# Is China a threat? (from: Global NATO?)



## Nemo888 (16 Jun 2006)

Maybe this is the reason for the stock market correction? Geopolitics just got alot more intresting.

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061506.shtml

*WASHINGTON PONDERS WAYS TO COUNTER THE RISE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION * 

Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization during a June 15 summit forcefully asserted their right to regulate affairs in Central Asia. A declaration signed by the heads of state of all six member states, including Russia and China, is widely viewed as placing the group in direct opposition to the United States in the regional geopolitical contest.

SCO leaders gathered in Shanghai, site of the group’s founding five years ago. In the June 15 declaration, the SCO professed to be operating according to "principles of openness, non-alliance and not targeting at any third party." However, the text’s language left little doubt that the group rejects the US democratization agenda, and hinted that member states would consider acting in concert in an effort to reduce the United States’ geopolitical presence in Central Asia.

"The SCO will make a constructive contribution to the establishment of a new global security architecture of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and mutual respect," the declaration asserted. "Threats and challenges can be effectively met only when there is broad cooperation among all countries and international organizations concerned. What specific means and mechanisms should be adopted to safeguard security of the region is the right and responsibility of countries in the region."

The statement went on to indicate that Central Asian states would follow their own development paths. "Diversity of civilization and the model of development must be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and model of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs."

Also at the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support for Iran’s right to engage in peaceful nuclear research. Following a side meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who attended the summit as an observer, Putin stated that "all countries in the world, including Iran, have the right to fulfill their plans in the use of high technologies for the benefit of their development," the Moscow News web site reported. The Russian leader, however, added a caveat that nuclear research should be conducted "in a way to fully eliminate" international concerns that Iran was striving to build a nuclear weapon. Putin also announced that Iran was ready to negotiate on an international package designed to prompt Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities in return for economic benefits. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. He indicated that Iran would soon makes its views clear on a possible timeline for talks, the official RIA Novosti news agency reported.

In a speech at the summit, Ahmadinejad called on regional states to tighten cooperation. "We need a strong powerful organization [SCO] to protect us from unreasonable outside interference," the Iranian leader said, plainly referring to the United States.

Washington now confronts the likelihood the SCO states will try to put the squeeze on the US geopolitical position in Central Asia. American policymakers are currently working to develop a strategy to blunt the SCO’s ability to influence regional developments.

Kazakhstan, an SCO member, figures prominently in the US strategic calculus. Energy-rich Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s economic engine, and thus wields considerable influence in any regional grouping of which it is a member. Top Bush administration officials have courted the country’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. For example, during an early May visit to Kazakhstan, US Vice President Dick Cheney expressed admiration for the country’s economic and political development. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. 

The United States is also believed to be supportive of Kazakhstan’s efforts to join the World Trade Organization. The hope in Washington is that stronger US-Kazakhstani ties will encourage Astana to act as a force for moderation within the SCO vis a vis the United States.

The United States, however, will have to show patience toward Astana. Understandably, Nazarbayev is engaged in a balancing act between the Bear, the Dragon, and the far-away American Eagle. He recently sent a letter to Ahmadinejad calling attention to Kazakhstan’s decision to voluntarily give up its nuclear stockpile after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a gesture appreciated by the Bush Administration. At the same time, Kazakhstani officials have expressed a desire to forge closer economic relations with Iran.

So, what else can the United States do to counter the rise of the SCO? For one, Washington should recognize that the SCO’s leading powers – China and Russia – are extremely sensitive to the US presence in what has traditionally been their sphere of influence. Washington should develop a nuanced policy, using both words and actions, designed to reassure Moscow and Beijing that the geopolitical competition in Central Asia is not a zero-sum game.

American diplomats should also strive to convince Chinese officials that Russia is trying to drag Beijing into the anti-American bloc, an action that runs contrary to China’s long-term economic interests. In addition, US officials should remind Beijing that unless Tehran is restrained, Iran is likely to drive up world oil prices through pursuit of its aggressive policies, especially its nuclear research program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. China is experiencing a tremendous rise in energy consumption, driven by the country’s rapid economic development. As a UN Security Council member, China could play a key role in the possible imposition of sanctions against Iran, if Tehran continues to defy the international community on the nuclear issue.

