# The CCV and the Infantry



## Kirkhill

Can I jump in and ask why we couldn't create composite MBT/CCV Squadrons equivalent to the US Cavalry Troops which comprise 9 MBT (1+4+4) and 13 CCV (1+6+6) with 2 Mortar Carriers?

The US Squadron (Regiment) comprises 3 of the previous Troops (Squadrons) with an extra 14 Tank Company (Squadron) in the TOE.

3x9 + 14 + 2 = 43
3x13 = 39

To my understanding those numbers x3 are VERRRY close to the numbers of MBTs and CCVs being purchased.

If there aren't enough vehicles to go round then turn the Regiment into 2 Composite Squadrons and a Small (14) MBT Squadron.

If there are extra Blackhat numbers to fill the slots then they could either go to the Recce Squadron (TAPV/LAV-LRSS) or ride as GIBs/Panzergrenadiers in the CCVs.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> why we couldn't create composite MBT/CCV Squadrons equivalent to the US Cavalry Troops which comprise 9 MBT (1+4+4) and 13 CCV (1+6+6) with 2 Mortar Carriers?



We could, but we aren't building Cavalry units.

The 3 CCV-equipped companies will have tracked mech in Canada, but it is not necessarily what they will deploy with (I know, sounds crazy).  Those Infantry Companies need to be prepared to go armoured, mech or motorized when they are force employed on operations.

Having hybrid sub-units makes force generating "general" infantry much more difficult - although I can guarantee you that Rotos 1 through 8 of the next mission will need Rifle Companies, I can't tell you they'll need tanks or hybrid armoured combat teams.  Building hybrid sub-units and breaking them up right away doesn't sound useful.  We can build combat teams with exisiting doctrine that is ingrained right from the beginning in Gagetown.


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## Kirkhill

Put the CCVs into the RCAC and you gain more platforms for them to train on, platforms that are related to each other and which will be employed together, and the RCAC types that aren't crewing will be riding.  Thus you gain additional "infanteer" assaulters who also are in a position to learn how to operate and maintain tracked vehicles.

Leave LAVs and TAPVs with the Infantry.

Your infantry are going to have enough on their plates learning how to conduct arctic, mountain, heli and amphibious/riverine ops as well as jungle and desert ops as well as dismounted ops as well as COIN ops as well as mounted (LAV) and mounted (TAPV) ops as well as learning how to fall out of aeroplanes when and if the situation merits.

And you need Cavalry - you are a very, very, very small force.  Cavalry, especially Heavy Cavalry, is a multi-role force capable acting independently in a variety of situations as well as being able to detach a formed Combat Team to heavy up an infantry Battle Group.

Equally, although unlikely, Two MBT/CCV Regiments together with a LAV Battalion, backed by an M777 Regiment and a LRPRS Battery, would make a credible, "short term" addition to any Allied intervention.


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## Infanteer

"A multi-role force capable acting independently in a variety of situations" sounds like Infantry to me.  I don't know why you call it Cavalry.  Nor do I see the sense having the the Armoured Corps crew some of the Infantry's vehicles but not others.  Would we ask the Armoured Corps to have EMEs drive their tanks for them?  As we live and fight from our vehicles when necessary, the guy driving it should be part of the same team, not some stranger from another unit who brings the vehicle once in a while.

You list a group of environments ("desert", "jungle", "mountain" - tanks also do this), some ways to move around ("helo", "airborne", "amphibious", "mounted" and "dismounted"), and a political condition (counter-insurgency; tanks do this too).  These are all circumstantial to the core infantry task - the fact of the matter is a vehicle is a vital tool for an Infantry commander to accomplish that core task due to what it brings in terms of mobility, firepower, protection and sensors.  The fact that we can work with it or without it with little real cost is even better - that's what makes us a "multi-role force capable of acting independently in a variety of situations".


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> "A multi-role force capable acting independently in a variety of situations" sounds like Infantry to me.


 
I know it does.  It does to me as well.



> I don't know why you call it Cavalry.



Because the alternative is to call it Mounted Infantry - but I am trying to find a way to better utilize the RCAC than reducing them to drivers of armoured trucks (TAPVs) many of whom will be sans vehicules - at least according to some suggestions that I have seen.



> Nor do I see the sense having the the Armoured Corps crew some of the Infantry's vehicles but not others.



I have suggested this idea in the past.  That is not what I am suggesting this time.  What I am suggesting is that the RCAC be given responsibility for all the tracked vehicles and that it revert back to its role as "The Armoured Fist", that it be formed and maintained as a heavy strike force that is immediately available.



> Would we ask the Armoured Corps to have EMEs drive their tanks for them?



No.



> As we live and fight from our vehicles when necessary, the guy driving it should be part of the same team, not some stranger from another unit who brings the vehicle once in a while.


.

Agreed, wholely and unreservedly.

And to which I would add "Why wouldn't you want your Infantry/Armoured team to have the same level of familiarity when their vehicles are mixed up in the same patch of ground?"  Do you expect to maintain some of your 6 infantry battalions at high-readiness Armoured Co-Op battalions?  Why not use the "super-numary" (silly concept in an Army as small as the Canadian Army) RCAC troopers as Assaulters?  They enhance the ability of the RCAC Regiments to conduct some of the tasks that the Infantry undertakes.   They are gainfully employed in the family in which they wish to operate.  They are intimately tied to their vehicles and will be learning how to maintain, operate and fight their vehicles - in a dedicated fashion. 

And.... at short notice ..... a complete, formed Cavalry Combat Team can be readily detached to supply support to an Infantry Battle Group as and when necessary.



> You list a group of environments ("desert", "jungle", "mountain" - tanks also do this), some ways to move around ("helo", "airborne", "amphibious", "mounted" and "dismounted"), and a political condition (counter-insurgency; tanks do this too).



You know that I understand those differences.  But aren't some environments more convivial to some Arms than others?  

The point is that each of those environments, each of those modes, each of those tasks, carries a training bill.  That bill has to be paid somewhere sometime.   With 6 large battalions (as I have seen suggested numerous times on this site - Personally I favour 9 small ones for similar reasons to what I am arguing now) how is the Infantry going to cover all of those bases with competent forces at high readiness?  Isn't there a risk associated with the government deploying a "ready" battalion to some distant locale because half of its number completed riverine and jungle training 4 years ago?

Which risk is greater? Deploying a trained and ready, but small unit?  Or deploying a large, confident unit whose training is not up to date? 

Why not take some of the load off the Infantry Corps by allowing the Armoured Corps a wider scope of activities?
Why not increase the number of deployment options available to the government by increasing the number of ready battle groups to 12 from 9 rather than reducing them to 6?



> These are all circumstantial to the core infantry task



Agreed.



> - the fact of the matter is a vehicle is a vital tool for an Infantry commander to accomplish that core task due to what it brings in terms of mobility, firepower, protection and sensors.



Does that include "Shank's Mare"?



> The fact that we can work with it *or without it  *



This would seem to suggest "Yes" to my previous.

"As we live and fight from our vehicles when necessary, the guy driving it should be part of the same team, not some stranger from another unit who brings the 
vehicle once in a while."

Doesn't the same thing apply to boat drivers, ship drivers, helicopter drivers, aeroplane drivers......?

You don't expect all of them to become infanteers, I am sure of that.  You do expect to train regularly with all of them, preferably in the full range of environments and across the full range of the conflict spectrum.  That eats into the amount of time available for the infanteer to learn his primary trade - which is conducted on foot in the face of the enemy.   

His support may be only 5 meters away in the back of a 10 tonne truck.  Equally it could be 1200 km away on some airfield or other.  Those realities are going to shape the way he/she engages the enemy - and the shape of that engagement requires planning, training and famiiiarity.



> .....with little real cost is even better .....



If it were with little real cost I could agree with you.  But I can't for the life of me see how you can escape the cost.



> - that's what makes us a "multi-role force capable of acting independently in a variety of situations".



A variety of situations.... yes.  Not every situation.

Take some of the workload off yourselves by passing it on to the RCAC and let them train for a different variety of situations.

As currently configured the Armoured Corps seems to be destined to find your enemy for you then show up with some Direct Fire Support if you need it.

The RCAC is comprised of a Regiment of Dragoons (Mounted Infantry), a Regiment of Cavalry that was raised from Mounted Policemen that served as Mounted Infantry in South Africa and a Tank Regiment formed in WW2 with Militia Cavalry roots.



In the movie "The Light Horse"  there is a scene at Beersheba where a British Cavalry commander is offended that the Charge to take the position is to be lead by the Mounted Infantry of the Light Horse (Lee Enfields and Bayonets - not a sword or lance in sight)  To paraphrase:  if there is any charging to be done the cavalry should do it.

I occasionally get the sense that in the Canadian Army there is a strong sentiment that: if there is any charging to be done the infantry should do it.

I think the mob is too small for that type of attitude and the workload has to be distributed more broadly.

My own prescription:

1 SF Regiment

3 Lt Bns (Helo with Para Capable Elements and TAPV Carriers)

6 LAV Bns with a TAPV Patrol Company

3 MBT/CCV Cavalry Regiments.

There is enough overlap there to permit units to move up and down the scale of training given enough time if the Army is engaged for a protracted period in particular environment.   Equally there is enough variety of capability there to allow the government to react to a variety of situations in and expeditious fashion AND to make interesting careers.

Just sayin'.

And PS,  I still owe you a Guiness or two.


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## ArmyRick

The plan I saw on the PPT (I think it was from D INF in Gagetown) was for 1 VP to have 2 x Coy CCV, 1 x Coy LAV III and 2 VP to be 2 x Coy LAVIII and 1 x Coy CCV.

I do not agree with the armoured taking on the CCV. How many vehicles should they have as part of their training? This includes Driver, Gunnery, Surv Op and Crew Commander). Do we end making 3 new MOSIDs? CCV Crewman, Tank Crewman and Recce Crewman?

Right now in the armoured, they have
-Leo 1 (Still some kicking around aren't there?)
-Coyote
-G-Wagon (P Res)
-MRAP

25 years ago, it was simply Leo1, Cougar and Lynx.

I think keeping CCV in the infantry units tasked to do them will work. Note in those battalions, pers will have oppurtunity to rotate between CCV and LAVIII. I am guessing by keeping CCV co-located with MBT in 1 CMBG will allow for better Combat team trg oppurtunities.


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## ArmyRick

Also keep in mind, for employing the CCV will depend on what vehicle we get (It calls for a highly mobile vehicle with a 25mm or 30mm 0r 35mm gun). 

Lets say we get the ASCOD with 30mm Marder canon, its employment would ideally be with MBT. Its basically taking the principles of using the LAVIII but now you have a more armoured, bigger gun, slower but can move better in crappier terrain.

The real trg that will get more specific will be in driver, gunnery and crew commander trg.

Comparing Boats, Airplanes and helicopters to CCV and LAVIII (as to means of support from another unit) is VERY different. Boats, planes and helicopters are very limited, have other missions to support and the crew do NOT fight from them or with them.

The LAVIII and eventually the CCV, the crews will be living out of these, they are dedicated to their sect/platoons. They fight with crews on board or alongside when dismounted. Their sighting systems work as STANO when operating out hide/harbour or pulling OP.

Yes, the infantry can dismount and fight away from these vehicles like they do with helos and boats. However thats only when the situation dictates and the mission analysis demands it as the best COA most likely to succeed.

Please, please do not compare Apples and Oranges.


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## Franko

Last time I checked, Armour crewman was that...a crewman. Able to fight the (non-descriptive) armour vehicle under all conditions.

Who cares if the Armour Corps gets the CCV as long as the Infantry and Armour units work together on a regular basis. At one time we did. We knew how to work with each other and how each entity complimented each other. 

Now it's like a couple of kids. One getting a new piece of kit to ride around in but wants to shoot the thing too. Anyone remember the M113? It was a means for the infantry to get closer with and destroy the enemy and nothing more. The .50 cal was usable in the intimate support role. Now the LAVIII is doing the same role with a more accurate gun. When it was coming in there were cries of "The Infantry want to crew them with our guys because of....yadda yadda"

Now this CCV. It's a bigger gun and able to take out bigger targets like light tanks and bunkers, reminds me of the firing capabilities of a Cougar. Don't remember too many Infanteers wanting to get in that thing.

Next thing you'll hear is "We want to crew the tanks too because we can put guys on the back deck".

/rant


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## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The 3 CCV-equipped companies will have tracked mech in Canada, but it is not necessarily what they will deploy with (I know, sounds crazy).  Those Infantry Companies need to be prepared to go armoured, mech or motorized when they are force employed on operations.



The platform has not been chosen yet - it may be wheeled.  As to employment, dollars to donuts we end up with a composite BG with a LAV Coy, TAPV Coy, and CCV Coy...


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## dapaterson

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> The platform has not been chosen yet - it may be wheeled.  As to employment, dollars to donuts we end up with a composite BG with a LAV Coy, TAPV Coy, and CCV Coy...



And, due to the need to support so many dissimilar vehicle types, an integral maintenance company and an integral spare parts company.


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## PPCLI Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And, due to the need to support so many dissimilar vehicle types, an integral maintenance company and an integral spare parts company.



Not for CCV - apparently maint and SPSS will all be delivered by the supplier.  Besides, the mix is not not all that different from LAV, RG / COUGAR and TLAV now.


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## REDinstaller

Good luck with maint and spares then. The best support is delivered when you need it and where you want it. CCV maint contracts won't come repair a veh out at Post Office. You'll have to get it back into the hardstand in Wainwright.


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## Fishbone Jones

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not for CCV - apparently maint and SPSS will all be delivered by the supplier.  Besides, the mix is not not all that different from LAV, RG / COUGAR and TLAV now.



The supplier is going into the field to do first & second line maint? Excuse me if I seem somewhat skeptical of the idea. You used to be in LFCA when we had to leave crews stranded on the Hogs Back because CBO wouldn't bring an APC out til Monday. Even when we could have self recovered (which we did on many occasions anyway). They also locked up the contract so that units that had qualified APC drivers couldn't draw it for the weekend and use it for recovery.

I have no confidence in civvies that are supposed to work on Army time under Army conditions.

Full civvie maintenance contracts for any kind of AFV is like buying a pig in a polk.



_edit - spelling_


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## McG

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> As for CCV, if it does turn out to be something like the CV9030 then it should go to the Armoured Corps if we want it used to its full advantage.


If the platform itself can cause so much confusion between the existing lines, perhaps 





			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> As for CCV, if it does turn out to be something like the CV9030 then it should go to the Armoured Corps if we want it used to its full advantage.


If the platform itself can cause so much confusion between the existing lines, perhaps this is indication that we could/should rethink the idea of a homogeneous manoeuvre branch and analogous manoeuvre regiments and force structures.


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## TangoTwoBravo

MCG said:
			
		

> If the platform itself can cause so much confusion between the existing lines, perhaps If the platform itself can cause so much confusion between the existing lines, perhaps this is indication that we could/should rethink the idea of a homogeneous manoeuvre branch and analogous manoeuvre regiments and force structures.



If by rethink you mean that we should resolve to bury that idea.


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## Kirkhill

I agree Tango2Bravo.

But perhaps not in the way you might think.

I adhere to the notion that the role of the infantry was to occupy and hold ground: an essentially static role.
The role of the cavalry was essentially a manoeuver role.

These days, especially in the Canadian Army, both Infantry and Cavalry (as embodied in the RCAC) are essentially manoeuver forces.  There is a very limited ability to hold ground for an extended period.

The RCIC, equipped with LAVs, has in my view become Rangers/Mounted Infantry/Mounted Rifles/Light Dragoons/Light Cavalry.  The RCAC has had much of its "Cavalry" role usurped by the "Infantry".   The RCAC now seems to me to have been relegated to supplying recce forces and Direct Fire Support to the Infantry.  I believe they could be better utilized as Heavy Dragoons, forming Heavy Combat Teams of Leos and a Puma/CV90 type CCV.

