# RCAF Authorities / Future Unmanned Aircraft for RCAF



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The good news is that the Air Force already has 3,700 officers so we really don't need any more than we're paying now. We just need to winkle them out of the cubicles that they are hiding in.
> 
> 🙂


If they already have a cubicle with a screen then don't they just need joysticks?  Or do they have those already as well?


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## blacktriangle

Kirkhill said:


> If they already have a cubicle with a screen then don't they just need joysticks?  Or do they have those already as well?


Some of them definitely do...


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## SupersonicMax

FJAG said:


> The good news is that the Air Force already has 3,700 officers so we really don't need any more than we're paying now. We just need to winkle them out of the cubicles that they are hiding in.
> 
> 🙂


Not sure where all those people are hiding but we were unable to fill all our hard fighter pilot staff billets this year...


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## FJAG

SupersonicMax said:


> Not sure where all those people are hiding but we were unable to fill all our hard fighter pilot staff billets this year...


Scour the halls of Ottawa and Winnipeg. I'm sure you'll find a few.

There are some 676 majors and 2,030 captains//captain/lieutenants on your establishment. (which by the way is more than the 671 majors and 1,898 captains//captains/lieutenants the Army has) (Full disclosure, my data is two years old but probably hasn't changed much)

🙂


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## SupersonicMax

How many are pilots?


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## dimsum

FJAG said:


> But all things being equal, you should be able to train several UAV operators for the cost of training one afterburner jockey. The airframes should be less costly and if you loose one you don't loose an afterburner jockey with it. In fact many of your drones could very well be one-trip-munition vehicles designed to suicide on the target or alternatively just release a precision guided weapon near the target. To get back to another thread, you could probably train NCOs to pilot remote munitions and no longer need to worry about the pilot attrition rate  🙂
> 
> There are endless possibilities here limited only by our imagination. And yes, in mine there are still roles for fighter jocks.
> 
> 🍻


That's the thing, UAVs (RPAs, whatever) are not one thing.  There are multiple categories that range from your Quadcopter drone to a Global Hawk, which has a larger wingspan than a 737.  We don't just say "airplane" - licensing defines recreational, ultralight, light single engine, twin engine, jet, etc etc.  

So, the requirements for UAV operators really varies if you're flying something that's 25kg, or a Global Hawk.  Why wouldn't someone who flies a Global Hawk or Reaper (which is not a small aircraft) need something equivalent to a Pilot's license?  Those things are as big, or bigger, than many light civilian aircraft whose operators need a Pilot's license.


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## FJAG

dimsum said:


> That's the thing, UAVs (RPAs, whatever) are not one thing.  There are multiple categories that range from your Quadcopter drone to a Global Hawk, which has a larger wingspan than a 737.  We don't just say "airplane" - licensing defines recreational, ultralight, light single engine, twin engine, jet, etc etc.
> 
> So, the requirements for UAV operators really varies if you're flying something that's 25kg, or a Global Hawk.  Why wouldn't someone who flies a Global Hawk or Reaper (which is not a small aircraft) need something equivalent to a Pilot's license?  Those things are as big, or bigger, than many light civilian aircraft whose operators need a Pilot's license.


Understood Dimsum. And let me start off by saying that your knowledge and experience on the subject far exceeds mine. I've been delving deep into the history of the formation of a UAV troop for Op Athena 1 ROTO 0 recently so I've got some opinionated views at least on the tactical UAV level.

I thought the thread's discussion related to RCAF level UAVs, RPAs etc etc and not the tactical level ones so my comments were in respect to those and I never contemplated not having a "pilot". I'm just saying you don't need one qualified and trained to the level of your typical jet jockey or even a transport pilot. There are dozens of things that those guys need to deal with "on the fly" so to speak that requires both training, talent and endurance. While flying UAVs and RPVs also require some piloting skills its not on the same level.

It may interest you to know that the bombardiers and master bombardiers who flew the Sperwers on ROTO 0 also went through a certified three month flight school program before being trained for another three months on the UAV itself. The RCAF imposed a pilot or navigator to sit in the control module with the crew to oversee "air worthiness" but in effect the gunners, under the supervision of their sergeant mission commander launched, flew and recovered the aircraft which weighs in at some 700 pounds, had a twelve foot wingspan and cruised up to 16,000 feet. It was the size, ceiling and nearby airport that made the RCAF nervous (or maybe it was the fact that the Army got a bunch of cash to buy Sperwers on a UAV in a matter of three months)

There's no doubt in my mind that the guy who flies a Raven B doesn't need anywhere near as much training as those Sperwer operators did and that anyone who flies a Reaper should have more. But none of them need the same degree of training as someone who flies an F-18 or F-35 or C-17. Neither do they need the same rank nor compensation package. That was my point: the RCAF is locked into the mentality that unless you are a pilot trained captain receiving flight pay you have no business operating an airframe. The fact of the matter is that there are pilots and then there are pilots. We need to keep the training and rank and compensation commensurate to the task at hand. Guys who fly suicide drones, do not need to be RCAF fully qualified pilots (they don't need to be RCAF at all) neither do most tactical UAVs and quite probably some of the more esoteric aerial guided weapon systems (hell we launch precision munitions by cannon, why not guided/piloted winged ones from a HIMARS?) The technology is getting spectacular and its time to set some paradigms aside and think differently about who does what and whether they get to collect flight pay and sleep in hotels.

🍻


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## rnkelly

I always thought that the rcaf got called in for the Sperwer to fix issues. Ie; crashes, airspace violations etc.
Is this revisionist history or is there some truth to that?


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## PuckChaser

I think any aircraft (manned or unmanned) falls under RCAF Flight Safety, so they would handle those investigations.


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## SupersonicMax

PuckChaser said:


> I think any aircraft (manned or unmanned) falls under RCAF Flight Safety, so they would handle those investigations.


There are many residual authorities that fall under the RCAF regardless of who operates an aircraft. They are:

Doctrine
Aircrew training and standards
Flight Safety
Operational Airworthiness 
Technical Airworthiness


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## Oldgateboatdriver

I am not completely convinced, SSM.

I full agree with your last three: They should remain under the RCAF.

But I seriously doubt the first one. As indicated before, there are multiples RPA's with huge differences in scope, sizes and capabilities that don't make for one size fits all solutions. 

For instance, why should the RCAF have any doctrinal input into a small field deployed quadcopter used by infantry to get a look over the next ridge? Similarly, why should the RCAF have any doctrinal input into the naval employment of smaller shipboard RPA's whose main purpose is to extend the sensor horizon, or carry out ship's identification, or would the RCAF know how to use such RPA for, say, a hot pursuit of vessels of interest? This seem to me to fall under doctrine that should come from the Army or the RCN.

As for Aircrew training and standards, again I believe it depends on what you consider to be an Aircrew. On the civilian side of things, Transport Canada issues licenses for "drone" operators - but they don't call those pilot's licenses. If you consider certain RPA's, such as the ones in my doctrine examples, to be closer to "civilian drones" than actual "airplanes", I don't see what the need would be for the RCAF to be involved in crew training and standards. The RCN or  Army, as the case may be, are perfectly capable of training the operators and overseeing the standards to be met and maintained.

Of course, in the RCN, we have the advantage of deploying with Airdets that are already RCAF,  so it is a much more theoretical discussion since they would most likely operate both the shipboard airframes and RPA's.


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## Quirky

PuckChaser said:


> We shouldn't be short changing current requirements for future, unproven designs.



*Gripen-E has left the chat.


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## dapaterson

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> Of course, in the RCN, we have the advantage of deploying with Airdets that are already RCAF,  so it is a much more theoretical discussion since they would most likely operate both the shipboard airframes and RPA's.



And be given fewer bedspaces because "they don't need pilots" and try to be tagged with extra duties because "since they're not pilots they don't need crew rest" and many other types of NWO genius...


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## Kirkhill

Further to the OGBD  - SSM Doctrine discussion




			https://d2r9nfiii89r0l.cloudfront.net/article/images/740x500/dimg/160709-m-ob268-122-100675897-orig.jpg
		


Where in the RCAF spectrum would the Black Hornet fit?
Used by a ABCANZUS troops.
When the kit was issued (after less than a day's instruction) the troops immediately started experimenting and developed their own TTPs.

The battery was only used to power the blades to hop from one perch to another.  The 30 min life of the NUAV was extended by going quiet and just letting the EO package operate while acting as an OP.

And how about this one









> Scientists attached an electronic backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and turned it into a drone​
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> Scientists attached an electronic backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and turned it into a drone
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> At a certain point it becomes really difficult to scale down machines. A tiny drone can only be so tiny. Scientists at Draper have come up with a solution: make a drone out of a dragonfly. Researchers at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) genetically modified a dragonfly to make the...
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> ca.finance.yahoo.com


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## YZT580

Transport Canada only gets involved when certain weight, altitude or distance flown limits are exceeded.  Most of the navy or army applications such as over the horizon scouting described previously are below the limits.  If Transport doesn't need to be involved I don't see any need for Air Force input.  RC aircraft have been around for decades with no requirements for licensing or training for that matter.  Drones are really not much different until they get up to altitudes where gen. av. could be adversely affected or where there is a risk of third party injury/property damage.  Since battlefield applications would preclude the presence of civ.av. again why require the skills and costs of a qualified pilot?


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## Kirkhill

> In 2016 Nammo reached a significant milestone in the development program when the 155 mm IM HE-ER completed its qualification trials. This followed an extensive test program that included environmental, transportation and firing tests.
> 
> Such testing is a complex and rigorous process, and requires access to highly specialized test areas. During the maximum range test, when fired over the important benchmark range of 40 km at sea level, parts of the *airspace over southern Sweden had to be closed off as the shells reached over 16 000 meters (more than 50 000 feet) into the air in less than a minute. By comparison, most airliners fly at altitudes between 30 and 40 000 feet.*











						Nammo's new artillery shell: Flying higher than a passenger jet
					

When Nammo late last year wanted to test the full range of its new artillery ammunition, parts of the airspace over southern Sweden had to be shut down. That...




					www.mynewsdesk.com
				




And what is the ceiling for an M31 GMLRS unitary warhead missile?  Or as I like to think of it - a single use UAV.   Is it a large, medium or small UAV?

Is the RCA flying in RCAF airspace?  Or is the RCAF flying in RCA airspace?

Is Excalibur a cannon-launched UAV?


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Nammo's new artillery shell: Flying higher than a passenger jet
> 
> 
> When Nammo late last year wanted to test the full range of its new artillery ammunition, parts of the airspace over southern Sweden had to be shut down. That...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.mynewsdesk.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And what is the ceiling for an M31 GMLRS unitary warhead missile?  Or as I like to think of it - a single use UAV.   Is it a large, medium or small UAV?
> 
> Is the RCA flying in RCAF airspace?  Or is the RCAF flying in RCA airspace?
> 
> Is Excalibur a cannon-launched UAV?


Finding unclassified data as to the maximum ordinate of the MLRS or HIMARS is very hard. Add to that even guided or GPS based artillery projectiles are fired at higher angles to result in plunging and more accurate fire through lower probable errors and that everyone is striving for longer ranges for depth fires and hence higher maximum ordinates and one can easily see that the  problem is compounding itself rather than lessening.

Back in the 1960s and 70s when helicopters in large numbers and tactical air was first introduced in Vietnam at an industrial scale, we practiced all types of coordination measures to minimize accidental air space conflicts. In Canada, as Vietnam faded in the rear view mirror we gave much of that up in practice for a concept called "big sky; little bullet" which in essence was a risk acceptance theory that basically said "let's face it folks, the chance of an aircraft and a projectile converging on the same spot is really, really small and limited to very, very narrow circumstances".

In our more modern risk averse world we're back to much greater management of that air space which is evidenced by the fact that the only element of Canada's air defence artillery which still exists is the Air Space Control Centre (ASCC) which now performs a much broader function then it did in its pure air defence role.

Honestly, as far as tactical air is concerned, the RCAF is operating in the Army's air space (especially if we do field GBAD at some point in the future). The vast number of non-transport missions performed by the RCAF are in support of the Army within the Army's AO. The RCAF has no role within that air space without the Army's specific request (whether by specific mission or as general support). 

One of the big problems we have in this discussion is that considering that it's peacetime everyone is mightily concerned about an accidental incident between a friendly round and a friendly aircraft. There is a massive paradigm shift at the point that the enemy starts shooting back at the Army with various airframes and at the air force with numerous antiaircraft systems. We will no longer be operating in the permissive air environment that we've been assuming and operating in for the last half century. At that point air space management takes on a whole new meaning that we seem to be mostly ignoring at the moment. Maybe a form of "Big sky; little bullet" will be making a comeback for everyone except the air defenders (if we ever get any again)

🍻


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## Colin Parkinson

With the high end recreational drones like the Phantom 4, you don`t fly it, you direct it where to go, they already come with geographic fencing to keep them away from restricted airspace. The technology continues to improve and at some point I can see where civil aviation is restricted from flying below a certain altitude as drone operations (that is the civy lingo) become to economically important to allow manned flight to interfere with it. Transport Canada Civil Aviation is slow on the uptake as they are all pilots and are uncomfortable with the fact that in the future, most civil commercial drone operations will have little to no human control. (imagine a cargo drone air route between two courier depots or hospitals moving packages/samples)
I quite like the separation of responsibility, based on size/range/altitude. Each Reserve Artillery unit can have a UAV troop and it likely would be popular with the young troops who will likely adapt and trial methods far faster than the military is accustomed to. You can also tag Service Battalions with larger cargo drones to resupply units and a pickup truck with a shelter on the back and a couple of techs to repair and support small UAV.