The oil price issue represents a wedge that the United States can use to divide Russia and China. With its abundant yet hard-to-extract energy reserves, Russia is a high-cost oil producer, and is thus interested in the Middle East instability to keep oil prices high and its budget revenues higher. А senior Putin foreign policy advisor told me that Russia will quietly cheer more Middle East instability as oil prices may climb to $90 a barrel or higher. China, on the other hand, has an almost insatiable demand for energy so that it can maintain its present economic growth pace. Thus, Beijing is interested in keeping the price of Middle East oil as low as possible.

There are few levers available to Washington to influence Russian behavior. Perhaps the best Washington can do is to remind the Kremlin of the likely geopolitical repercussions of an aggressive, nuclear armed Iran. Russia’s present support for Tehran could easily boomerang in the coming years, and Moscow could come to see Tehran posing a geopolitical threat to the Russian Federation’s southern flank. Iranian influence is already making inroads into Azerbaijan, and Tehran is likely to intensify its competition with Moscow for influence throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia.

As US officials engage China and Russia, Washington should concurrently continue building relationships not only with Kazakhstan, but also with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia. Bush Administration strategists believe that wealth creation, robust education strategies, and ethnic and religious harmony will go a long way to stem the rise of radical Islam, and thus take much of the steam out of the SCO.

As America is pursuing its "long war" on jihadi terrorism and ideology, it can ill-afford a conflict with Russia and China in Eurasia. Thus, Washington must explore ways to establish a dialogue with SCO, or risk yet another humiliation in the hands of Moscow and Beijing. 


Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation, and the author of Eurasia in Balance (Ashgate, 2005) and Russia-Kazakhstan Energy Cooperation (GMB Publishing, 2006).


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## Nemo888 (16 Jun 2006)

The point is that if you are *intrested* in central asian geopolitics this is a major shift that probably won't be picked up in the mainstream media. Even though it won't be picked up it will strongly influence world events.


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## a_majoor (16 Jun 2006)

This has an interesting analogy to WWII, in the sense that there were several "different" wars being fought for several different reasons, but with enough overlap in time, space and the various actors to create a "global" narrative.

The British Empire was engaged in a European struggle to maintain the "Balance of Power" in Europe to prevent the establishment of an all powerful Nazi Germany which would dominate the continent, a naval war in the Mediterranean against Italy and a fierce struggle against the Japanese Empire over control of resources and freedom of the seas in the Indian Ocean basin. Certainly the actions of the various players were influenced by a convergence of aims; Italy, for example would probably nohave been emboldened to fight the British without the implied assurance of Germany to help (and remember the Germans eventually pushed the Italians aside in exasperation when it became clear they were unable to successfuly prosecute the war in the Mediterranean and North Africa).

Today, while the United States prosecutes their GWOT, other nations seek to extend or protect their own national self interest, setting up potential flashpoints for conflict in the near or mid future. There is also some strategizing going on here, supporting Iran is not in Russia or China's best long term interest but they may see this as a way of distracting the United States in the short term, putting a bigger draw on US military resources and slowing or stopping the overarching US "Purple Finger" strategy in SW Asia, which is probably what they fear the most.


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## Centurian1985 (16 Jun 2006)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> The point is that if you are *intrested* in central asian geopolitics this is a major shift that probably won't be picked up in the mainstream media. Even though it won't be picked up it will strongly influence world events.



This is nothing new.  Although under a new name, Russia and China have been resisting US influence in Central Asia ever since 1991.  IMO, the US is making a big mistake in supporting the Kazakhstan regime, one of the most corrupt and repressive governments in the area.


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## Shec (16 Jun 2006)

Good point.  I would think it even predates that, one can trace Sino-Russian attempts to keep the West from gaining a central asian foothold at least as far back as the "great game" of the late 19th century.  And you can't lose what you never really had.