Perhaps, logistically, it would also make sense to split Armoured Engineers from the Field Engineer structure and incorporate them into the "Heavy Dragoons" as as a permanent Attachment?  

Because of the range at which Gunners operate these days I don't think they need the same degree of intimacy with the formations they support.

The Engineers are operating in the face of the enemy in MBTs and TLAVs.

The Gunners, excluding the FOOs and FSCCs, generate much of their protection from the range of their guns and missiles.  The FOO vehicles, could they be supplied by the "client" organization with the FOOs riding in back?


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## TangoTwoBravo

Tanks do not just provide "direct fire support." Both infantry and armour are manoeuvre arms. They both have "battle space" where they move about and engage everything within sight/range without having to be told.

I would use the CV9030 as a recce vehicle. The infantry should be fine with a tracked vehicle with a machine gun or AGL in some kind of protected weapon station.


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## Old Sweat

Re the armour providing the FOO vehicles, that was tried in the Second World War with indifferent results. The headquarters squadron of an independent armoured brigade held six OP tanks for use by FOOs of supporting field regiments. SP regiments, on the other hand, had their own OP tanks. I don't like the idea of the armour providing the vehicles because in practice all members of a FOO party are supposed to be able to do all the jobs - driving, signalling, shooting the guns and being a FAC. In practice usually only two or three members of a six person FOO party are qualified FACs.


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## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I adhere to the notion that the role of the infantry was to occupy and hold ground: an essentially static role.
> The role of the cavalry was essentially a manoeuver role.



The role of the Infantry is to *close with* and destroy the enemy.  They don't just occupy and hold ground - they *take* it.

In order to do so, we have to be able to manoeuvre, in concert with all other elements of the combined arms team.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill, your conception of the role of the Infantry/Armour is, in my opinion, an outdated one that was finished with the Boer War.  The dichotomy of static/maneuver that you propose isn't true and I don't feel it represents anything on the modern battlefield; both the Infantry and the Armoured compose the maneuver arm; both use fire and maneuver to win battles.  They just do it in slightly different ways.  A better philosophical dividing line is probably that the infantry "arm the man" while the armour "man the arms".  For the Infantry, a vehicle is something to arm the man with.

Nobody has seriously advocated taking away Engineer or Artillery vehicles and giving them to the Armoured as well.  This is because vehicles are tools for those that employ them, and the Armoured Corps is not the "Heavy Vehicle Driving Corps".

When it comes to the CCV, a wheeled option would be completely ridiculous as we already have the LAV III.  I'm going to side with Tango2Bravo that something like a CCV would probably be best for Armoured Recce.  The requirements for an Infantry CCV are, in my opinion, an MBT hull with an RWS like this.  It offers the true protection and mobility to accompany the tanks into the teeth of the enemy while not armed with a big turret to avoid the predilection to use the thing as a tank.


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## R031button

Kirkhill seems to be trying to find a way for modern forces to emulate Napoleonic / 19th Century military designations, who really gives a crap if the Infantry current preforms roles once preformed by Cavalry? I would propose instead that it is best for one Arm to maintain one focus. The RCAC focuses on destroying the enemy through maneuver and firepower, then Infantry (to my knowledge there is no such thing as an RCIC i'm a moron) focuses on taking and holding ground / closing with and destroying the enemy. My argument against the idea of RCAC crewing APC / IFVs is simply this, what happens when the driver is killed by a mortar round in a leager or patrol base? Or breaks an ankle taking a dump in the bush? If he's a totally different trade then the rest of the guys, presumably they aren't qualified to crew the vehicle, then how do they move it? In a current mechanized battalion, it's a simple issue of the alt driver taking over, following that argument, why not maintain a spare crew force? Because then we're taking the close with and destroy specialists, that we're not training to the crew the vehicle because we want that specialization, and kicking them out of the back of the vehicle, and limiting the dismounted force of the ground. Or I suppose the CQ could have an HL filled with spare crew, hardly seems ideal though. 

Regarding the original point of "training bill," do you really think that retraining Armoured Crewmen to preform what is essentially an Infantryman (the term assaulter was used) has no training bill?

That being said, I don't see an MRAP style vehicle doing well in the Recce role, or actually any "conventional war" setting. They are by nature very tall vehicles, designed to get stand off from the ground, the side effect is that they present very large targets, and are not well equipped to take direct fire. I much prefer the idea of a CV90 in that role.


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## Kirkhill

PPCLI Guy:

I understand that the role of the "Infantry" *IS* to "close with and destroy the enemy, by day and by night, regardless of season or terrain"  (I believe I remember the phrase correctly).

I also understand that the "Infantry" is an arm of manouevre and needs to manouevre to achieve its assigned objectives.  

I was trying to suggest that Historically "Infantry" was not an arm of manoeuvre, in my opinion, and did not become so, in the modern sense until it became motorized.

The fact that dragoons were raised and cavalry adopted rifles and then incorporated dragoon regiments into the cavalry family, while the infantry learned to ride horses in South Africa and camels in Egypt suggests to me that the discussion over roles, titles and equipment has gone on a very long time.

Equally the fact that the Coldstream Guards have ridden horses, camels and Sherman Tanks suggests that titles win over roles.  The "family ties" are considerably stronger than any tactical consideration when it comes to regiments and roles.

With that in mind, and believing that the Government needs more than 6 large LAV Bns at its finger tips in order to act on the world stage,  I am proposing to enhance the Government's options by taking the RCAC and ensuring that all the RCAC members are gainfully employed riding in fighting vehicles rather than sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks - as some proposed force structures I have seen seem to suggest.  Or alternately the number of Squadrons in the RCAC is reduced.

At the same time the RCIC is bemoaning the fact it does not have enough people to do its current jobs and wants to add more..... At the same time they want to tank on the administrative and logistical burden of an addition F-vehicle.

It seems like a no-brainer to me (and there are no doubt those that will say I qualify) that IF a CCV is needed, and IF the Infantry is short of Manpower, and IF the RCAC has more people than vehicles - I stipulate that I don't know any of those assumptions to be true but your planning documents certainly seem to suggest that some some of your friends and associates believe them to be true - IF those statements are true THEN it would seem to me to be logical to assign the new vehicle to the available manpower that has the skills in place to support the new vehicles and incorporate them into deployment ready Units just as the Infantry does.

Tango2Bravo:

Point taken on the tanks.  But isn't it not true that tanks, like all other arms, are most effective when mutually supporting.

Equally isn't it also true that it takes time and training to build an effective, mutually supporting combined arms team?

Therefore, doesn't it follow that integrating arms at the lowest possible level ensures the most effective training and employment?

WRT the CCV as a Recce Force rather than an Assault Force - I see your point.  

Old Sweat:

Stipulated that this may be another one of my strange ones  ;D

Having said that isn't it fair to say that WW2 lasted 11 months for most of the Canadian Army (June 6, 1944 to May 8, 1945); that many vehicles were destroyed either by enemy action or use; that many similar vehicles of differing makes and models from a variety of manufacturers (some enemy) were in use; and above all there were a whole lot more vehicles in service?

This to my mind means that the logistical challenge of maintaining an operational fleet was vastly different in WW2 where a broken down Daimler might be replaced by repaired Chevrolet or a purloined Bren Carrier than the current challenge of maintaining a small number or vehicles in operating condition for a period of decades.

In the current environment might it not be acceptable to achieve an "indifferent" result (neither better nor worse)?


R031button:

You're not totally wrong.  I do enjoy clarity and a particular interest and peeve of mine is the way that vocabulary changes meaning over time thus making it difficult to "learn from history so that we're not all doomed" - to paraphrase.

In point of fact I accept the notion of Light Infantry fighting in Light Tanks or as Royal Marines.  Or as noted above - Guardsmen riding camels and horses.  


For me this is all about generating the largest number of effective intervention options for our Government with the available resources.

I don't believe an all LAV army is the answer.

Cheers.

PS WRT Light/Para/Helo troops

If there is a lack of manpower to effectively man 3 Hvy BGps and 6 Med BGps I would sooner that those ranks were filled first (complete with Mors, Pnr-Sprs, and DFS) then I would sacrifice man  the Lt Bns.

Additional, supernumary numbers I would assign to CSOR where they could be formed into non-traditionally sized and formed raiding squadrons in the fashion of the 1st SSF.


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## Kirkhill

R031button:

http://army.ca/inf/

FYI


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## R031button

I stand corrected, my bad.


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## Infanteer

R031 Button is correct in the administrative advantages of the infantry's vehicles belonging to them.  As a Platoon Commander, I rotated guys through positions to give them a change.  When we had one driver evac'd, I had a ready pool of spares.  When the vehicles weren't required, those crew easily transitioned into the dismounted role and provided additional bayonets.  Just as I wouldn't want some guy to bring me my C6 when I needed it, I don't need my vehicle to be loaned to me on occasion.

As for the roles of Infantry and Armour, they are both very similar.  Yes, the Infantry "close with and destroy the enemy" while the Armour "destroys the enemy through maneuver and firepower".  But the Infantry also destroys the enemy through maneuver and firepower while armoured forces do indeed close with and destroy the enemy (ever see tanks in intimate support?).  Both are maneuver arms forces and both focus on "find, fix, strike."

What differentiates between the two is, likely, the nature of the objective and the terrain on which the objective lies.  Sometimes, it will suit the Armour and sometimes it will suit the Infantry.  In either case, one supports the other in finding, fixing and striking.  There are some tasks (fighting in mountains, counter-attacks) that create situations where Armoured/Infantry forces will act on their own, but in most situations against a competent enemy, some form of combined arms fighting will be required.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I was trying to suggest that Historically "Infantry" was not an arm of manoeuvre, in my opinion, and did not become so, in the modern sense until it became motorized.



Infantry has always been an arm of maneuver.  Prior to the 19th century, maneuver was simply a matter of getting to the site of the battle and moving on after that.  The growth of armies and the motorization of battle have changed warfare (not war, though), so the concept of maneuver has changed as battle moved away from the concept of "strategy of a single point".   This is why we don't view Infantry and Armour doctrine and organization in the same context as a bunch of guys chasing Scottish hillbillies around the marches....  

As for your concern for the Armoured Corps being sat on the sidelines, your fears are unfounded.  The most heavily tasked unit throughout the Afghan mission was Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).


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## R031button

A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?

Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer:

I think we're circling again.

I accept that troops do better with equipment they know intimately and that the best way to get to know your kit is to live with it.  That is equally true for the RCAC as it is for the Gunners, Sappers and RCIC.  Accepted and agreed.

Equally we both agree that on the modern battlefield (I think we can accept agreeing to disagree on the ancients and when they became modern), on the modern battlefield both the RCIC and the RCAC use a combination or manoeuver and firepower to close with and destroy the enemy.  (A debate for another day is whether Patton's 3rd Army in 1944 and the 3rd ID in 2003 destroyed or merely disrupted their enemies).

Strangely, I find myself agreeing that the terrain and the vehicle constitute the deciding factors.

Accordingly I bring myself back to the position that a "tracked" CCV  - nod to PPCLI Guy, tracks or wheels has not yet been decided - should be operated by the RCAC.  If a "wheeled" CCV is selected then, to my mind, that becomes another RCIC vehicle.  

But is the Marginal Advantage to the Government of a wheeled CCV over the LAV III Up sufficiently great to justify PWGSC supplying the RCIC with a slightly better protected and equally mobile (tactically, operationally and strategically) vehicle? 

Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?

My preference would be that PWGSC spend its money on the tracked CCV for the RCIC, complete with logistical support.

The LAV III LRSS system would be best operated by the RCIC, which already operates LAVs, or by the Arty which is handling the FSCC, FOO, UAV, Radars, Sound Rangers and mapping the battlefield for the guns, aircraft and all other "projectiles" - commandos, infantry platoons or tank troops.


The TAPV should be acquired as an A/B Echelon vehicle as part of the LVM programme and employed as rover/liaison/LOC protection/ACP.

As for the fortuitous slap at Scots Hillbillies - you have to have worn a kilt before you're allowed to make those kind of disparaging remarks about Scots.  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

R031button said:
			
		

> A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?
> 
> Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.




WRT manpower - somewhere along the way I saw a ppt presentation describing a balanced 2013 Force, a Heavy West Force, a Heavy Split Force (A and B) and finally the decision.

All of the proposals generate 39 Combat Arms Sub-Units - 27 RCIC and 12 RCAC.  In all of those scenarios bar one the RCAC had 3 or 4 MBT Squadrons and 7 to 9 Recce Squadrons.  Those Recce Squadrons were TAPV equipped nominally but up to 5 of those Squadrons were Troops without Vehicles.

Meanwhile the Infantry was having LAVs replaced by CCVs in 3 or 4 Sub-Units.

Ultimately, apparently, the final decision decreed that the RCAC would lose 2 Sub-Units (down to 10 from 12) and that instead of the RCAC having Troopers without Vehicles the Infantry would have Lt Infantry troops with a few TAPVs as Weapons Carriers and 3 Sub-Units of troops scattered across 3 RCIC Regiments available for Parachute training - presumably if Aircraft were available.

Now while I agree it makes more sense to have Troops without Vehicles in the RCIC than it does in the RCAC, I have to say I would rather have those Lt Sub-Unit troops (9 Sub-Units in Total) reallocated to create 3 Deployable RCAC Regiments, 6 Deployable RCIC Battalions and a Full Strength CSOR Regiment.

Further to manning - an RCAC Sub-Unit (Recce) doesn't have to look like an RCIC Sub-Unit (Infantry).

Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.

14 LAVs may carry 140 RCIC types.  14 LAVs/CCVs may only carry 84 RCAC types.  In both cases both Sub-Units would make valuable and complementary contributions to the battle. Even if their capabilities overlapped their focuses would be different as would be their operating envelope.  

With respect to the last point about Number of Units vs Strength of Units.

There will never be enough resources to be able to do all things.  Everybody ends up doing what they can with what they have.  Infantry Battalions vary in size from 250 to 1250  (almost all of them have mortars and pioneers)

On the other hand the Number of Units reflects the number of teams that can train together for specific situations.  The more Units available the more situations that can be covered: the more options available to HMG to respond.

I would rather have options.  In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.


----------



## GnyHwy

I'll throw this topic way out in left field for a bit.  

From a FOO perspective, I would welcome and armoured turret Cmdr and Gnr.  With this, I would need an independent hunter killer sight and the understanding that I am IC of the vehicle.  The CF armoured troopers are uncontested in the turret.  I will be the first to admit that.  The Infantry, that can match them, are few and the rest are probably naive.  The Arty and Eng cannot match them at all with exception of very few.

As far as the Inf go, it may not be a bad idea either.  The Inf Sgt is IC of the vehicle and the turret Cmdr (MCpl/Sgt) fights the turret and answers to him.

Assuming the FOO or Sect Cmdr will dismount.  If we don't have a solid turret Cmdr, what are our Zulu  LAVs doing?


----------



## R031button

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.
> 
> I would rather have options.  In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.



This is where we disagree. If the CCV is being purchased to provide dismounts to support the Leo 2s, which is my understanding of why we're buying it, then having it bring only 2-4 dismounts is pointless. The amount of "weapons they can load into the back" is also pointless, who will use them? Will they clear the objective with an 84 and a C6 strapped to their respective backs?

This is where we get into the other point of this argument, if a unit or sub unit doesn't have the man power to do the job, then what is the point of having it, out side of saying "oh look we have 12 armoured sub units, look how relevant we are!" Similarly, I would rather be trained to operate in a variety of environments, rather then specifically one and be shit out of luck when I do deploy to the wrong one.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?



