for the Army reserve is 18,850 which includes the Army Signals now.

As far as operations are concerned about 1200 per year on Class C which equates to about 10% of the class A strength.  What I find interesting is, given that dynamic I have heard some complain that our commitment cannot be sustained.  I feel the opposite, and hope that we do not lose this after the Combat mission ends.  Much resitance I hear from all sides of the argument.  The intersting stat would be the impact at the units.  12,000 divided roughly by 140 units!  How big is the average unit?  I mean the real number, how many on a tuesday night and on local exercises?


----------



## Haggis

Consider how many of the 12,000 Class A soldiers are:

a. unavailable to deploy due to civilian commitments (job, education, family etc.)
b. not interested in a tour for whatever reason (Ex Reg F with lots of BTDT, for example);
c. have already done one or a number of tours.
d. cannot be deployed (i.e. PERSTEMPO restrictions, temporary medical limitations)
e. cannot be deployed due to the valuable contributions they currently make to the system (someone posted something earlier about "not eating the seed corn").

Therefore, only a small portion of the 12,000 are deployable on international operations.  Most, however, would readily step up to the plate for domestic deployments, particularly where their community was concerned (i.e. the Ice Storm).  This is the hallmark of the "Citizen-Soldier" .


----------



## Grognard73

Thanks for the response.  So what I hear is that there is pressure and debate on what size the Army Reserve should be.  Some people say that it is already too big given the contribution to Ops especially Afghanistan where the Reserves have sent the highest contribution since the Second World War, Korea did not call up the Militia at the time but lots joined the special service force.  Domestic Ops are the most important contribution in my opinion and there has been 11 Major Dom Ops over the last, say, 12 years.  The largest Res contribution was about 3500 during the Ice Storm and the Floods in Winnipeg.  The Reserves did that with a force that was easily 6000 smaller than it is today.  I also think that a fundamental flaw with LFRR was the lack of recognition that structure and people were required to continue this most important work.  That has to have an influence on the size I think.

Bottom line is that intuitively some Reservists feel that they should be larger, I agree, but the facts in evidence are that for the current reality they are currently producing without fail.  The argument for the mobilization basis remains undefined and as this planning paradigm is not currently relevant given the planning scenarios under the CFDS.

So, with growth being announced for the Reserves to 30,000 in the CF where is the growth to be assigned?  This is complicated and needs thought at the highest levels of the CF.


----------



## dapaterson

Go away for a few days, and see what topic pops up...

(1) Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.

(2) Identifying where full time Reservists work is a trivial exercise.  I was reporting on it on a regular basis when I worked on the land staff.  The granularity can be quite good, if people are willing to invest a bit of time to ensure things are kept clean.  However, there is no will to have the info.  The Army G1 staff is not filled with the best and brightest.  And there is no insistence from the top that they provide the commander with the information he requires.  Instead, they muddle along doing what they've always done.

(3) Further Reserve expansion.  (a) The LFRR model was an abject failure, travesty, and abject stupidity.  Never Again!
(b) Given the P Res currently parade about 19K (Army), 3.5K (Navy), 2K (AF), 1K (Other), expansion would be about 4.5K to get to 20K parading.  Remove 1200 BTL, and you're left with a minor increase.
(c) The Army Reserve remains bloated with LCols that have no use (both structurally and individually).  A structure is needed that provides increased opportunities for leadership to be employed outside unit lines earlier in people's careers to get greater breadth.

A few hobby horses of mine here; unfortunately, I don't have time right now to make detailed contributions to the discussion.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (3) Further Reserve expansion. (b) Given the P Res currently parade about 19K (Army), 3.5K (Navy), 2K (AF), 1K (Other), expansion would be about 4.5K to get to 20K parading.  Remove 1200 BTL, and you're left with a minor increase.



Are you including the PRLs in this estimate?  There are many Reservists on the PRLs but no longer on the ECS's Res Establishment.


----------



## Grognard73

PRL's, now there is an interesting story.  The numbers I quote exclude the NDHQ PRL and there are many Army Reservists working outside the Army on that PRL.  There are other PRL's as well but the numbers of personnel wearing an Army uniform are not significant.  I have estimates of between 700 to 2000 Army Reserve personnel outside the Army.  This is part of a great mystery that I know the Army staff  is trying to work through.  Counting Reservists and then managing them with current system is at a pretty basic level.  HRMS has failed and hopefully there is work being done to sort this critical issue out.


----------



## Haggis

Grognard73 said:
			
		

> Counting Reservists and then managing them with current system is at a pretty basic level.  HRMS has failed and hopefully there is work being done to sort this critical issue out.



HRMS hasn't "failed" but the users and those who manage personnel policy certainly have.  In that data regarding Reservists is stored in separate and non-interconnected systems, this results in duplicate counts and missed personnel.  What really drives this is that the only system that _really_ matters to the Class A 9and B) world is RPSR.  If the troops get paid, the troops are happy.  Therefore if the data on Class A/B Reservists isn't accurately entered in HRMS nobody really cares because the troops don't complain.

Yes, work is being done to address this (I saw a draft policy framework document this today, in fact) but it is going to be a slow, labourious and evolutionary process to bring the Reserves from (historically) strategic to (currently) operational.  There is, in my mind, no real need for a strategic Reserve to support mass mobilisation any longer.


----------



## Grognard73

I would just like to respond to some points made in an earlier post.

Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.

This is a really tough number.  Data systems to collect this a prone to info lag and poor updating.  Nevertheless HRMS indicates this is the number of not DP1 qualified pers.  If you assume a 15% attrition rate and recruiting to maintain that number you approach a number in the area of 3000 required for a BTL.  I think that is a pretty simplistic view but it illustrates the size of the problem.  Work to create a Rerserve AMOR seems to be stalled pending some kind of review of the establishment.Higher attrition rates mean more BTL, and if you consider the limitations of available time of candidates and throughput limitations these will all impact the number.  This must be considered in any system level analysis and you are right it is often ignored.

Please excuse my lack of skill with the site I am new here.

Reporting on Reserve strength is now part of the Army G1 monthly report.  I understand it is not perfect but at least it works. 

My opinion is the basic flaw with LFRR was it was not in synch with the requirements of the Army.  The Track 1 (or 2) if I am wrong was never completed.  The Army did not input into the analysis with what tey wanted or needed.  Ithink it is being done now and forms what is the basis for Army Transformation but it is far from complete.  Any analysis of the Army reserve structure must include the requirements from the Army.  

There are too many LCols but the Army seems to lack the organizational discipline to control it.  There seems to be some effort in Ontario but I do not know the details.  

I also think the lack of other career opportunities for junior Reservists is a factor of the current manning levels and not some plot.  If we had more structure and people it could be done.  But in a zero sum game of today, creating those may mean structure reduction.  Can this be done?


----------



## Larkvall

Grognard73 said:
			
		

> Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.



I wish to bring something up about this point. I am in the process of applying to the Reserves (32 CER). On the 32 Brigade website on this page....

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/32brigade/hq/BSL/Basic_Skills.htm

..... it talks about how they usually run 6 BMQ courses (previously they mentioned each course holds approximately 50 people), but under the BMQ - Land (formerly SQ) description they say they only run 1 or 2 courses per year. 

Everybody has to take these two courses so why is there such a drop off? Maybe not all the BMQ courses are full? Even so it seems people are dropping like flies during BMQ or right after. Do people really know what they are getting into?


----------



## Haggis

Larkvall said:
			
		

> I wish to bring something up about this point. I am in the process of applying to the Reserves (32 CER). On the 32 Brigade website on this page it talks about how they usually run 6 BMQ courses (previously they mentioned each course holds approximately 50 people), but under the BMQ - Land (formerly SQ) description they say they only run 1 or 2 courses per year.



32 CBG BSL may "only" run 1-2 BMQ (L) per year, but the Area RST in Meaford runs several more over the summer to accomodate those who cannot/do not attend the BSL BMQ (L) courses.  BMQ is not run over the summer.  It is decentralized to the units/CBG BSLs to run over the winter thus allowing RST to concentrate on BMQ (L) and, more importantly, DP1 courses.


----------



## Larkvall

Haggis said:
			
		

> 32 CBG BSL may "only" run 1-2 BMQ (L) per year, but the Area RST in Meaford runs several more over the summer to accomodate those who cannot/do not attend the BSL BMQ (L) courses.  BMQ is not run over the summer.  It is decentralized to the units/CBG BSLs to run over the winter thus allowing RST to concentrate on BMQ (L) and, more importantly, DP1 courses.



Thank you very much! I was somewhat concerned because according to the 32 CBG website they run 6 BMQs with 50 pers and only 1-2 BMQ (L)s with 36 pers. I thought the dropout rate was staggering.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Question: Why does LFAA still have two CBG HQs, when they were instructed over a decade ago that they were entitled to one, and to prepare a rationalization plan?
> 
> Start obeying a few orders to reduce overhead, then complain.





			
				NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> Maybe because we cover 4 provinces?
> 
> How about LFCA they have 3 CBG's.





			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Yeah.  Right.  Two CBGs plus one Comm Gp turned OSG in LFAA.  For four provinces, and (about) 4K personnel.
> 
> Wasteful overhead that isn't needed.
> 
> 
> In my world, there would be 2 Reserve formations in LFWA (5 right now), 2 in LFCA (4 right now), two in SQFT (who would inherit the NCR) (3 right now), and one in LFAA (3 right now).
> 
> But the LFAA case is simple: orders were given and ignored.  "Plan towards one CBG HQ - two is a temporary measure."  But if you ignore an order long enough someone above might forget it - so you can get away with it.


Sounds reasonable to me.


----------



## Rick Goebel

"In my world, there would be 2 Reserve formations in LFWA (5 right now), 2 in LFCA (4 right now), two in SQFT (who would inherit the NCR) (3 right now), and one in LFAA (3 right now)."

While this is a fine idea, it is necessary to also look at what is in those HQs.  I'm morally certain and willing to bet really good money that HQ costs for the army reserve INCREASED in the process of REDUCING 21 Militia District HQs to 10 CBG HQs and five Militia Area HQs to the army reserve responsibilities of four LFA HQs.  Just as an example, the old MD HQs each had one full-time Major and two full-time Captains while the CBG HQs started off with a full-time Lieutenant-Colonel, three full-time Majors and several (more than four) full-time Captains plus large increases in other full-time and part-time positions.

While eliminating HQs is a good idea in and of itself, it doesn't necessarily go the distance needed.


----------



## old fart

Have fun with this... 

I realise the thread has moved on...I started to cobble this together last night....so here is a belated post....

In answer to Dapaterson's post from last evening...not really a side issue...in essence it’s all part of the same sh_t sandwich or getting better bang for the buck. Unfortunately the CF does not get what it should in that regard...Minimal bang for our defence buck remains acceptable....and I for one cannot see things changing....But one can hope...

Our reserves would downsize massively if I was king for a day, but units that remain would be viable entities with a critical mass, and used domestically unless we mobilize, that’s it.  Do I ever see us mobilizing, never say never, but do I see a requirement for a larger Regular Force, of course I do.

Reservists would not be permitted to be employed in a Regular capacity under any circumstances...limited full time reserve service would be possible and similar to how things are now just in a much reduced force.  Reserve HQs would be CHOPPED to the bone.  

Much needed monies would be applied back into the Reg Force pot.  A Reg Force that would sustained and utilized by the Govt commensurate with its capabilities at the time expanding as need be (Govt decision). 

An arbitrary reduction in the Reserves would not equate to an easy expansion to the Reg Force, but should make growth easier. The choice would be clear... if you want a full liability career complete with all the trappings join the Regulars.  Reserves service could not be used to circumvent a traditional read full time/normal career progression. 

I'm not interested in hearing we could not function overseas without the contribution from our deployed Reservists...and I am certainly not knocking the contribution they have made...but a Reg Force fit for purpose would not need to draw on reserve augmentation.

Bottom line we should contribute to the world stage with what we have.....but at least with a view to getting the MAX BANG FROM THE DEFENCE BUCK.

Of course I am not a fan of the Total Force concept...never have been and never will be.  But should we have a Reserve Force, of course we should and could ex Regs join bringing what ever experience they may have, of course (supplementing a pension if that is the case). 

On this happy note...this Old fart..is off to nap...


----------



## dapaterson

Interesting collection of thoughts.

Given the Reg F's penchant for waste and bloat, I'd start looking inside for expansion before attacking Reserve budgets, though.

Example: over ten percent of the Reg F trained strength is in NDHQ.  Hmm.  Sounds to me like a prime target for reductions - even a modest 10% would give each Reg F Inf Bn a mortar pl, with some left over for other purposes.

Or, why are there nine Reg F inf bns?  There's no doctrinal reason, there are a few plans that were drafted to argue the conclusion, vice arrive at an analysis, but the need for an even multiple of three isn't sound at all.

Simple observation: 9 bns x 600 + 3 Armd Regts x 500 + 3 arty regts x 500 + 3 CERs x 500 + 3 Svc Bns x 500 = 11 400 Reg F. Yet the Army is around 21 000.  So, what are those other 10 000 doing?  (Yes, bases, support - all good - but how many HQs do we have?  How many do we need?  Why does Comd LFCA need a manpower expensive duty watch 24/7 so he can be told that a routine airforce training flight from outside his AOR to a destination outside his AOR that would not be transiting his AOR had a mechanical failure, that does not impact him in the least?)

The Reg F bloat need serious evaluation - and it's well past time to review the assumptions underlying pay, and re-allocate it: no more "team" approach, but different positions should get different premiums.  CO 1st Bn RHC (assuming we bring the Black Watch back into the Reg F  )?  Extra pay.  LCol staff wanker in NDHQ - no extra.  Posted in the last 3 years?  Extra pay for the disruption.  Settled down somewhere for 10 years?  No disruption pay.

And so on - reward the individuals doing it; don't spread the reward among everyone.  Heresy, I know.


----------



## old fart

Dapterson....totally agree...

In my utopia self licking ice creams would be gone also. 

I would also bring back round trip memo's etc...and minimize computers, my list goes on   Leaders out leading and not by virtue of Windows XP.

HQs shook up/NSEs would be thinned massively also....yes I am on a roll.

More teeth where needed commensurate with a well staffed training system...

"Soldiers First"...primarily Reg Force ones...


----------



## dapaterson

old fart said:
			
		

> Dapterson....totally agree...
> 
> In my utopia self licking ice creams would be gone also.
> 
> I would also bring back round trip memo's etc...and minimize computers, my list goes on   Leaders out leading and not by virtue of Windows XP.
> 
> HQs shook up/NSEs would be thinned massively also....yes I am on a roll.
> 
> More teeth where needed commensurate with a well staffed training system...
> 
> "Soldiers First"...primarily Reg Force ones...




One key disagreement:

Two choices:  Rebuild the echelon properly for units, or expand the NSE.  You can't fire the the unit support, cut the NSE, and then expect any decent support.  

The NCE, on the other hand, is ripe for some delicate adjustments - made with a chainsaw.


----------



## dangerboy

old fart said:
			
		

> Have fun with this...
> 
> 
> Reservists would not be permitted to be employed in a Regular capacity under any circumstances...limited full time reserve service would be possible and similar to how things are now just in a much reduced force.  Reserve HQs would be CHOPPED to the bone.



One question, could you expand on this point? 

Do you mean we should not have Reserves deploying overseas on tours or do you mean things like 3 year class B contracts.

Not knocking your ideas, just would like a clarification.


----------



## Mountie

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> "In my world, there would be 2 Reserve formations in LFWA (5 right now), 2 in LFCA (4 right now), two in SQFT (who would inherit the NCR) (3 right now), and one in LFAA (3 right now)."
> 
> While this is a fine idea, it is necessary to also look at what is in those HQs.  I'm morally certain and willing to bet really good money that HQ costs for the army reserve INCREASED in the process of REDUCING 21 Militia District HQs to 10 CBG HQs and five Militia Area HQs to the army reserve responsibilities of four LFA HQs.  Just as an example, the old MD HQs each had one full-time Major and two full-time Captains while the CBG HQs started off with a full-time Lieutenant-Colonel, three full-time Majors and several (more than four) full-time Captains plus large increases in other full-time and part-time positions.
> 
> While eliminating HQs is a good idea in and of itself, it doesn't necessarily go the distance needed.



I've posted this idea before, but can't remember which thread or how long ago.  But this post reminded me of it.  Its based on a staff college paper written by an Australian Army captain, but it fits the Canadian Army very well too.

Re-clasify each Area Headquarters to a Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters and make it a Militia command.  Re-clasify each Canadian Brigade Group to a Canadian Battle Group and create 12 CBGs: 4 in LFWA (one per province), 4 in LFCA and 4 in Land Forces Eastern Area (combining the two CBGs from LFQA and LFAA). This reduces the size of the HQs and the number of officers more in line with the number of troops being supported.
Each regiment would then be organized with a single operational sub-unit maintained at full-strength.  This allows unit history and traditions to continue.  Most have only one operational sub-unit anyway, so why maintain a unit headquarters and a training sub-unit just to support the one operational sub-unit.  The training sub-unit can be a battle group asset holding all the soldiers undergoing training.  This would elminiate several senior officers and allowing those that remain to actually command the elements that they would really command on operations. 

For example:
38 Canadian Battle Group (Manitoba/Western Ontario)
Battle Group HQ 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles 
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada
Lake Superior Scottish 
Fort Garry Horse
26th Field Battery (with each numbered battery becoming a troop to preserve unit history)
31 Field Engineer Squadron
17 Service Battalion


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mountie said:
			
		

> I've posted this idea before, but can't remember which thread or how long ago.  But this post reminded me of it.  Its based on a staff college paper written by an Australian Army captain, but it fits the Canadian Army very well too.
> 
> Re-clasify each Area Headquarters to a Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters and make it a Militia command.  Re-clasify each Canadian Brigade Group to a Canadian Battle Group and create 12 CBGs: 4 in LFWA (one per province), 4 in LFCA and 4 in Land Forces Eastern Area (combining the two CBGs from LFQA and LFAA). This reduces the size of the HQs and the number of officers more in line with the number of troops being supported.
> Each regiment would then be organized with a single operational sub-unit maintained at full-strength.  This allows unit history and traditions to continue.  Most have only one operational sub-unit anyway, so why maintain a unit headquarters and a training sub-unit just to support the one operational sub-unit.  The training sub-unit can be a battle group asset holding all the soldiers undergoing training.  This would elminiate several senior officers and allowing those that remain to actually command the elements that they would really command on operations.
> 
> For example:
> 38 Canadian Battle Group (Manitoba/Western Ontario)
> Battle Group HQ
> Royal Winnipeg Rifles
> Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada
> Lake Superior Scottish
> Fort Garry Horse
> 26th Field Battery (with each numbered battery becoming a troop to preserve unit history)
> 31 Field Engineer Squadron
> 17 Service Battalion



Nice idea, but the demographics suggest that you could probably have Bde in BC alone, and a BG spread across the Prairie provinces. It doesn't make sense to try to be 'fair' the the Prairies, in the reserve world, by making sure that they get the same deal as the West Coast.

Oh, and make sure that they move LFWA HQ and WATC to BC as well, reflecting these demographic realities.


----------



## Mountie

Yah, I agree the demographics of the Prairies don't really work.  The rest of the counry is better though.  Perhaps BC could have two CBGs.  Maybe ON and QC/Maritimes could each have 5.  Just trying to keep it even, but that might not really be possible.


----------



## dapaterson

Please, no.  Given an Army Reserve that parades about 15000 (trained strength) there's no way to form that number of Bdes.  BC would be hard pressed to put together a decent sized BG, let alone a Bde (more musicians than gunners in at least one unit).

We need to break the paradigm that a Reserve LCol commands 120 people.  That paradigm in turn breaks units, forcing folks into positions without sufficient experience.

There's no need for one Bde or more per province; put command where the troops are,not where there are pipe dreams.  With 20K Reg / 15K trained Reserves, and a Bde of 5K, that's a maximum of 7 Bdes nationally - and likely less.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Mountie said:
			
		

> Re-clasify each Area Headquarters to a Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters and make it a Militia command.  Re-clasify each Canadian Brigade Group to a Canadian Battle Group and create 12 CBGs: 4 in LFWA (one per province), 4 in LFCA and 4 in Land Forces Eastern Area (combining the two CBGs from LFQA and LFAA). This reduces the size of the HQs and the number of officers more in line with the number of troops being supported.
> Each regiment would then be organized with a single operational sub-unit maintained at full-strength.  This allows unit history and traditions to continue.  Most have only one operational sub-unit anyway, so why maintain a unit headquarters and a training sub-unit just to support the one operational sub-unit.  The training sub-unit can be a battle group asset holding all the soldiers undergoing training.  This would elminiate several senior officers and allowing those that remain to actually command the elements that they would really command on operations.



A simplistic plan that conveniently skips a few other functions of the Area HQs, like domestic response responsibilities.  These existed before the Area HQs did, and used to be embedded in the various  command HQs (MARCOM, LFCHQ, etc.).  Any new plan has to address all the required functions.

While many will also agree that economies should be made on unit structures, just deceasing each unit to an authorized sub-unit level ignores the demands of administration.  While a Reserve unit may have "only" 100+ soldiers, they take an incredible amount of administration compared to a Reg F soldier for which a decrease from a BOR to Coy Clerk(s) would be a disastrous "solution".  (For example, when a Reg F soldier (I.e., Cpl/Pte) goes on a course while serving in a battalion, it is usually a locally run course and doesn't require travel claims, changes to pay accounts, etc - While a Reserve unit BOR may process all of that admin for 100+ people launching out of the local area on training and tasks every summer.)  Any new plan has to address all the things those units do now - though few would argue against a seriously reconfigured admin system for repetitive tasks (that would have to be in place first).


----------



## Mountie

True enough.  But wouldn't the Battle Group Orderly Room be able to handle this for the whole battle group, along with the sub-unit clerks?  With todays technology surely someone going on course from 26th Field Regiment in Brandon, MB  could process his admin work through 38 BGOR 200km away in Winnipeg.  Its being done in the RCMP.  From rural MB all admin/financial claims are processed through either Division HQ in Winnipeg or Regional HQ in Edmonton.  Email is wonderful thing.


----------



## McG

It is being done the in the reserves already too.  The Engineer squadrons in Vancouver, Chilliwack and Trail are all part of the same unit.  Several other examples exist of units spread across multiple cities.

In the current structure, sub-sub-unit sized organizations are deemed "battalions" with all the "key positions" established at full rank while at the same time many of the lower ranking manpower within the HQ does not exist.  Through combining several regiments into a single battalion, we could reinvest the freed-up manpower to have full BORs (including all the Pte through MCpl positions) ... imagine this would also improve supervision and development of personnel as compared to the current system with one-ofs scattered about.  This more robust BOR would also have better flexibility to handle things such as leave, surges in work flow, and other unusualness.

... now repeat this improvement in the RQ and Ops shops for the amalgamated battalion.


----------



## dapaterson

There is the challenge of geogrpahy.  The bigger the AOR, the greater the demand on the CO and RSM (and ancillary other members of the command team).  How big is too big for a part-time CO and RSM?  Important question to consider in drawing up plans for the future.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mountie said:
			
		

> True enough.  But wouldn't the Battle Group Orderly Room be able to handle this for the whole battle group, along with the sub-unit clerks?  With todays technology surely someone going on course from 26th Field Regiment in Brandon, MB  could process his admin work through 38 BGOR 200km away in Winnipeg.  Its being done in the RCMP.  From rural MB all admin/financial claims are processed through either Division HQ in Winnipeg or Regional HQ in Edmonton.  Email is wonderful thing.



This would be the ideal solution, I agree. If we had great information systems, a stable command structure and a high % of reliability from the membership we could likely do the same thing. However, the reality is that the BOR staff are constantly overwhelmed with issues that can't be managed at a distance and still require alot of paper and F2F contact to handle. That is, of course, if we shiftless Class A vagabonds are available when required! 

I'm constantly amazed at the effort our administrators have to put in to help troops in our system, while equivalent issues in civvy organizations are dealt with by simple emails and phone calls. Radar O'Reilly would probably quit from stress...


----------



## Michael OLeary

MCG said:
			
		

> This more robust BOR would also have better flexibility to handle things such as leave, surges in work flow, and other unusualness.



Therein lies the key to any restructure plan, the admin support has to have the strength to match the surge requirements.  A simple model copying Reg F strength ratios between teeth and tail is not always the answer.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There is the challenge of geogrpahy.


Yep.  And, also the challenge of supporting:





			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> shiftless Class A vagabonds


Because of these challenges, the HQ structure may have to be individually tailored to each battalion in order to accommodate unit size and dispersion. Even for units that are relatively concentrated geographically, the differences for administering primarily Class A reservists means that the training, competencies and structure of the BOR may have to be different.  



			
				Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> A simple model copying Reg F strength ratios between teeth and tail is not always the answer.


+1


----------



## Mountie

I'll have to take your word for it since I'm an outsider. But I work for the same federal gov't and experience the same problems with administration and technology.  I just find it hard to believe that we can have over 30 isolated detachments spread across the province, many of which are accessible only by plane, which are administered by computer and mail through Winnipeg & Edmonton, but yet the Militia can't administer a unit in Brandon from 200 km down the Trans-Canada Highway in Winnipeg???  What businesses/organizations these days doesn't administer elements of their organization from other cities.  Perhaps an investment in communications would save in manpower.  We experience the same issues (general administration, course coordinating, compensation claims, relocation claims, pay claims, overtime claims, leave requests, medical administration, etc) and its all done effectively and quickly from a distance by a very small staff.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Mountie said:
			
		

> I'll have to take your word for it since I'm an outsider. But I work for the same federal gov't and experience the same problems with administration and technology.  I just find it hard to believe that we can have over 30 isolated detachments spread across the province, many of which are accessible only by plane, which are administered by computer and mail through Winnipeg & Edmonton, but yet the Militia can't administer a unit in Brandon from 200 km down the Trans-Canada Highway in Winnipeg???  What businesses/organizations these days doesn't administer elements of their organization from other cities.  Perhaps an investment in communications would save in manpower.  We experience the same issues (general administration, course coordinating, compensation claims, relocation claims, pay claims, overtime claims, leave requests, medical administration, etc) and its all done effectively and quickly from a distance by a very small staff.




I used to ask similar questions, albeit not about our reserve forces.

daftandbarmy provides *most* of the answer: _"If we had great information systems, a stable command structure and a high % of reliability from the membership we could likely do the same thing. However, the reality is that the BOR staff are constantly overwhelmed with issues that can't be managed at a distance and still require alot of paper and F2F contact to handle. That is, of course, if we shiftless Class A vagabonds are available when required!"_

I'm not sure why DND's IT appears to always be a major problem, but it does.

I'm prepared to agree that the CF reserve's "command structure" and the "reliability of the membership" are real problems.

I'm with you, Mountie, on one point: why do the CF reserves have _"issues that can't be managed at a distance and still require alot_ [sic]_ of paper and F2F contact to handle"_ while e.g. the RCMP in isolated detachments do not or, at least, learn to manage at a distance, without face-to-face contact?


----------



## dapaterson

The fundamental difference:  RCMP are full-time.  Reservists are part-time, working outside regular business hours.  (Many formation HQs have only a skeleton staff on evenings when reservists are parading - don't get me started on the inversion there).

It is the part-time, evenings and weekends nature of Reserve service that can be so problematic.  In an average month, I will have five three hour blocks of time when I can be reasonably sure of seeing my key subordinates, and see my superior, and engage the support staff.  That is the equivalent of about two working days.  (Time in the field for training is excluded from that calculation - since that's not the admin side that we're discussing here)

And while email etc are all fine tools (1) not everyone works full-time for DND, so access to DND's internal IM/IT resources is compressed for them into that window (with contention for access); (2) having other full-time employment means one cannot always drop everything to deal with a higher HQ's inane, pointless busywork.  (As to why DND is so paranoid about its networks, when the US military has wider-spread remote access to its networks, well, let's say that just like too many cooks spoil the broth, too many jimmies spoil the net).

Basic military thing:  COs and RSMs need to see and be seen by their troops.  They need to know what is going on.  But they also have full-time jobs.

So:  Let's assume a CO with troops in 3 locations, each 250km away (end-to-end line of 500km).  If this CO lives in one location where he normally parades, and wants to visit each of the two outlying locations once every month from Sept through May (the usual training cycle), that means he needs 18 days for travel and visits (since he's only got those small evening windows available).  That's for one half day a month of face time - hardly excessive.

Oh oh.  What if he has a full-time job?  Can he take nearly 4 weeks a year off work?  Using all his holidays, perhaps.  But what of his wife and family?  Might they not want him to take some holidays with them?  Or if our hypothetical CO moves some of his travel to weekends - again, that's still a significant increase in time away from family, travel, and fatigue.  (Add in Formation meetings that are quarterly and sometimes on weekends, sometimes not (more holidays being taken), teleconferences... the time disappears quickly)

I do not know how the RCMP's smaller dets work in terms of relations/visits with subordinates / superiors.  There may well be lessons to learn from them.

But the part-time nature of Reserve service adds some constraints that need to be understood and respected.  Maintaining a reasonable geographic span of control is one of those elements - because travel = time, and time is what's at a premium for reservists.  There's plenty more work for me with the Reserves on a part-time basis if I want it - but I do like to maintain some semblance of a personal life besides work and the military.


----------



## McG

... but, some reserve units are sucesfully operating from multiple locations with significant geographic dispersal.  It can be done.  We just have to accept that there may be some required deviations from the regular force templated HQ structure.


----------



## Rifleman62

A reminder that unlike the Reg F, a P Res CO  does not receive a trade qualified soldier on his doorstep. The P Res CO must commit resources to train recruits to trade qualified status (winter LHQ/summer trg period). For the Reg F this is centralised with an establishment of pers.

Career management and pay for Reserves is local, not NDHQ, therefore unit resources required.

38 CBG has a large AOR and has managed to garrison the unit OR's (approaching ten years now) and had COs commanding three units in three widely separated locations. It is not perfect, but it works.

If each higher HQ's (as DAP has stated) were not so bloated, less crap would flow downward.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> ... but, some reserve units are sucesfully operating from multiple locations with significant geographic dispersal.  It can be done.  We just have to accept that there may be some required deviations from the regular force templated HQ structure.



In fact, the template (at least as it existed a year ago) was supposed to provide additional admin resources for detached elements.  However, like a tower of champagne flutes, resources poured in the top of the structure intended for the bottom oft-times end up filling the middle, with nothing left to fill the bottom tiers.  (The text is awkward, but for me the visual is effective)

The other fundamental question:  Why doe elements intended to force-generate have strucutres designed for force-employment?  Shouldn't the Reserve establishments be designed from the ground up with FG as the focus; for collective training, organize those troops into doctrinal FE elements.

(Note that some "successes" have been at the expense of the health of the leadership trying to span multiple time-zones.  I also note that we rarely maintain split Reg F units for any period of time - for example, we could move N Coy, 3 RCR back to the Wolseley barracks, and have the CO commute between London and Petawawa.  I can't see that happening any time soon.)


----------



## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> ... but, some reserve units are sucesfully operating from multiple locations with significant geographic dispersal.  It can be done.  We just have to accept that there may be some required deviations from the regular force templated HQ structure.



That may be true, but how efficiently are they being run.  A "Can Do" attitude can be portrayed fairly easily and give some a false picture of what really is happening.  What is really going on, IS another matter.  One that many aI watch an OR staff handling CIMIC members who are scattered to the four corners of the earth, and see them pulling their hairs out in trying to keep track of what they are doing.  The job has gotten done in the sense that most members are getting paid, but little things like PeopleSoft entries, Releases, Transfers, Claims, etc. are falling through the cracks.  

I think dapaterson has opened up a valid point about the Reserves and the problems that they face.


----------



## c4th

MCG said:
			
		

> ... but, some reserve units are sucesfully operating from multiple locations with significant geographic dispersal.  It can be done.  We just have to accept that there may be some required deviations from the regular force templated HQ structure.



By unit I assume you mean Regiment and not a Brigade.  Define success and significant dispersal.  I think anything less than a Coy at any location is going to have a real hard time being successful.  The real litmus test will be in the coming months with an addition of a loyal eddie coy in Yellowknife.  Saskatoon and Regina may be considered significant.   I don't think there are any reserve CBG's spanning an AO greater than 1 or 2 CMBG but then brigades are less important to troops than CO’s and RSM’s.  DAP is absolutely correct that CO's and RSM's need to see their troops and it is likely that any geographic dispersment will make that difficult and I am fairly certain that there is anecdotal evidence that it is impossible.

Why disperse at all?  If we are talking about combining unit HQ's why not start with units that share the same armouries?  Chances are the respective CO’s are in the building at the same time anyway.  Combining units that span provinces certainly would not mitigate the cost of a class A CO and RSM and any other specialists required for training or HQ jobs.  If there are now fewer people working more man days and flying regional air or driving high rate from point a to b to c ...  Costs are going up.

I have yet to find any evidence that a class A soldier requires less admin and support then a reg F soldier and once you chuck in pay sheets they very well might require more.  I don't think anyone should follow any template of a HQ structure.  Get the people in place to support the aim.  If that means more clerks or OPs staff etc, get it done.  

Everybody fights with claims and peoplesoft.  It's the one offs involving multiple units and locations that seem to cause problems, at least for me.  The only difference in the PRes is that every one is a one off.



			
				Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> A reminder that unlike the Reg F, a P Res CO  does not receive a trade qualified soldier on his doorstep. The P Res CO must commit resources to train recruits to trade qualified status (winter LHQ/summer trg period). For the Reg F this is centralised with an establishment of pers.




A reminder that a Reg Force CO and his unit will be responsible for usually at least one PCF cycle annually which can include any course not run nationally and I would suggest that the list is more extensive than BMQ, SQ, QL3.  In today’s army most unit CO’s are required to force generate and train at least some element for deployment.  Is it advantageous to get a trade qualified soldier on the doorstep? Yes.  To suggest that the responsibility of a CO stops there or that the CO of that unit has not invested in the training of that soldier by providing TD increment staff to courses and posting leaders to schools is incorrect.  Every instructor at a school is a leader that has been trained at the unit level and for the time being cannot be employed on an inexhaustible list of unit tasks.   Getting a trained soldier whether directly training or indirectly supporting up to MOC training is the easy part.  Far more training is required to keep a unit running.



			
				Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> If each higher HQ's (as DAP has stated) were not so bloated, less crap would flow downward.



But who would you fire?  I could name individuals who I would love to see axed whom I’ve met throughout my military career, but undoubtedly they are performing some useful function that can’t be done at a lower level more efficiently.  Some of that crap that flows down is useful.  The rest is probably just unavoidable.

The regimental system isn’t broken.  It may be flawed but it works and I would argue has a pretty decent ROI.  Some of the trappings and redundancies could certainly be done away with IMO but I would be hesitant to risk the great results of Pres soldiers on operations and those training many levels of soldiers to save what really amounts to a few pennies.


----------



## dapaterson

Part of what's needed is better career management for the reserves.  Having been the "one of one" trade in a unit, you are neglected - not deliberately, but because it's easier to deal with the 127 that follow the same career progression.

Indeed, with some sort of career mgt you can recruit a wider range of trades within a unit and ensure their continuing development.

That's the main reason for broad AORs for some COs - so that the CO knows and understands the capabilities of the soldiers beneath them.  Otherwise you end up with one memorable exercise I was on - where a well-intentioned Inf Capt brought out the engineers to clear mines and booby traps.  Except, for exercise purposes, the "booby trap" was a bungie cord stretched between two trees.  So I said the area was clear - not knowing the enemy employed bungie cords.  Add to that the "mines" that, as I recall, were silver plastic remnants of 76mm blanks that were harmless, so we ignored them as well, and you had a memorable debacle.


----------



## c4th

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Part of what's needed is better career management for the reserves…
> 
> Indeed, with some sort of career mgt you can recruit a wider range of trades within a unit and ensure their continuing development.
> 
> That's the main reason for broad AORs for some COs - so that the CO knows and understands the capabilities of the soldiers beneath them.  Otherwise you end up with one memorable exercise I was on …and you had a memorable debacle.




DAP, I’m not tracking your argument.  Career management for support trades is always an issue.  I’ve met several reg force non-cbt arm MOC soldiers employed in cbt arm units and in at least one case essentially as an infantry NCO.   No one has any idea what he needs to get promoted.  How they merit always comes up at PER time.  It certainly is not only a reserve issue.  As the saying goes, you are your own best career manager.  Don’t underestimate unit RSM’s in career management.  I know for a fact some Pres units take very good care of this.  Some are horrible.  

Recruiting does not follow career management.  It’s the other way around.

Larger AOR’s does not make for better planned or better resourced exercises.  In your example liaise with a sapper rep and TSR the appropriate stores.  If it isn’t realistic, dump it and concentrate on what is working.  With the level of Op experience and the training in today’s Pres I would say that there is no excuse for your debacle these days.  Ex’s typically happen at a finite number of training areas, so unit or formation AO isn’t relevant. Except in predicting who is actually getting on the bus.


----------



## McG

Trust No One said:
			
		

> By unit I assume you mean Regiment and not a Brigade.


Yes, and no assumption is required.  "Unit" as defined in the CF refers to battalions and regiments (at least, as applied to the field army)  A brigade is a "formation".



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> Define success and significant dispersal.


Please read this thread.  See reply #1319.  39 CER was formed as an amalgumation of 6 FES, 44 FES and 54 ESS.  It currently has a sub-units in Vancouver, Chilliwack and Trail.

For more examples we might look at 31 CER with sub-units in StThomas and Waterloo, or 4 RCR in London and Stratford, or 1H in London and Sarnia.



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> Why disperse at all?  If we are talking about combining unit HQ's why not start with units that share the same armouries?


Absolutely, where there are multiple platoon sized regiments of the same arm parading out of the same building then put them under a single battalion HQ (and even go a step farther by bringing other platoon sized regiments from across the city into the same chain of command.  However, it is not so simple when dealing with multiple arms.

The unit is not simply an administrative thing that hands-out pay and looks after claims.  The unit is also responsible for the Ops & plans - the individual and collective training.  Trying to mash infantry with engineers and logistics simply because they share real estate introduces a whole new span of control problem that (in my opinion) is more insurmountable than geography (which we can communicate across with modern technology).



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> If there are now fewer people working more man days and  ...


Again, you are not reading.  See again reply # 1319 where it is mentioned that savings (from fewer COs, RSMs, & supporting MWO-Capt floppers) should be re-invested to create more robust and flexible unit HQ organizations.  (no more of everything being dependent on a "one-of")



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> ...  Costs ...


It is not about cost.  It is about effectiveness.  Larger & more capable units capable of more effective training.



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> I have yet to find any evidence that a class A soldier requires less admin and support then a reg F soldier


I don't think anyone has suggested this.



			
				Trust No One said:
			
		

> If that means more clerks or OPs staff etc, get it done.


+1


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Basic military thing:  COs and RSMs need to see and be seen by their troops.  They need to know what is going on.  But they also have full-time jobs.



And there are fewer and fewer people willing to 'flush their lives' down the toilet for two or more years to be a reservist CO/RSM because of the insane levels of commitment required - and expected. If you've got a choice between civvy career and family vs. militia career, you've got to go with the option that pays the mortgage and keeps the home fires burning... that is assuming you're relatively 'normal'.  :camo:


----------



## Journeyman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ... that is assuming you're relatively 'normal'.  :camo:



Humph...."normal" is the setting on the washing machine; who wants that?   :camo:


----------



## VIChris

Being new here, I understand I may be wading into a poopstorm without a coat for this, but are there other Militias out there doing a better job than we are in similar circumstances that we can learn from or emulate? I know looking to the US is unrealistic, as they have a considerably larger force, which is generally more concentrated due to their demographics, but what of Australia, or some of the Scandinavian countries? How do they deal with their reserve forces? Has it been looked into from this end? I'm sure I'm looking at this from a very simplified view, but I'm always of the mind you should borrow your neighbors wheel before you re-invent your own.


----------



## Haggis

VIChris said:
			
		

> Being new here, I understand I may be wading into a poopstorm without a coat for this, but are there other Militias out there doing a better job than we are in similar circumstances that we can learn from or emulate?..... but what of Australia, or some of the Scandinavian countries? How do they deal with their reserve forces? Has it been looked into from this end?



Comparing Scandinavian reserve forces with Canada's is like comparing apples and scissors.  Norway, for example, doesn't have a reserve, in our sense, grouping it's members into "associations" rather than units.  Finland's Reserves are all ex-regulars and train, at most, 3-4 times a year.

As Canada's representative to AESOR, I can tell you that our Reservists are, by far, regarded as true professional "citizen soldiers" and our system (warts and all) is envied by many nations.


----------



## VIChris

Thanks for the direct answer, that clears up some of my thoughts, and gives me hope as I enter the reserves that I'm joining the best group I can join. Cheers, mate.


----------



## mariomike

I hope this is the right place for this, and has not already been posted:
"Toronto Scottish heads to new home":
http://www.torontosun.com/news/torontoandgta/2009/09/11/10832871-sun.html


----------



## daftandbarmy

VIChris said:
			
		

> Being new here, I understand I may be wading into a poopstorm without a coat for this, but are there other Militias out there doing a better job than we are in similar circumstances that we can learn from or emulate? I know looking to the US is unrealistic, as they have a considerably larger force, which is generally more concentrated due to their demographics, but what of Australia, or some of the Scandinavian countries? How do they deal with their reserve forces? Has it been looked into from this end? I'm sure I'm looking at this from a very simplified view, but I'm always of the mind you should borrow your neighbors wheel before you re-invent your own.



I've had direct experience with the British TA (as a regular in the UK) and they were generally OK. They have a very similar system to ours, of course. 

Since returning to Canada, I've had a few UK TA folks attached to reserve units I have been with and they have, without exception, been excellent. Very professional, balanced, switched on and multi-talented - you know, just like most of our reservists  ;D


----------



## Matt_Fisher

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And there are fewer and fewer people willing to 'flush their lives' down the toilet for two or more years to be a reservist CO/RSM because of the insane levels of commitment required - and expected. If you've got a choice between civvy career and family vs. militia career, you've got to go with the option that pays the mortgage and keeps the home fires burning... that is assuming you're relatively 'normal'.  :camo:



And those are very important points which a prospective unit CO or RSM may be having to carefully consider when evaluating their candidacy for such a position.  2-3 years of frequent travel on weekends to visit the sub-units under his/her command while potentially having an adverse affect on family and professional life is only 2-3 years.  However it's not to say that there are civilian occupations whereby at an executive level, similar levels of travel and extraordinary working hours are required.


----------



## dapaterson

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> However it's not to say that there are civilian occupations whereby at an executive level, similar levels of travel and extraordinary working hours are required.



True.  The problem is that most people reach the point of being a CO/RSM just as such things are also arising in their civilian employment.

So, where do you cut?  Full time work?  Reserves?  Family?  Outside life?  Or do we limit ourselves to lower-tier command candidates with either (1) no life, (2) no family and/or (3) no real career outside the military?


----------



## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ... do we limit ourselves to lower-tier command candidates with either *(1) no life, (2) no family and/or (3) no real career* outside the military?


   Hello! I'm right here in the room. I can hear you.

 ;D

I suspect that what plays out in many cases is that they've invested so much time that when 'the golden ring' is in-sight, they take the promotion even though they know they cannot dedicate adequate time to the position. As such, we're stuck with less-than-stellar leadership.


----------



## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Hello! I'm right here in the room. I can hear you.
> 
> ;D



No, no.  I'm not talking about you, else I'd have included *(4) No appreciable talents and (5) No social skills*.



> I suspect that what plays out in many cases is that they've invested so much time that when 'the golden ring' is in-sight, they take the promotion even though they know they cannot dedicate adequate time to the position. As such, we're stuck with less-than-stellar leadership.



We've also built a system where we need to churn out, on an annual basis, 40 LCols (~120 units on a three year cycle).  If we reduce that number we may have better luck and a better quality line.

(And transfers from the Reg F directly into command positions can be fraught with danger - if the individual has no experience with the Reserves it makes for a very rocky road for both the individual and the unit; soem can do well, but many founder - and can inadvertently do damage to a unit that will take a long time to repair).


----------



## observor 69

My home town had a retired reg force officer commute on a three hour drive to his position as LCOL/CO. But he had also served as a private in the same unit in a previous life.  

Not knowing how this worked out but it would appear to be a happy coincidence.


----------



## R031button

dapaterson said:
			
		

> We've also built a system where we need to churn out, on an annual basis, 40 LCols (~120 units on a three year cycle).  If we reduce that number we may have better luck and a better quality line.



While I agree with the idea that we need to cut the number of reserve HQ's (and therefore CO's) the problem comes when the prospective majors start hitting the bottle neck. How do we keep those officers motivated and driven, even without reward? Do we start recruiting less officers? Then who do we have to cover the officer heavy reserve domain of cimic? Or do we just let officers stagnate in their positions? Or worse yet, have no positions for said officers?


----------



## George Wallace

Recruiting less officers wouldn't be an answer, as the attrition rate between O/Cdt and Major is too great.  You would eventually find that the well had run dry of qualified Majors to promote higher.  The problem may be in the retention of too many in the senior ranks, who may be stagnating, if nothing more than holding up the promotions of more junior officers.


----------



## dapaterson

R031button said:
			
		

> While I agree with the idea that we need to cut the number of reserve HQ's (and therefore CO's) the problem comes when the prospective majors start hitting the bottle neck. How do we keep those officers motivated and driven, even without reward? Do we start recruiting less officers? Then who do we have to cover the officer heavy reserve domain of cimic? Or do we just let officers stagnate in their positions? Or worse yet, have no positions for said officers?



Let's see...

Instructors at CFC; Bde HQ shadow positions; LFA HQ shadow positions / watch officers (weekends etc) are three that come to mind off the top of my head

Getting Majors out of the units and exposed to higher formations and awareness of the larger world would be one of the best things possible for the Reserves.  Too many officers have their first extra-regimental employment only post command.  Getting that exposure earlier in their careers would be a godsend.

(Note that the same applies also to Capts, WOs, and MWOs - get them out of unit lines so they have a better understanding of the larger Army.  And, heresy of heresies, start appointing the top Maj to command a unit - vice looking at cap badges.  Some units could use a good dose of chlorine in their gene pool...)


----------



## Fishbone Jones

R031button said:
			
		

> While I agree with the idea that we need to cut the number of reserve HQ's (and therefore CO's) the problem comes when the prospective majors start hitting the bottle neck. How do we keep those officers motivated and driven, even without reward? Do we start recruiting less officers? Then who do we have to cover the officer heavy reserve domain of cimic? Or do we just let officers stagnate in their positions? Or worse yet, have no positions for said officers?



You want less COs, but don't mention the accompanying CWOs. You want a bevy of Majors to hang around, with no hope or reward. No mention of WOs & Sgts bottlenecking, with no line serials and no career courses. Then it's the 'officer heavy' domain of CIMIC, but no mention of all the WOs & Sgts there. Just MHO, but you sound like your real problem is Officers in general, not what they're doing. or how many we have. Like I said, just my opinion, but you should try flipping that coin before you risk sounding anymore bitter.


----------



## R031button

Noted, didn't mean to leave out CWO's, MWO's and the accompanying WO's. 

I didn't say I wanted to have this bevy of majors kicking around with no hope of promotion. I was asking, if we do cut back on reserve leadership, at the top end, how do we counter the problem of having these pools of WO's and Majors, and probably Captains and Sgts, who know they probably won't get promoted? The two previous posts suggested some excellent alternatives, shadow positions at higher level formations or schools would expose reserve leaders to a good dose of, I'm going to say reality here and I'll explain myself. It's my opinion and my experience that because reserve SNCO's and Officers are used to dealing with small amounts of troops ( ie: company minus) while having a surplus of leadership. My experience with larger concentration type exercises ( Cougar Salvo, Maple Defender ) gives me the impression that some time could be spent of learning / experiencing leadership in the context of Battalions and Battle Groups.

I mentioned CIMIC as being officer heavy because it's such a high ration ( 1 per 4 man team) and because it's manned almost entirely by reservists, or it was in 08 at least. 

I want to make this clear; I do not have a problem with officers at all. I have a problem with the army holding onto a structure that doesn't reflect the reality ie: a regiment that parades a platoon and can't afford to go train.


----------



## daftandbarmy

R031button said:
			
		

> Noted, didn't mean to leave out CWO's, MWO's and the accompanying WO's.
> 
> I didn't say I wanted to have this bevy of majors kicking around with no hope of promotion. I was asking, if we do cut back on reserve leadership, at the top end, how do we counter the problem of having these pools of WO's and Majors, and probably Captains and Sgts, who know they probably won't get promoted? The two previous posts suggested some excellent alternatives, shadow positions at higher level formations or schools would expose reserve leaders to a good dose of, I'm going to say reality here and I'll explain myself. It's my opinion and my experience that because reserve SNCO's and Officers are used to dealing with small amounts of troops ( ie: company minus) while having a surplus of leadership. My experience with larger concentration type exercises ( Cougar Salvo, Maple Defender ) gives me the impression that some time could be spent of learning / experiencing leadership in the context of Battalions and Battle Groups.



One of the perceived barriers we have to break down are the 'regimental silos' we operate within. If one unit has more WOs and Majors than it needs, they should be cross posted to other units that need the help. Training plan and budget management, recruiting and personnel management is pretty much the same from one unit to another.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

So how do you take a Service Bn WO and send him to an amoured unit as a Tp WO without the accompanying trade qualification. Reserve units, on the whole, are spread out. Do I make the 240 mile round trip on a Thursday night to 'help out' the next nearest armoured unit? This solution may work in some fantasy place like Toronto, with it's bevy of units, but more often than not, it's not the reality everywhere else.


----------



## R031button

recceguy said:
			
		

> So how do you take a Service Bn WO and send him to an amoured unit as a Tp WO without the accompanying trade qualification. Reserve units, on the whole, are spread out. Do I make the 240 mile round trip on a Thursday night to 'help out' the next nearest armoured unit? This solution may work in some fantasy place like Toronto, with it's bevy of units, but more often than not, it's not the reality everywhere else.



Do you really need to be trade qualified to wrangle vehicles though? I agree that it's not really a relaity in a lot of places but I think it applies in most of the larger cities in Canada.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

R031button said:
			
		

> Do you really need to be trade qualified to wrangle vehicles though? I agree that it's not really a relaity in a lot of places but I think it applies in most of the larger cities in Canada.



Your inexperience and ignorance astound me. You obviously have no concept of what other trades, that you wish to toss around willy nilly, do, or how they accomplish it. Yet there you are moving peoples careers around like chess pieces. You've just become that noob poster that comes here stating that we should buy B29s to do bombing missions, without any consideration to cost or any other factor. Just a personal wish to feel cool and wanted. I'm all done with this.


----------



## McG

R031button said:
			
		

> Do you really need to be trade qualified to wrangle vehicles though?


If you are referring to the Tp WO example, yes you do need to be qualified in the job of the unit.


----------



## R031button

Okay, that was really just an honest question. My reserve unit, RMRang, has an RSM that's formally of the BCDs (ie not a qualified Infanteer) and an RQ from them as well. I work in WATC TSC's transport section right now, under a MSE Op WO.  

I was under the impression we were discussing the hypothetical here, I apologize.


----------



## McG

R031button said:
			
		

> Okay, that was really just an honest question. My reserve unit, RMRang, has an RSM that's formally of the BCDs (ie not a qualified Infanteer) and an RQ from them as well. I work in WATC TSC's transport section right now, under a MSE Op WO.


I have seem many units where the CO and/or RSM were from "outside" occupations.  These positions largely become administrators lacking the technical competencies to develop the Maj & MWO within the unit's occupation.

The ability to parachute another occupation into most positions just does not work though.  The Tp WO must be the technical expert within his occupation to supervise and develop the Sr NCO of the Tp (same of the Sgts for supervision and development of their sections/crews).


----------



## R031button

Oh, god, for some reason I read Tp as transport. Foot firmly in mouth.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Before we go too far down this road of rejecting the idea of cross-posting senior personnel to offset shortfalls in other units, it might be worthwhile to review daftandbarmy's original comment.  He was specifically commenting on general tasks, not trade specific skillsets.  



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> One of the perceived barriers we have to break down are the 'regimental silos' we operate within. If one unit has more WOs and Majors than it needs, they should be cross posted to other units that need the help. *Training plan and budget management, recruiting and personnel management is pretty much the same from one unit to another.*



The use of cross-posting could ensure those trade specific experts also remain in the chain of command where their particular skills are need most, rather than being promoted upwards into a vacuum they aren't ready to fill (and being replaced by an equally unready subordinate themselves).  I would add that the control over what positions need to be backfilled and for how long needs to rest with the receiving unit..


----------



## Haggis

Commander LFCA has already sai that this is an acceptable alternative for units that don't have the succession depth to generate thier own command teams.  Indeed, in LFCA, 33 CBG now has a commander who hails from London.  Nobody has died because of it and the brigade hasn't imploded.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> Commander LFCA has already sai that this is an acceptable alternative for units that don't have the succession depth to generate thier own command teams.  Indeed, in LFCA, 33 CBG now has a commander who hails from London.  Nobody has died because of it and the brigade hasn't imploded.



"The brigade hasn't imploded..." any more than usual.

But then, 33 CBG has always been special...


----------



## vigillis

As a member of a unit who now has had three non Engr RSMs in a row, the unit moral can go down slightly.  It all depends on the new RSM and his attitude, and approach.

The first two did all right, and both gave a different flavour to the ranks.  Nbr three has just started and it looks as it will go swimmingly.

This is a result BTW of a mass release of WO, Sgts, and Mcpls in 94, the parachuting of two Reg F MWOs upon retirement (one did a great job), and no succession planning.  

So will the world end if a non unit mbr takes over a key position NO.  Do the younger NCOs need to be on the top of the game trade wise YES.


----------



## ArmyRick

Why not form units in a similar manner to the London Regiment in England?

Its an infantry regiment where each company represents it former unit (cap badges and titles)
An example of how it is set up
London Regiment
HQ Company 
A (London Scottish) Company 
B (Queen's Regiment) Company 
C (City of London Fusiliers) Company 
D (London Irish Rifles) Company 

One example I will use is Toronto.
The Toronto Regiment
A (48th Highlanders) Company
B (Queen's Own Rifles) Company
C (Royal Regiment) Company
D (Toronto Scottish) Company

I could see this working as well in areas where regiments are spread out such and not in one city (use the battalion system) for example

1st Battalion, Ontario Light Infantry
A (RHLI) Company
B (Linc and Well) Coy
C (A and SH) Coy

2nd Battalion, Ontario Light Infantry
D (4RCR) Coy
E (E and K) Coy

etc, etc, etc.

I beleive this system can work because we organize our reserve units like that now anyways on weekend and other exercises.

Thoughts? Ideas? Opinions? Anybody want to whip a can of mashed pumpkin at my head?


----------



## daftandbarmy

The regular army has about a million Captains, Majors and Light Kernels doing marginally interesting/ value added work in various HQs around the country and elsewhere (OK, I've got a dodgy database but you get my drift). 

Why not post some of them in to get some command time, especially if they have family in the area, as COs and OCs, with a mandate to help generate their Class A replacements? Heck, if they come back to the area on retirement at a later date they might even consider joining up. We could do the same with SNCOs too.

And before you try to burn me as a heretic (sorry, nomex undies) I lived through the 'Totally Forced' phase and agree that sucked. There's no way we should try a repeat of that interesting sociological experiment.  :'(


----------



## Rifleman62

Here we go again.



> I lived through the 'Totally Forced' phase


 You had a good Reg F CO though.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Here we go again.
> You had a good Reg F CO though.



Yeah, too bad he was in Edmonton and we were on Vancouver Island. Never saw him. Unlike the OC and the CSM they inflicted upon us unfortunately. Oh, the humanity  ;D

Right then, this thread derailing insanity must stop!


----------



## Rifleman62

Wrong guy. 

I thought this thread had been beaten to death.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The regular army has about a million Captains, Majors and Light Kernels doing marginally interesting/ value added work in various HQs around the country and elsewhere (OK, I've got a dodgy database but you get my drift).
> 
> Why not post some of them in to get some command time, especially if they have family in the area, as COs and OCs, with a mandate to help generate their Class A replacements? Heck, if they come back to the area on retirement at a later date they might even consider joining up. We could do the same with SNCOs too.
> 
> And before you try to burn me as a heretic (sorry, nomex undies) I lived through the 'Totally Forced' phase and agree that sucked. There's no way we should try a repeat of that interesting sociological experiment.  :'(



Ya know......Just this very thing has been happening for the past fifteen or so years.


----------



## daftandbarmy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Ya know......Just this very thing has been happening for the past fifteen or so years.



Really? Not in the units out this way AFAIK. We've got the standard 1 x Reg F Capt plus 1 x Class B Adm O (soon to be axed... the position that is, not the person) and a Reg F WO position. There are no Reg F COs/OCs/CSMs/RSMs of mole-itia units.

Where's this being done now, and is it working out OK?


----------



## RangerRay

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Why not form units in a similar manner to the London Regiment in England?
> 
> Its an infantry regiment where each company represents it former unit (cap badges and titles)
> An example of how it is set up
> London Regiment
> HQ Company
> A (London Scottish) Company
> B (Queen's Regiment) Company
> C (City of London Fusiliers) Company
> D (London Irish Rifles) Company
> 
> One example I will use is Toronto.
> The Toronto Regiment
> A (48th Highlanders) Company
> B (Queen's Own Rifles) Company
> C (Royal Regiment) Company
> D (Toronto Scottish) Company
> 
> I could see this working as well in areas where regiments are spread out such and not in one city (use the battalion system) for example
> 
> 1st Battalion, Ontario Light Infantry
> A (RHLI) Company
> B (Linc and Well) Coy
> C (A and SH) Coy
> 
> 2nd Battalion, Ontario Light Infantry
> D (4RCR) Coy
> E (E and K) Coy
> 
> etc, etc, etc.
> 
> I beleive this system can work because we organize our reserve units like that now anyways on weekend and other exercises.
> 
> Thoughts? Ideas? Opinions? Anybody want to whip a can of mashed pumpkin at my head?



I like it.  I think the Brits also did the same thing with the Scottish and Welsh regiments.

For British Columbia:

1st Bn., British Columbia Light Infantry
A (The Rocky Mountain Rangers) Coy
B (The Royal Westminster) Coy
C (The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) Coy
D (The Canadian Scottish [Princess Mary's]) Coy

British Columbia Light Horse Regiment
A (The British Columbia Regiment [Duke of Connaught's Own]) Sqn
B (The British Columbia Dragoons) Sqn

Although even with the artillery, engineers and service battalion, 39 Brigade would be a pretty skimpy brigade!


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Thoughts?


I think your idea is fairly consistent with one of the more popular themes for change that some are promoting in this thread.  I am a supporter of the multi-regimental battalion.  There is also Canadian precedent for such organizations in the multi-regimental battalions that fisrt filled our NATO comitment to Europe.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Really? Not in the units out this way AFAIK. We've got the standard 1 x Reg F Capt plus 1 x Class B Adm O (soon to be axed... the position that is, not the person) and a Reg F WO position. There are no Reg F COs/OCs/CSMs/RSMs of mole-itia units.
> 
> Where's this being done now, and is it working out OK?



I know that both the RCD and RCR have over the past 15 years had officers fill the role of CO in a Reserve Unit.  One that I know personally went back to command our old Reserve unit in PEI and then continued to wear the PEIR hatbadge when he was posted back to NDHQ before being posted off to Australia.  (Army Vern can verify  this.)  He was replace in PEI by a Strat, who was also Regular Force at the time.  I have heard of several other instances where this has been done.


----------



## Edward Campbell

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I know that both the RCD and RCR have over the past 15 years had officers fill the role of CO in a Reserve Unit.  One that I know personally went back to command our old Reserve unit in PEI and then continued to wear the PEIR hatbadge when he was posted back to NDHQ before being posted off to Australia.  (Army Vern can verify  this.)  He was replace in PEI by a Strat, who was also Regular Force at the time.  I have heard of several other instances where this has been done.




Roger that; Col R.G. Elms, of The RCR, (about to retire from his post as CFA Tel Aviv) was CO of The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders just a few years ago.


----------



## dapaterson

The Army Commander has, in the past, had a very small number of positions to provide Reg F COs/DCOs to Reserve units.  However, rather than serving as a bridge when there was a gap in succession, it can become a crutch, with the same units repeatedly unable to generate senior leaders.

The Reg F has been unable to fill many of their Regular Force Cadre positions for a number of years now (for a while, less than half of Infantry Officer positions were manned, and under 10% of Artillery Officer positions were filled; I don't know of the current situation), so I do not see any increase to the number of positions allotted in the near term.


----------



## shamu

"So, where do you cut?  Full time work?  Reserves?  Family?  Outside life?  Or do we limit ourselves to lower-tier command candidates with either (1) no life, (2) no family and/or (3) no real career outside the military?"

Life: Priority of work for the Mo soldier.

#1 - Family.  #2 - Civilian Job/Education #3 - Reserves. #4 - Sports/Community/Hobbies 

With a calendar, pen and 9erDelta you can achieve a workable plan.  This is the template I set out for my subs in managing their personal affairs.  

In this we guide soldiers to plan the multiple priorities in their lives; better attendance, better morale, better troops.  Instead of being overwhelmed, they're behind the 8 ball.  When we plan training or an event we also get a more reliable "Yes" or "No".

Few years back, an incoming CO we had at our Res unit did something really effective, IMO.  He let us know his/our priorities and expectations.  Helps the Res soldier book time off work, plan with family:

Priorities for Reserve duties:

#1 - Deployment on operations (ie; Afghanistan).  He expects every soldier in the unit to at least do one tour in their career; majority has done so, and of those, many have 2nd or 3rd tours. 

#2 -  Career Courses.  One at least every 2 years, whether this be serials, weekends, block courses.

#3 -  Exercises.  Certain ex's are planned well ahead and attendance, if not doing #1 or #2, is required.

#4 - Instructing on courses. Whether it be unit run weekend crse or of the B class variety.

#5 - Parade nights.  Expected to attend MOST parade nights (75%).  Leaders expectations are higher.

#6 - Ceremonial.  Quite simply; encouraged to attend and a reason like sports or hobbies are exceptable if the troop is doing the other duties.

Communicating the intent, his expectations, guidance of how to prioritise. Brilliant! And in this we solve:

Soldiers being soldiers on operations; depth and experience in the unit.  Soldiers look at their individual situation and make time and space in their life for a tour on their own, knowing that is expected of them.  2nd or 3rd tours are not uncommon.

Regeneration issues.  No people sitting stagnant in the ranks for a decade; those who can lead are trained and developed to take on those positions.  

Parade nights are not the end all - be all.  Make productive use of this time; classes, admin, preparation for Exes, morale, look aheads,  interviews, so on.    

Greater turn out and focus for training on Exes.

Ceremonial events still end up being well attended because morale is good.


Not dogma, just something I saw that worked.


----------



## REDinstaller

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> To save money amongst the reserves, I would reccomend consolidating units, but another topic perhaps?


Some units within the PRes have already been consolidated. The CERs/FERs have been combined to form 1 HQ per province (At least out west). Don't know how much of a saving this is yet. As well the Comm Gp HQs have been consolidated as well.

[Staff Edit to insert quote prior to thread split]


----------



## Captsapper@gmail.com

With respect to the Engineers, there was a consolidation of units, Some FES's and FER's consolidated to form a single CER for each Bde.  This was not a decrease by any means, in fact it was an expansion.  In all of the brigades that had more than one engineer sub unit (FES or FER) they were amalgamated under a single HQ.  In those Bde's that did not have a FER and only a FES they were expanded to have a minimum 2 squadrons and form a CER within that Bde (33, 35, 36, 37).  In LFWA, LFCA and SQFT this has already happened with each Bde now having a CER, with the exception of 38 Bde, they had no engineer unit to expand.  There is currently a Fd Sqn as part of the FGH in order to grow that capability within that Bde (Doing a great job!!).  Currently in LFAA the engineers are growing as well with 1 ES stood up in Fredericton in 37 Bde, and a troop stood up in Halifax as part of 36 Bde.  I believe the CER's are soon to follow (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/37cbg_hq/units-unites/37cer-eng.asp).  Overall I think off the top of my head there were 6 additional engineer sub units created across the country as part of this initiative, certainly not a decrease in numbers.


----------



## ArmyRick

Looking at the PRes engineers as an example for consolidation. You have expanded but I am betting its been expansion at the soldier level and less RHQ (By combining in some cases the regiments). 

I am a beleiver in some cases we MUST do this for the infantry and armoured units.

example 32 CBG has created 2 battle groups (dividing the six infantry regiments between them). I don't know why we insist on keeping all these RHQs alive. Personally, I think we should consolidate them.


----------



## dapaterson

Capt Sapper:

Mroe subunits does not equal more troops.  We need to cut the number of reserve subunits, not increase it - as we havea a mannign cap that is smaller than the sum of all Res subunits (to say nothing of the need for BTL).

The Army Reserve is its own worst enemy, in preserving useless HQs at all levels.  Too many HQs mean too many forced through the grinder to reach command and senior appointments without depth and breadth of experience.

Cut the number of LCol positions in the Army Reserve in half and we'd still be overborne, but be much farther ahead.


----------



## larry Strong

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army Reserve is its own worst enemy, in preserving useless HQs at all levels.  Too many HQs mean too many forced through the grinder to reach command and senior appointments without depth and breadth of experience.
> 
> Cut the number of LCol positions in the Army Reserve in half and we'd still be overborne, but be much farther ahead.



Bingo 

I have been arguing that point for years. Way too many LCol's and assorted hanger on's running company size units.


----------



## Captsapper@gmail.com

Agreed, there are a significant number of smaller reserve units across the country commanded by LCol's.  I believe what the Engineers did was an example of how to streamline things to have less HQ and more soldiers.  I will use BC as an example.  Prior to this there were two independent field squadrons in BC each with their HQ (Adjt, Ops, CC, etc) and there was a Sqn standing up in Chilliwack.  Now with the formation of 39 CER there is 1 RHQ and 3 Sqn's.  It is my understanding that the HQ's at each location have been reduced.  Yes a LCol position was created but at the end of the day it is a very large unit.  

In the East from what I have read with 37 CER they are taking positions from the second mission element of the 8CH and the RHQ positions from the Service Bn Amalgamation, no increases in numbers but creates a large unit that is geographically dispersed with a larger recruiting base that can support the entire Bde.

As ArmyRick mentioned this is possible for the Infantry and Armoured regiments as well.  I think the way the Engineers did it was efficient but at the end of the day we all wore the same cap badge.  Amalgamation of Infantry and Armoured units is a very touchy/political subject that I am not prepared to comment on.


----------



## Infanteer

Captsapper said:
			
		

> As ArmyRick mentioned this is possible for the Infantry and Armoured regiments as well.  I think the way the Engineers did it was efficient but at the end of the day we all wore the same cap badge.  Amalgamation of Infantry and Armoured units is a very touchy/political subject that I am not prepared to comment on.



It would be touchy but I think the Infantry/Armoured Corps would get over it.  Associations may raise a snit, but considering the Reserves have such a high attrition rate that the next generation of soldiers (re, 1-2 years later) would have no real attachments to the "old" capbadge.

The simple solution: All Reserve Infantry/Armoured Units become Companies and Reserve CBGs would become TBG HQs.  The new TBGs can decide to amalgamate, create a new Regiment, or adopt a single existing Regiment as the new regiment for the Province.  These are all methods that the British Army has successfully utilized in the last 5 years.


----------



## Redeye

Plenty of those LCols aren't even running Company sized units - I don't think there are too many reserve units that could effectively raise a company complete.

The TBG structure as Infanteer mentioned is an interesting way of doing it - no need, necessarily, to bury unit traditions - many old units of the British Army are perpetuated in amalgamated units as Battalions, no additional overhead costs.



			
				Larry Strong said:
			
		

> Bingo
> 
> I have been arguing that point for years. Way too many LCol's and assorted hanger on's running company size units.


----------



## ArmyRick

I personally agree with the idea of consolidating reserve regiments. Yeah I can hear the arguments now
"What about the history?"
"What about the traditions?"
"We won X number of battle honours..."

Blah, blah, blah. The sad reality is that a RHQ is costly and having it run a 100 man unit is ridicolus.
Another point, almost all of our reserve regiments were a result of amalgamations or multiple changes from the time they first stood up.

One of my old regiments, The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) is an example. They celebrate 1866 as the founding year. However the Lorne Scots as it is now was formed in 1936 by combining 3 different county regiments (With battle honours from WW1) into a new regiment.

Option 1
No sacred cows, no political bull, no side agendas, TIME TO AMALGAMATE THE REGIMENTS!!! The needs of the Forces comes first.

The only people who suffer by keeping these units alive like this are the 40 young men who could not be recruited because we had to spend the money keeping way more LCol and CWO on strength then we need.

So for example, the Lornes, G and SF and Tor Scots may be amalgamated together to form the 1st battalion, Southern Ontario Regiment. New Cap badge, new colours, new traditions.

Option 2, The "London Regiment" example . Lets say we go with this
1st Battalion, Southern Ontario Regiment (example)
RHQ (where ever)
A (Toronto Scottish) Company (Mississauga and Toronto)
B (Lorne Scots) Company (Brampton, Oakville and Georgetown)
C (Grey and Simcoe Forester) Company (Barrie and Owen Sound)

Each company would wear its distinctive former regimental affiliation. On exercise, no worry, they are no cap badges on helmets and bush hats.

For Ceremonial parades, the CO and RSM would wear the appropriate regimental dress for that area. Example on Saturday LCol Bloggins wears a G and SF DEU for the freedom of the city of Barrie and two weeks later he might be in a Tor Scot DEU at a cenotaph dedication ceremony.

Ideas? I have put forth COA #1 and COA#2


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I personally agree with the idea of consolidating reserve regiments. Yeah I can hear the arguments now
> "What about the history?"
> "What about the traditions?"
> "We won X number of battle honours..."
> 
> Blah, blah, blah. The sad reality is that a RHQ is costly and having it run a 100 man unit is ridicolus.
> Another point, almost all of our reserve regiments were a result of amalgamations or multiple changes from the time they first stood up.
> 
> One of my old regiments, The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) is an example. They celebrate 1866 as the founding year. However the Lorne Scots as it is now was formed in 1936 by combining 3 different county regiments (With battle honours from WW1) into a new regiment.
> 
> Option 1
> No sacred cows, no political bull, no side agendas, TIME TO AMALGAMATE THE REGIMENTS!!! The needs of the Forces comes first.
> 
> The only people who suffer by keeping these units alive like this are the 40 young men who could not be recruited because we had to spend the money keeping way more LCol and CWO on strength then we need.
> 
> So for example, the Lornes, G and SF and Tor Scots may be amalgamated together to form the 1st battalion, Southern Ontario Regiment. New Cap badge, new colours, new traditions.
> 
> Option 2, The "London Regiment" example . Lets say we go with this
> 1st Battalion, Southern Ontario Regiment (example)
> RHQ (where ever)
> A (Toronto Scottish) Company (Mississauga and Toronto)
> B (Lorne Scots) Company (Brampton, Oakville and Georgetown)
> C (Grey and Simcoe Forester) Company (Barrie and Owen Sound)
> 
> Each company would wear its distinctive former regimental affiliation. On exercise, no worry, they are no cap badges on helmets and bush hats.
> 
> For Ceremonial parades, the CO and RSM would wear the appropriate regimental dress for that area. Example on Saturday LCol Bloggins wears a G and SF DEU for the freedom of the city of Barrie and two weeks later he might be in a Tor Scot DEU at a cenotaph dedication ceremony.
> 
> Ideas? I have put forth COA #1 and COA#2



Call me crazy, but consolidation smacks of defeatism. I'd be more inclined to do some research into what would attract and hold people to units, then do lots of that. There are enough people who travel long distances to parade at various units for good reasons, let's build on that kind of success story vs. implode the organization.


----------



## Haggis

I always cringe when I see this thread pop up in my "Recent Unread Topics" list.


----------



## Rifleman62

Me three!

Look to 38 CBG. They have been doing this for years, even to the point e.g. that the CO of the two Wpg Inf units has two CF uniforms.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Call me crazy, but consolidation smacks of defeatism. I'd be more inclined to do some research into what would attract and hold people to units, then do lots of that. There are enough people who travel long distances to parade at various units for good reasons, let's build on that kind of success story vs. implode the organization.



How would such changes implode the organization?  We are mandated to have an Army Reserve of about 20 000.  Working from that:

We organize into Company-sized building blocks.  A company is, for the sake of argument, 125 people.  To support a trained company of 125 soliders, we need recruits of about 35, with their own leadership and trainers of about 15 - call it 50 people.

Therefore, we are talking about a minimum size of 175 people, all ranks, to sustain a single company.  One hundred such companies will require 17 500 Army Reservists.

Adding bn HQ structures with another 50 people each, at a rate of one per four companies, equals 25 Bn HQs requiring another 1 250 Army Reservists.

Adding five Bde HQs, each with 100 people (to account for geography and a need for some redundancy for part-time soliders) and we need another 500 Army Reservists.

We are then left with 750 unallocated positions, to provide for Div and above troops, such as Info Ops, Int or others - we could make five under-strength companies, one per CBG.


Thus, starting from the known limit of 20K troops, we can have 100 companies organized into 25 Bns organized into 5 Bdes.

Right now, we have 51 Infantry "bn" HQs alone.  Therein lies a fundamental problem - and preserving The Royal Buckshot Fusiliers of Tisdale, SK solely because they had a solider attached to 1 CAN Div who got lost in Paris in a 1950s flyover serves no ones interests or needs.

We've got massive excesses of structure, all demanding to be filled.  Cull the structure ruthlessly - to increase and enhance the capability.


----------



## ArmyRick

daftandbarmy, 

Your example is a very rare exception not the rule. I have dealt numerous occassions with young 17-19 year old males (typical PRes infantry recruit) and the reasons they join are mostly things along the line of wanting be a soldier, wanting to blow stuff up, wanting to live the adventure, wanting to wear a cool uniform, etc, etc.

Very few of these young soldiers joined this regiment or that regiment because of "long proud history" or "How many battle honours they won".

Lets live in the here and now. We SHOULD not be supporting so many bloody RHQ, its way over redundant. Defeatism? How about what smacks of "lets never change with the times"

Every thing changes including armies and we must evolve. Or we become irrelevant. If we become irrelevant, then the Taxpayer and the Gov't will think of nothing to get rid of us.

When change is neccessary, we owe it to ourselves, Canadians, the governor general and the Gov't to change.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> - and preserving The Royal Buckshot Fusiliers of Tisdale, SK solely because they had a solider attached to 1 CAN Div who got lost in Paris in a 1950s flyover serves no ones interests or needs.



 :rofl:

STOP IT!!  People are hearing me laugh at NDHQ...

 :rofl:


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> :rofl:
> 
> STOP IT!!  People are hearing me laugh at NDHQ...
> 
> :rofl:




Don't worry - many of us laugh at NDHQ.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Option 2, The "London Regiment" example . Lets say we go with this
> 1st Battalion, Southern Ontario Regiment (example)
> RHQ (where ever)
> A (Toronto Scottish) Company (Mississauga and Toronto)
> B (Lorne Scots) Company (Brampton, Oakville and Georgetown)
> C (Grey and Simcoe Forester) Company (Barrie and Owen Sound)
> 
> Each company would wear its distinctive former regimental affiliation. On exercise, no worry, they are no cap badges on helmets and bush hats.
> 
> For Ceremonial parades, the CO and RSM would wear the appropriate regimental dress for that area. Example on Saturday LCol Bloggins wears a G and SF DEU for the freedom of the city of Barrie and two weeks later he might be in a Tor Scot DEU at a cenotaph dedication ceremony.


I prefer the multi-regimental battalion solution.  It should get fewer panties in a knot.  However, I would waste absolutely no money on providing the CO & RSM with multiple uniforms so they can mascaraed as from whichever of the historical regiments.  If a CO wearing another regimental capbadge is going to be catastrophic to the moral of distinct sub-units, then for the LCol and CWO of the Reserve Force to wear the Army accouterments of regular force Col and formation CWO.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Thus, starting from the known limit of 20K troops, we can have 100 companies organized into 25 Bns organized into 5 Bdes.


According to Wikipedia1, Canada has 18 P Res Armd Regt and 47 P Res Infantry Regiments.  Assuming that three of the five battalions in each of your brigades is a manoeuvre unit, that would see 60 companies to perpetuate the existing 65 P Res manoeuvre regiments.  At only five regimental amalgamations necessary, that is not a bad CoA.  We could also acknowledge that there are three P Res regiments that are not dependant upon the P Res for their lineage (RCR, R22eR and 12 RBC) - as such, only four regiments would have to be "blended" in two seperate sub-units.




1.  It is acknowledged that Wikipedia is not free of errors, but in this case it is accurate enough for the big-hand small-map analysis for which it has been referenced.


----------



## REDinstaller

I think 6 R22eR is in Farnham.


----------



## Haggis

The issue of perpetuation of history and lineage is a red herring.

The Brockville Rifles, Princess of Wales Own Regiment and Stormont Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (commonly referred to as the "river rats" as all three units are along the St. Lawrence River) have a shared history, shared WW2 battle honours and a shared lineage.  Some of this history is also sharded by the now defunct Peterborough Rangers (now the home of B Coy Hast & PER) 

So, with this in mind, what would be the stretch to form a "River Rat Battalion"?   Two companies (minus), an A Ech and a HQ commanded by one of the three Command Teams, with due consideration to succession ability and seniority.  The Brocks and Glens are already "tactically grouped" and have been conducting joint training for over two years.

Of course, there would be some logistical and administrative hurdles. For example the PWOR and Brocks are supported by Kingston, the Hast & PER by Trenton and the Glens by CFSU Ottawa.  Only one of those three support bases is actually owned by the Army.  Trenton is Air Force and Ottawa is VCDS.

Each unit maintains it's own cap badge, distinct DEU and local infrastructure - complete with Messes.  Each unit is responsible for force generating it's own soldiers from the local catchment areas.  BMQ and BMQ(L) training could be centralized with staff and equipment pooled.

Each unuit could continue to train and develop its own officers and NCMs but succession planning for command would be a shared effort.  Not each would need to generate a LCol, CWO, and a couple Maj or MWO every two to three years.

Sounds like a plan?  Sound familiar?  (I think there's a few threads suggesting this already).   :deadhorse:


----------



## ArmyRick

Beat that horse! Tenderized horse done up in a chilly taste delicous!

Seriously, Yeah that is what I envision as my COA 2 in my two suggestions. A very important practical principle behind this is having each Unit (company) train mostly at platoon and coy level during the year, maybe massing together once or twice a year for BG exercise. 

Admin support would have to be coordinated carefully. (The idea of having the entire river rat regt being forced to due all its unit admin out of say Kingston is not practical at all). For dispersed units this would definately have to be coordinated.

I came up with a third COA. I could have sworn (I wish I saved a copy of the document) that the PRes was supposed to grow to 30,000 by 2035 or something along that lines (either I read it or I was really over due to toss out my Creemore unpasturized beer!). If the Pres were to increase to 30,000 then I could certainly see each infantry unit growing to a Battalion minus size (maybe 2 trained coys and 1 coy for courses and holding). That would then certainly justify a LCol and CWO for each unit. 

Does anybody else remember reading this or am I using too much cough medicine again?


----------



## George Wallace

Well.  Being in a Platoon with the size of a Coy, we find it rather difficult to train.  We don't have enough 'Leadership' on all levels to provide for all the necessary day to day requirements of manning, meet Taskings from CFTPO, provide Instructors to Area, National and Branch Schools, and then run our own Training.  PWT is a real pain, as we don't have the Staff to properly run the unit through, with the Staff being able to qualify as well.  No authority to have a CQ hurts as well.  We do not have any field stores, and only a van and MILCOT for transport.  Imagination and networking are highly prized commodities.

So.  Be very careful as to how small you propose these 'Units' become.  Without the necessary pers in key posns and enough 'Leadership' (especially at the NCO/Snr NCO levels) the unit will not be able to function effectively and conduct the necessary trg and at the same time fill CFTPO and 'other' taskings that come along.


----------



## George Wallace

I might add, that the Established Strength of the Unit will have Line Serials for all the posns in the Unit.  You can only promote pers to meet what the unit has in its Line Serials.  There can only be one person in the rank of CO.  Only one filling the rank of RSM/CSM, etc.  You can not fill up your unit with pers filling ranks that out number the established Line Serial ranks.  

The smaller you make the units, the harder it is create a progressive program to perpetuate the hierarchy.


----------



## dapaterson

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I came up with a third COA. I could have sworn (I wish I saved a copy of the document) that the PRes was supposed to grow to 30,000 by 2035 or something along that lines (either I read it or I was really over due to toss out my Creemore unpasturized beer!). If the Pres were to increase to 30,000 then I could certainly see each infantry unit growing to a Battalion minus size (maybe 2 trained coys and 1 coy for courses and holding). That would then certainly justify a LCol and CWO for each unit.
> 
> Does anybody else remember reading this or am I using too much cough medicine again?



Overall CF P Res may be due to grow - but take off 4K NavRes, 2.5K Air Res, 1K Health Svcs Res, and you're left with overall growth of around 2.5K - to be spread among all four (ignoring the NDHQ PRL).

COA 3 is now a throwaway.


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> The smaller you make the units, the harder it is create a progressive program to perpetuate the hierarchy.


George,
People are not suggesting that units become smaller - they are suggesting the opposite.  Where we have many tiny units today, we should instead have one larger unit that can "perpetuate the hierarchy" from a gene pool that is multiple  times deeper.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> I might add, that the Established Strength of the Unit will have Line Serials for all the posns in the Unit.  You can only promote pers to meet what the unit has in its Line Serials.  There can only be one person in the rank of CO.  Only one filling the rank of RSM/CSM, etc.  You can not fill up your unit with pers filling ranks that out number the established Line Serial ranks.


I think this is already understood by most of the recent posters.  



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Well.  Being in a Platoon with the size of a Coy, we find it rather difficult to train.


Your unit may be unique or in a very small minority - most units are multiple times smaller than could be commanded & managed by the HQ with which they are established.  The majority are platoon to large company sized with a battalion HQ.


----------



## a_majoor

Sorry guys, but some of this discussion is like watching objects circling around a Black Hole. I clearly recall discussions along these lines in the 1990's (as part of Reserve 2000 or whatever the buzzword of the day was), and for 31 CBG, the proposal was to collapse the six Infantry regiments into 31 Light Infantry Bn, the two Armoured regiments into 31 Regt (RCAC), the two Artillery regiments become batteries of 31 Artillery, 3 Service battalions into 31 SVC BN etc.

Inertia and resistance from associations etc. kiboshed the plan, although in the fullness of time the three Service battalions did decay to the point there is now a 31 SVC BN, with enough troops to have critical mass and support the units of the Brigade. As noted, within five years of amalgamation, less than 10% of "A" Coy 31 LIB (Essex and Kent) would have any remembrance of the time there _was_ an Essex and Kent Regiment due to the rapid turnover of pers in the Reserve world. In the ideal world the resources freed up by eliminating 15 sets of HQ's, LCol's, CSM's etc. etc. would translate into more boots on the ground and more and better training. In the real world, I suspect most of the cost savings would be "captured" at a high level and reallocated to other "priority" projects.


----------



## McG

Some interesting thoughts on revitalization and the role of reserves:


> Re-thinking the Reserves
> David Pratt
> The Ottawa Citizen
> 29 Mar 2011
> 
> Later this year, when the dusty boots of the last Canadian soldier march up the ramp of one of our hulking C-17s at Kandahar Airfield, the largest Canadian Forces combat mission since Korea will draw to a close. The training contingent that follows will continue the NATO objective of having the Afghan forces take responsibility for their own national security.
> 
> For our Forces, it will be an opportunity to remember the fallen, to study carefully and to absorb the lessons learned as they make the transition from a high operational tempo to a steadier state.
> 
> As the military leadership, politicians and the general public focus on the Canadian Forces post-Afghanistan, it will be tempting to focus directly on what went wrong and to try to fix it.
> 
> Based upon that criterion, it would be doubtful if the Army Reserves would receive much more than a second thought. If they had performed badly in the Kandahar mission, then the calls for an inquiry or commission would echo from every editorial pulpit in the country.
> 
> But the fact is that the Army Reserve performed exceedingly well and drew accolades from the senior command.
> 
> As Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie noted recently, "The Army could not have done what it did in Afghanistan without the Reserve. We would have crashed and burned. The country owes them a huge debt of gratitude."
> 
> So how do we repay that debt? Well, for starters, it is time we directed some attention to the Reserve. As an institution, it has been largely forgotten.
> 
> The best evidence of that is the antiquated nature of one of the three roles we have assigned to the Reserve. Over 65 years since the end of the Second World War, official Canadian defence policy lists "mobilization" as one of the three roles of the Army Reserve. The other two roles are "augmentation" and the Reserve's role as a "footprint in the community."
> 
> But, mobilization simply has no relevance to the strategic environment we face today or are likely to face in the decades ahead. The very thought that we would muster two army corps in an age of asymmetrical and cyber warfare is completely unrealistic.
> 
> In fact, the military brass doesn't even pay lip service to the idea anymore. As Lt.-Gen. (Ret'd) George Macdonald recently noted, "Total mobilization is a total waste of time."
> 
> If we discard mobilization, what is left? It is clear that the augmentation and the community footprint role remain valid and important. The Reserve's augmentation of the Regular Force in Afghanistan, where they accounted for up to 20 per cent of the Canadian contingent, was by all accounts critical to the mission's success.
> 
> The community footprint role is also vital since the Reserve's presence in over 120 communities ensures that Canadians don't see their Army as garrisoned in a few bases and disconnected from the rest of society.
> 
> So, what other role, or roles, can we assign the Reserve?
> 
> Perhaps it is time to formalize the domestic operations task that the Reservists have been doing for years in assisting civilian authorities with disasters and emergencies. But, it may also be important to consider other more updated roles.
> 
> Over the last year, our abilities to defend ourselves against cyber attacks have been tested.
> 
> Our NATO allies are increasingly devoting more resources and attention to this challenge which threatens our security and economic prosperity. Combining the digital literacy of the civilian population with the disciplined program of cyber-security through the auspices of the Canadian Forces may be yet another way for the Reserves to contribute to the safety and security of Canadians.
> 
> But it is not just the roles of the Reserves that need a re-think. The administration of our Army Reserve is rife with problems. The recruiting system needs attention. Many soldiers aren't getting paid on time. Training courses need to be better managed and the equipment provided to Reservists needs to be upgraded. Many Reservists also return from foreign deployments feeling that their contribution has not been appreciated.
> 
> How does all this get fixed? It has been 16 years since the Report of the Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves.
> 
> Since then, much has changed. It is time the government appointed another special comission, or assigned a major study of the Reserves to the House of Commons Defence Committee. Individual reservists know what the problems are. We just need to give them a platform to help us fix them. After what they did for us in Afghanistan, we owe them at least this much.


----------



## Dissident

You know, just focus on fixing the pay system. We are doing fine otherwise, I think.


----------



## OldSolduer

Two years ago I took on the role of CSM of the Disaster Response Company in 38 CBG during the ice jams on the Red River. It was quite the experience gathering reservists from all over Saskatchewan, Manitoba and NW Ontario and blending them into a cohesive structured unit. 
My thoughts? Domestic operations, particularly Aid to the Civil Power in the local area. 

Just my :2c:


----------



## McG

Dissident said:
			
		

> You know, just focus on fixing the pay system. We are doing fine otherwise, I think.


The good news is that the "Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation Project" has a mandate to do that ... rather, it has a mandate that includes adopting a single CF pay system program.

I agree with the assessment that role, training management and organization all need to be looked at.  I believe the reserves can be both more effective and more efficient ... but I've already outlined my thoughts in this thread, so I will not repeat them all again right now.


----------



## The Bread Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> Some interesting thoughts on revitalization and the role of reserves:



This just out via the CDFAI site:


> Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
> DAVID PRATT
> In this Research Paper,  David Pratt, Senior Vice-President of Public Affairs for GCI and a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, examines the current state of the Reserves. Pratt stipulates that the historic role of the Reserves, for Mobilization, has no relevance in the current strategic environment. Instead, their current roles of augmentation and providing a footprint in the community, should be the focus. Additionally, Reserves may be able to play new roles, such as combating the threats associated with cyber-security.


Full report (4.2MB PDF) downloadable here, shorter version attached.


----------



## Haggis

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Two years ago I took on the role of CSM of the Disaster Response Company in 38 CBG during the ice jams on the Red River. It was quite the experience gathering reservists from all over Saskatchewan, Manitoba and NW Ontario and blending them into a cohesive structured unit.
> My thoughts? Domestic operations, particularly Aid to the Civil Power in the local area.



Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.



Was it the first, second or third BFT that did them in?


----------



## ArmyRick

I have seen a few reg f soldier who haven't done a BFT, are not on category but manage to linger on in their respective jobs for way too long. They manage to get their "protection" from friends and old boys. Yes, I have seen the same with PRes pers as well. That whole business of soldiers wasting the CF time is on both sides of the fence.

Part of improving recruiting and keeping the CF on track should maybe include a honest sweep across the entire spectrum of those that do not belong in the CF anymore.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Was it the first, second or third BFT that did them in?



PM inbound.


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> This just out via the CDFAI site:Full report (4.2MB PDF) downloadable here, shorter version attached.



I just skimmed it but I'm shocked: no apparent emphasis on TDBGs.  

What would the Tories say about that I wonder?


----------



## McG

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> Old Sweat said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jack is a smart guy. Sometimes however he damages the case he is trying to make by inflammatory language and/or dubious claims. I do wonder what is the aim of the exercise and if it takes into account the present security climate? If he is proposing a reserve force of 45,000, what will this do to the regular force? What about the equipment and accomodation bill?
> 
> Hopefully the report will soon be available online for examination.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I haven't read it yet, but it is available at http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/SSWG-Paper-Jack-English-September-2011.pdf.
Click to expand...




			
				Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> And to cut to the chase:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RECOMMENDATIONS
> 
> 1. 	Immediately bring part-time Class A Militia strength up to the 18,500 target that was supposed to have been met in March 2006.
> 2. 	 Reaffirm the Militia role sanctioned by the Minister and promulgated by the CDS in 2002.
> 3.      Aim to increase total Class A strength to 45,000 with clearly defined home defence roles within a skeletonized Militia structure that would serve as a framework for further army expansion.
> 4. 	  Produce a “no cost” mobilization plan with a war establishment order of battle structure for expanding a skeletonized Militia in emergency. Unit manning and equipment in this planned structure would be restricted by position and item in peacetime.
> 5.       Restrict Class B service for Militia support only, with all reservists filling regular positions being paid at Class C rates out of the regular budget.
> 6. 	 Establish a separate Militia pay envelope and ensure it is used for Militia pay only.
> 7.       Give priority to deploying formed Militia sub-units – and eventually units – for overseas operations and establish a time-efficient through-put training system to accomplish this objective.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Detailed discussion of these points should probably take place here: Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves
Click to expand...

I agree with recommendation 5.  There is too much Cl B (including Cl B/A) being used to grow regular force units & HQs without direct support to the reserves.  The only Cl B outside of reserve units & HQs should be individual positions that primarily support the reserves or that represent the reserve force in HQs on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.  Of course, while many HQ positions will be clearly fall one way or another, there will be many HQ positions that are a little grey as to whether the incumbent represent the reserve force in HQs on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.

... and this would also mean that annuitants would not be able to fill such representative positions outside reserve units or HQs.  Coming from the Reg F, they would not be qualified to represent the reserve force on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.


----------



## dapaterson

If Reg F units and formations require temporary incremental Reserve support, I have no heartache with that.  However, "temporary" needs to be enforced; no more endless extensions to temporary programs.

What I object to is the current failing of the accounting system, where such expenditures are not immediately captured in a way to permit them to be reported.  "Reserve Pay" should not be an amorphous blob where anyone paid as a Reservist has their salary expense attributed to the cost of the Reserves.  It would take no great effort to create better accounting methods - take your pick of General Ledger accounts or funds - to clearly differentiate between, say, a full-time reservist conducting admininstration for a Reserve unit and a full-time Reservist marking time in office of the Associate Deputy Minister for Basket Weaving (Natural Fibres) in NDHQ.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> Associate Deputy Minister for Basket Weaving (Natural Fibres) in NDHQ.



Oh! I met him at a conference once.  Nice guy!  >


----------



## GAP

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Oh! I met him at a conference once.  Nice guy!  >



Good baskets?


----------



## dapaterson

GAP said:
			
		

> Good baskets?



Your statement assumes that quality of output is measured and assessed in NDHQ.


Silly rabbit.


----------



## GAP

gulp......sorry


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Brihard said:
			
		

> Out of curiosity sir, what were the big lessons learned that came out of that without or TBG for force generation? I know how it all got perceived at our level as one of the Sect Comds, but we never really heard how things went higher up, and how it might affect the next time we do something like that. I get the impression that a similar force generation concept (and TBG structure) looks set to be exercised for Ft Knox... Will there be noticeable changes at the level of individual units, or of Pl/Coy once we glom together?



It won't matter ,whatever you did previous. The attempt to reinvent the wheel and expend maximum time and effort trying to sort the mess on the ground is the hallmark of any combined op\ ex involving the Reserve. It will all come together on the last two days, only to fall to pieces again for the redeployment home.


----------



## dapaterson

Hot off the press, the CDS vision for the Primary Reserve:

CANFORGEN 172/11 CDS 025/11 211449Z SEP 11
CDS P RES VISION
UNCLASSIFIED



THE PURPOSE OF THIS CANFORGEN IS TO CONVEY MY VISION FOR THE PRIMARY RESERVES (P RES) 


MANY TRANSFORMATIONAL AND RATIONALIZATION ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERWAY IN DND AND THE CF. AS WE TRANSITION OUR STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS AND FOCUS ON THE NEXT CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION AND THE CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY, IT REMAINS CLEAR THAT A ROBUST AND WELL TRAINED PART-TIME P RES WILL REMAIN KEY TO THE ABILITY OF THE CF TO MEET THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE. 


MY VISION FOR THE PRIMARY RESERVE IS A FORCE THAT CONSISTS OF PREDOMINATELY PART-TIME PROFESSIONAL CF MEMBERS, LOCATED THROUGHOUT CANADA, READY WITH REASONABLE NOTICE TO CONDUCT OR CONTRIBUTE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF CANADA. THIS FORCE IS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE CF CHAIN OF COMMAND. 


RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS AND CONNECTIONS WITH CANADIANS ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION AND TO THE ENVIRONMENTS AND COMMUNITIES IN WHICH THEY SERVE AND WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE ATTRACT, DEVELOP, SUPPORT AND RETAIN A READY, CAPABLE, MOTIVATED AND RELEVANT P RES FORCE AS BOTH A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL RESOURCE FOR CANADA AND THE CF WELL INTO THE FUTURE. 


WORK FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING REVIEWED ACROSS THE DEFENCE TEAM TO DETERMINE THE FORCE STRUCTURE NEEDED TO MEET OUR OPERATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS. AS PART OF THIS REVIEW, ESTABLISHED FULL-TIME P RES POSITIONS WILL BE ALIGNED TO THE PRIORITIES OF: RESERVE FORCE GENERATION, SUPPORT TO CF OPERATIONS, RESERVE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND SUPPORT TO THE CF INSTITUTION. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR P PRES TO SERVE IN CURRENT AND FUTURE CF OPERATIONS 


TO SUPPORT MY VISION, I WILL COMMUNICATE MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN THE FUTURE OUTLINING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, POLICY, MANAGEMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE P RES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP RELEVANT AND SUSTAINABLE MISSIONS AND TASKS WHICH REFLECT THE RESERVE CULTURE IN WHICH THE MAJORITY OF PRES MEMBERS SERVE PART-TIME AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CF. AS A PRIORITY, I WILL STRIVE TO ALIGN PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS SO THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT ALL CF MEMBERS. 


SIGNED BY GEN W.J. NATYNCZYK, CDS


----------



## Bin-Rat

Reserves' growth deliberately stifled: Report
 Article Link 


OTTAWA - Canada's military establishment has routinely defied ministerial orders to boost the reserve force since the 1990s, according to a new report.

Written by senior military scholar Jack English for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces paints a disturbing picture.

In it, English outlines a "wretched saga" of "sandbagging, obstruction, futile wheel-spinning, and endlessly wasted staff effort" to keep reserve numbers low because the part-time force is viewed as a lesser priority than full-time personnel.

"Nothing of substance has really been done over the past decade to grow militia numbers as promised," English writes.

Today, there are about 16,000 reservists, or citizen-soldiers, which is similar to the figures a decade ago despite the fact that successive defence ministers from both the previous Liberal and current Conservative governments have issued orders to the Canadian Forces to increase its size.

The full-time force is 65,000.

When asked what the current defence minister thought of English's report, a spokesman for Peter MacKay said the Conservatives have been working to restore the government's relationship with the country's military brass.

"After a decade of darkness under a Liberal government, this government has developed a strong relationship of trust with the military that has helped us achieve common goals," wrote Jay Paxton in an e-mail Wednesday. "Our government is committed to implementing the best policies to ensure that the Canadian Forces are able to do the difficult jobs we ask of them."

Paxton would not say what MacKay thought of the report, which indicates he, too, has been ignored. In December 2009, reserve pay budgets were cut dramatically and the funds relocated to other priorities. Many reservists, English writes, were told they would receive no work or pay for months.

While MacKay ordered the department to put in place policies to avoid similar turmoil from happening in the future, "as late as 23 February 2011, the vice chief reported that he was still 'working' on the problem, possibly in anticipation of the May 2011 federal election producing another minister.

"The matter of compliance still remains open," English adds.

The NDP's defence critic Jack Harris said it's no secret reservists have been complaining for years that they don't have adequate resources to increase the militia's size.

If the report's allegations are true, that successive defence ministers have been ignored by the military establishment when it comes to orders to increase the size of the reserves, "then we've got a problem.

"One of the themes of our critique of this government is that there ought to be strong civilian control over the military and we don't have that here. There are pieces missing in the puzzle, and if this is going on, then it's obviously evidence that there's something clearly wrong. If the minister's policies and the policies of the government aren't being followed through in the military then we've got a problem."


By Bryn Weese, Parliamentary Bureau
bryn.weese@sunmedia.ca
Last Updated: September 21, 2011 6:42pm


----------



## GAP

Christie Blatchford: Bureaucracy calls shots on reservists
Article Link
Christie Blatchford  Sep 24, 2011

That Canada’s reserve army routinely gets the shaft comes as news to no one, least of all the country’s long-suffering reservists.

As one reserve officer I know says, “In the civilian world, we would be the third shift at the Ford plant … or the casual part-time force that has no union, no guarantees, no benefits and no representation.

“We’re almost like discretionary spending.”

Still, the report, which was released this week by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Canadian International Council, is nonetheless startling.

Written by distinguished military scholar and veteran Dr. Jack English, it shows how the bureaucracy in Ottawa — an incestuous nest of regular army bosses with turf to protect and intractable civil servants — has consistently ignored or thwarted government directives to increase the size of the reserves.

What’s more, either those defence ministers whose pledges came to nought had the collective attention span of gnats, or they failed to grow a set of nuts sufficient to demand their instructions be followed, or they were simply shifted within Cabinet and the new fellow came in.

Any way you look at it, Dr. English says, the bureaucracy is calling the shots.

In the result, despite pledges to grow the reserves, the militia part-time head count remains still at about 16,500, or, as Dr. English wryly notes, about the size of National Defence Headquarters, or NDHQ as it’s called.

By the way, just getting the damn numbers out of NDHQ is a trick.

David Pratt, the former Liberal MP who wrote another report on Canada’s citizen soldiers for the CDFAI this spring — he takes a different approach, but certainly shares the view that the reserves have been neglected — first asked the Library of Parliament for an accurate count of reservists.

The library approached the Canadian Forces, which in turn essentially said it could go back only three years and couldn’t come up with a proper count.

In referring to this explanation in his report, Dr. English scornfully labels it “typical Byzantine, prevaricating gobbledygook.”

Virtually everyone who has studied the Canadian army, and their number is legion, agrees on a couple of things: The bureaucracy is obscenely bloated, far out of proportion for the size of the army; the citizen soldier, who until called up to full-time service costs only about 20% of the regular one, is a bargain for the taxpayer; the militia is more diverse, ethnically and otherwise, than the regular army.
More on link


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Ms Blatchford (along with many others) is making this a reserve vs reg force battle, when, in my judgement, it is not.  No line unit is in particularly good shape right now.  We seem to have the command and control piece of both DND and the CF screwed up right now and that is sucking up an inordinate amount of resources that could be allocated elsewhere.


----------



## PuckChaser

Haggis said:
			
		

> Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.



I didn't think we had that many Reds for IRU, I can only think of 1 from HQ+Sigs Platoon.


----------



## McG

Some thoughts from another thread:  





			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ... Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.
> 
> ... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat.
> 
> ...The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution!





			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> At the risk that you're doing this just to push my buttons I feel a need to respond.
> 
> A reserve force that no one is prepared to use compulsorily is a waste of money. The military is a force of last resort and to rely on them to come voluntarily when needed is a suicidal policy.
> 
> If this is truly a 'political' issue then its time to get over the conscription crisis - that was so last century.
> 
> My belief is that politicians here don't even have an understanding what the existing powers are. We have the legislation in place although I admit we are woefully behind in job protection legislation, financial hardship benefits, wounded warrior support etc.
> 
> The problem in my mind remains within both NDHQ and the CF who are stuck within a particular military model mindset.
> 
> The US has consistently used reserve call ups to increase their force size when necessary. One can argue about how effective Nat Guard units and formations may be but they continue to form a significant role on deployed operations without the US government having paid any political price.
> 
> In the UK right now the government is increasing the Territorial Army strength from 15,000 to 30,000 while cutting the regular army by 20,000 because they understand the massive cost savings involved. They know there will be challenges not the least of which is from within the regular force leadership. Their govt is not going to pay a political price for this because the public appreciates that cost cutting measures are necessary.
> 
> I see our military leadership's timid approach to the role and utilization of reserves in the same way that the US conventional military leadership addressed the use of special forces in the 80s and 90s. It took a politician - Rumsfeld - to finally get them off the dime.
> 
> Don't sell our political leadership short on a per forma basis. If given reasonable and viable options they will most probably go the right way. At present we give them no real options and as a result we get what appear to be arbitrary budget cuts.
> 
> …





			
				Petard said:
			
		

> FJAG, you are so far off the mark I don't even know where to begin
> The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. Artillery units have gained quite a bit of capability over the past  decade, but no PY growth, and indirectly there was a reduction in capability with the elimination of mortar capability in infantry Bn's. All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.
> 
> There will still be a need for P Res Arty units for some time, IMO, and there are many good people in these units, but the question is how much do you give them to train with before the skill level is simply not achievable because the limited training time available. The greatest gap right now, between P Res and Reg F units, is in their respective comm's systems. Reg F Artillery units are going more to networked fire control systems, and the reserves remain in the old fashioned voice system. Trying to close this gap can only be done with an increase of training time, and I would argue they're already having trouble now with availability without increasing the complexity of the system.
> 
> So the main need is to have viable P res force that can FG individuals, with as minimal training required as possible before they are deployed. The requirement to equip them with a fleet that is not necessarily deployable is a pattern we can see already with acquisition of the MilCOT fleet of vehicles. Even so, the remote possibility does exist that such a fleet could be deployed (certainly true of the Lg1). The basic intent, near as I've ever seen, is to provide P Res units with a training fleet that is less expensive to operate than the system used for full spectrum Ops, but in certain situations could be used on Ops.
> 
> …





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> Having "reserve only" capabilities seems to be part of the CF anyway, one can look at PRes armour or the RCN's use of reservists to man the Kingston class ships to see this in practice. The question of how you can reliably "force generate" units and sub units from the Reserve is a good question, although experience in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan seems to indicate there are plenty of willing people, so perhaps the answer may lie in "tweaking" existing rules and legislation rather than suggesting compulsion.
> 
> In one thread a poster had a realistic plan for raising units and subunits out of reservists by offering a long term Class C contract (the details escape me, but I think the idea was 6 months workup, one year deployed and six months post deployment). If this measure was taken, then each year a "deployment battery" would be formed, volunteers enrolled and the process started. At the same time, a "deployment battery" that was raised two years ago would finish post deployment, turn in the cleaned and repaired kit and everyone would disperse back to their respective regiments.
> 
> Combining this with some sort of kit with a small PY and O&M footprint and I think you have a winner. My personal suggestion would be the 120mm mortar given the ability to cover long ranges, provide heavy weight of fire (and terminal effects using smart rounds) towed behind a military utility vehicle in the HMMVW class, or alternatively a BV 206 type vehicle to provide maximum ability to move cross country (the Artillery would then also have a secondary ability to provide mobility in disaster relief and DOMOPS scenarios quite apart from their ability to provide firepower). Using systems that can be deployed and fired by 3 or 4 man crews would keep the footprint small, although there might have to be a larger maintainence troop/battery to keep the systems going, so PY's may be a wash.





			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> Sorry Petard but don't your observations prove my point?
> 
> Since Korea, we have stood up a large and expensive regular army/artillery which never went to war until Afghanistan. Even during the first Gulf war we did not send artillery to participate. Our will to commit conventional combat forces was and remains low yet we, as taxpayers, we pay a significant amount to still maintain an arguably large branch which sees, and is predicted to see, only minor operational commitment.
> 
> In Afghanistan many branches had large reserve components and they all had long work up sessions before deployment. In my mind that is very much part of the new model of operational deployment and it leaves room to take reservists with fundamental skills to the level needed for operations.
> 
> I don't believe in reserve unit mobilization. That's capability hasn't existed since the early 1960s.
> 
> I'll go further. In my mind there should be no reserve 'units'. Units are regiments and while we use the term for our reserve organizations they are in fact frequently undermanned and over ranked batteries.
> 
> What I see are reserve battery gun lines headed by a regular force captain and a cadre of regular force personnel for maintenance and key leadership positions. (No BC, no FOOS, no FSCC - leave those with the reg f) These batteries would come under the command of the existing regular force regiments and are to be administered and trained by them and plug into their overall establishment and operational role.
> 
> Why keep Reserve LCols and Majs many of the Capts, CWOs and MWOs in reserve units that rarely exceed a hundred all ranks. How many of them went to Afghanistan? Not enough to justify a career structure. Not to denigrate them but they are frequently in civilian employment that makes deployment difficult and their skill levels aren't up to the tasks they would need to do in combat. Get rid of these ranks and you can fund another twenty or thirty gunners per battery.
> 
> My reg v res model has always been to identify those jobs that you don't need day-to-day and build a viable reserve system around them. Reservists should have only a very minor career path. They should be doers. If they want a 'career' in the military they should component transfer. Young reserve gunners do not join with the aim of being the RSM. They join to fire the guns and get their hands on cool gear. Give them that and give them good leadership and their skill levels will blossom.
> 
> I don't for a minute believe there is any equipment we have which is too complex for reservists as a group to use. Its all a matter of the right training and exercise model. If comms systems are really that complex now then leave those as a reg f job.
> 
> My approach is one based on redoing the model from scratch based on what so far is an operational deployment model that rarely exceeds a battle group and that always has time for work-up training. If we do need a true quick reaction force as part of our defence mandate then that can be pure regular force. My guess is that it will never exceed a BG either so the one battery gun line per ref f regiment is more than adequate for that need - in fact with that model you could QRF a whole three gun regiment if needed.
> 
> …


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG has made some interesting statements.  However, if I recall correctly, the U.S. experience with its integrated reserve model, especially those concerned with service support, did not fare too well during the Iraq and Afghan conflicts.

From my understanding, the Commonwealth tradition in mobilization is that:

1.  Most of the reservists are cashiered right away as too old and unfit for wartime service;

2.  Most of the regulars are cashiered soon after first contact as stale and unfit for the demands of war; and

3.  The organization that comes out of this is a force of very young officers and NCOs who are wartime volunteers led at the higher levels by those few regulars and reservists who had the natural talent to survive the cut.


----------



## brihard

Infanteer said:
			
		

> FJAG has made some interesting statements.  However, if I recall correctly, the U.S. experience with its integrated reserve model, especially those concerned with service support, did not fare too well during the Iraq and Afghan conflicts.
> 
> From my understanding, the Commonwealth tradition in mobilization is that:
> 
> 1.  Most of the reservists are cashiered right away as too old and unfit for wartime service;
> 
> 2.  Most of the regulars are cashiered soon after first contact as stale and unfit for the demands of war; and
> 
> 3.  The organization that comes out of this is a force of very young officers and NCOs who are wartime volunteers led at the higher levels by those few regulars and reservists who had the natural talent to survive the cut.



I don't believe a 'next' world war would last long enough for that to play out, personally. We wouldn't have months in trenches to put everyone through that crucible. Nor would we be able to mass-produce recruits with anything past light infantry skills.

Nope, today it's very much 'going to war with the army you have'. And that'll probably be it. The lead time on production and the resource and technological requirements for modern AFVs would preclude mass producing attrition quantities of modern AFVs; we'd probably have to take a substantial leap backwards in terms of the technical complexity of front line kit simply in order to produce it fast enough. We'd probably have to do it with pre-existing natural resources that we already have in production on our own friendly soil.

So yeha- I don't think a modern war would be prolonged enough for the old dynamic to play out. We'd finally have a modern smashing of the 'militia myth', though, if we tried to call up our reserve regiments wholesale and commit them effectively to battle in amalgamated LIBs.


----------



## Infanteer

Brihard said:
			
		

> I don't believe a 'next' world war would last long enough for that to play out, personally. We wouldn't have months in trenches to put everyone through that crucible. Nor would we be able to mass-produce recruits with anything past light infantry skills.
> 
> Nope, today it's very much 'going to war with the army you have'. And that'll probably be it. The lead time on production and the resource and technological requirements for modern AFVs would preclude mass producing attrition quantities of modern AFVs; we'd probably have to take a substantial leap backwards in terms of the technical complexity of front line kit simply in order to produce it fast enough. We'd probably have to do it with pre-existing natural resources that we already have in production on our own friendly soil.



A big assumption to make, especially if such opinion is to inform planning for any contingency.  I've heard this argument made by some middle-management from Ottawa, and I'm not convinced there is any veracity to it.  One simply has to work out a plausible situation to see that a "come as you are" war isn't the only possibility.  Given that the Gulf War was almost 7 months from flash to bang, it is certainly easy to imagine a conflict taking longer to resolve with some bigger players involved.  All it takes is a solid stalemate or a good winter to slow things down enough.  If two forces batter each other pretty good in the opening phases, things could also conceivably slow down while mobilization is taken to some extent on the home front (say, for example, the raising of a Special Force).

A good read on this is Jim Storr's "Embryo of a Wartime Army" from the RUSI Journal.  Unfortunately, the file is a smidge to big for me to post it here.


----------



## ArmyRick

7 months flash to bang for the gulf war. 7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...


----------



## Journeyman

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...


No government will call for mobilization, at the first rumblings of conflict, so that you'd be given seven months.


----------



## Infanteer

No, however, the Special Force was called up 2 weeks after North Korea invaded south Korea and its first elements were on the ground in 3 months with the rest of the brigade following up 5 months later.


----------



## Journeyman

Yes, an interesting experiment, never repeated. I've often wondered about Brigadier Rockingham coming out of retirement to command; was there no other suitable leadership available in either the Res or RegF world?


----------



## Infanteer

Never say never.  IIRC, the Reg Force was left untouched to keep it focused on committments to Europe and home defence.  This was all a year or two before the large shift in defence posture that saw the Army grow to 4 Brigades.

The performance of the follow up force (Roto 1?) consisting of the Reg Force battalions certainly indicates that was the case (source: _A War of Patrols_).


----------



## Old Sweat

Actually the army was planning to mobilize a brigade for Europe before the Korean War came along. Two brigades were mobilized by the expedient of tasking selected militia units to recruit companies which were then grouped into the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry, Rifle and Highland Battalions with subunits of other arms and services being formed via the same route. The artillery regiment in Guelph, for example, recruited the 216th Field Battery which perpetuated Guelph's 16th Field Battery and the 284th Field Battery from Yarmouth did the same for that city's 84th Field Battery.

More or less concurrently the special force was forming along with training organizations which eventually became the 3rd Battalions of the permanent force infantry regiments. In a matter of months the army went from three to 15 infantry battalions and maintained two brigades - one fighting a war - on foreign shores at opposite ends of the world. This was possible because of a good reserve structure and because the supply bins were full of equipment. We did have to buy some stuff, like Sherman tanks from the US, but mainly it was just recreate the 1945 army again.


----------



## brihard

How many of those people quickly recruited for the special force in Koreawere WW2 vets- and how many were able to immediately be employed in their old NCO or officer ranks?

I'm not saying we couldn't fill a lot of ranks and files pretty quickly, but what about leadership?

Then again, I suppose we also have a lot of very capable combat arms and CSS leadership sitting in various offices in various places working essentially bureaucratic jobs that could be left vacant for the duration of a sudden conflict... I imagine someone's probably run the numbers on that...


----------



## Infanteer

Brihard said:
			
		

> How many of those people quickly recruited for the special force in Koreawere WW2 vets- and how many were able to immediately be employed in their old NCO or officer ranks?
> 
> I'm not saying we couldn't fill a lot of ranks and files pretty quickly, but what about leadership?



How many Afghan vets would return to the colours?


----------



## Old Sweat

The plan was to use as many vets as possible, and there had been some talk about them flocking to the colours. Most, however, were happily engaged in the baby boom in the suburbs and I think most who were enrolled were fresh off the streets. There were enough good quality officers and NCOs willing to come back in that the leadership cadre was pretty experienced. I am not sure if anyone every did a study of the manning of the intake, so my information is based on observation and a bit of personal experience from when I enlisted in 1957.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Infanteer said:
			
		

> How many Afghan vets would return to the colours?



What mechanism are we putting in place to keep RegF Afghan vet members who are releasing involved in the PRes so as to keep their skill sets from atrophying?


----------



## 54/102 CEF

Christie Blatchford, Reserves Languishing by not being upgraded, Korea Mobilisation ........ (let me see)

Here's my fly on the wall views 

Actually - we have 2 militia's the Permanent Active Militia (Regs) and the Non Permanent Active Militia (Res). These are their 1939 terms.

From 1952 to 1998 (end of Berlin Wall?) I could see a bigger reg force when the Soviets were still out there. 

Today - for all the song and dance we see at 101 Colonel By Drive I come to the conclusion its just about Federal Paychecks spread across the country.

To test this - let's play Risk and Deploy a Battle Group indefinitely. That lasts about 5 years then the Regs are so beat up they can't sustain it even with Reserve Support. Happened in Bosnia and Afghanistan - partly for Equipment Issues and manpower affairs. 

Then some talking head gives a speech and says we're ready to do it again. 

I just watched a Youtube Show on Canada and Korea - Type in Test of Will - Canada in Korea. Its about 90 mins long and a very (to me) well balanced show. It reveals we haven't had a mobilisation since 1939. For Korea we recruited WW2 Vets - Militia and Civvys in that order. Over 3-4 years we deployed about 25000 troops. But it was all done cheap - initial flag waving then ended with indiv soldiers arriving home in the middle of the prairies after dark. No one can keep the buzz going as it will inevitably fade from the front splash page of your m.news app.

So my point to keep it short? We use the Forces in support of a political mission. When that changes we all scale back. Same story in US, UK. 

Thus - having an almost 70 year run of DND on the cheap since 1945 we have to face facts. DND isn't a big stick and we all have to keep that in mind despite periodically doing something with the larger Nato Forces. 

Jack English and his friends have no voice. Statistics tells you a run of 7 indications up or down is a trend. The run for the Forces has been down for a long time, even adjusted for inflation by our pet bean counters and equipment procurement professionals. The more current year dough shovelled to the Forces - the less it gets - even if we had a budget on par with the UK (a force always under attack by its government) what would we do with a bigger force? We have no long history with a constant big force to police an Empire like the Brits had from 1759 to 1956. We are a force based on small everything. Never been big in peace and only temporarily big in the pre-nuclear warfare period. Once we had the big Firecracker - we were as high as 165,000 but this was in the pre 1968 period - again almost 50 years ago.

What is the impact of all the over head staff we have if all we can do is deploy a Kampfgruppe with some 700 outside the Wire.

The impact is simple - Federal Paychecks - outside the Cadpat Combat side of the Forces - any non Cadpat activity is probably an easily learnable civvy market based skill-trade-profession (insert your civvy equivalent). Yet we overlay it with an Army of managers and Financial Professionals (get your CMA kids and have a job for life!) to dress it up as a modern back end to a modern fighting force.

Really? So why haven't we got a replacement for the Buffalo, the Seakings, let alone the F35 Does our depth drive us to deals like buying Brit subs? Why are our bases wilting for lack of re-investment. What's our plan for the North if shipping lanes open for Euro-Asia trade?

These answers aren't only DND related - probably more than one government department is involved and new policy takes time. But log jams can be broken - the C17, Herc and Chinook replacements weren't evolutionary as far as I can see - it was political will that  did that. In the same vein - in time - we'll see new steel sailing the seas built in Canadian Shipyards.

But barring a Zombie Michael Jackson Army arriving on the scene - the boots we have now on the ground are probably all we'll see for some time to come. Seven is a trend - seventy five is a national policy impervious to whatever political party is in power.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 7 months flash to bang for the gulf war. 7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...


That assumes the magical equipment fairy provides for all the weapons, vehicles and support systems for these reserve platoons and companies to use.  If we want the reserve force as a mobilisation base for a 7 months notice war, then we need the equipment ahead of time.

On a less far-reaching note, reserve CSS and Engr put sub-units from opposite sides of a province under a single unit HQ.  Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?


----------



## brihard

MCG said:
			
		

> On a less far-reaching note, reserve CSS and Engr put sub-units from opposite sides of a province under a single unit HQ.  Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?



Regimental associations, regimental senates, and politically connected former reserve officers and families thereof. It is not a system that, objectively, makes much sense were one outside looking in.

I genuinely believe that it's only a matter of time before the British approach to reserve amalgamation is substantially adopted.


----------



## Journeyman

Brihard said:
			
		

> ..... sitting in various offices in various places *"*working*"* essentially bureaucratic jobs that could be left vacant  for the duration ....


_~clutching at chest~_ 
Having once been posted to NDHQ, you have no idea how self-important bureaucracies can be.




			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?


 Why indeed.   op:


----------



## ArmyRick

Personally, I think the London Regt is a good example of what our reserve infantry and armoured regiments could adopt. Each sub unit perpetuates a unit in headdress and name but the CO and RSM are the same for all (In this case the CO and RSM could choose to wear any one of the affiliated insignia). It would certainly reduce the LT COL and CWO count.


----------



## Jed

The CO and RSM should pull a 'Montgomery or Full Monty  ;D' : Wear multiple cap badges.


----------



## OldSolduer

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Personally, I think the London Regt is a good example of what our reserve infantry and armoured regiments could adopt. Each sub unit perpetuates a unit in headdress and name but the CO and RSM are the same for all (In this case the CO and RSM could choose to wear any one of the affiliated insignia). It would certainly reduce the LT COL and CWO count.



It works but is a stop gap measure. If we were to expand, we'd have two COs and two RSMs again.


----------



## dapaterson

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> It works but is a stop gap measure. If we were to expand, we'd have two COs and two RSMs again.



Canada's Army Reserve is, generously, 20K people, of which 16K are trained to the DP1 level.

Using a very generous 400 trained soldiers per unit, that gives us 40 LCols, nationwide, in command positions.

Currently there are 51 Infantry LCols commanding units.  Gunners: 17.  Recce: 17.  Engineers: 10.  CSS: 10.  Sigs: 10.  That's 115 LCols commanding - almost 3x what the current strength can justify.  (This ignores the growing Int empire & CBG HQs).

Will we see the Army Reserve triple in size in the near term?

Or would a system that has more competition for senior positions, that provides more time in rank to build better-experienced leaders provide a better end-product?


----------



## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Using a very generous 400 trained soldiers per unit.....


   ???  I can't imagine a militia unit with 400 people, trained or otherwise.


----------



## WLSC

> Posté par: Journeyman
> « le: Aujourd'hui à 10:20:27 » Citer ce message
> Citation de: dapaterson le Aujourd'hui à 10:08:24
> Using a very generous 400 trained soldiers per unit.....     I can't imagine a militia unit with 400 people, trained or otherwise.



The problem his not the size of the unit but to find a way to have them there when they are suppose to be.  My unit his almost half way there.  Even fi we parade at a minimum of 80%, it's not in the same time.  That's the challenge.  The solution for this his in the same ball park that the numbers of Lcol and CWO, well above are heads.
 :2c:


----------



## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> ???  I can't imagine a militia unit with 400 people, trained or otherwise.



How about a unit of three companies, each 125 people?

Say, one company in Brockville, a second in Cornwall, and the third in Kingston...


----------



## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> How about a unit of three companies, each 125 people?
> 
> Say, one company in Brockville, a second in Cornwall, and the third in Kingston...


Ah, seen. I thought you were saying that there are currently units out there parading 400 people; I would be inclined to mock. But suggesting such an amalgamation would be heresy; think of the Honouraries!




			
				FusMR said:
			
		

> The solution for this his in the same ball park that the numbers of Lcol and CWO, well above are heads.


This whole discussion is above our pay-grades; it's just a "discussion." 

And while the CDS would certainly benefit from asking my opinions....   ....to date, he has not. 
(I can only assume that he's still busy redecorating 101 Col By).


----------



## WLSC

> Citation de: FusMR le Aujourd'hui à 10:30:20
> The solution for this his in the same ball park that the numbers of Lcol and CWO, well above are heads.This whole discussion is above our pay-grades; it's just a "discussion."
> 
> And while the CDS would certainly benefit from asking my opinions....   ....to date, he has not.
> (I can only assume that he's still busy redecorating 101 Col By).



I could imagine that.  Not sure the bosses would like that  >  I know it's discution.  I can just dream of amalgatating all the units in Mtl city and do two bn.  5 inf unit (2 franco & 3 anglo) almost in walking distances.  :nod:


----------



## McG

FusMR said:
			
		

> I can just dream of amalgatating all the units in Mtl city and do two bn.  5 inf unit (2 franco & 3 anglo) almost in walking distances.


Or maybe put them into one bilingual battalion.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> I would be inclined to mock. But suggesting such an amalgamation would be heresy; think of the Honouraries!


If HCol system is going to get in the way of seeing to the health of the Army, then perhaps it has outlived its purpose.


----------



## Tank Troll

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Canada's Army Reserve is, generously, 20K people, of which 16K are trained to the DP1 level.
> Using a very generous 400 trained soldiers per unit, that gives us 40 LCols, nationwide, in command positions.
> Currently there are 51 Infantry LCols commanding units.  Gunners: 17.  Recce: 17.  Engineers: 10.  CSS: 10.  Sigs: 10.  That's 115 LCols commanding - almost 3x what the current strength can justify.  (This ignores the growing Int empire & CBG HQs).
> Will we see the Army Reserve triple in size in the near term?
> Or would a system that has more competition for senior positions, that provides more time in rank to build better-experienced leaders provide a better end-product?



That has been talked about for a while, at the last Armour Confrance it came up again.  BTW a couple of Armd units are commanded by Majors and SSM.


----------



## WLSC

> Citation de: FusMR le Aujourd'hui à 11:06:00
> I can just dream of amalgatating all the units in Mtl city and do two bn.  5 inf unit (2 franco & 3 anglo) almost in walking distances.
> Or maybe put them into one bilingual battalion.



That, would definitly not pass the test, on either side :blotto:


----------



## Mountie

I realize this topic hasn't been posted to for a while, but if you really want to reduce headquarters and streamline how about converting all the reserve CBGs into Battle Groups or Territorial Battalion Groups on a permanent basis.  That's all they can form anyway.  So why waste all the additional administrative overhead for a "brigade" when the you only field a battle group / battalion group?  By eliminating all those extra officers and senior NCOs you could actually add more PYs where they're needed.  Most unit could still be maintained at the sub-unit level.  (ie. 4 full strength rifle companies, rather than 4 infantry battalions each providing an HQ, HQ coy and a single rifle company).  The battle group/battalion group headquarters would control all the units just like they already do.


----------



## BC Old Guy

> So why waste all the additional administrative overhead for a "brigade" when the you only field a battle group / battalion group?



There are a number of reasons why the additional administrative overhead is needed in reserve formations.  These include :
-The Reserves need to do their own recruiting
- manage the recruit until trained
-conduct and control release procedure that is done by the Base/Garrison staff
-manage the release  file/releasee until release is finalized

These functions are done outside the operational unit/sub-unit in the Reg F, which is one of the reasons for the somewhat large CMP staff.

As well, there are financial authority requirements that require a formation commander, normally a Col / Capt(N).

My preference is to incr the size of the units, so that a Reserve Bde has a strength closer that of a doctrinal Bde / Bde Gp.   That option, however, requires political will to increase funding and Reserve establishments.

BDOG


----------



## FJAG

BC Old Guy said:
			
		

> There are a number of reasons why the additional administrative overhead is needed in reserve formations.  These include :
> -The Reserves need to do their own recruiting
> - manage the recruit until trained
> -conduct and control release procedure that is done by the Base/Garrison staff
> -manage the release  file/releasee until release is finalized
> 
> These functions are done outside the operational unit/sub-unit in the Reg F, which is one of the reasons for the somewhat large CMP staff.
> 
> As well, there are financial authority requirements that require a formation commander, normally a Col / Capt(N).
> 
> My preference is to incr the size of the units, so that a Reserve Bde has a strength closer that of a doctrinal Bde / Bde Gp.   That option, however, requires political will to increase funding and Reserve establishments.
> 
> BDOG



The reserve Bde / Bde Gp is only required if you plan to mobilize in the traditional sense. Your last para answers it all -- political will and funding which will never happen. There is no government intent to "mobilize" in the traditional sense and perhaps even more important, there is no intent/will within the regular army leadership for traditional "mobilization".

With that said then the concept of reducing reserve brigades to the battalions that they are is the best solution. It cuts extraneous rank overhead and provides a unified leadership and administrative structure that has an enhanced capability of going beyond pure individual augmentation. 

The administrative functions that you identify, as well as many others, could be easily incorporated into a "garrison/depot" company. Other items such as financial authorities etc can be easily accommodated.

The biggest impediment to true and meaningful reform are vested interests which exist in keeping historical units active and protecting bloated rank structures. 

To some extent we do need some redundancy in mid level officers and senior NCOs to provide depth to protect against high personnel turnover and physical fitness failures, but we do not need a Colonel, a half dozen or more of each of LCols and CWOs and several dozen majors to run what is essentially a battalion strength organization.

I love unit tradition as much as the next soldier, but if we can no longer say that we have both the intent or the ability to expand/mobilize to a two corps army then we simply do not need the numbers of battalions and regiments that we have.


----------



## Infanteer

What FJAG said.



			
				BC Old Guy said:
			
		

> There are a number of reasons why the additional administrative overhead is needed in reserve formations.  These include :
> -The Reserves need to do their own recruiting
> - manage the recruit until trained
> -conduct and control release procedure that is done by the Base/Garrison staff
> -manage the release  file/releasee until release is finalized
> 
> These functions are done outside the operational unit/sub-unit in the Reg F, which is one of the reasons for the somewhat large CMP staff.
> 
> As well, there are financial authority requirements that require a formation commander, normally a Col / Capt(N).
> 
> My preference is to incr the size of the units, so that a Reserve Bde has a strength closer that of a doctrinal Bde / Bde Gp.   That option, however, requires political will to increase funding and Reserve establishments.
> 
> BDOG



You're letting the tail wag the dog.  Unique administrative requirements ≠ requirement for formation staff.  Unique administrative requirements can be handled through augmenting unit organizations/CO authorities.


----------



## McG

I've already posted my opinion somewhere in the > 1450 posts of this thread.
To rehash, I agree with FJAG - the PRes needs fewer but larger battalions.


----------



## OldSolduer

Just as long as we don't get saddled with the CASW.


----------



## quadrapiper

If you don't like napkin-back crayoning, skip to the next post.

[out of lane]
In the search for a more logical and effective Militia structure, would adopting a more flexible interpretation of what a "regiment" is be advisable - allow the retention of whatever benefits a certain identity and history confer, especially in areas where the local regiment has some standing, but without any sort of compulsion to maintain a full old-school RHQ?

If the actual strength is more-or-less battalion/company/platoon sized, then double-hat the appropriate OIC as Regimental CO - let the formation's HQ bodies fill the "RHQ" roles. If there's any requirement for admin/trg/log/whatever beyond what a particular formation can handle, fill that need with a cell distinct from the Batt/Coy/Plt structure - a cell that might be shared by several nearby units. Fine-tune the larger formation's command structure so whatever lieutenant colonels do exist end up commanding a battalion-sized collection of dispersed units - perhaps, in areas without a larger regiment, allow one of the "company" COs to be over-ranked. Over-man a bit as far as officers and NCOs, especially in smaller units, so a particular body deploying doesn't completely disable the unit - I'm assuming something like this already exists?

As far as headquarters - if the idea's to have a pick-up-and-go command cell for a brigade- or division-sized deployment, then don't lumber the HQ proper with militia housekeeping - peel that off as a distinct function.

Pros? Clearly defined roles. No rank inflation for the regiments, and a clear incentive for any units that, by virtue of local demographics, should be much larger, to determine what they're doing wrong. Perhaps a greater possibility of matching deployable roles for individual reservists with their rank and responsibilities at the home unit.

Cons? Howling from the National Union of LCols and CWOs, and everyone else with a vested interest in the current manning structure. Possible loss of experienced bodies. Likely public stink about "gutting defense," and the like. As it'd be (other than the loss of senior officer and WO billets) more or less a recognition of the status quo, not sure what else sucks about it - sure there's something. 
[/out of lane]

Oh - and make sure that any DND-maintained Militia infrastructure is seeing full use, whether by the primary unit, or by other CF organizations, whether recruiting offices, cadet corps, or what-have-you.

Speaking of that, why aren't CFRCs located in armouries, if there's one handy to a given area of interest?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Just as long as we don't get saddled with the CASW.



The way things are going these days, if we could be assured of getting the ammo and support, I'd be happy if they made us all CASW/Machine Gun battalions....


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The way things are going these days, *if we could be assured of getting the ammo and support*, I'd be happy if they made us all CASW/Machine Gun battalions....



You're new here, aren't you...


----------



## OldSolduer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The way things are going these days, if we could be assured of getting the ammo and support....



And therein lies the problem.


----------



## Journeyman

While this debate has now reached almost 60-pages of circular argument, we're still no closer to the basic problem -- what is the role of the Reserve;  not the feel-good buzzwords, but what do we _really_ want our Reserve to do?  [and I'm speaking only to the Army side]

Much of what has been said remains true:
- in some communities, it seems to be the only military touch-stone present -- particularly as the Legions whither.
- it's an old boys' club, designed to grow LCols/CWOs; maybe that wasn't the intent, but it's there. This feeds into the self-licking ice cream cones of protectorate Regimental Senates.
- there appears to be a tendency to give the Reserve tasks that no one particularly cares about: eg - Air Defence, Influence Activities.
- from recent deployments, Reservists tended to be seen _primarily_ as Cpls in rifle sections or staff-officers in non-critical HQ postions.
- some admin functions are indeed unique to Reserve units, in-house.

But until someone mans up, says "Militia mafia, STFU," and states "_this_ is what we want; here's the funding,"  we will continue to see cities with 2-5 x Coy-size Infantry Regts, and smaller communities with a Pl-size Regt, each commanded by a LCol and CWO -- with appropriate hierarchy -- burning up their funded training year doing ethics and safety briefings....oh, and believing that they're here to form the nucleus of a Brigade or Division during mobilization.

Until our senior leadership _honestly_ addresses the underlying rationale and what they're willing to pay for it, there will be no substantive changes.....even in another 60 pages.


----------



## Old Sweat

What do we want from the Militia? Do we know why we have the Militia structure we have, other than that we always had it?

Our Militia structure is basically a mid-19th century creation that evolved through periodic crises between the UK and the Americans. It was designed partly as a vehicle to dispense patronage and partly as a way to satisfy the British that we were doing something. But, mostly it was designd to be cheap - in other words, to provide a bit of bang from not too many bucks. That we got away with it was more a matter of luck that design. Remember that there was no second line support and precious llittle in the way of first line; many of the units were rural and could only really parade after the crops were harzested; soldiers had to provide their own boots and underclothing; and command and control was wretched at best. The truth was that Canada lucky not to have faced a serious enemy from 1855 to the end of the Victorian era. The Fenians and the post-buffalo hunting Metis were few in number, not really all that well organized and lacked staying power. Even so, they managed to whip us in most of the early battles. Other than a couple of skirmishes, our first military victory was at Batoche. We lost at Ridgeway and Fort Erie in 1866, lucked out against skeleton Fenians forces in Quebec in the same year and in 1870, were driven from the field at Cut Knife and drew at best at Fish Creek in 1885. We were lucky we did not come up against the Zulus or the Comanches.

Even the Boer War was never really in doubt. However our army had improved and although Sam Hughes would never have admitted it, our successes were largely because of the strong regular army presence in the contingents. We were lucky indeed to have taken on the Boers before the Germans, and not the other way around. In fact the only three serious wars we fought largely made use of the mobilization base provided by the Militia. However, to field an effective army took time and training, and some fairly extensive housecleaning in the officers and sergeants messes. The half century past Korea saw our structure change to forces in being and manning the frontiers. With the end of the Cold War, things got fairly messy, but the Balkanistas and the Afghans were hardly in the big leagues militarily.

Dynamic inertia is a Canadian military organization principle and our reserve forces is still based on the 19th century model. Our Militia unit organization seems designed to perpetuate rather than generate. A cursory examination of the British, Australian and New Zealand organizations seems to indicate all three armies are less tied to maintaining a large number of regiments for the sake of cap badgery, although the number of reservists to both the regular force and the population base seems roughly the same as ours. Let us note that we probably require a few thousand reservists in each of BC, the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada for things like disaster relief, regional security operations and as a base to augment the regular force. The question to ask are we getting the best result for the buck, or are we, in a throwback to the 19th century, applying patronage, albeit in a non-political way?

Edit to add: Ask yourselves how many companies/squadrons/batteries are we getting from our total pool of combat arms COs and RSMs compared to the three other armies I examined?


----------



## GR66

Maybe we need a system which makes a clear distinction between Reservists and a Militia.  

"Reservists" might be defined as those forces which provide either direct support or augmentation for the Regular Forces.  Their organizational structure could be directly embedded in the existing Regular Force structure.  Battalions/Squadrons could have an additional"Reserve" Company/Troop in their organization to provide forces for augmentation.  Similarly Navy/AF Ships and Squadrons could have Reserve elements as part of their organization.  These units could have a mix of Reg Force and Reserve staff and the Reg Force elements of each unit could have a number of Class B positions for members of their Reserve unit.  Reservists would train to the identical standards as their Reg Force counterparts using the same equipment.  Reservists would augment their parent units both in deployment but also in training.  The size of the Reserve force would be smaller than the current Reserves since their role would be fairly specific and there would be no anticipation of using these troops as any form of force expansion base.

The "Militia" on the other hand would serve a different series of roles.  They could have their own historical units based on geographical location (within reason for organizational purposes) and would not be as directly linked to the Reg Force as the "Reservists".  They would provide a "face" of the CF to the general public.  They could be called out in times of emergency to provide disaster relief and support to civil authorities, etc.  They would not however need to be designed to directly augment the Reg Forces for overseas deployments or be used as a source of pre-existing units for force expansion in case of major conflict.  They could instead be used as a source of partially-trained personnel that could be fed into the Reg Force system in times of need instead of having to go directly to the public for completely untrained personnel.  

The training and equipment cost for this type of "Militia" would then be less than that of the existing Militia/Reserves.  They could focus more on skills/training such as rescue/first aid, communications, logistics and transport, leadership, etc rather than primarily on combat skills (not saying there wouldn't/couldn't be a combat training element to what they are taught of course).  A less stricly combat arms/military focus on the Militia might open up these units to more skilled civilians that might not necessarily be attracted to a more traditional part-time army unit.


----------



## Old Sweat

That is an interesting approach which has some merit. The challenge with the militia role, as opposed to the reserve role, is that we tried it in the 1950s and, in my opinion at least, the militia/reserves never really recovered. Sixty years ago we were faced with the very real prospect of nuclear war and the Canadian government took the threat very, very seriously. The existing militia formations dropped traditional titles such as brigades and became National Survival Groups and Columns. The military hardware was returned to depots and training became focused on what was called "Reentry Operations." On receiving an alert, the local militia columns were to abandon their families, report to the armoury and deploy to a safe site upwind of the target city. After the strike, the columns then would advance into the devastation, rescuing as many survivors as they could until they reached an area where the radiation/flames/destruction was too high for anyone to have survived. The concept was a dismal failure, not in part because traditional military training was abandoned.

In later years there was some discussion of vital point guards, regional battalions and the rest, but these always seemed to go nowhere, usually because one of the financial crunches which recur with the regularity of black flies in the Spring would emerge.*

Still, can you expand on the concept?

In the interest of clarity, I borrowed the line about black flies from a letter Pte Anderson of the RCD Machine Gun Section wrote to his family back in St John, NB in 1900. He was referring to an action where the section had a close call. Anderson described the Boers as being as thick as black flies up the brook in the Spring. I always wanted to use it, but really have to credit a long dead Canadian soldier for the inspiration.


----------



## Rifleman62

Diefenbaker hired hordes of the unemployed, put militia flashes on their black overalls and trained them for several winters, 1959 -62. There is even a book written about it: *Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada?s Cold War Civil Defence *By Andrew Burtch.

We were still doing " V and pancake " building collapse rescues in Shilo, June 1963. There was a mock village at Shilo, as at all bases, called the Ponderosa, for this training.

The fun part for a bug out drill or if the real deal happened was for most of the militia waiting/traveling by streetcar to Minto or Mac Gregor, firing up the Dodge 3/4 ton in Dec/Jan/Feb and deploying to Portage La Prairie in under a couple of hours. 

P.S. The _Molitia _never came up with all these grand schemes and plans.

I do not know how many times has it been said here that 38 CBG, years ago (probably close to ten now), starting with the Guns, then the Inf, followed by the Svc Bns, did exactly what  Journeyman and others are proposing.


----------



## FJAG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Dynamic inertia is a Canadian military organization principle and our reserve forces is still based on the 19th century model. Our Militia unit organization seems designed to perpetuate rather than generate.


Great term that. Couldn't agree more. 

What I can't understand is why we still let it happen. There was a time of powerful vested political influence that kept a tight rein on any NDHQ attempts to revitalize interfere with militia organizations but those elements are mostly gone. _Dynamic inertia_ however explains it in a very logical NDHQish sort of way.




			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Maybe we need a system which makes a clear distinction between Reservists and a Militia.


Really?  What possible benefit would it have for DND as a whole to have yet one more part time group that is even less versatile than what we already have. 

In the mid sixties we divided the militia into the military-centric "mobile striking" force and a force designed for nuclear / disaster search and rescue. A crappier organization never existed and we all cheered when this concept came to an end. While I would dearly love to be 18 years old again, please don't make me go back to this structure.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> And therein lies the problem.


 I can remember thru age dimmed eyes when the army reserve was more of a menagerie then a  militia it had Lynxes and and Grizzlies and Cougars  and by and and large did pretty well  and then ....strangely enough the support went away.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> While this debate has now reached almost 60-pages of circular argument, we're still no closer to the basic problem -- what is the role of the Reserve;  not the feel-good buzzwords, but what do we _really_ want our Reserve to do?  [and I'm speaking only to the Army side]
> 
> Until our senior leadership _honestly_ addresses the underlying rationale and what they're willing to pay for it, there will be no substantive changes.....even in another 60 pages.



And I thought that nobody really cared about us. Snif.... :'(


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You're new here, aren't you...



So new I still have forcep marks on my temples  ;D


----------



## GR66

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> That is an interesting approach which has some merit. The challenge with the militia role, as opposed to the reserve role, is that we tried it in the 1950s and, in my opinion at least, the militia/reserves never really recovered. Sixty years ago we were faced with the very real prospect of nuclear war and the Canadian government took the threat very, very seriously. The existing militia formations dropped traditional titles such as brigades and became National Survival Groups and Columns. The military hardware was returned to depots and training became focused on what was called "Reentry Operations." On receiving an alert, the local militia columns were to abandon their families, report to the armoury and deploy to a safe site upwind of the target city. After the strike, the columns then would advance into the devastation, rescuing as many survivors as they could until they reached an area where the radiation/flames/destruction was too high for anyone to have survived. The concept was a dismal failure, not in part because traditional military training was abandoned.
> 
> In later years there was some discussion of vital point guards, regional battalions and the rest, but these always seemed to go nowhere, usually because one of the financial crunches which recur with the regularity of black flies in the Spring would emerge.
> 
> Still, can you expand on the concept?



To be honest it's more of an undeveloped gut feeling than a clearly defined concept.  My gut feeling though is that our current Militia system is designed to fill too many different roles to be effective or cost efficient at any of them.  By trying to have a Militia structure that is potentially asked to do everything from providing provide trained individual augmentees to the Reg Force units, to deploying formed units for domestic operations in the brigade group areas to being a base for large scale force expansion in time of war, do we really have the money available to allow them to do any of these tasks well?  The idea of making a distinction between the "Reserves" and the "Militia" is to allow each to focus more clearly on a specific subset of tasks.  

The "Reserves" would be much more closely linked to the idea of part time PROFESSIONAL soldiers (as opposed to "citizen soldiers").  My personal opinion is that the days of any significant force expansion of the military is gone.  The equipment we use is too expensive and takes too long to replace to realistically grow our forces in any significant way in time of serious conflict.  We'll likely have more than enough difficulty keeping our existing units adequately equipped and provided with replacement personnel.  The (new) Reserves would be a way to augment and maintain the personnel levels of Ref Force units during a conflict (or when budgetary constraints mean that they are not maintained at full strength).  Training standards and equipment used would be the same for both Reg Force and Reservists...in fact the "Reserve" units would actually be Reg Force units...just staffed primarily with part time soldiers.  Admin for the units would run down through the existing Reg Force CoC cutting out (some of) the extra overhead of having separate Militia units. 

How exactly this is handled using existing Milita units would be up for debate...but essentially existing Militia units would become part of a parent Reg Force unit.  Don't really care if they maintain a separate Regimental identity for these sub-units that's not the important element.  Reservists would get Reg Force qualifications, have their staff train with the parent unit, use the same equipment, etc.  A certain number of positions within the Reg Force unit could be Class B/C positions allowing Reservists to serve full-time with their parent unit when possible in order to strengthen the ties between the elements.  The Reservists would then be available to be the source of augmentees for their parent unit when required.  Theoretically you wouldn't need as many "Reservists" as you have in the current system since their only role is to flesh out their parent unit in times of need.   Members releasing from the Reg Force may be more interested in staying in the Reserves if they can maintain their ties to their own unit as well as have training and tasks that are more relevant to their prior Reg Force service.

That leaves the question of how do you fulfill the other roles currently tasked to the Reserves?  Firstly I think we need to more clearly define what those roles are.  Are those roles REALLY primarily military roles or are they more support to civil powers roles?  Maybe there is a place for some type of "unit" (call it Militia or whatever you want) that is NOT strictly military in structure (or even part of the CF for that matter).  There could be volunteer/"Militia"-type units that are official and centrally organized by the federal government that are specifically trained for such tasks as Urban Rescue, C3, Fresh Water and mobile power provision, traffic control and civil defence, logistics, field hospitals/preventative medicine, etc.  These units could fall under a CF umbrella for sake of command and control, coordination and admin but might not look like strictly "military" units.  The level of training for these "Militia" (citizen soldiers/civil defence/volunteers) may not be as costly as training a current Militia member to existing CF standards. 

I'm not suggesting scrapping the current Reserves and replacing them with a Canadian Peace Corps/Civil Defence Corps (like was tried in the past)....but rather maybe slim down (in size) and and improve the capability of the "Reserves" to fulfill the specific role of augmentation to the Reg Force.  The "other" Militia tasks could then maybe be provided by an organization better suited to dealing with just those tasks.


----------



## dapaterson

Sounds like the National GUard vs Army Reserve in the US.

GIven the resources we have, such division would make things less effective and operational.

Standing up a volunteer emergency response corps, on the other hand, might have some merit - better still to have federal funding and limited standards, and provincial management and implementation, since concerns are different in different regions - earthquake preparednes in BC, flooding in Manitoba...


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:
			
		

> Training standards and equipment used would be the same for both Reg Force and Reservists...in fact the "Reserve" units would actually be Reg Force units...just staffed primarily with part time soldiers.  Admin for the units would run down through the existing Reg Force CoC cutting out (some of) the extra overhead of having separate Militia units.



10/90 redux?


----------



## Old Sweat

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 10/90 redux?



And we know how well that worked, thanks in no small part to some very fuzzy thinking that assumed we could create an operational battalion in 30 days.


----------



## quadrapiper

The militia, more-or-less as is, provides a convenient and relatively flexible structure to hang various roles off of, even those not strictly related to a given unit's function. Don't see the value that'd be provided by another federal agency taking over the sandbag filling, etc., role, especially as that'd mean _another_ line of bureaucrats from the useful bit to Ottawa - much better to plead for a few bodies for planning/liaison cells at some suitable level (brigade?), and a few more paid days a year for the units themselves to work on the subject. Realistically, if anything goes truly adrift, the Army will end up in the streets anyway - might as well keep awareness of domestic non-combat ops in-house.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66's plan also reprises the Haldane, Cardswell era reforms in Britain that resulted in the Territorials.  

The Reserves were Regulars that had served out a portion of their engagement and were on the books to be called up at any time after they had commenced their civvy careers.  It replaced the earlier notion of releasing soldiers on half-pay.

The Territorials were Civvies that had volunteered to make themselves available to His/Her Majesty when the need arose and in the meantime undertook some basic military training.

I believe that the working basis for all three classes of soldiers is that all three (Regular - Trained and Available Immediately, Reserve - Trained and Available at notice, Territorial or Militia - a willing hand) were, first and foremost, Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  In time of crisis the Army forms a pool of manpower on which the Government of the Day can rely.

Some crises involve killing and dying.  Some crises involve shoveling snow.  All crises require manpower but more importantly ORGANIZED manpower.

I would suggest that the Regs address Her Majesty's needs from one end of the spectrum and the Militia from the other. 

That means that the Militia would be capable of a variety of tasks necessary to sustain local services in times of crises - up to and including armed support of the local constabulary.

It doesn't follow that the Militia would be able to assist foreign governments in supplying those same services.   They simply are not available.  They contribute to society by being society.  If everybody left their businesses to assist other countries our society would suffer.  Consequently the Government has to hire people full time to meet its international commitments - Regulars.

If the Government chooses to send and Armoured Battle Group or an Infantry Brigade Group overseas then it needs to be staffed with people on the Regular payroll.  If it chooses to send a Brigade of Snow Shovelers overseas the same applies.   

Which brings me around to the role of the Reserves as opposed to the Militia.

I understand that, as happened after the Boer War, WW1, WW2 and Korea, post-Afghanistan retention is a problem.  It was also a problem after Crimea, the War of 1812 and the unpleasantness with the Yanks in the 1770's.  

One of the earlier methods taken to address the problem was to release some of the troops part way through their engagements on half-pay and let them pursue a "normal" civvy life on the understanding they would return to the colours when they were required.  The Reserve system merely modified the terms of service for the Regulars.

And I can't help but wonder if their isn't a solution for some of the CF's woes in better management of their Regs/Reserves by separating them from the Militia.

Many young, fit, well-trained and well-seasoned troops that signed up for the excitement of Afghanistan are getting out because they are facing years of garrison.  The CF is struggling to find dollars to keep those troops engaged with interesting training.  But for many of those troops, no matter how interesting the training it still smacks of a make-work project.

How about laying off a portion of those troops a portion of the time?  If you don't need all of your troops all of the time why not release some for part of the year to pursue seasonal employment - subject to recall?  How about releasing some others to pursue full time employment - subject to recall?

The CF would then retain a brigade to 6 battle groups or 2 brigades at NTM, a third brigade at short notice and enough additional reserves to flesh out the battle groups and perhaps, even, field a full division.

The key element would be in organizing a continuing tie that would require the Reservists to come back on an ongoing basis for prolonged, meaningful, refresher training.  Not pushing brooms but 72 hr live-fire exercises that simulate the battles they are expected to fight.


The would be done without reference to the Militia.  The Militia would get their own training suitable for meeting their own expected employment requirements.

The Regular is a fully trained soldier on the payroll.
The Reservist is a fully trained soldier not on the payroll.
The Militiaman is a potential soldier.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The Regular is a fully trained soldier on the payroll.
> The Reservist is a fully trained soldier not on the payroll.
> *The Militiaman is a potential soldier.*



Oh man.. I am going to use that one with some senior egos I know and see what happens  :rofl:


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Oh man.. I am going to use that one with some senior egos I know and see what happens  :rofl:


 >


----------



## McG

Is creating a Militia separate from the Reserve Force an answer looking for a question?  As pointed out, this is creating new bureaucracies and HQs as opposed to streamlining things, so any incremental savings from smaller individual pay scales is likely to be swallowed by the overhead costs of the beast.

Let's also keep in mind that there is the supplementary reserve fitting some of the nuanced differences being suggested for a differentiated Militia.


----------



## GR66

MCG said:
			
		

> Is creating a Militia separate from the Reserve Force an answer looking for a question?  As pointed out, this is creating new bureaucracies and HQs as opposed to streamlining things, so any incremental savings from smaller individual pay scales is likely to be swallowed by the overhead costs of the beast.
> 
> Let's also keep in mind that there is the supplementary reserve fitting some of the nuanced differences being suggested for a differentiated Militia.



Actually rather than seeing it as creating a new organization, I see it more as shifting some personnel and units from the current Militia/Reserves system to "part time" Reg Force units (i.e. the new "Reserves") and simply re-tasking the remaining existing Militia/Reserve units to their new roles.  These redefined Militia/Civil Defence? units could then be re-structured in a way that is perhaps less costly than the existing system.

For example, since there wouldn't be the requirement for the members of these units to be equally trained or interchangable with their Reg Force/Reserve members then they may not have to use the CF Rank structure along with the training and wage overhead that goes along with it.  The management structure could be much "flatter".  The CF would still have to do operational planning, etc for their own domestic operations so much of the higher level command and control could still be handled by them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to GR66:

On nomenclature - rather than describing the Militia units in Reg Force terms they could simply be defined as "Militias"  as in Militia 47 - Lakefield South.

The skill sets would include small arms training, comms and navigation and driving wheeled vehicles cross country.  Additional skills could include employment of engineering plant.


----------



## Journeyman

Perhaps consider shifting more capabilities to the Reserves that have less utility in a peacetime army. For example, most of the Air Defence and Influence Activities currently reside in the Reserve; why not establish things like ASICs there, where their part-time status would provide for financial savings while having little negative impact on operational readiness.


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman:

Are you talking about using GR66s "Part Time Regulars" that way or those earnest civilians currently employed by the Militia?

And I ask as an earnest civilian lately employed by the Militia.

I can see taking full time personnel that want to get out of the Regs and training them for those types of roles prior to their conditional release.  I can't see taking people like myself (or the younger, sleeker, fitter version) and training them up to the requisite standards, "half-days, two days a week or up to 12 days a year".


----------



## dapaterson

Or build Reg F units of varying readiness levels - 1 PPCLI is always the high readiness Bn in 1 CMBG; 2nd Bn the medium, 3rd Bn the low.  Pers can be rotated between the Bns to give the Bns the desired manning levels and the personnel relief from high-readiness tasks.  The same model could be used with other types of units as well, though it may require sub-unit level readiness levels (less than ideal).

If the High-readiness Bn is deployed, work begins to bring the medium readiness to high readiness, including activation of Reservists, and so on.

That would better leverage the existing Res F strucutre which is heavily weighted towards cbt arms.


The other challenge in determining a force structure is training: given the limited training time available for Reservists, which skillsets are most easily trained and retained within those time constraints?  Any force structure review of the Army needs to include that consideration.


----------



## Journeyman

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I can see taking full time personnel that want to get out of the Regs and training them for those types of roles prior to their conditional release.  I can't see taking people like myself (or the younger, sleeker, fitter version) and training them up to the requisite standards, "half-days, two days a week or up to 12 days a year".


For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" mode?

I'm not saying _all_ Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.


----------



## a_majoor

I recall being impressed with the Navy's use of Reservists in specific tasks, such as harbour defense and manning the Kingston class ships. This translated into a paper ("A New Role for the Reserve"), which was an early version of the Territorial Defense Battalion concept (although since one of the talking points was to increase the size of a Reserve unit to over 300 all ranks, this is not the TBD as it eventually evolved).

Since the paper was given in 1998, I can see there is a burning desire to examine the problem and enact changes (</snark>). Once there is an actual desire to examine the issue, there will be some pretty interesting answers developed.


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the  mode?
> 
> I'm not saying _all_ Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.



Point taken on something like All Source Intelligence.  I'm sure that some portion of that effort could be handled by "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" civilians.   And there is likely to be some other skill sets as well.

But trades like Air Defence, LRPRS, IED clearance..... wouldn't we be better served with fully trained soldiers in those roles? Having said that: "storing"  those capabilities in nights and weekend commitments from released soldiers does make sense.   That would mean a two tier Militia system though.  Some people would be able to enter certain trades off the street but other trades would require a Reg Force history for entrance.

Or you go with GR66's original thought of Reserve Sub-Units integrated within the Reg Force regimental structure.  I believe I remember reading that the French use (or used to use - it was a while ago I read it) that structure for units like their Para-Hussards.


Edit: Apparently it is still true - http://www.rhp1.terre.defense.gouv.fr/m2_OE_5esc.html  5th Squadron of the Para-Hussards are all Reservists.


----------



## Teeps74

Journeyman said:
			
		

> For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" mode?
> 
> I'm not saying _all_ Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.



Just wanted to point out that IA, by doctrine and design, augments everything that a military does from full on combat, to peace keeping, to foreign natural disaster response, to domestic ops. A military commander that chooses to not use IA is actively choosing to leave very important and capable tools on the wall back home in the shop. I am not sure that the argument that IA "... contribute little to ongoing RegF capability..." really holds water.

Storing that particular skill set on a CL A basis would be a colossal mistake.


----------



## Journeyman

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Just wanted to point out that IA....


Oh, so you're one of them     >


   ;D   <-----  seriously


----------



## Teeps74

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Oh, so you're one of them     >
> 
> 
> ;D   <-----  seriously



Yarp! And I am one of them that is trying to get more RegF buy in for IA. My dream is not as grand as the Americans or Chinese, but I do dream of a much more robust IA capability which can only happen when the RegF jumps on board.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Or build Reg F units of varying readiness levels - 1 PPCLI is always the high readiness Bn in 1 CMBG; 2nd Bn the medium, 3rd Bn the low.  Pers can be rotated between the Bns to give the Bns the desired manning levels and the personnel relief from high-readiness tasks.  The same model could be used with other types of units as well, though it may require sub-unit level readiness levels (less than ideal).
> 
> If the High-readiness Bn is deployed, work begins to bring the medium readiness to high readiness, including activation of Reservists, and so on.
> 
> That would better leverage the existing Res F strucutre which is heavily weighted towards cbt arms.
> 
> 
> The other challenge in determining a force structure is training: given the limited training time available for Reservists, which skillsets are most easily trained and retained within those time constraints?  Any force structure review of the Army needs to include that consideration.



That worlks if the entire Bde is co=located - not so much when it is split between two provinces and 1200 kms....


----------



## Infanteer

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> A military commander that chooses to not use IA is actively choosing to leave very important and capable tools on the wall back home in the shop. I am not sure that the argument that IA "... contribute little to ongoing RegF capability..." really holds water.



Is there any objective analysis that proves this to be true?  Over the last decade, I've seen some pretty big tire pumping of certain enablers, but nothing actually substantive indicating that there were deceive effects in an engagement or campaign derived from their activities.


----------



## Kirkhill

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Yarp! And I am one of them that is trying to get more RegF buy in for IA. My dream is not as grand as the Americans or Chinese, but I do dream of a much more robust IA capability which can only happen when the RegF jumps on board.



Teeps 74 - Does IA need to be a military function at all?  Or could it be one of those Whole of Government activities?

In the days of the Raj (why does that sound like "When I was in Poona.....") In the days of the Raj what is now called influence affairs was handled by the Colonial Office through District Commissioners.  They were civilians willing to go to hot, exotic and dangerous places, usually armed for personal defence but generally relying on the local British officered police force and military forces as well as a battalion or two of British troops to hold the line.

In an era of shrinking budgets I would be inclined to add IA and ASIC to the Foreign Affairs purview and hire suitably minded individuals in that department.   That would allow the Soldiery to concentrate on doing what they do best.  What was it RH said? "We're not the public service of Canada, we're not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people."

Edit: There is also the possibility of commissioning the Foreign Affairs types, in the same manner that Doctors, Lawyers and Chaplains hold commissions so that they hold a recognizable position in the military hierarchy, they have some understanding of the military's requirements and they have sufficient military training so that they are able to defend themselves and not be a liability to the mission.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Nice to see that the British seem to think we are a good example of how regular and reserve forces can work together:


Army restructuring faces big challenges

By James Blitz, Defence and Diplomatic Editor

There has never been a comfortable relationship between the full-time regulars in the British army and the part time reserves.

“Weekend Warriors” is the most polite term used by regular troops to describe their Territorial Army counterparts. “Dad’s Army” is another. 

Yet, the condescending air that regulars occasionally display towards the reserves will soon have to change. For in the next few weeks, the army will unveil the biggest overhaul of the relationship between the regulars and the reserve since the TA was founded in 1908 – one which will see reservists playing a far more significant role in front-line operations. 

The army is being forced to restructure itself because of the immense budgetary squeeze it faces. The size of the regular force is coming down from 102,000 to 82,000 in 2020. The size of the reserve is moving up from 15,000 to 30,000, making it a far larger proportion of UK land forces. 

But the transformation is qualitative, too. At present TA reservists tend to be deployed as individuals on the front line and can negotiate with employers and families over when they are deployed. About 20,000 have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, often with distinction.

But under new plans, the army wants to mobilise whole units of TA – often specialising in areas such as medical, communications and logistics support – at a moment’s notice.

“It is going to be a hell of a challenge to achieve this,” says General Sir John Kiszely, a former senior commander, now national president of the Royal British Legion. “You need to find enough people to double the reserve and train them to a high standard and get employers to be far more flexible about suddenly losing staff for long periods. You have to ask whether this can seriously be achieved.”

Leading figures in the reserve see this transformation as a huge opportunity. “Someone who is part-time infantryman who does a bit of shooting with the TA every other weekend will never be as good as a full-time combat professional,” says a TA colonel. “But if you give a unit of surgeons some additional training in personal protection, you end up with far more capability than the army could generate within its own ranks.” 

Evolution of ‘force of last resort’ 

Britain’s land forces have had a large component of volunteers in their midst for centuries, often made up of infantry, artillery and yeomanry, writes James Blitz. But it was only in 1908, that Richard Haldane, then secretary for war, brought together a body called the Territorial Force, the precursor to today’s Territorial Army, with an overall strength of 269,000 men.

The word “territorial” signified the volunteers who served were under no obligation to serve overseas. Yet within weeks of the outbreak of the first world war in 1914, about 70 territorial battalions had volunteered for service in France, their soldiers fighting alongside, and indistinguishable from, regulars.

As the former soldier and historian Allan Mallinson writes in his book The Making of the British Army, the territorials were soon “blooded” by the experience of battle. “The London Scottish were the first territorials to go into action at the battles of Messines Ridge losing half their strength in the process.”

As war clouds loomed over Europe in the early months of 1939, the government authorised the “duplication” of all Territorial Army units, thereby doubling its size. On the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939, the TA was mobilised and its units absorbed into the British army.

The TA provides much of the anti-aircraft cover for the UK until 1956. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, the government allowed the reserve to become seriously undermanned and poorly equipped. By the 1990s, the TA was regarded as a “force of last resort”.

It is only in the last decade that its fortunes have again flourished. About 6,900 TA personnel were mobilised for the invasion of Iraq, and the TA continues to provide about 1,200 troops each year to support the regular army in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. 
That said, many senior military figures are concerned about the scale of the challenge ahead. One fear is that British companies will be unwilling to shift from the current loose arrangement – where a reservist gets occasional leave and training – to one which might involve up to nine months deployment every five years.

Some defence experts may view the British army’s growing reliance on reserve forces as a dilution of professionalism. But the reforms would bring the UK more closely into line with the way land forces operate in countries such as Canada and Australia, both of which have had proud combat records in recent conflicts.

“In both Canada and Australia the reserves are fully integrated with regular units, with common training standards, the use of the same equipment and similar benefit structures” says Mark Phillips of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank, who has just completed a study of the UK reserves.

“In both countries, you even have a single chain of command. At any level of command, you tend to find that where the person in charge is a regular soldier, his deputy is often a reservist.”

Mr Phillips says one of the biggest lessons from both states is that “the capability provided by reserve forces improves when they are trained, mobilised and integrated properly with the regular professionals.”

The US has also leaned heavily on reservists during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“In the US, reserves are often of the highest quality because so much time and investment has been put into their training,” says General Kiszely. “But in the US, you have a tremendous culture of employer support, what I call the triumph of patriotism over avarice. We don’t have that kind of culture here.”

Business figures are wary. “The army likes to rehearse lots of arguments about improving the life experience of employees,” says one senior executive. “But this is a big ‘ask’. Small and medium sized businesses will suffer badly if they suddenly lose small numbers of staff.”

What many in the military believe is that if the new model for the British army is to work, everyone – government, business and the military – will have to get behind the change. “The army is currently enjoying a ‘help for heroes’ tide of goodwill,” says a brigadier in the regular forces. “But while the army is getting lots of sympathy there needs to be a lot more empathy about where we go as an institution.”


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1d9e826-b6ef-11e1-8a95-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2IIkX8hRy


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Nice to see that the British seem to think we are a good example of how regular and reserve forces can work together:
> 
> …
> 
> Some defence experts may view the British army’s growing reliance on reserve forces as a dilution of professionalism. But the reforms would bring the UK more closely into line with the way land forces operate in countries such as Canada and Australia, both of which have had proud combat records in recent conflicts.
> 
> “In both Canada and Australia the reserves are fully integrated with regular units, with common training standards, the use of the same equipment and similar benefit structures” says Mark Phillips of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank, who has just completed a study of the UK reserves.
> 
> “In both countries, you even have a single chain of command. At any level of command, you tend to find that where the person in charge is a regular soldier, his deputy is often a reservist.”
> 
> Mr Phillips says one of the biggest lessons from both states is that “the capability provided by reserve forces improves when they are trained, mobilised and integrated properly with the regular professionals.”
> …


The authors suggest we are a model, but our military is something between how the authors describe us and how they describe their own military.


----------



## Teeps74

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Teeps 74 - Does IA need to be a military function at all?  Or could it be one of those Whole of Government activities?



Apologies for the delay, I'll address these questions over the weekend in a new thread and link to here. The one armed paper hanger just got busy fast is all...


----------



## UnwiseCritic

Can anyone sum up what the reservists job is in Canada. I recently got into a bit of an argument and was told that reserves are not there to support reg F in areas of need that they cannot otherwise fullfil themselves. Just want to see the otherside of things before I go back.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

UnwiseCritic said:
			
		

> Can anyone sum up what the reservists job is in Canada. I recently got into a bit of an argument and was told that reserves are not there to support reg F in areas of need that they cannot otherwise fullfil themselves. Just want to see the otherside of things before I go back.



From the Army website:



> Role of Reserve Force
> 
> The primary role of the Reserve Force is to augment, sustain, and support the Regular Force. In recent years, Reservists have made substantial contributions to Canada's expeditionary (international) and/or domestic operations.
> 
> Many Reservists serve full-time within the Canadian Forces on employment contracts. Since the year 2000, more than 4,000 Primary Reservists have been deployed in Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, Haiti, and other international expeditionary operations.
> 
> Among the many ways that Reservists have participated in domestic operations, they have:
> 
> supported the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver;
> assisted with flood relief efforts in Quebec and Manitoba;
> participated in recovery efforts following ice storms in eastern Canada;
> fought forest fires in Alberta and British Columbia; and
> assisted with hurricane relief efforts in Newfoundland and Labrador.
> In addition, Reservists often help at or participate in cultural events, parades, festivals and other public events in their own and neighbouring communities across Canada.
> 
> Many Reservists have full-time careers outside the Canadian Forces in a wide range of civilian occupations. Others are full-time students.
> 
> Role of the Army Reserve
> 
> The Army Reserve has three roles:
> 
> Existing Reserve units are the framework or structure the Army would use to mobilize or expand the Army should the nation ever need to respond to a large crisis as in the World Wars.
> Located in over one hundred communities across Canada, the Army Reserve connects Canadians with their Army.
> The Army Reserve augments the Regular Force by providing soldiers, units or specialists to the Canadian Army.


----------



## Journeyman

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Apologies for the delay, I'll address these questions over the weekend in a new thread and link to here. The one armed paper hanger just got busy fast is all...


I can't help but notice he never did come back to enlighten us.

Maybe he's got a point; I know I'm further "influenced" on their utility.    >


----------



## UnwiseCritic

Thanks that is exactly what I was looking for.


----------



## x_para76

I haven't gone through all the previous comments on this thread so if I'm restating something that's already been said then I do apologize. 

Financially what might make the most sense would be to make all reserve regiments into out lying companies of  a reg force affiliated regiment. For example right now we have 4 RCR based in London, and if all the infantry units in 31 brigade were made into out lying companies of 4 RCR it would eliminate a lot of unnecessary upper echelon clag. You wouldn't have all these reserve Lt. Colonels and RSM's running around pretending that they're commanding an infantry battalion when in actuality at best they're commanding a heavy company. It would also eliminate all these expensive orders of regimental dress from the clothing budget and put everyone in DEU's.


----------



## a_majoor

O said:
			
		

> I haven't gone through all the previous comments on this thread so if I'm restating something that's already been said then I do apologize.



For example here: http://Forums.Army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1011164.html#msg1011164

An interesting twist to this argument has come out in the CMJ Vol 13 No 2: Redefining the Army Reserves for the 21rst Century by Dan Doran.

This is an expanded version of the Terretorial Defense Battalion concept, which emphasises the role of local knowledge and personal connections between members of a local reserve unit and the people and places where they live and serve. This is perhaps even more extreme than many other proposals, since both normal training and even courses/professional training would be directly linked to the regions of service (instead of studying AOC and practicing the concepts vs the Lemgonians in "Final Drive" in Kingston, the 31 CBG "Final Drive" would be an exercise based on and conducted in SW Ontario, for example). As well, there is a call for much of the other professional raining to be married to the TBG concept, for example practicing road moves and convoy drills in the context of short moves through urban areas rather than long logistical moves with packet spacing etc.

While there are some very good ideas within I think the author overstates the point. I would want the Reserve units to have more flexibility than being tied exclusively to TBG tasks, otherwise they will become too overspecialized and inflexible to respond to unanticipated situations, and of course an ongoing fiscal burden to the Regular force.


----------



## Dissident

Negative Ghostrider, I would stay away from further reserve integration into the Reg force.

My experience with having our platoon/Coy be part of a Reg force command structure has been somewhat negative.

While there have been some pretty Gucci tasking and exercises, which normally would have been difficult for us to send troops on, the squeeze has not been worth the Juice. Lost of control over assets and budget. Loss of long term vision/continuity. No control over our local training/operations. Longer OODA loop. Less flexibility and getting loss in what I consider minutia/administration.

Don't get me wrong, the Reg force is not wrong in the way they do things, it just has not worked well for us/me at the local level. It is really (REALLY) difficult for me to watch good troops walk away from the platoon when I know they are fed up by things which are out of my control and due to what really boils down to Res/Reg friction in Coy/Regimental Ops.


----------



## daftandbarmy

We already are integrated: we have some excellent support from our embedded Reg F/ full time staff.


----------



## McG

O said:
			
		

> Financially what might make the most sense would be to make all reserve regiments into out lying companies of  a reg force affiliated regiment. For example right now we have 4 RCR based in London, and if all the infantry units in 31 brigade were made into out lying companies of 4 RCR it would eliminate a lot of unnecessary upper echelon clag. You wouldn't have all these reserve Lt. Colonels and RSM's running around pretending that they're commanding an infantry battalion when in actuality at best they're commanding a heavy company. It would also eliminate all these expensive orders of regimental dress from the clothing budget and put everyone in DEUs.


With all the excitement over military heritage announcements, you are more likely to see 4 RCR return to being _The Oxford Rifles and the Canadian Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)_.

I assume that you are aware 4 RCR is a reserve "battalion" and not a regular force unit.  Your proposal is not a return to 10/90, but for aggregation of micro-units to create actual healthy battalions.

The idea of aggregating smaller than sub-unit sized PRes battalions to create actual battalion (-) size units has been discussed a number of times under a number of different models.  Some have suggested doing away with reserve regimental identities (and the emotional organizational barriers they introduce), others have suggested amalgamation of regiments (as has been previously done in Canada and to a greater extent in the UK), and still others have proposed allowing sub-units (companies & squadrons) to retain distinct regimental identities within regimentally neutral battalions.  Fewer but bigger reserve battalions would be the substance of such a reform while regimental identities and what to do with them is the window dressing ... but it is a very emotional window dressing, prone to fighting & resisting change that it does not like.


----------



## Dissident

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We already are integrated: we have some excellent support from our embedded Reg F/ full time staff.



Totally agree. I've seen what an experienced reg force member can bring to a reserve organization. 

What I am referring to is: our reserve coy is part of of a reg force Regiment. Culture clash abound.


----------



## Container

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We already are integrated: we have some excellent support from our embedded Reg F/ full time staff.



An excellent point. My limited experience with this has already demonstrated its usefulness. The consistency is nice- as is the breadth of experience along with the knowledge/connections


----------



## daftandbarmy

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Totally agree. I've seen what an experienced reg force member can bring to a reserve organization.
> 
> What I am referring to is: our reserve coy is part of of a reg force Regiment. Culture clash abound.



Many... many years ago we supported 2 Cdo with an airborne platoon from the Royal Westminster Regiment. 

I can honestly say that it was not a complete failure, but you could see it from where we were. Basically, the Reg F unit is so busy it just ignores you until it's too late, then they give you shit because you're not doing what you're supposed to. Even during joint exercises we were largely forgotten about in a variety of ways. No mystery there as if they only saw us for a couple of days once a year then it's hard to fully integrate on a variety of levels. 

Out of sight, out of mind. If the reserve unit can not be co-located with the Reg F unit on a regular basis, then it's unlikely to work out well.


----------



## myself.only

O said:
			
		

> Financially what might make the most sense would be to make all reserve regiments into out lying companies of  a reg force affiliated regiment.



Well, we could re-badge some RegF bns to affect the same change.... return QOR and the Black Watch to the ORBAT for example.


----------



## myself.only

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Out of sight, out of mind. If the reserve unit can not be co-located with the Reg F unit on a regular basis, then it's unlikely to work out well.



And I would think that co-location of reserve units would undermine some of the PRes' capability when dispersed to maintain a footprint across Canada and provide local responses in emergencies.


----------



## GR66

Do all "Reserve" units have to be the same?  Perhaps some units, co-located with Reg Force units (or geographically close enough to facilitate cooperative training, admin, support and supply, etc.) could be directly affiliated with their parent unit and organized in such a way as to provide trained augmentees (or even sub-units) in direct support of their parent unit.  

Other units could be organized, equipped and trained instead to fill other specific roles required by the reserves.  This could include specific support roles such as mortars, traffic control, security/aid to civil powers, mud recce, signals support, etc.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> Do all "Reserve" units have to be the same?  Perhaps some units, co-located with Reg Force units (or geographically close enough to facilitate cooperative training, admin, support and supply, etc.) could be directly affiliated with their parent unit and organized in such a way as to provide trained augmentees (or even sub-units) in direct support of their parent unit.
> 
> Other units could be organized, equipped and trained instead to fill other specific roles required by the reserves.  This could include specific support roles such as mortars, traffic control, security/aid to civil powers, mud recce, signals support, etc.



But all the Regs would have to work weekends too, just like reservists do ;D


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But all the Regs would have to work weekends too, just like reservists do ;D



Yeah good luck having that one fly, I've seen our reg force staff out twice in four years, nice that they did come out, but I doubt many are willing to give up their weekends regularly.  Reg force staff are great for Pres units, however I also think some units rely on them too much leading to them being over worked, and over stretched for their role within that unit.


----------



## OldSolduer

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Yeah good luck having that one fly, I've seen our reg force staff out twice in four years, nice that they did come out, but I doubt many are willing to give up their weekends regularly.  Reg force staff are great for Pres units, however I also think some units rely on them too much leading to them being over worked, and over stretched for their role within that unit.



Good assessment on the over use and dependence on Reg Force RSS staff.

If we, the PRes, want to be seen as near equals, then we have to do the lions share of the work ourselves.


----------



## MilEME09

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Good assessment on the over use and dependence on Reg Force RSS staff.
> 
> If we, the PRes, want to be seen as near equals, then we have to do the lions share of the work ourselves.



Agree'd, In my unit at least we have plenty of people willing to step up, part of the issue brought up though is why will an RSS staff member take X weeks to train some one who might be gone in a few months?. I have also seen people get turned down because units say they don't have the funds for class B, or officers think they have enough people.


----------



## x_para76

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Totally agree. I've seen what an experienced reg force member can bring to a reserve organization.
> 
> What I am referring to is: our reserve coy is part of of a reg force Regiment. Culture clash abound.



I agree with you about the experience a reg force senior nco or officer can bring to a reserve unit... providing that they have a good idea and are actually happy to be there. During my service with the reserves I would say that about 50% of the reg force staff that we got were incredible and a real asset. The other 50% were pissed off and unmotivated and spent more time figuring out ways to get out of the posting than they did doing their job. In some cases I couldn't blame them but nevertheless it does no favours to the unit that they're supposed to be supporting.


----------



## GR66

If you're going to formally affiliate some Reserve units with a parent Reg Force unit then I think you'd probably want to change the way those units relate to each other.  I agree that trying to do it with the existing RSS staff set-up probably wouldn't work.  Maybe we need a new "class" of reservist for these units...more of a part-time Reg Force member rather than Reservists that work full time and Reg force members just working with a Reserve unit.  That way unit admin could be run directly through the parent unit instead of trying to have two parallel systems trying to work together.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:
			
		

> Maybe we need a new "class" of reservist for these units...more of a part-time Reg Force member rather than Reservists that work full time and Reg force members just working with a Reserve unit.


A what? ???


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

What we need to do with the Reserves is reform them so that they can force generate actual capabilities for the CF because right now, other then able bodied people they don't offer a whole lot (Organizationally, speaking not talking about people here because their are many great soldiers who are Reservists!)

My personal opinion, the Reserves should focus on providing the CF with key enablers that he reg force cannot take on.  We already do this to an extent but I think this need to be further expanded.  For instance, we have no mortars in the regular infantry right now but why not have each Division be responsible for force generating mortar platoons for deployment on operations.  This is something that would be well within the capabilities of the Reserves to accomplish. 

As well, we need to consolidate the amount of reserve units we actually have and link the Reserve Bde Gps to force generation with lets say three Res Bde Gps linked to one of the CMBG's with the responsibility of force generating a battalion sized force for use by the CMBG Comd yearly.


----------



## Journeyman

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Reserves .....they don't offer a whole lot (Organizationally speaking, not talking about people here because there are many great soldiers who are Reservists!)


Now, are you talking about 'people here,' as in, "in this instance," or people _here_, as in, Reservists posting on army.ca?

......'cause if it's the latter, I can point out one....maybe _two_....who don't offer a whole lot!   >


----------



## MilEME09

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> What we need to do with the Reserves is reform them so that they can force generate actual capabilities for the CF because right now, other then able bodied people they don't offer a whole lot (Organizationally, speaking not talking about people here because their are many great soldiers who are Reservists!)
> 
> My personal opinion, the Reserves should focus on providing the CF with key enablers that he reg force cannot take on.  We already do this to an extent but I think this need to be further expanded.  For instance, we have no mortars in the regular infantry right now but why not have each Division be responsible for force generating mortar platoons for deployment on operations.  This is something that would be well within the capabilities of the Reserves to accomplish.
> 
> As well, we need to consolidate the amount of reserve units we actually have and link the Reserve Bde Gps to force generation with lets say three Res Bde Gps linked to one of the CMBG's with the responsibility of force generating a battalion sized force for use by the CMBG Comd yearly.




Just so I am on the right page your saying Reserve units/brigades should be able to provide a Platoon to Company sized element to augment the reg force when needed? In which case training and qualifications need to be equal to what the Reg force has in my opinion. This way when said reserve group arrives to augment the reg force we don't have a "well you don't have this qual so you cant do this" situation because a say reserve infinteer doesn't get trained on Qualification X


----------



## PMedMoe

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Just so I am on the right page your saying Reserve units/brigades should be able to provide a Platoon to Company sized element to augment the reg force when needed? In which case training and qualifications need to be equal to what the Reg force has in my opinion. This way when said reserve group arrives to augment the reg force we don't have a "well you don't have this qual so you cant do this" situation because a say reserve infinteer doesn't get trained on Qualification X



I've been saying that about the Army Reserve for years....  And not "equal" but the _same_ training.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Just so I am on the right page your saying Reserve units/brigades should be able to provide a Platoon to Company sized element to augment the reg force when needed? In which case training and qualifications need to be equal to what the Reg force has in my opinion. This way when said reserve group arrives to augment the reg force we don't have a "well you don't have this qual so you cant do this" situation because a say reserve infinteer doesn't get trained on Qualification X



That is exactly what I am saying... basically each Division should be able to force generate a Bn (+) sized reserve force to support the Reg Force CMBG they are aligned too.  The focus of this force should be on force generating enablers for the Reg Force i.e. Mortars, Anit-Armour, Vehicle Crews, CIMIC/Psy Ops, HUMINT etc... this way we can cover capability gaps that presently exist within the Reg Force that we don't have right now and provide the Reserves with a valuable raison d'etre!  

Edit:  I am also in favor of sub-dividing the Reserves into different classifications of Reservists, i.e. Active and Supplementary (I know we have a supp res but I used this for lack of a better word).  Active Reserve are essentially full-time soldiers but they are do not move around like Reg Force members and are employed in key areas where we have capability shortfalls.  For instance, employing Reservists in our Influence Activities Task Force.  Some of these people have valuable skills and we should be able to use their skills to maximum effect.  Their career progression could be within that organization as well.  We would be able to stand-up entire Reserve units that are full-time and based in a specific geographic location, they would do the same training everyone else does but would focus on their field of expertise and progress accordingly within their stream. 

The Supplementary Reserve would be your traditional part-time soldiers who we could turn to for disaster-relief, aide to civil power, etc and further augmentation of the Reg Force with personnel when required.


----------



## MilEME09

PMedMoe said:
			
		

> I've been saying that about the Army Reserve for years....  And not "equal" but the _same_ training.



unfortunately the opposite is occurring, I'm going through the new Pres Wpns tech training, the only weapons we now get is Browning HP, C7, M203, C6, C9, Carl G, and sub-cal inserts, maybe C3 howitzer is they don't take it out of the system. Leaves a massive gap between reg force and reserve for my trade. Any way I like the idea of having the Reserves fill the gaps in the reg force, especially now with the reg force loosing a lot of people post Afghanistan. Problem is seems like Ottawa wants to try and separate the Reserves and Reg Force more and more from each other


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> unfortunately the opposite is occurring, I'm going through the new Pres Wpns tech training, the only weapons we now get is Browning HP, C7, M203, C6, C9, Carl G, and sub-cal inserts, maybe C3 howitzer is they don't take it out of the system. Leaves a massive gap between reg force and reserve for my trade. Any way I like the idea of having the Reserves fill the gaps in the reg force, especially now with the reg force loosing a lot of people post Afghanistan. Problem is seems like Ottawa wants to try and separate the Reserves and Reg Force more and more from each other



That is because we keep trying to maintain the status-quo rather then trying to adapt and innovate.


----------



## myself.only

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> That is exactly what I am saying... basically each Division should be able to force generate a Bn (+) sized reserve force to support the Reg Force CMBG they are aligned too.  The focus of this force should be on force generating enablers for the Reg Force i.e. Mortars, Anit-Armour, Vehicle Crews, CIMIC/Psy Ops, HUMINT etc... this way we can cover capability gaps that presently exist within the Reg Force that we don't have right now and provide the Reserves with a valuable raison d'etre!
> 
> Edit:  I am also in favor of sub-dividing the Reserves into different classifications of Reservists, i.e. Active and Supplementary.  Active Reserve are essentially full-time soldiers but they are do not move around like Reg Force members and are employed in key areas where we have capability shortfalls.  For instance, employing Reservists in our Influence Activities Task Force.  Some of these people have valuable skills and we should be able to use their skills to maximum effect.  Their career progression could be within that organization as well.  We would be able to stand-up entire Reserve units that are full-time and based in a specific geographic location, they would do the same training everyone else does but would focus on their field of expertise and progress accordingly within their stream.
> 
> The Supplementary Reserve would be your traditional part-time soldiers who we could turn to for disaster-relief, aide to civil power, etc and further augmentation of the Reg Force with personnel when required.



Sounds good to me (FWIW).
Although it's far outside my lane, it's interesting stuff.

So - just wondering here - with the intent of training to need, do you think the PRes units would be able maintain essential skills with the task of generating capability gap specialists?
For instance, if you're tasked to provide a mortar platoon I'd imagine you have to train multiple mortar platoons since not everybody will be able to answer the call up.  
In the absence of trg with your CMBG, would there be the problem of PRes FTXs becoming basically days on the mortar rge and - aside from IBTS - infanteer skills would get short shrift?


----------



## dapaterson

Part time reservists cannot maintain the same breadth skillsets as the Regular Force.  It's foolish to claim otherwise.  So training on a well-defined skillset within the larger Reg F skillset makes sense.  That way, the gaps are well known and well quantified.  Training people to the same standard, then having them not practice skills because of the inherent time constraints in part-time service is a waste of training resources.  Do a few things and do them well, rather than try to do everything and do it poorly.


Full-time reservists are a contradiction in terms.  The NDA clearly defines Reservists as those employed on other than continuing full-time service.  You want military personnel for long-term full-time service?  That's the Regular Force.

The challenge is in designing a force structure balancing part time and full time, and what sorts of skills are required.  Based on that sort of analysis, we should vest high training cost skillsets in the Reg F, and retain a Reserve to hold larger groups of personnel who are in trades that require less skills maintenance.

That suggests a support-heavy Reg F, with adequate "pointy end" for initial deployments, with a Reserve Force that is then mobilized  (either through voluntary or compulsory service) to round out units for follow-on deployment.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Part time reservists cannot maintain the same breadth skillsets as the Regular Force.  It's foolish to claim otherwise.  So training on a well-defined skillset within the larger Reg F skillset makes sense.  That way, the gaps are well known and well quantified.  Training people to the same standard, then having them not practice skills because of the inherent time constraints in part-time service is a waste of training resources.  Do a few things and do them well, rather than try to do everything and do it poorly.
> 
> 
> Full-time reservists are a contradiction in terms.  The NDA clearly defines Reservists as those employed on other than continuing full-time service.  You want military personnel for long-term full-time service?  That's the Regular Force.
> 
> The challenge is in designing a force structure balancing part time and full time, and what sorts of skills are required.  Based on that sort of analysis, we should vest high training cost skillsets in the Reg F, and retain a Reserve to hold larger groups of personnel who are in trades that require less skills maintenance.
> 
> That suggests a support-heavy Reg F, with adequate "pointy end" for initial deployments, with a Reserve Force that is then mobilized  (either through voluntary or compulsory service) to round out units for follow-on deployment.



I can buy this for sure, administering and maintaining the army should most def be a Reg Force function.  I am def for having certain capabilities be maintained by the Reserves though and think if we give them specific things to look after they can do a good job at it and it will free up resources in the Reg Force.  As for full-time reservists?  I see a place for them.

IATF for instance in Kingston is a good example of a place where I think a full-time Reservist is a good fit.  You hire them at less cost then a Reg Force soldier and the only thing they do is work for the IATF.  Most of these people in these organizations don't want to move anyways, they want to stay where they are and keep doing what they love to do so why should we force them to move around?  For me this seems like a win-win situation because it costs less to employ these people, we don't have to pay for expensive cost moves to move them around and they can progress within the specific organizations they work in and become highly skilled in the occupations/fields they work in.


----------



## dapaterson

Again, we're faced with the NDA:

_There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service*._

*Active Service is a very poorly defined term within the NDA - I suspect the drafters knew what they meant and assumed everyone else would as well.


If you're saying, though, that we should pay full-time people less if they don't want to move and only want to progress within a narrow scope, then shouldn't that apply to the Reg F as well?  You want to stay in Petawawa in battalion and not move then your pay should be cut?  Be careful what you ask for...


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Again, we're faced with the NDA:
> 
> _There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service*._
> 
> *Active Service is a very poorly defined term within the NDA - I suspect the drafters knew what they meant and assumed everyone else would as well.
> 
> 
> If you're saying, though, that we should pay full-time people less if they don't want to move and only want to progress within a narrow scope, then shouldn't that apply to the Reg F as well?  You want to stay in Petawawa in battalion and not move then your pay should be cut?  Be careful what you ask for...



If you must play devils advocate then sure, personally when people say "I don't want to move" in the Reg's I say tough luck, either get on with it or get out.  Obviously welfare needs to be taken into consideration but we need to be flexible.  We also need a system that is flexible that works for us.  Maybe full-time reservists aren't the solution to some of our problems but we are hard-capped on numbers and can't grow anymore in the Reg force so what are some solutions?

I like your idea of making the Regs support heavy, this makes sense to me from an administrative perspective.  It is fairly straight forward to train guys to do basic infantry stuff; however, supporter trades are often skill intensive and require more training and it is just not possible for the Reserves to maintain fleets of vehicles/equipment they are given.  

Perhaps a restructure of the Reg Force and a re-alignment of the Reserve Force with an emphasis on generating specifically defined skillsets is what is needed?


----------



## MilEME09

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Perhaps a restructure of the Reg Force and a re-alignment of the Reserve Force with an emphasis on generating specifically defined skillsets is what is needed?



I think in their own way they are trying to do that now with this whole Reserve 90/10 dom/exp ops formula, CSS trades have been reworked to train for only what is needed in a dom op. Problem is this creates a large skill gap between reserve and reg force. This creates diminished capabilities on part of reserve units, atleast on the part of CSS, I know very little of what changes are being made to Combat arms trades, What I have heard is talk of removing the C3 howitzer from the system which would leave reserve arty with only a 81mm mortor. With only that kind of capability if it happens, what kind of role would reserve arty even have left?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IMHO the most effective approach would be something like this:

Play on the strengths we've got, like motivated troops and (thanks to Gagetown and elsewhere) a decent supply of well trained Pl Comds and Sect Comds. 

Issue orders likje: NLT 30 April each year X Div will provide X infantry platoons (engr/armd tps etc) to deploy with # PPCLI-RCR-R22R BG on Ex KILL'EM ALL LET GOD SORT 'EM OUT. D-Day: Same time every summer or something, after school is out anyways. If you've got some trained OCs and extra Pl Comds, send them along too.

Incorporate the trained pls/sqns into the Reg F ex under Comd of Reg F COs, or trained militia guys if you have them. Don't pretend that the militia guys can command anything higher than a platoon or troop from the get go as very few units can exercise effectively at that level through the training year. I know, I've tried - lots - and it just does not work.

Keep it to the basic stuff e.g., close with and destroy. Do this for two or three years in a row. After that, if you're starting to get really good, and hundreds of troops beg to come every year because it's soooo cool, then branch out and try some other stuff like Mor Pls etc.

Right now there is little in the way of a consistent motivator to keep troops engaged through the training year, although it looks like this last year may be a change in the right direction. All of them join up to be kill crazy commandos, but we consistently dumb it down for them by trying to be something we are not e.g., a militia BG (remember 2 years ago in Shilo, anyone?) which will generally suck for everyone below BG Comd level. 

,


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I think, if people want to invest some time, that if you guys go upthread and do some reading, you'll find this whole discussion has already taken place. 

Not that I want to stop all the fun your having reinventing the wheel of course


----------



## MilEME09

I think budget cuts have actually in a way helped move us in the right direction, atleast in 41 CBG, now atleast 4 exercises per year must have two or more units involved. This allows for combined arms training and units learn to work with each other more closely, instead of doing EX's on their own and suddenly showing up for the Brigade EX and be expected to work perfectly with other units. If we could take this one step further and perhaps do EX's with the reg force, it could go a long way for the capabilities of the reserve from learning by working closely with the Reg force.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think in their own way they are trying to do that now with this whole Reserve 90/10 dom/exp ops formula, CSS trades have been reworked to train for only what is needed in a dom op. Problem is this creates a large skill gap between reserve and reg force. This creates diminished capabilities on part of reserve units, atleast on the part of CSS, I know very little of what changes are being made to Combat arms trades, What I have heard is talk of removing the C3 howitzer from the system which would leave reserve arty with only a 81mm mortor. With only that kind of capability if it happens, what kind of role would reserve arty even have left?



Well since the Reg force arty is being forced to man the 81mm, it not much of a downgrade....But it does show how poorly thought out the replacement process is. We have known those guns were long in the tooth even when I joined in 1977. They had lots and lots of time to plan replacements and there is a wide variety of choice in replacements. It should have been an easy procurement and one that was done in stages, purchasing X number of already produced guns a year, so you can spread out the budget hit.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

recceguy said:
			
		

> I think, if people want to invest some time, that if you guys go upthread and do some reading, you'll find this whole discussion has already taken place.
> 
> Not that I want to stop all the fun your having reinventing the wheel of course



Recceguy, Much like the House of Commons, Army.ca is all about  :deadhorse:

Let us rant!  Let us rant!  Let us rant!  ;D


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Again, we're faced with the NDA:
> 
> _There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service*._
> 
> *Active Service is a very poorly defined term within the NDA - I suspect the drafters knew what they meant and assumed everyone else would as well.



There is no definition in the Act for "continuing, full-time" and therefore it would require either additional legislation or an interpretation by a court to tell us exactly what it means. In the absence of that we have generally used a rule of thumb saying three years might constitute "continuing, full-time." This is generally why you find Class B and C contracts for durations shorter than three years. I've known some reservists who have spent over twenty years bouncing back and forth between various Class B and C Service contracts but because they were fragmented, they were never on "continuing, full time" service.

Active service while not defined is easily understood. Any CF person is on active duty when "placed on active duty" by an order by the Governor in Council i.e. the Federal Cabinet". As an example, to assist in fulfilling its duties to NATO, the GiC placed all reg f members and (when outside Canada) reserve force members, on Active duty by way of order in council P.C. 1989-583 on 6 Apr 89 (this is a successor to various similar, earlier OiCs). There are various consequences as a result of being on active service including disciplinary liability, benefits etc (don't ask me to be specific - they're all over the legislation and regulations). 

Active Service is an old concept. If you're interested in it, I've attached an article that explains it and states one man's opinion that it irrelevant in this day and age. 

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

As long as Reservists are subject to the CSD 24/7 "when on active service" the concept remains relevant.  We have sufficient numbers of court-martials tossed because of a lack of disciplinary jurisdiction already.  (OR maybe that says more about the quality of some of our military prosecutors...)

And the "when outside Canada" regulation is poorly drafted (to say the least).  Lacking any qualifiers, it means that any Reservist outside Canada for any reason - military or otherwise - is on active service and therefore subject to the CSD.

And we're clutching at straws when we claim a Reservist doing 20 years continuous full time service in a variety of jobs is any different from a Reg F member who spends 20 years of continuous full time service in a variety of jobs.  We can apply a trifle of common sense; besides, if we explicitly create structures which are required to be continuously manned on a full-time basis by members of the Reserve Force we are overstepping the bounds of possible grey areas.


EDIT to add: As well, we don't want to be too aggressive.  Going to court is the last thing DND/CAF would want - then there will be hard and fast rules that we can't finesse around.  Keeping things in the fuzzy grey margins avoids that inconvenience


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Recceguy, Much like the House of Commons, Army.ca is all about  :deadhorse:
> 
> Let us rant!  Let us rant!  Let us rant!  ;D



And by the way, for the record, HE started it!  :nana:


----------



## McG

We have divisions now.  I suppose it is only a matter of time until someone proposes we establish div troops in the PRes.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> We have divisions now.  I suppose it is only a matter of time until someone proposes we establish div troops in the PRes.



Quick delete your post before some one gets an idea! >


----------



## OldSolduer

MCG said:
			
		

> We have divisions now.  I suppose it is only a matter of time until someone proposes we establish div troops in the PRes.



So there is hope for the 3rd Div Mess Tin and Bicycle Repair Coy?


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> As long as Reservists are subject to the CSD 24/7 "when on active service" the concept remains relevant.  We have sufficient numbers of court-martials tossed because of a lack of disciplinary jurisdiction already.  (OR maybe that says more about the quality of some of our military prosecutors...)
> 
> And the "when outside Canada" regulation is poorly drafted (to say the least).  Lacking any qualifiers, it means that any Reservist outside Canada for any reason - military or otherwise - is on active service and therefore subject to the CSD.
> 
> And we're clutching at straws when we claim a Reservist doing 20 years continuous full time service in a variety of jobs is any different from a Reg F member who spends 20 years of continuous full time service in a variety of jobs.  We can apply a trifle of common sense; besides, if we explicitly create structures which are required to be continuously manned on a full-time basis by members of the Reserve Force we are overstepping the bounds of possible grey areas.
> 
> 
> EDIT to add: As well, we don't want to be too aggressive.  Going to court is the last thing DND/CAF would want - then there will be hard and fast rules that we can't finesse around.  Keeping things in the fuzzy grey margins avoids that inconvenience



Not really sure where you are going with some of this but let me make some comments:

I can't recall of any court martial (incidentally the plural is courts martial) ever tossing a case based on an absence of jurisdiction over a reservist (Not saying there may not have been one but it would be an extremely rare event). On the other hand I do know of many DJAs/AJAGs advising units that they lack jurisdiction to charge a reservists in certain circumstances where the conditions of NDA s. 60(1)(c) have not been met.

While the NATO OiC is a bit vague, other OiCs make it clear that only reservists who are "part of or serve in immediate support of" a specific mission are considered having been placed on active service. The same interpretation is generally assumed for the NATO OiC. Just being a reservist on vacation in your civilian capacity in Italy would not make you subject to the OiC. 

If I had a nickel for every vague or badly worded piece of legislation . . . Not withstanding your disdain for Prosecutors let me simply say that they are in large measure very smart and talented people who make their living interpreting rules and regulations in light of any given factual situation. Common sense plays a large role in their day to day work.

Re the reservists with 20 years accumulated full-time work (who were friends of mine) let me simply say that they made their own beds. Each of them could have gone reg f but chose the route they did because they could not be posted or deployed or be subject to numerous matters they found didn't suit their lifestyle. In exchange they got a lower salary, no job security, and no pension. They were good at what they did but they were not the equivalent of their reg f counterparts who were subject to much more stringent  terms of service.

As to keeping things fuzzy, I can say that I've sat around the table where we did come to the conclusion that tightening up the language of a particular piece of legislation could very well end up in taking away from its flexibility and that it was better to leave things vague.

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

[off topic: Reserve court-martials]

I can think of two, off the top of my head.  R v Balint, http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/en/2012/balint.page?, where "Prosecutorial discretion" meant that the defence's plea in bar was met by the prosecution with "Don't worry, we'll prove it during the trial", leaving the learned judge to conclude that he lacked jurisdiction over the accused.



> The prosecutor submits that there are a number of bases upon which he will establish in evidence during the trial that the accused was subject to the Code of Service Discipline at the time of the alleged offence. He declined to specify one or more of the enumerated bases in subsection 60(1) as he claimed to be reserving the right of the prosecution to exercise its discretion. Whether this is or is not an area of prosecutorial discretion I need not decide because in my view the submission is simply not to the point. The opportunity to lead evidence that might satisfy the court as to its jurisdiction over the accused at the time of the alleged offence was given during the course of the plea in bar proceedings, and was declined. From an evidentiary point of view, I am left only with the terms of the charge itself.




The more amusing one was R v Byrne (tragically, it's old enough that it's no longer on the CMJ website).  Maj Byrne did not attend his own court martial, so the judge ordered him arrested and another charge was laid for failing to attend his own court martial.  During the court martial on the failure to attend charge, the same judge dismissed the charges as there was insufficient evidence that, as a class A reservist at the time, Maj Byrne was subject to the CSD when he was ordered arrested.

[/off topic: Reserve court-martials]


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> [off topic: Reserve court-martials]
> 
> I can think of two, off the top of my head.  R v Balint, http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/en/2012/balint.page?, where "Prosecutorial discretion" meant that the defence's plea in bar was met by the prosecution with "Don't worry, we'll prove it during the trial", leaving the learned judge to conclude that he lacked jurisdiction over the accused.
> 
> The more amusing one was R v Byrne (tragically, it's old enough that it's no longer on the CMJ website).  Maj Byrne did not attend his own court martial, so the judge ordered him arrested and another charge was laid for failing to attend his own court martial.  During the court martial on the failure to attend charge, the same judge dismissed the charges as there was insufficient evidence that, as a class A reservist at the time, Maj Byrne was subject to the CSD when he was ordered arrested.
> 
> [/off topic: Reserve court-martials]



Glad to say that the Balint decision came after I retired. I have three comments on it. 1. Peter Lamont is a good judge 2. While it may seem obvious with 20/20 hindsight that the prosecutor should have led evidence, this is a rare circumstance and I can see why he might have declined to do so; and 3 It sure looks like there were far too many lawyers working this case. Since having gone to DMP and DDCS it has now become necessary to give new legal officers some trial experience by sitting as 'second' (and it appears 'third') seat on trials. The optics of having five lawyers sit on a trial though are really poor. 

I don't recall R v Byrne and wish I could review it but it makes sense. I would think though that it was not a matter of insufficient evidence but a clear conclusion that the evidence proved that he was not subject to the CSD at the time. There was a considerable period of time where we legal officers were having a hard time convincing reserve COs that a reservist who was AWOA from his place of duty was at the time of the offence not subject to the CSD unless at that time he was in some way meeting one of the conditions of the s 60(1)(c).

Anyway while I've enjoyed this chat we've really gone quite far  ff topic: and should give the thread back to its lawful owners.

 :cheers:


----------



## McG

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> So there is hope for the 3rd Div Mess Tin and Bicycle Repair Coy?


Maybe but, when it comes time to stand-up the div engrs, I anticipate an emotional bun-fight over who is entitled to the name of 3 FER.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> Re the reservists with 20 years accumulated full-time work (who were friends of mine) let me simply say that they made their own beds. Each of them could have gone reg f but chose the route they did because they could not be posted or deployed or be subject to numerous matters they found didn't suit their lifestyle. In exchange they got a lower salary, no job security, and no pension. They were good at what they did but they were not the equivalent of their reg f counterparts who were subject to much more stringent  terms of service.


Is this a career path we want offered?  Someone who spends 20 years of full time service as a reservist but in organizations outside of the reserve is really neither a Reg F nor a Res F member; such a person really understands neither lifestyle and sitting in one job forever they really have more incommon with a civilian public servant (just in a uniform).  If that is what we want, why not hire the civilian?

Maybe Army Reserve career management needs to be done somewhere higher than the unit level.  The Navy does it at the national level, but Army needs could probably be satisfied by managing MCpl & Sgt at the brigade level while WO and up are managed at the division.  One of the outputs of this would be telling pers that "sorry, you have been hiding in that office for eight years, and you are not going back until you have spent some time in a unit."

On another note, I have found more than a handful of Class B positions that are really only required for three of thefive days they work (and of the seven days they are paid) each week.  In the Army Staff and throughout the RCAF, handfuls of Class A positions are established in otherwise fulltime units.  Maybe more such positions should be created to reduce the number of full time Class B and with the expectation that personnel employed in such positions would support thier home units on days that they do not sign-in to the "Class A day job."


----------



## Canadian.Trucker

MCG said:
			
		

> Is this a career path we want offered?  Someone who spends 20 years of full time service as a reservist but in organizations outside of the reserve is really neither a Reg F nor a Res F member; such a person really understands neither lifestyle and sitting in one job forever they really have more incommon with a civilian public servant (just in a uniform).  If that is what we want, why not hire the civilian?
> 
> Maybe Army Reserve career management needs to be done somewhere higher than the unit level.  The Navy does it at the national level, but Army needs could probably be satisfied by managing MCpl & Sgt at the brigade level while WO and up are managed at the division.  One of the outputs of this would be telling pers that "sorry, you have been hiding in that office for eight years, and you are not going back until you have spent some time in a unit."
> 
> On another note, I have found more than a handful of Class B positions that are really only required for three of thefive days they work (and of the seven days they are paid) each week.  In the Army Staff and throughout the RCAF, handfuls of Class A positions are established in otherwise fulltime units.  Maybe more such positions should be created to reduce the number of full time Class B and with the expectation that personnel employed in such positions would support thier home units on days that they do not sign-in to the "Class A day job."


I agree with you to a point.  When you're talking about someone that has sat in a non-unit position for an extended period of time in the same position, they become stagnant and their creative thinking drops.  But lets not forget that one of the reasons for this boom of PRes Class B positions was that there weren't the RegF personnel to fill all the required positions.  Granted time has passed and that is no longer the case in all areas with our committment in Afghanistan being smaller and soon ceasing, but it's still something to consider.  And those PRes individuals that have been "hiding" in the office are in good company with their RegF buddies too, so career management needs to be reviewed for everyone.

Your final point about the time worked might look good on paper, but right now there is a cap on number of Class A days that a PRes individual can use in a fiscal year, and the idea of only paying someone 5/7 days of the week (unless they are on a weekend exercise) in a full time position will have that person walking away giving the finger.  Downsizing Class B positions is one thing, but making a have-not class is unacceptable and ethically wrong.


----------



## dapaterson

Canadian.Trucker said:
			
		

> But lets not forget that one of the reasons for this boom of PRes Class B positions was that there weren't the RegF personnel to fill all the required positions.



The issue was less "positions we can't fill" and more "I have money so I'll hire people to do things that may or may not be needed".  As work expands to fill available time, it became a self-licking ice cream cone that increased in size as it licked itself.

Indeed, I know of one person who exploited the relaxed annuitant rules to free up key positions for some of his Reg F proteges - "Release and come back as a full-time Reservist and I'll promote you"; then his hand-picked folks would be posted in behind the just released person.  

It was obvious that eventually the gravy train would stop; few of the senior leaders were willing to think about that or to work at creating sustainable models.  Attempts at analysis of full-time Reserve employment by rank and by occupation, its impact on units or its long-term sustainability were largely ignored.


----------



## Canadian.Trucker

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The issue was less "positions we can't fill" and more "I have money so I'll hire people to do things that may or may not be needed".  As work expands to fill available time, it became a self-licking ice cream cone that increased in size as it licked itself.
> 
> Indeed, I know of one person who exploited the relaxed annuitant rules to free up key positions for some of his Reg F proteges - "Release and come back as a full-time Reservist and I'll promote you"; then his hand-picked folks would be posted in behind the just released person.
> 
> It was obvious that eventually the gravy train would stop; few of the senior leaders were willing to think about that or to work at creating sustainable models.  Attempts at analysis of full-time Reserve employment by rank and by occupation, its impact on units or its long-term sustainability were largely ignored.


Very true.  The significant increase and availability of Class B positions over a period of time also meant that PRes individuals became used to the idea that Class B could be a long term career plan.  This causes significant quality of life concerns when after 6 years in a position and unexpected downsizing takes place that individual who was counting on being on Class B for the next 10+ years has to try and wiggle their way back into the civillian job market and their skill sets they possessed prior to Class B are not current.  I know that this would fall in the category of "their own fault", but when you're told your job is secure and then it turns out to be the exact opposite it messes with people's morale.  Changes happen and we all need to adapt, but the issue of full time employment for reservists is larger than the PRes itself, it's an issue that starts from the top down in all areas of the CAF.


----------



## dapaterson

I spent just over a decade on full-time Reserve service, split between two positions..  I kept my resumé current at all times, and was selective about the work I did - on two different occasions I rejected positions where I was promised promotions because the fit, in my opinion would not have been good.

And I always, _always_, _always_ remembered that the only promise worth anything was the promise that they could terminate me in thirty days without reason or justification.


----------



## McG

Canadian.Trucker said:
			
		

> Your final point about the time worked might look good on paper, but right now there is a cap on number of Class A days that a PRes individual can use in a fiscal year, and the idea of only paying someone 5/7 days of the week (unless they are on a weekend exercise) in a full time position will have that person walking away giving the finger.  Downsizing Class B positions is one thing, but making a have-not class is bunacceptable and ethically wrong.


I have suggested no such thing.  If someone is working five days a week then they should be full time.  However, if there is only three days of work then the person should only be working and getting paid three days a week.

If we (the Army) can afford to pay a year long Cl B, then we can afford to pay a more regular Cl A in lieu.  The restriction on number of days per reservist is our own creation.  On the Army staff, directors can authorize more days for their established Cl A. We just need to create a mechanism so that Cl A pay for training is protected against becoming Cl A pay for staff.


----------



## Help Desk

For some time now we have some very accurate reports within Monitor MASS that will answer any of your questions in relation to all Reserve employment. Check it out you will be amazed.


----------



## Haggis

MCG said:
			
		

> The restriction on number of days per reservist is our own creation.


 The restriction that a Reservist who works more than 12 consecutive days is to be placed on Class B is contained in CF Mil Pers Instr 20-04 and is CAF wide, not Army specific.  LFCA/4 Div has also placed a restriction that prohibits reservists from parading more than 16 days cumulative in any 30 day period.
[/quote]


----------



## McG

Haggis said:
			
		

> The restriction that a Reservist who works more than 12 consecutive days is to be placed on Class B is contained in CF Mil Pers Instr 20-04 and is CAF wide, not Army specific.  LFCA/4 Div has also placed a restriction that prohibits reservists from parading more than 16 days cumulative in any 30 day period.


We are not talking about Class A working more than 12 consecutive days in the quote you have taken.  We are talking about reservists working three full days to five half days every week in leiu of a Class B reservist.

I have seen a handful of examples of full-time reservists doing what is really a part-time work load.  This happens (in the cases that I have seen) because it is easier to higher Class B than to get a Class A for the time needed.

Paying 365 days when one only needs about 90 days of work is foolish and wasteful.  As you have pointed out, there is no CAF restriction against using Class A to fill such a requirement except those which are are created at lower levels of command (and even in the case the 4 Div restriction you cite, it would still be possible to employ a Class A to fill a weekly part-time requirement and still have days to attend to weekend training events).


----------



## Rocky Mountains

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Giving the Reserves a vehicle such as the TAPV serves no useful purpose as it doesn't generate an actual capability and the Reserves have no way to support the vehicle.  People can dream all they want but need to be brought back down to reality.  The Reserves serve a useful purpose in that they provide bodies to beef up the Army in times of need but they don't generate capability as they have no actual cohesive structure.



So are U.S. National Guard F16 Squadrons useless?  The U.S. is committed to military reserves and half of overseas deployments seem to be reserves of one sort or another.  Canadians reserves have been gutted and re-gutted until there is nothing left to gut.  Then they are criticized for lack of capability.  The state of the reserves is deliberate and in no way the fault of the reserves.  Prior to 1940 the primary mission of the permanent force was to train the militia not fight wars.  It seems to have worked.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> So are U.S. National Guard F16 Squadrons useless?



This has relevance how?  The US has reserve Apache battalions.  We don't even have Apaches.  Comparing apples and asteroids here.



> The U.S. is committed to military reserves and half of overseas deployments seem to be reserves of one sort or another.  Canadians reserves have been gutted and re-gutted until there is nothing left to gut.



And there is your difference.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> So are U.S. National Guard F16 Squadrons useless?  The U.S. is committed to military reserves and half of overseas deployments seem to be reserves of one sort or another.  Canadians reserves have been gutted and re-gutted until there is nothing left to gut.  Then they are criticized for lack of capability.  The state of the reserves is deliberate and in no way the fault of the reserves.  Prior to 1940 the primary mission of the permanent force was to train the militia not fight wars.  It seems to have worked.



Bullcrap.  The Militia in Canada has been reduced to the state it is currently in for two reasons:

1) a Regular a Force which consistently misunderstands the unique challenges faced by reservists
2) Reserve Regimental Senates which have consistently, vocally and politically fought off any attempt to meaningfully update and change the structure of reserve units.  They are stuck in a mobilization mindset, which has led to Regimental HQs leading Platoons.

In the current state of affairs, the reserve force cannot be entrusted with complex kit.


----------



## dapaterson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Bullcrap.  The Militia in Canada has been reduced to the state it is currently in for two reasons:
> 
> 1) a Regular a Force which consistently misunderstands the unique challenges faced by reservists
> 2) Reserve Regimental Senates which have consistently, vocally and politically fought off any attempt to meaningfully update and change the structure of reserve units.  They are stuck in a mobilization mindset, which has led to Regimental HQs leading *understrength* Platoons.
> 
> In the current state of affairs, the reserve force cannot be entrusted with complex kit.



FTFY


----------



## OldSolduer

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> In the current state of affairs, the reserve force cannot be entrusted with complex kit.



Now that its out there, and its true....some bright spark will think we need a company of LAVs in Winnipeg.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And issue the Reserves standard civilian vehicles.  They will support local training and be useful in local DomOps (Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Ops.)



MSVS and LUVW Milcot ring a bell, heck in our lot the only SMP vehicles we have left are a couple broken ML's, an LS, and one cargo HL. Also I will point directly to the Alberta floods when you say Dom ops and reserves, 90% we sat around and did shit all. If the reserves are to help in Dom ops we need equipment and the trades to help do things like restoring power.


----------



## MilEME09

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Now that its out there, and its true....some bright spark will think we need a company of LAVs in Winnipeg.



yeap and then they'll rust for the most part and only get used one time a month, Only time I think the reserves need new kit is if its a CF wide capability issue like replacing our wreckers, or the LS. Rest of the time while even I can dream of one day using maybe a Bison once the Reg force stops using them I doubt it would happen. That said though for the benefit of augmentation Reserves especially techs should get the option of training on the kit the reg force uses so that if they plan on going over sea's they can work on all the kit.


----------



## Journeyman

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> ...... do things like restoring power.


   :rofl:   Yet SMP vehicles are too complex....


----------



## PuckChaser

The reg force can barely afford to maintain and fuel the bison, why would we dump them on the reserves? It would bankrupt your unit after a weekend exercise.


----------



## MilEME09

Journeyman said:
			
		

> :rofl:   Yet SMP vehicles are too complex....



I'm just saying if they want us to be useful, they better give us the skills to do that, until then our tiny disorganization of a reserve force is useless for anything but GD tasks until augmentation for a tour is needed.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> So are U.S. National Guard F16 Squadrons useless?  The U.S. is committed to military reserves and half of overseas deployments seem to be reserves of one sort or another.  Canadians reserves have been gutted and re-gutted until there is nothing left to gut.  Then they are criticized for lack of capability.



Rocky Mountains you missed my point and comparing National Guard units to our current Army Reserve is a very poor comparison.  For one, national guard units are kept at full strength so a national guard infantry battalion, for example, is a full strength battalion (of part time soldiers obviously) and they can be deployed complete by the government if req'd.  Not quite the same thing is it now?  National Guard units are reserves but they are operationally focused, our Reserves are anything but. 

Our Army Reserve is a bunch of severely under-strength units with no ability to deploy anything bigger than a platoon worth of soldiers.  It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.  To give you some numbers... We have approx 16,000 Army Reservists in 118 Army Reserve Units.  Simple division would tell me that's approximately 127 people per unit (obviously this is just an average).  Now how many of these 127 people parade regularly?  Lets say 60% so 76 pers (I am probably being generous in some cases).  Out of those 76 pers, how many are operationally fit to deploy, lets say 50%??? so your now down to 30 to 40 pers max.  

The fact is we have far too many units with far too few people in them to ever make using the Army Reserve for anything more than a replacement pool a viable option.  



> The state of the reserves is deliberate and in no way the fault of the reserves.  Prior to 1940 the primary mission of the permanent force was to train the militia not fight wars.  It seems to have worked.



Step 6 of mission analysis, has the situation changed?  

I think you might want to start asking yourself that a little more.  This isn't 1940 and we unfortunately do not have time to spend years mobilizing an army.  When the Government of Canada requires our services it usually needs it in a fairly timely fashion.  You also neglect the fact that weapons systems have become far more complex and warfare is far more fluid.  This is why we need a professional army that is ready to go at a moments notice.  

I would like to see the Reserves consolidate the number of Bde's and Units they have to something that is reflective of their actual strength.  A model like the US National Guard would be favorable IMO.  This way Reserve units would be actual operational units and could be deployed if req'd.  The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> MSVS and LUVW Milcot ring a bell, heck in our lot the only SMP vehicles we have left are a couple broken ML's, an LS, and one cargo HL. Also I will point directly to the Alberta floods when you say Dom ops and reserves, 90% we sat around and did crap all. If the reserves are to help in Dom ops we need equipment and the trades to help do things like restoring power.



Division staff spend more time figuring out how they are going to try and mobilize reservists for DomOps than they do actually aiding the civil powers.  The Reserves have the lead on DomOps in theory but in reality they don't have the equipment, training or reaction time to be of much use.


----------



## MilEME09

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Rocky Mountains you missed my point and comparing National Guard units to our current Army Reserve is a very poor comparison.  For one, national guard units are kept at full strength so a national guard infantry battalion, for example, is a full strength battalion (of part time soldiers obviously) and they can be deployed complete by the government if req'd.  Not quite the same thing is it now?  National Guard units are reserves but they are operationally focused, our Reserves are anything but.
> 
> Our Army Reserve is a bunch of severely under-strength units with no ability to deploy anything bigger than a platoon worth of soldiers.  It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.  To give you some numbers... We have approx 16,000 Army Reservists in 118 Army Reserve Units.  Simple division would tell me that's approximately 127 people per unit (obviously this is just an average).  Now how many of these 127 people parade regularly?  Lets say 60% so 76 pers (I am probably being generous in some cases).  Out of those 76 pers, how many are operationally fit to deploy, lets say 50%??? so your now down to 30 to 40 pers max.
> 
> The fact is we have far too many units with far too few people in them to ever make using the Army Reserve for anything more than a replacement pool a viable option.
> 
> Step 6 of mission analysis, has the situation changed?
> 
> I think you might want to start asking yourself that a little more.  This isn't 1940 and we unfortunately do not have time to spend years mobilizing an army.  When the Government of Canada requires our services it usually needs it in a fairly timely fashion.  You also neglect the fact that weapons systems have become far more complex and warfare is far more fluid.  This is why we need a professional army that is ready to go at a moments notice.
> 
> I would like to see the Reserves consolidate the number of Bde's and Units they have to something that is reflective of their actual strength.  A model like the US National Guard would be favorable IMO.  This way Reserve units would be actual operational units and could be deployed if req'd.  The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work.



The problem is, how can you do large scale amalgamation like that with such a large geographical area like Canada? Are you saying we need to stand down half the reserve units in the country? If so where will the personal go? You would spend say 2 hours to drive from home to base, so why expect a reservist to drive that long for a weekend EX for example? while its a great idea the geography of Canada makes it impossible.


----------



## McG

With the recent insertion of the split-off TAPV discussions, I will not that there seem to have been many threads seeking a reason/role and a vehicle to justify PRes Armour.  If one has to look so hard to justify the existence of an organization(s), then maybe it is time to consider the function has outlived its usefulness.  Maybe there is only room for one manoeuvre arm in the Canadian reserve force?



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> ... People can dream all they want but need to be brought back down to reality.  The Reserves serve a useful purpose in that they provide bodies to beef up the Army in times of need but they don't generate capability as they have no actual cohesive structure.
> 
> Units in the reserves aren't even real units, just a bunch of independent companies, squadrons and batteries (in some cases they are closer to platoon/troop strength).  We can't generate any sort of combat capability with an organization like this so why would we give them the latest and greatest military kit.
> 
> If the Reserves were reformed and units were merged to bring them up to something near battalion/regiment strength and had some sort of cohesion, I would be more willing to give them better kit.  If the Reserves want to continue to exist as a large shell organization and only serve the purpose of providing bodies to beef up the Regs in times of need, sorry no good kit for you.
> 
> This is not a knock on Reservists themselves as I have met many fantastic Reservists.  It's a knock on the archaic structure that the Reserves currently exist in.


In this thread, you will find a number of suggestions along the same lines.  It has been proposed that PRes battalions be permanently merged.  Regimental identities could be preserved at the sub-unit level, or (if the regimentals are the point of resistance) the regiments could be merged.



			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Bullcrap.  The Militia in Canada has been reduced to the state it is currently in for two reasons:
> 
> ...
> 2) Reserve Regimental Senates which have consistently, vocally and politically fought off any attempt to meaningfully update and change the structure of reserve units.  They are stuck in a mobilization mindset, which has led to Regimental HQs leading Platoons.


If the PRes regimental system is the impediment to having a useful Army reserve, then it is time to destroy that system.  Hopefully the regimental senates/mafias/brandy-clubs can keep that in mind when given the choice to reorganize with their regimental identities or without.


----------



## Haggis

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> It's run by a bunch of good old boys who hearken back to the good old days and are resistant to any change within the organization.


  I can safely say that this statement is an unfair and factually incorrect genralized condemnation of the professionalism and dedication of the vast majority or Reserve Force COs and RSMs.

However, Reserve _lobby groups_ fit this description nicely as many are out of touch with what today's Reserves are and what they want and *need* to be effective.




			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> The government would also need to create legislation protecting Reservist employment in order for this to work.



Done already, but not well done.  Reserve employer support legislation(s) is/are neither harmonized or consistent across the land.  But that's a topic discussed in  another thread.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> In this thread, you will find a number of suggestions along the same lines.  It has been proposed that PRes battalions be permanently merged.  Regimental identities could be preserved at the sub-unit level...


 ...as was done in the UK, particularly with Highland Scottish regiments.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> If the PRes regimental system is the impediment to having a useful Army reserve, then it is time to destroy that system.  Hopefully the regimental senates/mafias/brandy-clubs can keep that in mind when given the choice to reorganize with their regimental identities or without.



There are some leaders (as in the Reg F) who cannot see beyond the walls of thier garrisons and fail to grasp that they can contribute to the strategic health of the Army Reserve (and the tactical survival of their units)  by being more innovative and flexible and less obstructionist.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The problem is, how can you do large scale amalgamation like that with such a large geographical area like Canada? Are you saying we need to stand down half the reserve units in the country? If so where will the personal go? You would spend say 2 hours to drive from home to base, so why expect a reservist to drive that long for a weekend EX for example? while its a great idea the geography of Canada makes it impossible.



Not what I am saying at all... in certain cases geography adds challenges but all that means is you have different companies/squadrons in different cities and you come together only for certain collective training events.  

Use Ex STALWART GUARDIAN for instance, I would have companies train independently throughout the year and when the big summer Ex comes around, we bring it all together under our own Bn HQ, like a real Bn would.  

Why does an area like the Maritimes have 3 Armour Regt's, 8 Infantry Bn's, 3 Arty Regt's, 2 Engr Regt's, 2 Sigs Regt's and 2 Svc Bn's?  

Cut the # of Bde's in half, close down Regt's or merge Regt's together to get rid of the needless overhead which presently exists.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Haggis said:
			
		

> I can safely say that this statement is an unfair and factually incorrect genralized condemnation of the professionalism and dedication of the vast majority or Reserve Force COs and RSMs.


  Just because your dedicated and work hard doesn't mean your work provides any value to the organization.  From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army.   



> Done already, but not well done.  Reserve employer support legislation(s) is/are neither harmonized or consistent across the land.  But that's a topic discussed in  another thread.



Hence why it needs to be revisited and sorted.


----------



## MilEME09

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Not what I am saying at all... in certain cases geography adds challenges but all that means is you have different companies/squadrons in different cities and you come together only for certain collective training events.
> 
> Use Ex STALWART GUARDIAN for instance, I would have companies train independently throughout the year and when the big summer Ex comes around, we bring it all together under our own Bn HQ, like a real Bn would.
> 
> Why does an area like the Maritimes have 3 Armour Regt's, 8 Infantry Bn's, 3 Arty Regt's, 2 Engr Regt's, 2 Sigs Regt's and 2 Svc Bn's?
> 
> Cut the # of Bde's in half, close down Regt's or merge Regt's together to get rid of the needless overhead which presently exists.



Ok I get what your saying now, something similar to the merger of all the reserve service battalions so it was only one per brigade? my unit has a FSG in edmonton and calgary, weekend EX's we meet up as well as in large brigade and divisional EX's. The only challenges become logistical when moving equipment for EX's and HQ communication issues but thats another story.


----------



## Old Sweat

I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.

What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results. 

I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .


----------



## MilEME09

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.
> 
> What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results.
> 
> I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .



I'm afraid im not to well informed about the history of the reserves however it sounds like the structure of the reserves is yet another rotting element of the organization as a whole. Which makes me think that all of DND/CAF needs a large scale reorganization both at the organizational level and the bureaucratic level.


----------



## Haggis

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Just because your dedicated and work hard doesn't mean your work provides any value to the organization.  From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army.



Hence my comment:


			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> There are some leaders (as in the Reg F) who cannot see beyond the walls of their garrisons and fail to grasp that they can contribute to the strategic health of the Army Reserve (and the tactical survival of their units) by being more innovative and flexible and less obstructionist.



In my experience, such leaders as you describe are the exception and need to be shown the path to strategic enlightenment.

Reserve Job Protection Legislation is beyond the Army's ability to fix.  However, it has to be nationally harmonized so that ALL Reservists in every province and territory have the same protection.  And, continuing on a slight tangent, such legislation should have both rewarding and punitive components to encourage support and ensure compliance.  Think of tax breaks for small business who support Reservists and their activities.  The best way to give Reservists the ability to deploy in larger numbers is to minimize the risk to their post-deloyment livelihoods and educations.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I could write a book on the subject, but it has been flogged to death. The militia was re-organized in 1936 to constitute six divisions along with corps and army troops for a war in Europe. The plan was to mobilize two divisions at the start and then build up. As the government was not keen on going to war in Europe again, the plan was written for home defence.
> 
> What we have now is the remnants of the 1936 plan, while since 1950 we have been concentrating on forces in being. The militia has been hacked willy-nilly, especially in the 1960s, but since then no one of any political stripe has had the cojones to take on the local movers and shakers to rationalize an inefficient structure. This is not an attack on the reservists or even the units, but the numbers game leads to what Royal Drew has pointed out. I fear this has become sacrosanct, even with its defects. We have tried to play games with things like the 10/90 battalions and the total force venture into cloud cuckoo land with predictable results.
> 
> I wish I could be optimistic, but . . .



If the Reserves re-oriented themselves I envision them providing valuable contributions to Canada both on Domestic and Expeditionary Ops.  Initial forces on operations would be comprised of Regulars but with time to conduct requisite amounts of individual and collective training the Reserves would be able to provide far greater contributions to Operations than they presently do.  

I would like to eventually get to the point where the Reserves deploy sub-units or even entire units on operations.  Is a company of regular force soldiers better than company of reservists?  Yes, but only because they have been trained properly, with six to twelve months of workup training with proper equipment, a reservist company would be for all intents and purposes interchangeable with a regular company.  Afghanistan showed the Regular Force can't sustain itself for a prolonged period on an operation that size, it nearly broke us.  We need a stronger Army Reserve more than ever but the Reserve needs to be structured in a way that gives us flexibility, something it presently doesn't provide.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Haggis said:
			
		

> Reserve Job Protection Legislation is beyond the Army's ability to fix.  However, it has to be nationally harmonized so that ALL Reservists in every province and territory have the same protection.  And, continuing on a slight tangent, such legislation should have both rewarding and punitive components to encourage support and ensure compliance.  Think of tax breaks for small business who support Reservists and their activities.  The best way to give Reservists the ability to deploy in larger numbers is to minimize the risk to their post-deloyment livelihoods and educations.



Yep, we can't do anything about this but potentially we can use some of the same Reserve Lobbying groups we hate so much to do exactly this, they managed to re-instate pips and crowns so maybe they could focus on, you know, actually helping out the soldiers in their respective organizations.


----------



## x_para76

So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town? 

Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?


----------



## dapaterson

The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.

In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.

Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate.  

Of course, that suggests that the Army would take a holistic approach in assessing its requirements, and balancing forces between part and full time; instead, there seems to be perpetual competition within the Reg F between corps and regiments, looking for internal dominance and advantage regardless of the cost.  So we penny packet out fleets not based on a plan but on the desire of this, that or the other regiment to have the same toys as the others (thankfully, the worst example of that thought was stopped before it was purchased).  We reverse engineer plans to reflect the need to maintain the infantry balance of terror - and so the answer to the number of battalions needed must always be an even multiple of three.

Meanwhile, we were taking upwards of a year to prepare forces for deployment; if it takes a year to train the Regular Army for deployment then they're taking money under false pretences.

In short, if we want to look for dysfunctional messes that waste resources, the Reserves, sadly, do not hold a monopoly.


----------



## McG

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> From what I've seen many of these same COs and RSMs think more about the balmoral or beret on their head than they do about the actual health of the army.


To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.



			
				X_para76 said:
			
		

> So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town?
> 
> Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?


That is only one possible course of action.  They could all become companies of the Royal Southwest Ontario Regiment.  Or, maybe all the cap badges remain but the regimental identity is at the sub-unit level while the Bn HQ holds no regimental affiliation.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.
> 
> In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.
> 
> Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate.
> 
> Of course, that suggests that the Army would take a holistic approach in assessing its requirements, and balancing forces between part and full time; instead, there seems to be perpetual competition within the Reg F between corps and regiments, looking for internal dominance and advantage regardless of the cost.  So we penny packet out fleets not based on a plan but on the desire of this, that or the other regiment to have the same toys as the others (thankfully, the worst example of that thought was stopped before it was purchased).  We reverse engineer plans to reflect the need to maintain the infantry balance of terror - and so the answer to the number of battalions needed must always be an even multiple of three.
> 
> Meanwhile, we were taking upwards of a year to prepare forces for deployment; if it takes a year to train the Regular Army for deployment then they're taking money under false pretences.
> 
> In short, if we want to look for dysfunctional messes that waste resources, the Reserves, sadly, do not hold a monopoly.



 :goodpost:

You sure you're not a sniper?  Hitting the mark every time!



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.



Completely agree, I re-read some of my posts and I sounded a little biased... not my intent, apologies.


----------



## x_para76

MCG said:
			
		

> To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.
> That is only one possible course of action.  They could all become companies of the Royal Southwest Ontario Regiment.  Or, maybe all the cap badges remain but the regimental identity is at the sub-unit level while the Bn HQ holds no regimental affiliation.



I just used this example because I believe the Brits have done something similar with their T.A units. They have gassed regiments regular and T.A that are older than Canada. So how is it that some of these regimental senates hold such sway over DND and their ability to restructure the reserves in a more cost effective manor?


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army's current thought process (such as it is) is fundamentally flawed.
> 
> In the event of an emergency, you need to rely on standing forces, not wait for a call up and muster.  Conversely, when participating in deployed operations, beyond Roto 0 there is ample time to mobilize.
> 
> Thus, simple logic would suggest that the Reg F needs to have the Domestic response task, and the Roto 0 deployment task; for subsequent rotations the Reserves should be heavily leveraged.  Which suggests that you put the high training cost skillsets more heavily in the Regular Force as those have much longer timelines to generate.



Yes, but I disagree with the simple categorization of expeditionary operations - I'd argue that the Regular Force needs to be responsible for standing tasks of reaction and projection.  Forces for Op REASSURANCE were ready to go in 3 days and deployed in 7.  The MRP considers 60 and 90 days to deploy abroad (after a year of training) to be "high readiness", but this is, in my view, a medium level of readiness that could be tasked to a group of Reg/Res mixed formations.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

It is complicated and goes back to very roots of the Militia in Canada.  Basically, in Canada, the system has been built on petty politics.

A book called "Canadian Brass" is a very book introduction to the system.


----------



## McG

X_para76 said:
			
		

> So how is it that some of these regimental senates hold such sway over DND and their ability to restructure the reserves in a more cost effective manor?


Many regiments have politically connected honorary colonels, and there are certainly incidents of these honouraries using their connections and the media to fight initiatives from the Army chain of command.

http://www.recorder.ca/2009/03/20/rifles-leader-concerned-over-amalgamation-report

... And somehow, recent years have seen us going in the opposite direction of what is needed with regrowth in the number of reserve regiments.

http://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20080905005


----------



## GR66

I've stated in other threads that I think the very idea of mass mobilization using the Reg Force as an organizational template is ridiculous since we simply don't have the equipment to provide for such a force and there isn't the ability to mass produce such equipment quick enough to meet our needs in the case of full-scaled war.

It would be nice if we could transform our Militia into something like the US National Guard...real, full-sized units with real equipment and training but let's be realistic...it just isn't possible with the budgets our governments are willing to put toward the military.  What we need to do is something in between the problematic system we have now and the National Guard model.  

My thought is that we go to a two-tier system.  The "Reserves" could be something approaching what the US National Guard has.  Each Reg Force Battalion/Squadron could have an associated Reserve Company/Troop integrated right into the Regimental organization.  These units would be full-strength units (possibly with sub-units in different locations as required) and would receive the same training as Reg Force units and have access to the same equipment as the Reg Force.  These units could be used to provide trained augmentees or even deployable sub-units to their parent Reg Force units in case of deployment.  

Similarly, other Reserve units could be organized to provide fully trained specialist sub-units for their parent Reg Force units.  For example, Reserve "Regiments" for each Reg Force battalion could be organized to provide a deployable "specialty" support platoons in case of mobilization.  These Reserve units could be trained for such tasks as providing a Pioneer Platoon, or a Mortar Platoon, or an MP Platoon, etc.  These "Reserve" units would ideally be located in centers relatively close to their parent units to facilitate joint training, etc. and to hopefully take advantage of absorbing as many releasing members from the Reg Force as possible to provide experienced members to the Reserve units.  Perhaps the federal government could provide much stronger job protection legislation to the members of these units in return for the members of these units being deployable when required.

Those Militia units not filling these "Reserve" roles could maybe then be reorganized to fill a more "traditional" Militia role.  The members of these units would be both a readily available, partially-trained source for replacement troops in case of major mobilization as well as a source of local government troops when assistance is required for local authorities.  These units could possibly have different training requirements than Reg Force/"Reserve" unit members assuming that if they are required for mobilization there will be time to give them more specialized training prior to deployment.  These Militia units would be organized differently than "Reserve" units and could use COTS equipment, etc. that would better suit the more realistic tasks they would be assigned.


----------



## MilEME09

Even though its not in our control the job protection aspect is a big one for the reserves, in Alberta we only get protection for 20 days for training, after that we must provide 30 days notice and have our employer agree with a defined start and end date to the leave of absence. If our legislation was more of looking at the reserves as a commitment to ones country by giving us all required time off, similar to the job protection those in the states get.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> It is complicated and goes back to very roots of the Militia in Canada.  Basically, in Canada, the system has been built on petty politics.
> 
> A book called "Canadian Brass" is a very book introduction to the system.



It's a good point. The "militia myth" perhaps best defined under Sir Hughes pre/during WW1 has always been a prevailing consideration for politicians. The belief that Canadians can simply "rise up" out of the militia as we apparently did in 1812 (spoiler alert- we didn't), 1914 and 1939 due to our natural fighting abilities remains in vogue today. Look at the focus on the 1812 anniversary- 1812 was a war almost completely fought by the British army (the York volunteers, during the US invasion of York defended the governors house, than marched around the city looking for new "volunteers" to go and surrender to the Americans so that they wouldn't have to fight again.

I believe that some semblance of this myth is perpetrated today to justify not spending money on the regular force. Its easier and cheaper to maintain the reserve capability than to pay for expensive regulars, and the perpetuation of this myth in Canadian society (like the peacekeeping myth) justifies defence cuts nicely.


----------



## Old Sweat

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> It's a good point. The "militia myth" perhaps best defined under Sir Hughes pre/during WW1 has always been a prevailing consideration for politicians. The belief that Canadians can simply "rise up" out of the militia as we apparently did in 1812 (spoiler alert- we didn't), 1914 and 1939 due to our natural fighting abilities remains in vogue today. Look at the focus on the 1812 anniversary- 1812 was a war almost completely fought by the British army (the York volunteers, during the US invasion of York defended the governors house, than marched around the city looking for new "volunteers" to go and surrender to the Americans so that they wouldn't have to fight again.
> 
> I believe that some semblance of this myth is perpetrated today to justify not spending money on the regular force. Its easier and cheaper to maintain the reserve capability than to pay for expensive regulars, and the perpetuation of this myth in Canadian society (like the peacekeeping myth) justifies defence cuts nicely.



The reality of the Canadian militia was indeed quite different from the myth. One needs look no further than the Fenian invasion of the Niagara Peninsula for an example of what happened when untrained and poorly equipped volunteers came up against a properly organized force of Civil War veterans at Ridgeway on 2 June 1866. See www.fenians.org for the details. The North West Rebellion also had the potential to go bad very quickly; the only thing that saved the reputation of the Canadian Militia was that the Metis were even more poorly organized, trained and equipped and their campaign plan was a disaster. 

I am fond of saying we were very fortunate we did not come up against the Comanches or the Zulus. 

So what is the solution. It has been suggested, with lots of evidence to back up the thesis, that the regular force can not sustain a prolonged campaign. Unfortunately the reserves, in my opinion, are not in any position to take over the battle except after a mobilization and training period of 18 months to two years at a minimum. Look at Korea and the Special Force: it took eight months to field a battalion built around a cadre of veterans and some regulars and a couple of months after that to deploy the rest of the brigade group. At that time we still had lots of modern equipment in our stores and tactics were dismounted and operated at 3.5 miles per hour. That is not the case today.

If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.


----------



## GR66

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.



If the truth of the matter is that Afghanistan was a stretch as far as providing personnel and it was a strain on our equipment, then what would the situation have been if we were faced with a high-intensity conflict against a near peer?  If we can't support a significantly larger force in the field for any meaningful length of time in combat then why do we have an organizational structure that calls for us to do exactly that?  

If all we're really capable of doing is putting a single Brigade Group in the field and maintaining it by rotating through our Reg Force Regiments and supplementing with troops from the Reserves while we throw more people into the training system then I'm fine with that.  I'd prefer to admit this fact and re-organize to truly support that reality rather than have a whole infrastructure based on a non-supportable fantasy.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

GR66 said:
			
		

> My thought is that we go to a two-tier system.  The "Reserves" could be something approaching what the US National Guard has.  Each Reg Force Battalion/Squadron could have an associated Reserve Company/Troop integrated right into the Regimental organization.  These units would be full-strength units (possibly with sub-units in different locations as required) and would receive the same training as Reg Force units and have access to the same equipment as the Reg Force.  These units could be used to provide trained augmentees or even deployable sub-units to their parent Reg Force units in case of deployment.



Done already; Total Force and it was misery for both the Reg and Res members from what I could see. 



> Similarly, other Reserve units could be organized to provide fully trained specialist sub-units for their parent Reg Force units.  For example, Reserve "Regiments" for each Reg Force battalion could be organized to provide a deployable "specialty" support platoons in case of mobilization.  These Reserve units could be trained for such tasks as providing a Pioneer Platoon, or a Mortar Platoon, or an MP Platoon, etc.  These "Reserve" units would ideally be located in centers relatively close to their parent units to facilitate joint training, etc. and to hopefully take advantage of absorbing as many releasing members from the Reg Force as possible to provide experienced members to the Reserve units.  Perhaps the federal government could provide much stronger job protection legislation to the members of these units in return for the members of these units being deployable when required.



So you want current understrength say, PRes inf units to take on pioneer trg when they can't get enough time/money for basic inf trg ???



> Those Militia units not filling these "Reserve" roles could maybe then be reorganized to fill a more "traditional" Militia role.  The members of these units would be both a readily available, partially-trained source for replacement troops in case of major mobilization as well as a source of local government troops when assistance is required for local authorities.  These units could possibly have different training requirements than Reg Force/"Reserve" unit members assuming that if they are required for mobilization there will be time to give them more specialized training prior to deployment.  These Militia units would be organized differently than "Reserve" units and could use COTS equipment, etc. that would better suit the more realistic tasks they would be assigned.



Sorry.  This sounds like too many differences, possibly more HQ type Res orgs, and while the idea sounds great it is unrealistic to think all of this 'special task' trg will be useful when the SHTF.

Reduce the number of COs and Bdes, Bde HQs and all that...sink the money into actual trg of the troops.  If the 409th Mukluk Repair Regiment is actaually a COy strength PRES unit, they get the funding and adopt the CofC that = a Company.   :2c:

The times are a'changing, but the PRES doesn't seem to be changing with them.  What worked pre-WWII..well...it is pre-WWII anymore?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Reduce the number of COs and Bdes, Bde HQs and all that...sink the money into actual trg of the troops.  If the 409th Mukluk Repair Regiment is actaually a COy strength PRES unit, they get the funding and adopt the CofC that = a Company.   :2c:


----------



## Remius

Perhaps if the army reserves were given their own budget allocation and essentially be a separate arm rather than fall under the army budget?   Fund it under actual numbers and strength.


----------



## Haggis

Crantor said:
			
		

> Perhaps if the army reserves were given their own budget allocation and essentially be a separate arm rather than fall under the army budget?   Fund it under actual numbers and strength.



I would argue that before this happens, there has to be a decision, by the Government - not the Army - outlining what they expect the Army Reserve to be  able to do.  Then, the policy enabler of proper job protection legislation for both operational deployment/employment _and_ training must be enacted.  Finally, the Army must get it's marching ordsers from the Government and told to "get on with it".

Then, those COs/RSMs who subscribe to the Reseve worldview described by Royal Drew should be told to "lead, follow or get out of the way".  Should they refuse - apply QR&Os 19.75 and 15.01 (5)c. Draconian?  Yes.  But, by this time those obstructionist leaders will have had ample time to get on board with the new reailities.


----------



## Journeyman

Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......

It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.

Just sayin'.  Carry on.    op:


----------



## Rocky Mountains

Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......
> 
> It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.
> 
> Just sayin'.  Carry on.    op:



This thread was brought back from the dead by someone insinuating that the Reserves be given access to the TAPV, which in the present climate is incredibly wishful thinking.  That being said, over the past couple of days a general consensus has emerged from all parties that not only the Reserves, but also the Army itself, needs to change.  The problem with this is that we cannot come to a consensus on what the organization should actually look like.  The same can be said of the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces, they themselves cannot come to a consensus and as a result, we have arrived where we have arrived.

It will take someone with some big cojones to change all of this.  General Hillier was such an individual but I don't see anyone like him coming out of the woodwork any time soon. 



			
				Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.



Thanks for your valuable input  :


----------



## dapaterson

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.



Source?  I know a little about occupational structure and geographic dispersion of the military (both Reg and Res) and that does not correlate to any information from reputable sources.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> Reality check.  The military has as many clerks in Ottawa as it has reserves.  Perhaps we need more clerks.



Your attempt at exaggerating is  :.


----------



## Kirkhill

I was thinking much the same thing as Journeyman -  I couldn't get the tune of "Here we go round the mulberry bush" out of my head.

In the proposals suggested I see elements of the 10:90 solution, the reserve Jump Coy solution, the Defense & Duties solution, the Mortar and Machine Gun Platoons solution....all of which were actually implemented in the last 30 years and all of which ultimately foundered.  And they foundered on the same rock:  the inability of the reserves to field more than 10% of their authorized strength.  Given that units are authorized at sub-unit strength (~127 as RoyalDrew points out) than that means that, at best, the unit will be able to send a dozen motivated individuals for training, summer exercises or for operations.

It was ever thus.  In 1812 Brock and Prevost got some good service out of Militia "Flank Coys"  - basically those dozen soldiers brigaded into companies and attached to regular Brit battalions to thicken their lines.  It was the same again in 1866 with the Fenians, again it was "Flank Coys" - not the run of the mill militiamen - that contributed to the effort.

The Papal Zouaves, the NW Rebellion, the Boer War, the Mac-Pap Battalion, Korea, Bosnia, Afghanistan ..... those efforts were small.  Battalion/Brigade efforts - similar to what we managed all during the Cold War.  And all supplied by "Volunteers" - both full time and part time.

World Wars 1 and 2 were aberrations and even those were essentially "Volunteer" shows.  Yes conscription was introduced but late in the game and few of the conscripts made it to the front lines.

The underlying problem is that, unlike the Poles and Ukrainians and Russians, Canadians don't perceive any threat that would force them to pick up arms and kill the man in their front yard intent on slaughtering their family.  That threat is a nightmare in Eastern Europe.  It is a fantasy in Canada.

My solution:

Accept that you are never going to have the manpower.  Leverage technology.

In the beginning there was only manpower.  Men in lines with spears and shields.  Then it was bayonets and muskets.  Then it was bayonets and rifles.

World War 1 saw a move away from reliance on manpower with Quick Firing guns (75s and 18s) and of course the Machine Guns.  Lines were held by men on OPs and those guns.  The assault troops were husbanded in the reserve lines.

I suggest that technology makes possible, and politics demand, a continuation of that thought.  If I were in your position I would be lobbying to create a ring of unmanned sensors, backed by a ring of crew served weapons (aircraft, helos, guns) containing a core (not corps) of assault troops.  The sensors and the crew served weapons require money and time - not necessarily manpower.  The assault troops are nothing but manpower - with elan - a vital commodity that the French identified but wasted.

Again, if it were me, Reg Force infantry battalions when, they were being cut down in manpower, I would have held on to all the specialist companies platoons before I would have maintained my full strength rifle coys.  Equally I would have held onto my weapons dets, 4 per company, and reduced my rifle sections from 10 men to 6.

The role of the reserves would then be to thicken up the sections (12 men from one Reserve unit would bring a Regular Platoon back up to strength) in Roto 0 to 2.  If the operation proceeded longer than that then they could be brought up to trained platoon and trained company status and deployed as required.

In the US the Army instructs its COs, when they are sent to their training exercises, that if they are short of manpower they are to man their crew served weapons and vehicles as a priority.  The rifles suffer accordingly.

In 309(3) the advice used to be the same.

Rifles are not cannon fodder.  They are too valuable for that.  But the key elements of a good rifleman, a good assault trooper, are physical fitness and attitude.   Add in small arms training and small unit tactics, which can be accomplished locally, and you can turn out useful platoons of rifles at relatively low cost.

With respect to the clerks in Ottawa: as I was taking a look at the role of the Adjutant (for discussion in the expanding HQ thread) I was surprised to discover that the Brits had created something call the Adjutant General's Corps into which the enrolled all the clerks from Transport, REME, Post, Catering .... you name it.  It then dawned on me that Canada has done something of the same thing.

I get the idea of a common training syllabus for clerks but why do they have a separate command structure?  A separate empire.  Shouldn't they be creatures of the organizations and the commanders they serve?  Does the clerical empire contribute to the ever expanding HQs?


----------



## Old Sweat

Now for a different tack from Kirkhill, not better, not worse, just different.

Surely someone, somewhere, in the system can do a basic staff check with a set of basic assumptions. For example, to maintain a national contingent of a headquarters based on a brigade headquarters, a reconnaissance squadron, a battle group of three (four) mechanized or light companies and a combat support and combat service support companies, a tank squadron, an artillery regiment of a FSCC/ASCC, a gun battery, an AD battery, a mortar battery or troop, a STA battery and a HQ battery, an engineer regiment or squadron, a logistics element, a medical element along with an aviation wing including TACP, UAV, UTTH and MTH as well as an organization to run the airhead and look after the airplanes, a strategic communications organization and on and on* requires so many people with planned casualty rate of x and a tour length of y. But we can maintain z people which gives a shortfall or a surplus of whatever.

Then it comes to options and choices for the grownups and eventually the government.

Maybe, just maybe we can design a regular and reserve structure, or maybe not. This is the CAF after all and dynamic inertia is our overwhelming bureaucratic characteristic.

* Oops, forgot the PA bn.


----------



## Kirkhill

Maybe not so different Old Sweat.

Planning assumptions: 

Brigade/Battle Group Operations - check
Leverage Technology - I see an awful lot of technical positions implied in that structure of yours - so I'll take that as a check as well
Husband Rifles/Assault Troops - I don't see many of those in that long list of trades - a third check.

I think that another piece of the puzzle is trying to determine what technologies to leverage - starting with the decision on whether we are going to be an armour heavy force dependent on trucks and roads or a light force dependent on helos and airlift.  Once that is sorted, based on what our politicians expect our army to accomplish, then all the other decisions start falling into place.


----------



## Jungle

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Page #1 of this thread appeared in 2001.  A quick sampling of the intervening 13 years and 64 pages have not produced a single new thought that wasn't put forward in the initial few pages.....just more angst, some members banned, ridicule towards "the other"......
> 
> It seems to me that: a) the Army just can't sort itself out on these issues, and b) the government doesn't care to.
> 
> Just sayin'.  Carry on.    op:



And the thread title has always baffled me... what is divine about the role of the reserves ??


----------



## GR66

I think my (poorly presented) thought was actually very much in line with what Kirkhill suggested.  The key element that I was getting at was that the Reg Force has to be reformed FIRST and come to the realization that it's not going to ever magically expand to deploy Division-sized field units.  We simply don't have the equipment or trained people to be able to do that.  It should be a much smaller, but well equipped and fully manned force able to deploy on its own.  The Reserves could then be reorganized to properly support such an structure (Kirkhill's "rifles" to fill out losses).  

The idea of a "Militia" structure different than the "Reserves" is more of an idea that there may be at some point a requirement to have a trained and organized force that is able to deploy within Canada at a time when the Reg Force may already be deployed overseas.  For example if we were to go to war there would still be a need for a "Home Guard" to protect our key infrastructure, etc.  A Militia organization could be well suited for this but would not necessarily have to be trained or equipped or organized in that same way as our Reg Force.  The "Reserves" in this model would simply be Part-Time soldiers...the same training, etc as their Reg Force Full-Time peers, which could be called to Full-Time service when required.  The "Militia" on the other hand would be more like units of trained citizens that can be used for specific tasks within Canada.  

However you slice it I think that Reg Force re-organization needs to come first.  Re-organization of the Reserves to support the resulting structure would then come next.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> However you slice it I think that Reg Force re-organization needs to come first.  Re-organization of the Reserves to support the resulting structure would then come next.



And even before that, we need a 'Mission Statement' that drives everything else. Right now we're adrift in a sea of strategic indecision, and it shows throughout....


----------



## dapaterson

Jungle said:
			
		

> And the thread title has always baffled me... what is divine about the role of the reserves ??



It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."



As in "divining rods", also known as "witching".


----------



## Eye In The Sky

GR66 said:
			
		

> The "Reserves" in this model would simply be Part-Time soldiers...the same training, etc as their Reg Force Full-Time peers, which could be called to Full-Time service when required.



I think the yellow part is next to impossible, IMO.  PRES Inf types can't train up on LAVs and PRES Armour types can't train up on Coyote and Leo.  Just 2 examples off the top of my head.

/rant on

When I was  new Trooper in the Reserve Armd Recce world, we trained Mon and Thurs nights and 2 x weekend exercises a month.  That equated to 6 recce ex's before Christmas break, prep for winter warfare stuff, a winter indoc and winter warfare/dismtd recce ex, then back to mounted recce ex X 2/month in Apr, May and June.  Something like that.  But, I recall doing 12 or so Recce type ex's at the home unit.  

Anyways, we had the time and money to have fairly well trained recce troops.  We trained enough, and did a fair amount of variety of trg (of avail tasks from the Recce Sqn in Battle and Troop Ldr's Manual PAMs) that people were really interested in what was going on; morale was high then, despite this being before all the big pay raises of the last decade and a half - no 'miltiaman' did it for the money IMO.

The sqn weekend ex's, we would be going pretty much non-stop from 1800 Friday night until supper on Sunday; go into Tp Hides/Attack posn's on Friday night, confirmatory orders the Troopie would go to while the A c/s sorted out the Hide, BP was happening...H-hour Saturday morning (early), adv all day, into a running resupp then OP screen at night, withdrawl in contact with passage of lines, etc etc on Sunday, finishing up with Stables, a hot-wash and usually, a few pints in the Mess after.

Those are the days I remember that 'we' as a Sqn had a 'mandate' - train from the Recce Sqn in Battle, and Tp Leaders manual.  Train in AFV/AC rec.  Train in basic fieldcraft.  Wpns.  Heck, we'd go in on trg nights sometimes, and get a Wng O, kit out the troop and go to the RV, just to see how long it would take us and what part of our Tp SOPs needed some smoothing out.  

Kit and equipment - we had enough Iltis, radios, etc to kit out 3 x 7 car Recce Tps, plus SHQ with 2 CPs, and a small A1 ech.   Tp Ldrs had 46 sets usually, and ea C/S had a manpack for Dbl-banked comms.  We had $ for all the stuff we needed to train.  What we DID lack, compared to today's standard, was decent pay and somewhat substandard kit; there was nothing high speed/low drag issued like bivy bags, fleece this and that and CADPAT Gortex-like jackets.  Regardless, we still did sentry in the freezing rain in late fall, night OPs in the spring in the cold mud, and winter warfare.  All of us survived, and IMO the high morale back then overcame the lower standard kit.

Then, things changed.  The PRes went from 2 trg nights a week and 2 weekends ex's to 1 trg night a week and maybe 1 or 2 weekend ex's between Sept and Christmas.  Winter warfare was dropped and winter indoc was the only "ex" done until the spring.  People starting loosing interest in the 'same ol same ol'.  The old 49 and 46 sets were removed from the callsigns and replaced with TCCCs gear, but, sorry you don't have enough for a veh mount for all the troop veh's.  Changes were made, sometimes only taking 5 car troops on ex.  I remember a few times when people who wanted to go could NOT go on a Sqn ex, because "there wasn't enough seats".  Then the Iltis was replaced and sorry, you aren't getting a 1 for 1 replacement.  Now, there was less money = way less actual training events, less radios to kit out less vehicles...less motivation, less morale and less GAFF.

Before I jumped back to the Reg Force, I left my PRES unit (as one of the Tp WOs) for the Bde HQ for a Cl B/A.  I went back a few years later as an Obs/Cntlr for the Bde Spring EX.  Wow.  The "Regiment" was barely able to put together 1 (one) 7 car recce troop.  The troop was a shambles compared to the troops I had grown up in.  No SOPs.  No direction.  No real ability.  A "we don't do stuff like hide procedure anymore" attitude.  WTF?  It was above the Tp level too - this low sense of GAFF.  

When I joined my former PRES unit, there was an actual 21 callsign recce sqn, with SHQ (with CPs provided by the local Comm Res Sqn), that had a fairly clear (and simple) training objective as D Sqn Recce or 61 Tp.  We made less money, had less 'high speed' kit, but we were 400% more capable of doing the job than the mob of confusion I witnessed on the last time I saw my old unit 'in action'.  

From what I can gather, not much has changed with that "Regiment" as of late - interest is down, morale is down, numbers are down.  But there is still a RHQ for what equates to maybe a recce tp and an very understrength A1 Ech component.  

I am betting there are many similar stories across the various Res Bdes.  Those who are fixated on living in the past will be left in the past.  

I could go on and on about the reasons why things are like the way they are, and what improvements could be made as well as the thinking at the Bde HQ levels in the PRES (I worked in one for 5ish years), but in the end it is still just an exercise in  :brickwall: 

/rant off


----------



## GR66

Seen and understood.  The vast, vast majority on here seem to be saying basically the same thing.  I _think _(don't want to speak for Kirkhill) however that a fundamental change in the Reg Force structure along the lines Kirkhill is suggesting would make it possible to make some fundamental changes to the Reserves which _may _give them the opportunity to be effective in their new role.  

As suggested the Reg Force would become a much leaner organization with more focus on the advanced weapons and enablers that would compensate for the fewer numbers of overall troops.  The "new" Reserves wouldn't be designed to take over those roles...the Reg Force would ideally build in enough redundancy in these specialty trades that they could maintain those capabilities in the field...at least as long as these advanced weapons/tools are still available.  The Reserves would instead focus on providing replacements for the proverbial "Guys in Back".  I think it would be within the capability of fewer but larger Reserve units to fulfill this role.  The smaller overall number, the reduced overhead and hopefully closer working/training relationships with their affiliated Reg Force units should provide (hopefully) useful and interesting training opportunities for these Reservists.  Take those 10% turned on guys from a dozen units and put them together in a single unit with good leadership, purpose and tools.  Perhaps these few units will attract more turned on troops when they see that it's worthwhile.  You may even retain more releasing Reg Force members if they see the Reserve units are a worthwhile place to be.

What about the rest of the units/troops?  Maybe disband them.  Get rid of deadwood.  Or maybe that's where the concept of "Militia" units can come in to play.  You don't expect these units to have the time and resources available to train to the standard of your Reg Force troops.  So find something useful that these 90% can do.  Don't ignore their willingness to serve the CF..just give them roles to match the level of commitment they are able to give.  Different but useful training.  Civ pattern vehicles that suit what your asking them to do.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

First thing I would suggest is to cut out the fat - reduce the HQs.  Example:  NS-PEI has it's own "Bde".  So does NB and Nfld.  Why?  Is there REALLY enough troops in each to justify a Bde, and a Bde HQ?  Knock it back to 1 Bde &  HQ.  Where...who cares, just do it but shut down either the Hfx or Moncton Bde HQ.  1 CBG HQ in the Maritimes, 1 in Qc, 1 in On and 1 for the West. 

Most Cl B types on the Bde HQ payroll are at least SNCOs; from a $ perspective, every Cl B/Cl B(a) Sgt position eliminated in these unnecessary HQ position would pay for 11 Cl A Sgt positions (based on Cl A being funded @ 32 days/year).  11!  That is for 1 Sgt position.  

Carry that on - if a unit is a "Regiment" on paper but a Coy in strength...why do they have a CO, RSM, RHQ...etc.  I might be a former PRES type and , back in the Regs, but I am also a taxpayer.  I don't think we ( as in taxpayers) should pay a CO salary for a unit, when it doesn't really even have the numbers for a Sqn.  

If people want to keep living in la-la land, that is where they will continue to see their (limited) budget money going...


----------



## Jungle

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."



Ah... ok. I found this which clears things up:

http://runescape.wikia.com/wiki/Divination



> Divination is a gathering and manufacturing skill that was developed by humans shortly after the beginning of the Sixth Age. It involves gathering Guthix's residual life-force, which is leaking throughout Gielinor. To do this, the players gather divine energy from wisps and then use this energy to make items such as portents, signs, and divine locations.



And I thought this thread was about _defining_ the role of the Reserves... I feel like an idiot.

Now... who's Guthix ??


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:
			
		

> Seen and understood.  The vast, vast majority on here seem to be saying basically the same thing.  I _think _(don't want to speak for Kirkhill) however that a fundamental change in the Reg Force structure along the lines Kirkhill is suggesting would make it possible to make some fundamental changes to the Reserves which _may _give them the opportunity to be effective in their new role.
> 
> As suggested the Reg Force would become a much leaner organization with more focus on the advanced weapons and enablers that would compensate for the fewer numbers of overall troops.  The "new" Reserves wouldn't be designed to take over those roles...the Reg Force would ideally build in enough redundancy in these specialty trades that they could maintain those capabilities in the field...at least as long as these advanced weapons/tools are still available.  The Reserves would instead focus on providing replacements for the proverbial "Guys in Back".  I think it would be within the capability of fewer but larger Reserve units to fulfill this role.  The smaller overall number, the reduced overhead and hopefully closer working/training relationships with their affiliated Reg Force units should provide (hopefully) useful and interesting training opportunities for these Reservists.  Take those 10% turned on guys from a dozen units and put them together in a single unit with good leadership, purpose and tools.  Perhaps these few units will attract more turned on troops when they see that it's worthwhile.  You may even retain more releasing Reg Force members if they see the Reserve units are a worthwhile place to be.
> 
> What about the rest of the units/troops?  Maybe disband them.  Get rid of deadwood.  Or maybe that's where the concept of "Militia" units can come in to play.  You don't expect these units to have the time and resources available to train to the standard of your Reg Force troops.  So find something useful that these 90% can do.  Don't ignore their willingness to serve the CF..just give them roles to match the level of commitment they are able to give.  Different but useful training.  Civ pattern vehicles that suit what your asking them to do.



You're doing a fine job GR66.  Carry on.  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's a model for the "Militia" as opposed to the "Reserves".

Danish Home Guard - Unpaid Volunteers for home service with a small cadre of regular force instructors.

Reserves, on the other hand, could/should/might be, trained regular force personnel liable to recall for a period of years with a commitment to periodic refresher training.  

To take civilians off the street and expect to turn them into EO Techs, or even competent military clerks, on the basis of 9 months of Wednesday nights and Saturdays, together with a couple of summer courses, is unrealistic.

On the other hand, all those guys that came back from Afghanistan and wanted out, due to the lack of excitement, should have been released to the civvy world on a tether with a really strong return spring attached.  Form them into actual Reserve sub-units attached directly to their parent battalion or regiment.

Plan on engaging them with well planned, well resourced, paid, refresher exercises once every three years with annual bonuses for demonstrating current fitness.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The reality of the Canadian militia was indeed quite different from the myth. One needs look no further than the Fenian invasion of the Niagara Peninsula for an example of what happened when untrained and poorly equipped volunteers came up against a properly organized force of Civil War veterans at Ridgeway on 2 June 1866. See www.fenians.org for the details. The North West Rebellion also had the potential to go bad very quickly; the only thing that saved the reputation of the Canadian Militia was that the Metis were even more poorly organized, trained and equipped and their campaign plan was a disaster.
> 
> I am fond of saying we were very fortunate we did not come up against the Comanches or the Zulus.
> 
> So what is the solution. It has been suggested, with lots of evidence to back up the thesis, that the regular force can not sustain a prolonged campaign. Unfortunately the reserves, in my opinion, are not in any position to take over the battle except after a mobilization and training period of 18 months to two years at a minimum. Look at Korea and the Special Force: it took eight months to field a battalion built around a cadre of veterans and some regulars and a couple of months after that to deploy the rest of the brigade group. At that time we still had lots of modern equipment in our stores and tactics were dismounted and operated at 3.5 miles per hour. That is not the case today.
> 
> If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.



OS- this thread really took off in my day of travelling to Borden, but I'll respond.

IMHO, the future of warfare is more akin to what we would have expected in 1650 than 1913. I believe that, based on the expense in keeping a well equipped and trained regular army and employing said army, that wars of the future will be more, "fight with what you have" in "limited wars" than the traditional shoulder to shoulder advance to contact seen in unlimited warfare in the 20th century. Forces will fight close to their supply depots (certainly an extended distance than seen in armies under Louis XIV) for limited objectives. Evidence of this can be seen in the Falklands and even Afghanistan. 

So what role does the reserve play? I would see the reserve being more of a territorial army with a mission for defence of Canada and INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION and the regular force being placed on an expeditionary footing. Changes in organization, equipment, and training would be required for the reserves, to be sure. I personally see no role for formed reserve bodies in expeditionary operations.

Feel free to critique!


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And even before that, we need a 'Mission Statement' that drives everything else. Right now we're adrift in a sea of strategic indecision, and it shows throughout....



A big BINGO on that comment.  As I think I stated in both the HQ Bloat and F-35 threads the real problems won't be fixed until we have new (and realistic) Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers.  If we don't know what we're expected to do then EVERY capability and EVERY organization is defensible.  If we don't know what we're expected to do then every piece of kit we order can have an infinite number of possible requirements.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

If you are waiting for a white paper that is worth the paper it is written on, then I have a bridge to sell you. It will always be the politics of the moment and who is in power for that moment.


----------



## OldSolduer

Colin P said:
			
		

> If you are waiting for a white paper that is worth the paper it is written on, then I have a bridge to sell you. It will always be the politics of the moment and who is in power for that moment.



I have been saying for some time that the CAF has lost its focus. The focus should be on war fighting...just my opinion....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Perish the thoughts, parades, fancy camo patterns, paperwork, power point and promotions are what this army is about, war fighting and training for it gets in the way of real soldiering!


----------



## blackberet17

X_para76 said:
			
		

> So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town?
> 
> Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?



I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).

Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition. PEIR is the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...

The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.


----------



## x_para76

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).
> 
> Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition. PEIR is the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...
> 
> The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.



Would a middle ground be something modelled on what the Brits did with Royal Regiment of Scotland, where each unit maintains it's identity but organizationally comes under one flag? That would at least stream line things somewhat as well as eliminating numerous senior leadership positions.


----------



## OldSolduer

We tactically grouped the Rifles and Camerons here in Winnipeg several years ago. There were some hurt feelings that Camerons or Rifles would be commanded by someone not from their Regiment.

It seems to work, but for whatever reasons Winnipeg and the population does not seem to support the military much, despite what they all say. It's an inch deep and a mile wide.

For a city of 750,000 or so you'd think we could have at least two full companies of infantry.


----------



## KevinB

The Regimental system in effective action yet again  :facepalm:


 The Reserves need to be gutted and filleted like a fish to make combat effective entities like the Guard is down here.
(and that took a lot of gnashing of teeth and pains over the last 14 years too).

If Canada wishes to retain the Regimental system for the Reserves - the regimental senates need to take a long walk off a short pier - and then the units HQ's and command staffs need to be decimated until they reflect the realities of their effective strength -- which may end up being a Capt as the 'unit' 'CO'.  And due to the truncated command availabilities - an up or out method may need to be adopted to the Reserve Officer structure.


----------



## dapaterson

It's not only the Res F regiments that fight progress in the name of history.  Why are there nine infantry battalions in the Reg F - funny how we have three regiments of three Bns each - wonderful that the math works out so nicely.

It may be time to reexamine the Regimental system in its entirety - maybe do something heretical like posting the best Reg F infantry LCols into command positions regardless of cap badge.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:
			
		

> The Regimental system in effective action yet again  :facepalm:
> 
> 
> The Reserves need to be gutted and filleted like a fish to make combat effective entities like the Guard is down here.
> (and that took a lot of gnashing of teeth and pains over the last 14 years too).
> 
> If Canada wishes to retain the Regimental system for the Reserves - the regimental senates need to take a long walk off a short pier - and then the units HQ's and command staffs need to be decimated until they reflect the realities of their effective strength -- which may end up being a Capt as the 'unit' 'CO'.  And due to the truncated command availabilities - an up or out method may need to be adopted to the Reserve Officer structure.



I have for a long time been a fan of the National Guard system so I'll do a friendly pre-empt of the negative comments that others will undoubtedly throw in.

Firstly the Guard's effectiveness does not come from its level of training which is not much better than that of our own reserves.  The Guard's effectiveness (especially over the last ten years) comes from:

1. legislation and an administrative system that allows Guards to be relatively easily mobilized for operations (ours allows for mobilization but it is cumbersome at best and we have very poor job protection legislation). 

2. A willingness on behalf of senior leadership to compulsorily mobilize the Guard (units and/or individuals). (Our leadership is highly reluctant to use compulsory activation and looks to volunteer individual augmentation) 

3. A willingness of senior leadership to accept the risk of fielding soldiers that have not had the equivalent of full-time training and experience (ours leaders are highly risk adverse. The fact is that a six year reserve infantryman is not, and never will be, the equivalent of a six year regular force one - the real issue is does he have to be? There are arguments pro and con but the bottom line is how much risk should we be prepared to accept and how can we structure things to minimize that risk to an acceptable level-rather than eliminate it entirely) 

4. A willingness of senior leadership to assign the Guard both a role in the overall defence scheme and to pay for the basic equipment required to fulfil that role. The best example is the fact that much of the heavy armour, artillery and mech infantry (all of which are only needed for major operations occasionally) to be located in the Guard. (Our senior leadership, and many of those who post here, have a belief that sophisticated equipment needs to be with the regular force. In reality you can build a system to cater for this and the Guard is but one example of how to do that)

Reserve forces, if properly structured and used, can be a major cost multiplier for a government. Simply put the "stand-by" costs to train and maintain a single reservist is a small fraction compared to that of a regular soldier over the length of a career. The best place for reserves is in those trades and skills that are not required either for day to day operations or administration or for immediate reaction forces. Armour, artillery, heavy infantry and many specialty trades lend themselves to this.

Sadly it's my opinion that our senior military leadership has its head up its a** on this issue. It is not a "political" government issue unless and until the military present a viable course of options for them to consider. In my opinion that will never happen because we have now had several generations of generals, colonels and CWOs who know nothing but a system where the reservists are considered the poor and incompetent cousins who must be stroked from time to time but never taken seriously. They have no motivation to look outside the box and any hint that we need to break the two sacred cows of the existing limiting legislation and the fiction that operationally deployed reservists must be volunteers causes their eyes to glaze over in a heartbeat. The last half century has limped along with the current inadequate and misunderstood system and it will take a major external push to get any action to even study the issue. Won't happen in any of our lifetimes.   :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).



That was the way back in '89 when I joined.  Nothing new really...



> Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition.



Why?  Be creative; let each unit keeps its name, cap badge history and Guidon.  But structure and fund it as what PEIR is - an understrength Sqn (unless things have changed drastically recently).  They all become Sqns of the "3X Bde Armd Regiment" [ the first thing that needs to happen is putting all 5 Div Res units into a single CBG with one CBGHQ].   



> PEIR the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...



Despite it's name, PEIR is far from a Regiment, let's be honest.  It should have an OC, SHQ and the rest of stuff a PRES Armd Sqn gets.  Your own statement above underlines the fact that the Hfx Rifles and PEIR have to combine to get an 8 car troop.  That's not even half a Sqn.  

You mention the Sigs; the Comm Res transformation was something sensible; got rid of the Comm Res mafia and HQs.  Now, all NS and PEI PRES Sig's unit are part of 36 Signals Reg't.  Did it kill them?  No.  Did if ruffle feathers.  Yup.  Does that matter?  Shouldn't.  



> The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.



Last I remembered, CAF Officers and NCMs are required to follow lawful orders from their superiors.  Res COs are just like me or anyone else; I can bitch, moan and whine but at the end of the day when my SUNRAY says "get on with it", I either get on with it or face the music.


----------



## daftandbarmy

This year, at the unit level, we have approximately 37 'mandays' to train our troops up to participate in a culminating exercise in May 15.

Of those, approximately 10 or 12 get chewed up with 'mandatory' requirements imposed from above, like Domops, IBTS and various other PC/ ceremonial/ social fluff.

How much training can you get done with your troops in about 27 days (that includes one weekend per month and one night per week) between September and May? As for our Officers and SNCOs, they have little or no time assigned to their own professional development because that's way too costly.

I would say that 80% of our people are excellent material and want to participate in well planned and executed, tough, training. We are letting them down by not challenging them enough, and not allocating enough time and resources to training them properly. 

Double the time we currently have available and I'd say you'll have yourself a pretty good 'reserve' to draw on as required.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This year, at the unit level, we have approximately 37 'mandays' to train our troops up to participate in a culminating exercise in May 15.
> 
> Of those, approximately 10 or 12 get chewed up with 'mandatory' requirements imposed from above, like Domops, IBTS and various other PC/ ceremonial/ social fluff.
> 
> How much training can you get done with your troops in about 27 days (that includes one weekend per month and one night per week) between September and May? As for our Officers and SNCOs, they have little or no time assigned to their own professional development because that's way too costly.
> 
> I would say that 80% of our people are excellent material and want to participate in well planned and executed, tough, training. We are letting them down by not challenging them enough, and not allocating enough time and resources to training them properly.
> 
> Double the time we currently have available and I'd say you'll have yourself a pretty good 'reserve' to draw on as required.



If we want senior Reserve personnel to also be engaged in the community, where will they find this additional time?  Time is finite.  Between work, family, community engagement and the Reserves where does this elusive additional time come from?  Or do we want the Reserves to be inhabited (inhibited?) by chronically unemployed single folks with nothing to do?

Leadership needs to be engaged and ensure that appropriate, effective training is scheduled.  There are still some, however, who think that the 49th anniversary of this or the protection of the mess are more important; there needs to be a cull of those.


(And the less said about those who put their efforts into buttons and bows and pips and crowns while ignoring the other issues, the better...)


----------



## Rifleman62

Eye In The Sky





> But structure and fund it as what PEIR is - an understrength Sqn (unless things have changed drastically recently).  They all become Sqns of the "3X Bde Armd Regiment"



First of all, why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I don't know that they do, or don't.  I've always been a tactical level type, so won't guess on if they are/aren't needed.

But, looking at numbers "if" 36 and 37 Armd Recce units went to the field as a formed unit, it sounds like they might have enough to field 1 actual Recce Sqn of G Wags.  

So despite 3 capbadges and various locations...1 actual Sqn.

Not sure what the state is now, but there used to be 11 or so "Recce Sqn's" on the PRES side.  That was when the Boat folks had Cougars.  AFAIK, all the boat Sqn's re-rolled to Recce.  At least one Armd Recce unit was re-rolled out of the blackhat world (Elgins), so not sure what the current # of PRES Armd Recce...units...is these days.


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:
			
		

> Sadly it's my opinion that our senior military leadership has its head up its a** on this issue. It is not a "political" government issue unless and until the military present a viable course of options for them to consider. In my opinion that will never happen because we have now had several generations of generals, colonels and CWOs who know nothing but a system where the reservists are considered the poor and incompetent cousins who must be stroked from time to time but never taken seriously. They have no motivation to look outside the box and any hint that we need to break the two sacred cows of the existing limiting legislation and the fiction that operationally deployed reservists must be volunteers causes their eyes to glaze over in a heartbeat. The last half century has limped along with the current inadequate and misunderstood system and it will take a major external push to get any action to even study the issue. Won't happen in any of our lifetimes.   :2c:
> 
> :cheers:



There is a camp in the current Regular Force that will admin (in private at least) that the Reserve Force kept the army going through Afghanistan - not only with augmentees for deployment, but by filling in the holes back in Canada in record numbers.  That goodwill still remains in some circles.

The challenge is that when push comes to shove, and budgets are being cut, people instinctively protect their own.  Add to that the odd accounting systems of DND where pay for Reservists is a local expense looked at with envy as something that could be saved, and pay for Regulars is hidden away and rarely considered as a cost to day to day business, and many perverse incentives arise.


----------



## MilEME09

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Eye In The Sky
> First of all, why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?



Because there was no other role armour related to role them into, since the idea of reserve heavy armour went out the window with the sherman tank. Personally I would of kept the leopard 1, gave it to the reserves (but kept them at major bases like Wainwright) and role about half of those recce units back to armour


----------



## Remius

Which begs the question as to why have certain trades in the PRES.  Many trades in the PRES are undeployable in their actual trades and cannot even CT as a semi-skilled/skilled applicant so why have them?  The exception would be those trades that fill a niche for the reserves.  Armoured Recce, med tech, MP are just a few that I can think of.


----------



## McG

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> ... why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?





			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Because there was no other role armour related to role them into, since the idea of reserve heavy armour went out the window with the sherman tank.


That does not describe a need.  Reserve armour units could be transformed into infantry or a support function.  Not having tanks in the reserve does not lead to a requirement that we have more recce.


----------



## Remius

Many units could be re-rolled as infantry but have specialised functions that some non infantry units currently do.  Heck, more reserve MSEOP/drivers would be great.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

ROPU Units and Balloon Regiments.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Just look at the History of 31 CER....

Year	Change
1812	31 CER perpetuates the Royal Corps of Artificers and Craftsmen
1866	25th Elgin Battalion of Infantry
1900	25th Elgin Regiment
1903	(disbanded)
1904	25th Elgin Regiment (re-formed)
1915	Canadian Expeditionary Force:
18th, 33rd, and 91st Battalions raised
1920	The Elgin Regiment
1921	Canadian Expeditionary Force:
1st Battalion (perpetuating 91st Battalion CEF)
2nd (Reserve) Battalion
1942	25th Armoured Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)
1943	1st Canadian Tank Delivery Regiment
1943–45	25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)
"A" & "B" Squadrons attached to 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade
"C" Squadron attached to 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
"D" Squadron attached to 4th Canadian Armoured Division
"E" Squadron attached to II Canadian Corps
"F" Squadron attached to First Canadian Army
"G" Squadron attached to 5th Canadian Armoured Division
"H" Squadron attached to I Canadian Corps
1946	The Elgin Regiment (Infantry)
1954	The Elgin Regiment (27th Armoured Regiment)
1958	The Elgin Regiment (Royal Canadian Armoured Corps)
1997	31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgins)
2004	48 Field Squadron is re-established in Waterloo, Ontario
2006	Both Field Squadrons renamed Engineer Squadrons as part of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase 2.
2013	31 CER(The Elgins) perpetuates 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment (The Kangaroos


----------



## daftandbarmy

Crantor said:
			
		

> Many units could be re-rolled as infantry but have specialised functions that some non infantry units currently do.  Heck, more reserve MSEOP/drivers would be great.



We have just had one of our guys finally get his MSEop qualification... after three years. I can give him his Pte hooks this week (and a bottle of champagne for hanging in there for so long!).


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MCG said:
			
		

> That does not describe a need.  Reserve armour units could be transformed into infantry or a support function.  Not having tanks in the reserve does not lead to a requirement that we have more recce.



I don't think we have too much recce;  PEIR and Hfx Rifles combined can't do 2 x 8 car troops.  We have a lot of PRES G Wag units _*called*_ Regiments that are (likely all) understrength Sqns / overstrength Troops.


----------



## OldSolduer

We do have a generic mission statement at least in the infantry. We are supposed to train to generate general purpose combat capable soldiers. 

I personally think there are too many infantry regiments. Between the two orgs here we can barely maintain a company.


----------



## dangerboy

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> We do have a generic mission statement at least in the infantry. We are supposed to train to generate general purpose combat capable soldiers.
> 
> I personally think there are too many infantry regiments. Between the two orgs here we can barely maintain a company.



Just wondering if anyone has looked at how Winnipeg did it forming the Tac Inf Group and thought about applying to other cities with multiple Inf units, such as Toronto.  To me it seems like a good idea and I have not heard a lot of people bitching about loss of identity.


----------



## OldSolduer

dangerboy said:
			
		

> Just wondering if anyone has looked at how Winnipeg did it forming the Tac Inf Group and thought about applying to other cities with multiple Inf units, such as Toronto.  To me it seems like a good idea and I have not heard a lot of people bitching about loss of identity.



I'm not sure of the strength of Toronto's infantry units. I would say for units that can parade around 200 or more regularly, leave them be. If they can't produce, then group them under 1 CO and RSM and go for it. There will be some pushback, but once its said and done it is workable.


----------



## Dissident

Crantor said:
			
		

> Which begs the question as to why have certain trades in the PRES.  Many trades in the PRES are undeployable in their actual trades and cannot even CT as a semi-skilled/skilled applicant so why have them?  The exception would be those trades that fill a niche for the reserves.  Armoured Recce, med tech, *MP* are just a few that I can think of.



While the trade has been somewhat Schitzo since I've enrolled, the fact remains that the RegF MPs would have been in a world of hurt without the PRes MPs in the last ten years. With the Dom Ops tasking, RegF MPs have a hard time generating troops for any sort of surge in op tempo. 

We, PRes MPs, do not (with very few exceptions) get the full police training package. Nonetheless we have been able to fill in gaps as necessary. It's not great, but it has worked.

On a side note, I happen to have an acquaintance who just got posted to the Army MP Doctrine slot. I've met with Col LaFlamme this summer (along with CWO Raymond). The future of the PRes MPs has never looked brighter, IMHO. Let's see what happens with the PRes MPs in the next little while...

The main issue we are contending with right now is that the institution of the requirement to successfully complete MPAC, combined with the SIP limitation. Recruiting comes in dribbles. I warned higher of this 3 years ago and we will likely hit rock bottom before things changed. My platoon went from having our full establishment, 54 all rank on paper (~35 parading), to low 30s on paper (~18 parading). 

How is everybody else doing recruiting wise?


----------



## daftandbarmy

NinerSix said:
			
		

> How ius everybody else doing recruting wise?



We could recruit dozens more than we are allowed to, regularly. As a result we're kind of slowly drying up, especially when CT opportunities to the Regs come through.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We could recruit dozens more than we are allowed to, regularly. As a result we're kind of slowly drying up, especially when CT opportunities to the Regs come through.



And how much deadwood is still kept on the Regimental lists because "He's a good chap who might come back" or "We'll do releases later"?  Recruiting quotas are based (in part) on the posted strength of the unit - so keeping folks on the books who haven't paraded for a year or more only serve to cut your quota.

There are problems with the system, to be sure - but there are also many problems within units that units steadfastly refuse to address.


----------



## x_para76

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I'm not sure of the strength of Toronto's infantry units. I would say for units that can parade around 200 or more regularly, leave them be. If they can't produce, then group them under 1 CO and RSM and go for it. There will be some pushback, but once its said and done it is workable.



This would be a great idea for Hamilton as well. There are two infantry regiments and both have been steadily declining for one reason or another over the last few years, and both occupy the same armouries. If one unit could be formed likely from the RHLI as they're the senior regiment it would probably be a very successful move from the standpoint of training a fully manned company. 

Unfortunately this would likely never happen as the regimental senate for the A&SHOFC seems to be tied right into the old boys network and would fight the move tooth and nail.


----------



## Infanteer

The British Regimental system, despite what many think, has evolved tremendously over the years since 1685 when Regiments were officially brought onto the English Army establishment.  Most people associate the Regimental system with the British Army of the Cardwell-Childers reform era.  This era only lasted from 1881 to 1957 (76 years).  For the 200 years previous, they were all numbered Regiments of Foot (except for the Guards regiments) that were raised and disbanded as required.

Cardwell-Childers saw the British Army turn 109 Regiments of Foot into 69 Country Regiments.  This Regimental System was created specifically for the problem of garrisoning the Empire.  Each of these country Regiments generally had two battalions (although a couple had four) with one being at home (and generally understrength) while the other served abroad (predominantly in India).  Add three (later five) Guards Regiments, Gurkha Regiments and (post WWII) the Parachute Regiment and you had a Regimental System that served the needs of the Army.  During the two World Wars, Regiments expanded greatly, raising dozens of battalions.  

When India left the Empire, all the second battalions were disbanded in 47/48 and the need for such a Regimental System vanished.  So the system changed, and a series of amalgamations began starting in 1957 and occurring again in 1964, 1972, 1991 and 2005.  This would see the British Army reduced from 69 County Regiments to 10 Line Regiments (to which we can add the five Guards Regiments, a Gurkha Regiment and the Parachute Regiment).

So, when people talk about "the ancient Regiments of the UK", they aren't being completely accurate, as all 10 of the Line Regiments are about a decade old.  They carry on the traditions of the Regiments they perpetuate (for example, The Rifles bear the traditions of 22 Regiments of Foot which would, in 1882 become 13 County Regiments) but they are all fairly new and representative of a Regimental System that adapts to suite the Army and times.  Curiously, only seven Regiments have ever been disbanded - five Irish Regiments were disbanded when independence was granted in 1922 and two others chose to disband in 1968 rather than be amalgamated.  The Armoured Regiments of the UK have a very similar history.

The so what of the history lesson?  The Canadian Army is stuck in Cardwell-Childers.  Our system was designed during the same time, saw some moderate revision in the Interwar period, but has been basically stuck in "Cardwell-Childers Regimental System" mode ever since.  The oldest Regiments in the UK will likely always be the Guards Regiments, but the oldest line regiment (The Cheshire Regiment - over 300 years of independent service) was amalgamated in 2007, which shows that any reform is possible and that the world won't end.  Until we are able to flick the switch and figure out a Regimental System that serves the times, we'll be stuck with little Regiments living in splendid isolation but basically serving as an individual replacement pool....


----------



## ArmyRick

So in other words Canadian Army, EVOLVE already! I agree. 85 man regiments are ridicolous and every exercise usually sees units mixing and matching to create coy and battalions.


----------



## dapaterson

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> So in other words Canadian Army, EVOLVE already! I agree. 85 man regiments are ridicolous and every exercise usually sees units mixing and matching to create coy and battalions.



Yes, evolve already, and have a Reg F set of Bns based on need, not capbadge, and put the best infantry officers in positions of command, not the best of a particular capbadge.  And review why we need nine ERE Infantry LCols for each one commanding one of the ten (nine Bns plus the school).

Wasteful Bn and Regimental structures are not unique to the P Res...


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Yes, evolve already, and have a Reg F set of Bns based on need, not capbadge, and put the best infantry officers in positions of command, not the best of a particular capbadge.  And review why we need nine ERE Infantry LCols for each one commanding one of the ten (nine Bns plus the school).
> 
> Wasteful Bn and Regimental structures are not unique to the P Res...



Uh oh....  ;D


----------



## Rifleman62

Are we still at this?

Rifleman62:
[





> b]« Reply #1109 on: March 13, 2009, 09:52:00 »[/b]
> 
> Quote
> 
> *I posted this here previously on: June 24, 2005, 22:54:58*
> 
> It was only a matter of time, and the time is now. The Army Reserve needs transformation. We have far too many Reserve units that cannot be sustained. Too many Reserve units that cannot sustain leadership at all levels, especially at the MWO/CWO and Maj/LCol ranks. Unit sucession is difficult. Too many units with less than 75 effective personnel that have a CO, DCO, Adjt, RSM, Trg O, Orderly Room, Unit QM, etc. How many bayonets does that leave? Do we need all this unit infrastructure that we cannot sustain? Our Reserve units have not fought as a unit for over 60 years, and never will ( mobilization is dead, therefore the theory of why we need so many units is dead).In our CBG we have the following in a city of less than 115,000: a Nav Res stone frigrate; an Army Res Inf Bn and Svc Bn; a Coms Res Sqn; and a CFMG Fd Amb.The local area cannot sustain this many units, nor produce the senior leadership. We need to tacticaly group units, and in some cases all the P Res units in location. Why not a LCol or Cdr commanding all five of these units, with one OR, and a  Navy and Army Trg O's.  Sure cuts down on the infrastructure.  Sure sounds familiar.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Pardon an ignoramus such as I, but is the militia Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment working and training with its parent Regiment, or is it integrated into the RCBG system that covers Quebec? 

If the later, would it not be the logical choice to see if it could be turned into a real "reserve" for the vandoos, run by the vandoos regulars, and then see if the concept could be expanded to the rest o he militia?

Just asking.


----------



## Jungle

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Pardon an ignoramus such as I, but is the militia Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment working and training with its parent Regiment, or is it integrated into the RCBG system that covers Quebec?
> 
> If the later, would it not be the logical choice to see if it could be turned into a real "reserve" for the vandoos, run by the vandoos regulars, and then see if the concept could be expanded to the rest o he militia?
> 
> Just asking.



The 4th and 6th Battalions of the R22eR belong to 34 CBG.


----------



## Remius

Jungle said:
			
		

> The 4th and 6th Battalions of the R22eR belong to 34 CBG.



6th Battalion Canadian Guards also belongs to 34... ;D


----------



## Colin Parkinson

But the Reserves need a "draw" in order to recruit. With revolving tasks and no long term plan, why should anyone devote their spare time to the reserves? We were op's tasked to support 3rd herd, now a bit impractical, but the clear direction and extra resources, energized the unit for that time period, because you can give the new soldier and the long timer a clear answer in what is this all for? 

Equipment is going to play a part to, imaginary equipment is going to lead to imaginary soldiers. Artillery is going to need artillery guns or some real mortars, armour is going to require some sort of light armoured vehicle or direct access to them. Infantry is going to need crew served weapons and transport. Support services need the equipment to do the job and Combat engineers are going to need heavy equipment.

This is all going to cost, but unless you invest in it, your numbers will continue to dwindle.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> But the Reserves need a "draw" in order to recruit. With revolving tasks and no long term plan, why should anyone devote their spare time to the reserves? We were op's tasked to support 3rd herd, now a bit impractical, but the clear direction and extra resources, energized the unit for that time period, because you can give the new soldier and the long timer a clear answer in what is this all for?
> 
> Equipment is going to play a part to, imaginary equipment is going to lead to imaginary soldiers. Artillery is going to need artillery guns or some real mortars, armour is going to require some sort of light armoured vehicle or direct access to them. Infantry is going to need crew served weapons and transport. Support services need the equipment to do the job and Combat engineers are going to need heavy equipment.
> 
> This is all going to cost, but unless you invest in it, your numbers will continue to dwindle.



It's like any other sales process. Unfortunately, ours is stuck in the 'Don Draper' mode and era, while our competitors have entered the 'screen age' years ago....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I favour the older system of attesting virtually all-comers.  After they walk through the door and are cleared by the MO slap a beret/balmoral/glen/caubeen on their head, give them a pair of coveralls, a belt and a pair of boots and start them square-bashing.
> 
> After a few weeks of regular attendance put them on the Class A rolls and start paying them.
> 
> If they sign on for advanced training that would take them into Class B and C territory, potentially operating in support of the the Reserves or the Regs then clear them to the deployable standards of fitness and allowable moral turpitude.
> 
> The idea is get the interested into the system and engaged pdq.  At very least you will engage a part of the community and give them some exposure to the CF when they are most receptive.  That will give you a broader base of support in the community (even if it is only at the social club / auxiliary level) as well as developing a pool of attested willing from which the active Reserve and the Regs can be recruited.  You also get a longer period to actually evaluate recruits and determine if they are a fit.
> 
> With respect to liability - have the attested sign a waiver recognizing that they are not covered to the same standard as an enrolled soldier and have the CF/DND purchase commercial insurance similar to that purchased by high risk adventure businesses (skiing, parachuting, rafting, climbing etc) to cover loss of life and limb.
> 
> The full coverage should only be supplied to Class A,B and C Reserves and Regs under existing regulations.



I was the Rct O for the SHofC in 1980 (back when the earth was cooling and every civvy thought we were Vietnam baby killers) and we did exactly that. Within 3 months we had over 150 people on parade every night. Some dropped out before they hit recruit training, but we ran local courses on which all recruits were loaded and churned them through in droves. I recal one course with 60 recruits, all quartered right in the armoury during weekend courses. Many of those who came through this sausage machine are our SNCOs and Senior Officers of today (- or retired  )


----------



## quadrapiper

Seems there might also be a need for, in whatever structure might be adopted, much more flexibility in structure and role depending on unit location. The model that works in a university town might not be the right one for a rural unit. The former might need to adopt a structure based on bulk intakes and short service (hopefully ending with a transfer, rather than release), while the latter is likely looking at a more stable, but significantly smaller, existence.

Any thoughts on a split-purpose scheme? Group one is (relatively) short-notice deployable, either individually or on a small-unit basis, acting as a reserve for the Regulars, while group two is focused on DomOps in all their variety, acting as enablers for group one, local/civil defence, and whatever other domestic tasks might be best filled by part-time personnel.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As we did for the "Summer Youth Employment Programs" Worked quite well actually. Thankfully I had squirreled away the 51 pattern webbing, so the course went into the field looking like real 1960 reg force with webbing, black coveralls, boots and berets  ;D

Buy cheap airsoft tactical vests for them, coverall type uniforms, normal sleeping bags, poncho's to make hooches for the field and a fund to hire locally for the summer and bring on staff from the local units. You get young Jr and Snr NCO experience commanding troops, teaching skills and field craft. Perhaps run 1-2 course per brigade every summer. Convince Cabinet to force Human resources Canada (or whatever their name is now) to cough up some money to help pay the recruits. At the end offer them long term reserve or reg force service.


----------



## Kirkhill

The more we talk about this the more I realize there is already an expandable model available:  3 Div's "Bold Eagle" programme.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/jobs-caf-aboriginal/bold-eagle-training.page



> Challenge: Are you eligible?
> 
> This summer training program gives participants a taste of military life via the basic military qualification course – with the option to pursue a part-time or full-time career with the Canadian Armed Forces afterwards.
> 
> Conducted within 3rd Canadian Division (3 Cdn Div) since summer 1990, Bold Eagle is a partnership between the Department of National Defence and Aboriginal organizations from across western Canada.
> 
> Since its inception, over 1200 Aboriginal youth have completed the demanding Bold Eagle program, with many continuing to serve part-time or full-time in the Canadian Armed Forces afterwards.
> 
> Are you up to the Bold Eagle challenge?
> Are you Aboriginal (First Nation, Métis or Inuit)?
> Are you 16 years of age or older?
> Have you completed Grade 10 or higher education?
> Are you a Canadian citizen?
> Are you residing in western Canada or north-western Ontario?
> If you answered yes to all of the above, then you meet the eligibility requirements to apply to Bold Eagle.
> 
> Take the challenge and apply before April 30th!
> 
> Notes:
> Can apply at age 16 provided you turn 17 years of age prior to enrolment (attending the program).
> An exception to this is that you can apply and enroll (attend) at age 16 provided you are in school full-time.
> Parental or legal guardian consent is required for those under 18 years of age. The age limit to apply is 29 years of age.
> Those completing grade 10 may apply provided they obtain a letter from their high school outlining the courses they are taking and potential to complete them in order to attain grade 10 standing at the end of the school year.
> They cannot be enrolled until they provide proof of completion; and this may affect selection given there are limited positions which may already be filled at that time.
> Residents of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and NW Ontario are eligible to apply for the program.





> The course itself is the standard five-week Army Reserve Basic Military Qualification (BMQ).
> 
> In addition to the comprehensive and extremely demanding training, there are regular Elder hours throughout, and also a mid-course sweat in the sweat lodge.
> 
> During the BMQ course, candidates learn what every new recruit requires: military knowledge, weapons handling, navigation with map and compass, first aid, drill, outdoor field craft and survival skills for example. The training is designed to promote self-confidence, self-discipline, teamwork and physical fitness.



Maybe you could leave the pow-wows, sweat lodges and aboriginal influences in the programme.

The Kiwis seem to have effectively married British Squares with the Maori Haka as part of their military culture.


----------



## MilEME09

While its a very good program from what I've seen, from those who i've talked to that went through it, its also a culture shock for many which shy's many away from continuing on for a career in the reg force or from joining the reserves.


----------



## Kirkhill

Perhaps it might not be as much of a culture shock for non-aboriginals...

But there again


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Who is she?


----------



## dimsum

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The Kiwis seem to have effectively married British Squares with the Maori Haka as part of their military culture.



The Kiwis have integrated bits of Maori culture (specifically the Haka) into every aspect of their society.  Each school/sporting team/etc. has their own Haka, so it's natural for them that the military would have it as well.  

I'm not sure we could do something similar now, since the aboriginal culture isn't as ingrained in the collective Canadian identity.


----------



## dapaterson

Dimsum said:
			
		

> The Kiwis have integrated bits of Maori culture (specifically the Haka) into every aspect of their society.  Each school/sporting team/etc. has their own Haka, so it's natural for them that the military would have it as well.
> 
> I'm not sure we could do something similar now, since the aboriginal culture isn't as ingrained in the collective Canadian identity.



Canada has no single aboriginal culture; the Sto Lo of the Fraser Valley are different from the Mohawks for Kanewake who are different from the Mi'kmaq of Eskatoni.


----------



## a_majoor

A few semi random observations here:

1. The reserves could expand quite rapidly into a large force if we simply look at the issue of available bodies. A typical example was a Reserve CoOp course I was 2I/C on a few years ago, which was limited to an intake of 30 for London and surrounding area. One of the school councillors responsible for their school's intake told me that over 100 students applied from that school alone. Most of the other councillors had similar observations, meaning that up to 1000 recruits could have been taken (although after weeding out I suspect the real number would have been a still respectable 500+). I will also note that the CoOp program is NOT heavy promoted or advertised in the schools (often because *we* don't even know until the last minute if it will be given the green light or not: the mad scramble for course stores and training aids is something to behold), and in many schools the administration is indifferent or even hostile. In this case the limiting factor is more the size of the instructor cadre and amount of uniforms and training stores and areas that can be secured.

2. I think the _real_ locus of evolution needs to be in the Regular Force. Looking at conflicts like Ukraine, Gaza or the general mess in the Middle East, the types of forces which are being used tend towards SoF supported by a wide range of enablers (Cyber, PSYOPS, ISTAR and remote fire support in the form of UAVs and aircraft etc.). Large numbers of men are needed for "holding" actions rather than fighting (the bulk of the Russian forces are there on the border seemingly to mesmerize Ukrainian and NATO decision makers, the fighting was done by irregulars backed up with SPETSNAZ troops and training until quite recently. Even now, the numbers of Russian troops "on vacation" in Ukraine is a fraction of the potential available). These sorts of troops require intensive training to receive the proper skill sets, and to practice them often, hence the need for full time and relatively long term troops for these tasks.

3. COIN, STABOPS and other forms of "holding actions" (the Russians don't have to be the _only_ ones massed on the border, after all) needs lots of manpower, but fewer of the specialist skills and training of SoF and enablers. Bulking up the Reserves to do the traditional "peer to peer" type fighting and provide the boots on the ground for other manpower intensive missions makes sense because these missions are shorter term and much less frequent. Of course, lots of manpower still translates into lots of equipment, from actual boots (I'm down to one pair again, so the issue rankles) to trucks, AFVs, aircraft and ships, plus the stores to train people and run things. Now while this is expensive, it isn't impossible. Nordic nations have entire mechanized battalions "under tarps" waiting for their soldiers to arrive for their two week annual training exercise. US National Guardsmen only parade one weekend a month, yet seem able to operate in mechanized formations as well. We should look at how _they_ can pull that off with far less parading then *we* get.

This turns a lot of the arguments on their heads, but the reality we are facing is quite different than even the end of the cold war, when I first learned about fighting a large peer enemy force, much less the 90's or '00's.


----------



## PanaEng

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We have just had one of our guys finally get his MSEop qualification... after three years. I can give him his Pte hooks this week (and a bottle of champagne for hanging in there for so long!).


Unfortunately, that is common with the Engineers.


----------



## PanaEng

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> then clear them to the deployable standards of fitness and allowable moral turpitude.


I may not agree but I respect what you wrote in that post, except for this. There is no such thing as 'allowable moral turpitude' and, if you think there is or ought to be in the army, have a look at the events that led to the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.
I hope none here condones that concept. (I'm going by this definition/explanation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_turpitude)
Having said that, and having done stupid things drunk and sober both in my time (and may still do), there are things of low consequence that may be handled at the lowest levels and leadership discretion is warranted - but every "stupid" action must be addressed.

Chimo!


----------



## Kirkhill

PanaEng:

I have been trapped again by my own cynical brand of "humour".  And yet you and I are not so far apart.

"Allowable moral turpitude" was intended to be a euphemism for "character" which will always be determined subjectively.  Also, while I agree that high standards in that area are desirable I can't bring myself to accept that all positions in the CF require the same standard.  

Historically the quality of the force was not necessarily reflected in the quality of the individual. But that was likely due to soldiers being under tighter control and supervision both in garrison and in the field.  Once upon a time officers and NCOs had low expectations of their charges and behaved accordingly.

Do your officers and NCOs find it convenient to assume higher standards amongst their troops as an opportunity to spend less time "supervising" them?  Doesn't the tendency towards billeting troops on the economy, a practice "outlawed" in Britain in the 17th century (albeit for different reasons),  also tend to make the connection between the paternal command structure and the troops under command more tenuous?

For clarity's sake: I am not criticizing or implying criticism.  Your response to my comment just caused me to start wondering about the importance of, and necessity for, character and how it was and is managed.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I think the past SnrNCO's were expected to maintain order in the ranks and were given fair latitude in how to go about this. I suspect with their hands being tied in this modern era, more problems find their way into the more formal disciplinary procedures. This prevents abuses, but also limits what an NCO can do with a young soldier who needs a bit of firm guidance to correct his path. I can imagine the likes of Smokey Smith not doing well under the new structure.


----------



## Dissident

Or how about opening up the recruiting valve and let units do more recruiting events. Take recruiting away from the recruiting centers.

Yes, I know there would be problems. That is probably why recruiting was largely taken away from units in the first place. But the way we are doing it right now is killing us.


----------



## Rocky Mountains

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Or how about opening up the recruiting valve and let units do more recruiting events. Take recruiting away from the recruiting centers.
> 
> Yes, I know there would be problems. That is probably why recruiting was largely taken away from units in the first place. But the way we are doing it right now is killing us.



A lot of reserve units seemed to be quite proficient at recruiting.  My recollection is that recruiting centres took over reserve recruiting as a make-work project in the early 1990s when regular force recruiting was cut back severely.


----------



## Jungle

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> limited and uncomplicated combat operations.



Combat operations are uncomplicated until the shooting starts...


----------



## Fishbone Jones

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "Units can recruit all by themselves!"  No.  I recall the days of the helpful MCpl giving advice on the entry exams, and perhaps fudging a colour blindness test to help a unit make its numbers.  Standards exist for reasons, and undergo regular validation.  Saying "He's a great guy, just not smart enough to pass the test" is not a reason to lower or ignore the standards.



 : Of course the RC is the better choice, after all look at the headache and money waster they gave us. I'm sure you still have nightmares trying to short circuit his letters to the CDS, MoD and the PM. Yup, the RCs are a better choice because they would never screw up, right? :waiting:


----------



## GR66

Our deployment in Afghanistan was a strain on the military to sustain and relied heavily on Reserve augmentation.  How quickly would we go through our pool of "trained" replacements if we were ever forced to engage in major combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  WWI, WWII, Korea.  They all required expanding the Army and recruiting/conscripting to fill the military's manpower needs in time of war.  Untrained civilians have out of necessity been turned into soldiers in pretty short order in all our major wars.  I'm sure our next major war will be the same.  A larger pool of even partially trained recruits would certainly be better than nothing as a starting point.  

Even a relatively small pool of volunteer Militia combined with the unit rationalizations suggested throughout this thread would swell the size of the remaining Militia units.  This would permit better unit-level training opportunities even at a company level which would give the Class-A Reservists more chances to practice their basic soldiering skills, take on leadership roles and pass on their more advanced knowledge to the volunteer members.  

As to the question of why anyone would volunteer for the Militia instead of getting paid?  You'd probably be surprised.  Some people might have the interest but not have the time to devote to the courses required to become a Class A member.  Or their availability may be spotty.  Some may be curious and wish to find out if they like it before they make a greater commitment.  Regardless of the reason it's been my experience that many people will work much harder giving their time freely for something they love and care about than many others who are paid to do the same thing.


----------



## dangerboy

GR66 said:
			
		

> Our deployment in Afghanistan was a strain on the military to sustain and relied heavily on Reserve augmentation.  How quickly would we go through our pool of "trained" replacements if we were ever forced to engage in major combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  WWI, WWII, Korea.  They all required expanding the Army and recruiting/conscripting to fill the military's manpower needs in time of war.  Untrained civilians have out of necessity been turned into soldiers in pretty short order in all our major wars.  I'm sure our next major war will be the same.  A larger pool of even partially trained recruits would certainly be better than nothing as a starting point.



For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.

So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption.


----------



## GR66

dangerboy said:
			
		

> For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.
> 
> So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption.



I don't argue what you're saying at all.  In a more "restrained" high intensity conflict we wouldn't send recruits right into combat either.  The same training period would be required for any call-ups to bring them up to the "modern" standard of warfare.  

However, I believe that in the case of a full-scale war between NATO and Russia or China in the worst case scenario (which after all is what mobilization plans are designed to address aren't they?) the situation would be very different.  While nobody can divine the future with any certainty I would be willing to bet that we will run out of our advanced equipment (vehicles, combat aircraft, missiles, etc.) before we run out of people (excepting if it goes Nuclear of course which would make any military planning irrelevant).  

Modern combat vehicles, equipment and munitions are not quick to make and I would suspect that in the case of a general war our production facilities (or the power and transportation networks that allow them to operate) would be primary targets for enemy attack/disruption.  It wouldn't surprise me at all that if a war lasts beyond the relatively short "come as you are" phase and we have time to mobilize reserves that they will be equipped and operate in a very similar way to the way our fathers and grandfathers did in WWII.  Simple vehicles and weapons are faster and easier to make in quantity and are much more likely to be available to our mobilized forces than modern MBTs, F-35s, ATGMs, etc.  Having a pool of people that already have a basic understanding of fundamental infantry tactics probably wouldn't be a bad thing.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dangerboy said:
			
		

> For all our major wars you are talking 3 wars, WWI, WWII and Korea.  Training and tactics have changed since then and what the solider needs to know to be able to fight has increased.  And for all 3 of the wars it was not an immediate get there and fight.  In WWII they were fortunate to have a few years in England to train before they deployed to Italy.  And in Korea they had a lot of WWII veterans in key positions and it was one unit at the beginning and Col Stone delayed 2 PPCLI going into battle as he know they were not ready yet.
> 
> So to say that mass recruitment worked in the past and will work in the future is in my opinion not a very valid assumption.



AFAIK, the main thing that made our mass mobilizations of the past work at all is what we have in place today:

1) A small but well trained professional military
2) A broadly based national military 'footprint', and recruiting/mobilization capacity, represented by the militia and other reserve units based at local armouries

Do we need this 'legacy' organizational structure now? Too far above my pay grade....


