# Transforming An Army



## daftandbarmy (23 Dec 2008)

Transforming An Army: Military Leadership and Military Transformation in the British and Indian Armies

Britain’s victories in Europe and Burma in 1945 bear testimony to the successful transformation of the Commonwealth armies from defeat in 1940-1942 into victory three years later. The transformation was most pronounced in the two key field formations commanded by Montgomery in North Africa and Europe and Slim in Burma. While the increasing material made its presence felt towards the latter part of the Second World War, the key determinants of victory lay in the leadership of both Montgomery and Slim in transforming their hitherto defeated formations into well-trained and well-led forces that could beat their erstwhile invincible enemies in battle. Although the two commanders differed markedly in their leadership styles, both were in unison in their emphasis on doctrine, the crucial role played by battle drills and the importance of building up their troops’ morale through specialist training and blooding them in successful battles which guaranteed victory. Through this virtuous cycle of training, successful battle introduction and victories, both Montgomery and Slim retained the confidence of their men in their leadership, their own fighting formations, and more importantly, their self-belief that they can beat their enemies totally and decisively in the field of battle.

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/cdfessay/past/02merit2005.html


----------



## Greymatters (23 Dec 2008)

Hmmm, where are we going with this one?

And although I agree that Slim was an exceptional leader, I disagree with parts of the assessment on Montgomery...


----------



## geo (23 Dec 2008)

I think Patton would also question Monty's appointment


----------



## daftandbarmy (23 Dec 2008)

geo said:
			
		

> I think Patton would also question Monty's appointment



After watching the Movie "Patton" a few times and reading 'War as I knew It', one is inclined to agree. However, we need to respect Monty's place in history as the commander who finally turned the European War around to the advatage of the Allies.

"Before Alamein we never had a victory, after Alamein we never had a defeat." - Churchill

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_El_Alamein


----------



## Old Sweat (23 Dec 2008)

Montgomery was a pretty good general, who had a way of winning battles, and that is the criteria. On the other hand, he was pretty much a failure as a human being. He was a petty, egotistical little jerk who surrounded himself with yes men and manipulated the post-war historical record so as to claim success while shifting the blame to others.

I wonder what would have happened if Eisenhower had carried through with his threat to sack him in 1944 after the Normandy campaign. Monty had the gall to believe that if it came down to Ike or him, Ike would go. He of course was wrong; the Americans were calling the shots and would have prevailed. It took some pretty blunt talk from Alanbrooke to get him to go, double badged beret in hand, to Eisenhower and snivel for his job.


----------



## exspy (23 Dec 2008)

OS,

I liked your quote "On the other hand, he was pretty much a failure as a human being."

I'll think that you'll find that that is generally true about most highly successful people, generals especially.  Three Canadian generals who come to mind are Currie, Simonds and Foster, and I suspect (but don't know for sure) one could probably say the same about Crerar and Foulkes.  The first three were not successful as human beings outside of the army.  The last two were rather colourless figures who, while professionally successful, had more detractors than admirers in spite of their respective successes.  Now whether these detractors were that way because of professional differences or from personal jealousies I don't know, but I think it shows that any time a general is chosen it is always a toss of the dice as to whether or not he will be 'lucky' (as Napoleon would always ask).  Whether he is liked by the rest of the fraternity should never be a criteria.

As for Montgomery, well I think the same can be said about him as I recently said about Haig, he got the reputation he deserved.  Victorious?  Yes.  Likable?  Not really.  Egotistical?  Most assuredly.  Lucky?  Enough times when it counted.  Again, don't base his reputation on what the rest of the generals say (Patton has his own glass house to protect to be slinging so many stones at others), but instead ask did he achieve what he needed to, with what he had on hand, with what he knew at the time, within the time frame that he was to accomplish it?  Then you make your best assessment without prejudice.

My favourite bit of trivia about Montgomery is that he was the second choice to command the Eighth Army at El Alamein.  But for a twist of fate he would have been, historically, another Horrocks or Dempsey.

Dan.


----------



## geo (23 Dec 2008)

One thing that history can confirm is that Monty was able to gather together & cultivate enough capable battalion/regiment/brigade/division/corps commanders throughout his terms as commander.  