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## SupersonicMax

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> I am not completely convinced, SSM.
> 
> I full agree with your last three: They should remain under the RCAF.
> 
> But I seriously doubt the first one. As indicated before, there are multiples RPA's with huge differences in scope, sizes and capabilities that don't make for one size fits all solutions.
> 
> For instance, why should the RCAF have any doctrinal input into a small field deployed quadcopter used by infantry to get a look over the next ridge? Similarly, why should the RCAF have any doctrinal input into the naval employment of smaller shipboard RPA's whose main purpose is to extend the sensor horizon, or carry out ship's identification, or would the RCAF know how to use such RPA for, say, a hot pursuit of vessels of interest? This seem to me to fall under doctrine that should come from the Army or the RCN.
> 
> As for Aircrew training and standards, again I believe it depends on what you consider to be an Aircrew. On the civilian side of things, Transport Canada issues licenses for "drone" operators - but they don't call those pilot's licenses. If you consider certain RPA's, such as the ones in my doctrine examples, to be closer to "civilian drones" than actual "airplanes", I don't see what the need would be for the RCAF to be involved in crew training and standards. The RCN or  Army, as the case may be, are perfectly capable of training the operators and overseeing the standards to be met and maintained.
> 
> Of course, in the RCN, we have the advantage of deploying with Airdets that are already RCAF,  so it is a much more theoretical discussion since they would most likely operate both the shipboard airframes and RPA's.


It is in RCAF doctrine, available here: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D2-393-1-2018-eng.pdf

See page 8


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## SupersonicMax

FJAG said:


> Honestly, as far as tactical air is concerned, the RCAF is operating in the Army's air space (especially if we do field GBAD at some point in the future). The vast number of non-transport missions performed by the RCAF are in support of the Army within the Army's AO. The RCAF has no role within that air space without the Army's specific request (whether by specific mission or as general support)


Not true.  We, more often than not, operate in airspace nowhere near land forces.  Also, by doctrine (be it Canadian, NATO or US), airspace (and all air assets, in some cases less helos in direct support of a maneuver force) is controlled by airpower.  They apportion aircraft and airspace to the Army.  Not the other way around.  This ensures that all assets are deconflicted and that all effects are coordinated.  Airpower does a lot more than supporting the Army.


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## Good2Golf

> Honestly, as far as tactical air is concerned, the RCAF is operating in the Army's air space (especially if we do field GBAD at some point in the future). The vast number of non-transport missions performed by the RCAF are in support of the Army within the Army's AO. The RCAF has no role within that air space without the Army's specific request (whether by specific mission or as general support).


It depends what the CJTF/JTF Commander assigns, usually in the OP ORDER Coordinating Instructions, but however it is assigned, the supported/supporting relationship(s) should be clearly stated.


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## Weinie

SupersonicMax said:


> It is in RCAF doctrine, available here: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D2-393-1-2018-eng.pdf
> 
> See page 8


Doctrine is authoritative in nature, but requires judgment in application.


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## SupersonicMax

Weinie said:


> Doctrine is authoritative in nature, but requires judgment in application.


That’s a feel-good statement at best with no real substance.

Good luck getting those residual authorities out of the RCAF.  The RCAF may delegate some authorities to others (as it does training and standards and some OA to Comd CANSOFCOM for 427 Squadron), but it retains the overall authority.


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## SupersonicMax

FJAG said:


> Reread my paragraph and start with the part where I say "... as far as tactical air is concerned ...". Unless the air force has changed the joint doctrine somewhere "tactical air" concerns
> 
> Funny that thing about air power apportioning air space to the Army. And here I always thought that in a given theatre that air power and air space allocation was exercised by the JTF commander through the Joint Force Air Component Commander with the main emphasis here being "through". Strangely enough, when we are considering operations where there is a requirement for tactical air in support of Army operations then the JTF commander who exercises overall command is an Army guy. There are a lot of things that the air force does because its their bag and no one cares enough to bother about but when it comes to who tells who what in a joint operation keep a clear eye on who is in overall command.
> 
> Stop reading air force doctrine and start reading joint doctrine when it comes to tac air. Kinda works the same for Joint Navy Task Forces to where the air element supports the Navy commander.
> 
> 🍻


Notice I said Airpower and not Air Force.  JFACC will be an airpower expert.  By joint doctrine, they could be of any service although historically (since the concept was introduced in the Gulf War), I believe (but I am not 100% certain) that all JFACC for combat ops were Air Force.  

During the Gulf War, despite Schwarzkopf being an Army guy with a significant land force, Airpower ran, for the most part, the war.  He trusted his JFACC, Horner, being an expert and knowing how to effectively employ airpower better than Schwarzkopf could. While the last 100 hours saw land forces directly engaging Iraqi land forces, the focus was not solely the destruction of the enemy forces.


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## SupersonicMax

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> Interesting. I have never read this pub before, but will read it in greater detail later. Thank you.
> 
> I also note that the section refers to these five residual aspects as relating to "air power operations".  I went back in the pub to find a definition of "air power operations" and found none. There is a list of characteristics of air power (including some that merely state that a given characteristic is that it is "less" or "more" of some aspect than the naval or land component's such character - an interesting negative way of stating things a bit like "we are Canadian because we are not Americans  ) but it doesn't state if those are merely some indicators used to help in qualifying some operations as air power or wether they are characters that must *all* be present for something to fall within the purview of air power. I don't know the answer and genuinely would like to know.


Air Power, within the Canadian context is defined in the Defence Terminology Bank and reffered to innthe RCAF Capstone doctrine (available here: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-368-2016-eng.pdf) as: That element of military power applied within or from the air environment to achieve effects above, on, and below the surface of the Earth.  Other nations also include space (US, Australia) and cyber (US) as part of their definition.


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## Weinie

SupersonicMax said:


> *That’s a feel-good statement at best with no real substance.*
> 
> Good luck getting those residual authorities out of the RCAF.  The RCAF may delegate some authorities to others (as it does training and standards and some OA to Comd CANSOFCOM for 427 Squadron), but it retains the overall authority.


I get it that sometime fighter pilots make up their own rules, but sometimes you talk outta your ass.

This from CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine. Link below.



			https://military-justice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Canadian-Military-Doctrine.pdf
		


The concept and purpose of doctrine

 0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.* It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.*”1 It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”

I wear several hats in my job. Sometime they make me feel good.


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## SupersonicMax

Weinie said:


> I get it that sometime fighter pilots make up their own rules, but sometimes you talk outta your ass.
> 
> This from CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine. Link below.
> 
> 
> 
> https://military-justice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Canadian-Military-Doctrine.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> The concept and purpose of doctrine
> 
> 0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.* It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.*”1 It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”
> 
> I wear several hats in my job. Sometime they make me feel good.


Without context or a meaningful contribution to what judgement could be used, it is still an empty statement, not from the doctrine but your comment in this discussion’s context.

Saying this without context in the discussion is akin to a hockey coach that say their team needs to score more goals. Obviously true but meaningless,


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## Weinie

SupersonicMax said:


> Without context or a meaningful contribution to what judgement could be used, it is still an empty statement, not from the doctrine but your comment in this discussion’s context.
> 
> Saying this without context in the discussion is akin to a hockey coach that say their team needs to score more goals. Obviously true but meaningless,


Own goal?


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## Oldgateboatdriver

SupersonicMax said:


> That element of military power applied within or from the air environment to achieve effects above, on, and below the surface of the Earth.


 I noted that. I didn't think that was the definition.

It's pretty weak as definitions go, and the application is incredibly subject to interpretation. 

"Element of military power applied within the air environment to achieve effect above the surface of the earth": I shoot down a naval strike missile aimed at my ship with my ESSM. Is this air power? Used an element of military power (my ESSM) to achieve effect (destruction of incoming missile) within the air environment (that's where they met - and achieved the effect).

"Element of military power applied from the air environment to achieve effect on the surface of the earth" : I shoot aTLAM at a target six hundred NM from me. I used an element of military power (a missile) applied from the air environment (it flew more than a thousand Klics) and achieved an effect on the surface of the earth (i destroyed my target).

Any of these two "air power" operations? I think not . To me they are both purely naval operations.

Or is it one of those things that you know when you see it?

Again, not arguing for fun. Just finding that the boundaries are ill defined and that today's military tech is such that there are grey zones that are not clearly RCAF, not to mention some black and white ones that clearly involve the RCAF definition but fall squarely outside its purview (like my two examples above).


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## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> Without context or a meaningful contribution to what judgement could be used, it is still an empty statement, not from the doctrine but your comment in this discussion’s context.
> 
> Saying this without context in the discussion is akin to a hockey coach that say their team needs to score more goals. Obviously true but meaningless,


It is no more out of context than you vomiting doctrine without acknowledging the basic nature of doctrine. 

Weinie had it exactly right.  Authoritative but requiring judgement in application, means it is to be considered in the framework or regulations, policies and procedure, but to be clear, doctrine does not replace them, it is a codification of past experience combined with current best practices. 

The RCAF was and remains the least mature of the services, when it comes to doctrine. Look at the dates of the first B-GA-400 and you’ll see what I mean.  Some communities have a longer lineage of established doctrine, particularly Tactical Aviation (B-GA-440 series) and Maritime Aviation (B-GA-430 series), because they aligned themselves with the mature doctrine of their supported services.  The RCAF even had to copy operational doctrine in the early-2000s from the Army’s COMMAND-SENSE-ACT-SHIELD-SUSTAIN operational doctrine. It added GENERATE as a sixth operational function because of, what I might pejoratively call whinging from the training organizations within the Air Force that wanted what they did to be broken out from SUSTAIN.  It then, years later, subdivided ACT into SHAPE and MOVE, because...some of the transport types felt lesser being niched in the SUSTAIN function...apparently poor SUSTAIN doesn’t get the respect internally that it should, but egos and realities is another subject.

Anyway, the point is that it’s nice the RCAF finally codified its doctrine in the late-2000s and early-20teens, but understanding of what doctrine is and how it was formed and how it is appropriately applied seems to still be something younger RCAF practitioners are still working on.

$0.02


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## SupersonicMax

So, because it is more recent, it should not be taken as seriously as others?

Doctrine is the starting point.  If you want to deviate from doctrine, it is fine but you better have good reasons.  You don’t deviate from doctrine because the doctrine said we could...  In this context, I don’t see the RCAF accepting giving the residual authorities away anytime soon.

FWIW, Sense, Act, Sustain, Shield, Command is joint doctrine (which yes, was based on Army doctrine) but these functions apply equally to all services, including SOF, although some, like you mention, added their own functions.


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## Weinie

You have cited doctrine as the reason why RCAF should retain oversight/authority. That rationale doesn’t stand up to scrutiny or debate.Capabilities evolve,new concepts are introduced. Otherwise,Maginot Lines for all.


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## SupersonicMax

I have not cited doctrine as a reason but as to establish the accepted baseline.


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## Weinie

SupersonicMax said:


> I have not cited doctrine as a reason but as to establish the accepted baseline.


And posters on here are challenging what you accept/espouse as the baseline.


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## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> So, because it is more recent, it should not be taken as seriously as others?
> 
> Doctrine is the starting point.  If you want to deviate from doctrine, it is fine but you better have good reasons.  You don’t deviate from doctrine because the doctrine said we could...  In this context, I don’t see the RCAF accepting giving the residual authorities away anytime soon.
> 
> FWIW, Sense, Act, Sustain, Shield, Command is joint doctrine (which yes, was based on Army doctrine) but these functions apply equally to all services, including SOF, although some, like you mention, added their own functions.


You’re likely too young to have seen the doctrinal 5 Operational Functions start life in land forces across FVEYs & NATO in the mid-90s.  Not your fault, but you clearly aren’t familiar with how that doctrine developed.

Your rebuttal that recency relates to seriousness once again misses the point. It’s not seriousness that is the issue, but consideration relative to other constructs I mentioned before, Regulations, Policies and Procedures.  Doctrine is contextual and meant to be used to inform leaders at all levels, even to junior NCM leaders, how to train and operate.  It contributes to foundational understanding, but it is not the baseline itself.  Some organizations even complement their operational doctrine with subordinate guidelines, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TT&Ps) being one example.

Also, one must be mindful that force generators (and the RCAF is a force generator when it’s not a NORAD force employer) are not the organizations that decide dispositions of Command and Control relationships. There are so many historical and current variations to residual responsibilities, that it is facile and wrong to say that doctrinal residuals will never be delegated.


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## SupersonicMax

Weinie said:


> And posters on here are challenging what you accept/espouse as the baseline.


It is described in doctrine.  It is the baseline.  That was my point, to show that these five residual responsibilities did not come out of my rear end.




Good2Golf said:


> You’re likely too young to have seen the doctrinal 5 Operational Functions start life in land forces across FVEYs & NATO in the mid-90s.  Not your fault, but you clearly aren’t familiar with how that doctrine developed.
> 
> Your rebuttal that recency relates to seriousness once again misses the point. It’s not seriousness that is the issue, but consideration relative to other constructs I mentioned before, Regulations, Policies and Procedures.  Doctrine is contextual and meant to be used to inform leaders at all levels, even to junior NCM leaders, how to train and operate.  It contributes to foundational understanding, but it is not the baseline itself.  Some organizations even complement their operational doctrine with subordinate guidelines, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TT&Ps) being one example.
> 
> Also, one must be mindful that force generators (and the RCAF is a force generator when it’s not a NORAD force employer) are not the organizations that decide dispositions of Command and Control relationships. There are so many historical and current variations to residual responsibilities, that it is facile and wrong to say that doctrinal residuals will never be delegated.



I may not be intimate but I have an idea how that doctrine was developed. I have said that yes, they are delegated but the RCAF retains the overall responsibilities.  I have not said it will never be given away, just not anytime soon.  Also, Comd 1 CAD is CJOC’s JFACC so the RCAF, indirectly through 1 CAD, is a force employer.


----------



## PuckChaser

This great discussion deserves its own topic.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Thanks for splitting, PC.

I am definitely gonna keep participating, but first, I want to read through SSM's reference carefully and try and shake a few ideas I already have into cogent arguments/questions.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Taking a quick look at Russian Air Force doctrine, they have four divisions within; Long Range Aviation, Frontal Aviation, Transport Aviation and Air Defense Force. So they have an element dedicated to the tactical and another to the strategic, among others. While the RCAF is small, trying to keep it all multi-purpose might not actually be a good thing and like the Royal Artillery and it's pre-WWII fixation with all things HE, holding onto things because they appear to be within your mandate, might not be the best way to ensure the best effect on target. Also getting any government organization to divest control over something can be hard from the inside. So it may take an outside force to tell the RCAF what they get to keep and not.


