# Advancing With Purpose 4th Edn Dec 2020



## FJAG (15 Feb 2021)

I've just received a copy of the above and have now read the thing in detail and I'm actually quite pleased with many "fine print" issues raised within it. 

It appears that the target level for readiness and the MRP are changing so that a brigade will be the level to train towards (including as a brigade in an allied division) and a brigade will be held in a ready state for contingencies for a year rather than immediately used for deployments. It is only after the "ready" year has completed that elements of the brigade will do MTST and deploy. If I'm reading that right, then that's big. In addition, the paper suggests that symmetric force structure vis a vis brigades is not necessarily going to continue. There is an emphasis on the medium force but with a much stronger emphasis on light and heavy enhancements than in prior years. Couple that with commitments to tank life extension, long range precision fires, anti-tank systems, GBAD, and light force equipment enhancements and once again you are talking a much more capable force at either end of the spectrum assuming those are achievable goals (there are lots of cautions about the realities of finances).

There are some positive aspects to enhancement of the ARes as well albeit my big bugbear - a force equipped, organized and trained for expansion rather than mere augmentation - isn't there. Baby steps.

Divestment is in there and I don't like it too much. I think we could make better use of such equipment as hand-me-downs/ reserve-in-storage status but at least the divestment seems to be tied to a cycle that mandates new replacement equipment as a prerequisite. We'll see how that works out. The divestment at least is tied to "old equipment" rather than "old capabilities". 

I think this could go further especially, as per the ARes, but all-in-all it seems to signal an interesting direction that builds capabilities more in line with a complex environment that has peer conflict included in it. Still far too many buzzwords for my liking.

Interested in other folks comments about this document

🍻


----------



## MilEME09 (15 Feb 2021)

Two areas as a member of the ARes I see as important. The bigger one, below is reevaluating the IS needs of the PRes, as the amount of Institutional support hasn't changed in 30 years, but our authorized strength has grown. I hope there is also a change to class B contracts, career class B needs to end, put a cap of 1 resign unless no one else can fill the position. Class B's should be about ARes members getting OJT and experience, not being a out of trade CQ for 15 years as a retirement job.


> Analysis of, and measures to optimize, the efficiency of ARes administrative practices will reduce the overall administrative burden of its leaders, soldiers, and units. This includes an in-depth workflow analysis to determine the required level of full-time support at unit and sub-unit levels to properly administer and effectively train the ARes;


----------



## CBH99 (16 Feb 2021)

Personally, the document doesn’t really seem to mean anything.  It comes across more like “this is what we’d like to do” - while ignoring the important aspects of budgets, projects actually moving forwards, political interference, etc etc.  

- A GBAD capability in any form would be fantastic.  Whether it’s a highly capable & cheap MANPAD system, or vehicle mounted radar & weapons, or something more substantial.  (A combination of at least the first 2 would be ideal).  

^^ cheap to acquire, maintain, and train.  And extremely necessary depending on our next AO.  

-  Upgrade all of our Leopard 2’s to the same standard, for ease of maintenance and training.  (Having 3 different models in service is actually killing us on the maintenance side)

-  Find a way to replace logistics vehicles on a regular basis.  (How do police services keep their vehicle fleets relatively new?)


All in all, the document says some things which would be great if they happened.  But for some of these things to happen, we would need politicians in treasury board, public works, DND, etc - that are capable of accomplishing simple tasks in a timely manner.  Sooooooooo.... 

0.02


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Feb 2021)

I've found the biggest problem with this document so far, on page 1:


“Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’”

-     Sun Tzu, The Art of War2






						Canadian Army - Canada.ca
					

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca
				





As long as the 'Happy Talk', and various levels of meaningless back patting, continues to outweigh the really tough conversations we need to have (and listen to) connected to reality, we'll go on aimlessly wheel spinning IMHO....

Oh, and any military document that wants to be taken seriously probably shouldn't virtue signal about climate change being a bigger threat than resurgent totalitarianism and radical Islam, which is the impression I get when glancing through the 'Strategic Context'.


----------



## brihard (16 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I've found the biggest problem with this document so far, on page 1:
> 
> 
> “Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’”
> ...


Yeah right, don't pretend that reading "in-depth workflow analysis" didn't get you all hot and bothered.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Feb 2021)

brihard said:


> Yeah right, don't pretend that reading "in-depth workflow analysis" didn't get you all hot and bothered.


Dude, my Miro is vibrating!


----------



## FJAG (16 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Dude, my Miro is vibrating!


How's that working for you?  We had a team meeting yesterday about using Google Suite for a collaborative work tool for our writing/editing/production team (cause its darn cheap) - Let me know by PM so we don't clog this thread.

🍻


----------



## CBH99 (16 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I've found the biggest problem with this document so far, on page 1:
> 
> 
> “Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’”
> ...


I totally agree.  From a military / firepower / operations perspective, I agree with you.  Terrorism & a very potent totalitarian regime openly trying to sabotage us are much more potent military threats than “climate change”.  

However, I don’t think we should downplay the host of dangers that climate change will present.  If just albeit slowly.

Severe weather & natural disasters.  Forest fires, floods, etc.  Food scarcity in some parts of the world, which will lead to instability & conflict.  (Which may tie directly into peer conflict depending on circumstances).   Rising oceans flooding cities & coastal areas.  

Shrinking areas of habitable land, with an increasing population.


I don’t think this was the right document to mention climate change.  Especially when the world collectively seems happy to set a goal which is pathetically low.  Military papers should skip over to virtue signalling, agreed... imagine that’s for another government department


----------



## Haggis (16 Feb 2021)

CBH99 said:


> I don’t think this was the right document to mention climate change.  Especially when the world collectively seems happy to set a goal which is pathetically low.  Military papers should skip over to virtue signalling, agreed... imagine that’s for another government department


You will probably see every single high level policy document mention "climate change" under this government. If the PM tells the MND that it's a priority, then it's a priority.


----------



## FJAG (16 Feb 2021)

Haggis said:


> You will probably see every single high level policy document mention "climate change" under this government. If the PM tells the MND that it's a priority, then it's a priority.


And if you can convince the government that the virtue signaling issue of the day is important to you then maybe, just maybe, they'll throw and extra billion into the pot ... or at the very least not take an extra billion out of your budget for not supporting their agenda.

🙂


----------



## blacktriangle (16 Feb 2021)

Isn't China the world's largest polluter? So wouldn't a "pivot to China" help us combat climate change?


----------



## CBH99 (16 Feb 2021)

FJAG said:


> And if you can convince the government that the virtue signaling issue of the day is important to you then maybe, just maybe, they'll throw and extra billion into the pot ... or at the very least not take an extra billion out of your budget for not supporting their agenda.
> 
> 🙂


Is DND still returning $1B to $2B at the end of each fiscal year?


----------



## MilEME09 (16 Feb 2021)

CBH99 said:


> Is DND still returning $1B to $2B at the end of each fiscal year?


Probably, this year might be different because of OP LASER and Vector. That said I hope someone finally wakes up to the problems of our system and fixes them. Within my life time


----------



## Good2Golf (16 Feb 2021)

Ops Laser and Vector are Vote 1 O&M money...separate from Vote 5 Capital procurement funds.


----------



## Fabius (17 Feb 2021)

I find this like all our documents. Lots of big talk, some fancy words, some pats on the back all around but at the end of the day I see it as an unserious amateur document that ironically fails to provide a clear direction or purpose and provides no prioritization, in fact it seems confused on its priorities stating that all Lines of Effort have equal priority.  This is not made better by the statement that the Army's main effort is the "Training, Equipping and Preparation for Combat", that is not a main effort that is in effect saying the Army's Main Effort is being the Army and not useful in guiding the institution anywhere.