He succeeded because - they succeeded.


----------



## Kirkhill (23 Dec 2008)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> Hmmm, where are we going with this one?
> 
> And although I agree that Slim was an exceptional leader, I disagree with parts of the assessment on Montgomery...



I agree.  

Prior to Monty the Brits had a decent record in North Africa.  It was only the arrival of Rommel that set them back on their heels - and there is reason to criticize Churchill for meddling there.

In Slim's case he had nothing to build on and precious little materiel support to build with.

I put Slim head and shoulder's above Monty as a leader and commander.


----------



## Greymatters (24 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I put Slim head and shoulder's above Monty as a leader and commander.



That was my point - although it cannot be doubted that Montgomery had success as a general, he did not exemplify the traits we think of as a 'leader'.  A leader of units but not a leader of men...


----------



## Old Sweat (24 Dec 2008)

What keeps Montgomery out of the absolute top rank was his fumbles in the North West Europe campaign. I don't know if his nose was out of joint because Ike took command of all the ground forces, or what, but he did not do a good job in managing the battles south of Caen that culminated in the closing of the Falaise Gap. He seemed to have lost interest for a short period and his usual grip on the battle was not there. Characteristically Monty and his acolytes later shifted the blame to Crerar. He already had infuriated Eisenhower, but his patronizing attitude and endlessly arguing that the resources devoted to Patton et al would be better used allowing him to strike deep into Germany almost got him sacked. I think Montgomery's mounting of Arnhem rather than concentrating on clearing the Scheldt was more likely ego driven than the result of a realistic apprecation. He also needlessy p----- off the Americans by cavalierly giving the press the impression that he had defeated the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. Finally the battles in the Rhineland and the belated crossing of the Rhine seem to have been predicated on the aim of giving the British army a place in the postwar sun.


----------



## pbi (27 Dec 2008)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> That was my point - although it cannot be doubted that Montgomery had success as a general, he did not exemplify the traits we think of as a 'leader'.  A leader of units but not a leader of men...



I'm not sure about this statement. If you read "The Full Monty", a biography by Nigel Hamilton published in 2001, you do see that Monty clearly understood the need for the projection of personal leadership to the lowest levels. The biography is quite objective, balancing Monty's evident military traits against an unhappy, odd private personality that was almost emotionally crippled (he dwells on a sub-theme that Monty was struggling with being gay...) It appears well researched in terms of primary sources, and also refers to the secondary works of some of Monty's contemporaries.

As a platoon commander in the years before WWI, Hamilton claims that Monty was considered strange by his peers and superiors for the amount of time he dedicated to the training and welfare of his troops, when most of his fellows were on the sports field, in the Mess or off on the hunt.  This degree of interest in the details of soldiers' lives and training seems to have stayed with him as he advanced. 

Monty was quite adept at analysing the command abilities of officers below him: his grim review of formation/unit leadership in the Canadian Army in England is fairly well known (and, in my opinion, held largely true for the remainder of the 20th century...). He understood that Canadian soldiers and junior officers were extremely high quality and with great potential, but hampered by senior officers who were too often unfit for their ranks. My guess is that his experiences in WWI combat showed him the importance of training and leadership at the tactical level. 

He stressed the importance of senior leaders getting out of the HQ and down to the units as often as possible. In North Africa, his visits to units became well known. Although these were obviously staged, what Monty very clearly understood is that nothing replaces a senior commander explaining the "why" to soldiers. In Hamilton's book, Monty comments in several places about how important this was, and how poorly British generals did it in WWI.

I think that Monty's biggest problem has been one of his post war popular image: he just wasn't the swaggering, cigar-chewing Patton type that Hollywood has hyped up. On top of that, he wasn't very likeable and never really cared much what people thought of him.

Cheers

pbi


----------



## Greymatters (30 Dec 2008)

You present valid points.  The problem is that the same action can be seen as both negative or positive, but you cannot know for sure unless we have that persons personal thoughts on the what they were thinking...



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> As a platoon commander in the years before WWI, Hamilton claims that Monty was considered strange by his peers and superiors for the amount of time he dedicated to the training and welfare of his troops, when most of his fellows were on the sports field, in the Mess or off on the hunt.  This degree of interest in the details of soldiers' lives and training seems to have stayed with him as he advanced.