Track is merely about tactical mobility (usually at the expense of operational or strategic mobility).  How does pre-deciding that the vehicle must be tracked "increase the Government's options"?


----------



## vonGarvin

TANGENT
I did note that link  to the page about the Infantry.  It is titled incorrectly.  It hasn't been the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps for quite some time.  It is the correctly known as the Infantry Branch.  As well, some of the titles of the Regiments on that page are shown incorrectly.  As well, the regiments from the Supplemental Order of Battle aren't displayed.  They are:
1.The Canadian Guards
2.The Perth Regiment
3.Royal Rifles of Canada
4.The South Saskatchewan Regiment
5.The Victoria Rifles of Canada
6.The Winnipeg Grenadiers
7.The Yukon Regiment


I have the link for the reference at work.  Anyway, back to the CCV/No CCV argument.  And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else.


----------



## Infanteer

Technoviking said:
			
		

> And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else.



Good, because I rather like getting 8 hours of sleep.


----------



## R031button

I'll be sure to bring this up next time I'm in Wainwright in February.


----------



## Infanteer

You're going to be in the NWT in February, my friend....


----------



## ArmyRick

Kirkhill,

1. The RCIC really does exist anymore (unless this government makes that change as well), just the Infantry will do;
2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.

Good to go?


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> 2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.



Close enough.  But before we bring MW in here, one would have to explain how a junk theory filled with bad history and opaque concepts is relevant to modern warfare.  To date, I haven't seen Lind do it....


----------



## McG

Technoviking said:
			
		

> And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else.


... and, coming out of the Second Word War, that is what we (the Canadian Army) felt was the role of both the infantry and the armoured.  
Ref: Canadian Army Publication 10M-10-48(1629) Military Science Part I and Part II. 1948


----------



## Haligonian

Kirkhill, I'm not terribly knowledgeble on this, and perhaps I'm misunderstanding the Cavalary's role, but isn't what your proposing something different from traditional Armoured Cavalary?  I was under the impression that Cavalry forces were reconnaissance forces which had a great deal of firepower and protection in order to be able to fight for information, but they ultimately handed the fight off to larger forces so they could carry on locating the next objective. It seems to me that your proposal is slightly more ambition than 3 "heavy reconnaissance regiments" but a (in your terms) "cavalry" regiment that could be employed more flexibly than just destroying enemies via firepower and maneuver.  Would what you envisage still constitue as cavalry?


----------



## REDinstaller

Haligonian said:
			
		

> destroying enemies via firepower and maneuver.  Would what you envisage still constitue as cavalry?



Sounds like a Cbt Tm to me.


----------



## Haligonian

Tango18A said:
			
		

> Sounds like a Cbt Tm to me.



Well that is just it.  This confusion could quite possibly be due to my ignorance.  I guess another question would be, do traditional Armoured Cavalry units, such as the American 11th ACR, contain infantry or armoured troopers acting in an infantry role or dragoons to clear tranches, etc? My understanding is that the Bradley used by US Cavalry units are Cavalry variants that carry far fewer troops.  Thereby making them a cavalry fighting vehicle vice an infantry fighting vehicle.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

A traditional "Cavalry" unit in modern US parlance is essentially manned by Armor. The scouts in the M3 Bradleys are not infantrymen. They provide an integral dismounted reconnaissance capability to the scout platoons in the cavalry troops.

A Cavalry unit can execute security missions that do involve more fighting than a pure reconnaissance unit. You would leave decisive fighting, especially holding or assaulting terrain to tank/infantry units.


----------



## a_majoor

I am somewhat of a fan of Richard Simpkin, and his works suggest that airmobile formations like US Air Cavalry or Soviet era Air Assault Regiments would serve the functions of Cavalry due to their superior speed over ground formations.

CCV's serve a specialized function in accompanying tanks, and are thus part of the combined arms team (some sort of SP gun and tracked engineer vehicles wold be needed to fill out the team).


----------



## Kirkhill

“close with and destroy”
Without qualification. Unlimited.
Unlimited by time of day.  Unlimited by season. Unlimited by terrain.

CFP 165 Conduct of Land Operations 1976 as issued in 1983
Chapter 2, Section 4 – Infantry, 



> “213.  General
> The role of the infantry is to close with the enemy at short range and kill or capture him.  On some occasions the psychological effect of the presence of resolute infantry will be enough to defeat the enemy, but against a truly determined opponent it will usually be necessary to employ all weapons, and even to engage in hand-to-hand combat.
> 214. Organization and Equipment
> ..... Although all battalions are trained and equipped to operate on their feet, they may be specially categorized according to the major means of transport used to get to close quarters with the enemy. Truck-borne (motorized) or APC-borne (mechanized) battalions will be wholly mounted, the latter in APCs.  Airborne (parachutist), air-transported, and dismounted infantry battalions will possess less transport and will move primarily by air or on foot....
> 215. Characteristics and Employment
> 1. The flexibility of its organization allows infantry to be used in any size group from the battalion to the section. In major operations the battalion may be deployed as a unit, or small sub-units may be detached to guard bridges, vital points, tank laagers, engineer construction tasks or other operation which needs the close protection afforded by infantry.  The adaptability of infantry units assures them a role in all the operations of war and in other functions where disciplined men are required, such as internal security and peace-keeping operations.
> 2. The employment of infantry depends to a large extent upon the characteristics of the various types of infantry unit.  The ultimate task is to engage the enemy at close quarters and to defeat him, if necessary, by hand-to-hand combat.  This means that the infantryman must be brought to where his short-range weapons (Edit: hands?) can be effective, and it will usually demand that he dismount from his transport to fight.  APC-borne infantry....will only dismount to hold ground or to mop up.”



Dismounted Infantry, motorized, mechanized, airborne and air-transported.
Pistols, grenades, rifles, machine-guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons (to which should probably be added hands – if not knives and bayonets).
Section, Platoon, Company, Battalion operations – not to mention Combat Team, Battle Group and Brigade Group.
Administrative movements, retrograde movements, defensive operations, attack, pursuit, reconnaissance, raiding.
Airborne, airmobile, riverine, amphibious operations.
Mountain, jungle, bush, desert, arctic warfare (and let’s not forget urban)
Internal security, counter-guerilla (Co-In), peace-keeping, high intensity warfare.

And if that list isn’t enough to keep the average Battalion commander engaged in preparing a training plan there is the constant change in personnel and the need for individual training and advancement.

To that list is added the need to maintain, operate and fight a fleet of vehicles – sometimes wheels, sometimes tracks, sometimes turrets, sometimes boats.

The Canadian Army’s infantry branch seems to have an awful lot expected of it.  Especially when the operational decision matrix can mix and match any and all of the above in a multitude of combinations: 
Airmobile, riverine, internal security operations in an arctic desert city for example – dispersed sections with riot sticks.....

“close and destroy” ......

Apparently that is also the role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as McG notes, used to be the role of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.

As Technoviking points out, and as I noted at the beginning, there are no qualifiers to that statement when it comes to the infantry.  The application is therefore unlimited.  The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the Queen’s enemies: regardless of time of day; regardless of season or weather; regardless of terrain.  And by inference, from an old and not nearly well enough thumbed copy of CLO, regardless of vehicle and regardless of weapon.
  
My inference from CFP 165 is that all can be ignored or abandoned if it furthers the effort to destroy the enemy.  If the infanteer’s vehicle, if the infanteer’s rifle, hinders his ability to “close with and destroy” the enemy then the infanteer is expected to discard them and take on the competition in “hand to hand combat”.

That is an extraordinary undertaking.

Nobody expects that of the Gunners of the Ordnance.  Their weapons are considered too valuable in terms of crown treasure to just discard them.  They are too valuable in their effect to leave them unemployed.  They are too dangerous to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.  Consequently the Gunners job is to serve the guns to get full benefit out of Her Majesty’s investment and keep them from the enemy at all costs.

Under no circumstances could a gunner contemplate abandoning his gun.  Conversely the infanteer is expected to abandon everything, including his “gun”, if it will permit him to close with the enemy. (And before anyone thinks that is too extreme perhaps GAP could fill them in on Tunnel Rats).

I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs.  Nobody expects the crew of a Leo, when the enemy runs out of the range of their guns, to leave the vehicle and go haring after the bad guys on foot.

When the infantry is tasked with operating with fighting vehicles of that class it finds itself having to decide whether to pursue the enemy “a l’outrance” as the French would have it or, call it a day and decide to look after Her Majesty’s investment.

TAPV-APC-IFV-MICV-Lt Tank-Med Tank-Hvy Tank-SPATG-SPH-SPRL(ATGM, AA, LRPRS) on wheels or tracks.  We all know the differences until we try to determine where one vehicle type stops and the other starts.  

It is easily agreed that they are all surface bound vehicles.  

Perhaps it is not so easily agreed that the only difference amongst them beyond that is the nature of the projectiles carried and therefore their target sets.

Prior to World War One Admiral Fischer described the British Army as a “projectile launched by the Royal Navy”.

Equally if is possible to see the infanteer as a projectile to be launched: a smart projectile, possibly even a brilliant projectile and one that engages with other infanteers in co-ordinated swarming attacks, but still a projectile.  How he is transported to the “place of slaughter” (as the bard of the Battle of Brunanburh would have it) is immaterial.

When an infanteer is locked up in the back of a vehicle he is a wasted resource.  Just like a round of 5.56mm ball in inventory. And just like a poorly stored round his effectiveness declines with the time spent in inventory – when released from inventory it is harder to predict if the round will act as intended, misfire or cook-off.  Consequently it makes sense to keep the minimum inventory on hand and keep the majority of your stock in a controlled environment.   An infanteer not in the back of a vehicle can be resting, eating, training or conducting another operation somewhere else.  It doesn’t make sense to me to have the very small number of infanteers at Canada’s disposal tied up riding around in the back of the truck.  Infanteers and trucks should be married on an operational basis as close to the point of use as possible.  Economy of Effort and Concentration of Forces would demand it. 

Her Majesty’s current Canadian Government has engaged in a military policy that I believe can be paraphrased thusly:
1.	We will ensure we have the resources to secure our home;
2.	We will engage with the rest of the world to the best of our ability.

At home, in Canada, we have few existing external threats, limited prospects of such threats and a geographical location that limits the risk of a mass invasion.  We have the treasure to buy the technology to disrupt any large scale invasion force at sea or in the air before it arrives.  (Not to mention a really big buddy who shares our desire to limit access to our treasures).

Internationally we engage when and as we choose.  We don’t have to engage everywhere.

We are a treasure rich, manpower poor society.  Most places that need or want our assistance are manpower rich and treasure poor.  They need what our treasure can buy.  They need the technology that we can afford but they can’t.  They need our ISTAR systems, our communications, our vehicles, our guns.  Equally they need our expertise – our expertise as operators, planners and trainers.

Infantry is a manpower rich capability.  We will always be short of infantry.

Cavalry on the other hand (Armour, Rangers, MI, Lt Horse, Dragoons, what-have-you – only in Canada apparently is it impossible to conflate the historic roles of Cavalry with the modern Armoured Branch or Corps – all the rest of our ABCA cousins seem to have no difficulty with it), Cavalry on the other hand leverages the available manpower to a greater extent than infantry.

In the hands of the PPCLI 4 LAVs or CCVs will be transport for 40 infanteers.  The infanteers must be expected to abandon their vehicles when the terrain becomes unfavourable to continue their pursuit, or even just when they are training to continue the pursuit.

In the hands of the LdSH those same vehicles will be considered an effective force with as few as 12 troopers.  Similar forces are fielded successfully by the LdSH now (Coyote), Australian 2nd Cavalry Regiment (ASLAV), USMC Lt Armoured Recce Battalions (LAV25) and find gainful employment.  The LdSH Troopers, like Gunners, will have one job in life:  To serve Her Majesty’s investment; to train on it, to supply it, to maintain it, to fight it to the utmost of its capabilities and, above all, to defend it.

When fielded, when deployed, they, like the infantry would be required to “close and destroy”.  But unlike the infantry they would be expected to exploit forward only as far as their vehicles can take them.  The enemy may escape their pursuit but that is not their problem. It then becomes an infantry problem.
  
In foreign interventions, in Cabinet wars of choice, this is not an issue.  Canada’s Cavalry would have done what it could to the best of its ability.  From that point on the problem would devolve to the Host or Allied nation forces.  In those types of war, no matter what Canada does it will never be able to solve the problem on its own.  This is the situation the RCAF finds itself in while in Libya.

Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.

651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry.  Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments).  The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).

Sending expeditionary forces of this nature abroad would continue the precedent of Laurier where he despatched mounted forces to assist in the quieting of state (not so much a failed state as a potentially troublesome state).  It would also continue the tradition of Sir John A. MacDonald’s Mounted Rifles (aka the RCMP) who were sent to quiet the wide open spaces of Canada’s southern North West.

Those types of mounted troops (previously known as rangers or dragoons) were invaluable because a mounted man could see farther, travel farther, travel faster, carry more supplies and carry more weapons – consequently could react effectively to a greater variety of situations – than a man on foot.

Canada’s very small infantry corps (or branch) is too valuable to tie down to the care and maintenance and service of the mechanized vehicles.  There are too many tasks, in too many environments for which they are needed, both at home and abroad, to dissipate their numbers turning wrenches – and doing it poorly.

The infantry would be better served focusing on heliborne operations (suitable for all terrains and environments) and training for employment as platoon and combat team QRFs that would be equally valuable domestically and abroad when used in conjunction with the cavalry.  

Equip them with heli-transportable light vehicles and boats for local operations with a maximum 72 hour operational limit.  72 hours and out – or at least located in a secure, defendable facility with good, secure lines of communication.

Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.

And Mike, my apologies for the bandwidth banditry.

Cheers. 

Standing By......


----------



## GnyHwy

Not sure where you were going with that so I will just hit the two points that stood out the most for me.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs.



I don't see the comparison of an IFV to a gun.  

IFVs/BG= approx 60 IFVs, they fire a 25-40mm bullet to a max range approx. 3000m line of sight and with very little HE capability.

Guns/BG= 6 guns, firing a 155mm bullet, to a max range of 30km non line sight, with a lot of HE, precision munitions and a few other munitions.

There is no comparison.  I am not saying this just because I am a Gunner, but there are many reasons guns are HVTs and IFVs are not.



> Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.
> 
> 651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry.  Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments).  The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).



Are you suggesting the Infantry walk everywhere or will every attack involve an air assault?  Limiting to air assault would be one dimensional and if the enemy has any air defence capability, even HMGs, the attack could not happen.

I can see reasoning behind having Armd turret cmds and gnrs operating Inf CCV turret, but the Inf Sgt in the back is still overall IC and dismounts with his section.  I doubt it will ever happen, but one could make an argument for it.

As well, you forgot, the Arty will need some of those CCVs also.  

Last point for some common ground.  I am fully aware and fully agree that our Armd Corps turret gunners are top notch and the other Cbt arms units can't compare to their gunnery skills.  For the record, I would welcome and Armd Gnr in my turret anytime.


----------



## Kirkhill

Short form:

Can't do everything.  Shouldn't try.
Manpower is scarce.
Give available manpower all the tools you can afford.

On foreign service - send what you can. My suggestion send an ASLAV type Cavalry Regiment where and when you can as most diplomatic "bang" for the manpower "buck"

Don't send a manpower heavy Infantry Battalion.  Add infantry QRFs to the Cavalry force as and when necessary.

Domestically - most places the Army is needed are places the police aren't.  Generally speaking, if there are roads there are police.  The Army needs to be able to go where the police can't.

If there are roads then troops can find local National Defence transport available to assist them.  That could be MLVWs, TAPVs or even LAVs and CCVs. - Driven by the owners.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.



Yeesh, ya gotta tighten up your Mean Point of Impact my friend.