The Army may have amended MRP to have a Bde as the "Ready" force but right now across the force its not much different than before. I think the difference between the "Ready" element (or Contingency force) and what the previous reconstitution phase is largely symbolic not actual. 
The "Ready" forces will go through the Maple Resolve Exercises in the Spring, be declared OPRED, then post a significant portion of their leadership out during APS, they will receive a similar number of institutional support tasks as in the previous model for reconstitution phase.  All to say that they will not be "Ready" in the same vein as the US GRF etc.
There remains no conception of Strategic Readiness Exercises. There is talk of using the light Bn as a GRF, but that is very undeveloped and under resourced.

There is some use of the word "Mass" but there is no plan or discussion of how to achieve it.  A Bde is not mass.  Use of the Reserves for continued Roto 0.5 augmentation to the CBMG vice providing "Mass" is indicative of the rut that our strategic thinking is stuck in.  The Army does not think as an Army it thinks as a CMBG.


----------



## daftandbarmy (17 Feb 2021)

Fabius said:


> I find this like all our documents. Lots of big talk, some fancy words, some pats on the back all around but at the end of the day I see it as an unserious amateur document that ironically fails to provide a clear direction or purpose and provides no prioritization, in fact it seems confused on its priorities stating that all Lines of Effort have equal priority.  This is not made better by the statement that the Army's main effort is the "Training, Equipping and Preparation for Combat", that is not a main effort that is in effect saying the Army's Main Effort is being the Army and not useful in guiding the institution anywhere.
> 
> The Army may have amended MRP to have a Bde as the "Ready" force but right now across the force its not much different than before. I think the difference between the "Ready" element (or Contingency force) and what the previous reconstitution phase is largely symbolic not actual.
> The "Ready" forces will go through the Maple Resolve Exercises in the Spring, be declared OPRED, then post a significant portion of their leadership out during APS, they will receive a similar number of institutional support tasks as in the previous model for reconstitution phase.  All to say that they will not be "Ready" in the same vein as the US GRF etc.
> ...




That would look beautiful in a PER for the Army Commander.

Just sayin'


----------



## MilEME09 (17 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> That would look beautiful in a PER for the Army Commander.
> 
> Just sayin'


Driving change- Check


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (17 Feb 2021)

Its an important document. The changes to the Managed Readiness Plan are much more than symbolic. There will be always be postings etc, but the new model is a huge improvement over the current model in terms of readiness. Previously, units came out of MR and were broken up to missions that did not really require MR. There was no chance of having a high-readiness Brigade. With the new model, units don't get "consumed" by those UNIFIERS/IMPACTS until after a year of Hold. It will take some discipline, but at least now there is a chance of success.

As for priorities and main effort, the point is that you need success in all Lines of Operation to achieve a combat-capable force.


----------



## FJAG (17 Feb 2021)

CBH99 said:


> Is DND still returning $1B to $2B at the end of each fiscal year?





Red_Five said:


> Its an important document. The changes to the Managed Readiness Plan are much more than symbolic. There will be always be postings etc, but the new model is a huge improvement over the current model in terms of readiness. Previously, units came out of MR and were broken up to missions that did not really require MR. There was no chance of having a high-readiness Brigade. With the new model, units don't get "consumed" by those UNIFIERS/IMPACTS until after a year of Hold. It will take some discipline, but at least now there is a chance of success.
> 
> As for priorities and main effort, the point is that you need success in all Lines of Operation to achieve a combat-capable force.


I tend to agree. You know me, I'm one of the biggest cynics around here and have certainly dumped on my fair share of the Army's wordy foundational scribblings but this one actually seems to be signaling some positive directions. Hopefully much of that comes to fruition.

🍻


----------



## Fabius (17 Feb 2021)

I never said it is not important but important is different than good.

Is the new AMRP better? Perhaps, like you said postings etc will always exist is true.  However does every unit need to be impacted every year?
Readiness is in my opinion not simply AMRP plus Ex MR.

As for priorities and main effort, while your statement is not untrue it’s not helpful to the institution. The US Army equivalent documents is better written in that it states that while efforts on their LoE will proceed simultaneously their main effort is on readiness through to 2021 and then switching to modernization in 2022 accepting risk in force readiness while doing so.
Is that not clearer and more useful to the institution.

Edited to add. I hope what the document lays out is followed up with some clear directions on how we will achieve this. I think it’s a good direction and start to be fair but if we are going to achieve Build 1 for F2025 we need to get a move on.  It’s 2021 so we have four years to undertake some major changes. Changes that we have not decided on or socialized.


----------



## daftandbarmy (17 Feb 2021)

Fabius said:


> I never said it is not important but important is different than good.
> 
> Is the new AMRP better? Perhaps, like you said postings etc will always exist is true.  However does every unit need to be impacted every year?
> Readiness is in my opinion not simply AMRP plus Ex MR.
> ...



Some good points made here by Maj. Russell:

“CANADIAN ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS” – HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?

1. This paper will contend that the biggest issue facing the Canadian Army (CA) in the next ten years will be the achievement of true strategic readiness. Strategic readiness refers to the CA’s ability to rapidly respond to the Government of Canada’s (GOC) defence objectives with deployable military capability. This paper will focus on the short notice, deployable expeditionary aspects of the CA’s contribution to strategic readiness. Even though the CA maintains readiness in accordance with its traditional 30/60/90 day mandated levels, it has currently lost its strategic readiness, and is incapable of providing government with feasible, cost effective and timely options for short/no notice expeditionary missions. The key obstacles that hinder CA strategic readiness include an exhaustive road to high readiness (RTHR) cycle that is delinked with current Army operational missions, the hierarchical CA organizational structure and the CA’s over reliance on the force structures contained within the managed readiness plan (MRP). With improvements in the above three areas, the Canadian Army could enhance its strategic readiness to meet emerging GOC expeditionary priorities and better nest its preparation within national strategic direction.1 This would enable the CA to become the governmental force of choice for specific, short notice expeditionary deployments



			https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/russell.pdf


----------



## PPCLI Guy (17 Feb 2021)

> That would look beautiful in a PER for the Army Commander.
> 
> Just sayin'



Dude, to be honest, that feels like a cheap shot, from the cheap seats.


----------



## FJAG (17 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Some good points made here by Maj. Russell:
> 
> “CANADIAN ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS” – HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?
> 
> ...


I read that a year ago when I was writing "Unsustainable at any Price" and was particularly taken by this quote:



> The MRP outlines a plan to prepare and collectively train general-purpose combat capabilities in the CA and this process diverges from GOC priorities who often seek task tailored, highly specific, cost effective capabilities for short notice deployments. This statement is amplified in a report by Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC) that posits, “the current readiness approach of [military] force generators is inward looking and self-referential.”6 The report further critiques the tendencies of the CA as being “driven …by the cycles of the readiness management systems themselves rather than based on the actual demands of operations or the strategic environment.”7


While I agree with the latter assessment by DRDC, I disagree with Russell's major premise that the MRP be tailored more for the specific and limited GoC output requirements and abandon the concept of the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability. I tend to believe that the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability is an absolute necessity. Like Gen Simonds I'm a firm believer that once you train to that level (and IMHO at least to the brigade level) then everything else is a derivative of that and well within the Army's capability to adapt to and generate a force for. If on the other hand you train to the limited objectives which I believe Russell points to then it will become almost impossible to deploy as a general-purpose combat force if and when needed.

One of the SSS's requirements is to be able to deter and engage with near peer foes. Training in a limited way for ongoing missions and a company sized quick reaction force doesn't cut it. 