----------



## Rifleman62

Do you really think that if Canada had an immediate/urgent requirement to expand the CF, the CFRG would be responsible for recruitment with all their known worts?


----------



## a_majoor

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Do you really think that if Canada had an immediate/urgent requirement to expand the CF, the CFRG would be responsible for recruitment with all their known worts?



We could always try the Sir Sam Hughes solution instead.......


----------



## Old Sweat

Thucydides said:
			
		

> We could always try the Sir Sam Hughes solution instead.......



Or the 1950 Brooke Claxton approach which resulted in massive chaos and the recruitment of, among others, a Boer War veteran for the Special Force for Korea.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Is the British Reservist any different from ours regarding rights and obligations during mobilization?

Mobilisation means being called up for operational duties. These can be anywhere in the World where regular forces are operating. This page explains what happens when a soldier is mobilised and what happens when he returns to work following a tour of duty. Find out more about both Army Reserve and employer obligations. 


Rights and responsibilities


The laws covering mobilisation are there to protect both Reservists and their employers.

 Although the mobilisation process includes the issuing of an employer pack, the Reservist is still responsible for informing their employer that they have been called out.

 Once a call-out notice has been issued, the Reservist is covered by the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985 (SOE 85). This provides two types of protection - protection of employment for those liable to be mobilised, and reinstatement for those who have been mobilised. This means that:
•the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent
•the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service
•Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation

http://www.army.mod.uk/reserve/31786.aspx


----------



## Fishbone Jones

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Is the British Reservist any different from ours regarding rights and obligations during mobilization?
> 
> Mobilisation means being called up for operational duties. These can be anywhere in the World where regular forces are operating. This page explains what happens when a soldier is mobilised and what happens when he returns to work following a tour of duty. Find out more about both Army Reserve and employer obligations.
> 
> 
> Rights and responsibilities
> 
> 
> The laws covering mobilisation are there to protect both Reservists and their employers.
> 
> Although the mobilisation process includes the issuing of an employer pack, the Reservist is still responsible for informing their employer that they have been called out.
> 
> Once a call-out notice has been issued, the Reservist is covered by the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985 (SOE 85). This provides two types of protection - protection of employment for those liable to be mobilised, and reinstatement for those who have been mobilised. This means that:
> •the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent
> •the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service
> •Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation
> 
> http://www.army.mod.uk/reserve/31786.aspx



How dare you make such a sensible solution that even the Cdn gov't would find impossible not to pass :facepalm:

It's already written, all they have to do is find someone that has the balls to table it. :dunno:


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> •the employer cannot terminate a persons employment based on their liability to be mobilised and without their consent



Instead, the employer can refuse to hire the Reservist based on their liability to be mobilised.  This became a form of proactive discrimination in both the UK and the US during the last round of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> •the Reservist is entitled to reinstatement to their original position (or one of equal pay and status) on completion of military service



Unless the employer reorganizes or restructures in such a way as to render the Reservist's position redundant.  Also, this clause does not apply if the Reservists place of employment changes hands. The new owners are not bound by this.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> •Employers and Reservists are entitled to make claims for financial assistance and apply for exemption or deferral of mobilisation



This is the one piece of the UK plan which actually stands to benefit small and medium sized enterprises, those hardest hit when 1/3 to 1/2 of their workforce is mobilised.


----------



## cameron

So here's a related question.  A commissioned officer in a PRes Armour Regiment; for intance, an Lt., volunteers for an overseas combat deployment, say Afghanistan.  Seeing as how he would have been trained to command a completely different type of vehicle than his Reg Force counterparts, what role would he play with a Reg Force unit deployed overseas?


----------



## brihard

cameron said:
			
		

> So here's a related question.  A commissioned officer in a PRes Armour Regiment; for intance, an Lt., volunteers for an overseas combat deployment, say Afghanistan.  Seeing as how he would have been trained to command a completely different type of vehicle than his Reg Force counterparts, what role would he play with a Reg Force unit deployed overseas?



We didn't have reserve officers commanding regular force armoured units. The only reserve armoured officers I saw in command roles overseas were doing convoy escorts with platoons formed nearly completely of reservists, or in specialized roles like the CIMIC/PSYOPS world. The regular force has more than enough qualified officers to command its units and subunits.


----------



## cameron

Thanks Brihard, you've answered my question as to what slot a PRes Armoured Officer fills on an overseas deployment.  Thankfully, commanding a platoon tasked to convoy escort allows him/her to execute one of the armoured/cavalry roles they were trained for in an operational theatre.  Just one question, I know what PSYOPS is but what's CIMIC?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brihard said:
			
		

> We didn't have reserve officers commanding regular force armoured units. The only reserve armoured officers I saw in command roles overseas were doing convoy escorts with platoons formed nearly completely of reservists, or in specialized roles like the CIMIC/PSYOPS world. The regular force has more than enough qualified officers to command its units and subunits.



In other words you mean 'quarantined', right?


----------



## KevinB

My laptop died last week so a missed a lot of discussions.
FJAG - I fully agree with you, the Reserves need legislation to enable it.
   Down here the Gov gives tax breaks to companies hiring veterans, so hiring NG folks is not just protected but encouraged.  Something the Cdn Gov may wish to consider.

 I also fully agree that the Regular Force and its Regimental Structures is backwards and problematic (at best).

Infanteer has it dead nuts that the CF as a whole is stuck in an outdated method - one that needs to re-think it self for the good of the CF as a whole, the Navy seems to be a leader is this respect (as much as it pains me to say).

Military organization needs to be fluid and adaptive -- if it was - instead of coming up with wonderful buzz words (and new HQ's) it would be flexible and responsive, prepared as it can be for Canada's defensive needs.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:
			
		

> My laptop died last week so a missed a lot of discussions.
> FJAG - I fully agree with you, the Reserves need legislation to enable it.
> Down here the Gov gives tax breaks to companies hiring veterans, so hiring NG folks is not just protected but encouraged.  Something the Cdn Gov may wish to consider.
> 
> I also fully agree that the Regular Force and its Regimental Structures is backwards and problematic (at best).
> 
> Infanteer has it dead nuts that the CF as a whole is stuck in an outdated method - one that needs to re-think it self for the good of the CF as a whole, the Navy seems to be a leader is this respect (as much as it pains me to say).
> 
> Military organization needs to be fluid and adaptive -- if it was - instead of coming up with wonderful buzz words (and new HQ's) it would be flexible and responsive, prepared as it can be for Canada's defensive needs.



I'm also quite a fan of the US Montgomery GI Bill provisions which help significantly with educational programs post active duty.

I have looked at most of the benefits available to Canadian Reservists and find that for the most part they're based on a "what have you done for us today" philosophy that kick in for "actual days paraded" rather than the fact that reservists also form a "stand-by" force. (a key example is the transition away from the RFRG which rewarded "years served" rather than "days paraded"). To me it seems that reservists have become just another exercise in "bean counting".

Regretfully I have come to the conclusion that our senior leadership simply doesn't care enough to improve the system to make it more attractive to potential reservists or more effective for the country. I've :deadhorse: often enough when I was still in; at this point I just get :gloomy: when I see the wasted potential.

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm also quite a fan of the US Montgomery GI Bill provisions which help significantly with educational programs post active duty.
> 
> I have looked at most of the benefits available to Canadian Reservists and find that for the most part they're based on a "what have you done for us today" philosophy that kick in for "actual days paraded" rather than the fact that reservists also form a "stand-by" force. (a key example is the transition away from the RFRG which rewarded "years served" rather than "days paraded"). To me it seems that reservists have become just another exercise in "bean counting".



RFRG, like the Norwegian Blue parrot, is no more.  However, in its dying throes it was converted to CAF severance, and paid out based on years of service, not days paraded, and done so retroactively up to the day when it ceased to accumulate.

On the plus side, there is up to $2000 per year for for years in academic upgrading for Reservists (50% of tuition and books).  Not perfect, but a decent incentive.



> Regretfully I have come to the conclusion that our senior leadership simply doesn't care enough to improve the system to make it more attractive to potential reservists or more effective for the country. I've :deadhorse: often enough when I was still in; at this point I just get :gloomy: when I see the wasted potential.
> 
> :cheers:



Change is slow in any organization; the platoon commanders in Afghanistan will command the CAF in another 20 years.  I once despaired of seeing change - then realized that it comes slowly, particularly in intensely small-c conservative organizations like the military.


----------



## KevinB

My concern would be if the then Lt/Capt's can survive that long? and more pressingly can the CF.


----------



## GR66

I just picked up "A National Force - The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000" by Peter Kasurak at my local library.  I'm not far enough into it to comment on the book but he does discuss the Militia in Chapter 1.

In the 1950's he states:



> "What is clear is that, although the army had recognized that the key problem with the Militia was the incompatibility of part-time training with the skills required, it failed to design a workable solution.  Once the Second World War reservoir of military skills had been depleted, the Militia went into a death spiral"



In 1956, then Chief of the General Staff Graham commissioned Brigadier W.A.B Anderson to undertake a confidential study of the organization, equipment and training of the Militia.  As a result of his findings Anderson presented four options to CGS Graham:



> Plan A - Use existing Militia units to create a ready reserve of full-time, short-service soldiers recruited from sixteen- to twenty-four-year-olds serving for one year.
> Plan B - Make the strongest Militia units into the "Regular Army Reserve" as auxiliary battalions linked to Regular Force units.  The remaining units would become the "Militia" and would be given basic training to provide a partly trained nucleus for home and civil defence operations.
> Plan C - Link Militia units in pairs, one to be deployable and the other to be a depot and training unit.  Units would not know which had been designated as the deployable unit.
> Plan D - Some Militia units would become part of the Regular Army to provide troops to supplement the field force.
> 
> Both Anderson and Graham favoured Plan B, but a federal election took place, and the Conservatives led by John Diefenbaker came to power.  The new minister of national defence, George Pearkes, had been a strong supporter of a civil defence role for the Militia and, as we have already seen, did not believe that mass mobilization served a purpose in the nuclear age."



So it's not just 68 pages of thread circling around the same issue and same possible solutions...it's over 50 years of inability to solve the problem.  Organizational inertia and a conservative culture are one thing...this is total organizational paralysis!


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 

I have often heard the expression "the battles of academia are so long and bloody because the matter so little".

Perhaps that is ultimately the problem here - It just doesn't matter.


----------



## Monsoon

GR66 said:
			
		

> So it's not just 68 pages of thread circling around the same issue and same possible solutions...it's over 50 years of inability to solve the problem.  Organizational inertia and a conservative culture are one thing...this is total organizational paralysis!


Is Afghanistan now so far in the rearview mirror that we're back to conidently asserting that the militia is a hopeless bag of hammers that has no role to play? Frankly, in 68 pages the only legitimate criticism of the organization I've seen is, "Many reserve units are parading far below strength." Given the fact that units releasing 20-odd members a year are being given recruiting quotas of 6 to 10 to save training money, this should hardly come as a surprise to anyone.

Dare I suggest that the militia has no problems at all that an injection of cash and some will to support the organization at the CA HQ level won't solve?


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> GR66
> 
> I have often heard the expression "the battles of academia are so long and bloody because the matter so little".
> 
> Perhaps that is ultimately the problem here - It just doesn't matter.



You're probably right on that.  It certainly seems clear that as early as the 50's the leaders of the Army/CF seriously questioned the need for the Militia at all.  A repeated theme in the book is that both military and civilian leaders really question the need for the Militia at all, beyond a vague political purpose.  

Large scale mobilization has been almost universally seen as being a non-starter ever since the USSR got the bomb.  Any war between nuclear powers would be over (either escalated to nuclear war or negotiated to prevent nuclear war) long before any mobilized troops would have the ability to take part in the conflict.  Besides that there has simply never been the capability to rapidly deploy or even equip said mobilized forces. 

In the case of a non-superpower, or regional proxy conflict, the view seems to have been that there would never be mobilization of Reserve units and that their only role would be individual augmentation.  Even in this case the Reserves were seen as preferably used to augment domestic Reg Force positions in order to allow those Regulars to deploy as opposed to direct augmentation by Reservists.  

It seems to me that our (military and political leadership's) self-delusion about what the CF is REALLY capable of doing results in a Militia (and Reg Force) structure that is simply far too bloated and inefficient.  Ironically, accepting a reduced (in size anyway) role for the CF would likely be something that would be politically sellable to the majority of Canadians while at the same time the resulting, leaner and realistically organized military could hopefully be more efficient and reasonably well equipped.

Hamiltongs:  I don't think anyone is saying that Reservists are "bags of hammers"....just that the Militia as an organization is structurally designed to fulfill a role (fully trained individual augmentation) for which they are really not well suited, or alternately a role for which there may be no real need and/or ability to support (massive mobilization).  There are always individuals that make liars out of any generalization, however, and of course many Reservists played a key role in Afghanistan.  The question though is whether the Militia as currently designed is the best way to fulfill this role.


----------



## KevinB

I'll partially say it...
Realistically without legislation the Militia as a whole entity is a useless bag of hammers, as far as units are concerned.
  If there is a lesson to be learned from Reservist augmentation in Afghanistan - is that anything beyond a PL is a probably a waste.
 Perhaps in some trades Maj could be justified.

I would personally opine from a strict operational value POV that if you slash and burn a lot of Res Senior Officer and Senior NCO positions - the monies that where going to those PY's (or whatever term is used for Reserve positions) could be used for more training and equipment at the Section and Pl level.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

GR66 said:
			
		

> You're probably right on that.  It certainly seems clear that as early as the 50's the leaders of the Army/CF seriously questioned the need for the Militia at all.  A repeated theme in the book is that both military and civilian leaders really question the need for the Militia at all, beyond a vague political purpose.
> 
> Large scale mobilization has been almost universally seen as being a non-starter ever since the USSR got the bomb.  Any war between nuclear powers would be over (either escalated to nuclear war or negotiated to prevent nuclear war) long before any mobilized troops would have the ability to take part in the conflict.  Besides that there has simply never been the capability to rapidly deploy or even equip said mobilized forces.
> 
> In the case of a non-superpower, or regional proxy conflict, the view seems to have been that there would never be mobilization of Reserve units and that their only role would be individual augmentation.  Even in this case the Reserves were seen as preferably used to augment domestic Reg Force positions in order to allow those Regulars to deploy as opposed to direct augmentation by Reservists.
> 
> It seems to me that our (military and political leadership's) self-delusion about what the CF is REALLY capable of doing results in a Militia (and Reg Force) structure that is simply far too bloated and inefficient.  Ironically, accepting a reduced (in size anyway) role for the CF would likely be something that would be politically sellable to the majority of Canadians while at the same time the resulting, leaner and realistically organized military could hopefully be more efficient and reasonably well equipped.
> 
> Hamiltongs:  I don't think anyone is saying that Reservists are "bags of hammers"....just that the Militia as an organization is structurally designed to fulfill a role (fully trained individual augmentation) for which they are really not well suited, or alternately a role for which there may be no real need and/or ability to support (massive mobilization).  There are always individuals that make liars out of any generalization, however, and of course many Reservists played a key role in Afghanistan.  The question though is whether the Militia as currently designed is the best way to fulfill this role.



Mind you they questioned the need for anything army related with the advent of nuclear weapons. We were going to be bombed to the stone age was the opinion.


----------



## Old Sweat

Colin P said:
			
		

> Mind you they questioned the need for anything army related with the advent of nuclear weapons. We were going to be bombed to the stone age was the opinion.



There was an oped piece in the Ottawa Citizen last Saturday questioning the need of an army for other than minor tasks in Canada and suggesting the funds should be diverted to the RCAF and especially the RCN.


----------



## GR66

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> There was an oped piece in the Ottawa Citizen last Saturday questioning the need of an army for other than minor tasks in Canada and suggesting the funds should be diverted to the RCAF and especially the RCN.



I guess first we need to send all the bad guys a memo that they must now stay in the open or on boats...


----------



## McG

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... in 68 pages the only legitimate criticism of the organization I've seen is, "Many reserve units are parading far below strength." Given the fact that units releasing 20-odd members a year are being given recruiting quotas of 6 to 10 to save training money, this should hardly come as a surprise to anyone.
> 
> Dare I suggest that the militia has no problems at all that an injection of cash and some will to support the organization at the CA HQ level won't solve?


The problem is not that units are under strength.  The Army Reserve is capped at a prescribed size.  The problem is that we have an organization that puts a LCol over top of a small company.  Giving resources and authority for reserve units to grow to 500 pers is outside the CAF's scope.  What is within the CAF's scope is cutting the LCol, Maj, CWO And MWO which are extraneous to the authorized strength.


----------



## Monsoon

MCG said:
			
		

> The problem is not that units are under strength.  The Army Reserve is capped at a prescribed size.  The problem is that we have an organization that puts a LCol over top of a small company.  Giving resources and authority for reserve units to grow to 500 pers is outside the CAF's scope.  What is within the CAF's scope is cutting the LCol, Maj, CWO And MWO which are extraneous to the authorized strength.


Okay, I'll make the case if a devil's advocate is what's needed: expecting a 500-600 multiplier per LCol and CWO is a regular force infantry battalion-specific construct that fails in application all across the regular force CF, to say nothing of the reserve. The command challenges of commanding a 200-person militia unit that needs to do it's own recruiting, training of personnel much of the way to the OFP, career management, personnel administration, finance/budgeting for pay, etc, etc, etc are of the sort that few regular force operational units in the CF face, and they don't scale down much in complexity with unit size. Obviously, commanding a 300-person MP unit in the Reg F comes with operational demands that don't exist in the reserve, but it's important not to completely discount the admin burdens placed on the command teams on reserve units.

Now, I say this as someone who's not in the army and who just finished a three-year command tour of a 200-person reserve unit as a two-and-a-half without incident, and I'm certainly not going to argue that things couldn't be better organized across the reserve component. But I will say that given the current administrative demands on a militia unit, having a LCol CO and a CWO RSM is not manifestly unreasonable. I could (and won't for a variety of OPSEC reasons) count off a number of sub-100 person units in the CF that don't bear half as much admin burden and which have LCol/CWO command teams. Without a substantial re-org of how reserve admin is done (why, for instance, does CMP pay for and administer Reg F members' training to the OFP but not reservist training? Why does DGMC manage Reg F career admin but not much of reserve career admin?), giving the people trying to manage an already tough situation a round of demotions isn't going to solve more problems than it creates.


----------



## McG

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... expecting a 500-600 multiplier per LCol and CWO is a regular force infantry battalion-specific construct that fails in application all across the regular force CF, to say nothing of the reserve.


Okay, but 300 to 400 is not unreasonable expectation of other arms in an Army brigade (the sort of construct which the Army reserve follows) and Army reserve units are not established to come close to this for their LCol and CWO leadership team.  Instead of three units established at under 200 pers each with its own LCol and CWO, there is no reason that the Army Reserve could not have one unit with the 400 to 500 man establishment.  The hardship of every unit managing recruiting and training to OFP would also suddenly find itself with a deeper resource pool to manage the tasks.  Instead of BMQ courses with six candidates (which I have seen in the PRes), one course runs at full load (reducing the overhead demands of Ops staff attention, allocation of Crse O & Crse NCO, use of training resources).



			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> I could (and won't for a variety of OPSEC reasons) count off a number of sub-100 person units in the CF that don't bear half as much admin burden and which have LCol/CWO command teams.


If you cannot identify the units for OPSEC reasons, then I would tend to suspect there is something about those units that is a little different.  But it does not matter.  This is an appeal to hypocrisy - a logical fallacy.  One cannot justify organization A doing something wrong by pointing that organization B is also doing the same thing wrong.  Instead of defending the reserve excess of HQs, you have illustrated that there is potentially room for the same house cleaning in the Reg F (something we already know and something that warrants a discussion in a thread not about Army Reserve organization to address).



			
				hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ... given the current administrative demands on a militia unit, having a LCol CO and a CWO RSM is not manifestly unreasonable. ... Without a substantial re-org of how reserve admin is done (why, for instance, does CMP pay for and administer Reg F members' training to the OFP but not reservist training? Why does DGMC manage Reg F career admin but not much of reserve career admin?)...


Good.  Let's address the concerns.  Army Reserve units train BMQ and BMQ(L), but I have normally seen the trades training done at Area/Div training centres or national schools.  Should the first two courses become a CBG responsibility, or maybe economies are gained through larger units that can run these courses at max load (as opposed to below min load)?  Should career management become a CBG or Div responsibility?

All of this is in the realm of the CAF's ability to influence and control.


----------



## Monsoon

MCG said:
			
		

> Okay, but 300 to 400 is not unreasonable expectation of other arms in an Army brigade (the sort of construct which the Army reserve follows) and Army reserve units are not established to come close to this for their LCol and CWO leadership team.


But here's where the falacious comparision comes in: your CER CO with 300 engineers or your armoured CO with 400 troopers relies on the existence of LCols at CFRG, CDA, etc that support them in ways that they do not support militia units. If you left the current militia organizational support concept as-is and just dialled up the number of soldiers per LCol/CWO, you'd have reduced none of the unit admin burden and increased the personnel admin burden by two or three orders of magnitude. Why would we expect class "A" reservists to exercise a span of control that a Reg F CO isn't expected to?



> If you cannot identify the units for OPSEC reasons, then I would tend to suspect there is something about those units that is a little different.  But it does not matter.  This is an appeal to hypocrisy - a logical fallacy.  One cannot justify organization A doing something wrong by pointing that organization B is also doing the same thing wrong.


You've missed my point: organizations A and B in this case are both doing what the unique circumstances of their cases require. Neither is "wrong" just because they don't correlate to an infantry battalion. And yes, these others units are different because they recruit and train people in their capabilities largely in isolation (much like a reserve unit does).



> Good.  Let's address the concerns.  Army Reserve units train BMQ and BMQ(L), but I have normally seen the trades training done at Area/Div training centres or national schools.  Should the first two courses become a CBG responsibility, or maybe economies are gained through larger units that can run these courses at max load (as opposed to below min load)?  Should career management become a CBG or Div responsibility?
> 
> All of this is in the realm of the CAF's ability to influence and control.


I'd buy all of that. I'm just saying this is the stuff that needs to happen before we talk about changing ranks. And don't think that the end result will be a particularly noticeable overall drop in the number of senior officers and NCOs - you'll just have moved them out of the armouries and into centralized supporting organizations (a move that would be entirely welcome, though it would be met with a lot of wailing about loss of local control).


----------



## quadrapiper

For domestic operations, how much is expected of the "local" reserve unit as far as taking charge of activities within their footprint?


----------



## GR66

It seems fairly easy to point out may instances where the Reserves as currently organized and equipped are not in a good position to do certain tasks.  The first question then should be what SHOULD the Reserves be asked to do?

I guess the first item on the list would be mass mobilization.  Is there a need for the CF to plan for and have an organizational structure to support mass mobilization of troops for overseas combat deployment?  By this I mean adding and deploying new major combat units (Battle Group sized and above) beyond the currently existing Reg Force units as opposed to augmentation (individual or sub-unit) of existing Reg Force units.

From the 1950's on both Military and Civilian leaders questioned the requirement for mass mobilization to increase the size of the military like we did during the two World Wars.  The logic being that in a major conventional war between nuclear-armed powers either the regular forces in being would halt an enemy attack forcing a negotiated settlement long before new units could be raised, trained, equipped and transported to the front...or the conflict would escalate to a nuclear confrontation making reinforcement of the conventional front irrelevant.  

Is that still true today?  Is there a realistic scenario where a greatly expanded Canadian field force could be required to engage in extended combat operations?  Would the Canadian public support mobilization for a regional conflict as opposed to a general war between NATO and Russia/China?  Would a major NATO vs Russia/China war last long enough without resolution/going nuclear to give us time to mobilize?  Would we have any hope of being able to equip and supply an expanded army beyond just maintaining our existing Regular forces in the field?


----------



## Ostrozac

Even if we needed to mass mobilize, does the plan have to be based on existing reserve units? We only ever did that once, in the Second World War. The CEF of the First World War was mostly built out of whole cloth, largely ignoring the existing militia structure. And the Special Force of the 50's was based on expanding the Regular Force for Korea and Germany, initially on a temporary basis, then becoming permanent.

If we needed another 4 infantry battalions, right now, would we build them in armouries in Toronto or Montreal? Or is it more likely that they will stand up in a tent city in Wainwright or Suffield or Fort Irwin?

And does our current regimental system hinder us in such a task? Probably. Regular and Reserve both. The Regular Force Regiments would probably fight to have 3 battalions, or 6, so that they could be equally assigned to The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR. (Even if the estimate showed that we needed 4). The Reserve Force Regiments would probably fight to have platoons force generated completely from individual units, but this may not fit well into the actual manning situation. So if one unit had three great warrant officers, only one would go, and if another unit had one warrant officer, he would be picked as a platoon WO by default.

Honestly, I see our reserve individuals as a great pool for manning a future Special Force battalion, if it is ever required, but I'm not sure that the reserve unit is the right skeleton to build such a mobilisation around.


----------



## Remius

One interesting model adopted here is the TBG concept.  Basically the CBG is tasked with forming two companies.  Unit integrity is maintained for the most part at the platoon level but some are mixed based on what the units provide.  Stronger units form the HQ and full platoons and weaker ones may only provide a few sections.  Training becomes collective in that weekend training is done as this formation for the training year up until and including the summer concentartion.  Troops are dagged as green as can be achieved.  Platoons and companies are ready formed for whatever they are needed for with the scope of domestic ops and if needed could be mobilised for work up for whatever the flavour of the day would be.

Reservists not tasked fill other roles like battle school instruction or act as a reserve for the TBG which may have to find back fills.

So the expectation isn't to have Unit X fill a full company but contribute  something solid to a construct that is a combined effort of all units and forms a more flexible, ready formed body when needed.

A work in progress but a shift in mentality that might be exploited and developped into something better than the status quo.  The current reserve system/units would essentially become holding and recruiting units, IBTS stuff and what not,  with the TBG construct become the main effort for training.  And soldiers could move back and forth every year given the demands of civilian life.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> For domestic operations, how much is expected of the "local" reserve unit as far as taking charge of activities within their footprint?



Sometimes: a lot. The Fires of 2003 were well attended by hundreds of reservists in BC, for example

Sometimes: not so much, especially during something like an earthquake where families are severely impacted


----------



## GR66

This is why I ask the question.  How do you divine "the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves" without first defining what is realistically expected of the organization.  While full-scale mobilization is (hopefully) the least likely thing that the Reserves will ever be asked to do, is it not still one of it's official roles? (“The role of the Army Reserve is to *provide the framework to mobilize*, augment and sustain the Canadian Forces and serve as a link between the military and civilian communities as guided by the key Connect with Canadians initiative").  

However is mobilization (beyond augmentation of existing Reg Force units) a reasonable expectation?  Would Canada ever be willing to mobilize short of full-scale war between "The West" and a nuclear-armed opponent that poses an existential threat to Canada or it's key allies?  Is a non-nuclear armed country or group CAPABLE of posing an existential threat to the West since our bombs/missiles are the ultimate trump card in any conflict with them?  Does mobilization (other than for civil defence) make any sense in a conflict with a nuclear-armed enemy if we neither have the time to raise and deploy those forces, or the ability to arm, equip and sustain those forces in combat if they are mobilized?

Would the way you choose to organize, train and equip the Reserves be any different if you were to officially take mobilization off the table as a Role of the Reserves?  I think it's a fair question to ask.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Just curious, have you ever been in the CAF, either Reg or Res force?


----------



## GR66

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Just curious, have you ever been in the CAF, either Reg or Res force?



DND Civilian employee


----------



## little jim

KevinB said:
			
		

> I'll partially say it...
> Realistically without legislation the Militia as a whole entity is a useless bag of hammers, as far as units are concerned.



Legislation - I agree with KevB here but would be curious if people were tracking the other side of this coin.  The various regulations like the point system and contracts that are signed by members of the National Guard.  Yes the government could enact legislation to protect members of the reserves and their civilian jobs; but with that could come the loss of the ability to 'vote with their feet.'

The requirement to have to parade and train *might* make some units more viable than a bag a spanners.....


----------



## Haggis

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> For domestic operations, how much is expected of the "local" reserve unit as far as taking charge of activities within their footprint?



the short answer is that it is situationally dependent.  During the 1998 Ice Storm, for example, many eastern Ontario/west Québec Army Reservists were also victims of the storm as well as responders in their communities.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Get rid of the 'Temp Service' approach and put all reservists on 'half pay' and you can make us so what you want... as long as there's a pension etc involved:

During the eighteenth century some nations' military systems included practices and institutions that functioned effectively as a reserve force, even if they were not specifically designated as such. For example, the half-pay system in the British Army during the eighteenth century provided the British state with a force of trained, experienced officers not on active duty during peacetime but available for call-up during wartime.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_reserve_force


----------



## MilEME09

I think part of the problem is 90% of the reserves have no defined day to day role to fill, for example reserve arty helping with avalanche control in winter (in the west), thats a role they can fit into and since the training calendar is mostly during winter its works well. What about other units, CSS supports all, but without any one having a role or a task they sit around. As for the others, except for engineers i cant really think of anything.


----------



## x_para76

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Get rid of the 'Temp Service' approach and put all reservists on 'half pay' and you can make us so what you want... as long as there's a pension etc involved:
> 
> During the eighteenth century some nations' military systems included practices and institutions that functioned effectively as a reserve force, even if they were not specifically designated as such. For example, the half-pay system in the British Army during the eighteenth century provided the British state with a force of trained, experienced officers not on active duty during peacetime but available for call-up during wartime.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_reserve_force



If this is going to be fixed the CF is not going to copy anyone else's system no matter how well it may have worked. They're certainly not going to copy the Brit's as the French would complain bitterly about anything that resembled a return to our British roots. No they would much rather reinvent the wheel by creating a think tank staffed by a Brigadier, 3 Colonels, and more Captains than you can imagine. In the end nothing would change but someone would certainly get promoted to the lofty heights of CDS in recognition of their waste of time and resources.


----------



## Kirkhill

After following the latest comments I am drawn to the following:

Canada is a "victim" of its geography - not a new concept
Every organization, even a virtual one - requires full time administration

In Denmark and the Scandinavian countries administration, recruiting and training appear to be managed by full time staff - both civilian and regular force personnel.

That suggests to me a greater role for RSS or whatever they are called now in operating the Reserves/Militia.

None of the Scandinavian countries have the geography problems of Canada - but ultimately that is a problem of our own making.  It is what happens when California claims the whole land and sea area of the United States all for itself.  Some others might see that as being greedy.

I our case it also makes us impossibly wealthy.

If we are going to claim this land for the small number of bodies we have then we are going to have to convert some of that wealth into funds to support the increased administrative overheads resulting from our large territorial claims.

A couple of additional observations on the Danes that I think are applicable to our situation

The Danes don't lose touch with their volunteers.  Upwards of half of their Homeguard Volunteers are on reserve status because they parade less than 24 hours a year.  They stay on reserve status until they are 60.

The second thing is, like any voluntary organization they have to accept whatever time commitment volunteers are able and willing to give and manage around that.

The Danes conscript every male over 18 but only some of them are required so the ranks are filled by volunteers from that pool.

Service for a basic conscript is 4 months.  After that, depending on units or commitment contracts are longer.  And then there are the career soldiers.

The Homeguard extends this concept of "flexible working hours" further.

Interestingly the Danes also manage their Conscientious Objectors.

What it means is that in time of crisis the Danes have the ability to coordinate all of their population.


----------



## little jim

X_para76 said:
			
		

> If this is going to be fixed the CF is not going to copy anyone else's system no matter how well it may have worked. They're certainly not going to copy the Brit's as the French would complain bitterly about anything that resembled a return to our British roots. No they would much rather reinvent the wheel by creating a think tank staffed by a Brigadier, 3 Colonels, and more Captains than you can imagine. In the end nothing would change but someone would certainly get promoted to the lofty heights of CDS in recognition of their waste of time and resources.



Nice - don't forget that the Brig and the Col's all would have an RSM in the outer office telling what a good idea it was and half of the Capt's would be CFRs working their retirement. 

Yeap, my post adds nothing to the thread.

In my opinion we would be better off looking at the government enacting legislation to give the reserves some protections while at the same time requiring the reservists to fulfill mandatory employment windows - sort of your sign up for the PRes for min three years being required to work at least one training day a month with a certain number of required days during summer IT.  If you are unable to fulfill your yearly requirements (think NG points) then that year doesn't count towards your reserve pension.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The legislation would need to offer something positive to the employer, not just a responsibility. Make it attractive to hire a Pres person rather than a hindrance. Also make being posted RSS a plus for career development, not part of the endgame.


----------



## KevinB

Tax breaks for entities that hire Reservists...

3yr contracts 
  6 months (or more) on initial - so they can go to the same schools as reg force for trade training.
  21 days / year full service (MilCon whatever)
  1 weekend / month (except the 21 exercise period, or full employment for courses etc.) min
  2 weeknights/month min - and guaranteed employment for 1 night/week

Run Reg Force Course Serials during summer and integrate reservists into training (and teaching)


----------



## PuckChaser

What happens for the trades that have longer than 6 month courses? It's a great idea, but considering BMQ+SQ is 17 weeks, you're down to 2 months for a DP1 course if the timing lines up perfectly.


----------



## George Wallace

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> What happens for the trades that have longer than 6 month courses? It's a great idea, but considering BMQ+SQ is 17 weeks, you're down to 2 months for a DP1 course if the timing lines up perfectly.



They get broken down into Modules.  

It already takes some/many Reservists more than a year to get a Crse completed due to their availability or the availability of a crse, in order to complete all Crse Mods.


----------



## OldSolduer

George Wallace said:
			
		

> They get broken down into Modules.
> 
> It already takes some/many Reservists more than a year to get a Crse completed due to their availability or the availability of a crse, in order to complete all Crse Mods.


It can be worse for officers. It may take up to three years to qualify a young officer as a platoon commander.


----------



## MilEME09

George Wallace said:
			
		

> They get broken down into Modules.
> 
> It already takes some/many Reservists more than a year to get a Crse completed due to their availability or the availability of a crse, in order to complete all Crse Mods.



Case and point, Reserve weapons tech, trades courses take 4 years alone assuming the courses run every summer.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Maybe it is time to either find a better way of doing it (i.e. let the units run the courses throughout the trg year on Cl A time), or start eliminating some of the PRES MOSIDs.


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Maybe it is time to either find a better way of doing it (i.e. let the units run the courses throughout the trg year on Cl A time), or start eliminating some of the PRES MOSIDs.



Certain Mods are already run at the unit level.  Certain Mods are done online as Distant Learning.  As Jim and MilEME09 have pointed out, this has the effect the some pers, especially the officers and Spec Trades, will take a longer period of time, into numerous years, to get qualified.  

When I left my unit, it would take a minimum of three years to get an officer candidate off the street trained.  It would take one to two years just to get an officer who was a VOT crse loaded on an avail crse, if a crse was being run, to be trained.  Any lack of crses being run, or openings on crses, just added to the delays in pers getting quals.  We had three O/Cdts and three years later none of they had become qualified in Trade.


----------



## McG

Yes, it can take years to train some reservists to OFP, which goes back to the suggestion that started this side bar:


			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> 3yr contracts
> 6 months (or more) on initial - so they can go to the same schools as reg force for trade training.
> ...


Which proposed all reservists start their service as full-time until they reach OFP.  This raised the question:


			
				PuckChaser said:
			
		

> What happens for the trades that have longer than 6 month courses? It's a great idea, but considering BMQ+SQ is 17 weeks, you're down to 2 months for a DP1 course if the timing lines up perfectly.


The answer, as it appears to me, is that the proposal would have reservists serve an initial full-time service longer than 6 months if that is what it took to train them.

I would be curious what such a hypothetical system would do to the PRes recruiting base where many are high school students or university students with only two or four month summer breaks respectively.  It might be better for training, but I suspect it would turn away a lot of recruits.  Maybe this proposal just becomes one of many enrollement paths?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

So John Doe who works at "Company X" and wants to be a part time soldier would have to leave his full time job/career to be 'full time Res' until he is OFP at which point in time he gets put back to Cl A status and works 1/2 day a week and a weekend a month...hoping his real job was still there for him.

Or did I misread something ???


----------



## McG

KevinB has previsously mentioned that he believes job protection legislation is required for a relevant PRes.  So, the guy you describe is covered.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Copy


----------



## KevinB

I'm just spitballing on some CoA's.
 My knowledge of the CF PRes system is years dated.   However from looking for the outside, it appears that the system is horribly broken.  More broken than anything else in the CF.

 I believe that a massive 'made in Canada' change is required, however I do not think the Political or Reserve will exists to make the necessary changes to make the PRes effective.  This is not intended as a slight at individual reservists who often put their own personal advancement and well-being aside for reserve duties.


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> So John Doe who works at "Company X" and wants to be a part time soldier would have to leave his full time job/career to be 'full time Res' until he is OFP at which point in time he gets put back to Cl A status and works 1/2 day a week and a weekend a month...hoping his real job was still there for him.
> 
> Or did I misread something ???



I would not outright discount Kevin B's suggestion so easily.  Remember; the target audience of Reserve Recruiting is the High School student, not a full-time employee.  If a large portion of the new Reservists being recruited are High School graduates enroute to College or University, how much would a year delay in their education cost them?  They could have a full year employed as a Reservist, be trained in their Trade, and earn money towards their tuition.  A full year Class B for the new Recruits to get them Trade qualified, and then return to Class A at their unit being fully employable would be a bonus to the Reserves.  Would that mean that there would be no room for other recruits entering the Reserves that were not High School students graduating?  No.  It would just be a case of creating Entry Plans similar to the Regular Force to cover the various options for pers to join the Reserves.  Currently, there is only one method of joining the Reserves as a NCM.  (There are other options for hiring officers.)


----------



## daftandbarmy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I would not outright discount Kevin B's suggestion so easily.  Remember; the target audience of Reserve Recruiting is the High School student, not a full-time employee.  If a large portion of the new Reservists being recruited are High School graduates enroute to College or University, how much would a year delay in their education cost them?  They could have a full year employed as a Reservist, be trained in their Trade, and earn money towards their tuition.  A full year Class B for the new Recruits to get them Trade qualified, and then return to Class A at their unit being fully employable would be a bonus to the Reserves.  Would that mean that there would be no room for other recruits entering the Reserves that were not High School students graduating?  No.  It would just be a case of creating Entry Plans similar to the Regular Force to cover the various options for pers to join the Reserves.  Currently, there is only one method of joining the Reserves as a NCM.  (There are other options for hiring officers.)



By George, that is an excellent idea :nod:

The other audience we should target are public sector employees. They all have contracts that allow them time off for military service, and lots of them could use the extra $ (I know I did!).


----------



## Monsoon

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I would not outright discount Kevin B's suggestion so easily.  Remember; the target audience of Reserve Recruiting is the High School student, not a full-time employee.  If a large portion of the new Reservists being recruited are High School graduates enroute to College or University, how much would a year delay in their education cost them?  They could have a full year employed as a Reservist, be trained in their Trade, and earn money towards their tuition.  A full year Class B for the new Recruits to get them Trade qualified, and then return to Class A at their unit being fully employable would be a bonus to the Reserves.


I once pitched a similar "gap year" (as it's called in the UK) approach to reserve recruiting to NAVRES. Done properly, it could attract the kind of visibility in high schools that ROTP does: save some money working for a year, get subsidized tuition and have a guaranteed part-time/occasional summer full-time job through your education.

From the CAF's perspective, they get some predictability in training scheduling and an average of four years of employment as a trained member per PRes recruit. What was seen as the show-stopper was training billet throughput: what the PRes lost to the Reg F in personnel through the Af'stan years has hampered its ability to generate training staff in the way that it has successfully done for decades. It seems as though the PRes has done a bad job of communicating the nature of it's current difficulties in this way to argue for additional (rather than reduced) short-term support from the Reg F establishment.


----------



## x_para76

Ya that would end up with a reserve training system suitable only to students and the unemployable.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> So John Doe who works at "Company X" making $80k/yr and wants to be a part time soldier would have to leave his full time job/career to be 'full time Res' making $34 k/yr until he is OFP at which point in time he gets put back to Cl A status and works 1/2 day a week and a weekend a month...hoping his real job was still there for him.
> 
> Or did I misread something ???



TFTFY 

..........and who pays his company benefits and pension while he's gone? Is he going to have to pay R&Q, or will that be free if his wife is at home in their mortgaged house?


----------



## Fishbone Jones

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> By George, that is an excellent idea :nod:
> 
> The other audience we should target are public sector employees. They all have contracts that allow them time off for military service, and lots of them could use the extra $ (I know I did!).



Ontario PS get one week paid and one week unpaid. If your a Fed PS, you're only allowed one wage. It's likely, you'd be making more from your day job, so you'd have to turn your mil pay back to the Canadian Gov't.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I don't think any PS staff working for the reserves have to turn their pay back. Now if I got paid my currently hourly rate in the reserves I might join up again!


----------



## Haggis

Colin P said:
			
		

> I don't think any PS staff working for the reserves have to turn their pay back.



Recceguy is spot on.  A federal public servant can train with the Reserves while on vacation from his PS job, just like any private sector employee can.  However, if that public servant wants to deploy for a period in excess of his vacation entitlement, he can take military leave without pay from his government job.  See  Reserve Forces Training Leave Regulations  paragraph 4.


----------



## Ostrozac

X_para76 said:
			
		

> Ya that would end up with a reserve training system suitable only to students and the unemployable.



Not necessarily. The old career path of a worker starting on the assembly line at Ford when he finishes high school, and then walking away from Ford with an inscribed watch at retirement age seems to be deader than disco. A Canadian worker in the 21st century may find multiple points in his career where a year spent on Class B service may be useful, not only the year immediately following high school.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Some humour on the topic from the Duffel blog.

http://www.duffelblog.com/2014/09/national-guard/


*National Guard Stands Ready To Defend Constitution, Conduct Vehicle Maintenance*

ARLINGTON, Va. — As budget cuts hit all levels of the U.S. military, leaders in the Army National Guard Bureau are fighting back against fiscal hawks in Congress by highlighting the service’s long history of defending the constitution and conducting vehicle maintenance at least one weekend per month, sources confirmed.

“These soldiers meet one weekend a month for drill and two weeks in the summer for Annual Training to prepare for deployment along active-duty counterparts,” said Gen. Steven Perchman, a top Guard officer. “While many active soldiers look down upon their Guard counterparts, their sacrifice and bravery is integral to the defense of this nation.”

He added: “If we didn’t have these guys out here once a month driving Humvees to the gas station for a road test, America would fall apart.”

On a press tour of a local National Guard armory, soldiers wowed reporters with their contributions to the fighting spirit of the U.S. Army.

“I swore an oath to defend this nation and uphold our constitution, and I really feel like my service is integral to the defense of our nation’s ideals,” said Spc. Thomas McMillan, a driver in the 452nd Transportation Company, while watching NCAA football in the company office.

“Every time I go to drill and wait in line for three hours to dispatch a truck, spend another two hours lining up the trucks, drive to the gas station and get some bear claws and Monster energy drinks, and then get back and we spend an hour trying to park the trucks on-line, I know when I’m doing these things that I’m living up to everything George Washington and his brave soldiers did at Valley Forge.”

Sources confirmed at least one young private spent roughly 30 minutes of his drill time watching helmet-cam videos from combat in Afghanistan.

“Hey, yo, Steven, check out this video of combat in Afghanistan!” Pfc. Aaron Ellis told his platoon sergeant of footage found on the Funker530 website. “I’ve never been deployed, but this is pretty fuckin’ sweet!”

The scene was quickly interrupted after the company first sergeant attempted to corral soldiers to conduct squad-level training exercises. However, he was overruled by the company commander’s instruction that the unit conduct a four-hour sexual harassment class per the battalion commander.

After the class, soldiers were instructed to sweep up and mop the drill hall floor that they would dirty up the next day.

At press time, the commanding officer released his soldiers at around 4p.m. Most soldiers were seen running to their vehicles complaining about “how fucking long today was,” while gunning to be the first to arrive at Buffalo Wild Wings for happy hour.


----------



## George Wallace

X_para76 said:
			
		

> Ya that would end up with a reserve training system suitable only to students and the unemployable.



No.  If you read what I said, it would create *new Entry Plans* for the Reserves aimed at the NCMs, instead of only one that exists now.  The new Entry Plan would be a year long Class B to train the new Reservists to become Trade Qualified, while we would still maintain the current methods which take much longer to get a Reservist trained to be employable.  It would not totally replace what exists now, as we know many Reservists can not make such a commitment.  Reservists have professional lives outside the military and can not always commit to long periods of training, but still have skill sets from their civilian occupations that compliment and add to those of the military.  Those can not be lost, as it is often those other skill sets from their civilian jobs that help a Reserve unit function.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Haggis said:
			
		

> Recceguy is spot on.  A federal public servant can train with the Reserves while on vacation from his PS job, just like any private sector employee can.  However, if that public servant wants to deploy for a period in excess of his vacation entitlement, he can take military leave without pay from his government job.  See  Reserve Forces Training Leave Regulations  paragraph 4.


If they take leave without pay, then only 1 payscale. thanks for the link I forwarded it on to a Cadet Officer that works in our unit. 

_(2) Nothing herein contained shall preclude an employee from receiving Canadian Forces pay in addition to his civil pay for any period of service performed pursuant to these Regulations while he is on annual or vacation leave._


----------



## McG

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I would like to have fewer, bigger reserve force regiments - the same number of 'units' in armouries as we have now, but some being sub units of larger regiments.





			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> This has been discussed elsewhere - what I'd like to see is a study that (a) looks at the authorized and real parade strengths of each of the 49 Reserve Infantry Regiments and 18 Armoured Reserve Regiments.  This would have to be followed by recommendation for downsizing of Bde/Unit HQs to show the real gains (I'm not concerned about cap badges and colours - there are ways to work around that).  All this must be driven by a plan to reorganize the Reserves so they are able to do something more than act as an individual feeder pool.


Yes.  What the PRes needs is fewer Battalion HQs - less "overhead" or "more tooth less tail."  The regiments can then be fitted to the organization that is created.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> Yes.  What the PRes needs is fewer Battalion HQs - less "overhead" or "more tooth less tail."  The regiments can then be fitted to the organization that is created.



FWIW, based on what I've seen over the past few years we could recruit up to 100 people per year, but our SIP is only 8. We have achieved 100% of our recruiting targets this year and are now turning people away.

Bizarrely, we've got enough 'tail' to handle a couple of hundred more troops but are not allowed to recruit them.


----------



## McG

Your SIP numbers are derived from actual manning and authorized strength.  The problem is not the ability of PRes to recruit for and man the battalions under all of its HQs (though that ability probably would show wanting if tested).  The problem is that the established number of HQs is disproportionate to the overall manning ceiling.

In other words, there can never be enough people to justify all the Bn HQs.


----------



## Old Sweat

Absolutely, but with Canadian geography and population distribution, there are few options that aren't all bad and prone to producing negative results. I recall reading in a book that I think was called Duffy's Regiment about the career of a gentleman who was the wartime RSM of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment and later Colonel of the Regiment about when he called in some political markers when Mr Hellyer proposed closing down their outlying companies in places like Madoc. The minister proclaimed that his advisors said it would be more economical to bus the troops from Madoc for parades and this would produce a much more effective unit at a reduced cost. This, of course, was pure bull crap and the regiment lost touch with the northern part of Hastings County.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> This has been discussed elsewhere - what I'd like to see is a study that (a) _*looks at the authorized and real parade strengths of each of the 49 Reserve Infantry Regiments and 18 Armoured Reserve Regiments.*_  This would have to be followed by recommendation for downsizing of Bde/Unit HQs to show the real gains (I'm not concerned about cap badges and colours - there are ways to work around that).  All this must be driven by a plan to reorganize the Reserves so they are able to do something more than act as an individual feeder pool.



Why restrict the analysis to the Infantry and Armoured?  IIRC the Engineers are also employable as Infantry and in both Northern Ireland and Iraq much of the Artillery have found themselves used as Infantry in what were essentially ACP taskings.   Both the Arty and the Engineers must have infantry training.

In the Reserves (sorry, probably wrong thread) to me it makes more sense in a total force context to consider four principle skill sets:

Communications - managed by the Sigs Regiments
Transportation - this should be the focus of the Service Battalions
Vehicular Recce and Patrols - this should be the focus of the "Armoured" Regiments
Soldiering (Infanteering) - and here I would group the Arty and the Engineers with the Infantry

The reason for this is that all three Branches will fight alongside each other on the ground.  All three require infantry skills.  Infantry skills are amongst the easiest to transmit if not the easiest to perfect.  They are cheap to transmit if expensive to perfect.  

In a Canada First Defence context the need for disciplined bodies is more important than the need for Gunners and Engineers (domestically we don't need backhoe operators - there isn't a community anywhere in the country that can't supply experienced heavy equipment drivers).

The Reg Gunners and Sappers need to be fully focused on expeditionary warfare.  The reserves allocated to them need to be willing bodies that are trainable as opposed to fully trained.

Much the same argument can be made for the Infantry with the caveat that an Infantry heavy reg force Immediate Reaction Unit will have use domestically.    Abroad the infantry will take its place in whatever tasking the Government finds for the forces.  Again the emphasis for the reserves is on "fit and willing".  

For the Armoured Regiments - the regs need to join with the reg Arty and Engineers to form the backbones of the the expeditionary forces (heavy).  The reserves have a Canada First defence role in augmenting civilian police with roving patrols during time of crisis with more of an emphasis on patrolling back roads and trails that the police don't commonly service.  Those reservists can bring those skills to the reg forces where they would receive additional training to crew reg force equipment in a reg force fashion.  Reserve armoured could also, perhaps provided some limited numbers of Protected Mobility Vehicles for domestic service and support.

Service Battalions - it is unreasonable to expect reservists to maintain vehicles or other equipment.  That is a full time job in any organization. What the Army lacks is truck drivers. What Canada First lacks is the ability to transport goods when the rails are broken and the roads are washed out, or simply no longer exist.  Service battalions (reserve) should focus on cross-country logistics in high mobility vehicles. These could include RHIBs, pontoons and Marginal Terrain Vehicles (unarmoured)

The Sigs - they will always have a use and always be in short supply.

By considering the reserve Arty and Engineers with the Infantry it might go some way to bridging the gaps in the discussions about guns and mortars and pioneers.  

Teach the usable skills that the available time affords - and reality is that you have about 150 hours per reservist for each of four years.  What can you teach in that time and, more importantly, how long can you hang onto those skills before the body goes missing or the skills fade?

Regs are there to make sure that the Government as a panoply of skilled capabilities readily available for immediate usage and to bridge the gap until the Government can figure out what to do next.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In the Reserves (sorry, probably wrong thread) to me it makes more sense in a total force context to consider four principle skill sets:
> 
> Communications - managed by the Sigs Regiments
> Transportation - this should be the focus of the Service Battalions
> 
> Service Battalions - it is unreasonable to expect reservists to maintain vehicles or other equipment.  That is a full time job in any organization. What the Army lacks is truck drivers. What Canada First lacks is the ability to transport goods when the rails are broken and the roads are washed out, or simply no longer exist.  Service battalions (reserve) should focus on cross-country logistics in high mobility vehicles. These could include RHIBs, pontoons and Marginal Terrain Vehicles (unarmoured)



As a tech I want to disagree, but I can't vehicles can't be maintained by a class A soldier, we just dont have the time to do work past an oil change or a tire rotation most days. Weapons techs I think is possible since you can do any small arms task within a day. I agree our focus should be transport, but the problem is, and i don't know how it is in the reg force but we are having an incredibly difficult time recruiting MSE ops.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Why restrict the analysis to the Infantry and Armoured?


Probably because the comment was made in the context of discussing regiments of those arms.  In the case of other arms and services, they have already done the consolidation of HQs that was being proposed for manoeuvre arms.  Engineers, artillery and CSS units have all already been reduced to a single unit per brigade.  Meanwhile, one can find multiple sub-unit sized battalions of like manoeuvre arms stacked on top of each other in some places.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> IIRC the Engineers are also employable as Infantry and in both Northern Ireland and Iraq much of the Artillery have found themselves used as Infantry in what were essentially ACP taskings.   Both the Arty and the Engineers must have infantry training.
> 
> In the Reserves (sorry, probably wrong thread) to me it makes more sense in a total force context to consider four principle skill sets:
> 
> Communications - managed by the Sigs Regiments
> Transportation - this should be the focus of the Service Battalions
> Vehicular Recce and Patrols - this should be the focus of the "Armoured" Regiments
> Soldiering (Infanteering) - and here I would group the Arty and the Engineers with the Infantry
> 
> The reason for this is that all three Branches will fight alongside each other on the ground.  All three require infantry skills.  Infantry skills are amongst the easiest to transmit if not the easiest to perfect.  They are cheap to transmit if expensive to perfect.
> 
> In a Canada First Defence context the need for disciplined bodies is more important than the need for Gunners and Engineers (domestically we don't need backhoe operators - there isn't a community anywhere in the country that can't supply experienced heavy equipment drivers).


So, engineer and artillery units should be only trained as infantry in the PRes?  I think you assume the skills to be easier to train than they are.  There is a fair amount involved in bridging, rafting, water supply, combat road construction, etc.  If you want the RegF Engr to be entirely focused on expeditionary ops, then you need somebody in the PRes to do the job domestically.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> For the Armoured Regiments - the regs need to join with the reg Arty and Engineers to form the backbones of the the expeditionary forces (heavy).  The reserves have a Canada First defence role in augmenting civilian police with roving patrols during time of crisis with more of an emphasis on patrolling back roads and trails that the police don't commonly service.  Those reservists can bring those skills to the reg forces where they would receive additional training to crew reg force equipment in a reg force fashion.  Reserve armoured could also, perhaps provided some limited numbers of Protected Mobility Vehicles for domestic service and support.


I don't see what you are proposing here that warrants preserving PRes Armd while you would subsume Engr and Arty into infantry.  If anything, it seems the jobs you describe here are a better fit to infantry trained "disciplined bodies" than the sorts of things one would ask of a gunner or sapper.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Service Battalions - it is unreasonable to expect reservists to maintain vehicles or other equipment.  That is a full time job in any organization. What the Army lacks is truck drivers. What Canada First lacks is the ability to transport goods when the rails are broken and the roads are washed out, or simply no longer exist.  Service battalions (reserve) should focus on cross-country logistics in high mobility vehicles. These could include RHIBs, pontoons and Marginal Terrain Vehicles (unarmoured).


You realize that a main function of the Engineers is mobility, right?  If your vision is giant cross country supply chains reaching into disaster areas, then you need somebody to build those lines of communication, to put in crossings, to maintain the routes, and to breach whatever barriers may bar access to your destination.

Anyway, I am not sure that I understand where you are going with this.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> Probably because the comment was made in the context of discussing regiments of those arms.  In the case of other arms and services, they have already done the consolidation of HQs that was being proposed for manoeuvre arms.  Engineers, artillery and CSS units have all already been reduced to a single unit per brigade.  Meanwhile, one can find multiple sub-unit sized battalions of like manoeuvre arms stacked on top of each other in some places.



Point taken and I appreciate you moving this to a more appropriate forum.




> So, engineer and artillery units should be only trained as infantry in the PRes?  I think you assume the skills to be easier to train than they are.  There is a fair amount involved in bridging, rafting, water supply, combat road construction, etc.  If you want the RegF Engr to be entirely focused on expeditionary ops, then you need somebody in the PRes to do the job domestically.



Actually, it is precisely because there are so many skills associated with the Gunners and Engineers that I am proposing limiting the expectations of the PRes.   Unless those members spend a considerable amount of time in Class B or C service I don't see how the skills can be effectively transferred.  I hope that I am wrong. 

With respect to the domestic service of engineers I am at a loss to see how any of the services you described could not be supplied effectively by local civilian contractors - always supposing that they are not dodging bullets and I have to admit I see that as a pretty far-fetched likelihood.




> I don't see what you are proposing here that warrants preserving PRes Armd while you would subsume Engr and Arty into infantry.  If anything, it seems the jobs you describe here are a better fit to infantry trained "disciplined bodies" than the sorts of things one would ask of a gunner or sapper.
> 
> You realize that a main function of the Engineers is mobility, right?  If your vision is giant cross country supply chains reaching into disaster areas, then you need somebody to build those lines of communication, to put in crossings, to maintain the routes, and to breach whatever barriers may bar access to your destination.



Again, I would respond that the civilian market can more effectively provide those services.  Any small town in Canada has more heavy equipment at its disposal than the entire body of combat engineers can scrounge from all four of its bases.



> Anyway, I am not sure that I understand where you are going with this.



The simple form is that I do not believe that you can create the equivalent of a full time soldier who has 2000 hours a year available for training when the PRes soldier only has 100 to 200 hours to put at your disposal.  You cannot get there from here.

My principal point is that expectations must be tailored to match realities.


----------



## KevinB

Perhaps certain units/trades should only be stocked for retired/end of contract regulars?

It is much easier to maintain a skill set than teach a new one.



No one idea is going to solve this problem -- its going to take a holistic look.
1) What is needed
The Mission needs to be identified first, as without doing this first your just spinning your wheels - or expending more electron on the internet  

I am not talking about lip service to the whole CF Mission Statement - which the Regular Army is pretty misguided about as well.

I would also suggest that the CF and Political 'advisors' start sooner than later, as the while Iraq/Syrian Quaqmire ISIL Coalition is going to suck up the Reg Force inside 2 years (mark my words).


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We were doing engine rebuilds at our unit (only way to keep our 3-tonner), it's not that hard, machining was done at a local shop. Give each of the Svc Battalion a mobile workshop, hire 2 guys on Class B to go around and service the Brigades vehicles and a credit card to buy most parts and POL locally. They can do most of the light to medium stuff right there. The unit they are at can provide extra support with their RSS and Class B staff as well. I think you find the serviceability rates will go up and it will allow the area depots to focus on bigger stuff and reduce the downtime due to parts shortages. About the only thing that can't get locally would be body parts. You can get a custom length drive shaft in about 5 days, same for replacement differential. 
Plus you create a pool of experienced maintainers, who can disseminate knowledge to the units who can use that to reduce wear and tear.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin, the point there is that Class B service is effectively full time in that role.   I agree with the concept.  But it is all dollars.

Further, with respect to acquiring skills, why doesn't the CF get out of the teaching business and do what everybody else does: hire them.

If we/you need mechanics then go down to the local colleges, heavy equipment dealers and auto dealers and talk to them about hiring them (the students and employees) on a part time basis - bring the bosses into the discussion. 

If heavy equipment operators are need go to the colleges, union halls and local construction companies.

You name the trade.

Which is easier: to teach a soldier how to be a tradesman or teach tradesman how to be a soldier?  

Obviously I believe the latter to be true.

One advantage of talking to heavy equipment operators in Canada is that there is a lot of seasonality to their work.   They are likely to be available for training in the depth of winter rather than the height of summer.

Another advantage of working with tradesmen is that they are probably in a position to teach skills just as much as learn skills.


----------



## MilEME09

You touch on a point i'd like to highlight Kirkhill, the availability in winter to do training. For any reservist not going through school Summer is probably the busiest time of the work year, and when we are most needed by our respective companies. Now the army wants us to take say 8 weeks leave from work to go on a course? I personally would find it easier to do courses if they were done during the training calendar year. I would sooner go to (insert base here) for a course in September through May when my work is slow in the depth of winter then take it at the height of the busy summer season. For context I'm a weapons tech in the CF, and a Apprentice cook civilian side.


----------



## Monsoon

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> You touch on a point i'd like to highlight Kirkhill, the availability in winter to do training. For any reservist not going through school Summer is probably the busiest time of the work year, and when we are most needed by our respective companies. Now the army wants us to take say 8 weeks leave from work to go on a course? I personally would find it easier to do courses if they were done during the training calendar year. I would sooner go to (insert base here) for a course in September through May when my work is slow in the depth of winter then take it at the height of the busy summer season. For context I'm a weapons tech in the CF, and a Apprentice cook civilian side.


Good point - Canada has over a half-million seasonal workers, mostly of the same demographic as our military (predominantly male, same age range, etc). Even just 3% of that could form a very credible reserve force on its own: available for extended coursing and easily as many weeks a year on exercise as a battalion in garrison on standard readiness, provided a rotational schedule were set up to allow members to do their service in whatever seasons they happen to be laid off. We tend to focus too much on students as the one form of seasonal worker who can be used to build a reserve force, and then assume that everyone over the age of 21 works 40-hour-a-week office jobs 50 weeks a year. The demographic make-up of this country is a heck of a lot more diverse than that from an employment perspective.


----------



## MilEME09

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Good point - Canada has over a half-million seasonal workers, mostly of the same demographic as our military (predominantly male, same age range, etc). Even just 3% of that could form a very credible reserve force on its own: available for extended coursing and easily as many weeks a year on exercise as a battalion in garrison on standard readiness, provided a rotational schedule were set up to allow members to do their service in whatever seasons they happen to be laid off. We tend to focus too much on students as the one form of seasonal worker who can be used to build a reserve force, and then assume that everyone over the age of 21 works 40-hour-a-week office jobs 50 weeks a year. The demographic make-up of this country is a heck of a lot more diverse than that from an employment perspective.



Exactly, and I think until that is addressed we will continue to have problems of attendance, recruitment and retainment in the reserves. We don't all work office jobs, many are shift workers, and the CF needs to realize that.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Colin, the point there is that Class B service is effectively full time in that role.   I agree with the concept.  But it is all dollars.
> 
> Further, with respect to acquiring skills, why doesn't the CF get out of the teaching business and do what everybody else does: hire them.
> 
> If we/you need mechanics then go down to the local colleges, heavy equipment dealers and auto dealers and talk to them about hiring them (the students and employees) on a part time basis - bring the bosses into the discussion.
> 
> If heavy equipment operators are need go to the colleges, union halls and local construction companies.
> 
> You name the trade.
> 
> Which is easier: to teach a soldier how to be a tradesman or teach tradesman how to be a soldier?
> 
> Obviously I believe the latter to be true.
> 
> One advantage of talking to heavy equipment operators in Canada is that there is a lot of seasonality to their work.   They are likely to be available for training in the depth of winter rather than the height of summer.
> 
> Another advantage of working with tradesmen is that they are probably in a position to teach skills just as much as learn skills.



I did Class B myself (back in the Bronze age) We had 1 guy who was on Class B just to maintain the trucks (we were Ops tasked at that point) it worked well and I found Class B workload ebbed and flowed depending on the ex schedule. As for training, I would say that is one place the military well does exceed the standard. We do produce a lot of good instructors and far better than most of the college stuff I have seen. My main complaint is lack of focused syllabus on some military courses, others were quite well structured. For mechanics, heavy equipment operator or the basics of survey, you can supplement the military system with local technical college. So  reservist Engineers are sent to a local college to learn the basics of operating heavy equipment and then take a military centric course to apply that basic knowledge to army tasks.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Exactly, and I think until that is addressed we will continue to have problems of attendance, recruitment and retainment in the reserves. We don't all work office jobs, many are shift workers, and the CF needs to realize that.



Well, if you want to address attendance problems, then just give the Army Reserves the 'Commando Recon' role and stop running lame, boring training designed for low risk tolerance, fat, unimaginative leaders whose idea of a great exercise is setting up some mod tents and getting the radios working (the latter a minor miracle in itself when it does happen). 

All you need to run that show is a mission, 100lbs of weapons and CSups per man, and 48hours. Vehicles? Hah... we tab everywhere and destroy everything.  :camo:

You'd have to fight them away from the armouries with nun chuks, and the resulting influx and selection of high quality troops would help provide a major CT injected boost for the Regs...

TTFN - Green beret, smock and dagger, black helicopter.... Tally Ho!


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well, if you want to address attendance problems, then just give the Army Reserves the 'Commando Recon' role and stop running lame, boring training designed for low risk tolerance, fat, unimaginative leaders whose idea of a great exercise is setting up some mod tents and getting the radios working (the latter a minor miracle in itself when it does happen).
> 
> All you need to run that show is a mission, 100lbs of weapons and CSups per man, and 48hours. Vehicles? Hah... we tab everywhere and destroy everything.  :camo:
> 
> You'd have to fight them away from the armouries with nun chuks, and the resulting influx and selection of high quality troops would help provide a major CT injected boost for the Regs...
> 
> TTFN - Green beret, smock and dagger, black helicopter.... Tally Ho!



The serious point in there that I can find is that training has to be interesting and engaging for the troops to keep people coming back. Also you should know sometimes it takes the whole EX just to get those radios working


----------



## Journeyman

I thought he was trying to draw the nintendo ninjas away from the Recruiting threads, to the Reserves.  >


----------



## MilEME09

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I thought he was trying to draw the nintendo ninjas away from the Recruiting threads, to the Reserves.  >



We already get plenty of those


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The lack of equipment and the waffling on a useful and easily grasped mission, that can motivate people is killing the reserves, helped along by a recruiting system seemingly designed to keep people from joining.


----------



## MilEME09

Case and point this is the Army's latest youtube Video about reserve life, I see a lot of kit the reserves dont use in the video, bit of false advertising which will lead to "wait so I can't work on/operate a LAV? im gone" 

http://youtu.be/ItRPjUN0UAo


----------



## Dissident

Wow, I consider myself a cheerleader of the reserve, and that video was a bit much. Don't give people unrealistic expectations, or everyone will walk away disapointed.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Case and point this is the Army's latest youtube Video about reserve life, I see a lot of kit the reserves dont use in the video, bit of false advertising which will lead to "wait so I can't work on/operate a LAV? im gone"
> 
> http://youtu.be/ItRPjUN0UAo



Lies, damn lies, and army recruiting ads  ;D


----------



## OldSolduer

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The serious point in there that I can find is that training has to be interesting and engaging for the troops to keep people coming back. Also you should know sometimes it takes the whole EX just to get those radios working



For what its worth, I'd like to see an end to these silly waste of time and effort one hour courses that are mandatory for all. Its pure BS and they are distractions from the real training our soldiers need to do. CTAT, Info Management etc......


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> For what its worth, I'd like to see an end to these silly waste of time and effort one hour courses that are mandatory for all. Its pure BS and they are distractions from the real training our soldiers need to do. CTAT, Info Management etc......



It just reflects the massive arse covering culture we're suffering from these days, sadly.

(And there are some really, really massive arses out there to cover!  ;D)


----------



## dapaterson

However, a day or two of leadership planning can spread that pain out over the training year - one one-hour brief every second training night or so, with the more interesting stuff wrapped around it.

Of course, when it comes to interesting training, my perspective is that only the Army could take automatic weapons and explosives and make it boring...


----------



## OldSolduer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> However, a day or two of leadership planning can spread that pain out over the training year - one one-hour brief every second training night or so, with the more interesting stuff wrapped around it.
> 
> Of course, when it comes to interesting training, my perspective is that only the Army could take automatic weapons and explosives and make it boring...



The issue here is "you have until (date) to complete this." 

Real training has to be shunted aside for some dickwads "good idea".


----------



## MilEME09

One suggestion I made that wasn't taken was instead of wasting all this training time schedule an entire weekend and get it all dine in two days time. Bang done or make an online PowerPoint that can be accessible from home and tell the member you have until X day to read it all


----------



## Haggis

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> One suggestion I made that wasn't taken was instead of wasting all this training time schedule an entire weekend and get it all dine in two days time. Bang done or make an online PowerPoint that can be accessible from home and tell the member you have until X day to read it all



The problem with this approach is that once the troops find out that they are coming in to suffer "death by a thousand PowerPoints", they simply stay home.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> or make an online PowerPoint that can be accessible from home and tell the member you have until X day to read it all



You're were joking about this part?  How many pay sheets do they get to sign for working from home?

If I was going to make them work for free from home, they'd be doing PT, ruck marches or weapons or something actually useful and relevant to the defence of Canada...not "DRT SET Media Awareness Briefing" stuff.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Lies, damn lies, and army recruiting ads  ;D



Was that a Cougar or coyote they showed driving (Lav wheels)


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Lies, damn lies, and army recruiting ads  ;D


  Dear GOD! You could fertilize a fair sized farm with that ad!  :


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> You're were joking about this part?  How many pay sheets do they get to sign for working from home?
> 
> If I was going to make them work for free from home, they'd be doing PT, ruck marches or weapons or something actually useful and relevant to the defence of Canada...not "DRT SET Media Awareness Briefing" stuff.



I've done several instances of doing work via DND learn without signing a single paysheet. I am competely serious, schools do it, I've seen companies do (including my own employer) why not the CF? this way to everyone gets the check in the box not just the ones who show up.


----------



## Brasidas

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I've done several instances of doing work via DND learn without signing a single paysheet. I am competely serious, schools do it, I've seen companies do (including my own employer) why not the CF? this way to everyone gets the check in the box not just the ones who show up.



And for the rank and file, its dead wrong. I put in extra time too, developing ideas, checking up on folks, and writing up AARs and memos. But shoveling in *mandatory* BS into troops lives to fit in is unacceptable.

There's something that needs doing, it gets done in the workday - however much it needs to be extended. Buddy's sick that day, he gets time to make it up. No precedents for unpaid work should be allowed. If that makes the load on the training year unreasonable, then that needs to be pushed back.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I've done several instances of doing work via DND learn without signing a single paysheet. I am competely serious, schools do it, I've seen companies do (including my own employer) why not the CF? this way to everyone gets the check in the box not just the ones who show up.



I too gave many free hours once upon a time while doing Class A service.  How many units keep their head above water off these unpaid hours of work ?  Your willingness to use personal time for PRes stuff is great but should NOT be the standard or an expectation of part time soldiers.  

I lived and breathed the Class A, Class B and Class B/A worlds with Res F Ech units, Reg and Res force battle schools, Bde HQ, etc so I am fairly familiar with many of the issues pres folks face.

Doing the Crowns work on your own time is honourable ; but should never be an expectation or allowed to become the normal way to do business, for a whole list of reasons.


----------



## MilEME09

From the Info machine:

http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=908509



> Government of Canada expands support to Canada's reservists and their employers
> 
> November 25, 2014
> 
> OTTAWA – The Honourable Rob Nicholson, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Niagara Falls and Minister of National Defence, today announced a new Government of Canada program, which will provide financial support to employers of Canadian Armed Forces reservists who deploy on operations.
> 
> Canada’s reservists make an extraordinary commitment and many personal sacrifices to keep Canadians safe.  The Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program will provide compensation to employers of reservists who grant their reservist-employees leave to deploy on operational duty. The program, delivered jointly by the Department of National Defence and Employment and Social Development Canada, will fulfill our government’s commitment to ensure employers of Canadian reservists have more support when reservists are called upon to serve Canada through military operations.
> Quick Facts
> 
> Employer support is a force enabler, and is key to the generation of skilled forces.  Reservists have the unique challenge of balancing the demands of civilian careers with military duty.
> A sustainable Reserve Force, trained and equipped to meet the operational needs and challenges of the Canadian Armed Forces, is critical to operational success.
> The Government of Canada is enhancing programs and policies to ensure that Canadian reservists receive the widest possible support, care, and recognition they deserve for the vital contributions they make to Canada and Canadians.
> 
> Quotes
> 
> “Today’s announcement is welcome news for Canadian Armed Forces, and indeed all Canadians. Reservists are a vital part of the Canadian Armed Forces, making valuable contributions to operations at home and abroad.  The Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program will help offset costs incurred by employers, due to hiring replacements or dealing with lost productivity, when reservists deploy on operational duty.”
> The Honourable Rob Nicholson, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Niagara Falls and Minister of National Defence
> 
> “Reserve employer support directly contributes to the operational readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces.  The Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program enhances the existing suite of employer support programs currently in place to ensure that Canada maintains an effective, deployable Reserve Force and that reservists are able to balance the demands of two concurrent careers.”
> Rear-Admiral Jennifer Bennett, Chief Reserves and Cadets
> 
> “The introduction of this program ensures that Canada remains at the leading edge in delivering a world-class employer support program that answer the needs of the reservists and the Canadian Armed Forces, while building bridges with employers and business leaders in communities across Canada who support the work of the Canadian Armed Forces.”
> Mr. Scott Shepherd, National Chair, Canadian Forces Liaison Council


----------



## cryco

Great news. Now if they could do something like that for training...


----------



## MilEME09

cryco said:
			
		

> Great news. Now if they could do something like that for training...



Thats a good idea, on the other hand how about making it so that we are guarantied to have our job waiting for us when we get back? and make it so that we have to be given time off for training.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Thats a good idea, on the other hand how about making it so that we are guarantied to have our job waiting for us when we get back? and make it so that we have to be given time off for training.



You would have to define 'training' then. Otherwise, you'll have some COs and RSMs (and yes they are out there) that would be saying to their soldiers,

"Look, I know you make $240.00\ night on the evening shift at work, but there's legislation saying your employer needs to give you time off for training. Well, we expect to see you Thurs night, a training night, and you'll be paid a half days pay, in your case, about $45 before taxes and mess dues. See you Thursday."


----------



## MilEME09

I see your point, but it does eliminate the probably of troops not showing up cause they cant get time off, cause lets face it many employers aren't exactly reserve friendly, or know what the reserves are even


----------



## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I see your point, but it does eliminate the probably of troops not showing up cause they cant get time off, cause lets face it many employers aren't exactly reserve friendly, or know what the reserves are even



Though in some instances that's the Reservist never engaging their employer or using it as a convenient excuse.


----------



## cryco

I know my boss was kinda stunned when i told him that training for an officer in the reserves could involve 2 months and then 3 months off in consecutive years during the summer. My HR lady lost it. She wrote back to me as if a was daft when I was still inquiring, after making the mistake of telling her about the 2 and 3 months.
If the govt had something in place to help it would be nice, but i can't think what they could do. 
it's not like protecting the reservist's job when being deployed, it's the actual initial training. The employer can simply say, don't do it if you know it'll keep you away.
That's what my HR implied. In her defense, i do something so specialized, it's hard to find a replacement.
The only reason my boss is ok with me to go through with this is the weekend training offered outside of the summer months.


----------



## MilEME09

cryco said:
			
		

> I know my boss was kinda stunned when i told him that training for an officer in the reserves could involve 2 months and then 3 months off in consecutive years during the summer. My HR lady lost it. She wrote back to me as if a was daft when I was still inquiring, after making the mistake of telling her about the 2 and 3 months.
> If the govt had something in place to help it would be nice, but i can't think what they could do.
> it's not like protecting the reservist's job when being deployed, it's the actual initial training. The employer can simply say, don't do it if you know it'll keep you away.
> That's what my HR implied. In her defense, i do something so specialized, it's hard to find a replacement.
> The only reason my boss is ok with me to go through with this is the weekend training offered outside of the summer months.



my problem is if i take time off for weekend EX's and such my employer probably won't give me time off for course if i went to say every EX


----------



## cryco

oh, that sucks. I'm guessing you work on weekends in that case. The weekend thing is good for me wrt work. The summer training though will be trickier. I will burn through my vacation and have to take unpaid time off, which will raise a few eyebrows here. 
I guess that's where the gov't  can do something to help; not to pay me. Instead, allow me to take unpaid leave for such reasons.
But I'll deal with that when it happens. It's still a long way off.


----------



## mariomike

cryco said:
			
		

> The summer training though will be trickier. I will burn through my vacation and have to take unpaid time off, which will raise a few eyebrows here.



If you are a member of a union, your collective agreement may contain a Military Leave Policy. If not, you may wish to ask your union to consider negotiating such a policy. 

Some cover a limited amount of summer training: "Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program."


----------



## MilEME09

> http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/12/02/colin-busby-building-a-stronger-military-reserve/
> 
> Building a stronger military reserve
> 
> 
> Canadians’ wellbeing improved last week when the federal government took steps to solidify the future for Canada’s citizen soldiers. Reservists play key roles in meeting Canada’s growing international and domestic security needs, and Ottawa, last Tuesday, announced a low-cost plan to financially support employers of reservists when he or she volunteers for full-time military duty.
> 
> Canadian reservists usually participate full-time in the civilian workforce and train part-time as members of the reserve force. But every so often, be it after a natural disaster or during a major international event, crisis or operation, a reservist will have the choice to activate for full-time military service and work alongside Canada’s regular forces.
> 
> Reservists play a key role in the operational plans of the Canadian Forces. The Canada First Defence Strategy plans for reservists to make up 30% of total military personnel.
> 
> The increasing demand for Canadian reservists was particularly acute in the mid-2000s, when large numbers of reservists were necessary to complete the operational duties of Canada’s Afghanistan mission. This led to a number of federal and provincial job protection laws requiring employers of reservists to protect the latter’s jobs should they choose to deploy on a domestic or international mission. These laws were instated to protect a reservist’s decision to deploy without fear of repercussion in civilian life.
> 
> But there were unintended consequences from the legislation. The most important consequence was that these laws shifted the costs of military activities onto individual employers. After losing an employee, an employer would need to hire a temporary replacement, ask remaining workers to work overtime or perhaps turn away potential clients without the capacity to deliver on new contracts. The long-term concern was that the employer-employee relationship may erode, and employers might discriminate in hiring reservists in the future.
> 
> In a 2010 C.D. Howe Institute paper, I argued that, to protect the strength of employer and reservist relationships, the government of Canada should cover a portion of the costs borne by employers when a reservist takes a military leave of absence.
> 
> After Tuesday’s announcement, Canada is now one of three Commonwealth countries, alongside the United Kingdom and Australia, to offer financial compensation to employers of reservists while they deploy. The new Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program will offer cash benefits of around $403 per week, much like the Australian plan, payable at the end of a reservist’s deployment. Eligible employers include those in the private sector, provincial, municipal or territorial governments, whose employees are on a designated operation from a period of 30 days to 18 months.
> 
> A strong reserve force has a number of advantages for all Canadians. It allows for a cost-effective use of resources during peacetime and the rapid augmentation of capacity during times of war and heightened military readiness. It also enables a number of military personnel to bring unique skills into sometimes hard-to-fill positions in the forces, such as engineers, medical officers, water filtration specialists and so on. Likewise, many Canadian employers can benefit from the operational skills reservists learn from military training. Perhaps as importantly, a strong reserve force exposes more communities to the realities of Canadian military engagements in ways not possible when we rely solely on regular forces whose families often live on geographically isolated military bases.
> 
> Maintaining a balance between civilian and military life is complicated. A reservist’s relationship with his or her employee is central to transitioning into, and out of, civilian life. With this week’s news, the prospects for reservist-employer relationships have never been better. Employers now have one more reason to hire citizen soldiers, and all Canadians gain from a resilient reserve force staffed by those among our bravest and best.
> 
> National Post


----------



## MilEME09

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/dnd-s-budget-overhaul-of-reserves-buried-ahead-of-federal-election-1.2220942



> DND's budget overhaul of reserves buried ahead of federal election
> 
> The Canadian Press
> Published Wednesday, February 4, 2015 4:19PM EST
> 
> OTTAWA -- The Department of National Defence appears set to miss a self-imposed deadline to rebalance the number of reserve soldiers in the military.
> 
> It is a budget-driven exercise that experts say the Harper government is keen to avoid in the run-up to an election as Conservatives try to patch things up with disgruntled veterans.
> 
> Internal documents say a review of how Canada's force of citizen soldiers is structured was supposed to be done by the end of March 2014, with a new funding model to be in place by April 1 of this year.
> 
> But National Defence spokesman Zoltan Csepregi says the review is still ongoing and it's too early to speculate what it will recommend.
> 
> Csepregi says the vice-chief of defence staff is examining the "optimal number" of part-time and full-time reservists with an eye towards having a "predominantly part-time, strong and sustainable reserve force."
> 
> Retired lieutenant-colonel John Selkirk of Reserves 2000, a coalition that advocates for the militia, says the government faces a political backlash if it imposes significant changes and funding cuts on the reserves.


----------



## Kirkhill

Reserves 2000 huh?

This is 2015 - Presumably Reserves 2000 was formed ca 1995 .... when 2000 was the future.  1995 was 20 years ago and the Medak Pocket was still being hushed up.  Still waiting for restructuring.


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Reserves 2000 huh?
> 
> This is 2015 - Presumably Reserves 2000 was formed ca 1995 .... when 2000 was the future.  1995 was 20 years ago and the Medak Pocket was still being hushed up.  Still waiting for restructuring.



Be prepared to wait some more. This will only happen when it suits the politicians.....and not just those who sit in Parliament.


----------



## McG

Likely it will be the Army driving any significant change and not the agenda of a political party when it comes to the overhaul the PRes need.  In that light, military leadership would be wise to arrive at its decision after an election.  The alternative is that honouraries and tribal lobbies quickly make a stink in local media, then opposition parties pick-up the cause (regardless of merit) to score political points.  Very soon the national media holds up the uniformed honouraries as "proof" the Army does not really support its change.  The party in government, being more focused on relection than stewardship of the CAF, then takes the easy button by killing the initiative for at least another half decade.

Maybe that is too cynical, but I do believe the PRes needs an overhaul of a sort that should be launched early in the tenure of a majority government.  Otherwise, the lobby of honouraries holds too much power to push the tribes ahead of the whole.


----------



## daftandbarmy

:nod:


----------



## MJP

MCG said:
			
		

> Likely it will be the Army driving any significant change and not the agenda of a political party when it comes to the overhaul the PRes need.  In that light, military leadership would be wise to arrive at its decision after an election.  The alternative is that honouraries and tribal lobbies quickly make a stink in local media, then opposition parties pick-up the cause (regardless of merit) to score political points.  Very soon the national media holds up the uniformed honouraries as "proof" the Army does not really support its change.  The party in government, being more focused on relection than stewardship of the CAF, then takes the easy button by killing the initiative for at least another half decade.
> 
> Maybe that is too cynical, but I do believe the PRes needs an overhaul of a sort that should be launched early in the tenure of a majority government.  Otherwise, the lobby of honouraries holds too much power to push the tribes ahead of the whole.



Considering the timing of the article, I have to say that your post is eerily on the mark!


----------



## Rifleman62

MilEME09« Reply #1786 on: February 04, 2015, 16:08:26 » Quote

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/dnd-s-budget-overhaul-of-reserves-buried-ahead-of-federal-election-1.2220942
Quote
*
    DND's budget overhaul of reserves buried ahead of federal election*

    The Canadian Press - Published Wednesday, February 4, 2015 

    OTTAWA -- The Department of National Defence appears set to miss a self-imposed deadline to rebalance the number of reserve soldiers in the military.

    It is a budget-driven exercise that experts say the Harper government is keen to avoid in the run-up to an election as Conservatives try to patch things up with disgruntled veterans.

    Internal documents say a review of how Canada's force of citizen soldiers is structured was supposed to be done by the end of March 2014, with a new funding model to be in place by April 1 of this year.

    But National Defence spokesman Zoltan Csepregi says the review is still ongoing and it's too early to speculate what it will recommend.

    Csepregi says the vice-chief of defence staff is examining the "optimal number" of part-time and full-time reservists with an eye towards having a "predominantly part-time, strong and sustainable reserve force."

    Retired lieutenant-colonel John Selkirk of Reserves 2000, a coalition that advocates for the militia, says the government faces a political backlash if it imposes significant changes and funding cuts on the reserves.


http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/erin-o-toole-jason-kenney-say-reservists-will-get-same-benefits-as-regular-force-1.2993514
*

Erin O'Toole, Jason Kenney say reservists will get same benefits as regular force*
Unequal treatment of reservists has been sensitive topic for Conservatives

Buried at the last par of this article is:



> National Defence was supposed to have delivered a _*new structure*_ for the part-time, volunteer force by this spring's budget, but it likely won't be done until after the election, scheduled for October.



What do you think it means and/or is it related to the 4 Feb 15 post above?


----------



## Monsoon

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> What do you think it means and/or is it related to the 4 Feb 15 post above?


Basically they're talking about phase 2 of PRECS - figuring out what the optimal class "B"/"C" strength is going forward. The first round of PRECS was really just about budgetary fire-fighting; this one is about determining what "should" be, based on the fact that they want the permanently-established "B" positions to be about providing direct support to the PRes organization itself (with the operational and other organizational support positions being incremental taskings).


----------



## The Bread Guy

Not just about the Army, but worthy of note nonetheless - shared under the Fair Dealing provisions of the _Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42)_ ....


> *Reserve force review coming before election, Defence Minister Kenney says*
> _Delayed release had critics warning about political motivations for putting it off._
> By RACHEL AIELLO
> 
> A departmental review of the structure of military reserves will be wrapped up “this summer” and will focus on expanding the size and capability of Canada’s reserves, Defence Minister Jason Kenney says.
> 
> In an interview last week, Mr. Kenney, (Calgary Southeast, Alta.) told The Hill Times that it’s a priority for him to increase the number of personnel in the reserve units and it’s something he’s currently working on, with the aim of determining “how we can get more bang for the buck for reserves.”
> 
> The plan to review the structure of Canada’s reserves came as part of the “defence renewal plan” that the Conservatives announced in October 2013. The strategy was created to “minimize inefficiency, streamline business processes and maximize the operational results” by guiding resource allocations, among other things, between 2013 and 2018, according to the department. The plan set a $1.2-billion annual reduction target for the five years to be put into “frontline priorities,” and to re-allocate between 2,800 and 4,800 military and civilian employees.
> 
> Former Defence minister Rob Nicholson (Niagara Falls, Ont.) told reporters at the time that the plan wasn’t to reduce the number of staff but to “rebalance” the military’s regular, reserve and civilian workforce.
> 
> According to internal Department of National Defence documents reported on by The Canadian Press, a review of the structure of the reserve force was supposed to be completed by the end of March 2014, and the new funding model was to be in place by April 1, 2015, but this has not happened. The documents reportedly said that implementing a new funding model in the 2015-16 budget year was key to the department’s plans to continue absorbing the department’s budget cuts.
> 
> The initial delay in “re-balancing” the military staff and resources has been seen by critics as a political move, with critics assuming it meant cutbacks and the Conservatives not wanting to have that on their plate ahead of a federal election. Mr. Kenney denies this.
> 
> He said the project is aimed at “reallocating” the $1.2-billion in internal defence spending by moving resources from “lower priority, or lower-yield operations to higher-yield and higher priority areas,” and that the government has decided to identify reserves as a priority.
> 
> Mr. Kenney said he couldn’t give a precise date, but anything the government hopes to do in terms of new policy would “have to be pretty much wrapped up this summer.”
> 
> John Selkirk, a retired lieutenant-colonel and executive director of Armed Forces advocacy group Reserves 2000, told The Hill Times that he believes Mr. Kenney is committed to strengthening the reserves and that the presumption that the Department of National Defence would be considering cutting reserves at this point in the political cycle was “bizarre.”
> 
> He said that, if anything, the government needs to consider upping the number of reservists. With the current threat of terror, or the possibility for a natural disaster or emergency, for a nation of 33 million people “to only have a full-time regular force of around 60,000 is banana republic territory,” Mr. Selkirk said. “And then to only have a total of all reserves being 27,000, or closer to 23,000 or 24,000 right now, are very very tiny numbers for a nation of our size and breadth.”
> 
> NDP defence critic Jack Harris (St. John’s East, Nfld.) said that although this is the first he’s heard that Mr. Kenney would complete the report this summer, it is good news—“as long as there is good news that goes with it” for the reservists and approximately 100 communities across the country where bases are stationed.
> 
> Mr. Harris said he thinks the decision to boost the number of reservists is linked to similar government announcements to come in the next little while, aimed at boosting the Conservatives’ re-election prospects.
> 
> “These are the kinds of decisions they may make because reserves are popular in the communities which host them and the people who have an attachment to the military through the reserves are happy about that, and have been concerned with the cutbacks that have taken place,” he said. “It may be that whatever political damage that that has potentially caused is being sought to be mitigated.”
> 
> Liberal MP Joyce Murray (Vancouver Quadra, B.C.), her party’s defence critic, questioned how the government is planning on “squaring the disconnect” between the budget cuts and the capacity of the Canadian Armed Forces.
> 
> When Mr. Kenney was asked about how the department can afford to potentially increase, rather than decrease, the number of reservists, he said the department thinks there are “adequate resources to make modest increase in the size and footprint of reserves.”
> 
> _raiello@hilltimes.com_


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Working equipment always helps keeping people motivated, just saying


----------



## quadrapiper

Colin P said:
			
		

> Working equipment always helps keeping people motivated, just saying


Also, a clearly-defined mission, relevant and interesting/challenging/well-organized training, suitable and painless support/administrative apparatus, well-sited and usable armouries/training sites. Leadership that can make a decision regarding the utility of supporting a platoon rattling around some vast armoury calling itself a Regiment. And so on.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Working equipment always helps keeping people motivated, just saying



Not just working equipment, how about enough equipment, how is it a Reserve CSS FSG/company/what ever you want to call it only has two C9's? no C6's to protect the in and out route of a harbour and I won't even get at he issue of tooling, spare parts and vehicles.


----------



## Dissident

Our recruiting allotment his year: 5 pers. This does not even keep up with attrition. I've warned of this since late 2010, when we were full (54 pers on paper) to now where we are ~24 on paper and paraded 9 all rank for a week end ex. All I want for Christmas are a bunch of new troops. 5 doesn't cut it. Twice that would be OK. I want 15-20 for the next 3 years before we lose the core group we built.

Hopefully this reserve change is good news.


----------



## MilEME09

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Our recruiting allotment his year: 5 pers. This does not even keep up with attrition. I've warned of this since late 2010, when we were full (54 pers on paper) to now where we are ~24 on paper and paraded 9 all rank for a week end ex. All I want for Christmas are a bunch of new troops. 5 doesn't cut it. Twice that would be OK. I want 15-20 for the next 3 years before we lose the core group we built.
> 
> Hopefully this reserve change is good news.



dont forget of those 5, how many actually make it, and stay? When I got in I was 1 of 6 that entered my unit, within a year only two of us out of that 6 were still in.  with that kind of retainment, we need five times the number of people coming in to meet demand.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> dont forget of those 5, how many actually make it, and stay? When I got in I was 1 of 6 that entered my unit, within a year only two of us out of that 6 were still in.  with that kind of retainment, we need five times the number of people coming in to meet demand.



I would agree.  Of my intake I was one of 18.  3 stuck around.  I lasted 5 years.
Of the platoon I recruited (30) we managed to get 12 through BMT (conducted at the unit).


----------



## Rifleman62

MilEME09: 





> ....how is it a Reserve CSS FSG/company/what ever you want to call it only has two C9's? no C6's to protect the in and out route of a harbour....



Sign the weapons out from an Inf unit for trg, TOETS, FTX. As long as it is coord it can work out.

We had range shoots in Shilo during the month of March and fired all the ammo we could get our hands on that was not use by the Cbt Arms. You would be surprised at the amount of ammo including linked available. You do have to have all the trg/range work/simfire etc annotated in your trg plan and pester Bde for the six months prior to fiscal year end.  

Additionally, everyone in the unit qual on the 9mm pistol which we shot twice a year as nobody wanted 9mm ammo but us.

It can be done.


----------



## George Wallace

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Our recruiting allotment his year: 5 pers. This does not even keep up with attrition. I've warned of this since late 2010, when we were full (54 pers on paper) to now where we are ~24 on paper and paraded 9 all rank for a week end ex. All I want for Christmas are a bunch of new troops. 5 doesn't cut it. Twice that would be OK. I want 15-20 for the next 3 years before we lose the core group we built.
> 
> Hopefully this reserve change is good news.



It seems to be a problem with the SIP for the Reserves being managed as if it was Regular Force.  We have covered this here in the past year, presenting similar events and statistics.  The Reserves, as your example and Kirkhill have pointed out can not survive recruiting one for one.  The Reserves need to recruit at least five for each vacancy.  Then they may be able to fill those vacancies and stay ahead of unplanned attrition as well.  I remember my unit recruiting fifteen people, two years in a row.   In both those intakes, we lost 50% through Training Failures or CT to Regular Force.  The SIP when I left was only allowing the unit to recruit three people, at a time that the Unit's authorized strength had increased from 29 to 120.  Totally out of touch with reality.


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> It seems to be a problem with the SIP for the Reserves being managed as if it was Regular Force.  We have covered this here in the past year, presenting similar events and statistics.



To the contrary, there has to be central management of the Reserve SIP to ensure priorities are observed.  Otherwise, the Buckshot Fusiliers will recruit 75 more basketweavers, despite there being no requirement.  With limited resources available to train new soldiers, there must be priorities set.



> The SIP when I left was only allowing the unit to recruit three people, at a time that the Unit's authorized strength had increased from 29 to 120.  Totally out of touch with reality.



That unit is in a somewhat unique situation. That said, establishments are not fully funded; that a unit grew in size from Platoon to Company does not imply that there was any overall growth in the strength of the Reserves - so to grow one unit, others would have to be reduced in strength.

Once again, the oversized footprint of the Army Reserve does it no favours.  A ruthless culling of unit HQs to provide fewer HQs commanding larger sub-units would be the logical way to go; does Montreal (& area) truly need Bn HQs for the CGG, RHC, RMR, FMR, RdeM, and two Bns of R22eR - that's seven LCols & associated staffs to command around 1000 infantrymen?  Sounds more like two Bn HQs and seven or eight companies of trained soldiers, plus a Bde level depot to train the soldiers up to DP1.


----------



## cavalryman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> To the contrary, there has to be central management of the Reserve SIP to ensure priorities are observed.  Otherwise, the Buckshot Fusiliers will recruit 75 more basketweavers, despite there being no requirement.  With limited resources available to train new soldiers, there must be priorities set.
> 
> That unit is in a somewhat unique situation. That said, establishments are not fully funded; that a unit grew in size from Platoon to Company does not imply that there was any overall growth in the strength of the Reserves - so to grow one unit, others would have to be reduced in strength.
> 
> Once again, the oversized footprint of the Army Reserve does it no favours.  A ruthless culling of unit HQs to provide fewer HQs commanding larger sub-units would be the logical way to go; does Montreal (& area) truly need Bn HQs for the CGG, RHC, RMR, FMR, RdeM, and two Bns of R22eR - that's seven LCols & associated staffs to command around 1000 infantrymen?  Sounds more like two Bn HQs and seven or eight companies of trained soldiers, plus a Bde level depot to train the soldiers up to DP1.


 :nod:
Not to mention the spare LCols haunting Bde HQ after completing a tour of command of their company-sized regiments.


----------



## dapaterson

cavalryman said:
			
		

> :nod:
> Not to mention the spare LCols haunting Bde HQ after completing a tour of command of their *understrength* company-sized regiments.




FTFY


----------



## kratz

HR planning, states you need a minimum ratio of 6:1, just to meet recruitment needs, not including how many wash out.
After 13 graduated from my BMQ and after 20+ years, I'm aware of 1 or 2 who continue to serve.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> FTFY



So the Companies don't have enough "basket weavers"?

As for training budgets ..... send more of the training back to the units.  IIRC part of my training was Methods of Instruction and teaching standardized lessons on dental hygiene, ranks, orbats, military justice and a whole bunch of other stuff where I learned as I studied to present my lessons to my recruits (under the watchful eyes of my OC, CSM, RSM and Adjutant).


----------



## dapaterson

kratz said:
			
		

> HR planning, states you need a minimum ratio of 6:1, just to meet recruitment needs, not including how many wash out.
> After 13 graduated from my BMQ and after 20+ years, I'm aware of 1 or 2 who continue to serve.



SIP = target enrolments, not target for pers attracted and expressing interest.


----------



## George Wallace

dapaterson said:
			
		

> To the contrary, there has to be central management of the Reserve SIP to ensure priorities are observed.  Otherwise, the Buckshot Fusiliers will recruit 75 more basketweavers, despite there being no requirement.  With limited resources available to train new soldiers, there must be priorities set.
> 
> That unit is in a somewhat unique situation. That said, establishments are not fully funded; that a unit grew in size from Platoon to Company does not imply that there was any overall growth in the strength of the Reserves - so to grow one unit, others would have to be reduced in strength.
> 
> Once again, the oversized footprint of the Army Reserve does it no favours.  A ruthless culling of unit HQs to provide fewer HQs commanding larger sub-units would be the logical way to go; does Montreal (& area) truly need Bn HQs for the CGG, RHC, RMR, FMR, RdeM, and two Bns of R22eR - that's seven LCols & associated staffs to command around 1000 infantrymen?  Sounds more like two Bn HQs and seven or eight companies of trained soldiers, plus a Bde level depot to train the soldiers up to DP1.



Agreed and your solution seems the best method.  We are limited, as is all the CAF, to the amount of people that can be recruited, but as pointed out, all positions at the sharp end are eaten up when redundancy is built in at the other end.


----------



## RocketRichard

For the most part excellent comments here ladies and gents.  Thanks for your insights.


----------



## quadrapiper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Once again, the oversized footprint of the Army Reserve does it no favours.  A ruthless culling of unit HQs to provide fewer HQs commanding larger sub-units would be the logical way to go; does Montreal (& area) truly need Bn HQs for the CGG, RHC, RMR, FMR, RdeM, and two Bns of R22eR - that's seven LCols & associated staffs to command around 1000 infantrymen?  Sounds more like two Bn HQs and seven or eight companies of trained soldiers, plus a Bde level depot to train the soldiers up to DP1.


Would require someone to decide whether the militia is supposed to be, right now, at full strength in more or less formed units, or if it's supposed to be a core for a much larger force/a jumping-off point for future Regulars/etc.

I think I've posited earlier that all of the above might make sense depending on the nature of the unit and its location, and am in full agreement with the need to cull that swarm of HQ staff.

Only way such a plethora of HQs for so few pers would make sense is if the PRes was considered primarily a force generator for a much, much greater number of personnel than are currently being trained, which various people who know about this sort of thing have suggested is likely to be too slow a process for modern needs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So the Companies don't have enough "basket weavers"?
> 
> As for training budgets ..... send more of the training back to the units.  IIRC part of my training was Methods of Instruction and teaching standardized lessons on dental hygiene, ranks, orbats, military justice and a whole bunch of other stuff where I learned as I studied to present my lessons to my recruits (under the watchful eyes of my OC, CSM, RSM and Adjutant).



That's just the issue we fight constantly: leadership. A lack of consistent, good leadership causes attendance to wax and wane in lock step.

The continual ebb and flow of good people, or any people in some cases, leading from key positions creates this odd sense that you are on some kind of bizarre roller coaster. One year there's no one, the next the Mess is full, the next you are back to square one and rebuilding yet again.


----------



## MilEME09

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> MilEME09:
> Sign the weapons out from an Inf unit for trg, TOETS, FTX. As long as it is coord it can work out.
> 
> We had range shoots in Shilo during the month of March and fired all the ammo we could get our hands on that was not use by the Cbt Arms. You would be surprised at the amount of ammo including linked available. You do have to have all the trg/range work/simfire etc annotated in your trg plan and pester Bde for the six months prior to fiscal year end.
> 
> Additionally, everyone in the unit qual on the 9mm pistol which we shot twice a year as nobody wanted 9mm ammo but us.
> 
> It can be done.



you slightly misunderstand me, I have no issue with borrowing from other units, I'm just saying we don't have enough of these weapons to go around to fulfill ever required role according to doctrine.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> you slightly misunderstand me, I have no issue with borrowing from other units, I'm just saying we don't have enough of these weapons to go around to fulfill ever required role according to doctrine.



Unless you are in the usual position of having a CO who thinks his/ her penis is bigger than everyone else's, and therefore an idiot, it's a good idea to try and run exercises (especially ranges) with other units in the area. Even if (sharp intake of breath) they are not from your same arm/service, you can group up and get a lot of useful training done together.

And now I will expect a knock at the front door and the Spanish Inquisition to begin. Luckily, I already have my own comfy pillows picked out.  ;D


----------



## OldSolduer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Unless you are in the usual position of having a CO who thinks his/ her penis is bigger than everyone else's, and therefore an idiot, it's a good idea to try and run exercises (especially ranges) with other units in the area. Even if (sharp intake of breath) they are not from your same arm/service, you can group up and get a lot of useful training done together.
> 
> And now I will expect a knock at the front door and the Spanish Inquisition to begin. Luckily, I already have my own comfy pillows picked out.  ;D



No body expects the Spanish Inquisition! Fetch the......COMFY CHAIR!


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Unless you are in the usual position of having a CO who thinks his/ her penis is bigger than everyone else's, and therefore an idiot, it's a good idea to try and run exercises (especially ranges) with other units in the area. Even if (sharp intake of breath) they are not from your same arm/service, you can group up and get a lot of useful training done together.
> 
> And now I will expect a knock at the front door and the Spanish Inquisition to begin. Luckily, I already have my own comfy pillows picked out.  ;D



There is a great deal of coordination needed to pull off successful combined exercises, to ensure that all units involved benefit from it.  Even shared exercises between units of the same arm need to ensure that everyone is starting from the same place; no point in running a combined platoon live fire if one unit hasn't done their PWT 3 ranges yet.

Of course, that's why units have COs and their support staff - to try to sort those things out before the soldiers are on the ground.


----------



## CountDC

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Of course, that's why units have COs and their support staff  full time staff - to try to sort those things out before the soldiers are on the ground.



isn't that more accurate or are other units different and the Class A's actually do things besides reaping the glory?


----------



## dapaterson

CountDC said:
			
		

> isn't that more accurate or are other units different and the Class A's actually do things besides reaping the glory?



I have seen both extremes and everything in between.  And when I refer to support staff, I include both part-time and full-time personnel.

The biggest challenge in the part-time Reserve is time.  Longer lead times are needed if we want part-time leaders to be able to plan and organize things.  Announcing in March that there's a big exercise in August is far too late; the more senior part-time personnel are likely more senior elsewhere as well, and less able to drop things quickly.  As well, lead-up training won't happen - if it's a month to plan an exercise (best case, including booking ranges etc) then there may be an opportunity for one or two weekends in advance of the large exercise - hardly enough if you want people practiced when they arrive.


----------



## OldSolduer

We have a few problems. One is the double and triple hatting of captains and majors. Often they are on the Bde Staff and parading with their home regiment/unit on parade nights and weekends.
I often ask the question if a Reg Force Major was posted in to a Reg Force Bde HQ, would he be be told it's expected of him to command A Coy of the Buckshot Fencibles? I think we all know the answer to this.

Why are the officers double and triple hatted? Because it takes too bloody long to recruit and train them to a half decent level, therefore someone must take up the slack.


----------



## Harris

Totally agree.  In my Unit, nearly all of my leadership staff work Class B in Aldershot and volunteer with the Unit.  For example, OC A, CSM A, all 3 Pl WO's, and all my Sect Comd less two, and up until last year myself were filling at least two roles.  The Unit has had only 3 officers make it to Maj and still be with the Unit.  One is now the Brigade Comd, Myself as the CO and OC A.  The person slated to take of the Unit after me is still in the Reg force.


----------



## Remius

Harris said:
			
		

> Totally agree.  In my Unit, nearly all of my leadership staff work Class B in Aldershot and volunteer with the Unit.  For example, OC A, CSM A, all 3 Pl WO's, and all my Sect Comd less two, and up until last year myself were filling at least two roles.  The Unit has had only 3 officers make it to Maj and still be with the Unit.  One is now the Brigade Comd, Myself as the CO and OC A.  The person slated to take of the Unit after me is still in the Reg force.



And all for 15% off the regular price... >


----------



## Dissident

Building sand castles, this is what the reserve is about, IMHO, sadly.

Those of us who stick around will see an endless parade of troops and officers. The majority will serve and leave. Some will achieve greatness, leaving us to mourn their departure. Some will stick around, for better or worse. 

What is the purpose of the reserve?:
-Serve as a conduit to augment the regular force in time of need?
-Aid to civil power under dire circumstances?
-Maintain a CF footprint in the community?
-???


----------



## Ostrozac

NinerSix said:
			
		

> What is the purpose of the reserve?:
> -Serve as a conduit to augment the regular force in time of need?
> -Aid to civil power under dire circumstances?
> -Maintain a CF footprint in the community?
> -???



Also:

- Create an ability for units to end-run around the Regular Force ECP and Career Managers to create Class B billets for assorted jobs that aren't actually part of the Reg Force establishment
- Maintain a truly impressive array of cap-badges and regiments (Scotland has 3.5 Scottish regiments, Canada has 16 Scottish regiments, which seems a little excessive)
- Conduct initial attraction and initial entry training for civilians that eventually end up as Regulars. Many Regulars started in the Reserves -- our Reserve Units might be doing a better job than anything that Recruiting Group is doing.

- But the big one is the individual augmentation piece. Our Army units, as established, are way too understrength to do anything beyond Roto 0 without either 1: cannibalizing other units for guys, 2: reserve augmentation, or 3: both at the same time. Reservists were critical in Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, and are going to be a big part of our current quagmire in Iraq/Syria.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Also:
> 
> - Create an ability for units to end-run around the Regular Force ECP and Career Managers to create Class B billets for assorted jobs that aren't actually part of the Reg Force establishment
> - Maintain a truly impressive array of cap-badges and regiments (Scotland has 3.5 Scottish regiments, Canada has 16 Scottish regiments, which seems a little excessive)
> - Conduct initial attraction and initial entry training for civilians that eventually end up as Regulars. Many Regulars started in the Reserves -- our Reserve Units might be doing a better job than anything that Recruiting Group is doing.
> 
> - But the big one is the individual augmentation piece. Our Army units, as established, are way too understrength to do anything beyond Roto 0 without either 1: cannibalizing other units for guys, 2: reserve augmentation, or 3: both at the same time. Reservists were critical in Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, and are going to be a big part of our current quagmire in Iraq/Syria.



And, most importantly, to lend style and character to what would otherwise be yet another unfortunate organization robbed of its passion by the Federal fun police. ;D


----------



## OldSolduer

Perhaps the time has come to start to amalgamate regiments. Why does Winnipeg have two Infantry regiments? Why are there 16 Scottish Regiments?


----------



## medicineman

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> ...Why are there 16 Scottish Regiments?



Lots of cross dressers in the CAF  >  :dunno: ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Perhaps the time has come to start to amalgamate regiments. Why does Winnipeg have two Infantry regiments? Why are there 16 Scottish Regiments?



Newton's third law, of course

In the absence of a compelling reason to change, and the right leadership and resources, inertia will always win.


----------



## medicineman

Always funny how we can apply physics to anthropology, psychology and sociology.

MM


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Newton's third law, of course
> 
> In the absence of a compelling reason to change, and *the right leadership *and resources, inertia will always win.



So, does anybody have any idea how to get in touch with this chap:







Sam may have been a poor judge of rifles, entrenching tools and leather boots* but he did manage to get a division out the door in double quick time.

*And judging from the current state of affairs we may have been too hard on the old bugger.


----------



## MilEME09

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Perhaps the time has come to start to amalgamate regiments. Why does Winnipeg have two Infantry regiments? Why are there 16 Scottish Regiments?



Why not do what the brits have been doing? for example lets take 41 CBG just because that is were I am. We amalgamate the KOCR, and the SALH under one brand lets call it 41 Armoured Regiment. Each unit will retain its identity as a sub unit, but with one CO, one HQ, less fat, easier to coordinate training and exercises.


----------



## McG

That seems to be the answer this thread keeps circling back to.  Regiment-neutral battalions with regimentally aligned sub-units.


----------



## George Wallace

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Why not do what the brits have been doing? for example lets take 41 CBG just because that is were I am. We amalgamate the KOCR, and the SALH under one brand lets call it 41 Armoured Regiment. Each unit will retain its identity as a sub unit, but with one CO, one HQ, less fat, easier to coordinate training and exercises.



Problem is: You are using logic.  You know darn well what that means.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Problem is: You are using logic.  You know darn well what that means.



This is what proponents of Reserve reform have been saying for ages!  Which as you say George, is exactly why it won't happen.


----------



## BillN

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Perhaps the time has come to start to amalgamate regiments. Why does Winnipeg have two Infantry regiments? Why are there 16 Scottish Regiments?



Why indeed....there used to be four Infantry Regiments in Winnipeg  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

Can the "Regiment" be _civilianized_?  Instead of the Regiment being a military construct can the emphasis be shifted to the Regimental Association?

The role of the Regimental Association would be that of a Social Club attracting members of the local community. Their military purpose would be to maintain the local profile of the Canadian Army in general and to ensure/promote a steady stream of volunteers to man one of the subunits of the Territorial Battalion Groups.  Serving members would be members of the Regimental Association but would not be actively involved, at least not on the Government's time, with Association duties.  

Jus' thinkin' (again)  ???


----------



## Dissident

I'd be quite OK with 39 MP Coy with 10, 11 and 12 MP Platoons.


----------



## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Can the "Regiment" be _civilianized_?  Instead of the Regiment being a military construct can the emphasis be shifted to the Regimental Association?
> 
> The role of the Regimental Association would be that of a Social Club attracting members of the local community. Their military purpose would be to maintain the local profile of the Canadian Army in general and to ensure/promote a steady stream of volunteers to man one of the subunits of the Territorial Battalion Groups.  Serving members would be members of the Regimental Association but would not be actively involved, at least not on the Government's time, with Association duties.
> 
> Jus' thinkin' (again)  ???



I have my doubts that any Regimental Association would dream of ever becoming like the Legion and allowing for their organization to be overly populated by civilians with no Regimental ties.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> That seems to be the answer this thread keeps circling back to.  Regiment-neutral battalions with regimentally aligned sub-units.



The alternative being give us a budget, and reform the recruiting group to get more butts in the door to bring us to the size to require a "regiment" let alone a division


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The alternative being give us a budget, and reform the recruiting group to get more butts in the door to bring us to the size to require a "regiment" let alone a division



Not going to happen as that would come at the expense of the Regular Force.


----------



## MilEME09

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Not going to happen as that would come at the expense of the Regular Force.



I meant the CF as a whole, The reserves doesn't have the need to be larger then the reg force, for now, unless we change our model.


----------



## LightFighter

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Can the "Regiment" be _civilianized_?  Instead of the Regiment being a military construct can the emphasis be shifted to the Regimental Association?
> 
> The role of the Regimental Association would be that of a Social Club attracting members of the local community. Their military purpose would be to maintain the local profile of the Canadian Army in general and to ensure/promote a steady stream of volunteers to man one of the subunits of the Territorial Battalion Groups.  Serving members would be members of the Regimental Association but would not be actively involved, at least not on the Government's time, with Association duties.
> 
> Jus' thinkin' (again)  ???


Why would a civilian with no Regimental/Military ties wish to join a Regiment's Association? What would the draw for them be?

Also, would it really be beneficial to the Regiment/Association and encourage people to join the unit? I have my doubts. 
_______



One of the major changes that IMO needs to be done, like others has mentioned is a complete reorg of the Army Reserves and start combining units. Instead of a city having 2-4 Infantry "Regiments", they should reorg into 1 battalion, with the former "regiments" becoming a Rifle Company. As well, for the admin aspect, each of the former units could combine their Orderly Room into one Battalion Orderly room, and have each new company retain 1-2 clerks, 1 Ops NCO, etc - assuming that is realistic/doable. CO/RSM duties would rotate between cap badges.

Individual coys could carry on the linage/history of their prior regiment, keep the capbadge, etc. No more LCols commanding a Reserve "Regiment" that is in reality a under strength company. For weekend training, the battalion can go out and train together, instead of what is currently done with with unit being able to put out a platoon(+/-) and doing their own thing. Depending on what is being done, IBTS vs tactical training, it may be better for each Coy to do it's own individual training, but at other times it may be more beneficial to have each Coy working together.


As well this would occur in the brigade's Armour, Artillery, etc units as well.

I would assume having far less individual HQs and LCols, etc would save the brigades money which could be better spent towards training, recruiting, etc.


----------



## Old Sweat

To play a bit of the devil's advocate, if one wished to adopt such a course of action, it should be accompanied with a corresponding reduction in the bloated numbers of regular senior officers and marginally useful headquarters. Otherwise, the plan is vulnerable to attack for cutting the reserves so the regulars can grow.

There also may be more than a few unintended consequences here, and maybe we should barnstorm some what ifs. Consider in the late 1950s that we took a well-established militia structure with experienced war time commanders, many with impressive combat records, and converted it from a mobilization base for a war in Europe into a national survival organization to conduct recovery operations in our major cities after a nuclear attack. I really don't think the reserves really ever recovered, though I may be pessimistic.


----------



## medicineman

LightFighter said:
			
		

> Why would a civilian with no Regimental/Military ties wish to join a Regiment's Association? What would the draw for them be?



The Association would benefit from monetary and political connections and those connections would be able to have some more LCF to add to their CV's and bio's and public sides.

MM


----------



## Kirkhill

Its what attracts Honoraries to the Regimental Associations in the first place.  That and the opportunity to hangout at places like the Canadian Forces College and New Year's Levees.

It would be the opposite of a Reg Force Regimental Association where the soldiers create a family.  In this instance the "family" (community) would create soldiers.


----------



## LightFighter

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> To play a bit of the devil's advocate, if one wished to adopt such a course of action, it should be accompanied with a corresponding reduction in the bloated numbers of regular senior officers and marginally useful headquarters. Otherwise, the plan is vulnerable to attack for cutting the reserves so the regulars can grow.



I agree, changes must be made in the Regular Force as well in regards to HQ, etc. IMO, we could probably do with less divisions as well, personally I would like to only see 

1 Cdn Div - Western Canada
2 Cdn Div - Central/Atlantic Canada
3 Cdn Div - Quebec

I've also thought about having a 4th Cdn Div, but this one would have all Reserve Brigades fall under it, but I'm not sure it would work out well. 



			
				medicineman said:
			
		

> The Association would benefit from monetary and political connections and those connections would be able to have some more LCF to add to their CV's and bio's and public sides.
> 
> MM



Ack, but couldn't the Association hosting social events and inviting members/organizations in the community accomplish the same? As well, isn't the HCol supposed to help with this as well(eg connections, etc)?


----------



## Kirkhill

LightFighter said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> Ack, but couldn't the Association hosting social events and inviting members/organizations in the community accomplish the same? As well, isn't the HCol supposed to help with this as well(eg connections, etc)?



I think you are right.  I guess what I am suggesting is that the "social" burden be taken from the serving members and transferred to the Association or Honoraries, Past Members and Auxilliaries.  They could also take up the burden of managing the Cadet Corps.

The Civic value would be that of promoting values and raising a local corps of volunteers that may or may not sign up for Class A service but would be available to support the community in times of crisis.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Keep the militia, but make it all voluntary. 

Redirect 'militia' funding into a dozen of the old 'numbered' battalions/ regiments, to be known as 'reserve battalions/ regiments', scattered across Canada. They get a 'corn flake' style cap badge with a number on it, like the good old days. Arty/Engr/CSS stay pretty much the same. Cav and Inf go briefly insane while they adjust to the new reality.

If the militia guys want to join the numbered units they have to Dag green. New recruits are enlisted directly into the numbered battalions.

Post regular soldiers, in their last 2 or 3 years, to the numbered battalions to bolster the skill/ experience levels and overall numbers.

Task each numbered battalion to support one of the CMBGs in some way.

There, simples right?  

Hat... coat... taxi!


----------



## Fishbone Jones

It's not the 'boots on the ground' Reservists that are opposed to amalgamation. This I know from experience.

It is the LCol Company Commanders, the platoon sized RSMs, the Honourary Cols and LCols that oppose for fear of losing their personal stature, not the Regiments.

Ask the Jr Officers, WOs', Snr NCOs' and Jnr NCOs'. Move to their wishes and you'll be 33BG, 1st Armoured tomorrow. 

Fire the tit suckers and within 10 years you'll have the norm.


----------



## kratz

As a cautionary tale, I have to mention.

The system is quick enough to lose deadweight in the lower ranks.
If we start firing the mid to upper ranks as fast, what would be left with?


----------



## George Wallace

kratz said:
			
		

> As a cautionary tale, I have to mention.
> 
> The system is quick enough to lose deadweight in the lower ranks.
> If we start firing the mid to upper ranks as fast, what would be left with?



Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.


----------



## MilEME09

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.



Unfortunately the deadweight has friends who wont let the system be respected, so they get a helping hand


----------



## Underway

The reserves are just like survivor:

Outwit,Outlast, Outplay,   And eventually you'll be a Major.


----------



## Danjanou

Underway said:
			
		

> The reserves are just like survivor:
> 
> Outwit,Outlast, Outplay,   And eventually you'll be a Major CO.



FTFY  8)


----------



## Brasidas

recceguy said:
			
		

> It's not the 'boots on the ground' Reservists that are opposed to amalgamation. This I know from experience.
> 
> It is the LCol Company Commanders, the platoon sized RSMs, the Honourary Cols and LCols that oppose for fear of losing their personal stature, not the Regiments.
> 
> Ask the Jr Officers, WOs', Snr NCOs' and Jnr NCOs'. Move to their wishes and you'll be 33BG, 1st Armoured tomorrow.
> 
> Fire the tit suckers and within 10 years you'll have the norm.



In principle, maybe.

When the implementation ends up being three sub-units meeting at the most central location to conduct collective training (that was previously done on their own), driving everybody else 90 minutes, with breakdowns and holdups and coordination on site, orders are given, and then I get literally fifteen minutes to actually train troops before we're told to pack up and go home, I get skeptical.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Encouraging young officers and NCO, to work with the other units will build bonds and create those unofficial channels that makes things work. As mentioned being able to maximize training time on Parade nights needs to be a priority, much time is often whittled away. If things go off the rails, NCO's and Officers should have some idea how to fill that time with useful training.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Brasidas said:
			
		

> In principle, maybe.
> 
> When the implementation ends up being three sub-units meeting at the most central location to conduct collective training (that was previously done on their own), driving everybody else 90 minutes, with breakdowns and holdups and coordination on site, orders are given, and then I get literally fifteen minutes to actually train troops before we're told to pack up and go home, I get skeptical.



A big part of the problem you are stuck on is that you have 3 x CO, 3 x RSM, 3 x Ops cells vying for control and coordination. An amalgamated outfit would have only one of each driving a single organization. Training can be conducted the way it always has, but at the Sqn level vice Regimental, with a Major and SSM at the hilt operating under direction of the central Command Cell.


----------



## Eaglelord17

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Ah!  But there is the rub.  You ensure the system is quick enough to lose the deadweight in the lower ranks before they reach mid to upper ranks.  Failure to do so on both the NCO and officer lower ranks is where we have seen the problem spread, through the deadweight being promoted, found to be lacking and then sent to the Schools to breed more deadweight in their likeness.



To be fair having spent time in the Reserves and Regs, I have found much more deadweight in the Regs than the Reserves, main difference is one is always paid, the other isn't (and even then it is at 15% less with less benefits).

I feel the best way to fix the Reserves is to take it out of Reg Force control (at least budget wise). Give them a stable budget which shall increase by x amount each year, and if there are cuts do it equally between the Regs and Reserves (I know heresy). Also give them permission to recruit 180 troops per unit minimum with most the recruiting being done by the unit recruiter (as the current system bleeds the unit before they have a chance, how is it when you have 15 potential recruits in the fall only one gets in by the summer? Most recruits you get are either High School students or in University so it might be best to make it so you can hire them in a timely fashion before they get a job at X fastfood place or are no longer interested). This would bring the Reserve army up to approximately 25,000-30,000 troops which is something that can be used effectively (either in augmentation or in the event of a real war you actually have a decent force to call to arms).


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Increasing $$ to the Reserves when the Reg Force budgets are being slashed and Reg Force trg is being reduced isn't likely the smart thing to do and the thing that will happen.  

Simply having a 25-30k strength Reserve doesn't mean jack shit if you don't have the $ to train them to do something useful and the kit they need to do it once trained to the useful level.  Otherwise, all  you have is a paper force with no teeth.  

Now, if you did have that 25-30k force reserve army...just what are you doing with them that makes all this money worth spending to Joe and Jane Taxpayer?  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.

(1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.

Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.


----------



## dapaterson

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Increasing $$ to the Reserves when the Reg Force budgets are being slashed and Reg Force trg is being reduced isn't likely the smart thing to do and the thing that will happen.
> 
> Simply having a 25-30k strength Reserve doesn't mean jack shit if you don't have the $ to train them to do something useful and the kit they need to do it once trained to the useful level.  Otherwise, all  you have is a paper force with no teeth.
> 
> Now, if you did have that 25-30k force reserve army...just what are you doing with them that makes all this money worth spending to Joe and Jane Taxpayer?  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.
> 
> (1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.
> 
> Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.



Realistically, that needs to be done for both Reg and Res F at the same time - what do we want the CAF writ large to be able to do; how should we structure it to do that, with a mix of high readiness (Reg F) and reduced readiness (Res F).

With 25% of the Reg F now officers, I'd argue that there's ample room for an examination of command structures there as well... and likely some savings that could be reinvested from staff processes into readiness.


----------



## Remius

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> To be fair having spent time in the Reserves and Regs, I have found much more deadweight in the Regs than the Reserves, main difference is one is always paid, the other isn't (and even then it is at 15% less with less benefits).
> 
> I feel the best way to fix the Reserves is to take it out of Reg Force control (at least budget wise). Give them a stable budget which shall increase by x amount each year, and if there are cuts do it equally between the Regs and Reserves (I know heresy). Also give them permission to recruit 180 troops per unit minimum with most the recruiting being done by the unit recruiter (as the current system bleeds the unit before they have a chance, how is it when you have 15 potential recruits in the fall only one gets in by the summer? Most recruits you get are either High School students or in University so it might be best to make it so you can hire them in a timely fashion before they get a job at X fastfood place or are no longer interested). This would bring the Reserve army up to approximately 25,000-30,000 troops which is something that can be used effectively (either in augmentation or in the event of a real war you actually have a decent force to call to arms).



This.  The PRES needs its own budget independent of the reg force and may even need its own CoC.  Like the National Guard or something similar.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Realistically, that needs to be done for both Reg and Res F at the same time - what do we want the CAF writ large to be able to do; how should we structure it to do that, with a mix of high readiness (Reg F) and reduced readiness (Res F).
> 
> With 25% of the Reg F now officers, I'd argue that there's ample room for an examination of command structures there as well... and likely some savings that could be reinvested from staff processes into readiness.



Agree wholeheartedly.  We are not lean enough in either component and IMO, much useable $$ is being pissed away on thing that should not be a priority.  A housecleaning is in order.


----------



## George Wallace

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> To be fair having spent time in the Reserves and Regs, I have found much more deadweight in the Regs than the Reserves, main difference is one is always paid, the other isn't (and even then it is at 15% less with less benefits).



The problem exists in both, so it is not generic to one more than the other, although Reg Force deadwood being posted to a RSS position can be devastating.  



			
				Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> I feel the best way to fix the Reserves is to take it out of Reg Force control (at least budget wise).



This has been done in the past and still in certain units where there is a shortage of Reg Force to post in as RSS.  The problems with the Reserves is maintaining a cadre if pers who have the knowledge base to continue to operate effectively.



			
				Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Give them a stable budget which shall increase by x amount each year, and if there are cuts do it equally between the Regs and Reserves (I know heresy). Also give them permission to recruit 180 troops per unit minimum with most the recruiting being done by the unit recruiter (as the current system bleeds the unit before they have a chance, how is it when you have 15 potential recruits in the fall only one gets in by the summer? Most recruits you get are either High School students or in University so it might be best to make it so you can hire them in a timely fashion before they get a job at X fastfood place or are no longer interested). This would bring the Reserve army up to approximately 25,000-30,000 troops which is something that can be used effectively (either in augmentation or in the event of a real war you actually have a decent force to call to arms).



Finances and recruiting numbers are dictated by Treasury Board decisions, as discussed in other threads.  Recruiting timelines have also been discussed in other threads, and due to the fact that we are much more security conscious today than a couple of decades ago, the timelines for clearing new recruits will vary.  Could you imagine having an intake of new recruits to a Reserve unit who all had sympathies for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant just because you wanted to forgo any form of checks in a hurry to bring up your numbers?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Crantor said:
			
		

> This.  The PRES needs its own budget independent of the reg force and may even need its own CoC.  Like the National Guard or something similar.



But if you look at the sheer numbers of the entire US ORBAT, Active Service/Reserve/Guard units, they have enough numbers to make their system make (some) sense, militarily and politically (ie Guard units *belong* to the State).  Imagine a province like PEI under this org format, with a 'Guard force' of 100 crewmen and signallers about 50 or so Naval Reserves on the waterfront.


----------



## Remius

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> But if you look at the sheer numbers of the entire US ORBAT, Active Service/Reserve/Guard units, they have enough numbers to make their system make (some) sense, militarily and politically (ie Guard units *belong* to the State).  Imagine a province like PEI under this org format, with a 'Guard force' of 100 crewmen and signallers about 50 or so Naval Reserves on the waterfront.



For the army reserves we need to get out of provincial boundaries.

Put a Reg force BGen and CWO in charge of the Army Reserve Division and give them their own budget.

Three areas.  

Everything from Quebec city to the Atlantic would be the Eastern Reserve Brigade

Toronto to Mtl, central

West of Toronto would be western.

Each lead by a Colonel with several company commanders commanding elements of units that could be force generated to whatever. 

Or something similar to that.


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> ............  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.
> 
> (1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.
> 
> Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.





			
				Crantor said:
			
		

> This.  The PRES needs its own budget independent of the reg force and may even need its own CoC.  Like the National Guard or something similar.



[Drastic COA and be afraid of The Good Idea Faeries:]

One solution may be to change the Recruiting System.  As a large number of Reservist do CT to the Regular Force, sometimes as high as 50% of a Reserve unit's recruit intake, take the training of all recruits out of the hands of the Regular Force and have the Reserves run ALL Recruit Training.  Leave the CFRG to do all the documentation and checks of recruits, but the BMQ and BMOQ to the Reserve Force; running all CAF members, Reserve and Regular, through identical Basic Training and initial Trades training (Exception would be all Trades not found in the Reserves, of which there are many.) before being sent off to their units.  This would create a larger responsibility on the Reserves towards building that old idea of "Total Force".


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Crantor said:
			
		

> For the army reserves we need to get out of provincial boundaries.
> 
> Put a Reg force BGen and CWO in charge of the Army Reserve Division and give them their own budget.
> 
> Three areas.
> 
> Everything from Quebec city to the Atlantic would be the Eastern Reserve Brigade
> 
> Toronto to Mtl, central
> 
> West of Toronto would be western.
> 
> Each lead by a Colonel with several company commanders commanding elements of units that could be force generated to whatever.
> 
> Or something similar to that.



Now that right there would be a step towards reducing the fat that could allow for more 'teeth'.


----------



## George Wallace

Crantor said:
			
		

> For the army reserves we need to get out of provincial boundaries.
> 
> Put a Reg force BGen and CWO in charge of the Army Reserve Division and give them their own budget.
> 
> Three areas.
> 
> Everything from Quebec city to the Atlantic would be the Eastern Reserve Brigade
> 
> Toronto to Mtl, central
> 
> West of Toronto would be western.
> 
> Each lead by a Colonel with several company commanders commanding elements of units that could be force generated to whatever.
> 
> Or something similar to that.



Your geopolitical and ethnic/cultural boundaries may be problematic.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

George Wallace said:
			
		

> [Drastic COA and be afraid of The Good Idea Faeries:]
> 
> One solution may be to change the Recruiting System.  As a large number of Reservist do CT to the Regular Force, sometimes as high as 50% of a Reserve unit's recruit intake, take the training of all recruits out of the hands of the Regular Force and have the Reserves run ALL Recruit Training.  Leave the CFRG to do all the documentation and checks of recruits, but the BMQ and BMOQ to the Reserve Force; running all CAF members, Reserve and Regular through identical Basic Training and initial Trades training (Exception would be all Trades not found in the Reserves, of which there are many.) before being sent off to their units.  This would create a larger responsibility on the Reserves towards building that old idea of "Total Force".



What about this, but with Reg force pers injected into the system sort of like RSS is part of the PRES units now?  Would CFLRS then fall under one of the newly formed Reserve Bde's and be home to a large number of Cl B folks?


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> What about this, but with Reg force pers injected into the system sort of like RSS is part of the PRES units now?  Would CFLRS then fall under one of the newly formed Reserve Bde's and be home to a large number of Cl B folks?



CFLRS would remain under the Training System, separate from any Bde's quiffs.  

There already are Reservists on staff at CFLRS, so not much of a change there.  The largest change would likely be the increase in candidates passing through the doors of CFLRS, with a large number of Reservists now filling the June to August positions.  Other Reservists who can manage timings during other portions of the year would be included with Regular Force candidates, much the same way that both Reg and Reserve attend the same officer training at CTC.


----------



## Remius

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Your geopolitical and ethnic/cultural boundaries may be problematic.



Maybe but who cares.  Why does 33CBG have an armoured recce unit in Oshawa when there is one right across the river literally 5 mins from CSDH.  Makes no sense. 

Either way, you reduce the overhead to make the army reserve a more coherent functional entity rather than the mini empires scattered across the land.

And the Ottawa unified regiment, Toronto Regiment and Montreal regiment would still be culturally/ethnically the same they'd just answer to on central command who takes direction from the BGen who controls the reserve budget.


----------



## runormal

Crantor said:
			
		

> Maybe but who cares.  Why does 33CBG have an armoured recce unit in Oshawa when there is one right across the river literally 5 mins from CSDH.  Makes no sense.



One fatal flaw with that plan IMO and that is French Voice Procedure. Le Regiment de Hull is identified as a Franco unit. Is it fair to expect them to operate in English? Is it fair to expect the rest of the brigade to operate in French? 

Though I have never understood why the Ontario Regiment isn't a part of 32 Brigade.


----------



## Remius

runormal said:
			
		

> One fatal flaw with that plan IMO and that is French Voice Procedure. Le Regiment de Hull is identified as a Franco unit. Is it fair to expect them to operate in English? Is it fair to expect the rest of the brigade to operate in French?
> 
> Though I have never understood why the Ontario Regiment isn't a part of 32 Brigade.



34 CBG has Franco and Anglo units and seem to work just fine.  Most R de Hull guys I've worked with work fine in both French and English.  It's matter of adapting.  It's not a really a fatal flaw by any stretch.


----------



## Jungle

George Wallace said:
			
		

> There already are Reservists on staff at CFLRS, so not much of a change there.  The largest change would likely be the increase in candidates passing through the doors of CFLRS, with a large number of Reservists now filling the June to August positions.



I left CFLRS about a decade ago, so my info is dated, but there is a problem with this proposal. The June to Aug period is already problematic as that is the time the RMC/CMR candidates have to be trained. This already represents a large increase in the number of candidates and is challenging resources every year. I don't know how many PRes pers are trained on BMQ/BMOQ per year, but I can't imagine an influx of hundreds more on top of the RMC/CMR candidates.


----------



## Brasidas

recceguy said:
			
		

> A big part of the problem you are stuck on is that you have 3 x CO, 3 x RSM, 3 x Ops cells vying for control and coordination. An amalgamated outfit would have only one of each driving a single organization. Training can be conducted the way it always has, but at the Sqn level vice Regimental, with a Major and SSM at the hilt operating under direction of the central Command Cell.



My example was from multiple Saturday training days, post-amalgamation. One CO, one RSM.


----------



## George Wallace

Jungle said:
			
		

> I left CFLRS about a decade ago, so my info is dated, but there is a problem with this proposal. The June to Aug period is already problematic as that is the time the RMC/CMR candidates have to be trained. This already represents a large increase in the number of candidates and is challenging resources every year. I don't know how many PRes pers are trained on BMQ/BMOQ per year, but I can't imagine an influx of hundreds more on top of the RMC/CMR candidates.



Good point.  If the facilities can handle the influx of more candidates, a probable solution would be an influx of instructional Staff as well for the peak periods.


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Good point.  If the facilities can handle the influx of more candidates, a probable solution would be an influx of instructional Staff as well for the peak periods.



WRT the RMC cadets: They are on the payroll.  The Reservists aren't.  Readjust RMC's schedule to spread the load.  Perhaps the semester on - semester off system popular with University Co-Op systems.  Or perhaps more tactical training during longer semesters.


----------



## George Wallace

runormal said:
			
		

> One fatal flaw with that plan IMO and that is French Voice Procedure. Le Regiment de Hull is identified as a Franco unit. Is it fair to expect them to operate in English? Is it fair to expect the rest of the brigade to operate in French?
> 
> Though I have never understood why the Ontario Regiment isn't a part of 32 Brigade.



Look at how many Armour Regiments are with each Bde.


----------



## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> WRT the RMC cadets: They are on the payroll.  The Reservists aren't.  Readjust RMC's schedule to spread the load.  Perhaps the semester on - semester off system popular with University Co-Op systems.  Or perhaps more tactical training during longer semesters.



The influx of ROTP into CFLRS is due to the timings between when they are enrolled and then must start classes.  Being on the payroll is not really a factor.  At the same time, there are some Reservists who have the time to attend full-time training other than just in the summer months.  

There are many NCO's and officers in the Reserves who could use a Class B Call Out to be instructors and staff for the summer months and you have the problem solved.....as long as facilities can carry that load.  Then again, must they all go to St Jean to remain under the CFLRS umbrella?


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> as long as facilities can carry that load.  Then again, must they all go to St Jean to remain under the CFLRS umbrella?



And what is wrong with a summer under canvas in beautiful Shilo, Dundurn and Suffield?  There doesn't seem to be a shortage of Blue Rockets based on the pictures I have seen of 1 CanDiv's HQs.


----------



## blackberet17

LightFighter said:
			
		

> I agree, changes must be made in the Regular Force as well in regards to HQ, etc. IMO, we could probably do with less divisions as well, personally I would like to only see
> 
> 1 Cdn Div - Western Canada
> 2 Cdn Div - Central/Atlantic Canada
> 3 Cdn Div - Quebec
> 
> I've also thought about having a 4th Cdn Div, but this one would have all Reserve Brigades fall under it, but I'm not sure it would work out well.
> 
> Ack, but couldn't the Association hosting social events and inviting members/organizations in the community accomplish the same? As well, isn't the HCol supposed to help with this as well(eg connections, etc)?



No thanks. We Easterners have already a great enough dislike for the Toronto Sports Network to lumped unceremoniously with "Central" Canada in such a reorg. 5 Cdn Div already regroups four provinces. Think we'd have much of a voice grouped in with The Centre of the Universe Ontario?


----------



## Rick Goebel

I recently came across some figures which, while not strictly apples to apples, may add some perspective to this discussion.  Recent figures show 372 regular LCols and 9,012 regular Cpl/Ptes in army-managed occupations.  Recent figures show 205 primary reserve LCols on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down and 10,432 primary reserve  Cpl/Ptes on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down.  That’s 1:24.2 for the regular army and 1:50.9 for the army reserve.

On a separate note, you need to be really careful when talking about unit amalgamations that you don’t take actions that would wind up costing more money.  As an example, if you create one unit out of three dispersed units, somebody might decide that you then need to have a full-time DCO or Ops O and a full-time RSM or QMSI to provide for more frequent travel and easier leadership presence in the remote locations.  This would wipe out a good deal of the saving in eliminating two part-time COs and two part-time RSMs, etc.

Consider, for example, the 10 Brigade Group HQs that replaced 20 and then 14 Militia District HQs.  I’m not certain, but I’ve seen enough to be willing to bet that the total payrolls of the 10 are actually higher than the total payrolls of the 20 were.  Can anyone support or correct this?

Now, it is conceivable that the 10 newer HQs do cost much more but are worth every penny due to markedly improved performance of reserve units.  It’s conceivable that putting full-time DCOs or Ops Os into more dispersed units would improve the performance of those units.  It’s also possible that there has been or would be no measurable improvement attributable to the cost increase.


----------



## Brasidas

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> I recently came across some figures which, while not strictly apples to apples, may add some perspective to this discussion.  Recent figures show 372 regular LCols and 9,012 regular Cpl/Ptes in army-managed occupations.  Recent figures show 205 primary reserve LCols on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down and 10,432 primary reserve  Cpl/Ptes on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down.  That’s 1:24.2 for the regular army and 1:50.9 for the army reserve.
> 
> On a separate note, you need to be really careful when talking about unit amalgamations that you don’t take actions that would wind up costing more money.  As an example, if you create one unit out of three dispersed units, somebody might decide that you then need to have a full-time DCO or Ops O and a full-time RSM or QMSI to provide for more frequent travel and easier leadership presence in the remote locations.  This would wipe out a good deal of the saving in eliminating two part-time COs and two part-time RSMs, etc.
> 
> Consider, for example, the 10 Brigade Group HQs that replaced 20 and then 14 Militia District HQs.  I’m not certain, but I’ve seen enough to be willing to bet that the total payrolls of the 10 are actually higher than the total payrolls of the 20 were.  Can anyone support or correct this?
> 
> Now, it is conceivable that the 10 newer HQs do cost much more but are worth every penny due to markedly improved performance of reserve units.  It’s conceivable that putting full-time DCOs or Ops Os into more dispersed units would improve the performance of those units.  It’s also possible that there has been or would be no measurable improvement attributable to the cost increase.



You posted that while I was opening a new one with "Does anyone else have an image of amalgamation potentially resulting in more HQ bloat?"

Make three or so geographically-dispersed units an amalgamated regiment. Take the RSS/class B positions, put them into a pile, these belong to the regimental HQ to do with as they please. Two full-time clerks? Lets make that one, augmented by class A. QM? Let's bring them over here, and hope we can get a class A to fill in over there. Beyond eliminating class A appointments like CO's and SM's, you can end up eliminating a unit's full-time cadre, shoving more time-sensitive planning and admin onto class A pers who don't have the time available to support the unit, and generally creating a mess. 

Amalgamation can be a positive thing, but I'd be wary about rushing into it.


----------



## Remius

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> I recently came across some figures which, while not strictly apples to apples, may add some perspective to this discussion.  Recent figures show 372 regular LCols and 9,012 regular Cpl/Ptes in army-managed occupations.  Recent figures show 205 primary reserve LCols on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down and 10,432 primary reserve  Cpl/Ptes on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down.  That’s 1:24.2 for the regular army and 1:50.9 for the army reserve.
> 
> On a separate note, you need to be really careful when talking about unit amalgamations that you don’t take actions that would wind up costing more money.  As an example, if you create one unit out of three dispersed units, somebody might decide that you then need to have a full-time DCO or Ops O and a full-time RSM or QMSI to provide for more frequent travel and easier leadership presence in the remote locations.  This would wipe out a good deal of the saving in eliminating two part-time COs and two part-time RSMs, etc.
> 
> Consider, for example, the 10 Brigade Group HQs that replaced 20 and then 14 Militia District HQs.  I’m not certain, but I’ve seen enough to be willing to bet that the total payrolls of the 10 are actually higher than the total payrolls of the 20 were.  Can anyone support or correct this?
> 
> Now, it is conceivable that the 10 newer HQs do cost much more but are worth every penny due to markedly improved performance of reserve units.  It’s conceivable that putting full-time DCOs or Ops Os into more dispersed units would improve the performance of those units.  It’s also possible that there has been or would be no measurable improvement attributable to the cost increase.



And how many of the LCols are double hatted?  on class b with Reg force organisations?  But still parade with their units?


----------



## Eaglelord17

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Increasing $$ to the Reserves when the Reg Force budgets are being slashed and Reg Force trg is being reduced isn't likely the smart thing to do and the thing that will happen.
> Simply having a 25-30k strength Reserve doesn't mean jack shit if you don't have the $ to train them to do something useful and the kit they need to do it once trained to the useful level.  Otherwise, all  you have is a paper force with no teeth.
> Now, if you did have that 25-30k force reserve army...just what are you doing with them that makes all this money worth spending to Joe and Jane Taxpayer?  The main purpose of the PRES is to augment the Regs.
> (1) Define the need, role, whatever of the PRES.  (2) Define the realistic command and supply structures needed to support that role (3) fund that organization.
> Its great to toss numbers around for troop strength.  Pease don't throw the token "domestic ops" lifeline out for what the PRES will do.



As I see it the goal of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada, a task we cannot do at the moment with the current funding, structure, and manpower. At the moment both the Reg Force and Reserves both lack direction on how to do this, and I personally think that it is a great opportunity to change our structure back to the more traditional army look (I am not talking about the ribbons and bows), the type which is common in Europe, where you have a small Reg Force and a significantly larger Reserve Force. If you are going to argue about what the Reserves have to do you need to ask is the Reg Force doing what is required of itself in the first place? In my opinion if it wasn't for our friendly neighbour to the south we would have no chance of defending ourself. 

The CF as a whole needs to look at ourselves and justify how we need 68,000 people and can't provide more than roughly 6 ships all of the same class (if you want to be generous include the MCDVs, subs, and ships in refit), 77 combat aircraft, 37 Arty pieces, 120 tanks, sub 11,000 combat arms for the Army (that number is pretty generous), no air defence (unless you include aircraft and ships in that), and no AORs. (these are all rough numbers)

Maybe we need to look into different models for our military, as our current one isn't working. Maybe a Reservist training model where we send them off to train for a year straight then stay in the Reserves for x amount of years is required (somewhat like Switzerland). Maybe we should look at doing things like completely paying for there education provided they stay in the Reserves for x amount of years after as sort of retention, as it might be cheaper to do that then to have them join for two years then leave and have to completely retrain someone from scratch and hope they last longer than two years. 
Maybe if we looked into training Reservists in trades with equivalent civilian qualifications (i.e. making the qualifications equivalent), so they would have a job well being a Reservist (once finished trades training), and throw some sort of time frame commitment on there, you would end up with skilled workers who are working in there field civvy side and you can call them to arms in the event of war or have them work with the Reg Force as taskings. These are just ideas but they might be a solution to the biggest issue the Reserves have which is turnover.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Crantor said:
			
		

> For the army reserves we need to get out of provincial boundaries.
> 
> Put a Reg force BGen and CWO in charge of the Army Reserve Division and give them their own budget.
> 
> Three areas.
> 
> Everything from Quebec city to the Atlantic would be the Eastern Reserve Brigade
> 
> Toronto to Mtl, central
> 
> West of Toronto would be western.
> 
> Each lead by a Colonel with several company commanders commanding elements of units that could be force generated to whatever.
> 
> Or something similar to that.



The Int already do that.


----------



## dapaterson

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> No thanks. We Easterners have already a great enough dislike for the Toronto Sports Network to lumped unceremoniously with "Central" Canada in such a reorg. 5 Cdn Div already regroups four provinces. Think we'd have much of a voice grouped in with The Centre of the Universe Ontario?



The total population of the four maritime provinces is less than that of Ontario or Quebec.  There is no valid reason for 5 Div to exist.


----------



## dapaterson

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> I recently came across some figures which, while not strictly apples to apples, may add some perspective to this discussion.  Recent figures show 372 regular LCols and 9,012 regular Cpl/Ptes in army-managed occupations.  Recent figures show 205 primary reserve LCols on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down and 10,432 primary reserve  Cpl/Ptes on Class A, B, and C service from Army HQ on down.  That’s 1:24.2 for the regular army and 1:50.9 for the army reserve.



Apple to oranges.  There are institutional functions performed by the Reg F for the CAF writ large that the P Res does not do.

Not to say that we don't need to cull the Reg F as well (25% officers is excessive), but the problem space is different between the Regs and the Res.



> On a separate note, you need to be really careful when talking about unit amalgamations that you don’t take actions that would wind up costing more money.  As an example, if you create one unit out of three dispersed units, somebody might decide that you then need to have a full-time DCO or Ops O and a full-time RSM or QMSI to provide for more frequent travel and easier leadership presence in the remote locations.  This would wipe out a good deal of the saving in eliminating two part-time COs and two part-time RSMs, etc.
> 
> Consider, for example, the 10 Brigade Group HQs that replaced 20 and then 14 Militia District HQs.  I’m not certain, but I’ve seen enough to be willing to bet that the total payrolls of the 10 are actually higher than the total payrolls of the 20 were.  Can anyone support or correct this?
> 
> Now, it is conceivable that the 10 newer HQs do cost much more but are worth every penny due to markedly improved performance of reserve units.  It’s conceivable that putting full-time DCOs or Ops Os into more dispersed units would improve the performance of those units.  It’s also possible that there has been or would be no measurable improvement attributable to the cost increase.



The Army Reserve has a target of about 20,000 paid strength.  If we assume 80% will be trained to the DP1 level (an optimistic assumption), then that is 16,000 paid trained strength.  If we want units of 500 trained soldiers each (4 companies of 110, and 60 in the HQ) then we can fit 32 such beasts into the 16,000 trained strength.  That's 32 LCols.  We have 6x that number (based on the figure above).

While the 32 LCol model is excessively restrictive, there is no valid reason for Canada's Army Reserve to have 200+ LCols on strength for a target strength of 20,000.  The target strength of the Reserve Force should be a foundational piece of the plan, not an inconvenient irritant to maintaining the status quo of under-experienced LCols being churned out on a three-year cycle.


----------



## George Wallace

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The total population of the four maritime provinces is less than that of Ontario or Quebec.  There is no valid reason for 5 Div to exist.



I suppose you can say that for the Prairies as well.  Let's move all the Divs to Ontario, and have satellite Bdes in the other Provinces and Territories....... >


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I suppose you can say that for the Prairies as well.  Let's move all the Divs to Ontario, and have satellite Bdes in the other Procinces and Territories....... >



No.  But we need to be realists in our force structure; why not have a single Res Bde for Atlantic Canada?  If we scale the P Res down to say 6 Bde Gps, then those Bde HQs can take on some functions currently done by the Divs - and then we can get rid of some Div HQs as well.

Right now, in Halifax, we have both Div & Bde HQs - so if there's an incident in Halifax, we lose MARLANT and two Army HQs all at once.  From a "force destruction" perspective, very effective; from a survivability perspective, much less so...


----------



## Underway

Instead of almagimation I really think that you need to eliminate reserve units entirely.  As an example Hamilton has two infantry reserve units.  Do we really need two of the same type of unit in the same place?  You could drop one (or merge them like the Scottish Regiment in the UK concept) entirely and have a proper full strength regiment instead.  There are other similar examples across the country (Queens Own and Winnipeg Rifles etc...).  Also why does a community like St. Catharines have two reserve units when they can barely keep one going.  Shouldn't they just have artillery or Linc and Welland not both?  It would massively reduce the promotion bloat of getting to be a LCol just because they need a CO and probably reduce the number of officers and NCO's.  It's not like many reserve units are at proper strength anyways, and many positions would be eliminated that aren't currently being filled.


----------



## McG

Underway said:
			
		

> Instead of almagimation I really think that you need to eliminate reserve units entirely.


The math is the same regardless of how you get there.  Amalgamation and elimination would both leave one unit where there were previously two or three.  Which option is going to be more paletable?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Underway said:
			
		

> Instead of almagimation I really think that you need to eliminate reserve units entirely.  As an example Hamilton has two infantry reserve units.  Do we really need two of the same type of unit in the same place?  You could drop one (or merge them like the Scottish Regiment in the UK concept) entirely and have a proper full strength regiment instead.  There are other similar examples across the country (Queens Own and Winnipeg Rifles etc...).  Also why does a community like St. Catharines have two reserve units when they can barely keep one going.  Shouldn't they just have artillery or Linc and Welland not both?  It would massively reduce the promotion bloat of getting to be a LCol just because they need a CO and probably reduce the number of officers and NCO's.  It's not like many reserve units are at proper strength anyways, and many positions would be eliminated that aren't currently being filled.



We could ask why there are armour reserves when they dont have armour too, nor the ability to train anyone in armour operations.....


----------



## blackberet17

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We could ask why there are armour reserves when they dont have armour too, nor the ability to train anyone in armour operations.....



Ahh, because PRes serves to augment the REgF. LUVW may not have armour, but it is a means to an end, a platform on which tps can maintain skills required and transferable regardless of platform (except gunnery - TOC needed).


----------



## Kirkhill

The problem that the Canadian Army has is that approximately half their available PYs have no dedicated budget, the Chief of Reserves has inadequate authority.  The reserves are inadequately trained and there is no plan in place to remedy the situation.  Meanwhile the Army's personnel budget only has funds to employ the other half at full pay.



> The Canadian Army is the largest element of the Canadian Armed Forces:
> 
> 21,600 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 24,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,000 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 4,900 civilian employees who support the Army



http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/index.page

The Canadian Army Reserves:

The world's largest, most poorly administered Replacement Company.


----------



## The Bread Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I suppose you can say that for the Prairies as well.  Let's move all the Divs to Ontario*Toronto*, and have satellite Bdes in the other Provinces and Territories....... >


If we're getting the hate on anyway ....  >


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:
			
		

> Instead of almagimation I really think that you need to eliminate reserve units entirely.  As an example Hamilton has two infantry reserve units.  Do we really need two of the same type of unit in the same place?  You could drop one (or merge them like the Scottish Regiment in the UK concept) entirely and have a proper full strength regiment instead.  There are other similar examples across the country (Queens Own and Winnipeg Rifles etc...).  Also why does a community like St. Catharines have two reserve units when they can barely keep one going.  Shouldn't they just have artillery or Linc and Welland not both?  It would massively reduce the promotion bloat of getting to be a LCol just because they need a CO and probably reduce the number of officers and NCO's.  It's not like many reserve units are at proper strength anyways, and many positions would be eliminated that aren't currently being filled.



The lengths to which we currently go to avoid the 'poo storms' that would accompany any such efforts at amalgamation (e.g., Tactical Grouping, Colonel level Pl Comds etc) is an indication of the lack of ability, resources and influence in our senior leaders - political and military - to confront the obvious and lead us towards a compelling, shared and improving future vision.

We have, in effect, established a vast quasi-baronial system across the country, which (except for brief periods during world wars) has successfully resisted the 'evil forces' of centralization and common business sense for a couple of hundred years. 

Maybe we could export this cultural defence mechanism to countries who would benefit from such cultural level defence in depth, you know, like the Ukraine?  ;D


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Ahh, because PRes serves to augment the REgF. LUVW may not have armour, but it is a means to an end, a platform on which tps can maintain skills required and transferable regardless of platform (except gunnery - TOC needed).



What is it augmenting? Drivers who can't drive the regular force vehicles, NCOs/officers who can't crew command reg force vehicles, and no one with gunnery skills.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Funny Germany overan Europe with tankers trained in Plywood tanks. What they need to do is boil down the key skillsets each position needs and teach that. have a couple of training vehicles and crews, that travel to the different Reserve units and run short courses. Each member gets a little book they can check off those core competences on. One vehicle can train drivers while the other focus on gunnery, bring along electronic aids to assist. Choose your training teams well and you could get a lot out of it. You can do the same for artillery, medical, sigs, supply, engineer, MP's


----------



## blackberet17

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> What is it augmenting? Drivers who can't drive the regular force vehicles, NCOs/officers who can't crew command reg force vehicles, and no one with gunnery skills.



BS. The CComd skills are easily transferable from platform to platform. True, dvrs, gnrs and CComds would require a conversion crs IOT operate the wpns system on, say a LAV. However, this is NO different than RegF pers being qual'd on multiple platforms as they progress through their careers and courses.


----------



## George Wallace

Colin P said:
			
		

> Funny Germany overan Europe with tankers trained in Plywood tanks. What they need to do is boil down the key skillsets each position needs and teach that. have a couple of training vehicles and crews, that travel to the different Reserve units and run short courses. Each member gets a little book they can check off those core competences on. One vehicle can train drivers while the other focus on gunnery, bring along electronic aids to assist. Choose your training teams well and you could get a lot out of it. You can do the same for artillery, medical, sigs, supply, engineer, MP's




On that note; you do not need vehicles to teach Tactics, OPs, Voice Procedure, Comms equipment, Theory of MG shooting, SOPs, etc.  

Even the Regular Force Armour units do not have all pers qualified to drive every vehicle, gun every gun, nor CC every vehicle.  

Yes there is a ever growing delta between Reserve and Regular Force Armour, but like every other Cbt Arm, the Reserves teach the "Basics".


----------



## Halifax Tar

I think the issue here is that the RegF doesn't really understand why the PRes can't be plug and play.  We have a need, we call up a reservist and plug them in. 

Its an advantage that NAVres (some not all) and the RCAF Res (?) has that the Army Res is missing.


----------



## Underway

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I think the issue here is that the RegF doesn't really understand why the PRes can't be plug and play.  We have a need, we call up a reservist and plug them in.
> 
> Its an advantage that NAVres (some not all) and the RCAF Res (?) has that the Army Res is missing.



Three totally different ways of doing buisness.  The navy as a whole is pushing harder and harder for the One Navy concept with equivalent training up to a point for reservists, also much more blended crewing on all classes of vessels is happening.  There is even discussion of removing the one true PRes Navy trade, MESO's and rerolling them into something different.  The RCAF is over 80% ex RegF already.  Some years it was 90%.  There are very very few RCAF reservists who were not RegF at some point in either our or another countries military.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> On that note; you do not need vehicles to teach Tactics, OPs, Voice Procedure, Comms equipment, Theory of MG shooting, SOPs, etc.
> 
> Even the Regular Force Armour units do not have all pers qualified to drive every vehicle, gun every gun, nor CC every vehicle.
> 
> Yes there is a ever growing delta between Reserve and Regular Force Armour, but like every other Cbt Arm, the Reserves teach the "Basics".



True, but being able to feel, sit and use the "cool toys" is good for training, skillsets, morale, retention. A traveling roadshow solves some of the issues, no matter what you do, there will be problems, but better problems doing things than sitting around trying to avoid problems. Try out the idea in one region with a timeframe, go back and see what worked and didn't.

I recall a similar setup where a US army unit brought Warsaw pact vehicles to familiarize people with them, we got to see them in Graf. A travelling "threat" roadshow would be good as well.


----------



## PanaEng

Bottom line is that at this rate, with all the budget pressures, lack of equipment, lack of courses, unwillingness to let the units conduct courses and qualify ppl on the deltas from the reg force trg, in a few years time, the Army Reserves will be irrelevant.
Yes, you can sit in a classroom and do powerpoint but that does not give you ppl who can grab that equipment and use it properly. 
It will require major investment in capital and pay to get to the army reserve force (with the tasks that we have on paper) be a reality and that would include parity of equipment with the reg force (except for tanks)


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:
			
		

> ....  The RCAF is over 80% ex RegF already.  Some years it was 90%.  There are very very few RCAF reservists who were not RegF at some point in either our or another countries military.



In most countries this is the usual definition of Reservist: An ex RegF member that is available for call-up.

Militias, Territorials, Home Guards, Home Defence Forces, National Guards are an entirely different animal.  Their models vary all the way from the Swedish and Danish Home Guards which operate in much the same way that St John's Ambulance does, with voluntary service, all the way to the American Total Force National Guard model.  

But the US Reserves operate separately from the Guard.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> BS. The CComd skills are easily transferable from platform to platform. True, dvrs, gnrs and CComds would require a conversion crs IOT operate the wpns system on, say a LAV. However, this is NO different than RegF pers being qual'd on multiple platforms as they progress through their careers and courses.



I call BS to your BS. A LAV turret is extremely different than a LUVW turret and not even the tiniest bit comparable to a Leopard 2 turret. If you're talking CC, as in, "driver prepare to advance, driver advance" than sure. If you're talking CC as in the person can proficiently operate in a complex (TAPV or LAV 6.0) turret, in a complex, networked vehicle than not at all. 

So, why keep 18 armoured reserves "Regiments" when the skills they practice are of the same level as if we just let reserve infantry regiments augment their recce elements with LUVWs? What would the loss to augmentation to the Reg force be if we shut the doors of the 18 Bns, added the PYs to infantry BNs, and just opened up operational roto's to augment armour to the Infantry Bns (aside from emotional attachment)?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Colin P said:
			
		

> Funny Germany overan Europe with tankers trained in Plywood tanks. What they need to do is boil down the key skillsets each position needs and teach that. have a couple of training vehicles and crews, that travel to the different Reserve units and run short courses. Each member gets a little book they can check off those core competences on. One vehicle can train drivers while the other focus on gunnery, bring along electronic aids to assist. Choose your training teams well and you could get a lot out of it. You can do the same for artillery, medical, sigs, supply, engineer, MP's



The effectiveness of the German army in 1939-1941 is one of the more over exagerrated parts of the history of WW2. It would just as easy to say that the ineffectiveness of the British and French aided the Germans more than their own training did, but I digress.

The machinery and methods of warfare are more complex than they were in WW2. It's unrealistic to expect a reservist to be able to operate a modern military vehicle, fully equipped with digitalized radios and blue force tracker, digital turrets, and advanced weaponry without SIGNIFICANT work up training. That's the major reason why the AD reserves failed, particularly in terms of ADATS training- the system was just to complex to teach someone in 1 night a week and 2 days a month FTX.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> ... as if we just let reserve infantry regiments augment their recce elements with LUVWs? ...



What recce elements?  The infantry don't seem to have time to generate a proficient rifle coy let alone all the bells and whistles.  Hence the Engrs being added to Territorial Battalion Groups and the RCA supplying the Mortars.  Let the RCAC supply the lt cav / patrols / motorized recce element.


----------



## Castus

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Realistically, that needs to be done for both Reg and Res F at the same time - what do we want the CAF writ large to be able to do; how should we structure it to do that, with a mix of high readiness (Reg F) and reduced readiness (Res F).
> 
> With 25% of the Reg F now officers, I'd argue that there's ample room for an examination of command structures there as well... and likely some savings that could be reinvested from staff processes into readiness.



Does the Reg F actually have 25% officers? If so... what the hell are we doing?


----------



## Ostrozac

Castus said:
			
		

> Does the Reg F actually have 25% officers? If so... what the hell are we doing?



The regular force was 22% officers in 2008. I can't find more recent statistics right now. But yeah, it's pretty close to 25%.

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2008107/article/10657-eng.htm

The same report indicates that, in 2008, the Primary Reserve was 16% officers. Quite a bit leaner. So, yes, on the face of it, the Regs calling out the Reserves for having companies led by LCols does have a bit of pot/kettle/black about it.


----------



## dapaterson

You can look at current numbers from statistical reports from HRMS on the DWAN, and then do some long division.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> What recce elements?  The infantry don't seem to have time to generate a proficient rifle coy let alone all the bells and whistles.  Hence the Engrs being added to Territorial Battalion Groups and the RCA supplying the Mortars.  Let the RCAC supply the lt cav / patrols / motorized recce element.



recce element for what? non deployable reserve brigade groups? The mortars are deployable kit, so in terms of 1 for 1 augmentation reserve gunners could be called in to augment mortars with no extra training and a minor conversion course for M777 assuming that they are C3 qualified.


----------



## George Wallace

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> recce element for what? non deployable reserve brigade groups? The mortars are deployable kit, so in terms of 1 for 1 augmentation reserve gunners could be called in to augment mortars with no extra training and a minor conversion course for M777 assuming that they are C3 qualified.



The same can be said for the other Arms.  Resevists have come in and filled positions on tanks as Loaders and radio operators, truck drivers in the echelons, etc.  A minor conversion course to make Artillerymen from the Reserves capable of working on the M777 could also be said for a two week course to make a Reservist a Turret Operator on a Coyote.  Many Reserve Engineers are Hvy Equip qualified, and a simple conversion course for them would also be quite doable.


I think you have a bit of a faulty view of what training Reservists do have.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

George Wallace said:
			
		

> The same can be said for the other Arms.  Resevists have come in and filled positions on tanks as Loaders and radio operators, truck drivers in the echelons, etc.  A minor conversion course to make Artillerymen from the Reserves capable of working on the M777 could also be said for a two week course to make a Reservist a Turret Operator on a Coyote.  Many Reserve Engineers are Hvy Equip qualified, and a simple conversion course for them would also be quite doable.
> 
> 
> I think you have a bit of a faulty view of what training Reservists do have.



Having been a reservist, and having trained artillery reservists at the RCAS, I have a pretty solid idea of what training reservists do. My point is that if the armour reserve units have no armour than we could disband most, if not all, of the EIGHTEEN armour reserve "regiments" because, as you stated, anyone (infantry, arty, engineer) could just do a conversion course and drive a coyote as required by a CFTPO. Since they do ZERO training on reg force vehicles/systems than why does someone need to be have a black beret to just drive a coyote/TAPV? the value in these units would be if you could force generate pers to fill all voids of the armour trade, not just provide a few drivers here and there for armour recce.... because really, do we require 18 Regiments to meet that task? You could then move PYs into other units (maybe standing up an infantry recce element?).


----------



## George Wallace

I don't have a crystal ball.  I thought years ago that the decision by the Senior Serving Dragoon in his capacity as CDS to declare the end of "Tanks" in the CAF in favour of a wheeled vehicle called the MGS was WRONG.  I have no idea what vehicle will replace our current armoured force.   I strongly disagree with your views, knowing that there are many Armour Reservists who have CT'd into Regular Force units, keeping their rank and filling positions in Sabre Troops.  I am sure that the fact that they became Regular Force is no different than had they not, but still filled those positions.  There are a lot more factors involved in Corps training than having a certain vehicle, a certain gun, or whatever.  Tactics will remain the same.  Radio procedures will remain the same.  All the "Basics" will remain the same.  The resource is still there to be expedited and exploited if needed.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I don't have a crystal ball.  I thought years ago that the decision by the Senior Serving Dragoon in his capacity as CDS to declare the end of "Tanks" in the CAF in favour of a wheeled vehicle called the MGS was WRONG.  I have no idea what vehicle will replace our current armoured force.   I strongly disagree with your views, knowing that there are many Armour Reservists who have CT'd into Regular Force units, keeping their rank and filling positions in Sabre Troops.  I am sure that the fact that they became Regular Force is no different than had they not, but still filled those positions.  There are a lot more factors involved in Corps training than having a certain vehicle, a certain gun, or whatever.  Tactics will remain the same.  Radio procedures will remain the same.  All the "Basics" will remain the same.  The resource is still there to be expedited and exploited if needed.



And you're entitled to that opinion. I however think that there is ZERO requirement for EIGHTEEN reserve armour regiments. Amalgamate the 18 into, say 3 to keep low level expertise for reg force augmentation than that's palatable. 18 is ludicrous. 

We could also have an AD reserve by the same logic by giving current arty units the AD simulators that 4 GS Regt use on Maple Flag. 

I also debate that tactics remain the same. We are moving towards network centric warfare if we are to believe ADO 2021, where digitalization will be a bigger player than it has previously been. So reservists will need to learn those skills as well, assuming that the reserves dont digitalize in the near future.

Finally, I too have seen good arty reservists come into the regular force, but have also seen bad ones that by all rights should have been demoted instantly. People will always be the same.


----------



## blackberet17

Tactics as for the Armour trade have seen but slight changes over the years.

Move a vehicle (regardless of armament, crew size, tire size) from point A to point B tactically. Do so as part of a Patrol. Do so as part of a Troop. No change.

 no change from platform to platform. The only real difference is accounting for the veh size and signature, which can be learned in short time.

Mr. Wallace is bang on.



> If you're talking CC as in the person can proficiently operate in a complex (TAPV or LAV 6.0) turret, in a complex, networked vehicle than not at all.



That's part of the gunner skills, incl in the CComd task...which can be learned through the two-week TOC. Yes, greatly different running a LUVW turret with its C6 to operating a Leopard with its main gun. Yet the basics are taught on a CComd crs for a reason. Get the basics, then get the TOC as required.

At its basic, LUVW turret CComd it is no different than CComd from the turret of a LAV, aside from having to concern myself with the .25mm. But that's also what the two-man turret is for in the LAV...no such joy in a LUVW.



> We are moving towards network centric warfare if we are to believe ADO 2021, where digitalization will be a bigger player than it has previously been. So reservists will need to learn those skills as well, assuming that the reserves dont digitalize in the near future.



EVERYONE should learn those skills, PRes and RegF. Point is moot.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Tactics as for the Armour trade have seen but slight changes over the years.
> 
> Move a vehicle (regardless of armament, crew size, tire size) from point A to point B tactically. Do so as part of a Patrol. Do so as part of a Troop. No change.
> 
> no change from platform to platform. The only real difference is accounting for the veh size and signature, which can be learned in short time.
> 
> Mr. Wallace is bang on.
> 
> That's part of the gunner skills, incl in the CComd task...which can be learned through the two-week TOC. Yes, greatly different running a LUVW turret with its C6 to operating a Leopard with its main gun. Yet the basics are taught on a CComd crs for a reason. Get the basics, then get the TOC as required.
> 
> At its basic, LUVW turret CComd it is no different than CComd from the turret of a LAV, aside from having to concern myself with the .25mm. But that's also what the two-man turret is for in the LAV...no such joy in a LUVW.
> 
> EVERYONE should learn those skills, PRes and RegF. Point is moot.



Point is not moot. Reservists dont have the time to get proficient on complex technical equipment while in a class A status. Also, LAV turret is extremely different than sitting in a LUVW. But I'm guessing that you're not going to reason here and admit that EIGHTEEN armour reserve units with no armour equipment is ludicrus. 

This line of argument fits perfectly into the whole, "we need to get leaner and rationalize capabilities, as long as it's not my trade"


----------



## George Wallace

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This line of argument fits perfectly into the whole, "we need to get leaner and rationalize capabilities, as long as it's not my trade"



Thank you for your outside looking in opinions on another Trade other than your own.  Perhaps, therein lies the problem.  Too often in the CAF as a whole, decisions are being made by those who have no idea of what they are talking about or designing.  I have seen it in the construction of tank hangars where designs were changed to cut costs and when the building was finally finished, tanks would not safely fit through the doors.  A new and larger hangar having to be built was the end result.  Now we have two expensive buildings build due to someone trying to cut corners and costs.  The same can be said to non-Trades pers making decisions on what a Trade needs or should look like.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> What is it augmenting? Drivers who can't drive the regular force vehicles, NCOs/officers who can't crew command reg force vehicles, and no one with gunnery skills.



Core skills are just as important to driving, gunning and CCing a veh.  Hide/harbour occupation, OP occupation drills, veh/ptl/tp SOPs, RAS tasks, prep and conduct of RAPZ tasks, the list could go on.

In short, there is much more to learn, know and develop than the (yes, very important) PCF skills that are linked to specific veh's.

Your PRES crewman can augment a Reg Force Troop with a few weeks of training (excluding tank gunnery) and pick up the rest of the sub-unit SOPs on the fly, as a lot of the stuff I mentioned above is fairly common to any blackhat subunit.  

So, IMO, the PRES armour units are doing exactly what they are supposed to be doing with the lower-end "AFVs" they are given to train on.   :2c:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  But we need to be realists in our force structure; why not have a single Res Bde for Atlantic Canada?  If we scale the P Res down to say 6 Bde Gps, then those Bde HQs can take on some functions currently done by the Divs - and then we can get rid of some Div HQs as well.
> 
> Right now, in Halifax, we have both Div & Bde HQs - so if there's an incident in Halifax, we lose MARLANT and two Army HQs all at once.  From a "force destruction" perspective, very effective; from a survivability perspective, much less so...



36 and 37 were supposed to be merged into a single CGB but it never happened.  But it should have, and you'd have the saving there of one complete CBG HQ.  

For your HQ location redundancy, MARLANT in Hfx, 5 Div in Gagetown and the CBG HQ remains in Moncton (and central to all its sub-units in NS, NB, Nfld and PEI) vice Halifax would be the way to do that.  No one wants to pay for parking at RA Park anyways...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Its an advantage that NAVres (some not all) and the RCAF Res (?) has that the Army Res is missing.



ARAF folks, RCAF Reserves whatever you want to call them, they have the same trg as the Reg Force RCAF folks IIRC.  There is no "ARAF Avn Tech QL3" and "Reg Force Avn Tech QL3".  It is a Avn Tech QL3.  That is why a lot of ARAF folks are ex-Reg RCAF.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> And you're entitled to that opinion. I however think that there is ZERO requirement for EIGHTEEN reserve armour regiments. Amalgamate the 18 into, say 3 to keep low level expertise for reg force augmentation than that's palatable. 18 is ludicrous.



On this I agree; my former PRES Armd Recce unit (a res Regiment) used to at least be a Sqn when I was there (and had 3 Sqns prior to my time...), the last time I visited they had a hard time forming a 5 car Troop.  And there is still a Res Regt HQ element to command this understrength troop.  :facepalm: 



> Finally, I too have seen good arty reservists come into the regular force, but have also seen bad ones that by all rights should have been demoted instantly. People will always be the same.



A soldiers, sailors or airman/woman's component doesn't dictate if they are a shitpump or not.  We've all seen shitpumps in the Reg and Res and in all 3 Messes.   8)


----------



## Old Sweat

Let's step back and look at a bigger picture. If we accept that a role for the reserve is to provide individual augmentation to the regular force, then maybe we should ask how many and for how long? For the sake of discussion, let's say the operational requirement is to provide 20% of a brigade group for a series of one year deployments, including the replacement of casualties. I didn't haul either figure completely out of my butt. Un ABCA discussions Canada used to use a brigade group as the basis for its commitment, and it seems probably about what we could sustain for a few years given our existing equipment stocks.

So, how much is that in numbers? Perhaps 1500-2000, with a preponderance of infantry, although I haven't crunched any numbers. I know there is a NATO table, which by the way was greatly abused in force planning for a possible land contingent in Gulf 1 to the extent that in 30 days 4 CMBG was predicted to suffer more casualties in 30 days in the desert than either the Canadian Corps at Passchendaele or First Canadian Army in Normandy. 

Anyway, back on track. How do we generate and absorb into a regular formation that number of troops every year from the reserves? I'm not an expert, as unlike many of you I have never served in a reserve unit. I suggest we take a look at the concept and see what we cam make of it.


----------



## Underway

In the process of pre-deployment training it was remarked to me by my then OC that up to the rank of Cpl and Lt for reservists there is essentially no difference between them and their RegF counterparts.  Its at the Capt, MCpl level where the experience, courses and time in really begin to tell.  At the lower rank levels IMHO there is essentially no difference.  That may be a function of the fact that platoons have brand new troops all the time, a function of no money for proper training or just a function of just experience, I don't know.  But there is lots of time in battalion where troops do nothing but repair kit, do PT and have smoke breaks.  

Quite frankly during pre-deployment just as many RegF pers were not able to operate or field troubleshoot RWS, .50 cal or were qualified to drive LAV-UP (6.0), LAV III, RG-31's, Cougars or whatever vehicle that was fosted upon us.  Everyone had to re-qual on C9, C6 anyways.  Armoured PRes were further ahead than their infantry counterparts in many respects, as many were driver qualified on Bison, RG's and associated vehicles and were very familiar with the C6.  PRes officers were well versed in convoy, resupply protection, base security and if they were not then pre-deployment sorted them out.  PRes signalers were integrated into the unit in order to train those unfamiliar with the radios and act as a corporate knowledge base.

Learning to drive and crew command a TAPV should not be that big of a stretch that a one month course or training couldn't sort out, and RWS training is all of two weeks IIRC.  I doubt very much that PRes armour will ever end up in a tank so just throw that argument out.  The RegF will keep tanks as their own and the idea of training a reservist on tanks seem to me rather a waste of time.  Hell, over half the RegF armour can't event operate a tank so I don't see the point in using that as an argument.

PRes training also isn't a black and white issue.  With the every changing mix of Class A, B, C, overseas experience, previous RegF experience you never know what could be called up with what experience or training.

So all this rambling to say that at the end of the day you would be doing well if the PRes Army was trained to a minimum standard that could easily be plugged into a 2-3 month intensive refresher/pre-deployment system to agument holes in the RegF.  Giving them jobs that maximize their more limited military leadership experience (base security, convoy escort, gunner/loader etc...) in an overarching mission is smart and plays to the strengths of the entire team, freeing up the more experienced RegF to go hunt down the bad guys while the PRes guards home base so to speak.  

Being realistic modern deployments will probably consist of a RegF unit first on the ground anyways, with follow on units generated as needed.  The only reservists I see being on the ground with lead elements in a modern deployment are CIMIC which a reserve specialty anyways (though many RegF pers have the qualification).


----------



## Kirkhill

What would happen if the only Lt Col in a Reserve Regiment were the Honorary?  And the highest "deployable" rank was Captain?  And the number of "deployable" troops per armoury were something in the 30 to 100 range?

The discussion seems to be suggesting, and it is my opinion as well, that the primary benefit of the primary reserves is that it supplies a body of troops that are versed in a bunch of army stuff so that they can plugged in to vacancies when the Reg Force needs them. The more troops that are available with knowledge and skills picked up by whatever means: weekends and wednesdays, summer camps, previous service, deployments, personal interest..... reduces the training burden and shortens the time necessary to get vacancies filled.

Maybe it isn't absolutely necessary for the PRes to be anything more than it is/was and should be accepted as such.  Perhaps the focus should be on reducing the costs of administration by converting the Regimental positions to voluntary positions and by trading pay dollars for training dollars.

I know that back in my day it was not uncommon in some Regiments that the officers were required/expected to donate their pay to the Regiment and were still expected to buy the fripperies and frivolities (fancy sgian dubh's and sporrans, kilts with ribbons and bows, mess kits) out of their own resources.

Back then I would cheerfully have accepted a system where Class B and C service were paid positions and Class A pay were diverted to buying bullets and grenades for more time on the range.  Students that joined the reserves could be directly compensated by having their tuition paid or at least supplemented.

As to professional development - most of us spent a whole lot more time buying books, reading magazines and journals, and boring our non-service friends silly - and even keeping fit - outside the armouries than we ever spent inside.  You would have been hard put to find a reservist that didn't have his Firearms Acquisition Certificate and owned at least one personal weapon.

We picked up QR&Os and summary investigations on the job with the RSS looking over our shoulders.  We learned MOI and VPs and the organization of our units.  We sucked up whatever we could find on weapons available, and what their capabilities were and their tactical employment.  Just being allowed access to Restricted documents was a privilege we thoroughly enjoyed and took advantage of.  It reduced the cost of buying out of date Field Manuals from Allied Forces at second hand book stores.

I don't think that many of us considered ourselves trained soldiers.  We expected to have to be trained to deployment standards - and some/many did.  But we went out of our way to do as much as we could on our own on our own time.

This is what the old Territorials in Britain were, and what the Unpaid Volunteer Home Guard in Denmark and Sweden still is.  They are civilians willing to do their bit when time allows or the situation demands.

In the meantime the community gets another body of willing and organized volunteers, with some decent useful kit, to assist during local events and crises.

Perhaps iIt is too much to expect that a group of civilians, no matter how willing and motivated, can supply a Reg Force quality Platoon/Troop that can slot into deployed, active service on zero notice. 

Edit - PS

Getting into the office I am suddenly reminded - The Militia is where I learned about man-management (in an environment where you had to cajole and not command) and also how to write a clean and simple Ops Order (I still use SMESC in my civilian projects), conduct a sound time appreciation, map recce and field recce and prepare a clear, concise report.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Thank you for your outside looking in opinions on another Trade other than your own.  Perhaps, therein lies the problem.  Too often in the CAF as a whole, decisions are being made by those who have no idea of what they are talking about or designing.  I have seen it in the construction of tank hangars where designs were changed to cut costs and when the building was finally finished, tanks would not safely fit through the doors.  A new and larger hangar having to be built was the end result.  Now we have two expensive buildings build due to someone trying to cut corners and costs.  The same can be said to non-Trades pers making decisions on what a Trade needs or should look like.



Perhaps sometimes decisions are made by people who have too much emotional attachment to the issue resulting in stovepipes and emotional decisions.


----------



## GGHG_Cadet

I'm in 100% agreement with Bird_Gunner45. 



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Reservists dont have the time to get proficient on complex technical equipment while in a class A status.



Over the last couple of years, I've had several reservists fill CFTPO tasks in both my troop and squadron. These augmentees were keen and motivated, but lacked the experience to be useful as recce soldiers. Due to a lack of qualifications, they were mostly employed as GIBs (no, not surv ops since they weren't qualified) or as co-drivers in the echelon. They made the effort to learn the jobs they were given and generally performed well, but they were little more than warm bodies to fill the holes we couldn't. Overall, they were happy to be employed, but were demoralized by their bit-part roles.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Also, LAV turret is extremely different than sitting in a LUVW.



For those saying that it takes two weeks to qualify a reservist CComd on the 25mm, try six weeks and lots of money/bullets that we don't have.



			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> But I'm guessing that you're not going to reason here and admit that EIGHTEEN armour reserve units with no armour equipment is ludicrus.



Don't forget that these 18 armour reserve units don't even have enough G-Wagens to form real troops. Not to mention, that they generally operate without GIBs- which is the only real job that your normal, straight from the street reservist can do within a Reg Force troop without completing further qualifications that are 3-6 weeks in length.

Let's face it, having 18 armour reserve regiments with personnel who cannot easily augment their Reg Force counterpart is ridiculous. It's sad that there are many professional and motivated armoured reservists who can only be used in bit part jobs; it's not fair to them, and it doesn't work for us. 

Hopefully the introduction of the TAPV will help close this employment gap; however, the fact that these vehicles are likely going to be housed centrally at the division training centres again raises the question of why have so many reserve regiments who don't have the means to form real troops and squadrons, and will have to travel to a centralized location to train.


----------



## Dissident

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Getting into the office I am suddenly reminded - The Militia is where I learned about man-management* (in an environment where you had to cajole and not command)* and also how to write a clean and simple Ops Order (I still use SMESC in my civilian projects), conduct a sound time appreciation, map recce and field recce and prepare a clear, concise report.



So much this.

In my organization our parent company is a reserve entity on paper, but is really staffed by RegF pers (well, there is one class B slot, but he's been class B so long, he might as well be RegF). Often my job is to manage troops expectations. Having a RegF cadre who doesn't understand that even if you were in good faith, misrepresenting yourself even once can destroy years of built up trust. If you fuck around a RegF troop, he's going to stick around until he releases. You screw over a PRes troops, you are going to have to cajole him so he doesn't go ED&T.

Almost every time I have used my authority, I have regretted it. Presenting the challenge or situation to the troops and letting them sort it out has generally had incredibly positive results. The end result for me has been (humble brag alert) having troops/section/platoon who have taken top honours on national courses. Hell, one just left us and graduated top of his depot troop and I will miss him dearly.

Having ongoing friction with RegF leadership whom I feel are stealing resources to plug operational gaps and are mismanaging troops, brings me to the conclusion that managing/commanding reservist domestically needs to be under a PRes Structure up to the highest possible level.


----------



## Kirkhill

NinerSix said:
			
		

> So much this.
> 
> In my organization our parent company is a reserve entity on paper, but is really staffed by RegF pers (well, there is one class B slot, but he's been class B so long, he might as well be RegF). Often my job is to manage troops expectations. Having a RegF cadre who doesn't understand that even if you were in good faith, misrepresenting yourself even once can destroy years of built up trust. If you fuck around a RegF troop, he's going to stick around until he releases. You screw over a PRes troops, you are going to have to cajole him so he doesn't go ED&T.
> 
> Almost every time I have used my authority, I have regretted it. Presenting the challenge or situation to the troops and letting them sort it out has generally had incredibly positive results. The end result for me has been (humble brag alert) having troops/section/platoon who have taken top honours on national courses. Hell, one just left us and graduated top of his depot troop and I will miss him dearly.
> 
> Having ongoing friction with RegF leadership whom I feel are stealing resources to plug operational gaps and are mismanaging troops, brings me to the conclusion that managing/commanding reservist domestically needs to be under a PRes Structure up to the highest possible level.



Infamously I was once "Ordered" to lie to my troops. Fortunately I had a long-service CSM overseeing me.

Brigade had offered to supply support to a Boy Scout Jamboree.  It was tasked across the armoury floor to our Unit.  I received word from my OC that I was OPI and to tell the troops that they were working this weekend and tell them they were coming in for an FTX. Under no circumstances was I to tell the troops they were to be putting up tents for Boy Scouts.  It was understood that if the troops found out they wouldn't show.

I checked with the other subbies to find out if this was standard practice.  I was told to follow orders.

By the time classes had finished for the evening, BOR was closed and I was the last commissioned officer standing.  I found myself taking the last parade and passing along the news about the Exercise on the upcoming weekend.  The inevitable question came: "Sir. What are we doing?".  CSM Joe Doucette, watching from the Coy Office, said "Tell them Sir."  

Standing in front of 40 Reservists and confronted with disobeying orders or telling the truth.  I opted to tell the truth.

Of the 40 or so on parade about 10 showed up on the weekend.  We put up a couple of tents, dropped some supplies off around the site and came home.

Nothing was ever said about the exercise after.  No reports. No commentaries. No mentions in O-Groups. No repercussions.

But I knew I had at least 10 troops that I could count on to work with me in the future.   And Joe Doucette covered my back.

Edited to clear an error in logic.


----------



## a_majoor

This has been mentioned in other threads, but the individual augmentation idea has bad repercussions in the RegF as well. Cole has mentioned that having understrength companies with 3 platoons that can throw 1.5 sections each out the back of a LAV makes training the RegF inefficient as well.

So to reiterate an idea that exists on other threads; consolidate the RegF so they have full strength platoons, and focus their development on the advanced skillsets they will need to progress (LAV courses, Recce patrolman etc.). The empty slots should be filled by formed ResF sections or possibly platoons, who can do the manpower intensive but lower skilled jobs that still need to be done. By this model, each Company could be able to field 2 platoons on its own, and have a full compliment of LAV crews and specialists, with the other platoon being reservists.  The fourth (D&S company could also be made up of reservists. If desired, the two platoons could be split up to provide leadership and mentorship to the incoming reservists, but this negates one of the advantages of consolidation: team building. Once everyone is comfortable with working with a well established "team", pulling them apart to mix&match destroys that cohesion, and it needs to be rebuilt all over again with the new "team".

For the Guns, separate troops and batteries (with the advanced gunnery skills being provided by the RegF), for Armour, the bulk of Reserve Armoured might be gainfully trained and employed as the "Assault troops" (the separate vehicles and skillets won't be so much of a disadvantage here). Similar logic could be applied to Engineers, service and support troops and so on.

The idea that Reservists are training for real roles and can deploy into "real" jobs that compliment their RegF partners should be good for recruiting, retention and morale, and also make employment and training of the Reserves more palatable for the RegF as well.


----------



## daftandbarmy

When one looks at this, the horror tends to overwhelm one:


"Army Reserve

Canada's Army Reserve is organized into *143 units, located in 177 cities and communities across the country*. The role of the Army Reserve is to provide the framework to mobilize, augment and sustain the Canadian Forces and serve as a link between the military and civilian communities as guided by the key Connect with Canadians initiative.

After a period of very high operational tempo, the Army Reserve is focusing its efforts on reconstitution and expanding to meet its funded strength target of 19,471 part-time soldiers. It continues to provide augmentation to the Regular Force for domestic and international operations and to backfill Regular Force personnel shortfalls within the land forces and the CAF at all levels of responsibility. These demands will be balanced against the needs of the Army Reserve for its own leadership and management of personnel.

Domestically, the Army Reserve continues to develop and refine the force employment concepts of Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs), Domestic Response Companies (DRC) and Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG). These nascent capabilities represent the force employment framework through which the Army Reserve will leverage existing unit structures and capacities and eventually take the land forces lead in domestic operations, with support from the Regular Force as required.

Internationally, the role of the Army Reserve has expanded to provide 20 per cent of required land force personnel to expeditionary operations through individual and formed capability augmentation."

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2013-other-reserve-force.page

RANT ON

143 units... 177 cities/ communities. Really? How can that be even remotely considered good business sense and 'bang for the buck' considering that most of those units will be at less than full strength, but are drawing down on a lot of high paid help from the Reg F, as well as the usual Class A senior staff and other overhead, like facilities, weapons and other tools of the trades? 

The problem of sustaining this vast, tottering network of redoubtable outposts will be compounded as the baby boomer generation passes into retirement, of course. 

If you read through this web page, the multiple list of many, varied, and less than complimentary 'roles' loaded onto a part time organization is also truly staggering and fantastical. It's a strategic error of the greatest magnitude to not be able to focus the energies of a part time force on one or two things that they must do really well.

Someone up top is writing cheques that I don't think we can keep on cashing.

RANT OFF


----------



## LightFighter

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Canada's Army Reserve is organized into *143 units, located in 177 cities and communities across the country*.
> 
> the Army Reserve is focusing its efforts on reconstitution and expanding to meet its funded strength target of 19,471 part-time soldiers.



For comparison, the USMC Reserve has approx 40,000 pers, and 184 training centers.

Those 40,000 pers are organized into five organizations - 4th Marine Division(ground combat element), 4th Marine Aircraft Wing(aviation combat element), 4th Marine Logistics Group(logistics combat element), Force Head Quarters Group, and Command Element.

4th Marine Division, made up of
1x HQ Battalion
2x Infantry Regiments
1x Artillery Regiment
1x Assault Amphibian Battalion
1x Combat Engineer Battalion
1x Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Tank Battalion
2x Force Reconnaissance Companies

4th Marine Aircraft Wing - 25 subordinate units, plus 1 HQ
4th Marine Logistics Group - 2x Combat Logistics Regiments, 1x Engineer Support Battalion, 1x Medical Battalion and 1x Dental Battalion)
Command Element - Deployment Processing Command West, Environmental Services Division, Marine Corps Band New Orleans, Environmental Services Detachment.


----------



## Brasidas

LightFighter said:
			
		

> ...184 training centers.



=armouries+training areas?


----------



## Kirkhill

LightFighter said:
			
		

> For comparison, the USMC Reserve has approx 40,000 pers, and 184 training centers.
> 
> Those 40,000 pers are organized into five organizations - 4th Marine Division(ground combat element), 4th Marine Aircraft Wing(aviation combat element), 4th Marine Logistics Group(logistics combat element), Force Head Quarters Group, and Command Element.
> 
> 4th Marine Division, made up of
> 1x HQ Battalion
> 2x Infantry Regiments
> 1x Artillery Regiment
> 1x Assault Amphibian Battalion
> 1x Combat Engineer Battalion
> 1x Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
> 1x Reconnaissance Battalion
> 1x Tank Battalion
> 2x Force Reconnaissance Companies
> 
> 4th Marine Aircraft Wing - 25 subordinate units, plus 1 HQ
> 4th Marine Logistics Group - 2x Combat Logistics Regiments, 1x Engineer Support Battalion, 1x Medical Battalion and 1x Dental Battalion)
> Command Element - Deployment Processing Command West, Environmental Services Division, Marine Corps Band New Orleans, Environmental Services Detachment.



If I understand the US Marines Reserves correctly the officers go through the same selection and training as the reg force counterparts. The difference is that after training, when Regular Officers are assigned to Regular Units, Reserve Officers are assigned to Reserve Units, at which time they become "part time" Marines.

Marine ORs all go through Parris Island for 12 weeks regardless of whether they are Regs or Reserves.

This would put them on a par with the Swedish Homeguard which demands 85 days of training before a Homeguard contract can be signed.

None of these apply to the Canadian "Reserves".  The Canadian Army "Reserves" or Militia, is manned more along the lines of the unpaid volunteers of the Danish Homeguard.  In some senses the Militia has/had more in common with the Rangers and Cadets, or even St John's Ambulance.

I believe there is a place for both types of organizations.  The Army needs a functioning Reserve - but that Reserve needs to be a proper, deployable force.  That will require time and money and a commitment to making it happen. It needs to be an Army led exercise - so that the Army can expand to, and fully exploit,  its authorized strength of 50,500.



> The Canadian Army is the largest element of the Canadian Armed Forces:
> 
> 21,600 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 24,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,000 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 4,900 civilian employees who support the Army



One question that comes to my mind is: "If the Reserve Force were as professional as the US Marines or, perhaps, the Swedish Homeguard, could some of the FTE PYs be shifted from sweeping hangar floors and busy work to the Reserve?"  

Could that have a positive effect on skills retention in the force?  



> The Swedish Home Guard
> The Swedish Home Guard is a branch of the Swedish Armed Forces. It is comprised of local defence units and 23 national auxiliary defence organisations.
> 
> Although units of the Home Guard had been formed before the World War II, it was after the beginning of this war that officially the Riksday established it in May 1940.
> 
> Originally Home Guard units consisted of 8 to 15 men located in towns within factories and throughout Sweden;serving as defence in case of invasion or attack.
> 
> 
> 
> Members of these units were usually former military men, that had ammunition, rifles, machine guns and other war required materials such as medicine and protective gear. There was also the Women’s Voluntary Defence Service called the Lotta Corps, which did additional tasks that the Home Units was unable to do. Among the functions of the Lotta Corps, was administrative work and providing clothing such as socks and gloves.
> 
> The Home Guard has evolved to an organisation that is divided into battalions that cover a section of a county. Each battalion is then made up of companies and generally each municipality in the country of Sweden has one company. The task of all this is to guard all of Sweden by utilization of military and civilian installations.
> 
> Battalions in coastal regions also have marine companies and marine combat vessels. At least one Rapid Response Company is linked to each battalion. The Rapid Response Companies are more mobile and more trained for combative operations. It is expected that from 2014, most members of the Home Guard will be incorporated into the Rapid Response units.
> 
> From 2001 to 2012 there has been a significant decrease in the number of members in the Swedish Home Guard. However there has been a significant increase in the amount of quality equipment. The training of all Home Guards focuses on the competent use of weapons and guard duties.
> The one asset of this branch of the Swedish Armed Forces is their local knowledge of any area, yet a Home Guard member may act anywhere within the country. A Home Guard is a trained and competent local combat fighter or defender.
> Before being contracted as a Home Guard member, the person is to have experienced at least 85 days of basic military training. A contracted member of the Home Guards is generally obligated to train about 8 days a year and only 4 days a year if in support or non-Rapid Response Units. For Rapid Response units the training involves 2 sets of 4 day battalion training and for the other Home Guards it is one of the 4 day battalion training courses. It is customarily however for many of the members, also called soldiers, to spend far more time in military exercise.
> 
> Among the armoury of this branch are types of AK 4B rifles, machine guns and other rifles or pistols. To enhance the sensor system, trained sniffer dogs are also relied on. The Home Guard incorporates staff from 8 voluntary organisations, to support them in their functions or tasks.



http://www.sweden.org.za/swedish-home-guard.html



> THE HOME GUARD WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
> The Home Guard with the national security forces are part of the Swedish Armed Forces' mission-based organisation. The Home Guard is a unit and constitutes the basis for the protection of Sweden. It has the task of operating over the entire conflict scale, from societal support during great strains in peacetime to armed combat in times of war.
> The units of the Home Guard have a response capability that is measured in hours, as opposed to days or weeks. The personnel is made up of locally recruited volunteers and consists largely of experienced soldiers and officers with a background in mission-based units.
> 
> When the Armed Forces are called in to help with forest fires, flooding or missing person searches, it often falls to Home Guard units to support the police and Rescue Services. Territorial surveillance, base security, escort duties, transport protection, target identification and artillery spotting are other typical Home Guard duties.
> 
> In addition to personnel who have completed their national service or Basic Military Training, the Home Guard includes a large proportion of specialists, for example, paramedics, motorcycle orderlies and dog handlers, that are recruited and trained by voluntary defence organisations.



http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/our-organisation/our-forces/the-home-guard-with-the-national-security-forces/


----------



## Kirkhill

For reference here is the wholly volunteer, unpaid Danish Homeguard.



> The members of the Home Guard take part in the defence and support of the country on a voluntary and unpaid basis.
> 
> ​Men and women from the age of 18 can apply for membership. A military background is not necessary. The wish to participate is more important.
> 
> When membership has been granted, members are admitted into one of the following branches:
> The Army Home Guard
> The Naval Home Guard
> The Air Force Home Guard





> The Home Guard is a volunteer military organisation.
> The Home Guard had 46,651 members as of October 2014 .
> The active force had 15,808 volunteer soldiers as of October, 2014. The remaining volunteers belong to the Home Guard Reserve.
> Approximately 15 percent of all volunteer soldiers are women.
> The task of the Home Guard is to support the Armed Forces – nationally as well as internationally.  In addition, the Home Guard supports the police, the emergency services and other authorities in carrying out their duties.
> 1,845 people applied for enrollment in the Home Guard, and 1,301 volunteers signed a contract in 2014 (as of November 2014).
> 868 of the new volunteers (68 percent) were aged 18-32.
> The appropriation allocated to the Home Guard in the Finance Bill amounted to 498,4 m. DKK in 2014. (Edit: About 100 MCAD)





> The Home Guard has a dual military - civilian leadership:
> 
> 
> The Commander of the Home Guard, major general Finn Winkler, is responsible for the training and deployment of units and also for the overall supervision of the Home Guard
> 
> The Commissioner of the Danish Home Guard, Bjarne Laustsen, is responsible for recruitment and gaining support for the Home Guard in the Danish population.



I would suggest that Commissioner Laustsen's role is that which I was suggesting was appropriate for the old, honorary, structure of the Militia.  But note also that Training and Deployment is managed by the Military - not the Volunteers.

http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx
https://www.vistillerop.dk/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjZWBDOQAMY


----------



## LightFighter

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> If I understand the US Marines Reserves correctly the officers go through the same selection and training as the reg force counterparts. The difference is that after training, when Regular Officers are assigned to Regular Units, Reserve Officers are assigned to Reserve Units, at which time they become "part time" Marines.
> 
> Marine ORs all go through Parris Island for 12 weeks regardless of whether they are Regs or Reserves.



Officers and Enlisted both go through the same courses as their Active Duty peers. As well, Parris Island is not the only place Recruit Training is run from, males(all females go to Parris Island) on the western half of the US go to San Diego. After Boot Camp, pers would go on to their MOS School(Non Infantry Marines also do the Marine Combat Training course as well).




			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The Army needs a functioning Reserve - but that Reserve needs to be a proper, deployable force.  That will require time and money and a commitment to making it happen. It needs to be an Army led exercise - so that the Army can expand to, and fully exploit,  its authorized strength of 50,500.



Agreed



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> One question that comes to my mind is: "If the Reserve Force were as professional as the US Marines or, perhaps, the Swedish Homeguard, could some of the FTE PYs be shifted from sweeping hangar floors and busy work to the Reserve?"
> 
> Could that have a positive effect on skills retention in the force?



Personally, I'd rather see the Reg Force units fully manned, rather than cutting their numbers and sending more PYs to the Reserve. Also, would those positions be for full time positions within a Reserve unit or just be another Class A position?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> For reference here is the wholly volunteer, unpaid Danish Homeguard.
> 
> I would suggest that Commissioner Laustsen's role is that which I was suggesting was appropriate for the old, honorary, structure of the Militia.  But note also that Training and Deployment is managed by the Military - not the Volunteers.
> 
> http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx
> https://www.vistillerop.dk/
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjZWBDOQAMY



1 PARA worked with the Danish Home Guard when we were with the AMF. We'd do our bit out of the airframe then roam the countryside doing what infantry do.... and some army stuff  ;D. 

Apart from the really, really hot women they had working with them, what impressed me was that they had a clear purpose (e.g., defend the area of your home town from X to Y), they were well armed for that purpose, and they trained continually to be good at their mission. 

The operations they trained for were all the usual things we practise (attack, defense, patrolling etc), except they practised right in their back yards. Digging up cabbage fields for Platoon defensive positions was a common pastime as I recall, complete with farmer's wife doling out the coffee and yummy Danish pastries, bless 'em. 

They had (old) tanks and some cool MG42 upgrades but operated for all intents and purposes as fully integrated, infantry heavy, company sized units supported by arty, armour, air etc.


----------



## Dissident

Ohhhhhh, can you imagine the headlines:"Soldiers. In our back yards. Soldiers with guns. In our backyards. Guns in our backyards." 

I'm totally down, but somehow I doubt that would fly with most people.


----------



## quadrapiper

Few idle thoughts.

How many Reserve armouries are spoken for as far as local or regional emergency plans, etc.? Not something that should be funded by the PRes, but perhaps something that some other Ministry or level of government should be asked to throw some cash at, with the "stick" being that an armoury built to produce battalions for WWI but now housing an overstrength platoon might otherwise be divested/demolished.

As relates to the "requires long term training" Reg Force bits of kit/roles, how many of those need to be maintained in battalion+ strength in a single location? Are there any Reg Force capabilities that usually deploy/operate as a company/platoon, and could be split up and moved, _with all their equipment_, into Reserve facilities that house Reserve units with the same or complementary roles? Noting that that one would cost a fortune, initially.

How much use is made of non-DND lands for training? Why aren't, for (pulled out of the air) example, the CScotR, 5th Field, and the service battalion routinely thrashing around in Vancouver Island's basically limitless supply of mountains, trees, and logging roads? I know I've seen the occasional MilCOTS out in the sticks - how much more can be done?

Should there be a conscious grouping of reservists in a given area to "home guard/civil defense/warm bodies for sandbag filling," "retention of former Regulars," "augmentees in waiting," and "unit enabler" roles? Setting aside the question of areas with multiple units, re-focus RHQ on an enabler role; no expectation that anyone there will necessarily deploy or command in combat; and build sub-units around those various roles, perhaps. This reinvisioned RHQ might also assume responsibility for some multi-unit training facilities/events based on geography.

Perhaps look at reshuffling training, appointments, and promotions: determine what rank you could reasonably train a reservist to in each trade, and, as much as is reasonable, ensure that anyone who stays around and has the aptitude will work their way up the training ladder, regardless of rank - link that to unit strength, not promoting beyond a certain point (perhaps MCpl or Sgt and Capt?) unless there's actually enough bodies on parade to merit it.

Vigorously demote until the PRes officer and MWO/CWO cadre matches what's on parade. Perhaps look at a "command allowance" if you've got (for example) a Captain or WO as CO and "RSM" respectively in isolation from other units.


----------



## Kirkhill

LightFighter said:
			
		

> ....
> Personally, I'd rather see the Reg Force units fully manned, rather than cutting their numbers and sending more PYs to the Reserve. Also, would those positions be for full time positions within a Reserve unit or just be another Class A position?



Actually I was wondering if all the Reg Force Units need to be fully manned throughout their training/readiness cycle and if all of their positions have to  be full time positions.

For instance, when a Unit is going into its High Readiness Cycle couldn't it be topped up by some of those recently trained 12 week Reservists?

When the Unit comes off High Readiness then some of the regs stay with the unit as cadre, some disappear to schools as students or instructors, and some may even be tasked to daughter reserve units.  Meanwhile the Reserves go back to their homes to get on with their Civvy lives parading 1 night, 2 days and 2 weeks.

When the Unit cycles back to High Readiness the family of Regs reforms, and it again gets topped up by some freshly trained privates.


----------



## Kirkhill

Funny extrapolation or the Danish Homeguard data to the Canadian Militia.

Homeguard - Active	 15,808 
Homeguard - Reserve	 30,843 
Danish Homeguard	 46,651 
Danish Population	 5,627,235 
Participation Rate	0.8%

Militia - Active	 100,296 
Militia - Reserve	 195,687 
Canadian Militia	 295,983 
Canadian Population	 35,702,707 
Participation Rate	0.8%

Active means actively parading and training Weekends and Wednesdays.  The reserve is considered to be those ex-active members that are trained but no longer parading.

In both the Canadian and Danish cases the Regular army and Reserves are over and above these numbers (50,500 Cdn Army).

These active numbers of 100,296 represent the labour force available at Zero Cost, augmented by a comparable Canadian training budget of some 600 MCAD annually.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Funny extrapolation or the Danish Homeguard data to the Canadian Militia.
> 
> Homeguard - Active	 15,808
> Homeguard - Reserve	 30,843
> Danish Homeguard	 46,651
> Danish Population	 5,627,235
> Participation Rate	0.8%
> 
> Militia - Active	 100,296
> Militia - Reserve	 195,687
> Canadian Militia	 295,983
> Canadian Population	 35,702,707
> Participation Rate	0.8%
> 
> Active means actively parading and training Weekends and Wednesdays.  The reserve is considered to be those ex-active members that are trained but no longer parading.
> 
> In both the Canadian and Danish cases the Regular army and Reserves are over and above these numbers (50,500 Cdn Army).
> 
> These active numbers of 100,296 represent the labour force available at Zero Cost, augmented by a comparable Canadian training budget of some 600 MCAD annually.



By Jove! There's a good article in there somewhere my good man.  :nod:


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Actually I was wondering if all the Reg Force Units need to be fully manned throughout their training/readiness cycle and if all of their positions have to  be full time positions.
> 
> For instance, when a Unit is going into its High Readiness Cycle couldn't it be topped up by some of those recently trained 12 week Reservists?
> 
> When the Unit comes off High Readiness then some of the regs stay with the unit as cadre, some disappear to schools as students or instructors, and some may even be tasked to daughter reserve units.  Meanwhile the Reserves go back to their homes to get on with their Civvy lives parading 1 night, 2 days and 2 weeks.
> 
> When the Unit cycles back to High Readiness the family of Regs reforms, and it again gets topped up by some freshly trained privates.



Great idea, but we would also need job protection to be greater for reservists so they have civi jobs to come back to if they aren't some kid out of high school or university


----------



## TCBF

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Actually I was wondering if all the Reg Force Units need to be fully manned throughout their training/readiness cycle and if all of their positions have to  be full time positions.
> 
> For instance, when a Unit is going into its High Readiness Cycle couldn't it be topped up by some of those recently trained 12 week Reservists?
> 
> When the Unit comes off High Readiness then some of the regs stay with the unit as cadre, some disappear to schools as students or instructors, and some may even be tasked to daughter reserve units.  Meanwhile the Reserves go back to their homes to get on with their Civvy lives parading 1 night, 2 days and 2 weeks.
> 
> When the Unit cycles back to High Readiness the family of Regs reforms, and it again gets topped up by some freshly trained privates.



- When I was SSM Recce Sqn, our soldier shortage impinged on our ability to move our echelon, as well as degraded our ISTAR capacity. We lacked the right pers qual to drive the right vehs at the right time, and crew commanders need a formal qual as well these days. 

- Perhaps you should compare WE (War Establishment) with Peacetime Establishment. Our PE is close to 50% as it is, and our deployment ORBATs not much better once HLTA cuts in. Cutting more? Maybe it is time to cut a brigade?


----------



## Harrigan

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> How much use is made of non-DND lands for training? Why aren't, for (pulled out of the air) example, the CScotR, 5th Field, and the service battalion routinely thrashing around in Vancouver Island's basically limitless supply of mountains, trees, and logging roads? I know I've seen the occasional MilCOTS out in the sticks - how much more can be done?



It can be done, but there is significant administrative effort to use non-DND land for training, including the not inconsiderable requirement to put everything back to its former state at the end of it all.  Depending on region, the lead times can be quite lengthy to do proper notification for landowners, media heads-up, etc.  It is nothing that is impossible to accomplish, though.  Sometimes there is great value to train in an unfamiliar environment.

Harrigan


----------



## George Wallace

Harrigan said:
			
		

> It can be done, but there is significant administrative effort to use non-DND land for training, including the not inconsiderable requirement to put everything back to its former state at the end of it all.  Depending on region, the lead times can be quite lengthy to do proper notification for landowners, media heads-up, etc.  It is nothing that is impossible to accomplish, though.  Sometimes there is great value to train in an unfamiliar environment.
> 
> Harrigan



It is actually done all the time.  Both Regular Force and Reserves regularly conduct exercises on Public lands.  In the case of the Reserves, they do not have a large Training Area as do the Regular Force Brigades, so they must often conduct their Exercises on Public lands.  Remember though, that as noted above, it is a tremendous amount of planning and administration to conduct any large sized Exercise, no matter the location.  These facts restrict the number of such Exercises that may be conducted in a Training Year.


----------



## Harris

We normally do at least one per year on public lands.  As mentioned above it is a lot of work.  One exercise involved over 200 land clearance forms be signed. (We learned not to do that again).


----------



## Eaglelord17

LightFighter said:
			
		

> Personally, I'd rather see the Reg Force units fully manned, rather than cutting their numbers and sending more PYs to the Reserve. Also, would those positions be for full time positions within a Reserve unit or just be another Class A position?



It costs significantly less to have Reservists then Reg Force troops. For example a when I was a Pte. in the Reserves even taking as much taskings and such as I could, I still only made 13,000$ a year, vs. a Reg Force Pte. who is making roughly 3-4 times the same amount and sitting around a good portion of the day (I know what happens in the Regs, I have been there).

And when you take Reservist and Reg Force and put them together in the field, there actually isn't too much of a difference because it isn't like the time that Reservists aren't training the Reg Force is in the field training. One of the best examples is the Arty units in the Reserves. They have the same level of training and in a fair number of cases have more critical courses as they get run through them quicker due to the fact people are constantly releasing from the Reserves. 

Another point is if war is getting to be too 'technical' and the quality of equipment is getting to difficult to learn on, how long do we feel we could sustain such technology in a actual war. The Reserves are more a sustain measure then a quick reaction force (which is basically the main reason we have a large Reg force, a carry back from the Cold War when we needed to run troops across the Atlantic to Germany/Norway to fight the Soviets). If we fought a real war and sustained heavy casualties would we actually be able to maintain what equipment we have or would we fall back to some simpler technology? The best example I can give of what I am trying to explain would be the British Expansionary Force in early WWI with the mad minute. The Regulars were able to lay down some heavy firepower with all there training (years of practice and 1000s of rounds of ammo) but by 1915 this advantage ceased to exist because most the Regulars were dead or there were so few of them in comparison to the newly called up troops that the advantage was negated.


----------



## blackberet17

Harris said:
			
		

> We normally do at least one per year on public lands.  As mentioned above it is a lot of work.  One exercise involved over 200 land clearance forms be signed. (We learned not to do that again).



Egads, man!

We use public lands one or twice a year, our first fall exercise is a given. One thing our Div is doing is doing 10-yr land clearances, so we don't have to do them every year (yay!). We use provincial parks as much as possible, both for hides and harbours, but for other ex-related activities as well. Our backroads aren't wide, and very few have shoulders to allow us to do certain things, but it does force us (with obvious limitations) to think more in terms of urban tactics when it come to positions of observation and such.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Hopefully the "Wheatley River Octopus" is still a regularly used trg aide on route recces.  ;D  This was a great trg aide and I had many a laughs working that piece of ground in the PRes days.

* there is a defile directly under the words Wheatley River.  For added fun.


----------



## George Wallace

Well.  The ground from Cornwall through to Kensington is great tank country.


----------



## MilEME09

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Well.  The ground from Cornwall through to Kensington is great tank country.



So is suffield, don't get lost


----------



## Eye In The Sky

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Well.  The ground from Cornwall through to Kensington is great tank country.



Just need a few tanks...and a flying kitchen.  Right time of year...fresh potatoes, fresh cod, fresh lobster, fresh vegetables... 8)


----------



## Old Sweat

The bound from the Confederation Bridge to the main gate at Suffield is a bit long.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> It costs significantly less to have Reservists then Reg Force troops. For example a when I was a Pte. in the Reserves even taking as much taskings and such as I could, I still only made 13,000$ a year, vs. a Reg Force Pte. who is making roughly 3-4 times the same amount and sitting around a good portion of the day (I know what happens in the Regs, I have been there).
> 
> And when you take Reservist and Reg Force and put them together in the field, there actually isn't too much of a difference because it isn't like the time that Reservists aren't training the Reg Force is in the field training. One of the best examples is the Arty units in the Reserves. They have the same level of training and in a fair number of cases have more critical courses as they get run through them quicker due to the fact people are constantly releasing from the Reserves.
> 
> Another point is if war is getting to be too 'technical' and the quality of equipment is getting to difficult to learn on, how long do we feel we could sustain such technology in a actual war. The Reserves are more a sustain measure then a quick reaction force (which is basically the main reason we have a large Reg force, a carry back from the Cold War when we needed to run troops across the Atlantic to Germany/Norway to fight the Soviets). If we fought a real war and sustained heavy casualties would we actually be able to maintain what equipment we have or would we fall back to some simpler technology? The best example I can give of what I am trying to explain would be the British Expansionary Force in early WWI with the mad minute. The Regulars were able to lay down some heavy firepower with all there training (years of practice and 1000s of rounds of ammo) but by 1915 this advantage ceased to exist because most the Regulars were dead or there were so few of them in comparison to the newly called up troops that the advantage was negated.



Hmm.  Perhaps I will consider the source on this one.  As near as I can tell, your were PRes for a year or two with a CT in, and might now be a Reg F Navy dude in basic trades training.  Having said that, you are, rather impressively, close to 1/4 of the way to your CD.


----------



## PuckChaser

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Hmm.  Perhaps I will consider the source on this one.  As near as I can tell, your were PRes for a year or two with a CT in, and might now be a Reg F Navy dude in basic trades training.  Having said that, you are, rather impressively, close to 1/4 of the way to your CD.



You mean spending a year in the PRes without getting a Supply Tech QL3 done and now maybe being a RegF stoker with less than 2 years experience doesn't qualify you to make broad assumptions about the force employment of a PRes Pte? What has the internet come to?  ;D


----------



## blackberet17

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The bound from the Confederation Bridge to the main gate at Suffield is a bit long.



Great spot to do a crest drill in the centre...


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

MCG said:
			
		

> Quote from: Crantor on Yesterday at 16:42:56
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quote from: RoyalDrew on Yesterday at 16:11:55
> 
> I would dispute this as you can still assign a unit of Regulars a task and expect it to be conducted in some sort of organized fashion.  Many Reserve units couldn't organize a kiddy corral much less get themselves ready for war in any sort of reasonable amount of time.
> 
> There is a big difference between a Regular Battalion/Regiment and a Reserve Unit.  If you don't think so and think that they are somehow interchangeable than you're part of the problem.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think you have a real grasp on the current state of the CAF.  ....  The CAF regular force is not a high readiness machine you make it out to be.  DART, SOF and a few limited units at most.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> You understand that DART does not actually exist as a ready-to-go unit?  It is a small Ops and resource caretaker organization that draws on Reg F augmentation from various units accross the country.  Meanwhile, the recent Saskatchewan fire responce was launched by an average Reg F Infantry Bn which was, at the time of call-up, just going about its routine buisness in garrison.
Click to expand...


I didn't think his comment warranted a reply but thanks for giving one  

Contrary to your beliefs Crantor (I don't know where you get them from?), the Regular Force does move very quickly when it wants/needs to.  Don't mistake resource and equipment shortfalls for a lack of readiness.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Strongly incorrect.  Reg F numbers are signficiantly larger.  On an annual basis, funding is allocated to meet expected strength, with unused funds reallocated prior to the start of the FY to address a variety of pressures.



OK - let me turn my point on its head (and no cracks about pointy heads)

Take a look at the USMC reserve model and tell me how many FTEs/Dollars it would take to fund such a model.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> OK - let me turn my point on its head (and no cracks about pointy heads)
> 
> Take a look at the USMC reserve model and tell me how many FTEs/Dollars it would take to fund such a model.



I think there would be a short term increase, long term gain for the CAF, a bigger fully trained pool of reservists mean more members to augment the regular force when needed, and if we get into a conflict we will have plenty of reservists to fill the gap left by the loss of personal to a battle group.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Take a look at the USMC reserve model and tell me how many FTEs/Dollars it would take to fund such a model.


There is not a dollar value assigned to the concept of an FTE.  I understand that cutting the Reg F establishment permanently would provide funds to increase PRes pay, but the Conservatives are not proposing that we adopt a USMC model to replace the current PRes.  Are you proposing that we shrink the Reg F to pay more reservists to achieve the Conservatives' promise?


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> There is not a dollar value assigned to the concept of an FTE.  I understand that cutting the Reg F establishment permanently would provide funds to increase PRes pay, but the Conservatives are not proposing that we adopt a USMC model to replace the current PRes.  Are you proposing that we shrink the Reg F to pay more reservists to achieve the Conservatives' promise?



No.  I am asking how much it would cost to fund the PRes of 24,000(32,000) on the same contractual basis as the USMC Reserves (which closely mirrors the US Army Reserves and the National Guard, not to mention the Swedish Home Guard).

Nor am I suggesting replacing the PRes with a different system.  I am suggesting that a different contractual model be considered.
Beyond the initial 10 to 12 week Basic Training requirement I don't see a lot of difference between the Annual Drill expectation of a US Marine Reservist and a Canadian Forces Reservist.  The difference is measured in days, not weeks and certainly not months.

Apparently the PRes exists as an entity.  There has to be a cost associated with it - both the administrative cost and the cost of paying the individuals when they are training (drilling, parading, camping - choose your euphemism).

There is an implicit intention that the PRes will be a pool of usable bodies that fill slots in the Defence Establishment as and when needed.

It seems to me that some of those slots can be filled by Regular Force people that collect a salary for 365 day a year service, or they can be filled by "others" on short term contracts of 2 days, 2 weeks or 2 months.  When they are not working they are not paid.

A large pool of Reservists (unpaid but willing) means that it is more likely that you will find somebody available to fill a slot than if you only have a small pool.

The issue is how do you get the pool of Reservists and what skills should they have.

Other forces seem to have got the game figured out - Their forces are complex mixes of capabilities with only some portion of the force being fully manned by high readiness personnel.

The CF, or at least the CA, has been struggling with that for as long as I have known them.  Total Force has never achieved fruition.

Perhaps the system can start with offering all candidates for both the PRes and the Regs the same Basic Training programme and then having them diverge after the course is over.

One 11 week summer job, or even a single 11 week sabbatical from a job, once in a career is not an impossibility.


----------



## Jarnhamar

RoyalDrew isn't wrong.
The reserves are wholly unprepared to deploy on a short notice. 

Leadership has to practically put a gun to peoples heads to get them on week long exercises (with members at all rank levels pulling out, especially last second).
Even getting troops out to do weekend exercises is a battle. You call someone at home and tell them they *have* to go somewhere and they'll tell you no thanks, they have school/work/sorry I have kids/my dog is sick/Metallica concert (true story). 

Deploying on a long task?
People simply won't have their lives together to facilitate it. That's not including the number of physically unfit or injured who hold key positions and can't deploy.

If you're a shitty section commander in the regular force there's a big chance you'll get banished from being in charge of soldiers, you're new. Young officers who screw up and can't sort themselves out will share the same fate.
In the reserves there's shitty leaders who have been entrenched in the same position for years. Put pressure on them, take away their ability to blame others or pass off work and they'll crumble. You basically have to wait until someone retires or quits.

I would love for reserves to be able to deploy as units. The last reserve element I worked with overseas couldn't man a complete platoon of their own trade (reserve armored) from all of Ontario and needed a section of infantry. They also had to fire and replace one WO, two SGTs, a MCpl and two CPLs.  

Reserves are great for augmenting on an individual or small basis  (CANSOF has a lot ofchecked out dudes who came from the reserves, lots in the battalions too), they're a long way away from deploying as regiments.


----------



## Remius

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> RoyalDrew isn't wrong.
> The reserves are wholly unprepared to deploy on a short notice.
> 
> Leadership has to practically put a gun to peoples heads to get them on week long exercises (with members at all rank levels pulling out, especially last second).
> Even getting troops out to do weekend exercises is a battle. You call someone at home and tell them they *have* to go somewhere and they'll tell you no thanks, they have school/work/sorry I have kids/my dog is sick/Metallica concert (true story).
> 
> Deploying on a long task?
> People simply won't have their lives together to facilitate it. That's not including the number of physically unfit or injured who hold key positions and can't deploy.
> 
> If you're a shitty section commander in the regular force there's a big chance you'll get banished from being in charge of soldiers, you're new. Young officers who screw up and can't sort themselves out will share the same fate.
> In the reserves there's shitty leaders who have been entrenched in the same position for years. Put pressure on them, take away their ability to blame others or pass off work and they'll crumble. You basically have to wait until someone retires or quits.
> 
> I would love for reserves to be able to deploy as units. The last reserve element I worked with overseas couldn't man a complete platoon of their own trade (reserve armored) from all of Ontario and needed a section of infantry. They also had to fire and replace one WO, two SGTs, a MCpl and two CPLs.
> 
> Reserves are great for augmenting on an individual or small basis  (CANSOF has a lot ofchecked out dudes who came from the reserves, lots in the battalions too), they're a long way away from deploying as regiments.



I don't think anyone is stating that they can deploy as regiments.  

Where he is wrong is the blanket statements about how most reserve units can't organize any better than Boy Scout troops.  That's a typical SFRG attitude.  

Give the reserves the resources and support they need.  Right now they don't.  A big part of that is the reg force attitude and policies.


----------



## George Wallace

Crantor said:
			
		

> I don't think anyone is stating that they can deploy as regiments.
> 
> Where he is wrong is the blanket statements about how most reserve units can't organize any better than Boy Scout troops.  That's a typical SFRG attitude.
> 
> Give the reserves the resources and support they need.  Right now they don't.  A big part of that is the reg force attitude and policies.



The Reserves are not different than the Regs, in that some units have their shit wired more tight than others, and some are just crap (at the moment as Unit lives are cyclical depending on their leadership.).


----------



## Remius

George Wallace said:
			
		

> The Reserves are not different than the Regs, in that some units have their crap wired more tight than others, and some are just crap (at the moment as Unit lives are cyclical depending on their leadership.).



Exactly.

Some units by virtue of geography, resources (many of which have to be scrounged for through contacts) and solid leadership can be and are successful despite the lack of resources and support available.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Don't get me wrong guys, I'll criticize the reg force and reserves in equal measure.  I would say the best RSM and Company comander I've worked for were reserves.

It's an axiom there are shit pumps in either (every) organization.

The point I'm trying to make is that in the regs poopy leaders can sidelined or removed pretty fast.  In the reserves they can (and do) sit in the same positions and stagnate which harms the unit anytime they try and organize.  And it's near impossible to get rid of them.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Crantor said:
			
		

> Agreed.  Equipment is definitely an issue and it is why this is a CAF issue not just a reg or reserve issue.
> 
> Well aware of DART's composition.  But they have an ready HQ, equipment, a readily accessible base and sigs unit. And equipment.  The people they pull from across the CAF aren't just randomn.  They are for the most part dagged, pre screened and have trained for DART.



Are you certain you're aware of the DART's composition or are you just quoting what you read on the Wikipedia?

DART is not a unit, it's a tasking which falls under the auspices of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. A person isn't permanently with the DART but can be assigned the tasking from time to time.  You make it sound like they have an HQ and Sigs Unit sitting on their rucksacks waiting in Trenton for the call to pop over to Haiti, Philippines, Nepal, etc.  This is not the case.  All of the soldiers in a DART come from other units which get given a tasking to provide XX # of pers to the DART as part of the Managed Readiness Plan.  All DART really is are a bunch of sea containers in Trenton that can be loaded on a plane when the troops arrive to head overseas.

Being a member of the DART is a secondary duty for these folks.  It's the same thing with any other tasking.  For instance, if you're in a unit tasked to provide soldiers for CONPLAN ANGLE, i.e. NEO, you will have a portion of your unit (usually a company) dedicated to supporting this task.  When I was a Platoon Commander my Company was the NEO Vanguard Company for CONPLAN ANGLE.  My platoon was the Vanguard Platoon.  As part of our preparation to take over this tasking, the entire Company went through the DAG process, practiced numerous bugouts in case we got the call out.  Sounds like high readiness to me doesn't it?

You act as if the Regular Force just sits around and does nothing all day.  We have numerous contingency plans and standing tasks that we fill and train for, DART being a small one that we look after.  When my Battalion was in the hopper for LoO 4 of the MRP, we did a series of work up training and also had the entire Battalion DAG Green, go through our stores, check equipment allotments, etc.  Again, if the government wanted us to deploy rapidly, we would easily be able to.  A lot of times the political machine needs time to catch up to how quickly we can actually react.  




> As for the fire response, yeah, but the reserves managed the same thing during the ice storm (and they were in far worse shape back then as far as being equipped).  Like I said it depends on the task or the mission or the logistics and dependant on geography and the ability to get there.



You provided bodies but was that to achieve a military effect or a political one?  I know some folks who were planners during that time and from what they tell me, the amount of time and resources spent trying to mobilize the Reserves "to get them in the game" could have been better spent elsewhere.


----------



## Remius

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Don't get me wrong guys, I'll criticize the reg force and reserves in equal measure.  I would say the best RSM and Company comander I've worked for were reserves.
> 
> It's an axiom there are crap pumps in either (every) organization.
> 
> The point I'm trying to make is that in the regs poopy leaders can sidelined or removed pretty fast.  In the reserves they can (and do) sit in the same positions and stagnate which harms the unit anytime they try and organize.  And it's near impossible to get rid of them.



And some people don't see that balance unfortunately.  Biases and bubbles tend to blind some. Your last point is all too true in some cases.


----------



## Remius

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Are you certain you're aware of the DART's composition or are you just quoting what you read on the Wikipedia?
> 
> DART is not a unit, it's a tasking which falls under the auspices of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. A person isn't permanently with the DART but can be assigned the tasking from time to time.  You make it sound like they have an HQ and Sigs Unit sitting on their rucksacks waiting in Trenton for the call to pop over to Haiti, Philippines, Nepal, etc.  This is not the case.  All of the soldiers in a DART come from other units which get given a tasking to provide XX # of pers to the DART as part of the Managed Readiness Plan.  All DART really is are a bunch of sea containers in Trenton that can be loaded on a plane when the troops arrive to head overseas.
> 
> Being a member of the DART is a secondary duty for these folks.  It's the same thing with any other tasking.  For instance, if you're in a unit tasked to provide soldiers for CONPLAN ANGLE, i.e. NEO, you will have a portion of your unit (usually a company) dedicated to supporting this task.  When I was a Platoon Commander my Company was the NEO Vanguard Company for CONPLAN ANGLE and was on 72 Hrs NTM.  My platoon was the Vanguard Platoon and were on 24hrs NTM.  As part of our preparation to take over this tasking, the entire Company went through the DAG process, practiced numerous buyouts in case we got the call out with all members of the Company being called in and reporting for work usually within a two or three hour time frame.  Sounds like high readiness to me doesn't it?
> 
> You act as if the Regular Force just sits around and does nothing all day.  We have numerous contingency plans and standing tasks that we fill and train for, DART being a small one that we look after.  When my Battalion was in the hopper for LoO 4 of the MRP, we did a series of work up training and also had the entire Battalion DAG Green, go through our stores, check equipment allotments, etc.  Again, if the government wanted us to deploy rapidly, we would easily be able to.  A lot of times the political machine needs time to catch up to how quickly we can actually react.
> 
> 
> You provided bodies but was that to achieve a military effect or a political one?  I know some folks who were planners during that time and from what they tell me, the amount of time and resources spent trying to mobilize the Reserves "to get them in the game" could have been better spent elsewhere.



You keep putting words in my mouth.  

It took very little time to mobilize the reserves for the ice storm.  From fan out call to deployment it took less than12hrs.  Most units were on the ground before the reg force units because recalling so many people from leave took some time.  Again circumstance and task.  I get it.  You don't like the reserves.  Everything is perfectly fine in the reg force and they don't need them.   If the system provided the way it should the reserves could be more effective than it is.  But it isn't.  A lot of the reserve issues are not reserve generated.  

Just stop pretending that the reg force is all that and a bag of chips when it isn't.  I've said it before and I'll say it again these are CAF issues.  Issues that are shared between both reg and reserve.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Some of us reserves called out for the ice storm were told we don't have a choice,  if we didn't show up for work we would goto jail since  we were placed on emergency class c. 

Turns out it wouldn't have passed the Maury test =)


----------



## Remius

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Some of us reserves called out for the ice storm were told we don't have a choice,  if we didn't show up for work we would goto jail since  we were placed on emergency class c.
> 
> Turns out it wouldn't have passed the Maury test =)



They used to do a whole lot things back in the 90s that wouldn't have passed many of today's tests.  :blotto:


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Crantor said:
			
		

> You keep putting words in my mouth.
> 
> It took very little time to mobilize the reserves for the ice storm.  From fan out call to deployment it took less than12hrs.  Most units were on the ground before the reg force units because recalling so many people from leave took some time.  Again circumstance and task.  I get it.  You don't like the reserves.  Everything is perfectly fine in the reg force and they don't need them.   If the system provided the way it should the reserves could be more effective than it is.  But it isn't.  A lot of the reserve issues are not reserve generated.
> 
> Just stop pretending that the reg force is all that and a bag of chips when it isn't.  I've said it before and I'll say it again these are CAF issues.  Issues that are shared between both reg and reserve.



Where did I put words in your mouth?  I merely retorted some of your earlier statements about the DART, Readiness (we supposedly aren't ready in the Reg Force according to you?)

Anyways since you want to talk about the Regular Force I will for a second.  I agree with you that it isn't the be all end all.  My problem with the Reg Force is the same problem I have with the Reserves i.e. too many units without enough people to fill any of those units.  We also have far too many chiefs (officers) and not enough Indians (troops) but that is a problem that exists in both organizations.

I am actually for shrinking the Regular Force, both in terms of number of units and also overheard/personnel.  Both the Army and Air Force have a bunch of superfluous HQ's with too many officers creating needless work for people.  Shrink the number of officers and consolidate units and you would have more money per man to train with.  The quality of our soldiers would improve as a result.  

I have nothing personal against the Reserves, they just don't really serve a military purpose and as a military professional I can't put my support behind something that offers no military value.  I understand their historical role and also the connection they have with communities but from a military standpoint they don't really provide anything other than Individual augmentation which could be solved with additional recruitment, etc.

We spend a tonne of money on the Reserves, would that money be better spent funding an additional Brigade?  Maybe so?   

I'm sure the knives will be out headhunting me for the above comments but I'd love to see someone show me what you guys can actually do and not just follow up with more conjecture and posturing.

In other words, propose to me how you would make the Reserves function better, the only constraint being you get no more money than you are receiving now.


----------



## Remius

Crantor said:
			
		

> For the army reserves we need to get out of provincial boundaries.
> 
> Put a Reg force BGen and CWO in charge of the Army Reserve Division and give them their own budget.
> 
> Three areas.
> 
> Everything from Quebec city to the Atlantic would be the Eastern Reserve Brigade
> 
> Toronto to Mtl, central
> 
> West of Toronto would be western.
> 
> Each lead by a Colonel with several company commanders commanding elements of units that could be force generated to whatever.
> 
> Or something similar to that.



ROyaldrew: from our other discussion.  See above.  

The key is to give the pres their own budget and COC.  Drop non compatible trades. Force the CAF medical system to actually help dag reservists green (right now they won't unless they are deploying or for promotion).

Decentralize reserve training. 

Drop all class b that aren't employed by actual reserve establishments 

Pass stronger legislation to protect reservists jobs and schooling.

The point isn't to make the reserves equal to the reg force but to make them compatible. 

Psy ops, CIMC, D&S, QRF tasks are things reservists have done and could do as tasks.  CEremonial, community PR are also tasks ( yes they have value whether you agree or not) that can also be accomplished.


----------



## chrisf

Our reserve unit is drastically undermanned. We haven't come close to exceeding attrition with recruiting in the past 5 years or so. It's not for a lack of trying, we just can't find recruits. We can expand recruiting all we like, if the recruits aren't there, we can't recruit them.

Since the subject veered off to the effectiveness of the reserves, i'll add this... it's been my experience that reserves leadership is, on average, at the very least under experienced, and often incompetent, sometimes dangerously so ( we've got some great leadership as well, but its the exception not the rule)

I say that after spending the last 13 years as a reservist, much of that in a lower leadership position.

The problem I see, and this is just my own observation, is because promotion is typically by attrition, the longer you stick around the better your odds of being promoted. Unfortunately, working as a reservist isn't as compatible with civilian life as the recruiting ads would have you believe.

It's a great part time job for someone who's a student and single. So you get maybe a 4-6 year service life out of reservists, at best you'll make it to master corporal. 

Once you start adding a civi job and kids, it becomes very hard to balance these things... as much as i'd love to stay at it, and if I squeezed, I can make the time, if I get injured on mo'litia time, I can't do my regular job, and then my family and I would probably end up hungry and homeless.

Unfortunately the folks who stick around the longest, and the folks who can be available for career courses are the same folks who can't hold down a "real" job, but can't bring themselves to go reg force either. If you've made it to mwo as a reservist, and you still make your living from summer class b and winter time ei claims, you need to re-evaluate your life choices.

Not that we dont have plenty of outstanding examples and exceptions, bu that's what ive observed.

So way I see it, what the reserves does best is generate privates, corporals, and master corporals (I can't comment on officers, as I was an ncm... I can, but it'll mostly be insults, so ill refrain)

So if that's the strength, and also the weakness, if we really want to be efficient, that's where we need to concentrate. Either federally legislated job protection, earnings insurance, etc, or, provide more leadership from the reg force to reserves units.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Crantor said:
			
		

> ROyaldrew: from our other discussion.  See above.
> 
> The key is to give the pres their own budget and COC.  Drop non compatible trades. Force the CAF medical system to actually help dag reservists green (right now they won't unless they are deploying or for promotion).



I would also like to see the Reserves split off from the Regular Army.  I think the Canadian Army should have two divisions, a Regular one and a Reserve one.  Definitely a good idea and one that should be explored.  This also ties back to the fact that the CAF has too many officers though so someone at the end of the day needs to get fired, a very tricky proposition.

One thing to add, we still need to reduce the number of units we have.  We have too many units parading 30 guys a night when they are supposed to be at company strength.  These units need to be amalgamated to again reduce the overhead.  If a town Reserve unit only forms a platoon, so be it.  



> Decentralize reserve training.
> 
> Drop all class b that aren't employed by actual reserve establishments



Yep, I think these are good ideas as well.  The only problem with most Class B is that if we dropped a lot of them we wouldn't be able to re-roll them into the Reserve world because the NDA wouldn't allow it.  Class B is a grey area that the Regular Force uses to augment itself due to staffing shortfalls, which I don't really understand because we have more than enough underemployed officers but I digress.  In the government's eyes, if you work as a full time soldier, you should be a full time soldier i.e. Regular Force.  

I'd like to see us get more mileage out of the full time cadre we do send to Reserve units.  Getting sent as RSS to a Reserve unit is often considered a crap posting by most Reg guys, it really shouldn't be.



> Pass stronger legislation to protect reservists jobs and schooling.



This is the single biggest thing holding back the Reserves IMO.  Without legislation, you're not going to be able to keep the best and the brightest in the Service long enough to really get any benefit from them.  I've met a lot of really switched on Reservist Officers and Senior NCOs who have big jobs in the Private Sector but end up leaving because they aren't protected.

If we want the Reserves to provide value for money, they need job protection.



> The point isn't to make the reserves equal to the reg force but to make them compatible.
> 
> Psy ops, CIMC, D&S, QRF tasks are things reservists have done and could do as tasks.  CEremonial, community PR are also tasks ( yes they have value whether you agree or not) that can also be accomplished.



They can do some of them but not without help.  PSYOPS and CIMIC are going to eventually become primarily a Regular Force unit, it's the only way that the capabilities are going to be kept alive.  I think you will see IATF become a Reg Force unit over the next few years.

I value ceremonial and PR for the political connections.  If I was a politician I would think it's great.  I'm not a politician though so I can't say that I believe those functions provide any sort of military value because they don't.


----------



## Kirkhill

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> I value ceremonial and PR for the political connections.  If I was a politician I would think it's great.  I'm not a politician though so I can't say that I believe those functions provide any sort of military value because they don't.



Drew - Here's your answer.



> Our reserve unit is drastically undermanned. We haven't come close to exceeding attrition with recruiting in the past 5 years or so. It's not for a lack of trying, we just can't find recruits. We can expand recruiting all we like, if the recruits aren't there, we can't recruit them.



Drums beating, Flags flying, Bayonets fixed has value - and it is a useful employment of the part time soldier.

You beating the bushes at Gagetown does not bring in recruits.  Heels hitting pavement in downtown wherever generates knowledge if not interest.  And the more bodies on parade the more the locals will think there might be something to this mob that has attracted their interest.

It cannot be the only reason for being - otherwise you are re-enactors like the Fort Henry Guard.  But it is not without value.

As to the points about an organized Reserve Division and a defined budget, I have to agree.  With respect to the parade strength, I also agree that that is a problem.  

I continue to suggest that the US Reserve Contract system has much to commend it.  I can't think of any reason why the number of parade days should be discretional.

If there is a role for a pure volunteer force then the unpaid Danish Homeguard model might be worth looking at, in addition to a properly funded US model Reserve.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Drew - Here's your answer.
> 
> Drums beating, Flags flying, Bayonets fixed has value - and it is a useful employment of the part time soldier.
> 
> You beating the bushes at Gagetown does not bring in recruits.  Heels hitting pavement in downtown wherever generates knowledge if not interest.  And the more bodies on parade the more the locals will think there might be something to this mob that has attracted their interest.
> 
> It cannot be the only reason for being - otherwise you are re-enactors like the Fort Henry Guard.  But it is not without value.



In a lot of cases some of the units act like a bunch of re-enactors.  If parading around in fancy clothes is a recruitment tool than it is a terrible one.  Want to get young guys interested in the Reserves?  Show them videos of guys kicking in doors, throwing grenades and generally kicking butts and taking names.  The USMC does this and they have the most success of all the services in the US military in terms of recruitment.

Of course this all ties back into my earlier points about creating real units, cutting back on the overhead and turning the Reserves into a real military organization with actual operational capabilities.  

I don't think we should adopt any continental European model and quite frankly we don't need to.  We have no existential threat where we would need to rapidly mobilize and we have no way of getting anyone anywhere if we did mobilize.

I think the Reserves should be all about leveraging every facet of your national power.  I suggest you read about the 77(UK) Brigade which was just stood up.  These are the sorts of organizations where I believe Reservists could definitely make a valuable contribution, especially when we consider some of the academics, business folk, engineers, etc... That aren't in the military but could serve as special officers in some sort of advisory capacity.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> In other words, propose to me how you would make the Reserves function better, the only constraint being you get no more money than you are receiving now.



Give the reserves a mission (apart for the wishy washy temp agency like 'recruit, train, retain').

Heck, while you're at it give the Regs a mission too.

Then, like any good fighting patrol, work your organizational structure and resourcing back from the desired end state.


----------



## Remius

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> In a lot of cases some of the units act like a bunch of re-enactors.  If parading around in fancy clothes is a recruitment tool than it is a terrible one.  Want to get young guys interested in the Reserves?  Show them videos of guys kicking in doors, throwing grenades and generally kicking butts and taking names.  The USMC does this and they have the most success of all the services in the US military in terms of recruitment.



The marines also show up to almost every recruiting event in full dress, colour guards at sporting events, their silent drill team, bands etc.  heck they had a marine fight a dragon with a sword in one video.  They are successful because they know the value of those things as recruiting tools.  The NAtional Sentry Program has done more for recruiting and connecting with Canadians than any door kicking video can (not everyone wants to join the infantry).


----------



## dapaterson

Crantor said:
			
		

> The NAtional Sentry Program has done more for recruiting and connecting with Canadians than any door kicking video can (not everyone wants to join the infantry).



Until Oct 22, few Canadians had heard of or cared about the NSP.  Its relevance is marginal, its cost is not.  Much like the Ceremonial Guard, Garde en Rouge, Nova Scotia Tattoo and related activities, it's the sort of function that the local tourism department should be paying for, not the military.

Word of mouth is one of the more effective recruiting tools for the Reserves; conduct challenging and interesting training and you'll both retain the soliders you have, and attract their peers and friends.  Do the impossible (which the Army seems to do on a regular basis) and make soldier skills boring, and soldiers will vote with their feet - and let their friends and peers know about it.


----------



## George Wallace

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> I would also like to see the Reserves split off from the Regular Army.  I think the Canadian Army should have two divisions, a Regular one and a Reserve one.  .



I am not clear as to what you are proposing here, as I am under the impression that this is what we already have.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> One thing to add, we still need to reduce the number of units we have.  We have too many units parading 30 guys a night when they are supposed to be at company strength.  These units need to be amalgamated to again reduce the overhead.  If a town Reserve unit only forms a platoon, so be it.



A sensible suggestion, and one that can be done along the lines of what the UK forces have done.  The current units would no longer be Regiments, but Coys of an amalgamated unit, and able to maintain their historical lineages.  That would also help to reduce the number of officers and CWO's that you are suggesting.  Should "Total War" break out, they could revert back to Regimental status as recruiting expands their ranks; as they would have the nucleus for do so.




			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Yep, I think these are good ideas as well.  The only problem with most Class B is that if we dropped a lot of them we wouldn't be able to re-roll them into the Reserve world because the NDA wouldn't allow it.  Class B is a grey area that the Regular Force uses to augment itself due to staffing shortfalls, which I don't really understand because we have more than enough underemployed officers but I digress.  In the government's eyes, if you work as a full time soldier, you should be a full time soldier i.e. Regular Force.
> 
> I'd like to see us get more mileage out of the full time cadre we do send to Reserve units.  Getting sent as RSS to a Reserve unit is often considered a crap posting by most Reg guys, it really shouldn't be.



Your points of Class B being used by the Reg Force to backfill positions is taken.  At the same time, Class B at the Reserve units should not be lumped in with that general philosophy.  My former unit, had five of us on Class B running the daily OPs O, OPs WO, Trg NCO, QM and Recruiting as there were no RSS to fill positions within our unit and several others.  In cases like this, especially if filled by former Reg Force pers, the Reserve unit benefits.  RSS positions filled by pers who are there only for a 'vacation' do more harm than good, both to the Reserve unit itself and the Reg Force pers filling the position.

Many years ago ('70's timeframe) it was the desire that the RSS and Reg Force would train the Reserves to a standard that the Reserves could train themselves.  The beginings of the idea of "Train the Trainer".   Where that ball was dropped, I don't know.  If the Reserves had become self sufficient, the RSS positions would have disappeared.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> This is the single biggest thing holding back the Reserves IMO.  Without legislation, you're not going to be able to keep the best and the brightest in the Service long enough to really get any benefit from them.  I've met a lot of really switched on Reservist Officers and Senior NCOs who have big jobs in the Private Sector but end up leaving because they aren't protected.
> 
> If we want the Reserves to provide value for money, they need job protection.



That legislation has to be beefed up to provide better job protection.  

These are the people with so many qualifications and professional experiences that is unavailable within the Regular Force that can provide an extra mindset to problem solving and mission success.  An asset that is wasted when their Reserve service is hampered by lack of job protection.


----------



## blackberet17

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That legislation has to be beefed up to provide better job protection.
> 
> These are the people with so many qualifications and professional experiences that is unavailable within the Regular Force that can provide an extra mindset to problem solving and mission success.  An asset that is wasted when their Reserve service is hampered by lack of job protection.



One problem I see is labour laws are a provincial matter. I don't know the exact numbers, but is it not IVO of half of the provinces have legislation protecting employment?


----------



## George Wallace

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> One problem I see is labour laws are a provincial matter. I don't know the exact numbers, but is it not IVO of half of the provinces have legislation protecting employment?



True, and even then employers don't always 'respect' those laws.  There has to be Federal input into ensuring that there is job protection.  It exists for Federal employees, who may deploy as Reservists, but does not cover non-Federal employees.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Word of mouth is one of the more effective recruiting tools for the Reserves; conduct challenging and interesting training and you'll both retain the soliders you have, and attract their peers and friends.  Do the impossible (which the Army seems to do on a regular basis) and make soldier skills boring, and soldiers will vote with their feet - and let their friends and peers know about it.



Give the man a ceeeegar!  :nod:


----------



## Haggis

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> One problem I see is labour laws are a provincial matter. I don't know the exact numbers, but is it not IVO of half of the provinces have legislation protecting employment?





			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> There has to be Federal input into ensuring that there is job protection.  It exists for Federal employees, who may deploy as Reservists, but does not cover non-Federal employees.



Most provinces have some type of job protection legislation (JPL).  However, there is no harmonization between them or with the federal legislation.  For example, take two Reservists who work for the same national private sector employer in different provinces.  They both want to go on their DP3B.  One is eligible under his provincial JPL but the other is not.


----------



## MilEME09

Haggis said:
			
		

> Most provinces have some type of job protection legislation (JPL).  However, there is no harmonization between them or with the federal legislation.  For example, take two Reservists who work for the same national private sector employer in different provinces.  They both want to go on their DP3B.  One is eligible under his provincial JPL but the other is not.



For example in alberta we get 20 days we can put towards training under reservist leave. I am just ending my 10 week DP2.2, I simply had to leave my job to go on course. My employer wouldn't give time off pass my two weeks vacation or the 20 days. I can't do something like this again to start back at square one, which leaves me in the bad spot many have been in of either never going on course again, waiting till im out of work, or just leaving the CF.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> For example in alberta we get 20 days we can put towards training under reservist leave. I am just ending my 10 week DP2.2, I simply had to leave my job to go on course. My employer wouldn't give time off pass my two weeks vacation or the 20 days. I can't do something like this again to start back at square one, which leaves me in the bad spot many have been in of either never going on course again, waiting till im out of work, or just leaving the CF.



I have seen this happen too many times, and it's ridiculous.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Drew - Here's your answer.
> 
> Drums beating, Flags flying, Bayonets fixed has value - and it is a useful employment of the part time soldier.
> 
> You beating the bushes at Gagetown does not bring in recruits.  Heels hitting pavement in downtown wherever generates knowledge if not interest.  And the more bodies on parade the more the locals will think there might be something to this mob that has attracted their interest.
> 
> It cannot be the only reason for being - otherwise you are re-enactors like the Fort Henry Guard.  But it is not without value.
> 
> As to the points about an organized Reserve Division and a defined budget, I have to agree.  With respect to the parade strength, I also agree that that is a problem.
> 
> I continue to suggest that the US Reserve Contract system has much to commend it.  I can't think of any reason why the number of parade days should be discretional.
> 
> If there is a role for a pure volunteer force then the unpaid Danish Homeguard model might be worth looking at, in addition to a properly funded US model Reserve.



I brought the first Bison into downtown Windsor on a Saturday morning. Phone calls to the Regiment, asking how to join, started before I even got to the armouries.

Same thing happened to me. When the local Regiment used to drive down my street in Shermans, I couldn't wait til I became legal age to join. Literally. I lied about my age and joined the military at 15.

Getting out and showing the flag really helps recruiting. Calls spike after Remembrance Day, Freedom of the City, etc. Local Reserve units need to be highly visible in their communities.

They also require a substantial budget increase in order to pay for the troops to bring them to proper strength. Limiting units to 8 new recruits per half year is ludicrous in the extreme and only sets them up for failure to perpetuate the myth of the incapable Reserve force.


----------



## MilEME09

recceguy said:
			
		

> I brought the first Bison into downtown Windsor on a Saturday morning. Phone calls to the Regiment, asking how to join, started before I even got to the armouries.
> 
> Same thing happened to me. When the local Regiment used to drive down my street in Shermans, I couldn't wait til I became legal age to join. Literally. I lied about my age and joined the military at 15.
> 
> Getting out and showing the flag really helps recruiting. Calls spike after Remembrance Day, Freedom of the City, etc. Local Reserve units need to be highly visible in their communities.
> 
> They also require a substantial budget increase in order to pay for the troops to bring them to proper strength. Limiting units to 8 new recruits per half year is ludicrous in the extreme and only sets them up for failure to perpetuate the myth of the incapable Reserve force.



My unit runs an open house every year which causes a spike in recruiting, this past year we had 35 some odd people start filling out recruiting packages. No numbers for awhile though how many actually make it in due to how long the process takes. I have brought it up before many times at my unit that more things inside the city need to be done to have visibility. Calgary is a big city, with a big potential recruiting pool tapping that pool should be part of the responsibility of the reserve units.


----------



## George Wallace

recceguy said:
			
		

> I brought the first Bison into downtown Windsor on a Saturday morning. Phone calls to the Regiment, asking how to join, started before I even got to the armouries.
> 
> Same thing happened to me. When the local Regiment used to drive down my street in Shermans, I couldn't wait til I became legal age to join. Literally. I lied about my age and joined the military at 15.
> 
> Getting out and showing the flag really helps recruiting. Calls spike after Remembrance Day, Freedom of the City, etc. Local Reserve units need to be highly visible in their communities.
> 
> They also require a substantial budget increase in order to pay for the troops to bring them to proper strength. Limiting units to 8 new recruits per half year is ludicrous in the extreme and only sets them up for failure to perpetuate the myth of the incapable Reserve force.


 :goodpost:


----------



## George Wallace

recceguy said:
			
		

> They also require a substantial budget increase in order to pay for the troops to bring them to proper strength. Limiting units to 8 new recruits per half year is ludicrous in the extreme and only sets them up for failure to perpetuate the myth of the incapable Reserve force.



That is an important point.  The Reserves are not the Regular Force when it comes to Recruiting.  The Regular Force is offering full-time employment and a wide range of Trades.  The Reserves are more restricted in what they can offer Trade wise and employment wise.  They, unlike the Regs, need to recruit in large numbers in order to maintain their numbers.  As Reservists are for the most part young students and older 'Professionals', their commitment to the unit is limited on several fronts.  The young students will parade with the unit while they go to school and are free for summer employment.  Once they graduate, many find employment in other locations of the country and leave, or they join the Regular Force.  Once they become 'Professional' their commitment will be restricted times that they can be excused from their jobs by their employer or their private enterprise, if self-employed.  

In my experience, in a small unit (which has since been authorised to grow from Platoon to Company strength) we  had no problems maintaining our strength of just over 25, by annually recruiting 15.  For three years while in the process of expanding, with recruiting 15 pers/year, the trend looked like this: Recruit 15 annually and Trades qualify them, on completion of Trades Trg, half would CT to Reg Force, one or two would transfer to another city or Release, the unit would also lose 3 to 5 other long serving members to Release or NES; in the end leaving the unit just able to roughly maintain its current strength.  When the SIP restricted the unit to recruiting only 3 to 5 annually, and normal attrition, the unit strength fell drastically, seriously affecting the attempts to enlarge the unit to the new authorized strength (NES, Transfers and Releases still continued).  The SIP does not take into consideration the high turn over of pers in the Reserves.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My unit runs an open house every year which causes a spike in recruiting, this past year we had 35 some odd people start filling out recruiting packages. No numbers for awhile though how many actually make it in due to how long the process takes. I have brought it up before many times at my unit that more things inside the city need to be done to have visibility. Calgary is a big city, with a big potential recruiting pool tapping that pool should be part of the responsibility of the reserve units.



We have stopped doing open houses because the 'system' can't respond to the influx they generate and just creates more people who are pi**ed off with the CF.


----------



## Haggis

George Wallace said:
			
		

> The SIP does not take into consideration the high turn over of pers in the Reserves.



The SIP also gives no credit when members CT to the Regular Force because a CT is not, technically, "attrition".


----------



## GR66

Previously in the thread there were discussions about the idea of a volunteer model for the Militia which obviously has some significant issues, but what about a mixed paid/volunteer model?  New recruits would start parading, doing their basic in-unit training and going on exercises on as volunteers.  A per diem rate of pay would kick in if they go away on course, go on exercises lasting longer that a weekend, or are called up for duty in an emergency.  

Once a member completes their trades training and now has value to the Reg Force as a potential augmentee (and have the potential to advance in rank to a leadership role) then the normal reserve pay would kick in.  

I have zero personal experience with the Militia so this is more of a "what if" for the sake of discussion.  There seem to be lots of discussions about how long it takes to get on a trades course, especially if your work schedule is restrictive but it also sounds like keen recruits with a flexible schedule could pass through the "volunteer" phase of their service pretty quickly if they want to.  For others they may not really have a great desire to move up the ranks beyond being a "militiaman" and a longer-term volunteer service might be enough as long as training can be kept interesting.

Would something like this allow the Militia to keep the level of pay similar to what it is now while also expanding the size of units by opening up recruiting of volunteer members?  I'm sure there would be cost increases in both equipment and training costs to support the larger numbers, but would having larger units not also benefit the paid members (by providing more leadership opportunities, more elaborate training possibilities, etc.?).


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My unit runs an open house every year which causes a spike in recruiting, this past year we had 35 some odd people start filling out recruiting packages. No numbers for awhile though how many actually make it in due to how long the process takes. I have brought it up before many times at my unit that more things inside the city need to be done to have visibility. Calgary is a big city, with a big potential recruiting pool tapping that pool should be part of the responsibility of the reserve units.



Long ago and far away (1980s) we recruited a Platoon into the Calgary Highlanders every September and the KOCR that shared the same armouries got a similar influx.  Both units, together with th Svc Bn,  the MPs, the Comm Squad, the Fd Ambulance managed to remain viable.  

For St Julien's Day we (the Highlanders) could turn out 100 - 150 on parade.  We had a platoon of high performers (rappel, airborne, pioneer, all infantry weapons qualified, sigs) and managed to retain 10 to 25% of the September intake through the first year and get them loaded on summer courses.  

Weekend exercises were well attended when interesting  (40 to Wainwright by Chinook for ranges, similar numbers for Suffield) and not so well when not interesting (pitching tents for a Boy Scout Jamboree).

Weeknights were fine for first year recruits (class work and parade work) but generally a waste of time for everybody else unless they were involved in training the recruits or preparing exercises or general administration.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> The SIP also gives no credit when members CT to the Regular Force because a CT is not, technically, "attrition".



Wrong.

The RAMORs take a snapshot of the Army Reserve, then compare trained strength and BTL for each occupation in the Army Reserve to targets, while staying within strength targets.  SIP is calculated based on those calculations.  So, a CT in 2015 will show in SIP for 2016.

That said, Divs and Bdes may not allocate those positions to the units that lost them, for any number of reasons.

But to say CTs don't result in SIP is factually incorrect.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Wrong.
> 
> The RAMORs take a snapshot of the Army Reserve, then compare trained strength and BTL for each occupation in the Army Reserve to targets, while staying within strength targets.  SIP is calculated based on those calculations.  So, a CT in 2015 will show in SIP for 2016.
> 
> That said, Divs and Bdes may not allocate those positions to the units that lost them, for any number of reasons.
> 
> But to say CTs don't result in SIP is factually incorrect.



Then I sit corrected, factually.  Notwithstanding, many units don't usually get the number of SIP required to meet their attrition, in whatever form, which results in negative growth.  And those who do run up against a recruiting system that is unable to handle the number of files required to fill that SIP resulting, again, in negative growth.


----------



## dapaterson

It's remarkable that even under the "recruit until your ears bleed" era of LFRR the same units always remained small and stressed, and always had a litany of reasons why they couldn't grow and couldn't retain their soldiers.

But it's always easier to blame someone else, rather than to attempt any substantive change to the things under our own control.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> Previously in the thread there were discussions about the idea of a volunteer model for the Militia which obviously has some significant issues, but what about a mixed paid/volunteer model?  New recruits would start parading, doing their basic in-unit training and going on exercises on as volunteers.  A per diem rate of pay would kick in if they go away on course, go on exercises lasting longer that a weekend, or are called up for duty in an emergency.
> 
> Once a member completes their trades training and now has value to the Reg Force as a potential augmentee (and have the potential to advance in rank to a leadership role) then the normal reserve pay would kick in.
> 
> I have zero personal experience with the Militia so this is more of a "what if" for the sake of discussion.  There seem to be lots of discussions about how long it takes to get on a trades course, especially if your work schedule is restrictive but it also sounds like keen recruits with a flexible schedule could pass through the "volunteer" phase of their service pretty quickly if they want to.  For others they may not really have a great desire to move up the ranks beyond being a "militiaman" and a longer-term volunteer service might be enough as long as training can be kept interesting.
> 
> Would something like this allow the Militia to keep the level of pay similar to what it is now while also expanding the size of units by opening up recruiting of volunteer members?  I'm sure there would be cost increases in both equipment and training costs to support the larger numbers, but would having larger units not also benefit the paid members (by providing more leadership opportunities, more elaborate training possibilities, etc.?).



We already have a lot of volunteers associated with militia units.

For example, our Pipe Band is mainly volunteer staffed, we only have 5 x Class A positions out of about 40 pers. Our associations are all volunteers. Our Trustees are volunteers. The regimental kit shop is manned by volunteers. The Ladies auxiliary are volunteers, as are the Museum staff.

Guess where the most problems are in the regiment at any point in time? You guessed it... all of the above.

If there's one thing that keeps convincing me that I never, ever want to be a CO it's the fact that the majority of your time is usually consumed appeasing and managing issues from the all the 'volunteers' we have already. A complete PITA and waste of time IMHO, and some thing that few Reg F CO's ever have to deal with (along with recruiting by the way).

Add volunteer riflemen to that mix? Inconthhhhhhheivebale!


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's remarkable that even under the "recruit until your ears bleed" era of LFRR the same units always remained small and stressed, and always had a litany of reasons why they couldn't grow and couldn't retain their soldiers.



Yes, it was.  No matter what you do, those units seem to survive nonetheless, which is, in itself, remarkable as well.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> But it's always easier to blame someone else, rather than to attempt any substantive change to the things under our own control.



Are there ways we can do things better in the Army Reserve?  Of course!  This thread alone is filled with probably 50 of 80 pages of ideas.  What's needed is the _institutional will _and _organizational flexibility_ to enact those changes. 

But we can agree that the recruiting system is broken, yes?  And neither the Army or the Army Reserve  owns that piece of the problem.

Personally, I'm a big fan of a streamlined or even standalone recruiting system for the Reserves.  There are several hurdles to overcome before it can happen and it will probably result in some of the same challenges at the corporate end due to the necessary sharing of certain resources (CAF Health Services, for example).


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We already have a lot of volunteers associated with militia units.
> 
> For example, our Pipe Band is mainly volunteer staffed, we only have 5 x Class A positions out of about 40 pers. Our associations are all volunteers. Our Trustees are volunteers. The regimental kit shop is manned by volunteers. The Ladies auxiliary are volunteers, as are the Museum staff.
> 
> Guess where the most problems are in the regiment at any point in time? You guessed it... all of the above.
> 
> If there's one thing that keeps convincing me that I never, ever want to be a CO it's the fact that the majority of your time is usually consumed appeasing and managing issues from the all the 'volunteers' we have already. A complete PITA and waste of time IMHO, and some thing that few Reg F CO's ever have to deal with (along with recruiting by the way).
> 
> Add volunteer riflemen to that mix? Inconthhhhhhheivebale!



And how do those groups assist your unit in training soldiers to close with and destroy the enemy?


----------



## Kirkhill

Haggis said:
			
		

> Are there ways we can do things better in the Army Reserve?  Of course!  This thread alone is filled with probably 50 of 80 pages of ideas.  What's needed is the _institutional will _and _organizational flexibility_ to enact those changes.
> 
> But we can agree that the recruiting system is broken, yes?  And neither the Army or the Army Reserve  owns that piece of the problem.
> 
> Personally, I'm a big fan of a streamlined or even standalone recruiting system for the Reserves.  There are several hurdles to overcome before it can happen and it will probably result in some of the same challenges at the corporate end due to the necessary sharing of certain resources (CAF Health Services, for example).



The one thing that continues to amuse/amaze/gall me is the constant refrain - no matter what the proposal (and as you said there are 80 pages of them here) - "You can't do that!"

Pretty sure that is the same thing that Sam Hughes heard in August 1914.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And how do those groups assist your unit in training soldiers to close with and destroy the enemy?



They don't. 

But they do, in a small way, assist in maintaining the community connection (footprint) nurturing the extended regimental family and preserving the history and heritage of the regiment.

These are important and years ago unit COs and RSMs could manage them on their own.  Today, however, with the ever increasing demands for time and administration on unit leaderships, these task by necessity, must be done by volunteers (either off-duty or retired) or fall by the wayside.


----------



## Kirkhill

Haggis said:
			
		

> They don't.
> 
> But they do, in a small way, assist in maintaining the community connection (footprint) nurturing the extended regimental family and preserving the history and heritage of the regiment.
> 
> These are important and years ago unit COs and RSMs could manage them on their own.  Today, however, with the ever increasing demands for time and administration on unit leaderships, these task by necessity, must be done by volunteers (either off-duty or retired) or fall by the wayside.



Years ago, when the CO was responsible for recruiting, they were part and parcel of the recruiting effort.  Our "unit funds" came in part from local donors, members of the extended family, who supported things like local advertising, arranging meet and greets with the community, supplying funds for social exchanges with folks like the Washington National Guard, New Year's Levees, Highland Balls, St Juliens, Walcheren, kilts-buttons-bows, support for the pipe band, arranging the production of pipe band CDs, and a host of other "useless" activities.

I don't recall ever putting out a dollar of pay for anything, mess dinners, social engagements, whatever, in my time in the Highlanders (or my short stint with the Johns for that matter)(although I do recall spending a lot of money in the mess).

And those engagements were part of the attraction to the unit that all ranks experienced.  And our patrons (including ww2 vets like Maj Mark Tennant and LCol Sam Nickle who also were our honoraries) managed to arrange spectacles such as getting our new colours presented in person by Her Majesty (with Gen de Chastelain parading with the Pipe Band as an ordinary piper - where he started his career). Actually the presentation of Colours was organized in large part (and funded) by one of our Honoraries, Fred Mannix.

All of those activities I now presume are managed by fully qualified and permanently paid professional LCols of the Public Relations and Human Resources varieties - to great effect and efficiency.

No.  Those volunteers did nothing to make your troops more efficient.  All they did was make sure that you had soldiers to train and the soldiers got a few perks on the side.   Nothing of consequence.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Long ago and far away (1980s) we recruited a Platoon into the Calgary Highlanders every September and the KOCR that shared the same armouries got a similar influx.  Both units, together with th Svc Bn,  the MPs, the Comm Squad, the Fd Ambulance managed to remain viable.
> 
> For St Julien's Day we (the Highlanders) could turn out 100 - 150 on parade.  We had a platoon of high performers (rappel, airborne, pioneer, all infantry weapons qualified, sigs) and managed to retain 10 to 25% of the September intake through the first year and get them loaded on summer courses.
> 
> Weekend exercises were well attended when interesting  (40 to Wainwright by Chinook for ranges, similar numbers for Suffield) and not so well when not interesting (pitching tents for a Boy Scout Jamboree).
> 
> Weeknights were fine for first year recruits (class work and parade work) but generally a waste of time for everybody else unless they were involved in training the recruits or preparing exercises or general administration.



The Highlander's and the KOCR enjoy good turnouts and high numbers from all i have witnessed, and people I walk to. The same cannot be said for the other units. Attrition is out growing recruiting by leaps and bounds, or in some cases just no one wants to join in certain trades, we've had no cooks for years.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And how do those groups assist your unit in training soldiers to close with and destroy the enemy?



They provide good examples of what not to become, of course.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> They provide good examples of what not to become, of course.



Yup....Don't get old.


----------



## tomahawk6

What might be helpful is to change Canadian law along US law for Reserve Components.We are able to call up entire reserve/national guard units as well as individual augmentee's.Their civilian jobs are protected.We also have a program called Active Guard/Reserve where they work full time at their unit.

http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/current-and-prior-service/continue-serving/army-reserve-prior-service/active-guard-reserve.html


----------



## FJAG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> What might be helpful is to change Canadian law along US law for Reserve Components.We are able to call up entire reserve/national guard units as well as individual augmentee's.Their civilian jobs are protected.We also have a program called Active Guard/Reserve where they work full time at their unit.
> 
> http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/current-and-prior-service/continue-serving/army-reserve-prior-service/active-guard-reserve.html



Canada has the legal ability to compulsorily "call up" reservists and units as well.  See here:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-09.page

The fact of the matter is that for well over the last half century we have not used this provision and have relied on individual volunteers to round out regular force units/elements.

As to civilian job protection, one can argue the effectiveness in the various approaches used by different countries. In theory the USERRA (see here: http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ednc/legacy/2011/04/29/EmploymentRights.pdf) is much more effective than our hodge-podge of provincial legislation but practically speaking, for the most part, deploying reservists will take a hit in their civilian careers unless their employers are genuinely committed to the system. This, in large part, is why Canada focuses more on building employer relationships than legislating compliance (Not to mention that such legislation is not an issue of major importance for any of our political parties)

Full time service by reservists exists through our Class B and Class C reserve service. Prior to Afghanistan the use of these two services was somewhat arbitrary but since then, in general, we use Class C for operational deployments while Class B relates to more administrative "temporary help" jobs (some of which "temporary" jobs have been in place for decades). Again, IMHO, the pay and benefits structure Canada uses to distinguish Class B and Class C service is arbitrary and based on antiquated concepts that the system continues to use.

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> Canada has the legal ability to compulsorily "call up" reservists and units as well.  See here:
> 
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-09.page
> 
> The fact of the matter is that for well over the last half century we have not used this provision and have relied on individual volunteers to round out regular force units/elements.
> 
> As to civilian job protection, one can argue the effectiveness in the various approaches used by different countries. In theory the USERRA (see here: http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ednc/legacy/2011/04/29/EmploymentRights.pdf) is much more effective than our hodge-podge of provincial legislation but practically speaking, for the most part, deploying reservists will take a hit in their civilian careers unless their employers are genuinely committed to the system. This, in large part, is why Canada focuses more on building employer relationships than legislating compliance (Not to mention that such legislation is not an issue of major importance for any of our political parties)
> 
> Full time service by reservists exists through our Class B and Class C reserve service. Prior to Afghanistan the use of these two services was somewhat arbitrary but since then, in general, we use Class C for operational deployments while Class B relates to more administrative "temporary help" jobs (some of which "temporary" jobs have been in place for decades). Again, IMHO, the pay and benefits structure Canada uses to distinguish Class B and Class C service is arbitrary and based on antiquated concepts that the system continues to use.
> 
> :cheers:



So does that mean that if the individual were ordered to duty their job would be protected (and the Government liable)?

By asking for volunteers, and putting the onus on the individual, does the Government dodge obligations and liability?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So does that mean that if the individual were ordered to duty their job would be protected (and the Government liable)?
> 
> By asking for volunteers, and putting the onus on the individual, does the Government dodge obligations and liability?



That's apples and oranges.

The ability to call up reservists is a federal government action while job protection in most instances comes under the labour powers of the provincial governments (because most civilian workers fall under provincial labour law).

This page is DND's info page on the topic and has links to all the relevant legislation:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/job-protection-legislation.page.

The federal government is never liable nor dodging responsibilities; it's the reservist's employers who are the ones who have obligations under the respective laws. 

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks for the clarification.


----------



## George Wallace

FJAG said:
			
		

> The federal government is never liable nor dodging responsibilities; it's the reservist's employers who are the ones who have obligations under the respective laws.



Meanwhile, the Federal Government is also a large employer of Reservists in their "Day Jobs".   They are inconsistent in their treatment of those Reservists when the Reservists go on deployments.


----------



## ModlrMike

There's also the question of financial loss. Many long serving reservists are well advanced in their civilian careers, and can't afford the income delta for very long. This makes Class B service much less attractive to them, resulting in a shortfall of experienced members available for tasking.


----------



## tomahawk6

If a reservist is called up why couldnt their employer continue to pay them for the length of their deployment ?Then whatever their pay was would be a tax write off for the business.This might require legislation.


----------



## Blackadder1916

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> If a reservist is called up why couldnt their employer continue to pay them for the length of their deployment ?Then whatever their pay was would be a tax write off for the business.This might require legislation.



Employee's pay and benefits are already a deduction.  What would be the employer's advantage to continue paying them without receiving any work?


----------



## geo

The CF is, on the whole, a lousy employer of reservists. 
You may be due for a career course, there may be an available position on same said course, but your class B employer won't let you go... So you want the full time job, or the course and career advancement?


----------



## George Wallace

geo said:
			
		

> The CF is, on the whole, a lousy employer of reservists.
> You may be due for a career course, there may be an available position on same said course, but your class B employer won't let you go... So you want the full time job, or the course and career advancement?



Problem lies in the mentality of the people who load the courses.  It is a Reg Force mentality where they figure you can tell a member that they are on course next week and send them.  Sorry, but some Reservists need up to a year to plan for attending a crse, arranging times with their employers (Reservists who are police are often in this boat).  Reservists need lots of lead time to plan on attending crses.


----------



## Kirkhill

How well do the Course Lengths match with the time off available to reservists?

Perhaps the courses could be structured in packets that reservists could attend without requiring long sabbaticals?


----------



## Haggis

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> How well do the Course Lengths match with the time off available to reservists?



Generally speaking, they don't.  Couse length is determined by the content required to be delivered and the depth/detail required for it to be applied.  (i.e.  a general introduction to a subject may take 45 minutes while a detailed immersion could take a couple of days).

Having sat on many QS/TP writing boards, I can tell you that there is always angst filled discussions about this with a view to shortening courses as much as possible (to reduce PERSTEMPO demands and TD costs) while ensuring the course properly prepares the member for entry-level employment in the trade/specialty being taught. In the final analysis, when critical content and course length are compared, content almost always wins out.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Perhaps the courses could be structured in packets that reservists could attend without requiring long sabbaticals?



There are ways to reduce residency course length which are being constantly explored by the Training Establishments. This is but one.


----------



## geo

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Problem lies in the mentality of the people who load the courses.  It is a Reg Force mentality where they figure you can tell a member that they are on course next week and send them.  Sorry, but some Reservists need up to a year to plan for attending a crse, arranging times with their employers (Reservists who are police are often in this boat).  Reservists need lots of lead time to plan on attending crses.


Another problem has to do with last minute course cancellation. A reservist has gone and allocated his vacation time & more for his career course, his employer has juggled shift changes to let you go.... And the Friday afternoon before you're supposed to leave.... They cancel the course. The boss is gonna love it, the next time you come up with a request for time off.


----------



## Haggis

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Problem lies in the mentality of the people who load the courses.  It is a Reg Force mentality where they figure you can tell a member that they are on course next week and send them.  Sorry, but some Reservists need up to a year to plan for attending a crse, arranging times with their employers (Reservists who are police are often in this boat).  Reservists need lots of lead time to plan on attending crses.



I fought this battle, mostly successfully, with CDA for NCMPD courses.  What I wasn't able to influence was how the services (RCN/CA/RCAF) chains of command then got the loading info to the Armoury floor/drill deck/hangar and the n to the member.  For example, CDA would release the loading message for, say ILP, 90 - 120 days in advance and Divs/Bdes/units were still not getting the info to the nominee in time for him/her to react and arrange for attendance.


----------



## George Wallace

geo said:
			
		

> Another problem has to do with last minute course cancellation. A reservist has gone and allocated his vacation time & more for his career course, his employer has juggled shift changes to let you go.... And the Friday afternoon before you're supposed to leave.... They cancel the course. The boss is gonna love it, the next time you come up with a request for time off.



Or just the shifting of the course by one day.  Had a Police officer arrange for time to attend a six to eight week course, and then someone shifted the course dates to the right one day.  He had Court appointments and now was unable to attend the course.   These types of problems rarely occur when working with Reg Force pers, but are the norm for Reservists.


----------



## jhk87

Crantor said:
			
		

> The marines also show up to almost every recruiting event in full dress, colour guards at sporting events, their silent drill team, bands etc.  heck they had a marine fight a dragon with a sword in one video.  They are successful because they know the value of those things as recruiting tools.  The NAtional Sentry Program has done more for recruiting and connecting with Canadians than any door kicking video can (not everyone wants to join the infantry).



All tasks easily handled by the RegF. If this is the primary function of 3 "bde gps" per div, we're not getting a high cost effectiveness.


----------



## jhk87

bossi said:
			
		

> Hmmm ... I wonder ... if the challenge is "chew on this", then is the password "Bite me"?
> 
> Why destroy esprit de corps?
> Why destroy regimental pride?
> 
> Why destroy any organisation that has survived the disgraceful cuts in defence spending foisted upon Canada by an irresponsible political party that makes Quisling look like a patriot?
> 
> Okay - chew on this:
> The Militia mobilised, fought, and won the Second World War.  If, as you propose, we destroy the Militia - who is left?  The Regular Force?
> 
> Dileas Gu Brath,
> MB



Nope. An army initially mobilised from the Miltia won the war after years of training, massive expansion, and operating on a full-time paid basis. Duringthe First World War, we managed to win without engaging the Militia at all.


----------



## Kirkhill

Nice that you came out of hibernation for the election JHK.

You might want to check the dates on the items you cite.  Your latest is 12 years dead.

Jus' sayin'.


----------



## FJAG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> If a reservist is called up why couldnt their employer continue to pay them for the length of their deployment ?Then whatever their pay was would be a tax write off for the business.This might require legislation.



Any salary paid by an employer is tax deductible in any event but why would an employer pay a soldier a salary (or even just a top-up of the difference between the soldier's military pay and his civilian salary) when he receives no benefit in exchange? Many people's patriotism stops at their pocketbook although some employers generously do provide that (generally lower paying ones). What we need is something in the nature of an additional tax credit over and above the deduction.

In addition there are insurance, pension, seniority etc issues. The problems aren't insurmountable; what's missing is political will. Hell, if we can't get benefits right for our wounded reserve vets, how can we expect any further action on this front (especially when it's a very low priority issue for our regular force masters) - Colour me pessimistic :brickwall:

:cheers:


----------



## Edward Campbell

FJAG said:
			
		

> Any salary paid by an employer is tax deductible in any event but why would an employer pay a soldier a salary (or even just a top-up of the difference between the soldier's military pay and his civilian salary) when he receives no benefit in exchange? Many people's patriotism stops at their pocketbook although some employers generously do provide that (generally lower paying ones). What we need is something in the nature of an additional tax credit over and above the deduction.
> 
> In addition there are insurance, pension, seniority etc issues. The problems aren't insurmountable; _what's missing is political will_. Hell, if we can't get benefits right for our wounded reserve vets, how can we expect any further action on this front (especially when it's a very low priority issue for our regular force masters) - Colour me pessimistic :brickwall:
> 
> :cheers:




I mentioned elsewhere that we cannot get things done until we have a sensible _defence policy_ and I said that _my sense_ is that anything like a sensible defence policy, and the political-bureaucratic discussions that must surround it, are "unwelcome" in _official Ottawa_ because of the expense ~ we Canadians are downright _Elizabethan_ in our views on the the military. This government, and both of its potential replacements, have other priorities and they _may_ see other, more serious, non-military threats on the immediate horizon.

But, there are two ways to make policy:

     1. Mostly we prefer the "top down," well structured _white paper_ route. The cabinet blesses a _policy_, implicitly agreeing to funding, for a particular ministry or function, like National Defence. This is "comfortable" for politicians, the public,
         bureaucrats and soldiers, alike;

     2. From the "bottom up," people like the CDS _propose_ projects to the cabinet and secure Treasury Board (the policy centre's) support. Ideally, hopefully, these projects are al tied together in an (invisible to most people) "master plan."

I do not believe either policy making option is in use in Ottawa, today, because, I repeat, defence policy, even individual, (relatively) low cost _initiatives_ like reserve force restructuring, are "unwelcome" in the _political centre_.


----------



## George Wallace

jhk87 said:
			
		

> .......... Duringthe First World War, we managed to win without engaging the Militia at all.



What history books have you been studying?


----------



## tomahawk6

Some courses could be done via computer,like distance learning is done at the university.


----------



## dapaterson

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Some courses could be done via computer,like distance learning is done at the university.



There's a growing library of online training available to CAF members, and several career courses are delivered via DL, or a blended approach with both DL and some residential.  That said, for most initial training, there's not only skills and knowledge acquisition, but military inculcation is also a key element, something that's hard to do with "Click here to continue".

The Defence Learning Network is available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-elearning/dln.page


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There's a growing library of online training available to CAF members, and several career courses are delivered via DL, or a blended approach with both DL and some residential.  That said, for most initial training, there's not only skills and knowledge acquisition, but *military inculcation is also a key element*, something that's hard to do with "Click here to continue".
> 
> The Defence Learning Network is available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-elearning/dln.page



A question might be how long does that take.   Internationally that indoctrination period seems to be about 3 months with "trades training" starting immediately after.

It seems to me that some trades are going to be more amenable to Distance Learning while others less so.  But all trades have some "book work" involved that could be covered on line and then tested at the armouries or in garrison.  That would free up instruction time for practical work (hands on with the C6), ranges and field exercises.


----------



## Haggis

When I was in NCMPD, the CDA had just rolled out the "CF Campus" concept, which was very heavy on DL and on-line learning (hence the CAF's DLN and RCAF's AFILE).  Some other federal agencies have gone to partial DL for "pre-recruit" training (e.g. the CBSA requires 50 hours of self-paced, instructor supported on-line training over a four week period) but there is still a need - and likely always will be - for residency training in the military schoolhouse for basic, trades and leadership training.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Any salary paid by an employer is tax deductible in any event but why would an employer pay a soldier a salary (or even just a top-up of the difference between the soldier's military pay and his civilian salary) when he receives no benefit in exchange? Many people's patriotism stops at their pocketbook although some employers generously do provide that (generally lower paying ones). What we need is something in the nature of an additional tax credit over and above the deduction.
> 
> In addition there are insurance, pension, seniority etc issues. The problems aren't insurmountable; what's missing is political will. Hell, if we can't get benefits right for our wounded reserve vets, how can we expect any further action on this front (especially when it's a very low priority issue for our regular force masters) - Colour me pessimistic :brickwall:
> 
> :cheers:



I know several employers who will not hire reservists precisely because they expect far more time off than other staff.

It speaks to the need to front end load as much training into our troops as possible while they are still in school and can take time off in the summers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Summer 1 (Graduating High School) - 12 weeks BMQ + 12 weekends at the armoury
Summer 2 (1st Year) - 12 weeks Trades (DP?) + 12 weekends at the armoury
Summer 3 (2nd Year) - Exercises + 12 weekends at the armoury
Year 4 - 12 weekends at the armoury
Years 5 to 8 minimum service Supplist OR can volunteer for continuing Class A service

Supplist Reserves and Class A Reserves available for call up with current skills.


----------



## C-Aitchison

George Wallace said:
			
		

> What history books have you been studying?



It's actually technically kind of true. The Militia was never formally mobilized during WWI, and instead they created the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Many members of the Militia transferred into the CEF, but from my understanding from a few of my military History classes here at school, Canada never fully mobilized their Militia Forces.

I could be completely wrong though.


----------



## Kirkhill

Lutheran - you aren't wrong.

But that is a bit of a difference than saying the Militia wasn't engaged at all.  Many soldiers in the CEF were Militiamen (who had to be trained at Valcartier, Salisbury Plains and Etaples prior to going to the trenches) and many others were recruited through the Militia.


----------



## C-Aitchison

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Lutheran - you aren't wrong.
> 
> But that is a bit of a difference than saying the Militia wasn't engaged at all.  Many soldiers in the CEF were Militiamen (who had to be trained at Valcartier, Salisbury Plains and Etaples prior to going to the trenches) and many others were recruited through the Militia.



You are the second person to refer to me as Lutheran this week! The first was when I was canvassing in a neighbourhood for a local federal candidate, and the gentleman attended Waterloo Lutheran.

I completely agree with your statement though.


----------



## jhk87

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Lutheran - you aren't wrong.
> 
> But that is a bit of a difference than saying the Militia wasn't engaged at all.  Many soldiers in the CEF were Militiamen (who had to be trained at Valcartier, Salisbury Plains and Etaples prior to going to the trenches) and many others were recruited through the Militia.



Those in the Militia had to enlist the CEF which was under a seperate ministry altogther, making the militia's impact negligble. The numbers and level of training were far, far too low to have an impact in mobilising an expiditionary force.

Most of the training conducted in Valcartier was overseen by Permanent Force regulars and Salisbury Plain was overseen by the British. Even then, troops were not on the line until 1915.

The point remaining that the Militia was not effective structure for mobilisation in 1914 and was superifical in 1939. Those wars were fought and won with professionalised citizen-soliders, not miltiamen, and before there is a sensible discussion about the roles and way forward of the PRes, we need to break the "Militia Myth" which clouds a lot of discussion.


----------



## Kirkhill

Horses for courses JHK 

Many nations manage to integrate both "Professional Soldiers" and "Citizen Volunteers".  In Canada ..... its like my kids squabbling at the table.

By the way: Cool name change.


----------



## OldTanker

It is with interest I note the comments directed at "volunteers", particularly the notion that we (yes, I have volunteered much of my time in semi-retirement to help out my Regiment) are examples of what serving soldiers should not become and somehow are lesser persons. I know we are not as gung-ho and fit and aggressive as the serving soldiers, but maybe we were once. When we dole out rum and clam chowder to the soldiers after a cold Remembrance Day parade are we providing examples of what soldiers shouldn't become when they get old? When we organize fund-raising for money to purchase ceremonial kit for the serving soldiers and bands that the government won't, is that providing a poor example? Are we wasting our time running Regimental museums so new soldiers can understand what old soldiers have done and the traditions they are expected to follow? I could go but I'm sure there are lots of other examples we have all seen of those who have served providing useful service to those who do serve. If the comment was aimed at those who seek to meddle in the running of the serving unit, I understand the sentiment, but please don't disrespect us all.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Summer 1 (Graduating High School) - 12 weeks BMQ + 12 weekends at the armoury
> Summer 2 (1st Year) - 12 weeks Trades (DP?) + 12 weekends at the armoury
> Summer 3 (2nd Year) - Exercises + 12 weekends at the armoury
> Year 4 - 12 weekends at the armoury
> Years 5 to 8 minimum service Supplist OR can volunteer for continuing Class A service
> 
> Supplist Reserves and Class A Reserves available for call up with current skills.



That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :




Hahahaha!


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :



Can't take credit - it is a direct steal from south of the line.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> _Perhaps you would be happier if we just created numbered independent companies._




Actually, _I_  would be happier if we had any sort of rational structure for the reserves.

   _First step_: four, regional reserve brigades ~ not brigade groups;

   _Second step_: about a dozen to as many as 20 independent artillery batteries - about 100 howitzers, under a separate, national, artillery HQ;

   _Third step_: 12 to 15 infantry battalions, each composed on three to six community based companies;

   _Fourth step_: four to 12 independent _armoured_ squadrons ~ with some sort of kit;

   _Fifth step_: four to six engineer squadrons, with some useful equipment;

   _Sixth step_: sour signal squadrons, with some useful equipment; and

   _Seventh step_: about a dozen independent service support companies, each with a lot of regular force support, especially in the maintenance elements. This is the most complex problem.

I have no idea what the C2 superstructure ought to look like ~ I am confident it will be overweight and top heavy (in both the organizational and personal aspects), but I suspect it can be rendered _harmless_.

Keep (almost) all the cap badges and regimental colours and silver and honoraries and, and, and ...but give the regional battalions (1st BC, 2nd Alberta, 3rd Saskatchewan, etc, etc) some useful training goals and tasks (train platoons in a company context) and give the soldiers and subalterns some challenges. Or, maybe, just give up on the reserve army ...


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Actually, _I_  would be happier if we had any sort of rational structure for the reserves.
> 
> _First step_: four, regional reserve brigades ~ not brigade groups;
> 
> _Second step_: about a dozen to as many as 20 independent artillery batteries - about 100 howitzers, under a separate, national, artillery HQ;
> 
> _Third step_: 12 to 15 infantry battalions, each composed on three to six community based companies;
> 
> _Fourth step_: four to 12 independent _armoured_ squadrons ~ with some sort of kit;
> 
> _Fifth step_: four to six engineer squadrons, with some useful equipment;
> 
> _Sixth step_: sour signal squadrons, with some useful equipment; and
> 
> _Seventh step_: about a dozen independent service support companies, each with a lot of regular force support, especially in the maintenance elements. This is the most complex problem.
> 
> I have no idea what the C2 superstructure ought to look like ~ I am confident it will be overweight and top heavy (in both the organizational and personal aspects), but I suspect it can be rendered _harmless_.
> 
> Keep (almost) all the cap badges and regimental colours and silver and honoraries and, and, and ...but give the regional battalions (1st BC, 2nd Alberta, 3rd Saskatchewan, etc, etc) some useful training goals and tasks (train platoons in a company context) and give the soldiers and subalterns some challenges. Or, maybe, just give up on the reserve army ...



Good enough for me.

Except that I would be ensuring that all of those limited available days (37.5 to 70) would ALL be dedicated to Training.  Adm and Support should NOT be a Reserve function.  It is a full time occupation.

The Reserves have the opposite problem to the Regs.  The Reserves have too few training hours available.  The Regs have too many.

If that were not the case then people wouldn't be trying to figure out what to do with their troops in garrison (and there wouldn't be so many idle officers for NDHQ to occupy filling out interminable forms).  Put more of them to work filling out forms and creating classes and exercises for the Reserves.


----------



## blackberet17

I know the Sigs complain about kit as much as any other trade, but "sour" Signal Sqns? Wassat?

 >


----------



## Edward Campbell

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> I know the Sigs complain about kit as much as any other trade, but "sour" Signal Sqns? Wassat?
> 
> >




Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say _four_.

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In _my opinion_ both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in _my_ reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say _four_.
> 
> And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In _my opinion_ both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in _my_ reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.



From my point of view, as an uneducated stubble jumper, the sigs reserves are doing a fantastic job. Every time we have had them on an exercise they have exceeded my (un edumecated) expectations.

Especially since they make me coffee all the time  ;D


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> From my point of view, as an uneducated stubble jumper, the sigs reserves are doing a fantastic job. Every time we have had them on an exercise they have exceed my (un edumecated) expectations.
> 
> specially since they make me coffee all the time  ;D



Same.  but we could use more of that.  Coffee too


----------



## MilEME09

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say _four_.
> 
> And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In _my opinion_ both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in _my_ reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.



I would agree with you on the RCEME side, our full time staff try to pull in guys for class A or if possible Class B as much as they can because with only a couple full time staff you can only get so much done on vehicles. Weapons side I haven't seen an issue as weapons don't tend to break as much, now if units could just clean their weapons regularly.....


----------



## George Wallace

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In _my opinion_ both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in _my_ reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.



I think you may have come up with the correct solutions for those types of Reserve Units.  It would allow them to function efficiently and capable of supporting other Reserve units, yet permit the recruiting and mentoring of Reservists.  Your next dilemma would be the properly equipping of those units, necessitating an increase in procurements.


----------



## PuckChaser

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say _four_.
> 
> And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In _my opinion_ both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in _my_ reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.



You'll never get more RegF Signallers into PRes units, the RegF is short as it is. I do completely agree, however, that PRes Signals units be trained and optimized at providing support to Battalion level and below. There is too much of a technology and training gap when you start talking about strategic/rear link comms and Bde CPs. PRes Signallers should be specialists at providing Pl/Coy/Bn support in the TacRad environment, and if focused there, could easily move to augment RegF at those levels with minimal delta training. You're not going to get a PRes Signaller proficient on a TSS/HCLOS/etc link working 2 weekends a month and a handful of Thursdays.

Radio equipment will always be an issue to supply the PRes units, as the Army never buys enough to even kit out the RegF. Radios aren't cheap (a new 117G is ~$35k USD) and are replaced far more frequently due to advances in cryptography/waveforms/etc.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Actually it may help retain Sigs as people that have doing a lot of field/frontline work can then rotate into a more relaxed posting with good opportunities for their families. This would help Reg force Sigs work on their leadership skills and help maintain up to date SOP's and knowledge for the PRes. Further for people with specialized skillsets, can transition out of the their Reg force career into a Reserve position and be guaranteed X amount of money in exchange for X amount of time for X amount of years. The money would flow into the Brigade to pay that position as they become the custodian of a asset for the whole forces.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Moved the more detailed "what should the Reserves look like?" here to join up with other discussion on same - keep up the great input, folks!

Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## George Wallace

Colin P said:
			
		

> Actually it may help retain Sigs as people that have doing a lot of field/frontline work can then rotate into a more relaxed posting with good opportunities for their families. .....



Hold your horses there.  They would still have to deploy to the field; perhaps a lot less that elsewhere, but still will have to deploy from time to time.  RSS postings for people who think it is just a holiday are detrimental to all.  The Reg Force member's career can suffer.   The Reserve unit gets little satisfaction out of the RSS member.  The Reg Force members will still have to maintain a high sense of dedication to their job.

On the Reg Force retention issue, it may help, in that this would open up a wider variety of postings to choose from, and permit the member a better quality of life for them-self and their families.


----------



## MilEME09

perhaps RSS positions can be a way to help when you have to many reg force members sitting on there hands for short periods of the year. Have a brigade EX coming up? okay we are going to send a couple sections, maybe more over to the Reserves, help train them up, get them ready, and go out and work with them for that entire EX. Call it a short term RSS, a quick shot in the arm, especially in a service battalion, a influx of say a section of techs mixed with reservists to shadow/train with would allow skill transfer and keep equipment ready to go.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> perhaps RSS positions can be a way to help when you have to many reg force members sitting on there hands for short periods of the year. Have a brigade EX coming up? okay we are going to send a couple sections, maybe more over to the Reserves, help train them up, get them ready, and go out and work with them for that entire EX. Call it a short term RSS, a quick shot in the arm, especially in a service battalion, a influx of say a section of techs mixed with reservists to shadow/train with would allow skill transfer and keep equipment ready to go.



That's not RSS. It's an OMLT. 

Which is a great idea, of course.  :nod:


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> That's not RSS. It's an OMLT.
> 
> Which is a great idea, of course.  :nod:



I have no idea what OMLT is so forgive me there. I think more intergration between the reg force and PRes, to a extent can be beneficial, less idle hands, and more well trained reservists.


----------



## PuckChaser

Operational mentorship and liason team. It's how we trained kandaks in Kandahar, by imbeding into the kandak and mentoring them in combat.


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree the OMLT idea is a great idea.

But could you make the OMLT team integral to the Reg Force Unit - essentially providing a command cadre for additional sub-units that would be manned by Reservists?

For example 2 PPCLI - could it be established with its current force structure but with additional sub-unit cadres who would be responsible for training the affiliated reserve unit. 

2 PPCLI would then have 

1x Command and Administration Company
1x Combat Support Company
3x Rifle Companies (Full-strength (Regular))
1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with RWR)
1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with LSSR)
1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with NSaskR)
1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with RRR)
1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with QOCHofC)

The Regs would then know their reservists, their training, their capabilities, and their deployability.

With five training bases, even if each unit doesn't parade everybody it has on strength the Regs would have a better sense of whether they had the numbers to field a fourth rifle company, or beef up the Combat Support company, or add a Motor Transport platoon, or a D&E platoon.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I agree the OMLT idea is a great idea.
> 
> But could you make the OMLT team integral to the Reg Force Unit - essentially providing a command cadre for additional sub-units that would be manned by Reservists?
> 
> For example 2 PPCLI - could it be established with its current force structure but with additional sub-unit cadres who would be responsible for training the affiliated reserve unit.
> 
> 2 PPCLI would then have
> 
> 1x Command and Administration Company
> 1x Combat Support Company
> 3x Rifle Companies (Full-strength (Regular))
> 1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with RWR)
> 1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with LSSR)
> 1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with NSaskR)
> 1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with RRR)
> 1x Rifle Company (Cadre (Regular)- Affiliated with QOCHofC)
> 
> The Regs would then know their reservists, their training, their capabilities, and their deployability.
> 
> With five training bases, even if each unit doesn't parade everybody it has on strength the Regs would have a better sense of whether they had the numbers to field a fourth rifle company, or beef up the Combat Support company, or add a Motor Transport platoon, or a D&E platoon.



I experienced something like that when we had an Op Tasking to support 2 Cdo.

They basically ignored us. 

Can't say I blame them as we were a time zone away and had limited ability to connect with them, apart from our annual 'Burma Rig' exercise.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ignorance can happen  ;D

But what if it becomes a gold star on someone's PER?   And you do not get your Company (Reg) without a Cadre gold star?

Like any other plan it can be made to fail.

The problem with getting on in years, like me, (I won't mention our resident members of the XX Legion) is that you end up seeing every possible plan and you have seen them all fail.   But, on occasion, you have seen people make some of those plans work, against the odds.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Ignorance can happen  ;D
> 
> But what if it becomes a gold star on someone's PER?   And you do not get your Company (Reg) without a Cadre gold star?
> 
> Like any other plan it can be made to fail.
> 
> The problem with getting on in years, like me, (I won't mention our resident members of the XX Legion) is that you end up seeing every possible plan and you have seen them all fail.   But, on occasion, you have seen people make some of those plans work, against the odds.



Reading "The Three meter zone" by J.D. Pendry he talked about his experience of relaxing the rules on enlisted members in barracks, no inspections and such. All the Senior NCO's claimed it wouldn't work and why it wouldn't. He realized it wasn't working because the Senior staff were so keen on it not working, they weren't giving it a chance or trying to make it work. So he brought them all together had a good talk with them all, made some changes, and soon to system was working, all because they tried to help it work. Some times the best plans can fail because those who are tasked with executing it don't want the plan to work.


----------



## Kirkhill

One organization that seems to make the plan work is this one

The 1er Regiment de Hussards Parachutistes owns it own reservists.  They are not from a general pool.

2e REP seems to work the same way.

Perhaps someone can confirm if that is standard practice in France.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> One organization that seems to make the plan work is this one
> 
> The 1er Regiment de Hussards Parachutistes owns it own reservists.  They are not from a general pool.
> 
> 2e REP seems to work the same way.
> 
> Perhaps someone can confirm if that is standard practice in France.



Our concept of Reserves does not exist in the French Army.  The Reserve Coy's in French Army Regiments are former professional soldiers that agree to remain in the army on a part time basis when they finish their contract.  

They do minimum training during the year and are mostly there as a supp list in case war breaks out, in which case they will be activated.  

The French Army also uses Reservists with special skills such as Academics who are enlisted on special contracts to do research for them.  They do not have a Reserve Force as we know it though.  

The French Army is 100,000 strong with over 20,000 soldiers on operations at any one time.  They have an Airborne BG on 72hrs NTM and a Brigade on 9 Days NTM at all times.  They don't have the luxury of taking a gazillion years to deploy and sort themselves out.


----------



## Kirkhill

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> *Our concept of Reserves does not exist in the French Army.  The Reserve Coy's in French Army Regiments are former professional soldiers that agree to remain in the army on a part time basis when they finish their contract.
> 
> They do minimum training during the year and are mostly there as a supp list in case war breaks out, in which case they will be activated.  *



I think, if you look back at some of my other posts you will see that I have argued FOR that model in the past as well. And actually is one of the reasons I argue FOR the USMCR/USANG models as alternatives for Canada.

But I think the bigger issue is one of the unit knowing its soldiers, be they regs or be they reservists.  

The Reg force unit should have intimate knowledge of its Reservists and in that way could better ensure that the Reservists are trained to their needs - so that they can move to the French (and British) NTM levels.  The alternative is where the Reservists and the Regs get to know each other via a disfunctional eHarmony and neither enjoys the intimate relations that result.


----------



## Lumber

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Our concept of Reserves does not exist in the French Army.  The Reserve Coy's in French Army Regiments are former professional soldiers that agree to remain in the army on a part time basis when they finish their contract.
> 
> They do minimum training during the year and are mostly there as a supp list in case war breaks out, in which case they will be activated.
> 
> The French Army also uses Reservists with special skills such as Academics who are enlisted on special contracts to do research for them.  They do not have a Reserve Force as we know it though.
> 
> The French Army is 100,000 strong with over 20,000 soldiers on operations at any one time.  They have an Airborne BG on 72hrs NTM and a Brigade on 9 Days NTM at all times.  They don't have the luxury of taking a gazillion years to deploy and sort themselves out.



Yes, that all sounds great, but:


----------



## blackberet17

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> The French Army is 100,000 strong with over 20,000 soldiers on operations at any one time.  They have an Airborne BG on 72hrs NTM and a Brigade on 9 Days NTM at all times.  They don't have the luxury of taking a gazillion years to deploy and sort themselves out.



Neither do we, should the proverbial excrement hit the large ventilation device, which we should be prepared for, whether it be at the international or domestic level.

But we certainly like to think we do.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Neither do we, should the proverbial excrement hit the large ventilation device, which we should be prepared for, whether it be at the international or domestic level.
> 
> But we certainly like to think we do.



Which is why the current concept of a larger regular, rapidly deployable, force with a small reserve element to provide one for one augmentation to the regular force makes sense.


----------



## Kirkhill

Perhaps an alternate plan would be to do use only the capabilities we have and not those we wish to have.  If you can't rely on your Reserves then remove them from your deployment plans and figure out what you can do with only the Reg forces available to you.

I seldom get to use labour I don't have.


----------



## dapaterson

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Which is why the current concept of a larger regular, rapidly deployable, force with a small reserve element to provide one for one augmentation to the regular force makes sense.



Our Reg F ambition for deployment should dictate force size and structure; it should not be driven by parochial capbadge considerations, or PY empire protection.  Unfortuately, our Army of 20000 Reg F proved unable to keep a battlegroup (roughly 2000) in the field for a sustained deployment without significant Reserve reinforcement.  Rather than taking that to heart and making hard decisions about how we are structured and what degree of C2 is truly needed, we've doubled down on the status quo.

Note that parochial capbadge considerations are a prime disabler of the current Reserve structure as well...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It's difficult just to re-locate existing units to places with a population base that would support them. No one wants to touch removing the units altogether. That being said, part of the reg force problem is that it has little or no presence in most of Canada and therefore people have little or no connection to it. The plan that looks like it will be the most efficient, might also be the one that kills your recruitment. We are dealing with humans here, in the military, political and civilian world. Modern western militaries spend a great deal of time trying to get to know the patterns of life, internal politics on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. I wonder if we ignore that thinking when we are back home?


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Which is why the current concept of a larger regular, rapidly deployable, force with a small reserve element to provide one for one augmentation to the regular force makes sense.



Bird Gunner:

Just remember that when planning a larger, rapidly deployable force we have to figure on having the means available to rapidly deploy said larger force.   And I still can't figure out whose job that is.


----------



## Lumber

Colin P said:
			
		

> It's difficult just to re-locate existing units to places with a population base that would support them. No one wants to touch removing the units altogether. That being said, part of the reg force problem is that it has little or no presence in most of Canada and therefore people have little or no connection to it.



This makes me wonder why bases are located where they are. In Halifax and and Victoria (but especially Halifax), I saw tremendous support for the forces becuase people saw and interacted with us every day. The Air Force and Army are much MUCH bigger than the Navy, yet their bases are located in BFN: Shilo, Pet, Gagetown, Valcartier, Cold Lake, Goose Bay, Wainright and to a lesser extent Bagotville and Borden. I know some are situated based on their strategic location like Gander, but how much better would it be if they were co-located with major cities like CFB Edmonton, Halifax and Esquimalt?

 :2c:


----------



## George Wallace

Lumber said:
			
		

> This makes me wonder why bases are located where they are. In Halifax and and Victoria (but especially Halifax), I saw tremendous support for the forces becuase people saw and interacted with us every day. The Air Force and Army are much MUCH bigger than the Navy, yet their bases are located in BFN: Shilo, Pet, Gagetown, Valcartier, Cold Lake, Goose Bay, Wainright and to a lesser extent Bagotville and Borden. I know some are situated based on their strategic location like Gander, but how much better would it be if they were co-located with major cities like CFB Edmonton, Halifax and Esquimalt?
> 
> :2c:



You aren't Army, are you?

The Bases are not the most important factor in the location of the large Army Bases.  The TRAINING AREA is the largest factor.  The Base infrastructure itself takes up a very small percentage of the total area of these "Bases".  CFB Gagetown, CFB Valcartier (an exception with a relatively small Training Area), CFB Shilo, CFB Suffield, and CFB Wainwright are all relatively large Training Areas and IMPACT Zones.  The Army could not reasonably and safely locate such bases near large, ever growing, metropolitan areas.


[EDIT ]

For those who are Air Force, the same applies for why the locations of Cold Lake and Goose Bay were so far removed from populated areas.  They have large IMPACT areas.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Lumber said:
			
		

> This makes me wonder why bases are located where they are. In Halifax and and Victoria (but especially Halifax), I saw tremendous support for the forces becuase people saw and interacted with us every day. The Air Force and Army are much MUCH bigger than the Navy, yet their bases are located in BFN: Shilo, Pet, Gagetown, Valcartier, Cold Lake, Goose Bay, Wainright and to a lesser extent Bagotville and Borden. I know some are situated based on their strategic location like Gander, but how much better would it be if they were co-located with major cities like CFB Edmonton, Halifax and Esquimalt?
> 
> :2c:



The answer is quite simple, those towns where the bases existed didn't want them there (property was too valuable) and they allied with the penny pinchers in government to get them moved because it was also costing the government a tonne of money to have to bug the Army out every time they wanted to train.  For example, the Brigade in Edmonton has to do a road move to Wainwright every time they want to do an exercise, this costs a lot of money.

We used to have Regiments in Chillwack, Calgary, Winnipeg and London.  Now, the only two true urban bases for the Army are Val-Cartier and Edmonton with Gagetown being pseudo-urban due to the relatively close proximity to Fredericton (I don't count Kingston as an Army base).  My prediction is you will see the Edmonton Garrison move to Wainwright sooner, rather than later.  That new maintenance building they built, which is now the largest floor hockey rink in the CAF is probably going to be the future home of the Lord Strathcona's Horse 

European Armies get by just fine with having their Regiments in cities so why do we insist on doing the opposite?  I guess because it costs less, theoretically, but we are robbing peter to pay paul at the end of the day.

We could save a lot of money if we just did a lot of low-level training in town but Canadians (especially of the urbanite variety) don't like seeing soldiers with guns running around on their streets.  If you go to Europe you will often see soldiers on exercise out in the towns and villages, some locals aren't happy but you can't please everyone.  They have ranges and training areas of course but there is no reason we can't do a lot of training out in the suburbs or bedroom communities of big cities.  Just requires some staff work, appropriate clearances, waivers and a couple of hand shakes.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> The answer is quite simple, those towns where the bases existed didn't want them there (property was too valuable) and they allied with the penny pinchers in government to get them moved because it was also costing the government a tonne of money to have to bug the Army out every time they wanted to train.  For example, the Brigade in Edmonton has to do a road move to Wainwright every time they want to do an exercise, this costs a lot of money.
> 
> We used to have Regiments in Chillwack, Calgary, Winnipeg and London.  Now, the only two true urban bases for the Army are Val-Cartier and Edmonton with Gagetown being pseudo-urban due to the relatively close proximity to Fredericton (I don't count Kingston as an Army base).  My prediction is you will see the Edmonton Garrison move to Wainwright sooner, rather than later.  That new maintenance building they built, which is now the largest floor hockey rink in the CAF is probably going to be the future home of the Lord Strathcona's Horse
> 
> European Armies get by just fine with having their Regiments in cities so why do we insist on doing the opposite?  I guess because it costs less, theoretically, but we are robbing peter to pay paul at the end of the day.
> 
> We could save a lot of money if we just did a lot of low-level training in town but Canadians (especially of the urbanite variety) don't like seeing soldiers with guns running around on their streets.  If you go to Europe you will often see soldiers on exercise out in the towns and villages, some locals aren't happy but you can't please everyone.  They have ranges and training areas of course but there is no reason we can't do a lot of training out in the suburbs or bedroom communities of big cities.  Just requires some staff work, appropriate clearances, waivers and a couple of hand shakes.



The grass is always greener...

I recall the British Army types literally drooling at the fact that we have our units located right next to awesome training areas. They have to send their regiments thousands of miles to do what we can do in our back yards.

And having 'jousted' for the hugely overworked training areas in the UK on a regular basis, I can tell you that being forced to do military training in a heavily urbanized area will make you go prematurely bald... like me  ;D


----------



## George Wallace

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> European Armies get by just fine with having their Regiments in cities so why do we insist on doing the opposite?  I guess because it costs less, theoretically, but we are robbing peter to pay paul at the end of the day.
> 
> We could save a lot of money if we just did a lot of low-level training in town but Canadians (especially of the urbanite variety) don't like seeing soldiers with guns running around on their streets.  If you go to Europe you will often see soldiers on exercise out in the towns and villages, some locals aren't happy but you can't please everyone.  They have ranges and training areas of course but there is no reason we can't do a lot of training out in the suburbs or bedroom communities of big cities.  Just requires some staff work, appropriate clearances, waivers and a couple of hand shakes.



European Armies have no choice.  The population of Europe and lack of many open spaces to have large training areas, has been the the major restriction there.  Then there was the fact that many European Armies relied on "Compulsory Service", which meant that often the local Army units were drawing on the local population for their strength.  

While there are large tracts of land used for Training Areas in Europe, they are nowhere as large as those we have here in Canada.  This is why the Germans used Shilo, the British used Suffield, and NATO trained in Goose Bay.  

We in Canada have the opposite.  Smaller population.  Large tracts of open land.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The accountants also saw that the land values of the bases like Work point in Victoria was quite significant and the political pressure to sell them off so they could be developed was significant. The right people got rich, the money received went into general revenue and likely DND got stuck with the cleanup costs. A win-win for everyone but DND. Local municipalities are doing the same with schools because of demographics, but some wise souls are pointing out "So what happens when the demographics swing back again?"


----------



## Kirkhill

Drew has a point though.

Part of it is "how do you train (what facilities are required, where, when and for how long)?"  Part of it is, when the Brits say next door,  they would probably be ecstatic to be as close to Wainwright and Suffield as Edmonton is.  Or even Calgary was.  Or Winnipeg was to Shilo, Ottawa to Pet....

Moving troops 6 hours over asphalt should not be a major logistical/planning problem.

Also, determining what can be effectively taught on-line, what can be taught in class rooms, what is necessary to train muscle memory, how long and what it takes to perform Tests Of Effective Training,  all of that is not only critical to the Reg Forces but it is also critical to how Alternate Forces (Militia/Reserves/Homeguard/National Guard/Look-Dook-Vanish) can be raised and effectively integrated into a National Defence plan.

It also would open up the question of which ranks/trades are actually training 2000 hours per year - and how they are employed when not engaged in training.  

2000 hours a year is, of course 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year.  It is also 83 days or 12 weeks a year - or a Basic Military Training course in most of the world.  After the soldier has put in his 2000 in the field on ex or on course - why does he/she need to be in Garrison?  That soldier has earned his annual salary.

All that I would require of him/her is that they show up ready to fight when the telephone rings.


----------



## quadrapiper

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Our concept of Reserves does not exist in the French Army.  The Reserve Coy's in French Army Regiments are former professional soldiers that agree to remain in the army on a part time basis when they finish their contract.