----------



## FJAG

SupersonicMax said:


> It is in RCAF doctrine, available here: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D2-393-1-2018-eng.pdf
> 
> See page 8


I think you meant page 9 but note that this doctrine and those residual authorities apply ONLY to RCAF assets that have been transferred from the RCAF as force generator, to the Comd CJOC as force employer (and subsequent transfer to the JTF Comd). They do not automatically belong to assets that already belong to the Army or the Navy. More importantly air space management is not one of the residual authorities. It belongs to the JTF comd who will use various agencies including CA, RCN and RCAF ones to complete that job.

🍻


----------



## SupersonicMax

FJAG said:


> I think you meant page 9 but note that this doctrine and those residual authorities apply ONLY to RCAF assets that have been transferred from the RCAF as force generator, to the Comd CJOC as force employer (and subsequent transfer to the JTF Comd). They do not automatically belong to assets that already belong to the Army or the Navy. More importantly air space management is not one of the residual authorities. It belongs to the JTF comd who will use various agencies including CA, RCN and RCAF ones to complete that job.
> 
> 🍻


I meant page 8.  This is where the section starts.

I wouldn’t be so sure. 
That same doctrine defines this:


Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) (it is the Comd RCAF)
The Royal Canadian Air Force officer with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of Canadian Armed Forces air doctrine.

Air doctrine, in my mind, is not limited to Air Force assets.  Whether this is only how the RCAF sees itself or not is a different matter but in practice, those authorities reside within the RCAF although the Comd (and the other authorities) sometimes delegate them to other organizations.

For example, the Technical Airworthiness Authority remains DGAEPM for the Skaldar, used by the RCN and CANSOF.


----------



## FJAG

SupersonicMax said:


> I meant page 8.  This is where the section starts.
> 
> I wouldn’t be so sure.
> That same doctrine defines this:
> 
> 
> Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) (it is the Comd RCAF)
> The Royal Canadian Air Force officer with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of Canadian Armed Forces air doctrine.
> 
> Air doctrine, in my mind, is not limited to Air Force assets.  Whether this is only how the RCAF sees itself or not is a different matter but in practice, those authorities reside within the RCAF although the Comd (and the other authorities) sometimes delegate them to other organizations.
> 
> For example, the Technical Airworthiness Authority remains DGAEPM for the Skaldar, used by the RCN and CANSOF.


I've looked that over a half dozen times now and can't find what you are quoting. At page 9 under residual authority for air doctrine I find the following:



> a. Air doctrine. RCAF air doctrine establishes officially sanctioned beliefs and principles that describe and guide the proper use of air power in military operations. Air doctrine is developed and promulgated under the authority of the Comd RCAF, who fulfils the role of RCAF Air Doctrine Authority



I'm looking at the document at the link that you supplied. Are we looking at different documents? Just a point, the same general statement is in B-GA-400-000/FP-001  Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine at para 16 on page 1-5 which reads:



> 16. RCAF doctrine is developed and promulgated through Air Force Order 8000-0, Air Doctrine, on the authority of the Commander (Comd) of the RCAF. The Comd RCAF is the Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of RCAF doctrine.



🍻


----------



## SupersonicMax

My bad, it was in the Capstone doctrine, page 52: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-368-2016-eng.pdf


----------



## SupersonicMax

Kirkhill said:


> Further to the OGBD  - SSM Doctrine discussion
> 
> Where in the RCAF spectrum would the Black Hornet fit?
> Used by a ABCANZUS troops.
> When the kit was issued (after less than a day's instruction) the troops immediately started experimenting and developed their own TTPs.
> 
> The battery was only used to power the blades to hop from one perch to another.  The 30 min life of the NUAV was extended by going quiet and just letting the EO package operate while acting as an OP.
> 
> And how about this one



The airworthiness directives were still being drafted last year but where it was going was very similar to what our allies are doing.  It was to be based on a maximum kinetic energy (too much means it can hurt people and damage things), operating altitudes (operating in the way of manned aircraft), range from users (operating in the way of manned aircraft) and payload consideration (safety considerations).  If any of the threshold was met, it was to go through the whole or at least parts of the airworthiness process.


----------



## FJAG

SupersonicMax said:


> My bad, it was in the Capstone doctrine, page 52: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-368-2016-eng.pdf


Got it. I note that is the Glossary and that it conflicts with the body of the text (especially p5) which deals with the concept of RCAF air doctrine.

This gets us back to basic principles. Comd of the RCAF has command and authority of all air forces allocated to him by the CAF just as the commander of the Army has command and authority for all land forces allocated to him. This includes formulating and promulgating doctrine for their respective forces.

You (and you are not the only one in the RCAF) are interpreting air doctrine as doctrine which applies to anything that operates in the air rather than systems which are a component of the RCAF. By your definition all artillery, all rockets, even rifle bullets which fly through the air ought to be subject to air doctrine. Clearly that would be ridiculous. The most relevant long standing example of divided doctrine are naval and army air defence resources which are not subject to air doctrine (but are heavily coordinated with the RCAF which has its own air defence role and resources (ie its aircraft and anti air weapon systems) and doctrine for those weapons. The three agencies interact and coordinate but each of the Navy and Army develop their own doctrine in this respect for the resources which they own and use.

It is the same with UAVs. There is a developing need to establishes doctrine for new weapon systems being brought on line. As I mentioned above there are more and more unmanned weapon systems which are being piloted from the ground and which fulfill a multitude of functions. The RCAF has no role in developing doctrine for a GPS guided rocket or projectile or one that is flown onto target by a laser designator other than to assist in developing joint policies that will reduce the risk to RCAF resources which need to share the air space. Remember that doctrine goes far beyond mere air safety and air worthiness issues.

The issue with UAVs is a developing one. The requirement to field Sperwer came as a surprise to the RCAF which had not previously concerned itself with UAVs beyond the long range (and I do mean long range in time JUSTAS project). The army was responsible for its developing doctrine for Sperwer use because it was "owned" by the army when first deployed. That changed in 2006. After incessantly whining about the the Army losing aircraft and airworthiness the RCAF finally winkled its way into the Sperwer business and 408 Sqn took over the role. At that point the Sperwer being an RCAF resource quite clearly came under RCAF air doctrine. Coincidentally the RCAF had supervised Sperwer airworthiness from 2003 to 2006 with on site RCAF personnel (both air crew and maintainers) while the Army operated it in Kabul.  The RCAF subsequently lost more Sperwers than the Army when it took over in Kandahar which was flat and level and not amongst hostile mountains as in Kabul. 

As result of the Manley Report the government funded acquisition of the Heron which was leased and also operated by the RCAF and again therefore was subject to RCAF doctrine. The Heron was even bigger and flew higher than the Sperwer. The problem here is that under the JUSTAS Concept of Operations the dividing line between "tactical" UAVs (operating from the rifle company to brigade) is a maximum ceiling of 5,000 feet and line-of-sight operations while HALE/MALE UAVs operate at the strategic and theatre level, above 5000 feet and in beyond-line-of-sight operations. (As an aside the RCAF operated Heron LOS anyway. It might have been unfortunate that the Sperwer and Heron, while clearly being used as a tactical resource, had the capability to operated at up to 16,000 feet which is probably why the RCAF got its nose out of joint in the first place - as an aside Kabul sits at around 6,000 feet and the surrounding terrain is higher so even with a max altitude of 16,000 feet the Sperwer was struggling and easily stayed less than 5,000 feet above ground level while there - which proves that class divisions by altitude is relative)

The sad part is that after having clamored for a hand in the tactical UAV area and running it until the end of Afghan operations the RCAF has gone back to floundering around in the JUSTAS program leaving the Army alone to develop its own doctrine and suite of true tactical UAVs. I don't wander the halls of CAF headquarters so don't know where things stand on the doctrine for tactical UAV usage arguments these days but it's very clear to me that there is a great need to make some major decisions about future "flying" weapons systems ownership (and consequentially doctrine ownership) for all the new things coming on line. The CAF can't afford to have the RCAF bumble around in another JUSTAS for two decades saga

Not sure if you have a JSTOR account but there's a fairly good article on this (Schaub Jnr, Gary. But Who's Flying the Plane? Integrating UAVs into the Canadian and Danish armed force 2015) You'll need a password to access it.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...


----------



## SupersonicMax

FJAG said:


> Got it. I note that is the Glossary and that it conflicts with the body of the text (especially p5) which deals with the concept of RCAF air doctrine.
> 
> This gets us back to basic principles. Comd of the RCAF has command and authority of all air forces allocated to him by the CAF just as the commander of the Army has command and authority for all land forces allocated to him. This includes formulating and promulgating doctrine for their respective forces.
> 
> 
> 🍻



This is not quite true.  The person holding the position of Comd RCAF has been designated the Airworthiness Authority for the Canadian Armed Forces by the MND.

There is a bit on the Airworthiness Process here: https://www.canada.ca/en/department...thiness/airworthiness-authority-overview.html

Essentially, there is an Airworthiness Authority (AA - Comd RCAF), the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA - DGAEPM), the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA - Comd 1 CAD) and the Airworthiness Investigation Authority (AIA - Director Flight Safety).  The OAA, TAA and AIA are designated by the CDS. There are two others but they have no formal roles beyond their specialties (the Flight Test Authority (FTA - CO AETE) and the Aerospace Medical. Authority (AMA - RCAF Surgeon)) who are designated by the AA. The OAA, AIA and TAA are not subordinate to the AA (they are all technically equal) and have different roles and responsibilities.  If we look at the resitual authorities, here's where the responsibilities lie:

Operational Airworthiness - OAA
Technical Airworthiness - TAA
Flight Safety - AIA
Training and Standards - OAA
Doctrine - AA


----------



## Good2Golf

Max, if you’re going to take information from the source, you should take the time to be accurate. Only the AA as Comd RCAF is Designated by the MND.  OAA, AIA and TAA are not designated by the MND, they are designated by the CDS.  The CDS takes  direction to do so, from the MND, but it is the CDS designating the three subordinate Authorities.  There is nuance to the difference in designations that influences the execution of the roles, particularly the TAA under civilian oversight of ADM(Mat), which given your current role, you appreciate.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...



G2G: You really should know that supporting land forces is one of many roles the RCAF conducts.  Your sole purpose as a Tac Hel pilot may have been to support the Army but there is a lot more done on a regular basis that doesn't involve the Army.  Three of the four CF-18 combat deployments did not involve supporting land forces (Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya) and none of the other operational deployments (Op Reassurance, Op Ignition, Op Mirador) or any of the domestic operations (NORAD, Op Podium, all the G7/8/20) remotely supported an Army scheme of maneuver.

Perhaps this is why our doctrine is written that way?


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> Max, if you’re going to take information from the source, you should take the time to be accurate. Only the AA as Comd RCAF is Designated by the MND.  OAA, AIA and TAA are not designated by the MND, they are designated by the CDS.  The CDS takes  direction to do so, from the MND, but it is the CDS designating the three subordinate Authorities.



Great. That doesn't change anything.  I edited my post...


----------



## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> Great. That doesn't change anything.  I edited my post...


I guess accuracy isn’t important in your business?


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> I guess accuracy isn’t important in your business?


That is semantics.  Directed by the MND, designated by the CDS.  The end-result is the same.  I went from memory, not from reading the website.  It is a forum. I don't proofread 100% of my posts especially when on a tablet.


----------



## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> G2G: You really should know that supporting land forces is one of many roles the RCAF conducts.  Your sole purpose as a Tac Hel pilot may have been to support the Army but there is a lot more done on a regular basis that doesn't involve the Army.  Three of the four CF-18 combat deployments did not involve supporting land forces (Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya) and none of the other operational deployments (Op Reassurance, Op Ignition, Op Mirador) or any of the domestic operations (NORAD, Op Podium, all the G7/8/20) remotely supported an Army scheme of maneuver.
> 
> Perhaps this is why our doctrine is written that way?


So you’re saying there was never any interaction with JTACs or the TACP or any coordination with JFLCC elements such as the FSCC or ASCC in any of those ops...interesting indeed...


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> So you’re saying there was never any interaction with JTACs or the TACP or any coordination with JFLCC elements such as the FSCC or ASCC in any of those ops...interesting indeed...



Op Friction (Gulf War): For the vast majority of the war, CF-18s conducted Defensive Counter Air.  They conducted a couple of air-to-ground missions at the very end. From speaking with people that went, it was killboxes. No interactions with JTACs. 
Op Echo (Kosovo): There was no allied land forces involved.
Op Mobile (Libya): There was no allied land forces involved.  While we supported rebels, there was no real coordination (that I would call ALI), definitely not at the tactical level and a very basic one at the operational level.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Good2Golf said:


> FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...


I do. Just sayin...


----------



## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> Op Friction (Gulf War): For the vast majority of the war, CF-18s conducted Defensive Counter Air.  They conducted a couple of air-to-ground missions at the very end. From speaking with people that went, it was killboxes. No interactions with JTACs.
> Op Echo (Kosovo): There was no allied land forces involved.
> Op Mobile (Libya): There was no allied land forces involved.  While we supported rebels, there was no real coordination (that I would call ALI), definitely not at the tactical level and a very basic one at the operational level.


Which explains your view of fast air contributions. Don’t mistake Canadian fighter force narrow operational employment in DCA and strike for an all-encompassing, broad operational experience. Not having done BAI or CAS limits the fighter force’s ability to understand the relationship between the land forces and those that support them, be they aviation (who often share tables at the DFAC), JTACs (who do understand intimately the land forces’ plight), fast air CAS assets (who may not ever see the faces of those on the ground, but have shared a bond over the radio) and then...well...the DCA/OCA/strike folks who will never see the faces of those blue forces on the ground that are often in the thick of it.