I have a lot of issues with the current MRP (as DRDC says) but Russell doesn't fix the problem. He compounds it.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy (17 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> Dude, to be honest, that feels like a cheap shot, from the cheap seats.



I dunno.... it's feedback. Take it for what it's worth which, being cheap, means it's free 


FJAG said:


> I read that a year ago when I was writing "Unsustainable at any Price" and was particularly taken by this quote:
> 
> 
> While I agree with the latter assessment by DRDC, I disagree with Russell's major premise that the MRP be tailored more for the specific and limited GoC output requirements and abandon the concept of the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability. I tend to believe that the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability is an absolute necessity. Like Gen Simonds I'm a firm believer that once you train to that level (and IMHO at least to the brigade level) then everything else is a derivative of that and well within the Army's capability to adapt to and generate a force for. If on the other hand you train to the limited objectives which I believe Russell points to then it will become almost impossible to deploy as a general-purpose combat force if and when needed.
> ...




I kind of liked this observation though:

"Operation REASSURANCE again provides an excellent example of how the hierarchical structure of the CA hindered agility and rapid deployment on a short notice mission. From the very outset of the mission, there was a clearly defined political objective to quickly deploy CA forces to conduct multi-national training with US and Polish forces. The urgency aspect of this deployment resulted from Russian aggression and incursions into the Crimea, which led to a deployment timeframe of approximately 7 days from notification, to the CA force achieving its initial operating capacity in Poland. During this 7 day window, paratroopers from the CA were screened for deployment, RCAF assets were aligned to support inflow and the advance party/main body forces were deployed. 10. *The rapid deployment of CA paratroopers was hindered by two key aspects; the lack of decision quality information pushed to the Canadian Joint Operations Center (CJOC), and staff confusion that resulted from information flow between the various levels of CA HQs. The lack of decision quality information resulted from interactions between the various stakeholders including CJOC, the CA (which includes CA HQ, division HQ, brigade HQ and battalion HQ levels) and the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC) who was responsible for determining collective training events suitable for CA participation in Europe. At no time in the deployment of Operation REASSURANCE did any of the stakeholders map out “the organization’s key decisions [required]…or where in the organization those decisions should 9 Ibid. 6 [have] happened.”10* This information, early in the process would have enabled all stakeholders, including the actual deployed force to streamline their information reporting and better enable decisions pertaining to critical aspects such as host nation logistical support capability etc. Instead, there was no clear understanding about “the level of authority decision makers need[ed] [or had],”11 and the resulting “information flow and processes…related to [critical] decision making,”12 were severely disrupted. For this reason, the CA needs to institutionalize a short notice deployment capability and operating procedure, and constantly refine the associated processes much like how the DART rehearses its CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. This activity would ensure that information flows between CA HQ elements and decision quality information requirements would be clearly understood, timely and able to support rapid deployability within the CA. While the CA was able to deploy forces on short notice in support of Operation REASSURANCE, it did so in an ad hoc fashion that lacked efficiency and introduced additional risk."

IMHO you probably don't need to have to have an expensive and resource intensive 'Standing Brigade' to ensure a fast and effective response as long as you have *efficient processes*, and comms/logisitcs, for decision making and force generation and projection.


----------



## FJAG (18 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I kind of liked this observation though:
> 
> ...
> 
> IMHO you probably don't need to have to have an expensive and resource intensive 'Standing Brigade' to ensure a fast and effective response as long as you have *efficient processes*, and comms/logisitcs, for decision making and force generation and projection.


I don't disagree with the issues raised in that quote. There are too many fingers in the pie, too much indecision and too many competing interests involved which ends up with how we do tend to ad hoc our forces these days which is very much part of the resource poor issues that the MRP tries to patch up.

My research and interviews right now is focusing on the decision making process and the manner in which ROTO 0 of ATHENA 1 was put together and deployed and it very much echoes the ad hocery in particular as 2 CMBG, the high readiness brigade under the then existing MRP was already deploying a ROTO to Bosnia. After 3 RCR deployed the 2 CMBG high readiness cupboard was truly bare.

As usual this makes me reflect back on the good old 1960'/70s Army and 1 CIBG's deployment on Op ESSAY into Quebec with 5 CIBG while 2 CIBG deployed into Ottawa on Op GINGER. It was very short notice (a matter of days) and we were able to pick up and do our job, notwithstanding most of the brigades had just come off annual leave and the annual posting cycle because we were a trained and equipped general-purpose combat force trained to the brigade level.

We did have a specified quick reaction battalion in our system but this wasn't as a result of any specified MRP-like training cycle. It was more a matter of designation and establishing liaison with all the regional agencies that it would probably called out to support than any particular type of training. Everyone basically ran on annual training plans which had us slightly less capable in September and more capable in May.

I really dislike the Army's MRP concept because of its three year cycle and unequal resource allocation (essentially 1/3 of your force is out of action at any given time and another 1/3 is only minimally capable) but I certainly do not object to the training objective culminating at the brigade level. Personally I'd prefer to see a return to an annual training cycle which every year ends with a brigade level exercise so that each of the three brigades remains proficient all the way up (and there should also be some levels of divisional exercises even if only at the CPX level although an occasional divisional FTX is a really good vehicle by which div staff can actually come to realize just how much sh*t they have to supply, maintain and move around.) While I dislike the MRP concept, I do understand the resource limitation which result in it's being there (although sometimes I suspect a level of risk aversion that makes it difficult to commit anything but a perfectly equipped and trained force (and even then I'm not so sure we uniformly accomplished that during many of our missions in the last twenty years). 

I agree with a lot of the points Russell raises. I just don't like his conclusions. IMHO it's just the surrender of one more vital capability to meet present circumstances rather than to prepare for a future unknown. At the end of the day, our Army should be organized and trained to meet that future unknown that threatens the country and that the GoC didn't see coming or blindly ignored.

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (18 Feb 2021)

Since you brought up 2 CMBG in 2003, I think its impressive that we sent a Bde HQ, Bde Tps and a BG to Kabul at the same time as a BG to Bosnia. Did you want yet _another shrubbery_ from us before you were satisfied? When we are committed to multi-BG operations on a rotational basis we are, well, _committed_. Its hard to do rotational deployments and be able to surge everything at the same time. It's a have your cake and eat it too situation.

Do you train your entire force to a baseline level and leave it a that or do you have asymmetrical training/readiness? Both can be valid. Rotational deployments, though, favour the asymmetrical method. If its WW2 Redux in Europe you train everything and send it. There is no rotation, but you have replacements. Horses for courses. Having said that, some have argued for the value of "foundational" training that is not directly tied to readiness but rather to keeping skill sets alive in the Army for when you need them. As always there will be compromises. We're not happy until you're not happy. 

Regarding the Russell article, I agree with his comments on the MRP that existed up until this Advancing with Purpose. I am really excited about the changes to the MRP and the training cycle. The bit about the problems deploying the airborne company to Op REASSURANCE, though, are a bit distracting. I had no part of the process (I was in the Middle East at the time), but the bit about CADTC being involved looking for training opportunities is very telling. Was it an operation or a training event? Bit of both I suppose. So you sit on your rucksack in Canada or you sit on your rucksack in Poland. Getting somewhere is often the easiest part. 

We do have "bespoke" elements for deployment that include the Army. I was in a Joint unit that was formerly an Army unit with three mission sets that had short-notice to move Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams with affiliated Army elements. We practiced this annually to include the army elements. Anyhoo.


----------



## FJAG (18 Feb 2021)

Red_Five said:


> Since you brought up 2 CMBG in 2003, I think its impressive that we sent a Bde HQ, Bde Tps and a BG to Kabul at the same time as a BG to Bosnia. Did you want yet _another shrubbery_ from us before you were satisfied? When we are committed to multi-BG operations on a rotational basis we are, well, _committed_. Its hard to do rotational deployments and be able to surge everything at the same time. It's a have your cake and eat it too situation.


