# The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group



## McG

There has been much discussion on this site about replacing the current brigade and battalion structures with something new.  There have been threads on the ability for Engr and Arty sub-units to sustain their skills if permanently entrenched within an infantry battalion.  There have been other threads suggesting that it is not even possible for two types of infantry (light & mech) to co-exist in one unit without horrible skill atrophy.  However, we are continually reminded of the value that organizations, which will fight together, should be training together.

So, what is right for the Army, the Optimal Battle Group (OBG) or the Affiliated Battle Group (ABG)?  In an OBG, all of the sub-units permanently exist within the unit even in Canada.  An OBG would include a mix of infantry (light & mech), armour, artillery, engineer, CS and CSS.  In an ABG system, all the required sub-units for three BG exist in each CMBG.  However, the sub units exist in functional parent units and are permanently affiliated with one of infantry battalions (the # RCHA has three batteries, the CER has three field squadrons, the armd regt has three recce squadrons, etc).

The ABG could even provide an alternative to the identical infantry battalion concept.  Instead of three battalions with 2 x mech and 1 x light coy, the light could remain light & affiliate two of its rifle coy with the other battalions.  In turn, each mech battalion would have a rifle coy affiliated with the light battalion.

Perhaps the the right answer is a little from column A and a little from column B.  2 PPCLI and 2 RCR both find themselves physically separated from their brigades.  These two units could exist as OBGs while the rest of the Army adopts a ABG structure.

Thoughts?


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## STING

Perhaps have all the regular infantry battalions become Mech and have a unit of CSOR attached to each brigade as their light infantry capability. Just a thought ...


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## Journeyman

STING said:
			
		

> Perhaps have all the regular infantry battalions become Mech and *have a unit of CSOR attached to each brigade * as their light infantry capability. *Just a thought  * ...





			
				STING said:
			
		

> Perhaps *station one of the future companies of CSOR at the Chilliwack * base . They wouldn't require the logistics and support of a full batallion . Plus a great training area for light infantry with all the coastal mountain terrain in BC . *Just a idea  * .....



While everyone is entitled to their "thoughts" and "ideas," they tend to fly better if they're _informed_ opinions. 

CSOR, when fully manned, will have two DA Coys and an SF Coy.....and you want to somehow provide three Coys to the Brigades and another Coy to garrison Chilliwack. That would be four independent Coys, isolated from their HQ and support elements (those are important things, by the way). 

Do you now see why the expression, "stay in your lane," keeps cropping up around this site?


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## larry Strong

OBG = Kampfgruppe, worked pretty well for the Germans in WW2. Was that not also the way the Soviet MRR's and Tank Rgt's were configured?


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## PPCLI Guy

Command-Sense-Act 105 said:
			
		

> IThe ABG idea is workable on paper, but when push comes to shove there is a lot of robbing Peter to pay Paul in that situation.  While ABG will work when everyone is in garrison and training plans are deconflicted, it fall apart on large exercises (BTE) or when multiple deployments crop up, as suddenly the Sappers and Gunners find enough demands that they could easily clone themselves and still have units demanding their skills.



Herein lies the rub - we need to have FE ask for (and/or accept) that which we FG.  No one asks the Navy for 1 1/3 Frigates...


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## McG

Command-Sense-Act 105 said:
			
		

> The ABG idea is workable on paper, but when push comes to shove there is a lot of robbing Peter to pay Paul in that situation.


That will be a problem of both OBG and ABG models until such time as there are enough PYs assigned (and filled) to the field force.

However, the ABG structure would allow extending the affiliations beyond the regular force.  I understand there was some examination of each regular infantry battalion having several affiliated reserve infantry units.  These reserve units would have a responsibity to force generate the fourth rifle company for every deployment.



			
				PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Herein lies the rub - we need to have FE ask for (and/or accept) that which we FG.  No one asks the Navy for 1 1/3 Frigates...


We are a part of this problem.  If you ask a dozen people what a BG looks like, you could easily get a dozen answers.  We have a doctrinal BG but the real army does not have the manpower to FG a doctrinal BG for any sustained period (and so we always invent something smaller for each deployment).  Is the doctrinal BG the right one?  I think it is close at the very least, but it may be lacking in many of the enabalers we are calling on in Afghanistan (CIMIC, PsyOps, Kingston assets, FAC, UAV Ops, etc).  We need to figure the worst case requirements & build our army to that (regardless of the ABG or OBG model).

If we do this & stick to a determined template, then the force employer can ask for 1 x BG.


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## retiredgrunt45

The last almost full strength BG Canada had was in the late 70's upto the late 80's in Germany "4CMBG". Everything from then has been on paper only strength. Even in Germany we had to rob assets from other units in Canada to keep our numbers up, upto 1989, when the wall came down and we began sending assets back to Canada, preparing for the eventual closing of both Baden and Lahr in 92-93.

I can remember 3RCR's strength in Germany, in the early 80's being approx 850 strong. Upto when I retired in 01, we couldn't even make 1/2 that number.


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## retiredgrunt45

Sorry my mistake.


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## TangoTwoBravo

I'll be the arch-traditionalist and advocate "pure" units that get grouped together for operations.  The chain of command in a given "pure" unit can ensure that its given elements are trained to the right standard.  These pieces can then come together to train in preparation for operations. 

While a Battle Groups seems to come together like a train wreck before deployment, as long as they have time to train together they can build the cohesion and knowledge of each other that is required.  That is built, however, on strong specific to corps foundations that are best developed, in my opinion, in the incubator of a pure unit.  I venture that mixed units would still get pulled apart and put back together again to meet the needs/constraints of a given mission.

With regards to doctrine, it turns out that we have some!

p.s. Guess I'm arguing for the"Non-Optimal Battle Group."  Oh well.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

My civvie question:  I've always been told that it's essential to train as you fight.  With that in mind, is there any role-specific training in the ABG model that outweighs the cohesive training of the OBG model?  Specifically, can someone give me an example of ABG-based training that can only be done with like units (infantry with infantry and artillery with artiilery) that would prove critical in a battlefield situation that could not be taught in the OBG-model when training occurs with unlike units (infantry, arty, etc all within same battle group)?

Of note, my apologies in advance for any errors in my military vocabulary....


Matthew.


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## TangoTwoBravo

It may vary from arm to arm, but I would argue that everything from individual skills up to sub-unit level training.  While there are "platoon-groups" operations out there, I wouldn't necessarily call them the norm.  Looking at an armoured unit, the CO/RSM and his staff can train and mentor the squadrons, troops and crews in their fundamental branch skills.  They understand what standard is required for those skills and how best to build them.

Once that is done the various pieces of the battle group can come together.  As a tank squadron BC, I arrived at a given infantry battalion to conduct exercises in a squadron that had been trained by the CO and had had some time alone to get the basics squared away.  Similarly, as a tanker I don't know much about artillery except that I want lots of it.  I believe that the training and organizing of an artillery battery should be done under the auspices of an artillery CO.


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## McG

Red_Five said:
			
		

> I'll be the arch-traditionalist and advocate "pure" units that get grouped together for operations.  ...  Guess I'm arguing for the"Non-Optimal Battle Group."  Oh well.


This would be the ABG concept provided that each of the pure units were balanced to provide thier respective element to each of the BGs that the Bde would generate.



			
				Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> ... can someone give me an example of ABG-based training that can only be done with like [pure] units


EOD teams and armd engr sects are two entities that are required on operations but which would lack the critical mass to be self-sustaining in an OBG.  However, a CER (a pure unit) can maintain the critical mass.  One Armd Engr Tp has the critical mass to train & maintain its skills.  By establishing affiliations between the Armd Engr Sects & the CERs Fd Sqns, an Armd Engr Sect becomes available for each ABG through its affiliated sqn.

Perhapse someone from the infantry would like to comment on the mixed light/mech battalion & its impact on training.


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## a_majoor

The OBG sounds a bit like a Mech Infantry battalion from the mid 1980's, with the Support Coy and Combat Support Coy expanded to battalion sized sub units in their own right. I suspect that the OBG is ideal in theory but would suffer from what Red _Five and others have pointed out; the specialist sub units would not have critical mass to develop and sustain thier skill sets.

What probably would work out best would be a hybrid arrangement, with the core OBG units living and training together as one, while the specialty units would be off to one side (as it were), with their platoon/troop/det "on call" for the OBG. The OBG's can be configured from the start to be "Cavalry", "Assault" or "Light", and this should not really affect the specialty skills like CIMIC, PSYOPS or EOD too much in this model.


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## a_majoor

A cautionary tale about rice bowls.......

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/dunn.htm

They could have been contenders, though!


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## Mountie

The Regimental System aside, wouldn't the Optimal Battle Group be more effective.  The US Army has moved switched to the Combined Arms Battalion both in their current heavy forces and with their Future Combat System force structure.  The present Combined Arms Battalion has two mechanized infantry companies, two armoured companies, a combat engineer company and a headquarters company (mortar, recce and medical platoons) and it has a forward support company attached from the Brigade Support Battalion.  (Why they chose to form permanent combined arms battalions but remove the CSS company and attach it from the BSB is another issue.)  Some sources also indicated that the companies themselves are permanently organized as combined arms with to rifle platoons and a tank platoon in a mechanized infantry company and visa versa in the armoured company. The Future Combat System organization presently being put forward is a combined arms battalion with two mechanized rifle company, two armoured companies, a mortar battery, and a reconnaissance troop (troop is company-size in US cavalry terms).  At present there is no engineer unit anywhere within the FCS Brigade Combat Team.  Only unmanned ground vehicles equipped for some engineering tasks.  The US Army has also used the combined arms concept in its Armoured Cavalry Regiment for decades.  An armoured cavalry squadron consists of a headquarters company (CSS), three cavalry troops (company) with two reconnissance and two tank platoons, a tank company and an artillery battery.  It also had an affiliated engineer platoon.

I would think that an Optimal Battle Group that could live and train together on a daily basis would be a much more effect unit then an Affiliated Battle Group that is only pulled together for specific training.  With the exception of the cavalry regiment, the regimental system could be basically maintained even with the Optimal Battle Group.  Engineer squadrons and artillery batteries have more history than their regiments and could be independently attached to the battle group and maintain their tradition and history.  The CSS unit could be similarily maintained on a company basis.


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## Kirkhill

First the good news:  Judging from this missive from Ft. Carlisle brainstorming that goes on here at Army.ca is as good as that that goes on in the most technologically advanced armed force in the world.

Now the bad news: Judging from this missive from Ft. Carlisle brainstorming that goes on here at Army.ca is as good as that that goes on in the most technologically advanced armed force in the world.

It seems that many folks on this site have looked at the same problems and come to same conclusions as many of the high paid help down south (and probably across the pond).

It also seems that the same counters have been identified and employed.  As are the same problems in institutions.

Here's a thought - maybe the biggest problem is the dammed accountants.

In their world of accountability it is necessary to track every dollar spent and every decision made.  From beginning to end everything must be tested and evaluated.  That requires that at the very outset of the process that final goals must be established.  At the end of the process goals must be met. 

Most importantly, if, at the end of the process, goals have not been fully achieved then the process is deemed a failure and careers die.  A 95% solution is never good enough - much less a 70% solution.

That is probably why the GAO - General Accounting Office - is so dead set against the iterative development process - even in time of "war" (or high intensity operations if you prefer).

This article states that the final straw that broke the concept was the AGS becoming more like a tank and the Armoured Corps determined that if there was any tanking to be done the it would be done there way and done in their tanks.   As a result (along with pressure from Infantry on 3-man TOW teams - IIRC the CAR used two-man teams in their jeeps - and the Arty on indirect fire (hellfires for the Yanks, mortars for the Canucks)) the HTLD couldn't fully meet its design objectives.

On the other hand it met many of those objectives and probably achieved other capabilities previously unconsidered.  Had that force been implemented then commanders would have had a broader range of options available to them and still had the existing force structure to continue with its existing taskings AND be able to backstop the new formation.   If the HTLD needed some heavy support then give it to them.  Ship a troop of tanks to the Theater to work with them.

But then that would turn it from a George Patton battle into an Omar Bradley battle - and as most are aware it is George Patton that wins wars.

14,000 years ago people in modern Algeria were lining up in battle lines and shooting arrows at each other.  It makes you wonder if the GAO had been around at the time to join with the Union of Bowyers and Fletchers and the Corps of Archers whether or not that chap that jumped on a horse 4000 years ago in Scythia would ever have been permitted to deploy.


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## Kirkhill

And Mountie, it is not the Regimental system per se.

The Regiment as developed by William of Nassau, Gustav Adolph and Talleyrand were all combined forces.  They mixed infantry with sword and pike, light artillery with muskets and heavier artillery with leather guns, grass guns and gallopers and equipped them uniformly, trained them to a common regime and then fought them in the field as a formed trained body.

The regiment grew out of the Spanish Tercios and even the mercenary Freelancers of the early renaissance.  These groups all operated, trained and lived together under one commander.  But they were armed with a variety of weapons.  Each man was trained to use his own weapon to its maximum capabilities, to rely on his mates with different weapons to protect him when his own weapon couldn't and to use his weapon to protect his mate.

All this "stovepiping" in modern armies may stem from a tendency to define the "essence" of particular elements in one word:
the bayonet - infantry
the sabre  - cavalry (or the horse, or the tank if you prefer)
the gun - arty
the flag, the drum, the trumpet, the horse, the radio, the satellite - sigs
the ship - navy
the aircraft - air force

And all of these inanimate objects were never more than tools that could be used to achieve a goal when used in cooperation with each other.

Interestingly the French tried to define the essence of infantry in terms of the amorphous elan - or fighting spirit.  They might have been on to something, because the one thing that keeps coming up over and over again on discussing Corps capabilities is the importance of mindset.  And the vehemence of the arguments as individual members of Corps defend their Corps suggests both that mindset is a very real factor in Corps operations AND that mindset is very hard, if not impossible to change.

Maybe mindset is the ultimate divider amongst Corps and Branches.  But if so how do you test for that amongst recruits and how does the GAO or Treasury Board measure how effectively such goal is being achieved.


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## George Wallace

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> First the good news:  Judging from this missive from Ft. Carlisle brainstorming that goes on here at Army.ca is as good as that that goes on in the most technologically advanced armed force in the world.
> 
> Now the bad news: Judging from this missive from Ft. Carlisle brainstorming that goes on here at Army.ca is as good as that that goes on in the most technologically advanced armed force in the world.



And the really bad news is that the brainstorming that goes on here at Army.ca is and/or has been unpaid.  Perhaps we could ask for some of those Taxpayer's Dollars to be sent our way.   ;D


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## Kirkhill

Heckuva plan George.  Where do we line up for the cheques?


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## Old Sweat

It seems to me that we have had experience with the optimal battle group concept. I am referring to the Canadian Airborne Regiment as it existed in Edmonton with its own battery and engineer squadron. The original organization also included an airborne reconnaisance squadron, but manpower cuts aborted it.

Speaking only as a gunner, the airborne battery was an excellent light battery, but it made a point of joining a field regiment for a practice camp once a year or more to exercise as part of larger gunner team. I suspect the engineers might, repeat might have done the same on their net.

What was the reason that the regiment was stripped of its supporting arms? I do not think it was because of any belief that the experiment failed, as opposed to falling out of the decision to move the unit to Petawawa and melding it into the SSF on its creation.

I am still not sure which way I would go, if anybody was misguided enough to ask me. That is why this debate is so interesting.


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## a_majoor

The most interesting part of the story (and Kirkhill spotted it right away) is the "new" capabilities which were being identified by people using tools in new and different ways. We really can't imagine what sorts of ideas might have been developed from that experient, and I'm sure that if we tried something along those lines (using 1 CMBG as the "test" unit and trying things out in Wainwright) we would probably evolve in ways we havn't even considered (and looking at various posts we have considered a lot of different ideas, such as Armoured Cavalry Regiments, "Modular Manouevre Battalions", Brigade sized Combined Arms Regiments..........)


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## TangoTwoBravo

Regarding the article, the ability to insert forces quickly into a theatre and still have the combat power necessary to deal with mechanized opponents is a difficult proposal.  What I find interesting is that the United States already had this with their USMC.  Everybody wants to be on the tip of the spear I guess.  

At the risk of looking like a rice-bowl defender, sometimes we should stick to our lanes and do what we are good at.   If we try to do somebody else's job because it looks interesting at the moment there may be grief down the line when we are called upon to execute our real tasks.  That being said, branch parochialism can be a bad thing.

I like the "homogenous" unit concept because it implies that you will have to improvise on the spot.  That means you train and prepare for that.  A mixed-unit might actually be less flexible, since you could go in thinking that you've already task-organized.  I imagine that the pressures of war will mean that even "combined arms units" will still get pulled apart and put back together to meet the situation.  This negates the prime advantage of the mixed-MOC unit in the first place.

Homogenous units must, of course, train together and see themselves as part of the same team.  I think that this happens with our current system.


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## a_majoor

The crux of the problem seems to be flexibility. The American "establishment" worked very hard to crush the test division, rather than learn and adapt from what was being discovered. The three man TOW dets, the inflexible attitude towards light armour and resistance to using ground launched HELLFIRE since it moved onto "artillery" turf don't speak too highly of the establishment.

These sorts of arguments will rise up and bite us again, since technology continues to extend and blend capabilities. A Leopard tank firing a LAHAT through tube missile can engage a target 13Km away; is it an "Armour" capability or an "Artillery" capability? Infantry soldiers with Gill/Spike can engage targets at ranges of 5 Km, and use the fiber optic system as a recce UAV during the flight of the missile. EFOG-M has a range of 10Km, and various proposals have been made for FOG-M munitions with ranges of up to 60km. 

MMEV, if it had ever happened, would have been another "gender bender", and even a stripped down proposal I wrote up (using a Blazer turret armed with a 25mm chain gun and Starstreak missiles) could be a Triple A system or a recce DFSV.

We will have to do a lot of thinking about how capabilities change the way we organize and work.


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## Kirkhill

Maybe the only real innovation we'll find is if we can locate another Alexander Gault or Lord Strathcona and have them recruit volunteers to staff a private army, equipped and trained at personal expense, then put at the service of the government to fulfill a specific task.

Keep the unit away from the accountants and micro-managers.  Set it up on a "no cure, no pay" cost recovery system.  Here's the job.  Here's the price.  You solve the problem.  You get paid AFTER the fact.


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## TangoTwoBravo

On the other hand, the US Army (and the US armed forces in general) did go through a fairly significant renaissance during the same period.  Much of this was, I suppose, iterative or evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary, but the point remains that they fielded some rather impressive new pieces of kit in fairly effective formations.  Accounting is boring, but a military does need to prioritize in terms of resources.  While the US Army did not field a light tank during the 80s, they put the M1 into the field and then made some significant upgrades along the way. 

Bureaucratic obstacles should be investigated and removed if required.  That being said, there can be good reasons for restricting capabilties in certain systems/branches.  Putting an air defence system on every tank or AFV is possible, but I'm not sure I'd want to do it even if it came at no dollar cost.  The same can be said for indirect fire and long-range NLOS missiles in the hands of every small unit.  Coordinating air defence and fires is tough enough as it is right now.  Looking a money again, if adding a whiz-bang indirect fire capability to a tank comes at a significant dollar cost and only partially replicates the capability already provided by a dedicated system then I can see a reason for killing a particular upgrade.  

As a complete tangent, I've been reading on the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05) and how it was interpreted by the European powers.  I'm not sure if we are on the cusp of a RMA in the same order of magnitude that was occuring in the years leading up to the First World War.  It is still, however, a cautionary tale for pro-establishment traditionalists and nay-sayers like me!


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## Red 6

I spent four years in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the 1980's, back when the US Army had three ACRs. These outfits were assigned to the armored corps. There were two in Europe and one stateside. While I was with the Regiment, we were in the H-series organization and the reorganized to the J-series. The armored cavalry regiment, of which only one still exists in the Army, were a powerful combined arms force that were permanently task-organized in garrison and combat.

The armored cavalry squadron had three line troops, a tank company, an artillery battery, an ADA platoon, an AVLB section and the full range of support assets. The regiment had three line squadrons, an air cavalry squadron, engineer and MI companies, and other assets that I can't remember anymore. We often were plussed-up with slice elements for Reforger, etc. But the basic organization stayed the same and we had a solid system that worked everyday, regardless of whether we were on the border, at gunnery in Graf or on maneuvers.

In the armored cavalry troop under the J-series we had two tanks platoons, two scout platoons, a mortar section, HQ and maintenance platoons. In 88 and 89 we did a test where they mixed up the tanks and Bradleys in our troop to make combined platoons. Operationally, it was a throwback to the old H-series TOE where the PL rode on a 113 and the PSG was on a tank. The theory with the test was that the troop could cover the same amount of ground and so did the platoons, but having all the platoons permanently task-organized would make them more flexible and responsive. We never did find out whether it worked or not, but were always saying that if the Army couldn't figure out the deal with the H-series after all those years, our stab at mixing it up wouldn't prove much. It was fun though, since all the scouts got licensed to drive the tanks and vice versa. 

Thursdays in the US Army have always been designated as "sergeant's day" where NCO's are supposed to have uninterrupted time for training their Soldiers in individual and collective tasks. Anyway, in the cav squadron, we had lots of Soldiers in low density MOS's spread out all over the place and they would link up for their training across troop lines. 

After I left the Blackhorse I was assigned to the Big Red One at Fort Riley, KS. I served in an armored battalion scout platoon and the battalion was pure in garrison and task organized for operations. It was always a goat screw when we were getting ready for an NTC rotation or field maneuvers on reorg day. Two tank companies would leave the hardstand and two companies of mech infantry would show up and so did all the slice elements. PLL was f***ed for awhile until they got all the right parts on-hand. The Soldiers still lived in the barracks from their home elements, but did PT with us. In theory, we got the same people everytime, but it never worked that way in practice. In my platoon we were supposed to get an ADA section, and an engineer platoon. We wasted so much time just figuring out who was who. In a word, it was stupid. 

To me it boils down to ownership and flexibility. Permanent task organizations send the message that we are in this for warfighting and will focus our energy on building and sustaining EFFECTIVE task forces that train as they fight. Pure battalions look pretty in the hardstand, but that's not how they fight. Yes, it is tough to sustain critical skills in low density MOS's but Soldiers are smart and they can do it. 

Let's face it, the days are over when infantrymen with bayonets were alone at the sharp end of the spear. If you could take a slice of the battlefield and analyze what MOS's were down there, they would all be mixed up. It only makes sense to officially organize them that way in garrison so much as possible.


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## TangoTwoBravo

The Cavalry organizations are probably the strongest argument for mixed-units.  A point to keep in mind, however, was that they were intended for a rather specialized purpose.  

Thinking back some ten years here, I think that Cavalry Squadrons had the same number of mortars as infantry or armor battalions, but they decentralized them up front (two per Troop as opposed to six held centrally at Sqn (Bn) level.  Given their expected task that made sense.  It might not make sense for a tank/infantry task force given their expected tasks to also permantly decentralize their mortars.  Where there any infantrymen in the Cavalry units with the exception of the mortarmen?

Centralization vs de-centralization of "enablers" is an old problem.  Do you centralize those Maxim machine guns into a battery held at Brigade level or do you give two to each Battalion?  I'm not sure if there is a hard and fast answer.  What works for one system might not work for another (I think we answered the machine gun question somewhere).  I favour de-centralized CSS assets where a given unit "owns" its first line CSS elements, but I also want Svc Bns and NSEs.  I think that each "unit" should own some level of integral fire support, but I also want a given commander to be able to mass his fires into a hammer for the big fight.  To have both means lots of resources.  Habitual affiliation is one way to solve the dilemma.

My own upbringing has been in an Armoured Regiment within a Mechanized Brigade (so to speak).  I've been in a Squadron that worked with two mechanized battlions (six companies) over a one year period.  Each battalion had its own quirks and that extended down to companies.  Still, we were able to work with these different companies.  The first day is always tough (we like to follow the old "run, stumble, fall" approach to collective training sometimes).  Adding a new FOO or an AD Tp could also lead to fun if you just said "as per SOP" and hit the LD. 

Being in one square combat team in garrison and in the field would be nice if you could guarantee that that combat team would always work together in battle.  I'm not sure if we can predict that.  Canada could realistically field one of those permanent square combat teams on operations (using a three to one principle).  Scarce enablers get moved around to minimize the time they are sitting idle.  Now, we could decide to form "permanent combat teams" consisting of a company of LAVs, a Tp of tanks, a Tp of sappers and a Tp of M777.  They could exist in Canada and live and train together.  This kind of thing does happen from time to time on operations, but sometimes the commander wants to concentrate his enablers.  In addition, those tankers, gunners and sappers came from somewhere (a Regiment that generate them).

Looking at the Germans in WW II, they had "pure" battalions and regiments that belonged to "mixed" Divisions.  That didn't seem to stop them having well-integrated yet temporary combined arms battle groups.


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## a_majoor

WRT the question of centralization, technology has moved things up and down the line. 

Current operations and evolving doctrine move units, sub units and sub sub units farther and farther away (and complex terrain such as urban canyons make the next block almost as inaccessible as the next county). In Afghanistan, platoons and sections can measure the distance between them and the next higher formation in kilometers, often separated by mountainous terrain.

To allow units to function in such environments, they have to be more self contained. Firepower assets need to be able to engage unpredictable targets in a 3D environment, and there are indications that even third world fighters will have access to advanced military technology (for example Hezbollah in south Lebanon using UAV's and anti-ship missiles supplied by Iran). In this sort of situation, attaching "Starstreak" missiles to an IFV makes sense, the crew has the ability to deal with high value targets like UAV's and use the considerable kinetic energy of the missile against hard ground targets as well. On a slightly larger scale (the one we are talking about), having Optimal Battle Groups allows the formation to be self contained and function as a "well oiled machine" in most war fighting scenarios against unpridicatable opponents in a 3600 environment.

Proponents of centralization should note how technology has changed the equation as well. Instead of brigading mortars and artillery to deal with hard targets, higher levels of command send air assets to pummel the targets. In the future, super long range artillery assets like HiMARS or EFOG-M will probably be in the theater commander's kitbag, and farther along, the Joint commander might be calling on the railguns of the DDX-21 to fire on targets almost 300km from the ship. Other proposals along these lines include retrofitted SLBM's with conventional warheads and hypersonic cruise missiles. An OBG that runs into trouble is only a radio call away from help.

Since the moment of contact is the time for the maximum confusion, friction and "fog of war" to take place, having everyone as part of a well trained and cohesive team brings the highest payoff. OBG's also ensure "corporate memory" ratherr than having to redo the basics every time an ABG is formed.


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## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> OBG's also ensure "corporate memory" ratherr than having to redo the basics every time an ABG is formed.


No.  The affiliation is permanent.  Everytime a battalion goes to the field, it could choose to bring its affiliated tank squadron, engineer squadron, and artillery battery.  The difference is back in garrison where focus will typically be on individual skills anyway.


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## Old Sweat

The ABG also has a couple of advantages that may not be all that readily apparent. First the commander of the BG in ABG and OBG does not have to concern himself with the individual and collective training requirements of his affiliated sub-units. There surely are more than enough alligators lurking in the training challenges of his own corps without adding those of three or four others. It also allows the parent corps of the sub-units to control the training and to assess how the officers and NCMs are developing. 

I hope this is not a red herring, but it is entirely possible a major whose PER (or whatever the annual report is called these days) was not written within the regimental family will suffer alongside his unaffiliated peers.

I served the majority of my field career in affiliated batteries and there was little doubt that we gunners identified closely with our 'other' regiments. In fact, we used to get in quite spirited discussions if anyone dared disparage them. Affiliation works. I am not sure optimization, which is a contradiction in itself, is more than a solution in search of a problem.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Art,

On the other hand, evolving technology can actually support centralization.  Strike aircraft do not belong to a given maneouvre unit.  They tend to be centralized at the highest level and then assigned to a given unit for a given mission (planned or immediate).  Long-range artillery and missiles lend themselves to centralization.  The sensors can certainly be decentralized.  The control and coordination piece is the tricky part.

I have witnessed the employment of "Platoon Groups", but I would hesitate to declare them as the only way of the future.  Our platoon commanders must be adept at the employment of other arms, and relatively junior leaders in the other arms must be adept at being "arms advisors."  I still think, however, that companies and battalions have a place and that it is hard to predict exactly which of your scarce resources you will need at a given moment in time.  A given task may require a Troop of sappers to get it done, but if you've scattered them across the combat team it can be hard to bring them back together to get that task done.

Personnel postings and rotations can lead to corporate memory loss to some degree, so an OBG will not necessarily have a huge advantage over an ABG.

I am in favour of combined arms groupings and I tend to de-centralization and self-containment when feasible.  I also admire concentration of force and economy of effort.  I lean towards affiliation as it allows for different arms to get to know each other through training while maintaining corps-specific skills and espirit de corps.   I think that the baseline training and preparation of a given element of a given arm is best done under the leadership and mentorship of a CO/RSM from that arm.

Cheers

T2B


----------



## Mountie

I was viewing the power point presentation on artillery transformation located on another post.  I see several  references to Formed Battle Groups.  Has the decision been made to switch to permanently formed battle groups?


----------



## AIC_2K5

I was browsing the 07/08 Report on Plans and Priorities and I came across this little tidbit:

"Contributing to international security and stability, the Regular Force will be restructured into cohesive Affiliated Battle Groups operationally focused on mid-intensity, full-spectrum operations in failed and failing states. The initial trials with the first Affiliated Battle Group will begin during the fall of 2007, when the task force then deployed in Afghanistan returns."

On the definition of the proposed Affiliated Battle Group:

"Affiliated Battle Groups will be organized, structured, equipped and trained as they will be employed on
expeditionary operations. They will be composed of a mixture of light and LAV infantry companies,
an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an engineer squadron, an artillery battery, military police and
combat service support elements. The restructure of the Regular Force, combined with equipment
modernization, forms a cornerstone of institutional capability investments and is key to positioning the
Land Force to meet its force generation and force employment requirements."

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp07-08/RPP07-08_e.pdf
Page 30

Additionally:

"Force development work in support of a concept of territorial defence battalion groups regionally distributed across the country will lead to the establishment of initial cadres in six urban locations fiscal 2007-2008, with an expanded capability in fiscal 2008-2009. This initiative will support the Government of Canada’s Canada First policy by creating a coordinated domestic response capability across the country."


Thoughts?


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Bubbles said:
			
		

> Thoughts?



Close the gap between Force Generation constructs and Force Employment constructs, and we may be on to something....

Let us not forget that no one has ever asked the Navy to deploy 1.5 Frigates - so why would the Army always allow that to happen?

Dave


----------



## McG

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Let us not forget that no one has ever asked the Navy to deploy 1.5 Frigates - so why would the Army always allow that to happen?


Better question is why is the Army FG structure built on a series of 1.4 frigates?  Imagine if we were to put the brigades out on a massive parade square and then have each brigade group its people into generic BGs.  forget the equipment for the moment and assume that nobody is sick, lame or on tasking.  We would probably see one completed BG for each Bde, then .75 of a BG and finally .30 of a BG.


----------



## Goober

In on OBG, the career progression of subunit pers will suffer.


----------



## Brad Sallows

After you parcel out the artillery, engineer, recce, tank etc sub-units, what do you do with the unit HQs and the capabilities and institutional knowledge they represent?

What happens if a formation commander one day needs a unit-sized engineer-heavy or recce-heavy organization for a particular task?  Does he pull a handful of sub-units "owned" by subordinate unit commanders, throw them together with an ad hoc HQ and tell them to behave like the applicable kind of regimental grouping?


----------



## Mortar guy

Brad,

That's a good point but I think we need to focus on what's really happening rather than basing our ORBAT on scenarios that are unlikely to happen. For the last 30 years or more we have deployed BGs based on an Inf Bn (or other arms re-roled to inf) with sub-unit sized attachments. So, why have we been ad hocing FG for those BGs when that has been the SOP for decades? I would say that the scenarios you describe are much less likely and so why would we organize our Army for the least likely scenarios?

Cheers.

MG


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> For the last 30 years or more we have deployed BGs based on an Inf Bn (or other arms re-roled to inf) with sub-unit sized attachments.


We deployed CERs to Iraq & in the early days to Yugoslavia, so the Inf BG only trend is less than 30 years old.  Still, it is a trend.

However, I'd thought I'd heard the CDS had a vision of being capable to conduct Bde operations.  It seems to me that the only way we can get flexibility to do both (BG and Bde ops) is balancing our CMBGs so that they have all the parts (and these parts must be complete with all pers & kit) for three ABGs each.