A variation of the French system seems like something that the local NRD or reserve regiment platoon might be able to take on, if the CAF wanted to get somewhat better value out of the Supp Res.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Drew has a point though.
> 
> Part of it is "how do you train (what facilities are required, where, when and for how long)?"  Part of it is, when the Brits say next door,  they would probably be ecstatic to be as close to Wainwright and Suffield as Edmonton is.  Or even Calgary was.  Or Winnipeg was to Shilo, Ottawa to Pet....
> 
> Moving troops 6 hours over asphalt should not be a major logistical/planning problem.
> 
> Also, determining what can be effectively taught on-line, what can be taught in class rooms, what is necessary to train muscle memory, how long and what it takes to perform Tests Of Effective Training,  all of that is not only critical to the Reg Forces but it is also critical to how Alternate Forces (Militia/Reserves/Homeguard/National Guard/Look-Dook-Vanish) can be raised and effectively integrated into a National Defence plan.
> 
> It also would open up the question of which ranks/trades are actually training 2000 hours per year - and how they are employed when not engaged in training.
> 
> 2000 hours a year is, of course 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year.  It is also 83 days or 12 weeks a year - or a Basic Military Training course in most of the world.  After the soldier has put in his 2000 in the field on ex or on course - why does he/she need to be in Garrison?  That soldier has earned his annual salary.
> 
> All that I would require of him/her is that they show up ready to fight when the telephone rings.



This is my point, DND/Government made a choice to largely abandon urban garrisons, a choice it now has to live with.  A French style Reserve system could work in Canada, if we still garrisoned cities, we don't though so it's a non-starter.

A road move to a training area doesn't have to be purely administrative either, you could incorporate this sort of thing in to your exercises, you could even set your echelons up to reflect the distances you need to cover from garrison to the training area.  A good way to exercise the sustainment piece.

Neither way of doing business is right or wrong, each has it's own advantages and disadvantages associated with it.  It's up to the government, based off recommendations from TB, Cabinet, DND, etc... to determine which one works best for us.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Bird Gunner:
> 
> Just remember that when planning a larger, rapidly deployable force we have to figure on having the means available to rapidly deploy said larger force.   And I still can't figure out whose job that is.



That's why we have CONPLAN Jupiter, 1 Cdn Div HQ, etc. Realistically, we need the regular force to be ready to deploy roto 0 and could at best expect reservists to augment on a roto 1/roto 2 basis. Equipment and the training for increasingly advanced equipment requires more time than reservists are going to have available for them to become effective on without significant work up training. We maintain reserve structures whose concept comes from the mass armies of the 1850's and was optimized to produce semi-trained labour to provide numbers (such as the Prussian conscription system). Mass conscript armies no longer exist, so the reserves need to be tailored to tasks that they can handle without major training time investments (DOMOPs, one for one augmentation, etc).


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> This is my point, DND/Government made a choice to largely abandon urban garrisons, a choice it now has to live with.  A French style Reserve system could work in Canada, if we still garrisoned cities, we don't though so it's a non-starter.



We already have 'urban garrisons'. They are called _Armouries _in which we train reservists.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We already have 'urban garrisons'. They are called _Armouries _in which we train reservists.



Once upon a time in the fabled village of Gagetown a Warrant Officer of gentle demeanour was kind enough to instruct me in the difference between cleaning and cleaned.

Just because I had spent two hours a night every night for a week cleaning the floor brass in an H-block did not mean that I had cleaned said floor brass.

Armouries are indeed places where training occurs.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We already have 'urban garrisons'. They are called _Armouries _in which we train reservists.



Apologies, I should have said "Urban Regulars"  

Side note:  Today I learned the value of having Class B Reservists in a specialist role.  The corporate knowledge they bring to the table having spent years in the same position is something we don't leverage enough of.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Apologies, I should have said "Urban Regulars"
> 
> Side note:  Today I learned the value of having Class B Reservists in a specialist role.  The corporate knowledge they bring to the table having spent years in the same position is something we don't leverage enough of.



And maybe there's a good role for the reserves: preserving specialist skills put at risk by the political flavour of the month approach that is inflicted upon our poor beleaguered Reg F colleagues.

We'll take the Mortar Platoons...  ;D


----------



## PPCLI Guy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Side note:  Today I learned the value of having Class B Reservists in a specialist role.  The corporate knowledge they bring to the table having spent years in the same position is something we don't leverage enough of.



Having been both the G3 and the COS of a Div, might I suggest that this is a double-edged sword.  Sometimes "corporate knowledge" is a euphemism for resistance to change, or for that matter work.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Having been both the G3 and the COS of a Div, might I suggest that this is a double-edged sword.  Sometimes "corporate knowledge" is a euphemism for resistance to change, or for that matter work.



Absolutely, which is why they should only "advise" and never be "in charge"


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Absolutely, which is why they should only "advise" and never be "in charge"



Our HR practises with regard to Class B staff are ridiculous. There are people who have been Class B SNCOs and Capts/Majs for decades in the same HQ. Sometimes in the same jobs.

You can smell the festering miasma as you approach the Bde HQ building.

There needs to be a policy of regularly turning over the people in these positions so they don't go bad, like many are now. They are generally completely unemployable in civvie street, marginally useful in Class B Commando Land, so why keep them in the Mo'?


----------



## PPCLI Guy

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There needs to be a policy of regularly turning over the people in these positions so they don't go bad, like many are now. They are generally completely unemployable in civvie street, marginally useful in Class B Commando Land, so why keep them in the Mo'?



Yup.  As I told my "double dippers" in 2011, you are the people who couldn't get a job.........................in Edmonton in full boom time.

Bubbye.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Yup.  As I told my "double dippers" in 2011, you are the people who couldn't get a job.........................in Edmonton in full boom time.
> 
> Bubbye.



Now we are talking about something different though.  You're talking about a Div/Area HQ and in that case I fully agree with you, there is no good reason to have a Class B Reservist working in those organizations. 

When I say specialists, I'm really speaking about places like Army Doctrine, CALWC, CFWC, etc... Where Corporate knowledge goes a long way in helping with development because it allows for the accumulation of intellectual currency, sort of like an encyclopedia of sorts that a chief/comd can draw from.

There are some advantages to using Class B folks in these organizations.  Note that I also said they should never be "in charge" and should only be used in a staff and advisory role.


----------



## little jim

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> There are some advantages to using Class B folks in these organizations.  Note that I also said they should never be "in charge" and should only be used in a staff and advisory role.



I don't think we would ever have that worry. From having watched this thread over the past couple of years I sense a prevailing mood of cutting the amount of HQ. In particular reserve HQ down to the bn/rest level. 

This is a bit of a tangent but if we cut all these HQ we would no doubt realize a savings that we could re-invest in the armoury floor. But at some point we have to consider that as a reservist I have to commit/donate/give all of what my real job considers my free time to the reserves. Yeah my job might not care about what I do on the weekends but my wife sure does. Now if we can all of these HQ positions that take away from the real essence of the reserves; well why pray tell would I want to join an organization that I have to devote all of my free time to, at the expense of my family, full well knowing that if I do get trained after five or six years as an officer, slightly more as an NCM, I am going to be out of a job?  

What kind of people are we going to get?  Those similar to the above mentioned that couldn't find a job in the boom times?

So I don't think having class b people in charge is an issue.....


----------



## Kirkhill

little jim said:
			
		

> I don't think we would ever have that worry. From having watched this thread over the past couple of years I sense a prevailing mood of cutting the amount of HQ. In particular reserve HQ down to the bn/rest level.
> 
> This is a bit of a tangent but if we cut all these HQ we would no doubt realize a savings that we could re-invest in the armoury floor. But at some point we have to consider that as a reservist I have to commit/donate/give all of what my real job considers my free time to the reserves. _*Yeah my job might not care about what I do on the weekends but my wife sure does*_. .....



Amen brother.


----------



## Infanteer

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Now we are talking about something different though.  You're talking about a Div/Area HQ and in that case I fully agree with you, there is no good reason to have a Class B Reservist working in those organizations.
> 
> When I say specialists, I'm really speaking about places like Army Doctrine, CALWC, CFWC, etc... Where Corporate knowledge goes a long way in helping with development because it allows for the accumulation of intellectual currency, sort of like an encyclopedia of sorts that a chief/comd can draw from.



Sorry RoyalDrew, but the "but HQ X is special" approach is how we get big HQs - everyone demands exceptions.  If places like Army Doctrine had an accumulation of intellectual currency, perhaps we'd have an Infantry Battalion manual that has been updated since the end of the Cold War.  If a reservists wants to stay in Kingston for 10 years working full time in CADTC, maybe they should join the Reg Force?


----------



## Gunplumber

I had 10 years in the regs as a Wpns Tech. I took the FRP in 95. A few years later I tried to get back in to the same trade, they told me it would take a year. I gave up. In 2010 I applied to go Int Op. They called me a couple of months ago (5 years later)with an offer, I had a choice but course was in a month, I told them I was class B and had to give my 30 days. They said tough luck. I gave up. Yeah Im staying class B.


----------



## MedCorps

I am not sure if this is the thread to post this in, but mod's feel free to move if I have put in the wrong spot. 

So, about 2 months ago I met this guy at a party who is a "professional" organizational management / change consultant with a big well known firm.  Essentially corporations hire him to "reorganize and re-engineer" their organizations to make them more productive, cost effective, reduce redundancy, etc. Turned out to be a pretty cool dude.  After a few drinks I told him that his ultimate challenge would be to sort out the CAF Reserve structure.  He said, he could figure it out in a week.  I laughed and said you could not even figure out the 4 Cdn Div Res F in a week. I laughed more when he asked what a division was.  

So he decided to take up the challenge, just screwing around. Now, this guy is a processional organizational design guy, but knows nothing about the military, other than his brother was in Air Cadets 15 years ago.  I reckoned that would be the last of him until Monday when I got an e-mail asking a bunch of questions, including big ones like, "Is CFDS still your organizations guiding document".  The only direction I gave him (other then giving him copies of the current ORBAT and CFDS) was that most Res F "Units" are really companies even though they looked like battalions on paper, that equipment like artillery pieces, and armoured vehicles are in short supply and that maintenance in the Res F is a bit of a nightmare.  Flash forward to Thursday he calls back, with questions about Service Support doctrine, emerging capabilities in the CA, the domestic role of the Res F and the Res F to Reg F interaction... I was then really interested to see what he came up with at this point. He also noted that the CBG structure is broken and of his initial assumptions was that Res F units would operate at the Coy level with maybe some Coy-to-Coy interaction but not train or deploy at the Bn or Bde level. He also noted the importance of force generating for the Reg F.  When he said that, I knew that he did some serious reading and was less delusional then many serving CAF members. 

So here it is... an outsiders look at how 4 Div would be restructured. This is a guy with no regimental knowledge or loyalties. Some of it is painful to see, some of it funny, and the vernacular is off in places, but it is somewhat tell-tale about how outsiders see the role of the Reserve Force and some neat out of the box ideas. I asked him questions on some of the rational, and he had reasonable rational for everything and a methodology If you want to know let me know and I will shoot him an e-mail. If this gets adopted ( ) we can send a cheque to KPMG.   

Ladies and Gents, the "New 4 Cdn Div"

*4 Cdn Div (Reserve Force)
*
*Royal Canadian Infantry Corps (5 x Light Inf Coy + Ceremonial Guard)*

The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto) 
-	1 x Light Inf Coy
-	Positions from QOR
-	Positions from 31 Sig Regt 
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough) 
-	1 x Light Inf Coy 
-	Transfers Toronto positions to The Royal Regiment of Canada
The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston) 
-	1 x Light Inf Coy
Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa) 
-	1 x Light Inf Coy
-	Receives positions from 31 CER 
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regt) (Burlington) 
-	1 x Light Inf Coy  
-	Transfers Hamilton positions to ASHCAN 
Ceremonial Guard (Ottawa)
	- 1 x Guard and Band 

*Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (2 x Armd Recce Sqn) *

The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
	- 1 x Armd Recce Sqn
The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
	- 1 x Armd Recce Sqn

*Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery  (3 x Arty Bty)*

11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Guelph)
-	1 x Artillery Bty
-	Hamilton positions transferred to ASHCAN 
30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Ottawa)
	- 1 x Artillery Bty
42nd Field Artillery Regiment (1 Air Defence Regiment, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), RCA (Pembroke)
-	1 x Artillery Bty

*The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers (1 x Fd Sqn, 1 x Eng Sp Tp, 1 x Const Tp)*

33 Combat Engineer Regiment (Orleans)
-	1 x Field Squadron 
-	Transfers Ottawa positions to GGFG
31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgin's) (St. Thomas, Waterloo)
-	Rerolled
-	1 x Engineering Support Troop
49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Construction Engineering Troop

*Intelligence Branch (3 x Int Coy, 1 x Met Coy)*

2 Intelligence Company (London)
-	1 x Int Coy
-	Toronto positions transferred to 7th Toronto Regiment, RCA
7 Intelligence Company (Ottawa)
-	1 x Int Coy
7th Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto)
-	Rerolled to Meteorological Coy 
-	1 x Met Coy 
The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC) (Aurora)
-	Rerolled to Int
-	1 x Int Coy 
-	Toronto positions transferred to 7 Fd RCA

*Royal Canadian Medical Service (5 x Med Coy, 1 x Amb Coy, 1 x FST)*

23 Field Ambulance (Hamilton)
	- Receives Positions from 31 Sig Regt  
	- 1 x Med Coy
	- 1 x Field Surgery Team  
25 Field Ambulance (Toronto)
	- Receives positions from 48th Highlanders of Canada\ 
-	1 x Med Coy
-	1 x Amb Coy  
28 Field Ambulance (Ottawa) 
-	1 x Med Coy 
1st Hussars (RCAC) (Sarnia)
-	Rerolled 
-	London positions transferred to 4 RCR
-	1 x Med Coy
4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (London, Stratford)
-	Rerolled 
-	Receives Personnel from 1st Hussars 
-	Receives personnel from 31 Svc Bn
-	1 x Med Coy 
48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
-	Removed from Order of Battle
-	Positions transferred to 25 Fd Amb 
31 Signal Regiment (Hamilton)
-	Removed from Order of Battle
-	Positions transferred to 23 Fd Amb 

*Royal Canadian Dental Corps (1 x Dent Coy)*

Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener) 
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Dental Coy 
*
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (1 x HQ & Sigs Sqn)*

33 Signal Regiment (Ottawa)
	- 1 x HQ & Sigs Sqn

*Logistics Branch (2 x S&T Coy, 1 x CS Tn Coy, 1 x GS Tn Pl, 1 x Ammo Coy, 1 x Postal Coy)
*
32 Service Battalion (Toronto)
	- 1 x Supply and Transport Company 
33 Service Battalion (North Bay)
-	1 x Supply and Transport Company 
-	Ottawa positions transferred to 33 Sig Regt 
-	Sault Ste. Marie positions transferred to 49 Fd RCA 
The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Close Support Transport Company 
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Heavy Transport Platoon 
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Ammunition and EOD Coy 
The Brockville Rifles (Brockville) 
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Postal Coy 
*
Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical Engineers  (6 x Maint Coy)*

The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
-	Rerolled
-	1 x Maint Coy 
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's) (Hamilton)
-	Rerolled 
-	Receives positions from 31 Svc Bn, RHLI and 11 Fd RCA
-	1 x Maint Coy 
The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Maint Coy 
The Algonquin Regiment (Timmins)
-	Rerolled 
-	North Bay positions transferred to 33 Svc Bn
-	1 x Maint Coy 
2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Maint Coy 
31 Service Battalion (Windsor)
-	Rerolled
-	Hamilton positions transferred to ASHCAN 
-	London positions transferred to 4 RCR
-	1 x Maint Coy 
*
Influence Activities Capability  (3 x IA Coy) *

The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Duke of Edinburgh's Own) (Ottawa)
-	Rerolled
-	1 x IA Coy
The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Queen Elizabeth, The Queen Mother's Own) (Mississauga)
-	Rerolled 
-	Toronto Personnel Transferred to 32 CER 
-	1 x IA Coy  
32 Combat Engineer Regiment (Toronto)
-	Rerolled 
-	Receives Personnel from Toronto Scottish 
	- 1 x IA Coy

*Foreign Military Training Capability  (1 x FMT Coy)*

The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
-	Rerolled
-	Windsor positions to Windsor Regiment  
-	1 x FMT Coy 

*Recruiting Capability (1 x Recruiting Coy)*

31 Signals Regiment (Borden) 
-	Rerolled 
-	1 x Division Recruiting Platoon 

*Military Police Branch (2 x MP Coy) *

The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
-	Rerolled 
-	Received positions from 56th Fd RCA 
-	1 x MP Coy 
56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe)
-	Rerolled 
-	St. Catherines positions transferred to Lincoln and Welland 
-	1 x MP Coy 


MC


----------



## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> I am not sure if this is the thread to post this in, but mod's feel free to move if I have put in the wrong spot.
> 
> So, about 2 months ago I met this guy at a party who is a "professional" organizational management / change consultant with a big well known firm.  Essentially corporations hire him to "reorganize and re-engineer" their organizations to make them more productive, cost effective, reduce redundancy, etc. Turned out to be a pretty cool dude.  After a few drinks I told him that his ultimate challenge would be to sort out the CAF Reserve structure.  He said, he could figure it out in a week.  I laughed and said you could not even figure out the 4 Cdn Div Res F in a week. I laughed more when he asked what a division was.
> 
> So he decided to take up the challenge, just screwing around. Now, this guy is a processional organizational design guy, but knows nothing about the military, other than his brother was in Air Cadets 15 years ago.  I reckoned that would be the last of him until Monday when I got an e-mail asking a bunch of questions, including big ones like, "Is CFDS still your organizations guiding document".  The only direction I gave him (other then giving him copies of the current ORBAT and CFDS) was that most Res F "Units" are really companies even though they looked like battalions on paper, that equipment like artillery pieces, and armoured vehicles are in short supply and that maintenance in the Res F is a bit of a nightmare.  Flash forward to Thursday he calls back, with questions about Service Support doctrine, emerging capabilities in the CA, the domestic role of the Res F and the Res F to Reg F interaction... I was then really interested to see what he came up with at this point.
> 
> So here it is... an outsiders look at how 4 Div would be restructured. This is a guy with no regimental knowledge or loyalties. Some of it is painful to see, some of it funny, and the vernacular is off in places, but it is somewhat tell-tale about how outsiders see the role of the Reserve Force and some neat out of the box ideas. I asked him questions on some of the rational, and he had reasonable rational for everything and a methodology If you want to know let me know and I will shoot him an e-mail. If this gets adopted ( ) we can send a cheque to KPMG.
> 
> Ladies and Gents, the "New 4 Cdn Div"
> 
> *4 Cdn Div (Reserve Force)
> *
> *Royal Canadian Infantry Corps (5 x Light Inf Coy + Ceremonial Guard)*
> 
> The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> -	1 x Light Inf Coy
> -	Positions from QOR
> -	Positions from 31 Sig Regt
> The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> -	1 x Light Inf Coy
> -	Transfers Toronto positions to The Royal Regiment of Canada
> The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> -	1 x Light Inf Coy
> Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> -	1 x Light Inf Coy
> -	Receives positions from 31 CER
> The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regt) (Burlington)
> -	1 x Light Inf Coy
> -	Transfers Hamilton positions to ASHCAN
> Ceremonial Guard (Ottawa)
> - 1 x Guard and Band
> 
> *Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (2 x Armd Recce Sqn) *
> 
> The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> - 1 x Armd Recce Sqn
> The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> - 1 x Armd Recce Sqn
> 
> *Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery  (3 x Arty Bty)*
> 
> 11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Guelph)
> -	1 x Artillery Bty
> -	Hamilton positions transferred to ASHCAN
> 30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Ottawa)
> - 1 x Artillery Bty
> 42nd Field Artillery Regiment (1 Air Defence Regiment, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), RCA (Pembroke)
> -	1 x Artillery Bty
> 
> *The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers (1 x Fd Sqn, 1 x Eng Sp Tp, 1 x Const Tp)*
> 
> 33 Combat Engineer Regiment (Orleans)
> -	1 x Field Squadron
> -	Transfers Ottawa positions to GGFG
> 31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgin's) (St. Thomas, Waterloo)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Engineering Support Troop
> 49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Construction Engineering Troop
> 
> *Intelligence Branch (3 x Int Coy, 1 x Met Coy)*
> 
> 2 Intelligence Company (London)
> -	1 x Int Coy
> -	Toronto positions transferred to 7th Toronto Regiment, RCA
> 7 Intelligence Company (Ottawa)
> -	1 x Int Coy
> 7th Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto)
> -	Rerolled to Meteorological Coy
> -	1 x Met Coy
> The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC) (Aurora)
> -	Rerolled to Int
> -	1 x Int Coy
> -	Toronto positions transferred to 7 Fd RCA
> 
> *Royal Canadian Medical Service (5 x Med Coy, 1 x Amb Coy, 1 x FST)*
> 
> 23 Field Ambulance (Hamilton)
> - Receives Positions from 31 Sig Regt
> - 1 x Med Coy
> - 1 x Field Surgery Team
> 25 Field Ambulance (Toronto)
> - Receives positions from 48th Highlanders of Canada\
> -	1 x Med Coy
> -	1 x Amb Coy
> 28 Field Ambulance (Ottawa)
> -	1 x Med Coy
> 1st Hussars (RCAC) (Sarnia)
> -	Rerolled
> -	London positions transferred to 4 RCR
> -	1 x Med Coy
> 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (London, Stratford)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Receives Personnel from 1st Hussars
> -	Receives personnel from 31 Svc Bn
> -	1 x Med Coy
> 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> -	Removed from Order of Battle
> -	Positions transferred to 25 Fd Amb
> 31 Signal Regiment (Hamilton)
> -	Removed from Order of Battle
> -	Positions transferred to 23 Fd Amb
> 
> *Royal Canadian Dental Corps (1 x Dent Coy)*
> 
> Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Dental Coy
> *
> Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (1 x HQ & Sigs Sqn)*
> 
> 33 Signal Regiment (Ottawa)
> - 1 x HQ & Sigs Sqn
> 
> *Logistics Branch (2 x S&T Coy, 1 x CS Tn Coy, 1 x GS Tn Pl, 1 x Ammo Coy, 1 x Postal Coy)
> *
> 32 Service Battalion (Toronto)
> - 1 x Supply and Transport Company
> 33 Service Battalion (North Bay)
> -	1 x Supply and Transport Company
> -	Ottawa positions transferred to 33 Sig Regt
> -	Sault Ste. Marie positions transferred to 49 Fd RCA
> The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Close Support Transport Company
> Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Heavy Transport Platoon
> The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Ammunition and EOD Coy
> The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Postal Coy
> *
> Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical Engineers  (6 x Maint Coy)*
> 
> The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's) (Hamilton)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Receives positions from 31 Svc Bn, RHLI and 11 Fd RCA
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> The Algonquin Regiment (Timmins)
> -	Rerolled
> -	North Bay positions transferred to 33 Svc Bn
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> 2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> 31 Service Battalion (Windsor)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Hamilton positions transferred to ASHCAN
> -	London positions transferred to 4 RCR
> -	1 x Maint Coy
> *
> Influence Activities Capability  (3 x IA Coy) *
> 
> The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Duke of Edinburgh's Own) (Ottawa)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x IA Coy
> The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Queen Elizabeth, The Queen Mother's Own) (Mississauga)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Toronto Personnel Transferred to 32 CER
> -	1 x IA Coy
> 32 Combat Engineer Regiment (Toronto)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Receives Personnel from Toronto Scottish
> - 1 x IA Coy
> 
> *Foreign Military Training Capability  (1 x FMT Coy)*
> 
> The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Windsor positions to Windsor Regiment
> -	1 x FMT Coy
> 
> *Recruiting Capability (1 x Recruiting Coy)*
> 
> 31 Signals Regiment (Borden)
> -	Rerolled
> -	1 x Division Recruiting Platoon
> 
> *Military Police Branch (2 x MP Coy) *
> 
> The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> -	Rerolled
> -	Received positions from 56th Fd RCA
> -	1 x MP Coy
> 56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe)
> -	Rerolled
> -	St. Catherines positions transferred to Lincoln and Welland
> -	1 x MP Coy
> 
> 
> MC



So after he shook your hand, did you check to see if you still had your wrist watch?  ;D


----------



## MedCorps

His wrist watch was much, much nicer then mine will ever be!


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sorry RoyalDrew, but the "but HQ X is special" approach is how we get big HQs - everyone demands exceptions.  If places like Army Doctrine had an accumulation of intellectual currency, perhaps we'd have an Infantry Battalion manual that has been updated since the end of the Cold War.  If a reservists wants to stay in Kingston for 10 years working full time in CADTC, maybe they should join the Reg Force?


If they want a decade in Kingston, maybe they should join the PS.


----------



## McG

MedCorps said:
			
		

> Ladies and Gents, the "New 4 Cdn Div"


Some quick thoughts & questions:
What does a PRes Postal Coy do?
6 x Maint Coys sounds very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective.
What does a PRes Ammo Coy do?
5 x Med Coys also sound very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective, and these are not Army Reserve.
3 x Int Coys sounds like overkill (especially beside only 5 x Rifle Coys).
Does the proposed Ceremonial Guard consist of more than a year round planning staff that is filled-out in the summer?
The Army Reserve does not have Construction Engineers.  Like maintainers, this is difficult to support from a skills/training perspective.
What does a Engr Sp Tp do in the Reserve?  Is this Hy Eqpt, ROWPU, a bridge train or something else?
What does a PRes Dental Coy do?  It would not be Army Reserve if it were to exist.
What do 3x IA Coys do?
What does a Foreign Military Training Coy do?
What does a Recruiting Coy do (especially when concentrated in a single geographic location)?


----------



## Old Sweat

MCG

Indeed, this order of battle seems predicated on providing what? Could it mobilize a what? How many individual augmentees could it produce for a prolonged operation with several rotos?


----------



## Kirkhill

MedCorps said:
			
		

> His wrist watch was much, much nicer then mine will ever be!



MedCorps - the role of the consultant is to look at your watch and tell you what the time is....

Isn't that right D&B?  >


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Pardon my ignorance, as I confess here being a seaman, but ... a whole company of meteorologists??? WTF ???

I mean Metoc Halifax and Esquimalt each keep tab on the weather over half the planet, with a staff of about 15 each.

Is there something I don't get here ?


----------



## Old Sweat

The Met Company would probably provide ballistic met detachments to the artillery, including down to the detached troop level. I am not competent to state an opinion whether it is required or not, as I practiced my gunnery in the fifties to the seventies.


----------



## MedCorps

So I got the first batch of answers with the promise to have the rest tomorrow.  Here is what I have: 

---START---

*Indeed, this order of battle seems predicated on providing what? Could it mobilize a what? How many individual augmentees could it produce for a prolonged operation with several rotos?*
---

This organizational structure is predicated on:
1) providing a qualified individual back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave 
2) generating (mobilizing) section to platoon (max) level formations for exercises and possibly deployments 
3) generating (mobilizing) platoon level formations of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks. If you get more then a platoon to respond to the call-out for a domestic crisis then great, but plan on a platoon (30% +/-) of your Coy-sized unit. I am under the impression that many reservists are in critical jobs (police, fire, etc) and cannot respond as part of the Res F requirement and/or cannot just drop their normal jobs (doctor, CEO, self-employed) to run off at no-notice when the reserves are called out domestically. I could be wrong.  

The Res F needs to get away from the concept that it will deploy or exercise anything larger than a platoon.

How many individual augmentees can this structure provide for prolonged rotos?.  Excellent question.  How many can the current 4 Cdn Div produce? Does anyone really know? Seems like an unmeasurable metric. 

---*
•	6 x Maint Coys sounds very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective.*
---

This is to address what I am told is a problem, the Res F having to rely totally on the Reg F for equipment maintenance and being the "poor step-brother".  A Maint Coy would ideally attract people with civilian vocational training in the field they are employed in the reserve. They would concentrate on vehicle repair, towing operations and weapons repair. Maybe less comprehensive occupations need to be made for Res F versus Reg F in these areas.  

The coy tasks would be: 

1) provide qualified maintenance individuals to back-fill or augment the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave. Especially in the summer. 

2) Field two or three of each vehicle repair, tow truck, weapons repair teams (I have seen these referred to as light aid detachments / mobile repair teams) for exercise or deployment.

3) Provide support to other reserve units in garrison. Especially for the Maint Coys in Windsor (Close Support Tn Coy) and Hamilton (Medical Unit), but also for other units where weapons and vehicles could be sent.  

4) Provide support to the EME School / Base EME for the Maint Coy in Barrie. 

I find it odd that Maint is grouped with Log in the Service Bn in the current Res F structure. They seem to get forgotten about in the Res F because of this (I suspect most of the Svc Bns are led by Logistics Officers).  They need to be separated out.  I was also amazed by the training lengths to get someone qualified.  I do not know the answer to this, but someone needs to figure this out if Maint is going to work in the Res F.  

---
*•	Does the proposed Ceremonial Guard consist of more than a year round planning staff that is filled-out in the summer?*
---

I did not know that CG was not full all year. Their website is misleading. I would suggest they have a standing cadre and standing full ceremonial band for NCR use (there must be all sorts of functions in the capital) and then fill out the guard and band for the busy summer season. Maybe by having a standing band, redundancy could be found in the Ottawa Reg F band?   

----
*•	What does a Recruiting Coy do (especially when concentrated in a single geographic location)? *
---

Should have read Recruiting Platoon, my error. A 4 Div HQ asset.  Co-located with your National Recruiting HQ. They are personnel dedicated (part-time) to respond to shortfall in units. They design and distribute targeted regional advertising within the 4 Div area. Can do roadshows on the weekends (Lots of units within a 3 hour radius of Borden), again in a targeted manner. The backup to the unit recruiting cell. For instance, the Maint Coy Sudbury short mechanics?  Then they would come up with a solution to target mechanic students at the local community college and licensed mechanics in local heavy equipment shops.  MP Coy needs recruits, they would target police officers in Brantford / Simcoe / St Catharine's / Welland and those people in similar type civilian occupations.  They would also run yearly(?) training for unit recruiting staff in 4 Div. The Pl would be made up of people who have worked in the National Recruiting HQ or in a Recruiting Centre, Personnel Selection Officers, or who have training in civilian media, social media, marketing, graphic design or advertising.  
---

Looking forward to replying more.  Thank you for the interest.  I hope I have not offended anyone.  This has been educational (and fun) for me!  

--- END ---

Cheers, 

MC


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> MedCorps - the role of the consultant is to look at your watch and tell you what the time is....
> 
> Isn't that right D&B?  >



Yes. And then give it back to you broken


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Yes. And then give it back to you broken



I generally prefer to leave it on the client's wrist - maybe that is why KPMG charges more.


----------



## MedCorps

The next round of answers.  More to follow as he missed some of the questions and I reminded him. 

I have done a little editing for format and clarity. 

MC. 

---START---

----
*•	What does a PRes Postal Coy do?*
----

A Res F Postal Coy: 

1) provides qualified postal clerks / officers (?) to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  Especially during the summer employment period. 

2) generating (mobilizing) up to three mobile military post offices for larger exercises and deployments. I suspect these are not large organizations in terms of personnel requirement.  It is my impression from some of my reading that the Reg F is starting to civilianize the military postal system and the Res F might help that process along.  

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brockville area. 

4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their civilian or military postal system post crisis or improve an existing postal system (delivery networks, parcel services, mail processing, physical delivery, customer engagement, commercial products and government postal policy). It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. Canada Post is not in a position to deploy employees overseas (especially where unlimited liability is a factor) despite being part of the "Whole of Government" approach to global engagement. 

---
*•	What does a PRes Ammo Coy do?*
---

1) provides qualified ammunition technicians / ammunition officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave and mat-pat leave. 

2) generating (mobilizing) a field ammo storage team and up to three EOD teams.

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area. 

4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their military ammunition storage system. It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. 

5) generating subject matter experts for deployment to teach civilians (especially children) in post-conflict area of the risks of mines and un-exploded munitions.  

6) Consideration could be given to establishing a standing ammo storage facility for the large number of Res F units in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area.  This would be run by this Res F Coy and would save the drive to Borden. 

---
*•	5 x Med Coys also sound very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective, and these are not Army Reserve.
*---

They should be Army Reserve.  Not having your field medical support owned and tasked by the Army is strange. Not having some dedicated garrison medical support for the Res F is counter-productive given the business hours of the Res F vs. Reg F.  These Med Coys are all in areas where there are medical / nursing or paramedic schools (McMaster, U of O, U of T, Western).  Recruiting would be targeted on these civilian professionals. These units would also provide medical screening support to Res F units in area (or via a mobile road show) to conduct medical screening (which I am told the Reg F does poorly for the Res F). Deployment of these folks (like the recent Ebola) thing I think will be on the rise as part of the GoC “global engagement” movement.   

---
•	3 x Int Coys sounds like overkill (especially beside only 5 x Rifle Coys).
---

Units are not linked like they are now, so do not use ratios like 3 Int Coys to 5 Light Inf Coys as it does not matter as they will never deploy as a Bde. I read that the ASIC / Army Intelligence Regiment concept is the rage and it seems like the Reg F is sucking positions away from the combat arms to staff these large organizations.  Having 3 x Int Coys could help offset these Reg F position shifts.  It also seems like military intelligence world is well suited for reservists who may have a number of civilian occupations / education that would be useful to the military on a part-time basis.  

---
*•	The Army Reserve does not have Construction Engineers.  Like maintainers, this is difficult to support from a skills/training perspective.*
---
I think they should have a Troop of these guys. It seems like a hole in the current establishment. 30 guys who do the skilled trades in their civilian Brick and Stone Mason, General Carpenter, Plumber, etc Monday to Friday then you would just need to learn and master the solider and leadership skills and learn the army way of doing construction engineering. Two weeks of training in the summer could be spent working on a base, etc learning the organizational culture while still doing your trade. 

---
*•	What does a Engr Sp Tp do in the Reserve?  Is this Hy Eqpt, ROWPU, a bridge train or something else?*
---

1) provides qualified combat engineers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave. 

2) generating (mobilizing) a ROWPU for exercises and deployments.  

3) generating (mobilizing) a section of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Waterloo / St Thomas area. 

4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using civil-engineering. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. 
This Tp has a foot print in Waterloo which has a big engineering school.  

---
•	What does a PRes Dental Coy do?  It would not be Army Reserve if it were to exist.
---

They should be Army Reserve.  Not having field dental support currently owned Army is strange. It is also strange that Res F personnel do not get Reg F dental support when dental fitness is required for deployment I am told. 

1) provides qualified dental technicians to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  You will never get a dentist to leave their civilian practice to do back-fill, especially given the rates of Res F pay. 

2) generating (mobilizing) three mobile dental clinics for exercises and deployments.  These mobile clinics could also visit Res F units in 4 Cdn Div to conduct periodic dental examinations (and minor repairs) for Res F personnel. 

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Cambridge / Kitchener area.  

4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using dentistry. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. 

---END---


----------



## Kirkhill

MedCorps - It sounds like your contact took CFDS to heart - and also appears to be reacting to what could be described as an "anything but bullets" foreign policy.


----------



## FJAG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Indeed, this order of battle seems predicated on providing what? Could it mobilize a what? How many individual augmentees could it produce for a prolonged operation with several rotos?



I haven't posted in this thread for some time but have been following it and the recent efforts that MedCorps and his "consultant" went through does show the problem you get into when self-acknowledged non-experts start playing numbers games - one ends up playing with details rather than setting out the fundamental principles that should apply.

Here's my shot at some principles:

1.  We need to acknowledge that we are not going to do World War 2 mobilization ever again and therefore we do not need 100 man battalions led by LCols and battalion staff. Whatever structure we adopt should as a starting point be based on fully manned and appropriately staffed establishments;

2.  We need to determine if, in the event of an operational deployment, we will, in appropriate circumstances, "call up" reservists or simply ask for volunteers. The actual structure of our total force will very much depend on determining this willingness and perhaps setting the threshold when we will use "call ups" (and making any legislative/regulatory adjustments necessary to make this process effective);

3.  The fundamental role of reservists should remain the concept of adding "breadth and depth" to the regular forces. "Breadth" constitutes providing individuals and units/subunits that do not exist as part of the regular forces; "Depth" constitutes providing additional individuals and units/subunits that already exist in the regular force but which may be in insufficient numbers or to provide casualty replacement or follow on rotations;

4.  There needs to be a realistic appraisal of what branches of the military should be regular, reserve or mixed units based on the likelihood they will need to be immediately deployed. As an example, there is only a moderate need within our peace-time army for armoured crewman or artillerymen as in most situations they will not deploy immediately. On the other hand, a standing force of various infantry battalions seem necessary for rapid deployment. In my mind this leads to several likely scenarios:

4a.  Rapid deployment forces need all their organic elements as part of the regular force (for example infantry battalions need their integral mortars and service support. If we accept compulsory call-up then some of these can be reservists, but if so should they should be hat-badged and be on the establishment of the battalion);

4b.  Follow on combat forces such as armoured, artillery and engineer regiments should most likely be mixed organizations with core leadership and technically advanced skills being regular force while the remained are reservists. (again all personnel would be on strength so that the total of all regulars and reservists equal a full establishment);

4c.  Support forces (transport, maintenance, CIMIC, etc etc) need to be rigorously reviewed to determine those whose principle role is day-to-day support of the CF and those only required for operational deployments and designated regular or reserve as appropriate;

4d.  All forces, regular and reserve, designated for deployment purposes must be fully equipped. In this respect Canada must determine and designate what is the appropriate maximum force we will ever deploy operationally and acquire sufficient equipment for 1) deployment; 2) for casualty replacement; and 3) for an additional pool of training stocks;

4e.  Recruiting and manning for reservists should be above 100% of establishment level to allow for attrition and troops in basic training.

I think that will do for starters and re-rolling units and re-badging individuals can wait until those issues are settled. There are a few attitude adjustments necessary:

1.  The regular force needs to accept that they can't afford to protect their PY rice bowls much longer and that the only way to have an effective large scale force is to convert more of their massive regular force pay envelope for a more numerous, better equipped, and better trained reserve force;

2.  The regular force needs to re-evaluate training standards across the board. We've become so risk adverse that we've lost the concept of what a given soldier's "must knows, should knows, and could knows" actually are and how training should be delivered - reservists can spend significantly shorter durations on courses if we eliminate the chaff and train six days per week and 10-12 hours per day. 

3.  Reservists must accept that there will be an across the board reduction in units and re-badging and re-rolling. Fully manned units must be cap badged and uniformed the same (whether a western reserve infantry battalion has a company nicknamed the Calgary Highlanders is immaterial) - while there are initial morale issues in the short term eventually (after the old sweats die out - no pun intended OldSweat) the morale level of a fully formed and equipped battalion will far exceed that of our current situation.

My  :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## MedCorps

And the last installment 

MC

---START---

---
*•	What do 3x IA Coys do?
*---

I think the Army / Res F has done a poor job at developing the concept of Influence Activities. These organizations would do psychological operations, deception, public affairs and CIMIC for the Div. 


The IA Coy: 

1) provides IA NCOs and Officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  Especially during the summer employment period. 

2) each unit would generate (mobilizing) a tactical psychological operations team, public affairs team, CIMIC team and a small cadre of HQ Information Operations Coordinating Centre officers for exercises and deployments. 

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in their respective areas. 


---
*•	What does a Foreign Military Training Coy do?
*---

This unit would be specialists at training foreign armies in basic solider skills, a well defined list of specialty solider skills, and low-level NCO / Officer leadership. For specially solider skills I might suggest (stole from a US publication – driving training, section tactics, shooting, crew served weapons, first aid and sensitive site exploitation.) 

They are part of the GoC government of Canada engagement strategy.  It is a capability that I think is unique enough to warrant having a small cadre of dedicated personnel and a unique skills set not existing in the Army (it does seem like your SOF is doing a lot of this stuff though, even when the Army could do it if they had trained people).  These guys are not only experts at the skills they teach but experts at cultural engagement, use of interpreters, and evalating the requirement for foreign military assistance training. 

This Coy would be tasked to:

1) provide NCOs and Officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  They would concentrate backfill at your national leadership and recruit school, divisional training centre and national combat training centre.  

2) the unit would generate (mobilizing) a up to three training teams (Common Solider Skills, Leadership, Specialty Solider Skills) for deployments.

3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Chatham area.  
4) Assist in the running of Div weekend basic training and specialty soldier skill courses. 

---
*a whole company of meteorologists???
*---

Yes, a company.  

Well... meteorological technicians with a few meteorologists as officers (not sure if exist in the Reg F?). 

Remembering that you are likely only ever going to force generate for exercise / deployment three meteorological sections from this company.  These sections will provide meteorological data to artillery formations that requires it for the correction for firing and locating and in the ASICs.  

Otherwise it will provide individual augmentation to tri-service meteorological units, the meteorological school, ASICs, nuclear, biological chemical warfare coordinating centres, UAV operations, tactical helicopter units, and Reg F artillery units that hold standing meteorological sections. 

---END---


----------



## daftandbarmy

Well, Uncle Rick has it all figured out: we'll just become part of the CBSA

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-rick-hillier-refugees-military-christmas-1.3225732


At least we've got a chance for some PR coverage as part of their TV program  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> And the last installment
> 
> MC
> 
> ---START---
> 
> ---
> *•	What do 3x IA Coys do?
> *---
> 
> I think the Army / Res F has done a poor job at developing the concept of Influence Activities. These organizations would do psychological operations, deception, public affairs and CIMIC for the Div.
> 
> 
> The IA Coy:
> 
> 1) provides IA NCOs and Officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  Especially during the summer employment period.
> 
> 2) each unit would generate (mobilizing) a tactical psychological operations team, public affairs team, CIMIC team and a small cadre of HQ Information Operations Coordinating Centre officers for exercises and deployments.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in their respective areas.
> 
> 
> ---
> *•	What does a Foreign Military Training Coy do?
> *---
> 
> This unit would be specialists at training foreign armies in basic solider skills, a well defined list of specialty solider skills, and low-level NCO / Officer leadership. For specially solider skills I might suggest (stole from a US publication – driving training, section tactics, shooting, crew served weapons, first aid and sensitive site exploitation.)
> 
> They are part of the GoC government of Canada engagement strategy.  It is a capability that I think is unique enough to warrant having a small cadre of dedicated personnel and a unique skills set not existing in the Army (it does seem like your SOF is doing a lot of this stuff though, even when the Army could do it if they had trained people).  These guys are not only experts at the skills they teach but experts at cultural engagement, use of interpreters, and evalating the requirement for foreign military assistance training.
> 
> This Coy would be tasked to:
> 
> 1) provide NCOs and Officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  They would concentrate backfill at your national leadership and recruit school, divisional training centre and national combat training centre.
> 
> 2) the unit would generate (mobilizing) a up to three training teams (Common Solider Skills, Leadership, Specialty Solider Skills) for deployments.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Chatham area.
> 4) Assist in the running of Div weekend basic training and specialty soldier skill courses.
> 
> ---
> *a whole company of meteorologists???
> *---
> 
> Yes, a company.
> 
> Well... meteorological technicians with a few meteorologists as officers (not sure if exist in the Reg F?).
> 
> Remembering that you are likely only ever going to force generate for exercise / deployment three meteorological sections from this company.  These sections will provide meteorological data to artillery formations that requires it for the correction for firing and locating and in the ASICs.
> 
> Otherwise it will provide individual augmentation to tri-service meteorological units, the meteorological school, ASICs, nuclear, biological chemical warfare coordinating centres, UAV operations, tactical helicopter units, and Reg F artillery units that hold standing meteorological sections.
> 
> ---END---



So .I assume that you will now send him your invoice for the number of hours you have invested in replying to his asinine questions X $250 USD/ hour, right?  :nod:


----------



## a_majoor

It is pretty horrifying to see what a crapshow IA has become. While everyone acknowledges that IA as a concept and capability is useful and even decisive (see Russia, or ISIS for two top notch examples), IATF has essentially devolved to a training aid for the IA coys and the IA coys are like every other reserve "unit"; you never know who is showing up until you see who gets off the bus.

What is even worse is there seems to be no acknowledgement of lessons learned, for example in MR13 the coy was so ineffectual and virtually un integrated in the Bde, so we went all out to change how things were done for MR 14 (including setting up the IACC from IATF full time assets so we could train and integrate for virtually a full year before MR), which was successful, only to see 2 Div entirely disregard the lesson and set themselves up for failure in MR 15. An entirely different approach yet again seems to be in development for MR 16...

WRT how it should be done, I am looking at the UK's 77 Brigade, which has an almost 50/50 split between full and part time elements. The full time is important because this provides continuity and corporate knowledge, as well as a Roto 0 capability and the ability to undertake research and development of the capabilities. The part time elements provide the "surge" capabilities and manning for follow up Rotos. The 77 Bde model provides an outline as to how *we* could actually create an IA capability.

Of course we also need to _actually_ resource it and employ it (NO IA troops from IATF have deployed or are going to OP Impact or to support the activities in Ukraine, for example, and there was no representation in other post Afghanistan actions like Lybia, which means our skills and experience in using IA in a war fighting context is rapidly fading), and I see a danger in Canadian IA eventually becoming irrelevant in terms of being a "value added" organization for the CAF, despite the very real value IA adds to the modern battlespace.


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:
			
		

> Here's my shot at some principles:
> 
> 2.  We need to determine if, in the event of an operational deployment, we will, in appropriate circumstances, "call up" reservists or simply ask for volunteers. The actual structure of our total force will very much depend on determining this willingness and perhaps setting the threshold when we will use "call ups" (and making any legislative/regulatory adjustments necessary to make this process effective);


Is the Naval Reserve Division an alternate model worth considering - entirely force-generation, without even the pretense of being any kind of "field" or fighting formation?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> WRT how it should be done, I am looking at the UK's 77 Brigade, which has an almost 50/50 split between full and part time elements. The full time is important because this provides continuity and corporate knowledge, as well as a Roto 0 capability and the ability to undertake research and development of the capabilities. The part time elements provide the "surge" capabilities and manning for follow up Rotos. The 77 Bde model provides an outline as to how *we* could actually create an IA capability.



Yeah, like the CAF will sanction the stand up of a Canadian equivalent to the Neo-Chindits.  :

The 77th Brigade is a British Army formation, created in January 2015 under the Army 2020 concept.[3] It is the renaming of the Security Assistance Group which was created under the Army 2020 concept.[4][5] It is based at Denison Barracks in Hermitage, Berkshire and will be fully operational by April 2015.[6][7]

The brigade was named the 77th in tribute to the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, which was part of the Chindits, an Indian Army guerilla warfare force led by Orde Wingate who used unorthodox tactics against the Japanese in Burma in World War II. The arm badges of the revived 77th will show a mythical Burmese creature in reference to the Chindits.[6]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/77th_Brigade_(United_Kingdom)


----------



## MedCorps

It is interesting to note that the final composition of 77 (UK) Bde will be 53% Reserve (235 personnel). 

http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-02-25/225426/

MC


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Yeah, like the CAF will sanction the stand up of a Canadian equivalent to the Neo-Chindits.  :



Well that is really the point, isn't it. We can give as much lip service as we want to "enablers" and the capabilities they can bring to the table as we want (while resourcing an entire new "Brigade" HQ capability [CAEG]), or we could actually, you know, _resource the capability_ and use it.

Like I said, the way IA is being organized and employed right now does not create any "value added" to the CAF (and I am speaking from the inside of the beast), so if the powers that be are truly interested in maintaining and utilizing the capability and its effects, then they will have to bite the bullet and put some real time and effort and resources into this, or admit that they made a mistake and put a stake through its heart and rely on US CA and MISO and other allied powers to create these effects for us. 

Of course, that answer applies to virtually any of the capabilities of the Armed Forces in general, outside of mega HQ organizations...


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Well that is really the point, isn't it. We can give as much lip service as we want to "enablers" and the capabilities they can bring to the table as we want (while resourcing an entire new "Brigade" HQ capability [CAEG]), or we could actually, you know, _resource the capability_ and use it.
> 
> Like I said, the way IA is being organized and employed right now does not create any "value added" to the CAF (and I am speaking from the inside of the beast), so if the powers that be are truly interested in maintaining and utilizing the capability and its effects, then they will have to bite the bullet and put some real time and effort and resources into this, or admit that they made a mistake and put a stake through its heart and rely on US CA and MISO and other allied powers to create these effects for us.
> 
> Of course, that answer applies to virtually any of the capabilities of the Armed Forces in general, outside of mega HQ organizations...



You're right, of course.

Now, if we only had a proper Divisional/Corps/Army level organization that you could slot this capability into... hmmmm


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Is the Naval Reserve Division an alternate model worth considering - entirely force-generation, without even the pretense of being any kind of "field" or fighting formation?



I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.

The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle. 

The point I'm making is that the CF is ill serving Canada by continuing to hold on to a force structure whose major day to day expense is in providing for salary and benefits for a standing regular force that is not essential for the type of operations that Canada is likely to commit to day to day. Our operational deployments over the last half century have been few and it seems unlikely we will see another extensive effort like Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. We need to limit our standing forces to a moderately sized high readiness special operations force as well as a moderate sized roto 0 infantry force. The remaining deployable forces including all armour, artillery, engineers and service support should be a fully-equipped, well-trained part-time force with various full-time leaders and technical experts.

Unfortunately I'm pessimistic that the rice bowl holders in the CF will ever see the writing on the wall. They shouldn't forget that two of the three political parties vying for power only see us going on unarmed UN blue beret humanitarian missions. Maybe they'll get the point when the only full-time people within DND/CF are civilians. It's time for a radical change; the time of the death by a thousand cuts needs to stop.

 :cheers:


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.
> 
> The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.


Should have been clearer - meant for reserve units, due to the prevalence of individual augmentees. Consider the Regular unit the "ship."


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.
> 
> The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.
> 
> The point I'm making is that the CF is ill serving Canada by continuing to hold on to a force structure whose major day to day expense is in providing for salary and benefits for a standing regular force that is not essential for the type of operations that Canada is likely to commit to day to day. Our operational deployments over the last half century have been few and it seems unlikely we will see another extensive effort like Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. We need to limit our standing forces to a moderately sized high readiness special operations force as well as a moderate sized roto 0 infantry force. The remaining deployable forces including all armour, artillery, engineers and service support should be a fully-equipped, well-trained part-time force with various full-time leaders and technical experts.
> 
> Unfortunately I'm pessimistic that the rice bowl holders in the CF will ever see the writing on the wall. They shouldn't forget that two of the three political parties vying for power only see us going on unarmed UN blue beret humanitarian missions. Maybe they'll get the point when the only full-time people within DND/CF are civilians. It's time for a radical change; the time of the death by a thousand cuts needs to stop.
> 
> :cheers:



The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess.  My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft.


----------



## Jed

Colin P said:
			
		

> The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess.  My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft.



Isn't that the truth? I think we all should keep our wits about us and be prepared to engage on short notice to move.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.
> ...



You know, I am not sure that "equipping the man" actually does still clearly define the modern army.  More and more we seem to be "manning the equipment" - be it crew served man portable weapons, artillery pieces, tanks, recce vehicles, trucks, communications systems and don't forget HQs and ASICs and drones and radars and assorted sensors.   We actually have very few "men" to equip in the sense that Sam Hughes would have understood the concept.    Equipping the man is useful shorthand when you are talking about about an infantry army supplemented by mounted rifles on horse back.    

MedCorps' guy is onto something.  We keep talking about the need to support the forces in being (I don't mean red tshirts and yellow ribbons here) and it is those same missing support elements that are most often missing from disaster zones and third world armies.  Those "soft" assets can buy us a lot of street creds, while working with other armies would build up our experience levels while also minimizing the physical and political risks and the loss of blood.  The counter-vailing proposition is the we would have to expend more treasure.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess.  My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft.



I'm fully in agreement with you but, politically speaking, if there is one thing that the Afghan experience has done is made us more timid in responding. ISIS is arguably a greater threat internationally than the Taliban ever were but look at our (and the international community's) current tepid response. Same for the Ukraine. I really agree with you that at some point in the future, we will have to become involved with a more credible forces than we are capable of generating today and that we should take the opportunity of the pause that we have right now to figure out how to do that.

I think that we are all agreed that our current level of defence spending is inadequate. Most people on this board (as well as NATO) is advocating for Canada to increase defence spending. I don't believe that increased spending is a realistic possibility even if we were to re-elect another Conservative majority. 

For me the math is very simple: if we want to have more people, better equipment and a deployable, trained organization then we need to find that money within current funding levels and the only way that I can see to do that is to replace a large number of the people who are paid 365 days per year with ones that are paid 60 - 90 days per year. 

There is no doubt that such a reserve heavy deployable field force concept comes with challenges BUT the biggest challenge is simply accepting that such a concept change is essential. All other challenges that need to be faced in making a reserve heavy force an effective one are comparably small once the need to move to such a system is recognized. 

The Conservatives have pledged an increase in the reserve force by 5,000. That's an interesting move in itself showing that they do recognized a need for more forces. The trouble in my mind is that with our current military bureaucracy's inertia favouring a reg centric system, such increases will be paid for out of existing, or slightly augmented, funds leaving reserve equipment and training standards most probably worse than they are now. 

Remember that when Leslie made his Report on Transformation, his recommendations pointed almost exclusively at preserving the regular force "front line" numbers by reducing bloat in headquarters (military civilian and consultant). His Thrust 2 Army Force Generation Structure called for a two division force (1 Regular, 1 Reserve) where 2 Div's responsibility is domestic response and augmentation to 1 Div. His team had a defined goal: "the explicit goal of the transformation team was to identify areas where we could reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness, to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite constrained resources" and guiding principles to work with the first of which was: "the need to make every dollar count in the terms of the pursuit for operational efficiency". 

Never once in the report is there an analysis of the courses open vis a vis the army's regular/reserve mix; it jumps to and maintains (if not entrenches even further) the current model of a divided ref/res force with all of its inherent inefficiencies and financial burdens. I don't doubt for a minute that there is a downside to a mixed reg/res deployable field force but without a proper analysis of the pros and cons how will we know whether or not the cons are insurmountable? IMHO Leslie utterly failed in what was his primary job; presenting DND/CF (not to mention the government) with a full range of options to consider and pursue. :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

Army generals situating the estimate to preserve the status quo of the various regiments, branches and corps to the detriment of the larger institution?  What a novel idea.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You know, I am not sure that "equipping the man" actually does still clearly define the modern army.  More and more we seem to be "manning the equipment" - be it crew served man portable weapons, artillery pieces, tanks, recce vehicles, trucks, communications systems and don't forget HQs and ASICs and drones and radars and assorted sensors.   We actually have very few "men" to equip in the sense that Sam Hughes would have understood the concept.    Equipping the man is useful shorthand when you are talking about about an infantry army supplemented by mounted rifles on horse back.
> 
> MedCorps' guy is onto something.  We keep talking about the need to support the forces in being (I don't mean red tshirts and yellow ribbons here) and it is those same missing support elements that are most often missing from disaster zones and third world armies.  Those "soft" assets can buy us a lot of street creds, while working with other armies would build up our experience levels while also minimizing the physical and political risks and the loss of blood.  The counter-vailing proposition is the we would have to expend more treasure.



I know where you are coming from. My point was more to do with responding to the question of a navy reserve force generation model. In my mind once the navy decides that it's a twenty ship navy, it has locked itself into a force structure and most likely it's reserve force tasks will be simply to generate additional people to help keep those ships at sea. I see the air force in a similar vein.

I still like the concept of the army's mission ultimately turns on that soldier (most probably infantry) who needs to occupy a certain piece of ground and that everything else turns on making sure he can get there and stay there as long as we need.

In one respect I agree with you totally. In the end it strikes me that much of our defence planning is budget based and the decision about the army's organization is how many and what type of units can we get out of our allocated PYs. I think that if our defence planning was based on how many battalions/brigades/divisions do we need to equip and man and how much overall budget is available then our reg/res structure might finally be reconsidered. If you need a division (like Leslie suggests) but if, with your reg force PY's, you can only man it to 40% of it's establishment while with a reg/res mix you can man it to 100% then maybe you would start getting serious about creating a credible, deployable reserve force system so that you can in fact "man the equipment".

I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council. 

For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> I know where you are coming from. My point was more to do with responding to the question of a navy reserve force generation model. In my mind once the navy decides that it's a twenty ship navy, it has locked itself into a force structure and most likely it's reserve force tasks will be simply to generate additional people to help keep those ships at sea. I see the air force in a similar vein.
> 
> I still like the concept of the army's mission ultimately turns on that soldier (most probably infantry) who needs to occupy a certain piece of ground and that everything else turns on making sure he can get there and stay there as long as we need.
> 
> In one respect I agree with you totally. In the end it strikes me that much of our defence planning is budget based and the decision about the army's organization is how many and what type of units can we get out of our allocated PYs. I think that if our defence planning was based on how many battalions/brigades/divisions do we need to equip and man and how much overall budget is available then our reg/res structure might finally be reconsidered. If you need a division (like Leslie suggests) but if, with your reg force PY's, you can only man it to 40% of it's establishment while with a reg/res mix you can man it to 100% then maybe you would start getting serious about creating a credible, deployable reserve force system so that you can in fact "man the equipment".
> 
> I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council.
> 
> For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?
> 
> :cheers:



Agreement in the offing.

The other piece of the puzzle in my view is, in American terms, the difference between the Secretary of State's Army (Navy, Marines, (Edit to add the Special Operations community),CIA) versus the Secretary of the Interior's (??? I think I have that right) Army (Army, Air Force) and the National Guards.

In my view the Regs should be focused on Expeditionary support to national foreign policy.  They can do domestic response but the types of things they are going to be good at responding to are (hopefully) unlikely to happen in Canada.

The Domestic force could be organized along the National Guard / Hjemmegard lines with a VERY high proportion of voluntary  (unpaid) members.

Of course - in Canada - that could be a hard political sell: having an army, navy and air force dedicated to violent action beyond our borders in support of our national interests and values.

But....maybe.....Syria and Operation Haven 2015?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm fully in agreement with you but, politically speaking, if there is one thing that the Afghan experience has done is made us more timid in responding. ISIS is arguably a greater threat internationally than the Taliban ever were but look at our (and the international community's) current tepid response. Same for the Ukraine. I really agree with you that at some point in the future, we will have to become involved with a more credible forces than we are capable of generating today and that we should take the opportunity of the pause that we have right now to figure out how to do that.
> 
> :cheers:



I suspect the coming crises will run the show with the western politicians being dragged kicking screaming to act by events beyond their control.    8)


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council.
> 
> For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?
> 
> :cheers:



So then should Reserve Force units be deployable? and how would that work when you have members that usually cant drop their jobs to be deployed all the time.


----------



## LightFighter

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> and how would that work when you have members that usually cant drop their jobs to be deployed all the time.



Or have zero desire to deploy(not just a Reserve issue).


----------



## daftandbarmy

LightFighter said:
			
		

> Or have zero desire to deploy(not just a Reserve issue).



We just have to make sure that we only participate in 'good wars' and that should take care of reservists' interest and willingness to be involved.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We just have to make sure that we only participate in 'good wars' and that should take care of reservists' interest and willingness to be involved.



HEY NOW!

Am I the only one that can't wait to tell their grandchildren? "I fought for oil!"

 ;D


----------



## Jed

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> HEY NOW!
> 
> Am I the only one that can't wait to tell their grandchildren? "I fought for oil!"
> 
> ;D


It is all how you phrase it. "I fought for affordable energy"


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Jed said:
			
		

> It is all how you phrase it. "I fought for affordable energy"



LOL I fought for "Non-Renewable Resources!"

 > > >


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So then should Reserve Force units be deployable? and how would that work when you have members that usually cant drop their jobs to be deployed all the time.



Just because we haven't called-up reservists or reserve units in the last half century doesn't mean it can't be done. The US National Guard and reserves were certainly "activated" for Iraq and Afghanistan:

"In 2005, more than 300,000 Guard members and reservists were deployed in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, comprising 43% and 55%, respectively, of the overall fighting forces. During the past decade in those two conflicts, the Guard comprised 28% of the 2.3 million total service members deployed, with 37% of the Guard engaging in multiple deployments, 700 of its troops killed and more than 9,000 wounded in action."

Extract from National Guard Bureau: http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/national-guard-bureau?agencyid=7381

In fairness the Guard did reach a recruiting crisis in 2005 being at only 330,000 of it's authorized ceiling of 350,000 (at the time they also had a further 50,000 Guardsman in New Orleans for Katrina). In consequence they developed and made use of the Army National Guard - Recruiting Assistance Program from 2007 to 2012 to augment their existing recruiting system. The program paid bounties to serving soldiers and part-time contract recruiters of $1,000 for every referred recruit who signed a contract and a further $1,000 for every one of those that actually travelled to basic training. The program was very successful in restoring and keeping the Guard at authorized strength during this period.

Reservists can and do put their education and careers on hold. In the US hundreds of thousands have. Yes, you need to be up front with reservists and tell them it can happen. Yes, you need better legislation and employer support programs than we have. Yes, some have suffered because of this. 

The point is that to continue to do business as usual means we will simply continue to spiral into obscurity. 

The whole thing reminds me a bit of Kennedy's launching the US's space program: "We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win."

We need to stop inventing excuses as to why it can't be done; instead we should study the concept and find the solutions to do it effectively.  :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## blackberet17

FJAG said:
			
		

> Just because we haven't called-up reservists or reserve units in the last half century doesn't mean it can't be done. The US National Guard and reserves were certainly "activated" for Iraq and Afghanistan:
> 
> "In 2005, more than 300,000 Guard members and reservists were deployed in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, comprising 43% and 55%, respectively, of the overall fighting forces. During the past decade in those two conflicts, the Guard comprised 28% of the 2.3 million total service members deployed, with 37% of the Guard engaging in multiple deployments, 700 of its troops killed and more than 9,000 wounded in action."
> 
> Extract from National Guard Bureau: http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/national-guard-bureau?agencyid=7381
> 
> In fairness the Guard did reach a recruiting crisis in 2005 being at only 330,000 of it's authorized ceiling of 350,000 (at the time they also had a further 50,000 Guardsman in New Orleans for Katrina). In consequence they developed and made use of the Army National Guard - Recruiting Assistance Program from 2007 to 2012 to augment their existing recruiting system. The program paid bounties to serving soldiers and part-time contract recruiters of $1,000 for every referred recruit who signed a contract and a further $1,000 for every one of those that actually travelled to basic training. The program was very successful in restoring and keeping the Guard at authorized strength during this period.
> 
> Reservists can and do put their education and careers on hold. In the US hundreds of thousands have. Yes, you need to be up front with reservists and tell them it can happen. Yes, you need better legislation and employer support programs than we have. Yes, some have suffered because of this.
> 
> The point is that to continue to do business as usual means we will simply continue to spiral into obscurity.
> 
> The whole thing reminds me a bit of Kennedy's launching the US's space program: "We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win."
> 
> We need to stop inventing excuses as to why it can't be done; instead we should study the concept and find the solutions to do it effectively.  :2c:
> 
> :cheers:



Posting Series of the Day Award.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:
			
		

> Just because we haven't called-up reservists or reserve units in the last half century doesn't mean it can't be done. The US National Guard and reserves were certainly "activated" for Iraq and Afghanistan:
> 
> "In 2005, more than 300,000 Guard members and reservists were deployed in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, comprising 43% and 55%, respectively, of the overall fighting forces. During the past decade in those two conflicts, the Guard comprised 28% of the 2.3 million total service members deployed, with 37% of the Guard engaging in multiple deployments, 700 of its troops killed and more than 9,000 wounded in action."
> 
> Extract from National Guard Bureau: http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/national-guard-bureau?agencyid=7381
> 
> In fairness the Guard did reach a recruiting crisis in 2005 being at only 330,000 of it's authorized ceiling of 350,000 (at the time they also had a further 50,000 Guardsman in New Orleans for Katrina). In consequence they developed and made use of the Army National Guard - Recruiting Assistance Program from 2007 to 2012 to augment their existing recruiting system. The program paid bounties to serving soldiers and part-time contract recruiters of $1,000 for every referred recruit who signed a contract and a further $1,000 for every one of those that actually travelled to basic training. The program was very successful in restoring and keeping the Guard at authorized strength during this period.
> 
> Reservists can and do put their education and careers on hold. In the US hundreds of thousands have. Yes, you need to be up front with reservists and tell them it can happen. Yes, you need better legislation and employer support programs than we have. Yes, some have suffered because of this.
> 
> The point is that to continue to do business as usual means we will simply continue to spiral into obscurity.
> 
> The whole thing reminds me a bit of Kennedy's launching the US's space program: "We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win."
> 
> We need to stop inventing excuses as to why it can't be done; instead we should study the concept and find the solutions to do it effectively.  :2c:
> 
> :cheers:



I don't think we should be talking about success when we talk about the National Guard deploying to Iraq in 2003.  They faced a myriad of problems and regular units did most of the heavy lifting.  Abu Ghraib?  Yep just What I want for the Canadian Army  :

It's good to see the "militia myth" is alive and well though.  Every other Military worth their salt is doing away with Large Citizen Armies and moving to a professional model.  Even the Russians and Chinese have disbanded large portions of their conscript force and are moving towards professionalization.

If anything, we need to further professionalize our military.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> I don't think we should be talking about success when we talk about the National Guard deploying to Iraq in 2003.  They faced a myriad of problems and regular units did most of the heavy lifting.  Abu Ghraib?  Yep just What I want for the Canadian Army  :
> 
> It's good to see the "militia myth" is alive and well though.  Every other Military worth their salt is doing away with Large Citizen Armies and moving to a professional model.  Even the Russians and Chinese have disbanded large portions of their conscript force and are moving towards professionalization.
> 
> If anything, we need to further professionalize our military.



I agree.

Can we start with some of the RSS/ Full timers who support the reserves? Please? 8)


----------



## Remius

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Posting Series of the Day Award.



FJAG should be getting a lot of those.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I agree.
> 
> Can we start with some of the RSS/ Full timers who support the reserves? Please? 8)



Why bother?

He wants to professionalize the manpower pool.  Reservists need not apply.


----------



## Kirkhill

One man's profession is another man's .....

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdOCWUgwiWs

 > ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> I don't think we should be talking about success when we talk about the National Guard deploying to Iraq in 2003.  They faced a myriad of problems and regular units did most of the heavy lifting.  Abu Ghraib?  Yep just What I want for the Canadian Army  :
> 
> It's good to see the "militia myth" is alive and well though.  Every other Military worth their salt is doing away with Large Citizen Armies and moving to a professional model.  Even the Russians and Chinese have disbanded large portions of their conscript force and are moving towards professionalization.
> 
> If anything, we need to further professionalize our military.



I'll see you Abu Ghraib and raise you Shidane Arone.  By all means professionalize.


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:
			
		

> The whole thing reminds me a bit of Kennedy's launching the US's space program: "We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win."
> 
> We need to stop inventing excuses as to why it can't be done; instead we should study the concept and find the solutions to do it effectively.  :2c:
> 
> :cheers:



So the effort that it took to make "one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind" would be necessary to restructure our military?  While it would be noble to think that our leadership has the courage to spend the political capital to attempt such an undertaking, reality would be another matter.  In comparison to putting a man on the moon, our high accomplishment in space was https://youtu.be/KaOC9danxNo?t=69 .  Renaming areas to "divisions" so that they could wear a "traditional" patch is more in line with how the military's masters see reorganization.



			
				RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> It's good to see the "militia myth" is alive and well though.  Every other Military worth their salt is doing away with Large Citizen Armies and moving to a professional model.  Even the Russians and Chinese have disbanded large portions of their conscript force and are moving towards professionalization.



Those "Large Citizen Armies" were a product of their times and necessity.  Since I assume you speak mainly of our NATO partners (Germany, France, et al) remember that for years we sat on a heavily defended border (on both sides) with the expectation that if the war became "hot" there would not be the luxury of time to constitute the military force necessary to oppose any incursion.  Canada, of course, sat in ignorant bliss and provided the minimum ground forces necessary to avoid distain and called ourselves a "professional" army.  As the circumstances changed, so did the requirement for large forces in being (including reserves) and that, in the main, was the reason most of those countries transitioned to a professional volunteer military.



> If anything, we need to further professionalize our military.



Maybe my impression of your use of "professionalize" is in error, but you seem to be saying that more should be "full-time" and "Regular".  Well, perhaps FJAG is right and we should be using more of our military the same way I (and most people) use the professionals that are necessary in our day to day lives (doctor, lawyer, accountant).  I only pay them when I use them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> Maybe my impression of your use of "professionalize" is in error, but you seem to be saying that more should be "full-time" and "Regular".  Well, perhaps FJAG is right and we should be using more of our military the same way I (and most people) use the professionals that are necessary in our day to day lives (doctor, lawyer, accountant).  *I only pay them when I use them*.



A shopping list....

http://www.privatemilitary.org/private_military_companies.html

Falck doesn't do the bang-bang stuff but it handles all the Disaster Assistance - MajAid type stuff - Hand SAR, Forest Fires, Ice Storms, Floods over to them.   And maybe they might be interested in starting a "kinetic" division to provide 20,000 bodies on an on-demand basis.

https://www.falck.com/en/services/


----------



## Eaglelord17

Its about bang for your buck. The Canadian government/people have shown time and time again they aren't willing to pay for a massive military. The reality is if we want a military capable of fighting anything larger than the Afghanis without significant time to build up, we need a larger Reserve. 

To put in perspective, the Regular Force model we have couldn't sustain a very one sided war with only 2000 people in the field without significant Reserve support. 

Yes the Reserves might not be as well trained as the Regular Force in some cases, but it is still significantly better than anyone you have just pulled off the street. Even if it takes a month to get the Reserves ready to fight, that is better than taking years to train new people up to combat standards. It is also better than just having your Regulars getting killed off and having untrained soldiers replacing them (like what happened to the British Army by 1915).


----------



## Halifax Tar

The empire defence (Reg V Res) in this thread is so thick you can cut it with a knife. 

I think both side need to make some tough decisions.  

Such as; is the O&M budget, alone, of an armories that houses an Regiment (platoon in reality), lead by a LCol and a CWO, really fiscally responsible ?  

For the Regs, are we better off with joint unit this and that or what have you coming out of our wazzo ?  Or are these really just positions for continued employment of redundant personnel ?  Why are we so unwilling to tell people "service no longer required" ?


----------



## Kirkhill

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> The empire defence (Reg V Res) in this thread is so thick you can cut it with a knife.
> 
> I think both side need to make some tough decisions.
> 
> Such as; is the O&M budget, alone, of an armories that houses an Regiment (platoon in reality), lead by a LCol and a CWO, really fiscally responsible ?
> 
> For the Regs, are we better off with joint unit this and that or what have you coming out of our wazzo ?  Or are these really just positions for continued employment of redundant personnel ?  Why are we so unwilling to tell people "service no longer required" ?



 :goodpost:


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> The empire defence (Reg V Res) in this thread is so thick you can cut it with a knife.
> 
> I think both side need to make some tough decisions.



Pretty much sums up my feelings on the issues.  The chances of any of this changing are so remote that it just isn't worth getting bent out of shape over.  

Lots of ideas in this thread, none of them would survive the political minefield in Ottawa.  We are a status quo military and will remain so into the near future.

For those who think we can make do with a substantially reduced Regular Force, or that we aren't robust enough, what do you have to say about 2010?  The year we had nearly 10,000 soldiers engaged in Operations in three different theatres?  Op PODIUM, Op HESTIA and Op ATHENA.  I'd say that alone counters the narrative in this thread that we aren't a robust organization.  

Would we have been able to carry out such radically different missions simultaneously with a substantially reduced Regular Force?  I seriously doubt it and I challenge anyone to prove me wrong. 

This isn't even touching on all the enduring operations our Armed Forces conducts on a daily basis, Op CARIBBE, Op LIMPID, NORAD, etc...


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> To put in perspective, the Regular Force model we have couldn't sustain a very one sided war with only 2000 people in the field without significant Reserve support.



I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.


----------



## MJP

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.


----------



## Alberta Bound

EL17, I am guessing that you meant Afghans and not Afghanis (which is the currency). But maybe this is just my OCD. 

I always chuckle when people start throwing around the term "professional". As in does the activity While adhering to a technical code or standard in their work, or doing an activity for financial gain that is also often done by others as a pastime (amateurs). Just because someone does a job full time doesn't make them a professional. I know Judges, Doctors, Nurses, Engineers, Firefighters, Police Officers and others who don't work full time in their field and who would all state that they are as professional as others who do put in 40 hrs or 38.25 or 37.5 or 35 hrs or whatever # that your feel makes "full time".   

I once had a conversation with a combat arms Major who had retired from the reg force and was working class b. He spoke of how the reg force were "professionals" vs the reserves. I asked him how it felt the day that he CT'd and went from being a professional to suddenly just being another amateur. Once the light came on I couldn't help but smile. He didn't join me. 

As a CIC Officer I don't think of myself as a soldier, professional or otherwise. But I don't think of myself as an amateur. When I was a paid part time - on call firefighter lieutenant directing, commanding, instructing and assessing part time and full time FFs I did consider myself a professional. 

Just an opinion.


----------



## Happy Guy

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.


For the cbt arms maybe, but for Log/EME it was very difficult to sustain.  We only had 3 x Svc Bns (one on, one trg and one off) to chose from and even then we were forced to continually ask the RCN and RCAF for CSS pers. 
Having the mandate of 20% Res F was difficult for the CSS because of the Res F lack of tech skills and experience.  They, after workup trg could get their soldier skills up to standard but their tech skills were still deficient.  However after a few months overseas while on the job most reached the tech standard required.  Then we were rotated home and the cycle began again with the new guys.


----------



## dapaterson

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.



At least one resident of the office of COS Land Strat would disagree.

And there were numerous no-fills from the Standing Force - including at least once when the Infantry no-filled a hard LCol position (as all 100+ Inf LCols were doing more important work than our #1 priority), and then no-filled for a Maj to be promoted WSE LCol (since all ~400 Inf Maj were doing more important work than our #1 priority) - and thus a Reservist was deployed to Afghanistan, since all 500 senior Infantry officers in the Standing Force were doingmore important things.

The Standing Force appears in many cases to have lost the bubble and lost their focus, and become more interested in palace intrigues and the protection of their iron rice bowls than in the generation of combat to meet the needs of our nation (We need nine infantry battalions because it must be a multiple of three!  MAPLE RESOLVE is the Army's vital ground!  I won't be the Commander, RCN who permits the fleet to shrink!  We need more command positions!).  The Standing Force has over 5000 senior officers; has 25% of its paid strength as officers; has 25% of its officers in Ottawa... there is a long overdue requirement for the Standing Force to conduct some honest self assessment.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> At least one resident of the office of COS Land Strat would disagree.
> 
> And there were numerous no-fills from the Standing Force - including at least once when the Infantry no-filled a hard LCol position (as all 100+ Inf LCols were doing more important work than our #1 priority), and then no-filled for a Maj to be promoted WSE LCol (since all ~400 Inf Maj were doing more important work than our #1 priority) - and thus a Reservist was deployed to Afghanistan, since all 500 senior Infantry officers in the Standing Force were doingmore important things.
> 
> The Standing Force appears in many cases to have lost the bubble and lost their focus, and become more interested in palace intrigues and the protection of their iron rice bowls than in the generation of combat to meet the needs of our nation (We need nine infantry battalions because it must be a multiple of three!  MAPLE RESOLVE is the Army's vital ground!  I won't be the Commander, RCN who permits the fleet to shrink!  We need more command positions!).  The Standing Force has over 5000 senior officers; has 25% of its paid strength as officers; has 25% of its officers in Ottawa... there is a long overdue requirement for the Standing Force to conduct some honest self assessment.



I don't dispute any of that.  Like I said, we allowed ourselves the luxury of a long road (or parking lot) to high readiness, and did not go all in when we clearly should have.  Given a choice, the institution always takes the path of least resistance, which is becoming a well worn path to rack and ruin.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have listened to this meme for entirely too long without going into rant mode, so here it is.  We (the Reg F) were mandated to have a 20% Res component, because that is what we had in Bosnia.  It was not necessary for AStan - it was habit.  We could, and I would argue should, have met the need from within the ranks of the Standing Force.  We didn't because we allowed ourselves the luxury of a 20-24 month readiness cycle.



Yep and we let Regulars sit on their rucksacks for years at a time.  I had soldiers in my Platoon who had joined the Battalion in 2008, while 2/3 of the unit was deployed to Afghanistan.  From that point until 2013 when I left, they still hadn't deployed.  I'm not talking one or two soldiers either, I'm talking like two Companies worth of Pte's and Cpl's and a Platoon of Junior Officers.

We've got plenty of meat for the grinder, anyone who says otherwise doesn't have the whole picture.  As PPCLI Guy said, we could and should have met the entire requirement in the Standing Force.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> At least one resident of the office of COS Land Strat would disagree.
> 
> And there were numerous no-fills from the Standing Force - including at least once when the Infantry no-filled a hard LCol position (as all 100+ Inf LCols were doing more important work than our #1 priority), and then no-filled for a Maj to be promoted WSE LCol (since all ~400 Inf Maj were doing more important work than our #1 priority) - and thus a Reservist was deployed to Afghanistan, since all 500 senior Infantry officers in the Standing Force were doingmore important things.
> 
> The Standing Force appears in many cases to have lost the bubble and lost their focus, and become more interested in palace intrigues and the protection of their iron rice bowls than in the generation of combat to meet the needs of our nation (We need nine infantry battalions because it must be a multiple of three!  MAPLE RESOLVE is the Army's vital ground!  I won't be the Commander, RCN who permits the fleet to shrink!  We need more command positions!).  The Standing Force has over 5000 senior officers; has 25% of its paid strength as officers; has 25% of its officers in Ottawa... there is a long overdue requirement for the Standing Force to conduct some honest self assessment.



DP, I agree with everything you said.  I remember asking to deploy on Op ATTENTION numerous times and being told "no" because what I was doing atm was more important for my "career".  It's the same story now, "you should be working on French!" "You should be doing a masters!" "How about you go work for Col XXX so we can get you a better PER score and get you promoted!"  

We've lost the freaking plot man!  We have too many officers involved in career enhancement projects.  It's a sign that we have too many officers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I don't dispute any of that.  Like I said, we allowed ourselves the luxury of a long road (or parking lot) to high readiness, and did not go all in when we clearly should have.  Given a choice, the institution always takes the path of least resistance, which is becoming a well worn path to rack and ruin.



For many reservists (like myself) that particular road was soooooooo long that it turned everyone off. The horror stories coming back from tours were mainly about the tremendously long work up phase, during which huge amounts of time were wasted 'guarding the lockers' or the equivalent, and various other idiocies that had nothing to do with getting ready to go kill bad guys.

We need more of this kind of stuff: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxFgSmR0i3A

 ;D


----------



## Jed

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> Yep and we let Regulars sit on their rucksacks for years at a time.  I had soldiers in my Platoon who had joined the Battalion in 2008, while 2/3 of the unit was deployed to Afghanistan.  From that point until 2013 when I left, they still hadn't deployed.  I'm not talking one or two soldiers either, I'm talking like two Companies worth of Pte's and Cpl's and a Platoon of Junior Officers.
> 
> We've got plenty of meat for the grinder, anyone who says otherwise doesn't have the whole picture.  As PPCLI Guy said, we could and should have met the entire requirement in the Standing Force.
> 
> DP, I agree with everything you said.  I remember asking to deploy on Op ATTENTION numerous times and being told "no" because what I was doing atm was more important for my "career".  It's the same story now, "you should be working on French!" "You should be doing a masters!" "How about you go work for Col XXX so we can get you a better PER score and get you promoted!"
> 
> We've lost the freaking plot man!  We have too many officers involved in career enhancement projects.  It's a sign that w
> we have too many officers.



Well that is how I remember it from 2008 - 2010. Lot's of BS flying around why it was so much more important for you to be here and not there.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jed said:
			
		

> Well that is how I remember it from 2008 - 2010. Lot's of BS flying around why it was so much more important for you to be here and not there.



The CAF are not the only ones with that issue. The British Army were in Northern Ireland for over 30 years and I was amazed that I kept coming across people who had never been there, while others had 20 tours or more. 

For some of them it was accidental, of course, as they missed tours for various reasons related to the units they were with at the time, and where their careers took them. 

Others, I'm afraid, were simply cowards who managed to wriggle their way out of it somehow and not enough had been done to hold them accountable to their duty, IMHO.


----------



## Jed

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The CAF are not the only ones with that issue. The British Army were in Northern Ireland for over 30 years and I was amazed that I kept coming across people who had never been there, while others had 20 tours or more.
> 
> For some of them it was accidental, of course, as they missed tours for various reasons related to the units they were with at the time, and where their careers took them.
> 
> Others, I'm afraid, were simply cowards who managed to wriggle their way out of it somehow and not enough had been done to hold them accountable to their duty, IMHO.



Agreed on your points. For me in my career, mostly reg force, I missed about 5 postings into the shit somewhere because it was just 'so necessary' that I stay behind and man the fort or some bad luck on where I was working at the time. It pissed me off to no end. I felt like Marty McFly when some knob would imply I was a chickenshit.


----------



## ArmyRick

It seems to be a case of mismanagement or underemployed for some. A reservist currently (and for remainder of career) but have been on the reg force side of the fence my views
1. We NEED to have a coherent and straight up defence policy FIRST (as stated by some well seasoned members here  
2. Both the Reserves and the Regs need to scale back on "spent casings" hanging around, collecting money and marking time. Where possible more of the 20+ crowd should consider moving on to new careers (I realize economy and job market is brutal, but can still be done)
3. There has to be a constant inflow of new troops, especially for the combat arms. Combat arms is rugged and tough, can wear people down.
4. I said it before and I stand by it, I think majority of new army recruits should be stream lined to combat arms. After 4-6 years advance to MCPL or we find a new job (remuster to tech something). I firmly believe in section level leadership being young, eager, a little experienced and still able to "give 'er hard".
5. As for reservist, we should recruit much more. I know alot of 50 man regiments in Nowhere, Ontario would become 250 man regiments if given the chance (and $$$)
6. For pre-deploment (I will speak for infantry anyways), seriously 6 months is plenty of time. You are either ready or never going to be.
7. Keeping a large reserve force keeps that military-community connection, very important so that our forces do not become some obscure thing that 30% of Canadians only see once in a while on TV. It also takes away from using Ref F troops for this public display event or that community event ("soldier petting zoo"), let the P Res take that off your plates.
8. The P Res can serve as a great recruiting pool or stepping up point for many who want to join the Regs. I initially joined the reserves 25 years ago so I could serve while I was in high school and then go reg force afterwards. In my regiment, its slim pickings these days for alot of 17-18 year olds who WANT to join but can not due to positions available, etc.

One final point, I have instructed many reserve and reg force SQ/BMQ(Lands) and DP1 infantry courses. For the infantry, you can easily get a fully trained troop in about 8 weeks of summer training (to whats employable but will still need on the job experience). I would go further to say that if we concentrate on weekend and coop BMQs during the year, we focus on DP trg in summer months. My thoughts anyways.


----------



## Mountie

Here's an option that strays from the historic organizations of battalions, regiments and brigades.   The idea is to organize into deployable units.  We don't deploy battalions or brigades.  We deploy battlegroups.  This also coincides with the Reserve Force Structure of 10 small brigade groups.

Maintaining an army based on "3", three CMBGs, each with three infantry battalions, with three rifle companies....etc doesn't necessarily work.  The Army could reorganize into something more suitable for what is required on the modern battle field.  Prior to Army Structure 2020 the British Army was planning to organize itself based on the Rule of Five.  That would be 5 large (6,500-personnel) multi-role brigades + 16th Air Assault Brigade.  All CS and CSS units were based on the Rule of Five as well (ie. STA Regiment had 5 batteries, etc).  This they believed would allow them to sustain a deployed brigade at all times.  The Rule of Five allowed for a 2.5 year rotational cycle with five 6-month deployment cycles (rest, reset/training, collective training, high-readiness & deployment) a brigade would have 24 months at home in between 6-month deployments.  

The Canadian Army could do the same thing on a battle group level.  Five large battle groups spread across the country, each paired with two large Reserve Force Territorial Battalion Groups.  

The 5 battle groups would maintain the history and traditions of the brigade groups: 
1 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Edmonton/Wainwright
2 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Petawawa
3 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Gagetown
4 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Shilo
5 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group - Valcartier

Each battle group would consist approximately to 2,000 personnel permanently organized as a combined arms unit with a COL in command and a LCol as deputy commander.   

- Headquarters
- Information Operations Squadron (signals, military intelligence, CIMIC, etc)
4 x Mechanized Rifle Company (4 rifle platoons & administration platoon = 20 LAV-6.0 Stryker ISC/TCPs with RWS)
Cavalry Squadron (4 fire support troops with LAV-6.0 FSV, admin troop = 20 LAV-6.0 FSV/TCPs with 25mm gun turret)
Combat Engineer Squadron (4 field troops with LAV-Engineer variant, support troop, admin troop & HQ)
Artillery Battery (mortar troop with 8 81mm or 120mm mortars on LAV variant, 2 gun troops with 2 M777 each, ATG troop, STA troop & HQ/Svc troop)
Service Company (Close Support/2nd line supply, transport, maintenance & food services platoons)
Field Ambulance Company (Role 2 BMS and evacuation assets)
Military Police Platoon

The Reserve Brigade Groups would be reorganized and renamed as Territorial Battalion Groups and organized in the same way but on a light infantry scale with about 1,800 personnel with current regiments reduced to sub-unit status. This would allow for five divisions.  The current four but with 3 Div divided into two and a little shuffling.  The Shilo based brigade would have 38 Brigade and one of the Ontario brigades under command I guess.

Each division would have 1 Reg Force battle group and 2 Res Force battalion groups with a division support group (general support battalion, engineer support squadron and HQ/Sigs elements).

The cost savings from eliminating headquarters and support units could be reinvested in a sixth combat group.  The Canadian Airborne Regiment Group organized along the same lines but as an airmobile rather than mechanized unit.  This would give the Army 5 mechanized battle groups and an airmobile (rapid reaction) battle group for expeditionary operations and 10 battalion groups for domestic response and augmentation of their affiliated Reg Force battle group.


----------



## Kirkhill

I am going to suggest turning things on their head and suggest that the Regular Force only be comprised of those members who are actually at ease with being ordered to kill people according to the wishes of Her Majesty's Canadian Government.  - The qualification for the Combat Arms.

Critical Edit - this is not to suggest that all soldiering is killing.  A larger part of soldiering is being willing to conduct mundane, civilian tasks in harsh environments, while you are being shot at.

Regular force personnel should also include such numbers as are necessary to administer the Combat Arms and ensure the Combat Arms are properly supplied.

All technical trades should first and foremost be contracted from civilian suppliers.  

HMCG enters into an agreement with a service provider.  The terms of the contract are that the provider supply and maintain the capability - right into the back pocket of the Combat Arms.

As part of the supply and maintenance package the supplier will be required to supply ex-number of physically fit technicians, acceptable to the CAF, that are willing to under go military training, or have undergone military training,  and put themselves under the jurisdiction of QR&Os, CFAOs, etc.

The supplier would as, part of their contract have X number of technicians on deployment contracts and Y number on reserve contracts.

The military would ensure the technicians had passed Basic so they could operate in a military environment (salute when necessary - wear appropriate buttons and bows), wear the prescribed military PPE and operate weapons for their own personal defence (should they so choose).

The military would get out of trades training entirely.  It would not hire soldiers and turn them into technicians. It would be provided technicians to be turned into soldiers.

The RCN, CA and CAF could then concentrate their efforts entirely in training and organizing for combat.  

Time expired servicemen would, as part of their service contract be expected to spend some years working with the Militia training the Militia in military skills.  (Not technical trades).

The Militia would be a two part organization - a strictly volunteer, unpaid, civilian entity focused on emergency response in their local community - and a military core (not corps, core) - of individuals able and willing to undergo military training and supplement the Regular Force when and if required.   Some portion of those militarily trained Militiamen will be available for voluntary augmentation of the Regs, a larger portion will be available if ordered to the colours.  

The Regs should know their Reservists and Augmentees, and their skills and capabilities, long before they call them up.

Just some thoughts.

Second Critical Edit.

The Technicians are paid at civilian scale.  Their civilian wages are augmented by HMCG for the duration of their service/deployment.  Dismemberment results in a lifetime pension with benefits.  Death results in the family being cared for for life.   Reserve technicians on the company payroll, and not deployed are available to the company for other duties.

Get the military out of trades training.  Hire qualified tradesmen and turn them into soldiers, sailors and airfolks.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> All technical trades should first and foremost be contracted from civilian suppliers.



So your intelligence, your communications, your medicine, your prisoner of war camps and your priests are all provided by Blackwater, Halliburton, KBR, and/or SNC-Lavalin? In a best case scenario that sounds a lot like a cross between the Rumsfeld model of minimal boots on the ground, maximum spend, and you could end up doubling your defence budget but not increasing your firepower, because all the money is going to shareholders, not to combat power. In a worst case scenario your commercial partners end up steering wars towards what is best for their bottom line -- not necessarily what is best for Canadian national security.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Not to mention Alternate Service Delivery was tried in the late 90s and failed.  

The civilians we have now in the service support branches are hard enough to get earn their pay,  let's not turn the whole thing over to them. 

Training I agree with, that makes sense.  But not employment/deployment.


----------



## Remius

I don't agree with a lot of what kirkhill stated.  I would rather see some conversion to the PS rather than contract out.  

Some trades could be pared down.  You could take for example a chunk of TDOs, clerks, logistics, musicians and legal officers and make them into DND employees.  But you still need the other chunk to be able to meet universality of service and as such in uniform, swearing allegiance to the crown.


----------



## Kirkhill

https://www.falck.com/en/services/
http://wcmrc.com/
http://www.provincialaerospace.com/SurveillanceSpecialists/
http://gs.mdacorporation.com/
http://www.chc.ca/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_of_Canada
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/policy/anre-menu-3019.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_railways
http://www.canadatransportation.com/
http://www.arifleet.ca/services/canadian_fleet_management
http://www.aiac.ca/canadas-aerospace-industry/canadian-aerospace-sector-profiles/aircraft-maintenance-repair-and-overhaul/
http://www.impgroup.com/en/home/aerospace_defence/aerospace_division/aircraft_maintenance/default.aspx
http://www.mas.l-3com.com/depot.asp
http://www.gdlscanada.com/index.php/about-us/locations
http://www.rheinmetall.ca/en/rheinmetall_canada/systemsandproducts/vehicleintegration/vehicle-integration.php
http://www.seaspan.com/seaspan-shipyards-current-programs
http://www.irvingshipbuilding.com/
http://www.davie.ca/
http://www.bell.ca/Mobility
http://www.rogers.com/consumer/wireless/promotions
http://saab.com/region/saab-australia/naval/tacticall/
http://saabgroup.com/
hagglunds

And then hire these three guys (or the nearest facsimile).


----------



## Kirkhill

Remius said:
			
		

> I don't agree with a lot of what kirkhill stated.  I would rather see some conversion to the PS rather than contract out.
> 
> Some trades could be pared down.  You could take for example a chunk of TDOs, clerks, logistics, musicians and legal officers and make them into DND employees.  But you still need the other chunk to be able to meet universality of service and as such in uniform, swearing allegiance to the crown.



Remius - I am still proposing that the guys operating radios, driving trucks, flying air transports, supplying intelligence feeds, maintaining weapons and vehicles and radios and optics, are all in uniform, all under the command of the Combat Arms officers, and all subject to the universality of service.  All I am proposing is that the service providers supply suitable candidates to the CAF to man the equipment when it is in the field.  One of their services would be to act as a headhunter and also to maintain a viable pool of qualified reserve personnel - personnel that it would be a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider to find, train, make available for military training and for military deployments.

These are not Blackwater guys.  They are Rheinmetall employees who are available for reserve training and for deployments.  They are Finning Cat employees.  They are Volker Stevins employees.  They are Calfrac employees (logistics of remote camps).  But, when they put the uniform on - just like any other Reservist - they become soldiers and are subject to service discipline.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Remius - I am still proposing that the guys operating radios, driving trucks, flying air transports, supplying intelligence feeds, maintaining weapons and vehicles and radios and optics, are all in uniform, all under the command of the Combat Arms officers, and all subject to the universality of service.  All I am proposing is that the service providers supply suitable candidates to the CAF to man the equipment when it is in the field.  One of their services would be to act as a headhunter and also to maintain a viable pool of qualified reserve personnel - personnel that it would be a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider to find, train, make available for military training and for military deployments.
> 
> These are not Blackwater guys.  They are Rheinmetall employees who are available for reserve training and for deployments.  They are Finning Cat employees.  They are Volker Stevins employees.  They are Calfrac employees (logistics of remote camps).  But, when they put the uniform on - just like any other Reservist - they become soldiers and are subject to service discipline.



Wasn't that the model the US used in Iraq with Haliburton et al?

What a crap show that was.

In 45 Cdo and 1 PARA I was always able to take clerks, drivers and other assorted 'base wallahs' out on patrol with me. 

And a damn fine job they all did too at proving there is no 'REMF' in modern war.

We need an echelon that can fight, not one that has to suck up resources by being protected by scarce teeth arms.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Wasn't that the model the US used in Iraq with Haliburton et al?
> 
> What a crap show that was.
> 
> In 45 Cdo and 1 PARA I was always able to take clerks, drivers and other assorted 'base wallahs' out on patrol with me.
> 
> And a damn fine job they all did too at proving there is no 'REMF' in modern war.
> 
> We need an echelon that can fight, not one that has to suck up resources by being protected by scarce teeth arms.



NO.  It was not the Halliburton model.

I stated explicitly that the bodies in your Troop/Platoon/Company/Commando/Battalion are soldiers and marines first, last and always.  

The difference is that "Halliburton" or "Rheinmetall" or "Saab" - when they get the contract to supply you with a new Comms system, radar system, weapons system, supplies a pool of physically fit technicians that are willing to join the Army/Navy/Air Force and that the CAF can screen to find out if the are a good fit and then send them off to basic training.

They do their time.  They can decide to extend or than can decide to go back to their primary employer to resume their civilian job and stay  in the employer's Reserve pool, which he would be required, under his contract to maintain.

The employee is available to the civvy employer for other civvy tasks.  The employer is obligated to make the trained technician, or his suitably trained, army capable replacement, available at the time and place of Her Majesty's choosing.

One of your major issues is trying to get employers to give Reservists time off.  Write it right into the vendor's contract.  Thou shalt supply army capable technicians and keep them on staff or thou shalt not get this multibillion dollar contract.  Breach will result in penalties.

This is not Halliburton dumping some unemployed Hoosier behind a wheel of  semi in Basra and then pointing him in the direction of Baghdad.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> NO.  It was not the Halliburton model.
> 
> I stated explicitly that the bodies in your Troop/Platoon/Company/Commando/Battalion are soldiers and marines first, last and always.
> 
> The difference is that "Halliburton" or "Rheinmetall" or "Saab" - when they get the contract to supply you with a new Comms system, radar system, weapons system, supplies a pool of physically fit technicians that are willing to join the Army/Navy/Air Force and that the CAF can screen to find out if the are a good fit and then send them off to basic training.
> 
> They do their time.  They can decide to extend or than can decide to go back to their primary employer to resume their civilian job and stay  in the employer's Reserve pool, which he would be required, under his contract to maintain.
> 
> The employee is available to the civvy employer for other civvy tasks.  The employer is obligated to make the trained technician, or his suitably trained, army capable replacement, available at the time and place of Her Majesty's choosing.
> 
> One of your major issues is trying to get employers to give Reservists time off.  Write it right into the vendor's contract.  Thou shalt supply army capable technicians and keep them on staff or thou shalt not get this multibillion dollar contract.  Breach will result in penalties.
> 
> This is not Halliburton dumping some unemployed Hoosier behind a wheel of  semi in Basra and then pointing him in the direction of Baghdad.



The we should figure out how to employ Mexican nationals in these roles just like the LNG and other industries are doing, right? 

E.g., 

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/temporary-foreign-workers-needed-for-b-c-s-future-says-premier-1.2786289

Sadly, we are spending billions on student loans preparing our kids for jobs that don't have vacancies, like teachers and hairdressers. So the employers we will be insisting provide reservists will be relying on temporary foreign workers to fill the gaps.


----------



## Kirkhill

How to Join the U.S. Marines As a Foreigner

Insh'Allah?

Maybe you get a Ghurka or two?  The occasional Sikh?  A Fijian in a kilt?

Oops - almost forgot about the FFL.....


----------



## McG

FJAG said:
			
		

> Follow on combat forces such as armoured, artillery and engineer ...


You do realize these are all required in the vanguard force and not something that can wait for R1 to replace R0?



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---*
> •	6 x Maint Coys sounds very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective.*
> ---
> 
> This is to address what I am told is a problem, the Res F having to rely totally on the Reg F for equipment maintenance and being the "poor step-brother".  A Maint Coy would ideally attract people with civilian vocational training in the field they are employed in the reserve. They would concentrate on vehicle repair, towing operations and weapons repair. Maybe less comprehensive occupations need to be made for Res F versus Reg F in these areas.
> 
> The coy tasks would be:
> 
> 1) provide qualified maintenance individuals to back-fill or augment the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave. Especially in the summer.
> 
> 2) Field two or three of each vehicle repair, tow truck, weapons repair teams (I have seen these referred to as light aid detachments / mobile repair teams) for exercise or deployment.
> 
> 3) Provide support to other reserve units in garrison. Especially for the Maint Coys in Windsor (Close Support Tn Coy) and Hamilton (Medical Unit), but also for other units where weapons and vehicles could be sent.
> 
> 4) Provide support to the EME School / Base EME for the Maint Coy in Barrie.
> 
> I find it odd that Maint is grouped with Log in the Service Bn in the current Res F structure. They seem to get forgotten about in the Res F because of this (I suspect most of the Svc Bns are led by Logistics Officers).  They need to be separated out.  I was also amazed by the training lengths to get someone qualified.  I do not know the answer to this, but someone needs to figure this out if Maint is going to work in the Res F.


Maintaining the PRes fleet is not a part-time job.  The solution is not more PRes maintainers to tinker on weekends and evenings; the solution is to establish standing contracts to support the vehicles through local civilian garages (more and more we are contracting this through-life support within the vehicle procurement).

Maintaining the skill sets in the PRes is problematic in itself.  If every PRes vehicle maintainer is a civilian Red Seal mechanic, then I suppose you would have a good start point to build from.  But, a lot of guys do not want to join the PRes to do their day job in a green uniform.  Instead, you must be prepared for the possibility of establishing and sustaining both the technical and the soldier skill sets in every member.  This is difficult enough in the Reg F where RCEME techs work full time and are exposed to a greater cross section of military equipment.

EME and Logistics are grouped within common battalions in the Reg F too.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---
> *•	Does the proposed Ceremonial Guard consist of more than a year round planning staff that is filled-out in the summer?*
> ---
> 
> I did not know that CG was not full all year. Their website is misleading. I would suggest they have a standing cadre and standing full ceremonial band for NCR use (there must be all sorts of functions in the capital) and then fill out the guard and band for the busy summer season. Maybe by having a standing band, redundancy could be found in the Ottawa Reg F band?


Why invest in capability that is already adequately serving its purpose?  The ceremonial guard pulls in sufficient university students on summer break to fill its 3 month function, and the year round planning cadre has been more than up to the task for ages.  A PRes band will not displace the NDHQ band because the NDHQ band is available for functions during working hours, and there already is a largely volunteer (ie. unpaid) band with the highlanders in Ottawa.

... On the other hand, I am personally not opposed to the idea of eliminating all Reg F bands.  If another part-time band enables such a transition, then I could maybe accept it.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ----
> *•	What does a PRes Postal Coy do?*
> ----
> 
> A Res F Postal Coy:
> 
> 1) provides qualified postal clerks / officers (?) to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  Especially during the summer employment period.
> 
> 2) generating (mobilizing) up to three mobile military post offices for larger exercises and deployments. I suspect these are not large organizations in terms of personnel requirement.  It is my impression from some of my reading that the Reg F is starting to civilianize the military postal system and the Res F might help that process along.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brockville area.
> 
> 4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their civilian or military postal system post crisis or improve an existing postal system (delivery networks, parcel services, mail processing, physical delivery, customer engagement, commercial products and government postal policy). It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance. Canada Post is not in a position to deploy employees overseas (especially where unlimited liability is a factor) despite being part of the "Whole of Government" approach to global engagement.


The military should not get in the business of rebuilding (or mentoring to rebuild) another nation's postal service; this is an area where civilian postal experts can be used.  I don't believe the back-fill demand or individual augmentation demand is particularly high for military postal clerks (there are no postal officers).  I don't think this proposal warrants the investment.  From time to time we do need "general support troops" for domestic response, but this can be done by any occupation.  My recommendation is to leave this as an infantry location.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---
> *•	What does a PRes Ammo Coy do?*
> ---
> 
> 1) provides qualified ammunition technicians / ammunition officers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave and mat-pat leave.
> 
> 2) generating (mobilizing) a field ammo storage team and up to three EOD teams.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon sized formation of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area.
> 
> 4) generating subject matter experts for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country to re-establish their military ammunition storage system. It is my impression from reading a few things that this is a new and upcoming area the CAF is becoming more interested in. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.
> 
> 5) generating subject matter experts for deployment to teach civilians (especially children) in post-conflict area of the risks of mines and un-exploded munitions.
> 
> 6) Consideration could be given to establishing a standing ammo storage facility for the large number of Res F units in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area.  This would be run by this Res F Coy and would save the drive to Borden.


In the Canadian Army, post-conflict mines and UXO are a Combat Engineer problem and not Ammo Techs.  Operational EOD is done by Combat Engineers and Clearance Divers; Depot and garrison level EOD are Ammo Tech roles.  Educating children of explosive hazards does not require a technical expert of the threat.  Creating a TDM in the Brampton / Oakville / Georgetown area would result in a full time staffing requirement ... this is not a good fit for part-time reservists.  If one wants reserve Ammo Techs, it might better be achieved by creating a few Class A positions in CFAD Bedford or even with the TDM of larger bases. Like the postal clerks, I don't see the value in creating a new PRes occupation in this area.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> *•	5 x Med Coys also sound very ambitious to support from a skills/training perspective, and these are not Army Reserve.
> *---
> 
> They should be Army Reserve.  Not having your field medical support owned and tasked by the Army is strange. Not having some dedicated garrison medical support for the Res F is counter-productive given the business hours of the Res F vs. Reg F.  These Med Coys are all in areas where there are medical / nursing or paramedic schools (McMaster, U of O, U of T, Western).  Recruiting would be targeted on these civilian professionals. These units would also provide medical screening support to Res F units in area (or via a mobile road show) to conduct medical screening (which I am told the Reg F does poorly for the Res F). Deployment of these folks (like the recent Ebola) thing I think will be on the rise as part of the GoC “global engagement” movement.


The Reg F Army does not have medics either.  It is a whole other stovepipe in the empire building CAF.  I am not opposed to more PRes health services capability, but breaking the HSS empire is not worth the fight within a PRes context.

As far as the Reg F doing a poor job supporting the PRes, is this a performance shortcoming or is it a dissatisfaction over the limited entitlement that PRes have for medical services?  If it is the latter, creating more capability will change nothing. 



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---
> •	What does a PRes Dental Coy do?  It would not be Army Reserve if it were to exist.
> ---
> 
> They should be Army Reserve.  Not having field dental support currently owned Army is strange. It is also strange that Res F personnel do not get Reg F dental support when dental fitness is required for deployment I am told.
> 
> 1) provides qualified dental technicians to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.  You will never get a dentist to leave their civilian practice to do back-fill, especially given the rates of Res F pay.
> 
> 2) generating (mobilizing) three mobile dental clinics for exercises and deployments.  These mobile clinics could also visit Res F units in 4 Cdn Div to conduct periodic dental examinations (and minor repairs) for Res F personnel.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a platoon of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Cambridge / Kitchener area.
> 
> 4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using dentistry. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.


Observations here are generally the same as above.  The HSS empire owns dental services and not the Army.  Growing this capability in the PRes will not afford regular dental services to PRes members because there is no entitlement.  And when you want "general support troops" then the efficient means to generate these is with Infantry and not technical trades.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> •	3 x Int Coys sounds like overkill (especially beside only 5 x Rifle Coys).
> ---
> 
> Units are not linked like they are now, so do not use ratios like 3 Int Coys to 5 Light Inf Coys as it does not matter as they will never deploy as a Bde. I read that the ASIC / Army Intelligence Regiment concept is the rage and it seems like the Reg F is sucking positions away from the combat arms to staff these large organizations.  Having 3 x Int Coys could help offset these Reg F position shifts.  It also seems like military intelligence world is well suited for reservists who may have a number of civilian occupations / education that would be useful to the military on a part-time basis.


You are not proposing that the PRes deploy in brigades, but there should still be some balance to the numbers; the force generation base should be proportional to the individual augmentation demand that will exist.  3:5 seems steep to me.



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---
> *•	The Army Reserve does not have Construction Engineers.  Like maintainers, this is difficult to support from a skills/training perspective.*
> ---
> I think they should have a Troop of these guys. It seems like a hole in the current establishment. 30 guys who do the skilled trades in their civilian Brick and Stone Mason, General Carpenter, Plumber, etc Monday to Friday then you would just need to learn and master the solider and leadership skills and learn the army way of doing construction engineering. Two weeks of training in the summer could be spent working on a base, etc learning the organizational culture while still doing your trade.


Like the RCEME techs, it is difficult to find guys who want to join the PRes to do their civilian job.  Even more so than RCEME Techs, military construction trades are not so nicely analogous to civilian trades (generally, the military skill sets cover multiple civilian trades while leaving out skills of each trade that are not militarily relevant).  The RCAF makes construction troops work by hiring mostly retired military, having a larger Reg F presence, and sending the few off-the-street recruits on the year long Reg F trades training.  It works, but is this a model the Army wants to introduce to the Army Reserve?



			
				MedCorps said:
			
		

> ---
> *•	What does a Engr Sp Tp do in the Reserve?  Is this Hy Eqpt, ROWPU, a bridge train or something else?*
> ---
> 
> 1) provides qualified combat engineers to back-fill or augmentation to the Reg F be it on exercise, deployment, sick leave, mat-pat leave.
> 
> 2) generating (mobilizing) a ROWPU for exercises and deployments.
> 
> 3) generating (mobilizing) a section of "general support troops" for domestic response tasks in the Waterloo / St Thomas area.
> 
> 4) generating subject matter experts (officers) for civil-military cooperation tasks where the GoC wants to “globally engage” a country using civil-engineering. This task requires special expertise and training both in mentoring, teaching and in providing foreign assistance.
> This Tp has a foot print in Waterloo which has a big engineering school.


If you have properly trained engineers, you are wasting them as "general support troops" in domestic response.  In domestic operations, there is always a job for combat engineers.  Currently, the PRes Engr support troops are established with specific roles but many of those roles are not actually realised because the training or equipment does not exist.  PRes EROC Tps and Hy Eqpt Tps exist on paper but not in reality - The EOD, vehicle and Hy Eqpt training is not provided to PRes and the equipment does not exist outside the Reg F.  The "light Hy Eqpt" (aka. backhoe & dump truck) capability does function within the PRes, though I don't know that the resources exist to actually field full troops where they are designated.  There are also some water supply troops, and I do not know how these are resourced.  In any case, if you want to say there is going to be an Engr Sp Tp, then you need to specify what capability that Tp embodies.


----------



## McG

... So, not everything is negative in your friend's proposal, but I will have to come back later to cover the ideas to build on.  It is late.


----------



## Infanteer

Mountie said:
			
		

> Here's an option that strays from the historic organizations of battalions, regiments and brigades.   The idea is to organize into deployable units.  We don't deploy battalions or brigades.  We deploy battlegroups.  This also coincides with the Reserve Force Structure of 10 small brigade groups.
> 
> Maintaining an army based on "3", three CMBGs, each with three infantry battalions, with three rifle companies....etc doesn't necessarily work.  The Army could reorganize into something more suitable for what is required on the modern battle field.  Prior to Army Structure 2020 the British Army was planning to organize itself based on the Rule of Five.  That would be 5 large (6,500-personnel) multi-role brigades + 16th Air Assault Brigade.  All CS and CSS units were based on the Rule of Five as well (ie. STA Regiment had 5 batteries, etc).  This they believed would allow them to sustain a deployed brigade at all times.  The Rule of Five allowed for a 2.5 year rotational cycle with five 6-month deployment cycles (rest, reset/training, collective training, high-readiness & deployment) a brigade would have 24 months at home in between 6-month deployments.



Looks similar to the organization of U.S. Army Pentomic Divisions, which lasted about 10 years before being folded up as too unwieldy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Looks similar to the organization of U.S. Army Pentomic Divisions, which lasted about 10 years before being folded up as too unwieldy.



We 'did' the 5 thing in 5 AB Bde, typically for Out of NATO area operations (a.k.a. 'Golly Bashing  ;D).

The usual drill was 2 x Parachute Inf Bns would capture the in theatre airfield and secure the footprint for 3 x Air Landing Inf Bns who would arrive in Hercs.

We practised this a couple of times per year. The rest of the time we never had anything to do with the 'hats' at all. A susual, it all relied for success on the capabilities of a pretty well trained Bde HQ set up.

If there's anything we should make sure we have in place, AFAIC, therefore it is a solid Bde HQ setup that can manage complex operations with multiple moving parts of five or more.


----------



## McG

MCG said:
			
		

> ... So, not everything is negative in your friend's proposal, but I will have to come back later to cover the ideas to build on.  It is late.


coming back to this now ...

I liked that all the battalions were reduced as companies.  This is a much more efficient structure.  But, I do not know that all Ontario (less a few bits on the edge by Manitoba) is a manageable span of control for a single infantry unit HQ (and same for each other branch/Corps). Regardless, companies do need to be the new building block of the Army PRes.

I also like the attempt to more extensively leverage civilian qualifications for trades and professions.  I don't think units can be sustained around the hope of recruiting an adequate pool of such qualified and certified/licensed individuals.  So, that means creating another mechanism to achieve the same.  

I don't know what that mechanism would look like.  Maybe such qualified reservists could be assigned an occupation of the Special Force which, being more narrowly defined, could better conform the civilian trade/profession than would a PRes occupation.  In times of great need, the government could then authorize activation of he Special Force for individual augmentation and then these reservists could be hired into positions under the Special Force occupation.  ... or maybe there is a simpler way to do it.


----------



## McG

As a counter proposal for a 4 Div PRes, here is a relatively inside the box option:


> 31 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> A  Bty, 31 RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 31 Engineer Squadron (The Elgin's) (St. Thomas, Waterloo)
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> A Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry  (Hamilton)
> B Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> F Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> G Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> 31 S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 31 Maint Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> 
> 32 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, 32 RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, 32 RCA (Brantford, Simcoe, St Catharines)
> 32 Engineer Squadron (Toronto)
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> E Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> F Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> 32 S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 32 Maint Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 
> 33 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group
> 
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> A Bty, 33 RCA (Ottawa)
> B Bty  (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), 33 RCA (Pembroke)
> C Bty, 33 RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> 33 Engineer Squadron (Ottawa, Orleans)
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa)
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa  (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> H Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> 33 S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 33 Maint Coy (Ottawa)


And for (just a little) less inside the box there is this:


> Canadian Guards
> 
> Ceremonial Guard
> A Bty, Canadian Guards Artillery, RCA (Ottawa)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> S&T Coy (Ottawa)
> 
> 
> Ontario Scottish and Highland Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> B Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> C Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> H Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> M Coy Mortars, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish (Pembroke)
> S&T Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> 
> Western Ontario Regiment (4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> A Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> B Coy Infantry, The Elgin Regiment (St Thomas)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 
> 
> 5th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Hamilton)
> M Coy Mortars (St Catharines)
> S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 
> 6th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> A Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 
> 
> 4 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe)
> C Bty, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> D Bty, RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 
> 
> 4 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (London, Windsor)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Toronto)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Ottawa, Orleans)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Hamilton, Waterloo)
> 
> 
> 4 Signals Regiment
> 
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa, Kingston)
> 
> 
> 4 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 31 Maint Coy (London, Hamilton)
> 32 Maint Coy (Ottawa, Prescott)
> 33 Maint Coy (Toronto)


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> As a counter proposal for a 4 Div PRes, here is a relatively inside the box option:And for (just a little) less inside the box there is this:



Kill a truck load of kittens. It would generate less outrage.


----------



## McG

I know.  Everyone needs a LCol for the glory of the regiment.


----------



## Rifleman62

Have all the CO's and DCO's plus some of the senior posns RegF thus clearing out some of the HQ's. 

If the posns were RegF, the likely scenario would be new RegF estb posns allowing more posns to be promoted into.That's how things work isn't it? ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

> *31 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 31 Maint Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> 31 S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 
> A  Bty, 31 RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 
> 31 Engineer Squadron (The Elgin's) (St. Thomas, Waterloo)
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry  (Hamilton)
> B Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> F Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> G Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> 
> 
> 
> *32 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 32 Maint Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> 32 S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, 32 RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, 32 RCA (Brantford, Simcoe, St Catharines)
> 
> 32 Engineer Squadron (Toronto)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> E Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> F Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> 
> 
> 
> *33 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 33 Maint Coy (Ottawa)
> 
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa)
> 33 S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 
> A Bty, 33 RCA (Ottawa)
> B Bty  (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), 33 RCA (Pembroke)
> C Bty, 33 RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> 
> 33 Engineer Squadron (Ottawa, Orleans)
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa  (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> H Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)



Same battle order McG.  Just slightly rearranged.


----------



## Kirkhill

> *31 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 31 Maint Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> 31 S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 31 Engineer Squadron (The Elgin's) (St. Thomas, Waterloo)
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry  (Hamilton)
> B Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> F Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> G Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> 
> A  Bty, 31 RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 
> *32 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 32 Maint Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> 32 S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 32 Engineer Squadron (Toronto)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> E Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> F Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> 
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, 32 RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, 32 RCA (Brantford, Simcoe, St Catharines)
> 
> *33 Ontario Territorial Battalion Group*
> 33 Maint Coy (Ottawa)
> 
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa)
> 33 S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 33 Engineer Squadron (Ottawa, Orleans)
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> 
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa  (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> H Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> 
> A Bty, 33 RCA (Ottawa)
> B Bty  (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), 33 RCA (Pembroke)
> C Bty, 33 RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)



And a further realignment.


----------



## McG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Same battle order McG.  Just slightly rearranged.





			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And a further realignment.


I sense there is a message here, but I cannot make it out.


----------



## Kirkhill

Sorry man.  

Me being obtuse again.

My sense of the situation is that in a Reserve capacity one of the first responsibilities of the command is maintenance of its assigned assets.  Therefore the Maintenance element should be properly manned as a priority - and probably with full time personnel.  Now whether they are civvies providing service "out of the line of fire" or people that are willing to do the job while being shot at and what the relative ratios are is a point that provides for hours of interesting debate here and elsewhere.

The next grouping essentially provides a flying squad for the local command element that can be despatched easily in the area to tackle short notice emergencies - and not necessarily shooting emergencies.  A deployable comms element, a significant transport capability and an ability to assist the police by conducting patrols and recconnaissance during a Highwood flood, as well as an engineering group to permit small scale mobility problems to be solved with pontoons, rope bridges and zodiacs seem to me to be a useful amalgamation capabilities that would be useful both in civil emergencies and in military situations.

The artillery and the infantry are interesting to me.

In war the infantry will sustain the brunt of the casualties and the artillery will inflict them.  In peace neither one of their skills are in particularly high demand.  Their primary advantage to the government is they provide a pool of trained, disciplined, organized manpower that can be tapped to provide local security, or riot forces, or help old ladies and their dogs off of roofs.

In war, or when fighting the government is going to be happier inflicting casualties than having them inflicted.  Equally, in war, the deployed regulars will be looking for a thickening of the gun lines.  Consequently, in war, I can see that the first units available in a reserve area that will be called to arms are likely to be the gunners.

The next units, in war, would likely be the flying squad troops for line of communications duties.

The third group of units would then be the infantry - initially assigned to base security and, along with the armoured and transport troops, assigned to convoy protection duties.  At least until acclimatized at which point they would start making up the developing gaps in the reg forces' ranks.

In peace the gunners are the least utilitarian troops when considered in their primary trade.  In war they are likely to be in greatest demand.

Maintenance troops are in demand in peace and war (may be moreso in peace).

Mobile troops, with or without weapons, can always find a role (but they don't always need a LAV or a TAPV to make a difference - often 5 tonnes, Pickups, Jeeps and vehicles like the Bv206 are all that are needed, and deployable).

The infantry,  as described by Pvt Pook, Sugar Coy, 1 Para - remain Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Capable of filling any gaps in any plan where manpower is required.

Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

PS before any wearers of Red Berries call me out on it.  The Pook above served in Palestine in 1947.  It wasn't me.


----------



## McG

I see.  I was just going for the much simpler illustration that we can keep all these regiments (even revive a few that went away in the 50s and 60s) while still transitioning to a more efficient and effective structure.


----------



## Kirkhill

No disagreement on that point.

And no disagreement on "assymetric" group structures.  Symmetry is vastly over-rated.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> No disagreement on that point.
> 
> And no disagreement on "assymetric" group structures.  Symmetry is vastly over-rated.



Except where women's breasts are concerned, of course.  :nod:


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> No disagreement on that point.
> 
> And no disagreement on "assymetric" group structures.  Symmetry is vastly over-rated.



Not to mention it doesn't always work to have a symmetrical structure


----------



## McG

Extrapolating the above 4 Div organization across the country might produce something like this:

3 Canadian Division Reserves

The British Columbia Regiment

A Sqn Recce, The Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles (Vancouver) 
B Sqn Recce, The British Columbia Dragoons (Kelowna and Vernon) 
A Coy Infantry, The Vancouver Regiment (Irish Fusiliers of Canada) (Vancouver) 
B Coy Infantry, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Vancouver) 
C Coy Infantry, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) (Victoria, Nanaimo, Comox) 
D Coy Infantry, The Rocky Mountain Rangers (Kamloops, Prince George) 
E Coy Infantry, The Royal Westminster Regiment (New Westminster, Chilliwack) 
M Coy Mortars, RCA (Vancouver) 
39 S&T Coy (Richmond) 
39 Maint Coy (Victoria) 
39 Signal Coy (Victoria, Nanaimo)

The Alberta Regiment (4th Battalion, PPCLI) 

A Sqn Recce, The South Alberta Light Horse (Medicine Hat) 
B Sqn Recce, The Alberta Dragoons (Edmonton) 
C Sqn Recce, The King's Own Calgary Regiment (Calgary) 
A Coy Infantry, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (Edmonton,) 
B Coy Infantry, The Calgary Highlanders (Calgary) 
M Coy Mortars, RCA (Red Deer)

The Central Canada Regiment 

A Sqn Recce, The Fort Garry Horse (Winnipeg) 
B Sqn Recce, The Saskatchewan Dragoons (Moose Jaw) 
A Coy Infantry, The Royal Regina Rifles (Regina) 
B Coy Infantry, The Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Winnipeg) 
C Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Winnipeg) 
D Coy Infantry, The North Saskatchewan Regiment (Saskatoon, Prince Albert) 
E Coy Infantry, The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment (Thunder Bay) 
M Coy Mortars, RCA (Kenora)

The Canadian Arctic Regiment

A Coy Infantry, The Yellowknife Regiment (Yellowknife) 
B Coy Infantry, The Yukon Regiment (Whitehorse)

3 Field Artillery Regiment

A Bty, RCA (Regina) 
B Bty, RCA (Brandon) 
C Bty, RCA (Lethbridge) 
D Bty, RCA (Edmonton)  
E Bty, RCA (Victoria) 
F Bty, RCA (Nanaimo)

3 Field Engineer Regiment  

1 Fd Sqn (Edmonton) 
2 Fd Sqn (Trail) 
3 Fd Sqn (Winnipeg) 
4 Fd Sqn (Saskatoon)
5 Fd Sqn (Calgary)

3 Engineer Support Regiment  

1 Fd Sqn (Vancouver) 
2 B&R Sqn (Chilliwack) 
3 Const Sqn (Abbotsford)

3 Signal Regiment  

38 Signal Coy (Regina, Saskatoon) 
40 Signal Coy (Vancouver) 
41 Signal Company (Edmonton) 
42 Signal Coy (Winnipeg, Thunder Bay)

3 Maintenance Battalion

41 Maint Coy (Edmonton)  
38 Maint Coy (Winnipeg)

3 Supply & Transport Battalion

38 S&T Coy (Thunder Bay) 
40 S&T Coy (Edmonton)  
41 S&T Coy (Calgary) 
42 S&T Coy (Saskatoon)


4 Canadian Division Reserves

Canadian Guards

Ceremonial Guard
A Bty, Canadian Guards Artillery, RCA (Ottawa) 
A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto) 
B Sqn Recce, 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (Kanata) 
A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa) 
B Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal) 
S&T Coy (Ottawa)

Ontario Scottish and Highland Regiment

A Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham) 
B Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton) 
C Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto) 
D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener) 
E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall) 
F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Ottawa) 
G Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown) 
H Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga) 
M Coy Mortars, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish (Pembroke) 
S&T Coy (Hamilton)

Western Ontario Regiment (4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment) 

A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia) 
B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor) 
A Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London) 
B Coy Infantry, The Elgin Regiment (St Thomas) 
C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford) 
D Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie) 
S&T Coy (London, Windsor)

5th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment

A Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora) 
A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough) 
B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto) 
C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland) 
D Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Hamilton) 
M Coy Mortars (St Catharines) 
S&T Coy (Toronto)

6th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment

A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa) 
A Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury) 
B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston) 
C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough) 
D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville) 
E Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins) 
S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)

4 Field Artillery Regiment

A Bty, Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto) 
B Bty, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe) 
C Bty, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie) 
D Bty, RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)

4 Field Engineer Regiment

1 Fd Sqn (London, Windsor) 
2 Fd Sqn (Toronto) 
3 Fd Sqn (Ottawa, Orleans) 
4 Fd Sqn (Hamilton, Waterloo)

4 Signals Regiment

31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London) 
32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden) 
33 Signal Company (Ottawa, Kingston)

4 Maintenance Battalion

31 Maint Coy (London, Hamilton) 
32 Maint Coy (Ottawa, Prescott) 
33 Maint Coy (Toronto)


2 Canadian Division Reserves

4e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment

A Sqn Recce, The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal) 
Esc B, Régiment de Hull (RCAC) (Gatineau) 
A Coy Infantry, Royal Montreal Regiment (Montreal) 
B Coy Infantry, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (Montreal) 
Cie C infanterie, Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Montreal) 
Cie D infanterie, Le Régiment de Châteauguay (Laval) 
Cie E infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (St.-Hyacinthe) 
Cie F infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (Drummondville) 
Cie G infanterie, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve (Montreal)

5e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment

Esc A, 12e Régiment blindé du Canada (Trois-Rivières) 
Esc B, The Sherbrooke Hussars (Sherbrooke) 
Cie A infanterie, Voltigeurs de Québec (Québec) 
Cie B infanterie, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent (Rimouski) 
Cie C infanterie, Le Régiment de la Chaudière (Lévis) 
Cie D infanterie, Régiment du Saguenay (Saguenay) 
Cie E infanterie, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke (Sherbrooke)

2e Régiment d’artillerie de campagne

Bty A, ARC (Montreal) 
Bty B, ARC (Shawinigan) 
Bty C, ARC (Lévis, Val-Bélair, Montmagny)

2e Régiment de génie de campagne

1e Escadron de Génie (Montreal) 
2e Escadron de Génie (Québec) 
3e Escadron de Génie (Rouyn)

2e Régiment des transmissions

35 Escadron des transmissions (Québec and Sherbrooke) 
34 Escadron des transmissions (Montreal)

2 Maintenance Battalion

35 Maint Coy (Québec) 
34 Maint Coy (Montreal)

2 Supply & Transport Battalion

35 S&T Coy (Québec) 
34 S&T Coy (St Hubert)


5 Canadian Division Reserves

The Royal New Brunswick Regiment  

A Sqn Recce, 8th Canadian Hussars (Moncton) 
B Sqn Recce, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (Charlottetown) 
A Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Fredericton) 
B Coy Infantry, The North Shore Regiment (Bathurst) 
C Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Grand Falls)

The Nova Scotia Regiment 

A Sqn Recce, The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (Halifax) 
A Coy Infantry, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Truro) 
B Coy Infantry, The Cape Breton Highlanders (Sydney) 
C Coy Infantry, The Princess Louise's Fusiliers (Halifax) 
D Coy Infantry, The West Nova Scotia Regiment (Kentville)

The Royal Newfoundland Regiment 

A Coy Infantry (St. John’s) 
B Coy Infantry (Corner Brook) 
56 Engineer Squadron (St. John’s) 
37 S&T Coy (St. John’s) 
37 Signal Coy (St. John’s)

5 Field Artillery Regiment

A Bty, RCA (Halifax) 
B Bty, RCA (Yarmouth) 
C Bty, RCA (Saint John)

5 Field Engineer Regiment

1 Engineer Squadron (Fredericton)
2 Engineer Squadron (Sydney) 
3 Engineer Squadron (Halifax)

5 Signals Regiment

1 Signal Company (Halifax, Glace Bay) 
2 Signal Company (Saint John, Charlottetown)

36 Service Battalion

1 S&T Coy (Saint John) 
2 S&T Coy (Sydney)  
36 Maint Coy (Halifax)


----------



## The Bread Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> Extrapolating the above 4 Div organization across the country might produce something like this ....


Interesting model.  I'm curious why you grouped some S&T Coy's with Regiments, and clustered others with more of their own.


----------



## McG

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Interesting model.  I'm curious why you grouped some S&T Coy's with Regiments, and clustered others with more of their own.


Various reasons.  BC and NFLD are separated by more than distance from neighbors because of the shape of geography; so geographic groupings make more sense than functional.  In other places, it is a balance of functional groupings to support training or providing resources to do a sort of Admin Coy function in the maneuver regiments.  Mostly, by throwing in a mix of options this illustrates that (for at least some things) there may be more than one right answer.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

The Elgins are engineers not infantry.

The Essex and Kent is HQd in Windsor with A Coy. I don't see them listed. The Chatham location is the outlying Coy.

The E&K and Windsor Reg't are co-located. It makes more sense to keep them together, to train together, which they do quite frequently.

Why do we need a special grouping for Highland Regiments?


----------



## McG

recceguy said:
			
		

> The Elgins are engineers not infantry.
> 
> The Essex and Kent is HQd in Windsor with A Coy. I don't see them listed. The Chatham location is the outlying Coy.


Nothing there that I don't know.  I am not describing what is.  I am showing what could be.

Where Windsor and London have schools that teach engineering, they are better locations for an engineer unit than St Thomas.  Rather than over-saturate Windsor with PRes, the E&K persist only in their Chatham location.  This also leaves the Elgins without a role - they could go back to Armd Recce, but there already is a lot of that ... so, infantry.



			
				recceguy said:
			
		

> Why do we need a special grouping for Highland Regiments?


I am not saying we need - it is just an idea.  When I first posted options for 4 Div, the highland grouping was only in the second model. But, I think Highlanders see themselves as something special ... Maybe an ego stroke of their own grouping keeps them happy.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Sorry man.
> 
> Me being obtuse again.
> 
> My sense of the situation is that in a Reserve capacity one of the first responsibilities of the command is maintenance of its assigned assets.  Therefore the Maintenance element should be properly manned as a priority - and probably with full time personnel.  Now whether they are civvies providing service "out of the line of fire" or people that are willing to do the job while being shot at and what the relative ratios are is a point that provides for hours of interesting debate here and elsewhere.
> 
> The next grouping essentially provides a flying squad for the local command element that can be despatched easily in the area to tackle short notice emergencies - and not necessarily shooting emergencies.  A deployable comms element, a significant transport capability and an ability to assist the police by conducting patrols and recconnaissance during a Highwood flood, as well as an engineering group to permit small scale mobility problems to be solved with pontoons, rope bridges and zodiacs seem to me to be a useful amalgamation capabilities that would be useful both in civil emergencies and in military situations.
> 
> The artillery and the infantry are interesting to me.
> 
> In war the infantry will sustain the brunt of the casualties and the artillery will inflict them.  In peace neither one of their skills are in particularly high demand.  Their primary advantage to the government is they provide a pool of trained, disciplined, organized manpower that can be tapped to provide local security, or riot forces, or help old ladies and their dogs off of roofs.
> 
> In war, or when fighting the government is going to be happier inflicting casualties than having them inflicted.  Equally, in war, the deployed regulars will be looking for a thickening of the gun lines.  Consequently, in war, I can see that the first units available in a reserve area that will be called to arms are likely to be the gunners.
> 
> The next units, in war, would likely be the flying squad troops for line of communications duties.
> 
> The third group of units would then be the infantry - initially assigned to base security and, along with the armoured and transport troops, assigned to convoy protection duties.  At least until acclimatized at which point they would start making up the developing gaps in the reg forces' ranks.
> 
> In peace the gunners are the least utilitarian troops when considered in their primary trade.  In war they are likely to be in greatest demand.
> 
> Maintenance troops are in demand in peace and war (may be moreso in peace).
> 
> Mobile troops, with or without weapons, can always find a role (but they don't always need a LAV or a TAPV to make a difference - often 5 tonnes, Pickups, Jeeps and vehicles like the Bv206 are all that are needed, and deployable).
> 
> The infantry,  as described by Pvt Pook, Sugar Coy, 1 Para - remain Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Capable of filling any gaps in any plan where manpower is required.
> 
> Cheers.



When we were "ops tasked" we had a class B Vehicle Tech working at the unit fulltime, it certainly made a difference in keeping things working. It was my opinion that brigade saw the arty units as vehicle pools as we had 7 Deuces, 6 for guns and 1 ammo truck. that's fine when the units are doing individual training, but falls apart when it's a brigade exercise. When you have a Svc Battalion located in the same area as other units, it makes sense that they would have a Class B vehicle tech, a mobile repair truck kitted out with tools and spares who can visit each units and carry out maintenance and small repairs.


----------



## TSM A

MCG said:
			
		

> Extrapolating the above 4 Div organization across the country might produce something like this:
> 
> 3 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> The British Columbia Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles (Vancouver)
> B Sqn Recce, The British Columbia Dragoons (Kelowna and Vernon)
> A Coy Infantry, The Vancouver Regiment (Irish Fusiliers of Canada) (Vancouver)
> B Coy Infantry, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Vancouver)
> C Coy Infantry, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) (Victoria, Nanaimo, Comox)
> D Coy Infantry, The Rocky Mountain Rangers (Kamloops, Prince George)
> E Coy Infantry, The Royal Westminster Regiment (New Westminster, Chilliwack)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Vancouver)
> 39 S&T Coy (Richmond)
> 39 Maint Coy (Victoria)
> 39 Signal Coy (Victoria, Nanaimo)
> 
> The Alberta Regiment (4th Battalion, PPCLI)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The South Alberta Light Horse (Medicine Hat)
> B Sqn Recce, The Alberta Dragoons (Edmonton)
> C Sqn Recce, The King's Own Calgary Regiment (Calgary)
> A Coy Infantry, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (Edmonton,)
> B Coy Infantry, The Calgary Highlanders (Calgary)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Red Deer)
> 
> The Central Canada Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Fort Garry Horse (Winnipeg)
> B Sqn Recce, The Saskatchewan Dragoons (Moose Jaw)
> A Coy Infantry, The Royal Regina Rifles (Regina)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Winnipeg)
> C Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Winnipeg)
> D Coy Infantry, The North Saskatchewan Regiment (Saskatoon, Prince Albert)
> E Coy Infantry, The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment (Thunder Bay)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Kenora)
> 
> The Canadian Arctic Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Yellowknife Regiment (Yellowknife)
> B Coy Infantry, The Yukon Regiment (Whitehorse)
> 
> 3 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, RCA (Regina)
> B Bty, RCA (Brandon)
> C Bty, RCA (Lethbridge)
> D Bty, RCA (Edmonton)
> E Bty, RCA (Victoria)
> F Bty, RCA (Nanaimo)
> 
> 3 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (Edmonton)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Trail)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Winnipeg)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Saskatoon)
> 5 Fd Sqn (Calgary)
> 
> 3 Engineer Support Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (Vancouver)
> 2 B&R Sqn (Chilliwack)
> 3 Const Sqn (Abbotsford)
> 
> 3 Signal Regiment
> 
> 38 Signal Coy (Regina, Saskatoon)
> 40 Signal Coy (Vancouver)
> 41 Signal Company (Edmonton)
> 42 Signal Coy (Winnipeg, Thunder Bay)
> 
> 3 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 41 Maint Coy (Edmonton)
> 38 Maint Coy (Winnipeg)
> 
> 3 Supply & Transport Battalion
> 
> 38 S&T Coy (Thunder Bay)
> 40 S&T Coy (Edmonton)
> 41 S&T Coy (Calgary)
> 42 S&T Coy (Saskatoon)
> 
> 
> 4 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> Canadian Guards
> 
> Ceremonial Guard
> A Bty, Canadian Guards Artillery, RCA (Ottawa)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (Kanata)
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> S&T Coy (Ottawa)
> 
> Ontario Scottish and Highland Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> B Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> C Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> H Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> M Coy Mortars, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish (Pembroke)
> S&T Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> Western Ontario Regiment (4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> A Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> B Coy Infantry, The Elgin Regiment (St Thomas)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 
> 5th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Hamilton)
> M Coy Mortars (St Catharines)
> S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 6th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> A Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 
> 4 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe)
> C Bty, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> D Bty, RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 
> 4 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (London, Windsor)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Toronto)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Ottawa, Orleans)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Hamilton, Waterloo)
> 
> 4 Signals Regiment
> 
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa, Kingston)
> 
> 4 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 31 Maint Coy (London, Hamilton)
> 32 Maint Coy (Ottawa, Prescott)
> 33 Maint Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 
> 2 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> 4e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)
> Esc B, Régiment de Hull (RCAC) (Gatineau)
> A Coy Infantry, Royal Montreal Regiment (Montreal)
> B Coy Infantry, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (Montreal)
> Cie C infanterie, Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Montreal)
> Cie D infanterie, Le Régiment de Châteauguay (Laval)
> Cie E infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (St.-Hyacinthe)
> Cie F infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (Drummondville)
> Cie G infanterie, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve (Montreal)
> 
> 5e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment
> 
> Esc A, 12e Régiment blindé du Canada (Trois-Rivières)
> Esc B, The Sherbrooke Hussars (Sherbrooke)
> Cie A infanterie, Voltigeurs de Québec (Québec)
> Cie B infanterie, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent (Rimouski)
> Cie C infanterie, Le Régiment de la Chaudière (Lévis)
> Cie D infanterie, Régiment du Saguenay (Saguenay)
> Cie E infanterie, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke (Sherbrooke)
> 
> 2e Régiment d’artillerie de campagne
> 
> Bty A, ARC (Montreal)
> Bty B, ARC (Shawinigan)
> Bty C, ARC (Lévis, Val-Bélair, Montmagny)
> 
> 2e Régiment de génie de campagne
> 
> 1e Escadron de Génie (Montreal)
> 2e Escadron de Génie (Québec)
> 3e Escadron de Génie (Rouyn)
> 
> 2e Régiment des transmissions
> 
> 35 Escadron des transmissions (Québec and Sherbrooke)
> 34 Escadron des transmissions (Montreal)
> 
> 2 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 35 Maint Coy (Québec)
> 34 Maint Coy (Montreal)
> 
> 2 Supply & Transport Battalion
> 
> 35 S&T Coy (Québec)
> 34 S&T Coy (St Hubert)
> 
> 
> 5 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> The Royal New Brunswick Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 8th Canadian Hussars (Moncton)
> B Sqn Recce, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (Charlottetown)
> A Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Fredericton)
> B Coy Infantry, The North Shore Regiment (Bathurst)
> C Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Grand Falls)
> 
> The Nova Scotia Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (Halifax)
> A Coy Infantry, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Truro)
> B Coy Infantry, The Cape Breton Highlanders (Sydney)
> C Coy Infantry, The Princess Louise's Fusiliers (Halifax)
> D Coy Infantry, The West Nova Scotia Regiment (Kentville)
> 
> The Royal Newfoundland Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry (St. John’s)
> B Coy Infantry (Corner Brook)
> 56 Engineer Squadron (St. John’s)
> 37 S&T Coy (St. John’s)
> 37 Signal Coy (St. John’s)
> 
> 5 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, RCA (Halifax)
> B Bty, RCA (Yarmouth)
> C Bty, RCA (Saint John)
> 
> 5 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Engineer Squadron (Fredericton)
> 2 Engineer Squadron (Sydney)
> 3 Engineer Squadron (Halifax)
> 
> 5 Signals Regiment
> 
> 1 Signal Company (Halifax, Glace Bay)
> 2 Signal Company (Saint John, Charlottetown)
> 
> 36 Service Battalion
> 
> 1 S&T Coy (Saint John)
> 2 S&T Coy (Sydney)
> 36 Maint Coy (Halifax)



the only problem with the BC Regt is the Mortar Coy (Vancouver), read : 15 Fd RCA. they need to remain a howitzer bty as Vancouver is still a Salute base.


----------



## dapaterson

Except that the 105s are self-divesting without a replacement plan, so the whole "salute base" idea will rapidly become irrelevant.

If the only justification for units of the PRes is to fulfil ceremonial tasks, then turn off the lights and send everyone home.


----------



## VIChris

MCG, in your model, you have BC main being done by 39 SVC in Victoria. I'd suggest Vancouver as the more logical spot. They are closer to the bulk of the BC units, have the better facility, and are the only dedicated maint unit on the lower mainland. We in Victoria have fewer units to look after by your model, and are within a few KMs of CFB Esquimalt's TEME facility. Thoughts?


----------



## daftandbarmy

VIChris said:
			
		

> MCG, in your model, you have BC main being done by 39 SVC in Victoria. I'd suggest Vancouver as the more logical spot. They are closer to the bulk of the BC units, have the better facility, and are the only dedicated maint unit on the lower mainland. We in Victoria have fewer units to look after by your model, and are within a few KMs of CFB Esquimalt's TEME facility. Thoughts?



Once upon a time we had 'Pacific Militia Area' HQ based at Jericho, in Vancouver, with a Bde 'Tac HQ' setup in Victoria to manage the units on the Island.

This worked well, I believe, which is likely why they blew it up many years ago.  ;D

What happens now is that one of the units on the Island winds up running combined exercises for all the other units. This can be a huge tax on available resources, of course, and is sub-optimal IMHO.


----------



## McG

VIChris said:
			
		

> MCG, in your model, you have BC maint being done by 39 SVC in Victoria. I'd suggest Vancouver as the more logical spot. They are closer to the bulk of the BC units, have the better facility, and are the only dedicated maint unit on the lower mainland. We in Victoria have fewer units to look after by your model, and are within a few KMs of CFB Esquimalt's TEME facility. Thoughts?


I see PRes units being supported by contracted garages.  The role of PRes maintenance should not be the garrison support to other PRes - the role should be in the field.  That does not require fancy repair bay facilities, and the role is not diminished by proximity to other larger CF maintenance facilities.


----------



## blackberet17

Because I only really know my piece of the pie, PEIR with 8CH in the RNBR 5 Div...not sure. PEIR and HalRif are in 36 Bde, 8CH on its own in 37 Bde. Plus, historically, with 8CH closer to 5CDSB Gagetown, and having a somewhat larger pool = more personnel, PEIR and HalRif working together creates a more equal in size asset.

Just my 0.000002 cents to this convo


----------



## Lumber

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Because I only really know my piece of the pie, PEIR with 8CH in the RNBR 5 Div...not sure. PEIR and HalRif are in 36 Bde, 8CH on its own in 37 Bde. Plus, historically, with 8CH closer to 5CDSB Gagetown, and having a somewhat larger pool = more personnel, PEIR and HalRif working together creates a more equal in size asset.
> 
> Just my 0.000002 cents to this convo



Was that english?


----------



## blackberet17

Lumber said:
			
		

> Was that english?



I tried. My brain is tired.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> Extrapolating the above 4 Div organization across the country might produce something like this:
> 
> 3 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> The British Columbia Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles (Vancouver)
> B Sqn Recce, The British Columbia Dragoons (Kelowna and Vernon)
> A Coy Infantry, The Vancouver Regiment (Irish Fusiliers of Canada) (Vancouver)
> B Coy Infantry, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Vancouver)
> C Coy Infantry, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) (Victoria, Nanaimo, Comox)
> D Coy Infantry, The Rocky Mountain Rangers (Kamloops, Prince George)
> E Coy Infantry, The Royal Westminster Regiment (New Westminster, Chilliwack)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Vancouver)
> 39 S&T Coy (Richmond)
> 39 Maint Coy (Victoria)
> 39 Signal Coy (Victoria, Nanaimo)
> 
> The Alberta Regiment (4th Battalion, PPCLI)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The South Alberta Light Horse (Medicine Hat)
> B Sqn Recce, The Alberta Dragoons (Edmonton)
> C Sqn Recce, The King's Own Calgary Regiment (Calgary)
> A Coy Infantry, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (Edmonton,)
> B Coy Infantry, The Calgary Highlanders (Calgary)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Red Deer)
> 
> 3 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, RCA (Regina)
> B Bty, RCA (Brandon)
> C Bty, RCA (Lethbridge)
> D Bty, RCA (Edmonton)
> E Bty, RCA (Victoria)
> F Bty, RCA (Nanaimo)
> 
> 3 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (Edmonton)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Trail)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Winnipeg)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Saskatoon)
> 5 Fd Sqn (Calgary)
> 
> 3 Signal Regiment
> 
> 38 Signal Coy (Regina, Saskatoon)
> 40 Signal Coy (Vancouver)
> 41 Signal Company (Edmonton)
> 42 Signal Coy (Winnipeg, Thunder Bay)
> 
> 3 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 41 Maint Coy (Edmonton)
> 38 Maint Coy (Winnipeg)
> 
> 3 Supply & Transport Battalion
> 
> 38 S&T Coy (Thunder Bay)
> 40 S&T Coy (Edmonton)
> 41 S&T Coy (Calgary)
> 42 S&T Coy (Saskatoon)



It's a good plan for Alberta, not many would complain about B coy of the SALH going back to being the Alberta Dragoons. Would under your model these units set in stone, and in place or would be see small detachments to other areas. Logistically it makes little sense to have Maintenance only in Edmonton, and S&T only in Calgary, cost would go up for those units to support in the field units in the other side of the province. 41 CBG also includes the NWT, so would those units also get field support from your 3rd reserve div?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MCG said:
			
		

> I see PRes units being supported by contracted garages.  The role of PRes maintenance should not be the garrison support to other PRes - the role should be in the field.  That does not require fancy repair bay facilities, and the role is not diminished by proximity to other larger CF maintenance facilities.



I will have to disagree with you on this, having Svc Bat REME types doing most of the maintenance and smaller repairs builds capacity, knowledge and skillsets. Allow the Svc Bat units to source generic parts locally as well as through the system, your vehicle availability goes up and problems with vehicle abuse or lack of driver care can be spotted and dealt with. You can have local contractors who will conduct the more complex stuff like transmission, axle rebuilding and bodywork. The agreement should allow the local vehicle techs to tag along on those repairs when possible to expand their knowledge base. 

I got to help the gun techs in Shilo strip down a 105mm to determine what went wrong with the gun, it was very educational.


----------



## blackberet17

Colin P said:
			
		

> I will have to disagree with you on this, having Svc Bat REME types doing most of the maintenance and smaller repairs builds capacity, knowledge and skillsets. Allow the Svc Bat units to source generic parts locally as well as through the system, your vehicle availability goes up and problems with vehicle abuse or lack of driver care can be spotted and dealt with. You can have local contractors who will conduct the more complex stuff like transmission, axle rebuilding and bodywork. The agreement should allow the local vehicle techs to tag along on those repairs when possible to expand their knowledge base.
> 
> I got to help the gun techs in Shilo strip down a 105mm to determine what went wrong with the gun, it was very educational.



LUVW (aka G-Wag): Not exactly easy to source locally, nor through the system. It's hard enough to get a veh sitting in Gagetown fixed, even the part could be easily (I say easily, I'm not a mechanic though) stripped from one of over two dozen other broken G-Wags sitting at various locations in said same Gagetown. (apologies if I made a veh tech's head hurt with that)


----------



## Kirkhill

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> LUVW (aka G-Wag): Not exactly easy to source locally, nor through the system. It's hard enough to get a veh sitting in Gagetown fixed, even the part could be easily (I say easily, I'm not a mechanic though) stripped from one of over two dozen other broken G-Wags sitting at various locations in said same Gagetown. (apologies if I made a veh tech's head hurt with that)



Don't buy G-Wags then.  Buy something that can be fixed locally - and doesn't have a Volkswagen Diesel engine.


----------



## dapaterson

There are distinct rules about robbing and cannibalization of vehicles, inncluding who can authorize it.  Land Maintenance in Batte is a good plac to start reading.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are distinct rules about robbing and cannibalization of vehicles, inncluding who can authorize it.  Land Maintenance in Batte is a good plac to start reading.



It does happen though i've seen it, especially in the reserves when your not high on the priority for spare parts. Only with non-A class parts though, god help someone who tries to swap a A class part without LCMM authorization.


----------



## CountDC

3 Field Combat Engineer Regiment  
•1ES Fd Sqn (Edmonton) 
•2ES Fd Sqn  (Trail) Cranbrook.  My opinion - larger recruiting base in a more centralized and accessable area and not totally reliant on a single company (Teck). 
•3ES Fd Sqn  (Winnipeg) 
•4ES Fd Sqn  (Saskatoon)
•5ES Fd Sqn  (Calgary) 

3 Engineer Support Regiment  
•1 Fd Sqn (Vancouver) 
•2 B&R Sqn (Chilliwack) 
•3 Const Sqn (Abbotsford)
This one appears to be a mix of Combat Engineers (Vancouver) with Construction Engineers.  Combats are military geared towards enabling our forces to move through areas while preventing the enemy from moving.  Construction are just that - building things to make life easy.  Need an H-hut, offices, kitchen, road on base, etc.  They are tradesmen - carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc.  Not a good mix as their roles are vastly different although the Combats can often do the Construction work to some extent. 

Sorry - B&R I can't figure out what it stands for other than Bridging and Recce or maybe Beer and Recreation.


----------



## VIChris

Bridging and rafting with the BBEs?


----------



## McG

CountDC said:
			
		

> 3 Field Combat Engineer Regiment


Nope.  It is FER.  An FER is the close support engineer unit at the division level.  A CER is a brigade level unit.



			
				CountDC said:
			
		

> •2ES Fd Sqn  (Trail) Cranbrook.  My opinion - larger recruiting base in a more centralized and accessable area and not totally reliant on a single company (Teck).


I know the new nomenclature is "ES" with establishments that reflect one Fd Tp and two (seemingly random and often unresourced) Sp Tps.  That is not what these squadrons are.  They are Fd Sqns with two Fd Tps and a backhoe/dump troop.

I will give the nod to your Cranbrook suggestion though.



			
				CountDC said:
			
		

> 3 Engineer Support Regiment
> 
> This one appears to be a mix of Combat Engineers (Vancouver) with Construction Engineers.  Combats are military geared towards enabling our forces to move through areas while preventing the enemy from moving.  Construction are just that - building things to make life easy.  Need an H-hut, offices, kitchen, road on base, etc.  They are tradesmen - carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc.  Not a good mix as their roles are vastly different although the Combats can often do the Construction work to some extent.


These do work well together and are complementary within the general support engineer unit.  4 ESR is forging ahead on closer integration and colaberation be mixing Fd Tps and Const Tps at the sub-unit level.  In camp construction, the horizontal work and force protection works are typically combat engineer jobs.



			
				CountDC said:
			
		

> Sorry - B&R I can't figure out what it stands for other than Bridging and Recce or maybe Beer and Recreation.


Bridging and Rafting.  Western Canada's MR and MFB are permanently located in Chilliwack, so the role/task would be properly resourced.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> LUVW (aka G-Wag): Not exactly easy to source locally, nor through the system. It's hard enough to get a veh sitting in Gagetown fixed, even the part could be easily (I say easily, I'm not a mechanic though) stripped from one of over two dozen other broken G-Wags sitting at various locations in said same Gagetown. (apologies if I made a veh tech's head hurt with that)



Not so much the G-wagon, but for the LVSW/MLVW/Sterlings  90% of the mechanicals would be standard stuff. Bearings, u-joints, hoses can be made up as needed. Driveshafts can be custom ordered in a week. the parts that are hard are curved windshields, axle housing that have a custom width. There


----------



## McG

MLVW is going away (where it is not already gone) and MSVS MilCOT is already contracted maintenance.  There is no role for PRes Maint to provide garrison support.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Those were merely examples, I have seen this work with my own eyes, I realize the role is not there at the moment but I think it's a good idea, based on what I saw at my unit when we were Op's Tasked.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> MLVW is going away (where it is not already gone) and MSVS MilCOT is already contracted maintenance.  There is no role for PRes Maint to provide garrison support.



All I've seen mostly is oil changes, changing tires between rims, windshield replacement, very basic stuff, but at the same time this is all stuff PRes might do in the field, I don't see the replacement of a engine in a MILCOT any time soon.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

A engine swap is easy and I suspect even easier in one of those. One day I watched a driver and his buddy swap engines in his truck (same size as a 2 1/2 ton) with just a A frame, pulleys and comealong. Rebuilding an engine is a bit trickery and requires some specialized tools and more training, same with a tranny or axle differential. Our PresRes vehicle techs should be more than capable of swapping out major components like that.


----------



## chrisf

MCG said:
			
		

> MLVW is going away (where it is not already gone) and MSVS MilCOT is already contracted maintenance.  There is no role for PRes Maint to provide garrison support.



LSVWs? Trailers? Portable generators? Or the many other bits and pieces maintained by your friendly neighbourhood mechanics?

Mechancal skills aren't something that can be learned and maintained a few weekends a year, investing a few bucks and making sure mechanics can tinker at all opportunities (parade nights, garrison weekends) are exceptionally important.

Can't tell you the number of times out mechanics scrambled to fix up a rad van so we could roll out the door.

If we were using contracted maintenance it would be months before the tuck was back, and we'd be walking out the door.


----------



## daftandbarmy

a Sig Op said:
			
		

> LSVWs? Trailers? Portable generators? Or the many other bits and pieces maintained by your friendly neighbourhood mechanics?
> 
> Mechancal skills aren't something that can be learned and maintained a few weekends a year, investing a few bucks and making sure mechanics can tinker at all opportunities (parade nights, garrison weekends) are exceptionally important.
> 
> Can't tell you the number of times out mechanics scrambled to fix up a rad van so we could roll out the door.
> 
> If we were using contracted maintenance it would be months before the tuck was back, and we'd be walking out the door.



We are the largest reserve unit on Vancouver Island, the second largest in 39 CBG, and I have an Adm Coy that is, get this, 18 personnel strong including 'overhead' like me.

Of that we have five people who are 'transport tasked'. Only two are MSE Ops, and both are Class A.

If we weren't co-located with CFB Esquimalt and their TEME section, we'd be pretty much doomed.


----------



## MedCorps

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We are the largest reserve unit on Vancouver Island, the second largest in 39 CBG, and I have an Adm Coy that is, get this, 18 personnel strong including 'overhead' like me.
> 
> Of that we have five people who are 'transport tasked'. Only two are MSE Ops, and both are Class A.
> 
> If we weren't co-located with CFB Esquimalt and their TEME section, we'd be pretty much doomed.



I guess the question I would ask is... 

If your unit was given 4 x Pte / Cpl Veh Tech and 1 x MCpl Veh Tech that are trained in basic SMP / MilCOT vehicle repair (plus double the regular entitlement of Class A days) as well as 1 x MRT (Light Vehicle) (and/or wecker) and a general tooling and space for a garage in your unit lines would you be able to employ them effectively?  Would they be a help or hinderance to your Coy / Unit? Would you rather they are employed at the TEME section or under your command?  

MC


----------



## CountDC

MCG said:
			
		

> Nope.  It is FER.  An FER is the close support engineer unit at the division level.  A CER is a brigade level unit.
> I know the new nomenclature is "ES" with establishments that reflect one Fd Tp and two (seemingly random and often unresourced) Sp Tps.  That is not what these squadrons are.  They are Fd Sqns with two Fd Tps and a backhoe/dump troop.
> 
> I will give the nod to your Cranbrook suggestion though.
> These do work well together and are complementary within the general support engineer unit.  4 ESR is forging ahead on closer integration and colaberation be mixing Fd Tps and Const Tps at the sub-unit level.  In camp construction, the horizontal work and force protection works are typically combat engineer jobs.
> Bridging and Rafting.  Western Canada's MR and MFB are permanently located in Chilliwack, so the role/task would be properly resourced.



Thanks - never heard anyone mention FER before.  Even when dealing with the Reg F ones I always hear CER.

Chilliwack will need a lot of investment to bring it up to snuff in order to fill that role.  Sure no one would complain about that one.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> I guess the question I would ask is...
> 
> If your unit was given 4 x Pte / Cpl Veh Tech and 1 x MCpl Veh Tech that are trained in basic SMP / MilCOT vehicle repair (plus double the regular entitlement of Class A days) as well as 1 x MRT (Light Vehicle) (and/or wecker) and a general tooling and space for a garage in your unit lines would you be able to employ them effectively?  Would they be a help or hinderance to your Coy / Unit? Would you rather they are employed at the TEME section or under your command?
> 
> MC



Well, that would be awesome but we are an infantry reserve unit and, if we were given those resources, we'd likely be better staffed than the Svc Bn.


----------



## MedCorps

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well, that would be awesome but we are an infantry reserve unit and, if we were given those resources, we'd likely be better staffed than the Svc Bn.



Staff does not equate to capability.  Understanding that this sub-sub-sub unit sized RCEME unit would maybe more robust than your local Res F Svc "Bn", would you be able to effectively employ them in order to achieve an effect (capability?).  

Assuming the effect you want to achieve is: 

- Lower VOR rate of Inf Res Unit vehicles in garrison 
- Higher vehicle availability rates when deploying to the field 
- Ability to unit recover vehicles while on exercise
- Ability to conduct minor repairs in the field in order to keep the vehicle on exercise
- In-Unit ability to conduct driver maintenance and driver recovery training as required
- Maybe reduced cost of sending vehicles for third party contract for maintenance / minor repair 

Would you be able to employ these 5 NCM's and 1-2 vehicles with double the Class A days to achieve that effect?  Or would these five RCEME guys hanging around the Res F Inf Unit be used as kit shop staff or get lost in the normal function of a Res F Inf unit?  Or would they be in unit lines but would not be able to achieve the aforementioned effect for other reasons?  

Not being adversarial, just picking your brain. 

MC


----------



## Colin Parkinson

With our unit which was a 6 gun arty battery with 2 cp's, 2 op's ,sig truck, field kitchen and ambulance the vehicle tech was almost always busy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MedCorps said:
			
		

> Staff does not equate to capability.  Understanding that this sub-sub-sub unit sized RCEME unit would maybe more robust than your local Res F Svc "Bn", would you be able to effectively employ them in order to achieve an effect (capability?).
> 
> Assuming the effect you want to achieve is:
> 
> - Lower VOR rate of Inf Res Unit vehicles in garrison
> - Higher vehicle availability rates when deploying to the field
> - Ability to unit recover vehicles while on exercise
> - Ability to conduct minor repairs in the field in order to keep the vehicle on exercise
> - In-Unit ability to conduct driver maintenance and driver recovery training as required
> - Maybe reduced cost of sending vehicles for third party contract for maintenance / minor repair
> 
> Would you be able to employ these 5 NCM's and 1-2 vehicles with double the Class A days to achieve that effect?  Or would these five RCEME guys hanging around the Res F Inf Unit be used as kit shop staff or get lost in the normal function of a Res F Inf unit?  Or would they be in unit lines but would not be able to achieve the aforementioned effect for other reasons?
> 
> Not being adversarial, just picking your brain.
> 
> MC



We could keep a small LAD pretty busy is my SWAG. 

However, we recently had 2 x MSVS taken away from us because of lack of miles on the clock. I would say this was due less as a result of not being needed and more as a result of a lack of focus (at all levels, including the highest) of ensuring that we have a sound, well trained Echelon at the unit level.


----------



## dapaterson

Army Reserve units often lose sight of their mandate: to train platoons in a company context.  That's it.  Despite the grand aspirations of some, there is no mandate to train companies or even to roll out the battalion in battle.

"Selection and maintenance of the aim" therefore should be focused on trianing individual soldiers, then working on training at the section level, and then the platoon.  All else is noise and should be secondary - the associations, the bands, the auxiliaries, the plethora of reports and returns demanded by the plethora of HQs...

Perhaps, instead of obsessing that a group mandated to train platoons lacks the echelon for a battalion, efforts would be better placed into providing meaningful, challenging training to build soldier skills and fighting spirit.

Or we could devote the limited time and effort available to a part-time organization to debate the finer points of millinery and haberdashery.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> However, we recently had 2 x MSVS taken away from us because of lack of miles on the clock. I would say this was due less as a result of not being needed and more as a result of a lack of focus of ensuring that we have a sound, well trained Echelon at the unit level.


You could have a full 40 pers Reg F Maint Pl available 24/7 and your echelon would not make a difference on the MSVS.  Military techs are not authorized to do anything on that vehicle.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Army Reserve units often lose sight of their mandate: to train platoons in a company context.  That's it.  Despite the grand aspirations of some, there is no mandate to train companies or even to roll out the battalion in battle.
> 
> "Selection and maintenance of the aim" therefore should be focused on trianing individual soldiers, then working on training at the section level, and then the platoon.  All else is noise and should be secondary - the associations, the bands, the auxiliaries, the plethora of reports and returns demanded by the plethora of HQs...
> 
> Perhaps, instead of obsessing that a group mandated to train platoons lacks the echelon for a battalion, efforts would be better placed into providing meaningful, challenging training to build soldier skills and fighting spirit.
> 
> Or we could devote the limited time and effort available to a part-time organization to debate the finer points of millinery and haberdashery.


 :nod:


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> You could have a full 40 pers Reg F Maint Pl available 24/7 and your echelon would not make a difference on the MSVS.  Military techs are not authorized to do anything on that vehicle.
> :nod:



And it's pretty easy to dumb things down too far, which we have also seen happen. There's nothing like seeing a rifle company debus from a leased civilian bus at the Assembly Area for a big attack to remind you of your Army Cadet days. 

Nevertheless, I'm all excited now... I've just heard that we'll be able to mount a RADIO in one of our LSVWs for the first time, ever!

ohboyohboyohboyohboy

Now we can pretend we're a LAV!


----------



## blackberet17

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Nevertheless, I'm all excited now... I've just heard that we'll be able to mount a RADIO in one of our LSVWs for the first time, ever!
> 
> ohboyohboyohboyohboy
> 
> Now we can pretend we're a LAV!



If the radio works...


----------



## daftandbarmy

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> If the radio works...



Or the LAV, apparently. It's been 'in the shop' for about 9 months.


----------



## Blackadder1916

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> . . . There's nothing like seeing a rifle company debus from a leased civilian bus at the Assembly Area for a big attack to remind you of your Army Cadet days. . . .



If you can fit a rifle company into "a" bus, it's not a rifle company - it's a platoon commanded by a major.

Well, if it's this bus, then maybe.

And what's wrong with using buses to get to the Assembly Area?  It's "traditional".


----------



## George Wallace

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> And what's wrong with using buses to get to the Assembly Area?  It's "traditional".



Perhaps this Government is not into "Tradition" as much as the outgoing one was.   >


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Not every unit is infantry centric. So not every unit fits into that simplistic synopsis. Some units are vehicle mounted. Those mounts require maintenance. Stovepipes and empires have arisen to the point where drivers are not allowed to change light bulbs on SMP vehicles and units are not allowed to self recover, amongst other ludicrous impositions.

The loss of essential vehicles and equipment to national courses, and the resultant maintenance and return times, ensure that home units seldom get, and hold, their equipment long enough to properly train, whether at the soldier level or higher.

A simple example is a unit sending all its extremely serviceable MGs to summer training, having them returned in December, in condemned condition and told no replacements will be forth coming in the near future. Typically, they get replaced just in time to be sent for summer training again. The same goes for vehicles and radios.

The silver lining being the cumbersome, antiquated IBTS system taking soooooooo much time, there is seldom anything else to do. 

Oh, and mandatory lectures, which have become absolutely comical in their sheer number.


----------



## blacktriangle

recceguy said:
			
		

> Not every unit is infantry centric. So not every unit fits into that simplistic synopsis. Some units are vehicle mounted. Those mounts require maintenance. Stovepipes and empires have arisen to the point where drivers are not allowed to change light bulbs on SMP vehicles and units are not allowed to self recover, amongst other ludicrous impositions.
> 
> The loss of essential vehicles and equipment to national courses, and the resultant maintenance and return times, ensure that home units seldom get, and hold, their equipment long enough to properly train, whether at the soldier level or higher.
> 
> A simple example is a unit sending all its extremely serviceable MGs to summer training, having them returned in December, in condemned condition and told no replacements will be forth coming in the near future. Typically, they get replaced just in time to be sent for summer training again. The same goes for vehicles and radios.
> 
> The silver lining being the cumbersome, antiquated IBTS system taking soooooooo much time, there is seldom anything else to do.
> 
> Oh, and mandatory lectures, which have become absolutely comical in their sheer number.



I'm not going to beat the PRes Armd dead horse, but I agree that a lack of "simple" things like GPMGs and radios is pretty disgusting. There should be no excuses for that. And I'm sure that the mandatory lectures are a big hit with the troops...


----------



## MilEME09

Spectrum said:
			
		

> I'm not going to beat the PRes Armd dead horse, but I agree that a lack of "simple" things like GPMGs and radios is pretty disgusting. There should be no excuses for that. And I'm sure that the mandatory lectures are a big hit with the troops...



Agreed, How can a Pres Service battalion do recovery properly if their wrecker has no radio? I've done convoys with Motorola's, and we were relaying messages from vehicle to vehicle, if they even worked. GPMG's and LMG tasked out, its the same old story, my only hope is with the new C6A1 being purchased, they get more then enough that units and training centers will have enough. That is just too much wishful thinking though I believe.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

If all we are going to do is 'peacekeeping', there is no need for silly things like guns and trucks.   ^-^


----------



## dapaterson

recceguy said:
			
		

> Not every unit is infantry centric. So not every unit fits into that simplistic synopsis. Some units are vehicle mounted. Those mounts require maintenance. Stovepipes and empires have arisen to the point where drivers are not allowed to change light bulbs on SMP vehicles and units are not allowed to self recover, amongst other ludicrous impositions.



True.  But roughly 40% of Army Reserve units are infantry - and therefore the concerns of the infantry take up a certain amount of heat and light.

And yes, permissible user maintenance needs to be expanded so that at least some level of common sense is in place - but remember, most stupid rules get put into place because someone, somewhere, pulled off something collossally stupid that got higher-ups excited and writing stupid rules.



> The loss of essential vehicles and equipment to national courses, and the resultant maintenance and return times, ensure that home units seldom get, and hold, their equipment long enough to properly train, whether at the soldier level or higher.
> 
> A simple example is a unit sending all its extremely serviceable MGs to summer training, having them returned in December, in condemned condition and told no replacements will be forth coming in the near future. Typically, they get replaced just in time to be sent for summer training again. The same goes for vehicles and radios.



The user philosophy of "drive it like you stole it" extends to weapons and radios, and results in this situtation.  Add to it a lack of adequate fleet management (cyclical replacement and other basics) and we have the current situation.



> The silver lining being the cumbersome, antiquated IBTS system taking soooooooo much time, there is seldom anything else to do.
> 
> Oh, and mandatory lectures, which have become absolutely comical in their sheer number.



In my semi-perfect world we'd see all those things moved to online training.  Complete them on your own time and, as a Reservist, get 2 days(?) pay; don't stay current, and you're not eligible for class B including career courses.  That frees up time at the armoury floor for some of the more relevant training...


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:
			
		

> In my semi-perfect world we'd see all those things moved to online training.  Complete them on your own time and, as a Reservist, get 2 days(?) pay; don't stay current, and you're not eligible for class B including career courses.  That frees up time at the armoury floor for some of the more relevant training...



I've suggested it this before, took flak because people thought they shouldn't be doing army "work" on their own time. Frankly if the private sector can do it, so can we, give them the two days pay upon completion and give them X amount of time to do it,


----------



## Haggis

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I've suggested it this before, took flak because people thought they shouldn't be doing army "work" on their own time. Frankly if the private sector can do it, so can we, give them the two days pay upon completion and give them X amount of time to do it,



This approach is already in place for the DL portions of our NCM leadership courses, specifically ILP and SLP (ALP is all DL now).  You get a minimum of X amount of days pay to complete all your DL paid after completion.  We could do the same with some of the IS1 IBTS which is PowerPoint friendly (much like we did with the recent Security Awareness completion surge).

Heck, someday we may even get folks to qualify PWT1 from the comfort of their chesterfields via a DLN enabled Army specific "Call of Duty" interface.


----------



## MilEME09

Haggis said:
			
		

> This approach is already in place for the DL portions of our NCM leadership courses, specifically ILP and SLP (ALP is all DL now).  You get a minimum of X amount of days pay to complete all your DL paid after completion.  We could do the same with some of the IS1 IBTS which is PowerPoint friendly (much like we did with the recent Security Awareness completion surge).
> 
> Heck, someday we may even get folks to qualify PWT1 from the comfort of their chesterfields via a DLN enabled Army specific "Call of Duty" interface.



Everything from Harassment, Mine awareness, to ETHAR and Convoy ops could be done DL, all these annual power points need to come to an end some how, it consumes a good 2/3 of the reserve training calendar just to complete it all. This takes a lot of time away from doing our trades, what ever they may be.


----------



## Kirkhill

Somebody recently suggested returning the Army List to the old concept of Half-Pay, just like the Navy used to.  That system said that when their weren't jobs for commanders they were taken of the strength and put on Half-Pay until their services were needed again.  

The problem with that system is maintaining currency.  Any officer (or NCM) that has been put ashore on Half-Pay for too long gets rusty and becomes less useful.

One way to deal with that is to make the member requalify every year for their Half-Pay.   While on Half-Pay they have the opportunity to double-dip and earn a second income.  The price for their Half-Pay could be staying current on all the DL stuff and having them come in once a year for a fire-arms and fitness check.

Staying current on one's own time is an expectation of any profession.  Unions get Development days.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Somebody recently suggested returning the Army List to the old concept of Half-Pay, just like the Navy used to.  That system said that when their weren't jobs for commanders they were taken of the strength and put on Half-Pay until their services were needed again.



We Class A reservists are a lot cheaper than that (but better looking, of course  )


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We Class A reservists are a lot cheaper than that (but better looking, of course  )



My Granny aye said: You get what you pay for....... >


----------



## McG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Somebody recently suggested returning the Army List to the old concept of Half-Pay, just like the Navy used to.  That system said that when their weren't jobs for commanders they were taken of the strength and put on Half-Pay until their services were needed again.
> 
> The problem with that system is maintaining currency.  Any officer (or NCM) that has been put ashore on Half-Pay for too long gets rusty and becomes less useful.
> 
> One way to deal with that is to make the member requalify every year for their Half-Pay.   While on Half-Pay they have the opportunity to double-dip and earn a second income.  The price for their Half-Pay could be staying current on all the DL stuff and having them come in once a year for a fire-arms and fitness check.
> 
> Staying current on one's own time is an expectation of any profession.  Unions get Development days.


I think you have found an answer to a question that does not exist.  Between PRes and Sup Res, there are options to keep guys in the CAF without keeping them on full time employment.

... and I am not entirely sure this idea/suggestion is on topic with the thread.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> I think you have found an answer to a question that does not exist.  Between PRes and Sup Res, there are options to keep guys in the CAF without keeping them on full time employment.
> 
> ... and I am not entirely sure this idea/suggestion is on topic with the thread.



I only said I would try.....


----------



## McG

What size population is able to support a company sized PRes organization?  
Most of Canada's top 100 population centers have a PRes presence (and a few communities that don't make the list).

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_100_largest_population_centres_in_Canada

Based on where I have heard of struggling units, the minimum population to support a company would be 30,000 if not higher.

While some small communities may not be able to sustain the PRes footprint that is currently aspired to, the top 6 to 9 cities could probably support additional sub-units.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

The rule of thumb we used to use was that every 1000 in population would yield you one recruit for a reserve unit.

University towns and some place the Maritimes are exceptions that prove the rule.


----------



## McG

So, 60k should be the minimum size community to try and sustain a small company within.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Recent CDS direction regarding the Reserves. Looks like we're here to stay, at least on Parliament Hill:


----------



## RocketRichard

Thanks for this daftandbarmy. As a high school administrator and former soldier methinks  this bodes well. Hopefully it pans out...


----------



## McG

I see both the GGFG and CGG are supposed to grow by a company each.  I wonder if "they" will look at more formally grouping the guards units under a common HQ?


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Canadian Guards
> 
> Ceremonial Guard
> A Bty, Canadian Guards Artillery, RCA (Ottawa)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (Kanata)
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> C Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> D Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> S&T Coy (Ottawa)


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Recent CDS direction regarding the Reserves. Looks like we're here to stay, at least on Parliament Hill:



Remember that this letter pre-dates the election.  Effective 04 November, all bets are off, and the CDS took this into account at para 10b.


----------



## ArmyRick

650 positions for the growth of the army reserve is spread across every unit I assume? So its really not much growth.


----------



## Remius

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 650 positions for the growth of the army reserve is spread across every unit I assume? So its really not much growth.



I was under the impression it was for units that could sustain growth. Some certainly can.  Others not so much.


----------



## Haggis

Remius said:
			
		

> I was under the impression it was for units that could sustain growth. Some certainly can.  Others not so much.



As per Annex A, yes.  Units that are struggling will continue to struggle. Those that are flourishing will be rewarded - provided that the local demographics will support this.  Cities and towns with no business or industry to keep post secondary young adults in the community will not see an increase in A Res positions.


----------



## PuckChaser

Haggis said:
			
		

> Units that are struggling will continue to struggle. Those that are flourishing will be rewarded - provided that the local demographics will support this.  Cities and towns with no business or industry to keep post secondary young adults in the community will not see an increase in A Res positions.



As they shouldn't. Lack of positions is likely not the issue with these units. Creating more positions at units that can't even fill the ones they have wouldn't make much sense at all.


----------



## Haggis

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> As they shouldn't. Lack of positions is likely not the issue with these units. Creating more positions at units that can't even fill the ones they have wouldn't make much sense at all.



Which is why the plan is to "rebalance" the Reserves by removing positions from those units that historically cannot fill their establishments and assigning them to those units that can and will sustain growth.

What remains to be seen is, although the CDS stated that no units would disappear, will those struggling units be reduced to minor (sub) unit status with CO/RSM converted to OC/CSM in both position and rank?


----------



## George Wallace

Haggis said:
			
		

> Which is why the plan is to "rebalance" the Reserves by removing positions from those units that historically cannot fill their establishments and assigning them to those units that can and will sustain growth.
> 
> What remains to be seen is, although the CDS stated that no units would disappear, will those struggling units be reduced to minor (sub) unit status with CO/RSM converted to OC/CSM in both position and rank?



There is not method to the madness.  I have heard rumours that my former unit, which was finally stood up to Coy strength from Platoon, which has a strong recruiting base with many interested prospects applying, that some one has now deemed it to be on the chopping block for disbanding.  As a Platoon, it was larger than any of the three Coys that exist elsewhere in the country.  Now someone wants to undo the long hard struggle that it took to become a Coy.  Hopefully it is only a rumour and saner heads have not followed that train of thought.


----------



## Kirkhill

As far as I can see the major news out of the CDS directive is the PRes finally gets a Line Item (ie Budget) all to itself.



> STRENGTHENING THE PRIMARY RESERVE
> GROUPINGS AND TASKS
> 1. Ll tasks in addition to those identified in the main document are assigned as follows:
> 
> A-1/4 .
> 
> a. ADM(FIN). By Apr 2016 develop a Reserve Corporate Account to ensure
> dedicated funding is provided to the P Res in a predictable and sustainable
> manner. Ensure that future financial reports show P Res funding and
> expenditures as separate line items.
> 
> Supported by: All L 1 s
> 
> b. C PROG. By Apr 2016 segregate Reserve Force funding to enable a separate
> reporting process designed to demonstrate the value of Government
> investment in the Reserve Force and link assigned funding to expected
> deliverables. Current processes do not lend themselves to reporting on these
> measures in a forthright and clear manner.
> 
> Supported by: D Budget, All Lls





The second bit of useful news is a trimming of the recruiting procedure to 6 weeks and localizing as much of it as possible.



> COORDINATING  INSTRUCTIONS
> 
> 15.    The following  initiatives  will  be  leveraged  to ensure that the goals of strengthening
> the PRes and  achieving the target  growth  are met with in the set timelines:
> 
> a. Re-engineer the Recruitment Process (CFAT to enrolment) to streamline the methodology and i
> ncrease through put with the goal of 60 - 90 days for the recruiting process by summer 2016.
> Continue to expand devolution and decentralization to units for some aspects of processing;
> b. Develop a strategic governance and PRes SIP that will allow CFRG and the ECS's to manage PRes intake in a more flexible manner;


----------



## PuckChaser

60-90 days for Canadian Citizen applicants with no time spent living outside the country should be the standard for RegF and ResF recruiting.


----------



## Haggis

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> 60-90 days for Canadian Citizen applicants with no time spent living outside the country should be the standard for RegF and ResF recruiting.



This sounds like a re-statement of the direction issued by Gen Hillier circa 2010.  That never came to pass because CFRG barely had the capacity to meet Reg F attraction and recruiting requirements then.  What has changed - or will change - to make this happen now?

What I fear is a return to the two tiered CAF recruiting system of years ago wherein the Res F will be able to recruit people who could never meet the enrolment requirements of the Reg F.  This would bring about the return of a Res F member who CT's to the Reg F having to be processed from scratch because of the huge delta between Res F and Reg F processes.


----------



## PuckChaser

CFRG needs a gutting, and complete retool. Whether there's political will (political will being the Cols and GOFOs at the top) to do it, remains to be seen. In 2002 I was able to walk into a recruiting center in April and join in time for 26 June BMQ. Good luck getting that done now, and there's no reason why we can't get back to that.


----------



## McG

Haggis said:
			
		

> As per Annex A, yes.  Units that are struggling will continue to struggle. Those that are flourishing will be rewarded - provided that the local demographics will support this.  Cities and towns with no business or industry to keep post secondary young adults in the community will not see an increase in A Res positions.


I imagine that some regiments will be authorized another platoon in their one "mission sub-unit" while regiments in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouvre and Calgary might even be authorized to grow a second rifle coy.  150 positions could bring the Prince of Wales Rangers back to Peterbourough (they were 50 Fd Regt RCA when last stood down, but I don't see the resources for more arty today).


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> ....150 positions could bring the Prince of Wales Rangers back to Peterbourough Peterboro (they were 50 Fd Regt RCA when last stood down, but I don't see the resources for more arty today).



Through the 70s they were the Hasty P's  - Maj Jack Richardson OC.


----------



## McG

Different lineages.  The PWR are still on the supplementary order of battle as Arty.

http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/50far-eng.asp


----------



## blacktriangle

Which PRes trades/branches currently suffer from the largest training deltas when compared to their RegF counterparts? 

Anyone?


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> Different lineages.  The PWR are still on the supplementary order of battle as Arty.
> 
> http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/50far-eng.asp



Thanks - I remember seeing the Prince of Wales's feathers and the Rangers reference on the sign at the armoury doors.  I didn't realize the unit could be reactivated.


----------



## McG

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Which PRes trades/branches currently suffer from the largest training deltas when compared to their RegF counterparts?


How do you measure this?  Is it by time required to make-up the missing training, or is it by the proportion of tasks a PRes member can not do?  Either way, I don't know.

But, why do you ask?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Which PRes trades/branches currently suffer from the largest training deltas when compared to their RegF counterparts?
> 
> Anyone?




All of them, depending on how good the training/ leadership is back in their units.


----------



## vonGarvin

B Company of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment is in Peterborough, ON.


----------



## runormal

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> All of them, depending on how good the training/ leadership is back in their units.



It also depends on the member, if you don`t make the time and attend supplementary training (which no one can force you you to do). It doesn`t matter what your unit does. 

Then there is the availability or lack thereof of equipment to use, in which case it doesn`t matter if you have the training or not.

Lots of factors in play it isn`t as simple to say well ACISS Res DP 1.0 doesn`t cover X,Y,Z. X,Y,Z _could _very easily be made up at the unit level, but if people don`t show or up, well what can you do?

Edit: For what it is worth I had a buddy who just recently CTed to the regs, he kept his Cpls, DP 2.0, DP 1.0 Etc, so it has to be close enough. But I know a guy who CTed- INF- INF who kept his cpls but had to redo his 3`s  ???.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> B Company of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment is in Peterborough, ON.



So they are still there then.     Thanks.

Jack Richardson was the terror of my High School.  He was the Vice-Principal.


----------



## McG

Interesting thing is that the regiments of the golden horseshoe are all established with only a single rifle coy.  The size of the established companies varies:  The QOR A Coy is established at five platoons while the Hast&PE A Coyu is established with three platoons and the RHF of C A Coy is in between with four platoons.  There are enough extranious Maj, jr offr and sr NCO in the HQ&Svc Coy for these units to organize into more rifle companies, but it is an illusion.


----------



## blacktriangle

MCG said:
			
		

> How do you measure this?  Is it by time required to make-up the missing training, or is it by the proportion of tasks a PRes member can not do?  Either way, I don't know.
> 
> But, why do you ask?



Maybe it's a combination of both? 

I ask because I'm starting to wonder if we aren't just setting our PRes up for failure. Minimal trg time, minimal funding, lack of equipment etc. Is it possible there are some trades that currently exist in the PRes that simply should not be there?


----------



## Jed

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Maybe it's a combination of both?
> 
> I ask because I'm starting to wonder if we aren't just setting our PRes up for failure. Minimal trg time, minimal funding, lack of equipment etc. Is it possible there are some trades that currently exist in the PRes that simply should not be there?



Good question.  On the matter of reserve Engineers: There is never enough of this force capability in peace or in war. Engineer roles and tasks are equipment intensive and are often 'in support'. This means they need to work with Combat Arms, Logistics, and the full spectrum of CMBG sub units. 

If the Res force was to cease fulfilling this role then our forces would never be able to spool up in time to be competent and effective. On the other hand how do they learn their job without the other sub units to train with?

Maybe the Reg force should be plus size manned to provide more robust training to only the most needed units in the Res force?  I'm sure arguments can be made for any and all elements and branches of the military but someone should make a realistic priority list.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jed said:
			
		

> Maybe the Reg force should be plus size manned to provide more robust training to only the most needed units in the Res force?  I'm sure arguments can be made for any and all elements and branches of the military but someone should make a realistic priority list.



Except that there are few Reg F units in the same geographical area as reserve units, except in Edmonton AFAIK.

The big opportunity is to synch reserve training with Reg F exercises, and align reserve Bde training plans with Reg F requirements for augmentation. DAG green? You get to go on the awesome Reg F ex. DAG Red? Try again next year.

The current 'two solitudes' approach is wasteful in more ways than one.


----------



## a_majoor

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Except that there are few Reg F units in the same geographical area as reserve units, except in Edmonton AFAIK.
> 
> The big opportunity is to synch reserve training with Reg F exercises, and align reserve Bde training plans with Reg F requirements for augmentation. DAG green? You get to go on the awesome Reg F ex. DAG Red? Try again next year.
> 
> The current 'two solitudes' approach is wasteful in more ways than one.



The big issue in this approach is the chaotic nature of "planning". How many tales of woe have we heard as people are lined up for an exercise or course, make provisions with their employers, family and vacation time only to be told at the last second "oh, sorry, the course/exercise/etc. has been changed to timeframe "x". This is frustrating for both sides, as the prospective candidate/augmentee is out of not only their planned military employment, but also most likely civilian vacation time and possibly even wages. Few people would be stupid enough to try that twice. As for the Forces, they are now scrambling to get minimum manning, find augments and otherwise picking up the mess they created.

Infanteer has constantly pointed out the chaotic nature of even our internal planning (high readiness, managed readiness and APS cycles are all out of sync with each other), so maybe we need to fix that first; _then_ there will be a stable environment where Reserve augmentation will be a painless process for everyone.


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The big opportunity is to synch reserve training with Reg F exercises, and align reserve Bde training plans with Reg F requirements for augmentation. DAG green? You get to go on the awesome Reg F ex. DAG Red? Try again next year.



Sounds a bit like Op REINFORCEMENT.

One of the challenges in DAGging GREEN for Reservists is that in many locations sp bases will not do many of the things a Reservist needs to DAG GREEN (i.e. vaccinations, PHAs, dental exams, I cards) unless they have a tasking message.  You can't get a tasking message until after you DAG GREEN.  The workaround for this is for the Reg F mounting formation to waive certain DAG requirements for Res F participants if the exercise or training is to be held in Canada.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> The workaround for this is for the Reg F mounting formation to waive certain DAG requirements for Res F participants if the exercise or training is to be held in Canada.



The other workaround would be for Health Services to fulfil their mandate...


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The other workaround would be for Health Services to fulfil their mandate...



One requires resources.  The other does not. 

A wide variety of DAG requirements can be waived for contingency operations (for both Reg F and P Res).  The same is not true for routine operations.  But if a routine operation is being conducted in Canada it should be possible to scale back the DAG requirements to the minimum required for a contingency operation thus saving both time and money while making more troops available for the operation.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> One requires resources.  The other does not.



A reallocation of resources.  There are plenty of things done in the CAF and DND that are not core to the mandate.  Ensuring solider readiness is core.


----------



## a_majoor

Or maybe some thought should be put into the process of doing a DAG.

I DAG'd 3 times to get from Kingston to Meaford for JOINTEX 15. While I understand that doing a DAG is also part of the training for the clerks, who designs a process that can't be done quickly and efficiently with just one pass? And this isn't the only time. I spent more time and did more paperwork to go to Harrington Lake as part of the G8 Summit meeting than I did to go to Afghanistan the year before.

The system seems to be more about process than actually accomplishing anything.


----------



## dapaterson

People don't trust each other, so a DAG done in one place means you'll DAG again in a second place, and then again in a third place; sort of like doing BFTs before the 2010 Olympics.

Internal institutional trust is lacking, and little Napoleons introducing their own opinions vs real requirements is another ongoing problem.


----------



## PanaEng

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Internal institutional trust is lacking, and little Napoleons introducing their own opinions vs real requirements is another ongoing problem.



Best quote of the day!!

have a leftover halloween smarty   :nod:


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ....sort of like doing BFTs before the 2010 Olympics.



and



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Internal institutional trust is lacking, and little Napoleons introducing their own opinions vs real requirements is another ongoing problem.



Leads to having the rucksack weights second-guessed by JTFC HQ staff after the march.


----------



## Mortar guy

Morning all,

I am a longtime lurker here but always enjoy reading this thread. Some of the things written here should be thrown into the Infantry Newsletter to generate Corps-wide debate in the RCIC. There are too few PRes articles in the Newsletter, and there are too many topics that need daylight, for this not to happen. If anyone wants to dive in, PM me.

[\paid political advertisement ends]

MG


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Morning all,
> 
> I am a longtime lurker here but always enjoy reading this thread. Some of the things written here should be thrown into the Infantry Newsletter to generate Corps-wide debate in the RCIC. There are too few PRes articles in the Newsletter, and there are too many topics that need daylight, for this not to happen. If anyone wants to dive in, PM me.
> 
> [\paid political advertisement ends]
> 
> MG



You mean... you mean... you mean that someone actually cares about what we reservists think? 

Really?

Must be a slow news day


----------



## Mortar guy

Well "care" is a strong word.

I just figured that with so many reservists in the RCIC, there's bound to be one or two who can piece together a coherent sentence.
 [

MG


----------



## dapaterson

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Well "care" is a strong word.
> 
> I just figured that with so many reservists in the RCIC, there's bound to be one or two who can piece together a coherent sentence.
> [
> 
> MG



So, more than in the Reg F, then...


----------



## Kirkhill

That didn't take long.... :christmas happy:


----------



## Journeyman

I'm still Googling "coherent"  -- it's kind of the opposite of "incontinent," isn't it?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm still Googling "coherent"  -- it's kind of the opposite of "incontinent," isn't it?



Yes, but drier


----------



## medicineman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Yes, but drier





			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm still Googling "coherent"  -- it's kind of the opposite of "incontinent," isn't it?



Depends on the amount of drool leaking out...

MM


----------



## daftandbarmy

medicineman said:
			
		

> Depends on the amount of drool leaking out...
> 
> MM



Speaking of drool, I have just read the first edition of the Infantry newsletter and I think I want a LAV 6 and a TAPV now. It's an irrational and completely impossible to achieve desire, I know, but Xmas is just around the corner so who knows.

The Commandant needs to lighten up a little though. 'Closing with and destroying' is a lot of fun; too bad he makes it sound so much like a sacred duty, or something less enjoyable than brassing things up with a C6 fired from the hip.


----------



## Mortar guy

I'll make the intro to the next edition a little lighter - maybe with a focus on moustache maintenance in patrol bases?


----------



## George Wallace

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> I'll make the intro to the next edition a little lighter - maybe with a focus on moustache maintenance in patrol bases?



Wax or No Wax?


----------



## Mortar guy

I take a mission command approach to wax - my intent is that the moustache look man-tacular - the "how" is up to the wearer.


----------



## Ostrozac

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Speaking of drool, I have just read the first edition of the Infantry newsletter and I think I want a LAV 6 and a TAPV now.



Good for you. At least somebody is excited about them.

LAV 6 looks like a bit of a burden for the maintainers (recovery in particular is a nightmare) and TAPV (depending on who you talk to) is either a light vehicle that isn't very light, or a personnel carrier that can't carry many personnel.


----------



## Oscar590

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Good for you. At least somebody is excited about them.
> 
> LAV 6 looks like a bit of a burden for the maintainers (recovery in particular is a nightmare) and TAPV (depending on who you talk to) is *either a light vehicle that isn't very light, or a personnel carrier that can't carry many personnel.*


Reminds me of this scene from Pentagon Wars about the M2 Bradley https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA


----------



## McG

So, let's get back to the topic of PRes.

I believe we have other threads for TAPV, LAV and the failings of major projects.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Good for you. At least somebody is excited about them.
> 
> LAV 6 looks like a bit of a burden for the maintainers (recovery in particular is a nightmare) and TAPV (depending on who you talk to) is either a light vehicle that isn't very light, or a personnel carrier that can't carry many personnel.



You may have defined the problem Ostrozac - the TAPV a Light Personnel Carrier:  A carrier designed to carry Light Personnel (ie little guys).

Sorry McG- couldn't resist.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> So, let's get back to the topic of PRes.
> 
> I believe we have other threads for TAPV, LAV and the failings of major projects.



I've recently done an AAR with my folks and here are the take aways for me:

Assuming 'no change' in the terms of service and levels of equipment for Class A personnel, we must....

Ensure that training is well planned and communicated thoroughly in advance through a well managed OPP, is incremental and culminates in worthwhile, challenging, interesting, infantry (in our case) mission aligned field activities. The natural 'culminating points' in our annual training calendar are November, April and August. Shooting, fitness and tactics all need to progress meaningfully beyond the mere 'ticking of boxes'. Exercises need to be well run and hard so that - as one Sgt explained to me - 'we hit the ground running on Friday night and pray for death by Sunday morning'.We need to balance all this with other activities, like various 'non combat' Bde events and Regimental family activities, that have nothing to do with the main mission of the infantry: to kill bad guys and break all their stuff. Domops, 'PC briefings' etc etc etc must always assume a secondary priority because it merely eats in to our measly annual allocation of 37 Class A days (5 to 10 of which are apparently kept at Bde HQ for frittering away on various flavours of the month).

Further, we need to make best use of the training and development infrastructure provided for us by the CF through the thoughtful development and mentoring of our junior members, and proactive career management. We must ruthlessly cull bad leaders and avoid, at all costs, putting poorly trained, incompetent and/or under trained Officers and NCOs in charge of our soldiers and other Officers. This goes for all rank levels up to and including Bde Comd.

All of this, of course, needs to be done within the vessel of a higher purpose of some kind, which we continue to lack beyond the platitudes of 'recruit, train and retain'. This, of course, is the responsibility of the Army Commander and CDS and, on the armoury floor level, it is painfully obvious that we continue to lack that kind of higher direction which shows up as various kinds of waffling and contradiction the Div/Bde level which then adversely influences the rest of us. 

The natural tendency of most of those on the armoury floor is to seek opportunities to train collectively with the Reg F. This may take various forms and the annual summer concentration seems to be the most obvious annual opportunity. Should this direction be given I am sure that, over time, we part timers could grow into a reliable and competent compliment to any full time formation to the dismounted company level, or something like that.


----------



## Harris

An example of the problem:

For 5 Div "ARCON" in Aug the Div Comd has asked for 2 RCR (and others) to support the trg.  Apparently this received a yes from 4 Div Comd.  So far so good.

I attend the IPC and I see things fall apart as follows:

5 Div wants 2 RCR to basically run a giant gun camp for the week up to and including level 3 by day and by night.

2 RCR arrives at the table and says they are running their own Ex and don't want to travel to Pet so they will take our soldiers a sect at a time and insert them into their Paltoons to train with them.  No plan for reserve leadership was mentioned.

IMO these two starting points are basically on the opposite ends of the spectrum.  I await the "fix" at the MPC.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> I am a longtime lurker here but always enjoy reading this thread. Some of the things written here should be thrown into the Infantry Newsletter to generate Corps-wide debate in the RCIC. There are too few PRes articles in the Newsletter, and there are too many topics that need daylight, for this not to happen. If anyone wants to dive in, PM me.



One of our Majors did a PD lecture on the different methods of reserve force initial training for infantry officers (and some of that was concurrently done with NCO training) utilized by some of our allies. I will suggest to him that he submit something to you Sir. The take home point of his presentation was that the Aussies and the Brits seem to turn out trained infantry officers much more efficiently than we do. 

The current training system in the CF does not seem to be meeting the needs of the PRes... that may be a controversial statement but how many PRes infantry platoons across Canada are currently commanded by partly trained 2Lt.s (or WOs) rather than DP 1.1 qualified LT.s? Very few. In most regiments, out of 2-3 Pls only 1 will be led by a qualified Lt., some units have no qualified PL comds and also have PL WO positions covered by Sgt.s We manage to limp along (mostly due to the mentoring of some stellar Capt./Maj.) but this is obviously far from ideal.

I found the Infantry Newsletter quite informative, it would be great to see some reserve force content.

With respect to TAPV, I see on the Texetron website that there is a stretched infantry carrier variant. The Aussies have re-re-roled their Armd recce troops to drive the bushmaster APC and move their reserve infantry around. This might have merit for the CF. The armoured corps might not like to act as taxi drivers but at least they would be driving armoured vehicles again...


----------



## Kirkhill

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> ....
> 
> With respect to TAPV, I see on the Texetron website that there is a stretched infantry carrier variant. ....



Nothing a contractor enjoys more than a good Change Order.    Not that it is a bad idea, just that it would have been better before the contract was inked.  Or even the SOR published.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> I will suggest to him that he submit something to you Sir. The take home point of his presentation was that the Aussies and the Brits seem to turn out trained infantry officers much more efficiently than we do.



I've been out of the loop for several years now but, having done both RESO and Sandhurst, I believe that Phase III is more than a match for the UK training in terms of the time invested vs the quality and suitability of product for our reserves. For the infantry anyways. 

However, in Canada, it can take us 3 years to get someone through Phase III, if at all. My unit has several 'non-trade qualified' 2Lts lurking around who have had more than one kick at the can and have yet to pass.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> My unit has several 'non-trade qualified' 2Lts lurking around who have had more than one kick at the can and have yet to pass.



Is the problem in the selection process, in the unit-level indoctrination of young officers, in the training system, or some combination of all of those factors?


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Is the problem in the selection process, in the unit-level indoctrination of young officers, in the training system, or some combination of all of those factors?



IMHO we accept people into RESO Infantry training who are too old. If you recall Capt Willard, on reading Col Kurtz' bio saying something like 'he did the airborne course when he was 40. I did it when I was 19 and it nearly killed me'. I was 18 on Phase 2 (Loachman was wayyyyy older than me  ), 19 on Phase 3, and then 20 when I did the Airborne Course at CABC. Well, Phase 2 and 3 Inf are, IMHO, much harder than the Airborne course in most ways, and yet we send guys who are in their 30s who struggle as they have day jobs, wives, kids etc.

You also need to send at least two people recognizing that one might not make it. So volume is another requirement we can't meet.

Then there's the preparation for these guys (and gals, and some women have passed Phase 3 quite handily). There is none, apart from what they manage to do on their own time. They should all be on a monitored, professionally managed battle fitness program that vastly exceeds the sub-standard - for infantry officers - requirements in BMQ & BMOQ, and ensures they don't turn up with injuries. One of my promising 2Lts was loaded on Phase 3 last summer then injured himself 2 weeks before he was due to go, so must now sit out for another year. By Summer 2016 he will have been a 2Lt for three years as well as an OCdt a year before that.

They also need to be tuned up on the basic OPP requirements for each Phase, at least, as well as refreshed on the weapons they'll use, but I would say these are lower on the priority list than fitness.


----------



## ArmyRick

We just had our first fully trained LT in probably a good 4-5 years finish his DP 1.1 last summer. Mostly we seem to be commissioning guys from the ranks or have our 2LTs/Lt (not trained).

I really, REALLY think Regiments need to attract and recruit the right people
-Must be very fit and highly motivated
-As one Major in our regiment said, when he sits on a board he is not looking for a new officer but a potential future CO (thats a good approach in my mind)
-Evaluate their life circumstances (Is their civilian career so demanding they can not get the time off?)
-Get your WO/MWO input as far as they old "gut check" (What do you think of this guy?)
-Another approach, is target strong private/corporals as they enter university

My input


----------



## George Wallace

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> -Another approach, is target strong private/corporals as they enter university



That is probably the best approach for a unit that is in a "university town"; but not so great for units well outside of those "university towns".


----------



## Journeyman

Take the Reservists whose priority is Mess Kit/badges/feather boas (you can likely lure them all together by organizing a Garrison Ball soirée on a field training weekend), and dump them directly into the Legion of Frontiersmen.


----------



## Haggis

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Take the Reservists whose priority is Mess Kit/badges/feather boas (you can likely lure them all together by organizing a Garrison Ball soirée on a field training weekend), and dump them directly into the Legion of Frontiersmen.



Are your numbers getting low?   ;D


----------



## Journeyman

Haggis said:
			
		

> Are your numbers getting low?   ;D


For the specific individuals that the Reserves would lose, I'd risk it; step two would then be realistic command hierarchies -- no more LCols commanding Pl(+) / Coy(-) organizations.   :nod:


----------



## Journeyman

;D


----------



## Kirkhill

One thing that I have noticed when comparing reserve systems is how many other countries start off with a 10 to 12 week basic course  on signing.  Just like the regs.  The Regs and Reserves separate after that course.  I'm pretty sure the Swedes, the Danes and the Yanks aren't teaching basic skills on the Weekend. They all seem to start with a solid indoctrination effort right at the very beginning.

The only outfit that I have seen that does without the indoctrination period and tries to train on the Canadian Militia pattern is the Danish Homeguard.  But they are unpaid volunteers who are only employed after they have been tested and approved by the Regs.


----------



## George Wallace

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> One thing that I have noticed when comparing reserve systems is how many other countries start off with a 10 to 12 week basic course  on signing.  Just like the regs.  The Regs and Reserves separate after that course.  I'm pretty sure the Swedes, the Danes and the Yanks aren't teaching basic skills on the Weekend. They all seem to start with a solid indoctrination effort right at the very beginning.
> 
> The only outfit that I have seen that does without the indoctrination period and tries to train on the Canadian Militia pattern is the Danish Homeguard.  But they are unpaid volunteers who are only employed after they have been tested and approved by the Regs.



Back in the day, that is how we used to train the Militia; "Go to Summer Camp and be trained Basic, then move into Trades Training" all in one summer (for most Trades).


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> One thing that I have noticed when comparing reserve systems is how many other countries start off with a 10 to 12 week basic course  on signing.  Just like the regs.  The Regs and Reserves separate after that course.  I'm pretty sure the Swedes, the Danes and the Yanks aren't teaching basic skills on the Weekend. They all seem to start with a solid indoctrination effort right at the very beginning.
> 
> The only outfit that I have seen that does without the indoctrination period and tries to train on the Canadian Militia pattern is the Danish Homeguard.  But they are unpaid volunteers who are only employed after they have been tested and approved by the Regs.



This is a good idea, and I am amazed we always tend to skirt around it with various 'modules' etc,, or being oversensitive to the needs of various secondary/ post-secondary educational programs.

There is no reason why we can't train an Officer to RESO Phase 3 standard within a 6 to 8 month period. In that time I'm sure we could get a soldier to an equivalent level of competency e.g., ready for 2 stripes in all but length of service. 

Both streams would be start together, then diverge after a month or so. They would meet back at the 'Annual Collective Training Event' in August. After that, off you go to your regiment to begin a fulfilling career at whatever you have been trained for.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Back in the day, that is how we used to train the Militia; "Go to Summer Camp and be trained Basic, then move into Trades Training" all in one summer (for most Trades).



That works when you don't have 20lbs of shit crammed into a 5lb bag....as some of our trades training takes up a whole summer to start..


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is a good idea, and I am amazed we always tend to skirt around it with various 'modules' etc,, or being oversensitive to the needs of various secondary/ post-secondary educational programs.
> 
> There is no reason why we can't train an Officer to RESO Phase 3 standard within a 6 to 8 month period. In that time I'm sure we could get a soldier to an equivalent level of competency e.g., ready for 2 stripes in all but length of service.


Might actually be easier for students in some programs to take a term or a year off, rather than dealing with penny-packet disruptions.


----------



## Halifax Tar

***I REALIZE I AM DRIFTING OUTSIDE MY LANE, AND I DIDN'T USE MY BLINKER***

I have many peers who have done RSS jobs/postings.  Most of them hated it.  One of the things they all joked about was going on weekend ex with 1 LCol, CWO, and a whole slew of MWOs, Officers and other WO/Snr NCOs and almost no Jr NCMs.  

Perhaps what is needed is less officers and more NCMs and compulsory training, your civi commitment or job be damned.  Granted some form of parliamentary legislated job protection would be needed but if you want the Army reserve to be taken seriously start acting seriously, step one: hold people accountable.  

I know our Force Pro section on 1-10 was a joke.  It was all Army Reservists from the Toronto Brigade.  19 year old MCpls with 2 years of weekends and  1 hair cut in the army, trying to lead grown men/women with actual experience did not turn out well.  I tell ya, they were great at C7 IAs and stoppages but just about anything else was way, WAY beyond them.  They tried hard, and they did catch on, but it did not start out well.  

***DRIFTING BACK INTO MY LANE***


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Might actually be easier for students in some programs to take a term or a year off, rather than dealing with penny-packet disruptions.



Exactly, especially if they're getting paid full time, which will help fund the rest of their degree or whatever.


----------



## mariomike

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Granted some form of parliamentary legislated job protection would be needed but if you want the Army reserve to be taken seriously start acting seriously, step one: hold people accountable.



As discussed in the Reservists Job Protection Superthread, some employers have a Military Leave policy. Ours was,

A two week leave of absence with pay per calendar year. All benefits continue during the leave. An employee's service is not affected by the leave. An employee's vacation entitlement, seniority and pension credit do not change.

"Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work."

It was negotiated by the union. Perhaps something similar could be legislated?


----------



## Haggis

mariomike said:
			
		

> Perhaps something similar could be legislated?



As noted in great detail in the Job Protection thread, legislating this on a national scale is not going to fly in Canada. Employment law falls squarely in the provincial purview for non federally regulated employers.  There is a hodge-podge of uncoordinated provincial/territorial laws right now, with each jurisdiction offering slightly different protection for Reservists.  I highly doubt the present government will make any moves to harmonize the provincial job protection legislations. 


Edited to remove extra spaces added by the cat.


----------



## Harris

Before we decide what training the reserves do, shouldn't we determine what mission we have first?  As far as I see we currently have none.  Based on some of the comments upthread, we don't even have a standardized training regimen within Divs, not alone across the country.  For example I ran pre-PLQ trg for my guys in Feb this year.  I believe only one other Unit in the Brigade did too I believe.  The only reason I was able to was because there was extra $ around, not because it was mandated.

Unfortunately most of what I see is the regular force wanting us to be more like them (closer to full-time) and the reserve force wanting to be what we currently are (closer to part-time).  Unfortunately we are somewhere in between.  The Government can't have it both ways without the laws and tools to do one or the other.

I've got guys who are edging up on 80-100 class A days (not including short Class B or summer employment).  That isn't the 37.5 (minus various HQ "tax") days we spout to troops.  Nor is that even close to the one weekend a month and one night a week we still tell recruits.  If the part time members of the Unit were forced to only work those hours, the Unit would have to shut down.  I'm being tasked with regular force admin/trg tasks that are done during reserve force hours and things drop off the plate.


----------



## McG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> One thing that I have noticed when comparing reserve systems is how many other countries start off with a 10 to 12 week basic course  on signing.  Just like the regs.  The Regs and Reserves separate after that course.  I'm pretty sure the Swedes, the Danes and the Yanks aren't teaching basic skills on the Weekend. They all seem to start with a solid indoctrination effort right at the very beginning.


10 weeks will not be achievable for NCM as long as we accept high-school students into the force.  For that group, 7 weeks is achievable for an initial block training with some flexibility on dates.  

On the officer side, training has already exceeded that (at least, it exceeded that target at one point in the past).  There was a time (maybe still now) when RESO Ph I was run for all Militia officers by the Infantry School through the month of May (after University academic years, but while RMC was still busy with academic retesting and grad parade rehearsals).  Then the RESO and ROTP officers would come together for Ph II through June and July.  The first week of August was theoretically also Ph II, but in practice it was a week long parade practice for a giant all-CTC grad parade ... I believe some hard PRes occupations (like Armd Recce officer) continued to train through this week and graduated with much more modest ceremonies the week following.  Then for the remainder of August, the RMC students went on leave and the Militia officers went back to their area concentrations.  There were about a dozen weeks of solid block initial training.

I believe the giant CTC summer parade was killed over the past decade for budget constraints and related pressures to reduce student training days, and one could decide that getting fully trained officers is more important than having the newly trained 2Lt at summer concentration.  In theory, there could be 16 to 17 weeks to take a first year university student and turn that individual into a fully qualified Pl Comd before the start of second year (and meaning at least two more employable summers to run courses before that same individual graduates into the civilian job market).

This will not work for all officer occupations, but it could be an achievable model for many.



			
				NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> That works when you don't have 20lbs of shit crammed into a 5lb bag....as some of our trades training takes up a whole summer to start..


So do we say that if it cannot be done in a summer, it cannot be done in the PRes?  Or are there other ways?

What if occupations requiring a full summer just for occupation specific stuff were trained as infantry in the first year.  They could even be employed in an infantry unit over the next year until going to occupation training the next summer and joining the parent unit in the fall.  Unsuccessful students would stay with the infantry.



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> As noted in great detail in the Job Protection thread, legislating this on a national scale is not going to fly in Canada. Employment law falls squarely in the provincial purview for non federally regulated employers.  There is a hodge-podge of uncoordinated provincial/territorial laws right now, with each jurisdiction offering slightly different protection for Reservists.  I highly doubt the present government will make any moves to harmonize the provincial job protection legislations.


More details on that here:  http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/job-protection-legislation.page


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> What if occupations requiring a full summer just for occupation specific stuff were trained as infantry in the first year.  They could even be employed in an infantry unit over the next year until going to occupation training the next summer and joining the parent unit in the fall.  Unsuccessful students would stay with the infantry.



Excellent idea. The infantry should be the place where hopes and dreams go to die. It will prepare them well for the next 'Forlorn Hope' task


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Excellent idea. The infantry should be the place where hopes and dreams go to die. It will prepare them well for the next 'Forlorn Hope' task



 :cheers:  That didn't take long.

Beyond that I think McG presents an interesting basis for discussion.  Especially if it is compared to this:



> TERMS OF ENLISTMENT
> 
> After successful completion of Marine Corps Recruit Training and becoming proficient in their MOS, Marines in the Reserve begin their duties as a Reserve Marine. From this point forward, training periods are called drills, which usually occur one weekend every month and two weeks each summer (full-drill status). The last portion of their commitment is spent in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) where they are not obligated to participate in military activities unless specifically called upon to meet support requirements. Enlistment term options include:
> 
> The first six (6) years are spent in a drilling status with the last two (2) in the IRR. Those who wish to participate in the Post-9/11 GI Bill must choose this program.
> The first five (5) years are spent in a drilling status and the last three (3) will be as an IRR member.
> The first four (4) years are spent in a drilling status and the remaining four (4) in the IRR.



Some of the options buy the High School grad a college or university degree.

Meanwhile, for the Reserve Officer



> A Reserve Officer must meet the same qualification process required of a regular, active-duty officer. Upon completion of OCS, TBS and MOS school, the Reserve Officer will be assigned to a reserve unit. Reserve Officers have the option to choose the location where they will serve, often near their hometown. They commit to training one weekend a month and two weeks a year. The rest of the time, the Reserve Officer enjoys a civilian life, but is ready to be called into action at any time.



http://www.marines.com/eligibility/service-options/reserve?nav=LP1


----------



## runormal

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Might actually be easier for students in some programs to take a term or a year off, rather than dealing with penny-packet disruptions.



It could work, but I have a few reasons why I think it might not:

A) At the university I was at CO-OP started in the second summer, and you couldn't miss any time after that (I gurantee each University is different, but it is definitely something to consider). I got lucky because I transferred into program which gave me two summers to muck around with the reserves ;D. I even asked about the fact that I was a reservist and was told that they didn't accommodate. 
B) Lots of summer student jobs require you to be full time before/after and the work term, depending on when this ends you _might _miss out on a summer of employment in your field. 
C) I know personally I would of lost my parents benefits if I took a term/year off and wasn't full time.  My benefits are fairly lucrative and lot more than what I get as a CLS A reservist in terms of benefits.
D) Member get's hurt on the course. Now what?  
E) What about pre-req's, I've had courses that were only offered _once _ a year, in my 3rd year in a fairly large university. There were also courses that were "easier" to take in the Fall or Winter because there were more time slots. I.E Stats 1 had 6 courses in the Fall and 1 in the Winter, whereas Stats II had 2 in the fall and 4 or 5 in the winter. You need Stats 1 for like 5 other courses and if you had conflict or failed it you typically set yourself behind a semester. Again not the end of the world, but it is something to consider (other programs may have more strict/flexible timelines depending on the major). 
F) Course gets cancelled what now? I've just put my life on hold. 

Don't get me wrong, it most certainly *would be easier* to get trained in one shot. You could train BMQ-L + DRVR WHL + ACISS DP 1.0 in one summer. It would be tight, but for university students it would work. They currently run the DRVR WHL's and the ACISS DP 1.0's back to back and it is working fairly well. Heck if you started the basic on the weekends in Sept and did SQ after you graduated then you could without question train everyone up and have them ready for their 3's in May. (Other than the INF since they don't do SQ any more). High school students are another issue but if they could get BMQ + SQ during the school year, and have 2 months to give.

Could it perhaps be a national course and be optional while still running the other courses in blocks?



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> What if occupations requiring a full summer just for occupation specific stuff were trained as infantry in the first year.  They could even be employed in an infantry unit over the next year until going to occupation training the next summer and joining the parent unit in the fall.  Unsuccessful students would stay with the infantry.



What about the fact the infantry is a V3 Occupation? There are numerous people who I know who are only sigs because they couldn't get into inf in the first place. ACISS DP 1.0 is only 2 months so it _may _be a moot point. However you are "supposed" to have DVR WHL prior to going to go on the course (So i've been told) I believe that the really long NCM courses are combat eng and a lot of the service battalion techs.




			
				Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Perhaps what is needed is less officers and more NCMs and compulsory training, your civi commitment or job be damned.  Granted some form of parliamentary legislated job protection would be needed but if you want the Army reserve to be taken seriously start acting seriously, step one: hold people accountable.



If someone is that available why not just join the reg-f in the first place? As for the civvy job it is going to be a tough sell to task people to take 3-6 months off to go back to part-time after the course. Though again it could work well in seasonal jobs (Fishing, Farming and Construction), and perhaps this is where the reserves should target if they want people other than university students. But when the reserves are working how available are these people going to be?


----------



## LightFighter

MCG said:
			
		

> What if occupations requiring a full summer just for occupation specific stuff were trained as infantry in the first year.  They could even be employed in an infantry unit over the next year until going to occupation training the next summer and joining the parent unit in the fall.  Unsuccessful students would stay with the infantry.



Force people into the infantry before they are allowed to become a clerk, signaller, or whatever?  

Not everyone wants to be Infantry nor is everyone cut out to be a Infantryman. Plus, some people can not meet the medical category for Infantry, but meet the category for their trade. 

As well what happens to these recruits if they do not meet the medical category for the infantry or fail DP1 Infantry? 

As well, I wouldn't want to deal with people in the unit who don't want to be there and are just waiting out until they can go on to their DP1 course and do the job they signed on to be. As well, on the other end of the spectrum, what if Bloggina signs up to be a Maintainer with a Service Battalion but after completing DP1 Infantry and now decides he no longer wants to be a Maintainer. Now the service battalion has lost a new member and has to wait X amount of time until they can get another person to fill that empty position.


----------



## a_majoor

Since people generally follow incentives, then perhaps we need to look at how to incentivise the Reserves for both members and employers.

Incentives for members:

A more realistic pay and benefit package. A pension is fairly meaningless to a 17 year old reservist, but if it was replaced by a group RRSP plan they would see immediate benefits (a tax reduction) as well as a long term benefit (the compounded interest growth of the actual plan). Canadian law also makes the RRSP accessible for things like house down payments, so with proper explanation, this can appeal to the more astute members. Group RRSP programs are generally free, since financial institutions will eat the costs to get your business, and the potential of getting 20,000 customers will have banks and financial institutions jumping through hoops of fire to provide a Reserve Group RRSP. Group RRSP plans will also save a lot of money for the military as well, since conventional pensions are very expensive to run in terms of overhead.

Medical and dental plans. Nothing gold plated, but a very basic coverage plan which also answers the questions like "what happens if I get hurt on training nights?"

Real training opportunities. If Maple Resolve were to be done at the end of the summer when traditional Reserve concentrations were held, you could probably get a vast number of Reservists signing up to go, especially if they were getting to perform in a challenging and fairly realistic environment. There will need to be some very clear boundaries, especially in terms of leadership, but all reserve platoons/equivalent formations with reserve Pl Comd and Pl 2I/C's seem doable.

Make military qualifications transferable to civilian life. This is especially important for the trades, where being a qualified vehicle tech or medic does not seem to translate into the "real world".

Incentives for employers:

Instead of job protection legislation and associated paperwork and red tape, give employers generous tax breaks per reservist, up to some pre set limit. This will give employers an incentive to let people go on training so they can collect the tax break, while careful crafting of the legislation will ensure that "dummy" corporations are not being set up to mine tax benefits by hiring all reservists (shocking thought!) and protecting smaller employers from being hollowed out by their reserve staff leaving at once (say no more than 10% of the work force)

The Reg Force and training system will also have to clean up their acts, especially in terms of being able to plan and delivery courses and training where and when they say they will. No one wants to take valuable vacation time for a course or exercise then get burned by having the dates changed at the last minute. And training will have to be streamlined so people are not being left out in the cold because they need to take a 13.5 week long course but don't have 13.5 weeks available.

OF course that does mean smashing a few rice bowls and dismantling some "empires", but if we want to have an effective reserve force, we do have to think outside the box.


----------



## mariomike

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Make military qualifications transferable to civilian life. This is especially important for the trades, where being a qualified vehicle tech or medic does not seem to translate into the "real world".



If they have the qualifications, now is the time to apply,
http://torontoparamedicservices.ca/paramedic-opportunities/
Closing Date 05-Jan-2016


----------



## ArmyRick

Halifax Tar

"I know our Force Pro section on 1-10 was a joke.  It was all Army Reservists from the Toronto Brigade.  19 year old MCpls with 2 years of weekends and  1 hair cut in the army, trying to lead grown men/women with actual experience did not turn out well.  I tell ya, they were great at C7 IAs and stoppages but just about anything else was way, WAY beyond them.  They tried hard, and they did catch on, but it did not start out well.  
***DRIFTING BACK INTO MY LANE***"

I was not on that tour but I happen to know some of those NCOs and troops. Have something specific or just plain old mud slinging? I know from speaking to an RCR captain on 1-10 that he was sick of wogs slagging force pro when they were doing a fine job.


----------



## ArmyRick

PM sent to Halifax Tar. 

Enough with the reserve bashing, some of us get really sick of it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Halifax Tar
> 
> "I know our Force Pro section on 1-10 was a joke.  It was all Army Reservists from the Toronto Brigade.  19 year old MCpls with 2 years of weekends and  1 hair cut in the army, trying to lead grown men/women with actual experience did not turn out well.  I tell ya, they were great at C7 IAs and stoppages but just about anything else was way, WAY beyond them.  They tried hard, and they did catch on, but it did not start out well.
> ***DRIFTING BACK INTO MY LANE***"
> 
> I was not on that tour but I happen to know some of those NCOs and troops. Have something specific or just plain old mud slinging? I know from speaking to an RCR captain on 1-10 that he was sick of wogs slagging force pro when they were doing a fine job.



I spoke to several NCMs and Officers who did gate guard and their observations were revealing. The gist if it was that reserves are always more effective when employed alongside and fully integrated with their Reg F counterparts, as has been the practice up to this point. When employed in a 'ghetto' on jobs no one else wants to do, like full time gate guards, they don't tend to have the same success rate. And who would, really?


----------



## MilEME09

Thucydides said:
			
		

> OF course that does mean smashing a few rice bowls and dismantling some "empires", but if we want to have an effective reserve force, we do have to think outside the box.



Like the decentralization of training for some trades? take weapons and vehicle techs for example, why the hell does everything need to be taught at RCEME School in Borden? Why not teach in a real world environment, have the school just create the standards, and have people learn at base maintenance/service battalions. This would reduce travel costs and the reservist would get to see real world problems, and learn to fix them. Not some broken part that some Sgt took a grinder to so it acted broken, or reblue a part (cause that happens in real life when a part breaks).


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Thucydides said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> OF course that does mean smashing a few rice bowls and dismantling some "empires", but if we want to have an effective reserve force, we do have to think outside the box.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Like the decentralization of training for some trades? take weapons and vehicle techs for example, why the hell does everything need to be taught at RCEME School in Borden? Why not teach in a real world environment, have the school just create the standards, and have people learn at base maintenance/service battalions. This would reduce travel costs and the reservist would get to see real world problems, and learn to fix them. Not some broken part that some Sgt took a grinder to so it acted broken, or reblue a part (cause that happens in real life when a part breaks).
Click to expand...


I'm no expert, but that sounds like a traditional Journeyman-Apprentice kind of approach to trades training.

Don't we do that already somewhere in the system for trades people? I hope?


----------



## McG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Like the decentralization of training for some trades? take weapons and vehicle techs for example, why the hell does everything need to be taught at RCEME School in Borden? Why not teach in a real world environment, have the school just create the standards, and have people learn at base maintenance/service battalions.


Running maintenance courses on the backs of line units has the negative effect of cutting into production.  I don't know any unit (Reg or Res) with a healthy enough VOR to look after its own trucks and run a QL3.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I'm no expert, but that sounds like a traditional Journeyman-Apprentice kind of approach to trades training.
> 
> Don't we do that already somewhere in the system for trades people? I hope?


RCEME and construction trades do this, but members must get through QL3 to form the baseline before doing a QL4 OJT which then leads to a QL5 and trade qualification.



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> Force people into the infantry before they are allowed to become a clerk, signaller, or whatever?


No.  Train people as infantry if they are in occupations which cannot be trained to QL3 in the members' initial summer block training.  The individuals are then employable in an occupation until they are able to get back into the training system and qualify in the trade they enrolled into.



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> Not everyone wants to be Infantry nor is everyone cut out to be a Infantryman.


If you are in the Army and an operation goes bad, you might have to fight like infantry regardless of what you want to be.  So this is training that can benefit anyone regardless of their intended end-state occupation



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> ... what if Bloggina signs up to be a Maintainer with a Service Battalion but after completing DP1 Infantry and now decides he no longer wants to be a Maintainer. Now the service battalion has lost a new member and has to wait X amount of time until they can get another person to fill that empty position.


Or, there opens an OT opportunity for someone who joined as infantry but realized that is not the path for them.

Regardless, if you don't like the idea, how do you address the problem of PRes who spend multiples of years untrained in any occupation?




			
				MCG said:
			
		

> So do we say that if it cannot be done in a summer, it cannot be done in the PRes?  Or are there other ways?


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> When employed in a 'ghetto' on jobs no one else wants to do, like full time gate guards, they don't tend to have the same success rate. And who would, really?



So because someone doesn't feel their assigned task is "cool" enough or feel that it's below them, that's sufficient justification to not do a good job?


----------



## Haggis

Spectrum said:
			
		

> So because someone doesn't feel their assigned task is "cool" enough or feel that it's below them, that's sufficient justification to not do a good job?



Never.  You make the best of it.  Get inventive, invest some time in PD and continuation training.  Don't wallow in your situation.  Make it better.

Conversely, others should treat those doing "ghetto" jobs (i.e. gate guard) appropriately.  They deserve to be treated with the same respect as anyone else in uniform.  I have seen this first-hand, both in the CAF and on civvy street.   They are doing a job you'd rather not do.  Help them do it well.


----------



## RCPalmer

My Apologies,

I am a long time lurker, but this is a great discussion.

I think that daftandbarmy's point here is that the quality and variety of the tasks undertaken by an organization will impact their performance.

The general principle in any military organization is that you "spread the pain" on any unpleasant duty.  I would consider gate guard to be a prime example of that.  If you put a Regular Force platoon on uninterrupted gate guard duty for six months, they would have discipline problems too.

To build on the example being referenced, I think you will find that in Afghanistan, the reserve NSE and PRT Force Pro platoons that rotated through convoy escort and other mobile force protection duties performed much better than those who were relegated to purely gate guard work.  However, if you create a reserve platoon, and assign it the tasks no one else wants, they will consider themselves to be part of the "ghetto" unit.  It is not an excuse for not doing a good job, but it is not exactly a model for building trust and mutual respect between the RegF and PRes either.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

There seems to be a few posters who do not know the current situation with regard to training in the PRes.
Current training progression for a reserve infantry (because that's what I'm familiar with) officer;

*For PRes only *
-4 week* BMQ*; NCMs and Officer combined, offered as a weekend course or full time

-2 week *BMOQ*; Primarily learning battle procedure and small party tasks, offered part-time or full time

*Reg Force/ PRes combined courses* (run collectively, no PRes specific course)

10 week *BMOQ(L)*; 
-still commonly referred to as CAP, formerly just in Gagetown or Aldershot but now offered at various locations across Canada
-broken into 10 modules of 2 weeks
-rumored to soon be changed to become shorter, possibly as short as 6 weeks

13 Week *IODP 1.1*; 
-Only run in Gagetown. 1 x / year (summer)

-The course commonly starts with about 100+ candidates in 3 Platoons and ultimately graduates a platoon (or less) 

-broken into 3 modules of 1 month (ish), mods must be completed within 3 summers (so if you miss a summer because of work or injury you go back to day 1)

-The Brits do a separate reserve infantry officer course which is primarily DL at the unit and then a 2 week residency/ confirmation. Interestingly the reserve PLQ/WO and Inf O are all run together in composite platoons. 

-I think 2 weeks is too short but perhaps a reserve IODP 1.1 in 6 weeks, broken into 2 week mods would be more realistic for training people who have jobs etc. As a working professional I personally find getting away for more than 2 weeks at a time to be very challenging… 

I realize that the infantry corps as a whole has serious reservations about “diluting” how the course is delivered and views the 13 weeks as a “gut check” however the current set-up is not producing the number of trained officers required by the reserves; some but certainly not all of this can be blamed on the units for recruiting inappropriate people. Surely there are other (more efficient) methods of weeding out people who don’t make the cut.

It’s all well and good to say you will only select candidates who are first year university students but this may mean picking those who merit lower during the board interviews, not to mention violating a myriad of employment standards. Those first year university kids have often also not worked out either for various reasons.

*Reserve concentrations*; Division or Brigade level, these do occur annually in Spring or August
Frequently summer courses overlap, but even when they do not very few candidates are inclined (or able) after already being gone for 2 or more months to spend an additional 2 weeks away from family/ regular employment. Most attendees are those soldiers who were not doing summer courses as staff or candidates. 

Using these exercises as a confirmation of summer training would certainly increase attendance and potentially give bang for buck in training value. Potential downside would be diluting the training experience for the main audience.

*37.5 Class A days/ Year*
As for "regular" training during the Sept - May/ June time frame, regular exercises have been disrupted for some time as we try to run courses and conduct "make-up" training for things not covered in the infantry DP 1.1. Many of us do train far in excess of 1 weekend and 4 weeknights/ month as we try to accomplish everything that needs to get done. Not sure how valuable weekend exercises are anyway, at least beyond a few shake out weekends prior to a summer concentration. I learned more in 10 days on Grizzly Defender than I did in a year or two of weekends.

*Current Role*
As for our role, it seems clear to me; provide 1 Domestic Response Company on 72hours NTM for civil emergencies and provide individual augmentees to the regular force for operations overseas.  I feel that we do both of these things reasonably well… We deployed our DRC during Lentus 2013 in less than 48 hours and we sent so many troops to Afghanistan that we earned a unit commendation.  
  
Despite the comments about reservists on 1-10, judging from the individual honours and awards many of our soldiers and officers received for their work while deployed, and general feedback from reg force OICs most of the people we sent performed at an adequate level and many at a very high level..

In summary, from my worms eye view the PRes still delivers value for money, however we are currently hampered by some structural training and training delivery issues which are degrading our capacity. More money for equipment would also be nice, but then I might as well ask for a pony and…


----------



## blacktriangle

Haggis said:
			
		

> Never.  You make the best of it.  Get inventive, invest some time in PD and continuation training.  Don't wallow in your situation.  Make it better.
> 
> Conversely, others should treat those doing "ghetto" jobs (i.e. gate guard) appropriately.  They deserve to be treated with the same respect as anyone else in uniform.  I have seen this first-hand, both in the CAF and on civvy street.   They are doing a job you'd rather not do.  Help them do it well.



I agree. I personally won't downplay things like gate guard. Sometimes these guys are protecting some pretty important assets i.e. aircraft, communications/intelligence infrastructure etc. Aircrew or analysts in an ASIC can't do their jobs very well if suicide bombers are driving on to the base and causing all hell to break loose. 

The problem I see is a sense of entitlement to do "cool" things while forgoing more basic (yet necessary) tasks. The attitude is rampant in my RegF job, and I also noticed it during my short stint as a reservist.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The general principle in any military organization is that you "spread the pain" on any unpleasant duty.  I would consider gate guard to be a prime example of that.  If you put a Regular Force platoon on uninterrupted gate guard duty for six months, they would have discipline problems too.



Bingo.

During various ops I've been on we never had troops who were gate guards 100% of the time. We had troops who were assigned 'Guard duty' for short periods of time as part of a rotation between guard force, patrols, and other duties. 

Coincidentally, we found that spending time on the gate, or in permanent OPs or sangars helped troops get information and context that helped them when they were out on the ground or doing other things later.


----------



## LightFighter

MCG said:
			
		

> No.  Train people as infantry if they are in occupations which cannot be trained to QL3 in the members' initial summer block training.  The individuals are then employable in an occupation until they are able to get back into the training system and qualify in the trade they enrolled into.



If a member can take 6 weeks(or how ever long DP1 Infantry currrently) is, wouldn't they be able to complete the QL3 course of the trade they signed up for, or at least modules of it? As well, throwing in a DP1 Infantry into a member's pipeline for initial training just means the candidate must request more time off from work, as well is more money a unit must spend to get recruits qualified.

As well, what about the pers who do not meet the medical category of Infantry or fail off on a DP1 Infantry course?



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> If you are in the Army and an operation goes bad, you might have to fight like infantry regardless of what you want to be.  So this is training that can benefit anyone regardless of their intended end-state occupation



Isn't BMQ-Land supposed to get Army pers(and I believe some Navy/Air Force pers in purple trades) supposed to do? Make them into "rifleman" and able to conduct certain activities at a basic level. IMO, saying "fight like Infantry" implies they are more competent than they really are at the Infantryman's job(at least with the current training system). 

As well, it may even loose potential applicants if they had to complete a DP1 Infantry. I've met more than a few people in the Army, who have zero interest in doing any Infantry/Soldier tasks. 



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Or, there opens an OT opportunity for someone who joined as infantry but realized that is not the path for them.



How is this different than the current system? If someone decides the Infantry is not for them, they can Cease Training during their DP1 or submit a OT in the future.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Regardless, if you don't like the idea, how do you address the problem of PRes who spend multiples of years untrained in any occupation?


First thoughts are the following COAs

COA1 - More generous job protection/legislatrion so members can take the time off, especially in the first year to get to OFP. As well, have members sign a contract on entry that they will attend all DP1 level courses(eg BMQ/BMOQ, DP1/QL3, etc) within X amount of time. Also, ensure the training system is capable of making this happen.

COA2 - Have the longer DP1 courses go to a modular system(if they haven't already). Possibly have the unit/brigade battle school  able to conduct some of the PO/EC/mods. 

COA3 - if all else fails, have more of the classroom material go DL so the recruits can go on course, do a refresher of the DL material and go straight into the hands on. Although, I am really a fan of DL for the DP1 level.


----------



## McG

LightFighter said:
			
		

> If a member can take 6 weeks(or how ever long DP1 Infantry currrently) is, wouldn't they be able to complete the QL3 course of the trade they signed up for, or at least modules of it?


Okay, I perceive now that you read my earlier post without having read any conversation leading up to it.  I will summarize.

The discussion had suggested that taking multiple years to train a reservist was a problem and that proper military indoctrination should be done in a solid training block of 10 to 12 weeks (so, not weekend BMQs and certainly not sitting in front of a screen to do DL).  It was also suggested that a civilian could be trained into a PRes infantry private in a summer training block if the system were to break from the existing series of courses and replace that with a purposed designed (more efficient) single course to achieve that aim.  The same could be done with some other occupations, but not all other occupations.  But, from the ealier discussion, we don't want untrained individuals hanging about units over time measured in years.  That brings us here:



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> So do we say that if [an occupation] cannot be [trained] in a summer, it cannot be done in the PRes?  Or are there other ways?



One other way is to use entry occupations that can be done in one summer.  Infantry had been identified as an occupation that could be done in a single summer.



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> As well, what about the pers who do not meet the medical category of Infantry ...


Then maybe identify alternate entry occupations for such pers.  Maybe Recce Crewman or MSE Op could be trained from civilian to Private in a single summer.



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> COA1 - More generous job protection/legislatrion so members can take the time off, especially in the first year to get to OFP. As well, have members sign a contract on entry that they will attend all DP1 level courses(eg BMQ/BMOQ, DP1/QL3, etc) within X amount of time. Also, ensure the training system is capable of making this happen.


This would be the easy button.  It is also a hope CoA.  Neither the CAF nor even the federal government control either provincial job protection legislation or academic cycles of high-school and post secondary institutions.  Waiting for perfect conditions could mean waiting forever.  The CAF needs a plan that is at least within the preview of the federal government to implement.  



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> COA2 - Have the longer DP1 courses go to a modular system(if they haven't already). Possibly have the unit/brigade battle school  able to conduct some of the PO/EC/mods.


This produces individuals who return to their units for at least a year untrained in any occupation. 



			
				LightFighter said:
			
		

> COA3 - if all else fails, have more of the classroom material go DL so the recruits can go on course, do a refresher of the DL material and go straight into the hands on. Although, I am really a fan of DL for the DP1 level.


... and this fails to deliver the block indoctrination desired by others.


----------



## runormal

Which trades can't be trained in a summer? 

For NCM's 
I know the following can: Sigs, Inf, Clerk, Arty, Mp.

I believe the following can: Medic, Supply Tech, MSE-OP, amoured recee, cook.

I know the following can't: Combat ENG, Vehicle Tech

I have no idea about: INT OP, Weapons Tech.

I may have missed a few trades, but I'm fairly confident that most NCM trades can be trained in one summer.

The biggest issue I've seen for members not being able to get trained where two things:
-Member availability (school/work/personal issues)
-Course availability 

While like you said we can't control provincial legislation or school schedules we can do our best to mitigate this. Right now I say we do a good job.

Legalisation is not the way to solve a problem, force employers to give time off? Way to create a negative stigma for the reserves.... Like other people have said the best way would be tax credits/write offs.

At the end of the day if a member wants to take time off work for a coursee, the employer needs to pay someone to "act", perhaps multiple employees and potentially a student or a temp employee to fill in responsibility at the bottom. While possibilly paying the employees salary or even just "topping them up". 

Among everything else, Joe Smith could fail, VR, get hurt and be medically RTU. The course dates could change, the course could be cancelled

And for what? So Joe Smith can be qualified on the 521, CI and know how to set up a rad Detachment? 

How does this relate to my civvy Job? Unless I work in some field of engineering/radio/ telecommunications it is going to be a tough sell.

Yes it might keep Joe Smith happy and he may stay at company X longer but most people don't think like that. There also maybe transferable skills.

Don't get me wrong there are transferable skills I've learned such as attention to detail and ability to handle stress and multi tasking.  I've been told by countless people "we can't believe for someone so young your attention to detail". I attribute this directly to inspections on course. Even other things like writing PDR's have helped.

The other major issue is the training system. It took me two summers to get trained for something that at the time was 3 months. 1 month for SQ and 2 months for DP1. After I finished DP1 in June " Are we done for the summer?" "Yup see you in September". So I go back to my student Job and two weeks later " WE'VE GOT A SPOT FOR YOU ON YOUR DP 1,  it starts next week does that work for you?" "No sorry, I've already told my other employer I'm back for the sumner".

Then when we look at my SQ there was only 2 PLTs training in May vice 4 for the other 2 courses. But unless you were on the may course you wouldn't even be able to do your 3s in the same summer*. *unless you were infantry because it took only two months and the dates didnt overlap. Who was in my PLT? 80% Infantry,  when in reality it should of been all of the support trades because our DP 1.0s take longer. :facepalm:


----------



## LightFighter

MCG said:
			
		

> Okay, I perceive now that you read my earlier post without having read any conversation leading up to it.  I will summarize.
> 
> The discussion had suggested that taking multiple years to train a reservist was a problem and that proper military indoctrination should be done in a solid training block of 10 to 12 weeks (so, not weekend BMQs and certainly not sitting in front of a screen to do DL).  It was also suggested that a civilian could be trained into a PRes infantry private in a summer training block if the system were to break from the existing series of courses and replace that with a purposed designed (more efficient) single course to achieve that aim.  The same could be done with some other occupations, but not all other occupations.  But, from the ealier discussion, we don't want untrained individuals hanging about units over time measured in years.  That brings us here:One other way is to use entry occupations that can be done in one summer.  Infantry had been identified as an occupation that could be done in a single summer.
> Then maybe identify alternate entry occupations for such pers.  Maybe Recce Crewman or MSE Op could be trained from civilian to Private in a single summer.



Yea I did go on a tangent based on the current system in reply to your last post with regards to my COAs, my apologies.

To get back on discussion regarding the block indoctrination/training if the system could be worked where a member/untrained recruit shows up at the start of summer and at the end of it they are trades qualified that would be great.  My issue with it was the idea of making recruits who are unable to do the QL3 of the trade they signed up to be and having them complete another trade's QL3 course. IMO, it's just adding more cost and possibly other issues(ex member not wanting to be trained in another trade). I'd rather see the member complete at least a portion(mod) of the QL3 course of the trade they signed up to be, followed by OJT and possibly a mod taught over the parade/training nights and weekends and finished off the following summer.  

Aside from I believe only a couple NCM trades, the majority of Army Reserve NCM trades could probably be trained in one summer. Assuming courses can be confirmed/dates set in stone, and staff being available to run these courses having recruits do all their training in one large block over the summer would be ideal.  Also, provided the recruits are available to do 10-12 weeks straight.


----------



## Kirkhill

If, at the end of the first summer block the candidate knows who to salute, which uniform to wear, how to fire and care for a rifle safely, how to operate a radio and how to drive a 4x4 cross country, then that person becomes usefully employable in a variety of trades.  And you can probably figure out who is motivated to continue with self-directed learning that will permit new skills to be checked out during weekend drills - all of which should include some range time (at least if they are infantry).

That means that during the two weeks annual exercise the candidate can fall in as a supernumerary on a rifle section or an MG det or a mortar det, gun det, radio det......  and learn by watching.  Meanwhile the reg force unit gains strong and willing backs.

As for the trades training aspect of things - why do you need to go to school to get accreditation before you are allowed to hand a wrench to a mechanic, or go fetch a can of 10W30?  Many tradesmen have learned their craft simply by being gophers for experienced hands.


----------



## Jed

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> If, at the end of the first summer block the candidate knows who to salute, which uniform to wear, how to fire and care for a rifle safely, how to operate a radio and how to drive a 4x4 cross country, then that person becomes usefully employable in a variety of trades.  And you can probably figure out who is motivated to continue with self-directed learning that will permit new skills to be checked out during weekend drills - all of which should include some range time (at least if they are infantry).
> 
> That means that during the two weeks annual exercise the candidate can fall in as a supernumerary on a rifle section or an MG det or a mortar det, gun det, radio det......  and learn by watching.  Meanwhile the reg force unit gains strong and willing backs.
> 
> As for the trades training aspect of things - why do you need to go to school to get accreditation before you are allowed to hand a wrench to a mechanic, or go fetch a can of 10W30?  Many tradesmen have learned their craft simply by being gophers for experienced hands.




An often overlooked factor in our new society that values paper accreditation above actual capabilities.


----------



## mariomike

runormal said:
			
		

> At the end of the day if a member wants to take time off work for a coursee, the employer needs to pay someone to "act", perhaps multiple employees and potentially a student or a temp employee to fill in responsibility at the bottom. While possibilly paying the employees salary or even just "topping them up".



Where I worked, it cost the city 80 hours at double time a half ( plus benefits ) "for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program."


----------



## Eaglelord17

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> As for the trades training aspect of things - why do you need to go to school to get accreditation before you are allowed to hand a wrench to a mechanic, or go fetch a can of 10W30?  Many tradesmen have learned their craft simply by being gophers for experienced hands.



This falls into the militaries fear of allowing people who aren't 'qualified' to do something without formal courses (even if they have proper supervision). There are people in the military which are civvy side qualified aircraft engineers, but are not allowed to touch a truck because they haven't gotten the formal qualification. This is not a exaggeration as I have seen it. 

In regards to not being trades trained in a year, is it really that big a issue? Personally I am not currently trades qualified in my current trade however, most people who don't know me think I am due to the fact I have figured out how/been informally trained how to do most of my trade. 

The other thing about being trades qualified, is realistically how often as a Reservist is it actually used? Regular garrison nights, they aren't used (for the most part) and most work is GD related (which anyone can do). For a weekend ex, sometimes you just need a co-driver whether or not the co-driver is actually qualified to do anything.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Before a gun detachment commander becomes one, they have spent time in each position of the gun, then time as the 2IC. The Detachment commanders course just fills in the gaps and adds another level on top of all that experience. Unlikely some armies who train a raw recruit to NCO/commander in one go. Generally by the time a NCO gets to be a gun commander, they have worked for 2-3 different ones and gained a lot of practical knowledge. I know that really helped me. Quality mentoring has a lot of value. Perhaps this element is missing with the focus on checking the boxes?


----------



## a_majoor

Colin P said:
			
		

> Before a gun detachment commander becomes one, they have spent time in each position of the gun, then time as the 2IC. The Detachment commanders course just fills in the gaps and adds another level on top of all that experience. Unlikely some armies who train a raw recruit to NCO/commander in one go. Generally by the time a NCO gets to be a gun commander, they have worked for 2-3 different ones and gained a lot of practical knowledge. I know that really helped me. Quality mentoring has a lot of value. Perhaps this element is missing with the focus on checking the boxes?



In "Continental System" military forces, NCO's are often given their stripes upon completion of some technical speciality (i.e the sergeant is a radio operator or vehicle mechanic), while jobs like gun detachment commander are actually given to junior officers (who do the sorts of jobs that are usually the province of NCO's in British/American/Commonwealth system military forces).

While it pains me to say this, time and resource constraints may make a Reserve military force on the British/American/Commomwealth system virtually impossible to do, and so long as *we* continue to restrict resources to the Reserves and allow what little resources *we* do get to be poorly allocated, then perhaps the Continental model might actually be more appropriate for the Canadian Reserves.


----------



## PuckChaser

We can't have 2 different rank models, unless you never plan on deploying the Reserves to augment the Regular Force, or even having them work together. We already have enough issues with inflated ranks on deployments to match other countries (Op ATTENTION comes to mind).


----------



## OldSolduer

Remius said:
			
		

> Well there was also teh statement that some areas cannot promote growth.  Hopefully this means cutting those reserve unit that struggle to recruit and maintain adequate numbers and beef up those that can.



Don't count on that. We have two infantry regiments, an armoured recce regiment, a Service Company, a Med Coy and some MPs in Winnipeg and that is hard to sustain. In a city of around 700,000 we can't fill our establishment. 
Having said that, the solution IMO is to put all that clag under comd of one  LCol and be done with it.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Don't count on that. We have two infantry regiments, an armoured recce regiment, a Service Company, a Med Coy and some MPs in Winnipeg and that is hard to sustain. In a city of around 700,000 we can't fill our establishment.



Don't forget 31 Engineer Squadron too....


----------



## Brad Sallows

I'd be curious to know how much of the Res F recruitment/retention problem is due to constant policy shifting.  Do USAR and NG forces have to cope with constantly changing conditions to a comparable degree?


----------



## quadrapiper

Remius said:
			
		

> Well there was also the statement that some areas cannot promote growth.  Hopefully this means cutting those reserve unit that struggle to recruit and maintain adequate numbers and beef up those that can.


A flexibly structured PRes would include, IMO, the ability to scale units up or down as local demographics wax and wane, even if that means a captain, WO, and RMS MCpl as RHQ. Keeps the CAF in general visible, following the same line of reasoning that saw NRDs established far, far away from salt water.

What's the smallest sustainable unit? A platoon?


----------



## Kirkhill

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> A flexibly structured PRes would include, IMO, the ability to scale units up or down as local demographics wax and wane, even if that means a captain, WO, and RMS MCpl as RHQ. Keeps the CAF in general visible, following the same line of reasoning that saw NRDs established far, far away from salt water.
> 
> What's the smallest sustainable unit? A platoon?



QP:

You just described the basic organizing principle that kept the British Army supplied with troops from Cromwell's day until WW1.  The Company led by a Capt and his Sergeant, with a coy clerk.  The size of the company ranged in size from 40 to 200.  Companies were grouped in regiments for administration then divided into battalions for fighting wars.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> We can't have 2 different rank models, unless you never plan on deploying the Reserves to augment the Regular Force, or even having them work together. We already have enough issues with inflated ranks on deployments to match other countries (Op ATTENTION comes to mind).



Actually the RN did that for years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Naval_Reserve


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> Actually the RN did that for years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Naval_Reserve



And don't forget the Wavy Navy (the R(C)NVR)







   R(C)N






   R(C)NR






   R(C)NVR

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2aaRN-PayTables00Ranks-Badges.htm


----------



## Journeyman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And don't forget the Wavy Navy (the R(C)NVR)


That would meet the needs of the "let's change badges" crowd.

As for a Company led by a Capt and his Sergeant, with a Coy clerk.... the horror.  All those LCols and Majors-in-waiting simply couldn't go on.  

Sure, there'd likely be some downside too...


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Interestingly enough, however (and it is seldom mentioned), the ratings, be they Chiefs, Petty Officers, seamen or boys, had no distinction whatever between the "three" navies (Regular, Reserve, Volunteer Reserve), unless you count the seamen cap tallies that would identify their unit as a reserve one while serving there.


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> .....
> 
> As for a Company led by a Capt and his Sergeant, with a Coy clerk.... the horror.  All those LCols and Majors-in-waiting simply couldn't go on.
> 
> ......



Eggzackly.  The only reason those old Regimental Colonels paid LCols and Majors was to do the actual work that they themselves were unwilling to do.  Thing was - the cost of those LCols and Majors came out of their profits - a major disincentive for hiring them.  Likewise for Captains hiring Lieutenants and taking on Ensigns.

Time to put the commission back into the commission.


----------



## Jed

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Eggzackly.  The only reason those old Regimental Colonels paid LCols and Majors was to do the actual work that they themselves were unwilling to do.  Thing was - the cost of those LCols and Majors came out of their profits - a major disincentive for hiring them.  Likewise for Captains hiring Lieutenants and taking on Ensigns.
> 
> Time to put the commission back into the commission.



Yep, but who would do the never ending mandated poltically correct nauz?  When Op orders go back to 1 page and harassment briefs are forgone and societal experimentation doesn't rule, we can slim down our ORBAT.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jed said:
			
		

> Yep, but who would do the never ending mandated poltically correct nauz?  When Op orders go back to 1 page and harassment briefs are forgone and societal experimentation doesn't rule, we can slim down our ORBAT.



Once upon a time most senior leaders had enough experience and character to filter out the important from the trivial, and spare their troops the latter. This allowed us to get on wit things with far fewer 'PowerPoint builders' than we have now.

In some areas this is still the case, of course, and we should look upon these areas of good practice as examples to follow.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Have all the "Obligatory courses" taught by NDHQ types, except all of them must be taught while in the field, during a live fire ex and in a tactical setting. Having the class dug in while MG's rip overhead should provide entertainment to the troops watching the presenter crap themselves. After all you want them to be able apply these important lessons they are learning while under stress.  8)


----------



## a_majoor

Journeyman said:
			
		

> As for a Company led by a Capt and his Sergeant, with a Coy clerk.... the horror.  All those LCols and Majors-in-waiting simply couldn't go on.



Funny, in Starship Troopers Heinlein felt that was the ideal ORBAT for a company sized unit that carried tactical nucelar weapons and was capable of dropping onto the  target from space. (The clerk jumped in as well....)

I can only imagine what sort of organization would be dreamed up to use these capabilities if they were to become available today (and reading Karl Schroeder's attempts to write military futurology isn't going to help).


----------



## a_majoor

I'm starting to rethink a lot of things here.

Given the ever increasing complexity of the things *we* want to do, we should be considering taking only the high end capabilities into the Regular Forces, including enablers.

For many enablers and even trades, we can augment Regulars with reservists on the UK 77 Brigade model. Imagine the CF cyber capability with half full time Regular personnel, with the other half hired from high end IT positions who can keep the unit updated with current trends, industry training and techniques. Similarly a medical unit might have its reserve half made up of civilian doctors, nurses, paramedics and other medical professionals. Service Battalions are also capable of using this model, hiring class A mechanics, and civilians who work in clerical, logistics and other trades as their Reservists. 

For the Combat Arms, it is a bit dicier, but lets say each Brigade needs enough Regulars to man an IRU, and the R2HR and HR Brigades get fleshed out with reservists who fill the rifleman, gun number and other slots which require less training and experience. Reservists who are in the R2HR and HR Brigade get trade and career courses (and it is probably a good idea to "overstock" the R2HR Brigade to ensure that you will have enough people aboard when you cycle to HR), which provides a pool of people who go back to their units and provide the training and leadership in the Reserve world.

This should also provide enough actual troops to cary out DOMOPS if required, without the massive games of musical chairs necessary to carry out these tasks or cut and paste battle groups together for deployments. Even with the low number of troops available today (Infanteer's example of his battalion being short almost 100 men is probably not an isolated example), the battalions can concentrate their manpower for the IRU task, and "flesh out" with reservists as they move up the readiness ladder.

This also leads into another hobby horse of mine: equipment.

In order for a system like this to work, Reservists need to be familiar with the equipment they will fall into if/when they marry up with the Regular Force pars of their units/Brigades. Having a few large families of vehicles/equipment in sufficient numbers provides low unit costs for purchase, simplified logistics and seamless transitions between training and deployment. It also provides a much larger pool of equipment to raid when the Regular Force actually needs to cover contingencies, and is less likely to cripple Reserve training when that does have to happen.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I'm starting to rethink a lot of things here.
> 
> Given the ever increasing complexity of the things *we* want to do, we should be considering taking only the high end capabilities into the Regular Forces, including enablers.



They couldn't afford us


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> They couldn't afford us



LOL!


Then let's make it one and only one CAF; no Regular Force and no Primary Reserve.  Everyone in their Trade does the same courses.

Those who parade once a week and weekends (Part time) get paid Class A.

Those who hold full-time positions, get paid Class B.

Those who deploy overseas get paid Class C.  

Part-timers will be able to hold civilian jobs or go to school (perhaps even get rid of RMC).  If they want full-time employment, they can apply for Class B or Class C.  One Pay System covers them all.  One Training System covers them all.  One Supply System covers them all.  One Pension covers them all.


----------



## cavalryman

George Wallace said:
			
		

> LOL!
> 
> 
> Then let's make it one and only one CAF; no Regular Force and no Primary Reserve.  Everyone in their Trade does the same courses.
> 
> Those who parade once a week and weekends (Part time) get paid Class A.
> 
> Those who hold full-time positions, get paid Class B.
> 
> Those who deploy overseas get paid Class C.
> 
> Part-timers will be able to hold civilian jobs or go to school (perhaps even get rid of RMC).  If they want full-time employment, they can apply for Class B or Class C.  One Pay System covers them all.  One Training System covers them all.  One Supply System covers them all.  One Pension covers them all.


And one ring to rule them all.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

George Wallace said:
			
		

> LOL!
> 
> 
> Then let's make it one and only one CAF; no Regular Force and no Primary Reserve.  Everyone in their Trade does the same courses.
> 
> Those who parade once a week and weekends (Part time) get paid Class A.
> 
> Those who hold full-time positions, get paid Class B.
> 
> Those who deploy overseas get paid Class C.
> 
> Part-timers will be able to hold civilian jobs or go to school (perhaps even get rid of RMC).  If they want full-time employment, they can apply for Class B or Class C.  One Pay System covers them all.  One Training System covers them all.  One Supply System covers them all.  One Pension covers them all.



And cause that makes alot of sense .. it will never catch on..... ;D


----------



## runormal

Are you guys actually being serious :facepalm:?

With regular force basic being 13 weeks alone who the hell is going to take that much time off work for a part time job? Let's not forget SQ plus DP1, Driver Wheel, Dp2, PLQ. 

So it would take a reservist at least two if not three summers to be trained to the DP 1.0 level. Before DP 2.0, PLQ and driver wheel.

You can't just simply take off semesters either, this has implications for benefits from your parents, eligibility for scholarships, student employment opportunities (outside of the army),  not every course is offered every semester. 

Unless the CF wants to introduce a robust benefits package, a scholarship program and other me steady cls B employment because my course schedule is fucked up, I might as well wait tables...


----------



## quadrapiper

runormal said:
			
		

> Are you guys actually being serious :facepalm:?
> 
> With regular force basic being 13 weeks alone who the hell is going to take that much time off work for a part time job? Let's not forget SQ plus DP1, Driver Wheel, Dp2, PLQ.
> 
> So it would take a reservist at least two if not three summers to be trained to the DP 1.0 level. Before DP 2.0, PLQ and driver wheel.
> 
> You can't just simply take off semesters either, this has implications for benefits from your parents, eligibility for scholarships, student employment opportunities (outside of the army),  not every course is offered every semester.
> 
> Unless the CF wants to introduce a robust benefits package, a scholarship program and other me steady cls B employment because my course schedule is fucked up, I might as well wait tables...


It's unrealistic until the CAF can join up enough training for going from "attested" to "employable" to become a proper gap year option, pre, post, or midway through post secondary.


----------



## George Wallace

You want to get serious?  OK:



			
				runormal said:
			
		

> Are you guys actually being serious :facepalm:?
> 
> With regular force basic being 13 weeks alone who the hell is going to take that much time off work for a part time job? Let's not forget SQ plus DP1, Driver Wheel, Dp2, PLQ.
> 
> So it would take a reservist at least two if not three summers to be trained to the DP 1.0 level. Before DP 2.0, PLQ and driver wheel.



A great majority of Primary Reservists join while they are in High School and continue on through university.  That is a good eight years right there.  They have three months on average, every summer, where they are looking for employment.  Three months is enough time to get them through a Basic Crse in St Jean, and then OJT at their unit, Trades training the next summer, PLQ another summer, etc.  They parade at their unit in the Fall, Winter and Spring, and do full-time training in the summers.  



			
				runormal said:
			
		

> You can't just simply take off semesters either, this has implications for benefits from your parents, eligibility for scholarships, student employment opportunities (outside of the army),  not every course is offered every semester.



???  There is no need to take off semesters.  Students, as stated above, would parade as they currently do at their own units, and will have full-time (Class B) employment to do courses in the summer.  Of course, they can pass up doing 'military' training and carry on with job placements that fill educational requirements or go on ED&T.  

When it comes to military courses; well the Schools will just have to get off their butts and actually plan their Course Scheduling to accommodate the "New CAF".



			
				runormal said:
			
		

> Unless the CF wants to introduce a robust benefits package, a scholarship program and other me steady cls B employment because my course schedule is fucked up, I might as well wait tables...



There are already programs in place:  ROTP, RESO, UTPM, and on and on.  Some would have to be amended to reflect the "New CAF" and some would likely be deleted.  For instance, perhaps ROTP would be expanded to cover all officer candidates who are in a university program, no matter what unit they are members of.


----------



## George Wallace

Just think of all the people who can get their box "promoting change" checked off.   [


----------



## daftandbarmy

runormal said:
			
		

> Are you guys actually being serious :facepalm:?
> 
> With regular force basic being 13 weeks alone who the hell is going to take that much time off work for a part time job? Let's not forget SQ plus DP1, Driver Wheel, Dp2, PLQ.
> 
> So it would take a reservist at least two if not three summers to be trained to the DP 1.0 level. Before DP 2.0, PLQ and driver wheel.
> 
> You can't just simply take off semesters either, this has implications for benefits from your parents, eligibility for scholarships, student employment opportunities (outside of the army),  not every course is offered every semester.
> 
> Unless the CF wants to introduce a robust benefits package, a scholarship program and other me steady cls B employment because my course schedule is ****ed up, I might as well wait tables...



As a RESO Officer, and college student, I did Phase 2 (4 months, May-August) one summer then Phase 3 (May - August) the enxt summer.

8 months in total over 2 years.

Totally do able.

If there was an option for me to do 8 months at once (I think Phase 2-3 could be done in 6, but that's just me), on Class B saving tons of cash for tuition, I would have jumped at it.


----------



## Old Sweat

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> As a RESO Officer, and college student, I did Phase 2 (4 months, May-August) one summer then Phase 3 (May - August) the enxt summer.
> 
> 8 months in total over 2 years.
> 
> Totally do able.
> 
> If there was an option for me to do 8 months at once (I think Phase 2-3 could be done in 6, but that's just me), on Class B saving tons of cash for tuition, I would have jumped at it.



When the first RESO courses were designed in the mid-70s, I know we gunners aimed to come up with a program that would produce a competent war time officer. I believe the other arms worked to the same end. There was some material that we were directed to use that was not required for war time, but was needed for the CF officer development criteria. And believe me, we wished we could also use the RESO courses for regulars as we would have saved a ton of time and resources.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If there was an option for me to do 8 months at once (I think Phase 2-3 could be done in 6, but that's just me), on Class B saving tons of cash for tuition, I would have jumped at it.



I did ROUTP Phase I in one summer.  When I was doing ROUTP Phase II they had started converting to RESO, and made RESO 1-2 to be a little less than what the ROUTP I had been.  RESO 3 became what the ROUTP Phase II had been.  RESO 4 was OJT. I finished RESO 4 for a total of threes summers training.  Not hard for a university student.


----------



## runormal

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You want to get serious?  OK:


I'll take a stab at it. For the sake of the argument, I'm assuming that the current Reg-F standard will be the new standard.   



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> A great majority of Primary Reservists join while they are in High School and continue on through university.  That is a good eight years right there.  They have three months on average, every summer, where they are looking for employment.  Three months is enough time to get them through a Basic Crse in St Jean, and then OJT at their unit, Trades training the next summer, PLQ another summer, etc.  They parade at their unit in the Fall, Winter and Spring, and do full-time training in the summers.


First off your 8 year figure is way off, let me explain it. It is closer to 5 (if they apply when they are 16 or 3 if they apply in university) 

The vast majority of reservists I've talked to and worked with started in University (Sample sourced:from my unit, basic, SQ, units I've worked with 2011-2016) (I will admit that high school recruits do exist but are the minority). Reasons for joining in university ranged from: Wanted to max out cadets, Declined from RMC, never thought about it, needed a part time job. Another factor to consider in this debate is the amount of time it takes to transfer from unit x/y. Attach posting from personal experience and talking with others who have attach posted is fairly short (3 months ish) the only one who I talked to about transferring took something like a year, which to me seems excessive, but it is definitely a factor to consider in this plan because the member lost a year of training as a result of the transfer (because the member moved cities to attend school). I'm not sure if this is normal or not so I'm not going to include this in my calculations.

Regardless let crunch numbers...

http://www.forces.ca/en/page/faq-220

 To join the Forces, you must:

Primary Reserve applicants, who must be 16 years of age (while maintaining full-time student status) or older. So if we assume that *every* applicant applies when they turn 16 and assume the Date of Birth for each applicant is evenly distributed (Which would mean that 50% of the applicants would be born before/after July allowing them to train that year assuming they could be processed in time and that units had spots.... For argument sake lets assume that *every * recruit is ready to train (processed) by June 1st of their 17th birth year. This would be put every student at the end of their  3rd year of high school. While some students who be processed in grade 10 and others would could stay for a "Victory Lap" or 5th year, these people would be in the minority. This would give every student 16 weeks (between the summers of grade 11-12 and grade 12-university which _would _be enough time to run a BMQ / SQ if you broke it into two mods. However anyone who applied in grade 12, or was RTU'ed for whatever reason would be in this weird limbo and not fully qualified, which would then screw up their schedule afterwards.

Assuming that every/most applicant goes to a 4 year university program  (Which I would wager is the majority but it likely depends on the city). We now have *3 *summers to train them.

Summer 1: DP 1 (Forgive me I don't know the length of every Army reg-F DP 1.0 but i'd wager this is fairly safe to assume that DP 1.0 as well as the end of summer exercise would occupy the bulk of the time)
Summer 2: DP 2* + Support courses I.E: (Driver wheel, Support weapons (infantry), Arty Comms (Arty), MSVS/Air Brakes, Engineers (I know they have some cool courses), Service Battalion (I don't have many close friends in these trades but what I was told from them is that "It takes forever to get trained" or "We will never be fully qualified")   
Summer 3: PLQ
Summer 4: You've graduated! Hopefully applied to jobs in January so that you are working in your field or semi-related. If not Here is a CLS B position for RSS  ;D

*Not entirely sure what the status on most trades for DP 2.0. I know with ACISS P-RES it is a joke 7 days DL + and assessment form your unit. However IMO it doesn't seem logical to do DP 2.0 the same summer as PLQ. I'm not sure if there would be enough work for every trade in this summer as I have no idea what the reg-f DP 2.0 standard is.

In summary I don't really don't think that there enough time to fully train reservists to the reg-f standard (Assuming training times remain the same) even if they maxed out their  summers. It can be done if they start when they are 17 but then they will graduate with no experience in their field of study, which in today's work force is a death trap. Just look at the entry level jobs that want you to have 1-2 years of experience with knowledge/skills that can only be obtained by doing the job beforehand.  



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> ???  There is no need to take off semesters.  Students, as stated above, would parade as they currently do at their own units, and will have full-time (Class B) employment to do courses in the summer.  Of course, they can pass up doing 'military' training and carry on with job placements that fill educational requirements or go on ED&T.


While I admit this that this more proactive statement as a opposed to reactive, I didn't want anyone to suggest it. WRT to work obligations/missing training. Fine you can, but at my university COOP started after during the summer between 2nd year and 3rd year and was then a constant cycle of school/work placement until you graduated which means if you didn't get trained in the first summer of university or transferred into the program of study (like me) then you only had one summer to muck around with the reserves. Which means that the reserves would loose good applicants because they can't balance the reserves + coop. Even if the member can't get into CO-OP at their university they should seriously look at other student employment opportunities whether it is with the local government, university itself or provincial or federal government as well as corporations.

While skipping training for a summer is an option (My friend did it) he kept on getting re-hired and could never get qualified in the reserves as a result and thus released..  I turned down PLQ myself for the same reason. 



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> When it comes to military courses; well the Schools will just have to get off their butts and actually plan their Course Scheduling to accommodate the "New CAF".



Why? Why would they do this? When I inquired about CO-OP and I said "I'm not sure if i will be fully trained by the end of the summer with the army reserves can I miss the first work term?" "We don't accommodate for army reserves." "Sweet" . Not really much you can do their when you've already invested $14k to the university and transferring credits is a pain in the ass and sometimes impossible.  CAF reservists are also a minority on campus some courses I took where only offered once a year (granted up year courses  year 3/4, but I know the same thing applied to 2nd year courses for other students). Likewise some courses had a disproportionate amount of offerings in semester over the other. Without being mandated from the government they aren't going to do jack.    



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> There are already programs in place:  ROTP, RESO, UTPM, and on and on.  Some would have to be amended to reflect the "New CAF" and some would likely be deleted.  For instance, perhaps ROTP would be expanded to cover all officer candidates who are in a university program, no matter what unit they are members of.



While we could expand ROTP or create some sort of benefit package who is going to pay for it? We don't even have enough LSVW's let alone quality boots to do our jobs in the first place... 

Let me be clear, I don't think a one year gap year between high school/university  "mega" course is a bad idea I just don't think it should be _only _the option. Likewise how do you retain these new soldiers? It is already a challenge to keep people after school as it is.

I also don't disagree with your pay system either, I'm just concerned about the proposed training system and that it might be slightly out of touch with the realities of the job market today.


----------



## daftandbarmy

runormal said:
			
		

> In summary I don't really don't think that there enough time to fully train reservists to the reg-f standard (Assuming training times remain the same) even if they maxed out their  summers. It can be done if they start when they are 17 but then they will graduate with no experience in their field of study, which in today's work force is a death trap. Just look at the entry level jobs that want you to have 1-2 years of experience with knowledge/skills that can only be obtained by doing the job beforehand.



I hire BComms and MBAs every once in awhile.

They all have pretty limited life experience and 'character development' compared to a qualified Combat Arms/CSS Officer who has been through the mill at Gagetown etc. Military experience is a HUGE force multiplier when combined with a degree, especially when compared with restaurant jobs or cheesy 'save the world' type volunteer work.

If someone walked through the door with good grades in a relevant degree and any kind of military experience, Officer or NCM, I'd put them right a the top of the pile.

Just sayin'...


----------



## runormal

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I hire BComms and MBAs every once in awhile.
> 
> They all have pretty limited life experience and 'character development' compared to a qualified Combat Arms/CSS Officer who has been through the mill at Gagetown etc. Military experience is a HUGE force multiplier when combined with a degree, especially when compared with restaurant jobs or cheesy 'save the world' type volunteer work.
> 
> If someone walked through the door with good grades in a relevant degree and any kind of military experience, Officer or NCM, I'd put them right a the top of the pile.
> 
> Just sayin'...




Which is fine and dandy, but not everyone has military experience and/or understands how the military works. I've already been screened out of one job out of few entry level jobs that I've applied to for lack of relevant experience (even though I will graduate with over a year of full time experience).

 One interview I had a question along the lines of "tell me a time you had to deliver bad news to a client/customer". As I worked on internal projects mainly I didn't have a strong example in the office. I used an army example of when I was attached to an infantry unit and someone said " hey rad OP my radio is not working properly" so I then explained how I trouble shooted/isolated the problem and wrote an n/s tag with the specifics and explained to the user what the problem was (some thing was screwed up with the antenna input and that I couldnt fix it because I'm not a tech) and how we would make it work for the final attack and reassured the "client" that it needed to be repaired after the excercise. The response? (uh yeah can you explain it again I don't understand this) so I did. For what it is worth I did qualify for said job and have been placed in a pool, however MTF on the front. 

Again I'm not disagreeing that military provides good life lessons/skills. As a result being in military I've learned the importance of attention to detail, how to prioritize things, trouble shooting, time management, leadership,  personnel management and a "can do" attitude. As a student working in an office, I've been praised for my attention to detail, the speed that i work and ability to find solutions for any problem. Which I credit mainly to the army as well as growing up on a farm. 

It however is often to difficult translate it into interview or screening questions "explain how you have thorough experience with Microsoft office suite." "Explain how you have experience providing HR support services for at least a year". I've had jobs where I haven't even bothered applying for because I know I don't have quite enough experience.

It also depends on your major I'm sure that if you were an engineer or for example it would be really relevant. The current system is good because people can get trained fairly quickly (1 - 2 summers )and then if they want they can find cls B with the army for their remaining summers or diversify their resume and take advantage of student employment within their field. 

Not saying it couldn't be improved because it definitely could. But I don't think that matching qualifications and  training lengths to the reg f 1:1 is the proper solution. 



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If someone walked through the door with good grades in a relevant degree and any kind of military experience, Officer or NCM, I'd put them right a the top of the pile.
> 
> Just sayin'...



Cool geographically and industry wise where do you work?


----------



## The Bread Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> When it comes to military courses; well the Schools will just have to get off their butts and actually plan their Course Scheduling to accommodate the "New CAF".


I'm guessing _that's_ a big area where folks may not have a lot of faith.


			
				runormal said:
			
		

> It however is often to difficult translate it into interview or screening questions ...


You're not alone - that's why there's sites like this or this.


----------



## GR66

If Regulars and Reservists are going to be merged into a single CF with different classes of service, then why assume that it must mean trying to shoehorn Class A members into the existing full-time system?  Redefine the trades training so that members can be employable earlier.  Change the ways that the CF schools schedule and deliver their courses.  It would be a huge task to make such a fundamental change, but if it actually fixes something that isn't currently working then it would be worth it.  However, just fudging it and tinkering around the edges will likely break more than it fixes.

 :2c:


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> If Regulars and Reservists are going to be merged into a single CF with different classes of service, then why assume that it must mean trying to shoehorn Class A members into the existing full-time system?  Redefine the trades training so that members can be employable earlier.  Change the ways that the CF schools schedule and deliver their courses.  It would be a huge task to make such a fundamental change, but if it actually fixes something that isn't currently working then it would be worth it.  However, just fudging it and tinkering around the edges will likely break more than it fixes.
> 
> :2c:



Pretend we're in a global war. That tends to streamline the processes a bit and help focus on what is really important


----------



## George Wallace

runormal

I get the impression that you figure everyone will follow the same education path, career path and select the same Trade as you.  What works for you may not work for someone else.  At the same time what works for many others, may not work for you.  

Perhaps thinking outside the box may help you when looking at the problem(s).

The Training System exists today.  Even before the advent of digitalization to the CAF, the Schools would draw up their Crses and Crse Schedules for a minimum of three years in advance.  There should be no problem in scheduling Crses to accommodate CAF members who only want to work part-time as Class A for periods of Class B training during the summer months, while running Fall, Winter and Spring courses for those who wish to make the CAF a full-time career.  

With this system, the current Reg Force Bases and units would see no change; but the current Reserve units would see the implementation of a "full-time" cadre of personnel to run the day to day operations of their unit, maintain their facilities and equipment, and be a 'ready reserve" to react to a crisis or augment other units on deployments.  It would justify and permit the issuance of kit to the Reserve units that they currently are unqualified on and have no capabilities to store and maintain.  The benefit being that the "training delta" between Reg and Reserve members would no longer exist.


----------



## runormal

George Wallace said:
			
		

> runormal
> 
> I get the impression that you figure everyone will follow the same education path, career path and select the same Trade as you.  What works for you may not work for someone else.  At the same time what works for many others, may not work for you.



I don't really think I'm all that special in education/career path. I'm a business major, my course schedule is more strict than anyone in arts or social studies but less strict to those in engineering/hard sciences. As for career path, no one is at school for "fun" or for interest unless mom and dad are footing the bill. When I graduate in may I ideally would like a job in my field. I really don't think I'm asking for anything out of the ordinary. I did briefly look at options within the CAF, but was told that MARS and LOG were both closed for 5 years for CT/OT. I was told to either pick other trades, remuster in the reserves (impossible as I won't be able to get the time off work) or release and re apply :... I did look at that NAV COMM but was told that aren't taking any CT(U) this year (In October), yet they are taking 70 off the street ;D. So I've more or less given up on a career in the reg-f because I can't even get an interview. I'm also not the only who is a tad bitter about the CT/OT process, I've got friends who have waited similar amounts of times (years) and got nothing out of it.

While it is true some people may be doing masters or supplementary education (Designations or college certs) most of us would kill for a job after we graduate without incurring my debt/time in a class room. Like wise I don't think I'm asking for the unthinkable for wanting to get experience before I graduate. If I was there wouldn't be government sponsored programs as well as rebates for employers who hire students. Students get experience and employers can try out students very a little cost, if they are good give them rehire them for subsequent summers and give them a job when they graduate. If they suck, don't re hire them. You also save the time/money associated with running a staffing process as you already have qualified candidates. I'm also not the only one in my unit who took a summer off to work in their field...   

As for my trade in the CAF I also don't think I'm special or that everyone wants to be a sig. However again I think I'm in the middle of the pack in terms of how long it takes to be qualified. Arty can be trained quicker, Infantry is about the same time (with the shorting of SQ CSS trades), engineers is longer, weapons tech / veh techs is much longer. Not to sure about MP's, Supply Techs, MSE-OPs, Armd Recee, or med techs but I'd imagine they are all around the 2-3 month mark. What ever we do needs to incorporate the "big picture". You have trades with varying amount of time to become qualified as well as some trades that need Driver wheel and trades that require more equipment (Sigs, Armoured Recee, Cmbt ENGR, MSE-OP) or consumable equipment (combat arms). You also have to factor in the availability of high-school students and university students. Highschool students finish at the end of the June and University students finish at the of April. You also need to acknowledge that not everyone isn't going to start in grade 11 and not everyone is going to start in their freshman year of university. Likewise some people are going to college which gives them even less time. We can't cater to every special scenario but we should try to accommodate the majority. Seeing how most trades can be trained in 1-2 summers I think we are doing okay on that front. 



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Perhaps thinking outside the box may help you when looking at the problem(s).
> 
> The Training System exists today.  Even before the advent of digitalization to the CAF, the Schools would draw up their Crses and Crse Schedules for a minimum of three years in advance.  There should be no problem in scheduling Crses to accommodate CAF members who only want to work part-time as Class A for periods of Class B training during the summer months, while running Fall, Winter and Spring courses for those who wish to make the CAF a full-time career.
> 
> With this system, the current Reg Force Bases and units would see no change; but the current Reserve units would see the implementation of a "full-time" cadre of personnel to run the day to day operations of their unit, maintain their facilities and equipment, and be a 'ready reserve" to react to a crisis or augment other units on deployments.  It would justify and permit the issuance of kit to the Reserve units that they currently are unqualified on and have no capabilities to store and maintain.  The benefit being that the "training delta" between Reg and Reserve members would no longer exist.



I'm not sure what problems you have identified in this statement. Or what potential solutions you are offering. How is this any different then what is currently being done at reserve units? We already have people on CLS B to do this who do this. In the sigs world at least advanced equipment isn't the problem it is the* basic kit* such as LSVW's and serviceable generators or Mil-cot with dual installs + remote kits as well as J-Boxes that are in short supply. It'd be cool if we had some of the newer equipment as well but I think that should be a priority once we have enough of the basics. With that being said this training Delta _seems _to be going away as they are starting to run intro courses on the new kit before it comes into service.  

Like wise 

If you want to look at problems in the reserves look at" recruiting (time), retention and availability of equipment to do said job. 

My biggest gripe with training is how some courses are "separate". For example ATCIS with the combat arms guys, DVR WHL with Sigs, Arty, Supp Techs, Med Techs (Armoured Recee/Mse-OP? are these separate or not?) Dangerous goods and Driver Wheel. SQ with everyone who isn't infantry. 

I'm not going to suggest "mega" courses, but it'd great if we could create an Infantry/ACISS/CBT ENGR/Trade XYZ Summer Package. Kind of like how PLQ is currently broken down into mods and that you can in theory do one mod and come back the following next summer. Keep all the courses  "Separate" but have them run one after the other. Personally  it took me two summers to become a qualified rad op, I did SQ the first the summer (1 month), was supposed to do DVR WHL but it got pulled last minute, the second summer I did DP 1.0  (2 months). Luckily i had a very accommodating retail job that allowed me to employed the entire time and take time off for courses.

For example: 
We push weekend basics + SQ (Assuming it stays the 13 days it is) for everyone who isn't Infantry. High-school students get priority for the SQ these courses because they only have two months to give in the summer. 

Sigs: 
world you would do you SQ if you needed it (May), followed by DVR WHL (June) and then July to August you'd do your DP 1.0.  

Infantry:

May (ATCIS) June ( DVR WHL? / GD/ Combat Stores Man ) July- August (DP 1) 

Arty:
 May Driver Wheel (LSVW + Milcot) June ( Airbrakes + MSVS) : July Dp 1.0 August (Arty/Comms/prep for summer training ex.). SQ if they need it (Has to be fit in somewhere).

The point is we do all the supplementary course in May/June and ensure that both university students and High school can get on the DP 1.0 During July/August. We adopt a system like this that when candidates swear in we can give them their dates and allow them to plan accordingly. Since we know exactly how many candidates we are going to hire each year, we can project how many students will be available for summer training and how many courses we need to run, now the army can guarantee employment which will make it that much more attractive. Like wise the unit is guaranteed to get a fully qualified candidate. Obviously not every student will pass, some will VR, some will be medically RTUED. Definitely will be some variables to iron out, but if we made a push back to national courses for certain trades, we could guarantee that we would have enough candidates to fill each course.      

What do you/others think?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I think this is 'window dressing' that won't change anything in the cake, just the icing.  Will we have more 'active service' members?  No.  Will we have more 'weekend warrior' reservists?  No.

Think of how much time and money it takes to train someone in my trade to a Basic Category, just-showed-up-at-the-Sqn, operator.  And now they are going to be what is now known as Cl A service.  Waste of time waste of money.  And they'd always be at that "not quite useful yet" level.

I think the same could be said for many trades in the Navy and RCAF.  Maybe the C Army could make this work in some trades, but it will never happen across the board.

We will maintain a Regular and Reserve Component of the CAF because making it 'all one CAF'...well it already IS 'all on CAF'.


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I think this is 'window dressing' that won't change anything in the cake, just the icing.  Will we have more 'active service' members?  No.  Will we have more 'weekend warrior' reservists?  No.
> 
> Think of how much time and money it takes to train someone in my trade to a Basic Category, just-showed-up-at-the-Sqn, operator.  And now they are going to be what is now known as Cl A service.  Waste of time waste of money.  And they'd always be at that "not quite useful yet" level.
> 
> I think the same could be said for many trades in the Navy and RCAF.  Maybe the C Army could make this work in some trades, but it will never happen across the board.
> 
> We will maintain a Regular and Reserve Component of the CAF because making it 'all one CAF'...well it already IS 'all on CAF'.



It is quite obvious to anyone who is knowledgeable of what is involved in training for many of the CAF Trades, that NOT ALL Trades can have entry level personnel filling a Class A position.  There, however, is the possibility for Class A positions in some of those Trades to exist for fully trained pers who may be retiring from the CAF, who still want to keep an affiliation with the CAF, as what we already see today with "Double Dippers".   (See other discussions on changes affecting "Double Dippers".)

Canada's does have "One" CAF, split into Regular and Reserve Forces.  We know that.  The suggestion was made to do away with that "Regular/Reserve Split" and make it "ONE".

Is this the perfect solution?  No.  It is a part of this thread's "brain storming".   It is a "outside the box" "take the blinders off" train of thought.

runormal

Yes, there are Class B at Reserve units today; filling positions of Storemen, Trg NCO, and other single/individual 'office or admin' positions.  The proposal is to create a minimum of a whole Platoon/Troop/Bty of Class B positions at local Reserve units would be the idea.  An effective "QRF" in essence.

As for Recruiting:

Recruiting issues that exist today for both Reg Force and Reserve Force is a red herring.   Recruiting issues have existed in the past, and will exist in the future.  They will be affected by the attitudes towards the military held by the Public, effectiveness of Recruiting campaigns, manning numbers and financing dictated to the CAF by the Government, and numerous other National and World events.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

George Wallace said:
			
		

> There, however, is the possibility for Class A positions in some of those Trades to exist for fully trained pers who may be retiring from the CAF, who still want to keep an affiliation with the CAF, as what we already see today with "Double Dippers".   (See other discussions on changes affecting "Double Dippers".)



Which we have in my trade, and at my Sqn.  The changes to the Double Dipping rules really hurt the CAF (IMO).  



> Canada's does have "One" CAF, split into Regular and Reserve Forces.  We know that.  The suggestion was made to do away with that "Regular/Reserve Split" and make it "ONE".



In the context of the threads title, I don't think the solution to the PRES problem list is to revamp the Reg Force; fix the PRES.  You, me and others who have served on both sides know they are different worlds with similarities between them.  



> Is this the perfect solution?  No.  It is a part of this thread's "brain storming".   It is a "outside the box" "take the blinders off" train of thought.



I realize that, and nothing wrong with any of that, I was just trying to show it wouldn't work 'across the board'.  More so than RCAF NCM flying trades, I was thinking of the enormous amount of time required to train, say, NETs in the Navy.  Or Air Wpns Systems Techs, FCS Techs in the Army, etc.

I also don't support planning the operational capability of the Forces around the monetary needs of university students.  That is the taxpayer opinion in me, as well as the military one.


----------



## Kirkhill

Another example of how it might be done:

Sweden http://jobb.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/vagen-in/grundutbildning/  (you might need to hit the translate switch).

Summary:

18 year old Swede (male or female)

4 - 5000 per year 

GMU (Basic Training) universal

Decision Point

Three paths 

Soldier (Regs),  Homeguard (Militia/Res),  Officers.

Regs get an additional 3 to 8 months trades training.
Homeguard gets an additional 1 to 4 months trades training.
Officers get an additional 3 months Officer stuff training.

http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/career-in-the-swedish-armed-forces/military-programmes-and-training/

Homeguard goes back to civilian life and is called up annually for exercises. (Normally about 8 days a year - either 1x 8  or 2x 4).
Regs offer both full and part time positions on contract.
Officers are Special.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Sweden)#Equipment


The Heavy Weapons are held by the Regs.

The Homeguard uses the Glock 17, G3, MAG, M2, CG-84 and the AT-4.  For mobility it has a variety of wheeled vehicles with cross-country capability, the Bv206 and the CB90 combat boat.


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> In the context of the threads title, I don't think the solution to the PRES problem list is to revamp the Reg Force; fix the PRES.  You, me and others who have served on both sides know they are different worlds with similarities between them.



Many of the PRes problems stem from lack of current equipment and technology held by the Reg Force, and the ever growing Training Delta that this has created.  Revamp the whole CAF into a "Total Force", so that that equipment and technology can be held within the PRes by creating the opportunity for full-time employment of the pers required to man and maintain that technology and equipment.  This would likely make the TBGs more effective, as there would be QRF Troops/Platoons/Btys at 'Reserve' units.  



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I realize that, and nothing wrong with any of that, I was just trying to show it wouldn't work 'across the board'.  More so than RCAF NCM flying trades, I was thinking of the enormous amount of time required to train, say, NETs in the Navy.  Or Air Wpns Systems Techs, FCS Techs in the Army, etc.



Pointing out why is can't or won't work 'across the board' with the current ORBAT of the CAF means that what we are discussing is necessary.  It won't work with the current system, so we must change the system.  The system has to evolve.  Currently it is stagnating and dying a slow death.

Don't fixate on the amount of time that it takes to train Flying Trades, NETs, Air Wpns Systems Techs, FCS Techs, etc.  Those would only be Class A positions after a person was fully trained and had opted later in their careers to 'retire' and just want to 'keep their hand in' part-time.  Most of those Trades are on Bases/Ships and require full-time employment.  At the same time, it would also benefit the (old) PRes to have full-time Maintainers posted into their HQ Sqn/HQ Bty/HQ Coy to service their equipment in a timely fashion.  Not all Trades are represented in current PRes units, and that is a problem (ie.  No Gun Plumbers to maintain wpns and equipment.  No Vehicle Techs to keep their VOR rates down.)  A 'new CAF' may resolve this. 

Back to Recruiting:  One part of recruiting to the CAF is "visibility".  If CAF members are visible and in the Public eye, recruiting has one less hurtle to leap.  Beefing up the CAF with more full-time employment at what is currently PRes units, may be one hurdle less to jump.



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I also don't support planning the operational capability of the Forces around the monetary needs of university students.  That is the taxpayer opinion in me, as well as the military one.



I think that is a red herring, or such a minimal concern as not to be a consideration.  The number of university students involved would be such a low percentage of the Total Force, that it would be inconsequential.


----------



## McG

Every now and again, this thread circles back to proposals that seem more driven to the glory of the PRes than to the needs of CAF service to the nation.  I feel we have arrived at one of those points.

Our ability to support domestic operations does not benefit from scattering military full time pay as platoons in every armoury across the country.  We can already deploy company (+) to battalion (-) into a domestic theatre faster than provinces know what to do with the manpower.  Our real value added is in the standing, exercised unit headquarters and in the formed logistics strength that comes from a manoeuvre unit’s admin sub-unit and the backing of a full Service Battalion.  You do not get that with scattered platoons (even it all the platoons are CSS).

Think you will get access to the newest Gucci kit?  We don’t buy enough.  Even in the CMBGs, resources need to be pooled and shared to get the requisite levels or training.  Dispersing full time manpower will not give the part time manpower access to kit and thereby elevate skill sets; dispersing full time manpower will diminish everybody’s access and related skill sets.

Total Force and 10/90 were failed experiments.


----------



## dapaterson

But then we have a problem: the standing force (full-time force) therefore presumably needs a bias towards sustainment functions, as those are skills that we need at short notice.  The pointy-end forces can be smaller in number (in the standing force) as we will generally be able to surge from the force in waiting (part time force) for such deployments.

That's turning the current thinking on its head.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> But then we have a problem: the standing force (full-time force) therefore presumably needs a bias towards sustainment functions, as those are skills that we need at short notice.  The pointy-end forces can be smaller in number (in the standing force) as we will generally be able to surge from the force in waiting (part time force) for such deployments.
> 
> That's turning the current thinking on its head.


That it does, but it is the direction that we need to be thinking.


----------



## George Wallace

I am not promoting the maintaining of a "Regular Force and a Primary Reserve Force".  I am proposing a total restructure into one entity as opposed to two........ a Hillier Hellyer's Unification Part II.    >


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I am not promoting the maintaining of a "Regular Force and a Primary Reserve Force".  I am proposing a total restructure into one entity as opposed to two........ a Hillier's Unification Part II.    >



Hillier built new commands; it's Hellyer that unified...


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> That it does, but it is the direction that we need to be thinking.



Agreed with both DAP and MCG and George

Which is why I raised the Swedish model and have raised the Danes, the USMC, USAR and USNG in the past.

Somebody was asking in another thread about what gunners do when they aren't training or on deployment - and got all the usual answers.

Not all trained personnel need to be on strength all the time.  Many of them could be returned to the civilian world on a hard return spring.

And the training for the pointy end doesn't have to be multi years.  

Even with the current intake of some 5000 PYs per year, if all of them received their 3 months basic training and then half of them chose a full time career while the other half chose a reserve career then the reserve pool, if operated on the basis of the USMC with an 8 year obligation, would supply a trained pool of 10,000 bodies liable for call-up*.

*Regardless of their employer's opinion on the subject. The contract is with the reservist and not the employer.  It is up to the reservist to find employment commensurate with his prior obligation to the Crown.  Equally it is up to the Crown to offer a package that makes the restrictions on civilian occupation worth the agony.  The Americans do this by offering a really attractive package of benefits (Education, mortgages, grants, insurances....as well as pay)  You have to pay people who are "on call".  You just don't have to pay them as much.  But if you are paying them then they are obligated to you.

If you only pay them when they show up for work then you are obligated to them.


----------



## Old Sweat

I may be talking out of my butt here and I am not up to speed on any recent amendments to the appropriate sections of the NDA, but Canadian governments even in wartime have been loath to use compulsory call up of reservists for service. This is doubly so for overseas service and in September 1939 when the Mobile Force was mobilized under Defence Scheme Three, the soldiers actually had to volunteer twice. The first was when they enlisted and the second was to agree to serve overseas.

This explains in part the lack of job protection legislation.

In 1866 when the QOR were call up to counter the Fenian invasion, a number of the officers chose not to report as they were professors at the University of Toronto and they had to supervise examinations. In 1885 when the 90th Winnipeg Rifles were called up to counter Riel and company, a number of additional men had to be hastily enlisted, as some employers refused to allow their employees time off to proceed on active service, or would let them go, but their jobs would not be waiting when they returned. Two early examples I have come across and I am sure there are others.


----------



## George Wallace

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hillier built new commands; it's Hellyer that unified...



Opps.....Correction .....Hellyer Unification Part II.....  [


----------



## Kirkhill

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I may be talking out of my butt here and I am not up to speed on any recent amendments to the appropriate sections of the NDA, but Canadian governments even in wartime have been loath to use compulsory call up of reservists for service. This is doubly so for overseas service and in September 1939 when the Mobile Force was mobilized under Defence Scheme Three, the soldiers actually had to volunteer twice. The first was when they enlisted and the second was to agree to serve overseas.
> 
> This explains in part the lack of job protection legislation.
> 
> In 1866 when the QOR were call up to counter the Fenian invasion, a number of the officers chose not to report as they were professors at the University of Toronto and they had to supervise examinations. In 1885 when the 90th Winnipeg Rifles were called up to counter Riel and company, a number of additional men had to be hastily enlisted, as some employers refused to allow their employees time off to proceed on active service, or would let them go, but their jobs would not be waiting when they returned. Two early examples I have come across and I am sure there are others.



Old Sweat.

I am not talking about compulsory service call ups.  That is a horse of a different colour.

I am talking about a contractual obligation for the reservist to show up for an alloted number of days each year, for a limited number of years to support collective training (ammunition numbers, truck drivers, riflemen, machine gunners - most Corporal-Private positions).  In exchange the soldier gets an annual stipend and an assortment of other benefits.

In addition, the soldier would be liable for call up.  If the government ever got round to it.

The Afghanistan type soldiers would continue to be a mixture of Regular Force personnel and others, including Reservists, who volunteer for short term contracts.


----------



## George Wallace

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Old Sweat.
> 
> I am not talking about compulsory service call ups.  That is a horse of a different colour.
> 
> I am talking about a contractual obligation for the reservist to show up for an alloted number of days each year, for a limited number of years to support collective training (ammunition numbers, truck drivers, riflemen, machine gunners - most Corporal-Private positions).  In exchange the soldier gets an annual stipend and an assortment of other benefits.
> 
> In addition, the soldier would be liable for call up.  If the government ever got round to it.
> 
> The Afghanistan type soldiers would continue to be a mixture of Regular Force personnel and others, including Reservists, who volunteer for short term contracts.



How about....Remove "Reservist" and replace with "member".  Remove "Regular Force member" and replace with "member".  Then differentiate three Pay Scales; Full-time Deployed; Full-time Domestic; and Part-time Domestic.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Never gonna happen, and the only thing it would change is giving (what is now) a class b reservist a pay raise.  

Again, you are proposing changing the entire CAF for the benefit of the PRES, most of which only parades a % of the 32 parade days a year or whatever it is now.

I get the same pay and AIRCRA when I am home or deployed, I get theatre benefits based on FSP points, along with HA and RA levels.  Now we should change the entire CF pay system (the new one is being implemented this month for the reg force) to 'solve the PRES problems'?  This would be just one of many changes required for a "TOTAL FORCE" [remember the 8 CH tried this and it failed...] that would produce no tangible benefits IMO.  We'd still field the same number of full and part timers.  SO...why change anything that doesn't extend the 'tooth' ratio but would suck up even MORE money that is becoming scarce?


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> How about....Remove "Reservist" and replace with "member".  Remove "Regular Force member" and replace with "member".  Then differentiate three Pay Scales; Full-time Deployed; Full-time Domestic; and Part-time Domestic.



I think it is workable.

And I don't think it is just for the PRes benefit EITS.  I think it is for the Army's benefit, in particular the Combat Arms.  

I get that the RCAF and RCN are in a very different situation.  No matter if people are shooting at you or not you still have patrols to conduct and stuff to transport and ships and planes to maintain.  Same thing goes for armourers and mechanics in the Army.

But what is a gunner, or a rifleman, or an AT gunner supposed to do when there are no targets?

When the targets pop up we need them.  And we need a lot of them quickly.  But in the meantime they aren't getting much out of the Army and the Army isn't getting much out of them.  (Perhaps that could be worded better - sorry if offence was given to anybody - none intended.)

There is a need for a number of shooters to be on hand during peace time, and some of those should be deployed overseas to keep skills sharp, but there is very little justification for keeping a large, and expensive, standing force of riflemen in peacetime.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Building unicorn farms and selling unicorns to raise extra money would also benefit the CAF.  How likely is it to happen?

About as likely as getting rid of the Regular Force to benefit an even smaller 32 days paid a year Reserve Force. :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

I don't think anybody is talking about eliminating the Regular Force.

But the Unicorn farm is something I could get behind.


----------



## Haggis

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> But the Unicorn farm is something I could get behind.



CFIA has strict regulations controling the breeding and sale of domesticated unicorns.  Also, international trade in unicorns is governed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

Mods, perhaps this should be in it's own thread?


----------



## Haggis

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> There is a need for a number of shooters to be on hand during peace time, and some of those should be deployed overseas to keep skills sharp, but there is very little justification for keeping a large, and expensive, standing force of riflemen in peacetime.



Agreed, we will need shooters available on short notice in peacetime.  And, frankly, it doesn't matter what thier deployability status is (i.e. full time or part time "member") but it's important to remember that, aside from training, we, the CAF, don't get to decide when and where we go overseas to "keep skills sharp".  The government does.  And if they elect to keep us out of future overseas "skills maintenance" adventures then we are no further ahead.


----------



## Brasidas

Suppose that the Reserves were effectively gutted, particularly the army, with army positions reallocated primarily to Edmonton and Quebec City. Cadre and recruiting put in place and sustained to substantially expand the local units to absorb the positions.

Sharing the local equipment pool and facilities, with some expansion, does it become substantially more practical to cut the delta between reg force and reserve?


----------



## MilEME09

Brasidas said:
			
		

> Sharing the local equipment pool and facilities, with some expansion, does it become substantially more practical to cut the delta between reg force and reserve?



I can't speak for others, however my unit has been forming a good partnership with 1 Service, they usually let us know of upcoming EX's well in advance and let us send anyone available to be dropped in. Those that go out have said it was excellent training value to work with their reg force counterparts, and it definitely cut that delta.


----------



## The Bread Guy

One option shared with Senators this week ...


> The new Liberal government should massively expand the country's part-time military force and overhaul its mandate, a Senate committee heard Monday.
> 
> John Selkirk, a retired lieutenant-colonel and a member of the group Reserves 2000, said there should be at least 45,000 army reservists and their roles should be re-oriented towards to responding to domestic emergencies, including natural disasters and even cyberattacks.
> 
> He wouldn't speculate on how many air force and naval reservists the country might need.
> 
> Such an increase would be dramatic in light of the fact there are only 21,000 part-time members of all three branches of the military on the books at the moment, which is about 19 per cent less than their assigned strength.
> 
> The traditional role of reservists has been to fill out the ranks of regular force units headed overseas for operations and peacekeeping missions, but Selkirk said he believes future threats to the nation's security will come at home, in the form of terrorism and weather-related emergencies.
> 
> "Today, we feel the real threat to our way of life, if you wish, is a domestic threat and the disruption it would cause would require a tremendous amount of consequence management," he said.
> 
> "And although we have large security forces, they are nowhere near large enough to provide that consequence management on a 24/7 basis." ...


----------



## Kirkhill

Logistics!

A reserve (in the classical business sense as opposed to capitalized institutional sense) of transport and communications capable of operating in difficult environments, is the first priority.

The capability is the first thing the government reaches for in times of disaster or crisis.   Trucks and radios and people with boots and mukluks.

Those people need to understand, when they are engaged, that they are being hired to do mundane jobs under dangerous conditions, including when people are shooting at them.

The fact that some of them have the skills to backfill combat units and have the opportunity to shoot back at their tormentors, is a bonus.

Bandvagons, Kerax and Navistars over TAPVs and LAVs.  CB90s, AOPSs and Enforcers over CSCs.  And helicopters. Lots and lots of helicopters.

My priority kit lists for the Reserves:  Boots, Trucks and Radios.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> My priority kit lists for the Reserves:  Boots, Trucks and Radios.



After those i'd say we need people to fill those boots. While I'll believe when I see it the government has hinted it wants to eventually expend the forces, and to do it cheaply would be to expand the reserves. Either by increasing authorized strength of units, reactivating units from the Supplementary ORBAT, or a combination of both. The infrastructure funds given out in the latest budget could allow DND to do some foresight into training ranges closer to reserve units, hangers for air Res at local airports, etc.. possibilities are endless if planned correctly.


----------



## The Bread Guy

From the summary of the Spring 2016 Auditor General's report on the Army Reserves ...


> ... We concluded that although Army Reserve units received clear guidance for domestic missions, the Canadian Army did not require Army Reserve groups to formally confirm that they were prepared to deploy on domestic missions. Army Reserve units and groups did not always have access to key equipment. At the same time, Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of training as cohesive teams, and had not fully integrated this training with that of the Regular Army.
> 
> We concluded that the Army Reserve did not have the number of soldiers it needed and lacked information on whether soldiers were prepared to deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers has been steadily declining because the Army Reserve has been unable to recruit and retain the soldiers it needs. Furthermore, funding was not designed to fully support unit training and other activities.
> 
> We concluded that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of physical fitness training and were not trained in the same number of skills as Regular Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had not acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed ...


DND's response to the recommendations here.


----------



## MilEME09

Two recommendations that stuck out at me I hope to god DND and the government actually implement because it would go a long way to solving some of the problems in the reserves.



> 5.96 National Defence should work with departments and agencies that have responsibility under the Canada Labour Code and the Reserve Forces Training Leave Regulations to consider including coverage of absences to attend all types of occupational skills training into the Code and the Regulations. (5.94–5.95)





> 5.98 National Defence should consider amendments to its proposed Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program to include absences for all occupational skills training of Army Reserve soldiers.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Two recommendations that stuck out at me I hope to god DND and the government actually implement because it would go a long way to solving some of the problems in the reserves.



We had something like that where I used to work,

Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.
The maximum period of absence is two weeks in a calendar year.
Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work. 
Compensation received for travelling expenses and meal allowance does not have to be returned to the city.
All benefits continue during the leave.
An employee's service is not affected by the leave. An employee's vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

> We concluded that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of physical fitness training and were not trained in the same number of skills as Regular Army soldiers.



Cl A reservists have, what, 32 paid days a year?  Take away from that all the PC and 'required' trg, how many days are left?  And how many Cl A folks hit the 100% mark on attending evening and weekends?  My experience is not that many.

Even if there were 0 wasted days out of the 32...anyone who thinks Soldier 'A" who trains 32 days a year will be to the same standard as Soldier 'B' who does it full time has had their bacon in the frying pan too long.

That 'conclusion' is about as insightful as if they 'concluded' all people need to breathe air on a regular basis.   :


----------



## MilEME09

I think it depends what type of training you are talking about, just standard yearly stuff, or do they mean trades training? judging by the rest of the material i'd say trades training, and soldier skills. Meaning if I on paper compare what each soldier is qualified on, the two will not be equal, ever, which is very true for every trade.


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Cl A reservists have, what, 32 paid days a year?  Take away from that all the PC and 'required' trg, how many days are left?  And how many Cl A folks hit the 100% mark on attending evening and weekends?  My experience is not that many.
> 
> Even if there were 0 wasted days out of the 32...anyone who thinks Soldier 'A" who trains 32 days a year will be to the same standard as Soldier 'B' who does it full time has had their bacon in the frying pan too long.
> 
> That 'conclusion' is about as insightful as if they 'concluded' all people need to breathe air on a regular basis.   :



It is definitely an outsider's view, and not reflective of a nuanced understanding of the reserve force employment model, managed readiness, etc. However, sometimes you need an outsider to point out the blatantly obvious:

1. That the Army reserve is an essential, integral component of Army which is necessary for both domestic and international operations, and will continue to be so unless the RegF Army was grown substantially at great expense; and
2.  Assuming point 1, that the institution (i.e. the Army) must take the necessary steps (training, manning and equipment) to ensure that the Army Reserve is set up for success to meet its mandate.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think it depends what type of training you are talking about, just standard yearly stuff, or do they mean trades training? judging by the rest of the material i'd say trades training, and soldier skills. Meaning if I on paper compare what each soldier is qualified on, the two will not be equal, ever, which is very true for every trade.



It doesn't matter what type of training (formal, informal, OJT, "experience", whatever), Res (Cl A) will not have the same amount of trg (encompassing everything including formal trades/classification trg, which also may not be the same QS and TP).

To make it clear, I'm not bashing the reserves or reservists.  Like many others, I was a reservist too.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> It is definitely an outsider's view, and not reflective of a nuanced understanding of the reserve force employment model, managed readiness, etc. However, sometimes you need an outsider to point out the blatantly obvious:
> 
> 1. That the Army reserve is an essential, integral component of Army which is necessary for both domestic and international operations, and will continue to be so unless the RegF Army was grown substantially at great expense; and
> 2.  Assuming point 1, that the institution (i.e. the Army) must take the necessary steps (training, manning and equipment) to ensure that the Army Reserve is set up for success to meet its mandate.



That can only happen if the Federal government funds the Army, actually the entire CAF with the dollars needed for both the Reg and Res force.  

And I'm not seeing THAT happen.


----------



## RCPalmer

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think it depends what type of training you are talking about, just standard yearly stuff, or do they mean trades training? judging by the rest of the material i'd say trades training, and soldier skills. Meaning if I on paper compare what each soldier is qualified on, the two will not be equal, ever, which is very true for every trade.



Yep, they talk about several dimensions of training deficiencies:

1.  That there are training deltas between RegF and PRes IT courses.  I would consider this unavoidable in the current employment model, but if future TOS and job protection legislation (another recommendation in the report) make the completion of RegF courses possible for members with full-time jobs, then maybe that is the solution.  

The more serious deficiency noted was that IT training deltas (pistol and M203 being two examples they noted) were not addressed in high readiness trg before deploying on international ops.  In a 1 year plus R2HR period, that is inexcusable, and indicative of broader Army training management failures rather than a reserve force specific failure.  

2.  PRes have lower levels of personnel readiness and IBTS completion than RegF units.  This is again understandable in the current employment model, but perhaps institutional changes will be made to facilitate reserve force success in this area.  Training bounties for IBTS completion and a reserve entitlement to routine medical assessment would be great places to start.  

3. PRes conduct collective training at a lower level than the RegF, and that this training is not integrated into the Army Managed Readiness Plan.  Clearly,  the smaller number of training days available to a part time member/unit was a key factor missed or misunderstood in the report.  However, I see no reason the PRes collective training could not be more closely integrated with the Army Managed Readiness Plan, and with the RegF in general.  

The broader thrust of the report goes to the long term ability of the Army Reserve to sustain itself and grow in current conditions. In particular, it noted the requirement for reserve recruiting and training capacities to be significantly increased.  This would require a CAF wide effort, and was clearly what was envisioned in last fall's CDS initiating directive.  Unfortunately, we have not seen much change on the Armory floor as of yet.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mean while, in the Huffy Post:

A scathing auditor general's report Tuesday shows Canada's army reserve is in dire straits, with only a fraction of its troops properly trained, equipped and fit for international operations and domestic emergencies.

Michael Ferguson's latest audit conducted a detailed examination of the problems faced by the military's part-time branch and found that even though there are 21,000 positions on the books, only 13,944 reservists are considered active and ready for service.

The federal government's stated goal is to have a reserve force of 27,000.


http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/05/03/canada-s-army-reserve-lacking-soldiers-equipment-training-audit-finds_n_9828412.html?ncid=fcbklnkcahpmg00000001


----------



## George Wallace

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think it depends what type of training you are talking about, just standard yearly stuff, or do they mean trades training? judging by the rest of the material i'd say trades training, and soldier skills. Meaning if I on paper compare what each soldier is qualified on, the two will not be equal, ever, which is very true for every trade.



Actually not entirely true.  There are a few PRes Trades that get the identical training as Reg Force, in fact they even attend mixed Reg/PRes crses.  In some instances there are Regs attending PRes crses.  However, in the vast majority of cases/Trades you are correct.  

Although "trained" Reg Force pers are employed 24/7; they are not necessarily performing that qualification 24/7.  Pt; sweeping hangar floors, support to outside organizations, attending non-Trade related courses, ceremonial parades and numerous other instances can be cited where Reg Force members are not performing Trade related work.  The PRes are affected even more than that by the amount of time that they are away from Trade related work while attending school or their civilian employment.  In the end, both are not performing Trade related work 24/7.   [


----------



## George Wallace

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> That can only happen if the Federal government funds the Army, actually the entire CAF with the dollars needed for both the Reg and Res force.
> 
> And I'm not seeing THAT happen.



That is the crux of the problem.


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> That can only happen if the Federal government funds the Army, actually the entire CAF with the dollars needed for both the Reg and Res force.
> 
> And I'm not seeing THAT happen.



And/or clean out the the institutional fat.  The CAF spends a lot of money on things that do not result in operational capabilities, and the reserve force is an area where modest investments can lead to significant results. Keep in mind that the full cost of the reserve force (all elements) is only 1.1 Billion dollars with 740 million spent on the Army Reserve. Additionally, this report notes that significant portions of those costs such as some base infrastructure costs and PRes full time contracts supporting RegF activities were incorrectly attributed.  At a certain point, we have to set priorities and make efficient use of the funding envelope available to us.


----------



## MilEME09

Moving class B positions to a different budget would probably free up a lot of funds, which could be allocated else where.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## mariomike

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Cl A reservists have, what, 32 paid days a year?



I also read this from 2007,



			
				kratz said:
			
		

> I know from my command the bare minimum is 12 days of the year, or 24 nights between the begining of Sept through the end of May.


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> I also read this from 2007,



And deduct about 20% from that total for 'fluff' and non-valued added stuff that eats up training time.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Moving class B positions to a different budget would probably free up a lot of funds, which could be allocated else where.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



Free up funds in one area, but only to take them from another.

If the entire CAF budget is 18 apples, it doesn't matter who I hand out to, who I take one from to give some one another apple, in total I still only have 18 apples.

To solve our problems, at least some of them, we simply need more apples each year.  But, we've had some more taken away or 'deferred' or what magic term they gave it this time.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Free up funds in one area, but only to take them from another.
> 
> If the entire CAF budget is 18 apples, it doesn't matter who I hand out to, who I take one from to give some one another apple, in total I still only have 18 apples.
> 
> To solve our problems, at least some of them, we simply need more apples each year.  But, we've had some more taken away or 'deferred' or what magic term they gave it this time.



We could start by coming up with an operational role for the reserves other than  1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

And then, I suppose, you'd want to have a viable trg plan to meet those roles AND then have the kit available.... rly:

 ;D


----------



## blacktriangle

Even the RegF has training/manning issues. It can take a lot of time and investment to get members in some trades to function at a competent level. And then there's the challenge of keeping them at that level. Expecting no training delta for the PRes is unreasonable.


----------



## blacktriangle

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We could start by coming up with an operational role for the reserves other than  1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force.



Domestic operations. And not just a domestic response ex once every year or so...


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We could start by coming up with an operational role for the reserves other than  1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force.



There are plenty of roles.  The Army Force Employment Concept (via _Waypoint 2018_ articulates a bunch:
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf

To summarize the key tasks:
-Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) x4 - these are exercised every year
-Territorial Defence Battalions (TBG) x10 - these are exercised at a CP level every year (though unevenly), and they have been deployed in recent DOMOPS
-Individual augmentation for Army LOO 3 (Expeditionary Ops) on the order of 20% of the force strength starting on Roto 1
-Force Pro Coy, Convoy Security Tp, PSS Pl, and IA Coy for Army LOO 3 (Expeditionary Ops) starting on Roto 1

There is lots for the PRes to do, and for the most part, I think the tasks are quite reasonable.  What the report is noting is that training, resourcing and institutional support for the Army Reserve in meeting these tasks is highly deficient.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

It's all academic. Nothing is going to change. These are the same problems we've  had for the last 50 years.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> There are plenty of roles.  The Army Force Employment Concept (via _Waypoint 2018_ articulates a bunch:
> http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf
> 
> To summarize the key tasks:
> -Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) x4 - these are exercised every year
> -Territorial Defence Battalions (TBG) x10 - these are exercised at a CP level every year (though unevenly), and they have been deployed in recent DOMOPS
> -Individual augmentation for Army LOO 3 (Expeditionary Ops) on the order of 20% of the force strength starting on Roto 1
> -Force Pro Coy, Convoy Security Tp, PSS Pl, and IA Coy for Army LOO 3 (Expeditionary Ops) starting on Roto 1
> 
> There is lots for the PRes to do, and for the most part, I think the tasks are quite reasonable.  What the report is noting is that training, resourcing and institutional support for the Army Reserve in meeting these tasks is highly deficient.