Do not want another shrubbery to be satisfied.

I think 2 CMBG did very well, especially 2 RCHA who not only had to turn out another gun battery but had to form, train and deploy two troops on two capabilities they didn't even have in their inventory at the beginning of the year, namely UAVs and counter mortar radars (Same, same on the ISTAR capability.) The regiment was pretty much stripped bare and when the folks that remained behind received a large influx of newly trained recruits that fall, they were severely challenged to muster even a handful of NCOs and drivers tracked to run DP1 courses.

My point was simply that with 2 CMBG being the high readiness force in 2003 and the mass of it's troops and all of it's headquarters deployed on rotational operations there was no "reserve" in the cupboard for an emergency. If the GoC had in fact needed another shrubbery, they would have had to reach down to the brigade on the road to high readiness for one. The issue showed the fallacy of the MRP at the time and not any deficiency in 2 CMBG. And that's pretty much been the problem with MRPs ever since.

I too think that the new MRP is a leap forward. I'm looking forward to the eventual PowerPoint presentation showing in 73 slides how it will work.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09 (19 Feb 2021)

My big question is with only 3 brigades, can this work long term? I feel two up and one down constantly may cause burn out. That said we do not have the budget or the man power to raise a 4th brigade.


----------



## FJAG (19 Feb 2021)

MilEME09 said:


> My big question is with only 3 brigades, can this work long term? I feel two up and one down constantly may cause burn out. That said we do not have the budget or the man power to raise a 4th brigade.


It's still a three year cycle with a brigade in each of one of the cycles as set out below:



> A rotational cycle with three phases: build, contingency, and committed. This plan will be centred on a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) which builds combat readiness and then holds that force at a ready posture for one year, retaining forces available to react to contingencies as necessary. At the end of this period in high readiness, contingency elements conduct TMST and deploy on predicted international operations as they transition to the committed phase;


As I see it a brigade starts the cycle upon having completed a deployment phase. For the first year it reconstitutes and rebuilds itself to a ready status. During the second year the brigade remains intact available for contingencies but undoubtedly continues to build its effectiveness perhaps with higher level exercises. At the end of the second year the brigade is assigned deployment missions and conducts TMST for the specific missions. During the third year it is deploys operationally such elements as are required during that year.

The key change here is that the current MRPs rebuild/reconstitute year and the road to high readiness year are collapsed into one build year with perhaps a bit of a wash-over of some road to high readiness into the contingency year (essentially that's very much like what our older annual training plans did over a period of one year - reconstitute the unit after the APS, move through a system of individual and increasing collective training until by the end of the cycle we were fully functional and usually ended with a brigade FTX/concentration). To me it seems doable as long as the resources are there. It strikes me as an improvement in that the plan calls for 2/3 of the force to be ready and/or committed at any given time rather than the 1/3 which is both ready and committed as at the present. Most importantly a completely trained brigade is available for contingencies. I would think that most of the time, the contingency cycle will not result in any greater stress on the units or personnel than the current road to high readiness year and quite possibly even less if the unit is kept relatively stable in manning and equipment after the end of the build cycle.

It strikes me it can also create  clear path for ARes commitment to operations by having a requirement for ARes participation identified during the contingency phase and then have selected individuals go on Class C in time for the TMST and deployment (especially if they come from within the same division as the committed brigade).

The plan seems sound to me, creates a higher degree of readiness and capability for the force but, like anything else, the devil will be in the details.

🍻


----------



## lenaitch (19 Feb 2021)

CBH99 said:


> Find a way to replace logistics vehicles on a regular basis.  (How do police services keep their vehicle fleets relatively new?)


Software and money.  It's an unfair comparison.  Patrol vehicles benefit from a North American-wide accepted platform standard, so it's a matter of ordering then tacking on the local bits.  Depending on department, patrol vehicles last (very) roughly 30-odd months, so it's not a matter of developing specs, waiting for design bids, requesting funding, etc. every 10 or 20 years.  Parts streams are commercial and maintenance is either commercial or fleet shop, depending.  Non-patrol vehicles, like Ident, tactical vehicles, aircraft, etc. are somewhat more bespoke and usually require a distinct business case for funding, but last a whole lot longer.

Money is always the kicker.  A couple of years ago my (former) service had ~40Mn pulled from its budget and the Minister said they could easily accommodate that by simply running the cars a couple of more oil changes.  Sigh.


----------



## Fabius (19 Feb 2021)

The plan on the face of it creates higher readiness and capability.  I am interested to see how the Army will manage the institutional tasks that always come out, I think the plan is that the Bde assigned to the Contingency Phase will be still getting a very large percentage of them. This will likely preclude any higher level trg and will to a degree especially when paired with APS impact the relative stability and continuity in the Readiness Forces.  The stability through the cycle I think is a key problem.

I think its also problematic to not have the Reserves integrated into the AMRP as formed units vice just augmentation.  If we sort out our Strategic issues with the Reserves we could better integrate them to AMRP and offer the Army as a whole some depth.  As an example of what we could do with a revised system, in 2005 50% of the US Army Forces deployed in Iraq were US National Guard. This was done deliberately IOT allow the US Army Regular force to manage the modernization and transformation efforts that they were undertaking concurrent to fighting two ground wars.  The plan did not work perfectly and the US accepted risks in doing so but they made the decision anyway to enable their modernization efforts.

Given the potential changes on our horizon for F2025 and our requirement to maintain our tempo of operations what is our plan to manage these concurrent efforts? We will have the same challenge as the US Army in 2005, we will need more combat power than we have while we potentially take units out of operational readiness to realign/rerole them to a new Bde and Army structure.


----------



## MilEME09 (19 Feb 2021)

Fabius said:


> The plan on the face of it creates higher readiness and capability.  I am interested to see how the Army will manage the institutional tasks that always come out, I think the plan is that the Bde assigned to the Contingency Phase will be still getting a very large percentage of them. This will likely preclude any higher level trg and will to a degree especially when paired with APS impact the relative stability and continuity in the Readiness Forces.  The stability through the cycle I think is a key problem.
> 
> I think its also problematic to not have the Reserves integrated into the AMRP as formed units vice just augmentation.  If we sort out our Strategic issues with the Reserves we could better integrate them to AMRP and offer the Army as a whole some depth.  As an example of what we could do with a revised system, in 2005 50% of the US Army Forces deployed in Iraq were US National Guard. This was done deliberately IOT allow the US Army Regular force to manage the modernization and transformation efforts that they were undertaking concurrent to fighting two ground wars.  The plan did not work perfectly and the US accepted risks in doing so but they made the decision anyway to enable their modernization efforts.
> 
> Given the potential changes on our horizon for F2025 and our requirement to maintain our tempo of operations what is our plan to manage these concurrent efforts? We will have the same challenge as the US Army in 2005, we will need more combat power than we have while we potentially take units out of operational readiness to realign/rerole them to a new Bde and Army structure.


I am worried what if any impact the new plan will have on our equipment, two bridges at high readiness at the same time makes me think maintenance challenges will increase.


----------



## Ostrozac (19 Feb 2021)

MilEME09 said:


> I am worried what if any impact the new plan will have on our equipment, two bridges at high readiness at the same time makes me think maintenance challenges will increase.


Not enough ‘stuff’ to go around is certainly an issue.

Another problem is not enough specialists. As I recall, the real scarce enablers simply are always on high readiness or deployed, with next to no depth on the shelf, and are therefore strictly rationed. Does the Combat Support Brigade have the ability to provide enough UAV, Int, EW, et al to support this envisioned contingency force?