----------



## vonGarvin

MCG said:
			
		

> *However, I'd thought I'd heard the CDS had a vision of being capable to conduct Bde operations*.  It seems to me that the only way we can get flexibility to do both (BG and Bde ops) is balancing our CMBGs so that they have all the parts (and these parts must be complete with all pers & kit) for three ABGs each.



So, how about brigades (or brigade groups) each homogenous so that 1 bde looks like 5 bde, and so forth.  Each with an HQ element, a number of manoeuvre battalions (infantry and tank), a number of combat support battalions (engineer, artillery, etc) and even a combat service support battalion.  Then, if the bde comd is tasked to field or conduct bde operations, he/she has all the working parts required.  If a BG is told to go "fight the commies.......here!", then how about a novel idea of using the chain-of-command, tasking that to a bde comd to deploy one of his/her units, and then they can mix/match.  This is just an idea, I know.....


----------



## Brad Sallows

>I think we need to focus on what's really happening

That's a legimate argument and important decision factor; essentially the same principle underlies the recent removal and shuffling of some capabilities between various arms.  I am mostly concerned for the loss of institutional knowledge - for example, the employment and function of a mortar or anti-armour platoon within a battalion, or in this case, the higher organizations and groupings of the manoeuvre support arms.


----------



## Mortar guy

I agree that the ABG concept is not perfect and that it represents a trade off in some ways but it appears to be much better than the current ad hoc approach we use. I also don't really understand how the "loss of institutional knowledge/experience" argument works. Regimental level exercises and training are almost non-existant within the Engrs, Armd and Arty units so there isn't much experience/knowledge to lose. In the same way we don't have any institutional knowledge in commanding an Armd Bde, we don't have the capability to field a full Armd Regt right now without pretty substantial mobilization and trg anyway so why short change real world FG requirements for "nice to haves"?

Don't get me wrong, I think Capt Sensitive has it right and we _should_ have full up Bdes with full up units but that ain't the reality of it.

MG


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> I agree that the ABG concept is not perfect and ...


 I see the Army's gone and changed its terminology on this topic.  I sat in on a DLCD presentation in the early spring and OBG was used to describe what is now called ABG in the plans & prioreties report.  At that time ABGs (as I read of them in a CIA annual mtg doc) were exactly what Capt Sensitive but a step better.  ABGs were full brigades with full units, but those full units were balanced so that all components would exist in the right numbers (no more CERs with 2 x Fd Sqn being expected to FG for 3 x BGs) to form 3 x ABG in each Bde.


----------



## vonGarvin

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Don't get me wrong, I think Capt *Sensitive * has it right and we _should_ have full up Bdes with full up units but that ain't the reality of it.



Of course, if I had a million dollars....but in the end, the optimal-affiliated battlegroups are probably a good thing (vice just another thing to bitch at).


PS: My name is Sensible, but hey, maybe I'm just being Sensitive?


----------



## dapaterson

The key problem, as is too often the case, is resource constraints.

If we assume an Inf Bn is 3 line coys of 150, plus Cbt Sup Coy plus Admin Coy plus Bn HQ, we arrive at about 800 positions per Bn.  Nine Bns = 7200 positions.  Add in a recce sqn of +/- 200 positions, nine times, and that's another 1800 positions.  CS Engr Sqn is another 200; 1800 more.  Arty bty (with all the goodies) is 200 (1800)... that's 12 600 positions without manning the Svc Bns at all; unmanned Armd, Arty & Engr RHQs; nothing for the sabre sqns (someone's got to drive those Leo IIs); no AD, no TUA, no specialist engr capabilities...  Oh, and no CMBG HQs.  That's also not including any support at the bases, any support from the ASGs, or any schools.  And, of course, there's no Area HQ or Army HQ (snide coments aside, such HQs are needed... though perhaps not in the nubmers or size that they are).

Which means that the final model for the ABG will end up as a collection of compromises, with every corps and branch upset because they aren't doctrinally correct, or because the Regimental Goat Tender has been dropped from the authorised establishment.


----------



## Mortar guy

> PS: My name is Sensible, but hey, maybe I'm just being Sensitive?



I know your name. I didn't drink that much last night!

As for the ABGs being Bdes, that's the first I've ever heard of that. I did all the background reading on the ABGs prior to the CIA so as to brief my CO on the concept and I only ever saw ABGs referring to BG vice Bde level organizations. I have seen other presentations dealing with fully established and manned units and I never understood how the two were to be reconciled. 

I guess there are just too many good ideas floating around out there.

MG


----------



## Brad Sallows

>I also don't really understand how the "loss of institutional knowledge/experience" argument works.

I'm in no position to judge how far gone the knowledge base is.  If we're that far into the current "imperial policing" phase, we'll have to wait for the next archduke's assassination to turn it around.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The Adjective Battle Group (ABG)   project should perhaps focus on bringing the infantry battalions up to strength.  It might mean we would have to collapse three battalions, but having full-up battalions might be of more benefit than a permanent grouping of combined arms that may well end up working apart.

An infantry battalion with four full strength companies, an admin company and something of a combat support company would be a start.  Add in a HQ that includes a real S2 cell, an S4 cell outside of the Admin Coy, an ISTAR CC, an ESCC, an ASCC, an FSCC and an Information Operations CC and you have the baseline for a fairly effective unit that has a brain large enough to control the many enablers in today's battles and enough muscle to do something about it.  Generating these coordination centres would be no easy feat and would involve a fairly large number of officers and NCOs from other arms to make it work.  

To this would be added sub-units from other arms to fit the situation.  Make six of these infantry battalions and tell the government that you can sustain one in the field.  We would lose some command positions but these would fill out my OMLT units with the hard-core dissenters going to the Artic Training Centre.  There would still be armour, artillery, engineer and CSS units to generate the sub-units that would be bolted onto these Adjective Battle Groups (or potentially given to multi-national formations).


----------



## a_majoor

First Captain _Sensitive_, then introducing the _Adjective_ Battle Group. Spellcheck is going wild tonight!

Now I dont feel so bad looking over some of my past posts


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The "Adjective Battle Group" was an attempt to make a snide comment about assigning adjectives to proposals (Optimal being my favourite.  Who said it was Optimal?)


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> As for the ABGs being Bdes, that's the first I've ever heard of that.


I've worded myself poorly.  A Bde would be exactly 3 x ABGs, but all the elements would still be in their respective branch units.  If I look at this from the traditional perspective of Fd Sqns in a Bde it is:

the old way
    2 x Fd Sgn in a CER to support 3 x BG

ABG model
    3 x Fd Sqn in a CER to support 3 x BG

OBG model
    1 x Fd Sqn in each of 3 x BG


----------



## Mortar guy

Voo (as they say in french).

Arthur - it wasn't poor spelling on my part either. I just think Capt S is a thoughtful, caring guy.

MG


----------



## vonGarvin

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Voo (as they say in french).
> 
> Arthur - it wasn't poor spelling on my part either. *I just think Capt S is a thoughtful, caring guy*.
> 
> MG


And a little too sensitive for his own good!  ;D


----------



## vonGarvin

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The Adjective Battle Group (ABG)   project should perhaps focus on bringing the infantry battalions up to strength.  It might mean we would have to collapse three battalions, but having full-up battalions might be of more benefit than a permanent grouping of combined arms that may well end up working apart.


As I was reading "Barbarossa" (Alan Clark I believe) last night, I was reading about the consolidation period between Stalingrad and Kursk.  As the IG (Inspector General) for the Armour Troops, Guderian wanted his Panzer Divisions to be at full strength vice a bunch of understrength ones.  Each understrength div, he argued, had a tail as large as a full strength one, but in reality, all they did was clog the roads and provided underwhelming combat power.  "God is on the side of the big battalion" said Voltaire (I think).  So, would large, full strength effective battlegroups be better than a bunch of 200 soldier "battalions" that are tasked six ways from Sunday?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Capt Sensational,

I guess if you have many tasks then having many small units is one response.  I would favour, I think, having a few really powerful units and then some "economy of force" units that get the holding actions.  

I'm going to ramble a little bit.

I've been with two "plug and play" battlegroups/task forces.  While people did miss the "one battalion" sourcing, the big things they (well, I) missed were the things that used to be integral.  The CSS company being, perhaps, the biggest one.  I was in a company with platoons/troops from all elements and about 10 units.  That never bothered me as much as not having a Sqn echelon.

It would be nice to have a battle group formed permanently, I suppose, but over a year of pre-deployment training I think that we can get past sub-units coming from different units.  What is much harder to overcome is over-centralized C2 and CSS structures in theatre.  This next bit might seem at odds with my first line, but a BG HQ that comes together like a train wreck is a bigger problem, in my opinion, than having sub-units from other arms join a battle group.

A unit that doesn't have its own reconnaissance assets, its own fire support and its own CSS will always be beholden to others.

I would suggest, in order of priority, the following:

a.   make companies full-strength to include A1 echelons
b.   have a CSS company integral to a Bn and do NOT take it away when they go to war
c.   have a BG HQ that includes the core Coordination Centres (this will be expensive)
e.   have four rifle companies
f.    bring back the missing combat support platoons once you have the people and have done the other bits

I am sure that many would move my last priority up, and I may well have that one wrong.  The BG HQ could get out of control and I might have to cut back a little, but the core centres should be there.

Having a recce sqn, an engineer sqn or an artillery battery permanently attached to the battalion would not, I believe, achieve as much as the first six.

With six of these real battalions the government could keep one in the field while still giving guys a break when they get back.  The other arms may or may not be attached to these battalions when they deploy depending on the mission.  Some of the other arms might attach elements to a higher level HQ.  If a second front opens then we face some heartache, and that is a major shortcoming.


----------



## armyvern

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Capt Sensational,



Captain Sensitive ... if you choose to run with this new one above, please post your name change into the thread located here. 

Or my whip will start cracking ...


----------



## vonGarvin

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Captain Sensitive ... if you choose to run with this new one above, please post your name change into the thread located here.
> 
> Or my whip will start cracking ...



Though I posted in that thread, where's that whip?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Captain Sensitive ... if you choose to run with this new one above, please post your name change into the thread located here.
> 
> Or my whip will start cracking ...




Kinky 
	

	
	
		
		

		
			





  ;D  >


----------



## a_majoor

The real answer seems to be less having an ABG or OBG than simply filling all the slots of our current structure so when units trundle off to war they are not sending press gangs out to filch soldiers and sub units from other battalions or brigades.

The other thing which *may* help is using modern communications and IT technology along with modern management practices to finally shrink down the various HQ's and free up money and PY's to fill the rifleman positions.


----------



## McG

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The real answer seems to be less having an ABG or OBG than simply filling all the slots of our current structure so when units trundle off to war they are not sending press gangs out to filch soldiers and sub units from other battalions or brigades.


If you only look at the infantry, this may be true.  If each Bn is complete, then it does not need to steal from other battalions in order to provide what should be its core competency (ie: infantry platoons & companies).  However, if we don't have the other arms' building blocks balanced, then that will become the weak path.  Consider only a few years ago when infantry pers were complaining that tours were few & far between while other arms were were doing back-flips just to keep up with the demand.

Yes, it may be that for the infantry battalions we can go a long way simply by manning to 100% (or even 110%), but expansion is required where critical building blocks do not exist to be manned.


----------



## warrickdll

The Army’s consistent use of either a Battle Group, or a supported Infantry battalion, for 50 years should have led to an organizational change at some point. It isn’t that the Army is constantly being asked to deploy 1.5 frigates; it’s that, to over use the analogy, the Army is using a frigate that is 1.5 times larger than is required.

The Infantry battalion, in my opinion, seems too large - as are the Regimental units of other Branches.  What would be better is to reinforce the company level units; increasing their combat, HQ and CSS capabilities. Or to view it a different way – dramatically decrease the size of battalion units.
All this ends at something similar to the OBG. This is what we actually use (but not organize as).

This would lead to the end of the Brigade Group, but it itself was only ever a breakdown of a Division’s assets.


----------



## a_majoor

Iterator said:
			
		

> The Army’s consistent use of either a Battle Group, or a supported Infantry battalion, for 50 years should have led to an organizational change at some point. It isn’t that the Army is constantly being asked to deploy 1.5 frigates; it’s that, to over use the analogy, the Army is using a frigate that is 1.5 times larger than is required.
> 
> The Infantry battalion, in my opinion, seems too large - as are the Regimental units of other Branches.  What would be better is to reinforce the company level units; increasing their combat, HQ and CSS capabilities. Or to view it a different way – dramatically decrease the size of battalion units.
> All this ends at something similar to the OBG. This is what we actually use (but not organize as).
> 
> This would lead to the end of the Brigade Group, but it itself was only ever a breakdown of a Division’s assets.



What you seem to be proposing is a turn of the wheel back to the '80's vintage Mech Infantry Battalion but expanding the Combat Support and CSS Coys capabilities (and perhaps size). Substitute an artillery battery for 81mm mortars, a Tank Troop for the AAP and we are starting to get towards the idea of the composite combined arms unit......This would allow the deployment of fully capable company combat teams which I think is where you are suggesting we go.

Combined with the next generation of smart weapons and a capable C3I system, and we are also looking at a form of "Dispersed Operations" that the Marines are advocating (not sure if DO is Dispersed Operations or not, but you get the idea).


----------



## McG

I like that Land Ops 2021 talks of "the optimized formation and its battle groups" as the model that we are working toward.  It also talks of the brigades being composed of modular battle groups.  The FE product would be OBGs, but my read of the document does not suggest the FG structure will necissarily be built on OBGs.  

To this end, I see the essence of the internationally deployable army as 9 identical OBGs.  These would be produced from 9 identical ABGs based on each of the regular force infantry battalions.  However, the Army’s regimental structure would not need to be changed as a FG base.  Through a FG optimized brigade, it would still be possible to surge an armoured BG, reconnaissance BG or CER for a short period.  Alternately, each FG optimized brigade could provide all the components to deploy a brigade on an operation.

One fully committed FG optimized brigade could provide up to either one of the following deployed capabilities:
[*] 3 x FE OBGs
[*] 1 x FE CMBG


----------



## vonGarvin

Iterator said:
			
		

> The Army’s consistent use of either a Battle Group, or a supported Infantry battalion, for 50 years should have led to an organizational change at some point. It isn’t that the Army is constantly being asked to deploy 1.5 frigates; it’s that, to over use the analogy, the Army is using a frigate that is 1.5 times larger than is required.
> The Infantry battalion, in my opinion, seems too large - as are the Regimental units of other Branches.  What would be better is to reinforce the company level units; increasing their combat, HQ and CSS capabilities. Or to view it a different way – dramatically decrease the size of battalion units.
> All this ends at something similar to the OBG. This is what we actually use (but not organize as).


I disagree to some extent.  Let us not forget that for almost 40 of those 50 years we had a Brigade and then Brigade Group permanently deployed.
As for a smaller battalion, I would argue for larger.  What's the point of having bags and bags of "supporting elements" when you have no elements to support?  "God is on the side with the big battalions" (or words to that effect) were muttered years ago, and yes, in a different context; however, size matters.  A robust, large battalion, with the requisite support should be, in my opinion, the baseline for an army of our size and capability.  If we as an army focus on the sub-unit (company/battery/squadron), then we truly have jumped the shark.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm with Iterator.

The fundamental building block of operations is unchanging for the last couple of millenia.  It is the Company of 100 to 200 bodies led by a Captain.

Their internal structure has changed. (Maniples, Sections, Firings, Pelotons, Platoons).  Their equipment has changed (no need to go there I think).  Their transport has changed (foot, horse, boat, truck or helicopter).

The way in which they have been amalgamated into usable forces has changed (legions, tercios, columns, regiments, battalions - with ever higher levels of complexity between them and the Commander-in-Chief).

The Company is unchanging.  That says something about internal cohesion and effective force size.  Everything else is just mucking about.

How do you buy your nails?  By the penny, by the pound, by the dozen or by the clip? You are still buying nails - devices for hammering two blocks of wood together.

If the Company is to be used in different groupings to perform different tasks then it seems to me that the simple solution is repetition - ie training.

If there is a need for the Company to do many things then spend the money and train them to do many things until they run out of daylight to learn all the things they need to do.  Then start specializing.

As I understand the current situation the biggest, continuing problem is a lack of money to train the bodies you do have in all the skills that they are capable of learning. You also have a shortage of bodies in each of the designated Companies - be they Companies of Infanteers, Engineers, Gunners, Tankers or Pilots.  But that too comes down to money.

Why not go all the way back to the origin of the Regiment - a holding ground for a number of Companies trained to a common standard - with the Battalion being a tactical formation organized under elements of the Regimental Command structure according to need?  Constant training with affiliated Companies of different Arms for a limited number or specific tasks would surely result in the necessary proficiency as well as cohesion and confidence?

Any reason not to support a 10 Company Regiment comprised of a Light Recce Company and 9 Line Companies?  Then organize the Company internally along the lines suggested by our Uberly Sensitive but Seldomly Sensible Hauptmann (or whatever name he is going by today  ;D). That would effectively parcel out the old Grenadier Company amongst the Line Companies along with an appropriate allocation of the Regimental Baggage Train.


----------



## ArmyRick

Does anyone DIN links to web sites describing the ABG structures? Also, if I am not mistaken I beleive on eof the units is already ear marked to stand up as a permament BG (I don't know if its clasified so I won't say wich battalion it is).

My opinion? I am going to p*ss some of you off. TOUGH!

We are fighting battles now in afghanistan. Lets stand up these battle groups and leave them as they are. When a BG CO needs an engineer squadron or an arty, it should be there for him. I have had long conversations with people back from the recent tours in 'stan (F echelon types not KAF types). I am basing my opinion alot on what they have told me is going on over there.

The structure should be built around maneouver units.


----------



## warrickdll

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I disagree to some extent.  Let us not forget that for almost 40 of those 50 years we had a Brigade and then Brigade Group permanently deployed. ...



I would state that the CMBG was based in Germany, proximal to its expected area of deployment, not deployed. But I don’t doubt that the Army was planning on deploying the Brigade Group structure; at least until Divisions could be generated (the CMBG itself was mostly just the Optimized Force degenerated from a Division).




			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> ...As for a smaller battalion, I would argue for larger.  What's the point of having bags and bags of "supporting elements" when you have no elements to support?  "God is on the side with the big battalions" (or words to that effect) were muttered years ago, and yes, in a different context; however, size matters.  A robust, large battalion, with the requisite support should be, in my opinion, the baseline for an army of our size and capability.  If we as an army focus on the sub-unit (company/battery/squadron), then we truly have jumped the shark.



To some extent, I disagree. Or at least view it differently.
I believe the OBG is the correct formation of units for our Army. It is the correct size for what we can both deploy and sustain, and should be formalized.

Once the OBG is formalized there will be little need for the Battalion as a manoeuvre unit (or anything else). Mechanized Infantry should have always been organized much more like an old Tank squadron, for dispersed and independent deployment, with the addition of real organic CS, CSS, and HQ elements.

The formalized OBG doesn`t create extra, it just allows for the rationalization of what you already have. In the end you have the OBG and the new manoeuvre units (the expanded former subunits). 

The OBG can be viewed as either a small brigade or as a large battalion. The new manoeuvre units can be viewed as either small battalions or as large companies. Either way, it is still a more realistic organization for the Army.


----------



## blacktriangle

I'm quite interested in this discussion, and there is one thing I'd like to know...

I remember being told once that recce sqn's are generally a brigade level asset, but has there not been a full recce squadron on each roto of BG size? Is there more then one sqn in each CMBG?


----------



## McG

popnfresh said:
			
		

> I remember being told once that recce sqn's are generally a brigade level asset, but has there not been a full recce squadron on each roto of BG size?


No.  There has not been. 1-06 had one troop, and the link above suggests that is still what is overthere.


----------



## blacktriangle

MCG said:
			
		

> No.  There has not been. 1-06 had one troop, and the link above suggests that is still what is overthere.



Thanks for the clarification, it makes alot more sense numbers wise.


----------



## Mortar guy

MCG said:
			
		

> No.  There has not been. 1-06 had one troop, and the link above suggests that is still what is overthere.



Not quite accurate. ISTAR Sqn is quite a bit bigger than the lone troop you saw on 1-06.

MG


----------



## blacktriangle

Mortar guy said:
			
		

> Not quite accurate. ISTAR Sqn is quite a bit bigger than the lone troop you saw on 1-06.
> 
> MG



So, if not OPSEC, what is the Sqn composed of? Not looking for anything to specific, just a general idea...


----------



## Mortar guy

Bigger. At least two troops, plus a Sqn HQ. I can't give you much more than that.

MG


----------



## pbi

CSA is right on this. There was, several years ago, an idea to form an actual "ISTAR unit" but it was realized that in a modern BG or Bde there are so many functioning sources of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and recce, and so many different types of targets, that this just wasn't practical. At Kingston we present ISTAR to the students as an integrating function in the HQ that provides the comd and staff with a kind of "all source" integration centre for tactical information. ISTAR (doctrinally anyway) doesn't have the power to task the assets out on the ground without the G3 or Ops O getting involved: it doesn't "own" Recce Sqn, or Recce Pl, or UAV, etc.

As for Recce Sqns deploying: during the ISAF rotos in Kabul, there was a Recce Sqn or Sqn minus, grouped with Inf Recce and snipers, as part of the TF. For a while it was Cda's only manouevre contribution to ISAF. Since then, Recce is normally a component of the BG, more or less, but usually a lot more than one troop.

As a note, the Inf BG that we teach here has a Recce Sqn in it, so that students get used to the idea of integrating it into the BG ops. The idea that something will strictly be only a bde asset or div asset or whatever is disappearing: tactical grouping will reflect what is needed to get the job done in each situation.

Cheers


----------



## tomahawk6

RSTA squadrons are organic to all of our BCT's. The link below gives a good overview of the composition of a US Cav RSTA. I wasnt real keen on each BCT losing a rifle battalion in favor of a RSTA squadron but I have grudgingly seen some merit to the concept. In a perfect world we could have both. 

http://www.14cav.org/rsta.html

Manning the RSTA squadrons with trained leaders are a top priority.

https://www.benning.army.mil/rtb/new_lrsc/article2.htm



> The long-range surveillance community is racing to produce enough soldiers to man one-third of all ground maneuver battalions with reconnaissance soldiers.
> 
> To meet the projected need, recon instructors will have to nearly triple their current output of 400 troops a year.
> 
> Driving the growth is Army Transformation from division-centric operations to a lighter, more mobile force built around brigade combat teams. The Army has planned for 42 active BCTs to be stood up by 2007, each including a Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron.
> 
> The RSTA teams are seen as vital in the fight against terrorists, guerrillas and other unconventional enemy forces.
> 
> “Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition is a highly important task in any type of military operation, but that is particularly true when you’re conducting a counterintelligence campaign such as in Iraq or Afghanistan,” said Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Ka





> One of the most significant new areas of training is in the use of digital surveillance systems to collect images and data that can be transmitted almost simultaneously for analysis hundreds or thousands of miles away.
> 
> Until now, LRS soldiers were observers who reported back to military intelligence battalions without engaging the enemy. Now, the capability and authority of RSTA soldiers to strike is similar to what the original Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol units had in Vietnam. What’s different is the quick turnaround time of the digital systems versus analog technology. The time to analyze field data significantly accelerated, shortening the time needed to process information and decide what action to take.
> 
> With the surveillance equipment, soldiers can digitally send detailed information down to a 10-degree grid coordinate. They also can send pictures of entry points, people, buildings and descriptions of the security environment or a neighborhood.


----------



## blacktriangle

I think this has been touched upon before, but...

If each BG was to deploy with an armd recce sqn, would it not make sense in an ideal army to have an entire regt in each CMBG devoted to recce? As well as another regt devoted to DFS/Tanks? That way each BG could deploy with a tank and recce sqn? I realize this is currently impossible with equip and manning issues, but would that be a good idea at some point? Thanks for any input...


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

A rose by any other name is still a rose.  Calling a Recce Sqn an ISTAR Sqn does not change anything, and as long as their is an ISTAR Coordination Centre at the supported HQ I am ambivalent.  I've been in both a Recce Sqn and an ISTAR company.  The change in name meant much less than the loss of the sqn echelon.  

Force Generation for the robust battle groups we have overseas is a tough issue.  It would make sense for each Infantry Battalion to have an affiliated recce sqn, tank sqn, engineer sqn and artillery battery.  That is easier said than done.

As for unit size, the lines between unit, brigade and division have gotten a little blurred.  The sizes of Areas of Operations combined with dispersed operations and enablers pushed to very low levels means that old distinctions don't mean as much.  There are things at Battle Group that used to be the domain of Brigade, and this carries down to company CPs.


----------



## blacktriangle

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> popnfresh, ref an entire Regt in each CMBG devoted to recce?  What do you think 2 and 5 Brigade have right now?  Well, except for the single tank that the RCD just received..



I realize this, but I meant would it not be beneficial to have a full regt (assuming 3 sqns each) of both tanks and recce veh's so that each inf bn would have what it needs? without robbing peter to pay paul etc...sorry for the lack of clarity on my part.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

CSA 105 said:
			
		

> Yes, but the name is stupid.  You can say "what's in a name" - OK, let's get rid of PPCLI, RCR, R22eR, RCD, 12eRBC, LdSH and call ourselves "Combat Arms Manoeuvre Units 1-6".  We don't play that game there - let's not play it with our recce squadrons.
> 
> ISTAR is a process.  It's not a "thing".  It's not a 'tactical grouping".  You can't "ISTAR" something.  You can't haul the "ISTAR" up to the top of a hill, push the start button and then know everything.  You don't go to the QM to sign for an "ISTAR".  It's like calling the recce squadrons "surveillance squadrons" - another bullshit anomaly name for a unit type that not only is a misnomer, but does not exist!
> 
> The question is why do we persist in a naming convention stupidity that is at odds with our own doctrine and doesn't reflect what the thing does?  For those who will point out that the US has "RSTA" units - so what, apples and crowbars - will we get rid of Sqn/Tp nomenclature for our tank and engineer units?  Just because the US/UK/Australia/whoever does something does not make it *right * for us.



I think that you are arguing the name to an extreme.  Sub-unit names are sub-unit names, and nobody talked about getting rid of Regiments when they called it ISTAR Company or Squadron.  The Dragoons in ISTAR Company still wore Springboks.  We changed our organization on a fairly frequent basis.  I think that we were really a Recce Sqn with attachments and no echelon, but hey, no big deal to me.

I think that the Armoured Corps tried to go a little too far about four years ago in an attempt to preserve its existence through the ISTAR bit.  The guns went through the same thing with the UAVs.  Suddenly people have their real jobs to do.

Going back to ISTAR Company, we were a collection of ISTAR collectors, and we were not the only collectors. The important part of the ISTAR process was the Coordination Centre which wasn't even part of us.  I'm comfortable with the ISTAR process, and once again I think that we have bigger fish to fry than sub-unit names.


----------



## Infanteer

Naming conventions aside (I am not sure if naming a sub-unit after a process or a function is a key issue here) one of the most interesting arguments I've seen to date, both on these forums and in the Army Journal, on the Affiliated Battle Group at this point in time is the need to shrink to grow.  The goal of fixing the "hollow Army" while at the same time prosecuting a warfighting operation overseas seems to produce conflicting effects on our units (ie: plug'n'play BG's, centralizing core unit functions in order to manage resources, etc, etc).

The notion of "shrinking to grow" is that we are, to paraphrase General Eric Shinseki, fighting a 9 battlegroup war with a 6 battlegroup Army.  By organizing, employing, and managing our forces as if we can sustain nine robust Battlegroups, perhaps we are creating unnecessary friction within our operational units (this is as much a question as a statement).

The "shrink to grow" idea has us reduce the regular force infantry establishment to 6 battalions.  I would imagine this would entail reducing the 3 Battalions to "zero strength".  This is done for two reasons:

1.  Our nine battalions struggle to put together full strength rifle companies.  This forces them to - as we've seen, from ROTO 1 in Kandahar on, we've had a confusing array of sub-units pasted together to form a fighting unit.

2.  Irregardless of "bayonet strength", a battalion requires personnel to fill key administrative and support positions.  Requiring these positions be filled for battalions that can barely scrape together two full companies (which can, at times, be "ghost companies" with most pers away on course or supporting the training establishment) puts additional strain on our manning situation.

So, we have six battalions, but we ensure that each one is manned with 4 rifle companies manned to 100% (this is both our doctrinal amount and that required by a "Robust TF" such as Afghanistan).  This puts 3 Infantry LtCols and CWOs out of the job, as well as 3 Majors and MWOs as the Infantry has went from (theoretically) 27 rifle companies to 24 full-strength, real ones.  Hopefully, there is some additional manpower (PY's) in the cut to allow us to fill out some key functions we've been missing such as Combat Support or sub-unit echelons.  As well, the Battalion's Admin company could be filled out, recognizing that it will serve as the foundation for Task Forces deployed abroad.

The Affiliated Battle Group concept gives leads us to the next logical step - since our Task Forces are to be built around Infantry Battalions, I could see the other Branches of a CMBG organized around the principle of shrink to grow.  The Artillery and the Engineers - usually the smaller of the Combat Arms units, could form their Regiments around two very robust sub-units and perhaps some niche capabilities that are farmed out as needed.  Each of these robust sub-units "affiliates" with one of the remaining battalions.  Each Armoured Regiment, with both its recce and armoured (DFS) sub-units, may be forced to create more.  It would have its two affiliated "robust" Armoured Recce Squadrons as well as 1 (or hopefully 2, so they could be affiliated as well).  There appears to be minimal savings in the Armoured Corps under the "shrink to grow" concept, so perhaps they would need priority on new PYs.  Naturally, the Service battalions and Field Ambs would use the same concept to organize, using the concept of "affiliation" and "robust sub-unit" packages to be plugged into deploying Task Forces. 

As the institutional "main effort" right now is to fill out the hollow Army, these units would continue to take in new recruits and perhaps man their sub-units to 115% or create additional sub-units as needed.  When a critical mass is reached, the excess can be broken off and the 3rd Battalions stood up again, with corresponding increases in the other arms used to create robust "affiliated" sub-units.  Until this point, the Army can provide, with minimal shuffling and "Robbing Peter to Pay Paul", 6 full strength Battlegroups to CEFCOM as needed.  Managed readiness would dictate that these would deploy once every 3 years (with 6 months at "heightened readiness" as strategic reserve).  Whats more, by sucking back to reload, and going for the idea of fewer but better units, these Battlegroups would be more self-sufficient and make less demands to dig deep into the institutional Army to fill out NSE and NCE structures.

Shrinking to grow may seem regressive and antithetical to the governments plans to expand the military, but it may be the best short term solution for long term success.


----------



## AIC_2K5

I agree, I think Infanteer is right on the mark. This is what I've been supporting for some time, form BGs around infantry battalions with other combat arms and combat support units providing sub-units to support them. Now do you really need to get rid of those unit RHQs instead of having tasked sub-units coming together for pre-deployment training? I don't know.

Now could we take this one step further by raising 6 inf battalions instead of the original 3? Assuming the bulk of the 13,000 new reg force pers are going to the Army, we could effectively double the size of the Army's deployable force. Manpower might be tight, that fourth Rifle Coy in each inf battalion might have to be scratched. Form those infantry inf battalions and supporting sub-units, with maybe 6 BGs being light and the other 6 comprising mechanized forces. This would prevent the Army from needing to make alot of major vehicle purchases. Now with this you could sustain these BGs indefinetly overseas in two seperate deployments or one larger deployment under a brigade headquarters along with brigade support forces, forming a sort of composite brigade. This would fit nicely in the Army Managed Readiness Plan and would provide the CDS with those 2 deployable task forces he's been talking about.


----------



## blacktriangle

Bubbles said:
			
		

> I agree, I think Infanteer is right on the mark. This is what I've been supporting for some time, form BGs around infantry battalions with other combat arms and combat support units providing sub-units to support them. Now do you really need to get rid of those unit RHQs instead of having tasked sub-units coming together for pre-deployment training? I don't know.
> 
> Now could we take this one step further by raising 6 inf battalions instead of the original 3? Assuming the bulk of the 13,000 new reg force pers are going to the Army, we could effectively double the size of the Army's deployable force. Manpower might be tight, that fourth Rifle Coy in each inf battalion might have to be scratched. Form those infantry inf battalions and supporting sub-units, with maybe 6 BGs being light and the other 6 comprising mechanized forces. This would prevent the Army from needing to make alot of major vehicle purchases. Now with this you could sustain these BGs indefinetly overseas in two seperate deployments or one larger deployment under a brigade headquarters along with brigade support forces, forming a sort of composite brigade. This would fit nicely in the Army Managed Readiness Plan and would provide the CDS with those 2 deployable task forces he's been talking about.