Except without the ability to call reservists up full time there can be as many paper tasks as anyone can imagine. When your force generation model relies on people showing up as they want there's no legitimate way that you can properly train large groups, no matter how much money is thrown at it. Ex WESTERN GUNNER in Shilo last year, for example demonstrates this- All the western area arty "regiments" pooled together to do a Regimental ex but got just under 90 people of the 200 they expected. 1 RCHA got to make up the difference.


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Except without the ability to call reservists up full time there can be as many paper tasks as anyone can imagine. When your force generation model relies on people showing up as they want there's no legitimate way that you can properly train large groups, no matter how much money is thrown at it. Ex WESTERN GUNNER in Shilo last year, for example demonstrates this- All the western area arty "regiments" pooled together to do a Regimental ex but got just under 90 people of the 200 they expected. 1 RCHA got to make up the difference.



Agreed, the reserve force is on life support at the moment, mainly due to a lack of recruiting and training capacity.  With the current limited capacity we have to prioritize all tasks and if it is a matter of sending a member on a career course (as an instructor or candidate), or an exercise, we will always send the member on course because that is the investment in long term capability. Ultimately, these are part time soldiers, and we can only ask so much of them.  If the Army was serious about rebuilding capacity in the reserve force, we wouldn't even attempt collective training until we had rebuilt our critical mass.

More robust TOS with an element of mandatory service would definitely help, but absent that I do not agree that further investments in a volunteer reserve force are a waste.

We have had a lot of successes in a volunteer reserve model.  The reserve force generated more pers for Afghanistan than the Army had any right to expect given the investment made over the previous 20 years.  While it hasn't always been pretty, we've generated workable platoons for Afghanistan and companies for Bosnia.  I would argue that if our reserve force had been properly resourced and managed, we could have done a lot better.

In the 2013 floods, 41 TBG was the largest unit in 1 CMBG, formed in an afternoon, and was mobile because we still had our full allocation of MSVS at that point.

To motivate a part time member to join and stay (whether that service is cumpulsory or not) they need to see that they are part of a serious, professional organization, and when when we run our reserve force on a shoe string, that has significant attraction and retention implications which impact our capabilities.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Agreed, the reserve force is on life support at the moment, mainly due to a lack of recruiting and training capacity.  With the current limited capacity we have to prioritize all tasks and if it is a matter of sending a member on a career course (as an instructor or candidate), or an exercise, we will always send the member on course because that is the investment in long term capability. Ultimately, these are part time soldiers, and we can only ask so much of them.  If the Army was serious about rebuilding capacity in the reserve force, we wouldn't even attempt collective training until we had rebuilt our critical mass.
> 
> More robust TOS with an element of mandatory service would definitely help, but absent that I do not agree that further investments in a volunteer reserve force are a waste.
> 
> We have had a lot of successes in a volunteer reserve model.  The reserve force generated more pers for Afghanistan than the Army had any right to expect given the investment made over the previous 20 years.  While it hasn't always been pretty, we've generated workable platoons for Afghanistan and companies for Bosnia.  I would argue that if our reserve force had been properly resourced and managed, we could have done a lot better.
> 
> In the 2013 floods, 41 TBG was the largest unit in 1 CMBG, formed in an afternoon, and was mobile because we still had our full allocation of MSVS at that point.
> 
> To motivate a part time member to join and stay (whether that service is cumpulsory or not) they need to see that they are part of a serious, professional organization, and when when we run our reserve force on a shoe string, that has significant attraction and retention implications which impact our capabilities.



Cannot agree more.


----------



## CBH99

I remember years ago, there was a big moment that simply "hit me" one day - and a week later I was on my way out of the reserve force.

I was tasked with organizing a unit level weekend exercise - nothing special.  

In the weeks leading up to the exercise, I had to beg, borrow, and steal (in that order) - just for a couple of working LS' & ML's, because our unit had no working vehicles other than 2 Milcots.

41 CBG then took one of our Milcots, saying we didn't need 2.  So we ended up with 1.  1 Milcot.  No working ML.  No working LS.  


It was in the final week of prepping for the exercise that it all just hit me at once.  I'm serving in the military of a 1st world country - why do I have NO working vehicles?  Why can't I get my hands on any?  Why do I have to ask units in different cities if they can lend us their vehicles?  *Why is this such an uphill battle?*

Once that exercise was done, I was done.  Morale had finally sunk to an all time low, when I realized that a ragtag militia in Africa of a similar size had more transport capability than we did.  One of my untrained privates who was helping with odds & ends around the unit had jokingly suggested I could try to borrow a truck or two from Botswana - it was funny, but also brutally true.

^Quite a few reservists that I personally know, got out of the military for similar reasons.  It wasn't the time commitment.  It wasn't the pay.  It wasn't anything of the sorts - I think most of them would have stayed in if things like the above had been different.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I remember years ago, there was a big moment that simply "hit me" one day - and a week later I was on my way out of the reserve force.
> 
> I was tasked with organizing a unit level weekend exercise - nothing special.
> 
> In the weeks leading up to the exercise, I had to beg, borrow, and steal (in that order) - just for a couple of working LS' & ML's, because our unit had no working vehicles other than 2 Milcots.
> 
> 41 CBG then took one of our Milcots, saying we didn't need 2.  So we ended up with 1.  1 Milcot.  No working ML.  No working LS.
> 
> 
> It was in the final week of prepping for the exercise that it all just hit me at once.  I'm serving in the military of a 1st world country - why do I have NO working vehicles?  Why can't I get my hands on any?  Why do I have to ask units in different cities if they can lend us their vehicles?  *Why is this such an uphill battle?*
> 
> Once that exercise was done, I was done.  Morale had finally sunk to an all time low, when I realized that a ragtag militia in Africa of a similar size had more transport capability than we did.  One of my untrained privates who was helping with odds & ends around the unit had jokingly suggested I could try to borrow a truck or two from Botswana - it was funny, but also brutally true.
> 
> ^Quite a few reservists that I personally know, got out of the military for similar reasons.  It wasn't the time commitment.  It wasn't the pay.  It wasn't anything of the sorts - I think most of them would have stayed in if things like the above had been different.



It's still like that.

Vehicles aren't being repair or being repaired quickly, people don't want to lend out vehicles because they only have a few working vehicles and don't want to risk someone else breaking a vehicle on loan.

41 CBG had to order units to provide vehicles for a Driver Wheeled course because the unit hosting it had only 2 working vehicles and one trailer. Hard to get 25 privates trained on 2 vehicles in a an expedient fashion. They initially asked other units to help out and nobody budged.

It's no different on any other piece of equipment we have. No working radios, broken helmets and tac vests, boots... Don't get me started on boots.

Even many career courses, reservists are left with equipment scraped off the bottom of the barrel which causes a student to lose focus when you're spending 80% of the time just trying to get things to work.

It's terribly demoralizing. We could be doing so much more and so much better, if only we were properly funded and equipped.


----------



## stanleyykk

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/auditor-general-report-army-reserves-1.3563990

Just 17 hours ago a scathing auditor general's report said the reserve is under equipped and trained for international operation and domestic emergencies.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-wildfire-fortmcmurray-idUSKCN0XU2D8

Just 2 hours ago a wildfire in Alberta broke lose and everyone is calling for the support of the army. (Without the needed equipment? Your guess is as good as my.)

But according to the huffingpost:
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/05/03/canada-s-army-reserve-lacking-soldiers-equipment-training-audit-finds_n_9828412.html

"When there is a domestic emergency, reserve units are expected to assemble trained units of up to 600 soldiers, but Ferguson's report noted that they were thrown into the field over the last few years — specifically in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba — without everything they needed, including essential items."

 [:'(


----------



## CBH99

Essential items must be referring to...*cough*...trucks & vehicles to actually transport people.

You can ask a lot of reservists!  But marching on foot to Ft. McMurray isn't one of them...

We have the MSVS.  I'm hoping that when the new fleet of trucks arrives, everybody can finally have a basic transport capability again.


----------



## MilEME09

LunchMeat said:
			
		

> It's still like that.
> 
> Vehicles aren't being repair or being repaired quickly, people don't want to lend out vehicles because they only have a few working vehicles and don't want to risk someone else breaking a vehicle on loan.
> 
> 41 CBG had to order units to provide vehicles for a Driver Wheeled course because the unit hosting it had only 2 working vehicles and one trailer. Hard to get 25 privates trained on 2 vehicles in a an expedient fashion. They initially asked other units to help out and nobody budged.
> 
> It's no different on any other piece of equipment we have. No working radios, broken helmets and tac vests, boots... Don't get me started on boots.
> 
> Even many career courses, reservists are left with equipment scraped off the bottom of the barrel which causes a student to lose focus when you're spending 80% of the time just trying to get things to work.
> 
> It's terribly demoralizing. We could be doing so much more and so much better, if only we were properly funded and equipped.



I recall being on my DP2 and having 1 tool box of specialized tooling to share between 2 PRes, and 3 Reg force courses, try doing a course on a C6 with only one set of gauges for 5 courses, testing was a night mare


----------



## George Wallace

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Essential items must be referring to...*cough*...trucks & vehicles to actually transport people.
> 
> You can ask a lot of reservists!  But marching on foot to Ft. McMurray isn't one of them...
> 
> We have the MSVS.  I'm hoping that when the new fleet of trucks arrives, everybody can finally have a basic transport capability again.



You overlooked the problem currently affecting the CAF, of the shortage of BOOTS.  Hard to march up to Fort Mac without boots.   >


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I remember years ago, there was a big moment that simply "hit me" one day - and a week later I was on my way out of the reserve force.
> 
> I was tasked with organizing a unit level weekend exercise - nothing special.
> 
> In the weeks leading up to the exercise, I had to beg, borrow, and steal (in that order) - just for a couple of working LS' & ML's, because our unit had no working vehicles other than 2 Milcots.
> 
> 41 CBG then took one of our Milcots, saying we didn't need 2.  So we ended up with 1.  1 Milcot.  No working ML.  No working LS.
> 
> 
> It was in the final week of prepping for the exercise that it all just hit me at once.  I'm serving in the military of a 1st world country - why do I have NO working vehicles?  Why can't I get my hands on any?  Why do I have to ask units in different cities if they can lend us their vehicles?  *Why is this such an uphill battle?*
> 
> Once that exercise was done, I was done.  Morale had finally sunk to an all time low, when I realized that a ragtag militia in Africa of a similar size had more transport capability than we did.  One of my untrained privates who was helping with odds & ends around the unit had jokingly suggested I could try to borrow a truck or two from Botswana - it was funny, but also brutally true.
> 
> ^Quite a few reservists that I personally know, got out of the military for similar reasons.  It wasn't the time commitment.  It wasn't the pay.  It wasn't anything of the sorts - I think most of them would have stayed in if things like the above had been different.



Did you check the radios? ( that make us share our cellphone numbers around to make sure we can have comms on ex?)


----------



## ArmyRick

This is a good thread to follow and I would hope some of these concerns make their way up to the Minister, maybe not through these means but through CoC and "nasty" reports. 

The reserves are an excellent return in investment on the dollar. I am saying this as an ex-regular force soldier, currently a reserve infantry CSM. It hurts a lot of people's feeling but shoving ego aside, here is the reality. The current government (and most previous ones) do not have the stomach to build up a true full size three or four brigade army. They are not willing to spend the funds, not now and not likely in the near future. Deal with it.

I have done 2/3 of my tours as a reservist. From an Infantry perspective, I will say this, most units keep a pretty good rythymn of training soldier indivdual up to platoon level skills. Most operational deployments, it takes anywheres between 3-6 months to shake out and get the soldiers up to speed. Most regular force infantry battalions need at least a month or two of shake out training themselves to get sorted. UNLESS they are fresh off the road to high readiness. 

Now for resources, a very good point. We need vehicles, no if, ands or buts, we need vehicles. We need uniforms and personal kit as well, that seems to be a systemic problem across the board. On the shortage of resources, we may need to really focus on what we need from our reserve force. I will say the politically incorrect thing to say and hurt people's feelings. Is it time to re-roll a few regiments into less resource intensive arms? Like re-rolling some armoured and artillery regiments into infantry?
My regiment has been artillery and armoured corps in the past. We are Infantry today and have been since 1970, we originally were infantry.

Why create more Infantry? 
1. We are simple to train and equip (small arms, troops, radios and a few vehicles for stores)
2. Our trg delta with reg f light infantry is very marginal. 
3. Infantry can be used for force protection, dom ops, parades, etc. We truly are a "general duty" force
4. Very easy to deploy when needed (aircraft, ship, bus, on foot, boat, ATV, snowmobile, helicopter)5. You can build 
5. You can build an easily achievable training cycle from September to May going from individual to section to platoon and touching onto company level operations (most certainly can do by the time the summer ex rolls around)

What does it take?
POLITICAL WILL from both inside the army and the politicians 
I think we need to re-think how P Res pay funding is sourced (from Army O & M budget, is it not?), how about same as reg force members?
Someone with more info than myself on pay can comment on that please
It will need people to park their egos to the side

Remember the context of this modern Canada, Their is no desire to build or maintain a large regular army, we do some very unique operations overseas with unpredictable forecast of what we will be asked to do and some P Res can be fired up to Op readiness pretty quick


----------



## Kirkhill

Rick - I agree with you, especially on the need for infanteers.

The one point of modification I would make is concerning rerolling Artillery, Armoured and Engineer units.  

Infantry is Her Majesty's Odd Job Corps.  They do whatever is required wherever and whenever it required.  Up to and including going to strange places meeting strange people and killing them.

Artillery, Blackhats and Engineers, in my opinion, are all infanteers with additional sets of skills.  There is no need to re-role the Blackhats of the Gunners or the Engineers.   There may be a need to refocus their training so that, for example, of the unit only a troop or a battery/squadron is fully trained up to deploy with their specialist skills.  The rest of the unit would just be GS soldiers - capable of doing whatever, wherever.


----------



## RCPalmer

CBH99 said:
			
		

> We have the MSVS.  I'm hoping that when the new fleet of trucks arrives, everybody can finally have a basic transport capability again.



We have the MSVS for now. We have already lost a significant portion of our MSVS(MILCOT) fleet in 3 Div to support R2HR.  I don't begrudge them the use of the vehicles.  Obviously, high readiness should be the priority.  However, as the MLVW fleet rusts out, and the MSVS(SMP) (ie the RegF MSVS to be built by Mac) procurement drags on, the RegF will increasingly look to the reserve MSVS fleet to solve their B vehicle problems.  If those vehicles are not returned (like the Bison) or returned worn out (remember it isn't an SMP vehicle, so its life span is shorter), that will have significant long term implications for the reserve force capabilities in DOMOPS and routine training.


----------



## ArmyRick

One point, Chris Pook,

Part of the reason I have suggested re-rolling some other units is very much an unfortunate reality, co$t of training/running these units

-Procurement cost
-Maintenance cost
-Training Cost (courses are more $$$)
-Then their is the CAF concept of "sharing" (i.e. CFTPO) since the days of a unit holding its own kit seem to be long gone

Fiscal restraint is a reality and there is no escaping it. There is much more to to infantry than taking G-wagons and mortars away from the other two P Res branches. There is skill sets that have to be trained and exercised, it takes some time but is much more fiscally achievable than training for "armoured" or artillery.

This does not mean that all P Res Armoured and Arty be re-rolled. Its a thought. Also look at what MOSID can not realistically keep a reserve equivalent (I have heard lots of rumblings on hear about vehicle technician for example). Looking at skill sets and development time to become operational. 

I can most certainly see certain trades/units being moved out of the reserve force altogether.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> This is a good thread to follow and I would hope some of these concerns make their way up to the Minister, maybe not through these means but through CoC and "nasty" reports.
> 
> The reserves are an excellent return in investment on the dollar. I am saying this as an ex-regular force soldier, currently a reserve infantry CSM. It hurts a lot of people's feeling but shoving ego aside, here is the reality. The current government (and most previous ones) do not have the stomach to build up a true full size three or four brigade army. They are not willing to spend the funds, not now and not likely in the near future. Deal with it.
> 
> I have done 2/3 of my tours as a reservist. From an Infantry perspective, I will say this, most units keep a pretty good rythymn of training soldier indivdual up to platoon level skills. Most operational deployments, it takes anywheres between 3-6 months to shake out and get the soldiers up to speed. Most regular force infantry battalions need at least a month or two of shake out training themselves to get sorted. UNLESS they are fresh off the road to high readiness.
> 
> Now for resources, a very good point. We need vehicles, no if, ands or buts, we need vehicles. We need uniforms and personal kit as well, that seems to be a systemic problem across the board. On the shortage of resources, we may need to really focus on what we need from our reserve force. I will say the politically incorrect thing to say and hurt people's feelings. Is it time to re-roll a few regiments into less resource intensive arms? Like re-rolling some armoured and artillery regiments into infantry?
> My regiment has been artillery and armoured corps in the past. We are Infantry today and have been since 1970, we originally were infantry.
> 
> Why create more Infantry?
> 1. We are simple to train and equip (small arms, troops, radios and a few vehicles for stores)
> 2. Our trg delta with reg f light infantry is very marginal.
> 3. Infantry can be used for force protection, dom ops, parades, etc. We truly are a "general duty" force
> 4. Very easy to deploy when needed (aircraft, ship, bus, on foot, boat, ATV, snowmobile, helicopter)5. You can build
> 5. You can build an easily achievable training cycle from September to May going from individual to section to platoon and touching onto company level operations (most certainly can do by the time the summer ex rolls around)
> 
> What does it take?
> POLITICAL WILL from both inside the army and the politicians
> I think we need to re-think how P Res pay funding is sourced (from Army O & M budget, is it not?), how about same as reg force members?
> Someone with more info than myself on pay can comment on that please
> It will need people to park their egos to the side
> 
> Remember the context of this modern Canada, Their is no desire to build or maintain a large regular army, we do some very unique operations overseas with unpredictable forecast of what we will be asked to do and some P Res can be fired up to Op readiness pretty quick



As an Infantry guy (with a capital 'I') I can see your point.

However when a real war starts, which is what national level militaries are supposed to be ready for, we will need the whole team at the party or we can expect to see a repeat of the 'Forlorn Hope' of old on a massive scale. 

If we focus just on Infantry because we are cheaper and supposedly more flexible (and much, much better looking of course  ), the CF will be basically useless in any kind of fight that does not resemble the most basic of COIN type operations or DOMOPS. You can't 'magic wand'' up a significant armour/arty/engr capability overnight.


----------



## Staff Weenie

Vehicles are a huge issue for my unit as well. We have three LSVW Ambulances. At any given point, two are in maintenance for a variety of reasons. Ambulances are supposed to be a priority for repair, but this is Ottawa, and civilians tell us they have other things they are working on. When we do use them, we are extremely reluctant to drive them outside of Ottawa, because they are so mechanically unreliable - one of my great worries is to have a Pri A in the back, and the vehicle sh$ts the bed...... 

Comms are another issue - we've resorted to using cell phones as well - and then you have some HQ idiot give you grief about using them, they're not secure! Well how about getting the right number of reliable radios that have a decent range??? 

As far as training time goes - how many days per year are we mandated to spend on various political correctness training, and CYA activities for Senior Officers and politicians? We had a DND Ethics Coordinator come in and give us a big song and dance about ethical models in decision making. I put him on the spot with some pretty standard medical ethical issues faced in the R3MMU - where you have seconds to make a call - life or death for the patient - make the decision and then live with it years later (that gave me a huge amount of respect for the Docs). How does your decision tree work now dingbat???

Insane levels of financial micromanaging and approval hampers effectiveness. A unit wants me to send a Med A to support training in Petawawa? That's outside of the 100 Km zone - I need to secure the approval of our higher HQ for that! In my career I've seen activities that were once approved by Captains, now requiring a LGen to sign off - who on this planet thinks that's a good idea?

There is so much to fix, on so many levels.


----------



## ArmyRick

daftandbarmy, 

IF, big IF a war of nation on nation started TODAY, and lets just throw it out there that PM JT suddenly changed his heart and multiplied the defence budget many times over, how soon could we have those armoured reserve units manning AFV (tanks, recce or whatever) and ready to do their jobs as intended?
How long long could our industries (or American ones?) churn out the AFVs? How long would the learning curve be? How long would it take to recruit and train those soldiers to an effective operational capability? TOO LONG. Thats my answer. 

Yes, there is always the big scary scenario, and it is very real. I will emphasize their is little political will to keep the RESERVES equipped and skilled in operating big and expensive gear. It would be more prudent to keep the regular force armoured regiments topped up or structured similar to Australian Army. 

My point is here and now, a government and a Canadian population, will NOT support expensive (in money, time and maintenance) equipped reserve army. There is barely stomach to keep the regular force going. When those G-Wagons rust out, what will they replace them with? We can't even get enough trucks for current logistic issues. Let alone "half-assed reconnaissance vehicles"  

I am saying that with the current political will, lets build on capabilities that we can in the reserves, such as LOTS of infantry. No one ever went to war and said "we have too many infantry battalions".

I am NOT advocating getting rid of armoured or artillery. Or combat engineers (I have not touched that one on the P Res side, not sure how resource heavy they are). I am saying in the current context we are operating, lets exploit what we can.


----------



## George Wallace

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> daftandbarmy,
> 
> IF, big IF a war of nation on nation started TODAY, and lets just throw it out there that PM JT suddenly changed his heart and multiplied the defence budget many times over, how soon could we have those armoured reserve units manning AFV and ready to do their jobs as intended?



There is no such thing as a majic wand that will produce a Div of Armour vehicles overnight with fully trained, even partially trained, crews and support troops and vehicles.

It takes years to gear up, tool and produce armour vehicles and their support equipment and vehicles.  A future war may be over well before JT could make that decision.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

George Wallace said:
			
		

> There is no such thing as a majic wand that will produce a Div of Armour vehicles overnight with fully trained, even partially trained, crews and support troops and vehicles.
> 
> It takes years to gear up, tool and produce armour vehicles and their support equipment and vehicles.  A future war may be over well before JT could make that decision.



Which is why the Reserves need to be more than a "manpower" pool for the regular force. If we are going to keep reserve armour/artillery than they need to be given an "operational role" to go along with DOMOPs. The talk previous in the arty had been to equip the reserves with 120mm mortars to give them an operational role. armour units, not trained in armour, offer only limited value, particularly if a force on force war.

First step is to remove the limitations on reserve units, give them roles (such as the US reserves) and equip/train them appropriately.


----------



## George Wallace

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Which is why the Reserves need to be more than a "manpower" pool for the regular force. If we are going to keep reserve armour/artillery than they need to be given an "operational role" to go along with DOMOPs. The talk previous in the arty had been to equip the reserves with 120mm mortars to give them an operational role. armour units, not trained in armour, offer only limited value, particularly if a force on force war.
> 
> First step is to remove the limitations on reserve units, give them roles (such as the US reserves) and equip/train them appropriately.



Another proposal is to do what the Germans have done.....They cascade their equipment down, as opposed to putting it out as targets on the ranges, or sold off as scrap.


----------



## cphansen

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> daftandbarmy,
> 
> 
> 
> I am saying that with the current political will, lets build on capabilities that we can in the reserves, such as LOTS of infantry. No one ever went to war and said "we have too many infantry battalions".



Actually thatès exactly what Canada said at the beginning of WW II. They called up the Militia, and transferred many units to the CASF and trained them to be infantry only to decide the units weren t needed as Infantry, so they were retrained as Armour or Artillary or even Headquarter units.  Many of these units accepted the few months of training and excelled in those tasks. Donèt tell me the militia or Primary Reserve are unable to fulfill the roles of armoured drivers, gunners and loader. Back in the sixties, my first trade was a driver and then I was on a gunnery course when I was accepted for a commission.

I


----------



## RCPalmer

SherH2A said:
			
		

> Actually thatès exactly what Canada said at the beginning of WW II. They called up the Militia, and transferred many units to the CASF and trained them to be infantry only to decide the units weren t needed as Infantry, so they were retrained as Armour or Artillary or even Headquarter units.  Many of these units accepted the few months of training and excelled in those tasks. Donèt tell me the militia or Primary Reserve are unable to fulfill the roles of armoured drivers, gunners and loader. Back in the sixties, my first trade was a driver and then I was on a gunnery course when I was accepted for a commission.
> 
> I



While I agree with you with regards to the employability of the Army Reserve in Armor and Artillery roles, the broad trend of occupational re-assignment in the Canadian Army in WW2 was into the Infantry and not out of it.  Once the Italian and Normandy campaigns ramped up and the casualties mounted (concentrated in the infantry) there was wholesale occupational reassignment of other arms and services into the Infantry.  A few complete units were even converted to Infantry.  As an example, my grandfather started the war in the 1st Light Anti Aircraft Regiment and he was re-roled into infantry when that unit became the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish.


----------



## ArmyRick

Valid point. You never truly have "too many infantry". 1939 aside, lets face our current restraints.

I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them.... The term equip. Is not going to happen from now until 2019 when this government is up for another job interview with its 36 million employers. I may be annoying but I truly believe we need to face what we have available, what funds there are (or NOT available), the POLITICAL will and what can we do. 

Its not being negative, its more of a shelve that idea and lets deal with the today.

Realistic roles for reservist
1. Domestic Operations (Most likely disaster related, may be security related like Olympics or G20 stuff)
2. Individual Augmentation for Reg F (Has worked and will continue to work)
3. Platoon/Troop and Company/squadron Deployment (in roles like Force Protection)
4. Specialist roles such as IA

With what I see above and keeping in mind we have no money available for new stuff. What would you have us do? What do we need?
First thing we truly need is MANPOWER, more troops, our greatest resource. I would scarifice really cool gear like 120mm Mortars or MBT for additional troops. Thats me. 
For kit, the stuff we need as a higher priority is personal kit (a real issue right now), radios, log vehicles (newer versions of MLVW and other utility vehicles) and ensure we have adequate small arms (do not think that an issue at this time. Anybody seeing different?)

Big point over and over, what POLITICAL will is there for the reserves? That is from both inside the Forces hiearchy and the government itself.


----------



## OldSolduer

A good start would be to shut down units that aren't effective and role them into one unit.


----------



## Journeyman

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them....


The OAG Report states that the Reserves are tasked with four roles already: Influence Activities; Convoy Escort; Force Protection; and Persistent Surveillance -- noting that only IA has been provided with some semblance of guidance and training.  It's much like when Air Defence went to a 10/90 unit, specific tasks for Reserves only crop up when it's something the RegF doesn't, or has stopped, caring about.

In fact, if you read through the entire report, the recurring theme is OAG: "Recommendation" DND: _"Agreed. However, waffle, waffle..."_  suggesting strongly that the Reserve is something the RegF doesn't particularly care about.  

Or as stated previously:


			
				recceguy said:
			
		

> Nothing is going to change. These are the same problems we've had for the last 50 years.





			
				Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> A good start would be to shut down units that aren't effective and role them into one unit.


       anic:    That disturbance in the force you felt was Sam Hughes.


----------



## GR66

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Valid point. You never truly have "too many infantry". 1939 aside, lets face our current restraints.
> 
> I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them.... The term equip. Is not going to happen from now until 2019 when this government is up for another job interview with its 36 million employers. I may be annoying but I truly believe we need to face what we have available, what funds there are (or NOT available), the POLITICAL will and what can we do.
> 
> Its not being negative, its more of a shelve that idea and lets deal with the today.
> 
> Realistic roles for reservist
> 1. Domestic Operations (Most likely disaster related, may be security related like Olympics or G20 stuff)
> 2. Individual Augmentation for Reg F (Has worked and will continue to work)
> 3. Platoon/Troop and Company/squadron Deployment (in roles like Force Protection)
> 4. Specialist roles such as IA
> 
> With what I see above and keeping in mind we have no money available for new stuff. What would you have us do? What do we need?
> First thing we truly need is MANPOWER, more troops, our greatest resource. I would scarifice really cool gear like 120mm Mortars or MBT for additional troops. Thats me.
> For kit, the stuff we need as a higher priority is personal kit (a real issue right now), radios, log vehicles (newer versions of MLVW and other utility vehicles) and ensure we have adequate small arms (do not think that an issue at this time. Anybody seeing different?)
> 
> Big point over and over, what POLITICAL will is there for the reserves? That is from both inside the Forces hiearchy and the government itself.



If the biggest need is manpower but there is also little political will to provide more money, then maybe we could look at a variation on earlier discussions about a volunteer militia.

Would it be possible to expand the militia with a partial volunteer service model.  It might look something like this:
- local units recruit their own volunteer Militia members.
- volunteer Militia receive local weekend basic training
- some volunteers may choose to remain at this level and participate in parade nights, exercises and Domestic Ops call-ups (would receive pay if called-up)
- those interested in going further and completing training in a CF trade would then apply to the CF as a Reservist (would require recommendation from their unit)
- new Reservists would be paid while taking their career courses but would continue to to parade and take part in exercises on a volunteer basis.
- once a trade-qualified Reservist is promoted to Corporal and they begin to have leadership responsibilities they would earn their Class A days as per the current system.

Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.

This would allow the paid "Reserve" force to be the leadership base and source for Reg Force augmentation while at the same time allowing local units to expand their size with unpaid volunteers, providing a greater pool of at least partially trained personnel for training and operations and more leadership opportunities for the NCM and officer corps.


----------



## krimynal

just out of curiosity.  

Why is it so long and hard for someone from the reserve to switch over to Reg Force.  Don't get me wrong I don't want to come out and say that this is BS and everything.
But if we speak about the role of the reserve.  A lot of time people from the reserve want to switch over to Reg Force and eventually they just end up dropping the Idea or releasing.

How is it that someone who is fully trained in a trade has a harder time becoming Reg Force than someone new straight out of the streets ? 

I do realise it's all about Quotas and what the CF is looking for.  But why would someone who is already somehow trained ( I'm not going to say that a reserve pvt as the same training as a regular one , we all know this is not true. )
But why would this person not be priotised in the papers?  

Is it only because there is only like 4-5 people working for the CT side of the CF or ? 

If this is not the right place to post this let me know and I'll put it down !

P.S. Spell Check dosen't work at my workplace right now so sorry for the mistakes !


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> anic:    That disturbance in the force you felt was Sam Hughes.



I thought the slam on Sam was that he disconnected Force Generation and Force Employment.  Yes, he raised many militia units.  But when it came time to deploy them he created an entirely new functional structure that was infantry heavy. (And, just as in World War 2, morphed over time as needs changed - machine guns, mortars, tanks, sappers, railway troops....)


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:
			
		

> If the biggest need is manpower but there is also little political will to provide more money, then maybe we could look at a variation on earlier discussions about a volunteer militia.
> 
> Would it be possible to expand the militia with a partial volunteer service model.  It might look something like this:
> - local units recruit their own volunteer Militia members.
> - volunteer Militia receive local weekend basic training
> - some volunteers may choose to remain at this level and participate in parade nights, exercises and Domestic Ops call-ups (would receive pay if called-up)
> - those interested in going further and completing training in a CF trade would then apply to the CF as a Reservist (would require recommendation from their unit)
> - new Reservists would be paid while taking their career courses but would continue to to parade and take part in exercises on a volunteer basis.
> - once a trade-qualified Reservist is promoted to Corporal and they begin to have leadership responsibilities they would earn their Class A days as per the current system.
> 
> Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.
> 
> This would allow the paid "Reserve" force to be the leadership base and source for Reg Force augmentation while at the same time allowing local units to expand their size with unpaid volunteers, providing a greater pool of at least partially trained personnel for training and operations and more leadership opportunities for the NCM and officer corps.



I think it would be possible.


----------



## mariomike

krimynal said:
			
		

> If this is not the right place to post this let me know and I'll put it down !



Nothing wrong with posting about it here, but we already have a 44-page Component Transfers (Reserve to Regular) discussion.


----------



## krimynal

mariomike said:
			
		

> Nothing wrong with posting about it here, but we already have a 44-page Component Transfers (Reserve to Regular) discussion.




Yeah I know about that one , I usually post in that one too.  I just thought since that one was about the role of the reserve force it might of been on some interests. 

But I do get what you mean tho! 

As far as reserve role.  I am not trained / have enough experience to really comment and put in my 2cents !


----------



## mariomike

krimynal said:
			
		

> Yeah I know about that one , I usually post in that one too.  I just thought since that one was about the role of the reserve force it might of been on some interests.
> 
> But I do get what you mean tho!
> 
> As far as reserve role.  I am not trained / have enough experience to really comment and put in my 2cents !



I've always enjoyed your posts, Krimynal. Wherever they are.  

From reading them ( yours and others ) I can understand the frustration of the painfully long CT process.


----------



## krimynal

mariomike said:
			
		

> I've always enjoyed your posts, Krimiynal. Wherever they are.



haha well I'll take that as a compliment  ! I'll try to keep that up then !


----------



## Journeyman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I thought the slam on Sam .....


Oh, where to start....  ;D  

He's the spiritual godfather of the "militia myth" (although it pre-dated him), that Canadians are natural warriors and woodsmen, inherently superior to full-time soldiers of other nations (esp, Britain). His arrogance and public bragging about his awesomeness/British leadership incompetence got him thrown out of South Africa during the 2nd Boer War -- where he fought for the British because the Canadian commander wanted nothing to do with him.

Back home, he eventually cajoled his way into Minister of Militia and Defence under Borden.  He worked hard to build up the Militia, at the expense of the Permanent Force, right up to 1914.  With the declaration of war, he threw out the straight-forward mobilization plan built by LGen Gwatkin (Brit RegF; Chief of General Staff for Canadian Army) to gather troops at Petawawa for pre-deployment training. Instead, he sent telegrams to individual COs to get their troops to Valcartier....where they had to actually build the camp before they could even start pre-deployment training -- leaving little time for actual training.

Getting troops and equipment to Halifax, loading, and unloading in England was even more of a nightmare, because there was no plan, rhyme or reason to it.  

Micromanaging; foisting poor equipment based on his personal preference; political interference and media muck-raking.  He's got it all.

.....except one or more Victoria Crosses, which he felt he deserved for his South African exploits. 


In effect,  Sam Hughes is a role model for the "Mess-kit Militia" (which is why we can't amalgamate understrength units; the Reserves would lose way too many LCol/CWO positions, and then who would organize the Army Ball, campaign for new/old rank badges, claim to be SAS, and stuff)  >


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Oh, where to start....  ;D
> 
> He's the spiritual godfather of the "militia myth" (although it pre-dated him), that Canadians are natural warriors and woodsmen, inherently superior to full-time soldiers of other nations (esp, Britain). His arrogance and public bragging about his awesomeness/British leadership incompetence got him thrown out of South Africa during the 2nd Boer War -- where he fought for the British because the Canadian commander wanted nothing to do with him.
> 
> Back home, he eventually cajoled his way into Minister of Militia and Defence under Borden.  He worked hard to build up the Militia, at the expense of the Permanent Force, right up to 1914.  With the declaration of war, he threw out the straight-forward mobilization plan built by LGen Gwatkin (Brit RegF; Chief of General Staff for Canadian Army) to gather troops at Petawawa for pre-deployment training. Instead, he sent telegrams to individual COs to get their troops to Valcartier....where they had to actually build the camp before they could even start pre-deployment training -- leaving little time for actual training.
> 
> Getting troops and equipment to Halifax, loading, and unloading in England was even more of a nightmare, because there was no plan, rhyme or reason to it.
> 
> Micromanaging; foisting poor equipment based on his personal preference; political interference and media muck-raking.  He's got it all.
> 
> .....except one or more Victoria Crosses, which he felt he deserved for his South African exploits.
> 
> 
> In effect,  Sam Hughes is a role model for the "Mess-kit Militia" (which is why we can't amalgamate understrength units; the Reserves would lose way too many LCol/CWO positions, and then who would organize the Army Ball, campaign for new/old rank badges, claim to be SAS, and stuff)  >



So the archetype for the Canadian military then.   >

 :surrender:   ;D


----------



## Old Sweat

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So the archetype for the Canadian military then.   >
> 
> :surrender:   ;D



Journeyman was being kind to Sam's memory. Don't forget the Ross Rifle and the meddling and interference with commanders in the field, as well as his hatchet job on Sir Arthur Currie.

Perhaps the best thing he ever did was to have an agent secretly buy land near Quebec City starting a few years before the war. This became Valcartier, and he shifted the contractors building the Connaught Ranges on the outbreak of the war.


----------



## mariomike

GR66 said:
			
		

> Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.



Even Auxiliary members of the police department, must volunteer ( although unpaid, while on duty they must be covered by WSIB ) a minimum of 150 hours per year. From what I have read in this tread, a paid Reservist can parade as little as 12 days / 24 nights a year. How many days / nights would an unpaid Reservist ( aka militia, auxiliary, volunteer ) be required to show up?

As far as volunteer firefighters are concerned, take a look at some of the collective agreements negotiated by their union, including "Wages and Rates of Pay",
http://www2.hamilton.ca/NR/rdonlyres/3EF302D1-5D1A-4BCD-B9C6-D2A54F965939/0/GHVFFA911Jan12012Dec312015CollectiveAgreement.pdf

Volunteer firefighters vote overwhelmingly to unionize
http://www.mykawartha.com/news-story/4383230-volunteer-firefighters-vote-overwhelmingly-to-unionize-update/

Volunteer firefighters now unionized 
http://www.thesudburystar.com/2013/02/13/volunteer-firefighters-now-unionized

etc...


----------



## Kirkhill

MM:

I would argue that those "volunteers" had just moved up the scale from "volunteers" to "part-time employees".

That shouldn't discount the contributions of all the unpaid volunteers serving small communities.

Why wouldn't you want to take advantage of freely offered hours?


----------



## GR66

I don't mean to suggest that in any way a semi-volunteer Militia would in any way be free.  It might however be one way of meeting the goal of increasing the size of the Reserves without bearing an unrealistic cost to do so.

No issue with requiriing the volunteers to put in a minimum number of hours per year.  How can they be trusted to be able to perform if deployed if they're not putting in the time to learn and practice their skills?  And no issue with having them protected in case they are injured while training or enacting job protection legislation for Reservists who are called up as has been widely suggested by others.  Ther will certainly be admin costs to increasing the size of units and providing in-unit training and also equipment costs like uniforms (although maybe the volunteers could be issued cheaper old-style "combats" instead of CADPAT, etc.).

If the goal however is to increase the size of the Reserves then this is one possible way to increase the number of troops on the base of the rank pyramid while focusing the majority of the pay expenses on the smaller, upper levels of the pyramid.  

If currently there are 21,000 positions on the books, and only 13,944 reservists are considered active and ready for service as was mentioned up thread, how many of those are represented by members that are not yet trade trained?  These would be volunteers in the new system which would open up a lot more positions for those that ARE trade qualified as paid reservist positions.

It's only a very rough idea and I have no idea if it would work for Air/Naval Reserve units, but possibly a starting point?


----------



## krimynal

The only problem I see with that is , 

Most of the people in the reserve are part time because they are currently at school , which costs a small fortune.  
Here in Quebec ( I don't know if it's the same everywhere ) if you work too much , the government will cease some of the student loans that helps you to go to school in the first place.
I for one was doing a degree 2 years ago while in the reserve.  When I made my taxes at the end of the year , initially the government was giving me 2000$ in loans and 3500$ in scolarship ( that I didn't have to give back).

Once they saw how much money I made with the army ( which wasn't much ) they removed all my scolarship and left me with only the loans , So I now was in debt of 3500$ because I wanted to work while in school.

If you start taking some students , ask them to train on nights / weekends.  To manage full time students ( which dosen't pay ) and tell them that while basic training they won't get a paycheck neither. 
There is no way these kids will be able to survive and complete a degree or any type of higher education without money.  The idea is good ... but the outcome will be dramatic


----------



## LightFighter

Or instead of this volunteer militia.. We stick with recruiting people into the Reserves, fully train them in a MOSID and have them capable of deploying on domestic and international operations.  


As well, amalgamating Reserve units is required IMO, no point in having LCol/CWO commanding a "battalion" that is a Company minus sized organization.. Which realistically may be a platoon plus sized unit if you only count the people that actually show up, and go on exercise on a regular basis.


----------



## Journeyman

GR66 said:
			
		

> If the biggest need is manpower but there is also little political will to provide more money, then maybe we could look at a variation on earlier discussions about a volunteer militia.


I think that would be a non-starter.  Again, go back to the Auditor-General's report (pp. 35-40) and look at how many units are currently parading at half of their optimal strength or less -- and that's while they're getting paid.  I can't imagine any significant improvement by saying "you're going to get the same amount of cock, but we're not going to pay you."   :dunno:




			
				mariomike said:
			
		

> Even Auxiliary members of the police department, must volunteer ( although unpaid, while on duty they must be covered by WSIB ) a minimum of 150 hours per year. From what I have read in this tread, a paid Reservist can parade as little as 12 days / 24 nights a year. How many days / nights would an unpaid Reservist ( aka militia, auxiliary, volunteer ) be required to show up?
> 
> As far as volunteer firefighters are concerned, take a look at some of the collective agreements negotiated by their union, including "Wages and Rates of Pay",
> http://www2.hamilton.ca/NR/rdonlyres/3EF302D1-5D1A-4BCD-B9C6-D2A54F965939/0/GHVFFA911Jan12012Dec312015CollectiveAgreement.pdf
> 
> Volunteer firefighters vote overwhelmingly to unionize
> http://www.mykawartha.com/news-story/4383230-volunteer-firefighters-vote-overwhelmingly-to-unionize-update/
> 
> Volunteer firefighters now unionized
> http://www.thesudburystar.com/2013/02/13/volunteer-firefighters-now-unionized


You do a great job as the sites' 'previous thread librarian.'  :nod:  
....however not every post you make personally has to be linked to Toronto Emergency Services.  Honest.

The points are irrelevant; citing WSIB and some firefighters unionizing is simply a fallacious argument ("Association Fallacy" if you're interested).  You _do_  know that neither the Reserves nor even the Reg Force are unionized.  It is therefore massively unlikely that the chain of command will have to deal with any volunteer militia collective bargaining issues.


----------



## mariomike

Journeyman said:
			
		

> You do a great job as the sites' 'previous thread librarian.'  :nod:
> ....however not every post you make personally has to be linked to Toronto Emergency Services.  Honest.
> 
> The points are irrelevant; citing WSIB and some firefighters unionizing is simply a fallacious argument ("Association Fallacy" if you're interested).  You _do_  know that neither the Reserves nor even the Reg Force are unionized.  It is therefore massively unlikely that the chain of command will have to deal with any volunteer militia collective bargaining issues.



 :ignore:


----------



## CountDC

mariomike said:
			
		

> From what I have read in this tread, a paid Reservist can parade as little as 12 days / 24 nights a year. How many days / nights would an unpaid Reservist ( aka militia, auxiliary, volunteer ) be required to show up?



They don't even have to parade 12 days/24 Nights.  Once in a 30 day period that has 3 scheduled parades in it if the unit will actually enforce the NES policy.  Depending on a unit parade schedule this could be as little as 7 parades for a unit that stands up in Sep and stands down in May.   I have seen a unit schedule based on budget restrictions in the past consist of Sep - Nov, stand down for Dec, Jan/Feb and Mar have evenings designated as on ramps if money was available so 5 evening parades kept the mbrs safe for that period.  Apr started the new FY so they had to do 1 day in Apr and 1 Day in May to finish off the training year.


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I think that would be a non-starter.  Again, go back to the Auditor-General's report (pp. 35-40) and look at how many units are currently parading at half of their optimal strength or less -- and that's while they're getting paid.  I can't imagine any significant improvement by saying "you're going to get the same amount of cock, but we're not going to pay you."   :dunno:



And yet: 

144,250 Canadians were volunteer firefighters in 2013-2015 (vice 25,550 career firefighters)
http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/research/nfpa-reports/fire-service-statistics/oscanadafirefighters.pdf?la=en

In addition 

75,000 Canadians volunteered to assist the RCMP in its duties, including 1,600 auxilliary constables
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/vol-ben/index-eng.htm
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps-spcca/auxil-eng.htm

4,000 Canadians volunteer for the Canadian Coast Guard Auxilliary
http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/College-and-Careers/Volunteers

2,800 Canadians volunteer for CASARA (Civil Air Search and Rescue Association)
http://www.casara.ca/about-casara/

>20,000 Canadians volunteer for the Red Cross
http://www.redcross.ca/volunteer/volunteer-with-us

12,000 Canadians volunteer for St John's Ambulance (1,000,000 hours per year or 80 hours per person average)
https://www.sja.ca/English/How-You-Can-Help/Pages/Volunteer/Volunteer-Landing.aspx

12,000 Canadians volunteer for Ground Search and Rescue teams (SARVAC)
http://sarvac.ca/about/

There is a pool of more than 270,000 Canadians already volunteering their services, many of them taking on physically demanding and hazardous tasks.

You don't think that some of those would be suitable candidates for an unpaid Militia?

In my opinion it isn't about the pay.  It is about the organization.


----------



## trustnoone73

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Realistic roles for reservist
> 1. Domestic Operations (Most likely disaster related, may be security related like Olympics or G20 stuff)
> 2. Individual Augmentation for Reg F (Has worked and will continue to work)
> 3. Platoon/Troop and Company/squadron Deployment (in roles like Force Protection)
> 4. Specialist roles such as IA
> 
> .... MANPOWER, more troops, our greatest resource. I would scarifice really cool gear like 120mm Mortars or MBT for additional troops. Thats me.
> For kit, the stuff we need as a higher priority is personal kit (a real issue right now), radios, log vehicles (newer versions of MLVW and other utility vehicles) and ensure we have adequate small arms (do not think that an issue at this time. Anybody seeing different?)



1 & 3 are only ever going to be in the context of 2. 2 workes because we are a military that is reg force centric.

Define what any reserve is, either strategic or tactical, and you get augmentation.  It's not sexy, but that is exactly what it is.

I kinda like the idea of 120mm mortars.  I think a mortar group provides a lot of bang for the buck.  



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> The OAG Report states that the Reserves are tasked with four roles already: Influence Activities; Convoy Escort; Force Protection; and Persistent Surveillance -- noting that only IA has been provided with some semblance of guidance and training.



So far as I know there are zero reserves providing Convoy Ecsort or Force Pro to anyone in high readyness or on R2HR I serviously doubt the Reserve Force has the platforms or the training to do this outside of a mission specific task with appropriate work up training.  As a rolls those are dubious.  I have no idea what is meant by persistent surveillance in a PRes context.  I suspect this is a Rangers roll.

The roll for the green PRes is really augmentation. The capability should be to provide augmentation up to two down:  i.e. a Bde a Coy, a unit can provide a Pl,..etc.  Structure:  what ever it takes to do that, whether regimental systems or combined unit tactical groupings.

The OAG states that "Only a fraction of its troops properly trained, equipped and fit for international operations and domestic emergencies."  Yes, so what?  A fully trained deployable reserve force is neither neccessary nor realistic.  Stop trying to impose the impossible.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

Simply put:


You stop paying reservists, you lose reservists.


----------



## blacktriangle

Provide real job protection, force reservists to sign a binding contract upon completion of BMQ or some other milestone, and pay them a salary. Give them the training and equipment required to function, but stop trying to train PRes in skillsets that even the RegF has trouble maintaining. 

Define a realistic and achievable end state for the PRes, give them the recruiting and funding they need, and organize them in a sensible manner. Squash every reserve council or special interest group that gets in the way...


----------



## Kirkhill

Lunchmeat:

Not talking about stopping pay to Reservists.  Talking about inviting more people to join on a voluntary basis.

The basic issues in attracting people, in my mind are:

Letting them through the door (reducing the number of barriers to enrolment)
Keeping them (engaging them by supplying useful and interesting training and giving them opportunities to serve and advance).

Volunteer Militia could provide feedstock for a Part Time, Paid, Reserve.

See here  http://army.ca/forums/threads/122267.0

A difference between us and the Danes is that all of our separate volunteer groups listed above are centralized through the Danish Homeguard - an unpaid organization with a percentage them that are paid for standing by for rapid deployment.


----------



## Kirkhill

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Provide real job protection, force reservists to sign a binding contract upon completion of BMQ or some other milestone, and pay them a salary. Give them the training and equipment required to function, but stop trying to train PRes in skillsets that even the RegF has trouble maintaining.
> 
> Define a realistic and achievable end state for the PRes, give them the recruiting and funding they need, and organize them in a sensible manner. Squash every reserve council or special interest group that gets in the way...



I agree with everything but your first two comments.  Forcing, either reservists or employers, will not get you where you want to be.  People will not join the reserves.  Employers will not hire reservists.  These things are known from the experience in Canada, Britain and the US.


----------



## blacktriangle

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I agree with everything but your first two comments.  Forcing, either reservists or employers, will not get you where you want to be.  People will not join the reserves.  Employers will not hire reservists.  These things are known from the experience in Canada, Britain and the US.



Well if that's truly the case, then nothing positive will come out of more investment into the PRes. If I were in charge, why would I allocate my limited resources to train and equip a "reserve" that won't actually function in that context? I'd be much more inclined to focus on funding the RegF in that case. I'd leave the PRes "status quo" and I'd take every chance to "steal" the best and brightest of the PRes for individual augmentation or CT. The golden carrot works, I've seen it.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

100  pages dating to 2001. Nothing has changed, including the ideas. Keep them coming though , someone might eventually get a good  idea from here and make it work.


----------



## krimynal

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Well if that's truly the case, then nothing positive will come out of more investment into the PRes. If I were in charge, why would I allocate my limited resources to train and equip a "reserve" that won't actually function in that context? I'd be much more inclined to focus on funding the RegF in that case. I'd leave the PRes "status quo" and I'd take every chance to "steal" the best and brightest of the PRes for individual augmentation or CT. The golden carrot works, I've seen it.



at least we can agree that right now , the CT process is a real big problem.  At my reserve unit , once they knew that I applied for a transfert , the first thing my COC said to the people working at operation was : There is no point in giving him any full time or courses since he is going to leave anyways. 
With that mindset , it's pretty much impossible to keep someone in.  I know it's all about budget ... but at the end of the day, if someone want's to go regF then why would he be penalised ??


----------



## cavalryman

recceguy said:
			
		

> 100  pages dating to 2001. Nothing has changed, including the ideas. Keep them coming though , someone might eventually get a good  idea from here and make it work.


Isn't that how we got pips and crowns?  >


----------



## dapaterson

Not all units adopt the "CT in, he's dead to us" mindset.  Some units and unit command teams encourage and support those trying to component transfer - you know, the old "Know your soldiers, and look out for their welfare" thing.


----------



## krimynal

sadly because they decided to boycott me from all the courses and everything. That's one of the main reason why I decided to release and re-apply directly RegF.  But hey , that's my personnal story don't want to drift from the original posts !


----------



## PuckChaser

Volunteer firefighters are not volunteers. They're like reservists that are on call. They show up, they get paid. That's not a true volunteer.


----------



## mariomike

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> MM:
> 
> I would argue that those "volunteers" had just moved up the scale from "volunteers" to "part-time employees".
> 
> That shouldn't discount the contributions of all the unpaid volunteers serving small communities.
> 
> Why wouldn't you want to take advantage of freely offered hours?
> 
> Why wouldn't you want to ?



Chris, I see no reason why not to take advantage of freely offered hours. _If_  the hours are freely offered, and the unpaid member is not required to serve a minimum number of hours.

My reply was limited to Reply #2481, "...volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxiliary..."

Although we do not have volunteer firefighters in the city where I live, I read this on a Canadian website, "Contrary to a common assumption, ‘volunteer’ does not mean ‘free’.  Volunteer fire fighters are paid-on-call employees of the municipalities they work for.  They receive a standard hourly wage for all calls they respond to, and they are often paid for attending meetings and their practice sessions." 
http://www.thefirewithin.ca/blog/?p=70

We do have auxiliary police in my city. But, they must serve "a minimum of 150 hours per year." 

I read here about paid Reservists, "They don't even have to parade 12 days/24 Nights.  Once in a 30 day period that has 3 scheduled parades in it if the unit will actually enforce the NES policy.  Depending on a unit parade schedule this could be as little as 7 parades for a unit that stands up in Sep and stands down in May.   I have seen a unit schedule based on budget restrictions in the past consist of Sep - Nov, stand down for Dec, Jan/Feb and Mar have evenings designated as on ramps if money was available so 5 evening parades kept the mbrs safe for that period.  Apr started the new FY so they had to do 1 day in Apr and 1 Day in May to finish off the training year."

If that's the case for paid Reservists, it would be difficult to demand unpaid "militia" serve an equal or greater amount of time.

I simply questioned if the comparison of unpaid militia with volunteer firefighters or auxiliary police was valid.



			
				krimynal said:
			
		

> sadly because they decided to boycott me from all the courses and everything. That's one of the main reason why I decided to release and re-apply directly RegF.  But hey , that's my personnal story don't want to drift from the original posts !



I think that information - if you are being held back on courses etc because of a CT application - is relevant to this discussion, krimynal.


----------



## krimynal

I remember vividly my MWO telling the guys in the OPs about not putting me on any course , or if they did , to put me at the very end if they really "don't have any choice to put someone up there"

Good thing for me tho was that the guy working at OPs was a RegF member.  He understood me and always tried a LOT to put me on different course and tasking.  But my CoC was really against every tasking I got.

I had the upmost respect for him .... my CoC ... not so much haha


----------



## Eye In The Sky

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> This is a good thread to follow and I would hope some of these concerns make their way up to the Minister, maybe not through these means but through CoC and "nasty" reports.
> 
> The reserves are an excellent return in investment on the dollar. I am saying this as an ex-regular force soldier, currently a reserve infantry CSM. It hurts a lot of people's feeling but shoving ego aside, here is the reality. The current government (and most previous ones) do not have the stomach to build up a true full size three or four brigade army. They are not willing to spend the funds, not now and not likely in the near future. Deal with it.
> 
> I have done 2/3 of my tours as a reservist. From an Infantry perspective, I will say this, most units keep a pretty good rythymn of training soldier indivdual up to platoon level skills. Most operational deployments, it takes anywheres between 3-6 months to shake out and get the soldiers up to speed. Most regular force infantry battalions need at least a month or two of shake out training themselves to get sorted. UNLESS they are fresh off the road to high readiness.
> 
> Now for resources, a very good point. We need vehicles, no if, ands or buts, we need vehicles. We need uniforms and personal kit as well, that seems to be a systemic problem across the board. On the shortage of resources, we may need to really focus on what we need from our reserve force. I will say the politically incorrect thing to say and hurt people's feelings. Is it time to re-roll a few regiments into less resource intensive arms? Like re-rolling some armoured and artillery regiments into infantry?
> My regiment has been artillery and armoured corps in the past. We are Infantry today and have been since 1970, we originally were infantry.
> 
> Why create more Infantry?
> 1. We are simple to train and equip (small arms, troops, radios and a few vehicles for stores)
> 2. Our trg delta with reg f light infantry is very marginal.
> 3. Infantry can be used for force protection, dom ops, parades, etc. We truly are a "general duty" force
> 4. Very easy to deploy when needed (aircraft, ship, bus, on foot, boat, ATV, snowmobile, helicopter)5. You can build
> 5. You can build an easily achievable training cycle from September to May going from individual to section to platoon and touching onto company level operations (most certainly can do by the time the summer ex rolls around)
> 
> What does it take?
> POLITICAL WILL from both inside the army and the politicians
> I think we need to re-think how P Res pay funding is sourced (from Army O & M budget, is it not?), how about same as reg force members?
> Someone with more info than myself on pay can comment on that please
> It will need people to park their egos to the side
> 
> Remember the context of this modern Canada, Their is no desire to build or maintain a large regular army, we do some very unique operations overseas with unpredictable forecast of what we will be asked to do and some P Res can be fired up to Op readiness pretty quick



I'll play the Devils Advocate using a point I read elsewhere early today about this topic.

- It takes about 1/3 the cost to produce a trained Res soldier to "level X" than it does a Reg force one.

- being that most Res units are thin, and there is no real way to be able to predict 'who' will show up when the SHTF (say, Dom Ops or something).  

- the Reserves could be disbanded, if there are approx. 15,000 parading strength.

- take THAT money, and produce 5000 additional Reg Force mbr's who would be available 24/7 and trained.

 :warstory:


----------



## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Volunteer firefighters are not volunteers. They're like reservists that are on call. They show up, they get paid. That's not a true volunteer.



PC:  didn't you "volunteer" for the Regs?

Words are such slippery things.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to unpaid volunteer fire fighters:



> By Nick Krewen  |  www.samaritanmag.com
> Posted on July 31, 2011
> Isaac Jones
> 
> *Here’s a surprising stat: Canada boasts more than 85,000 volunteer firefighters.*
> 
> *That’s, volunteer, as in unpaid *  (Edit: I will assume the difference between these 85,000 unpaid volunteers and the 114,250 volunteers mentioned previously represents a paid on-call force of some 29,000)— these brave men and women risk their lives every time an alarm is sounded for very little or no remuneration.
> 
> “We do what we do because in many cases, the community needs protection,” Martin Bell, Nova-Scotia-based president of the Canadian Volunteer Fire Services Association, tells Samaritanmag. “The local municipality doesn’t necessarily have the funds to have a career fire department to provide the service that they need.”
> 
> *Bell estimates that there are approximately 3500 volunteer fire stations located across Canada, with volunteers often donating upwards of 25 hours of personal time a month to ensure public safety.*
> 
> *They’re also responsible for purchasing their own equipment and custom-built uniform, which could add up to $6000.*
> 
> “It usually costs about $2500 to equip one firefighter with a helmet, protective burn equipment, gloves, your bunker suit, which is usually heat-and-fire retardant — and that suit is normally built to the size of individual to meet their height, weight and waistline,” Bell explains. “So it’s not like you can order a couple of suits and hang them in the fire station for anyone to use.”
> 
> Bell says there’s also the breathing apparatus that you would don with a tank and mask in addition to your suit. “That would very well add another $3500,” he explains.
> 
> *Volunteers undergo the same amount of rigorous training, usually 200 hours worth, before they’re ready to go out on calls.
> *
> 
> Sometimes the firefighters receive a small honorarium of $1000 to $2000 per 200 or 300 volunteer hours per year, but that is intended as “reimbursement for clothing that may be destroyed or may need to be washed,” says Bell.
> 
> He also says it’s not unusual to for volunteers to dip into their own pockets to keep the stations in small municipalities running.
> 
> “Sometimes during the winter months, members of the community or that fire department would chip in to fill the oil tank in that station to make sure that the equipment doesn’t freeze,’ Bell asserts.
> 
> Bell says that are three types of fire stations in Canada: career, composite and volunteer. Career fire stations are fully staffed with paid individuals; composite is centered on a few paid staffers and supplemented with volunteers; and, of course, the latter consists solely of volunteers.
> 
> Municipalities fund their own fire stations and firefighters, and Bell explains that costs can be prohibitive. “Once you become a career (full-time) firefighter, it automatically puts the municipality into a different liability class,” he concedes.
> 
> In some composite station cases, the municipality employs the fire chief because of the chief’s changing role and insurance complexities, while volunteers man the rest of the station.
> 
> “The fire chief is more of an administrator as well as a fire ground commander,” says Bell. “The government, and Workman’s Compensation, and some of the provincial statutes, require a lot of paper work after every fire, either for insurance or safety needs, so the documentation has to be very accurate and submitted in a timely fashion.
> 
> “So municipalities will hire a career chief, and they’re responsible to make sure that all this reporting is done on time, and be responsible for the selection of the training criteria for that department.”
> 
> Peter Van Loan
> (L to R) Peter Van Loan, leader of the Government In The House Of Commons with Martin Bell, president, Canada Volunteer Fire Services Association
> In composite situations, Bell says volunteers are only called upon when needed.
> 
> “When an alarm comes in, they will dispatch a paid crew, and if it’s a minor fire, that’s the last you’ll hear of it,” he says. “If it becomes a working fire, then they’ll put out a second alarm, which will summon volunteers to come to the station, and they’ll don their equipment and drive out with extra trucks and work beside the career firefighters because you have a manpower need or a human resource need that exceeds the normal capacity.”
> 
> As far as procuring and updating equipment, Bell says its often “the pride of the community that ensure you get a little better truck, a little better training and a little better equipment,” either through donations or fundraising.
> 
> Bell, a professional paramedic and 30-year veteran who started his volunteer firefighting career at the age of 16, says the biggest challenges today facing firefighting departments are volunteer retention and declining enrollment.
> 
> “I’d say that 20 years from now, many municipalities will be looking at a very serious situation, or a much increased budget for moving towards career firefighters.”
> 
> He says it’s still easy to volunteer: just show up at a station and ask. There will be forms to fill out and interviews that will be conducted — and volunteers won’t necessarily need to go out on call and risk their lives.
> 
> “They could be bookkeeping or doing some banking, whatever else is needed to keep that fire department rolling,” Bell explains.
> 
> Bell would like to see some funding changes implemented, specifically the federal and/or provincial governments “to accept some responsibility for the cost to provide that service within the community,” arguing that he would define volunteer firefighters responding to disasters such as floods and other community crises as “a civic emergency response rather than a fire community response.”
> 
> He’d also like to see some federal or provincial compensation to the families of those volunteers who have lost their lives in the line of duty.
> 
> “Often those surviving families get little or nothing in the way of compensation,” he states. “They might get as little as $20,000 or $30,000 in their insurance policy, which is barely enough to feed a family for a year, let alone the rest of their lives.”
> 
> At times a thankless job, Bell says the reason volunteer firefighters engage in the profession is a sense of pride in their community. “They’re hoping to give back in some way,” he says.
> 
> - See more at: http://www.samaritanmag.com/798/ever-dreamed-becoming-volunteer-firefighter#sthash.nQ3zabJh.dpuf


----------



## PuckChaser

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> PC:  didn't you "volunteer" for the Regs?
> 
> Words are such slippery things.


Press-ganged. Cheap beer though, so I stayed.


----------



## Kirkhill

Oh - the traditional navy reasons....  [


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'll play the Devils Advocate using a point I read elsewhere early today about this topic.
> 
> - It takes about 1/3 the cost to produce a trained Res soldier to "level X" than it does a Reg force one.
> 
> - being that most Res units are thin, and there is no real way to be able to predict 'who' will show up when the SHTF (say, Dom Ops or something).
> 
> - the Reserves could be disbanded, if there are approx. 15,000 parading strength.
> 
> - take THAT money, and produce 5000 additional Reg Force mbr's who would be available 24/7 and trained.
> 
> :warstory:



With the way the reserves is now this may not be a bad option. 

Everyone here seems to be pushing for the reserve combat arm elements, but there is a good argument to adapt most units into CSS units to take advantage of skills readily available in civilian industry. For example, it would be easier/cheaper to recruit mechanics, Sup Techs, cooks, drivers, construction engineers, etc from civilian labour and teach them to be soldiers than to try and train armour soldiers without armour, gunners without guns, and infantry without trucks/MGs.

The US reserves is structured this way, and they want to cut the fat out of the Reg force.....


----------



## runormal

krimynal said:
			
		

> The only problem I see with that is ,
> 
> Most of the people in the reserve are part time because they are currently at school , which costs a small fortune.
> Here in Quebec ( I don't know if it's the same everywhere ) if you work too much , the government will cease some of the student loans that helps you to go to school in the first place.
> I for one was doing a degree 2 years ago while in the reserve.  When I made my taxes at the end of the year , initially the government was giving me 2000$ in loans and 3500$ in scolarship ( that I didn't have to give back).
> 
> Once they saw how much money I made with the army ( which wasn't much ) they removed all my scolarship and left me with only the loans , So I now was in debt of 3500$ because I wanted to work while in school.
> 
> If you start taking some students , ask them to train on nights / weekends.  To manage full time students ( which dosen't pay ) and tell them that while basic training they won't get a paycheck neither.
> There is no way these kids will be able to survive and complete a degree or any type of higher education without money.  The idea is good ... but the outcome will be dramatic



Your tuition is like half the cost of the rest of the country ;D. I studied there for a year, it was cheaper to do 8 months in Québec than 4 months in Ontario... plus beer was cheaper. But i do Agree. en ontario c'est la même chose. After about $7k all of the money after that is "free", you don't pay it back but it is directly related to your parents/income. First year I received like $13k, as I started to work and more I received less and less. I think the last year I only received $3k and owed the government $4k during the middle of the semester (I was working a job in my field as well as showing up to every event with the reserves... Fun, fun times. Looks like student loans are fucked throughout the country. This is a valid point to discuss. The more you work, the less grant money you receive and then you might as well not work...  ???  



			
				Spectrum said:
			
		

> I'd leave the PRes "status quo" and I'd take every chance to "steal" the best and brightest of the PRes for individual augmentation or CT. The golden carrot works, I've seen it.



Funny I can't even get an interview for MARS/LOGS for 5 years. "It is closed" yet DCMPG-5 suggested that I release and reapply, as did the captain at the CFRC. Yet the directive CF Mil Pers 3/08 (written in 2008) says I will be allocated an external spot for a CT/OT..  The Captain literally said "If we take you from the reserves we have to replace you". Which is true, but I've maxed out my ILP, other than my pay (which to be quite honest isn't bad) there is very little incentive to stay, or to work as much as I do. Especially once the student loans are taken care off. Most of my friends have found jobs in their field of study and are now/or have released. I'll be honest, I'm single, love my job, love my unit and I have a love/hate organization with the organization (I truly do love it). I spent all week verifying stats between excel/powerpoint and tomorrow i'm moving files between databases. I'm looking quite forward to working this weekend  :nod:.  



			
				Spectrum said:
			
		

> Well if that's truly the case, then nothing positive will come out of more investment into the PRes. If I were in charge, why would I allocate my limited resources to train and equip a "reserve" that won't actually function in that context? I'd be much more inclined to focus on funding the RegF in that case.


Another valid point, this year the end of summer ex is 2 weeks. I'm on a contract until the end of August. I'd love to go, but if I don't show up to work at my current job I loosemoney. I'll make more money staying at work (sorry at this point of my life, money is more important as I have over $20k of debt), likewise this job _may_ turn into a full-time job. I'd love to give more back to the reserves as it has given me so much (Attention to detail, huge boost in self confidence, physical fitness (lost 40 lbs since joining the reserves), a great group of friends, some really fucking cool experiences (i.e going past the tree line), thousands of dollars, business connections, helped me with my french, teamwork, leadership experience). I could go on and on. I love the reserves, I really do. But I've essentially been told to "fuck off" when it comes to full time employment. I've turned down PLQ + full time summer taskings to work in my field of study. Quite frankly, I'm glad I did because I'm much further ahead in my civvy career as result of it. This organization has let me off for the exercise in my first summer there, so we will see what happens...  

But with the way everything is structured and that I've graduated, I can no longer "take a semester off", "take a year off". I'm trained, I'm at the rank I am and it will likely take me two summers to get my MCpl's. Even if my work gives me the time off work to go on PLQ, there is no way in hell they will also give me a week or two off to go on the ex at the end off the summer. Other than weekends, I'm unemployable. And to be honest I'd rather use my 3-4 weeks or whatever I'll get off to go see my friends in Australia or Europe rather than go up to Northern Ontario or spend two weeks in Meaford in the middle of the summer. Forcing my employer to do it isn't going to fly. I'd take LWOP if I could, (From my olders friends I've talked to, their employers typically make them max out on vacation days first and if they need additional days to do LWOP) and take the hit financially but my short term priorities are visiting the friends I've made around the world. Don't get me wrong, the week/2 week exercises are the best experiences I've had in the reserves, but now I simply do not have the time.

There are countless problems within the reserves, equipment shortages,  the recruiting system, the training system, the retention system, the CT system. Like I've already said, I'd love to do more go on every long exercise, go up "north". But the day job pays my bills, and the reserves is assisting with that. If i lost my day job i'd be screwed. 



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'll play the Devils Advocate using a point I read elsewhere early today about this topic.
> 
> - It takes about 1/3 the cost to produce a trained Res soldier to "level X" than it does a Reg force one.
> - being that most Res units are thin, and there is no real way to be able to predict 'who' will show up when the SHTF (say, Dom Ops or something).
> - the Reserves could be disbanded, if there are approx. 15,000 parading strength.
> - take THAT money, and produce 5000 additional Reg Force mbr's who would be available 24/7 and trained.
> 
> :warstory:



This is an option, but if we ever "need" the reserves again how hard will it be to build it up from scratch?


----------



## GR66

Just to be clear about my suggestion about "volunteer" Militia.  A member of the Militia would only be unpaid if A) they choose not to pursue trades training beyond basic training (and SQ?) and in-unit training, or B) until they reach the rank of Corporal (alternately this could be revised to until they complete their complete DP1 training).

The idea behind this is that until you have completed your initial trades training you are not yet "employable" in the key role of being a potential Reg Force augmentee.

Volunteer militia would still get paid though while on CF courses and if they are called up for domestic ops.  Just like an "on call" volunteer firefighter.  While I'm sure some people would gladly ship off to fight a fire for a couple of weeks without pay if asked, I'm not suggesting that.  

Think of it like Cadets for adults in a way.  You show up a night or two every week and the occasional weekend without being paid because you enjoy what you're doing and you think it's important.  When you have to make a more serious time commitment to go off to camp in the summer you get paid for it.  The difference however is that once you reach a certain level of training where you become truly "employable" in your trade you begin to get paid just like Reservists are now.


----------



## CBH99

Just an idea...it's probably been thrown around plenty before...

What about running courses at the unit level, i.e. Driver Wheeled?  Comms?  

Could the structure of the course be modified so that it could be offered at the unit level?  Instead of it being, from my experience anyhow, usually run with several units coming together to run the course once a year?

The goal of my idea is to generate more _useful training during the year, so summer courses could focus on trade/career courses.

*There were plenty of nights when the soldiers would show up.  Hang out in the mess.  Help the QM sort out some stuff.  Practice drill.  Go back to hanging out in the mess.  And eventually just be dismissed.  That time COULD have been spent helping them get useful training to help their career progress, which I think would have helped big time with retention._


----------



## Journeyman

Leave out your references to pay, and that's how _some_  people, Reg and Res (not Civie, because really, they don't care) see the Reserves. 


			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Think of it like Cadets for adults in a way.  You show up a night or two every week and the occasional weekend  without being paid because you enjoy what you're doing and you think it's important.  When you have to make a more serious time commitment to go off to camp in the summer you get paid for it.



If the RegF cared, they'd fund, mentor, and ensure the Reserves were trained.  If some of the Res leadership cared, they'd _insist_ on it, and be less focussed on badges and Regimental Balls.

Sorry, I'm sometimes unsure who to blame.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> *There were plenty of nights when the soldiers would show up.  Hang out in the mess.  Help the QM sort out some stuff.  Practice drill.  Go back to hanging out in the mess.  And eventually just be dismissed.


 THAT is simply a leadership problem.  We keep hearing that there isn't enough time to train (especially given all the 'politically correct' mandatory lectures), yet your troops are treated like this?  Self-inflicted wound.


----------



## runormal

GR66 said:
			
		

> Just to be clear about my suggestion about "volunteer" Militia.  A member of the Militia would only be* unpaid* if A) they choose not to pursue trades training beyond basic training (and SQ?) and in-unit training, or B) until they reach the rank of Corporal (alternately this could be revised to until they complete their complete DP1 training).
> 
> The idea behind this is that until you have completed your initial trades training you are not yet "employable" in the key role of being a potential Reg Force augmentee.
> 
> Volunteer *militia would still get paid though while on CF courses* and if they are called up for domestic ops.  Just like an "on call" volunteer firefighter.  While I'm sure some people would gladly ship off to fight a fire for a couple of weeks without pay if asked, I'm not suggesting that.
> 
> Think of it like Cadets for adults in a way.  You show up a night or two every week and the occasional weekend without being paid because you enjoy what you're doing and you think it's important.  When you have to make a more serious time commitment to go off to camp in the summer you get paid for it.  The difference however is that once you reach a certain level of training where you become truly "employable" in your trade you begin to get paid just like Reservists are now.



What problem are you trying to solve by not paying people when they first show up? While it really *depends*, on the unit. I've seen sweet fuck all to pats, to ensuring that the pats are in the field with the unit at every chance possible. 

When I first joined i got paid for *everything*. Half's day pay for military ID, Half days pay to swear in, Half Days pay to get my kit. We already pay people *everytime* they walk through the amouries doors, and we *still* can't convince enough people to join/show up. Again even in the reserves you aren't really that employable until you gets Pte(T)'s. You might get lucky and get to do some OJT, but  I really don't see how this would change anything, help recruiting or save money. If money was important to me when I first joined I would of served tables or flipped burgers at MC Donald's because at the time I was getting like $90 a day, for the amount of time I was away I could of made more doing other work.. (Granted on the weekends the army pays for my clothes and food, but most people don't think that deeply)




			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> Just an idea...it's probably been thrown around plenty before...
> 
> What about running courses at the unit level, i.e. Driver Wheeled?  Comms?
> 
> Could the structure of the course be modified so that it could be offered at the unit level?  Instead of it being, from my experience anyhow, usually run with several units coming together to run the course once a year?
> 
> The goal of my idea is to generate more _useful training during the year, so summer courses could focus on trade/career courses.
> 
> _


_
I believe this is how it is currently run. To run a driver wheel solely at the unit level, you'd need the staff (driver examiner qualified, course O) as well as the vehicles  ;D, then you need to work around the brigade calendar, your unit calendar and ensure that you can meet your commitments. This why I assume that units come together to do a DVR WHL. Units loan vehicles for spots on the course, and likewise if 3-4 members miss a unit exercise it isn't a big deal, compared to if the whole unit missed it. That being said I did my Driver wheel on the weeekends. Both comms units I've been with run an ATCIS course that "appears" to be run at the unit level for members within the brigade.




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		


			Lunchmeat:

Not talking about stopping pay to Reservists.  Talking about inviting more people to join on a voluntary basis.

The basic issues in attracting people, in my mind are:

Letting them through the door (reducing the number of barriers to enrolment)
Keeping them (engaging them by supplying useful and interesting training and giving them opportunities to serve and advance).
		
Click to expand...


I don't disagree that two big issues, are getting people enrolled and providing meaningful tasks (we have discussed that it takes 1 month to a year and I believe the average is around 3 months?) It is part time work, it shouldn't take that long. 


My other big gripe is the training system. When you join, you don't have any dates. "When is basic?" "We will let you know in a few weeks". Thursday Night 10pm "Hey PTE XXX, what are you doing this weekend? Want to go on Basic?" "I thought I was starting two weekends from now, but sure when/where do I show up". 

I got 5 days notice for my DP 1.0/QL3 (that year in particular, was a shit show, but I had already told my civilian employer that I wasn't going on course for the summer). 

I've had friends who were interested in joining, but lost interest when all I could say was the length of the courses. Can you do your 3's on the weekend? No you can't. "When do you do them?" "Well it depends on x y z ".

As for providing interesting tasks with the current legislation (Provincial), Federal, attitude towards the army (i.e not the states), how much can you really do on the weekend? I did an amphibious assault on the weekend, that was fucking cool. We practiced snowmobile moves for our exercise up north one weekend, that was cool. But I've also had some "not so enjoyable" weekends a weekend of mandatory briefings (which if you don't show up doesn't really matter), verifying equipment or drill practice. Obviously the "not so enjoyable" tasks need to be done and it is a balance. But you can also make the not so interesting tasks much more enjoyable. Instead of testing the radios just outside of QM, why not make an "exercise" out of it. We would drive around to various locations in the city, set up the equipment test it and then move on to the next spot. Yes the latter takes much more work/organizing but i'd rather spend my weekend doing that. 

Without a doubt the best training opportunities are the 1 week, 2 week or month long exercises. But if I am actually employed I can't get the time off work to participate in them. Or I loose money by doing LWOP, or I need to use my limited vacation days (which I'd rather not do as I already give up anywhere from 1-4 weekends a month to the unit) as well as 1-2 nights a week. 




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		


			Volunteer Militia could provide feedstock for a Part Time, Paid, Reserve.

See here  http://army.ca/forums/threads/122267.0

A difference between us and the Danes is that all of our separate volunteer groups listed above are centralized through the Danish Homeguard - an unpaid organization with a percentage them that are paid for standing by for rapid deployment.
		
Click to expand...


We already have a similar system. : Class A, Class B/C, Supplementary Reserve. 


Edit: 
My current employer cannot believe my level of attention to detail as well as my ability to trouble shoot and problem solve. All of this I directly attribute to the time I've spent preparing my kit for inspection and working as an ACISS with the the reserves. I definitely learned very valuable skills as a reservist which have aided me in civilian career even though the two jobs I work at are completely  different. The reserves does provide its soldiers with very valuable skills. But I do not think that the reserves does a good job at explaining to employers why they should allow the reservists the time off to take part in week long exercises and/or further career courses. Forcing people to do it won't work either. Tax Credits might help. But i think things such as the liaison council need to be expanded. _


----------



## krimynal

runormal said:
			
		

> Your tuition is like half the cost of the rest of the country ;D. I studied there for a year, it was cheaper to do 8 months in Québec than 4 months in Ontario... plus beer was cheaper. But i do Agree. en ontario c'est la même chose. After about $7k all of the money after that is "free", you don't pay it back but it is directly related to your parents/income. First year I received like $13k, as I started to work and more I received less and less. I think the last year I only received $3k and owed the government $4k during the middle of the semester (I was working a job in my field as well as showing up to every event with the reserves... Fun, fun times. Looks like student loans are ****ed throughout the country. This is a valid point to discuss. The more you work, the less grant money you receive and then you might as well not work...  ???



Yeah I'm definetly not arguing about the fact that our tuition is WAY cheaper than most of the rest of the country.  This is a known fact and people are still complaining about the prices. 
My main problem was that I was a degree to become a teacher ( english teacher in a french environment ).  But you can't really do any type of teaching legally ( unless it's private personnal teacher ).
without the degree itself.  So I couldn't work in my trade.  The reserve days were 1 tuesday night every 2-3 weeks + 1 weekend exercise in a month.  Which wasn't enough to pay for my appartment and other stuff ( mind you I was 25 when I went back to school so living at my parents wasn't an option ).
I then had to get a second job which wouldn't let me get weekend off for the reserve.  I was in a type of hole.  I wanted to work more at my unit but it wasn't possible for them.  The second job I had wouldn't let me get time off for the reserve. 
And with 2 jobs , no more student loans ... eventhought I was doing 2 jobs because I needed the money to actually pay for everything.

Eventually I dropped out of university without a degree , 7000$ in debt , and no real job ( the were no B-class or C-class available ). 

that's my story , which could of been a lot better but , mainly WRONG choices got me there.  I am still in the process to re-apply for RegF right now.  But let's just say the last 3 years were spent wondering how to pay at the end of the month and arguments with my wife !


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We used to run driver courses at the unit level, it was not hard, but then we had more vehicles and most worked. At the end of the day, with all the ideas tossed out here, ask yourself why would someone take the time to work with the Reserves? Regardless of what the Reg forces or the planners may want, if you offer a crappy product, then why would people buy it? If you want people to join and stay, you need offer them something they won't get in the civilian environment. People want some marching and uniforms but not just that, they want to be appreciated, to be challenged, to make things go bang and watch stuff go boom, they want the camaraderie. If you don't offer this stuff your plan is going to fail.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> ... If you want people to join and stay, you need offer them something they won't get in the civilian environment. People want some marching and uniforms but not just that, they want to be appreciated, to be challenged, to make things go bang and watch stuff go boom, they want the camaraderie. ...


   :nod:


----------



## krimynal

problem is also the budget cuts ...

When I did SQ + DP1 for artillery , I came out of SQ not even qualified on the grenade and C6 ... only C9 and C7 ... They told us on SQ that it would now be the people at our unit that would be qualifying us on those 2 things.
Fast forward 1 month , get back to the unit , we ask when we will get qualified on those 2 things , they tell us it should of been done on the SQ and no one will qualify us at the unit.  So basically when we did an exercise involving those 2 things , I never got to use any of those 2. 
I am not qualified on any of them and I don't know any procedure. 

It's sad that as a reservist those 2 things where basically the highlight of SQ let's be honest , C7 and C9 are great , but C6 and Grenade looks awesome ... yet I never even held a real grenade in my hand. 

As far as the artillery course , the lenght of the course was about 3 weeks with 2 weekend off and a 6 days exercise included in those 3 weeks .... so basically a crash course of 1 week on the C3 and that's it. 
They told us that if we really wanted to learn and practice we should ask for tasking full time in gagetown.  Which some of us asked , yet there were no tasking available for about 7 months .... so comes next summer , in 1 whole year we did 3 or 4 exercise involving the C3.
Everyone forgot the drills , and we look like dummeys on the guns helping new recruits .... 

This is just wrong


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> With the way the reserves is now this may not be a bad option.
> 
> Everyone here seems to be pushing for the reserve combat arm elements, but there is a good argument to adapt most units into CSS units to take advantage of skills readily available in civilian industry. For example, it would be easier/cheaper to recruit mechanics, Sup Techs, cooks, drivers, construction engineers, etc from civilian labour and teach them to be soldiers than to try and train armour soldiers without armour, gunners without guns, and infantry without trucks/MGs.
> 
> The US reserves is structured this way, and they want to cut the fat out of the Reg force.....



The "civilian equivalent skills" argument has been tossed around a fair bit, and while it has some merit, would require institutional change within the training system that would be no easier/less expensive than scaring up a few more radios and machine guns.  The army specific components of the various army CSS trades always seem to be just different enough that you still need significant additional training:

Long Haul Truck Driver?  You can drive, but now we need to teach you to drive an MSVS...
Heavy Vehicle Mechanic?  Ok, that covers off your EME common training, but now we need to teach you all of these platforms...

Additionally, whether subject to compulsory service or not, CAF members are volunteers, and elect their military occupation.  For most reservists, they are there for challenge, variety and adventure, not a casual second job in their core career.  We have a lot of office workers in the PRes.  We don't make them all RMS clerks.  

You are correct, the U.S. Army Reserve is CSS focused, but composed largely of former Active Duty members completing compulsory service.  In many ways, it is a mechanism to ensure a good return on the expensive training investments the Army has made in those members.  Additionally, it is only about 1/3 of the U.S. Army reserve component.  

The U.S. Army National Guard is the larger element, is combat arms focused, and is more of a mixed bag of former Active Duty and purely part time soldiers .  As you have noted, there is considerable debate in the U.S. forces with regards to getting the right full-time/part time mix.  All components make their arguments (indirectly) at the political level, and state governments back the guard. This is done largely through the argument that the inflow of forces into a major theater of operations permits significant work-up training windows, making a large standing army less important.

My anecdotal exposures to these organizations has been that guard troops and units are more disciplined and effective than their USAR counterparts.   I would argue that this is due in no small part to the citizen soldier component.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

krimynal said:
			
		

> problem is also the budget cuts ...
> 
> When I did SQ + DP1 for artillery , I came out of SQ not even qualified on the grenade and C6 ... only C9 and C7 ... They told us on SQ that it would now be the people at our unit that would be qualifying us on those 2 things.
> Fast forward 1 month , get back to the unit , we ask when we will get qualified on those 2 things , they tell us it should of been done on the SQ and no one will qualify us at the unit.  So basically when we did an exercise involving those 2 things , I never got to use any of those 2.
> I am not qualified on any of them and I don't know any procedure.
> 
> It's sad that as a reservist those 2 things where basically the highlight of SQ let's be honest , C7 and C9 are great , but C6 and Grenade looks awesome ... yet I never even held a real grenade in my hand.
> 
> As far as the artillery course , the lenght of the course was about 3 weeks with 2 weekend off and a 6 days exercise included in those 3 weeks .... so basically a crash course of 1 week on the C3 and that's it.
> They told us that if we really wanted to learn and practice we should ask for tasking full time in gagetown.  Which some of us asked , yet there were no tasking available for about 7 months .... so comes next summer , in 1 whole year we did 3 or 4 exercise involving the C3.
> Everyone forgot the drills , and we look like dummeys on the guns helping new recruits ....
> 
> This is just wrong



the basic course is the starting point, you should been assigned to a gun crew and your Gun Commander should have run you through the drills and you can practice all the basic skills in the armoury and parking lot. Dry "heaves" exercise were common back in my day.


----------



## krimynal

Colin P said:
			
		

> the basic course is the starting point, you should been assigned to a gun crew and your Gun Commander should have run you through the drills and you can practice all the basic skills in the armoury and parking lot. Dry "heaves" exercise were common back in my day.



I was assigned to a gun crew ... but pretty much every tuesday night we were having some classes ... like maps or RCR ( I think I did at least Maps and RCR 13 times in the whole year ) but gun drills were basically never ...
We did some C7 and KarlGustav refesh course ( eventhought pretty much no one in the entire unit ever shot the KG ).  
And we used some dummey grenade and threw them in a circle made with toilet paper on the side of the building once every year to "pratice" something we were not even qualified on.

This might not be the reality to all the reserve unit, but my experience really wasn't what I tought it was going to be.  I wanted to join and train and perform.  But at the end of the day most of the tuesday nights were some CPLc beeing told 10 minutes before the class that they would need to "teach us something".
So we ended up having the same class every month....

I know for a fact that most of these CPLc ( I'm using CPLc instead of Master bombardier ) were really not happy about that.  

Once we got to an exercise , they would plan something completely idiotic , for example,  We would get there on friday night at 9PM , we would get the ammo at 9AM the next morning. 
They would plan something like 8 moves in the day, then finish it up with some day for night and night for night.  All that with about 80 rounds for 4 guns for the entire weekend .... so most of all the BTY Mission were 1 shot FFE and then move out.

At the end of the saturday night , they would make a night for night with illum and HE then we would move out to camp , sleep , wake up , clean pack , get back to our unit , clean then leave. 
Sometime in that sunday we would have a parade with the CWO and Officer telling us that they were not happy about the exercise and that we were not able to complete what they had in mind.
then they would tell us that we need more training ..... and the training never came.  When our CPLc wanted to do gun drills , someone would come up and say that we were all needed in a classroom for something REALLY important, which ended up with a map class....

like I said , this is my story , I know it's not the same everywhere , but I really wasn't happy about it !


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The "civilian equivalent skills" argument has been tossed around a fair bit, and while it has some merit, would require institutional change within the training system that would be no easier/less expensive than scaring up a few more radios and machine guns.  The army specific components of the various army CSS trades always seem to be just different enough that you still need significant additional training:
> 
> Long Haul Truck Driver?  You can drive, but now we need to teach you to drive an MSVS...
> Heavy Vehicle Mechanic?  Ok, that covers off your EME common training, but now we need to teach you all of these platforms...
> 
> Additionally, whether subject to compulsory service or not, CAF members are volunteers, and elect their military occupation.  For most reservists, they are there for challenge, variety and adventure, not a casual second job in their core career.  We have a lot of office workers in the PRes.  We don't make them all RMS clerks.
> 
> You are correct, the U.S. Army Reserve is CSS focused, but composed largely of former Active Duty members completing compulsory service.  In many ways, it is a mechanism to ensure a good return on the expensive training investments the Army has made in those members.  Additionally, it is only about 1/3 of the U.S. Army reserve component.
> 
> The U.S. Army National Guard is the larger element, is combat arms focused, and is more of a mixed bag of former Active Duty and purely part time soldiers .  As you have noted, there is considerable debate in the U.S. forces with regards to getting the right full-time/part time mix.  All components make their arguments (indirectly) at the political level, and state governments back the guard. This is done largely through the argument that the inflow of forces into a major theater of operations permits significant work-up training windows, making a large standing army less important.
> 
> My anecdotal exposures to these organizations has been that guard troops and units are more disciplined and effective than their USAR counterparts.   I would argue that this is due in no small part to the citizen soldier component.



You are right that some relatively minor trade training would be required to take a long haul driver and teach him to drive a MSVS, but the skill sets of that person are going to be overall better, and training time reduced, than bringing a 18 year old off the street and training him to drive a MSVS, get experience, etc etc etc. Same for Mechanics, Finance people, supply, cooks, etc. As a bonus, you are recruiting people who have an interest in those trades (as they do it in civie world) that can be sold on the "army/military" aspects of those jobs (CPs, DPs, ranges, etc). And with a direct role for standing forces they would directly impact operations on the grand scale which helps with job satisfaction.  As Colin P and Chris Pook noted, and I agree with, people who join the reserves aren't generally doing it for money, but rather for experiences or a real desire to serve. This can be achieved just as easily in a CSS capacity as it can in an infantry role (perhaps more so... the long haul trucker who is a reserve Sgt gains skills he can apply directly to his civilian job and gets to talk about ranges, exercises, etc with other truckers as opposed to an artillery reservist who shows up, gets lectures on MAPS or some other thing since there's no equipment to train with, sits in the mess, and then goes home). 

The National Guard/Reserves/Regular force in the US is a completely different bag from us due to their history. The National Guard is a left over of the militia system that the states maintained whereas the reserves were created to DIRECTLY augment regular forces and provide capabilities. Our reserve is also a hold over of our militia system, but was never controlled at provincial level, so has completely different emotional baggage. The fact that the Regular forces in the US cannot deploy domestically creates a different element as well. That's why their reserves are a much better comparison for us than the National Guard as the reserves were created to tie governments to the people and LIMIT foreign involvement in wars (since reserves would need to be called up to support). With our reserve having no ability to be called into service it effectively became a 1 for 1 augmentation of regular forces.

It's true that the reserve use a lot of former regular force personnel, but that could be said more many of the reserve units here too (not including the many retiring members who move directly into the Public Service doing the same job they were as a regular force member) so I don't think the difference is as big as you make it to be.


----------



## dapaterson

A few thoughts:

1. Not everyone wants to do the same things in the Reserves they do for full-time employment.  People are looking for challenges, not more of the same.  (I seem to recall a heart surgeon who, evenings and weekends, was an infantry officer).  In a mobilization framework, it's a fine way to fill out ranks.  Peacetime, likely not as much.

2. Most trades training is more intense, resource and time consuming than most Cbt Arms training.  If we are to get a reasonable return on investment, and wish to ensure readiness, then it makes sense to vest those skills more heavily in the Regular Force - so, when called, the military (reg and res) are ready to respond - vehicles are fixed, boots are available, communications are reliable... all the unsexy support pieces are in place.  Without those pieces in place, you can't respond effectively.

3. The current Army Reserve model does need fixing.  Too much C2, at the unit and above level.  If we begin our analysis looking at what government has directed, which seems to be a paid strength for the Army Reserve of around 20,000, that translates into no more than six brigade-ish sized formations, of about 3300 each (all ranks, trained and untrained).  If a brigade consists of three maneuver units, one artillery unit, one engineer unit, one signals unit, and one CSS unit, they should be about 450 trained strength each, all ranks, for a total of 2700 trained strength, plus personnel not yet qualified numbering around 600.  With seven units per brigade, that's forty-two LCol command positions across the Army Reserve - a reduction of about two thirds.

4.  The biggest resistance to change comes from Reserve units (and their various senates and boosters).  Where Reg F functions have been successfully centralized, Reserve units fight tooth and nail to retain end-to-end admin inside their lines, to the detriment of the quality and timeliness of their admin.


----------



## Remius

dapaterson said:
			
		

> A few observations:
> 
> 1.



Very astute observation... [


----------



## dapaterson

Remius said:
			
		

> Very astute observation... [



Either budget cuts, or possibly a computer and mouse that hate me...


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> You are right that some relatively minor trade training would be required to take a long haul driver and teach him to drive a MSVS, but the skill sets of that person are going to be overall better, and training time reduced, than bringing a 18 year old off the street and training him to drive a MSVS, get experience, etc etc etc. Same for Mechanics, Finance people, supply, cooks, etc. As a bonus, you are recruiting people who have an interest in those trades (as they do it in civie world) that can be sold on the "army/military" aspects of those jobs (CPs, DPs, ranges, etc). And with a direct role for standing forces they would directly impact operations on the grand scale which helps with job satisfaction.  As Colin P and Chris Pook noted, and I agree with, people who join the reserves aren't generally doing it for money, but rather for experiences or a real desire to serve. This can be achieved just as easily in a CSS capacity as it can in an infantry role (perhaps more so... the long haul trucker who is a reserve Sgt gains skills he can apply directly to his civilian job and gets to talk about ranges, exercises, etc with other truckers as opposed to an artillery reservist who shows up, gets lectures on MAPS or some other thing since there's no equipment to train with, sits in the mess, and then goes home).
> 
> The National Guard/Reserves/Regular force in the US is a completely different bag from us due to their history. The National Guard is a left over of the militia system that the states maintained whereas the reserves were created to DIRECTLY augment regular forces and provide capabilities. Our reserve is also a hold over of our militia system, but was never controlled at provincial level, so has completely different emotional baggage. The fact that the Regular forces in the US cannot deploy domestically creates a different element as well. That's why their reserves are a much better comparison for us than the National Guard as the reserves were created to tie governments to the people and LIMIT foreign involvement in wars (since reserves would need to be called up to support). With our reserve having no ability to be called into service it effectively became a 1 for 1 augmentation of regular forces.
> 
> It's true that the reserve use a lot of former regular force personnel, but that could be said more many of the reserve units here too (not including the many retiring members who move directly into the Public Service doing the same job they were as a regular force member) so I don't think the difference is as big as you make it to be.



I agree with you that converting a civilian skill set to a military qual (such as a civvy heavy equipment mechanic into an Army Veh Tech) should be a relatively short conversion course, but up to this point we haven't been able to do that, even for the RegF where semi-skilled (red seal pre-enrollment) and NCM SEP entry plans should make it straight forward.  

On the whole, the PRes CSS trades have the longest initial training periods, and as a result, the reserve CSS capability is hamstrung even more than the rest of the PRes capabilities.  

My unit has piles of skilled tradespeople, (as well as cops, paramedics, and lawyers, etc.) and as Dapaterson has said, they have chosen combat arms for a reason. 

Ultimately, the tasks to the PRes are more than just individual augmentation.  We have unit level DOMOPS tasks (TBG) and sub-unit level expeditionary tasks (Force Pro, PSS, and IA).  We have completed those tasks surprisingly well considering the lack of investment, and a volunteer model.  While we could do a lot more with an element of compulsory service, I don't see that happening anytime soon.  However, some modest investments (along with a institutional realignment) would make the reserve force much more viable in the long term because the value proposition for the members would be improved, and that would be a game changer for us.  

Just a small point, but the U.S. Army active component can absolutely be deployed domestically (through the provisions of the Pose Comitatus Act), and they have been for the larger disasters like Katrina.  The U.S. Army also has some strategic infrastructure responsibilities within CONUS to include dams, canals, and flood protection.  The use of Active Duty forces is just less common for DOMOPS because each state has significant DOMOPs capability within its own National Guard element.


----------



## trustnoone73

Journeyman said:
			
		

> If the RegF cared, they'd fund, mentor, and ensure the Reserves were trained.



The RegF does not fund the PRes.  Training the PRes is not a primary task of the RegF though it happens pretty much constantly via IT at CTC, the Div TC's, and the RSS postings  Should the RegF care more about the quality of the PRes than the PRes themselves?  There is more than enough institutional experience in the PRes to know what standards need to be achieved to meet the required tasks within thier respectiver skill sets.  It's not hard but it is a unit responsibnility to ensure it is trained.  If a unit cannot do that, fire the leadership and promote those who can.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

dapaterson said:
			
		

> A few thoughts:
> 
> 1. Not everyone wants to do the same things in the Reserves they do for full-time employment.  People are looking for challenges, not more of the same.  (I seem to recall a heart surgeon who, evenings and weekends, was an infantry officer).  In a mobilization framework, it's a fine way to fill out ranks.  Peacetime, likely not as much.
> 
> 2. Most trades training is more intense, resource and time consuming than most Cbt Arms training.  If we are to get a reasonable return on investment, and wish to ensure readiness, then it makes sense to vest those skills more heavily in the Regular Force - so, when called, the military (reg and res) are ready to respond - vehicles are fixed, boots are available, communications are reliable... all the unsexy support pieces are in place.  Without those pieces in place, you can't respond effectively.
> 
> 3. The current Army Reserve model does need fixing.  Too much C2, at the unit and above level.  If we begin our analysis looking at what government has directed, which seems to be a paid strength for the Army Reserve of around 20,000, that translates into no more than six brigade-ish sized formations, of about 3300 each (all ranks, trained and untrained).  If a brigade consists of three maneuver units, one artillery unit, one engineer unit, one signals unit, and one CSS unit, they should be about 450 trained strength each, all ranks, for a total of 2700 trained strength, plus personnel not yet qualified numbering around 600.  With seven units per brigade, that's forty-two LCol command positions across the Army Reserve - a reduction of about two thirds.
> 
> 4.  The biggest resistance to change comes from Reserve units (and their various senates and boosters).  Where Reg F functions have been successfully centralized, Reserve units fight tooth and nail to retain end-to-end admin inside their lines, to the detriment of the quality and timeliness of their admin.



A few thoughts back,

1. True, but many would want to work within their jobs and offer more long term value to the CAF (which is the point, isn't it?). Having only 1 type of reserve unit in a geographical area similarly limits someone's options as not everyone may want to be infantry, artillery, armour, engineers, CSS, etc... People who are employed in similar positions to their civilian employment also offer the benefit of having continual Professional Development 

2. Skilled persons training is only limited and long duration due to the requirements of the CF and I would argue could be reduced. For example, a civilian qualified chef could be trained in large scale feeding relatively easily if the system was more flexible to allow them to do so. Plus, as mentioned, they continually develop their primary skills through their civilian jobs (Finance offers working as accountants, for example). Skill fade would be less than in combat arms units, so costs associated with work up, etc would be reduced. Not to mention that an armoured solider, to be brought to the Reg force, needs further courses and to learn to drive a Coyote, or a gunner needs to convert to M777, etc. Further, CSS pers can be more easily kitted out (trucks, etc) than combat arms (lets face it- armour reserves will never have armour again). Unless we expect to force employ large numbers of light infantry than keeping large numbers of light infantry makes little sense too, aside from a manpower pool (which could be any trade).

3. agree.

4. Agree.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Equipping the Reserve armoued units with light armour could easily be done, if your not looking at MRAP's levels of protection. It would also give the reg force a pool of vehicles to harvest for that unforeseen mission that is coming. Trade off some protection for mobility and a light weight class. while they can still train for recce, also train for patrolling and escorting and for rapid securing of infrastructure. We used to run 6 gun batteries in the 80's and 90's and the budget was not so great then either. I seriously believe the real problem is less money than will. Once the will and direction is there, the budget can be focused. The constant wandering of mission is soul destroying, so they focus on mundane things (buttons and bows) they can achieve.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I remember before the G Wagon and TCCCS radio days.  My old PRES recce Sqn could field 3 x 5 car troops, a SHQ that had a CP, step-up, etc etc and a small but effective A1 Ech.  And, we had enough radio's for all C/S's AND...'drum roll' pretty much every C/S was properly manned.  It was common to have 5 pers Ptl's, but you could still man an OP, etc with those numbers.

Now?  GWagons replace the Iltis but I think there was not even enough for 1 x 7 car troop.  TCCS radios...nope, 1 radio per patrol (interesting when a Ptl is 2 goddamn veh's...), etc etc etc.

I don't know what all PRES units are now compared to what mine was like back in the 1990 timeframe.  For mine, what used to be a decent Res recce sqn has shrunk to...god knows what.  It is a Regiment in name only.  Heck Sqn might be a big stretch now.  History and all that aside, from a completely military standpoint, is there not better things to do with the $$ for trg, equip, stores, ammo and gas?  

 :dunno:


----------



## Kirkhill

Like this Colin?

Reserve Yeomanry in LandRovers - WMIK http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/28480.aspx
Regular Light Cavalry in Jackals - WMIK http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/26871.aspx
Regular Armoured Cavalry in Scimitars http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/26872.aspx
Regular Tanks in Challengers http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/34270.aspx

With respect to driving vehicles in the army.  Why isn't everyone qualified to drive a straight frame, 2 axle vehicle on the highway? And couldn't off-road driving skills be taught universally on ATVs?

Nobody is going anywhere without an internal combustion engine these days.  Isn't driving as critical a skill set as navigation, communication and weapons handling?


----------



## RCPalmer

trustnoone73 said:
			
		

> The RegF does not fund the PRes.  Training the PRes is not a primary task of the RegF though it happens pretty much constantly via IT at CTC, the Div TC's, and the RSS postings  Should the RegF care more about the quality of the PRes than the PRes themselves?  There is more than enough institutional experience in the PRes to know what standards need to be achieved to meet the required tasks within thier respectiver skill sets.  It's not hard but it is a unit responsibnility to ensure it is trained.  If a unit cannot do that, fire the leadership and promote those who can.



A few things:

1.  The budgets of PRes CBGs and units are captured within the budgets of their respective divisions.  There is no separate funding envelope dedicated to the PRes, and because there is no PRes commander above CBG level, there would be no authority to spend that money in a focused manner to develop the reserve force on a national level if there was.  So, we count on our RegF commanders to spend that money in a manner that makes sense for the force as a whole. 

2.  PRes IT was a core mandate of the RegF up until very recently, around 2002-2003. The transition to a primarily self-trained PRes has significantly reduced the reserve force intake and training capacities, which is a major contributor to our current state.  That should not be surprising given the fundamentally part time nature of reserve service.  If you want a soldier to be working all the time, they belong in the RegF.  British and American reserve force IT is completely underwritten by their full-time forces.  Beyond that, the original reason the government of Canada created a RegF in the first place was to create a militia training cadre. While the roles have clearly evolved since then, that should tell you something.   

3.  The PRes does not control the training system, the Army does, and because there are no reserve commanders above CBG level, that means it is driven by RegF priorities.  PRes participation in QS and TP writing boards is token at best.  This means that we have no ability to shape the training system accommodate reserve, part time realities.

To summarize, from an internal management perspective the RegF controls all of the resources and sets the rules of the game.  There is one army, and the reserve force is nearly half of it.  If nearly half of the Army is failing (as opposed to isolated units or formations), that is an army problem, and requires Army level solutions.   

While I agree that the structure of the PRes is completely outdated which results in significant unnecessary overheard (this is also outside of the control of the PRes by the way) the idea that lower level commanders are to blame for army level, structural problems is both disingenuous, and insulting.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And couldn't off-road driving skills be taught universally on ATVs?



Driving an ATV cross country is prettyyy different than crewing an AVGP cross country.  At least an ATV you have a decent chance to jump off if the driver goes full-on stupid.  Little harder to do from something like a Bison (which was/is a _great_ AVGP IMO).  Incidentally, the Bison was initially called the MILLAV (Militia Light Armoured Vehicle).  Then people realized it was a decent piece of kit and...the "MIL" in MILLAV" went away.   8)


----------



## dapaterson

Most PRes senior leaders have no understanding of the way that DND/CAF operates.  Reserve control of Reserve funding would be an unmitigated disaster.

There does need to be Army leadership to put the Permanent Active Militia back to work in training the Non-Permanent Active Militia; when Reserve units are sending people on five month summer taskings while Div HQs are ordering all their pers to take at least two weeks of leave over the summer, there's a pretty bad disconnect.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Most PRes senior leaders have no understanding of the way that DND/CAF operates.  Reserve control of Reserve funding would be an unmitigated disaster.
> 
> There does need to be Army leadership to put the Permanent Active Militia back to work in training the Non-Permanent Active Militia; when Reserve units are sending people on five month summer taskings while Div HQs are ordering all their pers to take at least two weeks of leave over the summer, there's a pretty bad disconnect.



We always tend to learn more when we concentrate 'en masse'. 

I know that geography is a challenge, but it would be interesting to see how much better we would do if every weekend exercise was a Bde exercise.

I assume you could share the OPI role across units, with Bde HQ support, but having two or three hundred people working together each weekend, in the same place, would make it feel more like a real Army than what can actually happen e.g., a flat faced major like me supervising a 2Lt commanding two weak sections. 

Heck, you might even be able to run some pretty effective Pro D for Officers and SNCOs.


----------



## dapaterson

My back of the envelope structural math for an Army Reserve designed from the ground up, not morphed to fit the historical cap-badges on the ground.

Trained platoon = 32
Trained Company = 125 (3 platoons + Wpns + CHQ)
Trained Bn = 420 (3 companies + Bn HQ)

Bde = 3300 (7 Bns + Bde HQ + Recruiting/Battle School unit (call it a Depot?) + BTL)

We can fit six of those into our current ~20K total strength target.

That means 42 trained Bns (plus six Depots), with 126 trained companies, with 378 trained platoons.


Obviously, different corps and branches have variations in structure, but as a high level start point, perhaps that's what we should aim for: 420-strong Bns that do not do recruiting, or worry about training before soldiers are occupationally qualified - that's the Depot's task.  Even if folks have exams / fall sick / are washing their hair, a Bn sized exercise run to train sections and platoons is now much more viable and interesting.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We always tend to learn more when we concentrate 'en masse'.
> 
> I know that geography is a challenge, but it would be interesting to see how much better we would do if every weekend exercise was a Bde exercise.
> 
> I assume you could share the OPI role across units, with Bde HQ support, but having two or three hundred people working together each weekend, in the same place, would make it feel more like a real Army than what can actually happen e.g., a flat faced major like me supervising a 2Lt commanding two weak sections.
> 
> Heck, you might even be able to run some pretty effective Pro D for Officers and SNCOs.



I noted that many cross training opportunities grew out of personal relationships at the unit level. It was also common of the QM staffs of the various units to help each other out when it didn't impact the home unit. The same still applies in my Public Service work, personal relationships with people in other ministries is how things get done, the official process are always to unwieldy. Cross training with the other units builds those relationships and furthers communication and flexibility, which is why the "kingdom builders" hate it.


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Most PRes senior leaders have no understanding of the way that DND/CAF operates.  Reserve control of Reserve funding would be an unmitigated disaster.
> 
> There does need to be Army leadership to put the Permanent Active Militia back to work in training the Non-Permanent Active Militia; when Reserve units are sending people on five month summer taskings while Div HQs are ordering all their pers to take at least two weeks of leave over the summer, there's a pretty bad disconnect.



I would be curious to know what specific skill set a reserve full Col or BGen is missing that would prevent them contributing effectively at the defence team at that level, but I see your point with regards to the deeper corporate institutional knowledge.

Perhaps a better way to articulate my point that is that there should be commanders at the appropriate levels responsible for the success of the reserve force with the financial authority to make it happen.  If that authority were to take the form of an HQ, that HQ would have need to have a combination of RegF and PRes pers, and like every other element of the CAF, would be accountable to its higher authority for its broader governance.  For example, the Aussies do that by organizing their Army into 2 divisions. 1 Div is primarily (but not exclusively) RegF and 2 Div is primarily (but not exclusively) PRes.  I would also offer that a guy who has spent his entire career in the RegF is likely not well equipped to make decisions about what is "good" for the PRes.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I would be curious to know what specific skill set a reserve full Col or BGen is missing that would prevent them contributing effectively at the defence team at that level, but I see your point with regards to the deeper corporate institutional knowledge.



How about 'zero experience leading teams larger than Coy/ Sqn size' and, for units of that size, zero experience leading them for more than an aggregate total of a week or two over a period of, maybe, a year or two.


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> How about 'zero experience leading teams larger than Coy/ Sqn size' and, for units of that size, zero experience leading them for more than an aggregate total of a week or two over a period of, maybe, a year or two.



From a tactical standpoint, absolutely, but I am talking institutional leadership here.  To become a full Col in the PRes, you have to command a CBG, a unit of 1500-2000 pers, and that is effectively a full time role.  Those officers have also completed a tenure as a unit CO, which is also nearly a full time job and while the units are embryonic, they have significant responsibilities in shaping their own institutions in terms of community footprint, recruiting, strategic engagement, etc.  The best of the group will become Div DComds, also nearly a full time job with significant responsibilities.  These senior leaders get the better part of a decade to "learn the ropes" institutionally.  Senior reserve force leaders frequently also bring significant management and leadership experience from their civilian employment.  Again, I agree that there are a lot of "Kentucky Colonels" out there, but there are also a lot of really sharp people. 

As I said, they also lack some of the depth with regards to CF/DND level bureaucratic knowledge that comes with decades of full time service (and they would definitely need some staff to help them out), but I view that as a positive.  What we need are fresh ideas, and not slavish servitude to an organizational culture that has made little recent institutional progress, apart from adding ever increasing layers of HQ in the Army, and maintaining an 8,000 man NDHQ while the core capabilities rot. 

I'm not saying that a reservist should be the Army Commander, or even a brigade in active operations, but I think that to move forward institutionally, reservists need a voice at the highest level, and that requirement is not met by officers in purely advisory roles.  What we need are some reservists in some responsible positions at the highest levels to help shape the institution so that the needs of the whole army are met.


----------



## Journeyman

trustnoone73 said:
			
		

> The RegF does not fund the PRes.


Thank you; the military folks _predominantly involved in making the big decisions_  are RegF.


----------



## dapaterson

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I would be curious to know what specific skill set a reserve full Col or BGen is missing that would prevent them contributing effectively at the defence team at that level, but I see your point with regards to the deeper corporate institutional knowledge.



It's also a lack of any staff experience, in either formations or in more "corporate" functions.  Those are key developmental positions to make institutional leaders.



> Perhaps a better way to articulate my point that is that there should be commanders at the appropriate levels responsible for the success of the reserve force with the financial authority to make it happen.  If that authority were to take the form of an HQ, that HQ would have need to have a combination of RegF and PRes pers, and like every other element of the CAF, would be accountable to its higher authority for its broader governance.  For example, the Aussies do that by organizing their Army into 2 divisions. 1 Div is primarily (but not exclusively) RegF and 2 Div is primarily (but not exclusively) PRes.  I would also offer that a guy who has spent his entire career in the RegF is likely not well equipped to make decisions about what is "good" for the PRes.



I lurch back and forth between dedicated Res/Reg high level formations.  I think we need better methods to integrate Reg & Res leaders.  And we need ways to get class A leaders exposure to staff roles (both formation and "corporate" type ones).

But there's the challenge: class A time is limited.  If we want to develop some of the knowledge and experience of things outside the unit (and to my mind, we do), we run into time constraints.  How deep of a knowledge base do we need senior leaders to have if we want them to succeed?

And I have seen far too many "I'm from the outside, I can change everything" types.  There are statutory and regulatory realities that shape the military; lack of knowledge in those areas often means tremendous wasted time, wasted effort, and wasted opportunity as individuals chase windmills - or, worse, fix symptoms and cause even more problems because they do not understand the underlying problems.  A lack of understanding the interrelations and responsibilities within DND/CAF are equally problematic - and a senior formation leader needs that understanding if they are to be effective.

The Reserve system today produces too many senior individuals without the knowledge and experience base to be effective institutional leaders.  The push to find "The Next CO" drives a neverending process of pushing people too quickly, and not getting them the necessary experience to be effective, in either their roles as COs or in further employment.  (The cap badge wars and refusal to provide any meaningful ERE until an individual is post-command is equally problematic).  Despite armoury floor belief, there is little widespread Regular Force animosity towards the Reserves; in my experience, there is more ill-founded distrust/dislike of the Reg F in the Res F than the other way around.

I am not holding up the current Reg F C2 structure as any sort of beacon on a hill; frankly, if we are to keep the Army as a formation (which is the  worst option, but is what we will do), then the three CMBG commanders should report directly to the Army commander; the Divs should be disbanded and formations commanded by Colonels should report to an Army HQ BGen to do the sustain piece (bases etc), and a Res Formation, commanded by a Reg F BGen should take on the half dozen or less Reserve Bde Gps that could reasonably be built within the structure and resources available to the Reserves.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> From a tactical standpoint, absolutely, but I am talking institutional leadership here.  To become a full Col in the PRes, you have to command a CBG, a unit of 1500-2000 pers, and that is effectively a full time role.  Those officers have also completed a tenure as a unit CO, which is also nearly a full time job and while the units are embryonic, they have significant responsibilities in shaping their own institutions in terms of community footprint, recruiting, strategic engagement, etc.  The best of the group will become Div DComds, also nearly a full time job with significant responsibilities.  These senior leaders get the better part of a decade to "learn the ropes" institutionally.  Senior reserve force leaders frequently also bring significant management and leadership experience from their civilian employment.  Again, I agree that there are a lot of "Kentucky Colonels" out there, but there are also a lot of really sharp people.
> 
> As I said, they also lack some of the depth with regards to CF/DND level bureaucratic knowledge that comes with decades of full time service (and they would definitely need some staff to help them out), but I view that as a positive.  What we need are fresh ideas, and not slavish servitude to an organizational culture that has made little recent institutional progress, apart from adding ever increasing layers of HQ in the Army, and maintaining an 8,000 man NDHQ while the core capabilities rot.
> 
> I'm not saying that a reservist should be the Army Commander, or even a brigade in active operations, but I think that to move forward institutionally, reservists need a voice at the highest level, and that requirement is not met by officers in purely advisory roles.  What we need are some reservists in some responsible positions at the highest levels to help shape the institution so that the needs of the whole army are met.



Well, there is BGen RRE Mackenzie http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/about-army/leadership.page

And this 'badass' http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/harjit-sajjan-badass-canada-defence-minister-1.3304931

But I wonder how much influence even these people can have, really...


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well, there is BGen RRE Mackenzie http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/about-army/leadership.page
> 
> And this 'badass' http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/harjit-sajjan-badass-canada-defence-minister-1.3304931
> 
> But I wonder how much influence even these people can have, really...



BGen Mackenzie's position and the Director Reserves and Cadets are two examples of the advisory roles I was referring to.  Neither of them command anything.  What I would like to see is a more integrated organizations with PRes and RegF commanders and staff in various positions to provide some balance in "the force".


----------



## MilEME09

Until we see significant Reserve force influence in the decision making process for the reserves I doubt we will see much change from the way things are, I mean no offense by saying this but in the majority of cases the regular force doesn't understand Reserve Force issues well enough to make informed choices.


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's also a lack of any staff experience, in either formations or in more "corporate" functions.  Those are key developmental positions to make institutional leaders.



Agreed.  There are currently some institutional barriers to building those types of capabilities in the PRes, mostly due to the fact that our talent gets pushed into the succession planning racetrack to generate COs.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> I lurch back and forth between dedicated Res/Reg high level formations.  I think we need better methods to integrate Reg & Res leaders.  And we need ways to get class A leaders exposure to staff roles (both formation and "corporate" type ones).



Absolutely.


			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> But there's the challenge: class A time is limited.  If we want to develop some of the knowledge and experience of things outside the unit (and to my mind, we do), we run into time constraints.  How deep of a knowledge base do we need senior leaders to have if we want them to succeed?



Very true, but I would offer that if you want a vibrant and dynamic organization, you need some fresh blood from time to time, and that will never happen if takes a person decades to get up to speed.  I was listening to a speech Field Marshall Slim gave after the war, and in talking about his staff in 14th Army he noted that:
1.	His best intelligence officers were university professors and essentially civilians in uniform.
2.	His best operational planner was a U.S. Army National Guard Officer who was a refrigerator salesman in civilian life with no pre war full time service.  I will note that this particular Army operated in extremely difficult conditions, and resupplied primarily by air to the tune of 9,000 Dakota sorties per day.

My point here is that diversity of experience is sometimes a good thing.  



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> And I have seen far too many "I'm from the outside, I can change everything" types.  There are statutory and regulatory realities that shape the military; lack of knowledge in those areas often means tremendous wasted time, wasted effort, and wasted opportunity as individuals chase windmills - or, worse, fix symptoms and cause even more problems because they do not understand the underlying problems.  A lack of understanding the interrelations and responsibilities within DND/CAF are equally problematic - and a senior formation leader needs that understanding if they are to be effective.



I think that there is a balance to be struck here between those with the institutional knowledge, and those with the wild, fresh ideas.  In the current CAF structure, we have lots of the former, but none of the later.  One of the most effective methods to rejuvenate an organization in the corporate world is to hire a new CEO, or (at a lower level), bring in some new managers.  It isn’t pretty, and employees generally don’t like it, but that approach has turned around a lot of businesses.  In WW2, the relief of commanders was one of the major methods to rejuvenate a failing division/corp/army, but we have all but abandoned that practice.
  


			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Reserve system today produces too many senior individuals without the knowledge and experience base to be effective institutional leaders.  The push to find "The Next CO" drives a never-ending process of pushing people too quickly, and not getting them the necessary experience to be effective, in either their roles as COs or in further employment.  (The cap badge wars and refusal to provide any meaningful ERE until an individual is post-command is equally problematic).  Despite armoury floor belief, there is little widespread Regular Force animosity towards the Reserves; in my experience, there is more ill-founded distrust/dislike of the Reg F in the Res F than the other way around.



I agree on the lack of staff officer development in the PRes.  As you say, our outdated organizational structure forces us to sacrifice a lot to generate COs and RSMs for tiny units.  

I think we will have to agree to disagree on the PRes/RegF relationship overall, but I agree with you in the sense that I don’t think there is a lot of animosity within the RegF towards the PRes generally. It is more of a culture of neglect.  I think they view us more as an occasional nuisance (when we need something), and sometimes as a useful labour pool (when they need troops to fill out their hollow units).  The PRes has little capability to damage or undermine the RegF in a serious way, but I would offer that the opposite is not true.  I will preface what I say below by emphasizing the fact that I think that the relationship has improved significantly because of Afghanistan, and that I have observed lots of good, low level cooperation between RegF and PRes units.  However, I will cite a few examples to highlight how the relationship is often not one of mutual support, trust and respect:

-While briefing an officer visiting the HQ I was working at in Afghanistan, the visiting officer noted, “My this HQ has a lot of PRes augmentee officers…I guess that’s ok as long as you’re not commanding anything”.  At that moment, other reserve officers were commanding CSS convoys, PYSOPS and CIMIC Teams, and leading OMLT company mentor teams…

-A few years ago my unit had all of its machine guns CFTPO’d for a RegF unit’s end of FY “ammo burnathon”, not tied to any training objective.  They returned every one broken without a word of apology or explanation.  Could you imagine what would have happened if a reserve unit had done that?  Later in the year we were running a WDM course, and went through the CFTPO process to procure some additional C6s and SF kits.  While they were eventually provided, it took considerable staff effort and it was made clear to us at every stage that we were somehow being done a favour.  As a matter of course, when we beg and plead for a few NVGs for an exercise, we are told in no uncertain terms that if so much as a lense cap is missing, the loan will not be repeated.  I have no problem returning equipment in the state we received it, but would appreciate some reciprocation.  I shudder to think what our MSVSs will look like when/if we get them back.  

-A nearby base decided to close range control on weekends, severely limiting PRes access to ranges.  Concurrently, our formation was being chastised for having low IBTS numbers.  After much begging, (and a period where our formation funded the range control staff), said base agreed to open range control one weekend per month.  If you know anything about PRes training calendars, you would see that such a move would be of little benefit.  



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> I am not holding up the current Reg F C2 structure as any sort of beacon on a hill; frankly, if we are to keep the Army as a formation (which is the  worst option, but is what we will do), then the three CMBG commanders should report directly to the Army commander; the Divs should be disbanded and formations commanded by Colonels should report to an Army HQ BGen to do the sustain piece (bases etc), and a Res Formation, commanded by a Reg F BGen should take on the half dozen or less Reserve Bde Gps that could reasonably be built within the structure and resources available to the Reserves.



That sounds like a great structure, one of several that would help get us closer to where we need to be.


----------



## Rick Goebel

FYI, one of my reserve contemporaries served as a Task Force Commander in Bosnia as a Colonel.  Another served as Deputy Com­mand­ing Gen­eral for Polit­i­cal Mil­i­tary Inte­gra­tion in the Com­bined Secu­rity Tran­si­tion Com­mand — Afghanistan as a Brigadier General.  Both were what I like to call "pure reservists".


----------



## daftandbarmy

Rick Goebel said:
			
		

> FYI, one of my reserve contemporaries served as a Task Force Commander in Bosnia as a Colonel.  Another served as Deputy Com­mand­ing Gen­eral for Polit­i­cal Mil­i­tary Inte­gra­tion in the Com­bined Secu­rity Tran­si­tion Com­mand — Afghanistan as a Brigadier General.  Both were what I like to call "pure reservists".



And they would represent about 25% of the total. Seriously.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> My back of the envelope structural math for an Army Reserve designed from the ground up, not morphed to fit the historical cap-badges on the ground.
> 
> Trained platoon = 32
> Trained Company = 125 (3 platoons + Wpns + CHQ)
> Trained Bn = 420 (3 companies + Bn HQ)
> 
> Bde = 3300 (7 Bns + Bde HQ + Recruiting/Battle School unit (call it a Depot?) + BTL)
> 
> We can fit six of those into our current ~20K total strength target.
> 
> That means 42 trained Bns (plus six Depots), with 126 trained companies, with 378 trained platoons.
> 
> 
> Obviously, different corps and branches have variations in structure, but as a high level start point, perhaps that's what we should aim for: 420-strong Bns that do not do recruiting, or worry about training before soldiers are occupationally qualified - that's the Depot's task.  Even if folks have exams / fall sick / are washing their hair, a Bn sized exercise run to train sections and platoons is now much more viable and interesting.



DAP - you refer to the entities as "trained".  Don't you mean "in training"?  The Army is authorized to hire 20,000 bodies, plus or minus, each year.  QR&Os say that the CDS can employ those bodies for up to 60 days of Class A and 15 days of Class B service annually each.  75 Days would be equivalent to an 11 week course or a little bit shy of BMQ or BMOQ-L.  So, theoretically, after two years of Class A/B service the Army would have a fully trained private.

But that only works if three things happen:

One - the Army funds the training of troops for 75 days (24 hour days - as would happen on a course)
Two - the training happens locally to conform with the limitations of Class A service
Three - the Army retains those privates and provides local training to permit them to become corporals, master-corporals, sergeants and warrants.

And then, once you have a suitable body of all ranks, proficient in their ranks, led by a similarly trained officer corps, can you start talking about creating a trained force.

I believe that it is unlikely, with the current terms of enlistment, and financing, that a force of 20,000 bodies will ever be able to field more than 10% of its strength as an organized entity. So 10 Brigades, each of 2,000 nominal can realistically find 200 bodies adequately trained to create a useful company.  Everybody else is "in training" trying to find the course days to achieve the necessary skills to qualify in their rank.

And the Army isn't "calling up" their authorized reserve strength for 75 days a year.  They are only "calling them up" for something like a fifth of that.  So it would take a civvy off the street 4 to 5 years to put in the time at the local armouries to achieve even BMQ, assuming, as previously noted, that the courses were offered on the local parade square.  And most folks that enroll don't stick around that long when they realize that the courses, the field work, the range time aren't available.

Short form: You can't get there from here.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> DAP - you refer to the entities as "trained".  Don't you mean "in training"?  The Army is authorized to hire 20,000 bodies, plus or minus, each year.  QR&Os say that the CDS can employ those bodies for up to 60 days of Class A and 15 days of Class B service annually each.  75 Days would be equivalent to an 11 week course or a little bit shy of BMQ or BMOQ-L.  So, theoretically, after two years of Class A/B service the Army would have a fully trained private.
> 
> But that only works if three things happen:
> 
> One - the Army funds the training of troops for 75 days (24 hour days - as would happen on a course)
> Two - the training happens locally to conform with the limitations of Class A service
> Three - the Army retains those privates and provides local training to permit them to become corporals, master-corporals, sergeants and warrants.
> 
> And then, once you have a suitable body of all ranks, proficient in their ranks, led by a similarly trained officer corps, can you start talking about creating a trained force.
> 
> I believe that it is unlikely, with the current terms of enlistment, and financing, that a force of 20,000 bodies will ever be able to field more than 10% of its strength as an organized entity. So 10 Brigades, each of 2,000 nominal can realistically find 200 bodies adequately trained to create a useful company.  Everybody else is "in training" trying to find the course days to achieve the necessary skills to qualify in their rank.
> 
> And the Army isn't "calling up" their authorized reserve strength for 75 days a year.  They are only "calling them up" for something like a fifth of that.  So it would take a civvy off the street 4 to 5 years to put in the time at the local armouries to achieve even BMQ, assuming, as previously noted, that the courses were offered on the local parade square.  And most folks that enroll don't stick around that long when they realize that the courses, the field work, the range time aren't available.
> 
> Short form: You can't get there from here.




And 'reserve math' suggests that for every one that turns up, you need three on the books. 

For example, one platoon of 32 requires you to have 96 on strength.


----------



## Journeyman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And 'reserve math' suggests that for ...one platoon of 32 requires you to have 96 on strength.


....'commanded' by a LCol, 3 x Maj, CWO, 3 x MWO....   

....and a band....


.....oh, and usually some weird, retired guy who's _all over_  regimental quirks, "we've always done it this way," accoutrements,
 historical 'glory' (whether true or not), etc.....


----------



## Rifleman62

> Another served as Deputy Com­mand­ing Gen­eral for Polit­i­cal Mil­i­tary Inte­gra­tion in the Com­bined Secu­rity Tran­si­tion Com­mand — Afghanistan as a Brigadier General



If it is the same fellow I am thinking about, he was in the RWpgRif as a Lt, then went RCR. Promoted to LCol to be CO of the LSSR, retired, rejoined the PRes, then on, and on.


----------



## dapaterson

Trained means: has completed basic training plus army common training plus occupational training to the point where they are employable.  That DP1 training burden is taken away from units so they can focus on collective training, not recruiting or basic training.


----------



## Kirkhill

If the desired end state is 20,000 troops at DP1, and the churn rate is 4000 releases per year (5 yrs in the reserves) then is the system supplying 4000 DP1s to the units annually?

And DP1 means BMQ for 12 weeks plus 4 weeks for BMQ-L plus 10 weeks for a gunner, 11 weeks for tanker and 17 weeks for an infanteer.  A total of 26 to 33 weeks of full time training.  To supply and maintain a force of 20,000 trained privates.

Are reservists entering with the understanding that they will be trained to that standard before they go onto the roll of a reserve unit?  I don't think so.  To achieve 33 weeks of training at the rate of 20 paid days annually (3 to 4 weeks) it will take the recruit 8 to 11 years to become fully qualified to be deployable.

The alternatives are, in my opinion:

to ensure every soldier is trained to a common standard on entry prior to assignment to a reg force or a reserve force unit
to cascade reg force soldiers into the reserves
to treat the local armouries as centres of individual training for force generation and not for force employment.

And I will continue to bang the drum for an unpaid Homeguard/Militia that trains at the local armouries and supplies a recruiting pool for people willing to commit the time for reg force equivalent training and deployments.  

Finally, I would separate the Reserves from the Militia.  Their roles are different.  The Reserves need to be willing to deploy wherever, whenever at the beck and call of Ottawa.  The Militia is tied to their homes and their community.


----------



## dapaterson

Chris, you do not understand the training system.  It's not an 8-11 year process.  DP courses are run full time; if someone will commit for only 20 days a year, frankly, they should never be enrolled in the first place.  Serving in the military requires commitment.  If you don't want to show up, don't join.  If you can't make the time to train, don't join.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Chris, you do not understand the training system.  It's not an 8-11 year process.  DP courses are run full time; if someone will commit for only 20 days a year, frankly, they should never be enrolled in the first place.  Serving in the military requires commitment.  If you don't want to show up, don't join.  If you can't make the time to train, don't join.



And as long as they don't cancel, or change dates at the last minute, career courses we are generally good to go. Of course, reality intrudes upon the best plans


----------



## krimynal

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And as long as they don't cancel, or change dates at the last minute, career courses we are generally good to go. Of course, reality intrudes upon the best plans



Litterally EVERY course I went while in the reserve , there was a problem with the dates / timming / etc. 

I wasn't on that many courses : 

-BMQ
-SQ
-DP1
-Driver ( wheel ) 
-Recce Tech
-PC Tech

The ONLY one that was on the right time and everything was BMQ.  
SQ : I got told on the 7th that I needed to be there on the 9th .... 
DP1 : we got it short right after SQ

Driver : They booked me 1 night prior , litterally told me to drive up there and show up on the class which didn't even had my name on the papers.
Recce Tech : got told 5 days prior , got there , wasn't even on the paper , spent 1 day running everywhere trying to get everything sorted out
PC Tech : Wasn't listed for the course , told me in the middle of Recce Tech , had to call my unit to fix the issue before then end of the course. 


I Know sometimes things don't work out like it should , but as a reservist , it was pretty hard to keep a regular job and try to balance both of them when they call you and give you a 4 days notice ...


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And as long as they don't cancel, or change dates at the last minute, career courses we are generally good to go. Of course, reality intrudes upon the best plans



That's, in part, my point.  Units spend disproportionate effort recruiting and managing non-DP1 qualified personnel. Remove that from them.  Let the Depot units (one per Bde, geographically dispersed as the Bde is) focus on that.  Let units work at ongoing CT for qualified soldiers.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Chris, you do not understand the training system.  It's not an 8-11 year process.  DP courses are run full time; if someone will commit for only 20 days a year, frankly, they should never be enrolled in the first place.  Serving in the military requires commitment.  If you don't want to show up, don't join.  If you can't make the time to train, don't join.



DAP - you're right.  I don't understand the training system.  I don't understand how you can require a "trained force" to be made available from people that are still completing the training necessary to meet the minimum standard for employment.

And I do get the need for commitment - to create a reg force replacement on a part time basis.  Is the reservist expected to train on their own time - without pay?  In order to achieve the standards expected of the reg force?  Because I agree that you can't train a soldier on the basis of 20 days a year. (or even 37.5 days and a couple of weeks as alluded to by pbi way back in 2004)

http://army.ca/forums/threads/25365/post-113706.html#msg113706

As you've noted this problem is not new and the solutions aren't new either.  Way back in 2004 I was trying to figure out how shove 10 lbs into a 5 lb bag.  In the intervening 12 years I have come to accept that you can't.

An unpaid volunteer will never achieve the skills of a Reservist.

But, equally a Reservist, trained under the current system will never achieve parity with the Regs.

On the other hand the Reservist is able to relieve some of the Reg burden when properly employed. I would argue the same case can be made for a corps of unpaid volunteers.  Other government departments, and other countries, seem to agree.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> That's, in part, my point.  Units spend disproportionate effort recruiting and managing non-DP1 qualified personnel. Remove that from them.  Let the Depot units (one per Bde, geographically dispersed as the Bde is) focus on that.  Let units work at ongoing CT for qualified soldiers.



And here we agree - You are effectively arguing, in my view, for the separation of the trained Reserve as an independent entity.


----------



## dapaterson

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And here we agree - You are effectively arguing, in my view, for the separation of the trained Reserve as an independent entity.



No.  All one entity, but defined roles for different parts in personnel production.  Reserve units are their own worst enemies, fighting to do everything when they should be concentrating on collective training (Section & platoon).

An effective reserve requires established standards for training and readiness, so we know what we have when we need to activate them as individuals or formed groups.  I don't think holding up the Reg F as the standard to achieve is necessarily the right measuring stick; we need to be able to compare to them to understand where the deltas are, but I will whisper the heresy that perhaps we provide too much training to the Reg F - and then don't provide enough opportunities to permit them to retain and develop those skills.  A Reserve force that focuses on a narrower skill set, but practices those skills regularly, is far ahead of one that tries to do everything, but nothing well.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  All one entity, but defined roles for different parts in personnel production.  Reserve units are their own worst enemies, fighting to do everything when they should be concentrating on collective training (Section & platoon).
> 
> An effective reserve requires established standards for training and readiness, so we know what we have when we need to activate them as individuals or formed groups.  I don't think holding up the Reg F as the standard to achieve is necessarily the right measuring stick; we need to be able to compare to them to understand where the deltas are, *but I will whisper the heresy that perhaps we provide too much training to the Reg F *- and then don't provide enough opportunities to permit them to retain and develop those skills.  A Reserve force that focuses on a narrower skill set, but practices those skills regularly, is far ahead of one that tries to do everything, but nothing well.



Interesting comment.  A result of hiring people and then having nothing for them to do?  Once they are trained, and there is no immediate requirement for their services maybe they could be put into reserve?

Beyond that, I actually agree - FWIW - if the Reserve can manage to discipline itself to manage two or three roles concurrently.  

My preference for separation is that I don't see the Regs being able to manage their Reserve because they are focused on other things.  That doesn't give me much confidence that the Reserves could manage Individual Training (even when centralized at local brigade), Collective Training, maintenance of a trained ready force and maintenance of a supplementary force of trained augmentees.  That is a big ask, in my opinion, for a small group volunteers to administer, especially if there are 117 of them scattered around the country.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  All one entity, but defined roles for different parts in personnel production.  Reserve units are their own worst enemies, fighting to do everything when they should be concentrating on collective training (Section & platoon).
> 
> An effective reserve requires established standards for training and readiness, so we know what we have when we need to activate them as individuals or formed groups.  I don't think holding up the Reg F as the standard to achieve is necessarily the right measuring stick; we need to be able to compare to them to understand where the deltas are, but I will whisper the heresy that perhaps we provide too much training to the Reg F - and then don't provide enough opportunities to permit them to retain and develop those skills.  A Reserve force that focuses on a narrower skill set, but practices those skills regularly, is far ahead of one that tries to do everything, but nothing well.



I would also argue we have the wrong skill sets in the Reserves, I keep hearing time and time again that the Reserves are to be DOMOPS heavy, so where are our PRes Firefighters, and Electricians?, perhaps even a PRes Light SAR trade specializing in urban search and rescue or mountain rescue.


----------



## dapaterson

Hence my I call for a smaller number of units.  They can be geographically dispersed units - companies / platoons do not have to be co-located.  Thus we can maintain the current geographical coverage.  But a hundred plus units trying to do similar things in different ways, all performing the same admin and basic training functions - one would be hard pressed to deliberately concoct a more bound for failure model.


----------



## dapaterson

DOMOPS is the great Army intellectual dishonesty.  If something happens, we need to be able to respond immediately.  That suggests the standing force will be the first to come in - that is, the Regular Force, with possible follow on from the locals.  Except if they're local, they're likely caught in the same problems and less able to get away to work with the military.  As well, there are a significant number of first responders in the military- folks who will already be out the door.

Overseas operations may have a short fuse immediate deployment, but then become reliant on regular rotations - a prime place to employ a force that may require longer lead times to get ready.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> DOMOPS is the great Army intellectual dishonesty.  If something happens, we need to be able to respond immediately.  That suggests the standing force will be the first to come in - that is, the Regular Force, with possible follow on from the locals.  Except if they're local, they're likely caught in the same problems and less able to get away to work with the military.  As well, there are a significant number of first responders in the military- folks who will already be out the door.
> 
> Overseas operations may have a short fuse immediate deployment, but then become reliant on regular rotations - a prime place to employ a force that may require longer lead times to get ready.



There are no Reg F units that will respond where I am, apart from the Navy who will all jump on their ships and sail away when trouble strikes, which is what they are supposed to do.

Meanwhile, I'm sure that a couple of hundred reservists will show up at our armoury within the first couple of days of an earthquake.

Sadly, we have no equipment or food for them apart from a ridiculously token store of digging tools, body bags and IMPs housed in a couple of sea containers in our parking lot.


----------



## RCPalmer

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I would also argue we have the wrong skill sets in the Reserves, I keep hearing time and time again that the Reserves are to be DOMOPS heavy, so where are our PRes Firefighters, and Electricians?, perhaps even a PRes Light SAR trade specializing in urban search and rescue or mountain rescue.



While we have a renewed focus on DOMOPS, I would offer that it should not be (nor is it) a primary task for the Army.  Instead, the Army is (as it should be) a force of last resort.  We also have to be careful about providing federally funded alternatives to capabilities that should be maintained by the provinces.  For the most part, the provinces already do a good job with those mandates.  That said, I could see us doing a bit of cross-training with some of the agencies we would be most likely to work with in various emergency scenarios. 

The most useful thing we can do to prepare for DOMOPS is to maintain a high level of personnel readiness in our units, exercise our C2 capabilities to ensure we can respond to emergent tasks (which we should be doing as part of our warfighting BTS anyway), and stockpile some resources to ensure short term self-sufficiency in the event of disruptions of supplies and services.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> While we have a renewed focus on DOMOPS, I would offer that it should not be (nor is it) a primary task for the Army.  Instead, the Army is (as it should be) a force of last resort.  We also have to be careful about providing federally funded alternatives to capabilities that should be maintained by the provinces.  For the most part, the provinces already do a good job with those mandates.  That said, I could see us doing a bit of cross-training with some of the agencies we would be most likely to work with in various emergency scenarios.
> 
> The most useful thing we can do to prepare for DOMOPS is to maintain a high level of personnel readiness in our units, exercise our C2 capabilities to ensure we can respond to emergent tasks (which we should be doing as part of our warfighting BTS anyway), and stockpile some resources to ensure short term self-sufficiency in the event of disruptions of supplies and services.



I disagree in that if DOMOPS is to be the main priority of the reserves than maintaining high numbers of combat arms units is counter-intuitive. Combat arms would generally be used to provide semi-skilled labour ISO the public power. The maintenance of more CSS trades would provide real deployable capabilities to manage times of crisis in an DOMOP context (truckers, cooks, sup techs, health care, supply chain management, etc etc). If the main priority is one for one augmentation than the number of units of each trade should be rationalized and the training rationalized to ensure that the 1 for 1 task is completed.


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I disagree in that if DOMOPS is to be the main priority of the reserves than maintaining high numbers of combat arms units is counter-intuitive. Combat arms would generally be used to provide semi-skilled labour ISO the public power. The maintenance of more CSS trades would provide real deployable capabilities to manage times of crisis in an DOMOP context (truckers, cooks, sup techs, health care, supply chain management, etc etc). If the main priority is one for one augmentation than the number of units of each trade should be rationalized and the training rationalized to ensure that the 1 for 1 task is completed.



The key thing to keep in mind here is that outside of Defence of Canada/sovereignty tasks, DOMOPS are not the reason why we have armed forces.  DOMOPS are simply something else we can do, and while they are important for a variety of reasons, they should not and do not drive our force structure or training system.  

All of the capabilities you have noted above are things that Provincial authorities and the private sector do much better than we could ever do.  The City of Calgary alone owns more trucks and heavy equipment (and associated drivers and mechanics) than the entire Canadian Army. Alberta Health Services has over 100,000 employees including over 3,000 paramedics, and 7,000 doctors.  Provincial and municipal level emergency management planning harnesses those significant capabilities; everything from transit buses to keep people warm and transport them to reception centers to social workers to attend to their emotional needs once they get there.  In all of that, there is definitely a place for the military, but it is in a supporting role. 

Militaries are primarily (but not exclusively) about killing people and breaking things, and that is what should drive our structure and training.  

I am not sure I follow your argument with regards to 1 for 1 augmentation, but I think we are all in agreement here that an organizational structure realignment is long overdue.  With regards to rationalizing the trades, we seem to have the more trouble at the moment training CSS types than anyone else due to the long course lengths.  That said, some prioritization in the training system to shorten course lengths would be be beneficial to all trades, and would likely help the CSS trades the most. There are also the motivation aspects I have alluded to in prior posts.  A part time soldier is generally more interested in challenge and adventure, and not a low paying version of their day job.


----------



## Rick Goebel

Not the same guy.  This one was Calg Highrs and 4RCR.  Never Regular.



			
				Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> If it is the same fellow I am thinking about, he was in the RWpgRif as a Lt, then went RCR. Promoted to LCol to be CO of the LSSR, retired, rejoined the PRes, then on, and on.


----------



## mariomike

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The City of Calgary alone owns more trucks and heavy equipment (and associated drivers and mechanics) than the entire Canadian Army.



The City of Calgary also has CANADA TASK FORCE 2 ( CAN-TF2 ) Disaster Response Team:
http://www.cantf2.com/#about
"The team is composed of over 100 Rescue Specialists, Doctors, Paramedics, Structural Engineers, Communications Specialists, Canine & Technical Searchers, Logistics Specialists, and Command Staff..."


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> if we are to keep the Army as a formation (which is the  worst option, but is what we will do) ...


The new government has been accused of undoing everything from the previous government just for the sake of it.  They might be open to reverting the NDA to where the environmental commands are not entrenched in law.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There are no Reg F units that will respond where I am ...


Nonsense.  If there is an RFA anywhere in this country, the Reg F will be on the ground, organized and in a composition suitable to the ask long before "a couple of hundred reservists" leave their disaster stricken families and mobilize at the armoury.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> The new government has been accused of undoing everything from the previous government just for the sake of it.  They might be open to reverting the NDA to where the environmental commands are not entrenched in law.
> Nonsense.  If there is an RFA anywhere in this country, the Reg F will be on the ground, organized and in a composition suitable to the ask long before "a couple of hundred reservists" leave their disaster stricken families and mobilize at the armoury.



I think you under estimate reservists, during the floods in 2013 in calgary we had guys who's homes were under 6 feet of water who still showed up. Not the case for everyone but to assume in a disaster no reservist is going to show up is a bit much.


----------



## RCPalmer

mariomike said:
			
		

> The City of Calgary also has CANADA TASK FORCE 2 ( CAN-TF2 ) Disaster Response Team:
> http://www.cantf2.com/#about
> "The team is composed of over 100 Rescue Specialists, Doctors, Paramedics, Structural Engineers, Communications Specialists, Canine & Technical Searchers, Logistics Specialists, and Command Staff..."



Yep, another great example.  It is quite an interesting discipline, and a lot of skill sets to maintain:
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-eng.aspx

There also probably some great cross training opportunities which would allow us to back up the technical specialists as needed.  39 CBG seems to be doing that within the scope of the Light Urban Search and Rescue (LUSAR) capability:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/lfwapao/sets/72157643715505913/


----------



## McG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think you under estimate reservists, during the floods in 2013 in calgary we had guys who's homes were under 6 feet of water who still showed up. Not the case for everyone but to assume in a disaster no reservist is going to show up is a bit much.


Of course, I did not say that "no reservist is going to show."  Are you trying to say that "a couple of hundred reservists" will be first operationally ready on the ground?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The key thing to keep in mind here is that outside of Defence of Canada/sovereignty tasks, DOMOPS are not the reason why we have armed forces.  DOMOPS are simply something else we can do, and while they are important for a variety of reasons, they should not and do not drive our force structure or training system.
> 
> All of the capabilities you have noted above are things that Provincial authorities and the private sector do much better than we could ever do.  The City of Calgary alone owns more trucks and heavy equipment (and associated drivers and mechanics) than the entire Canadian Army. Alberta Health Services has over 100,000 employees including over 3,000 paramedics, and 7,000 doctors.  Provincial and municipal level emergency management planning harnesses those significant capabilities; everything from transit buses to keep people warm and transport them to reception centers to social workers to attend to their emotional needs once they get there.  In all of that, there is definitely a place for the military, but it is in a supporting role.
> 
> Militaries are primarily (but not exclusively) about killing people and breaking things, and that is what should drive our structure and training.
> 
> I am not sure I follow your argument with regards to 1 for 1 augmentation, but I think we are all in agreement here that an organizational structure realignment is long overdue.  With regards to rationalizing the trades, we seem to have the more trouble at the moment training CSS types than anyone else due to the long course lengths.  That said, some prioritization in the training system to shorten course lengths would be be beneficial to all trades, and would likely help the CSS trades the most. There are also the motivation aspects I have alluded to in prior posts.  A part time soldier is generally more interested in challenge and adventure, and not a low paying version of their day job.



I use DOMOPs as an "if" task in light of the arguments that had been brought forward about DOMOPs. The DOMOP task ought to be a BPT sort of task, thought I agree with earlier comments that the regular force is likely better situated to respond to crisis' than reserve forces due to the restrictions on the reserve units (the not being able to be called out". A regular force unit can get transport and move into an area quicker than a reserve unit can be piecemealed together, CFTPO created, trained, and shipped out.

1 for 1 augmentation. Without the ability to call out a reserve unit complete, the only valid task for that unit at a national level is to provide 1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force. If we have 9 x infantry battalions, 4 x artillery, and 3 x armour regiments in the reg force how many reserve units do we need to provide that 1 for 1?

Finally... I don't agree with your statement about the motivation of persons to join the reserves. CSS personnel can be recruited into jobs that use their skill sets by offering them the "army" aspect of that job.... truckers get to do CPs, DPs, fire machine guns, etc etc. Reserve doctors/nurses/dentists could be largely paper reserves who go out and confirm soldier skills on a semi-regular basis as their skills wont be improved through reserve service outside of major exercises. Finally, as I noted, many areas only offer 1 type of reserve option so your recruitment pool is already limited to whoever may want to do that trade. In this case, in a town with only infantry (say, Owen Sound, Ontario) than your recruitment pool is already limited to only those who want to be infantry, so what's the difference?

Edited to add:

CSS training costs, in the short term, may be higher but long term they will be lower as there is less need for refresher/work up training. They will develop critical skills (finance officers being accountants for example) in their primary jobs that can be applied to the military with no additional costs. An artilleryman, however, cannot develop primary skills in their civilian employment and would need constant refresher training, particularly if they miss Class A time.


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> DOMOPS is the great Army intellectual dishonesty.  If something happens, we need to be able to respond immediately.  That suggests the standing force will be the first to come in - that is, the Regular Force, with possible follow on from the locals.  Except if they're local, they're likely caught in the same problems and less able to get away to work with the military.  As well, there are a significant number of first responders in the military- folks who will already be out the door.
> 
> Overseas operations may have a short fuse immediate deployment, but then become reliant on regular rotations - a prime place to employ a force that may require longer lead times to get ready.



I would offer that the response times will vary widely depending on the circumstances.  I could imagine a local emergency so dire that only outside units could respond, but that risk could impact the RegF as much as PRes.  

During the 2013 AB floods, we had no trouble mobilizing pers, including some with flooded homes.  A major contributing factor was the fact that most businesses closed that week, meaning that getting time off was not required.  For those who worked for businesses still operating, getting the time off was an easy sell.  

In this way, we were able to form the bulk of the TBG within 4 hours of the fanout initiation (on a Friday afternoon), with the outside of Calgary elements arriving overnight, and we were complete (500 pers with the necessary troop lift and comms) and ready for operations by 9am the following morning.  

Having some PRes pers among the first responders worked quite well during this operation as they could be well employed in liaison roles. So, the competing commitments of  PRes members worked in our favour in that case.  

However, as you say, in most cases the RegF high readiness elements (primarily IRU) should provide the first response.  I don't think anyone in the Army CoC is marketing the TBG capability as the DOMOPS first line of defence.  Isn't that why the Navy has established some land-based elements to provide initial response within JTF(P)?  I realize they would be quite constrained in terms of their operations due to a lack of outdoor clothing, tentage, radios, SMP veh, etc., but they could likely respond a lot faster to a west coast emergency than an Edmonton or Shilo based IRU.


----------



## mariomike

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Provincial and municipal level emergency management planning harnesses those significant capabilities; everything from transit buses to keep people warm and transport them to reception centers to social workers to attend to their emotional needs once they get there.



That would not surprise me, "In the wake of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, more than 9,000 counselors went to New York City to offer aid to rescue workers, families, and direct victims of the violence of September 11, 2001."
http://psi.sagepub.com/content/4/2/45.abstract


----------



## blackberet17

MCG said:
			
		

> If there is an RFA anywhere in this country, the Reg F will be on the ground, organized and in a composition suitable to the ask long before "a couple of hundred reservists" leave their disaster stricken families and mobilize at the armoury.



"Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location, if the call were to be made, and it's a real DOMOPs scenario. Cape Breton NS; PEI; and NFLD. We all live in the communities where we train. We know the areas, we know who to call and what to call to get something done.

And let's say it is a perfect DOMOP scenario. PEI is cut off from the Mainland in the middle of winter. How long will it take for 4 AR (GS) to mobilize and get here from Gagetown should an RFA be submitted, when the bridge is out, the Northumberland Straight is frozen solid, and the airports are closed? Same for Cape Breton, with a closed causeway, etc.

But $hit, what do I know, I've only lived here for 20 plus years, and not been able to get off the Island mid-winter for days straight...or have fresh food delivered...or fuel...

Alas, as someone else has pointed out in regards to their own situation: a laughable supply of IMPs, no storage capacity for food stuff, and no CAF-held equipment for DOMOPs on PEI... There's a DOMOPs kit sea container in Sydney Cape Breton and another in NFLD somewhere...yet someone, when looking at "isolated areas" (isolatable?) didn't think PEI could be isolated and, ergo, was unworthy of a DOMOPs sea container...

So I do bristle somewhat at the comment. As well, if and when the call is made, Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> "Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location, if the call were to be made, and it's a real DOMOPs scenario. Cape Breton NS; PEI; and NFLD. We all live in the communities where we train. We know the areas, we know who to call and what to call to get something done.
> 
> And let's say it is a perfect DOMOP scenario. PEI is cut off from the Mainland in the middle of winter. How long will it take for 4 AR (GS) to mobilize and get here from Gagetown should an RFA be submitted, when the bridge is out, the Northumberland Straight is frozen solid, and the airports are closed? Same for Cape Breton, with a closed causeway, etc.
> 
> But $hit, what do I know, I've only lived here for 20 plus years, and not been able to get off the Island mid-winter for days straight...or have fresh food delivered...or fuel...
> 
> Alas, as someone else has pointed out in regards to their own situation: a laughable supply of IMPs, no storage capacity for food stuff, and no CAF-held equipment for DOMOPs on PEI... There's a DOMOPs kit sea container in Sydney Cape Breton and another in NFLD somewhere...yet someone, when looking at "isolated areas" (isolatable?) didn't think PEI could be isolated and, ergo, was unworthy of a DOMOPs sea container...
> 
> So I do bristle somewhat at the comment. As well, if and when the call is made, Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.



During the famous 'Snowmageddon of 1996' we had at least 200 troops turn up at various armouries in Victoria. 

Admittedly this was not a disastrous earthquake, but we were full on for a few days, and had zero Reg F augmentation except for a couple of guys who were home on leave and decided to join us to help out. 

In addition to rescuing various shut ins, assisting the ambulances do their thing and ferrying hospital workers to and fro, this included shoveling snow off the CFB Esquimalt CANEX building, so it wouldn't cave in, while interested (Reg F) sailors looked on from the comfort of their accommodation blocks.


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> During the famous 'Snowmageddon of 1996' we had at least 200 troops turn up at various armouries in Victoria.
> 
> Admittedly this was not a disastrous earthquake, but we were full on for a few days, and had zero Reg F augmentation except for a couple of guys who were home on leave and decided to join us to help out.
> 
> In addition to rescuing various shut ins, assisting the ambulances do their thing and ferrying hospital workers to and fro, this included shoveling snow off the CFB Esquimalt CANEX building, so it wouldn't cave in, while interested (Reg F) sailors looked on from the comfort of their accommodation blocks.



We had similar experiences in the 2013 floods.  We had a few travelling pers (RegF and PRes) join in with us to help out, but the two RegF organizations in the city  stayed out of the operation altogether.  One organization stayed home because their building was in the evacuation zone, and the other maintained their 9-5 routine.


----------



## McG

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> "Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location ...


Hopefully we don't get the opportunity to see who is right.  I have watched and been part of more than a few DOMOPS on on both east and west sides of the country and places in between.  The first foot on the ground is a mix of Cl B and Reg F liaison and recce, then the RegF vanguard closely followed by Reg F echelon and then, on call, follow-on forces which could be a mixture of components depending on timelines.



			
				RCPalmer said:
			
		

> We had similar experiences in the 2013 floods.  We had a few travelling pers (RegF and PRes) join in with us to help out, but the two RegF organizations in the city  stayed out of the operation altogether.  One organization stayed home because their building was in the evacuation zone, and the other maintained their 9-5 routine.


There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In addition to rescuing various shut ins, assisting the ambulances do their thing and ferrying hospital workers to and fro, < snip >



That winter when Mayor Lastman called in the army, a couple of Reservists shovelling snow saw us struggling with a stretcher patient and gave us a hand back to the bus ( an actual 36' bus ). They, and their shovels, rode with us for a while.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.



I was one of those who was an evacuee in the Calgary 2013 floods (tucked my family in safely with the in-laws just prior to the fan-out) but reported for duty regardless. Through the course of our deployment I had no idea if my house was intact or not, despite being just blocks away at one point. There were many other soldiers who also lived in the evac zone and who also responded to the fan-out. 



> There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.



The military contribution in the Calgary AO was pretty much entirely PRes. I believe 1 CMBG was responsible for High River and a few other places, and my recollection is that we were deployed and ready for operations way before 1 CMBG was able to get down from Edmonton. Admittedly we were fortunate that Mewata armoury was not flooded and that the Calgary ASU/ brigade HQ were well outside the flood zone.


----------



## mariomike

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> The military contribution in the Calgary AO was pretty much entirely PRes.



For those of us who were not there,

Alberta floods 2013
http://army.ca/forums/threads/111031.25.html
5 pages


----------



## RCPalmer

MCG said:
			
		

> There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.



Not at all.  I was just commenting on two local organizations, echoing Daftandbarmy's experience.  It was clearly 1 CMBG's show, and as Col Anderson noted in the AAR, it was a great example of the "get in fast, be awesome, and get out" model that we should be looking for in DOMOPS generally.  I think that it was a great example of RegF/PRes cooperation, particularly so considering that we do not conduct CT together at all, nevermind for CT for DOMOPS.  

On that vein, I would encourage you to have a look at the official CAF record of the event:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-past/op-lentus-13-1.page 

Somehow we went from being the largest (in excess of 500 pers) and arguably busiest unit deployed as part of 1 CMBG on the operation to, "41 Territorial Battalion Group assisted the Calgary Fire Department by supplying four assault boats to move through affected neighborhoods and identify anyone still remaining in the evacuation area."  Boy, it sounds like those reservists were really earning their pay...

As the rest of the text in the record was simply copied from 1 CMBG consolidated sitreps, the drafter would have had to have taken the time to physically delete our actual contributions. It is a very small matter, but indicative of broader corporate culture.  Later in the year, a communication was circulated (unofficially) around the division, harshly criticizing 41 TBG's performance, primarily with regards to pers admin readiness.  Most of it was true, but quite misguided considering the resourcing realities, entitlements and conditions of service in the PRes generally which ironically are largely in the hands of the organization from where the communication originated.  Stuff like this is pure morale poison for a volunteer organization, and I only bring it up because the damage has long since been done.  

I have touched on this point in some of my earlier posts.   In the current construct, PRes soldiers and leaders could worship the earth the RegF walks on or hate their guts. It doesn't matter. However, the attitude of RegF soldiers and leaders towards the PRes is very important because they control all of the resources and set the rules of the game. I have included a few other examples of this in earlier posts in this thread of how that power dynamic plays out.  

If we are to move forward in a positive way, the first step is to establish a culture (which is largely a command function) based on mutual respect, trust, and support.  There are many individuals of all ranks in the RegF and the PRes who do precisely that. However, the broader trend appears to be a continuation of a deep split that disappoints me greatly.


----------



## mariomike

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Yep, another great example.  It is quite an interesting discipline, and a lot of skill sets to maintain:
> https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-eng.aspx



Our city HUSAR is Task Force 3. Calgary TF2 and Vancouver TF1 also have Heavy Urban SAR.



			
				RCPalmer said:
			
		

> There also probably some great cross training opportunities which would allow us to back up the technical specialists as needed.



Probably. I saw HMCS York involved in a training exercise with our Marine SAR crews.

I like the way New York City handles Urban Rescue.


----------



## GK .Dundas

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Another proposal is to do what the Germans have done.....They cascade their equipment down, as opposed to putting it out as targets on the ranges, or sold off as scrap.


 Or do the occasional bargain hunting , You will note I said occasional bargain hunting. Other wise our erstwhile Masters will have us running around in SUVs and pick up trucks .......oh wait I forgot . :
 Cascading could be a good idea does anyone know if there are (aside from the T-LAVS ) any M   113s left ? Solves a fair bit of your infantry mobility problems .
 Then there is the problem of training armour crews , probably not enough Leo C2 s to train with so  perhaps  we could strike a deal with the Americans for these
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/raytheon-can-turn-old-american-made-m60a3-tanks-killing-16142 

 Of course all of the above is dependent on money .And a Canadian Government that actually give a Gerbil's Backside about Defence and by extension about a Regular Force that does the same.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think you under estimate reservists, during the floods in 2013 in calgary we had guys who's homes were under 6 feet of water who still showed up. Not the case for everyone but to assume in a disaster no reservist is going to show up is a bit much.



"Showing up" and being able and tasked to do something aren't always hand in hand.  After Hurriance Juan hit Halifax, the IRU (Gagetown) was in location, and running while the local CBG was trying to org itself into a TF or some kind.

Aside from the ingrained "res force" problems that always happen, there is the question of what forces is the provincial government, EMO or whoever asking for and how is the local commander (such as JTF-A) going to order/authorize to be boots on the ground.

Things to consider....


----------



## Eye In The Sky

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> "Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location, if the call were to be made, and it's a real DOMOPs scenario. Cape Breton NS; PEI; and NFLD. We all live in the communities where we train. We know the areas, we know who to call and what to call to get something done.
> 
> And let's say it is a perfect DOMOP scenario. PEI is cut off from the Mainland in the middle of winter. How long will it take for 4 AR (GS) to mobilize and get here from Gagetown should an RFA be submitted, when the bridge is out, the Northumberland Straight is frozen solid, and the airports are closed? Same for Cape Breton, with a closed causeway, etc.
> 
> But $hit, what do I know, I've only lived here for 20 plus years, and not been able to get off the Island mid-winter for days straight...or have fresh food delivered...or fuel...
> 
> Alas, as someone else has pointed out in regards to their own situation: a laughable supply of IMPs, no storage capacity for food stuff, and no CAF-held equipment for DOMOPs on PEI... There's a DOMOPs kit sea container in Sydney Cape Breton and another in NFLD somewhere...yet someone, when looking at "isolated areas" (isolatable?) didn't think PEI could be isolated and, ergo, was unworthy of a DOMOPs sea container...
> 
> So I do bristle somewhat at the comment. As well, if and when the call is made, Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.



PEIR (whats left of it) and the Sqn from the Sig's over at Brigthen (if they're still there...) aren't going to be capable of anything.  How are they going to get 'too' the QCA?  What are they operating to get 'out' of the QCA, and to do what?  If that Day After Tomorrow situation every happened, the people making decisions in the military around the maritimes would likely be looking for choppers from 403 and 413, Hercs from 413, a '140 to take a look at 'whats what', and heavy lift in to, say, Summerside.  They can land a Globemaster in Alert, I'd bet they can put them down in Summerside too if they needed to.  8 ACCS could go in and set up shop if the towers were taken out by...anything.  But for the purpose of this we'll say I am the 1 Cdn Div Comd, shit, I just can't land even a Herc in Summerside, or Chtown.  Damn, looks like those folks who fly things like Hercs and C-17s are going to have to airdrop stuff.  Anywhere they want to (zero threat environment, no concern for SAMs, etc, right?).  

Loyalty and all taken into consideration, there needs to be a consideration given to realities in terms of # of troops, kit that can operate in the scenario you suggested, etc.  If I was a JTFA type, in that scenario I'd be looking for mobility and that is airborne.  I need an 'ambulance' to get someone to emerg.  Do I hope a patrol of PRES folks can get there with a toboggan or GWag behind a plow or do I send a Cormorant with a few SAR Techs.  That kind of thing.    

If PEI is ever 'snowmagedoned", the biggest asset the provincial government/EMO can tap into?  Right here.  ---->  http://www.peisa.ca/   Far more capable in the winter than 5 G-Wags are ever going to be.  No offense intended, but we need to be realistic in cap's and lim's.

You'd be surprised how many bug smasher parking lots there are all over.  Herc's can land on unprepared.  Choppers can do all kinds of neat and wonderful things fixed-wing folks dare not try.  If I were a betting man, I'd bet I could put my light elements from my IRU on the ground PDQ if push came to shove and someone called the Div up for no-duff DOMOPs.


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> "Showing up" and being able and tasked to do something aren't always hand in hand.  After Hurriance Juan hit Halifax, the IRU (Gagetown) was in location, and running while the local CBG was trying to org itself into a TF or some kind.
> 
> Aside from the ingrained "res force" problems that always happen, there is the question of what forces is the provincial government, EMO or whoever asking for and how is the local commander (such as JTF-A) going to order/authorize to be boots on the ground.
> 
> Things to consider....



I don't think anyone is advocating that any PRes organization just "show up".  There must always be an RFA from provincial authorities, and an order to assign the relevant forces to the RJTF based on the mandate of the operation.  The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox.  

DOMOPs planning (particularly for the PRes) has improved a lot since 2003 and your experience with Juan.  You might get a better result today, but I would still expect that the IRU to be able to deploy more quickly in most circumstances.  That shouldn't come as a surprise.  That said, as has been noted here, there have been some circumstances where the PRes element was able deploy quite quickly as well.  

However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited.



True, which goes back to the original problem of units not being able to be called out complete and not having standing tasks aside from "provide pers" type things. If the task us to provide IRU for PEI and the PEI R can be called out as a whole than by all means give them the kit. Aside from that, why have kit just sitting somewhere to be used a couple times a month that us needed elsewhere?


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> True, which goes back to the original problem of units not being able to be called out complete and not having standing tasks aside from "provide pers" type things. If the task us to provide IRU for PEI and the PEI R can be called out as a whole than by all means give them the kit. Aside from that, why have kit just sitting somewhere to be used a couple times a month that us needed elsewhere?



While I would love to have some element of compulsory service (for both training and operations), I think that the Army Reserve has a reasonably good track record using the volunteer model, generating the capabilities we have been asked to generate for domestic and international operations.  We just don't know exactly who we are going to get, though we have more predictability with regards to the "who" when it comes to leaders as opposed to troops. For example, 41 CBG is around 1000 pers, and the TBG build is only about 350.  In the 2013 floods, we exceeded that requirement by 150, putting 500 pers in the field.

The common yardstick applied with regards to PRes capabilities are the major summer CT exercises, and admittedly attendance at those is (generally) quite light at the moment.  However, I would offer that is a structural deficiency based on competing IT demands.  

With regards to equipment, the same argument could be made about every RegF unit that isn't in a collective training cycle or tasked as the IRU.  While they don't need as much equipment as a unit in R2HR, they still need some to conduct IT, IBTS, and generate basic capabilities for a DOMOP.  We are talking about a some pretty basic stuff here, and its absence has implications for PRes IT, IBTS and CT in addition to the DOMOPs consideration.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> While I would love to have some element of compulsory service (for both training and operations), I think that the Army Reserve has a reasonably good track record using the volunteer model, generating the capabilities we have been asked to generate for domestic and international operations.  We just don't know exactly who we are going to get, though we have more predictability with regards to the "who" when it comes to leaders as opposed to troops. For example, 41 CBG is around 1000 pers, and the TBG build is only about 350.  In the 2013 floods, we exceeded that requirement by 150, putting 500 pers in the field.
> 
> The common yardstick applied with regards to PRes capabilities are the major summer CT exercises, and admittedly attendance at those is (generally) quite light at the moment.  However, I would offer that is a structural deficiency based on competing IT demands.
> 
> With regards to equipment, the same argument could be made about every RegF unit that isn't in a collective training cycle or tasked as the IRU.  While they don't need as much equipment as a unit in R2HR, they still need some to conduct IT, IBTS, and generate basic capabilities for a DOMOP.  We are talking about a some pretty basic stuff here, and its absence has implications for PRes IT, IBTS and CT in addition to the DOMOPs consideration.



Most reg force units not in R2HR or IRU are stripped of equipment minus specialist equipment. 

At the end of the day, the reserves suffer from the inability to be called out as a formed body. Without that, justifying equipment, train above platoon level, and pers will remain difficult. Why train a reserve group to level 4-5 when that group won't be called out as a formed group and doesn't add much to 1-1 augmentation of the reg force, particularly at the critical cpl/pte level?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I don't think anyone is advocating that any PRes organization just "show up".  There must always be an RFA from provincial authorities, and an order to assign the relevant forces to the RJTF based on the mandate of the operation.  The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox.
> 
> DOMOPs planning (particularly for the PRes) has improved a lot since 2003 and your experience with Juan.  You might get a better result today, but I would still expect that the IRU to be able to deploy more quickly in most circumstances.  That shouldn't come as a surprise.  That said, as has been noted here, there have been some circumstances where the PRes element was able deploy quite quickly as well.



Agree and points taken.  I think in some geo areas it would work better; CAF politics and everything taken into consideration.    



> However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited.



And this is the problem the entire CAF deals with, not just the Reg or Res.  I don't see this changing before I am CRA (2030) either.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox.



And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.


----------



## blackberet17

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> PEIR (whats left of it) and the Sqn from the Sig's over at Brigthen (if they're still there...) aren't going to be capable of anything.  How are they going to get 'too' the QCA?  What are they operating to get 'out' of the QCA, and to do what?  If that Day After Tomorrow situation every happened, the people making decisions in the military around the maritimes would likely be looking for choppers from 403 and 413, Hercs from 413, a '140 to take a look at 'whats what', and heavy lift in to, say, Summerside.  They can land a Globemaster in Alert, I'd bet they can put them down in Summerside too if they needed to.  8 ACCS could go in and set up shop if the towers were taken out by...anything.  But for the purpose of this we'll say I am the 1 Cdn Div Comd, crap, I just can't land even a Herc in Summerside, or Chtown.  Damn, looks like those folks who fly things like Hercs and C-17s are going to have to airdrop stuff.  Anywhere they want to (zero threat environment, no concern for SAMs, etc, right?).



Globemaster requires 3,000 feet with a 160,000 lbs load. Landing distance for a Herc (numbers vary) at a weight of 130,000 lbs is 2,300 feet, for the C-130E. I couldn't find landing specs for the C-130J.

Charlottetown Airport runways are 5- and 7,000 feet respectively, and it was announced just last month the second runway would get a 2,000 foot extension.

Ye Olde CFB Summerside has three runways (only two are - somewhat - maintained), the longest of which is 8,000ft. And Hercs have landed there a number of times, including last year's Air Show at the old base airport.

I'm not disputing some of your other points. Our lack of vehs is PRes-wide, not just affecting the Sigs in Brighton and PEIR. We can shake the tree as much as we like, and our COs can raise (polite) hell up the chain. Until someone higher realizes we are at a critical point CAF wide in terms of vehs and equipment, it's not going to be pretty when something "Day After Tomorrow" DOES happen.

Or, hell, we'll just show up in our pj's and wait for the civies to dig us out, too.


----------



## George Wallace

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.



Empires.  Once someone has created an Empire or Empires, it is hard to get rid of it/them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Empires.  Once someone has created an Empire or Empires, it is hard to get rid of it/them.



You mean, like, 'Ottoman Empires', right?


----------



## blackberet17

(says the guy who hasn't missed a TBG ex in five years...)


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.



We do love our interlocking, interwoven, and interjumbled organizational structures....so there's that.   [

But seriously, the reason we have TBGs is that the government directed that we establish them, though they never took the form of the 100 RegF and 300 PRes pers originally specified.  It would be an interesting case study to follow the Government-CAF-DND communications loops to see how that concept evolved.  A bizarre concept developed with little to no stakeholder engagement, directed by the government of the day, but not tied to any resource envelope, and then not implemented...  

However, I will go the other way with this. One useful byproduct of the TBG system is that we created set of units that actually look like real units with crazy things like multiple sub-units, BHQs supported by Sigs Pls, and Admin Coys.  To me, that structure looks a lot more viable than our current "core" structure of 100+ embryonic units organized into 10 tiny CBGs.  Why would we reach into a PRes Svc Bn to generate an Admin Coy when we could just build an organic Admin Coy?  If that was our core structure, we could assign the TBG tasks to those units on a rotating basis (like the IRU), or maybe the DOMOPs task is just a standing task for all of the PRes battalions with a uniform level of readiness across the board. 

What I would much prefer to see would be 12-15 PRes combined arms battalions organized into 3-5 Brigades. If we moved the BTLs into depots as others have suggested here, leaving only trained pers in the battalions, I see no reason why you couldn't/wouldn't consistently field a 400 pers unit for DOMOPS and CT if the "effective" strength of the unit was 8-900.  

Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> We do love our interlocking, interwoven, and interjumbled organizational structures....so there's that.   [
> 
> But seriously, the reason we have TBGs is that the government directed that we establish them, though they never took the form of the 100 RegF and 300 PRes pers originally specified.  It would be interesting to follow the communications chain to see how that concept evolved.
> 
> However, I will go the other way with this. One useful byproduct of the TBG system is that we created set of units that actually look like real units with crazy things like multiple sub-units, BHQs supported by Sigs Pls, and Admin Coys.  To me, that structure looks a lot more viable than our current "core" structure of 100+ embryonic units organized into 10 tiny CBGs.  Why would we reach into a PRes Svc Bn to generate an Admin Coy when we could just build an organic Admin Coy?  If that was our core structure, we could assign the TBG tasks to those units on a rotating basis (like the IRU), or maybe the DOMOPs task is just a standing task for all of the PRes battalions with a uniform level of readiness across the board.
> 
> What I would much prefer to see would be 12-15 PRes combined arms battalions organized into 3-5 Brigades. If we moved the BTLs into depots as others have suggested here, leaving only trained pers in the battalions, I see no reason why you couldn't/wouldn't consistently field a 400 pers unit for DOMOPS and CT if the "effective" strength of the unit was 8-900.
> 
> Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.



Well, if we want to simplify and allocate resources to our 'main effort' then I think they are eating some of our lunch right now, and making our focus fuzzy.


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well, if we want to simplify and allocate resources to our 'main effort' then I think they are eating some of our lunch right now, and making our focus fuzzy.



Sorry, who's eating our lunch?  Its almost lunchtime in AB and I'm getting peckish  8)


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Sorry, who's eating our lunch?  Its almost lunchtime in AB and I'm getting peckish  8)



Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!

As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources. AKA 'Our Lunch'.

It seems like it's a nice little club though what with all the junkets, TD, photo ops, and big SUV rentals


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!



You mean the ones raised humanely in the US  ???  [lol:


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!
> 
> As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources. AKA 'Our Lunch'.
> 
> It seems like it's a nice little club though what with all the junkets, TD, photo ops, and big SUV rentals



The hardest part of living in Calgary is getting sick of steak...just kidding that doesn't happen  ;D

It seems like every location has implemented the TBG differently. Some establish separate structures and troops, others use it as their primary vehicle for delivering CT.  

For us, the tasks are farmed out to each unit.  For example, the Calg Highrs provide 2 x Pl and a DRC Coy HQ. 41 Sigs provides the Sigs Pl, and (because it is their turn in the rotation), the TBG Comd and staff.  In that way, 41 TBG is really just all of the operational elements in 41 CBG.  The downside of this approach is that it if taken seriously it is a lot of work for the lead unit for that year.  The upside is that it really prevents the empire building.  Fortunately, the (with the exception of the signalers) the TBG validation doesn't really reach below the sub-unit command teams. It is more of a leadership and time distraction for us than a resource distraction preventing us from training soldiers.


----------



## McG

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> It seems like every location has implemented the TBG differently. Some establish separate structures and troops, others use it as their primary vehicle for delivering CT.


I can't find any established TBG doing a quick search in DHRIM down to the unit level.  Is it that some brigades task units to fill elements of the TBG while other brigades expropriate positions from units to create the illusion of a dedicated organization, or is something else being done to make these things exist?



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources.


But, are the TBGs a parasite on the backs of units or is the problem the extraneous unit HQs between the TBG and the necessary sub-units?

Right now, the generic PRes unit establishment is one mission sub-unit, one training sub-unit and (occasionally) a band all under a Bn/Regt HQ (you can check your own establishment on DHRIM and it will most likely fit this model).  Often times, the training sub-unit HQ is used to man a second mission sub-unit HQ in some healthier units or units with multiple parading locations.

One could put the RSS and Cl B positions into the mission sub-units then strip away everything less the mission sub-units.  Next, elevate these sub-units to unit status with majors as COs.  Create (and establish) a formation with an HQ that is structured like a Bn HQ (... let's call it a TBG HQ), and place all the Coy/Sqn/Bty units into the formation.  Use positions from the various training sub-units to create a territorial training group (or territorial depot).  Bands (where they exist) could continue to exist as a platoon of the mission Coys/Sqns, or they could be rolled together as platoons of a territorial band (or they could be shut-down and the positions harvested for riflemen).  Finally, any leftover positions are reinvested into the companies, squadrons, batteries and TBG HQ.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Globemaster requires 3,000 feet with a 160,000 lbs load. Landing distance for a Herc (numbers vary) at a weight of 130,000 lbs is 2,300 feet, for the C-130E. I couldn't find landing specs for the C-130J.
> 
> Charlottetown Airport runways are 5- and 7,000 feet respectively, and it was announced just last month the second runway would get a 2,000 foot extension.
> 
> Ye Olde CFB Summerside has three runways (only two are - somewhat - maintained), the longest of which is 8,000ft. And Hercs have landed there a number of times, including last year's Air Show at the old base airport.
> 
> I'm not disputing some of your other points. Our lack of vehs is PRes-wide, not just affecting the Sigs in Brighton and PEIR. We can shake the tree as much as we like, and our COs can raise (polite) hell up the chain. Until someone higher realizes we are at a critical point CAF wide in terms of vehs and equipment, it's not going to be pretty when something "Day After Tomorrow" DOES happen.
> 
> Or, hell, we'll just show up in our pj's and wait for the civies to dig us out, too.



Don't get me wrong.  I know there is lots of willingness and desire; heck we used to plan for 'aid to the civil power' stuff *just in case*.  There was one time it did actually happen.  There was a murder in western Prince (Richmond area...) that they couldn't locate the person or body.  CAF assistance was requested - not 1 person from either Sqn was asked to 'assist' (it was primarily a Coy from 2RCR who came) in the ground search.  Never mind, exactly like you pointed out, local PRES types grew up, lived and resided in that area and knew the place and people like the back of their hand.  

Juan (OP Splinter, as it was called...);  I watched that one and the politics between DEUs and components play out.  

I get the loyalty, willingness, desire part.  There is a 'XVII' included in my 1/4 sleeve tattoo.


----------



## RCPalmer

MCG said:
			
		

> I can't find any established TBG doing a quick search in DHRIM down to the unit level.  Is it that some brigades task units to fill elements of the TBG while other brigades expropriate positions from units to create the illusion of a dedicated organization, or is something else being done to make these things exist?
> But, are the TBGs a parasite on the backs of units or is the problem the extraneous unit HQs between the TBG and the necessary sub-units?
> 
> Right now, the generic PRes unit establishment is one mission sub-unit, one training sub-unit and (occasionally) a band all under a Bn/Regt HQ (you can check your own establishment on DHRIM and it will most likely fit this model).  Often times, the training sub-unit HQ is used to man a second mission sub-unit HQ in some healthier units or units with multiple parading locations.
> 
> One could put the RSS and Cl B positions into the mission sub-units then strip away everything less the mission sub-units.  Next, elevate these sub-units to unit status with majors as COs.  Create (and establish) a formation with an HQ that is structured like a Bn HQ (... let's call it a TBG HQ), and place all the Coy/Sqn/Bty units into the formation.  Use positions from the various training sub-units to create a territorial training group (or territorial depot).  Bands (where they exist) could continue to exist as a platoon of the mission Coys/Sqns, or they could be rolled together as platoons of a territorial band (or they could be shut-down and the positions harvested for riflemen).  Finally, any leftover positions are reinvested into the companies, squadrons, batteries and TBG HQ.



I can only speak from perspective of a unit level Ops O and Coy OC (so I don't know all of the backroom stuff), but in 41 CBG it was all CFTPO tasks to units, and all of the pers would remain on the unit's manning reports. For a while we only populated the positions based on our tasks down to the MCpl level on an ongoing basis, but I think there was a move afoot to force units to continuously populate every position.  Either way, once a DOMOP started, the CFTPPO build would be updated to reflect who actually showed up.  

I think we are of the same mind with regards to the nuts and bolts of restructuring.  What was your rationale in making each company a CF unit with its own CO, UIC, etc. instead of a sub-unit of a TBG/Bn with an OC? 

I would also offer that we would likely still need a few (3-5) CBG HQs to address span of control matters.


----------



## McG

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I think we are of the same mind with regards to the nuts and bolts of restructuring.  What was your rationale in making each company a CF unit with its own CO, UIC, etc. instead of a sub-unit of a TBG/Bn with an OC?


There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).


----------



## RCPalmer

MCG said:
			
		

> There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).



Absolutely.  I see your point.  The counterpoint to consider is authority and responsibility often also brings with it a significant time commitment. In the current construct, even with full-time staff support, a CO needs to parade around 100 days a year to be effective (and I realize that is because we try to try to apply a RegF administrative model to the PRes).  I see no reason why a Maj or Capt couldn't be a CO, but I would rather have them focus on training their soldiers instead of worrying about the budget, acting as the IA on grievances, stickhandling AR(MEL) matters, etc.


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).



One would think the rank would scale to the size of an organization, a smaller PRes unit would maybe have a CO who is a captain, but then after a few years their membership adds a second Coy maybe so making that CO a major would then be warrented, not say have a LCol for 120 reservists


----------



## daftandbarmy

IMHO the TBG is primarily a Domops 'task' that can be assigned to units to lead on a rotational basis in an annual set of orders from the Bde Comd. Call it what it is: a Domops Response Lead Unit Tasking.

A few extra resources and Bde assets can be realigned to help out the lead unit, you know, like we practice all the time (I hope) already in other parts of our business. Sigs and Log orgs are already really good at figuring out how to realign to major units to make this work.

It doesn't need to add all the complexity of CFTPO tasking and all the other administrivia that accrues to these politically driven shadow units, does it?

Really, I'm no expert, so help me out here.


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> IMHO the TBG is primarily a Domops 'task' that can be assigned to units to lead on a rotational basis in an annual set of orders from the Bde Comd. Call it what it is: a Domops Response Lead Unit Tasking.
> 
> A few extra resources and Bde assets can be realigned to help out the lead unit, you know, like we practice all the time (I hope) already in other parts of our business. Sigs and Log orgs are already really good at figuring out how to realign to major units to make this work.
> 
> It doesn't need to add all the complexity of CFTPO tasking and all the other administrivia that accrues to these politically driven shadow units, does it?
> 
> Really, I'm no expert, so help me out here.



We can always make it work, it just isn't very efficient.

My point is that we don't really need 2 structures at all, and that if we are going to ditch a structure, it should be the less functional one, which in my opinion is the completely unsustainable 110 unit/10 CBG model we currently have.  If we were permanently organized into real battalions with the host of capabilities that should organically reside in a battalion (which might look a lot like TBGs) we would be in a much better position for CT and DOMOP.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

One option for some Pres armour units would to be driver/crew commanders for APC. You could build a basic or training APC off a commercial truck chassis, even using soft steel and pres armour would maintain and provide vehicle and crew to support the infantry. For the time being could start with trucks with a hatch and gun ring to start practicing the techniques. Hell I bet the US be happy to sell us cheaply a whole bunch MRAPs  [
For the button and bows brigade their is even historical use of armour to provide infantry transport that they can make a fuss about.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.



Mortar platoons? Those don't even exist in regular force infantry battalions.... If there is no means of calling out the so called "core battalions" than what purpose does having it fully fleshed out if it can't deploy and only needs to do one for one augmentation of the reg force? Why do we need 10 CBGs worth of "core battalions" to provide one for one augmentation for 9 regular battalions?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Colin P said:
			
		

> One option for some Pres armour units would to be driver/crew commanders for APC. You could build a basic or training APC off a commercial truck chassis, even using soft steel and pres armour would maintain and provide vehicle and crew to support the infantry. For the time being could start with trucks with a hatch and gun ring to start practicing the techniques. Hell I bet the US be happy to sell us cheaply a whole bunch MRAPs  [
> For the button and bows brigade their is even historical use of armour to provide infantry transport that they can make a fuss about.









And, in my opinion, a fairly shittty mud recce veh.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I was thinking more of APC's that move the infantry around and practice some of the techniques, sort of a Saxon like vehicle.


----------



## RCPalmer

Colin P said:
			
		

> I was thinking more of APC's that move the infantry around and practice some of the techniques, sort of a Saxon like vehicle.



Yep, the Aussies have wholesale converted their Army Reserve Armored Recce units to Bushmaster APV crew units.  In many ways, the Bushmaster would have been a good TAPV alternative.  Decent mobility and protection with the ability to carry a full infantry section:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushmaster_Protected_Mobility_Vehicle 

It wouldn't have been a particularly good recce vehicle, but probably no worse than TAPV.  

From a doctrinal standpoint, this dovetails quite nicely with the ACR concept they employ in their regular army.  All of the Infantry battalions are light, but each brigade maintains an ACR which includes about a battalion's worth of LAV and M113 based lift mannned by armored crewmen.


----------



## RCPalmer

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Mortar platoons? Those don't even exist in regular force infantry battalions.... If there is no means of calling out the so called "core battalions" than what purpose does having it fully fleshed out if it can't deploy and only needs to do one for one augmentation of the reg force? Why do we need 10 CBGs worth of "core battalions" to provide one for one augmentation for 9 regular battalions?



Except that the 81mm conversion has already started, and will only accelerate as the C3 fleet dies out.  Are you saying that we can't generate a dozen mortar platoons out of the strength of 20+ PRes Arty regiments and independent batteries?  The Australian Army Reserve has already converted all of their Arty units to mortar platoons for virtually the same reasons we would. The lack of a gun for the PRes to train on will also have implications for individual augmentation of RegF Arty batteries, so I think that this is a good role, and quite realistic given current realities. 

You keep stating that the only role of the PRes is 1 to 1 augmentation of the RegF, but repetition doesn't make it any more true. That statement is incorrect in terms of the experience of the last 20 years which includes multiple Pl and Coy level reserve deployments in expeditionary operations, and several Bn/TF level deployments in domestic operations.  It is also incorrect with regards to the Army's Force Employment Concept, manifested most recently in Waypoint 2018, which solidifies the role of Bn sized PRes elements for DOMOPS and up to company level for expeditionary ops.  

If the PRes is going to train above IBTS, and our mandate requires that we do, we need units to train in. To train at Pl level we need a Coy HQ , and to train at Coy level we need a Bn HQ, etc. All I am advocating is that we move away from our current unsustainable model of 120+ hollow PRes battalions and 10 small CBGs to 12-15 real PRes battalions in 3-5 CBGs.  This would allow us to reinvest a considerable portion of our existing institutional overhead in real capabilities that would be of benefit to the individual augmentation mandate as much as the others.  

An element of mandatory service would have a lot of advantages, but unless the government makes the call we aren't going to get it.  Are you saying that we shouldn't bother making any reforms within the (surprisingly successful) volunteer model we do have?


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> An element of mandatory service would have a lot of advantages, but unless the government makes the call we aren't going to get it.  Are you saying that we shouldn't bother making any reforms within the (surprisingly successful) volunteer model we do have?



If we fix it so that it doesn't take a year for a soldier to join a part time outfit, as I have seen happen more than once, that would be the kind of transformation we should start with IMHO


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If we fix it so that it doesn't take a year for a soldier to join a part time outfit, as I have seen happen more than once, that would be the kind of transformation we should start with IMHO



Absolutely. Unfortunately everything I have seen with regards to the recruiting SLA to move to 60-90 day processing is that it is not going well...


----------



## RedcapCrusader

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If we fix it so that it doesn't take a year for a soldier to join a part time outfit, as I have seen happen more than once, that would be the kind of transformation we should start with IMHO



It's getting there, in the good ol' Calgary, I think we've managed to get it down to 7 months.

It will get there.


----------



## MilEME09

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> If the PRes is going to train above IBTS, and our mandate requires that we do, we need units to train in. To train at Pl level we need a Coy HQ , and to train at Coy level we need a Bn HQ, etc. All I am advocating is that we move away from our current unsustainable model of 120+ hollow PRes battalions and 10 small CBGs to 12-15 real PRes battalions in 3-5 CBGs.  This would allow us to reinvest a considerable portion of our existing institutional overhead in real capabilities that would be of benefit to the individual augmentation mandate as much as the others.



I think such a model could work, but I would stress that the CO of such battalions and CBG's could be in any of the locations of said formations, to not produce geographical favoritism. I mean if I joined as a NCM in Windsor, but got told I'd never be RSM because I don't' live in Toronto, i'd say that's retarded.


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think such a model could work, but I would stress that the CO of such battalions and CBG's could be in any of the locations of said formations, to not produce geographical favoritism.



Every now and then the Reserve Force gets going on a remote workforce travel policy -- and then it kind of stalls out. I'm pretty sure that the current commander of 38 Brigade lives in Thunder Bay (while his HQ is in Winnipeg) -- but that's the only example that I'm aware of. I don't think that 6 Int Coy has ever generated a CO from one of the dispersed platoons in Vancouver or Winnipeg. How are things going in 37 Brigade? They've been doing the split unit thing with 37 Sig Regt and 37 CER -- both units have elements in both NB and Newfoundland. Is it a success story and the way ahead? Or is separating sub-units by 1000km and half a time zone too much of a burden?


----------



## MilEME09

Can't talk about them but my unit has the CO in calgary with the RSM in Edmonton, always has been that way, it is possible we could switch, but lets just say suitable candidates aren't around for a switch to happen, in both cases.


----------



## RocketRichard

LunchMeat said:
			
		

> It's getting there, in the good ol' Calgary, I think we've managed to get it down to 7 months.
> 
> It will get there.


The latest enrolment ceremony of 10 or so in YYC included individuals that started the process 8 months ago to well over a year. Let's keep working on this to get better.


----------



## dapaterson

There are numerous units with geographical dispersion - a few examples include 34 CER in Montreal and Rouyn-Noranda; 38 Svc Bn covers three provinces; 39 Svc Bn has Juan de Fuca between its subunits; 33 Svc Bn is spread over 800kms.

The challenge in time & space for C2 should be a planning consideration when identifying groupings.  If we assume that Reserve units will be commanded by Reservists, who have other full-time employment, then the geographic area that their unit spans has to be a reasonable space for them to be able to see their soldiers.  Otherwise there is risk that qualified and desirable individuals will be unable to command.


----------



## RCPalmer

LunchMeat said:
			
		

> It's getting there, in the good ol' Calgary, I think we've managed to get it down to 7 months.
> 
> It will get there.



That is still 3 times what the CDS has directed (60-90 days).  If the average processing time is 6 months (which is what it was for my unit's applicant's over the last FY), half of the successful applicants are still being processed in a longer time period.  Additionally, that doesn't count the unsuccessful applicants. Those who are processed for a period of time and are not successful, or give up are also an important demographic to consider.  In the case of those who give up, they represent a lost opportunity and wasted unit attraction efforts.


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are numerous units with geographical dispersion - a few examples include 34 CER in Montreal and Rouyn-Noranda; 38 Svc Bn covers three provinces; 39 Svc Bn has Juan de Fuca between its subunits; 33 Svc Bn is spread over 800kms.
> 
> The challenge in time & space for C2 should be a planning consideration when identifying groupings.  If we assume that Reserve units will be commanded by Reservists, who have other full-time employment, then the geographic area that their unit spans has to be a reasonable space for them to be able to see their soldiers.  Otherwise there is risk that qualified and desirable individuals will be unable to command.



The British Army Reserve takes it a step further.  Virtually all of their units are split across multiple armories, often in the Coy or Pl sized elements, and they have a number of "national" units.  4 Para for example, is split across 9 armories in England and Scotland.  The C2 implications are definitely a consideration, and the British geography creates a different dynamic in terms of travel time, but splitting in this way creates some opportunities to broaden occupational choices, particularly in smaller communities.  I think it makes sense as long as we go where the people are.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The British Army Reserve takes it a step further.  Virtually all of their units are split across multiple armories, often in the Coy or Pl sized elements, and they have a number of "national" units.  4 Para for example, is split across 9 armories in England and Scotland.  The C2 implications are definitely a consideration, and the British geography creates a different dynamic in terms of travel time, but splitting in this way creates some opportunities to broaden occupational choices, particularly in smaller communities.  I think it makes sense as long as we go where the people are.



And, although things may have changed, as I recall, the TA have about 10 times the Reg F support per unit than we have, including a full training team of SNCOs and support staff, drivers etc, usually headed up by a 'Training Major' (a job that I narrowly dodged at one point .... whew  )


----------



## dapaterson

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> If the average processing time is 6 months (which is what it was for my unit's applicant's over the last FY), half of the successful applicants are still being processed in a longer time period.



No.  Average usually refers to arithmetic mean, not median.  For example, if enrolment times were 2, 2, 2, 3 and 16 months, then the average is 5 months, but 80% of applicants were below average in time. (EDIT: See http://www.purplemath.com/modules/meanmode.htm)

(Not to say that work isn't necessary to shorten recruiting times).


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  Average usually refers to arithmetic mean, not median.  For example, if enrolment times were 2, 2, 2, 3 and 16 months, then the average is 5 months, but 80% of applicants were below average in time. (EDIT: See http://www.purplemath.com/modules/meanmode.htm)
> 
> (Not to say that work isn't necessary to shorten recruiting times).



Well, you've got me on my arts major math.   

To provide some context, our fastest processing time (for enrolled applicants) was 4 months and the longest 11, but most applicants were clustered pretty tightly around the 6 month mark.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  Average usually refers to arithmetic mean, not median.  For example, if enrolment times were 2, 2, 2, 3 and 16 months, then the average is 5 months, but 80% of applicants were below average in time. (EDIT: See http://www.purplemath.com/modules/meanmode.htm)
> 
> (Not to say that work isn't necessary to shorten recruiting times).



And to complete the pedantic trifecta the mode is 2.


----------



## blackberet17

36 Bde has the Bde Comd from Nova Scotia Highlanders, while the Bde SM is PEIR.

My enrolment from the time I dropped off the papers to swearing in was just over three months.

These days, it's a year. We were able to squeeze a couple new enlistments in, in under five months, to be on the latest BMQ.

But the ones we've lost over the last three years just because they waited too long, and found other employment...



_edited to correct Bde Comd's home unit. Thanks to Harris for letting me know._


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Yup, all these computers and programs sure have helped make us more efficient!   ^-^


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Yup, all these computers and programs sure have helped make us more efficient!   ^-^



Don't mock, EITS!  I am sure the Army, like every other organization is now much more efficient at killing trees and sequestring carbon in filing cabinets.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The things we did back in the day when Op's tasked, moving a battery to Shilo from Vancouver for a shoot, without much in the way of computers I might add.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

OBVIOUSLY staged;  how could that have happened without a 99 slide Powerpoint to detail everything out, use buzzwords and all the important stuff?

What...did you just use, you know...a basic orders format with, timings and all that on it?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> What...did you just use, you know...a basic orders format with, timings and all that on it?


And maybe even a bit of carbon paper here and there as well ...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> And maybe even a bit of carbon paper here and there as well ...



If only they would have supplied that somewhere convenient...like the back of the pad you used in the field for messages!   :blotto:

Oh, I miss the days when the runner (usually the Tp Ldr's dvr) would go from callsign to callsign in the hide, with a copy of the Warning Order...which you would read, copy the important parts into your FMP and then initial that you'd read it.  Back in the day when, people actually talked to each other and stuff...


----------



## The Bread Guy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> If only they would have supplied that somewhere convenient...like the back of the pad you used in the field for messages!   :blotto:
> 
> Oh, I miss the days when the runner (usually the Tp Ldr's dvr) would go from callsign to callsign in the hide, with a copy of the Warning Order...which you would read, copy the important parts into your FMP and then initial that you'd read it.  Back in the day when, people actually talked to each other and stuff...


To sound truly old & crochety, however did the British/French/Belgian empires ever maintain their rule without email?


----------



## Kirkhill

Or consider the lot of poor Captain Cook, without benefit of supervisory assistance for three whole years!  Truly tragic.

And they forced him to do it two more times.


----------



## cavalryman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Or consider the lot of poor Captain Cook, without benefit of supervisory assistance for three whole years!  Truly tragic.
> 
> And they forced him to do it two more times.


With nary a Powerpoint briefing to be seen.

Sadly, these days, we're closer to the famously mangled Winston Churchill's quote.... _Never has so little been done by so many for so few _ [Xp


----------



## blackberet17

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> If only they would have supplied that somewhere convenient...like the back of the pad you used in the field for messages!   :blotto:
> 
> Oh, I miss the days when the runner (usually the Tp Ldr's dvr) would go from callsign to callsign in the hide, with a copy of the Warning Order...which you would read, copy the important parts into your FMP and then initial that you'd read it.  Back in the day when, people actually talked to each other and stuff...



Tp Ldr's dvr?! He should stay with the veh. Take the GIB, take the GIB! (or Golf's gnr  [Xp)

The pads still have carbon at the back...but it's not easy prying those from the hands of an RQ, they're expensive...


----------



## MilEME09

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Tp Ldr's dvr?! He should stay with the veh. Take the GIB, take the GIB! (or Golf's gnr  [Xp)
> 
> The pads still have carbon at the back...but it's not easy prying those from the hands of an RQ, they're expensive...



Given the reserves access to functioning radios, carbon paper and runners would probably be a step up


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> To sound truly old & crochety, however did the British/French/Belgian empires ever maintain their rule without email?



An unshakable faith in themselves, God and Country. In that order usually.

We Were Caesars, There Being No One to Contradict Us’

http://frontierpartisans.com/1369/we-were-caesars-there-being-no-one-to-contradict-us/


----------



## blackberet17

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Given the reserves access to functioning radios, carbon paper and runners would probably be a step up



Touché, my friend...touché.

We're down to two man packs...we started using Kenwoods the last ex...


----------



## MilEME09

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Touché, my friend...touché.
> 
> We're down to two man packs...we started using Kenwoods the last ex...



we've been using them for years since we've only had two radios, usually one in the CP the other in the wreaker, sometimes we get luck and other units loan us one or two. It's incredibly frustrating trying to do a tactical road move using kenwoods having to play telephone vehicle to vehicle for the convoy.


----------



## blackberet17

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> we've been using them for years since we've only had two radios, usually one in the CP the other in the wreaker, sometimes we get luck and other units loan us one or two. It's incredibly frustrating trying to do a tactical road move using kenwoods having to play telephone vehicle to vehicle for the convoy.



Yep.

We can manage on some road moves and short bounds with hand signals or head/brake lights...but we have left a GIB or two on the side of the road once or twice...

Another issue is OP's...a little difficult to report back when radios and field phones aren't available, and the cell phones die...


----------



## MilEME09

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Yep.
> 
> We can manage on some road moves and short bounds with hand signals or head/brake lights...but we have left a GIB or two on the side of the road once or twice...
> 
> Another issue is OP's...a little difficult to report back when radios and field phones aren't available, and the cell phones die...



Ah yes cell phones, PRes comms, I think i'll be making the carbon paper/runner recommendation to my chain, I found it sad on a EX I was on sentry and due to a small hill I couldn't communicate to the CP anyone else from my OP unless they were 50m away with a kenwood. Given our lack of working radios, the reserves really should invest in alternate comms, heck i've suggested using funds to buy better PRR's and a signal amp to hopefully create comms.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ah yes cell phones, PRes comms, I think i'll be making the carbon paper/runner recommendation to my chain, I found it sad on a EX I was on sentry and due to a small hill I couldn't communicate to the CP anyone else from my OP unless they were 50m away with a kenwood. Given our lack of working radios, the reserves really should invest in alternate comms, heck i've suggested using funds to buy better PRR's and a signal amp to hopefully create comms.



Or just dumb down training so that you only are able to achieve the standards seen in any paintball game.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Or just dumb down training so that you only are able to achieve the standards seen in any paintball game.



As high as that? Isn't that awefuly optimistic?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Tp Ldr's dvr?! He should stay with the veh. Take the GIB, take the GIB! (or Golf's gnr  [Xp)



No good A c/s is going to let the Troopie have a JAFO when the ptl's are short...which they always are!   :blotto:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

blackberet17 said:
			
		

> Yep.
> 
> We can manage on some road moves and short bounds with hand signals or head/brake lights...but we have left a GIB or two on the side of the road once or twice...
> 
> Another issue is OP's...a little difficult to report back when radios and field phones aren't available, and the cell phones die...



This should be an indicator of the exact role the GoC believes the Pres should have.  

No comms?  No orders?  No way to communicate?  Best thing to do...same as always...brew up and have a dart!

Seriously, if that is the state of affairs now, I honestly can't see how the unit (s) are retaining anyone.  If I was still doing that stuff, I dare say I'd find better things to do with my weekend than go on a Ex with no comms.  Whats the point?

Additionally, it seems to put an exclamation mark on this post I made earlier in the thread.  I'd bet a box of donut holes the PEIR also doesn't have the veh's (runners, not counting VORs) to man and equip a scaled down Troop if the SHTF.  We know the answer to that comm's side of the house already.

The PRES is in a shambles worse than it ever was.  Individually there are good troops, NCOs, WOs, Officer to be found.  But if a recce troop can't even communicate internally...boy things are rough.

The PRES had to become part of the solution for its own problems.  Amalgamate units and CBH HQs.  Maximize trg opportunities, share resources that are scarce.  I've said it before; there is ZERO requirement for 2 complete CBGs and HQs in 5 Div.  (Its not a Div...fuck me, but that's another a topic).  How much $ is being pissed away in Cl B/A wages?  Lots.  PEIR/8CH/Hfx Rifles together couldn't form a skeleton Regiment.  Amalgamate into one "Regiment", keep your cap badges.  3 Sqns with different cap badges form the "5 CBG Armour Regt" or whatever.  Stop wasting money flying your Bde SM from province to province.  If it were up to me, I'd likely have the Bde SM a Reg Force CWO;  I know what little _actual_ experience your current Bde SM has and have seen those types before during my time at a CBG HQ.  I also know 1 CWO at the HQ that has metric shit-tons of experience, Reg and Res, who SHOULD be the Bde SM.  The CBG HQ is a self licking lollipop in my experience.  I get it, people want to keep their jammy jobs.  Hard choices have to be made if the PRES is going to be anything more combat effective than the Cadet units in the same area.  It would piss off a lot of Career Cl B Commandos, and PRES MWOs/CWOs and Snr Officers who've been holding out for their turn in the wheelhouse;  it will also trim some of the fat, the most expensive fat at that.  

If the change doesn't come internally, then the big pants folks in Ottawa need to direct it.  

Otherwise, PRES cbt arms unit will be so far out of relevance and usefulness, they might as well just fold altogether and turn their PYs and $ into more Reg Force positions that can be used.

Kenwoods and personal cell phones.  Fuck me senseless.


----------



## Dissident

The succession planning is lacking in my reserve world. And by lacking, I mean non existent. What usually happens is that we get a "reserve" CSM, who inreality was a Reg F WO who released into the the PRes. (we've had 3-4 now). The problems are two folds: it makes my glass ceiling real low and even a good RegF WO has a hard time coming to terms with some of the PRes intricacies. This is not insurmountable, but it makes it hard to reach through to the chain when the final stop doesn't really understand where his troops are coming from. (Our problem is compounded as we are part of a RegF Regt.) Then as a motivated individual who has been trying to get varied experiences, chances are I still won't get a shot at CSM. A good friend has been a WO for 20+ years (currently working outside the unit) and he likely will never get promoted higher. Thankfully for me, my motivation is not rank/position based. But at some point you need new challenges.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Seriously, if that is the state of affairs now, I honestly can't see how the unit (s) are retaining anyone.  If I was still doing that stuff, I dare say I'd find better things to do with my weekend than go on a Ex with no comms.  Whats the point?



Because: why we fight.. and some other stuff

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHcJtU9dr6I

So don't get in our way, 'k?


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Because: why we fight.. and some other stuff
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHcJtU9dr6I



"We are told that the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for. Now, at least, he will know what he is fighting against.”

General Eisenhower


----------



## blackberet17

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'd bet a box of donut holes the PEIR also doesn't have the veh's (runners, not counting VORs) to man and equip a scaled down Troop if the SHTF.  We know the answer to that comm's side of the house already.



It would help if we ever saw our vehs again after a summer in Gagetown and Aldershot...but we've also discussed that point ad nauseum.



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> PEIR/8CH/Hfx Rifles together couldn't form a skeleton Regiment.  Amalgamate into one "Regiment", keep your cap badges.  3 Sqns with different cap badges form the "5 CBG Armour Regt" or whatever.



We train together two-three times a year as it is. But it doesn't solve the issues of lack of vehs, radios, etc.



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Stop wasting money flying your Bde SM from province to province.



Whoops.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ah yes cell phones, PRes comms, I think i'll be making the carbon paper/runner recommendation to my chain, I found it sad on a EX I was on sentry and due to a small hill I couldn't communicate to the CP anyone else from my OP unless they were 50m away with a kenwood. Given our lack of working radios, the reserves really should invest in alternate comms, heck i've suggested using funds to buy better PRR's and a signal amp to hopefully create comms.



There is a solution, likely will have to buy your own wire


----------



## Journeyman

.....and the RQ would go out and buy single-strand, being too young to know better.


----------



## MilEME09

I might be young, but I was still taught field phones and splicing wire on BMQ in 2010, unfortunately, we'd have to buy our own field phones too


----------



## cavalryman

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I might be young, but I was still taught field phones and splicing wire on BMQ in 2010, unfortunately, we'd have to buy our own field phones too


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tin_can_telephone


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I might be young, but I was still taught field phones and splicing wire on BMQ in 2010, unfortunately, we'd have to buy our own field phones too



Just looking on ebay and about $2,500 in Unit funds will buy you switchboard, wire and 8-10 phones


----------



## The Bread Guy

Colin P said:
			
		

> Just looking on ebay and about $2,500 in Unit funds will buy you switchboard, wire and 8-10 phones


If there was a CF crowdfunding hub like the Ukrainian military does, I'd donate ...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Might be enough to embarrass them into action if we did. Actually you could work it into the button and bows heritage scheme as many of the armouries were built by subscription and units raised with private funds.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Colin P said:
			
		

> Might be enough to embarrass them into action if we did. Actually you could work it into the button and bows heritage scheme as many of the armouries were built by subscription and units raised with private funds.


 >


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Might be enough to embarrass them into action if we did. Actually you could work it into the button and bows heritage scheme as many of the armouries were built by subscription and units raised with private funds.



Just make armoury maintenance a historic restoration project, then suddenly money will come


----------



## daftandbarmy

Excellent....



This interview is part of a project to interview army reservists in Alberta about their experiences on overseas deployments. CWO Chris Tucker (Calgary Highlanders) was a young Canadian army reservist when he served with the 3 PPCLI Battle Group on Op HARMONY in Croatia (1992-93). He describes their inadequate work-up training in Victoria and Wainwright, the shock of his first week in theatre ("This is not Cyprus"), assisting wounded civilians wounded in an ambush, and his muted homecoming in 1993. CWO Tucker is the regimental sergeant major of the Calgary Highlanders. He has completed four overseas deployments.




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBAR-dIpi60


----------



## rnkelly

Great interview, thanks for sharing!


----------



## MilEME09

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/christie-blatchford-canadas-ragged-reserves-have-too-few-vehicles-little-ammo-and-now-no-radios



> Christie Blatchford: Canada’s ragged reserves have too few vehicles, little ammo and now, no radios
> 
> Now, it’s radios that Canadian reserve units are expected to do without, probably until the summer of 2017.
> 
> The army recently took away the old radios because it’s replacing them, Postmedia sources say, but with the usual staggering incompetence, failed to synch the clawback with the acquisition of the new ones.
> 
> Ergo, no radios until July of next year.
> 
> Without radios, soldiers on training or exercise in the field won’t be able to communicate with one another, which rather defeats the ostensible goal of having part-time soldiers who are as well-trained as full-time or regular soldiers.
> 
> Mind you, that may matter less than it should because there are fewer and fewer such courses and exercises available to reserve soldiers anyway — even though such things are a draw and mean a paycheque for young men and women off from school for the summer.
> 
> As well, many units have fewer vehicles available to them because they’re either rusting out or unserviceable — or because mechanics can’t be trained because regulations decree that they can only trained by regular-force members and there aren’t enough of those around.
> 
> In other words, for Canada’s beleaguered militia — the 117 reserve units, many of them among the country’s oldest and most storied regiments, based in 130 cities and towns across the country — it is in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, deja vu all over again.
> 
> Most cruel is that the reserves are being deliberately starved and the culprit starving them is, as usual, the bureaucracy of the regular (or full-time) army itself.
> 
> But if the situation is dire, as reserve leaders say, it is also familiar.
> 
> The gutting of the militia is an old, familiar story. It always happens the same way.
> 
> First, reserve units have their quotas cut.
> 
> This last happened in 2010, when Brigadier-General John Collin, then the commander of Joint Task Force Central Area (this means Ontario) held a series of town hall meetings at which he said the army was looking to chop 5,000 reservists.
> 
> That’s pretty much what they’ve done.
> 
> As federal Auditor-General Michael Ferguson said in a spring report on the state of the army reserve, units have lost about 1,000 soldiers a year for several years, and instead of the 21,000 reservists the army purported to fund in its budget of last year, there were only 13,944.
> 
> Then, since recruiting is always laughably slow (last I looked, it took an average 180 days to enrol a soldier for a part-time job), the bodies coming in the door don’t begin to fill the holes left by those who are going out even by way of normal attrition.
> 
> Eventually, some of the regiments either run out of bullets (seriously, that happened once, years ago) or courses to send their soldiers on or leaders to run them, and someone like me writes about it, at which point, government and regular army folks who control the purse strings for the reserves deny or minimize the crisis, swear there’s nothing to see here, and move on.
> 
> And while governments have been more or less inept or uninterested, the problem is not one created by politicians; rather, by craven officials in the regular army who see any increase in militia size or power as a threat and who even get away with ignoring the will of the government of the day.
> 
> The previous Conservative government, for instance, promised to increase the reserves by 10,000, reneged on that promise, then slashed reserve pay budgets and made things worse. Then-defence minister Peter MacKay ordered his department to develop policies to stop militia paycheques being used for other purposes, but never got an answer, let alone a result.
> 
> As the military scholar Jack English wrote in a scathing report several years ago, for the military, compliance with government orders has come to be seen as a voluntary matter.
> 
> Ten years ago, the Canadian army, in the form of Task Force Orion in Kandahar — the core regiment the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, but with plenty of reservists too — was on the ground in Afghanistan.
> 
> That wonderfully nimble battle group, headed by then-Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, was punching way above its weight and about to suffer some of its most significant losses.
> 
> And a century ago, on July 1, in the village of Beaumont-Hamel, France, 700 members of the First Newfoundland Regiment were being slaughtered in the first phase of the Battle of the Somme.
> 
> Yet with these two historic events on the military calendar, one modern and one from the First World War, the biggest mission on the Canadian Forces’ radar today is Op Honour, the purported “fight” against harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour in the military.
> 
> How very sad that this army — under-led, over-managed and risk-averse as it is — may just be up for that fearsome task.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/christie-blatchford-canadas-ragged-reserves-have-too-few-vehicles-little-ammo-and-now-no-radios



I will agree with the Ammo part, however Vehicle and Radio complaints maybe be regional issue. 

We have radios out West, they're the old 522 Manpacks,  heavy as shit and don't work 90% of the time, but we have them. 

Vehicles, again, we're losing more and more vehicles. Vics are either not being repaired because of parts shortages or are being taken out of service due to age,  irreparable issues, and lack of parts but I wouldn't say we have too few vehicles. 

Last maneuver I was on, we were short drivers and gunners and had to actually park vehicles. Weird.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ah yes cell phones, PRes comms, I think i'll be making the carbon paper/runner recommendation to my chain, I found it sad on a EX I was on sentry and due to a small hill I couldn't communicate to the CP anyone else from my OP unless they were 50m away with a kenwood. Given our lack of working radios, the reserves really should invest in alternate comms, heck i've suggested using funds to buy better PRR's and a signal amp to hopefully create comms.



Good god if only we did our training in areas with cell coverage, we'd actually be able to communicate. 

Even the Sigs only brought enough Motorola PTTs for HQ elements (who demanded to have the radios, even though they never left the Ops Centre), the 4 Manpacks that were brought out weren't vetted and turned out to be paperweights. 

When our Op Tempo/Force Pro Condition changed, we wouldn't know until we got back to the FOB, met by a screaming RSM demanding we bloused our trousers, and then jacked up our convoy for only being in combats with bush cap vice the now-required FFO with helmet carried. 

Sometimes, our army really makes me mad and I question why I still put myself through the suffering.


----------



## MilEME09

LunchMeat said:
			
		

> Good god if only we did our training in areas with cell coverage, we'd actually be able to communicate.
> 
> Even the Sigs only brought enough Motorola PTTs for HQ elements (who demanded to have the radios, even though they never left the Ops Centre), the 4 Manpacks that were brought out weren't vetted and turned out to be paperweights.
> 
> When our Op Tempo/Force Pro Condition changed, we wouldn't know until we got back to the FOB, met by a screaming RSM demanding we bloused our trousers, and then jacked up our convoy for only being in combats with bush cap vice the now-required FFO with helmet carried.
> 
> Sometimes, our army really makes me mad and I question why I still put myself through the suffering.



I went on an EX a few months ago where we were actually told we were not to take radios in the convoy, this EX was using simunition through built up areas. Now try communicating your lead vehicle was just taken out by OPFOR safely without radios


----------



## PuckChaser

How are you going to communicate with that lead vehicle if a near-peer (or tech savvy) enemy is jamming your command net in the same ambush?

Yes, not having radios for exercises sucks. In that same notion, think outside the box and work to solve the issue. Maybe you develop a new TTP with hand signals or vehicle horn signals to indicate certain things after contact? Combat isn't a perfect world where everything is going to work electronically for you. I've seen the TCCCS radios reset mid convoy in a really sketchy area, but other than having my GIB work the problem, I knew what to do if certain things happened, because we rehearsed actions on.


----------



## MilEME09

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> How are you going to communicate with that lead vehicle if a near-peer (or tech savvy) enemy is jamming your command net in the same ambush?
> 
> Yes, not having radios for exercises sucks. In that same notion, think outside the box and work to solve the issue. Maybe you develop a new TTP with hand signals or vehicle horn signals to indicate certain things after contact? Combat isn't a perfect world where everything is going to work electronically for you. I've seen the TCCCS radios reset mid convoy in a really sketchy area, but other than having my GIB work the problem, I knew what to do if certain things happened, because we rehearsed actions on.



Tried to horn thing, was told in a not so pleasent way it was bad noise discipline in a tactical environment, and I am not even going to start on hand signals cause that is a loosing battle i've been fighting. To sum it up radios are broken, troops are trying to create a solution, COC says no in one way or another


----------



## PuckChaser

If you're in a TIC and your CoC is worrying about noise discipline, they've not paid attention to any military training, ever. Hand signals are taught on the AVCC course, you can find that on the CTC website and print it out.

I believe there is a project ongoing to give the PRes Motorola Astro 2500s as a stop gap, perfect for training but not deployable. They're a decent radio, with comparable range to a 522 manpack.


----------



## daftandbarmy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> If you're in a TIC and your CoC is worrying about noise discipline, they've not paid attention to any military training, ever. Hand signals are taught on the AVCC course, you can find that on the CTC website and print it out.
> 
> I believe there is a project ongoing to give the PRes Motorola Astro 2500s as a stop gap, perfect for training but not deployable. They're a decent radio, with comparable range to a 522 manpack.



The Yanks use these. They are excellent. Why don't we buy some off of them (and tell everyone they were made in PQ)? 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/PRC-117F


----------



## dapaterson

Because the moment we buy a radio with crypto, CSE is part of the process, and they are concerned with managing crypto through its lifecycle.  Which takes time, and is not necessarily as responsive as one might like.

(Plus, the Army decided to spend lots of money on vehicles for which the necessity has yet to be determined - imagine if the Army had sunk that kind of money into acquiring radios instead.  But the Army has huge blinders on anything "support", so radios, logistics and support vehicles, and anything like that goes far down the list after mistakes like the TAPV).

Plus, since the device includes encryption, and is from an American supplier, the US will enforce more wonderful restrictions on their use, storage and training.  Remember the Controlled Goods and Security Awareness training?  Add several levels of crap to that.

For the CAF for routine admin and DomOps there's no need for complex radios, no need for encryption (at least, not on the radio).  KISS.


----------



## PuckChaser

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The Yanks use these. They are excellent. Why don't we buy some off of them (and tell everyone they were made in PQ)?
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/PRC-117F



Depending on your options, a AN/PRC 117F is upwards of $30k USD each, as it's a multiband radio and those are inherently more expensive. I also don't think they're making many 117Fs anymore, as that's a plenty old radio (by technology terms), and a quick look at the Harris website doesn't show it on there anymore.

DAP brings up some good points, any US radio (or Canadian radio with US crypto because we don't have our own Type 1 industry here) is subject to their ITAR regulations as well as our CTAT rules. Take the US crypto rules, throw CSE's 2 cents in making it more restricted use, and you have a whole hockeysock full of problems to deal with. You also are not allowed to have Cl A pers as COMSEC custodians in an account, so either you dual-hat each of the unit's limited pers as the custodian, or you don't get the radios. The 117F isn't handled through the CF Supply System like a 522, its a CCI item and handled like any other crypto, we got a temp-loan at my old unit a few years ago, and its not as easy as just signing a 638 for it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Depending on your options, a AN/PRC 117F is upwards of $30k USD each, as it's a multiband radio and those are inherently more expensive. I also don't think they're making many 117Fs anymore, as that's a plenty old radio (by technology terms), and a quick look at the Harris website doesn't show it on there anymore.
> 
> DAP brings up some good points, any US radio (or Canadian radio with US crypto because we don't have our own Type 1 industry here) is subject to their ITAR regulations as well as our CTAT rules. Take the US crypto rules, throw CSE's 2 cents in making it more restricted use, and you have a whole hockeysock full of problems to deal with. You also are not allowed to have Cl A pers as COMSEC custodians in an account, so either you dual-hat each of the unit's limited pers as the custodian, or you don't get the radios. The 117F isn't handled through the CF Supply System like a 522, its a CCI item and handled like any other crypto, we got a temp-loan at my old unit a few years ago, and its not as easy as just signing a 638 for it.



I'd just like to see a man pack radio that is actually lighter than the one it supercedes... for a change.


----------



## Dissident

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (Plus, the Army decided to spend lots of money on vehicles for which the necessity has yet to be determined - imagine if the Army had sunk that kind of money into acquiring radios instead.  But the Army has huge blinders on anything "support", so radios, logistics and support vehicles, and anything like that goes far down the list after mistakes like the TAPV).



Or anything for fighting in low light. I'm deployed and finally was issued a set of PVS-14 (basically brand new!) and a PEQ-2, then later a PEQ-4 (meh). Previously the only other time I even came close to NVGs was a famil on basic training, with a burnt out tube PVS-14, in 2003. I know the the RegF side has the same problem/shortcoming, so this isn't just a PRes issue. For a modern army, this is underwhelming.


----------



## PuckChaser

They exist, the stopgap measure for the idiots who didn't plan for having manpacks when they made all 522s into vehicle only radios should be the 152/152A. It won't be in massive numbers, but that radio is basically the same size and weight as a LAR (521), but it actually works.


----------



## LightFighter

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The Yanks use these. They are excellent. Why don't we buy some off of them (and tell everyone they were made in PQ)?
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/PRC-117F



The Canadian Forces have been using the 117F as well as other American radios(148s, 152s) for years. The 117F is an older radio as mentioned above, I believe the 117G replaced it. Being CCI brings restrictions though as PuckChaser noted above. Plus, they are quite expensive and have capabilities they probably aren't required for the PRes. A simple VHF man pack/vehicle mountable and handheld radio(152 size) non CCI radio(that a RQ/CQ) can hold/issue is required. Plus enough EIS for all the radios. 

Also, I believe the Americans use a different radio for their Platoon RTOs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

LightFighter said:
			
		

> The Canadian Forces have been using the 117F as well as other American radios(148s, 152s) for years. The 117F is an older radio as mentioned above, I believe the 117G replaced it. Being CCI brings restrictions though as PuckChaser noted above. Plus, they are quite expensive and have capabilities they probably aren't required for the PRes. A simple VHF man pack/vehicle mountable and handheld radio(152 size) non CCI radio(that a RQ/CQ) can hold/issue is required. Plus enough EIS for all the radios.
> 
> Also, I believe the Americans use a different radio for their Platoon RTOs.



And this is an example of how far out of my lane I am 

But seriously folks, the main thing that differentiates an army from a street gang is a good comms net. 

It was the radio that defeated France in 1940, not tanks.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And this is an example of how far out of my lane I am
> 
> But seriously folks, the main thing that differentiates an army from a street gang is a good comms net.
> 
> It was the radio that defeated France in 1940, not tanks.



Whereas it was a part-time dentist that defeated England in 2016...


----------



## brihard

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Whereas it was a part-time dentist that defeated England in 2016...



I think it's been obvious for many years that England has no full time dentists...


----------



## mariomike

Brihard said:
			
		

> I think it's been obvious for many years that England has no full time dentists...


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

I think Brihard missed the point here.

But then again, maybe he is not a fan of the beautiful game. He doesn't know yet about  the "Miracle on Grass"  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> If you're in a TIC and your CoC is worrying about noise discipline, they've not paid attention to any military training, ever. Hand signals are taught on the AVCC course, you can find that on the CTC website and print it out.



I watched this too, just to be ready  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSK3maq8Cyk


----------



## MilEME09

https://m.facebook.com/NationalPost/posts/10154309017359595?fb_comment_id=1071076976304822_1077354812343705&comment_id=1077354812343705

Cant seem to copy and paste it from my phone but here is an official reply to an earlier article about the lack of equipment especially radios. Sounds more like to me that the general is giving the political answer and down playing just how bad the situation is.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## dapaterson

See also: http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=recruitment-retention-and-equipment-the-focus-of-the-canadian-army-reserve-renewal/iptirjvg


----------



## McG

The radio problem is not unique to the PRes.  It may be more acute in the PRes, but I have been in the field with the Reg F over the past year and dealing with a shortage of radios that was partially related to our manpack radios haven been taken for modification by this project.  The other (and probably more significant factor) is that the CAF has a history of buying insufficient quantities of operational equipment and providing token distribution (ie. Everybody gets some kit, but few to none get enough kit to train with it properly).


----------



## PuckChaser

You won't get those manpacks back. Everyone involved in the CNR(E) didn't realize if you take all the radios, upgrade them so they only work in vehicles, that you now have a giant gap where manpack radios used to be. Someone should be fired, but won't.


----------



## CBH99

I think the bigger question we're all forgetting about is......they found vehicles to install the radios in!?

I don't believe it.  Unless it's some MilCots.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

https://m.facebook.com/NationalPost/posts/10154309017359595?fb_comment_id=1071076976304822_1077354812343705&comment_id=1077354812343705





> Letter to the Editor: National Post
> 
> “Canada’s ragged reserves have too few vehicles, little ammo and now, no radios”
> 
> I am writing in response to an article published on June 27, 2016, regarding the current state of the Canadian Army Reserve and would like to clarify several points that would benefit your readers.
> 
> I have had the privilege of wearing an Army uniform for the last 31 years; 20 years of which have been as an Army Reserve Officer, and in that time, I have witnessed first-hand the professionalism and dedication of the entire Army Team. A Team comprised of Regular Forces, Reserve Forces, Canadian Rangers and civilians all working together to achieve our common objectives.
> 
> Let me first clarify the role of the Army Reserve which is a professional part-time force that provides local engagement and a responsive integrated capability, at home or abroad, in support of the Army mission. This role has evolved significantly since the Second World War, and is the rationale from which we currently organize, train and equip our Army Reserve.
> 
> In terms of concrete output, the emphasis is to have an Army Reserve that contributes with formed Arctic Response Company Groups and Territorial Battalion Groups on the domestic front and to reinforce individually and formed elements from 10 to 100 personnel with mission-task such as convoy escort, surveillance and force protection on overseas operations. To support the training requirement associated with those missions, the Army, in 2014, re-established Annual Summer Reserve Concentrations across all Divisions to provide an additional week of high quality training to the one night a week and one weekend a month of normal duty.
> 
> To set the record straight, it is true that radio equipment across the Canadian Army have commenced a life extension phase, but mitigation measures are in place to ensure that Units have access to what they need to conduct their mandated training and tasks. For example, when the Canadian Army identified there was an issue with vehicles, 80 Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) were purchased to enhance the mobility of the Territorial Battalion Groups. We also centralized fleets of Military Patterned Vehicles and other essential equipment to Training Centres with views to facilitate their access, use and management. As for rations and ammunitions, I can assure you that there are rigorous management systems in place to ensure all Army Reserve Units have the necessary resources to conduct their mandated training.
> 
> In recent years, the urbanization and changing demographics throughout Canada have challenged the Canadian Army in relation to recruiting. To address this issue, the Canadian Army has made it a high priority to grow the Army Reserve by streamlining and decentralizing the recruiting process. For example, the Canadian Army has established 117 full-time recruiter positions at the unit level, reduced the initial course length to an optimum level, and is working hard to find ways to improve the retention of current members to ensure the Canadian Army maintains valued skills and experience.
> 
> What concerns me the most about your article is the insinuation that the Regular Army is not providing sufficient support to the Army Reserve out of fear or spite; this is a completely unsubstantiated statement. In fact this statement does more damage to our young Army reservists who consider themselves as part of One Team. My role as Chief of Staff – Army Reserve is to ensure our Reserve Units and soldiers are supported, and I can assure your readers that the Regular Force, Reserve Force, Canadian Rangers and our civilian members are truly part of the One Army Team.
> 
> I believe we have the right type of leaders in the Canadian Army to overcome our current challenges. While there remains work to be done as indicated in the recent OAG Report on Army Reserve, I am proud of the recent initiatives and ongoing changes we are making to the Canadian Army Reserve, so that it may continue to support the needs of the Government of Canada and their communities.
> 
> Strong – Proud - Ready,
> 
> Brigadier-General Rob Roy MacKenzie
> Chief Of Staff - Army Reserve
> Canadian Army Headquarters



.......and I have had the privilege of wearing an Army uniform for 31 37+ years, Reg & Reserve and I call 'out of touch bullshit'. The General should get out of his office and go visit a Reserve Unit's Jr NCO Mess and WOs' & Sgts' Mess, buy a couple of rounds and ask them what they think. He'll find it nowhere as spiffy and harmonious as he thinks it is.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Tried to horn thing, was told in a not so pleasent way it was bad noise discipline in a tactical environment, and I am not even going to start on hand signals cause that is a loosing battle i've been fighting. To sum it up radios are broken, troops are trying to create a solution, COC says no in one way or another



Go hook up with / talk to / exchange email with some peers at a Armd Recce unit if you can.

Unless the world has changed, they use hand signals and other signals all the time.  In fact, ops normal is (or used to be) RLS until first contact and tons of messages were passed visually before, and after, first contact using hand signals and other means.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Go hook up with / talk to / exchange email with some peers at a Armd Recce unit if you can.
> 
> Unless the world has changed, they use hand signals and other signals all the time.  In fact, ops normal is (or used to be) RLS until first contact and tons of messages were passed visually before, and after, first contact using hand signals and other means.



We are usually ordered to be on radio silence 99% of the time so radios are pretty much useless anyways


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We are usually ordered to be on radio silence 99% of the time so radios are pretty much useless anyways



Even easier to manage when you don't give the PRes radios in the first place.  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

>



 :rofl:

Points inbound

 :cheers:


----------



## McG

No radios is not a PRes problem. It is an Army problem.  Pretending that only PRes are lacking radios is both a misrepresentation and an understatement of the problem.

Let's get back to discussing what is actually unique to the PRes.  CNR(E) already has its own thread.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> No radios is not a PRes problem. It is an Army problem.  Pretending that only PRes are lacking radios is both a misrepresentation and an understatement of the problem.
> 
> Let's get back to discussing what is actually unique to the PRes.  CNR(E) already has its own thread.



Roger, out


----------



## blacktriangle

Generally speaking, how are PRes units doing in terms of leadership at the MCpl/Sgt level? Lt/Capt?

It's been close to a decade since I last paraded with a PRes unit. Are training/experience levels higher, lower, or on par with where they were 8-9 years ago? I didn't want to start a new topic, just curious. Thanks.


----------



## MilEME09

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Generally speaking, how are PRes units doing in terms of leadership at the MCpl/Sgt level? Lt/Capt?
> 
> It's been close to a decade since I last paraded with a PRes unit. Are training/experience levels higher, lower, or on par with where they were 8-9 years ago? I didn't want to start a new topic, just curious. Thanks.



My own unit we only have 1 MCpl (two others are tasked out long term), and two sgts, no WO, one MWO, 0 LT's, and 2 Capt. That is just the FSG, our HQ is well.... your standard CF HQ I would guess, and I dont mean that in the good way. Lot's of guys just went on PLQ so should see more promotions soon to flesh things out.


----------



## dapaterson

It varies dramatically between units, brigades and divisions.  Units vary in size from a rump platoon to over two hundred soldiers, so there's no one-size fits all answer.  That said, if you do a little browsing on the HRMS DWAN site, you can look at current and historical strengths by rank for the various elements of the Primary Reserve.  It is imperfect (as some orgs are not broken out - for example, the Health Services Reserve does not appear as a distinct entity, but rather as a part of the Militia), and reports on people on the books, not people who parade.  That said, it will give you some indications of where strength number have gone.

My quick review suggests minor reductions in the number of MCpl+ in the past 8 years (probably about 2-3 per unit, overall), and about the same number reduced in junior officers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Spectrum said:
			
		

> Generally speaking, how are PRes units doing in terms of leadership at the MCpl/Sgt level? Lt/Capt?
> 
> It's been close to a decade since I last paraded with a PRes unit. Are training/experience levels higher, lower, or on par with where they were 8-9 years ago? I didn't want to start a new topic, just curious. Thanks.



It's like watching the tide go in and out. 

For a few years we'll be flush with people, then they move on and we're sucking wind. In general, though, I think the courses are excellent and better than ever in many ways. It's just a challenge making sure that they are run when people are available, and vice versa. We have also had disasters happen where alot of people are lined up for a course and it's cancelled at the last minute. We have people who hang around for years trying to get qualified, in some cases.

More pertinent to the theme of this thread: driver/comms courses. I have no idea where they went or if they're still offered, but every Cpl should do this as soon as they get their 2nd strip IMHO.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's like watching the tide go in and out.
> 
> For a few years we'll be flush with people, then they move on and we're sucking wind. In general, though, I think the courses are excellent and better than ever in many ways. It's just a challenge making sure that they are run when people are available, and vice versa. We have also had disasters happen where alot of people are lined up for a course and it's cancelled at the last minute. We have people who hang around for years trying to get qualified, in some cases.
> 
> More pertinent to the theme of this thread: driver/comms courses. I have no idea where they went or if they're still offered, but every Cpl should do this as soon as they get their 2nd strip IMHO.



Driver Wheeled is now required before a tech can go on RCEME Common, has been for about 4 years now, dont know about other trades.


----------



## blackberet17

> To set the record straight, it is true that radio equipment across the Canadian Army have commenced a life extension phase, but mitigation measures are in place to ensure that Units have access to what they need to conduct their mandated training and tasks. For example, when the Canadian Army identified there was an issue with vehicles, 80 Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) were purchased to enhance the mobility of the Territorial Battalion Groups. We also centralized fleets of Military Patterned Vehicles and other essential equipment to Training Centres with views to facilitate their access, use and management. As for rations and ammunitions, I can assure you that there are rigorous management systems in place to ensure all Army Reserve Units have the necessary resources to conduct their mandated training.



Apologies to the BGen, but...

The 80 SUVs are used by the TBG leadership to drive themselves around. All those fancy Ford Escapes aren't being used by troops to complete their assigned patrol tasks, AFAIK.

"Centralizing" green fleet at the TC's does d**k all for units not located within 100+k of a Gee-Dee TC...specially if they don't have vehs to get there, or their vehs never returned in the first place.

Rather difficult to annually qualify gnrs on a box and a half of 7.62, or - if you're lucky to have any at all - 15 rnds for the C9...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

That's not qualifying, that is 'famil shoot' ammo levels.

Fund, or fold, the reserves.  The more I read, the more I see a shell of what it was when I left.  Fund it so it is functional, or fold it and put the money towards Reg frce positions/units/equip/trg.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's like watching the tide go in and out.
> 
> For a few years we'll be flush with people, then they move on and we're sucking wind. In general, though, I think the courses are excellent and better than ever in many ways. It's just a challenge making sure that they are run when people are available, and vice versa. We have also had disasters happen where alot of people are lined up for a course and it's cancelled at the last minute. We have people who hang around for years trying to get qualified, in some cases.
> 
> More pertinent to the theme of this thread: driver/comms courses. I have no idea where they went or if they're still offered, but every Cpl should do this as soon as they get their 2nd strip IMHO.



Driver courses beyond Driver Wheeled? None, unless you're lucky to get on an Evasive Driving/Tactical Drivers Course (hard to get though; CSOR, and CF PSU,  among other high speed groups get priority). 

Comms? ATCIS is available, but optional, and infrequently hosted and only if you're lucky to have qualified instructors. Generally you'll find ATCIS course nearby Artillery Regiments as its required for their career progression.


----------



## blacktriangle

Thanks for the info guys. I might be a "free agent" sooner than I thought. Interested units can apply via PM.  ;D




			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> That's not qualifying, that is 'famil shoot' ammo levels.
> 
> Fund, or fold, the reserves.  The more I read, the more I see a shell of what it was when I left.  Fund it so it is functional, or fold it and put the money towards Reg frce positions/units/equip/trg.



Unfortunately I feel that statement could apply to parts of the RegF as well. Sad times.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It varies dramatically between units, brigades and divisions.



For a non-DWAN snapshot, review the  Appendix to the Auditor General's Report 5 - Canadian Army Reserve.


----------



## MilEME09

42% for my unit sounds very correct but also notice the percentages are higher for combat arms units across the board. I know they are more visable and such but I hope more resources are put towards CSS and purple trade recruiting

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## McG

The AG spoke to the Senate committee on the topic of his spring report.  Generally, this articl summarizes a nice set of recommendations in its closing paragraph.  However, having seen the pre deployment training that all components are pumped through before a mission, I am less concerned about the pre-deployment training (which is not to say that I did not se room for improvement).  And though anecdotally I have seen more extreme examples of obesity arrive on tour from the PRes, fitness is really a problem for all components.

Units not being given instruction on what to train is a problem.  The answer to that drives all the equipment and infrastructure requirements too.  Do units not have this direction because of leadership incompetences, or do we have units for which there is no justifiable role to train toward?



> Poorly-trained reservists may endanger peacekeeping missions, Auditor-General warns
> 
> STEVEN CHASE
> The Globe and Mail
> 20 Sep 2016
> 
> The Auditor-General of Canada says there is a risk that inadequately trained reservists may endanger soldiers’ health and safety on a deployment such as a peacekeeping mission to Africa.
> 
> The government is preparing to announce what it bills as a major return to Canadian peacekeeping and there is widespread expectation that this could include a sizable contingent of soldiers to a particular dangerous and deadly United Nations mission in the West African country of Mali. More than 105 peacekeepers have died there since 2013, including 69 from “malicious acts.”
> 
> Reservists, or part-time soldiers, serve alongside regular troops in deployments. For instance, army reserve soldiers completed 4,642 deployments to Afghanistan, where 16 of them died and 75 were wounded in action.
> 
> Auditor-General Michael Ferguson appeared before a Senate committee on Tuesday morning to follow up on a spring, 2016, report that revealed the weak state of Canada’s army reserve – with major shortfalls in training, equipment and preparedness. His report, released in April, said the military budgets for about 21,000 full-time and part-time reservists but can count on only an average of 13,944 trained and attending soldiers.
> 
> Asked about whether unfit reservists could jeopardize themselves or others in a deployment such as African peacekeeping, Mr. Ferguson said, “We identified that there is such a risk.”
> 
> The military tries to mitigate this by providing reservists extra training before deployment.
> 
> But the Auditor-General said his office has found that there can still be cases where reservists do not receive sufficient training. “It might have been physical fitness or it might have been training on individual weapons – so that can create a risk and that risk is then a risk to the safety of the individual and, in fact, could be a risk to the safety of the whole unit.”
> 
> In the course of the study, auditors asked to see the Department of National Defence system that tracks the training and readiness of soldiers. “According to the system, it was 7 per cent of them were up to date on their handling of their own personal weapons; 55 per cent of them were up to date on their physical fitness,” Mr. Ferguson told the senators.
> 
> He said that when auditors asked DND why the reservists appeared to be so unprepared, “the response we got from National Defence was, ‘The information in that system is not reliable.’ ”
> 
> He said this means that the military is relying on individual unit commanders to decide if their reservists are ready to be deployed “and they’re not really tracking in enough detail” whether these troops are prepared.
> 
> His spring report also noted significant shortfalls in equipment and instruction for reservists.
> 
> Mr. Ferguson said his office found many reserve units were not given clear instructions “on what they were supposed to be training for.”
> 
> He said the Canadian Armed Forces should establish a minimum level of skill and training for all soldiers, regardless of whether they are in the reserve or the regular force, “before they would be allowed into that sort of dangerous theatre.”
> 
> The Army Reserve has more than 120 units across Canada.
> 
> A spokesman for the Department of National Defence said no ill-equipped reservists will be sent abroad. “The bottom line is that we would never deploy members who aren’t trained, ready and equipped to meet their mission in service of Canada,” Daniel LeBouthillier said.
> 
> He said the DND is taking steps to improve the training and readiness of reservists, including doing a better job of ensuring units get the funds they need, boosting recruitment and retention strategies, fixing gaps in training and trying to provide more equipment for this part-time force.


http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/poorly-trained-reservists-may-endanger-peacekeeping-missions-auditor-general-warns/article31969386/


----------



## mariomike

How many Reservists can take the necessary time off school or work? I got a two-week Leave with Pay ( LWP ) for military training every summer. That was it. Anything longer would take a Declaration of War.
Fortunately, I did my GMT/BMQ and Trade training while still in High School. No way I could have done it after I started on the job.


----------



## MilEME09

mariomike said:
			
		

> How many Reservists can take the necessary time off school or work? I got a two-week Leave with Pay ( LWP ) for military training every summer. That was it. Anything longer would take a Declaration of War.
> Fortunately, I did my GMT/BMQ and Trade training while still in High School. No way I could have done it after I started on the job.



One of the things that has been beaten to death in this thread is the requirement for better job protection for reservists to allow us to take time. We can't be a well trained force when many trades need months off to train but legally we only get a couple weeks. If out legeslation was similar to what protects US National Guard members, making a legal requirement to give us time off for training, I firmly believe we as a Reserve Force would be much better off, members would regularly be showing up, get proper training, and attendance wouldn't be an issue. Instead of wondering how many might show up for an EX, you would always have a hard number, with room for exclusion due to excusable reasons (illness, death in family, etc..)


----------



## Halifax Tar

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> One of the things that has been beaten to death in this thread is the requirement for better job protection for reservists to allow us to take time. We can't be a well trained force when many trades need months off to train but legally we only get a couple weeks. If out legeslation was similar to what protects US National Guard members, making a legal requirement to give us time off for training, I firmly believe we as a Reserve Force would be much better off, members would regularly be showing up, get proper training, and attendance wouldn't be an issue. Instead of wondering how many might show up for an EX, you would always have a hard number, with room for exclusion due to excusable reasons (illness, death in family, etc..)



I fully agree with you here and I think this type of legislation is what we need.  I wonder though if civilian employers would shy away from hiring reservists if they knew they had to provide time off for them to go play "silly buggers"  for X number of days every year.  Canada isn't the most supportive of its military and I could see this being a detriment to hiring a reservist for civilian jobs. 

But again I think it is what is needed.


----------



## runormal

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I fully agree with you here and I think this type of legislation is what we need.  I wonder though if civilian employers would shy away from hiring reservists if they knew they had to provide time off for them to go play "silly buggers"  for X number of days every year.  Canada isn't the most supportive of its military and I could see this being a detriment to hiring a reservist for civilian jobs.
> 
> But again I think it is what is needed.



This is why I don't think it would work or very well. Where I work, there is 2 other people who  manage the pay/benefits for the entire organization. I'm being trained to replace one of them when they retire. 

I think that there are lots of unanswered questions. Legislation is all fine and dandy in theory, but let's look at my current situation.

I need 6 weeks off or 2 3 weeks mod for PLQ as this is my next career course.

Could I get 6 weeks off for PLQ? Possibly, but consider the following:
What happens if I fail or get injured? Whats in it for my employer?
Should I have to use my vacation time? Should my employer have to top up my salary? Why or why not? 
What happens to my bills if I take a temporary pay cut?  
How much notice does my employer need  >? 
Should this notice be a longer period for a 2 month course than a 2 week excercise? 
Is getting the time off as important for say PLQ as would be getting the time off for BASIC PARA? What about other none career courses?
What happens when the course is cancelled or my unit loses the spots? Who pays for my replacement employee? If the Army gives the reservist employer a tax credit/money for a temp hire is the reservist obligated to stay in the reserves?
What if due to operational requirements for the civilian employer it isn't possible to give the time off? I.e the employee has a specific skill set, or other members of the reservists team already have booked off vacation time.
Who defines "operational requirements"?
Why should my organization promote me if they know that I could be gone for x amount of time? You might be able to protect my job, but can you protect my career?
What penalities does my organization face if they don't grant me the time off?
Is a reservist obligated to disclose that they are a reservist throughout the hiring process? What if this reservist has no intention of taking any additional time off for courses?

I personally think the reserves should do a better job of selling what they do and  highlight the skills that reservists recieve. I.e leadership, technical knowledge, attention to detail, problem solving. Things like the liaison council need to be expanded, more spots for "executreks". I mean why can't we bus up a load of bosses/supervisors for every TBG Excercises? I think we should be offering incentives to employers in the terms of Tax Credits to hire reseverists and additional credits if they get time off for courses / excercises. Telling an employer that they have to give Cpl Bloggins time off for an excercise/course isn't the best way to create a positive relationship with not only the  reserves but the reservists career. 


In closing, let assume that legislation was passed yesterday that protects my job. Do you really think that I'm going to go after my employer if they don't give me the time off for PLQ? Fuck, no. I'm still on probation for crying out loud. Even I wasn't my civilian career is a alot more important and pays a lot more money than the reserves.


----------



## Haggis

runormal said:
			
		

> In closing, let assume that legislation was passed yesterday that protects my job. Do you really think that I'm going to go after my employer if they don't give me the time off for PLQ? frig, no. I'm still on probation for crying out loud. Even I wasn't my civilian career is a alot more important and pays a lot more money than the reserves.



This is covered in excruciating detail somewhere else on this site, but such legislation already exists at the federal level for public servants and, to varying degrees, at the provincial level for everyone else.


----------



## mariomike

Haggis said:
			
		

> This is covered in excruciating detail somewhere else on this site, but such legislation already exists at the federal level for public servants and, to varying degrees, at the provincial level for everyone else.



Ref: Reservists Job Protection Superthread  

This is Leave Without Pay ( LWOP ). 
The employee should calculate if they will have a + / - change in income on LWOP, to keep their personal finances in order. 

In those cases where the employee requests leave without pay for the purpose of taking part in Reserve Forces activities as described in the CLC, which are:
a.an operation in Canada or abroad –including preparation, training, rest or travel from or to the employee's residence – that is designated by the Minister of National Defence;
b.an activity set out in the regulations;
c.annual training for the prescribed period or, if no period is prescribed, for a period of up to 15 days;
d.training that they are ordered to take under paragraph 33(2)(a) of the National Defence Act;
e.duties that they are called out on service to perform under paragraph 33(2)(b) of the National Defence Act;
f.service in aid of a civil power for which they are called out under section 275 of the National Defence Act;

the employee is to be granted leave without pay and cannot be replaced on an indeterminate basis even if the absence is for a period exceeding one year. In accordance with the Public Service Employment Act, all employees on a leave of absence for this purpose are to be reinstated in the position that they occupied on the day before the leave began.
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/psm-fpfm/pay-remuneration/notices-avis/2008/0516-eng.asp

Section C highlighted  is Leave With Pay ( LWP ) at the municipal level, where I worked.


----------



## medicineman

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/index.page

CFLC Home Page.

MM


----------



## dapaterson

Perhaps that's where the Army can initially invest its efforts: at properly planning ahead, setting dates firmly, and committing to training so Reservists can schedule with confidence around their civilian commitments.

Part of that will involve disintermediation - make information readily available to units, and not have multiple stovepipes limiting the flow of information until the last minute.  There is nothing more frustrating than to discover information sat in the CoC for a prolonged period, while units were champing at the bit to get things done.

For example, announcing a need for summer augmentees for a five month period with only a week or two of notice - when people who could have been available made other plans.  Or an order to units to promote some activity in advance of the summer stand-down, when that order is issued in mid-July.


----------



## mariomike

To add to Reply #2719,

The employee may also wish to inquire from their employer if benefits, seniority, vacation entitlement, sick bank credits, pension etc. will, or will not, be affected during LWOP.


----------



## daftandbarmy

runormal said:
			
		

> I personally think the reserves should do a better job of selling what they do and  highlight the skills that reservists recieve. I.e leadership, technical knowledge, attention to detail, problem solving. Things like the liaison council need to be expanded, more spots for "executreks". I mean why can't we bus up a load of bosses/supervisors for every TBG Excercises? I think we should be offering incentives to employers in the terms of Tax Credits to hire reseverists and additional credits if they get time off for courses / excercises. Telling an employer that they have to give Cpl Bloggins time off for an excercise/course isn't the best way to create a positive relationship with not only the  reserves but the reservists career.



We all work for the same government, and Generals, so shouldn't have to 'sell' what we do. We should all be seamlessly integrated into a well oiled machine that is designed to consign our nation's enemies to the garbage heap of history with efficiency and, hopefully, a certain degree of panache.


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Perhaps that's where the Army can initially invest its efforts: at properly planning ahead, setting dates firmly, and committing to training so Reservists can schedule with confidence around their civilian commitments.


The "problem" is that the Army dgaf about the reserves. Besides, things happen, things change and the regular army more easily adapts to this change.
Not without some gears grinding along the way, but since the military ignores its own doctrince when it comes to planning, this is not surprising.
"Why plan when you can react..."


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We all work for the same government, and Generals, so shouldn't have to 'sell' what we do. We should all be seamlessly integrated into a well oiled machine that is designed to consign our nation's enemies to the garbage heap of history with efficiency and, hopefully, a certain degree of panache.



I can think of a few management consultants that make a living out of helping people sell ideas to their management......


----------



## mariomike

runormal said:
			
		

> Legislation is all fine and dandy in theory, but let's look at my current situation.
> 
> I need 6 weeks off or 2 3 weeks mod for PLQ as this is my next career course.
> 
> Could I get 6 weeks off for PLQ? Possibly, but consider the following:
> What happens if I fail or get injured? Whats in it for my employer?
> Should I have to use my vacation time? Should my employer have to top up my salary? Why or why not?
> What happens to my bills if I take a temporary pay cut?
> How much notice does my employer need  >?
> Should this notice be a longer period for a 2 month course than a 2 week excercise?
> Is getting the time off as important for say PLQ as would be getting the time off for BASIC PARA? What about other none career courses?
> What happens when the course is cancelled or my unit loses the spots? Who pays for my replacement employee? If the Army gives the reservist employer a tax credit/money for a temp hire is the reservist obligated to stay in the reserves?
> What if due to operational requirements for the civilian employer it isn't possible to give the time off? I.e the employee has a specific skill set, or other members of the reservists team already have booked off vacation time.
> Who defines "operational requirements"?
> Why should my organization promote me if they know that I could be gone for x amount of time? You might be able to protect my job, but can you protect my career?
> What penalities does my organization face if they don't grant me the time off?
> Is a reservist obligated to disclose that they are a reservist throughout the hiring process? What if this reservist has no intention of taking any additional time off for courses?
> 
> I personally think the reserves should do a better job of selling what they do and  highlight the skills that reservists recieve. I.e leadership, technical knowledge, attention to detail, problem solving. Things like the liaison council need to be expanded, more spots for "executreks". I mean why can't we bus up a load of bosses/supervisors for every TBG Excercises? I think we should be offering incentives to employers in the terms of Tax Credits to hire reseverists and additional credits if they get time off for courses / excercises. Telling an employer that they have to give Cpl Bloggins time off for an excercise/course isn't the best way to create a positive relationship with not only the  reserves but the reservists career.
> 
> 
> In closing, let assume that legislation was passed yesterday that protects my job. Do you really think that I'm going to go after my employer if they don't give me the time off for PLQ? Fuck, no. I'm still on probation for crying out loud. Even I wasn't my civilian career is a alot more important and pays a lot more money than the reserves.



A good example of why I was thankful for the Student Summer Employment Program ( SSEP ). Do as much of the training as you can while still a student.

After I started on the job, unless or until the government declared war, Class A and two weeks each summer was my small contribution to the effort.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

runormal said:
			
		

> This is why I don't think it would work or very well. Where I work, there is 2 other people who  manage the pay/benefits for the entire organization. I'm being trained to replace one of them when they retire.
> 
> I think that there are lots of unanswered questions. Legislation is all fine and dandy in theory, but let's look at my current situation.
> 
> I need 6 weeks off or 2 3 weeks mod for PLQ as this is my next career course.
> 
> Could I get 6 weeks off for PLQ? Possibly, but consider the following:
> What happens if I fail or get injured? Whats in it for my employer?
> Should I have to use my vacation time? Should my employer have to top up my salary? Why or why not?
> What happens to my bills if I take a temporary pay cut?
> How much notice does my employer need  >?
> Should this notice be a longer period for a 2 month course than a 2 week excercise?
> Is getting the time off as important for say PLQ as would be getting the time off for BASIC PARA? What about other none career courses?
> What happens when the course is cancelled or my unit loses the spots? Who pays for my replacement employee? If the Army gives the reservist employer a tax credit/money for a temp hire is the reservist obligated to stay in the reserves?
> What if due to operational requirements for the civilian employer it isn't possible to give the time off? I.e the employee has a specific skill set, or other members of the reservists team already have booked off vacation time.
> Who defines "operational requirements"?
> Why should my organization promote me if they know that I could be gone for x amount of time? You might be able to protect my job, but can you protect my career?
> What penalities does my organization face if they don't grant me the time off?
> Is a reservist obligated to disclose that they are a reservist throughout the hiring process? What if this reservist has no intention of taking any additional time off for courses?
> 
> I personally think the reserves should do a better job of selling what they do and  highlight the skills that reservists recieve. I.e leadership, technical knowledge, attention to detail, problem solving. Things like the liaison council need to be expanded, more spots for "executreks". I mean why can't we bus up a load of bosses/supervisors for every TBG Excercises? I think we should be offering incentives to employers in the terms of Tax Credits to hire reseverists and additional credits if they get time off for courses / excercises. Telling an employer that they have to give Cpl Bloggins time off for an excercise/course isn't the best way to create a positive relationship with not only the  reserves but the reservists career.
> 
> 
> In closing, let assume that legislation was passed yesterday that protects my job. Do you really think that I'm going to go after my employer if they don't give me the time off for PLQ? Fuck, no. I'm still on probation for crying out loud. Even I wasn't my civilian career is a alot more important and pays a lot more money than the reserves.



I'm in the same boat with PLQ, the difference being is that I'm Unionized and out of probation now. It's still a sticky point to get more than  3 weeks off for training. 

One of the things you can try selling to your employer is the fact that PLQ is a leadership course and the benefits of it are very valuable to any organization willing to allow their employees to partake.


----------



## McG

Wondering out loud here ... how many reservists are actually happy for the lack of employment protection?  They are content with the level of employment/involvement that they get, and they are just happy that (through the nature of the beast) they don't have the legal obligation to show-up any more frequently than they already choose to show.  I know there are a lot of dedicated reservists who would be thrilled with job protection legislation and the increased training opportunity that it would provide, but would the benefit to this group be offset by an exodus of regular and reliable class A types at the more senior ranks who just don't want the hassle of obligatory career courses and summer concentrations?  Any such exodus would probably take all the closet Frontiersmen too, so maybe it would not be a bad thing.

Anyway, the Hill Times seems to provide a much better coverage of the AG's comments.  I can see now that the problem is not so much pre-deployment training as it is the fact that there is no mechanism to specifically close the PRes to Reg F training delta prior to a deployment.  That seems a legitimate concern.  The lack of money in the defence budget seems to be another factor fighting against getting things right.


> *Feds will face budget ‘strain’ in boosting army reserves: AG*
> Michael Ferguson also raises concerns with reservist training, and availability of crucial equipment
> The Hill Times
> By MARCO VIGLIOTTI
> 21 Sep 2016
> 
> The Liberal government will face difficulties in adequately training an expanded Canadian reserve contingent with the resources available in the existing defence budget, according to Auditor General Michael Ferguson.
> 
> Speaking before the Senate National Security and Defence Committee on Tuesday, Mr. Ferguson said that if the Canadian Army was tasked with training the number of reservists it planned to accommodate, it would likely squeeze available funding channels.
> 
> “I think it’s very clear that if the Canadian Armed Forces…had 21,000 troops in the reserves to fully train, that would put a significant strain on the resources they’ve already allocated,” he told the committee, which is meeting this week to study issues relating to the government’s ongoing defence policy review.
> 
> “I think there very much is a strain in terms of how much budget they have been allocated compared to what they’ve been asked to do,” he said, noting that $166-million of the reserves’ roughly $700-million budget is sent back to National Defence to pay for infrastructure.
> 
> Although the army has provided funding for 21,000 reservists, who are part-time soldiers, only about 14,000 are active and trained, and when reserve units met for their annual large-scale elective training events across Canada in 2015, only about 3,600 showed, he noted.
> 
> In his presentation, Mr. Ferguson also raised pointed concerns about training, and the availability of crucial equipment for reservists.
> 
> A study released by his office last spring as part of its annual spring report found that training of the army reserves “was not fully integrated” with that of the regular army units, and though they received clear guidance when preparing for domestic assignments, reserve units did not receive the same level of guidance in how to train troops for international missions, he said.
> 
> Army reserve courses, he said, were designed to teach significantly less skills than regular army courses and this skills gap was “not always addressed” prior to the deployment of reserve soldiers.
> 
> For example, when Canadians troops began to deploy as part of the NATO mission in Eastern Europe earlier this year, a gap remained in weapons training between reservists and regular members, he said.
> 
> “We identified that a number of reserve soldiers weren’t receiving the number of days of training that was predictive for them,” Mr. Ferguson said.
> 
> “It’s very important that the Canadian Forces determine what that is that they expect from the Canadian reserves, that they make sure that the reserves have the equipment that they need…and they have enough money to be able to carry out what they’re supposed to do.”
> 
> Recruitment has also proven to be challenging for the reserve force.
> 
> Mr. Ferguson said his office found many units failed to meet desired troop levels, with 12 of the 123 army reserve units “smaller than half of their ideal size.”
> 
> But while the government is pushing to grow the reserves, figures continue to show a precipitous slide in recruits.
> 
> “[The government] has set a goal to increase the army reserve by 950 soldiers by 2019 but, in our opinion, this goal will be difficult to achieve given that the number of army reserves soldiers declined by about 1,000 soldiers for the three years we audited,” Mr. Ferguson told the committee.
> 
> As of May 15, the number of active and trained army reserve soldiers has declined by a further 1,000 soldiers to 13,180, he said, charging that “National Defence knows that the current reserve recruiting system doesn’t work, and that it needs to take steps to improve retention.”
> 
> Jordan Owens, spokesperson for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan (Vancouver South, B.C.), said that the Liberals are committed to ensuring reservists are “fully trained and ready” for international and domestic deployments.
> 
> “Following up on previous recommendations from the auditor general, the Canadian Armed Forces is taking steps to make improvements [including] ensuring funds are appropriately allocated across the army reserve force, improving recruitment and retention strategies, resolving training gaps during the pre-deployment phase for international operations, and investigating a plan to address the accessibility of equipment to support Reserve Force training,” she said in an emailed statement.
> 
> Conservative Senator Daniel Lang (Yukon), chair of the committee said that Mr. Ferguson’s testimony raises alarms about sparse resources being allocated to the reserves.
> 
> “The information that he has provided us [shows] the reserves are obviously, at the present time, in a state of flux, and the fact is the necessary financing is being put in place for the necessary training that they need,” he told The Hill Times, calling on the federal government to review the situation and determine what it expects out of the reserve forces, which comprise roughly 20 per cent of those being deployed.
> 
> “It brings up a real question that we have to ask in respect to any future deployments: are people being adequately trained and are we meeting the objectives we need to meet?”
> 
> Mr. Lang also touched upon safety concerns voiced by Mr. Ferguson, saying that training gaps raise questions about whether reservists are being adequately prepared to safely perform what is being asked of them.
> 
> “It’s a very serious issue and something that I think the government has to address,” he charged.
> 
> The Senate committee is expected to conclude meetings on the defence policy review this week, and produce a report with recommendations to the government by the end of October.
> 
> The federal government concluded public consultations on the review in August, with the development of a formal defence policy paper expected in early 2017.
> 
> On Monday, the committee heard from several academics, experts, and retired military brass, including retired Liberal Senator and lieutenant-general Romeo Dallaire.
> 
> The topic largely centred on the future of Canadian peacekeeping, with the Liberal government pledging this summer up to 600 troops for a still to be determined peacekeeping mission, likely in Africa.
> 
> While acknowledging potential difficulties in staffing, Mr. Dallaire urged Canada to step up and contribute to international peace operations.
> 
> “We fully understand the complexity of peace operations, but we cannot be an island of stability in an ocean of turmoil. Canada needs to do its part,” he said.
> 
> The opposition Conservatives are demanding that any deployment be debated and voted in Parliament. Mr. Dallaire, who accompanied Minister Sajjan on his study trip of African peacekeeping operations in August, said that the Liberal government would welcome a debate on the merits of a peacekeeping mission, though stopped short of promising a vote.
> 
> “We are going to take a thorough effort before we put all the facts together and before we have a thorough debate on this,” he said.
> 
> Defence chief General Jonathan Vance has said that the military was not recommending any missions that would stretch it too thin, though he was comfortable that the military could conduct a peacekeeping mission in Africa while operating in the Middle East and Latvia, the Canadian Press reported.
> 
> He is scheduled to testify before the committee on Wednesday.


https://www.hilltimes.com/2016/09/21/army-reserves/80981


----------



## mariomike

"Although the army has provided funding for 21,000 reservists, who are part-time soldiers, only about 14,000 are active and trained, and when reserve units met for their annual large-scale elective training events across Canada in 2015, only about 3,600 showed, he noted."

wow


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> "Although the army has provided funding for 21,000 reservists, who are part-time soldiers, only about 14,000 are active and trained, and when reserve units met for their annual large-scale elective training events across Canada in 2015, only about 3,600 showed, he noted."
> 
> wow



And of the 3,600 who showed, how many were in the PTA i.e., 18 year old Pte Bloggins, and his fire team partner, with bay'nets fixed and war face on? 

I would hazard a generous guess of about 70%.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, based on Afghanistan experience:

How many privates capable of following orders do you need?
How long does it take to convert a civvy to a useable private?
How long does it take to break a reservist of bad habits?  (Just thought I would throw that one in for laughs  > )


----------



## dapaterson

Based on our Afghanistan experience, we admitted that the Regular Force isn't ready to deploy without a lengthy work-up, so I am less concerned about the need of the Reserve Force to do the same.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Based on our Afghanistan experience, we admitted that the Regular Force isn't ready to deploy without a lengthy work-up, so I am less concerned about the need of the Reserve Force to do the same.



Dang... Mil points don't go up to one billion


----------



## Jarnhamar

Physical fitness and an inclination  to jump on the medical chit system  is really what hamstrings reservists at the troop &  jnco level.  The former directly impacting the latter.   A reservists who rides chits for 6 months shouldn't deploy just because no one wants to deal with removing them. 

Fit reservists who have strong work ethics have no problem sliding in beside reg force  counter parts.  I'd go so far as to say it's often a bonus when they bring life experience and civilian job experience to a platoon. 

IMO there's a lot of Bs and dickery on work up training.  We could probably hammer it out in two,  maybe 3 months instead of 6months work up.  Which of course is difficult for reserves to get time off. 

If reserves want to improve then leadership needs tools which enable them to force members to parade and attend exercises.  The reserves dismal numbers would probably sky rocket if that shit show if a recruiting system we have gets burned down and rebuilt. 

If the number of leadership allowed to sign the pays sheets for parade nights and exs was directly proportional to the number of troops who showed up then I think it wouldn't be just a few good officers and ncos burning themselves out trying to hold units together and keep morale up. There would be a lot more effort to keep attendence up.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Based on our Afghanistan experience, we admitted that the Regular Force isn't ready to deploy without a lengthy work-up, so I am less concerned about the need of the Reserve Force to do the same.



 :goodpost:

Afghanistan and Iraq are interesting cases.

In the US Army, recruits took (and still take) two courses in order to be considered trained: A common to everyone ten-week Basic Combat Training course and a follow on corps specific, varying length Advanced Individual Training course (usually for combat arms these are run as a continuous program at a "One Station Unit Training" facility). For the Infantry MOS the AIT at an OSUT is an additional four weeks for a grand total of fourteen weeks. The training is the same for both Regular and National Guard components.

Unless things have changes (and correct me if I'm wrong) Canadian training to basic infantryman is BMQ 13 weeks; SQ - 20 days; and Inf MOC training 17 weeks (roughly 34 weeks all told and almost two and one half times as long as the US)

The Brits incidentally have a Phase 1 course of 14 weeks but for infantry there is a combined course for Phase 1 and the Phase 2 basic infantry training for a total of 26 weeks from civilian to trained infantryman. (If you don't want to do the math it's eight weeks less than Canada.)

US soldiers were considered deployable and in fact were deployed immediately after AIT with their predeployment training varying widely depending on their units. I've read a number of the interviews published in the Combined Arms Research Library and one can see that some predeployment phases were as short as two weeks especially for individual augmentees. See here:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/ 

and here for a search example: 

https://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/results.php?CISOOP1=any&CISOFIELD1=CISOSEARCHALL&CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOBOX1=joint

I'm not one to say that we should necessarily go to the US experience but I would think that somewhere between the US model of 14 weeks training, the Brits of 26 weeks and ours of 34 weeks there seems to be a very distinct difference of opinion as to what is sufficient training to turn out a basic useable soldier. The same goes for the length of deployment training.

In my humble opinion, the Auditor General isn't a soldier, sailor or airman and has no experience to opine on the military. What he and his staff do is interview key stakeholders in the military and form an opinion based on what they are told. Again, IMHO such a report is generally useless because it usually mimics the head shed party line that "we're doing the best we can on the limited budget that we have." I find this to be so much bulls**t because we waste countless billions each year on bureaucratic and structural inefficiencies.

What we truly need is a complete bottom to top  review of the entire armed forces in order to develop a cohesive combination of viable regular and reserve units that have the funding, equipment, and training to play their respective roles. (I prefer "bottom to top" rather than "top to bottom" because I prefer to analyze military organizations starting from the "bayonets needed" viewpoint and then slate in the top based on the essential elements needed to support those bayonets)  :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## kratz

Jarnhamar's post is blunt, but it calls for what is needed.

NavRes has been bleeding corporate knowledge, experience and skills
"hand over fist", the past 5+ years we've been told to quit or OT.

As much as the Navy claims to be "One Navy", many of my old shipmates
have followed the advice to OT....and entered the RCAF or CA.

5 years earlier, there was a panic to fill the mid-ranks of the CAF,
we are now experiencing the results "of the pull" for this effort.

We've hollowed out the PRes again...and in 1 year...there will not even be 
a back up for the RegF.


----------



## Halifax Tar

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Based on our Afghanistan experience, we admitted that the Regular Force isn't ready to deploy without a lengthy work-up, so I am less concerned about the need of the Reserve Force to do the same.



I went through a 8 month work up period for TF 1-10.  

Your statement isn't entirely correct.  I know from first hand experience that allot of our work up trg was to ensure our PRes folks were as trained as their UERs and MM said they were.  Not to mention their admin and pay were in a horrendous state.  You cant just willy nilly deploy people with out having their admin all set up. 

For our FP platoon it was truly a "try out" phase as roughly 1/3 of them were "cut" after our California confirmation Ex.


----------



## Dissident

While we should still refer to PLQ as a leadership course between us .mil folks, y'all need to "civillianize" the teaching points. I heard that some people even went as far as becoming consultants using the battle procedure and communication process, to help increase efficiency in businesses.

-Any decent/good instructor demonstrates the ability to verbally communicate effectively, even in front of groups.
-Orders format and reports/returns are logical written communications. I typically use the orders format to convey information in emails, minus the headings and military jargon, quite efficient.
-Can work/strive in a diverse environment, under the most difficult situations.
-Focuses on company goals above your own.
-Battle procedure is our term for what really are steps of project management. A successful superintendent I know always referred to the 15/16/17 SBP and claimed it is the main source of his success.
-Evaluating/counselling peers ans subordinates.
-Using PPT. I loath it for how terribly abused it is, but lets not kid ourselves, it can be a great tool to make yourself look good.
-Attention to detail.
-Leading small teams.

A half decent PLQ grad who can translate the skill/teaching points to the civilian world makes a better than average manager, IMHO. 

While I am sure most of you had already figured out what I said, we need to ensure to teach it to our troops. People in corporate pay incredible amounts of money and time to teach these things to their employee. And here we are giving it to them for almost nothing, and practiced under some pretty harsh conditions (typically).


----------



## daftandbarmy

NinerSix said:
			
		

> While we should still refer to PLQ as a leadership course between us .mil folks, y'all need to "civillianize" the teaching points. I heard that some people even went as far as becoming consultants using the battle procedure and communication process, to help increase efficiency in businesses.
> 
> -Any decent/good instructor demonstrates the ability to verbally communicate effectively, even in front of groups.
> -Orders format and reports/returns are logical written communications. I typically use the orders format to convey information in emails, minus the headings and military jargon, quite efficient.
> -Can work/strive in a diverse environment, under the most difficult situations.
> -Focuses on company goals above your own.
> -Battle procedure is our term for what really are steps of project management. A successful superintendent I know always referred to the 15/16/17 SBP and claimed it is the main source of his success.
> -Evaluating/counselling peers ans subordinates.
> -Using PPT. I loath it for how terribly abused it is, but lets not kid ourselves, it can be a great tool to make yourself look good.
> -Attention to detail.
> -Leading small teams.
> 
> A half decent PLQ grad who can translate the skill/teaching points to the civilian world makes a better than average manager, IMHO.
> 
> While I am sure most of you had already figured out what I said, we need to ensure to teach it to our troops. People in corporate pay incredible amounts of money and time to teach these things to their employee. And here we are giving it to them for almost nothing, and practiced under some pretty harsh conditions (typically).



I have seen civilian workplaces where an ex-military guy tries to introduce military battle procedure, complete with our 'unique' phraseology and delivery methods. It provided hours of mirth and ridicule opportunities for the staff, and was discarded almost immediately. Some consultants have tried to sell the military thing to the civilian world but it almost never works outside of a few specialized programs (SealFit comes to mind).

There is no need to 'dumb down' a communications culture designed over the years to help teams of soldiers be really good at killing bad guys, just for the reserves. Really. Good soldiers should make good leaders in the civilian world, and they can usually show up their peers based on merit, which is the best way to show off the military to the civilian world in a good light - of course.

5 Reasons Why You Don't Want to be 'In the Army Now'

Over the past few years, no doubt influenced by the ‘Global War on Terror’ in which western nations have been engaged since 9/11, an enormous amount of material has been published regarding lessons that civilian organizations can learn from the military. They include articles with titles such as:

‘8 Great Business Lessons from Military Leaders’

‘6 Leadership Lessons from a 3 Star General’

‘7 Tough Leadership Lessons from a Navy SEAL Commander’

‘Hiring MBAs? You Should be Looking at NCOs’

This fascination with all things military extends into the corporate training sphere. Various programs offering civilians an opportunity to ‘build character’ within the context of military style selection events have also emerged. Tough Mudder is probably one of the most recognizable examples of this trend. Sealfit, a course that invites participants to endure a ‘Hell Week’ like experience derived from the selection program for the US Navy’s famed special forces unit, is another popular offering intentionally emulating the military in some way.

Mainstream media has also been heavily influenced by this militarization trend. Various individual and small team endurance testing programs challenge innocent, but willing, ‘victims’ to endure privations and other hardships formerly reserved for only the most elite of military units. Survivor, the best known of this genre, is a product of the work of the famous British born TV producer Mark Burnett who, I am inordinately proud to say, is a former member of my old unit: The Parachute Regiment.

I have over 30 years of military service, in both a full and part time capacity as well as 20 years experience as a full time management consultant. I will be the first to admit that my military experience has stood me in good stead, especially with respect to ethical integrity, leadership skills and a personal commitment to physical fitness. Many of my best, lifelong friendships are with military folks I have met along the way. The trouble is that most civilians, and the organizations they work for, have very little in common with the military and, as a result, they should use caution when trying to adopt learnings directly from the Army.

Here are 5 reasons why you don't want to be 'in the Army now’:

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/5-reasons-why-you-dont-want-army-now-richard-eaton?forceNoSplash=true

1. Soldiers have to be really good at doing nasty things

I know it’s self-evident, but the reason why the Army and soldiers exist is to, ultimately, do a really good job at things that civilian organizations will never be involved in unless they are very unlucky: like war. Soldiers are often called upon to do many things that have nothing to do with war, such as supporting civilian agency response to floods and wildfires, but are ultimately required to, as a combat experienced Sergeant once told me ‘shoot bad guys and break all their stuff’.

2. The Army is the most controlling of government jobs, ever, anywhere

You can’t really tell from playing Call of Duty, but the Army is a government job.

Even more importantly, it’s the most rigidly hierarchical and micromanaging of government jobs featuring the most intrusive bureaucracy you can imagine, designed to exert the maximum possible control over its members using a variety of severe, coercive tools. For example, I know a senior Officer who was actively looking for ways to lay a formal charge on someone for not replying to one of his emails.

Ponder that enormity for awhile, if you will.

Worst case: think about it like a maximum security prison without bars (well, most of the time) that pays pretty well, and offers great benefits and world class training. Clearly, this is not something to aspire to in a civilian workplace, that is, of course, unless at your workplace you can be shot at dawn for refusing to kill the enemy.

3. The Army can make soldiers really unproductive

Soldiering is a noun with two meanings, viz:

1 skills that are required for the life of soldier [syn: soldiership]

2 the evasion of work or duty [syn: shirking, slacking, goofing off, goldbricking)

http://soldiering.askdefinebeta.com/

The industrial engineer and original ‘efficiency expert’, F.W. Taylor, famously used the term 'soldiering' to describe workers who slowed their production levels down to match the lowest performing peer. Not that soldiers willingly engage in that activity, much, but the realities of Army life - the phrase ‘hurry up and wait’ was invented by the Army – may mean that soldiers can spend enormous amounts of time doing nothing, or doing the wrong thing and then having to redo it. Certain operational roles, like the somewhat ironically named ‘Rapid Deployment Force’, can also have thousands of troops simply waiting to deploy on a moment’s notice, doing nothing for days.

4. The Army spends far more on training than you could ever dream of

In comparison with most civilian workplaces, the Army expends vastly greater amounts of time, money and resources on training and development of all kinds. For example, in my first 8 years of full time military service I estimate that I spent over two years in one type of training program or another. And that doesn’t include a degree or other educational certificate program. This training was designed to teach me to lead units of various sizes in battle, jump out of airplanes, fight and survive in the high arctic in winter time, lead high intensity counter terrorist operations, and manage the planning and delivery of complex military operations on land, sea and air. A well trained military unit is therefore a truly a formidable force, but represents a price that is far beyond anything that a civilian organization could afford.

5. The Army is a lot of fun, really

Twelve giant, blacked out, C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft dipped below the storm riven cloud base at 500 feet, 300 feet beneath the recommended safety ceiling. Engines screaming, they quickly slowed their airspeed to 120 knots as the drop zone suddenly appeared in the mountain pass. Standing upright bearing 100 pound loads we lurched, some vomiting on the man in front. The green light flicked ‘Go!’ and, bearing rifles, mortars, machine guns and 4 days of combat supplies, we 600 paratroopers leapt into the night sky….

Sounds like the opening scene of the latest ‘Mission Impossible’ movie, right? Well, that was my job for several years. It’s these kinds of experiences that tend to attract people to, and keep them engaged with, the Army despite some of the ‘nausea’ that I described earlier.

So what are the take aways for a civilian organization considering ‘Going Army’?

Berlineaton looks at organizational effectiveness through three dimensions: direction, process and people. Direction, Process and People.
•Direction: the vision, goals, strategies, and tactics propel an organization towards its purpose.
•Process: day-to-day tasks and deliverables yield their best results when processes are clear and strong, and aligned with organizational objectives
•People: they have the skills, capability, and impetus to translate strategic intent into reality. People and the culture they create drive the future of an organization

https://www.berlineaton.com/about/our-approach/

As it relates to the Army life, we suggest that you borrow from the People stuff, while being wary of the Direction and Process stuff.

The ethical underpinnings of the profession of 'good' soldiering are laudable and applicable to any human organization. Tested in countless situations far more stressful than anything you would hope to encounter in civilian life, they can provide you with a sound, virtual, ethical bedrock upon which to build the people focused side of your business. But when it comes to certain organizational goals, motivational factors, training systems and business practices, use caution, because you could accidentally prescribe yourself some of the most coercive, restrictive, expensive and bureaucratic medicine on earth.


----------



## Dissident

I guess my writing didn't do justice to my concept.

While I did mention that some people do try and implement a civilianized version of military procedure, the crux of my argument is that the skills taught on PLQ are a great asset to most organization, on an individual basis.

Militaries are inherently wasteful. There is no directly profitable business case for national defence. That said, from the junior leadership side of things, a section leader is successful when he maximizes the utilization of his resources. Translating what I learned into something useful in my civilian occupations has been the most important building block of my current success (and yes, honestly, some failures). 

Re-reading your post I realize that, perhaps, you made my point more eloquently than I could.


----------



## Journeyman

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Re-reading your post I realize that, perhaps, you made my point more eloquently than I could.


...with panache.   ;D


----------



## Rick Goebel

mariomike said:
			
		

> "Although the army has provided funding for 21,000 reservists, who are part-time soldiers, only about 14,000 are active and trained, and when reserve units met for their annual large-scale elective training events across Canada in 2015, only about 3,600 showed, he noted."
> 
> wow



It would be interesting to know whether the annual collective training events in 2015 were set up as "all to attend" or as people being selected for certain specific slates.  I recognize that you might get only 3,600 show up when you had an "invited" slate of 4,000 due to changes of life plans but you might get that same ratio if you "invited" 14,000.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Some sort of tax incentive for the employers of said Reserves might alter the equation. Of course actually giving your members enough time to request such time and not screwing the pooch on said exercises will also play a part. In essence the army actually has to "sell the exercises" to it's members. Because they won't use up their leave for it otherwise. Not sure if the Army leadership gets that part?


----------



## Staff Weenie

Ah collective training exercises. In the 1990's and early 2000's, we would all dog-pile into Petawawa with people from 23, 25, and 28 Med Coy (later Fd Ambs), with a few augments from the Reg F, and form a composite Fd Amb. We would have about 250 pers from Pte to LCol. If you were fit, you could get on the bus and go (even a few unfit ones, but that's another story). We planned it for months, and one of the three units would always have the lead - they would coord everything, write the orders and instructions and make it work. The learning opportunities were excellent.

Now, the Fd Amb on Ex SG is run by 2 Fd Amb. 4 H Svcs Gp Det in Toronto develops the initial plan - the Res Fd Ambs don't have a lot of input. The Res Fd Ambs are given about 10-12 positions each, and they really only want Pte/Cpl to attend. All of the leadership positions are typically close-hold by the Reg F. 

So, we've gone from a somewhat chaotic, but valuable learning experience for all ranks from newest Medic to CO, to being augmentee labour. I'm not seeing the positive in this at all.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> Ah collective training exercises. In the 1990's and early 2000's, we would all dog-pile into Petawawa with people from 23, 25, and 28 Med Coy (later Fd Ambs), with a few augments from the Reg F, and form a composite Fd Amb. We would have about 250 pers from Pte to LCol. If you were fit, you could get on the bus and go (even a few unfit ones, but that's another story). We planned it for months, and one of the three units would always have the lead - they would coord everything, write the orders and instructions and make it work. The learning opportunities were excellent.
> 
> Now, the Fd Amb on Ex SG is run by 2 Fd Amb. 4 H Svcs Gp Det in Toronto develops the initial plan - the Res Fd Ambs don't have a lot of input. The Res Fd Ambs are given about 10-12 positions each, and they really only want Pte/Cpl to attend. All of the leadership positions are typically close-hold by the Reg F.
> 
> So, we've gone from a somewhat chaotic, but valuable learning experience for all ranks from newest Medic to CO, to being augmentee labour. I'm not seeing the positive in this at all.



I think you have done an excellent job of describing, in microcosm, what has happened across the country. 

Once upon a time, we could attract over 100 people per major unit to an annual summer concentration. I recall one exercise where my current unit showed up with almost 200 pax. 

Now that we have made it more 'like the Reg F', and have introduced various other confects like overlapping course schedules etc., we are lucky if we can get 30.


----------



## MilEME09

Ive said it before but i think moving PRes courses to within the training calender instead of summer would help, many employers would also be more willing to loose a body during a slow period rather then summer.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ive said it before but i think moving PRes courses to within the training calender instead of summer would help, many employers would also be more willing to loose a body during a slow period rather then summer.



But, aren't a lot of Reservists students? Would they be able to skip class for two weeks during the training calendar?


----------



## MilEME09

mariomike said:
			
		

> But, aren't a lot of Reservists students? Would they be able to skip class during the training calendar?


That is a problem too, we cant please everyone but can we have both? Give reservists the option of a winter course if there is demand for it

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Jarnhamar

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Ive said it before but i think *moving PRes courses to within the training calender instead of summer* would help, many employers would also be more willing to loose a body during a slow period rather then summer.





			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> That is a problem too, we cant please everyone but can we have both? *Give reservists the option of a winter course if there is demand for it*



I've seen this argument before.
  
I think in theory this sounds good but in practice I've found it to often be extremely difficult and frustrating.  Class A students miss training nights and weekends for any number of reasons which means instructors (who are already pressed for time) need to try and find time to make up for the lost training.  That or a bunch of students fail which reflects bad on the members, instructors, unit etc.. which means instructors are pressured to just pass students anyways.
It leads to '6 people didn't show up tonight to learn how to change a tire on an LS? Don't worry we'll find time on some exercise down the road to show them (which never pans out)'.  And we can't forget the pissing contests and empire protection.  We ran a basic mountain ops at a reserve unit (ran by a very strict ex-reg officer) and seemed like a constant battle with brigade and people with their noses out of shape because a bunch of reserves were doing mountain ops- in this case they were very strict about doing it by the book but ultimately still didn;t get the qual as far as I recall.

Doing courses on summer training gives you a captive audience who isn't sick incidentally when modern warfare 2 is released or a Metallica concert happens (true story).


That said however running cool courses _could_ be a way to attract new members, help retention and increase attendance, I just wouldn't want to try and organize that stuff.


----------



## dapaterson

Or just treat all courses as Army courses. Don't limit Res F to only summer; if there is space available and a valid requirement then load the Res F soldier on the Reg F course.


----------



## Jarnhamar

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Or just treat all courses as Army courses. Don't limit Res F to only summer; if there is space available and a valid requirement then load the Res F soldier on the Reg F course.



That's a phenomenal idea.  Would be great to see reserves on basic recce,  comms, driver wheeled,  TCCC,  basic mountain ops, cqc and such. (and other trade specific course too). 

Especially since they will be augmenting the reg f on tours.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> That's a phenomenal idea.  Would be great to see reserves on basic recce,  comms, driver wheeled,  TCCC,  basic mountain ops, cqc and such. (and other trade specific course too).
> 
> Especially since they will be augmenting the reg f on tours.



Agreed. Which means that we will need to find out about Basic Recce Course vacancies for reservists further than 5 days in advance of the start date, like what happened to us last month.


----------



## MilEME09

Problem is some trades are different now reg vs Pres, specifically weapons and vehicle techs, Pres gets the shaft and only gets about 60% of what the reg force does. Just had one of our vtechs transfer reg force. Was ql5 qualified but now must start from the begining because of all the missing stuff PRes doesnt get.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Agreed. Which means that we will need to find out about Basic Recce Course vacancies for reservists further than 5 days in advance of the start date, like what happened to us last month.



Several years ago I was course loaded on the old Advanced Combat Intelligence Course. I took the (then) 5 weeks off work after my boss (former Reg F Black Watch) rearranged the schedule to make it work.  I showed up at the Armoury to leave for Borden only to receive a faxed message "Course cancelled - Regret short notice.".  So, I went back to work and pleased with my boss to give me my shifts back.  (In those days the Army didn't have a policy where you would be employed at your unit if the course was cancelled with less than a certain days notice.)  That was the last time that employer ever gave any Reservist time off work for Army stuff.


----------



## MilEME09

Another problem the Reserve suffer from is the lack of original training, we show up every september, ask whats the training year going to be like and get basically told SALY, Same as Last year, I'm sorry but I am going to be bored of EX's rather fast if your trying to accomplish BTS is the quickest most direct way instead of making it dynamic and interesting for the troops.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Or just treat all courses as Army courses. Don't limit Res F to only summer; if there is space available and a valid requirement then load the Res F soldier on the Reg F course.



I took the Sigs course with 3 RCHA, my biggest criticism was it was a good 2 week course crammed into 4 weeks with a lot of pooch humping.


----------



## Haggis

Despite that everyone across the CAF wants to reduce costs and PERSTEMPO, no one is willing to sacrifice course content to do so.  The oft heard complaint that courses are "too long" is heard alongside the assertion that all the content that fills that white space is necessary.

Yet comments like those from Colin P are commonplace.  This begs the question of why, in the Infantry, for example, do we need 34 weeks to train a Regular Force Infantry soldier from civvy to OFP when other nations, who fight in more wars that we do, can do it in 1/2 to 2/3 the time? (see reply #2735 by FJAG).  How much of that content could be safely declared "no train" or "developmental" and delivered either in unit lines (rather that "personal administration time or maintenance on vehicles that don't move) or as part of the now lengthy pre-deployment training? 

Every Reg F manoeuver unit travels down the road to high readiness (RTHR).  That's where a lot of this delta can be closed for both Reg F and P Res augmentees. Those augmentees then take it back to the Armoury floor thus shortening the RTHR for the next batch.


----------



## MilEME09

Haggis I do agree some items on courses probably could be cut, I painfully went through this on my DP2, they had just redone the PRes weapons tech courses so every course was a pilot course for me, and they just grabbed the reg force MLP and went to it, teaching us much that we didn't need to know. In theory if you have enough courses say part X, Y, and Z could be better taught at unit lines, some ones going to listen and remove it from the course. We then improve and stream line our courses. That creates a new problem, now we have more training to cram into a PRes training year


----------



## daftandbarmy

I know a guy who joined the RLI in the 70s. He had had previous experience with the CF as an NCO, and described their weapon training like this:

"During the first week of recruit training they got us in a room, issued us FNs, and took us outside to the range. After a quick safety brief they gave each of us a full mag which we then proceeded to fire off at the targets. We then went back inside and learned about the stripping and assembly of the weapon while we cleaned it."

Much of the rest of the training was apparently like this, and targeted towards new recruits who would be parachuting into combat within 6 months of joining. I have had similar experience with local police on the ranges where they had me shooting a Glock, a weapon I had never used, quite confidently and safely within a couple of hours along with some of their newly recruited reservists (many of whom had never fired a gun before).

This is a good example of the red tape we regularly wrap ourselves in: I have no idea why it takes us weeks to get smart recruits to the point where they can actually fire a rifle at a target when we do 'fun shoots' for civvies all the time.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is a good example of the red tape we regularly wrap ourselves in: I have no idea why it takes us weeks to get smart recruits to the point where they can actually fire a rifle at a target when we do 'fun shoots' for civvies all the time.



We probably figure that since the civvies are smart enough not to join that they can figure it out faster than those of us foolish enough to join...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Haggis said:
			
		

> Despite that everyone across the CAF wants to reduce costs and PERSTEMPO, no one is willing to sacrifice course content to do so.  The oft heard complaint that courses are "too long" is heard alongside the assertion that all the content that fills that white space is necessary.
> 
> Yet comments like those from Colin P are commonplace.  This begs the question of why, in the Infantry, for example, do we need 34 weeks to train a Regular Force Infantry soldier from civvy to OFP when other nations, who fight in more wars that we do, can do it in 1/2 to 2/3 the time? (see reply #2735 by FJAG).  How much of that content could be safely declared "no train" or "developmental" and delivered either in unit lines (rather that "personal administration time or maintenance on vehicles that don't move) or as part of the now lengthy pre-deployment training?
> 
> Every Reg F manoeuver unit travels down the road to high readiness (RTHR).  That's where a lot of this delta can be closed for both Reg F and P Res augmentees. Those augmentees then take it back to the Armoury floor thus shortening the RTHR for the next batch.



To be fair the course content I got was far more than I would have gotten at a Reserve course and had the rest of the time been used more wisely, I would have been happy. I was aware how much that course was costing my unit in paydays and that we had a finite number of them.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Based on our Afghanistan experience, we admitted that the Regular Force isn't ready to deploy without a lengthy work-up, so I am less concerned about the need of the Reserve Force to do the same.



2 points on this.

1.  Was there really a need to do that much work-up?  What % of it was a waste of time shit-show.

2.  Some Reg force units are high readiness and go out the door much quicker than 3 months.


----------



## dapaterson

Agreed. I was focusing on the Army, which has never found a two week course it can't fit into four...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Problem is some trades are different now reg vs Pres, specifically weapons and vehicle techs, Pres gets the shaft and only gets about 60% of what the reg force does. Just had one of our vtechs transfer reg force. Was ql5 qualified but now must start from the begining because of all the missing stuff PRes doesnt get.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



Using the current (yet old) system we have though (Reg Force, Reserve Force and Special Force), the Reg gets the full meal deal for trg, the Reservist (in most cases..not all) gets a little less and, if ever used, the Special Force members would get even less.  Take a look at trade Occupation Specifications and (if your trade uses them) JTARs.  

Now question....when was the last time the Special Force was ever mobilized... ;D



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Another problem the Reserve suffer from is the lack of original training, we show up every september, ask whats the training year going to be like and get basically told SALY, Same as Last year, I'm sorry but I am going to be bored of EX's rather fast if your trying to accomplish BTS is the quickest most direct way instead of making it dynamic and interesting for the troops.



But, this is also part of military life and Reg force endures it as well.  I've done the same 'battle' in the simulator time and time again.  COREXs get repetitive, etc.  BUT part of that is to drive the mental/muscle memory and form the foundation of, if needed, follow on work-up/bolt on/TST as required...

Difference being...Cl A types likely will eventually get bored and stop showing up.  (Somedays I wish I still had that option  8))


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Agreed. I was focusing on the Army, which has never found a two week course it can't fit into four...



There have been a few times where I have been impressed by some courses delivered in the reserve world that have been exponentially better than their Reg F equivalent, which gives me hope. One was the Cbt Tm Comd's course which was only 2 weeks long but, in the quality and quantity of learning delivered, was a marvelous example of well deployed adult learning principles.


----------



## Old Sweat

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Now question....when was the last time the Special Force was ever mobilized... ;D



1950 for Korea.


----------



## Eland2

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I know a guy who joined the RLI in the 70s. He had had previous experience with the CF as an NCO, and described their weapon training like this:
> 
> "During the first week of recruit training they got us in a room, issued us FNs, and took us outside to the range. After a quick safety brief they gave each of us a full mag which we then proceeded to fire off at the targets. We then went back inside and learned about the stripping and assembly of the weapon while we cleaned it."
> 
> Much of the rest of the training was apparently like this, and targeted towards new recruits who would be parachuting into combat within 6 months of joining. I have had similar experience with local police on the ranges where they had me shooting a Glock, a weapon I had never used, quite confidently and safely within a couple of hours along with some of their newly recruited reservists (many of whom had never fired a gun before).
> 
> This is a good example of the red tape we regularly wrap ourselves in: I have no idea why it takes us weeks to get smart recruits to the point where they can actually fire a rifle at a target when we do 'fun shoots' for civvies all the time.



The introduction I received to the FNC1A1 when I joined an armoured reserve unit in 1979 was somewhat more detailed and structured than this. I joined up under the auspices of something that was called SRTP, or Summer Reserve Training Program, which was basically a summer job-creation programme aimed at young people aged 16 - 19. Most of our basic training was done in the summer months in the armoury, from 0830 to 1630, Monday to Friday, although we later had a field component lasting about a week where we learned how to live in the field, dig trenches, prepare basic defensive positions and learn basic infantry section tactics and drills. 

In the second week of training, we were issued our FN rifles. We were introduced to the basic parts and capabilities of the FN, and learned how to strip and clean them, and this took less than a half day to accomplish. On the next day, we were introduced to IA's and stoppages.

We spent the rest of our time taking courses on first aid and other things, and doing more foot drill, this time with our issued weapons. 

We didn't actually fire them for the first time until we went to Wolseley Barracks at CFB London for a week of additional training and our passing-off parade. The range they took us to was the pistol range that was located next to one of the barrack blocks. There we were issued .22 calibre barrel adapters and shown how to install them, along with breech blocks adapted to accept the smaller round. We were also given magazines adapted to hold .22 calibre rounds. 

Because the ammunition didn't have enough power to properly cycle the action of the rifles, we had to manually cock our rifles after each round. The reason for using the low-power rounds, of course, wasn't just because of the small size of the range we were on, but because CFB London was located practically in the middle of London, with lots of residential areas nearby, so noise was a concern. I say 'was' because CFB London doesn't really exist anymore, save for the original Wolseley Barracks building and a small collection of buildings allocated for the use of 22 Svc Bn and 'A' Sqn 1st Hussars.

We didn't actually get to use full-power 7.62 NATO ammunition until after Milcon, when we went to CFB Borden for a range meet. After a box lunch that we ate while on the range, we were marched over to the Terra theatre, where we were treated to a showing of Zulu, which I thought was a pretty fun way to end our basic training.


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Using the current (yet old) system we have though (Reg Force, Reserve Force and Special Force), the Reg gets the full meal deal for trg, the Reservist (in most cases..not all) gets a little less and, if ever used, the Special Force members would get even less.  Take a look at trade Occupation Specifications and (if your trade uses them) JTARs.
> 
> Now question....when was the last time the Special Force was ever mobilized... ;D
> 
> But, this is also part of military life and Reg force endures it as well.  I've done the same 'battle' in the simulator time and time again.  COREXs get repetitive, etc.  BUT part of that is to drive the mental/muscle memory and form the foundation of, if needed, follow on work-up/bolt on/TST as required...
> 
> Difference being...Cl A types likely will eventually get bored and stop showing up.  (Somedays I wish I still had that option  8))


While I understand that, what I mean is we go to the same training area and use the same site. How is that usefull to the troops exacuting the same thing they kmow from the previous year, and how can SNCOs really be good at siting a location if its the same location every time?

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Not just Snr NCOs.  It applies to Jnr NCOs, Warrant Officers and Officers alike...and, as I said I've done the exact same "sim" time after time and learn something from each one.

If repetition is a military reality (which it is), then people need to accept that and get on with getting better at their duties and skillsets.


----------



## FJAG

Eland2 said:
			
		

> ... After a box lunch that we ate while on the range, we were marched over to the Terra theatre, where we were treated to a showing of Zulu, which I thought was a pretty fun way to end our basic training.



Hey. We got to see _Breaker Morant_ on our Basic Legal Officers Course.  ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## OldSolduer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> 2 points on this.
> 
> 1.  Was there really a need to do that much work-up?  What % of it was a waste of time crap-show.
> 
> 2.  Some Reg force units are high readiness and go out the door much quicker than 3 months.



In most cases the work up was longer than the actual deployment, which is ridiculous.


----------



## Eland2

FJAG said:
			
		

> Hey. We got to see _Breaker Morant_ on our Basic Legal Officers Course.  ;D
> 
> :cheers:



How apropos that you would have been shown Breaker Morant, of all things, while on a legal course. One of the things that has always impressed and amazed me 
was how one of the soldiers who was being ordered to give testimony managed to haul himself out of his chair on one leg and snap to attention in the required fashion before giving his testimony. I've never seen anyone do that before.


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There have been a few times where I have been impressed by some courses delivered in the reserve world that have been exponentially better than their Reg F equivalent, which gives me hope. One was the Cbt Tm Comd's course which was only 2 weeks long but, in the quality and quantity of learning delivered, was a marvelous example of well deployed adult learning principles.



in 2007 (or 2008, maybe?  Can't quite remember) I was teaching on a DP4 Infantry CSM Course in Gagetown.  It was a mixed course, 2 Reg F and 2 P Res syndicates.  When it came time to do up the course reports, the decision was made by the chain of command to only grant the P Res graduates the "Reserve" qualification code, because, well, they were Reservists, despite having done EXACTLY the same work to EXACTLY the same standard as the Reg F candidates.  The instructors, both Reg F and P Res argued against it and won their case.  Everyone was awarded the Reg F qualification.  But how many other times was this done and either not noticed or not challenged?


----------



## a_majoor

Sadly, one of the main reasons to have extended workup training for deployments has little to do with the amount of training (or lack thereof) but rather to build a cohesive unit from all the mix'n'match parts that are bolted together to create a deployable battlegroup. If you are bringing in another company from a different battalion, filling the files in the Admin company and Support company with mechanics, cooks and clerks who volunteered from all over the place for a tour and also have to absorb 20% Reserve augmentees, you don't have a real unit at that point, but a large collect of of uniformed personnel.

The building of personal relationships and trust takes a long time, and having hollowed out units as the building blocks of deployed battlegroups is the first problem. If each battalion was at its establishment of @ 800 men, the amount of workup training would be drastically reduced because the personal relationships within the unit will already be strong and established.


----------



## Monsoon

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Sadly, one of the main reasons to have extended workup training for deployments has little to do with the amount of training (or lack thereof) but rather to build a cohesive unit from all the mix'n'match parts that are bolted together to create a deployable battlegroup. If you are bringing in another company from a different battalion, filling the files in the Admin company and Support company with mechanics, cooks and clerks who volunteered from all over the place for a tour and also have to absorb 20% Reserve augmentees, you don't have a real unit at that point, but a large collect of of uniformed personnel.


...who ideally will have been trained and conditioned to cohere quickly with people who have similar training and conditioning. The real shame is that our HR structure's shift towards "a career for life" over the past couple of decades has decreased our capacity to quickly mobilize civilians into soldiers and increased our tolerance of administration and leadership approaches that rely on long-term relationships.


----------



## Journeyman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ..... because the personal relationships within the unit will already be strong and established.


Everyone will already know who to hate and avoid  ;D


Edit: see post #2779 by dapterson.  The rest of mine on Engen's book was posted before the coffee kicked in.  :facepalm:


----------



## Kirkhill

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ...who ideally will have been trained and conditioned to cohere quickly with people who have similar training and conditioning. The real shame is that our HR structure's shift towards "a career for life" over the past couple of decades has decreased our capacity to quickly mobilize civilians into soldiers and increased our tolerance of administration and leadership approaches that rely on long-term relationships.



That bears repeating........


----------



## daftandbarmy

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> ...who ideally will have been trained and conditioned to cohere quickly with people who have similar training and conditioning. The real shame is that our HR structure's shift towards "a career for life" over the past couple of decades has decreased our capacity to quickly mobilize civilians into soldiers and increased our tolerance of administration and leadership approaches that rely on long-term relationships.



Once upon a time, good leaders could get any team of rag tags together to work miracles with a simple 'Follow Me'. 

I wonder how much we expect that from our senior leaders in particular these days?


----------



## dapaterson

Is that a follow-on to Engen's "Strangers in Arms" (https://www.amazon.ca/Strangers-Arms-Motivation-Canadian-1943-1945/dp/0773547258)?


----------



## MilEME09

So as part of the changes being made to the recruiting system due to the Army taking direct control of recruiting as of april 1st 2017, I present to you the new timeline for the Army reserves recruiting process, as handled directly by the units.









> On April 1, 2017, the Army takes over responsibilty for recruiting from the Chief of Military Personal. The Army Commander, General Wynnk (who started his military career with 20 Fd Regt) has directed that reserve recruitng and processing be done by reserve units. He has mandated that it be done in two days. In 3 Cdn Div, the Dep Comd, BGen Stanton, is the lead on making sure it happens.


----------



## McG

The slide says "pre-decision".

Is it actually decided now?


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> The slide says "pre-decision".
> 
> Is it actually decided now?



that is my understanding based on brains I got to poke at yesterday, including BGen Stanton who is the one making sure this timeline is accomplished for 3 Div, Well he is the Div Commander.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Doesn't matter. The system is still full of the ones that take months\ years to process the paperwork and fulfil the appointments. Nothing will change until the recruiting system is purged top to bottom and replaced with people that can follow direction and meet timings.

Sorry, finding it hard to control my cynicism today.


----------



## MilEME09

recceguy said:
			
		

> Doesn't matter. The system is still full of the ones that take months\ years to process the paperwork and fulfil the appointments. Nothing will change until the recruiting system is purged top to bottom and replaced with people that can follow direction and meet timings.
> 
> Sorry, finding it hard to control my cynicism today.



Obviously this is the for the ideal candidate with no issues, however I think the army taking direct control of recruiting from the Chief of Military Personal is a good first step.

EDIT: More info on the state of the PRes


----------



## Haggis

As Recceguy pointed out, rather bluntly, some of these activities can take months to complete, such as reliability screening and medicals, particularly as units don't have access to the resources to do them in-house.

What's the plan?  No idea, but here's what I'd suggest we do.

Send home a detailed medical questionnaire to have the applicant's GP/family doctor complete it.  Bring in the receipt and get reimbursed.
Have the applicant attend their local police department for a criminal record check.  Bring in the receipt and get reimbursed.

As MilEME09 pointed out, the timelines are great for a healthy, fit, moderately intelligent applicant who meets all the prerequisites with no criminal record.  The one thing the slide doesn't account for is how long it would take the applicant to get in to see their family doctor and get a criminal record check completed.  The time span between visits 1 and 2 could be several weeks.  The difference, this time, is that the delay would be applicant based, not system based as it frequently is now.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I'm all for recruiting faster. If the Army taking over their own again does it, I'm all for it.

Ideally, when a person leaves the CFRC for the first time, they should be told to plan their going away party for the very near future.

Today's recruits aren't like our days. We have to get them before their short attention span gets distrac..................look a squirrel!


----------



## McG

183.5 mission sub-units for 123 unit HQs.  That we have so many units for so few sub-units is also a problem.


----------



## Flavus101

Haggis said:
			
		

> Have the applicant attend their local police department for a criminal record check.  Bring in the receipt and get reimbursed.



In my area the wait for a criminal background check to come back is several weeks if not months. I fail to see how third-partying this and medicals out will have any improvement.

The problem is the bureaucracy. If you can cut out paperwork or rungs that paperwork must travel up that is where you will see the most gains be made for decreasing time spent in the application process.


----------



## George Wallace

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> In my area the wait for a criminal background check to come back is several weeks if not months.



Today, that is a problem.  Back when recceguy joined, that was not as important, and likely not even a requirement.



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I fail to see how third-partying this and medicals out will have any improvement.



This, however, is a very good suggestion and does take us back several decades, where a DND medical form was taken to a civilian doctor and they conducted a medical to fill in the blanks on the form.  Only delays would be a result of the applicant booking appointments in a less than a timely fashion.



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> The problem is the bureaucracy. If you can cut out paperwork or rungs that paperwork must travel up that is where you will see the most gains be made for decreasing time spent in the application process.



Today we have many more security concerns than we did four or five decades ago.  That part of the bureaucracy moves at a snails pace if an applicant is flagged on anything.  The Canadian military no longer has an open door policy of accepting anyone who is physically and medically fit.  There are many more checks and balances in place these days to ensure the security of the CAF and the loyalties of its members.


----------



## MedCorps

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I fail to see how third-partying this and medicals out will have any improvement.



Wait for it.  No third party medicals required. Only a questionnaire and five core medical assessments that can be done by a Res F Med A. Total time required = 30 minutes + the time to fill out of the questionnaire.  

This experiment will prove to be interesting.  

MC


----------



## MilEME09

What I have heard is that it will be forns given to the recruit to be filled out by their Dr. Or potentially having a day or two a week for a cf doctor to process people

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Flavus101

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Today we have many more security concerns than we did four or five decades ago.  That part of the bureaucracy moves at a snails pace if an applicant is flagged on anything.  The Canadian military no longer has an open door policy of accepting anyone who is physically and medically fit.  There are many more checks and balances in place these days to ensure the security of the CAF and the loyalties of its members.



I am not intimately familiar with the paperwork process of an applicant. If you believe that there are no parts of the paperwork trail that can be sped up (not solely related to security checks, just paperwork in general) without placing undue risk on the CAF than I will defer to your opinion. What I have experienced (not with enrollments, with releases) is that a file is mailed to Brigade HQ only to be returned with a sticky note detailing a couple minor errors that could have been sorted out through a phone call or email. This is the type of stuff that tacks on an extra couple days to a week.


----------



## dapaterson

On the release side, the CAF still has an indecent obsession with paper.  Moving to paperless, where possible, could speed things up.  But there's an aversion to electronic signatures that is incomprehensible.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> On the release side, the CAF still has an indecent obsession with paper.  Moving to paperless, where possible, could speed things up.  But there's an aversion to electronic signatures that is incomprehensible.



Hand on there... next thing you'll be suggesting is that we get rid of the all hallowed pay sheet. Heretic!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MCG said:
			
		

> 183.5 mission sub-units for 123 unit HQs.  That we have so many units for so few sub-units is also a problem.



Mind you my unit has 2 batteries, really in name only. Back in my day, one was the firing battery and the other the training battery, so you started in the training battery and then when finished assigned to a gun crew in the firing battery. The structure of the training battery was one BSM and as many Snr/Jnr NCO's as needed for the training.


----------



## MJP

dapaterson said:
			
		

> On the release side, the CAF still has an indecent obsession with paper.  Moving to paperless, where possible, could speed things up.  But there's an aversion to electronic signatures that is incomprehensible.



Anyone that has signed what seems like a million leave passes will agree!  Hell I would settle for a system similar to how we approve lve for civvies.


----------



## dapaterson

Colin P said:
			
		

> Mind you my unit has 2 batteries, really in name only. Back in my day, one was the firing battery and the other the training battery, so you started in the training battery and then when finished assigned to a gun crew in the firing battery. The structure of the training battery was one BSM and as many Snr/Jnr NCO's as needed for the training.



The count of "Mission elements" includes only the firing battery; the HQ & training sub-unit function, in the ARE, are under the unit HQ template and thus not counted against the 183.5.


----------



## MilEME09

my question is (and hopefully someone can answer), how can you have half a sub unit?


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> my question is (and hopefully someone can answer), how can you have half a sub unit?



Some reserve units are established in the Army Reserve Establishment as a rifle company plus a rifle platoon. I'm not sure what the math is that they used, but that would be one factor I think.


----------



## George Wallace

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Some reserve units are established in the Army Reserve Establishment as a rifle company plus a rifle platoon. I'm not sure what the math is that they used, but that would be one factor I think.



Or the Unit is located in several locations.  If you look at 6 Int Coy in Edmonton, it also is located in two locations outside of the Edmonton area: one in Winnipeg and one in Vancouver.


----------



## dapaterson

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Or the Unit is located in several locations.  If you look at 6 Int Coy in Edmonton, it also is located in two locations outside of the Edmonton area: one in Winnipeg and one in Vancouver.



No.

A geographically dispersed sub-unit would not show up as a fraction in the ARE, since 1/2 + 1/2 = 1.


----------



## McG

So how are "independent sub-units" (such as 20th Independent Field Battery) counted in the previously seen numbers.  I assume they add to the 183.5 mission sub-units, but don't count toward the 123 unit HQs.  That would mean the average unit HQ is responsible for less than the 1.49 mission sub-units one might calculate with the available numbers.


----------



## McG

Never mind.  Looks like it does not influence the math very much at all.  With the Med Coys all removed from Army, the Sigs Sqns all upgraded to regiments, and the engineer squadrons amalgamated into CERs, there are only two "independent sub-units" remaining in the PRes: the 20th Independent Field Battery and the 116th Independent Field Battery.


----------



## Ostrozac

MCG said:
			
		

> there are only two "independent sub-units" remaining in the PRes: the 20th Independent Field Battery and the 116th Independent Field Battery.



Also there are the five intelligence companies which are units that are also sub-units, hence the 5 to 5 unit HQ to mission element ratio.

Personally, I never saw anything wrong with a Reserve Company commanded by a Major being its own unit. It eliminates some overhead and reduces the careeer management challenge of producing PRes LCol and CWO.