However, considering the mistrust rooted in historical enmities between Russia and China, China and India, and Russia and Iran/Persia I wonder just how serious a long term threat this regional bloc poses.  I tend to support a_majoor's assessment.


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## vangemeren (16 Jun 2006)

S_Baker said:
			
		

> NEMO888,
> 
> in your original post you had nothing but the original article.  No reason given for the post, no analysis, nothing.  You might like to have a look at A_MAJOOR's analysis before you post...



I don't see the problem with that. Others on this site do the same thing.


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## Nemo888 (16 Jun 2006)

S_Baker said:
			
		

> NEMO888,
> 
> in your original post you had nothing but the original article.  No reason given for the post, no analysis, nothing.  You might like to have a look at A_MAJOOR's analysis before you post...



Actually sometimes that is better left to others with more knowledge, hence the post. A_MAJOOR's analysis happened because of the post, not the other way around.


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## CougarKing (16 Jun 2006)

I'm just curious, does anyone here believe that the SCO- otherwise known as the "Shanghai Six"- will someday become exactly like the former Warsaw Pact? I've heard of "anti-terrorism" exercises in Xinjiang province between the PLA and other SCO members back around Fall 2003. 

With the exception of China, all those nations who are SCO members were all former Soviet satellites (China was never truly a Soviet "satellite" since the 50s when an apparent schism grew between Stalin and Mao, and later between succeeding Soviet leaders and Mao, until China began to open up in Deng Xiaoping's time. Apparently Gorbachev was making a state visit to China to help mend ties when the Tiananmen Square incident was unfolding back in June 1989).


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## pbi (17 Jun 2006)

Nemo888 said:
			
		

> The point is that if you are *intrested* in central asian geopolitics this is a major shift that probably won't be picked up in the mainstream media. Even though it won't be picked up it will strongly influence world events.



The mainstream media has had this for a while now. I have seen CBC coverage of it, and this is from the CBC website (there are lots more listed if you do a search):http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto061520060813253009

Something like this was really inevitable, wasn't it?


Cheers


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## Fishbone Jones (17 Jun 2006)

van Gemeren said:
			
		

> I don't see the problem with that. Others on this site do the same thing.





			
				Nemo888 said:
			
		

> Actually sometimes that is better left to others with more knowledge, hence the post. A_MAJOOR's analysis happened because of the post, not the other way around.



A simple, "What's everyone think?" or "I'm confused by this whole concept?" would have sufficed. It's called opening a dialogue.


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## couchcommander (17 Jun 2006)

a_majoor said:
			
		

> This has an interesting analogy to WWII, in the sense that there were several "different" wars being fought for several different reasons, but with enough overlap in time, space and the various actors to create a "global" narrative.



Indeed I think you are correct in poiting out that there are converging interests here between several large and powerful entities, and it is similar to the pre-world war II situation in the grand scheme of things. 

However, I think drawing that comparison causes people to divide the parties into "good" and "bad" based on who one thinks they represent in the analogy, when in fact we do not have a Nazi Germany, a fascist Italy, nor an Imperial Japan seeking conquest. 

We should seek to determine what the goals of these states are, and deal with them in light of the current situation, not a previous one IMO (once again analogy isn't wrong, I just don't think it's helpful). 

Whoever pointed out that supporting Kazakhstan is a slippy slope is right though, and the US has made the mistake of supporting a regime for convenient reasons before. Though, in the end it serves to demonstrate that the US concern is far from purple fingers, and, like most motives, is more in line with their own self interest rather than altruistic democracy spreading. 

In the end though, we should be looking at this situation with the question "what is best for Canada?" in mind, not "what is best for the United States?" (of course often times what is best for the United States is also best for Canada, but we should not automatically assume that but examine it case by case).

So, having said that, what would be best for Canada in this regard? Would we actually be hurt from the emergence of a mutli-polar world?