I read your post (it took me two times) and all I can offer is that I believe you have some misconceptions about a few things and a completely incorrect outlook on what a vehicle implies for the Infantry, what it costs in terms of time and resources, and what it demands of the soldiers.  I think you assume too much because the thing has a turret.  I won't fence with all 38 of your paragraphs but I will respond to any points in detail (maintenance, training time, employment, etc) if you wish to hone in on them.

I'll start with this:



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Can't do everything.  Shouldn't try.
> Manpower is scarce.
> Give available manpower all the tools you can afford.
> ....
> Domestically - most places the Army is needed are places the police aren't.  Generally speaking, if there are roads there are police.  The Army needs to be able to go where the police can't.
> 
> If there are roads then troops can find local National Defence transport available to assist them.  That could be MLVWs, TAPVs or even LAVs and CCVs. - Driven by the owners.



A vehicle is not "everything", so I don't know why you characterize it as such.  Domestically, we don't need the Army for places the police aren't, and the police can go where there are no roads.  Domestically, we need bodies and we need command and control that can handle many moving parts over a large area with bad stuff happening.  It's as simple as that, and almost any Army unit, regardless of trade, can provide those two things to some extent, although some are better than others.

In the end, if I didn't have 3 guys crewing a LAV III, they would be humping a GPMG with the section instead.  In return for losing that GPMG team, I get 2 GPMGs and a stabilized 25mm cannon.  Those guys also "hump" all of their section's marching order, taking much strain off their fellow bayonets.  They also hump 72 hours food and water and a few loads of ammo, taking more strain off the bayonets and making things for the CQ a little easier.  They also have some pretty advanced optics, saving their section mates from having to pack something like a NOD.

So, it is a pretty good trade-off for 3 guys, especially knowing I can dump the thing for a while in the rear area if I have to (with or without crew) or leave it in Canada for whatever reason and still take those 3 crew because they are trained Infantrymen.  Believe it or not, IFV crews do not spend 100% of their time dealing with a vehicle and they are still quite adept as dismounted bayonets; at least mine were.  If you go to a turretless I, it only costs you 2 guys at a loss of some firepower (not a big deal).  It is going to cost the Army those 2-3 guys anyways, but the gains in administrative ease, flexibility and cohesion by having them integral with those who would live and fight with them are, in my opinion as a commander in a mechanized infantry unit in both training and operations, far better then any of the esoteric arguments about Cavalry and manpower bills I've seen to date.

My 2 cents,

Infanteer

Edit: spelling


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> only in Canada apparently is it impossible to conflate the historic roles of Cavalry with the modern Armoured Branch or Corps – all the rest of our ABCA cousins seem to have no difficulty with it



I don't get this.  In both Britain and the United States, Infantry own their vehicles, just like us.  It is like this in most other NATO countries I've worked with.  Australia is the wild card, not us.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I don't get this.  In both Britain and the United States, Infantry own their vehicles, just like us.  It is like this in most other NATO countries I've worked with.  Australia is the wild card, not us.



Not arguing the ownership of the vehicle.  I agree that infantry can own its own vehicles.  

However, I think we can get better value for money by having the RCAC operate the vehicles we have as they operate them with fewer personnel.

The infantry we have, have many many demands placed on them.  I am not convinced that we need them locked up in LAV Bns learning how to do what the RCAC already does.

The comment about Cavalry vs Armour was the result of comments trying to parse the differences amongst Armoured Regiments, Cavalry Regiments, Armoured Recconaissance Regiments, Lt Armoured Recconaissance Regiments and Mechanized Infantry Regiments, especially when all of the above are mixed and matched in Combat Teams, Battle Gps, Bde Gps and even Divs.

I was referring to the nomenclature and titles - which as has been pointed out to me - mean SFA.  The definition is in the role.... but even there there seems to be a whole lot of the same words being used to different effect.

The Brits have their Royal Armoured Corps and Household Cavalry made up of Tank Regiments and old time Horse Cavalry Regiments all doing the same jobs they did on horseback.

The Yanks Armor Branch includes Tank Companies alongside Cavalry Squadrons in Cavalry Regiments serving alongside Tank Battalions.  Their Cavalry includes Abrams and Bradleys operating in the same Sub-Unit (9 Abrams and 13 Bradleys).  Other Cavalry operate from Strykers.  Both conduct recce and "assault" missions as well as contributing to OOTW.

The Aussies RAAC, as noted cheerfully disregard terminology but includes any unit that ever rode a horse, including the Lt Horse - also known variously as Mounted Infantry or Mounted Rifles.  The defining commonality then was the horse.  The defining commonality between then and now was the ability of the units to range far and fast.

In Canada the RCAC is very much like the RAAC and incorporates Horse Regiments of various lineages and Tank regiments.

The reason for the "Crack" was in reference to a question, earlier on in the thread, about why I chose to call a similar formation a Cavalry formation.

What is the difference in capability (or burden) between a Mech Inf Coy (CCV) reinforced by a Half-Squadron of Leos and a US Cavalry Abrams-Bradley Troop reinforced by a Platoon of dismounted infantry?

I have difficulty seeing the difference.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The infantry we have, have many many demands placed on them.  I am not convinced that we need them locked up in LAV Bns learning how to do what the RCAC already does.



They don't.  The Armoured Corps fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles.  The Infantry uses its vehicles to support all phases of its ground fight.  There is a difference.



> The Brits have their Royal Armoured Corps and Household Cavalry made up of Tank Regiments and old time Horse Cavalry Regiments all doing the same jobs they did on horseback.
> 
> The Yanks Armor Branch includes Tank Companies alongside Cavalry Squadrons in Cavalry Regiments serving alongside Tank Battalions.  Their Cavalry includes Abrams and Bradleys operating in the same Sub-Unit (9 Abrams and 13 Bradleys).  Other Cavalry operate from Strykers.  Both conduct recce and "assault" missions as well as contributing to OOTW.
> 
> The Aussies RAAC, as noted cheerfully disregard terminology but includes any unit that ever rode a horse, including the Lt Horse - also known variously as Mounted Infantry or Mounted Rifles.  The defining commonality then was the horse.  The defining commonality between then and now was the ability of the units to range far and fast.
> 
> In Canada the RCAC is very much like the RAAC and incorporates Horse Regiments of various lineages and Tank regiments.



Again, many inaccuracies.  

The Brits have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles.  Their Infantry uses its vehicles to support its ground fight.

The Americans have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles.  Their Infantry uses its vehicles to support its ground fight.

See a trend here; guys on horses and historical nomenclature have nothing to do with any of this.  Fighting in modern warfare does.  I think your attachment to the term cavalry is clouding your inability to realize this; it might prove useful to drop it from the discussion entirely.

The Aussies have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles; and yes, it also is the odd man out in that it operates APCs for the Infantry to support them in the ground fight.  But, they do not have IFVs (their Infantry operate out of M113s and Bushmasters) and they have not, in the last 100 years, partaken in any serious and sustained mechanized warfare.  I'll take that for what it's worth.



> What is the difference in capability (or burden) between a Mech Inf Coy (CCV) reinforced by a Half-Squadron of Leos and a US Cavalry Abrams-Bradley Troop reinforced by a Platoon of dismounted infantry?



The difference is that a U.S. Cavalry Troop with dismounted Infantry would have a bunch of foot-soldiers with no transport trying to keep up with a reconnaissance organization.  So you would have mechanized assets moving at the speed of marching soldiers.

Compare this to a Square Combat Team, where the infantry have the ability to keep up with the tanks and yet is still self-sufficient and mobile when the Armd Sqn needs to go somewhere else.


----------



## R031button

Kirkhill you realize that the joint Bradley / Abrahms units (Heavy Brigade Combat Teams) the Bradley companies are infantry right? And that the Recce units are actually using a different varient in a totally different role? The assault is done by Battalions operating two companies each of tanks and mechanized infantry... almost like a big square formation... Further more the Australians maintain 2 APC squadrons, both assigned to light brigades, I can only assume they function as a temporary battle field taxi, and are not expected to fight with the infantry they carry (keep in mind the Bushmaster is designated and "infantry mobility vehicle" not a proper fighting vehicle).


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> What is the difference in capability (or burden) between a Mech Inf Coy (CCV) reinforced by a Half-Squadron of Leos and a US Cavalry Abrams-Bradley Troop reinforced by a Platoon of dismounted infantry?
> 
> I have difficulty seeing the difference.



The US Heavy Cavalry Troop I trained for had M1s and M3s had tanks combined with scouts. Those M3s were carrying scouts - not infantrymen. Those scouts were a subset of the Armor branch. While a dismounted scout might look like an infantryman (although women naturally find the scouts more irresistable), they have different roles and associated training. The only infantrymen in the Cavalry Troop were manning the two mortars.


----------



## ArmyRick

Kirkhill,

This really is not a slam but I think your arguing something with those that have far more experience than yourself.

CDN Army Armour= Tanks, Coyotes (soon to be TAPV), G-wagons. 

US Combined Armoured Battalions=2 Coys Tanks + 2 Coys Bradley Infantry
---M2 Bradley 3 crew + 6 bayonets
---M3 Bradley 3 crew + 2 eye balls/TOW loaders

US Cavalry = Scouts (M3 Bradley) and Tanks combined

Brit Armour has Challenger Tanks or Scimitar Recce vehicles and one regiment is tasked as CRBN. The household cavalry do a "ceremonial Tasks" as well on horses

Austrlian armour has a Tank Regiment of MBT, 2 regiments of cavalry (ASLAVs) with a combination of aussied Coyote and Bisons. The Dismounts in these units are for little more than scout and security work. They are not intended to conduct major assaults.

Forget the historical roles of what armoured/mounted rifles/dragoons/light horses/hussars, etc, etc. Its an ARMOURED corps (branch really) that defeats the enemy through the aggressive use of battlefield mobility and fire power.

The CCV carries with it, as said, bayonets. The Infantry or the bayonets are the dismounted close combat fighting element.

Listen to what people say. No one is tied up for ever and ever to a LAVIII vehicle. Yes, Armoured Crewman are the best at gunnery in Leos, LAVs and coyotes (I do beleive they still design and come up with the training plans for all armoured vehicles? SMEs?)

However, as Infanteer said. If you ditch the LAVIII or CCV, there is 3 more grunts on the ground. If its crewed by armoured, then if a commander ditches the CCV/LAV, he DOES NOT get those 3 crewman for fighting. 

I have noticed your very creative thinker but you have to be able to aply the practical experience as well (Good in theory but doesn't always work type principle?)



Off to Starbucks for a bold, black coffee (I can't get at Timmys) and then off to practice singing YMCA... A joke for those that were on that thread...


----------



## Haligonian

Off topic: What do the M3's bring to the table in the US Cavalry Regiments? Why not just have the tanks?  Is it for the scouts they carry? Make the formation cheaper by being lighter but still survivable?  I don't think they carry a mast or anything specialized like the coyote does.


----------



## Kirkhill

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Kirkhill,
> 
> This really is not a slam but I think your arguing something with those that have far more experience than yourself.



Agreed.


----------



## Kirkhill

Before I close my role in this discussion down....

US Infantry

 - now organized in 
20 Infantry or Light Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Wpns Coy with a Light Cavalry Squadron.  Vehicles - foot or administrative    21/45 Brigade Combat Teams 

8 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (2 reroled from Cavalry and 1 found from 1 Armd Div) - 3 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Stryker Cavalry Squadron
8/45 Brigade Combat Teams
Structure basically equivalent to Infantry with ADDITIONAL resources to man carrier vehicles.  
The infanteers can dismount, leave their vehicles behind, along with their crews, and conduct operations in exactly the same manner as the other Infantry in the other 20 IBCTs.

16 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Combined Arms Battalions of 2 Bradley Coys (14/Coy - 12 with 6 Dismounts) and 2 Abrams Coys (14/Coy) and a Cavalry Squadron of 3 Troops of 6 Bradleys with 2 Dismounts.
Brigade Total of 56+ Abrams, 74+ Bradleys with 288 dismounting "rifles" and 36 dismounting "scouts".
16/45 Brigade Combat Teams
The HBCT Infantry Structure is unique and directly tied to employment with Tanks.

Of 80 infantry battalions in US service 16 of them have a unique organization optimized for operation of a turreted vehicle which is used in concert with Tanks. 

Is our LAV, our CCV, with their turrets and 6 dismounts closer in concept to an Abrams or the Stryker?

Forget all my meandering through the weeds of nomenclature.....obviously that didn't help what I was trying to say.

Try this on for size

Why not use the HBCT/Combined Arms Battalion concept as a model for an RCAC Heavy force based on Leos and CCVs?
As to the LAVs - why not supply at least some of them to the RCAC to create Light Armoured Forces - maybe even eliminate the turrets on some of the rest of the LAVs to allow Light, Regular, Standard infantry to be carried when the situation requires.

Perhaps each infantry regiment could supply a small, permanent Armoured Co-Op battalion to work with the RCAC Heavies.  The other two battalions would just be Infantry.  The RCAC could reciprocate by supplying permanent LAV Recce Squadrons to cooperate with each of the 6 Infantry Battalions.

But .... as you say.....


----------



## GnyHwy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Before I close my role in this discussion down....Is our LAV, our CCV, with their turrets and 6 dismounts closer in concept to an Abrams or the Stryker?
> 
> Why not use the HBCT/Combined Arms Battalion concept as a model for an RCAC Heavy force based on Leos and CCVs?
> As to the LAVs - why not supply at least some of them to the RCAC to create Light Armoured Forces - maybe even eliminate the turrets on some of the rest of the LAVs to allow Light, Regular, Standard infantry to be carried when the situation requires.
> 
> Perhaps each infantry regiment could supply a small, permanent Armoured Co-Op battalion to work with the RCAC Heavies.



The CCV/LAV is like a Stryker.  The Stryker has one significant thing that our current LAV and maybe future CCV will still require and that is networking. i.e. Blue and Red PA and quick exchange of orders.

As for the HBCT question.  I believe, we are already somewhat like that, or at least as close as we are likely to get.  Not as large as the US, but a fully fitted Bde would resemble that.  To take it further, I believe the decision has already been made to move all Leos to 1 CMBG.  2 CMBG is emphasizing the light role, and I would think that would leave Le Cinquiem as a medium Bde.

I love the idea of a heavy Div/Corps recce, but that is not in the cards for our small but capable army.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Is our LAV, our CCV, with their turrets and 6 dismounts closer in concept to an Abrams or the Stryker?



Is the LAV III closer to an M1A2 Main Battle Tank or a Stryker?  Is this what you are asking?


----------



## R031button

I _think_ Kirkhill is trying to say that the SBCT forces are less tied to vehicles then the infantry in a HBCT are, and that is carried to then ask if our CCV will be preforming a role closer to the Styker or Heavy force? Maybe? I'm at a loss. Are the infantry in a heavy formation some how less able to walk then other infantry?

The CCV is an AFV that's primary role is to deliver infantry onto or close to the objective and support their fight, exactly like the LAV. Across the world armies have realized that it makes the most sense to have these vehicles and dismounts permanently attached to each other. Since the CCV will deliver infantry, it should be part of an infantry battalion. But that point has been made, I'm not going to get my head around this obsession with giving the RCAC an infantry role. Doesn't make sense to me and smacks of somebody that's a bit out of touch or ignorant to how mechanized formations work.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Haligonian said:
			
		

> Off topic: What do the M3's bring to the table in the US Cavalry Regiments? Why not just have the tanks?  Is it for the scouts they carry? Make the formation cheaper by being lighter but still survivable?  I don't think they carry a mast or anything specialized like the coyote does.