Doesn't do much good to have a brigade on the shelf that is heavy on riflemen and short of everything else you‘d want to go to war with.


----------



## daftandbarmy (19 Feb 2021)

Ostrozac said:


> Not enough ‘stuff’ to go around is certainly an issue.
> 
> Another problem is not enough specialists. As I recall, the real scarce enablers simply are always on high readiness or deployed, with next to no depth on the shelf, and are therefore strictly rationed. Does the Combat Support Brigade have the ability to provide enough UAV, Int, EW, et al to support this envisioned contingency force?
> 
> Doesn't do much good to have a brigade on the shelf that is heavy on riflemen and short of everything else you‘d want to go to war with.



So what we probably need then are some really good logistics and HR people at the highest levels to help figure all this out for us, right?

Any organization that formally plans to have only a very a small percentage of its force/ complement 'deployment ready' at any one point in time is probably not all that good at figuring out what it means to be, or how to be, deployment ready IMHO.


----------



## Kirkhill (19 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> I've found the biggest problem with this document so far, on page 1:
> 
> 
> “Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’”
> ...


Frankly I can't be bothered anymore with worrying about the vocabulary of philosophies.  The only thing that should matter to the government and the forces is: "Can the available forces maintain the integrity of the state?"  Does it have the numbers and the tools available to defeat the likely threats.  

Leave the philosophizing and the propagandizing to the Corps Diplomatiques.  That is what they are hired for.

Personally I am not bothered if the threat is totalitarian, vegan or martian.  A threat is a threat and threats need to be neutralized by deterrence or elimination.

This document at least is doing a better job than most I have seen at pulling the threads together and weaving a coherent whole.

The best news is that it is a continuity document.  It builds on the past and heads towards a previously described future.  While I would like the future to arrive before our new C130s (2010), C17s (2007) and CH147s (2013) clapped out I recognize that this is Canada. 

A little stick-to-it-iveness goes a long way.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (19 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> So what we probably need then are some really good logistics and HR people at the highest levels to help figure all this out for us, right?
> 
> Any organization that formally plans to have only a very a small percentage of its force/ complement 'deployment ready' at any one point in time is probably not all that good at figuring out what it means to be, or how to be, deployment ready IMHO.


What's an appropriate percentage of a force to be "deployment ready" at any one point in time?


----------



## FJAG (19 Feb 2021)

Red_Five said:


> What's an appropriate percentage of a force to be "deployment ready" at any one point in time?


Doesn't that really require an analysis of what the primary threats are that potentially need to be responded to?

My view of readiness in the case of an undefined threat is: in what stages and at what intervals can you "mobilize" your entire force and sustain it? A battalion on 72 hours notice; a brigade in seven days etc. The problem is much of that is almost meaningless unless you have the means to deploy it to the threatened theatre and sustain it once its there. And that's before we even ask the question as to whether we even have the equipment needed by the "mobilized" force.

IMHO, our force has lacked that concept since at least the 1980s and even then the plan for reinforcing NATOs northern flank was weak in practice. The plan for reinforcing 4 CMBG was okay but I'm not sure if we ever had a viable plan for sustaining 4 CMBG in the event of a heavy commitment.

The problem that I see is that we have the establishment of enough full-time soldiers for a division and enough reservists for a second division yet we have neither the equipment nor the structure to even deploy one division. We probably could deploy a single brigade (so long as its within an allied division which can fill the gap for our numerous capability deficiencies).

So to answer your question, IMHO we should have a "deployment ready" brigade at any given time with a "plan" to increase that force up to a division within a given period of time and to have a further "plan" to project and sustain that division indefinitely out of our current resources in the event of a major emergency. On top of that there needs to be a further and final "plan" as to how we can grow the force if our current numbers aren't enough.

If we can't manage something like that then the question we should be asking ourselves is: do we really need a full-time force as large as we have or is it time to become Switzerland which maintains a force of 120,000 on active service using 9,100 "professionals"  and the rest conscripts or volunteers (of whom many fill junior officer and NCO positions)? Their annual budget is a quarter of ours, their equipment rivals ours (albeit the air force is significantly smaller [34 F18s which they built themselves under license] and their navy ... well that's another matter isn't it?) Heck they even manage to be tri-lingual.

🍻


----------



## Ostrozac (19 Feb 2021)

FJAG said:


> the question we should be asking ourselves is: do we really need a full-time force as large as we have or is it time to become Switzerland


That‘s the real question isn’t it? What is the primary purpose of the Canadian military? And its been asked since the 1870’s. Is it “home defence”? Employing military force domestically, up to and including at the highest end things like the Northwest Rebellion, the October Crisis, Olympic Security and Oka. Or is it “imperial defence”? Participating along with our allies in imposing our will on countries that are far from Canada but viewed as a threat to world order — the high end of this was seen in places like South Africa, Northwest Europe, Korea and Afghanistan.

We have to pick -- you can’t have two primary purposes.


----------



## daftandbarmy (19 Feb 2021)

FJAG said:


> Doesn't that really require an analysis of what the primary threats are that potentially need to be responded to?
> 
> My view of readiness in the case of an undefined threat is: in what stages and at what intervals can you "mobilize" your entire force and sustain it? A battalion on 72 hours notice; a brigade in seven days etc. The problem is much of that is almost meaningless unless you have the means to deploy it to the threatened theatre and sustain it once its there. And that's before we even ask the question as to whether we even have the equipment needed by the "mobilized" force.
> 
> ...



Based on our performance OP LENTUS, if we could just make sure that people went to the dentist we'd be about 20% more effective.


----------



## Ostrozac (20 Feb 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Based on our performance OP LENTUS, if we could just make sure that people went to the dentist we'd be about 20% more effective.


Our entire check in the box culture of ‘readiness’ needs a good scrub. Your example of how flossing relates to disaster relief is a good one. I once needed to qualify with a 9mm Browning pistol before a deployment, even though not only was I not issued a Browning pistol on that tour, but within the entire Task Force there was not a single Browning pistol.


----------



## PPCLI Guy (20 Feb 2021)

Ostrozac said:


> Our entire check in the box culture of ‘readiness’ needs a good scrub. Your example of how flossing relates to disaster relief is a good one. I once needed to qualify with a 9mm Browning pistol before a deployment, even though not only was I not issued a Browning pistol on that tour, but within the entire Task Force there was not a single Browning pistol.


In my last uniformed position in the CAF, I had "Readiness" in my job title.  Shortly after taking on that position I discovered that a C17 crew was being held up because they had not conducted a C7 PWT.....even though none of them would be issued a C7, or even have access to one.  That was quickly unfucked, and ultimately led to a wholesale review of the training requirements for missions....


----------



## FJAG (20 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> In my last uniformed position in the CAF, I had "Readiness" in my job title.  Shortly after taking on that position I discovered that a C17 crew was being held up because they had not conducted a C7 PWT.....even though none of them would be issued a C7, or even have access to one.  That was quickly unfucked, and ultimately led to a wholesale review of the training requirements for missions....


Wouldn't you consider it to be a systemic problem that it had to get all the way to your level to be unfucked rather than to be done at a lower lower level of CoC?

🍻


----------



## PPCLI Guy (20 Feb 2021)

FJAG said:


> Wouldn't you consider it to be a systemic problem that it had to get all the way to your level to be unfucked rather than to be done at a lower lower level of CoC?
> 
> 🍻


The problem is that no one before me fixed it...because they didn't know it was broken.  Which meant that the Iron Majors and MWOs had been running amok for years, and no one challenged them....because no one asked.

I have always said, at every level, if I don't know it is broken, I cant fix it.  Some got it.  Others hid.  Now I am retired....