You no doubt have some great back-slapping stories to share with your fast air peers.  Shame you may have not have had as much experience working with others different than you, where an interdependent relationship in a combat environment is an experience to be respected and appreciated.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> Which explains your view of fast air contributions. Don’t mistake Canadian fighter force narrow operational employment in DCA and strike for an all-encompassing, broad operational experience. Not having done BAI or CAS limits the fighter force’s ability to understand the relationship between the land forces and those that support them, be they aviation (who often share tables at the DFAC), JTACs (who do understand intimately the land forces’ plight), fast air CAS assets (who may not ever see the faces of those on the ground, but have shared a bond over the radio) and then...well...the DCA/OCA/strike folks who will never see the faces of those blue forces on the ground that are often in the thick of it.
> 
> You no doubt have some great back-slapping stories to share with your fast air peers.  Shame you may have not have had as much experience working with others different than you, where an interdependent relationship in a combat environment is an experience to be respected and appreciated.


I did participate, twice, in Op IMPACT, which was  mostly (95%) CAS with some limited SCAR. I am not saying we do not work i support of the Army, SOF and Navy. I have worked closely with Land forces on Op IMPACT thank you. I consider this type of work to be the most rewarding and the most important. I am saying, however, that it is only one of many roles we have (and one that, aside from Tac Hel, we don’t actually do often operationally).  Having a capstone and keystone doctrine purely based on Air Land Integration would be flawed.  The RCAF, aside from Tac Hel, does not exist to only support land forces.

Ironically, it seems you are the one that can’t see we don’t only support land forces.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

SupersonicMax said:


> I did participate, twice, in Op IMPACT, which was  mostly (95%) CAS with some limited SCAR. I am not saying we do not work i support of the Army, SOF and Navy. I have worked closely with Land forces on Op IMPACT thank you. I consider this type of work to be the most rewarding and the most important. I am saying, however, that it is only one of many roles we have (and one that, aside from Tac Hel, we don’t actually do often operationally).  Having a capstone and keystone doctrine purely based on Air Land Integration would be flawed.  The RCAF, aside from Tac Hel, does not exist to only support land forces.
> 
> Ironically, it seems you are the one that can’t see we don’t only support land forces.


That is not at all what G2G just said. You are twisting his words. He acknowledged that you have a certain expertise, but noted that your expertise may lack breadth. He never said that the only role for fighters was to support the land fight. That is a ridiculous non sequitor.

I am not sure why you are taking this so personally.


----------



## Kirkhill

Weinie said:


> ....
> 
> This from CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine. Link below.
> 
> 
> 
> https://military-justice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Canadian-Military-Doctrine.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> The concept and purpose of doctrine
> 
> 0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.* It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.*”1 It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”
> 
> ....




This concept of Doctrine has always intrigued me.  As much as the concept of Dogma does.

Rugby.

My favourite sport.  Probably because it is the only one I could play in a half-assed fashion.

We trained so that during a game we had a bit of a clue as to what our team-mates were going to do, what support we could expect and what support we could offer.  We didn't broadcast that to the opposition much.  Not that there was much to broadcast.

Selection and Maintenance
Preservation of Morale
Offensive Action
Surprise.....

Surprise...

On the Rugby pitch you try to surprise the opposition.  Ideally your mates know that it is coming.  But the opposition doesn't have a clue. 

Sometimes you may take it on yourself to surprise both the opposition and your mates.  In which case you have to expect to be exposed for a bit until your mates get over the shock and catch up with you.

“fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions"

How does one achieve surprise if everyone pedantically and dogmatically follows doctrine that is publically distributed for all to read?
Just curious.

How does one adapt to working with people in an environment requiring constant adaptation if one never learns how to accommodate "Surprises"  - including own team surprises.

Not every war gives the likes of Norman Schwarzkopf the luxury of developing an Encyclopedia Brittanica sized playbook that he can refer to from the sidelines and call shots.

Some wars hinge on the likes of LayForce in France and the efforts of people like O'Connor in North Africa.

Working with what's available and using it in unexpected, non-doctrinal, manners.

Rugby.

The game of the Reverend William Webb Ellis of the Church of England who, when a schoolboy at Rugby



> ... *WITH A FINE DISREGARD FOR THE RULES* OF FOOTBALL
> AS PLAYED IN HIS TIME
> FIRST TOOK THE BALL IN HIS ARMS AND RAN WITH IT
> THUS ORIGINATING THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF
> THE RUGBY GAME
> A.D. 1823



Doctrine may save lives in peacetime.    Not convince that doctrinal Generals save lives in wartime.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

A good up to date example of that might the Armenian army, their doctrine had not changed for quite some time and their opponent used that to their advantage.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> This concept of Doctrine has always intrigued me.  As much as the concept of Dogma does.
> 
> Doctrine may save lives in peacetime.    Not convince that doctrinal Generals save lives in wartime.


I'm not much hung up on doctrine. My posting was in support of an earlier posting.

Doctrine establishes some broad guidelines, and gives you a sense of what folks "can or may" do. Campaign planning, including surprise, is what a Comd "intends" to do. He/she can follow doctrine, but are not bound by it. Selection and maintenance of the aim, and the achievement of the desired outcome is what really matters.


----------



## Kirkhill

Weinie said:


> I'm not much hung up on doctrine. My posting was in support of an earlier posting.
> 
> Doctrine establishes some broad guidelines, and gives you a sense of what folks "can or may" do. Campaign planning, including surprise, is what a Comd "intends" to do. He/she can follow doctrine, but are not bound by it. Selection and maintenance of the aim, and the achievement of the desired outcome is what really matters.


I have occasion to remind folks that it is not the plan that matters.  It is the intent.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I have occasion to remind folks that it is not the plan that matters.  It is the intent.


Custer's intent was to capture all the Sioux and move them back to the reservation. His plan sucked. I think sometimes the plan matters a lot. 

🍻


----------



## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:


> That is not at all what G2G just said. You are twisting his words. He acknowledged that you have a certain expertise, but noted that your expertise may lack breadth. He never said that the only role for fighters was to support the land fight. That is a ridiculous non sequitor.
> 
> I am not sure why you are taking this so personally.


Well, he did accuse the fighter force of never supporting land forces in operations, which is false, and blaming this lack for the way we think.  Of all the platform in the RCAF inventory, we are arguably the most joint and multi-role.  Saying we lack breadth is a little dense, imo.

I don’t take it personally, but I take professional offense when unsubstantiated shots are taken at the fighter force.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

SupersonicMax said:


> Well, he did accuse the fighter force of never supporting land forces in operations, which is false, and blaming this lack for the way we think.  Of all the platform in the RCAF inventory, we are arguably the most joint and multi-role.  Saying we lack breadth is a little dense, imo.
> 
> I don’t take it personally, but I take professional offense when unsubstantiated shots are taken at the fighter force.


Most joint platform in the RCAF? Right. Because every single operational deployment a CF-18 does is onboard a RCN ship, right Max? Gee,  I wonder what RCAF platform actually does joint on a daily basis? Take your time.

You are talking out of your ass and you probably know it.

I have FAC’d hundreds of CAS missions with CF-18s. I have ridden in the backseat of a CF-18. I have have deep respect for the mission set and capabilities of fighter aircraft, but you are digging a hole and making yourself look foolish. Just stop.


----------



## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:


> Most joint platform in the RCAF? Right. Because every single operational deployment a CF-18 does is onboard a RCN ship, right Max? Gee,  I wonder what RCAF platform actually does joint on a daily basis? Take your time.
> 
> You are talking out of your ass and you probably know it.
> 
> I have FAC’d hundreds of CAS missions with CF-18s. I have ridden in the backseat of a CF-18. I have have deep respect for the mission set and capabilities of fighter aircraft, but you are digging a hole and making yourself look foolish. Just stop.


Joint is not exclusive to operating from a given platform. Joint « connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. » (US Joint Doctrine) We work with the Navy regularly (RIMPAC, TGEX), Army (MAPLE RESOLVE, FAC training, operationally on OP IMPACT) and SOF (SOJTAC training, OP IMPACT).  Our tactical doctrine delineates how to integrate with all those people.   Not sure what more we could do to convince you that our mission set is joint and how it compares to others.

Having controlled Hornets on CAS missions and ridden in the backseat once or a couple of times doesn’t make you an expert on everything Hornet.  I am pretty sure my 1,800 hours in the aircraft, 3 operational deployments, domestic/continental operations and countless exercises (with all other elements) makes not talking out of my ass.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Custer's intent was to capture all the Sioux and move them back to the reservation. His plan sucked. I think sometimes the plan matters a lot.
> 
> 🍻


Custer might have had occasion to rethink his plan to achieve his intent.  😁


----------



## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:


> Well, he did accuse the fighter force of never supporting land forces in operations, which is false, and blaming this lack for the way we think.  Of all the platform in the RCAF inventory, we are arguably the most joint and multi-role.  Saying we lack breadth is a little dense, imo.
> 
> I don’t take it personally, but I take professional offense when unsubstantiated shots are taken at the fighter force.



Never? Quote please...heck, I'll do it for you.  I was addressing that CF-18s have demonstrably been absent in providing direct support to Canadian land forces. 



Good2Golf said:


> Which explains your view of fast air contributions. Don’t mistake Canadian fighter force narrow operational employment in DCA and strike for an all-encompassing, broad operational experience. Not having done BAI or CAS limits the fighter force’s ability to understand the relationship between the land forces and those that support them, be they aviation (who often share tables at the DFAC), JTACs (who do understand intimately the land forces’ plight), fast air CAS assets (who may not ever see the faces of those on the ground, but have shared a bond over the radio) and then...well...the DCA/OCA/strike folks who will never see the faces of those blue forces on the ground that are often in the thick of it.
> 
> You no doubt have some great back-slapping stories to share with your fast air peers.  Shame you _may have not have had as much experience working with others_ different than you, where an interdependent relationship in a combat environment is an experience to be respected and appreciated.


"not done as much" is not "never"

And to be clear, I’m not talking training, I’m talking Ops, deployed Ops. So...



SupersonicMax said:


> Op Friction (Gulf War): For the vast majority of the war, CF-18s conducted Defensive Counter Air.  They conducted a couple of air-to-ground missions at the very end. From speaking with people that went, it was killboxes. No interactions with JTACs.
> Op Echo (Kosovo): There was no allied land forces involved.
> Op Mobile (Libya): There was no allied land forces involved.  While we supported rebels, there was no real coordination (that I would call ALI), definitely not at the tactical level and a very basic one at the operational level.


So you confirm what I said for  3 of the 4 deployments CF-18s have been involved in.

Then on to the 4th - OP IMPACT:



SupersonicMax said:


> I did participate, twice, in Op IMPACT, which was  mostly (95%) CAS with some limited SCAR. I am not saying we do not work i support of the Army, SOF and Navy. I have worked closely with Land forces on Op IMPACT thank you. I consider this type of work to be the most rewarding and the most important. I am saying, however, that it is only one of many roles we have (and one that, aside from Tac Hel, we don’t actually do often operationally).  Having a capstone and keystone doctrine purely based on Air Land Integration would be flawed.  The RCAF, aside from Tac Hel, does not exist to only support land forces.
> 
> Ironically, it seems you are the one that can’t see we don’t only support land forces.



95% CAS with some SCAR (essential area ISR for others)?

I'm genuinely asking your help Max to help me understand what CAS you would have done in OP IMPACT.

Everything I see records for, and from knowing operators in the AOR, indicates CF-18s conducted strike.

Operation IMPACT – Airstrike History


> Under Operation IMPACT, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) carried out airstrikes* on targets in Iraq and Syria from October 30, 2014 to February 15, 2016. Operation IMPACT is the CAF’s role as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.
> 
> CAF fighter aircraft (CF-188 Hornets) flew a total of 1378 sorties**. They made 251 airstrikes—246 in Iraq and 5 in Syria—and spent 606 munitions. The sorties affected:
> 
> 
> 267 Daesh fighting positions;
> 102 Daesh equipment and vehicles; and
> 30 Daesh Improvised Explosive Device (IED) factories and Daesh storage facilities.
> The CAF ceased airstrikes in Iraq and Syria on February 15, 2016. This direction came from the Canadian government.
> 
> The following is a list of Operation IMPACT airstrikes.
> 
> *An airstrike is an attack from the air. It is intended to damage or destroy a target.
> 
> **A sortie is an operational flight by one aircraft. It starts when an aircraft takes off and ends when it lands.


So which of the 1378 sorties conducted were CAS or XCAS missions in direct support of Canadian or coalition land forces?  And are you saying you were on the ATO as a CAS or XCAS line?


And from your first quote above...most-joint? Seriously?  You know there’s a difference between Combined and Joint, right?

For 'Joint' in the RCAF, I would offer this as a ranking:

1. 427 SOAS - the entire squadron is literally detached OPCOM to CANSOF 24/7/365.
2. MH - embarked on HMCS globally, supporting the RCN
3. TH - situated with CA brigades and integrated enough with CMBGs that the RCAF delegates tasking authority to 1 Wing and CMBGs G3Avns.
4. SAR - I'm going to call working frequently with the JRCCs and the CCG 'joint'...some may not agree.
5. MP/LRP - involvement with RCN for integrated effects with RCN on as tasked operations and taskings
6. TT/ST - task-specific support to CA and CANSOF.
7. Civilian ex-snowbirds contracted by DND providing regular JTAC training to CA and CANSOF 
8. FF - provision of task-specific training to CA, RCN and CANSOF.

I stand to be corrected, but I think this is a pretty fair shot at the 'jointness' ranking.  I have listed these RCAF elements fairly, and not meant to denigrate fighters, but 'jointness' is not something that comes to mind when CF-18s are mentioned.  I certainly know that's the case in face to face interactions I had with CA and CANSOF members.



SupersonicMax said:


> G2G: You really should know that supporting land forces is one of many roles the RCAF conducts.  Your sole purpose as a Tac Hel pilot may have been to support the Army but there is a lot more done on a regular basis that doesn't involve the Army.  Three of the four CF-18 combat deployments did not involve supporting land forces (Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya) and none of the other operational deployments (Op Reassurance, Op Ignition, Op Mirador) or any of the domestic operations (NORAD, Op Podium, all the G7/8/20) remotely supported an Army scheme of maneuver.
> 
> Perhaps this is why our doctrine is written that way?