The M3s are the recce vehicles. A heavy Troop has two tank platoons and two scout platoons. Each M3 has two scouts, and with a pair of vehicles you have a self-contained dismounted patrol that can check defiles, crests etc. There were several options on my Cavalry Leader's Course, but generally when conducting a zone recce or advance to contact you led with your scout platoons and followed up with your tank platoons. In a screen/guard you had your scouts forward in OPs finding the lead enemy elements and the tanks were held back and dispatched to whack the advancing enemy.

A scout platoon with six  M3s can cover more ground in a dispered manner than a tank platoon due to the dismounts.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> To take it further, I believe the decision has already been made to move all Leos to 1 CMBG.



Negative Ghostrider.


----------



## GnyHwy

Just hearsay on my part.  I would argue it though.  You need tanks in the prairies.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Just hearsay on my part.  I would argue it though.  You need tanks in the prairies.



As opposed to someplace else? Are we planning to fight in the prairies? 

There will be a tank squadron out East.


----------



## Infanteer

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I would argue it though.  You need tanks in the prairies.



I'll echo T2B - we don't position our Reg Force units in Canada on where they are likely to fight.

As for tanks, here you go:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/102346/post-1072643.html#new


----------



## Haligonian

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The M3s are the recce vehicles. A heavy Troop has two tank platoons and two scout platoons. Each M3 has two scouts, and with a pair of vehicles you have a self-contained dismounted patrol that can check defiles, crests etc. There were several options on my Cavalry Leader's Course, but generally when conducting a zone recce or advance to contact you led with your scout platoons and followed up with your tank platoons. In a screen/guard you had your scouts forward in OPs finding the lead enemy elements and the tanks were held back and dispatched to whack the advancing enemy.
> 
> A scout platoon with six  M3s can cover more ground in a dispered manner than a tank platoon due to the dismounts.



Thanks alot Tango2Bravo.  The American ACR is becoming alot more clear to me now... it's a recce organization as I thought.


----------



## Rick Goebel

GnyHwy said "The CCV/LAV is like a Stryker."

This is not quite the case.  The Stryker carries half again as many dismounts, two thirds the crew, and a much less capable weapon system.  The difference in organizations of Bradley and Stryker units in the US Army reflect this difference.  I'm pretty sure that the Canadian Army has nothing like the Stryker in the infantry.


----------



## ArmyRick

I have my way of looking at US units

Armoured Cav Regt... Poke around for enemy, find them and start a fight, maybe finish it if its not too big of an enemy.

Stryker BCT...Loads of infantry with fast wheels and some fire power, need bayonets that move fast, call these guys.

Heavy BCT...Loads of fire power, loads. moderate amount of dismounts. When they come, its the heavyweight slug fest!

Infantry BCT...Light and easy to move around by chopper. Very limited on fire power but handy for mountains and jungles.


----------



## a_majoor

Throwing it out there, a CCV equipped formation is similar in nature to the heavy infantry of ancient times. Rather than shields and breastplates, they use a heavily armoured vehicle for protection, and thus can assault prepared positions or manoeuvre under fire. A secondary role would be like the _Hammipoi_, specially trained Infantry who gripped the manes of Cavalry mounts and jogged alongside to provide close protection to the Cavalry; in modern terms the CCV equipped units are able to keep up with the tanks and accompany them in close and complex terrain.

The role of the Infantry does not change, just the way they commute to work!


----------



## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> A secondary role would be like the _Hammipoi_, specially trained Infantry who gripped the manes of Cavalry mounts and jogged alongside to provide close protection to the Cavalry;



well, if they have to hold on to manes, then I suppose giving the CCV to PPCLI battalions only makes sense, so they can grip the hair of those Strats ;D


----------



## REDinstaller

From what i've seen it should be the other way around. Although feathers are hard to hold on to.  >


----------



## ArmyRick

Don't give anybody in Ottawa a cost saving bright idea like this! Next thing you know, PT is fall in beside the Strats riding troop and double march...


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> “close and destroy” ......
> 
> Apparently that is also the role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as McG notes, used to be the role of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.
> 
> As Technoviking points out, and as I noted at the beginning, there are no qualifiers to that statement when it comes to the infantry.  The application is therefore unlimited.  The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the Queen’s enemies: regardless of time of day; regardless of season or weather; regardless of terrain.  And by inference, from an old and not nearly well enough thumbed copy of CLO, regardless of vehicle and regardless of weapon.
> 
> My inference from CFP 165 is that all can be ignored or abandoned if it furthers the effort to destroy the enemy.  If the infanteer’s vehicle, if the infanteer’s rifle, hinders his ability to “close with and destroy” the enemy then the infanteer is expected to discard them and take on the competition in “hand to hand combat”.
> 
> That is an extraordinary undertaking.


We had a fairly lengthy discussion in another thread, and seemed to come to the conclusion that an arm's role should not have such limitations/constraints, and it should also be free of caveats such as "how."



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> So it's settled then - an ideal "role" does not need to include a "how".


----------



## Kirkhill

> Role of the Artillery
> To destroy or neutralize the enemy with indirect fire as part of the all arms battle.
> 
> Role of Armour
> To defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility.
> 
> Role of the Infantry
> To close with and destroy the enemy.



MCG - If you delete the "how" reference from the role statements of the above three branches you end up with essentially the same role: to destroy/defeat/neutralize the enemy.

At that point it is hard for this voice in the cheapseats to understand how the three branches are differentiated.  I know that you said earlier that you didn't want to re-open the all-arms manoeuvre branch debate but it seems to me that this discussion has ended back at that point.

If all the arms exist to eliminate the enemy,  and there is to be no allowable distinction on the basis of how that goal is accomplished then why is there any distinction at all amongst them? 

My efforts above were predicated on the notion that branches were differentiated and that while there were logical reasons for the differentiation, equally, around the edges where things get fuzzy, there will always be a degree of abitrariness.

I can understand the formation of a single manouever branch of 6 regular cap-badges, with Gunners and Engineers enroled within those regiments.   I don't think regimental politics would ever permit it but I can understand it.

Equally I can understand retention or modification of the status quo.

But to argue that the branches should remain differentiated by their roles should be undifferentiated - I'm afraid I'm clearly not following the discussion.

The existance of the branches is predicated on the "How" - their technologies, training and procedures are what define them.  The Ordnance would not exist were it not for gunpowder and the guns.  The Cavalry would not have existed were it not for their horses.  The Tanks are their technology incarnate.

How do you separate the Branches from the "How"?

Or is this just another armless suggestion? ;D




As an aside: apparently the Arty, perhaps because of their gentlemanly upbringing, are much nicer than the Infantry and can accept merely neutralizing the enemy as an alternative to destroying them; the Armour will apparently accept the enemy's surrender - it being enough that they are defeated; only the Infantry is mean, nasty and brutish enough to demand the utter destruction of the enemy.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> MCG - If you delete the "how" reference from the role statements of the above three branches you end up with essentially the same role: to destroy/defeat/neutralize the enemy.
> 
> At that point it is hard for this voice in the cheapseats to understand how the three branches are differentiated.


If you go back to the source thread of the role discussion, then you will note that the published role of artillery discusses assisting in or contributing to the defeat/destruction of the enemy.  As such, the Artillery is a supporting killer and the role is distinct from the Armoured and Infantry.

Therefore, if you remove the "how," only the manoeuvre arms (or basic arms if you want to take a historical label) have that common role of the intimate destruction of the enemy.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> If you go back to the source thread of the role discussion, then you will note that the published role of artillery discusses assisting in or contributing to the defeat/destruction of the enemy.  As such, the Artillery is a supporting killer and the role is distinct from the Armoured and Infantry.
> 
> Therefore, if you remove the "how," only the manoeuvre arms (or basic arms if you want to take a historical label) have that common role of the intimate destruction of the enemy.



Seen and thanks.

So the discussion revolves solely around the 6 capbadges of the Regular Force Infantry and Armour Branches/Corps/Arms.




> ARTILLERY•FIELD ARTILLERY - Role. Field artillery contributes to the defeat of the enemy by indirect fire
> •AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY - Role. Air defence artillery prevents enemy aircraft from interfering with land operations.
> 
> ARMOUR•TANKS - Role. The tank defeats the enemy by the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility.
> •ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE - Role. Armoured reconnaissance obtains and relays timely information about the enemy and the ground, and contributes to battlefield security.
> •TANK DESTROYERS - Role. Tank destroyers (TDs) destroy enemy armour.
> 
> INFANTRY•INFANTRY - Role. Infantry closes with and destroys the enemy.
> •LONG RANGE ANTI-ARMOUR WEAPONS - Role. The long range anti-armour weapon (LRAAW) destroys enemy armour.
> 
> ENGINEERS•ENGINEERS - Role. Engineers assist the land force to live, move and fight on the battlefield and work to deny the same to the enemy. Engineers may also be employed as infantry when required.




But if you take a look at that list it seems to me to be curiously imbalanced.

Why are Long Range Anti Armour and Tank Destroyers listed separately and why they both not in the Artillery?  Given that we no longer have TDs in any case and the Tanks do their own destruction of the enemy armour.....But don't Tanks benefit from being accompanied by LRAAW's as much as the Infantry?  Or are LRAAWs carriage mounted or man-packed?  Did that have an influence on why they were assigned to the Infantry?

Why does only the Armour Branch/Corps/Arm list the Recce as a separate clearly defined element?   Isn't there an Infantry Recce element as well?  Should it be equally categorized with the Armoured Recce?  How about Aerial Recce (Heli, Fixed, Unmanned - Large, Medium, Small, Petite)?


From here that list looks like many of those lists derived from self-actualization that I have been forced to sit through over the years where employees are encouraged to describe their jobs, how they fit in the company and what their vision is for the company.

In most of those companies, however, someone comes along and massages the list so that overlaps and redundancies are eliminated and clarity prevails.....

And things aren't helped by Wavell's comment (Thanks D&B):



> ....the art of the infantryman is less stereotyped and far harder to acquire (edit: and define) than that of any other arm...



If you can't clearly define the role of the key piece of the puzzle in your programme how can you determine how the rest of the pieces will fit?

Otherwise you end up with the roles being:

Infantry - does everything

Other Arms - do part of everything else.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And things aren't helped by Wavell's comment



For background, the full article: In Praise of Infantry


----------



## Franko

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Why are Long Range Anti Armour and Tank Destroyers listed separately and why they both not in the Artillery?  Given that we no longer have TDs in any case and the Tanks do their own destruction of the enemy armour.....But don't Tanks benefit from being accompanied by LRAAW's as much as the Infantry?  Or are LRAAWs carriage mounted or man-packed?  Did that have an influence on why they were assigned to the Infantry?
> 
> Why does only the Armour Branch/Corps/Arm list the Recce as a separate clearly defined element?   Isn't there an Infantry Recce element as well?  Should it be equally categorized with the Armoured Recce?  How about Aerial Recce (Heli, Fixed, Unmanned - Large, Medium, Small, Petite)?



Tanks can hit as far if not further than most anti armour these days. Anti armour is to fill in the gaps when the tanks are spread thin.

As for Armour Recce; it's a Brigade asset, not combat team or Battle Group. It can do the job of Infantry Recce (short to medium scope) but concentrates it's efforts in supporting the Brigade in the mounted role (medium to long) for extended periods of time without resupply.

Regards


----------



## Kirkhill

Excerpts from a 1999 book on Infantry by Daniel Bolger.  
To further the discussion.

The author:
LTG Daniel P. Bolger
DCOS G3/5/7 US Army
Commands:
Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk
1 Cavalry Div (Unit of Action Generator – Cavalry Model)
2 Brigade 2nd Infantry Div  (Stryker Brigade Combat Team)
1-327th Infanty Battalion, 101st Airborne Div (Air Assault)
Platoon Leader & Rifle Coy Commander 24th Infantry Div (Bradley)

“Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in Battle”: Presidio Press, 1999 – written while in the rank of Colonel.

Chapter 3: Hell on Wheels

“Only a neophyte would mistake an M-113 for a genuine tank.  Not so the Bradley; it features an impressive turret complete with a 25mm Bushmaster autocannon, TOW anti-tank missile launchers, a coaxial light machine gun, and a wonderful thermal imaging sight – all served by a three-man crew as is the light tank it resembled.  True the Bradley had room in the back for seven dismounts, but the more you considered this wonderful weapon, the more the 11M10s seemed like afterthoughts compared to those powerful turret weapons.  After all, dropping the rear ramp slab just slowed down the whole operation.....”

“FM7-7J....”The Infantryman remains mounted unless the enemy must be cleared from restrictive terrain, or unless forced to dismount by enemy resistance.””

“.... In today’s Mech battalions.....Most Bradleys do not carry a full house (of dismounted infantry).  Bu design, the four Brads in a platoon have room for at least 28 foot troops.  Instead the Army chooses to authorize only 18 organized into two 9-man rifle squads.  That yields a maximum of only 54 riflemen per company; the other 58 men in the outfit run the Bradley’s....and...that was before deducting any combat casualties, sentries, truck guards, relief drivers, and command post augmentees, not to mention sick, lame, lazy or the like.”

“Battalions training at the Fort Irwin National Training Center routinely report plenty of Bradleys but low dismount strengths.”
Bolger’s note 62. “Interview with Lt. Col. John Antal, USA, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 27 January 1998.  Antal noted that in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1992, battalions routinely borrowed dismounts from other mech battalions to fill their Bradleys when en route to a rotation at the National Training Centre (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. The division commanding general put a stop to this practice, with the result that Bradleys averaged three or fewer riflemen on a 1992 NTC rotation.  (Kirkhill interpolation: a Cavalry Bradley M3A2 dismounts 2 “scouts” vice the 3 “riflemen” described here).  Current reports show that this has not improved.  Most Bradley rifle platoons bring 50 percent or less (Kirkhiill interpolation: 9 of 18  in 4 vehicles with 7 seats each = 3 in each section vehicle with the PL vehicle for him, his 2ic, radop, his MFC and his radop) ....”

“The Army’s tactical manning guidelines lead commanders this way, because doctrine rightly encourages them to assign their strongest weapons first. When commanders get only some of what they need, the Brads get first dibs.  Dismounts make do with the leftovers.

“To add to this trend the Infantry Center’s decision to separate the enlisted force into 11M mech infantry and 11B light infantry (including airborne, air assault and Ranger) has created an unfortunate side effect.  Until the mid-1980s, NCOs routinely transferred from mech to light.  The airborne guys brought in foot skills; the mounted folks taught combined-arms tank ops.  Pre-Bradley M-113 mechanized units knew how to fight on the ground.  In an under-gunned, thinly protected M-113, trying to do it any other way got very risky very fast.

“But those days are over.  The force has divided. The 11Bs have gone to Ranger school and out on patrols and night infiltration.  The 11Ms opt for master gunner courses and live-fire battle run ranges.  Although mech leaders acknowledge a need for dismounts with the “full skills and toughness of light infantry,” that’s one bunch of jobs too many for mechanized soldiers fully committed to learning the ins and outs of a complex, capable armoured fighting vehicle.  The 11M specialty naturally puts a premium on the highly challenging Bradley turret skills, running and gunning, not fighting on foot.  Rank as an 11M is made by learning the hull and engine, then the turret.....

“The 11B-11M enlisted separation and the latter’s emphasis on the fighting vehicle, not the fighting men, leads to disturbing consequences if not checked by a determined chain of command.  In some U.S. Army mech battalions, riflemen come from the newbies, the mechanically inept, and the unwanted. Thus the Bradley infantryman – already a minority in his own battalion – can become a disadvantaged minority at that.”

“Of course, it is one thing to authorize slots.  Its another to fill them.  In the Gulf War (1) ...(mech battalions) ....enjoyed their full complement of 11M10 riflemen..... To get.... riflemen required extraordinary measures across the force, including activation of the Individual Ready Reserve, stripping nondeploying mechanized battalions, and cannibalizing light infantry battalions too.”