----------



## daftandbarmy (21 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> In my last uniformed position in the CAF, I had "Readiness" in my job title.  Shortly after taking on that position I discovered that a C17 crew was being held up because they had not conducted a C7 PWT.....even though none of them would be issued a C7, or even have access to one.  That was quickly unfucked, and ultimately led to a wholesale review of the training requirements for missions....



There should be a medal for fearless displays of common sense like that.

But then you'd need a second jacket


----------



## Haggis (21 Feb 2021)

In 2010 while DAGging for Op CADENCE, I was found deficient due to an incorrectly entered vaccination in my immunization book.  The vaccination had been administered a few years earlier prior to another deployment by CFHSC Ottawa.  (I had deployed twice following this with no issues.)  The Comd LFCA was very insistent that no waivers would be granted during the DAG process and the look on my CO's and TF Comd's faces when they saw a one of their TF RSMs sitting on the "bench of shame" was priceless. Notwithstanding their reaction, I was DAGGed RED in the interim and I had to return a couple of days later to be re-vaccinated and have my book updated.

All that to say I'm thrilled that *PPCLI Guy* was able to institute a wholesale review, which was probably 20 years overdue.  It's disheartening that the DAG and RTHR processes don't evolve and adopt lessons learned.  Instead we often were not DAGging/training for Roto 10,  we're DAGging/training for Roto 0 for the tenth time.


----------



## daftandbarmy (21 Feb 2021)

Haggis said:


> In 2010 while DAGging for Op CADENCE, I was found deficient due to an incorrectly entered vaccination in my immunization book.  The vaccination had been administered a few years earlier prior to another deployment by CFHSC Ottawa.  (I had deployed twice following this with no issues.)  The Comd LFCA was very insistent that no waivers would be granted during the DAG process and the look on my CO's and TF Comd's faces when they saw a one of their TF RSMs sitting on the "bench of shame" was priceless. Notwithstanding their reaction, I was DAGGed RED in the interim and I had to return a couple of days later to be re-vaccinated and have my book updated.
> 
> All that to say I'm thrilled that *PPCLI Guy* was able to institute a wholesale review, which was probably 20 years overdue.  It's disheartening that the DAG and RTHR processes don't evolve and adopt lessons learned.  Instead we often were not DAGging/training for Roto 10,  we're DAGging/training for Roto 0 for the tenth time.



I deployed three times to NI in the British Army, as a Reg F member.

The first time, I was fresh out of Sandhurtst (which included some pretty good COIN training) and all I needed was a quick 2 week upgrading course at NITAT Ballykinlar, in NI, prior to being attached to my unit.

The second and third times I went through the full workup package with my regiments, managed by NITAT at Hythe and Lydd. One for a rural tour, and another for a Belfast tour.

Each of these 'full meal deal' experiences represented, from start to finish, about two months of intensive training. Specialist skills, like drivers and search team members, were trained concurrently. Some, like the Int teams, were pulled away to start their training before the main unit training as they had alot more to hoist in. We had some reservists attached to us on these tours and they joined in the training, and then deployed, with us. I don't think we 'rejected' any of these guys but in both cases (Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines) we had reservists who had passed the relevant selection programs - P Company, Commando Course - to make it into those units in the first case. Their total time away from work/ home would have amounted to about 8 months, max.

Fast forward to my experience in the CAF during the Afghanistan experience.

I was a militia rifle company OC during this period of about 4 or 5 years when, for reservists, the work up period seemed interminable, months and months, and was consistently... well... inconsistent. We never really knew when we had to send people, and to where, and to what levels they needed to be trained and prepared prior to attending workups. It was always a colossal PITA for everyone involved, and skewed the whole unit training cycle to try to accommodate the vagaries on the system. In some ways, I don't think the Reserves have ever recovered from this.

I considered deploying myself but faced the prospect of being away from my business and family for up to a year given the interminable workup phase, the tour itself, then the wind down afterwards, plus all the associated uncertainties. This would have put me out of business, and probably seen me divorced as well, so I canned that idea after a hard look in the mirror. I know at least two reservists, one of whom deployed twice, whose businesses and family lives failed because they deployed, and they struggled to succeed in the civilian world following their tours.

All that to say is if we had a really slick, efficient, well integrated system of some kind you could quite easily be able to rely on the reserves to do what they're supposed to do: surge in to support the Reg F as required. Right now we're more of a hindrance than a help, it seems, and have been left to go play with our toys on our own in the corner while not contributing much of anything important to the overall effort.


----------



## PPCLI Guy (22 Feb 2021)

Oh how I hate the Army approach to readiness.  Road to High Readiness my ass.  It is the driveway to irrelevance.  

I did UNTAT (UN Trg Adv Tm) twice when I was with the Brits.First time as a trainer, second time as PTA.  It was two weeks of intensive mission specific training.  Two years later I returned to Bosnia with a Canadian unit, after an 8 month work up period.  And if I am honest, the Canadian Bn was better trained, fitter, and more focused than the Brit one, but we still did 8 months training.

If you command a company or a battalion and it cannot deploy, including leave, with 8 weeks warning you should be fired. 

We use the RTHR to get someone else to pay for training we want to do, and then try to train all the risk out of an inherently risky proposition.  It is unprofessional and wastes time - our soldier's time.  It also erodes our confidence in ourselves, and each other.

Sigh.

<Deep retired breath>


----------



## CBH99 (22 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> Oh how I hate the Army approach to readiness.  Road to High Readiness my ass.  It is the driveway to irrelevance.
> 
> I did UNTAT (UN Trg Adv Tm) twice when I was with the Brits.First time as a trainer, second time as PTA.  It was two weeks of intensive mission specific training.  Two years later I returned to Bosnia with a Canadian unit, after an 8 month work up period.  And if I am honest, the Canadian Bn was better trained, fitter, and more focused than the Brit one, but we still did 8 months training.
> 
> ...


I wish I could give this 10 thumbs up


----------



## Infanteer (23 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> Oh how I hate the Army approach to readiness.  Road to High Readiness my ass.  It is the driveway to irrelevance.
> ....
> We use the RTHR to get someone else to pay for training we want to do, and then try to train all the risk out of an inherently risky proposition.  It is unprofessional and wastes time - our soldier's time.  It also erodes our confidence in ourselves, and each other.


So is there a better approach?


----------



## SeaKingTacco (23 Feb 2021)

Infanteer said:


> So is there a better approach?


A lot of the pre-deployment training/screening we do is “check in the box”. It is unimaginative, unfocussed and often, unnecessary.

Nobody (to my knowledge) actually looks at the upcoming mission and puts in place an actual individual/collective training plan that actually makes sense. Rather, a monstrosity gets grabbed off the shelf that tries to reduce risk (the risk of a senior officer or the government being accused of negilience, mind, not actual risk to troops) to zero. So, every conceivable piece of training gets put in place. Training that ignores how different services operate (CJOC, until recently, had yet to admit or accept that RCAF aircrew carry SiG Sauer pistols. The standard pre-deployment training calls for a Browning qualification, dammit!). A gas hut run is deemed more important than aircrew getting their flying stats in order, despite there being no credible NBC threat at sea. When I went to Ramstein in 2017 to work, at a NATO HQ, I was required by CJOC to do a gas hut run and go to the range, despite me working in an office environment in a first world country. Canada keeps neither small arms, nor NBCW kit at that location.

So, in summary, a little bit of common sense and some actual acceptance that soldiers, sailors and air(people?) are pretty well trained to begin with, so let’s not unnecessarily insult everybody’s intelligence by starting over from day one at basic training, every time we deploy.


----------



## daftandbarmy (23 Feb 2021)

Infanteer said:


> So is there a better approach?