----------



## McG

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Personally, I never saw anything wrong with a Reserve Company commanded by a Major being its own unit. It eliminates some overhead and reduces the careeer management challenge of producing PRes LCol and CWO.


This is the model that I advocate.  The company/squadron/battery is established as a unit while miniature formations (we will call them regiments or battalions) are established under LCols.  Reserve Brigades are eliminated.  Making the majors into COs ensures that all the authority to manage the organization remains local.


> *3 Canadian Division Reserves*
> 
> 6 Int Coy (Edmonton)
> 
> The British Columbia Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles (Vancouver)
> B Sqn Recce, The British Columbia Dragoons (Kelowna and Vernon)
> A Coy Infantry, The Vancouver Regiment (Irish Fusiliers of Canada) (Vancouver)
> B Coy Infantry, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Vancouver)
> C Coy Infantry, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) (Victoria, Nanaimo, Comox)
> D Coy Infantry, The Rocky Mountain Rangers (Kamloops, Prince George)
> E Coy Infantry, The Royal Westminster Regiment (New Westminster, Chilliwack)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Vancouver)
> 39 S&T Coy (Richmond)
> 39 Maint Coy (Victoria)
> 39 Signal Coy (Victoria, Nanaimo)
> 
> The Alberta Regiment (4th Battalion, PPCLI)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The South Alberta Light Horse (Medicine Hat)
> B Sqn Recce, The Alberta Dragoons (Edmonton)
> C Sqn Recce, The King's Own Calgary Regiment (Calgary)
> A Coy Infantry, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (Edmonton,)
> B Coy Infantry, The Calgary Highlanders (Calgary)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Red Deer)
> 
> The Central Canada Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Fort Garry Horse (Winnipeg)
> B Sqn Recce, The Saskatchewan Dragoons (Moose Jaw)
> A Coy Infantry, The Royal Regina Rifles (Regina)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Winnipeg)
> C Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Winnipeg)
> D Coy Infantry, The North Saskatchewan Regiment (Saskatoon, Prince Albert)
> E Coy Infantry, The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment (Thunder Bay)
> M Coy Mortars, RCA (Kenora)
> 
> The Canadian Arctic Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Yellowknife Regiment (Yellowknife)
> B Coy Infantry, The Yukon Regiment (Whitehorse)
> 
> 3 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, RCA (Regina)
> B Bty, RCA (Brandon)
> C Bty, RCA (Lethbridge)
> D Bty, RCA (Edmonton)
> E Bty, RCA (Victoria)
> F Bty, RCA (Nanaimo)
> 
> 3 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (Edmonton)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Trail)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Winnipeg)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Saskatoon)
> 5 Fd Sqn (Calgary)
> 
> 3 Engineer Support Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (Vancouver)
> 2 Bridge & Raft Sqn (Chilliwack)
> 3 Const Sqn (Abbotsford)
> 3 Mapping Troop (Vancouver)
> 
> 3 Signal Regiment
> 
> 38 Signal Coy (Regina, Saskatoon)
> 40 Signal Coy (Vancouver)
> 41 Signal Company (Edmonton)
> 42 Signal Coy (Winnipeg, Thunder Bay)
> 
> 3 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 41 Maint Coy (Edmonton)
> 38 Maint Coy (Winnipeg)
> 
> 3 Supply & Transport Battalion
> 
> 38 S&T Coy (Thunder Bay)
> 40 S&T Coy (Edmonton)
> 41 S&T Coy (Calgary)
> 42 S&T Coy (Saskatoon)
> 
> 
> *4 Canadian Division Reserves*
> 
> 2 Int Coy (Toronto)
> 
> Canadian Guards
> 
> Ceremonial Guard
> A Bty, Canadian Guards Artillery, RCA (Ottawa)
> A Sqn Recce, The Governor General's Horse Guards (Toronto)
> B Sqn Recce, 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (Kanata)
> A Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Ottawa)
> B Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> C Coy Infantry, Governor General's Foot Guards (Barrhaven)
> D Coy Infantry, The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Montreal)
> S&T Coy (Ottawa)
> 
> Ontario Scottish and Highland Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry, The Essex Kent Scottish (Chatham)
> B Coy Infantry, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  (Hamilton)
> C Coy Infantry, 48th Highlanders of Canada (Toronto)
> D Coy Infantry, Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Cambridge, Kitchener)
> E Coy Infantry, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Cornwall)
> F Coy Infantry,The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Ottawa)
> G Coy Infantry, The Lorne Scots (Brampton, Oakville, Georgetown)
> H Coy Infantry,The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Mississauga)
> M Coy Mortars, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish (Pembroke)
> S&T Coy (Hamilton)
> 
> Western Ontario Regiment (4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment)
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 1st Hussars (RCAC) (London, Sarnia)
> B Sqn Recce, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC) (Windsor)
> A Coy Infantry, The London and Oxford Fusiliers (London)
> B Coy Infantry, The Elgin Regiment (St Thomas)
> C Coy Infantry, The Perth Regiment (Stratford)
> D Coy Infantry, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Owen Sound, Barrie)
> S&T Coy (London, Windsor)
> 
> 5th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Queen's York Rangers (RCAC) (Toronto, Aurora)
> A Coy Infantry, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (Scarborough)
> B Coy Infantry, The Royal Regiment of Canada (Toronto)
> C Coy Infantry, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (St. Catherine’s, Welland)
> D Coy Infantry, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Hamilton)
> M Coy Mortars (St Catharines)
> S&T Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 6th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> 
> A Sqn, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Oshawa)
> A Coy Infantry, Irish Regiment of Canada (Sudbury)
> B Coy Infantry, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (Kingston)
> C Coy Infantry, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Belleville, Cobourg, Peterborough)
> D Coy Infantry, The Brockville Rifles (Brockville)
> E Coy Infantry, The Algonquin Regiment (North Bay, Timmins)
> M Coy Mortars, The Prince of Wales Rangers (Peterborough)
> S&T Coy (North Bay, Sault Ste Marie)
> 
> 4 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, Toronto Regiment, RCA (Toronto)
> B Bty, RCA (Brantford, Simcoe)
> C Bty, RCA (Sault Ste. Marie)
> D Bty, RCA (Hamilton, Guelph)
> 
> 4 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Fd Sqn (London, Windsor)
> 2 Fd Sqn (Toronto)
> 3 Fd Sqn (Ottawa, Orleans)
> 4 Fd Sqn (Hamilton, Waterloo)
> 
> 4 Signals Regiment
> 
> 31 Signal Company (Hamilton, London)
> 32 Signal Company (Toronto, Borden)
> 33 Signal Company (Ottawa, Kingston)
> 
> 4 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 31 Maint Coy (London, Hamilton)
> 32 Maint Coy (Ottawa, Prescott)
> 33 Maint Coy (Toronto)
> 
> 
> 2 Canadian Division Reserves
> 
> 4e Cie de rens (Montreal, Québec)
> 
> 4e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)
> Esc B, Régiment de Hull (RCAC) (Gatineau)
> A Coy Infantry, Royal Montreal Regiment (Montreal)
> B Coy Infantry, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (Montreal)
> Cie C infanterie, Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Montreal)
> Cie D infanterie, Le Régiment de Châteauguay (Laval)
> Cie E infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (St.-Hyacinthe)
> Cie F infanterie, Le Régiment de St.-Hyacinthe (Drummondville)
> Cie G infanterie, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve (Montreal)
> 
> 5e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment
> 
> Esc A, 12e Régiment blindé du Canada (Trois-Rivières)
> Esc B, The Sherbrooke Hussars (Sherbrooke)
> Cie A infanterie, Voltigeurs de Québec (Québec)
> Cie B infanterie, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent (Rimouski)
> Cie C infanterie, Le Régiment de la Chaudière (Lévis)
> Cie D infanterie, Régiment du Saguenay (Saguenay)
> Cie E infanterie, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke (Sherbrooke)
> 
> 2e Régiment d’artillerie de campagne
> 
> Bty A, ARC (Montreal)
> Bty B, ARC (Shawinigan)
> Bty C, ARC (Lévis, Val-Bélair, Montmagny)
> 
> 2e Régiment de génie de campagne
> 
> 1e Escadron de Génie (Montreal)
> 2e Escadron de Génie (Québec)
> 3e Escadron de Génie (Rouyn)
> 
> 2e Régiment des transmissions
> 
> 35 Escadron des transmissions (Québec and Sherbrooke)
> 34 Escadron des transmissions (Montreal)
> 
> 2 Maintenance Battalion
> 
> 35 Maint Coy (Québec)
> 34 Maint Coy (Montreal)
> 
> 2 Supply & Transport Battalion
> 
> 35 S&T Coy (Québec)
> 34 S&T Coy (St Hubert)
> 
> 
> *5 Canadian Division Reserves*
> 
> 3 Int Coy (Halifax)
> 
> The Royal New Brunswick Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, 8th Canadian Hussars (Moncton)
> B Sqn Recce, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (Charlottetown)
> A Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Fredericton)
> B Coy Infantry, The North Shore Regiment (Bathurst)
> C Coy Infantry, The Carleton and York Regiment (Grand Falls)
> 
> The Nova Scotia Regiment
> 
> A Sqn Recce, The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (Halifax)
> A Coy Infantry, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Truro)
> B Coy Infantry, The Cape Breton Highlanders (Sydney)
> C Coy Infantry, The Princess Louise's Fusiliers (Halifax)
> D Coy Infantry, The West Nova Scotia Regiment (Kentville)
> 
> The Royal Newfoundland Regiment
> 
> A Coy Infantry (St. John’s)
> B Coy Infantry (Corner Brook)
> 56 Engineer Squadron (St. John’s)
> 37 S&T Coy (St. John’s)
> 37 Signal Coy (St. John’s)
> 
> 5 Field Artillery Regiment
> 
> A Bty, RCA (Halifax)
> B Bty, RCA (Yarmouth)
> C Bty, RCA (Saint John)
> 
> 5 Field Engineer Regiment
> 
> 1 Engineer Squadron (Fredericton)
> 2 Engineer Squadron (Sydney)
> 3 Engineer Squadron (Halifax)
> 5 Mapping Troop (Fredericton)
> 
> 5 Signals Regiment
> 
> 1 Signal Company (Halifax, Glace Bay)
> 2 Signal Company (Saint John, Charlottetown)
> 
> 36 Service Battalion
> 
> 1 S&T Coy (Saint John)
> 2 S&T Coy (Sydney)
> 36 Maint Coy (Halifax)


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Also there are the five intelligence companies which are units that are also sub-units, hence the 5 to 5 unit HQ to mission element ratio.
> 
> Personally, I never saw anything wrong with a Reserve Company commanded by a Major being its own unit. It eliminates some overhead and reduces the careeer management challenge of producing PRes LCol and CWO.



If you go back to the notion of the Captain leading a company, with his assistant(s) the Lieutenant(s), and the Major being the Colonel's man then the system readily falls into place.  The Company belongs to the Captain.  The Major ensures that the Captain is performing to the Colonel's expectations and that he/she has all the tools they need to get the job done.  The Colonel's Assistants get to be applied as the Colonel sees fit.  Some could be put permanently in charge of tactical groupings of companies.


----------



## George Wallace

So?  Where would such units as 64 Fd Bty, 10 Fd Regt RCA, Yorkton (and Melville), Sask., fall into this org, as you have 10 Fd Regt RCA, Regina as a Bty?  Do they now fall under Corps Troops?  A whole new level of HQ.... >



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> This is the model that I advocate.  The company/squadron/battery is established as a unit while miniature formations (we will call them regiments or battalions) are established under LCols.  Reserve Brigades are eliminated.  Making the majors into COs ensures that all the authority to manage the organization remains local.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> If you go back to the notion of the Captain leading a company, with his assistant(s) the Lieutenant(s), and the Major being the Colonel's man then the system readily falls into place.  The Company belongs to the Captain.  The Major ensures that the Captain is performing to the Colonel's expectations and that he/she has all the tools they need to get the job done.  The Colonel's Assistants get to be applied as the Colonel sees fit.  Some could be put permanently in charge of tactical groupings of companies.



Please... no.

There is no way a a Capt or Maj would put up with all the crap ...

They download so much trivial garbage onto CO's


----------



## Dissident

MPs anywhere in there?


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> So?  Where would such units as 64 Fd Bty, 10 Fd Regt RCA, Yorkton (and Melville), Sask., fall into this org, as you have 10 Fd Regt RCA, Regina as a Bty?  Do they now fall under Corps Troops?  A whole new level of HQ.... >


How big is 64 Fd Bty?  Maybe Regina and Yorkton together constitute a single bty, or maybe 3 Div gets one bty more than I have shown.



			
				NinerSix said:
			
		

> MPs anywhere in there?


No.  The MP empire decided it wanted to own all the toys.  There are no more MP in the Army PRes


----------



## Ostrozac

NinerSix said:
			
		

> MPs anywhere in there?



Yes, they are not in the Army Reserve anymore. Under the most recent reorgs the MP reserve now are under command of the Provost Marshall (and the medical reserve are under command of the Surgeon General).


----------



## RedcapCrusader

MCG said:
			
		

> No.  The MP empire decided it wanted to own all the toys.  There are no more MP in the Army PRes



Well, there are still Army Reserve MPs, but we belong to the CF MP Gp, under the Provost Marshal whom reports directly to the VCDS, rather than previously under Divisional and Brigade command.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> How big is 64 Fd Bty?  Maybe Regina and Yorkton together constitute a single bty, or maybe 3 Div gets one bty more than I have shown.
> No.  The MP empire decided it wanted to own all the toys.  There are no more MP in the Army PRes



What happens if you take the tactical out of the discussion and just focus on the administrative?

Rather than talking about whether or not you can raise, train and retain a sufficient number of troops in a given location to man guns that are not in existence, what happens if you just concentrate on raising and retaining bodies locally.  You facilitate what common training you can at the individual and local level.  You bring together eager, knowledgeable soldiers for tactical training.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> What happens if you take the tactical out of the discussion and just focus on the administrative?
> 
> Rather than talking about whether or not you can raise, train and retain a sufficient number of troops in a given location to man guns that are not in existence, what happens if you just concentrate on raising and retaining bodies locally.  You facilitate what common training you can at the individual and local level.  You bring together eager, knowledgeable soldiers for tactical training.



Isn't that what happened in 1914 with the introduction of numbered battalions?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Isn't that what happened in 1914 with the introduction of numbered battalions?



With pluses, minuses and Oak Leaves.


----------



## McG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Rather than talking about whether or not you can raise, train and retain a sufficient number of troops in a given location to man guns that are not in existence, what happens if you just concentrate on raising and retaining bodies locally.  You facilitate what common training you can at the individual and local level.  You bring together eager, knowledgeable soldiers for tactical training.


That is generally how the PRes units makes things work.  IT locally, and then bring the unit's geographically separated groups together in a training area for CT.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just recently went through this exercise:

4 Aug 1914 - War declared

21 Aug 1914 - Volunteers of the 103rd Calgary Rifles board the train out of town - 2 and a half weeks after war declared
22 Aug 1914 - 10th Bn CEF stood up at Valcartier with volunteers from 60th Rifles of Canada (Moose Jaw), 95th Sask Rifles (Regina), 90th Wpg Rifles and 99th Manitoba Rangers
31 Aug 1914 - 10th Bn CEF strength of 53 officers and 1528 other ranks  - 4 weeks after war declared
31 Aug 1914 - Volunteers of the 103rd Calgary Rifles arrive at Valcartier to an empty field 9 days after boarding the train in Calgary

27 Sep 1914 - 10th Bn CEF receives uniforms - 8 weeks after war declared
29 Sep 1914 - 10th Bn CEF boards ships at Quebec
3 Oct 1914 - 10th Bn leaves Quebec in convoy
14 Oct 1914 - 10th Bn arrives in Plymouth, UK
20 Oct 1914 - 10th Bn on Salisbury Plain and training commences - 2 and a half months after war declared 

10 Feb 1915 - 10th Bn sails for France - 6 months after war declared and 4 month after equipping, organizing (and re-org, and re-re-org, and re-re-re-org and re-re-re-re-org (4 or 8 companies))
22 Feb 1915 - 10th Bn baptism of fire as some troops shelled doing trench duties.

22 Apr 1915 - 10th Bn earns Oak Leaves at St Juliens Wood. - 8 months after war declared, 6 months after training commenced, 2 months after introduction to theatre and baptism of fire.

Then the learning started.... and continued for four years.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> That is generally how the PRes units makes things work.  IT locally, and then bring the unit's geographically separated groups together in a training area for CT.



That was the way we used to make it work as well.  You did what you could with what you had.  

Maybe the institution could just focus on working with that reality and helping it to succeed at what it can do rather than pining for change to create a system that will never exist.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> That was the way we used to make it work as well.  You did what you could with what you had.
> 
> Maybe the institution could just focus on working with that reality and helping it to succeed at what it can do rather than pining for change to create a system that will never exist.



Part of that problem I feel is a lack of clear defined direction of what the CAF wants out of the reserves. Sure they have said very broad terms like augmentation of the reg force, but thats a lot harder to do given the structure of the CAF (not to mention many trades don't get trained to their reg force counterparts level). I think it would help if every PRes unit had a parent reg force unit that could advise and assist in guiding the training of the PRes units to what that particular unit needs.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

What the reg forces needs/wants out of the reserves may not be viable for the Reserves. The Reverse have to compete not only with other employers but with recreational activities and other distractions that will want to share the same time slot as the reserve unit can offer. You have to give people a reason to give up their free time. Cool training will be part of it, proper equipment is another, but the uniform, belonging also play a part and is harder to quantify. You could name units "Manning pool #2" but we can guess how attractive that will be.


----------



## Ostrozac

Colin P said:
			
		

> What the reg forces needs/wants out of the reserves may not be viable for the Reserves.



Admittedly, the CF seems to want some odd stuff out of their part-time force. Stuff like intricately detailed reports and returns, official bilingualism, an incredibly complicated travel policy and an Army Reserve Establishment model that likes to assign roles without providing training and equipment (Reserve Geomatics, I'm looking at you). Our reserve force provides first class soldiers, but I think it's in spite of our structure, not because of it.


----------



## RocketRichard

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Admittedly, the CF seems to want some odd stuff out of their part-time force. Stuff like intricately detailed reports and returns, official bilingualism, an incredibly complicated travel policy and an Army Reserve Establishment model that likes to assign roles without providing training and equipment (Reserve Geomatics, I'm looking at you). Our reserve force provides first class soldiers, but I think it's in spite of our structure, not because of it.



Good post


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> ... (not to mention many trades don't get trained to their reg force counterparts level)....



To be honest, I don't think it is realistic for the Reserve Force to train any trade to the Reg Force level.  Especially technical trades.  The only way I can see those capabilities been supplied from the Reserves if if they are brought into the Reserves with trained soldiers from the Regs.  That makes the Reserve Force a very different creature than a Volunteer Force.

Enthusiasts should be encouraged, engaged and exploited as far as possible.  They can make a useful auxiliary force.  They can even be employed in the Reg Force order of battle as individuals if they pass an appropriate standard.  But I don't think it is reasonable to expect a Reservist to learn how to become a mechanic on their own time, in addition to working their regular job and raising a family, much less become a mechanic qualified to the same standard as one who is fully engaged repairing equipment.  Also I don't think it is reasonable to expect to see a steady stream of volunteerss willing to give up a year of their life for foreign service.

Agreeing to serve in time of crisis is vastly different to agreeing to serve on a full time basis.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> To be honest, I don't think it is realistic for the Reserve Force to train any trade to the Reg Force level.  Especially technical trades.  The only way I can see those capabilities been supplied from the Reserves if if they are brought into the Reserves with trained soldiers from the Regs.  That makes the Reserve Force a very different creature than a Volunteer Force.
> 
> Enthusiasts should be encouraged, engaged and exploited as far as possible.  They can make a useful auxiliary force.  They can even be employed in the Reg Force order of battle as individuals if they pass an appropriate standard.  But I don't think it is reasonable to expect a Reservist to learn how to become a mechanic on their own time, in addition to working their regular job and raising a family, much less become a mechanic qualified to the same standard as one who is fully engaged repairing equipment.  Also I don't think it is reasonable to expect to see a steady stream of volunteerss willing to give up a year of their life for foreign service.
> 
> Agreeing to serve in time of crisis is vastly different to agreeing to serve on a full time basis.



I agree with your points because as a reserve force we dont have the time or the resources to keep trained on every piece of kit in the technical trades. That said I think maybe we should create a way to get PRes techs atleast familiarized with reg force kit, example the LAV 6. That way we walk into a shop or if we are trying to deploy it can say on paper "oh Cpl Bloggins has work with the LAV before but we will need to give him a refresher when he arrives" sort of a learn on the spot. Let's face it for us techs there is a manual for everything that will tell you everything you need to do (well almost). With the right supervision any tech should be able to be shown how to work on any kit whether the all might RCEME School in Border says you have a qualification or not.


----------



## ballz

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I agree with your points because as a reserve force we dont have the time or the resources to keep trained on every piece of kit in the technical trades. That said I think maybe we should create a way to get PRes techs atleast familiarized with reg force kit, example the LAV 6. That way we walk into a shop or if we are trying to deploy it can say on paper "oh Cpl Bloggins has work with the LAV before but we will need to give him a refresher when he arrives" sort of a learn on the spot. Let's face it for us techs there is a manual for everything that will tell you everything you need to do (well almost). With the right supervision any tech should be able to be shown how to work on any kit whether the all might RCEME School in Border says you have a qualification or not.



I know our maintenance platoon would be happy to have augmentation, even if it were only 1x a month. Using their Class A payday to actually come to an operational unit and work on vehicles would be a good ROI IMO. It's stuff we're always undermanned for and would provide excellent experience / training for the PRes member.


----------



## MilEME09

ballz said:
			
		

> I know our maintenance platoon would be happy to have augmentation, even if it were only 1x a month. Using their Class A payday to actually come to an operational unit and work on vehicles would be a good ROI IMO. It's stuff we're always undermanned for and would provide excellent experience / training for the PRes member.



I'm sure if you reached out to what ever PRes Service Battalion is closest to you, I am sure something can be arranged, if your at 1 SVC BN in Edmonton shoot me a PM and I can get the ball rolling with 41 SVC.


----------



## MilEME09

Sorry for the double post. For those that took part in that retention survey last year, follow up emails are now being sent out along with a brief summery of the information now being compiled, heres a little snippet. For reference it notes only just over 3000 PRes members took part in this survey.



> Commitments outside the Res F:
> 
> o It is estimated that whereas 36% of P Res members work solely as Reservists, 39% hold civilian employment, 15% are attending school, and 10% are doing both in addition to their Reserve service;
> 
> o In the COATS, only 14% of members work solely as Reservists; 69% hold civilian employment, 4% are attending school, and 13% are doing both.
> 
> Leave intentions:
> 
> o It is estimated that 8% of P Res members and 5% of COATS members definitely intend to leave within three years;
> 
> o The most commonly cited reasons for leaving the Res F were a perceived lack of opportunities in the Reserves, conflict with one’s civilian obligations (e.g., work, school), family reasons, and dissatisfaction with aspects of the job.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sorry for the double post. For those that took part in that retention survey last year, follow up emails are now being sent out along with a brief summery of the information now being compiled, heres a little snippet. For reference it notes only just over 3000 PRes members took part in this survey.



I never got that survey... But I agree.

The lack of opportunities is the one thing that keeps pushing me closer to release, especially in my trade where we keep getting promised all this cool new stuff and deployments... But when it's offered to us, we're never selected.


----------



## Dissident

Conflicts with other commitments is always code words for: the training is not interesting/challenging enough.


----------



## CBH99

100% agreed with NinerSix.


----------



## MilEME09

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Conflicts with other commitments is always code words for: the training is not interesting/challenging enough.



whats not interesting about doing the exact same thing you did when you joined 10+ years ago? seriously I'm all for repetition to create a sense of second nature for a skill set, but if your going to do it, do atleast something to make it fresh. As my unit it does it, its pretty much hold the troops hand every time as a walk through talk through, and I'm sorry but your troops won't learn how to exacute a mission properly if they know some WO is going to come over tell them where to stand and where to look. Why? "This exercise is more geared towards training the command staff" every single damn time unless its a road move EX where to purpose is to just get Km's.


----------



## Dissident

Don't get me wrong, I tend to be underwhelmed when unmotivated troops complain about doing the same training over and over, while still not being able to recall basic info. Sure we do battle procedure every year, but how many can rattle off something close to the 15/16/17 steps?

Sigh.


----------



## MilEME09

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Don't get me wrong, I tend to be underwhelmed when unmotivated troops complain about doing the same training over and over, while still not being able to recall basic info. Sure we do battle procedure every year, but how many can rattle off something close to the 15/16/17 steps?
> 
> Sigh.



well you get the once a year lecutre yes, but how often do you actually practice it? I have once on my MRT commander course, that was it.


----------



## Kirkhill

And every year you get a new team that is shaking down for the first time.....


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And every year you get a new team that is shaking down for the first time.....



in some cases yes, i've had 98% the same command team for 4 years, really isn't it our courses that are teaching us to do X, so why should our command team be re teaching us? it should be the objective is Y, go. We do the mission, do an AAR, then accomplish Y better and more effectively next time.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> in some cases yes, i've had 98% the same command team for 4 years, really isn't it our courses that are teaching us to do X, so why should our command team be re teaching us? it should be the objective is Y, go. We do the mission, do an AAR, then accomplish Y better and more effectively next time.



I was thinking more along the lines of the troops than the command team.  I agree there is a lot of continuity at the command level.  Is that true at the section/platoon level?


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I was thinking more along the lines of the troops than the command team.  I agree there is a lot of continuity at the command level.  Is that true at the section/platoon level?



it is a little more unstable there, the platoon level command has changed hands twice in four years, and change S/C's more times then I can count. Also doesn't help if no NCO's show up on EX. leading to more problems.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> it is a little more unstable there, the platoon level command has changed hands twice in four years, and change S/C's more times then I can count. Also doesn't help if no NCO's show up on EX. leading to more problems.



Seems to me it is kind of difficult to have an army without a steady supply of switched-on sections......no matter how many Majors and Warrants you may have.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Seems to me it is kind of difficult to have an army without a steady supply of switched-on sections......no matter how many Majors and Warrants you may have.



warrants? don't have any of those, but we have two senior, and 2 junior nco's, and a bunch of cpl's and pte's. Many are reluctant to get plq and go up the ranks because we hear our command team is a shit show, and really doesn't care what the troops think.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Some observations about the reserves; problems and possible fixes.

Problems.
[Caveat for the below, these aren't always the case but they do happen often IMO]
-Young officers sign in and spend the training night immersed in school books. They're spending work time studying for exams or courses or whatever other personal shit they have on the go.
-Senior officers sign in and likewise meander around, chitchat and collect a pay check for very little work.
-JNCOs and SNCOs sign in and blow off any real training or work, just there to sign in and collect a paycheck. Piss around on the internet waiting to hit the mess.
-Leadership at all levels show up with the sole intention of trying to nail down their next tasking or class B contract, no smick what their troops are doing or seem to give a shit about their subordinates development. The local armories is a welfare office for them. Happy to take but not so much give back to the unit.
-Training is boring and the normal regular parading members are stuck doing the same shit over and over while the part time -part time members are playing catch up (more on this below).
-Blatant double standards where privates are reamed out for showing up 5 minutes before everyone falls in (instead of 10) yet SNCOs or Officers show up just whenever and sign in.  The excuse of coming from another job doesn't extend below the rank of sgt.
-Soldiers aren't held accountable for shitty behavior. No one wants to discipline or charge them, either because it makes the closed confines of an armory awkward or they don't want the member to stop parading.
-"bad apples" are still sent on taskings (and some of them really good ones) because at the end of the day reserve units just want to put names to cftpo messages. No visible repercussions for ***king off training or the unit.

Fixes.
-The "boring training" is a double edged sword. You need to make training interesting and fun so members want to attend but at the same time it should be relative and realistic and not assassination missions or hostage rescue ops.  I would break the training into month long blocks with each block it's own theme starting with something basic then culminating in a related exercise after 3 or 4 training nights.  Ambushes, Section movement, first aid, IEDs & minefields, defensive, comms. Whatever.  A month block would split training between core basics and fun training. It's relatively quick so people won't get bored.
-If members are shitty then forget trying to look good in front of whatever brigade and just don't send them on taskings. Bad soldiers shouldn't be rewarded with courses or 4 months employment. I'd say those bad soldiers that get sent on taskings regardless are usually the ones that get in trouble with alcohol or behavior.
-Scale training nights depending on rank. There's no need for 4 platoon commanders and 4 sergeants to show up to work (and work on school work) if there's 4 soldiers showing up for training.  I bet they would get more involved in attendance if it hit them in the wallet.
-Augment the regular force more, especially for exercises. If money is an issue then cut some headquarters positions.  On the same note space is always a premium, if the regular force are going to do a 2 week exercise then organize it in a city or area with reserves so the regs can draw on them for manpower augmentation.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> You need to make training interesting and fun so members want to attend but at the same time it should be relative and realistic and not assassination missions or hostage rescue ops.



But how else will we practice extracting the good people from NDHQ to help us lead the way into a brighter future?


----------



## Flavus101

> -Soldiers aren't held accountable for shitty behavior. No one wants to discipline or charge them, either because it makes the closed confines of an armory awkward or they don't want the member to stop parading.



This right here. 

A big problem in the reserves is that a lot of the MCpl's and even Sgt's are pushed through the ranks so fast that the Cpl's of the Regiment they lead are their best friends who they joined with. Creates a very difficult dynamic to ensure discipline is maintained.

The Officers and SNCO's showing up as they please and leaving when they please is also a serious issue. There are some Officers whose only purpose it seems is to task someone else to polish some piece of silver or brass and then pop smoke for the night.


----------



## OldSolduer

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> This right here.
> 
> A big problem in the reserves is that a lot of the MCpl's and even Sgt's are pushed through the ranks so fast that the Cpl's of the Regiment they lead are their best friends who they joined with. Creates a very difficult dynamic to ensure discipline is maintained.
> 
> The Officers and SNCO's showing up as they please and leaving when they please is also a serious issue. There are some Officers whose only purpose it seems is to task someone else to polish some piece of silver or brass and then pop smoke for the night.



That's part of the issue, but it can be mitigated by holding the leaders accountable. 

As for Snr NCOs leaving early, the only ones that did that were cops who were going on duty. 

And no officer in my unit ever tasked anyone to polish anything!!


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Some observations about the reserves; problems and possible fixes.
> 
> Problems.
> [Caveat for the below, these aren't always the case but they do happen often IMO]
> -Young officers sign in and spend the training night immersed in school books. They're spending work time studying for exams or courses or whatever other personal crap they have on the go.
> -Senior officers sign in and likewise meander around, chitchat and collect a pay check for very little work.
> -JNCOs and SNCOs sign in and blow off any real training or work, just there to sign in and collect a paycheck. Piss around on the internet waiting to hit the mess.
> -Leadership at all levels show up with the sole intention of trying to nail down their next tasking or class B contract, no smick what their troops are doing or seem to give a crap about their subordinates development. The local armories is a welfare office for them. Happy to take but not so much give back to the unit.
> -Training is boring and the normal regular parading members are stuck doing the same crap over and over while the part time -part time members are playing catch up (more on this below).
> -Blatant double standards where privates are reamed out for showing up 5 minutes before everyone falls in (instead of 10) yet SNCOs or Officers show up just whenever and sign in.  The excuse of coming from another job doesn't extend below the rank of sgt.
> -Soldiers aren't held accountable for shitty behavior. No one wants to discipline or charge them, either because it makes the closed confines of an armory awkward or they don't want the member to stop parading.
> -"bad apples" are still sent on taskings (and some of them really good ones) because at the end of the day reserve units just want to put names to cftpo messages. No visible repercussions for ***king off training or the unit.
> 
> Fixes.
> -The "boring training" is a double edged sword. You need to make training interesting and fun so members want to attend but at the same time it should be relative and realistic and not assassination missions or hostage rescue ops.  I would break the training into month long blocks with each block it's own theme starting with something basic then culminating in a related exercise after 3 or 4 training nights.  Ambushes, Section movement, first aid, IEDs & minefields, defensive, comms. Whatever.  A month block would split training between core basics and fun training. It's relatively quick so people won't get bored.
> -If members are shitty then forget trying to look good in front of whatever brigade and just don't send them on taskings. Bad soldiers shouldn't be rewarded with courses or 4 months employment. I'd say those bad soldiers that get sent on taskings regardless are usually the ones that get in trouble with alcohol or behavior.
> -Scale training nights depending on rank. There's no need for 4 platoon commanders and 4 sergeants to show up to work (and work on school work) if there's 4 soldiers showing up for training.  I bet they would get more involved in attendance if it hit them in the wallet.
> -Augment the regular force more, especially for exercises. If money is an issue then cut some headquarters positions.  On the same note space is always a premium, if the regular force are going to do a 2 week exercise then organize it in a city or area with reserves so the regs can draw on them for manpower augmentation.


 there's no reason Sgts and Lts shouldn't participate in section level training, particularly small arms training.  Hop in and go through the drills on every weapon system and be intimately familiar with how it functions.  Same with section level battle drills, radio ops, etc.  The limited time avail to Reservists should be spent mastering craft, I can't think of anything else more important that they could be doing?


----------



## MilEME09

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> That's part of the issue, but it can be mitigated by holding the leaders accountable.
> 
> As for Snr NCOs leaving early, the only ones that did that were cops who were going on duty.
> 
> And no officer in my unit ever tasked anyone to polish anything!!



But who is holding them accountable? and how? the brigade commander/RSM? doubt they have the time to drop in at units all the time to check up on whats going on.


----------



## George Wallace

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> This right here.
> 
> A big problem in the reserves is that a lot of the MCpl's and even Sgt's are pushed through the ranks so fast that the Cpl's of the Regiment they lead are their best friends who they joined with. Creates a very difficult dynamic to ensure discipline is maintained.
> 
> The Officers and SNCO's showing up as they please and leaving when they please is also a serious issue. There are some Officers whose only purpose it seems is to task someone else to polish some piece of silver or brass and then pop smoke for the night.



This is not a big problem in the Reserves.  This is a BIG problem in your UNIT.


----------



## Remius

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is not a big problem in the Reserves.  This is a BIG problem in your UNIT.



Exactly.  

Big problems in the reserves include:

Lack of clear mandate
Lack of equipment
Lack of logistical support
Increase in mandatory feel good training that eats into real training
Too many changes in the training system making it very difficult to get trained pers
Centralised training 


The list goes on.  People should not mistake their own unit issues with issues at large.


----------



## Flavus101

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is not a big problem in the Reserves.  This is a BIG problem in your UNIT.



I often hear the same concerns from members of other Regiments, perhaps it is in just the Ontario regiments, specifically the Infantry ones (though I doubt it).

And you can replace the "polish an item" part with any task that is tailored towards the various associations of a Reserve unit and that does nothing to improve operational skillsets.


----------



## Brasidas

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I often hear the same concerns from members of other Regiments, perhaps it is in just the Ontario regiments, specifically the Infantry ones (though I doubt it).



Its not just your unit, but it is something that could be solved within the units, as opposed to the great mess of "role, capability, structure, and so forth".

I know my unit's had serious leadership issues, and is particularly short on experienced NCOs and officers, but we seem to have learned some lessons on how not to develop leaders.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I often hear the same concerns from members of other Regiments, perhaps it is in just the Ontario regiments, specifically the Infantry ones (though I doubt it).
> 
> And you can replace the "polish an item" part with any task that is tailored towards the various associations of a Reserve unit and that does nothing to improve operational skillsets.



I've spent 20+ years in the Reserve system, in Ontario. I won't say the problems that you and Jarnhammer are speaking of don't exist. However, you can't use that brush for all Units. There are more than a few units out there that don't appear to have these problems. So, I have to surmise that it is either a Corps problem or a Unit problem. Either way, not all units are as fooked as your's.


----------



## childs56

NinerSix said:
			
		

> Don't get me wrong, I tend to be underwhelmed when unmotivated troops complain about doing the same training over and over, while still not being able to recall basic info. Sure we do battle procedure every year, but how many can rattle off something close to the 15/16/17 steps?
> 
> Sigh.



I know many full time Cbt Arm  NCMs and NCOs prior to Afghanistan who had a hard time rattling off the Steps to Battle procedure.


----------



## Jarnhamar

I'd be more concerned someone truly understands battle procedure (principles of leadership etc..) than just being able to rhyme them off like a PLQ style laundry list we've all seen.

Junior leadership is an issue with the reserves. I've seen a reservist private with 11 months in the military on his PLQ (had the maturity of a 13 year old).  How long before he was promoted to MCpl after he graduated? 

The reserves seem to have an atmosphere where troops show up IF they need money or IF whatever they're doing sounds fun. One day a month doesn't cut it. Members should be told they will parade a specific number of nights a month (say 4) unless they are otherwise employed by another job. In which case, the chain of command should be given a work schedule.


----------



## George Wallace

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Junior leadership is an issue with the reserves. I've seen a reservist private with 11 months in the military on his PLQ (had the maturity of a 13 year old).  How long before he was promoted to MCpl after he graduated?



I saw the same thing in the '80's in the Reg Force at CTC.  YTEP candidates offered direct transfer into the Reg Force and within months newly minted MCpls (Infantry).  An old problem or solution that will be perpetuated as needs arise.  

About five years ago, there was a serious problem in the Reserves with a shortage of MCpls.  It created quite the Catch 22.  We needed Instructors for BMQ, but had a great shortage of MCpls.  We had to find potential leaders in a hurry, so PLQ was given priority over all other crses.  Problem arose there with not enough instructors, so the process was slowed; which slowed the availability of MCpls to run BMQ to create a larger pool of potential leadership candidates, and around it went......One big vicious circle.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

There are rules for NES etc.   Having to provide  work schedule;  why?  If I don't want to do Cl A on a given night, I just don't go.  You can't ppay people part time wages, and expect more than part time commitment. Nature of the beast.


----------



## Jarnhamar

George Wallace said:
			
		

> It created quite the Catch 22.  We needed Instructors for BMQ, but had a great shortage of MCpls.


Someone doesn't need to be a MCpl to instruct though. My QL3 section 2IC instructor was a cpl.  I think when we push soldiers to MCpl too fast we get immature leaders who take advantage of the rank.



			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> There are rules for NES etc.   Having to provide  work schedule;  why?  If I don't want to do Cl A on a given night, I just don't go.  You can't ppay people part time wages, and expect more than part time commitment. Nature of the beast.



There are rules for NES but having dealt first hand with that nightmare it's not effective. People slide on and off the NES list, providing their CoC is even paying attention (providing that CoC even showed up to work), with next to no repercussions. People can ditch work for months then come crawling back and they'll get sent on good summer taskings because someones gotta do it.

As far as providing a schedule when you have a part time job you _still _have a schedule. You don't get to decide if you want to work 10 minutes before your shift starts and keep your job.  Reservists show up if they feel like it. I'd say it's less a part time job and more a casual job.  Reservists can actually be ordered to work up to 12 days a month if I recall correctly but I believe it was Haggis who pointed out that members who are ordered to show up for work (class A) and don't would be charged in a civilian court (vice military side) which would be a mess to try and battle.  Anyone in the reserves has seen exercises where 30 people promise to show up for a weekend ex and 7 show up and theres nothing the chain of command can do about it. I've seen unit ex's where 3 soldiers show up for an exercise. Addressing accountability and making the reserves more part time (in line with civilian jobs) and less casual work would improve the level of training among other things.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Again, people should not take their experience at a couple of Reserve units and use a broad brush to paint the whole Reserve system with that experience.


----------



## mariomike

From what I remember, if you were familiar with one Reserve unit, you were familiar with one Reserve unit. 

I am sure times have changed since then, but I wonder how much?

Regarding NES, I just know what I read on here,

NES - Non-Effective Strength  
http://army.ca/forums/threads/732.0
3 pages.


----------



## George Wallace

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Someone doesn't need to be a MCpl to instruct though. My QL3 section 2IC instructor was a cpl.  I think when we push soldiers to MCpl too fast we get immature leaders who take advantage of the rank.



It is true that one "does not need to be a MCpl" to instruct; but they must meet one of two requirements to do so: 
Be a SME; or 
hold the PLQ qualification necessary to instruct.  (A qualified Cpl, who holds the qual but has not been appointed MCpl)


----------



## Jarnhamar

recceguy said:
			
		

> Again, people should not take their experience at a couple of Reserve units and use a broad brush to paint the whole Reserve system with that experience.


True I can only speak with familiarity with some eastern Ontario units and through word of mouth to others in Ontario.


----------



## MilEME09

recceguy said:
			
		

> Again, people should not take their experience at a couple of Reserve units and use a broad brush to paint the whole Reserve system with that experience.



While I agree, I'm in Alberta, and I'm hearing similar stories on here from Ontario, while not every unit is like that yes, but it does beg the question, are we selecting bad leaders? or is it that the training for our leaders needs to be amended.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> There are rules for NES but having dealt first hand with that nightmare it's not effective. People slide on and off the NES list, providing their CoC is even paying attention (providing that CoC even showed up to work), with next to no repercussions. People can ditch work for months then come crawling back and they'll get sent on good summer taskings because someones gotta do it.
> 
> As far as providing a schedule when you have a part time job you _still _have a schedule. You don't get to decide if you want to work 10 minutes before your shift starts and keep your job.  Reservists show up if they feel like it. I'd say it's less a part time job and more a casual job.  Reservists can actually be ordered to work up to 12 days a month if I recall correctly but I believe it was Haggis who pointed out that members who are ordered to show up for work (class A) and don't would be charged in a civilian court (vice military side) which would be a mess to try and battle.  Anyone in the reserves has seen exercises where 30 people promise to show up for a weekend ex and 7 show up and theres nothing the chain of command can do about it. I've seen unit ex's where 3 soldiers show up for an exercise. Addressing accountability and making the reserves more part time (in line with civilian jobs) and less casual work would improve the level of training among other things.



Having done the Cl A/ B / B (a) gigs in my former life, I agree; unless the CofC is willing to have a GAFF, WRT NES policy, etc and lead and administer their units IAW policy, there isn't much to you can do at the lower leadership levels.

My experience tells me that good attendance in the PRes world has 2 key aspects.  

(1) interesting training with a known end state.

(2) good morale and leadership particularly at the Jnr Officer and Snr NCO/MCpl level.  I say this because the low numbers are usually seen when 'the troops' say "f88k this, I am not going to that BS".  Then you end up with the RSS and Cl B types on the ex, pissed off and being more miserable to the few Cl A guys who DO show up...sooner or later, they start joining the "f**k this" crowd.  

My former PRes unit, in the early 90s, had upwards of 98-99% attendance rates for trg nights and weekends.  Some of the things that changed since then, which has basically left that unit in tatters, is lack of kit, lack of bucks in the trg budget which results in a low GAFF.  What was once a good *5 to 7 car troops, 3 troops PRes Armd Recce Sqn with a reasonable A1 Ech and SHQ with 2 x CPs*, etc is now...far less than that.  I don't know what would motivate me to have a GAFF now, if I was still there.

Treating reservists with the " you don't have a choice " attitude you can throw around the Reg Force can backfire, and then you see they DO have a choice to miss the "mandatory Diversity trg" weekend.  And SFA you can do about it.

My early PRes days were focused on the actual tasks we did;  trg, mini-exs on a training night such as establish a mounted OP.  We did anything we could to mix it up, and it worked.  Our attendance records showed it.  It takes the junior leadership to pop the bubble, turn off the PowerPoint projector, and actually _do stuff_.  We would start a trg night with a Wng O for a mounted OP task.  Let the BP happen...next night, show up, kit up, Ptl Cmdr orders, move to/occupy the Mtd OP screen, to the point where we sent in our OP reports.  End-ex, back, clean up, turn kit in, then off to the mess for the hotwash, Final Parade and a few wobblies.  Morale was high, people had +GAFFs.

If that kind of stuff isn't happening now, make it happen.  Beg, borrow, steal...train and motivate your folks.


----------



## FJAG

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> There are rules for NES but having dealt first hand with that nightmare it's not effective. People slide on and off the NES list, providing their CoC is even paying attention (providing that CoC even showed up to work), with next to no repercussions.  . . .   Reservists can actually be ordered to work up to 12 days a month if I recall correctly but I believe it was Haggis who pointed out that members who are ordered to show up for work (class A) and don't would be charged in a civilian court (vice military side) which would be a mess to try and battle.  Anyone in the reserves has seen exercises where 30 people promise to show up for a weekend ex and 7 show up and theres nothing the chain of command can do about it. I've seen unit ex's where 3 soldiers show up for an exercise. Addressing accountability and making the reserves more part time (in line with civilian jobs) and less casual work would improve the level of training among other things.



Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the NDA provides that reservists may be ordered to train for such period as are prescribed in regulations.

QR&O 9.04(2) is a regulation that prescribes that reservists may be ordered to train for up to 60 days on Class A service and 14 days Class B service in a year.

There are various policies and directives which indicate when a person is considered to no longer be effective and what the processes are that should be followed to release the individual.

The problem that we have is what to do when a person disobeys an order to attend training.

Paragraph 60(1)(c) of the NDA specifies when a reservist is liable under law for an offence under the Code of Service Discipline. The problem is that at the moment in time that the individual is not attending the ordered training he is generally not physically present nor meeting one of the other conditions of 60(1)(c) (I could see rare circumstances where he would be e.g. not attending training on the armoury floor but up in the mess having a beer) and therefore not liable under the CSD.

On the other hand, however, there is a provision in the NDA--para 294(1)--that makes it an offence triable before a civilian court for "failure to attend parade". The punishment is a $25 fine for ORs and $50 for officers for every day not paraded.

In part the "NES problem" is the structure of the laws as it becomes an administrative hassle to go to court whenever people fail to show up. You need to lay the charge, attend at court to prove the individual was ordered to train and didn't show up etc. The CoC in general just does not need or want the hassle. A change to the NDA would be helpful but during the time when I sat on the CRes&C council, while there were complaints about the issue, there was no appetite to seek a change in the laws.

The real problem is the false notion that reservists have some right to pick and choose when to attend military activities because they are "volunteers" and would quit if compelled to do things. This belief is deeply ingrained in our regular force CoC and to a large extent in our reserve CoC as well.

The truth of the matter is that a reservist only truly volunteers once: at the moment that they agree to be enrolled in the reserves. After that they are liable under the law to numerous provisions which can require them to report for and do their duty. That liability exists until the day that they are released from the Forces.

If we want to get around the "NES problem" we need firstly a major change in attitude in the CoC and secondly if we achieve that, then some minor changes in the laws to bring "failure to parade" within the Code of Service Discipline.

If they would quit if compelled to attend is a different issue. In my mind once you create a fair system where everyone understands their responsibilities people tend to tow the line. Besides do you really need the fair-weather soldiers who are part of the problem now. I think that in the end we might end up with a smaller force but it would be a significantly more effective one.

 [cheers]


----------



## mariomike

FJAG said:
			
		

> If we want to get around the "NES problem" we need firstly a major change in attitude in the CoC and secondly if we achieve that, then some minor changes in the laws to bring "failure to parade" within the Code of Service Discipline.



Regarding "failure to parade",



			
				CountDC said:
			
		

> They don't even have to parade 12 days/24 Nights.  Once in a 30 day period that has 3 scheduled parades in it if the unit will actually enforce the NES policy.  Depending on a unit parade schedule this could be as little as 7 parades for a unit that stands up in Sep and stands down in May.   I have seen a unit schedule based on budget restrictions in the past consist of Sep - Nov, stand down for Dec, Jan/Feb and Mar have evenings designated as on ramps if money was available so 5 evening parades kept the mbrs safe for that period.  Apr started the new FY so they had to do 1 day in Apr and 1 Day in May to finish off the training year.


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the NDA provides that reservists may be ordered to train for such period as are prescribed in regulations.
> 
> QR&O 9.04(2) is a regulation that prescribes that reservists may be ordered to train for up to 60 days on Class A service and 14 days Class B service in a year.
> 
> Paragraph 60(1)(c) of the NDA specifies when a reservist is liable under law for an offence under the Code of Service Discipline. The problem is that at the moment in time that the individual is not attending the ordered training he is generally not physically present nor meeting one of the other conditions of 60(1)(c) (I could see rare circumstances where he would be e.g. not attending training on the armoury floor but up in the mess having a beer) and therefore not liable under the CSD.



Here is the problem I see here, if it's not a national emergency Reservist leave legislation covers around 20 days for annual training. Let's say QR&O 9.04(2) is invoked for 30 days, now of you have 10 days were Bloggins does not have legal job protection. That said I think this could be a useful provision for the CoC, particularly for major training events like a brigade EX.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> if it's not a national emergency Reservist leave legislation covers around 20 days for annual training.



Which province are you referring to?

Ontario
https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/guide/reservist.php


----------



## MilEME09

mariomike said:
			
		

> Which province are you referring to?
> 
> Ontario
> https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/guide/reservist.php



BC, AB, i just looked up SK, and MB and there rules are much better. Ontario if you notice it talks only about pre and post deployment training, not general training. Manitoba has is best where it states that all training is covered. A common thing though is all state written notice must be given to an employer 4 weeks prior, thats an issue too.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> BC, AB, i just looked up SK, and MB and there rules are much better.



I didn't look it up, but I am assuming that is unpaid leave?

Some employers offer two-weeks of paid leave for annual summer training,
https://wx.toronto.ca/intra/hr/policies.nsf/a8170e9c63677876852577d7004ff7f8/58a35e5368beb69e852567bd006d7e4b?OpenDocument


----------



## MilEME09

correct it is unpaid leave


----------



## RCPalmer

FJAG said:
			
		

> Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the NDA provides that reservists may be ordered to train for such period as are prescribed in regulations.
> 
> QR&O 9.04(2) is a regulation that prescribes that reservists may be ordered to train for up to 60 days on Class A service and 14 days Class B service in a year.
> 
> There are various policies and directives which indicate when a person is considered to no longer be effective and what the processes are that should be followed to release the individual.
> 
> The problem that we have is what to do when a person disobeys an order to attend training.
> 
> Paragraph 60(1)(c) of the NDA specifies when a reservist is liable under law for an offence under the Code of Service Discipline. The problem is that at the moment in time that the individual is not attending the ordered training he is generally not physically present nor meeting one of the other conditions of 60(1)(c) (I could see rare circumstances where he would be e.g. not attending training on the armoury floor but up in the mess having a beer) and therefore not liable under the CSD.
> 
> On the other hand, however, there is a provision in the NDA--para 294(1)--that makes it an offence triable before a civilian court for "failure to attend parade". The punishment is a $25 fine for ORs and $50 for officers for every day not paraded.
> 
> In part the "NES problem" is the structure of the laws as it becomes an administrative hassle to go to court whenever people fail to show up. You need to lay the charge, attend at court to prove the individual was ordered to train and didn't show up etc. The CoC in general just does not need or want the hassle. A change to the NDA would be helpful but during the time when I sat on the CRes&C council, while there were complaints about the issue, there was no appetite to seek a change in the laws.
> 
> The real problem is the false notion that reservists have some right to pick and choose when to attend military activities because they are "volunteers" and would quit if compelled to do things. This belief is deeply ingrained in our regular force CoC and to a large extent in our reserve CoC as well.
> 
> The truth of the matter is that a reservist only truly volunteers once: at the moment that they agree to be enrolled in the reserves. After that they are liable under the law to numerous provisions which can require them to report for and do their duty. That liability exists until the day that they are released from the Forces.
> 
> If we want to get around the "NES problem" we need firstly a major change in attitude in the CoC and secondly if we achieve that, then some minor changes in the laws to bring "failure to parade" within the Code of Service Discipline.
> 
> If they would quit if compelled to attend is a different issue. In my mind once you create a fair system where everyone understands their responsibilities people tend to tow the line. Besides do you really need the fair-weather soldiers who are part of the problem now. I think that in the end we might end up with a smaller force but it would be a significantly more effective one.
> 
> [cheers]



I think that you would find a lot of support for enforced mandatory training amongst all ranks of the PRes...assuming the service expectations are reasonable. In the current model, a PRes soldier is soaked for as much time and energy as they are willing to provide.  This is why soldiers and leaders pick and choose. If you make yourself available for 100 days of work per year, the PRes will oblige. Some will do that because they want to or need the money, and that is fine. Others will take on the extra work to support their units, and they will burn out and release or their family lives will suffer.  Work three weekends on, one off for six monhs to teach a weekend BMQ?  Give up family time to track CTAT completion results or write a PER for every Cpl in the unit, even if they only trained 10 days In the whole year? Where does that fit into a part time model of service?  

Because PRes members have the option (and a veritable smorgasbord activities, courses and task that the Army is willing to pay for) some will choose the activities aligned with the priorities of the organization, and some will focus on themselves and the activities they like.  

A key part of this discussion should be an honest dialog of what we expect out of part time soldiers, and at the moment there are lots of things that we do demand that are rediculous for a cohort of people who should be focused on their civilian careers and schooling.


----------



## RedcapCrusader

I'd be all for mandatory training and work, if the legislation to protect our other jobs reflected better policy to suit.

20 training days per year is not nearly enough... Ditto 2 weeks during summer months.

I'd like more employers to offer a top-up too.

Also, If the CAF really wants us to commit more, maybe they should offer more (like better pay, and include benefits even if it's an optional buy-in).


----------



## Fishbone Jones

They should offer boots, lots would sign up then.  :rofl:


----------



## MilEME09

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I think that you would find a lot of support for enforced mandatory training amongst all ranks of the PRes...assuming the service expectations are reasonable. In the current model, a PRes soldier is soaked for as much time and energy as they are willing to provide.  This is why soldiers and leaders pick and choose. If you make yourself available for 100 days of work per year, the PRes will oblige. Some will do that because they want to or need the money, and that is fine. Others will take on the extra work to support their units, and they will burn out and release or their family lives will suffer.  Work three weekends on, one off for six monhs to teach a weekend BMQ?  Give up family time to track CTAT completion results or write a PER for every Cpl in the unit, even if they only trained 10 days In the whole year? Where does that into a part time model of service?
> 
> Because PRes members have the option (and a veritable smorgasbord activities, courses and task that the Army is willing to pay for) some will choose the activities aligned with the priorities of the organization, and some will focus on themselves and the activities they like.
> 
> A key part of this discussion an honest dialog of what we expect out of part time soldiers, and at the moments there are lots of things that we do demand that are rediculous for a cohort of people who should be focused on their civilian careers and schooling.



If they want a lot out of the troops then the CF should be able to give back, offer up cool courses that require a CO's approval, idea being say MCpl X has been working his but off and logged 90+ class A days to keep the unit running, reward said person and say hey do you wanna go on this cool course/tasking as a break from all this? As well as we have all stated we the PRes need a defined purpose, and mandate, training should be made dynamic, and hold the interest of the troops. Training should also be audited by higher command periodically including an officer or NCO from higher HQ being an observer on an EX.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Training should also be audited by higher command periodically including an officer or NCO from higher HQ being an observer on an EX.



Once upon a time, Bde Comds would participate in training and kick CO ass if it was lame, or give an attaboy if it was good. Same for COs participating in Coy level training. That was called 'leadership', and this was one of the main roles for senior leaders. Leading by example, in person.

Now? Everyone seems to 'command' by email and 'lead' no one.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If they want a lot out of the troops then the CF should be able to give back, offer up cool courses that require a CO's approval, idea being say MCpl X has been working his but off and logged 90+ class A days to keep the unit running, reward said person and say hey do you wanna go on this cool course/tasking as a break from all this? As well as we have all stated we the PRes need a defined purpose, and mandate, training should be made dynamic, and hold the interest of the troops. Training should also be audited by higher command periodically including an officer or NCO from higher HQ being an observer on an EX.



"Cool courses"...can you elaborate some?  Trg should be something that is relevant to your trade and something you can actually use in your unit lines.  Sending PRes members on Jump Courses/Cool Course X costs money.  I'd love to get some 'cool courses' but I have the trg I need to do my job and that's my main purpose in CAF life, isn't it?  

When I was at a CBGHQ, we certainly did send Obs/Controllers out on Bde Exs to see how things were going down, sometimes embedded right at the sub-unit (troop/Ptl) level.  Back then at least, the HQ operated and exercised as a HQ and there really isn't that many 'free' people to observe trg that understand what the trg is about.  There's no sense sending a Log O to observe an Arty unit, as an example.


----------



## mariomike

LunchMeat said:
			
		

> I'd like more employers to offer a top-up too.



We had / have two weeks of paid military leave every year. It isn't cheap for the employer.

My salary for two weeks ( 80 hrs. ), plus calling in 80 hours of overtime at time and a half ( 120 hrs. ) = 200 hrs. to cover my shifts.

I had to give my two weeks pay from the CAF to The City Treasurer, but it didn't compensate them for those 200 hrs.

Maybe the Government of Canada should be topping up the employers?


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> "Cool courses"...can you elaborate some?  Trg should be something that is relevant to your trade and something you can actually use in your unit lines.  Sending PRes members on Jump Courses/Cool Course X costs money.  I'd love to get some 'cool courses' but I have the trg I need to do my job and that's my main purpose in CAF life, isn't it?



My definition is any course that offers a new skill set that isn't learned from a power point presentation for a couple days. Something like a jump course would be expensive, but say the unit was given three positions on a CIMIC/psy ops course, offer them a spot before others. Preferential treatment? maybe a bit but if bloggins is keeping the lights on, and the cogs moving, why not give him first crack when these things come up?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My definition is any course that offers a new skill set that isn't learned from a power point presentation for a couple days. Something like a jump course would be expensive, but say the unit was given three positions on a CIMIC/psy ops course, offer them a spot before others. Preferential treatment? maybe a bit but if bloggins is keeping the lights on, and the cogs moving, why not give him first crack when these things come up?



Rewarding key members is always a good idea.  I guess the overall point is you've got to take what you have and make it as interesting as possible; that is what you can do at your level, always, to make it as interesting as possible and keep people showing up.  Like my example above;  a mounted OP scenario for Armd Recce where one trg night was Battle Procedure, the next one (a week later...) was H-hour to ENDEX.  Or, foot patrols.  In the winter, we concentrated on mandated winter ex stuff, and made the exercises more than just up pole/down pole stuff because that just sucks ass.  

I know this gets said, but the reality of boredom/routine/no cool courses etc also exits in the Regs.  I just accept it as part of military life.  I had a trade in the PRes that had lots of things to train for in Armd Recce so we never ended doing the same thing over and over.  Back then, we also had comms for each C/S, we had enough veh's for a Sqn, etc.  Doesn't seem to be the norm these days, so I am not sure how the interest levels can be the same.

NCOs and WOs come to their CofC with problems _and_ recommended solutions.  Look around your unit, find ways to break the routine and do what you can to make it happen.  I don't think you are going to see an increase in the $$ the PRes has in the near future...


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My definition is any course that offers a new skill set that isn't learned from a power point presentation for a couple days. Something like a jump course would be expensive, but say the unit was given three positions on a CIMIC/psy ops course, offer them a spot before others. Preferential treatment? maybe a bit but if bloggins is keeping the lights on, and the cogs moving, why not give him first crack when these things come up?



The best reward is well planned, resourced, led, incrementally challenging and effective training, and the sense of personal confidence and competence, and peer and other kinds of recognition that emanates from that.

All the other stuff is merely icing on the cake.


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the NDA provides that reservists may be ordered to train for such period as are prescribed in regulations.
> 
> QR&O 9.04(2) is a regulation that prescribes that reservists may be ordered to train for up to 60 days on Class A service and 14 days Class B service in a year.
> 
> There are various policies and directives which indicate when a person is considered to no longer be effective and what the processes are that should be followed to release the individual.
> 
> The problem that we have is what to do when a person disobeys an order to attend training.
> 
> Paragraph 60(1)(c) of the NDA specifies when a reservist is liable under law for an offence under the Code of Service Discipline. The problem is that at the moment in time that the individual is not attending the ordered training he is generally not physically present nor meeting one of the other conditions of 60(1)(c) (I could see rare circumstances where he would be e.g. not attending training on the armoury floor but up in the mess having a beer) and therefore not liable under the CSD.
> 
> On the other hand, however, there is a provision in the NDA--para 294(1)--that makes it an offence triable before a civilian court for "failure to attend parade". The punishment is a $25 fine for ORs and $50 for officers for every day not paraded.
> 
> In part the "NES problem" is the structure of the laws as it becomes an administrative hassle to go to court whenever people fail to show up. You need to lay the charge, attend at court to prove the individual was ordered to train and didn't show up etc. The CoC in general just does not need or want the hassle. A change to the NDA would be helpful but during the time when I sat on the CRes&C council, while there were complaints about the issue, there was no appetite to seek a change in the laws.
> 
> The real problem is the false notion that reservists have some right to pick and choose when to attend military activities because they are "volunteers" and would quit if compelled to do things. This belief is deeply ingrained in our regular force CoC and to a large extent in our reserve CoC as well.
> 
> The truth of the matter is that a reservist only truly volunteers once: at the moment that they agree to be enrolled in the reserves. After that they are liable under the law to numerous provisions which can require them to report for and do their duty. That liability exists until the day that they are released from the Forces.
> 
> If we want to get around the "NES problem" we need firstly a major change in attitude in the CoC and secondly if we achieve that, then some minor changes in the laws to bring "failure to parade" within the Code of Service Discipline.
> 
> If they would quit if compelled to attend is a different issue. In my mind once you create a fair system where everyone understands their responsibilities people tend to tow the line. Besides do you really need the fair-weather soldiers who are part of the problem now. I think that in the end we might end up with a smaller force but it would be a significantly more effective one.
> 
> [cheers]



You need to read NDA SERVICE 33(2) and 33 (3). 
and then 31 (1)


other wise the only time a Reserve Soldier has an actual obligation to training and or employment is when they sign a contract such as Class B or C, or they signed the Class A training day pay sheet. Reserve Soldiers have a moral obligation to attend training but that is it. Unless a Order of Council is done. 

Job Protection and Leave for training is only mandatory for Public Service employees. A couple of the Provinces have also enacted Legislation to Protect Reserve Jobs for training who work for the provincial service. Otherwise Civilian Employers are under no Obligation to allow Reserve Soldiers time off for training or Deployments. 

Right now I know a few excellent Reserve Soldiers who can only attend a few nights a year due to their full time job requirements, (not everyone works M-F 8-5). Their Units recognize this and they also recognize the value those soldiers have to their unit. When push comes to shove those Soldiers get the job done, usually at great personal and work sacrifice. Which the Forces could care less about. But the Member needs to weigh the options and consequences. 
I personally would work my Civilian job for 8-10 hrs  a day, then do another 4 hrs+ a night 4 days a week unpaid at my unit. Then was usually in on the weekends to ensure things were taken care of, Call backs were done for possible recruits, paper work was filled out for requests. 
Lets say I burnt myself out after a few years and so did a few other guys. My Civilian job suffered greatly as did my social life 
I laughed the day the Brigade Commander came for a visit and I was at my desk full of papers, unshaven and in civies, feet on my desk as he and the Bgde Sgt Maj walked in. The Sgt Maj blew a gasket and asked me if i regulalry came to work unshaven and in civies. I responded yes I do when I am not paid to be here and  the job needs to get done and there is no one eles around to get the job done.


----------



## MilEME09

mariomike said:
			
		

> Even if it is unpaid leave, it could be expensive for the employer if they have to pay other employees overtime to do your job.



One of the last pieces of legislation the cons passed was compensation for employers if reservists go overseas, had a briefing about it a few weeks ago, formula is based on a number of factors but can cover the cost of OT or even a potential new hire. Now if this could be extended to annual training and courses of over X number of days I think that would help.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You want to make it look like benefit to hire a reservist, rather than an obligation on the employer.


----------



## FJAG

CTD said:
			
		

> You need to read NDA SERVICE 33(2) and 33 (3).
> and then 31 (1)
> 
> other wise the only time a Reserve Soldier has an actual obligation to training and or employment is when they sign a contract such as Class B or C, or they signed the Class A training day pay sheet. Reserve Soldiers have a moral obligation to attend training but that is it. Unless a Order of Council is done.



Not sure what you are getting at with this.

33(2) is the paragraph that allows the chain of command to order obligatory parading/training sessions. QE&O 9.04(2) limits that to 60 days Class A and 14 days Class B.

33(3) is not relevant to anything. The only reserve component whose terms of service limited them to only perform duties on active service was the Supplementary reserve (See QR&O 2.034(b)). 33(3) has no application as far as the Primary Reserve who remains subject to 33(2) vis a vis training.

31(1) relates to the power of the governor in council (cabinet) to place any unit, component etc on Active Duty in the specified circumstances. That's a whole long story in and of itself but has nothing to do with what we would call the run of the mill ordinary primary reserve force training. 31(1) is what you could call being mobilized or called up for obligatory full time service.

There is absolutely no requirement to sign a contract for Class B or C service to be liable under 33(2). Once you have been enrolled in the reserve force you are automatically liable to perform whatever training is ordered pursuant to 33(2). The legal obligation and consequences are there if in fact the provision is used. 

The reality is that the various units rarely make the training obligatory pursuant to 33(2). The fact is that the units allow the training to be voluntary which, as you say, may trigger some moral obligation and not a legal one. That's not to say that the law isn't there. It most certainly is and as I said before, if you were to fail to attend a mandatory training session ordered under 33(2) you would be liable to being charged and fined in a civilian court under NDA 294(1)

 :cheers:


----------



## RCPalmer

FJAG said:
			
		

> Not sure what you are getting at with this.
> 
> 33(2) is the paragraph that allows the chain of command to order obligatory parading/training sessions. QE&O 9.04(2) limits that to 60 days Class A and 14 days Class B.
> 
> 33(3) is not relevant to anything. The only reserve component whose terms of service limited them to only perform duties on active service was the Supplementary reserve (See QR&O 2.034(b)). 33(3) has no application as far as the Primary Reserve who remains subject to 33(2) vis a vis training.
> 
> 31(1) relates to the power of the governor in council (cabinet) to place any unit, component etc on Active Duty in the specified circumstances. That's a whole long story in and of itself but has nothing to do with what we would call the run of the mill ordinary primary reserve force training. 31(1) is what you could call being mobilized or called up for obligatory full time service.
> 
> There is absolutely no requirement to sign a contract for Class B or C service to be liable under 33(2). Once you have been enrolled in the reserve force you are automatically liable to perform whatever training is ordered pursuant to 33(2). The legal obligation and consequences are there if in fact the provision is used.
> 
> The reality is that the various units rarely make the training obligatory pursuant to 33(2). The fact is that the units allow the training to be voluntary which, as you say, may trigger some moral obligation and not a legal one. That's not to say that the law isn't there. It most certainly is and as I said before, if you were to fail to attend a mandatory training session ordered under 33(2) you would be liable to being charged and fined in a civilian court under NDA 294(1)
> 
> :cheers:



I have heard these regulations noted in passing in various "what we are doing to strengthen the Army Reserve?" briefs and fireside chats, so maybe we will see them used, especially in the Provinces (like AB) with job protection for routine training.

That said, I don't think it would be fair to think of this legislation as a tool in every commander's kit. Are you aware of any instances where this legislation was used by the PRes, say in the last 20 years? I would be very surprised if a local commander (CO or CBG commander for example) would be able to declare any training mandatory without soliciting much higher level buy in, perhaps at the L1, CDS, or even MND level.


----------



## FJAG

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> I have heard these regulations noted in passing in various "what we are doing to strengthen the Army Reserve?" briefs and fireside chats, so maybe we will see them used, especially in the Provinces (like AB) with job protection for routine training.
> 
> That said, I don't think it would be fair to think of this legislation as a tool in every commander's kit. Are you aware of any instances where this legislation was used by the PRes, say in the last 20 years? I would be very surprised if a local commander (CO or CBG commander for example) would be able to declare any training mandatory without soliciting much higher level buy in, perhaps at the L1, CDS, or even MND level.



I do not know of any cases although I have heard of one anecdotally but have never been able to verify it. 

I do know that I have spoken with the most senior leaders of the reserves as well as numerous unit COs, and there is generally no desire to use the legislation the way that it exists. 

In some cases the issue is the administrative complexity of dealing with crown prosecutors and the civilian court system.

In others it's the view that heavy handed enforcement of obligatory training would result in loss of people, particularly at the officer and NCO levels where individuals are more likely to have more responsible and better paying civilian jobs that they would consider jeopardised. 

Changing the NDA to bring s294(1) within the CSD would solve the first matter but not the second. 

As I said several posts ago, the issue is really one of an attitude that has developed over many decades where throughout the entire forces system, leaders (both regular and reserve), at all ranks, have grown to accept a status quo that our people are free to opt in or opt out of military activities as they see fit.

Paradoxically, it is the same people who bemoan the fact that people do not show up for training and that the reserves as a whole are less effective than they could be. I've long been an advocate of the fact that the system is broken and needs a radical fix--that it can't be repaired with fine tuning. Unfortunately those views have fallen on deaf ears.

 :cheers:


----------



## RCPalmer

FJAG said:
			
		

> I do not know of any cases although I have heard of one anecdotally but have never been able to verify it.
> 
> I do know that I have spoken with the most senior leaders of the reserves as well as numerous unit COs, and there is generally no desire to use the legislation the way that it exists.
> 
> In some cases the issue is the administrative complexity of dealing with crown prosecutors and the civilian court system.
> 
> In others it's the view that heavy handed enforcement of obligatory training would result in loss of people, particularly at the officer and NCO levels where individuals are more likely to have more responsible and better paying civilian jobs that they would consider jeopardised.
> 
> Changing the NDA to bring s294(1) within the CSD would solve the first matter but not the second.
> 
> As I said several posts ago, the issue is really one of an attitude that has developed over many decades where throughout the entire forces system, leaders (both regular and reserve), at all ranks, have grown to accept a status quo that our people are free to opt in or opt out of military activities as they see fit.
> 
> Paradoxically, it is the same people who bemoan the fact that people do not show up for training and that the reserves as a whole are less effective than they could be. I've long been an advocate of the fact that the system is broken and needs a radical fix--that it can't be repaired with fine tuning. Unfortunately those views have fallen on deaf ears.
> 
> :cheers:



Well, you'll get no arguement from me on the requirement for major change, and the significant institutional cultural factors holding us back.  I think that if the top level commanders wanted mandatory reserve training, we would have it.  Local commanders would adapt to the new reality, and while we might lose a few of our less motivated people I think most would adapt to the new expectations, provided that mandatory training was implemented in a judicious manner respectful of the requirement of members to maintain their civilian careers and a semi functional family life. For example, if we made 3-4 weekends (dedicated to individual training courses, exercises or teaching based on service requirements) per year and the annual week-long concentration mandatory, I don't think that would break anyone.

Unfortunately, a volunteer model also happens to fit in well with the prevailing RegF narrative that the PRes cannot be counted for anything more than a casual labour pool with few to no organic capabilities to offer, which continues to justify a lack of adequate equipment and institutional support.  This lack of support perpetuates that narrative as it sewers morale and retention, keeping the part time force on its back foot.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Well, you'll get no arguement from me on the requirement for major change, and the significant institutional cultural factors holding us back.  I think that if the top level commanders wanted mandatory reserve training, we would have it.  Local commanders would adapt to the new reality, and while we might lose a few of our less motivated people I think most would adapt to the new expectations, provided that mandatory training was implemented in a judicious manner respectful of the requirement of members to maintain their civilian careers and a semi functional family life. For example, if we made 3-4 weekends (dedicated to individual training courses, exercises or teaching based on service requirements) per year and the annual week-long concentration mandatory, I don't think that would break anyone.
> 
> Unfortunately, a volunteer model also happens to fit in well with the prevailing RegF narrative that the PRes cannot be counted for anything more than a casual labour pool with few to no organic capabilities to offer, which continues to justify a lack of adequate equipment and institutional support.  This lack of support perpetuates that narrative as it sewers morale and retention, keeping the part time force on its back foot.



Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.

But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.
> 
> But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.



So basically we have rules that could help solve the problem (even if its a band aid fix) but CO's don't want to use them because of the admin? am I understanding that correctly? no wonder things are down hill.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.
> 
> But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.



Well since we can all dream, my proposal would include the following:

1. develop a force structure end state that would comprise the maximum size organization that you need for your defence objectives (assuming we ever get any)

2. analyse what part of that structure needs to be full-time and which part could be served by a mobilizeable part-time force. (just as an example such skills as artillery gun line, infantry mortars and riflemen could easily be reserve force to ramp up reg force units which would have minimally manned subunits when not deployed on operations; as could transport companies in service bns, recce troops, etc) Fund equipment acquisition and maintenance for the total mobilized force establishment (plus a replacement scale) (Quite frankly much of the money to pay for ramped up reserve service and equipment could come from reallocating PY funds from regular force personnel that are not needed on a day to day basis and could be replaced by significantly greater numbers of mobilizeable reservists.)

3. eliminate from the part-time force the vast bulk of the leadership component and concentrate and fund primarily at the Maj and below and WO and below level (I'm one of those guys that feels that we need a lot more cpls and ptes and a lot less reserve Cols, LCols, CWOs, MWOs and staff weenies)

4. establish courses for the reserves that concentrate on the "must know" level (and fund accordingly) and leave the "should know" and "could know" levels to the reg force. 

5. establish set piece, nationally established obligatory training requirements (both monthly and annual) with fixed parade days and fund accordingly. (In my dream world annual training exercises would all be combined reg force with their mobilized reserve force component events.)

6. amend legislation (and the command culture to use it) so as to a) put teeth into obligatory training, b) expand the Ministers powers to call out reservists on service under QR&O 9.04(3) (currently limited to "emergencies" i.e. war, invasion, riot or insurrection [for example under the current definition the Minister could not have called out reservists for Afghanistan even if he had wanted to - my position is that the Minister should be able to call out reservists for any government initiated operation without having to go to cabinet--something like the US National Guard and Reserve]) c) establish real job protection legislation that properly protect reservists under the new structure.

That's the kind of stuff I floated continuously at CRes&C council for some six-seven years but could never get anyone to leave the though process of business as usual with tiny steps that lead nowhere. So I expect the dream will always remain just a dream. On the other hand if things stay the way they are you'll continue to get a half days pay for your wild game dinner.  ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG - lets say for a second your dream was implemented, do you think in that model it would be best to have PRes units as a deployable subunit? example say 1VP goes over seas and the Calgary Highlanders or the Loyal Edmonton Regiment are called up to provide 1 Coy to the battlegroup?


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So basically we have rules that could help solve the problem (even if its a band aid fix) but CO's don't want to use them because of the admin? am I understanding that correctly? no wonder things are down hill.



Not just admin. 

There is a very large component that believes that if you start making things obligatory for the reserves then they will quit and/or not join up in the first place. That's not just academic. If you want to really make things obligatory then you need to have a backup plan to replace those of the senior leaders (both officers and NCOs) who will walk out. 

In my mind reserve units should have a larger reg force cadre that both train and lead. In the very early part of my career I was an RSSO with a staff of three. With five more people I could have easily run the regiment which was really only a battery (Effectively a reserve battery strength organization (100 plus people) needs a Capt, a MWO/WO (BSM), a WO/Sgt (BQMS), a Sgt (CC), a Tech WO/Sgt, a gun line WO/Sgt, a MBdr (FOO tech), a General Duty (MBdr) and a GD (Bdr) to fulfil the essential core leadership and training functions - the rest can all be reservists) (Note There is also a need for equipment maintainers but I see that function coming from outside of the subunit and being primarily reg force)

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> Not just admin.
> 
> There is a very large component that believes that if you start making things obligatory for the reserves then they will quit and/or not join up in the first place. That's not just academic. If you want to really make things obligatory then you need to have a backup plan to replace those of the senior leaders (both officers and NCOs) who will walk out.
> 
> In my mind reserve units should have a larger reg force cadre that both train and lead. In the very early part of my career I was an RSSO with a staff of three. With five more people I could have easily run the regiment which was really only a battery (Effectively a reserve battery strength organization (100 plus people) needs a Capt, a MWO/WO (BSM), a WO/Sgt (BQMS), a Sgt (CC), a Tech WO/Sgt, a gun line WO/Sgt, a MBdr (FOO tech), a General Duty (MBdr) and a GD (Bdr) to fulfil the essential core leadership and training functions - the rest can all be reservists) (Note There is also a need for equipment maintainers but I see that function coming from outside of the subunit and being primarily reg force)
> 
> :cheers:



I would agree with you about a large reg force element, in my mind CSS can't be handled effectively by officers who practice it so little. CO's should be reg force LCol's instead of posting them to NDHQ, same with RSM, that way your most senior leadership is dedicated full time to the success of the organization. I also agree you would see a lot of people jump ship at mandatory training, but frankly in my mind if you are not about to show up to the best of your ability, and give full effort, you are a burden on the organization any way. Major restructuring will be required, how we run the PRes from the ground up must be reworked. No PRes unit to my knowledge has authorization to be more then an over or under sized Company asset, that means a Major at most in charge. If max maning increase to allow a second company to be stood up, and i do mean a full company, then do so, but our organization needs to stop over bloating it self.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> FJAG - lets say for a second your dream was implemented, do you think in that model it would be best to have PRes units as a deployable subunit? example say 1VP goes over seas and the Calgary Highlanders or the Loyal Edmonton Regiment are called up to provide 1 Coy to the battlegroup?



I'm up in the air on that primarily because I do not know what the needs of every type of branch of the service is. I have experience with both artillery and infantry (besides legal branch but that branch actually already has a very good reserve component and use model)

In the artillery, for example (because artillery regiments deploy on operations very infrequently) I would see that every artillery regiment wold have a regimental headquarters and much of the services battery would be reg f, one battery would be primarily reg f with minor reserve force augmentation and two batteries would be primarily res force with cadres of 10 to 15 reg f. The reservists to augment the regiment would be located close to the regiment (eg. for 2RCHA in Petawawa the batteries would be in Ottawa so as to have easy control and access to ranges)

In infantry battalions I would think that there should be several battalions that are primarily reg f because they have a higher need to deploy and do so more frequently (maybe elements such as mortars and other support groups could be reserve here). Other battalions with a lower readiness requirement could have a higher ratio of reservists and could even be similarly structured to my artillery model above.

I would think that the armoured corps (assuming we get back to having more tanks) could also be structured like the artillery again primarily because armour does not deploy operationally very often but when needed it is required it will have to have operational tanks ready to go.

What I do see is that the reserve bty/company does deploy as a sub unit within its regt/bn together with its cadre because to a large extent the cadre is the sub unit's key leadership. (I am greatly opposed to the concept of individual augmentation except in very limited circumstances). To a large extent it relegates reservists to second class citizen status and takes away from the impetus for both the CO and the cadre to train the subunit up to a deployable standard. The entire concept should be that the reserve sub units are part and parcel of the unit and that the CO is responsible and accountable to get his entire unit up to whatever readiness standard he or she is assigned.

I haven't made up my mind as to whether or not the cadre should furnish both the BC/CO and the BSM/CSM or whether those should be reserve force positions. It is certainly easier and more effective to make them reg f but that does limit the res f career structure to top out at Capt/WO which might be a bit limiting (insofar that it might keep good people from staying in or joining up in the first place)

I also think that it is very important that you have a sufficient base of  reg f people so that there is an adequate career development flow to the higher ranks needed to man the cadres and the regt/bn/bde headquarters. 

 :cheers:


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I would agree with you about a large reg force element, in my mind CSS can't be handled effectively by officers who practice it so little. CO's should be reg force LCol's instead of posting them to NDHQ, same with RSM, that way your most senior leadership is dedicated full time to the success of the organization. I also agree you would see a lot of people jump ship at mandatory training, but frankly in my mind if you are not about to show up to the best of your ability, and give full effort, you are a burden on the organization any way. Major restructuring will be required, how we run the PRes from the ground up must be reworked. No PRes unit to my knowledge has authorization to be more then an over or under sized Company asset, that means a Major at most in charge. If max maning increase to allow a second company to be stood up, and i do mean a full company, then do so, but our organization needs to stop over bloating it self.



As you can see from my previous post, I do not see there being any reserve units, but primarily res sub units or elements belonging to reg f units (I'm not dismissing out of hand any free standing res units or subunits - they might be quite appropriate in some circumstances)

I also do not see people who jump ship as a big loss. Under our current model we had many people who never had an intention to deploy except in the case of a major war which most believed would never happen.

The down side of the model that I'm advocating for is that it is a given that reservists will be called up with their units if the unit deploys (although even during Afghanistan almost every deploying BG was a hodge podge of attached sub units and augmentees that needed long predeployment training. 

This means that reservists who join should do so with the understanding that should we again do a venture like Afghanistan, reservists will be called out to deploy and not merely be asked to volunteer to go. This is in fact the model that the National Guard worked under for the last twenty years. They still had recruits even though at one point programs had to be initiated to bolster recruiting. (As an aside I think that our six month deployment model and a long predeployment training cycle is not effective nor sustainable - we should have longer deployments -1 year- and shorter predeployment which should be possible if units are homogeneous and not ad hoced.

One thing that we should be striving for is to ensure that we create more units than the number of existing reg f units. Assuming for the sake of argument that we strip away 50% of the reg f personnel from each regt/bn and replace them with reserve subunits/pers then for every two regts or bns we should use 25% from each to form a third regt/bn and the remaining 25% from each to form the cadres of the res btys/coys required to lead/train all three regts/bns. The big trick is to decide on what the structure should be based on our defence needs and our commitments to ongoing funding.

Like I said, sometimes I still dream.

 :cheers:


----------



## Journeyman

FJAG said:
			
		

> 3. eliminate from the part-time force the vast bulk of the leadership component and concentrate and fund primarily at the Maj and below and WO and below level (I'm one of those guys that feels that we need a lot more cpls and ptes and a lot less reserve Cols, LCols, CWOs, MWOs and staff weenies)


Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."

I'd be content if the tribal elders who are producing this endless stream of ass-covering mandatory briefings, tests, lectures, etc would realize that while the RegF has five days/week to go through all that nause, the Res has only one or two evenings/week.  And because most of it sucks rectum, the Res troops vote with their feet and attendance takes a hit.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."
> 
> I'd be content if the tribal elders who are producing this endless stream of ***-covering mandatory briefings, tests, lectures, etc would realize that while the RegF has five days/week to go through all that nause, the Res has only one or two evenings/week.  And because most of it sucks rectum, the Res troops vote with their feet and attendance takes a hit.



My observation is that the 'clag' has been created to deal with the constant stream of chaos firehosed down to the Bdes and units. 

There are a lot of capable people who would make excellent COs etc but can't take the 24/7 Crack-berry abuse.


----------



## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."



An entirely unreasonable proposal.



What are the odds those folks are capable of doing a sit-up?


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> My observation is that the 'clag' has been created to deal with the constant stream of chaos firehosed down to the Bdes and units.



 :rofl: That is a chillingly apt description of the state of play of planning efforts in the Army. It is inexcusable to force part time leaders to run that treadmill.  If a PRes unit can produce a fairly detailed calendar as part of its Op Plan and stick to it, why can't the Army commit to running critical career courses more than 45 days out?


----------



## Kirkhill

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> :rofl: That is a chillingly apt description of the state of play of planning efforts in the Army, it is inexcusable to force part time leaders to run that treadmill.  If a PRes unit can produce a fairly detailed calendar as part of its Op Plan and stick to it, why can't the Army commit to running critical career courses more than 45 days out?



Because they create planners and planners must planify or else they aren't planners?


----------



## childs56

9.04 - TRAINING AND DUTY

(1) Subsections 33(2), (3) and (4) of the National Defence Act provide:

"33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof

may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
(*3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.**
*
(4) In this section, "duty" means any duty that is military in nature and includes any duty involving public service authorized under section 273.6."
(1 September 1999)

(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days.


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> Not sure what you are getting at with this.
> 
> 33(2) is the paragraph that allows the chain of command to order obligatory parading/training sessions. QE&O 9.04(2) limits that to 60 days Class A and 14 days Class B.
> 
> 33(3) is not relevant to anything. The only reserve component whose terms of service limited them to only perform duties on active service was the Supplementary reserve (See QR&O 2.034(b)). 33(3) has no application as far as the Primary Reserve who remains subject to 33(2) vis a vis training.
> 
> 31(1) relates to the power of the governor in council (cabinet) to place any unit, component etc on Active Duty in the specified circumstances. That's a whole long story in and of itself but has nothing to do with what we would call the run of the mill ordinary primary reserve force training. 31(1) is what you could call being mobilized or called up for obligatory full time service.
> 
> There is absolutely no requirement to sign a contract for Class B or C service to be liable under 33(2). Once you have been enrolled in the reserve force you are automatically liable to perform whatever training is ordered pursuant to 33(2). The legal obligation and consequences are there if in fact the provision is used.
> 
> The reality is that the various units rarely make the training obligatory pursuant to 33(2). The fact is that the units allow the training to be voluntary which, as you say, may trigger some moral obligation and not a legal one. That's not to say that the law isn't there. It most certainly is and as I said before, if you were to fail to attend a mandatory training session ordered under 33(2) you would be liable to being charged and fined in a civilian court under NDA 294(1)
> 
> :cheers:



My point is a Reservist on Class A Service has no legal obligation to serve x amount of days and cannot be charged if they do not show up for regular training. 
If the Reservist voluntarily signs a Class B or C contract and then fails to show up for their duty then they are liable to be charged. That would be the only time other then a Order of Council.


----------



## childs56

Some people are talking about job protection for Reservists as if it applies across the board. The only job protection in any province has to do with Public Service Employees on the Federal and Provincial list. No Civilian employer is obligated to provide job protection to any Reserve Soldier.


----------



## FJAG

CTD said:
			
		

> My point is a Reservist on Class A Service has no legal obligation to serve x amount of days and cannot be charged if they do not show up for regular training.
> If the Reservist voluntarily signs a Class B or C contract and then fails to show up for their duty then they are liable to be charged. That would be the only time other then a Order of Council.



Okay. That's what I thought and in that case you are wrong. A reservist on Class A service, who neglects or refuses to attend a particular training session is liable to be charged and brought for trial before a civilian court pursuant to s 294(1) of the NDA and, if found guilty, is liable to be fined a maximum of $25.00 (if an non commissioned member) and $50.00 (if an officer) for every day of training he fails or neglects to attend.

A reservist on Class B or C service would in a similar case most probably be liable to charges under the CSD because at the time they fail to attend they would most probably be subject to s 60(1)(c).

As I stated above, s 33(2)(a) of the NDA gives the chain of command the legal authority to order an individual to attend training (either Class A or B) within the limits laid down by QR&O 9.04(2).

The GiC has no application or role in the circumstances of training. s 31 has a completely different purpose.

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

CTD: Thanks for making FJAG's point.  The part in red in the QR&O describes the terms of service of the Supp Res, not the Primary Reserve.


----------



## childs56

dapaterson said:
			
		

> CTD: Thanks for making FJAG's point.  The part in red in the QR&O describes the terms of service of the Supp Res, not the Primary Reserve.



If the part highlighted in Red was in reference to the Sup Reserves it would specifically state Sup Reserves. There is a different terms of service for them them


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> CTD: Thanks for making FJAG's point.  The part in red in the QR&O describes the terms of service of the Supp Res, not the Primary Reserve.



Correct. The reference for that is in QR&O 2.034 which reads in part:



> 2.034 - RESERVE FORCE - SUB-COMPONENTS
> 
> The sub-components of the Reserve Force are:
> 
> a. the Primary Reserve, which consists of officers and non-commissioned members who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them and contains all formed Reserve Force units;
> 
> b. the Supplementary Reserve, which consists of officers and non-commissioned members who, except when on active service, are not required to perform military or any other form of duty or training;



... (emphasis added.)

 :cheers:


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> Okay. That's what I thought and in that case you are wrong. A reservist on Class A service, who neglects or refuses to attend a particular training session is liable to be charged and brought for trial before a civilian court pursuant to s 294(1) of the NDA and, if found guilty, is liable to be fined a maximum of $25.00 (if an non commissioned member) and $50.00 (if an officer) for every day of training he fails or neglects to attend.
> 
> A reservist on Class B or C service would in a similar case most probably be liable to charges under the CSD because at the time they fail to attend they would most probably be subject to s 60(1)(c).
> 
> As I stated above, s 33(2)(a) of the NDA gives the chain of command the legal authority to order an individual to attend training (either Class A or B) within the limits laid down by QR&O 9.04(2).
> 
> The GiC has no application or role in the circumstances of training. s 31 has a completely different purpose.
> 
> :cheers:



Ha ha ha. your kidding me, you really do not understand what the CSD is used for. Civilian Court would not consider a charge for a Reservist who failed to show up for Class A service or being AWOL. That is why the Military has a CSD. 

A Class B or C Reservist who failed to show up for work would be charged with AWOL under the CSD and would face a Military Tribunal aka Summary Trial or Courts Martial depending on the severity of their charge. 

I will standby the fact that the GIC would have to mandate training in order for Reservists to have to abide by 294. It clearly states it in the sub paras.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

:  Did you even bother to look at his MOSID?


----------



## childs56

The following is taken from Volume 1 Chapter 9 QR&O Ref Reserve Service
9.04 - TRAINING AND DUTY

(1) Subsections 33(2), (3) and (4) of the National Defence Act provide:

"33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof

may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.

(4) In this section, "duty" means any duty that is military in nature and includes any duty involving public service authorized under section 273.6."

The highlighted in BLUE clearly states that the GIC would have to prescribe the training, KEY WORDS  "may be ordered as prescribed in regulations made by the GIC". This does not give the Command level any authority to order Primary Reservists to train while on Class A service, nor does it give them the Authority to order a Primary Reservist to Sign a Class B contract to conduct training. 

As a Reservist you cannot charge them under the CSD unless the offence was conducted while on duty, and there are strict rules as to what is considered on Duty.


----------



## childs56

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> :  Did you even bother to look at his MOSID?



That's what makes it even worse.


----------



## FJAG

CTD said:
			
		

> Ha ha ha. your kidding me, you really do not understand what the CSD is used for. Civilian Court would not consider a charge for a Reservist who failed to show up for Class A service or being AWOL. That is why the Military has a CSD.
> 
> A Class B or C Reservist who failed to show up for work would be charged with AWOL under the CSD and would face a Military Tribunal aka Summary Trial or Courts Martial depending on the severity of their charge.
> 
> I will standby the fact that the GIC would have to mandate training in order for Reservists to have to abide by 294. It clearly states it in the sub paras.



I've tried three times now to point out to you how the law works (and with twenty four years experience as a legal officer with the Office of the Judge Advocate General I think I have a pretty fair understanding of that)

Quite frankly you are either hopelessly muddled in your understanding of it or you are just trying to punk us here. Personally I won't waste any more time trying to explain it to you.

 :cheers:


----------



## dapaterson

CTD said:
			
		

> The following is taken from Volume 1 Chapter 9 QR&O Ref Reserve Service
> 9.04 - TRAINING AND DUTY
> 
> (1) Subsections 33(2), (3) and (4) of the National Defence Act provide:
> 
> "33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof
> 
> may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
> may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
> (3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.
> 
> (4) In this section, "duty" means any duty that is military in nature and includes any duty involving public service authorized under section 273.6."
> 
> The highlighted in BLUE clearly states that the GIC would have to prescribe the training, KEY WORDS  "may be ordered as prescribed in regulations made by the GIC". This does not give the Command level any authority to order Primary Reservists to train while on Class A service, nor does it give them the Authority to order a Primary Reservist to Sign a Class B contract to conduct training.
> 
> As a Reservist you cannot charge them under the CSD unless the offence was conducted while on duty, and there are strict rules as to what is considered on Duty.



Regulations issued by the Governor in Council.  You mean like... a QR&O that's indicated with a (G) at the end?  Sort of like, oh, QR&O 9.04, on Training and Duty, which specifies that "Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days."

Sorry, bud, you're RTFO on this one.  You're a barracks lawyer of the worst type.


----------



## childs56

I am kind of curious if they cant perform a mandatory call out of Reservists to assist in natural disasters such as the BC, Alberta Fires Ab Floods, Ice storms what makes one think that they can force a Primary Reservist into mandatory training. The rules contradict themselves. Yet they all allow Commanders a tool box to try and have some semblance of order in trying to maintain an effective force. 

As I use to say "Charge me and lets see what happens"  I am willing to admit if I am wrong, When reading the QR&Os about this matter it seems to say one thing then counter dict itself in another place.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CTD said:
			
		

> I am kind of curious if they cant perform a mandatory call out of Reservists to assist in natural disasters such as the BC, Alberta Fires Ab Floods, Ice storms what makes one think that they can force a Primary Reservist into mandatory training. The rules contradict themselves. Yet they all allow Commanders a tool box to try and have some semblance of order in trying to maintain an effective force.
> 
> As I use to say "Charge me and lets see what happens"  I am willing to admit if I am wrong, When reading the QR&Os about this matter it seems to say one thing then counter dict itself in another place.



And that, ladies and gentlemen, is why we have lawyers


----------



## Eye In The Sky

CTD said:
			
		

> As a Reservist you cannot charge them under the CSD unless the offence was *conducted while on duty*, and there are strict rules as to *what is considered on Duty*.



Actually, that is not correct.  What is does relate to 'when subject to the CSD'.  I know of 1 pers who was not 'on duty' but subj to the CSD as a Reserve mbr, and the incident and follow-on disciplinary and admin action resulted in the mbr's release.  Never signed a pay sheet that day and wasn't in uniform.

Attention to detail is important and you seem to lack in on this subj.  QR & O, Vol 2, Art 102.01 refers:

102.01 – PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE CODE OF SERVICE DISCIPLINE

Section 60 of the National Defence Act provides:

"60. (1) The following persons are subject to the Code of Service Discipline:
a.an officer or non-commissioned member of the regular force;
b.an officer or non-commissioned member of the special force;
c.an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force when the officer or non-commissioned member is i.undergoing drill or training, whether in uniform or not,
ii.in uniform,
iii.on duty,
iv.[Repealed, S.C. 1998, c. 35, s. 19],
v.called out under Part VI in aid of the civil power,
vi.called out on service,
vii.placed on active service,
viii.in or on any vessel, vehicle or aircraft of the Canadian Forces or in or on any defence establishment or work for defence,
ix.serving with any unit or other element of the regular force or the special force, or
x.present, whether in uniform or not, at any drill or training of a unit or other element of the Canadian Forces;

d.subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor in Council may by regulations prescribe, a person who, pursuant to law or pursuant to an agreement between Canada and the state in whose armed forces the person is serving, is attached or seconded as an officer or non-commissioned member to the Canadian Forces;
e.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who is serving in the position of an officer or non-commissioned member of any force raised and maintained outside Canada by Her Majesty in right of Canada and commanded by an officer of the Canadian Forces;
f.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who accompanies any unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that is on service or active service in any place;
g.subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor in Council may by regulations prescribe, a person attending an institution established under section 47;
h.an alleged spy for the enemy;
i.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who, in respect of any service offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the person, is in civil custody or in service custody; and
j.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, while serving with the Canadian Forces under an engagement with the Minister whereby the person agreed to be subject to that Code.


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> I've tried three times now to point out to you how the law works (and with twenty four years experience as a legal officer with the Office of the Judge Advocate General I think I have a pretty fair understanding of that)
> 
> Quite frankly you are either hopelessly muddled in your understanding of it or you are just trying to punk us here. Personally I won't waste any more time trying to explain it to you.
> 
> :cheers:



At What  point would a Civilian Court run a trial on a CSD charge that was minor and only applicable to the Military.  Why would the Military not run a Summary trial for such. In your 24 years of service as JAG you should be able to clarify this for me and others. 

This makes me wonder why a JAG would not be able to clarify and differentiate between the different sub sections. of QR&Os 9.04 along with the NDA 33 (3)
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Actually, that is not correct.  What is does relate to 'when subject to the CSD'.  I know of 1 pers who was not 'on duty' but subj to the CSD as a Reserve mbr, and the incident and follow-on disciplinary and admin action resulted in the mbr's release.  Never signed a pay sheet that day and wasn't in uniform.
> 
> Attention to detail is important and you seem to lack in on this subj.  QR & O, Vol 2, Art 102.01 refers:
> 
> 102.01 – PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE CODE OF SERVICE DISCIPLINE
> 
> Section 60 of the National Defence Act provides:
> 
> "60. (1) The following persons are subject to the Code of Service Discipline:
> a.an officer or non-commissioned member of the regular force;
> b.an officer or non-commissioned member of the special force;
> c.an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force when the officer or non-commissioned member is i.undergoing drill or training, whether in uniform or not,
> ii.in uniform,
> iii.on duty,
> iv.[Repealed, S.C. 1998, c. 35, s. 19],
> v.called out under Part VI in aid of the civil power,
> vi.called out on service,
> vii.placed on active service,
> viii.in or on any vessel, vehicle or aircraft of the Canadian Forces or in or on any defence establishment or work for defence,
> ix.serving with any unit or other element of the regular force or the special force, or
> x.present, whether in uniform or not, at any drill or training of a unit or other element of the Canadian Forces;
> 
> d.subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor in Council may by regulations prescribe, a person who, pursuant to law or pursuant to an agreement between Canada and the state in whose armed forces the person is serving, is attached or seconded as an officer or non-commissioned member to the Canadian Forces;
> e.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who is serving in the position of an officer or non-commissioned member of any force raised and maintained outside Canada by Her Majesty in right of Canada and commanded by an officer of the Canadian Forces;
> f.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who accompanies any unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that is on service or active service in any place;
> g.subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor in Council may by regulations prescribe, a person attending an institution established under section 47;
> h.an alleged spy for the enemy;
> i.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, who, in respect of any service offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the person, is in civil custody or in service custody; and
> j.a person, not otherwise subject to the Code of Service Discipline, while serving with the Canadian Forces under an engagement with the Minister whereby the person agreed to be subject to that Code.



Yup.

I know a (former) Class A CWO who was court martialed and released 5 f for sexual assault. He was not in uniform and not on duty.

It's pretty much ruined his whole life, civilian and military, of course.


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> charged and brought for trial before a civilian court 0(1)(c).
> 
> .
> 
> :cheers:



I am not trying be be a confrontational, or troll. I am am very curious about this whole situation.  My understanding is the CSD is used to enforce discipline within the Military for such things not covered under normal Civilian law. At what time would a Civilain court be tasked with, carry forth with these or similar charges?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

CTD said:
			
		

> Ha ha ha. your kidding me, you really do not understand what the CSD is used for. Civilian Court would not consider a charge for a Reservist who failed to show up for Class A service or being AWOL. That is why the Military has a CSD.



Certainly comes across as confrontational,  even more so when you demonstrate you don't even know when a Reservist is subj to the CSD.  I doubt there is a more knowledgeable Mil Law SME than FJAG on the forum. :2c:


----------



## childs56

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Yup.
> 
> I know a (former) Class A CWO who was court martialed and released 5 f for sexual assault. He was not in uniform and not on duty.
> 
> It's pretty much ruined his whole life, civilian and military, of course.



Was the other member of the assault a Military member also?  

In the CSD there are things that you can be charged for through the civilian courts that no matter what will effect you up to and including  release from the military.


----------



## childs56

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Certainly comes across as confrontational,  even more so when you demonstrate you don't even know when a Reservist is subj to the CSD.  I doubt there is a more knowledgeable Mil Law SME than FJAG on the forum. :2c:



When am I subject to the CSD?
If you are a member of the Regular Force you are always subject to the CSD, both inside and outside Canada. If you are a member of the Reserve Force, you are subject to the CSD:

while undergoing drill or training (whether you are in uniform or not)
whenever you are in uniform
while on any military duty
24 hours a day, 7 days a week during any period of full time service (Class "B" or "C" service)
whenever you are present on defence property
whenever you are in a vehicle, ship or aircraft of the CF.


----------



## McG

CTD said:
			
		

> I am not trying be be a confrontational, or troll. I am am very curious about this whole situation.  My understanding is the CSD is used to enforce discipline within the Military for such things not covered under normal Civilian law. At what time would a Civilain court be tasked with, carry forth with these or similar charges?


Do you believe "CSD" and "NDA" to be synonyms?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

CTD said:
			
		

> When am I subject to the CSD?
> If you are a member of the Regular Force you are always subject to the CSD, both inside and outside Canada. If you are a member of the Reserve Force, you are subject to the CSD:
> 
> while undergoing drill or training (whether you are in uniform or not)
> whenever you are in uniform
> while on any military duty
> 24 hours a day, 7 days a week during any period of full time service (Class "B" or "C" service)
> whenever you are present on defence property
> whenever you are in a vehicle, ship or aircraft of the CF.



try this.   http://Army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1466416.html#msg1466416


----------



## Monsoon

CTD said:
			
		

> I am not trying be be a confrontational, or troll. I am am very curious about this whole situation.  My understanding is the CSD is used to enforce discipline within the Military for such things not covered under normal Civilian law. At what time would a Civilain court be tasked with, carry forth with these or similar charges?


My approach when in command was to use remedial measures to address situations where people failed to turn out when directed without prior permission or a genuine emergency. The CSD is a blunt instrument and not one the chain of command really fully controls.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CTD said:
			
		

> Was the other member of the assault a Military member also?
> 
> In the CSD there are things that you can be charged for through the civilian courts that no matter what will effect you up to and including  release from the military.



Nope. Civilian female.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I've never been a supporter of using admin processes like RMs on people for times they aren't subj to the CSD, they are quasi-civilians at that point IMO.  I say this as a former Cl A/B/B(a) type who has lived and breathed those worlds.  I never would have recommended a RM (or VW/RW as they were back then...) for someone not showing up at a Trg event UNLESS they were in contravention of approved NES policy.

We can't ignore the official NES policy, it is there for a reason.  Skirting it using RMs...is this really the way to do business in a day and age where funding is down, it seems morale is down in some Res formations/units, trg is boring, all the issues being discussed in this thread.  Now to add onto it, CL A types being put in ICs and RWs for missing a trg night or 2?  It strikes me as trying to fix a crack in a windshield with a hammer;  it is doing something, hoping to fix the problem but in all likelihood will just make it worse in the end.

I think units that have that approach will see their budgets shrink as people release.  When I was Cl A, the rare time I said I wasn't or couldn't make a wknd FTX or something, I can tell you my loyalty and GAFF would have started bottoming out if I came in the next trg night and someone slide an IC in front of me.  I would have been looking for the NES policy and pushing back, but most others will probably say "you know what, this shit isn't worth $75 a week.  I'm out".

Leadership in CL a units takes the right balance of stick and carrot.  Hit with the stick too often, people will leave, especially if the reason you see them 50% of scheduled trg is because the trg is boring, sucks and the unit higher ups are fucking the dog and strutting around doing SFA/avoiding the scheduled trg as well (it happens).


----------



## FJAG

CTD said:
			
		

> At What  point would a Civilian Court run a trial on a CSD charge that was minor and only applicable to the Military.  Why would the Military not run a Summary trial for such. In your 24 years of service as JAG you should be able to clarify this for me and others.
> 
> This makes me wonder why a JAG would not be able to clarify and differentiate between the different sub sections. of QR&Os 9.04 along with the NDA 33 (3)
> (3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.



I must be a gluten for punishment but I'll give it one more try.

1 NDA 33(3) does not apply to the Primary Reserve. It applies to the Supplementary Reserve. QR&O 2.034b cited above shows that.

2. The Code of Service Discipline is a specific part of the National Defence Act called Part III. It starts at s 60 which sets out who is liable under the CSD and ends at s 249.26. The link to the NDA index is here: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/

3. The NDA has a further part called Part VII Offences Triable by Civilian Courts. Let me be clear. Part VII is NOT part of the CSD but does contain a number of other offence which have to be tried before a civilian court. One of those is 294 which reads as follows:



> Failure to attend parade
> 
> 294 (1) Every officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who without lawful excuse neglects or refuses to attend any parade or training at the place and hour appointed therefor is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction for each offence, if an officer, to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and, if a non-commissioned member, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
> Marginal note:Each absence an offence
> 
> (2) Absence from any parade or training referred to in subsection (1) is, in respect of each day on which the absence occurs, a separate offence.



Again. Let me make it absolutely clear. Part VII is not part of the CSD and offences listed in it cannot be tried by a service tribunal and must be tried by a civilian court.

You may not like it. You may not understand why the legislature wrote it that way but that's the way it is.

One additional matter. DAPaterson is quite correct when he says above that a (G) at the end of a QR&O means that the provision is one that was made by the Governor in Council under powers granted by the NDA or some other piece of legislation. Similarly an (M) means it comes from the Minister of National Defence; a (C) means it comes from the Chief of Defence Staff; a (T) means it comes from Treasury Board.

 :cheers:


----------



## Monsoon

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I've never been a supporter of using admin processes like RMs on people for times they aren't subj to the CSD, they are quasi-civilians at that point IMO.  I say this as a former Cl A/B/B(a) type who has lived and breathed those worlds.  I never would have recommended a RM (or VW/RW as they were back then...) for someone not showing up at a Trg event UNLESS they were in contravention of approved NES policy.


Whether you're a supporter of it or not, it's both perfectly acceptable (since we're not talking about "service discipline") and very effective. The NES policy, it's worth pointing out, also applies when members aren't subject to the CSD. I don't know of any other employer in the world (part- or full-time) who accepts people showing up for work or not as the fancy strikes them without clearing it with their boss first.



> We can't ignore the official NES policy, it is there for a reason.  Skirting it using RMs...is this really the way to do business


The NES policy is an administrative tool to track and manage effective strength for, among other things, purposes of tracking pensionable service, counting years towards CDs, and (eventually) releasing members who have de facto quit. Remedial measures are an administrative tool used to correct negative behaviour. One process doesn't preclude the other, but if you're accusing me of having used remedial measures to try to prevent people from going NES, then I'm very happy to agree that that was exactly my goal.



> I think units that have that approach will see their budgets shrink as people release.  When I was Cl A, the rare time I said I wasn't or couldn't make a wknd FTX or something, I can tell you my loyalty and GAFF would have started bottoming out if I came in the next trg night and someone slide an IC in front of me.  I would have been looking for the NES policy and pushing back, but most others will probably say "you know what, this crap isn't worth $75 a week.  I'm out".


That's the received wisdom. The actual experience of applying remedial measures for attendance at our unit revealed that the received wisdom was wrong, at least in our case. Attendance and retention increased significantly, not just over a single sample year but in a way that continued on into the long term. People were motivated to come to work because they knew that the other people they needed to be there to get their own work done would also be there. Go figure.



> Leadership in CL a units takes the right balance of stick and carrot.


Yes, it most certainly does. I assume from your response that you understood that we weren't permitting people to miss training events; that's not the case. What we did do was ask people to look at their schedules in advance and identify when they couldn't come to work, and then communicate that to their bosses so they could plan accordingly. And if an emergency arose then all we asked was that they let us know as soon as they were able.

Remedial measures are just another "stick" to add to our significant arsenal of carrots, but it's one that's vastly underused leading to organizational disarray in units and a negative impact on personnel readiness. In the end, the number of remedial measures we ended up actually issuing for failure to attend a training event was probably fewer that two dozen in three years (in a unit that grew from 140 to 165 in that same time). But a clearly communicated policy about their use and what was expected of members to avoid getting a remedial measure contributed to improving some outcomes in the unit.


----------



## Brasidas

I don't doubt that 294 exists and is valid. I am curious when and why it is exercised.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> Failure to attend parade
> 
> 294 (1) Every officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who without lawful excuse neglects or refuses to attend any parade or training at the place and hour appointed therefor is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction for each offence, if an officer, to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and, if a non-commissioned member, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
> Marginal note:Each absence an offence
> 
> (2) Absence from any parade or training referred to in subsection (1) is, in respect of each day on which the absence occurs, a separate offence.



What is the standard for a lawful excuse for the purposes of prosecution, vice administrative action?

If my troop's sister calls bawling about a boyfriend leaving an hour before parade, he sends a text message to an appropriate person that he can't make a class A parade due to a family emergency, is it a justification for prosecution?

If he's previously given short notice, after such admitted faults such as sleeping in or missing an exit off the freeway, and he gives an excuse that is "not his fault" but involves a subjective judgement as to what is an appropriate circumstance for missing a parade, who can make the determination as to whether to charge them for failing to attend, and what is the standard by which that determination is made?

Of course the easier path if a unit gets fed up with a member, who may parade at least every 30 days but calls in questionable excuses (eg. "uh, my girlfriend promised her best friend that I'd help with the setup for her cousin's bachelorette party...") on a regular basis for Cl A days that they'd previously committed to, is to simply drop support for them going on courses and taskings.


----------



## FJAG

See thread above. To the best of my knowledge the section has not been used in the last few decades.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

Brasidas said:
			
		

> I don't doubt that 294 exists and is valid. I am curious when and why it is exercised.
> 
> What is the standard for a lawful excuse for the purposes of prosecution, vice administrative action?
> 
> If my troop's sister calls bawling about a boyfriend leaving an hour before parade, he sends a text message to an appropriate person that he can't make a class A parade due to a family emergency, is it a justification for prosecution?
> 
> If he's previously given short notice, after such admitted faults such as sleeping in or missing an exit off the freeway, and he gives an excuse that is "not his fault" but involves a subjective judgement as to what is an appropriate circumstance for missing a parade, who can make the determination as to whether to charge them for failing to attend, and what is the standard by which that determination is made?
> 
> Of course the easier path if a unit gets fed up with a member, who may parade at least every 30 days but calls in questionable excuses (eg. "uh, my girlfriend promised her best friend that I'd help with the setup for her cousin's bachelorette party...") on a regular basis for Cl A days that they'd previously committed to, is to simply drop support for them going on courses and taskings.



My unit two years ago started tracking peoples reasons for not attending, most are usually work related (we have a lot of people in the trades, and thus dont work 9-5) but you do get family/personal reasons and such, every failure to show requires a reason. If the same reasons keeps showing up it may trigger a meeting with your CoC to figure out whats going on. It gives a chance for the member to open up privately about an issue and the chain might be able to point them towards helping resources. If the member is just willfully not attending to parade, then they need to ask them selves why are they wearing the uniform.


----------



## ArmyRick

MiLEMEO9, 

agree 100% with that approach.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If the same reasons keeps showing up it may trigger a meeting with your CoC to figure out whats going on.



Sounds similar to what some employers might call an Attendance Management Program?


----------



## FJAG

Half a century ago when I was a young Bombardier in Toronto I was responsible for three gunners. Every Friday I had to call them to ensure they were parading the next morning and get their excuses if they weren't. The next Saturday morning I had to justify any absences to my Troop Sergeant Major. Seemed to me that the system worked pretty well.

We also did kit recovery for NES personnel by having our transport section going to released folks homes (usually their parents) where we basically grabbed anything brown, threw it into a kit bag and brought it back to stores (sure as hell beat the hell out of the kit recovery system we had going three decades later what with lawyers and notice letters and civil suits for damages etc)

 :subbies:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Half a century ago when I was a young Bombardier in Toronto I was responsible for three gunners. Every Friday I had to call them to ensure they were parading the next morning and get their excuses if they weren't. The next Saturday morning I had to justify any absences to my Troop Sergeant Major. Seemed to me that the system worked pretty well.
> 
> We also did kit recovery for NES personnel by having our transport section going to released folks homes (usually their parents) where we basically grabbed anything brown, threw it into a kit bag and brought it back to stores (sure as hell beat the hell out of the kit recovery system we had going three decades later what with lawyers and notice letters and civil suits for damages etc)
> 
> :subbies:



We did the same, and had around 100 on parade every night.

But, as Recruiting Officer, I could also enroll a new recruit, and have him marching around in a boiler suit getting yelled at by the duty NCO, on the same night.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We did the same, and had around 100 on parade every night.
> 
> But, as Recruiting Officer, I could also enroll a new recruit, and have him marching around in a boiler suit getting yelled at by the duty NCO, on the same night.



When I was RSSO in Brandon in 76-78 we could still do that. I think the good times ended not too long after that.

 :subbies:


----------



## MilEME09

Seems with email people thought it would be easier. Turns out lots of people like to not read emails at times. So go back to what works, now we see around 30 to 40 on a parade night. Our size is about 60 right now with atleast 10 or so tasked out or on course so id say the old method works

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Brasidas

Apparently with recruiting being moved to the units, the new target is 2 to 4 weeks from "Hello, I would like to join your unit" to signing a Cl A paysheet.

I'm optimistic, but colour me skeptical.


----------



## PuckChaser

Was possible in 2002, should be no reason why it's not now.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> When I was RSSO in Brandon in 76-78 we could still do that. I think the good times ended not too long after that.
> 
> :subbies:



That was the form at the SD&Gs in 78 and the Calg Highrs in 80.  (I paraded a couple of weeks with the Glens before my civvy career moved me west to Calgary by way of 18 months in Oshawa)


----------



## MilEME09

So I was talking to a member of the British territorial army the other day who is attached to my unit, the Brits expect their reservists to be available to deployed every 5 years unless they are in a position deemed operationally necessary. You get a brown envelope in the mail saying you are now called to active duty, and to report to X on date Y and thats it. Maybe a similar system could work for our reserves?


----------



## runormal

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So I was talking to a member of the British territorial army the other day who is attached to my unit, the Brits expect their reservists to be available to deployed every 5 years unless they are in a position deemed operationally necessary. You get a brown envelope in the mail saying you are now called to active duty, and to report to X on date Y and thats it. Maybe a similar system could work for our reserves?



Is a system like this necessary? Or would it cause senior members to release to not hinder their primary source of income? I know that there are lots of reservists that want to deploy but haven't had any opportunities to do so. I also know of a few reservists who delayed releasing because JT said "Africa". 

However does this also mean that I can get called up to work 6 months in Wainwright as a rad op of HQ and Sigs?

I could see my employer be more supportive of a tour vice 6-12 of months of class "C" in Canada. 




			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> the Brits expect their reservists to be available to deployed every 5 years unless they are in a position deemed operationally necessary.



Who determines this? Do you know if there is any recourse available if the army/member disagree on operationally necessary. Could the member just release if called up?


I'll be honest I personally like the system as is, it has come up several times at my day job "so your career in the reserves" "explain to me your long term plan with army" "so how does the reserves work". It is nice to be able to say "well the next course is PLQ, but that is 2 months long so we need to wait and see when it is a good time for me personally, the organization and the army to go on PLQ and for tours not everyone got to go who wanted to go, it is all voluntarily". 

Instead of saying "I could be called up at anytime for an undetermined amount of time in the next few years especially given the uncertainty of whether anything comes up regarding "Africa", so don't assign me anything critical or important because I might have to leave in 30 days and while we are at it don't promote me either. "

I could of deployed if something came up while I was in University, but that window has come and gone. I'm now at my first entry level job and all of my focus is into that so that I can get promoted or at least solidify my position/experience.  So now the army has invested how ever many thousands of dollars into me. Is it better to keep me around even though I'll likely never deploy but I can help train/mentor the next group that might? 

As much as I bitch and complain I don't see me releasing anytime soon. The reserves has been an excellent experience and it really mixes up my 9-5 work grind.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

If Canada _really_ needs Reservists that bad...they'll be put on active duty.  Anyone who thinks the GoC doesn't have the power and authority to do that doesn't understand the fine print in the PRES TOSs, IMO.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So I was talking to a member of the British territorial army the other day who is attached to my unit, the Brits expect their reservists to be available to deployed every 5 years unless they are in a position deemed operationally necessary. You get a brown envelope in the mail saying you are now called to active duty, and to report to X on date Y and thats it. Maybe a similar system could work for our reserves?



Deployed for how long? 

My former employer "supports employees who want to participate in the military reserve force and allows them to take a paid leave of absence to fulfill their reserve duties."

Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the employer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work. 

All benefits continue during the leave.

An employee's service, vacation entitlement, seniority, pension etc. continue to accumulate during their military leave. 

But, that is only for two weeks per year.

There is also the question of will the military compensate the employer?

The employer will have to call in overtime to cover the employee's shifts during her/his military leave. 
That's 40-hours per week at time and a half. 

For more on this discussion,

Reservists Job Protection Superthread  
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rjfX2xvg26EJ:https://milnet.ca/forums/index.php%3Ftopic%3D2552.0+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca
20 pages.


----------



## YZT580

Why is it that the law mandates employers to grant time off for maternity and paternity leave with total job protection but the same benefits are not ascribed to citizens in the reserve?


----------



## mariomike

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Why is it that the law mandates employers to grant time off for maternity and paternity leave with total job protection but the same benefits are not ascribed to citizens in the reserve?



They did where I used to work, "Military Leave:
Leave of absence shall be granted to employees to serve in the Armed Forces during hostilities or during a time of war as declared by the Government of Canada. Seniority will accumulate during such leave."

That would include non-reservist employees who volunteer for active service, or get drafted, during a time of war as declared by the Government of Canada.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So I was talking to a member of the British territorial army the other day who is attached to my unit, the Brits expect their reservists to be available to deployed every 5 years unless they are in a position deemed operationally necessary. You get a brown envelope in the mail saying you are now called to active duty, and to report to X on date Y and thats it. Maybe a similar system could work for our reserves?



They still can not compel them, legally, to deploy.


----------



## Kirkhill

And that is why tiered terms of service are appropriate:

Those available for domestic crises on a voluntary basis - unpaid
Those available for call-out - on a stipendiary basis (they get paid as long as they are available - at a reduced rate - then get paid at regular rates when activated).
Those available for domestic service - full time
Those available for expeditionary service - full time.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

We need the full-timers to be deployable.  When CJOC comes callin', we have enough people who haul out their Yellow Card...


----------



## MilEME09

> eployed for how long?
> 
> My former employer "supports employees who want to participate in the military reserve force and allows them to take a paid leave of absence to fulfill their reserve duties."
> 
> Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the employer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work.
> 
> All benefits continue during the leave.
> 
> An employee's service, vacation entitlement, seniority, pension etc. continue to accumulate during their military leave.
> 
> But, that is only for two weeks per year.
> 
> There is also the question of will the military compensate the employer?
> 
> The employer will have to call in overtime to cover the employee's shifts during her/his military leave.
> That's 40-hours per week at time and a half.



Upto 6 months was what he told me, not a long deployment at all, and yes to adopt such a plan we would need better job protection rules.





> They still can not compel them, legally, to deploy.



Apparently due to Afghanistan, and Iraq more prominently, they could because of an operational requirement to fill positions that certain individuals had the required skill set for.




			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> We need the full-timers to be deployable.  When CJOC comes callin', we have enough people who haul out their Yellow Card...



The fact we need over 30% PRes augmentation just to sustain the 2500 person battlegroups of Afghanistan shows we have a people problem, out of three infantry regiments you are telling me we cant sustain 1 battlegroup continuously? that should of been a red flag for the army.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The fact we need over 30% PRes augmentation just to sustain the 2500 person battlegroups of Afghanistan shows we have a people problem, out of three infantry regiments you are telling me we cant sustain 1 battlegroup continuously? that should of been a red flag for the army  *Canadian government and citizens*.



FTFY...I'm confident the ECS's are well aware of the "PML to TES" realities in the CAF.   :nod:

If there is a shortage in Reg Force people for ops, then the focus should be on building the Reg Force first, then ways to augment with PRES second.  Money and effort has to be prioritized; in a country with a military and political and funding realities that are the norm for Canada we need to focus on the folks who go out the door regularly and with little to no time to train up for the mission.  That, 9.5 times out of 10, is our Reg Force.


----------



## dapaterson

Little to no time to train up?  I call shenanigans.  There is a limited subset of tasks like that.  Most we could (and should) do a better job of planning for.  You'd think that with around 5000 majors and lcols in the Reg F that we could plan in a timely and coherent manner...


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Little to no time to train up?  I call shenanigans.  There is a limited subset of tasks like that.  Most we could (and should) do a better job of planning for.  You'd think that with around 5000 majors and lcols in the Reg F that we could plan in a timely and coherent manner...



Well when you have 5000+ senior ranks at NDHQ, all with different views on how things should be done, nothing gets done.


----------



## Flavus101

Thinning the herd of NDHQ and starting to put more trust at the Unit level leadership is where things need to go. 

I understand that there has to be some standardization. I come from a reserve context, however I hear the same complaints from reg force folks at times. To use an officer example. Manpower gets so low that an OC who on paper is commanding a Coy is really commanding a Pl plus organization. The OC then gradually starts to creep down and gets involved with activities that should be managed at the Pl level as there is less on his plate. From what I see that creep goes up much further than just sub-unit level.

The other issue is what do we do with a Capt who deserves a promotion but there are no command positions available? It seems that our solution is to create another staff position. This probably has more to do with the "Bloated HQ's" thread.


----------



## Halifax Tar

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The fact we need over 30% PRes augmentation just to sustain the 2500 person battlegroups of Afghanistan shows we have a people problem, out of three infantry regiments you are telling me we cant sustain 1 battlegroup continuously? that should of been a red flag for the army.



That percentage was mandated and I would question if was just reserves or augmentees, most of whom were reg force.  We had tons'o'people who wanted Afghan deployments but never lucked out.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Little to no time to train up?  I call shenanigans.



For some, yes, for others, no.  Aircew are one example of folks who go out the door on various missions with little to no time to prep;  hence our requirement to stay current on a daily basis.  My last DAG took me 1.5 days and only that long because I had to do a FORCE test.  If not for that, I'd have been done in a day or less, because all my DRTSET/IBTS stuff and other currencies are up to date, day to day to day.  It would be extremely hard to have a Reservist in my trade (or any trade) out the door that quick.  Heck, I doubt they could sort out the Cl C contract that quickly alone.

AFAIK, like our high readiness posturing, the Army has high readiness units, so does the Navy along with the RDS on each coast, etc.

Wasn't Haiti a 'quick' deployment?  Libya was very quick for some.  Impact as well.



> There is a limited subset of tasks like that.  Most we could (and should) do a better job of planning for.  You'd think that with around 5000 majors and lcols in the Reg F that we could plan in a timely and coherent manner...



You'd think.   :nod:


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> For some, yes, for others, no.  Aircew are one example of folks who go out the door on various missions with little to no time to prep;  hence our requirement to stay current on a daily basis.  My last DAG took me 1.5 days and only that long because I had to do a FORCE test.  If not for that, I'd have been done in a day or less, because all my DRTSET/IBTS stuff and other currencies are up to date, day to day to day.  It would be extremely hard to have a Reservist in my trade (or any trade) out the door that quick.  Heck, I doubt they could sort out the Cl C contract that quickly alone.
> 
> AFAIK, like our high readiness posturing, the Army has high readiness units, so does the Navy along with the RDS on each coast, etc.
> 
> Wasn't Haiti a 'quick' deployment?  Libya was very quick for some.  Impact as well.
> 
> You'd think.   :nod:



I don't think anyone is disputing the fact that high readiness tasks (there are some exceptions such as TBGs for DOMOPS) are principally the domain of the Regular Force. 

That said, even reservists can be pushed out the door fairly quickly (within a day or two), especially for DOMOPS. WRT Class C contracts, the issue is more about securing the financial authority as it is held at a fairly high level.  Once the decision is made to put reservists on Class C, it can be done fairly quickly.  

WRT IBTS, (and I can only speak to the Army here), I would offer that while the RegF does it better than the PRes overall, there are gaps all over the place.  Apart from high readiness units, the bulk of the Army (RegF or PRes) isn't ready for "cold start" immediate expeditionary operations at the individual level to say nothing of the collective training validations required to deploy a formed body of any size.  

However, the big personnel bill comes with sustaining an operation over time, and that implies a window to train up the follow on forces. Based on that assumption, options become available to employ a mix of full and part time personnel.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

This is why the Reg Force needs to maintain high(er) readiness units, and PRes needs to maintain that 'baseline skillset' (not saying IBTS is the *Gold* Standard; there are many things that could be done to improve it Reg or Res force).  SHTF, deployment comes up...the HR folks go.  Reg Force *next ROTO* folks start trg and DAGing...assessments are done, decision made to augment with PRES folks...they start trg and DAGing.  The PRes folks who want to deploy but not be Reg Force...well, they have to keep their fitness, medical, admin, etc up to snuff so when the call comes, they are the ones who can be *wheels in the well* the quickest.

I know there is a lot of talk about Reservists ''being bored with doing the same thing over and over, year after year" but I'll state again we have the same thing in the Reg Force too.  But...we get paid to be ready to do job X in unit Y whether its Reg or Res.  End of the day, that is what Joe and Jane Taxpayer are forking over tax dollars for us to be able to do.  

Leadership, right down to the Jnr NCO level, is key to any unit being able to get out the door ASAP when the call comes.  Reg, or Res.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> This is why the Reg Force needs to maintain high(er) readiness units, and PRes needs to maintain that 'baseline skillset' (not saying IBTS is the *Gold* Standard; there are many things that could be done to improve it Reg or Res force).  SHTF, deployment comes up...the HR folks go.  Reg Force *next ROTO* folks start trg and DAGing...assessments are done, decision made to augment with PRES folks...they start trg and DAGing.  The PRes folks who want to deploy but not be Reg Force...well, they have to keep their fitness, medical, admin, etc up to snuff so when the call comes, they are the ones who can be *wheels in the well* the quickest.
> 
> I know there is a lot of talk about Reservists ''being bored with doing the same thing over and over, year after year" but I'll state again we have the same thing in the Reg Force too.  But...we get paid to be ready to do job X in unit Y whether its Reg or Res.  End of the day, that is what Joe and Jane Taxpayer are forking over tax dollars for us to be able to do.
> 
> Leadership, right down to the Jnr NCO level, is key to any unit being able to get out the door ASAP when the call comes.  Reg, or Res.



So, when 'leadership' at the highest levels promises all kinds of awesome training and everyone is pumped then, at the last minute, it's all cancelled because Bde has blown the budget and we can't go on weekend exercises anymore and have to cut parade nights down to 2 per month, then what?


----------



## MilEME09

Im one of those people that complain about the training. However I get it that the army is repetative in nature. What grinds my gears is when the chain of command does not even try to make training engaging or interesting. As well as when we go on EX and the most jr person there has 3 years at the unit and they treat us all like we have never seem a hide before.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> So, when 'leadership' at the highest levels promises all kinds of awesome training and everyone is pumped then, at the last minute, it's all cancelled because Bde has blown the budget and we can't go on weekend exercises anymore and have to cut parade nights down to 2 per month, then what?



Then the CBG Comd should be engaged by the COs.  I suspect the Comd would then have some direct questions for his HQ COS who is usually a Reg Force LCol and also the HQ CO.  If needed a discussion with the Div could follow.  Just needs people at the right level to have some nads.


----------



## Flavus101

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Im one of those people that complain about the training. However I get it that the army is repetative in nature. What grinds my gears is when the chain of command does not even try to make training engaging or interesting. As well as when we go on EX and the most jr person there has 3 years at the unit and they treat us all like we have never seem a hide before.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



The most junior person on Ex having three years in is a problem all unto itself.


----------



## George Wallace

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> The most junior person on Ex having three years in is a problem all unto itself.



Not if he is a Cpl or above with more than three years in the army, not just the unit.


----------



## MilEME09

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Not if he is a Cpl or above with more than three years in the army, not just the unit.



Thats why I worded it that way, if it was a Pte with only 3 years in the army thats not an issue.


----------



## George Wallace

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Thats why I worded it that way, if it was a Pte with only 3 years in the army thats not an issue.



 :warstory:

It seems that that flew over the heads of some.   [


----------



## Flavus101

What I was referring to is that it is generally very hard to survive as a reserve unit if you are not constantly taking on new troops (perhaps this rule mostly applies to the infantry regiments) each year.

If it was a unit ex and the most junior person on that ex had three years in that speaks to (what I believe anyways) a serious problem to the health of a unit.


----------



## MilEME09

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> What I was referring to is that it is generally very hard to survive as a reserve unit if you are not constantly taking on new troops (perhaps this rule mostly applies to the infantry regiments) each year.
> 
> If it was a unit ex and the most junior person on that ex had three years in that speaks to (what I believe anyways) a serious problem to the health of a unit.



CSS used to go a year or two without getting a new recruit, call that a recruiting problem. Once recruited though it used to be a couple years before the member was out with the unit, the first two years on average were lost to BMQ and BMQ-L.


----------



## PuckChaser

That's the problem with forcing the units to run courses on the weekends for BMQ instead of during the summer. Wastes 2 full years of weekend training.


----------



## dapaterson

Done right, they get BMW year one, BMQ-L and DP1 in summer one.


----------



## RocketRichard

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Done right, they get BMW year one, BMQ-L and DP1 in summer one.


Yes, or BMQ BMQL summer 1 and DP1 summer 2. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


----------



## MilEME09

I said on average because I find only if the recruit is a student can they do both it 1 summer.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## RocketRichard

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I said on average because I find only if the recruit is a student can they do both it 1 summer.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


Or, a teacher. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


----------



## Eland2

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> That's the problem with forcing the units to run courses on the weekends for BMQ instead of during the summer. Wastes 2 full years of weekend training.



Interesting to see they do BMQ over so many weekends instead of the summer. When I joined up in the late spring of 1979, it was under the auspices of something called SRTP, or Summer Recruit Training Programme. It was partly a way of giving kids 16 and older a summer job and partly a way of bringing them into the reserves. The programme ran for the entire summer, save for the last week of August and was designed to give participants an abbreviated form of basic training. In the fall, returning graduates would go straight into the TQ1 phase of trades training.


----------



## mariomike

Eland2 said:
			
		

> When I joined up in the late spring of 1979, it was under the auspices of something called SRTP, or Summer Recruit Training Programme. It was partly a way of giving kids 16 and older a summer job and partly a way of bringing them into the reserves.



I did the Student Summer Employment Plan (SSEP) when I was 16 with the RCASC. I enjoyed it, and decided to stay in the Reserve.


----------



## RocketRichard

mariomike said:
			
		

> I did the Student Summer Employment Plan (SSEP) when I was 16 with the RCASC. I enjoyed it, and decided to stay in the Reserve.


We are targeting high school students in our unit. More BMQ courses slated to run in the brigade than normal this summer. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


----------



## Rifleman62

When I enrolled in Oct 1962 it was the Young Soldier Training Plan (YSTP). We has YS after our service number H817400YS until we transferred to the Militia. Had to be 16. I just turned 15. After I got my CD a friendly clerk changed my birth date.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I think they changed the acronym every year, there was also the SYEP (Summer Youth Employment Program) which also used funds from HRDC as I recall.


----------



## RocketRichard

In addition, a few brigades have high school co-op programs where students get work place credits as well as BMQ.


----------



## MilEME09

works for some trades not others, unless you are going for a masters or PhD, and have summers off for 8 years, you will take a long time to become say a vehicle or weapons tech, or an officer for that matter.


----------



## Ostrozac

dapaterson said:
			
		

> If by "regiment" you mean "undersyrength company that can, on a good day, field two sections"...



Hey, are you really saying that size does matter? That the five battalions of the R22eR are not somehow the ceremonial and heritage equal of those two sections?

The British Army had a similar issue with units that brought minimal combat capability to the table but had very active political and social connections. I once heard a Territorial Army unit described as "A Masonic Lodge with a Rifle Company attached". The answer they found was amalgamation; initially painful, but much more flexible and effective in the long run.


----------



## Lightguns

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> The Highlanders were amalgamated into the Royal Regiment of Scotland over ten years ago, and the whole of the RRS wears the same headdress, although each battalion wears a different coloured hackle.
> 
> During the same time period, Canada has gone from 15 Scottish regiments to 16, with the re-establishment of the Cape Breton Highlanders.



To clarify, I was speaking of the 4 RRS (The Highlanders) who continue the traditions of 3 former regiments.

The Royal Regiment of Scotland Regular consists of 7 battalions, each battalion has a variation in costume according to it's adopted history and traditions:

The Royal Scots Borderers, 1st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 
The Royal Highland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 
The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 
*The Highlanders,* 4th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 
5th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders)

Reserve battalions 
52nd Lowland, 6th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland 
51st Highland, 7th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland


----------



## Lightguns

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Hey, are you really saying that size does matter? That the five battalions of the R22eR are not somehow the ceremonial and heritage equal of those two sections?
> 
> The British Army had a similar issue with units that brought minimal combat capability to the table but had very active political and social connections. I once heard a Territorial Army unit described as "A Masonic Lodge with a Rifle Company attached". The answer they found was amalgamation; initially painful, but much more flexible and effective in the long run.



I concur and a more Canadian face to our regiments as well, we are well past the point of identifying with highlanders, lowlanders, Irish, Riflemen (in traditions sense) or Light Infantry (in the traditions sense).  Nothing wrong with Canadian Territorial Regiments based on Provincial Names incorporating the battle honours of the units of said Province, ie: the Nova Scotia Regiment.  And maybe the battalions being numbered with their branch affiliation in brackets 1st (RCAC) Battalion, The Nova Scotia Regiment.  Engineers and Artillery would continue their branch regimental affiliation.


----------



## Rifleman62

Lightguns: 





> I concur and a more Canadian face to our regiments as well, we are well past the point of identifying with........ Riflemen (in traditions sense).....



I Object!  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Hey, are you really saying that size does matter? That the five battalions of the R22eR are not somehow the ceremonial and heritage equal of those two sections?
> 
> The British Army had a similar issue with units that brought minimal combat capability to the table but had very active political and social connections. I once heard a Territorial Army unit described as "A Masonic Lodge with a Rifle Company attached". The answer they found was amalgamation; initially painful, but much more flexible and effective in the long run.



And this 'territorial' approach was instigated by a cheap British government, in the 19th C IIRC, who wanted to make it easier and less expensive to recruit troops quickly by leaning on local affiliations wherever possible. As a result, they gave up some 'corporate' control over branding etc. This didn't matter too much as British national survival relied mainly on the Royal Navy.

Where national survival could not rely on this quaint local approach to raising troops, Continental Armies used more corporate approaches from the outset, like conscription en masse, which was effective but far more expensive. Nevertheless, infantry units in Germany, France and other similar countries look and feel far more 'corporate'. The USA is the same, having adopted many of the Continental European customs (including, sadly, some shocking foot drill). 

So you could say our 21st Century Army culture in Canada was defined by a 19th Century British policy implemented under the assumption that we have the most powerful Navy in the world. 

Anyone see any flaws in that strategy? Anyone


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> So you could say our 21st Century Army culture in Canada was defined by a 19th Century British policy implemented under the assumption that we have the most powerful Navy in the world.
> 
> Anyone see any flaws in that strategy? Anyone



As I understand it, until the next class of US aircraft carriers are commissioned, we have more MCDVs than they have carriers.  So it's all good.


----------



## Lightguns

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And this 'territorial' approach was instigated by a cheap British government, in the 19th C IIRC, who wanted to make it easier and less expensive to recruit troops quickly by leaning on local affiliations wherever possible. As a result, they gave up some 'corporate' control over branding etc. This didn't matter too much as British national survival relied mainly on the Royal Navy.
> 
> Where national survival could not rely on this quaint local approach to raising troops, Continental Armies used more corporate approaches from the outset, like conscription en masse, which was effective but far more expensive. Nevertheless, infantry units in Germany, France and other similar countries look and feel far more 'corporate'. The USA is the same, having adopted many of the Continental European customs (including, sadly, some shocking foot drill).
> 
> So you could say our 21st Century Army culture in Canada was defined by a 19th Century British policy implemented under the assumption that we have the most powerful Navy in the world.
> 
> Anyone see any flaws in that strategy? Anyone



We are protected by the most powerful navy in the world and we don't pay a dime for it...............


----------



## ArmyRick

As far as our reserve regiments go, I can see a few options
1. Create "Battalions" that function similarly to the London Regiment (i.e. The Toronto Battalion would have like A (48th High) Coy, B (QOR) Coy, C (RR of C) Coy, D (Tor Scot) Coy). This means a shared CO and RSM. I still feel WAY too many Lt Col and CWO running amuk. 

2. Amalgamation. Which is a viable option but now is not the time to do it. Somehow something like "Toronto Rifle Regiment" or "Toronto Light Infantry" sounds way cooler than the non-offending, gender neutral, all inclusive "Toronto Regiment". This option would be tough. My Regiment (The Foresters, thats all I have to say we are the last Foresters in the world) has its two armouries 110 KM apart. My armoury (Owen Sound) is close to nothing really. That would be a reality for many rural units across Canada. However in this day and age of electronic everything, we should in theory make it work well. Or screw it up even worse.

3. Recruit. I mean recruit. You can easily fill up the reserves ranks. Some tweaking and overhaulage in the recruiting process for the P Res. The Liberals at first would be against this idea (its military, oh my!) but we sell the pitch as "Give young muslim, hindu, sihk, and other Canadian youth an exciting employment opportunity". The sales pitch has to be Liberal themed to make them buy it. Its interesting, I listened to a retired Regular Force Lt Col infantry (now a P Res) state that reserves are actually a better economic option than keeping our reg force at its present size. Roasting coming for that I know. Don not bother, I know all the valid points from both sides of the argument and I will sum it up as the government of the day and the flavour they choose is what its going to be.


----------



## Journeyman

> *[US] Army turns to special ops model to prepare regular forces for wars in major cities*
> 
> LINK
> 
> The U.S. Army says it will need to start planning now for war in a world filled with megacities — urban areas with populations exceeding 10 million people.
> 
> What this means then -- The Army will definitely have to organize differently, probably into smaller, more compartmented groups.


Canadian Army Reserves are already way ahead;  small....compartmented (as in, not speaking with other units)...usually city-dwelling....    

Shame about that whole "scaring city folks when training" thing.      :nod:


----------



## Halifax Tar

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As far as our reserve regiments go, I can see a few options
> 1. Create "Battalions" that function similarly to the London Regiment (i.e. The Toronto Battalion would have like A (48th High) Coy, B (QOR) Coy, C (RR of C) Coy, D (Tor Scot) Coy). This means a shared CO and RSM. I still feel WAY too many Lt Col and CWO running amuk.
> 
> 2. Amalgamation. Which is a viable option but now is not the time to do it. Somehow something like "Toronto Rifle Regiment" or "Toronto Light Infantry" sounds way cooler than the non-offending, gender neutral, all inclusive "Toronto Regiment". This option would be tough. My Regiment (The Foresters, thats all I have to say we are the last Foresters in the world) has its two armouries 110 KM apart. My armoury (Owen Sound) is close to nothing really. That would be a reality for many rural units across Canada. However in this day and age of electronic everything, we should in theory make it work well. Or screw it up even worse.
> 
> 3. Recruit. I mean recruit. You can easily fill up the reserves ranks. Some tweaking and overhaulage in the recruiting process for the P Res. The Liberals at first would be against this idea (its military, oh my!) but we sell the pitch as "Give young muslim, hindu, sihk, and other Canadian youth an exciting employment opportunity". The sales pitch has to be Liberal themed to make them buy it. Its interesting, I listened to a retired Regular Force Lt Col infantry (now a P Res) state that reserves are actually a better economic option than keeping our reg force at its present size. Roasting coming for that I know. Don not bother, I know all the valid points from both sides of the argument and I will sum it up as the government of the day and the flavour they choose is what its going to be.



I would actually agree in terms of Land forces.  But you would need to make the reserves more accountable for call ups and provide them the job protection and other tac on benefits they deserve.  

Where this would fall down though is for Sea and Air components.  These need robust fulltime employment to ensure skills and operations are maintained.


----------



## Loachman

The 400 Squadron min monthly attendance requirement for A Class Aircrew was six days, and four for all others. Most put in more time than that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Lightguns said:
			
		

> We are protected by the most powerful navy in the world and we don't pay a dime for it...............



Oh... you're goooood


----------



## Flavus101

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I would actually agree in terms of Land forces.  But you would need to make the reserves more accountable for call ups and provide them the job protection and other tac on benefits they deserve.
> 
> Where this would fall down though is for Sea and Air components.  These need robust fulltime employment to ensure skills and operations are maintained.



I would wager that not all Sea and Air components are as technical as some Land components. Once you have hammered in a skill you usually just require periodic refreshers to keep yourself proficient. However this requires you to have learned the skill properly.

Personal gripe - We need to stop cutting corners in the training system. Year after year more is cut from courses (specifically talking about Infantry as that is what I know). The training that we do is less effective as we have moved to a completely zero risk environment.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I would wager that not all Sea and Air components are as technical as some Land components. Once you have hammered in a skill you usually just require periodic refreshers to keep yourself proficient. However this requires you to have learned the skill properly.


I can't speak for all fleets, but LRP doesn't really work this way with periodic refreshers.  We have requirements for currency, both flying and simulators, plus a whole list of other things.  My trade takes 2 years to upgrade from Basic Category to Advanced Category *after* completing a 6-8 month long Maritime Operational Aircrew Training course.  Working full time at it, it is extremely challenging to be proficient in all the lines of taskings.  Our only reservists are folks who spent years in the trade beyond their upgrade and have left the Reg Force for the part time gig.  Usually they end up in on OPs shop or in Standards and Training.

It is not as difficult to be *current*, but being proficient...another story.  You want the proficient, not current.  Stepping away from the maritime stuff for X months for things like OP IMPACT, even as a A Cat, when you get back to the normal maritime stuff, its going to take time to knock the rust off, get current again and then work back to proficient.

Having done the res side before, I am of the opinion that the land stuff is easier to maintain in the part time stuff.


----------



## Loachman

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I would wager that not all Sea and Air components are as technical as some Land components. Once you have hammered in a skill you usually just require periodic refreshers to keep yourself proficient.



I cannot speak for the Rum/Sodomy/Lash crowd, but "periodic refreshers" for aircrew need to be constant, and most "refreshers" come from actually conducting missions. Techs are "refreshed" by fixing broken aircraft and conducting routine maintenance. Skill fade is quicker than you seem to think. Unemployed/under-employed aircraft are wasteful, and we do not have enough aircraft to allow under-employment.


----------



## Flavus101

Without straying too far out of my lane here (I really do not know a whole lot about the Navy nor Airforce) I think we are speaking to almost the same point.

I definitely agree that there are certain trades within the Airforce and Navy that are a hell of a lot more technical than the majority of the Army trades. I also agree that there are trades from all three branches that would be difficult to adequately fill with reservists.

I will look at it from an Infantry perspective as that is what I am most familiar with. When we focus on the Offensive BTS for a year we often lose practice with the skills that accompany the Defensive BTS. Ensuring that trenches are properly sited and built, the defensive routine is fully adhered to and a proper occupation and withdrawal plan is created and executed definitely gets foggy when not practiced. Then when we switch back into the Offensive BTS we often have to refresh ourselves to become current (I think current and proficient are the same thing, you're simply splitting hairs if you think otherwise. Why would you train to a standard that does not make you proficient? As I previously alluded to I do not believe our current method of training is always the best) on a wide variety of offensive operations. Perhaps the most challenging is becoming current in urban operations (or fighting in built up areas, or whatever the new buzzword is) and as we all know that takes time and costs a significant amount of lives if not done right.

To be fair we are not often dealing with equipment as expensive as what the Airforce and Navy operate. I completely understand that Pilots must get as much flight time as possible. It is much like when a dismounted Pl Comd goes mounted, things happen at a much quicker pace (then multiply the speed of the LAV to supersonic, trust me I get that pilots need training time). I just do not agree with the sentiment that the Navy and Airforce somehow cannot operate with reservists while the Army can due to some perceived increase of technical competence required across all trades of the Navy and Airforce.

*Edited for clarity*


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I lived the *defensive stuff this year, offensive stuff next year* stuff in the PRes too before I made the jump back to the Regs.  I'm not talking about this without having experiences the Res Cl A, B, B (A) worlds...



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I think current and proficient are the same thing, you're simply splitting hairs if you think otherwise. Why would you train to a standard that does not make you proficient?



Example.  I have to fly and operate sensors 1 flight every 90 days to remain *current* ( to maintain my Category - no Category = grounded, can't be a crew member ).  Operating 4 sensors, plus all the non-sensor related tasks, A/C general, safety and emergency skills and requirements, IFTS and AFRP knowledge...impossible to be proficient at all/any of that if you are only smashing buttons with wheels in the well 1 flight every 90 days.  Just RADAR alone has different modes, sub-modes and also includes IFF.  You can't do all tasks in one flight;  impossible.  And you are rotating thru all the seats and tasks...so you aren't even doing, on a 10 hour mission once every 90 days as an example, 10 hours of RADAR.  You'd be lucky to remember what menu and sub-menu the different functions are on the PEP (kiosk-like keyboard you operate sensors from).    In the flying world, at least the one I am in, there is a huge and understood difference between *current* and *proficient*.  Think of it like physical fitness cbt arms soldier who can complete the BFT in 1.5 hours compared to one who can complete it with 30 seconds left before the drop-dead time.  Sure they both can do it, but one obviously is better able to do the task and could likely do more when that one was over.  Best example I can come up with right now.

When does this come into play?  Our version of high readiness is being able to walk into work on a Thursday afternoon after flying late into the night on a training-mission-turned-maritime SAR tasking to find out you are being deployed OUTCAN for a named (not commonly known outside our community) operation, and being in another country on crew rest before your first mission that Saturday night; that's not an fictional example.  My last operational deployment, I found out late on a Tuesday afternoon and was DAGed and waiting for a CAL flight Thursday at noon.  That only took that long because my FORCE test had to be conducted Thursday morning.  Both of those examples were part of 2016 for me, and not that long apart (the first one was only a few weeks long, the other was a roto).

All said to give real world examples of times in the RCAF where reservists don't work for what is *ops normal* for some units.  



> I just do not agree with the sentiment that the Navy and Airforce somehow cannot operate with reservists while the Army can due to some perceived increase of technical competence.



The RCAF, at least, can operate with ARAF types and does, just not as easily as PRes in some (most?) cases.  Keep in mind, in the RCAF there is no separate Reg Force/Res Force QS for say, AVN Tech.  The requirements for currency are the same for a Res (flying) AES Op as a Reg Force one.  I know of no person in my trade who is a reservist who was not Reg Force (with tons of experience) type before, and retired from the full time gig.  How long would it take to put a Cl A reservist thru a course that takes a Reg Force operator 6-8 months to go thru?  The training to Wings standard before that...6 months.  Impossible in some trades.  If they went away and did it 8 weeks each summer...the stuff the learned the summer before would be a distant memory.  3 hours a week...a waste of time and money.  

Which leads to this point;  as an example, are Reg Force crewmen and Res force crewmen trained from the same QS, with the same TP, same POs using the same equipment?  No; if they deployed, they would have to take whatever applic PCF training to be say, a Coyote Surv Op or gunner, etc.  They have, to whatever degree, different training, qual codes, etc and go thru a PLAR if they CT to the Regs and then have to take whatever applic PCF or DP training.

Compared to the flying MOCs...what equipment would a reserve AES OP in a operational/flying billet train and fly on?  The exact same as the Reg Force guys and gals, with the same qual and currency requirements.  

As for the RCN, my understanding is the greater portion of the MCDVs were crewed by NavRes types...who were on Class C.  So, effectively, full time sailors.

Again, not trying to  :duel:, just giving examples for consideration;  the number, location and availability of some key equipment (aircraft and operational mission simulators) make it considerably more difficult to have Res aircrew across the country than it is to have Res combat arms ones, as an example.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I would wager that not all Sea and Air components are as technical as some Land components. Once you have hammered in a skill you usually just require periodic refreshers to keep yourself proficient. However this requires you to have learned the skill properly.
> 
> Personal gripe - We need to stop cutting corners in the training system. Year after year more is cut from courses (specifically talking about Infantry as that is what I know). The training that we do is less effective as we have moved to a completely zero risk environment.



How about a 'zero' or 'near zero' training environment, due to budget cuts, over runs, poor planning etc?

Since December last year we've had the guts chopped out of our training plan so that we have only been able to do fairly limited stuff, infrequently, and the attendance shows it. This happens with a dreary regularity. Our troops are excellent, the system lets them down every time.

You could probably get a fully trained, Class A, CSOR (or CSOR- like) light infantry battalion out of one or two Divisions, but only if you put the funds and leadership into it.


----------



## Flavus101

In case it isn't clear I have never operated the sensor suite you are talking about, when reading my next bit of rambling factor that in  .

In my mind I equate the complexity of operating that sensor suite to conducting an insert with assault boats, infilling on foot, then conducting a raid on a 3-storey building, followed by an exfil on foot back to the boats and then extracting on your boats. If you break each part of the mission up it doesn't appear too difficult, however when you combine them all it quickly becomes complex and a technical operation.

While I agree with you that your average infantryman right out of DP1.2 does not hold the technical qualifications equivalent to what your trade would have out of their trades training, I do not think we are comparing apples to apples in that situation. In my mind to be an effective infantryman there are a number of follow on courses that are required (and a number of them no longer exist but that's down to what daftandbarmy mentioned). Every infantryman requires their Weapons Det member course and Basic Winter Warfare, which should be part of their basic trades training in my mind. I also think that we have completely gutted the training system. Removing the mortar and taking away learning how to fire off of a map for a mounted C6 from the Weapons Det member is a huge disservice. For the Basic Winter Warfare my biggest gripe is the lack of equipment to properly run the course, we were unable to locate skis at all for this year. Those are just examples from those two specific courses, there are many more items that have been removed and really should not have been.

I am not sure what follow on courses there are for your trade (by that I mean equivalent courses such as Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Demo, Urban Ops Instructor, etc.) what I am getting at is that there are a number of very technically competent folks in the Land Forces. I personally do not believe that you can maintain proficiency (fair enough, I'll come around to your definition) on all of these skills when just attending weekend ex's (and it shows when guy's say that they are not confident in their skills because they have went out of practice for a number of months). 

As far as operational tempo, absolutely the Reg Force is going to have a higher tempo. That is the inherent part of being full-time. Now correct me if I am wrong, but I would imagine that all Air, Navy and Land component reservists go through work-up training before deployment (even if it is a small number of reservists from the Air and Navy side deploying). Would that not suggest that each component has technical competencies whose proficiency just cannot be maintained part-time?

If we stray away from the Infantry example and look at Engineers and their training perhaps we have a more comparable comparison between a Land trade and your trade?


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> How about a 'zero' or 'near zero' training environment, due to budget cuts, over runs, poor planning etc?
> 
> Since December last year we've had the guts chopped out of our training plan so that we have only been able to do fairly limited stuff, infrequently, and the attendance shows it. This happens with a dreary regularity. Our troops are excellent, the system lets them down every time.
> 
> You could probably get a fully trained, Class A, CSOR (or CSOR- like) light infantry battalion out of one or two Divisions, but only if you put the funds and leadership into it.



From the CSS stand point I am seeing the same, spare parts budget down, time for trades training cancelled, exercises reduced in scope, as has been said it is hard to keep proficiency in the PRes. It would be easier if someone people knew how to lead effectively and use the time and resources we have to max effect. However that doesn't happen, as a result I have to open up my cftos on my own time and review maintenance procedures for weapon systems to try and have some level of proficiency. Attendance is down among the senior members of the unit because they've seen it all before, many of them are shift workers and are not willing to take a pay cut for a day to come in and sit around for half a day while the CoC gets a last econd plan together because they didn't realize till now that Plan A can't work now due to budget problems.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> As far as operational tempo, absolutely the Reg Force is going to have a higher tempo. That is the inherent part of being full-time. Now correct me if I am wrong, but I would imagine that all Air, Navy and Land component reservists go through work-up training before deployment (even if it is a small number of reservists from the Air and Navy side deploying). Would that not suggest that each component has technical competencies whose proficiency just cannot be maintained part-time?



A reserve aircrew (LRP atleast) type is going to do the same training, which is minimal, to go as aircrew because they must already hold a Category and all the other currencies and quals we need just to fly.  What they might need is the DRT SET IBTS stuff that is common to all; CBRN, small arms, Nav/Comms (which does SFA for aircrew types in its current form).  There are some other CAC type things, but for the most part, if a reservist hold their flying category they are for the most part, good to go.  If their Category is expired...they won't be going in a flying position.   This is a key difference, with the regulations around our Category.  Way back when, when I did my Recce Crewman course, I kept that qual.  I might not have done any recce for some time, and wouldn't be proficient at it, but there was no regulations saying "the members' recce crewman course needs to be validated".  You got the qual, you kept it for life.  Our Categories our different from our quals.  I will always keep my quals, but I have to meet certain requirements to keep my Category.  This is a big difference between a PRes and ARAF aircrew type.  I am not sure if maintainers lose their Levels if they don't turn wrenches in certain timeframes.



> If we stray away from the Infantry example and look at Engineers and their training perhaps we have a more comparable comparison between a Land trade and your trade?



First, don't get me wrong.  There is just as broad and complicated skillsets required of infanteers, sappers, etc.  I get that.  The difference I am (badly?) trying to demonstrate centers on the impact of Categories in flying trades for reservists compared to say, a reserve Armour Recce Tp Leader.  If the Tp Ldr goes ED & T for 9 months, he comes back to work, goes on ex and scrapes away the rust.  If a reserve AES Op goes away from 9 months ED & T, he/she comes back without a Category and is then a passenger on the plane until they do the required steps to get their category back.  They keep all their qualifications, but that Category is different.  

Without a Category, I am just a self loading meatsack on the aircraft;  for an aircraft to be mission capable, we have requirements for crewmembers with both specific _qualifications_ and current _Categories_.  

Now, if same, a reserve Engineer had requirements to do certain EOD tasks in certain timeframes, or they would lose their EOD qual and not be able to do demo, then we would be comparing apples to apples and the PRes engr type would loose their "EOD category" like the reserve AES Op would if they didn't blow stuff up once every 90 days.

I am hoping this makes more sense.  The qualified vice current category thing...qualifications don't expire, categories do. NO category = can't fly on a crew.


----------



## Flavus101

> Without a Category, I am just a self loading meatsack on the aircraft;  for an aircraft to be mission capable, we have requirements for crewmembers with both specific qualifications and current Categories.



A category is much like what I know a "competency" to be. Like a qual it says you can do something, however it has an expiry time.

Now this is just trying to extrapolate the category concept a bit further. The variety of PWT's that must be shot in order to stay "current" or the number of jumps one must have to stay "current" would be similar to the activities you must complete to keep your "category". 

When we go out to do a Coy live fire event you must be qualified up to Pl live fire (there may be a method of getting a waiver so long as you already have Sect Live, I would have to look it up though as I am not certain) prior to participating otherwise you won't be getting any ammo. I equate that to being a self-loading meatsack (land based vehicles only  ;D) for the Land based trades.

I see what you are saying though, if you don't maintain your category you are much more limited as to what you can do to fulfill your job than the standard infantry dude who hasn't maintained currency on all his competencies.

Which makes me wonder if the GBA+ is a qual or a competency, never really looked into it


----------



## daftandbarmy

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> A category is much like what I know a "competency" to be. Like a qual it says you can do something, however it has an expiry time.
> 
> Now this is just trying to extrapolate the category concept a bit further. The variety of PWT's that must be shot in order to stay "current" or the number of jumps one must have to stay "current" would be similar to the activities you must complete to keep your "category".
> 
> When we go out to do a Coy live fire event you must be qualified up to Pl live fire (there may be a method of getting a waiver so long as you already have Sect Live, I would have to look it up though as I am not certain) prior to participating otherwise you won't be getting any ammo. I equate that to being a self-loading meatsack (land based vehicles only  ;D) for the Land based trades.
> 
> I see what you are saying though, if you don't maintain your category you are much more limited as to what you can do to fulfill your job than the standard infantry dude who hasn't maintained currency on all his competencies.
> 
> Which makes me wonder if the GBA+ is a qual or a competency, never really looked into it



Let's not try to compare the requirements to keep infantry current with aircrew. 

As an Infantry guy, I could walk out the door right now and do a pretty good job of leading a live dismounted platoon, or company, attack... years after leading my last one. Annually, with no preparation, I can pass the PWT and the BFT, just like a lot of other people.

Aircrew skills, I would assume, are far more technical and perishable that many of those skills we bayonet pushers require, unless you're talking about more technical stuff, like the use of advanced weapon systems or vehicles/ equipment/radios... even then....


----------



## Flavus101

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Let's not try to compare the requirements to keep infantry current with aircrew.
> 
> As an Infantry guy, I could walk out the door right now and do a pretty good job of leading a live dismounted platoon, or company, attack... years after leading my last one. Annually, with no preparation, I can pass the PWT and the BFT, just like a lot of other people.
> 
> Aircrew skills, I would assume, are far more technical and perishable that many of those skills we bayonet pushers require, unless you're talking about more technical stuff, like the use of advanced weapon systems or vehicles/ equipment/radios... even then....



We all aren't as talented.  

What I am getting at is it depends what is involved in the attack. Is the attack your standard walk along until you find that specific hill with the depression or forest on the flank and then simply do your flanking attack.

Or does it involve part of the force arriving by assault boat and another part arriving by air, seizing a building and then reinforcing and defending that building while waiting to conduct a link up with follow on forces? 

Anyways, I've said my part. I think we've reached the point where we agree that each trade has it's own unique skill sets and that the government doesn't get as upset when we break our rifle vs when the plane has a mishap  . In all seriousness, I completely understand that when things are moving at supersonic speeds shit can get messed up a lot more quickly then when Bloggins trips over his feet and eats his rifle.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> We all aren't as talented.
> 
> What I am getting at is it depends what is involved in the attack. Is the attack your standard walk along until you find that specific hill with the depression or forest on the flank and then simply do your flanking attack.
> 
> Or does it involve part of the force arriving by assault boat and another part arriving by air, seizing a building and then reinforcing and defending that building while waiting to conduct a link up with follow on forces?



Unless things have changed in the over 30 years since I wore an infantry cap badge, all the elements (the basic skills anyway) of your scenario should be in the portfolio of any infantryman or infantry officer.  Sounds like a interesting fighting patrol task, but it's not rocket surgery.  While many may be rusty in some of the skills, that's what rehearsal is for.


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Unless things have changed in the over 30 years since I wore an infantry cap badge, all the elements (the basic skills anyway) of your scenario should be in the portfolio of any infantryman or infantry officer.  Sounds like a interesting fighting patrol task, but it's not rocket surgery.  While many may be rusty in some of the skills, that's what rehearsal is for.



I seem to recall that, in the old (and probably returning), conscript army in Sweden, after initial training (about 6 months to a year) the conscripts were released to civilian careers and called up once every 5 years or so for a 2 week refresher.  And that included tankers and gunners.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I seem to recall that, in the old (and probably returning), conscript army in Sweden, after initial training (about 6 months to a year) the conscripts were released to civilian careers and called up once every 5 years or so for a 2 week refresher.  And that included tankers and gunners.



It's similar in most countries with conscription. But they also have a core of regular full timers to keep the lights on...


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's similar in most countries with conscription. But they also have a core of regular full timers to keep the lights on...



And that core of Regulars is critical - for three primary functions

Conducting day to day operations
Maintaining facilities and equipment
Ensuring that the conscripts, on mobilization, form an effective force.

For the Swedes that meant running down the road to the armoury, drawing weapons and taking up defensive positions with Zero NTM.


----------



## McG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Now, if same, a reserve Engineer had requirements to do certain EOD tasks in certain timeframes, or they would lose their EOD qual and not be able to do demo, then we would be comparing apples to apples and the PRes engr type would loose their "EOD category" like the reserve AES Op would if they didn't blow stuff up once every 90 days.


EOD pers do have currency and re-certification requirements.
... but, we don't send PRes on EOD courses.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MCG said:
			
		

> EOD pers do have currency and re-certification requirements.
> ... but, we don't send PRes on EOD courses.



There, I didn't think aircrew and divers were the only folks with currencies, etc to be maintained or the ability to do a task was denied until they were checked out again.

Am I assuming correctly PRes Engineers don't do EOD because the ability to stay current makes it to difficult and ineffective?  I remember hearing about an experiment with the Coyote 25mm gunnery when the PRes blackhat world wanted to get in on the action and it was proven the ability of Pres folks to maintain the turret skillsets would be extremely limited, or extremely costly.  So it was dropped.


----------



## dapaterson

The Army does not take simulation seriously.  Get some decent crew trainers and install them in Res units, then see if skills can be maintained.  Turret skillsets were not maintained because there were no turrets on hand to maintain them.

Simulators are cheap; but the Army is rarely willing to invest in them, since they'd rather have unused vehicles rusting in Wainwright than sims across the country...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

They have benefits but limitations as well.  You can't check someone out on a sim...its usually followed up with the real deal (flying a mission).  Gunnery sims, our OMS (Operational Mission Simulators) etc are all great but, they are sim and not real world.  Example, our OMS doesn't pitch and turn left right left right climb, decent while turning, etc that tosses people around like real ASW (which can be the most challenging part...hard to focus when your lunch is making plans to say hi again).

But yeah, done right they are pretty valuable for training; I recall being down in Fort Knox in a SIMNET, doing recce with Bradleys (they took our TOWs away after we started whacking everyone we saw  >), the heavy metal types were in Abrams, and we were linked to an Apache Bn or flight that was in their sim's somewhere in Germany, according to our MSgt who was babysitting us at the time.

Sims are a great training tool and if gas and bullets become less and less...affordable...its time to spend some (or more) $ on sims.  I know PRes Armd Recce units, or some of them, wanted the Coyote sims brought to their armouries...but that, like many things, never happened and never was _really_ going to.


----------



## Halifax Tar

I have to ask the question, do we have the support in place to look after these proposed simulators ? 

What happens when they break down, as computer systems do.  I think of the once great BOSS system and how it was quickly discarded and left to gather dust when break downs started to happen.  Not a simulator, per say, but a computer system meant to save time and money that really wasn't properly supported after installation.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

No, you just have to hire and pay a whole bunch of specially-trained and experienced (*cough* retired military *cough*) people to man, run and maintain them  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

No batteries necessary   [


----------



## Flavus101

I don't know if we should be using conscripts as comparing apples to apples here  .

I will concede for the moment, thanks EITS and others for laying out your positions. I have definitely taken it on board and you've changed my outlet on certain subjects.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

https://www.esimgames.com/?page_id=823



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AsqiJf-7kM


----------



## dapaterson

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I have to ask the question, do we have the support in place to look after these proposed simulators ?
> 
> What happens when they break down, as computer systems do.  I think of the once great BOSS system and how it was quickly discarded and left to gather dust when break downs started to happen.  Not a simulator, per say, but a computer system meant to save time and money that really wasn't properly supported after installation.



You mean, what happens when those in positions of responsibility fail to do their job, and fail to adequately plan support?

We could always try (just for a change of pace) to hold someone accountable...


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You mean, what happens when those in positions of responsibility fail to do their job, and fail to adequately plan support?
> 
> We could always try (just for a change of pace) to hold someone accountable...



What a silly-billy you are!  ;D  Next thing you know you will be with-holding medals on the grounds that people were only doing what they were paid for.


----------



## MilEME09

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> What a silly-billy you are!  ;D  Next thing you know you will be with-holding medals on the grounds that people were only doing what they were paid for.



Na to save money and time you'll be sent home from tour two days before you qualify for your medal. True story, cost a friend of mine his GCS-Afg.


----------



## George Wallace

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Na to save money and paperwork you'll be sent home from tour two days before you qualify for your medal. True story, cost a friend of mine his GCS-Afg.



TFTFY


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army does not take simulation seriously.  Get some decent crew trainers and install them in Res units, then see if skills can be maintained.  Turret skillsets were not maintained because there were no turrets on hand to maintain them.
> 
> Simulators are cheap; but the Army is rarely willing to invest in them, since they'd rather have unused vehicles rusting in Wainwright than sims across the country...



We have lots of simulators... I walk around simulating a real Major all the time


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Na to save money and time you'll be sent home from tour two days before you qualify for your medal. True story, cost a friend of mine his GCS-Afg GCS-SWA.



Unfortunate as it is, I hardly think the date the mbr was sent out of theatre was specifically to deny them a throwing star.  30 days is the min for a throwing star, so 28 days is short of 30.  Simple math.  I know at least one guy who did a full roto in IMPACT, and left with 29 mission complete after X months in theatre.  No star, 29 is short of the required 30.   :dunno:

* there is no GCS-Afg, I am assuming you meant GCS-SWA.


----------



## Halifax Tar

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You mean, what happens when those in positions of responsibility fail to do their job, and fail to adequately plan support?
> 
> We could always try (just for a change of pace) to hold someone accountable...



Who do you hold accountable when the simulator at the 17th Rifle Royal Regiment of Irish Foot Guards 33rd Bn breaks down in some far flung town ? 

Things break down over time, its life, how would these be supported ?  More RSS positions in the units or system maint folks ?  The closest CFB is responsible ?  That could be a challenge...


----------



## dapaterson

JJT: those who acquire eqpt are responsible to put in place the in service support contracts to support it.  Too often that has been glossed over.

Or "We'll buy extra X for the Reserves" morphs into "We have no support plan for X in the Reserves, so we will assign more to the Reg F instead "

(This differs from the Bison approach, where, however briefly, eqpt purchased for the Reserves actually makes it to the Reserves before being reallocated. )


----------



## Halifax Tar

dapaterson said:
			
		

> JJT: those who acquire eqpt are responsible to put in place the in service support contracts to support it.  Too often that has been glossed over.
> 
> Or "We'll buy extra X for the Reserves" morphs into "We have no support plan for X in the Reserves, so we will assign more to the Reg F instead "
> 
> (This differs from the Bison approach, where, however briefly, eqpt purchased for the Reserves actually makes it to the Reserves before being reallocated. )



Was that to me ?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Who do you hold accountable when the simulator at the 17th Rifle Royal Regiment of Irish Foot Guards 33rd Bn breaks down in some far flung town ?
> 
> Things break down over time, its life, how would these be supported ?  More RSS positions in the units or system maint folks ?  The closest CFB is responsible ?  That could be a challenge...



I would think simulators would go, primarily, to civilian positions.  Most of my experience with them, is they are staffed with retired Reg Force folks who have some SME level knowledge of what the simulator is designed to replace (field or operational mission training for X type units/pers).  I've been on the SIMNET down at the Mounted Warfare Sim Center in Knox and it was pretty advanced compared to anything I've seen on the army side in Canada.  We did the JANUS system in Gagetown, the SAT is a version of sim that works (different opinions on that).  We have a simulator for the Aurora for both the front and back ends that is actually pretty close to the real thing, minus the airsickness and cordite that can can, in theory, place ourselves in any mission pretty much anywhere in the world.  If something gets messed up, we can stop, rewind, start again.  

Most of the "interactors" I worked with on JANUS and a large majority of the folks who operate/maintain our OMS are retired aircrew who understand the mission sets we are exercising and are trained on the OMS itself.  I'd rather that, than a handful of straight civies who don't know, or care about, the tactical stuff.

How to make this work, or workable, for the Reserve side?  

- Give them access on weekends to the *bigger* systems at the larger bases is a possibility, but now you're talking about whatever issues arise from civilian contractors working weekends, or overtime.  It was done in the past, though.

- develop simulators (*games*) that can run on the DWAN infrastructure in armouries (also been done in the past).  There was a simulation...I don't want to call it a game, but I can't remember the name of it, that would run off a laptop server IIRC, back in the early 2000s.  I used it a few times, but can't remember for the life of me what it was called.  You could do things down at the nitty gritty level, like at the C/S level for a recce troop.

- sandtables are cheap, reusable and were a great simulator/training aid.

- TEWTs.  You can go thru all your BP, estimates, everything but swinging shovels and digging holes and still exercise your sub-unit leadership in everything they'd be doing without burning thru gas and rations.  Maybe it doesn't seem like this benefits the rank and file, Cpl/Pte level.  But it can;  run a one day TEWT a few weekends before the exercise to get your sub-unit leadership thinking and planning the Ex, things might be more organized and better training/learning for the whole unit when all the moving parts are together.

There are things that can be done.  If you can't get money, or until you do get money, at the PRes armouries for any kind of simulation training, get some sandtable exercises and TEWTs on the go.  It's not a perfect solution, but its something and something is better than nothing.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I would think simulators would go, primarily, to civilian positions.  Most of my experience with them, is they are staffed with retired Reg Force folks who have some SME level knowledge of what the simulator is designed to replace (field or operational mission training for X type units/pers).  I've been on the SIMNET down at the Mounted Warfare Sim Center in Knox and it was pretty advanced compared to anything I've seen on the army side in Canada.  We did the JANUS system in Gagetown, the SAT is a version of sim that works (different opinions on that).  We have a simulator for the Aurora for both the front and back ends that is actually pretty close to the real thing, minus the airsickness and cordite that can can, in theory, place ourselves in any mission pretty much anywhere in the world.  If something gets messed up, we can stop, rewind, start again.
> 
> Most of the "interactors" I worked with on JANUS and a large majority of the folks who operate/maintain our OMS are retired aircrew who understand the mission sets we are exercising and are trained on the OMS itself.  I'd rather that, than a handful of straight civies who don't know, or care about, the tactical stuff.



Agreed on all points.  I don't have a ton of experience with them, I have used them in Kingston, Petawawa and St. Jean but it was more for shits and giggles. 

The issue with support close to major bases wouldn't be hard to put in place, its when you get to isolated reserve units that it would be more difficult.  Could a reserve unit afford to employ a retire former reservist on a basis that would stop skill fade and ensure the simulator is always available for trg requirements ?  

The Naval reserves went an interesting route where then got rid of their "technical trades" and concentrated on trades where class A employment would be sufficient to keep up skills.  Boatswain, Cook, Sup Tech ect.  Perhaps, and I am out my lane I know, the Army reserve should look at what it can reasonably produce, in the way of adequately trained members, and do away with trades that require a level of practice to keep up core competencies that is not conducive to the Class A reservists employed time constraints.


----------



## George Wallace

Every PRes unit does not necessarily need to have Simulators.  It would likely be more practical to set up 'centralized' Sim Centers, in some cases using existing Reg Force Bases facilities when within short travel distances.  This would likely ensure that the people running and maintaining the Simulators will be more often and efficiently employed, and current on their operation.  One negating factor may be that the further the Sim Centers are from the units they serve then makes the planning for the housing and messing of the personnel an added consideration.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> The issue with support close to major bases wouldn't be hard to put in place, its when you get to isolated reserve units that it would be more difficult.  Could a reserve unit afford to employ a retire former reservist on a basis that would stop skill fade and ensure the simulator is always available for trg requirements ?



Or, perhaps one (several?) on CL B, who would be the SME and provide the service to the entire Bde [could be done from the Bde G3 shop, as an example]?  For the average PRes unit, I would see the simulator as something that could run and be supported off the DWAN server and PCs (it can and has been done).  I wish I could remember the name of the one I saw in the early 2000s.  It was actually pretty decent.



> The Naval reserves went an interesting route where then got rid of their "technical trades" and concentrated on trades where class A employment would be sufficient to keep up skills.  Boatswain, Cook, Sup Tech ect.  Perhaps, and I am out my lane I know, the Army reserve should look at what it can reasonably produce, in the way of adequately trained members, and do away with trades that require a level of practice to keep up core competencies that is not conducive to the Class A reservists employed time constraints.



Outside my lane too;  when I was in the PRes we had Medics, Wpns Techs, Veh Techs that were Cl A types and they used to form the core of our Echelon.  When we did Stables (maintenance), those folks were the SMEs;  our drivers would do veh maint under the Veh Techs supervision, the Wpns tech was the SME and would be with the JAFOs doing maint on the GPMGs, etc.  We had a Det from the local Sigs Reg't who provided CPs and were the SMEs on all things Sigs, etc.  I don't know what its like now or if units are even still holding those 'specialty trades' in PRes cbt arms units, but from what I remember there was a tangible benefit to the unit to have these folks all with us.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Every PRes unit does not necessarily need to have Simulators.  It would likely be more practical to set up 'centralized' Sim Centers, in some cases using existing Reg Force Bases facilities when within short travel distances.  This would likely ensure that the people running and maintaining the Simulators will be more often and efficiently employed, and current on their operation.  One negating factor may be that the further the Sim Centers are from the units they serve then makes the planning for the housing and messing of the personnel an added consideration.



Like JANUS was in Gagetown and we'd all travel there for a weekend SIMEX.  I don't know if we'd ever get the money for something like the Mounted Warfare Sim Center in Knox, but that would be nice if the bucks were ever made available; a nice standard to aim towards for mtd warfare sim trg.

If you could get a lower level "can run off Baseline" simulator (obviously it would be a lower quality, like a computer program running on Baseline PCs) that was accessible at each armouries, you could still do lower level quality training anytime you wanted (still wish I could remember the name of the one that was out in the late 1990s/early 2000 timeframe in LFAA).

Use the lower level armoury level trainor for the workup, culminate with the big SIMEX at the central base location.


----------



## The Bread Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Every PRes unit does not necessarily need to have Simulators.  It would likely be more practical to set up 'centralized' Sim Centers, in some cases using existing Reg Force Bases facilities when within short travel distances.  This would likely ensure that the people running and maintaining the Simulators will be more often and efficiently employed, and current on their operation.  One negating factor may be that the further the Sim Centers are from the units they serve then makes the planning for the housing and messing of the personnel an added consideration.


As someone who used to "do the 'Mo'" in places not close to CF bases (closest CFB:  8 hour drive;  closest Army base:  14 hour drive), I can tell you that if you were planning things, I see you included and understand the bit in yellow.  Others who've come up with centralized schemes of one sort or another?  Not so much.  Also, in situations when money had to be "found", I saw a few times when it was easier cutting travel money to/from  "the colonies" than to cut at the centre (not just in the military, to be fair).


			
				Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> ... If you could get a lower level "can run off Baseline" simulator (obviously it would be a lower quality, like a computer program running on Baseline PCs) that was accessible at each armouries, you could still do lower level quality training anytime you wanted (still wish I could remember the name of the one that was out in the late 1990s/early 2000 timeframe in LFAA).
> 
> Use the lower level armoury level trainor for the workup, culminate with the big SIMEX at the central base location.


Even a lower-level Armoury training set-up would be better than nothing at all with hopes the centre remembered all of the periphery when figuring out training schedules and funding.


----------



## Kirkhill

Boredom.

Could that be defined as the point in time when training becomes ineffective?  How about unnecessary?

When a youngster gets his coveralls and web belt it doesn't take much to keep him entertained.  About the only thing that you struggle with is instructing them in the need for proper dental hygiene and why we are spending 40 minutes in a class discussing it.  But everything else, you at least get the opportunity to keep their attention on MOI and Voice Procedures and safe handling of pyrotechnics.

The problem is you only get to cover that ground so many times - and refreshers, or skills retention only go so far.

When is it appropriate to say to the more experienced members "we don't need you - see you in two months for a 4 day range."?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> When is it appropriate to say to the more experienced members "we don't need you - see you in two months for a 4 day range."?



Not sure.  How long do you expect the majority of them to stick around *if they are not needed*, or that they will still have a GAFF about your 4 day range you *need* them for?  I suspect their interest and commitment to the unit would die quickly.


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Not sure.  How long do you expect the majority of them to stick around *if they are not needed*, or that they will still have a GAFF about your 4 day range you *need* them for?  I suspect their interest and commit to the unit would die quickly.



Other side of the coin. Agreed.

But if they are bored with nothing to do but refreshers and instructions on self-actualization and the importance of being Canadian would it not be better to focus training on effective training infrequently rather than frequently ineffective training?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Refreshers are part of the military life though.  One thing I've always been at odds with, even back in the day when I was in the reserves, was the "I've done this before" stuff.  So have hockey players, yet they practice some of the same skills, over and over and over.  When they play, the skills are second nature and have helped condition them to play at their best.

Repetition in things like doing battle procedure, combat estimates, even foot and/or rifle drill, is designed around the same concept.  If you *just did an O.P. screen occupation last year*, you probably aren't all the sharp at it, really, and the repetition is designed to hone your ability.  It is also a great opportunity to develop sub-ordinates and test out Jnr leaders on their skills.

Having said that, I've wondered before if the Canadian Army PRes training should move to something more similar to US system with the Guard or Reserves.  http://www.usar.army.mil/Join-Us/Ways-to-Serve/Troop-Program-Unit-TPU/

_These men and women typically train on selected weekends and perform annual training which typically is 2 weeks long.   You will spend one weekend a month on duty and two weeks a year in training. _

Personally, I think the avg reservist pay would be better put to use on a *duty weekend* once a month (Fri night, Sat, Sunday) than the 3-4 hour *training night* 4 times a month.  Back in my day, a trg night usually consisted of first parade with the SSM @ 1900 (5 - 10 min's), then 3 period of instructions, or whatever trg or main was scheduled.  final parade, usually with the Tp Ldr, Tp WO at 2200.

If I was able to turn those 4 half days into 2 full days on a weekend, even if people went home Sat night, I'd be able to do a lot more *stuff* with the same amount of training dollars.


----------



## MilEME09

Building a skill set and then honing it is good and all, but you can't retain a skill off one weekend ex a year. My unit goes out once a year to do hides and harbours, we do a walk through talk through, by the 3rd and final scenario (if we make it that far) we are crawling into with MWO's telling us where to stand and which way to look, just like they did the previous year. EX is over and the next morning we pack up and go home, waiting till next year to do it again. While I realize this may be a my unit problem. In general units need to be more creative to incorporate IBTS and trades training together to maximize training time and value, and above all else keep the training engaging for new and old members alike.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> units need to be more creative to incorporate IBTS and trades training together to maximize training time and value



101% agree, and that is going to come from within the unit itself.  It doesn't have to be at the CO level, it can start from the Cfn/Cpl level up the CofC too.  Whats that saying; "be the change you'd like to see in the world"...something like that.

Back in the day, we'd get tired of the same ol same ol.  first parade.  3 classes with breaks in between.  It was brought up one time in a O Gp "this is getting really old".

We started doing the stuff we were able to do to change it up.  One Thursday night, we would issue a Wng Order, go thru all the battle procedure for say, occupying a mounted Op.  End the night with the patrol commanders issuing OP occupation orders.  Next Thursday night, come in, kit up the vehicles, Tp Ldr issue final orders, go out somewhere close, occupy the mounted ops.  once the OP reports were all sent in, end ex.  Return to armouries, de-kit vehicles, stores away, quick hotwash.

This simple, doable stuff broke the routine.  It also kept our maint and serviceability up.  People practiced VP on the radios, reports and returns, BP, drivers kept the veh lockers sorted out, observers knew what radios were n/s, etc.  

Things like that, in some units, are doable at the unit level and require nothing extra.  Think outside the box.


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Refreshers are part of the military life though.  One thing I've always been at odds with, even back in the day when I was in the reserves, was the "I've done this before" stuff.  So have hockey players, yet they practice some of the same skills, over and over and over.  When they play, the skills are second nature and have helped condition them to play at their best.
> 
> Repetition in things like doing battle procedure, combat estimates, even foot and/or rifle drill, is designed around the same concept.  If you *just did an O.P. screen occupation last year*, you probably aren't all the sharp at it, really, and the repetition is designed to hone your ability.  It is also a great opportunity to develop sub-ordinates and test out Jnr leaders on their skills.
> 
> Having said that, I've wondered before if the Canadian Army PRes training should move to something more similar to US system with the Guard or Reserves.  http://www.usar.army.mil/Join-Us/Ways-to-Serve/Troop-Program-Unit-TPU/
> 
> _These men and women typically train on selected weekends and perform annual training which typically is 2 weeks long.   You will spend one weekend a month on duty and two weeks a year in training. _
> 
> Personally, I think the avg reservist pay would be better put to use on a *duty weekend* once a month (Fri night, Sat, Sunday) than the 3-4 hour *training night* 4 times a month.



I'm a fan of that system as well.  

Although there is another point about "drill nights".  Socializing.  I know that this makes Reg skin crawl, the notion that a bunch of civvies get together once a week to put on uniforms so they can have a beer together.  But there is, in my view, a value to that socializing.  For exactly the same reason that there is a great value in Mike supplying this site for us.  It becomes a forum for support and discussion and for connection.  For the Regs that is not an issue as they are stuck with each other 24/7 and have to look for chances to escape.   For the civvies in uniform, they have to look for chances to get together.

Recently I saw somebody reference UK Territorial Regiments  as a Masonic lodge with a rifle company attached.  I don't know that that was far off the mark.  In the sense that the Masons were the fore-runners of all the community service clubs like the Kiwanis, the Lions, the Rotarians etc.  And what the "lodge" would have been encouraging would be community service in the form of the "honourable" profession of arms.  Given that the alternative was the attitude of much of the population to soldiering was that of Tommy the Lobsterback and the Dragoons it was critical that soldiers be seen as "us" and not "them".  If only 10 in a 100 that showed up for a drink were fit for service and willing to serve that opportunity to mix with the community and put military thoughts in the minds of the community is valuable.

My Scots grandfather came from a tiny coal mining village of Annbank.  I now live in what was the coal mining village of Lethbridge.  Back on a visit to Scotland some time ago I discovered that both communities had an institution in common.  Both had, or used to have a "Miner's Library".  Nominally devoted to self-improvement it was actually a social club where the miners could get together for a pint while telling the Missus that they were just off to the Library.  I can't help but wonder how many strikes were plotted and prevented there and how many mine rescue teams were organized there - all over a pint of beer.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm a fan of that system as well.
> 
> Although there is another point about "drill nights".  Socializing.  I know that this makes Reg skin crawl, the notion that a bunch of civvies get together once a week to put on uniforms so they can have a beer together.  But there is, in my view, a value to that socializing.  For exactly the same reason that there is a great value in Mike supplying this site for us.  It becomes a forum for support and discussion and for connection.  For the Regs that is not an issue as they are stuck with each other 24/7 and have to look for chances to escape.   For the civvies in uniform, they have to look for chances to get together.



There is that side and, also, if you go down to *1 weekend a month*, and people can't make that weekend, you've now left them out of uniform for 2 months effectively.  That could lead to loss of interest, etc because, as you say, socializing is part of it (the trg night/per week).  Also, I still say that Canadian business/civilian employers do not support reservists the way that their US counterparts support Reservists or Guardsmen.  University students may also be more willing to 'part' with 1 night a week more than 1 full weekend a month.

Funny how the same issues are being discussed now that were being discussed 20+ years ago when I was in the Mau.  I recall when it was announced we were being cut from 2 nights a week to 1 (we used to parade on Mon and Thurs) and it was thought then that the Militia would fold inside of 4-5 years.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> 101% agree, and that is going to come from within the unit itself.  It doesn't have to be at the CO level, it can start from the Cfn/Cpl level up the CofC too.  Whats that saying; "be the change you'd like to see in the world"...something like that.
> 
> Back in the day, we'd get tired of the same ol same ol.  first parade.  3 classes with breaks in between.  It was brought up one time in a O Gp "this is getting really old".
> 
> We started doing the stuff we were able to do to change it up.  One Thursday night, we would issue a Wng Order, go thru all the battle procedure for say, occupying a mounted Op.  End the night with the patrol commanders issuing OP occupation orders.  Next Thursday night, come in, kit up the vehicles, Tp Ldr issue final orders, go out somewhere close, occupy the mounted ops.  once the OP reports were all sent in, end ex.  Return to armouries, de-kit vehicles, stores away, quick hotwash.
> 
> This simple, doable stuff broke the routine.  It also kept our maint and serviceability up.  People practiced VP on the radios, reports and returns, BP, drivers kept the veh lockers sorted out, observers knew what radios were n/s, etc.
> 
> Things like that, in some units, are doable at the unit level and require nothing extra.  Think outside the box.



The most effective approach, from what I've seen, is to giver everyone a warning order in September indicating the tasks the will need to complete successfully in the 2 week summer ex the following August. Defense, Offence, whatever, just be clear about the tasks they are expected to complete and then they can figure out how to get it done wit the time allotted during the normal training year.

This focus is the key to success, along with an early warning order. When we are never told what we need to be ready to do, which is more and more common these days sadly, we lose focus, and troops, as it becomes apparent that no one knows WTF is going on.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> no one knows WTF is going on.



Not limited to the PRes world  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

Christie Blatchford: Canada couldn’t have taken Vimy without citizen soldiers

"Of the 40 regiments with Vimy colours or guidons, 37 are reserve units, what used to be called the militia."

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/christie-blatchford-canada-couldnt-have-taken-vimy-without-citizen-soldiers


----------



## Halifax Tar

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Christie Blatchford: Canada couldn’t have taken Vimy without citizen soldiers
> 
> "Of the 40 regiments with Vimy colours or guidons, 37 are reserve units, what used to be called the militia."
> 
> http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/christie-blatchford-canada-couldnt-have-taken-vimy-without-citizen-soldiers



While I can appreciate her steadfast support for the reserves and the CAF in general I think the argument as presented in the article is a bit of a stretch.  While the 37 regiments/units were part of the "mighty-mo" the soldiers who dispatched overseas were signed on for the duration of hostilities, were they not ?  I mean, WW1 wasn't fought 1 night a week and 1 weekend a month. 

Her argument seems like a red herring to me in that the vast majority of those soldiers were not members of reserve units until the outbreak of hostilities.  Lets also not forget about the 47'000 conscripts who went over seas. 

Again I appreciate her efforts, I think they are well meaning, and they may resonate more with people who lack the military exposure that we do.  I simply think that is a poor argument for upping the reserves as it was a wartime and wartime only, which repeated its self 20 years later.


----------



## ArmyRick

Have to disagree with you Halifax Tar,

She hit some very valid points in her article. Their is no reason for the reserves to be larger within the context of the current budget. 

Interesting some of the tasks reserves have tackled, such as being the lead in each division's ARCG.

I will commit blasphemy here and say we need more reserves before we need additional regular units.

However current government in place, I suspect neither will be increased.


----------



## Halifax Tar

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Have to disagree with you Halifax Tar,
> 
> She hit some very valid points in her article. Their is no reason for the reserves to be larger within the context of the current budget.
> 
> Interesting some of the tasks reserves have tackled, such as being the lead in each division's ARCG.
> 
> I will commit blasphemy here and say we need more reserves before we need additional regular units.
> 
> However current government in place, I suspect neither will be increased.



I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to tie the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept).  

While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule. 

As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support.  

Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.

Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.


----------



## Kirkhill

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept).
> 
> While *the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers* they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.
> 
> As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support.



And that is the real value of the "Militia"  - the social club with a rifle company attached.  It provides a local point of attachment into the military system where people can see friendly, or at least recognizable faces, rather than heading off three thousand kilometers to join an amorphous blob run by the same people that take your taxes.


----------



## Remius

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept).
> 
> While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.
> 
> As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support.
> 
> Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.
> 
> Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.



I think her point is valid.  The fact is that most people that joined were not and did not become career soldiers like those in the Regular Force and never really considered themselves that way. Most thought it would all be over in a few months time.  Militia units were activated and grew as a result.  Many people were drawn to those local units in order to serve and fight in what they thought would be a short term thing.  Heck many units were created just so they could recruit locally.  If you took a reserve unit and activated it for 6 months is it part of the regular force in your eyes or is a reserve unit that stood up for a full time task? 

Essentially it wasn't the regular force or the militia units themselves that fought and won the war but a citizen army that stood up for a time to do what needed to be done.


----------



## mariomike

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And that is the real value of the "Militia"  - the social club with a rifle company attached.  It provides a local point of attachment into the military system where people can see friendly, or at least recognizable faces, rather than heading off three thousand kilometers to join an amorphous blob run by the same people that take your taxes.



The British had their "Pals" battalions in early WW1.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwone/pals_01.shtml

"The pals battalions of World War I were specially constituted battalions of the British Army comprising men who had enlisted together in local recruiting drives, with the promise that they would be able to serve alongside their friends, neighbours and colleagues ("pals"), rather than being arbitrarily allocated to battalions."

"The practice of drawing recruits from a particular region or group meant that, when a "Pals battalion" suffered heavy casualties, the impact on individual towns, villages, neighborhoods, and communities back in Britain could be immediate and devastating. With the introduction of conscription in March 1916, further Pals battalions were not sought. Voluntary local recruitment outside the regular army structure, so characteristic of the atmosphere of 1914–15, was not repeated in World War II."


----------



## Halifax Tar

Remius said:
			
		

> I think her point is valid.  The fact is that most people that joined were not and did not become career soldiers like those in the Regular Force and never really considered themselves that way. Most thought it would all be over in a few months time.  Militia units were activated and grew as a result.  Many people were drawn to those local units in order to serve and fight in what they thought would be a short term thing.  Heck many units were created just so they could recruit locally.  If you took a reserve unit and activated it for 6 months is it part of the regular force in your eyes or is a reserve unit that stood up for a full time task?
> 
> Essentially it wasn't the regular force or the militia units themselves that fought and won the war but a citizen army that stood up for a time to do what needed to be done.



Your highlighted portion is correct.  Just because they wore a certain cap badge doesn't mean a thing.  It was a way to keep people organized and in some form of order.  

Your underlined question, that has to do with its place in the order of battle does it not ?  Or perhaps Class A, B or C contracts ?  Would there be any use in activating a reserve unit as a whole ?  What actual numbers in strength could you get ?  Unless conscription was announced and people were funneled by force into the unit.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

If you activated a reserve unit for 6 months, I think the real question is would the *Regiment* be a Coy or platoon, and where would they get all the kit they need?   :nod:


----------



## Remius

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> If you activated a reserve unit for 6 months, I think the real question is would the *Regiment* be a Coy or platoon, and where would they get all the kit they need?   :nod:



The larger ones would only be able to provide a platoon at most for any extended period depending on the task.  And likely, they would not get what they need in this day and age... [ [ [ 

But whether they deploy individual soldiers, sections platoons or whatever, they are always still reservists and not regular force members.


----------



## MilEME09

Depends on the unit. Going back to my comments on the british territorials. I asked a few more questions to the member attached to us. They do have contracts unlike us, 5 years in length, states when they have to parade, that they can be called up for one six month period during that contract. Sounds like a better system to me.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## dapaterson

Remius said:
			
		

> But whether they deploy individual soldiers, sections platoons or whatever, they are always still reservists and not regular force members.



Which has caused no end of trouble, as our comp & ben are still done on Reg / Res lines.

Far better to stand up the Special Force (per the NDA), post people (Reg or Res) to the Special Force for the duration of their deployment (and beyond if necessary), and pass a single, simple QR&O stating something along the lines of,

"Unless explicitly provided for elsewhere, for the purposes of all orders, regulations, instructions and directives, members of the Special Force are deemed to be members of the Regular Force."


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sounds like a better system to me.



OK.  Why?  What are the pro's and con's of their system over ours?  Would this help recruitment, retention or be negative to it if someone who intended to be a Cl A type only, with a full time civilian job, was told they would HAVE to parade on dates XYZ and they *might* have to deploy for 1/2 a year in that 5 year timeframe?  (Example of things to consider)


----------



## Remius

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> OK.  Why?  What are the pro's and con's of their system over ours?  Would this help recruitment, retention or be negative to it if someone who intended to be a Cl A type only, with a full time civilian job, was told they would HAVE to parade on dates XYZ and they *might* have to deploy for 1/2 a year in that 5 year timeframe?  (Example of things to consider)



It's about managing expectations.  Not sure how it would help retention though. All good points to consider.  Also they have a smaller territory thus many units are very near each other.  We have a geography issue that doesn't help...

I for one would like to see some rules about attendance tightened.


----------



## RCPalmer

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept).
> 
> While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.
> 
> As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support.
> 
> Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.
> 
> Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.



There were definitely some nuances missed in the article, and I would agree that the approach is unnecessarily confrontational.  However, there is a very valid underlying truth in what she is saying which I and many others have raised in this thread before, and articulated in great detail.

First, I think you are incorrectly conflating the concept of a "Regular Force" as we understand it today with full time service of any kind, and you are further conflating the Regular Force of today with that of WW1 and WW2.  The Army at the outbreak WW1 was the militia and its members were citizen soldiers, almost to a man.  The relatively small pre-war professional army (or Regular force) was structured to meet the training and administrative needs of that part time component. 

In the case of WW2, the militia was far more than just a recruiting base. The 40,000 man militia (and its citizen soldiers) provided the critical base and structure for force expansion, not the Regular Force.  Militia leaders also had a key role in training that expanding force, though many of the senior leaders (LCol and above) were too old for active campaigning, so they were replaced by other (younger) citizen soldiers who signed on for the duration of hostilities, not for career-long service in a professional army.  

Do we tie our success in WW1 or WW2 to the Reserve Force?  Of course we don't.  As you say, these were national efforts from a political, military and economic standpoint.  However, I would offer that it was incorrect to minimize the role of the part time force and the citizen soldier in those achievements, and it would have been nice if that had made it into the national dialog.  

Turning to the argument for institutional support for the PRes in the present day, the RegF may have been able to sustain the 4000 troop commitment in Afghanistan on its own in terms of overall troop numbers, but as organized throughout the conflict, it was unable to do so.  You talk about guys chomping at the bit to go, and I am sure there was a lot of that on an individual level.  However, the reality is that every unit which deployed to Afghanistan required massive cross-unit augmentation (including at least one full Rifle Coy equivalent for every Battle Group, Op Res, and numerous individuals), and this augmentation included a significant PRes component on the order of 20% of the force.  The force as a whole was burning out by 2011, and it would have burned out a lot sooner if not for the PRes.  No one (Christy included) is arguing that it was a PRes show, but the contribution was required as part of a team effort.

By their very nature, any part time force will require support from a full time component.  If we were to look to our western allies, most Reserve forces have both a full-time reserve component and institutional support from the "professional force".  Ultimately, if you are looking for a PRes track record, it is really only fair to assess the force against the tasks they have been assigned, and there are plenty of examples of the PRes meeting its obligations:

Op LENTUS (2014-Present)- Short notice individual and Pl sized augmentation.  
Op LENTUS 2013 - 400+ reservists deployed at 24 hrs notice for a week-long local DOMOP using local resources almost exclusively.
B.C. Fires 2004 - 600+ Reservists deployed over a month long domestic operation, forming multiple battalion sized task forces. 
Ice Storms 1998 - Hundreds of reservists deployed on short notice.  
Op PALLADIUM - Composite PRes Rifle Coys for Rotos 11 and 12, and significant augmentation throughout.
Op HARMONY - Significant PRes augmentation.  Anecdotally, I have read that some Rifle Coys had as much as 50% PRes augmentation.   

I would offer that given current levels of resourcing (appx 6% of the defence budget including equipment, RSS PYs, infrastructure, etc.) and institutional prioritization, the Government is getting great value out of its PRes.  However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.


----------



## dapaterson

WW2 saw the "citizen soldiers" serve longer than a current initial engagement in the Regular Force; undergo months to years to training prior to entering hostilities; and then undergo a gradual demobilization.

The "citizen soldier of WWII" is a potent myth, but its potency does not change its mythic nature.


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> WW2 saw the "citizen soldiers" serve longer than a current initial engagement in the Regular Force; undergo months to years to training prior to entering hostilities; and then undergo a gradual demobilization.
> 
> The "citizen soldier of WWII" is a potent myth, but its potency does not change its mythic nature.



Some reservists (myself included) completed a year of high readiness training prior to deployment of Afg.  

We're not going to find an Oxford definition of a "citizen soldier".  We're all citizens.  However, I still think it useful to differentiate the professional force (those who will spend their working lives in the full time paid service of the crown) from those who live in both worlds, serving in a part time capacity and/or full time for a finite period of time when required by the nation.  Regardless of the length of service, the citizen soldiers of WW1 and WW2 still went home when the war was over.

I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I would also challenge you on the proportion of the RegF on a 3 year (or shorter) VIE. As I understand it, only combat arms privates would be on that kind of TOS.  Even assuming a high proportion of short term TOS, everyone who joins does so with the knowledge that they could complete their career in full time service if they chose.  To me, those are the employment terms of professional, not citizen soldiers.  

The Canadian "Militia Myth" was about an erroneous conception of the average Canadian as a woodsman inherently suited to soldiering without significant military training which is quite different from what you are talking about.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.



Exactly. 

For example: a properly managed and led reserve force should probably not run out money in the last quarter of the fiscal year, requiring Officers to order their soldiers (WTF Boss?) to not attend, and to cancel training that was planned meticulously in advance by a capable mixed reserve-regular force operations team, right?


----------



## dapaterson

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Some reservists (myself included) completed a year of high readiness training prior to deployment of Afg.



That the Reg F was doing the same suggests fundamental failings in readiness of the Reg F.  I'd suggest that if we maintain part of the military - Reg or Res - at a state of readiness that takes a year or more to prepare them for deployment, then we are failing badly.

A Res F cannot be the Reg F - nor should we expect them to be so on deployment.  Know the skills that are trained and maintained, and employ people appropriately.  If leadership can't handle that, get better leaders.



> We're not going to find an Oxford definition of a "citizen soldier".  We're all citizens.  However, I still think it useful to differentiate the professional force (those who will spend their working lives in the full time paid service of the crown) from those who live in both worlds, serving in a part time capacity and/or full time for a finite period of time when required by the nation.  Regardless of the length of service, the citizen soldiers of WW1 and WW2 still went home when the war was over.



Agree.



> I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I would also challenge you on the proportion of the RegF on a 3 year (or shorter) VIE. As I understand it, only combat arms privates would be on that kind of TOS.  Even assuming a high proportion of short term TOS, everyone who joins does so with the knowledge that they could complete their career in full time service if they chose.  To me, those are the employment terms of professional, not citizen soldiers.



A solider mobilized in Sept 1939 would have served six years or more; most VIEs fall within that range.  

My point (made abruptly, I'll admit) was that the traditional myth of the "Canadian citizen dropped his lumberjack axe, picked up a rifle, and singlehandedly repelled the Hun and took back Europe" is false; equally false is the "Existing citizen soldiers immediately liberated Europe".  Canadian soldiers spent years in training and preparation before invading.



> The Canadian "Militia Myth" was about an erroneous conception of the average Canadian as a woodsman inherently suited to soldiering without significant military training which is quite different from what you are talking about.



I think we are in pretty violent agreement here...


----------



## Halifax Tar

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> There were definitely some nuances missed in the article, and I would agree that the approach is unnecessarily confrontational.  However, there is a very valid underlying truth in what she is saying which I and many others have raised in this thread before, and articulated in great detail.
> 
> I think where we differ here is that I don't see people who were conscripted or enrolled for the duration of hostilities as true reservists.  These people were enrolled to complete a task, to put it most simply.  This is not a slight on the reserves or a chest pumping for permanent force of the time.  Its just they way it was.
> 
> First, I think you are incorrectly conflating the concept of a "Regular Force" as we understand it today with full time service of any kind, and you are further conflating the Regular Force of today with that of WW1 and WW2.  The Army at the outbreak WW1 was the militia and its members were citizen soldiers, almost to a man.  The relatively small pre-war professional army (or Regular force) was structured to meet the training and administrative needs of that part time component.
> 
> Agreed, that's just history.  I am aware of those nuances but in the spirit of the article I spoke using the same level.
> 
> In the case of WW2, the militia was far more than just a recruiting base. The 40,000 man militia (and its citizen soldiers) provided the critical base and structure for force expansion, not the Regular Force.  Militia leaders also had a key role in training that expanding force, though many of the senior leaders (LCol and above) were too old for active campaigning, so they were replaced by other (younger) citizen soldiers who signed on for the duration of hostilities, not for career-long service in a professional army.
> 
> Again hostilities only pers were not reserve or permanent force, they were hostilities only people.
> 
> Do we tie our success in WW1 or WW2 to the Reserve Force?  Of course we don't.  As you say, these were national efforts from a political, military and economic standpoint.  However, I would offer that it was incorrect to minimize the role of the part time force and the citizen soldier in those achievements, and it would have been nice if that had made it into the national dialog.
> 
> No one is minimizing anything.  I find it strange that the Army as a certain level of two way distrust between the Reg and Res force.  I have experienced this a few times.  We don't seem to share this sideways glance with our RCN reserve folks.  Not sure about the RCAF.
> 
> Turning to the argument for institutional support for the PRes in the present day, the RegF may have been able to sustain the 4000 troop commitment in Afghanistan on its own in terms of overall troop numbers, but as organized throughout the conflict, it was unable to do so.  You talk about guys chomping at the bit to go, and I am sure there was a lot of that on an individual level.  However, the reality is that every unit which deployed to Afghanistan required massive cross-unit augmentation (including at least one full Rifle Coy equivalent for every Battle Group, Op Res, and numerous individuals), and this augmentation included a significant PRes component on the order of 20% of the force.  The force as a whole was burning out by 2011, and it would have burned out a lot sooner if not for the PRes.  No one (Christy included) is arguing that it was a PRes show, but the contribution was required as part of a team effort.
> 
> Perhaps you missed my post.  You are right augmentation happened, it was forced.  I had a very long chat with the NSE RSM about this in Cyprus.  I had no idea, at that time, that billets were divided up between different commands, the majority obviously with the assembling brigade and the remainder spread to other commands and reserve organizations.  I continually ran into antimosity during work up training from people in 2 CMBG who wanted to go but couldn't because augmentees had taken billets, in their minds they saw it that way.  My point isn't to down play the excellent showing many reservists displayed in AFG.  My point is that augmentation was forced
> 
> By their very nature, any part time force will require support from a full time component.  If we were to look to our western allies, most Reserve forces have both a full-time reserve component and institutional support from the "professional force".  Ultimately, if you are looking for a PRes track record, it is really only fair to assess the force against the tasks they have been assigned, and there are plenty of examples of the PRes meeting its obligations:
> 
> Op LENTUS (2014-Present)- Short notice individual and Pl sized augmentation.
> Op LENTUS 2013 - 400+ reservists deployed at 24 hrs notice for a week-long local DOMOP using local resources almost exclusively.
> B.C. Fires 2004 - 600+ Reservists deployed over a month long domestic operation, forming multiple battalion sized task forces.
> Ice Storms 1998 - Hundreds of reservists deployed on short notice.
> Op PALLADIUM - Composite PRes Rifle Coys for Rotos 11 and 12, and significant augmentation throughout.
> Op HARMONY - Significant PRes augmentation.  Anecdotally, I have read that some Rifle Coys had as much as 50% PRes augmentation.
> 
> Again you seem to think that I am talking down the Army reserve.  In fact would like to see them more independent and responsible for their own tasks.  Right now every one of those examples you provided were held together by a regular force foundation and core that ensured the success of those OPs.  I would like to see the reveres be given an Op in its entirety and have them be successful with it, this should be the goal
> 
> I would offer that given current levels of resourcing (appx 6% of the defence budget including equipment, RSS PYs, infrastructure, etc.) and institutional prioritization, the Government is getting great value out of its PRes.  However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.
> 
> Again no one is invalidating.  The fact is that the reg force has, can and will again have to deploy, domestically or internationally, on a moments notice.  Until such time as the reserves can maintain that level readiness in useful numbers the lions share of funding should go to the regulars.  IMHO.


----------



## Halifax Tar

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Some reservists (myself included) completed a year of high readiness training prior to deployment of Afg.
> 
> I did this as well.  Most of it was holding down pic-nic tables and time allotted to reservist could catch up on training, no slight intended just being honest.  I remember how horrible their pay was.  They were all paid a flat rate of 2400$ a month until someone in Ottawa could sort their pay out, this took some time.  We hadone guy go home on weekend leave as Cpl and come back a MCpl fully unexpected, this caused all kinds rank/position problems.  I have also deployed to AFG with 2 weeks of work up training, I much preferred the 2 weeks.
> 
> We're not going to find an Oxford definition of a "citizen soldier".  We're all citizens.  However, I still think it useful to differentiate the professional force (those who will spend their working lives in the full time paid service of the crown) from those who live in both worlds, serving in a part time capacity and/or full time for a finite period of time when required by the nation.  Regardless of the length of service, the citizen soldiers of WW1 and WW2 still went home when the war was over.
> 
> See, I don't define you, a reservist, as a citizen soldier.  You are a part time pro, Semi-Pro if you will  , A citizen soldier to me is the person who is compelled into military service either by force or their own beliefs and is at it for a defined task, say WW1 and WW2.
> 
> I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I would also challenge you on the proportion of the RegF on a 3 year (or shorter) VIE. As I understand it, only combat arms privates would be on that kind of TOS.  Even assuming a high proportion of short term TOS, everyone who joins does so with the knowledge that they could complete their career in full time service if they chose.  To me, those are the employment terms of professional, not citizen soldiers.
> 
> Its my understanding that initial TOS are now 5 years.  But I could be wrong.
> 
> The Canadian "Militia Myth" was about an erroneous conception of the average Canadian as a woodsman inherently suited to soldiering without significant military training which is quite different from what you are talking about.


----------



## mariomike

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Canadian soldiers spent years in training and preparation before invading.



From what I have read,

Infinite delay provided infinite time for the Russian army and the Wehrmacht to destroy - or at least fatally weaken - each other. 
Meanwhile, Britain ( including Canada ) and America bombed Germany.


----------



## MilEME09

Atleast we didnt go through with Operation Unthinkable

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## RCPalmer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> That the Reg F was doing the same suggests fundamental failings in readiness of the Reg F.  I'd suggest that if we maintain part of the military - Reg or Res - at a state of readiness that takes a year or more to prepare them for deployment, then we are failing badly.
> 
> A Res F cannot be the Reg F - nor should we expect them to be so on deployment.  Know the skills that are trained and maintained, and employ people appropriately.  If leadership can't handle that, get better leaders.
> 
> Agree.
> 
> A solider mobilized in Sept 1939 would have served six years or more; most VIEs fall within that range.
> 
> My point (made abruptly, I'll admit) was that the traditional myth of the "Canadian citizen dropped his lumberjack axe, picked up a rifle, and singlehandedly repelled the Hun and took back Europe" is false; equally false is the "Existing citizen soldiers immediately liberated Europe".  Canadian soldiers spent years in training and preparation before invading.
> 
> I think we are in pretty violent agreement here...



I think we're in violent agreement on both the history and the contemporary considerations.


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> OK.  Why?  What are the pro's and con's of their system over ours?  Would this help recruitment, retention or be negative to it if someone who intended to be a Cl A type only, with a full time civilian job, was told they would HAVE to parade on dates XYZ and they *might* have to deploy for 1/2 a year in that 5 year timeframe?  (Example of things to consider)



For it to work perfectly we would obviously need reform to laws governing time off for military duties. However I am in the mind set that the reserves is still a job, 1 evening a week, and one weekend a month is not a large commitment to make(FYI I'm a shift worker and work weekends but still request time off for training). In the British system you can still miss training however unlike our just don't show up and give an excuse later, they have to request permission to be excused from training for a period. Example I was given is the member in question requested and was approved for a exemption for his wedding and honeymoon. One issue it solves is attendance for sure, I keep hearing "you want cool training, tell people to show up", if everyone will be there, CoC always knows numbers for rations, vehicles needed for EX, etc...

The number of troops dagging green in the PRes would increase, while I admit it would put a strain on a members personal and professional lives, we do sign up to do this and accept the level of commitment.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> For it to work perfectly we would obviously need reform to laws governing time off for military duties. However I am in the mind set that the reserves is still a job, 1 evening a week, and one weekend a month is not a large commitment to make(FYI I'm a shift worker and work weekends but still request time off for training). In the British system you can still miss training however unlike our just don't show up and give an excuse later, they have to request permission to be excused from training for a period. Example I was given is the member in question requested and was approved for a exemption for his wedding and honeymoon. One issue it solves is attendance for sure, I keep hearing "you want cool training, tell people to show up", if everyone will be there, CoC always knows numbers for rations, vehicles needed for EX, etc...
> 
> The number of troops dagging green in the PRes would increase, while I admit it would put a strain on a members personal and professional lives, we do sign up to do this and accept the level of commitment.



It's not really rocket surgery... 

If you plan good training that is incrementally more challenging, builds on previous knowledge and success and aims to be ready for a large scale, culminating exercise of some sort (and are consistent in ensuring that it happens when we said it would happen) then people will turn up. This training does not need to include helicopters, parachuting, submersibles, or hover technology. For example, good old section attacks are a real crowd pleaser when done properly with enough ammo etc.

If we move away from this well proven approach, failures of various kinds will occur and troops will vote with their feet.

Simples....


----------



## Brasidas

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's not really rocket surgery...
> 
> If you plan good training that is incrementally more challenging, builds on previous knowledge and success and aims to be ready for a large scale, culminating exercise of some sort (and are consistent in ensuring that it happens when we said it would happen) then people will turn up....



And then someone, somewhere in div overspends, then all units are told to shut down. Then six weeks later, after someone changes their mind, the tap gets turned back on after folks have made other plans.

It might be simple, but simple is difficult.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Under our current system, you need to market the job and fulfill those promises. Maybe certain individuals are annoyed that the PRes personal get a vote by showing up or not, but that's life and if you don't provide decent training, decent equipment and some decent organization, why will people waste their time? It's more remarkable that people do show up and continue to try to make things works, despite the best efforts of the organization to frustrate them.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> For it to work perfectly we would obviously need reform to laws governing time off for military duties. However I am in the mind set that the reserves is still a job, 1 evening a week, and one weekend a month is not a large commitment to make(FYI I'm a shift worker and work weekends but still request time off for training). In the British system you can still miss training however unlike our just don't show up and give an excuse later, they have to request permission to be excused from training for a period. Example I was given is the member in question requested and was approved for a exemption for his wedding and honeymoon. One issue it solves is attendance for sure, I keep hearing "you want cool training, tell people to show up", if everyone will be there, CoC always knows numbers for rations, vehicles needed for EX, etc...
> 
> The number of troops dagging green in the PRes would increase, while I admit it would put a strain on a members personal and professional lives, we do sign up to do this and accept the level of commitment.



I believe that the system is currently designed around finding people willing to volunteer their time and then paying them when they show up.

I think that if you paid people for their time and then demanded they show up you would get a different response.

Currently you are relying on people who want to help out then discover that they can't because of life (job, family).  If, however, you contracted with people up front then they would have to seek out employment (part time or otherwise) that would allow them to keep their commitments.  In order for that to happen you have to make the up front payout, and the back end reward, worthwhile so as to convince people to put the rest of their life on hold for three to seven years.

That is my sense of the US system.  You get enlisted.  You get paid.  You get trained. You get released subject to recall.  You can continue with education or seasonal work or part time work or work for sympathetic employers.  But when the bell rings you are liable to show up regardless of your other commitments.  Your service commitment is priority.  

Once you have served out your hitch other goodies fall your way: education, medical, taxes, relocation.....continuing service, preference on some jobs.


----------



## George Wallace

Chris

Most Reservists are more than happy to do the Courses.  Unfortunately, as you say, life and work do come into play; and with people in positions where they are Course Loading or Scheduling courses as if they were dealing with Regular Force members, the system will continue to fail.  You can give a Reg Force member short notice to attend a course.  You can't with Reservists.  Many Reservists need a minimum of six months notice to attend courses, so they can arrange with family, employers, school, etc. for the time to attend.  I have seen too many instances where the "Reg Force Mentality" has come into play and people have Course Loaded Reservists with little or no notice.  Of course, the Reservists, unless unemployed, had to refuse the course.

I had a City Police officer who needed a minimum of six months to book his leave.  He was loaded on a two month course in the Reserves after scheduling his Leave and Court Dates.  The Course was moved to the Left one day, and that meant that he could no longer attend.  Crap like that should not happen.  Fix the DATES for the Course and stick to them, and give the candidates a good lead time to make their preparations to attend.


----------



## RocketRichard

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Chris
> 
> Most Reservists are more than happy to do the Courses.  Unfortunately, as you say, life and work do come into play; and with people in positions where they are Course Loading or Scheduling courses as if they were dealing with Regular Force members, the system will continue to fail.  You can give a Reg Force member short notice to attend a course.  You can't with Reservists.  Many Reservists need a minimum of six months notice to attend courses, so they can arrange with family, employers, school, etc. for the time to attend.  I have seen too many instances where the "Reg Force Mentality" has come into play and people have Course Loaded Reservists with little or no notice.  Of course, the Reservists, unless unemployed, had to refuse the course.
> 
> I had a City Police officer who needed a minimum of six months to book his leave.  He was loaded on a two month course in the Reserves after scheduling his Leave and Court Dates.  The Course was moved to the Left one day, and that meant that he could no longer attend.  Crap like that should not happen.  Fix the DATES for the Course and stick to them, and give the candidates a good lead time to make their preparations to attend.


Well said George. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


----------



## Kirkhill

George, I'm not going to argue with the need for the Training System to be on their game and understand the needs of their clients (the Forces and the Volunteers - full time or part time).  From reading these boards over the years it is apparent that the managing of human resources is a soup sandwich at all levels.  Possibly/Probably worse than the procurement issue.

The issue that I have is that I believe that the current system is ineffective at producing effectives in large numbers.  Regulars are, frankly too expensive to rely on them for all our defence needs and the Militia/Reserve system produces neither numbers nor effectives.

And that is not to disparage any service member in uniform.

My suggestion is based on what I see in the US where Guard and Reserve personnel are enticed into a system that rewards them well but also requires a commitment from them.  They are free to live on the economy but they also have to be careful what commitments they make outside their military service.

They know that they will be away for 11 weeks and then be liable for weekend service and summer training.  The system knows that those bodies will be showing up on such and such dates and must be accommodated and utilized.  The volunteers also know that they are going to have to find employers who don't need them for those days.  I would suggest that means virtually anybody that is not tied to an assembly line job.  Trades people.  Part-timers. Seasonal workers. And yes students.  All of those people are likely to be more flexible in finding opportunities to accommodate service.

On the other hand, if the military weren't built around "band camp"  (  ;D ) but was, instead organized on a year round, multiple intake system then it would also make it easier for people to find slots to fit with their lives.


----------



## Kirkhill

Wild hair thought:

Is it in any way obvious to anybody that the system has improved with the elimination of the positions of Adjutant-General and Master-General of Ordnance?


----------



## runormal

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The issue that I have is that I believe that the current system is ineffective at producing effectives in large numbers.  Regulars are, frankly too expensive to rely on them for all our defence needs and the Militia/Reserve system produces neither numbers nor effectives.



Agreed, at least on the reserve side. Barring a major conflict, I will not be able to deploy. I either need to find a different job, or I need to accept the career implications. However, if I'm going to take a career hit, I might as well go reg-f. This also doesn't solve our problem..




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> My suggestion is based on what I see in the US where Guard and Reserve personnel are enticed into a system that rewards them well but also requires a commitment from them.  They are free to live on the economy but they also have to be careful what commitments they make outside their military service.
> 
> They know that they will be away for 11 weeks and then be liable for weekend service and summer training.  The system knows that those bodies will be showing up on such and such dates and must be accommodated and utilized.  The volunteers also know that they are going to have to find employers who don't need them for those days.  I would suggest that means virtually anybody that is not tied to an assembly line job.  Trades people.  Part Timers. Seasonal workers. And yes students.  All of those people are likely to be more flexible in finding opportunities to accommodate service.



While this is all fine and dandy, where do these magical employers exist? I've also hinted at seasonal employers, but from my from limited experience it seems that the army "Shuts down" on a large scale between November and March. Which is when all our construction workers, farmers, and trades people would be available. If I'm wrong, correct me. So even if we adopted your model, our students would still be available and so would our part Timers/under employed reservists. Why change the system? In fact it would put more strain on people like myself, who have full time jobs. 

Does the system work right now? Fuck No. I have subordinates who still don't know if they have will work for RST. Despite emails that both the member and myself have been submitting since February. 

Training is something that baffles me, here is the notice that I've received:
Basic - weekends (less than 24 hours notice)
SQ (2 weeks)
Dp1 (4 days notice)
DVR Whl - weekends (1 Day)
MSVS - weekends (4 months) - this surprised me.

I'm blown away at how difficult it is organize a course. Case in point is ACISS Dp 1.0. It is a 2 month long course that *has* be run from July to August, in order to accommodate both university and highschool students. 

Why then the difficulty in planning and organizing the dates? We know roughly how many candidates we will have because of the SIP. So why can't students get the dates in January?


----------



## MilEME09

runormal said:
			
		

> Why then the difficulty in planning and organizing the dates? We know roughly how many candidates we will have because of the SIP. So why can't students get the dates in January?



I think if the tried to run courses in the winter they would be surprised how many people would actually be able to attend. I know winter is my only shot at PLQ unless I quit my job.


----------



## mariomike

runormal said:
			
		

> While this is all fine and dandy, where do these magical employers exist?



Some employers have a - paid - Military Leave Policy.

Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.

Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer. 

All benefits continue during the leave.

An employee's service is not affected by the leave. An employee's vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change. 

See also,

Reservists Job Protection Superthread  
20 pages.


----------



## MilEME09

mariomike said:
			
		

> Some employers have a - paid - Military Leave Policy.
> 
> Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.
> 
> Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer.
> 
> All benefits continue during the leave.
> 
> An employee's service is not affected by the leave. An employee's vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change.
> 
> See also,
> 
> Reservists Job Protection Superthread
> 20 pages.



The best policies I've seen are are all public sector jobs, even the largest companies I've worked for didn't have a military policy, perhaps a small step forward would be to legislate that companies of a certain size (as to not create problems for small business's) must have a leave policy, even if it is just whats stated under provincial rules.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The best policies I've seen are are all public sector jobs,



That is the Military Service Policy where I worked. Others may vary.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The best policies I've seen are are all public sector jobs, even the largest companies I've worked for didn't have a military policy, perhaps a small step forward would be to legislate that companies of a certain size (as to not create problems for small business's) must have a leave policy, even if it is just whats stated under provincial rules.



Exactly. And you have hit upon one of the hobby horses I've been riding for a few years: we should target our recruiting efforts at various levels of government (municipal, provincial, federal) across the country primarily because these work places have leave policies that are reservist friendly.


----------



## Cloud Cover

I work in the public sector, and in our Ministry there is no policy for military leave. There is, however, leave to add professional or educational advice to social justice issues.


----------



## Flavus101

Cloud Cover said:
			
		

> I work in the public sector, and in our Ministry there is no policy for military leave. There is, however, leave to add professional or educational advice to social justice issues.



Does the defence of Canada and her laws regarding personal rights and freedoms count as providing professional advice/assistance to a social justice issue?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> Does the defence of Canada and her laws regarding personal rights and freedoms count as providing professional advice/assistance to a social justice issue?



For 'Social Justice' read 'Anti-Establishmnet' so probably not.


----------



## Rifleman62

daftandbarmy: 





> For 'Social Justice' read 'Anti-Establishmnet' so probably not.[/quote
> 
> I think you mean anti-conservative pro liberal.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> Does the defence of Canada and her laws regarding personal rights and freedoms count as providing professional advice/assistance to a social justice issue?



not according to the OPSEU posters. Try LGBTQ (did I get that right?), women's rights (not the rights of men), anti-capitalism, anti globalism, climate change, criminal justice for the unjustly imprisoned, etc.


----------



## Flavus101

This generation needs a world event to happen that causes significant hardship.

There will be less worrying about whether or not buddy who murdered and then ate said person is receiving their chocolate bar at every jail meal and is having visits out to the town.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> This generation needs a world event to happen that causes significant hardship.
> 
> There will be less worrying about whether or not buddy who murdered and then ate said person is receiving their chocolate bar at every jail meal and is having visits out to the town.



This is absolutely not what we need. Give your head a shake


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This is absolutely not what we need. Give your head a shake


I suspect that by "world event causing  significant hardship," he means Facebook and Snapchat both crashing at the same time.   

           anic:


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I suspect that by "world event causing  significant hardship," he means Facebook and Snapchat both crashing at the same time.
> 
> anic:



For anyone under 25 this would likely lead to mass suicides....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> For anyone under 25 this would likely lead to mass suicides....



OTOH, if we take away their 'Angry Birds' it seems that they might just make good Infantry  

http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/kids-turn-violent-as-parents-battle-digital-heroin-addiction/news-story/12292c2f5a1b779a56697594b871f57b


----------



## MilEME09

unfortunately we Canada need a threat, even my anti-military spending girlfriend believes we have no threats against Canada and do not need a significant military, despite my best efforts to convince otherwise. Very much I think this is the main opinion of most Canadians because they don't see a threat or a major function for the Canadian Forces in our current society. This is because of neglect of successive governments in my opinion.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> unfortunately we Canada need a threat, even my anti-military spending girlfriend believes we have no threats against Canada and do not need a significant military, despite my best efforts to convince otherwise. Very much I think this is the main opinion of most Canadians because they don't see a threat or a major function for the Canadian Forces in our current society. This is because of neglect of successive governments in my opinion.



But she is right... there are no REAL existential threats to Canada. North Korea, Russia, China, and ISIS/Taliban/terrorist organization x aren't existential, so its hard to justify military spending. That said, lets not pretend like us not having an existential threat is a bad thing.


----------



## MilEME09

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> But she is right... there are no REAL existential threats to Canada. North Korea, Russia, China, and ISIS/Taliban/terrorist organization x aren't existential, so its hard to justify military spending. That said, lets not pretend like us not having an existential threat is a bad thing.



oh I agree we have no threats however I firmly believe that given the size of our coast line we need a navy capable of patrolling and keeping those water ways safe.


----------



## SRidders

It's easy to prepare for the known, it's the unknown we need to be afraid of. 

Given the speed of modern mobilization and technological advances, to not keep a standing military modern is potentially failing our future selves. 

Which is why a properly funded reserve force is an important factor with dealing with the unknown. We train for the day the country will need us, hoping they will never need us. It's happened twice before in as little as 100 years. betting it will not happen again and thinking you can then raise a civilian military to deal with a world of professional forces is both short-sighted and reckless. 

What do you expect from a political system which promotes short sighted goals.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

No threats to Canada, at all, anywhere?  Not sure I believe that.   :2c:


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> No threats to Canada, at all, anywhere?  Not sure I believe that.   :2c:



No EXISTENTIAL threats.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> No EXISTENTIAL threats.



What?  Sorry, what are you trying to say?

https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/01/existential-threat-the-birth-of-a-cliche/#

But if you want to get into philosophy, there's nothing better than https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9SqQNgDrgg


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> What?  Sorry, what are you trying to say?
> 
> https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/01/existential-threat-the-birth-of-a-cliche/#
> 
> But if you want to get into philosophy, there's nothing better than https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9SqQNgDrgg



Neat article. However, ISIS, Russia, Iran, etc are no rusk to the US led liberal world order established post-1945. China could be a threat, potentially, at some point but they seem more likely to join said world order than destroy it. Germany challenged the world order and lost. 

Either way, to the discussion  at hand (outside of international relations convos) there is little to no pressing reason for a military reinvestment in large scale forces at the moment.


----------



## Flavus101

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This is absolutely not what we need. Give your head a shake



I gave it a shake, situation no change.

This world event does not necessarily have to be a global conflict with massive loss of life such as the world wars.

I am talking about an event that unifies Canadians (and to a greater extent Western civilizations) towards a common purpose. An event that forces people to start being accountable for their actions and not simply looking towards the state for handouts required from their poor decisions. I think that Western civilization has become stagnant and lacking in innovation and drive (not counting the yearly iPhone or other gadget release). 

There is no denial that the US is still the predominant global power. However, there is legitimate cause to be concerned that the US no longer holds the same level of  global power it once had and that the world is breaking up into a situation where there are dominant regional hegemons that can dominant US power. 

History has shown that global powers are never able to sustain themselves indefinitely due to a variety of reasons, perhaps stagnation is the most signifiant. I believe that the US is currently on a downward trend and that powers such as Russia, India and China will seek to assert themselves as significant regional powers willing to challenge the US in their spheres of influence as time progresses (this decay could be dragged out over the next 50 to 100 years).

As a single global hegemony starts to decay, those who gain power and influence will continually challenge and destabilize the global political landscape as they seek to become the predominant power (this does not necessarily have to be widespread open warfare, as we all know there are different ways to inflict losses). I believe that the United Nations will prove to be as effective as the League of Nations in stopping this new age of political instability.


----------



## SRidders

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I am talking about an event that unifies Canadians (and to a greater extent Western civilizations) towards a common purpose. An event that forces people to start being accountable for their actions and not simply looking towards the state for handouts required from their poor decisions. I think that Western civilization has become stagnant and lacking in innovation and drive (not counting the yearly iPhone or other gadget release).



I think you are mistaking stagnation with other nation states catching up from a period in history (WW1 and WW2) that crippled them or drastically changed their political systems. Innovation today happens in the pharmaceutical and supply chain management sector (not easily visible to the naked eye).



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> There is no denial that the US is still the predominant global power. However, there is legitimate cause to be concerned that the US no longer holds the same level of  global power it once had and that the world is breaking up into a situation where there are dominant regional hegemons that can dominant US power.



It's expensive to have your fingers on all corners of the planet at all times. At the infancy of the current global economy, it was profitable to send out your armed forces to force you economic will in all major makets. As China and other emerging world powers caught up via developing economies, they naturally regained their influence over their immediate spheres of influence. The USA was no longer the default power and it would cost them too much to retain that power. So, they started to retract a lot of influence and concentrated on specific regions. This is where we are seeing a major battle for influence, namely the Middle East. 

In short, the USA saw the writing on the wall and are now more focused on where they place their forces to gain influence.



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> As a single global hegemony starts to decay, those who gain power and influence will continually challenge and destabilize the global political landscape as they seek to become the predominant power (this does not necessarily have to be widespread open warfare, as we all know there are different ways to inflict losses). I believe that the United Nations will prove to be as effective as the League of Nations in stopping this new age of political instability.



This is Historically accurate if you look at it from a broad perspective. However, current world actors are too intertwined economically to truly inflict the historical destabilisation you are talking about. China would never go to war with the USA unless it was economically to their advantage. Nato would not institute blanket sanctions on Russia as Europe is too intertwined with their energy sector. If we ever saw a retraction of the current global economy, then your senario could happen. However, we're all done if that happens.


----------



## Flavus101

SRidders said:
			
		

> I think you are mistaking stagnation with other nation states catching up from a period in history (WW1 and WW2) that crippled them or drastically changed their political systems. Innovation today happens in the pharmaceutical and supply chain management sector (not easily visible to the naked eye).



Absolutely you can argue that the world wars crippled the economies of Europe, I would agree with that. I would argue that those economies had recovered and in the majority of cases improved from pre-war conditions by the mid-70's. 

Would you not say that there is innovation around the world in much more than the pharmaceutical sector and supply chain management systems? 

I think materials innovation is also quite relevant, from synthetic clothing materials to actual building materials. An example off the top of my head, technological innovation of being able to mass produce curved glass has started to influence the smartphone world.



			
				SRidders said:
			
		

> It's expensive to have your fingers on all corners of the planet at all times. At the infancy of the current global economy, it was profitable to send out your armed forces to force you economic will in all major makets. As China and other emerging world powers caught up via developing economies, they naturally regained their influence over their immediate spheres of influence. The USA was no longer the default power and it would cost them too much to retain that power. So, they started to retract a lot of influence and concentrated on specific regions. This is where we are seeing a major battle for influence, namely the Middle East.



I would compare this to the historical colonization efforts. Historically it was profitable to send out armies to colonize technologically backwards people and exploit them and their land. As these new lands were gradually industrialized the populations (whether native or with immigrant roots) became less willing to have colonial overlords. While I will concede that in modern times there is much less direct colonialism (in the form of the host nation having very limited sovereignty) I think that there is a lot of hidden economic colonialism with more economically powerful countries having significant influence within an economically weaker country.

I would compare the modern day US to the British Empire when it started the decline from the world's pre-eminent global power (the period of which lasted for a much shorter timeframe than that of the current US global dominance).



			
				SRidders said:
			
		

> This is Historically accurate if you look at it from a broad perspective. However, current world actors are too intertwined economically to truly inflict the historical destabilisation you are talking about. China would never go to war with the USA unless it was economically to their advantage. Nato would not institute blanket sanctions on Russia as Europe is too intertwined with their energy sector. If we ever saw a retraction of the current global economy, then your senario could happen. However, we're all done if that happens.



Your scenario involves all actors being truly rational, which I would argue is not always the case.

Historically the vast majority of wars were fought due to economic tendencies, the seizing of land for resources or control over trade routes, the sacking of large cities for riches. etc. I would agree that open warfare of the scale seen in the World Wars will not happen in the near future, however I think proxies wars such as Vietnam and Korea are a severely increasing concern.

And now that this topic has been significantly derailed I will end my post... (Perhaps when the new staff are appointed we could get a thread split)


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> No EXISTENTIAL threats.



Do you think that, also, for the US?  We're pretty close to them after all.

*I think you use the term existential threat more literally than I do?  It could be argued any nation/state with nuclear weapons poses a possible existential threat, IMO.  But, I could be off on my understanding of the word/context.


----------



## MilEME09

I would also call any country with territorial claims against us a potential threat.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Kirkhill

Flavus101 said:
			
		

> Absolutely you can argue that the world wars crippled the economies of Europe, I would agree with that. I would argue that those economies had recovered and in the majority of cases improved from pre-war conditions by the mid-70's.
> 
> Would you not say that there is innovation around the world in much more than the pharmaceutical sector and supply chain management systems?
> 
> I think materials innovation is also quite relevant, from synthetic clothing materials to actual building materials. An example off the top of my head, technological innovation of being able to mass produce curved glass has started to influence the smartphone world.



I am going to guess that SR was responding to your statement "I think that Western civilization has become stagnant and lacking in innovation and drive (not counting the yearly iPhone or other gadget release)" which read as fairly categorical, by offering one are in which innovation has continued, not necessarily implying that it was the only field in which innovation thrived.  

On the other hand, I can agree with you on the political front. There has been a degree of ossification; a tendency which has, in my view been encouraged, by entrenched interests that consider the last 70 years to have been a disaster.  Liberal Democracy was not popular on the continent prior to May 8 1945.  And just because governments "surrendered", people didn't.



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> I would compare this to the historical colonization efforts. Historically it was profitable to send out armies to colonize technologically backwards people and exploit them and their land. As these new lands were gradually industrialized the populations (whether native or with immigrant roots) became less willing to have colonial overlords. While I will concede that in modern times there is much less direct colonialism (in the form of the host nation having very limited sovereignty) I think that there is a lot of hidden economic colonialism with more economically powerful countries having significant influence within an economically weaker country.
> 
> I would compare the modern day US to the British Empire when it started the decline from the world's pre-eminent global power (the period of which lasted for a much shorter time frame than that of the current US global dominance).



Actually, Ferguson's Empire will give a good read of the other view of Empire.   Britain's most successful Empire happened before the Empire was "Nationalized".  The East India Company was self financing and raised its own security forces from its local clients.  

Things went down hill with the arrival of the Methodists and the desire to "Improve" the locals.  All of a sudden Britain had to send in "White" troops to protect the Methodists.  Things got worse when Britain started exporting its unemployed to Canada, Australia and South Africa.  The Hudson's Bay Company, like the East India Company, had a good thing going with the locals.  The locals sold pelts and got Axminster blankets and were satisfied.  The HBC were not fans of the Settlers as the folks around the Red River in Manitoba will tell you.

Trade empires, the empires of Clive, Raffles, Jardine and Mathieson, and Radishes and Gooseberries were actually quite profitable. Settlers were a millstone.  Little England made money.



			
				Flavus101 said:
			
		

> Your scenario involves all actors being truly rational, which I would argue is not always the case.
> 
> Historically the vast majority of wars were fought due to economic tendencies, the seizing of land for resources or control over trade routes, the sacking of large cities for riches. etc. I would agree that open warfare of the scale seen in the World Wars will not happen in the near future, however I think proxies wars such as Vietnam and Korea are a severely increasing concern.
> 
> And now that this topic has been significantly derailed I will end my post... (Perhaps when the new staff are appointed we could get a thread split)



Rational actors are rare.  And even those that are rational may base their rationale on entirely different criteria than mine and appear irrational.  I deal with dietary laws in my line of trade.  

The best safeguard for human survival, in my opinion, is variety.  Inbred monocultures are very vulnerable to singular events.  Weeds, mongrels and nomads as well as multivarious plantings will always survive.  And to accommodate the differences well, I eat rump roast while others eat brisket - everybody is happy and none of the cow goes to waste.

Accommodation.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I would also call any country with territorial claims against us a potential threat.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



Including Scotland, FFS  :

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/scotland-as-canada-s-11th-province-author-says-it-s-a-good-idea-1.3375160


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I would also call any country with territorial claims against us a potential threat.
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



Are you talking about the United States (the Beaufort Sea triangle) and Denmark (Hans Island) or are there other territorial disputes that I'm not tracking?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Including Scotland, FFS  :
> 
> http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/scotland-as-canada-s-11th-province-author-says-it-s-a-good-idea-1.3375160



In the name of patience!  NOOOOO!


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Do you think that, also, for the US?  We're pretty close to them after all.
> 
> *I think you use the term existential threat more literally than I do?  It could be argued any nation/state with nuclear weapons poses a possible existential threat, IMO.  But, I could be off on my understanding of the word/context.



existential= pertaining to existence

No nation/group is going to make Canada, the US, NATO, etc etc etc "not exist". The current world order created in the post-WW2 era out of Bretton woods, the Marshall Plan, the UN, etc also isn't in any threat of not existing within the current time.

That is all to back to original point that there is no "boogey man" to justify spending money on a large standing military for Canada, particularly in the reserves. As a middle power, Canada (like most middle powers historically) will serve its interests by assisting in maintenance of the current world order from which it prospers. This means small scale expeditionary units deploying to theatres where the US feels its interests (not existence) are at stake, including, GASP, UN Peacekeeping operations where said interests are at stake. This is how it's been since 1945 and how it will remain for the foreseeable future.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Ack.  Thanks for the reply, as I thought, you were using it in a context fairly significantly more literal and absolute than I do.

Its interesting, the differences in opinions.  (1) don't spend money on reserves, fund a small, capable standing force or (2) reduce the standing force size and rely on a reserve force that is expanded, as it is cheaper day to day that way.  Something like that.  I, personally, lean towards (1) so I think we support the same argument.

Cheers!


----------



## MilEME09

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Are you talking about the United States (the Beaufort Sea triangle) and Denmark (Hans Island) or are there other territorial disputes that I'm not tracking?



Just missed Russia,


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Ack.  Thanks for the reply, as I thought, you were using it in a context fairly significantly more literal and absolute than I do.
> 
> Its interesting, the differences in opinions.  (1) don't spend money on reserves, fund a small, capable standing force or (2) reduce the standing force size and rely on a reserve force that is expanded, as it is cheaper day to day that way.  Something like that.  I, personally, lean towards (1) so I think we support the same argument.
> 
> Cheers!



We are in violent agreement.... I dont think that having undeployable "territorial brigade groups" does anything to assist in our actual national defence. To me, the reserves should be fully there to augment the regular force and do disaster assistance. The days of large standing armies, based largely on trained reserves (though this wasn't the case in the British system) are over. We need to let them go, focus money on where it needs to be (assisting the major powers in maintaining the current world order) and stop living in a fantasy world where WW2/WW1 are the key elements


----------



## daftandbarmy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> We need to let them go, focus money on where it needs to be (assisting the major powers in maintaining the current world order) and stop living in a fantasy world where WW2/WW1 are the key elements



So, like, does that mean the Navy will stop focusing their efforts on building a force whose main effort is to escort convoys across the Atlantic, too?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> So, like, does that mean the Navy will stop focusing their efforts on building a force whose main effort is to escort convoys across the Atlantic, too?



That's not, like, their main effort. The Canadian navy should, IMHO, focus on drug/smuggling interdiction and inter-operability with the USN and NATO


----------



## MilEME09

Wasnt our cold war role keeping the north atlantic free from soviet subs? Thus our ASW forcus

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Ostrozac

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> or (2) reduce the standing force size and rely on a reserve force that is expanded, as it is cheaper day to day that way.



You know, I often hear it mentioned that reserve forces are significantly cheaper than regular forces, but I've never seen any hard numbers to back that up, particularly when you factor in infrastructure. When I was on RSS duty I was briefly involved in the project that was looking at the future of reserve armouries in the city I was posted to, and what numbers I saw implied that both the cost of continuing to operate the ancient facilities and the cost of new replacement faculties were astronomical -- and all that cost is required to support relatively few part-time soldiers. Don't get me wrong, infrastructure for regulars is also expensive, but with units of 400-500 soldiers you can get some economy of scale for a building -- but my reserve unit was less than 100 all ranks.

I wonder what the actual cost breakdown is for a reserve unit -- between salary for the part-time soldiers, salary for the full-time support staff, training, equipment and infrastructure. And how that compares to the breakdown for a regular unit.


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The Canadian navy should, IMHO, focus on drug/smuggling interdiction...


If in doubt (ie - the absence of a current, coherent Defence White Paper), return to first principles.  A fleet optimized for constabulary duties cannot establish command of the seas.  We may as well paint Coast Guard hulls grey and task the RCN to focus on NavRes and Sea Cadets across the prairies.


----------



## Good2Golf

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> No physical EXISTENTIAL threats.



*cough*...CYBER...*cough*

Whether the CAF is the right tool, that remains to be seen, but Canada needs to think of security in more than just the physical plane. 

Regards
G2G


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> You know, I often hear it mentioned that reserve forces are significantly cheaper than regular forces, but I've never seen any hard numbers to back that up, particularly when you factor in infrastructure. When I was on RSS duty I was briefly involved in the project that was looking at the future of reserve armouries in the city I was posted to, and what numbers I saw implied that both the cost of continuing to operate the ancient facilities and the cost of new replacement faculties were astronomical -- and all that cost is required to support relatively few part-time soldiers. Don't get me wrong, infrastructure for regulars is also expensive, but with units of 400-500 soldiers you can get some economy of scale for a building -- but my reserve unit was less than 100 all ranks.
> 
> I wonder what the actual cost breakdown is for a reserve unit -- between salary for the part-time soldiers, salary for the full-time support staff, training, equipment and infrastructure. And how that compares to the breakdown for a regular unit.



The problem is the model of armouries that we use. If you take a look at National Guard and Reserve centers in the US (especially for smaller towns) you will find that the local infrastructure is design to support a company size organization  or a battalion headquarters and consists of a fenced parking lot (which generally has a company's worth of vehicles) and a smaller building which contains just enough office, training and assembly space. Larger centers have larger structures or complexes but again the size is generally tailored for fully manned entities. Not like here where battalions are authorized to company plus establishments and manned at company minus, platoon plus strengths. The big difference is that US NG units and subunits are established, manned and equipped to near Active Army levels because they are intended to be mobilized and deployed as complete entities.

Reserve units are cheaper on a man for man basis because individual reservists only receive 85% of the daily pay and benefits of a regular soldier and are not paid at a full 365 days a year basis as their regular counterparts but generally at a small fraction of that. So man for man they are definitely cheaper. 

On the other hand reserve organization and headquarters (and to an extent infrastructure) fall far short of being efficient and effective. Nonetheless whatever shortcomings they do have has to be laid at the feet of the regular force leadership which for decades has refused to do anything to properly rejig the entire regular force and reserve structure to maximize both components' strengths and efficiencies. You can't fine tune a force that is fundamentally flawed. :2c:

 :cheers:


----------



## McG

FJAG said:
			
		

> Nonetheless whatever shortcomings they do have has to be laid at the feet of the regular force leadership ...


Sorry.  You cannot absolve reserve leadership from any responsibility for the state of the reserve force.  The regular force has not fought to retain or restore platoon-regiments for the glory of local fiefdoms.

I would also have to partially agree with Ostrozac.  You cannot claim the PRes is cheaper (even man-for-man) while choosing to exclude the costs of infrastructure and the organizational structures.  That being said, I don't know that the reserves do become more expensive when those overhead costs are included.  I have neither done the math nor even seen the data.


----------



## Old Sweat

I am not sure there is any sort of attainable solution that will fix the force structure, especially as the political will, knowledge base and interest in expending political capital on an issue without a meaningful level of support is non-existent. Without political support at the highest level and the same from the public service, and that means money and lots of it, we are probably doomed to go through periodic bursts of wheel spinning that results in things like total force and 10/90 units and the like. And that goes for the regular force as well as the reserves and in all three services. 

So what do we do? Maybe we making the best of a bad situation and maybe we can't expect more from a system that is designed to be not so good, but not all that bad. I suspect we have what the government and the public will accept and pay for because it is relatively cheap and doesn't get in serious trouble too often.


----------



## FJAG

MCG said:
			
		

> Sorry.  You cannot absolve reserve leadership from any responsibility for the state of the reserve force.  The regular force has not fought to retain or restore platoon-regiments for the glory of local fiefdoms.
> 
> I would also have to partially agree with Ostrozac.  You cannot claim the PRes is cheaper (even man-for-man) while choosing to exclude the costs of infrastructure and the organizational structures.  That being said, I don't know that the reserves do become more expensive when those overhead costs are included.  I have neither done the math nor even seen the data.



Reserve leadership generally ends at the lieutenant colonel level with a smattering of colonels and the odd brigadier. It speaks very poorly of the RegF senior CF leadership if good ideas can be stymied by lower ranking officers and the odd politically connected civilian/retired hack. I sat on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council for over half a decade and failed to see anything other than reactive survival activities there as well. We certainly didn't generate any far reaching reform programs but mostly because we were sure that anything we brought forward would be shot down in flames.

I think the reality is that the RegF senior CF hasn't had a viable idea or plan for the reserves since the 1950s and has failed to garner any by-in from the reserves for any forward steps that would help and improve the overall force structure. In large part they are in the trenches fighting to protect the existing RegF PYs and budgets without any appetite to even consider whether a few thousand of those could be used to create a larger more efficient total force (and yes that would include legislative changes; a willingness to compulsorily mobilize and deploy reserve individuals, subunits etc; proper equipping, etc etc) 

Sorry MCG. The RegF 2, 3 and 4 stars can't off load their responsibility to construct and lead a comprehensive effective total force by blaming a bunch of part timers sitting in the local armouries, who (while they might like their mess dinners and regimental kit) are doing their best (as they know it) to keep things moving along in a system that is daily becoming less and less defensible.



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I am not sure there is any sort of attainable solution that will fix the force structure, especially as the political will, knowledge base and interest in expending political capital on an issue without a meaningful level of support is non-existent. Without political support at the highest level and the same from the public service, and that means money and lots of it, we are probably doomed to go through periodic bursts of wheel spinning that results in things like total force and 10/90 units and the like. And that goes for the regular force as well as the reserves and in all three services.
> 
> So what do we do? Maybe we making the best of a bad situation and maybe we can't expect more from a system that is designed to be not so good, but not all that bad. I suspect we have what the government and the public will accept and pay for because it is relatively cheap and doesn't get in serious trouble too often.



I don't think that we would see much political opposition to a plan to that would expand the total deployable force if it came with a zero budget increase. Back door political interference could be minimized if the plan is a good one and built with reserve buy in.

The very fact that we don't get into trouble very often is exactly why we could trade of RegF PYs for a larger deployable reserve/RegF force.

Back to what I said before; if the RegF objective is to squeeze every possible RegF PY out of the existing budget, and if  the proposition is that in order to build up the reserves we need more funds, then we are dealing with a nonstarter.

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

A bit of editing if you don't mind Old Sweat.



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I am not sure there is (are) (m)any sort of attainable solution(s) that will fix the force structure.  especially as (But) the political will, knowledge base and interest in expending political capital on an issue without a meaningful level of support is non-existent. Without political support at the highest level and the same from the public service, and that means money and lots of it, we are probably doomed to go through periodic bursts of wheel spinning that results in things like total force and 10/90 units and the like. And that goes for the regular force as well as the reserves and in all three services.
> 
> So what do we do? Maybe we making the best of a bad situation and maybe we can't expect more from a system that is designed to be not so good, but not all that bad. I suspect we have what the government and the public will accept and pay for because it is relatively cheap and doesn't get in serious trouble too often.



There are lots of effective models out there (both within NATO and ABCANZUS as well as elsewhere).   It is indeed the lack of political will that allows the uniformed force to swan around playing with buttons and bows.  If there were a discerned need then I can't imagine that somebody wouldn't grip the situation and get everybody numbered off.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> Reserve leadership generally ends at the lieutenant colonel level with a smattering of colonels and the odd brigadier. It speaks very poorly of the RegF senior CF leadership if good ideas can be stymied by lower ranking officers and the odd politically connected civilian/retired hack. I sat on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council for over half a decade and failed to see anything other than reactive survival activities there as well. We certainly didn't generate any far reaching reform programs but mostly because we were sure that anything we brought forward would be shot down in flames.
> 
> I think the reality is that the RegF senior CF hasn't had a viable idea or plan for the reserves since the 1950s and has failed to garner any by-in from the reserves for any forward steps that would help and improve the overall force structure. In large part they are in the trenches fighting to protect the existing RegF PYs and budgets without any appetite to even consider whether a few thousand of those could be used to create a larger more efficient total force (and yes that would include legislative changes; a willingness to compulsorily mobilize and deploy reserve individuals, subunits etc; proper equipping, etc etc)
> 
> Sorry MCG. The RegF 2, 3 and 4 stars can't off load their responsibility to construct and lead a comprehensive effective total force by blaming a bunch of part timers sitting in the local armouries, who (while they might like their mess dinners and regimental kit) are doing their best (as they know it) to keep things moving along in a system that is daily becoming less and less defensible.
> 
> I don't think that we would see much political opposition to a plan to that would expand the total deployable force if it came with a zero budget increase. Back door political interference could be minimized if the plan is a good one and built with reserve buy in.
> 
> The very fact that we don't get into trouble very often is exactly why we could trade of RegF PYs for a larger deployable reserve/RegF force.
> 
> Back to what I said before; if the RegF objective is to squeeze every possible RegF PY out of the existing budget, and if  the proposition is that in order to build up the reserves we need more funds, then we are dealing with a nonstarter.
> 
> :cheers:



FJAG

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page

From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.

I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> FJAG
> 
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page
> 
> From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.
> 
> I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.



We have the ability to control much of our own destinies within our reserve Bdes, so, we do it to ourselves too, of course.


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> FJAG
> 
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page
> 
> From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.
> 
> I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.



I've been violently in agreement with this notion for quite some time.  ;D

Even within the current army reserve organization there is an authorized strength of some 18,000 which to me represents 3 to 4 bdes with maybe twenty-five bn sized units (rather than 10 bdes with 143 units) The savings in excess reserve force cols, lcols, maj, CWOs and MWOs would easily fund a bn or two of extra jnr ncos and jnr officers. (no, I haven't done the actual math. My name isn't Sheldon. ;D)

The old concept of having a high percentage of leadership to tail ratio was designed at a time where units had slow mobilization times where the tail could be recruited and trained by the existing leadership before deployment. Those days, like the Reg F is fond of saying, are long gone and won;t come back. To be truly deployable RegF and ResF units need to be fully manned and trained with an overage percentage for annual attrition.

The three month training at the beginning makes too much sense and is what the NG uses to ensure that a soldier coming from basic training is immediately useable by the unit. Note to that in the US the basic training for a NG soldier and an active duty soldier is the same but substantially shorter than for Canadians. (e.g. Inf has a Basic Combat Training phase of ten weeks and an Advanced Individual Training phase of five weeks all of which turns out a basic trade trained infantryman).

There are numerous things the reserves could do themselves to make things better but the real issue is that the total force should consist of complimentary elements which are mutually supporting (I've always believed that the RegF should be infantry and tech maintainer heavy and armour and arty poor while the reserves provide the vast majority of the armour, artillery and support trades that are only needed on deployment on the basic principle that the RegF be those elements that need to go on a moments notice while the ResF should be those that aren't needed every day of the year and can take a little extra time to be deployed. 

:cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> I've been violently in agreement with this notion for quite some time.  ;D
> 
> Even within the current army reserve organization there is an authorized strength of some 18,000 which to me represents 3 to 4 bdes with maybe twenty-five bn sized units (rather than 10 bdes with 143 units) The savings in excess reserve force cols, lcols, maj, CWOs and MWOs would easily fund a bn or two of extra jnr ncos and jnr officers. (no, I haven't done the actual math. My name isn't Sheldon. ;D)
> 
> The old concept of having a high percentage of leadership to tail ratio was designed at a time where units had slow mobilization times where the tail could be recruited and trained by the existing leadership before deployment. Those days, like the Reg F is fond of saying, are long gone and won;t come back. To be truly deployable RegF and ResF units need to be fully manned and trained with an overage percentage for annual attrition.
> 
> The three month training at the beginning makes too much sense and is what the NG uses to ensure that a soldier coming from basic training is immediately useable by the unit. Note to that in the US the basic training for a NG soldier and an active duty soldier is the same but substantially shorter than for Canadians. (e.g. Inf has a Basic Combat Training phase of ten weeks and an Advanced Individual Training phase of five weeks all of which turns out a basic trade trained infantryman).
> 
> There are numerous things the reserves could do themselves to make things better but the real issue is that the total force should consist of complimentary elements which are mutually supporting (I've always believed that the RegF should be infantry and tech maintainer heavy and armour and arty poor while the reserves provide the vast majority of the armour, artillery and support trades that are only needed on deployment on the basic principle that the RegF be those elements that need to go on a moments notice while the ResF should be those that aren't needed every day of the year and can take a little extra time to be deployed.
> 
> :cheers:



Lots of kids take a 'gap year' between high school and college.

Why don't we enlist them for a year, at age 17/18, train them up full time, then assign them to reserve units for Class A commitments at age 18/19 until they've graduated university? They could save a ton of money for their education in that first year, get all their military qualifications done, build up a great resume, as well as avail themselves of the various educational subsidies etc we now have available afterwards.

This could be a 'thing' across the country and would benefit both the reserves and the Reg F (as some would no doubt want to join the full timers after their year's stint).


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Journeyman said:
			
		

> If in doubt (ie - the absence of a current, coherent Defence White Paper), return to first principles.  A fleet optimized for constabulary duties cannot establish command of the seas.  We may as well paint Coast Guard hulls grey and task the RCN to focus on NavRes and Sea Cadets across the prairies.



I agree, which is why I put in the part about NATO interoperability. Things like ASW and being able to work with the USN, who actually maintain control of the seas, will serve us well. Canada can't hope to have enough of a navy to protect the coasts by ourselves, so alliances are the only real strategy


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> You know, I often hear it mentioned that reserve forces are significantly cheaper than regular forces, but I've never seen any hard numbers to back that up, particularly when you factor in infrastructure. When I was on RSS duty I was briefly involved in the project that was looking at the future of reserve armouries in the city I was posted to, and what numbers I saw implied that both the cost of continuing to operate the ancient facilities and the cost of new replacement faculties were astronomical -- and all that cost is required to support relatively few part-time soldiers. Don't get me wrong, infrastructure for regulars is also expensive, but with units of 400-500 soldiers you can get some economy of scale for a building -- but my reserve unit was less than 100 all ranks.
> 
> I wonder what the actual cost breakdown is for a reserve unit -- between salary for the part-time soldiers, salary for the full-time support staff, training, equipment and infrastructure. And how that compares to the breakdown for a regular unit.



Reserve units are cheaper in a sheer pay vs pay sort of way, but the opportunity costs of maintaining reserves are too high. What you get with a larger regular force and smaller reserve force is a readily deployable and well trained unit that can be deployed in a timely manner. No offence to the reserves, but reserves don't provide full units, well trained units, or readily deployable units. So the opportunity costs of enlarging them far outweighs whatever monetary costs we may save. 

IMHO, reserves should be for 1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force or specialized capabilities that are better trained in the civilian world (doctors, dentists, etc)


----------



## Journeyman

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I agree, which is why I put in the part about NATO interoperability. Things like ASW and being able to work with the USN, who actually maintain control of the seas, will serve us well. Canada can't hope to have enough of a navy to protect the coasts by ourselves, so alliances are the only real strategy



Sorry, I based my response on what you actually posted:  "The Canadian navy should, IMHO, focus on drug/smuggling interdiction and inter-operability with the USN and NATO."

Interoperability does not mean alliances; it refers to STANAGS and the like -- ensuring that our comms, refueling fixtures, etc, etc are....well, interoperable.  Subsequently throwing things in, "like ASW," is not the purview of a drug interdiction fleet, but requires an actual war-fighting Navy.

For some of us, correct terminology usage is an important thing.  Again, sorry.

I suspect that you'll want the last word, so have at 'er


...then maybe this can return to being an Army Reserve thread.


----------



## Rifleman62

> What you get with a larger regular force and smaller reserve force is a readily deployable and well trained unit that can be deployed in a timely manner. No offence to the reserves, *but reserves don't provide full units, well trained units, or readily deployable units.*



Well tell me how the reserves themselves can change that without funding, equipment, nor a willingness to change the current status quo.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Well tell me how the reserves themselves can change that without funding, equipment, nor a willingness to change the current status quo.



They can't, but I'm arguing that they don't have to. We could get away with far less units covering far less areas of interest to achieve the same results. I'd see it more in line with the US reserve system where they have specific tasks with a few combat arms reserve units in the vicinity of regular force units to augment them. 

There is no military requirement for the sheer bulk of reserve units and the money could be better spent in the regular force.


----------



## Remius

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> the money could be better spent in the regular force.



 :rofl:

edit:  I'll quantify that emoticon with the statement that the CAF as a whole needs to figure out how to best spend its money effectively.  I doubt the money could be better spent as it can't even spend what it currently has effectively.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> There is no military requirement for the sheer bulk of reserve units and the money could be better spent in the regular force.



If by Regular Force you mean the RCN, the RCAF, Special Ops, Logistics, Comms and ISR then I might agree with you.  But strangely none of those are army.  And I don't see anybody, beyond the army itself, rushing to put large numbers of Canadian boots on foreign soil.

Here we are talking about the Army and how the Army organizes itself.  And while there is no rush to deploy the requirement is to have bodies in waiting "come the day".  I personally would like to see a large pool of prepared raw material from which to draw and which can be converted into useful force with notice, which can also provide a domestically useful capability for those days when "routine" services are overwhelmed.

Various portions of that pool can be hired under various NTM regimes.  Arguably, for the Army, I would suggest that foreign excursions on 72 Hrs NTM or less are the realm of the Special Ops types.   Domestically, some portion of the pool could be retained as civilians with a 72 hour call up requirement.  

2 week to 2 month NTM regimes are an arguable grey area of what, how many and for how long.


----------



## RCPalmer

Remius said:
			
		

> :rofl:
> 
> edit:  I'll quantify that emoticon with the statement that the CAF as a whole needs to figure out how to best spend its money effectively.  I doubt the money could be better spent as it can't even spend what it currently has effectively.



Agreed.  To provide a bit of context as the overall cost of the reserve force has been talked around in this thread, a fairly comprehensive estimate of the cost of the reserve force for FY 13/14 can be found here:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page

To summarize, the total cost of the PRes (including RSS PYs, pay, infrastructure and equipment) is approximately 1.3 billion dollars, or 7.2% of the 18 billion dollar defence budget.  Unfortunately, this type of cost capture was not published for the years before or after, so there is no easy way to do a year over year comparison.  Viewed in this context, I would offer that the PRes offers excellent value for the money.  

I would further offer that even if you disbanded the PRes tomorrow, and the defence portfolio somehow realized that 1.3b in savings, you wouldn't see much in the way of capability growth in the RegF.  LGen Leslie's 2011 transformation report concluded that most of the funding growth realized in the 2000's not directly related to the war in Afghanistan went into personnel costs that did little to enhance capabilities or readiness.  This is why he was making the case for a leaner, more efficient force.  Until we take some steps to achieving such a force, we really have no idea whether anyone in defence needs more money.  

In terms of comparing forces, the Australians manage to maintain all of the capabilities we do (and a number of capabilities we don't) with a 55,000 person full-time component.  Assuming a CAF funded to 68,000, that is a 20% manning difference of 13,000 full time personnel.   Employing a $100,000/person/year SWAG for the incremental cost of a full time paid member (think pay, benefits and training only), that personnel delta alone (without accounting for the capability deltas which would widen that chasm) accounts for $1.3 billion dollars, equivalent to the cost of the entire PRes.  

It is undeniable that the PRes requires significant structural reform, particularly if an increase in PRes roles and missions is desired in the context of the needs of the overall force.  There are inefficiencies all over the place. However, the cost of those inefficiencies are absolutely trivial compared to those that exist in the full time component.  

The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level. My hope is that within the CAF there would be discussions about reform on all fronts to make the entire force more efficient.  Instead, what I hear (both from an institutional perspective and to a certain extent on this forum) are parochial discussions of the PRes not providing value for money, and a requirement for the PRes to grow while simultaneously becoming more accountable and efficient without any of the structural changes necessary to actually make that happen.  To summarize, from the shop floor it looks like we (the PRes) are being set up for failure as an excuse to justify the status quo.  Whether that is true or not, the perception exists and it is a morale crusher.  Until we as a force find a way bring the full and part time components together to move forward together as a team, we are just spinning our wheels.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Wasnt our cold war role keeping the north atlantic free from soviet subs? Thus our ASW forcus
> 
> Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk



The Atlantic and other bodies of water were never free of soviet surface or sub-surface vessels...international waters and all...the goal was to track them and let them know you were there...more of less.  Unless they're in territorial waters, that kind of thing...not much else you can do.

...sorry...back to Army stuff...


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Agreed.  To provide a bit of context as the overall cost of the reserve force has been talked around in this thread, a fairly comprehensive estimate of the cost of the reserve force for FY 13/14 can be found here:
> 
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page
> 
> To summarize, the total cost of the PRes (including RSS PYs, pay, infrastructure and equipment) is approximately 1.3 billion dollars, or 7.2% of the 18 billion dollar defence budget.  Unfortunately, this type of cost capture was not published for the years before or after, so there is no easy way to do a year over year comparison.  Viewed in this context, I would offer that the PRes offers excellent value for the money.
> 
> I would further offer that even if you disbanded the PRes tomorrow, and the defence portfolio somehow realized that 1.3b in savings, you wouldn't see much in the way of capability growth in the RegF.  LGen Leslie's 2011 transformation report concluded that most of the funding growth realized in the 2000's not directly related to the war in Afghanistan went into personnel costs that did little to enhance capabilities or readiness.  This is why he was making the case for a leaner, more efficient force.  Until we take some steps to achieving such a force, we really have no idea whether anyone in defence needs more money.
> 
> In terms of comparing forces, the Australians manage to maintain all of the capabilities we do (and a number of capabilities we don't) with a 55,000 person full-time component.  Assuming a CAF funded to 68,000, that is a 20% manning difference of 13,000 full time personnel.   Employing a $100,000/person/year SWAG for the incremental cost of a full time paid member (think pay, benefits and training only), that personnel delta alone (without accounting for the capability deltas which would widen that chasm) accounts for $1.3 billion dollars, equivalent to the cost of the entire PRes.
> 
> It is undeniable that the PRes requires significant structural reform, particularly if an increase in PRes roles and missions is desired in the context of the needs of the overall force.  There are inefficiencies all over the place. However, the cost of those inefficiencies are absolutely trivial compared to those that exist in the full time component.
> 
> The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level. My hope is that within the CAF there would be discussions about reform on all fronts to make the entire force more efficient.  Instead, what I hear (both from an institutional perspective and to a certain extent on this forum) are parochial discussions of the PRes not providing value for money, and a requirement for the PRes to grow while simultaneously becoming more accountable and efficient without any of the structural changes necessary to actually make that happen.  To summarize, from the shop floor it looks like we (the PRes) are being set up for failure as an excuse to justify the status quo.  Whether that is true or not, the perception exists and it is a morale crusher.  Until we as a force find a way bring the full and part time components together to move forward together as a team, we are just spinning our wheels.



Well said. 

So it looks like you went through the RESO program too, eh?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level.



Just for clarity...did you mean CMBG level?  It's been some time, but when I was at a CBG HQ, the Comd was PRes, the Bde Sgt-Major was PRes;  the unit COs were PRes.  What was at the PRes HQ, as the HQ CO and COS was a Reg Force Lt Col and the HQ was a mix of Cl A, B and B(A) Pres with some Reg Force in there to...the G3, Supt Clerk, etc.  Each learned from each other and we had a pretty good HQ.


----------



## Remius

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Just for clarity...did you mean CMBG level?  It's been some time, but when I was at a CBG HQ, the Comd was PRes, the Bde Sgt-Major was PRes;  the unit COs were PRes.  What was at the PRes HQ, as the HQ CO and COS was a Reg Force Lt Col and the HQ was a mix of Cl A, B and B(A) Pres with some Reg Force in there to...the G3, Supt Clerk, etc.  Each learned from each other and we had a pretty good HQ.



there are no CMBGs at the PRES level.   The M is for Mechanised.  The PRES is at best motorised.  With busses.


----------



## RCPalmer

Remius said:
			
		

> there are no CMBGs at the PRES level.   The M is for Mechanised.  The PRES is at best motorised.  With busses.



Civilian contracted buses that is ...Yep, I am referring to the PRes Canadian Brigade Groups (CBGs) and opposed to the RegF Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBGs).  I draw attention to that because those CBG Comds are the highest command appointment held by the PRes members.  There some other notable PRes positions at higher levels, to include the Div DComds, COS Army Reserve, and Director Reserves and Cadets, but my point is that top level PRes commanders are pretty far down the chain.





			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Well said.
> 
> So it looks like you went through the RESO program too, eh?



I did. It is too bad we've killed off some of the best parts of that program.  As I understand it, all non-degree holding officers in the PRes are technically still enrolled in the RESO program.


----------



## MilEME09

Our PRes is most definitely in my opinion a motorized element, using trucks and other transport to move around. We also do a bad job of being a brigade too, at best we are battalion plus, just like everything else in the PRes, we are called what we are not.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Our PRes is most definitely in my opinion a motorized element, using trucks and other transport to move around. We also do a bad job of being a brigade too, at best we are battalion plus, just like everything else in the PRes, *we are called what we are not*.



Confusion to the Enemy!  [cheers]


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Remius said:
			
		

> there are no CMBGs at the PRES level.   The M is for Mechanised.  The PRES is at best motorised.  With busses.



I know.  I was wondering if he meant CMBG because, when I was at a CBG HQ, we had a PRes BGen at the area level as, IIRC, either Deputy Comd or Comd (or both, at offset times).  Early 2000s, LFAA.  But, looking now, I forgot to add that part after the CBG HQ Comd Pres/CO HQ - COS Reg Force LCol part.   ;D


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Confusion to the Enemy!  [cheers]



Exactly!  How can _they_ know what we are up to if _we_ don't know ourselves!   ;D


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Our PRes is most definitely in my opinion a motorized element, using trucks and other transport to move around. We also do a bad job of being a brigade too, at best we are battalion plus, just like everything else in the PRes, we are called what we are not.



I suspect if you looked at a Syrian "Division" right know you find 4-500 men, a squadron of tanks and a battery of artillery.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Lots of kids take a 'gap year' between high school and college.
> 
> Why don't we enlist them for a year, at age 17/18, train them up full time, then assign them to reserve units for Class A commitments at age 18/19 until they've graduated university? They could save a ton of money for their education in that first year, get all their military qualifications done, build up a great resume, as well as avail themselves of the various educational subsidies etc we now have available afterwards.
> 
> This could be a 'thing' across the country and would benefit both the reserves and the Reg F (as some would no doubt want to join the full timers after their year's stint).



Been thinking more about this re 12 months vs 3 months.

It strikes me that with a 3 month engagement then a single PY gets me 4 training periods or 4 trained soldiers.  If you engage them for a year you only have one trained soldier.

My aim is to create a trained pool of soldiers which can be assigned Reserve status and from which the Reg Force can recruit/draw.

Take 1000 PYs from the Reg Force Budget.

With that train 4000 Soldiers in 4 3-month periods.  Pay them at Regular recruit pay scale.

Upon successful completion of training assign them to the Reserves on Class A service for a period of 5 years. 

You now have a pool of 20,000 trained privates from which to draw.  Privates that could fit into 2 to 4 weeks of annual training, and that could be maintained with Wednesday nights and once a month refreshers/updates/PD.

You also have the opportunity to demonstrate to those 20,000 bodies the wonders of service life and try to draw them into longer contracts.

You want more Privates?  Adjust intake, training period and engagement period to suit.

The draw for the kids, beyond the fun and excitement?  Education and guaranteed stipends for 5 years.


----------



## runormal

I've got a few problems with your plan... 




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Been thinking more about this re 12 months vs 3 months.
> 
> It strikes me that with a 3 month engagement then a single PY gets me 4 training periods or 4 trained soldiers.  If you engage them for a year you only have one trained soldier.
> 
> My aim is to create a trained pool of soldiers which can be assigned Reserve status and from which the Reg Force can recruit/draw.
> 
> Take 1000 PYs from the Reg Force Budget.



This is true that if you run more cycles, you will be able to train more people. However given your time frame, you'd only be able to pump out infantry and artillery soldiers and possibly some LOG support trades. ACISS, Engineers, Armd Recee would all take longer than 3 months to fully train. (Assuming a BMQ, BMQ-L and DP 1.0 standard) Additionally, what is their experience of the army? 3 straight months of course... Sounds awesome :rofl:!




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> With that train 4000 Soldiers in 4 3-month periods.  Pay them at Regular recruit pay scale.



The vast Majority of your intake is going to be available after the Summer Session of High School... So late June-ish. A smaller portion will be available every December. How do you expect to run 4 equally loaded courses, if 80% of your potential recruits are available at only one time? Anyone that we aren't recruiting directly out of school, is likely going to be wanting full time work. Even if we include University/College students, my point still stands that the bulk of your candidates are only going to be available in the summer. 

Additionally who pays for all of the rations, foods and accommodations? Can our bases/Training Centres even support this increased volume of troops? What about weapons? Radios? Vehicles? Bullets? Can the recruiting system even process this many applications?



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Upon successful completion of training assign them to the Reserves on Class A service for a period of 5 years.


Of the reservists that we recruit voluntarily, who "can leave at anytime", we loose about half of them before they hit 5 years of service. I'm not sure how telling someone that they need a 5 year commitment (for a part time job), is going to increase our numbers.. Part of the appeal to the reserves to me, was the whole "try, before you sign". Likewise to which unit(s)? What are we going to do with 16,000 Class A infanteers/arty soldiers? The whole reserve force itself is only ~25k... 




			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> You now have a pool of 20,000 trained privates from which to draw.  Privates that could fit into 2 to 4 weeks of annual training, and that could be maintained with Wednesday nights and once a month refreshers/updates/PD.


Who sticks around for a job to be called up for 2-4 weeks? This is what I don't understand, from anyone who proposes this sort of nonsense. I don't have guys telling me "I need work for 2-4 weeks during the summer". It is either, "I need the Whole Summer" or "I found a job and I do not need any work". The only ones who seem to be available for this amount of time, are the ones who got screwed over by the training system or are generally under-employed. 

That being said, I would love a 2 week exercise or 2 guaranteed 1 week exercises (1 in summer and 1 in the winter reading week), throughout the training year.  However, the Army would need to plan these well in advance, so that people can actually get the time off work. We have people who could go, if they had the proper notice.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> You also have the opportunity to demonstrate to those 20,000 bodies the wonders of service life and try to draw them into longer contracts.



Given the speed that we currently process CT-OT's, I do not think that this is realistic. Hell we tell people on this board, "Do not apply to the reserves if you are even thinking about going full time, go reg-f right away". I'd argue that we should be putting a greater push to recruiting the reserves first, and then once Pte Bloggins finds out that he loves the reserves, he can easily CT to the Reg-F. 



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> You want more Privates?  Adjust intake, training period and engagement period to suit.


Preferably, I'd work on retention vice recruiting. 



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The draw for the kids, beyond the fun and excitement?  Education and guaranteed stipends for 5 years.


We already have the ILP program which is fairly easy to get the full $8,000k, if you stick around for 4-5 years. 


That's not to say that I'm against this something like this, but I would prefer more of a hybrid approach. 

Something like:

~500 PY's - 1 year gap year.
~500 PY's - 65% Summer intake, 20% (January Intake), 15% (Fall intake)

I think a structured 1 year gap year would be great, but we'd need make sure that our recruiting and training systems could actually handle it.

A compressed gap year/summer job program would also be great, but again we'd need make sure that our recruiting and training systems could actually handle it. Personally, I would of preferred to do all of my courses in 1 summer, vice two.


----------



## Kirkhill

Yep, you're right.  20,000 infanteers.  Volunteers who, if you can convince them to put up with the guff, might decide they want to hang around and become engineers, or mechanics, or radar techs, or who just want a full gig for a summer entertaining the tourists on Parliament Hill.

Cheers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Yep, you're right.  20,000 infanteers.  Volunteers who, if you can convince them to put up with the guff, might decide they want to hang around and become engineers, or mechanics, or radar techs, or who just want a full gig for a summer entertaining the tourists on Parliament Hill.
> 
> Cheers.



Good idea. 

It would be kind of like our Officer training: all arms and services lumped together to start with then, as you progress, you specialize into your various elements and stove pipes ...


----------



## runormal

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Yep, you're right.  20,000 infanteers.  Volunteers who, if you can convince them to put up with the guff, might decide they want to hang around and become engineers, or mechanics, or radar techs, or who just want a full gig for a summer entertaining the tourists on Parliament Hill.
> 
> Cheers.



You know it _isn't_ a, a bad idea. So you are basically saying that that would be the new minimun standard. If after all that I want to transfer to Sig's, CER, Armd Recce I can. 

What do you propose, that we do with people who want to be trade Y or X but can't get the time off or aren't available for the Dp 1.0.  Though, I suppose that it'd be no different than if someone hung around a unit as a BMQ/L qualified troop. 

I still think that your scaling and frequency of these courses is far too high. 




			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Good idea.
> 
> It would be kind of like our Officer training: all arms and services lumped together to start with then, as you progress, you specialize into your various elements and stove pipes ...



We sort of had this when everyone in the Army P-Res did BMQ and the same BMQ-L. 

Edit: We could even do this properly for Highschool students. Take the two months between Highschool and knock out BMQ and BMQ-L. Then when you show up for school in the fall, you'd actually be somewhat employable.


----------



## Kirkhill

People that want trades would have to sign longer contracts.  For training, for service and for reserve service.


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> People that want trades would have to sign longer contracts.  For training, for service and for reserve service.



I don't want to get in the way of what is a good discussion but quite frankly the methodology of how you do different trades or even whether certain trades should be in the P Res is somewhat secondary to the key issue which is can you or should you restructure the overall force by subtracting funding from the RegF in order to create a larger, effective P Res that would, at any given time, provide you a total force with more numbers and more bang for the same buck.

The basic trade-off is subtracting a significant number of full-time PYs to create a higher multiple of part-time PYs. 

So far all the comments which I have seen that argue against that (here and elsewhere) put forward the position that the current P Res isn't effective or dependable (or some derivative/tangent of that). That however isn't the issue. The issue is how do you change the overall system to make the P Res fully effective and dependable. All of that would require extensive and (here's the kicker) unbiased staff work. Like anything, a good estimate of the situation would go a long way to developing a coherent plan.

:cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't want to get in the way of what is a good discussion but quite frankly the methodology of how you do different trades or even whether certain trades should be in the P Res is somewhat secondary to the key issue which is can you or should you restructure the overall force by subtracting funding from the RegF in order to create a larger, effective P Res that would, at any given time, provide you a total force with more numbers and more bang for the same buck.
> 
> The basic trade-off is subtracting a significant number of full-time PYs to create a higher multiple of part-time PYs.
> 
> So far all the comments which I have seen that argue against that (here and elsewhere) put forward the position that the current P Res isn't effective or dependable (or some derivative/tangent of that). That however isn't the issue. The issue is how do you change the overall system to make the P Res fully effective and dependable. All of that would require extensive and (here's the kicker) unbiased staff work. Like anything, a good estimate of the situation would go a long way to developing a coherent plan.
> 
> :cheers:



But... but... then what would pundits like me do?


----------



## McG

FJAG said:
			
		

> The basic trade-off is subtracting a significant number of full-time PYs to create a higher multiple of part-time PYs.


Why is this a required trade off?  Even if you accept the premise of the government (current and previous) that military commitment should be measured in output and not investment as a percent of GDP,  then surely the right answer can be that both components need reforms and more investment.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> Why is this a required trade off?  Even if you accept the premise of the government (current and previous) that military commitment should be measured in output and not investment as a percent of GDP,  then surely the right answer can be that both components need reforms and more investment.



I'd like to see both more money and more bodies.  My proposal is based on not getting either and having to rob Peter (the Regs) to pay Paul (the Res) so as to create a Reserve that offers more value to the Regs.  At least that's the thought.   ???


----------



## FJAG

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'd like to see both more money and more bodies.  My proposal is based on not getting either and having to rob Peter (the Regs) to pay Paul (the Res) so as to create a Reserve that offers more value to the Regs.  At least that's the thought.   ???



And I think that is the only realistic way to approach it. Any plan built on the premise that more money will be forthcoming is doomed to failure while a plan built on using existing funds will succeed and will have the bonus of providing even more capability in the unlikely event the government does kick in extra funding.

The one minor divergence I have is that rather than "create a Reserve that offers more value to the Regs" I would say create a reserve that provides an overall larger total force from existing resources."

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:
			
		

> And I think that is the only realistic way to approach it. Any plan built on the premise that more money will be forthcoming is doomed to failure while a plan built on using existing funds will succeed and will have the bonus of providing even more capability in the unlikely event the government does kick in extra funding.
> 
> The one minor divergence I have is that rather than "create a Reserve that offers more value to the Regs" I would say create a reserve that provides an overall larger total force from existing resources."
> 
> :cheers:



Seen


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bumped with the latest promises from the Defence Review (PDF) -- more background attached.


> ... *NEW INITIATIVES*
> 
> To enhance the role and capabilities of the Reserve Force, the Canadian Armed Forces will:
> 
> 74. Increase the size of the Primary Reserve Force to 30,000 (an increase of 1,500) and dramatically reduce the initial recruitment process from a number of months to a matter of weeks.
> 
> 75. Assign Reserve Force units and formations new roles that provide full-time capability to the Canadian Armed Forces through part-time service, including:
> • Light Urban Search and Rescue;
> • Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence;
> • Combat capabilities such as direct fire, mortar and pioneer platoons;
> • Cyber Operators;
> • Intelligence Operators;
> • Naval Security Teams; and
> • Linguists.
> 
> 76. Enhance existing roles assigned to Reserve Force units and formations, including:
> • Information Operations (including Influence Activities);
> • Combat Support and Combat Service Support; and
> • Air Operations Support Technicians.
> 
> 77. Employ the Reserve Force to deliver select expeditionary missions in a primary role such as Canadian Armed Forces capacity building.
> 
> 78. Create an agile service model that supports transition between full- and part-time service and provides the flexibility to cater to differing Reserve career paths.
> 
> 79. Align Primary Reserve Force remuneration and benefits with those of the Regular Force where the demands of service are similar.
> 
> 80. Revise annuitant employment regulations to attract and retain more former Regular Force personnel to the Reserves.
> 
> 81. Offer full-time summer employment to Reservists in their first four years with the Reserves commencing in 2018.
> 
> 82. Work with partners in the federal government to align federal acts governing job protection legislation. Subsequently, we will work with provinces and territories to harmonize job protection for Reserves at that level. ...


----------



## Kirkhill

Civil Defence.

Ropes, ladders, buckets and radiation detectors.

Back to the future.


----------



## McG

Well, I see that filling the Ceremonial Guard is a reoccurring challenge & priority.  I propose the PLDG be brought back in Ottawa (and maybe with footprint in some surrounding areas) so that we can have another guards unit focused on this ... and they can also do some soldiering in the off seasons.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Civil Defence.
> 
> Ropes, ladders, buckets and radiation detectors.
> 
> Back to the future.



A military paid SAR team in Vancouver would be busy, but the pissing match between the volunteers, military and the emergency services could get nasty.


----------



## mariomike

Colin P said:
			
		

> A military paid SAR team in Vancouver would be busy, but the pissing match between the volunteers, military and the emergency services could get nasty.



I believe Vancouver emergency services are only involved in Heavy Urban SAR.

"Collapsed structures and trenches; challenging, near-vertical environments; and swift-moving water. The team also prepares for and carries out the decontamination of large numbers of people."
http://vancouver.ca/home-property-development/urban-search-and-rescue.aspx


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I was thinking more the Northshore Rescue team who do stellar work and are almost doing it full time. There is a push to make it paid. A reserve SAR team might be a threat to that plan. Better they give Reserves more paydays so they can train for SAR x time a year (on top of their normal training). Problem is that in the smaller communities, many of the members might also be called in by their respective employers in event of a large SAR incident.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Oh look - double-dipping is back.

The so called growth of the so called Reserves will in fact come from the Reg F who retire to become Class B double dippers in non-deployable positions in HQs.

Perfect.


----------



## MJP

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Oh look - double-dipping is back.
> 
> The so called growth of the so called Reserves will in fact come from the Reg F who retire to become Class B double dippers in non-deployable positions in HQs.
> 
> Perfect.



Well we are rolling back the clocks to 1968 on everything else so we might as well bring back every other change we have made over the years.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Oh look - double-dipping is back.
> 
> The so called growth of the so called Reserves will in fact come from the Reg F who retire to become Class B double dippers in non-deployable positions in HQs.
> 
> Perfect.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Bumped with the latest promises from the Defence Review (PDF) -- more background attached.



New inititives?  72 and 84 maybe. The rest isn't new.  :


----------



## MilEME09

> 76. Enhance existing roles assigned to Reserve Force units and formations, including:
> • Combat Support and Combat Service Support; and



Giving us proper tooling, parts, and training time would be a good start


----------



## Fishbone Jones

National Service. Do we want to go there? I figure after 127 pages we might want to look back (or not, I didn't) and see if anything or situations, taskings, etc has changed with the change of government.

I'm pretty sure we talked it here or elsewhere on the forums but I'll wait until you guys decide whether it should be part of the discussion..


----------



## Ostrozac

recceguy said:
			
		

> National Service. Do we want to go there?



Do you mean Conscription? Considering how much difficulty Canada had with implementing conscription during both World Wars, it's hard to imagine a realistic scenario for peacetime conscription in Canada. 

Besides, conscription isn't that trendy anymore. I think NATO is down to only about 6 nations using conscription, as opposed to its heyday in the 1950's, when I believe every NATO nation except Canada had conscription.


----------



## The Bread Guy

recceguy said:
			
		

> National Service. Do we want to go there? I figure after 127 pages we might want to look back (or not, I didn't) and see if anything or situations, taskings, etc has changed with the change of government ...


For more background, another 14 pages on mandatory military service & the CF here (last posts ~5 years ago).


----------



## Haggis

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> The so called growth of the so called Reserves will in fact come from the Reg F who retire to become Class B double dippers in non-deployable positions in HQs.
> 
> Perfect.



The Reserves will then be managed by Reserve formation HQs filled with "Reservists" who have never darkened an armoury door and have no idea how the Class A world works.

Perfect.


----------



## Haggis

> 81. Offer full-time summer employment to Reservists in their first four years with the Reserves commencing in 2018



You mean... like... Regional (Reserve) Summer Training (RST) which is presently underway and has been since...well... forever? 

This goes to prove there are no original ideas left in either Hollywood or Ottawa.  "The Mummy" and the Defence Policy are perfect examples of that.


----------



## Jarnhamar

I think the reserves need to be revamped and take on a more obligatory service model.

Having privates, section platoon and company commanders pull out of exercises (or taskings) at the last minute constantly screws everything up.

Having reservists augment the reg force is awesome, greatly needed and much appreciated but dealing with the various unique contract dates and different arrival departure times is a huge pain in the ass.

Maybe increase schooling benefits for reserves (and regs) but the trade off being mandatory exercises and training.  That would of course need to involve employers like in the US.


----------



## RCPalmer

Haggis said:
			
		

> You mean... like... Regional (Reserve) Summer Training (RST) which is presently underway and has been since...well... forever?
> 
> This goes to prove there are no original ideas left in either Hollywood or Ottawa.  "The Mummy" and the Defence Policy are perfect examples of that.



If they mean full summers of employment, that would be a significant improvement.  In the current training model, we are only offering a few weeks of full time training.  For example, we might offer a member a 4 week BMQ or a 7 week Infmn DP1, but rarely will we offer those courses consecutively to both to train the member in a single summer and provide them with a full summer of employment.  That has a huge impact on the value proposition of the reserves for post-secondary students who need to work for that full 4 month summer break.


----------



## RCPalmer

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> I think the reserves need to be revamped and take on a more obligatory service model.
> 
> Having privates, section platoon and company commanders pull out of exercises (or taskings) at the last minute constantly screws everything up.
> 
> Having reservists augment the reg force is awesome, greatly needed and much appreciated but dealing with the various unique contract dates and different arrival departure times is a huge pain in the ***.
> 
> Maybe increase schooling benefits for reserves (and regs) but the trade off being mandatory exercises and training.  That would of course need to involve employers like in the US.



I agree with you, but that commitment has to go both ways.  Last minute course/task cancellations, and/or date changes are increasingly becoming the norm these days, and we shouldn't be surprised when that impacts on the member's availability.  When the Army's commitment to a member is wishy-washy, it makes it very hard for the members to plan their lives, so they will hedge their bets.  There are cultural changes on both sides of the fence that will have to happen to see improvement in the PRes reliability piece.


----------



## Kirkhill

Doesn't all of this boil down to the need for the Reserves to have a separate, dedicated budget?  A budget of something like 1 BCAD (+/- 25%) from what I can gather from published reports.  A budget that is mandated and not, apparently, discretionary.


----------



## Remius

:goodpost:


----------



## Halifax Tar

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Doesn't all of this boil down to the need for the Reserves to have a separate, dedicated budget?  A budget of something like 1 BCAD (+/- 25%) from what I can gather from published reports.  A budget that is mandated and not, apparently, discretionary.



You are of course including the RCN and RCAF reserves into that budget, yes ?


----------



## RCPalmer

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> You are of course including the RCN and RCAF reserves into that budget, yes ?



I threw that number out in this thread some time ago based on the following:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page 

Unfortunately, FY14/15 was the only year the cost capture was done in this way that I have seen, but I think it reasonable to carry it forward or backward from an order of magnitude standpoint. So, yes it is intended to capture the full cost of the PRes, not just the Army Reserve.  It does not however, capture the costs associated with COATS, Rangers, or the Supplementary Reserve.


----------



## Journeyman

Speaking as an outsider....

I read quite often, here and elsewhere, about basic Infantry skills (like an annual PWT3 shoot) being difficult to keep current in many Reserve units.

Beyond possibly providing for some really cool t-shirts and badges, is giving them more technical tasks likely going to work?

:dunno:


----------



## MilEME09

On regards to pwt 3, all units should be doing it since its the min to dag green. Many dont due to ammo shortages, or using ranges that arent large enough (kip range for example) or simple the CoC doesnt want to do it because they think as a PRes unit we dont need it.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk


----------



## Kirkhill

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> You are of course including the RCN and RCAF reserves into that budget, yes ?



I started to compose a lengthy response but I ended up getting wrapped up in where my own conclusions were leading me.

The short bit I could agree with myself on was that the RCN and the RCAF and their needs, in particular their needs for Reserves, is different than the needs of the Army.  The difference boils down to them manning their ships and being operational in peace and war.  The only difference between peace and war for them is whether or not they are allowed to shoot back.  In war time they will lose ships and with them crews.  In the absence of replacement ships there is no need for replacement crews.

The Army is different.

The Army is seen as a high risk venture, politically.  When the Army is deployed voters' sons and daughters start dying at a fast rate.  

Consequently the Government chooses to limit the deployments of soldiers to a greater extent than it does sailors and aviators.

But the Government still has need for an Army, on occasion.  And it is that occasional requirement that makes the Army different to the RCN and the RCAF with their standing requirement.

I think the difference is reflected in the way the both the RCAF and the RCN have, apparently, effectively integrated their Reservists, at least more effectively than the Army has.

That occasional difference is also the reason I see for accepting the need for separating the Army Reserves from the Regular Army.

The Regular Army shares more in common with the RCN and the RCAF than it does the Reserves.  This is driven by two observables I believe.  The first is that much of the Regular Army owes a lot to the Ordnance Corps as historically understood.  They are engineers who man their guns, radios and survey gear.   In that they are like the Navy in the Air Force.  Given the expense of their gear it is not likely to be rapidly replaced when war breaks out.  On the other hand they are useful diplomatically to loan to other Armies of other Governments that need their services but can't afford them.  The second observable is that the Government maintains a small cadre of voters's sons and daughters of which they are willing to invest some portion to do the Government's bidding.  The size of the "investment" varies with the vagaries of the Government.  Those forces are weapons launched by the Navy and the Air Force.  They are the Special Forces and the Regular Brigades.  They are discretionary.

The Reserve Force is a crisis response capability.  It is the body necessary when the Government screws up so badly that it has let things get out of hand and it can't handle the situation with the personnel and budget available and it is forced to do the other thing --- whatever that is.

The Reserve Force needs to be a disciplined body willing to work when the situation demands.  What the situation is and what is demanded is probably not apparent until the situation presents itself.

Some portion of the Reserve Force can be used to Augment the Regular Force on an ongoing basis but that is not its primary utility.  Its primary utility is as a disciplined and fit body on whom the Government can rely with skills that are generally useful:

Working in small teams,  working in formations, living austerely, travelling in rough terrain, navigating, observing, communicating.  First Aid is a useful skill of general utility.  Managing explosives also has some general utility.  Shooting straight is a useful skill with some particular applications.

All of those skills make the Reservist a good candidate for a soldier.  But soldiering is more than just that, especially Regular soldiering.

On the other hand, a Reserve Force comprised of people with those skills would have general utility for the Government.

......Rambling again, ain't I?  Sorry for that.

Heh.  " I started to compose a lengthy reply."  Instead I opted for this lengthy reply.  Oh well.


----------



## Journeyman

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> On regards to pwt 3, all units should be doing it since its the min to dag green. Many dont due to ammo shortages, or using ranges that arent large enough (kip range for example) or simple the CoC doesnt want to do it because they think as a PRes unit we dont need it.


I assure you I'm not arguing why something is or isn't happening; I'm merely feeling sceptical that adding complex tasks to an already _apparently_  dysfunctional system, without fixing those inherent problems, will somehow produce successes.

I also assure you that I will be most pleasantly surprised and congratulatory if it all comes together.


----------



## PuckChaser

I thought creating all these Div HQs was supposed to allow staff officers to actually create plans for RST so members know what courses are available in February. I know, I know, rhetorical question. Why would we expect Div/Bde G7 shops to do their jobs?


----------



## McG

Creating the Divisions was a cosmetic renaming; it was the granting of field formation identities to institutional organizations with true lineages that had not been to the field since confederation.  It was not supposed to do anything tangible.


----------



## Rifleman62

> field formation identities to institutional organizations with true lineages that had not been to the field since confederation



Possibly I misunderstand but the Divisions were active in the First and Second World War. I.E.

The 8th Battalion (90th Winnipeg Rifles), CEF, was an infantry battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the Great War. The Battalion was authorized on 10 August 1914 and embarked for Great Britain on 1 October 1914. It disembarked in France on 13 February 1915, where it fought as part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Canadian Division.

In Second World War The Royal Winnipeg Rifles landed in England in September 1940. As part of the 7th Infantry Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division.


----------



## McG

The divisions were active in both world wars.  They were stood down.  Then, a few years ago, the identity of those divisions were given to various area HQs that that can trace their true lineage back to domestic, institutional formations of the world wars. The renaming/lineage-transfer had nothing to do with any organizational improvement.


----------



## Jarnhamar

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> On regards to pwt 3, all units should be doing it since its the min to dag green.



I heard the first requirement of a soldier deploying is to be GBA+ qualified, not passed their fitness test or PWT.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

:facepalm:


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> The divisions were active in both world wars.  They were stood down.  Then, a few years ago, the identity of those divisions were given to various area HQs that that can trace their true lineage back to domestic, institutional formations of the world wars. The renaming/lineage-transfer had nothing to do with any organizational improvement.



I'd aruge, we should go down to one Divisional HQ, which all CMBG's report to, eliminate the CBG HQ's and fold their command directly into the CMBG's. There I just eliminated 12 HQ's personal can now be shifted forward, and probably saved money in time saved in the streaming lining of the CoC.


----------



## Rifleman62

The staff at the Div HQ and CMBG HQ will just get larger. What do the CMBG's HQ staff know about the PRes pers/pay system for example.


----------



## MilEME09

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> The staff at the Div HQ and CMBG HQ will just get larger. What do the CMBG's HQ staff know about the PRes pers/pay system for example.



But would the increase at the 1 Div, and the CMBG's be large enough to off set the savings? I'm no expert but i'd like to think you could do the job better, and less HQ's mean decision making could hopefully be done more quickly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Here's a revolutionary new idea.

You know how we get 'promised' 37 man days per year for training? Make sure we get it, consistently, and the units get what they need to deliver consistently.

It's the continual chopping and changing that's killing us, essentially the lack of good management practices at the highest levels of budgeting, not the lack of commandoninjaunderwaternightknifefighting roles....


----------



## The Bread Guy

Aaaaaand, re-announcing how the plan's good for the Reserves:


> Strong, Secure, Engaged, Canada’s new defence policy, recognizes that the long-term success of Canada’s military depends on the women and men who make up the Canadian Armed Forces. Our people, across all ranks, and from all walks of life, are our most important asset, and they are at the core of the new policy.
> 
> Following the launch of Strong, Secure, Engaged, Stephen Fuhr, Member of Parliament for Kelowna-Lake Country, today spoke at The British Columbia Dragoons’ Armoury in Kelowna, British Columbia, to highlight the new vision and investments in Canada’s Reserve Force as a result of the new policy.
> 
> Strong, Secure, Engaged will:
> 
> Increase the size of the Reserve Force by 1,500 to 30,000, to ensure it can meet its full operational potential;
> Align Primary Reserve compensation and benefits with Regular Force members where duties are similar;
> Assign the Reserve Force new roles that provide full-time capability to the Canadian Armed Forces through part-time service, such as light urban search and rescue, intelligence operators, and cyber operators;
> Employ the Reserve Force to deliver select deployed missions in a primary role such as Canadian Armed Forces capacity building;
> Ensure Reservists are appropriately trained, prepared and equipped in sufficient numbers to be ready to contribute to operations at home and abroad;
> Offer full-time summer employment to Reservists in their first four years with the Reserves commencing in 2018; and
> Attract and retain top quality candidates, while reducing the length of the recruitment process for Reservists to a matter of weeks.
> 
> Canada’s Reserve Force forms an integral part of the Canadian Armed Forces working alongside the Regular Force on both national and international operations, making substantial contributions to the safety and security of Canada and its citizens.
> 
> Canada can only meet its defence needs at home and abroad with the dedicated, motivated, and highly skilled people who work tirelessly to defend Canada and promote Canadian values and interests internationally. Canada’s Reserve Force is critical to our ability to succeed. These investments and this new vision for the Reserves will enable Canada to meet its military commitments and ensure that Canada is strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world.
> 
> Quotes
> 
> “The women and men of our Reserve Force bring a wealth of knowledge and experience that enrich and strengthen our military. As security challenges evolve, it is our duty to support our Reservists and ensure they have the skills, training, and capabilities they need to continue to excel. I look forward to building a stronger Reserve Force and a more capable and agile military that I know will serve Canada with pride.”
> 
> Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan
> 
> “The Government of Canada takes the security and safety of our nation and our people seriously. The investments in Strong, Secure, Engaged will strengthen Canada’s Reserve Force, and in turn, ensure the Canadian Armed Forces continue to succeed both at home and abroad, so that we can all enjoy a more peaceful and prosperous world.”
> 
> Member of Parliament for Kelowna—Lake Country, Stephen Fuhr
> 
> Quick Facts
> 
> Defence is taking action to transform the Reserves by:
> Putting in place measures to encourage members who are leaving the Regular Force to join the Reserves, by revising annuitant employment regulations so that members can more easily transfer between the Regular and Reserve Force;
> Creating an agile service model that supports the transition between full and part-time service and provides the flexibility to cater to different Reserve career paths;
> Providing federal tax relief on the military salaries of all Canadian Armed Forces personnel, including Reservists, up to the salary level of Lieutenant-Colonel, deployed on named international operations as designated by the Chief of the Defence Staff; and
> Working with provinces and territories to harmonize job protection for Reservists at the federal level.
> 
> The launch of Strong, Secure, Engaged concludes the most comprehensive review process in Canadian defence and security history – a year-long review process that included open and transparent consultations with Canadians, parliamentarians, defence experts, allies, and partners ...


----------



## McG

> Offer full-time summer employment to Reservists in their first four years with the Reserves commencing in 2018


This one will be difficult to crack.  I assume this is a commitment of both two months for high school students and four months for university and college students, and anything in between for anybody else who can get such significant blocks of time.

One of the challenges with PRes training is often uncertainty that required staff positions will be filled, or that the minimum student load will arrive.  It might work to transfer some instructional responsibilities from the PRes to the Reg F.  This would require some chunk of the PY growth be placed into the schools that deliver DP1 and DP2 training to ensure these schools have the capacity to deliver their DP1 & DP2 Reg F instructional program primarily from September through to the end of April.  From May through to end July (or early August), the Reg F school staffs with PRes augmentation would deliver the PRes instructional program.

In total, the "guaranteed employment training program" (GETP) could consist of 12 x month long course mods (three months of courses every summer for four years) and 4 x reserve summer concentrations (one per year), though some occupations may forsake the first summer concentration to get an extra month of courses.  Assuming that units are encouraged to deliver one of the month long mods to high school students over the course of the academic year, those who start the program in highschool will sill have a few course mods remaining at the end of four years (assuming they transition to university or college).  Well, lucky them: they will get assured employment stretching into a fifth summer.  The program would very by occupation but in general the first 4-6 mods would get reservists from civilian to qualified in occupation (DP1), the next 3-5 mods would cover PCFs and/or MOS specific DP2, and the final 3 mods would be PLQ.

Alternatives to "GETP" would include the ceremonial guard program, and sending officers on the Reg F phase training (and funding attendance on phase four/DP1.2 which generally has not been attended by reservists).


----------



## The Bread Guy

Lookit all the highlighting going on ...

_*"Minister Sajjan Highlights Investments in Canada’s Reserve Force (@ Moss Park Armoury, Toronto)"*_
_*"Parliamentary Secretary Romanado Highlights Investments in Canada’s Reserve Force (@ Petawawa)"*_
_*"Parliamentary Secretary Lamoureux Highlights Investments in Canada’s Reserve Force (@ Minto Armoury in Winnipeg)"*_
_*"Parliamentary Secretary Miller Highlights Investments in Canada’s Reserve Force (meeting with Reservists of the Canadian Grenadier Guards in Montreal)"*_


----------



## a_majoor

After reading through this thread (I suddenly had lots of extra time on my hands....) it seems the ultimate issue has still not been addressed: what is the purpose of the Reserve?

We still operate under a paradigm of raising full units to march off to battle, much like the CEF in 1914 (or for that matter, American Governors raising regiments for the American Civil War), without really stopping to consider if this is viable (if you don't have the guns, tanks and other kit to fall in on, it is not), or even in accord with modern military doctrines. Opponents like Russia or China use doctrines like Hybrid Warfare or Unlimited Warfare to attack things like civilian and political will and morale, or strike at things which might not even be recognized as military targets initially (imagine destructive computerized trading that crashes the valuation of Canadian companies on the TSE). Even in the kinetic realm, "they" attack areas where we are not strong, using technologies like AA/AD to prevent us from reaching the AO and deploying in the first place, or in the case of insurgencies, using ambushes, IEDs and provoking firefights to create civilian casualties to weaken the will to fight. Sending the Royal Winnipeg Rifles or the First Hussars, even fully equipped with LAVs and Leopards and Coyotes isn't likely to change the balance that much.

The current evolution of Western War seems dependent on highly detailed target information, and applying precision strikes against identified targets. Reserve units as currently organized simply don't fit into this model of warfare, and can only make minimal contributions.

Targeting, emplacing sensors and manning units optimized to go deep behind enemy lines to locate and mark targets really is more of an SoF skill set, but reserve units *could* be optimized for such tasks as data processing and interpretation, creating and maintaining high density communications networks to support these sensor to shooter "kill webs", manning artillery units equipped with PGMs to strike identified targets and supplying manpower for the rear area security tasks to allow many of these activities to take place. 

Given the small pools of deployable manpower, there would have to be a change in the way Reserve units are equipped as well. A reserve artillery unit, for example, would have to be equipped with something like the FH-77 "Archer", which only needs a three man crew to operate. The highly automated and mechanized machine does most of the work (it is fed from a magazine, for example, and even sipping out magazines is done with a small crew in the logistics truck). True, there is a cost in maintaining these devices, but this is more a garrison issue, and where there is more available manpower anyway (the non deployable people help in the upkeep of the machinery). A light infantry unit for rear area security tasks can get away with light infantry weapons and motorized transport of some sort.

This is obviously a broad handwave, but unless and until someone finally makes a clear case as to what the Reserve actually is supposed to do, then it is as good a guess as any other.


----------



## Kirkhill

"{Opponents like Russia or China use doctrines like Hybrid Warfare or Unlimited Warfare to attack things like civilian and political will and morale, or strike at things which might not even be recognized as military targets initially (imagine destructive computerized trading that crashes the valuation of Canadian companies on the TSE)"

I have taken to believing that this form of warfare is a lot more ancient than we currently think.

One way of looking at history is through the prism of religion.  We have been brought to believe that belief creates wars.  That religion creates wars. But when you look at belief as just the tool employed to rally support and consider the real driver then, as now, as being trade and commercial interest, that wars were initiated for control of rivers - as both highways and barriers; for control of mountain passes - for the same reason; for the ability to raise taxes, or to eliminate taxes.

Generally speaking I can't think of many wars that were fought on the basis of taxation - at least in terms of slogans. On the other hand I can think of a number of tax riots and many people declared outlaws, brigands, smugglers and pirates because they refused to pay the mail.

It might have been difficult to rally the troops the Hapsburg flag on the basis of raising taxes on trade along the Danube.  But if you could throw in a charge of heretic, unbeliever, infidel then your recruit pool swells.

If you relate wars of heresy to trade advantage I believe you find some very strong correlation.

Which leads me to believe that religion not only offered individual solace and assisted in controlling domestic populations but it also served to assault the enemy from above and below by promoting supranationality and subsidiarity - both of which tend to deligitimate the targeted local authority.

The priest, the imam and the missionary as well as the party organizer, when working outside of their home community, are not friends of authority.  They are propagandists.


----------



## Underway

MCG said:
			
		

> This one will be difficult to crack.  I assume this is a commitment of both two months for high school students and four months for university and college students, and anything in between for anybody else who can get such significant blocks of time.
> 
> One of the challenges with PRes training is often uncertainty that required staff positions will be filled, or that the minimum student load will arrive.  It might work to transfer some instructional responsibilities from the PRes to the Reg F.  This would require some chunk of the PY growth be placed into the schools that deliver DP1 and DP2 training to ensure these schools have the capacity to deliver their DP1 & DP2 Reg F instructional program primarily from September through to the end of April.  From May through to end July (or early August), the Reg F school staffs with PRes augmentation would deliver the PRes instructional program.
> 
> In total, the "guaranteed employment training program" (GETP) could consist of 12 x month long course mods (three months of courses every summer for four years) and 4 x reserve summer concentrations (one per year), though some occupations may forsake the first summer concentration to get an extra month of courses.  Assuming that units are encouraged to deliver one of the month long mods to high school students over the course of the academic year, those who start the program in highschool will sill have a few course mods remaining at the end of four years (assuming they transition to university or college).  Well, lucky them: they will get assured employment stretching into a fifth summer.  The program would very by occupation but in general the first 4-6 mods would get reservists from civilian to qualified in occupation (DP1), the next 3-5 mods would cover PCFs and/or MOS specific DP2, and the final 3 mods would be PLQ.
> 
> Alternatives to "GETP" would include the ceremonial guard program, and sending officers on the Reg F phase training (and funding attendance on phase four/DP1.2 which generally has not been attended by reservists).



Reference your regular force staff recommendation.  Aside from the basic training blocs, PRes Navy go to the various naval schools.  Often these courses are staffed with mostly regular force members, augmented by PRes Class B instructors.  MARS Officers have been trained like this for years at Venture where the staff are a mix, and often you get a few summer augments for help aboard the ORCA's when they sail.  Most of the other trades are similar.  It seems to work quite well for the most part though there is always a scramble to find those last few spots.  Staffing is short all around.

It's the basic training instructor slots that are usually the most difficult to fill.  Currently the Navy is using the unit recruiters to fill those spots.  There are two unit recruiters and one goes away every summer to teach either BMQ or BMOQ.  It's part of their contract.  

So  basically I agree with those who have stated the RegF needs to have some of their own investment into this training.  If only to provide the base structure, or framework into which you can add a few PRes instructors to augment for the numbers.  If they were really clever then make all the courses equivalent and then you could put Reg and Reservists on any course, as there are always some who don't make it or vary from the normal career progression schedule.  Might make a few less PAT's


----------



## Good2Golf

Thucydides said:
			
		

> After reading through this thread (I suddenly had lots of extra time on my hands....) it seems the ultimate issue has still not been addressed: what is the purpose of the Reserve?



Crazytalk, Thuc!  Imagine someone (or group) starting out from first principles and defining exactly that "What should the Reserves be, what should it do and how do we want it to do it, and then resource if correctly?"

The Army is still trying to figure this out, between thoughts of somehow holding onto the notion of Mobilization, one of these days...and a model that may be closer to the RCAF's "we've committed the 'Reserve' to operate on a daily basis, since the Air Force conducts most of its ops across the force, not like the Army's MRS of peaks and valleys..."

I predict that nothing will change, and that the Army will fight to have it's status quo Reserve force do monetary battle with the other CAF Reserve elements and not much will change.