Where are all these additional BN's coming from? I think you may want to re-read the last few posts...


----------



## Infanteer

Lest I be given credit for someone elses idea, here is the editorial from the Army Journal from which I expanded on here:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_2/CAJ_vol10.2_23_e.pdf

As for raising 6 battlegroups, that seems to be heading the other way - let's focus on what we got on hand....


----------



## AIC_2K5

> Where are all these additional BN's coming from? I think you may want to re-read the last few posts...



Why? I've read both CSA-105's and Infanteer's posts introducing the topic. I've also read the Army Journal topic Infanteer referenced. Perhaps you don't understand the concept...?

EDIT: I see in Infanteer's referenced article it doesn't talk about the inf battalion expansion, I had a brainfart and got it mixed up with another article. Working nonstop all weekend on a term paper will do that...I'll try to fix that, and I'll try to find the article.


----------



## McG

Does anybody have any feedback/info on how the OBG experiment is going in 2 RCR?  So far I've heard the only thing they've done was plug in an engineer squadron from 4 ESR (no guns or armour though).


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So, we have six battalions, but we ensure that each one is manned with 4 rifle companies manned to 100% (this is both our doctrinal amount and that required by a "Robust TF" such as Afghanistan).



Actually, since the late 1990's, our doctrinal strength of rifle coys/bn went from 4 to 3.  This was a PY thing.  I've advocated going from 9 to 3 bns to get rid of "overhead" and to focus on "the big battalion", what with them God favouring those with the Big Battalions, and all....


----------



## Infanteer

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Actually, since the late 1990's, our doctrinal strength of rifle coys/bn went from 4 to 3.  This was a PY thing.  I've advocated going from 9 to 3 bns to get rid of "overhead" and to focus on "the big battalion", what with them God favouring those with the Big Battalions, and all....



As far as I understand it, the _Infantry Battalion in Battle_ and the _Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle_ both show four rifle companies, and these are the documents that the Infantry School hands to us.  Now, Corps 2000 or whatever its called shows three.

Obviously, since we don't use any of these today for our Infantry Battalions, we have some doctrinal dissonance.


----------



## Kirkhill

Keep it up and you will be arguing for 10 Company Regiments: 1 Light, 1 Heavy and 8 Line with the Line Companies and specialists parcelled out under the Colonel's Lieutenants according to need.

You may even want to consider retaining the option of Brigading the Light and Heavy Companies of the three Regiments as separate entities:  Perhaps the Canadian Rifles and the Canadian Grenadiers?  ;D


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As far as I understand it, the _Infantry Battalion in Battle_ and the _Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle_ both show four rifle companies, and these are the documents that the Infantry School hands to us.  Now, Corps 2000 or whatever its called shows three.
> 
> Obviously, since we don't use any of these today for our Infantry Battalions, we have some doctrinal dissonance.


I believe that those documents are under review.  392-001 (Inf Bn in Battle), for example still refers to Mortar Platoons, Assault Pioneer Platoons and Anti-Armour Companies.  I don't have a source for the three coy battalion, but it was done in the late 1990s, though....


----------



## dapaterson

In fact, as recently as a month ago, the Reg F had nine Infnatry bns with nine different establishments - no two were the same.

It's remarkable that with a force this small we somehow manged to have dissimilar tactical units.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> As far as I understand it, the _Infantry Battalion in Battle_ and the _Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle_ both show four rifle companies, and these are the documents that the Infantry School hands to us.  Now, Corps 2000 or whatever its called shows three.


 The 20CMBG model that I was seeing in the 2001 timeframe was down to only 3 rifle companies per battalion.  Currently, the 4CMBG model that I've seen come out of CLFCSC is also three rifle companies. (Infanteer, you may want to visit the CLFCSC website to create an AJOSQ profile for yourself.  While going through the course, you will see this model).


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> The 20CMBG model that I was seeing in the 2001 timeframe was down to only 3 rifle companies per battalion.  Currently, the 4CMBG model that I've seen come out of CLFCSC is also three rifle companies. (Infanteer, you may want to visit the CLFCSC website to create an AJOSQ profile for yourself.  While going through the course, you will see this model).



I've done that and went through that stuff.  It's already out of date with its Light and Mech battalions - the stuff I see in coming out now in Infantry corners is fixed on the new concept of 9 equal infantry battalions with two mechanized companies and a motorized company.

As I said, doctrinal dissonence.  We can't even decide what our own infantry units should look like.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I've said it before, but surprise is a principle of war.  If I'm surprised by unit structures you can imagine the effect on the enemy.

As an aside we serve in a personality-based army.  Doctrine pales in comparison to ego and personal experience.  We're like crazy frontier Protestant preachers.  The good book give some basis but for the most part we make it up as we go along.

In all seriousness, I've advocated a collapse of three battalions to make six good ones back on page three of this thread.  I doubt it would fly due to my second point about egos and personalities, but you never know.  Maybe I'll be surprised...


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I've done that and went through that stuff.  It's already out of date with its Light and Mech battalions - the stuff I see in coming out now in Infantry corners is fixed on the new concept of 9 equal infantry battalions with two mechanized companies and a *motorized  * company.



Pet Peeve alert: motorised infantry are infantry who have integral motor transport (eg: trucks).  Remember, our non-mechanised infantry are *cough* *hack*  "light"


			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> As I said, doctrinal dissonence.  We can't even decide what our own infantry units should look like.



And that, my friend, is the problem.


----------



## McG

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Pet Peeve alert: motorised infantry are infantry who have integral motor transport (eg: trucks).  Remember, our non-mechanised infantry are *cough* *hack*  "light"


Motorized is what I've seen too.  I think the vision is that it will be GWagon infantry (eventually whatever the FFCV light platform is).  They even use the right tac symbol:


----------



## blacktriangle

Question;

If the Bn's were ever to go back to 4 rifle companies, would it 3 mech, 1 light/motorized or an equal amount of each. What would be best/likely?


----------



## vonGarvin

popnfresh said:
			
		

> Question;
> 
> If the Bn's were ever to go back to 4 rifle companies, would it 3 mech, 1 light/motorized or an equal amount of each. What would be best/likely?


Answer
I doubt that they would go back to four rifle companies; however, if they did, it would best serve the unit if all four were mech OR all light OR all whatever.  IMHO, homogenous units work better.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

We only have a company worth of LAVs on the floor these days....


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Good old Whole Fleet Management.


----------



## vonGarvin

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> We only have a company worth of LAVs on the floor these days....


You have a whole company's worth?  You guys are lucky.....


Which goes of course to my argument that they all be the same.  Not enough LAVs?  Fine: go light.  But, if you GO light, do it right!


----------



## rampage800

Mortarman

I agree whole heartily with your comment, there is a misconception in a lot of circles with "dismounted" and "light". I personally believe they are two very different skill sets and are either all Light or all Mech, when you start crossing over, theres going to be things that slip between the cracks..Anyhow I'm sure this has been discussed at great length in a separate forum, just adding my thoughts.


----------



## Mountie

There was conversation a few pages back about reducing the Army to six full-strength infantry battalions until such time as there are sufficient personnel levels to return to nine battalions.  On that topic, what if the Army was to reduce, or rather just reorganize I guess is a better term, into three smaller brigade groups.

The light infantry battalions could use their para companies as the basis for a second battalion of the CSOR in order to maintain two battalions of light/special operations capable infantry and use the remainder of the battalion to bring the 1st and 2nd battalions up to full strenght, including a full combat support company.  The rest of the brigade units should be likewise reduced to two full-strenght sub-units to support only two affiliated battle groups per brigade.  A full-strength but smaller brigade could then be tasked more routinely.  A single CMBG could be responsible for a year's operational deployment.  One battle group at a time for six-months each.  Or, to dream, a whole brigade could be deployed.  While this is still unlikely, it is more likely than ever deploying a whole brigade of three battle groups.  In the Balkans the Army did have two battalion/battle groups and a small logistics battalion and medical unit deployed at one time.  That would be the equivalent of a new, smaller brigade.

Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group 
Brigade Headquarters
Command Support Regiment (Similar to US Army's Special Troops Battalion or Australian Command Support Regiment)
- Signal Squadron, Military Intelligence Company & Military Police Platoon
2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalion
- 3 x Mechanized Rifle Companies, Combat Support Company (signals, mortars, assault pioneer, recce and anti-armour platoons) & Administration Company 
Cavalry Regiment
- RHQ (forming Brigade ISTAR CC), 2 x Reconnaissance Squadrons & HQ Squadron (and possibly a single tank squadron if you want)
RCHA Regiment
- RHQ (forming Brigade FSCC), 2 x Artillery Battery (6-8 M777's), STA Battery, Air Defence Battery (forming Brigade ASCC) & HQ & Services Battery 
Combat Engineer Regiment
- RHQ (forming Brigade ESCC), 2 x Field Engineer Squadrons, Engineer Support Squadron & Administration Squadron 
Service Battalion & Field Ambulance would remain basically unchanged just slightly smaller.

Once the Army ever increases in size and acquires more equipment (LAV-IIIs, M777s, etc) theoretically a fourth CMBG should be created.  This would give the Army 8 mechanized infantry battalions and 2 battalions of the CSOR compared to the 6 mechanized infantry and 4 light/CSOR battalions at present.  It would also have 8 recce squadrons, artillery batteries, and field engineer squadrons as compared to the 9 under-strength sub-units of today.  So in the end the Army would have 8 mechanized battle groups evenly divided between four brigade groups which would allow for a better Operational Readiness Cycle and 2 battalions of the CSOR.

The new brigade could be formed in LFAA at Gagetown and recruited primarily from Atlantic Canada and English speaking Quebec (I realizing basing is a whole new topic, but if 1 RCHA and 2 PPCLI were moved to Edmonton could the CTC move to Shilo?? I don't know.  This is more theory that may not be reality) and consist of the following regiments:

3 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
3 Commmand Support Regiment
1st Battalion, Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada
2nd Battalion, Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada
8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)
3rd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
3 Combat Engineer Regiment
3 Service Battalion
3 Field Ambulance

Although the creation of a fourth brigade seems far fetched right now, there have been many times throughout the post-WW2 Army that new battalions and even brigades have been created, disbanded and transferred to other bases.  Just curious on what anyone thinks of the theory.


----------



## Im Not Telling

All this talk about the comparison of OBG and ABG, how about we see how the OBG works out first.  I know I'm intrested as I just fund out I'm posted to Gagetown this year and I'm want to see what growing pains arise and how it evolves.


----------



## Infanteer

Mountie said:
			
		

> The light infantry battalions could use their para companies as the basis for a second battalion of the CSOR in order to maintain two battalions of light/special operations capable infantry



CSOR is not at "battalion" strength.  As well, I think you'd find the Army reluctant to release 3 Coy's worth of PY's to CANSOFCOM.

Other than that, your post sounds like something I pitched a few pages back.  I want royalties!


----------



## McG

Im Not Telling said:
			
		

> All this talk about the comparison of OBG and ABG, how about we see how the OBG works out first.


What are you, the thought police?  You do know what discussion boards are for, right?

In any case, there are many issues which the OBG experiment will not examine.  Sure it might work to permanently establish an OBG in 2 RCR when the whole rest of the Army is not doing it, but will Bde's properly balanced for ABGs better serve the super bases such as Valcartier, Petawawa & Edmonton?


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> CSOR is not at "battalion" strength.  As well, I think you'd find the Army reluctant to release 3 Coy's worth of PY's to CANSOFCOM.
> 
> Other than that, your post sounds like something I pitched a few pages back.  I want royalties!



Point of clarification:  PYs are positions ("Person-Years"); the challenge is to find the P ("Personnel") to fill the PYs.  It's the Ps the Army is trying to hold on to.

Or, to use the preferred NDHQ analogy, PYs are chairs, and Ps are asses to fill the chairs.


----------



## Mountie

I was thinking a little more about the big picture I guess.  Whether the light/CSOR battalions belong to the Army or are the Army's contribution to CANSOFCOM isn't really a big deal I don't think.


----------



## dapaterson

Mountie said:
			
		

> I was thinking a little more about the big picture I guess.  Whether the light/CSOR battalions belong to the Army or are the Army's contribution to CANSOFCOM isn't really a big deal I don't think.


It's a tremendous issues from a force management perspective.  Does the Army command 9 "normal" infantry bns plus one light bn, meaning that plans can be built around a rotation of 10, or only the 9 normal bns, forcing a cycle of 9?  Is the light bn a one-way flow of personnel in but no one out, meaning a constant drain from the aforementioned nine, or do you still control them and can you thus rotate and post pers from them?  Is the light bn trained and equipped the same as other 9 (in big terms), or do they go out and get jammie toys and build skills that aren't immediately transferable to the other 9 bns?

And many more Qs.  Big picture, the issues of fractured command and control structures are what are eroding the CF right now - too many "Level 1" organizations in DND all looking for CO's drivers and SO 4-7-12-13-9, while the line organizations are being "refined" and "rationalized".


----------



## Mountie

I guess I was thinking of the CSOR as more like the Canadian Airborne Regiment where personnel flowed both ways.  In my proposal all of the regular, so to speak, battalions would be mechanized so obviously the CSOR would be organized different.  The proposal was a rotational cycle of 8 battle groups based on the 8 mech battalions with the 2 CSOR battalions which would the be rapid reaction, stand-by units.  The operational tempo for the CSOR battalions could be higher.  Basically the CSOR would be like US Army Ranger battalions.


----------



## Im Not Telling

> In any case, there are many issues which the OBG experiment will not examine.  Sure it might work to permanently establish an OBG in 2 RCR when the whole rest of the Army is not doing it, but will Bde's properly balanced for ABGs better serve the super bases such as Valcartier, Petawawa & Edmonton?



I don't know about Valcatraz or Ed but Pet's no super base, and 2 CMBG seems to stand pretty good as it is minus the fact that 2 SVC BN is not part of Bde leaving out a mass amount of CSS out.  Sure each unit has thier own but most of them get left behind for rear party and they take A,B, or C coy from multiple units.  Of course then you have Aviation assets controled from an other base that are attached to CSOR and not the Bde so you have this great big amazing Bde with holes that still seems to work well.

I think the Idea of the OBG is to establish a perminent first in unit and to extend the ideas of the MEU that has been canceled at this time.  This fills a need for Canada to have a major first responce unit out side of SOF or the Teams that still means you need sections to do advance party and set up the ground lay out and do everything else but you have one stop shopping for the man power issues of needing specialty trades in a unit and all that good stuff.  how ever it gives you what you need in one place allowing the standard Bde (like 2 CMBG)to fall into place after a ground work has been put inplace.  I'm pretty sure it's not Just 2 RCR that will be going through this growing pain as they want (and need) at least two such units on each side of the country if this is going to work.  That said, it goes back to being the thought police,  we're going to haveto see what happens, you can cruch numbers and stats all day but if you don't have the raw facts from doing the actual work your screwed just like anyone else who mistakes theory for fact.  (Not that anyone in here whould actually do that......I hope)


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## McG

Im Not Telling said:
			
		

> ... 2 CMBG seems to stand pretty good as it is minus the fact that 2 SVC BN is not part of Bde leaving out a mass amount of CSS out ... then you have Aviation assets controled from an other base that are attached to CSOR and not the Bde so you have this great big amazing Bde with holes that still seems to work well.


This is generally why I think ABGs will work in the brigade bases, and (as you've pointed out) there already is real world experience from which to comment on how a Bde should/could be balanced for an ABG model.  What are the benefits to 2 CMBG of having 2 RCHA in the same location?  If the Army went to a mixed ABG/OBG structure, should 1 RCHA be moved to Edmonton & Shilo be designated the home to a second OBG?



			
				Im Not Telling said:
			
		

> That said, it goes back to being the thought police,  we're going to haveto see what happens, you can cruch numbers and stats all day but if you don't have the raw facts from doing the actual work your screwed just like anyone else who mistakes theory for fact.  (Not that anyone in here whould actually do that......I hope)


It is true that the real world validates the theoretical (or proves it wrong).  However, a good grasp of the theoretical side gives a better likelyhood that one will know what questions need to be asked, what theoretical concepts need to be proven before the whole can be accepted, and which real-world whole-force factors will not be reflected in a single unit experiment.



			
				Mountie said:
			
		

> I guess I was thinking of the CSOR as more like the Canadian Airborne Regiment where personnel flowed both ways.


In addition to dapaterson's observations, CSOR is not an infantry unit.  In the Airborne Regiment, infantry men were infantry men.  In CSOR, operators may be infantrymen, stokers, divers, AVN Techs, engineers, cooks, etc.  It does not exist to do the same thing & its training is not aligned toward the same thing as was the Airborne.


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## TheNomad

Firstly, I have not read the entire thread, but this is a subject I have thought about on several occasions so here is my 2p worth.

Currently the various arms and corps are experts at what they do, and think in terms of what they need to do. 

This gives the senior commanders a "golf bag" of assets that they can pick from based on the operational task.  Commanders around the Lt Col level are trained on how to use the extras he might be given for that task, as well as being trained in how to operate within other battle groups.

 For example.  The commander of an infantry battalion that forms the base of a battle group is trained on how to use the tanks, artillery, engineers etc. that he has been given to play with.  He also recognises that they are the experts in their field and will listen to their professional advice on how they can best support his aim.

The commander of an infantry company that has been a assigned to a battle group based on a tank regiment knows how best to support the tank commander in achieving his aim.

The current system gives great flexibility at all levels.

If the other route was taken there would be a constant robbing Peter to pay Paul while attempting to create the correct mix for the task.  Furthermore, by keeping for example all the artillery in artillery units and not spreading them about in penny packets, it enables them to retain their artillery first professionalism, as well as retaining economies of scale.


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## PanaEng

I would just like to add that in a practical level, at least in the initial/formative stages, the OBG model has many challenges. 

For example, back in 92 (iirc) 2TP from 2CER was moved to the CAR, as were other units from the various arms. I was not part of the transfer but I can attest that what initially seemed like a great step turned out to cause many problems for the unit and the personnel involved. The troop was not equipped properly - barely the basics, - training suffered and morale went down. For whatever reason, the commanders and the whole support chain in the CAR did not know how to deal with these sub-units that were not infantry and their needs went unresolved.

Perhaps in the long term these issues might have been worked out. However, it serves to highlight the difficulty in creating an OBG organization from existing units without extensive training and awareness of the needs of the different components.

cheers,
Frank


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## Mountie

I think that if done, which I think it should be, the OBG should be organized more as a mini-brigade group rather than a battalion+.  In this sense the battle group commander would have to be trained extensively in combined arms operations.  The battle group headquarters should also be structures as a miniture brigade headquarters rather than a battalion heaquarters (ie. G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, etc).  As I proposed before the battle group would be numbered along the lines of a brigade, restoring the history of the WW1 and WW2 brigades.  This would allow for a better sense of belong and higher morale.  Rather than being attached to an infantry battalion the support units would be an integral part of the battle group.  Sub-units would take on the unit lineage.  For example,

*1 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group*
1 CMBG Headquarters
1 Command Support Squadron (signal troop, military intelligence troop, military police section, admin troop to support the squadron and BG HQ)
1 Company, PPCLI
2 Company, PPCLI
3 Company, PPCLI
1 Squadron, LdSH (RC)
A Battery, RCHA
11 Combat Engineer Squadron
1 Service Company
1 Field Ambulance Platoon

This would make the battle group gell as one more than units being added to an infantry battalion I would think.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Mountie said:
			
		

> I think that if done, which I think it should be, the OBG should be organized more as a mini-brigade group rather than a battalion+.  In this sense the battle group commander would have to be trained extensively in combined arms operations.  The battle group headquarters should also be structures as a miniture brigade headquarters rather than a battalion heaquarters (ie. G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, etc).



What we call three infantry companies, a tank squadron, and artillery battery, an engineer squadron a CSS sub-unit and its HQ is, in my view, not the critical issue.  I would argue that today's "battle group" commanders are already trained extensively in combined arms operations.  

A Canadian battalion-sized organization on today's battlefield may well have a larger HQ element than it did in the past with some coordination centres that would have normally been thought of as Brigade level. 

Naming conventions aside, I see the following issues remaining:

a.   Generation of the various sub-units.  I would argue that armoured, artillery and engineer sub-units benefit from belonging to a homogenous unit.  You can have the odd independent sub-unit kicking around, but the branch remains healthy by having units (in my opinion).

b.   Task Tailoring.  Permanently creating a combined arms unit may lose its argued benefits when the pre-determined task tailoring does not match the actual situation.  Those combined arms wizards of yore (the Germans in World War II) had combined arms Panzer Divisions, but inside those were homogenous Regiments composed of homogenous Battalions.  They mixed and matched according to the situation.  They belonged to the same Division and had a shared esprit de corps.  This is something that I think our CMBGs have arguably done well.

Cheers


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## vonGarvin

I agree with you, T2B, in that having _effectively manned_ brigade groups is preferable to permanently manned battlegroups. The problem, of course, is that our CMBGs today are terribly undermanned, with way too many recce squadrons, and not enough tank squadrons, not enough fire support assets, too few infantrymen, and so on and so forth.


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## Old Sweat

We spent more than four decades screwing around with our force structure, and not because we thought it was a good idea. Our structure got hacked, mutilated and unsupersized every few years for all sorts of reasons, but mostly to free up money for other purposes and/or because somebody had a better idea. That we were able to retain anything is a bit of a miracle, and says wonders about our collective ability to make a sow's ear out of a silk purse. 

We can't fix it overnight, but it is fixable, if we keep basic principles in mind. To my mind, an OBG sacrifices too much flexibility and cohesion in pursuit of a specialized organization disguised as a general purpose combat capability.

This may be straying off the track, but the large national support element (and no unit and sub-unit echelons) that deployed to Afghanistan is an optimized organization. I submit it has not survived contact with the enemy. Is there a lesson here for those who would optimize other organizations?


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## Infanteer

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> a.   Generation of the various sub-units.  I would argue that armoured, artillery and engineer sub-units benefit from belonging to a homogenous unit.  You can have the odd independent sub-unit kicking around, but the branch remains healthy by having units (in my opinion).



Agreed.  I would add that one of the aspects of a _professional_ standing Army is the host of "garrison" things such as career management.  Any case 



> b.   Task Tailoring.  Permanently creating a combined arms unit may lose its argued benefits when the pre-determined task tailoring does not match the actual situation.  Those combined arms wizards of yore (the Germans in World War II) had combined arms Panzer Divisions, but inside those were homogenous Regiments composed of homogenous Battalions.  They mixed and matched according to the situation.  They belonged to the same Division and had a shared esprit de corps.  This is something that I think our CMBGs have arguably done well.



Agreed in part that the ABG may be preferred to the OBG as it allows for more flexibility when force generation calls for a different set of "pieces" to build the team.  However, I would argue that the CMBG's haven't done the greatest job of shared esprit de corps - that is still maintained at the Regimental/Branch level and that is where all our identity is organized around.  I believe that the marriage of Regimental affiliation to a single trade will be the biggest stumbling block for the Regimental system in the future as the combined-arms functions get pushed down to lower and lower levels....


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## Mountie

I'm curious why so many think that permanent combined arms battle group are not a good idea for the independent sub-units?  There are plenty of examples of this that have worked.  Through the Cold War German panzer battalions had one panzer grenadier company and visa versa.  This was a permanent organization not a battle group/task force reorganization.   From the Cold War through to the present US Army Armoured Cavalry Regiments have been organized with three combined arms cavalry squadrons (US battalion) equipped with three cavalry troops (US Company), a tank company and an artillery battery.  Current US Army heavy battalions are a mix of two tank companies, two mechanized infantry companies and one engineer company.  The US Army Future Combat System battalions that are to be formed sometime in the next decade or two are likewise organized with two direct fire support companies and two mechanized infantry companies.

As armies shrink in size they have traditionally reduced the level at which a combined arms force is maintained.  As we see in another thread the diffusion of combined arms that in the days of Napoleon the level of combined arms shifted to the corps.  During WW1 trench warfare the corps remained the typical combined arms formation.  During WW2 the division was typically the lowest combined arms unit, even though Commonweatlth armoured brigades and independent US tank battalions were attached to their respective infantry divisions rather than being permanently organized within.  During the Cold War the major powers used the division as the basic combined arms formation.  The smaller armies such as Canada shifted to the brigade-level for permanently organized combined arms formations (ie. CMBG).  As armies continued to downsize and the nature of warfare changed the major powers such as the US, UK, French, German, Italian, and other armies shifted to the brigade-level for combined arms.  In the US Army, the largest western army, this is called the brigade combat team.  Within the BCT even some battalions are permanently organized as combined arms battalions.  So while the major armies shifted from division to brigade-based combined arms, the smaller armies such as Canada should shift from the brigade to the battle group level of permanently organized combined arms.

Other than the brigade in Germany, Canada has not deployed a brigade group on operations overseas since the Korean War.  So why are we maintaining the brigade as the basic combined arms unit.  Canada has always deployed battle groups or battalion groups.  So it would make more sense to organize in peace time as we organize for operations.   As far as the battle group structure not being ideal for every deployment, lets be honest, the majority of battle groups deployed in the past twenty years have been organized the same.  Lets go back to the early 1990's and Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia to the present Afghanistan mission; almost all organizations have been based on 3-4 mechanized infantry companies, a Cougar/Coyote/Leopard squadron, an engineer squadron, an artillery battery (not in the UN mission to the Balkans, but established with the SFOR mission), and a logistics/medical/military police support element.  This basic structure has remained the same, so permanently organizing as a OBG and generating different unit during those rare occassions that don't require a typical battle group would be easier than trying to generate a battle group every time.

The permanent battle group organization allows for a more cohesive unit and better morale.  Soldiers maintain their traditional regimental family and history but their every day family becomes the battle group.


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## TangoTwoBravo

The US cavalry organizations you mention were composed primarily of Armor soldiers, although some were indeed scouts and other tankers(they all had the 19 MOS indicator).  The only infantrymen that I knew of were the guys manning the mortars in the companies.  Depending on the organization there were artillerymen present (the ACR squadrons), but that was based on knowing the expected tactical tasks of those units.  The Div Cav guys had aviators but no guns.  That was a real special case unit.  I can't speak to the Cold War Germans.  The US Army is indeed moving towards combined arms groups.  We will see where that will go I suppose.

Regarding battle groups, their composition has actually gone through lots of changes (in terms up sub-units - never mind the little things).  Would what is sent to Kandahar in 2009 be what we send to another theatre in 2015?  I am not sure.

Along with that, if we currently have to bring in infantry sub-units from other bases to get battle groups up to strength to deploy, what is the big push to combine the arms permanently? I see some other dragons to slay.

If you do group permanently, what does it look like?  Nine battle groups with nine artillery batteries, nine tank squadrons, nine recce Squadrons and nine engineer squadrons? 

With what we have today the battle group comes together in varying degrees up to a year out from deployment.  Given the yearly APS shuffle of a professional army, I am not sure if permanent combined arms groups will achieve the added cohesion that they promise.


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## Mountie

Agreed, nine permanently organized combined arms battle groups would not work with the present structure.  It would required full manning.


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## Infanteer

I'm of two minds on the issue.

On the *"Optimized"* side, I've always been a big proponent of the "downward diffusion of combined arms" (I started that thread).  I also used to advocate a permanent battalion-level combined arms grouping as well.  In fact, I like the US Army Stryker Brigade concept where a Company Commander has Recce/Surveillance, Snipers, 105mm DFS (MGS), and mortars integral to his sub-unit.  Throw in a section of engineers and you have a mini-battlegroup.  Permanent combined-arms groupings at the sub-unit level is probably the way to go, as sub-units seem to be the "unit of action" or "unit of employment" on today's battlefield.  The Canadian Infantry can do this, all it needs to do is revive its Combat Support Company and push those assets down to the Company Commanders.  The hard part - as identified above - kit and soldiers to fill those billets.

On the *"Affiliated"* side, I am a little leery of bashing up our Force Generation System (training, career management, branch experience, etc) to simply get what we have anyways - Combat Teams and Battle Groups that are pretty good at killing badguys.  My understanding of organizational theory is that no military organization provides the silver bullet and what works today may be wrong for tomorrow.  "Brigading" different sub-sub and sub-units allows our deployed units max flexibility - do we gain anything if we form "all arms battalions" with 2 infantry coys and 2 armoured sqdns and end up having to chop 2 infantry coys from another battalion and leave the 2 armoured sqdns at home because the war of the day is some jungle bush war?  The idea of Combined Arms Battalions came from the writing of LCol Douglas MacGregor in the mid-90s and works off the premise that the main "unit of employment" of the US Army should be changed from the division to the brigade - we deploy battalions, so I would assume that our "optimized" concept would have to work a bit differently.

Finally, as I said above, any talk of "Optimizing" our units for optimal force employment needs to consider the effects on force generation (again, training, career management, branch experience, etc).  The fact that the unit is the focus for identity (vice the US or German examples where it is found at the Divisional level) and that the unit is heavily tied to the system of a "trade-pure" Regiment/Corps/Branch means that "optimizing" the Army is going to run into some pretty heavy institutional friction.

In my opinion, any "optimizing" right now should be done at the sub-unit level for the Infantry.  Sub-units should receive the extra kit, PYs and actual dudes to man permanent "Combat-Teams", similar to Stryker Companies, with the addition of the Echelon (we in the Infantry need to thank the Armoured Corps for teaching us how to properly resupply ourselves).  The Artillery, Engineers, and Armoured Regiments should continue to exist as unit level entities which preserve higher level support (M777, Tanks, Bridging, etc, etc) that can be Affiliated with the Combat Teams and taken by Battle Group Commanders on operations as required.

My 2 Cents.


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## vonGarvin

Infanteer makes some very good points.  The key, in my opinion, is that what's good for today's fights may not be good for tomorrow's.  So what?  The organisation, whatever it is, must be flexible.
In my opinion, the brigade group, along the model of the 4 CMBG model, would be ideal.  
As a reminder to our younger forum members, its ORBAT was roughly as follows
4 CMBG HQ and Signal Squadron
2 x Infantry Battalions
1 x Armoured Regiment
1 x Artillery Regiment
1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1 x Service Battalion

As each task would "come up", the Bde Comd would swap sub-units about.  From there, the CO's would do the same.  Now, I am not advocating having three brigades able to fight at once or whatever, but if this structure were adhered to, with three brigades, each with 2 infantry battalions (yes, leaving us six vice nine), we would, in the short term anyway, be able to fully man them now. If we then have to go to "country X" to do "task Y", then when "Z" CMBG is tasked, then Col Wassisname then would have the assets available to form a BG and send them on their way.  
Going to a permanent structure, optimised or affiliated or whatever, may be a luxury that we cannot do in the short term.


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## ArmyRick

I kind of think six fully manned infantry battalions would work better as well, BUT my stipulation would be that they have 4 rifle coys each instead of 3. Would a BN deploy with all 4 rifle coy? More than likely no. But it gives you that 10% pool that we actually dip into these days.


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## vonGarvin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I kind of think six fully manned infantry battalions would work better as well, BUT my stipulation would be that they have 4 rifle coys each instead of 3. Would a BN deploy with all 4 rifle coy? More than likely no. But it gives you that 10% pool that we actually dip into these days.


That's my point.  4 fully manned (less those on career courses, tasking, instructing, whatever) companies would, in my opinion, provide a wider and more easily sustainable force pool.  Heck, maybe there's a mission requiring only a headquarters element and one rifle company (as happened in East Africa in 2000/2001).

As for the other arms and services, there is less demand (eg,if there is only one armoured squadron and one recce squadron required), then the tools are there "in the bag" ready for use.  Heck, suppose a mission where a virtual brigade is required (think Bosnia early 90s, with CANBATT 1, CANBATT 2, LOGBATT, etc).  I think that focussing on battalions/regiments is a bit too far down the totem pole, as it were.


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## Mountie

I was reading a book on Canadian operations in Afghanistan and during the one particular operations being discussed the rifle companies were dispursed approximately 75 km away from each other or from the battle group headquarters.  As indicated in above posts the "unit of employment" has become the sub-unit.  Therefore, would it not be more effective to organize those sub-units as mini-combined arms elements?  