Bolger note 61. “.....Light Infantry battalions from the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and 25th Infantry Division (Light) sent a total of twenty-seven light infantry squads, a battalion equivalent. Nondeploying U.S. Army units in Europe shipped out twenty-seven Bradley platoon equivalents. Some of these filler dismounts proved unusual.  Dan Stempniak received a combat engineer as a rifleman......”


----------



## ArmyRick

Thats the US. If you ever served in a battalion equipped with LAVs, we take a much different mind set than the yanks to training on LAVIII crews and career progression in and out of the LAV. We are too small an army to treat our grunts like nothing but armoured crewman.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Thats the US. If you ever served in a battalion equipped with LAVs, we take a much different mind set than the yanks to training on LAVIII crews and career progression in and out of the LAV.* We are too small an army to treat our grunts like nothing but armoured crewman.*



I'm not sure if that's a kick in the nuts or not? 8)


----------



## MikeL

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> “To add to this trend the Infantry Center’s decision to separate the enlisted force into 11M mech infantry and 11B light infantry (including airborne, air assault and Ranger) has created an unfortunate side effect.  Until the mid-1980s, NCOs routinely transferred from mech to light.  The airborne guys brought in foot skills; the mounted folks taught combined-arms tank ops.  Pre-Bradley M-113 mechanized units knew how to fight on the ground.  In an under-gunned, thinly protected M-113, trying to do it any other way got very risky very fast.
> 
> “But those days are over.  The force has divided. The 11Bs have gone to Ranger school and out on patrols and night infiltration.  The 11Ms opt for master gunner courses and live-fire battle run ranges.  Although mech leaders acknowledge a need for dismounts with the “full skills and toughness of light infantry,” that’s one bunch of jobs too many for mechanized soldiers fully committed to learning the ins and outs of a complex, capable armoured fighting vehicle.  The 11M specialty naturally puts a premium on the highly challenging Bradley turret skills, running and gunning, not fighting on foot.  Rank as an 11M is made by learning the hull and engine, then the turret.....
> 
> “The 11B-11M enlisted separation and the latter’s emphasis on the fighting vehicle, not the fighting men, leads to disturbing consequences if not checked by a determined chain of command.  In some U.S. Army mech battalions, riflemen come from the newbies, the mechanically inept, and the unwanted. Thus the Bradley infantryman – already a minority in his own battalion – can become a disadvantaged minority at that.”



Just an update to that since you are using an older text.  The MOS 11M(Mech Inf) is no more, all Infantry pers are either 11C(Mortars), or 11B(everything else).  Not sure if the 11Z(Inf Senior Sgt) MOS still exists or not though.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I guess for me the question is , what is more important to have in the CCV?

I think mobility that equals the Leo 2 is a must.

Armour protection that at least attempts to get close to the Leo 2

The next question is: Is a mounted weapon system with FCS more important to the mission than the dismounts?

If the weapon system and attending FCS is the most important part of the equation than you can suffer fewer dismounts. if the dismounts are the most important element than you need to focus on that and dispense with all but a small MG turret. 

The networking is a bit of a red herring in my opinion, I could network a Ferret and armoured CMP truck.


----------



## a_majoor

One possible way to upend this debate is to rerole the CCV:

Give it and the associated dismounts to the Armoured Corps and task them with close protection of Armoured assets in close terrain. (This would be similar to the role of the _Happohammi_ in ancient times). The CCV is tied to the tanks anyway more or less by design since it is to fight in the same conditions and elements alongside the tanks. Manning, maintainence, training and logistics would fall on the RCAC (and yes, the dismounts would actually be an assault troop in the Squadron).

Standard model Canadian Infantry would continue to go to work in LAV's, Helicopters, ATV's, snowshoes or whatever else seemed appropriate for the mission at hand. As noted in so many threads, the logistical and maintainence bill for all the various mini fleets we have today puts an excessive burden on the various branches. Taking a 100 or so strong CCV fleet and all its associated costs from the Infantry and handing it off the the Armoured would result in some consolodation of the Infantry fleet (even if it means an increased bill for the Army, the burden would go to those who have IMO the most need for it). In the ideal world infantry battalions would receive LAV mortar carriers, LAV ATGM carriers and LAV pioneer vehicles capable of light engineering support, but that is an argument for another day.


----------



## Kirkhill

I know I'm picking at a scab here..... but I can't help myself  

Ignore as you choose.

I've found myself digging down into the current US land force structure to determine the number and distribution of combat arms sub-units (combat arms - those elements that close and destroy, but exclusive of the recce/rsta elements).

Results:

Light Infantry Rifle Coys - 288 (of which 72 (25%) will be mounted in Strykers by 2013)
Bradley Infantry Coys - 64
LAV-25 Infantry Coys (USMC) - 12
Tank Coys - 76 (including 12 USMC)

Total of 440 active companies 

1/3 of the force is Heavy (50% Heavy Infantry - 50% Tank)
2/3 of the force is Light (Plain, old-fashioned leg infantry)

The Light Force is variously transported under silk, by helicopter, by amphibian, by boat and by Stryker (25% of 2/3 = 16%)

Dividing the numbers by 10 (the usual Canadian Discount), we would end up with a force of:

27-28 Rifle Coys
8-9     LAV/CCV Coys
8-9     Tank Squadrons (14 tanks/squadron)

The Rifle Coys would require an additional lift capacity of 6-7 LAVIII-RWS (which, like the AA7s of the USMC, could also be tasked as armoured logistics vehicles when not transporting troops).

What is the current plan?

0-9 Rifle Coys?
18 LAV/CCV Coys
2-4 Tank Squadrons (14-19 Leos per squadron)

And aren't the LAV/CCV Coys cutting into the need for armoured recce because of their ability to conduct long-ranging small unit patrols?


Waiting Out.  :warstory:


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Light Infantry Rifle Coys - 288 (of which 72 (25%) will be mounted in Strykers by 2013)
> Bradley Infantry Coys - 64
> LAV-25 Infantry Coys (USMC) - 12
> Tank Coys - 76 (including 12 USMC)
> 
> Total of 440 active companies
> 
> 1/3 of the force is Heavy (50% Heavy Infantry - 50% Tank)
> 2/3 of the force is Light (Plain, old-fashioned leg infantry)


If Marines in LAV 25 are "heavy" then why are soldiers in Strykers "light"?  How many of the 288 light infantry companies are formally HMMVW based?

The Canadian "vision" sees LAV III as medium and CCV as heavy, but your model does not have a place for the medium concept.  Does your model remain valid despite this inconsistency?


----------



## Kirkhill

Of the 288 "Light" Rifle Coys, all 288 are organized to put full sections on the ground to fight.  216 have no dedicated transport of their own at the Coy level (Marines, Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Mountain) and rely on Battalion HMMWVs to bring in the heavier weapons and logistics.  72 (including 18 that have been/will be found from re-roled Armored Cavalry Regiments) dismount full Army sections of 9 men and are capable of operating as Light Units without retasking their Stryker crews - they are additional items to the TOEs of the Light role infantry.  

In other words, of the 288 light coys 216 are dedicated ground pounders but the other 72 are ground pounders with a transport section so that they can either revert to their boot roots or keep up with the heavies.

The heavies of the Army comprise 64 Abrams coys of 14 tanks which are accompanied by 64 Bradley coys of 14 ICVs.  Based on Bolger's comments above those Bradley troops are capable of meeting their NTC training objectives with as few as 3 dismounts in the back of each vehicle.......because the vehicle is the weapon and not the section.  The role of the heavies is to close and destroy - but more in the sense of disrupt than eradicate.   As demonstrated by 3ID in Iraq, the American intervention in Kuwait and Patton's runs across France armour does a great job of busting the line and disrupting the rear - but it doesn't have a great track record in eliminating the threat. (but I'm digressing again....with a purpose though).

The Marines bring another 12 Tank Coys to the fight.

The LAV-25s present a particular point of interest.

They are manned in the same fashion as the Bradleys with the emphasis being on the 3 man crew with a small 3 man dismount team.  They are utilized by the Marines in conjunction with armed HMMWVs as recce forces and as part of  QRFs because of their speed and firepower.  At various times commanders have considered them assault vehicles (perhaps because they had nothing heavier available?) and at other times recce vehicles that do best when kept at a distance from the Close Combat battle.

My own decision to include them with the heavies finally came down to the fact that they were first and foremost Fighting Vehicles and only in a secondary fashion could they be considered Infantry Carriers.  The success of a LAV operation, for the Marines, depends less upon the dismounts than the turret crew.  In my view that put them broadly into the camp of the heavies.

The Strykers are clearly transport for Infantry Sections.  They can be used by the Infantry Section to assist it in patrols in certain environments, perhaps can even be used in assaults in certain environments, but their primary role is to deliver a full section to the Area of Operations where the section, full, complete and entire, can get out and close with the enemy face to face.

Again, in my view, the LAV-25 falls between the two stools of the Infantry Carrier and the Tank Escort.  It is too light for the Heavy force (with mobility issues due to the lack of tracks if I understand the original rationale for the CCV).  It is too small to be able to dismount a full infantry section - and in any event its value does not rely on having a full section of dismounts.





> **1013G 17 DEC 1993 RIFLE COMPANY, INFANTRY BATTALION, INFANTRY....
> 
> 3.  MISSION AND TASKS.
> TO LOCATE, CLOSE WITH, AND DESTROY THE
> ENEMY BY FIRE AND MANEUVER, OR TO REPEL HIS ASSAULT BY FIRE AND
> CLOSE COMBAT.
> .....
> 
> 4.  CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION
> 
> A.  COMMAND AND CONTROL
> B.  FIREPOWER.
> IN ADDITION TO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, THE ORGANIC
> FIREPOWER OF THE RFLCO CONSISTS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS,
> LIGHT MORTARS, LIGHT ANTITANK WEAPONS, SHOULDER LAUNCHED
> MULTIPURPOSE ASSAULT WEAPONS AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS.
> *C.  MOBILITY.
> THE RFLCO IS PRIMARILY FOOT MOBILE; BUT THE
> COMPANY IS READILY TRANSPORTED BY TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES AS
> WELL AS HELICOPTERS, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS AND CRAFT, AND TACTICAL AND
> STRATEGIC AIR TRANSPORTATION.
> *



http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/To1013g.htm

The rest of the Marine TOEs can be found here  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/index.html

Edit: Having said all of that about the Marines LAVs - ultimately they only represent 12 Coys.  Regardless of whether they are counted in amongst the heavies, the lights or taken off the board completely and counted amongst the proliferation of RSTA Coys that I intentionally excluded from the discussion, the overall trend of the numbers isn't skewed significantly.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> IAnd aren't the LAV/CCV Coys cutting into the need for armoured recce because of their ability to conduct long-ranging small unit patrols?
> 
> 
> Waiting Out.  :warstory:



A LAV company may have similar equipment (in the big picture) to a Recce Sqn, but their organization and training give them very different capabilities.


----------



## Infanteer

I'm confused.  Why are we counting American companies?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ... of the 288 light coys 216 are dedicated ground pounders but the other 72 are ground pounders with a transport section so that they can either revert to their boot roots or keep up with the heavies.


While SBCT doctrine was designed to emphasis the dismounts in the vehicle, that vehicle is still integral to the section level.  Calling this organization light infantry is about as accurate referring to our pre-LAV III mechanized units (M113, Bison or AVGP) as light infantry.  If you really want to stick to a distinction by weight class, then you probably need to consider the LAV 25 infantry and Stryker infantry as a separate medium class.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm confused.  Why are we counting American companies?


I think there is an underlying assumption that CF structure (at the level of operational units) should be a 1:10 model of the US structure.  That in itself is debatable.


----------



## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> While SBCT doctrine was designed to emphasis the dismounts in the vehicle, that vehicle is still integral to the section level.  Calling this organization light infantry is about as accurate referring to our pre-LAV III mechanized units (M113, Bison or AVGP) as light infantry.  If you really want to stick to a distinction by weight class, then you probably need to consider the LAV 25 infantry and Stryker infantry as a separate medium class.



My sense of the American situation is that they have gone through a long debate that pitted Heavies against Light and discovered that they need both in varying ratios depending on the situation.  Currently they are in the process of divesting of Heavies while generating more Lights.  The Stryker force, in my opinion only, represents less of a Medium Force (based in part on its weight for deployability purposes) than it represents a Swing Force: a force that can go light if required, heavy up the lights if required, or add depth to the heavies if required.




> I think there is an underlying assumption that CF structure (at the level of operational units) should be a 1:10 model of the US structure.  That in itself is debatable.



There is no such underlying assumption.  There is a well known process call "Benchmarking" where you compare your assets/performance to those of your peers.

In this instance I was curious to see if I could fathom the utility, and the perception of the utility, of various combat arms elements by reviewing our ABCA partners and discern which balance of elements they consider appropriate to their current circumstances (financial and geo-political).

Further to that:

Her Majesty's Forces

7 Brigades - 1 Royal Marines, 5 Combined Arms, 1 Air Assault

Each contains 4 Light Role Battalions (Including Paras and Marines) with 3 Companies

7x4x3=84 Light Role Battalions

The 5 Combined Arms Brigades also incorporate an Armoured Group of 1 Tank Regiment, 2 Warrior Battalions and 1 Armoured Recce Regiment.

Those Armoured Groups represent:

5x1x3 = 15 Tank Squadrons
5x2x3 = 30 Warrior/Bulldog Companies.

Together with the Light Role Companies we find a total of 129 combat arms sub-units, exclusive of the Recce/RSTA elements.

11.6% Tanks
23.3% Armoured Infantry
65% Light Role Infantry.

In a world of reducing ability to find qualified recruits and where machines are becoming lighter, more powerful and more capable, why do our premier allies persist in devoting 50 to 65% of their combat strength to light role infantry?

And why do we pursue an alternate course?  What are we seeing that they are not?

Aussies to follow.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Not entirely convinced they see anything beyond the cost savings.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> Not entirely convinced they see anything beyond the cost savings.



Possible.

And yet, with manpower being such a major cost driver, with Air Force and Navy both reducing the amount of manpower per platform, with the US Army determining that platforms without manpower (NTC success) can fight a Colin Powell type of war, with light role infantry being the antithesis of all that....why do they persist?

In terms of bang for buck surely light role infantry is the LEAST effective use of the defense dollar.  Why not disband half of the Light forces and sinke that manpower budget into putting the remaining manpower into manning pre-existing, if roughly treated, vehicles?

I'm not seeing the dollar savings associated with a light force, at least in terms of effect.

Even with the drawdowns the ratio of light to heavy remains high.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I think light Infantry looks good cost wise on paper and for the bean counters that's all that matters. The concept of light infantry trying to hold off a full blown armoured attack on their own in open country does not occur to them.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> My sense of the American situation is that they have gone through a long debate that pitted Heavies against Light and discovered that they need both in varying ratios depending on the situation.  Currently they are in the process of divesting of Heavies while generating more Lights.  The Stryker force, in my opinion only, represents less of a Medium Force (based in part on its weight for deployability purposes) than it represents a Swing Force: a force that can go light if required, heavy up the lights if required, or add depth to the heavies if required.


It was a force designed to be heavier in responce to the US realizing how vulnerable its Airbore was on the extreem left flank in the first Gulf War.  It is a force designed to go into operations with its vehicles just like our mechanized battalions since the arrival of the M113.  Stryker battalions are not light infantry.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In a world of reducing ability to find qualified recruits and where machines are becoming lighter, more powerful and more capable, why do our premier allies persist in devoting 50 to 65% of their combat strength to light role infantry?