Regards
G2G


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Crazytalk, Thuc!  Imagine someone (or group) starting out from first principles and defining exactly that "What should the Reserves be, what should it do and how do we want it to do it, and then resource if correctly?"
> 
> The Army is still trying to figure this out, between thoughts of somehow holding onto the notion of Mobilization, one of these days...and a model that may be closer to the RCAF's "we've committed the 'Reserve' to operate on a daily basis, since the Air Force conducts most of its ops across the force, not like the Army's MRS of peaks and valleys..."
> 
> I predict that nothing will change, and that the Army will fight to have it's status quo Reserve force do monetary battle with the other CAF Reserve elements and not much will change.
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Mission:

1) Ceremonial Guard
2) Fill all the crummy outcan staff postings that the Reg F don't want, you know, like the ones in darkest Africa


----------



## a_majoor

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Crazytalk, Thuc!  Imagine someone (or group) starting out from first principles and defining exactly that "What should the Reserves be, what should it do and how do we want it to do it, and then resource if correctly?"
> 
> The Army is still trying to figure this out, between thoughts of somehow holding onto the notion of Mobilization, one of these days...and a model that may be closer to the RCAF's "we've committed the 'Reserve' to operate on a daily basis, since the Air Force conducts most of its ops across the force, not like the Army's MRS of peaks and valleys..."
> 
> I predict that nothing will change, and that the Army will fight to have it's status quo Reserve force do monetary battle with the other CAF Reserve elements and not much will change.
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Sad that this is gong to be the case, especially given the dramatic increase in military spending gives everyone the resources and opportunity to reset and reorganize.


----------



## MilEME09

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Sad that this is gong to be the case, especially given the dramatic increase in military spending gives everyone the resources and opportunity to reset and reorganize.



I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change



Including those in the Pres who like things the way they are.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change



"Amazing" isn't the word that I'd use. "Scandalous", "Disappointing", and "Infuriating" are the ones that come to my mind.

I just spent the last half hour rereading my notes and the various Records of Decisions that I kept from my years (2001 to 2009) of sitting as a member of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council to remind myself of what the heck it was that we actually did there. In short we spent a lot of time on things like the reserve pension project, component transfers, injury/disability policies, the ill-fated Reserve Force Employment Project etc etc but when it came t hard-core role, capabilities and structure issues--not so much.

At the table I represented the smallest group of reservists, (just 63 of us) while the other commanders represented the remaining 24 to 25,000 so my voice didn't carry much water when it came to deciding what issues we would address. 

I frequently felt that all that we were looking at was making life more profitable for the Class B and Class C soldier while ignoring the Class A types. There was very much an attitude at the higher level of leadership-both regular and reserve-that centered on "what are you doing for me today?" Quite properly the Class Bs and Cs were providing services that the regulars saw and needed every day so their focus was on them. Class As, on the other hand, merely represented a potential and nebulous service for the future and which, as far as day-to-day operations were concerned, were principally viewed as being merely a resource consumer.

On a number of occasions I broached the subject of advancing a legislative agenda (after all I was the lawyer) to make the ability of DND to facilitate the compulsory operational deployment of reservists more practical so that there would be a stronger incentive to properly organize, train and equip reserve units so that they would be available for immediate service. (In short the NDA already has those provisions and what was, and continues to be, needed are more regulations that allow the Minister to initiate the call up reservists (rather than requiring an Order in Council) and stronger job protection legislation.) 

Those attempts were rejected within CResC Council for what I perceived the following reasons:

1. there was a perception that the civilian political leadership would not be prepared to enact such legislation/regulations;

2. there was a perception that senior CF leadership would not support or push for such legislation;

3. no one within the senior CF leadership was prepared to change anything which might cause an undesirable side effect on the status quo of the regular force structure and roles.

There was one thing I became to be embarrassed about and that was that, for the most part, senior Reg F leadership does not understand the current powers that they have under the NDA to essentially call up reservists (some, alternatively, understand the power but believe that it would be political or career suicide to advocate for it's use). The result is that Class As are viewed as having little value within the CF until such time as they volunteer for B or C service.

In large part we learned a false lesson in Afghanistan in that we could always get sufficient Class C volunteers to fill out the battle groups without any need for a compulsory call up. In addition there was always sufficient predeployment training time to get people up to scratch even for our risk-averse leaders. This makes us complacent and for the most part senior leadership will continue to happily run the risk that there will never be a need to rapidly call out a reserve force and therefore save themselves the budget costs for the training and equipment needed to create and maintain a truly effective reserve force.

In my view until DND as a whole gets over its aversion to compulsory call up of individuals or units of the reserve force we will never see any serious attempts being made to change the status quo except for minor--and basically inconsequential--fine tuning.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09

So basically despite your efforts the council was more concerned with concessions and the little things rather then the actual tough decisions that we expected of our senior leadership simply because they thought that nothing would ever actually come of it. You know if you never try you are going to fail 100% of the time.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So basically despite your efforts the council was more concerned with concessions and the little things rather then the actual tough decisions that we expected of our senior leadership simply because they thought that nothing would ever actually come of it. You know if you never try you are going to fail 100% of the time.



I wouldn't so much say the "little things". Some of those matters were fairly significant but they never did touch on anything that could be called a review of the basic raison d'etre of the CF reserves in the modern era.

As far as the reason for not pushing for reform I think there is a very real lethargy in any bureaucracy that resists dramatic change unless it is on the coal face of disaster and has no other choice. We're not there yet.

I tend to view reserves the same way as insurance policies; you pay for years for something that gives you little in the way of a return so that when the need suddenly arises you're good to go. History is replete with examples of societies that fell because they didn't prepare for the unexpected. Personally, my two medical events in the US (this year and last) made me damn happy that I've been paying for good travel insurance. All the premiums I have paid up to now and will ever pay in the future have been more than reimbursed.

What bothers me more than anything else is that much of the cost of an efficient reserve force is already in existing budgets. What we're really talking about is serious organizational and structural changes (and that legislative stuff). There clearly would be additional capital costs to create an equipped force in being as well as the ongoing facilities and maintenance and training costs associated with a more deployment ready force. I know that there are others who would disagree with me but DND already has a fairly healthy budget which could be better utilized than it is. I do, however, also believe that we need to increase that budget if we want to be seen as serious contributors to NATO. 

When you take a look at defence expenditures by countries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures you learn two lessons:

1. The NATO block spends significantly more on defence then all our potential enemies combined; and

2. Many countries who spend around what Canada does (e.g. Israel, Turkey, Spain) get an awful lot more deployable force for the money that they spend than we do.

That makes me think that somewhere we've gone off the track as far as what we get for what we spend. A serious review of our organization, from the bottom to the top, is seriously needed. We simply can't count on that being initiated within the DND bureaucracy. Unless change comes from outside, it will never happen.

 :cheers:


----------



## Haggis

FJAG said:
			
		

> I wouldn't so much say the "little things". Some of those matters were fairly significant but they never did touch on anything that could be called a review of the basic raison d'etre of the CF reserves in the modern era.


Each of the environments recruits, trains and employs their P Res differently.  An overarching decision on the raison d'etre for any single environment would not apply to the others.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> What bothers me more than anything else is that much of the cost of an efficient reserve force is already in existing budgets. What we're really talking about is serious organizational and structural changes (and that legislative stuff).


Firstly, reforms cost money.  Reserve budgets are, at the best of times, discretionary funds liable to reallocation to higher priority line items.

Secondly, when reforms are pushed through in an ill-conceived, poorly executed manner simply to show that the senior leadership has done _something_ to improve/change the Reserves, it rarely ends well.  The Reserve Force Pension is a prime example.

Thirdly, at the time you were on C Res & Cdts Council there were a huge number of Class B's in many HQs.  Some of them, I believe, served the sole purpose of improving their lots in life and employment prospects at the expense of the Class A Reservist.  Many times I saw draft policies and proposals that did absolutely nothing to improve the effectiveness of the Reserves writ large or increase the effectiveness of those on the Armoury floor/drill deck.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> Many countries who spend around what Canada does (e.g. Israel, Turkey, Spain) get an awful lot more deployable force for the money that they spend than we do.


  Many of those same countries militaries are not as heavily regulated as Canada nor do they have to contend with the initiatives of social justice warriors within their civilian and political leadership ranks.  Also, none of those you mention have to contend with the very expensive and career limiting policy of official bilingualism and none areas as geographically challenged as Canada, (they could all fit in Ontario).



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> That makes me think that somewhere we've gone off the track as far as what we get for what we spend. A serious review of our organization, from the bottom to the top, is seriously needed. We simply can't count on that being initiated within the DND bureaucracy. Unless change comes _*from outside the CAF*_, it will never happen.



FTFY


----------



## FJAG

Haggis said:
			
		

> Each of the environments recruits, trains and employs their P Res differently.  An overarching decision on the raison d'etre for any single environment would not apply to the others.



We frequently dealt with issues that only dealt with one environment or branch. The problem, however, is a generic/universal one because each environment and/or branch has issues with how to fully maximize their reserve component. The solutions may very well differ to cater to their differences.



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> Firstly, reforms cost money.  Reserve budgets are, at the best of times, discretionary funds liable to reallocation to higher priority line items.



That in a nutshell is not the problem but a symptom of the problem which is perception. All budgets, regular and reserve, may need to give way to higher priority line items. The problem here is that reserve budgets are from the outset a low priority because reserves as a whole are not perceived to be full members of the defence team. As I said before, within the Reg F structure the question asked to determine worth of a unit or individual is "what have you done for me today?"  I know this will cause outrage amongst many of the regular components, but there are elements of the Reg F that do not need to be on full time service. As an example many of the gunners in the artillery (beyond those needed to keep expertise, a moderate career flow and to maintain equipment) are only needed on operations and could easily be filled by reservists. For every Reg F PY saved, 6 Res PYs (at 60 days per year) could be created.



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> Secondly, when reforms are pushed through in an ill-conceived, poorly executed manner simply to show that the senior leadership has done _something_ to improve/change the Reserves, it rarely ends well.  The Reserve Force Pension is a prime example.



Why are you assuming that the reforms will be ill conceived or poorly executed? I do agree that the RSP was poorly done and argued so at CResCC. (In my view it followed the "what have you done for me today" mantra in that it only rewarded paid days served and therefore greatly favoured Class Bs and Cs. IMHO the potential to be called up should also be recognized in some way for Class As somewhat in the nature of the RFRG)

The fact of the matter is that there are a number of examples around the world which show ways that reservists are great force multiplier at a cheaper day to day cost. A proper study and implementation plan would make it successful. The problem is that no one at the top is remotely interested in doing the study for the reasons that I listed above.



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> Thirdly, at the time you were on C Res & Cdts Council there were a huge number of Class B's in many HQs.  Some of them, I believe, served the sole purpose of improving their lots in life and employment prospects at the expense of the Class A Reservist.  Many times I saw draft policies and proposals that did absolutely nothing to improve the effectiveness of the Reserves writ large or increase the effectiveness of those on the Armoury floor/drill deck.



I do agree with that statement completely. The whole thing was started by the fact that commanders who considered themselves Reg F understaffed could use their budgets to fill their full time positions or add to them. As a result we created a generation of Class Bs (and regretfully many of them for a long time were Class Cs until we tightened up the rules) who spent much of their time improving their own lots in life (the Reserve Pension was their greatest success). Unfortunately Class B's were in their commanders' presence day-to-day and therefore had much greater influence over them than their Class A counterparts. (I also have to admit that I also had great sympathy for many Class B reservists who did very good work for their directorates, in many cases [because they weren't posted around] formed the directorates corporate memory but were paid at 85% of their Reg F peers)



			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> Many of those same countries militaries are not as heavily regulated as Canada nor do they have to contend with the initiatives of social justice warriors within their civilian and political leadership ranks.  Also, none of those you mention have to contend with the very expensive and career limiting policy of official bilingualism and none areas as geographically challenged as Canada, (they could all fit in Ontario).



Again you are not pointing at a problem but a symptom of the problem. We are long overdue for a pruning of regulations. The reason our headquarters are so bloated are because every time someone in NDHQ farts, another directorate is stood up to figure out how to solve the problem and then to administer the solution. There used to be a time when we dealt with "must knows, should knows and could knows" when determining how to spend our training time. Today everything is a "must know". Similarly our bureaucracy (both external and internal) has created regulations and offices of primary interest for just about everything that comes to their mind. Its time to reverse that trend which again requires a good study (preferably by an outside agency) and a good implementation plan.

Geography shouldn't be a challenge to us if we use it properly. I have seen small towns of ten thousand people scattered far and wide on the US Plains who each have a small armory with a fully equipped and manned National Guard or Reserve transportation or engineer company. Meanwhile Brandon/Portage La Prairie Manitoba, (two cities with a total of some 70,000 folks), within spitting distance of the best artillery range in Canada, a two-battery artillery regiment is hard pressed to put a troop in the field (which is a good thing because that's all the equipment it has anyway.) What we need is a new structure, a new rationale, and the proper enablers to ensure that such units and their soldiers can thrive.

Haggis. Please believe me that I know that there are difficulties but for every difficulty there is a solution. Any rationale, knowledgeable outside observer (and many inside ones) will tell you that for numerous reasons, we are not getting the military capability that our country is paying for. For decades now we have become a headquarters-bound force that's more concerned with administering itself (and when I'm really cynical; ensuring that every officer has a fulfilling career) than ensuring that we have a deployable field force commensurate with the number of people we have on the payroll. I guess maybe everyone is just too busy trying to figure out what to do with five guys and a flag.

 :cheers:


----------



## Haggis

FJAG said:
			
		

> Haggis. Please believe me that I know that there are difficulties but for every difficulty there is a solution. Any rationale, knowledgeable outside observer (and many inside ones) will tell you that for numerous reasons, we are not getting the military capability that our country is paying for.



I know you know, FJAG.  We have sat around the same table at different times dealing with the same issues.  

This thread has 129 pages of people who also know we have a problem and about 1/3 to 1/2 of those pages propose one solution or another.  the biggest problem is that no matter what solution is proposed to "fix" the Army Reserve, even if it's the best one ever found, the institutional and political will to carry it forward - to flank the self-centred, careerists in the HQs, to slay special interest dragons in the lobby rooms, to silence those who would continue to turn the CAF into a social experiment- is not there.


----------



## MilEME09

Essentially this thread will continue to go in circles until people with power decide to change things. Atleast with the TAPV's they also gave us the kit to transport and maintain them in the field.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Don't worry, those will go the way the Bison (originally called the MILLAV...Militia Light Armd Veh) went...you'll be able to, maybe, possibly, borrow some of them from time to time after the Reg units claw them back when the next big C Army deployment happens...

 ;D


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Don't worry, those will go the way the Bison (originally called the MILLAV...Militia Light Armd Veh) went...you'll be able to, maybe, possibly, borrow some of them from time to time after the Reg units claw them back when the next big C Army deployment happens...
> 
> ;D



If I can lick it, the reg force won't want it any more right?


----------



## MilEME09

Any one else tracking a seemingly slow expansion of the PRes? seems some units have platoons popping up in smaller towns, example a few months back it was in the news the KOCR has a new B Squadron in Okotoks/high river


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Without a healthy Class A pool, you will not be able to recruit enough Class B & C when you desperately need them. If you want to healthy pool you need to be able to recruit and hold people. To do that you need an interesting and defined mission, that is unique to the military. You also need to properly fund training and provide equipment. 
If you treat Class A as unimportant, people will receive the messages and leave, generally the good ones first, because they can find other ways to occupy themselves. Civil defense, SAR, forest fires, flood rescue and such are all great secondary tasks. At the end of the day, what makes the military different is the combat aspect, whether real life or training.


----------



## Underway

This info from November's Frontline Magazine.  Heres the whole article about the Mighty Maroon.

http://defence.frontline.online/article/2017/5/8815-Mighty-Maroon-Machine-in-Atlantic-Canada

I pulled this out in particular.  Interesting.  Mortars are back, heavy weapons platoon is back, pioneers are back? What's going on?



> *New Roles for Reserves*
> BGen Macaulay comes to Atlantic Canada from Army Headquarters in Ottawa where he was the Director of Army Strategy, or as he describes it: “the Director of the Army of Tomorrow,” a position he concurrently held until November.
> 
> Certain organizational lessons were reinforced by last year’s Auditor General’s report, which underscored the unrealized potential of a strong, well-equipped reserve force. Historically, the Canadian Army Reserves have comprised some 18,000 personnel, but the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities and responsibilities.
> 
> “This is an exciting time as the team works to strengthen the Army Reserves. We are examining how we conduct business, are guaranteeing summer employment four summers in a row to new applicants, and enhancing the recruiting, retention and enrollment process” – all aimed at growing the base of part-time soldiers across the Army.
> 
> “In the past, we had to shave the ice cube,” BGen Macaulay noted, using a metaphor favoured by senior Canadian army personnel to explain the frustrations of budget paring, funding claw-backs and acquisition cancellations. “Now, the Army Commander has told us to build the ice cube. I have conveyed that to my unit commanding officers by telling them ‘You hire them, and I’ll pay them.’”
> 
> Building the army’s ice cube includes creating the Canadian Combat Support Brigade. And so, in October, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre transferred command authority for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) to the 5th Canadian Division at a ceremony held at Fort Frontenac in Kingston. According to the Defence Department’s announcement, the brigade “institutionalizes key operational enabling capabilities such as Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Information Operations and Operational Support.”
> 
> Previously under the authority of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (Kingston) – the brigade now operates under the authority of the 5th Canadian Division, headquartered in Halifax.
> 
> The reserves of the four divisions across Canada will each provide four platoon-based capabilities, “the sweet 16” as they are called by BGen Macaulay:
> 
> *Mortar* – once cancelled as a capability of the infantry, is now being brought back as a weapons system for light infantry.
> *Direct fire platoon* – will specialize in heavier weapons, such as the 50-calibre machine gun.
> *Pioneer platoons* – for route preparation and route denial to the enemy.
> *Support* – for light urban search and rescue.
> ​“These specialized mission tasks will not conflict with the primary functions of a unit such as Halifax’s Princess Louise Fusiliers, who will retain their primary roles, but these other capabilities will be added to their list of responsibilities – with additional soldiers and equipment provided to the units to accomplish these missions. This is in direct contrast to previous times when the reserve force would be assigned new responsibilities but frequently without the personnel, training and equipment to achieve them.
> 
> “With 5 Div assuming control of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB), Atlantic Canada’s maroon patch will be worn by the soldiers in this brigade across Canada,” Macaulay effused.
> 
> The core mandate of the CCSB is to oversee the training and operations of the Canadian Army’s key operational enabling functions:
> 
> Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance – collection and management of information on the operational environment.
> Information Operations – information-related activities planned and conducted to have behavioural effects in support of a mission.
> Operational Support – elements of support that facilitate all forms of military operations including engineering and artillery.
> The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is the first Regular Force brigade to serve under the command authority of the 5th Canadian Division, which is the command element of the Canadian Army in four Atlantic Canada provinces.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

> the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities



950...from coast to coast?  Maybe I am being too _glass half empty _but...from BC to Nfld, 950 is pretty thin butter on the bread.  Or is this to be selective and concentrated, with new units being stood up like the Hfx Rifles were a few years back?

As I get closer to CRA, anytime I see statements like "*it's an exciting time to be in the YXZ*..."...I hope the intent of the statement doesn't match the uniqueness of it - I've heard for too many people say that crap with zero change behind it.  2 decades and some change ago, my old Reserve unit could field 3 x 5 car recce troops, along with a suitable SHQ, Ech including some maintainers, a medic or 2, and go on Ex with 2 proper CPs from the local Sigs unit.  Last I heard, they didn't have the people or kit for 1 full 5 car troop anymore.


----------



## Journeyman

Underway said:
			
		

> ....the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre transferred command authority for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) to the 5th Canadian Division...


So does CADTC lose its "Corps" patch?


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> 950...from coast to coast?  Maybe I am being too _glass half empty _but...from BC to Nfld, 950 is pretty thin butter on the bread.  Or is this to be selective and concentrated, with new units being stood up like the Hfx Rifles were a few years back?
> 
> As I get closer to CRA, anytime I see statements like "*it's an exciting time to be in the YXZ*..."...I hope the intent of the statement doesn't match the uniqueness of it - I've heard for too many people say that crap with zero change behind it.  2 decades and some change ago, my old Reserve unit could field 3 x 5 car recce troops, along with a suitable SHQ, Ech including some maintainers, a medic or 2, and go on Ex with 2 proper CPs from the local Sigs unit.  Last I heard, they didn't have the people or kit for 1 full 5 car troop anymore.



maybe thats their target recruitment goal? I know my own units recruitment goal would suck up a lot of that 950, so I think somethings out of context here.


----------



## RADOPSIGOPACCISOP

> the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities



Excellent.

Now if they can just mandate the filling our other failed recruitment quotas we'll have a much better military. 

Short of gangpressing people in, what exactly does "mandating" recruitment accomplish?


----------



## Underway

You people are burying the lead here.  

Reserve PIONEERS?  Mortar Platoons?  Is this a change for all of the PRes army or just infantry?  Is this a specialized platoon taken from all of the various reserve regiments in the brigade or is this a unit focus thing.  So are combat engineering regiments from a brigade now supposed to collectively provide a pioneer platoon (traditionally an infantry skill set) where the light infantry provide mortar and direct fire platoon pers.  Where does armour and artillery fit into this or are they already doing their own thing (with 105 and 81mm mortars for the arty and the new TAPV for the armoured pers)?


----------



## Jarnhamar

Seems like a lot of money time and effort spent to create a capability where the soldier can say no thanks I don't feel like working. I'm not sure an 'everyone's special' approach to the reserves is what would benefit the regular force most either.

I think the reserves should fix the problems they currently have (retention, attendance, lack of equipment, administrative burdens) before they try and put another 1000 soldiers in uniform.


----------



## Rifleman62

> I think the reserves should fix the problems they currently have (retention, attendance, lack of equipment, administrative burdens) before they try and put another 1000 soldiers in uniform.



It is not a Reserve problem to fix. It is mainly the government, then the military head shed who control the funding. Additionally, not everyone wants to join the military, full or part time.

We have had this discussion a zillion times.


----------



## MilEME09

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> I think the reserves should fix the problems they currently have (retention, attendance, lack of equipment, administrative burdens) before they try and put another 1000 soldiers in uniform.



Lack of equipment is not something the reserves can do anything about, thats above them, if DND allocates the funding to purchase equipment in enough numbers that the Reserves can have enough, perfect. Attendance, retention and training have been beaten to death by this thread and how they all go hand in hand. At the end of the day more bodies means more people as a percentage of troops will show up, more people showing up means the CoC is more willing to put in the effort to plan better training.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> It is not a Reserve problem to fix. It is mainly the government, then the military head shed who control the funding. Additionally, not everyone wants to join the military, full or part time.
> 
> We have had this discussion a zillion times.



Fair enough, I mean the reserves as an entity needs to be fixed whether it's by the government, headsheds or local units,  whomever. 

Not saying reserves are at fault for all the issues that plague them but they are responsible for some of it. 

Reserves need more funding for basic equipment from the government. They can't afford body Armor or boots for their members, I have no idea how they'll afford specialized equipment for all these special roles coming to them.

I'm not sagging the reserves, I still believe 100% the reg force can't deploy or fight a war without the reserves. 
 Still were talking about training 4 or 5 reservists with these special skills and tasks  to ensure at least 1 can augment the regular force, I think even that is optimistic.


----------



## FJAG

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Fair enough, I mean the reserves as an entity needs to be fixed whether it's by the government, headsheds or local units,  whomever.
> 
> Not saying reserves are at fault for all the issues that plague them but they are responsible for some of it.
> 
> Reserves need more funding for basic equipment from the government. They can't afford body Armor or boots for their members, I have no idea how they'll afford specialized equipment for all these special roles coming to them.
> 
> I'm not sagging the reserves, I still believe 100% the reg force can't deploy or fight a war without the reserves.
> Still were talking about training 4 or 5 reservists with these special skills and tasks  to ensure at least 1 can augment the regular force, I think even that is optimistic.



I've said this many times. The reserves are a way that you can multiply the fighting force that you have without paying an inordinate amount of money for it. We're just doing it wrong and need to fix the system from the ground up.

I'm writing another novel right now and since my characters are CID agents working out of Florida I use existing Army elements there. In my last one I arbitrarily picked the 1st Battalion 124th Infantry of the Florida Army National Guard where a murder happens for them to solve. 

As I researched the 1-124 I found that the battalion's strength is around 600 folks. Their battalion headquarters and headquarters company and C Company is in Miami, A coy in Hollywood Fl, B Coy in Cocoa and D Coy in West Palm (nicely scattered along the eastern coast. Since 9/11 the battalion complete has deployed 2002-2004 for a year and a bit to Iraq; In 2006-2006 for a year and a bit several hundred deployed to Afghanistan training the new Afghan army and 2010 the whole battalion went back to Iraq. The 1-124th sister battalion, the 2-124th (HHC Orlando, A - Leesburg, B - Sanford, C - Ocala, D - Eustis - basically central Florida) has a similar record.

We may wish to denigrate the Yanks but think about their service plans. In general, an individual signs up for Active Duty with a 2,4 or 6 year contract but with a total of 8 years of military commitment. The balance between the 8 years commitment and the active duty contract must be spent in the National Guard or Army reserves (with a one weekend per month, two weeks per year compulsory training requirement) or in the inactive reserve. In addition, of course, the President can activate individual reservists (including the inactive reserves) and reserve and guard units to active duty.

In addition of course, individuals can join the National Guard without doing Active duty first.

There are currently eight "deployable" National Guard Infantry divisions and numerous non-divisional but "deployable" brigades, formations and units (arty, engineer, sustainment, air defence, MP, aviation etc). And while noting is 100% perfect, most are manned and equipped up to their "deployable" state. (Many units are heavy armor, armored infantry and self propelled artillery and missile launcher.

For a current overview, Wikipedia gives you a quick glance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_National_Guard

Here's a 2005 overview of the restructuring that was going on at the time to modernize the system.

https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/TBSR-2005-ARNG-Division-and-Brigade-Combat-Team-Designations.pdf

I'm a great fan of our reserves. Have served both regular and reserves for a very long time. Quite frankly I've reached the point that unless we are going to get serious about changing our attitudes as to how to recruit, train, equip and employ our regular and reserve components so that they will actually become one credible force, then we might as well shut the whole piece of crap down and use the money to fund better day-care centers and free community colleges (universities should all be shut down except for the professional faculties)

My rant for the day.  ullhair:

 :cheers:


----------



## Privateer

From Canadian Forces twitter feed today:
https://twitter.com/CanadianForces/status/1004453419250307072



> Starting in 2018, Army Reserve units will be assigned specific Mission Tasks: mortars, pioneers, light urban search and rescue, and direct fire support


With a link to "Defence Investment Plan 2018": https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/defence-investment-plan-2018/planned-expenditures.html

Does this mean that the Army Reserve is getting out of "basic" infantry, artillery and armoured reconnaissance work?


----------



## Jarnhamar

[quote author=Privateer]

Does this mean that the Army Reserve is getting out of "basic" infantry, artillery and armoured reconnaissance work?
[/quote]

Yup. 

Basic skills and experience is the last thing the regular force needs when reservists show up for work  ;D


----------



## RCPalmer

Privateer said:
			
		

> From Canadian Forces twitter feed today:
> https://twitter.com/CanadianForces/status/1004453419250307072
> With a link to "Defence Investment Plan 2018": https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/defence-investment-plan-2018/planned-expenditures.html
> 
> Does this mean that the Army Reserve is getting out of "basic" infantry, artillery and armoured reconnaissance work?



These mission tasks above are just the "new" ones.  As part of this process, the expected outputs of the Army Reserve for "basic" Infantry, Arty, Armored Recce, et al. are being codified as well as part of the same mission task framework.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Privateer said:
			
		

> From Canadian Forces twitter feed today:
> https://twitter.com/CanadianForces/status/1004453419250307072
> With a link to "Defence Investment Plan 2018": https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/defence-investment-plan-2018/planned-expenditures.html
> 
> Does this mean that the Army Reserve is getting out of "basic" infantry, artillery and armoured reconnaissance work?



No.

I'm pretty sure that we will try to do both the jobs, and fail.


----------



## pbi

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> No.
> 
> I'm pretty sure that we will try to do both the jobs, and fail.



Oh, no....not this again.

I lived through the ill-fated "Op Tasking" episode in the Army decades ago, which was done for more or less the same stated reasons. Kit and tasks were dumped on Reserve units who couldn't really handle either very well.

Of course, like all ill-conceived military ventures, when it didn't work out like the Powerpoint said it would, blame was freely flung about. The Militia had proved its essential worthlessness, or the Regular Army had once again demonstrated its fundamental ignorance and arrogance. Or both.

Then we all forgot about it. (the Army has the institutional memory of a gnat: we can tell you all about Vimy or Dieppe, but just try asking what happened 20 or 30 years ago...)

So, here it is, back again as a "new idea".  Will the units get more paid days and more qualified instructional staff, so that they can actually be proficient in their MOC skill (which is why the Army has the units in the first place...), AND be proficient in these new skill sets?

If the answer is "yes", well then that's great, and I wish it well.  If "no", then just forget the whole thing right now before we repeat the pain by pointless wheel re-invention.

It's particularly ominous to see the LUSAR task: this brings back the ghosts of the "Snakes and Ladders" era in the 1960s when the Militia was being trained as a big Civil Defence force for post-nuclear strike recovery operations. Ropes, ladders, shoring and block-and-tackle  were the order of the day. It was a huge dissatisfier, and according to people I've spoken with who served at the time, it caused serious attrition in Militia units by people who joined to soldier.

Structural search and rescue is a skill that fire departments (whose business is rescue) usually allocate to dedicated rescue squads, manned by qualified specialists using a wide range of  unique tools and techniques. Venturing into damaged and unstable buildings with electrical power, water and gas hazards, along with fire and HAZMAT threats, is not a job for amateurs. I wonder what skill level an Army Reserve LUSAR-tasked unit could actually achieve, unless it was already a Combat Engineer unit.


----------



## dapaterson

With the guns currently self-divesting, LUSAR is going to the artillery, mortars to the Infantry, and blackness to my soul.


----------



## pbi

dapaterson said:
			
		

> With the guns currently self-divesting, LUSAR is going to the artillery, mortars to the Infantry, and blackness to my soul.



Oh, well then. It's all good. Nothing to worry about.

_I say, my good man, shuffle those deck chairs about a bit would you? I'd like a better view of those icebergs._


----------



## mariomike

pbi said:
			
		

> It's particularly ominous to see the LUSAR task:



For reference to the discussion,

Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) classification guide
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-en.aspx

Covers Light, Medium and Heavy USAR.


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> For reference to the discussion,
> 
> Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) classification guide
> https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-en.aspx
> 
> Covers Light, Medium and Heavy USAR.



We've been toying with the LUSAR thing for years, badly. Without the training, equipment, specialist skills and leaders, and infrastructure, I'm pretty sure we'll just become better informed casualties.


----------



## pbi

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We've been toying with the LUSAR thing for years, badly. Without the training, equipment, specialist skills and leaders, and infrastructure, I'm pretty sure we'll just become better informed casualties.




So, I looked at the Public Safety LUSAR link, in particular at the training bill for LUSAR. Sorry, but without the additional resources I noted in my earlier e-mail, I really don't see how the unit can achieve the proficiency to operate safely in a significant structural collapse incident without close supervision by Fire Service rescue technicians. (Who would, BTW, already be very busy if it is a major incident)

And I really, _really_ don't see how the unit could have any hope of being certifiably competent at the LUSAR task and still be competent at its MOC skills. It's hard enough now on 37.5 days a year, with unpredictable attendance, and other mandated training and activities.

Maybe this LUSAR task is the wrong answer to the right question. If the question is "Does Canada have enough domestic USAR capability in the event of a major emergency?", and the response is "No", then the proper COA is to establish a civilian volunteer augmentation or auxiliary to the existing Fire Service, similar to the Civil Defense rescue squads of the 1950s and 60s, or the Auxiliary Fire Service in UK during WW2. People who train on rescue as their primary function, to the exclusion of other things.

Granted, it would exist as a municipal or provincial thing, funded by Public Safety, and not as a feather in DND's cap, but it might keep the right things in the right lanes.


----------



## Rifleman62

> link to "Defence Investment Plan 2018": https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/defence-investment-plan-2018/planned-expenditures.html





> *Defence Investment Plan 2018 | Part II: Maximizing Defence's success*
> 
> 2.2 Maximizing Defence’s success
> 
> 2.2.1.Capitalizing on innovation
> 
> 2.2.2 Optimizing procurement



and on, and on. Who writes this stuff let alone believes it?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> and on, and on. Who writes this stuff let alone believes it?



The Canadian Government  ;D

The Canadian Federal Public Service is like the French Colonial Army, Operationally Optimistic.


----------



## pbi

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> and on, and on. Who writes this stuff let alone believes it?



Answers:

a. the usual suspects; and

b. nobody.

The success of any Govt's defense procurement and funding policies can be judged only by looking at what is really sitting in the compound, on the apron, or alongside the jetty: never by what is on paper.

What I don't understand is how, in the short six years of WW2 we went from a tiny little tinpot military to a large and respectable force. How the hell did that happen? And how has it gotten so arsed up?


----------



## pbi

Here is the kind of civilian volunteer Civil Defense LUSAR unit that was kicking around in the 1950s (see attachment)


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> With the guns currently self-divesting, LUSAR is going to the artillery, mortars to the Infantry, and blackness to my soul.



Please tell me that this is just an attempt at humour. I really don't want to hate the Reg F artillery leadership more than I already do.

 :brickwall:


----------



## OldSolduer

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> The Canadian Government  ;D
> 
> The Canadian Federal Public Service is like the French Colonial Army, Operationally Optimistic.



There’s too damn many good idea fairies infecting DND and the CAF.


----------



## mariomike

pbi said:
			
		

> Here is the kind of civilian volunteer Civil Defense LUSAR unit that was kicking around in the 1950s (see attachment)



Metropolitan Toronto established the Department of Emergency Services ( D.E.S.) under Commissioner John H. Pollard.

It was responsible for the operation of the Emergency Measures Civil Defense division known as, Emergency Measures Organization ( EMO ). 

EMO was responsible for training and setting up a Heavy Urban Rescue Service ( now known as HUSAR ).
http://maps.library.utoronto.ca/datapub/digital/metro_1963/metro_1963_046.jpg


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> There’s too damn many good idea fairies infecting DND and the CAF.



yes, it seems they want us to do everything but actually be a military


----------



## OldSolduer

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> yes, it seems they want us to do everything but actually be a military



How True. It seems charity work, dressing in civvies on Fridays etc is far more important than operations, training and mundane stuff like making sure boots are available for soldiers to wear......


----------



## FJAG

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> How True. It seems charity work, dressing in civvies on Fridays etc is far more important than operations, training and mundane stuff like making sure boots are available for soldiers to wear......



True enough but the stupid thing is that the two do not need to be mutually exclusive. I do wonder how it has gotten this way.

 :cheers:


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I heard the Reserves will be doing civil defence and nuclear fallout surveys. 

(some may be too young to get the inference)


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> How True. It seems charity work, dressing in civvies on Fridays etc is far more important than operations, training and mundane stuff like making sure boots are available for soldiers to wear......



.....or sleeping bags. I wonder if they'll have to hot bag it in Mali?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

recceguy said:
			
		

> .....or sleeping bags. I wonder if they'll have to hot bag it in Mali?



We can start referring to TF Mali as the Sahel Submariners  8)


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> Metropolitan Toronto established the Department of Emergency Services ( D.E.S.) under Commissioner John H. Pollard.
> 
> It was responsible for the operation of the Emergency Measures Civil Defense division known as, Emergency Measures Organization ( EMO ).
> 
> EMO was responsible for training and setting up a Heavy Urban Rescue Service ( now known as HUSAR ).
> http://maps.library.utoronto.ca/datapub/digital/metro_1963/metro_1963_046.jpg



We had the HUSAR folks in Vancouver in for a weekend of 'getting to know you' type activities. My take away was that we, the Reserves especially, are currently a moon shot away from being able to integrate with, or otherwise support without getting in the way, of the activities of organizations like this.

Confined/ semi-confined space entries and any kind of rescue in any kind of built up area? NBC decontamination? Anything that requires to be done in a fire/flood/chemical toxic environment? No way, uh uh...

Unless you need us to fill and carry body bags... which was something I mentioned we could probably do with our current levels of training and support.


----------



## OldSolduer

FJAG said:
			
		

> True enough but the stupid thing is that the two do not need to be mutually exclusive. I do wonder how it has gotten this way.
> 
> :cheers:



I think it’s simple yet complex. Politicians that think they know everything about the military and messing things up. Military members who are outside their element and haven’t got the sense to realize it.
The CAF has a plethora of GIF (Good Idea Fairies) who have not been told to “sit down and STFU”.


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We had the HUSAR folks in Vancouver in for a weekend of 'getting to know you' type activities. My take away was that we, the Reserves especially, are currently a moon shot away from being able to integrate with, or otherwise support without getting in the way, of the activities of organizations like this.
> 
> Confined/ semi-confined space entries and any kind of rescue in any kind of built up area? NBC decontamination? Anything that requires to be done in a fire/flood/chemical toxic environment? No way, uh uh...
> 
> Unless you need us to fill and carry body bags... which was something I mentioned we could probably do with our current levels of training and support.



Everything is so specialized now. 

Apart from the Emergency Support Unit ( ESU ) I was a member of, there was HUSAR, and separate from ESU and HUSAR, there was the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Team (CBRN). 

Not to mention Marine, ETF, PSU etc... 

I do not recall much interest for that sort of training when I was in the Reserves.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

mariomike said:
			
		

> Everything is so specialized now.
> 
> Apart from the Emergency Support Unit ( ESU ) I was a member of, there was HUSAR, and separate from ESU and HUSAR, there was the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Team (CBRN).
> 
> Not to mention Marine, ETF, PSU etc...
> 
> I do not recall much interest for that sort of training when I was in the Reserves.



Civil Defence was the Reservists raison d'etre in the 60's and early 70's Radiac meters https://www.orau.org/PTP/collection/radiac/IM174B.htm and personal dosimeters https://www.orau.org/PTP/collection/radiac/IM9.htm for everyone :rofl:


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> Everything is so specialized now.
> 
> Apart from the Emergency Support Unit ( ESU ) I was a member of, there was HUSAR, and separate from ESU and HUSAR, there was the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Team (CBRN).
> 
> Not to mention Marine, ETF, PSU etc...
> 
> I do not recall much interest for that sort of training when I was in the Reserves.



One area where we COULD focus, and where it makes sense IMHO, is the CBRN stuff. It's a skill and capability that we don't really maintain effectively throughout the CF, I don't think, and it's a good match with the potential needs of municipalities.

But even that one capability would consume all of our training time to keep up the courses, skills and training required, and the infrastructure/ kit demands would be daunting.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> I think it’s simple yet complex. Politicians that think they know everything about the military and messing things up. Military members who are outside their element and haven’t got the sense to realize it.
> The CAF has a plethora of GIF (Good Idea Fairies) who have not been told to “sit down and STFU”.



This made me think of something I saw on Reddit yesterday:







Yes Retired General Cox, I'm certain you were able to provide very sound advice about "Winning the War in Aghanistan" and "Solving the Insurgency" to the man that commanded maybe 1% of total NATO Forces at the time in Afghanistan.  

I'm certain he has had some good ideas, but 'Winning the War" was probably a little outside of Canada's scope  :dunno:


----------



## ArmyRick

Sad. I am in the release procedures now (in the P Res, its taking awhile) and I am not impressed with the Good idea fairyism going on.

I will speak for infantry P Res (if I may after 27.5 years), focus on individual skills at a HIGH standard, focus on Section and platoon level training during the "school year" and then have a kick ass coy+ FTX in the summer concentration period. Fall arrives, re-start, hopefully some have moved up one on the totem pole.

For infantry, keep it basic. Focus on good solid soldiering skills and you can still pull off some high speed stuff with minimal training/rehearsals

Skills that are vital
-Small arms handling (know the drills cold for every company weapon)
-basic comms
-CRBN and combat ish first aid (not boring refresher crap that most troops practically sleep through)
-NAV (many soldiers suck at it and don't do enough instead they get to know their local bases and training areas)
-PW drills, casualty evacuation, resupply, vehicle searches, person searches, etc
-Section Hasty attacks
-Platoon hasty and deliberate attacks (day and night)
-platoon defensive occupations and withdrawals
-Urban ops (breaching, room clearing, building searches, etc)
-Keep winter warfare skills going

ALL of the above mentioned skills can easily gobble up all the training time September through June. It may not be sexy for some senior officers but at the end, the most important asset is there, a well trained and prepared infantry soldier


----------



## MJP

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Sad. I am in the release procedures now (in the P Res, its taking awhile) and I am not impressed with the Good idea fairyism going on.
> 
> I will speak for infantry P Res (if I may after 27.5 years), focus on individual skills at a HIGH standard, focus on Section and platoon level training during the "school year" and then have a kick *** coy+ FTX in the summer concentration period. Fall arrives, re-start, hopefully some have moved up one on the totem pole.
> 
> For infantry, keep it basic. Focus on good solid soldiering skills and you can still pull off some high speed stuff with minimal training/rehearsals
> 
> Skills that are vital
> -Small arms handling (know the drills cold for every company weapon)
> -basic comms
> -CRBN and combat ish first aid (not boring refresher crap that most troops practically sleep through)
> -NAV (many soldiers suck at it and don't do enough instead they get to know their local bases and training areas)
> -PW drills, casualty evacuation, resupply, vehicle searches, person searches, etc
> -Section Hasty attacks
> -Platoon hasty and deliberate attacks (day and night)
> -platoon defensive occupations and withdrawals
> -Urban ops (breaching, room clearing, building searches, etc)
> -Keep winter warfare skills going
> 
> ALL of the above mentioned skills can easily gobble up all the training time September through June. It may not be sexy for some senior officers but at the end, the most important asset is there, a well trained and prepared infantry soldier



Nah brah, that is too well thought out and makes sense.  We will carry on down a path that has failed before because....well Canadian Army of course!


----------



## Haggis

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But even that one capability would consume all of our training time to keep up the courses, skills and training required, and the infrastructure/ kit demands would be daunting.



A few years ago my unit, located in an area known as "Smuggler's Alley"  was tasked to train and equip a boat platoon to provide non-engineer marine mobility to the Territorial Battalion Group.  The plan was to do dry shore based training from September to November then on-water training from December to March and then contribute our developed capability to a TBG exercise. Our "training area" was generally frozen solid from December to March and overrun with cigarette boats and freighter traffic the rest of the time.  I'm sure those boat operators would have been less than thrilled to find the Army playing in their pool.

Thankfully the equipment, training and tasking never actually made it to the Armouy floor.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Petard said:
			
		

> Unfortunately a lot of truth in that self divestment (I'm doubtful you'll give into the dark side of the force though Dave)



South Korea still has about 1500 105mm M101A1 in reserve, they are also adapting a number of them to be truck mounted, so lower half of the guns might be available as well. http://www.defenseworld.net/news/19711/South_Korea_To_Begin_Mass_Production_Of_Upgraded_105mm_Howitzer_In_2018


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> South Korea still has about 1500 105mm M101A1 in reserve, they are also adapting a number of them to be truck mounted, so lower half of the guns might be available as well. http://www.defenseworld.net/news/19711/South_Korea_To_Begin_Mass_Production_Of_Upgraded_105mm_Howitzer_In_2018



It's not that there aren't reasonably priced guns available. That's never been the problem.

The problem is that the Reg F arty leadership has never taken its head out of it's butt to properly treat the reserve side of the branch seriously. It's always been an inconvenience as can be seen from the fact that some 50 years ago we took the diversity and capability out of the reserve artillery (locating, field, medium, even self propelled) and made them a vanilla brand of 105mm C1 towed which really had no war role at all. We've had a half century of basically the same gun (upgunned slightly to C3 and we now how well that worked out) with minor tweaks for gun tractors, radios and fire direction computers. The 105's are a dead end training aid and nothing more. 

The fact is our leadership has never properly advocated or explored ways to improve the arty reserve capability. We should be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves.

 [cheers]


----------



## Eye In The Sky

recceguy said:
			
		

> .....or sleeping bags. I wonder if they'll have to hot bag it in Mali?



or the shortage of NCDs in Halifax recently (in the past 13 months) - a Navy base.

or the basic inability for aircrew to get flight suits for over a year and not until, the last I heard, Nov of this year for a contract to be awarded.  direction given out at morning brief lately;  people with really thread bare, torn, worn etc flight suits they can't get exchanged are to take pictures, that the Sqn's are to send to the Air Div.  One of my B Cats was recently unable to get an issued flying knife "because there aren't any".  Our orders state "shall fly with ISSUED flying knife".  I could go on...but, flight suits are part of our ALSE (Aviation Life Support Equipment) and one of the mandated dual-layers we are required to fly in.  The day I have thread-bare uniforms, I'll be letting my CofC know I am unable to fly because of insufficient equipment.

Or the numerous attempts for the Cdn Army to get....combat (worthy) boots.  When there are numerous companies who make completely suitable and serviceable boots;  Danner, Matterhorn, Magnum, Bates....but the GoC makes us reinvent the wheel to produce a wheel that doesn't roll true.

And....http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sajjan-dnd-equipment-funds-1.4683606

Feels like 20 years ago...next will be stories of the Reserves saying "bang! bang!" in training when they can't even get blanks.


----------



## Remius

Or the current shortage and recall of rucksacks...


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> One area where we COULD focus, and where it makes sense IMHO, is the CBRN stuff. It's a skill and capability that we don't really maintain effectively throughout the CF, I don't think, and it's a good match with the potential needs of municipalities.
> 
> But even that one capability would consume all of our training time to keep up the courses, skills and training required, and the infrastructure/ kit demands would be daunting.



CRT - Chemical Recce Teams, NBC Survey tasks...etc.  Back in the day when I was PRes Armd Recce in the early 90s, NBC/CRT tasks were part of the handful of tasks the Armd Recce Sqns trained in.  We also trained 2 nights a week and 2 weekends a month back then, and NBC Sur/CRTs were a secondary task.  It was part of my 6B years ago as well, everyone had to pass a NBC/CRT trace as either the Tp Ldr or Tp WO.  We trained on the kit, the TTPs, etc on the Recce Crewman course, QL3, 6A. 

Definitely a doable task, and one proven in the past the PRes units could maintain a skillset in.  Not sure if the Reserve zipperheads are still playing in that sandbox these days.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> CRT - Chemical Recce Teams, NBC Survey tasks...etc.  Back in the day when I was PRes Armd Recce in the early 90s, NBC/CRT tasks were part of the handful of tasks the Armd Recce Sqns trained in.  We also trained 2 nights a week and 2 weekends a month back then, and NBC Sur/CRTs were a secondary task.  It was part of my 6B years ago as well, everyone had to pass a NBC/CRT trace as either the Tp Ldr or Tp WO.  We trained on the kit, the TTPs, etc on the Recce Crewman course, QL3, 6A.
> 
> Definitely a doable task, and one proven in the past the PRes units could maintain a skillset in.  Not sure if the Reserve zipperheads are still playing in that sandbox these days.



And, although I have no idea if this is a good fit, aren't the TAPVs potentially suitable as NBC recce vehicles? I assume they can be 'over pressured'?


----------



## dubble

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Feels like 20 years ago...next will be stories of the Reserves saying "bang! bang!" in training when they can't even get blanks.



Just throwing this out there, but that exact situation happened to me on my DP1 - Infantry but a few years ago.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> It's not that there aren't reasonably priced guns available. That's never been the problem.
> 
> The problem is that the Reg F arty leadership has never taken its head out of it's butt to properly treat the reserve side of the branch seriously. It's always been an inconvenience as can be seen from the fact that some 50 years ago we took the diversity and capability out of the reserve artillery (locating, field, medium, even self propelled) and made them a vanilla brand of 105mm C1 towed which really had no war role at all. We've had a half century of basically the same gun (upgunned slightly to C3 and we now how well that worked out) with minor tweaks for gun tractors, radios and fire direction computers. The 105's are a dead end training aid and nothing more.
> 
> The fact is our leadership has never properly advocated or explored ways to improve the arty reserve capability. We should be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves.
> 
> [cheers]



A 105mm with the same sights as a M777 and basically the same fire control systems as the reg force, then you can work them into the existing batteries. have some travelling 155 with teams to familiarize Reserve arty troops with the M777, in regards to setup and loading drills. A shrunken M777 in 105mm would be a good training gun. The C1-C3 has been a good gun for the reserves as it has been incredibly robust. 
As I recall when we became a Ops task battery, we ended up with 2 CP's each with a Milpac computer and lasers for our OP teams. the only thing we lacked was encrypted comms, myself and one other guy were Nestor qualified.


----------



## mariomike

I was an MSE Op in a Service Battalion.  Transportation Company did the mandatory NBCW training. Perhaps not as much as some units. It was not something we specialized in.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> One area where we COULD focus, and where it makes sense IMHO, is the CBRN stuff. It's a skill and capability that we don't really maintain effectively throughout the CF, I don't think, and it's a good match with the potential needs of municipalities.
> 
> But even that one capability would consume all of our training time to keep up the courses, skills and training required, and the infrastructure/ kit demands would be daunting.



I could have taken the voluntary Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear training with the city, but for the $425.00 annual premium ( back then ), it was not something I was particularly interested in.

Especially after what a friend who had been sent to Three Mile Island as an observer told me.

Class A training is one thing, but how enthusiastic would the average reservist be about voluntarily responding to a real-life CBRN call downtown?

If it was that serious, reservists who were members of the emergency services would likely already be there.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> A 105mm with the same sights as a M777 and basically the same fire control systems as the reg force, then you can work them into the existing batteries. have some travelling 155 with teams to familiarize Reserve arty troops with the M777, in regards to setup and loading drills. A shrunken M777 in 105mm would be a good training gun. The C1-C3 has been a good gun for the reserves as it has been incredibly robust.
> As I recall when we became a Ops task battery, we ended up with 2 CP's each with a Milpac computer and lasers for our OP teams. the only thing we lacked was encrypted comms, myself and one other guy were Nestor qualified.



As I said the C3 is a training aid and we'll never take it to war.

I'm strongly of the view that reservists should have a weapon system that they can go to war with. Simplest example is that Canada needs (or at the very least should have) a multiple rocket launcher system. In the US there are 3 Active Duty FA Brigades and 8 National Guard FA Brigades equipped with HIMARS. A perfect solution--several brigades for immediate deployment and a lot more for follow up deployment. You don't need them every day but when you do need them you'll want people trained on them and ready to go. They're a perfect reserve role as they do not require a complex infrastructure -- just firing units, logistic support and basic maintenance.

Strangely enough, the US Army also entrusts M777 and M109A6 Paladin self propelled battalions to the National Guard and deploys them when needed.

I'm sure someone will bring up the issue that all these things are resource heavy. And they are. But here's the big point. What's the use of paying any money for a reserve force that's without the equipment and skills to go to war without lengthy training and equipment procurement cycles. Effectively we have a Reg F arty establishment that can't be grown (but maybe partially augmented and nothing more). Our reservists are a wasted resource (but they get to wear Divisional patches - just brilliant)

 :brickwall:


----------



## Petard

Actually, training on the C3 or LG1, IMO, is not the main issue, it is at least a start on the basics
Reg F units have taken upon themselves to build on this baseline. For example 2 RCHA has shipped some of their M777 to armouries across Ont so P Res units can get trained on at least the basics, and confirmation live fire happens in Petawawa, using some of that Regt's ammo allotment

The training of STA Dets, on the other hand, hasn't really progressed too far, yet.

The main problem with this latest idea is that available training days are maxed out as they are, there's no room to jam anything else in there.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And, although I have no idea if this is a good fit, aren't the TAPVs potentially suitable as NBC recce vehicles? I assume they can be 'over pressured'?



Not sure actually.  Not having worked an AFV with an overpressure system, I'd guess that they have a air filtering system as well.  Some  of the heavy metal types might know, the Leo 1 had a overpressure/BNC system IIRC (I remember hearing some of the Germany guys talking about how the NBC fan was a decent 24 cooler).

If so, they could be good for the mounted aspect;  I wouldn't waste something like that on a dismounted team task (probably a Capt Obvious statement).


----------



## MilEME09

The fact they are asking what is essentially a deployable sub unit, but not changing any other rules and regulations means this is not going to work well at all, while it is great to say we will deploy a gun det or a CSS combined platoon from the PRes, how many bodies can actually commit? there are way to many questions in my opinion about how this process might work, and frankly most of them don't have answer's or good ones at that. You'll ask for a platoon and get maybe a section at best for an EX, and even less for deployment I will guess. Then there is the question of integration with Reg F elements and what that would look like. Pretty sure when a section+/- shows up when a Company commander is expecting an extra platoon thing will go sideways against the reserves.


----------



## Rifleman62

> Pretty sure when a section+/- shows up when a Company commander is expecting an extra platoon thing will go sideways against the reserves.



Inform the Coy Comd that the remainder are LOB's. :nod:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Thinking about the other side of the coin, how often have people complained 'the reserves have no role or goal from the Army etc';  now, they are doing it (not perfectly, but perhaps a step in the direction of improvement...too early to tell IMO) and people are throwing the baby out with the bathwater already.

Any chance at all this is an improvement from the status quo?  And if it is, what comes of this can be improved more, and so on as the next few years go on?


----------



## FJAG

This brings me back to my prime reserve force hobby horse. Our problem is that we have a volunteer-once regular force and a volunteer-twice reserve force. 

The Regs volunteer once to enrol and after that are subject to orders postings etc as the CF requires. The Res, on the other hand volunteer twice: once to enrol and thereafter volunteer every time they deploy, go on exercise or even show up on a parade night. That is a fundamental flaw.

Our system could be (and should be) refined to have at it's heart a volunteer-once reserve. Once enrolled training and deployments should be mandatory and enforceable. Without that reservists will always be viewed as marginally useful when it comes to operational roles. Harjit! Come see me. Have coffee. We'll talk.  ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Curious - how would your version of the Res accommodate (or would it accommodate) things like university exams, *family member sick*, civie job schedule conflict, etc?  Would you stick to the current system for NES?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Thinking about the other side of the coin, how often have people complained 'the reserves have no role or goal from the Army etc';  now, they are doing it (not perfectly, but perhaps a step in the direction of improvement...too early to tell IMO) and people are throwing the baby out with the bathwater already.
> 
> Any chance at all this is an improvement from the status quo?  And if it is, what comes of this can be improved more, and so on as the next few years go on?



The right op tasking for the reserves is being ready to augment the Reg F on exercises and operations as individuals and sub sub units.Probably like we have been doing since Yugo.
.
However, this new tasking proposes we ‘replace’the Reg F support. Pls at the unit level.


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Curious - how would your version of the Res accommodate (or would it accommodate) things like university exams, *family member sick*, civie job schedule conflict, etc?  Would you stick to the current system for NES?



Okay. 

1.  Let's start with the basic issue which is that on enlistment the regulations must call for a term of service that must be completed. There should be no six month or immediate release by either the regular or reserve force. The US offers various terms of enlistment of 2 or more years. The NG even has a one year "Try-One" enlistment. The key is offer choices and then hold the individual to their commitment.

2.  The initial enlistment would include a major basic training component based on the school summer vacation during which the individual would be qualified up to and including their basic military skill be it gunner, infantry, or tradesman.

3.  Training during the non summer months would be limited to one weekend per month focusing on individual refresher training. There would be no additional training or administration during the month for Class A reservists. All year-round unit administration or maintenance would be conducted by full time reg or Class B type members. 

4.  Annually there would be a two-three week exercise to practice at the sub-unit/unit level.

5. Advanced/Career course would only be given to people who agree to such additional training (and possibly a further period of elistment).

6.  At the end of any given enlistment period the individual would be released unless he/she agrees to reenlist for a new specific term and the unit agrees to keep the individual.

7. I would consider longer term enlistment periods (such as eight or nine years) for the Reg F where after a given period of time (say 4 years) the individual could elect to serve out the remainder of his/her enlistment period in a reserve unit.

8.  Current NDA provisions permit reservists or units to be put on active service by order of the Governor in Council. I would devolve that power on the MND which would give him/her the opportunity to mobilize reservists/reserve sub units/units for given operations etc.

9.  Employment protection laws need beefing up to support both monthly training, annual training and activation situations. Failing to attend training or failure to meet a troop movement would become chargeable as an AWOA 
 (or possibly desertion) under the NDA vis a vis reservists.

To answer your specific questions: under the above regime, university exams would not be an issue as training is only on weekends or summer vacation; sick leave or family sick leave would be at a CO's discretion the same as in the Reg F; civvie job schedule should not be a major issue as all training periods are condensed, are scheduled a year in advance and attendance is protected by legislation; NES doesn't exist. If the member does not show up he is charged as an AWOA and punished accordingly. Chronic absence could be subject to mandatory bad conduct release with consequential federal (and maybe even provincial) employment consequences. 

The key here is to emphasize that the individual is fully committed for the enlistment/re-enlistment period (both regular and reserve) he has committed to and because all basic training is completed shortly after enrollment, the individual and sub unit/unit is therefore more capable of operational taskings.

As an aside, I also see the overall structure of the reserves to change significantly. There would be far fewer units but with each unit having an establishment for a full battalion/regiment (and, in fact authorized to recruit a certain percentage above establishment to cater for attrition). Large cities like Toronto might have only two or three battalion size units in total while a province like Manitoba might have only one battalion size unit in total with one  sub unit split between Brandon and Portage.

In addition since I see that each unit would also be equipped to establishment, there would be an increased full time staff component to cater for routine equipment maintenance.

Do I see that the reserves might go down in size. Maybe. But wouldn't 15,000 deployable reservists be preferable to 30,000 undependable ones. In addition there would be a certain increase in numbers from trained Reg F people choosing to serve out their enlistment terms in a reserve unit.

That's it in a thumbnail.

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Question (I don't dislike what you said....just thinking here);

I am a 33 year old, university educated person with full time employment.  I talk to a reserve unit recruiter and I am interested but am wondering if the initial training can take place over 2 summer, because of 'reason X and Y.  Birth of child...etc etc.

Currently (or they used to be able to), RESO or other entry Officers were able to do their required Phase training over more than 1 summer.  Would this still be possible?


----------



## FJAG

Like I said, the above was a basic framework and while I could go into making detailed policies and procedures for every eventuality, I'm not about to do so because we're just spitballing here and anyone who could really make a difference isn't on this board anyway.

On a theoretical level I think that we need to rethink and revise a number of career oriented processes to simplify and make them deliverable. I personally think that we make all of our courses too long because 1. we include too many "should knows" and "could knows" as "essential knowledge"; and 2. we leave too much slack time on courses. In addition numerous career training modules should also be made deliverable through distance learning components which could be compensable upon successful completion.

I would think that for officer training it should work basically the same as for OR recruits, in other words the BOMQ component should be run up front so that immediately after completion the individual is able to function as a 2nd Lieutenant in their unit. I think that this might well vary between classifications so that some could achieve that status in one summer while others take two. Easy enough while the candidate is at university but perhaps more difficult for the example that you give. My bottom line is that the enlistment period should be such that if an option  or need for module-based, multiple-year training is required then the enlistment term should be such that it extends a minimum of two years at the unit after training is completed. 

While I knew once how RESO worked back in my day, I'm out of the system for too long to know exactly how RESO works these days. I recall the old MITCP system which worked in several (I think three) two-week blocks for gunners. I think that's entirely inadequate as it turned out individuals who were simply not sufficiently competent to do their jobs. I think in a reserve structure that is designed to deliver better trained and deployable reservists and reserve units, we cannot afford to have them led by poorly trained officers. I think that on the true "must knows" for an officer in a given classification there can be no compromise.

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Despite neither you nor I being the ones who can 'create change', maybe those who can will read your posts.  

I like the idea of tightening up the reigns coupled with the legislation to protect people's civilian employment.  Yes, we might lose some people or some people who may have signed up might say "no thanks", but I think the loss of quantity would be made up for with the increase in quality.  

My only addition would be to have it in policy that full time students would be given some leeway during exams;  we'd want to recruit and retain people who are actively educating themselves.  I know when I was Res years ago, many of our NCMs and Jnr Officers were university and college students.  I'd prefer to see it in policy because despite good intentions and all, my experience says there are some Reserve COs who don't always...colour inside the lines.


----------



## RocketRichard

As it stands now the trg progression for CA PRes officers is BMQ/BMOQ part 1 (5 weeks ft in summer or spread out on weekends in fall/winter) BMOQ Part 2 a (week ft or on weekends) BMOQ A (formerly BMOQ L) is 11 weeks (no more mods that can be spilt up) and ‘ trade trg’ usually a full summer depending on the trade. So a university student could complete the training in 2 years. This isn’t usually the norm as life can get in the way. Folks with ft jobs can take a very long time to get trade qualified. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> As I said the C3 is a training aid and we'll never take it to war.



Other armies seem content to use 105mm in conflicts and South Korea seem to see it as a still viable weapon system, even without the longer barrel.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Other armies seem content to use 105mm in conflicts and South Korea seem to see it as a still viable weapon system, even without the longer barrel.



I don't generally have anything against the 105 mm calibre nor the basic C3 myself but wouldn't see it as an option for deployment in any theatre we might end up in (although Afghanistan would have been permisive enough)

Interesting that you should mention South Korea as they are planning a massive upgrade program to some 800 of  their M2 etc  105mms. Short article and video follows.







http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/06/28/0200000000AEN20170628001700315.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRaMiC6AjXo

I think with the North Korean artillery advantage, every tube in South Korea counts.

 :cheers:


----------



## Kirkhill

> The Hawkeye is one of the lightest self-propelled howitzers in the world today. This system consists of a standard US Army's M20 105 mm howitzer, mounted on an M1152A1 HMMWV chassis. The Hawkeye is also referred as 105 mm Mobile Weapon System, or 105MWS. Though this artillery system can be integrated on many types of military vehicles.



http://www.military-today.com/artillery/hawkeye.htm


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Despite neither you nor I being the ones who can 'create change', maybe those who can will read your posts.
> 
> I like the idea of tightening up the reigns coupled with the legislation to protect people's civilian employment.  Yes, we might lose some people or some people who may have signed up might say "no thanks", but I think the loss of quantity would be made up for with the increase in quality.
> 
> My only addition would be to have it in policy that full time students would be given some leeway during exams;  we'd want to recruit and retain people who are actively educating themselves.  I know when I was Res years ago, many of our NCMs and Jnr Officers were university and college students.  I'd prefer to see it in policy because despite good intentions and all, my experience says there are some Reserve COs who don't always...colour inside the lines.



Give me 4 months..... https://army.ca/forums/threads/124522.0


----------



## pbi

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ...Unless you need us to fill and carry body bags... which was something I mentioned we could probably do with our current levels of training and support.



It might be worth noting that even volunteer fire depts (ie: most of the fire depts in North America) , who provide much of the first response rescue squad coverage outside big cities with fully career depts, struggle with keeping their rescue techs properly trained and current on a volunteer's limited time and the dept's limited budget.

In my opinion, (and based on the DomOps I was on) what the military brings to any civil emergency is not really some set of hastily learned civilian skills (there are usually lots of civilians around to do it much better, with much more modern kit), but its organization (including strong low-level leaders); its adaptability; its mission focus; and its integral ability to move, communicate and sustain itself.

Oh--and, of course, its ability to shoot people if things get dodgy.... 

Those attributes all come from one thing (IMHO): training for war. Dilute that focus, and look out.

Just saying....


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't generally have anything against the 105 mm calibre nor the basic C3 myself but wouldn't see it as an option for deployment in any theatre we might end up in (although Afghanistan would have been permisive enough)
> 
> Interesting that you should mention South Korea as they are planning a massive upgrade program to some 800 of  their M2 etc  105mms. Short article and video follows.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/06/28/0200000000AEN20170628001700315.html
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRaMiC6AjXo
> 
> I think with the North Korean artillery advantage, every tube in South Korea counts.
> 
> :cheers:



It has to do with the fact that the 105mm is more suitable to the terrain and doctrine of the Republic of Korea.  Korean Topography is mostly mountainous with lots of Valleys.  The majority of Korea's Infantry Divisions are in fact Light Infantry Divisions.  ROK doesn't emphasize deep battle like the US does, rather it's emphasis is on close-support.  

It makes perfect sense to me that you would want a lot of 105mm tubes for the Korean Theatre where you will likely be driving them up or pushing them up mountains so that they can be used to create a nice big concentration for massed infantry the Chinese and North Koreans will use.  You can even use them in the Direct-Fire role if needed  8)


----------



## daftandbarmy

pbi said:
			
		

> It might be worth noting that even volunteer fire depts (ie: most of the fire depts in North America) , who provide much of the first response rescue squad coverage outside big cities with fully career depts, struggle with keeping their rescue techs properly trained and current on a volunteer's limited time and the dept's limited budget.
> 
> In my opinion, (and based on the DomOps I was on) what the military brings to any civil emergency is not really some set of hastily learned civilian skills (there are usually lots of civilians around to do it much better, with much more modern kit), but its organization (including strong low-level leaders); its adaptability; its mission focus; and its integral ability to move, communicate and sustain itself.
> 
> Oh--and, of course, its ability to shoot people if things get dodgy....
> 
> Those attributes all come from one thing (IMHO): training for war. Dilute that focus, and look out.
> 
> Just saying....



Krulak and the US Marines gave us the 'Three Block War'. Maybe we need to dream up and deploy the 'Three Block Domop'?

1. Response
2. Recovery
3. Security


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Maybe we need to dream up and deploy the 'Three Block Domop'?
> 
> 1. Response



Find the Timmies.



> 2. Recovery



Get the Timmies up and running.



> 3. Security



Keep orderly lines at the Timmies.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As Canada has not suffered a terrible natural disaster, we have not really felt the lack of security that can come of a long term recovery and collapse of social structure. Therefore the value of soldiers in a disaster zone might be unappreciated.


----------



## brihard

pbi said:
			
		

> In my opinion, (and based on the DomOps I was on) what the military brings to any civil emergency is not really some set of hastily learned civilian skills (there are usually lots of civilians around to do it much better, with much more modern kit), but its organization (including strong low-level leaders); its adaptability; its mission focus; and its integral ability to move, communicate and sustain itself.



This. I just got back from G7 with the RCMP, and my experience there (I was one of around 4k mounties deployed, plus Quebec polcie and CAF) dramatically highlighted how the CAF excels in comparison i terms of logistics and communication.

You take a CMBG - or even a CBG - and deploy it comestically, and yeah you get a few hundred or thousand guys who can fill sandbags, shovel dirt, get quick courses in running chainsaws or fire hoses... But...

You get some heavy equipment and trained operators.
You get a transportation company that can move people and goods.
You get a field ambulance that can run basic medical in clinical and field settings.
You get a maintenance company that can fix vehicles and equipment.
You get field showers.
You get administrators who can track the flow of money.
You get professional logisticians who know intuitively what kind of effort and resources any given task will take.
You get tents to sleep under and cots to sleep on.
You get a field kitchen that can deploy off the back of trucks.
You get an entire command and control infrastructure with pretty reliable VHF communications.
You get an organization completely accustomed to working with a chain of command and relatively smoothly pushing orders, adminsitration, and reports and returns both up and down.
You get people who are completely accustomed to a modular organization that can att or det as needed and still maintain command and control.
You get a structure of management built in that will maintain accountability and continuity for all of its people.

And you get leadership in a way the civilian world seldom understands it.

So you take this and you place it as a skeletal structure, fleshed out with civilian agencies and volunteers, but all able to be coordinated and sustained, and you've got a really potent force multiplier. Literally the ability to take just about any Cpl, give him a radio and a spare battery, and attach him to whatever task force or strike team you're assembling so as to maintain comms with an incident command- that's a huge asset we bring that we barely even think about. Never mind the incredible asset that is someone with the experience of a platoon warrant. God I wish my organization has platoon warrants...


----------



## Kirkhill

Funny.  I was just driving out of town (Lethbridge) yesterday and found myself looking at all the lots filled with tractors and combines, loaders and utility vehicles as well as construction plant.

My thought was that in the event that the Lower Mainland, or at least that part beyond the Port Mann bridge, decided to separate, the first action from the prairies should be for the government to commandeer all of those vehicles from the lakehead west, together with every available flatbed and move them as close to the point of separation as possible.   Then it would be a matter of airlift, barges and pontoons to bridge the gap.   The plant is on the flatbeds.

Next issue is getting operators for all that plant - and I don't think that would be all that hard.  Civvy operators volunteering.  Civvy operators paid by the Government.  Farmers volunteering.  BC locals who can't get to their own equipment or whose equipment has been damaged.  Perhaps even some CAF types.

The resources are not short.  

The big issue would be organizing the effort.    In some respects we are talking about something like Operation Dynamo.  But instead of an Ad Hoc operation we have the opportunity to develop a plan - which in all likelihood means that no realistic plan will ever be devised....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Taking part in disaster scenarios, I find the Fed players are not well connected into reality, the Provincial Emergency Planners are, as there is generally a crisis of one sort or another in the Province every year, so real life experience helps a lot, and some of them have had numerous crisis to sink their teeth into. For Vancouver, large Earthquake, I recommend grabbing every small tug/barge operator and getting them to sail to Vancouver, give them exemptions to carry passengers on the barges, moving large masses of people over numerous waterways is your biggest challenge. The flip side of that is it gives vessel carried rescue and relief operators, multiple points of access. Your going to need to make barge landings, which is not to difficult. Fuel will need to be barged in, as likely the main refinery is down as would Cherry point. You also need a team of civil engineers well versed in assessing damaged infrastructure, so you can quickly reopen standing bridges to traffic.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Funny.  I was just driving out of town (Lethbridge) yesterday and found myself looking at all the lots filled with tractors and combines, loaders and utility vehicles as well as construction plant.
> 
> My thought was that in the event that the Lower Mainland, or at least that part beyond the Port Mann bridge, decided to separate, the first action from the prairies should be for the government to commandeer all of those vehicles from the lakehead west, together with every available flatbed and move them as close to the point of separation as possible.   Then it would be a matter of airlift, barges and pontoons to bridge the gap.   The plant is on the flatbeds.
> 
> Next issue is getting operators for all that plant - and I don't think that would be all that hard.  Civvy operators volunteering.  Civvy operators paid by the Government.  Farmers volunteering.  BC locals who can't get to their own equipment or whose equipment has been damaged.  Perhaps even some CAF types.
> 
> The resources are not short.
> 
> The big issue would be organizing the effort.    In some respects we are talking about something like Operation Dynamo.  But instead of an Ad Hoc operation we have the opportunity to develop a plan - which in all likelihood means that no realistic plan will ever be devised....



Part of the problem with earthquake recovery for the Lower Mainland will be the expectation that the help will come from 'out there'. COP Panorama is a good example, sadly, where the cavalry will come charging in from Alberta to save us.

This mental state of dependency on others seems to be driving all of our response planning as opposed to a robust, self-sufficient effort to ensure that we can quickly and efficiently mobilize all our internal to SW BC resources first.

We are, perhaps with good intentions but unknowingly, adding inexorably to the 'snowflake' effect IMHO.


----------



## dapaterson

So, BC, blocking infrastructure necessary for Alberta's prosperity, is planning is to rely on the kindness of Alberta in the event of a huge disaster.


Let me know how that works out for you...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Any major earthquake hitting the lower mainland is likely to play havoc with the mountain pass roads as well, so I would not count on help from East coming to soon, even if they want to. The help we will get is from the US, how fast that is depends on how hard hit Seattle is, if Seattle gets hit as well, then Ft Lewis will respond there, we will have to wait till military resources reach us from California. 

12 Service Battalion will be isolated in Richmond and possibly flooded, 6th Fd Squadron has very limited resources and will be busy assisting in the North Shore. Seaforth, 12 med, 744 Comms and 15th Fd RCA, will likely combine resources and operate out of 1-2 functioning armouries. But they will have limited manpower, as personal will have to self rescue, take care of families and then report.

The Island based units will likely ask for volunteers and be ready to provide assistance in the recovery phase, but not rescue phase. One hopes the RCAF uses it's Chinooks to carrying a detachment and equipment to get Abbostford, Boundary airports up and running to receive aid. YVR, might be heavily damaged and unusable to fixed wing for sometime and then only to military transports. The USN will likely dispatch a carrier and or helicopter assault ship to support rescue and recovery efforts. Basically the Lower Mainland is going to depend on the US military to save it's ass.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Part of the problem with earthquake recovery for the Lower Mainland will be the expectation that the help will come from 'out there'. COP Panorama is a good example, sadly, where the cavalry will come charging in from Alberta to save us.
> 
> This mental state of dependency on others seems to be driving all of our response planning as opposed to a robust, self-sufficient effort to ensure that we can quickly and efficiently mobilize all our internal to SW BC resources first.
> 
> We are, perhaps with good intentions but unknowingly, adding inexorably to the 'snowflake' effect IMHO.



So you don't need our help. Good enuff.  Have at it and bash on regardless.  Give us a call when the Yanks get there ..... and be sure to let us know how much they charged you for the service.  Must maintain that BC sovereignty donchano....  ;D


----------



## Halifax Tar

You guys should read this book:


Who Killed The Canadian Military? Paperback  
by J. L. Granatstein

https://www.amazon.ca/Who-Killed-Canadian-Military-Granatstein/dp/1554683017

It opens with the exact scenario you are talking about in BC and then he expands on his expect response.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So you don't need our help. Good enuff.  Have at it and bash on regardless.  Give us a call when the Yanks get there ..... and be sure to let us know how much they charged you for the service.  Must maintain that BC sovereignty donchano....  ;D



Vancouver is completely self-sufficient w.r.t. three key food groups: 

1) fruits
2) nuts
3) flakes


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Vancouver is completely self-sufficient w.r.t. three key food groups:
> 
> 1) fruits
> 2) nuts
> 3) flakes



 :rofl:


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We had the HUSAR folks in Vancouver in for a weekend of 'getting to know you' type activities. My take away was that we, the Reserves especially, are currently a moon shot away from being able to integrate with, or otherwise support without getting in the way, of the activities of organizations like this.
> 
> Confined/ semi-confined space entries and any kind of rescue in any kind of built up area? NBC decontamination? Anything that requires to be done in a fire/flood/chemical toxic environment? No way, uh uh...
> 
> Unless you need us to fill and carry body bags... which was something I mentioned we could probably do with our current levels of training and support.
> And I bet you were really popular for mentioning that too!


----------



## Jarnhamar

The light urban search and rescue really seems like an oddball task.


----------



## OldTanker

The HUSAR teams are the tip of the capability spear in terms of emergency response. They are few and far between and relatively small considering the potential magnitude of a large disaster anywhere in Canada. There are plenty of worthwhile tasks the CF could do following a disaster event, in particular tasks that require organizing people giving direction, and communicating. The average Militia master-corporal (I mean no disrespect having been one myself) is far more competent in terms of organizing and leading small-unit tasks than the vast majority of civilians. We as a society are so poorly prepared to respond to a major disaster that this is really the case that in a world of blind people, a one-eyed person will be king. Or something similar, but please don't underestimate how useful the military could be. I fully understand how few of them there are but they would still be a valuable resource. And consider the attitude General Honoré brought to New Orleans after Katrina and the effect that had.


----------



## daftandbarmy

'Popular' has never really been one of my life goals, fortunately


----------



## a_majoor

OldTanker said:
			
		

> The HUSAR teams are the tip of the capability spear in terms of emergency response. They are few and far between and relatively small considering the potential magnitude of a large disaster anywhere in Canada. There are plenty of worthwhile tasks the CF could do following a disaster event, in particular tasks that require organizing people giving direction, and communicating. The average Militia master-corporal (I mean no disrespect having been one myself) is far more competent in terms of organizing and leading small-unit tasks than the vast majority of civilians. We as a society are so poorly prepared to respond to a major disaster that this is really the case that in a world of blind people, a one-eyed person will be king. Or something similar, but please don't underestimate how useful the military could be. I fully understand how few of them there are but they would still be a valuable resource. And consider the attitude General Honoré brought to New Orleans after Katrina and the effect that had.



As weird confirmation story, I took part in an exercise with 32 IA Coy, where we spent a weekend with Toronto's EMS, working on a scenario on how the Armed Forces could assist Toronto in the event of a disaster like the Ice Storm. We did our prep work, area survey, identified vulnerable neighbourhoods etc. then went to their operations centre.

The place was quite impressive and very "high tech", and in a specially constructed building with its own on board power and so on. Their expectation seemed to be that "we" would be arriving with fleets of trucks and manpower to augment the Police, Fire Department and Ambulance services, but after the initial introduction and scenario briefing, a question came to my mind:

Q: "Each department has its own internal radio system, but how does the incident commander report to you, here?"

A: "By cell phone"

Q: "What is the backup comms plan?"

A: "City community centres can be converted to CP's for the incident commander. The incident commander will set up at the community centre and Skype into the Ops Centre....."

Our preliminary plan for supporting Toronto in the event of an ice storm or other major power outage is now to establish a TOC in or on the grounds of the operations centre and fan out RRB's to supply VHF radio support to the incident commanders.....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

OldTanker said:
			
		

> The HUSAR teams are the tip of the capability spear in terms of emergency response. They are few and far between and relatively small considering the potential magnitude of a large disaster anywhere in Canada. There are plenty of worthwhile tasks the CF could do following a disaster event, in particular tasks that require organizing people giving direction, and communicating. The average Militia master-corporal (I mean no disrespect having been one myself) is far more competent in terms of organizing and leading small-unit tasks than the vast majority of civilians. We as a society are so poorly prepared to respond to a major disaster that this is really the case that in a world of blind people, a one-eyed person will be king. Or something similar, but please don't underestimate how useful the military could be. I fully understand how few of them there are but they would still be a valuable resource. And consider the attitude General Honoré brought to New Orleans after Katrina and the effect that had.



One of the challenges is the first few arriving to the armouries will likely have no access, unless they physically break in, hopefully they are in uniform so they don't get arrested for looting....


----------



## mariomike

OldTanker said:
			
		

> The HUSAR teams are the tip of the capability spear in terms of emergency response. They are few and far between and relatively small considering the potential magnitude of a large disaster anywhere in Canada.



Not sure how much operational experience the teams have. ( Which we can be thankful for. )

For example, Toronto HUSAR ( CAN-TF3 ) has only deployed four times ( that I know of ) since it was created in 2003.

Two explosions, one roof collapse and one tornado.


----------



## OldTanker

Calgary HUSAR (CANTF 2) deployed en masse to relieve the EOC staff in Fort Mac several summers ago. The Vancouver HUSAR team (CANTF1) deployed to Louisiana post-Katrina. I know these two teams train rigorously (I've provided some training to the Calgary HUSAR team a few years ago). I would assess their operational experience as fairly high, considering that their members already bring significant operational experience to the teams.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> As weird confirmation story, I took part in an exercise with 32 IA Coy, where we spent a weekend with Toronto's EMS, working on a scenario on how the Armed Forces could assist Toronto in the event of a disaster like the Ice Storm. We did our prep work, area survey, identified vulnerable neighbourhoods etc. then went to their operations centre.
> 
> The place was quite impressive and very "high tech", and in a specially constructed building with its own on board power and so on. Their expectation seemed to be that "we" would be arriving with fleets of trucks and manpower to augment the Police, Fire Department and Ambulance services, but after the initial introduction and scenario briefing, a question came to my mind:
> 
> Q: "Each department has its own internal radio system, but how does the incident commander report to you, here?"
> 
> A: "By cell phone"
> 
> Q: "What is the backup comms plan?"
> 
> A: "City community centres can be converted to CP's for the incident commander. The incident commander will set up at the community centre and Skype into the Ops Centre....."
> 
> Our preliminary plan for supporting Toronto in the event of an ice storm or other major power outage is now to establish a TOC in or on the grounds of the operations centre and fan out RRB's to supply VHF radio support to the incident commanders.....



This is an excellent example of how the reserves (and CAF in general) can provide a value added service in the event of a natural disaster: through being really good at some of our core battle tasks, like C3, vehicle and logistics management, general first aid etc.

Trying to out do the guys in 'Backdraft'? Not so much....


----------



## mariomike

OldTanker said:
			
		

> Calgary HUSAR (CANTF 2) deployed en masse to relieve the EOC staff in Fort Mac several summers ago. The Vancouver HUSAR team (CANTF1) deployed to Louisiana post-Katrina. I know these two teams train rigorously (I've provided some training to the Calgary HUSAR team a few years ago). I would assess their operational experience as fairly high, considering that their members already bring significant operational experience to the teams.



Yes, they have operational experience. HUSAR is in addition to the 40 hours a week they work 9-1-1 operations.

I don't recall many guys volunteering for HUSAR. I remember it paid a $425.00 annual premium. I'm sure it has gone up a bit since then.

Personally, I like the Rescue-Medic program.


----------



## Remius

mariomike said:
			
		

> Personally, I like the Rescue-Medic program.



The reserves would have to actually have medics to do that... ;D


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:
			
		

> The reserves would have to actually have medics to do that... ;D



From what I have read, it sounds like they can ( or will be? ) trained for Light Urban Search and Rescue ( LUSAR ).
"•Assign new roles to Army Reserve units such as light urban search and rescue (LUSAR)" 
http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=commander-canadian-army-statement-on-the-new-defence-policy/j2yxndxe


----------



## Remius

mariomike said:
			
		

> From what I have read, it sounds like they can ( or will be? ) trained for Light Urban Search and Rescue ( LUSAR ).
> "•Assign new roles to Army Reserve units such as light urban search and rescue (LUSAR)"
> http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=commander-canadian-army-statement-on-the-new-defence-policy/j2yxndxe



I know some units that made a point of indicating their disinterest in that task...


----------



## Blackadder1916

As the discussion wends back to Urban Search and Rescue (regardless of weight class), I bring your attention to this service paper from a (2016) student at Staff College. CAF URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPABILITY

Without making any judgement about the scholarship of the author (and recognizing that I am years removed from familiarity of current CF capabilities or contemporary disaster response doctrine - but I did stay in a Holiday Inn once while attending a conference on disaster response), this paper is an example of what I think is a common construct in CF thinking about disaster response.  They want a role in disaster response because it justifies their existence but steam forward with but a slim understanding of the task.  That is not to say that there is no role for military intervention in, particularly, domestic disaster response but as noted in one study of (international) military response to natural disasters



> The provision of medical military assets is more controversial than air transport
> because it entails a high degree of interaction between affected populations and foreign
> military personnel. Also, deploying military field hospitals is considerably more
> expensive than deploying civilian field hospitals, as was recognized by several
> contributing countries. Even so, several countries continue to dispatch military field
> hospitals, mobile clinics and hospital ships to disaster sites. Some of the reasons for this
> were identified by contributing countries and members of the NGO community as:
> • an overwhelming humanitarian need that cannot be met by local health infrastructure
> or by the humanitarian agencies responding to the disaster (access, security etc);
> • assets already deployed in the country or region;
> • the political attraction (visibility, media exposure) of having one’s armed forces
> saving lives in a foreign disaster situation.


That I think drives the thought process of a number of decision makers (both in and out of uniform) at all levels.  From the highest to the lowest.  One of the most disgusting moments that I witnessed during my military career was the antics of some senior officers when rumours reached us that (while in Rwanda) a crew from 60 Minutes would be visiting us.  They didn't show up to their disappointment  - and a few were upset when they later found out that I was interviewed by Harry Belafonte for UNICEF TV when he stopped after noticing a section of us by the roadside.

I am more in favour of a domestic disaster response organization such as that found in Germany.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11117024

While they do not rule out the use of the military if necessary, it is not the first (or even second) echelon of response.  I am particularly taken with this philosophy.


> . . .  Rescue service is carried out by professionals, disaster relief by volunteers. . . .


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Now, contrary to my earlier musings, I don't believe it is necessary (or even prudent) to aim to build square combat teams all the time.
> 
> I could see an ideal CMBG (or CABG?) with the following manoeuvre elements:
> 
> 2x Mech Inf Bns (3x Rif Coys, 1x Cbt Sp Coy)
> 1x Tank Regt (4x Saber Sqns, 1x Cbt Sp Sqn)
> 
> Bde manoeuvre is provided by 6x Mech Inf and 4x Tank sub-units, serving under 3x unit HQs.  In the offence or defence, the math the Army is looking at as a max right now is 12km of frontage.  I need to dig into frontages based off recent historical studies a bit more, but my gut tells me that nothing has significantly changed the range of a dismounted infanteer for the last half-century - the platoon can still probably control a good 600 to 800 meters of ground.  Sure, weapons ranges are a lot longer - but that doesn't guaranteed you anything, especially with the effects of microterrain in masking an enemy's movement.
> 
> I'd argue that you probably would want to avoid a 12km frontage if you could, with 6km for a Bde Gp as a "start point" likely being a lot more workable.  With a 6km frontage, two BGs could cover 3 km each, with BG task organization being completely dependent on the task - I attached a PPT with a few different combinations.




... how about adding a wheeled Inf Bn from the reserves?  The UK used to have a 'in case of war' establishment that included a TA element. This gave the TA a war role it could train for, and an associated Reg F formation it could work with.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ... how about adding a wheeled Inf Bn from the reserves?  The UK used to have a 'in case of war' establishment that included a TA element. This gave the TA a war role it could train for, and an associated Reg F formation it could work with.



That would require more investment in people who only show up on average once every 2 weeks. More is being put on the reserves in terms of what is demanded of them but we arent getting the one thing we need to make it work. That is time, double the reserves from one evening a week to two would be a start. Thay said isnt having a reg force parent unit for the reserves been done before with the 10/90 concept? Heard that didnt go so well.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> That would require more investment in people who only show up on average once every 2 weeks. More is being put on the reserves in terms of what is demanded of them but we arent getting the one thing we need to make it work. That is time, double the reserves from one evening a week to two would be a start. Thay said isnt having a reg force parent unit for the reserves been done before with the 10/90 concept? Heard that didnt go so well.



If the average reservist only shows up every 2 weeks (approx. 20 x 3hr sessions a year), how would doubling the Cl A trg budget across the PRes solve the problem that issue?

If there's more money to be had, there are many operational regular force units who needs things worse than the PRes needs a 2nd trg night.  If anything,  I'd pipe the money towards kit shortages and valuable trg (3 more hours in an armouries doesn't necessarily qualify, IMO).


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> If the average reservist only shows up every 2 weeks (approx. 20 x 3hr sessions a year), how would doubling the Cl A trg budget across the PRes solve the problem that issue?
> 
> If there's more money to be had, there are many operational regular force units who needs things worse than the PRes needs a 2nd trg night.  If anything,  I'd pipe the money towards kit shortages and valuable trg (3 more hours in an armouries doesn't necessarily qualify, IMO).



I'm a strong supporter of the PRes and think they have much more to contribute to Canada than they presently do.

But ... I think that it's an utter waste of money to throw even one more nickle towards PRes training until such time as: the training becomes obligatory and is supported by an internal to DND enforcement system rather than purely voluntary; becomes organized and structured across the Army as a whole rather than ad hoc'd by individual units; underlies a meaningful role that expands the capabilities and credibility of the Army as a whole rather than merely filling in random gaps in RegF establishments; and is supported by appropriate equipment holdings that facilitate the deployability of tasked PRes units and elements.

Don't get me wrong. I'm not against spending more money on the PRes, in fact I think that the PRes should get much more money for both training and equipment but not until it is radically reorganized so that it can become a credible and deployable entity.

 :2c:


----------



## Infanteer

:goodpost:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm a strong supporter of the PRes and think they have much more to contribute to Canada than they presently do.
> 
> But ... I think that it's an utter waste of money to throw even one more nickle towards PRes training until such time as: the training becomes obligatory and is supported by an internal to DND enforcement system rather than purely voluntary; becomes organized and structured across the Army as a whole rather than ad hoc'd by individual units; underlies a meaningful role that expands the capabilities and credibility of the Army as a whole rather than merely filling in random gaps in RegF establishments; and is supported by appropriate equipment holdings that facilitate the deployability of tasked PRes units and elements.
> 
> Don't get me wrong. I'm not against spending more money on the PRes, in fact I think that the PRes should get much more money for both training and equipment but not until it is radically reorganized so that it can become a credible and deployable entity.
> 
> :2c:



Very well said; I'm also a supporter of the Reserves and have seen them 'dwindled' over the last 2+ decades. I was a PRes Cl A and B type back in the late 80's/early 90's when we did have 2 trg nights a week and usually one wknd ex/month.  We also had enough vehs/radios/wpns/etc to field 3 x Recce Tp (5 car min), a SHQ with 2 X CPs (from the local CommRes Sqn), and a modest A1 Ech.  Overall, not to shabby for part-timers.  We trained enough that we were good at the job too.  

Things are not that way now; the last time I saw my old Regt on Remembrance Day, there were more Officers than Jnr Ranks on Parade and they struggle to field a single Recce Tp - not only because of personnel shortages, but mostly because there old 46 sets were replaced with TCCCS - but not one for one.  The Iltis was replaced by the G-Wagons - but not one for one.  I believe the personnel shortage is a result of the kit shortages.

Your post above proposes great solutions to many of the big ticket issues.

Sorry for the sidetrack in a very interesting and educational thread (I've been following in the background, I've no meaningful contribution to anything 'green' anymore).


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm a strong supporter of the PRes and think they have much more to contribute to Canada than they presently do.
> 
> But ... I think that it's an utter waste of money to throw even one more nickle towards PRes training until such time as: the training becomes obligatory and is supported by an internal to DND enforcement system rather than purely voluntary; becomes organized and structured across the Army as a whole rather than ad hoc'd by individual units; underlies a meaningful role that expands the capabilities and credibility of the Army as a whole rather than merely filling in random gaps in RegF establishments; and is supported by appropriate equipment holdings that facilitate the deployability of tasked PRes units and elements.
> 
> Don't get me wrong. I'm not against spending more money on the PRes, in fact I think that the PRes should get much more money for both training and equipment but not until it is radically reorganized so that it can become a credible and deployable entity.
> 
> :2c:



Agreed. If you run a reserve augmentation role like a 'come as you are party', that's what you'll get. If you have a Bde establishment that has a dotted line around 'Reserve BGp', and align all reserve training, leadership and equipment scales to that task, you'll get far more bang for your buck. You'd also need to move heaven and earth to formalise Reg F training so that annual collective exercises happen at the same time every year e.g. in the summer.

10/90 was a thin attempt to hide a Reg F Bn establishment in the Reserves' skirts when a previous Liberal government was looking to axe PYs. This temorary expedient, as a result, didn't work as a way to better align Reserves with Reg F war roles....


----------



## Jarnhamar

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'm a strong supporter of the PRes and think they have much more to contribute to Canada than they presently do.
> 
> But ... I think that it's an utter waste of money to throw even one more nickle towards PRes training until such time as: the training becomes obligatory and is supported by an internal to DND enforcement system rather than purely voluntary



Great post.


----------



## MilEME09

I fully agree with you all, our reserve force is institutionally ineffective, and disorganized to provide effective anything aside from an effective waste of resources.  If the reforms could/did happen to make the reserves effective I do believe doubling avalible training time would be beneficial. If our PRes were deployable sub units or unitz as a whole, IE the brigade HQ was a deployable HQ, we would see less strain on our limited RegF elements that struggled to maintain a brigade in Afghanistan. While PRes man power helped, individual augmentation is less effective and does effect unit cohesion by taking a bunch of unknown people and dropping them into an established organization that the people of know how to work together. If a PRes company or larger could be deployed instead that would eliminate this problem mostly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> While PRes man power helped, individual augmentation is less effective and does effect unit cohesion by taking a bunch of unknown people and dropping them into an established organization that the people of know how to work together. If a PRes company or larger could be deployed instead that would eliminate this problem mostly.



But it's cheap, and very low risk to the Reg F in many ways... right? 

And that's probably one of the main reasons why we will need to continue to factor the Reserves into anything 'big' the Reg F does in the future, like it or not.


----------



## Kirkhill

Still a fan of how the French integrate their "reserves" into their unit structure:

Le 1er RHP est composé de :

 1 escadron de commandement et de logistique.
 3 escadrons blindés sur AMX 10 RCR et ERC 90 SAGAIE.
 2 escadron d'éclairage et d'intervention sur VBL, équipé de missile MILAN.
 1 escadron de réservistes.
 1 peloton de commandos parachutistes.

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/3e-division/11e-brigade-parachutiste/regiments/1er-regiment-de-hussards-parachutistes

Keeping in mind that their reservistes, by and large, are ex-regs.


----------



## Brad Sallows

This is drifting off topic, but I'll throw in my 1c.

I'd rate this most important: "the training becomes obligatory and is supported by an internal to DND enforcement system rather than purely voluntary".

And this second most: "becomes organized and structured across the Army as a whole rather than ad hoc'd by individual units".

No data; only personal impressions.  My time with the Res F was 1982-2004.  In the early part of that period, I noticed that things tightened up a little through the '80s which moved some of the "militia rats" to drop out.  The immediate effect of tightening up terms of service should be to strip out most of the deadwood.  Reliable soldiers resented the ones who showed up infrequently, and didn't particularly care for the "prize pig" excuses ("so-and-so is a valuable soldier/doesn't have to play in the mud because...").  Thus: a one-time drop in numbers which might look alarming on paper but would represent no real loss of capability.

And: too much of the training plan was inflected by the desires of particular people, notwithstanding that in general it managed to cleave to whatever was required by higher HQ.

Building on first point, go all-in on reform with a major cultural shift in "when"; in particular, eliminate weekly evenings for most people.  

How many full weekends (Sat/Sun or Fri-Sun) can be reasonably demanded from Sep to Nov and Jan to May?  How many are needed when coupled with a one-week conc to at least maintain functional platoon-sized elements?  Instead of a one-week conc, what about 2 x 4/5-day across weekends* - one in May to confirm and shake out for one later in the summer in which everyone is plugged into a more or less full-size formation (bde) commanded and run for the most part by Reg F?


----------



## Rifleman62

MilEME09:





> While PRes man power helped, individual augmentation is less effective and does effect unit cohesion by taking a bunch of unknown people and dropping them into an established organization that the people of know how to work together.



What do you think is going to happen when we get into combat and take casualties? The LOB's, if there were any, would have some unit cohesion. Reinforcements coming from e.g. reinforcement battalion/divisional reinforcement company which included returning battle casualties, but mainly battle inexperienced soldiers. Going into France in June 1944 there were few battle experienced soldiers.

After the D-Day drop 1 Can Para Bn received non jump qualified Inf reinforcements, incl a RWpgRif Rfn who was KIA with them.

B Coy, RWpgRif, landed 0750 where the Juno Beach Centre is now. Capt Gower, the Coy Comd, landed with reinforced Coy of 164, 8 Pioneers to clear wire with Bangalore's, FOO party of 3, and 18 Engrs as demolition and mine clearing teams When they got off the beach, Capt Gower was the only Offr with 24 Rfn, plus 4 stretcher bears he left at the beach to look after casualties (don't know if those figures incl the Engrs). That night B coy got 3 Offrs, and 60 OR's and he reorg the Coy into 3 Pls. On the morning of the 7th the Coy received 1 Offr and 40 OR'd which Capt Gower reported were untrained/non Inf. On the afternoon of 8 Jun, A, B, C Coys were over run by a unit of the 12 SS Panzer Div. Fifty-eight of our Rfn were murdered, Capt Gower was captured.

All that to say unit cohesion is going to be missing in a conflict. another example:


https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5362&context=etd

An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945

Extract: Combat losses robbed Canadian units of more than just personnel when large numbers of battle
casualties occurred during a short period of time. This type of casualty could total over 200 personnel in
one day, as evidenced by the experience of the previously mentioned The Royal Highland Regiment of
Canada.

Its losses on 25 July 1944 were almost exclusively confined to its four forward infantry line
companies. Due to the experienced, highly-trained and effective infantry platoons of these companies
being the real fighting power of the unit, it's combat effectiveness in the immediate aftermath was reduced
to nothing. The Black Watch would not regain its previous combat effectiveness for some time due to
inexperienced replacements not performing at the same level as their predecessors.
It was very dangerous for an Canadian combat arms unit in NWE to immediately launch a new
operation after receiving a large amount of new replacements. If a gradual integration of new personnel
was not completed with appropriate refresher training, further heavy losses could occur. This is exactly
what befell the Black Watch during its second failed operation on 5 August 1944 in the village of May sur-Orne. 
This action involved many new replacement personnel, and it is arguable they had not had to time to acclimatize 
themselves and lacked experienced NCO section leadership.

It was most beneficial to slow acclimatize new personnel to front line conditions, regardless of
the combat arm. Upon arrival, a new infantry replacement would not know any of his fellow platoon
members or his section commander. To function as a well-oiled machine in combat, each section member
had to possess a certain confidence in his fellow soldiers and his weapons. This came through training
and shared experiences, the most valuable but most dangerous of the latter being combat itself. Prior to
combat operations it was necessary to have new Canadian soldiers become confident in themselves and
their teammates as soon as possible due to the often immediate need to thrust them back into action.
While it was beneficial for this goal to be achieved on a regular basis within Canadian combat arms units
in NWE, military necessity and a lack of forces often did not allow it to occur.

Failure to accomplish successful integration could result poor combat performance and increased
casualties within the ranks of the new personnel, especially in the infantry. While a shortage of infantry
and constant high-intensity operations from August to November 1944 had hurt the ability of new
Canadian infantry replacements to integrate, a period of inactivity during the winter of 1944-1945
allowed unit training and gradual integration to occur.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

In the 80's we did one night and Saturday each week, the night was mostly admin stuff, the day was training. We also did 3-4 full weekends and at least 1 week long gun camp. Thanks to an injection of money from elsewhere we ran a 2 week basic gunners course and I think a 3 week recruit course. Done in the armoury and nearby training areas.

Tie a basic trades course that runs 2-3 weeks to a unit training week at a major training centre, so the recruits can get their live fire qualifications and learn how they integrate into the unit.

If we could get a setup like SYEP going in each area over the summer, perhaps with a few unit's pooling instructors and resources. That would be a good source of personal. Quite a few went either full time or reserve from those courses. 

To qualify they get a basic medical and basic criminal record check ($75 each from the RCMP). Basic medical is done by the local medical unit for screening, anything weird sees a local civy clinic.

Issue kit is:
gym pants
T-shirts
Coveralls
Boots
Beret

Extra kit
is basic webbing (Belt, canteen and storage pouch)
Cheap sleeping bag and mat
Training rifle (plastic AR)
KFS, cup and mess tins

Once they complete the course they get a certificate and a option to go full or part time. In which case they go through the standard screening process.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> How many full weekends (Sat/Sun or Fri-Sun) can be reasonably demanded from Sep to Nov and Jan to May?  How many are needed when coupled with a one-week conc to at least maintain functional platoon-sized elements?  Instead of a one-week conc, what about 2 x 4/5-day across weekends* - one in May to confirm and shake out for one later in the summer in which everyone is plugged into a more or less full-size formation (bde) commanded and run for the most part by Reg F?



As a rifle company OC I've seen the full range of options tried. I found that if you did more than one weekend's training per month, you got more students to attend as people with 'real jobs' and families couldn't attend more than one weekend a month. This meant that the senior people were burning out.

I found that the optimum schedule was one weekend a month, and one parade night a week. More often than not, a social event took up at least one other weekend each month so, sometimes, could be paired with a range day, which got people doing more shooting. 

Funny thing... regardless of the schedule, if the training was well prepared and supported, incremental, realistic, interesting and challenging, attendance was always better.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> As a rifle company OC I've seen the full range of options tried. I found that if you did more than one weekend's training per month, you got more students to attend as people with 'real jobs' and families couldn't attend more than one weekend a month. This meant that the senior people were burning out.
> 
> I found that the optimum schedule was one weekend a month, and one parade night a week. More often than not, a social event took up at least one other weekend each month so, sometimes, could be paired with a range day, which got people doing more shooting.
> 
> Funny thing... regardless of the schedule, if the training was well prepared and supported, incremental, realistic, interesting and challenging, attendance was always better.



I basically have the same thoughts about one weekend per month being the optimum. During my RSSO days my unit did every second weekend and it was definitely too much as we generally had a lack of the married/working folks attending (who were also our key MBdrs, senior NCMs) leaving us with a few junior officers and the usual student gunners.

I'm generally against the one evening per week concept. I think that it's primary purpose is to gather folks together for a night in the mess (which does have some utility in bonding and making for a "fun" activity for everyone). I generally found that little else was accomplished during these evenings other than some minor administrative work around the chief clerks and finance office. While it's useful to keep "admin" functions away from the "training" weekend, perhaps one night per month would be sufficient. The CO and DCO I worked with, while generally good guys and true reservists, not Reg F retreads, spent most of their admin nights on mess and band matters, regt'l association issues, regt'l ball/mess dinner planning etc which to me should be done as non-paid extra curricular activities. Most of the troops spent their evening time polishing guns that were already clean or maybe attending the odd lecture that would be run again on another day because too few attended the first time.

I think that the real problem that we have is in not having the ability to put together a good summer training cycle with sufficient time that would allow firstly, new recruits to be brought to a proper DP1 standard in one fell swoop and, secondly (and separately) to allow DP1 and higher trained personnel/units some solid collective training. That, however, has an underlying cultural and legislative issues that are well beyond the ability of any one unit's or even brigade's capability of solving.

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Keeping the night to Admin stuff, paperwork and Stores, prepping for an exercise means not everyone has to show up, it does mean that a course instructor can prep for the Saturday course and maybe have paperwork sorted, trainings set up, etc. Then Saturday morning a quick parade and then training starts and your not mucking around till 10 to get started.


----------



## mariomike

Might depend somewhat on one's trade.

As PRes MSE Ops, we paraded two nights a week. We could work every weekend, if we wanted. 

Some of it was trade training. But, mostly it was doing your job in support of the District.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If our PRes were deployable sub units or unitz as a whole, IE the brigade HQ was a deployable HQ, we would see less strain on our limited RegF elements that struggled to maintain a brigade in Afghanistan.



I'm not connecting the dots here;  if CBG HQs were deployable, the strain on the RegF in Afghanistan would have been mitigated?

It's been some time since I was at a CBG HQ, but my impression from the several years I was there:

CBG HQs and CMBG HQs are significantly different orgs, rightfully so IMO.  The units and capabilities they administer, command and control are completely different.  I don't think any commander who exists in the real world believes a CBG can really 'deploy' much above and beyond the OP LENTUS stuff, which is pretty basic tasks and expectations in the big scheme of things.

CBGs are the wealth-family distant cousins of CMBG, and the HQs of each reflect that (IMO).


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'm not connecting the dots here;  if CBG HQs were deployable, the strain on the RegF in Afghanistan would have been mitigated?
> 
> It's been some time since I was at a CBG HQ, but my impression from the several years I was there:
> 
> CBG HQs and CMBG HQs are significantly different orgs, rightfully so IMO.  The units and capabilities they administer, command and control are completely different.  I don't think any commander who exists in the real world believes a CBG can really 'deploy' much above and beyond the OP LENTUS stuff, which is pretty basic tasks and expectations in the big scheme of things.
> 
> CBGs are the wealth-family distant cousins of CMBG, and the HQs of each reflect that (IMO).



Yes they are different beasts, not saying previous experience in Afghanistan would of been better if Pres units could be called up amd deployed. Not in their current state any way. To make PRes units deployable a reality would require a reorganization, and a shift in training focus and intensity from the PRes. For example if say the Seaforth Highlanders, Regina Rifles, and Loyal Edmonton Regiment were called up to form a mixed battalion for over seas. Assuming each is at company strength, how well would this deal with burn out among the reg force with the current deployment cycle we have? It would also help create a more operationally ready reserve force because of that experience.


----------



## BDTyre

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Funny thing... regardless of the schedule, if the training was well prepared and supported, incremental, realistic, interesting and challenging, attendance was always better.



I witnessed this last month when we had a total of two sections worth of people deploy on ex and about 1/3 of these were dedicated to pre-PLQ training. We had one MCpl, a few Cpls of varied seniority (again, most of which were dedicated to pre-PLQ) and a lot of recently trained privates. The focus was stand-based training including basic patrolling, why things are seen, and how to move. Definitely not the epitome of realistic, interesting or challenging.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CanadianTire said:
			
		

> I witnessed this last month when we had a total of two sections worth of people deploy on ex and about 1/3 of these were dedicated to pre-PLQ training. We had one MCpl, a few Cpls of varied seniority (again, most of which were dedicated to pre-PLQ) and a lot of recently trained privates. The focus was stand-based training including basic patrolling, why things are seen, and how to move. Definitely not the epitome of realistic, interesting or challenging.



Sigh.... so much for creative leadership, eh?

Therefore, I predict that next exercise you might get about one section out....


----------



## BDTyre

Even better, they stood us down three weeks early to accommodate a locally run DP1 Infantry. Like they can't find something for the candidates to do for three hours on a Wednesday night. So our next ex will be the range in Sept/Oct. and that always gets a good turn out. Oh, and for some reason there was no brigade ex run in the spring.


----------



## MilEME09

CanadianTire said:
			
		

> Even better, they stood us down three weeks early to accommodate a locally run DP1 Infantry. Like they can't find something for the candidates to do for three hours on a Wednesday night. So our next ex will be the range in Sept/Oct. and that always gets a good turn out. Oh, and for some reason there was no brigade ex run in the spring.



My understanding at least in 41 cbg is no brigade EX due to a fucus on individual training vs collective. Especially with the large influx of recruits they want instructors avalible. Unfortunately interesting or useful training sometimes comes down to the jr leaders to plan and exacute last minute rather then be part of a larger training plan.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My understanding at least in 41 cbg is no brigade EX due to a fucus on individual training vs collective. Especially with the large influx of recruits they want instructors avalible. Unfortunately interesting or useful training sometimes comes down to the jr leaders to plan and exacute last minute rather then be part of a larger training plan.



We can, and must, figure out how to do both or retention issues will kill your best recruiting efforts.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Dom ops exercise.

Road move to another town or city without the use of GPS or the internet. Convoy drills, manifest lists, broken down vehicle SOPs, route cards.

Set up a CP at the location then have sections conduct operations. Collect information on infrastructure, man a VCP, QRF/rest, local security, point, area and route recces. Practice self-recovery. Officers practice meeting with and speaking to local police, fire, EMS.

Reservists won't deploy overseas without a few months of training (in most cases). They may be called upon for domestic operations last minute. If you're creative you can check off a whole lot of IBTS boxes with domestic operations.


----------



## Remius

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Dom ops exercise.
> 
> Road move to another town or city without the use of GPS or the internet. Convoy drills, manifest lists, broken down vehicle SOPs, route cards.
> 
> Set up a CP at the location then have sections conduct operations. Collect information on infrastructure, man a VCP, QRF/rest, local security, point, area and route recces. Practice self-recovery. Officers practice meeting with and speaking to local police, fire, EMS.
> 
> Reservists won't deploy overseas without a few months of training (in most cases). They may be called upon for domestic operations last minute. If you're creative you can check off a whole lot of IBTS boxes with domestic operations.



We did something like that for OP Abbacus.


----------



## Haggis

Remius said:
			
		

> We did something like that for OP Abbacus.


But how many times since then?

I retired as the Ops O of a P Res Infantry unit in December last year.  It was a constant battle to find white space to conduct unit training once all the annual IBTS, Battle School and TBG/Bde activities were overlaid unless you used a stat holiday weekend (which was pretty much verboten by higher).  Shifting L1 and L2 priorities often meant shifting activity dates.  Competition with Reg F units for equipment and training areas was ongoing.  The process for use of civilian land was cumbersome and inflexible.

Late notification of collective training activities meant little time for the most basic Battle Procedure in a Class A world.  This last point was particularly irritating as it is exceedingly easy to pass information today in the Class A world.  Far too easy, in fact, that it almost encourages 'just-in-time" planning and passage of information.  That makes command and battle staffs lazy and fosters procrastination.


----------



## Remius

Off hand maybe two or three times that were of any value.  

Definitely not enough.  But that sort of training is possible.




			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> But how many times since then?
> 
> I retired as the Ops O of a P Res Infantry unit in December last year.  It was a constant battle to find white space to conduct unit training once all the annual IBTS, Battle School and TBG/Bde activities were overlaid unless you used a stat holiday weekend (which was pretty much verboten by higher).  Shifting L1 and L2 priorities often meant shifting activity dates.  Competition with Reg F units for equipment and training areas was ongoing.  The process for use of civilian land was cumbersome and inflexible.
> 
> Late notification of collective training activities meant little time for the most basic Battle Procedure in a Class A world.  This last point was particularly irritating as it is exceedingly easy to pass information today in the Class A world.  Far too easy, in fact, that it almost encourages 'just-in-time" planning and passage of information.  That makes command and battle staffs lazy and fosters procrastination.


----------



## MilEME09

Haggis you might be able to relate, another headache is when 80% of the units in the brigade decide to go on ex the same weekend, makes it potentially hard to get enough vehicles amd equipment.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Yes they are different beasts, not saying previous experience in Afghanistan would of been better if Pres units could be called up amd deployed. Not in their current state any way. To make PRes units deployable a reality would require a reorganization, and a shift in training focus and intensity from the PRes. For example if say the Seaforth Highlanders, Regina Rifles, and Loyal Edmonton Regiment were called up to form a mixed battalion for over seas. Assuming each is at company strength, how well would this deal with burn out among the reg force with the current deployment cycle we have? It would also help create a more operationally ready reserve force because of that experience.



Does the average Pres "Regiment" have the experience to deploy and command a Coy or equivalent size on deployed ops?

You've stated the avg Res member is only showing up 2 times a month; and the Cl A trg year is approx 10 months long.  Using those numbers, that's 60 hours of experience/year and all at an Armouries.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Dom ops exercise.
> 
> Road move to another town or city without the use of GPS or the internet. Convoy drills, manifest lists, broken down vehicle SOPs, route cards.
> 
> Set up a CP at the location then have sections conduct operations. Collect information on infrastructure, man a VCP, QRF/rest, local security, point, area and route recces. Practice self-recovery. Officers practice meeting with and speaking to local police, fire, EMS.
> 
> Reservists won't deploy overseas without a few months of training (in most cases). They may be called upon for domestic operations last minute. If you're creative you can check off a whole lot of IBTS boxes with domestic operations.



This;  I've said before "do what you can with what you have".

We used to do creative stuff;  Tp Leader would issue a Wng O on a Class A night (was Thursday for us back in the day) early in the night for a tasking, say Estab Mounted Ops covering the harbour entrance or something.  That night would then be spent doing BP.  That night would usually end with Patrol Commanders issuing their orders.

Next trg night, crews went to the Veh Garage to kit out the callsigns, comms checks, etc.  Crew Commanders went to confirmatory orders, troop mounted up, and moved off to occupy the Mounted Ops.  once the final Op Report was sent in, End Ex was called, returned to the armouries, Stables conducted and then a hot-wash in the mess (we had an All Ranks one) and usually pizza's showed up.

Best use of 6 hours, got people doing the real stuff, found out what kit worked, what needed to be fixed, trained newer people in some basic tasks.  No extra funding required.  We had 90% attendance rates as a rule.


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Does the average Pres "Regiment" have the experience to deploy and command a Coy or equivalent size on deployed ops?
> 
> You've stated the avg Res member is only showing up 2 times a month; and the Cl A trg year is approx 10 months long.  Using those numbers, that's 60 hours of experience/year and all at an Armouries.



That's an interesting question and I'll answer as far as it relates to an artillery regiment where the sub-unit is a gun battery.

Essentially you can train a battery and conduct live fire exercises with as little as one gun, one CP, one FOO party and a battery commander with an FSCC. Artillery officers will learn the the essential skills for their jobs at their various DP level courses and as such one can say that a PRes artillery regiment can field a functioning battery (albeit that doesn't mean they have the numbers or equipment to field a full battery). In fact most units carry out some extent of live fire training several times per year.

What is missing from the equation is that PRes artillery regiments have none of the A or B echelon staff or equipment (veh, weapons and rad techs, medical or kitchen) required to actually be capable of deploying. 

Equally important is that a number of the higher end functions of fire support coordination (such as air integration) is nowhere near as well learned or practiced as they need to be.

The short answer is that while a PRes artillery regiment has the fundamental ability to "deploy and command" a battery on "deployed ops" it has neither the equipment, personnel, or experience to do so successfully without major augmentation and predeployment training.

 :cheers:


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:
			
		

> That's an interesting question and I'll answer as far as it relates to an artillery regiment where the sub-unit is a gun battery.
> 
> Essentially you can train a battery and conduct live fire exercises with as little as one gun, one CP, one FOO party and a battery commander with an FSCC. Artillery officers will learn the the essential skills for their jobs at their various DP level courses and as such one can say that a PRes artillery regiment can field a functioning battery (albeit that doesn't mean they have the numbers or equipment to field a full battery). In fact most units carry out some extent of live fire training several times per year.
> 
> What is missing from the equation is that PRes artillery regiments have none of the A or B echelon staff or equipment (veh, weapons and rad techs, medical or kitchen) required to actually be capable of deploying.
> Equally important is that a number of the higher end functions of fire support coordination (such as air integration) is nowhere near as well learned or practiced as they need to be.
> 
> The short answer is that while a PRes artillery regiment has the fundamental ability to "deploy and command" a battery on "deployed ops" it has neither the equipment, personnel, or experience to do so successfully without major augmentation and predeployment training.
> 
> :cheers:


Although a Regular Force Regiment might have the support behind them in theory, they are heavily augmented to fill a deployment especially sustained operations. Usually taking all three Gun Btys/ HQ Bty and using Soldiers from each to full fill their lines for each deployment. When a Bty deploys from the Regiment the gun lines look pretty empty. Its a sad reality in some of the Regular Force and Reserve units that at times they lack the manpower to deploy even a small number of their equipment. 
I remember back in the late 90's My Reserve Sub unit could deploy 90 soldiers in the field (we had 100-120 on paper). Our Parent unit 40ish, The other sister Regiment was around another 40. Plus With our local Service Battalion we could field our own Mechanics,Techs, Medics and such. 
We had 6 guns, two working command posts and everything else was usually bailing twined together between the two Regiments.  
At times We lacked much of the working technical equipment such as survey, Op Equipment,radios etc  That limited us severely for training and retention.

As for the Higher Integration We could have filled that gap very quickly if we had the training allotment to do so. As much as a Bty can deploy, its assets are seldom far from full Regimental support. 

Its a topic that is sore point for many. To compare a Reserve Unit to a Regular Force one for training and skills has many on edge to favor the Regular Force. My expirance has been both have their short comings that can be over come fairly quick with proper allotment of training and equipment along with engaged recruiting and retention.


----------



## Haggis

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> This;  I've said before "do what you can with what you have".



I tried as much as possible to make the IBTS exercises challenging and fun but was often defeated by the higher HQ requirement to have all my IBTS done by end October despite the fact that a lot of my equipment hadn't returned yet from RST or had come back broken and every unit in the Bde and 2 CMBG were trying to book training areas and ranges at the same time. 

In my three years as Ops O, at least in my Div/Bde, training direction and required BTS were proscribed by higher and units had certain IBTS and collective BTS gateways to attain by certain dates before all unit collective training became focused on preparing members for TBG led/directed collective training. In my unit, I was able to find one free weekend of white space every quarter to do "fun" unit stuff and that sometimes disappeared when Bde or TBG either moved or added activities. (I lost one late spring DOMOPS/IS exercise that had taken months to plan due to the urgent need across the Bde to support Op LENTUS 17-2... clearly not the Bde's fault)

I even went to Quebec for an excellent range and IBTS exercise one year but the process changed the following year making training in Quebec almost as cumbersome as going OUTCAN.


----------



## brihard

Haggis said:
			
		

> I even went to Quebec for an excellent range and IBTS exercise one year but the process changed the following year making training in Quebec almost as cumbersome as going OUTCAN.



I know the vote was pretty close, but...


----------



## Haggis

Brihard said:
			
		

> I know the vote was pretty close, but...



I'm a dual citizen so I just went to l'ambassade.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Does the average Pres "Regiment" have the experience to deploy and command a Coy or equivalent size on deployed ops?
> 
> You've stated the avg Res member is only showing up 2 times a month; and the Cl A trg year is approx 10 months long.  Using those numbers, that's 60 hours of experience/year and all at an Armouries.



Yes. Given the right numbers, and enough of the right trained people, I have successfully run a Coy CP (usually dismounted) on field exercises. Usually, it was me with a radio on my back as I wanted to make sure that everyone had a chance to get some section attacks etc done, and were not stuck watching a radio all weekend. On patrolling focused exercises though we usually had a CP and briefing area set up in some MOD tentage somewhere.

As for your training time calculation, you forgot to subtract the hours required to deliver 'mandatory' training, and other fastballs. These are usually Army mandated briefings, that add nothing to the infantry skills of your average 18 year old Private, and usually have to be paid for out of our manday budget with no chance of recouping the loss.


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Does the average Pres "Regiment" have the experience to deploy and command a Coy or equivalent size on deployed ops?
> 
> You've stated the avg Res member is only showing up 2 times a month; and the Cl A trg year is approx 10 months long.  Using those numbers, that's 60 hours of experience/year and all at an Armouries.



Just one more comment about the above. Most artillery weekend exercises (most Army ones for that matter) start on a Friday night and run through until Sunday afternoon with a bare minimum time for sleep. That's usually around 30 to 35 hours of training time on any given weekend alone.

It's the same for summer concentrations. Training days are not 9-5 but generally a 24 hour day with minimal sleep. The Almighty created the nighttime so that gunners could  practice night moves and fire illumination missions.  ;D

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> That's an interesting question and I'll answer as far as it relates to an artillery regiment where the sub-unit is a gun battery.
> 
> Essentially you can train a battery and conduct live fire exercises with as little as one gun, one CP, one FOO party and a battery commander with an FSCC. Artillery officers will learn the the essential skills for their jobs at their various DP level courses and as such one can say that a PRes artillery regiment can field a functioning battery (albeit that doesn't mean they have the numbers or equipment to field a full battery). In fact most units carry out some extent of live fire training several times per year.
> 
> What is missing from the equation is that PRes artillery regiments have none of the A or B echelon staff or equipment (veh, weapons and rad techs, medical or kitchen) required to actually be capable of deploying.
> 
> Equally important is that a number of the higher end functions of fire support coordination (such as air integration) is nowhere near as well learned or practiced as they need to be.
> 
> The short answer is that while a PRes artillery regiment has the fundamental ability to "deploy and command" a battery on "deployed ops" it has neither the equipment, personnel, or experience to do so successfully without major augmentation and predeployment training.
> 
> :cheers:



Our ops tasking solved that with the addition of kitchen trailer, sigs truck, 2nd CP, REME truck and a ambulance, along with full FOO parties. Eventually all taken by brigade, mind you we also had 6 functioning guns and tractors back then.


----------



## FJAG

Colin P said:
			
		

> Our ops tasking solved that with the addition of kitchen trailer, sigs truck, 2nd CP, REME truck and a ambulance, along with full FOO parties. Eventually all taken by brigade, mind you we also had 6 functioning guns and tractors back then.



That raised a number of questions for me Colin.

1. What and when was the op tasking?

2. Did the tasking cease when brigade took the equipment?

3. What did the brigade do with the equipment?

Back in the day, 26th Fd had six guns, gun tractors, a CP, recce vehicles, FOO vehicles as well. On exercise the ambulance came from the District's med coy or 3rd Horse, the local Sig Sqn (in those days belonging to the Comms Gp) frequently provided extra rad op CP vehicles. Extra ammo 2 1/2s from the Service Bn. We never saw RCEME or kitchen vehicles. (IMPs or haybox only)

Just curious.

 :cheers:


----------



## Rifleman62

Op tasted 26 Fd Regt had two CP's (one not completely outfitted with radios I think but had the Milpac) an Amb, ammo 2 1/2 with winch, plus another. Can't remember about a kitchen truck. That was was possibly after your tenure there. As G4, did the planning/veh tasking for Prairie Mil Area Arty Conc, and once Prairie/Pacific as Man Mil Dist was tasked to run all the Arty Concs. Always got Wpn Techs from Shilo for the Concs to do safety pre-fire checks after the moves and during the FTX. We eventually low bedded all the guns to save wear and tear, but still did the SPF.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I believe op tasking started around 1980 and ran for about 3-4 years, then it was dropped. As part of that tasking, they airlifted the entire unit to Shilo to support the German Black Bear exercise, heady times they were, we had kit, pay, bodies, radios, working howitzers and ammunition. We never got our full compliment of small arms though, i think we were supposed to get some .50cals or GPMG's as well. The politics at the end I have no real idea of though.


----------



## AlDazz

I bit of a wandering topic. I don't think any PRes unit is capable of generating a capable sub unit in the form of Sqn, Bty or Coy.  They don't posses the required stores and resources and would need considerable augmentation. The differences in equipment for the Armd Recce and Fd Arty units would present integration challenges as well. The Infantry would be able to generate Platoon Groups into Light Infantry Companies and any training deficit would be eliminated during work up training.  As the PRes is expected to provide individual augmentation to the Regular Army if there is no change to equipment scales of issue then there will be no change in capability.


----------



## MilEME09

*"Matt Gurney: Keep Canada safe by building out the Army Reserve"*
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-keep-canada-safe-by-building-out-the-army-reserve?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR0hIw6nod3_4Gu3fAZH_fHmPZoWiFArG7O9zI9AhnBs6rK936wxsHAbr2w#Echobox=1562604573

Two take aways from this article: One sounds like the Cons may expand the reserves if they gain power in October.

Two: The author makes things way to simple of a money game, which is naive at best. Sure the reserves cost $300 million in 2015, at face value he suggests doubling the Reserves. Great idea if it was only so simple as to cost $300 million more. He fails to account for if you added say 20,000 bodies to the reserves, the cost to equip them, and the cost to expand infrastructure. While he claims many reserve units have lot's of space to grow, that is not the case from what I've seen, at least in major cities. If you told my unit our authorized effective strength was doubling, you would be crazy to say we had the space, or the equipment for 450 - 600 bodies. We would need huge investments in infrastructure, vehicles, weapons and other equipment. Which as pointed out on this thread, without a fundamental restructure of the Reserves is not worth the investment.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> *"Matt Gurney: Keep Canada safe by building out the Army Reserve"*
> https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-keep-canada-safe-by-building-out-the-army-reserve?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR0hIw6nod3_4Gu3fAZH_fHmPZoWiFArG7O9zI9AhnBs6rK936wxsHAbr2w#Echobox=1562604573
> 
> Two take aways from this article: One sounds like the Cons may expand the reserves if they gain power in October.
> 
> Two: The author makes things way to simple of a money game, which is naive at best. Sure the reserves cost $300 million in 2015, at face value he suggests doubling the Reserves. Great idea if it was only so simple as to cost $300 million more. He fails to account for if you added say 20,000 bodies to the reserves, the cost to equip them, and the cost to expand infrastructure. While he claims many reserve units have lot's of space to grow, that is not the case from what I've seen, at least in major cities. If you told my unit our authorized effective strength was doubling, you would be crazy to say we had the space, or the equipment for 450 - 600 bodies. We would need huge investments in infrastructure, vehicles, weapons and other equipment. Which as pointed out on this thread, without a fundamental restructure of the Reserves is not worth the investment.



I'm not sure where Gurney got the $300 million figure from. Para 5.82 of the Auditor General's Report says this:



> National Defence reported to Parliament that it spent $1.2 billion to train and operate the Primary Reserve in the 2013–14 fiscal year. According to the Canadian Armed Forces, $724 million of this amount was to train and operate the Army Reserve. Of that amount, $166 million was attributed to the Army Reserve for the operation of Canadian Army bases. This amount was calculated based on a ratio of the number of Army Reserve soldiers to the number of Regular Army soldiers, not on the use of base facilities. The Canadian Armed Forces does not maintain information on the Army Reserve’s actual use of base facilities. In our opinion, the $166 million estimate is not well supported and may result in providing incorrect information to Parliament by overstating the reported expenses of the Primary Reserve.



I think that there's some creative math there but let's not quibble about numbers. 

The problem isn't one of expanding the number of reservists but the need to change the structure, role and overall concept of the reserves within the overall CAF. Our system is broken. Adding more people is just reinforcing failure.

I've been doing some number crunching for an article on reforming the Army's primary reserves that I've written for the Canadian Forces Journal and quite simply, even at some 20,000 trained Army reservists, you can fully man 2 mechanized brigade groups (at 4,500 each), three support brigades (at 3,000 each) and training depot establishments (another 2,000). (Members who are undergoing their DP1 level training should be counted against a BTL rather than the establishments of the Reserve Force's units and formations)

Expanding the number of reservists is not a bad idea, but before one even considers that, one has to completely and utterly change the underlying system so that we have not merely more reservists but rather that we have an effective, equipped and deployable Reserve Force that will multiply rather than augment the combat power of our existing Regular Force. Anything else is a waste of money.

 :stirpot:


----------



## dapaterson

I believe the $300M is the direct pay and O&M cost; imputed costs (base support, uniforms, ammunition, accruals of capital assets etc) make up the balance of the $1.2B.


Land Force Reserve Restructure was supposed to impose a rational C2 structure on the Army Reserve (among other things).  Imagine an Army Reserve that acknowledged and embraced geographically dispersed units, and, within the current 20K(ish) cap, provided 30 battalions of 500 trained soldiers each, organized into five brigades of 3200 each (giving six battalions each - two inf, one recce, one arty, one engr and one CSS, plus a Bde HQ and Sigs, plus a few other enablers), plus a training system of ~36500 - that's 80 trained pers to manage and train the BTL plus 650 on the BTL, for each Bde, plus 350 for Advanced training (year-long courses) and levels above Brigade.


But instead, we must preserve the status quo of LCols commanding 90 soldiers, all ranks, including 25 untrained...


----------



## dimsum

dapaterson said:
			
		

> But instead, we must preserve the status quo of LCols commanding 90 soldiers, all ranks, including 25 untrained...



Well we can't abolish or combine Regiments now, can we...


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> But instead, we must preserve the status quo of LCols commanding 90 soldiers, all ranks, including 25 untrained...



I had to chuckle a bit when I read the commander of MILPERSGEN and the Defence Academy make this statement in his CMJ article back in 2016:



> ...
> Permanent groupings should be formed of consistently understrength Reserve Units that can together form a single unit that can provide significant response capability. This would not involve closing or moving units, but simply admitting that a region can only produce a sub-unit or sub-sub-unit, not something larger. These smaller parts, in a fashion that maintains their rich histories, can be then combined to form a single unit under a commanding officer.
> 
> However, one could also ensure that senior Reserve positions are dedicated to those communities to maintain the historical continuity of senior CAF engagement within those areas. Building on this idea, experienced and capable senior Reservists who would currently be released due to a lack of Reserve positions at their rank level could be kept on strength in order to maintain the CAF connection to communities, as well as to establish and act as military liaison for public safety and security. This capability would need to be carefully managed to ensure that it does not become a sinecure.
> ...



http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no3/PDF/CMJ163Ep16.pdf page 25

I expect there were to be similar roles found for all the majors, CWOs and MWOs that would no longer be required. Not that I have anything against LCols or CWOs but I'd rather pay three privates or corporals that we need for every LCol that we don't need.

 :cheers:


----------



## Journeyman

Just a pet peeve...





			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> ... if you added say 20,000 bodies to the reserves....


I really dislike soldiers being referred to as "bodies."


I have nothing substantive to contribute to the discussion, although I hope someone finds the magical solution.


----------



## Remius

FJAG said:
			
		

> I expect there were to be similar roles found for all the majors, CWOs and MWOs that would no longer be required. Not that I have anything against LCols or CWOs but I'd rather pay three privates or corporals that we need for every LCol that we don't need.
> :cheers:



I think in theory that might work but not really in practice.  Some units have already created tactical groupings under one CO and RSM but the elimination of three or four LCol's/CWOs hasn't seemed to translate into more troops for those units that are under strength. 

Taking away a LCol and replacing him with a major does not solve the issue some units have.  You'll just have the same issues only with a major in charge. 

Capability and equipment.  Fix that.


----------



## dapaterson

If they can't recruit more troops, then they don't need the LCol and CWO to begin with.


----------



## Remius

dapaterson said:
			
		

> If they can't recruit more troops, then they don't need the LCol and CWO to begin with.



the point is that eliminating senior positions does not mean more troops.  People seem to think that LCol's and CWOs are the issue and that getting rid them will solve something when it won't unless you address the real issues. 

Good training and equipment helps retain more pers.  Right now I can't even get mukluks for troops or C-6s let alone anything more complicated...


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Taking away a LCol and replacing him with a major does not solve the issue some units have.  You'll just have the same issues only with a major in charge. 

The major should be younger, and removal of the pressure to retain enough people to form a candidate pool for promotion to LCol should increase average capability and competence among Res F senior officers.  It's not a one-for-one swap: in each unit it's potentially a swap of the LCol and all the superfluous Maj for one Maj.  (The difference would be noted in overborne units, not the ones struggling to retain enough people to fill each of the half-dozen or so key appointments.)


----------



## FJAG

Just to emphasize a point here. My comment about converting the LCols pay to three privates or corporals was facetiously made in response to the quoted article where a Reg F Maj Gen suggested that if we consolidate units and thus have redundant LCols hanging around we can still find useful work for them rather than retiring them.

While we will save some money on such retirements (as well as the excess Majs, CWOs and MWOs) that's just a drop in the bucket.

Getting better training and equipment (just like more people) is a nice to have (and probably more important than more people) but doesn't cure the underlying problem with our reserve structure. At this point in time, you cannot generate any viable combat capable entities from within the reseres. That said, the Reg F also has tremendous capability gaps that prevent them from being a viable fighting force against a sophisticated enemy. If you think that our Reg F is a "near peer" to the Russians you are dreaming in technicolour. It took many months of pre-deployment training to just get our battle groups organized and ready for service against the Taliban and even there we had significant capability gaps that took years to work out.

If you've had a look at both Strong, Secure, Engaged and the verbage that makes up WayPoint 2018 you'll distill the fact that while we recognize Russia (and in part China) as our most significant potential enemies we are structuring ourselves as a medium weight combat force that will deploy in no more than battle group strength. The whole system is akin to not buying house insurance because you hope that your house will never catch fire and no one will ever slip and fall on your icy front step.

Reserves exist primarily for use in extreme situations that might never happen while Reg Forces exist to take care of the country's day-to-day defence needs. Reserves are cost effective forces for such extreme events but only if they are properly structured, trained and equipped. Quite frankly we are paying too much for for what appears to be a mildly effective day-to-day military which currently would be hard pressed to put one medium weight LAV brigade into the field. Concurrently our reserve structure is largely ineffective. We will undoubtedly never pay significantly more. 

It's long past time to go back to the drawing board. The fine tuning of the system that we've been playing with for decades has not and will not lead us to to a more effective, more capable military. Over the last few decades we've had several reorganization studies that have all been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. As long as we stay in that mold we will never get anywhere.

 :2c:


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

ballz said:
			
		

> I had a post written up about this earlier but this thread has gone a bit off the rails. But since you're going down a similar road as I was going down...
> 
> I would have *zero* issues with having the PRes augment the Reg Force day-to-day (i.e. not just for tours) and then we can provide them all of this training and integrate them into the grind that one must endure to keep a LAV fleet maintained and LAV crews trained.
> 
> But this idea that the reserves, with zero resources, can take on a LAV fleet and do it all internally is just silly. The reserves simply don't have the resources to do this internally. The *people* may be as capable but the Units as a whole simply aren't. That's why they augment the Reg Force with troops, not with with Battle Groups. It's also not "augmenting" the Reg Force at all. If anything it will end up sucking more out of the Reg Force as the PRes just won't have the resources required to do it, and they'll need Reg Force assets.
> 
> FTSE is a perfect example where we should be giving troops Class B contracts to go join a Reg Force unit. All the infrastructure is in place to employ them, provide good training, have them take part in good training, and lord knows when I was trying to "train" my platoon with 7 troops in the summer time because they are all tasked to frig, I could have used some augmentation. If a mechanized Battalion was full of reserve augmentees in the summer it would be a lot better way to keep the PRes folks engaged in mechanized infantry stuff than sending the PRes units a bunch of LAVs they can't maintain, can't store, and can't operate, and saying "hey, figure this out yourself."
> 
> But instead during FTSE the PRes Units are expected to be like a Reg Force Unit for the summer.... and I've seen the plans on how they intended to keep the now idle troops occupied, like running back-to-back-to-back first aid courses.



The Reserves would need to be reorganized if we wanted them to be able to operate equipment like the LAV 6.0.

There are a whole host of reasons, political, cultural, etc. Why that won't happen.


----------



## brihard

ballz said:
			
		

> I had a post written up about this earlier but this thread has gone a bit off the rails. But since you're going down a similar road as I was going down...
> 
> I would have *zero* issues with having the PRes augment the Reg Force day-to-day (i.e. not just for tours) and then we can provide them all of this training and integrate them into the grind that one must endure to keep a LAV fleet maintained and LAV crews trained.
> 
> But this idea that the reserves, with zero resources, can take on a LAV fleet and do it all internally is just silly. The reserves simply don't have the resources to do this internally. The *people* may be as capable but the Units as a whole simply aren't. That's why they augment the Reg Force with troops, not with with Battle Groups. It's also not "augmenting" the Reg Force at all. If anything it will end up sucking more out of the Reg Force as the PRes just won't have the resources required to do it, and they'll need Reg Force assets.
> 
> FTSE is a perfect example where we should be giving troops Class B contracts to go join a Reg Force unit. All the infrastructure is in place to employ them, provide good training, have them take part in good training, and lord knows when I was trying to "train" my platoon with 7 troops in the summer time because they are all tasked to frig, I could have used some augmentation. If a mechanized Battalion was full of reserve augmentees in the summer it would be a lot better way to keep the PRes folks engaged in mechanized infantry stuff than sending the PRes units a bunch of LAVs they can't maintain, can't store, and can't operate, and saying "hey, figure this out yourself."
> 
> But instead during FTSE the PRes Units are expected to be like a Reg Force Unit for the summer.... and I've seen the plans on how they intended to keep the now idle troops occupied, like running back-to-back-to-back first aid courses.



Do you know if any of the battalions have asked for FTSE personnel for stuff like this? By the end of this summer the various CBGs should be able to say with a fair degree of accuracy 'we had x number of troops sitting idle in May, June, July, and August'. It should be easy enough to determine how many could be pledged to battalions for next year.

You do that, and you beef up the CT cells at CFRG... Some problems will be solved.


----------



## dapaterson

Many FTSE pers are not yet at the OFP - depending how late they are enrolled, some will not even get BMQ in a summer.  While I agree that providing FTSE pers to get OJT with Reg F units would be valuable experience, I don't think Reg F units would like to have dozens on untrained folks in their lines for the summer.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Many FTSE pers are not yet at the OFP - depending how late they are enrolled, some will not even get BMQ in a summer.  While I agree that providing FTSE pers to get OJT with Reg F units would be valuable experience, I don't think Reg F units would like to have dozens on untrained folks in their lines for the summer.



You are def right.  I think the idea of OJEs is a nice one but it really just turns in to filler time and what ends up happening is we end up dumping dozens of untrained people at operational units who really shouldn't be babysitting them.

Case in point, the annual dog & pony show that is the ROTP summer OJE program.  The Navy tries to run a pretty extensive OJE program but all that ends up happening is we spend many thousands of dollars flying Naval Cadets out to Esquimalt or Halifax for the summer who park themselves and do nothing other than eat rations.

Or we send a bunch of NCdts/OCdts on courses like BPara or Ships Dive Course that takes spaces from people that are going to actually use the course on an operational ship.  We then complain that we don't have enough parachute qualified soldiers or sailors qualified as divers/rescue swimmers, etc.

I think it would be better if we GASP.....
Trained our people in a timely manner.

A NCdt shouldn't receive four years of free education only to find out they get chronically seasick because they have never set foot on a ship before.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I'm all for simple and inexpensive field vehicles, particularly trucks, but what I mean by "simple" is the difference between our old 6-wheel AVGP and today's LAV.  My guesses are that in adjusted dollars, a LAV costs much more than an AVGP; that a LAV and all of its hardware is more complex to learn to use properly; and that a LAV requires a greater breadth and depth of maintenance skills and time to look after all of the aforementioned hardware.

Another guess is that the Res F, while continually improving, has not improved as fast as some of our equipment.  What the Res F in 1990 could do with contemporary equipment is - again mostly a guess - beyond what the Res F in 2020 can do with contemporary equipment.  Comparisons to what other nations achieve highlight to me that the explanation must lie in differences between them and us: so look to the money, the training and time commitment (again, the money), etc.

I'd restructure the Res F as it stands to see whether it improves itself before committing to more equipment and facilities.  To provide the latter up front is an unjustifiable leap of faith.  Some of the people arguing for change back in my day were also some of the people arguing that each proposed change was impractical, insulting, un-doable, etc.  If the only possible changes are their preferred changes, don't bother trying.

The generations that fought WWII and Korea and whose 1950s and 1960s Res F experience I did think deserved to be heard (larger units, experienced leadership) are pretty much gone from the associations and other points of influence.  Another guess: most of the senior Res-side people who weigh in going forward will just be people who grew up in the Res F as it is, with very few true veterans of multiple operational deployments.  It's past time to stop giving much weight to the opinions that tend to favour status quo.


----------



## brihard

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Many FTSE pers are not yet at the OFP - depending how late they are enrolled, some will not even get BMQ in a summer.  While I agree that providing FTSE pers to get OJT with Reg F units would be valuable experience, I don't think Reg F units would like to have dozens on untrained folks in their lines for the summer.



Right. I hadn't thought of that, and many of those who are OFP are babysitting thsoe who aren't- pre PLQ Cpls with two and a half years in making sure the new kids don't light themselves on fire.

Big picture, how's the army looking in terms of getting sufficient people leadership qualified these days? I'm hoping within a few more years the FTSE construct will create a larger cohort of PLQ candidates and then instructors? It jives with my recollection of many recruits joining late in high school, and having basically five summers to give the army before graduating university.


----------



## MilEME09

FTSE is designed for those under 5 years of service, meaning for tech trades you womt have a qualified tech until the 5th year if your lucky. DRCCC is for trained personal in the CSS world to get class B contracts upto 90 days (sometimes longer) for skills maintance. I agree that the ARes cant under current structure maintain LAVs, what I foresee working is having LAVs at the major bases Avalible for the Pres to sign out for exercises. Maybe invest in some kind of simulator for training in garrison.

Back to the topic on hand the news releases state 8 varients. I can only seem to count 7, whats the last one? TUA, mortor carrier?

Troop carrier
EW
MRV
MRT
CP
Amb
Engineer


----------



## ballz

Brihard said:
			
		

> Do you know if any of the battalions have asked for FTSE personnel for stuff like this?



No, that I don't know, nor do I suspect it would matter as the plan for FTSE was from much higher. I do know that when I was at 2 RCR we spent 2 years trying to get reserve augmentation, even gave it a name "Op REINFORCEMENT," and it transpired into us getting only about 15 reservists for Ex Rugged Bear (Level 3/5 pre-MR training) / Maple Resolve. Except their CFTPOs were only done up until the end of Rugged Bear so half of them had to go home because they had other commitments lined up (not blaming them, blaming the machine for that one).

We also went out of our way to get untrained 2Lts from the Infantry School brought in. We employed them in garrison and in the field. They were with us all the way up to Level 4 live in the fall which is as far as we went that year.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Many FTSE pers are not yet at the OFP - depending how late they are enrolled, some will not even get BMQ in a summer.  While I agree that providing FTSE pers to get OJT with Reg F units would be valuable experience, I don't think Reg F units would like to have dozens on untrained folks in their lines for the summer.



They wouldn't be. They'd be sent on their courses that they are supposed to go on and prioritized for. But at least then they'd have the administrative support to get them on the courses / get them looked after / receive them / employ them during the breaks between courses. One of the struggles I heard for PRes Units was actually trying to administer all this as they had so many people coming and going in and out of the unit. This is not normal for the Reserves in the summer time as they are usually stood down. Everyone goes on their courses and when they aren't on course they are at home because the unit isn't running. Now they were on full-time Class B contracts so they couldn't just be at home doing nothing in the 3 weeks between each course.

That said, there is plenty of stuff at a Battalion that a non-OFP person can be employed. It's not like all of the infantry tasks are rocket science. See above about us employing untrained 2Lts in our rifle companies who were on loan from the infantry school, and speaking to one of them at the Xmas Mess Dinner in December, having just finished his Ph IV, he was quite happy he was training with us the year prior and said it definitely helped him be successful on his courses.

And personally, the best thing I witnessed for our SNCOs and NCOs was after 2 years of having zero privates (the running joke was that they were unicorns) because of the recruitment cycle, all of a sudden there were huge influxes of brand new privates that needed leadership, needed direction, and needed help.



			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> You are def right.  I think the idea of OJEs is a nice one but it really just turns in to filler time and what ends up happening is we end up dumping dozens of untrained people at operational units who really shouldn't be babysitting them.



3x dozen divided by 9 platoons... is 4 per platoon. I suspect I could have taken 8-10 with who I had on the ground at the time and we'd have been better off vice hindered.



			
				Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Case in point, the annual dog & pony show that is the ROTP summer OJE program.  The Navy tries to run a pretty extensive OJE program but all that ends up happening is we spend many thousands of dollars flying Naval Cadets out to Esquimalt or Halifax for the summer who park themselves and do nothing other than eat rations.



I'm not sure the untrained officers is a fair comparison to a BMQ-qualified troop. There are also a lot more places to employ a BMQ-qualified troop in the Reg Force Army than there are places to employ a untrained Navy officers, so the sheer numbers issue would be less of a factor.


Granted, I'd like to see the number of people in the army, by rank, that took advantage of FTSE this year and last year. There is obviously a lot of assumptions being made on our parts about viability that would be impacted by those numbers.


----------



## MilEME09

https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/taylor-the-battle-to-save-the-canadian-forces-army-reserve

Interesting read, new book to add to my reading list


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/taylor-the-battle-to-save-the-canadian-forces-army-reserve
> 
> Interesting read, new book to add to my reading list



I'll get it just as soon as I can. It releases tomorrow but doesn't look like it might be available through Amazon.ca at this time.

This got me to review the current Reserves 2000 website and I see that their advocacy still runs to the meaningless. Essentially they are advocating for funding for 15,000 more Army Reservists without any indication as to what one would do with them and no indication as to reforming the system so that the Army Reserve become credible and effective. 

 :not-again:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> I'll get it just as soon as I can. It releases tomorrow but doesn't look like it might be available through Amazon.ca at this time.
> 
> This got me to review the current Reserves 2000 website and I see that their advocacy still runs to the meaningless. Essentially they are advocating for funding for 15,000 more Army Reservists without any indication as to what one would do with them and no indication as to reforming the system so that the Army Reserve become credible and effective.
> 
> :not-again:



I’ve talked to some of these people. They seem to be a bit cray, cray.

But that was just my first, second and third impressions


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I’ve talked to some of these people. They seem to be a bit cray, cray.
> 
> But that was just my first, second and third impressions



I hadn't given them much thought for many years and in fact had thought the organization was defunct until I heard about this book and saw their new website. https://reserves2000.ca/. When you click on the "Take Action" button you get a form letter to send to your Member of Parliament which essentially uses the last auditor-general's quote that the Army's ideal size for the reserves is 29,000 then throws some numbers around and recommends an expansion of 15,000 to the existing 22,000 positions (which if my analog math is still functional works out to 37,000 and not 29,000).

At the moment we're falling short of keeping our strength above 19,000 (lower for DP1 trained). Of all the things wrong with the Army Reserve (much of which but not all is contained in the A-G report) creating another 15,000 positions isn't one of them. Here's an idea. Let's fix all the other crap wrong with the Army Reserve first (like meaningful training, real equipment, a bloody meaningful  purpose) and once we have all that underway then let's see if we need another 15,000. 

I've just run a paper exercise with another member on this site to restructure and re-purpose the existing Army Reserve and with 22,606 part-time positions and 2,732 RegF positions (477 more than the current RSS staff and certain Reg F units becoming part of the force [mostly the CCSBde)) you can form two fully staffed mechanized brigade groups, an artillery brigade, a manoeuvre enhancement brigade and a sustainment support brigade each of which is augmented with it's own training depot and an enhanced capability to maintain its own equipment (most of the 477 full-time shortfall is additional maintainers).

15,000 more! Jesus!

 :brickwall:


----------



## tomahawk6

Why not just expand the Army by 15000 instead of expanding the reserves ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Why not just expand the Army by 15000 instead of expanding the reserves ?



Then you’d be feeding the wrong egoes...according to these guys anyways.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We need to expand both, but it takes time and money. Not to mention equipment. Plus committed politicians/voters.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/taylor-the-battle-to-save-the-canadian-forces-army-reserve
> 
> Interesting read, new book to add to my reading list



From the article:



> Without them, Canada’s military would be hard put to function effectively and the reserve provides four trained soldiers for the cost of just one regular soldier.



Statements like these detract and blind some people, me included, to articles like this.  The average Cl A reserve soldier doesn't have the same capabilities as a Reg Force one, not even close to the same TOS, just as a starting point to pick away at that single statement.

The last part of the statement is a horrible metric to anyone who understands the most very basics of anything above "human waves" in military force employment (IMO).


----------



## FJAG

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Why not just expand the Army by 15000 instead of expanding the reserves ?



I've expounded on my opinions too often and am probably  :deadhorse: for some time now.

For starters we don't need another 15,000 in the Reg F Army unless we were given a role or mission that substantiated it. Quite frankly while we've been reducing our overall numbers in the Forces, we've been expanding headquarters like drunken sailors. We're up to our butt holes in bureaucrats and quite frankly if we were prepared to recognize that there is a need for a deployable force larger than a battalion plus battle group, we should first drag folks out of our headquarters and into field units through a rigorous slimming down process before adding more people.

That said, our military is one of the highest paid in the world. We currently spend over half of our defence budget on personnel salaries and benefits which severely impacts our ability to fund essential capital projects. Another 15,000 regular force soldiers would be completely unsustainable based on our current budget trends. In fact our current Regular Force numbers are most probably unsustainable. This is why we've had one cut in numbers after the other over the last few decades.

Man for man, year for year, done properly, a reservist should cost approximately one sixth that of an equivalent ranked Regular Force member. We have many good reservists (just like we have many good Reg F soldiers) but for various long standing reasons, we have a sh*tty reserve system. As I said above, we have probably enough reserve positions right now so that they could double the Regular Army's combat power BUT because of our systemic problems, our reserves presently are merely capable of filling some individual holes in existing Reg F establishments and are not able to add any degree of additional combat power (much of which is related to their lack of equipment and lack of collective training.)

Fundamentally we need to seriously overhaul the entire system from the ground up. We need to do that long before we need to add people.

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

FJAG said:
			
		

> That said, our military is one of the highest paid in the world. We currently spend over half of our defence budget on personnel salaries and benefits which severely impacts our ability to fund essential capital projects.



Is that the real issue, though, or is it our budget itself not being big enough?


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Is that the real issue, though, or is it our budget itself not being big enough?



I think that it's big enough for the time being. I'm going to do a little cherry picking here.

Italy, like us, spends 1.3% of it's GDP on defence which in 2018 worked out to USD 28 Billion as to our USD 22 Billion for the same period. Italy's regular army numbers 100,000 (plus another 71,000 in their air force and navy) organized (roughly) into a special forces brigade; an army aviation brigade; an Alpine division of two brigades; two deployable division headquarters; an airmobile brigade; a cavalry brigade; an armored brigade; an airborne brigade; five mechanized brigades; an artillery brigade; an anti-air artillery brigade; an engineer brigade; a signals brigade; a military intelligence brigades and numerous support elements. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_the_Italian_Army
Fairly well equipped with fairly modern weapons systems
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipment_of_the_Italian_Army

Japan spends 0.9% of their GDP on defence which works out to USD 47 Billion or a bit over twice our budget. For that they get a 247,000 military (including an army of 150,000) formed into 1 armored and 8 infantry divisions (which in fact are really more like very large all arms brigades; a further 8 more normal sized brigades; and nine combat support brigades
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Ground_Self-Defense_Force#Organisation
Again fairly well equipped:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_equipment_of_the_Japan_Ground_Self-Defense_Force

Our USD 22 Billion basically buys us a little over a battalion-sized special forces, three deployable brigades with a smattering of tanks, two mech and one light battalion each and an anaemic artillery regiment plus one combat support brigade that has a non-deployable headquarters.

If it wasn't for Australia, which with 1.9% of GDP at USD 27 Billion budget and which buys them an Army of only 30,000 and a reserve of 17,500, I'd say we were at the bottom of the heap for value for money spent. Australia has a deployable division headquarters, 3 "mixed" brigades, a combat support brigade, an aviation brigade and a combat service support brigade, a special forces command and an administrative division which holds their six reserve brigades which have problems not dissimilar from those that our own reservists have. Essentially their reserve brigades, like ours are basically administrative in nature and are neither manned nor equipped to the same level as the regular brigades.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Army
https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/speeches-and-transcripts/australian-army-reserve-transformation-a-total-force-address-by

Neither Italy nor Japan are significant users of reserves while Australia, like us, looks at the reserves as an office overload labour pool from which it can round out regular force units and formations but will do nothing in the way of allowing us to expand the regular army beyond it's current limited capabilities. That is a major missed opportunity. One only needs to look at the US Army's National Guard and Army Reserve structures and their recent contributions in the War on Terror to see what the possibilities are.

Why do I feel like you've sucked me into another rant on this subject?  

 :cheers:


----------



## Eaglelord17

Three simple ways to significantly increase the power of the Reserves without much in the way of change.

1) Federal Gov enacts legislation making it so Reservists are guaranteed time off from civilian job and the job must be held, for the following: International and Local (like the floods, etc.) deployments, Career courses (with a limitation of how often this can happen, so the employer doesn't end up without a worker for most the year), and a 1 month period at the end of the summer.

2) Every summer all Army Reservists will attend and participate in a 1 month exercise at the end of the summer before school starts, as full unit exercises. This should more or less take care of any training differences between the Regs and the Reserves (there would still be a difference, but it would be much smaller and not nearly as much of a gap to close). It would require complete deployment of all equipment and the units will be expected to function as they would in combat with all the equipment they would in combat. I suspect it would be a dismal failure for the first year, but each year afterwards once equipment and capabilities get sorted out, it could lead to a fairly effective force. 

3) Take the Reserve Force budget out of the Regular Forces control. This would stabilize the Reserves and allow them to actually have predictable budgeting each year, instead of the current boom/bust method that exists.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

1.  Never going to happen.

2.  1 month a year "full time" will not = 12 months a year full time experience and ability.  There are just too many perishable skills.

Additionally, how many of the Cl A types actually want to give up half of their summer do you think?  People are forgetting, some cl A types like it the way it is...


----------



## Remius

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> 1.  Never going to happen.
> 
> 2.  1 month a year "full time" will not = 12 months a year full time experience and ability.  There are just too many perishable skills.
> 
> Additionally, how many of the Cl A types actually want to give up half of their summer do you think?  People are forgetting, some cl A types like it the way it is...



Nobody wants to give up a month of the summer if the training sucks and they get treated like crap. 

Good solid training and being treated professionally with solid employer support and you'd see a good chunk of reservists out.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

But the statement was "all reservists", making it mandatory not optional.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Like any good marketing challenge you need to decide what the right audience is and target/attract/retain them properly.

The Reserves are basically designed to attract students, high school and university. The focus on summer training is an example of that. 

As a result, at most, you can expect to get 5 or 6 years service out of them before life changes etc mean that they move on to other things. Some will stick around, but not enough to guarantee that they will fill the succession plans for various units.

With that in mind, how can we incentivize students (and perhaps teachers and other school/college staff) to join and remain in the reserves? Breaks on their student loans? Civilian employment connections? Additional credits to add to educationally focused resumes?

It seems that a federal organization (DND) might be able to get help from another public service organization (Education) to figure this out.


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:
			
		

> Good solid training and being treated professionally with solid employer support and you'd see a good chunk of reservists out.



If you are in a union, you may wish to ask your reps to negotiate a Military Leave Policy into the collective agreement.

We had one where I worked, but not everyone does.


----------



## Remius

mariomike said:
			
		

> If you are in a union, you may wish to ask your reps to negotiate a Military Leave Policy into the collective agreement.
> 
> We had one where I worked, but not everyone does.



I work for the PS so getting time off is not an issue.  But not every reservist is a as lucky. I still have to pick my battles though.  One off tasks work fine.  But if I take time off for a dom ops going to the area concentration becomes less of an option.  There is still some give and take.  Not to mention pension implications for taking LWOP or vacation time.  I have exercised my ability to take LWP though for some things.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Like any good marketing challenge you need to decide what the right audience is and target/attract/retain them properly.
> 
> The Reserves are basically designed to attract students, high school and university. The focus on summer training is an example of that.
> 
> As a result, at most, you can expect to get 5 or 6 years service out of them before life changes etc mean that they move on to other things. Some will stick around, but not enough to guarantee that they will fill the succession plans for various units.
> 
> With that in mind, how can we incentivize students (and perhaps teachers and other school/college staff) to join and remain in the reserves? Breaks on their student loans? Civilian employment connections? Additional credits to add to educationally focused resumes?
> 
> It seems that a federal organization (DND) might be able to get help from another public service organization (Education) to figure this out.



Since finishing my article for the CMJ and playing with reserve establishments I've been thinking of dozens of ways to incentivize reserve service. Like the old bugbear about not having enough maintainers to look after equipment if we ever gave any to the reserves. How about teaming with community colleges whereby we pay the tuition and related expenses for young folks to take diesel and/or heavy equipment maintenance courses during the school year (with no salary to them during this time) and then teaching them the military maintenance essentials during one or two full pay summer programs and then requiring 3 or 4 years of part-time service (and maybe even full time jobs with a local service battalion maintaining reserve equipment)

Same kind of thing for truckers and numerous other support and skilled trades that we constantly have difficulty filling. We get several years of skilled service and Canada gets a trained and experienced worker.

Personally, I think that we should maximize the latter high school years and university and college years where getting jobs or practical experience is difficult for most young folks. Helping with schooling expenses and practical full-time summer employment is a great draw but needs to be coupled with compulsory service and training requirements.

We really do want maybe six years of service by youths for the bulk of our Res F rather than 20+ year reserve force careers by teachers and accountants and what nots who probably won't be physically capable of deployment anyway. The critical leadership positions can come from the Reg F pers or transferees and those reservists prepared to commit. Re-enlistment bonuses would help with that. Real and meaningful job protection legislation is also needed but less critical if you thin the herd of old "career" reservist leadership by reducing establishments to several dozen full-sized battalion sized units and maybe five full sized brigades.

Damn. Sucked in again.

 :cheers:


----------



## Jarnhamar

Reservists need to be held to a stricter work schedule than once every couple months.


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:
			
		

> I work for the PS so getting time off is not an issue.  But not every reservist is a as lucky. I still have to pick my battles though.  One off tasks work fine.  But if I take time off for a dom ops going to the area concentration becomes less of an option.  There is still some give and take.  Not to mention pension implications for taking LWOP or vacation time.  I have exercised my ability to take LWP though for some things.



This was / is our Military Leave Policy,



> Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.
> 
> The maximum period of absence is two weeks in a calendar year.
> 
> Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work.
> 
> Compensation received for travelling expenses and meal allowance does not have to be returned to the city.
> 
> All benefits continue during the leave.
> 
> An employee's service is not affected by the leave. An employee's vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change.
> https://wx.toronto.ca/intra/hr/policies.nsf/a8170e9c63677876852577d7004ff7f8/58a35e5368beb69e852567bd006d7e4b?OpenDocument



It cost the city taxpayers double time and a half. Your 80 hours, plus another 80 hours at time and a half for the off-duty people called in to work your shifts.

The highlighted part was interesting.

We worked twenty 12-hour shifts every six weeks. So, if your PRes training landed on your 7 days off, you didn't have to give it to the city treasurer.

I know it was frustrating for our payroll clerks.


----------



## Jonezy76

I'm wondering if the 5 week residency portion of PLQ is a major stumbling block for older reservists? (and has a lot to do with retention) I mean, once out of university or college, who can take 5 weeks off of a job to attend? No PLQ=no promotion to MCpl. My belief is that not many folk would be happy as a Cpl forever.

Thankfully I have an understanding employer that will give me the time off if/when it comes.

Forgive me if it has already come up, I only made it through about 50 of 136 pages.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jonezy76 said:
			
		

> I'm wondering if the 5 week residency portion of PLQ is a major stumbling block for older reservists? (and has a lot to do with retention) I mean, once out of university or college, who can take 5 weeks off of a job to attend? No PLQ=no promotion to MCpl. My belief is that not many folk would be happy as a Cpl forever.
> 
> Thankfully I have an understanding employer that will give me the time off if/when it comes.
> 
> Forgive me if it has already come up, I only made it through about 50 of 136 pages.



Everything about training in the Reserves is a stumbling block, unless you happen to be a 20 year old student. That’s the way it’s been designed.


----------



## MilEME09

I have brought it up many times and RCEME corp is going to look into courses for the ARes in the fall and winter months because thats the better time if your not a student.


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Everything about training in the Reserves is a stumbling block, unless you happen to be a 20 year old student. That’s the way it’s been designed.



That was the way it seemed to me. Joined the CAF Student Summer Employment Plan (SSEP) at age 16.


----------



## daftandbarmy

mariomike said:
			
		

> That was the way it seemed to me. Joined the CAF Student Summer Employment Plan (SSEP) at age 16.



Which is an excellent example of something we should have continued.


----------



## Jarnhamar

[quote author=Jonezy76] My belief is that not many folk would be happy as a Cpl forever.

[/quote]

Our culture promotes getting paid more money and gaining rank as signs of success. 

We also built up a stigma around members who don't want to be promoted and deal with the BS that comes with climbing up in rank. 

If someone wants to fix helicopters their whole career and not be a leader I think that's great. They'll become a hell of an expert in that field.

I don't see why reserves can't run smaller plq course at their home units if they need to promote that bad. 

The down side is those new leaders are far far behind in skills (and I'd say equality) when compared to someone hammering out the same course full time over 6 weeks. You learn a lot in the in-between times between PO checks.


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Which is an excellent example of something we should have continued.



I can't speak highly enough of SSEP. We were all the same age. At 16 most young people are more easily "moldable" than when they get older.  

It's not uncommon now to read of applicants with "Life Experience" going on social media to ask questions.

Not to say SSEP was better or worse than that. Just different.


----------



## FJAG

mariomike said:
			
		

> I can't speak highly enough of SSEP. We were all the same age. At 16 most young people are more easily "moldable" than when they get older.
> 
> It's not uncommon now to read of applicants with "Life Experience" going on social media to ask questions.
> 
> Not to say SSEP was better or worse than that. Just different.



Ditto. The funny thing is that at the time I never realized there were other ways to become a soldier and I never even dreamed of becoming an officer back then. Maybe I was a bit more motivated to the military than the average flower children of the mid 60s that were all around me but I have to admit, pretty much everything that has become my life started in SSEP.

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Ditto. The funny thing is that at the time I never realized there were other ways to become a soldier and I never even dreamed of becoming an officer back then. Maybe I was a bit more motivated to the military than the average flower children of the mid 60s that were all around me but I have to admit, pretty much everything that has become my life started in SSEP.
> 
> :cheers:



If anyone were ever able to align the Cadets properly with the rest of the CAF, the line of sight would be pretty much: Cadets, SYEP/SSEP, Reserves, RegF (then back to support the reserves or cadets on retirement).

Call it the 'Full circle program' or something like that.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Our Navy League is a major feeder for the 3 other cadet corps, but we are left out in the wild. My unit used to have tight bonds with the Army cadets, who would come out and be part of the gun crews, who then joined the unit and were generally great additions as they have already learned a lot and generally were better at drill then the rest of us.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

And the SJWs would start yelling "child soldier" at us even louder than they currently do.

It will never fly.


----------



## brihard

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If anyone were ever able to align the Cadets properly with the rest of the CAF, the line of sight would be pretty much: Cadets, SYEP/SSEP, Reserves, RegF (then back to support the reserves or cadets on retirement).
> 
> Call it the 'Full circle program' or something like that.



I started out in cadets, then into the PRes with the same regimental affiliation. Starting on that path definitely got me to where I am today.


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If anyone were ever able to align the Cadets properly with the rest of the CAF, the line of sight would be pretty much: Cadets, SYEP/SSEP, Reserves, RegF (then back to support the reserves or cadets on retirement).



FJAG would know this, but since this was almost 50 years ago ( 1970 ) just to be clear, SSEP _was the Reserves_. You had to go through the same application process.

Cadet experience was not a requirement to join the SSEP.

SSEP was BMW, or GMT as it was known then.

Back then you could join the PRes at age 16. Same as now.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> but I have to admit, pretty much everything that has become my life started in SSEP.
> 
> :cheers:



Same here. When I applied for my full-time job, the Commissioner of Department had been a Colonel during the war. Awarded the Military Cross. I can't say for sure, but I believe my being in the PRes didn't hurt my chances.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

TAYLOR: The battle to save the Canadian Forces' army reserve

https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/taylor-the-battle-to-save-the-canadian-forces-army-reserve?fbclid=IwAR1EXdNd7NMAs-IeOn34txcwiwzoKWC09s7R_XosFSZb8g6dzWfEqAIEN4k

The average Canadian might ask why the Canadian Forces’ army reserve needs a bunch of retired reservists, honorary colonels and influential civilians banding together to advocate on its behalf.

Surely, the militia’s outstanding record and stellar accomplishments speak for themselves. Surely, the militia will be well looked after by the federal government and, particularly, the Department of National Defence.

Well, apparently not. That’s why an action group called Reserves 2000 was established 25 years ago to look out for the best interest of the army’s reserve force and the thousands of dedicated young soldiers who serve in it.  Rest at link..


----------



## Blackadder1916

mariomike said:
			
		

> FJAG would know this, but since this was almost 50 years ago ( 1970 ) just to be clear, SSEP _was the Reserves_. You had to go through the same application process.
> 
> Cadet experience was not a requirement to join the SSEP.



The raft of Federal Government funded "initialized abbreviation" youth employment programmes of the 60s and 70s (and going onto the YTEPs of the 1980s) that were used by DND to fund the salaries all had a common theme - they limited the period that an individual could be employed under that programme.  The money for SSEP, SYEP, YTEP (there were other programmes like OFY and LIP, etc but I don't think DND used them for military employment) did not come from the defence budget but from other departments that had responsibility to make work for young Canadians.  Remember, back then the government was very worried about youth, not just about their employment prospects but also about activism and purpose (or the lack of purpose - anyone else remember the summer . . 1970? . .  when armouries were opened up as youth hostels to accommodate all the "hippies" hitchhiking across the country - google Battle of Jericho Beach).

While these programmes were the reason many joined the CF Reserves, their terms of service held them only for that period during the summer when they were employed (or the year or so that a YTEP was expected to complete basic and TQ3).  They were automatically released once they completed that summer - to stay in the Primary Reserves required them to actually request to join a reserve unit (or in the case of YTEP to apply to join the Reg Force in a different trade)


----------



## FJAG

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> The raft of Federal Government funded "initialized abbreviation" youth employment programmes of the 60s and 70s (and going onto the YTEPs of the 1980s) that were used by DND to fund the salaries all had a common theme - they limited the period that an individual could be employed under that programme.  The money for SSEP, SYEP, YTEP (there were other programmes like OFY and LIP, etc but I don't think DND used them for military employment) did not come from the defence budget but from other departments that had responsibility to make work for young Canadians.  Remember, back then the government was very worried about youth, not just about their employment prospects but also about activism and purpose (or the lack of purpose - anyone else remember the summer . . 1970? . .  when armouries were opened up as youth hostels to accommodate all the "hippies" hitchhiking across the country - google Battle of Jericho Beach).
> 
> While these programmes were the reason many joined the CF Reserves, their terms of service held them only for that period during the summer when they were employed (or the year or so that a YTEP was expected to complete basic and TQ3).  They were automatically released once they completed that summer - to stay in the Primary Reserves required them to actually request to join a reserve unit (or in the case of YTEP to apply to join the Reg Force in a different trade)



I can't be certain of the details as I was a young squady back then but there was a difference between the SSEP that I went through and the subsequent SSEPs. The SSEP that I went through was a straight recruit course and at the end of it all of those who wanted to remain were seamlessly kept on by the regiment and started our basic gun number's training. I don't ever recall signing any separate papers or transfers. We all remained in the same battery and got paid (which was really all that mattered to us then)

A few years later, after I had already gone regular army as an officer in 3 RCHA, about a hundred officers and NCOs from the regiment stayed on in Wainwright after the brigade's WAICON summer concentration and became the instructional cadre for about 465 students in what was called the Student Summer Employment Program (5B), basically a pared down program with lots of drill and adventurous training in a military environment but which concentrated more on building citizenship and leadership. It wasn't quite the same as the one that I had been on previously and in looking back at the description of this event in the Canadian Gunner for 1971 (at pg 53) http://rca-arc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Canadian-Gunner-1971.pdf it states it was "designed to provide meaningful and gainful employment to militia personnel and also qualify them to the Junior NCO level." 

We graduated about 385 but I'm not so sure if these folks actually started out as Militia folks because I seem to recall most of them being pretty green or in existing Militia units (although I believe several had some regimental affiliation and looked like they may have had a recruit course in the past.) I certainly had the feeling these folks were more temporary in nature than we had been in the mid sixties. While we had standard issued uniforms and all the standard kit of the day (basic as that was) we were treated like recruits and not students. All the training was pure military. The (5B) folks in the early 70s were treated more like kids on a summer adventure, and were not supplied with standard uniforms or kit.

 :cheers:


----------



## mariomike

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Remember, back then the government was very worried about youth, not just about their employment prospects but also about activism and purpose (or the lack of purpose - anyone else remember the summer . . 1970? . .  when armouries were opened up as youth hostels to accommodate all the "hippies" hitchhiking across the country - google Battle of Jericho Beach).



We were at the old Denison Armoury when it was at Dufferin and the 401. There were no hippies up there. They were down at Yorkville and Rochdale. 



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> I can't be certain of the details as I was a young squady back then but there was a difference between the SSEP that I went through and the subsequent SSEPs. The SSEP that I went through was a straight recruit course and at the end of it all of those who wanted to remain were seamlessly kept on by the regiment and started our basic gun number's training. I don't ever recall signing any separate papers or transfers. We all remained in the same battery and got paid (which was really all that mattered to us then)
> 
> :cheers:



That is how it was for us. Other than the fact we not an artillery unit.


----------



## quadrapiper

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> And the SJWs would start yelling "child soldier" at us even louder than they currently do.
> 
> It will never fly.


There's a fair number of skills both inoffensive to that sort of person, and Army-related, that could be delivered to Army Cadets, whether through trade-esque specialized summer training, or as part of the generic local, winter scheme.

Land nav, radio/signals, first aid, mechanic, cookery, perhaps some low-end engineering, and so on all have possibilities.


----------



## kratz

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> There's a fair number of skills both inoffensive to that sort of person, and Army-related, that could be delivered to Army All Cadets, whether through trade-esque specialized summer training, or as part of the generic local, winter scheme.
> 
> Land nav, radio/signals, first aid, mechanic, cookery, perhaps some low-end engineering, and so on all have possibilities.



FTFY...I've seen the same skills assist people who used to be Air and Navy cadets. It all rolls on how well an individual can transition what they have been taught into a new environment.


----------



## quadrapiper

kratz said:
			
		

> FTFY...I've seen the same skills assist people who used to be Air and Navy cadets. It all rolls on how well an individual can transition what they have been taught into a new environment.


Absolutely: only emphasized the green world given the thread.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The subject is not land forces, but illustrates that Canada might not be doing some things as well as it could:

Military Photo: F-35s Arrive In Vermont


----------



## FJAG

Looks like the US Army continues to depend on National Guard combat arms units to deploy into foreign theatres.



> Carolina Army Guard troops move into eastern Syria with Bradley Fighting Vehicles
> 
> By COREY DICKSTEIN | STARS AND STRIPES
> Published: October 31, 2019
> 
> WASHINGTON — National Guard members from North and South Carolina began moving into eastern Syria with heavy armored vehicles on Thursday as part of the Pentagon’s new mission to secure oil fields wrestled from the Islamic State, a military spokesman said.
> 
> Soldiers with the North Carolina-based 4th Battalion, 118th Infantry Regiment and the South Carolina-based 218th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade were deployed to Deir al-Zour to protect American-held oil fields around that city, Army Col. Myles Caggins, the spokesmen for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS mission known as Operation Inherent Resolve, tweeted Thursday. Caggins’ tweet included photos of soldiers loading M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles onto Air Force C-17 Globemaster cargo jets to be used on the mission.
> 
> The deployment consists primarily of infantrymen, said a Pentagon official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. That official and a Pentagon spokesman declined to say how many troops would be deployed into eastern Syria, where American special operators left in recent weeks by order of President Donald Trump. The officials said the number of troops had yet to be decided, though they insisted the force would remain below the 1,000 or so troops that remained in Syria recently.
> 
> Defense Secretary Mark Esper on Monday said he expected the new crop of troops to be less than that amount. He declined to speculate how long troops would remain around oil-rich Deir al-Zour, the former ISIS stronghold about 80 miles southeast of Raqqa along the Euphrates River. He insisted, as Trump has, that eventually those troops would “be going home.”
> 
> For now, the new deployment will not include M1 Abrams tanks, the Pentagon official said Thursday.
> 
> The 4-118th Infantry Regiment is part of the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team, which includes about 4,200 soldiers from Army National Guard units from North and South Carolina and West Virginia. The entire brigade deployed to Kuwait during the summer for a nine-month rotation in support of Operation Spartan Shield, during which it conducted desert training operations. That brigade includes armor units with dozens of M1 tanks. The Pentagon official said Thursday that military planners had not ruled out moving some of those tanks into Syria.
> 
> Esper said Monday that the troops’ new mission would to be ensure the oil fields, once used by ISIS as its major revenue source to finance terrorist campaigns around the world, did not fall back into the terrorists’ hands. While ISIS lost the last remnants of its so-called caliphate across parts of Syria and Iraq in March and its top leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed Saturday, the group has retained dangerous cells across both countries, military officials have warned.
> 
> Esper said the troops would also protect the oil fields from falling into the hands of the Syrian regime or its Russian or Iranian backers. He argued revenue from oil production could fund operations for the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led militia that the United States heavily relied on to fight ISIS in Syria. SDF missions include detaining thousands of imprisoned ISIS fighters, he said.
> 
> The SDF has expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning it. American troops withdrew from SDF positions near Syria’s border with NATO-ally Turkey ahead of a Turkish military invasion into the country launched Oct. 9 and aimed at the Kurdish forces. Turkey considers the Kurdish fighters, who have been backed since 2014 by the United States, a terrorist organization.
> 
> Esper said Monday that U.S. military would not abandon the SDF. Nonetheless, the SDF announced this week that it had struck a deal with Russia and the Syrian regime in an effort to protect its forces from Turkey.



[urlhttps://www.stripes.com/news/us/carolina-army-guard-troops-move-into-eastern-syria-with-bradley-fighting-vehicles-1.605423[/url]

Note that while the 4-118th are part of the 218th Manouvre Enhancement Brigade (formerly 218th Infantry Brigade) of the South Carolina National Guard, they were attached to and deployed to Kuwait as part of the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team which is garrisoned in North Carolina and has units from the North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia National Guard and is equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 155mm M109A6 Paladin SPs



> ...
> 
> 4-118th is a combined arms battalion equipped with both Bradleys and Abrams and had those vehicles with it when it deployed to Kuwait sometime earlier in the month. The battalion is part of the Army National Guard's 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team, the bulk of which is part of the North Carolina National Guard, but which also includes troops from the South Carolina and West Virginia Army National Guards. The 30th began arriving in Kuwait last week to relieve the regular Army 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division.
> 
> The Army always has a forward-deployed armored brigade in that country as part of Operation Spartan Shield. Forces deployed in support of this operation are on call to be able to respond to any potential contingency in the Middle East and the War Zone had posited last week that whatever brigade was deployed to Kuwait was the most likely force provider for the new mission in Deir Ez Zor. Units from the various brigades that have rotated through this deployment over the years have already taken part in operations in Syria.
> 
> It is not clear yet whether the battalion is also sending some of its tanks into Syria. The M2A2s, with their 25mm automatic cannons and TOW anti-tank missiles, are certainly better armed and armored than lighter vehicles, such as M-ATVs. They also have a more robust suite of sensors that will help troops monitor the areas around their positions, especially at night.
> 
> However, the Bradleys would still not offer the same anti-armor capability as even a small group of M1s with their 120mm main guns, which could be important if the force finds itself facing off against a more conventionally armed opponent. In 2018, a force aligned with the Syrian regime of dictator Bashar Al Assad, with the support of Russian mercenaries and equipped with tanks and heavy artillery, notably attempted to eject American forces and their local partners from a position near the Conoco Gas Plant in Deir Ez Zor. A massive counterattack involving air and artillery strikes was necessary to repel that threat.



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30754/army-national-guard-bradley-fighting-vehicles-are-in-syria-guarding-oil-and-gas-fields

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Looks like the US Army continues to depend on National Guard combat arms units to deploy into foreign theatres.
> 
> [urlhttps://www.stripes.com/news/us/carolina-army-guard-troops-move-into-eastern-syria-with-bradley-fighting-vehicles-1.605423[/url]
> 
> Note that while the 4-118th are part of the 218th Manouvre Enhancement Brigade (formerly 218th Infantry Brigade) of the South Carolina National Guard, they were attached to and deployed to Kuwait as part of the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team which is garrisoned in North Carolina and has units from the North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia National Guard and is equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 155mm M109A6 Paladin SPs
> 
> https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30754/army-national-guard-bradley-fighting-vehicles-are-in-syria-guarding-oil-and-gas-fields
> 
> :cheers:



Another good example of why this is one of the most interesting periods of international conflict in recent history. I’m looking forward to reading about the Post 911 period in history books ... about 50 years from now


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> I'm all for simple and inexpensive field vehicles, particularly trucks, but what I mean by "simple" is the difference between our old 6-wheel AVGP and today's LAV.  My guesses are that in adjusted dollars, a LAV costs much more than an AVGP; that a LAV and all of its hardware is more complex to learn to use properly; and that a LAV requires a greater breadth and depth of maintenance skills and time to look after all of the aforementioned hardware.
> 
> Another guess is that the Res F, while continually improving, has not improved as fast as some of our equipment.  What the Res F in 1990 could do with contemporary equipment is - again mostly a guess - beyond what the Res F in 2020 can do with contemporary equipment.  Comparisons to what other nations achieve highlight to me that the explanation must lie in differences between them and us: so look to the money, the training and time commitment (again, the money), etc.
> 
> I'd restructure the Res F as it stands to see whether it improves itself before committing to more equipment and facilities.  To provide the latter up front is an unjustifiable leap of faith.  Some of the people arguing for change back in my day were also some of the people arguing that each proposed change was impractical, insulting, un-doable, etc.  If the only possible changes are their preferred changes, don't bother trying.
> 
> The generations that fought WWII and Korea and whose 1950s and 1960s Res F experience I did think deserved to be heard (larger units, experienced leadership) are pretty much gone from the associations and other points of influence.  Another guess: most of the senior Res-side people who weigh in going forward will just be people who grew up in the Res F as it is, with very few true veterans of multiple operational deployments.  It's past time to stop giving much weight to the opinions that tend to favour status quo.



You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently.



We tried to field Grizzlies with reserve units... they wound up being deployed mainly to the shop at the CFB for servicing and repairs.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We tried to field Grizzlies with reserve units... they wound up being deployed mainly to the shop at the CFB for servicing and repairs.



Was there a maintainer at the unit on Class b who's job it was to maintain them? I am guessing a lot of the down time was waiting for parts. When my unit was ops task, we had a mechanic with a 5/4 full of parts to maintain our vehicles, funny enough the rate of serviceable vehicle shot up.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin P said:
			
		

> Was there a maintainer at the unit on Class b who's job it was to maintain them? I am guessing a lot of the down time was waiting for parts. When my unit was ops task, we had a mechanic with a 5/4 full of parts to maintain our vehicles, funny enough the rate of serviceable vehicle shot up.



As I recall, no, there was a 100% reliance on a Naval support base for the effective maintenance of four armoured personnel carriers....


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently.



As much as I would love to say we can do this, what I see on the shop floor in a PRes service battalion,does  not paint a pretty picture towards us having the institutional capability to maintain anything, due to lack of tooling (easier said then done to buy, its like pulling teeth), and a institution set up so a PRes maintainer isn't allowed to do their trade without a Reg Force tech watching over our shoulder, that tech is on leave? sorry no training for you then, doesn't matter if you have 22 years and a operational tour as a vehicle tech(and are a civi mechanic), and the reg force guy is fresh off his QL5. There has to be massive fundamental change in the Reserve force if we are to any tangible work that has a positive effect on the army as a whole.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> As much as I would love to say we can do this, what I see on the shop floor in a PRes service battalion,does  not paint a pretty picture towards us having the institutional capability to maintain anything, due to lack of tooling (easier said then done to buy, its like pulling teeth), and a institution set up so a PRes maintainer isn't allowed to do their trade without a Reg Force tech watching over our shoulder, that tech is on leave? sorry no training for you then, doesn't matter if you have 22 years and a operational tour as a vehicle tech(and are a civi mechanic), and the reg force guy is fresh off his QL5. There has to be massive fundamental change in the Reserve force if we are to any tangible work that has a positive effect on the army as a whole.



Totally agree with this statement with one caveat: There also has to be a fundamental change in the Regular Force. The system is broken. The problem is that the senior leadership doesn't see it as a problem worth spending too much time on. The last time they did was around 2001/2 and that didn't work out so well.

 :worms:


----------



## dapaterson

The Army Reserve structure, defended to the death by the Army Reserve's senior personnel (note I am not using the word leaders) will be the death of the Army Reserve.

About 1 in 3 members of the A Res are Infantry; in the Reg F, that's 1 in 4.

The Reg F ratio of Inf to Veh Techs is about 3:1; in the A Res it's closer to 16 to 1.

So, want Res F mechanics to maintain the Res F veh fleet?  (A) it's not done that way in peer militaries, where they rely mostly on contracted support, and (B) we still need to scrap a large chunk of the existing Res F Infantry structure (designed to feed warm bodies into WWI / WWII attritional warfare) and replace it with more support functions.

But that would mean that the storied Second Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Western Mukluks, which parades fewer than 50 trained soldiers, might disappear, and god forbid we make any change.


The biggest threat to the continued existence of the Army Reserve is the Army Reserve... refusing to ever make difficult choices, and believing its own Potemkin facades to be reality.


Mind you, the Reg F is also spiraling the same drain.  With only 37 M777, we could field at maximum a single regiment of artillery (four firing batteries of six guns) which, in a peer or near-peer environment, would be rendered combat ineffective within 24 hours.  (Assuming we retain a reference model, and two batteries for training).  Smiling and putting up a brave face about our critical shortfalls across the Army is not a Reg / Res either /or.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army Reserve structure, defended to the death by the Army Reserve's senior personnel (note I am not using the word leaders) will be the death of the Army Reserve.
> ...
> The biggest threat to the continued existence of the Army Reserve is the Army Reserve... refusing to ever make difficult choices, and believing its own Potemkin facades to be reality.
> 
> Mind you, the Reg F is also spiraling the same drain.  With only 37 M777, we could field at maximum a single regiment of artillery (four firing batteries of six guns) which, in a peer or near-peer environment, would be rendered combat ineffective within 24 hours.  (Assuming we retain a reference model, and two batteries for training).  Smiling and putting up a brave face about our critical shortfalls across the Army is not a Reg / Res either /or.



I'll take that on in two respects - one important; one petty.

I tend to believe much of what is written in "Relentless Struggle" insofar as that the Regular Force, because it holds the power and for numerous other reasons, is the reserves' biggest enemy. Where I do agree with you is that the army reserves' leadership (including the retired ones in Reserve 2000) despite the good things that they've done are also the biggest obstacle particularly in how they insist on expanding the reserves and not allowing consolidation into fewer, bigger units. Firstly, I'm not sure we can generate 40,000 reservists; secondly, using the current reserve force model, it would still be an ineffective organization (I'm of the view that we need a paradigm shift to lift the reserves out of the rut they are in); thirdly, consolidation into fewer, fully manned units organized into fewer and more effective brigades, each with clearly defined roles and resources is such a logical step that any resistance to it makes little sense (but that all depends on the plan and so far the regular force hasn't generated any good ones to back up consolidation-consolidation by itself will not solve the problem without many other concurrent changes). I expect Reserve 2000's position is that even when consolidated, the regular force will still deny the reserves the appropriate funding, role, equipment etc and therefore they would just be one step closer to withering away.

On the petty side, most nations have artillery battalions of three six-gun batteries (and also some general support stuff to back that up) so 37 guns should provide us with two equipped regiments (which still leaves us one short, not to mention general support) But that's just math. And don't get me started on our tank situation and whether or not the LAV6.0 is a fighting vehicle that can operate with tanks (or just a battlefield taxi).

More in line with the topic of this thread:



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> About 1 in 3 members of the A Res are Infantry; in the Reg F, that's 1 in 4.
> 
> The Reg F ratio of Inf to Veh Techs is about 3:1; in the A Res it's closer to 16 to 1.
> 
> So, want Res F mechanics to maintain the Res F veh fleet?  (A) it's not done that way in peer militaries, where they rely mostly on contracted support, and (B) we still need to scrap a large chunk of the existing Res F Infantry structure (designed to feed warm bodies into WWI / WWII attritional warfare) and replace it with more support functions.



I agree with you here in general because I believe we still require some combat oriented reservists in fully manned and equipped formations to provide more lethality for our forces in general. Our much vaunted three regular brigades are so ill equipped and manned, so rife with critical capability deficiencies, that we have very little staying power in a peer-to-peer conflict (and I use the term loosely because we are well below peer level with our most likely opponent) On a rough estimate my view is that we need two fully staffed reserve (or mixed) manoeuvre brigade groups to augment the other three.

More importantly we need more support capability. I've run some numbers and establishments on that and come up with three support brigades: one artillery, one manoeuvre enhancement and one sustainment using the current/achievable strength of the army reserve. I add quite a lot of Class A and B maintainers in that equation. If I saw any possibility of expanding the size of the army reserve it would clearly be by adding more support brigades as I think our overall need will be there. I think the ratio of support brigades to manoeuvre should be roughly 2.5 to 1. The only reason that I see that we can get by with three support brigades is that I think we will never be able to deploy more than 1.5 or maybe 2 manoeuvre brigade groups at any given time in any event. Regardless. We need a lot more usable maintainers, truckers and sup techs to name a few.

 :stirpot:


----------



## OldSolduer

And the vast majority of Canadians could care less if they could. Defence matters are not a priority until the caskets start arriving in Trenton. Then those matters start to matter, until its over. 

Forgive me for my somewhat bitter negative tone.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Does the army accept any of the outside trade qualifications for Reserve personal? So if they have air tickets, electrical or mechanic from a reputable org, that translate directly into a army qualification? If not make it happen and that eases your training burden, along with increasing the number of available techs at minimal costs. Then add 1 Class b maintainer to each Svc Battalion, issue tools and give the unit authority to order spare parts and locally source others. Vehicle dependent units like artillery, armour and Combat Engineers are next in line for Class B maintainers. this will benefit the Infantry as more of the Brigade vehicles will be serviceable and can be borrowed as required.


----------



## dapaterson

Yes, civilian quals translate to mil quals; I recall enrolling a Veh Tech who got PLAR'd everything up to his 6s (it's been a while, so I may be off a bit).

Please stop proposing "solutions" at the unit level.  There are minimums for safety, supervision, development etc... a single maintainer is useless; two can do something, but a critical mass is what's necessary - a half dozen (IC, control, four wrench benders) is what I'd consider the bare minimum.  Add Wpns, EO and comms techs as well if you want a realistic shop, plus a few sup techs.  

Or do the onesies and twosies that most units will load down with secondary duties like mess manager that take up 90+% of their available time, and we'll not have moved at all.


----------



## a_majoor

After reading and re reading parts of this thread, I might suggest a bit of a frame change.

While I am all for economies of scale and logistical compatibility, the political will and institutional ability to augment our fleet of LAV's (even for the Regular Force) simply isn't there. The time to have bought 1400 LAV's was when the program started.

On the other hand, there are arguments for smaller, lighter, less expensive vehicles which can do many of the jobs that the LAV is supposed to do. The STK "Light Strike Vehicle" is an example of this class of vehicle, weighing 1800kg, and being 4.9m long by 2.1m wide by 1,8m tall. The Mk II version can be used as a troop carrier with a crew of 6, or as a weapons carrier mounting a variety of weapons, from 40mm grenade launchers to Spike ATGM's and even the STK 120mm mortar. As a logistics/utility vehicle, it can carry 1000kg of stores.

Vehicles like this are obviously not front line, but then again, a great deal of what we do does not really require a full LAV 6.0. Changes in technology, like "smart" rounds from 120mm mortars capable of attacking armoured targets or soft recoil 105mm's that can be mounted in the back of an HMMVW could even free many vehicles from the need to carry heavy direct fire weapons, and of course lots of roles like recce, liaison and so on don't require a LAV at all. The STK is about the smallest and lightest vehicle out there, but there are plenty of other vehicles which have the sort of size and cross country performance to augment LAVs in many roles, preserving the LAVs for their primary use. They are also simple enough to provide a much lighter logistics footprint, maybe not enough to be present on Reserve armoury floors, but much more available to both regular and reserve units in terms of numbers, availability and uptime.

Even doctrinally, the STK makes more sense than the TAPV (carries more people, and is far more versatile and can fill multiple roles), so finding a vehicle with similar performance characteristics and perhaps a larger size (STK Bronco, SC Jaguar or a host of other choices) should be a priority. We certainly cannot go on waiting for the skies to open and deliver new LAV 6.0's.


----------



## dapaterson

I have not yet read Relentless Struggle, but as the staff officer responsible for Army Reserve funding and establishments from '03-08, I can state that (a) my name would show in any document review of Army Reserve documents from that period and (b) the author made no effort to contact me.

Thus, I am at best skeptical about the contents of that work... others I know who were in the Army HQ at the time were also not interviewed.

My experience in the Army HQ convinced me that the Reg F largely wants a successful, viable Res F as a base to draw personnel, and as a source of augmentation.  It is senior Res F personnel who lack understanding of the CAF, its processes, and the limits, both in time and money, of its personnel who inflict ongoing damage to the institution (by accident, not by design).


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Does the army accept any of the outside trade qualifications for Reserve personal? So if they have air tickets, electrical or mechanic from a reputable org, that translate directly into a army qualification? If not make it happen and that eases your training burden, along with increasing the number of available techs at minimal costs. Then add 1 Class b maintainer to each Svc Battalion, issue tools and give the unit authority to order spare parts and locally source others. Vehicle dependent units like artillery, armour and Combat Engineers are next in line for Class B maintainers. this will benefit the Infantry as more of the Brigade vehicles will be serviceable and can be borrowed as required.




Some are but PLRs are a case by base basis, I see it more with v tech's and cooks then anything else.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Yes, civilian quals translate to mil quals; I recall enrolling a Veh Tech who got PLAR'd everything up to his 6s (it's been a while, so I may be off a bit).
> 
> Please stop proposing "solutions" at the unit level.  There are minimums for safety, supervision, development etc... a single maintainer is useless; two can do something, but a critical mass is what's necessary - a half dozen (IC, control, four wrench benders) is what I'd consider the bare minimum.  Add Wpns, EO and comms techs as well if you want a realistic shop, plus a few sup techs.
> 
> Or do the onesies and twosies that most units will load down with secondary duties like mess manager that take up 90+% of their available time, and we'll not have moved at all.


My life was at the unit level so that is my focus, we had a Class B maintainer along with Class b QM and RSS staff, we all helped the maintainer when they needed it. Many of the repairs are minor and can be done in house and quickly. We also started doing maintenance on our guns including exercising the recoil system, something that made the gun plumbers in Chilliwack happy. I have given up on "big fixes" and go for the little bites. All the power to you if you can make your idea work.


----------



## garb811

Colin P said:
			
		

> My life was at the unit level so that is my focus, we had a Class B maintainer along with Class b QM and RSS staff, we all helped the maintainer when they needed it. Many of the repairs are minor and can be done in house and quickly. We also started doing maintenance on our guns including exercising the recoil system, something that made the gun plumbers in Chilliwack happy. I have given up on "big fixes" and go for the little bites. All the power to you if you can make your idea work.


I was posted to a MP Pl in a previous life. We had a Reg Force MCpl maintainer with a full bay and all the tools he needed. If he needed assistance on something, he could tap into the MP on strength and if it was something too technical, he could ask either HQ&Sigs or Svc Bn to get parts and/or hands. He had 10 x Iltis and trailers, 4 x LSVW and trailers and 1 x MLVW with a water buffalo. He could barely keep ahead of things at times, many times we were at a 50% VOR, not due to a lack of parts or anything, simply because he just couldn't keep up with the required inspections, let alone the flood of repairs that would result from a month of abuse in the field. Throw in the paperwork and it was more than a single guy could handle at times.  

Talked to the "current" guy a few years ago and his time turning wrenches was pretty much non-existent with a down-sized fleet (G-Wagons didn't replace Iltis 1/1 and the MLVW was waiting for disposal), he'd essentially become a control office due to DRIMIS and the work was being conducted by QL3s from the Svc Bn working on their QL4s. The MP at the Pl were useless to him for anything other than pretty much driver maintenance due to the fact that even the basic vehicles aren't basic anymore.

Take from that what you will but dapaterson is right, there is no way, from my experience, that a single Veh Tech is going to give any kind of useful maint capability.


----------



## CBH99

I know this is off topic -- pls forgive, my intent isn't to derail this thread at all.  


I was having a chat with members from 2 US Army National Guard units about 6 months ago, and they had similar problems.  So while they absolutely have the manpower, kit, and weapons at the unit level to deploy as a self-sufficient unit & contribute as a unit to an AO, they had ample vehicle issues of their own.

Different guard units had different models of Bradleys, which meant - in some cases - different engine parts & components, as well as different mechanisms in the turrets, tracks, etc.


So while they all had "Bradleys" - some units had updated comms, some didn't.  Some had slightly different or upgraded engines, some didn't.  Some had different little mechanical bits here and there, while others didn't.  They had more maintenance issues than I ever imagined.


Like everything else US military related...similar problems, just on a whole other level than "We only have 2 working MilCots".  


*Random tangent over*


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> My experience in the Army HQ convinced me that the Reg F largely wants a successful, viable Res F as a base to draw personnel, and as a source of augmentation.  It is senior Res F personnel who lack understanding of the CAF, its processes, and the limits, both in time and money, of its personnel who inflict ongoing damage to the institution (by accident, not by design).



Once again you have put your finger right on the problem which is that the Regular Force is looking for augmentees to fill holes either as day-to-day administrative Class Bs or as surge operational Class Cs.

With respect, that is a limited view of what the reserves could be capable of if properly organized and trained. The current system relegates them to an "office overload" position which does nothing to expand the capabilities of the total force which quite frankly is a bloody weak organization at best because Regular Force personnel costs are sapping the organization of money for critical equipment and operations and maintenance.

To quote a much used phrase "reserves add depth and breadth". Augmentation is only depth. Reserves currently provide only very limited breadth. It could provide much more.

 :cheers:


----------



## McG

FJAG said:
			
		

> Once again you have put your finger right on the problem which is that the Regular Force is looking for augmentees to fill holes either as day-to-day administrative Class Bs or as surge operational Class Cs.


... or is the problem a Reserve Force with ambitions to deploy itself internationally in formed sub-units, units, and formations even in the absence of a requirement?



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> [The Total Force] is a bloody weak organization at best because Regular Force personnel costs are sapping the organization of money for critical equipment and operations and maintenance.


So your proposal is to cut the Regular Force?



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> To quote a much used phrase "reserves add depth and breadth". Augmentation is only depth. Reserves currently provide only very limited breadth. It could provide much more.


Just because a thing can be done, it does not follow that the thing should be done.  What is the requirement for (and what problem is being fixed by) getting third-rate armoured fighting vehicles and establishing support brigades for the reserves?  Do we think that we could mobilize units in a Saxon or Grizzly like vehicle and deploy these without catastrophic results against a peer enemy?  Or would we really be buying these for the glory of the units which would park them at the armouries?


----------



## Halifax Tar

I am enjoying this dissucssion and learning lots.  

Out of left field is there any lessons that could be learned from the way the RCN and RCAF organize, operate and employ their respective reserve forces ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Once again you have put your finger right on the problem which is that the Regular Force is looking for augmentees to fill holes either as day-to-day administrative Class Bs or as surge operational Class Cs.
> 
> With respect, that is a limited view of what the reserves could be capable of if properly organized and trained. The current system relegates them to an "office overload" position which does nothing to expand the capabilities of the total force which quite frankly is a bloody weak organization at best because Regular Force personnel costs are sapping the organization of money for critical equipment and operations and maintenance.
> 
> To quote a much used phrase "reserves add depth and breadth". Augmentation is only depth. Reserves currently provide only very limited breadth. It could provide much more.
> 
> :cheers:



One might lead to another e.g., if the the Reserves get good at the 'augmenting' thing then, over time, they can build the capacity to do the 'stand alone' thing.

Going from what we are capable of now (IMHO, barley able to get the augmenting thing sorted out) straight to providing independent sub-units for immediate integration into Reg F units is a tricky 'peak leap', from both a policy and practical point of view.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> One might lead to another e.g., if the the Reserves get good at the 'augmenting' thing then, over time, they can build the capacity to do the 'stand alone' thing.
> 
> Going from what we are capable of now (IMHO, barley able to get the augmenting thing sorted out) straight to providing independent sub-units for immediate integration into Reg F units is a tricky 'peak leap', from both a policy and practical point of view.



Not sure what you mean by "barely capable" of augmenting the Reg Force. The Calgary Highlanders have augmented virtually every 3 Div deployment for the last 15 years or so. We currently have pers augmenting various Reg Force Units in multiple (at least 3) theaters. 

As we speak there is a 100% PRes mortar platoon deployed to Latvia. Considering that this capability was rebuilt within the army from scratch, and the flash to bang was less than 2 years I think that is a pretty good indicator that deployable (vs. deplorable  ) formed PRes sub-units are realistic right now.


----------



## McG

platoon = sub-sub unit

company = sub-unit


----------



## MilEME09

Sub sub unit or sub unit is semantics, point was the Pres deployed a body that wasn't just individual augmenties, now this is a success case, cant say I have heard of other units yet reaching those platoon deployment objectives set by the army


----------



## Loch Sloy!

I get that a mortar platoon is not a company... however take at the look at a mortar platoon ORBAT, it's a large and complex beast. 

If we can train and deploy a mortar platoon from scratch, I'm very confident that we (41 brigade) could manage a rifle company.


----------



## MilEME09

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> I get that a mortar platoon is not a company... however take at the look at a mortar platoon ORBAT, it's a large and complex beast.
> 
> If we can train and deploy a mortar platoon from scratch, I'm very confident that we (41 brigade) could manage a rifle company.



Does the Highlanders and the LER have the manning for a rifle company? I think a bigger milestone will be if we or any other brigade can have each units platoon task deployed at the same time, recce troop, combined CSS platoon, etc
.... such a deployment would represent a company + in assets.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Could you have a brigade provide the company, where each infantry unit works at providing a platoon and other units fill different positions (mortar, driver, medic, storesman, etc)?


----------



## dapaterson

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> I get that a mortar platoon is not a company... however take at the look at a mortar platoon ORBAT, it's a large and complex beast.
> 
> If we can train and deploy a mortar platoon from scratch, I'm very confident that we (41 brigade) could manage a rifle company.



No.  A mortar platoon is small and straightforward.  It's an important achievement, but it's neither large nor complex.

As with many of Canada's Army Reserve formations, 41 CBG has the trained strength to justify a single LCol in command.  (Assuming all Pte R, Pte B, OCdt and 2Lt are not yet OFP).   The trained strength of infanteers across the brigade could form two companies at 100% attendance.  Based on the 3:1 rule of thumb for Res F availability, 41 CBG would be hard pressed to generate a rifle company - more likely, a company HQ, two platoons of infantry (with luck) and a third composite company of ATR soldiers.

DWAN only link: http://mcs-lcm.forces.mil.ca/MCSPersonnel/Default.aspx#MOS:!FRCRes!LZ:9824!RNK:!CIV:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> Not sure what you mean by "barely capable" of augmenting the Reg Force. The Calgary Highlanders have augmented virtually every 3 Div deployment for the last 15 years or so. We currently have pers augmenting various Reg Force Units in multiple (at least 3) theaters.
> 
> As we speak there is a 100% PRes mortar platoon deployed to Latvia. Considering that this capability was rebuilt within the army from scratch, and the flash to bang was less than 2 years I think that is a pretty good indicator that deployable (vs. deplorable  ) formed PRes sub-units are realistic right now.




Yes, I know the Cal His are awesome. You rock. Now.

But what about the other several thousand Class As across Canada?  Can your awesomeness be sustained forever?

Accidents of geography and access to resources, like a lot of retired Reg F people for example, or downturns in the economy that incent people to join up, are no way to ‘run a railroad’ over the longer term.

Not saying that’s the case for you, but I’ve certainly seen those factors influence units I’ve been part of over the last couple of decades.


----------



## OldSolduer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  A mortar platoon is small and straightforward.  It's an important achievement, but it's neither large nor complex.



Not straight forward - in terms of personnel required to competently man six 81 mm medium mortars you need a decent command element and trained MFCs. 
Its also not terribly easy to train competent numbers on the mortars themselves.

Mortar Platoons in the 70s and 80s at wartime strength was at that time in about the 50 all ranks range. 

NOT straightforward.


----------



## Kirkhill

I note that this conversation started with mention of units fielding 4 Grizzlies.

I was in the "Calg Highrs" when we had our 4 Grizzlies.

Maintenance wasn't a problem.  Because we didn't use them.

I remember them being used locally to train drivers and VCs. I remember a dog and pony show recruiting exercise in a classy mall (trying not to damage the marble).  I remember a singular road move to Suffield preceeding an exercise where me and my buddies tried to dig trenches in hardpan and never caught a glimpse of our Grizzlies.

We had ranges at Harvey Barracks so we could have trained gunners.  Just like we could have trained riflemen, grenadiers, machine-gunners, 60 mm mortarmen, CG men and asslt pnrs.  We didn't lack facilities.

We didn't lack for willing offrs, NCOs or troops.

We lacked dollars.

Dollars to hire the troops for training (offrs and NCOs were donating more time than we were getting paid for)
Dollars to buy beans
Dollars to buy bullets, bombs and pyro
Dollars fuel for buses, jeeps, 5/4s, deuces and grizzlies to get to ranges.
Dollars for range staff....

Recruiting people to play with toys is not a problem.  Keeping them more than 30 days was and is a challenge.


----------



## PuckChaser

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> If we can train and deploy a mortar platoon from scratch, I'm very confident that we (41 brigade) could manage a rifle company.



Shouldn't take an entire brigade to field a rifle company...


----------



## MilEME09

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Shouldn't take an entire brigade to field a rifle company...



If we were manned at actual brigade strength I would agree with you. But the reserves in canada are not manned at proper strength for what they are.


----------



## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If we were manned at actual brigade strength I would agree with you. But the reserves in canada are not manned at proper strength for what they are.



The Reserve brigades are not properly structured.  The GoC goal is a 30K Res F, about 75% Army.  That's 22.5K.  BTL and recruiting overhead of 4.5K leaves 18K trained strength.  That's four brigades, not ten.

Res F structure is stuck in 1946.


----------



## MJP

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> Not sure what you mean by "barely capable" of augmenting the Reg Force. The Calgary Highlanders have augmented virtually every 3 Div deployment for the last 15 years or so. We currently have pers augmenting various Reg Force Units in multiple (at least 3) theaters.
> 
> As we speak there is a 100% PRes mortar platoon deployed to Latvia. Considering that this capability was rebuilt within the army from scratch, and the flash to bang was less than 2 years I think that is a pretty good indicator that deployable (vs. deplorable  ) formed PRes sub-units are realistic right now.



It was a great achievement but it really took a Div effort to produce one Pl and even then it was dicey and required Ref F augmentation at all stages to get it done.  Hardly a marker for a self sustaining ResF or the CA to rest its laurels on and say fait accompli.


----------



## CBH99

The Calg Highlanders also deployed a sub-unit to Afghanistan for I believe 2 rotations in a row, in additional to other augmentations.

The RegF was required to stand up the capability as they were the ones who had some experience with mortars, and the mortars themselves.  The training on mortars & the mortars themselves came from the RegF, and it was the RegF who was needed to assist in standing up the capability.


Now that the unit has mortars, instructors, and the ability to generate troops to provide that capability - RegF involvement is minimal.  (From what I understand, anyway)


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Reserve brigades are not properly structured.  The GoC goal is a 30K Res F, about 75% Army.  That's 22.5K.  BTL and recruiting overhead of 4.5K leaves 18K trained strength.  That's four brigades, not ten.
> 
> Res F structure is stuck in 1946.



18000 / 120 nominal units = 150 TES per reserve unit = 1 Coy + 1 Cadre = 1 Capt + 1 Maj

120 Coys / 4 Brigades = 30 Res Coys per Res Brigade 

1 Res Bde / Area  

So how do you want to regiment your companies?

Land Force Structure

CanSOFCom

1 Div (1,2 and 5 Bde)

Res Div (R2, R3, R4 and R5 Bdes)

Canadian Rangers

What do we want to do with those troops?

What tools do they need to do the job effectively?

How much training do they need?  How often?  Can they be put on a long return spring once trained?

Myself, I have argued, and continue to argue, that reserve units should essentially be foot borne rifle companies focused on lots of practice of BMQ skills with a secondary function as a repository for skilled trades released from the regs but still under obligation to the colours.

Small arms, comms and roadworthy vehicles as a priority.


----------



## daftandbarmy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Shouldn't take an entire brigade to field a rifle company...



Good point.

I've been the OC for reservist rifle companies that required 3 different brigades to 'field'.... 

.... that we were able to get our act together at all was a testament to the excellent leadership at the platoon level (Officers, SNCOs and NCMs), usually just in time to be embarrassed by the directing staff invigilating over advanced tasks that we were thrown into at short notice which, while serving in the Reg F, I had had weeks to prepare a rifle company for


----------



## FJAG

I'd be the last guy to demean anyone's achievements in turning out a platoon to support the regular force. In fact I'd go so far as to laud it as quite an achievement considering how heavily the whole system is stacked on achieving that so, good on 'ya Cal His.

In answer to these points: 



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> ... or is the problem a Reserve Force with ambitions to deploy itself internationally in formed sub-units, units, and formations even in the absence of a requirement?



The requirement is that SSE, amongst other things, recognizes Russia and China as a threat and proposes that we have forces capable of deterring and fighting them. We currently do not have the equipment to do that. and our three brigades seem hard pressed to get out a couple of battle groups at any one time. We need a lower cost alternative, even if that has more risk. (and quite frankly having a company of LAVs with little anti armour, artillery, air defence, no reinforcement plan and a whole lot of other things that would help them survive a fight is in my mind an enormous risk. We need to do better.




			
				MCG said:
			
		

> So your proposal is to cut the Regular Force?



If that's what it takes to ensure that our regular force and reserve force is properly equipped, trained and maintained then absolutely. Right now we p*** away half of our defence budget on salaries. Our aging equipment is taking up an inordinate percentage of the remaining budget just to keep stuff on the road. Leslie pointed out in 2011 how bloated our headquarters have become. Rather than taking action on that NDHQ tinkered away very little on the job after he was gone. I'd start by cutting headquarters. I've attached an article of some folks who did it.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Just because a thing can be done, it does not follow that the thing should be done.  What is the requirement for (and what problem is being fixed by) getting third-rate armoured fighting vehicles and establishing support brigades for the reserves?  Do we think that we could mobilize units in a Saxon or Grizzly like vehicle and deploy these without catastrophic results against a peer enemy?  Or would we really be buying these for the glory of the units which would park them at the armouries?



Who says they should be third rate? Maybe as an interim training and organization measure but in the end we should never give any soldier (regular or reserve) any equipment he can't fight with. Giving the reserves hand-me-downs is part of the attitude problem what permeates the system. I totally agree that under the current system it makes little sense. That's why I'm a strong advocate that the system (both regular and reserve) needs to be torn down and rebuilt in a way that creates a balance of risks and costs through the use of a combined total force where the regulars are there to meet the day-to-day issues that the forces must face and the reserves are there (trained and equipped) to meet the extreme situations where a lethal and credible force is needed. Right now we have neither a lethal nor credible force.

I'll be honest with you. I think Hellier s****d the pooch back in the day when he bought into the Stryker concept. He took his eye off the heavy stuff. He wasn't alone but he was still wrong and we're still playing shell games as a result. Hindsight is 20/20.

 :stirpot:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Loch Sloy! said:
			
		

> I'm very confident that we (41 brigade) could manage a rifle company.



Think about that statement.  An entire CBG might be able to manage a Coy.  Is that supposed to be impressive?  

3 decades ago, my old PRes Armd unit could field a decent Recce Sqn;  3 x 7 (or 5) car troops, an A1 Ech, SHQ with 2 X CPs from the resident Comm Res unit.  Nowadays?  I'd be surprised if they had the kit and people for a single recce troop.  We paraded 2 nights a week, usually did Weekend Recce Ex's regularly (10 was normal pre/trg year, plus the normal range/IBTS weekends, Winter Indoc and Warfare)...we could go out on a ruck march or establish a hasty mounted Op screen on a trg night back then without having to go thru ridiculous amounts of requests and staff work to everyone above the rank of MCpl in the Bde (District).

Training has been decimated, with 32 cl A days per mbr/per year, which includes all the mandatory mamby-pamby stuff.

Are we getting the bang for our buck out of the Reserves as a whole?  My opinion is "I don't think so, unfortunately".  Should we throw a bunch of money at problem?  Nope.  We have operational, Reg Force units who NEED that money to do the day to day business, at home and around the world.   :2c:


----------



## MilEME09

In my opinion it's not that we as an organization need more money, the problem is we as an organization are not spending the money we have efficiently, look at our bloated HQs and empires, we have 5 divisions, and would never field enough manpower to fill 1.if we continue to pretend we are something we aren't , the CAF will continue to fail.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Think about that statement.  An entire CBG might be able to manage a Coy.  Is that supposed to be impressive?



Said it before but to rehash I've seen it take 3x reserve brigades to populate a reserve infantry company and couple dets for a roto. 

Reserve armored regiments across 3 brigades couldn't populate a platoon and needed augmentation. 

Shorter work up periods would help. In the case of the former we had 6 months of pre-work up training. Weekends and some week or two ex's here and there. 6 months work up. 6 month tour. 
Bet I could put together some wicked training to qualify people in the important stuff in a month or two. 
But I also bet that would turn into 7 months of BS


----------



## daftandbarmy

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Said it before but to rehash I've seen it take 3x reserve brigades to populate a reserve infantry company and couple dets for a roto.
> 
> Reserve armored regiments across 3 brigades couldn't populate a platoon and needed augmentation.
> 
> Shorter work up periods would help. In the case of the former we had 6 months of pre-work up training. Weekends and some week or two ex's here and there. 6 months work up. 6 month tour.
> Bet I could put together some wicked training to qualify people in the Importsnt stuff in a month or two.
> But I also bet that would turn into 7 months of BS



Just think of all the rice bowls you'd be breaking  :


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Think about that statement.  An entire CBG might be able to manage a Coy.  Is that supposed to be impressive?
> 
> 3 decades ago, my old PRes Armd unit could field a decent Recce Sqn;  3 x 7 (or 5) car troops, an A1 Ech, SHQ with 2 X CPs from the resident Comm Res unit.  Nowadays?  I'd be surprised if they had the kit and people for a single recce troop.  We paraded 2 nights a week, usually did Weekend Recce Ex's regularly (10 was normal pre/trg year, plus the normal range/IBTS weekends, Winter Indoc and Warfare)...we could go out on a ruck march or establish a hasty mounted Op screen on a trg night back then without having to go thru ridiculous amounts of requests and staff work to everyone above the rank of MCpl in the Bde (District).
> 
> Training has been decimated, with 32 cl A days per mbr/per year, which includes all the mandatory mamby-pamby stuff.
> 
> Are we getting the bang for our buck out of the Reserves as a whole?  My opinion is "I don't think so, unfortunately".  Should we throw a bunch of money at problem?  Nope.  We have operational, Reg Force units who NEED that money to do the day to day business, at home and around the world.   :2c:



The Primary Reserve budget is a rounding error in the overall defence budget at around 1 billion dollars.  That includes all of the Reserve salary, the salary of RSS, equipment, our slice of individual training and institutional support, base infrastructure...everything. The department turns back significantly more than that every year.  If you're looking for efficiencies, there isn't much blood to squeeze out of the PRes stone. 

At that price point, I would offer that the PRes would be a great investment if it did nothing but act as a strategic reserve of trained personnel to be called up in the event of some sort of major domestic calamity, or to provide depth to the Regular Force in the case of a protracted major conflict.  However, we don't just do that.  We have contributed to domestic and international operations on a sustained basis since the early 90s, including 20% of our commitment to Afghanistan, and even higher percentages for the former Yugoslavia operations.  It was fairly clearly recognized that the Army would not have been able to sustain either of those operations without significant reserve support.  Beyond that, we provide a military presence and conduct community relations in every major community in the country, keeping the military at the front of mind of our citizens and helping to maintain the goodwill necessary protect the military budget we have.   

If you are talking about gaining efficiency in terms of manpower, I would offer that we should absolutely be looking at that.  The Australian Defence Forces maintain every capability the CAF does (and some we don't to include Attack Helicopters and Amphibious Assault Ships) and a very similar force structure with a full-time component of 55,000 compared to our 68,000.  Is that particularly efficient? The capital acquisition/O&M/manpower balance is the real question here, and I would offer that we are unbalanced with high personnel costs at the expense of O&M and capital acquisition.


----------



## McG

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> The Primary Reserve budget is a rounding error in the overall defence budget at around 1 billion dollars.  That includes all of the Reserve salary, the salary of RSS, equipment, our slice of individual training and institutional support, base infrastructure...everything. The department turns back significantly more than that every year.


Is your premise here an assumption, or can you reference something that shows the aggregate of all these costs adding up to just "a rounding error" ... including where you point to the costs of infrastructure and Reg F pay that are consumed in support of PRes?


----------



## Infanteer

As well, I'd hardly consider $1b in a $22b budget a rounding error - that's a significant portion (just below 5%) of the defence program.


----------



## Rifleman62

Canada spends more on National Debt interest than on Defence per year.

Last Updated on December 18, 2019:

*Interest Payments Per Year C$29,534,055,223;*

Interest Payments Per Second C$937; National Debt Per Citizen C$34,173; Debt as % of GDP 62.58%; GDP Of Canada C$1,981,461,877,337; and Canada Population 36,285,770.

Read more at: https://commodity.com/debt-clock/canada/


----------



## RCPalmer

MCG said:
			
		

> Is your premise here an assumption, or can you reference something that shows the aggregate of all these costs adding up to just "a rounding error" ... including where you point to the costs of infrastructure and Reg F pay that are consumed in support of PRes?



Admittedly that is a hard thing to quantify, but they did attempt to do precisely that in the FY 13/14 Departmental Plans and Priorities report. The have not done so in subsequent years, so perhaps it is hard to do.  The link is now dead, but I've included below my original post in this thread from when it was active. I will see if I can find the original report.  With regards to cost capture around things like RegF infrastructure in support of PRes tasks, it is admittedly hard to disentangle for expenses not directly related to an O&M fin code.  However, RegF units use PRes infrastructure too, CFTPO PRes equipment in support of various tasks, and even occasionally participate in individual training delivered by the PRes.  

Perhaps "rounding error" is a bit too strong of a word, though I'm sure the variance in DND's Q1 and Q2 financial projections is well over a billion dollars.  My point is that even if you closed down the PRes program entirely, it would not be significant enough to change the funding outlook for the institution more broadly.



			
				RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Agreed.  To provide a bit of context as the overall cost of the reserve force has been talked around in this thread, a fairly comprehensive estimate of the cost of the reserve force for FY 13/14 can be found here:
> 
> http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page
> 
> To summarize, the total cost of the PRes (including RSS PYs, pay, infrastructure and equipment) is approximately 1.3 billion dollars, or 7.2% of the 18 billion dollar defence budget.  Unfortunately, this type of cost capture was not published for the years before or after, so there is no easy way to do a year over year comparison.  Viewed in this context, I would offer that the PRes offers excellent value for the money.
> 
> I would further offer that even if you disbanded the PRes tomorrow, and the defence portfolio somehow realized that 1.3b in savings, you wouldn't see much in the way of capability growth in the RegF.  LGen Leslie's 2011 transformation report concluded that most of the funding growth realized in the 2000's not directly related to the war in Afghanistan went into personnel costs that did little to enhance capabilities or readiness.  This is why he was making the case for a leaner, more efficient force.  Until we take some steps to achieving such a force, we really have no idea whether anyone in defence needs more money.
> 
> In terms of comparing forces, the Australians manage to maintain all of the capabilities we do (and a number of capabilities we don't) with a 55,000 person full-time component.  Assuming a CAF funded to 68,000, that is a 20% manning difference of 13,000 full time personnel.   Employing a $100,000/person/year SWAG for the incremental cost of a full time paid member (think pay, benefits and training only), that personnel delta alone (without accounting for the capability deltas which would widen that chasm) accounts for $1.3 billion dollars, equivalent to the cost of the entire PRes.
> 
> It is undeniable that the PRes requires significant structural reform, particularly if an increase in PRes roles and missions is desired in the context of the needs of the overall force.  There are inefficiencies all over the place. However, the cost of those inefficiencies are absolutely trivial compared to those that exist in the full time component.
> 
> The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level. My hope is that within the CAF there would be discussions about reform on all fronts to make the entire force more efficient.  Instead, what I hear (both from an institutional perspective and to a certain extent on this forum) are parochial discussions of the PRes not providing value for money, and a requirement for the PRes to grow while simultaneously becoming more accountable and efficient without any of the structural changes necessary to actually make that happen.  To summarize, from the shop floor it looks like we (the PRes) are being set up for failure as an excuse to justify the status quo.  Whether that is true or not, the perception exists and it is a morale crusher.  Until we as a force find a way bring the full and part time components together to move forward together as a team, we are just spinning our wheels.


----------



## RCPalmer

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Admittedly that is a hard thing to quantify, but they did attempt to do precisely that in the FY 13/14 Departmental Plans and Priorities report. The have not done so in subsequent years, so perhaps it is hard to do.  The link is now dead, but I've included below my original post in this thread from when it was active. I will see if I can find the original report.  With regards to cost capture around things like RegF infrastructure in support of PRes tasks, it is admittedly hard to disentangle expenses not directly related to an O&M fin code.  However, RegF units use PRes infrastructure too, CFTPO PRes equipment in support of various tasks, and even occasionally participate in individual training delivered by the PRes.
> 
> Perhaps "rounding error" is a bit too strong of a word, though I'm sure the variance in DND's Q1 and Q2 financial projections is well over a billion dollars.  My point is that even if you closed down the PRes program entirely, it would not be significant enough to change the funding outlook for the institution more broadly.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> Shouldn't take an entire brigade to field a rifle company...



In a perfect world reserve battalions would be properly manned and equipped, and in that world I would agree with you. 

In reality 41 brigade only has 2 Infantry Units both of which are only authorized a certain number of pers (as I'm sure you know that authorized strength is WAY below a full battalion) and very few vehicles. Of the vehicles we had, many were re-directed to the reg force to cover shortfalls caused by delayed procurement projects. Although I hear we're getting some of our MSVSs back now and we do get to see our milcots parked in a field in Wainwright when we are on EX...  :

Also the reserves have tasks other than supporting the Regular force on international operations (in particular the DomOps task is fairly significant) which place constraints on reserve COs. 

Given all of those factors, it doesn't seem unreasonable to form a composite (each unit to provide a platoon or 2) reserve company. As you say, it's worked fairly well for reserve concentration exercises, and with a proper work up I'm confident that a sub unit of this type could add a lot of value operationally (DNS tasks for example). It would be sustainable for reserve units as currently configured and would actually drive recruiting and retention for the reserves.


----------



## GR66

Hi, 

Lots of questions come to mind in following this discussion.  Very informative!

What would the impact be of going from 9 x Infantry Battalions (6 x LAV, 3 x Light) in 3 x Reg Force Brigades to 6 x Infantry Battalions (1 x Medium LAV Brigade and 1 x Light Infantry Brigade)?  

Would the command overhead and PY savings in the reduction of the number of Commands/Battalions allow the remaining 6 x Battalions to be fully manned including all of the supporting elements, school and staff positions, etc?

If fully manned, would these Brigades be more or less capable of deploying a Battle Group (with less Reserve augmentation required?) than the existing undermanned Battalions?  Would overall troop availability for "routine" (non-emergency) deployments be significantly affected?

Would there be enough annual PY savings year on year to reinvest the money into better (properly) equipping the Reg Force Armoured, Artillery and Engineer Regiments (roles that from what I gather from these forums are difficult for a Reserve unit to generate up to a Reg Force standard).

If we are replacing the current (6 Battalion?) fleet of LAV IIIs with LAV 6.0's, would there benefit to taking the fleet that would have gone to the 3 x disbanded LAV battalions in this scenario and keeping them as replacement war stocks that could be manned by troops from the Light battalions and/or Reserves in case of mobilization?  Would having this kind of reserve equipment available be more useful in being able to sustain a single existing Brigade Group in combat rather than trying to increase the size of our force in time of war (without having the equipment stocks available to properly equip them)?

Would changes like this enable a re-think in how the Reserves are expected to support the Reg Force?


----------



## PuckChaser

Its almost like these are the questions that could have been answered with a promised (in 2015) wide-ranging defense policy review...


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:
			
		

> Hi,
> 
> Lots of questions come to mind in following this discussion.  Very informative!
> 
> What would the impact be of going from 9 x Infantry Battalions (6 x LAV, 3 x Light) in 3 x Reg Force Brigades to 6 x Infantry Battalions (1 x Medium LAV Brigade and 1 x Light Infantry Brigade)?
> 
> Would the command overhead and PY savings in the reduction of the number of Commands/Battalions allow the remaining 6 x Battalions to be fully manned including all of the supporting elements, school and staff positions, etc?
> 
> If fully manned, would these Brigades be more or less capable of deploying a Battle Group (with less Reserve augmentation required?) than the existing undermanned Battalions?  Would overall troop availability for "routine" (non-emergency) deployments be significantly affected?
> 
> Would there be enough annual PY savings year on year to reinvest the money into better (properly) equipping the Reg Force Armoured, Artillery and Engineer Regiments (roles that from what I gather from these forums are difficult for a Reserve unit to generate up to a Reg Force standard).
> 
> If we are replacing the current (6 Battalion?) fleet of LAV IIIs with LAV 6.0's, would there benefit to taking the fleet that would have gone to the 3 x disbanded LAV battalions in this scenario and keeping them as replacement war stocks that could be manned by troops from the Light battalions and/or Reserves in case of mobilization?  Would having this kind of reserve equipment available be more useful in being able to sustain a single existing Brigade Group in combat rather than trying to increase the size of our force in time of war (without having the equipment stocks available to properly equip them)?
> 
> Would changes like this enable a re-think in how the Reserves are expected to support the Reg Force?



You raise a good point. If the three battalions of LAVs are kept "in reserve" (rather than cut up for scrap like the M109s) then we have not lost any capability if manned by properly trained reserve battalions.

The trouble is that under the current system we cannot create "properly trained" reserve battalions. Not because we don't have good willing people; but because the system just makes it impossible with our "parade whenever you feel like it" system and a system that has lesser standards for individual training for reservists and no system at all for viable and realistic collective training. 

One other point is that in your model you are not reducing the size of the regular force (and thereby freeing up $ for capital equipment purchases and O&M costs) but just shuffling PYs around. (and me being the cynic that I am would bet dollars to donuts that most of those PYs would end up in Ottawa)

 :cheers:


----------



## Eye In The Sky

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> At that price point, I would offer that the PRes would be a great investment if it did nothing but act as a strategic reserve of semi-trained personnel to be called up in the event of some sort of major domestic calamity, or to provide depth to the Regular Force in the case of a protracted major conflict.  However, we don't just do that.  We have contributed to domestic and international operations on a sustained basis since the early 90s, including 20% of our commitment to Afghanistan, and even higher percentages for the former Yugoslavia operations.  It was fairly clearly recognized that the Army would not have been able to sustain either of those operations without significant reserve support.  Beyond that, we provide a military presence and conduct community relations in every major community in the country, keeping the military at the front of mind of our citizens and helping to maintain the goodwill necessary protect the military budget we have.



I'm sorry, but having heard this argument before, I always remember reading Red Storm Rising and the callup of the Category C units in the old Red Army;  how their fitness, training and equipment actually demonstrated they lacked combat capability when the bullets started flying (yes, I know it was a book, but you get my point).  Strategic Reserve...like how 41 CBG might be able to form a Rifle Coy?  I don't see much punch there for the price point.  

Yup, I was in the PRes when Yugo was going on, UNPROFOR...Afghanistan.  I'm not slighting anyone who served in, well, any operational theatre or on DOMOPs.  Both are important.  But, during any of those, did a Reserve unit go "complete" or were they plugged in here and there?  It's not like the 8 CH loaded up all their Cougars and deployed to FYR, right?  So, we could cut down on the amount of HQs (which are fairly top-heavy in terms of rank/pay) and even Res units...and put that money into Cpls and Lts on the armoury floor.  Example;  what is the actual need for 2 CBGs and CBG HQs in the Atlantic provinces?  

I'm never sold on the "military presence" part.  I don't believe it plays a part, at all, in how big/small the defense budget is.     



> The capital acquisition/O&M/manpower balance is the real question here, and I would offer that we are unbalanced with high personnel costs at the expense of O&M and capital acquisition.



Start paying less;  see how many people release, or start 'working less'.  I think our personnel costs (salary, programs, benefits) are reasonable and if we need more for O & M, that indicates we need a bigger budget.


----------



## FJAG

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Start paying less;  see how many people release, or start 'working less'.  I think our personnel costs (salary, programs, benefits) are reasonable and if we need more for O & M, that indicates we need a bigger budget.



You're quite right that paying less won't work. There's an expectation and an "industry standard" that we have to contend with.

On the other hand numbers of PYs we can deal with. I won't get into my usual rant about the fact that our headquarters is probably bigger now then it was when we had some 120,000 folks.

When you deal with just the math it gets kind of simple:

1 RCR (for example) is established at 593 all ranks. Of those 279 are Cpl/Ptes, another 78 are Cpls and another 100 are MCpls (the three lowest paid ranks). That's some 457 out of 593 who learn their basic skills at a fairly early stage in their careers.

If you consider that most of those have had about one year of course based training and thereafter are just putting in time honing their skills and climbing the career progression ladder (or just putting in time to retirement) for the next 19 years then you can begin to see where reserve service can help out. 

Let's say you give a reservist that same year of training to the same standard but over two or three years (at 2 - 4 months per summer) and thereafter you employ them for two months a year (say a weekend every month and a three to four-week annual collective training exercise) then you end up saving 5/6th of a PY for the next 18-19 years for every regular that you can convert to a reservist.

Yup; you do have to factor in attrition. How many times do you need to roll-over that same reservist to keep the position filled for 20 years. Attrition's been running at 5-8% from what I understand - so it looks like maybe two to three times. That leaves you replacing that 20 years PY with 3 PYs in training and 1/6th of 17 PYs for another 3 PYs. That means that you fill that 20 PYs position for roughly 6 PYs, a cost saving of approximately 14 PYs or better if we can cut attrition. (and as an aside we have attrition in the reg force too which results in having a position unfilled within the battalion while the replacement is in training)

And yes, you still need to develop leaders but that's only for the remaining 136 positions (which includes 61 sergeants). That will require an additional training PY equivalent or two along the way. (As another aside, a reserve battalion would provide much more stability from the annual posting cycles that plague the regular force battalions which has them going though constant reconstitution cycles)

You can enshrine the attrition rate by requiring recruits to enroll on fixed term contracts and enforcing those together with requiring mandatory training attendance. Those are the two major prerequisites for creating any reserve service system that will actually create a reliable reserve force. Without that; as long as we stay with "come play with us whenever you feel like it" we'll have a reserve force that provides limited value for even the small amounts paid for it. 

 :stirpot:


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:
			
		

> ...
> One other point is that in your model you are not reducing the size of the regular force (and thereby freeing up $ for capital equipment purchases and O&M costs) but just shuffling PYs around. (and me being the cynic that I am would bet dollars to donuts that most of those PYs would end up in Ottawa)
> 
> :cheers:



Are our infantry battalions so undermanned that dropping from 6 x LAV battalions to 3 x LAV battalions and dropping from 3 x Reg Force Mechanized Brigades and 10(?) x Reserve Brigade Groups to 2 x Reg Force Mechanized Brigades and 1 or 2 Reserve Brigade Groups would not allow the remaining Reg Force infantry battalions to be fully manned and still have PY's left over for savings?

I'm not proposing increasing the size of the Armoured/Artillery/Engineer regiments...just using the savings in PY's from above to properly equip them.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:
			
		

> Are our infantry battalions so undermanned that dropping from 6 x LAV battalions to 3 x LAV battalions and dropping from 3 x Reg Force Mechanized Brigades and 10(?) x Reserve Brigade Groups to 2 x Reg Force Mechanized Brigades and 1 or 2 Reserve Brigade Groups would not allow the remaining Reg Force infantry battalions to be fully manned and still have PY's left over for savings?
> 
> I'm not proposing increasing the size of the Armoured/Artillery/Engineer regiments...just using the savings in PY's from above to properly equip them.



I'm not sure how under resourced our battalions are although with the drop of mortar and pioneer platoons I would think it's a bit thin. I know the last establishment I saw for 2018 was 593 while I believe the "desired" strength (I'm not sure if its a "war establishment") is at 750 which leaves a given battalion short 157 even if all authorized positions are manned. So, doing some meatball math, each battalion chopped should allow up-manning four others. Cutting three battalions should up-man the six remaining ones and leave 900 PYs unallocated.

Reserve Bde headquarters have varying establishments but they roughly end up with 14 PYs and 90 reserve positions each (no idea how many of those would be made Class B) - so there isn't a big saving.

I've been doing some number crunching including all PRes units including their bdes and regular support staff, adding in the MPs and Health Services numbers plus the reg f folks in the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and from that end up with a consolidated organization that has two manoeuvre brigade groups (either light, medium or heavy) and one Sustainment Bde (all three mostly reservists) and a total force artillery bde and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade (roughly equally mixed regular and reserve units and people)

We might be able to squeeze one more sustainment brigade out of the organization but that might require getting more folks into the system and I'm not sure if we have the ability to actually recruit to the full 21,000 that the Army reserve should be allowed to grow to this year.

All of that said, I'm pretty sure that I do not want to see us cutting a regular force brigade group.

We can do the other stuff without that (but I really doubt that we ever would) Equipment is an issue but not so much if you form light infantry brigades now and convert them up to medium or heavy when the money is available (or if you can get the equipment cheap from the US under the US Foreign Assistance Act - Excess Defence Articles provisions (M1s, M2s, and M109s are available - but I doubt our Army would take it on account of the maintenance and operating costs) 

Have fun

 :stirpot:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Alot of kids do a gap year between high school and college, or whatever comes next.

We could run a national program where school leavers (at 17 or 18 years old, or 16 for those who leave in Grade 10) become soldiers/ sailors/ air peeps for a year, at a reduced wage in return for university credits/ tuition support. They then get called up/ given an opportunity to apply for positions on, as required for operations, upgrading training or major exercises.

This could be administered from Ottawa. Local units could be assigned the role of keeping track of them, doing the work up training, or something like that.

Call it 'Combat Katimavik', just to rile up the 'do gooders'.


----------



## dapaterson

Or even call it YTEP...


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Or even call it YTEP...



... or even SYEP. We got alot of good people out of that one.


----------



## RCPalmer

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I'm sorry, but having heard this argument before, I always remember reading Red Storm Rising and the callup of the Category C units in the old Red Army;  how their fitness, training and equipment actually demonstrated they lacked combat capability when the bullets started flying (yes, I know it was a book, but you get my point).  Strategic Reserve...like how 41 CBG might be able to form a Rifle Coy?  I don't see much punch there for the price point.
> 
> Yup, I was in the PRes when Yugo was going on, UNPROFOR...Afghanistan.  I'm not slighting anyone who served in, well, any operational theatre or on DOMOPs.  Both are important.  But, during any of those, did a Reserve unit go "complete" or were they plugged in here and there?  It's not like the 8 CH loaded up all their Cougars and deployed to FYR, right?  So, we could cut down on the amount of HQs (which are fairly top-heavy in terms of rank/pay) and even Res units...and put that money into Cpls and Lts on the armoury floor.  Example;  what is the actual need for 2 CBGs and CBG HQs in the Atlantic provinces?
> 
> I'm never sold on the "military presence" part.  I don't believe it plays a part, at all, in how big/small the defense budget is.
> 
> Start paying less;  see how many people release, or start 'working less'.  I think our personnel costs (salary, programs, benefits) are reasonable and if we need more for O & M, that indicates we need a bigger budget.



Apologies for the delay.  Its been an extremely busy week.  Yep, there are definitely training deltas, and no one is saying that the reserve component should be part of the "fight tonight" force or Roto 0 scenarios.  Given 6-12 months of warning, a great many of those gaps can be closed.  In many ways, large parts of the RegF would need the same amount of time to spool up.  It is about having some capability depth at a reasonable cost. This methodology has informed the U.S. military's full-time/part time mix since the end of WW2.  

As I've said before, I would completely agree that there are lots of efficiencies that could be gained by restructuring the PRes.  We probably don't need 10 CBG HQs and there are lots of non-viable units that could be rolled into others to save on the HQ positions.  However, when you are only paying most people 40 days per year, the costs of those inefficiencies are a lot less than when you pay everyone full time.  

When we are talking about generating a rifle coy from a CBG, we are talking about pulling volunteers from a part-time force to fullfill the missions of a military that (a few SOF elements aside) is basically operating on a footing of peacetime military engagement and strategic deterrence.  I'm not sure we would want to commit our reserve force to a greater extent than that for those types of missions, nor would we expect or desire a higher proportion of part-time soldiers to put their civilian careers on hold in the service of such missions.  On the other hand, the capability potential from the PRes for DOMOPs is a completely different animal, as is the capability potential for the PRes in the event of a major, protracted conflict.

Also to be clear, when I was talking about personnel savings, I was talking about a smaller force, not decreasing benefits, hence the comparison of  the Canadian 68,000 RegF to the Australian 55,000. The Aussies have elected to focus on capital acquisition to build capability and O&M to maintain readiness, while CAF has over the last 20 years, proportionally increased its personnel costs significantly to a benefit that is not at all clear.  

If you have access to an academic search engine to pull up the full text, you might find LCol Michael Rostek's application of Peak Load Theory to the full-time/part time mix interesting:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690600888205


----------



## daftandbarmy

RCPalmer said:
			
		

> Apologies for the delay.  Its been an extremely busy week.  Yep, there are definitely training deltas, and no one is saying that the reserve component should be part of the "fight tonight" force or Roto 0 scenarios.  Given 6-12 months of warning, a great many of those gaps can be closed.  In many ways, large parts of the RegF would need the same amount of time to spool up.  It is about having some capability depth at a reasonable cost. This methodology has informed the U.S. military's full-time/part time mix since the end of WW2.
> 
> As I've said before, I would completely agree that there are lots of efficiencies that could be gained by restructuring the PRes.  We probably don't need *10 any CBG HQs* and there are lots of non-viable units that could be rolled into others to save on the HQ positions.  However, when you are only paying most people 40 days per year, the costs of those inefficiencies are a lot less than when you pay everyone full time.
> 
> When we are talking about generating a rifle coy from a CBG, we are talking about pulling volunteers from a part-time force to fullfill the missions of a military that (a few SOF elements aside) is basically operating on a footing of peacetime military engagement and strategic deterrence.  I'm not sure we would want to commit our reserve force to a greater extent than that for those types of missions, nor would we expect or desire a higher proportion of part-time soldiers to put their civilian careers on hold in the service of such missions.  On the other hand, the capability potential from the PRes for DOMOPs is a completely different animal, as is the capability potential for the PRes in the event of a major, protracted conflict.
> 
> Also to be clear, when I was talking about personnel savings, I was talking about a smaller force, not decreasing benefits, hence the comparison of  the Canadian 68,000 RegF to the Australian 55,000. The Aussies have elected to focus on capital acquisition to build capability and O&M to maintain readiness, while CAF has over the last 20 years, proportionally increased its personnel costs significantly to a benefit that is not at all clear.
> 
> If you have access to an academic search engine to pull up the full text, you might find the LCol Michael Rostek's application of Peak Load Theory to the full-time/part time mix interesting:
> https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690600888205



There, FTFY


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There, FTFY



So you would rather PRes units report directly to the CMBGs? It to Division? Would you then have a cell in charge of the PRes, to coordinate them?


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So you would rather PRes units report directly to the CMBGs? It to Division? Would you then have a cell in charge of the PRes, to coordinate them?



All of those are great ideas. But we probably don’t need 50 + people and the associated infrastructure to get between the units and the Div Comd.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> All of those are great ideas. But we probably don’t need 50 + people and the associated infrastructure to get between the units and the Div Comd.



I think the resistance there would be from the Div HQ staff, who likely prefer having some Cl B types to hand off routine (annoying) staff functions...and the Cl B'ers like the Cl B gig, more so now that the pay delta has lessened.


----------



## dapaterson

Units with realistic command structures for their size would mean probably 20 or so Res units, in 3 or 4 Res brigades.  Probably with most commanded by full time, not part time, personnel.

Of course, capping Res F progression at Maj with the odd LCol would be extremely unpopular, but likely more productive.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So you would rather PRes units report directly to the CMBGs? It to Division? Would you then have a cell in charge of the PRes, to coordinate them?



I'm pretty sure a Div Comd and his/her staff can figure out how to employ, say 41 CBG (which, according to the last few pages, amounts to a Rifle Coy and a mortar platoon).


----------



## RCPalmer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There, FTFY



Touche. There are definitely options.  If we were to go that route, some of the admin functions currently centralized at CBG level would have to be shuffled up or down.  For example, in 41 CBG very few of the units have independent finance capabilities, so the G8 cell does most of that work.  Which brings me to the key efficiency to be gained if we are looking to reduce admin overhead, which is managing the overall amount of admin the institution must actually do to operate effectively.  

The most straight-forward example is the electronic pay system we should have implemented 20+ years ago, (I'm sure were all gun-shy about Phoenix, and would prefer the status quo to something like that), but in many ways we are going backwards.  I started an SI process a few months ago, only to discover several new requirements to include a centralized, Ottawa level approval for the Terms of Reference, and SI training for the assigned officer.  While I'm sure the policy is well intentioned, the net result is leaders spending more time administering and less time with their troops, and developing as professionals.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Units with realistic command structures for their size would mean probably 20 or so Res units, in 3 or 4 Res brigades.  Probably with most commanded by full time, not part time, personnel.
> 
> Of course, capping Res F progression at Maj with the odd LCol would be extremely unpopular, but likely more productive.



And realistic. Seriously.


----------



## dapaterson

Although most Res LCols are already unusual...

Present company included.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And realistic. Seriously.



They did that to an extent when they merged CER and Service battalions together in the PRes, Alberta Dragoons got folded into the South Alberta Light horse. Also heard that Engineers are parading with the Fort Gary Horsw because there aren't enough to have their own unit. I agree this doesnt go far enough, units can keep their heritage while till being part of a larger unit in the PRes.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> They did that to an extent when they merged CER and Service battalions together in the PRes, Alberta Dragoons got folded into the South Alberta Light horse. Also heard that Engineers are parading with the Fort Gary Horsw because there aren't enough to have their own unit. I agree this doesnt go far enough, units can keep their heritage while till being part of a larger unit in the PRes.



Sigh.

We're doing something wrong. Very, very wrong.

 :brickwall:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> Sigh.
> 
> We're doing something wrong. Very, very wrong.
> 
> :brickwall:



It's called 'Tactical Grouping' but should probably be called 'Strategic Compromise'.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It's called 'Tactical Grouping' but should probably be called 'Strategic Compromise'.



I was RSSO for 26th Fd in Brandon back in the 70s and the "regiment" could field a six-gun battery pretty much any day. Since I was CI of the Arty NRQS/ARTS program in the summer I could also give pretty much anyone a full summer job if they wanted one. We always had a pretty good instructor and firing troop complement through those days.







That's me standing on the left in the good old days.

Now 26th Field is in a 38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group with 10th Fd from Regina and 116 Ind Fd Bty from Kenora and it takes all of them to achieve the same thing (if they can)

The problem isn't so much the folks on paper (although that's low too) but who come out to play.


----------



## MilEME09

I'd agree FJAG, recent EX at my unit had 29 attend all ranks, and 56 not attend all ranks, that's just from our Coy, not including our Edmonton coy. Unfortunately we have beat that horse to death on here.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We probably don't need any CBG HQs ...





			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> So you would rather PRes units report directly to the CMBGs? It to Division? Would you then have a cell in charge of the PRes, to coordinate them?


There are lots of options, and ...


			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> [Units] can keep their heritage while till being part of a larger unit in the PRes.


Once we come to terms with this reality there are even more options that can be considered.
https://army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1463859.html#msg1463859


----------



## FJAG

MCG said:
			
		

> There are lots of options, and ...Once we come to terms with this reality there are even more options that can be considered.
> https://army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1463859.html#msg1463859



You're thinking along the way that I'm thinking but I go off on a bit of a tangent. Right now we tend to structure our reserves as mini, undermanned brigade groups and not thinking too much of the big picture.

If you look at the structure of the US active army, its National Guard and its reserves, it tells quite the story. The Active Army has 35 manoeuvre brigades and 75 support brigades (which includes everything from artillery, air defence, engineers, intelligence, sustainment) while the ARNG has 27 manoeuvre brigades (including five of the heavy ABCTs) and 78 support brigades and the USAR has 59 support brigades (heavy on sustainment) Think about it - 62 manoeuvre brigades to 201 support brigades. that's more than 3 support brigades for every manoeuvre brigade. Just under one half of the manoeuvre brigades are in the ARNG and almost two thirds of the support brigades are in the ARNG and USAR.

There's little wonder why we can't deploy more than a battle group these days. We just don't have the support legs to do it with.

I think I said it before upthread. Running the numbers for the current reserve force (if you could make it a reliable organization and add in health services and a few other non-army specialists) you could probably come up with between 4 and 6 fully manned brigades (or brigade groups). I've got an article coming out where I suggested two heavy brigades, one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade (although the later three also contain some infantry, recce and artillery as individual replacements for the three Reg and two Res manoeuvre brigades). If we upsized the reserves then every new person and equipment dollar should go into further support brigades. - we desperately need an enhanced system of maintainers and logisticians that can keep the Army running.

 :2c:


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:
			
		

> There's little wonder why we can't deploy more than a battle group these days. We just don't have the support legs to do it with.
> 
> I think I said it before upthread. Running the numbers for the current reserve force (if you could make it a reliable organization and add in health services and a few other non-army specialists) you could probably come up with between 4 and 6 fully manned brigades (or brigade groups). I've got an article coming out where I suggested two heavy brigades, one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade (although the later three also contain some infantry, recce and artillery as individual replacements for the three Reg and two Res manoeuvre brigades). If we upsized the reserves then every new person and equipment dollar should go into further support brigades. - we desperately need an enhanced system of maintainers and logisticians that can keep the Army running.
> :2c:




Problem is our entire structure is still back in 1945, we would need a fundimental complete reorg of the CAF, not just the reserves, our biggest enemy though is geography. 3 Div for example is the largest geographic profile in the CAF, 38 CBG covers Saskatchewan, Manitoba and part of western Ontario. If we restructure to a handful of brigades, and one division total (lets face it this 5 divisions + CJOC and other high level HQ's is ridiculous and needs to end.) we can shift PY's from our tail to our teeth.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Problem is our entire structure is still back in 1945, we would need a fundimental complete reorg of the CAF, not just the reserves, our biggest enemy though is geography. 3 Div for example is the largest geographic profile in the CAF, 38 CBG covers Saskatchewan, Manitoba and part of western Ontario. If we restructure to a handful of brigades, and one division total (lets face it this 5 divisions + CJOC and other high level HQ's is ridiculous and needs to end.) we can shift PY's from our tail to our teeth.



With my math you have three divisions. 1 Cdn Div does what it does now: command and control all forces assigned and deployed on operations as the C&C arm of CJOC. 2nd and 3rd Division control the Army's force generation aspects (in my scenario that's Ontario including 2 Bde in Petawawa and everything east going to 2 Div and 3 Div taking southern Ontario and everything west. - Each controls four brigades with 3rd Div focused on Latvia/Europe and heavy forces while 2 Div focused on light and medium forces and everything else but Latvia

In part the dividing line between the two Divs is based on the population centres necessary to generate four brigades each and the superiority of Wainwright and Suffield and Shilo for training heavy forces. Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown are eminently suitable for light and LAV mech forces.

Distance is a factor but not a problem with communications being what they are. Concentrating forces scattered over a wide region is an opportunity to exercise road, rail, air and even sea movements which is a skill set everyone needs (4 CMBG did it a rail move every year)

 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:
			
		

> With my math you have three divisions. 1 Cdn Div does what it does now: command and control all forces assigned and deployed on operations as the C&C arm of CJOC. 2nd and 3rd Division control the Army's force generation aspects (in my scenario that's Ontario including 2 Bde in Petawawa and everything east going to 2 Div and 3 Div taking southern Ontario and everything west. - Each controls four brigades with 3rd Div focused on Latvia/Europe and heavy forces while 2 Div focused on light and medium forces and everything else but Latvia
> 
> In part the dividing line between the two Divs is based on the population centres necessary to generate four brigades each and the superiority of Wainwright and Suffield and Shilo for training heavy forces. Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown are eminently suitable for light and LAV mech forces.
> 
> Distance is a factor but not a problem with communications being what they are. Concentrating forces scattered over a wide region is an opportunity to exercise road, rail, air and even sea movements which is a skill set everyone needs (4 CMBG did it a rail move every year)
> 
> :cheers:



Geography is so ‘Boomer’.

Why can’t we have virtual brigades?


----------



## BDTyre

Isn't that what the cyberoperators are for?


----------



## MilEME09

Speaking of Suffield, that has got to be one of the most under utilized training areas in the CAF. That base could support so much more then what I have seen it used for, heck I am surprised that when CFB calgary closed they didn't move LDSH(RC) there instead of edmonton, perfect training ground for armoured warfare.


----------



## Blackadder1916

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Speaking of Suffield, . . .  perfect training ground for armoured warfare.



And lousy "hunting" ground for young, single (primarily male) soldiers reaching the peak of their mating years.


----------



## MilEME09

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> And lousy "hunting" ground for young, single (primarily male) soldiers reaching the peak of their mating years.



Good thing medicine hat, and Calgary are an hour and a half away or less. Not to mention colocation with BATUS would allow for some good cross training with the Brits.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Good thing medicine hat, and Calgary are an hour and a half away or less. Not to mention colocation with BATUS would allow for some good cross training with the Brits.



26 minutes to Medicine Hat.


----------



## garb811

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Good thing medicine hat, and Calgary are an hour and a half away or less. Not to mention colocation with BATUS would allow for some good cross training with the Brits.


BATUS owns Suffield from May to Oct. If you want to do a winter ex in Suffield, fill your boots I guess. I've done it, wasn't fun with nothing to break the wind on the bald ass prairie.

Leslie used to like to take 1 CMBG down to try and squeeze PRAIRIE RAM in between spring thaw and the arrival of the first Brit BG.


----------



## daftandbarmy

garb811 said:
			
		

> BATUS owns Suffield from May to Oct. If you want to do a winter ex in Suffield, fill your boots I guess. I've done it, wasn't fun with nothing to break the wind on the bald *** prairie.
> 
> Leslie used to like to take 1 CMBG down to try and squeeze PRAIRIE RAM in between spring thaw and the arrival of the first Brit BG.



So, not very muddy then?


----------



## MilEME09

garb811 said:
			
		

> BATUS owns Suffield from May to Oct. If you want to do a winter ex in Suffield, fill your boots I guess. I've done it, wasn't fun with nothing to break the wind on the bald *** prairie.
> 
> Leslie used to like to take 1 CMBG down to try and squeeze PRAIRIE RAM in between spring thaw and the arrival of the first Brit BG.



Work with the Brits, do force of force training against them, I am sure am arrangement could be made, suffield also has a railhead for easy transportation access for heavy assets.


----------



## OldSolduer

garb811 said:
			
		

> Leslie used to like to take 1 CMBG down to try and squeeze PRAIRIE RAM in between spring thaw and the arrival of the first Brit BG.



I remember those. Pretty neat to see a full or almost full brigade.


----------



## FJAG

garb811 said:
			
		

> BATUS owns Suffield from May to Oct. If you want to do a winter ex in Suffield, fill your boots I guess. I've done it, wasn't fun with nothing to break the wind on the bald *** prairie.
> 
> Leslie used to like to take 1 CMBG down to try and squeeze PRAIRIE RAM in between spring thaw and the arrival of the first Brit BG.



Did safety officer for the Airborne battery one winter in February in the days long before GPS. Map reading is a real challenge on snow covered bald ass prairie.  ullhair:

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> 26 minutes to Medicine Hat.



Sober that is


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:
			
		

> Did safety officer for the Airborne battery one winter in February in the days long before GPS. Map reading is a real challenge on snow covered bald *** prairie.  ullhair:
> 
> :cheers:



What is also a challenge on the bald prairie is finding a spot to privately take a shit cat-sanitation style.  On a Prairie Ram (1995 - when Jimmy Cox was Bde Comd) I had moved my coy CP into location in advance of the portapotties being positioned (and Suffield's environmental guidelines about sanitation rivaled the ones we had to follow in Germany); having a sudden urge, I grabbed a shovel and bog roll and went to find a convenient location that wasn't in public view.  I stopped walking after about 5 minutes and decided "fuck it - what's more important - not shitting my pants or being seen squatting for a dump".  If I had decided in favour of modesty, I'd probably still be walking.


----------



## BDTyre

Took a walk in Suffield to go see the stand of trees we could see from camp. We thought it was about a kilometer, it was actually closer to two (if not over). The trees were dead and the "pond" they surrounded was filled with black water. But it was a nice, sunny day and we had the afternoon off so at least it got us out of camp for a little while.


----------



## MilEME09

I was reading the QR&O's the other day and came across this in chapter nine.

"(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days."

It sounds like depending on the policy the CDS has set out a CO can order a reservist to parade. Combined with reservist leave granting a minimum of 20 days, this could be a way to force attendance and get effective collective training Done.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> It sounds like depending on the policy the CDS has set out a CO can order a reservist to parade. Combined with reservist leave granting a minimum of 20 days, this could be a way to force attendance and get effective collective training Done.



It's there and is effectively never used. I'm inserting a quote from an article that I've written which explains why:



> Two provisions in the National Defence Act, in combination, require that a reservist, who fails to attend ordered training, has to be charged and tried before a civilian court rather than under the Code of Service Discipline (CSD)—a process which is not followed because of its impracticality and almost meaningless punishment.
> 
> _PART VII Offences Triable by Civil Courts
> ...
> Failure to attend parade
> 294 (1) Every officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who without lawful excuse neglects or refuses to attend any parade or training at the place and hour appointed therefor is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction for each offence, if an officer, to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and, if a non-commissioned member, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
> 
> Each absence an offence
> (2) Absence from any parade or training referred to in subsection (1) is, in respect of each day on which the absence occurs, a separate offence.  _
> 
> Concurrently, s 60(1)(c) of the National Defence Act sets out the circumstances when a reservist is subject to the CSD. When a reservist fails to show up is not one of those circumstances. As a result, even though there are clear CSD provisions for dealing with a member being absent without leave  when one is dealing with a reservist being absent from training, one is forced to rely on the jurisdiction of a civilian court.
> 
> This is a fundamental and fatal flaw. The result is that the chain-of-command accepts most reservists attending unit training in a haphazard manner. Without appropriate legislation and regulations by which compulsory training can be enforced internally under the CSD, essential collective training is impossible



 :cheers:


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Work with the Brits, do force of force training against them, I am sure am arrangement could be made, suffield also has a railhead for easy transportation access for heavy assets.



I can walk, thanks


----------



## Eaglelord17

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I was reading the QR&O's the other day and came across this in chapter nine.
> 
> "(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days."
> 
> It sounds like depending on the policy the CDS has set out a CO can order a reservist to parade. Combined with reservist leave granting a minimum of 20 days, this could be a way to force attendance and get effective collective training Done.



Forcing attendance would be the dumbest thing they could do without the legislation to protect the Reservists civilian jobs.

I know it doesn't occur to many but Reservists have a life outside of the military, and they can't just drop everything and show up all the time. If they made it so employers were required to provide unpaid leave for military training (maybe a month every year, which you can bank so if you need to take a 2 month course to progress you can still do it later), you would likely see more Reservists training and progressing in their careers. Some sort of benefit would have to be made to the employers though otherwise they wouldn't hire Reservists. Maybe some sort of tax break per Reservist they employ.


----------



## MilEME09

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Forcing attendance would be the dumbest thing they could do without the legislation to protect the Reservists civilian jobs.
> 
> I know it doesn't occur to many but Reservists have a life outside of the military, and they can't just drop everything and show up all the time. If they made it so employers were required to provide unpaid leave for military training (maybe a month every year, which you can bank so if you need to take a 2 month course to progress you can still do it later), you would likely see more Reservists training and progressing in their careers. Some sort of benefit would have to be made to the employers though otherwise they wouldn't hire Reservists. Maybe some sort of tax break per Reservist they employ.



Thats why I mentioned reservist leave legislation. In Alberta we get 20 days per year for military activities, a brigade EX is usually 10 days, give plenty of notice, order all to show up and use 10 of their 20 days. now you get collective training for the entire brigade atleast once a year. I am well aware the flaws in the legislation, I am a weapons tech in the PRes, my courses have been as long as 3 months, employers aren't thrilled at all with that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Forcing attendance would be the dumbest thing they could do without the legislation to protect the Reservists civilian jobs.
> 
> I know it doesn't occur to many but Reservists have a life outside of the military, and they can't just drop everything and show up all the time. If they made it so employers were required to provide unpaid leave for military training (maybe a month every year, which you can bank so if you need to take a 2 month course to progress you can still do it later), you would likely see more Reservists training and progressing in their careers. Some sort of benefit would have to be made to the employers though otherwise they wouldn't hire Reservists. Maybe some sort of tax break per Reservist they employ.



Agreed.

As ever, good leadership is the most effective, and most difficult, thing to guarantee any military organization.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Agreed.
> 
> As ever, good leadership is the most effective, and most difficult, thing to guarantee any military organization.



And sometimes it's the leadership that isnt showing up. Unfortunately lately I have actually witnessed the PRes working against it self more then trying to help it self, like auto no fill any requests it receives, why? Cause they dont wanna do work unless forced to. Was entertaining to see said individuals caught in the act and having the CO and RSM sort them out.


----------



## Eaglelord17

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Thats why I mentioned reservist leave legislation. In Alberta we get 20 days per year for military activities, a brigade EX is usually 10 days, give plenty of notice, order all to show up and use 10 of their 20 days. now you get collective training for the entire brigade atleast once a year. I am well aware the flaws in the legislation, I am a weapons tech in the PRes, my courses have been as long as 3 months, employers aren't thrilled at all with that.



Makes sense, I didn't see that part earlier on. Its just tiring arguing with Reg Force members (at the unit or elsewhere) as to why they are being ridiculous in their expectations. For example they were complaining about a lack of Reservist instructors on courses and why should the Reg Force have to provide instructors, etc.

Most Reservists simply can't commit to a full summer after highschool/post secondary unless they have some sort of seasonal job which is off in the summer (Teachers are the only one off the top of my head). 

The Swiss have a interesting system. When your hired they train you for a year, then every year afterwards they have a 1 month exercise. I am pretty sure they don't bother with parade nights the rest of the year, as realistically that month in the field does more for retaining skills than any number of parade nights or weekend exercises.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Makes sense, I didn't see that part earlier on. Its just tiring arguing with Reg Force members (at the unit or elsewhere) as to why they are being ridiculous in their expectations. For example they were complaining about a lack of Reservist instructors on courses and why should the Reg Force have to provide instructors, etc.
> 
> Most Reservists simply can't commit to a full summer after highschool/post secondary unless they have some sort of seasonal job which is off in the summer (Teachers are the only one off the top of my head).
> 
> The Swiss have a interesting system. When your hired they train you for a year, then every year afterwards they have a 1 month exercise. I am pretty sure they don't bother with parade nights the rest of the year, as realistically that month in the field does more for retaining skills than any number of parade nights or weekend exercises.



Perhaps the Army is being unrealistic in what trades the Army reserve can reasonably be expected to employ if training length to get to OFP is outside of what can reasonable be expected of a reservist.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Makes sense, I didn't see that part earlier on. Its just tiring arguing with Reg Force members (at the unit or elsewhere) as to why they are being ridiculous in their expectations. For example they were complaining about a lack of Reservist instructors on courses and why should the Reg Force have to provide instructors, etc.
> 
> Most Reservists simply can't commit to a full summer after highschool/post secondary unless they have some sort of seasonal job which is off in the summer (Teachers are the only one off the top of my head).
> 
> The Swiss have a interesting system. When your hired they train you for a year, then every year afterwards they have a 1 month exercise. I am pretty sure they don't bother with parade nights the rest of the year, as realistically that month in the field does more for retaining skills than any number of parade nights or weekend exercises.



The Swiss are a mainly conscript force, of course, with different imperatives from ours. However, a friend’s son is heading back to Switzerland to do his military service (which guarantees citizenship!) and they have a choice of how long they spend on their initial training/ employment - 6,12,18 months. 

They also get paid whatever wage they were making in civvy street plus a (fairly modest) military pay on top of that. I can’t see us ever doing that, of course.


----------



## dapaterson

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> Perhaps the Army is being unrealistic in what trades the Army reserve can reasonably be expected to employ if training length to get to OFP is outside of what can reasonable be expected of a reservist.



Precisely.  It's a comprehensive force structure question, both full-time and part-time, and not a Res F / Reg F question.  What can be effectively and reasonably generated from a primarily part-time force - in terms of skills development and skills maintenance.  What is more reasonable to vest in a full-time component.  And what is a reasonable time commitment to demand.  The (in)famous 37.5 days in the Army Reserve was based on the one night a week, one weekend a month model - not because that's what trade X takes to maintain, but because that was seen as a reasonable time demand.

The current Army Reserve model seems hell-bent on breaking and burning out leadership - its baked-in assumptions are that a unit CO and RSM should be working nearly three times that amount - 100 days per year.  And those are working days - so nearly five months for a notionally part-time commitment.

For junior leaders it's similar - instruct on a BMQ two weekends this month; one weekend in the field with your parent unit this month, plus one training night per week, plus calls and emails all month long that you're not compensated for plus...


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The Swiss are a mainly conscript force, of course, with different imperatives from ours. However, a friend’s son is heading back to Switzerland to do his military service (which guarantees citizenship!) and they have a choice of how long they spend on their initial training/ employment - 6,12,18 months.
> 
> They also get paid whatever wage they were making in civvy street plus a (fairly modest) military pay on top of that. I can’t see us ever doing that, of course.



We remained on full pay ( and benefits, seniority, pension. sick bank, vacation etc. ). 

But, that was only for two weeks. Each and every summer guaranteed, as long as you were in the PRes.


----------



## Blackadder1916

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The Swiss are a mainly conscript force, of course, with different imperatives from ours. However, a friend’s son is heading back to Switzerland to do his military service (which guarantees citizenship!) and they have a choice of how long they spend on their initial training/ employment - 6,12,18 months.
> 
> They also get paid whatever wage they were making in civvy street plus a (fairly modest) military pay on top of that. I can’t see us ever doing that, of course.




https://www.moneyland.ch/en/swiss-military-service-financial-questions-answered


> 6. Do I receive a salary for my military service?
> 
> You receive a token payment from the military itself. The amount you receive depends on your rank, and ranges between just 4 francs for a recruit to 30 francs for a lieutenant general. You may be able to increase this “salary” by completing a military training course. For example, cadets who complete a kitchen chef apprenticeship, lower officer school or a Sergeant training program receive a payment of 23 francs per day.
> 
> 7. Can I get compensation for income lost due to military service?
> 
> Yes, you do receive daily financial compensation for your military service. All employed workers in Switzerland pay a social security contribution of 0.45% towards military service (EO contributions), and this is passed on to service people in the way of lost income compensation. The minimum compensation which all recruits are entitled to is 62 francs per day, regardless of whether or not they had an income prior to service. This is paid out by the Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) office (AHV/IV – AVS/AI).
> 
> If you work for an employer, compensation equal to 80% of your salary is forwarded to you via your employer. Although this will never be less than the minimum compensation of 62 francs per day, the maximum compensation you can get is capped at 196 francs per day (80% of a 245-franc daily salary). This money is channeled through your employer, which is obligated to pass it on to you. Your employer can decide to pay you more than what the OASI/DI compensates, for example if 80% of your salary is above the maximum compensation of 196 francs per day, your employer may pay you 80% of your full salary. Of course, your employer may also choose to continue to pay you 100% of your salary, if they are exceptionally generous.
> 
> If you run your own business and have business-related obligations such as rentals or leases, you can receive additional compensation of up to 67 francs per day. This compensation also applies to farm owners (and their children who are actively employed in the family business).



And Swiss military pay rates.
https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-militaerdienst/dienstleistende/sold-eo.html


----------



## mariomike

Also worth considering, here in Canada. 

Cost to employer - even if only away on military training two weeks every year.

Your 80 hours regular pay. Add to that, another 80 hours, paid at overtime rate, to cover your shifts while away.

ie: 200 hours of pay to cover an 80 hour military leave.

In addition, "Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work."


Because we were on 12-hour shifts, we only had to come in 20 days every six weeks. ie: 6 or 7 days every two weeks. 

So, in reality, you only had to turn in half your military pay.

Even a relatively short paid absence could be pretty expensive for an employer.

Even if unpaid, they still have to bring people in on overtime to cover your shifts.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Precisely.  It's a comprehensive force structure question, both full-time and part-time, and not a Res F / Reg F question.  What can be effectively and reasonably generated from a primarily part-time force - in terms of skills development and skills maintenance.  What is more reasonable to vest in a full-time component.  And what is a reasonable time commitment to demand.  The (in)famous 37.5 days in the Army Reserve was based on the one night a week, one weekend a month model - not because that's what trade X takes to maintain, but because that was seen as a reasonable time demand.
> 
> The current Army Reserve model seems hell-bent on breaking and burning out leadership - its baked-in assumptions are that a unit CO and RSM should be working nearly three times that amount - 100 days per year.  And those are working days - so nearly five months for a notionally part-time commitment.
> 
> For junior leaders it's similar - instruct on a BMQ two weekends this month; one weekend in the field with your parent unit this month, plus one training night per week, plus calls and emails all month long that you're not compensated for plus...



And perhaps 1/3 of all that time is spent on 'Army stuff', while the rest is wasted on administrivia and responding to the multitude of requests from various HQs.


----------



## quadrapiper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Precisely.  It's a comprehensive force structure question, both full-time and part-time, and not a Res F / Reg F question.  What can be effectively and reasonably generated from a primarily part-time force - in terms of skills development and skills maintenance.  What is more reasonable to vest in a full-time component.  And what is a reasonable time commitment to demand.  The (in)famous 37.5 days in the Army Reserve was based on the one night a week, one weekend a month model - not because that's what trade X takes to maintain, but because that was seen as a reasonable time demand.


Bet a great deal of that would be easier to sort out if the Army Reserve was revised to something much more like the Naval Reserve: give up on, or at least strongly de-emphasize, unit specialization.

Might also help if it provided a better way to bring PLAR-able civvies into uniform: suddenly there's a reasonable path to reserve service available and not dependent on having e.g. a service battalion in the area.


			
				Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> Most Reservists simply can't commit to a full summer after highschool/post secondary unless they have some sort of seasonal job which is off in the summer (Teachers are the only one off the top of my head).


IIRC logging comes to a halt in the summer, too, due to fire risk. Expect there's other trades in a similar situation.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Might also help if it provided a better way to bring PLAR-able civvies into uniform: suddenly there's a reasonable path to reserve service available and not dependent on having e.g. a service battalion in the area.IIRC logging comes to a halt in the summer, too, due to fire risk. Expect there's other trades in a similar situation.



The reserves used to be an Army of students commanded by teachers... not so much anymore.


----------



## CBH99

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Might also help if it provided a better way to bring PLAR-able civvies into uniform: suddenly there's a reasonable path to reserve service available and not dependent on having e.g. a service battalion in the area.IIRC logging comes to a halt in the summer, too, due to fire risk. Expect there's other trades in a similar situation.




I remember one of the last BMQ courses I was an instructor on, I was sitting in a classroom chatting with some of the recruits.  As I got older, the appeal of strict "calling them to room" and the strict formality started to wain on me.  I felt I was able to get much better & faster results just by being a good leader & normal person most of the time, and left the formality for the parade square.

I specifically remember sitting there, silently thinking to myself what a well qualified group of people I had infront of me.  Most of them had degrees, or a 2 year college diploma.  I remember there were a few police officers & sheriffs, some of whom had a decent amount of experience on civvy side, who basically had to start from scratch as they started their career as a military police officer - amongst a few others who were well trained already, going into various trades.


I'm not familiar with the PLAR requirements & such as they are now.  Do we recognize people's civilian qualifications easily, or do we make it so much of a hassle they don't bother?  If we made it easy for people to do the military version of their civilian qualifications, that would help get people in and keep people in. (If we don't already...I've been out for a while now.)


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I remember one of the last BMQ courses I was an instructor on, I was sitting in a classroom chatting with some of the recruits.  As I got older, the appeal of strict "calling them to room" and the strict formality started to wain on me.  I felt I was able to get much better & faster results just by being a good leader & normal person most of the time, and left the formality for the parade square.
> 
> I specifically remember sitting there, silently thinking to myself what a well qualified group of people I had infront of me.  Most of them had degrees, or a 2 year college diploma.  I remember there were a few police officers & sheriffs, some of whom had a decent amount of experience on civvy side, who basically had to start from scratch as they started their career as a military police officer - amongst a few others who were well trained already, going into various trades.
> 
> 
> I'm not familiar with the PLAR requirements & such as they are now.  Do we recognize people's civilian qualifications easily, or do we make it so much of a hassle they don't bother?  If we made it easy for people to do the military version of their civilian qualifications, that would help get people in and keep people in. (If we don't already...I've been out for a while now.)



My experience in trying to guide people through the PLAR door was universally disappointing, for both us and them. I gave up trying a couple of decades ago...


----------



## mariomike

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> IIRC logging comes to a halt in the summer, too, due to fire risk. Expect there's other trades in a similar situation.



Some jobs have seasonal layoffs. But, in Canada, I would guess they are more common in winter than summer. I am thinking of municipal islands ferry boat workers, for example.  

At any rate, for workers in that situation, would it be ( financially ) worth working in the PRes while collecting Employment Insurance ( EI )?


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> My experience in trying to guide people through the PLAR door was universally disappointing, for both us and them. I gave up trying a couple of decades ago...



I know one person who has navigated it successfully, Ticketed red seal mechanic, had certification for tracked commercial vehicles, basically everything under the sun, was granted a full write off of all his Vehicle tech trades courses, except what was then Eme common due to the mrt field portion. I have been told myself if I hit my head hard enough and OT'd to cook (my civilian trade) I'd have everything written off as well with my red seal. I think part of the issue is we aren't asking the right questions at the recruiting stage, if someone has applicable skills at intake we should be gathering those documents and doing a PLAR right away.


----------



## Kirkhill

I think I have said this before.

I believe it is easier to teach a tradesman how to soldier than it is to teach a soldier how to be a tradesman.

The Homeguard/Militia system is better seen as a means of organizing manpower for national emergencies, which could include invasion, than as an extension of the Force in Being.  That role is a role for the Regs and the Reserves.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I know one person who has navigated it successfully, Ticketed red seal mechanic, had certification for tracked commercial vehicles, basically everything under the sun, was granted a full write off of all his Vehicle tech trades courses, except what was then Eme common due to the mrt field portion. I have been told myself if I hit my head hard enough and OT'd to cook (my civilian trade) I'd have everything written off as well with my red seal. I think part of the issue is we aren't asking the right questions at the recruiting stage, if someone has applicable skills at intake we should be gathering those documents and doing a PLAR right away.



Well, that's awesome. Seriously.

I've had experienced, trained, long haul truckers try to get their military driving equivalencies with no success, amongst other similar experiences.

Like, you know, the retired 45 year old PPCLI WO who gave up in frustration after trying to CT into the reserves, and failing, for over a year. But that's a different subject.


----------



## medicineman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Like, you know, the retired 45 year old PPCLI WO who gave up in frustration after trying to CT into the reserves, and failing, for over a year. But that's a different subject.



Nobody likes a new guy more qualified than them...:sarcasm:

MM


----------



## daftandbarmy

medicineman said:
			
		

> Nobody likes a new guy more qualified than them...:sarcasm:
> 
> MM



 :rofl:

It's OK.... he was an Anti-tank guy. We have no use for those kind of skills


----------



## MilEME09

medicineman said:
			
		

> Nobody likes a new guy more qualified than them...:sarcasm:
> 
> MM



We used to have an Ex reg force mat tech at my unit, qualified to have his leaf decades ago. Only reason he didn't get it, his trade didn't exist in the PRes, that's it. Most ridiculous thing I have ever encountered in my career, atleast he didn't care he was a CFL. Our system is broken and the admin to move people to and from within our organization needs to get better. When it's faster to quit, wait 6 months and rejoin your desired trade then it is to do an OT, we have a problem.


----------



## FJAG

We've known all this for decades. Why are we, as a system, this stupid and hidebound?

 :brickwall:


----------



## medicineman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> :rofl:
> 
> It's OK.... he was an Anti-tank guy. We have no use for those kind of skills



Y'all need recce, pioneers or mortars right?  Though anti-armour can teach the AFV recognition for recce I would think...hope...pray.

MM


----------



## dapaterson

Most of the problems are leadership (or lack thereof).  Processes exist to address CTs, occs not in the PRes - but people insert opinions into processes that delay them, or are ignorant and lazy and don't make the effort to sort it out.

The systems in place are generally halfway decent; the people responsible for implementing them... not so much.


----------



## Kirkhill

Some comments I have made on other means that I think bear repeating to a wider audience.



> Serious side of things for a minute.  One of the greatest losses in society over the past few decades has been the diminution of the "official" volunteer.
> 
> The Specials, St John's, Red Cross, Terries, Cadets, Scouts etc
> 
> People that are organized and organizable and willing to follow a plan.  People you  can base a plan on.



If I remember some ancient rules of planning it was recommended that 2/3 of the time available be allocated to subordinates and that 1/3 be the maximum allowed to self for planning.
I also seem to remember allocating 2 out of 3 units up and keeping 1 third back to react.  And 1/3 of those held back (10% of the total) being held as a flexible, untasked reserve.

That general division of 60-30-10 is what I hold to when planning projects and budgets (and fight over with accountants).

Essentially they want a contingency not to exceed 10%.  Myself I want a contingency of 40%.

I want 60% to cover the known knowns
I want 30% to cover the known unknowns
I want 10% to cover the unknown unknowns.

Given enough time (and information) then I can run through enough planning iterations to start approximating their desired levels of uncertainty.

But if time forces me to act on the basis of my first iteration then I need a contingency of unknown size and max flex capability (ie unknown and undefined skill sets) to be able to manage plan b when the first throw of the dice inevitably fails to completely resolve the crisis at hand.

I continue to argue that it is fools errand to over think your contingency planning.   It is more important to have a contingency of dollars and man-hours than it is to have a detailed plan on how to use them.  Each crisis will generate its own unique demands.

It is critical to have people used to following plans and on whom you can base plans.  How you keep them engaged and entertained until needed is entirely secondary.

The Reserves need to be available to cover Class 4 and Class 5 estimates - conceptual crises dominated by unknown unknowns.







https://assetinsights.net/Glossary/G_Classes_of_Estimates.html


----------



## Kirkhill

By the way, if I haven't got a clue about the situation, as is often the case, then I can be inclined to reverse the 60-30-10 ratio and argue for a 10-30-60 commitment.  

Holding back the majority of available assets until my exploratory 10%, thrown into the dark, gives me enough information to start working on.

10% Special Forces
30% Regs
60% Reserves.


----------



## FJAG

So about five months ago some of the discussions on this thread got me to putting down my thoughts on paper and offering it to the Canadian Military Journal as an article. They said: "Sure!" And gave me 7,000 words to express my ideas. Did that and my article will be out in the upcoming issue which I'm told is in the process of being distributed. Keep an eye out for it on their website.

Since I'm a lawyer you all know that I can't say everything that I want to in 7,000 words which got me sitting down at the keyboard again to expand that and lo and behold I've produced my first non fiction book (which comes in at 165 pages.)

The article is called: "The Canadian Army Needs a Paradigm Shift". I went a little more broadly (and into a whole lot more detail) for the book which is called "Unsustainable At Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis."

I've posted Chapter one on my web site here: https://sites.google.com/view/wolfriedel/blog/2020-03-30-unsustainable-at-any-price-ch-1. I'll be posting a few more chapters from time to time.

The Kindle version of the book is here: https://www.amazon.com/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q

And the paperback is here: https://www.amazon.com/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian/dp/1926521250

I truly believe that at the pre Covid rate of expenditures, the CAF had maybe another ten years before it's personnel costs would have priced it completely out of business. With the tightening of discretionary budgets that will be necessary in the aftermath of this health and economic crisis, there won't be even that much time. 

 :cheers:


----------



## BeyondTheNow

Thanks for sharing, FJAG. I’m sure it’ll do well!


----------



## GK .Dundas

FJAG said:
			
		

> So about five months ago some of the discussions on this thread got me to putting down my thoughts on paper and offering it to the Canadian Military Journal as an article. They said: "Sure!" And gave me 7,000 words to express my ideas. Did that and my article will be out in the upcoming issue which I'm told is in the process of being distributed. Keep an eye out for it on their website.
> 
> Since I'm a lawyer you all know that I can't say everything that I want to in 7,000 words which got me sitting down at the keyboard again to expand that and lo and behold I've produced my first non fiction book (which comes in at 165 pages.)
> 
> The article is called: "The Canadian Army Needs a Paradigm Shift". I went a little more broadly (and into a whole lot more detail) for the book which is called "Unsustainable At Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis."
> 
> I've posted Chapter one on my web site here: https://sites.google.com/view/wolfriedel/blog/2020-03-30-unsustainable-at-any-price-ch-1. I'll be posting a few more chapters from time to time.
> 
> The Kindle version of the book is here: https://www.amazon.com/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q
> 
> And the paperback is here: https://www.amazon.com/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian/dp/1926521250
> 
> I truly believe that at the pre Covid rate of expenditures, the CAF had maybe another ten years before it's personnel costs would have priced it completely out of business. With the tightening of discretionary budgets that will be necessary in the aftermath of this health and economic crisis, there won't be even that much time.
> 
> :cheers:


I'd love to buy your book I really would but Amazon won't ship a book on the Canadian military to Canada ....yeah .


----------



## garb811

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> I'd love to buy your book I really would but Amazon won't ship a book on the Canadian military to Canada ....yeah .


Maybe try the Canadian Amazon site?  :dunno:

https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/1926521250/ref=crt_ewc_img_huc_1?ie=UTF8&psc=1&smid=A3DWYIK6Y9EEQB


----------



## GK .Dundas

garb811 said:
			
		

> Maybe try the Canadian Amazon site?  :dunno:
> 
> https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/1926521250/ref=crt_ewc_img_huc_1?ie=UTF8&psc=1&smid=A3DWYIK6Y9EEQB


OOPS!  
Yeah that works too......😉


----------



## FJAG

Amazon Canada does not have the ability to do printing of paperback books yet (These things are printed on-demand as they're ordered)

Amazon.com will be returning to delivering to Canada once this whole Covid thing is over but it's anyone's guess when that will be.

You can get the Kindle version from either Amazon.com or Amazon.ca

https://www.amazon.ca/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q

 :cheers:


----------



## GK .Dundas

Ordered through Amazon.ca  paperback arriving May.1.


----------



## FJAG

Well. I learned a new thing today. Bit slower though. I usually get my copies through Amazon.com within two weeks but still--that's pretty godd. Too bad CA still doesn't have an Author's Page that aggregates all you books though. They do in the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan.

Thanks for the order. Hope you enjoy it.

 :cheers:


----------



## stellarpanther

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> You are indeed correct, we are likely to fail this, not necessarily because we dont have enough bodies to throw at the problem,but because we do not have enough trained bodies to effectively handle the situation. Bloggins from the infantry can easily handle say helping deliver supplies to a remove community, but what about techs, cooks, etc to keep the battle group going? even the reg force is hurting there last i saw.



This is the perfect example for this question my wife recently asked who isn't in the CAF.  I didn't have an answer.  What is the point in actively trying to recruit people into the Reserves or even Reg F if they go untrained for years.  My son for example has been in the Reserves  for about 2 years and only has his BMQ and BMQ-L, years ago when I was a Reservist we did weekend courses to get people trade qualified, not much of that anymore.  Even if this pandemic wouldn't have occurred, he was already told he wouldn't be getting his trade qual this summer because others have been waiting longer than him.  Why can't units run some of these courses like the old days?


----------



## Lumber

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> This is the perfect example for this question my wife recently asked who isn't in the CAF.  I didn't have an answer.  What is the point in actively trying to recruit people into the Reserves or even Reg F if they go untrained for years.  My son for example has been in the Reserves  for about 2 years and only has his BMQ and BMQ-L, years ago when I was a Reservist we did weekend courses to get people trade qualified, not much of that anymore.  Even if this pandemic wouldn't have occurred, he was already told he wouldn't be getting his trade qual this summer because others have been waiting longer than him.  Why can't units run some of these courses like the old days?



A member of the reserve unit I worked at was a Leading Seaman for almost 20 years because he could never get away from his job long enough to complete PLQ and QL5. 

Not all courses CAN be conducted in-house on weekends. Some require specialist equipment and instructors. How are you going to teach a jr boatswain boat driving skills in the prairies?


----------



## stellarpanther

Lumber said:
			
		

> A member of the reserve unit I worked at was a Leading Seaman for almost 20 years because he could never get away from his job long enough to complete PLQ and QL5.


If people can't get away from their regular job, they shouldn't join.  Becoming a MCpl or MS isn't a requirement do I wouldn't worry about the PLQ but QL5 has to be done.  They should have a time limit to get it.  My concern though is even if someone is making themselves available during the summer, they often don't have enough instructors so people go unqualified for years.  I assume people join because they want to do a specific job.  In the Reg Force people end up quitting because they get stuck on PAT Platoon's for too long and get tired of just sitting around.  They should have it set up so you go from Basic to your trade course with a short period of rest in between.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Dimsum said:
			
		

> If they knew that in advance, sure.  But, how many people know for certain what the next 20 years will be like in terms of job situation and time off?



Exactly.  :nod:

On the upside, as an Adm Coy OC I had three (very senior) Cpls, who were all fully employed with civilian logistics/ long haul firms, who were 100% reliable when it came to moving troops and kit on time, safely, for most exercises. Because of their jobs, none of them could take the 3 or 4 months off required for their next career course with the CAF, because the CAF course had no ability to adapt to a reservist with a full time job, and they were fine with that as was I.


----------



## stellarpanther

Dimsum said:
			
		

> If they knew that in advance, sure.  But, how many people know for certain what the next 20 years will be like in terms of job situation and time off?



I understand that and it's good that people want to join and continue to serve,but there needs to be a point that mbr's realize that they just won't be able to meet that commitment despite the best of intentions.  That's what got me to release from the Res.  If we're going to depend on the reserves as we have in the past few years (floods come to mind) maybe the government needs to pass legislation that guarantees the right to time off for mandatory training. The civilian sector would push back though I'm sure.


----------



## PuckChaser

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> Why can't units run some of these courses like the old days?



Because Reservists wanted equivalent training to the RegF. That means providing a condensed version of the training at the appropriate school. I mean, we could go to 5 different versions of the Basket Weaver QL5, but then the (now slower than molasses in the Winter) CT process would involved a lot of ranks being lost and hurt feelings. As an example, my Father CT'd in the 80s. Was qualified to be a CWO in his trade (was MWO). RegF sent him on his QL5 again and made him a Cpl. Flash forward 20 years, same trade, I CT and keep my rank, all my Quals and was EPZ for Sgt right away (and they gave me a signing bonus).

You pick what system is better...


----------



## stellarpanther

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Because Reservists wanted equivalent training to the RegF. That means providing a condensed version of the training at the appropriate school. I mean, we could go to 5 different versions of the Basket Weaver QL5, but then the (now slower than molasses in the Winter) CT process would involved a lot of ranks being lost and hurt feelings. As an example, my Father CT'd in the 80s. Was qualified to be a CWO in his trade (was MWO). RegF sent him on his QL5 again and made him a Cpl. Flash forward 20 years, same trade, I CT and keep my rank, all my Quals and was EPZ for Sgt right away (and they gave me a signing bonus).
> 
> You pick what system is better...



I don't have a good answer but something needs to be done. What's the point in actively recruiting people if it takes years to get them trained?


----------



## Blackadder1916

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I think this issue has been discussed (and badly argued by people like me) elsewhere too. Can anyone help with a link?
> 
> Then we can get back to the Covid thing....



Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves  all 143 pages and counting


----------



## X Royal

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> If people can't get away from their regular job, they shouldn't join.


As long as the government doesn't legally require time off for training this will continue to occur.


> They should have it set up so you go from Basic to your trade course with a short period of rest in between.


Obviously you have no clue on how the reserves actually work. 
Many joining the Reserves start when they are students.


----------



## stellarpanther

X Royal said:
			
		

> As long as the government doesn't legally require time off for training this will continue to occur.Obviously you have no clue on how the reserves actually work.
> Many joining the Reserves start when they are students.



I know how they don't work and that's the problem I'm trying to point out.  I joined the Reserves in 1988 and did my Basic from Jan-Jun.  In July, when it was still a base we went to London and did part of our training and then went to Meaford for the other part.  We came home at the end of the summer and by July did the equivalent of what is now QL5.  While some courses may be the same as Reg F, not all of them are.  HRA/FSA courses are shorter, MP courses are not the same as what the Ref F does.


----------



## stellarpanther

Kilted said:
			
		

> And what about all the reservists who are first responders or health care workers? They could normally get time off for training or for deployment, but are unavailable now because they are more needed where they are.



This problem has been going on longer the last few weeks.  Why stay in if you can't parade or train or make any kind of commitment?  During a conversation I had with the CWO of a unit last summer, he told me that a lot of people view it as a social club and come when they feel like it.


----------



## X Royal

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> I joined the Reserves in 1988 and did my Basic from Jan-Jun.


Where did you do your basic course?


----------



## blacktriangle

Someone said it earlier and I agree...let's actually call up the PRes (not voluntary) and see what happens. We will either be pleasantly surprised or it will be an epic fail and we can go from there. 

If not now, when?


----------



## MilEME09

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Someone said it earlier and I agree...let's actually call up the PRes (not voluntary) and see what happens. We will either be pleasantly surprised or it will be an epic fail and we can go from there.
> 
> If not now, when?



Two weeks after never I will guess, in our risk adverse culture, no ones going to make a bold move that could fail. Really even this might fail, PRes may have bodies but do they have enough qualified bodies, or are they all Pat's?


----------



## BeyondTheNow

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> I know how they don't work and that's the problem I'm trying to point out.  I joined the Reserves in 1988 and did my Basic from Jan-Jun.  In July, when it was still a base we went to London and did part of our training and then went to Meaford for the other part.  We came home at the end of the summer and by July did the equivalent of what is now QL5.  While some courses may be the same as Reg F, not all of them are.  HRA/FSA courses are shorter, MP courses are not the same as what the Ref F does.



HRA courses now take place over 2 summers (unless a reservist can land a RegF course, but that’s really rare).

There are others who can offer further detail and I’m pretty sure it’s been talked about on the MP boards anyway, but from my (limited) understanding, a PRes MP and a RegF MP’s training is different because the scope of their jobs is very different.


----------



## X Royal

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Someone said it earlier and I agree...let's actually call up the PRes (not voluntary) and see what happens. We will either be pleasantly surprised or it will be an epic fail and we can go from there.
> 
> If not now, when?


There is no basis in law currently for a mandatory call up.
Nor do I see the laws changing it.


----------



## stellarpanther

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> It's interesting to see which off topic posts are moved and which aren't.



Since your post isn't related to the topic we could start with that one or we can just move on.


----------



## stellarpanther

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Someone said it earlier and I agree...let's actually call up the PRes (not voluntary) and see what happens. We will either be pleasantly surprised or it will be an epic fail and we can go from there.
> 
> If not now, when?



As someone else mentioned, some of the mbr's in the Reserves are First Responders and medical workers, by calling people up just to see and to have them sitting around and potentially spreading it to each others wouldn't make sense.  Hopefully there's never a time to call them up. I don't think any authority exist to do this as an exercise.


----------



## stellarpanther

X Royal said:
			
		

> Where did you do your basic course?


Windsor


----------



## X Royal

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> Windsor


Windsor or Ipperwash. To the best of my knowledge all basic weekend courses during those times were done in Ipperwash for units in London Militia District.


----------



## stellarpanther

X Royal said:
			
		

> Windsor or Ipperwash. To the best of my knowledge all basic weekend courses during those times were done in Ipperwash for units in London Militia District.



It was out of the armoury.  We came to work around 0800-1600, went home and came back Sunday morning.  We went to Ipperwash to throw grenades and to the range, we also used the range at Cedar Springs.  Our unit ran their own basic, some other units combined with London and Sarnia.


----------



## brihard

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> If people can't get away from their regular job, they shouldn't join.  Becoming a MCpl or MS isn't a requirement do I wouldn't worry about the PLQ but QL5 has to be done.  They should have a time limit to get it.  My concern though is even if someone is making themselves available during the summer, they often don't have enough instructors so people go unqualified for years.  I assume people join because they want to do a specific job.  In the Reg Force people end up quitting because they get stuck on PAT Platoon's for too long and get tired of just sitting around.  They should have it set up so you go from Basic to your trade course with a short period of rest in between.



You are aware that most of us join in high school or post secondary? And that most of a unit's leadership is built around people who have full time jobs, families, etc, but who do their best to continue contributing to their unit as best their able to once they graduate and enter into full time careers? Thinking of the sections I commanded before I got out, I had troops who were students, then became  engineers, accountants, lawyers, tradespersons, government office workers, firefighters, police officers, medical profesionals... A number did their best to stick it out, often resulting in some years of reduced activity in the busy early years of junior professional career work. The handful that stick it out long term end up being your senior NCOs and Officers outside of the permanent Cl B guys.

The life circumstances of a recruit generally do not stay the same, and the personal and professional responsibilities pile up. Quite frankly you seem hell bent on appearing to habe an informed opinion on the service availability of present day reservists based on your time in the mo' several decades ago. I'm not sure that you do.


----------



## stellarpanther

Brihard said:
			
		

> Quite frankly you seem hell bent on appearing to habe an informed opinion on the service availability of present day reservists based on your time in the mo' several decades ago. I'm not sure that you do.



Well we're all entitled to our opinions whether we agree with each other or not.  I'm stating my opinion, if a person can't get the required training in a timely manner regardless of the reason, what's the point in being in the Reserves?  Maybe I'm wrong and please correct me if I am but isn't the purpose of the Reserves to augment the Reg Force when needed or did that change since I was a Reservist?  If I'm right, how is that done when Reserve units are half full of untrained mbr's?


----------



## brihard

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> Well we're all entitled to our opinions whether we agree with each other or not.  I'm stating my opinion, if a person can't get the required training in a timely manner regardless of the reason, what's the point in being in the Reserves?  Maybe I'm wrong and please correct me if I am but isn't the purpose of the Reserves to augment the Reg Force when needed or did that change since I was a Reservist?  If I'm right, how is that done when Reserve units are half full of untrained mbr's?



You're entitled to your own opinion; you aren't entitled to your own set of facts. You're still not grasping that there's a difference between the circumstances of the 17 year old recruit, and the 32 year old MCpl or Sgt. And no, reserve units are not 'half full of untrained pers'. While all will have  cadre of troops going through their basic training, most reserve units have quite a good roster of people who have hit their Operationally Functional Point. In PRes infantry, for instance, most troops if they join in the fall can be fully DP1 trained by the end of the first summer. Yes, expecially in the more technical trades there are some who are not able to get trained up quickly. In other cases a member may join with every intention of being able to complete the training, but then for whatever reason hiccups ensue and their training progression is delayed- maybe a death in the family that precludes them going on course; maybe not enough course serials to handle the number of recruits, suddenly landing a good new job that they can't break away from in the first year... But I know when I was a recruiting NCO, I made sure everyone came through the door understanding the expectations regarding availability for the necessary summer(s) to get trained up.

Depending on the need, the reserves have a lot of bodies and a lot of... say section level leadership, with a modest amount of higher level leadership. That said the reserves are heavily weighted in favour of combat arms with relatively faster training towards OFP. It's easier to generate effective riflemen than effective medics or vehicle techs. So it depends on what problem set we're structuring our force against.


----------



## Remius

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> Well we're all entitled to our opinions whether we agree with each other or not.  I'm stating my opinion, if a person can't get the required training in a timely manner regardless of the reason, what's the point in being in the Reserves?  Maybe I'm wrong and please correct me if I am but isn't the purpose of the Reserves to augment the Reg Force when needed or did that change since I was a Reservist?  If I'm right, how is that done when Reserve units are half full of untrained mbr's?



There was a time you could get your QL2 and QL3 and even a a QL4 in a year.  Then 2 years later get all your leadership quals.  Now i’m Talking infantry. 

But then they moved to the PLQ and DP system.  First year you could get your DP1.  Then you needed to get a platoon support weapons course before you could start PLQ.  Then get on the PLQ mod system.  Then get your ASA.  Then get your section 2ic course.  Then hopefully get on an advanced field firing qual.  Then go on your rifle section commander course.  I know it has gone back to the older model now but we’ve had over a decade of this broken system.  Some other trades have had it way worse.

So a 17 year old that joins might get that all done in 5 or 6 years.  They likely graduated from college or university by then and might have found full time work by then.  So by the time they are qualified to be of any use as instructors or leaders they can’t commit the same time.  Keep in mind they committed five years of summers and weekends to get to that point.   Then they get into jobs that while sympathetic and will try to accommodate, that will only go so far for so long. Also if they can’t get to Sgt they age themselves out of their peer group leaving them more or less ready to quit. 

It used to be you needed a QL4 and a 10 day ex before getting promoted to CPL.  Now?  It’s automatic.  So their is really no motivation to getting promoted.  MCpl? Barely makes more than a CPL and requires way more time and effort and crap, so why bother? 

These are institutional problems that need fixing but likely won’t be.


----------



## MilEME09

We have our system more paperwork intensive and longer for no reason. Example PRes weapons techs have a course on ancillary equipment, no can answer why it takes 3 weeks to teach Coleman stove and lantern, and 4 days of kitchen trailer gas Line maintenance.

I agree, and it grinds my gears that promotion seem automatic in some cases. Though I have also seen examples of it not happening to people who should never be promoted which was great to see, including one gentleman who thought he would get his leaf just because he got plq. Oh boy was that fun to see him shut down.


----------



## MilEME09

For all who want to read it, here is FJAG's article, it is a good read, eye opening as to how big our HQ has gotten especially in the Ottawa area.

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/page19-eng.asp?utm_content=buffer8ef2d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer&fbclid=IwAR1gYAPZLh96VZoep2I3SPMKcCM1RlEELgVsE0PyB1k5vw9Jft0piBTJBxY


----------



## FJAG

Happy to answer any questions anyone may have about the article. 

It's a very stripped down version of my book: "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis" https://www.amazon.ca/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q as I was limited to 7,000 words which was already a very generous increase in size afforded me by the CMJ's editors.

Unfortunately, it's a big subject and not one solvable by simple solutions.

 :cheers:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:
			
		

> Happy to answer any questions anyone may have about the article.
> 
> It's a very stripped down version of my book: "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis" https://www.amazon.ca/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q as I was limited to 7,000 words which was already a very generous increase in size afforded me by the CMJ's editors.
> 
> Unfortunately, it's a big subject and not one solvable by simple solutions.
> 
> :cheers:



Well if the solution can`t be formatted to fit the Briefing Note format, then we can`t use that solution and certainly not in that font.....


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Well if the solution can`t be formatted to fit the Briefing Note format, then we can`t use that solution and certainly not in that font.....



Sure you can, it's just multiple briefing notes, one each day till the point gets across


----------



## Jarnhamar

FJAG said:
			
		

> Happy to answer any questions anyone may have about the article.
> 
> It's a very stripped down version of my book: "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis" https://www.amazon.ca/Unsustainable-At-Any-Price-Canadian-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q as I was limited to 7,000 words which was already a very generous increase in size afforded me by the CMJ's editors.
> 
> Unfortunately, it's a big subject and not one solvable by simple solutions.
> 
> :cheers:



I'm going to pick that bad boy up the next time I put an amazon order in.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sure you can, it's just multiple briefing notes, one each day till the point gets across



This is why books have chapters.  ;D


----------



## MilEME09

https://www.forces.net/news/virtual-battlefield-how-reservists-have-kept-training-during-lockdown

I was reading this today about how the British reserves are utilizing VBS right now to train remotely. It got me thinking, right now the CAF uses VBS, but it is usually for large scale events in centralized locations to utilize a lag free local network. Should we perhaps expand the use of VBS  in armories? Have VBS labs in each one, train people to operate it just like a SAT. Potentially create a network for multiple units/armouries to connect together and do combined operations on evenings and weekends.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://www.forces.net/news/virtual-battlefield-how-reservists-have-kept-training-during-lockdown
> 
> I was reading this today about how the British reserves are utilizing VBS right now to train remotely. It got me thinking, right now the CAF uses VBS, but it is usually for large scale events in centralized locations to utilize a lag free local network. Should we perhaps expand the use of VBS  in armories? Have VBS labs in each one, train people to operate it just like a SAT. Potentially create a network for multiple units/armouries to connect together and do combined operations on evenings and weekends.



If the SAT system was supposed to prepare us to operate even more sophisticated systems like this, I’m guessing we should stick to chalk boards


----------



## FSTO

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If the SAT system was supposed to prepare us to operate even more sophisticated systems like this, I’m guessing we should stick to chalk boards


The problem with the CAF is that we fall for the "oooo....SHINY! Lets buy it!" 9 times out 10 the shiny arrives at the unit and the folks who are required to use it say, "Umm....did anyone set up the support system, the training system and the updating of the software schedule?" "
The usual answer is "No...................BUT SHINY!!!! :temptation:"


----------



## MilEME09

FSTO said:
			
		

> The problem with the CAF is that we fall for the "oooo....SHINY! Lets buy it!" 9 times out 10 the shiny arrives at the unit and the folks who are required to use it say, "Umm....did anyone set up the support system, the training system and the updating of the software schedule?" "
> The usual answer is "No...................BUT SHINY!!!! :temptation:"



One of the main issues with VBS is DND won't purchase dedicated stand alone computers for it. As a result, software conflicts with out security programs etc cause crashes, slow downs and other technical issues.


----------



## GR66

Going to throw this in here as a starting point for discussion.  First image is the current structure of the CF (from the internet...I know it might not be 100% accurate currently with the CSSB, etc., but pretty close I believe) and the 2nd is a possible alternate structure.

The general idea is to make the Reserves more of a cohesive force that is better integrated into the Reg Force structure and to provide a framework for mobilization if ever required.  It also hopefully provides a more structured organization of support units for the combat elements.

No new units were created in the process and minimal units were re-roled to different tasks.  This is basically related to the aspirational equipment goals roughly outlined in the "Advancing With Purpose" document on Army modernization (http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/canadian-army-modernization-strategy.page)

Reserve units would/could keep their regimental names and traditions but would be grouped together as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries (their actual sizes) to form infantry battalions/armoured & artillery regiments. 

The key points are:


Three symmetrical Reg Force Mechanized Brigade Groups are grouped together in 2 Canadian Division
These three units would be the primary "Ready" force for the CA and would rotate readiness based on the new MR plan allowing for the deployment of a single Brigade Group at any one time.
2nd Division would be supported by a Combat Support Brigade containing the combat enablers which would allow a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group to be effective in a near-peer environment (tanks, AD, rocket artillery, additional engineering support).
The division would also have a Combat Service Support Brigade containing additional supporting units (EW, Signals, MP, Intelligence and Medical)
The 3rd (Light) Battalions of each Infantry Regiment would be a core Reg Force Battalion for three Brigade Groups within 3 Canadian Division
Reserve units would be grouped together to fill out the rest of the battalions of the Brigade Groups as would the armoured, artillery, engineer and support units.  
Reserve units beyond those required to fill out the Brigade Groups build around the Reg Force 3rd Battalions would be grouped together under a single all Reserve Brigade Group.
3 Canadian Division would not have its own Combat Support Brigade, but it would have its own Combat Service Support Brigade.
3 Division would cycle readiness between the Brigade Groups which would allow for the ability to deploy an infantry Battle Group from the Reg Force light battalions in addition to the Brigade Group available from the 2nd Division.
The 4th-6th Battalions of each 3 Division Brigade Group would follow the MR cycle of their Reg Force 3rd Battalion which would provide some predictability to their Class-C posting availability/sub-unit deployment requirements.
The all Reserve Brigade would also cycle readiness and since it has 5 Battalions it could maintain a Battalion at readiness for expected annual domestic deployments.
The handful of Reserve units that are beyond the requirements to fill out the Brigade Groups could be assigned as dedicated Arctic Response Companies and teamed with the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups to provide an improved arctic presence.
The reduced overall number of Brigade Groups would allow a greater concentration of Engineer and Support units to be assigned to each Brigade Group.
As far as equipment on my "wish list" for the new structure my goal would be the following:


The three Reg Force Brigade Groups would all be LAV based.  Goal would be to acquire the LAV-based 105mm howitzer system (under the Indirect Fire Improvement program) for their Artillery Regiments, freeing up the M777s for the 3rd Division Reserve Artillery Regiments.
The tanks from the Reg Force Armoured Regiments would be shifted to a Reserve Regiment in the Combat Support Brigade
An additional Reserve Armoured Regiment in the Combat Support Brigade would be equipped as an Anti-Tank Regiment under the proposed ATGM purchase (preferably LAV based)
One Reserve Artillery Regiment in the CSB would be equipped as an Air Defence Artillery Regiment (again preferrably LAV-based) under the proposed GBAD purchase
A second Reserve Artillery Regiment in the CSB would be equipped with HIMARS under the Indirect Fire Improvement program.
The Reserve Armoured Regiments would be equipped with the TAPV-Recce vehicles
Two of the batteries of each of the Reserve Artillery Regiments would take over the Reg Force M777s (4 per battery for a total of 32 guns with the remaining 5 guns for training/spares).  The 3rd battery of each Reserve Regiment would be equipped with a wheeled 155mm platform (Archer or similar as part of the Indirect Fire Improvement program) giving commonality of ammo across all the Reserve Artillery Batteries/Regiments.
The Arctic Response Companies (and ideally at least the 3rd Infantry Battalions) would be equipped with the BV-206 replacement under the Domestic and Arctic Mobility program.
The only true re-roling of units would be that three of the existing Reserve Signals Regiments would be re-roled as a Reserve EW Regiment in the 3rd Division's Combat Service Support Brigade to match the capability provided by 21 EW Regiment for the 2nd Division CSSB.

Looking forward to your comments/criticisms.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Going to throw this in here as a starting point for discussion.  First image is the current structure of the CF (from the internet...I know it might not be 100% accurate currently with the CSSB, etc., but pretty close I believe) and the 2nd is a possible alternate structure.
> 
> The general idea is to make the Reserves more of a cohesive force that is better integrated into the Reg Force structure and to provide a framework for mobilization if ever required.  It also hopefully provides a more structured organization of support units for the combat elements.
> 
> No new units were created in the process and minimal units were re-roled to different tasks.  This is basically related to the aspirational equipment goals roughly outlined in the "Advancing With Purpose" document on Army modernization (http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/canadian-army-modernization-strategy.page)
> 
> Reserve units would/could keep their regimental names and traditions but would be grouped together as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries (their actual sizes) to form infantry battalions/armoured & artillery regiments.
> 
> The key points are:
> 
> 
> Three symmetrical Reg Force Mechanized Brigade Groups are grouped together in 2 Canadian Division
> These three units would be the primary "Ready" force for the CA and would rotate readiness based on the new MR plan allowing for the deployment of a single Brigade Group at any one time.
> 2nd Division would be supported by a Combat Support Brigade containing the combat enablers which would allow a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group to be effective in a near-peer environment (tanks, AD, rocket artillery, additional engineering support).
> The division would also have a Combat Service Support Brigade containing additional supporting units (EW, Signals, MP, Intelligence and Medical)
> The 3rd (Light) Battalions of each Infantry Regiment would be a core Reg Force Battalion for three Brigade Groups within 3 Canadian Division
> Reserve units would be grouped together to fill out the rest of the battalions of the Brigade Groups as would the armoured, artillery, engineer and support units.
> Reserve units beyond those required to fill out the Brigade Groups build around the Reg Force 3rd Battalions would be grouped together under a single all Reserve Brigade Group.
> 3 Canadian Division would not have its own Combat Support Brigade, but it would have its own Combat Service Support Brigade.
> 3 Division would cycle readiness between the Brigade Groups which would allow for the ability to deploy an infantry Battle Group from the Reg Force light battalions in addition to the Brigade Group available from the 2nd Division.
> The 4th-6th Battalions of each 3 Division Brigade Group would follow the MR cycle of their Reg Force 3rd Battalion which would provide some predictability to their Class-C posting availability/sub-unit deployment requirements.
> The all Reserve Brigade would also cycle readiness and since it has 5 Battalions it could maintain a Battalion at readiness for expected annual domestic deployments.
> The handful of Reserve units that are beyond the requirements to fill out the Brigade Groups could be assigned as dedicated Arctic Response Companies and teamed with the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups to provide an improved arctic presence.
> The reduced overall number of Brigade Groups would allow a greater concentration of Engineer and Support units to be assigned to each Brigade Group.
> As far as equipment on my "wish list" for the new structure my goal would be the following:
> 
> 
> The three Reg Force Brigade Groups would all be LAV based.  Goal would be to acquire the LAV-based 105mm howitzer system (under the Indirect Fire Improvement program) for their Artillery Regiments, freeing up the M777s for the 3rd Division Reserve Artillery Regiments.
> The tanks from the Reg Force Armoured Regiments would be shifted to a Reserve Regiment in the Combat Support Brigade
> An additional Reserve Armoured Regiment in the Combat Support Brigade would be equipped as an Anti-Tank Regiment under the proposed ATGM purchase (preferably LAV based)
> One Reserve Artillery Regiment in the CSB would be equipped as an Air Defence Artillery Regiment (again preferrably LAV-based) under the proposed GBAD purchase
> A second Reserve Artillery Regiment in the CSB would be equipped with HIMARS under the Indirect Fire Improvement program.
> The Reserve Armoured Regiments would be equipped with the TAPV-Recce vehicles
> Two of the batteries of each of the Reserve Artillery Regiments would take over the Reg Force M777s (4 per battery for a total of 32 guns with the remaining 5 guns for training/spares).  The 3rd battery of each Reserve Regiment would be equipped with a wheeled 155mm platform (Archer or similar as part of the Indirect Fire Improvement program) giving commonality of ammo across all the Reserve Artillery Batteries/Regiments.
> The Arctic Response Companies (and ideally at least the 3rd Infantry Battalions) would be equipped with the BV-206 replacement under the Domestic and Arctic Mobility program.
> The only true re-roling of units would be that three of the existing Reserve Signals Regiments would be re-roled as a Reserve EW Regiment in the 3rd Division's Combat Service Support Brigade to match the capability provided by 21 EW Regiment for the 2nd Division CSSB.
> 
> Looking forward to your comments/criticisms.
> 
> View attachment 64575View attachment 64576



There are hundreds of full time (Class B) staff contained in the CBG HQs. Quite a few Reg F and Class A staff too IIRC.

How would you redeploy those to support this project, you know, after you blow them up in order to add greater value to the whole?


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> There are hundreds of full time (Class B) staff contained in the CBG HQs. Quite a few Reg F and Class A staff too IIRC.
> 
> How would you redeploy those to support this project, you know, after you blow them up in order to add greater value to the whole?


if one of the concerns with the current structure is HQ and staff bloat, then wouldn't this be one area where we could improve the "tooth to tail" ratio?  Work toward fully manning the infantry Battalions with infantry.  Instructor positions at the schools?  Brigade Group centralized recruit and individual training courses to free up Reserve units to focus on collective training?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> if one of the concerns with the current structure is HQ and staff bloat, then wouldn't this be one area where we could improve the "tooth to tail" ratio?  Work toward fully manning the infantry Battalions with infantry.  Instructor positions at the schools?  Brigade Group centralized recruit and individual training courses to free up Reserve units to focus on collective training?