SeaKingTacco said:


> So, in summary, a little bit of common sense and some actual acceptance that soldiers, sailors and air(people?) are pretty well trained to begin with, so let’s not unnecessarily insult everybody’s intelligence by starting over from day one at basic training, every time we deploy.



This was the underlying assumption of every tour/deployment I did in the British Army.

The Army had already trained you and the CO & Bde Comd were expected to figure it out and get on with it. Allied with a really good 'sausage machine' type pre-deployment training program run by a Forces-wide, or other, training establishment that was tailored to current conditions (e.g., NITAT), it was fully possible to train up and deploy troops to Arctic Norway (4 months unaccompanied), Northern Ireland (4-6 months unaccompanied, or 2 years accompanied), the Jungle (3-4 months unaccompanied), Armoured formations on the Central Front, or any number of other tasks.

Within 8 weeks. Not including one week pre-deployment leave if you were entitled.


----------



## rnkelly (23 Feb 2021)

PPCLI Guy said:


> Oh how I hate the Army approach to readiness.  Road to High Readiness my ass.  It is the driveway to irrelevance.



Driveway to irrelevance, that's awesome!

I'll use that the next time I'm stabbing the gravel with a bayonet for mine training instead of getting ready for an Air Force deployment by actually flying.


----------



## daftandbarmy (23 Feb 2021)

rnkelly said:


> Driveway to irrelevance, that's awesome!
> 
> I'll use that the next time I'm stabbing the gravel with a bayonet for mine training instead of getting ready for an Air Force deployment by actually flying.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (23 Feb 2021)

I was on the pistol range with my Chalk a couple of hours after my arrival at Kandahar airfield in 2006. The soldier next to me had _never_ been trained on the pistol that he had been issued. Awkward moments ensued. 

I was very well prepared for my year-long deployment as a unarmed Observer with the UN in 2014. I found it odd that I had to qualify on the C7 and Pistol since I would not have a weapon, but hey. My training at PSTC was very focused and absolutely prepared me for deployment. 

As the ranking senior officer in a high-readiness L2 HQ I was in the tough position on a Saturday of having two key members of a Reconnaissance Team having barely-expired PWT qualifications as we got them ready to leave the country that weekend. I was willing to accept risk, but I still had to go to CJOC. 

What shall we cut from our IBTS/pre-deployment requirements? If you stay on top of IBTS then pre-deployment is less of an issue. Who should have the hammer on risk acceptance?


----------



## Kat Stevens (23 Feb 2021)

Looking at all this from the bottom of the food chain, 8-9 months of runup training for a six month deployment was always pointless. An AEV driver already knows his job. A Leo loader knows his job. Recce Sgts know their job. Very reminiscent of doing the exact same trace 18 times a year in WX just so junior officers could see what it feels like to have their heads sticking out the hatch. "Okay, driver, we're going to be under this tree for 28 minutes, now is a good time for a leak and a quick brew up". It doesn't matter where we do it, the job doesn't change. Other than boning up on the various weapons drills and the threat of prosecution from the legal beagles if you use said weapons, being a bipedal carbon based chess piece for the grownups to shove around the map is not the best use of troops time. IMHO, of course.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (23 Feb 2021)

Red_Five said:


> I was on the pistol range with my Chalk a couple of hours after my arrival at Kandahar airfield in 2006. The soldier next to me had _never_ been trained on the pistol that he had been issued. Awkward moments ensued.
> 
> I was very well prepared for my year-long deployment as a unarmed Observer with the UN in 2014. I found it odd that I had to qualify on the C7 and Pistol since I would not have a weapon, but hey. My training at PSTC was very focused and absolutely prepared me for deployment.
> 
> ...


The specific issue is that, eventually units just give up on training the basics because it is a waste of time. CJOC will just make you do everything, all over again, anyway as part of pre-deployment training, so why bother?

if we trusted COs and resourced them adequately, maybe we wouldn’t have to do this ”driveway dance“ every single deployment.


----------



## MilEME09 (24 Feb 2021)

SeaKingTacco said:


> The specific issue is that, eventually units just give up on training the basics because it is a waste of time. CJOC will just make you do everything, all over again, anyway as part of pre-deployment training, so why bother?
> 
> if we trusted COs and resourced them adequately, maybe we wouldn’t have to do this ”driveway dance“ every single deployment.


It's this mentality that I see heavily in the PRes, which leads to subpar training as a normal to get the check in the box at thats it. I can't tell you how many times of done walk through talk through and thats considered "did it" even though I learned nothing after the first time 11 years ago.


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 Feb 2021)

MilEME09 said:


> It's this mentality that I see heavily in the PRes, which leads to subpar training as a normal to get the check in the box at thats it. I can't tell you how many times of done walk through talk through and thats considered "did it" even though I learned nothing after the first time 11 years ago.



For some reason, Pre-COVID anyways, we were forced to 'go through the basics' for the first half of the training year. Every. Single. Year. 

It wasn't until January that you could actually begin doing any interesting training. And then you only had two weekends, in January and February, to get the troops ready for any Bde level concentrations in March, during Spring Break. As a result, some experienced soldiers got bored and left/ checked out, and there was always a panic to try and get people ready for whatever Level 4/5 training was being planned for March.

The term 'self-defeating' well fits this approach IMHO.


----------



## SupersonicMax (24 Feb 2021)

MilEME09 said:


> It's this mentality that I see heavily in the PRes, which leads to subpar training as a normal to get the check in the box at thats it. I can't tell you how many times of done walk through talk through and thats considered "did it" even though I learned nothing after the first time 11 years ago.



And that's a problem within the organization.  The "check the box" culture is one of "cover your ass," where we value currency over proficiency. Your pre-deployment training will make you current but not necessarily proficient.  However, when something happens, it will be easy to point the finger at the individual, rather than the institution, since they were "current" even though leadership failed the individual and failed to make them proficient.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (24 Feb 2021)

SupersonicMax said:


> And that's a problem from the organization.  The "check the box" culture is one of "cover your ass," where we value currency over proficiency. Your pre-deployment training will make you current but not necessarily proficient.  However, when something happens, it will be easy to point the finger to the individual, rather than the institution, since they were "current" even though leadership failed the individual and failed to make them proficient.


This.


----------



## Halifax Tar (24 Feb 2021)

I have very elementary exposure to the Army.  Couple Afg deployments and a posting to a Sigs regt.  So take this in context.

But when thinking about the defence of Canada; should we not more heavily invest in our Sea and Air components and simply keep our Army for our own territorial defence ?  What's the point in having deployable ground forces ?  We could just as easily and with more effect provide to our allies by helping with a robust Navy to safe guard sea lanes and an Air Forces that is capable of patrolling our air space (NORAD) and contribute to coalition air wings. 

This would allow us to "be players" but in all likelihood sustain less casualties in an Afghan 2.0 scenario or WW3... Seems like a political win.


----------



## GR66 (24 Feb 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I have very elementary exposure to the Army.  Couple Afg deployments and a posting to a Sigs regt.  So take this in context.
> 
> But when thinking about the defence of Canada; should we not more heavily invest in our Sea and Air components and simply keep our Army for our own territorial defence ?  What's the point in having deployable ground forces ?  We could just as easily and with more effect provide to our allies by helping with a robust Navy to safe guard sea lanes and an Air Forces that is capable of patrolling our air space (NORAD) and contribute to coalition air wings.
> 
> This would allow us to "be players" but in all likelihood sustain less casualties in an Afghan 2.0 scenario or WW3... Seems like a political win.


We'll do the flying and they'll do the dying?

With friends like that who needs enemies?