"Sole purpose?"  You must have stopped reading the RCAF doctrine when it got to the parts with TH. "Sole-purpose" is like saying 'never' for others that you accused me of saying about you earlier.  Supporting CA, RCMP, LEAs, RCN, CCG, DND/OGDs, etc. all things I've done with green helicopters...and I have more time in non-green helicopters, so I am very familiar with true joint. 



SupersonicMax said:


> Joint is not exclusive to operating from a given platform. Joint « connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. » (US Joint Doctrine) We work with the Navy regularly (RIMPAC, TGEX), Army (MAPLE RESOLVE, FAC training, operationally on OP IMPACT) and SOF (SOJTAC training, OP IMPACT).  Our tactical doctrine delineates how to integrate with all those people.   Not sure what more we could do to convince you that our mission set is joint and how it compares to others.
> 
> Having controlled Hornets on CAS missions and ridden in the backseat once or a couple of times doesn’t make you an expert on everything Hornet.  I am pretty sure my 1,800 hours in the aircraft, 3 operational deployments, domestic/continental operations and countless exercises (with all other elements) makes not talking out of my ass.


Nice, jump right into accusing SKT of claiming he was "an expert on everything Hornet."

I (and SKT) have with facts as appropriate to the points we're attempting to make, been as accurate and factual as possible.  Your hyperbole and oft-contradicting reactions frequently don't align with the very material you say makes your case.  While you said earlier that our points you don't take personally, but do so professionally rings a bit hollow.

Regards
G2G


----------



## SeaKingTacco

SupersonicMax said:


> Joint is not exclusive to operating from a given platform. Joint « connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. » (US Joint Doctrine) We work with the Navy regularly (RIMPAC, TGEX), Army (MAPLE RESOLVE, FAC training, operationally on OP IMPACT) and SOF (SOJTAC training, OP IMPACT).  Our tactical doctrine delineates how to integrate with all those people.   Not sure what more we could do to convince you that our mission set is joint and how it compares to others.
> 
> Having controlled Hornets on CAS missions and ridden in the backseat once or a couple of times doesn’t make you an expert on everything Hornet.  I am pretty sure my 1,800 hours in the aircraft, 3 operational deployments, domestic/continental operations and countless exercises (with all other elements) makes not talking out of my ass.


I never claimed expertise in all things Hornet. I demonstrated my level of experience with Hornets to bolster my claim that have seen enough fighter pilots in action to have deep respect for their work. Work that you are doing an excellent job in undoing, right now, given your crap ass attitude and your continued display that you do not fully comprehend doctrine nor do understand the difference between a Joint and a Combined Op. 

TL;DR- fighters are an important mission set in the RCAF. They are, however, not the entirety of the RCAF.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Good2Golf said:


> Then on to the 4th - OP IMPACT:
> 
> 95% CAS with some SCAR (essential area ISR for others)?
> 
> I'm genuinely asking your help Max to help me understand what CAS you would have done in OP IMPACT.
> 
> Everything I see records for, and from knowing operators in the AOR, indicates CF-18s conducted strike.
> 
> Operation IMPACT – Airstrike History
> 
> So which of the 1378 sorties conducted were CAS or XCAS missions in direct support of Canadian or coalition land forces?  And are you saying you were on the ATO as a CAS or XCAS line?



95% of those.  Out of my 30-some missions during Op IMPACT, I conducted one pre-planned strike, one SCAR (it was actually a CAS line that was changed to SCAR halfway through) and the rest were all CAS lines, supporting Canadians or coalition partners.



Good2Golf said:


> And from your first quote above...most-joint? Seriously?  You know there’s a difference between Combined and Joint, right?
> 
> I stand to be corrected, but I think this is a pretty fair shot at the 'jointness' ranking.  I have listed these RCAF elements fairly, and not meant to denigrate fighters, but 'jointness' is not something that comes to mind when CF-18s are mentioned.  I certainly know that's the case in face to face interactions I had with CA and CANSOF members.



I did say arguably.  We support/supported every element in training and in operations (albeit most often is a coalition setting - while this is combined, this is still joint in my books - they are not mutually exclusive).  My argument lies with the amount of joint activities we conduct with a diverse number of elements.  We support all three other elements on a regular basis, rather than one.


SeaKingTacco said:


> I that you do not fully comprehend doctrine nor do understand the difference between a Joint and a Combined Op.



Not sure where you picked that up but sure, whatever you want to believe.



SeaKingTacco said:


> TL;DR- fighters are an important mission set in the RCAF. They are, however, not the entirety of the RCAF.



This is precisely my point, that no single platform is the entire RCAF. The whole argument that our doctrine needs to revolve around ALI is flawed because it is centered on a single point of view.


----------



## SupersonicMax

SeaKingTacco said:


> in undoing, right now, given your crap ass attitude



Crap ass attitude?  If some cheap shots are taken against my community, I'll retaliate.  Because I don't agree with you doesn't mean I have a "crap ass" attitude.


----------



## Weinie

SupersonicMax said:


> Crap ass attitude?  If some cheap shots are taken against my community, I'll retaliate.  Because I don't agree with you doesn't mean I have a "crap ass" attitude.


Max,

This is not an attack against your community, it is (was) a discussion on how warfare needs to evolve, given developments and real world events.

You have made some statements that I and others have challenged you on, you have challenged some of my, and other's statements. Fair dinkum.

I am ill-prepared to talk anything CF-18, other than I, and my kids, think they are cool. You will note that I have skirted your postings on your experience with the airframe and its' FE completely. I am more prepared to talk about the evolving nature of warfare, and how the CAF is perhaps not as aggressive/forward looking as we need to be (for a whole host of reasons) and have offered some opinion. I am well prepared to talk doctrine, and how it relates to how the CAF does business, and _I will challenge you on your assumptions._


----------



## SupersonicMax

Weinie said:


> Max,
> 
> This is not an attack against your community, it is (was) a discussion on how warfare needs to evolve, given developments and real world events.
> 
> You have made some statements that I and others have challenged you on, you have challenged some of my, and other's statements. Fair dinkum.
> 
> I am ill-prepared to talk anything CF-18, other than I, and my kids, think they are cool. You will note that I have skirted your postings on your experience with the airframe and its' FE completely. I am more prepared to talk about the evolving nature of warfare, and how the CAF is perhaps not as aggressive/forward looking as we need to be (for a whole host of reasons) and have offered some opinion. I am well prepared to talk doctrine, and how it relates to how the CAF does business, and _I will challenge you on your assumptions._



Weinie,

I am more than happy to engage in respectful discourse (without the attacks) on how warfare could evolve. I am more than happy to have assumptions challenged but it is a bit cheap (not from you) to be attacked when I challenge others assumptions.


----------



## blacktriangle

I hope one day advanced propulsion and cognitive modelling allow unmanned craft to think and act like SSM one minute, and G2G the next. Or better yet, make the craft optionally-manned and you guys can fly it together.


----------



## Loachman

FJAG said:


> I thought the thread's discussion related to RCAF level UAVs, RPAs etc etc and not the tactical level ones so my comments were in respect to those and I never contemplated not having a "pilot". I'm just saying you don't need one qualified and trained to the level of your typical jet jockey or even a transport pilot. There are dozens of things that those guys need to deal with "on the fly" so to speak that requires both training, talent and endurance. While flying UAVs and RPVs also require some piloting skills its not on the same level.
> 
> It may interest you to know that the bombardiers and master bombardiers who flew the Sperwers on ROTO 0 also went through a certified three month flight school program before being trained for another three months on the UAV itself. The RCAF imposed a pilot or navigator to sit in the control module with the crew to oversee "air worthiness" but in effect the gunners, under the supervision of their sergeant mission commander launched, flew and recovered the aircraft which weighs in at some 700 pounds, had a twelve foot wingspan and cruised up to 16,000 feet. It was the size, ceiling and nearby airport that made the RCAF nervous (or maybe it was the fact that the Army got a bunch of cash to buy Sperwers on a UAV in a matter of three months)
> 
> There's no doubt in my mind that the guy who flies a Raven B doesn't need anywhere near as much training as those Sperwer operators did and that anyone who flies a Reaper should have more. But none of them need the same degree of training as someone who flies an F-18 or F-35 or C-17. Neither do they need the same rank nor compensation package. That was my point: the RCAF is locked into the mentality that unless you are a pilot trained captain receiving flight pay you have no business operating an airframe. The fact of the matter is that there are pilots and then there are pilots. We need to keep the training and rank and compensation commensurate to the task at hand. Guys who fly suicide drones, do not need to be RCAF fully qualified pilots (they don't need to be RCAF at all) neither do most tactical UAVs and quite probably some of the more esoteric aerial guided weapon systems (hell we launch precision munitions by cannon, why not guided/piloted winged ones from a HIMARS?) The technology is getting spectacular and its time to set some paradigms aside and think differently about who does what and whether they get to collect flight pay and sleep in hotels.
> 
> 🍻


I was the last one to run a Sperwer mission in the Canadian Forces.

Sperwer was a Tactical UAV.

The AVOs (Air Vehicle Operators) and POs (Payload Operators) were still Bombardiers, with one or two promoted to Master Bombardier in theatre, and one of our AVOs was some variety of Aircraft Tech.

All four Mission Commanders were Tac Hel Pilots.

None of us were receiving aircrew allowance as we were not flying. None of the deployed aircrew were, either, as they all received the same as anybody else deployed.

Our wingspan was actually just a tad under fourteen feet.

Scan Eagle was completely run by 4 AD Regiment. It was designated as a Small UAV.

There was no "RCAF" at the time. It was still "Air Command".

Operating Sperwer was nothing like flying a manned aircraft. The controls consisted of a panel embedded in a desk/counter and had nothing more than twiddly knobs and large, square, illuminated buttons. It reminded me of the original Star Trek control panels. We had no peripheral vision, nor could we hear our engine noise (which was a major factor in at least two AV losses) or feel what our aircraft was doing - even when we flew into thunderstorms and got swatted down eight hundred feet or so.

Scan Eagle is a smaller machine than Sperwer, but more modern and designed and built by a real US company with a real history of real aircraft design whereas Sperwer was designed and built by SAGEM, a French communications electronics company (my Bell Fibe modem-thingy is a SAGEM product, but, fortunately, it works reliably) with extremely limited experience designing and building anything that flew - and it showed. Lots of components were sub-contracted and did not work well together and much of it was just plain really, really weird.

We never lost a mission due to lack of a serviceable machine, but that's purely because we had magicians instead of Techs. Our "Body Shop" guy even rebuilt a whole wing after he'd noticed that the airfoil on one wing of an AV, newly-returned from a major rebuild by SAGEM, was inverted (excellent quality control there, SAGEM). That would have made for a highly entertaining launch...

We lost six machines, one in Wainwright during Ex Maple Guardian due to a launcher failure, one in theatre due to a parachute failure (my personal first loss), one due to a partial engine failure (my personal second loss), one due to a faulty engine RPM failure that mimicked an engine failure (my personal, and - thank fuck - final personal loss), one that failed to climb post-launch due to a temperature inversion and ended up in a mountain of old mines in KAF (I had an iron-clad alibi that time), and the last another launch system failure.

I almost lost one due to another inversion, but my quick-witted AVO followed low ground based purely on moving-map-display contour lines with no direct input needed from me and we eventually began to slowly climb. The inversion problem had likely happened on previous rotos, but was still not fully understood at the time and it caught us by surprise. The other problems were neither anticipated  (and were not, therefore, included in the checklist) nor had they ever occurred before, at least not in CF service. I obtained all of the previous flight safety reports after my third loss and went through every one of them. There were several of which we were unaware, but, fortunately, none of those recurred during our roto.

I almost lost another very early on when the AV symbol on the moving map display froze, which made it extremely difficult to blunder our way back to KAF and make a successful recovery - which was due to the intelligence, skill, and incredible co-ordination of and between my AVO and PO.

We had amazingly brilliant people for the most part, but were not set up for success by either the "system" overall or previous rotos. We were still inventing and learning things from scratch, but we actually documented everything.

We operated at much lower altitudes than the little Scan Eagles did. They were around 11000 feet above ground level, whereas I tended to hang around 3000 feet. Any higher, and detail suffered - our thermal imager was not the best. Scan Eagle, then, did not even have a thermal imager. They were strictly a daytime operation, and their image tended to be rather jerky. Both of those shortcomings had been corrected when I went back a couple of years later.

Yes, those pairs of young Scan Eagle Bombardiers seemed effective in their roles, but they certainly sounded nervous when talking to ATC or Taipan (the tactical controller). That was a new environment for them.

Our Tac Hel experience, especially for the two of us with a Kiowa recce background, certainly helped, as did my Police helicopter time.

There is less and less need for actual flying time for largish systems as they develop and improve, but additional training is required to make up for the lack thereof for those who do not have any - not so much for the flying skills, but general air sense and tactical awareness. I still think, however, that the only way to be able to comprehend and think in a 3D environment is to experience it directly and to understand what one's aircraft is actually doing, especially when it deviates from normality.

The smaller toys don't need that air sense, or any more tactical sense than what their operators already have, as they are operating at much lower altitudes and ranges than we were.


----------



## Loachman

FJAG said:


> having clamored for a hand in the tactical UAV area and running it until the end of Afghan operations the RCAF has gone back to floundering around in the JUSTAS program leaving the Army alone to develop its own doctrine and suite of true tactical UAVs.
> 
> 🍻


It's much better for the Army if it stays that way.


----------



## Underway

Navy is going to use the SKELDAR UAS. It's not flown by pilots. It's flown by contractors who are definitively not pilots (as they double as technicians).  It seems to me that there are some obvious dividing lines here.

Tactical UAS are going to be flown at a lower level in the pay scale.  The reasons for this are obvious.  Lower cost platform increased speed of employment and decision making.  Some tactical UAS may be designated as throw-away sensors/munitions.

