# Papers on Int/Influence Ops in AFG



## The Bread Guy (4 Jan 2010)

"Behavioural Conflict - From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation & Influence" (PDF), Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Shrivenham Papers Number 9, December 2009



> Executive Summary
> This paper represents nearly two years of work and active consideration – both in the academic domain and in the field of conflict – of the problems confronting the British military in contemporary and future conflict. At its heart is the belief that future campaigns will need to focus on altering the behaviours of others, either in advance – and therefore deterring conflict – or as a coupled component in the process of combat and post combat operations. It takes the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as its principal case study and examines the thought processes – falling outside more conventional military wisdom and training – that lay behind the Commander’s decisions to mount an influence-led deployment, one that specifically sought to reduce hard kinetic engagement and place the consent of the population at the centre of the operational design. Indeed the paper argues that success in battle will demand as much understanding of social psychology, culture and economics as it does military art and science. It examines the corporate structures available within the MoD to support that decision and, finding them lacking, suggests not only how a new strategic communication structure might evolve to meet future demands but also how the provision of education, learning, unlearning and relearning at every level, from Commander to strategic Corporal, is likely to be the pre-eminent factor in success in future conflict.
> 
> Key Points
> ...



H/T to _The Torch_ for the head's up on this one....

"Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevent in Afghanistan"
Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) publication, 4 Jan 10


> This report critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The authors - Major General Michael T. Flynn, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan; his advisor Captain Matt Pottinger; and Paul Batchelor, Senior Advisor for Civilian/Military Integrations at ISAF - argue that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate in and the people they are trying to protect and persuade.
> 
> Quoting  General Stanley McChrystal, the authors write that "Our senior leaders - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States - are not getting the right information to make decisions with ... The media is driving the issues.  We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers."
> 
> This report is the blueprint for that process.  It describes the problem, details the changes, and illuminates examples of units that are "getting it right."  It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals in Afghanistan, the United States and Europe.


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