[Edited to temper a flippant response to a serious question]

I'll agree that as essentially an "island" nation with no likelihood of being subjected to a land invasion (nobody except our closest neighbour and ally have the capability) our Navy and Air Force should be the main focus of our military.  This is no different than how Britain dominated for centuries.  A mastery of the seas due to a strong Royal Navy and a small, but efficient professional Army for expeditionary wars.

There comes a time though that your national interests, either directly or indirectly through your allies, require you to take on enemy forces on the ground.  That requires an Army.  And being part of an alliance sometimes requires showing that you are willing to share the sacrifice of blood and treasure with your allies, not making them do the heavy lifting while you do the politically safer jobs.

So in my view I generally agree with you that for Canada the RCN and RCAF should be the main focus for our military, but believe we also need a credible expeditionary Army that can make a meaningful contribution on the ground when militarily and politically necessary.

Sorry if my initial response was disrespectful.


----------



## Halifax Tar (24 Feb 2021)

GR66 said:


> We'll do the flying and they'll do the dying?
> 
> With friends like that who needs enemies?
> 
> ...



lol No offence taken, but in my scenario the MI wouldn't be dying unless Canada was invaded, as they would never leave the home pitch 

One of my favorite books BTW.

Again why do we need to deploy ground forces ?  Why are Canadas interests that are worth Canadian blood and treasure enough to put boots on some foreign land ?


----------



## Infanteer (24 Feb 2021)

...because the international system doesn't support the level of peace and prosperity Canada enjoys without supporting global stability.  We have treaty obligations to NATO to provide a certain level of land power to a the alliance.  We have to be prepared to support allies in the event of an Article 5 declaration.

So, even if we didn't want to partake in UN missions, or NATO "missions of choice" like Kosovo or Afghanistan, or other alliance efforts, we're still on the hook by Treaty to maintain land power for use abroad in support of our allies.  Dandourand's fireproof house disappeared a long time ago.


----------



## Halifax Tar (24 Feb 2021)

Infanteer said:


> ...because the international system doesn't support the level of peace and prosperity Canada enjoys without supporting global stability.  We have treaty obligations to NATO to provide a certain level of land power to a the alliance.  We have to be prepared to support allies in the event of an Article 5 declaration.
> 
> So, even if we didn't want to partake in UN missions, or NATO "missions of choice" like Kosovo or Afghanistan, or other alliance efforts, we're still on the hook by Treaty to maintain land power for use abroad in support of our allies.  Dandourand's fireproof house disappeared a long time ago.



Why cant we do that only utilizing our forces at sea and in the air and leave the ground pounding to Canadian shores and territory ?


----------



## daftandbarmy (24 Feb 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I have very elementary exposure to the Army.  Couple Afg deployments and a posting to a Sigs regt.  So take this in context.
> 
> But when thinking about the defence of Canada; should we not more heavily invest in our Sea and Air components and simply keep our Army for our own territorial defence ?  What's the point in having deployable ground forces ?  We could just as easily and with more effect provide to our allies by helping with a robust Navy to safe guard sea lanes and an Air Forces that is capable of patrolling our air space (NORAD) and contribute to coalition air wings.
> 
> This would allow us to "be players" but in all likelihood sustain less casualties in an Afghan 2.0 scenario or WW3... Seems like a political win.



That's what Mackenzie King tried to do prior to WW2.

Thinking 'hey, we'll just be the place where they train aircrew and save lives in the next war (and my political neck)' he enthusiastically backed the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan









						British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




Then WW2 came along and our infantry suffered some of the highest casualty rates ever, by anyone, because the need for large armoured, combined arms forces became clearly priority #1.

Hence the - correct - approach focused on 'balance' more recently.


----------



## Infanteer (24 Feb 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> Why cant we do that only utilizing our forces at sea and in the air and leave the ground pounding to Canadian shores and territory ?


Because belonging to NATO specifically lays out land force contributions.  Nobody likes a cheapskate who is only half-in.

Even Donald Trump couldn't walk the U.S. out of that obligation, as much as he wanted to.


----------



## Halifax Tar (24 Feb 2021)

I do believe in dubya dubya two our attachment/obedience to the crown may have had a large role to play in what we deployed.  I would argue this is far from the case currently.

Did we have to send ground forces into WW2 ? I would argue the biggest role Canada played in WW2 was at sea and in the air during the BOA. Not that we were always very good at that, just that it was arguably our most important contribution to the ETO.  Followed closely by BCATP and our lads in fighter and bomber command.

So is it that we need a deployable Army because we've always done it that way ?  Or is there actually an existential requirement for us to function in that capacity ?

Canada seems to want to be a player on the world stage, but only with the minimal commitment to what that requires defence wise.  So instead of trying to do everything sort of good, why not concentrate our efforts in a couple of areas and become the best at the that ?  Say ASW / convoy protection and control of air space.   Thus leaving our forces in green to defend the home land should an enemy ever make it to our shores.



Infanteer said:


> Because belonging to NATO specifically lays out land force contributions.  Nobody likes a cheapskate who is only half-in.
> 
> Even Donald Trump couldn't walk the U.S. out of that obligation, as much as he wanted to.



Aren't we already a cheapskate ?


----------



## FJAG (24 Feb 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I do believe in dubya dubya two our attachment/obedience to the crown may have had a large role to play in what we deployed.  I would argue this is far from the case currently.


The US had no obligation to the Brit crown and was into it already before Pearl Harbor and all in after.


Halifax Tar said:


> Did we have to send ground forces into WW2 ? I would argue the biggest role Canada played in WW2 was at sea and in the air during the BOA. Not that we were always very good at that, just that it was arguably our most important contribution to the ETO.  Followed closely by BCATP and our lads in fighter and bomber command.


Yes we did. You can't win a war by leaving the enemy untouched in its homeland. All you do is extend the war indefinitely. The war at sea was very important in getting the war materials from its manufacturing base to the point of conflict. One can't underestimate that.  Our air force contributed mightily to the air war. At the end of the day, It was 250,000 Canadians in the First Canadian Army that put boots on the ground in Europe and shaped the outcome of European (and incidentally Canadian) history for the next 80 years.


Halifax Tar said:


> So is it that we need a deployable Army because we've always done it that way ?  Or is there actually an existential requirement for us to function in that capacity ?


One of my favourite quotes says it all:



> The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression.[Ochmanek, David et al. “U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World” RAND Corp 2017  at p. 45  https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1782-1.html]


In order to properly defend one must have the ability to strike back. That is a fundamental truth. A balanced force is essential for that.


Halifax Tar said:


> Canada seems to want to be a player on the world stage, but only with the minimal commitment to what that requires defence wise.  So instead of trying to do everything sort of good, why not concentrate our efforts in a couple of areas and become the best at the that ?  Say ASW / convoy protection and control of air space.   Thus leaving our forces in green to defend the home land should an enemy ever make it to our shores.
> 
> 
> 
> Aren't we already a cheapskate ?


When one extends your arguments, and questions why do we need this? then one of the logical solutions is that we have a tremendous moat around our country and a very interested ally down south. Who is going to attack North America in the first place. Why do we even need an air force and navy when the risk of such an attack is infinitesimally small? Why not just coastal missile artillery and air defense?

Those arguments make no sense of course. We need a balanced force to go in all directions. That's without question. The hard part is to determine the size and makeup of that force. That's where being a cheapskate comes into play.

🍻


----------



## Halifax Tar (24 Feb 2021)

FJAG said:


> The US had no obligation to the Brit crown and was into it already before Pearl Harbor and all in after.
> 
> At sea and in the Air yes.  But they had no stomach to commit ground forces until Pearl Harbor.  Either way, I am discussing Canada.
> 
> ...


----------