Anything that carries weapons (in the traditional sense) will have an officer in the loop directing it.  That's a clear "management of the application of violence" job that falls to officers.  And of course, anything that is large enough to fly in civilian lanes will have an officer in the loop as well.  That would likely fall into a Strategic category.

Now note that I didn't say, pilot.  For various reasons, it might be better or more applicable for an Air Combat Systems Officer to run UAS missions as a mission commander with NCM's acting as the UAS controller.  Lots of ways to look at this.


----------



## FJAG

Loachman said:


> It's much better for the Army if it stays that way.


When did you first work with Sperwer? I definitely would like to interview you when it comes time for the the further look at these as we moved from Sperwer to Heron to ScanEagle and Skylark and Maveric and Raven and Blackjack.

There is one item that is interesting me right now (just as an aside). When 2 RCHA deployed a troop (essentially one launcher, some ground stations and several aircraft in 2003 it was a captain's command with some 25 pers. When 408 deployed it in 2006 the establishment had slid up to over 50 with a major in charge but basically the same launch and mission control capability. Were you involved at that time? and if so, maybe send me a PM if you know the rationale for the changes.

🍻


----------



## Loachman

FJAG said:


> When did you first work with Sperwer? I definitely would like to interview you when it comes time for the the further look at these as we moved from Sperwer to Heron to ScanEagle and Skylark and Maveric and Raven and Blackjack.
> 
> There is one item that is interesting me right now (just as an aside). When 2 RCHA deployed a troop (essentially one launcher, some ground stations and several aircraft in 2003 it was a captain's command with some 25 pers. When 408 deployed it in 2006 the establishment had slid up to over 50 with a major in charge but basically the same launch and mission control capability. Were you involved at that time? and if so, maybe send me a PM if you know the rationale for the changes.
> 
> 🍻


I was on Roto 6, arriving at the beginning of October 2008 and leaving on 1 May 2009 (a day late as somebody broke the C17).

Flt Comd was a Tac Hel Major, 2IC/Ops O was a 4 AD Captain, all four Mission Commanders were Tac Hel Captains. FSM was a 4 AD MWO, Senior Tech was a Tac Hel MWO. The absence of an AERE probably contributed to our ability to maintain at least one serviceable AV despite the problems with them.

Full strength was a little north of 50.

I can give more specific numbers later.

It was a stable op by that point, but we were grossly misemployed. We were always short of spares as no more were being bought.

It was both a very frustrating time, dealing with all of the quirks of that fershugginer beast, but we made it work through sheer determination and talent and ingenuity of a lot of our people. And those people were what made it a career highlight. Nailing an IED emplacement team caught in the act was right up there, too, as was an ICOM Chatter report just before launch one dark and stormy night when nothing but us could fly: "the weather is bad tonight, but that plane will be up". It felt good to be unloved.

Our Roto blew all of the previous ones out of the water for hours and missions flown. We were only mandated to fly one mission per twenty-four-hour period, but pushed that to three in early 2009 and maintained two even once we'd dropped back to two vice four GCS crews after thinning out in March. That was our original end date, but most of us stayed longer to cover Heron's stumbling start. We kept the best of a bunch of excellent Techs as well.

I have a buttload of photographs on my Flickr page (but haven't added any since around 2012). Access to my military photographs is restricted to friends and family. I can add you to that list.

The one on display in the aviation museum at Rockcliffe was the last one that we wrote off. I can't remember what the initial problem was, but that's how we discovered that there could be something like a twenty-second delay between ordering a launch cancellation (as the launch crew did) and the new Robonics launcher losing interest. The engine shutdown was the first thing that happened once the button had been smacked, and it was almost instantaneous (and frequently blew up the muffler, something that we were very short of in the last couple of weeks).

If only the sequence of the cancellation was reversed...

But we had no control over that.

I gained a lot of respect for the power of the Robonics launcher, though, as everything _*appeared*_ normal - I was standing right beside one of the two huge generators that powered the whole system and couldn't *hear* anything, like the now-silent engine, above the racket, besides barely-audible voices in the little radio that I had.

It climbed/was flung up to a couple of hundred feet, and then levelled off, and then gently began to descend, still in a climbing attitude as its little robot brain tried vainly to keep it going up. It reminded me of space shuttle landings, until it disappeared behind the blast barriers along the southern edge of our compound.

Our techs spruced it up a little once it was finally brought back in, then added a six-bladed propeller stack in place of the four-bladed stack, built out of six broken blades. Photographs were sent to SAGEM extolling the benefits of our new mod.


----------



## FJAG

Loachman said:


> ...
> I have a buttload of photographs on my Flickr page (but haven't added any since around 2012). Access to my military photographs is restricted to friends and family. I can add you to that list.
> 
> The one on display in the aviation museum at Rockcliffe was the last one that we wrote off.  ...


That's terrific and we'll definitely talk again when I get to that phase later this year.

For those of you wondering what Loachman and I are jabbering about, the  Canadian Aviation and Space Museum has a very good research article with lots of photos about the Sperwer  to compliment the exhibit which they have on the floor. It covers the project from the earliest deployments in 2003 until it exited service.

🍻


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Good2Golf said:


> 5. MP/LRP - involvement with RCN for integrated effects with RCN on as tasked operations and taskings



A _little_ simplified from reality but...

Good read;  just curious...what thread was this split off of?


----------



## Loachman

FJAG said:


> For those of you wondering what Loachman and I are jabbering about, the  Canadian Aviation and Space Museum has a very good research article with lots of photos about the Sperwer  to compliment the exhibit which they have on the floor. It covers the project from the earliest deployments in 2003 until it exited service.
> 
> 🍻


Excellent article, and I'll be going through it in detail.

The photograph on page 18/35 shows my last launch, from the Robonics launcher. It was a much better launcher than the original. A lot of people came out for the occasion, and then-Col Chris Coates was in the box with us for a bit. Sadly, it was a routinely boring flight.

Note the lack of the "OLOSP", SAGEM's name (they had some bizarre terminology, and none of us bothered with the weird full names, most of which were French; it was also referred to as the "payload") for the thermal imager and daylight camera ball in the photograph of 161001 on page 22/35. It was destroyed in the launch crash that I described in my last post.

From the "CU-161 SPERWER FLEET DISPOSITION/SUMMARY" beginning on page 26/35:

161001 - I don't remember the "engine kill button" being pushed "inadvertently". I heard one of the launch crew guys call for cancellation over the radio. I don't remember why. I'll have to look at my "war diary" to match up other events around that time.

There was a period where we could not get quite the engine RPM up to the point required for launch, and we could only hold it at full throttle for a very short period of time. I was on the verge of cancelling a few times, when the RPM suddenly increased at the last possible second. A cancelled launch would impose long delays - if we had another AV ready to go - or a mission loss, and usually a scarce muffler. We never found a cause. Every serviceable AV was affected. We had every fuel test done that was available. The only one that we could not have done was octane level, and this beast required a higher-than-normally available octane level. After a week or two, the problem just evaporated.

We had a similar problem with HNS (Hybrid Navigation System) units passing ground checks, failing during launch checks, being undiagnosable and passing subsequent ground checks only to fail on the next launch attempt. Old units were swapped for new, and between AVs, but no specific fault could be found. And then, after a couple of weeks, we suddenly had no further HNS problems.

My theory was that these things had an ability to communicate and spitefully conspired between themselves.

Edit, after reading through the article at a more leisurely rate: Page 19/35 "the vehicle again suffered further Category “B” damage on 01 November 2008, when the “engine-kill” button was inadvertently pushed during the launch sequence. *The air vehicle was then again repaired*. It never flew again. The "repairs" were only cosmetic, and, as previously mentioned, six broken propeller blades were spliced together to make two three-bladed propellers which were stacked and installed on the dead machine as a joke. Propellers were oak, and designed to shatter upon striking the ground in a less-than-ideal landing thus preventing transmission of the impact to the engine. The stacked two-bladed propellers were supposed to stop in an "X" position upon engine shut-down so that the tips would be a little higher on touch/smash-down, but would frequently stop in an "+" position, breaking the one pointing down. We had tri-walls of broken blades hanging around.

161002 - I mentioned this one previously as well. We got the first Robonics launcher while in Wainwright. It was much lighter than the original SAGEM one, could fold up and pack into a twenty-foot sea container, did not require the water-bag brake on the catapult (a real plus in Wainwright in winter), could be set for variable launch weights, and was much quicker to change launch heading whenever the wind opted to move out of limits. That early version had a few problems, though, like shearing rivets. On the crash mentioned, the AV cradle only went about halfway along the rails and then seized, still managing to fling the AV off into the air. Lacking the necessary speed, though, the AV descended slightly, shattering the oaken blades as described. Fortunately, the launcher was on a gentle hill, and the AV hit downslope in about a foot of snow, limiting damage and probably helping to prevent a ruptured fuel tank. It was returned to us in theatre.

161004 - this was one of the last two flown. I can't remember if I had that one for the final flight or a different one, but will check my log book.

161006 - "but the airframe was later stripped by locals"... That may have been the one/one of the ones where guys bought parts back from village market(s) - yes, we were that short.

161016 - This one was returned to us in theatre and was, I believe, the one with the inverted wing that I mentioned.

161017 - I signed for that one, and did not sign it back in. One of two engine cylinders failed, resulting in a significant power loss and engine RPM reduction. That was insufficient to trigger the "Engine Out" warning. Our first indication was "AV Approaching Stall Speed", which caused little concern as we often flew just a tad above stall speed to conserve fuel and extend mission duration. The standard procedure was to just bump the throttle up a little. That did not work this time, and we eventually realized that it was descending. We lost line-of-sight contact when it descended behind Masum Ghar, or another adjacent mountain. Unbeknownst to us at the time, it was still in climb attitude as it was attempting to get back up to its assigned altitude. Note that there were no conventional instruments in the GCS. Depictions only appeared on the monitor in from of each GCS crew member. Many were very small. We would have had a much better idea of what was happening were we onboard, and could see, feel, and hear - but then we, too, might have been "scavenged by locals". We had just launched and were on our way out to where we were going to be operating when this happened.

161019 - "Bang". Fortunately, the bulldozer was unmanned at the time that the little grey cruise missile slammed into it. If I remember correctly, it made a nice fireball. We were in Wainwright when this happened, and monitoring Roto 5's series of losses very closely, hoping that a couple would survive long enough for us to play with them in theatre.

161028 - This was the first one that I signed out and not back in, the day before 161017. Recovery was carried out autonomously, so that was engaged just before the AV was established on its recovery track. There was, at that point, nothing for us to do but watch the triangular AV symbol move along parallel to that track while the smaller square with a parachute symbol in its middle followed along the track. That symbol would show where the AV would land when recovery was initiated, compensated for wind. We would use that time to tidy up the inside of the GCS. Once the recovery symbol reached the recovery point, it would stop, and the AV symbol would move to meet it, while often twirling around a little beneath the parachute. This time, it continued for a bit while veering off. We didn't think much of it, because it didn't look too abnormal, until the 4 AD Ops Guy burst into the GCS and said "you know you crashed it". My response, I think, was "Fuck off. No, we didn't." The funniest part was the recovery crew (who were also the launch crew). Every launch and recovery was videotaped as that could be a major clue for the Flight Safety investigators. The camera guy was doing nicely until the parachute failed and it started tumbling, as did the camera view as everybody yelled "It's going to crash".

161031 - The third and final one that I signed out and not back in. The engine had not actually failed, but the RPM sensing system had - loose wire, if I remember correctly, and that was found on the other surviving machines as well. We could not tell, however, and did not have time to dick around before we lost it behind the electronic shadow of Masum Ghar again, so I ordered a recovery. It came back in two small boxes. Our Flight Safety guy was very nervous about going out for the recovery. "Can I have your stuff if you don't come back?" did not go over very well.

So, I just realized, we killed both the first and last Sperwers bought, plus a few in between.

I have to go back through the list for the six months before us as see how many Roto 5 wrote off. They accounted for more than we did, and we flew almost twice as many hours.

FJAG - PM me for Flickr details and access to my military photographs. I've got thousands of photographs in there, but many/most are SCA or railway ones.


----------



## dimsum

FJAG said:


> That's terrific and we'll definitely talk again when I get to that phase later this year.
> 
> For those of you wondering what Loachman and I are jabbering about, the  Canadian Aviation and Space Museum has a very good research article with lots of photos about the Sperwer  to compliment the exhibit which they have on the floor. It covers the project from the earliest deployments in 2003 until it exited service.
> 
> 🍻


It would have been nice if they had a Heron and a Scan Eagle as well, to show how different the three were.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> When did you first work with Sperwer? I definitely would like to interview you when it comes time for the the further look at these as we moved from Sperwer to Heron to ScanEagle and Skylark and Maveric and Raven and Blackjack.
> 
> There is one item that is interesting me right now (just as an aside). When 2 RCHA deployed a troop (essentially one launcher, some ground stations and several aircraft in 2003 it was a captain's command with some 25 pers. When 408 deployed it in 2006 the establishment had slid up to over 50 with a major in charge but basically the same launch and mission control capability. Were you involved at that time? and if so, maybe send me a PM if you know the rationale for the changes.
> 
> 🍻



At the risk of furthering a tangent from a rather interesting thread on airpower, the Sperwer piece on the Aviation Museum did bring up memories. I was a Capt in the ISTAR Coy HQ in Kabul - we had the first UAV Tp in our sub-unit. To your point about staffing levels, by the time the UAV Tp deployed they had a considerable RCAF component - mostly technicians but also the four AC commanders. I recall the Tp was close to 50 when you included all those folks and the SAGEM dudes. We also had an eight-person RCAF testing team for a good portion of the tour, plus two advisors from the Dutch Army. When I saw the Sperwer organization in early 2006 in Kandahar I thought that the RCAF construct made sense.