Unusual indeed.  For every commander Ive known who took extra time to train his troops and took care of them, Ive known another who was a micromanager or just wanted his troops to perform perfectly so he would get a good reputation (read 'PER').  What would settle this would be the perception from the troops view - was he bagdriving them to achieve a perceived perfect performance for himself, or did they really need the extra training to be as good as the rest or better?  You cant find this info in the history books.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> He stressed the importance of senior leaders getting out of the HQ and down to the units as often as possible. In North Africa, his visits to units became well known. Although these were obviously staged, what Monty very clearly understood is that nothing replaces a senior commander explaining the "why" to soldiers. In Hamilton's book, Monty comments in several places about how important this was, and how poorly British generals did it in WWI.



Also called 'showmanship'.  This lacks the details to confirm if he was acting like a leader or being a leader.  Did he speak with the men, or just the officers?  Did he review the troops on a parade square and ask a few questions, or did he casually tour the line and speak informally with the men?  Did he eat dinner with the officers in the mess, or did he grab a plate and sit down with the boys and eat field rations?  There are a hundred ways to tell if a leader actually cares about the welfare of his troops and the history books rarely provide these...


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (30 Dec 2008)

Take this for what it is worth, but A History of the First Hussars  (the 1981 edition at least) mentions a visit by Monty to the Regiment quite favourably. It has him talking to the troops individually on parade while they "stood easy" which was greeted favourably. He then had them break ranks and gather around his jeep so "we can get a good look at each other" as he put it. He used that time to talk about the importance of a general and the men knowing each other (As an aside, I've seen this done today with good effect.) The history offers that "the informality and the sincerity of talk brought forward three terrific cheers." 

From what I have read he did seem to be able to gain the confidence of the men and the obedience of his officers. I question his tactics and plans sometimes, but I am a few pay grades below that level... From what I have read there was a problem with senior leadership in th time before his coming into command where there was a lack of confidence and officers debated while Rommel maneouvred. I do believe that Monty benefited from good timing in North Africa, as Auckinleck had got the 8th Army through its greatest crisis, but he still seemed to have been what the British Army needed at that time and place. Auckinlek was treated badly by Churchill in my opinion, but those are tough jobs and I guess you can't always be nice.


----------



## Rifleman62 (30 Dec 2008)

Interesting read I believe. Re-enforces pbi's post.

6 Mar 42
*
Some General Notes on What to Look for When Visiting a Unit*

1.	The underlying object is obviously to find out what the CO is worth, and generally if it is a good or a bad unit.  The method adopted, and the length of time it will take, will depend entirely on the inspecting officer's own military knowledge, on his own experience in actual command, and generally on whether he can be "bluffed" by the CO.

2.	Most CO's will want to lay on a tour of the unit area, looking at the training and so on.  This would be quite suitable for a later visit.  But for the first visit, if you really want to find out all about the unit there is only one way to do it.  And that is to sit with the CO in his orderly room and cross-examine him on certain points which are "key" points, and which will show at once whether or not he knows his job.  The Brigadier should be present, but no one else.  The CO is then put through once.  The CO will welcome such an interview and will learn a great deal from it.  On no account must he be bullied or rattled.  The great point is to show him his difficulties and worries and to help him.  I have found all CO's in the Canadian Corps most friendly, and very willing to tell me how they run their show.  It is very important that the CO should realize early in the proceedings that you really do know what you are talking about, it is quite easy to show him this by cross-examining him on some point of detail about which he probably thinks you know nothing.  Once he sees this, he will be perfectly frank and will welcome any ideas you may give him.  Both parties will learn a great deal from this discussion-the visiting officer and the CO.  And so will the Brigadier.  And all the time you are summing up the CO and finding out what he knows.  It must all be friendly and natural from the beginning; you then get the CO's confidence; this is most important.