Because many of these infantry fill very expensive niche roles that do not mix well with armoured fighting vehicles.  There is no airborne mechanized infantry nor airmobile mechanized infantry.  Marines & mountain brigades are other niche roles.  To collectively write these all up just as "light infantry" is to distort your objective of benchmarking.  Some of these niche capabilities require a minimum critical mass in order to provide any utility worth the cost - your model needs to account for these should Canada (at x .10) require fewer companies than whatever that critical mass may be.

What does your benchmark suggest when "light" is seperated by "niche" and "plain"?

If you want to benchmark, the ABCA nation of greatest similarity for size & population would be Australia.  How do we compare there?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> 216 have no dedicated transport of their own at the Coy level (Marines, Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Mountain) and rely on Battalion HMMWVs to bring in the heavier weapons and logistics



This is inaccurate.  I've worked with both units of the 10th Mountain Division and the 82nd Airborne Division and they were "motorized" in MRAPs and MTAVs - some US Marines I know reported the same situation; in order for them to operate they had to do the same thing as our "light forces" did and take on a protected platform to maintain some mobility and protection.  As McG has stated, framing a dichotomy of them being "light" vs our LAV III mounted Infantry as "not light" is simply false.  These guys had to drive, maintain and operate from some form of armoured transport.

Also know that these guys have had to be pulled out of rough spots by our heavier armed LAV IIIs on more than one occasion; and this is against a guy with flip-flops, a cell phone and an AK.

Don't build a strawman out of the turret or number of wheels.


----------



## Kirkhill

The British Army Perspective

The British Army describes four separate infantry variants:

Light Infantry;
Air Assault Infantry;
Mechanised Infantry;
Armoured Infantry;

Reference: http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/role/default.aspx

The cited reference has this to say about the role of Light Infantry:
“Light Infantry battalions operate with minimal transport and sometimes almost entirely on foot..... The Light Role Infantry battalion is a versatile organisation that can work in support of Armoured and Mechanised manoeuvre brigades to dominate urban areas or control mountainous terrain and forests/jungle. They are employed in all major UK operations.”

The same reference says this about Air Assault Infantry:
“Air Assault Infantry are Light Infantry, specialised for the Air Assault role. They provide a hard hitting and versatile force that can be delivered by air, aviation or by land in support of Apache Attack Helicopter Regiments......”

About Mechanised Infantry this is said:
“Mechanised Infantry use the Bulldog armoured personnel carrier as a form of protected mobility to move around the battlefield. Bulldog offers protection against small arms and artillery fire and provides good tactical and cross-country mobility. However, Mechanised Infantry operate on foot in the area of the Close Battle, much like Light Role Infantry.”

All three of the above forms of infantry are described as Light Infantry or as Light Infantry with transport.
  
Of the Armoured Infantry, however, this is said:
“The Armoured Infantry are equipped with the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. The high levels of protection, firepower, mobility and sustainability enjoyed by Armoured Infantry make them well suited to providing both shock action and the endurance element of any operational force. The Warrior is armed with a 30mm Rarden Cannon, capable of engaging vehicle and dismounted targets out to 2000m. It carries a crew of 10: driver, commander, gunner and 7 riflemen.”

This is not a section with transport.  This is a vehicle with crew.  A large crew admittedly, and one that can dismount some of its members to fight on the ground but first and foremost it is a vehicle that supplies protection, firepower and mobility to provide shock action.  Those characteristics render the Armoured Infantry discrete from the other forms of infantry – all of which are described as variants of Light Infantry.  I will accept that Light Infantry could equally be rendered as Plain Infantry, Regular Infantry, Infantry or even Rifles. When situations warrant then the Light Infantry can be supplied with any of a great variety of transport including MRAPs, TAPVs and such like, often crewed independently of the Rifle Companies by an enlarged Motor Transport Platoon or by attached elements from an Armoured Battalion as in the case of 2RTR driving British infantry around in Armoured Carriers instead of driving Tanks.

More to Follow.....


----------



## Kirkhill

The US Marines Perspective

“TO 1013G Rifle Company, Infantry Battalion, Infantry Regiment, Marine Division -- Table Of Organization

3.  Mission And Tasks. 
 To locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.

Mobility.  The RFLCO (Rifle Company) is primarily foot mobile; but the company is readily transported by tracked and wheeled vehicles as well as helicopters, amphibious ships and craft, and tactical and strategic air transportation.”

The Marines are explicit.  They are riflemen, organized in Rifle Companies that can be deployed by any means of transport.  Full Stop.  They are not tied to their Landing Craft, their Amphibians or their helicopters.  Those are merely tools to get them to the fight.


More to follow......


----------



## Kirkhill

The American Army Perspective

US Army Field Manual FM7-8 1992 has this to say about the mission and role of Infantry (unadulterated and unexpurgated Infantry):

“1-1. MISSION 
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

a. Despite any technological advantages that our armed forces might have over an enemy, only close combat between ground forces gains the decision in battle. Infantry rifle forces (infantry, airborne, air assault, light, and ranger) have a key role in close combat situations.”

I would ask you to note the lack of differentiation amongst infantry, airborne, air assault, light and ranger type forces, at least at the platoon/company level of organization.  There do not appear to be separate field manuals describing separate TTPs for those types of forces at that level.

Conversely there are separate manuals for Bradley (HBCT) troops and Stryker (SBCT) troops;

US Army FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company offers this:

“The Infantry companies of the SBCT and HBCT mostly use the same doctrine, but cover more specific doctrine in their own manuals”

More to Follow .....


----------



## Kirkhill

Which brings me to FM 3-21.71 The Mechanized Infantry Rifle Platoon (Bradley Fighting Vehicle):

“Section I. MECHANIZED INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON EMPLOYMENT 
Despite any technological advantages our armed forces might have over an enemy, the only way to gain the decision in battle is by close combat between ground forces. Mechanized infantry rifle forces equipped with the Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) play the following main roles in close combat situations:
	Operate mainly at night or during other periods of natural or induced limited visibility.
	Penetrate and hold existing (natural and man-made) obstacles and difficult terrain as pivots for operational and tactical maneuver.
	Attack over approaches not feasible for armored forces.
	Seize or secure forested and built-up areas.
	Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.
	Conduct rear area operations.”

Compared to the simplicity and clarity associated with the rest of the US Infantry the Bradley Infantry employment seems to be distinctly constrained and subordinated to “those approaches not feasible for armoured forces”.

MTF.....


----------



## Kirkhill

Then there is the current point of contention:

From US Army FM 3-21.10 The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company 

“This manual addresses the doctrine of the SBCT at the company level. The SBCT infantry rifle company capitalizes on the strengths and minimizes the limitations of mechanized and light doctrine. *The light infantry ethos is the foundation of this organization * but is combined with the speed, mobility, and precision of mounted warfare. Success is achieved by integrating the complementary characteristics of each type of infantry where decisive action must occur.

1-1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

Because the fundamentals of fire and maneuver are unchanged, *the majority of the combat power of the SBCT infantry rifle company lies in its highly trained squads and platoons*. The organic vehicles in the platoons are for moving infantry to the fight swiftly and providing tactical flexibility *while tailoring the soldiers' loads through a "mobile arms room*" concept. ......

1-2. OPERATIONAL PREMISE

The SBCT was developed to address some of the changing situations the US Army currently faces. At the brigade level, there are significant changes that affect the way this unit fights. Although the *changes at brigade level do not significantly change tactics at company level and below*, they do affect the frequency with which companies, platoons and squads execute certain missions.”


*In my opinion *  this clearly represents the Stryker Brigade Rifle Company as *a Light Infantry company with transport * so that it can cover a large operating area and bring a variety of weapons to the fight.  Basically the Light Infantry Company gains a strengthened CQ capability – more transport and more storage with the carriers armed with their own defensive weapons and manned by dedicated transport personnel.

"1-7. SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON
The platoon includes the following personnel and equipment:
	Platoon headquarters, which includes platoon leader (PL), platoon sergeant (PSG), RATELO, forward observer (FO), and platoon medic (attached).
	*Four ICVs, each with driver and vehicle commander. The PL and PSG are the vehicle commanders of two of the ICVs while the platoon is mounted.*	Three 9-man squads of infantry with antitank assets (Javelin).
	One 7-man weapons squad.
The SBCT infantry platoon has one officer and 44 enlisted personnel in three elements: the platoon headquarters, the mounted element, and the infantry squads.

Note the separation of the Vehicle Section of 4 vehicles each with two crewmen, separate, discrete and different from the Pl HQ, the strong Weapons Squad and the three standard issue, general duties, full strength Rifle Squads (complete with Javelin - available because of the useful transport).

This is a Light Infantry Rifle Platoon with a large, integral weapons squad and an attached light armoured transport section.  But it is still a Light Infantry Rifle Platoon that could, can and does fight on its feet with or without the presence of its transport.

It can be deployed without its transport and fight effectively without its transport until such time as its transport arrives or it reaches ground favourable to operations with wheeled transport.

With the wheeled transport it can support the Bradley/Abrams forces in depth or on the flanks, just as heliborne or airborne Light Infantry can support them in the assault by taking the fight to the enemy’s rear.


More to follow ....


----------



## Kirkhill

The Vehicle as Section Vehicle or as Adjunct.

The working position seems to be that the LAV belongs to the section and that the crew are to be found from within the section.  The related thought is that these infantrymen, these riflemen, will easily maintain skills in both mounted and dismounted disciplines and be able to transition between them.

In my opinion that position seems to be at odds with the decisions of the British Army, the US Marines and the US Army.

All three organizations focus their Infantry, even when provided with armoured transport like Bulldogs (FV432s or M113/TLAV clones) or Strykers, on dismounted operations.  The transport adjusts to fit the organization.  The organization does not adjust to fit the vehicle.

Where the US Army and the British Army have adopted vehicles that require the organization to adjust to the transport (Bradley Mech or Warrior Armoured Infantry) they have created specialist units that have significantly different TTPs when compared with their Light Infantry brethren.

In the case of the Brits the section, including the dismounts crews the vehicle.  They, like gunners and tankers, serve the vehicle.  The focus of their lives is moving that vehicle forward so that its guns can do the killing.

The Americans, with their Bradleys, have a slightly different take.  The dismounts in the back are NOT part of the vehicles crew.  

The Bradley Platoon consists of two discrete elements carved up into 5 chunks.  There is the mounted element and the dismounted element.
The mounted element comprises two separate chunks.  Each chunk comprises 6 crewmen with two vehicles that live and work as a unit.
The dismounted element comprises 2 to 3 rifle squads, that may or may not be at full strength, that are assigned to vehicles for transport purposes in much the same way that you have to break up a 3 sections in a Gagetown course when only supplied two Deuce and a Halfs to transport them.  Or you are trying to set chalks for helicopters that won’t carry a full section.

The Dismounts are expected to debus and then find their squad leaders and form up on him.  Presumably this is better done while the enemy is not shooting at them.

US Marine LAVs are similarly organized to the extent that the vehicle crews are paired while the dismounts (1 patrol of 3 or 1 assault element of 6) are separately organized.

More to Follow ......


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## Kirkhill

Crewmen are Not Riflemen.  Riflemen are Not Crewmen.

Our allies and peers have seen fit to emphasize General Duties, Bog Standard Riflemen that can be transported any where by any means with any support and fight.  

They have de-emphasised the portion of their force that is specialized to operations associated with a specific platform.

In the US Army, even the Crewmen are discrete from Riflemen in the Bradley Platoon, Stryker Platoons and for all Rifle Platoons.  

The British Army is making a special case for their Warriors and supplying the Warrior, which can effectively be fought with a crew of 3, with a crew of 10.  They are still crewmen and not Riflemen.


Why do we feel that we can effectively do what our allies feel that they cannot effectively do?  Why do we wish to, or feel the need to, put all of our eggs in the LAV basket?  Why do we feel that we cannot separate the Rifles from the Crew and still fight effectively and, I would argue, perhaps train more effectively and deploy more efficiently and flexibly when our allies apparently feel they can?


By Way of Postscript

From some chap name of Owen writing in Infantry Magazine, Jan-Feb 2006 on Patrol Based Infantry Doctrine.

“Current fashionable obsessions with SF, and the ill-conceived promotion of certain formations as being uniquely tactically proficient, have led to what little amount of useful alternate infantry thought there is in the United Kingdom being labeled as "SF tactics" and thus suffering from all the less-than-positive understanding that brings. With the exception of some specialist roles, Special Forces are arguably a light infantry formation,”

Thus the SFSG from 1 Para being formed to conduct "Special" operations.  Special meaning operations that the Government of the Day neither confirms nor denies.  It used to be the Government limited itself to section size operations of that sort.  Now they are up to Rifle Company operations of that sort.

And as my version of 309(3), Chapter 3, Section 5, para 309 says: "The Rifle Company contains the troops who close with and destroy the enemy."

With the Americans adding that the Rifle Company (either Marine or Army) is where you find the depth and strength to "to repel ... assault by fire and   close combat." To Hold.


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## Infanteer

:boring:



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Our allies and peers have seen fit to emphasize General Duties, Bog Standard Riflemen that can be transported any where by any means with any support and fight.



Are you implying that we can't do this?

Edit to add:  Much of your statements are right outta 'er.  To imply that U.S. Stryker infantry are much different from our Infantry is disingenuous at best as they both will operate from a 20 ton, modern fighting vehicle.  To imply that Warriors are manned by sections of 10 crewman is nonsensical.  You continue to build a strawman out of a vehicle with a turret and are fixated on an erroneous belief that Canadian Infantry companies equipped with the LAV III are handicapped in everything other than trailing behind a Main Battle Tank.


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## a_majoor

I _think_ what Kirkhill is getting at is the forces which use heavier vehicles tend to become "attached" to the vehicle; it is the primary weapons system and the dismounts are there to provide close protection as well as provide the service and first line maintainence of the thing. These dismounts would therefore tend to operate and fight in a different manner than their counterparts who are not provided with a powerful mount.

The LAV III comes close to that ideal with the provision of a 25mm cannon in a stabilized turret, under the best circumstances it can provide a great deal of effective firepower directly to the dismounted section, or indirectly grouped with the other platoon vehicles under control of the LAV Sgt. Kirkill sees this as a bit of an unhappy compromise, since the LAV III cannot mount much more armour, nor move cross country very well due to the limits of its wheeled suspension, hence the LAV mounted Infantry are potentially deprived of their support when separated from the LAVs.

The soldiers he describes as "Light" are not as attached to their vehicles, helicopters, trucks or APC's mounting GPMG/HMG class weapons are a convenience, but not as critical in the actual fight (indeed, only APC's provide _any_ sort of tactical advantage during the fight, since they have some limited ability to provide fire support). Weirdly, this argument can even be extended to the Achzarit/Namer class of HAPC's, since they provide protected mobility but not a great deal of protected firepower (that is the job of the tanks).

Now Kirkhill can set me straight if I have misinterpreted the point, but that is what I see as the argument so far...


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## Infanteer

If that is indeed the case, then I still say the argument is wrong.  I don't get how one can imply that there is a categorical difference between a Canadian Infantry Platoon in a LAV III with a Delco turret and an American Infantry Platoon in a LAV III with a RWS .50 cal.  They are similarly equipped, drive the same vehicle (one just has a bigger gun) and have the same number of dudes.  They even, surprise, have the same training/maintenance requirements - yep; US Army Strykers need someone to check fluids and learn to steer them too.

I've seen guys attached to much lighter vehicles than a LAV III.  I've seen 82 Airborne guys married to Humvees.  Attachment to a vehicle/platform is a leadership issue, not an equipment one.  

This whole argument seems to rotate on a thesis that Canadian Infantry platoons and companies are somehow over-reliant on the LAV III and lack the flexibility of other nation's infantry who pilot vehicles without 25mm Delco turrets.  Nowhere in all of these silly exercises of counting companies and comparing ratios have I seen any argument or proof that Canadian Infantry soldiers cannot operate away from the LAV III or are tactically deficient due to training/maintenance requirements for such a vehicle.  I have repeatedly offered first hand proof that this is not the case, but that doesn't really seem to matter.