----------



## FJAG

Glad to see this opening up again.

I'll look over it more tonight but most here already know my basic view on the subject from this: Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis.

🍻


----------



## McG

I don't see how wedding light battalions to PRes brigades will improve the readiness of what should be the most quickly deployable battalions in the army.


----------



## MilEME09

McG said:


> I don't see how wedding light battalions to PRes brigades will improve the readiness of what should be the most quickly deployable battalions in the army



We need to get our institution in order before any reorg. It doesn't matter how you reorg us, if nothing is set up to support us or create the conditions for a better trained, equipped and responsible fighting force any reorg is just semantics.


----------



## Ostrozac

McG said:


> I don't see how wedding light battalions to PRes brigades will improve the readiness of what should be the most quickly deployable battalions in the army.


You can add “What’s the purpose of our light forces?” to the long list of the great, existential questions of the Canadian Army. And it’s been an open question since at least the 1960’s. Sometimes the answer is they are high readiness forces supposedly optimized for counterinsurgency warfare. Sometimes the answer is that they are the guys left over when we ran out of expensive armoured fighting vehicles.


----------



## FJAG

I think McG and MilEME09 have hit the two major issues bang on.

First and foremost, any attempt to provide for a meaningful role for the reserves at a collectively trained battalion or even company level requires a complete transformation to eliminate the underlying problems with the reserves caused by the existing "come when you feel like it" conditions of service, the lack of meaningful employment protection legislation and lower training standards. Without correcting all that and a few other things, all you'll ever be able to manage is individual or very small team augmentations.

Second, Canada can form only two types of quick reaction forces: one based on special forces and the other based on light battalions. This is because we have no capability to rapidly project a medium or heavy force. Both special and light forces are necessary for the type of operations mostly likely adopted by the government during peacetime.  Canada uses the symmetrical brigade system within the Managed Readiness System to always have one light battalion at the ready state. IMHO I would prefer to see an asymmetrical force of a light, medium and heavy brigades where the light brigade would always have two battalions available for rapid deployment (one deployed, one on stand by for anywhere in the world including the arctic). The medium brigade would form the follow up force while the heavy brigade would form our centre of excellence for all things Europe.

I can't see tanks in a combat support brigade. Tanks are a maneuver unit and as such I would suggest grouping the tank regiment in the heavy brigade with two mechanized battalions (and as such having a total of three maneuver units)

By my count you have three reg maneuver brigades; three hybrid maneuver brigades; one res maneuver brigade; two combat support brigades and one combat service support brigade plus some unaffiliated res units. That's a total of ten brigades. When I did the math of the existing personnel structure of the CA I came up with the conclusion that we could only man six maneuver and three support brigades (one artillery, one sustainment and one maneuver enhancement) and I cut one of the maneuver brigades and redistributed it's people/units to other brigades because I concluded we couldn't sustain the ninth brigade headquarters so I left it with five maneuver brigades, one combat support brigade and two service support brigades. Quite frankly if I could have managed another brigade headquarters I would probably have made it another sustainment brigade because a ratio of five maneuver brigades to four support brigades makes more sense than six and three. I know that flies in the face of common Canadian reserve force thinking but we're already stressing out trying to support and sustain battlegroups and if we want to ever hope to deploy a brigade (or heaven forbid, a division) then more service support units are critical. Also, for peacetime operations, having some depth in engineering, logistics, transport and similar capabilities would broaden the scope of the type of operations we could do.

Those are my thoughts for the time being.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I think McG and MilEME09 have hit the two major issues bang on.
> 
> First and foremost, any attempt to provide for a meaningful role for the reserves at a collectively trained battalion or even company level requires a complete transformation to eliminate the underlying problems with the reserves caused by the existing "come when you feel like it" conditions of service, the lack of meaningful employment protection legislation and lower training standards. Without correcting all that and a few other things, all you'll ever be able to manage is individual or very small team augmentations.
> 
> Second, Canada can form only two types of quick reaction forces: one based on special forces and the other based on light battalions. This is because we have no capability to rapidly project a medium or heavy force. Both special and light forces are necessary for the type of operations mostly likely adopted by the government during peacetime.  Canada uses the symmetrical brigade system within the Managed Readiness System to always have one light battalion at the ready state. IMHO I would prefer to see an asymmetrical force of a light, medium and heavy brigades where the light brigade would always have two battalions available for rapid deployment (one deployed, one on stand by for anywhere in the world including the arctic). The medium brigade would form the follow up force while the heavy brigade would form our centre of excellence for all things Europe.
> 
> I can't see tanks in a combat support brigade. Tanks are a maneuver unit and as such I would suggest grouping the tank regiment in the heavy brigade with two mechanized battalions (and as such having a total of three maneuver units)
> 
> By my count you have three reg maneuver brigades; three hybrid maneuver brigades; *one res maneuver brigade*; two combat support brigades and one combat service support brigade plus some unaffiliated res units. That's a total of ten brigades. When I did the math of the existing personnel structure of the CA I came up with the conclusion that we could only man six maneuver and three support brigades (one artillery, one sustainment and one maneuver enhancement) and I cut one of the maneuver brigades and redistributed it's people/units to other brigades because I concluded we couldn't sustain the ninth brigade headquarters so I left it with five maneuver brigades, one combat support brigade and two service support brigades. Quite frankly if I could have managed another brigade headquarters I would probably have made it another sustainment brigade because a ratio of five maneuver brigades to four support brigades makes more sense than six and three. I know that flies in the face of common Canadian reserve force thinking but we're already stressing out trying to support and sustain battlegroups and if we want to ever hope to deploy a brigade (or heaven forbid, a division) then more service support units are critical. Also, for peacetime operations, having some depth in engineering, logistics, transport and similar capabilities would broaden the scope of the type of operations we could do.
> 
> Those are my thoughts for the time being.
> 
> 🍻



Reserve Manoeuvre Brigade?  That's impossible, of course. 

CAF Reserve Reinforcement Unit? Maybe....


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Reserve Manoeuvre Brigade?  That's impossible, of course.
> 
> CAF Reserve Reinforcement Unit? Maybe....


Under the current system yes, but if I have learned anything, it's that any plan will fail if those executing it believe it will fail and want it to. Significant reform of the army as a whole would be required for the ARes to do such a thing.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Reserve Manoeuvre Brigade?  That's impossible, of course.
> 
> CAF Reserve Reinforcement Unit? Maybe....


Only if one insists on keeping the glass at the status quo of one eight full.

"The difference between the impossible and the possible lies in a person's determination." Tommy Lasorda.

The key is to define the objective and then chart a course to it. I see a reserve manoeuvre  brigade. The course to it is actually less difficult than most people think. Just look south.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Only if one insists on keeping the glass at the status quo of one eight full.
> 
> "The difference between the impossible and the possible lies in a person's determination." Tommy Lasorda.
> 
> The key is to define the objective and then chart a course to it. I see a reserve manoeuvre  brigade. The course to it is actually less difficult than most people think. Just look south.
> 
> 🍻



Yes, well, I just assumed the 'B' in Brigade stood for $1 Billion


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes, well, I just assumed the 'B' in Brigade stood for $1 Billion


A regular force one does in annual pay and O&M. A reserve one comes in at 1/3 to 1/6th salary and a lower O&M as well. 

🙂


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> A regular force one does in annual pay and O&M. A reserve one comes in at 1/3 to 1/6th salary and a lower O&M as well.
> 
> 🙂


Though with your own plan, reserve service wouldn't be such a revolving door of soldier of convenience. Thus that ratio may bump up a little higher.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Though with your own plan, reserve service wouldn't be such a revolving door of soldier of convenience. Thus that ratio may bump up a little higher.


Yeah. I'm much more of a Class A reserve fan with Class C deployments as second to gain experience within the unit. I'm very much against Class Bs which I consider as a way to inflate government set PY levels and/or a way of allowing the RegF to compensate for poor recruiting/training/retention performance. (and I say that having spent three years on Class B [ and 13 years RegF and 28 years Class A])

I think every time a Class B gets hired it should be where there is a RegF position vacancy and that the salary should come from the RegF pay envelope (that would need some changing of the system.)

🙂


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Yeah. I'm much more of a Class A reserve fan with Class C deployments as second to gain experience within the unit. I'm very much against Class Bs which I consider as a way to inflate government set PY levels and/or a way of allowing the RegF to compensate for poor recruiting/training/retention performance. (and I say that having spent three years on Class B [ and 13 years RegF and 28 years Class A])
> 
> I think every time a Class B gets hired it should be where there is a RegF position vacancy and that the salary should come from the RegF pay envelope (that would need some changing of the system.)
> 
> 🙂


I agree, in some cases class Bs are reg force members who pulled bin because they didn't get the posting they wanted. Class B should be temporary, 180 max, meant as a stop gap until someone can be posted in. It's abused too much these days.


----------



## quadrapiper

McG said:


> I don't see how wedding light battalions to PRes brigades will improve the readiness of what should be the most quickly deployable battalions in the army.


Would there be utility to having what're presumably the cheapest sort of Regular soldier on tap to support Reserve training, whether as actual instructors or through using their own readiness process as a frame off which to hang Reserve training? Also, is a light _battalion_ the desired deployable force, or a given number of light companies?


FJAG said:


> I think every time a Class B gets hired it should be where there is a RegF position vacancy and that the salary should come from the RegF pay envelope (that would need some changing of the system.)
> 
> 🙂


Why there isn't a single pay budget, managed based on desired end effects, is beyond me. Discourages silly games.

Swerving somewhat, on the other end of the spectrum, some of the hand-wringing over Class A peanuts in my corner of the CAF really gets in the way of actually delivering the effects the CoC desires, by not adequately compensating members for work done: the automatic paid slate for cadet corps is 1 x 35 days/year, 4 x 25 days/year, but there's no provision for redistributing that in permanently understaffed corps, though, following the logic of the pay allocation, it takes a minimum of 135 days/year of paid time to operate a corps.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Would there be utility to having what're presumably the cheapest sort of Regular soldier on tap to support Reserve training, whether as actual instructors or through using their own readiness process as a frame off which to hang Reserve training? Also, is a light _battalion_ the desired deployable force, or a given number of light companies?



Right now there are no Reg F trainers in a Reserve Force unit. None of the ones I've been part of for the past umpteen years at any rate.

Reg F staff are largely employed as either administrators (e.g., Adjt, Chief Clerk) or Ops Planners/Coord (Ops WO). Very few of them ever go out on weekend exercises. Some of the keeners do, of course, and they stand out as amongst the better ones.

I can't recall a time when a Reg F staff member ever delivered any training on anything. Oh, tell a lie, once we had a very keen Ops WO (PPCLI) who had a ton of combat experience and put the troops through a really good PWT 4 package, which they loved.

In contrast, in the UK, every TA Battalion has (or used to have at any rate) a Reg F training team of about 8-10 NCMs and a few driver/admin types, commanded by a Reg F 'Training Major', who plan and deliver alot of the training. Reservists deliver training too, of course, but there is always a strong core of regulars there to make sure everyone (including the Officers and NCOs) get good training. Unit COs are Reg F as well.

If there's one way to add value fast in order to increase readiness and retention, it would probably be to implement training teams like this in reserve units. (And not like the 10/90 scam, where they trained up a bunch of our troops then CT'd them all over to the Reg F when they were done  ).


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> Right now there are no Reg F trainers in a Reserve Force unit. None of the ones I've been part of for the past umpteen years at any rate.
> 
> Reg F staff are largely employed as either administrators (e.g., Adjt, Chief Clerk) or Ops Planners/Coord (Ops WO). Very few of them ever go out on weekend exercises. Some of the keeners do, of course, and they stand out as amongst the better ones.
> 
> I can't recall a time when a Reg F staff member ever delivered any training on anything. Oh, tell a lie, once we had a very keen Ops WO (PPCLI) who had a ton of combat experience and put the troops through a really good PWT 4 package, which they loved.
> 
> In contrast, in the UK, every TA Battalion has (or used to have at any rate) a Reg F training team of about 8-10 NCMs and a few driver/admin types, commanded by a Reg F 'Training Major', who plan and deliver alot of the training. Reservists deliver training too, of course, but there is always a strong core of regulars there to make sure everyone (including the Officers and NCOs) get good training. Unit COs are Reg F as well.
> 
> If there's one way to add value fast in order to increase readiness and retention, it would probably be to implement training teams like this in reserve units. (And not like the 10/90 scam, where they trained up a bunch of our troops then CT'd them all over to the Reg F when they were done  ).


That was what I was circling around: using the light battalions as a ready source of training teams who'd (at a completely outsider guess) be able to support common (e.g. Basic, PLQ, etc.), infantry, and whatever infantry-lite/shared soldier skills evolutions the non-infantry militia units need to maintain.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> That was what I was circling around: using the light battalions as a ready source of training teams who'd (at a completely outsider guess) be able to support common (e.g. Basic, PLQ, etc.), infantry, and whatever infantry-lite/shared soldier skills evolutions the non-infantry militia units need to maintain.



Or even, as a start, convert all the FTEs at the Bde HQs into training positions and assign them to the units....


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Right now there are no Reg F trainers in a Reserve Force unit. None of the ones I've been part of for the past umpteen years at any rate.
> 
> Reg F staff are largely employed as either administrators (e.g., Adjt, Chief Clerk) or Ops Planners/Coord (Ops WO). Very few of them ever go out on weekend exercises. Some of the keeners do, of course, and they stand out as amongst the better ones.
> 
> I can't recall a time when a Reg F staff member ever delivered any training on anything. Oh, tell a lie, once we had a very keen Ops WO (PPCLI) who had a ton of combat experience and put the troops through a really good PWT 4 package, which they loved.
> 
> In contrast, in the UK, every TA Battalion has (or used to have at any rate) a Reg F training team of about 8-10 NCMs and a few driver/admin types, commanded by a Reg F 'Training Major', who plan and deliver alot of the training. Reservists deliver training too, of course, but there is always a strong core of regulars there to make sure everyone (including the Officers and NCOs) get good training. Unit COs are Reg F as well.
> 
> If there's one way to add value fast in order to increase readiness and retention, it would probably be to implement training teams like this in reserve units. (And not like the 10/90 scam, where they trained up a bunch of our troops then CT'd them all over to the Reg F when they were done  ).


I tend to agree especially about the CO, the reserve officer Corp is relatively self taught. As a result many are at best bad at their jobs, and worst have no idea what their job is unless they have time over seas or working with the reg force for any significant amount of time. Officers need experienced trainers just as much as the NCOs do. Training teams who actually created meaningful training would go a long way.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> I tend to agree especially about the CO, the reserve officer Corp is relatively self taught. As a result many are at best bad at their jobs, and worst have no idea what their job is unless they have time over seas or working with the reg force for any significant amount of time. Officers need experienced trainers just as much as the NCOs do. Training teams who actually created meaningful training would go a long way.



Outside of a couple of career courses I can pretty much guarantee there was zero training for me planned as a part of my service over the years.

And I don't count the TEWTs which, in the 20-teens, were largely indistinguishable from the TEWTs in the 1980s.

I always tried to set up some kind of training for my Junior Officers, even if it was largely experiential learning during exercises where we had them leading recce and fighting patrols, and other platoon tasks.


----------



## GR66

With regard to having three symmetrical Medium Brigades vs a Light, Medium and Heavy Brigade in all reality we only have the capability of producing Light Brigades, Medium Brigades and Medium Brigades with tanks.  Our mechanized infantry will be LAV-based for the foreseeable future and the likelihood of our getting any type of tracked APC/IFV for an actual Heavy Brigade is somewhere between zero and none.

So if the only difference between a Canadian Medium Brigade and a Canadian Heavy Brigade is our single Regiment worth of tanks (and according to "Advancing with Purpose" there is no plans to increase the number of tanks we have) the question then is how do you group these tanks.  You can either spread the tank squadrons between the Armoured Regiments (basically making them an infantry support weapon) or you can group them together in a single Armoured Regiment where they have the opportunity to act as a maneuver unit.

In my proposed model I made the Tank Regiment a Reserve unit.  Maintains a capability for the CF that we need to have available but don't necessarily require for all deployments/missions.  I dropped it into the Combat Support Brigade, but you could make it a Divisional level asset or put it somewhere else if that's important.

This would allow the Reg Force 2nd Division to have three symmetrical Medium maneuver Brigades (each with 2 x Mechanized Battalions and 1 x Armoured Recce Regiment).  These three Brigades could rotate readiness and be equally capable for the majority of the missions the Army is likely to face.  If required, the Reserve Tank Regiment can be mobilized and any one of the Medium Brigades can become a "Heavy" Brigade.

To me this model sounds more flexible and easier to manage rotating readiness than having three asymmetrical Light, Medium and Heavy Brigades.

That then leaves you with the question of our three Light Battalions.  As mentioned by a few people, these are the most readily deployable elements of the Army.  They could either be grouped together into a single Light Brigade and rotate readiness between them in order to have one Battalion ready for deployment at any given time.  Alternately, they could be separated such that each can act as an "anchor" unit to a Light Brigade filled out by Reserve units.  

Readiness could then rotate among the Brigades which would still allow one Reg Force Light Battalion to be available for deployment at any given time.  The advantage of this in my mind is that it both gives the Reserve elements of the Brigade a clearer role for deployment in case of the need to mobilize, but also a clearer collective training path as they would rotate readiness along with their "parent" Battalion.

I think the Reg Force Battalion would also benefit by having a full Brigade going through the readiness cycle allowing for larger training exercises both within the Brigade and even with the Mechanized Brigades.  By having a clearer deployment schedule for their parent Battalion the members of the Reserve elements of the Brigade could better plan for both individual Class-C deployments as well as formed sub-unit deployments within each 3-year cycle.

As for the 4th all-Reserve Light Brigade I will certainly defer to those with much more knowledge than I as to whether there is the depth within the Reserves to man an additional Brigade.  Those units could certainly be split up to provide 4th companies to the other Brigade's Reserve infantry Battalions, or fill specialist roles within the Battalions like Combat Support platoons (Pioneers, mortars, AT, etc.), or some could be re-roled to provide additional support units for the other Brigades.

Some have also mentioned that there is no point in making these structural changes to the Army Reserve because there isn't the legislation and other enabling factors in place currently to allow the Reserves to actually fulfill these envisioned roles.  To that I would say that they are correct and both changes need to take place.  One change (the structure) however is within the power of the CF to do itself.  Why not do that and have the Reserves ready to take on the task for when the Government is ready to finish the job by changing the legislation?


----------



## MilEME09

Really we need to stop being delusional about our forces. With our tank numbers, we would barely field a Squadron if they all worked, let alone a Regiment. We need to either A, accept reality and put all our tanks to one unit, and re-role the other two, or B procure either more Leo 2s, or perhaps CV90120's to outfit all three regiments properly.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Right now there are no Reg F trainers in a Reserve Force unit. None of the ones I've been part of for the past umpteen years at any rate.
> 
> Reg F staff are largely employed as either administrators (e.g., Adjt, Chief Clerk) or Ops Planners/Coord (Ops WO). Very few of them ever go out on weekend exercises. Some of the keeners do, of course, and they stand out as amongst the better ones.
> 
> I can't recall a time when a Reg F staff member ever delivered any training on anything. Oh, tell a lie, once we had a very keen Ops WO (PPCLI) who had a ton of combat experience and put the troops through a really good PWT 4 package, which they loved.
> 
> In contrast, in the UK, every TA Battalion has (or used to have at any rate) a Reg F training team of about 8-10 NCMs and a few driver/admin types, commanded by a Reg F 'Training Major', who plan and deliver alot of the training. Reservists deliver training too, of course, but there is always a strong core of regulars there to make sure everyone (including the Officers and NCOs) get good training. Unit COs are Reg F as well.
> 
> If there's one way to add value fast in order to increase readiness and retention, it would probably be to implement training teams like this in reserve units. (And not like the 10/90 scam, where they trained up a bunch of our troops then CT'd them all over to the Reg F when they were done  ).


Interesting. I did RSSO in 76-8 and my terms of ref (and those of my team) were to support the unit with whatever they needed. The clerk sgt was a simple situation because he couldn't do anything but clerk and did it full time. I had a WO and a Sgt who, like me did it all but heavily weighed to organizing and supervising training where reservists were able to deliver it or actually provide trg where they couldn't. We were out on all exercises as DS and supervisors. (the CO rarely showed up - which was generally considered a good thing). Ops planning/coordinating? We didn't do no steenking ops planning. It was all about training.

If folks aren't doing this now and everywhere then we've lost the bubble about what it is all about.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> With regard to having three symmetrical Medium Brigades vs a Light, Medium and Heavy Brigade in all reality we only have the capability of producing Light Brigades, Medium Brigades and Medium Brigades with tanks.  Our mechanized infantry will be LAV-based for the foreseeable future and the likelihood of our getting any type of tracked APC/IFV for an actual Heavy Brigade is somewhere between zero and none.
> 
> So if the only difference between a Canadian Medium Brigade and a Canadian Heavy Brigade is our single Regiment worth of tanks (and according to "Advancing with Purpose" there is no plans to increase the number of tanks we have) the question then is how do you group these tanks.  You can either spread the tank squadrons between the Armoured Regiments (basically making them an infantry support weapon) or you can group them together in a single Armoured Regiment where they have the opportunity to act as a maneuver unit.
> ...


Just to address this issue. We currently have enough tanks for a regiment plus a few and six mech battalions.

To make a medium brigade takes three LAV battalions and a recce regiment plus the usual arty engrs service bn etc.

A heavy brigade requires just two mech bns and you're quite right, they'll need to be LAVs if for no other purpose than commonality of equip. The LAV is not a bad piece of kit in it's own right. I'd say mass all the tanks in the brigade's armored regiment and make the RHQ and one squadron reg f to remain a centre of excellence in all things tank and two affiliated reserve squadrons to round out the regiment if it ever needs to deploy as an entity. That also leaves approximately two squadrons worth of armoured personnel to create the core of a recce regiment. (while the tanks constitute the brigade's third manoeuvre unit, there is still a need for a full recce regiment albeit a part of that could be reserve as well)

Grouping the tanks in one regiment significantly decreases the maintenance load across the country by virtue of the fact that some are only used part-time and that all the heavy maintainers are concentrated in one place. It also simplifies the heavy engineer capabilities by concentrating them in one brigade.

Just as an aside, forming a mech brigade and a heavy brigade requires some form of SP arty capability much of which (especially in the heavy brigade) can be reserve.

The above, incidentally, leaves a battalion worth of LAVs unallocated - some of which could go to the heavy recce regiment and/or be distributed to resf training centres for each of the heavy and mech brigades.

(Maybe while Eyre is acting CDS he can fix some of the Forces-wide problems so that the Army gets back on its feet. If he cancels just one frigate we can buy all the SP arty and GBAD and anti-armour that we need and then some 🙂)

Okay. Problem solved. It's Miller time.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Interesting. I did RSSO in 76-8 and my terms of ref (and those of my team) were to support the unit with whatever they needed. The clerk sgt was a simple situation because he couldn't do anything but clerk and did it full time. I had a WO and a Sgt who, like me did it all but heavily weighed to organizing and supervising training where reservists were able to deliver it or actually provide trg where they couldn't. We were out on all exercises as DS and supervisors. (the CO rarely showed up - which was generally considered a good thing). Ops planning/coordinating? We didn't do no steenking ops planning. It was all about training.
> 
> If folks aren't doing this now and everywhere then we've lost the bubble about what it is all about.
> 
> 🍻



Believe me, the Reg F resources are deployed to the greatest areas of risk for the CO: avoiding criticism from higher that your returns have not been submitted on time, etc. Oh, and getting clearance so the Class A chattel can go out and sleep in the mud, shoot on ranges, do parades up and down the main streets etc.

I've never seen a Reg F RSS staff member deliver any training/ lectures, except on a rare few occasions. They sometimes joined us on the ranges, managing ammo and rations etc. They might have run a relay as RCO, but I can't remember the last time I ever saw that. Once, I saw the RSS run a grenade range, which was nice of him.

They never joined us on weekend FTXs. One or two might have come out on occasion, but I only remember two or three (in over 20 years) who actually put on cam cream and wandered around in the rain with us. More often than not they claimed deep and mysterious medical issues, or pressing family or work commitments (Class A have no family or work commitments, right?) that kept them from spending 2 days in the field once per month. There was no accountability related to this, of course.

To be fair, most of the (Class A) COs I've had were about as rarely seen out of the armoury and in the field. On occasion they might turn up with the RSM for a  quick cameo - and to point out we were improperly dressed or something - before going home to catch the big game on TV, so I assume the Regs were only following their example.

I know that experiences differ but based on my experience, in general, the 'outside apartheid' policy was pretty stark: Rifle company troops from Major on down - outside on the weekends and run your own training. Everyone else, except for a few 'sustainers' gawd blesss 'em, take it easy at home. RSS, take a day off in lieu for all the hard work they notionally put in on the weekend.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I found our artillery RSS staff very engaged, from Captain, WO to Bdr. They generally didn't teach formal courses, but were always around giving advice and mentoring.


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:


> Believe me, the Reg F resources are deployed to the greatest areas of risk for the CO: avoiding criticism from higher that your returns have not been submitted on time, etc. Oh, and getting clearance so the Class A chattel can go out and sleep in the mud, shoot on ranges, do parades up and down the main streets etc.
> 
> I've never seen a Reg F RSS staff member deliver any training/ lectures, except on a rare few occasions. They sometimes joined us on the ranges, managing ammo and rations etc. They might have run a relay as RCO, but I can't remember the last time I ever saw that. Once, I saw the RSS run a grenade range, which was nice of him.
> 
> They never joined us on weekend FTXs. One or two might have come out on occasion, but I only remember two or three (in over 20 years) who actually put on cam cream and wandered around in the rain with us. More often than not they claimed deep and mysterious medical issues, or pressing family or work commitments (Class A have no family or work commitments, right?) that kept them from spending 2 days in the field once per month. There was no accountability related to this, of course.
> 
> To be fair, most of the (Class A) COs I've had were about as rarely seen out of the armoury and in the field. On occasion they might turn up with the RSM for a  quick cameo - and to point out we were improperly dressed or something - before going home to catch the big game on TV, so I assume the Regs were only following their example.
> 
> I know that experiences differ but based on my experience, in general, the 'outside apartheid' policy was pretty stark: Rifle company troops from Major on down - outside on the weekends and run your own training. Everyone else, except for a few 'sustainers' gawd blesss 'em, take it easy at home. RSS, take a day off in lieu for all the hard work they notionally put in on the weekend.


You just described exactly what I saw at my unit over the last few decades.  And what has been seen at other units I know.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> You just described exactly what I saw at my unit over the last few decades.  And what has been seen at other units I know.



Terrible, isn't it?

The other sad thing I observed over the years was that, occasionally, you'd get a really keen RSS WO (less so the RSS Captain, for some reason) who wanted to do more for the troops, and were very capable of doing so, but 'they' eventually ground the poor buggers down and put them back in the office 'where they belonged'. 

This didn't mean that we were leaderless, or couldn't deliver the goods when we had to. On the contrary, I was always impressed by the leadership and skill of our Class A NCMs and Officers. 

What tended to happen was, over time, the really good reservists burned out and just couldn't keep delivering all the training and leading all the exercises/ courses anymore because they had jobs, school, and families, and being away every weekend (which is entirely possible what with training, courses and other things going on) was just too much.

PAssivly poor RSS weren't the biggest issue. If you had 'actively obstructive' RSS, this would magnify the difficulties for the Class A leaders to the point where the red tape, and often open derision/hostility, would strangle the passion out of them and then that was it. No more 'sticking my neck out' anymore.


----------



## FJAG

That's really sad to hear. 26 Fd trained every second weekend during the year so for the RSS I instituted a schedule that gave every Monday off. This meant we'd have a training weekend with only the Monday off and every second weekend was a three-day one. On real long weekends we made it a four-day weekend. The guys and their families liked that as it gave everyone a regular schedule to go by (and luckily in our case everyone's kids were out-of-school age and left home - mine on the other hand were still tiny and pre-school.) I can't say I knew the other RSSOs in the District as I was in Brandon and everyone else in Winnipeg and there was very little collective training except in the summer when I was locked down in Shilo as the CI for the Area and National arty school.

The only other RSSO I ever knew well was the one for the Camerons in Winnipeg when I went through law school and he was a keener who was heavily into training ( a bit too airbornish, rangerish and light infantry gung-hoish for my liking but good nonetheless)

In those days the RSS leadership was a bit loose with no real connection to any regular force units or formations. My boss was the last of the serving Reg F Queen's Own Rifles majors and very good at letting you have your head if you demonstrated performance. You would think with the more structured divisional system these days that someone would grab the RSS, as a group, by the short and curlies and bring them into line. If they don't then we don't have anyone to blame but ourselves.

🍻


----------



## OldTanker

I was RSS with the SALH 78-81. I had a regular staff of myself (Ops and Training), Armd WO (Training), Clerk Sgt (Arm) and Armd MCp (storesman). We absolutely deployed on training events with the unit. I would mentor the OC, the WO would mentor the SSM and the MCpl would assist the SQMS. For various reasons we seldom saw the CO in the field. The challenge we had was to mentor but not take over. Sometimes we were successful, sometimes not, but we certainly were in the field whenever the unit was. I'm not sure this was consistent throughout the Area but both my WO and I were young and keeners and frankly enjoyed being in the field with the soldiers. Maybe if I was a bit older (and wiser?) I wouldn't have felt the same. I have no idea why or how things have changed since then.


----------



## daftandbarmy

OldTanker said:


> I was RSS with the SALH 78-81. I had a regular staff of myself (Ops and Training), Armd WO (Training), Clerk Sgt (Arm) and Armd MCp (storesman). We absolutely deployed on training events with the unit. I would mentor the OC, the WO would mentor the SSM and the MCpl would assist the SQMS. For various reasons we seldom saw the CO in the field. The challenge we had was to mentor but not take over. Sometimes we were successful, sometimes not, but we certainly were in the field whenever the unit was. I'm not sure this was consistent throughout the Area but both my WO and I were young and keeners and frankly enjoyed being in the field with the soldiers. Maybe if I was a bit older (and wiser?) I wouldn't have felt the same. I have no idea why or how things have changed since then.



A great example of how it's supposed to work. Thanks!

And as for your AWOL CO....


----------



## Halifax Tar

I've been led to believe in the Combat Arms world the RSS positions aren't usually filled by the keen or talented.  More than once in conversation I've been told those extra regimental positions are for those out of the running for key leadership positions within the cap badge.

I know we struggle to get storesman/sup techs/MMTs into those RSS positions as they have a habit of abusing the reg force people.


----------



## Eaglelord17

Halifax Tar said:


> I've been led to believe in the Combat Arms world the RSS positions aren't usually filled by the keen or talented.  More than once in conversation I've been told those extra regimental positions are for those out of the running for key leadership positions within the cap badge.
> 
> I know we struggle to get storesman/sup techs/MMTs into those RSS positions as they have a habit of abusing the reg force people.


1000% accurate on the last part. Part of this though is the fact they are used to abusing Class A and B personnel usually knowing if the individual doesn't do all the extras they demand of them they won't give them another contract or those Class A days. Reg Force pers are harder to abuse as they lack those same powers, though it can happen all the same.


----------



## Rifleman62

FJAG​"My boss was the last of the serving Reg F Queen's Own Rifles majors and very good at letting you have your head if you demonstrated performance."

Awful Werry. Miss him. A great mentor.


----------



## dapaterson

As a commanding officer, I saw magnificent, dedicated Reg F personnel going above and beyond; I administered remedial measures to others; I saw the CAF medical system refuse to endorse posting a Reg F member unfit field, unfit office to the SPHL; I saw Reg F personnel not needed on exercise show up anyways because they wanted to participate; and I have seen (since I left command) Reg F members retire in the area of the unit and immediately component transfer back to the unit because of their experience.

Being posted to a Res F unit can be extremely rewarding - how many other jobs can you have when, as a relatively junior person, your boss only shows up once a week and trusts you to do your work, with minimal supervision?


----------



## OldSolduer

dapaterson said:


> Being posted to a Res F unit can be extremely rewarding - how many other jobs can you have when, as a relatively junior person, your boss only shows up once a week and trusts you to do your work, with minimal supervision?


In order to be successful it helps if the incoming RSS people know people already in the unit and th CoC is engaged with the Reg Force unit that person came from.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> What tended to happen was, over time, the really good reservists burned out and just couldn't keep delivering all the training and leading all the exercises/ courses anymore because they had jobs, school, and families, and being away every weekend (which is entirely possible what with training, courses and other things going on) was just too much.


Seeing this heavily right now after this past summer. Every instructor that went to teach this summer has thrown in the towel , and the handful left are now triple hated.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Seeing this heavily right now after this past summer. Every instructor that went to teach this summer has thrown in the towel , and the handful left are now triple hated.



It's a great way to 'cull the herd'. 

If you're intention was to chase away all the high performers, and sabotage the succession of your regiments, of course


----------



## FJAG

Rifleman62 said:


> FJAG​"My boss was the last of the serving Reg F Queen's Own Rifles majors and very good at letting you have your head if you demonstrated performance."
> 
> Awful Werry. Miss him. A great mentor.


That's him. He gave me the best, most concise and clearest terms of reference I ever received in any job: 

"If there's a reservist who know how to do the job then let him do it; if no reservist knows how to do the job but someone is willing to do it then teach him how and let him do his job; and if there's no one who knows how to do the job and no one is willing to learn then you do it" 

Every year we held a live fire exercise at the end of March in Shilo. I kept a hundred rounds 105 in my pocket for that just in case and Werry got me all unexpended 105 left lying around in all of Mil Area Prairie which was usually around another 600 rds of all natures. Pretty much doubled our annual allotment. Nothing gunners like more than sending bricks downrange.

IMHO that sums up RSS to a tee.

🍻


----------



## Haggis

My unit was generally pretty lucky with our RSS.  Yes, we had some oxygen thieves and others who's first reply to any question or suggestion to move training beyond the "wash-rinse-repeat" IBTS was "No!".  We also had a few who really moved the yardsticks and helped plan and lead some exceptional unit-level training and participated in unit social life.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haggis said:


> My unit was generally pretty lucky with our RSS.  Yes, we had some oxygen thieves and others who's first reply to any question or suggestion to move training beyond the "wash-rinse-repeat" IBTS was "No!".  We also had a few who really moved the yardsticks and helped plan and lead some exceptional unit-level training and participated in unit social life.



We had one RSSO who, as soon as he took over, dove into the databases and surfaced with a series of accusations, questioning the qualification levels of all the Officers and SNCOs. He came across as disrespectful, confrontational and almost crusader like.

Of course it was a massive flinch, and he was proven wrong, but never apologized.

It was a wonderful way to introduce yourself to a new regiment. Not.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> We had one RSSO who, as soon as he took over, dove into the databases and surfaced with a series of accusations, questioning the qualification levels of all the Officers and SNCOs. He came across as disrespectful, confrontational and almost crusader like.
> 
> Of course it was a massive flinch, and he was proven wrong, but never apologized.
> 
> It was a wonderful way to introduce yourself to a new regiment. Not.


Yeah. But he was infantry, right?

🙂


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Yeah. But he was infantry, right?
> 
> 🙂



On target!


----------



## Rifleman62

Wayne Eyre bio extract:  "As a staff officer, LGen Eyre has served with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles......"


----------



## daftandbarmy

Rifleman62 said:


> Wayne Eyre bio extract:  "As a staff officer, LGen Eyre has served with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles......"


 
Cool. But, I bet he never delivered a lecture or led any other training


----------



## OldSolduer

daftandbarmy said:


> Cool. But, I bet he never delivered a lecture or led any other training


I know Wayne fairly well. I'm thinking he probably had a huge hand in training the Rifles. Rifleman62 probably has a better insight than I.


----------



## daftandbarmy

OldSolduer said:


> I know Wayne fairly well. I'm thinking he probably had a huge hand in training the Rifles. Rifleman62 probably has a better insight than I.



I have no doubt.

I'm just finding it a paradox that we don't assign Reg F trainers, even though they might be the most experienced people in the unit, to the Reserves. 

We just post in Reg F Staff Officers and NCOs who, if they're keen, manage to deliver some training, most probably at their own risk, and contrary to their primarily assigned task: sitting in offices and pushing paper, or pixels.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Return-on-investment of full-time training cadres assigned to units mustering handfuls of effectives seems low.  The first problem is to increase the size of the units.  Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.  How many Canadian metropolitan areas do we have capable of drawing enough recruits?


----------



## MilEME09

Brad Sallows said:


> Return-on-investment of full-time training cadres assigned to units mustering handfuls of effectives seems low.  The first problem is to increase the size of the units.  Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.  How many Canadian metropolitan areas do we have capable of drawing enough recruits?


smaller units could have a single person, or a training element for multiple units sharing.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Return-on-investment of full-time training cadres assigned to units mustering handfuls of effectives seems low.  The first problem is to increase the size of the units.  Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.  How many Canadian metropolitan areas do we have capable of drawing enough recruits?



Well, there is the argument that retention will increase if training/ career pathing is better managed. Right now it seems we're pouring well trained new recruits directly through the colander....

I'm not sure if the UK's approach is the right answer, it's just that we haven't really tried it before.

In any case the UK has alot more units than we do, so it likely balances out in some way. For example, if you look at a city like York, which supports several TA units, as well as some regular regiments like the chaps who just buried 'Captain Tom', the numbers are comparable with Greater Victoria, BC (about 200,000).


----------



## CBH99

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, there is the argument that retention will increase if training/ career pathing is better managed. Right now it seems we're pouring well trained new recruits directly through the colander....
> 
> I'm not sure if the UK's approach is the right answer, it's just that we haven't really tried it before.
> 
> In any case the UK has alot more units than we do, so it likely balances out in some way. For example, if you look at a city like York, which supports several TA units, as well as some regular regiments like the chaps who just buried 'Captain Tom', the numbers are comparable with Greater Victoria, BC (about 200,000).


Geographically it’s easier to do in a place like the UK also.  

Not that it couldn’t be done here.  Edmonton to Lethbridge isn’t that bad at all.  But geography, in cases such as this, is a bit of a hinderance at times.  0.02


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Return-on-investment of full-time training cadres assigned to units mustering handfuls of effectives seems low.  The first problem is to increase the size of the units.  Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.  How many Canadian metropolitan areas do we have capable of drawing enough recruits?


Here's a quick recap of some statistics from when I put together when writing "Unsustainable at Any Price".

A full-sized brigade can vary in size from a 3,000 person support brigade to a 5,000 person manoeuvre brigade. Based on current army reserve numbers:

all of the Prairies and BC combined can support one manoeuvre brigade and one depot battalion. 
Ontario can support one manoeuvre brigade AND one support brigade and one depot battalion. 
Quebec can support one support OR one manoeuvre brigade and one depot battalion; and 
the Maritimes can support one support brigade and one depot battalion. 
Note: This presupposes that all MPs,  health services and intelligence personnel within these regions are added to fill the requisite MP, health Services and Int positions on the establishment of  those brigades.

Combining all existing RSS resources from the current 10 brigades into these 5 brigades (which concurrently reduces some 120 battalions plus to 35-40) would provide approximately 14 full-time staff per full battalion-sized unit. Reducing the brigades from 10 to 5 and reducing the divisional headquarters from 4 non operational ones to two would provide sufficient full-time staff for approximately 50 full-time staff at each of the five brigade headquarters and a cadre of approximately 50 full-time positions at each depot battalion. (Depot battalions are responsible for all planning and programming and leading of all individual training within their respective brigades, conduct most of their training during the summer at which time they receive significant augmentation from both regular force and reserve force units.)

Reducing the over 120 reserve force units greatly reduces the need for the training system to generate the numbers of senior MWO/CWO and Maj/LCol currently in use and will therefore allow for greater ability on creating fully trained soldiers and junior leaders.

The current reserve facilities geographic location footprint can and should be maintained including smaller locations albeit that a platoon strength location would now be called and organized as a platoon rather than be called a company or worse, a battalion.

This is just a rough meatball estimate although I've run actual numbers. More is involved including making various units (both regular and reserve) as hybrid units that have varying ratios of regular and reserve force personnel and whose numbers also need to be taken into account.

There is no great issue in having a large geographic stretch for some brigades with numerous small units and subunits in small locations. As an example the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team, an armoured, heavy combined arms brigade out of Idaho is made up of battalions in Montana, Oregon, Idaho and Nevada and belongs to the Army's 34th Infantry Division in Minnesota which also has armoured, infantry and aviation brigades out of Minnesota, Iowa and Wisconsin. Modern communications makes geographic dispersion less of a challenge for a division or a brigade then it was several decades ago. Battalions components should be a bit more collocated but even then only to the point where they can aggregated for annual collective training.

I fully agree with you that in order to get a better RoI we need larger units with less administrative overhead. We can't simply ask for more money to bulk up existing units under our present system. That has proven itself a failure. I'm not sure if the population could or would generate a sufficient increase to make a difference under our current system. What we do need to do is to consolidate existing units and headquarters. That too has seen its failures (especially in the last big contraction in the 1960s). For success, there needs to be an accompanying fundamental change in the nature of reserve service and its interrelationship with the regular force. Once we find ourselves capable of sustaining 5 full-sized reserve brigades we could look at growing the reserve force but not until we find ourselves stable and capable of upsizing.

🍻


----------



## Weinie

Brad Sallows said:


> Return-on-investment of full-time training cadres assigned to units mustering handfuls of effectives seems low.  The first problem is to increase the size of the units.  Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.  *How many Canadian metropolitan areas do we have capable of drawing enough recruits?*


It's a complicated/tricky space.

GTA has roughly 6.5 M folks in it, or about 17% of the population. So the potential recruit base is fairly large.

It also has the most diverse population of any major centre in Canada. When I was at LFCA in the 90's/2K's, The Royal Regiment of Canada could claim the most diverse membership of any military unit in the world, with pers representing more than 80 different ethnic groups. But no one ethnic group comprised a large part of the unit, or a large part of 32 Bde, it was simply economics/aspirational.

We offer a unique experience. When I say unique, it has appeal to some, but not many. Couple that with perceived crap wages and the constant cacophony of stupid stories that resonate through media, it is no wonder that many opt out.

Having said that, word of mouth is the best advertisement. If we added some FT trg cadres that really gave young men and women in units something to be excited about, we would likely benefit.


----------



## Ostrozac

Brad Sallows said:


> Britain has more high-population hubs than Canada.


But they don’t, not really, depending on how you measure it. The UK has 4 metro areas larger than 1 million, while Canada has 5. Both countries have both mega-cities (Greater London and the GTA) and sparsely populated regions (Highlands and western Newfoundland, for example). We don’t have to get hung up on the logistics of Canada’s vast distances. If we come up with a solution for the reserves that works for the GTA, Montreal, the Lower Mainland, Calgary and Edmonton then that’s a third of the country by population — maybe more when you consider only the youth population. Start with the big cities — that’s where the potential recruits are.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> But they don’t, not really, depending on how you measure it. The UK has 4 metro areas larger than 1 million, while Canada has 5. Both countries have both mega-cities (Greater London and the GTA) and sparsely populated regions (Highlands and western Newfoundland, for example). We don’t have to get hung up on the logistics of Canada’s vast distances. If we come up with a solution for the reserves that works for the GTA, Montreal, the Lower Mainland, Calgary and Edmonton then that’s a third of the country by population — maybe more when you consider only the youth population. Start with the big cities — that’s where the potential recruits are.


You'll certainly fill a vast majority of your ranks from those regions. I'm a fan of also having widely disbursed smaller sub-units and sub-sub-units in smaller locations. Not so much because we need the extra numbers but because every citizen who wants to should have the opportunity to serve if they so choose without having to travel hundreds of miles to do so. It keeps us connected to the country as a whole.

🙂


----------



## dapaterson

There must be balance for command teams, though - command presence is needed, and adding significant travel time on top of other command responsibilities deselects some potential commanders, and severely burns out others.


----------



## childs56

I was part of a Recruiting team where we went from 16 Reserve Soldiers to over 120 on paper, regularly parading 90 or so. Our failure was not recruiting, nor was it geographical area. It was a lack of equipment and money for training and full time positions. IF we had the equipment, if we had the positions, and if we had the money to sustain training  we would have maintained that 90 or so parading. Our goal was to raise 150 person Battery, But we did not have the equipment to do so. We were on our way to providing staff for 6 guns, two or three recce parties, Three Foo parties, three command posts and have extras for echelon duties such as ammo transport, one or two mechanics. Etc. 

What stopped us from moving forward was a lack of training at the schools, a large lack of equipment to man, lack of full time spots to make things go, a lack of money to pay for it all. Our numbers started to dwindle as we could not put enough people through the training system, nor could we provide adequate training on parade nights and exercises due to lack of equipment.  
Our numbers dwindled until we were around 30-40. For a Reserve Artillery Bty was pretty decent. Especially considering the lack of equipment we had. 

You want to fix the problem, get rid of the Reserve HQs. send those positions to units. Get equipment for the troops, get the money to pay them, get the money and spots for training, Make the training more flexible with the modern work force. Stop cancelling courses after demanding absolute commitment from the troops only to cancel a day or two before. Then tell them to bad so sad that's how she goes. 

The idea of forming BG in each area is a awesome idea, I bet in Alberta if you could get some money you could man two to three BG consisting of  arty Battery, Engineer sqns, Armored/recce, Infantry battalions, Svc Support, even aviation assets. Again you need  the money, the commitment and the willingness  to do the hard work that goes in with getting there and staying there. 
Unfortunate when the Reserves start to threaten the budget they cut it back, and there never is enough equipment to go around. It would take a hard drive to get there, but once there I think you could maintain it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> *Reducing the brigades from 10 to 5 and reducing the divisional headquarters from 4 non operational ones to two would provide sufficient full-time staff for approximately 5Combining all existing RSS resources from the current 10 brigades into these 5 brigades (which concurrently reduces some 120 battalions plus to 35-40) would provide approximately 14 full-time staff per full battalion-sized unit.0 full-time staff at each of the five brigade headquarters and a cadre of approximately 50 full-time positions at each depot battalion*. (Depot battalions are responsible for all planning and programming and leading of all individual training within their respective brigades, conduct most of their training during the summer at which time they receive significant augmentation from both regular force and reserve force units.)



And that, Herr Colonel, would be a real game changer IMHO.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> And that, Herr Colonel, would be a real game changer IMHO.


That was one of my underlying premises in "Unsustainable ...". 

The Depot battalion structure would be responsible for all recruits and officer candidates who would stay on a BTL until they achieve DP1 status and are then handed over to the battalion trained in their specific trade. Subsequently the Depots would manage and conduct all individual advancement training. Units would be free from all individual training responsibilities and would instead concentrate on annual refresher training and collective training.

There's a lot of additional terms of service, job protection etc stuff too, but IMHO we can never expect to achieve a decent standard of individual training or any standard of collective training under the system the way that it functions now. That's totally self evident for over sixty years now. It is utterly beyond me why this hasn't changed long ago.  Yup. I've read "Relentless Struggle" and I know exactly why it hasn't changed but it is still beyond me why over sixty years not one Minister or CDS has undertaken a major change rather than  the pathetic initiatives that pop up every now and then - Oh wait. Here it is albeit on the topic of reducing the size of our bloated NDHQ/CFHQ: 



> “_Militaries are inherently conservative bureaucracies and they don't like change,_”_...
> Bercuson said such cuts will need a strong minister, who isn't afraid to _“_stand on the necks_”_ of officials and force staffing cuts through. _
> ...
> _Historically speaking, this kind of significant change I think this report is calling for, if that's not driven by the civilian sector, it’s just not going to happen,” Bercuson said. “To introduce a sweeping program of reform, as opposed to one or two changes, you need a very, very, very highly placed political figure to take ownership of it.”*[1] *_
> [1] Davis, Jeff “Ottawa mandarins, general skirmish over bureaucratic cuts", _Postmedia News,_ Ottawa 19 August, 2011


🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> That was one of my underlying premises in "Unsustainable ...".
> 
> The Depot battalion structure would be responsible for all recruits and officer candidates who would stay on a BTL until they achieve DP1 status and are then handed over to the battalion trained in their specific trade. Subsequently the Depots would manage and conduct all individual advancement training. Units would be free from all individual training responsibilities and would instead concentrate on annual refresher training and collective training.
> 
> There's a lot of additional terms of service, job protection etc stuff too, but IMHO we can never expect to achieve a decent standard of individual training or any standard of collective training under the system the way that it functions now. That's totally self evident for over sixty years now. It is utterly beyond me why this hasn't changed long ago.  Yup. I've read "Relentless Struggle" and I know exactly why it hasn't changed but it is still beyond me why over sixty years not one Minister or CDS has undertaken a major change rather than  the pathetic initiatives that pop up every now and then - Oh wait. Here it is albeit on the topic of reducing the size of our bloated NDHQ/CFHQ:
> 
> 
> 🍻



Right now the only people who are getting trained regularly, and I'm not talking about nationally run career courses or annual training concentrations for NCMs and Officers that might take place years apart, are below the rank of MCpl.

As a result, the least well trained people in the Reserves are frequently the most senior. This is a tragedy, and not only because the Colonels and Generals who are deciding our fate are Reservists too, but becasue poor senior leaders can drive out the more junior through bad practises.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I remember thinking that the Res F was not very cost effective when a unit with a Cl A budget of maybe $500K to $1M also consumed the equivalent of 5 or 6 full-time positions.  For that, a unit produced one or two platoons of "effective" people.  Most of the available or potential output (time and energy) of the middle and senior ranks was consumed as administration just perpetuating things in place.

I see no point in dreaming much further until someone first proves that we can consolidate soldiers in rural and small urban locations into single (administrative, if not role) units of 500+ that can be properly administered by half-a-dozen full-timers, with the part-timers spending no more than 10% of their time (none unpaid) on administration.  The surplus full-time positions should go back to the schools for two or three years to keep the IT pipeline flowing while the changes in practice and organization are proven and established.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> I remember thinking that the Res F was not very cost effective when a unit with a Cl A budget of maybe $500K to $1M also consumed the equivalent of 5 or 6 full-time positions.



If your main effort is 'political', then the Reserves are doing an excellent job in their current format.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> I remember thinking that the Res F was not very cost effective when a unit with a Cl A budget of maybe $500K to $1M also consumed the equivalent of 5 or 6 full-time positions.  For that, a unit produced one or two platoons of "effective" people.  Most of the available or potential output (time and energy) of the middle and senior ranks was consumed as administration just perpetuating things in place.
> 
> I see no point in dreaming much further until someone first proves that we can consolidate soldiers in rural and small urban locations into single (administrative, if not role) units of 500+ that can be properly administered by half-a-dozen full-timers, with the part-timers spending no more than 10% of their time (none unpaid) on administration.  The surplus full-time positions should go back to the schools for two or three years to keep the IT pipeline flowing while the changes in practice and organization are proven and established.


If we take $80,000 per year as the average salary for a member of a Reg F battalion of 500 members then the pay package alone for that battalion is $40,000,000 before any benefits etc. On average, a Class A reservist serving a total of 60 Class A/B days per year should cost 1/6th of a Reg f salary. Therefore a full Res F battalion would cost $6.6 million per year which is a substantial saving for a unit whose task is to be on standby for emergencies. For the cost of one Reg F battalion one could have six Res F battalions.

Like anything, the key difference is in clearly recognizing which units we need to have serving full-time because their skills are so complex that they need to train full-time or who are required for immediate quick reaction force duties and those units which can be held "in reserve" until they are needed.. Since we tend to put Reg F units through lengthy pre-deployment training cycles, there is really no need to to have as many Reg F battalions as we do. We tend to use very few on what would be a quick reaction basis.

I agree with you that we need to consolidate Res units and headquarters in order to minimize administrative overhead but quite frankly the administrative overhead that they use now pales in comparison to the 17,000 folks providing administrative overhead in Ottawa plus the additional 100 to 200 in each of the divisional headquarters (of which 2 would be more than enough - I'd leave their training centres untouched but turn those into the before mentioned Depot battalions) I quite frankly think that if one was to amalgamate three or more Res F battalions into one then all their RSS staff should be part of that amalgamation not only to provide the administration but also to plan, organize and conduct their training and fill key leadership roles.

These days there are numerous jobs which are difficult for reservists to fill even at the lower levels. For example an artillery forward observer these days needs to know not only the conduct of a simple fire mission but how to operate the turret of a LAV, numerous complex technical instruments therein and to be able to be a FAC/JTAC. The same for an artillery FOO technician. Managing an FSCC in a deployed battle group is completely outside the skill set of a properly qualified Res F artillery major. All of them would require significant additional specialist training before being able to do the job. On the gun line most jobs are learnable but the reserve units do not train on the same equipment as the Reg F units they are to support and therefore there is again a need for substantial conversion training (some Reg F units provide such training here and there but at significantly differing levels). I expect the same issues apply to the infantry and armoured corps.

Quite frankly, the issue isn't the piddling little budget or even the administrative load (which I agree should be reduced in any event) which makes the reserves not as cost effective as they should be. It's the failure of the overall system (which is totally owned by the Reg F) to provide the reserves with the proper training and equipment to make them truly plug and play capable or to allow them to function at a collective training level. As long as they are managed a second class soldiers by their Reg F leaders they will never reach the cost effective force multipliers that they could and should be.

We truly need to figure out which Reg F capabilities we need which can safely be kept in reserve and organize, train and equip the reserves to fill those roles and to be maintained in a state that allows them to be quickly mobilized (there I've used that dirty word) as and when needed. That IMHO includes many of the heavy lifting capabilities such as gun batteries, tank squadrons, air defence batteries, anti-armour platoons/companies, mortar platoons, reconnaissance companies, MP companies, transport companies, supply companies, maintenance companies, intelligence companies, UAV reconnaissance and strike companies, I could go on but you get the idea. For each of these skill sets there need to be sufficient Reg F specialists who will develop doctrine, conduct training and maintenance and provide key leadership roles. If these organizations can be aggregated into functional and deployable battalions then so much the better.

The current practice to simply cut capabilities every time the Reg F faces a budget crisis is just plain stupid and has left us as an Army that cannot even deploy one fully equipped mechanized brigade with all the combat and service support enablers that it needs. Quite frankly if you want to look at an organization that is failing miserably on its RoI then look at the Reg F Army. We spend billions on it every year and its combat capability outputs are measured by the minimally equipped battle group.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

Here's a statistic to support hq cuts, especially in the PRes, 3 division has almost 900 pers in CSS,  just over 100 are officers. That's a ridiculously high ratio.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:


> There must be balance for command teams, though - command presence is needed, and adding significant travel time on top of other command responsibilities deselects some potential commanders, and severely burns out others.


There are so many variables connected to this, particularly since the bulk of our training is when the weather is less than ideal for travelling.  When I was RSM of our Bde Battle School, our training was highly decentralized due to geography.  There were several occasions when my CO and I were stranded due to aircraft issues, weather or both, which sometimes meant a missed half day or day of work on Monday.  Not a lot of employers will tolerate this on a recurring basis.


----------



## MJP

MilEME09 said:


> Here's a statistic to support hq cuts, especially in the PRes, 3 division has almost 900 pers in CSS,  just over 100 are officers. That's a ridiculously high ratio.


So how many are in HQs?  Generally when one uses a fact to back up their argument, the underlying fact is linked in some way to support that argument.

I don't even I think even the 100 or 900 number is correct unless you are trying to say just those are the numbers in the PRes alone?  1 CMBG my opinion ( see difference from fact) would easily fill the 900 numbers and a large portion of the officers but i am not sure what org you are saying has the bloat.

You like to make assertive posts that you can't or don't ever back up when challenged.  I don't disagree we have too much HQ bloat in certain areas but please show us the money or at least the right numbers. If it is just the PRes folks what are you including just PRes? RegF posns? Where are they? Even general ballpark would be better than spewing number with no context.

Next would be to highlight where there is redundancy in those officer numbers so we can see if there truly is an imbalance.

*edited to clarify


----------



## dapaterson

Well, we don't really need things such as clothing stores, maintenance, transport, food services or other enablers to be ready.  We need thousands of nude infanteers without vehicles, ability to move or food.

The CAF should be about readiness, and ability to take action when called upon.  That suggests a full time force weighted towards maintaining readiness and in hard to train and maintain skillsets, with sufficient force to project roto 0 on little to no notice, to be replaced by progressively larger elements drawn from a primarily part-time force.

If we want an Army Reserve of 20K part-time (all-in) that's about 16K trained.  Which to equip, sustain and train calls for probably 1600 full-time personnel - weighted towards sustainers like Materiel Management Techs and Vehicle Techs and HRAs and FSAs and Log Os, and trainers from the occupations we wish to generate.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Well, we don't really need things such as clothing stores, maintenance, transport, food services or other enablers to be ready.  We need thousands of nude infanteers without vehicles, ability to move or food.
> 
> The CAF should be about readiness, and ability to take action when called upon.  That suggests a full time force weighted towards maintaining readiness and in hard to train and maintain skillsets, with sufficient force to project roto 0 on little to no notice, to be replaced by progressively larger elements drawn from a primarily part-time force.
> 
> If we want an Army Reserve of 20K part-time (all-in) that's about 16K trained.  Which to equip, sustain and train calls for probably 1600 full-time personnel - weighted towards sustainers like Materiel Management Techs and Vehicle Techs and HRAs and FSAs and Log Os, and trainers from the occupations we wish to generate.


You and I frequently diverge a bit (not far, but a bit) on some issues but on this one I'm in violent agreement with you particularly because I'm of the view that the reserves should own significant stocks and varieties of deployable equipment so that it can grow the force beyond what the equipment of the Reg F currently allows. 

There is no way on God's green earth that the reserves can manage any level of equipment holdings unless there is an existing chain of maintainers and supply (don't like the term material management- why does the CAF replace a perfectly useable two syllable word with a seven syllable compound)  folks who can, firstly ensure that equipment is kept serviceable under ordinary peacetime conditions; secondly train the force in those skills; and third, make the force fully sustainable in an emergency by the addition of many more of the same and also the transport, food services, finances, etc etc services). 

This is why in my model Res F I have two manoeuvre brigades, one combat support brigade and two combat service support brigades (rather than ten dinky undermanned infantry brigades) and, quite frankly if we could expand the reserves beyond its current numbers, the first thing that I would add is yet another combat service support element (to facilitate theatre level sustainment) before any others.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

MJP said:


> So how many are in HQs?  Generally when one uses a fact to back up their argument, the underlying fact is linked in some way to support that argument.
> 
> I don't even I think even the 100 or 900 number is correct unless you are trying to say just those are the numbers in the PRes alone?  1 CMBG my opinion ( see difference from fact) would easily fill the 900 numbers and a large portion of the officers but i am not sure what org you are saying has the bloat.
> 
> You like to make assertive posts that you can't or don't ever back up when challenged.  I don't disagree we have too much HQ bloat in certain areas but please show us the money or at least the right numbers. If it is just the PRes folks what are you including just PRes? RegF posns? Where are they? Even general ballpark would be better than spewing number with no context.
> 
> Next would be to highlight where there is redundancy in those officer numbers so we can see if there truly is an imbalance.
> 
> *edited to clarify


Numbers are just PRes CSS and do not include any RSS positions, only class A and B, spread out over the 3 CBGs, 40% of which are outside the service battalions. I should of been more detailed In my posts, absolutely. These numbers are as of Oct of last year , within the 107 officers in the div is over 50 of captain and above. Again PRes CSS only. It is my opinion, and only that, that an officer for every 7.2 troops is a low number. I'd be happy to clarify more if need be


----------



## MJP

Ok so just PRes, you are right the ratio seems off are they mostly Class A or B?

 I tend to agree with dapaterson that more CSS is likely needed as a foundation for the PRes world. They already do institutional support tasks in their various areas often without the underlaying support that others do for the same roles. 
​


----------



## MilEME09

MJP said:


> Ok so just PRes, you are right the ratio seems off are they mostly Class A or B?
> 
> I tend to agree with dapaterson that more CSS is likely needed as a foundation for the PRes world. They already do institutional support tasks in their various areas often without the underlaying support that others do for the same roles.
> ​


All class A and B, the chart I have access to doesn't break it down by class A and B, just lumps them all together unfortunately. 

I agree CSS is a foundation, and in the PRes perhaps more important then combat arms. By that I mean the training cycle is longer. In event of war it would take much longer to train a mechanic then an infanteer. Meaning it would take longer for our tail to effectively grow to properly support our teeth.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> You and I frequently diverge a bit (not far, but a bit) on some issues but on this one I'm in violent agreement with you particularly because I'm of the view that the reserves should own significant stocks and varieties of deployable equipment so that it can grow the force beyond what the equipment of the Reg F currently allows.
> 
> There is no way on God's green earth that the reserves can manage any level of equipment holdings unless there is an existing chain of maintainers and supply (don't like the term material management- why does the CAF replace a perfectly useable two syllable word with a seven syllable compound)  folks who can, firstly ensure that equipment is kept serviceable under ordinary peacetime conditions; secondly train the force in those skills; and third, make the force fully sustainable in an emergency by the addition of many more of the same and also the transport, food services, finances, etc etc services).
> 
> This is why in my model Res F I have two manoeuvre brigades, one combat support brigade and two combat service support brigades (rather than ten dinky undermanned infantry brigades) and, quite frankly if we could expand the reserves beyond its current numbers, the first thing that I would add is yet another combat service support element (to facilitate theatre level sustainment) before any others.
> 
> 🍻



Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves. 

That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves.
> 
> That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.


That will need to be supported by a supply system that delivers in time. I shouldn't have to wait 2 months for parts to fix a C6.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> That will need to be supported by a supply system that delivers in time. I shouldn't have to wait 2 months for parts to fix a C6.



Maybe Logisitk Unicorp can start delivering other important items for the CAF, apart from sexy fur hats that is


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Love that fur hat. Best piece of Arctic gear on issue.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves.
> 
> That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.


I'm not so much a fan of base support because its not deployable per se except in one of those ad hoc'd NSE things. I would prefer to see a hybrid Reg F and Res F workshop like company whose Reg F members provide the maintenance support for their Res F brigade and train their Res F maintainers during peacetime and in an emergency can mobilize as a unit to provide a complete above brigade level maintenance company within a sustainment brigade or NSE (if that floats your boat). (Same for above service battalion level supply companies/battalions, transport company/battalions - we need both IMHO)

As a victim of the great unification reshuffle and the formation of the "base" concept, I generally dislike anything that is static and doesn't have a deployable field role. It's not that hard to design a maintenance organization that has a dual role of ongoing support in peacetime and a field role in an emergency. Equipping it is the limitation. Our leadership does not like spending money on a "potential" need. It would rather truck along as if nothing will ever go wrong.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

Doctrinally you need both static and deployable, since not all functions can be done deployed and since you are in theory continuing to train and prepare follow on forces; if 100% of your support is deployed, who supports the ongoing force generation effort?

The Army often fails to grasp the difference between green and purple support, and somehow expects support elements to work full-time 9-5, while also deploying at the same tempo as combat arms who do not work 9-5.


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> I'm not so much a fan of base support because its not deployable per se except in one of those ad hoc'd NSE things. I would prefer to see a hybrid Reg F and Res F workshop like company whose Reg F members provide the maintenance support for their Res F brigade and train their Res F maintainers during peacetime and in an emergency can mobilize as a unit to provide a complete above brigade level maintenance company within a sustainment brigade or NSE (if that floats your boat). (Same for above service battalion level supply companies/battalions, transport company/battalions - we need both IMHO)
> 
> As a victim of the great unification reshuffle and the formation of the "base" concept, I generally dislike anything that is static and doesn't have a deployable field role. It's not that hard to design a maintenance organization that has a dual role of ongoing support in peacetime and a field role in an emergency. Equipping it is the limitation. Our leadership does not like spending money on a "potential" need. It would rather truck along as if nothing will ever go wrong.
> 
> 🍻


Within RCEME doctrine, a maintenance battalion would have a company dedicated to training, with a platoon dedicated to Jr, intermediate, and senior technicians. However our doctrine of the respective corps hasn't blended perfectly. We have OJT cells, but not dedicated training cells to mentor and train all. This is because we rely on the schools, but they do not have the capacity now to generate personal.  Log and RCEME doctrine read as elements are independent of each other especially at higher levels, but in reality they never are.


----------



## FJAG

Yay! I just figured out how to insert multiple quotes!


dapaterson said:


> Doctrinally you need both static and deployable, since not all functions can be done deployed and since you are in theory continuing to train and prepare follow on forces; if 100% of your support is deployed, who supports the ongoing force generation effort?
> 
> The Army often fails to grasp the difference between green and purple support, and somehow expects support elements to work full-time 9-5, while also deploying at the same tempo as combat arms who do not work 9-5.



I maybe wasn't too clear. I do see a role for base support but when I look at providing better service support for a full-sized Res F brigade, I see a further need.

I just think that we are missing a capability by not having above-brigade-level (I'd like to call them divisional but that always gets me branded as a dinosaur) Res F service support elements that have the capability of deploying added resources over and above what is within the brigade itself. You probably understand the rationale of why we did it much better than I but it strikes me as strange that we've spent decades developing doctrine and creating establishments for service support at the company, battalion and brigade and above level but the moment we deployed operationally we threw all that out the window and started ad hocing NSEs by stripping the battalions of much of their service support and then amalgamating it into a national theatre level organization. I presume it was economical and convenient in a static theatre setting but it runs roughshod on providing experience with our actual doctrine.

I read Conrad's book "What the Thunder Said" and was left with the distinct impression, that when the NSEs are allocated positions on these operations then, like the artillery, the organizers fail to understand and properly staff the resources required to have a properly functioning establishment in place. (for example the absence of a proper armoured LAV recovery vehicle was glaring) The result is we cobble together the best we can, doctrine be damned.



MilEME09 said:


> Within RCEME doctrine, a maintenance battalion would have a company dedicated to training, with a platoon dedicated to Jr, intermediate, and senior technicians. However our doctrine of the respective corps hasn't blended perfectly. We have OJT cells, but not dedicated training cells to mentor and train all. This is because we rely on the schools, but they do not have the capacity now to generate personal.  Log and RCEME doctrine read as elements are independent of each other especially at higher levels, but in reality they never are.



The artillery has gone through phases where at times the artillery school did all DP1 training, then the regiments did it as well and finally specific battle schools. I've frankly lost track of where things stand now. So I see the problem. At least with the artillery all you need is a gun, a truck and a range. In your case there's probably a boat load of training aids and workshop tools and facilities needed which might be harder to find outside the school environment. We need a lot more maintainers, IMHO, and organizing a "school-in-a-box" system for training DP1s that can be trucked out to a unit or facility for months at a time might be useful. 

I do wonder why RCEME doesn't have it's own supply chain. I know it's always in fashion and theoretically saves positions by consolidating functions such as for "materiel management" but if spare parts and tools were separate from all the toilet paper and ammunition and water and gasoline etc functions. (Yup I know it's separated internally within supply but the folks who need a critical motherboard to get their radar up and working don't want to hear that "we're waiting until the end of the week to consolidate an order".)

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you


----------



## MJP

Colin Parkinson said:


> You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you


While a bit of side track, you can do it with our current system. Knowledge is lacking in executing and setting max and mins (I actually posted a how to on the site) and there is no central control on some aspects and over control on other aspects. 

The other larger issue is that depot or 3rd line stock is either in Edm or Montreal depots. Depending on where you are geographically determines where  your supporting depot is and how the system automatically directs your order. However, if that depot doesn't have the right stock it does not get automatically redirected to the other depot for order fulfillment. You have to manually re-direct it and that is suppose to happen at the unit level. So unless a unit control  and supporting parts shop is on the ball orders languish in the system.


----------



## FJAG

Colin Parkinson said:


> You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you


Gets me back to the old army days when we didn't have no steenkin' software. Everything was on little cardboard cards. Still have no idea how our tiffies kept the batteries running but they were always there and parts magically appeared. It's not that we didn't have the odd hangar queen for a bit and the old 25s, 125s and 524s had a pretty high failure rate and we were constantly swapping them out from here and there to keep the CPs and FOOs up and running. Our Sig Sgt and Rad Tech were two of the busiest guys in the echelon. I know when I was BK G for three years that the battery's maintenance det (which was pretty large - I seem to remember thirteen or fourteen of them - since we were a tracked SP bty) were by far my favourite people.

🍻


----------



## Eaglelord17

MilEME09 said:


> Here's a statistic to support hq cuts, especially in the PRes, 3 division has almost 900 pers in CSS,  just over 100 are officers. That's a ridiculously high ratio.


Actually that is a fantastic rate in comparison to the CF in general. If anything the CAF should be following those numbers much closer as right now for the whole organization its about a 1:4 ratio.

The CAF should seriously look into providing apprenticeships or incentives for skilled trades people to join the Reserves. Possibly make it a partnership where they get you signed as a apprentice (the hardest part of the whole apprenticeship process) and work with local shops to make it happen (possibly a wage subsidy for the civilian employer to incentivize them to work with the CAF). That way you can effectively build skilled tradesmen without having to actually employ them yourselves (maybe make a condition in there that they get so much time off a year for military training). This would obviously cost more money, but the idea that you pay say 10-15% of their wage and get a skilled individual out of it might be worthwhile. Certainly cheaper than employing them full time to build those skills up.


----------



## MJP

FJAG said:


> Gets me back to the old army days when we didn't have no steenkin' software. Everything was on little cardboard cards. Still have no idea how our tiffies kept the batteries running but they were always there and parts magically appeared. It's not that we didn't have the odd hangar queen for a bit and the old 25s, 125s and 524s had a pretty high failure rate and we were constantly swapping them out from here and there to keep the CPs and FOOs up and running. Our Sig Sgt and Rad Tech were two of the busiest guys in the echelon. I know when I was BK G for three years that the battery's maintenance det (which was pretty large - I seem to remember thirteen or fourteen of them - since we were a tracked SP bty) were by far my favourite people.
> 
> 🍻


It was also a time when platforms were very simple and could be fixed by an 18 year old with a grade 10 education and very little training.

The other thing we did was subscribe to the school of inventory where any inefficiency in your system can be hidden because you just always have the parts.

Nowadays platforms are complex, have way more parts and we've gone from fixing those parts to just pull and replace. However we also don't have the inventory to lean on like we used too, so that replace aspect has to be carefully managed to make sure parts are in the right area.  We are not good at that.  Part of that is much of our senior managers both military and civilian lived in the era where we just held lots inventory, so they think we still do it that way but also our system is inefficient.....very very inefficient


----------



## FJAG

Eaglelord17 said:


> Actually that is a fantastic rate in comparison to the CF in general. If anything the CAF should be following those numbers much closer as right now for the whole organization its about a 1:4 ratio.
> 
> The CAF should seriously look into providing apprenticeships or incentives for skilled trades people to join the Reserves. Possibly make it a partnership where they get you signed as a apprentice (the hardest part of the whole apprenticeship process) and work with local shops to make it happen (possibly a wage subsidy for the civilian employer to incentivize them to work with the CAF). That way you can effectively build skilled tradesmen without having to actually employ them yourselves (maybe make a condition in there that they get so much time off a year for military training). This would obviously cost more money, but the idea that you pay say 10-15% of their wage and get a skilled individual out of it might be worthwhile. Certainly cheaper than employing them full time to build those skills up.


I've always thought we should be putting tons of service support reservists through light and heavy equipment mechanics course, food services courses, health services course, transport courses etc through community colleges by paying their tuition but no salary, then giving them military conversion course with the army in the summers - with pay- and then having them locked in for an obligatory period of service to compensate for the tuition costs. Heck we could put some of them on a year or two of Class B after that fixing things and giving them work experience for a good civilian career. Betcha we could fill up the service battalions in a few years.

🤔


----------



## MilEME09

MJP said:


> While a bit of side track, you can do it with our current system. Knowledge is lacking in executing and setting max and mins (I actually posted a how to on the site) and there is no central control on some aspects and over control on other aspects.
> 
> The other larger issue is that depot or 3rd line stock is either in Edm or Montreal depots. Depending on where you are geographically determines where  your supporting depot is and how the system automatically directs your order. However, if that depot doesn't have the right stock it does not get automatically redirected to the other depot for order fulfillment. You have to manually re-direct it and that is suppose to happen at the unit level. So unless a unit control  and supporting parts shop is on the ball orders languish in the system.


Agreed, it's not the systems(program) fault, it is a good system. The CAFs problem comes from a lack of user understanding, and two as pointed out by you and last years AG report into our supply system. Depot isn't always stocked, impact the AG found many items are set to 0 hold which for a military is a bad thing.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

How often does the supply and procurement side sit down with specialists on the operational side to assess service to the users and upcoming needs?


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Agreed, it's not the systems(program) fault, it is a good system. The CAFs problem comes from a lack of user understanding, and two as pointed out by you and last years AG report into our supply system. Depot isn't always stocked, impact the AG found many items are set to 0 hold which for a military is a bad thing.


This raises a question that has interested me for some time: how does the system (software or whatever) correct for such a situation?

Does the system need a manual input to override or correct such a setting? And if so is there a policy/overwatch system in place to make such corrections on the thousands of disparate parts recorded in the system?

Or does the system itself (through some magical algorithm) self correct itself  when a given parameter is exceeded?

This again reminds me of Target's failure in Canada which in very large measure came about because the software (which itself was very powerful) was not properly programmed (to an extent the requirement to incorporate bilingualism and the metric system to an existing product line proved difficult) and ended up causing major supply management failures as a result of which the customer base (which was very excited by the chain's entry into Canada) lost faith in the brand. Target ultimately decided it couldn't cure the problem and took a multi-billion dollar hit to extricate itself.

🤔


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> This raises a question that has interested me for some time: how does the system (software or whatever) correct for such a situation?
> 
> Does the system need a manual input to override or correct such a setting? And if so is there a policy/overwatch system in place to make such corrections on the thousands of disparate parts recorded in the system?
> 
> Or does the system itself (through some magical algorithm) self correct itself  when a given parameter is exceeded?
> 
> This again reminds me of Target's failure in Canada which in very large measure came about because the software (which itself was very powerful) was not properly programmed (to an extent the requirement to incorporate bilingualism and the metric system to an existing product line proved difficult) and ended up causing major supply management failures as a result of which the customer base (which was very excited by the chain's entry into Canada) lost faith in the brand. Target ultimately decided it couldn't cure the problem and took a multi-billion dollar hit to extricate itself.
> 
> 🤔



I connect regularly with people who are really good at getting billions of dollars worth of product from one part of the globe to another, with no problems at all.

It would be nice to see the CAF be able to get that right, starting with the same postal code.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I connect regularly with people who are really good at getting billions of dollars worth of product from one part of the globe to another, with no problems at all.
> 
> It would be nice to see the CAF be able to get that right, starting with the same postal code.


I've just read the another answer to my interview questionnaire on Op Athena 1 Roto 0 and now have my fourth response that indicates that the NSE there had problems in giving any priority to replacing/fixing operationally necessary technical (primarily electronic or optical) equipment.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> I've just read the another answer to my interview questionnaire on Op Athena 1 Roto 0 and now have my fourth response that indicates that the NSE there had problems in giving any priority to replacing/fixing operationally necessary technical (primarily electronic or optical) equipment.
> 
> 🍻


Was that due to the supply chain? We have a priority list for vehicle and equipment repair. Example an Ambulance is priority 1, even above tanks and arnoured fighting vehicles, and standardized repair times. This usually gets tracked via time cards, and if you log 10 hours on a 5 hour repair, the system should flag it and you better explain why. Now repairs can only begin and time logged if the parts are available in most cases.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Was that due to the supply chain? We have a priority list for vehicle and equipment repair. Example an Ambulance is priority 1, even above tanks and arnoured fighting vehicles, and standardized repair times. This usually gets tracked via time cards, and if you log 10 hours on a 5 hour repair, the system should flag it and you better explain why. Now repairs can only begin and time logged if the parts are available in most cases.


I must admit these are anecdotal (but I think the speakers were credible) In one case a request for a critical circuit board for a radar had been submitted in to the NSE but when checked on a week later was found to not have been forwarded onward submitted but was being held up for a bulk request. Another was a thermal sight on a OPLAV which was down for a month without any action and finally ended up being swapped out from a Zulu LAV which didn't have the same operational need. The folks I'm talking about were gunners and if you recall the gunners were a brigade resource and not a battle group one. While that should have made no difference there was a distinct feeling (whether rightly or wrongly) that the battery, which had a BQMS, did not get the same response rate from the NSE as the battle group which had a Log O on staff. People who were in even smaller brigade level detachments but not part of the usual Bde HQ felt particularly that they were orphans as far as logistics support was concerned.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I must admit these are anecdotal (but I think the speakers were credible) In one case a request for a critical circuit board for a radar had been submitted in to the NSE but when checked on a week later was found to not have been forwarded onward submitted but was being held up for a bulk request. Another was a thermal sight on a OPLAV which was down for a month without any action and finally ended up being swapped out from a Zulu LAV which didn't have the same operational need. The folks I'm talking about were gunners and if you recall the gunners were a brigade resource and not a battle group one. While that should have made no difference there was a distinct feeling (whether rightly or wrongly) that the battery, which had a BQMS, did not get the same response rate from the NSE as the battle group which had a Log O on staff. People who were in even smaller brigade level detachments but not part of the usual Bde HQ felt particularly that they were orphans as far as logistics support was concerned.
> 
> 🍻



If I remember correctly, we had a truck VOR at CFB Esquimalt for months because they were waiting for one part. For the heater. In Victoria.


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> I must admit these are anecdotal (but I think the speakers were credible) In one case a request for a critical circuit board for a radar had been submitted in to the NSE but when checked on a week later was found to not have been forwarded onward submitted but was being held up for a bulk request. Another was a thermal sight on a OPLAV which was down for a month without any action and finally ended up being swapped out from a Zulu LAV which didn't have the same operational need. The folks I'm talking about were gunners and if you recall the gunners were a brigade resource and not a battle group one. While that should have made no difference there was a distinct feeling (whether rightly or wrongly) that the battery, which had a BQMS, did not get the same response rate from the NSE as the battle group which had a Log O on staff. People who were in even smaller brigade level detachments but not part of the usual Bde HQ felt particularly that they were orphans as far as logistics support was concerned.
> 
> 🍻



The Army portion of the RCLS should have some very big takeaways from our Afghan excursion.  Having said that, moving a pencil from Canada is hard when you don't have the planes that can do it.  And only marginally better when you have 5 or 6. 

On my second tour I was at the PDC.  And I remember being frustrated that I wasn't getting my ADREPs filled but randomly the NSE would ship me flat screen TVs and fridges. There were less than 20 Canadians there... How many TVs and fridges did we need ?  It all seemed very adhoc to me.


----------



## MJP

Colin Parkinson said:


> How often does the supply and procurement side sit down with specialists on the operational side to assess service to the users and upcoming needs?


Major procurements projects in terms of building a capability into a SOW/SOR is done by the various services by operators (Director Land Requirements, Director Air Requirements, Director Naval Requirements). ADM(Mat) in concert with PSPC do the procurement but largely "what to buy" is shaped by the various environments/end users. There is more nuance and stakeholders than that but procurement I would argue (along with many others) is not the issue.  Rather, largely the issue is that Canada’s Defence Supply Chain (DSC) was designed with *a procurement and materiel life cycle focus* and therefore is at odds with the customer (command) focus and agility required in an expeditionary force ( Mills, 2014 discussing Zimmer's 2008 analysis). So what we procure is less the issue, rather the issue is more how we manage supply chain relationships which is the backbone of Supply Chain Management.

(I adapted this from some other work I am doing, so if it seems not perfectly tailored apologies)

A bit of background to how we are orientated and organized to support CAF operations is in order to give some perspective to what Supply Chain management (SCM) means to the CAF. National Defence falls under two umbrellas ; The Dept of National Defence which is predominantly civilian in the form of ADM (Mat). Within ADM (Mat) there are equipment management divisions and  supply chain directorate. On the equipment side they procure and support the various fleets (vehicles, ships, aircraft, weapons etc) while the supply chain directorate develops supply policies and procedures:

_ADM (Mat) is the designated functional authority for [MA&S] and is responsible to develop all related policy, procedures, processes and training standards as well as ensuring compliance and oversight.”49 Essentially, the ADM (Mat) is responsible for the provisioning component of the supply chain, by acquiring equipment on behalf of the CF and filling the depots with the necessary stock to sustain it, and for the corporate level management function, to include the CFSS and performance management _

On the CAF side there is an Canadian Material Support Group that oversees national stocks and the transportation system that moves material (and a few other things). In addition, each of the services (Navy, Army, Air Force) run and maintain bases that include regional and local warehouses and repair facilities and are linked into the national supply chain.

_(look at OAG 2020 exhibit 3.1, which has an easy to understand diagram that lays this out, but I can't upload to the site for some reason)_

So the CAF (CMSG) stores and moves equipment based on policy developed and managed by DND which is often at odds with environmental priorities and policies. To link back to issues surrounding DND/(ADM (Mat) holding the conch for in-service management means that CMSG holds stock that is often slow moving or dormant but still takes up space in our depots. So much material at one point that we were perilously close to being at 100% capacity leaving no room for additional stocks. This has an impact on other resources especially time, as we have to still account for that inventory through deliberate counts and other control measures on a regular basis. DND and the CAF has gone on a deliberate strategy to reduce these stocks but even with a plan at the strategic level, what what is held is managed by ADM(Mat) and at times they are very reluctant to remove items from the inventory (sometimes the environments are the issue as well). An example I was given, was there was a textile that we have almost 20,000 meters of that had zero demand in ten years that took some deliberate back and forth to dispose of and even then we kept 5000 meters "just in case".

The other issue is that at our strategic level we have a completely joint system whereas most other country's supply chains follow service lines (i.e. Navy, Army, and Air Force). This means at that strategic level there are competing priorities between the services that all place demand on the same finite amount of resources (Zima, 2012). Acerbating this is that as you can imagine across all the services their is an incredible amount of equipment all with their own unique NSNs that either needs holdings or a dedicated supply channel.

Simply put our management of relationships between all these stakeholders is weak and does not follow good SCM principles. Processes to order/move/fulfill demands internal to the CAF are also an issue but we do not own all the processes and many things are silo'd leaving different people holding the bag all with their own competing priorities. Our transportation tracking system for example does not communicate very well with DRMIS as it is a bespoke standalone system, same as our ammo management system.

Because there is no central controlling agency, we are left trying to piece things together ad hoc to fix these issues. It is not all bleak as there are some great projects on the go that are strengthening the relationships but also working on bringing silos in from the dark like MISL and even rationalizing where inventory is located based on demand. 

Some light reading if ya want to see some decent background papers which is where I got most of this material for another project I am doing

Zimmer, 2008  For Want of a Nail the Campaign was Lost’ DND’s Supply Chain: A State of Performance Paralysis,
Zima, 2012 A Canadian Revolution in Military Logistics – Improving the CF Operational Supply Chain Through Benchmarking
Mills, 2014 LOGISTICS: REDUCING FRICTION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING, INTEGRATION, AND OWNERSHIP


FJAG said:


> This raises a question that has interested me for some time: how does the system (software or whatever) correct for such a situation?
> 
> Does the system need a manual input to override or correct such a setting? And if so is there a policy/overwatch system in place to make such corrections on the thousands of disparate parts recorded in the system?
> 
> Or does the system itself (through some magical algorithm) self correct itself  when a given parameter is exceeded?
> 
> 
> 
> 🤔


At the end of the day any computer system will only do what you tell it to do, one of my mentors always laughs as there is a computer error code that one can utilize for write offs but he points outs that "computers don't make the errors, people feeding the info make them".

That aside SAP/DRMIS can absolutely tell you when you have stock outs, and other supply chain issues as ithas built in ability to do analytics (and can be linked to powerful visuals like Business Objects (BOBJ) but execution has to be done by folks at the strategic or tactical level (depending what they want to do). You can automate aspects of the system and many are but you still need real life people who know what they are doing making the corrections or determining what KPIs to monitor, which I would argue is where we suffer.


This is way outside the lanes of PRes Restructure so I apologize for the tangent.


----------



## quadrapiper

Brad Sallows said:


> ...consolidate soldiers in rural and small urban locations into single (administrative, if not role) units...


A "(Town) Garrison" structure would make sense.


MJP said:


> It was also a time when platforms were very simple and could be fixed by an 18 year old with a grade 10 education and very little training.
> 
> The other thing we did was subscribe to the school of inventory where any inefficiency in your system can be hidden because you just always have the parts.
> 
> Nowadays platforms are complex, have way more parts and we've gone from fixing those parts to just pull and replace. However we also don't have the inventory to lean on like we used too, so that replace aspect has to be carefully managed to make sure parts are in the right area.  We are not good at that.  Part of that is much of our senior managers both military and civilian lived in the era where we just held lots inventory, so they think we still do it that way but also our system is inefficient.....very very inefficient


How does the actual difficulty level compare between more involved repair operations on simpler equipment and plug-and-play swaps on more complicated kit?


----------



## MJP

quadrapiper said:


> How does the actual difficulty level compare between more involved repair operations on simpler equipment and plug-and-play swaps on more complicated kit?


It is not one thing alone.  The sheer number of parts for each platform has skyrocketed plus the inability to fix a broken part at the lowest level combined with an overall reduction in inventory held means there are more chances for failure within the supply chain itself.


----------



## childs56

daftandbarmy said:


> If I remember correctly, we had a truck VOR at CFB Esquimalt for months because they were waiting for one part. For the heater. In Victoria.


Its funny one of my Gun Tractors was a mis-matched truck full of parts from other donors. When something broke and Esquimalt did not have a part. magically one would be found for my truck and another truck would be missing it. My truck looked like it was painted a really bad camo pattern, because it was full of parts from other trucks. Once they caught on to what we were doing, they said they didn't blame us for doing what we did. But to stop borrowing parts.


----------



## dapaterson

The CAF supply chain requires significant investments: in technology (the next big step is rumoured to be WiFi in warehouses to enable (gasp!) bar coding technology); in personnel (bases and support structures are generally first in line for reductions); and in inventory (just in time is fine for COTS items with robust supply chains; not so much for military unique requirements).  But the Army would rather 600 LAVs without parts than 500 LAVs with parts, it sometimes seems.

Operating equipment beyond its forecast life adds additional complexities, suppliers go under, certain parts wear more quickly than anticipated or any number of other possible ways for things to go astray.  The C6 discussed earlier is a good example; weapons used hard, in many cases beyond economical repair yet pushed back into service, consuming parts and driving requirements for additional parts because the replacement was arguably a decade+ late.

On the personnel front, there will sometimes be redundancies in military personnel which are locally unneeded and could be replaced with civilians, but the enterprise requires them.  As there is little to no lateral entry in the CAF, if you want a Sgt today, it means you recruited a dozen or so a decade or so ago.  Assuming the usual Reg F 7% attrition annually, and that Sgt requires a tail of a dozen or so people to produce, and to get the experience and knowledge (CAF, environmental and trade) necessary for that rank.  Those other eleven people need to exist for the purpose of the enterprise, even if at CFAD Bedford they'd rather trade that Cpl MM Tech for a GL...


----------



## MJP

daftandbarmy said:


> If I remember correctly, we had a truck VOR at CFB Esquimalt for months because they were waiting for one part. For the heater. In Victoria.


While that is silly unless it is a safety issue that grounds the veh,  the unit can take the vehicle back and use it as _outstanding usable_ (which means there is a fault but veh is still drivable). This is less a maint/supply issue and more a unit that doesn't understand how things work (or is getting bad advice).


childs56 said:


> Its funny one of my Gun Tractors was a mis-matched truck full of parts from other donors. When something broke and Esquimalt did not have a part. magically one would be found for my truck and another truck would be missing it. My truck looked like it was painted a really bad camo pattern, because it was full of parts from other trucks. Once they caught on to what we were doing, they said they didn't blame us for doing what we did. But to stop borrowing parts.


That is robbing which mean there is an intention to replace the part eventually, cannibalization means there is no intent to ever replace the part. Permission for both is usually held at the formation level but not unheard of at the tactical/unit level to make magic happen. Have subscribed to the school of rob first ask permission later at times myself.


----------



## childs56

MJP said:


> While that is silly unless it is a safety issue that grounds the veh,  the unit can take the vehicle back and use it as _outstanding usable_ (which means there is a fault but veh is still drivable). This is less a maint/supply issue and more a unit that doesn't understand how things work (or is getting bad advice).
> 
> That is robbing which mean there is an intention to replace the part eventually, cannibalization means there is no intent to ever replace the part. Permission to both is usually held at the formation level but not unheard of at the tactical/unit level to make magic happen. Have subscribed to the school of rob first ask permission later at times myself.


LOL, often the only permission was cruising the fence looking for a truck with a red tag on it. Find the part take the part. Install the part then put broken part on floor boards of red tagged truck. Then Let base maintenance know your truck magically fixed itself and You found the same part on the floor boards of truck on the fence but it was broken so you couldn't use it. Call it what ever you want, trucks kept rolling and eventually base maintenance  figured out what we were doing. I (we) were not allowed unsupervised in their yard.
Or buying a airline yourself and replacing the $20 part so your truck wasn't grounded and did not need a $500 tow bill.


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:


> A "(Town) Garrison" structure would make sense.


I'm not sure that I buy into that.

Brad's suggestion was to reduce the amount of full-time administrators by aggregating small town units into one unit with shared administrative overhead. That makes sense to me, but I don't think that a "(Town) Garrison" is the answer, if I correctly understand what you mean by that. I'm understanding what you mean as a group of disparate units (say an inf coy an arty battery a recce squadron) all located close to each other and all supported by a single administrative element.

The US National Guard has a concept like that called a "Troop Command" which is a static brigade-level equivalent headquarters in a given state that is too small to have a brigade and that provides administrative services for whatever units are in that state that either aren't affiliated with a given brigade or division or are too far geographically from their next highest headquarters. 

The single problem that I have with that is that these are administrative headquarters where in my perfect world, all reserve elements, from brigade on down, should be mobilizable and deployable in the case of a major emergency including their Reg F members who are needed to provide leadership and administration on deployment. There is no place in that construct for a small town subunit that doesn't belong to a higher battalion headquarters (even if a hundred miles away) which has responsibility for administrative oversight.

Again, in my perfect world, the only agencies that aren't deployable are what I call depot battalions which provide across the board individual training and the reason I have them as non deployable entities is that in a major emergency you will still need a core that can recruit and train further reinforcements long term and what is better than giving that job to the same organization that does it in peacetime?

If there's one thing that bothers me about our current reserve system its that we parade too much and don't train enough (especially collectively) I don't want to sound too cynical (as this was my attitude as both an RSS officer and a parading reservist,) but the admin night every Tuesday, training night every Thursday one exercise per month (two if its a recruit course) routine was one of the big reasons we never got anywhere. (Except into the mess quite regularly at 10:00 pm. twice a week) 

You always had a large number of people who couldn't keep up with the routine so both administration and training became very spotty and if one hour of good administration or training was accomplished on any of those nights then you were lucky. That's why, IMHO, we need to parade less, off load administration on full-timers,  off-load individual training on a dedicated training cadre and have units conduct one solid two and one half day - 100% attendance IBTS or collective training exercise per month augmented by a two to three week 100% collective training exercise in the summer. 

Our valuable Class A pay and training time is being frittered away in tiny little 3 hour fragments throughout the year. (You can still open the mess on Tuesday and Thursday nights for those that need it.) If you do go to a solid one mandatory weekend per month and summer training exercise then the whole RSS staff concept can change dramatically, especially for those tiny remote outposts which could become serviced by a "circuit" administration/training team from battalion headquarters who conducts administration, planning and leadership full-time centrally and then supervise/conduct the training events. (I remember having a Reg F WO working for me as the sole RSS staff at the battery in Portage La Prairie - he was too far away to supervise properly and was undoubtedly one of the most underemployed folks in the CAF. There are a lot of those distributed around the RSS system)

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

MJP said:


> While that is silly unless it is a safety issue that grounds the veh,  the unit can take the vehicle back and use it as _outstanding usable_ (which means there is a fault but veh is still drivable). This is less a maint/supply issue and more a unit that doesn't understand how things work (or is getting bad advice).
> 
> That is robbing which mean there is an intention to replace the part eventually, cannibalization means there is no intent to ever replace the part. Permission for both is usually held at the formation level but not unheard of at the tactical/unit level to make magic happen. Have subscribed to the school of rob first ask permission later at times myself.


Do you have a reference for robbing authorization also being formation level? My understanding from reading various RCEME documents on ACIMS is Robbing and reclamation is authorized at the tactic level (Wainwright PCC lot is pretty empty after my techs stripped it this summer) and cannibalizing parts was formation or higher level, in the case of weapons usually the LCMM.


----------



## MJP

MilEME09 said:


> Do you have a reference for robbing authorization also being formation level? My understanding from reading various RCEME documents on ACIMS is Robbing and reclamation is authorized at the tactic level (Wainwright PCC lot is pretty empty after my techs stripped it this summer) and cannibalizing parts was formation or higher level, in the case of weapons usually the LCMM.


No, going off memory and experience on expeditionary ops and brigade level exercise as a staff weenie. My experience is generally we do what we need to keep things going and if you fall below a certain threshold it makes sense to keep a vehicle going than holding two VOR.  Not at work until next week so fill your boots if you want to read RCEME doctrine...


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure that I buy into that.
> 
> Brad's suggestion was to reduce the amount of full-time administrators by aggregating small town units into one unit with shared administrative overhead. That makes sense to me, but I don't think that a "(Town) Garrison" is the answer, if I correctly understand what you mean by that. I'm understanding what you mean as a group of disparate units (say an inf coy an arty battery a recce squadron) all located close to each other and all supported by a single administrative element.


I was actually thinking specifically of the situation on Vancouver Island, with a fair number of units not just _close_ to each other, but in the same building.

Was thinking of how you might shuffle tasks to get the _admin_ side of things out, as much as possible, of the Reserve unit's finite time on site: how much of what ends up taking up admin nights would go away with e.g. a common OR open (say) three times a week, including a day on the weekend, for hours convenient to members? I'm assuming the goal is to have the Reservist, from recruit to OC, spending as much of their Class A time as possible training in/for role/trade. 

Could also be a place, especially in areas with several smaller units, to accrete specialist instructors only needed on a fractional basis by each local unit.

Seems like it could align with the same sort of principle as your depot battalion: someone to keep the lights on, and the bodies flowing, should the local unit(s) be deployed.


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:


> I was actually thinking specifically of the situation on Vancouver Island, with a fair number of units not just _close_ to each other, but in the same building.
> 
> Was thinking of how you might shuffle tasks to get the _admin_ side of things out, as much as possible, of the Reserve unit's finite time on site: how much of what ends up taking up admin nights would go away with e.g. a common OR open (say) three times a week, including a day on the weekend, for hours convenient to members? I'm assuming the goal is to have the Reservist, from recruit to OC, spending as much of their Class A time as possible training in/for role/trade.
> 
> Could also be a place, especially in areas with several smaller units, to accrete specialist instructors only needed on a fractional basis by each local unit.
> 
> Seems like it could align with the same sort of principle as your depot battalion: someone to keep the lights on, and the bodies flowing, should the local unit(s) be deployed.


True enough. You always need a rear party.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> I was actually thinking specifically of the situation on Vancouver Island, with a fair number of units not just _close_ to each other, but in the same building.
> 
> Was thinking of how you might shuffle tasks to get the _admin_ side of things out, as much as possible, of the Reserve unit's finite time on site: how much of what ends up taking up admin nights would go away with e.g. a common OR open (say) three times a week, including a day on the weekend, for hours convenient to members? I'm assuming the goal is to have the Reservist, from recruit to OC, spending as much of their Class A time as possible training in/for role/trade.
> 
> Could also be a place, especially in areas with several smaller units, to accrete specialist instructors only needed on a fractional basis by each local unit.
> 
> Seems like it could align with the same sort of principle as your depot battalion: someone to keep the lights on, and the bodies flowing, should the local unit(s) be deployed.


We have 6 (six) licensed establishments in one 1915 era building but only one (very poorly equipped e.g. 6ft tables and folding chairs avec chalk board a la 1968) training room shared by two regiments. We have to parade on different nights of the week, in part so we can use the one room that can seat 30 (pre- COVID).

I think you seriously misunderstand the primarily role of the reserve Infantry and Artillery


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> We have 6 (six) licensed establishments in one 1915 era building but only one (very poorly equipped e.g. 6ft tables and folding chairs avec chalk board a la 1968) training room shared by two regiments. We have to parade on different nights of the week, in part so we can use the one room that can seat 30 (pre- COVID).
> 
> I think you seriously misunderstand the primarily role of the reserve Infantry and Artillery


That just gave me pause to think.

In 1966 I had the pleasure of being a member of the first troop to parade on the drill square of the brand spanking new, state of the art  Moss Park Armoury in Toronto which housed one artillery regiment, two infantry battalions and the fledgling service support elements that were about to become a service battalion. There were offices all around the main floor including three classrooms while the entire upper floor was taken over by messes. So a ration of 1:1 for messes v administration/training. Oh yes and there was also a basement for QM stores and all of our guns and vehicles which at best could hold around twenty maybe twenty-five trucks. So. Four "battalions"; twenty some odd trucks; four guns; and twelve wet messes and two dry canteens. Priorities.

🤦‍♂️


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> That just gave me pause to think.
> 
> In 1966 I had the pleasure of being a member of the first troop to parade on the drill square of the brand spanking new, state of the art  Moss Park Armoury in Toronto which housed one artillery regiment, two infantry battalions and the fledgling service support elements that were about to become a service battalion. There were offices all around the main floor including three classrooms while the entire upper floor was taken over by messes. So a ration of 1:1 for messes v administration/training. Oh yes and there was also a basement for QM stores and all of our guns and vehicles which at best could hold around twenty maybe twenty-five trucks. So. Four "battalions"; twenty some odd trucks; four guns; and twelve wet messes and two dry canteens. Priorities.
> 
> 🤦‍♂️



It would be scandalous... if anyone really cared of course


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:


> We have 6 (six) licensed establishments in one 1915 era building but only one (very poorly equipped e.g. 6ft tables and folding chairs avec chalk board a la 1968) training room shared by two regiments. We have to parade on different nights of the week, in part so we can use the one room that can seat 30 (pre- COVID).
> 
> I think you seriously misunderstand the primarily role of the reserve Infantry and Artillery


You guys are full to the brim with capable NCOs and Officers, serviceable GPMGs and night optics though, right?


----------



## daftandbarmy

reveng said:


> You guys are full to the brim with capable NCOs and Officers, serviceable GPMGS, and night optics though, right?



If by 'night optics' you mean 'the red filter I swing down on my personally acquired Petzl headlamp' then yes, of course 

It's OK though, we're tasked with providing a Recce Pl and have very few recce trained pers either AFAIK, so we don't need anything like that right?

So, yeah, pretty much less night vision gear than we had in 1979 when I was with the militia in Vancouver and had Starlight scopes issued.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MJP said:


> While that is silly unless it is a safety issue that grounds the veh,  the unit can take the vehicle back and use it as _outstanding usable_ (which means there is a fault but veh is still drivable). This is less a maint/supply issue and more a unit that doesn't understand how things work (or is getting bad advice).
> 
> That is robbing which mean there is an intention to replace the part eventually, cannibalization means there is no intent to ever replace the part. Permission for both is usually held at the formation level but not unheard of at the tactical/unit level to make magic happen. Have subscribed to the school of rob first ask permission later at times myself.


Is it robbing when you acquire parts from another allied army without their knowledge? Asking for a friend....


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:


> If by 'night optics' you mean 'the red filter I swing down on my personally acquired Petzl headlamp' then yes, of course
> 
> It's OK though, we're tasked with providing a Recce Pl and have very few recce trained pers either AFAIK, so we don't need anything like that right?
> 
> So, yeah, pretty much less night vision gear than we had in 1979 when I was with the militia in Vancouver and had Starlight scopes issued.


Shoulda been in LFCA or whatever the eff they call it these days. OPFOR (especially if any RegF present) would be too busy making fools of the QOR, or roadkill of whatever QY RANG/GGHG Recce Tp that just advanced into an obvious defile to even notice your Recce Pl...


----------



## daftandbarmy

reveng said:


> Shoulda been in LCFA or whatever the eff they call it these days. OPFOR (especially if any RegF present) would be too busy making fools of the QOR, or roadkill of whatever QY RANG/GGHG Recce Tp just advanced into an obvious defile to even notice your Recce Pl...



OPFOR? You guys were organized enough to have a proper OPFOR? 

Luxury!


----------



## Rifleman62

FJAG: "In 1966 I had the pleasure of being a member of the first troop to parade on the drill square of the brand spanking new, state of the art Moss Park Armoury in Toronto...."

I was on that parade also, as a Pioneer with the QOR. Got a photo somewhere.

Times have changed. That may "Regimental" messes would never happen again in a new build. Wonder if there are composite messes in Moss Park now?


----------



## FJAG

Rifleman62 said:


> FJAG: "In 1966 I had the pleasure of being a member of the first troop to parade on the drill square of the brand spanking new, state of the art Moss Park Armoury in Toronto...."
> 
> I was on that parade also, as a Pioneer with the QOR. Got a photo somewhere.
> 
> Times have changed. That may "Regimental" messes would never happen again in a new build. Wonder if there are composite messes in Moss Park now?


 That would have been the slightly later official parade.

The one I'm talking about was when our TSM took us over from the temporary Richmond Street Armory (basically a small warehouse building) to the new armouries for a look around before it was officially opened. The commissionaire let us in and we took advantage of doing some foot drill while there. The QOR were with us in Richmond and you'll remember the parade square there was a basement room around maybe 50 x 100 feet where we had to do "automatic wheels" so we wouldn't run into the walls. A real parade square was luxury.


----------



## Rifleman62

Richmond had a cobblestone floor. Very slippery with studded ammunition boots, especially doing 140 paces per minute! I was told that Richmond building was where the QOR mobilized for the Riel excursion in 1885.


----------



## FJAG

Rifleman62 said:


> Richmond had a cobblestone floor. Very slippery with studded ammunition boots, especially doing 140 paces per minute! I was told that Richmond building was where the QOR mobilized for the Riel excursion in 1885.


I don't think so about the latter. Richmond was just a facility (a former warehouse and business (If I recall directly, the main floor was a drive in garage under which there was an open basement and then two upper stories, the lower one for offices and the upper for messes.) that DND rented for a few years (1963 -5) after the University Avenue Armory was demolished to make way for the new court house complex and prior to Moss Park being completed. (The City had wanted the University Avenue Armoury site for quite some time)

The QOR was at University since 1894 joined by the 48th Highlanders and 29 Fd and 42nd Medium, a service company and the GGHG. It was Toronto's first real, large-scale armory. Prior to that from the time of the formation of the Battalion there are references that I've found to a Drill Shed but without an actual location until 1877 when a new Drill Shed was built on Front and Jarvis Street (across the street from the St Lawrence Market. It is from this location that the Toronto contingent would have marched off in 1985.

Front and Jarvis is about three blocks south of the Richmond St facility. 

🍻


----------



## dangerboy

FJAG said:


> The QOR was at University since 1894 joined by the 48th Highlanders and 29 Fd and 42nd Medium, a service company and the GGHG. It was Toronto's first real, large-scale armory. Prior to that from the time of the formation of the Battalion there are references that I've found to a Drill Shed but without an actual location until 1877 when a new Drill Shed was built on Front and Jarvis Street (across the street from the St Lawrence Market. It is from this location that the Toronto contingent would have marched off in 1985.
> 
> Front and Jarvis is about three blocks south of the Richmond St facility.
> 
> 🍻


When I was in the 48th in the early 90's the veterans were still bitter about the demolishing of the University Armouries.


----------



## FJAG

dangerboy said:


> When I was in the 48th in the early 90's the veterans were still bitter about the demolishing of the University Armouries.


Yeah. At the time I joined both 42 Med, 29th Fd and 1st Loc had been amalgamated into 7th Tor so those guys were mad about two things. The problem was that University Armoury took up a piece of absolutely prime downtown real estate right next to the new City Hall and the city was just slavering to get their hands on that piece of land.

There's an article here which I find interesting:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toronto_Armories

The interesting part is that the various regimental associations came on board with the idea of building the new Moss Park Armoury at Queen and Jarvis.

Not sure what the area was like when you joined, but in 1966, Queen and Jarvis was a shithole. The place was surrounded by a about a half dozen or more missions who were housing and feeding the downtown homeless and patrolled by dozens of low rent hookers. There was at the time an empty field next to the armouries and every morning on my recruit course we would run several circuits of the field in formation. Concurrently the missions had opened and field was covered by literally hundreds of folks stretched out having their post-breakfast sleep in the grass which meant our run was also a steeplechase jumping over the sleeping and comatose. Essentially they moved everyone from prime University Avenue real estate to the middle of a slum and red light district. I'm not sure what was in the associations heads at the time.  🤔 

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

Probably thinking "The slum is a prime recruiting area, and the red-light district a fringe benefit."  QoR are airborne, after all...


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Yeah. At the time I joined both 42 Med, 29th Fd and 1st Loc had been amalgamated into 7th Tor so those guys were mad about two things. The problem was that University Armoury took up a piece of absolutely prime downtown real estate right next to the new City Hall and the city was just slavering to get their hands on that piece of land.
> 
> There's an article here which I find interesting:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toronto_Armories
> 
> The interesting part is that the various regimental associations came on board with the idea of building the new Moss Park Armoury at Queen and Jarvis.
> 
> Not sure what the area was like when you joined, but in 1966, Queen and Jarvis was a shithole. The place was surrounded by a about a half dozen or more missions who were housing and feeding the downtown homeless and patrolled by dozens of low rent hookers. There was at the time an empty field next to the armouries and every morning on my recruit course we would run several circuits of the field in formation. Concurrently the missions had opened and field was covered by literally hundreds of folks stretched out having their post-breakfast sleep in the grass which meant our run was also a steeplechase jumping over the sleeping and comatose. Essentially they moved everyone from prime University Avenue real estate to the middle of a slum and red light district. I'm not sure what was in the associations heads at the time.  🤔
> 
> 🍻



I'm always amazed at how awful some militia armouries are and, paradoxically, how much the units fight to continue living and working in squalor at the expense of quality training and overall operational efficiency. 



dapaterson said:


> Probably thinking "The slum is a prime recruiting area, and the red-light district a fringe benefit."  QoR are airborne, have a few 'Jolly Jumpers' after all...



There, FTFY


----------



## MilEME09

Someone at army HQ is on this form because I just read as part of Force 2025 "asses the impact of minimizing the number of formation level HQs, within the CA to reinvest those positions into required capabilities"

Highly recommend reading up on force 2025, looks like major restructuring of the CA is coming.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Someone at army HQ is on this form because I just read as part of Force 2025 "asses the impact of minimizing the number of formation level HQs, within the CA to reinvest those positions into required capabilities"
> 
> Highly recommend reading up on force 2025, looks like major restructuring of the CA is coming.



Whatever happens, it looks like it will wind up being a 'Musical Chairs' shuffling exercise. Not very bold at all...

Assumptions​
There will be no fundamental changes to policy or resource allocation, and the Canadian Army’s modernization goals will remain relevant to the achievement of Canada’s defence objectives;
Subsequent planning horizons will be impacted by moderate policy and resource adjustments. This will necessitate a constant multi-horizon development perspective, meaning this document will require periodic updating;
Modernization efforts must be undertaken concurrent to force generation and force employment on operations. There will be no pause. Efforts must be managed and prioritized, with the tempo of change being a key lever of control; and,
Significant growth in structure is unlikely. All modernization efforts will be conducted with the perspective that every change in capability, structure, or organization must be done within the Canadian Army’s existing personnel envelope.






						Canadian Army - Canada.ca
					

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Someone at army HQ is on this form because I just read as part of Force 2025 "asses the impact of minimizing the number of formation level HQs, within the CA to reinvest those positions into required capabilities"
> 
> Highly recommend reading up on force 2025, looks like major restructuring of the CA is coming.



Which of the various documents are you referring to? The latest one I have seen is Ed 4 of Advancing with Purpose dated Dec 2020. Is there anything newer?

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Which of the various documents are you referring to? The latest one I have seen is Ed 4 of Advancing with Purpose dated Dec 2020. Is there anything newer?
> 
> 🍻


I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.



Too bad. Hope some of that gets into the public domain at some point.

🍻


----------



## Haggis

MilEME09 said:


> I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.


Wait for next week's budget.


----------



## Infanteer

MilEME09 said:


> I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.


If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....


----------



## Haggis

Infanteer said:


> If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....


There you go again... using facts during an Internet discussion.


----------



## MilEME09

Infanteer said:


> If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....



True but still not information that should be released publicly even if it's unclassified


----------



## blacktriangle

MilEME09 said:


> True but still not information that should be released publicly even if it's unclassified


Either way, threat actors now know that "something" exists where they may not have before, what system it resides on, and even the file format to look for!


----------



## FJAG

Sound familiar?



> *Is the overarching principle of Future Reserve 2020 realistically achievable by the British Army?*​As we reach the end of 2020, regardless of restrictions and delays by the COVID-19 virus and the fallout from it, the Future Reserve 2020 (FR2020) policy should lead to a fundamentally different Army Reserve.  The FR2020 policy was developed in order to learn lessons from operational deployments and to create a Reserve that is fit for purpose.
> 
> Having been a reservist for nearly fifteen years, and having deployed operationally, I have been able to see the transformation of the Territorial Army (TA) into the Army Reserve (AR).  The development taking place to transform the TA into a respected force that regularly supplies individual augmentees to the Field Army is being stymied by its mismanagement across the board.  Many of the issues identified by FR2020 are still extant, with the cumbersome and inappropriate reporting process just one example.  Indeed, FR2020 has been frustrated by rivalry and a lack of action between departments that are supposed to work together for a common goal.  This was explored by Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani in their scholarly analysis of FR2020, which criticised the intra departmental rivalries and lack of communication as being characteristic of poor management of the Reserves.
> 
> Furthermore, the quality of the soldier being promoted in the AR has diminished.  This is a direct result of a lack of understanding of the role and capabilities of the Army Reserve has and resulted in unachievable demands placed on those in full-time employment trying to balance their civilian jobs with their commitment to defence.  The shift towards a “One Army” method of training and attendance on Regular courses means that those able to and most likely to attend and progress are the unemployed or the unemployable.  This creates other issues further down the line relating to morale, quality of training, and the perception of the Reserves.  Furthermore, the misapplication of the “One Army” concept and a haphazard approach to the allocation of permanent staff has failed to develop the Reserve into an effective tool for supporting the “Whole Force”.
> 
> The desire for a fully integrated Reserve into the field army does not appear to have advanced at all since the publication of FR2020, and this is unlikely to ever be achieved unless there is fundamental change.  In order to effect this change, senior elements of the Regular Army need to adjust their expectations and decide clearly on what type of a Reserve they actually want with a clearly delineated role.  In conjunction, the AR needs to evolve professionally to become suitable for its role of supporting the Regular Army, with a more robust approach to Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) a suitable starting point, especially considering physical fitness can be worked on in reservists’ spare time.  Whilst FR2020 was a good start to this process, at this point it serves as a policy document not been acted upon by any stakeholder. ...



A Reserve Force that is an integral element of the Whole Force »

🍻


----------



## markppcli

How sustainable would it be to assign units fully manned with Class B reservists to the CMBGs as a light motorized infantry unit. I realize this is of course extremely hypothetical, but in the quest for PYs to man our support functions and given the impracticalities of having light infantry integral to a mechanized brigade could we see the idea of a "depth" battalion manned by reserves as practical? If we were to assume that each present CBG (I'm convinced they should be Bns but that's an enormous fight I'm sure) could force generate a rifle company, and a TAPV carrier troop, to stand up on 6 month contracts, with some form of ability to activate them for overseas service if needed we would have about the right numbers. Those companies could stay in location, and be be massed for Bde exercises, providing the nucleus for a regional depot company. 

Would that similarly work for high formation requirements, something like DIV ARTY or even GBAD? What about taking a page out of the British Army's book and giving some reserve units "crew replacement" tasks (I'm thinking SALH is particularly well situated).


----------



## McG

That Class B battalion would sort of go against the NDA’s stipulation that PRes are for other than full time employment. If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F. We should also make it easier to move between components for people who want to move between full & part time service.


----------



## markppcli

McG said:


> That Class B battalion would sort of go against the NDA’s stipulation that PRes are for other than full time employment. If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F. We should also make it easier to move between components for people who want to move between full & part time service.


I mean fair point, but as of right now full time employment is available for all reserve force members who want it. Why not integrate that into the field force? Especially given the Force 2025 assertion that we are not getting any bigger anytime soon. 

I have far to much time on my hands and produced this; both the rationalize the reserves structure and give purpose to the RCAC units as TAPV "carrier" and DFS formations. I haven't gone into detail on artillery or engineers simply because I have no knowledge of their internal works really and what would be appropriate. Fundamental to this would be a shit in thinking regarding armouries as reserve training centres were multiple sub units can conduct training. 

I am open to the idea of regional names for the Reserve Bns, especially in Quebec where Mounted Rifles does not translate the Voltigeurs seems like the best option. Each coy would carry the name(s) of existing Regiments. Where I have listed combat support, those platoons may be dispersed as makes best sense. The “household” regiments have been reduced to ceremonial tasks. Part of this would see each Mounted Rifle Bn, or what ever name makes everyone happy frankly, raising a class be "depot" company that would be responsible for the training of that Bn.


10 Canadian Rifle Brigade
11 Canadian Mounted Rifles 
A Coy (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
B Coy (Canadian Scottish)
C Coy (Royal Westminster Regiment)
Combat Support (Rocky Mountain Rangers)
TAPV Sqn (British Columbia Dragoons / British Columbia Regiment)

12 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Loyal Edmonton Regiment)
B Coy (Calgary Highlanders)
C Coy (Royal Regina Rifles)
Combat Support (North Sask Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Sask Dragoons / Kings Own Calgary Regiment)

13 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles)
B Coy ( Winnipeg Grenadiers)
C Coy (Cameron Highlanders of Canada)
Combat Support (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Fort Gary Horse)

10 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

10 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

10 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


20 Canadian Rifle Brigade
21 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry)
B Coy (Essex and Kent Scottish / Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders)
C Coy (Grey and Simcoe Foresters)
Combat Support (Royal Highland Fusiliers)
TAPV Sqn (Windsor Regiment)

22 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Toronto Scottish / 48th Highlanders / Lorne Scots)
B Coy (Queens own Rifles of Canada)
C Coy (Royal Regiment of Canada)
Combat Support (Lincoln and Welland Regiment / Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Queens York Rangers)

23 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Ontario Highlanders (Cameron, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders))
Governor Generals Foot Guards (ceremonial)

B Coy (Irish Regiment of Canada)
C Coy (Princes of Wales own Regiment of Canada)
Combat Support (the Algonquin Regiment / Brockville Rifles)
TAPV Sqn (Ontario Regiment )
Governor Generals Horse Guards (ceremonial)


20 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

20 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

20 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


30 Brigade du Voltigeur Canadian
31 Voltigeur Canadian
A Coy (Black Watch of Canada)
Canadian Grenadier Guards (ceremonial)

B Coy (Regiment de Maisonnueve)
C Coy (Fusiliers Mont-Royal)
Combat Support (Royal Montreal Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Royal Canadian Hussars / Regiment du Hull)

32 Voltigeur Canadian
A Coy (Voltigeur du Quebec)
Citadel Guard (no longer wasting 2 R22R’s time)

B Coy (la Regiment de Chaudiere)
C Coy (la Regiment de Saguenay)
Combat Support (Fusilier de Sherbrooke et St Lauren)
TAPV Sqn (Sherbrooke Hussars)

30 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

30 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

30 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


40 Canadian Rifle Brigade
41 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Halifax Rifles)
B Coy (West Nova Scotia Regiment)
C Coy (Nova Scotia Regiment)
Combat Support (Cape Breton Highlanders)
TAPV Sqn (Princess Louise’s Fusiliers)

42 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Newfoundland Regiment)
B Coy (Royal New Brunswick Regiment)
C Coy (PEI Regiment)
Combat Support (The North Shore Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (8th Canadian Hussars)

40 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

40 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

40 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


----------



## Eye In The Sky

You gave TAPVs to units that have no links back to Armd (Mud) Recce...and made those Mud Recce Sqn's Inf Coys in your 40 CRB?


----------



## markppcli

Eye In The Sky said:


> You gave TAPVs to units that have no links back to Armd (Mud) Recce...and made those Mud Recce Sqn's Inf Coys in your 40 CRB?


To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it. The TAPV Sqn is there to provide mobility and fire support. Similarly I see that "sqn" dispersed across the area in multiple troops. When I worked out numbers for the TAPV across the army I think 24... ish provides enough mobility for a company? So if that works out being like 4 troops of 5 and an HQ split across those armouries, or two troops of ten so be it. In short Operational tasks > Regimental Tradition.

I'll say this as an aside. We had, up until the end of WW2, absolutely no problems re rolling units from Artillery, to Cavalry, to Infantry and back again. The British Columbia Rifle started life as Coastal Artillery, the Halifax Rifles were original (shocker) a Volunteer Rifle regiment. The idea that regiments cannot be renamed, re roled, and re purposed is a very very modern one and I think is a massive obstacle in reform and modernization.

PS Absent from my order of battle there are 1st Hussars and SALH - who I would task as Crew Replacement Regiments and locate close to Regular Force Armoured units to use their simulators and tanks to train.


----------



## blacktriangle

Why not give the PRes Inf something like the US Army ISV made by GM? If they had ATGM and a vehicle to move them quickly around the battlespace (but not to fight from) it might work, no?

You can still have the TAPVs do...whatever.


----------



## markppcli

Because I'm operating off of what we have in our system. Additionally the TAPV is in use by the regular forces so training soldiers on it allows them to support CAF Operations with minimal retraining.


----------



## blacktriangle

Fair enough.


----------



## markppcli

reveng said:


> Fair enough.


sort of grew out of my reading on Force 2025, and @Kirkhill and a few others statments on "how do we make this system work for the army."


----------



## Colin Parkinson

reveng said:


> Why not give the PRes Inf something like the US Army ISV made by GM? If they had ATGM and a vehicle to move them quickly around the battlespace (but not to fight from) it might work, no?
> 
> You can still have the TAPVs do...whatever.


Give it to the MP's for convoy escorts


----------



## dapaterson

Colin Parkinson said:


> Give it to the MP's for convoy escorts



You really don't like the MPs, do you?


----------



## blacktriangle

dapaterson said:


> You really don't like the MPs, do you?


Even the MPs don't like the MPs, so it's a perfect fit.


----------



## Ostrozac

Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at training large numbers of RCEME.

And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.
> 
> And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?


a hundred percent. Which is why I also think we need to reimagine what a reserve unit looks like. In my force structure I included dispersed "support Bns" and I would see those being pushed out as much as possible to cast as wide a net as possible for getting folks into the reserves as RCEME, other trades too but RCEME I feel is most critical, dispersion of TAPV would have to be based on that. As I said before, if in one Bn that looks like two troops split between two major centres, in another it's across three provinces, and in a third they're all in one city, that's all fine. What's important is capability's that are equipped, in roles that are defined and make sense as part of a total force. 

Out of curiosity how are Reserve Units like say the British Columbia Dragoons in Kelowna handling the maintenance of their TAPVs?


----------



## blacktriangle

Ostrozac said:


> Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.
> 
> And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?


Which is exactly why I suggested the GM ISV.

If Jane & Joe Public can take care of their Colorado ZR2s, so can the PRes. You could probably even get a "C&R" variant for the Armd Recce & have them fill a light cav/DFS role.


----------



## PuckChaser

Infanteer said:


> If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....


You mean like the RCAF having a spreadsheet with the flight info for every cargo and pax flight heading into and out of operational theatres, to include stopover/layovers?

Yeah that'd never be on UNCLASS DWAN...


----------



## MilEME09

Ostrozac said:


> Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at training large numbers of RCEME.
> 
> And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?


The army can't quickly train reserve techs because it doesn't manage the trades reserve side well. 4 to 5 years to train a vehicle tech is crazy and we could half that if we utilized civilian automotive programs to teach the basics, and then taught the military specific stuff in summers.

PRes also needs proper tooling, parts supply, etc....  we the reserves have hemorrhaged techs in recent years because once trained we are not able to do our jobs. My unit alone I have seen loose 5 qualified vehicle techs to CT or release because we don't do any turning if wrenches.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F.



Absolutely.  If we're going to employ and pay people full-time, do it properly.  Of course, think of the money we could save if all full-time positions were Cl B...


----------



## FJAG

Interesting revival of this thread. Let me just address a couple of points. 


markppcli said:


> How sustainable would it be to assign units fully manned with Class B reservists to the CMBGs as a light motorized infantry unit.  ...


Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.



markppcli said:


> ... I have far to much time on my hands and produced this; both the rationalize the reserves structure and give purpose to the RCAC units as TAPV "carrier" and DFS formations. ...


I love reorganizing the ORBAT of the CAF as much as anyone, but there are certain considerations to keep in mind:

1. We tend to lose sight of the purpose behind the reserve force structure. For almost a century Militia units were the foundation of mobilization. Militia units in peacetime had much of the needed command structure (both officer, NCO and a core of ORs) so that it could be bulked up by civilian recruits, trained and deployed as a "mobilized" unit. Because of this there were hundreds of Militia units which could conceivably be mobilized into several corps of hundreds of thousands of troops. 

Over the years the size of the "to be mobilized force" was reduced and accordingly many Militia units were zero-manned and relegated to the supplementary order of battle. Around the 1960s, with the expansion of the full-time army, the "mobilization" concept faded away and was mostly replaced with a concept of individual and small group "augmentation" to full-time regular force units. At the time equipping Militia units with "mobilizable" equipment disappeared in favour of a handful of training equipment only while all the operational equipment is held by the Reg F. 

The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc. If one was to take our current structure (which according to one government website says has 19,000 Army reservists in 185 unit - and I question the accuracy of those numbers) and manned each of those 185 units to a "mobilized" level of let's say 600 personnel each then the Army Reserve could expand to some 111,000 people. We have no plans to do that. If, on the other hand, you want to set up the minimal structure necessary to train and hold those 19,000 reservists based on those same 600 man units then you could reduce the number of units to just 34. We have no plan to do that either. 

So why are we structured the way we are? Its basically a policy of sucking and blowing at the same time. We don't want to pay more reservists but at the same time we don't want to offend a whole lot of folks by putting even more units onto the supplementary order of battle regardless of how weak they are.

2. It's a bit hard to aggregate Res F units because they too have a legal structure albeit that this can be changed by the MND as needed. There's no reason what you propose can't be done, but it's more complex than necessary. Effectively what you are doing is part and parcel of the same "suck and blow" shell game that we're doing now through such structures as the always popular "tactical group". Effectively we're trying desperately to keep some old units and traditions alive. The right thing to do is to either keep the structure we have but develop a proper mobilization and expansion plan (which is really something we will never do) or, on the other hand, reduce the number of units to those that can be properly recruited and equipped indefinitely as either force generation units, force employment units or (and preferably) both.

3. The fact of the matter is that our Res F system is an anachronism that is on the one hand fed by a Res F leadership that is hanging onto the past and a Reg F leadership that doesn't want to or doesn't know how to make the reserve force a viable, credible mobilizable force by creating proper system of reserve service that elevates the training standard of the reservists, properly equipping the reserves and providing for its maintenance and properly including the reserve units (and formations) into defence plans. For the Reg F it's always a budget issue, but as I've said many times, I think it goes much deeper than that because a properly trained and organized reserve force would be be less expensive to maintain on an annual basis than a similar full-time. The trick is to determine what forces you absolutely need during peace time and which are only necessary in a major emergency (which for DND by definition includes war)

What's missing from our entire Army reserve system is an overarching coherent plan - in essence a doctrine for the army that full incorporates the reserves in the full spectrum from peacetime to high intensity conflict. We've had numerous studies on the subject which have for the most part either gone into the trash bin or resulted in minor incremental changes. I'm afraid that there is no way that the situation for the reserves will ever improve until there is both a Minister of National Defence and a CDS and a CLS who are prepared to undertake serious reform from the bottom up.

🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it. The TAPV Sqn is there to provide mobility and fire support. Similarly I see that "sqn" dispersed across the area in multiple troops. When I worked out numbers for the TAPV across the army I think 24... ish provides enough mobility for a company? So if that works out being like 4 troops of 5 and an HQ split across those armouries, or two troops of ten so be it. In short Operational tasks > Regimental Tradition.
> 
> I'll say this as an aside. We had, up until the end of WW2, absolutely no problems re rolling units from Artillery, to Cavalry, to Infantry and back again. The British Columbia Rifle started life as Coastal Artillery, the Halifax Rifles were original (shocker) a Volunteer Rifle regiment. The idea that regiments cannot be renamed, re roled, and re purposed is a very very modern one and I think is a massive obstacle in reform and modernization.
> 
> PS Absent from my order of battle there are 1st Hussars and SALH - who I would task as Crew Replacement Regiments and locate close to Regular Force Armoured units to use their simulators and tanks to train.


Equally, don't we have enough miscellaneous names floating around in varying degrees of non-existence that, should you want to, you could just _find_ a pre-existing name to match a new or shifted mission set, possibly even one with local place names in it? Or just stand up a new identity entirely, if there's nothing in the inactive list that's a good match.

Given the unit-specific recruiting aspect of the PRes, unless they shift to something closer to the NAVRES or Service Battalion multiple trades/roles in one unit approaches, having either some resonance _or_ absolutely none between whatever you're trying to recruit for and the name over the door might be a good thing, especially in areas with multiple units in one town.


----------



## markppcli

reveng said:


> Which is exactly why I suggested the GM ISV.
> 
> If Jane & Joe Public can take care of their Colorado ZR2s, so can the PRes. You could probably even get a "C&R" variant for the Armd Recce & have them fill a light cav/DFS role.


And we're back to having to retrain "armoured" reservists whenever we deploy them / employ them with the regular force. The reserves are already employing the TAPV at units spread out across the country, does anyone have first hand knowledge of how they handle the maintenance?

Also the IMV has yet to be fielded and is under trials at the moment, it won't be pushed to units until 2025 and I can't see us realistically procuring it by 2025 given it's going to take us 13 years to buy new ATGMs.  TAPV is what we have, so for better or worse we need to use it.



quadrapiper said:


> Equally, don't we have enough miscellaneous names floating around in varying degrees of non-existence that, should you want to, you could just _find_ a pre-existing name to match a new or shifted mission set, possibly even one with local place names in it? Or just stand up a new identity entirely, if there's nothing in the inactive list that's a good match.
> 
> Given the unit-specific recruiting aspect of the PRes, unless they shift to something closer to the NAVRES or Service Battalion multiple trades/roles in one unit approaches, having either some resonance _or_ absolutely none between whatever you're trying to recruit for and the name over the door might be a good thing, especially in areas with multiple units in one town.



I mean apparently we don't have enough names, because we've used the Cameron Highlanders twice. In most of my moves to the TAPV Squadrons I tried to avoid "Regional" names, Hull and Windsor being exceptions, to encourage dispersion across their respective areas. That was part and parcel of why the PEI Regiment would be stood down to a rifle company. The intent was to maintain as much perpetuation, and thus ruffle less feathers and keep identity, while radically shifting the way we look at the reserves. The way the Navy handles it's reserves is exactly how I see this working. Ie: if I'm in PEI instead of only being able to be an Armoured Recce reservists, I join as what ever trade, and am assigned to the relevant sub unit or sub sub unit as the case may be.




FJAG said:


> Interesting revival of this thread. Let me just address a couple of points.
> 
> Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.
> 
> 
> I love reorganizing the ORBAT of the CAF as much as anyone, but there are certain considerations to keep in mind:
> 
> 1. We tend to lose sight of the purpose behind the reserve force structure. For almost a century Militia units were the foundation of mobilization. Militia units in peacetime had much of the needed command structure (both officer, NCO and a core of ORs) so that it could be bulked up by civilian recruits, trained and deployed as a "mobilized" unit. Because of this there were hundreds of Militia units which could conceivably be mobilized into several corps of hundreds of thousands of troops.
> 
> Over the years the size of the "to be mobilized force" was reduced and accordingly many Militia units were zero-manned and relegated to the supplementary order of battle. Around the 1960s, with the expansion of the full-time army, the "mobilization" concept faded away and was mostly replaced with a concept of individual and small group "augmentation" to full-time regular force units. At the time equipping Militia units with "mobilizable" equipment disappeared in favour of a handful of training equipment only while all the operational equipment is held by the Reg F.
> 
> The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc. If one was to take our current structure (which according to one government website says has 19,000 Army reservists in 185 unit - and I question the accuracy of those numbers) and manned each of those 185 units to a "mobilized" level of let's say 600 personnel each then the Army Reserve could expand to some 111,000 people. We have no plans to do that. If, on the other hand, you want to set up the minimal structure necessary to train and hold those 19,000 reservists based on those same 600 man units then you could reduce the number of units to just 34. We have no plan to do that either.
> 
> So why are we structured the way we are? Its basically a policy of sucking and blowing at the same time. We don't want to pay more reservists but at the same time we don't want to offend a whole lot of folks by putting even more units onto the supplementary order of battle regardless of how weak they are.
> 
> 2. It's a bit hard to aggregate Res F units because they too have a legal structure albeit that this can be changed by the MND as needed. There's no reason what you propose can't be done, but it's more complex than necessary. Effectively what you are doing is part and parcel of the same "suck and blow" shell game that we're doing now through such structures as the always popular "tactical group". Effectively we're trying desperately to keep some old units and traditions alive. The right thing to do is to either keep the structure we have but develop a proper mobilization and expansion plan (which is really something we will never do) or, on the other hand, reduce the number of units to those that can be properly recruited and equipped indefinitely as either force generation units, force employment units or (and preferably) both.
> 
> 3. The fact of the matter is that our Res F system is an anachronism that is on the one hand fed by a Res F leadership that is hanging onto the past and a Reg F leadership that doesn't want to or doesn't know how to make the reserve force a viable, credible mobilizable force by creating proper system of reserve service that elevates the training standard of the reservists, properly equipping the reserves and providing for its maintenance and properly including the reserve units (and formations) into defence plans. For the Reg F it's always a budget issue, but as I've said many times, I think it goes much deeper than that because a properly trained and organized reserve force would be be less expensive to maintain on an annual basis than a similar full-time. The trick is to determine what forces you absolutely need during peace time and which are only necessary in a major emergency (which for DND by definition includes war)
> 
> What's missing from our entire Army reserve system is an overarching coherent plan - in essence a doctrine for the army that full incorporates the reserves in the full spectrum from peacetime to high intensity conflict. We've had numerous studies on the subject which have for the most part either gone into the trash bin or resulted in minor incremental changes. I'm afraid that there is no way that the situation for the reserves will ever improve until there is both a Minister of National Defence and a CDS and a CLS who are prepared to undertake serious reform from the bottom up.
> 
> 🍻



I'll stress what I said above, and I think I've said it before in here. This would see the idea of the Rocky Mountain Rangers, near and dear to my heart though they are, no longer being the only show in Kamloops and BC, their name is kept by a company for tradition purposes but for the organization it's just a name. If you show up the Armoury in Kamloops you could be an Infantry Soldier, a TAPV Crewman, a Sig Op, ect they would mass regionally during training, where I see those parade nights being changed to a single weekend a month.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

markppcli said:


> To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it.



You're absolutely wrong in your 40 CRB org;  it does matter.  PEIR knows as much about dismounted inf ops and PLF knows about mounted recce ops.  PEIR knows as much about Pioneer tasks as PLF knows about mounted screen ops or flank surv.

Sure, PRes units have been changed to other functions...I remember how well that went for the Elgins initially.  I had a few friends in RETS at CFSME in Gagetown, and because they (Elgins) didn't have the background knowledge and experience, they were viewed as 'dangerous'.  That was a few moons ago, but that is still the initial result.  There was more $ allotted to unit trg days back then, and far less 'mandatory' trg eating away at a precious Cl A trg budgets.  Nowadays, who many years would it take a re-role a Inf unit to Recce, and train them to any level of actual proficiency?  

But you're not talking about re-roling units, you talking about "swapping";  example - Hfx Rifles go to 'dismounted', PLF go to 'mounted'.  Why?  What benefit is this?  I see none.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers​Who We Are
The Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF) is a Primary Reserve infantry unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. Based out of Halifax, Nova Scotia, this infantry regiment traces its local roots as a Halifax unit of Militia back to June 18, 1749.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers’s main responsibility is as a Light Infantry regiment, including a new mission task of Pioneers.

The mission task for our unit is: Assault Pioneers – A platoon of 31 members, which is trained in the employment of obstacle-building and obstacle-breaching tools to provide mobility and counter-mobility support to a manoeuvring battle group.

The Halifax Rifles (RCAC)​Who We Are
The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) is a Primary Reserve armoured reconnaissance regiment of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The mission task for our unit is: Influence Activities – A Squadron of up to 52 members, which is trained in the employment of population group influence techniques, including Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation, to provide behavioural and psychological effects on those populations in support of a Commander’s intent or mission.

So you'd basically take those 2 units, and "flip" them.  I'm going to suggest, being that both units are in Halifax, that the folks who joined PLF wanted to do "infantry stuff" and the ones who joined Hfx Rifles wanted to do "armd recce stuff".  The ones that join Inf and then go "hey that mounted stuff looks fun"...they transfer within the Bde.

But overall...re-naming units to "this or that"...what benefit?  If the same amount of troops are available for Dom Ops, summer trg support, FTX and all that....what's the benefit?  This just looks like window dressing to me; name changes etc that will cost money...for no added 'troops on the ground'.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Why not just get rid of names and regimental mafias and simply go to numbers ?  

It seems the army is very held back from structural change by names.


----------



## markppcli

Eye In The Sky said:


> You're absolutely wrong in your 40 CRB org;  it does matter.  PEIR knows as much about dismounted inf ops and PLF knows about mounted recce ops.  PEIR knows as much about Pioneer tasks as PLF knows about mounted screen ops or flank surv.
> 
> Sure, PRes units have been changed to other functions...I remember how well that went for the Elgins initially.  I had a few friends in RETS at CFSME in Gagetown, and because they (Elgins) didn't have the background knowledge and experience, they were viewed as 'dangerous'.  That was a few moons ago, but that is still the initial result.  There was more $ allotted to unit trg days back then, and far less 'mandatory' trg eating away at a precious Cl A trg budgets.  Nowadays, who many years would it take a re-role a Inf unit to Recce, and train them to any level of actual proficiency?
> 
> But you're not talking about re-roling units, you talking about "swapping";  example - Hfx Rifles go to 'dismounted', PLF go to 'mounted'.  Why?  What benefit is this?  I see none.
> 
> The Princess Louise Fusiliers​Who We Are
> The Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF) is a Primary Reserve infantry unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. Based out of Halifax, Nova Scotia, this infantry regiment traces its local roots as a Halifax unit of Militia back to June 18, 1749.
> 
> The Princess Louise Fusiliers’s main responsibility is as a Light Infantry regiment, including a new mission task of Pioneers.
> 
> The mission task for our unit is: Assault Pioneers – A platoon of 31 members, which is trained in the employment of obstacle-building and obstacle-breaching tools to provide mobility and counter-mobility support to a manoeuvring battle group.
> 
> The Halifax Rifles (RCAC)​Who We Are
> The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) is a Primary Reserve armoured reconnaissance regiment of the Canadian Armed Forces.
> 
> The mission task for our unit is: Influence Activities – A Squadron of up to 52 members, which is trained in the employment of population group influence techniques, including Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation, to provide behavioural and psychological effects on those populations in support of a Commander’s intent or mission.
> 
> So you'd basically take those 2 units, and "flip" them.  I'm going to suggest, being that both units are in Halifax, that the folks who joined PLF wanted to do "infantry stuff" and the ones who joined Hfx Rifles wanted to do "armd recce stuff".  The ones that join Inf and then go "hey that mounted stuff looks fun"...they transfer within the Bde.
> 
> But overall...re-naming units to "this or that"...what benefit?  If the same amount of troops are available for Dom Ops, summer trg support, FTX and all that....what's the benefit?  This just looks like window dressing to me; name changes etc that will cost money...for no added 'troops on the ground'.



They wouldn't be mounted Recce, they would be there to provide mobility and limited DFS to the Bn. I have explained multiple times that the nature of these units would be very much different. You are ignoring my other points and are seeing these units as they are not as I would have them. If you join the reserves in in Nova Scotia, you will pick your trade, and be assigned to a sub unit from there. If that means you're an infantry soldier in A Coy so be it, if you choose to be armoured you'll be in the TAPV Sqn whether you parade in Sydney or Halifax. Quite frankly you seem obsessive over the minutia as opposed to the structure, does your opposition change if those two sub units change who they perpetuate?

As to why change to a mounted rifle bn vs a CBG? Because we dedicated an absurd amount of time, money, and effort to maintaining the "regiments" of the reserves. What is the possible benefit of the 52 members of the Halifax Rifles having a Lt Col, a DCO, an Agj, an RSM, and what ever else to administer half a Sqn? In my methodology that Sqn would recruit across Nova Scotia, and would be a Sqn as part of a Bn. Again, it's not about re rolling individual regiments, it's about forming new structures and the regimental titles are there purely as perpetuation. Frankly I wouldn't even keep their cap badges.

@Halifax Tar absolutely yes. Every one will see this a reeducation of their regiment as opposed to streamlining the reserves into a Division Structure that could actually be deployed.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

The (few TAPVs) roled as limited DFS?  Sorry...I don't see ANY benefit to this.   What would be the recce elements in this structure, then?  I'm looking at your proposed establishment changes with a 'benefit for cost' view.  I see great cost, little benefit.

Easier solution;  collapse 36 and 37 CBG into a single PRes Bde.  Using the Armd Recce units as an example

1. let them keep their cap badges (only to keep people happy...and morale should be taken into consideration, or you might see an exodus when you make 'change').

2.  PEIR, 8 CH and Hfx Rifles all become A/B/C Sqn of the "new atlantic CBG" (whatever the name would be).  Or...make them D Sqn if they can't sustain a Sqn, and then they can provide 41 -> 43, and maybe a reasonable A1 Ech on Bde FTXs, ARCON, etc.

3.  1 RHQ, remainder get SHQ and applic manning.

4.  Do the same for all CBGs across Canada, if it works for 36/37.

TL;DR:  there is way to increase economy of force without reinventing the wheel, and stripping units of their Guidons/Colors and identities while trimming away the fat (LCols in charge of what amounts to understrength Sqns).


----------



## markppcli

Recce element would be the Bns integral Recce platoon.
TAPV is mobility and DFS, ie they provide enough lift to be able to move a company at a time.
Your suggestion would be to amalgamate units and have a single brigade for the Atlantic, ie the structure I suggested, where do you see savings in regards to what I suggested. In fact collapsing those units into a Sqn or Two is what I essentially did, I just grouped them in a Bn, and actual manned Bn, to support and gave them something Reserve Armoured Recce doesn’t have, a mission.

Frankly I see more hinderance in keeping, for example, single trade units as the only option in given places. So I’m in PEI and armoured Recce doesn’t appeal to me, guess I don’t join the reserves because we care more about Guidons and Cap Badges than mission and capability.

ps 8 CH isn’t in there because it becomes a tank crew replacement Sqn, working closely with the tanks in Gagetown. If that makes more sense to be another unit then fine, the principals matter more than the minutia.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

PEI?  not interested in Armd Recce...I can still be a veh tech, or HRA at PEIR.  They used to have wpns techs, medics.  I can join Signals...as one of the RCCS trades they have, or support trades they have...or I can join the NavRes....there's PLENTY of options if someone isn't interested in Armoured Soldier/Officer.

So the infantry Bn's are doing recce....for who?  Are they mounted, dismounted?   They are going to provide the "bde level" recce and cover off all those tasks?  They can't do both at the same time...

Savings?  less LCols and CWOs that can be turned into pay for Cpls and Lts.  it's a start...

Sorry...I don't see much 'mission capability' in your changes.  Those org's still have the same kit, the same trg budgets...

Guidons aren't important? People died earning those battle honours.  We don't have to throw away cap badges...just bloated command structures.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:


> Why not just get rid of names and regimental mafias and simply go to numbers ?
> 
> It seems the army is very held back from structural change by names.



People are genuinely proud of their units history;  PEIR as an example has battle honours from the South African War (1900) to WWII.  Mbr have served in UN mission like Cyprus, Yugo (including Medak Pocket), Afghanistan...so while not serving as a formed unit or sub-unit even, like many reserve units, they have still augmented the Reg Force on operations. 

Regimental mafia's are an issue...official lineage and cap badges aren't.  My old unit, for example, has a pretty storied history.  Light Horse, Highland, Regt members have visited the The 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's).  There's much to be proud of in the cap badge itself, and the strong ties serving members feel to PEI.

Take a few minutes and read thru the history.  I'm not saying it is the most important thing...but it is important, at the same time.  I think we can 'make change' without making proud troops and Officers re-badge to the 36 Atlantic Inf Bn, or some other "generic" title...end of the day, everyone still have to have a cap badge.

The official lineage of The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC) armour regiment

Is the PEIR a capable Regiment?  No.  Are they even a functional Sqn at this point in time?  No.

Why is that?  Because of the decisions of the Govt of Canada and the CAF.

- when I joined way back when...PEIR could field a 3-Tp recce sqn with A1 Ech and SHQ with 4/4B (step up CP)...the stuff you'd expect.  Depending on VORs, those recce tps could be 7 car, but 5  car was normal.

- each veh had double-banked comms.  Jnr C/S's had a 77-set as their double-bank but...that's all the needed.

- the budget allowed for 2 trg nights a week (Mon and Thurs).  Sep - Nov and April - June, we would do 2 FTXs a month sometimes.  Jan/Feb was winter indoc stuff, and we'd knock off our mandatory stuff like AFV, etc.

- we used to do mini-ex's on trg nights because we had the time and kit.  Mon night might be 'issue Wng O, begin Battle Procedure for a mounted Op screen".  Thurs night...bomb up the veh's, kit checks, comms check...and off to estab a mounted Op on the harbour or something.  didn't matter, it was exercising the BP, getting crews into the crew lockers, testing radios and all that kind of stuff.  once the last OP report was sent...End Ex....quick Stables, then a Troop hot-wash in the mess with pizza and beverages.  Morale was high...we had a normal 90%+ turn out for FTXs.

- then...Iltis was replaced, but not one for one, with G Wags.

- TCCS replaced 46/49/77 sets...but not one for one.

- Cl A trg was cut in half, and then some more.  FTXs were 'a couple a year'....

- on FTXs...it wasn't unheard of for OPs to send "contact reports" over people's pers cell phones...because there wasn't enough radios to have one in each C/S. 

- morale dropped...interest dropped.  people released, or stopped showing up.  everyone knows how Cl A funding works...


Changing 36 and 37 CBG isn't to 40 CRB isn't going to change the REAL issues.  Kit shortages, morale shortages, training budget shortages.  All these 'rename/reorg this to that' conversations that don't address equipment, training money and morale issues do nothing to increase capability and morale.

Fix the kit and training $ shortage.  If you want to rename "36 CBG" to "40 Cdn Bn of Rifles" or whatever...fine, but do it so people aren't throwing away cap badges and history....go after the bloated Command/HQ aspects.  Cpl and Capt Bloggins are proud of their cap badge...why kick the shit out of what morale is left out there?


----------



## markppcli

Eye In The Sky said:


> PEI?  not interested in Armd Recce...I can still be a veh tech, or HRA at PEIR.  They used to have wpns techs, medics.  I can join Signals...as one of the RCCS trades they have, or support trades they have...or I can join the NavRes....there's PLENTY of options if someone isn't interested in Armoured Soldier/Officer.
> 
> So the infantry Bn's are doing recce....for who?  Are they mounted, dismounted?   They are going to provide the "bde level" recce and cover off all those tasks?  They can't do both at the same time...
> 
> Savings?  less LCols and CWOs that can be turned into pay for Cpls and Lts.  it's a start...
> 
> Sorry...I don't see much 'mission capability' in your changes.  Those org's still have the same kit, the same trg budgets...
> 
> Guidons aren't important? People died earning those battle honours.  We don't have to throw away cap badges...just bloated command structures.


And under this structure you would be able to join as a gunner, or an engineer, an infanteer.

You’re of course aware of a Recce platoon as per the standard Bn orbat right? Well they would provide Recce for the Bn, defining Objectives in the exact same way that every infantry Recce platoon does.

As stated multiple times the the Bn has the TAPV Sqn that can motorized one coy at a time, or provide mobility to Recce platoon, or what ever. Capability comes from the fact that now you have actual credible units organized for tasks as opposed to being organized for history and tradition. These are designed to actually be capable of filling their orbats

Less CWO, less Lt Cols, less Cols, less captains in Bde HQs, many full time, are all budget savings that can go to training.

History and tradition are important until they become hinderances to progress. This is the road block we have to at some point overcome if the reserves is ever going to crawl toward relevance.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I am sensing you don't know what a Bde Recce Sqn does/is supposed to do?

Under your structure...anyone in PEI could join as a Gnr, Spr or Tpr?  LOL  ok.  where do, and who do they train with on parade nights, wknd trg?  I am sure PEI isn't going to have a Arty, Engr and Armd sub-units.  ???????  Is PEI going to have 1 x Engr Sect, and 1 x Armd Recce Ptl, and 1 Arty Gun Det?  Where is the kit they are training on? 

Units ARE organized for tasks now.  All you're doing in moving the shells around on the table.  It's the same amount of shells, and the ball is still under the same one, when your done.

The problem isn't tasks;  kit shortages, Cl A training budgets...those are your culprits. 



markppcli said:


> Capability comes from the fact that now you have actual credible units organized for tasks as opposed to being organized for history and tradition



Sorry, I don't see credible units.  I see name changes, and 're-roling' that is more detrimental than anything. 

Your plan doesn't address equipment shortages or Cl A training budget issues.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

markppcli said:


> Less CWO, less Lt Cols, less Cols, less captains in Bde HQs, many full time, are all budget savings that can go to training.



This, I agree on.  And...change has to start somewhere.  36/37 is a logical place to start (it was supposed to happen years ago, but never did...).

36 CBG HQ is in Halifax, 37 in Moncton.  Do we need 2 Pres CBGs and their HQs for the actual amount of troops in both?  Nope.

PEIR, 8 CH, Hfx Rifles.  Are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM?  Nope.  PLF, 1 NSH, CBH, N Nfld R...are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM?  Nope.  Are all the Herbie units Regt's...you see the pattern I'm sure.

- Collapse 36 and 37 CBGs into 1 Bde.  Cut the excess HQs (Bde and Regt).  Make 1 Armd Regiment, with 1 CO.  Make 1 Inf Regt, with 1 CO....etc etc etc.

- let the Bns, Sqns, Battery's all keep the cap badges and names.  84th in Yarmouth can still call themselves 84th...but their HQ is the "Atlantic Arty Regt"...  

Fat gets trimmed, monies are saved, cap badges (pride) and Battle Honours carry on...

Now, do this in all the Div's...

Changing names and all that stuff right now to me is like "painting over rust".


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> ...
> 
> Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.
> 
> 
> ...




Just to focus on the Class system for a moment.  And kind of in line with something I saw Dimsum post about the Aussies and varying terms of service.

What would be wrong with 

Enroll all entrants as Class A
Entrants proceed to Class B for training
Trained personnel remain in Class B to support Mark's 3rd Battalion and local support personnel for the Reserves
Career personnel move to Reg Force
Deployable Reserves temporarily operating in support of the Regs go to Class C
Reserves liable for service but not actively serving remain on strength as Class A so long as they parade on the traditional Militia schedule.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Just to focus on the Class system for a moment.  And kind of in line with something I saw Dimsum post about the Aussies and varying terms of service.
> 
> What would be wrong with
> 
> Enroll all entrants as Class A
> Entrants proceed to Class B for training
> Trained personnel remain in Class B to support Mark's 3rd Battalion and local support personnel for the Reserves
> Career personnel move to Reg Force
> Deployable Reserves temporarily operating in support of the Regs go to Class C
> Reserves liable for service but not actively serving remain on strength as Class A so long as they parade on the traditional Militia schedule.


Once you create pseudo-RegF Class B battalions, there will be no money for Class A pay. Aside from being contrary to the NDA, it will effectively kill the actual  PRes.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc.



The "mobilizable" (fit for war on the scale and intensity which requires mobilization) part of the Res F is soldiers under 30, with a few under 40 (if suited for formation-level appointments).  Of the rest, some would be employable in administrative positions (districts) and the remainder would be jettisoned.  (And with respect to the latter, why not immediately?)


----------



## markppcli

Eye In The Sky said:


> This, I agree on.  And...change has to start somewhere.  36/37 is a logical place to start (it was supposed to happen years ago, but never did...).
> 
> 36 CBG HQ is in Halifax, 37 in Moncton.  Do we need 2 Pres CBGs and their HQs for the actual amount of troops in both?  Nope.
> 
> PEIR, 8 CH, Hfx Rifles.  Are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM?  Nope.  PLF, 1 NSH, CBH, N Nfld R...are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM?  Nope.  Are all the Herbie units Regt's...you see the pattern I'm sure.
> 
> - Collapse 36 and 37 CBGs into 1 Bde.  Cut the excess HQs (Bde and Regt).  Make 1 Armd Regiment, with 1 CO.  Make 1 Inf Regt, with 1 CO....etc etc etc.
> 
> - let the Bns, Sqns, Battery's all keep the cap badges and names.  84th in Yarmouth can still call themselves 84th...but their HQ is the "Atlantic Arty Regt"...
> 
> Fat gets trimmed, monies are saved, cap badges (pride) and Battle Honours carry on...
> 
> Now, do this in all the Div's...
> 
> Changing names and all that stuff right now to me is like "painting over rust".



I agree and is where my thought process was going.


Eye In The Sky said:


> (1)I am sensing you don't know what a Bde Recce Sqn does/is supposed to do?
> 
> (2)Under your structure...anyone in PEI could join as a Gnr, Spr or Tpr?  LOL  ok.  where do, and who do they train with on parade nights, wknd trg?  I am sure PEI isn't going to have a Arty, Engr and Armd sub-units.  ???????  Is PEI going to have 1 x Engr Sect, and 1 x Armd Recce Ptl, and 1 Arty Gun Det?  Where is the kit they are training on?
> 
> (3)Units ARE organized for tasks now.  All you're doing in moving the shells around on the table.  It's the same amount of shells, and the ball is still under the same one, when your done.
> 
> (4)The problem isn't tasks;  kit shortages, Cl A training budgets...those are your culprits.
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry, I don't see credible units.  I see name changes, and 're-roling' that is more detrimental than anything.
> 
> Your plan doesn't address equipment shortages or Cl A training budget issues.


I'll go point by point here if you don't mind. 
  1. I am acutely aware of the roles of Bde recce, however if you read that full order of battle for the reserves you will note how dispersed those Bn's are and how difficult it would be to mass a Bde Recce force across the entirety of Western Canada for example. 
 2.  Those Arty, Eng, Armd, Infantry Sub units would belong to the Bde, again look, and the training may not look like what it is now. We get 12 hours of training out of 4 parade nights when we can get a full weekend for the same price. Let's do that, and allow some travel for sub units to mass for training. There's no reason, for example, that Artillery Reservists from Lethbridge can't drive to Calgary to train for a weekend. They'll probably get more out of that then 3 hours on a Thursday night.
3.  RCAC Reserve units are not task organized. The actual doctrine for "mud" recce is lacking, and their role in operations is doubtful at best. So we have to consider what are we actually looking for them to do on operations and what equipment do they have? Well we need them to be able to crew vehicles, and integrate in Operation. What they have is the TAPV. What can it do? Well it's being ditched for Recce as fast as possible so I think we can write that role off. It can move our infantry around as an APC, and at least we'll get some guys experienced in motorized operation if not mechanized. Similarly it can provide some limited DFS. Could that Sqn be tasked as a recce element? Sure why not. 
4.  Kit Shortages and Class A days, I agree, but if you want the kit and the budge you need to be able to say we provide x,y, z. Right now the reserves, frankly, provides 120 Lt Cols and an  unreliable labour pool. Organize into a unit where you can say " the reserves provides 10 Infantry Bn's with TAPV Sqns attached to provide mobility, fire power, and a recce capability, we are enabled by light Artillery and Engineer assets spread across the country which are capable of providing Regiments to each Brigade." - that is assigning a role.
5. You seem focused on who does what, and which names I placed where and I'm sympathetic to regimental pride. However that's not the most important bit here. What matters is these units are being reformed into combined arms groups, under a single HQ, grouped into Bde. What matter is getting rid of the idea that it makes sense to say "Sorry you live in London, you can't be a combat engineer."  I concede that tactical groups are an easier pill to swallow, but from what I've seen they seem to be splitting apart, and are often victims of regimental rivalries with who gets to be CO next. I am aware this is painful, but surely if the British can survive creating the Royal Regiment of Scotland by smashing all their Scots together, or the Rifles by smashing all the light infantry together, we can do the same.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

markppcli said:


> You seem focused on who does what, and which names I placed where



Yes, to an extent.  Not for cap badges, thought.  For '*current role/capability*'...and that makes sense. 

I know I'm circling the same topic points again...so I'll say 'thanks for the discussion' at this point.


----------



## markppcli

Well I mean I was looking for discussion more than anything else, I don't actually expect a sudden email and secondment to the the Reserve Restructure Program lol. Cheers.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Just to focus on the Class system for a moment.  And kind of in line with something I saw Dimsum post about the Aussies and varying terms of service.
> 
> What would be wrong with
> 
> Enroll all entrants as Class A
> Entrants proceed to Class B for training
> Trained personnel remain in Class B to support Mark's 3rd Battalion and local support personnel for the Reserves
> Career personnel move to Reg Force
> Deployable Reserves temporarily operating in support of the Regs go to Class C
> Reserves liable for service but not actively serving remain on strength as Class A so long as they parade on the traditional Militia schedule.


It's normal that immediately after enrollment a reservist is automatically on Class A;
It's also normal that when a reservist goes on DP1 training that part or all of that is on Class B;
It is also normal that a reservist could fill into a vacant Reg F position on Class B service (albeit the rule of thumb is not for more than three years);
It is has even become normal to hire reservists on Class B positions for lengthy periods of time as staff augmentees in headquarters positions for which there is no Reg F position vacant (albeit I think this practice defies the letter and spirit of the NDA respecting reserve service);
But. When you start creating battalions filled by Class B personnel as permanent organizations for continuing, full-time service, you have crossed the line completely with the fundamental distinction between regular force and reserve force which is based on "continuing, full time service" and "other than continuing, full time service".

The government regulates the number of continuing, full-time positions through the allocation of person years (PYs). The CAF cannot create additional PYs without the government's authorization.  BUT - the CAF uses other funds (primarily the reserve force budget or O&M funds) to pay for Class B positions which are in many cases "continuing, full-time" positions. It's a financial slight of hand trick that the CAF uses to increase their full-time positions over and above government authorized PYs which has become more and more tolerated.

Quite frankly, if that continuing, full-time battalion is needed then the CAF should justify its requirement to the government and get the allocation of additional PYs rather than syphoning funds off from other sources. What frosts my gourd is that 4,000 Class Bs in Ottawa (if that's still the number) syphon off almost half a billion dollars from other sources such as equipment or training for Class A reservists.

I dislike shell games played at the institutional level.

As an aside, I see nothing wrong with the idea of re-roling units from one arm to another. The artillery re-roled several reserve units from field guns to air defence quite successfully. I also think that we have more combat arms units then we need in the reserves and could use a better pool of service support and I would happily re-role a few units to transport companies or maintenance companies (assuming we properly train, equip and use them). I also do not see anything wrong with (and in fact find it desirable) to have combined arms battalions made up of two companies each of tanks and armoured infantry.

On the other hand I don't see much value in mixing a given unit up with a variety of trades unless the specific unit needs those specific trades for it's normal functions and can properly train them and utilize them. My guess is that we are not far off from having to re-role various units to other skill sets that do not exist right now but which are desperately needed in the future.

🍻


----------



## Eye In The Sky

markppcli said:


> Well I mean I was looking for discussion more than anything else, I don't actually expect a sudden email and secondment to the the Reserve Restructure Program lol. Cheers.



If you have good ideas, they might not want you anways.  😁


----------



## Halifax Tar

Eye In The Sky said:


> People are genuinely proud of their units history;  PEIR as an example has battle honours from the South African War (1900) to WWII.  Mbr have served in UN mission like Cyprus, Yugo (including Medak Pocket), Afghanistan...so while not serving as a formed unit or sub-unit even, like many reserve units, they have still augmented the Reg Force on operations.
> 
> Regimental mafia's are an issue...official lineage and cap badges aren't.  My old unit, for example, has a pretty storied history.  Light Horse, Highland, Regt members have visited the The 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's).  There's much to be proud of in the cap badge itself, and the strong ties serving members feel to PEI.
> 
> Take a few minutes and read thru the history.  I'm not saying it is the most important thing...but it is important, at the same time.  I think we can 'make change' without making proud troops and Officers re-badge to the 36 Atlantic Inf Bn, or some other "generic" title...end of the day, everyone still have to have a cap badge.
> 
> The official lineage of The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC) armour regiment
> 
> Is the PEIR a capable Regiment?  No.  Are they even a functional Sqn at this point in time?  No.
> 
> Why is that?  Because of the decisions of the Govt of Canada and the CAF.
> 
> - when I joined way back when...PEIR could field a 3-Tp recce sqn with A1 Ech and SHQ with 4/4B (step up CP)...the stuff you'd expect.  Depending on VORs, those recce tps could be 7 car, but 5  car was normal.
> 
> - each veh had double-banked comms.  Jnr C/S's had a 77-set as their double-bank but...that's all the needed.
> 
> - the budget allowed for 2 trg nights a week (Mon and Thurs).  Sep - Nov and April - June, we would do 2 FTXs a month sometimes.  Jan/Feb was winter indoc stuff, and we'd knock off our mandatory stuff like AFV, etc.
> 
> - we used to do mini-ex's on trg nights because we had the time and kit.  Mon night might be 'issue Wng O, begin Battle Procedure for a mounted Op screen".  Thurs night...bomb up the veh's, kit checks, comms check...and off to estab a mounted Op on the harbour or something.  didn't matter, it was exercising the BP, getting crews into the crew lockers, testing radios and all that kind of stuff.  once the last OP report was sent...End Ex....quick Stables, then a Troop hot-wash in the mess with pizza and beverages.  Morale was high...we had a normal 90%+ turn out for FTXs.
> 
> - then...Iltis was replaced, but not one for one, with G Wags.
> 
> - TCCS replaced 46/49/77 sets...but not one for one.
> 
> - Cl A trg was cut in half, and then some more.  FTXs were 'a couple a year'....
> 
> - on FTXs...it wasn't unheard of for OPs to send "contact reports" over people's pers cell phones...because there wasn't enough radios to have one in each C/S.
> 
> - morale dropped...interest dropped.  people released, or stopped showing up.  everyone knows how Cl A funding works...
> 
> 
> Changing 36 and 37 CBG isn't to 40 CRB isn't going to change the REAL issues.  Kit shortages, morale shortages, training budget shortages.  All these 'rename/reorg this to that' conversations that don't address equipment, training money and morale issues do nothing to increase capability and morale.
> 
> Fix the kit and training $ shortage.  If you want to rename "36 CBG" to "40 Cdn Bn of Rifles" or whatever...fine, but do it so people aren't throwing away cap badges and history....go after the bloated Command/HQ aspects.  Cpl and Capt Bloggins are proud of their cap badge...why kick the shit out of what morale is left out there?


The British Army doesn't seem to have an issue with this.  

Regiments exist to serve the Army, not the other way around.


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> It's normal that immediately after enrollment a reservist is automatically on Class A;
> It's also normal that when a reservist goes on DP1 training that part or all of that is on Class B;
> It is also normal that a reservist could fill into a vacant Reg F position on Class B service (albeit the rule of thumb is not for more than three years);
> It is has even become normal to hire reservists on Class B positions for lengthy periods of time as staff augmentees in headquarters positions for which there is no Reg F position vacant (albeit I think this practice defies the letter and spirit of the NDA respecting reserve service);
> But. When you start creating battalions filled by Class B personnel as permanent organizations for continuing, full-time service, you have crossed the line completely with the fundamental distinction between regular force and reserve force which is based on "continuing, full time service" and "other than continuing, full time service".
> 
> The government regulates the number of continuing, full-time positions through the allocation of person years (PYs). The CAF cannot create additional PYs without the government's authorization.  BUT - the CAF uses other funds (primarily the reserve force budget or O&M funds) to pay for Class B positions which are in many cases "continuing, full-time" positions. It's a financial slight of hand trick that the CAF uses to increase their full-time positions over and above government authorized PYs which has become more and more tolerated.
> 
> Quite frankly, if that continuing, full-time battalion is needed then the CAF should justify its requirement to the government and get the allocation of additional PYs rather than syphoning funds off from other sources. What frosts my gourd is that 4,000 Class Bs in Ottawa (if that's still the number) syphon off almost half a billion dollars from other sources such as equipment or training for Class A reservists.
> 
> I dislike shell games played at the institutional level.
> 
> As an aside, I see nothing wrong with the idea of re-roling units from one arm to another. The artillery re-roled several reserve units from field guns to air defence quite successfully. I also think that we have more combat arms units then we need in the reserves and could use a better pool of service support and I would happily re-role a few units to transport companies or maintenance companies (assuming we properly train, equip and use them). I also do not see anything wrong with (and in fact find it desirable) to have combined arms battalions made up of two companies each of tanks and armoured infantry.
> 
> On the other hand I don't see much value in mixing a given unit up with a variety of trades unless the specific unit needs those specific trades for it's normal functions and can properly train them and utilize them. My guess is that we are not far off from having to re-role various units to other skill sets that do not exist right now but which are desperately needed in the future.
> 
> 🍻


I think I may have asked this before, but in your opinion are we giving the CA Res trades that they can actually be expected to become functional and proficient at in a reasonable about of time ? 

If it takes 5 years to get a Res RCEME pers to OFP is the problem the training cycle or is this a job that just doesn't fit a reserve model ?

In the RCN Res not every trade is available.  Simply because training times and actual usefulness at expected task doesn't exist.


----------



## OldSolduer

Halifax Tar said:


> The British Army doesn't seem to have an issue with this.
> 
> Regiments exist to serve the Army, not the other way around.


You are correct BUT the point he was trying to make was that the bureaucracy (aka The Man lol) can and does have an effect on morale,

Note the budget cuts and equipment cuts EITS stated.


----------



## Halifax Tar

OldSolduer said:


> You are correct BUT the point he was trying to make was that the bureaucracy (aka The Man lol) can and does have an effect on morale,
> 
> Note the budget cuts and equipment cuts EITS stated.


I understand.  To this outside observer its seems the Armys obsession with the regimental system and protection of its individual regiments customs and traditions defeats any willingness or effort to effect change and bring the CA Res back into a credible fighting force.


----------



## markppcli

Eye In The Sky said:


> If you have good ideas, they might not want you



Like letting Reg Force soldiers access the Veterans Education Benefit if they transfer to the reserves instead of totally loosing those 6 and 12 year investments?


----------



## FJAG

Halifax Tar said:


> I think I may have asked this before, but in your opinion are we giving the CA Res trades that they can actually be expected to become functional and proficient at in a reasonable about of time ?


IMHO the short answer is, no.


Halifax Tar said:


> If it takes 5 years to get a Res RCEME pers to OFP is the problem the training cycle or is this a job that just doesn't fit a reserve model ?
> 
> In the RCN Res not every trade is available.  Simply because training times and actual usefulness at expected task doesn't exist.


Personally I think trades like RCEME could fit very well into the reserves.

I'm more and more convinced that our reserve system is not fit for purpose. Yes, we do have a large number of dedicated reservists who are quite good at what they do but under our current system they all require extensive pre-deployment training before becoming "deployable". In my opinion a reserve system should create a "low cost" manpower pool that can be quickly brought into full-time service when needed. On the other hand I'm also convinced that our Reg F Army is no longer fit for purpose. Think about it. Under the managed readiness system and fleet management system, two thirds of our army is considered NOT ready to deploy. If we needed more than 1/3, we'd have to cobble together a structure from what is left and put them through a lengthy training cycle or accept the risk of failure or high losses. Don't even get me started on equipment and skills capability gaps where we simply do not have key stuff that any modern army needs to have to fight.

I think we need to rebuild structures, but particulalry reserve structures, from the ground up. Fundamental to that is the question of determining what we need for peace and conflict and then designing a system which is low cost during the former but capable of rapid expansion for the later.

I think that the reserve RCEME trade is a perfect example of a system that could be vastly improved but before you even start with it you need to improve the underlying reserve concept. For me the greatest failing of the reserves are 1) courses are too short to teach the fundamental skills needed by each individual regardless of trade; 2) there needs to be a period of mandatory training each year to allow individuals to hone their basic skills further and units advance collective training (I think 48 days per year would do) Any additional training or employment, if any, would be voluntary;  3) people can quit anytime meaning we've wasted expensive training resources. I think there should be set terms of service and, in exchange for the moneys invested in training, the individual is required to complete set years of his/her contract to be available in case he/she is needed; and 4) in order to facilitate the previous points there needs to be some really solid legislation to protect reservists civilian jobs, and to ensure that there is a clear, predictable pattern of service that ensures that the employer's, the reservist's and the reservist's family's interest are balanced so as to make being a reservist, hiring a reservist and being a member of the family of a reservist attractive.

I could see a RCEME trade working like this in order to create an effective system:

1. The Army sets up "Workshop depots" in four or five major cities;

2. A high school student in his last year is interested in mechanics. He enrolls in the reserves as a craftsman on a fifty-month (4 years plus two months) contract and for his first summer school vacation attends a six-day a week BMQ/SQ program for the full summer for which he is paid as a private;

3. In September he starts a course in automotive mechanics at a local community college the tuition for which is paid for by the military but for which he does not receive a salary. He does however parade for one mandatory weekend (Fri evening to Sun evening) a month for additional military training for which he is paid;

4. In June he commences a basic craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has already learned at the CC but converts those skills to the essential ones needed to be a DP1 mechanic. He is paid for this training;

3. In September he starts another course with the community college (maybe heavy equipment maintenance). Again the military pays the tuition but no salary except for the mandatory 1 weekend per month;

4. In June he commences an advanced craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has again learned at the CC and again converts those skills to selected ones needed for a DP 2 specialty. He is paid for this training;

5. In September he is transferred to the RCEME company of a service battalion within the same city and which is affiliated with the workshop depot. He now starts a one year mandatory Class B contract with his RCEME company during which his primary responsibility is to conduct maintenance on all of the vehicles which are part of his reserve brigade. He is paid for this work and builds experience for his resume. The following August he attends his first three-week collective training exercise with his RCEME company;

6. In September he reverts to Class A status with a requirement over the next year to attend ten 2.5 day monthly weekend trg sessions Sept to June, to have all of July off and to attend another 23-day exercise in August as well as any additional voluntary trg or Class B employment available. (This becomes the standard Class A service year for all fully trained personnel) At the end of August his contract ends but he has the opportunity to sign up for additional fixed-term contracts each of which has a mandatory 48 day trg requirement.

The end result is that you have an individual who has received a subsidized education, a civilian recognized trade certification and a year of practical experience as a mechanic and as such should become a valuable commodity for any employer. Throughout this the individual has continued to live in his family's home at no cost to the military. The military has a fully trained and experienced individual who has also provided one year of valuable maintenance service for his brigade. By having established an additional year of a fixed pattern of reserve service, both the individual and his employer can see the benefit of continued Class A service. Just as importantly, after completing the year of Class B service, any individual who wishes to transfer to the Reg F should be able to do so seamlessly, at rank, with no further training required.

The "workshop depot" is a training institution separate from the reserve brigade which is fully responsible for recruiting and managing the individual until fully trained and ready to serve in a line unit. It's makeup could include a core of managers during the winter augmented by either reserve or regular force instructors during the summer training cycles. The Class A RCEME coy would have a core of Reg F NCOs to supervise and conduct maintenance (together with the Class B's) to service the brigade fully.

That's just one idea. There are hundreds of options and similar programs could be run for many skilled trades from cooks to transport operators to health services specialist--wherever there are community course which teaches the bulk of the basic skills and techniques for a given occupation and provides the civilian certification which greatly benefit the reservist's opportunities in the civilian world.

In this kind of model, there is room to vary some of the terms. For example you could make it a 5 year plus two month first contract to increase the period of "pay-back" service for the tuition. You could offer additional Class B contracts if there is a high maintenance load. You could offer signing bonuses for reenlisting for another 3-5 year term of service. You could have a term of mandatory years (say 2-3) of supplementary reserve service after release which would permit calling individuals "back to the colours" in a major emergency. The possibilities are endless.

🍻


----------



## Remius

I saw an interesting an interesting idea for reserve RMS clerks.  Make them all CRs as PSE.  Then when they serve class A they essentially get paid Class A or deploy as needed.  This would be more for the class B type clerked we currently have at reserve units.  Make them all PSEs for all their daytime work, then on training nights, weekend exercises or deployments they put their uniforms on.


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> IMHO the short answer is, no.
> 
> Personally I think trades like RCEME could fit very well into the reserves.
> 
> I'm more and more convinced that our reserve system is not fit for purpose. Yes, we do have a large number of dedicated reservists who are quite good at what they do but under our current system they all require extensive pre-deployment training before becoming "deployable". In my opinion a reserve system should create a "low cost" manpower pool that can be quickly brought into full-time service when needed. On the other hand I'm also convinced that our Reg F Army is no longer fit for purpose. Think about it. Under the managed readiness system and fleet management system, two thirds of our army is considered NOT ready to deploy. If we needed more than 1/3, we'd have to cobble together a structure from what is left and put them through a lengthy training cycle or accept the risk of failure or high losses. Don't even get me started on equipment and skills capability gaps where we simply do not have key stuff that any modern army needs to have to fight.
> 
> I think we need to rebuild structures, but particulalry reserve structures, from the ground up. Fundamental to that is the question of determining what we need for peace and conflict and then designing a system which is low cost during the former but capable of rapid expansion for the later.
> 
> I think that the reserve RCEME trade is a perfect example of a system that could be vastly improved but before you even start with it you need to improve the underlying reserve concept. For me the greatest failing of the reserves are 1) courses are too short to teach the fundamental skills needed by each individual regardless of trade; 2) there needs to be a period of mandatory training each year to allow individuals to hone their basic skills further and units advance collective training (I think 48 days per year would do) Any additional training or employment, if any, would be voluntary;  3) people can quit anytime meaning we've wasted expensive training resources. I think there should be set terms of service and, in exchange for the moneys invested in training, the individual is required to complete set years of his/her contract to be available in case he/she is needed; and 4) in order to facilitate the previous points there needs to be some really solid legislation to protect reservists civilian jobs, and to ensure that there is a clear, predictable pattern of service that ensures that the employer's, the reservist's and the reservist's family's interest are balanced so as to make being a reservist, hiring a reservist and being a member of the family of a reservist attractive.
> 
> I could see a RCEME trade working like this in order to create an effective system:
> 
> 1. The Army sets up "Workshop depots" in four or five major cities;
> 
> 2. A high school student in his last year is interested in mechanics. He enrolls in the reserves as a craftsman on a fifty-month (4 years plus two months) contract and for his first summer school vacation attends a six-day a week BMQ/SQ program for the full summer for which he is paid as a private;
> 
> 3. In September he starts a course in automotive mechanics at a local community college the tuition for which is paid for by the military but for which he does not receive a salary. He does however parade for one mandatory weekend (Fri evening to Sun evening) a month for additional military training for which he is paid;
> 
> 4. In June he commences a basic craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has already learned at the CC but converts those skills to the essential ones needed to be a DP1 mechanic. He is paid for this training;
> 
> 3. In September he starts another course with the community college (maybe heavy equipment maintenance). Again the military pays the tuition but no salary except for the mandatory 1 weekend per month;
> 
> 4. In June he commences an advanced craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has again learned at the CC and again converts those skills to selected ones needed for a DP 2 specialty. He is paid for this training;
> 
> 5. In September he is transferred to the RCEME company of a service battalion within the same city and which is affiliated with the workshop depot. He now starts a one year mandatory Class B contract with his RCEME company during which his primary responsibility is to conduct maintenance on all of the vehicles which are part of his reserve brigade. He is paid for this work and builds experience for his resume. The following August he attends his first three-week collective training exercise with his RCEME company;
> 
> 6. In September he reverts to Class A status with a requirement over the next year to attend ten 2.5 day monthly weekend trg sessions Sept to June, to have all of July off and to attend another 23-day exercise in August as well as any additional voluntary trg or Class B employment available. (This becomes the standard Class A service year for all fully trained personnel) At the end of August his contract ends but he has the opportunity to sign up for additional fixed-term contracts each of which has a mandatory 48 day trg requirement.
> 
> The end result is that you have an individual who has received a subsidized education, a civilian recognized trade certification and a year of practical experience as a mechanic and as such should become a valuable commodity for any employer. Throughout this the individual has continued to live in his family's home at no cost to the military. The military has a fully trained and experienced individual who has also provided one year of valuable maintenance service for his brigade. By having established an additional year of a fixed pattern of reserve service, both the individual and his employer can see the benefit of continued Class A service. Just as importantly, after completing the year of Class B service, any individual who wishes to transfer to the Reg F should be able to do so seamlessly, at rank, with no further training required.
> 
> The "workshop depot" is a training institution separate from the reserve brigade which is fully responsible for recruiting and managing the individual until fully trained and ready to serve in a line unit. It's makeup could include a core of managers during the winter augmented by either reserve or regular force instructors during the summer training cycles. The Class A RCEME coy would have a core of Reg F NCOs to supervise and conduct maintenance (together with the Class B's) to service the brigade fully.
> 
> That's just one idea. There are hundreds of options and similar programs could be run for many skilled trades from cooks to transport operators to health services specialist--wherever there are community course which teaches the bulk of the basic skills and techniques for a given occupation and provides the civilian certification which greatly benefit the reservist's opportunities in the civilian world.
> 
> In this kind of model, there is room to vary some of the terms. For example you could make it a 5 year plus two month first contract to increase the period of "pay-back" service for the tuition. You could offer additional Class B contracts if there is a high maintenance load. You could offer signing bonuses for reenlisting for another 3-5 year term of service. You could have a term of mandatory years (say 2-3) of supplementary reserve service after release which would permit calling individuals "back to the colours" in a major emergency. The possibilities are endless.
> 
> 🍻



Just a fore note, I wasn't picking on RCEME just an example that existed above.  I have no dog in their fight.

I like your idea, but you and I dig military stuff, not sure this will sell to Joe civi and convince them its worth giving up their summers.


----------



## markppcli

OldSolduer said:


> You are correct BUT the point he was trying to make was that the bureaucracy (aka The Man lol) can and does have an effect on morale,
> 
> Note the budget cuts and equipment cuts EITS stated.





FJAG said:


> IMHO the short answer is, no.
> 
> Personally I think trades like RCEME could fit very well into the reserves.
> 
> I'm more and more convinced that our reserve system is not fit for purpose. Yes, we do have a large number of dedicated reservists who are quite good at what they do but under our current system they all require extensive pre-deployment training before becoming "deployable". In my opinion a reserve system should create a "low cost" manpower pool that can be quickly brought into full-time service when needed. On the other hand I'm also convinced that our Reg F Army is no longer fit for purpose. Think about it. Under the managed readiness system and fleet management system, two thirds of our army is considered NOT ready to deploy. If we needed more than 1/3, we'd have to cobble together a structure from what is left and put them through a lengthy training cycle or accept the risk of failure or high losses. Don't even get me started on equipment and skills capability gaps where we simply do not have key stuff that any modern army needs to have to fight.
> 
> I think we need to rebuild structures, but particulalry reserve structures, from the ground up. Fundamental to that is the question of determining what we need for peace and conflict and then designing a system which is low cost during the former but capable of rapid expansion for the later.
> 
> I think that the reserve RCEME trade is a perfect example of a system that could be vastly improved but before you even start with it you need to improve the underlying reserve concept. For me the greatest failing of the reserves are 1) courses are too short to teach the fundamental skills needed by each individual regardless of trade; 2) there needs to be a period of mandatory training each year to allow individuals to hone their basic skills further and units advance collective training (I think 48 days per year would do) Any additional training or employment, if any, would be voluntary;  3) people can quit anytime meaning we've wasted expensive training resources. I think there should be set terms of service and, in exchange for the moneys invested in training, the individual is required to complete set years of his/her contract to be available in case he/she is needed; and 4) in order to facilitate the previous points there needs to be some really solid legislation to protect reservists civilian jobs, and to ensure that there is a clear, predictable pattern of service that ensures that the employer's, the reservist's and the reservist's family's interest are balanced so as to make being a reservist, hiring a reservist and being a member of the family of a reservist attractive.
> 
> I could see a RCEME trade working like this in order to create an effective system:
> 
> 1. The Army sets up "Workshop depots" in four or five major cities;
> 
> 2. A high school student in his last year is interested in mechanics. He enrolls in the reserves as a craftsman on a fifty-month (4 years plus two months) contract and for his first summer school vacation attends a six-day a week BMQ/SQ program for the full summer for which he is paid as a private;
> 
> 3. In September he starts a course in automotive mechanics at a local community college the tuition for which is paid for by the military but for which he does not receive a salary. He does however parade for one mandatory weekend (Fri evening to Sun evening) a month for additional military training for which he is paid;
> 
> 4. In June he commences a basic craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has already learned at the CC but converts those skills to the essential ones needed to be a DP1 mechanic. He is paid for this training;
> 
> 3. In September he starts another course with the community college (maybe heavy equipment maintenance). Again the military pays the tuition but no salary except for the mandatory 1 weekend per month;
> 
> 4. In June he commences an advanced craftsman course at the workshop depot for 3-4 months which lasts the entire summer vacation and which builds on what he has again learned at the CC and again converts those skills to selected ones needed for a DP 2 specialty. He is paid for this training;
> 
> 5. In September he is transferred to the RCEME company of a service battalion within the same city and which is affiliated with the workshop depot. He now starts a one year mandatory Class B contract with his RCEME company during which his primary responsibility is to conduct maintenance on all of the vehicles which are part of his reserve brigade. He is paid for this work and builds experience for his resume. The following August he attends his first three-week collective training exercise with his RCEME company;
> 
> 6. In September he reverts to Class A status with a requirement over the next year to attend ten 2.5 day monthly weekend trg sessions Sept to June, to have all of July off and to attend another 23-day exercise in August as well as any additional voluntary trg or Class B employment available. (This becomes the standard Class A service year for all fully trained personnel) At the end of August his contract ends but he has the opportunity to sign up for additional fixed-term contracts each of which has a mandatory 48 day trg requirement.
> 
> The end result is that you have an individual who has received a subsidized education, a civilian recognized trade certification and a year of practical experience as a mechanic and as such should become a valuable commodity for any employer. Throughout this the individual has continued to live in his family's home at no cost to the military. The military has a fully trained and experienced individual who has also provided one year of valuable maintenance service for his brigade. By having established an additional year of a fixed pattern of reserve service, both the individual and his employer can see the benefit of continued Class A service. Just as importantly, after completing the year of Class B service, any individual who wishes to transfer to the Reg F should be able to do so seamlessly, at rank, with no further training required.
> 
> The "workshop depot" is a training institution separate from the reserve brigade which is fully responsible for recruiting and managing the individual until fully trained and ready to serve in a line unit. It's makeup could include a core of managers during the winter augmented by either reserve or regular force instructors during the summer training cycles. The Class A RCEME coy would have a core of Reg F NCOs to supervise and conduct maintenance (together with the Class B's) to service the brigade fully.
> 
> That's just one idea. There are hundreds of options and similar programs could be run for many skilled trades from cooks to transport operators to health services specialist--wherever there are community course which teaches the bulk of the basic skills and techniques for a given occupation and provides the civilian certification which greatly benefit the reservist's opportunities in the civilian world.
> 
> In this kind of model, there is room to vary some of the terms. For example you could make it a 5 year plus two month first contract to increase the period of "pay-back" service for the tuition. You could offer additional Class B contracts if there is a high maintenance load. You could offer signing bonuses for reenlisting for another 3-5 year term of service. You could have a term of mandatory years (say 2-3) of supplementary reserve service after release which would permit calling individuals "back to the colours" in a major emergency. The possibilities are endless.
> 
> 🍻


This plan could be achievable by allowing RCEME, and other specialists / in demand trades, to "front load" their Education Benefit, ie instead of after six or 12 years, they get that money for school and are then contracted for X amount of service. We do it for ROTP by not for skilled trades? Similarly the Reserves Education Reimbursement should be reevaluated to cover trades training. I like the idea of a regional workshop structure to build skills. I wonder if a trade union partnership, where those hours worked in the CF can count towards apprenticeship time would be doable?


----------



## McG

Halifax Tar said:


> The British Army doesn't seem to have an issue with this.
> 
> Regiments exist to serve the Army, not the other way around.


I would not say the British don’t have this problem. Amalgamation of Scottish regiments in the UK has brought about protest movements several times in different decades.


Halifax Tar said:


> I think I may have asked this before, but in your opinion are we giving the CA Res trades that they can actually be expected to become functional and proficient at in a reasonable about of time ?


No. There are trades and occupations in the PRes that cannot be trained on PRes timelines. 


FJAG said:


> I think that the reserve RCEME trade is


There is no such thing as the RCEME trade. There are several skilled NCM trades in the corps.


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> This plan could be achievable by allowing RCEME, and other specialists / in demand trades, to "front load" their Education Benefit, ie instead of after six or 12 years, they get that money for school and are then contracted for X amount of service. We do it for ROTP by not for skilled trades?


The RCAF basically does this with several reserve trades that primarily recruit by component transfer of qualified members from the Reg F. If we want a system that takes 12 to 18 months to train someone & then has the member “work off” the education benefit, then the Reg F is already set-up to do it. Introducing such a scheme to the PRes again gets back to that distinction of being for other than full time employment.


----------



## markppcli

McG said:


> The RCAF basically does this with several reserve trades that primarily recruit by component transfer of qualified members from the Reg F. If we want a system that takes 12 to 18 months to train someone & then has the member “work off” the education benefit, then the Reg F is already set-up to do it. Introducing such a scheme to the PRes again gets back to that distinction of being for other than full time employment.


Fair enough then, how about we let reg force who retire to the reserves keep their education benefit so they don't just completely get out like they do now?


----------



## FJAG

Halifax Tar said:


> Just a fore note, I wasn't picking on RCEME just an example that existed above.  I have no dog in their fight.
> 
> I like your idea, but you and I dig military stuff, not sure this will sell to Joe civi and convince them its worth giving up their summers.



Neither was I. RCEME are some of my favourite people. They kept all the mech stuff in my M109 battery humming like a top (and there's a lot of mech stuff in an M109 battery). We have far to few of them and need many, many more - both reg and res.

I think most young folks who join the reserves figure it will be more demanding then it turns out to be. I think too that if we're up front with people and spell out for them exactly what the first five years of their contract will be and what it will do for them, then--as long as the CAF keeps up its side of the commitment--we would have people tripping over each other to join.

Employment legislation currently mandates paid leave in all jurisdiction. I'm of the opinion that one could make federal legislation that would also mandate a certain period of unpaid leave for annual military service (together with legislation which would protect pension credits (or merges with CFSA) etc which would otherwise have been earned during such period. School breaks are generally a minimum of 2 months which leaves five weeks for family vacations even after military service. Quite frankly there are numerous options to make this type of service very attractive to Joe civi if we sat down and worked out what's important to both Joe civi, Herbie reservist, Jill spouse and Dave employer and designed a system that provides for those things while creating stable and equipped reserve units that can function at a collective level.


McG said:


> There is no such thing as the RCEME trade. There are several skilled NCM trades in the corps.


You are absolutely right and I'm letting my age show. Folks that fix stuff and keep it operating are my heroes (as are the folks that keep the parts flowing). On the other hand, systems (by whatever name they go by) that keep these folks from doing their jobs well need to be kicked to the curb.

🍻


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> Fair enough then, how about we let reg force who retire to the reserves keep their education benefit so they don't just completely get out like they do now?


This we absolutely need to get done quickly


----------



## MJP

McG said:


> This we absolutely need to get done quickly


It was the # 1 reason I quit completely recently as it was the only way to access VAC Education benefits. #2 reason was the CAF itself but I likely could have been persuaded to become a PRes mbr if it was a real option.


----------



## blacktriangle

McG said:


> This we absolutely need to get done quickly


Maybe the powers that be want people out? Self-selecting force reduction!


----------



## childs56

FJAG said:


> Employment legislation currently mandates paid leave in all jurisdiction.
> what jurisdictions does this apply to?
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

Every province and the Feds have a version of an Employment Standards Act. For Ontario, as an example, Part XI is the "Vacation with Pay" provision.

It sets out the rights of an employee and the obligations of an employer with respect to providing paid vacations.

These are minimum standards and union contracts and employment contracts can increase the benefits/obligations.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

MJP said:


> It was the # 1 reason I quit completely recently as it was the only way to access VAC Education benefits. #2 reason was the CAF itself but I likely could have been persuaded to become a PRes mbr if it was a real option.


When I was in college, I would get every assignment done THE DAY IT WAS ASSIGNED.  A one page paper assigned in September, that wasn’t due until early November?  

I got it done that night.  Printed it.  Put it in my binder.  And was ready to submit it when the time came.  No stress. 

Big assignments that were several pages long?  I’d do up my outline, then each night I would do one paragraph.  Took me all of maybe 10 minutes each night, more or less.   3 or 4 main paragraphs, plus an intro and a conclusion.  Boom, done.  

—

I feel like if the ‘powers at be’ just reviewed, approved/denied, and forwarded the same day they received it — people would be a lot more satisfied overall.  

whether it’s enrolment, retirement, accessing VAC assets, recognizing civilian equivalents to courses, etc - if people just reviewed & got it done the day they received the submission, everything would be a lot smoother for everybody.  

We live in an age where a Google search earlier today produced approx 3 million results in 0.56 seconds.  Surely we can streamline things so members get in faster, are happier once in, and keep a foot in the door when they leave...


----------



## CBH99

Halifax Tar said:


> I understand.  To this outside observer its seems the Armys obsession with the regimental system and protection of its individual regiments customs and traditions defeats any willingness or effort to effect change and bring the CA Res back into a credible fighting force.


I’m not so sure about that.  But equally, I’m not so sure you aren’t totally bang on either.  

The Army/CAF needs to decide clearly, and with no probability of change for the next decade or two, what it wants and needs from its Reserve.  Then restructure accordingly.

This could be quite easy, be done efficiently, and wouldn’t cost a ton of money.

- If the Army decides it wants the Reserves to provide sub units for deployments, in addition to individual augmentation.  Say so.  It isn’t hard for folks to DAG green if the unit leadership does an annual ‘let’s make sure everybody is up to date with everything.’

*For example - if the Army wants its reserve component to provide extremely capable mortar teams, give them that clear direction.  Provide the type of weapons they want the Reserve Force to become experts at - both real weapons, and simulators where possible.   



Shorten enrolment time.  Period.  (There as an experiment a while back where reserve units were handling their own recruiting.  Guaranteed offer within 30 days.   What’s the status on that?)
Shorten enrolment time.  Period.  (There as an experiment a while back where reserve units were handling their own recruiting.  Guaranteed offer within 30 days.   What’s the status on that?)

- I personally think the BMQ/SQ way of doing thing is inefficient.  We literally teach them the most basic things - things most of them know.  Yes it’s important we start everybody off at the same level, but surely we could make a better use of their time.  (Unit run BMQ during school year, and summer courses can be actual useful military training?)

^ No idea what the solution is here.  Maybe I’m out to lunch.  I’d love to hear suggestions.  


organize unit level courses on training nights and weekends that take advantage of partnerships with local companies or government organizations.  Regardless of unit specialty, allow members to gain valuable skills.  (I work with a former US Army guy, who was only in for a few years.  His resume is a mile long with random courses his unit put on, in partnership with local fire departments, police agencies, EMS, etc.)
Eliminate trades in the Reserves that can’t be trained on a Reserve timeline.  (Weapons techs?  Vehicle techs?  Cooks?)

perhaps Reg F personnel getting out can keep their foot in the door with the reserves, and provide that knowledge?  (Or Reg F sends a tech or two where needed, when needed?) 

^^ WTF does a 3hr training night look like for a cook, anyway?  🤷🏼‍♂️


- Invest in training tools & basic equipment at the units, so member’s skills can be kept fresh.  This, plus they can DAG green.  (Simulators for small arms, AD systems, artillery, etc)


Streamline enrolment.  Don’t issue them a pickup truck worth of kit right off the bat (holy heck, does a new enrolment ever walk out of ASU with a ton of random kit that is barely ever used.)

Recognize civilian equivalents without jumping through a ton of hoops.  (Civilian police officer or firefighter?  Probably has a ton of useful qualifications that get used regularly 

Most important - KEEP IT SIMPLE.  The more simple an organization, the smoother it can run, and produce the desired results.


streamline enrolment, train them up to standard faster, provide equipment to support the role the unit is given, and streamline paperwork.  It sounds so simple I’m afraid it will sound like a dumb post, but just those things alone would give the CAF way more bang for the Reserve buck.  

(I don’t know how the Navy Reserve works, so I stuck with Army)


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> ...I feel like if the ‘powers at be’ just reviewed, approved/denied, and forwarded the same day they received it — people would be a lot more satisfied overall. ...


You're bang on with this. When I was practicing law, every lawyer I knew had a handful of "stinky" files in the back of their filing cabinet. Ones that had a small wrinkle in them that you would get to just as soon as you had time. The problem is that you never have time. Every day something new comes in and every day the new problem takes priority and and sucks all the air out of the room. It's not until you start getting call after call asking for an update or for action on the stinky file that it actually starts receiving some attention. The trouble is the moment that you pull it out of the filing cabinet and start working on it, another file gets put aside and becomes stinky. Its a never ending dilema. 
There is software out there that prompts or brings forward stinky files but that too can be ignored. The solution is designing systems that not only put older files at the front of the queue but that also allow decision making and completion actions to be made more rapidly. The more a transaction has multiple actions and individual involved in completing it, the more likely that somewhere along the way it becomes a stinky file. Today we have entirely too many administrative processes that have multiple levels of supervisory oversight that slow down or halt completion. We need to set up systems that can be rapidly completed through either automation or at a single worker's desk and only be elevated to another worker/supervisor in extraordinary circumstances.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

CBH99 said:


> ^ No idea what the solution is here.  Maybe I’m out to lunch.  I’d love to hear suggestions.
> 
> 
> organize unit level courses on training nights and weekends that take advantage of partnerships with local companies or government organizations.  Regardless of unit specialty, allow members to gain valuable skills.  (I work with a former US Army guy, who was only in for a few years.  His resume is a mile long with random courses his unit put on, in partnership with local fire departments, police agencies, EMS, etc.)
> Eliminate trades in the Reserves that can’t be trained on a Reserve timeline.  (Weapons techs?  Vehicle techs?  Cooks?)
> 
> perhaps Reg F personnel getting out can keep their foot in the door with the reserves, and provide that knowledge?  (Or Reg F sends a tech or two where needed, when needed?)
> 
> ^^ WTF does a 3hr training night look like for a cook, anyway?  🤷🏼‍♂️


Cooks can do things like menu planning and recipe development on a Wednesday night. There is a plan in place right now to get reserve Cooks working for the various courses running part time to ween ourselves off contractors, and its slowly working.

As for trades to eliminate, I think its a matter of the army needs to be more flexible for non students. The reserve training cycle is optimized for Hugh school and university students, but nothing for those who don't complete a 4 year degree and thus have 4 or 5 summers off. The Army should run a course or two during the training year, January is a very slow month for many businesses and would be easier to let an employ go for a course then in June.

Weapons tech for example, it can take 4 years to train if the stars align, but can take longer. I am not even at OFP yet after almost 12 years, why? Training has changed 3 times over the past 7 years, courses have been added, removed, merged, and changed creating gaps and forcing retaking of some courses. Not for the better unfortunately, the biggest gap in RCEME  right now is the lack of OJT which has been left as a unit responsibility now, which isn't happening


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> ..., the biggest gap in RCEME  right now is the lack of OJT which has been left as a unit responsibility now, which isn't happening


Never been a fan of OJT. Admittedly it runs differently as between trades. 

Back in the 70's a gunner's TQ4 trg was OJT and rather than plan out an individual's upcoming experiences, we (the troop officers and snr NCMs) would usually sat down after every exercise with a stack of OJT checklists and try to figure out which EOs and POs Gnr Bloggins achieved on this particular exercise. Too much serendipity involved.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Never been a fan of OJT. Admittedly it runs differently as between trades.
> 
> Back in the 70's a gunner's TQ4 trg was OJT and rather than plan out an individual's upcoming experiences, we (the troop officers and snr NCMs) would usually sat down after every exercise with a stack of OJT checklists and try to figure out which EOs and POs Gnr Bloggins achieved on this particular exercise. Too much serendipity involved.
> 
> 🍻


For weapons techs (reg force and the old Res system) you would have to get a certain number of exposures to each weapon system, than be tested on it. A OJT package is a long time for tech trades, which is how it should be. Having PRes units do OJT is fine but right now it's not being tracked, monitored, or anything by the army so no one's calling up CO's asking why techs aren't turning wrenches. Something like that needs to happen, either RCEME Corp, CADTC, or NDHQ needs someone tracking this and hammering units to be getting techs hands on time.

A warrant at the weapons school said to me about a year ago thst right now Reg F techs do not trust the technical competence of ResF techs, and it's not our fault but a system and a CoC setting us up for failure.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Never been a fan of OJT. Admittedly it runs differently as between trades.
> 
> Back in the 70's a gunner's TQ4 trg was OJT and rather than plan out an individual's upcoming experiences, we (the troop officers and snr NCMs) would usually sat down after every exercise with a stack of OJT checklists and try to figure out which EOs and POs Gnr Bloggins achieved on this particular exercise. Too much serendipity involved.
> 
> 🍻



Major difference.  Always been a big fan of OJT.  That is the environment in which I have spent my career.  Bringing new kit on line and teaching newbies (often with English as Second Language) how to operate it - and then watching the teams figure out how to get more out of the gear than I intended or expected.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MilEME09 said:


> For weapons techs (reg force and the old Res system) you would have to get a certain number of exposures to each weapon system, than be tested on it. A OJT package is a long time for tech trades, which is how it should be. Having PRes units do OJT is fine but right now it's not being tracked, monitored, or anything by the army so no one's calling up CO's asking why techs aren't turning wrenches. Something like that needs to happen, either RCEME Corp, CADTC, or NDHQ needs someone tracking this and hammering units to be getting techs hands on time.
> 
> A warrant at the weapons school said to me about a year ago thst right now Reg F techs do not trust the technical competence of ResF techs, and it's not our fault but a system and a CoC setting us up for failure.


We hardly saw a weapons tech leave their workshop in my day, I got the benefit to help out on stripping down a 105 C1 that had a back into battery failure (thank you 202 workshop for leaving metal shavings in the recoil system)  and learned a lot about them. There was no ongoing education on weapons and weapon systems and due to that our cleaning methods for small arms was destructive and handling of weapon parts also poor (using magazines to open bear bottles) After helping with the howitzer tear down, I made sure as the Class B guy to exercise the recoil systems on our guns every month. As for small arms, I learned far more about firearms and ammunition outside of the military than in it. Get rid of this idea that information needs to be hoarded, get out there and teach advanced weapons care, so there will be far less problems coming to the shops.


----------



## mariomike

MilEME09 said:


> Cooks can do things like menu planning and recipe development on a Wednesday night. There is a plan in place right now to get reserve Cooks working for the various courses running part time to ween ourselves off contractors, and its slowly working.


In my PRes company there were two trades. Transport Operator ( MSE Op ) and Cook.

I got to know one Cook in particular pretty well. He was regarded as the best. And, he knew it. When I asked his "secret", he told me.
The only favour he wanted in return was to be excused from "all military crap". His words. Not mine. As far as I could ever tell, they always granted him his "favour".  



> These are minimum standards and union contracts and employment contracts can increase the benefits/obligations.



Depends on the employer.

They paid us 80 hours Leave With Pay ( LWP )  every summer for two week during militia concentration.

You received your 80 hours regular pay.

Add to that, another 80 hours, paid at time and a half,  to whoever covered your shifts while away.

So, that cost the City 200 hours of pay to cover an 80 hour ( two-week ) military leave.

Your pension, sick bank, vacation time,  benefits etc. all continued as if you never were away.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Major difference.  Always been a big fan of OJT.  That is the environment in which I have spent my career.  Bringing new kit on line and teaching newbies (often with English as Second Language) how to operate it - and then watching the teams figure out how to get more out of the gear than I intended or expected.


I've always found OJT to be a REALLY good way to accelerate competence, IF it is structured correctly.

After the initial basic training is finished, doing the job under 1 or 2 instructors who provide guidance, mentorship, and experience has always produced great results in the various jobs I've had.  (Inside and outside the military.)  

**That being said, none of them had to do with maintaining or fixing weapons - some of which are more than a mere 5.56mm rifle.  So you are definitely the expert on OJT appropriateness for Weapons Techs, MilEME.



A structured OJT with certain tasks, hours, experience to be acknowledged and signed off by a mentor/instructor - I've found has worked well for us here at SOLGEN.  Once the list is complete, the member is then put under another mentor/instructor for either the same thing (learn different ways of doing things) - or the new instructor/mentor comes with a new list.  Depends on the position.

I learned far more practical things doing OJT my first week on the job, than I ever did in training.


----------



## markppcli

I would honestly suggest that the best way to increase man power in the reserves is to actively encourage releasing members to transfer to the reserves. As it stands now there is no incentive what so ever, in fact it is de-incentivized, some form of allowance, bonus, or what ever to encourage members to go the reserves, and the CF to retain that skilled member would be a massive boon. Especailly those getting out to make use of the 6 and 12 year Education benefit. 

I actually like the idea of a reservist being on an initial year long contract upon enrollment, should be enough time to get them through DP1 and be a "productive" member of their unit when they get there.


----------



## McG

McG said:


> Extrapolating the above 4 Div organization across the country might produce something like this:
> 
> ...





McG said:


> This is the model that I advocate.  The company/squadron/battery is established as a unit while miniature formations (we will call them regiments or battalions) are established under LCols.  Reserve Brigades are eliminated.  Making the majors into COs ensures that all the authority to manage the organization remains local.
> 
> ...


Stumbled across my old Army Reserve Force structure proposal.  A little less adventurous that the Force 2025 plan but, at the same time, it's a nice start point for building new total force units.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Stumbled across my old Army Reserve Force structure proposal.  A little less adventurous that the Force 2025 plan but, at the same time, it's a nice start point for building new total force units.


You know me. I'm an amalgamation advocate from long ago.

I really can never understand why a program of this type (and the dozens of similar variations) has never gained traction. "Relentless Struggle" highlighted how not to go about it, but the concept is viable, realistic and, let's face it, the only thing that will work.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Posting here to avoid too much of a derail of the Force 2025 Thread...

Geography might pose a few problems with the idea of creating hybrid Reg Force/Reserve Force units in some areas.

I think a reasonable objective would be to try and keep Reserve units within around a 3 hour drive from their parent Reg Force unit (totally picked that number out of thin air, but think it's fairly reasonable in terms of a weekend Ex for example...7pm forming up at the Armoury, 8pm on the road, 11pm at your parent unit, kit squared away by midnight?).

In Ontario most of 33 Brigade is within 3hrs of Petawawa.  Establishing a parent unit at Borden (with add'l training area at Meaford) would capture most of the rest of Ontario units within the 3hr radius.  The exceptions would be Windsor (4-1/4 hrs to Borden), Sault Ste-Marie (6-1/2 hrs + to either Borden or Petawawa) and Sudbury (about 3-1/2 hrs to either base).

Valcartier would work for most of 34/35 Brigades in Quebec with the exceptions of Rimouski (3-1/4 hours) and Hull (4-1/2 hours).  Montreal units would all have a pretty significant trek though at the top end of the range (2-3/4 hours).  Are there any South Shore training areas that could be used for 34 Brigade instead?  Would St-Jean be an option for posting a parent unit (Battalion HQ and 1 x Reg Force Company of a 30/70 unit)?

The Eastern and Western Brigades would be much more difficult to make work.  Gagetown would work for the NB units but the rest of the units are all 4+ hours away.  Are there any NS training areas that could support a unit build around a parent unit based in Halifax?  Would there be value in a 30/70 Marine/Naval Infantry Battalion based in Halifax?  Not a storm the beaches type unit, but rather a unit trained to operate off the AOPS/JSS, provide port security, small boat handling, etc.?  Newfoundland of course is off by itself and likely doesn't have enough troops between the units to support even a hybrid Brigade, but possibly they could provide a Support Company for 5 Ranger Patrol Group?

Shilo would work for the Manitoba units from 38 Brigade and Edmonton plus a parent unit at Suffield could work for 41 Brigade in Alberta.  The Saskatchewan units from 38 Brigade however are stuck in the middle and 39 Brigade in BC is difficult as well.

I believe there are training areas around CFAD Dundurn.  Could you maybe have a parent Company at CFB Moosejaw and use the Dundurn training areas for the Saskatchewan units?

In BC I guess you could have a Marine/Naval Infantry Battalion parent company at CFB Esquimalt which is around 3 hours from Vancouver by Ferry, but I doubt that is ideal.  Training areas at Comox are more like 4 hours from Vancouver (again with a ferry trip required).  Are there any mainland training areas that could be used?  Is there enough space left in Chilliwack to support a Reg Force parent Company?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> In BC I guess you could have a Marine/Naval Infantry Battalion parent company at CFB Esquimalt which is around 3 hours from Vancouver by Ferry, but I doubt that is ideal.  Training areas at Comox are more like 4 hours from Vancouver (again with a ferry trip required).  Are there any mainland training areas that could be used?  Is there enough space left in Chilliwack to support a Reg Force parent Company?



Chilliwack is becoming more and more constrained now that urban sprawl from Vancouver has taken hold. The range and training area restrictions are ridiculous, and a danger area trace conflict with local First Nations and other land users means the ammunition natures permitted on Vokes Range are very limited. It might even be shut down and handed back to them. Even the demolition area at Slesse Creek is now inaccessible as the road washed out last winter. If you put a Reg F unit there, they'd spend most of their time trying to get back to Wainwright, I'd guess.

Vancouver Island isn't much better as we have the most inaccessible terrain, and the lowest % of Crown Land, in BC. Heals Range in Victoria is permanently inaccessible due to current CFB Esquimalt policies, and the one remaining range in Nanaimo is barely adequate. Rocky Point, (tiny) Albert Head and the (even tinier) Nanoose Bay training areas are all we have available on a routine basis.

The Chilcotin range, near Williams Lake, is only useable for a small portion of the year and may soon disappear due to First Nations' land claims. Most summers it's been closed due to local wildfire activity anyways, which is becoming increasingly more aggressive.

The whole amphibious role thing is a bit of non-starter too. Any capabilities we try to develop out of the mainstream 'General War Fighting' categories, like littoral ops & mountain warfare, are doomed to failure mainly as the Big Army/ Navy/Air Force just can't support it. I commend 39 CBG's effort to emphasize littoral operations during their currently ongoing exercise in Comox, but previous attempts to do the same thing have generally been 'one hit wonders', that make various commanders look good to their bosses with no follow on capability development momentum.

Our best training areas for BC remain Wainwright and JBLM/ Yakima which, with the right planning and resourcing (and air lift) within a 10/90 Reg F supported model, might be doable.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Geography might pose a few problems with the idea of creating hybrid Reg Force/Reserve Force units in some areas.


You are absolutely correct but geography cuts both ways. Our biggest source of reservists comes from urban areas where ranges are not easily accessible. Its obviously to impossible to move the population closer to the ranges, or vice versa, and your solution is a workable one but I think we need to look at more options, including restructuring reserves around skill sets that are not range intensive; more and better simulators; creating a RegF model that facilitates long term (perhaps a whole career) postings to urban areas; up front, intensive training of students with time for it; airlift of urban troops to equipment caches at bases - just as examples.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> You are absolutely correct but geography cuts both ways. Our biggest source of reservists comes from urban areas where ranges are not easily accessible. Its obviously to impossible to move the population closer to the ranges, or vice versa, and your solution is a workable one but I think we need to look at more options, including restructuring reserves around skill sets that are not range intensive; more and better simulators; creating a RegF model that facilitates long term (perhaps a whole career) postings to urban areas; up front, intensive training of students with time for it; airlift of urban troops to equipment caches at bases - just as examples.
> 
> 🍻


Investing in more efficient transportation would benefit us, preposition equipment at bases, OR since every major city has a rail head, uses those for major brigade level exercises instead of large road moves and just bus the troops


----------



## mariomike

FJAG said:


> , intensive training of students with time for it;



^ This.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> You are absolutely correct but geography cuts both ways. Our biggest source of reservists comes from urban areas where ranges are not easily accessible. Its obviously to impossible to move the population closer to the ranges, or vice versa, and your solution is a workable one but I think we need to look at more options, including restructuring reserves around skill sets that are not range intensive; more and better simulators; creating a RegF model that facilitates long term (perhaps a whole career) postings to urban areas; up front, intensive training of students with time for it; airlift of urban troops to equipment caches at bases - just as examples.
> 
> 🍻



Realistically, if we can guarantee a regular deployment on some kind of live firing collective training for a week or 10 days just before everyone takes off for the Summer training period - probably late April/Early May after college classes finish up - this would add about 200% to the focus and effectiveness for the September-April training cycle, and about 500% to the satisfaction levels for most reservists.

If you want 'train to excite' a live fire attack launched through breaches blown by a series of bangalores - covered by live 81mm and C6 SF, would probably qualify.

For BC units, for example, that means deploying to Wainwright or JBLM. Which we used to do on a regular basis as I recall.

It seems that, since the 90s, this training pattern has gone by the wayside to the point that there is seldom any key focus for the militia training year.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Realistically, if we can guarantee a regular deployment on some kind of live firing collective training for a week or 10 days just before everyone takes off for the Summer training period - probably late April/Early May after college classes finish up - this would add about 200% to the focus and effectiveness for the September-April training cycle, and about 500% to the satisfaction levels for most reservists.
> 
> If you want 'train to excite' a live fire attack launched through breaches blown by a series of bangalores - covered by live 81mm and C6 SF, would probably qualify.
> 
> For BC units, for example, that means deploying to Wainwright or JBLM. Which we used to do on a regular basis as I recall.
> 
> It seems that, since the 90s, this training pattern has gone by the wayside to the point that there is seldom any key focus for the militia training year.


You can also do most of that in the Chilcotin. I’ve shot 84mm and done fire and movement live, with frag, there. As I recall RMRang used it for IPSWQ back in 2010?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> You can also do most of that in the Chilcotin. I’ve shot 84mm and done fire and movement live, with frag, there. As I recall RMRang used it for IPSWQ back in 2010?



I think I remember that. It might have been becasue OP PODIUM freed up some resources, and will power, to get that done in BC.

Since then there's been no attempt to run ranges like like - on a regular basis - up there AFAIK...


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Realistically, if we can guarantee a regular deployment on some kind of live firing collective training for a week or 10 days just before everyone takes off for the Summer training period - probably late April/Early May after college classes finish up - this would add about 200% to the focus and effectiveness for the September-April training cycle, and about 500% to the satisfaction levels for most reservists.
> 
> If you want 'train to excite' a live fire attack launched through breaches blown by a series of bangalores - covered by live 81mm and C6 SF, would probably qualify.
> 
> For BC units, for example, that means deploying to Wainwright or JBLM. Which we used to do on a regular basis as I recall.
> 
> It seems that, since the 90s, this training pattern has gone by the wayside to the point that there is seldom any key focus for the militia training year.


Wouldn't you want it the opposite? Have it near the end of summer to give them experience at what they just learned?


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Wouldn't you want it the opposite? Have it near the end of summer to give them experience at what they just learned?



Either is fine and, in the past, it's been done both ways. If you're going to do it at the end of the summer, then courses and summer employment contracts need to be aligned appropriately.

The biggest issue is that there is no regular annual training 'pattern' to align with, and rarely have there been opportunities to deploy sections/platoons on field firing activities, which is the 'bread and butter' stuff that our troops join for.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Realistically, if we can guarantee a regular deployment on some kind of live firing collective training for a week or 10 days just before everyone takes off for the Summer training period - probably late April/Early May after college classes finish up - this would add about 200% to the focus and effectiveness for the September-April training cycle, and about 500% to the satisfaction levels for most reservists.


I've mulled this over and found the big problem is the start and stop time of summer holidays for students.

Most provinces have high school students in school until the end of June while university students are open from end April. Both return late August early September.

That gives a two month break for high schoolers and almost four months for university students which is plenty of time for summer courses and a summer exercise. I tend to favour the last two weeks of summer (varying slightly for regions) so that both high schoolers and university students can attend and there is still time to fit in uninterrupted training from the end of school to the start of exercises. 

My preferred model would go something like this:

1. High school student joins some time during the later part of the school year with an enrollment date of 1 Jul;

2. Assigned to a depot battalion working out of local armoury and/or local training camp. Takes a mandatory eight week modified BMQ/SC from 1 Jul until 31 Aug and then attends mandatory 10 x 2.5 day weekends at local armouries/distance learning during the winter while attending university or community college;

3. Immediately at end of 1st year university starts mandatory 3.5 month DP1 course on 1 May until mid August at which point he/she is transferred to his/her unit in time to join the unit for its mandatory two-week annual exercise;

4. From this point forward the only mandatory training is the 10 x 2.5 day monthly refresher training as well as the two-week annual exercise. All other training is strictly voluntary and it is assumed that while still attending schools individuals will take maximum advantage of DP2 and other individual training available during the summers. The intent is to create a very set pattern of repeated training that people can easily tune themselves to, leaves them plenty of time with the family on weekends and in the summer and still achieve a high level of individual skills; and

5. Officers have a longer mandatory DP1 training arc stretching over a four summers.

If I were king ...

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Either is fine and, in the past, it's been done both ways. If you're going to do it at the end of the summer, then courses and summer employment contracts need to be aligned appropriately.
> 
> The biggest issue is that there is no regular annual training 'pattern' to align with, and rarely have there been opportunities to deploy sections/platoons on field firing activities, which is the 'bread and butter' stuff that our troops join for.


I agree,schools do everything their own way, the infantry School, RCEMES, etc... they do not coordinate the reserve summer training season. On top of that courses at each school are scheduled to make no sense, like running a vehicle tech DP1.3 in may, but a 1.1 and 1.2 in July. Meaning those 1.1/1.2 students how wait till next year for 1.3.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I've mulled this over and found the big problem is the start and stop time of summer holidays for students.
> 
> Most provinces have high school students in school until the end of June while university students are open from end April. Both return late August early September.
> 
> That gives a two month break for high schoolers and almost four months for university students which is plenty of time for summer courses and a summer exercise. I tend to favour the last two weeks of summer (varying slightly for regions) so that both high schoolers and university students can attend and there is still time to fit in uninterrupted training from the end of school to the start of exercises.
> 
> My preferred model would go something like this:
> 
> 1. High school student joins some time during the later part of the school year with an enrollment date of 1 Jul;
> 
> *2. Assigned to a depot battalion working out of local armoury and/or local training camp. Takes a mandatory eight week modified BMQ/SC from 1 Jul until 31 Aug and then attends mandatory 10 x 2.5 day weekends at local armouries/distance learning during the winter while attending university or community college;*
> 
> 3. Immediately at end of 1st year university starts mandatory 3.5 month DP1 course on 1 May until mid August at which point he/she is transferred to his/her unit in time to join the unit for its mandatory two-week annual exercise;
> 
> 4. From this point forward the only mandatory training is the 10 x 2.5 day monthly refresher training as well as the two-week annual exercise. All other training is strictly voluntary and it is assumed that while still attending schools individuals will take maximum advantage of DP2 and other individual training available during the summers. The intent is to create a very set pattern of repeated training that people can easily tune themselves to, leaves them plenty of time with the family on weekends and in the summer and still achieve a high level of individual skills; and
> 
> 5. Officers have a longer mandatory DP1 training arc stretching over a four summers.
> 
> If I were king ...
> 
> 🍻



We already kind of do that, with CITY courses during the training year, I think.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> We already kind of do that, with CITY courses during the training year, I think.


Sorta, and brigade usually mandates each unit provide 1x instructor. Some give excuses and no fil, leading to some units having to shoulder more burden then others.


----------



## markppcli

And inevitably supported by reg force augmentation so our average days away from home can be topped up to 180 plus, where upon we can be talked down to about how we “just sit around sweeping the lines.” Sorry tangent.


----------



## CBH99

MilEME09 said:


> I agree,schools do everything their own way, the infantry School, RCEMES, etc... they do not coordinate the reserve summer training season. On top of that courses at each school are scheduled to make no sense, like running a vehicle tech DP1.3 in may, but a 1.1 and 1.2 in July. Meaning those 1.1/1.2 students how wait till next year for 1.3.


That has to be the dumbest thing I will hear all week, and it’s only 7:46am on a Monday…

So DP 1.3 is run first, for those who have completed 1.1 and 1.2…. And troops who didn’t get qualified the year prior then have to wait until after?


I know ‘Big Army’ doesn’t operate efficiently on the admin level, anywhere.  If there is one common thing that binds together troops worldwide, it is the phrase “this doesn’t make sense…” 

But could we at least _try_ to have some synergy?  Like FFS…. 🤦🏼‍♂️


One of the things we could and should do to help fix retention, is just to have some coordinated synergy at getting people qualified & doing what they signed on for, as quickly as possible.  

More folks will stay.  We save money.  We have more qualified people to share deployments & such with, etc


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> That has to be the dumbest thing I will hear all week, and it’s only 7:46am on a Monday…
> 
> So DP 1.3 is run first, for those who have completed 1.1 and 1.2…. And troops who didn’t get qualified the year prior then have to wait until after?
> 
> 
> I know ‘Big Army’ doesn’t operate efficiently on the admin level, anywhere.  If there is one common thing that binds together troops worldwide, it is the phrase “this doesn’t make sense…”
> 
> But could we at least _try_ to have some synergy? Like FFS…. 🤦🏼‍♂️
> 
> 
> One of the things we could and should do to help fix retention, is just to have some coordinated synergy at getting people qualified & doing what they signed on for, as quickly as possible.
> 
> More folks will stay.  We save money.  We have more qualified people to share deployments & such with, etc



Welcome to the last 20 years of my military service... dealing with the soldier level fall out from a Balkanized training system 'supply chain' at the parade square level.


----------



## McG

MilEME09 said:


> I agree, schools do everything their own way, the infantry School, RCEMES, etc... they do not coordinate the reserve summer training season. On top of that courses at each school are scheduled to make no sense, like running a vehicle tech DP1.3 in may, but a 1.1 and 1.2 in July. Meaning those 1.1/1.2 students how wait till next year for 1.3.


There are lots of things constraining the schools that the average student and even incremental staff do not get to see.
Both schools that you have listed are responsible to run their officer training programs Jun through August.  If a limited training resource cannot simultaneously support PRes NCM and ROTP/RESO training steams, then the schools are stuck placing that block in May for the PRes NCM (even if that block should happen last in the order of training).


----------



## RangerRay

Back in the 90’s in BC, they would have the main concentration Cougar Salvo during high school spring break in March or April. Those of us in college or uni had Reading Week in February and mid-terms during Cougar Salvo so couldn’t participate. I was told the reason it was scheduled then was because all the officers at District HQ (or whatever 39 Brigade was called back then) in Vancouver were high school teachers.  🤷‍♂️


----------



## daftandbarmy

RangerRay said:


> Back in the 90’s in BC, they would have the main concentration Cougar Salvo during high school spring break in March or April. Those of us in college or uni had Reading Week in February and mid-terms during Cougar Salvo so couldn’t participate. I was told the reason it was scheduled then was because all the officers at District HQ (or whatever 39 Brigade was called back then) in Vancouver were high school teachers.  🤷‍♂️



As I recall, the main reason for running it in March related primarily to the availability of $ for ammo, and 'blowing the wad' at the end of the Fiscal Year was always easier than trying to scrape together cash earlier in the training year.

Thinking back on it I don't think there were that many people in 39 CBG who were teachers, which is a great shame of course


----------



## Colin Parkinson

LCol> General MacDonald was, he was my CO and principal at the same time, then became the Brigade Commander.


----------



## BillN

Colin Parkinson said:


> LCol> General MacDonald was, he was my CO and principal at the same time, then became the Brigade Commander.


Stu MacDonald was my Social Studies teacher at N Van High......great guy.  One of my few teachers who made school interesting.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Looks like we're 'going Commando' 

The action starts here on Chek 6 News at about 14.00









						Vancouver Island Livestream and Newscasts - CHEK News
					

Watch the CHEK News livestream or view recent newscasts here.




					www.cheknews.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

So much about Ukraine -  this article about the role of volunteers in the defence of Kyiv.

This should be considered together with the Brits training 10,000 troops in 120 days with battalion sets getting 3 weeks of instruction and batteries of artillery getting similar abbreviated programmes in the UK, Germany, the US and Canada. 



> “Everything was happening pretty fast. On the morning of 24 February, our battalion [of the 112th brigade of territorial defense] gathered during the first three hours. *There were no more than thirty people.* On the morning of 25 February, there were almost a hundred people. And the same day, by noon, the first Russian incursion had begun. For us, this operation was a surprise. We learned about it from the battalion of the National Guard who came from Novi Petrivtsi where the Russians had already been crushed, and they joined us too.
> 
> Then, only the incredibly quick military decisions by the commander of the battalion, the commander of the 112th Brigade [Oleksandr] Pavliy, and the Ministry of Defense saved the situation. We received a very large number of weapons in a few hours and turned a battalion with less than 100 people into one with 650 people. By the evening there were already 800. *The next day [February 26] there were 1200 people.* We immediately formed groups of 50-100 people and sent them to positions, and at the same time mining was carried out on the Hostomel highway.
> 
> It all moved very fast because in the first hours we needed to stop the first Russian groups and show that there were many troops in Kyiv. But we weren’t even creating an illusion: because indeed a huge number of people took up arms. For me, 24, 25, and 26 February were like one day, and only two weeks later from the logs of hostilities did I realize that then we didn’t sleep, didn’t eat, and indeed lived through it as if it was one day.
> 
> An incredible number of people came. On the afternoon of February 25, 700 people came to enroll, the crowd was huge, and it took me 20 minutes of aggressive persuasion for people to disperse. The fact that we, battalion officers [Myronenko joined the defense three years ago – Ed], knew each other and understood who was responsible for what helped us to quickly get down to work. And this is what allowed some units to grow tenfold. It is best when there are such groups of 10-15-20 people with an organizational core, as was also the case in other battalions.





> *We could do whatever we wanted without orders. *We understood how many Russians were coming and we decided where to strengthen [our positions]. This is the first time we met so many people [joining the territorial defense]. It was crazy and such feelings are impossible to forget. Some of the units were in Moshchun, where it got quite scary. Every day we waited for the Russians to attack – everything was on a knife’s edge. We had this feeling for about four days, and everyone said goodbye to life, so overall it was quite easy. Only then, when it’s over, do you realize that it was complete madness, everyone has children, and so on. But then we were in a state of mind that a single person could not enter in principle. Everyone united and kept a rather cool head.





			https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/07/15/putin-ordered-to-take-kyiv-in-three-days-so-thousands-of-ordinary-kyivans-took-up-arms/


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> So much about Ukraine -  this article about the role of volunteers in the defence of Kyiv.
> 
> This should be considered together with the Brits training 10,000 troops in 120 days with battalion sets getting 3 weeks of instruction and batteries of artillery getting similar abbreviated programmes in the UK, Germany, the US and Canada.
> 
> 
> 
> https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/07/15/putin-ordered-to-take-kyiv-in-three-days-so-thousands-of-ordinary-kyivans-took-up-arms/


An awesome story. I won't try to argue about the fact that in a Canadian context such a situation and such a need is most probably unnecessary but I will take the following lesson:

You cannot rapidly expand a military force, regardless as to whether or not you have an enthusiastic core to build on, unless you have the weapons to give them rapidly. Our stocks of even the most basic of systems - the rifle - are very limited. Our crew served weapons even more so and heavy equipment close to non-existent. Just as importantly we lack any plan to expand the force. We're stuck in a "forces-in-being" rut. Much of this comes from our policy to use our equipment until its clapped out, then divest it while we acquire less than what we're replacing. Can you imagine where Ukraine would be now if they didn't have massive stocks of Soviet era equipment to fall onto and had to do a UOR for basic gear in those first few hours. Even the kindness of a few strangers providing them with key advanced weapons on an urgent basis would have been too little and too late.

I'm not saying that we need a home guard such as Ukraine and several other European countries have but, at the very least, we need a reserve force that is capable of doing more than providing individual augmentees to RegF units. The fact that even now, with Force 2025, we are once again targeting some form of nebulous Total Force founded in augmentation shows that we continue to fail in our thinking.

What is particulalry galling is that we have spent years in Ukraine (and the Baltics) teaching the western way of command and control but have utterly failed to learn from them about how to properly structure a defence force and a mobilization concept. We continue to treat the word "mobilization" as a dirty one while we continue to live under the false lessons of reserve service from Afghanistan with its concepts of augmentation and six month predeployment cycles and managed readiness and whole fleet management. We're over a decade away from Afghanistan and once again focussed on Europe and yet we continue to dither.

The accelerated training for the Ukrainians is also interesting but nothing new. We did something similar as part of TF Phoenix with the US in Afghanistan where for years we looked after the collective training phase of the ANA. It's one thing, however, to run such a program in times of emergency and another to do it as a steady-state program for the Canadian Army. Crash training and using every waking hour is usually quite doable for the course students, but burns out instructor cadres at an alarming rate. That said, we need to reprogram our training, at least at the DP1 level, to speed it up - especially to take advantage of ResF student availability in the summers - and to create a common standard for both RegF and ResF, while ensuring that individual instructors have a separate and sustainable work pace while the trainees are worked to the limit.

😖


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> An awesome story. I won't try to argue about the fact that in a Canadian context such a situation and such a need is most probably unnecessary but I will take the following lesson:
> 
> You cannot rapidly expand a military force, regardless as to whether or not you have an enthusiastic core to build on, unless you have the weapons to give them rapidly. Our stocks of even the most basic of systems - the rifle - are very limited. Our crew served weapons even more so and heavy equipment close to non-existent. Just as importantly we lack any plan to expand the force. We're stuck in a "forces-in-being" rut. Much of this comes from our policy to use our equipment until its clapped out, then divest it while we acquire less than what we're replacing. Can you imagine where Ukraine would be now if they didn't have massive stocks of Soviet era equipment to fall onto and had to do a UOR for basic gear in those first few hours. Even the kindness of a few strangers providing them with key advanced weapons on an urgent basis would have been too little and too late.



Agree.  And having kit in stock to donate also seems to be a valuable asset.  Perhaps even more important than supplying a few more trigger pullers.



FJAG said:


> I'm not saying that we need a home guard such as Ukraine and several other European countries have but, at the very least, we need a reserve force that is capable of doing more than providing individual augmentees to RegF units. The fact that even now, with Force 2025, we are once again targeting some form of nebulous Total Force founded in augmentation shows that we continue to fail in our thinking.



I like keeping the Force In Being from the Just In Case Force separate.  It clarifies things and makes sure that the Force In Being has what it needs and it is clear what it doesn't have and what it can't do.  With the Total Force concept it is way too easy to say "oh sure, we can do that, just give us a minute while we do a quick round up of the reserves and see who is available".



FJAG said:


> What is particulalry galling is that we have spent years in Ukraine (and the Baltics) teaching the western way of command and control but have utterly failed to learn from them about how to properly structure a defence force and a mobilization concept. We continue to treat the word "mobilization" as a dirty one while we continue to live under the false lessons of reserve service from Afghanistan with its concepts of augmentation and six month predeployment cycles and managed readiness and whole fleet management. We're over a decade away from Afghanistan and once again focussed on Europe and yet we continue to dither.



And we insist on thinking of mobilization as only being applicable for bang-bang shoot-em-ups!   Mobilization has to mean being able to respond to any disruption to the economy and the society.

Question:  Is dealing with a nuclear strike, whose effects broadly mimic a natural disaster, a civil emergency or a military one?



FJAG said:


> The accelerated training for the Ukrainians is also interesting but nothing new. We did something similar as part of TF Phoenix with the US in Afghanistan where for years we looked after the collective training phase of the ANA. It's one thing, however, to run such a program in times of emergency and another to do it as a steady-state program for the Canadian Army. Crash training and using every waking hour is usually quite doable for the course students, but burns out instructor cadres at an alarming rate. That said, we need to reprogram our training, at least at the DP1 level, to speed it up - especially to take advantage of ResF student availability in the summers - and to create a common standard for both RegF and ResF, while ensuring that individual instructors have a separate and sustainable work pace while the trainees are worked to the limit.
> 
> 😖



I think the key phrase there was "speed it up".

There was something to the old MITCP programme.   Most people could afford 2 weeks a year for a couple or three years.  And the instructors, likewise, only had to commit 3 weeks a year to the course (assuming somebody else organizes the lesson plans).   Effective training can occur on nights and weekends as well.  It just doesn't look like Victorian square-bashing.

The effort won't create an augmentation force for the Regs but it will create a willing force base for mobilization when the world goes to hellinahandbasket.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I like keeping the Force In Being from the Just In Case Force separate.  It clarifies things and makes sure that the Force In Being has what it needs and it is clear what it doesn't have and what it can't do.  With the Total Force concept it is way too easy to say "oh sure, we can do that, just give us a minute while we do a quick round up of the reserves and see who is available".


Separate doesn't necessarily mean apart. There are some jobs (opinions vary on which ones) that require both the training and experience that a only full-time career can give you. Other jobs in the Just In Case Force also need to be done day-to-day. A degree of full-time support and/or leadership is always necessary. 



Kirkhill said:


> And we insist on thinking of mobilization as only being applicable for bang-bang shoot-em-ups!   Mobilization has to mean being able to respond to any disruption to the economy and the society.


Absolutely



Kirkhill said:


> I think the key phrase there was "speed it up".
> 
> There was something to the old MITCP programme.   Most people could afford 2 weeks a year for a couple or three years.  And the instructors, likewise, only had to commit 3 weeks a year to the course (assuming somebody else organizes the lesson plans).   Effective training can occur on nights and weekends as well.  It just doesn't look like Victorian square-bashing.
> 
> The effort won't create an augmentation force for the Regs but it will create a willing force base for mobilization when the world goes to hellinahandbasket.


I don't think a MITCP reserve force cuts it any more. You can turn out, in one or two two-week blocks, some very basic level soldier jobs that will allow them to be able to do something if given very tight supervision but it falls down on the more technical and leadership roles. I had a two-week junior NCO course and immediately became a bombardier (the equivalent of a Master Bombardier in today's world) - not ideal. We turned out lieutenants in three two-week blocks, captains with two more and majors with two more. Even then you could see a vast difference between a six-week MITCP trained gun position officer and a RESO trained one who had had some six months of training over three summers. The majors? - long story short, no MITCP-trained arty major would have the first clue as to what to do in today's battle group fire support coordination centre.

This gets me back to my view that officer and OR DP1 as between RegF and ResF should be identical and tailored to fit into a student's summer vacation. i.e roughly seven week blocks so as to fit one block into high-schoolers vacation or two blocks into a university one.  (Give me one 7 week block after high school and three annual university blocks of 14 weeks each and I can turn out pretty good ResF lieutenants and sergeants and maybe even captains and WOs) 

How we turn out MWOs and majors is a more complex issue unless the individual is prepared to take a lengthy break from work to take the requisite training. Training alone doesn't do it; you also need a good bit of experience. This is why, IMHO majors and MWOs and above in ResF units will probably need to be full-timers (and that raises a big question as to how you do that and not have them bored out of their gourds during the periods when the unit isn't parading). There are work arounds. For example in the artillery you can separate the tactical group from the gun battery. A senior captain can easily run a battery gun line. What is now the major battery commander would have no more connection to the gun line but would be a full-timer working with the battlegroup. I would think in some other arms a company-sized organization could be "managed and led" by ResF captains and WOs.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> An awesome story. I won't try to argue about the fact that in a Canadian context such a situation and such a need is most probably unnecessary but I will take the following lesson:
> 
> You cannot rapidly expand a military force, regardless as to whether or not you have an enthusiastic core to build on, unless you have the weapons to give them rapidly. Our stocks of even the most basic of systems - the rifle - are very limited. Our crew served weapons even more so and heavy equipment close to non-existent. Just as importantly we lack any plan to expand the force. We're stuck in a "forces-in-being" rut. Much of this comes from our policy to use our equipment until its clapped out, then divest it while we acquire less than what we're replacing. Can you imagine where Ukraine would be now if they didn't have massive stocks of Soviet era equipment to fall onto and had to do a UOR for basic gear in those first few hours. Even the kindness of a few strangers providing them with key advanced weapons on an urgent basis would have been too little and too late.
> 
> I'm not saying that we need a home guard such as Ukraine and several other European countries have but, at the very least, we need a reserve force that is capable of doing more than providing individual augmentees to RegF units. The fact that even now, with Force 2025, we are once again targeting some form of nebulous Total Force founded in augmentation shows that we continue to fail in our thinking.
> 
> What is particulalry galling is that we have spent years in Ukraine (and the Baltics) teaching the western way of command and control but have utterly failed to learn from them about how to properly structure a defence force and a mobilization concept. We continue to treat the word "mobilization" as a dirty one while we continue to live under the false lessons of reserve service from Afghanistan with its concepts of augmentation and six month predeployment cycles and managed readiness and whole fleet management. We're over a decade away from Afghanistan and once again focussed on Europe and yet we continue to dither.
> 
> The accelerated training for the Ukrainians is also interesting but nothing new. We did something similar as part of TF Phoenix with the US in Afghanistan where for years we looked after the collective training phase of the ANA. It's one thing, however, to run such a program in times of emergency and another to do it as a steady-state program for the Canadian Army. Crash training and using every waking hour is usually quite doable for the course students, but burns out instructor cadres at an alarming rate. That said, we need to reprogram our training, at least at the DP1 level, to speed it up - especially to take advantage of ResF student availability in the summers - and to create a common standard for both RegF and ResF, while ensuring that individual instructors have a separate and sustainable work pace while the trainees are worked to the limit.
> 
> 😖



I recall joining the British Army for a Potential Officer's Course, a course to select those who would be sponsored to Sandhurst by the Parachute Regiment, with about 70 others. Many of them were civilians with no prior military service. I was lucky in that I had previously completed Phase 2 & 3 Inf, and the Airborne Course, in Canada so had some previous training and service.

It was four months long and, to this day, was one of the hardest things I've ever survived. It was kind of like compressing BOTC & Phase 2 & 3 Infantry in with a Ranger/ Pathfinder Course I guess.

The final test exercise was an 18 hour 50 miler carrying 60-70 pounds each where we inserted into an RV - navigating in pairs - wearing civvies, then donned uniform (which we carried) and launched a series of raids 'behind enemy lines'. Weapons and ammo had been broken down and stuffed in the bergans too, of course.

Only a handful made it. Me and one other were sponsored by the Regiment. The other 'survivors' went forward sponsored by other regiments. Many who failed were regimental NCOs who thought that they might want to be Officers, but jacked it in. Some of those 'failures' went back to their battalions and won decorations for bravery in the Falklands War the following year. Some of the best were civvies with no military experience.

This proved to me that, given the right opportunity and leadership, it's clearly possible to prepare neophytes for battle quickly, and to a very high standard.

That is, if you can focus on the end state and not the process, and other wasteful institutional BS


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> I recall joining the British Army for a Potential Officer's Course, a course to select those who would be sponsored to Sandhurst by the Parachute Regiment, with about 70 others. Many of them were civilians with no prior military service. I was lucky in that I had previously completed Phase 2 & 3 Inf, and the Airborne Course, in Canada so had some previous training and service.
> 
> It was four months long and, to this day, was one of the hardest things I've ever survived. It was kind of like compressing BOTC & Phase 2 & 3 Infantry in with a Ranger/ Pathfinder Course I guess.
> 
> The final test exercise was an 18 hour 50 miler carrying 60-70 pounds each where we inserted into an RV - navigating in pairs - wearing civvies, then donned uniform (which we carried) and launched a series of raids 'behind enemy lines'. Weapons and ammo had been broken down and stuffed in the bergans too, of course.
> 
> Only a handful made it. Me and one other were sponsored by the Regiment. The other 'survivors' went forward sponsored by other regiments. Many who failed were regimental NCOs who thought that they might want to be Officers, but jacked it in. Some of those 'failures' went back to their battalions and won decorations for bravery in the Falklands War the following year. Some of the best were civvies with no military experience.
> 
> This proved to me that, given the right opportunity and leadership, it's clearly possible to prepare neophytes for battle quickly, and to a very high standard.
> 
> That is, if you can focus on the end state and not the process, and other wasteful institutional BS


You old heretic,you !😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> You old heretic,you !😉


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Separate doesn't necessarily mean apart. There are some jobs (opinions vary on which ones) that require both the training and experience that a only full-time career can give you. Other jobs in the Just In Case Force also need to be done day-to-day. A degree of full-time support and/or leadership is always necessary.



I agree that full time adult supervision is necessary.  I just don't think the Reg Force is temperamentally inclined to take the time away from its primary duties to supply that supervision.



FJAG said:


> Absolutely


 
Good Lord! Agreement!   



FJAG said:


> I don't think a MITCP reserve force cuts it any more. You can turn out, in one or two two-week blocks, some very basic level soldier jobs that will allow them to be able to do something if given very tight supervision but it falls down on the more technical and leadership roles. I had a two-week junior NCO course and immediately became a bombardier (the equivalent of a Master Bombardier in today's world) - not ideal. We turned out lieutenants in three two-week blocks, captains with two more and majors with two more. Even then you could see a vast difference between a six-week MITCP trained gun position officer and a RESO trained one who had had some six months of training over three summers. The majors? - long story short, no MITCP-trained arty major would have the first clue as to what to do in today's battle group fire support coordination centre.
> 
> This gets me back to my view that officer and OR DP1 as between RegF and ResF should be identical and tailored to fit into a student's summer vacation. i.e roughly seven week blocks so as to fit one block into high-schoolers vacation or two blocks into a university one.  (Give me one 7 week block after high school and three annual university blocks of 14 weeks each and I can turn out pretty good ResF lieutenants and sergeants and maybe even captains and WOs)
> 
> How we turn out MWOs and majors is a more complex issue unless the individual is prepared to take a lengthy break from work to take the requisite training. Training alone doesn't do it; you also need a good bit of experience. This is why, IMHO majors and MWOs and above in ResF units will probably need to be full-timers (and that raises a big question as to how you do that and not have them bored out of their gourds during the periods when the unit isn't parading). There are work arounds. For example in the artillery you can separate the tactical group from the gun battery. A senior captain can easily run a battery gun line. What is now the major battery commander would have no more connection to the gun line but would be a full-timer working with the battlegroup. I would think in some other arms a company-sized organization could be "managed and led" by ResF captains and WOs.
> 
> 🍻



And here we come to the crunch. 

I am not looking at the MITCP mobilization force as a Reserve force in the sense you mean it.  We both agree, I think, that there are highly skilled jobs that need practice, practice, practice.  That level of skill development is only possible in a full time environment such as that offered by the Regular Force.  I would look to the Regular Force to supply my trained Reserves - released soldiers bound to the colours for a definite period of time (and held on the supp list indefinitely maybe?).  Part of the contract entered into.

The MITCP force is something else - the thing you don't like.  But I think has merit.  

And yes it would mean another line item to compete with CANSOFCOM, the RCN, the CA, and the RCAF.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I agree that full time adult supervision is necessary.  I just don't think the Reg Force is temperamentally inclined to take the time away from its primary duties to supply that supervision.


Yeah. That has to change. It won't until looking after and developing the ResF becomes a requirement on their PERs and their promotion and advancement depend on it.



Kirkhill said:


> Good Lord! Agreement!


It happens. 



Kirkhill said:


> And here we come to the crunch.
> 
> I am not looking at the MITCP mobilization force as a Reserve force in the sense you mean it.  We both agree, I think, that there are highly skilled jobs that need practice, practice, practice.  That level of skill development is only possible in a full time environment such as that offered by the Regular Force.  I would look to the Regular Force to supply my trained Reserves - released soldiers bound to the colours for a definite period of time (and held on the supp list indefinitely maybe?).  Part of the contract entered into.
> 
> The MITCP force is something else - the thing you don't like.  But I think has merit.
> 
> And yes it would mean another line item to compete with CANSOFCOM, the RCN, the CA, and the RCAF.


The only way that I would see a "home guard" type of force is if there was an existential threat from irregular nutjobs from south of the border. Unfortunately that's a scenario which looks less and less far-fetched every year.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Yeah. That has to change. It won't until looking after and developing the ResF becomes a requirement on their PERs and their promotion and advancement depend on it.



FJAG - They did Sam Hughes in.  What makes you think there is a prospect for change?  That is why I have come to the conclusion that there should be an amicable separation.



FJAG said:


> It happens.



Actually more often than either of us generally admit.



FJAG said:


> The only way that I would see a "home guard" type of force is if there was an existential threat from irregular nutjobs from south of the border. Unfortunately that's a scenario which looks less and less far-fetched every year.
> 
> 🍻



I continue to be one of those who see merit in citizen service and having an organizational framework that works when the world breaks down - regardless if the problem is the Michigan Militia or Yellowstone eruption.  People that we can equip with radios and trucks  and either rifles or ladders.

Michigan Militia - Wikipedia 
(Fenians Part Deux).


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG - They did Sam Hughes in.  What makes you think there is a prospect for change?  That is why I have come to the conclusion that there should be an amicable separation.
> 
> 
> 
> Actually more often than either of us generally admit.
> 
> 
> 
> I continue to be one of those who see merit in citizen service and having an organizational framework that works when the world breaks down - regardless if the problem is the Michigan Militia or Yellowstone eruption.  People that we can equip with radios and trucks  and either rifles or ladders.
> 
> Michigan Militia - Wikipedia
> (Fenians Part Deux).


Sam Hughes was a nutjob of the first order. Even the British noticed. Laurier had to fire him.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG - They did Sam Hughes in. What makes you think there is a prospect for change? That is why I have come to the conclusion that there should be an amicable separation.





SeaKingTacco said:


> Sam Hughes was a nutjob of the first order. Even the British noticed. Laurier had to fire him.


I sometime wonder how much of Sam's bad reputation was a hatchet job. I'll certainly admit that he was flamboyant and full of himself but he was also dealing with a rough structure.

The Boer War era Militia was a bit of a mess and the reforms that came with the 1903 Militia Act were really only just taking hold. The quality of the staff at all levels was poor and his hatred for the permanent force was well known and reciprocated. While there was a newly developed mobilization plan for the Militia it was slow and cumbersome and restrictive in dealing with the massive groundswell of popular support for the war that came with the declaration of war.

One can obviously argue the case, but by tossing aside the existing system and creating a new expeditionary force from volunteers of all stripes the process was actually accelerated. Let's face it, we'd be hard pressed today, with all of our modern technology, in putting 31,200 troops on ships for transport to Europe in the interval of 4 Aug when war was declared and 3 Oct when the first contingent sailed. 420,000 other soldiers would be mobilized during the remainder of the war. Strangely enough, we do not laud this as a major accomplishment in administration but gripe about how new numbered battalions were formed. Just think about it, with all the griping that's done about how Hughes screwed everything up, he put a division overseas from scratch in two short months.

I think what the British noticed was that Hughes was rabidly Canadian, didn't suffer fools and trumped-up stuffed shirts gladly, and refused to kowtow to the British who felt themselves superior in all respects. He refused to let the British break up the Canadian contingent to serve as reinforcements to the British, he refused to let the division be commanded by a Brit until eventually convinced Canada didn't have one to offer (what went wrong Permanent Militia?), and singlehandedly achieved the creation of the four-division Canadian Corps. Concurrently he pushed hard for the Canadians to be equipped with Canadian manufactured gear (including, for a time, the infamous Ross rifle)

When Borden visited the front in 1915 he realized that Hughes' critiques of the ineptitude of the British was correct and that much of what Hughes had done, while seemingly chaotic, was mostly just cutting through the bullshit of administration.

Hughes had his problems, made scores of enemies, and for sure, in the end, Borden had no choice but to fire him. At the same time we have to recognize that this "nutjob" had a talent for getting things done and being the strongest advocate for Canada that one could have at a time when the Brits considered us nothing more than country bumpkins only good as cannon fodder.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I might add that conditions at Valcartier didn't differ significantly from those of the British encampment at Salisbury (or even the Ayr Race Course in Scotland).


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> The only way that I would see a "home guard" type of force is if there was an existential threat from irregular nutjobs from south of the border *Edmonton*. Unfortunately that's a scenario which looks less and less far-fetched every year.
> 
> 🍻



There, FTFY


----------



## SeaKingTacco

FJAG said:


> I sometime wonder how much of Sam's bad reputation was a hatchet job. I'll certainly admit that he was flamboyant and full of himself but he was also dealing with a rough structure.
> 
> The Boer War era Militia was a bit of a mess and the reforms that came with the 1903 Militia Act were really only just taking hold. The quality of the staff at all levels was poor and his hatred for the permanent force was well known and reciprocated. While there was a newly developed mobilization plan for the Militia it was slow and cumbersome and restrictive in dealing with the massive groundswell of popular support for the war that came with the declaration of war.
> 
> One can obviously argue the case, but by tossing aside the existing system and creating a new expeditionary force from volunteers of all stripes the process was actually accelerated. Let's face it, we'd be hard pressed today, with all of our modern technology, in putting 31,200 troops on ships for transport to Europe in the interval of 4 Aug when war was declared and 3 Oct when the first contingent sailed. 420,000 other soldiers would be mobilized during the remainder of the war. Strangely enough, we do not laud this as a major accomplishment in administration but gripe about how new numbered battalions were formed. Just think about it, with all the griping that's done about how Hughes screwed everything up, he put a division overseas from scratch in two short months.
> 
> I think what the British noticed was that Hughes was rabidly Canadian, didn't suffer fools and trumped-up stuffed shirts gladly, and refused to kowtow to the British who felt themselves superior in all respects. He refused to let the British break up the Canadian contingent to serve as reinforcements to the British, he refused to let the division be commanded by a Brit until eventually convinced Canada didn't have one to offer (what went wrong Permanent Militia?), and singlehandedly achieved the creation of the four-division Canadian Corps. Concurrently he pushed hard for the Canadians to be equipped with Canadian manufactured gear (including, for a time, the infamous Ross rifle)
> 
> When Borden visited the front in 1915 he realized that Hughes' critiques of the ineptitude of the British was correct and that much of what Hughes had done, while seemingly chaotic, was mostly just cutting through the bullshit of administration.
> 
> Hughes had his problems, made scores of enemies, and for sure, in the end, Borden had no choice but to fire him. At the same time we have to recognize that this "nutjob" had a talent for getting things done and being the strongest advocate for Canada that one could have at a time when the Brits considered us nothing more than country bumpkins only good as cannon fodder.
> 
> 🍻


I don’t why I said Laurier…of course it was Borden who was PM.

That Sam Hughes was a nationalist and fought to  keep a Canadian Corps together was not something that I would fault him with. I would give him a passing grade on getting 1 Cdn Div to England in two months, but it was utter chaos and the Div was  in no shape to fight for over a year.

He hated Permanent Force and Professional soldiers and refused to acknowledge that, at the beginning of the war, the Canadian Officers available were in no real shape to Command Divisions and Corps. Yes, McNaughton and Currie eventually became two of the best Commanders of the Great War, but they had to grow and learn from 1914 onward.

Hughes was ridiculously nepotistic and gave his friends Bn and Bde Commands, irrespective of their actual talent- much to the horror of everyone- Canadians and British alike. He was a micromanager who created and disbanded regiments on seeming whim which created utter chaos in supplying trained troops overseas. His fixation on awarding himself the VC bordered on the pathological.   He refused to even try and get along with the British- who, like it or not, were still the senior partners in 1914-1918.

Why any of this matters, is that the legacy of Sam Hughes still echos through our military today.


----------



## FJAG

SeaKingTacco said:


> I don’t why I said Laurier…of course it was Borden who was PM.
> 
> That Sam Hughes was a nationalist and fought to  keep a Canadian Corps together was not something that I would fault him with. I would give him a passing grade on getting 1 Cdn Div to England in two months, but it was utter chaos and the Div was  in no shape to fight for over a year.


Not quite a year. War declared Aug 4 - started deploying overseas 3 Oct - went over to Belgium on 16 Feb - won its first action at Ypres on 22/23 Apr by closing the gap during the first gas attack. That's slightly over eight months from the start of recruiting to fighting and holding under very adverse circumstances in a major battle. That's a major feat by anyone's assessment. 

Like I said, we tend to pile on Sam Hughes without giving him, and the folks who accomplished all this, the credit they are due.


SeaKingTacco said:


> He hated Permanent Force and Professional soldiers and refused to acknowledge that, at the beginning of the war, the Canadian Officers available were in no real shape to Command Divisions and Corps. Yes, McNaughton and Currie eventually became two of the best Commanders of the Great War, but they had to grow and learn from 1914 onward.


I don't want to lay the condition of the Canadian Militia at the feat of the Permanent force but they'd been in existence for over forty years by then and had been charged with the training of the Non-permanent Active Militia which was established at around 60,000 men of which around 40,000 would show up for training. Many of the permanent officers were trained with the Brits and were former Brits. It's quite clear that the poor shape of the Militia as a whole was a combination of many things including government disinterest, vacillating defense policies, poor organization and, poor management. Until 1904 the organization was under the command of a General officer Commanding who had to be British.

I think hating the permanent force might be a bit strong, he certainly had no respect for it and disdained it - often with cause. What he truly hated was bureaucracy.


SeaKingTacco said:


> Hughes was ridiculously nepotistic and gave his friends Bn and Bde Commands, irrespective of their actual talent- much to the horror of everyone- Canadians and British alike. He was a micromanager who created and disbanded regiments on seeming whim which created utter chaos in supplying trained troops overseas.


The first part is true and the second while true wasn't really a bad thing. Think about it. When Canada created the Special Force for Korea it did pretty much what Hughes did. The big difference was that there was a good pool of experienced officers and NCOs from WW2 who could lead, but the SF was completely disconnected from both the RegF and the ResF. Hughes ended up raising 71 battalions between Oct 1914 and Sep 1915 and when the Brits kept running the Western Front through the meat grinder he turned to raising "pals battalions" -170 (40 full strength the rest understrength) by 1916. 

Canada's pre WW1 mobilization plans were very poor. No equipment, no mass training areas, no munitions. Hughes cobbled all that together, including the means to produce the equipment, with what he had available.

Remember as well as the war broke out that Kitchener, who believed that the war would be big and long, also bypassed mobilizing his quarter million strong Territorial Army who he regarded as a joke. Instead, like Hughes he called for volunteers and cobbled together new battalions. His job was sufficiently easier as he had a large regular army (although 1/3 of it was in India)

Right now we have a massive RegF compared to what Hughes had but where is the mobilization plan to create a "great host"? Our RegF leadership has convinced itself that there will be no time to mobilize even the existing ResF except as augmentees. Let's face facts: if we ever face war again, we'll need a Minister who can cobble together a force. Hopefully the 100 plus full-time generals we have won't get bogged down in their own bureaucracy. Personally I think they will because we do not have the mechanisms to ramp up quickly at all and too many bureaucratic obstacles to surmount.



SeaKingTacco said:


> His fixation on awarding himself the VC bordered on the pathological.


Yup.



SeaKingTacco said:


> He refused to even try and get along with the British- who, like it or not, were still the senior partners in 1914-1918.


The Imperial General Staff were inbred class-conscious assholes. Kitchener, Haig and French - this is why I love the film "Oh! What a Lovely War". I doubt that anyone but an Anglophile sycophant could have gotten along with them.



SeaKingTacco said:


> Why any of this matters, is that the legacy of Sam Hughes still echos through our military today.


Yup he botched up procurement in many big ways by trusting the wrong people. His personality was also toxic.

I quite frankly do not think that neither our moribund staff system nor our glacial procurement process owe their origins to a reaction to Hughes - Canada did much better in WW2 (despite the interwar years) and our lessons learned memory simply isn't that good or long. I think the CAF is what it is today entirely a result of the post WW2 era and its infatuation of large bureaucratic NATO-style headquarters and forces-in-being.

Nice chat. If I wasn't so stuck into Afghanistan right now I would go back to look at some of this again. I'll be seeing @Old Sweat next month and maybe have a look at what he's got in his library on this.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:


> Why any of this matters, is that the legacy of Sam Hughes still echos through our military today.



There we can agree absolutely.

Whose side are you on?  😄

As to Sam's temperament... Father from Tyrone and Mother an Ulster-Scot Huguenot cross.  He was an anti-establishmentarian born and bred.  Anglo-Irish and Episcopalians would not be at the top of his Christmas card list.  And they dominated the British Army establishment.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I quite frankly do not think that neither our moribund staff system nor our glacial procurement process owe their origins to a reaction to Hughes - Canada did much better in WW2 (despite the interwar years) and our lessons learned memory simply isn't that good or long. I think the CAF is what it is today entirely a result of the post WW2 era and its infatuation of large bureaucratic NATO-style headquarters and forces-in-being.
> 
> Nice chat. If I wasn't so stuck into Afghanistan right now I would go back to look at some of this again. I'll be seeing @Old Sweat next month and maybe have a look at what he's got in his library on this.
> 
> 🍻



And about 80% of the reserve units in Canada are still housed in armouries built during the Hughes era, I believe.

With the original plumbing, training infrastructure and air conditioning in many cases, sadly


----------



## Old Sweat

This could get interesting. Hughes did get things moving, but he could not get out of the way. By the way, we had started to build large training centres, Petawawa for example. Hughes had organized the purchase of the land in smaller bit by agents who apparently had no attachment to the Department of Militia and Defence. It worked for Petawawa, and was underway in the Valcartier when the war came along. All (?) he had to do was divert the construction effort from Connaught to Valcartier.

And I am baffled by a lot of the thinking, or lack of it, I see being applied to the issue considering the potential for things to go pear shaped. Our force structure thinking seems to be based on preparing to fight the last bunch of bad guys with a minimum force. It is almost like we have decided that old standby, winning the fire fight, should be achieved without using automatic weapons.


----------



## Eaglelord17

FJAG said:


> Concurrently he pushed hard for the Canadians to be equipped with Canadian manufactured gear (including, for a time, the infamous Ross rifle)


Just to add to this point, in many cases there wasn't much option other than to be armed with Canadian kit. The Ross Rifle for example only came about after asking the British to be allowed to set up production of Lee Enfields during the 2nd Boer War, and being denied (unlike the Australians who later on were given permission to set up Lithgow). Sir Charles Ross offered to set up a factory and make these rifles for Canada as a alternative, and seeing as there wasn't much other option at the time they accepted. 

The failure of the Ross Rifle in the trenches had more to do with the British wanting the rifle to fail than the rifle itself being a failure. The Canadians for the years before WWI would embarrass the British in service rifle competitions as the Ross is a much better target rifle than a Lee Enfield. They tended not to be too happy to be beaten by some colonials on a regular basis. When supplied with high quality Canadian made ammo the rifles would function flawlessly. The issue being in WWI the British would take the Canadian made ammo and supply it to their machine gunners as the quality ammo was consistent and reliable, well British wartime ammo was not anywhere near the same quality (in many cases it was manufactured out of spec and sent anyways). In fact all the issues of the Ross (mainly getting it to work with low quality ammo) had been resolved by late 1915/1916 but by that point confidence had been lost in the rifle. 

The story of the Ross is more a story of the failures of the British than it is a story of the rifle itself being a failure.


----------



## Kirkhill

> *Antidisestablishmentarianism* (/ˌæntidɪsɪˌstæblɪʃmənˈtɛəriənɪzəm/ (
> 
> listen), US also /ˌæntaɪ-/ (
> 
> listen)) is a position that advocates that a state Church (the "established church") should continue to receive government patronage, rather than be disestablished.[1][2]
> 
> In 19th century Britain, it developed as a political movement in opposition to disestablishmentarianism, the Liberal Party's efforts to disestablish or remove the Church of England as the official state church of England, Ireland, and Wales. The Church's status has been maintained in England, but in Ireland, the Anglican Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1871. In Wales, four Church of England dioceses were disestablished in 1920 and became the Church in Wales. In colonial America, the Church of England was disestablished in 6 colonies despite its mild popularity in Anglicanism in the 1780s and many former Anglicans deemed themselves Episcopalians instead.[3]
> 
> _Antidisestablishmentarianism_ is also frequently noted as one of the longest non-scientific words in the English language.





> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.



This relates to Sam Hughes

The Establishment is and was a real thing.   The Church of England was described as the Tory Party at prayer.   The Tory Party was the party of the Crown and the Church.  For a long while if you wanted a public office, or a commission in the army, you had to be a member of the Church of England.  This was true for Gladstone (raised Church of Scotland), MacDonald (raised Church of Scotland) and even Tony Blair (who converted to Catholicism after he left office).

The problem began in England's first colony: Ireland.

Dublin and the south was settled by the Tudor English while the Tudors were deciding if their church would continue to be a church of Bishops, episcopalian, or presbyterian instead, and if the church service would follow the Roman rites or be austere and Calvinist.  In the end they opted for continuing the Catholic organization and the Catholic traditions.  The only substantive change they made was swapping out the Pope for the King/Queen.

In Scotland, as of 1560, while the Tudors were getting themselves sorted out, John Knox had sorted Scotland and, together with the Scottish Establishment had created their own Established Church, the Church of Scotland.  But while the Church of England was controlled from the top by Bishops selected by the Crown and the Tories the Church of Scotland was controlled from the bottom by local lairds, landowners and congregations.  

Scotland and England did not get along well.  The problem was particularly notable at the Border between the two countries.  It became a lawless zone where neither English nor Scottish law prevailed.

1603.  Little Ice Age.  Famines and pestilence.  And more outlawry.  James Stewart finds himself in charge on both sides of the border and makes it his first item of business to clear up the mess.  His solution is to clear the borders. Chase the locals away.  Kill those that were disinclined to obey.  Sell them to the Dutch, French and Spanish armies - whoever would buy them.  Enslave them and their families to work in the coal mines and the salt works to bring in revenues from salt (1606 - Scots were enslaved by their own government).  And put them on boats.  Some boats were sent to Virginia - many of them didn't turn up.  But that was OK.  So long as they weren't on the Border anymore.  Some of the rest were deported to the English colony of Ireland.

The Irish were just as happy to see the Scots as they were the English.  Mutual slaughter ensued.

1689.  Glorious Revolution.  The Stewarts are evicted and a Dutch Protestant with a strong pragmatic streak was invited to take the thrones of England and Scotland.  The Irish weren't consulted.  The Scots and the English agreed to give William and Mary the throne, and access to the English treasury to fund his wars against the Habsburgs and the Bourbons if they could retain their respective Established Churches.  The presbyterian Church of Scotland and the episcopal Church of England.

1707.  The United Kingdom of England and Scotland.  The Church of Scotland gets to continue in Scotland.  The Church of England is the power centre.  If you wanted a ruling position in the UK it was better to go to the Church of England than the Church of Scotland.

The problem arises in the Colonies where the two recognized Establishment Churches collide.  Both claim legitimacy.  But under the system "there can be only one".   In America that friction ultimately leads to lots of Irish presbyterians leaving Ireland and heading for the hills and ultimately fomenting a revolution against the Establishment.

The reason the presbyterians left Ireland was that their ministers were going broke while the Church of England bishops raked in the cash.  The Bishops were funded from the treasury.  The ministers were not recognized by the Establish Church of Ireland (a branch of the Church of England) and were funded solely from their parishioners - who were impoverished.   The 1707 union was precipitated by a last desperate gamble of a desperate, starving nation, the Scots who, like much of northern Europe, was suffering through a multi-year cold period with drawn out famines due to failed crops.   Issues came to a head with the arrival of George I and the Hanoverians.  The Church of England was at the forefront of the Jacobites, calling out the Tory Mob in England to protect the Church.   The target of the mob was not the Catholics.  It was the Dissenting Protestants - the Quakers and Baptists, the Congregationalists and, most despised of all the Presbyterians - whom they associated with Cromwell and taking away all the fun stuff in life - theaters, Christmas and May Day frolics in the Greenwood - that were targeted.

In Ireland this gave rise to some presbyterians finding common ground with some catholics and even some episcopalians.  They met as Freemasons which dates to this period.  Circa 1717.  The Freemasons were an anti-Establishment group of liberals with enlightened notions of fraternity.

The first victory of the anti-Establishmentarians was the American revolution.  The presbyterian protestants of Belfast turned out in the streets to cheer the announcement of the American Declaration of Independence.  Anglican Dublin was quiet.   The Belfast protestants turned out again on July 14 1789 - the day the Bastille fell.

With the French Revolution the Establishment started taking the Anti-Establishmentarians seriously.  This was particularly a concern in Ireland when liberal Catholics, Presbyterians and Anglicans formed the Society of United Irishmen and aided and abetted a landing of revolutionary Frenchmen in Ireland.    The Anglo-Irish establishment responded by turning out their mob again, the Tory mob, originally known informally as the Peep o' Day boys but eventually officially sanctioned as the Orange Order.  The Orange Order is not just protestant it is Anglican.  Its enemies were not just Catholics and Fenians but anyone who wasn't CoE or CoI  (Church of England or Ireland).

Against this background the Freemasons became the Establishment - they accepted the House of Hanover and George IV became Grand Master of the Premier Grand Lodge of England.

In Canada these Irishmen, of all stripes, started showing up and brought their troubles with them.  The biggest cleavage was between the Establishmentarians, exemplified by the Scottish Episcopalian, Bishop Strachan of the Church of England. and the Anti-Establishmentarians of the Dissenting Churches. Strachan was keen to keep the Establishments privileges one of which was ownership by the Established Church of a massive chunk of real estate in the Canadas known as the Clergy Reserves.   Consider it alongside the Railway Lands and the Jesuit Lands issues.  Or even the setting aside of Stanley Park.  In Canada land was wealth.

1832 The Great Reform Act.  Catholics become people as far as the Establishment was concerned.  The native Catholics of England, Scotland and Ireland had kept their heads down and didn't challenge the authority of the Queen over the Church and disavowed the infallibility of the Pope.  They made good Establishmentarians and were worthy of public office. 

Who didn't make good Establishmentarians were Dissenters like Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists and a new mob that was splitting from the Church of England, the Methodists.  These people ended up taking to the streets in England because they, good protestants that had stood with King William in 1689 against the Catholics were denied access to public office that was granted to the Catholics.  Dissenters were granted toleration after the Catholics.  This was true in the UK, in Ireland and in Canada.  Except in Quebec.  Dissenting protestants and discomfited Quebecers found common ground.

With that recognition though the Anti-Establishmentarians, now recognized officially, agitated for their share of the lands set aside for the Established Church.  Strachan defended.  The Anti-Establishmentarians attacked.  These Anti-Establishmentarians, these Dissenters, included William Lyon MacKenzie, Scots presbyterian, Egerton Ryerson, Methodist, Robert Baldwin, whose Anglo-Irish family had moved to Upper Canada in the wake of the French incursion into Ireland, and George Brown, founder of the Banner and the Globe and Mail and also a Scots presbyterian.  As was MacDonald.

Sam Hughes shows all the signs of being a proud Anti-Establishmentarian with a visceral dislike for the English dominated Establishment.

His Anti-Catholicism also may be seen in context.

As I noted the Establishment found the native anglo-catholics amenable and good Establishmentarians.  But things were changing.

With the rise of the liberal Methodist faction in the Church a conservative faction arose in counter point with more rigorous Catholic tendencies.  Eventually some of that faction left the Church of England and joined the Church of Rome - and proceeded to become more Catholic than the Pope.  In particular they declared the Pope out ranked the Queen and agreed that he was infallible.

The argument was at the heart of the Franco-Prussian war.  It precipitated Garibaldi's assault on Rome and the raising of the Zouaves in Quebec to support the Pope.  It caused Gladstone to write in opposition to the proposition. Although the Pope lost the argument when the Prussians captured his French champion at Sedan, Louis Napoleon, the argument underlay the Fenians, the assassination of McGee, the Northwest Rebellion, the Manitoba Schools Question, the Jesuit Lands decision and even, the Conscription debates and involvement in World Wars 1 and 2.  Not properly resolved until the Quiet Revolution and the elections of Kennedy and Trudeau - in my opinion.

One other thing that came out of this era was the Roman Church's association with Corporatism - as described by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum in 1891 and reiterated by Pius XI in Quadragessimo Anno in 1931 - a search for a middle ground when Establishments were being assailed by liberalism and Communism.

These discussions left a mark on society. 

We can look back on them now and criticise the people and their notions.  But we shouldn't forget or ignore their impacts.

Sam was a creature of his world as much as any of us are today.

A better sense of the situation is given in the attachment and its linked download



> God & Government Exploring the Religious Roots of Upper Canadian Political Culture​
> Denis McKim








						God & Government: Exploring the Religious Roots of Upper Canadian Political Culture – Ontario History
					

An article from Ontario History, on Érudit.




					www.erudit.org


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Still having my first coffee and I have learned more about Canadian History in 20 minutes from Kirkhill, than in a semester of school. Thank you.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Still having my first coffee and I have learned more about Canadian History in 20 minutes from Kirkhill, than in a semester of school. Thank you.



And the coffee helped to keep you awake!  (says the guy who has a degree in Canadian History... and coffee drinking ).


----------



## Kirkhill

Back on topic

An oldie but goodie

I have intentionally left the gunners out of this.  I figure they should be tucked up nice and tight with the Ref Force regiments

This is all the Territorial Groups / Brigades

Each one has a Sigs Sqn, a Svc Bn and and Eng Rgt.

They also have, usually, two Cavalry elements.   As well they have an indeterminate number of Infantry elements.

The interesting part for me is the second line.  That is the size of the recruiting area in millions of Canadians. The distribution does not appear to be particularly rational.  If TBGs are organized like 36 TBG then the Toronto Area should be able to raise 9 and Alberta 4.  Either that or if 36 TBG is the model then 36 TBG should be reduced to a company team.


----------



## Kirkhill

I just finished watching the late Queen's funeral.   The procession up the Mall from Westminster Abbey and Horseguards to Buckhingham Palace was very impressive.  There was a bit of pride in seeing the RCMP being the lead element in the parade and the only horsed element other than the Lifeguards and the Blues and Royals of the Household Cavalry.  The Australians looked good in their slouch hats. The Kiwis were identifiable in their lemon squeezers with their red bands.  I was told that there would be a strong Canadian representation in the parade.  I looked hard for them in the Commonwealth section at the head of the parade, along with the Mounties, the Aussies and the Kiwis .... but all I could see was a motley crew in fancy dress.


----------



## Remius

Kirkhill said:


> I just finished watching the late Queen's funeral.   The procession up the Mall from Westminster Abbey and Horseguards to Buckhingham Palace was very impressive.  There was a bit of pride in seeing the RCMP being the lead element in the parade and the only horsed element other than the Lifeguards and the Blues and Royals of the Household Cavalry.  The Australians looked good in their slouch hats. The Kiwis were identifiable in their lemon squeezers with their red bands.  I was told that there would be a strong Canadian representation in the parade.  I looked hard for them in the Commonwealth section at the head of the parade, along with the Mounties, the Aussies and the Kiwis .... but all I could see was a motley crew in fancy dress.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> I just finished watching the late Queen's funeral.   The procession up the Mall from Westminster Abbey and Horseguards to Buckhingham Palace was very impressive.  There was a bit of pride in seeing the RCMP being the lead element in the parade and the only horsed element other than the Lifeguards and the Blues and Royals of the Household Cavalry.  The Australians looked good in their slouch hats. The Kiwis were identifiable in their lemon squeezers with their red bands.  I was told that there would be a strong Canadian representation in the parade.  I looked hard for them in the Commonwealth section at the head of the parade, along with the Mounties, the Aussies and the Kiwis .... but all I could see was a motley crew in fancy dress.


What is the point you want to make?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> What is the point you want to make?
> View attachment 73657



Something to do with regimental parochialism.  I used to wear a kilt and Glengarry.  Everybody in rifle green and a beret would start solving a bunch of problems.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Something to do with regimental parochialism.  I used to wear a kilt and Glengarry.  Everybody in rifle green and a beret would start solving a bunch of problems.


Nothing wrong with the different uniforms, while some may say it's a soup sandwich, it also shows the diversity of heritage in the Regiments of the commonwealth


----------



## Remius

MilEME09 said:


> Nothing wrong with the different uniforms, while some may say it's a soup sandwich, it also shows the diversity of heritage in the Regiments of the commonwealth


That contingent was also filled with units that Her Majesty had links to.  They looked good and did Canada proud.

Good for them.  An experience those CAF members won’t soon forget.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Something to do with regimental parochialism.  I used to wear a kilt and Glengarry.  Everybody in rifle green and a beret would start solving a bunch of problems.


And you are making the point in this thread because … ?
A lot of the funny uniforms in there are Reg F. The Gunners all wore a unique uniform that they picked a few years back, and many of those red coats are R22eR. Most of the highlanders were still at least in the distinct Canadian green.


----------



## Spencer100

I like it.  

It showed the world the very different Regiments but common mother.


----------



## MilEME09

McG said:


> And you are making the point in this thread because … ?
> A lot of the funny uniforms in there are Reg F. The Gunners all wore a unique uniform that they picked a few years back, and many of those red coats are R22eR. Most of the highlanders were still at least in the distinct Canadian green.


Only Shame here is that there is no reg force highland regiment


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Only Shame here is that there is no reg force highland regiment



Uh oh, now you've gone and done it


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Only Shame here is that there is no reg force highland regiment


And who is to blame for that? They also binned a rifle regiment with historical roots and a guards regiment with none. I never really could understand why the RegF decided to contract into three multi-battalion regiments rather than go with six or more single battalion ones. Was there a sale on in Pakistan on only certain cap badges and accoutrements?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Something to do with regimental parochialism.  I used to wear a kilt and Glengarry.  Everybody in rifle green and a beret would start solving a bunch of problems.


What possible problem would it solve ? I’m at a loss here. You’d be surprised to know that the Kiwis have dress distinctions within their army; the QAMR were quite proud to tell me they were the only regiment allowed into wear their “jungle hat” in garrison.


----------



## Remius

I’ll add.

The whole point of that Contingent was to highlight the Commonwealth Units that the Queen had a special relationship with.  The Canadian portion certainly did that all the units they sent in their unit dress.  The Kiwis and the Aussies look great but they all look the same and could essentially be from the same unit for all we know.  Only their environmental dress differentiated them.  

If there was a parade where mixed dress was appropriate this was it.


----------



## Mike5

I don't like the 'coat of many colours' look.  I like both the historic regimental identities (and especially the kilts and the scarlets) and the idea of highlighting the Commonwealth units with whom the Queen had a special relationship.  Why not parade in rows by environment and by regiment (or at least by similar uniform)?  I know this would be a mess for the Sr NCOs to organize but then at least then you could identify the various regiments...


----------



## RangerRay

I think Kirkhill’s point was that while the Kiwis and Aussies were all in their equivalent to DEU, we were a mix of DEU, patrols, and full ceremonial, so we kinda looked like a dog’s breakfast.  Not to say you need to erase regimental diversity with DEU. If you look closely, the Kiwis have different headwear depending on their branch/regiment. It was like national command in Australia and New Zealand decided how their representatives would dress, but in Canada, that decision seemed to have been made by each unit CO. 

Having said all that, I don’t think it was terrible, or bad. It just looked uncoordinated.


----------



## Good2Golf

RangerRay said:


> I think Kirkhill’s point was that while the Kiwis and Aussies were all in their equivalent to DEU, we were a mix of DEU, patrols, and full ceremonial, so we kinda looked like a dog’s breakfast.  Not to say you need to erase regimental diversity with DEU. If you look closely, the Kiwis have different headwear depending on their branch/regiment. It was like national command in Australia and New Zealand decided how their representatives would dress, but in Canada, that decision seemed to have been made by each unit CO.
> 
> Having said all that, I don’t think it was terrible, or bad. It just looked uncoordinated.


If the Queen had passed between 68 and 88, we would have looked consistently….green.  Alas, ‘‘twas not to be.


----------



## RangerRay

Good2Golf said:


> If the Queen had passed between 68 and 88, we would have looked consistently….green.  Alas, ‘‘twas not to be.


Then we would have just looked fugly…but the same!


----------



## Remius

RangerRay said:


> I think Kirkhill’s point was that while the Kiwis and Aussies were all in their equivalent to DEU, we were a mix of DEU, patrols, and full ceremonial, so we kinda looked like a dog’s breakfast.  Not to say you need to erase regimental diversity with DEU. If you look closely, the Kiwis have different headwear depending on their branch/regiment. It was like national command in Australia and New Zealand decided how their representatives would dress, but in Canada, that decision seemed to have been made by each unit CO.
> 
> Having said all that, I don’t think it was terrible, or bad. It just looked uncoordinated.


My guess and it is only a guess is that the tasking likely indicated Ceremonial Dress?  And likely the Brits organised how they would be arrayed on parade based on their protocols.   Looks like maybe units in precedence by rank?  Officers definitely at the front followed by SNCOs and and then other ranks.


----------



## RangerRay

There is a definite unequal availability of ceremonial dress and patrols in the CAF. I think it depends on if units have wealthy benefactors or not. 

Other than optional navy whites, do the Commonwealth navies and air forces have an equivalent to full ceremonial like scarlets or patrols?


----------



## Kirkhill

Good morning all.  I see the cat's well among the pigeons.  

It was good to see the Canadian representation.  But generally you are seeing this from the point of view of the Canadian soldier.  That wasn't the point of view of the international community.  They recognized the Mounties.  They recognized the Kiwis and Aussies, the Aussies in particular.  Thsy generally didn't comment on the Canadian contingent.  I suspect because they didn't see it as a contingent.  The leading effort was the Commonwealth.  I further suspect that the assumption was that there was a large ANZAC contingent and a collection of other Commonwealth contingents.  The commentators I was watching, British ones, didn't mention them at all.  As I said, they did note the Mounties and the ANZACs.

By not parading in DEUS you missed an opportunity to sell Canada, and the Canadian Army, to billions of people.  Including your own country.  Especially new Canadians, many of whom come from the Commonwealth.

Once I figured out what I was looking at I could start picking out individual regiments and eventually concluded that all of the non-Anzacs, the other half of the Commonwealth element following the RCMP, were all Canadians.  But even I had difficulty finding the Calgary Highlanders and distinguishing them from the ASHoC and the other Highlanders.  In all honesty realization dawned when I saw a trooper in DEUs and realized he was wearing a KOCR badge.  The shame of it.  Recognizing the KOCR before I found my own Highlander.

One other thought.  Our esteemed leader, in expressing the nations condolences, at pains to reflect that he was speaking for most Canadians.  Not ALL Canadians but most Canadians.  This is a true statement but made politically necessary by a Quebec that declined to honour Her Majesty's passing in the manner of other provinces.  Their right and no complaint.

But by having a contingent dressed in Ceremonials you looked more British than Canadian.  You effectively hid the Canadians in plain sight.  And this with a government and a nation that are ambivalent towards the monarchy, the Brits and the Army.




> Now that the Captains and Kings , in Kipling’s words, have departed, we can look back at yesterday’s state funeral as a remarkable example of the late Queen as an international pole of attraction. 100 heads of state and government, a multitude of other international dignitaries, a global TV audience of over 4 billion, about half the planet: as an event it dwarfs the meeting of heads of state and government who traditionally flock to New York for the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly this week. Indeed many leaders curtailed their visit to New York to ensure they were present at yesterday’s state funeral.
> 
> And if the proceedings had very much a military feel, rightly given the late Queen’s connections with the armed forces and her close family having seen active service, it was soft power which brought and fixed the world’s attention to Westminster. Soft power, sometimes called the second face of power,  comes in many forms. An ability to ensure that others admire your cultural values and foreign policies, an ability to coopt not coerce, to appeal and attract are all marks of an advanced liberal democracy in stark counterpoint to the likes of Russia, China, Iran and many others.











						Queen Elizabeth's funeral was the greatest diplomatic triumph in modern history
					

Our late monarch's soft power was without equal. It now falls upon King Charles to replicate it




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## Mike5

Kirkhill said:


> Good morning all.  I see the cat's well among the pigeons.
> 
> It was good to see the Canadian representation.  But generally you are seeing this from the point of view of the Canadian soldier.  That wasn't the point of view of the international community.  They recognized the Mounties.  They recognized the Kiwis and Aussies, the Aussies in particular.  Thsy generally didn't comment on the Canadian contingent.  I suspect because they didn't see it as a contingent.  The leading effort was the Commonwealth.  I further suspect that the assumption was that there was a large ANZAC contingent and a collection of other Commonwealth contingents.  The commentators I was watching, British ones, didn't mention them at all.  As I said, they did note the Mounties and the ANZACs.
> 
> By not parading in DEUS you missed an opportunity to sell Canada, and the Canadian Army, to billions of people.  Including your own country.  Especially new Canadians, many of whom come from the Commonwealth.
> 
> Once I figured out what I was looking at I could start picking out individual regiments and eventually concluded that all of the non-Anzacs, the other half of the Commonwealth element following the RCMP, were all Canadians.  But even I had difficulty finding the Calgary Highlanders and distinguishing them from the ASHoC and the other Highlanders.  In all honesty realization dawned when I saw a trooper in DEUs and realized he was wearing a KOCR badge.  The shame of it.  Recognizing the KOCR before I found my own Highlander.
> 
> One other thought.  Our esteemed leader, in expressing the nations condolences, at pains to reflect that he was speaking for most Canadians.  Not ALL Canadians but most Canadians.  This is a true statement but made politically necessary by a Quebec that declined to honour Her Majesty's passing in the manner of other provinces.  Their right and no complaint.
> 
> But by having a contingent dressed in Ceremonials you looked more British than Canadian.  You effectively hid the Canadians in plain sight.  And this with a government and a nation that are ambivalent towards the monarchy, the Brits and the Army.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Queen Elizabeth's funeral was the greatest diplomatic triumph in modern history
> 
> 
> Our late monarch's soft power was without equal. It now falls upon King Charles to replicate it
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.telegraph.co.uk



I agree with all sentiments except one: "... a contingent dressed in Ceremonials ... looked more British than Canadian."  The kilts and scarlets are Canadian, part of our heritage and a link to one of our founding nations.  We just have to promote it more consistently.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> By not parading in DEUS you missed an opportunity to sell Canada, and the Canadian Army, to billions of people. Including your own country. Especially new Canadians, many of whom come from the Commonwealth.


I buy this argument, but it's not a critique of the PRes system (and it overlooks that the Reg F was as much a contributor to the ambiguity).  Perhaps you intended to have the conversation here: "Re-Royalization", "Re-Britification" and the Heritage Transformation


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> I buy this argument, but it's not a critique of the PRes system (and it overlooks that the Reg F was as much a contributor to the ambiguity).  Perhaps you intended to have the conversation here: "Re-Royalization", "Re-Britification" and the Heritage Transformation



I would accept reallocation of the discussion to another thread.  The one thread I didn't want it to appear in was the one on Her Majesty's funeral.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RangerRay said:


> I think Kirkhill’s point was that while the Kiwis and Aussies were all in their equivalent to DEU, we were a mix of DEU, patrols, and full ceremonial, so we kinda looked like a dog’s breakfast *we act as a military on a daily basis.*


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> Good morning all.  I see the cat's well among the pigeons.
> 
> It was good to see the Canadian representation.  But generally you are seeing this from the point of view of the Canadian soldier.  That wasn't the point of view of the international community.  They recognized the Mounties.  They recognized the Kiwis and Aussies, the Aussies in particular.  Thsy generally didn't comment on the Canadian contingent.  I suspect because they didn't see it as a contingent.  The leading effort was the Commonwealth.  I further suspect that the assumption was that there was a large ANZAC contingent and a collection of other Commonwealth contingents.  The commentators I was watching, British ones, didn't mention them at all.  As I said, they did note the Mounties and the ANZACs.
> . . .



Seen.

At the risk of reinforcing the notion that I'm an out of date old-fart, besides the multiple orders of dress (No. 1, 1B, 1C) worn by the Canadian contingent, what I noticed the most (and continues to irritate me) is the "unshaven".  I have nothing against facial hair; various combinations have adorned my features for most of the past half century (I had to completely shave when I went through Cornwallis).  And I can understand trying to be "fashionable", but if one is growing a beard . . . grow a fecking beard, don't sport the hipster stubble look, especially for such an important and public event.  And if you're going to look like Santa Claus, maybe not the best choice of look as a junior officer.


----------



## Kirkhill

Mike5 said:


> I agree with all sentiments except one: "... a contingent dressed in Ceremonials ... looked more British than Canadian."  The kilts and scarlets are Canadian, part of our heritage and a link to one of our founding nations.  We just have to promote it more consistently.



I'll accept that critique as well.  Our heritage is British and we are rightfully not shy about it.  It has seen the RCR, PPCLI, Van Doos, RRCA, and RCAF, to my knowledge been granted the privilege of standing guard at Buckingham Palace.  And those units stood guard in their Regimentals.

There is a time and place though.  And I think there needs to be consideration given to those times when it is appropriate to present a uniform appearance.  Even if it means putting Highlanders in breeks and common head dress.


----------



## Remius

Kirkhill said:


> I'll accept that critique as well.  Our heritage is British and we are rightfully not shy about it.  It has seen the RCR, PPCLI, Van Doos, RRCA, and RCAF, to my knowledge been granted the privilege of standing guard at Buckingham Palace.  And those units stood guard in their Regimentals.
> 
> There is a time and place though.  And I think there needs to be consideration given to those times when it is appropriate to present a uniform appearance.  Even if it means putting Highlanders in breeks and common head dress.


And what if this time was the host nation’s request?  It’s quite likely they set the dress for this.


----------



## Kirkhill

Remius said:


> And what if this time was the host nation’s request?  It’s quite likely they set the dress for this.



If, then.  I will stand to be corrected if that were the case.  But I would still note the contrast to the ANZACs.


----------



## Mike5

Hopefully our collective participation served to remind those watching of the strong bonds between the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand militaries.  A good message at times like this...


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mike5 said:


> Hopefully our collective participation served to remind those watching of the strong bonds between the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand militaries.  A good message at times like this...



FWIW I had several buddies contact me by email, to ask about the Canadian regiments represented, from around the world as a result of seeing the troops interviewed on TV.

They were clearly impressed!


----------



## Remius

Kirkhill said:


> If, then.  I will stand to be corrected if that were the case.  But I would still note the contrast to the ANZACs.


Do we know what units from the ANZACS were there and if they have distinctive ceremonial dress? 



			https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Army%20Dress%20Manual_0.pdf
		


This is their dress manual.   Seems fairly standard and even have a few Scottish orders of dress.  Thee is a chapter on ceremonial parade dress and looks like that is what they were wearing.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> Do we know what units from the ANZACS were there and if they have distinctive ceremonial dress?
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Army%20Dress%20Manual_0.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> This is their dress manual.   Seems fairly standard and even have a few Scottish orders of dress.  Thee is a chapter on ceremonial parade dress and looks like that is what they were wearing.



'Blues' was the No. 1 dress standard at one point in time, I think. That was a pretty good look all round in terms of both formality and uniformity.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Not sure how worked up anyone should get about this.  I suppose if a mixed contingent couldn't be distinguished from the Legion of Frontiersmen, we'd have to admit there's a problem.


----------



## RangerRay

Remius said:


> Do we know what units from the ANZACS were there and if they have distinctive ceremonial dress?
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Army%20Dress%20Manual_0.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> This is their dress manual.   Seems fairly standard and even have a few Scottish orders of dress.  Thee is a chapter on ceremonial parade dress and looks like that is what they were wearing.


I see in that manual that forage caps are to be worn with patrols, not slouch hats. I can see why the decision was made for Aussies, and presumably Kiwis, to go with ceremonial service dress since patrols would be too similar to British patrols. 

It looks like the Canadians were told “Wear your best uniform with medals. And officers, bring swords”.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Remius said:


> Do we know what units from the ANZACS were there and if they have distinctive ceremonial dress?
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Army%20Dress%20Manual_0.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> This is their dress manual.   Seems fairly standard and even have a few Scottish orders of dress.  Thee is a chapter on ceremonial parade dress and looks like that is what they were wearing.



Here's whom they sent.

Australia


			https://news.defence.gov.au/international/emotional-farewell-queen
		



> The Australian contingent represented each of the services, coming from Australia’s Federation Guard and the special relationship organisations, where the Queen had held Honorary military appointments.
> 
> The Queen served as:
> 
> Colonel-in-Chief of:
> Royal Australian Engineers
> Royal Australian Infantry Corps
> Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps
> Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps
> 
> Captain-General of the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery
> Air Commodore-in-Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force – Reserve




New Zealand








						NZDF contingent to depart for UK to take part in official mourning events
					

A contingent from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is set to embark on travel to the United Kingdom this week to pay tribute to the life of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.




					www.nzdf.mil.nz
				





> Some of the personnel selected to attend are drawn from the units and are reflective of the military appointments that were held by the Queen which include:
> 
> Captain-General of the Royal Regiment of New Zealand Artillery (1953);
> Captain-General of the Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps (1953);
> Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps of Royal New Zealand Engineers (1953);
> Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1964); and
> Air-Commodore-in-Chief of the Territorial Air Force of New Zealand (1954)


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> Here's whom they sent.
> 
> Australia
> 
> 
> https://news.defence.gov.au/international/emotional-farewell-queen
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 73669
> 
> New Zealand
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> NZDF contingent to depart for UK to take part in official mourning events
> 
> 
> A contingent from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is set to embark on travel to the United Kingdom this week to pay tribute to the life of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nzdf.mil.nz
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 73670



I detect a sense of commonality....

The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal Australian Infantry Corps 
The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment
The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps

Is there something we could pick up on from there?


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> I detect a sense of commonality *uniform*ity....



FTFY


----------



## Remius

Kirkhill said:


> I detect a sense of commonality....
> 
> The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal Australian Infantry Corps
> The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment
> The Queen served as - Colonel in Chief of - the Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps
> 
> Is there something we could pick up on from there?


So we want to copy the ANZACS instead of the Brits?  Why?

She was the colonel in chief of all those Canadian Units as well.  That’s the commonality.


----------



## Kirkhill

Remius said:


> So we want to copy the ANZACS instead of the Brits?  Why?
> 
> She was the colonel in chief of all those Canadian Units as well.  That’s the commonality.



I would like my Brit relatives to know there were Canadians on parade.  They all recognized the Mounties.  Strangely, I am proud of being a Canadian.


----------



## Remius

Kirkhill said:


> I would like my Brit relatives to know there were Canadians on parade.  They all recognized the Mounties.  Strangely, I am proud of being a Canadian.


So am I.  Was proud to have Canadian uniforms on parade.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> So am I.  Was proud to have Canadian uniforms on parade.



Good interview...









						Canadian armed forces members reflect on marching in Queen Elizabeth's funeral
					

Canadian soldier says marching in Queen Elizabeth's funeral procession was a "humbling" experience. Canadian armed forces and RCMP were part of the delegation to the late monarch's state funeral in London.




					ca.news.yahoo.com


----------



## RangerRay

Kirkhill said:


> I would like my Brit relatives to know there were Canadians on parade.  They all recognized the Mounties.  Strangely, I am proud of being a Canadian.


I thought they looked Canadian. Just the normal dog’s breakfast that we always are!

But we also don’t have distinctive bits of uniforms like lemon squeezers and slouch hats to distinguish ourselves. But unless we want to go all Yukon Force and bring back Stetsons and muskrat fur hats, I don’t see that happening anytime soon.


----------



## OldSolduer

RangerRay said:


> I thought they looked Canadian. Just the normal dog’s breakfast that we always are!
> 
> But we also don’t have distinctive bits of uniforms like lemon squeezers and slouch hats to distinguish ourselves. But unless we want to go all Yukon Force and bring back Stetsons and muskrat fur hats, I don’t see that happening anytime soon.


I think alot of the issue is the major complexes the CAF and Canada in general has towards the UK. We want to be better but we can't look as good as them well because Canadian you know....Can't spend money on fancy la dee da uniforms or even operational gear without massive interference and red tape.

And actually Dan Carlin brought this up. He basically said you can equip other people like Romans, give them the same training but at the end of the day they aren't Romans nor do they perform the same way.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

OldSolduer said:


> I think alot of the issue is the major complexes the CAF and Canada in general has towards the UK. We want to be better but we can't look as good as them well because Canadian you know....Can't spend money on fancy la dee da uniforms or even operational gear without massive interference and red tape.
> 
> And actually Dan Carlin brought this up. He basically said you can equip other people like Romans, give them the same training but at the end of the day they aren't Romans nor do they perform the same way.


Honestly, we're in that weird awkward spot where our doctrine is British, our Staff/HQs are structured (and commanded by those who wish we were) like an American Division HQ, but our equipment and funding are akin to that of Jamaica or Ireland.

We have a bad identity crisis in that we want to break away from our colonial roots, establish an identity (which emulates Big Bro to the South), but we don't want to pay for any of it.

This is extremely evident with our Reserve forces that are Brigades and Regiments in name only.


----------



## daftandbarmy

rmc_wannabe said:


> Honestly, we're in that weird awkward spot where our doctrine is British, our Staff/HQs are structured (and commanded by those who wish we were) like an American Division HQ, but our equipment and funding are akin to that of Jamaica or Ireland.
> 
> We have a bad identity crisis in that we want to break away from our colonial roots, establish an identity (which emulates Big Bro to the South), but we don't want to pay for any of it.
> 
> This is extremely evident with our Reserve forces that are Brigades and Regiments in name only.



I think I saw that movie


----------



## FJAG

rmc_wannabe said:


> Honestly, we're in that weird awkward spot where our doctrine is British, our Staff/HQs are structured (and commanded by those who wish we were) like an American Division HQ, but our equipment and funding are akin to that of Jamaica or Ireland.
> 
> We have a bad identity crisis in that we want to break away from our colonial roots, establish an identity (which emulates Big Bro to the South), but we don't want to pay for any of it.
> 
> This is extremely evident with our Reserve forces that are Brigades and Regiments in name only.


Personally, I had no problem with what I saw. If you were to take British regiments and parade them in a block with 4 to 5 members per regiment they would look very little different from the way we looked what with Highlanders, Rifles, Guards, Line regiments, Ghurkhas, gunners and tankers and the various logistics and paras etc. It too would be a polyglot. 

I personally do not like the standard green army uniform. I started in brown and think that's what a soldier should be wearing, but it doesn't offend me to see the green, or red, or blue. 

We do not have British doctrine or uniforms nor do we emulate the American staff system. We do have our own doctrine that is a derivative of several NATO nations and our staff system is "continental" in nature. Canada has both a British and French heritage and its only natural that there are still traditional elements of that reflected in our uniforms and some of our culture. IMHO, it should stay that way. Traditions are a way of honouring those who represented this country before us and who put their lives on the line for it.  Traditions should be thrown out only when they are counterproductive. My own opinion is that the homogenization which went on in the '60s was an early version of a "woke" culture. It was an unnecessary throwing out of babies with the bathwater in the name of forcing a national identity and in order to create a distinctive Canadian culture. If you look at the Australians and New Zealanders you basically see a continuation of the British uniform with a distinctive national touch by way of the slouch hats. They didn't need a wholesale "one uniform fits all" revolution to create a distinctive national identity.

Don't decry the fact that we still have some traditional individualism; celebrate it!

🍻


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> It really is a false economy though.
> 
> If you look at the Militia in Canada, it’s not going to be able to expand to anything meaningful.
> 1) Equipment is lacking worse than the Reg Force
> 2) A very very very slim amount of SNCO’s and Officers at Capt and above have any experience in their jobs beyond a 2 week ex.
> 
> Other countries make it work by having a real system, not some sort of pre WW2 relic.


Responding to this here so I'm not blamed for yet another Army Reserve sidetrack of another thread...    

Maybe a two tier Reserves/Militia for the Army is the way to go.

Reserve units where they can be located within a reasonable travel distance to existing Reg Force facilities.  They are integrated directly into Reg Force units and meant to augment the Reg Force as a complete unit when mobilized.  Reg Force leadership.  Draw heavily on former Reg Force personnel that CT to the Reserves so they have the required training already.  Supplemented by Class A recruits off the street to fulfill the lower level positions for which adequate training can be provided locally during summer school breaks, weekends at a centralized location, etc.

Militia units would be those units to distant to Reg Force resources to be able to meet the requirements of being a "Reserve" unit.  Similar to the existing AR structure.  Act as a source of individual augmentees (from those individuals that had the time/opportunity to get the required training levels) and some specialized skills (STAR specializations) as well as being a source of organized manpower available to the Government in time of emergencies.  During mobilization the Militia units wouldn't deploy as units, but like WWI they would provide an initial base of partially trained soldiers to feed into the training system in order to fill out existing units, provide replacements, etc.


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

A reserve unit, should be paired up with a Reg force unit that does the same sort of operational tasking.  Money should be budgeted for the Reserve Unit to send soldiers on the Reg Force Exercises.  Then it should also work backwards. Reg Force soldiers at all levels should be tasked back to on the Res Units exercises to help mentor the Reserve soldiers on how to improve things.  How to use the equipment better and how to take care of it better could be shared on exercises.  No matter what the soldiers will learn and gain valuable skills. The Res Troops would learn how to operate beyond a section or platoon, because they would be filling in positions within an actual full company or platoon. 
Operators of equipment would gain knowledge and skills by watching and learning how to operate the equipment more often than a weekend every few months.  Reg force would learn that the Reserve soldiers can provide a valuable skillsets from their non uniform jobs and experience.  Not every skill is transferable but everyone can learn from the other side


----------



## daftandbarmy

FormerHorseGuard said:


> A reserve unit, should be paired up with a Reg force unit that does the same sort of operational tasking.  Money should be budgeted for the Reserve Unit to send soldiers on the Reg Force Exercises.  Then it should also work backwards. Reg Force soldiers at all levels should be tasked back to on the Res Units exercises to help mentor the Reserve soldiers on how to improve things.  How to use the equipment better and how to take care of it better could be shared on exercises.  No matter what the soldiers will learn and gain valuable skills. The Res Troops would learn how to operate beyond a section or platoon, because they would be filling in positions within an actual full company or platoon.
> Operators of equipment would gain knowledge and skills by watching and learning how to operate the equipment more often than a weekend every few months.  Reg force would learn that the Reserve soldiers can provide a valuable skillsets from their non uniform jobs and experience.  Not every skill is transferable but everyone can learn from the other side



What about inviting each other to Mess functions too?

And this time hope that 3 VP doesn't steal some of the priceless treasures from your mess but, luckily, your regiment has several cops (Twice the Citizen!) and the unofficial 911 call nailed them before they got too far.


----------



## Remius

FormerHorseGuard said:


> A reserve unit, should be paired up with a Reg force unit that does the same sort of operational tasking.  Money should be budgeted for the Reserve Unit to send soldiers on the Reg Force Exercises.  Then it should also work backwards. Reg Force soldiers at all levels should be tasked back to on the Res Units exercises to help mentor the Reserve soldiers on how to improve things.  How to use the equipment better and how to take care of it better could be shared on exercises.  No matter what the soldiers will learn and gain valuable skills. The Res Troops would learn how to operate beyond a section or platoon, because they would be filling in positions within an actual full company or platoon.
> Operators of equipment would gain knowledge and skills by watching and learning how to operate the equipment more often than a weekend every few months.  Reg force would learn that the Reserve soldiers can provide a valuable skillsets from their non uniform jobs and experience.  Not every skill is transferable but everyone can learn from the other side


There are already integration exercises happening.  Not sure if it’s happening everywhere but the RCR is integrating reserve troops in their exercise planning.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

"Ops tasked units" enter chat. Getting ops tasked really made a difference in my unit, mostly equipment wise, but also focus.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> "Ops tasked units" enter chat. Getting ops tasked really made a difference in my unit, mostly equipment wise, but also focus.



As long as we can 'keep the plot', and provide the right kind of continuous and longer term leadership and logistical support.

I've seen those things fall through the cracks a couple of times due to a lack of real commitment.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> As long as we can 'keep the plot', and provide the right kind of continuous and longer term leadership and logistical support.
> 
> I've seen those things fall through the cracks a couple of times due to a lack of real commitment.


10/90 gun batteries and 4 AD Regt enter the chat.

🍻


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

GR66 said:


> Responding to this here so I'm not blamed for yet another Army Reserve sidetrack of another thread...
> 
> Maybe a two tier Reserves/Militia for the Army is the way to go.
> 
> Reserve units where they can be located within a reasonable travel distance to existing Reg Force facilities.  They are integrated directly into Reg Force units and meant to augment the Reg Force as a complete unit when mobilized.  Reg Force leadership.  Draw heavily on former Reg Force personnel that CT to the Reserves so they have the required training already.  Supplemented by Class A recruits off the street to fulfill the lower level positions for which adequate training can be provided locally during summer school breaks, weekends at a centralized location, etc.
> 
> Militia units would be those units to distant to Reg Force resources to be able to meet the requirements of being a "Reserve" unit.  Similar to the existing AR structure.  Act as a source of individual augmentees (from those individuals that had the time/opportunity to get the required training levels) and some specialized skills (STAR specializations) as well as being a source of organized manpower available to the Government in time of emergencies.  During mobilization the Militia units wouldn't deploy as units, but like WWI they would provide an initial base of partially trained soldiers to feed into the training system in order to fill out existing units, provide replacements, etc.


one problem I see with this a lot of former Reg force when they transfer to the Reserves, they transfer for a a few different reasons, but they fall into these groups. 1) aging out and do not want a full time army job. they come and get a promotion, then expect the Res Unit to work like the Reg force,  do not understand how a part timer cannot give 110% to get the job done every day.  2) they found a new job in the civilie world and do not have the time to drop everything go running back to the former Reg Force Regiment every time the bell rings. So the odd training night and weekend exercise to earn extra money and have fun sounds good still.  3) They come in expecting to change the world of the Res Unit by showing how the Reg Force does it and then realizes the Res Unit has to beg borrow equipment from every where to just to get to the training area. The former Reg Force soldiers has some back door connections and this really helps.


FJAG said:


> 10/90 gun batteries and 4 AD Regt enter the chat.
> 
> 🍻


was Part of 1AD before I transfered to the HorseGuards. With the right leadership and budgets they could of made this work,  they made it work for a while then, equipment issues, lack of training area big enough to operate , and personnel issues. The Area Command put more money in the budget for Res Training, the SSF Command put money in the hat, but once money dried up training ceased on all levels. ( I was educated after the Regiment was made in to mud gunners, so I admit I do not have all the facts). 
If they really wanted these units to workable and operational, they needed to put in place leadership from the top down to the lowest 1 hook soldier from the Reg side of the chart, and the Res side had to step and realize the commitment they were making was serious and could be real.  A good Res Unit is only as good as the lowest rank on the ladder, the CO , RSM can be great but if the soldiers under them are willing to perform, show up and do the job assigned, it looks like a circus and everyone complains. 
Reg Force Leadership team needs to know what the Res Leadership can bring to the table,  and they have to know the weakness of both sides.
It cannot be a dumping ground for Reg Force career managers getting rid of the troops that are on their way out anyways, or problem children. They have to be professionals and leaders to show the Res Force team how it really works.  They have to work as a team,  not one side doing all the work and just show up.
Planning & Ops has to be shared work load
Equipment clean up has to be shared
The Res troops when they show up have to show up as professionals too. Show up to the job they are assigned and lead, and be willing to learn at all Ranks so they can do the job if the bell is rung and it is real. Does not have to be a shooting war, but they could be tasked a real operation in Canada where troops are needed and are expected to work shoulder to shoulder.


I believe the Reg Force career managers let the 10/90 units down by giving them mostly the unwanted or unneeded soldiers, and gave in some cases officers who were poor performers to hide them . The Res unit saw the changes and did not like the changes because their way of doing things was changed.  Change is never good unless both sides are going to work and make the changes a positive thing


----------



## daftandbarmy

FormerHorseGuard said:


> I believe the Reg Force career managers let the 10/90 units down by giving them mostly the unwanted or unneeded soldiers, and gave in some cases officers who were poor performers to hide them . The Res unit saw the changes and did not like the changes because their way of doing things was changed.  Change is never good unless both sides are going to work and make the changes a positive thing



Memories of a 10/90 Reg F MWO who, in about a week, threw the whole unit into a tailspin and had to be removed about 6 months later. 

Too late to prevent several key leaders leaving.


----------



## FJAG

FormerHorseGuard said:


> I believe the Reg Force career managers let the 10/90 units down by giving them mostly the unwanted or unneeded soldiers, and gave in some cases officers who were poor performers to hide them .


Which RegF person to give to a reserve unit has been a fluctuating issue that varies over time. I think that there are a couple of us on this board with RSS time under our belts who do not consider themselves too shabby. But I will agree with you that there were ones who suck big time. I thought that the guy that I had replaced had been a waste of rations.

There were big differences between the 10/90 concept and 4 AD. 4 AD effectively consisted of four units, 4 AD itself, 1 AD, 18 Ad and 58 BAA which collectively had a role and which, collectively, was more in the nature of a 50/50 unit. They could afford to put a large RegF component in with the ResF units (in fact the three RegF manned Airspace Coordination Centres were located within the ResF units to be geographically close to the three brigades they supported.) Each ResF unit's taskings were modest (1 or 2 Javelin troops) and achievable.

10/90 arty regiments were equipped to field a complete 105mm battery right down to the kitchen vehicle. That should have been sustainable and I'm not sure why they ever petered out. Funding is not the prime issue. The RegF 10/90 battalions were a completely different story.

I think that there are two fundamental issues that need addressing if one wants to blend ResF units with RegF leadership/support.

The first is "what do the RegF folks do when the reservists aren't there to train?" Yes there are things to prepare for but in general there are large periods of time that can easily be wasted. Just like its important to keep reservists motivated and challenged, RSS staff need to be as well or they can, and some will, just phone it in or worse and will consider an RSS posting as either an assignment to purgatory (for those who are motivated) or a place to slack off (for those who aren't motivated).

The second is regularity of training. I'm not a fan of the two weekends per month, every Thursday night and a week in the summer model of reserve training. While it's a good model for some of the younger folks it's too much time for many of the working senior members. It results in inconsistent and irregular attendance across the board which makes it very difficult to advance the training beyond the very basics. IMHO there needs to be use made of the "ordered to train" provisions of the KR&Os to, let's say, 1 weekend for each ten months and two weeks per summer as mandatory where everyone shows up for a well regulated progressive training cycle. Separate that entirely from additional voluntary training activities and hand every scrap of administration over to the RegF staff so that the mandated training becomes the primary focus of the reservists.

There are a whole lot of other things that need doing, but if you cannot get a grip on those two issues, the reserve system will continue to underperform (or, some say, continue to fail).

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> 10/90 arty regiments were equipped to field a complete 105mm battery right down to the kitchen vehicle. That should have been sustainable and I'm not sure why they ever petered out. Funding is not the prime issue. The RegF 10/90 battalions were a completely different story.


2 Bty 30Fd didn't have a kitchen during 10/90.
   I suspect that PY issues came to bite the Artillery and so 10/90 was deemed superfluous.
Some friends of mine where in 3VP when it went to 10/90, it really was a system that should have worked - but the PY's where again salvaged to make the 1st and 2nd Bn's whole again (at the same time as absorbing the CAR, and a bunch of new BSL intake Pte - which resulted in some fairly large BN's with 4 full Rifle Coy and Cbt Spt (albeit no MG Platoon).



FJAG said:


> I think that there are two fundamental issues that need addressing if one wants to blend ResF units with RegF leadership/support.
> 
> The first is "what do the RegF folks do when the reservists aren't there to train?" Yes there are things to prepare for but in general there are large periods of time that can easily be wasted. Just like its important to keep reservists motivated and challenged, RSS staff need to be as well or they can, and some will, just phone it in or worse and will consider an RSS posting as either an assignment to purgatory (for those who are motivated) or a place to slack off (for those who aren't motivated).


The same thing that Unit employed Class B personnel do -- required Admin and Maintenance.
  Which isn't the same thing as doing all the maintenance - a lot of inspection work can be done by the RegF members that can allow the PRes members to correct any faults in the equipment.



FJAG said:


> The second is regularity of training. I'm not a fan of the two weekends per month, every Thursday night and a week in the summer model of reserve training. While it's a good model for some of the younger folks it's too much time for many of the working senior members. It results in inconsistent and irregular attendance across the board which makes it very difficult to advance the training beyond the very basics. IMHO there needs to be use made of the "ordered to train" provisions of the KR&Os to, let's say, 1 weekend for each ten months and two weeks per summer as mandatory where everyone shows up for a well regulated progressive training cycle. Separate that entirely from additional voluntary training activities and hand every scrap of administration over to the RegF staff so that the mandated training becomes the primary focus of the reservists.