3.	An investigation into the following points will show you at once what the unit is worth, and if the CO knows his job:

a.	The system of selection, promotion, and inspection of NCO's.  This is a very important point, and its importance is not always realised by the CO's.  The NCO's are the backbone of the battalion; a good solid foundation must be built up on the L/Cpl level, and the standard of this foundation must be the CO's standard and NOT five different company standards.  The CO must interest himself directly in everything connected with his NCO's and WO's;

b.	Organization of individual training, ie., training of the rank and file.  The usual fault here is that men are not graded before the training begins, and put in to categories in accordance with their knowledge and efficiency.  This must always be done, so as to ensure that men get instruction in accordance with their needs.  The principle of piece work is also very important;


c.	Training of the NCO's.  The training of the NCO's in all duties in the field, tactical and administrative, must be carried out by the Coy Comds.  The Adjutant and the RSM must take a very definite hand in keeping the NCO's up to the mark, in instruction in discipline matters, and generally in ensuring that the non-commissioned ranks are a credit to the battalion, are able to maintain a high standard in all matters, are not afraid of the men, and are trained on for promotion;

d.	Training of the Officers.  The CO must handle this himself, personally.  No one else can do it for him.  He must do it himself.  The best results are obtained when the CO has an officers day once a week.  Officers have to be taught the stage-management of the various operations of war, the technique of movement, the co-operation of all arms in battle, the technique of reconnaissance and deployment, administration in the field, and so on; and

e.	Organization and conduct of collective training.  Before beginning Coy or Bn.  Training the CO must issue instructions as to how it is to be done.  He should assemble his officers and lay down:

(1)	The object of the training;
(2)	The principles on which it is to be based;
(3)	The standard aimed at;
(4)	The phases of war to be studied;
(5)	His views on operations by night; and
(6)	How he wishes the time available to be used.
etc.

The great point in collective training is to mix the training. During platoon training the whole company should go out once a week. During the company training the whole battalion should go out once every ten days or so. During Battalion training the whole Brigade should go out once a fortnight. This is far better than having long periods devoted separately to each subject.

The next point is that when you embark on unit training every exercise must include the dusk and the dawn.  These are the times when things happen in war. A small number of exercises lasting 24 hours or more are much better than a large number of short exercises.  The exercise lasting from after breakfast till tea-time is of little use.  A good exercise is one that tests out 	the administrative arrangements, and involves the dusk and the dawn.

During collective training the following operations must be taught and practised:

(1)	The set-piece attack, ie., the Brigade battle;
(2)	Breaking down the Brigade battle and carrying on the advance by means of resolute fighting in self-contained groups of all arms;
(3)	The dusk attack;
(4)	The night attack;
(5)	Forcing the crossing of obstacles;
(6)	Re-organization and holding the ground gained;
(7)	Disengagement and withdrawal;
(8)	Defensive tactics; and
(9)	Counter-attacks.

Teaching "Training" as Distinct from Teaching "War".

4.	It is the exception to find a commander who teaches his subordinates how to train troops.  The FSR we have laid down the principles of training; officers are supposed to know all about this subject; actually, very few know anything about it and a great deal of time is wasted in consequence.Training is a great art; there are principles of training just as there are principles of war.  Training in war time must be carried out somewhat differently to training in peacetime, as we have to be ready to meet the enemy at any time.

5.	In the training of his unit the CO has got to consider the following points:

a.	Training of the rank and file;

b.	Training of the NCO's in their duties as leaders;

c.	Training of the officers;

d.	Organization and conduct of collective training generally;

e.	The best way to run sub-unit training, ie., platoon and company training; and

f.	Battalion training.

If he will think it out on these lines he has got a firm basis from which to start.

6.	But he will do no good in his in his training unless he realises very clearly the importance of the following basic points, and has a good system for carrying them out:

a.	Interior economy and administration, and life generally within the unit; and

b.	The training of the leaders, ie., the officers and the NCO's.

Some CO's realize the necessity for training the officers; not a great many, but only some.  Very few bother about the NCO's; in fact practically none.  But the NCO's are the backbone of the unit; the whole question of their selection, promotion, instruction, and welfare must be on good and sound lines.  Sgts Messes are very important.