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## daftandbarmy

Why not leave the LAVs with the infantry to complete the normal range of tasks in all situations short of WW3, then group the CCV with their crews under the modern equivalent of the 'armoured carrier regiment', which can be called on as required for support:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Canadian_Armoured_Carrier_Regiment

And then again maybe I should just shut my dismounted infantry guy hatch and go hull down, turret down, pants down....  :camo:


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## Kirkhill

Beyond saying that Thuc is on point it is well past time for me to join D&B.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:
			
		

> .....I have repeatedly offered first hand proof that this is not the case, but that doesn't really seem to matter.



I am not discounting "first hand proof".  I don't doubt that Canadian soldiers did transition easily between LAV supported tasks and plain Infantry tasks. I don't doubt the quality of the Canadian Soldier in general or particular.

I would point out that the Canadian Soldier deployed to Afghanistan included a heavy seasoning of troops that were brought up in Light Companies,

My concern is not about the current soldier.

My concern is for the future soldier.

After 5 years, 10 years of Garrison Duty in Canada, with a change of Governments and a change in financial fortunes, will an Army of 6 LAV Battalions maintain the range of skills that the army currently possesses?

I believe that that is partly why other armies focus skill sets in different units.   I believe that the American experience with the Bradley Infantry demonstrated the skill fade in their dismounts as COs struggled to man the vehicles they had and chose to deploy all their vehicles rather than "full" vehicles.

In addition, I have no doubt that "even" Armoured Crewmen   8) can be re-trained to be adequate infantry, (and the reverse is equally true) given time, but if you want competent units, that can get best use out of their available kit, deployed in a timely fashion (not after a 1 year work up), don't you have to keep a broad range of skill sets alive at any given moment? 

Isn't a degree of specialization necessary to ensure competence or can generalists maintain adequate competence across the board?


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## ArmyRick

In the infantry, we don't look at as "full" manned vehicles. Even in a LAV equipped platoon, we look at as manning sections, weapons, vehicles. In the infantry we still think of our breakdown as section and platoons.

Kirkhill, my advice, take it for what it worth. You are arguing about how to grow apples with the apple farmer! Yes, it is one thing to put forth a theory and suggestions, quite another to insist that things be done a certain way with people far more experienced than yourself. 

Do you not think that our senior infantry guys have not sat down in a room and dreamed up every which way possible to man a battalion and how many we actually need?

I find your approach to be TOO much about numbers and formulas. That does not always work in the real world. The average infantryman, with a small degree of training in each art, can operate in the arctic, desert, jungle, mounted or dismounted, mountain or urban environment. The role Close with and destroy the enemy does not mean only from the back of a LAV for this unit, on foot for these guys. The mission needs dictate what we need to get the job done. 

Yes, armoured guys COULD be trained to become infantry, but why? They would be better investing their time in perfecting their current AFVs or learning to crew newer armoured vehicles.

We do a degree of specialization in our battalions. Advance Mountain Ops, advance winter ops (or whatever the course is called now) and urban operation instructors are a perfect examples.


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## Michael OLeary

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Do you not think that our senior infantry guys have not sat down in a room and dreamed up every which way possible to man a battalion and how many we actually need?



Don't be to certain about that. Our battalion sizes are dictated by manning ceilings and organizational decisions on how many battalions they will be divided between. We struck the Pioneer and Mortar platoons, not on a basis of relative tactical utility, but to address a manpower redistribution challenge. Our last three section vehicles (Grizzly, M113, LAV 3) all coincidentally fit our "doctrinal" 10-man section, so we never had to force ourselves to challenge the model to see if there were better ways to address light, heavy, or any other given specialist infantry role. We deployed the LAVs on their first operation without having had a corps wide discussion on how they might be employed; their use has evolved organically and their employment overseas has lasted long enough to see a critical mass of that experience roll back into the training system to augment the basic technical training on weapons and vehicles - but the current sate has been a reaction to current operational needs, and not developed from a system of considered alternatives prepared before and adapted to the missions at hand. Many still see the infantry as essentially a dismounted capability that is augmented with mobility and firepower when vehicles are available and assigned. We have yet to develop a concept of actual "heavy" infantry where their primary role and combat capability is dependent on close integration with their own vehicles as a primary method of employment. Our infantry organizations have survived and performed to an impressive standard mainly because those on the ground found ways to make them work, not necessarily because they are the strongest foundation for every imaginable role. It's the quality of our people and of our training that has been and continues to be the key combat multiplier.


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## Kirkhill

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Kirkhill, my advice, take it for what it worth. You are arguing about how to grow apples with the apple farmer!




Isn't it Great?  >  And people pay me in the real world to do that very thing.  :nod:

And by the way I don't insist that anybody do anything.  I propose. I offer. I suggest. I ask. I try to understand.

As you and Infanteer and everyone else on this site are right to point out:  It is your livelihoods and your lives that are at risk.  The decisions can always only be yours.

And I thank you for taking those risks.


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## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> can generalists maintain adequate competence across the board?



With 90% of the tasks we are expected to do, in my opinion yes.


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## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> With 90% of the tasks we are expected to do, in my opinion yes.



As evidenced by the rank 'General'...


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## Infanteer

???


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## HatMan

Just an update to that since you are using an older text.  The MOS 11M(Mech Inf) is no more, all Infantry pers are either 11C(Mortars), or 11B(everything else).  Not sure if the 11Z(Inf Senior Sgt) MOS still exists or not though.

11B is Directed Infantryman and 11C is In-Directed infantryman. ( Fire of course). As for 11Z will exist so long that They are 1SG/MSG and CSM/SGM. 1SG/MSG = CSM/MWO and CSM/SGM = RSM/CWO. US Army MOS (Trade for my Northern neighbor) break down in such a way. 11B10 mean this is infantry is direct fire role @ basic level. Hope this help out.


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## a_majoor

Found an old ARMY article while looking at the "Block III" program which delves into the US Army's thinking of protected mobility back in the mid-late 80's. A comparison to what is supposed to be accomplished by the CCV is interesting, Here is the description of the Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle:

ARMY May 1991 Armor's Future: From One, Many

By Eric C. Ludvigsen, Associate Editor



> • Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV)
> 
> The salient feature of the FIFV is that it will have the same armor protection as the Block III tank, thus ensuring that its pioneer infantrymen can go anywhere the tank goes. This is the kind of mechanized infantry vehicle the Army proposed in the early 1970s, before the Bradley's predecessor, the XM723 was developed, but could not sell to the Defense Department or Congress—it was deemed as heavy, complex and expensive as a tank and thus incapable of the required proliferation on the battlefield (roughly two infantry vehicles for every three tanks). All parties to this long-running debate, however, appear to have learned the lesson of the Bradley and have accepted the necessity for an infantry vehicle that can advance in the face of the heaviest fire, without the need for compensating tactics. "With this vehicle, the infantry will be able to remain on board until they overrun target," Mr. Wynbelt said, "and then disembark, so that they will not have to fight toward an objective."
> 
> Compared to the Bradley, the FIFV will have more than 11 times the effective effective frontal protection and 200 percent greater protection from flank attacks, plus all of the VIDS passive and active countermeasures of the Block III tank.
> 
> The FIFV will have missile armament with a degree of antiarmor capability as yet undetermined. The Army is looking for a 150 percent increase in effectiveness—including twice the armor penetration—from an automatic main gun in the 35-mm to 60-mm caliber range. There would also be a centrally controlled area suppression weapon system to deal with enemy infantry in the vincinity of the vehicle; this is expected to be 60 percent more effective than the individual port-firing weapons now operated by infantrymen mounted in the M2 Bradley.
> 
> With power and fuel capacity comparable to the main battle tank, the FIFV is expected to have 70 percent greater cruising range than the Bradley and cross-country speeds more than one-third higher. Vetronics and advanced fire control will allow the vehicle crew to be reduced from three men to two, but the size of the dismounted element is not yet certain.


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## Infanteer

I recently had the chance to read _Mechanized Infantry_ by Richard Simpkin.  Although the text is 30 years old now, many of the arguments are the same as we see here.  Two key ideas he hits on are the separation of mech and light infantry as trades.  He argues that mech inf and armoured should be combined as a trade, as they shouldn't be apart.
The other argument is that the Mech infantry need a heavy infantry carrier to keep up to the tanks; very similar to what Thucydides just put up.  Simpkin was very impressed with the design of the first gen Merkava and, had he lived longer, would have been a fan of the Namur as he proposed the concept in his book.  For other infantry, he argues for a lighter carrier for mobility to simply get them to where they need to fight with a little mobility and firepower to boot.
While I have my own ideas, Simpkin's writings were pretty good to get some real practical thinking on the roll of vehicles in the engagement.


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## a_majoor

I liked Simkin's books as well (they are also clearly written), but the APC/IFV he proposed was rather nightmarish from a logistical/maint point of view.

The turret mounting a 76mm low velocity cannon, a 20mm automatic cannon and a machine gun (plus the idea that the crew commander's seat would counter rotate so the CC did not get disoriented) would have been in the shop most of the time, and trying to coordinate the fire of three very disparate weapons (using early 1980's FCS systems) would have been difficult as well. Obviously the Russians were big fans, vehicles like the BMP-3 and the BMPT follow his prescriptions.

The "today" solution is a large calibre automatic cannon as the main gun (40mm will deal with almost everything we could encounter) and a Fire and Forget missile mount so the commander can shoot from the hip if he suddenly encounters enemy armour (and possibly helicopters). The other arguments remain well thought out and clearly detailed, the only remaining questions are do we have the will to get into this game, and if so, how far are we willing to go (a small handfull of CCV's will just be another orphan fleet).


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## Colin Parkinson

Would the German "PanzerGrenadier" of the late 70's-80's not be considered a "heavy infantry"? As I recall there job was to support the tanks in their Marders. Which the Boxer is supposed to carry on this tradition.


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## vonGarvin

Colin P said:
			
		

> Would the German "PanzerGrenadier" of the late 70's-80's not be considered a "heavy infantry"? As I recall there job was to support the tanks in their Marders. Which the Boxer is supposed to carry on this tradition.


In the tradition of the German Army, what we would simply call "infantry" they called "Infanterie" (or "Jäger") and "Panzergrenadier".  They were separate trades/classifications, as unique as Armour and Artillery in our army.  So, the "Gebirgsjäger", the "Fallschirmjäger" are of one "type", and the "Panzergrenadier" are of another type.  Imagine if in our army the 1st and 2nd battalions of our regular force regiments had soldiers of type "a", and our 3rd battalions had soldiers of type "b".  Some would offer that there is a difference.

So, the difference in the Bundesheer is more than tradition: it's a separation of trades and methods of employment.


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## a_majoor

While we mull on about a wheeled CCV (either French or a upgunned LAV variant) the US army is evaluating several vehicles to define their next IFV. The CV-90, NAMER and a turretless version of the M-2 were tested, with a regular M-2 being the baseline. The PUMA seems like it would have been a possible candidate as well (the robotic turret is unique, and may have offered lessons for the Americans) but for whatever reason was not part of the evaluation:

http://defense-update.com/20120607_aifv_evaluation.html



> *US Army Evaluates the Israeli Namer, Swedish CV9035 AIFVs at Ft. Bliss*
> Posted by Tamir Eshel
> 
> Soldiers who took part in the Maneuver Battle Lab’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) assessment last month at Fort Bliss, Texas, praised the various capabilities and features on the five vehicles used in the week-long evaluation. The EXFOR conducted platoon-level operations on five different platforms at Fort Bliss: M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Turret-less Bradley, Double V-Hull Stryker, Swedish CV9035 vehicle and the Israeli Namer. Each vehicle was evaluated for durability, capacity, modularity, lethality, interior space and operational capability.
> 
> Harry Lubin, the Maneuver Battle Lab’s Live Experimentation Branch chief, said the Army is assessing the best attributes on each vehicle as part of an effort to consolidate them into a design that could replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in the future.
> 
> The Ground Combat Vehicle assessment’s first stage unfolded in Israel this past winter, when the experimentation force took part in a month-long evaluation of the Israeli Namer. In March, the Soldiers were in Denmark working with the Swedish CV9035 vehicle. The Fort Benning Soldiers ran six missions a day — three during the day and three at night — across open desert and urban terrain.
> 
> “Maneuverability was my focus,” said Spc. Michael Platzer, a driver. “The CV9035 was the most responsive, but the two Bradleys were a close second. I found that the vehicles with a three-man crew allowed us to maneuver and fight better, and they were still capable of carrying a whole squad.” Maneuver Battle Lab officials said a key objective in the Army’s campaign is to produce a vehicle that can carry nine fully equipped Infantrymen and three crew members. The M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle currently in use holds a maximum of seven Infantry Soldiers.
> 
> Sgt. Nehemiah Robertson, a gunner, said he identified a target at 1,500 meters in the Swedish CV9035 vehicle but also liked the Bradley’s sights capability. Both delivered great firepower. ”We liked the bigger-gun capabilities,” Manilla said. “Any vehicle without a large cannon to destroy armored vehicles gave us some challenges because it forced the Soldiers to dismount.”
> 
> Each vehicle provided different levels of situational awareness, said Maj. Jerel Evans, the EXFOR commander. The Israeli Namer, for example, had seven cameras — they can show the positions of dismounted squad members and where the gunner is firing.
> 
> “All those vehicles and emerging technologies allow Soldiers to have that situational awareness before they hit the ground,” he said. “Survivability is a big feature the Army is going after in a new ground combat vehicle. It has to be able to maneuver in urban environments and off-road terrain. The IED (improvised explosive device) threat has changed the way we fight. It’s put more emphasis on survivability.”
> 
> Evans said he likes the direction taken by the Army in seeking a vehicle that’s as versatile, lethal and adaptive as the individual warfighter.
> 
> “We need a vehicle that deals with the capability gaps we’ve had in other vehicles,” he said. “This comes from lessons learned since we’ve been fighting in 10-plus years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. I love this new concept.”
> 
> “As these assessments go, it went successfully well at Fort Bliss,” Lubin said. “We built the scenarios and command-and-controlled the exercise to get at those data points we needed to get at. Our goal, for the whole process, was to provide feedback to the Mounted Requirements Division so we can make an informed decision down the road. It’s critical they get the requirements right so industry knows what to build to.”
> 
> About 75 personnel from Fort Benning had roles in Phase 2 of the nondevelopmental assessment, which was aimed at informing Army leaders about eventual requirements for a new Infantry fighting vehicle. It included about 45 Soldiers from A Company, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, 197th Infantry Brigade, the post’s experimentation force, known as the EXFOR.
> 
> The results of these evaluations could shape the Army’s attitude toward refining the scope of the future GCV, especially when tradeoff between cost and requirements will unfold, as the program move through its next phases. Given the role of BAE Systems (CV9035, Bradley) and GDLS (Stryker, Namer)as prime contractors for two of the foreign vehicles, positive conclusion of the testing could also trigger expanding the scope of potential vehicle  types or vendors considered for the future program.


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## McG

Odds are, whatever vehicle the US Army develops from this, they will also develop all the necessary combat support and service support variants.

With CCV, a Canadian Cbt Tm's ambulance will still not have the same mobility characteristics and so it may not be able to follow where the infantry go and suffer casualties; the recovery & maintenance vehicles will not have the same mobility characteristics and so they many not be able to follow where the infantry go and get stuck or breakdown; there will be no vehicle for the roles of mortar, anti-armour, or air defence.  Even Engineer sections, occasionally operating forward of the infantry CCVs, will continue to ride in vehicles that apparently have neither the armour nor the mobility to survive.


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