Take the USMC armoured reconnaissance battalion as an example (this is the closest we come to a Canadian mechanized infantry battalion).  It operates the LAV-II family of vehicles rather than the LAV-III but its a good comparison.  It is organized with 3-4 line companies each consisting of a headquarters platoon (2 x LAV-25, 1 x LAV-C2, 3 x LAV-L and 1 x LAV-R), three scout platoons (4 x LAV-25) and a weapons platoon (2 x LAV-M and 4 x LAV-AT).  The headquarters and services company has over 330 personnel organized in with the battalion headquarters, a communications platoon, a supply platoon, a transport platoon, a large maintenance platoon and a large medical platoon.

Wouldn't a combined arms battle group permanently organized into company groups be more effective.  Take today's mechanized rifle company and add a combat support platoon with mortars, TUAs, an assault pioneer section and a scout/sniper team.  Then add an echelon with LAV-based logistics vehicles, MRVs, MRTs and Ambulances.  A similarily organized recce squadron, engineer squadron and artillery battery and supported by a large service company and a large health service platoon would round out the battle group and allow it to operated effectively during distributed operations.


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## Mountie

*Enhanced Company Operations* - A logical progression to capability development by Col. Vincent J. Goulding, Jr.

From 2004 through 2006 the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) focused its experimentation on the evolving concept of distributed operations (DO), itself focused on better trained, manned, and equipped platoons and squads. The DO project deliberately took a bottom-up approach, guided by the notion that a company is only as good as its platoons, its platoons only as good as its squads, and its squads only as good as its Marines. 

The results of this 2-year program were outlined in the April 2008 Marine Corps Gazette.1 Collateral efforts in direct support of DO experimentation were SQUAD FIRES and COMBAT HUNTER, the former to create, through simulation, Types II and III Close Air Support capability at the Squad Level and the latter to increase tactical situational awareness of individual Marines. Both projects were successful.

In June 2007 the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force hosted a Tactical Capabilities for Irregular Warfare Conference. Participants were assigned to one of three subgroups and asked to identify irregular warfare required capabilities in terms of "find, fix, or engage."  Each group produced a list of required capabilities within its specific assigned topic. While there were redundant findings in several areas among the three groups, the required capability that all three identified (and the one that precipitated the liveliest discussion) had to do with standardizing a company-level intelligence cell. 

It was clear that company commanders were creating this capability ad hoc and out of hide. It was equally clear that what they wanted was a standardized "train, man, equip" model.

The small contingent of MCWL participants returned to Quantico, assessed what had taken place over those 2 days at Camp Pendleton, and decided that the time had come for experimentation to shift from the squad- and platoon-focused DO program to the company level. For all intents and purposes, enhanced company operations, or ECO, was born.

*Why the Company Level? Why CLIC?*
Many battlefield functions previously thought of as "battalion level" have gravitated to the ever-broadening shoulders of the company commander. The problem, of course, is that the company is not trained, manned, or equipped to accomplish many of these critical tasks. Savvy company commanders and their Marines make it happen, but they do so more often in spite of than because of institutional support. 

Add to this the Marine Corps ethos of maneuver warfare predicated on intelligence-driven operations, and the company-level intelligence cell (CLIC) became the logical starting point. A final consideration was the less obvious one that the company is probably the smallest tactical formation capable of conducting independent operations—and frequently does on today's battlefield.

CLIC experimentation began with development of a best practices model, based on a series of face-to-face meetings with combat veteran company commanders from across the Marine Corps. Based on those meetings, a task list was created, manning straw man developed, and "experimental" equipment list procured. Just as importantly, and in conjunction with Training and Education Command's (TECom's) Marine Corps Intelligence School, an extant training package was modified to suit the task.

Two limited objective experiments (LOEs) were conducted. They included all facets of training, manning, and equipping—culminating in mission execution during Exercise MOJAVE VIPER. The results were positive. As a result, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command's (MCCDC's) Combat Development Directorate established an integrated planning team to assess the results and inject the appropriate takeaways across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. 

Additionally, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office brokered a number of meetings with the U.S. Army and has expressed interest in funding requisite training facilities and equipment for the execution of CLIC training in both Services.

*Company-Level Operations Center*
The 8-month CLIC project consistently validated the plan to take company enhancement to the next level. Lessons learned from current operations were also making it increasingly apparent that, as areas of responsibility in Iraq and Afghanistan became increasingly larger and more distributed, more and more battlefield functions were being pushed to the company level. Early in the CLIC process and after discussions with TECom, particularly the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) at Twentynine Palms, the decision was made to grow the CLIC effort into CLOC—company-level operations center—and make it the centerpiece of ECO LOE 2. 

The approach is similar to CLIC. Begin with a research phase to define the required tasks, develop a prototype best practices model, man and equip it properly, conduct requisite training, then have the test unit run it through MOJAVE VIPER. Collaboration with and input from MCTOG and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center's Tactical Training Exercise Control Group has been indispensable, as has been the support of the 7th Marines, who from the outset have fully understood that the overhead required by experimentation is worth the value-added that CLIC and CLOC provide, not only to the regiment's organic battalions but also eventually to battalions Marine Corps-wide. Live force CLOC experimentation is scheduled for this summer at Twentynine Palms.

*The Next Steps*
ECO doesn't end with CLIC/CLOC. Two additional events are being designed and refined. The first is to look at potential critical limiting factors (logistics, command and control) to ECO (LOE 3); the second is the requirements incumbent with company-level expeditionary operations from the sea (LOE 4).

LOE 3 will examine two major objective areas, both in the context of an immature theater and irregular enemy: (1) distributed logistics/casualty handling and evacuation and (2) company-level command and control. Achievement of the first objective will include the use of prototypical air delivery systems, as well as unmanned air and ground vehicles for supply distribution and "short haul" casualty evacuation (CasEvac)—short haul in that the idea is to get the injured Marine from point of injury to a relatively secure area where conventional CasEvac can occur without putting mission enablers at undue risk from direct fire. MCWL planners are working closely with the Robotic Systems Joint Project Office, the U.S. Army's Telemedicine and Advanced Research Center, and U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Medical Distance Support and Evacuation Joint Capability Technology Demonstration Office. The logistical and medical implications of the distributed battlefield transcend any single Service.

The second objective of ECO LOE 3 has a number of moving parts. Company-level command and control must begin with a capable and simple on-the-move, over-the-horizon tactical radio. To that end, MCWL developed a netted iridium distributed tactical communications system (DTCS). While never intended to become a program of record, DTCS was designed to provide the tactical beyond-line-of-sight communications required to develop and assess the tactics, techniques, and procedures the distributed battlefield requires at the company level. This command and control aspect of ECO LOE 3 has an additional and potentially very important subobjective: inform MCCDC and the Marine Corps Systems Command?s (MarCorSysCom's) development of the program of record Capability Set V—designed specifically for the company commander?s operations center. ECO LOE 3 is scheduled to take place late in the summer of 2009.

*ECO From the Sea* 
The final event in the ECO program will occur in 2010 and look at the employment of a reinforced rifle company from the sea on a mission that causes it to operate in an austere environment and at significant distance from its higher headquarters. The mission won't be tactically unsound but will be tactically demanding. The central idea will be to put stress on communications to higher and lower headquarters, as well as on all aspects of tactical logistics, to include CasEvac. 

The intended consequence of ECO LOE 4 is reorientation of experimentation and capability development on the Corps' enduring core competency of seabased expeditionary warfare as described in Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, written over a decade ago. In aggregate, the ECO experimentation program will put teeth into prescient concept papers of the past as well as contribute to the development of tactical units eminently capable of conducting the types of operations outlined in the recently released long war concept.2

*Final Thoughts*
Marines win battles at the tactical level, and a robust partnership between MCWL, TECom, and MarCorSysCom ensures that MCCDC gets the input it needs to identify valid requirements and set the stage for training, manning, and equipping tactical units that are the most agile, lethal, and survivable anywhere. Experimentation comes with a price, especially when considering operational tempo and the underlying requirements behind the ever-improving predeployment training package in which units must engage. The reality is, however, that Marines like those depicted in the photographs in this article stand to gain a great deal from the capability development and assessment process Marine Corps experimentation brings to the table.


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## Infanteer

I read that article in the latest edition of the Marine Corps Gazette (perhaps you should include a link?) and it piqued my interest.  I followed the DO Project with interest and see ECO as the logical extention.

Problem is, is there any depth to the concept.  Our Doctrine is heading this way, with the new force employment concept being based around the concept of "adaptive dispersed operations".  Seems like we managed to get "adaptive" and "dispersed" - two big military buzzwords today - into one phrase.  Yay.  Now, does this mean cramming more electronics onto existing structures?


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## vonGarvin

I have an idea.  Let's form SECTION Ops Centres.  I mean, why stop at Coy level? [/sarcasm]

Let's face it.  Our military is currently jumping a shark.  Our HQs are bloated, ineffective and very VERY slow.  A boy scout could out-OODA loop even our once-lean BGs!

ADO is just the latest in useless buzz-phrases that add no value.  "Spread out" is one way to say "dispersed", and we do that already.  Same with "Adaptive".  Do they mean FLEXIBLE?  I mean, come on: why do we really need to label wheels every time someone re-invents them?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Problem is, is there any depth to the concept.  Our Doctrine is heading this way, with the new force employment concept being based around the concept of "adaptive dispersed operations".  Seems like we managed to get "adaptive" and "dispersed" - two big military buzzwords today - into one phrase.  Yay.  Now, does this mean cramming more electronics onto existing structures?



Don't forget "command centric" and "network enabled."  Make sure you make it "JIMP capable."  

A while ago I was thinking about "platoon groups."   This was based on watching platoons operate with a variety of support elements added in.  I think that this might be too low of a grouping.  Combat team/company group operations do seem to the norm, but not every situation calls for the same organization.  Spreading things like artillery, tanks, PSYOPs and CIMIC around can work in one situation, but it can then be hard to bring those assets back together to focus on a main effort.  What works in an insugency might not work when facing a modern army in old-school heavy metal fighting.

I suppose I want to have my cake and eat it to.  Organize along single-arms lines but train to group arms together at low levels.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Your CSS point is extremely important.  The loss/slashing of integral CSS from combat arms units is, perhaps, the issue that needs resolving before we start worrying over where other things like integral TUA et.  You can plug in supporting arms like tanks, artillery, reconnaissance, engineers etc, but integral CSS and C2 should be the baseline for a unit.


----------



## a_majoor

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I have an idea.  Let's form SECTION Ops Centres.  I mean, why stop at Coy level? [/sarcasm]
> 
> Let's face it.  Our military is currently jumping a shark.  Our HQs are bloated, ineffective and very VERY slow.  A boy scout could out-OODA loop even our once-lean BGs!





			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Your CSS point is extremely important.  The loss/slashing of integral CSS from combat arms units is, perhaps, the issue that needs resolving before we start worrying over where other things like integral TUA et.  You can plug in supporting arms like tanks, artillery, reconnaissance, engineers etc, but integral CSS and C2 should be the baseline for a unit.



It seems the two common factors (going back through the thread) would seem to be a need for a smaller, faster and more flexible Command and Control apparatus as well as an integral CSS organization. 

It seems rather crazy that Rommel could command an entire army spread out over North Africa from the back of a half-track while we need a huge command organization with multiple cells and sub cells for a single battle group. Using T2B's observation, maybe we should look at the BG (OBG or ABG) as a tree. The C3I and CSS are the permanent roots and trunk of the organization, and units and capabilities are branches grafted on as needed. I am still of the opinion that the "branches" should have common bonds of long association (like we sort of have with the CMBG's), and fleshing out the units to full strength to prevent musical chairs on deployment would probably be the cure for that problem.

This kind of turns the issue inside out; while capabilities might change and evolve (CIMIC and PSYOPS will not be very important in a future heavy metal conflict, but are very important now, while combat arms units will become smaller and capable of more dispersion), the real focus is not on the tooth but the tail.....


----------



## a_majoor

If Command and control is the trunk of the tree, then here is a working model to start with:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20080930.aspx



> *Putting Science Fiction To Work*
> 
> September 30, 2008: The war in Iraq has changed the U.S. Army in many ways, some of them largely unknown to the public. A few of these unknown have been huge, and one of the less publicized of those has been the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). This has become the Command Post of Right Now. CPOF is basically a PC based software and communications system that enables users to collaborate with other units and officers, and plan and run operations in real-time. Each CPOF PC has three flat screen displays, which is unusual for your average PC user, but quite common for corporate heavyweights and Wall Street operators. There are now over 500 of these CPOF PCs in use at brigade and higher headquarters in Iraq and Afghanistan (and worldwide).
> 
> The idea for CPOF is only ten years old, but five years ago it was basically ready to go. CPOF showed up in Iraq four years ago, and emerged from beta (was officially "released") two years ago. The speed of development had a lot to do with the fact that similar software was already in heavy use by corporations, and that the army had been quick to adopt PCs and digital data.
> 
> CPOF means that commanders can confer from anywhere, with anyone, using network and videoconferencing technology. Most importantly, maps and other data can be shared, in real time, as well. For several decades, the Command Post of the Future was much talked about, but didn't appear much because of cost (high) and technology (largely science fiction) issues. As has happened in the past, wartime tends to eliminate cost and technology issues. In this case, civilian command post technology showed up, along with lots of high speed satellite communications capability, just as the war on terror began. That took care of a lot of cost and technology issues. By the time Iraq was invaded, individual combat divisions, and other military organizations, were already taking the civilian software and hardware to create their own Command Post of the Future experiments.
> 
> The U.S. Army had several official projects in development for Command Post of the Future, most notably ideas based on the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) project. Parts of this (especially the Blue Force Tracking system) were quickly issued to the troops for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As combat operations continued in Iraq, so did the flow of money for new communications gear, software and communications capability. As a result, there were soon several improvised Command Post of the Future systems in action in combat zones, and headquarters that were supporting them. The tools were available, there was a need, and things just happened. Standardizing all this, and distributing it to the rest of the army, and Department of Defense, took a year or so. But with new hardware and software appearing every month, standardization became a problem. However, many components of this new form of command post (the fast satellite data links, PCs, large flat screen displays and laptops everywhere, plus easy networking) do remain fairly stable. Most of the change is coming in the software. But even this aspect is kept under control because most screw-ups occur in front of senior commanders. This provides an additional incentive to get these things working right.
> 
> This was not the first time radical technology sneaked up on the military. Portable radio, first widely used during World War II, radically changed how commanders operated, especially at the tactical level. But the current revolution is different in that the signals can easily be encrypted, and carry visual, as well as speech, data. Thus commanders at all levels can eliminate face-to-face meetings, and just videoconference, or talk freely about plans. But even Instant Messaging have become a powerful tool, because many times, a few short text messages are all that is needed to solve problems.
> 
> Finally, the Internet provided, for the military, many new ideas on how to efficiently handle information. The Internet has been militarized much faster than anyone expected. That has led to the military adopting new database and visualization tools as well. In a single decade, the way commanders run their units, and battles has changed more than it has in the past half century.


----------



## vonGarvin

There are no surprises in this article.  Not only is the US doing things this way, but also the CF.  The only problem that I personally have with it is the lack of its acceptance by some elements in the chain of command.  It's hard to break the habit of having a 3D map model for face to face orders when the exact same information can be passed via electronic (and secure) means.  I for one rely exclusively on digital applications.  Having said that, analog means are always on standby "just in case".  (Just like Joe Dirt, I always have back up!)


----------



## dapaterson

Dinosaurs in the chain of command?  Who'd have thought?

See also: Radar in Hawai'i, and officers who ignored its reports.


----------



## Mountie

Is there any update on how the 2 RCR ABG experiment is going?  I haven't been able to find anything online other than a reference on the RCD website to its squadron that is forming part of the BG.


----------



## ArmyRick

I am also curious as to how that turns out.


----------



## Mountie

The RCD website calls the 2 RCR BG an "Optimized Battle Group".  However, the DND paper posted earlier in this site says the Army will move towards "Affiliated Battle Groups".  What's with the contradition in terms?  Is it just a word play or have plans changed at all?


----------



## Mountie

Sounds great.  I just thought that it was a ABG experiment.  I wasn't sure how that would be different from the present.  I like the idea of an OBG.  So are the supporting artillery battery and armoured squadron actually being moved to Gagetown?  I assume the engineer squadron is already in Gagetown.


----------



## armyvern

Indeed they are ... I have seen them ...  8)

 >

Oh ... and lookie down on the bottom of the page you linked - there's a pic which includes the DCO Maj Kim Lapointe ... for those roto zero Namibia people - he was there as a Sgt. I'll have to go toss that up in that thread (I forgot about listing him).


----------



## vonGarvin

Wow, C Sqn, in Gagetown, forming a BG with 2 RCR.  We've come miles, haven't we?  :

(For you young'uns for whom the "Cold War" is a subject in history class, "many moons ago", when this rockpainter was new at painting rocks, he was rolling up and down the Lawfield Corridor, part of combat teams in which, hold on to your helmets, 2 RCR and C Sqn RCD formed battlegroups!  Yes, there was a field squadron (22?) as well as an Artillery Battery (W).  The only recce was recce platoon, but back then, they rode in lynxes!)

Oh, how we go through hoops to try to "validate" various ideas, some as old as the idea of an army itself.

I'm sorry, colour me cynical.  This has been done, and this "make work" project is bollocks.  



			
				ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Oh ... and lookie down on the bottom of the page you linked - there's a pic which includes the DCO Maj Kim Lapointe ... for those roto zero Namibia people - he was there as a Sgt. I'll have to go toss that up in that thread (I forgot about listing him).



Snake was a Sgt?  THAT, my friends, is news!  I've known him for pretty near ten years!


----------



## SeaKingTacco

You forgot 119 AD Bty- another proud member of the Gagetown Battlegroup of Cold War days.


----------



## vonGarvin

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You forgot 119 AD Bty- another proud member of the Gagetown Battlegroup of Cold War days.


Yes, I did, and how could I forget the ADATS, then all shiny and new, rumbling along with us?  Though, to be honest, they were probably in well sited positions, kilometres behind me as I got splashed by Leopard C1s as we trundled through the Otnabog or Scotty Dog Wood?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Wow, C Sqn, in Gagetown, forming a BG with 2 RCR.  We've come miles, haven't we?  :
> 
> Oh, how we go through hoops to try to "validate" various ideas, some as old as the idea of an army itself.



I believe, however, that the C Sqn of yore was an independent unit where the OC was a Commanding Officer.  While a battlegroup based on 2 RCR would certainly be formed for specific exercises, I believe that the Sqn was its own unit for the rest of the year.  The current experiment has the Sqn residing inside 2 RCR.


----------



## Kirkhill

Jeez, and here was me thinking all they had done was painted new spots on an old dog.

I didn't realize how badly the Gagetown Battle Group had been drawn down.

As I understood it in the bad old days The Battle Group solved two problems - neither of them operational.  One: It served the needs of the Combat Training Center (That which is now being done at Wainwright was done at Gagetown) Two: It served the needs of the politicians who wanted a military presence in the Maritimes but didn't want to pay for the 5th Brigade Group   (Calgary-Winnipeg-Shilo-Victoria) (Petawawa-London) (Valcartier) (Germany) - Gagetown would have been #5 (actually 3 I guess - Old Sweat or Edward will no doubt square the facts).


----------



## SeaKingTacco

> Yes, I did, and how could I forget the ADATS, then all shiny and new, rumbling along with us?  Though, to be honest, they were probably in well sited positions, kilometres behind me as I got splashed by Leopard C1s as we trundled through the Otnabog or Scotty Dog Wood?



Forget ADATS- I was talking about the Blowpipe days.  Nothing more fun than a Troop of 5/4 tons trying to to keep up with a M113 mounted Coy on an advance up the 220 feature...


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Jeez, and here was me thinking all they had done was painted new spots on an old dog.
> 
> I didn't realize how badly the Gagetown Battle Group had been drawn down.
> 
> As I understood it in the bad old days The Battle Group solved two problems - neither of them operational.  One: It served the needs of the Combat Training Center (That which is now being done at Wainwright was done at Gagetown) Two: It served the needs of the politicians who wanted a military presence in the Maritimes but didn't want to pay for the 5th Brigade Group   (Calgary-Winnipeg-Shilo-Victoria) (Petawawa-London) (Valcartier) (Germany) - Gagetown would have been #5 (actually 3 I guess - Old Sweat or Edward will no doubt square the facts).



Wasn't 'C' Sqn RCD essentially rebadged into 'A' Sqn. 8CH when they (8CH) returned from Germany?  From my limited memory, A 8CH was essentially the 'heavy' training support squadron for the armoured school, as at that time, all officer phase training, NCM crew commanding, and Troop WO courses were run on tanks rather than recce.  I'd imagine the same commitments to the Armour School were the same when it was C Sqn RCD, rather than primarily supporting 2RCR as a permanent battlegroup.

An Optimal Battlegroup may be great for certain operations, however from my Marine Corps experience, I'm more a fan of mission specific organized task forces, as it maintains more flexibility.


----------



## ArmyRick

I am a little curious about something. We only have X number of tanks in the CF. Will every OBG get a tank squadron or troop? Or will armoured regiments hold the MBT squadrons and receive infantry coys subordinate to their BG?

I see that 2 RCR BG has combined its infantry and Armoured recce assetts under the control of the recce squadron. This makes sense to me. 

If you look at an american stryker coy, the MGS are crewed by armoured (or armored since they be yanks?) but the coy is primarly infantry.

Would we do something similar if we attach our MBTs to infantry BG?


----------



## armyvern

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Snake was a Sgt?  THAT, my friends, is news!  I've known him for pretty near ten years!



Well, had you known him for damn near 20 like me ... you'd have known he slithered down here with us once upon a time just as you did.  >


----------



## armyvern

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I'm sorry, colour me cynical.  This has been done, and this "make work" project is bollocks.



Nah, not the same - they had mortars and pioneers way back in those times too ...  >


----------



## McG

Mountie said:
			
		

> Is there any update on how the 2 RCR ABG experiment is going?


I understand the whole thing was on the brink of being shut-down to Force Generate for Afghanistan.  The Army does not have enough soldiers to keep a whole BG protected from the deployment cycles.

... but it is possible the decision was made to keep pressing on despite the shortage of pers and unit HQs.


----------



## vonGarvin

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Nah, not the same - they had mortars and pioneers way back in those times too ...  >


Ah, noted.  Heck, who needs those "Cold War Anachronisms" anyway?   :


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I am a little curious about something. We only have X number of tanks in the CF. Will every OBG get a tank squadron or troop? Or will armoured regiments hold the MBT squadrons and receive infantry coys subordinate to their BG?
> 
> I see that 2 RCR BG has combined its infantry and Armoured recce assetts under the control of the recce squadron. This makes sense to me.
> 
> If you look at an american stryker coy, the MGS are crewed by armoured (or armored since they be yanks?) but the coy is primarly infantry.
> 
> Would we do something similar if we attach our MBTs to infantry BG?



Your question about tanks is, to me, the crux of the debate for the potential Army-wide application of the OBG concept.  Do we spread the tanks, engineers, guns, recce etc equally across nine battlegroups or do we hold them centrally and task-organize?


----------



## a_majoor

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Your question about tanks is, to me, the crux of the debate for the potential Army-wide application of the OBG concept.  Do we spread the tanks, engineers, guns, recce etc equally across nine battlegroups or do we hold them centrally and task-organize?



Given the ongoing shortages of combat equipment and soldiers, perhaps the model of creating a strong permanent C4I and CSS trunk (or maybe spine is a better metaphor) in each Area and grafting the appropriate limbs for the task is the only model that will be possible for the short and medium term. Barring some sort of unexpected event like the Afghanistan conflict suddenly spilling over into Pakistan or the "'Stans" in a big way, I don't see any government pouring extra resources into the CF, especially at the rate we had in the last several years.

Internally, if "we" can figure out how to streamline the C4I and CSS to provide service with fewer PY's, then we can free up resources to at least flesh out the Combat Arms and put boots on the ground. The equipment issues will have to be dealt with at the political level, and requires lots of public support and political will; sadly lacking and beyond our control.


----------



## George Wallace

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Your question about tanks is, to me, the crux of the debate for the potential Army-wide application of the OBG concept.  Do we spread the tanks, engineers, guns, recce etc equally across nine battlegroups or do we hold them centrally and task-organize?



That is a good point to ponder.  I would say both, but I don't hold the purse strings.  Having been in the only "Tank Sqn" in Canada, I witnessed the lack of knowledge and experience in the other Arms in how to effectively work with tanks, the exception being 2 RCR, 22 Fd Sqn, and W Bty.

Spreading the tanks out amongst the nine battlegroups also spreads the tanks rather thin on the ground, and may not be an ideal plan either.  

If we could manage to get enough tanks to do both, we would be better able to give all arms more realistic training.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I doubt that we can have tanks in all the OBGs and also tanks held centrally.  The advantage to centralizing resouces such as tanks is that their effect can be concentrated by the commander with greater ease.  This holds true in peacetime organizations as well as in war.  I believe that it is easier to attach-out a tank squadron from a tank regiment to an infantry battalion as required than it would be to suddenly try to concentrate those tank squadrons if you had decentralized them.  In addition, I believe that you get more bang for your buck within the same resource envelope with a tank regiment with three squadrons than you would with those tanks dispersed into troops in each OBG.

Even if you had nine tank squadrons I would argue they would be better served in three tank regiments within the CMBGs than spread out.  I think that the same would hold true for artillery and engineers.  Reconnaissance is an interesting argument, and perhaps it depends on what level of HQ we deploy.


----------



## Old Sweat

There also is the real world issue of preparing and deploying a tank or engineer squadron or an artillery battery for a mission outside the country. I can only speak about what I have learned about the artillery, but to deploy a M777 battery as configured for the sandbox takes a load of resources both from within and outside the regiment. Suffice to say that the battery is both much larger than and possesses capabilities not found in its Canada-based counterpart. I am firmly in the camp of the affiliated battle group, and am unlikely to undergo a 'road to Damascus' conversion anytime soon.


----------



## dapaterson

Remember:  The OBG is an experiment, not an end-state.

Right now we're sufficiently engaged in bastardizing everything in the hopes of making it work somehow for operations that it's difficult to draw any conclusions about what model works best.


----------



## George Wallace

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Even if you had nine tank squadrons I would argue they would be better served in three tank regiments within the CMBGs than spread out.  I think that the same would hold true for artillery and engineers.  Reconnaissance is an interesting argument, and perhaps it depends on what level of HQ we deploy.



A three tank Sqn Armour Regiment per CMBG is more than adequate to cover the training, familiarization and effectively deploy Cbt Teams from within the Bde resources.  As I said, centralizing all the tanks in one location does nothing to keep effective fighting units.  Only those who get to work regularly with tanks can appreciate the work involved in fighting, maintaining and supplying tanks.  The Cougar, was a poor tank trainer, and created many poor habits amoungst, not only Armour soldiers, but their supporting Arms.  It caused many bad lessons to be learned.

I may also point out that only an Armour Ech really knows how to support Tanks.  You can not centralize all this experience in one location/BG.

A Tank Regiment, can easily provide a Sqn of tanks to each of a Bde's Inf Bns.  Tank Sqns working with the same Inf Bns, with the same FOO/FAC, and the same Engr Tp, become very efficient in what they do.   This is the optimal solution in my opinion.


----------



## Infanteer

When considering what to "optimize" and what to "centralize", I guess you want to look at what needs to deploy and what is mission specific.  Tanks, in my opinion, are not going to be deployed on every operation.  Mortar Platoons are, as they can be transitioned into a variety of other enablers.  Optimize mortar platoons and affiliate tank squadrons.

Now, how to affiliate?  If we saw our Reg Force moving to the "Optimized Formation" (feck, they love that word) - Basically 1 CDN Div of 1,2 and 5 CMBGs - a probable solution would be to consolidate tank assets into a divisional battalion; a full on, full equipped Tank Regiment that belongs to Division.  This is what the USMC does, and they seem to have effective Tank-Infantry Cooperation when required (Baghdad, Fallujah), so your point is probably a little unfounded, George.

If we had the resources, having a Tank Regiment in each Brigade would be nice, but we may not have the numbers or the energy to overcome the Regimental Mafias....


----------



## George Wallace

Actually, my fears are not unfounded.  I have seen so called "Tankers" advancing on a Trace in Suffield with a frontage of 100 m per Troop, where they should have had a frontage of approx 2 km.  I have seen Infantry Coys bring up twenty Jerry Cans of Diesel to replenish a Troop of Tanks that were attached to them.  These are common problems of people who do not train on or with tanks.  It was one of my greatest fears when they announced that the Leo 1 was to be replaced by a MGS.  These fears and problems are not as frivolous as you may seem to think.

As for tanks not deploying.  Where have you been?  They are deployed right now in Afghanistan, and if the next people rotating in do not get the experience of working with them, and the knowledge of their capabilities and what they are not capable of doing; then it is pure arrogance on the part of the Leadership and dooms many to failure.


----------



## Infanteer

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Actually, my fears are not unfounded.  I have seen so called "Tankers" advancing on a Trace in Suffield with a frontage of 100 m per Troop, where they should have had a frontage of approx 2 km.  I have seen Infantry Coys bring up twenty Jerry Cans of Diesel to replenish a Troop of Tanks that were attached to them.  These are common problems of people who do not train on or with tanks.  It was one of my greatest fears when they announced that the Leo 1 was to be replaced by a MGS.  These fears and problems are not as frivolous as you may seem to think.



The competence of a Tank Troop or their training relationship with other arms is predicated by training time and opportunity, not unit organization.  I'd argue that maybe we see a decline in tank skills when a regiment becomes diluted more than one task (Armoured Recce and Armoured) in a regiment?



> As for tanks not deploying.  Where have you been?  They are deployed right now in Afghanistan, and if the next people rotating in do not get the experience of working with them, and the knowledge of their capabilities and what they are not capable of doing; then it is pure arrogance on the part of the Leadership and dooms many to failure.



Tanks have deployed 3 times since WWII.  Korea, Kosovo, and Kandahar.  There are many deployments where we did not employ tanks and there are many potential deployments where we will not employ them, either due to terrain or political/strategic reasons.  An infantry battalion will go everytime and anywhere.  It's "optimized" assets should be those ones that it expects to take with it everytime and anywhere - the rest can be husbanded at a higher level and "affiliated" as needed.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

We should not confuse the issue of the utility of the Cougar as a tank trainer with organization and structure.  Bringing MGS into the debate can only lead to more tangents (it was never intended as a tank trainer).  In addition, if a tank Sqn has an integral echelon (as it should) then whether the tanks sqns are centralized in one Regiment or put in three Regiments is a bit moot.   Having balanced armoured regiments is, perhaps, another debate entirely from the OBG, although it plays into the ABG issue.  There are indeed good reasons for having a tank squadron in each Regiment to support the force generation of battle groups.    

I would argue that if you marry a tank squadron up with an infantry battalion for three months of collective training then they will get slick even if they came from opposite coasts and never worked together before.


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> When considering what to "optimize" and what to "centralize", I guess you want to look at what needs to deploy and what is mission specific.  Tanks, in my opinion, are not going to be deployed on every operation.  Mortar Platoons are, as they can be transitioned into a variety of other enablers.  *Optimize * mortar platoons and affiliate tank squadrons.


*pssst*  We don't have mortar platoons anymore, so the verb you seek may be "recreate"

Anyway, this "experiment" is just rubbish.  If you want PYs, I have a solution: gut the bloated HQ's we have, ESPECIALLY the TWO levels of command we have in theatre for ONE battlegroup!  OK, two battlegroups, now that 2-2 is on board.  HUNDREDS of PYs in there, just waiting to get cut.

And there's nothing wrong with the CMBG model.  Remember, the "G" was for group, in that certain divisional assets were added to the bde, right?  Anyway, I digress...


----------



## dapaterson

At the end of the day we are in a resource constrained situation.  We are buying 100 new MBT hulls.  Full stop.  Take away 19 for the deployed sqn; another 19 for CMTC's training fleet; another 19 to be undergoing refit/refurb at any one time; say another dozen or so for ARVs and AEVs (and ingoring any need for AVLBs)... and we're down to 31 available for distribution to the line units.  If we decide the Armd school should have some (say a dozen), we have one sqn of tanks to assign to a single unit.

So don't expect an Armd Regt in every CMBG any time soon...


----------



## George Wallace

Well.  100 is only 28 less than we bought in 1970 during the Cold War Days.  Then we had a full three Tank Sqn Armd Regiment in Germany with an Independent Tank Sqn in Gagetown.  28 less would account for that Independent Tank Sqn and the Sqn in War Reserve in Germany leaving us with the 100.