I was involved in some tough conversations in late 2003/early 2004 with senior folks in Ottawa at odd hours as the Sperwer reality set in after the great expectations. I recall watching Sperwer 003 majestically (and silently) sailing over the Queen's Palace from my CP door to the quite excited report of the recovery crew that the chute had not deployed. I put my coffee cup down in the CP and proceeded to have a busy morning. The recovery/destruction of 005 was a major endeavor. There was also an awkward pause when it was learned that 005 and 006 had been assembled in theatre and used on my order..as a Captain.  Didn't know I had to ask permission...Bad Captain! Bad!


----------



## FJAG

Red_Five said:


> At the risk of furthering a tangent from a rather interesting thread on airpower, the Sperwer piece on the Aviation Museum did bring up memories. I was a Capt in the ISTAR Coy HQ in Kabul - we had the first UAV Tp in our sub-unit. To your point about staffing levels, by the time the UAV Tp deployed they had a considerable RCAF component - mostly technicians but also the four AC commanders. I recall the Tp was close to 50 when you included all those folks and the SAGEM dudes. We also had an eight-person RCAF testing team for a good portion of the tour, plus two advisors from the Dutch Army. When I saw the Sperwer organization in early 2006 in Kandahar I thought that the RCAF construct made sense.
> 
> I was involved in some tough conversations in late 2003/early 2004 with senior folks in Ottawa at odd hours as the Sperwer reality set in after the great expectations. I recall watching Sperwer 003 majestically (and silently) sailing over the Queen's Palace from my CP door to the quite excited report of the recovery crew that the chute had not deployed. I put my coffee cup down in the CP and proceeded to have a busy morning. The recovery/destruction of 005 was a major endeavor. There was also an awkward pause when it was learned that 005 and 006 had been assembled in theatre and used on my order..as a Captain.  Didn't know I had to ask permission...Bad Captain! Bad!


Please send a PM to Petard and I with your particulars. I'd like to set up a ZOOM interview with you and get some of your recollections recoded if you are willing.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

So far behind the times, me.

Somewhere along the way I made reference to Project Taranis -  a Brit UCAV concept vehicle.

Since then ...

The Brits have launched:

Project Tempest for a Typhoon follow-on that is "optionally manned" 









						Team Tempest | Royal Air Force
					

The Future of Combat Air Tempest is the next-generation combat aircraft, operating at the cutting edge of technological innovation and securing the UK's position as a global leader in combat air.




					www.raf.mod.uk
				




and

Project Mosquito




> "which will design and manufacture a prototype for the UK’s first fleet of unmanned fighter aircraft, according to a Jan. 25 press release from the Royal Air Force (RAF).
> 
> “Project Mosquito is a vital element of our approach to Future Combat Air, rapidly bringing to life design, build and test skills for next-generation combat air capabilities,” Richard Berthon, director of future combat air, said in a press statement. “Autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ aircraft create the opportunity to expand, diversify and rapidly upgrade Combat Air Forces in a cost-effective way, now and in the future."
> 
> The goal of Project Mosquito is to create a demonstrator for the RAF’s Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) concept with flight tests by the end of 2023, according to the release.
> 
> “The Project will deliver a demonstration of a capability that the RAF may wish to develop further in the future,” a spokesperson from the RAF told Avionics. “It is not intended to output an operational capability at this stage, but it will inform future decisions for the future UK combat air capability.  We are exploring the optimum way in which such capabilities could complement platforms such as Typhoon, F-35, and Tempest as loyal wingmen.”"
> 
> According to the RAF release, these aircraft could have capabilities to target and shoot down enemy aircraft and survive against surface-to-air missiles. The aircraft would fly alongside Typhoon, the F-35, or the Tempest to provide protection, survivability, and information as part of the future combat air system.
> 
> “We’re taking a revolutionary approach, looking at a game-changing mix of swarming drones and uncrewed fighter aircraft like Mosquito, alongside piloted fighters like Tempest, that will transform the combat battlespace in a way not seen since the advent of the jet age,” Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston, Chief of the Air Staff, said in a press statement.
> 
> Spirit AeroSystems will work with Northrop Grumman UK on Project Mosquito, according to the release. The deal spans three years and will create over 100 jobs in Belfast.











						Project Mosquito Provides £30 Million Investment for UK Fighter Drone - Avionics International
					

The U.K.’s Ministry of Defense has awarded a £30 million contract to Spirit AeroSystems in Belfast to lead Project Mosquito which will design and manufacture a prototype for the UK’s first fleet of unmanned fighter aircraft, according to a Jan. 25 press release from the Royal Air Force (RAF)...




					www.aviationtoday.com
				






> In July 2019, the Dstl announced that Phase 1 contracts had been awarded to three teams, led by Blue Bear Systems Research, Boeing Defence UK, and Callen-Lenz. The latter is part of Team Blackdawn, which brings in the expertise of Northrop Grumman and Bombardier Aerospace’s UK division headquartered in Belfast. Dstl and its partner agency, the Royal Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), expect to make a down-select to one or two teams imminently.











						Project Mosquito: UK’s ‘Loyal Wingman’ Program Moves Ahead
					

The UK’s defense laboratory is overseeing a project to develop unmanned vehicles to partner with manned combat aircraft.




					www.ainonline.com
				




Curious potential involvement of Bombardier.

Other people in the race (from the same source).




> LANCA is similar in scope to those being undertaken elsewhere. The U.S. Air Force has launched its Skyborg UCAS program and is evaluating the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie—which has already flown several times—as a “loyal wingman.” Boeing Australia has designed a similar Airpower Teaming System vehicle that the Royal Australian Air Force will evaluate in its Loyal Wingman advanced development program. The first of an expected three evaluation vehicles rolled out in May. In Europe Airbus is leading the development of “remote carriers” as part of the Franco-German-Spanish SCAF/FCAS effort. Russia, too, has a manned-unmanned teaming project with the low-observable Sukhoi T-70 Okhotnik UCAS, expected to partner with the Su-57 manned fighter.
> 
> All of the projects seek to create a transonic, networked vehicle that makes heavy use of artificial intelligence so that it can make its own decisions within the wider framework of a planned mission and even fly some missions autonomously if desired. Vehicles can be used to augment the manned aircraft in terms of weapons or be used for reconnaissance and defense suppression tasks. The use of multiple air vehicles in coordinated swarms can saturate defenses.



2023 is coming up pretty fast (just ask the Light Infantry Battalions and the Force 2025 goal).



> In the meantime, the RAF has re-established No. 216 Squadron at RAF Waddington to develop “swarming drone” technologies and capability. The RCO’s “Many Drones Make Light Work” project is now in its third and final development phase, with Blue Bear having performed a successful first test in March. Five fixed-wing drones were flown in a series of co-ordinated operations, controlled by a single operator.




RAF may be considering cutting F35Bs but has added, or is planning to add, a squadron to play with swarming drones, a lone endurance uav squadron, 3 MALE UAV squadrons and a raft of ISTAR squadrons.  Not to mention a Space Command.

I'm thinking that there is something in the wind and that a lot of things are going to look very different in the next 5 years.

Both technology and circumstances.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my last - another "Old" report  -  May 4, 2020




> SYDNEY (Reuters) - Boeing Co sees mass production of its unmanned, fighter-like jet developed in Australia likely happening by the middle of the decade, an executive said on Tuesday, as it rolled out the first of three prototypes.
> 
> "We are expecting middle of the decade, maybe a bit earlier that this will be in production," Shane Arnott, the programme director of Boeing's Airpower Teaming System, told reporters.
> 
> He said up to 16 of the Loyal Wingman drones could be teamed with a manned aircraft for missions and it was on track for its first flight by the end of the year.
> 
> Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Air Vice-Marshal Catherine Roberts said the Loyal Wingman's role could include carrying weapons in combat and protecting assets like the E-7A Wedgetail early warning and control aircraft as well as being used as a target to shield manned fighter jets such as the F-35A and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
> 
> Defence contractors are investing increasingly in autonomous technology as militaries around the world look for a cheaper and safer way to maximise their resources.
> 
> The Australian government has invested A$40 million ($25.71 million) in development of the product, which Roberts said had also attracted interest from the United States and United Kingdom as potential future customers.
> 
> The Loyal Wingman aircraft is 38 feet long (11.6 metres) and has a 2,000 nautical mile (3,704 kilometre) range and a nose that can be removed to fit various payloads.











						Boeing could produce Loyal Wingman fighter-like drone by middle of decade: executive
					

Boeing Co sees mass production of its unmanned, fighter-like jet developed in Australia likely happening by the middle of the decade, an executive said on Tuesday, as it rolled out the first of three prototypes.  "We are expecting middle of the decade, maybe a bit earlier that this will be in...




					ca.movies.yahoo.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Quick question - do "drones" need to be "stealthy"?   Or is it more important that they be cheap?  And thus attritable, if not expendable.

It seems to me that the original attraction of the UAV, aside from removing the risk to pilots, was that it was cheap and thus expendable.
Now, it seems to me, that the US in particular, is engaged in its usual spiral of making its kit ever more expensive requiring ever more defences making it ever more more expensive resulting in ever fewer units and ever less availability.  Fewer units, risked less frequently. 

Meanwhile others, like the Turks, and the Israelis, seem to be embracing the "good enough" concept and exploiting the value of the least cost formulation to achieve "big battalions" right now - battalions that can be used the way  Napoleon or Stalin used their battalions.


----------



## Kirkhill

Or are we getting tied up in some version of the "Precautionary Principle"?  Freezing in place until we have perfect knowledge of the future?


----------



## Kirkhill

On  The Precautionary Principle....




> ... The precautionary principle was incorporated into EU jurisprudence with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and has become over time the defining ideological feature of an ageing, defensive, status quo society that seems to be afraid of everything.
> 
> As it happens, 1997 also marks the moment when Europe began to decouple from the US and go into economic decline, although monetary union also dates from that time and has played a role. It is an astonishing thought that per capita income in the eurozone had actually slipped to $39,928 even before the pandemic hit, while in America it had kept rising to $62,795, according to World Bank data. The post-Covid gap will be even wider.
> 
> 
> The precautionary principle has been married with another EU deformity: its slow, rigid, legalistic ethos, and its 190,000 pages of near-irreversible _Acquis_. The two together have reinforced each other in a paralysing fashion. This regime is perfect for vested interests that know how to play the Brussels game and manipulate the regulatory committees. The zero-risk code can be mobilised to shut out rivals and new technologies that pose a commercial threat.
> 
> Is it a coincidence that the EU has become a technology spectator over the last quarter century, while America and China vie for supremacy? Might the precautionary principle be the reason why not a single one of the world’s 20 most valuable tech companies is European, and why the region lags again in artificial intelligence?
> 
> It is true that BioNTech’s ground-breaking mRNA vaccine was made in Germany, but its founders are Turkish immigrants and most of the clinical trials took place in the US, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. It is famously difficult to conduct clinical trials in the EU.
> 
> It is also true that the precautionary principle has made inroads into Anglo-Saxon societies. But only up to a point. The US, the UK, and Canada still cleave towards the ‘innovation principle’, a preference for trial-and-error and a willingness to risk failure along the way — “nothing ventured, nothing gained”.
> 
> You could argue that this philosophy has its roots in English Common Law, a legal culture that loosely permits behaviour unless explicitly forbidden by statute. It is fundamentally different from Napoleonic law that prohibits behaviour unless explicitly authorised – “guilty until proven innocent”. Legal scholars will object to this contrasting schema but it contains a nugget of truth.
> 
> The innovation philosophy also has roots in the Baconian Method: the scientific interrogation of facts: the bottom-up empiricism of Francis Bacon and his followers, from Newton through to the Scottish Enlightenment, and beyond. There are great Baconians in Continental Europe of course, but they are not dominant.
> 
> What is dominant is the top-down Cartesian Method instilled into the French civil service, and through them into the EU’s machinery. It has fused with the zero-risk totemism of modern Germans to produce a precautionary monster, and a long list of destructive policies. The consequence of banning GMO crops – that is to say, refusing to use technology to tweak genes for better yields – is that you end up using more chemicals instead. _Cui bono?_











						The precautionary principle is literally killing Europe
					

European leaders have destroyed confidence in the AstraZeneca vaccine, meaning even more people will die




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> On  The Precautionary Principle....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The precautionary principle is literally killing Europe
> 
> 
> European leaders have destroyed confidence in the AstraZeneca vaccine, meaning even more people will die
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.telegraph.co.uk



Apparently being a little too 'smugly socialist' is a dangerous posture for the long term:

Reviving innovation in Europe​*Europe a century ago *was a global powerhouse of innovation, but it has started to lose its edge: today, despite some notable exceptions, many innovative companies are found elsewhere. Europe is falling behind in growing sectors as well as in areas of innovation such as genomics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, where it is being outpaced by the United States and China.

A discussion paper from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), suggests five paths that could help the continent regain its competitive edge. The paper, _Innovation in Europe: Changing the game to regain a competitive edge (PDF—395KB),_ focuses on ways that Europe could seek to build on its strengths rather than trying to play catch-up, given that it is hindered by fragmentation and lack of scale. This article is a condensed version of the original paper, which draws from MGI research as well as from a recent collaboration with the World Economic Forum.











						Reviving innovation in Europe
					

European innovation is losing its edge. Five paths could build on existing strengths and help the continent scale up to meet the challenge.




					www.mckinsey.com


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> Quick question - do "drones" need to be "stealthy"?   Or is it more important that they be cheap?  And thus attritable, if not expendable.
> 
> It seems to me that the original attraction of the UAV, aside from removing the risk to pilots, was that it was cheap and thus expendable.
> Now, it seems to me, that the US in particular, is engaged in its usual spiral of making its kit ever more expensive requiring ever more defences making it ever more more expensive resulting in ever fewer units and ever less availability.  Fewer units, risked less frequently.
> 
> Meanwhile others, like the Turks, and the Israelis, seem to be embracing the "good enough" concept and exploiting the value of the least cost formulation to achieve "big battalions" right now - battalions that can be used the way  Napoleon or Stalin used their battalions.


The US has a number of the enormous and expensive, like Tritons and Global Hawks, but they also have thousands of lower end systems like the Ravens. The correct answer is, of course, that you’ll want a mix.