The RSM

7.	The RSM is one of the most important people in the unit.  I always ask to see the RSM, treat him like an officer, and shake hands with him.  When inspecting the S. Saskatchewan Regt. I called the RSM out in front and shook hands with him in front of the whole Bn; It may seem a small point but in my view it means a great deal.
The RSM is the senior non-commissioned rank in the unit; his authority over the NCO's is supreme, and he must be backed up and given opportunities to pull his weight.  He should frequently assemble the WO's and NCO's by Coys and address them, getting across to them various points in the daily life of the unit that wants attention.
He and the Adjutant should work together as a team; and they should go out together round the battalion area whenever they can, keeping an eye on    the general show.
It is very difficult, in fact practically impossible, to have a good cadre of NCO's without a good RSM.

Visiting Collective Training

8.	When visiting a unit on inter-Bde exercise, or a Divisional exercise, you want to be clear as to what you want to find out.  Generally I suggest that this will be as follows:

a.	What the commander is worth, and whether he is able to handle his ship when in full sail in a rough sea;

b.	Whether his machinery for exercising command is good, and runs smoothly; and

c.	Broadly, how the formation or unit re-acts.  Does it answer to the helm, or is it awkward and unsteady in a rough sea?

As far as the Corps Commander is concerned, or in fact any senior or general officer, the above points are the ones that really matter.  The points of detail such as the minor tactics, the fieldcraft, and so on, are the province of subordinate commanders.  If you want to get a line on this it can be done by getting a staff officer to watch the operation in the front line and to keep an eye on such things as:

a.	technique of movement;

b.	deployment;

c.	battle drill;

d.	quick manoeuvre;

e.	outflanking tactics;

f.	sub-unit tactics generally; and

g.	cooperation with other arms on the sub-unit level.

9.	As regards para 8a and 8b. The points here are:

a.	What orders did the commander receive?

b.	What did he know about the enemy when he received those orders? and

c.	What orders did he then give?

Once you have got this from the commander himself, then you are well on the way to what you want to find out.
You then go as follows:

d.	What are his present dispositions?

e.	What is his view as to the general situation, ie., how does he view the problem? and

f.	What are his plans for future action?	

A few questions as to the layout of his HQ, and a quick round tour of his HQ, follows.  I should then leave him.

10.	As regards para 8c.

You now visit the next commander below, eg. if para 9 has been done with a Brigadier you visit one of the forward battalion HQ.  There you go for the same points as outlined in para 9.

11.	You have now got the answer to what you want to know.  But you want to check up on it, so you must find out from the Director when some important change or event in the battle is about to take place.  There may be a movement when a very fast ball is going to be bowled at the commander of one side.
You want to be in on this, and study the reactions.  In particular it is a good thing if you can be present when the commander is giving out his orders; by listening to this you will find out a good deal.

12.	In general the art lies in being at the right place a the right time, and knowing when that time is.
The next point is to get all your information from the commander himself.  You want to sum him up; therefore you must deal with him personally.  If he is out, you must chase him till you find him.
The last point is to remember what is the object of your visit; see 
para 8.  You will not have time to also visit sub-units in the front line; if you want a line on how they are working, send some other officer to get that information for you.

[signed] B.L. Montgomery
Lieutenant-General
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
South Eastern Command


----------



## Rifleman62 (30 Dec 2008)

*COMMAND IN BATTLE - A REPORT BY A CO OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION*

In front line with 49 Div - 30 Jun 1944

1.	I took command on the evening of 26 Jun.  From a.m. 27 Jun until a.m. 30 Jun we have been in contact with enemy and under moderately heavy mortar and shell fire.

2.	The following facts make it clear that this report makes no reflection on the state of my battalion when they left UK:

a.	In 14 days there have been some 23 officer and 360 OR casualties;

b.	Only 12 of the original officers remain and they are all junior.  The CO and every rank above Cpl (except for 2 Lts) in Bn HQ have gone, all coy comdrs have gone.  One coy has lost every officer, another has only one left;

c.	Since I took over I have lost two 2 i/c's on successive days and a coy comdr the third day; and

d.	Majority of tpt, all documents, records and a large amount of equipment was lost.