----------



## vonGarvin

Get rid of CMTC for starters.  "Laser Tag" may be nice, but it detracts from the training events/lessons that we aim for.  As well, 19 tanks sitting there, awaiting serials to show up is a disgusting waste of resources.  
The sqn here doesn't have four troops: only three.  Assume 19 anyway (spares)
Maybe it's time for a Bde Tank Squadron, and a full up Recce Regiment per brigade group?
So, four squadrons (56), one in each brigade, and one deployed.
That leaves 44 for 'other uses', including a squadron at CTC (if you have none at CTC, then forget about having any in the brigades).  Now down to 25.
So, the three armour regiments have say two recce squadrons and a tank squadron.  The tank squadron is a brigade asset and the recce squadrons can pair up with each of the infantry battalions as required, or centralised if needed.  (Yes, only two infantry battalions per brigade).  Coupled with an Artillery Regiment of two gun batteries per brigade, it's smaller than what we have, but it's enough for our deployments, if stewarded properly.  
So, in the end, each brigade looks like this:
Bde HQ and Signal Squadron
Armour Regiment (1 tank, 2 recce squadrons)
Artillery Regiment (2 gun batteries)
Engineer Regiment
Service Battalion
Infantry Battalion x 2
Now, assume for a moment that we are deployed "somewhere" in the world where we need a battlegroup.  Suppose infantry battlegroup, with tanks and recce.
(I know this is a stretch, but hold on, I'm going somewhere with this)
Assume further that the brigades are numbered 1st, 2nd and 5th (don't ask about 3 and 4: they were bad, just leave it at that!)
So, army commander rings up 2 bde comd and says "I say, Dean my boy, you are next up in the hopper.  I'll need an infantry battlegroup with a gun battery, engineer squadron, recce sqn and tank squadron attached OPCOM.  As well, I need a Bde HQ, a Service Battalion (*cough* "NSE" *cough*) and an OMLT.  The Infantry battlegroup only needs three companies, so that fourth company, they can be the OMLT.  The rest of the bde, well, they can assist with your training.  You deploy in 6 months and you'll be gone for 9.  Questions?"
(Assume again that the infantry battalion has four rifle companies and a skeleton Cbt Sp Coy of recce and sigs).  
I don't need an experiment to see if this would work.  It's what we used to do, but there are fewer infantry battalions (by four) from say 1990.  But instead of people deploying, returning, going on leave, and starting training AGAIN, this time there are six fully functional battalions that can deploy for BG and for OMLT.  With tweaking, of course.  But a hell of a lot better than what we're doing.  

Just my two pence worth...


----------



## Old Sweat

I am going to poke a stick in a few eyes here, for I feel we are in one of our spirals. If this is such a good idea, like unification, why haven’t other western militaries done it? There is, to my tiny mind at least, one overriding reason to go this route, and that is to free up manpower spaces. By posting the sub-units of the armoured, field artillery and engineers units into the infantry battalions, theoretically we can free up almost a unit’s worth of people from the disbanded headquarters and CSS organizations. Do you realize how many new headquarters we can staff with that?

It has already been pointed out that there are not enough tanks to go around, so what do we post in lieu - light armour, reconnaissance or something else? In the case of the guns there are not enough field batteries to fill the slots as well. Which battalion in each brigade gets the STA battery instead? To reach back many years ago, during a summer concentration in 3 CIBG in Gagetown the commander decreed that the affiliated squadrons and batteries would join their battalions in the field. It soon became apparent that the infantry were only interested in having the BC and FOOs with them. Moreover the battalion commanders were neither willing nor able to take on the task of training the gun end of the battery.

I suggest that the training load has not been fully appreciated. Nor, I submit has the requirement for arms advisors at brigade headquarters, let alone the need for a FSCC there. The engineers would probably have something to say about the fragmentation of a very scarce resource, especially if a river crossing or an obstacle breaching was to be conducted.

To return to the manpower spaces, a very senior retired officer told me a few months ago that back in the mid-nineties the land staff had to convince the senior department management that it was not a good idea to reorganize the army on precisely this concept. He did not share his logic with me at the time. However one reason against it that has occurred to me is that the unit command slots in the army are reduced by half, thus halving the gene pool of potential senior commanders. It seems to me that a case could be made that the remaining nine (leaving 4 AD Regt out of the discussion) slots should be shared across the armoured, artillery, engineers and infantry. It probably would work our on a ratio of 5/4 infantry to the others, perhaps flipping to 4/5 from time to time.

Now, since units such as the RCD and the RCHA will disappear from the order of battle, it seems only fair that we maintain consistency. Thus the nine battle groups would be named 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/2, 2/2, 3/2/ 1/5, /25 and 3/5 Battle Groups and the command slots all become combat arms instead of infantry.


----------



## ArmyRick

I think mortarman rock painter has a very realistic model of CMBG if we do decide on a serious re-org. It seems most workable solution.


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I am going to poke a stick in a few eyes here, for I feel we are in one of our spirals. If this is such a good idea, like unification, why haven’t other western militaries done it?



They are.  The first major proponent of such an idea was LCol Douglas MacGregor and his "Breaking the Phalanx".  We are seeing his theories come out (perhaps not directly due to his writings) with both the Stryker Bde, Batt, and Coy and with the "Unit of Action" Light and Heavy Maneuver Battalions that are being created throughout the US Army - they are, clearly, optimizing.

The USMC, on the other hand, remains wedded to the idea of "affiliated" and continues to build MAGTF's from "branch-pure" battalions and regiments.



> I suggest that the training load has not been fully appreciated. Nor, I submit has the requirement for arms advisors at brigade headquarters, let alone the need for a FSCC there. The engineers would probably have something to say about the fragmentation of a very scarce resource, especially if a river crossing or an obstacle breaching was to be conducted.



That is what I had in mind when I mentioned "husbanding" the tanks into a single "divisional" regiment.



> To return to the manpower spaces, a very senior retired officer told me a few months ago that back in the mid-nineties the land staff had to convince the senior department management that it was not a good idea to reorganize the army on precisely this concept. He did not share his logic with me at the time. However one reason against it that has occurred to me is that the unit command slots in the army are reduced by half, thus halving the gene pool of potential senior commanders. It seems to me that a case could be made that the remaining nine (leaving 4 AD Regt out of the discussion) slots should be shared across the armoured, artillery, engineers and infantry. It probably would work our on a ratio of 5/4 infantry to the others, perhaps flipping to 4/5 from time to time.



My guess is that the training system would have to adjust to ensure that once an officer becomes a LCol, he is a "Maneuver" or a "Support" trade, not a branch trade.  Is this possible?  I think we are doing a decent job of covering that off now - any recent staff college grads want to address this?


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> They are [moving to a model of permanent standing OBGs].


They are not.  Take a look at the scale.  A SBCT is a move from Div centric operations to Bde Gp centric.  Effectively, SBCT brings the US closer to what we already have in CMBGs with recognized ABG.  SBCT is not an OBG.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> They are not.  Take a look at the scale.  A SBCT is a move from Div centric operations to Bde Gp centric.  Effectively, SBCT brings the US closer to what we already have in CMBGs with recognized ABG.  SBCT is not an OBG.



Sure it is; look at what a Stryker Infantry Company has.  Snipers, Direct Fire Support LAVs, Mortar LAVs, it own Ambs.  If that ain't optimized, then I don't know what is.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Sure it is; look at what a Stryker Infantry Company has.  Snipers, Direct Fire Support LAVs, Mortar LAVs, it own Ambs.  If that ain't optimized, then I don't know what is.


It is an infantry battalion.  We used to have that ...

Snipers -> still there with Recce Pl
DFS -> used to have TUA
Mortar -> used to have Mor Pl
Ambs -> also used to find these in the Bn.

The OBG concept is far more than just having Bn assets that can be grouped into the companies for operations/training.   SBCT does not put cavlry type armour into the infantry battalions.  Engineers and guns are still a Bde asset.  SBCT is CMBG without the removal of past capabilities from battalions.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> It is an infantry battalion.  We used to have that ...
> 
> Snipers -> still there with Recce Pl
> DFS -> used to have TUA
> Mortar -> used to have Mor Pl
> Ambs -> also used to find these in the Bn.



Well, maybe Rockpainter's point about reinventing the wheel is apt then.



> The OBG concept is far more than just having Bn assets that can be grouped into the companies for operations/training.



What is it then?  The way I see it, it is pushing combined arms functions down to lower and lower levels on a permanent level; irregardless of trade or branch.  This is clearly what the Americans are doing by moving from the Division to the Brigade Combat Teams and by pushing combined arms teams down to a lower level such as the Stryker Company and Battalion and the Combat Maneuver Battalions (assets which used to belong to a Regimental and/or Divisional level).  These aren't assets that are grouped - they are integral.  Perhaps "Integral" would have been a better word than "Optimized"?

Mind you, the Americans have always been better at this due to not being blessed/cursed by a Regimental System.


----------



## McG

The OBG puts everything into the BG (Tk, Arty, Engr).  SBCT does not do this.  The Stryker Bn only includes the type of functions and capabilities that we have traditionally associated with a Mech Bn (except that they've swapped MGS in place of TUA).  

When these traditional assets are integral to the Bn, then I think the structure is adequate.  Permanently plugging them into a rifle coy can serve to reduce the BG Comd's flexibility.  In a stability operation with "non-contiguous" AOs it would make perfect sense to attach these assets to companies.  When the day comes that we're called on to invade Sudan, it might be better to aggregate these assets to focus on a main effort or guard a flank ... but we can't do this if the Pl and Coy level HQs don't exist because they were dissolved when the sub-elements were blended into the rifle coys.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> The OBG puts everything into the BG (Tk, Arty, Engr).  SBCT does not do this.



Well, I'm looking at things in terms of capability.  Sure, an SBCT doesn't have MBTs and 155s, but they have 81mm (and potentially 120mm) mortars and 105mm guns, so they have much of the same capability.  This is not what a US TO&E Company had before, so they've made changes along the same vein as we are looking at.  Again, their "Combined Arms Battalions" as part of the heavy UA are probably a better example of the trend - either way, it is very similar to what we are playing around with.



> When the day comes that we're called on to invade Sudan, it might be better to aggregate these assets to focus on a main effort or guard a flank ... but we can't do this if the Pl and Coy level HQs don't exist because they were dissolved when the sub-elements were blended into the rifle coys.



Roger - which is why I agree with you (I think we had this initial debate and I conceded to you about 4 years ago).  I am all about husbanding our slim resources and "Affiliating" them where needs be.  The only "Optimizing" I'm interested in seeing is expanding at Company (Squadron) level and below to make them more capable and independent for the "everytime and always" scenarios.


----------



## dangerboy

The best resupply we had on TF 3-06 were ran by the LDSH.  The Infantry in my view could take some lessons from the Armoured on the Echelon and how to do DP's.


----------



## Kirkhill

I seem to recall reading many years ago that the 82nd Airborne Div, which was tasked with being the US Army's Strategic Quick Reaction Force had a policy of maintaining a Ready Brigade (essentially a Brigade Group) and within that a Ready Battalion (a Battle Group) and, as far as I recall a Ready Combat Team.

The Div rotated assets through the slots so that they were taken out of unit training and grouped for readiness training.  

The concept seemed to work for them.

I believe that we used to work on a similar concept but geography (3 independent brigade groups requiring 3 support lines and training facilities) and manpower (not enough bodies to get the job AND the training done) work against us.

Trying to have three equal Brigade Groups doesn't help if all the Groups are to have an equal smattering of all the heavy assets that are expensive to maintain.

Perhaps the problem was in disbanding 4 CMBG where all the heavy assets were maintained.  

Maybe it would have been better to reform 4 CMBG in Canada at a reduced level as a Divisional Support Group with Tanks and Arty and create 3 Light Brigades (Infantry and LAVs and 2 Battalions each) to minimize the regional training burden.   As well the lighter forces are the types of forces more likely to be suitable for both domestic and international rapid intervention.

Gagetown would have been the best choice for the Div Spt Group with its combination of Ranges and access to salt water.  The DSG would be most likely used on long stay foreign interventions, like Korea, Kosovo and Kandahar.


----------



## Old Sweat

Kirkhill,

I don't know if I'm talking out of my butt, but having a divisional support group with the tanks and arty in Gagetown pretty well ensures an even lower level of knowledge of all arms operations than we had at the end of the decade of force cuts and the financial and intellectual poverty we went through. (I keep saying 'we' but I was happily spending my pension while the rest of you soldiered on.) I don't really want to debate the number of battalions or the organization of CMBGs or whatever. 

I have yet to hear a compelling argument for the optimized brigade battle group.


----------



## vonGarvin

dangerboy said:
			
		

> The best resupply we had on TF 3-06 were ran by the LDSH.  The Infantry in my view could take some lessons from the Armoured on the Echelon and how to do DP's.


I have 19 years in the reg force infantry (+5 in reserves).  Nobody does the Echelon as well as the Armour Corps.  As a young'un when we did cbt tms all over gagetown, we were "okay" at it, but C Sqn RCD were tops.  Same with 12e RBC.  Never worked with LdSH (RC) (until now), but I can only assume the same.


----------



## a_majoor

"Ahem"

Back to the regularly scheduled argument

I am with Infanteer on this. SBCT companies or '80's vintage Canadian Mech Infantry battalions have the combined arms mixture and flexibility to work across a wide range of scenarios; the biggest change would be to add an "echelon" platoon (for lack of a better word) to the company to keep up with logistical requirements of fast moving and widely dispersed elements.

Grafting these kinds of units to a strong and flexible C4I and CSS "Spine", and being able to graft of additional heavy or specialist elements from the "pool" depending on the mission (and given the lack of resources this may be the *only* way we can do this) seems to be the model for our future structure. Neither fish nor fowl, the ideal ( >) Canadian solution.


----------



## ArmyRick

The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources. the permament structure of a stryker rifle coy is 
-HQ
-Sharpshooter det
-Fire Support det (We call it FOO)
-Ambulance 
-Mortar Section (2 x 120mm mortars, good fire power at the OC's finger tips)
-MGS Platoon (they group them in 3s for some reason)
-3 x platoons of infantry

I beleive this structure is a great start, it gives certain capabilities immediately availible to the OC.

I think back to when the mortars were handed over to the arty and we were told we would still have access to them. Thats that, the battalions never or see of 81mm again and I beleive the arty does what should do (focus on the big boom 155mm) but they under employ the 81mm (quick and fast fire power).

The SBCT has some other assetts as brigade tools
-A company of TOW
-an armoured regiment of cavalry/armoured recce troops (they call a regiment a squadron, go figure)
-a combat engineer company
-UAV capabilities

there is more but I can not remember off hand exactly what they are.

The way I see it is the coy comd has the most important aspects to win the fire fight and for bigger and more in depth missions, he can get engineers, arty, recce, etc, etc.

I do beleive this is a step in the right direction. I wonder if our OBG will follow a similar route or will we have a million people with their versions of it? 

Interesting to see how this turns out.


----------



## vonGarvin

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources. the permament structure of a stryker rifle coy is
> -HQ
> -Sharpshooter det
> -Fire Support det (We call it FOO)
> -Ambulance
> -Mortar Section (2 x 120mm mortars, good fire power at the OC's finger tips)
> -MGS Platoon (they group them in 3s for some reason)
> -3 x platoons of infantry
> ....
> The SBCT has some other assetts as brigade tools
> -A company of TOW
> -an armoured regiment of cavalry/armoured recce troops (they call a regiment a squadron, go figure)
> -a combat engineer company
> -UAV capabilities
> .


We are, in my professional opinion, re-inventing the wheel.  The Stryker Company looks remarkably similar to a combat team.  In fact, I seem to remember drafting an order (very recently) with a very similar ORBAT.  Though thankfully we don't have MGS, but Leo 2A6M CANs instead.

As for the "Brigade combat team", it reminds me of our Brigade Group of old.
TWO companies of TOW (we called them "platoons", go figure)
A brigade armoured recce squadron
A combat engineer BATTALION (we call them "regiments", go figure)
Aviation for C2 and Ln and Obsn.

The wheel, she keeps on turning...


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources ...


Just to confirm that we are all working on the same sheet, An SBCT is a Brigade.



			
				Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> As for the "Brigade combat team", it reminds me of our Brigade Group of old.


Excactly.  SBCT is not something new.  It is just the US moving the size of independent formation from Div down to Bde.  We were there with CMBGs.  In some cases, our CMBGs were even better resourced than an SBCT (ie. CER vs Engr Coy).


----------



## Mountie

Great discussion.  I see a lot of comments about smaller but fully manned brigade groups.  Good idea.  It would be nice to some day see a fourth brigade stood up.  Dreaming I know.  

On the topic of the tanks; wouldn't a squadron per brigade group be a good compromise?  It is pretty unlikely that Canada would actually deploy a regiment of tanks together.  A squadron would allow for some collective training and would allow each regiment to have some tanks and would let the ffiliated squadrons work with their infantry battalions on a somewhat regular basis.  

The Australian Army has recently purchased 59 M1A1 Abrams MBTs.  They have formed them into one armoured regiment with three squadrons of 13 tanks and a RHQ of 2 tanks.  That's 41 tanks in the regiment and 18 for training stocks.


----------



## George Wallace

Mountie said:
			
		

> The Australian Army has recently purchased 59 M1A1 Abrams MBTs.  They have formed them into one armoured regiment with three squadrons of 13 tanks and a RHQ of 2 tanks.  That's 41 tanks in the regiment and 18 for training stocks.



We found the 4 tank Troop, in a 4 Troop Squadron, with three tanks in SHQ (2 Command and 1 Dozer), to work fairly well and facilitate the odd occasion when it may be required to split the Sqn into  "Half Sqns".  19 Tanks per Sqn, in three tank Sqns per Regt brings us to 59 per Regt of Tanks.  

A Sqn per Regt, as we currently stand will help maintain the necessary skills that Tankers need.  It would also allow each of the current Bdes to have troops in the other Arms familiar with the characteristics of Heavy Armour.


----------



## ArmyRick

SBCT stands for Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Americans are using the term Brigade Combat Team to describe what we call a Brigade Group. Its basically a mounted infantry brigade with bells and whistles.

The only big differences between their SBCT and our older Brigade groups that I see is
(1) The armoured unit is all armoured recce
(2) The MGS are attached permamently to the companies (their is no MGS squadron or anything like that).
(3) They have fewer engineers (A coy vs a regiment as we did).

Its good for the yanks to move away from the Div centric formation and move in to brigade combat teams. They actually do deploy brigades.

We do not deploy as a brigade (lets stop pretending that we will in the near future) and we deploy as battle groups for our primary maneuver unit. Maybe this OBG is a step in the right direction for us?

"If an idea is absurd then it must be a good idea" or something to that effect, trying to qoute Einstein.

This is where I now take cover as a barrage of anti-permanent battle group remarks are hurled at me.


----------



## Mountie

I wasn't suggesting smaller squadrons.  I was just stating the Australian organization and how they grouped all their operational tanks  into one unit.  I would also suggest staying with 19 or maybe 18 tank squadrons.  As you stated that would allow the squadron to split in half when required.  With only two infantry battalions in the brigade this would allow a half squadron to affiliate with each battalion.  I don't know how the logistics or command and control of a half squadron would work.  I doubt it is sustainable.  But perhaps during brigade-level operations it would work (if that every happens).


----------



## ArmyRick

Here is another crazy thought (I am really going to get pelted today with rocks)

Move into 9 OBG based on the following models

Each Brigade has 3 OBG
2 x Infantry and recce based OBG
1 x Tank and infantry based OBG

Fold the third battalions of each infantry regiment (Ducking, first barrage of rotten tomatoes coming right at me and jeers). Use the man power from those battalions and to form 2 rifle coys for each Heavy OBG.

The Infantry/Recce BG
-BG HQ 
-Recce Squadron (based on C SQN RCD model, check their web site)
-3 x LAVIII Mounted Companies
-Engineers and Arty attachments as required

Tank and Infantry BG
-BG HQ
-Tank Squadron (the new standard of 3 troops? or they old model of 4 troops?)
- 2 or 3 x LAVIII mounted infantry companies (do we have enough LAVIIIs?)
-again arty and engineers as required

I would also add in a service support company with a unique twist, it would be a mixed formation of various trades including lots of armoured types. i am basing this idea on the Royal Marines Commando 21 structure
The SVC SPT COY would be
-Coy HQ
-3 or 4 x A Echelon Platoons (crewed by 011, they are the best at doing this)
-B Echelon Platoon
-Medical station
-Rations platoon
-Maintenance platoon (second line, maybe part of B ech?)

Thoughts? Ideas? Or do you want to hammer me with rocks, rotten tomatoes, mouldy apples and angry cats while booing me off the stage?


----------



## HItorMiss

Honestly folding the 3rd Bn's is not a bad idea, seeing as all Inf Bn's are now going to the 2 Mech 1 light concept.

I would cravat that by saying fold the Jump Coy's into one 3 Coy Bn a la 2 Can Para. Adding one more Maneuver element and Unit without loosing a beneficial capability.


----------



## Mountie

I think both the OBG and ABG could work.  But the most important thing is to fully man whatever units we have to stop this force generation mess where one rifle company comes from one battalion or brigade and another company from a different battlion or brigade and an armoured squadron with a troop from each regiment, etc.  Fully man however many units we can afford to and temporarily stand down the others until there is $$, PYs and equipment to stand them back up.  Regardless, of what the units look like I think we should be looking at 6 battle groups for the time being.  

I'm interested in comments about the infantry battalions having 2 mech and 1 light rifle companies.  Why?  Doesn't the battalion typically deploy as one or the other?  Bosnia always required a mechanized battalion.  The first deployment to Afghanistan was a pure light battalion.  The Kandahar mission has been pure mech companies I thought.  Wouldn't it be more beneficial to maintain pure battalions?  I would even suggest combining the jump companies and the CSOR into something closer to the US Army Ranger Battalions or Australian 4 RAR (Commando) battalion.  They would be capable of traditional light infantry operations and more specialized operations in support of JTF II.  Basically a Special Operations Capable (SOC) light infantry battalion.  1st and 2nd Battalions, Canadian Guards????   Just throwing out a name for fun.  Don't mean to start a three day debate over a title.


----------



## HItorMiss

You have the role and model of CSOR and 4 RAR very confused....

CSOR and 4 RAR are not akin to the US Army Ranger model, I wont get into what it is they do and what model they use for OPSEC reasons.

You could use the Jump Coy's folded into one Bn to do that sort of task however.


----------



## Mountie

I realize there is a difference.  I'm saying that the role of CSOR is to support the JTF2 similar to the Special Forces Support Group of the UK, which is similar (but not exactly the same) as 4 RAR and the US Army Rangers.  I was more suggesting convert the CSOR and jump companies into something in between a regular infantry battalion and the CSOR.


----------



## HItorMiss

Mountie PM inbound, I will clear up some confusion for you...

Again yes CSOR has ONE task of support to JTF2 but there is a lot more.

4 RAR has moved even further away from that to now have a domestic CT role for all of eastern Aus, putting them on par with the ASAS. It has become a more symbiotic relationship for them there are some areas where the ASAS are still and forever will be the SME's but 4 RAR is not just a support unit and neither is CSOR.


----------



## HItorMiss

Going to add though that the Jump Coy's folded into one unit would be perfect for the role that the Rangers fill. I would say they would relish it.

On that note I will add an AIRBORNE! to my jumping friends


----------



## Infanteer

First off, we don't really need to discuss CMBG's and Stryker Brigades.  Whatever we do with "optimizing" or "affiliating", the CMBG's will largely have the same resources.

I highlighted the Stryker Company and Battalion because this is where the real change is happening and this is where we are interested in.  I mentioned the Armored Division's Manuever Battalion as a good example:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/images/bct-heavy-toe.gif

As for the light/mech question I believe that, for the line infantry battalions, it is largely a false dichotomy.  I would rather lose the para capability, letting CSOR (who would most likely employ it) and focus on 9 Battalions with a mechanized capability.  I say mechanized capability vice mechanized as all battalions should have the ability to leave the LAV's behind and conduct dismounted ("light") operations - it's a function of leadership.  I know CLS was interested in an Army (vice CANSOFCOM) "light" battalion, but I want to see 4 full strength companies per battalion first.


----------



## baboon6

Infanteer said:
			
		

> First off, we don't really need to discuss CMBG's and Stryker Brigades.  Whatever we do with "optimizing" or "affiliating", the CMBG's will largely have the same resources.
> 
> I highlighted the Stryker Company and Battalion because this is where the real change is happening and this is where we are interested in.  I mentioned the Armored Division's Manuever Battalion as a good example:
> 
> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/images/bct-heavy-toe.gif
> 
> As for the light/mech question I believe that, for the line infantry battalions, it is largely a false dichotomy.  I would rather lose the para capability, letting CSOR (who would most likely employ it) and focus on 9 Battalions with a mechanized capability.  I say mechanized capability vice mechanized as all battalions should have the ability to leave the LAV's behind and conduct dismounted ("light") operations - it's a function of leadership.  I know CLS was interested in an Army (vice CANSOFCOM) "light" battalion, *but I want to see 4 full strength companies per battalion first.*



Would you bring back a proper support coy i.e. one with anti-tank, assault pioneer and mortar platoons?


----------



## Old Sweat

Back a million years ago, or at least circa 1966 when I was a lieutenant liaison officer in HQ 4 CIBG, CFHQ forwarded a proposal for restructuring the brigade to the commander for comment. The details are a bit fuzzy as it was a long time ago and the brigadier and the BM did most of the analysis themsevles. In outline each infantry battalion would include a squadron of tanks and three mech companies, and I can't recall what exactly happened to the armoured regiment, but it still had tanks and picked up some mech infantry. This may have entailed converting the manpower spaces from two of the mech companies to armour, so that the regiment had two tank squadrons and a mech company. I dunno!

The proposal was rejected because of its tactical inflexibility and the perceived lowering of training standards of the sub-units sent out of their normal home. On the administrative side the reasons against it included a large construction bill for not only hard standings and upgrades to roads, but the need for rail sidings, larger gates, tank hangers, etc. And of course, everybody got agitated about cap badges and the colour of berets and mess kit and all that good stuff. I wonder what might have happened if the idea had originated inside the formation, as was the case for the mortar reorginization into groups a couple of years later.


----------



## PhillyLost_1

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I have an idea.  Let's form SECTION Ops Centres.  I mean, why stop at Coy level? [/sarcasm]
> 
> Let's face it.  Our military is currently jumping a shark.  Our HQs are bloated, ineffective and very VERY slow.  A boy scout could out-OODA loop even our once-lean BGs!
> 
> ADO is just the latest in useless buzz-phrases that add no value.  "Spread out" is one way to say "dispersed", and we do that already.  Same with "Adaptive".  Do they mean FLEXIBLE?  I mean, come on: why do we really need to label wheels every time someone re-invents them?




Many things have become redundant and ridiculous but you can't lump all things in that category b/c you don't see a particular use for it.  DO & by extension ECO do not fit in that category.

Starting with DO the Goal of the experiments was to see exactly how far you could push a Marine Infantry Plt.  They experimented, trained Fire Teams & Squads to act Independently of their command structure over extended ranges.  Gave them Advanced Patrolling, Reconnaissance, Observation & Surveillance, Man Tracking, & Long Range Communications training.  Authorized the Sqds to call in Level II CAS & the 2 Plt HQ Cells to call in Level I & to Direct & Control Aircraft.  

Then set them loose in 2 Combat Zones in A'stan & the Philippines & found they were capable of that level of training & more.

However the System was & is not ready to handle that level of advancement, not the Training Pipelines or the Logistics&Support Lines & Definitely not the Ops & Intel Cycle.

So then the focus shifted to, "Ok, at what level would those systems be best optimized to support Ops that could potentially breakdown to a level that involved Independently Operating Squads; if the mission dictated it".  The answer was the Comp Level,  "Enhanced Company Operations" was born.


So if your just pulling capabilities out of the air saying "yeah that's nice & how about a little of that too", of course it would be stupid but thats not what happened.  They followed a path to its logical conclusion, & that led to where they're at now.  

Future applications are widespread.  One is the SC MAGTF construct currently being developed & debated.


----------



## PhillyLost_1

_*The Security Cooperation MAGTF—Fighting the Long War *_

_By LtCol Chuck Risio, USMCR_
May 2008


In the not-too-distant future, Marines will be fighting the global war on terrorism in a new, more fundamental way. The Long War Concept, recently approved by General James T. Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is part of a Department of Defense effort to better meet the irregular threats and other causes of instability we are likely to continue to confront.

The Long War Concept is a vision for Marine force employment that provides a persistent, forward-deployed Marine pres­ence across key regions in the world, while still providing the nation with the ability to conduct full spectrum operations. This is accomplished with the *Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF)*. For leathernecks and their fam­ilies, that means a return to a familiar Ma­rine Expeditionary Unit-like Operation­al Cycle, but with an added capability.

Security Cooperation is a mission require­ment for all Geographic Combatant Com­manders, and the SC MAGTF provides the capability to meet that requirement—which the Marine Corps is uniquely able to provide. Security cooperation is founded on the idea of cooperative activities between the United States and other countries with similar values and interests in order to meet common defense goals.

A partial list of activities that fall under the security cooperation umbrella include Partner Nation Capacity Building; Security Assistance; Information Sharing/Intelligence Cooperation; Counter-Drug Assistance; Humanitarian Assistance; Small-Unit Training in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures; Staff Training; and Small-Unit Leader Development. Any number of other possible activities could arise depending on the circumstances and the partner country’s resources, abilities and needs.

The SC MAGTF will be similar to the MEU(SOC) that has served our nation so well during the past decades. Built around an infantry battalion, it would have a composite aviation squadron and a combat logistics element. The deployment workup would include the Block 1 through Block 4 packages currently in the predeployment training plan, and also the more traditional evolutions, such as combined arms exercises (CAXs), mountain warfare training and amphibious exercises.

*The purpose of each particular SC MAGTF would determine additional attachments and training*. So the SC MAGTF headed to the Middle East might take along a larger attachment with anti-armor capabilities, while the one deploying to South America perhaps would need more engineering support, medical capability and rotary wing augmentation.

Just as some regiments habitually supported the MEU(SOC) deployment cycle and others supported the unit deployment pro­gram cycle, the parent regiment of each SC MAGTF would have a habitual region­al focus. Some would support South Ameri­ca, others would support the Middle East, and others would support the Pacific area.

What really sets the SC MAGTF apart from traditional MEU(SOC)s is the regionally focused language and culture training. Building cul­tural awareness and language proficiency through this regional focus makes the SC MAGTF a much more useful and potent or­ganization for the combatant commander.

This regional focus starts well before the SC MAGTF is formed. Marines are screened for language skills as early as possible, even while at the recruit depots. Native speakers might attend language schools along with those who volunteer or are assigned.

Certain regiments then will be tasked with providing habitually assigned battalions to their designated area and be staffed accordingly. For example, Marines with a Hispanic or South American background would be assigned to the regiment that is tasked with the habitual support of South America. These Marines would experience all the other parts of a typical military career including recruiting duty, staff assignments, etc. But most of their time in the operating forces would be spent in a deploying battalion whose parent regiment focuses on a certain region.

The tool that makes this happen is the *Career Marine Regional Studies* *(CMRS)* program. Newly commissioned lieuten­ants at The Basic School and sergeants in the sergeants’ course are introduced to cultural concepts and their application in military operations. Two follow-on professional military education courses complete each region’s study packages.

Regional Affairs Officers and Foreign Affairs Officers *(RAOs/FAOs)* also will be billet-coded to this regiment and tasked out to deploying SC MAGTFs as needed. The entire SC MAGTF undergoes region­al training. Under coordination from the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group *(MCTAG)*, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) provides detailed and specific country studies, and the Center for Advanced Operational Cul­ture Learning (CAOCL) conducts tailored training packages relative to the destination area for each SC MAGTF.

Another distinguishing feature of the SC MAGTF is how it gets to and operates in its area. The U.S. Navy is moving forward with its Global Fleet Station *(GFS)* concept, which is related to the Long War Concept. GFS is intended to provide a persistent sea base from which to conduct shaping operations.

The composition of these sea bases would depend on the needs of the Combatant Commander, the needs of the host nation, the operating environment and the missions to be conducted. Platforms for the GFS sea base could range from LHAs; LPDs; surface combatants, such as destroyers or frigates; intra-theater high-speed vessels (HSVs); or perhaps even a new class of ship specifically built for security cooperation type missions.

The idea is to allow the GFS sea base to operate a self-contained headquarters with the capacity to provide command and control facilities, classroom space, medical facilities, combat service support and on-ship repair facilities.

Just as Marines start training with the basics and progressively move to advanced techniques, the partner nations that we work with would start from the ground up. This doesn’t mean that Marines would be running partner nations’ boot camps, but it might entail advising partner nations’ drill instructor training courses. The basics, in this case, are the presumption of a certain level of proficiency and willingness to improve certain skills.