----------



## Kirkhill

That prescription still seems awfully corporatist to me - it puts decisions in the hands of the few rather than the many.  It is designed to keep large organizations on top.

Europe isn't the only place suffering 

Canada used to be a lot more innovative than it is today.  Can we blame the Autopact and the institutionalization of the Branch Plant?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> The US has a number of the enormous and expensive, like Tritons and Global Hawks, but they also have thousands of lower end systems like the Ravens. The correct answer is, of course, that you’ll want a mix.


Which way should the Loyal Wingman concept go?  Keep it as a reusable vehicle in the Tomahawk price range?  Or push it up into an early F16 price?


----------



## Underway

Culture eats strategy for breakfast.  Unless the culture changes (which it won't) then you can post all the strategies that you want.  You're just wasting paper until there is a revolution in behavior.


----------



## Kirkhill

Agree entirely that culture eats strategy for breakfast.  

Can't agree that culture won't change.  

Mother culture is the term used for a broth from which reproducible cultures can be reproduced by inoculating sterile ground.    Mother culture, mother tongue, milk tongue.  These things, like genetics leave a lasting impression on the individual.  Not indelible but lasting.  It changes but generally changes slowly (although my kids exhibit different cultural traits than me).

Institutional culture is different.  It is the sum of the cultures of all its individuals.  And as the individuals change, either within themselves or by replacement, the culture of the institution changes.

The world is replete with institutions that now represent cultures diametrically opposed to those they defended previously.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> On  The Precautionary Principle....
> 
> ... It is an astonishing thought that per capita income in the eurozone had actually slipped to $39,928 even before the pandemic hit ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The precautionary principle is literally killing Europe
> 
> 
> European leaders have destroyed confidence in the AstraZeneca vaccine, meaning even more people will die
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.telegraph.co.uk



One needs to factor in that the EU has incorporated a large number of Eastern block countries which have very low economies and thus dragged down the overall averages for many statistics.

On the drone issue. Cheap and plentiful. Treat them as expendable munitions (although we already spend much too much on things like Excalibur and some of the more esoteric HIMARS/MLRS munitions). Those costs need to come down or we'll bankrupt ourselves just before we're overrun.


----------



## FJAG




----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> One needs to factor in that the EU has incorporated a large number of Eastern block countries which have very low economies and thus dragged down the overall averages for many statistics.
> 
> On the drone issue. Cheap and plentiful. Treat them as expendable munitions (although we already spend much too much on things like Excalibur and some of the more esoteric HIMARS/MLRS munitions). Those costs need to come down or we'll bankrupt ourselves just before we're overrun.



So as the drones/loitering munitions become cheaper and more plentiful, what does that mean for our GBAD plans?  Do you use a missile to shoot down a loitering munition that doesn't cost much more than the missile you're shooting?  Or do gun-based systems become more attractive?  

Are drones/loitering munitions and Rockets/Artillery/Mortars going to be a bigger threat than larger, more expensive manned aircraft that many GBAD systems are designed to counter?  How quickly will you run out of missiles on a modern battlefield?  Will EW solutions, decoys, dazzlers, and more sophisticated camouflage become more important?  Or do you make targeting by the enemy more difficult with a larger number of less valuable and more dispersed targets to choose from?


----------



## blacktriangle

GR66 said:


> So as the drones/loitering munitions become cheaper and more plentiful, what does that mean for our GBAD plans?  Do you use a missile to shoot down a loitering munition that doesn't cost much more than the missile you're shooting?  Or do gun-based systems become more attractive?
> 
> Are drones/loitering munitions and Rockets/Artillery/Mortars going to be a bigger threat than larger, more expensive manned aircraft that many GBAD systems are designed to counter?  How quickly will you run out of missiles on a modern battlefield?  Will EW solutions, decoys, dazzlers, and more sophisticated camouflage become more important?  Or do you make targeting by the enemy more difficult with a larger number of less valuable and more dispersed targets to choose from?


Interesting that you should bring this up, as I had been asking myself similar questions recently. Not to mention the implications for tanks, major surface combatants, and satellites/orbital vehicles...


----------



## MarkOttawa

Meanwhile in US:



> Pentagon Unveils Details On Effort To Equip Its Services With Massive Swarms Of Deadly Drones​
> The Pentagon has quietly laid critical groundwork for fielding weaponized swarms of drones across all of the services.​
> The Pentagon has announced that one of its offices has completed planned research and development work on a number of unmanned swarming technologies and has now turned them over to the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to support various follow-on programs. The systems in question are the Block 3 version of Raytheon's Coyote unmanned aircraft and an associated launcher, a jam-resistant datalink, and a software package to enable the aforementioned drones to operate as an autonomous swarm. These developments give us a glimpse into what has been a fairly opaque, integrated development effort to field lower-end swarming drones across the services that leverages common components.
> 
> All of these technologies were developed under the auspices of the Low-Cost Cruise Missile (LCCM) effort, led by the Pentagon's Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) program office. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Office of Naval Research (ONR) were also directly involved in the project, which dates back at least to 2017. While Raytheon led the development of the Coyote and its launcher, L3Harris was the prime contractor for the datalink, and the Georgia Tech Research Institute at the Georgia Institute of Technology headed up work on the "autonomy software module."..
> 
> Readily available details about the LCCM project are limited. It "provides a decentralized autonomy capability for low-cost, conventional air-launched cruise missiles that will enable joint access and maneuver in the global commons," according to the Pentagon's 2019 Fiscal Year budget request "It will be capable of conducting networked integrated attacks, in-flight dynamic retargeting/reallocation and synchronized cooperative/saturation attacks."
> 
> "Flight demonstrations will be conducted using surrogate weapon platforms and will provide residual leave-behind payloads for transition to a full weapon system development program," it continued. "FY 2017 funds were used to begin production of LCCM air vehicles."..
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Pentagon Unveils Details On Effort To Equip Its Services With Massive Swarms Of Deadly Drones
> 
> 
> The Pentagon has quietly laid critical groundwork for fielding weaponized swarms of drones across all of the services.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks Mark

Related - 


Specifications[edit]​


Joe Cione of NOAA with a Coyote



_This aircraft article is missing some (or all) of its specifications. If you have a source, you can help Wikipedia by adding them._

Airspeed: 55 knots (102 km/h) cruise, 70 knots (130 km/h) kts dash[18]
Deployment altitude: up to 30,000 feet (9,100 m) MSL (in non-icing conditions)
Comms range: 50 nautical miles (93 km) (May 2016); 70 nautical miles (130 km) (ground test October 2016)
Endurance: 1 hr+ @ cruise (May 2016); 2h (2017)
Weight: 13 pounds (5.9 kg)
Length: 36 inches (0.91 m) [19]
Wingspan: 58 inches (1.5 m)
Cost: $20,000 per drone [20]
On 28 February 2021, Raytheon received a contract from the U.S. Navy for the Coyote Block 3 to provide an ISR and strike capability when launched from unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)









						Raytheon Coyote - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				















						The Navy Plans To Launch Swarms Of Aerial Drones From Unmanned Submarines And Ships
					

Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles capable of deploying drone swarms in contested territory could be game-changing for the Navy.




					www.thedrive.com
				











And once again.... we are talking Raytheon.


How do these things fit into RCA/RCN/RCAF plans?


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## SupersonicMax

Kirkhill said:


> How do these things fit into RCA/RCN/RCAF _*plans*_?


What, there is a plan?!


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## Loachman

GR66 said:


> Do you use a missile to shoot down a loitering munition that doesn't cost much more than the missile you're shooting?


It's not the cost of the loitering munition that counts, but the amount and cost of damage that it could cause.


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## GR66

Loachman said:


> It's not the cost of the loitering munition that counts, but the amount and cost of damage that it could cause.


Absolutely true.  In the case of the Coyote mentioned by Kirkhill above, the cost of the unit is only $20,000 but you may be willing to spend quite a bit more than that to protect a vehicle worth millions of dollars (not to mention the troops inside).

However, if you're shooting down these $20k munitions with a $40k missile (Wikipedia cost for a Stinger missile) do you not risk running out of money for Stingers before your enemy runs out of money for UAVs?  

The disparity of cost between arrow and shield I think does need to be a factor in determining how you deal with these new types of weapons.


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## FJAG

Loachman said:


> It's not the cost of the loitering munition that counts, but the amount and cost of damage that it could cause.


Well, kind of, but initially the cost of the munition creates a trade off of how many of those you can purchase and may effect the cost of what has to be left out of the inventory. We've been casting off capabilities for decades now because we cannot afford to maintain them in light of the cost of new weapon systems. For example my understanding is that we lost the ADATS in large part because we could not afford the upgraded missiles required.

On top of that there is little to be gained my taking out an $1,000 82mm mortar with a $100,000 Excalibur round. That equation gets modified of course if that mortar was about to take out one of your rifle sections. 

The question is not so much whether that missile cost more than the loitering munition, but once having used that missile will you be short of missiles to deal with the more destructive fighter jet following it up. Let's not forget that Canadian artillery used far fewer Excaliburs per mission in Afghanistan than the US Marines primarily because we simply didn't have as many to use. And that was a relatively leisurely war where the logistics system ought to be able to easily keep up with expenditures. Conflicts on a higher scale would have us very quickly run out of the more esoteric munitions which would not be easily resupplied.

One needs to balance the weapon system's capabilities with the target set they may encounter so a GBAD system, for example, should have a suite of weapons to select from so as to engage varying targets with the most appropriate munition. A simple example is the aging Avengers which can engage a target with either a Stinger or a .50 cal. The .50 cal is probably quite adequate for both UAVs or many loitering munitions. Over and above that it ought to be fairly simple to design and build very small and inexpensive missiles and gun systems which could operate quite well against some of the new loitering munitions threat if coupled with a good target acquisition and engagement system. There are already many out there that could be adapted and developed for these new threats.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Or do you disregard the enemy's drones and focus on building lots of cheap new drones to kill the enemy's legacy ground forces and force them into a different model of warfare.  Swap massed charges with lances for artillery supported Tercios.


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## blacktriangle

While it's easy to focus on hard-kill options, one should not overlook the importance of defensive soft-kill measures.


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## GR66

How much more difficult will the counter-UAV task become when you have swarms of small air vehicles from both sides flying over the battlefield?  Will all these UAVs require a form of IFF...and all ground units with counter-UAV capabilities the ability to interrogate potential targets?  

Will  these UAVs need to be included in airspace deconfliction plans?  How does that impact plans of distributing these weapons down to sub-unit levels?


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## Kirkhill

Air Force Drone Plan May Rile MQ-9 Champions - Breaking Defense
					

"This is a new effort, as the expanded mission now goes beyond a strict MQ-9 replacement," an AFLCMC spokesperson said. "This endeavor serves to explore concepts that address capability gaps of legacy platforms against increasingly sophisticated threats in denied, contested, and highly contested...




					breakingdefense.com
				






> The Air Force plans to develop a family of highly-survivable drones for multiple missions to replace the MQ-9 — but rather than the Reaper’s traditional ground-attack role, the service’s top priority seems to be counter-air capabilities.





> Congress blocked Air Force plans to stop production of the MQ-9 by prime contractor General Atomics in 2021, adding 16 aircraft to its budget plans. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown admitted last month that the service “can’t just walk away” from the MQ-9 because of its popularity with commanders.



Air Force trying to pull an A-10 on the MQ-9?

Soothing noises about - “Reapers will be in the force for a long time.”  

While -  “the family of UAVs the Air Force apparently wants to procure will expand — not contract — the mission capabilities of its UAV force and threat environments it will operate in.” And finally, “I believe the Air Force intends to grow its overall UAV capacity over time, not reduce it. UAVs—including attritable systems—are force multipliers in many regards.”



> the shift makes sense particularly when looking at the Pacific theater and competition with China.
> 
> “The peer battle in the Pacific is so stressing that *ACC [Air Combat Command] wants every missile carrier and comm relay node it can put in the air*. *They might deploy P-51 Mustangs if the museums would give them up*,” she said. “Then there is targeting for those Army long-range fires set to dot the
> Pacific – that will take lots of combat air patrols.”



So?  Boneyard drones in the short term?  Lots of them.  Going cheap.  Conversion knowledge exists.
Kratos type drones in the mid term? Knowledge of how to build them, carry them and launch them exists.  Relatively cheap.
Loyal Wingman type drones in the longer term?  Within 5 years?

And a new class of orbiting MQ-9s providing 24/7 comms, situational awareness and a ready mixed arsenal of BVRAAMs and ASMs?

What is the relative positioning of the F35 and JUSTAS?  How many of each?


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## Kirkhill

F16 Software updated in flight with existing comms and hardware.



> “The ingenuity and skills of the Flight Test and Program Teams enabled a Viper to land with better capabilities than it took off with,” explained an F-16 System program manager about the recent inflight test. “This techno-marvel was done with existing systems in much of the Viper fleet, with no hardware mod[ifications] required. This is a significant first step!”












						Like an iPhone: Air Force F-16 Fighter Get a Software Update in Flight
					

Although this doesn’t sound like a big deal, the ability to revive real-time upgrades is crucially important. Here’s why. iPhone Fighter?  For the first time, an Air Force F-16C Fighting Falcon successfully received, installed, and flew with a software update that it received while in flight...




					www.19fortyfive.com
				




Upgradeable swarms of drones from the boneyard?


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## Kirkhill

Autonomy With Limits Essential For Future Drones Air Force Generals Say​Advanced autonomy is key to the Air Force’s future drone plans, but humans will still make key decisions like about when to fire weapons.











						Autonomy With Limits Essential For Future Drones Air Force Generals Say
					

Advanced autonomy is key to the Air Force's future drone plans, but humans will still make key decisions like about when to fire weapons.




					www.thedrive.com


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## Kirkhill

Supersonic Turko-Ukrainian UAV


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/z25r8p


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## Rifleman62

Other uses for a drone:​Rare Griffon vulture saved with help from a military drone (Israel) - ITV News - 28th July 2020​


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