3.	State of Men:

a.	Seventy-five percent of the men react adversely to enemy shelling and are "jumpy";

b.	Five cases in 3 days of self-inflicted wounds - more possible cases;

c.	Each time men are killed or wounded a number of men become casualties through shell shock or hysteria;

d.	In addition to genuine hysteria a large number of men have left their posns after shelling on one pretext or another and gone to the rear until sent back by the MO or myself;

e.	The new drafts have been affected, and 3 young soldiers become casualties with hysteria after hearing their own guns; and

f.	The situation has got worse each day as more key personnel have become casualties.

4.	Discipline and Leadership:

a.	State of discipline is bad although the men are a pleasant cheerful type normally;

b.	NCOs do not wear stripes and some officers have no badges of rank.  This makes the situation impossible when 50% of the bn do not know each other; and

c.	NCO leadership is weak in most cases and the newly drafted officers are in consequence having to expose themselves unduly to try and get anything done.  It is difficult for the new officers (60%) to lead the men under fire as they do not know them.

5.	Organization and Aim of Bn:

a.	Bn HQ and battle procedure generally is in a state of complete disorganization for various reasons, but mainly because all key men have gone.  It will take some time to put right;

b.	Major items of equipment are mostly made up, but tpt and all the essential minor items, which make for smooth running of the HQs, are missing; and

c.	QM has an impossible task as if he manages to get a return it is out of date if the bn moves, as numerous articles are then left behind.

6.	Conclusion:

	a.	My battalion is not fit to take its place in the line; and

b.	Even excluding the question of nerves and morale, the battalion will not be fit to go back into the line until it is remobilized, reorganized and to an extent retrained.  It is no longer a bn but a collection of individuals.  There is naturally no esprit de corps for those who are frightened (as we all are to one degree or another) to fall back on.  I have twice had to stand at the end of a track and draw my revolver on retreating men.

7.	Recommendation:

a.	If it is not possible to withdraw the bn to the base or UK to re-equip, reorganize and train, then it should be disbanded and split among other units;

b.	If it is not possible to do either of the above and if it is essential that the bn should return to the line, I suggest that I may be relived of my command and I suggest that a CO with 2 or 3 years experience should relieve me, and that he should bring his Adjutant and a signal officer with him;

c.	Being a regular officer I realize the seriousness of this request and its affect on my career.  On the other hand I have the lives of the new officer personnel (which are excellent) to consider.  Three days running a Major has been killed or seriously wounded because I have ordered him to help me to "in effect" stop them running during mortar concentrations.  Unless withdrawn from the Div, I do not think I can get the bn fit to fight normally and this waste of life would continue.  My honest opinion is that if you continue to throw in new officer and other rank replacements as casualties occur, you are throwing good money after bad; and

d.	I know my opinion is shared by two other commanding officers who know the full circumstances.

In the Field, 30 Jun 44.

(Sgd) Lt Col, Commanding Officer

As a result of this report the battalion was immediately withdrawn from the division, as it was clearly no longer fit for battle.  In responding to the divisional Commander's report of this decision, Montgomery wrote, on 2 July 1944, "I consider the CO displays a defeatist mentality and is not a "proper chap".

(REPRODUCED FROM AN ORIGINAL REPORT HELD IN THE ARCHIVES OF CHURCHILL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE).


----------



## Old Sweat (30 Dec 2008)

This is not the first time I have read this report and the follow on by Montgomery. I hate to second guess more than six decades after the event, and I won't. It is difficult to imagine an infantry battalion falling apart, and it is noteworthy that M. sent the whole division to a 'quiet' sector in the area taken by 6 AB Division on D Day to keep it out of the way.


----------



## a_majoor (31 Dec 2008)

Monty gets mixed reviews here as well (On the Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman F. Dixon). 

One of the previous posters alluded to Montgomery's personality "issues", and Dixon goes into greater detail on Monty's personal history. This would seem to track with Dixon's observations about how inflexible and authoritarian personalities, while perhaps desirable (or at least harmless) in a peacetime army, lead to disaster in wars. Monty's upbringing seems to have impressed certain defects on his character, but not deeply enough to warp him into a "military incompetent". Most of these flaws were demonstrated more in his relations with his staff, associates and family rather than taken out on the PBI, for which we should all be thankful.


----------