One of the most sought-after basic train­ing programs has been the *Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)*. For the training providers and recipients, equipment and facility requirements are minimal, progress is immediately measurable, and it provides a tremendous morale boost.

Basic and Advanced Marksmanship train­ing is another relatively simple exercise series to conduct, as are Combat Lifesaving, Patrolling, Combat Engineering and more. Building on these basics, more advanced training can take place. Small-Unit Leader Professional Development is an area in which the Marines excel. Other activities include bilateral training in peacekeeping operations, basic Foreign Internal Defense, Counter-Insurgency and Border Patrolling.

*All of these activities are conducted throughout the entire SC MAGTF area of operations(an entire geographic combatant command). These training events, and the units conducting them, are spread out. A Reinforced Platoon might conduct marksmanship training in one area, while a Reinforced Squad is conducting MCMAP training in another province, while another Company, reinforced with Engineers, is training in ob­stacle clearing in yet another area or even a neighboring country.*

An important thing to keep in mind is the fact that the SC MAGTF shouldn’t be thought of as a “MEU-light.” Because of the regular pre-deployment training, *the SC MAGTF is fully capable of rapidly join­ing back together as a single cohesive unit and conducting combat operations just as expected of any other MAGTF*.

MEUs that now deploy are well prepared for Iraq because of the intense training at Exercise Mojave Viper conducted at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif. But it wasn’t so long ago that MEUs and Battalion Landing Teams did CAXs, Amphibious Operation Exercises and Training in Urban Environment *(TRUEX)* exercises in preparation for Western Pacific or Mediterranean Sea floats. As the Commandant, Gen Conway, stated, the demands of Iraq meant less attention to the traditional missions of Ma­rines. He is concerned that we are not do­ing the other types of training that make us capable of meeting threats across the full spectrum of conflict.

*To appreciate how all these elements work together in the Long War Concept, it’s helpful to see an example of what a proposed SC MAGTF goes through in its entire cycle. Set in the future, roughly four or five years from now, you will see how this unit conducts predeployment train­ing, deployment, primary mission ex­ecution, contingency mission execution and redeployment.*

In this example, since we’re in the near future, we’ll assume that most of our DOD and Marine Corps initiatives are well underway. The MV-22 Osprey has replaced the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter in half of the medium-lift squadrons, the internally transportable vehicle (ITV) is fielded, and the new geographic combatant command, *United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)*, is fully operational.

The Second Marine Regiment is designated as the *“Africa Regiment”* and has the responsibility of rotating its three battalions to Africa on a six-month deployment as an SC MAGTF. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines is designated SC MAGTF 2/2 and is about to execute the predeployment training program. The unit already is locked on for CAX, including the entire Range 400 series, and amphibious landing exercises with USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19). There are 19 Marines in 2/2 who speak lan­­guages native to West Africa, 23 more who speak French, and another eight Marine linguists attached as individual augments.

Further specialized training on the region is provided by MCIA, with cultural orientation provided by CAOCL. Supporting 2/2 is a civil affairs detachment, a combat engineer platoon, a military police platoon and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachment. Other agencies contributing personnel include federal law enforcement officers from the *FBI*, Immigration and Customs Enforcement *(ICE)* and the Drug Enforcement Agency *(DEA)*, the U.S. Agency for International Development *(USAID)*, and the *National Intelligence Community*.

The aviation element is a composite squadron of MV-22s and CH-53 Super Stallions. With a combat logistics element, SC MAGTF 2/2 will operate aboard USS Mesa Verde and the littoral combat ship USS Independence (LCS-2), which will meet them in theater. Command and control is accomplished by augmenting the headquarters of 2/2 with additional personnel from the regiment, thus making the battalion headquarters element also serve as the SC MAGTF headquarters element. This headquarters element provides direct command and control of its security cooperation activities, as directed by the AFRICOM combatant commander and coordinated through the regional Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group.

After completing predeployment training, SC MAGTF 2/2 deploys by air to Rota, Spain, marries up with its equipment and embarks on the ships. The SC MAGTF headquarters, the subordinate element headquarters and Company E, acting as the reserve, remain aboard ship. Weapons Company leathernecks also remain aboard ship.

“Fox” Co, reinforced with the engineer platoon, deploys directly from Rota to southwest Algeria to train with the Algerian military on patrolling techniques and border enforcement. The military police, along with the federal law enforcement agents, head to Lagos, Nigeria, to work with government security forces on antidrug-smuggling efforts.

Finally, Golf Co conducts dispersed operations with three platoons, reinforced with explosive ordnance disposal and civil affairs Marines, conducting humanitarian operations with USAID and the United Nations World Food Programme as well as de-mining efforts across the trans-Sa­hel region of Africa with U.N. and African Union forces.

SC MAGTF 2/2 is able to support all of these widely dispersed operations by lev­eraging the advantages of the sea-based GFS and organic logistics element supported by the long-range Ospreys, as well as contracted local services.

In our example scenario, with six weeks remaining in the deployment, SC MAGTF 2/2 is ordered to respond to the U.S. ambassador’s call for help in Sierra Leone. Large violent riots threaten national elections with the additional possibility of a military coup in the capital of Freetown. The headquarters element and Echo and Weapons companies, still operating at sea, sail for Freetown.

MV-22s gather platoons from Golf Co and fly directly to the capital, with Fox Co boarding C-130 aircraft sent from Rota. SC MAGTF 2/2 remains in Freetown pro­viding additional embassy security and safeguarding the nearby municipal soccer stadium and port facilities in preparation for a possible noncombatant evacuation operation. With the arrival of the 24th MEU, the situation calms and SC MAGTF 2/2 returns to its original mission.

This example shows one possible deployment cycle of an SC MAGTF, but even more important is the continuous forward presence established with this concept. As SC MAGTF 2/2 is leaving West Africa, another SC MAGTF is ready to immediately replace it, falling in on the same gear.

Although only an example, with notionally identified units and assets, this concept is already on its way to becoming reality. The Marine Corps always will main­tain the capability to provide well-trained and -equipped general-purpose forces. The SC MAGTF is another versatile tool to engage in irregular warfare and to meet the challenges of an uncertain security environment.

_Editor’s note: LtCol Risio is a Marine Corps Reserve infantry officer currently ac­tivated and assigned to Plans Branch, PP&O, HQMC. He previously was activated and deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom._


----------



## a_majoor

Just a stray thought, but much of the criticism of concepts like DO and Gen Petreaus reorganization of the force to better reflect COIN ops is based around the idea we will be preparing to fight the "last war" (or Long War, if you prefer), but will no longer have the ability to fight the Heavy Metal war against China, resurgent Russia, the Martians or whoever else comes along.

It seems to me that if our forces evolve into ever lighter, more dispersable and leathal packages, then a Heavy Metal enemy will have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such a force (being almost in the same position as "we" were early in most insurgencies). However, our soldiers will have access to very sophisticated training, equipment, distributed C4I and logistics, as well as support from platforms like the B-2 or nuclear attack submarines with cruise missiles. Attacking such a force or defending against them will be akin to dealing with an infestation of fire ants, with all the problems that that entails.


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## PhillyLost_1

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Just a stray thought, but much of the criticism of concepts like DO and Gen Petreaus reorganization of the force to better reflect COIN ops is based around the idea we will be preparing to fight the "last war" (or Long War, if you prefer), but will no longer have the ability to fight the Heavy Metal war against China, resurgent Russia, the Martians or whoever else comes along.
> 
> It seems to me that if our forces evolve into ever lighter, more dispersable and leathal packages, then a Heavy Metal enemy will have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such a force (being almost in the same position as "we" were early in most insurgencies). However, our soldiers will have access to very sophisticated training, equipment, distributed C4I and logistics, as well as support from platforms like the B-2 or nuclear attack submarines with cruise missiles. Attacking such a force or defending against them will be akin to dealing with an infestation of fire ants, with all the problems that that entails.




I don't mean to sound sarcastic or condescending but unless you just breezed over the whole article & every other article written about the SC MAGTF then you would have read that they retain all their Traditional capabilities, in fact training for Traditional Full Spectrum Warfare is part of Every 18mth Deployment Cycle.  Added to that towards the end of the PTP cycle is the SC training which would only build on the Traditional FS training.

Also as far as DO goes, all their DO training was in addition to their traditional, which is why the retained the same Platoon structure.  They could disperse when it was to their advantage to and take advantage of leveraged Fire Power, whether against a Conventional or Insurgent force.  Then reassemble when that was the best formation, it was a flowing formation.

A whole divisions worth of DO Capable BNs would still fight as a Traditional Div.  But have the Advantage of dispersing some Companies& BNs while consolidating others for a or multiple 1-2 punches.  Flooding one area w/ dispersed troops to slow a Conv. Enemy down while punching thru w/ a consolidated assault force or bypassing/leap frogging w/them.

That bypassing force can then disperse ahead flood the battlespace gather intel, call in CAS, stay on the move.  The formerly dispersed unit could then consolidate & become assaulting/bypassing or stay dispersed as rear a guard.


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## TangoTwoBravo

PhillyLost_1 said:
			
		

> I don't mean to sound sarcastic or condescending but unless you just breezed over the whole article & every other article written about the SC MAGTF then you would have read that they retain all their Traditional capabilities, in fact training for Traditional Full Spectrum Warfare is part of Every 18mth Deployment Cycle.  Added to that towards the end of the PTP cycle is the SC training which would only build on the Traditional FS training.



The experiment sounds very interesting and seems to describe a reconnaissance platoon.  If you can train every line platoon in the skill sets of a recce platoon then go for it.  Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.


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## a_majoor

It is not just the DO concept of the USMC but also the increasing emphasis on COIN (along with the earlier version of "Transformation" to lighter and smaller formations in the US Army) which has prompted the critics. I am not among them, BTW.

Even without the ability to reform as a conventional unit, modern training, weapons, C4I and logistics makes these smaller transformed formations as dangerous as traditional formation, maybe more so. This was the impetus behind the Stryker Brigade, breaking traditional Corps and Divisions into smaller UA/UE's and so on within the US Army. The critics need to adjust their frame of reference, and realise the Heavy Metal force is not the only tool that can take on another Heavy Metal force. The historical analogy that comes to mind for me are the development of mixed forces with substantial light elements to defeat the Greek and Macedonian Phalanx.


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## Kirkhill

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The experiment sounds very interesting and seems to describe a reconnaissance platoon.  If you can train every line platoon in the skill sets of a recce platoon then go for it.  Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.



T2B - our modern line infantry originally developed from light infantry.  The Battalion Light Company (Recce Pl/Coy) became  Light Battalions, became Rifle Regiments, then the Rifle Corps then everybody got issued a rifle and was trained to operate more freely on a dispersed battlefield.

It sounds to me like these MAGTF experiments are just continuing the push to find out how much terrain can be dominated by the Platoon and its Sections.  (18th and 19th Century Companies with a Captain and a Lieutenant were actually close to the size of a USMC Platoon and in a constabulary/COIN role were regularly independently deployed).

The Technology may be revolutionary but the change is evolutionary.


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## PhillyLost_1

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> T2B - our modern line infantry originally developed from light infantry.  The Battalion Light Company (Recce Pl/Coy) became  Light Battalions, became Rifle Regiments, then the Rifle Corps then everybody got issued a rifle and was trained to operate more freely on a dispersed battlefield.
> 
> It sounds to me like these MAGTF experiments are just continuing the push to find out how much terrain can be dominated by the Platoon and its Sections.  (18th and 19th Century Companies with a Captain and a Lieutenant were actually close to the size of a USMC Platoon and in a constabulary/COIN role were regularly independently deployed).
> 
> The Technology may be revolutionary but the change is evolutionary.




Exactly... 

DO is not this one thing and another.  Or this capability or that, the Concept & the Experiments were simply this...   

   *"How far can we push a Marine Infantry Platoon and still maintain all its capabilities.  How far can we push the Independent Leadership of our Small Unit Leaders & the Tactical abilities of our Small Units.  How many Additional Skills can be Performed at the Inf Plt Level & be done Effectively.  etc,etc"*

What they found was the Present Inf Plt was capable of much more than even DO had pushed them to.  It was our structure that was not ready to be pushed past a certain point.

DO is not limited to COIN.  

A DO Plt is not a Recon Plt, even though they are trained to perform many of the basic Recon & Surveillance functions, they actually free up Recon Plts to concentrate on their more Advanced Missions.  

DO is not about or dependent on new technology, all the additional skills are taught w/out the aid technology, then the Marines are taught to use the techn to enhance the results.

*There's going to come a Point when all this Additional Training is not going to be ADDITIONAL, it is already slowly becoming just part of basic training.  Young Marine Boots in the Inf Training BN are already being trained in Advanced Patrolling, Man Tracking, & Surveillance Techniques; Sqd Ldrs are already being trained to Call in Level II CAS w/out a JTAC & Level I w/ JTAC assistance.*


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## PhillyLost_1

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.



No ones calling it revolutionary in the its sending units to do bi-lateral training to various foreign countries.  Other units do it/have done the USMC itself has a long history, both distant & recent, doing it.  

Before & During the GWOT I can fill pages w/ articles about Annual/Bi-Annual Deployments like UNITAS, a shipboard deployment around S Amer to like 15 countries doing FID & Bi-lateral using Reinforced Co size DETs; LF CARAT, same thing only to 15 or so countries in SE Asia; WATC to W Africa. etc

But thats not what the SC MAGTF is.  Its a much more deliberate & comprehensive strategy to keep the countries in these regions continuously engaged thru military & civil development to deny safehaven for extremist groups.  But not just through the USMC but all the Sea Services, various Gov't Agencies/Orgs, & NGOs.

There are really too many points to list you, really have to go thru a few different articles on the SC MAGTF to grasp the concept.

If the MEU(SOC) concept was unveiled on the Internet I'm sure it would have met the same if not more skepticism.  Most Non-Marines who have not personally witnessed its capabilities still have either a hard time understanding it or what makes it be able to operate so far beyond what its #s state.  

Same thing w/the SC MAGTF.


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## Kirkhill

A bit off topic here - but is that the difference between Armoured Soldiers and Infanteers?

The Infanteer is taught not to bunch up.  When engaging the enemy a dispersed unit is further dispersed into a fire base and a flanking force.  The only concentrating happening is concentrating fire on the objective.

For the Armoured Soldier, whose emblem is the clenched and mailed fist the watchwords seem to be mass and shock and keeping the heaviest armour to face the enemy.  When the enemy is confronted the Armoured Soldier seems to want to concentrate his force on the approach to the objective.

Is that a fair characterization of the two arms?  And if so, does early training leave a lasting impression on the way that Infantry and Armoured Commanders conduct operations?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is that a fair characterization of the two arms?


It is not.  All arms employ fire bases and will manoeuvre sub-elements to get a position of advantage for the assault.  Everyone is taught not to bunch-up and everyone is taught that concentration of effects are important (while physical concentration is not typically good) ... If anything, my observations of armd suggests they have a better appreciation of the need to physically disperse the force while concentrating effects.  I've witnessed a few occasions where an infantryman has pointed to an area of ground where he'd want a squadron of tanks to fight from, only to be told by the Armd that the area would be tight for a single troop.  This perception of dispersion comes from each arm's influence reach and its mobility.  Tanks reach in thousands of metres while infantry reach in hundreds.  Tank movement is measured in km/h while dismounted infantry movement is in m/h.  Thus, infantry must be much closer for mutual support or to concentrate fire effects onto a common objective and so the infantry's perspective on dispersion is much different than the Armd.  The LAV crews will have another perspective on these distances while mounted.


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## Old Sweat

This may be an oversimplification, and I am straying outside of my lane. 

It has been my belief based in part of training, in part on experience and in part on historical study that the two arms have different appreciations of ground. The infantry sees it as something to be fought for, occupied and held, while the armour sees ground as something without value in itself, but rather something to be crossed to engage the enemy.


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## PhillyLost_1

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> A bit off topic here - but is that the difference between Armoured Soldiers and Infanteers?
> 
> The Infanteer is taught not to bunch up.  When engaging the enemy a dispersed unit is further dispersed into a fire base and a flanking force.  The only concentrating happening is concentrating fire on the objective.
> 
> For the Armoured Soldier, whose emblem is the clenched and mailed fist the watchwords seem to be mass and shock and keeping the heaviest armour to face the enemy.  When the enemy is confronted the Armoured Soldier seems to want to concentrate his force on the approach to the objective.
> 
> Is that a fair characterization of the two arms?  And if so, does early training leave a lasting impression on the way that Infantry and Armoured Commanders conduct operations?




Are you asking me?  Are you asking as in reference to DO?  Or is this just a general question?


----------



## Kirkhill

As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.

It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.

I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).


Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames   )


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## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.
> 
> It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.
> 
> I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).
> 
> 
> Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames   )



I think that the USMC issues could be discussed separately from this thread except for any connection to whether the task forces are of a fixed composition or are task-organized according to the situation.  

For Philly, we have the ADO (Adaptive Dispersed Operations) concept up here when discussing future forces.  I am a buzz-word skeptic at the best of times, but I do see the value.  On operations I have seen widely dispersed "platoon groups" but I have then seen the same groups come back together into more traditional company-level groupings when heavy lifting had to be done.  I think that there is still an important place for the company HQ and having two or three platoons at hand really helps when things don't go all your way.

Back to Kirkhill,

Concentration and dispersion can be confusing terms since, as others have said, scale can be an issue.   I would argue that a tanker has a different scale when looking at battle space than a dismounted infantryman.  To me, if the elements of a company/squadron are all maneouvring towards a common objective and are within their weapon-effects range of each other then they are concentrated even if they have a large footpring on the ground.  A mounted combat team might have troops/platoons spread over a fairly wide area for a tactical task, but if they are manouvering under the command of single person towards the same objective then I would think that they are concentrated.  They might not all be able to see each other, but their effects are influencing the same objective.  A TUA platoon on a cut-off task might not see the objective and not see any of the maneouvre force but they would still be having their effects concentrated on the single combat team objective.

If, on the other hand, the same combat team had troop/platoon teams on widey separated axis of advance that cannot quickly come together then they would (to me) be dispersed.  They would _really_ be dispersed if they could not be supported by the same indirect fire element (say 155mm battery).  Precise CAS and relatively precise surface to surface rockets have certainly increased the the fire support assets available to a dispersed force.

The point on indirect fire assets brings me back to the OBG issue.  Do you chop out your combat support and combat service support assets or keep them conentrated?  Its an old question.

Coming back to dispersed vs concentrated, given the same resources would you rather have a force with three fairly robust elements or nine smaller ones?  I suppose we would like to be able to do both.  Having more elements can certainly give an advantage in that it would be more flexible.  Having said that, if the nine agile elements were engaged one at a time by the more concentrated forces than I would give the advantage to the concentrated elements.  If I am a tanker having to face other tanks I would prefer to keep my tanks concentrated (although not necessarily side-skirt ot side-skirt).


----------



## ArmyRick

When talking concentrating resources, one should read the latest CAJ article on the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of WWI. It was interesting to note that at first, they concentrated them at Battalion level. Then some brilliant general decides to concentrate them as a brigade assett and eventually a Division asset. I gather from what I have read that as the MG moved into higher formations, the less involved they became and and less readily availible to fighting troops.

My point? I think we have to be careful how much concentration of force we do. Right now, we are in the counter insurgency fight and from our stand point now, it don't look like we are going to fight a large fighting force. Thats not saying it won't happen, just right now, unlikely.

In the same CAJ, I enjoyed reading about how Tanks are being employed in A-stan.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Good points, with the takeaway for me being that you can go too far in either direction and you should be flexible.

I was studying the use of machine guns from 1900 to 1918 last year as part of a paper.  One thing I found interesting was that the Germans approached the issue of centralization/de-centralization by having it both ways.  They had machine guns integral to battalions but also had independent machine gun units that were allocated by higher level headquarters as appropriate.  This meant that each battalion had the most important source (arguably) of the infantry's firepower under its own control while the higher level HQ could still mass to some degree.  

The same prinicple can be seen in how most armies organize their fire support.  Battalions have mortars which thus guarantees some level of indirect fire support for all units while concentrating artillery pieces at higher levels to allow a commander to mass effects at a given point.


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## PhillyLost_1

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.
> 
> It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.
> 
> I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).
> 
> 
> Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames   )




I wasn't disagreeing or upset, I wasn't sure if your question was for me or not b/c it was so many topics going on previously.  

So yeah anything you want to ask go head, I just thought you may have been referencing something to someone fr/ earlier.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> When talking concentrating resources, one should read the latest CAJ article on the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of WWI. It was interesting to note that at first, they concentrated them at Battalion level. Then some brilliant general decides to concentrate them as a brigade assett and eventually a Division asset. I gather from what I have read that as the MG moved into higher formations, the less involved they became and and less readily availible to fighting troops.


A comparison could be made between the machine guns in the first half of the 20 century and heavier direct fire support in the later half (and to today).  Look at out concentration of TUA in the Armd regiments (arguably the organization which least requires that extra punch).  The Stryker Bn has its Stryker ATGM and Stryker MGS to provide that punch with platforms optimized for a supporting role.  Our infantry battalions completely lack some form of heavy close fire support.


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## PhillyLost_1

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> For Philly, we have the ADO (Adaptive Dispersed Operations) concept up here when discussing future forces.  I am a buzz-word skeptic at the best of times, but I do see the value.  On operations I have seen widely dispersed "platoon groups" but I have then seen the same groups come back together into more traditional company-level groupings when heavy lifting had to be done.  I think that there is still an important place for the company HQ and having two or three platoons at hand really helps when things don't go all your way.
> 
> Back to Kirkhill,
> 
> Concentration and dispersion can be confusing terms since, as others have said, scale can be an issue.   I would argue that a tanker has a different scale when looking at battle space than a dismounted infantryman.  To me, if the elements of a company/squadron are all maneouvring towards a common objective and are within their weapon-effects range of each other then they are concentrated even if they have a large footpring on the ground.  A mounted combat team might have troops/platoons spread over a fairly wide area for a tactical task, but if they are manouvering under the command of single person towards the same objective then I would think that they are concentrated.  They might not all be able to see each other, but their effects are influencing the same objective.  A TUA platoon on a cut-off task might not see the objective and not see any of the maneouvre force but they would still be having their effects concentrated on the single combat team objective.
> 
> If, on the other hand, the same combat team had troop/platoon teams on widey separated axis of advance that cannot quickly come together then they would (to me) be dispersed.  They would _really_ be dispersed if they could not be supported by the same indirect fire element (say 155mm battery).  Precise CAS and relatively precise surface to surface rockets have certainly increased the the fire support assets available to a dispersed force.



Great explanation and right on point.  Whether you were aiming to describe DO or not it is a very apt description of what a DO Plt is Capable of.

The point is to not change the compostion or mission of the Infantry Plt but to leverage it to the farthest extension of MAGTFs Combat Power; MAGTF being Combined Arms TFs utilizing all forms of Direct & Indirect Fire.  

Whether a Plts Squads are a block or a mile apart their actions are still being led & guided by the Plt Cmdr under the Mission Construct of his Comp Cmdr, which includes the 2 other Plts, whether he's 1mi or 50 fr/ the Plts.  & so on to the BN Cmdr to the TF Cmdr.

I have to agree & disagree w/ you on 1 pt, & thats agree w/the fact that it is important to have a Comp HQ, but disagree w/the fact that DO doesn't address this.  The 'ECO', "Enhanced Company Operations", is the Construct being developed to build a Comp Level HQ that can properly handle Overall Distributed Operations & be able to plug into a Larger TF & leverage DO towards that TFs Operational Goals.

Now Tango I'm not directing this to you b/c you seem to have a pretty firm grasp of DO Doctrine, but towards Joe Reader who will read this and say, "Well all the Marine Corps is trying to create is dispersed/distributed units that operate dispersed & can then come back together", as if thats what they are.  No, they are Traditional Inf Units that can disperse to Leverage the MAGTFs FirePower when its to their Tactical Advantage, not Dispersed Units that can come back together for missions.

Its like when the Marines started to train all Inf BNs headed to the MEU(SOC) in Urban Ops in '85, & Rangers began training all BNs in Urban Ops after the Mog' they didn't some how become new Urban Ops Units, it just became another part of their training; now all Personnel are trained in Urban Ops.

It will be the same w/ DO.  Marine Inf Ops will not change just have another Dimension---& since the Brits & Aussie's are also heavily invested in the development of this Program don't be surprised to see it in some form or fashion in their more Expeditionary Units.


----------



## armyca08

I think organization depends on "mission requiremnts" and the extent.

You can see the forces as a "total force" and potential capacity.

Contigency and operandii are then weighted in to determine force composition requirements for successful mission acheivement.

The brigade deployment level or company deployment etc.. may be an easier way of determining force capacity. 

When dealing with special forces or squad level, platoon level operations and insertions, the application is likely cladestine, or a short term operation. Large compositions as the brigade level are broken down and spread out but still accounted for on a base of cost economy and logistics needs for supply chain.

Obviously there are times when specific skills can come in useful, and other times were broad specialization is useful. An engineering corps is specifically geared to needs of physics and engineering constrains, as far as I'm aware. While officers in the army may have the time as professional soilders to develop and learn basic skills of a specialist, and then can confer those abililities. 

I think organizationally the rank, and organization are seperate from mission deployment. Part of joint task force operations is training to work with a diverse skill set, and having a unified capacity, as part of a joint task force. None the less all this bubble talk aside, I think that for logistics purposes for a defensive operation deploying only those forces you need is required. In a OBG I think it is more geared towards coordinated operations. 

For Canada specifically the OBG makes more sense , but for logistics and training reasons it does not. So in this respect I think that having a "active duty" OBG rapid response for national defence could be useful, but  cycling people into active training operations and domestic MOC, specialty training periods would be useful. Obviously in Afghanistan this provides an opourtunity to live operations training. 

SO ideally I would use both.

One for domestic skills, dress and regimental training. One for national defence operational training, and a slightly tweaked live operational training in the feild.

The only downside is cost for bringing together people from various units and running the war games. 

Both are useful for various reasons. 

I think stretching the usefullness of equipment and operational capacity needs to be taken into account when talking about operational composition. That can change from environment to environment.


----------



## Infanteer

Huh?


----------



## Mountie

Holy crap.  I'm lost on that post too.  I couldn't even follow what he was trying to say.  Engineers, specialist, special forces, brigade-level, company-level.  I couldn't even follow it.


----------



## armyca08

To reiterate the comment it is very simple:

For logistics purposes, use miminalized supply need groupings, when domestic (in canada on operation specific bases - ect. a CFB airbase would be best supplied along airforce logistics with minimal carry over for non airforce supply needs) If you base smaller core units together, eg, a Navy Port Facility with an airbase. If there is centralization cost diffence may be negligable, however in the case of smaller groupings of mixed units wth different supply needs costs would be larger in shiping mixed units, due to a little overhead on sorting, and depot shipping. 

While for an operational setting you may have fixed expectances, and develope a supply chain simply for the mission requirements, on a more short term basis, rather than a more regularized supply line.  That is makeshift supply during an operation,vs. the ongoing running of a military facility which would need enhanced security inbedded if protection of equipment and assets was a priority.  In an operational setting you may have recon or armed movements of supplies. This is not to say that this wouldn't happen domestically, however I don't know, however I am under the impression that paper and other goods arn't under armed gaurd when they arrive on base.

The point of that was, in a mixed deployment or training scenario there is more overhead in logistics needs, be it uniforms, replacement kit, if not streamlined for all forces.

In regard to mixed light and mobile infantry, by putting the two together, you combine the logistics needs, but if you spread this out, you may be adding split sorting on th supply side.  That is if you have two smaller units of mixed mobile then you will need to split the shipment at some point. While there is sorting, it adds a little more sorting, also you add to the need for sorting and unpacking, in the slightest way.  

So while having two modes of training, regular MOC focused training, and Joint Operations Training. With Joint Operations focused on mission capacity building. The MOC focused training and specialization would  for reasons of skill development with centralization of specialist trainers, unless there was an excess of trainers to be deployed to all the smaller working groups.

Traning supplies and materials, and facilities  can likewise be spread. The other alternative is to build duplicate infrastructure, and enhance the logistics to create more supply depots, and more regular shipments or larger shipments, as cost overhead would likely be larger for a smaller shipment.

The key point from my earlier post is each mission and environment may have a different ideal composition. You can think of knights in france, or blitzkreig or latin american geurilla warfare. Each environment and technology collage will offer different weakenesses and advantages. Having mixed forces can be benificial when you are not sure what you will face, while being able to have the proper equipment for the operation and knowing it can help with logistics needs. Obviously it isn't clear cut; however, for each mission be it peace keeping, war in afghanistan, Iraq or Georgia, the forces and development of order of battle engagement may differ, it all depends on the short term and long range needs from a tacticle to a strategic basis. 

To simplify, a single type of force will not always be ideal alone, attachments can be benificial, however for logistic purposes it is a hastle. In the case of embedded specialists, insuring that universal training mechanisms exist to prime joint operations is of tremendous importance. It really depends on a case by case basis.

I'm not sure if this explains the two face training, and deployment strategy or not, however the concept is very simple.


----------



## Mountie

What does this have to do with an Optimal or Affiliated Battle Group?


----------



## McG

army08,
I'm really not traking what your intended argument is.  Are you familiar with the Canadian Forces Supply System, or regurgitating information from an undergraduate logistics management course?


----------



## armyca08

MCG said:
			
		

> army08,
> I'm really not traking what your intended argument is.  Are you familiar with the Canadian Forces Supply System, or regurgitating information from an undergraduate logistics management course?



It wasn't an argument which may be why you don't see the argument. It was opinion, and coming from a self made armchair junkie, not someone with actual real life strategic command experience, so it is geuss work, it just seems the logical end.

The point really was there are two key elements of structural design and development for combat forces. 1. Is the Logistic -Supply and Management of a large combat force that intersects with the military industrial complex as a whole, as well as any civilian counter parts that produce war materials. 2. Is the effectiveness of the fighting force from a strategic standpoint - that is how can the training and deployment 'bloom' into a optimal force given the materials and personnel available.

In the case of taking a direct approach to the OBG ABG people already are working with what is at hand, using Artillary and Infantry in Coordination and how it is best to contain the working elements of the forces. My comments were more generalized and not specific, because there is no absolute to the equipment or personnel or materials, in a developmental framework.

My ideal battle group from an armchair perspective is likely nothing like your ideal, as I have a very fantastic and non engrained viewpoint of the military, current and past military, and the future fighting forces.  

I think that protection and fire support are heavy, with mobility an engagement capacity, cost and image and cultural interface are all key elements in modern warfare.  The roles and costs are also key, not to start ranting again.

So really I was more saying neither and both.  There is a need to position your forces to provide for their needs, and efficiently

As for your perhaps rhetorical comment. Neither. I've read and thought about  international logistics, most of my past reading was based on US logistics, however civilian logistics (business management)  and history - ancient to modern warfare, reading about different modes of war, role playing etc..  

I'm very much light weight and left field here Just my opinion.   And finally - it depends on what you are fighting and under what circumstances. However I think training should both insure effective warriors and adapatable soilders.  I can only imagine.


----------



## armyca08

MCG said:
			
		

> army08,
> I'm really not traking what your intended argument is.  Are you familiar with the Canadian Forces Supply System, or regurgitating information from an undergraduate logistics management course?




2011 lies or hell.
It can take a long time for adminsitrative rework.


----------



## Steel Badger

Army08;  You've gone off the plot mate. Very difficult to follow your line of reasoning.  Perhaps filling out a bit more of your profile would help us understand where yo are coming from?


----------



## armyca08

;D
Oh.  I like my ideas to speak for me not my personality.


----------



## Steel Badger

army08 said:
			
		

> 2011 lies or hell.
> It can take a long time for adminsitrative rework.



If that is your ideas speaking for ya mate, you should perhaps tell 'em to ease off the redbull and coffee! In or out of context, that post is just a wee bit cryptic, savvy?


----------



## ltmaverick25

He is talking about very large pie in the sky concepts that academics like to talk about in a classroom or at the conference table.  I am going through some of this pain in my masters degree right now...  Not without its merit but not directly applicable to the OBG vs ABG debate.  Regardless of which model one prefers, strategic level logistics are an issue, but that issue is a constant, therefore not much of a factor here.