I'd go for 2 weeknights (there are some admin issues than can dealt with on those), but yes on the 1 weekend Ex a month (I would say 8 Months Sept-April - leaving May--Aug as stand down or summer tasking times for the unit -- but 110% on the mandatory (and protected by legislation) 2 week summer Ex.



FJAG said:


> There are a whole lot of other things that need doing, but if you cannot get a grip on those two issues, the reserve system will continue to underperform (or, some say, continue to fail).
> 
> 🍻


----------



## childs56

Honest question, what does the Regular Force do day to day in Garrison that makes them so special? 
How many live training days of training do the Regular Force conduct in a year?
How many hours a day, week, month, year are spent doing PT, sweeping the lines or doing routine maintenance on equipment? That is just filler time.

I had a gun Det that was trained up in any of the gun drills on 105mm and very proficient in those drills. They were trained and competent at their jobs. Some of them were great CP Techs, Recce Techs, Sigs etc. When they worked with the Regular Force besides not wearing RCHA epaulettes you would not of known they were Reservists.  (except for the amount beer they drank).

We begged, borrowed and stole equipment to train with. We were not properly supported, nor equipped or staffed. We made things work because people were dedicated to the cause. We turned out some pretty decent Soldiers. Few of them carried onto successful Careers in the Military, most of them have become very successful in their Civilian Jobs.  
To me Send every Reserve Unit 10 Regular Force competent willing to work, motivated and supported members and see what happens. Things will change. 

They could even run Regular Force units spread around the Country who come together for Main training events. For example, 1 RCHA could disperse one Gun Battery to Victoria and one to Vancouver. Then have two Gun Battery's in Shilo along with HQ who supports  all the units. 
The Reserves 5th (BC) and 15 Field could supply 100 Soldiers each to fill in another Battery each. You could have 6 gun batteries with four of them Regular Force and two Reserve. Provide the equipment and training to "bring them up to the standard" All while filling in the regular hours the Reserves do. 
You could do the same with C-Scott R and  _Royal Westminster Regiment. and etc. 

It is a workable solution it just needs more thinking and will power to happen. _


----------



## markppcli

childs56 said:


> Honest question, what does the Regular Force do day to day in Garrison that makes them so special?
> How many live training days of training do the Regular Force conduct in a year?
> How many hours a day, week, month, year are spent doing PT, sweeping the lines or doing routine maintenance on equipment? That is just filler time.



In garrison we probably spent 8-10 hours training a week. That’s a week that we aren’t on course or doing an exercise. We run 4 PCF cycles a year, and probably spend somewhere in the 100 ish range in terms of days in the field. Beyond that it’s maintaining that kit, pre and post ex drills. Also PT isn’t filler time, that’s a critical job task, thinking kit maintenance is filler time is equally foolish, every minute a guy spends working on their LAV / Tank / MSVS is important a) to ensure they work and b) to ensure the soldiers are familiar with fixing them when they are being used operational. Nothing “makes the reg force special” it’s just a professional job.


I call shenanigans that there’s 100 gunners in any reserve artillery regiment. Even pre so that will show up for the non sexy routine training.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I call shenanigans that there’s 100 gunners in any reserve artillery regiment. Even pre so that will show up for the non sexy routine training.


This is the link to the 2021 Canadian Gunner.  Starting at pg 62 are the annual reports of each of the ResF artillery units including their nominal roll as of Dec 31st.

You'll find that almost all units have a strength of over 100 but, like all ResF units, these include some individuals who have not yet completed basic artillery training and also includes some who are not regular attendees on training and exercises - and possibly the odd bandsman.

I tend to agree with you that most regiments are challenged to put a battery in the field on exercise under our current system (especially the A Ech which is usually missing many key tradesmen).

That said, because I tend to be aspirational, I think that it wouldn't take much effort to create a system whereby most of the ResF artillery regiments could form the nuts and bolts of a gun battery and several dismounted FOOs. FSCCs would be a challenge as would JTACs (too complex a skill these days) and is one area where a RegF core team is required. There are other areas where smaller ResF units (independent field batteries and geographically challenged regiments) could help out as well such as UAV troops, counter mortar and acoustic system troops, and independent gun troops to round out RegF batteries.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> This is the link to the 2021 Canadian Gunner.  Starting at pg 62 are the annual reports of each of the ResF artillery units including their nominal roll as of Dec 31st.
> 
> You'll find that almost all units have a strength of over 100 but, like all ResF units, these include some individuals who have not yet completed basic artillery training and also includes some who are not regular attendees on training and exercises - and possibly the odd bandsman.
> 
> I tend to agree with you that most regiments are challenged to put a battery in the field on exercise under our current system (especially the A Ech which is usually missing many key tradesmen).
> 
> That said, because I tend to be aspirational, I think that it wouldn't take much effort to create a system whereby most of the ResF artillery regiments could form the nuts and bolts of a gun battery and several dismounted FOOs. FSCCs would be a challenge as would JTACs (too complex a skill these days) and is one area where a RegF core team is required. There are other areas where smaller ResF units (independent field batteries and geographically challenged regiments) could help out as well such as UAV troops, counter mortar and acoustic system troops, and independent gun troops to round out RegF batteries.
> 
> 🍻


I suppose we differ in that I think the reserves has to be adjusted in organization because the legislation simply isn’t a priority and will not happen. Fundamentally if you were to tell me each troop will have a 3rd gun manned by reservists and a battery a third troop manned with reservists I’d be quite happy. The dismounted foo parties are also filling PCG tasks so if that can be manned by reservists is questionable at best, I’d rather have FOO parties that can fill either roll myself and if that means less manning on the guns so be it. You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I suppose we differ in that I think the reserves has to be adjusted in organization because the legislation simply isn’t a priority and will not happen. Fundamentally if you were to tell me each troop will have a 3rd gun manned by reservists and a battery a third troop manned with reservists I’d be quite happy.


That was definitely behind the system behind going to four-gun batteries when PYs had to be found to form bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and all of the STA. The various RegF regiments cross training reservists in their region on the M777. I just happen to have X Bty 5 RALC's nominal roll open in front of me from TF 3-07. A gun troop had 33 all ranks so three troops were 99 all ranks. 24 of those were reservists spread around the six gun detachments and three command posts. One thing though, while there are reserve force gunners capable of augmenting M777 batteries, there are not enough M777s in the system without moving active guns from one battery or regiment to the other. 



markppcli said:


> The dismounted foo parties are also filling PCG tasks so if that can be manned by reservists is questionable at best, I’d rather have FOO parties that can fill either roll myself and if that means less manning on the guns so be it. You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.


PCG? Not sure what that is.

Re FOOs; when the big reorg happened under the CLS directive in 2005 each RegF regiment was established to have 12 X RegF FOO parties (up from 6) and 3 X RegF battle group FSCCs which are sufficient to man three battlegroups complete. I'm not sure right now how many LAV OPVs each regiment has but I believe all RegF FOOs are still all trained on both mounted and dismounted ops.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> That was definitely behind the system behind going to four-gun batteries when PYs had to be found to form bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and all of the STA. The various RegF regiments cross training reservists in their region on the M777. I just happen to have X Bty 5 RALC's nominal roll open in front of me from TF 3-07. A gun troop had 33 all ranks so three troops were 99 all ranks. 24 of those were reservists spread around the six gun detachments and three command posts. One thing though, while there are reserve force gunners capable of augmenting M777 batteries, there are not enough M777s in the system without moving active guns from one battery or regiment to the other.
> 
> 
> PCG? Not sure what that is.
> 
> Re FOOs; when the big reorg happened under the CLS directive in 2005 each RegF regiment was established to have 12 X RegF FOO parties (up from 6) and 3 X RegF battle group FSCCs which are sufficient to man three battlegroups complete. I'm not sure right now how many LAV OPVs each regiment has but I believe all RegF FOOs are still all trained on both mounted and dismounted ops.
> 
> 🍻


PCG - parachute company group 

The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> PCG - parachute company group
> 
> The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.



Based on my experience a Para role isn’t a non starter for reserves. 
   But I’d fully agree the FOO role isn’t ideal - mainly as that should have a JTAC in it. 

WRT conversion training, in the 80’s everything started with the C1, 109 or L5 (even 81mm Mortar) was a simple bolt on, as the fundamentals didn’t change. 
   109 Drivers required Driver, Light Track (same as 113, 548 or Queen Mary) as a STT/PCF 
  Now towed Arty still requires Driver Wheeled, and Gun Tow, plus for the 777 I’m assuming Air Brakes and whatever the gunntractor acronym is.  So that’s basically a wash.  

I’m of the opinion the PRes ideally would make up personnel to allow for enough guns for 4 gun Troops and 3 Firing Battery’s/ Reg’t, plus augmentation to CP and Recce/Survey (if that is still a thing given GPS etc).  
   With the hope that DArty and DLR are pushing for a 109 type vehicle for two of the Bde’s, and a Rocket Reg’t for Div GS.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Based on my experience a Para role isn’t a non starter for reserves.



Yes, yes it is a non-starter for Reserves in Canada.

Having tried to keep a reserve unit's Airborne Platoon up and running against the tide of no courses, no exercises, not enough time to select enough of the right people and keep them fit enough, usual levels of militia turnover, and no refresher equipment or instructors available - amongst other general f*ckery like Reg F disinterest and ARes Senior Officers and staff who have no idea what and Airborne Platoon is or does or care - I can tell you it's a fool's errand. The troops were very keen and capable I thought, but the system continually let them down.

At best you might achieve 'parachute club' status. At worst, you're going to kill people... IMHO.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Do we need paratroopers? 

Maybe this is a specialty that should be left to SOF.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Halifax Tar said:


> Do we need paratroopers?
> 
> Maybe this is a specialty that should be left to SOF.



Whelp, there goes this thread


----------



## Halifax Tar

daftandbarmy said:


> Whelp, there goes this thread



I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me. 

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?


----------



## markppcli

Halifax Tar said:


> I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.
> 
> But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?


Norther Iraq in 2003, the seizure of Kandahar airfield, but in general I agree it’s a niche capability we likely don’t need.


----------



## Weinie

Halifax Tar said:


> I am Navy guy... *Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.*
> 
> But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?


My kids used to say that when I said "Eat your vegetables."


----------



## GK .Dundas

OldSolduer said:


> I think alot of the issue is the major complexes the CAF and Canada in general has towards the UK. We want to be better but we can't look as good as them well because Canadian you know....Can't spend money on fancy la dee da uniforms or even operational gear without massive interference and red tape.
> 
> And actually Dan Carlin brought this up. He basically said you can equip other people like Romans, give them the same training but at the end of the day they aren't Romans nor do they perform the same way.





Halifax Tar said:


> I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.
> 
> But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?


Crete is a really bad example. If the British had even the faintest clue as to what was really happening around. Instead of surrendering. They  might have demanded that the Germans surrender.
Given how badly the Jerry airborne had mauled damned near massacred to be honest. They might have surrendered themselves.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Weinie said:


> My kids used to say that when I said "Eat your vegetables."



I would equate the Army to raw Brussel Sprouts lol


----------



## Weinie

Halifax Tar said:


> I would equate the Army to raw Brussel Sprouts lol


Yuck.


----------



## Remius

Halifax Tar said:


> I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.
> 
> But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?


I’m not in disagreement.  Is massed airborne ops a relevant thing in this day and age?  And more importantly relevant in what the CAF is doing or wants to do (something I am not sure has been determined).

At the end of the day, parachuting is an insertion method.  

SOF, SAR, and Pathfinders.  That makes sense. 

The only reason to keep any other capability might be to integrate with other forces should they decide to do massed airborne ops.

The concern is maybe we don’t need it now but what if we need it later?  We’ve already seen what getting rid of some capabilities we thought were not needed has gotten us.


----------



## markppcli

If you don’t have conventional paratroopers you don’t need pathfinders.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Remius said:


> I’m not in disagreement.  Is massed airborne ops a relevant thing in this day and age?  And more importantly relevant in what the CAF is doing or wants to do (something I am not sure has been determined).
> 
> At the end of the day, parachuting is an insertion method.
> 
> SOF, SAR, and Pathfinders.  That makes sense.
> 
> The only reason to keep any other capability might be to integrate with other forces should they decide to do massed airborne ops.
> 
> The concern is maybe we don’t need it now but what if we need it later?  We’ve already seen what getting rid of some capabilities we thought were not needed has gotten us.



Very valid point. 

I would say we can't be all singing all dancing. We haven't the will or the capitol.  Hard questions need to asked. And some golden cows need to turned into ground beef.

Ive already expressed that I don't think Canada needs an Army.  Especially not structured as we have now.  So I'm standing outside the fire and asking.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

In the 80's we had two FOO parties of 3-4 each using jeep with trailers, simulators were a puff table. Plus two CP's and survey party, supporting a 6 gun battery. I don't know how good our FOO's were but with modern simulators they can do the majority of the training indoors and use the exercises both dry and live fire to learn approach and concealment.
I argue that based on the Ukrainian experience, reservists can do these jobs. I would stand up a UAV Troop in every Reserve artillery regiment right now. Buy them a commercial drone and use it to develop techniques and procedures based on current Ukrainian lessons. The young solider will figure out the basics faster than the Army can write procedure down. I would keep procedures basic, let the troops try out different ideas, submit results, while feeding in techniques learned in Ukraine as they develop. Cost of this program would be peanuts (well unless you resurrected the Peanut).


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes, yes it is a non-starter for Reserves in Canada.
> 
> Having tried to keep a reserve unit's Airborne Platoon up and running against the tide of no courses, no exercises, not enough time to select enough of the right people and keep them fit enough, usual levels of militia turnover, and no refresher equipment or instructors available - amongst other general f*ckery like Reg F disinterest and ARes Senior Officers and staff who have no idea what and Airborne Platoon is or does or care - I can tell you it's a fool's errand. The troops were very keen and capable I thought, but the system continually let them down.
> 
> At best you might achieve 'parachute club' status. At worst, you're going to kill people... IMHO.


For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s 
   The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.  

Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science.  Both of us are proof of that  

Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership.  The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity. 

IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing.  There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles. 
  No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.  

Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min


----------



## ArmyRick

KevinB said:


> For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s
> The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.
> 
> Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science.  Both of us are proof of that
> 
> Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership.  The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity.
> 
> IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing.  There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles.
> No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.
> 
> Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min


I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)

My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)

Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc. 

Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.


----------



## Halifax Tar

ArmyRick said:


> I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)
> 
> My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)
> 
> Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.
> 
> Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.



Para dropping for response seems like a valid idea.  Especially for a country our size.  

How long should the territorial response teams be self sustaining ?  And how do we sustain them after they have exhausted their carried stores ?


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> PCG - parachute company group


Thx


markppcli said:


> The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.


You're preaching to the converted here.



KevinB said:


> WRT conversion training, in the 80’s everything started with the C1, 109 or L5 (even 81mm Mortar) was a simple bolt on, as the fundamentals didn’t change.
> 109 Drivers required Driver, Light Track (same as 113, 548 or Queen Mary) as a STT/PCF


MY BOTC-Arty in 1969 had us learning and firing the 81 mortar, C1, L5, M109, 106 RR and every small arm, machine gun and LAW/MAW in service at the time, but not the SS11 or Centurion (although we had demonstrations at Meaford)

We were taught to drive every vehicle the arty had including M113 (and M577, M548 and Lynx [which we didn't have but learned anyway] which are all basically the same), M109, all wheeled vehicles but not the M578 (which is based on the M107/M110 chassis and is different from but not dissimilar to the M109 using a steering bar vice a steering wheel or the M113s tiller bars).

Mind you being taught to drive the thing and being a qualified driver with all that entails as to maintenance etc are two very different things.



KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion the PRes ideally would make up personnel to allow for enough guns for 4 gun Troops and 3 Firing Battery’s/ Reg’t, plus augmentation to CP and Recce/Survey (if that is still a thing given GPS etc).
> With the hope that DArty and DLR are pushing for a 109 type vehicle for two of the Bde’s, and a Rocket Reg’t for Div GS.


I think we're firmly in the grip of the 6-gun battery divisible into two troops. I don't see a push for either a 109ish system nor a rocket one - all their eggs are in the GBAD basket and we seem to have lost the appetite for concurrent activity although I keep looking at that little icon for "indirect fires" for 2028 on the Force 2025 COAs and what appears to be the military symbol for a tracked single rocket vice multiple rocket launcher for 4 RCA (GS) (but which at least on one slide I've seen is labelled "HIMARS". Go figure.   

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:


> I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)
> 
> My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)
> 
> Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.
> 
> Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.



Great idea.

In the end, Para and Commando are merely different ways to get to the battlefield/ place of work. 

All the tough guy training is designed to make sure that you don't become a liability once you get there because follow on support can be very minimal and, after all, you still need to walk alot in harsh conditions carrying several days of CSupps on your back.

For example, I recall at least two large airborne/mobile exercises, in remote locations during periods of bad weather, where we had to evacuate the (non-PARA) umpire staff because they all either couldn't keep up, or went down with cold injuries.


----------



## FJAG

ArmyRick said:


> I am not a jumper but spent a year add as a PRes add on with then Para Coy 3RCR, I got hang out and do some cool sh*t (like follow on forces for patrol pathfinder course, deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, Helo-casting, etc just no jumping as I was not qualified)
> 
> My observation is this. If we are serious about defending ALL of Canada (LOTS of real estate), then I feel a much larger and serious airborne force is actually more important than the hugely expensive mech/medium or heavy forces. Train them to be truly deployable by air (plane and helo), land (light vehicles or black cadillac) and sea (assault boats and cheap landing craft, after seeing what Harry De Wolfe class ships have, maybe a limited amphibious capability?)
> 
> Now, lets look at the cost of a "Commando" type brigade (Commando as in Royal Marines/Para Regt not SOF) which is mostly light versus the need for LAVs, Tanks, Self Propelled arty, etc.
> 
> Now add in lightweight technology such as Javelin Missiles, NLAW, Switchblade 300 and 600, Carl G 84mm GMM rounds and I think you have a serious HOME DEFENCE capability.


I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.

I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.

That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.
> 
> I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.
> 
> That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.
> 
> 🍻



Well, the downside of that is that lightweight countries provide lightweight forces.

You have to 'pay to play' to have any kind of say in international politics, and if we commit ourselves to a 'Heavily Armed Scouting Brigade' we'll be treated like that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I would agree with you entirely if it wasn't for the fact that I think the deterrence value and political capital that comes with having a heavy commitment to NATO in Europe.
> 
> I firmly believe though that the bulk of our RegF should be in the light to medium quick reaction model and the bulk of our ResF and heavy equipment in the NATO model on a flyover basis on the basis of the likelihood or non-likelihood of use. Forming and training that heavy capability is an issue that needs to be solved.
> 
> That IMHO does call for a solid airborne, airmobile and amphibious capability primarily for the RegF. I also like the idea of a mountain capability but tend to think it might be an adjunct to either a light amphibious or airborne/airmobile capability.
> 
> 🍻



I know we tend to think in terms of 'silos' when we start talking about special capabilities, but, having done all three of these things with various different units in my past lives, it would be relatively easy to have one unit cover off PARA, Amphibious and Mountain capabilities.

You could probably get all that done right now with the three light battalions we have in place. They'd need support from the usual cast of characters though, who are fit and properly equipped enough to join them on their various escapades, such as Engr, Log, Arty, Sigs etc. Without these enablers, Infantry alone can't do it all.

But don't just don't call it the Airborne Comando Gebirgsjager Brigade .... no need for more Empires - or funny hats - than necessary


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> I know we tend to think in terms of 'silos' when we start talking about special capabilities, but, having done all three of these things with various different units in my past lives, it would be relatively easy to have one unit cover off PARA, Amphibious and Mountain capabilities.


Until you need two units at the same time.
  I think Para fits with mountains - while they can jump into help Amphib units.



daftandbarmy said:


> You could probably get all that done right now with the three light battalions we have in place. They'd need support from the usual cast of characters though, who are fit and properly equipped enough to join them on their various escapades, such as Engr, Log, Arty, Sigs etc. Without these enablers, Infantry alone can't do it all.


It needs to be a properly resourced Bde.



daftandbarmy said:


> But don't just don't call it the Airborne Comando Gebirgsjager Brigade .... no need for more Empires - or funny hats - than necessary


With a leopard print beret


----------



## GK .Dundas

KevinB said:


> Until you need two units at the same time.
> I think Para fits with mountains - while they can jump into help Amphib units.
> 
> 
> It needs to be a properly resourced Bde.
> 
> 
> With a leopard print beret


Fezs.....fezs are cool !


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s
> The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.
> 
> Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science.  Both of us are proof of that
> 
> Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership.  The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity.
> 
> IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing.  There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles.
> No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.
> 
> Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min


Speaking on behalf of the mechanized infantry, I am fully in favour of our light cousins spending more time in the arctic.


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

10/90 throw that number system away. 10% Reg force is easy, career managers post 10 Reg troopers to a Unit and the Res Unit has to come up with 90,  trained and able to do the job. That is is the hard number to fill.

I think they should look at it this way ( not 100% worked out in my head been away from the Inf and AD for longer than I remember) but I remember more of how the Armoured worked.

4 car troop of cougars ( yes me old) Give the Regiment the equipment to operate without having to beg, borrow or steal it so they can train.

2 of the cougars would be made of Reg Force troops so that they still do the training as required. The other 2 cougars are made up of Res Troops
They work together, Command and Control, The Reg force on an exercise provide a snr crewman to each Res crew so there is some mentorship and some training guidance. But each of the Res Cougars have a different position filled by the Reg Force staff.  Reg force Gunner to assist in training Res Force Gunner ( more mentorship) , other cougar have a Reg F Crew commander to mentor crew commander. 

Reg F cougars to have 1 Res F trooper to work with the crew to build up skills and work on getting everyone use to working with each other and within the Regiment have the experience of how both sides of the Regiment work so they can create a bond of working together as a team.
Have a Reg Force Officer lead the Res Troop, and Res Officer lead the Reg Force Troop, so the Res Officer gets the experience of leading more trained and rounded troops so the officer can learn from them and the SNR NCO can help guide the choices the troop leader makes.
The Reg Force troop leader helps guide the Res Crew commanders in the right direction so they have better command practices to follow.

HQ Control
CO and 2I/C

Reg force one term as CO , then the Res 2I/C takes command for a term and a Reg Force 2 I/C is posted in to assume command after the Res Command term is over

RSM
If the CO is Reg Force then the RSM is Res Force, and switches as the Command team switches after some over lap
The over lap is important so an united front is projected for all soldiers.

It would improve all way round as how the unit operates

Maintaining the fleet so to speak

Should be some class B positions that allow various rank positions to be filled beyond the normal class b positions in a regular Res Unit

Clerk BA
Storesman BA
Fin Clerk BA
Storesman BA 
Ops person BA
plus 

Fleet qualified drivers x2
Maintainer x2
Weapons maintainers x1

Some crew members to do crew training with the Reg Force team members 

These positions could be switched out every quarter to allow other soldiers to take some extra training not to make these career Class B positions

Plus extra funds to send the Res side of the team on courses thru the year so they can up train to a better standard to work a long side the Reg Force part of the team.




Then they have to get rid of the Rules about deploying Res Forces and how they are deployed to make it easier to deploy as part of the Regimental Team.


Biggest Change is going to be uniforms and the Reg force team might have some issues here

Cap Badges and uniforms.  They have to wear the Host Regimental Badges and Dress so they are more part of the team and when Posted out they put their Reg Force Cap Badge back on.  So everyone is the same on the parade square and helps get rid of the Reg Force vs Res Force issues .


Jus the thoughts of an old Fin Clerk, who might be totally wrong


----------



## Remius

10% reg force might be a bit unrealistic.

There are 15 units in my brigade.  So 150 reg force.  That’s one CBG.  4 Div has 3 CBGs.  So 450 reg force types give or take that you are pulling from reg force units in 4 Div alone. 

I’m not sure that is achievable. 

I’d buy it if they make it so they get posted if they are near getting out, embed with the a unit a facilitate a component transfer if that is what they want.  But make sure they have the incentives to do so to go with that.

Heck even broken guys that can still add value and experience.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Remius said:


> 10% reg force might be a bit unrealistic.
> 
> There are 15 units in my brigade.  So 150 reg force.  That’s one CBG.  4 Div has 3 CBGs.  So 450 reg force types give or take that you are pulling from reg force units in 4 Div alone.


I'm ignorant as hell, but from the outside looking in it seems like the path from CBG's as they are to useful 10/90 units is to toss out the existing unit structure and assign the 10% based on the targeted endstate.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.


Would an "independent section" (or whatever the customary Artillery term might be) coincidentally colocated and tasked with each Reserve battery, or simply assigning, as Regular positions, JTAC pers to Reserve units be sustainable or worthwhile? Set aside the whole 10/90 or other percentages discussion for these roles, but have them placed to support Reserve training.

Assume there might be some added costs as far as flying JTAC pers to train within more complex operational structures than might be readily available with the Reserve batteries.


----------



## markppcli

On 0 level does it make sense for any kind of operationally tasked unit to be led by a part time L Col. We need to stop seeing Reg / Res as some kind of different animals and start to see soldiers employed either full time or part time. It does not matter that the CO has been full time their whole career, it matters that to do that job effectively they must be. Rotating full and part time only serves the interests of those entrenched in a system that has become more about ensuring a building keeps its mess silver than on providing effective forces with a capability geared towards operational outputs.


----------



## Remius

IKnowNothing said:


> I'm ignorant as hell, but from the outside looking in it seems like the path from CBG's as they are to useful 10/90 units is to toss out the existing unit structure and assign the 10% based on the targeted endstate.



Would have to establish the end state.

Establishment number, effective numbers and actual real numbers fluctuate yearly and sometimes monthly. 

And then chances are your 10% end up tasked for a variety of « other » stuff the 90% can’t fill.  Not sure how that would fly.


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> Would an "independent section" (or whatever the customary Artillery term might be) coincidentally colocated and tasked with each Reserve battery, or simply assigning, as Regular positions, JTAC pers to Reserve units be sustainable or worthwhile? Set aside the whole 10/90 or other percentages discussion for these roles, but have them placed to support Reserve training.
> 
> Assume there might be some added costs as far as flying JTAC pers to train within more complex operational structures than might be readily available with the Reserve batteries.


No, there would be 0 benefit to either party there. Not only are there simply not enough to fill that, the training and qualification requirements are such that spreading them out all across the country would make keeping them qualified virtually impossible.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Would have to establish the end state.
> 
> Establishment number, effective numbers and actual real numbers fluctuate yearly and sometimes monthly.
> 
> And then chances are your 10% end up tasked for a variety of « other » stuff the 90% can’t fill.  Not sure how that would fly.


This becomes the problem. What is the end state?

I would suggest that the end state be that the reserves can independently force generate a deployable sub unit and a push and reliably generate sub sub units. Doesn’t mean they will, but that’s the largest group that’s ever deployed independently (CRIC for Bosnia 2003), but that is a realistic and attainable goal. So what does that mean ? Well we need Force generators that can assess sub sub units, ie Bn / Regiments, and that are manned to provide them, ie they need to encompass a catchment area that can reliable provide their sub units a full compliment. We need those Bn / Reg HQs to be fully staffed to manage the training of these sub units, and not just a skeleton crew sat around because there has to be a CO. It also means we need to be serious about the selection of these COs and their staffs, as opposed to who’s the oldest officer in the mess.  This probably means each reserve CBG becomes essentially a Bn, probably holding a mixed bag of sub units (this is fine plenty of other militaries do this), and the Divisions end up with a reserve Bde, now made up of 3-5 properly manned units each with a goal of generating sub units, a piece.

Edit to add this is something I see are primarily a Armoured and Infantry thing. Reserve artillery should be built around adding guns / troops to existing regiments first and foremost. I’m not familiar enough with the engineers to really comment intelligently on how they should function.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> This becomes the problem. What is the end state?
> 
> I would suggest that the end state be that the reserves can independently force generate a deployable sub unit and a push and reliably generate sub sub units. Doesn’t mean they will, but that’s the largest group that’s ever deployed independently (CRIC for Bosnia 2003), but that is a realistic and attainable goal. So what does that mean ? Well we need Force generators that can assess sub sub units, ie Bn / Regiments, and that are manned to provide them, ie they need to encompass a catchment area that can reliable provide their sub units a full compliment. We need those Bn / Reg HQs to be fully staffed to manage the training of these sub units, and not just a skeleton crew sat around because there has to be a CO. It also means we need to be serious about the selection of these COs and their staffs, as opposed to who’s the oldest officer in the mess.  This probably means each reserve CBG becomes essentially a Bn, probably holding a mixed bag of sub units (this is fine plenty of other militaries do this), and the Divisions end up with a reserve Bde, now made up of 3-5 properly manned units each with a goal of generating sub units, a piece.


Make the transition from CBG= Canadian Brigade Group; a wholly fictional brigade made up of paper regiments to:CRBG = Canadian Reserve Battalion Group,  A RegF led Unit fully accountable to take the PRes personnel in their catchment area, organize, train and deliver something that looks a lot like a light battlegroup.  Any CBG where the "Regiments" are consistently in the platoon+ to Company- range maps over very well.


----------



## dapaterson

My best and worst C2 experiences as a part time CAF member were both under the same Reg F formation, which (a) made effort to accomodate the different working hours / capacity of part time vs full time, but also (b) demanded short fuse reports and returns to justify why part time personnel with full time non military careers who had not indicated availability for full time periods of service were not available for short fuse periods of full time service.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> No, there would be 0 benefit to either party there. Not only are there simply not enough to fill that, the training and qualification requirements are such that spreading them out all across the country would make keeping them qualified virtually impossible.


Copy.



IKnowNothing said:


> Make the transition from CBG= Canadian Brigade Group; a wholly fictional brigade made up of paper regiments to:CRBG = Canadian Reserve Battalion Group,  A RegF led Unit fully accountable to take the PRes personnel in their catchment area, organize, train and deliver something that looks a lot like a light battlegroup.  Any CBG where the "Regiments" are consistently in the platoon+ to Company- range maps over very well.


Perhaps not use size-linked terminology at all? Call it a militia district / regional HQ and depot / whatever: avoids anyone getting ideas about how the thing should behave based on the name alone.


----------



## KevinB

quadrapiper said:


> Copy.
> 
> 
> Perhaps not use size-linked terminology at all? Call it a militia district / regional HQ and depot / whatever: avoids anyone getting ideas about how the thing should behave based on the name alone.


Militia Districts are so 1980’s…

The problem with a non specific name is one can see how the CA acts even with a specific name for those formations.


----------



## IKnowNothing

quadrapiper said:


> Perhaps not use size-linked terminology at all? Call it a militia district / regional HQ and depot / whatever: *avoids anyone getting ideas about how the thing should behave based on the name alone.*


Again, ignorant outsider, but I think that will lead to more of the same.   No one should be left to get ideas on how the thing should behave, because what it is and how it should be behave should be defined, and someone should be accountable for delivering that.
Design an attainable, replicable, and functional unit templates(s), assess the existing CBG's and their catchment areas and their ability to deliver, and divide/amalgamate, eliminate as needed.

I see two basic Bn size taskings for CBG's
those Co-located with a regF Bde-  provide a 3rd Bn, + gun battery, armoured squadron, engineer squadron, augments for a parent bde
those not - generate deployable artic/domestic light BG's


----------



## quadrapiper

KevinB said:


> Militia Districts are so 1980’s…
> 
> The problem with a non specific name is one can see how the CA acts even with a specific name for those formations.


Not so much non-specific as _specifically not a manoeuvre formation name_. 

Army Reserve Regional Training / Support Depot (Pacific), say, would be about as force-generator as you can get, says what it's supposed to do on the tin, doesn't encourage the CO to wander off on non-core tasks or get distracted by (assuming this isn't desired) trying to maintain a deployable field HQ for a formed combat brigade, and doesn't cap, even conceptually, unit size _below _it (there's enough people on the lower mainland that there _could_, with a will, be a number of real battalions over there). Chop, forevermore, everything that isn't training to full-time brigades and the domestic Joint HQs: JTF Pac, JRCC, CJOC, etc.


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> Perhaps not use size-linked terminology at all? Call it a militia district / regional HQ and depot / whatever: avoids anyone getting ideas about how the thing should behave based on the name alone.


No, needs to be organized in unit / sub unit terms. These should be seen as operational units who are capable of generating deployable sub units and also able to provide the basis of a Bn sized unit. In my fever dreams of the CAF those deployable sub units and be formed as a Bn under the regular force Bde. Something in the lines of:

3 Can Div:
  1 CMBG:

1 PPCLI
2 PPCLI
LdSH
1 RCHA
1 Svc Bn
1 CER
3 Bn RCIC
  3 CBG

38th Bn RCIC
39th Bn RCIC
41sr Bn RCIC
3rd Regiment RCAC
3 CER
3rd Regiment, RCA
3 Svc Bn

3 Bn RCIC would be a skeleton crew able to accept 1 coy from each of the 3 CBG Bns, 3rd RCAC would be tasked to support LdSH with Cav Tps and crew replacements for Leopards (Edmonton based Sqn). Similarly the Artillery folks would be focused on flushing out the 1 RCHA batteries first. 3 CBG is a force generating Bde reporting directly to 3 Div on its ability firstly to fill those tasks. 3 Svc Bn would be almost entirely an administrative Bn HQ mostly concerned with ensuring training and career development of dets all over the Div AO, I see it functioning almost like a standards organization ensuring everyone is on the same page.


----------



## Brad Sallows

A force-generating formation is a "district".  At least a lot of other armies think/thought so.  Districts produce operational elements but are not themselves one.


----------



## dapaterson

The Army Reserve's seniors long for a past filled with glory that never existed.


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> A force-generating formation is a "district".  At least a lot of other armies think/thought so.  Districts produce operational elements but are not themselves one.


Outside of Russia who employs districts as a military formation?


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> Outside of Russia who employs districts as a military formation?


The Uk?









						London District (British Army) - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> The Uk?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> London District (British Army) - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.m.wikipedia.org



They're more of a geographically defined administrative unit, kind of like our Divisions, than a military formation.

Also, as I recall, their HQ set ups are full of the castaways and awkwards squads of various line units and brigades. Trying to get anything done though SE District was like trying to capture Stalingrad with a plastic KFS set


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> Outside of Russia who employs districts as a military formation?


Here is a list of countries who have or had the district system in various forms






__





						Military district - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:


> They're more of a geographically defined administrative unit, kind of like our Divisions, than a military formation.


I think that is what Brad was hinting at though.


----------



## markppcli

Seems like their more responsible for the buildings and barracks than the actual units from wiki


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Here is a list of countries who have or had the district system in various forms
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Military district - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.m.wikipedia.org


There’s a lot of “district was” in there. Also a lot of combatant commands called Districts for example Algeria and Vietnam.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Seems like their more responsible for the buildings and barracks than the actual units from wiki



Yes, and some of the training areas and ranges. They also have a role managing the TA and Cadets that we never really understood, or I didn't at any rate.

Force generation is usually managed through the operational brigades.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I just remember that it was when the name changed to "brigade" that the fun folks at 4050 W 4th Ave in Vancouver really started to exceed their limitations.  "District" has a nice mundane not-a-battle-formation-so-stop-trying-to-be-one ring about it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> I just remember that it was when the name changed to "brigade" that the fun folks at 4050 W 4th Ave in Vancouver really started to exceed their limitations.  "District" has a nice mundane not-a-battle-formation-so-stop-trying-to-be-one ring about it.



Exactly... an A Res CBG Commander is not a Brigade Commander, ironically. Their G staff are not G1, 3, 4s etc either; not by a long shot


----------



## FJAG

You and I are close to violent agreement but not quite


markppcli said:


> This becomes the problem. What is the end state?
> 
> I would suggest that the end state be that the reserves can independently force generate a deployable sub unit and a push and reliably generate sub sub units.


Absolutely agree on this.


markppcli said:


> Doesn’t mean they will, but that’s the largest group that’s ever deployed independently (CRIC for Bosnia 2003), but that is a realistic and attainable goal. So what does that mean ? Well we need Force generators that can assess sub sub units, ie Bn / Regiments, and that are manned to provide them, ie they need to encompass a catchment area that can reliable provide their sub units a full compliment.


Absolutely agree again.


markppcli said:


> We need those Bn / Reg HQs to be fully staffed to manage the training of these sub units, and not just a skeleton crew sat around because there has to be a CO. It also means we need to be serious about the selection of these COs and their staffs, as opposed to who’s the oldest officer in the mess.


We probably diverge a bit here. IMHO these COs need to be RegF as does most of their staff. (Please note I do not consider ClassBs to be a viable entity except as temporary replacements for RegF - a unit has a combination of full-time positions - i.e. RegF PYs and part-time positions - i.e. Class As.) IMHO each of these battalion HQs (and by that term I include armoured, arty and engineer regiments) must be capable of being fully deployable.

As a further provision, each of these battalions must have at least one fully equipped RegF sub-unit. The purpose of this sub-unit is to be a fully trained and deployable as any other RegF sub-unit is now. It also provides an anchor around which the battalion revolves, and provides expertise and equipment to help train the ResF subunits. This is the reason I call these units 30/70 but again, the percentages are approximate and vary depending on the type of unit.

Secondly there would be two or three ResF sub-units each of which has a RegF core that reports to the Bn HQ. I tend to call these 10/90 units but the percentage is arbitrary and could vary from as low as 5% to maybe 20% depending on the needs of the sub-unit. this RegF core should include a Coy Comd, a CSM, a CQ (WO), a storeman, a Chief Clerk (Sgt) and a fin clerk as a minimum. Additional RegF PYs might be necessary for sub-units with complex equipment requiring maintenance or other tech skills. All other positions to complete a full establishment are Class A. The purpose of the core is to a) train its Class As; b) form a core around which a sub-unit can be stood up either by volunteers from its own Class As or others from across the region or by way of compulsory mobilization of its own Class As; and to train with the Bn during the Bn's RegF training

Thirdly there would be a HQ Company appropriate for the type of Bn it is and with a mixture of RegF and Class A personnel so as to properly support the RegF component and its equipment day-to-day and to train its own Class A to fully round out the company on mobilization.



markppcli said:


> This probably means each reserve CBG becomes essentially a Bn, probably holding a mixed bag of sub units (this is fine plenty of other militaries do this), and the Divisions end up with a reserve Bde, now made up of 3-5 properly manned units each with a goal of generating sub units, a piece.


We diverge a bit here. IMHO, the CBGs and RSS disappear entirely. Their RegF staff are reassigned to a) probably 2 or 3 additional deployable manoeuvre brigade and 2 additional support brigade headquarters and the 10% elements of the 10/90 sub-units.

Each of the RegF brigades is retained but also transformed into hybrid ones. I see heavy brigades as 30/70; mech brigades as one of 30/70 and one of 70/30; and light brigades of 70/30 to 100/0 (all ratios are RegF/ResF)

Each of the manoeuvre brigades is organized identically to the existing 1, 2 and 5 brigades as either armoured, mech or light. The support brigades are organized as an artillery brigade, a sustainment brigade and what used to be called a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade and which is now called a Protection Brigade. (I'm toying with the idea as to whether or not an Engineer Brigade should exist or whether the CERs should be distributed)

Each existing ResF unit (Inf bn, armd regt, arty regt, Engr regt) devolves into a Class A sub-unit assigned to core battalions (this may involve amalgamation of multiple weak units into a single sub-unit). Sigs and Medics and MPs devolve into Bde signals squadrons, field ambulances and MP platoons as well as one divisional sigs bn, one field hospital and one MP battalion. 21 EW stays as is. CAIR is tightened up. 4 ESR becomes a 70/30 unit. 4 RCA (GS) becomes a 30/70 unit. RegF and ResF service bns are reorganized to support, in appropriate RegF/ResF ratios, the manoeuvre brigades and create, in addition, a divisional sustainment brigade made up of a 30/70 maint battalion, a 30/70 supply battalion and two 10/90 Tn battalions



markppcli said:


> Edit to add this is something I see are primarily a Armoured and Infantry thing. Reserve artillery should be built around adding guns / troops to existing regiments first and foremost. I’m not familiar enough with the engineers to really comment intelligently on how they should function.


This I don't agree with. I see artillery in exactly the same way as inf and armour. A core arty regt HQ mostly RegF, a single 100/0 6-gun battery, 2 or 3 10/90 6-gun batteries, a 100/0 FOO Bty and a 30/70 STA battery

Just as a summary. The intent of the above is to create more deployable brigade and unit headquarters to a) ease the burden of rotations and b) form a core around which a force larger than 3 brigades can be raised. At the same time the structure retains existing 100/0 RegF sub-units which are capable of a high level of readiness. Any of the infantry battalions could thus deploy to Latvia with its own single company and a slice of battalion support or on another operation with either a 100/0 company or two from another battalion (if rapid reaction is needed) or its own 10/90 companies filled out by Class C volunteers (if time for predeployment training permits). In many ways our battle groups deploying to Afghanistan were generally an amalgamation of the RegF battalions within the brigade augmented by ResF members.

Overall, the system provides better leadership, access to equipment and training to reservists while expanding the Army's flexibility and capability.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> You and I are close to violent agreement but not quite
> 
> Absolutely agree on this.
> 
> Absolutely agree again.
> 
> We probably diverge a bit here. IMHO these COs need to be RegF as does most of their staff. (Please note I do not consider ClassBs to be a viable entity except as temporary replacements for RegF - a unit has a combination of full-time positions - i.e. RegF PYs and part-time positions - i.e. Class As.) IMHO each of these battalion HQs (and by that term I include armoured, arty and engineer regiments) must be capable of being fully deployable.
> 
> As a further provision, each of these battalions must have at least one fully equipped RegF sub-unit. The purpose of this sub-unit is to be a fully trained and deployable as any other RegF sub-unit is now. It also provides an anchor around which the battalion revolves, and provides expertise and equipment to help train the ResF subunits. This is the reason I call these units 30/70 but again, the percentages are approximate and vary depending on the type of unit.
> 
> Secondly there would be two or three ResF sub-units each of which has a RegF core that reports to the Bn HQ. I tend to call these 10/90 units but the percentage is arbitrary and could vary from as low as 5% to maybe 20% depending on the needs of the sub-unit. this RegF core should include a Coy Comd, a CSM, a CQ (WO), a storeman, a Chief Clerk (Sgt) and a fin clerk as a minimum. Additional RegF PYs might be necessary for sub-units with complex equipment requiring maintenance or other tech skills. All other positions to complete a full establishment are Class A. The purpose of the core is to a) train its Class As; b) form a core around which a sub-unit can be stood up either by volunteers from its own Class As or others from across the region or by way of compulsory mobilization of its own Class As; and to train with the Bn during the Bn's RegF training
> 
> Thirdly there would be a HQ Company appropriate for the type of Bn it is and with a mixture of RegF and Class A personnel so as to properly support the RegF component and its equipment day-to-day and to train its own Class A to fully round out the company on mobilization.
> 
> 
> We diverge a bit here. IMHO, the CBGs and RSS disappear entirely. Their RegF staff are reassigned to a) probably 2 or 3 additional deployable manoeuvre brigade and 2 additional support brigade headquarters and the 10% elements of the 10/90 sub-units.
> 
> Each of the RegF brigades is retained but also transformed into hybrid ones. I see heavy brigades as 30/70; mech brigades as one of 30/70 and one of 70/30; and light brigades of 70/30 to 100/0 (all ratios are RegF/ResF)
> 
> Each of the manoeuvre brigades is organized identically to the existing 1, 2 and 5 brigades as either armoured, mech or light. The support brigades are organized as an artillery brigade, a sustainment brigade and what used to be called a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade and which is now called a Protection Brigade. (I'm toying with the idea as to whether or not an Engineer Brigade should exist or whether the CERs should be distributed)
> 
> Each existing ResF unit (Inf bn, armd regt, arty regt, Engr regt) devolves into a Class A sub-unit assigned to core battalions (this may involve amalgamation of multiple weak units into a single sub-unit). Sigs and Medics and MPs devolve into Bde signals squadrons, field ambulances and MP platoons as well as one divisional sigs bn, one field hospital and one MP battalion. 21 EW stays as is. CAIR is tightened up. 4 ESR becomes a 70/30 unit. 4 RCA (GS) becomes a 30/70 unit. RegF and ResF service bns are reorganized to support, in appropriate RegF/ResF ratios, the manoeuvre brigades and create, in addition, a divisional sustainment brigade made up of a 30/70 maint battalion, a 30/70 supply battalion and two 10/90 Tn battalions
> 
> 
> This I don't agree with. I see artillery in exactly the same way as inf and armour. A core arty regt HQ mostly RegF, a single 100/0 6-gun battery, 2 or 3 10/90 6-gun batteries, a 100/0 FOO Bty and a 30/70 STA battery
> 
> Just as a summary. The intent of the above is to create more deployable brigade and unit headquarters to a) ease the burden of rotations and b) form a core around which a force larger than 3 brigades can be raised. At the same time the structure retains existing 100/0 RegF sub-units which are capable of a high level of readiness. Any of the infantry battalions could thus deploy to Latvia with its own single company and a slice of battalion support or on another operation with either a 100/0 company or two from another battalion (if rapid reaction is needed) or its own 10/90 companies filled out by Class C volunteers (if time for predeployment training permits). In many ways our battle groups deploying to Afghanistan were generally an amalgamation of the RegF battalions within the brigade augmented by ResF members.
> 
> Overall, the system provides better leadership, access to equipment and training to reservists while expanding the Army's flexibility and capability.
> 
> 🍻


Fundamentally our divergence stems from if we can have reservists forced to deploy or not. I don’t ever see that happening so I think the deployable units need to be 100/0 at least on paper.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Lots of moving little green army men all over the sand box here.

What's the plan for the Svc Support and Sigs Support units and personnel ?


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

Remius said:


> 10% reg force might be a bit unrealistic.
> 
> There are 15 units in my brigade.  So 150 reg force.  That’s one CBG.  4 Div has 3 CBGs.  So 450 reg force types give or take that you are pulling from reg force units in 4 Div alone.
> 
> I’m not sure that is achievable.
> 
> I’d buy it if they make it so they get posted if they are near getting out, embed with the a unit a facilitate a component transfer if that is what they want.  But make sure they have the incentives to do so to go with that.
> 
> Heck even broken guys that can still add value and experience.


That is what happened in some of the 10/90 units, soldiers on their way out were posted as farewell posting and they did not bring any value to the table and moral and training suffered. They needed to post younger soldiers who were still willing to work and train hard because they had to set the standard for the Res troops to reach.  Having a Captain posted at the end of his/her Career and knowing he/she was not going back to the Home Regiment,  and no chance of promotion. They did and do nothing but sign off training requests. They do not mentor or even provide answers to officers or troops who were asking question about training or courses.  When it was a dumping ground for the unwanted it showed all the way down to the newest recruit walking in the door.  They need to post soldiers who see this as career stepping stone. Because a Mcpl in the Res unit will do a lot more than a Reg Force Mcpl because they have to step up more often as the SGT or WO cannot make the exercise and they have to fill a position or rank above them more often.  Cpls do the work of Mcpl because they are there and the Mcpl is not. So the Reg Force staff will always be jumping to fill in positions in the training plan that is left empty because some one cannot make it to the exercise. So troops on the way out might not want to step up and provide the extra service. Yes a broken soldier can give knowledge, value, and share experience but an able body has to be pitch in and show how it is done.


----------



## markppcli

FormerHorseGuard said:


> That is what happened in some of the 10/90 units, soldiers on their way out were posted as farewell posting and they did not bring any value to the table and moral and training suffered. They needed to post younger soldiers who were still willing to work and train hard because they had to set the standard for the Res troops to reach.  Having a Captain posted at the end of his/her Career and knowing he/she was not going back to the Home Regiment,  and no chance of promotion. They did and do nothing but sign off training requests. They do not mentor or even provide answers to officers or troops who were asking question about training or courses.  When it was a dumping ground for the unwanted it showed all the way down to the newest recruit walking in the door.  They need to post soldiers who see this as career stepping stone. Because a Mcpl in the Res unit will do a lot more than a Reg Force Mcpl because they have to step up more often as the SGT or WO cannot make the exercise and they have to fill a position or rank above them more often.  Cpls do the work of Mcpl because they are there and the Mcpl is not. So the Reg Force staff will always be jumping to fill in positions in the training plan that is left empty because some one cannot make it to the exercise. So troops on the way out might not want to step up and provide the extra service. Yes a broken soldier can give knowledge, value, and share experience but an able body has to be pitch in and show how it is done.


Yes thank god were all fully manned for NCOs here in regular army Bns, never see Sgts / MCpls running platoons. Nope never not a thing.


----------



## markppcli

Halifax Tar said:


> Lots of moving little green army men all over the sand box here.
> 
> What's the plan for the Svc Support and Sigs Support units and personnel ?


The inherent problem with reserve Svc Support people is that they’re likely doing the same job for a lot more money Monday to Friday. It’s much harder to convince a mechanic to come fix vehicles for a fraction of their wage on a weekend than it is to convince someone to go run around the bush or kick in doors. Similar with Signals. The way to increase these numbers is to make it easier to parade, see my comment about the reserve Svc Bn being more of a standards org, and edit the requirements of the Vetrans Education Benefit so that reg for members releasing can be incentivized to join the reserves as opposed to incentivized to not. Increase integration with trade unions / governing bodies so that hours in uniform can translate to apprenticeship time would be another help.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

markppcli said:


> Fundamentally our divergence stems from if we can have reservists forced to deploy or not. I don’t ever see that happening so I think the deployable units need to be 100/0 at least on paper.


The mechanisms actually exist to make this happen.  It's the whole reason for Class C Contracts.  Now getting the CAF organized enough to make it happen would be a challenge.  

IMO, Regular Force Units should all be kept at their war time doctrinal strength when in the R2HR and HR/Deployment phases of their readiness cycle.

A Canadian Infantry Battalion is supposed to be 800+ pers by doctrine when it deploys overseas so by rights, the units in LOO1/LOO3 should be at their actual established strengths, the Military shouldn't be robbing from other Units/Formations to form BGs overseas.

My proposal would be that units in R2HR sign Reservists to 2 year Class C contracts to actually fill out their line units properly for employment overseas.

Year 1 - R2HR
Year 2 - Force Employment 
Year 3 - Reconstitution 

In Reconstitution the Reservist positions could be left empty and all the Reservists employed in the Line Units could return to Class A service.

I would offer opportunities for the Reservists to transfer to the Regular Force.  

I think it would be a great way to deliver instant value added in experience and significantly improved training to the Reserves.


----------



## markppcli

Humphrey Bogart said:


> The mechanisms actually exist to make this happen.  It's the whole reason for Class C Contracts.  Now getting the CAF organized enough to make it happen would be a challenge.
> 
> IMO, Regular Force Units should all be kept at their war time doctrinal strength when in the R2HR and HR/Deployment phases of their readiness cycle.
> 
> A Canadian Infantry Battalion is supposed to be 800+ pers by doctrine when it deploys overseas so by rights, the units in LOO1/LOO3 should be at their actual established strengths, the Military shouldn't be robbing from other Units/Formations to form BGs overseas.
> 
> My proposal would be that units in R2HR sign Reservists to 2 year Class C contracts to actually fill out their line units properly for employment overseas.
> 
> Year 1 - R2HR
> Year 2 - Force Employment
> Year 3 - Reconstitution
> 
> In Reconstitution the Reservist positions could be left empty and all the Reservists employed in the Line Units could return to Class A service.
> 
> I would offer opportunities for the Reservists to transfer to the Regular Force.
> 
> I think it would be a great way to deliver instant value added in experience and significantly improved training to the Reserves.


Sorry for clarity I meant “being made to deploy” vs be allowed to. The difference between being able to know you have x amount of soldiers vs having to ask for y  and getting z.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

markppcli said:


> Sorry for clarity I meant “being made to deploy” vs be allowed to. The difference between being able to know you have x amount of soldiers vs having to ask for y  and getting z.


And on a Class C contract, there wouldn't be a choice 😉.  You're on Class C Service, if the unit you're with that is ready to deploy, ends up being sent somewhere, you're going.


----------



## Remius

Humphrey Bogart said:


> And on a Class C contract, there wouldn't be a choice 😉.  You're on Class C Service, if the unit you're with that is ready to deploy, ends up being sent somewhere, you're going.


And maybe that might be a way to go.  Keep class B as short term fills.  Anything under a year or 180 days and make anything over that into class C. 

I know it’s not perfect but the new reserve readiness policy would essentially make all reservists deployable for Dom ops and partially ready for anything international.  If it’s actually done properly it could be a first step in helping to modernise reserve force service.


----------



## ArmyRick

My personal opinion (subject to having rotten tomatoes thrown at me) is that highly skilled and technical trades should not have a P Res equivalent. It seems very difficult to get these trades trained and employable.

I would make exceptions for Regular force said trades retiring and joining a local P Res unit, but no P Res entry.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

ArmyRick said:


> My personal opinion (subject to having rotten tomatoes thrown at me) is that highly skilled and technical trades should not have a P Res equivalent. It seems very difficult to get these trades trained and employable.
> 
> I would make exceptions for Regular force said trades retiring and joining a local P Res unit, but no P Res entry.


The problem is the Army's archaic recruitment and mundane PLAR process.  Reserve Units like Sigs and Comms as an example, could actually have highly skilled members if they tailored their recruitment towards that.  

Why we recruit so many unskilled people in to the Reserves is beyond me?  High training cost to us with low return on investment.

IMO, cash incentives and a robust PLAR process is what is really needed.  Maybe Pte Bloggins needs only 1 week of actual trades training and a kit famil as opposed to months of training in the summer?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Fundamentally our divergence stems from if we can have reservists forced to deploy or not. I don’t ever see that happening so I think the deployable units need to be 100/0 at least on paper.



If there was one way we could get more 'bang for the buck' out of the A Res it would be how to fix this, so that the CT from 'DAG Green' A Res to Class C, or whatever, can be done reliably and rapidly and the A Res becomes seen as a valuable asset as opposed to an annoying little brother


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Fundamentally our divergence stems from if we can have reservists forced to deploy or not. I don’t ever see that happening so I think the deployable units need to be 100/0 at least on paper.


Strangely enough, this is the argument that I had with a number of GOFOs during the Reserve Force Employment Project.

There is a very large gap between "can we" and "will we" where people seem to muddle legislative reality and the conscription crisis.

The NDA is absolutely 100% clear:



> *31* (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so
> (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada;
> (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or
> (c) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.


This provision applies to all members, including reservists and reserve units

If the conditions are met - the GoC can place reservists or units of reservists on active service. Essentially, by having once volunteered to enlist in the ResF the individual has volunteered to allow himself to be placed on active service if the GoC considers it advisable. This is not the same as conscription which takes a civilian off the street and makes him a soldier without their consent.

The real question is "will the GoC" ever place any reservists on active service? If for example the GoC decides it wants to send a reserve unit for a rotation to Latvia as part of the ePF, they could legally do so under s 31(1)(c).

In all my dealings on giving legal advice on this issue I've pointed out that this is a power that the government has by legislation and that it is not up to the CAF to predict or guess as to whether or not the government will ever use that power, but to configure the ResF in such a way that the GiC at least has the option to use it if it considers it advisable.

QR&O states:



> 4.02 - GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS​(1) An officer shall:
> ....
> 3. promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all subordinates;


QR&O is an order issued by the MND.

One might wish to argue the meaning of the term "efficiency" as it relates to the ResF but, IMHO, I'll go so far as to say that if the CAF leadership organizes and trains the ResF in such a way that the GiC is denied the option of using s 31(1) vis a vis the ResF then the leadership has been negligent in the performance of a military duty to properly structure and train and equip the ResF.

Yup. I'm bullish on this issue. 

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Humphrey Bogart said:


> And on a Class C contract, there wouldn't be a choice 😉.  You're on Class C Service, if the unit you're with that is ready to deploy, ends up being sent somewhere, you're going.


If you sign that contract


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> The inherent problem with reserve Svc Support people is that they’re likely doing the same job for a lot more money Monday to Friday. It’s much harder to convince a mechanic to come fix vehicles for a fraction of their wage on a weekend than it is to convince someone to go run around the bush or kick in doors. Similar with Signals. The way to increase these numbers is to make it easier to parade, see my comment about the reserve Svc Bn being more of a standards org, and edit the requirements of the Vetrans Education Benefit so that reg for members releasing can be incentivized to join the reserves as opposed to incentivized to not. Increase integration with trade unions / governing bodies so that hours in uniform can translate to apprenticeship time would be another help.


I'll add to that the fact that you really can't expect to maintain any volume of equipment by way of part-time reservists. If ResF units are ever given any major equipment then they need full-time maintainers. The part-timers, once trained in their particular trade should, received refresher military training, learn to operate as units in the field on exercise and receive "upgrade" training in their trade but not be counted on as functional day-to-day maintainers or whatever service support trade they have.

🍻


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> The inherent problem with reserve Svc Support people is that they’re likely doing the same job for a lot more money Monday to Friday. It’s much harder to convince a mechanic to come fix vehicles for a fraction of their wage on a weekend than it is to convince someone to go run around the bush or kick in doors. Similar with Signals. The way to increase these numbers is to make it easier to parade, see my comment about the reserve Svc Bn being more of a standards org, and edit the requirements of the Vetrans Education Benefit so that reg for members releasing can be incentivized to join the reserves as opposed to incentivized to not. Increase integration with trade unions / governing bodies so that hours in uniform can translate to apprenticeship time would be another help.


Part of that is engaging the employers also. For example Finning (Caterpillar) can possibly fix and maintain Cat engines installed in our Vehicle fleet. A Reservist who works for Finning could possibly be paid/ subsidized training and Wages by the Military to train up on their current job/ Trade. Even learn how to fix the more technical side of the equipment ie optics.  The Local Finning Shop could have the contract to fix that equipment. Thus allowing the Reservists to work on the very equipment we run and maintain their job. If they need to deploy there could a agreement with their employer, many of the large international companies do already. 


ArmyRick said:


> My personal opinion (subject to having rotten tomatoes thrown at me) is that highly skilled and technical trades should not have a P Res equivalent. It seems very difficult to get these trades trained and employable.
> 
> I would make exceptions for Regular force said trades retiring and joining a local P Res unit, but no P Res entry.


See my above. I can add to the above and say The Reserves have people from all different back grounds and experience to bring to the table. A few I have met and worked alongside were Engineers, Doctors, Ships Captains, Lawyers, Paramedics, Heavy Duty and light Mechanics,  Aircraft Mechanics, Tele communication specialists etc. Many bring a wide variety of skills to the table that may or may not be utilized direct or indirectly. 


Humphrey Bogart said:


> The problem is the Army's archaic recruitment and mundane PLAR process.  Reserve Units like Sigs and Comms as an example, could actually have highly skilled members if they tailored their recruitment towards that.
> 
> Why we recruit so many unskilled people in to the Reserves is beyond me?  High training cost to us with low return on investment.
> 
> IMO, cash incentives and a robust PLAR process is what is really needed.  Maybe Pte Bloggins needs only 1 week of actual trades training and a kit famil as opposed to months of training in the summer?


See above


FJAG said:


> I'll add to that the fact that you really can't expect to maintain any volume of equipment by way of part-time reservists. If ResF units are ever given any major equipment then they need full-time maintainers. The part-timers, once trained in their particular trade should, received refresher military training, learn to operate as units in the field on exercise and receive "upgrade" training in their trade but not be counted on as functional day-to-day maintainers or whatever service support trade they have.
> 
> 🍻


I agree with this to a extent. Properly equipped shops and staff are required. Again you can have Reservists work for local Repair shops while working on our equipment and we could top their pay up. It is workable solution and could be hit for all. Engage the employers and see what could happen.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Alas.  Modern soldiering is too complex for low-skilled part-timers to be much use, and modern skilled workers command too much money to be interested in part-time soldiering.


----------



## McG

Why do we keep thinking that, not only do people want to join the reserves to do their day job, but that there are enough such people to build a force model around them?


----------



## RangerRay

McG said:


> Why do we keep thinking that, not only do people want to join the reserves to do their day job, but that there are enough such people to build a force model around them?


On my reserve Infantry QL2/3 many moons ago, one of my section mates was a cook at his civie job. I asked him why he didn’t go into the cook trade instead. He looked at me like I had three heads and said “Why would I want to do my day job on the side?  I want to blow shit up!”


----------



## Remius

McG said:


> Why do we keep thinking that, not only do people want to join the reserves to do their day job, but that there are enough such people to build a force model around them?


We shouldn’t build a model around them.  But we should be leveraging the skills they have when we can.

On one of the Lentus DomOPs they wouldn’t let us go out without a medic with each group.  We only had 2 but we were sending out multiple groups.  We had two infantry cpls who were civy fire fighters.  Both were way more qualified than the two reserve medics we had so we managed to get permission to have them act as our « medics » with the two we had.  

I’m sure there are plenty of other examples where civy skill sets could be utilized but we just ignore to our loss.


----------



## childs56

Remius said:


> We shouldn’t build a model around them.  But we should be leveraging the skills they have when we can.
> 
> On one of the Lentus DomOPs they wouldn’t let us go out without a medic with each group.  We only had 2 but we were sending out multiple groups.  We had two infantry cpls who were civy fire fighters.  Both were way more qualified than the two reserve medics we had so we managed to get permission to have them act as our « medics » with the two we had.
> 
> I’m sure there are plenty of other examples where civy skill sets could be utilized but we just ignore to our loss.


Thats like when the HLVW had a air line brake during the 2003 fires. The Forestry Officer was a Heavy Duty Mechanic and wanted to fix the truck so it wouldn't get burnt. The Military said no your not qualified to perform this fix. We will leave the truck and come back for it later. He convinced the Section Commander to leave him a driver and the rest leave on another truck. He fixed the line and the driver drove the truck out.


----------



## GK .Dundas

childs56 said:


> Thats like when the HLVW had a air line brake during the 2003 fires. The Forestry Officer was a Heavy Duty Mechanic and wanted to fix the truck so it wouldn't get burnt. The Military said no your not qualified to perform this fix. We will leave the truck and come back for it later. He convinced the Section Commander to leave him a driver and the rest leave on another truck. He fixed the line and the driver drove the truck out.


There's stupid and then there's Army stupid.


----------



## MJP

GK .Dundas said:


> There's stupid and then there's Army stupid.


There is also anecdote, one side of the story and truth.... 

I remember 2003 but don't remember this anecdote not to say I was everywhere but was there and in a world that likely would have heard the story!


----------



## markppcli

childs56 said:


> Part of that is engaging the employers also. For example Finning (Caterpillar) can possibly fix and maintain Cat engines installed in our Vehicle fleet. A Reservist who works for Finning could possibly be paid/ subsidized training and Wages by the Military to train up on their current job/ Trade. Even learn how to fix the more technical side of the equipment ie optics.  The Local Finning Shop could have the contract to fix that equipment. Thus allowing the Reservists to work on the very equipment we run and maintain their job. If they need to deploy there could a agreement with their employer, many of the large international companies do already.
> 
> See my above. I can add to the above and say The Reserves have people from all different back grounds and experience to bring to the table. A few I have met and worked alongside were Engineers, Doctors, Ships Captains, Lawyers, Paramedics, Heavy Duty and light Mechanics,  Aircraft Mechanics, Tele communication specialists etc. Many bring a wide variety of skills to the table that may or may not be utilized direct or indirectly.
> 
> See above
> 
> I agree with this to a extent. Properly equipped shops and staff are required. Again you can have Reservists work for local Repair shops while working on our equipment and we could top their pay up. It is workable solution and could be hit for all. Engage the employers and see what could happen.


See the posts and answer the question “why would Joe the mechanic want to joint an organization to be a badly paid mechanic on the side”? Of course there’s a dozen examples of reservists being able to employ civilian skills or ought to have been able, but of course the risk aversions of the CAF comes into “how do I know you know what your doing?” Its hardly something you can build into something structurally. Unless we start to recruit trades persons wil an optional bonus to give us reserve time after their initial contract.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> See the posts and answer the question “why would Joe the mechanic want to joint an organization to be a badly paid mechanic on the side”? Of course there’s a dozen examples of reservists being able to employ civilian skills or ought to have been able, but of course the risk aversions of the CAF comes into “how do I know you know what your doing?” Its hardly something you can build into something structurally. Unless we start to recruit trades persons wil an optional bonus to give us reserve time after their initial contract.


It isn’t that hard.  And once again it does not have to be structurally into the reserve system. 

Make or create a list of trades and quals civy side that can be applicable and make a list of associated tasks they could   could do or be allowed to do.  Basically a PLAR for some things or maybe waivers in some cases.

Running something that needs a medic nearby?  But you have a few paramedics in your reserve engineer squadron?  Good to go.

Why couldn’t an infantry MCpl who might be an RN conduct part of a recruiting medical at an isolated unit if it helps expedite the file. 

Or a guy who might have a backhoe licence in real life not have that recognized if the need would arise when that could be useful.  

If I have a qualified fire fighter, why can’t I use him to conduct our PFET training?  Instead I have to try and book one through the system. 

It is not about that person doing the same job they have in real life in the reserves but using their skill sets to deal with certain situations that are appropriate and that helps the organisation.   Most of those types are normally very happy to showcase their civy skills on occasion.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Remius said:


> Why couldn’t an infantry MCpl who might be an RN conduct part of a recruiting medical at an isolated unit if it helps expedite the file.
> 
> Or a guy who might have a backhoe licence in real life not have that recognized if the need would arise when that could be useful.
> 
> If I have a qualified fire fighter, why can’t I use him to conduct our PFET training?



Across the multitude of CBGHQs, Cl B Majors in the G1 billets…







G3 staffs…


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:


> Running something that needs a medic nearby?  But you have a few paramedics in your reserve engineer squadron?  Good to go.



As a PRes MSE Op, two-hatting with DND as a paramedic would have not have been good to go with MOHLTC and Sunnybrook Base Hospital.

I was only licenced to work for the city.

In Ontario, to be considered a paramedic who can perform controlled acts and other advanced medical procedures, an individual must:


have the appropriate certificate from the Ministry of Health (MOH);
be employed by a certified ambulance service; and
be authorized by the medical director of an Ontario regional base hospital program.
If you want to be a Pres Med Tech on your days off, join as one.

But, working OT at your city job would pay more. It's a career, not a hobby.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Eye In The Sky said:


> Across the multitude of CBGHQs, Cl B Majors in the G1 billets…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> G3 staffs…



I have come to believe that Army Reserve G3 shops are where good idea fairies are born.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Halifax Tar said:


> I have come to believe that Army Reserve G3 shops are where good idea fairies are born.



live fire Cbt Tm ranges by Port Hardy enter the chat


----------



## dapaterson

In many cases, getting quals recognized is an established process; PRes units are notoriously bad at admin, so it doesn't get done.

For your medical professional example: more than PLAR; would also require training on CAF standards and CAF EHR system.

Nothing is insurmountable. But is the juice worth the squeeze?  And is the unit willing to do the work?  The latter is often the limiting factor - good admin, doing recruiting properly are things that are secondary to running the mess.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> In many cases, getting quals recognized is an established process; PRes units are notoriously bad at admin, so it doesn't get done.
> 
> For your medical professional example: more than PLAR; would also require training on CAF standards and CAF EHR system.
> 
> Nothing is insurmountable. But is the juice worth the squeeze?  And is the unit willing to do the work?  The latter is often the limiting factor - good admin, doing recruiting properly are things that are secondary to running the mess.



Come, come my dear boy, don’t forget other important career builders like hosting the CAF Kilted Regiments conference


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:


> Come, come my dear boy, don’t forget other important career builders like hosting the CAF Kilted Regiments conference


Let's be honest - if the mess isn't up to snuff, would the unit be selected to host the Kilted Regiments conference?


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Let's be honest - if the mess isn't up to snuff, would the unit be selected to host the Kilted Regiments conference?


----------



## childs56

MJP said:


> There is also anecdote, one side of the story and truth....
> 
> I remember 2003 but don't remember this anecdote not to say I was everywhere but was there and in a world that likely would have heard the story!


Did you hear when the Army Reps told the Forestry Reps their helos could not lift a bambi bucket because they did not have the power.  I was delivering supplies to a Forestry Leased Helo, he couldn't believe what he heard. He was running the same model helo as the Army. They were flying people around. I heard they would prefer all the chopper rides to be cut short and a bucket be under the chopper, but what did they know about requirements.  

He was really impressed with our food, and supply lines. When he asked for supplies we had them the next morning, fresh chow and cold drinks out to the fire lines was appreciated.  

When the Same Forestry guy asked me why my Major and his side man were completely useless. I laughed and said I just met them myself. 

The Same Forestry gut who ordered me a nice Chevy pickup truck with AC and some speed to drive around do my job with. It beat the LSVW on speed, radio and comfort. But I actually gained a bit of respect for the LSVW driving it around so much , only to have the Major appropriate the chevy for himself and his self important photo ops. Then have to wash and fuel it up for me the next day, he and the Sgt Major were red faced when they handed me the keys and had to apologize for the misunderstanding.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> It isn’t that hard.  And once again it does not have to be structurally into the reserve system.
> 
> Make or create a list of trades and quals civy side that can be applicable and make a list of associated tasks they could   could do or be allowed to do.  Basically a PLAR for some things or maybe waivers in some cases.
> 
> Running something that needs a medic nearby?  But you have a few paramedics in your reserve engineer squadron?  Good to go.
> 
> Why couldn’t an infantry MCpl who might be an RN conduct part of a recruiting medical at an isolated unit if it helps expedite the file.
> 
> Or a guy who might have a backhoe licence in real life not have that recognized if the need would arise when that could be useful.
> 
> If I have a qualified fire fighter, why can’t I use him to conduct our PFET training?  Instead I have to try and book one through the system.
> 
> It is not about that person doing the same job they have in real life in the reserves but using their skill sets to deal with certain situations that are appropriate and that helps the organisation.   Most of those types are normally very happy to showcase their civy skills on occasion.


Once again, fine you could use them. If they wanted to show up. I’m pretty sure that firefighter, I’d love to know how many full time professional fire fighters are in the reserves btw, doesn’t want to come in knowing he’s doing that. Similar to that nurse, call me cynical but I’d probably ask to be paid at a nursing officers rate if I was performing their role.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Once again, fine you could use them. If they wanted to show up. I’m pretty sure that firefighter, I’d love to know how many full time professional fire fighters are in the reserves btw, doesn’t want to come in knowing he’s doing that. Similar to that nurse, call me cynical but I’d probably ask to be paid at a nursing officers rate if I was performing their role.



If only more professional occupations could be attracted in, we might see some of the worst leadership issues addressed.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> If only more professional occupations could be attracted in, we might see some of the worst leadership issues addressed.


Maybe, but my experience was that the guys sticking around reserve units were usually the ones with less… uh… fulfilling careers, obviously some exceptions of course but generally if you have a serious job, and a hobby, and a family, well the reserves becomes less and less attractive. I don’t really blame some one working 40 hours a week at KPMG for not wanting to come in a fill out a TSR for next months patrolling exercise in Meaford, nor do I blame a guy working on a roof all day not getting very excited about a thrilling Thursday evening of drill and lectures.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Maybe, but my experience was that the guys sticking around reserve units were usually the ones with less… uh… fulfilling careers, obviously some exceptions of course but generally if you have a serious job, and a hobby, and a family, well the reserves becomes less and less attractive.



Dude...


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Dude...


The exception surely.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:


> I have come to believe that Army Reserve G3 shops are where good idea fairies are born.



It’s the company they keep;  other CBG HQ lifers.  Lol


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> Once again, fine you could use them. If they wanted to show up. I’m pretty sure that firefighter, I’d love to know how many full time professional fire fighters are in the reserves btw, doesn’t want to come in knowing he’s doing that. Similar to that nurse, call me cynical but I’d probably ask to be paid at a nursing officers rate if I was performing their role.


You are missing the point. 

This isn’t about firefighters.  (My unit had three for a time btw) or how many are in the reserves.  It’s about leveraging the skill sets some people can bring to the table that can be used when needed.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> If only more professional occupations could be attracted in, we might see some of the worst leadership issues addressed.


 Lawyers and Management Consultants! Yeah . Right. 

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Lawyers and Management Consultants! Yeah . Right.
> 
> 🍻


----------



## mariomike

> Running something that needs a medic nearby? But you have a few paramedics in your reserve engineer squadron? Good to go.



For clarication.

In case the CAF wants to take advantage of PRes members who happen to be off-duty Ontario paramedics,



> Paramedics have no medical delegation or authority to perform controlled acts as a bystander, a firefighter, a first responder or in any other job capacity when they are off duty.





			https://tbrhsc.net/wp-content/base-hospital/policies/MC-400.pdf
		


They can call 9-1-1 with the best of them. But, other than first-aid and CPR, that's about it.


----------



## KevinB

mariomike said:


> For clarication.
> 
> In case the CAF wants to take advantage of PRes members who happen to be off-duty Ontario paramedics,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://tbrhsc.net/wp-content/base-hospital/policies/MC-400.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> They can call 9-1-1 with the best of them. But, other than first-aid and CPR, that's about it.


While true, the CAF could set them up like a Ranger Medic or like, and create a secondary MOSID and work in missing training gaps as needed.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> You are missing the point.
> 
> This isn’t about firefighters.  (My unit had three for a time btw) or how many are in the reserves.  It’s about leveraging the skill sets some people can bring to the table that can be used when needed.



Being in a government town I was, at one time, taken to task for trying to recruit public servants. 

Clearly, there are alot of skills present in the public service that are useful in a CAF context, they are all local residents and so unlikely to move cities (unlike students), and they all have clauses in their employment agreements that permit them to take time off for military training.

This went against the grain of harvesting young and impressionable (and much faster and easier to recruit) souls from local high schools and colleges though, so this idea was consigned to the dustbin of history by the reigning autarks


----------



## mariomike

daftandbarmy said:


> Clearly, there are alot of skills present in the public service that are useful in a CAF context, they are all local residents and so unlikely to move cities (unlike students), and they all have clauses in their employment agreements that permit them to take time off for military training.



This was the Military Leave policy for the government I worked for. Not sure how it compares to others.








						Military Service
					

Policy Statement The City of Toronto supports employees who want to participate in the military reserve force and allows them to take a leave of absence to fulfill their reserve duties. Application All employees listed below are eligible for Military Service leave. Non-union employees CUPE local...




					www.toronto.ca
				




Employees can take a leave of absence with pay, for the two week period of absence, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Training Program.

The maximum period of absence is two weeks in a calendar year.

Employees applying for leave must provide their executive director/general manager/division head or designate with a letter of support from their commanding officer.

Employees are paid their regular pay provided they submit any compensation received for military service to the city treasurer, unless this compensation is paid for days they are not scheduled to work.

Note: The last part of that sentence can work to your advantage if you are on a 12 / 24 -hour shift schedule.

Compensation received for travelling expenses and meal allowance does not have to be returned to the city.

All benefits continue during the leave.

An employee’s service is not affected by the leave. An employee’s vacation entitlement, and pension credit do not change.



> This went against the grain of harvesting young and impressionable (and much faster and easier to recruit) souls from local high schools and colleges though, so this idea was consigned to the dustbin of history by the reigning autarks



I joined the PRes when I was 16. At that age, I was pretty "moldable".


----------



## desindarfur

When I was working in the Ontario Public Service they had a policy that allowed for one week of paid leave of absence for military training.


----------



## mariomike

desindarfur said:


> When I was working in the Ontario Public Service they had a policy that allowed for one week of paid leave of absence for military training.



The 2 weeks annual paid leave we got was pretty generous, in my opinion.

It cost our city taxpayers 200 hours in salary. ( 80 hours for the reservist + 80 hours OT at time and a half for your replacement ).


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> You are missing the point.
> 
> This isn’t about firefighters.  (My unit had three for a time btw) or how many are in the reserves.  It’s about leveraging the skill sets some people can bring to the table that can be used when needed.


No you’ve missed my point. I used fire fighters as an example, then I followed up with nurses. The salient point being you can’t rely on people coming in to do their civilian job for less money, or even expect them to. Because who would want to?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> No you’ve missed my point. I used fire fighters as an example, then I followed up with nurses. The salient point being you can’t rely on people coming in to do their civilian job for less money, or even expect them to. Because who would want to?


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Being in a government town I was, at one time, taken to task for trying to recruit public servants.
> 
> Clearly, there are alot of skills present in the public service that are useful in a CAF context, they are all local residents and so unlikely to move cities (unlike students), and they all have clauses in their employment agreements that permit them to take time off for military training.
> 
> This went against the grain of harvesting young and impressionable (and much faster and easier to recruit) souls from local high schools and colleges though, so this idea was consigned to the dustbin of history by the reigning autarks


I’m sure your unit would have been keen to gainfully employ 17 new OCdts.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’m sure your unit would have been keen to gainfully employ 17 new OCdts.



GIven the CAF's ability to piss off new Potential Officers to the point that they quit in frustration, having 17 to start with would mean that we'd likley get one or two through their (at least) two years of training


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Being in a government town I was, at one time, taken to task for trying to recruit public servants.
> 
> Clearly, there are alot of skills present in the public service that are useful in a CAF context, they are all local residents and so unlikely to move cities (unlike students), and they all have clauses in their employment agreements that permit them to take time off for military training.
> 
> This went against the grain of harvesting young and impressionable (and much faster and easier to recruit) souls from local high schools and colleges though, so this idea was consigned to the dustbin of history by the reigning autarks


The interesting thing about the PRes in the legal branch is that every ResF legal officer recruit has to already be a qualified lawyer fully licensed to practice law in their province. This makes the recruiting process somewhat unique. The establishment was 65 across the country inclusive of those recruited for DMP and DDCS who were primarily chosen from the criminal bar. We managed to pretty much stay at 90-95% of establishment year-round and occasionally hit 100%.

One big thing is that the training path is tremendously shortened by concentrating on folks already called to the bar. Essentially all we had to do was add on the training for Mil Admin Law, Ops Law and Mil Justice Law through the same modules that were given to the RegF LegOs. Those modules were easily achievable by reservists.

Effectively, there is no difference between a newly trained ResF and RegF LegO although from that point forward the experience levels start to diverge dramatically as a result of the fact that RegF ones are totally employed in Mil Admin and Ops Law and therefore start to pull away knowledge wise. There is one great reversal of that, however. ResF criminal law lawyers work full time in the field at a much more intense and complex level than RegF Mil Justice ones. RegF DMP and DDCS LegOs have nowhere near the depth and breadth of criminal justice experience that the ResF ones have. In my day we had several ResF DMP and DDCS LegOs who were mentors and subject matter experts for the RegF ones.

The value of a civilian professional in a military organization can vary greatly. The trick is identifying where the strengths and weaknesses are and leveraging the strengths to maximum effect within the general limitations that ResF service brings to the table.

🍻


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> No you’ve missed my point. I used fire fighters as an example, then I followed up with nurses. The salient point being you can’t rely on people coming in to do their civilian job for less money, or even expect them to. Because who would want to?


It isn’t about them coming in to do their job all the time.  It’s about leveraging the skills they have when needed.  

If I can get the fire fighter to deliver few hours of PFET training in the fall rather than wait x amount of time to get one and get that check in the box then why not?  It’s not about making them our unit fire fighter or unit nurse. 

We’ve  had police officers in our unit teach guys how to properly effectuate citizen arrests (dom ops context) .  None of them had an issue with it and none were crying foul over money. 

I know it’s hard to believe for some but plenty of reservists with careers and jobs aren’t in it for the money.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> No you’ve missed my point. I used fire fighters as an example, then I followed up with nurses. The salient point being you can’t rely on people coming in to do their civilian job for less money, or even expect them to. Because who would want to?


I'll disagree with that.

My ResF daily rate of pay was less than my hourly billing rate as a civilian lawyer. Every full day of ResF service was roughly $500.00 net out of my own pocket as well as almost as much out of my partnership's income. That was and remains true for many of the ResF LegOs in the system (except for the ones in provincial or federal government service). 

Our folks were there for entirely different reasons. I used to run a one week summer field exercise for both the RegF and ResF LegO in Prairie region which did everything from small arms live fire to teaching folks how to cook and eat military rations and sleep in the woods (besides such things as doing POW determination tribunals). 

It was the change from the ordinary day-to-day stuff and the camaraderie of ResF service that grabbed them. 

We had a few clunkers but for the most part they were enthusiasts.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> It isn’t about them coming in to do their job all the time.  It’s about leveraging the skills they have when needed.
> 
> If I can get the fire fighter to deliver few hours of PFET training in the fall rather than wait x amount of time to get one and get that check in the box then why not?  It’s not about making them our unit fire fighter or unit nurse.
> 
> We’ve  had police officers in our unit teach guys how to properly effectuate citizen arrests (dom ops context) .  None of them had an issue with it and none were crying foul over money.
> 
> I know it’s hard to believe for some but plenty of reservists with careers and jobs aren’t in it for the money.


If your in a dom op it’s not a citizens arrest, you’re a peace officer in that context.  My point was an *expectation* of using civilians skills is building on a poor foundation. It’s great you have guys willing to do that, but imagine trying to organize across a wide breadth of units and civilian skills to make that happen, or ensuing your IBTS requirements actually align with the way it’s being taught. Telling a soldier “hey Steve, your a plumber right? Next week I’m going to need you to fix the plumbing in mens bathroom” is probably not the direction you want to go to build the reserves in terms of numbers or capability. 



FJAG said:


> I'll disagree with that.
> 
> My ResF daily rate of pay was less than my hourly billing rate as a civilian lawyer. Every full day of ResF service was roughly $500.00 net out of my own pocket as well as almost as much out of my partnership's income. That was and remains true for many of the ResF LegOs in the system (except for the ones in provincial or federal government service).
> 
> Our folks were there for entirely different reasons. I used to run a one week summer field exercise for both the RegF and ResF LegO in Prairie region which did everything from small arms live fire to teaching folks how to cook and eat military rations and sleep in the woods (besides such things as doing POW determination tribunals).
> 
> It was the change from the ordinary day-to-day stuff and the camaraderie of ResF service that grabbed them.
> 
> We had a few clunkers but for the most part they were enthusiasts.
> 
> 🍻


Were you being asked to review charges or contracts as a lawyer when you showed up?


----------



## mariomike

markppcli said:


> My point was an *expectation* of using civilians skills is building on a poor foundation.



Nice if you are invited to give a lecture next week in a classroom at the armoury.

Not so nice to be doing your MSE Op job on a field ex., and people screaming, "Hey you! Medic!!" - while pointing dirctly at you.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> If your in a dom op it’s not a citizens arrest, you’re a peace officer in that context.  My point was an *expectation* of using civilians skills is building on a poor foundation. It’s great you have guys willing to do that, but imagine trying to organize across a wide breadth of units and civilian skills to make that happen, or ensuing your IBTS requirements actually align with the way it’s being taught. Telling a soldier “hey Steve, your a plumber right? Next week I’m going to need you to fix the plumbing in mens bathroom” is probably not the direction you want to go to build the reserves in terms of numbers or capability.
> 
> 
> Were you being asked to review charges or contracts as a lawyer when you showed up?


Once again it’s isn’t about building this structurally into the reserves.

And no you have that absolutely wrong about being a peace officer in that context.  It was quite the opposite and dealing with situations where we weren’t acting as peace officers but dealing with potential issues that arise in dom ops that could lead to troops having to effectuate citizen arrests.  If we were acting as peace officers we’d be making actual arrests which was not the case.  The citizen arrest training was to show them how to do it correctly and legally. 

Again, it’s not about abusing someone’s skill set but using it when the the institution fails us as it does very often.  I already provided actual examples where in a pinch their quals came in handy.  Maintaining a list and getting them checked off for certain things is just a smart easy thing to do.  Not sure why you would want to ignore it.  

You seem to to think it has something to do with going to recruit from those groups.  It’s isn’t.  It’s about the 17 year old who joins stays in gets his career off the ground but still serves.  The fire fighters we had all started with the unit became fire fighters and still served for a time.  The cops are mostly the same but a few are ex reg force who joined.  We had a nurse that was with us fir about 7 years but didn’t join as a nurse.  Was a student who became one.  There are still some that will join after getting a career somewhere else but it’s more the guys who are in and have the mentality of wanting to help where and when they can because of their initial links to the unit.

How many times do we lament that private industry should recognize military quals and what they can bring to the table?  I bet someone somewhere made similar arguments that you have made and nothing ever gets done to fix that.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Once again it’s isn’t about building this structurally into the reserves.
> 
> And no you have that absolutely wrong about being a peace officer in that context.  It was quite the opposite and dealing with situations where we weren’t acting as peace officers but dealing with potential issues that arise in dom ops that could lead to troops having to effectuate citizen arrests.  If we were acting as peace officers we’d be making actual arrests which was not the case.  The citizen arrest training was to show them how to do it correctly and legally.



In what context, in a dom op, would you be conducting a citizens arrest? 



Remius said:


> Again, it’s not about abusing someone’s skill set but using it when the the institution fails us as it does very often.  I already provided actual examples where in a pinch their quals came in handy.  Maintaining a list and getting them checked off for certain things is just a smart easy thing to do.  Not sure why you would want to ignore it.



The context of this conversation arouse from how to get more support trades into the reserves… so yeah we’d need to be able to rely on the use of those skills.



Remius said:


> You seem to to think it has something to do with going to recruit from those groups.  It’s isn’t.  It’s about the 17 year old who joins stays in gets his career off the ground but still serves.  The fire fighters we had all started with the unit became fire fighters and still served for a time.  The cops are mostly the same but a few are ex reg force who joined.  We had a nurse that was with us fir about 7 years but didn’t join as a nurse.  Was a student who became one.  There are still some that will join after getting a career somewhere else but it’s more the guys who are in and have the mentality of wanting to help where and when they can because of their initial links to the unit.



Never said that. What I’ve said, and I’ve been fairly clear in this, is that those people aren’t going to want to join to do their civilian jobs for less money. What you just described is completely different . 



Remius said:


> How many times do we lament that private industry should recognize military quals and what they can bring to the table?  I bet someone somewhere made similar arguments that you have made and nothing ever gets done to fix that.


I don’t, and for most trades they actually do. Frankly my ability to organize a section isn’t super relevent to most jobs… maybe early childhood education.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> How many times do we lament that private industry should recognize military quals and what they can bring to the table?  I bet someone somewhere made similar arguments that you have made and nothing ever gets done to fix that.



OTOH, at one time, my rifle company complement included a nuclear physicist who was #2 on the C6. She did a great job on the gun team.

I'm not sure the CAF would have been qualified to employ her civilian skills anywhere, even if she had offered


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Were you being asked to review charges or contracts as a lawyer when you showed up?


The job changed quite a bit over the years as I moved up and as the terms of reference of what LegOs did and had to do.

In my early years as a major I was a jack of all trades doing all of the above and much more. One of my biggest roles then was "legal advice by walking around" which essentially was visiting the district's units during their parade nights and exercises and having coffee with folks. It's surprising how much you can find out about the issues a unit is having by having a friendly cup of coffee with them. I also did a fair bit of prosecuting and defence work in those days. (This was before DMP and DDCS when we prosecuted within our own region and would be called on as defence counsel in other regions). A ton of lecturing on Ops Law (primarily LOAC) and Mil Justice.

As  lieutenant colonel DAJAG the job was mainly supervising all the ResF LegOs in MilAreaPrairie, dealing with the district commanders and CWO on broad legal issues and working on appellate cases before the CMAC. That later switched to a role as a DLaw/SP with DLawT to do training which turned out to be a bust (funding issues for exercises) so I turned my attention to creating policy documents for ResF LegO governance and a further ton of lecturing on Ops Law.

My last job as DJAG/Res was a the CAF's senior ResF legal advisor where I was concerned with overall governance of all ResF LegOs (but not command as that remained within the various directorates), advising CRes and Cadets and Council; providing legal advice on various ResF centric projects and participating in international ResF agencies (a lot of swanning around on that but very busy).

Long story short. The job a ResF LegO does is very much dependant on what they are willing to do and what their AJAG or Director assigns them to do. Some stay connected primarily to their ResF brigades and provide the bulk of the legal services to them while other who have special talents are much more used across the board. Each of an AJAG office, DMP and DDCS is in fact a total force organization which is commanded by a RegF LegO with a ResF deputy and a variety of RegF and ResF LegOs with varying talents. How each operates is very much personality and ability driven.

One point on contracts. In my day there wasn't much contract work for AJAGs (and none for DMP or DDCS that I know of). Much of that is specialized work that's more in the purview of DND&CF LA (and prior to DND&CF LA there was a JAG directorate that did most of that). There was some minor claims work decentralized to AJAGs but contracting isn't really part of what ResF LegOs get involved in even though some of them were experts at it in their private practice.


🍻


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> We shouldn’t build a model around them.  But we should be leveraging the skills they have when we can.
> 
> On one of the Lentus DomOPs they wouldn’t let us go out without a medic with each group.  We only had 2 but we were sending out multiple groups.  We had two infantry cpls who were civy fire fighters.  Both were way more qualified than the two reserve medics we had so we managed to get permission to have them act as our « medics » with the two we had.
> 
> I’m sure there are plenty of other examples where civy skill sets could be utilized but we just ignore to our loss.


What you’ve described here is literally force structure. You didn’t have enough medics, that’s a structure issue, so you now had to rely on some one’s civy skills, so now you have to track who has what, what that equates do ect ect. In the context of a medic that means their scope of practice which is different province to province, and qualification to qualification.


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:


> We had two infantry cpls who were civy fire fighters.  Both were way more qualified than the two reserve medics we had so we managed to get permission to have them act as our « medics » with the two we had.



You could have an infantry cpl with an Honours Bachelor of Science Degree in Paramedicine from the University of Toronto, employed as an Ontario  Critical Care Paramedic.

But, if something goes down when they are off-duty,



> Paramedics have no medical delegation or authority to perform controlled acts as a bystander, a firefighter, a first responder or in any other job capacity when they are off duty.





> They can dial 9-1-1 with the best of them. But, other than first-aid and CPR, that's about it.


----------



## FJAG

Medics are in fact one of the professions that give me pause as to how reasonable it is to have professionals in the reserves. This is not because of the value that they bring day to day, which is substantial, but how useable they are in an emergency or disaster when they will probably be even more required in their civilian role. They are already essential workers. Will their skill be as well utilized in the role of a military medic as they would be as a civilian nurse or paramedic.

If the intent is to expand the availability of skilled workers in an emergency through activating a military reserve don't we have to position those essential "military" skills in a civilian workforce that is not inherently essential during an emergency?


----------



## mariomike

FJAG said:


> If the intent is to expand the availability of skilled workers in an emergency through activating a military reserve don't we have to position those essential "military" skills in a civilian workforce that is not inherently essential during an emergency?



Our orders were,

Military Leave
24.09 (a) Leave of absence shall be granted to employees to serve in the Armed Forces during hostilities or during a time of war as declared by the Government of Canada. Seniority will accumulate during such leave.

"Hostilities" or "war".

Nothing about leave for Dom Ops.


----------



## FJAG

mariomike said:


> Our orders were,
> 
> Military Leave
> 24.09 (a) Leave of absence shall be granted to employees to serve in the Armed Forces during hostilities or during a time of war as declared by the Government of Canada. Seniority will accumulate during such leave.


I'm thinking more in the nature of a call out for a domestic disaster or health crisis like supporting facilities during COVID etc where the aim is to augment the civilian health care workers. There's still scope for that if the disaster is local and you can bring in professionally qualified reservists from other provinces but, as has been pointed out here, those people might still end up underemployed because of provincial licencing restrictions.

🍻


----------



## mariomike

FJAG said:


> I'm thinking more in the nature of a call out for a domestic disaster or health crisis like supporting facilities during COVID etc where the aim is to augment the civilian health care workers.
> 
> 🍻



Like HUSAR CAN-TF3. They are able to respond to disaster situations at a city, provincial and national level, as well as offer international assistance.

There are other specialty teams as well.

But, those police, firefighters and paramedics would be under the command of the City of Toronto. Not the CAF.



> There's still scope for that if the disaster is local and you can bring in professionally qualified reservists from other provinces but, as has been pointed out here, those people might still end up underemployed because of provincial licencing restrictions.


Right.

In Canada, provincial paramedic regulators have the legislated authority to grant registration/licensure/certification to individuals to practice as paramedics. Regulation, registration/licensing/certification requirements and practice standards differ in each provincial jurisdiction.


----------



## Brad Sallows

FJAG said:


> If the intent is to expand the availability of skilled workers in an emergency through activating a military reserve don't we have to position those essential "military" skills in a civilian workforce that is not inherently essential during an emergency?



Most emergency responses end up bringing in people from outside the affected area (eg. swarms of utility workers); there aren't that many scenarios where all possible hands are needed and those scenarios usually mean we have much bigger problems to solve.


----------



## Remius

Brad Sallows said:


> Most emergency responses end up bringing in people from outside the affected area (eg. swarms of utility workers); there aren't that many scenarios where all possible hands are needed and those scenarios usually mean we have much bigger problems to solve.


It why we had a few firefighters in our unit come out on one OP Lentus.  They wanted to deploy to help and got the time off to do it.  Mileage will vary I would guess on the emergency, how local it is and flexibility of the employer.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> What you’ve described here is literally force structure. You didn’t have enough medics, that’s a structure issue, so you now had to rely on some one’s civy skills, so now you have to track who has what, what that equates do ect ect. In the context of a medic that means their scope of practice which is different province to province, and qualification to qualification.


Which is what we already do when qualified (ie semi skilled) pers apply to the CAF.


----------



## RangerRay

daftandbarmy said:


> Being in a government town I was, at one time, taken to task for trying to recruit public servants.
> 
> Clearly, there are alot of skills present in the public service that are useful in a CAF context, they are all local residents and so unlikely to move cities (unlike students), and they all have clauses in their employment agreements that permit them to take time off for military training.
> 
> This went against the grain of harvesting young and impressionable (and much faster and easier to recruit) souls from local high schools and colleges though, so this idea was consigned to the dustbin of history by the reigning autarks


FFS… 🤦‍♂️


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Which is what we already do when qualified (ie semi skilled) pers apply to the CAF.


Yea, in specific trades. Trying to keep tabs on every paint, plumber, and candle stick maker in the reserves specific qualifications would be an administrative nightmare for very little practical gain.


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> The job changed quite a bit over the years as I moved up and as the terms of reference of what LegOs did and had to do.
> 
> In my early years as a major I was a jack of all trades doing all of the above and much more. One of my biggest roles then was "legal advice by walking around" which essentially was visiting the district's units during their parade nights and exercises and having coffee with folks. It's surprising how much you can find out about the issues a unit is having by having a friendly cup of coffee with them. I also did a fair bit of prosecuting and defence work in those days. (This was before DMP and DDCS when we prosecuted within our own region and would be called on as defence counsel in other regions). A ton of lecturing on Ops Law (primarily LOAC) and Mil Justice.
> 
> As  lieutenant colonel DAJAG the job was mainly supervising all the ResF LegOs in MilAreaPrairie, dealing with the district commanders and CWO on broad legal issues and working on appellate cases before the CMAC. That later switched to a role as a DLaw/SP with DLawT to do training which turned out to be a bust (funding issues for exercises) so I turned my attention to creating policy documents for ResF LegO governance and a further ton of lecturing on Ops Law.
> 
> My last job as DJAG/Res was a the CAF's senior ResF legal advisor where I was concerned with overall governance of all ResF LegOs (but not command as that remained within the various directorates), advising CRes and Cadets and Council; providing legal advice on various ResF centric projects and participating in international ResF agencies (a lot of swanning around on that but very busy).
> 
> Long story short. The job a ResF LegO does is very much dependant on what they are willing to do and what their AJAG or Director assigns them to do. Some stay connected primarily to their ResF brigades and provide the bulk of the legal services to them while other who have special talents are much more used across the board. Each of an AJAG office, DMP and DDCS is in fact a total force organization which is commanded by a RegF LegO with a ResF deputy and a variety of RegF and ResF LegOs with varying talents. How each operates is very much personality and ability driven.
> 
> One point on contracts. In my day there wasn't much contract work for AJAGs (and none for DMP or DDCS that I know of). Much of that is specialized work that's more in the purview of DND&CF LA (and prior to DND&CF LA there was a JAG directorate that did most of that). There was some minor claims work decentralized to AJAGs but contracting isn't really part of what ResF LegOs get involved in even though some of them were experts at it in their private practice.
> 
> 
> 🍻


Sorry that an an excellent reply to a question I asked in error.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> Yea, in specific trades. Trying to keep tabs on every paint, plumber, and candle stick maker in the reserves specific qualifications would be an administrative nightmare for very little practical gain.


We’ll have to agree to disagree. 

Not leveraging the skills people can bring to the table is a mistake in my opinion.  

But we are still stuck in an 1980s mindset and modernizing isn’t something the CAF is good at so I get it.


----------



## KevinB

Remius said:


> We’ll have to agree to disagree.
> 
> Not leveraging the skills people can bring to the table is a mistake in my opinion.
> 
> But we are still stuck in an 1980s mindset and modernizing isn’t something the CAF is good at so I get it.


It would be very simply to add a section to one’s MPRR (or whatever that is today) on supplemental qualifications.  
   However given that my MPRR was never accurate and for years was sent in a never ending circle for updates in the Reg Force, I’m not really optimistic that it would be any better in the Reg Force.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> We’ll have to agree to disagree.
> 
> Not leveraging the skills people can bring to the table is a mistake in my opinion.
> 
> But we are still stuck in an 1980s mindset and modernizing isn’t something the CAF is good at so I get it.


And I fail to see how any of what your talking about pertains to modernization, restructuring the reserves, and reconstitution. Yes good we have firefighters, and occasionally that may be useful, but there is a point in which it’s much simpler to just blanket train everybody. 

Leveraging Skills - Good, but how on earth does that help us recruit, retain, and reconstitute ?


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> It would be very simply to add a section to one’s MPRR (or whatever that is today) on supplemental qualifications.
> However given that my MPRR was never accurate and for years was sent in a never ending circle for updates in the Reg Force, I’m not really optimistic that it would be any better in the Reg Force.


It wouldn’t be though, because now we have to track a) the qualification, b) the granting institution, c) what that qualification actually means, d) expiry, required retraining, and any other licensing issues. Who do we expect to do that?


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> It wouldn’t be though, because now we have to track a) the qualification, b) the granting institution, c) what that qualification actually means, d) expiry, required retraining, and any other licensing issues. Who do we expect to do that?


Clearly the same folks who already don’t do that for CAF courses in the MPRR  

Beyond that easy…


----------



## dapaterson

Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF.  Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed.  So you're a volunteer firefighter?  Check.  You speak and write Klingon?  Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)

Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information.  And the ability to input info.  Including flagging corrections.  And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.


----------



## GR66

dapaterson said:


> Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF.  Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed.  So you're a volunteer firefighter?  Check.  You speak and write Klingon?  Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)
> 
> Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information.  And the ability to input info.  Including flagging corrections.  And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.


Of course if we were actually fighting the Russians in Latvia and your vehicle broke down and the cook said he could fix it she'd just do it...no referring to the MPRR required.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> And I fail to see how any of what your talking about pertains to modernization, restructuring the reserves, and reconstitution. Yes good we have firefighters, and occasionally that may be useful, but there is a point in which it’s much simpler to just blanket train everybody.
> 
> Leveraging Skills - Good, but how on earth does that help us recruit, retain, and reconstitute ?



HR modernisation is a thing.  And should be part of any discussion as it pertains to restructuring the reserves or any large organisation. 

It’s bigger picture.  If I can get troops dagged faster and more efficiently (ie PFET training) rather than wait months or in some cases longer because we can’t get a reg force fire fighter to come out one evening after hours or on a Saturday morning.  Or get the nurse I have that is more than willing to help expedite some recruiting medicals that will otherwise sit for months on end because that part of the system is broken.  

All I can do is offer up what suggestions I can when asked.  I don’t make the big decisions.

As I said we can agree to disagree.


----------



## dapaterson

Records are for management, not combat.

But they permit identification of skills (writ large) when needed.  Need people with specific language skills to sit in an airconditioned box and translate?  That should be on the MPRR, searchable, so Bloggins can be sent for testing and, if their skills are sufficient, we can send them to that airconditioned box.


----------



## Remius

dapaterson said:


> Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF.  Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed.  So you're a volunteer firefighter?  Check.  You speak and write Klingon?  Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)
> 
> Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information.  And the ability to input info.  Including flagging corrections.  And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.


We’ve been staff checked many times for languages and have historically kept a bank of names in case the need arises and it does at times.  Beyond Franco and Anglo.


----------



## Remius

dapaterson said:


> Records are for management, not combat.
> 
> But they permit identification of skills (writ large) when needed.  Need people with specific language skills to sit in an airconditioned box and translate?  That should be on the MPRR, searchable, so Bloggins can be sent for testing and, if their skills are sufficient, we can send them to that airconditioned box.


Sometimes it’s just to send a driver for some visiting dignitary that can speak the language.


----------



## mariomike

Remius said:


> Not leveraging the skills people can bring to the table is a mistake in my opinion.



CAF should also understand what professionals are licenced to do - and not licenced to do - when off-duty.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF.  Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed.  So you're a volunteer firefighter?  Check.  You speak and write Klingon?  Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)
> 
> Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information.  And the ability to input info.  Including flagging corrections.  And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.


Just a guess - this was not a PY neutral solution.


----------



## dapaterson

Remius said:


> We’ve been staff checked many times for languages and have historically kept a bank of names in case the need arises and it does at times.  Beyond Franco and Anglo.


As I said - two types of quals.  MPRR.  Stops the need to send staff checks.  That assumes units will keep records up to date.  Which, in the Army Reserve, does not happen.

Again - if unit records are not maintained / transfers take months / releases take months etc etc, then let a few Army Res COs hang "pour encourager les autres".


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:


> Just a guess - this was not a PY neutral solution.


Self service in HR can reduce demand for clerks.

But, as noted elsewhere many times, the Army is not serious about admin, particularly for Res units.  A clerk's role is to administer.  If you send them to instruct on a BMQ, that admin doesn't happen.  If you use the money that's intended for a class B clerk to hire a class B Regimental Anniversary Planner instead, that admin doesn't happen.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Self service in HR can reduce demand for clerks.
> 
> But, as noted elsewhere many times, the Army is not serious about admin, particularly for Res units.  A clerk's role is to administer.  If you send them to instruct on a BMQ, that admin doesn't happen.  If you use the money that's intended for a class B clerk to hire a class B Regimental Anniversary Planner instead, *or the CO had to find his side dish a job*, that admin doesn't happen.



There, augmented that for you


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> There, augmented that for you


That wouldn't be half as funny if I didn't know of at least one case of that happening.


----------



## RangerRay

daftandbarmy said:


> There, augmented that for you


Eww.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> Records are for management, not combat.
> 
> But they permit identification of skills (writ large) when needed.  Need people with specific language skills to sit in an airconditioned box and translate?  That should be on the MPRR, searchable, so Bloggins can be sent for testing and, if their skills are sufficient, we can send them to that airconditioned box.


I think your saying MPRR but meaning monitor mass, to make them searchable you need standardized titles / qual codes / ect ect. So we fall back on who’s going to do that for the whole mess of civilian qualifications; for the benefit of knowing Cpl Bloggins is a first year basket weaver, sadly when needed for the great basket emergency he won’t have his tools or means to transport them so it’s all for naught.


----------



## McG

Oh, definitely don’t stick the information in MonitorMASS. If it matters then put it in the real system of record, not into the Franken-app.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> I think your saying MPRR but meaning monitor mass, to make them searchable you need standardized titles / qual codes / ect ect. So we fall back on who’s going to do that for the whole mess of civilian qualifications; for the benefit of knowing Cpl Bloggins is a first year basket weaver, sadly when needed for the great basket emergency he won’t have his tools or means to transport them so it’s all for naught.




Attitudes like this is why we can’t get anything done and why the reserves are in the state that it is.   « Sorry, too hard. »


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Attitudes like this is why we can’t get anything done and why the reserves are in the state that it is.   « Sorry, too hard. »


No, the reserves is non functional because it fights tooth and nail to stay built on a system of 1890s social clubs as opposed to evolving. Do you think keeping tabs of civilian quals would stop people getting out or all of a sudden makes the Rocky Mountain Rangers a viable Bn? 

Don’t worry I’m not so thin skinned I get offended by a different opinion. 



McG said:


> Oh, definitely don’t stick the information in MonitorMASS. If it matters then put it in the real system of record, not into the Franken-app.


It works better than people give it credit for, just a terrible UI.


----------



## mariomike

markppcli said:


> So we fall back on who’s going to do that for the whole mess of civilian qualifications; for the benefit of knowing Cpl Bloggins is a first year basket weaver, sadly when needed for the great basket emergency he won’t have his tools or means to transport them so it’s all for naught.



Even if they had the equipment and supplies, certain professions are not licenced in their clinical practice when working part-time for the CAF.


----------



## KevinB

mariomike said:


> Even if they had the equipment and supplies, certain professions are not licenced in their clinical practice when working part-time for the CAF.


But the CAF could license/indemnify them in extremis.


----------



## mariomike

KevinB said:


> But the CAF could license/indemnify them in extremis.



I am only familiar with Medical Control in Ontario.



> The paramedic must be on duty as an employee of a licensed ambulance service when providing any advanced life support care to any patient within Ontario to be covered by their respective Base Hospital Program Medical Director’s License.



I was an MSE Op. As far as CAF Med Techs are concerned, I just know what I read on here.

QUOTE

Medics are not maintaining their PCP licence for the same reason that they are not completing their yearly MCSP requirements. And its not because Med techs lack motivation or drive.
I have been a Medic for 11 years. I'm on my 6Th posting, and have been licensed as a PCP in 5 different provinces. I have spent thousands of dollars trying to maintain a licence but I have finally given up. 11 years in, and I have only had 2 shifts on Amb through the MCSP program.
Until the CoC gets serious about providing real MCSP for Medics (that EHS in Canada will honor), most Medics will not be able to maintain a licence.

The issue I've found is that I was licensed in BC upon completion of my PCP. Now I'm posted in Ontario and I asked about challenging the Ontario exam to become licensed here. I was told that the unit will only pay for QL5's to do this. I also haven't received any opportunities for MCSP, and I've been posted for over 2 years now. So now my license in BC has expired and I do not hold any sort of qualification in Ontario. I'd hoped the military would have been more supportive of keeping us Med Tech's licensed so that the training we'd received would be more useful.

Back in 2007 the military approached the MOHLTC to accept their QL5 Med Techs if trained at JIBC, to be permitted to challenge the AEMCA. In the past the Ministry has permitted this, but has required an additional of 120 hrs minimum of field placement in Ontario.

To obtain these hours you could participate in a Med Tech Field Placement Program. Currently there are several Military Med Tech Field Placement Programs that have been implemented across Ontario. This Program offers Med Techs both QL3 and QL5 the opportunity to obtain these 120 hours, in addition to having the ability to be Temporarily Certified to perform Medical Directives consist ( sic ) with that of a Primary Care Paramedic in Ontario while doing their ride alongs. Some services that currently offer this program are: Ottawa, Toronto, Renfrew County, and possibly Simcoe County. There may be a couple other services that offer it as well.

In the past three years we have offered this program to 57 Med Techs.

The process generally calls for writing the AEMCA in addition to possibly a practical skills test (has been done in the past - but not always depending on qualifications and education)."

There was an agreement posted on the CFHS website between the CF and the Ontario MOHLTC allowing QL5's to challenge the AEMCA exam.

The link no longer works.

"Recognition of QL5A & Challenge of AEMCA exam:

Reference A is a confirmation letter by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Emergency Health Services Branch, recognizing the CF QL5 Med Tech as meeting the PCP requirements to challenge the AEMCA exam, all QL5 Med Techs are encouraged to prepare for and write this exam with approval through their Chain of Command. Upon successful completion of this exam, those Med Techs will have access to On-car opportunities to complete their MCSP in Ontario.

A decision was made that going forward, all CAF HS occupations would hold an equivalent civilian license or certification. That is when the PCP qualified Med Tech appeared in the Reg F. We (at the coal face) knew from the very outset that it was just not sustainable for a variety of reasons. PCP was seen as the one qual that was accepted (mostly) across Canada, allowing our pers to be posted, or employed on DOMOPS without too much difficulty. Reality was very different though, as has been noted above.

That is when the PCP qualified Med Tech appeared in the Reg F. We (at the coal face) knew from the very outset that it was just not sustainable for a variety of reasons. PCP was seen as the one qual that was accepted (mostly) across Canada, allowing our pers to be posted, or employed on DOMOPS without too much difficulty. Reality was very different though, as has been noted above.

END QUOTE


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> No, the reserves is non functional because it fights tooth and nail to stay built on a system of 1890s social clubs as opposed to evolving. Do you think keeping tabs of civilian quals would stop people getting out or all of a sudden makes the Rocky Mountain Rangers a viable Bn?
> 
> Don’t worry I’m not so thin skinned I get offended by a different opinion.
> 
> 
> It works better than people give it credit for, just a terrible UI.


I didn’t mean to offend if it came off that way.  And it may and does look tocome off like that. 

I would suggest that is very antiquated and biased view of the reserves and just how desperate they actually do want to evolve.

The CAF has no idea what it wants from its reserve force and in particular the army reserves.  
I’m not saying that some units are resistant to certain changes but at some point things break when they are ignored or left to rot for too long.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:


> There, augmented that for you


Like that wouldn't happen in a large Federal Department where a whole new level of management would be created in order for the Regional Director General to employ her boy toy.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

markppcli said:


> I think your saying MPRR but meaning monitor mass, to make them searchable you need standardized titles / qual codes / ect ect. So we fall back on who’s going to do that for the whole mess of civilian qualifications; for the benefit of knowing Cpl Bloggins is a first year basket weaver, sadly when needed for the great basket emergency he won’t have his tools or means to transport them so it’s all for naught.


Have searchable check boxes for different types of qualifications and skills along the ability to put in dates. The check boxes can be generic (Class 3 drivers licence, First Aid training, 2nd language, diving certification, explosive ticket, mechanic training) Have a profile that each member can update as needed and by logging in themselves.
This would allow a quick database search for potentiel skillsets, then a more granular search can be done through the results fairly quickly.


----------



## foresterab

Interesting discussion on what is involved with secondary credentials.   I've been on wildfires where the out of province resource beside me offers to deal with bear issues...because that's part of their day job but not mine...or oil spills or wiring (journeyman electrician who did a career change).  Like the army these are not tracked skills but there are some things I think we do right...especially out of province when credentials are not the same.

Deploy on a wildfire and you go as X role - incident commander, fire fighter, helicopter coordinator?...it's the role the host agency ordered but the agency representative/liaison officer also has copies of all your training and certification records so if you need to move from position X to Y they can authorize the change.   Keep in mind that position change might also entail very different workloads, qualifications and payment rates as per the pre-arranged agreements.     So it's a positive on that front...

Unfortunately things like languages are rarely tracked well.   Africans, Polish, Dene, Cree, French, German, Russian...pick a language skill set and they've come up.  Last summer I really could have used a Chinese and Nepalese speaker.   In many cases it's not a fully fluent person as per federal government standards but someone that knows enough to break the ice and communicate the language issue which can sometimes mean using a 3rd language to communicate - iZulu speaker using Afrikans to translate so we can understand it in English in one case.    

Secondary skills such as trades are often not known at all and skill sets people have come exposed at the most unusual times.  Locked the keys in the truck...put a pack of smokes on the truck, announce the problem, and go for a coffee.  When you return the truck is unlocked but nobody knows how .    Many professionals are there to get the job done and will volunteer their experience if asked as long as a person treats it as a true emergency situation and not a case of "Joe the plumber...you're in charge of toilets instead of driving your tank".     The electrician example I found out at 1am when the individual complained of cold showers and no water and then reset the heater units so he could be clean for the next days operations.    An electrician was called in the next day to ensure all was correct and my emergency fixer never touched a another tool that deployment.


----------



## FJAG

Remius said:


> I would suggest that is very antiquated and biased view of the reserves and just how desperate they actually do want to evolve.
> 
> The CAF has no idea what it wants from its reserve force and in particular the army reserves.
> I’m not saying that some units are resistant to certain changes but at some point things break when they are ignored or left to rot for too long.


I think that your statement is highly accurate.

Yes. There is clearly a calcified element within the reserves that while it talks reforms is just as happy to keep it the way it is. But, the mass of troops want something more.

I'm of the view that the calcified views of the RegF, that still see the ResF as a social club that competes with them for resources rather than one of the cornerstones of a total army, is a key problem as it controls the purse strings, and the primary access channel to the government.

The main problem though is that the RegF does know exactly what it wants from the ResF - a steady stream of Class Bs to fill chairs in cubicles and the occasional Class C to round out a deployment. In order to generate those, it wants the cheapest Class As that money can buy. The result is an underequipped and undertrained Class A force and that suits the RegF just fine as it means it doesn't have to spend money on additional equipment and training dollars for the ResF.

The primary motivator in the RegF leadership is the question of "what are you doing for me today?" It is not "What can you do for me tomorrow?" As long as the focus is on day-to-day activities with no thought of what is needed for the future, the Class A ResF will always play a very minor role in defence thinking and planning and especially in funding. That's the way its been since the middle of the last century and its not about to change.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I think that your statement is highly accurate.
> 
> Yes. There is clearly a calcified element within the reserves that while it talks reforms is just as happy to keep it the way it is. But, the mass of troops want something more.
> 
> I'm of the view that the calcified views of the RegF, that still see the ResF as a social club that competes with them for resources rather than one of the cornerstones of a total army, is a key problem as it controls the purse strings, and the primary access channel to the government.
> 
> The main problem though is that the RegF does know exactly what it wants from the ResF - a steady stream of Class Bs to fill chairs in cubicles and the occasional Class C to round out a deployment. In order to generate those, it wants the cheapest Class As that money can buy. The result is an underequipped and undertrained Class A force and that suits the RegF just fine as it means it doesn't have to spend money on additional equipment and training dollars for the ResF.
> 
> The primary motivator in the RegF leadership is the question of "what are you doing for me today?" It is not "What can you do for me tomorrow?" As long as the focus is on day-to-day activities with no thought of what is needed for the future, the Class A ResF will always play a very minor role in defence thinking and planning and especially in funding. That's the way its been since the middle of the last century and its not about to change.
> 
> 🍻



Based on the attitude of most RSS staff I've encountered, the prevailing attitude of the Reg F to the Reserves resembles a pandering and paternalistic approach, similar to that of an angry parent confronting a naughty child.

You get what you lead, of course


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Like that wouldn't happen in a large Federal Department where a whole new level of management would be created in order for the Regional Director General to employ her boy toy.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Give credit to people who join for being able to see the problems and having some energy and motivation to deal with the problems.  Assume this exists in each cohort and is not a one- or few-off happenstance.

Then allow them to butt their heads against the institution a few times, achieving little except to learn a long list of excuses why things can't change.  Some leave; some remain and learn to settle for what is possible; some of the latter become part of the calcification.

"We're not going to change that" comes from on high.  So you end up in a Dilbert cartoon: organization surveys employees every year; every year, a few of the same questions return the same low scores; every year, organization forces employees to convene working groups to explore which problems can be addressed to raise scores; every year, working groups make same recommendations; every year, employer says "that can't (won't) change".  There's a hole in the bucket, dear Liza...


----------



## RocketRichard

dapaterson said:


> Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF.  Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed.  So you're a volunteer firefighter?  Check.  You speak and write Klingon?  Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)
> 
> Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information.  And the ability to input info.  Including flagging corrections.  And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.


The Klingon remark made me laugh out loud! Thanks for the belly laugh.


----------



## McG

Apparently reading the Star Wars alphabet has replaced speaking Klingon as the thing to do.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> I didn’t mean to offend if it came off that way.  And it may and does look tocome off like that.
> 
> I would suggest that is very antiquated and biased view of the reserves and just how desperate they actually do want to evolve.



In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.



Remius said:


> The CAF has no idea what it wants from its reserve force and in particular the army reserves.
> I’m not saying that some units are resistant to certain changes but at some point things break when they are ignored or left to rot for too long.



Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.
> 
> 
> *
> Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.*



Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor. 

You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:


> Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor.
> 
> You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....


Correct.  I think it’s just an assumption being made more than anything else.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.
> 
> 
> 
> Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.


Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s?  When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board?  Are they still relevant? 

And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it.  Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.

 Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted?  And where exactly?  We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing.  No real defense policy. 

Is it antiquated?  Yep,  so what is being done?  I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step.  Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.


But I’m curious to see what is being resisted.  Mission tasks?  Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced.  Tactical groupings?  Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.  

Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained.  Like what?  Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.   

To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».


----------



## daftandbarmy

Remius said:


> Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s?  When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board?  Are they still relevant?
> 
> And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it.  Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.
> 
> Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted?  And where exactly?  We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing.  No real defense policy.
> 
> Is it antiquated?  Yep,  so what is being done?  I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step.  Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.
> 
> 
> But I’m curious to see what is being resisted.  Mission tasks?  Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced.  Tactical groupings?  Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.
> 
> Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained.  Like what?  Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.
> 
> To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».



And stop reorganizing, FFS...






						www.canadiansoldiers.com
					

www.canadiansoldiers.com



					www.canadiansoldiers.com


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s?  When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board?  Are they still relevant?



I’m assuming so as very little has changed organizationally.



Remius said:


> And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it.  Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.



The infighting and resistance to forming tactical groups; which from my understanding at least in Winnipeg devolved into fighting between both regiments over how they’d rotate COs as opposed to, I dunno, a merit system.


Remius said:


> Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted?  And where exactly?  We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing.  No real defense policy.



Valid points there, but in a similar vain are they suggesting new ways going forward themselves? Does it involve the reduction of numbers of COs? I’d be interested to know. 



Remius said:


> Is it antiquated?  Yep,  so what is being done?  I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step.  Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.



What other structure would you see as being antiquated ? I call out the reserve system because it is in my opinion a structure that works against any kind of force generation, and serves no one but the COs and RSMs of units and Bdes. 



Remius said:


> But I’m curious to see what is being resisted.  Mission tasks?  Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced.  Tactical groupings?  Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.



All the units in the reserves require tactical grouping. Possible exceptions might be something like the Royal Newfoundland Regiment where it’s isolated and spread out and occupies the whole province. That’s something of an anomaly though. Agreed that the reserves have done their best on the mission tasks, deploying a mortar platoon in 2022 should have been proof of concept; unfortunately a foolish line in training safety kills that.  What other resources are required for say Assault Pioneer?



Remius said:


> Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained.  Like what?  Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.



That was a dig, again, at the Army for holding onto 54 “Regiments.” I mean Christ we have so many we had to reuse the Cameron Highlanders. 


Remius said:


> To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».


I mean the glory days of most reserve regiments was like 1945 so probably pretty accurate. 

Now how was this a response to me not thinking it really matters in the overal scheme of things that 1 platoon A Coy the Pembroke Highlanders can supply us a 2nd year carpenter  apprentice? Since you even said it wouldn’t effect organization. 



daftandbarmy said:


> Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor.
> 
> You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....



I think the post below you said that I was making an assumption. If you been tasked to do something, like augmentation to operations, since the Cold War, I’d call that informing. 

You know like “Sir, I understand your intent to be..” 

Agreed it should be spelled out clearly in a mission statement. I whole heartedly disagree about reorganization, all we’ve functionally done is changed districts to brigades, reorganization would’ve meant some actual meaningful change ideally linked to an output.


----------



## KevinB

FWIW I really want to know what idiot thought giving Cbt Spt roles to the PRes was a good idea?
  Rifle Section is significantly easier and would be more needed.


----------



## dapaterson

Reserve leadership that, for years have been unable to provide inspiring leadership to units and keep soldiers active and motivated, claimed that the only solution was to give them more tasks to half-ass.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> What other structure would you see as being antiquated ?


Recruiting.
Retention.
Housing.
Infrastructure.
How people are posted.
Base Locations.
Things like TI cards (not sure why we haven’t started using the revolutionary and innovative technology called bar codes)
Procurement 

Plenty of stuff need modernizing,  some are symptoms others are causes of the various woes we currently are facing as a force. 

For the record, I agree with a lot of what you are posting.  I disagree though as to what you think are the real causes.  It’s not some cabal of association types that is keeping things like pay sheets a thing or the reason we have CBGs vs Militia Districts etc etc.  It’s systemic issues that the CAF as a whole has.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.


I'm not a defender of Reserves 2000.

Their origin comes from a RegF movement in Ontario under MGen Vernon to downsize and amalgamate units and it was done in a way that involved minimal ResF involvement. Tie that to the debacle of the disappearing Bisons and  a multitude of other actions which made it clear that reservists were not partners in the process but merely pawns to be shoved around.

Reserves 2000 opposed this and makes it clear that the required solution is to leave the units as the Army's contact with the nation, to raise the numbers to 30,000 and to properly equip the reserves. Vernon's arrogance and divide and conquer approach was the catalyst that mobilized the movement.

There's nothing in their manifesto that they want to keep the messes open and and run it like the old Militia fiefdoms. (interestingly when they were fiefdoms private money was rolled into units to clothe and equip them far beyond what the government spent on them resulting in many battalions which were at full strength. What Reserves 2000 wants is an effective ResF which they believe based on much evidence, the RegF couldn't care less about. Their manifesto is Fund, Train, Equip and Expand. Nothing more.

I tend to disagree with Reserves 2000 because I do not think that the ResF will ever be effective until it is combined in such a way with the RegF so that RegF commanders become both responsible and accountable for the ResF's effectiveness. That's where ideas like a 30/70 force come into play which are a concept that Reserves 2000 would probably object to because it does result in ResF  unit amalgamations. Basically I'm an advocate for fully formed units and not rump units. Basically I believe that a "ready reserve" cannot afford to have minimally trained officers and senior NCMs anymore.

All of that to say, however, at least Reserves 2000 has a vision for the ResF, something which has been absent within the RegF Army's leadership for over a half a century. The RegF is not prepared to put any more resources or the thought into the ResF than they are being pressured to do and, as such, are wasting one of the least expensive assets that the Army has.



markppcli said:


> The infighting and resistance to forming tactical groups;


These are not a solution. They are a band aid being plastered on a dysfunctional system perpetuated by a RegF too clueless to initiate and work on real reform. I guess in fairness, and looking at how Force 2025 is floundering and everything else going, they are also too clueless to reform themselves.



markppcli said:


> What other structure would you see as being antiquated ? I call out the reserve system because it is in my opinion a structure that works against any kind of force generation, and serves no one but the COs and RSMs of units and Bdes.


As dysfunctional as it is it was able to generate up to 15-20% of the rotations we sent to Afghanistan. Just think of what could have been done if, like the American National Guard, we could have deployed fully formed brigades.

Let me just say this. The Army ResF has hundreds of middle managers and has had thousands of them but has been universally underperforming for decades. The law of averages alone would dictate that some of those middle managers ought to have been vibrant and successful at their tasks. The fact that they haven't been ought to demonstrate clearly that there are systemic problems and that senior leadership is taking zero interest in solving these.

I've said it above. The RegF looks to the ResF to generate sufficient Class Bs and the occasional Class C and doesn't care one whit about the capability of the Class A force beyond that. The RegF has no plan to make an effective Class A ResF and couldn't care less that it doesn't have one.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Reserve leadership that, for years have been unable to provide inspiring leadership to units and keep soldiers active and motivated, claimed that the only solution was to give them more tasks to half-ass.



That was pretty much it, I believe, and another bastard step child of the 'train to excite' idiocy.

Given the right support, of course, it could be very successful but it always devolves into too little, too late, with no real mission or connection with the rest of the Army.

Infantry reserve units, given the chance, can produce good sections, platoons and companies. Dismounted. That's the bread and butter stuff we should be good at but tend not to be because 'Good Idea Fairy Management'.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> FWIW I really want to know what idiot thought giving Cbt Spt roles to the PRes was a good idea?
> Rifle Section is significantly easier and would be more needed.


Probably the same geniuses that wrote in requirements for Mortar ranges to have an artillery mosid RSO. 


daftandbarmy said:


> Given the right support, of course, it could be very successful but it always devolves into too little, too late, with no real mission or connection with the rest of the Army.



Very irritating that we never see “our” support platoons in the field.



daftandbarmy said:


> Infantry reserve units, given the chance, can produce good sections, platoons and companies. Dismounted. That's the bread and butter stuff we should be good at but tend not to be because 'Good Idea Fairy Management'.


Sections yes, platoons maybe, companies would be a stretch right now. Shift some organization and training policies and maybe we’ll see MWOs and Maj’s who are used to leading full companies. I actually think the OJT Dp1 training, while and awful idea for the regular force, will be a net positive for the reserves.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

To be fair, simplistic tasks will not recruit and keep Reserve soldiers. Other armies are quite capable of having well armed and equipped Reserves conducting most tasks. The problem is how the army is structured and supported.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Sections yes, platoons maybe, companies would be a stretch right now. Shift some organization and training policies and maybe we’ll see MWOs and Maj’s who are used to leading full companies. I actually think the OJT Dp1 training, while and awful idea for the regular force, will be a net positive for the reserves.



Agreed. 

Given the opportunity to build up sections and platoons properly during the training year, September to May, you could pull everyone together during a summer FTX and get them up to Coy level tasks pretty quickly over a 2 week period.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Probably the same geniuses that wrote in requirements for Mortar ranges to have an artillery mosid RSO.
> 
> 
> Very irritating that we never see “our” support platoons in the field.
> 
> 
> Sections yes, platoons maybe, companies would be a stretch right now. Shift some organization and training policies and maybe we’ll see MWOs and Maj’s who are used to leading full companies. I actually think the OJT Dp1 training, while and awful idea for the regular force, will be a net positive for the reserves.


I believe FJAG's point is that with 30/70 units you'd have Reg Force Majors & MWO's leading Reserve Captains and WOs/Sergeants.


----------



## dapaterson

Colin Parkinson said:


> To be fair, simplistic tasks will not recruit and keep Reserve soldiers. Other armies are quite capable of having well armed and equipped Reserves conducting most tasks. The problem is how the army is structured and supported.



It's not quite the case.  While they may have better (in quantity and quality) equipment, the majority require significant workup / preparation time to deploy.  Blended units that increase in full-time as readiness level increases help offset that somewhat.

The old militia myth refuses to die; the soldiers who landed in Italy (and those who later landed in Normandy) had years of training - they were not straight off the farm and into combat the next day.

Finally, despite my affinity for trash talking the infantry and the combat arms, what they do is not a set of "simplistic tasks"; effectively practicing the skills they need should never be "boring" unless the leadership is weak and failing.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I believe FJAG's point is that with 30/70 units you'd have Reg Force Majors & MWO's leading Reserve Captains and WOs/Sergeants.


I was responding in that case to Daftandbarmy’s comment that the reserves can presently do that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I was responding in that case to Daftandbarmy’s comment that the reserves can presently do that.



Given the current range of courses available to the Reserves, assuming you've got a handful of RESO trained Pl Comds and at least one OC with the Dismounted Coy Comd's Course, any unit _should _be good to go.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Given the current range of courses available to the Reserves, assuming you've got a handful of RESO trained Pl Comds and at least one OC with the Dismounted Coy Comd's Course, any unit _should _be good to go.


Big fan of RESO. We could do more with it and should expand it into similar programs for ResF NCMs for complex trades and a branch of ResF SnrNCO training including porting it to Community Colleges

🍻


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Given the current range of courses available to the Reserves, assuming you've got a handful of RESO trained Pl Comds and at least one OC with the Dismounted Coy Comd's Course, any unit _should _be good to go.


If they can field 3 platoons.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> If they can field 3 platoons.



During weekend exercises it would be relatively easy to centralize platoons from various units. I’ve seen it done before. It just takes some planning and coordination, and the right reason e.g., a directive from X or XX to train platoons and companies.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> During weekend exercises it would be relatively easy to centralize platoons from various units. I’ve seen it done before. It just takes some planning and coordination, and the right reason e.g., a directive from X or XX to train platoons and companies.


Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post: 

the reserves need to be given a mandate to force generate X (I suggested platoons) to a deployable standard
the structure of the reserves needs to be built around that. Ie what can assess that level of training and group that in catchment areas that can support it.
training needs to be designed in a way that allows those units to mass for effective training. I don’t see much value in a three hour parade night and it’s less cost effective to do for of those than 2 days on a weekend anyways.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post:
> 
> the reserves need to be given a mandate to force generate X (I suggested platoons) to a deployable standard
> the structure of the reserves needs to be built around that. Ie what can assess that level of training and group that in catchment areas that can support it.
> training needs to be designed in a way that allows those units to mass for effective training. I don’t see much value in a three hour parade night and it’s less cost effective to do for of those than 2 days on a weekend anyways.



Or increase the meagre man days allotment from 37 annually, up to half of which gets siphoned off for anything except preparing platoons for battle, so that troops can train two weekends a month, which they will do if the training has meaning and is well organized and supported with ammo and other enablers.


----------



## FJAG

In a lot of ways you and I are talking exactly the same thing. When I talk about a 30/70 battalion I'm talking about the following:



markppcli said:


> Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post:
> 
> the reserves need to be given a mandate to force generate X (I suggested platoons) to a deployable standard


Each battalion has two rifle companies that are reserve centric and structured 10/90. The 90 is three rifle platoons of reservists. The 10 is a RegF company core with a RegF Coy Comd and various RegF and ResF HQ personnel. The company is basically trained and equipped as a light infantry company by its RegF leadership.


markppcli said:


> the structure of the reserves needs to be built around that. Ie what can assess that level of training and group that in catchment areas that can support it.


The two 10/90 companies belong to a 30/70 battalion where the bulk of its leadership, one complete rifle company and much of its support companies are staffed by RegF and are fully equipped. The RegF CO is responsible for the full training of his RegF and two ResF companies.


markppcli said:


> training needs to be designed in a way that allows those units to mass for effective training. I don’t see much value in a three hour parade night and it’s less cost effective to do for of those than 2 days on a weekend anyways.


Neither do I see value in those parade nights. In my kingdom, ResF members receive all their DP1 and 2 training at depot battalions and companies that exist both at a central location and distributed to local armouries and who train both the RegF and ResF to those levels. RegF individual training occurs 1 Sept to 30 Apr and individual ResF training takes place across the summer from 1 May to 31 Aug. Once DP1 trained at a depot, soldiers are "posted" to their units and there receive nothing but collective training.

ResF collective training takes place one 2.5 day weekend per month Sept to Jun and one 17.5 day or 23.5 day exercise in August under the control of their RegF battalion and company staff and using the battalion's equipment. There is no unit collective training in July. The RegF component of the battalion (including the leadership component of the 10/90 companies do their collective training 1 Sep to 30 Apr and transition to maintenance, APS, annual leave and assisting ResF training for the months 1 May to 30 Aug.

It's an integrated system which based, on the current level of authorized RegF subunits, is capable of forming up to 18 infantry battalions, 9 recce/armoured regiments and 6 artillery regiments which equates to 6-8 manoeuvre brigades. There are, however one or two battalions one might want to keep at greater than 30/70 strength - 70/30 or even 100/0 - which would make a 5 -6 manoeuvre brigade structure more viable.

An additional point. One can generate even more ResF companies through this structure simply by adding on 10/90 companies, squadrons or batteries to each 30/70 battalion as the essential RegF infrastructure to support them is already in place. One only needs to add small RegF core cells for each one.

The increase in deployable brigade and battalion cores makes peacetime rotations simpler and generating trained ResF augmentees easier.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

dapaterson said:


> It's not quite the case.  While they may have better (in quantity and quality) equipment, the majority require significant workup / preparation time to deploy.  Blended units that increase in full-time as readiness level increases help offset that somewhat.
> 
> The old militia myth refuses to die; the soldiers who landed in Italy (and those who later landed in Normandy) had years of training - they were not straight off the farm and into combat the next day.


I am quite aware of how long it took to work up the army, the navy on the other hand sailed ships sometimes with only one person who had actually been to sea.


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> FJAG said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not a defender of Reserves 2000.
> 
> Their origin comes from a RegF movement in Ontario under MGen Vernon to downsize and amalgamate units and it was done in a way that involved minimal ResF involvement. Tie that to the debacle of the disappearing Bisons and  a multitude of other actions which made it clear that reservists were not partners in the process but merely pawns to be shoved around.
> 
> Reserves 2000 opposed this and makes it clear that the required solution is to leave the units as the Army's contact with the nation, to raise the numbers to 30,000 and to properly equip the reserves. *Vernon's arrogance and divide and conquer approach was the catalyst that mobilized the movement.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻
Click to expand...

I was MGen Vernon's ADC during that period. On no less than three occasions, I witnessed Reserve CO's stating that Hon Col's forbid Reserve units from following LFCA direction. It wasn't MGen Vernon's arrogance, it was a complete frustration from how much influence that former members, no longer serving, but affiliated with those units, had ( and in my opinion, still have)

And BTW, MGen Herb Pitts was extensively consulted, as were other Honorary Colonels and LCol's. The other side had more influence, and won the day.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> I was MGen Vernon's ADC during that period. On no less than three occasions, I witnessed Reserve CO's stating that Hon Col's forbid Reserve units from following LFCA direction. It wasn't MGen Vernon's arrogance, it was a complete frustration from how much influence that former members, no longer serving, but affiliated with those units, had ( and in my opinion, still have)
> 
> And BTW, MGen Herb Pitts was extensively consulted, as were other Honorary Colonels and LCol's. The other side had more influence, and won the day.


As I said, I do not carry any water for Reserves 2000. I think that much of what they did back then, and now, is wrong headed. But the problem is very much a two-sided one with the only common ground between them being keeping the ResF separated from the RegF and under their own leadership. I'll add to that the "train when you feel like it" model of reserve service  That leads to a perpetuation of the problem.

There were and still are two issues here. The first is that the Army ResF structure, as originally conceived as a Militia, had two purposes - to make contact with the civilian population across the country in a way that the small permanent force couldn't and the current RegF can't; and to be a core around which mobilization takes place.

The former is still necessary but the later is a model that is less useful because of the complexity of modern war and its much heavier reliance on equipment than that of the old style Militia (where essentially a rifle and a uniform for each soldier was 90% of the kit a battalion needed.)

Vernon's initiatives were presented poorly in a dictatorial fashion and not well received by his audience. There's a great difference between consulting, even extensively consulting, and building consensus. The problem in fact centred around those "LFCA directions" which were, in varying degrees unattainable such as "build and reach warrior combat readiness by year's-end" on ever shrinking budgets.

Vernon had issues in how he approached things which smacked of arrogance. Just as an example look at his interview with Macleans after his retirement.

I recall those days as well, although with more distance than you as the issues were still hammering around in Chief of Reserves Council when I went there a few years later. Reserves 2000 was clearly marked as the enemy (actually more like the Devil's spawn) by those there and while I liked and respected many of my colleagues there, more than a few of them had drunk the RegF Kool-Aid. Rather than working together with Reserves 2000 to leverage their considerable political connections in successive governments, they declared war and butted heads. The result was that politicians declared a pox on both their houses and dodged meaningful reform issues whenever possible. It was such a wasted opportunity.

Vernon may have had good intentions, (I'll give him that) but his ham-fisted way of dealing with things poisoned an already shaky relationship and spread it nation-wide.

And just as an aside, I'll happily admit that there were a number of RegF leaders throughout the years who were very good and did try to advance the system in very meaningful ways. Unfortunately with the rotating desk career structure within the RegF, progress was fleeting and frequently abandoned or reversed to the former status quo.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

After one resoundingly poor briefing he made to assembled Reservists in Petawawa, everyone called him General Vermin. 
   Condescension was in his blood, or at least it routinely showed up in his bloodwork.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Wondering how spineless a Res F CO has to be to take direction from outside the CoC.  Even well before that time I understood that the only response to any kind of direction from an "Old Boy" was "thank you for your advice".


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> As I said, I do not carry any water for Reserves 2000. I think that much of what they did back then, and now, is wrong headed. But the problem is very much a two-sided one with the only common ground between them being keeping the ResF separated from the RegF and under their own leadership. I'll add to that the "train when you feel like it" model of reserve service  That leads to a perpetuation of the problem.
> 
> There were and still are two issues here. The first is that the Army ResF structure, as originally conceived as a Militia, had two purposes - to make contact with the civilian population across the country in a way that the small permanent force couldn't and the current RegF can't; and to be a core around which mobilization takes place.
> 
> The former is still necessary but the later is a model that is less useful because of the complexity of modern war and its much heavier reliance on equipment than that of the old style Militia (where essentially a rifle and a uniform for each soldier was 90% of the kit a battalion needed.)
> 
> Vernon's initiatives were presented poorly in a dictatorial fashion and not well received by his audience. There's a great difference between consulting, even extensively consulting, and building consensus. The problem in fact centred around those "LFCA directions" which were, in varying degrees unattainable such as "build and reach warrior combat readiness by year's-end" on ever shrinking budgets.
> 
> Vernon had issues in how he approached things which smacked of arrogance. Just as an example look at his interview with Macleans after his retirement.
> 
> I recall those days as well, although with more distance than you as the issues were still hammering around in Chief of Reserves Council when I went there a few years later. Reserves 2000 was clearly marked as the enemy (actually more like the Devil's spawn) by those there and while I liked and respected many of my colleagues there, more than a few of them had drunk the RegF Kool-Aid. Rather than working together with Reserves 2000 to leverage their considerable political connections in successive governments, they declared war and butted heads. The result was that politicians declared a pox on both their houses and dodged meaningful reform issues whenever possible. It was such a wasted opportunity.
> 
> Vernon may have had good intentions, (I'll give him that) but his ham-fisted way of dealing with things poisoned an already shaky relationship and spread it nation-wide.
> 
> And just as an aside, I'll happily admit that there were a number of RegF leaders throughout the years who were very good and did try to advance the system in very meaningful ways. Unfortunately with the rotating desk career structure within the RegF, progress was fleeting and frequently abandoned or reversed to the former status quo.
> 
> 🍻


Brian Vernon and John (which he styled himself earlier in his career, then switched to Jean) Boyle hated each other. I re-read the MacLeans article, it is correct to my knowledge.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> Brian Vernon and John (which he styled himself earlier in his career, then switched to Jean) Boyle hated each other. I re-read the MacLeans article, it is correct to my knowledge.


I'm not a fan of Boyle either. My time as a lawyer on the Somali Inquiry got me there.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Wondering how spineless a Res F CO has to be to take direction from outside the CoC.  Even well before that time I understood that the only response to any kind of direction from an "Old Boy" was "thank you for your advice".


That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart. 

When we talk about the difference in ways between the ResF leaders and RegF leaders its principally because of the sum of the military experiences of each of them brings to the table. A decision or dicta set down from above may be seen as a 'No-brainer" to a RegF officer who is conditioned (mostly) to accept it but can easily be seen as more equivocal or problematic by a reservist whose natural inclination will be to consult with others who he considers his peers. For many RegF officers their relationships with others is fleeting at best while sharing postings and then moving on and possibly reconnecting down the line. For most ResF officers the relationships can be life-long often having lived in the same community and unit for decades.

When the CoC is only one that exists short-term and part-time one has to expect that it will not be stronger than life-time connections.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart.
> .
> 
> 🍻


Key point being the ‘unit and community’, not necessarily the CAF or PRes as a whole.  

IMHO most Militia units act like a Fiefdom, that only pays lip service to those above.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Can't quite square all the criticism of senior Res F leadership with the idea that they become sage advisors after retirement.


----------



## quadrapiper

Brad Sallows said:


> Wondering how spineless a Res F CO has to be to take direction from outside the CoC.  Even well before that time I understood that the only response to any kind of direction from an "Old Boy" was "thank you for your advice".


To throw an additional note in, it's not too many generations of long-service Class A-type reservists from _armouries and units bankrolled by local magnates_ to now, with years of community and regimental family (or Family) engagement working its way into the DNA, including instances where former members might have been able to exercise significant influence on behalf of the unit.

Likely the only thing that _would _shift that in a wholesale manner is something akin to FJAG's concept.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart.
> 
> When we talk about the difference in ways between the ResF leaders and RegF leaders its principally because of the sum of the military experiences of each of them brings to the table. A decision or dicta set down from above may be seen as a 'No-brainer" to a RegF officer who is conditioned (mostly) to accept it but can easily be seen as more equivocal or problematic by a reservist whose natural inclination will be to consult with others who he considers his peers. For many RegF officers their relationships with others is fleeting at best while sharing postings and then moving on and possibly reconnecting down the line. For most ResF officers the relationships can be life-long often having lived in the same community and unit for decades.
> 
> When the CoC is only one that exists short-term and part-time one has to expect that it will not be stronger than life-time connections.
> 
> 🍻


This is an interesting comment and raises some questions.  Reservists are essentially CA members that are permanently posted to a single unit.  With that long term attachment it's really only human nature that loyalty to the unit would tend to conflict with Reg Force leaders that are only temporarily posted in to the organization.  The long-term Reservists would naturally develop a greater sense of "ownership" than someone just rotating through (for better or for worse).

That might not bode well for a proposed "Total Force" 30/70 or 10/90 type of structure.  Are you potentially setting the system up for cohesion issues?

It's interesting that in the US the National Guard has a more "separate but equal" type of relationship with the Active Service Army.  Army and National Guard units mirror each other in structure, training and equipment, but have their own separate chains of command within individual units rather than having one organization provide leadership for the other's personnel.  I believe it's the same with the US Army Reserve (Reserve officers rather than Active Duty officers leading Reserve units), although I may be mistaken.

The US of course has the benefit of a greater pool of former full-time officers and NCMs leaving the Active Duty force to draw on as a source of experience for the NG/Reserve units than we have in Canada.  

How does all of this potentially factor in to how we think about reforming the Reserves?


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Key point being the ‘unit and community’, not necessarily the CAF or PRes as a whole.
> 
> IMHO most Militia units act like a Fiefdom, that only pays lip service to those above.


All I can say is that experiences vary. I've been fortunate in dealing with mostly good folks. A few clunkers sure but, in general, folks who were trying their best but who weren't handed much to work with in the way of training or resources.



Brad Sallows said:


> Can't quite square all the criticism of senior Res F leadership with the idea that they become sage advisors after retirement.


I think most do well up to captain, okay at major, and some start to lose focus at lieutenant-colonel. I think much of the problem at LCol and above is the fact that there is too much to do and keep on top of on a purely part-time basis with a mostly part-time staff. It gets worse the higher that you go. Once you get out from under all that noise you do get time to reflect and become a "sage". Whether anyone listens to you is a whole different question.



GR66 said:


> ... The long-term Reservists would naturally develop a greater sense of "ownership" than someone just rotating through (for better or for worse).
> 
> That might not bode well for a proposed "Total Force" 30/70 or 10/90 type of structure.  Are you potentially setting the system up for cohesion issues?
> 
> It's interesting that in the US the National Guard has a more "separate but equal" type of relationship with the Active Service Army.  Army and National Guard units mirror each other in structure, training and equipment, but have their own separate chains of command within individual units rather than having one organization provide leadership for the other's personnel.  I believe it's the same with the US Army Reserve (Reserve officers rather than Active Duty officers leading Reserve units), although I may be mistaken.
> 
> The US of course has the benefit of a greater pool of former full-time officers and NCMs leaving the Active Duty force to draw on as a source of experience for the NG/Reserve units than we have in Canada.
> 
> How does all of this potentially factor in to how we think about reforming the Reserves?


You're absolutely right and it does concern me as well. The RegF and the ResF has a long history of separateness based in inequality and bordering on animosity.

I'm very pessimistic that there could ever be a "separate and equal" force in Canada even if you could up the education requirements for ResF officers and provide them with the requisite training experience and equipment to their units.  

I feel quite confident that if we can up ResF manning into full battalions, whether by 30/70 or amalgamated tactical groups, then they need a full-time CO to properly direct and oversee training and administration.

I'm more ambivalent about whether ResF officers can be company commanders on a part-time basis based on truncated courses and limited experience. I could see it happen with a full-time Coy 2i/c and staff.

I've actually lost touch with what the comparative education requirements for CA ResF officers and US ARNG and USAR officers are. I've been unsuccessfully looking for a comprehensive guides as to the prerequisites for both company and battalion command vis a vis the US and CA armies.  (which is complicated by the fact that in the US a company is a captain's command.) Many of the US ARNG courses used to be (and might still be) shortened models of the Active Army ones the way our MITCP ones were.

Equipment will probably also be a continuing challenge requiring a high degree of integration so that critical equipment and personnel capable of managing it and teaching others in its use become more widely available to the ResF.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Weinie said:


> I was MGen Vernon's ADC during that period. On no less than three occasions, I witnessed Reserve CO's stating that Hon Col's forbid Reserve units from following LFCA direction. It wasn't MGen Vernon's arrogance, it was a complete frustration from how much influence that former members, no longer serving, but affiliated with those units, had ( and in my opinion, still have)
> 
> And BTW, MGen Herb Pitts was extensively consulted, as were other Honorary Colonels and LCol's. The other side had more influence, and won the day.



So if a currently serving CO, who was an amazing bully amongst other deep character flaws, was employed in civvy street by a previous (and now retired CO), and ran a few exercises in a way that the 'retired bubbas network' magically became part of those exercises, and the Brigade Commander knew about it and ignored it, then how would you suggest an issue like that should be addressed?


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post:
> 
> the reserves need to be given a mandate to force generate X (I suggested platoons) to a deployable standard
> the structure of the reserves needs to be built around that. Ie what can assess that level of training and group that in catchment areas that can support it.
> training needs to be designed in a way that allows those units to mass for effective training. I don’t see much value in a three hour parade night and it’s less cost effective to do for of those than 2 days on a weekend anyways.


Barring some magical kumbaya moment that sees the Army actually making the commitment to completely re-organize itself into an integrated "Total Force" and the Government totally abandoning decades of neglectful funding of the military I think that this (above) is a reasonable and realistic goal for the Reserves.

Here are two articles from the Urban Warfare Project of West Point's Modern Warfare Institute website:
THE SCHOOL OF STREET FIGHTING: TACTICAL URBAN LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

URBAN OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE: SIZE, RATIOS, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

I'm a firm believer that in an increasingly urbanized world much of our future potential combat is likely to take place in built up areas.  Combat in cities requires combined arms, but it also requires large numbers of dismounted infantry as well.  The Reg Force has tanks, APCs and artillery (all of which require serious upgrades) but with only 6-7 dismounts per LAV likely doesn't have the dismounted strength to be successful in urban combat.

The Reserves have that extra manpower available.  Let's say that 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions (6 Infantry Companies), 5e Brigade is Medium with 3 x LAV Battalions (9 Infantry Companies) and 2 Brigade is Light (another 9 Infantry Companies).  That's a total of 24 Infantry Companies.  With 51 Reserve Infantry Regiments if each can augment with 1 x fully trained Platoon then that would be two additional Platoons of dismounts per Reg Force Infantry Company.  

They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles.  They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.

Still lots of questions about how to best make something like this work, but may be much easier (and more achievable) than some of the much more ambitions proposals.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles. They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.


Interestingly that is exactly the doctrinal purpose of the Stryker. Stryker brigades manoeuvre under armour but are supposed to fight dismounted. That is the fundamental difference from the IFV of the infantry in the combined arms battalions.

That begs the question: Should our model light infantry manoeuvre in an unprotected GM ISV or GM LUV or the LAV 6.0 or an ACSV-TCV before assuming its dismounted fight. Currently we have none of the above.

That is also the current situation of the US IBCTs whose rifle companies are basically unmotorized. Not all IBCTs are currently destined to receive ISVs but will continue to rely on shanks mare.

Maybe we need to sort out our doctrine for the motorization (if any) of our light infantry and then determine if that is a universal doctrine or one split on a RegF / ResF basis.

🍻


----------



## McG

You don’t want to use ACSV. It is a Queen Marry. Even the TCV will be taller than a LAV 6.


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles.  They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.


Vehicle that comes to mind is the the Protolab MiSu.  Assuming it lives up to its billing you've got a nice combo of all-weather mobility, low maintenance cost, protection (they claim STANAG level 4- I'm skeptical at 14 tonne), and payload (10 fully kitted troops).  

Basically an attempt to field an MRAP upgraded Pasi equivalent to cheaply protect their hordes of reservists and territorials.   Mobility platoon of 2x TAPV (3per), 17x MiSu (2per), 19 veh, 40PY's turns a light Inf Coy into a Heavy Protected Mobility Coy in a heartbeat 





__





						Protolab PMPV 6x6
					

Protolab PMPV 6x6 highly protected high mobility multipurpose vehicle  / armored personnel carrier APC with highest level of ballistic, blast, IED and mine protection and with extensive high payload capacity.




					www.protolab.fi
				











						Protolab Misu - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Interestingly that is exactly the doctrinal purpose of the Stryker. Stryker brigades manoeuvre under armour but are supposed to fight dismounted. That is the fundamental difference from the IFV of the infantry in the combined arms battalions.
> 
> That begs the question: Should our model light infantry manoeuvre in an unprotected GM ISV or GM LUV or the LAV 6.0 or an ACSV-TCV before assuming its dismounted fight. Currently we have none of the above.


I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.  
    Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.   

The units can be then vehicle agnostic, and receive vehicles as needed.  




FJAG said:


> That is also the current situation of the US IBCTs whose rifle companies are basically unmotorized. Not all IBCTs are currently destined to receive ISVs but will continue to rely on shanks mare.


Outside of the ARNG every IBCT has some mode of transport, be it ISV, Hummer, MeTT, UH, or Aircraft.  While they may reside in separate transport entities from the Battalion , they are available at the Bde level, which may change to Div level for some - but most have some sort of integral vehicles. 



FJAG said:


> Maybe we need to sort out our doctrine for the motorization (if any) of our light infantry and then determine if that is a universal doctrine or one split on a RegF / ResF basis.
> 
> 🍻


I remain committed that Light Infantry isn’t practical to simply be Infantry without Vehicles. 
   One should have a primary and secondary role: Airborne, Airmobile, Mountain, Arctic or Amphibious, and equipment and supported as such.  

For the reserves, it’s much simpler to focus them on being GIB’s as opposed to actual Light Infantry - as the training requirements are significantly lower.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.
> Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
> Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.


Personally I'm a fan of the Bv206 type vehicle.  Suitable for both domestic and overseas operations (including the arctic), high carrying capacity (full 10 member Section or gear/support weapons), amphibious, tracked (useful in urban rubble vs wheeled?) with STANAG 2 (upgradable to STANAG 4) protection for the BvS10.


KevinB said:


> The units can be then vehicle agnostic, and receive vehicles as needed.


US Army Reserves are primarily focused on CSS units including Support and Sustainment Battalions.  No reason some of our many Reserve Regiments couldn't be re-roled as Transport Companies.


KevinB said:


> Outside of the ARNG every IBCT has some mode of transport, be it ISV, Hummer, MeTT, UH, or Aircraft.  While they may reside in separate transport entities from the Battalion , they are available at the Bde level, which may change to Div level for some - but most have some sort of integral vehicles.
> 
> 
> I remain committed that Light Infantry isn’t practical to simply be Infantry without Vehicles.
> One should have a primary and secondary role: Airborne, Airmobile, Mountain, Arctic or Amphibious, and equipment and supported as such.
> 
> For the reserves, it’s much simpler to focus them on being GIB’s as opposed to actual Light Infantry - as the training requirements are significantly lower.


My thought is the Reserve infantry units act as extra dismounts available to support the existing Mech Battalions.  Our Reg Force Light Brigade can be our Airborne/Mountain/Arctic/Amphibious force.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:


> Or increase the meagre *man* days allotment from 37 annually, up to half of which gets siphoned off for anything except preparing platoons for battle, so that troops can train two weekends a month, which they will do if the training has meaning and is well organized and supported with ammo and other enablers.



CPCC Staff Officers reading your post…


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:


> CPCC Staff Officers reading your post…



I know, right?

I believe that's what ARes 'paysheet days' are still called, aren't they?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.
> Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
> Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.



Or just give our Loggies enough of the right trucks...


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:


> I know, right?
> 
> I believe that's what ARes 'paysheet days' are still called, aren't they?


I believe it’s up to 80 days days now that reservist can work and can go over with permissions required set at over the 80 then 120.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Barring some magical kumbaya moment that sees the Army actually making the commitment to completely re-organize itself into an integrated "Total Force" and the Government totally abandoning decades of neglectful funding of the military I think that this (above) is a reasonable and realistic goal for the Reserves.
> 
> Here are two articles from the Urban Warfare Project of West Point's Modern Warfare Institute website:
> THE SCHOOL OF STREET FIGHTING: TACTICAL URBAN LESSONS FROM UKRAINE
> 
> URBAN OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE: SIZE, RATIOS, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
> 
> I'm a firm believer that in an increasingly urbanized world much of our future potential combat is likely to take place in built up areas.  Combat in cities requires combined arms, but it also requires large numbers of dismounted infantry as well.  The Reg Force has tanks, APCs and artillery (all of which require serious upgrades) but with only 6-7 dismounts per LAV likely doesn't have the dismounted strength to be successful in urban combat.
> 
> The Reserves have that extra manpower available.  Let's say that 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions (6 Infantry Companies), 5e Brigade is Medium with 3 x LAV Battalions (9 Infantry Companies) and 2 Brigade is Light (another 9 Infantry Companies).  That's a total of 24 Infantry Companies.  With 51 Reserve Infantry Regiments if each can augment with 1 x fully trained Platoon then that would be two additional Platoons of dismounts per Reg Force Infantry Company.
> 
> They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles.  They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.
> 
> Still lots of questions about how to best make something like this work, but may be much easier (and more achievable) than some of the much more ambitions proposals.


1. Lots of sources in Ukraine citing the effectiveness of automatic cannons in urban warfare.

2. Your expecting a company to absorb two extra platoons when they go to urban environments? Where are these reserve units sitting until then? In the Bde depth per my description ? If that’s the case then it probably doesn’t make sense to have it integrated into the Bn itself, rather it can push through and conduct a forward passage once the ifv equipped Bns culminate on the initial break in.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> 1. Lots of sources in Ukraine citing the effectiveness of automatic cannons in urban warfare.


I assume that this comment is in relation to my suggestion that the Reserve units don't need to be equipped with IFVs?
I'm making the cynical assumption that the GOC is not going to be purchasing cannon-equipped IFVs for the Reserves and that the current situation of the Reserves being unable to adequately maintain and train on complex armoured vehicles is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  


markppcli said:


> 2. Your expecting a company to absorb two extra platoons when they go to urban environments? Where are these reserve units sitting until then? In the Bde depth per my description ? If that’s the case then it probably doesn’t make sense to have it integrated into the Bn itself, rather it can push through and conduct a forward passage once the ifv equipped Bns culminate on the initial break in.


My comment about 2 x Reserve Platoons potentially able to be generated per existing Reg Force Company is only meant to show the scope of what is capable as opposed to a proposed force employment model.

More likely I'd see groupings of Reserve "Regiments" task grouped together into "Battalions" capable of force generating a complete motorized Infantry Company (one Platoon coming from each Reserve Unit).  This could be attached as a 4th Company to each Mechanized Battalion.  Lots of tasks that an extra Infantry Company can undertake in support of the Battalion/Brigade besides dismounted support in urban ops.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:


> Or just give our Loggies enough of the right trucks...


You could buy proper SMP vehicles for the Reserve Combat arms and support arms and rerole the MVSV's into B echelon vehicles which they likely be good at.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I assume that this comment is in relation to my suggestion that the Reserve units don't need to be equipped with IFVs?
> I'm making the cynical assumption that the GOC is not going to be purchasing cannon-equipped IFVs for the Reserves and that the current situation of the Reserves being unable to adequately maintain and train on complex armoured vehicles is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
> 
> My comment about 2 x Reserve Platoons potentially able to be generated per existing Reg Force Company is only meant to show the scope of what is capable as opposed to a proposed force employment model.
> 
> More likely I'd see groupings of Reserve "Regiments" task grouped together into "Battalions" capable of force generating a complete motorized Infantry Company (one Platoon coming from each Reserve Unit).  This could be attached as a 4th Company to each Mechanized Battalion.  Lots of tasks that an extra Infantry Company can undertake in support of the Battalion/Brigade besides dismounted support in urban ops.


It was more about “mechanized unitscant so urban” I probably over reacted. In general I agree with what you’re saying, but structurally including reservists in sections was already something we did in force 2013, with 2 per section.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> You could buy proper SMP vehicles for the Reserve Combat arms and support arms and rerole the MVSV's into B echelon vehicles which they likely be good at.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> It was more about “mechanized unitscant so urban” I probably over reacted. In general I agree with what you’re saying, but structurally including reservists in sections was already something we did in force 2013, with 2 per section.


Personally I think that the Russian experience in Ukraine argues against planning for Reservists to fill out under strength Reg Force sections.  

Much of the difficulties that the Russians had in the initial invasion was that they (like us) have most of their units at 70% manning during peacetime.  In practice that means that for Mechanized Infantry units the vehicle positions get manned at the expense of dismounts.  As a result they didn't have enough dismounts to properly support their armour and they were chopped up by Ukrainian AT teams.

There is no guarantee that we will have enough notice when we're forced to deploy our forces to call up the Reservists to fill out our sections and we could face the exact same problem.

I'm strongly in favour of keeping our Reg Force units at 100% manning within at least sub-units.  That way when they deploy they have all the personnel they need to be combat effective (that goes for CS elements as well).  FJAG's 70/30 and 30/70 models are somewhat different in that the Reg Force Companies within the units are fully manned and it's the additional Companies to fill out the unit that are made up of primarily Reservists.  

And Mechanized units are definitely the go to type of units for urban combat.  The extra Reservist dismounts are just there to provide additional support for the Mech units because urban combat in particular is so manpower intensive.  I recall reading somewhere that in US urban warfare planning a major highrise office complex would be considered a Battalion objective.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Personally I think that the Russian experience in Ukraine argues against planning for Reservists to fill out under strength Reg Force sections.



The Russian and Ukrainian expereince in Ukraine suggests that the CAF is light years behind a couple of basket case countries in building any kind of credible, sizeable military force.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> The Russian and Ukrainian expereince in Ukraine suggests that the CAF is light years behind a couple of basket case countries in building any kind of credible, sizeable military force.


I don’t know that I’d call Australia and the Netherlands basket cases.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> US Army Reserves are primarily focused on CSS units including Support and Sustainment Battalions. No reason some of our many Reserve Regiments couldn't be re-roled as Transport Companies.


While the ARNG provides light infantry, Stryker and Armoured brigades as well as everything else. 

We currently have ten ResF service battalions which could easily be rerolled into larger transport and even maintenance battalions which would be more than sufficient to fill our needs for sustainment units above brigade level, even if three or four of them were to be retained as full-sized service battalions for three or four full-sized ResF brigades rather than the ten rump administrative entities that currently form the CBGs.

I'm not against re-rolling superfluous infantry battalions and armoured regiments but while I see a need for amalgamating units into fewer numbers, I really don't see a need for re-rolling at this point. We can do pretty much everything we need within the current number of all units available and simply control the structures by more judicious recruiting in the future to round out or bulk up specific units.

🍻


----------



## GR66

One of the potential problems with plans for closer Reserve Force augmentation/Total Force integration with Reg Force units is geography.  The bulk of our Reserve units are not located very close to our Reg Force bases/training areas.  

What is a reasonable travel distance between a Reserve unit and a parent Reg Force unit in order for augmentation/integration to be feasible?  Or do they have to be geographically nearby?  Is sending your deployable Reserve Platoon (as part of your Reserve Battalion's Task Grouped Company) off to exercise with your affiliated Reg Force Battalion once or twice a year enough?  The rest of the year you train the amalgamated Company in local training areas?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> One of the potential problems with plans for closer Reserve Force augmentation/Total Force integration with Reg Force units is geography.  The bulk of our Reserve units are not located very close to our Reg Force bases/training areas.
> 
> What is a reasonable travel distance between a Reserve unit and a parent Reg Force unit in order for augmentation/integration to be feasible?  Or do they have to be geographically nearby?  Is sending your deployable Reserve Platoon (as part of your Reserve Battalion's Task Grouped Company) off to exercise with your affiliated Reg Force Battalion once or twice a year enough?  The rest of the year you train the amalgamated Company in local training areas?



It's entirely feasible to do that.

As long as the Reg F can conduct their 'culminating' exercise when Reservists are available, and the Reservists have a couple of weeks to get ramped up through progressively more complex scenarios.

When you drop a militia rifle company, some of whom haven't ever worked together before, into a 'test exercise' scenario on Day 1 of a big exercise you will get what you deserve... a hot mess.

And, TBF to the RegF, I'm sure the militia higher ups played a roll in these chaotic events by overpromising what the Reservists could accomplish from Day 1.

Regardless, I could only stomach going through that nightmare during two summers, and never went back for more spankings


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> It's entirely feasible to do that.
> 
> As long as the Reg F can conduct their 'culminating' exercise when Reservists are available, and the Reservists have a couple of weeks to get ramped up through progressively more complex scenarios.
> 
> When you drop a militia rifle company, some of whom haven't ever worked together before, into a 'test exercise' scenario on Day 1 of a big exercise you will get what you deserve... a hot mess.
> 
> And, TBF to the RegF, I'm sure the militia higher ups played a roll in these chaotic events by overpromising what the Reservists could accomplish from Day 1.
> 
> Regardless, I could only stomach going through that nightmare during two summers, and never went back for more spankings


So in your opinion, as long as the Reserve units that are contributing Platoons to an augmentation Rifle Company are geographically close enough to train together regularly through the year and work up together as a cohesive sub-unit in prep for an annual culminating exercise with their Reg Force parent unit then geographic proximity to the Reg Force unit isn't critical?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> So in your opinion, as long as the Reserve units that are contributing Platoons to an augmentation Rifle Company are geographically close enough to train together regularly through the year and work up together as a cohesive sub-unit in prep for an annual culminating exercise with their Reg Force parent unit then geographic proximity to the Reg Force unit isn't critical?



Yes, absolutely.

What would be good though is regular communications between the Ops teams throughout the training year to ensure that the training being delivered aligns with what will be required during the summer exercise period.


----------



## ueo

FJAG said:


> Medics are in fact one of the professions that give me pause as to how reasonable it is to have professionals in the reserves. This is not because of the value that they bring day to day, which is substantial, but how useable they are in an emergency or disaster when they will probably be even more required in their civilian role. They are already essential workers. Will their skill be as well utilized in the role of a military medic as they would be as a civilian nurse or paramedic.
> 
> If the intent is to expand the availability of skilled workers in an emergency through activating a military reserve don't we have to position those essential "military" skills in a civilian workforce that is not inherently essential during an emergency?


This battle has raged (whimpered) since the early 80's. Still no resolution in sight!


----------



## IKnowNothing

What percentage combat arms and CS PRes Regiments on the books are currently large enough to deliver a platoon if so tasked?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> What percentage combat arms and CS PRes Regiments on the books are currently large enough to deliver a platoon if so tasked?



Random guess would be almost 100%. 

I've never seen a unit that couldn't scrape together at least one 'trained' platoon, and approximately another full of trainees at various stages in the qualification process.

I'm sure that someone will be along in a minute to correct me, though


----------



## IKnowNothing

daftandbarmy said:


> Random guess would be almost 100%.
> 
> I've never seen a unit that couldn't scrape together at least one 'trained' platoon, and approximately another full of trainees at various stages in the qualification process.
> 
> I'm sure that someone will be along in a minute to correct me, though


Thanks. Is there a material number that can do 2 or more?


----------



## GR66

IKnowNothing said:


> What percentage combat arms and CS PRes Regiments on the books are currently large enough to deliver a platoon if so tasked?


That to my mind should be one of the first things to be looked at in restructuring the Reserves.  I'm thinking that a reasonable goal would be for each Infantry unit to be able to muster a complete Company strength with 3 x Platoons of trained personnel plus a Recruit Platoon.  So 150-180 troops minimum?

That would allow each unit to deploy a Platoon for exercises using only 1/3 of their trained strength.  Platoons could run through a readiness cycle so that you have the same Platoon being your High Readiness Platoon and working with the Platoons from the other units making up the augmentation Company in prop for the annual exercise with their Reg Force parent unit.

The 2nd Platoon can be focusing on Platoon-level training while the 3rd Platoon can work on catching up on individual training, integrating newly trained recruits, etc.

I do like FJAG's idea of centralized Training Depots where recruits from all of the units making up the Reserve Battalion that is tasked to force generate the augmentation company can train together to get at least their DP1 qualifications before joining their individual units.  Doing basic training together with troops from your affiliated units would also help with cohesion as the Platoons from each unit train together.  Perhaps the Training Depot could be co-located with a Transport Company that can maintain a centralized pool of vehicles for the augmentation Company to train on throughout the year?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> Thanks. Is there a material number that can do 2 or more?



There are those who 'claim' to be able to produce more than one platoon, especially those with two 'mission elements' on the books, but their actual capacity fluctuates like the tides. 

At least with the two or three I've seen in the past.


----------



## ArmyRick

daftandbarmy said:


> There are those who 'claim' to be able to produce more than one platoon, especially those with two 'mission elements' on the books, but their actual capacity fluctuates like the tides.
> 
> At least with the two or three I've seen in the past.


My old unit (Foresters) could spool up 2 platoons easily IF we are talking short term DOM OP. Sadly, the poor civilian employment prospects in Simcoe, Grey and Bruce Counties though make that quite possibly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> That to my mind should be one of the first things to be looked at in restructuring the Reserves.  I'm thinking that a reasonable goal would be for each Infantry unit to be able to muster a complete Company strength with 3 x Platoons of trained personnel plus a Recruit Platoon.  So 150-180 troops minimum?



We are so far away from that capability you'd need a crystal ball to see it from here


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> We are so far away from that capability you'd need a crystal ball to see it from here


How many Reserve Infantry units currently would be able to muster those kind of numbers (150-180)?  If they can't then that's where I think consolidation could occur.  I don't see an issue however with having satellite Platoon locations if the trained numbers are there to support them, but they should be under a Company-level command.  

Other than showing the flag in the community and having a disciplined and organized body of personnel to fill sandbags, etc. in case of a crisis is there much real military utility in a unit smaller than that?  Can a unit smaller than that realistically hope to consistently field a trained Platoon on pretty much a permanent basis?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> How many Reserve Infantry units currently would be able to muster those kind of numbers (150-180)?  If they can't then that's where I think consolidation could occur.  I don't see an issue however with having satellite Platoon locations if the trained numbers are there to support them, but they should be under a Company-level command.
> 
> Other than showing the flag in the community and having a disciplined and organized body of personnel to fill sandbags, etc. in case of a crisis is there much real military utility in a unit smaller than that?  Can a unit smaller than that realistically hope to consistently field a trained Platoon on pretty much a permanent basis?



If the Reg F can't consistently produce those numbers, why would you expect the ARes to do so?


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> If the Reg F can't consistently produce those numbers, why would you expect the ARes to do so?


Sadly for the Reg Force that situation is by design with the Generation vs Establishment manning numbers.  Something that I believe needs to change or we could find ourselves in a pretty nasty situation if we ever have to deploy rapidly to face a threat.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Sadly for the Reg Force that situation is by design with the Generation vs Establishment manning numbers.  Something that I believe needs to change or we could find ourselves in a pretty nasty situation if we ever have to deploy rapidly to face a threat.


Can’t get there anyway  
    All by design…


----------



## IKnowNothing

Step 1-  take the tanks and the 3 LIB's, put them in a box for later
Step 2- plan 3 symmetrical CMBG's , 1x CAV Squadron+ 2x LAV Bn
Step 3- Scrap the CBG's that are collocated with CMBG's (or close enough for a reasonable drive) - 33/34/38/41
Step 4- All viable  units to be absorbed into CMBG.  Regiments remain as force generation body responsible for supplying a platoon/troop designated in the CMBG ORBAT.
Step 5 - Take Armoured and Artillery RegF Py's bumped/saved by Step 4 to stand up "Bde" type capabilities -  Doctrinal Tank Regiment, AD Regiment, HIMARS, etc.
Step 6-  Move 3 R22R to Montreal, absorbs 34CBG to become 70/30 Light Battle Group (If 6/7 Inf Unit listed can deliver would actually be closer to 50/50 with 2x 100/0 and 2x 10/90 Coys
Step 7- Move 3PPCLI and 3 RCR to Borden absorb 31 & 32 CBG and stand up 3CLBG  (assuming 4x RegF Coy's and 4x Pres worth of platoons)



Desired Result
 3x ~70/30 CMBG's fully manned with proper CS coys.  Line Coy RegF allocation either 100/70/40 or 100/100/10(HQ Reg), attachments to turn any of the 3 into a quasi heavy bde  with 3 maneuver units and proper enablers as needed,   a new light Bde.

How far off viable? What are the stumbling points to take it that far?

If not completely asinine
a-would there be any armoured/arty PY's created for the new units or would reserve integration just bring them up to strength?
b-would it be better to attach the Montreal based light battle group to 3 CLBG and be orphaned by language or 5CMBG and be orphaned by function?
c-what should be done with 36/37/39?  Could sims let them be re-roled to help with a? fly in coy's for the light bde?
d-is there enough CS and CSS inherent to 31&32 and leftover after step 5 to support the light Bde? (even as a Bn generator)


----------



## FJAG

Let me throw out a few random thoughts


GR66 said:


> That to my mind should be one of the first things to be looked at in restructuring the Reserves.  I'm thinking that a reasonable goal would be for each Infantry unit to be able to muster a complete Company strength with 3 x Platoons of trained personnel plus a Recruit Platoon.  So 150-180 troops minimum?


In any restructure I look at the objective as being the generation battalions within a brigade concept. I do not look at existing reserve battalions for this (albeit I definitely want to retain ResF battalion names for those units). What I look at is the number of troops that a geographic area can reasonably generate and sustain in order to determine what size element they should be required to generate. So a place like Brockville and it's region might be able to generate and sustain a company while Kingston might have a battalion with one company in Kingston and a company in Brockville and another in Bellevile but all being one battalion with one CO. I might even go so far as each of the Brockville and Bellevile companies keeping an affiliation with their prior unit (a buttons and bows thing perhaps) but the entire command and organizational structure for Belleville e.g. would be as a single rifle company.

On the other hand a place like Toronto or Montreal could undoubtedly form and sustain multiple battalions of different types.



GR66 said:


> That would allow each unit to deploy a Platoon for exercises using only 1/3 of their trained strength.  Platoons could run through a readiness cycle so that you have the same Platoon being your High Readiness Platoon and working with the Platoons from the other units making up the augmentation Company in prop for the annual exercise with their Reg Force parent unit.
> 
> The 2nd Platoon can be focusing on Platoon-level training while the 3rd Platoon can work on catching up on individual training, integrating newly trained recruits, etc.


Honestly, I think the whole readiness cycle thing is a red herring we created for Afghanistan and limited equipment. It isn't necessary for ResF elements at all. I anticipate that for any operational deployments where the RegF is looking for augmentation there will be a predeployment training cycle anyway to integrate volunteers. Basically the ResF is a "reserve" to be called on as volunteers when needed or "activated" when the Poop hits the fan. In that case we'll activate anyone who has completed DP1 (and probably some who haven't).

The important thing is to ensure that everyone is properly DP1 trained or better. IMHO ResF units should concentrate on collective training to the company level within the time frame available to them which includes the summer training cycle. While summer training would be as a battalion, the focus is training the companies.



GR66 said:


> I do like FJAG's idea of centralized Training Depots where recruits from all of the units making up the Reserve Battalion that is tasked to force generate the augmentation company can train together to get at least their DP1 qualifications before joining their individual units.  Doing basic training together with troops from your affiliated units would also help with cohesion as the Platoons from each unit train together.  Perhaps the Training Depot could be co-located with a Transport Company that can maintain a centralized pool of vehicles for the augmentation Company to train on throughout the year?


The primary intent of the the Depots, as you point out, is to relieve the requirement for units (both RegF and ResF) to do individual training and let them concentrate their time on collective training. Essentially a unit receives a DP1 qualified soldier. It also centralizes individual training management (and in my royal kingdom, recruiting for the Army) of the BTL and some elements of the ATL lists. In my perfect world the depot battalions would report to a Canadian Army Basic Training Group headquartered at Kingston and reporting to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (also in Kingston)

Geographically I see four or five battalions at the existing principal training centres (Wainwright, Meaford, Valcartier and Aldershot [with maybe something on the west coast - maybe]) but with subordinate companies or even platoons) at each of the main urban centres across the country. The aim is to recruit, train and manage BTL/ATL people locally on what can be taught locally and then bring them to centralized training areas for those things that need better resources such as equipment or ranges. I would see these depots training RegF throughout the year and ResF folks intensively in the summer months but also at opportune times during the winter. Equipment and peak summer training may be a challenge and will probably still require some augmentation for instructors and gear from both RegF and ResF units.

We already do some of these things but not as comprehensively as I think it needs to be.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Let me throw out a few random thoughts
> 
> In any restructure I look at the objective as being the generation battalions within a brigade concept. I do not look at existing reserve battalions for this (albeit I definitely want to retain ResF battalion names for those units). What I look at is the number of troops that a geographic area can reasonably generate and sustain in order to determine what size element they should be required to generate. So a place like Brockville and it's region might be able to generate and sustain a company while Kingston might have a battalion with one company in Kingston and a company in Brockville and another in Bellevile but all being one battalion with one CO. I might even go so far as each of the Brockville and Bellevile companies keeping an affiliation with their prior unit (a buttons and bows thing perhaps) but the entire command and organizational structure for Belleville e.g. would be as a single rifle company.
> 
> On the other hand a place like Toronto or Montreal could undoubtedly form and sustain multiple battalions of different types.


I think we're actually on the same page generally.  I too see Reserve Brigades & Battalions.  There would just be both a Mobilization role for the units as well as an Augmentation role which is one level down from the unit size.

For example a Reserve Light Infantry Brigade would consist of 3 x Light Infantry Battalions each with 3 x Infantry Companies and a CS Company (each of these companies may perpetuate an existing Reserve "Regiment" in name).  Each of these Infantry Companies would be tasked to generate a single Platoon annually for joint company-level training with the Platoons from the Reserve Battalion's other Infantry Companies.  

Between the three Reserve Battalions in the Reserve Brigade they would be able to provide a 4th Company to each of the Reg Force Battalions in their affiliated Brigade.

This "augmentation" Company would then join their affiliated Reg Force Battalion (as a 4th Infantry Company) in a culminating exercise each year, but they would also have the objective of being prepared (DAG Green) to deploy on Ops in support of their affiliated Reg Force Battalion on short notice if required.  The goal of this augmentation is to maintain a high level of unit and sub-unit level training within the Reserves and to establish an ongoing working relationship with the Reg Force units.

However, in case of a major crisis where expansion of the Army is required instead of just augmentation of the Reg Force then the Reserve Brigades and Battalions would mobilize en masse as complete formations.


FJAG said:


> Honestly, I think the whole readiness cycle thing is a red herring we created for Afghanistan and limited equipment. It isn't necessary for ResF elements at all. I anticipate that for any operational deployments where the RegF is looking for augmentation there will be a predeployment training cycle anyway to integrate volunteers. Basically the ResF is a "reserve" to be called on as volunteers when needed or "activated" when the Poop hits the fan. In that case we'll activate anyone who has completed DP1 (and probably some who haven't).
> 
> The important thing is to ensure that everyone is properly DP1 trained or better. IMHO ResF units should concentrate on collective training to the company level within the time frame available to them which includes the summer training cycle. While summer training would be as a battalion, the focus is training the companies.


You can deal with the concept of "readiness" however works, but the idea is that while you may not be able to ensure that 100% of your Reserve unit is available to conduct major collective training exercises each and every summer it should at least be possible to have at least 1/3 of your trained manpower (one full Platoon) reliably available to do so.  

This of course doesn't mean that just because the "augmentation" Platoon is preparing for their exercise with the Reg Force Battalion that the rest of the Reserve Company is not training as well.  There should still be Platoon and Company level training with the unit and Battalion and even Brigade-level exercises taking place as well.


FJAG said:


> The primary intent of the the Depots, as you point out, is to relieve the requirement for units (both RegF and ResF) to do individual training and let them concentrate their time on collective training. Essentially a unit receives a DP1 qualified soldier. It also centralizes individual training management (and in my royal kingdom, recruiting for the Army) of the BTL and some elements of the ATL lists. In my perfect world the depot battalions would report to a Canadian Army Basic Training Group headquartered at Kingston and reporting to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (also in Kingston)
> 
> Geographically I see four or five battalions at the existing principal training centres (Wainwright, Meaford, Valcartier and Aldershot [with maybe something on the west coast - maybe]) but with subordinate companies or even platoons) at each of the main urban centres across the country. The aim is to recruit, train and manage BTL/ATL people locally on what can be taught locally and then bring them to centralized training areas for those things that need better resources such as equipment or ranges. I would see these depots training RegF throughout the year and ResF folks intensively in the summer months but also at opportune times during the winter. Equipment and peak summer training may be a challenge and will probably still require some augmentation for instructors and gear from both RegF and ResF units.
> 
> We already do some of these things but not as comprehensively as I think it needs to be.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> I think we're actually on the same page generally.  I too see Reserve Brigades & Battalions.  There would just be both a Mobilization role for the units as well as an Augmentation role which is one level down from the unit size.
> 
> For example a *Reserve Light Infantry Brigade would consist of 3 x Light Infantry Battalions each with 3 x Infantry Companies and a CS Company (each of these companies may perpetuate an existing Reserve "Regiment" in name). * Each of these Infantry Companies would be tasked to generate a single Platoon annually for joint company-level training with the Platoons from the Reserve Battalion's other Infantry Companies.



So how would you accommodate and train all these people in a 1915, or earlier, era armoury with a parade square, 6 separate messes, one 'lecture room' (max 30 people) and a parking lot designed for a few horse drawn gun limbers?

Just wondering


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> So how would you accommodate and train all these people in a 1915, or earlier, era armoury with a parade square, 6 separate messes, one 'lecture room' (max 30 people) and a parking lot designed for a few horse drawn gun limbers?
> 
> Just wondering


The individual Reserve units (current "Regiments"/future "Companies") wouldn't have to relocate.  They would continue to use their existing (sub-optimal) facilities.  

Like everything else in the broken down CA there would have to be a plan to eventually upgrade/replace inadequate facilities.  Training Depots and Transport Companies/Service Battalions serving the Reserve units from a centralized location (ideally co-located with the training areas) could help by consolidating equipment/vehicles where there is more space.

Obviously no changes would be able to take place overnight.  First step (while the Reg Force concentrates on their reconsolidation) would be to examine the current strength and potential recruiting pool for the existing Reserve Regiments.  Then figure out how to best group them as Company groupings into the new Battalions and Brigades.  Then look at the training model and training facilities and work on getting those in a position to be able to start with the new model.  Finally figure out what equipment is required to complete the required training.

We're likely looking at a decades long process but you have to start somewhere.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> The individual Reserve units (current "Regiments"/future "Companies") wouldn't have to relocate.  They would continue to use their existing (sub-optimal) facilities.
> 
> Like everything else in the broken down CA there would have to be a plan to eventually upgrade/replace inadequate facilities.  Training Depots and Transport Companies/Service Battalions serving the Reserve units from a centralized location (ideally co-located with the training areas) could help by consolidating equipment/vehicles where there is more space.
> 
> Obviously no changes would be able to take place overnight.  First step (while the Reg Force concentrates on their reconsolidation) would be to examine the current strength and potential recruiting pool for the existing Reserve Regiments.  Then figure out how to best group them as Company groupings into the new Battalions and Brigades.  Then look at the training model and training facilities and work on getting those in a position to be able to start with the new model.  Finally figure out what equipment is required to complete the required training.
> 
> We're likely looking at a decades long process but you have to start somewhere.



Luckily, DND spent $70+M on an wonderful armoury upgrade for a regiment that rarely parades more than 40 troops on a training night or weekend ex, and a couple dozen Class B wallahs that show up during the day for 39 CBG HQ. 

I think the precedent has been set 









						B.C.’s army brigade gets new HQ — Seaforth Highlanders
					

By  Michael Mui , 24 Hours Vancouver | Sunday, September 25, 2016 2:32:16 PDT PM  British Columbia’s arm of the Canadian Army received a new headquarters in Vancouver this past weekend, based next to the city’s reserve infantry regiment, which also just received some much-needed seismic upgrade




					www.seaforthhighlanders.ca


----------



## Remius

daftandbarmy said:


> Luckily, DND spent $70+M on an wonderful armoury upgrade for a regiment that rarely parades more than 40 troops on a training night or weekend ex, and a couple dozen Class B wallahs that show up during the day for 39 CBG HQ.
> 
> I think the precedent has been set
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> B.C.’s army brigade gets new HQ — Seaforth Highlanders
> 
> 
> By  Michael Mui , 24 Hours Vancouver | Sunday, September 25, 2016 2:32:16 PDT PM  British Columbia’s arm of the Canadian Army received a new headquarters in Vancouver this past weekend, based next to the city’s reserve infantry regiment, which also just received some much-needed seismic upgrade
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.seaforthhighlanders.ca


Find a way to buy some empty schools.  Most are already fenced off.  Plenty of classrooms, parking normally a decent yard or football field, a gym, offices and storage space.  Wouldn’t take much to make a few upgrades.


----------



## FJAG

Remius said:


> Find a way to buy some empty schools.  Most are already fenced off.  Plenty of classrooms, parking normally a decent yard or football field, a gym, offices and storage space.  Wouldn’t take much to make a few upgrades.


Empty malls work too

🍻


----------



## Haggis

FJAG said:


> Empty malls work too
> 
> 🍻


....particularly those with an abandoned liquor store.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Random guess would be almost 100%.
> 
> I've never seen a unit that couldn't scrape together at least one 'trained' platoon, and approximately another full of trainees at various stages in the qualification process.
> 
> I'm sure that someone will be along in a minute to correct me, though


With the Rocky Mountain Rangers we were never above 25  on parade. When I was there at least. But I’d assume on aggregate most could manage something close to a platoon.

Sadly the regular Bns are mandated be be manned below war strength. Odd comparison to make really. I suppose the better question is why call something a regiment when it’s one platoon.

If we start readjusting units, and think in terms of catchment areas vs regiments reporting to armouries, we can alter and adjust who goes where for what. I would much much rather have all the units in Vancouver work out of ASU Chilliwack a weekend a month rather than 4 half days at their sub par armouries. Similar in Edmonton, they could make great use of the on base facilities vs their two armouries… which aren’t in the base because that made sense to some one… I digress.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> With the Rocky Mountain Rangers we were never above 25  on parade. When I was there at least. But I’d assume on aggregate most could manage something close to a platoon.
> 
> Sadly the regular Bns are mandated be be manned below war strength. Odd comparison to make really. I suppose the better question is why call something a regiment when it’s one platoon.
> 
> If we start readjusting units, and think in terms of catchment areas vs regiments reporting to armouries, we can alter and adjust who goes where for what. I would much much rather have all the units in Vancouver work out of ASU Chilliwack a weekend a month rather than 4 half days at their sub par armouries. Similar in Edmonton, they could make great use of the on base facilities vs their two armouries… which aren’t in the base because that made sense to some one… I digress.


While I think a lot of units can put out a platoon or two there are several that cannot.  At least not realistically. 

We do have some units that are tactically grouped.  Because of that.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> While I think a lot of units can put out a platoon or two there are several that cannot.  At least not realistically.
> 
> We do have some units that are tactically grouped.  Because of that.


At my core I argue if you can’t field a platoon, you probably don’t need a Lt Col a CSM, ect ect. If two units can field two platoons a piece, well that’s a company. Probably Winnipeg should have a company, maybe a Bn for the whole of 41 Bde. Tactical Grouping is, at present, a half measure that should be far more wide spread, amd include some more sweeping reforms in reserve structure.

To add we have 10 Reserve Brigades managing a total of 14,000 reservists (one the Rangers are taken out of the equation). At roughly 1400 per Bde I feel a Bn in their plus some divisional regiment / Bn HQs wouldn’t be much more appropriate.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> At my core I argue if you can’t field a platoon, you probably don’t need a Lt Col a CSM, ect ect. If two units can field two platoons a piece, well that’s a company. Probably Winnipeg should have a company, maybe a Bn for the whole of 41 Bde. Tactical Grouping is, at present, a half measure that should be far more wide spread, amd include some more sweeping reforms in reserve structure.


I’m not saying that restructuring is not required.  Just what some units are doing to get the training they can at platoon  level or higher.

We already have units tactically grouped sharing COs and RSMs so it does work and the world isn’t ending.

The issue too is that while you might be able to field two platoons out the door for what whatever, you could also  have more that on the establishment doing other stuff or having civilian priorities conflicting.   It’s not every unit though that would be in that situation.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Haggis said:


> ....particularly those with an abandoned liquor store.



Kind of a metaphor for my life, really


----------



## FJAG

Haggis said:


> ....particularly those with an abandoned liquor store.


And a food court for a kitchen.


----------



## OldSolduer

Remius said:


> We already have units tactically grouped sharing COs and RSMs so it does work and the world isn’t ending.


Been there, done that and it does work, despite the pouting of some who live and breath "Regimental Traditions"


----------



## Brad Sallows

Sigs and meds and some other folks and things are in there with 39 CBG and the Seaforths.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Sigs and meds and some other folks and things are in there with 39 CBG and the Seaforths.



Yes, I know. It's just a staggeringly huge investment out of all proportion to the realities of the evolving demographic realities of population centres in the Lower Mainland/ Fraser Valley, and where the largest units are located.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Yeah.  Took them forever, too.  I was tagged to attend a liaison committee to "prepare" some years before I released, so that'd be over 20 years ago.  On, off, on, off, on...

Agree they missed a chance to build something big somewhere out in the valley near Surrey/Langley border.  Easy access to Hwy 1, I-5, people, knock 45 min off travel time just getting out of Vancouver, etc.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> I’m not saying that restructuring is not required.  Just what some units are doing to get the training they can at platoon  level or higher.
> 
> We already have units tactically grouped sharing COs and RSMs so it does work and the world isn’t ending.



The world isn’t ending because we don’t use the reserves as an integral part of our operational capability. If we did this system would be crippling. But then again I never said it was and “isn’t a catastrophe” is hardly a glowing review. Also see above, those units don’t need COs or RSMs.



Remius said:


> The issue too is that while you might be able to field two platoons out the door for what whatever, you could also  have more that on the establishment doing other stuff or having civilian priorities conflicting.   It’s not every unit though that would be in that situation.


Yes very familiar, I was in a reserve unit that claimed 75 members but only ever paraded 25. NES paper work was something no one ever really wanted to get done I guess. It is of course the natural result of the show up when and if you want system, which is also why we can’t build reserve structures into our operational capabilities. Simply not reliable.

I’ll point out that the Netherlands has their reserve Bns directly inside their 3 Bdes. Each is made up of geographically dispersed, obviously to a lesser extent than in Canada, companies who come together to provide a third Bn to their parent formation.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Yes very familiar, I was in a reserve unit that claimed 75 members but only ever paraded 25. NES paper work was something no one ever really wanted to get done I guess. It is of course the natural result of the show up when and if you want system, which is also why we can’t build reserve structures into our operational capabilities. Simply not reliable.


NES scutt work is what got me into the legal branch. When I was with the Camerons while in law school I went to see the local AJAG in Winnipeg and volunteered to do NES files on the side. The units, like all units were sluffing them off. I got things cleaned up over the year and got known. When the branch opened up ResF positions to majors that year, I got the call, sent off on a Basic LegO course and the rest is history. 

It's not hard to do better. QR&O has a provision for "ordering" people to attend training and the NDA has a provision to charge someone downtown if they don't. Were sending sex assaults downtown now, why not failure to attend training. Maybe its because of the stupid $25.00 or $50.00 fine.



> 9.04 (2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(_b_) of article 9.07 (_Class "B" Reserve Service_) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (_see article 9.06_ - _Class "A" Reserve Service_), for a period not exceeding 60 days.





> *294* (1) Every officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who without lawful excuse neglects or refuses to attend any parade or training at the place and hour appointed therefor is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction for each offence, if an officer, to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and, if a non-commissioned member, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
> (2) Absence from any parade or training referred to in subsection (1) is, in respect of each day on which the absence occurs, a separate offence.



Of course the fear is that is Gunner Bloggins is pushed on this he'll just up and quit.

This needs fixing and we need service contracts with obligatory periods of service and a set number of obligatory training days if we ever hope to improve the system.

"Come play when you feel like it" is a really dumb way to run a military. Personally, I'd rather have 7,000 folks I can count on that 15,000 I can't.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> This needs fixing and we need service contracts with obligatory periods of service and a set number of obligatory training days if we ever hope to improve the system.
> 
> "Come play when you feel like it" is a really dumb way to run a military. Personally, I'd rather have 7,000 folks I can count on that 15,000 I can't.
> 
> 🍻


This new reserve force readiness program starting April 1 2023, setting out requirements is a step in the right direction, but IMO still pretty weak over all, infact I would call it more lax because instead of once a month, you can technically go three months before going NES. Though atleast they set in stone you have to get your IBTS done each year and a few other things, but they still haven't addressed issues like medicals, the revolving door of soldier of convenience, etc...


----------



## childs56

The system needs to be fixed, Courses cancelled, vacation time taken all for nothing. Commitments to the Reserve Training structure has been extremely lacking. Lack of equipment is another area where the Army Reserves lack. 
 How to Recruit people into a Reserve Force it is simple offer them a great part time job with benefits flexible schedule that will work with you to a point, good opportunity's for deployment overseas and regular training. 
How to retain these Reservists treat them well. give them the tools and resources to succeed and dont jerk them around. Lack of equipment, gear, clothing, ammo etc will demoralize a group of people quicker then anything else, add in a piss poor leader and they start bailing off the ship mid ocean. 

Units like 5th(Bc) Field and 15 Fd Regt need to go down to Field batteries, given 9 guns each along with Equipment. They need to be authorized strength and allotments for 150person strengths each. But expected to staff 75 each at all times. 
The Infantry Regiments should also be formed into Companies. The same Authorized for 150 and staff 75 each. 

The premise behind my thoughts is that if the units can have the equipment to train properly, have the funding to staff properly, the courses to back it all up along with the training day allotments then they can staff and provide some solid support to recruit, train and retain their soldiers.  

I know in my days we had lack of equipment, lack of courses (often cancelled after being confirmed)had budgets cut mid way through the year cutting back on training days. Anybody who may be serious about a commitment to the Reserves will think twice if it is ran so unprofessional.


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> The world isn’t ending because we don’t use the reserves as an integral part of our operational capability. If we did this system would be crippling. But then again I never said it was and “isn’t a catastrophe” is hardly a glowing review. Also see above, those units don’t need COs or RSMs.


I never said that either.   My statement supports what you are saying about tactical groupings.  Some units need to others not so much.  But until the system is fixed and that also means fixing the CAF force as a whole btw it likely will be a slow go and slog.  So it can be done and it isn’t the end of the world (for those units and for whatever identity people would think would be under threat if they did)

It’s starting to slowly fall apart though and COVID just accelerated things.  What do you think would happen if you removed every reservist currently serving on class B?  That’s a self inflicted reg force drug addiction that damaged both the regs and reserves long term.    And it’s starting to finally catch up to the organisation.   

As far as making the reserves an integral part of our operational capability we are seeing that change in an unprecedented way this year.  CBGs are being asked to be lead mounting formations, integration training with reg force units is ongoing etc etc.  




markppcli said:


> Yes very familiar, I was in a reserve unit that claimed 75 members but only ever paraded 25. NES paper work was something no one ever really wanted to get done I guess. It is of course the natural result of the show up when and if you want system, which is also why we can’t build reserve structures into our operational capabilities. Simply not reliable.


perhaps I didn’t explain well enough.  That unit that can get two or three platoons out the door for whatever reason or task  might have others that do show up but can’t make it out for whatever reason (employers, school etc).  Not to mention other elements of the unit. Again, some units will vary.  Mine is significantly larger than 75 on paper.  But maybe units that are larger are the exception and not the norm.  Coming out of COVID I am pretty sure they are the exception.




markppcli said:


> I’ll point out that the Netherlands has their reserve Bns directly inside their 3 Bdes. Each is made up of geographically dispersed, obviously to a lesser extent than in Canada, companies who come together to provide a third Bn to their parent formation.


Im pretty sure that concept existed in some form here a long time ago.  4 RCR, 6 vandoo are holdovers of that and many units had designated Bn numbers after their names.  

We sort of have that but it’s only loosely formalized and not at all integrate per se other than who we provide bodies to.


----------



## Remius

MilEME09 said:


> This new reserve force readiness program starting April 1 2023, setting out requirements is a step in the right direction, but IMO still pretty weak over all, infact I would call it more lax because instead of once a month, you can technically go three months before going NES. Though atleast they set in stone you have to get your IBTS done each year and a few other things, but they still haven't addressed issues like medicals, the revolving door of soldier of convenience, etc...


It’s a good start and it is not more lax.   It’s 10 days.  Same as now really but they extended the NES period to 60days of no parading. 

What gets you NES now:

Parading less than 10 days in a year
Failing to parade once in a 60 day period 
Failing to meet any of the IBTS requirements (which all together dags you green for dom ops)

That last part is the key difference.  And when you factor in the 10 day minimum of which you will need to be in for IBTS…


----------



## ueo

markppcli said:


> At my core I argue if you can’t field a platoon, you probably don’t need a Lt Col a CSM, ect ect. If two units can field two platoons a piece, well that’s a company. Probably Winnipeg should have a company, maybe a Bn for the whole of 41 Bde. Tactical Grouping is, at present, a half measure that should be far more wide spread, amd include some more sweeping reforms in reserve structure.
> 
> To add we have 10 Reserve Brigades managing a total of 14,000 reservists (one the Rangers are taken out of the equation). At roughly 1400 per Bde I feel a Bn in their plus some divisional regiment / Bn HQs wouldn’t be much more appropriate.


But then what do we do with all the extra officers?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> NES scutt work is what got me into the legal branch. When I was with the Camerons while in law school I went to see the local AJAG in Winnipeg and volunteered to do NES files on the side. The units, like all units were sluffing them off. I got things cleaned up over the year and got known. When the branch opened up ResF positions to majors that year, I got the call, sent off on a Basic LegO course and the rest is history.
> 
> It's not hard to do better. QR&O has a provision for "ordering" people to attend training and the NDA has a provision to charge someone downtown if they don't. Were sending sex assaults downtown now, why not failure to attend training. Maybe its because of the stupid $25.00 or $50.00 fine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course the fear is that is Gunner Bloggins is pushed on this he'll just up and quit.
> 
> This needs fixing and we need service contracts with obligatory periods of service and a set number of obligatory training days if we ever hope to improve the system.
> 
> "Come play when you feel like it" is a really dumb way to run a military. Personally, I'd rather have 7,000 folks I can count on that 15,000 I can't.
> 
> 🍻


When I was in 30th Fd, a friend of mine was charged for failing to attend a training night.  
  As a MBdr he then came in three Admin nights to talk to his AO, the while the BC found him guilty, he made money off it…

Yup the system sure showed him.


----------



## markppcli

Remius said:


> I never said that either.   My statement supports what you are saying about tactical groupings.  Some units need to others not so much.  But until the system is fixed and that also means fixing the CAF force as a whole btw it likely will be a slow go and slog.  So it can be done and it isn’t the end of the world (for those units and for whatever identity people would think would be under threat if they did)



Could you reword that last bit? 



Remius said:


> It’s starting to slowly fall apart though and COVID just accelerated things.  What do you think would happen if you removed every reservist currently serving on class B?  That’s a self inflicted reg force drug addiction that damaged both the regs and reserves long term.    And it’s starting to finally catch up to the organisation.



Maybd I’m just sheltered in a brigade, but I don’t see many class Bs in my day to day. Wainwright probably has more, but not like it used to when CMTC was in full swing.



Remius said:


> As far as making the reserves an integral part of our operational capability we are seeing that change in an unprecedented way this year.  CBGs are being asked to be lead mounting formations, integration training with reg force units is ongoing etc etc.



Your talking about Atlantic Canada with the storms? I suspect that has a lot to do with where it was and what was available as a lead formation frankly. 



Remius said:


> perhaps I didn’t explain well enough.  That unit that can get two or three platoons out the door for whatever reason or task  might have others that do show up but can’t make it out for whatever reason (employers, school etc).  Not to mention other elements of the unit. Again, some units will vary.  Mine is significantly larger than 75 on paper.  But maybe units that are larger are the exception and not the norm.  Coming out of COVID I am pretty sure they are the exception.



My point was more that what matters, in terms of size, is how many are actually available for op/training. Not the guys that probably should be on NES. What is the actual, tangible, out put.



Remius said:


> Im pretty sure that concept existed in some form here a long time ago.  4 RCR, 6 vandoo are holdovers of that and many units had designated Bn numbers after their names.



“In the 1950s, the Canadian Army promoted a scheme of administratively associating reserve infantry regiments with a regular one. Although this project did not make much progress in most of the army, three reserve regiments did join the Van Doos, becoming battalions of the Royal 22e Régiment:” - that’s from Wiki and it’s about the best bit of information I could find in it. It’s a similar story with 4 RCR shifting from its old regimental titles, to become a battalion of the regiment. They were never formally part of the regular force formation.





Remius said:


> We sort of have that but it’s only loosely formalized and not at all integrate per se other than who we provide bodies to.


----------



## markppcli

ueo said:


> But then what do we do with all the extra officers?


The reserves is the unique case where I believe officers should be selected from the ranks. So we can hire as needed as opposed to “oh I see you have a degree.”


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> With the Rocky Mountain Rangers we were never above 25  on parade. When I was there at least. But I’d assume on aggregate most could manage something close to a platoon.
> 
> Sadly the regular Bns are mandated be be manned below war strength. Odd comparison to make really. I suppose the better question is why call something a regiment when it’s one platoon.
> 
> If we start readjusting units, and think in terms of catchment areas vs regiments reporting to armouries, we can alter and adjust who goes where for what. I would much much rather have all the units in Vancouver work out of ASU Chilliwack a weekend a month rather than 4 half days at their sub par armouries. Similar in Edmonton, they could make great use of the on base facilities vs their two armouries… which aren’t in the base because that made sense to some one… I digress.


Agreed.  More weekend and longer training at (properly equipped) training areas rather than short evening training at sub-par armouries.  The armouries should basically be admin offices and recruiting locations in the local community.  Train in the field.


markppcli said:


> Yes very familiar, I was in a reserve unit that claimed 75 members but only ever paraded 25. NES paper work was something no one ever really wanted to get done I guess. It is of course the natural result of the show up when and if you want system, which is also why we can’t build reserve structures into our operational capabilities. Simply not reliable.


Again agreed.  FJAG's proposal that Reserve members have a fixed term contract with obligations for attendance makes sense to me.


markppcli said:


> I’ll point out that the Netherlands has their reserve Bns directly inside their 3 Bdes. Each is made up of geographically dispersed, obviously to a lesser extent than in Canada, companies who come together to provide a third Bn to their parent formation.


That would be a nice eventual goal, but I'd be happy to start with providing a Company to each Battalion as a first step based on where we are starting from.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> When I was in 30th Fd, a friend of mine was charged for failing to attend a training night.
> As a MBdr he then came in three Admin nights to talk to his AO, the while the BC found him guilty, he made money off it…
> 
> Yup the system sure showed him.


Interestingly, a reservist can't be charged for failing to attend training under the CSD.  At the time that they are not there, they are not subject to the CSD which has very limited situation when a reservist is liable  (see NDA 60(1)(c)). That's why the NDA has s 294 which makes it an offence triable by a civil court. Some DJA was sleeping on the job there.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Interestingly, a reservist can't be charged for failing to attend training under the CSD.  At the time that they are not there, they are not subject to the CSD which has very limited situation when a reservist is liable  (see NDA 60(1)(c)). That's why the NDA has s 294 which makes it an offence triable by a civil court. Some DJA was sleeping on the job there.
> 
> 🍻



And if a Reservist, in uniform, is driving to his parade night and gets into a car accident and is permanently disabled, he has no recourse to the CAF or VA for services.

I always told my guys to sign in before they left the house, if they could


----------



## Remius

markppcli said:


> Could you reword that last bit?


I mean that tactical groupings haven’t been the end of the world for those units that did it.  Regimental identity still exists for those grouped but they are probably more efficient.  The reserve RCA units that are grouped likely felt no real difference in that regard and same with the svc battalion grouping.  


markppcli said:


> Maybd I’m just sheltered in a brigade, but I don’t see many class Bs in my day to day. Wainwright probably has more, but not like it used to when CMTC was in full swing.


NCR, Kingston, with their proximities to the various HQ and training Deathstars.  Toronto with 4Div HQ nearby.  Montreal close to the mega.  Gagegtown.  All these areas rely heavily on reserve augmentation via class Bs.  We likely have a platoon plus of guys on class Bs all over the place.  What does not help is Div’s policy to have them transfer to whatever PRL despite them wanting to parade with their home unit.  Or the ones that when they get on a class B don’t come in anymore,   We’re lucky we can get guys to still show up but their class B employers are never to keen to give them up for dom ops, week long training etc etc unless it’s career courses. Or the challenge of why we have to fight for course spots when a prl type will never be employed in any trade related role but needs the promotion for his next class b.    Sorry that turned into a bit of a rant at the end lol.


markppcli said:


> Your talking about Atlantic Canada with the storms? I suspect that has a lot to do with where it was and what was available as a lead formation frankly.


No.  PM to follow.


markppcli said:


> My point was more that what matters, in terms of size, is how many are actually available for op/training. Not the guys that probably should be on NES. What is the actual, tangible, out put.


Yes.  Point taken.  But time and opportunity plays into it.  So a unit may have to have a higher administrative/garrison strength to be able to send out.  And it’s not guys that should be NES per say.  I don’t count those numbers nor do I add in releases pending.  The same guy who can’t make it one ex might be able to make the next one or the guy that can’t commit to two weeks for dom op in the fall might able to do one in the spring.  So maybe reserve units with the current make up need a 3 to 1 ratio for what’s on strength vs what they can deploy without being compelled by legislation.   I’m just math theory crafting though. 


markppcli said:


> “In the 1950s, the Canadian Army promoted a scheme of administratively associating reserve infantry regiments with a regular one. Although this project did not make much progress in most of the army, three reserve regiments did join the Van Doos, becoming battalions of the Royal 22e Régiment:” - that’s from Wiki and it’s about the best bit of information I could find in it. It’s a similar story with 4 RCR shifting from its old regimental titles, to become a battalion of the regiment. They were never formally part of the regular force formation.


Yeah it’s something on those lines.  My unit was designated 5Bn of our « parent » reg force unit but was likely cosmetic more than anything else.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

childs56 said:


> The system needs to be fixed, Courses cancelled, vacation time taken all for nothing. Commitments to the Reserve Training structure has been extremely lacking. Lack of equipment is another area where the Army Reserves lack.
> How to Recruit people into a Reserve Force it is simple offer them a great part time job with benefits flexible schedule that will work with you to a point, good opportunity's for deployment overseas and regular training.
> How to retain these Reservists treat them well. give them the tools and resources to succeed and dont jerk them around. Lack of equipment, gear, clothing, ammo etc will demoralize a group of people quicker then anything else, add in a piss poor leader and they start bailing off the ship mid ocean.
> 
> Units like 5th(Bc) Field and 15 Fd Regt need to go down to Field batteries, given 9 guns each along with Equipment. They need to be authorized strength and allotments for 150person strengths each. But expected to staff 75 each at all times.
> The Infantry Regiments should also be formed into Companies. The same Authorized for 150 and staff 75 each.
> 
> The premise behind my thoughts is that if the units can have the equipment to train properly, have the funding to staff properly, the courses to back it all up along with the training day allotments then they can staff and provide some solid support to recruit, train and retain their soldiers.
> 
> I know in my days we had lack of equipment, lack of courses (often cancelled after being confirmed)had budgets cut mid way through the year cutting back on training days. Anybody who may be serious about a commitment to the Reserves will think twice if it is ran so unprofessional.


5th fd is already a battery only. 15th Fd is a Regt in name only. In my day both units had 6 guns each. 15th Fd was broken down to 31 bty was the gun Battery and 68 was the training battery. Over the years a separate battery was stood up and stood down in the Fraser Valley to take advantage of the population and bases there. 
When we were Ops tasked, we had about 9 Deuces (6 guntractors, two ammo and spare), two CP's, two FOO parties in jeeps. A line lying vehicle, Field ambulance, REME truck and a couple of other smaller offroad capable vehicles. Along with a van and 3 ton stake truck.


----------



## dapaterson

The Vancouver gunners, as I recall, are a band with some 105mm percussion.


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> When we were Ops tasked, we had about 9 Deuces (6 guntractors, two ammo and spare), two CP's, two FOO parties in jeeps. A line lying vehicle, Field ambulance, REME truck and a couple of other smaller offroad capable vehicles. Along with a van and 3 ton stake truck.


pretty similar layout to 30 RCA 
   8 Gun tractors (only 6 guns) 
   4 MLVW Cargo 
   2 5/4 CP, main and alt 
   1 5/4 Cargo (Recce) 
   1 CUCV (generally occupied by RSS) 
   1 Line Laying Iltis 
   2 FOO Iltis (sometime with trailer). 
   1 BC Party Iltis and trailer 
   2 TSM Iltis with trailer 
   5/4 Amb (taken when Medics where removed to be consolidated at the Field Amb unit) 
   1 Ford F-350 Super Crew (RSS O Gene Browns personal vehicle for 4 years  ) 
   2 Panel Van.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Agreed.  More weekend and longer training at (properly equipped) training areas rather than short evening training at sub-par armouries.  The armouries should basically be admin offices and recruiting locations in the local community.  Train in the field.
> 
> Again agreed.  FJAG's proposal that Reserve members have a fixed term contract with obligations for attendance makes sense to me.
> 
> That would be a nice eventual goal, but I'd be happy to start with providing a Company to each Battalion as a first step based on where we are starting from.


A company to each Bn is actually harder to integrate than a Bn into a Bde.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> And if a Reservist, in uniform, is driving to his parade night and gets into a car accident and is permanently disabled, he has no recourse to the CAF or VA for services.
> 
> I always told my guys to sign in before they left the house, if they could


But they could be charged if they were in uniform.   

My memory is a bit vague on this but I don't think that signing the pay sheet would make a difference, because, if I remember correctly, there was a policy somewhere that expressly excluded travel to and from the armouries (place of parade etc) from being on duty. If I remember correctly it was to prevent, amongst other things,  people with long drives from turning a half day parade into a full day's one.

There are sooooo many policies.

🍻


----------



## childs56

Colin Parkinson said:


> 5th fd is already a battery only.


Still listed as a Regiment. They were a Fd Bty then Changed back to a Regiment and been that way since the late 90s. 


Colin Parkinson said:


> 15th Fd is a Regt in name only. In my day both units had 6 guns each.


4 guns in the 5th(BC) when I was there 56 Bty could man all 4 with spare people. Vic could do the same. Short equipment was and still a problem. 


Colin Parkinson said:


> 15th Fd was broken down to 31 bty was the gun Battery and 68 was the training battery. Over the years a separate battery was stood up and stood down in the Fraser Valley to take advantage of the population and bases there.
> When we were Ops tasked, we had about 9 Deuces (6 guntractors, two ammo and spare), two CP's, two FOO parties in jeeps. A line lying vehicle, Field ambulance, REME truck and a couple of other smaller offroad capable vehicles. Along with a van and 3 ton stake truck.


Interesting I am guessing the 80s into the early 90s is the time frame this was in.  

They need the equipment, money and training courses to make things work.


----------



## dapaterson

En route to your usual work location - not covered; en route to a different location - covered.

In the latter instance, the individual should also be reimbursed for milage.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> A company to each Bn is actually harder to integrate than a Bn into a Bde.


Better 1 soldier to each section...
   At this point, I doubt anyone would want a PRes Coy without significant workup - and no one is going to want a PRes BN, unless it takes 2 years of workup (mainly for the WO and higher)


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> A company to each Bn is actually harder to integrate than a Bn into a Bde.


You may be right, but I bet we'd struggle to to consistently form even fully trained Companies right now.  Complete Battalions I'm thinking would be in the realm of pure fantasy.  



KevinB said:


> Better 1 soldier to each section...
> At this point, I doubt anyone would want a PRes Coy without significant workup - and no one is going to want a PRes BN, unless it takes 2 years of workup (mainly for the WO and higher)


As I noted earlier my preference would be to have Reg Force units at full strength to avoid Russia-type issues.

My plan would be for Company-level augmentation to provide a trained and worked-up Reserve Company to EXERCISE with the Reg Force Battalions annually.  I don't think anyone would willingly consider deploying Reserve Companies (and certainly not Reserve Battalions) on overseas operations without a major work-up period given the current state of the Reserves.

The hope is that through regular annual joint training exercises that the work-up requirements for augmentation could be greatly reduced and _eventually _Reserve units (Battalions) could be deployed as complete units.


----------



## Eaglelord17

To make the Army Reserves combat effective for a reliable consistent force, it would require a complete restructuring of how we deal with both the Regs and Reserves, something neither side wishes to do at the moment. The way I see this working is doing something similar to the Swiss model with some Canadian modifications.

Basically have the Army Reserves centered around a mandatory 1 month to 1-1/2 month exercise/training session each year. Two weeks of that being IBTS, range qual, medicals, etc. basically all the admin and refreshers. The next 2 weeks to a month being a full field exercise featuring the Regs as well (possibly having Reg Force members acting as instructors for the previous two weeks).

Only trained Reservists would participate and time off from work would be guaranteed (with changes to leglisation to make it happen).

To become a trained Reservist there would be 3 entry routes.

 1) summer training based, aimed at highschool-university students or others that wish to do it that way.
2) have soldiers do a full year give or take to become trained in Reg Force courses. Contract can be extended if they wish to do more advanced courses past the basics.
3) transfer from the Regs into the Reserves with some sort of incentive to make it worthwhile for members leaving the Regs.

The intent would be to primarily get Reservists to OFP and then if they wish to progress past that point they need to find the time to do so. Higher up manning positions would mainly be held by Reg Force members/retired Reg Force members who have moved into the Reserves.

There still would be Reservist taskings throughout the year but they would be sent to you via email, which is basically how you receive most info now anyways.

Going with this model would also be logistics saving because you would remove the whole parade night function/requirement. Remove the admin for Reservists to attempt to plan training and exercises. Remove the requirement to have armouries and even regiments based on a geographical location. Remove the requirement for a ton of clerks as a lot of what is required as a Reservist clerk is simply managing who is on what tasking, who is NES, who is parading what days, where is that paysheet, etc. all things that take a lot more effort than it sounds, certainly more admin than a Reg Force member.

Equipment could be completely centralized and maintained in a couple locations.

Your troops would be significantly better trained this way and actually forming functional units. Yes they will not be 100% up to the standard of our Regular Force units but they would be a substantially higher standard than they are currently.

It also allows for a greater variety of soldiers from the sense your not geographically tied to a unit (i.e. the only Reserve unit in the area is the XYZ infantry so if you don’t want to be infantry you can’t join in the area, still try to tie close to the geographical area but it isn’t a limitation).

This model I think could work but it would be a huge undertaking with all sorts of changes along the way and empires both in the Regs and Reserves being destroyed.

The reason I see this being the best way forward is two fold
1) as mentioned we have neither the funding or willingness to maintain a Regular Force the size we need for defence, therefore a Reserve force (preferably in the 200k range) is necessary, and
2) Its hard to ask someone to do the Reserves part time and expect a large commitment when they actually get a life going without substantial changes. Its easier to get 1 month off mandated by law than it is to constantly give up weekends and show up to parade nights, especially those on shift, etc.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

childs56 said:


> Still listed as a Regiment. They were a Fd Bty then Changed back to a Regiment and been that way since the late 90s.


I thought you were wrong as it was always a Battery in my day, but your right, I guess when you don't have enough guns to go around, you have more time on your hands to play silly games:

On 25 October 1956 the battery was redesignated the '5th Independent Medium Battery, RCA' with the '120th Harbour Defence Troop, RCA' ceasing its amalgamation.Footnote16 It was redesignated: '5th (British Columbia) Independent Medium Battery, RCA' on 25 April 1958;Footnote17 '5th (British Columbia) Independent Medium Artillery Battery, RCA' on 12 April 1960.Footnote18 and '5th (British Columbia) Field Battery, RCA' and allocated to the '15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA', on 28 February 1965.Footnote19 The battery was detached from the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, to operate as an independent artillery battery on 1 September 1967;Footnote20 *and on 13 September 1991 the battery was reorganized as a regiment and redesignated the '5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA*'.Footnote23


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Better 1 soldier to each section...
> At this point, I doubt anyone would want a PRes Coy without significant workup - and no one is going to want a PRes BN, unless it takes 2 years of workup (mainly for the WO and higher)



As an ARes OC I never had any specific training or coaching in how to do my job in my three decades of service, outside of some lame CAX events and one two week course in Wainwright (the latter was pretty good, actually).

I have never seen an ARes CO receive any training that might be connected with running a BGp/Bn, and doubt that 80% of the ones I've worked with would have been capable anyways. I have never seen a ARes CO give a set of orders for anything, beyond emailing around a sync matrix, quad slide package or something equally unimpressive and ineffective. I have only observed A Res COs (and their RSS stooges) in the field sleeping on the ground and slogging through the mud with the rest of us a handful of times.

This 'workup' you speak of... it's more like a huge culture shift IMHO


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> As an ARes OC I never had any specific training or coaching in how to do my job in my three decades of service, outside of some lame CAX events and one two week course in Wainwright (the latter was pretty good, actually).
> 
> I have never seen an ARes CO receive any training that might be connected with running a BGp/Bn, and doubt that 80% of the ones I've worked with would have been capable anyways. I have never seen a ARes CO give a set of orders for anything, beyond emailing around a sync matrix, quad slide package or something equally unimpressive and ineffective. I have only observed A Res COs (and their RSS stooges) in the field sleeping on the ground and slogging through the mud with the rest of us a handful of times.
> 
> This 'workup' you speak of... it's more like a huge culture shift IMHO


I think 2 years was overly optimistic for some  

Part of the problem is obviously training but mainly simply lack of experience -- how can an OC get experience when they don't have an actual company to command? It gets worse as one goes higher than Coy level.

I've attended some ARNG exercises as a tech rep - and if it is a Bde Ex, there will be a full Bde on Ex, will ALL the enablers - and so there is experience (even in short periods of time) for personnel in there roles.

If the CA would shitcan a bunch of the PRes units and amalgamate the units, and then actually have real Coy, Bn's and Bde, then the Maj's and up would actually be able to have a role.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> As an ARes OC I never had any specific training or coaching in how to do my job in my three decades of service, outside of some lame CAX events and one two week course in Wainwright (the latter was pretty good, actually).
> 
> I have never seen an ARes CO receive any training that might be connected with running a BGp/Bn, and doubt that 80% of the ones I've worked with would have been capable anyways. I have never seen a ARes CO give a set of orders for anything, beyond emailing around a sync matrix, quad slide package or something equally unimpressive and ineffective. I have only observed A Res COs (and their RSS stooges) in the field sleeping on the ground and slogging through the mud with the rest of us a handful of times.
> 
> This 'workup' you speak of... it's more like a huge culture shift IMHO


Which is exactly why FJAG and others note that Reserve Brigades and Battalions should be integrated into a Total Force structure with Reg Force COs in the HQs and 10/90 or 30/70 Reg/Reserve manning so that Reservists aren't promoted up into ranks/positions for which there is simply not the ability to gain the experience necessary to be able to properly fulfill the roles on a part-time basis.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> My plan would be for Company-level augmentation to provide a trained and worked-up Reserve Company to EXERCISE with the Reg Force Battalions annually.


This is truly hard because RegF and ResF train at different times. We tried this using the Easter break and it didn't work well and you'll never get RegF unit to exercise in the summer because of APS and its simply out of their training cycle. When I think 30/70 units I see two separate training cycles with only the Bn HQ and RegF cadre to ResF companies involved in both.



Eaglelord17 said:


> To make the Army Reserves combat effective for a reliable consistent force, it would require a complete restructuring of how we deal with both the Regs and Reserves, something neither side wishes to do at the moment. The way I see this working is doing something similar to the Swiss model with some Canadian modifications.


Absolutely



Eaglelord17 said:


> Basically have the Army Reserves centered around a mandatory 1 month to 1-1/2 month exercise/training session each year. Two weeks of that being IBTS, range qual, medicals, etc. basically all the admin and refreshers. The next 2 weeks to a month being a full field exercise featuring the Regs as well (possibly having Reg Force members acting as instructors for the previous two weeks).


You simply won't get that long a period in our society. The ARNG moved to a four-year progressive cycle under Guard 4.0 which applies mainly to ARNG ABCT and SBCTs. Under this the first two years use the standard 39 day training year of one weekend per month as well as a two week summer exercise. The last two years add an extra week to the exercise with year three being preparatory to NTC and year four being an NTC rotation. One of the keys is that by knowing where a brigade is in its four year cycle lets command know exactly how much additional predeployment training it needs once an ARNG BCT is mobilized.



Eaglelord17 said:


> Only trained Reservists would participate and time off from work would be guaranteed (with changes to leglisation to make it happen).
> 
> To become a trained Reservist there would be 3 entry routes.
> 
> 1) summer training based, aimed at highschool-university students or others that wish to do it that way.
> 2) have soldiers do a full year give or take to become trained in Reg Force courses. Contract can be extended if they wish to do more advanced courses past the basics.
> 3) transfer from the Regs into the Reserves with some sort of incentive to make it worthwhile for members leaving the Regs.
> 
> The intent would be to primarily get Reservists to OFP and then if they wish to progress past that point they need to find the time to do so. Higher up manning positions would mainly be held by Reg Force members/retired Reg Force members who have moved into the Reserves.
> 
> There still would be Reservist taskings throughout the year but they would be sent to you via email, which is basically how you receive most info now anyways.
> 
> Going with this model would also be logistics saving because you would remove the whole parade night function/requirement. Remove the admin for Reservists to attempt to plan training and exercises.


Generally in agreement to this point.


Eaglelord17 said:


> Remove the requirement to have armouries and even regiments based on a geographical location.


There are many advantages for local armouries (albeit they do not need to be 19th century fortresses) including rapid assembly areas and , yes, even places to socialize and bond.


Eaglelord17 said:


> Remove the requirement for a ton of clerks as a lot of what is required as a Reservist clerk is simply managing who is on what tasking, who is NES, who is parading what days, where is that paysheet, etc. all things that take a lot more effort than it sounds, certainly more admin than a Reg Force member.


Admittedly reservists require a fair bit of admin. Removing clerks doesn't solve this. Removing or streamlining policies does.


Eaglelord17 said:


> Equipment could be completely centralized and maintained in a couple locations.


Equipment needs to be located where troops train. Local training has many advantages including cost and time savings. One needs the right equipment at the right location. Where that right location is varies with the training.


Eaglelord17 said:


> Your troops would be significantly better trained this way and actually forming functional units. Yes they will not be 100% up to the standard of our Regular Force units but they would be a substantially higher standard than they are currently.
> 
> It also allows for a greater variety of soldiers from the sense your not geographically tied to a unit (i.e. the only Reserve unit in the area is the XYZ infantry so if you don’t want to be infantry you can’t join in the area, still try to tie close to the geographical area but it isn’t a limitation).
> 
> This model I think could work but it would be a huge undertaking with all sorts of changes along the way and empires both in the Regs and Reserves being destroyed.
> 
> The reason I see this being the best way forward is two fold
> 1) as mentioned we have neither the funding or willingness to maintain a Regular Force the size we need for defence, therefore a Reserve force (preferably in the 200k range) is necessary, and
> 2) Its hard to ask someone to do the Reserves part time and expect a large commitment when they actually get a life going without substantial changes. Its easier to get 1 month off mandated by law than it is to constantly give up weekends and show up to parade nights, especially those on shift, etc.


I'm not sure. I think some of these might be counterproductive. I do agree that any meaningful change to the system will be a huge undertaking.



daftandbarmy said:


> As an ARes OC I never had any specific training or coaching in how to do my job in my three decades of service, outside of some lame CAX events and one two week course in Wainwright (the latter was pretty good, actually).


That's the problem with truncated courses for rank progression. Inevitably important stuff gets cut to fit the time frame. IMHO many of our RegF courses are overstuffed because they combine administrative management with tactical skills training. I see reservists learning the tactical while RegF people handle the "management"


daftandbarmy said:


> I have never seen an ARes CO receive any training that might be connected with running a BGp/Bn, and doubt that 80% of the ones I've worked with would have been capable anyways. I have never seen a ARes CO give a set of orders for anything, beyond emailing around a sync matrix, quad slide package or something equally unimpressive and ineffective. I have only observed A Res COs (and their RSS stooges) in the field sleeping on the ground and slogging through the mud with the rest of us a handful of times.


That's my experience too. During my years as RSSO the two COs I spanned both left training entirely to me while my RegF Chief Clerk handled 90% of all admin and Class B fin clerk 100% of pay leaving band fund, regimental fund, messes, regimental ball etc etc to the CO, DCO and RSM. That suited all of us.


daftandbarmy said:


> This 'workup' you speak of... it's more like a huge culture shift IMHO


I don't think that workup will happen. My take on it is that certain positions need both training AND experience in order to be done right. I think being an OC of a mech company is one of those (and maybe even a dismounted company) As it was in Afghanistan even some of the well trained and experienced RegF company commanders did not have a handle on many nuances, such as the use of artillery in close battle or engineering resources, until after the first contacts because their training covered those things in a superficial and unrealistic way. This goes back to my Combat Team Commanders course in the 1970s where all artillery was "notional" and engineers rarely dismounted their vehicles to actually do an engineering task (it too was done as  "notionally they are blowing the bridge now")

I don't think a ResF artillery major can handle a modern battlefield's FSCC duties what with JTAC'ing and running a LAV OPV and various types of smart munitions. That too takes time and experience. I'm not saying a reservist can't learn that. I'm just saying in the time available for a reservist in peacetime its not possible and you probably won't have the time and resources at mobilization. That's why I lean towards a RegF leadership at the company and above level for all units.

It limits the career of reservists but I'd prefer platoon commanders with lots of time in the job and good at it rather than a company commander who gets people killed. 

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> This is truly hard because RegF and ResF train at different times. We tried this using the Easter break and it didn't work well and you'll never get RegF unit to exercise in the summer because of APS and its simply out of their training cycle. When I think 30/70 units I see two separate training cycles with only the Bn HQ and RegF cadre to ResF companies involved in both.


Good thing wars never happen in the summer!  Maybe not all Reg Force units should be in the middle of APS and block leave at the same time?  Not just to accommodate training with Reservists, but you know...war and stuff.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Good thing wars never happen in the summer!  Maybe not all Reg Force units should be in the middle of APS and block leave at the same time?  Not just to accommodate training with Reservists, but you know...war and stuff.


The reason the regular forces don’t do exercises in the summer is
1. APS, 
2. RST tasks,
3. Op Lentus, and;
4. Units coming off the Spring Bde exercises prepping for the fall Bn / Regt exercises by doing PCFs.

APS is built to make it easier to move families, with school ending in June ish around the country that causes a minimum of disruption. And frankly much like a bandaid, it’s probably better to do it all at once and reorganize rather than constantly shuffle.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> The reason the regular forces don’t do exercises in the summer is
> 1. APS,
> 2. RST tasks,
> 3. Op Lentus, and;
> 4. Units coming off the Spring Bde exercises prepping for the fall Bn / Regt exercises by doing PCFs.
> 
> APS is built to make it easier to move families, with school ending in June ish around the country that causes a minimum of disruption. And frankly much like a bandaid, it’s probably better to do it all at once and reorganize rather than constantly shuffle.


There are very good reasons for why a RegF units training cycle used to be Sept to May/June (and may still be for all I know). There are also very good reasons why you will never have ResF unit participate fully on an exercise during Sept to May. 

That, however, should not be a bar to having a hybrid unit. It just has to be run with the realization that not everyone trains together at all times nor will they progress at the same pace. 

What it takes is a realization as to what each brings to the table: full-time experience and readiness on the one hand and inexpensive part-time mass on the other. One needs to build a system that leverages both to their maximum.

Our present system is collapsing. The Army is deluding itself if it thinks it can turn this around.

🍻


----------



## desindarfur

With all due respect to many of the schemes that have been discussed on this thread reserve training depends on individual reservists volunteering to train. Give them challenging goals to aspire to and they will come out. Run them ragged with administration, that might be important to the CoC, but not to them, they will stay away.
During my time in the Militia (later the reserves) well run exercises were well attended. All the participants knew in advance from the preparations (drawing specific kit, rehearsals etc) what was expected from them. 
The summer concentration exercises were a case in point. Some years it was a District (Bde) level ex. The CO wasn't named until May, not given enough time or resources to put together a good plan. They would inevitably fall back on the safe but boring stand training concept. Other years it was an LFCA effort (Div). The CO was named a year in advance. There was a budget for TEWTs, CAX and a spring break ex in the USA to test the concept, give command teams a chance to work together and rehearse the plan. Those exercises were well run and well attended.


----------



## FJAG

I can't disagree with you at all, but there are other factors as well.

Once the country has invested several tens of thousands or more dollars to train an individual it needs to ensure a return on investment. That return shouldn't be based solely on how well the Army entertains the individual. 

In addition, the initial training simply gets the reservist to the trained individual level and now needs to develop his incorporation into ever larger teams through collective training, a further investment. The training needs to be structured so that the money spent on it actually turns out teams and not a small subset of people who consider the training valuable. It needs to get everyone.

The problem being faced is we've now gone on for seventy some odd years with a system which, like you say, is spotty with some good training and some bad. The result is an all too large turnover and, at best very small teams. It is a system that is not even getting better by increments, it's barely holding a status quo. 

To many of us here that means a radical change is needed to guarantee the consistent delivery of the things which you say are important as well as those things that improve the overall capability of the force as a whole. 

What did Einstein say? "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results". That's where the Army is and has been for a long time.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well here is a way to get the Reserves fit


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Well here is a way to get the Reserves fit



I wore that webbing, usually full of rocks of course.

Nothing like huge open wounds on your lower back to toughen a chap up!


----------



## childs56

You want to fix the Reserves. Equip them properly, stop cancelling courses, stop watering down their existence and give them the resources to succeed. 
I have to ask a question, How many Reservists were killed in Afghanistan because they were a Reservist and lacked training? How frigging many? Tell me I am curious.
 I know a buddy of mine was blown up over there because of wrong place wrong time. The Regular Force guys killed same. They all died the same, no one said dam that Reservist lacked training that's why he died. They all died in a piece of crap unarmored g wagon.   

If you give the Regular Force the same lack of equipment, same course cancellations, the same lack of resources as you do Reservists I assume you would have the same issues and the same results. In some cases all the difference between Reg and Res is wages.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I admire his optimism... he used the term 'Rebuilding', as if the Reserve Force was 'built' at one time in the past 



Rebuilding the Reserve Force​
Introduction

Canada’s political and even military leaders take an exceptionally narrow approach to the reserves. The map below reveals that CAF primary reserve units remain an extraordinary network of army, navy, air, intelligence and medical units nested in cities and towns all across the country. They are available on short notice to deal with security problems or natural disasters and are a crucial supplement to our drastically under-strength regular force. And yet our political leaders, our cultural and thought leaders and even our military leaders consistently overlook the reserves’ importance and the need to ensure their vitality.




			Rebuilding the Reserve Force - Canadian Global Affairs Institute


----------



## Halifax Tar

childs56 said:


> You want to fix the Reserves. Equip them properly, stop cancelling courses, stop watering down their existence and give them the resources to succeed.
> I have to ask a question, How many Reservists were killed in Afghanistan because they were a Reservist and lacked training? How frigging many? Tell me I am curious.
> I know a buddy of mine was blown up over there because of wrong place wrong time. The Regular Force guys killed same. They all died the same, no one said dam that Reservist lacked training that's why he died. They all died in a piece of crap unarmored g wagon.
> 
> If you give the Regular Force the same lack of equipment, same course cancellations, the same lack of resources as you do Reservists I assume you would have the same issues and the same results. In some cases all the difference between Reg and Res is wages.



The A Res shouldn't get an ounce more funding or equipment until it can come to the table to with a sensible restructuring plan that amalgamates and eliminates some units, eliminates ridiculously over ranked positions and reclassifies them correctly, and eliminates some trades that just aren't feasible or reasonable for them to have in the reserves.

Having now spent a while working with the A Res they and their silly regimental mafias are they're own worst enemy.


----------



## KevinB

childs56 said:


> You want to fix the Reserves. Equip them properly, stop cancelling courses, stop watering down their existence and give them the resources to succeed.
> I have to ask a question, How many Reservists were killed in Afghanistan because they were a Reservist and lacked training? How frigging many? Tell me I am curious.
> I know a buddy of mine was blown up over there because of wrong place wrong time. The Regular Force guys killed same. They all died the same, no one said dam that Reservist lacked training that's why he died. They all died in a piece of crap unarmored g wagon.
> 
> If you give the Regular Force the same lack of equipment, same course cancellations, the same lack of resources as you do Reservists I assume you would have the same issues and the same results. In some cases all the difference between Reg and Res is wages.


What equipment? 

Honestly I’d shutter the PRes at this point - as per @Halifax Tar have a valid plan for the Res first - then go forward. 
   Right now the Reg Force is missing so much equipment, the PRes is pointless.


----------



## Remius

Halifax Tar said:


> The A Res shouldn't get an ounce more funding or equipment until it can come to the table to with a sensible restructuring plan that amalgamates and eliminates some units, eliminates ridiculously over ranked positions and reclassifies them correctly, and eliminates some trades that just aren't feasible or reasonable for them to have in the reserves.
> 
> Having now spent a while working with the A Res they and their silly regimental mafias are they're own worst enemy.


Would require an actual seat at the table first.  

Who exactly comes to the table with that plan? And how does it fit it into the overall CAF plan?  How is that plan going btw?  Seems to me that the state of the A Res is a symptom of a dysfunctional and degrading reg force.  And now that they actually need a ready A Res, there isn’t much to tap into. 

Who makes the decision to reclassify and eliminate trades?  

So, all of those things you mention cost money and time to do.  It won’t happen unless you fund, equip and train it to match the direction and vision of what is wanted from the A Res.  

But to an extent I agree with a lot of what you post.  The first thing though is for the CAF writ large (and the army) to sort itself out first.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Remius said:


> Would require an actual seat at the table first.
> 
> Who exactly comes to the table with that plan? And how does it fit it into the overall CAF plan?  How is that plan going btw?  Seems to me that the state of the A Res is a symptom of a dysfunctional and degrading reg force.  And now that they actually need a ready A Res, there isn’t much to tap into.
> 
> Who makes the decision to reclassify and eliminate trades?
> 
> So, all of those things you mention cost money and time to do.  It won’t happen unless you fund, equip and train it to match the direction and vision of what is wanted from the A Res.
> 
> But to an extent I agree with a lot of what you post.  The first thing though is for the CAF writ large (and the army) to sort itself out first.



Don't bring that weak sauce.  You have A Res CBG Commanders and higher with the A Res.  And you have DGen Army Reserve.  Don't try and deflect the current state of things without owning your portion. 

If the organization wants to be a player it needs to help is self first.  The first step is to propose a self reorganization into something rational and coherent. 

I'm going around right now and SIVing units with an ES of 25 troops.  Yet they have a compliment of command positions and staff.  Re-dick-you-lous. 

Break the cabals and mafias.


----------



## ueo

Colin Parkinson said:


> Well here is a way to get the Reserves fit


Better shape up the RF first as an  example for the res. Like it used to was.


----------



## Remius

Halifax Tar said:


> Don't bring that weak sauce.  You have A Res CBG Commanders and higher with the A Res.  And you have DGen Army Reserve.  Don't try and deflect the current state of things without owning your portion.


CBG commanders report to Div and Div reports to Army.  DGen Army reserves?  LOL.  Don’t make me laugh.

Have a real seat at the table. 

It isn’t deflection.  The army and the CAF have been left to rot from the top down not the other way around.  Or does the blame for the state of the Navy test with your ships crew and COs? 



Halifax Tar said:


> If the organization wants to be a player it needs to help is self first.  The first step is to propose a self reorganization into something rational and coherent.


So who does that?  How many focus groups, town halls and meetings will that take?  Or does the CO of that 25 man unit take the lead and do that?   There are so many stakeholders in something like that that that would be impossible. All you’ll do is empower whatever cabals and mafias you think are directing the ARes.  And what are we reorganising to do?  What you propose is the tail wagging the dog. 


Halifax Tar said:


> I'm going around right now and SIVing units with an ES of 25 troops.  Yet they have a compliment of command positions and staff.  Re-dick-you-lous.


Then they should be tactically regrouped and or amalgamated.  That sort of stuff has happened in other areas of the A Res.  Nor reason why it can’t be done.  Direction and orders from higher.


Halifax Tar said:


> Break the cabals and mafias.


You won’t if you take a ground up approach.


----------



## Eaglelord17

Halifax Tar said:


> The A Res shouldn't get an ounce more funding or equipment until it can come to the table to with a sensible restructuring plan that amalgamates and eliminates some units, eliminates ridiculously over ranked positions and reclassifies them correctly, and eliminates some trades that just aren't feasible or reasonable for them to have in the reserves.
> 
> Having now spent a while working with the A Res they and their silly regimental mafias are they're own worst enemy.


You could say the same thing for the Regs and the poor structures we employ there. 

One thing the Regs don't like to mention about the Reserves is even if it doesn't bring that much to the table as regiments at the moment is it does bring recruits into the Regs, which is something that organization seems to be desperate for. That alone is enough reason to justify its existence as it currently exists.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I am going to have to agree with the folks proposing a re-org of the A Res.   “Militia politics” are the only reason for the existence of 2 CBGs in Atlantic Canada, and for the existence of units that are troop/platoon strength in numbers but commanded by LCols.   

I can’t imagine morale is high in the class A world.  No kit, no decent trg consistently, no fun. Mandatory briefings and DLN courses.   Etc etc etc.  

I don’t know what the solution is, but “more money” is not the right one at this time.  

The A Res is a sad place compared to what it was not that long ago (2 decades or so).


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:


> I am going to have to agree with the folks proposing a re-org of the A Res.   “Militia politics” are the only reason for the existence of 2 CBGs in Atlantic Canada, and for the existence of units that are troop/platoon strength in numbers but commanded by LCols.
> 
> *I can’t imagine morale is high in the class A world.  No kit, no decent trg consistently, no fun. Mandatory briefings and DLN courses.   Etc etc etc. *
> 
> I don’t know what the solution is, but “more money” is not the right one at this time.
> 
> The A Res is a sad place compared to what it was not that long ago (2 decades or so).



I was talking to some of my former troops who are on a local Driver's course, led by one of my former SNCOs, and they are enjoying it immensely.

Well organized and delivered training is still possible, and valuable, in the ARes. 

All they need is a 'mission' to train for otherwise every option will have equal worth.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

daftandbarmy said:


> Well organized and delivered training is still possible, and valuable, in the ARes.



How much of that is happening though in a max 32 day A class trg year, once all the mandatory stuff is completed?  How many actual days are spent doing “hard” trade trg?  What level of proficiency in core tasks are the average in todays A Res?   



daftandbarmy said:


> All they need is a 'mission' to train for otherwise every option will have equal worth.



And this;  this isn’t the A Red’s fault. If mom and dad don’t give you the time and money needed to do your business, they have to accept it when you are asked to perform…and can’t.  

I’m not convinced the GoC really cares much about the situation, honestly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:


> How much of that is happening though in a max 32 day A class trg year, once all the mandatory stuff is completed?  How many actual days are spent doing “hard” trade trg?  What level of proficiency in core tasks are the average in todays A Res?
> 
> 
> 
> And this;  this isn’t the A Red’s fault. If mom and dad don’t give you the time and money needed to do your business, they have to accept it when you are asked to perform…and can’t.
> 
> I’m not convinced the GoC really cares much about the situation, honestly.



My CBG used to get about $20M per year to spend on training for under a thousand regular paraders, probably more like 600 or so in all units.

If you can't train up a world beating force with those kind of ratios, there's not enough money in the world to fix that problem.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Without focusing on money, though - how many of the 32 days/year (not much to start with…) is left after all the mandatory stuff to train soldiering stuff?  

And how effective are those remaining days with the kit shortages etc?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:


> Without focusing on money, though - how many of the 32 days/year (not much to start with…) is left after all the mandatory stuff to train soldiering stuff?
> 
> And how effective are those remaining days with the kit shortages etc?



Like anything else, it's usually about how well you plan it out.

The key to good training is good battle procedure. 

'Last minute scampering around trying to cobble things together because Bde HQ said so' isn't one of the steps of BP, as I recall


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> My CBG used to get about $20M per year to spend on training for under a thousand regular paraders, probably more like 600 or so in all units.
> 
> If you can't train up a world beating force with those kind of ratios, there's not enough money in the world to fix that problem.




That 20MCAD... did that include the salaries for the command and training staff as well as the actual Class A training hours?   Or were those separate?

100 full time "organizers" (Regs and Classes B & C) at $100,000 per year (support and benefits) = 10 MCAD or half the budget.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> That 20MCAD... did that include the salaries for the command and training staff as well as the actual Class A training hours?   Or were those separate?
> 
> 100 full time "organizers" (Regs and Classes B & C) at $100,000 per year (support and benefits) = 10 MCAD or half the budget.



You know what? I'm not sure. Budgets are closely guarded so there is minimal accountability for performance related to investments, I believe.


----------



## markppcli

Eaglelord17 said:


> You could say the same thing for the Regs and the poor structures we employ there.
> 
> One thing the Regs don't like to mention about the Reserves is even if it doesn't bring that much to the table as regiments at the moment is it does bring recruits into the Regs, which is something that organization seems to be desperate for. That alone is enough reason to justify its existence as it currently exists.


Disagree; those troops would just join the regular army of the option for the reserves didn’t exist. The numbers probably end up being neutral from  the “don’t join the regular army because I can join the reserves” vs the “tried it and liked it” crowd.




Remius said:


> CBG commanders report to Div and Div reports to Army.  DGen Army reserves?  LOL.  Don’t make me laugh.



Why is that a joke? You have 10 Cols, and DGen Res to advocate to the Div commanders as to how they can be be organized / support their Div commanders intent. What does a “real seat at the table” look like to you? Do you need equal representation ? Where is that going to come from?



childs56 said:


> You want to fix the Reserves. Equip them properly, stop cancelling courses, stop watering down their existence and give them the resources to succeed.
> I have to ask a question, How many Reservists were killed in Afghanistan because they were a Reservist and lacked training? How frigging many? Tell me I am curious.
> I know a buddy of mine was blown up over there because of wrong place wrong time. The Regular Force guys killed same. They all died the same, no one said dam that Reservist lacked training that's why he died. They all died in a piece of crap unarmored g wagon.
> 
> If you give the Regular Force the same lack of equipment, same course cancellations, the same lack of resources as you do Reservists I assume you would have the same issues and the same results. In some cases all the difference between Reg and Res is wages.



Was there a point to this beyond trying to grand stand on our casualties ? I was a reservist augmentee in 2008. We did 10 months with 1 VP before we deployed. Hard to call us “mitiatmen” at that point I’d think.  You obviously know that no one can answer your first question because no inquiry will ever say “soldier x wasn’t adequately trained” so your just trying to create a manufactured outrage. Be an adult.


----------



## Brad Sallows

What's the current expected/anticipated amount of Class A days for a Res F CO?  When I got out, I understood it was about 60.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> What's the current expected/anticipated amount of Class A days for a Res F CO?  When I got out, I understood it was about 60.



At the rifle company level we had to work with 37 days - between September and May. Some of those had to be spent on Bn/Bde level stuff though.

It's a paltry sum, unfortunately....


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> That 20MCAD... did that include the salaries for the command and training staff as well as the actual Class A training hours?   Or were those separate?
> 
> 100 full time "organizers" (Regs and Classes B & C) at $100,000 per year (support and benefits) = 10 MCAD or half the budget.


Budgets for Militia Districts didn't include the RSS, but did cover all the Class A days, and for Staff the B days.


Brad Sallows said:


> What's the current expected/anticipated amount of Class A days for a Res F CO?  When I got out, I understood it was about 60.


Parade Night, and Admin Night = 2x 1/2 day a week x 52 weeks, so around 52 ish plus exercises (if they go)...
   60 sounds fairly close to what would be expected (albeit I suspect that many of those Admin nights are boondoggles based on a lot of the unit sizes these days)


----------



## Rifleman62

A CBG  Salary Budget included all Cl A, B, and B "A" positions 15 years ago. Our super Compt fitted everything in.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> At the rifle company level we had to work with 37 days - between September and May. Some of those had to be spent on Bn/Bde level stuff though.
> 
> It's a paltry sum, unfortunately....


37 days, as in 37 full days or 37 half days ? Would you think that an transition to one weekend each month would be a better value that 4 class A nights ? Given the amount of training you get for the same “price” I mean.


----------



## dapaterson

37.5 paid days, a mix of half and full days.

However, the rate of pay is based on calendar, not working days, so there is a de facto class A discount.


----------



## Rifleman62

Cl A nights for Trg are a waste of time. Admin only. Exception would be prior to a weekend FXT to prep, do BP etc.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> 37 days, as in 37 full days or 37 half days ? Would you think that an transition to one weekend each month would be a better value that 4 class A nights ? Given the amount of training you get for the same “price” I mean.



That's 37 mandays, as in full days. This has to cover everything from AAG/DAG nights, range exercises, FTX events, training nights, Mandatory Online Courses, Admin/CQ stuff, Remembrance Day, Bde Concentrations etc etc. Sometimes you can scrape up additional mandays for courses.

I've been around the block with every conceivable type of training schedule over the years and have found that the one weekend per month, one night per week, is definitely the most effective.

Things change so fast that if you don't see the troops at least once per week, you quickly fall behind in being able to prepare for the latest 'fast ball'. 

You also tend to lose people with 'real jobs' and families etc as their weekends are really important.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> 37.5 paid days, a mix of half and full days.
> 
> However, the rate of pay is based on calendar, not working days, so there is a de facto class A discount.


Can you explain the discount ? Or do you mean that the days are parted out monthly?


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> That's 37 mandays, as in full days. This has to cover everything from AAG/DAG nights, range exercises, FTX events, training nights, Mandatory Online Courses, Admin/CQ stuff, Remembrance Day, Bde Concentrations etc etc. Sometimes you can scrape up additional mandays for courses.
> 
> I've been around the block with every conceivable type of training schedule over the years and have found that the one weekend per month, one night per week, is definitely the most effective.
> 
> Things change so fast that if you don't see the troops at least once per week, you quickly fall behind in being able to prepare for the latest 'fast ball'.
> 
> You also tend to lose people with 'real jobs' and families etc as their weekends are really important.


Cheers for that, appreciate the perspective.


----------



## dapaterson

markppcli said:


> Can you explain the discount ? Or do you mean that the days are parted out monthly?



Res F pay: Reg F monthly rate x 12, / 365, x 92.8%

So it is calculated on a calendar daily rate, not a working day rate.

If you are a full time reservist, you get the 92.8%.  Part time, if you work notional full time hours for a week, you get five, not seven, days pay


----------



## markppcli

To better create argument and bickering. I once again submit my proposed reorganization of the reserves into regional Bdes and roughly provincial regiments.


10 Canadian Rifle Brigade
11 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
B Coy (Canadian Scottish)
C Coy (Royal Westminster Regiment)
Combat Support (Rocky Mountain Rangers)
TAPV Sqn (British Columbia Dragoons / British Columbia Regiment)

12 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Loyal Edmonton Regiment)
B Coy (Calgary Highlanders)
C Coy (Royal Regina Rifles)
Combat Support (North Sask Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Sask Dragoons / Kings Own Calgary Regiment)

13 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles)
B Coy ( Winnipeg Grenadiers)
C Coy (we don’t need two Cameron Highlanders, then at Ottawa can have a fight over it)
Combat Support (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Fort Gary Horse)

10 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

10 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

10 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


20 Canadian Rifle Brigade
21 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry)
B Coy (Essex and Kent Scottish / Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders)
C Coy (Grey and Simcoe Foresters)
Combat Support (Royal Highland Fusiliers)
TAPV Sqn (Windsor Regiment)

22 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Toronto Scottish / 48th Highlanders / Lorne Scots)
B Coy (Queens own Rifles of Canada)
C Coy (Royal Regiment of Canada)
Combat Support (Lincoln and Welland Regiment / Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Queens York Rangers)

23 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Ontario Highlanders (Cameron, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders))
Governor Generals Foot Guards (ceremonial)

B Coy (Irish Regiment of Canada)
C Coy (Princes of Wales own Regiment of Canada)
Combat Support (the Algonquin Regiment / Brockville Rifles)
TAPV Sqn (Ontario Regiment )
Governor Generals Horse Guards (ceremonial)


20 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

20 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

20 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


30 Brigade du Voltigeur Canadian
31 Voltigeur Canadian
A Coy (Black Watch of Canada)
Canadian Grenadier Guards (ceremonial)

B Coy (Regiment de Maisonnueve)
C Coy (Fusiliers Mont-Royal)
Combat Support (Royal Montreal Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (Royal Canadian Hussars / Regiment du Hull)

32 Voltigeur Canadian
A Coy (Voltigeur du Quebec)
Citadel Guard (no longer wasting 2 R22R’s time)

B Coy (la Regiment de Chaudiere)
C Coy (la Regiment de Saguenay)
Combat Support (Fusilier de Sherbrooke et St Lauren)
TAPV Sqn (Sherbrooke Hussars)

30 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

30 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

30 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


40 Canadian Rifle Brigade
41 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Halifax Rifles)
B Coy (West Nova Scotia Regiment)
C Coy (Nova Scotia Regiment)
Combat Support (Cape Breton Highlanders)
TAPV Sqn (Princess Louise’s Fusiliers)

42 Canadian Mounted Rifles
A Coy (Royal Newfoundland Regiment)
B Coy (Royal New Brunswick Regiment)
C Coy (PEI Regiment)
Combat Support (The North Shore Regiment)
TAPV Sqn (8th Canadian Hussars)

40 Provisional Field Artillery Group
3 x Field Battery

40 Engineer Group
3 x Field Sqn

40 Support Bn
3 x dispersed Support Groups


The “dispersed support groups” function more as standards teams travelling and ensuring everyone is on the same page. I leave engineering groups fairly open as it’s not my area of expertise. The Artillery batteries would largely be provincial; and if necessary dispersed at troop level. The combat support companies are place holders, would be actually organized in large population centres to hopefully pull maximum numbers of trained pers. Some unit names have moved from RCAC to RCIC, that’s simply to ensure that we don’t hold capabilities in more isolated areas of the country. I’m sure they’ll be fine in their new roles. One key point would be that this gets away from small towns only having one unit available to them; The batteries and Sqns would have dets pushed out to give prospective young Canadians and breadth of options.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> To better create argument and bickering. I once again submit my proposed reorganization of the reserves into regional Bdes and roughly provincial regiments.
> 
> 
> 10 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 11 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
> B Coy (Canadian Scottish)
> C Coy (Royal Westminster Regiment)
> Combat Support (Rocky Mountain Rangers)
> TAPV Sqn (British Columbia Dragoons / British Columbia Regiment)
> 
> 12 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Loyal Edmonton Regiment)
> B Coy (Calgary Highlanders)
> C Coy (Royal Regina Rifles)
> Combat Support (North Sask Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Sask Dragoons / Kings Own Calgary Regiment)
> 
> 13 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles)
> B Coy ( Winnipeg Grenadiers)
> C Coy (we don’t need two Cameron Highlanders, then at Ottawa can have a fight over it)
> Combat Support (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Fort Gary Horse)
> 
> 10 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 10 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 10 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 20 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 21 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry)
> B Coy (Essex and Kent Scottish / Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders)
> C Coy (Grey and Simcoe Foresters)
> Combat Support (Royal Highland Fusiliers)
> TAPV Sqn (Windsor Regiment)
> 
> 22 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Toronto Scottish / 48th Highlanders / Lorne Scots)
> B Coy (Queens own Rifles of Canada)
> C Coy (Royal Regiment of Canada)
> Combat Support (Lincoln and Welland Regiment / Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Queens York Rangers)
> 
> 23 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Ontario Highlanders (Cameron, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders))
> Governor Generals Foot Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> B Coy (Irish Regiment of Canada)
> C Coy (Princes of Wales own Regiment of Canada)
> Combat Support (the Algonquin Regiment / Brockville Rifles)
> TAPV Sqn (Ontario Regiment )
> Governor Generals Horse Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> 
> 20 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 20 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 20 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 30 Brigade du Voltigeur Canadian
> 31 Voltigeur Canadian
> A Coy (Black Watch of Canada)
> Canadian Grenadier Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> B Coy (Regiment de Maisonnueve)
> C Coy (Fusiliers Mont-Royal)
> Combat Support (Royal Montreal Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Royal Canadian Hussars / Regiment du Hull)
> 
> 32 Voltigeur Canadian
> A Coy (Voltigeur du Quebec)
> Citadel Guard (no longer wasting 2 R22R’s time)
> 
> B Coy (la Regiment de Chaudiere)
> C Coy (la Regiment de Saguenay)
> Combat Support (Fusilier de Sherbrooke et St Lauren)
> TAPV Sqn (Sherbrooke Hussars)
> 
> 30 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 30 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 30 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 40 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 41 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Halifax Rifles)
> B Coy (West Nova Scotia Regiment)
> C Coy (Nova Scotia Regiment)
> Combat Support (Cape Breton Highlanders)
> TAPV Sqn (Princess Louise’s Fusiliers)
> 
> 42 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Newfoundland Regiment)
> B Coy (Royal New Brunswick Regiment)
> C Coy (PEI Regiment)
> Combat Support (The North Shore Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (8th Canadian Hussars)
> 
> 40 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 40 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 40 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> The “dispersed support groups” function more as standards teams travelling and ensuring everyone is on the same page. I leave engineering groups fairly open as it’s not my area of expertise. The Artillery batteries would largely be provincial; and if necessary dispersed at troop level. The combat support companies are place holders, would be actually organized in large population centres to hopefully pull maximum numbers of trained pers. Some unit names have moved from RCAC to RCIC, that’s simply to ensure that we don’t hold capabilities in more isolated areas of the country. I’m sure they’ll be fine in their new roles. One key point would be that this gets away from small towns only having one unit available to them; The batteries and Sqns would have dets pushed out to give prospective young Canadians and breadth of options.



I've been a member of most of the units in your '10 Bde' over the years.

I understand your good intentions, admire your optimism, and will wave from the sidelines with a smile on my face knowing that I will not have to have anything to do with trying to establish that formaiton


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Res F pay: Reg F monthly rate x 12, / 365, x 92.8%
> 
> So it is calculated on a calendar daily rate, not a working day rate.
> 
> If you are a full time reservist, you get the 92.8%.  Part time, if you work notional full time hours for a week, you get five, not seven, days pay



And, bonus points, you also save the VAC the trouble of paying you out the CAF Education and Training Credit to thousands of well trained, committed troops because there's no way in Hell that 90% of ARes members will ever accumulate enough time to qualify


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> That's 37 mandays, as in full days. This has to cover everything from AAG/DAG nights, range exercises, FTX events, training nights, Mandatory Online Courses, Admin/CQ stuff, Remembrance Day, Bde Concentrations etc etc. Sometimes you can scrape up additional mandays for courses.
> 
> I've been around the block with every conceivable type of training schedule over the years and have found that the one weekend per month, one night per week, is definitely the most effective.
> 
> Things change so fast that if you don't see the troops at least once per week, you quickly fall behind in being able to prepare for the latest 'fast ball'.
> 
> You also tend to lose people with 'real jobs' and families etc as their weekends are really important.


Is the highlighted part maybe a big part of the problem?  Other than deploying for a natural disaster, etc. there really shouldn't be any "fastballs" when it comes to training schedules, etc.  Any reason that the annual schedule couldn't be posted on Day 1 of the new Fiscal Year?


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> To better create argument and bickering. I once again submit my proposed reorganization of the reserves into regional Bdes and roughly provincial regiments.
> 
> 
> 10 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 11 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
> B Coy (Canadian Scottish)
> C Coy (Royal Westminster Regiment)
> Combat Support (Rocky Mountain Rangers)
> TAPV Sqn (British Columbia Dragoons / British Columbia Regiment)
> 
> 12 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Loyal Edmonton Regiment)
> B Coy (Calgary Highlanders)
> C Coy (Royal Regina Rifles)
> Combat Support (North Sask Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Sask Dragoons / Kings Own Calgary Regiment)
> 
> 13 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles)
> B Coy ( Winnipeg Grenadiers)
> C Coy (we don’t need two Cameron Highlanders, then at Ottawa can have a fight over it)
> Combat Support (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Fort Gary Horse)
> 
> 10 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 10 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 10 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 20 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 21 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry)
> B Coy (Essex and Kent Scottish / Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders)
> C Coy (Grey and Simcoe Foresters)
> Combat Support (Royal Highland Fusiliers)
> TAPV Sqn (Windsor Regiment)
> 
> 22 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Toronto Scottish / 48th Highlanders / Lorne Scots)
> B Coy (Queens own Rifles of Canada)
> C Coy (Royal Regiment of Canada)
> Combat Support (Lincoln and Welland Regiment / Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Queens York Rangers)
> 
> 23 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Ontario Highlanders (Cameron, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders))
> Governor Generals Foot Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> B Coy (Irish Regiment of Canada)
> C Coy (Princes of Wales own Regiment of Canada)
> Combat Support (the Algonquin Regiment / Brockville Rifles)
> TAPV Sqn (Ontario Regiment )
> Governor Generals Horse Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> 
> 20 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 20 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 20 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 30 Brigade du Voltigeur Canadian
> 31 Voltigeur Canadian
> A Coy (Black Watch of Canada)
> Canadian Grenadier Guards (ceremonial)
> 
> B Coy (Regiment de Maisonnueve)
> C Coy (Fusiliers Mont-Royal)
> Combat Support (Royal Montreal Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (Royal Canadian Hussars / Regiment du Hull)
> 
> 32 Voltigeur Canadian
> A Coy (Voltigeur du Quebec)
> Citadel Guard (no longer wasting 2 R22R’s time)
> 
> B Coy (la Regiment de Chaudiere)
> C Coy (la Regiment de Saguenay)
> Combat Support (Fusilier de Sherbrooke et St Lauren)
> TAPV Sqn (Sherbrooke Hussars)
> 
> 30 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 30 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 30 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> 40 Canadian Rifle Brigade
> 41 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Halifax Rifles)
> B Coy (West Nova Scotia Regiment)
> C Coy (Nova Scotia Regiment)
> Combat Support (Cape Breton Highlanders)
> TAPV Sqn (Princess Louise’s Fusiliers)
> 
> 42 Canadian Mounted Rifles
> A Coy (Royal Newfoundland Regiment)
> B Coy (Royal New Brunswick Regiment)
> C Coy (PEI Regiment)
> Combat Support (The North Shore Regiment)
> TAPV Sqn (8th Canadian Hussars)
> 
> 40 Provisional Field Artillery Group
> 3 x Field Battery
> 
> 40 Engineer Group
> 3 x Field Sqn
> 
> 40 Support Bn
> 3 x dispersed Support Groups
> 
> 
> The “dispersed support groups” function more as standards teams travelling and ensuring everyone is on the same page. I leave engineering groups fairly open as it’s not my area of expertise. The Artillery batteries would largely be provincial; and if necessary dispersed at troop level. The combat support companies are place holders, would be actually organized in large population centres to hopefully pull maximum numbers of trained pers. Some unit names have moved from RCAC to RCIC, that’s simply to ensure that we don’t hold capabilities in more isolated areas of the country. I’m sure they’ll be fine in their new roles. One key point would be that this gets away from small towns only having one unit available to them; The batteries and Sqns would have dets pushed out to give prospective young Canadians and breadth of options.


You can bicker over the details, unit naming and the assignments, but this is basically what many/most Reserve Napkin force submitters here have been suggesting for years..."right size" the Reserve Regiments as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries to reflect their actual strength.  

Once you accept this fact you can tinker with Reg Force/Reserve Force augmentation levels, specific roles, etc.


----------



## Brad Sallows

As I wrote, I meant specifically the CO: Commanding Officer.  When we understood our planning figure to be 37.5 days overall, it was also understood that whatever the greater burdens a CO faced were, up to 60 days was considered reasonable.

I heard that number might have been adjusted upward since a couple of decades ago, but I'd prefer some confirmation.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:


> And, bonus points, you also save the VAC the trouble of paying you out the CAF Education and Training Credit to thousands of well trained, committed troops because there's no way in Hell that 90% of ARes members will ever accumulate enough time to qualify


Factor in courses as a student and instructor, plus the 1.4x plus up for class A days, and reaching the approximately 2200 days needed is not insurmountable for individuals.

Assume over a 25 year period, the equivalent of one year class B on various courses, two six month class C deployments, and 46 days class A annually, on average, for the remaining time.  Voila.  Qualified.


----------



## dapaterson

Brad Sallows said:


> As I wrote, I meant specifically the CO: Commanding Officer.  When we understood our planning figure to be 37.5 days overall, it was also understood that whatever the greater burdens a CO faced were, up to 60 days was considered reasonable.
> 
> I heard that number might have been adjusted upward since a couple of decades ago, but I'd prefer some confirmation.


Last version of the funding model I saw was materially greater.

I was averaging 80+ a year, plus some days of leave with pay for military service per my collective agreement.

Edit: and I was on the low end compared to peers.


----------



## Brad Sallows

OK.  I heard 100, which struck me as ridiculous.  (For anyone wondering: that would be the number of Class A days a CO could sign for, without prompting a lot of questions about whether there was really that much work to be done.)  That's a lot of extra time to put in for anyone with a full-time job.

I'm on board with cutting the Res F rank ceiling in units by one level, simply because Res F competence rarely matches the expectations most people have for LCol and CWO.

But it's improbable that the COs are not worth what they're paid (too lazy to look up current pay rates and figure out what the hourly rate is based on 8 hours in a full day), and that "the system" thinks they need to be funded to do 100, or even 80, days of work.  Why so much work?  How could it be distributed or reduced?  How likely is it that the time commitment is causing some fraction of potentially useful candidates for the appointment to drop out somewhere along the way, thus aggravating the competence issue?


----------



## dapaterson

Time commitment is preposterous, as many functions cannot be delegated.  In my case, there were additional full time functions pushed to the unit that require additional time and effort.

The primary friction point was a lack of planning at many higher HQs, so everything becomes a continual panic.

A simplified breakdown: for nine months a year, average one and a half evenings a week, two weekends a month, for eight days monthly.

For the summer, about three days a month (all in).

That's 81 days.  Plus email access constantly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Time commitment is preposterous, as many functions cannot be delegated.  In my case, there were additional full time functions pushed to the unit that require additional time and effort.
> 
> That's 81 days.  *Plus email access constantly.*



.... hundreds of emails a month with the expectation that you will respond immediately 'or else'


----------



## Rifleman62

To answer some of the emails you needed to have all the info (files) at hand which you probably didn't which meant a trip to the Armory or a call of to the RSSO if they were in the issue picture.
Lots of these emails were generated by Staff Capts at Div HQ to answer queries to them by higher. They look good if they can give an "immediate" answer.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Rifleman62 said:


> Cl A nights for Trg are a waste of time. Admin only. Exception would be prior to a weekend FXT to prep, do BP etc.



Back in my Res Armd Recce days, we made good use of Cl A trg nights.  Even after we went to 1 trg night/week (Thurs).  Eg - est a Mtd Op Screen, to exercise all steps of BP.  At 2100hrs on a Trg night, issue a Wng O with task of Est Mtd Op Screen by Tp Ldr.  BP - starts, ends at 2200hrs.  Enough time to get things rolling.

Next Thurs night, BP continues.  Drivers and Obs are at veh park, crew commanders are recieving orders, etc.  Issue orders at veh park.  Move out, establish Mtd OP screen by H-hour.  Once last OP Report is sent - ENDEX.  Return to armouries, de-kit veh's, return kit to lockers, Stables as needed, hot wash in the Mess with a cold one and a slice of pizza.

Morale was pretty good back in those days.  Of course, there was enough veh's to field 7 car Recce tps, and those veh's had comms.  Double-banked comms, even.

Imagine that.

Jan - winter indoc/warface.  One trg night, go over tent group kit, march discipline and all that stuff.  tobaggans ready to go.  Next trg night, everyone brought in FMO, got into tent groups, did a short march, up pole/down pole, march back.  sort kit back out, wpns secured, Wng O issued for winter indoc/warfare FTX that started 1800 the next night.  It (Cl A trg nights) worked well, IMO...with motivated leaders.

After Stables on Sunday, there was always pizza and an open mess.

We'd usually be in the high 90%s for attendance back on those days...


----------



## daftandbarmy

Rifleman62 said:


> To answer some of the emails you needed to have all the info (files) at hand which you probably didn't which meant a trip to the Armory or a call of to the RSSO if they were in the issue picture.
> Lots of these emails were generated by Staff Capts at Div HQ to answer queries to them by higher. They look good if they can give an "immediate" answer.



Yes... this was insane.

I recall the time the CO insisted that he didn't answer to random requests from Class B Captains at a distant Bde HQ. If they wanted something from him, he expected the COS to call.

I have no idea how that worked out for him...


----------



## Rifleman62

Agree. Trg nights were for the mandatory, non trade specific, "training", as well as the prep for the FTX.  

We did similar to your post except as a SVC BN. Each mbr had a pocket notebook with the years Trg Plan printed within. Annotations for BP at each level  was Included.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Rifleman62 said:


> Agree. Trg nights were for the mandatory, non trade specific, "training", as well as the prep for the FTX.
> 
> We did similar to your post except as a SVC BN. Each mbr had a pocket notebook with the years Trg Plan printed within. Annotations for BP at each level  was Included.



We did our trade trg on those nights as well though.  We were lucky though, in that we had a decent size trg area literally off the back step of the Armouries.  Copps of woods, open fields, old runways...we could do lots of stuff "urban" armouries soldiers couldn't do.  So, we were quite lucky.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:


> Back in my Res Armd Recce days, we made good use of Cl A trg nights.  Even after we went to 1 trg night/week (Thurs).  Eg - est a Mtd Op Screen, to exercise all steps of BP.  At 2100hrs on a Trg night, issue a Wng O with task of Est Mtd Op Screen by Tp Ldr.  BP - starts, ends at 2200hrs.  Enough time to get things rolling.
> 
> Next Thurs night, BP continues.  Drivers and Obs are at veh park, crew commanders are recieving orders, etc.  Issue orders at veh park.  Move out, establish Mtd OP screen by H-hour.  Once last OP Report is sent - ENDEX.  Return to armouries, de-kit veh's, return kit to lockers, Stables as needed, hot wash in the Mess with a cold one and a slice of pizza.
> 
> Morale was pretty good back in those days.  Of course, there was enough veh's to field 7 car Recce tps, and those veh's had comms.  Double-banked comms, even.
> 
> Imagine that.
> 
> Jan - winter indoc/warface.  One trg night, go over tent group kit, march discipline and all that stuff.  tobaggans ready to go.  Next trg night, everyone brought in FMO, got into tent groups, did a short march, up pole/down pole, march back.  sort kit back out, wpns secured, Wng O issued for winter indoc/warfare FTX that started 1800 the next night.  It (Cl A trg nights) worked well, IMO...with motivated leaders.
> 
> After Stables on Sunday, there was always pizza and an open mess.
> 
> We'd usually be in the high 90%s for attendance back on those days...



And that's exactly how it _should _go!

The (constantly changing) reality that I and others frequently had to face was somewhat different, however


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> You can bicker over the details, unit naming and the assignments, but this is basically what many/most Reserve Napkin force submitters here have been suggesting for years..."right size" the Reserve Regiments as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries to reflect their actual strength.
> 
> Once you accept this fact you can tinker with Reg Force/Reserve Force augmentation levels, specific roles, etc.


I think all observers, and most members frankly, see the same thing. Pity that doesn’t result in action.


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> Was there a point to this beyond trying to grand stand on our casualties ? I was a reservist augmentee in 2008. We did 10 months with 1 VP before we deployed. Hard to call us “mitiatmen” at that point I’d think.  You obviously know that no one can answer your first question because no inquiry will ever say “soldier x wasn’t adequately trained” so your just trying to create a manufactured outrage. Be an adult.


Not grandstanding
My point is there is a lot of complaining about how poorly trained the Reserves are. Yet they are cleared to go on operations, have been for many years.  Will be for many years to come. The fact that casualties can not be attributed to the poor training and or the lack of training for a Reservist says something. 
We did 6 months work ups alongside the Regular Force, we put guys on Driver courses, MG courses gun conversion etc. at the end of the 6 months there was very little difference between the Reserves and the Regular Force other then hearing firetrucking Mos all the time. Attitudes from most of the Reservists I witnessed was a can do attitude as opposed to a drunking screw this from the Regs. 
If we are to equip the Reserves so they have the same tools as the Regular Force then things can happen. What happens is the Reserves get shorted on most everything. Have to make due with what they have. Dam we use to wrap rocks, to go through grenade drills because we couldn't get training grenades. But when we finally went to the grenade range we did pretty good. 

If we look at 2RCHA right now they are training the local Reserve Artillery Units, have been for a while. They recognized a short fall in their own staffing, asked how to fix it for the time being. They put their money where their mouth was and got they local units up to standards for things they could not do otherwise. Those Gunners have deployed over to Europe with the Regiment. Not much time is spent overall. Motivation, hope things will get better keeps a Citizen Soldier coming back, especially after some of the crap many of them go through.


----------



## markppcli

childs56 said:


> Not grandstanding



Then why bring it up?


childs56 said:


> My point is there is a lot of complaining about how poorly trained the Reserves are.



Where ? At what level?


childs56 said:


> Yet they are cleared to go on operations, have been for many years.  Will be for many years to come.



After proper work up yes


childs56 said:


> The fact that casualties can not be attributed to the poor training and or the lack of training for a Reservist says something.



What does it say? Where would that have been brought up, in what kind of inquiry and we both know that would never be the stated reason.

If I said Cpl X died because of his bad drills I’d be bad mouthing one of our dead. And I’d be deeply p lacking in human decency, which I’m sure you’d point out.  So fuck off with that because we both know it’s a bad faith line.


childs56 said:


> We did 6 months work ups alongside the Regular Force, we put guys on Driver courses, MG courses gun conversion etc. at the end of the 6 months there was very little difference between the Reserves and the Regular Force other then hearing firetrucking Mos all the time. Attitudes from most of the Reservists I witnessed was a can do attitude as opposed to a drunking screw this from the Regs.



Oh there it is lol. “Bar room layabouts,” much like in every other industry, peoples enthusiasm comes and goes. When augmentees show up they are excited to start a new experience, the guys in that company have been doing that exact same grind for 4 plus years straight, less that thrilled to train up new guys and that shouldn’t be a shock.


childs56 said:


> If we are to equip the Reserves so they have the same tools as the Regular Force then things can happen. What happens is the Reserves get shorted on most everything. Have to make due with what they have. Dam we use to wrap rocks, to go through grenade drills because we couldn't get training grenades. But when we finally went to the grenade range we did pretty good.



Have done this in the regs; we’re all hurting for equipment.


childs56 said:


> If we look at 2RCHA right now they are training the local Reserve Artillery Units, have been for a while. They recognized a short fall in their own staffing, asked how to fix it for the time being. They put their money where their mouth was and got they local units up to standards for things they could not do otherwise. Those Gunners have deployed over to Europe with the Regiment. Not much time is spent overall. Motivation, hope things will get better keeps a Citizen Soldier coming back, especially after some of the crap many of them go through.


All soldiers are also citizens. Hate to break it to you. Just a question but if a reg force guy has a job on the side is he also twice the citizen ? Or does that only work one way?


You presented nothing but an anecdote and chip on your shoulder. You asked a questions month ago about “what makes the regs so special” and when I gave you a schedule and an answer about differences you didn’t even comment back. You have a problem with some one giving you a hard time but have no actual imput.


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> Then why bring it up?
> 
> 
> Where ? At what level?
> 
> 
> After proper work up yes


Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?


markppcli said:


> What does it say? Where would that have been brought up, in what kind of inquiry and we both know that would never be the stated reason.
> 
> If I said Cpl X died because of his bad drills I’d be bad mouthing one of our dead. And I’d be deeply p lacking in human decency, which I’m sure you’d point out.  So fuck off with that because we both know it’s a bad faith line.


After Action reviews often cover training, equipment, co-ordination etc. 


markppcli said:


> Oh there it is lol. “Bar room layabouts,” much like in every other industry, peoples enthusiasm comes and goes. When augmentees show up they are excited to start a new experience, the guys in that company have been doing that exact same grind for 4 plus years straight, less that thrilled to train up new guys and that shouldn’t be a shock.


4 plus years doing the same grind. I can only speak for the Artillery side. But going to the field living in the Biv site for a week before actually  shooting really is more of a pain, sweeping the gun park floors and kicking the gun box for days on end. Doing some stores checks every other day and equipment maintenance.   Paid to Exercise every other morning and  over the year get some courses. Sounds kind of familiar. But not much more.   


markppcli said:


> Have done this in the regs; we’re all hurting for equipment.
> 
> All soldiers are also citizens. Hate to break it to you. Just a question but if a reg force guy has a job on the side is he also twice the citizen ? Or does that only work one way?


In that case the Reserve Soldier would be three times and some cases four times the soldier.  The Term Citizen Soldier often refers to Reserve Soldiers. Hence why I used the term. 


markppcli said:


> You presented nothing but an anecdote and chip on your shoulder. You asked a questions month ago about “what makes the regs so special” and when I gave you a schedule and an answer about differences you didn’t even comment back. You have a problem with some one giving you a hard time but have no actual imput.


I must have missed that information. I will try to look for it. 

No Chips on my shoulders but I must have struck a nerve with you. That was not my intent. It is what it is, I cant tread around lightly worried about hurt feelings or struck nerves. As I am sure you do not either.


----------



## Halifax Tar

childs56 said:


> Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?



I didn't.  I deployed to AFG the first time after a month of WUP training and a couple weeks leave. 

And the second time was a year of WUPs with most of it holding down a pick-nick table while the reserves were brought up to speed administratively and professionally.


----------



## markppcli

childs56 said:


> Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?



Interesting way of explaining that you don’t understand how training cycles work. 



childs56 said:


> After Action reviews often cover training, equipment, co-ordination etc.






childs56 said:


> 4 plus years doing the same grind. I can only speak for the Artillery side. But going to the field living in the Biv site for a week before actually  shooting really is more of a pain, sweeping the gun park floors and kicking the gun box for days on end. Doing some stores checks every other day and equipment maintenance.   Paid to Exercise every other morning and  over the year get some courses. Sounds kind of familiar. But not much more.



Sorry could you rephrase this in some kind of coherent English? 


childs56 said:


> In that case the Reserve Soldier would be three times and some cases four times the soldier.  The Term Citizen Soldier often refers to Reserve Soldiers. Hence why I used the term.



How does that work exactly? 4 times the soldier ?


childs56 said:


> I must have missed that information. I will try to look for it.
> 
> No Chips on my shoulders but I must have struck a nerve with you. That was not my intent. It is what it is, I cant tread around lightly worried about hurt feelings or struck nerves. As I am sure you do not either.


No I have less that 0 tolerance for the kind of human excrement that would try and use a fallen soldier as some kind of leverage to make a point.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

childs56 said:


> Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?


The Reg Force needs very little actual training time to deploy hastily for an operation overseas or domestically because the Regular Force is constantly training.

A Task Force could be given a warning order and be out the door in days to weeks.  I have seen and participated in this type of cycle myself a couple of times.

But if time and space are an available luxury, why not use it?

Reservists aren't the same because the units they are in aren't an actual operational unit, they are more akin to a holding unit. 

Military Organizations fight as collectives, not as individuals.  An individual Reservist might be a skilled soldier but the unit they are in is not a well-oiled machine. 

It could be made into one, but that would take a lot of time and require full mobilization. 


Semi-related:

You guys think the difference between a worked up Battalion and a Reserve Unit/Unit in Reconstitution are night and day?   You should see what a worked up Warship Crew vs a non-worked up Warship Crew looks like.....




The  best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.

Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:

The fleet standard is 5 minutes.  My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.

When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors.  The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong.  That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Humphrey Bogart said:


> The  best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.
> 
> Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:
> 
> The fleet standard is 5 minutes.  My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.
> 
> When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors.  The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong.  That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.



Making a meal while cleaning your rifle while changing your socks enters the chat


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

daftandbarmy said:


> Making a meal while cleaning your rifle while changing your socks enters the chat


BTDT

Won't lie, I miss that part of the Infantry. 😁


----------



## Halifax Tar

Humphrey Bogart said:


> The  best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.
> 
> Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:
> 
> The fleet standard is 5 minutes.  My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.
> 
> When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors.  The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong.  That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.



We kick 3 ships out the door for Op Apollo in a week or two.  WUPs on the way over MoFos


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Halifax Tar said:


> We kick 3 ships out the door for Op Apollo in a week or two.  WUPs on the way over MoFos


Yup, we did continuity work the entire way over when I went to the Gulf.  It's easy to do TMST when you've got a seven week transit to the theatre of operations.  Great time to drill your boarding, ops and bridge teams, build mission packs, conduct rehearsals and continuity training, etc.

It's even easier when you don't have a bunch of useless cocktail parties you have to plan and dedicate your efforts towards prepping for the actual operation 😉

The OROs, OOWs and Warfare Directors also did a bunch of specific training and planning for certain other operations we did. 

"Hey, we are transiting through the SCS, we should probably wargame this collectively together, come up with a plan and then gain blessing from the skipper so we can drill it and not be surprised when we inevitably have an interaction with a certain non-friendly Navy".


----------



## FJAG

Halifax Tar said:


> Don't bring that weak sauce.  You have A Res CBG Commanders and higher with the A Res.  And you have DGen Army Reserve.  Don't try and deflect the current state of things without owning your portion.
> 
> If the organization wants to be a player it needs to help is self first.  The first step is to propose a self reorganization into something rational and coherent.


The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.

I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.



Halifax Tar said:


> I'm going around right now and SIVing units with an ES of 25 troops.  Yet they have a compliment of command positions and staff.  Re-dick-you-lous.
> 
> Break the cabals and mafias.


I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.

I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.

I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.



markppcli said:


> Why is that a joke? You have 10 Cols, and DGen Res to advocate to the Div commanders as to how they can be be organized / support their Div commanders intent. What does a “real seat at the table” look like to you? Do you need equal representation ? Where is that going to come from?


It has to come from a knowledgeable and strong MND supported by his PM with a mandate for meaningful reform and not just cost cutting. It ought to be the priority. Everyone knows that you need a solid core of full-timers to develop doctrine, practice it and take care of the day-to-day discretionary defence deployments that we choose to take on and at the same time have a larger, well-trained and equipped, low cost part-time force to call on when a problem is no longer discretionary but has to be addressed with a military solution. The CAF is currently focussing on the former while marginalizing the latter.



markppcli said:


> To better create argument and bickering. I once again submit my proposed reorganization of the reserves into regional Bdes and roughly provincial regiments.


I agree fully with the basic concept of amalgamation and I know that it works in the US with their ARNG.

Where I would deviate is that I would remove artillery and engineers from the manoeuvre brigades and have them in their own brigades so that these specialty skills could be properly supervised and developed across the entire Army in a consistent and purposeful manner. I would leave the manoeuvre basically as infantry and recce/armour organizations so that they could concentrate on those combined arms skills.

Service support is too important to leave in little enclaves. It's one of the primary needs of an Army that is required to deploy beyond the routine peacetime deployments. A significant effort should go into creating ResF service support battalions and formations that are capable of supporting a brigade or larger deployed force and augmenting smaller RegF deployments. If we do not plan to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we do not need a ResF brigade service battalion, just a peacetime, full-time maintenance establishment commensurate with the brigade's equipment holdings. If we do get to the point where we want to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we need to have or to be able to rapidly form a brigade service battalion. Regardless, we need to have at least one, better yet two,  ResF sustainment brigades.

I'll get back to basics. I've come to the view that both warfighting and administration has become too complex to be handled by a part-time leadership. If we pool the ResF into more concentrated brigades and units (especially if we also reduce the number of division headquarters to a more reasonable two) but maintain the full-time RSS and brigade and division staffs in their current numbers then we already have a start at a core for a full-time leadership/administrative cadre. (That shouldn't stop us from also simplifying our administrative system)

On the other hand, I do not think that is enough. I do not think that amalgamation brings enough experience or equipment to the reservists to allow them to do proper individual and collective training. For that I think you need something in the nature of a 30/70 battalion where you have one CO responsible for training his fully equipped full-time company and his partially equipped, part-time companies using the resources that he is given. Resource sharing and management within a battalion is much easier to accomplish than Army wide. Additionally the full-time company and battalion headquarters is still available for peacetime deployment rotos fleshed out to an extent by it's own reservists.

All that to say that the ResF is in dire need to be fixed but incapable of fixing itself. Not just because it's stubborn or cliquish (which it is) but because it does not have the control over itself or the resources to the extent that is needed to really fix the problem.

🍻


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> Interesting way of explaining that you don’t understand how training cycles work.


Fully understand how the cycle works for all three elements. 


markppcli said:


> Sorry could you rephrase this in some kind of coherent English?





markppcli said:


> How does that work exactly? 4 times the soldier ?


You said a Regular Force member would be twice the soldier if they had another job. Many Reservist have other jobs some multiple along with attending school.


markppcli said:


> No I have less that 0 tolerance for the kind of human excrement that would try and use a fallen soldier as some kind of leverage to make a point.


Yup the same person that would not look at the facts of the overall situation and try to fix any issues of relevance in relation to the incident. 
The Airforce is pretty good at investigating all incidents and relating them to training, equipment, system failure or other issues. Putting the focus on the issues. It can be a hard reality but one that should be looked at. 

You don't have to agree but it can and does save lives.


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.
> 
> I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.
> 
> If the A res wants to be more than a social club and holding unit for partially trained soldiers I think it needs to start the change itself.  The first step would be to recognize the disfunction and present a plan to the CAF and Reg Army that makes sense.  And IMHO that includes vast reducing the command structure overhead that currently exists.
> 
> I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.
> 
> Absolutely, but I think the subject of this thread is the A Res.  So I am trying to stay on point.
> 
> I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.
> 
> Part of the issue, I agree, is that I think we are placing unreasonable expectations on our A Res. I have RQs/SQs that aren't Sup Techs, in fact only 3 of my units have Sup Techs as an RQ/SQ and one is a reserve Cpl, who is trying their best.  And we expect the same writ and returns from them; and Supply Management competency as a Reg Force MWO RQ at a Reg Bn.  Its ridiculous.  And completely unreasonable.
> 
> I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.
> 
> Again, and Ill be honest.  The A Res has to lead the change to be the organization it wants to be.  Dont sit around waiting for the Reg Force to do it.  The Reg Force wont pay them any mind until until they assert themselves and are honest about their own make up and structure.  I work with a ton of great people who want to do great things.  In many ways the A Res has been refreshing.  Its nice to be around people who actually want to be here.  But the change needs to come within. Only then, I think, will you get churn from big brother.
> 
> 
> 🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.
> 
> I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.
> 
> 
> I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.
> 
> I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.
> 
> I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.
> 
> 
> It has to come from a knowledgeable and strong MND supported by his PM with a mandate for meaningful reform and not just cost cutting. It ought to be the priority. Everyone knows that you need a solid core of full-timers to develop doctrine, practice it and take care of the day-to-day discretionary defence deployments that we choose to take on and at the same time have a larger, well-trained and equipped, low cost part-time force to call on when a problem is no longer discretionary but has to be addressed with a military solution. The CAF is currently focussing on the former while marginalizing the latter.
> 
> 
> I agree fully with the basic concept of amalgamation and I know that it works in the US with their ARNG.
> 
> Where I would deviate is that I would remove artillery and engineers from the manoeuvre brigades and have them in their own brigades so that these specialty skills could be properly supervised and developed across the entire Army in a consistent and purposeful manner. I would leave the manoeuvre basically as infantry and recce/armour organizations so that they could concentrate on those combined arms skills.
> 
> Service support is too important to leave in little enclaves. It's one of the primary needs of an Army that is required to deploy beyond the routine peacetime deployments. A significant effort should go into creating ResF service support battalions and formations that are capable of supporting a brigade or larger deployed force and augmenting smaller RegF deployments. If we do not plan to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we do not need a ResF brigade service battalion, just a peacetime, full-time maintenance establishment commensurate with the brigade's equipment holdings. If we do get to the point where we want to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we need to have or to be able to rapidly form a brigade service battalion. Regardless, we need to have at least one, better yet two,  ResF sustainment brigades.
> 
> I'll get back to basics. I've come to the view that both warfighting and administration has become too complex to be handled by a part-time leadership. If we pool the ResF into more concentrated brigades and units (especially if we also reduce the number of division headquarters to a more reasonable two) but maintain the full-time RSS and brigade and division staffs in their current numbers then we already have a start at a core for a full-time leadership/administrative cadre. (That shouldn't stop us from also simplifying our administrative system)
> 
> On the other hand, I do not think that is enough. I do not think that amalgamation brings enough experience or equipment to the reservists to allow them to do proper individual and collective training. For that I think you need something in the nature of a 30/70 battalion where you have one CO responsible for training his fully equipped full-time company and his partially equipped, part-time companies using the resources that he is given. Resource sharing and management within a battalion is much easier to accomplish than Army wide. Additionally the full-time company and battalion headquarters is still available for peacetime deployment rotos fleshed out to an extent by it's own reservists.
> 
> All that to say that the ResF is in dire need to be fixed but incapable of fixing itself. Not just because it's stubborn or cliquish (which it is) but because it does not have the control over itself or the resources to the extent that is needed to really fix the problem.
> 
> 🍻


I 100% agree that Role, Resources and Reorganization are equally important in producing an effective Army Reserve however that doesn't mean that they all have to be/can be done at the same time.

I see no reason why the Reserves couldn't begin their Reorganization while the Reg Force does the same with their (eventual) Force 20XX plans.  Once the Reorganization is completed the Army as a whole can then look at the building blocks that come out the other side of that process and determine what roles need to be filled to achieve our overall defence policy objectives (i.e. new Foreign Policy and Defence Policy White Papers required...hopefully developed with all-party - or at least Liberal and Conservative - input so that we don't have radical policy swings each time we get a new government).

At that point the Army can then tweak the structures as required and then equip the Army (Reg Force and Reserves) as required to fulfill their roles.

In the meantime CA Reserve units can focus on their primary skills (Light Infantry, Mounted/Dismounted Recce, etc.) and the Company/Squadron/Battery level.  To my mind each "Regiment" should have the ability to at least generate and consistently field in training that sub-unit level of troops.  Any existing unit that cannot meet that requirement should be amalgamated with another unit(s) so that they can.  

These amalgamated Reserve units can then be grouped geographically into Battalions/Regiments and Brigades with Reg Force RSS leadership and/or integrated into 30-70 or 70-30 type "Total Force" units as determined by the eventual overall force structure devised by the Army.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> I 100% agree that Role, Resources and Reorganization are equally important in producing an effective Army Reserve however that doesn't mean that they all have to be/can be done at the same time.
> 
> I see no reason why the Reserves couldn't begin their Reorganization while the Reg Force does the same with their (eventual) Force 20XX plans.  Once the Reorganization is completed the Army as a whole can then look at the building blocks that come out the other side of that process and determine what roles need to be filled to achieve our overall defence policy objectives (i.e. new Foreign Policy and Defence Policy White Papers required...hopefully developed with all-party - or at least Liberal and Conservative - input so that we don't have radical policy swings each time we get a new government).
> 
> At that point the Army can then tweak the structures as required and then equip the Army (Reg Force and Reserves) as required to fulfill their roles.
> 
> In the meantime CA Reserve units can focus on their primary skills (Light Infantry, Mounted/Dismounted Recce, etc.) and the Company/Squadron/Battery level.  To my mind each "Regiment" should have the ability to at least generate and consistently field in training that sub-unit level of troops.  Any existing unit that cannot meet that requirement should be amalgamated with another unit(s) so that they can.
> 
> These amalgamated Reserve units can then be grouped geographically into Battalions/Regiments and Brigades with Reg Force RSS leadership and/or integrated into 30-70 or 70-30 type "Total Force" units as determined by the eventual overall force structure devised by the Army.



So how do you 'clean house' at the leadership levels first, so that any new initiatives aren't badly bungled or otherwise wasted effort?


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> So how do you 'clean house' at the leadership levels first, so that any new initiatives aren't badly bungled or otherwise wasted effort?


Somewhat ironically I think the best way to ensure some modicum of success (let's be honest...there will be LOTS of broken eggs to make this omlette) is initially political rather than military.  

The leaders of the different political parties in both the US and Australia for example have for the most part come to some general, high-level agreement as to what the basic roles of their militaries are and broad agreement on the general level of funding required.

If the Conservative and Liberal parties could reach some similar type of accord then as a result our military leadership would not have to tip-toe around the politics of defence so much.  A clearer sense of general direction and confidence that this is unlikely to radically change from election to election would allow the CDS and the rest of the CAF leadership to move more decisively toward the agreed upon objectives.

Clear direction from the political top would mean that it would be much harder for those down the chain to fight against the changes as they would have no strong political base of support to back them.

In no way however will any radical changes to the CAF be neat or pretty.  It's in a very deep pile of doo-doo (some of it imposed from outside and some self-inflicted) and getting out of it will be messy and painful.

$.02


----------



## dapaterson

Fully agree that the Army Res C2 structure is inadequate, bloated, and too often filled with individuals of questionable competence.

But that same eye needs to be applied across the board.  A navy with sixteen warships (with respect to their crews, KIN and AOPS are not warships) sounds like a flotilla where even a single Rear Admiral would be excessive.  An Army writ large which under duress might be able to cobble together three brigades (Reg and Res combined) sounds suspiciously like a command for a MGen.

And so on throughout the structure...


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Fully agree that the Army Res C2 structure is inadequate, bloated, and too often filled with individuals of questionable competence.
> 
> But that same eye needs to be applied across the board.  A navy with sixteen warships (with respect to their crews, KIN and AOPS are not warships) sounds like a flotilla where even a single Rear Admiral would be excessive.  An Army writ large which under duress might be able to cobble together three brigades (Reg and Res combined) sounds suspiciously like a command for a MGen.
> 
> And so on throughout the structure...



'Emperor's New Clothes' time


----------



## Furniture

dapaterson said:


> Fully agree that the Army Res C2 structure is inadequate, bloated, and too often filled with individuals of questionable competence.
> 
> But that same eye needs to be applied across the board.  A navy with sixteen warships (with respect to their crews, KIN and AOPS are not warships) sounds like a flotilla where even a single Rear Admiral would be excessive.  An Army writ large which under duress might be able to cobble together three brigades (Reg and Res combined) sounds suspiciously like a command for a MGen.
> 
> And so on throughout the structure...


Do that and the pay for the new top ranks would have to increase to match what the old ranks were paid. 

What Maj will stick around to take over a Col's job, but still only get Maj pay? Everyone with their 20/25 would be out.


----------



## dapaterson

You assume that all those jobs and structures are necessary.


----------



## Weinie

markppcli said:


> Disagree; those troops would just join the regular army of the option for the reserves didn’t exist. The numbers probably end up being neutral from  the “don’t join the regular army because I can join the reserves” vs the “tried it and liked it” crowd.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why is that a joke? You have 10 Cols, and DGen Res to advocate to the Div commanders as to how they can be be organized / support their Div commanders intent. What does a “real seat at the table” look like to you? Do you need equal representation ? Where is that going to come from?
> 
> 
> 
> Was there a point to this beyond trying to grand stand on our casualties ? I was a reservist augmentee in 2008. We did 10 months with 1 VP before we deployed. Hard to call us “mitiatmen” at that point I’d think.  You obviously know that no one can answer your first question because no inquiry will ever say “soldier x wasn’t adequately trained” so your just trying to create a manufactured outrage. Be an adult.


Are you just trying 
to be outraged?


----------



## Brad Sallows

childs56 said:


> Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?


At least two scenarios come to mind.
1. They have to integrate some reservists.
2. Specialized domain/mission skills (particularly those associated with peace enforcement).


----------



## Furniture

dapaterson said:


> You assume that all those jobs and structures are necessary.


There are definitely jobs that could be cut, but that also requires a massive cut to our administrative paperwork. 

It's something that needs to be done, but I expect that the people who can make the changes won't, they like their stacks of reports.


----------



## dapaterson

Shrink the number of units - Army Reserve, for example, should be about 1/3 of the current number.  That means you can shrink the number of HQs by a third as well.  Which means that even if you keep the same number of reports and returns, you have 1/3 of the number of HQs demanding them, and 1/3 the number of HQ staff officers demanding them (and not reading them, then asking for the same info in a different format a week later).

Reduced C2 burden reduces the number of staff before you look at automation or elimination of redundant / unnecessary reports.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Shrink the number of units - Army Reserve, for example, should be about 1/3 of the current number.  That means you can shrink the number of HQs by a third as well.  Which means that even if you keep the same number of reports and returns, you have 1/3 of the number of HQs demanding them, and 1/3 the number of HQ staff officers demanding them (and not reading them, then asking for the same info in a different format a week later).
> 
> Reduced C2 burden reduces the number of staff before you look at automation or elimination of redundant / unnecessary reports.



Each Division could have a 'Reserve Force Generation Brigade' aligned with it. 

Make it accountable to a desk in the Div Comd's HQ, and give them 'readiness targets' to achieve on an annul basis.

Align the units to the Div Comd's FG requirements e.g., X # of Inf/Armd/Eng/CSS positions. 

Staff the units with a Reg F Cadre including a CO and Training staff, like an OMLT I guess.

Run an annual exercise to test readiness, maybe in May every year.

Promote the people who pass the readiness tests. Fire the people who aren't ready. Or something like that.

Simples.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Each Division could have a 'Reserve Force Generation Brigade' aligned with it.
> 
> Make it accountable to a desk in the Div Comd's HQ, and give them 'readiness targets' to achieve on an annul basis.
> 
> Align the units to the Div Comd's FG requirements e.g., X # of Inf/Armd/Eng/CSS positions.
> 
> Staff the units with a Reg F Cadre including a CO and Training staff, like an OMLT I guess.
> 
> Run an annual exercise to test readiness, maybe in May every year.
> 
> Promote the people who pass the readiness tests. Fire the people who aren't ready. Or something like that.
> 
> Simples.


I guess my question is:

1) does this RFGB simply generate slot fillers for the RegF brigade in that division; or

2) does it have some other role such generating additional sub-units or even units for a force over and above the 4 RegF brigades?

If it's the former than we're really not accomplishing much beyond what the ResF does now other than to eliminate 6 ResF brigade headquarters (which is in and of itself a laudable goal - and you should get rid of two div headquarters while your at it)

The other things - cadres, trainers, exercises, evaluations, firing - you could do now if you chose to.

I keep going back to the view that you really don't improve the army as a whole until you convert the 35-40,000 some odd folks it already has into let's say 8 or 9 fully manned brigades with a few of them at high readiness with full-time personnel and the rest of them at low readiness with a high part-time component.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I guess my question is:
> 
> 1) does this RFGB simply generate slot fillers for the RegF brigade in that division; or
> 
> 2) does it have some other role such generating additional sub-units or even units for a force over and above the 4 RegF brigades?
> 
> If it's the former than we're really not accomplishing much beyond what the ResF does now other than to eliminate 6 ResF brigade headquarters (which is in and of itself a laudable goal - and you should get rid of two div headquarters while your at it)
> 
> The other things - cadres, trainers, exercises, evaluations, firing - you could do now if you chose to.
> 
> I keep going back to the view that you really don't improve the army as a whole until you convert the 35-40,000 some odd folks it already has into let's say 8 or 9 fully manned brigades with a few of them at high readiness with full-time personnel and the rest of them at low readiness with a high part-time component.
> 
> 🍻


I viewed @daftandbarmy ’s proposal as an interim step. 
   1)  Align under a Reg Bde

Once you have that, you can start looking at what is the most practical combination, like you I think the future is 30-70 units for most.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I viewed @daftandbarmy ’s proposal as an interim step.
> 1)  Align under a Reg Bde
> 
> Once you have that, you can start looking at what is the most practical combination, like you I think the future is 30-70 units for most.



Yes, exactly.

You'll need to spend time on the change management, and people development, as opposed to a sudden switch from Point A to Point B.


----------



## Brad Sallows

There has to be some first step to give the Res F a focus other than "whatever COs and/or Bde commanders decide".  "Align under a Reg Bde" is as good as many and better than most.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> I viewed @daftandbarmy ’s proposal as an interim step.
> 1) Align under a Reg Bde
> 
> Once you have that, you can start looking at what is the most practical combination, like you I think the future is 30-70 units for most.


We may need a few interim solutions. Spiral development for the PRes. I’ve already presented where I think we need to go, but I think there will be necessary evolutions beyond the states that I have shown.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> We may need a few interim solutions. Spiral development for the PRes. I’ve already presented where I think we need to go, but I think there will be necessary evolutions beyond the states that I have shown.



Good luck getting all those units in BC to align under the name 'British Columbia Regiment'. 

You'd have more success going back to the WW1 practise of numbered units


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes, exactly.
> 
> You'll need to spend time on the change management, and people development, as opposed to a sudden switch from Point A to Point B.


There are two very opposing change management principles at play here.

On the one hand you need to move forward in an orderly measured manner establish quick wins but also testing and retooling along the way.

On the other hand you need to ram through sufficient change so that it becomes impossible for the bureaucracy to backslide to the status quo.

Over the last fifty years I have seen every attempt to reform the reserves, no matter how enthusiastically it started, die a withering death into meaningless minor tweaks that accomplished nothing because enthusiasm was not maintained at the highest levels as leadership changed and champions were replaced by 'meh' guys. 

I'm of the mind that one needs a champion who is prepared to ram things through quickly even if eggs are broken and a number of sacred cows slaughtered. Otherwise our grandchildren will be having this same conversation twenty to thirty years down the road.



Brad Sallows said:


> There has to be some first step to give the Res F a focus other than "whatever COs and/or Bde commanders decide".  "Align under a Reg Bde" is as good as many and better than most.



Practically speaking they have been since the 1950s. There have always been geographic alignments as between RegF brigades and Land Force Areas and ResF districts and bdes. The Land Force Areas/divisions have had actual command of both RegF and ResF brigades since they were formed in 1991. Nothing meaningful seems to have come out of that.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

Being tied to a Reg F bde, presumably including ties between units, would be a much tighter association than a bunch of formations commanded by a regional HQ.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> We may need a few interim solutions. Spiral development for the PRes. I’ve already presented where I think we need to go, but I think there will be necessary evolutions beyond the states that I have shown.


Some interesting thoughts.

You've seen my ideas upthread so I won't go into details but just make some general comments.

I firmly believe in restructuring most, but not all, ResF battalions into company size sub-units but letting them keep their geographic facilities and unit character. I don't believe in giving these aggregated battalions some neutral new name. Our units have history and heritage which should be retained even if it bends some noses out of joint. If the CScotR don't like being a company in the Seaforths then tough sh!t. 

You've created a fourth RegF brigade group by creating a new RegF armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment, service battalion and signals squadron. That's over 2,000 PYs that aren't there for that even at a 90/10 manning level; so one is forced to leave it at three brigade groups unless you are prepared to go to a 70/30 structure for most of those units. That requires a whole different equation.

I'm more and more of the view that all artillery, RegF and ResF, should be taken out of the brigades and brigade groups and concentrated in two artillery brigades for numerous reasons but principally for training and deployment augmentation reasons. 

I'd also remove the service support groups from the divisions and restructure them into one or, more probably, two sustainment brigades and a signals brigade. The later would also get 21 EW Regt, the Int Regt, the Influence Activity and all the ResF sigs regts/sqdns

Similarly I'd take 4ESR into an engineer brigade with all the ResF engr regiments. 

I'd leave the three RegF brigades with their infantry, armour/recce, an engineer squadron, a service battalion and a signals squadron. 

I'd leave the four ResF Inf regiments with all their regional infantry and recce squadrons amalgamated into one recce regiment.

Finally, I'd reduce the divisions to two and allocate 3 Div 1 CMBG and what you call 30 and 40 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade and the signals brigade while 2 Div  gets 2 and 5 CMBG, 10 and 20 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade.



Brad Sallows said:


> Being tied to a Reg F bde, presumably including ties between units, would be a much tighter association than a bunch of formations commanded by a regional HQ.


Probably true but it depends very much as to what you call "ties". There's the tie that currently exists between 2 RCHA and 7 Tor, 11 Fd, 30 Fd 42 Fd, 49 fd, and 56 Fd and then there is the 30/70 battalion/regiment concept. 

I don't think the paradigm will ever shift until you have a RegF CO with the responsibility, authority and resources to train his reservists. Everything else is blowing various densities of smoke up our collective butt holes.

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> You've created a fourth RegF brigade group by creating a new RegF armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment, service battalion and signals squadron.


That’s more a discussion for the other thread, but your observation is incorrect. We already have a fourth brigade (numbered 6) and it already has engineer and artillery regiments. The infantry an armoured units also already exist.


----------



## Halifax Tar

McG said:


> We may need a few interim solutions. Spiral development for the PRes. I’ve already presented where I think we need to go, but I think there will be necessary evolutions beyond the states that I have shown.



I like your restructuring.  That's bang on I think.


----------



## ueo

GR66 said:


> Is the highlighted part maybe a big part of the problem?  Other than deploying for a natural disaster, etc. there really shouldn't be any "fastballs" when it comes to training schedules, etc.  Any reason that the annual schedule couldn't be posted on Day 1 of the new Fiscal Year?


Tell/sell that to much higher.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Being tied to a Reg F bde, presumably including ties between units, would be a much tighter association than a bunch of formations commanded by a regional HQ.



It also presumes an enduring mission e.g., 'FG troops for X Bde', which is entirely achievable with the resources currently in place IMHO.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> That’s more a discussion for the other thread, but your observation is incorrect. We already have a fourth brigade (numbered 6) and it already has engineer and artillery regiments. The infantry an armoured units also already exist.


That's mixing apples and oranges. We have three manoeuvre brigades and one combat support brigade. 6 CCSB is not a deployable entity in its own right. On top of that you've moved most of its units out to other formations and repurposed some in a way that you will still be short PYs. 4 Fd(GS) is now an AD regiment in another brigade so there is no arty regt to convert to 3 RCHA. You've moved out 21 EW as well and the IA. Your missing an engineer support regiment for the Army because you've converted it to combat engineers. There is no service battalion to assign to the 6th and there is no HQ and signals squadron to assign to the 6th. While you've moved the RCD from the 2nd to the 6th, there is no longer a brigade recce/cavalry capability in the 2nd which limits its employability. 

Long story short, you are compromising a very important combat support function in favour of creating four manoeuvre brigades which have no more actual combat power than the three that already exist.

🍻


----------



## McG

If you want to talk Reg F structures, I'll answer in a thread that's not about PRes structures: Informing the Army’s Future Structure


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Some interesting thoughts.
> 
> You've seen my ideas upthread so I won't go into details but just make some general comments.
> 
> I firmly believe in restructuring most, but not all, ResF battalions into company size sub-units but letting them keep their geographic facilities and unit character. I don't believe in giving these aggregated battalions some neutral new name. Our units have history and heritage which should be retained even if it bends some noses out of joint. If the CScotR don't like being a company in the Seaforths then tough sh!t.
> 
> You've created a fourth RegF brigade group by creating a new RegF armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment, service battalion and signals squadron. That's over 2,000 PYs that aren't there for that even at a 90/10 manning level; so one is forced to leave it at three brigade groups unless you are prepared to go to a 70/30 structure for most of those units. That requires a whole different equation.
> 
> I'm more and more of the view that all artillery, RegF and ResF, should be taken out of the brigades and brigade groups and concentrated in two artillery brigades for numerous reasons but principally for training and deployment augmentation reasons.
> 
> I'd also remove the service support groups from the divisions and restructure them into one or, more probably, two sustainment brigades and a signals brigade. The later would also get 21 EW Regt, the Int Regt, the Influence Activity and all the ResF sigs regts/sqdns
> 
> Similarly I'd take 4ESR into an engineer brigade with all the ResF engr regiments.
> 
> I'd leave the three RegF brigades with their infantry, armour/recce, an engineer squadron, a service battalion and a signals squadron.
> 
> I'd leave the four ResF Inf regiments with all their regional infantry and recce squadrons amalgamated into one recce regiment.
> 
> Finally, I'd reduce the divisions to two and allocate 3 Div 1 CMBG and what you call 30 and 40 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade and the signals brigade while 2 Div  gets 2 and 5 CMBG, 10 and 20 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade.
> 
> 
> Probably true but it depends very much as to what you call "ties". There's the tie that currently exists between 2 RCHA and 7 Tor, 11 Fd, 30 Fd 42 Fd, 49 fd, and 56 Fd and then there is the 30/70 battalion/regiment concept.
> 
> I don't think the paradigm will ever shift until you have a RegF CO with the responsibility, authority and resources to train his reservists. Everything else is blowing various densities of smoke up our collective butt holes.
> 
> 🍻



Sounds like you're proposing a 'bold' approach to an organization that is anything but 











						CEO Excellence | McKinsey on Books
					

What if the world’s highest-performing CEOs held a master class to share the skills and practices that have driven their success over the years?




					www.mckinsey.com


----------

