# CH-146 roles



## VinceW (23 Sep 2012)

When the CH-146 replaced the Kiowa it was to perform reconnasiance missions that the Kiowa had done is one of the Flights in a Squadron dedicated to do just recon or can all Flights do recon?
And if yes for a dedicated Recon Flight are they also expected to do utility missions as well as recconnasiance?


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## Sf2 (25 Sep 2012)

There is no dedicated Sqn or Flt that provides 'recon'.

That said, any CH146 and its crew can provide ISR in various forms, with the most robust coming in the form of an INGRESS config'd Griffon and a qualified crew.


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## Loachman (25 Sep 2012)

The Griffon did not "replace" the Kiowa. None of the Kiowa roles survived the loss of the best helicopter that the CF ever had.

And it's "Recce" (pronounced "recky"), not "recon".


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## dapaterson (25 Sep 2012)

Loachman said:
			
		

> The Griffon did not "replace" the Kiowa. None of the Kiowa roles survived the loss of _*the best helicopter that the CF ever had*_.



How did the loss of the Chinook cause the loss of the Kiowa roles?   >


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## Loachman (25 Sep 2012)

Not even worthy of a response, Non-Kiowa Guy.


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## Good2Golf (25 Sep 2012)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> How did the loss of the Chinook cause the loss of the Kiowa roles?   >



The little flying APU was collateral damage...


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## Oldgateboatdriver (25 Sep 2012)

Actually, you could say that the Griffons replaced both the Kiowas and the Chinooks.

Historically, the Griffons were acquired at a time when, for costs saving reasons, the Air Force wanted to "simplify" its rotary wing holdings.

The Griffons were acquired so that the Jetrangers, Twin Hueys, Iroquois, Chinooks and Kiowa could be retired and replaced by a single class.

Similarly, the EH101 were supposed to replace the Voyageur, Labradors and Sea Kings, so that at the end of the process, two types of airframe would have replaced 8 in service.

That worked  .


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## Loachman (25 Sep 2012)

Neither Kiowa nor Chinook were "replaced", and Jet Rangers are still flying in Portage.

Griffons were ordered partially for political purposes and partially to fit within budgetary constraints.

They were assembled in the then-Defence Minister's home riding as his get-me-re-elected programme, which failed.

The programme was based upon misconceptions and lies and was contrary to our doctrine of the time.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (26 Sep 2012)

I did not say they could successfully "replace" all the other models, just that the big idea was to simplify the number of types in the Rotary-wings fleet.

Also, they were never assembled anywhere near the riding of the then Minister of National Defence. The MND at that time was Marcel Masse. He had not been in the job long enough to be the one who was in the job when the specs were developed or the bids reviewed. That would have been Bill McKnight.

Also, Masse's riding was Frontenac, way out in the Beauce/Lotbinière region, while the Griffons were built and assembled in Mirabel, up in the lower Laurentian North of Montréal. A mere 380 Km separate the two riding and they are as distant in distance and in type of population to be served as the riding covering Windsor would be from the one including Pickering, if this was in Ontario.


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## SeaKingTacco (26 Sep 2012)

good2golf can correct me if I get this wrong, but as I recall, no specs were developed for the Griffon purchase.

The MND of the day, Mr Masse, quite literally informed his staff one morning that DND would buy 100 Bell helicopters.


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## Loachman (26 Sep 2012)

I was wrong regarding Marcel Masse's home riding, however he became Minister of National defence in 1991 and the Griffons were ordered in 1992.

There was little research done prior to purchasing the Griffon. I do not even recall hearing about a formal Twin Huey replacement programme, let alone anything about "specs" and "bids", just a sudden announcement that the Twins would be replaced by Bell 412s.

From what I remember, the original hasty plan was for fifty of them to replace the Twins, which were definitely showing signs of aging. The minister was the one who doubled the size of the purchase.

Commonly-heard phrases: "It's an off-the-shelf purchase, of course it will work", "There is no need for user trials" and "We won't need to stock spare parts as Bell will get them to us within twenty-four hours anywhere on the planet".

The Army's preference was Black Hawk. The number that could have been purchased within the budget limit was far too small, however.

Regardless, the purchase was doctrinally unjustifiable.

Our doctrine of the time stated that:

At Brigade level, there was a continual requirement for light helicopters for reconnaissance and fire direction (which included Close Air Support), and occasional requirement for utility and attack helicopters.

At Division level, there was a continual requirement for utility and attack helicopters and an occasional requirement for medium transport helicopters (Chinook).

At Corps level, there was a continual requirement for medium transport helicopters.

We had no plan at the time for deploying anything larger than a Brigade, yet we gave up something for which we had a stated continual requirement in favour of something for which we had a stated occasional requirement.

Not that this was the first time that the CF had ever bought something contrary to doctrinal necessity and forced it to "fit", or artificially rewritten doctrine around a piece of kit after purchasing it.

Early, illogical, Griffon "doctrine" put a Squadron of three flights of eight in each Brigade whereas there had previously been a Squadron of two flights of eight Kiowas.

What were they supposed to do? There was no capability to conduct recce or Air OP or FAC, and training for those things ceased.

My initial prediction when the purchase was announced was that we would all get great suntans on major exercises because we would all be horrendously under-employed, unless those exercises were all written as airmobile ones (conveniently forgetting that we had no escort or other protective capability, which effectively limited us to administrative moves on our side of the FEBA).

A common term was Griffon/Reality Doctrine Line, where "Requirements" were listed down one side of the page/whiteboard and Griffon capabilities/characteristics were written down the other, on wither side of a prominent vertical line. No items from either side matched any on the other.

Yes, "Simplification" was a claimed benefit. It included a claim that we would save money by reducing Pilot training programmes from two (Kiowa and Twin Huey - Chinook had already been killed off due to operating and upgrading costs) to one. Not mentioned, however, was the fact that Kiowa was a single-Pilot machine while Griffon required two, burned one-quarter of the fuel that Griffon does, and ate up a lot fewer spare parts.

"Simplification" isn't always simplification, and is not necessarily even cost-effective; as for operationally-effective, well, fat chance.


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## Good2Golf (26 Sep 2012)

Quite right, SKT.

There is no doubt that the Griffon was a directed purchase.  I asked the Minister that question on the way home; I was the co-pilot who physically flew the MND to and from Mirabel on the 29th April, 1992.

In the end, the fleets were reduced to one, an although there was a short period where 10 Tactical Air Group (10 TAG) staff spoke of Type A (utility) and Type B (recce), the Griffon realistically replaced only the Twin Huey in the utility and special operations role, while the recce role was essentially paid lip service.

In the end, one characteristic of the large Griffon fleet's implementation was the retention of personnel to operate, support and maintain the fleet.  Folks can appreciate that retention by an organization of all of it's people, especially in trying times (mid-90's) was no mean feat and, although it took a few years (almost two decades) for that investment in systems and people to be realized in the form of operating an integrated transport and escort/recce capability in a theatre of war.  While not the same implementation now as the Kiowa's LOH role, the escort/recce capability of the INGRESS Griffons should not be downplayed. 

:2c:

Regards 
G2G


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## Loachman (26 Sep 2012)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> While not the same implementation now as the Kiowa's LOH role, the escort/recce capability of the INGRESS Griffons should not be downplayed.



And I would not. We made it work. That was more due to the human effort that went into doing so, rather than it being a stellar platform.


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