----------



## ltmaverick25

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> When talking concentrating resources, one should read the latest CAJ article on the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of WWI. It was interesting to note that at first, they concentrated them at Battalion level. Then some brilliant general decides to concentrate them as a brigade assett and eventually a Division asset. I gather from what I have read that as the MG moved into higher formations, the less involved they became and and less readily availible to fighting troops.
> 
> My point? I think we have to be careful how much concentration of force we do. Right now, we are in the counter insurgency fight and from our stand point now, it don't look like we are going to fight a large fighting force. Thats not saying it won't happen, just right now, unlikely.
> 
> In the same CAJ, I enjoyed reading about how Tanks are being employed in A-stan.



I think its important to define what we mean by dispersal vs concentration of force.  These two conceps are born from larger scale conventional operations.  Dispersal was something that the Canadian Corps created in WW1 to deal with high casualties resulting from machine gun and artillery fire.  In simple terms that meant spreading the troops out and avoiding choke points where they could be effectively mowed down, but it also meant that the Platoon Commander became the central figure on the battlefield stemming from the idea of decentralized command and control.  The Platoon Commanders needed the authority and ability to make decisions in the heat of battle to deal with local situations as they popped up that the Company comander or higher could not deal with.  Of course giving Platoon Commanders the ability to deal with said problems meant giving him assets like machine guns, rifle grenades and grenadiers at his direct disposal hence dispersal of your assets.  Having a large amount of machine guns under a brigade commanders control when he has limited ability to communicate and react proved innefectual.  At higher levels they were learning how to get the artillery to work with the infantry to create fire and movement capabilities instead of just firing and rushing which wasnt working too well for them.  Dispersal was essentially one very key ingredient to combined arms operations.

Dispersal however does not negate or overule concentration.  Consider two large armies of 500,000 men each squaring off against each other.  No side has a numerical superiority but when on the attack the commander would almost always create a local superiority of numbers by concentrating his forces in an attempt to create and exploit a break through of enemy lines.  Dispersal will still occur within this concentration of force.  The Platoon Commander will still be the central battlefield commander and he will still have support assets available to him.

In a manner of speaking, dispersal and concentration are always happening simultaneously.

In Afghanistan the context is completely different.  There is not necessarily a need to concentrate forces to create local superiority the way one would in a conventional setting so the idea of dispersal takes on a completely different definition entirely.  Now you are looking at the possibility of geographically dispersing your forces over a greater area which causes logistical problems that I would argue we have not yet properly accounted for as our training system is built around a conventional scenario.

OBG vs ABG would both encounter those same problems.

However for the sake of this thread I beleive that assuming we can solve our manning issues OBG is the way to go.  Combined Arms tactics and doctrine will defeat a numerically and technologically superior force that is not using Combined Arms.  

This is an area that I think Canada is exceptionally weak in.  I think we do an excellent job with individual training but a lousy job with collective training.  Budget is the major culprit here no doubt, but assuming your budget issue is fixed, what then to do with it?  Collective training is what will make the difference in a large scale battle at the end of the day.  OBG allows for the best possible collective training in my opinion.  The more effective collective training we conduct the more effective we will be on the battlefield.


----------



## Infanteer

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> However for the sake of this thread I beleive that assuming we can solve our manning issues OBG is the way to go.  Combined Arms tactics and doctrine will defeat a numerically and technologically superior force that is not using Combined Arms.



Are you implying that any force not organized along OBG lines is incapable of using combined arms doctrine?  How does an OBG set up facilitate a better approach to combined arms training?  



> This is an area that I think Canada is exceptionally weak in.  I think we do an excellent job with individual training but a lousy job with collective training.



At what level?  From where I'm standing, we're doing better than we ever have at putting combined arms assets together at levels 2 to 4 for training.


----------



## ltmaverick25

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Are you implying that any force not organized along OBG lines is incapable of using combined arms doctrine?  How does an OBG set up facilitate a better approach to combined arms training?
> 
> At what level?  From where I'm standing, we're doing better than we ever have at putting combined arms assets together at levels 2 to 4 for training.



No that is not what I am implying, I do think however that an OBG would help us improve our collective training to an even better degree than what we see now which would increase our combined arms ability.  There is more then one way to go about combined arms training, I just think the OBG is a stronger model.  If you have an organic group that is used to working with each other as opposed to pieces of a puzzle constantly being thrown together it stands to reason there would be better cohesiveness over the long run.  This of course all rests on us having enough manning slates to begin with, otherwise its moot as we will have to beg borrow and steal constantly anyway.

You are right, we are doing it better now then we did 10 years ago, even better then we did it 5 years ago.  There is no question that we are moving in the right direction but in my opinion we are not there yet and still have a long way to go.  If we keep at it and maintain the collective focus and get better funding to do it more often, combined with what I am suggesting above we will be even better, but for sure, things are moving forward instead of backwards.


----------



## McG

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> You are right, we are doing it [combined arms training] better now then we did 10 years ago, even better then we did it 5 years ago.  There is no question that we are moving in the right direction but in my opinion we are not there yet and still have a long way to go.  If we keep at it and maintain the collective focus and get better funding to do it more often, combined with what I am suggesting above we will be even better, but for sure, things are moving forward instead of backwards.


I heard the CLS speak a little over a week ago.  He seems to disagree with you.

After two and a half years of actual combined arms fighting, the Army's ability in combined arms fighting is not even a concern these days.  We get it, we've got it, and we are doing very well at it.


----------



## Cleared Hot

Just read through the 17 pages of posts to date on this thread and I apologize in advance if I am opening old wounds but I have one issue.  The elephant in my room is the fact that we are not just fighting a BG in theatre right now, so what happens to the other units who need the support of the enablers grouped with the BG/Bn?  The OMLT, PRT and yes even the NSE require Arty/FAC, Engineer, ISTAR etc. support.  By grouping all assets as part of an OBG/ABG these units literally have to beg the BG for support.  The TF HQ has no additional assets of its own and is limited in how it can solve problems.  If it owned the guns, TACP, Recce Sqn, Engineers etc. it would be able to determine and accept risk, set priorities and allocate resources to its main effort whatever that is on a day to day basis.  So IMO (as someone mentioned in a much earlier post) I think the best solution would be to return to a Bn from a BG and give the TF HQ (which is nesc with multiple units) the enablers.  This would also free PYs (by reducing the Bn HQ)because you would no longer have duplicate coord centers at different levels with only one of those levels actually having assets.  Agreed that for a roto 0 or 1 the BG/Bn needs all the support pieces in place as it crosses the LoD but as the mission evolves and units like the OMLT stand up, they are also going to be looking for help as well.  It's nice to think we are all Canadians who can play nicely together, but when it comes down to reality and it is my guys vs. yours, generally it takes a higher HQ to make the "right" decision.  I have many more opinions on this but as I am coming in rater late I will wait, besides, I have to go put my asbestos suit on. ;D

-CH


----------



## ltmaverick25

MCG said:
			
		

> I heard the CLS speak a little over a week ago.  He seems to disagree with you.
> 
> After two and a half years of actual combined arms fighting, the Army's ability in combined arms fighting is not even a concern these days.  We get it, we've got it, and we are doing very well at it.



Fair enough, but that does not necessarily make it so.  Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to rag on the army, I have been a soldier myself up until last month when I went Navy.  I have the utmost respect for what the army does but I still do not think we are doing as good a job on combined arms training as we can be, and I am not the only one that shares that opinion.  When I was still working as an Int Op in Toronto the higher ups there would talk about it all the time.  Two years of combined arms training is better then what we had before, but compare that to other armies that have been doing it much longer...  There is absolutely no taking away from the very positive strides made in the past few years by the army but there is also absolutely no taking away that we still have a good way to go.  

As has been mentioned in this thread and in others, alot of our combat arms brothers still dont fully understand what the others role is or how they do it, how they fit into the picture.  Intelligence generation has come a long long way but the dissemination and sharing of it leaves little to be desired at times.  The logistical networks and frameworks still need some work too.  There is always more to be done, I would submit the CLS knows this too.


----------



## Cleared Hot

LtMaverick25

While we are getting off the thread topic a bit I have to disagree.  We do a very good job at combined *arms training, i.e. Inf, Arty, Eng, Armd.  What we don't do well is integration of non-combat arms support trades (like Int which is probably why you heard your superiors complaining).  What we also don't do well is joint training but that's another debate.  As for combined arms though, we have basically been doing it for ever and do it well.  Admittedly, however, lately we have been focusing at lower levels like BG which is why some are concerned with skill fade and a loss of corporate knowledge.  That being said we have had Bde training events in 2003, 2005 and I believe at least one more since then (5 Bde).  The CLS loves big training events and I am willing to bet someone will have another BTE very soon.

-CH*


----------



## ltmaverick25

I think the BG combined arms training is the most realistic and practical you are going to get right now anyway due to our relatively small size and budget.  Its good to know the combat arms are doing alot of training together.  I heard the higher ups complaining, but they were not Int guys, these were officers in the HQ, one (G2) had a few things to say but alot of the feedback was coming from the G1 and G3.  You may be right about the issue being integrating your support network, but then again, that is one of the single most important factors to consider. 

How often are you guys running combined arms excercises now?  Is this widespread throughout the army or just the area that is supplying the next TF to Afghanistan?

Anyway back to the original thread, I think the issues you are raising here are another good indicator as to the strength of the OBG system.  I like the idea of bringing elements under one HQ and one system of accountability.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> I think the BG combined arms training is the most realistic and practical you are going to get right now anyway due to our relatively small size and budget.  Its good to know the combat arms are doing alot of training together.  I heard the higher ups complaining, but they were not Int guys, these were officers in the HQ, one (G2) had a few things to say but alot of the feedback was coming from the G1 and G3.  You may be right about the issue being integrating your support network, but then again, that is one of the single most important factors to consider.
> 
> How often are you guys running combined arms excercises now?  Is this widespread throughout the army or just the area that is supplying the next TF to Afghanistan?
> 
> Anyway back to the original thread, I think the issues you are raising here are another good indicator as to the strength of the OBG system.  I like the idea of bringing elements under one HQ and one system of accountability.



Whether units that are not deploying can or cannot do combined arms training does not have anything to do with OBG. TFs that are going to Afghanistan have the priority for resources.

I was a tank troop leader in the late 90s when training opportunities were pretty scarce.  We still conducted a fair amount of combat team and battle group (Level 5 and 6) training with our RCR, CER and RCHQ neighbours across the street. I would argue that we cut Troop/Squadron training to allow for combat team training. In 2002 as a tank squadron Battle Captain we did oodles of combined arms training up to Level 7 (Brigade). Since then Afghanistan has focused the training opportunties onto the deploying battle group, but that is a resource issue and not an organizational one.

I am not sure I understand the bit about accountability. Units are accountable.  Every CO has a Commander who is accountable in turn to a superior commander.


----------



## ltmaverick25

The accountability factor is more related to cooperation.  I have witnessed that break down and without strong direction from higher to settle things so to speak.  Albeit I have seen this far more on the reserve side of the house, I have still seen some examples on the reg force side.  I think really alot of it comes down to manning though.  Just not enough resources for everyone and thats where things start to break down.  At the end of the day I will concede you guys will have far more insight into alot of this stuff then I will.  When on the army side of things I was an NCM and alot of my feedback comes from some things I have seen while working the HQ side of things.  I realize that is not always the whole picture, but from the piece of the picture I was able to see, the above few posts are my impressions.


----------



## reccecrewman

Could this OBG be the death of the Regimental system as we know it in Canada? Suppose this experiment with 2RCR is decided to be the way LFC wants the Army to run, and each infantry Battalion was re-tooled to this, what happens to the Regimental identities to the Regiments directly involved? For example, 1RCR, 2RCR and 3RCR are all given a Squadron of RCD to be folded into the Battalion proper as assets at the Battalion CO's control. Now what would happen to the actual Regiment of the RCD? Their Squadrons are parcelled out to 3 separate RCR infantry Battalions, would there then be any requirement for a CO RCD? RSM? Regimental Headquarters? If these Squadrons are under an infantry CO's command, what role would there even be for the RCD RHQ? 

I'm asking this out of a genuine curiosity as to what would happen to the combat arms Units that would be dismembered to fill out the ORBAT of these beefed up infantry battalions. Thoughts or opinions?


----------



## dapaterson

Good question, without an answer right now.

But think of this:  If we make a unit "All Arms, all the time" do the CO and RSM then have to be infantry?  Or could 2 RCR be commanded by an Armour officer, with a Combat Engineer as his RSM?


----------



## Nfld Sapper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Good question, without an answer right now.
> 
> But think of this:  If we make a unit "All Arms, all the time" do the CO and RSM then have to be infantry?  Or could 2 RCR be commanded by an Armour officer, with a Combat Engineer as his RSM?



I know of one Engineer Unit with an Infantry CWO as their RSM and they seem to work ok.


----------



## Mountie

That's where I go back to my previous post from months ago abot how to name these new battle groups.  Why not make them mini-brigade groups so to speak?  Identity wise I mean. Then the regimental traditions are maintained by sub-units and the battle group headquarters consist of officers and NCM's from all trades.  The battle group commander and RSM would be infantry or armour, since the engineer and artillery LCol's and RSM's would be maintained at brigade level in the FSCC and ESCC similar to the Commander Royal Artillery and Commander Royal Engineers found in WW2 divisions.  Each of the battle groups would be number 1-2-3 in 1 Brigade, 4-5-6 in 2 Brigade, etc.

Example:  2 RCR would become 4 Canadian Battle Group

Battle Group Headquarters & Signal Troop
Golf Company, Royal Canadian Regiment
Hotel Company, Royal Canadian Regiment
India Company, Royal Canadian Regiment
C Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons
E Battery, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
22 Combat Engineer Squadron
4 Service Company
4 Field Ambulance Platoon


At the brigade level the Service Battalion could be renamed Brigade Support Group and include the Engineer Support Squadron from the now dissolved CER.  The Field Ambulance could be renamed Health Services Group to stick with the whole "group" theory.


----------



## ArmyRick

Alot of people will resist change at all cost. Which is too bad. 

Changes have happened to armies throughout history. Uniforms, tactics, weapons, etc, etc. Sometimes units get folded all together, happens. 

Maybe the Infantry Branch and the Armour Branch will be folded into the Combat Arms Branch. I know some people will scream they are corps but on paper in the CF they are listed as branches.

Look at the new US brigade Combat Team structures 9especially the heavy brigades) you will see some big changes. In the HBCT they have combined arms units which have 2 x infantry companies and 2 x tank companies. 

Will we follow suit with a similar system?


----------



## ltmaverick25

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Alot of people will resist change at all cost. Which is too bad.
> 
> Changes have happened to armies throughout history. Uniforms, tactics, weapons, etc, etc. Sometimes units get folded all together, happens.
> 
> Maybe the Infantry Branch and the Armour Branch will be folded into the Combat Arms Branch. I know some people will scream they are corps but on paper in the CF they are listed as branches.
> 
> Look at the new US brigade Combat Team structures 9especially the heavy brigades) you will see some big changes. In the HBCT they have combined arms units which have 2 x infantry companies and 2 x tank companies.
> 
> Will we follow suit with a similar system?



Assuming we can address manning issues I think what you describe above is ideal to a certain extent.  However I think it would be a mistake to fold the combat arms branches as each branch has the expertise required to ensure training occurs to a certain standard ect... Rather then folding things in, it may be better to integrate things better.  For example, and this is just off the top of my head, but perhaps as part of a final ex for courses we start integrating the various arms.  This will give newer members some valuable perspective on combined arms operations and remind them that they are not working in their own little bubble.  More importantly however, this would force the respective schools to coordinate and integrate field ex's.  This all by itself can pave the way to optimum integration, hopefully without sacrificing those aspects that the branches do best.

What may end up being sacrificed in this system is the regimental system.  As I see it, that would be the most challenging aspect of the old setup to incorporate.


----------



## vonGarvin

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> Assuming we can address manning issues I think what you describe above is ideal to a certain extent.  However I think it would be a mistake to fold the combat arms branches as each branch has the expertise required to ensure training occurs to a certain standard ect... Rather then folding things in, it may be better to integrate things better.  For example, and this is just off the top of my head, but *perhaps as part of a final ex for courses we start integrating the various arms. *  This will give newer members some valuable perspective on combined arms operations and remind them that they are not working in their own little bubble.  More importantly however, this would force the respective schools to coordinate and integrate field ex's.  This all by itself can pave the way to optimum integration, hopefully without sacrificing those aspects that the branches do best.
> 
> What may end up being sacrificed in this system is the regimental system.  As I see it, that would be the most challenging aspect of the old setup to incorporate.


What you propose there is exactly how Phase IV ended at the Combat Training Centre, until 2000.  From 2001 and on, the various schools held their own final exercises.  I think that there is a move afoot to bring back what you propose, however.


----------



## ltmaverick25

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> What you propose there is exactly how Phase IV ended at the Combat Training Centre, until 2000.  From 2001 and on, the various schools held their own final exercises.  I think that there is a move afoot to bring back what you propose, however.



Lets hope they do bring it back.  Any idea why they scrapped it in the first place?  I am willing to be that they could not make it work administratively or logistically.  To me, our ability to conduct admin and logistics is our single greatest weakness right now.


----------



## vonGarvin

When I did my Phase IV (in 2000), the Infantry Phase was still in M-113 APCs.  2001 was the first year for the LAV 3, and as a result of adding the Gunner/Crew Commander courses (since replaced, thank God!), the courses didn't end at the same time.  Then the Armour School went from tank-centric to Armd Recce-centric, and the whole thing just sort of fell to the wayside.

A few years ago they had the first integration of the "Final" ex (it was final ex for Armd Offr, but not for Inf Offr), and as a result, I think that the schools are working on better "fusion" for more "synergy" at the end of Phase IV 


(See how I used those buzzwords?  God, sometimes I scare even myself!!!)


----------



## dapaterson

MR:  Using all those buzzwords, you're almost ready to become a senior officer. You just have to stop knowing what they mean and using them correctly, then you'll be ready...


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> MR:  Using all those buzzwords, you're almost ready to become a senior officer. You just have to stop knowing what they mean and using them correctly, then you'll be ready...


Well, by task-tailoring all my enablers, in a Joint Integrated Multinational Public (or "JIMP") environment, I'm fairly certain that the integration of my personal self with the heightened resource rich and command centric majority, I too could find myself leading the cutting edge of troops to task.
(Translation: If I suck up enough, I could get promoted)
;D


----------



## Kirkhill

Brown Bess - 3 Rounds per minute at 50 yards effective, unaimed
Lee Enfield - 15 Rounds per minute at 300 yards effective, aimed
C6 - 200 Rounds per minute at 1000 m/y, aimed(area)

The Regimental System grew up in an era where it took 1000 men to put down fire at the rate of 3000 RPM over a 50 yard zone of influence. - A Battalion

By World War 1 it only took 200 men to acheive the same rate of fire. - A Company
But the zone of influence had expanded by a factor of 6 squared or 36.  One  Company was commanding the same ground as 36 Wellington era Battalions. - or A Corps of 36,000 men
The only counter was to send in more targets as the single  Company was still only equal to 1 Battalion

Now, it takes 15 troops armed with C6s to acheive 3000 RPM over a 1000 yard zone of influence.  l'll allow for the No.2 and call it a Platooon (30 men).
Their zone of influence at Suffield (ie not allowing for shrubbery and dead ground) is 400 times greater than a Wellington Battalion. ((1000/50)squared).
That single Platoon is now capable of exerting influence over an area equivalent to that influenced by 400 Wellington Battalions (4/Brigade, 12/Division, 36/Corps. 108/Army, 324 Army Group - and I'lll stop there and allow the rest as supernumaries).

Now I know that that is a numbers exercise, and in the real world the MG Platoon can't cover that area because of dead ground, nor does it have 400,000 pairs of eyes to be able to maintain a watch, nor does it have 400,000 bodies to police the area or to launch an assault.

But on the two simple metrics of laying down fire, rate of fire and effective range, then an MG Platoon now supplies the same support as a Wellington Battalion over an area (in a low intensity environment) that Wellington would have needed at least a Division or Corps to acheive a similar effect (supporting musket calibre fire).

At one level, using the business world's model that argues for making the MG  Platoon at least a LCol's billet, if not a Field Marshall, where the Boss is supposedly paid on the basis of responsibility for what he can do.  Not on the basis of how many men he is responsible for.

At the other level, there are still many jobs that Her Majesty requires of her soldiers that still require one-to-one service.  ie the soldier's zone of influence is reduced to his/her arm's length.  In those instances only large numbers will meet the need.

Unfortunately most of those tasks are not related to killing.  They are not related to fire support.  If the Infantry is challenged consider the poor artillery who has gone from muzzle loaded 6 pounders firing over open sights to Predators loitering for 24 hours any where in the world with Hellfires being controlled from an air conditioned room in Nevada.  How many Bombardiers and LCols do you need then?

The tasks are not even related to supplying the force.  In their case it is not just a case of PLS Trucks and RTFLs replacing horse drawn wagons (and one wagon in 3 supplying feed for the horses) and strong backs.  It is the fact that they need to deliver the same number of rounds but to fewer troops (who need less food, water and spares) spread over a wider area.  What is the appropriate MGen to RTFL ratio?

The one area where the old regimental  requirement can be justifiably maintained is in "Constabulary Duties"  aka  "Peace-Keeping".  There you still need the ability to act one on one with the THREAT of deadly force.  But you need the bodies to be able to conduct a human dialog face to face that will convince the other side of unruly rioters to back down and not lift a fist.

An MG Platoon, in that case can do an Amritsar on the crowd.  But it can't persuade them to pack up and go home without slaughtering them.  

If the Army is just about supplying deadly force is support of HMG's aims then a small army with few troops and lots of Generals meets the needs.

If the Army wants to supply a broader range of options, including non-violent or less lethal options then it needs lots of troops with fewer Generals.

And now back to your discussion about Wellingtonian Cap Badges in the ABG/OBG.


----------



## dapaterson

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> Well, by task-tailoring all my enablers, in a Joint Integrated Multinational Public (or "JIMP") environment, I'm fairly certain that the integration of my personal self with the heightened resource rich and command centric majority, I too could find myself leading the cutting edge of troops to task.
> (Translation: If I suck up enough, I could get promoted)
> ;D



Staff weenies are just so cute!


----------



## a_majoor

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Staff weenies are just so cute!



I understand using permethrin treated uniforms and bug bars can keep staff weenies from infesting your workspace....


----------



## dapaterson

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I understand using permethrin treated uniforms and bug bars can keep staff weenies from infesting your workspace....



Nope.  Nothing scares away staff weenies as much as real work...


----------



## vonGarvin

Actually, staff weenies enjoy hard work.  It's the STUPID work that scares us! ;D


----------



## Mountie

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Alot of people will resist change at all cost. Which is too bad.
> 
> Changes have happened to armies throughout history. Uniforms, tactics, weapons, etc, etc. Sometimes units get folded all together, happens.
> 
> Maybe the Infantry Branch and the Armour Branch will be folded into the Combat Arms Branch. I know some people will scream they are corps but on paper in the CF they are listed as branches.
> 
> Look at the new US brigade Combat Team structures 9especially the heavy brigades) you will see some big changes. In the HBCT they have combined arms units which have 2 x infantry companies and 2 x tank companies.
> 
> Will we follow suit with a similar system?



Exactly.  The US Army Combined Arms Battalion also adds a Combat Engineer Company with two combat engineer platoons (field troops) and an assault & barrier platoon (close support troop).  As well as mortar, recce and medical platoons in the Headquarters Company.  It also has an attached Forward Support Company from the Brigade Support Battalion with a support platoon (supply & transport) and a maintenance platoon. This is where I took the organization for the battle group in my previous posts.  

The Future Combat System Combined Arms Battalion has re-classified the mortars as a 'battery' rather than a 'platoon' with 8 120mm self-propelled mortars and the recce element as a 'troop' (US Company-size sub-unit = to our squadron) with 10 Reconnaissance & Surveillance variants of the FCS.    

Furthermore, if the Infantry and Armour Branches/Corps are consolidated into a single Combat Arms branch couldn't the infantry LAV-III's be crewed by Armoured Soldiers.  This would require mixed platoons and would mess with cap badges but essentially would streamlining skills.  I don't mean separate APC sections/platoons, just maintain the current platoons but slide armoured soldiers into the crew positions.  Then infantrymen wouldn't be bouncing back and forth between dismounted and vehicle crewman throughout his career.  The Combat Arms Branch could essential be split in two MOC's: dismount (infantry) and mounted (armour) allowing for more specialization and streamlined career progression, similar to the how the artillery is one branch/regiment but splits into field and air defence MOCs.


----------



## vonGarvin

Mountie said:
			
		

> Furthermore, if the Infantry and Armour Branches/Corps are consolidated into a single Combat Arms branch couldn't the infantry LAV-III's be crewed by Armoured Soldiers.  This would require mixed platoons and would mess with cap badges but essentially would streamlining skills.  I don't mean separate APC sections/platoons, just maintain the current platoons but slide armoured soldiers into the crew positions.  Then infantrymen wouldn't be bouncing back and forth between dismounted and vehicle crewman throughout his career.  The Combat Arms Branch could essential be split in two MOC's: dismount (infantry) and mounted (armour) allowing for more specialization and streamlined career progression, similar to the how the artillery is one branch/regiment but splits into field and air defence MOCs.


Crew commanding a LAV 3 is a distinct skill set from crew commanding a Coyote.  In a LAV 3, the crew commander is fighting as part of a section, platoon or company.  Or the vehicle is "left behind" and he or she is humping with his or her rifle/carbine.  In a Coyote, the crew commander is part of a recce patrol, troop or squadron, doing recce tasks.  They may be very close in terms of the skill sets; however, I would caution against the notion that they are as easily interchangable. 
To illustrate my argument, suppose you did the opposite: you took a crew commander qualified infantry Sgt, and put him in a Coyote.  Yes, he could offer direction to his or her crew as well as any armoured crew commander of similar quality; however, I highly doubt that any infantry Sgt could "slide" into an armoured recce squadron as a crew commander.  It goes both ways.

Having said all that, if the trades were "meshed" into one, then naturally there would be some cross training to be done.  This is well within our means as an army.  I mean, maybe Sgt Bloggins, who until "integration" was an infantry Sgt decided that she wanted to do the "armoured recce" stuff.


----------



## Mountie

Fair enough.  Obviously I don't have the practical experience to know that.  So let me ask you a few questions?  Would career transition from a LAV-III Crew Commander to a Coyote Crew Commander (or visa versa) be easier than from an LAV-III Crew Commander MCpl. to a dismounted section commander Sgt.?  There is going to be a conversion process regardless during career progression.  My point was that from infantry crew commander to recce patrol crew commander would be easier than from dismounted to mounted.   Career progression from a Coyote gunner to a LAV-III crew commander (or visa versa) or a LAV-III driver to a Coyote gunner would be a more logical progression than from dismounted to mounted and back and forth, wouldn't it?  

I know its hard to put the regimental affiliations aside.  I think that is such an obstacle to true combined arms theories.  I would hate to see the loss of the regimental system but for discussion sake I was thinking of truely combined units something like the USMC where everyone belongs to a numbered, non-regimental type unit.  You would have an infantry platoon with dismounted soldiers wearing the crossed rifle cap badge of the infantry and the LAV-III crewman wearing the iron fist cap badge of the armoured corps and nobody wearing a regimental cap badge such as the PPCLI or LdSH(RC).   The battle group mortar platoon/troop might have armoured crewman driving the mortar carriers with gunners in the back manning the mortar.  Similar to how I believe Bison Ambulances are crewed; don't armour/infantry drive the vehicle while medical technicians are in back treating the patients?  You don't need a medic to drive the vehicle.  Likewise, you don't need an infantrymen to drive a LAV-III, let the armoured crewman be the vehicle experts and let the infantry concentrate on dismounted close combat.


----------



## Command-Sense-Act 105

Mountie said:
			
		

> ...Similar to how I believe Bison Ambulances are crewed; don't armour/infantry drive the vehicle while medical technicians are in back treating the patients?  You don't need a medic to drive the vehicle.


----------



## Mountie

I would think so as well.  I thought I read a post a few months back on that topic.  I thought armour/infantry drivers were going to drive the Bison Ambulances for a Roto to Afghanistan?  Guess not.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Mountie said:
			
		

> Fair enough.  Obviously I don't have the practical experience to know that.  So let me ask you a few questions?  Would career transition from a LAV-III Crew Commander to a Coyote Crew Commander (or visa versa) be easier than from an LAV-III Crew Commander MCpl. to a dismounted section commander Sgt.?  There is going to be a conversion process regardless during career progression.  My point was that from infantry crew commander to recce patrol crew commander would be easier than from dismounted to mounted.   Career progression from a Coyote gunner to a LAV-III crew commander (or visa versa) or a LAV-III driver to a Coyote gunner would be a more logical progression than from dismounted to mounted and back and forth, wouldn't it?
> 
> I know its hard to put the regimental affiliations aside.  I think that is such an obstacle to true combined arms theories.  I would hate to see the loss of the regimental system but for discussion sake I was thinking of truely combined units something like the USMC where everyone belongs to a numbered, non-regimental type unit.  You would have an infantry platoon with dismounted soldiers wearing the crossed rifle cap badge of the infantry and the LAV-III crewman wearing the iron fist cap badge of the armoured corps and nobody wearing a regimental cap badge such as the PPCLI or LdSH(RC).   The battle group mortar platoon/troop might have armoured crewman driving the mortar carriers with gunners in the back manning the mortar.  Similar to how I believe Bison Ambulances are crewed; don't armour/infantry drive the vehicle while medical technicians are in back treating the patients?  You don't need a medic to drive the vehicle.  Likewise, you don't need an infantrymen to drive a LAV-III, let the armoured crewman be the vehicle experts and let the infantry concentrate on dismounted close combat.



It's not a matter of having to set aside regimental affiliations to discuss this.

The positions you are comparing have similar technical skill-sets with regard to the vehicles.  But each, infantry and armour, are also expected to be skilled at a much broader Corps (Branch if you prefer) skill-set which is not readily inter-changeable just because they use similar vehicles. It's a bigger question than whether crew commanding a Coyote has skills over-lap with crew-commanding a LAV.

When I see a rental cop standing in a public building with a gun on his hip, I see him "doing" the same skill set as a City Officer doing a similar task.  They look alike (somewhat) and at least one of them wants me to believe they have similar skill-sets and bring similar advantages to the task - but I know they're not inter-changeable across the full spectrum of duties I would expect the City cop to do.


----------



## Mountie

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> It's not a matter of having to set aside regimental affiliations to discuss this.
> 
> The positions you are comparing have similar technical skill-sets with regard to the vehicles.  But each, infantry and armour, are also expected to be skilled at a much broader Corps (Branch if you prefer) skill-set which is not readily inter-changeable just because they use similar vehicles. It's a bigger question than whether crew commanding a Coyote has skills over-lap with crew-commanding a LAV.
> 
> When I see a rental cop standing in a public building with a gun on his hip, I see him "doing" the same skill set as a City Officer doing a similar task.  They look alike (somewhat) and at least one of them wants me to believe they have similar skill-sets and bring similar advantages to the task - but I know they're not inter-changeable across the full spectrum of duties I would expect the City cop to do.



Point taken.  As I said I don't have the experience to back up my theory so I'll have to believe you folks that do.  I agree with the cop analogy, that I do have the experience to backup.  I was thinking more along the line of specific job functions such as "driving a LAV/Coyote" rather than the broader sense that you are thinking.  Perhaps that is narrow minded of me.  I was comparing to my own organisation.  We have so many Regular Members (cops) occupying positions in administrative/support units that could filled by Civilian Members.  I was thinking along those lines when I said just because its a medical Bison there is no need to have a medic driving it and wasting his/her medical skills.  To compare to my organization, in my provincial headquarters we have an Inspector, a sergeant and a corporal just to manage the computer tech section that fixes and maintains our computers.  The section only consists no more than a dozen Civilian Members and there is a Civilian i/c for the unit as well.  Why do we waste three Regular Members to supervise computer techs, who have their own unit i/c anyway when we are in a manpower crisis like never before??  It doesn't require a police background to fix a computer in a police service, put the cops on the streets and let the civies fix the computers.  Just like I don't think it takes a medical background to drive a Bison Ambulance.  Just my opinion though.


----------



## Mountie

Anything new on the Optimal Battle Group Experiment?  I read one article in the Canadian Army Journal  "Forging Land Forces for the Army of Tomorrow - Battle Group 2021".


----------



## ArmyRick

I was wondering if we have anybody from 2RCR floating around on here that could provide some feedback on the OBG experiment (they are the ones heading it up, right?).

I was reading an article about the OBG concept and it started with a quote from general Vokes staing back in the early 1950s that artillery, infantry and armour be placed together in a single unit but the regimental system will get in the way. Kind of mind boggling.

I was also reading an interesting article on British army and their future brigade structure (they will be identical) with the following
-Armoured Tank Regt
-Armoured Recce Regt
-Warrior (Heavy) Infantry battalion
-Bulldog (medium) infantry battalion
-2 x Light battalions

Is it directly related to the OBG vs ABG? Not entirely, but if you look at the size of our army and they way we fight, maybe we really should go with the OBG.

The structure for it would be interesting. Someone brought up that the arms CO and RSm provide the proper mentoring and training to their arms until its time to put the BG together for deployments.

Someone one even called it a train wreck. Thats not the way it should be. For sub unit trg and lower, why not have the arms (engineers, armoured, artillery) receive guidance from their appropriate schools? Ideas or thoughts on this one?


----------



## GnyHwy

Not from the 2RCR BG but, I'll say that I believe an OBG is too dependant upon predicting what your enemy will look like (otherwise it's a waste of resources).  The makeup you mention above sound like a great wrecking crew but, unless your up against the hordes it will likely be a lot of weapons and persons doing nothing.

The ABG works just fine now where a Bde Cmdr is tasked to provide a BG for a specific task and he then goes to his COs to execute.  As well, subunits and even sub-sub units can cross Bdes.

Comparing a BG to a weapon.  For a weapon you must figure out what you need to defeat i.e. Armour, Walls, Mountain Caves.  Once you figure out what you need to defeat, you can design the weapon.

In order to design a BG would work the same in my mind.  What do you need to defeat?  

If you can figure out what our enemy will look like in our next conflict and every conflict thereafter,  you could be a rich man.


----------



## ArmyRick

As someone else stated, build a BG around a worst case scenario and then you can anticipate success for lower intensity missions.

We still have on going issues with other arms not working with each other (including incidents of our guys going blue on blue overseas, luckily the one incident I am thinking of there was no casualties, BTW it was our armour firing on our infantry).

I personally beleive we need more combined arms training and getting used to use to working with each other. What we do now works, but i strongly beleive we can do better. I also beleive people fear change. Its my opinion, good luck selling me on something different. 

If you have a sound argument, sell it.


----------



## George Wallace

I still can't believe that someone had come up with the "Plug 'N Play" philosophy for deployments.  OK...... Here it comes........A 4 CMBG story....... What was wrong with the Cbt Team that we used in the past?  In 4 CMBG each Sqn, Coy, Engrs and FOO Party were more or less teamed up with the same members of the other Arms on every Ex and Alert.  B Sqn RCD would work with the same Coy of R22R, and have the same Engr C/S and  FOO Party everytime they deployed out the gate.   It worked, and people developed a good working relationship knowing how their 'peers' in the Cbt Team worked.  Why has someone decided to reinvent the wheel?



Oh!  With all this rain coming down, I think that this Winter is being brought to us by President's Choice Memories of Lahr.    ;D


----------



## Old Sweat

To my tiny mind, any difficulties in working together, including potential blue on blue, would not be solved by creating permanent mixed battle groups. In fact, the challenges would not be solved by permanent affiliations either, given the lack of combined arms collective training that has gone on in the army over the last decade and abit. I know, we plug the various bits and pieces together into a battle group well in advance, but even then t he training climate leads to running before the various components can even walk together properly. 

Part of it is a result of resources or the lack of same; part of it is a result of the three factors that work against force generation - population, distance and climate; and part of it is a lack of knowledge of the other arms' capabilities and limitations. I could launch into a giant rant, but I'll just opine that until the army can build some stability and routine into its organizations and training cycles, no amount of fiddling with organizations will matter a whit.

In the mid-sixties 4 CIBG, which was a mechanized formation, looked at reorganizing into affiliated battle groups. The plan involved including tank squadrons in infantry battalions and vice versa with the armoured regiment. Not all the battalions would gain a squadron and/or lose a company. The gunners and the sappers were left alone. This brain wave actually was at the behest of CFHQ and was proposed for, if I recall correctly, the flimsiest of reasons. The proposal failed the logic test, not because of cap badge politics, but because little or nothing was gained in terms of combat effectiveness, and all sorts of tactical flexibility was lost.

To sum up: there is no magic solution, especially if the army is unable to conduct formation operational training.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I still can't believe that someone had come up with the "Plug 'N Play" philosophy for deployments.  OK...... Here it comes........A 4 CMBG story....... What was wrong with the Cbt Team that we used in the past?  In 4 CMBG each Sqn, Coy, Engrs and FOO Party were more or less teamed up with the same members of the other Arms on every Ex and Alert.  B Sqn RCD would work with the same Coy of R22R, and have the same Engr C/S and  FOO Party everytime they deployed out the gate.   It worked, and people developed a good working relationship knowing how their 'peers' in the Cbt Team worked.  Why has someone decided to reinvent the wheel?
> 
> 
> 
> Oh!  With all this rain coming down, I think that this Winter is being brought to us by President's Choice Memories of Lahr.    ;D



Isn't this the same idea they are doing with 2 RCR? There is an embedded Field Section (or is it troop) from 4 ESR and also C Sqn RCD (IIRC)......


----------



## George Wallace

Not really.  The 2RCR setup is more like the US Cav where the unit has all those resources integral to the unit.  In the Cbt Teams, the different units were 'teamed' together for operations, but still belonged to their original Regt/Bn and were usually supplied by their 'mother' units or the unit with the largest Ech.


----------



## GnyHwy

After talking with a couple friends (both Arty friends).  One from the 2RCR BG and the other from a an Army tasking position.  Both of them have told me that the 2 RCR BG has conducted no more combined arms training than if they were with a regular Bde.  

In specific, my friend from 2RCR said the combined arms was nothing out of the ordinary and trade specific skills were suffering.  My friend from tasking summed it up kind of like I would think. " An OBG is great if you have a 150,000 man Army".

As far as the plug and play concept.  I think it's our best option considering all of our crappy factors.  That is why we have and need to maintain national standards.  Considering our national standards are probably simaliar in size to a Marine Div or Corps if we're lucky it should be attainable.


----------



## George Wallace

Your "Plug 'N Play" comment has set me off.  Perhaps you could go back and ask your friend at 2 RCR if he would fit in with their org easier if he were "Plugged in to Play" with them from Shilo on 24 hrs notice?  

I, as you can see, see "Plug 'N Play" as a great leap backwards from what we had and what your friend at 2 RCR is experiencing.


----------



## GnyHwy

Further,  factoring for worse case scenario would be a nice convieniance but, when the task calls for something smaller and more specific, you would end up with a bunch of unused and unhappy soldiers waiting behind waiting to be plugged and played.


----------



## GnyHwy

I will add to my comments.  I neglected to say, my friend from the 2RCR BG also said that the command relationship within the 2 RCR BG is top notch.  A very important consideration that took my regular BG probably 1/3 of the way throught our tour to accomplish.


----------



## George Wallace

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I regress.  I neglected to say, my friend from the 2RCR BG also said that the command relationship within the 2 RCR BG is top notch.  A very important consideration that took my regular BG probably 1/3 of the way throught our tour to accomplish.



That is my point.  Your friend has an intimate relationship with the Comd staff of the unit, an established working relationship with them, and knowledge and experience with their SOPs and little 'idiosyncrasies'.  You don't get that with "Plug 'N Play" when you hit the ground running.


----------



## GnyHwy

Roger,  I will agree with your point on  the command relationship, which is extremely improtant.  That does not yet compensate for the 1500 troops that might not be exercised as well as their own COs (with direction from Bde Cmdrs) might be able to accomplish i.e Eng, Arty, Comms.

I ask, because I am unsure.  When was the last time as far as a real BG is concerned, were we needed to hit the ground running?


----------



## George Wallace

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> .....  When was the last time as far as a real BG is concerned, were we needed to hit the ground running?



Well.....With year long or longer work up training for a ROTO it would seem that we don't.  However, there are still last minute substitutions and replacements, that may not come from the org deploying.  At the same time, there are other orgs deploying in other capacities that may have absolutely no familiarity with the orgs that they are to work with or for.  

We can look at the various handovers the BGs have done with each ROTO to see that "Plug 'N Play" is a fantasy.  There would be a smooth transition and the new ROTO would carry on where the other left off.  We have seen that this is not true.  Each ROTO has followed their own 'agenda', their own SOPs, their own priorities.  If "Plug 'N Play" were reality, there would be no difference between one ROTO and another.  The ultimate test, I suppose, of "Plug 'N Play"........the ROTO handover.


----------



## GnyHwy

I agree with all but,  because I like to debate I will choose the other side. 



> At the same time, there are other orgs deploying in other capacities that may have absolutely no familiarity with the orgs that they are to work with or for.



An arguement for Plug and Play and national standards.



> We can look at the various handovers the BGs have done with each ROTO to see that "Plug 'N Play" is a fantasy.



Various BGs will have the same effect as COs will always have different missions.



> Each ROTO has followed their own 'agenda', their own SOPs, their own priorities.  If "Plug 'N Play" were reality, there would be no difference between one ROTO and another.  The ultimate test, I suppose, of "Plug 'N Play"........the ROTO handover.



Get an Army Cmdr to pull this together.  Without, nothing has changed.


----------



## George Wallace

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> An arguement for Plug and Play and national standards.



Oh, I agree, unfortunately we know that every Bde, every Cbt Team, every Unit and every Sub-unit has their particular variations of what may very well be a National/Corps/Branch SOP.   "Ten Minutes Notice to Move" may be "Saddles" for one unit and "Cougar" for another.   Insert a Sub-unit into that Organization from the other end of the country, and confusion reigns for quite a period of time. 

What person, at what level of Command, came up with the idea that personnel could be switched around in positions like replacing a light bulb that was burnt out?  Perhaps we should have pointed out to this genius that not all the light bulbs on the shelf were of the same Wattage as the one needing replacing.


----------



## Journeyman

Perhaps we need a higher, oh say _National_, level of tactical command. I can't believe that no one has sorted out this urgent lack of standardization regarding "Saddles" vs "Cougar." Apparently it's not the purview of "Army Doctrine."



Hmmmm: we're already paying someone his MGen pay to be "PROJECT DIRECTOR AND COMMANDER, JOINT HEADQUARTERS RENEWAL.... 'PROJECT'." If someone in the tribal elder world would catch on that we're not deploying Divs, let alone Bdes, maybe he could put a bit of effort into Bn-level SOPs    :brickwall:


----------



## a_majoor

You would not believe how hard it is to standardize training platoons in the various schools either... > > >


----------



## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> You would not believe how hard it is to standardize training platoons in the various schools either... > > >


School?

Standards?

If only I knew someone....

 >


In all seriousness, I understand the reason for the OBG or ABG or whatever it's called these days.  It's all about inter-arms training.  I do believe that many years ago, when 2 RCR, C Sqn RCD and so forth were here in Gagetown.  Each were their own units; however, they trained together pretty well all the time.  I'm not sure if the current model is better or worse or just different.
As for our Brigades: if they were true brigades, with semi-permanent affiliations between units and sub-units, things would perhaps be better?  

Even proximity helps.  Imagine a large parade square, and around it are all the various units of the brigade.  In the middle of the square is a building, and that's Brigade HQ.  Once weekly, the COs and RSMs come to the middle for the weekly O Gp.  Every day the staffs are coming together to the middle for all the various staff functions.  Once monthly (weekly, if the Bde Comd is an officer in The RCR), all members come to the middle to parade, paint rocks, whatever.  Once yearly, all units come to the middle with their vehicles to marshall, marry up, and head out into the training area for a month-long exercise.  Ah, yes, ideal.  Naturally, the units go back to their lines to conduct their daily business, but proximity helps, amplified by a central command, no?


----------



## Mountie

Any update on the 2 RCR BG experiment?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Mountie said:
			
		

> Any update on the 2 RCR BG experiment?



What sort of update are you seeking? 

There is more to the 2 RCR BG 2021 than my piece, but I command the Reconnaissance Squadron.  We  have grown this year to include a Squadron Headquarters, two Recce Troops, one Recce Platoon, one Sniper Platoon and a small Admin Troop.  We've had the opportunity to conduct some good training and Op PODIUM saw roughly half of the Sqn deploy to BC.

As a combined arms squadron we've been able to compare/share TTP between the infantry and armoured recce communities, and we've had quite a bit of practice supporting infantry companies/combat teams.  We face resource constraints like anyone, but I'm having a great time.


----------



## Mountie

I just got a personal reply to my question saying that the whole experiment was a failure and all elements of the battle group had been returned to their parent regiments.  I assume from your post that this is incorrect then?  I was just wondering how the whole experiment was going.  If a permanent combined arms battle group was a successful concept.

Thanks for your imput, hope you have more info.


----------



## ArmyRick

Was the source reliable? I don't see how it can be a failure? Unless people put effort into making it a failure. All operations are combined arms and thats the way we must function and think.

Funny the Canadian Airborne Regiment was an all arms regiment and it certainly was no failure.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Mountie said:
			
		

> I just got a personal reply to my question saying that the whole experiment was a failure and all elements of the battle group had been returned to their parent regiments.  I assume from your post that this is incorrect then?  I was just wondering how the whole experiment was going.  If a permanent combined arms battle group was a successful concept.
> 
> Thanks for your imput, hope you have more info.



I'll let you judge the credibility of your source.     

We have doubled the number of armoured soldiers at the 2 RCR OBG since August.


----------



## Mountie

Well re-reading the personal message, the source did say he wasn't 100% sure and I should seak another source to confirm.  Thanks for the replies.  Any word of creating other OBG's or is that jumping the gun a little?


----------



## SeanNewman

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Funny the Canadian Airborne Regiment was an all arms regiment and it certainly was no failure.



...crickets...


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I don't walk in the hallways of Army power, but my gut feel is that the OBG will be a Gagetown thing for the time being.  As for the experiment, I think that these things take time to assess, and by time I am thinking at least five years. 

As an aside, since coming here I don't personally see this as an experiment, but rather as a Squadron that is part of a Battalion in the field force.  I focus on the people in the Squadron (their morale and careers) and on our ability to execute our tasks and leave the high end analysis to the science folks.  As for myself, I am very happy here.  Perhaps that is to be expected, but there it is.

Cheers!

T2B


----------



## SeanNewman

It's tough to really judge the overall effectiveness in it until you make it 100% all-inclusive.  Needs tanks, ESCC, FSCC, etc.  Not to mention things like CIMIC/PRT/PsyOps.


----------



## Mountie

How is it organized then?  Without breaching security.  I read a paper online that listed the sub-units.  Although it listed some as organic and others as attached.  But it had an artillery battery and an engineer squadron, so wouldn't it have a FSCC and ESCC from those sub-units?  It did have the CIMIC, etc 'attached'.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_3/CAJ_Vol11.3_05_e.pdf


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

There are:

a.   Golf, Hotel and India Coy (rifle companies) 
b.   Kilo Coy (Sigs, BG HQ etc)
c.   Lima (Admin) Company (with a CSS Major as the OC)
d.   Recce Squadron (described a few posts above)

The HQ company has an FSCC, FOO and an ASCC (there is an ALO position as well).  There is also an IA cell with CIMIC/Psyops.  These are all positions posted into the OBG which work and train with the BG.  The BG HQ is pretty big when it deploys.  There is an affiliated engineer squadron here in Gagetown.


----------



## Mountie

Excellent.  Thanks for that.  I thought the engineer squadron and artillery battery were part of the battle group.  You mentioned the engineers were attached.  Is there an attached artillery battery as well?


----------



## SeanNewman

When the BG deploys overseas, yes the actual Engineers and Arty guns are attached (although for practical employment it's a bit of a tightrope as to who really owns them, the BG or the Bde).

At least training with an integrated ESCC/FSCC allows the HQ to function in the mindset that they are there, even if there aren't actual M777s and Engr assets moving about the battlespace as they would be in a deployment.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Mountie said:
			
		

> Excellent.  Thanks for that.  I thought the engineer squadron and artillery battery were part of the battle group.  You mentioned the engineers were attached.  Is there an attached artillery battery as well?



Regarding the engineers, although they still have a parent Regiment here in Gagetown from whom they take their day to day orders, that Sqn is the one who works with us in the field.  As a result, for example, my Recce Tps/Pls work with the same Eng Recce Dets when we go to the field, and the companies work with the same guys from the field troops.  There is no artillery battery affilated here in Gagetown, but as I mentioned there is an FSCC, FOO party and ASCC inside the BG HQ.


----------



## SeanNewman

T2B,

From the other Pioneer thread, in the big picture is the 2 RCR BG meant to have an "in stone" OrBat?  For example, one of the concerns in getting rid of Pioneers/Mortars was that while the theory worked if you could guarantee Arty/Engineer support, the gap wasn't necessarily filled that way.

Is the OrBat fixed to remedy that issue?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Petamocto said:
			
		

> T2B,
> 
> From the other Pioneer thread, in the big picture is the 2 RCR BG meant to have an "in stone" OrBat?  For example, one of the concerns in getting rid of Pioneers/Mortars was that while the theory worked if you could guarantee Arty/Engineer support, the gap wasn't necessarily filled that way.
> 
> Is the OrBat fixed to remedy that issue?



For this experiment I am a lab rat and not one of the scientists in a white coat directing the experiment!  Having said that, my understanding of the OBG/BG 2021 experiment is that the Army is looking at what is the best mix of capabilities to be found at BG level and what is the best way to force generate those capabilties.  I don't think that they were looking specifically at the pioneer/mortar issue.  I believe, though, that one of the things being looked at as part of the second question is whether other arms should reside in the battalion or be attached.  

We are straying into the pioneer thread, but we do have engineer field troops supporting the companies when they conduct attacks. One thing, though, that should be considered is that whatever BG construct we come up for the future will be working for some higher tactical level HQ.  That higher level tactical HQ will, no doubt, attach and detach things to suit their estimate of the situation.  All that to say that just because an engineer squadron is part of a BG that does not mean that they will always be available.


----------



## SeanNewman

Understood, thank you.

What I was trying to get a grasp of was whether or not it was a command relationship or a fundamental OrBat change. (like having a weapons det in a platoon).

If it is still just a command relationship that can be taken at any time, then yes the Infantry Pioneer side gets more oomph behind their argument.  If the commander was always guaranteed Engr assets they wouldn't, and I'm actually surprised the new concept isn't going in that direction.

Heck, in WW2, Germany had some units that employed integrated platoon combat teams.  In those units a platoon commander would have his platoon driving around in trucks, a tank shadowing them, and one of the trucks would be towing an artillery piece.  The heavy assets could still be grouped at tactical levels to establish concentration of force if required, but as per the OrBat they were little teams.


----------



## McG

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Regarding the engineers, although they still have a parent Regiment here in Gagetown from whom they take their day to day orders, that Sqn is the one who works with us in the field.  As a result, for example, my Recce Tps/Pls work with the same Eng Recce Dets when we go to the field, and the companies work with the same guys from the field troops.


I am not sure that it is irony, but this element of the Optimal Battle Group experiment actually validates the principles of the Affiliated Battle Group structure and method of FG.


----------



## McG

There is a strong argument for keeping with the traditional affiliated battle groups as opposed adopting optimal battle groups in the newest Army Journal: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_2/CAJ_vol13.2_37_e.pdf


----------



## Old Sweat

Good post, MCG. The author was the BC with TF 1-07, besides having an in with the boss man on this site.


----------



## GnyHwy

I believe the above pdf link is right on the mark.  So on the mark with all of us anti-optimized battle group persons that I would think he cut, pasted and used Microsoft Word thesaurus to fancy it up.  

2 simple reasons why it can't and shouldn't be done.

1. Assets (particularly longer range assets) need to be shifted to the main effort.  If 2 BGs deploy only one will be the main effort.  If a Bde deploys, one BG will always be in reserve.  Do they need their assets? No, their guns, armoured recce, ISR and maybe tanks will be shifted to the main effort.

2. No one can predict what our future enemy will look like.  If you can, you are wasting your time on this site.  Go tell the right people and make yourself a ton of cash.


----------



## McG

If the Army chooses to stick with the traditional affiliated BG approach, then 1 CMBG should be consolidated with the Shilo units moving to join the rest of the brigade.  This would allow greater interaction between battalions and affiliated sub-units of all other arms.

For its role in supporting CTC, 2 RCR should remain in Gagetown as a both manoeuvre arm pseudo-OBG.


----------



## Kirkhill

GnyHwy:

You're successfully reiterating the argument for forming the Machine Gun Corps ca 1916. 

 The Germans were considered technologically advanced compared to the Brits because of their machine guns.  But the Germans only had six guns to the Regimental Brigade while the Brits had eight.  However because the Brit guns were parcelled out 2 to the Battalion and the Brigade only put 2 Battalions up there were only 4 guns on line and they were independently sited by the Battalion officers.  The other 4 guns were in the rear with the 2 Battalions in reserve and thus not contributing to the effort.

But - at the risk of creating a bridging firestorm here, that argument also applies to the brigading of other assets, such as mortars.  

If brigading makes sense for Machine Guns, and is ultimately the rationale for Affiliated Battle Group, then why doesn't it make sense to Brigade the Mortars?

Question: would it not give gunners a different appreciation of the requirements of the infantry if they were invited to pick up the mortars and walk?  And yes I do understand the need for lots of ammo but 2x 81mm TABbed into Goose Green and 1000 rounds seemed to have been a welcome addition.


----------



## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> If the Army chooses to stick with the traditional affiliated BG approach, then 1 CMBG should be consolidated with the Shilo units moving to join the rest of the brigade.  This would allow greater interaction between battalions and affiliated sub-units of all other arms.
> 
> For its role in supporting CTC, 2 RCR should remain in Gagetown as a both manoeuvre arm pseudo-OBG.



Perhaps a good idea, but I am not sure that that is really necessary.  4 CMBG operated out of two Bases in Europe, Baden and Lahr, as well as having a Tank Sqn, Eng Sqn and Inf Bn in Gagetown.  Distance did not affect interoperability between the Arms as much as you make it sound.  Time is a different matter.  It took time for the Gagetown troops and the numerous other augmentees from across the nation to fly over and deploy in Europe.    

The Two Inf Bns, one in Baden and one in Lahr were supported by a tank Sqn, Engr troops and Arty FOOs, all from Lahr.  The Gagetown troops had the opportunity to work together, both in Canada and in Europe.  When the Bde deployed, the same groupings were maintained, where familiar faces were the norm.  Why this can not be done today in our current Home Stations is the question to be asked.   I am sure the infrastructure in Edmonton does not exist to move in two or three more units.  Nor do I think another two thousand troops making the move to an area with higher costs of living will be too enthralled with the idea.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

I largely agree with what George is saying.  Despite being in close geographic proximity, outside of Brigade level Ex's (when is the last time we ran a full on BTE... 2004-6?) where units garrisoned in Edmonton would be operating out of Suffield, Wainwright, or Shilo in a field environment, what'd be the benefit to having the units on the same garrison?  I see alot of costs involved in shutting down Shilo and building new infrastructure in Edmonton, and little benefit.


----------



## Mountie

To play devil's advocate, here is a pro-OBG article.  I disagree with the composition of the battle groups in question.  I think its pretty clear that three battle groups per brigade is all that can be formed regardless of whether they are OBG's or ABG's.  But the principle of the argument is well explained.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA509125

I would agree that 2 PPCLI and 2 RCR pretty much need to be located with the rest of the CMBG if they ABG concept is to work.   Isn't the whole idea of both the OBG and the ABG is to have the battle groups working together in garrison and training together on a regular basis so they can for a more cohesive battle group in a shorter time?


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I am sure the infrastructure in Edmonton does not exist to move in two or three more units.


It is two units.  1 CMBG only has two units that are not co-located with the rest.  There is no three.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> The Gagetown troops [of 4 CMBG] had the opportunity to work together, both in Canada and in Europe.


During my time in 1 CMBG, I regularly worked/trained with the other Edm units in garrison and the field. It was no-cost and it did not cause (or increase) time away from family. With a common training area, it was very easy for my troop to be cut-over to our affiliated Bn (or the Armd Regt) in the middle of an exercise for a handful of days.  The same was true in garrison when said organizations were conducting TEWTs or CAXs.

Through that same period, the only time that I saw the guns come up to train was for a BTE and a CP crew for a TF 1-06 CPX, and the only time I recall Engrs going to Shilo was for a major base construction project.



			
				Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> I see alot of costs involved in shutting down Shilo ...


I would not shut down Shilo, but I would not keep the 1 CMBG units there either.  See the base closures thread for some ideas on what to do with the base & I beleive that providing a new home for LFWATC was suggested as another use for Shilo in another thread.


----------



## George Wallace

Mountie said:
			
		

> I would agree that 2 PPCLI and 2 RCR pretty much need to be located with the rest of the CMBG if they ABG concept is to work.   Isn't the whole idea of both the OBG and the ABG is to have the battle groups working together in garrison and training together on a regular basis so they can for a more cohesive battle group in a shorter time?



You are forgetting the other units as well.  22 Fd Sqn has changed names over the years, but it is still in Gagetown.  W Bty is still in Gagetown.  A whole Regt, 1 RCHA is in Shilo.  You are not just moving an Inf Bn or two, you are moving thousands more troops.  

2 RCR also provides support to the CTC, as do the rest of the units posted to Gagetown.  2 RCR is also an experiment and has its own integral Armour Recce Sqn.  

If you want to be cost effective, move an Engr Troop to Shilo and then you would have the core of a Cbt Team/OBG or whatever.


----------



## McG

George Wallace said:
			
		

> 22 Fd Sqn has changed names over the years, but it is still in Gagetown.


22 Fd Sqn still goes by the same name.  It is a sub-unit of 4 ESR which is a 1 Cdn Div asset and would not move even as part of a suggestion to consolidate 2 CMBG.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> W Bty is still in Gagetown ...


... as a sub-unit of the Arty School.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> You are not just moving an Inf Bn or two, you are moving thousands more troops.


No.  His suggestion is not moving "thousands more troops."  He is suggesting moving 2 PPCLI, 2 RCR and 1 RCHA.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> If you want to be cost effective, move an Engr Troop to Shilo and then you would have the core of a Cbt Team/OBG or whatever.


This might be efficient, but it would not be effective.  Such a move would rapidly see the Engr Fd Tp capabilities erode to it being just a pioneer platoon with another capbadge.  The BG would not get the value it needs from such an organization while the Tp Comd & Tp WO would not get the development they need to progress within the branch.


----------



## Infanteer

Matt_Fisher said:
			
		

> I largely agree with what George is saying.  Despite being in close geographic proximity, outside of Brigade level Ex's (when is the last time we ran a full on BTE... 2004-6?) where units garrisoned in Edmonton would be operating out of Suffield, Wainwright, or Shilo in a field environment, what'd be the benefit to having the units on the same garrison?  I see alot of costs involved in shutting down Shilo and building new infrastructure in Edmonton, and little benefit.



1 CMBG just finished a Brigade level ex.

Having the Brigade consolidated would greatly facilitate peacetime management.  Emails and VTCs only get you so far.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 1 CMBG just finished a Brigade level ex.
> 
> Having the Brigade consolidated would greatly facilitate peacetime management.  Emails and VTCs only get you so far.



... and we all know that in the modern CF it's all about ease of peacetime management, not practicing dispersed command and control on a routine basis.  Why would those skillsets be useful in modern, dispersed operations?


----------



## Infanteer

Peacetime management and battlefield command are two different things.  Brigade's don't cover 3 Canadian provinces of battlespace <edit to add, except the obvious ISAF RC(S) in 2006, which was a Brigade across 5 provinces  :-X)


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Peacetime management and battlefield command are two different things.  Brigade's don't cover 3 Canadian provinces of battlespace.



There are differences; but there are also common skillsets and practices between the two - managing time and space with subordinate units, co-ord via other than face-to-face means.  Though it's easier to do admin over a larger space with fixed comm links as opposed to relying on DND's occasionally ornery tactical communications systems.

Given the geography of Canada there will always be formations with dispersed subordinate units.  Maintaining a national presence is a reality that one can tilt at endlessly, but will remain the CF reality.  Ultimately, I think the best summation of the situation was explained to me by directing staff on a course long, long ago.  Paraphrased (and cleaned up) - "Suck it up, buttercup."


----------



## Mountie

I read an article this week (can't find it again to post the link, sorry) that indicated that the Affiliated Battle Groups were to transition into Permanent Battle Groups in five years.  Has anyone else heard of this?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

That runs counter to what I have been hearing.


----------



## Mountie

What have you been hearing?


----------



## old fart

For those interested but not aware, the DLCD - Formation and Battle Group 2021 Study Summary Report 2007-2010 has been released and is available on the DWAN.


----------



## Mountie

Can you give us a summary for those of us without access?


----------



## Infanteer

Mountie said:
			
		

> What have you been hearing?



That the concept is done for.  I don't see OBGs in the 2013 Org stuff I've been looking at.


----------



## Mountie

Please share some details then.


----------



## old fart

At this time, the report offers two options to conclude the 2 RCR BG 2021 aspects of the study. 

In short wrap things up this APS (Option 1 - Completion and Disbandment APS 11) or a gradual 'wind-down' completing the process by APS 2012 (Option 2 - Reduction and Completion APS 2012).   

Option 2 was recommended, and a final decision is awaited....One of the reasons for leaning towards option 2 is that it allows time for decisions to be made with regard to the establishment (or not) of a LEO II Sqn in Gagetown

Suffice to say, that had  CF combat operations continued in Afstan, the BG 2021 BG would have deployed - but given the nature of TF 2-12 that was not to be and therefore a key part of the study was thwarted.  That being said, a significant amount of insights have been gleaned in the realms of command, sense and the human dimension (HD) aspects manifest within  a permanently formed BG.

At any rate, various lines of investigation (Fmn and BG 2021) will continue within the Army of Tomorrow Campaign Plan....which will also draw on vast amounts of material derived from the CF's largest and most complex simulation experiment to date, namely CDX 2010.


----------



## Mountie

So what exactly does this mean?  Affiliated Battle Groups, Permanent Battle Groups, neither ???  All it talks about is winding down the experiment.  What are the conclusions?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

It means we bash on with the structures that we have. We have always mixed and matched in accordance with the estimate of the situation. 

As for CDX 10, we (C Sqn) are going to finish the last day in a couple of weeks. I hate cliff hangers...


----------



## Infanteer

Mountie said:
			
		

> So what exactly does this mean?  Affiliated Battle Groups, Permanent Battle Groups, neither ???  All it talks about is winding down the experiment.  What are the conclusions?



The Army has got enough on the go with reorg-ing the 9 Bns to potentially hold 3 different fleets and to balance the Armoured Corps between the Armoured and Recce tasks.  "Optimizing" sounds great, but our doctrine is flexible enough with Combat Teams and Battle Groups to give us the combined arms punch at the lowest of levels.  That doctrine gives us far greater return on investment than solidifying structures that are not guaranteed to be required for operations.


----------



## GnyHwy

As I have said before, the OBG is a pipe dream of someone who thinks they can predict our enemy of the future.  Their vision and insistence on it's potential for success has made them ignore all of the logistical and training nightmares it would cause.

The ABG is somewhat of a myth also.  Has anyone ever seen a subunit at full strength?  To say that we could match all the CS1s and 2s accordingly is farfetched.  Augmenting from 1 CS to another to produce an effective subunit is the only real solution. 
  



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> It means we bash on with the structures that we have. We have always mixed and matched in accordance with the estimate of the situation.





			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> That doctrine gives us far greater return on investment than solidifying structures that are not guaranteed to be required for operations.



What they said.

Interestingly enough, we already have  what I would call an optimized Bde, with an existing CoC and capable of producing many combinations of BGs, perhaps even 2 if we stretch the numbers.


----------



## Mountie

I found the paper I read that suggested the ABG's would become permanent in 5 years.  It was a 2007 JADEX paper written at the very start of the OBG experiment.  My apologies.  I didn't realize the date on it at first.


----------



## Haligonian

With the decision now being officially made for C sqn of the RCD's to be re-rolled to Tanks and being detached from 2 RCR the OBG seems to be dead for all intents and purposes.


----------



## vonGarvin

So....C Sqn RCD will be co-located in Gagetown?  Along with 2 RCR?  

Sounds like 1989  all over again.


----------



## George Wallace

Technoviking said:
			
		

> So....C Sqn RCD will be co-located in Gagetown?  Along with 2 RCR?
> 
> Sounds like 1989  all over again.



If we go back to 1983, we can see the reincarnation of 22 Fd Sqn.  

With W Bty..........The makings of a very compentent Cbt Team.


----------