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## tomahawk6 (18 Jun 2006)

Keep in mind that China is still a communist dictatorship. So any organization they sponsor will adhere to China's foreign policy goals - namely acquiring access to a large share of the world's energy resources.


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## a_majoor (18 Jun 2006)

One should not confuse short term expediency with long term strategy, or even believe the United States acts in a monolithic manner if foreign and defence policy.

Kazakhstan is an important beach head if actions need to be taken in SW or Central Asia, hence the interest. This is a place which is needed now, and is probably not a good candidate for the "Purple Finger" strategy in the short run. The problem is the diplomats and functionaries who make these decisions are often not comfortable with changing the arrangement after it is no longer working. American policy in the middle East from the post war period to 9/11 is a very good indication of how old assumptions trap us. Even post 9/11 there are very real and public frictions between the State Department and the Defence Department in the United States.

The "Purple Finger" is a very long term strategy which seeks to change the very nature of the societies and political cultures of the Middle East and SW Asia. Kazakhstan may eventually be able to fall under the "Purple Finger" umbrella, but I can see internal conflicts between various factions in the US government, and various factions in Kazakhstan trying to exploit these divides for their own benefit. Saudi Arabia is a good player of this particular game, they are certainly not friends of the Anglosphere West, but still get the Royal treatment because of their oil and the free flow of petrodollars to buy influence. So long as the US perceives Kazakhstan to be a potential FOB and staging point, they too will be getting support without demands for long term changes.


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## Centurian1985 (18 Jun 2006)

a_majoor, totally agree with your points, but think that choosing Kazakhstan is going to come back and bite them in the ass later as it has in so many previous cases of supporting hostile regimes.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Sep 2006)

I know I am repeating myself but I need to take issue with Echo-9 when he says:



> … the idea of a new alliance based on the Anglosphere is an enticing one- you do get the advantage of more of the baseline shared understandings of culture across its nations.  It does not need to be geographically based, which NATO will continue to be for the reasons highlighted above.  It has the potential of integrating the next superpower (India) early on in its development.
> 
> Most importantly, it has the benefit of sharing a perception of the threats of the next century- islamofascism and China.



Two points:

1.	India chose, wisely, I think, to develop and entrench political democracy first while it, unwisely in my opinion, decided to follow the socialist _path_ which, history teaches, leads straight to poverty.  India is, now, working on becoming a major, global economic actor – a process which might require 25 or more years – given the damage done by 50 years of socialism.  It is, already, a significant _regional_ military power but it lacks the economic _depth_ and resources to build more power which could then be projected beyond it’s very important area of interest.  (It cannot weaken itself in its own area without ceding Kashmir to Pakistan.)  India is not the next superpower; and

2.	China is not a problem.  See e.g. Thomas P Barnett and others.  China is very open, very public about its ambitions.  In the short term they are:

•	Building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society;

•	Rejuvenating the country through science and education and strengthening the nation with talent – _many, many Chinese believe this is the _sine qua non_ of power in the 21st century_;

•	Deepening system reform – _this is the rule of law/governance (corporate and government)_;

•	Implementing mutually beneficial and win-win opening up strategy – _this is the foreign trade/foreign investment issue_;

•	Building a harmonious socialist society – _this is a bit complex.  Socialism is dying, rapidly, in China – it was never a good fit.  _”A harmonious socialist society”_ is code for preserving the ‘mandate’ of the Communist Dynasty.  Government’s in China recognize the need for a popular mandate – as they have for 2,500 years; they just go about securing it in a different way_;

•	Reinforcing construction of socialist democracy and politics – _ditto_;

•	Strengthening construction of socialist culture – _ditto_;

•	Strengthening construction of national defence and the military – _this is the continuation of a process begun more than 10 years ago.  The PLA is now an all volunteer force which is undergoing rapid, revolutionary transformation.  The levée en mass is gone – China is building lighter, highly mobile – globally mobile – joint forces.  The _centre of mass_ is shifting (maybe has shifted) from the South/Taiwan Straights to the North West where low level Islamic insurgencies are feared_; and

•	Strengthening construction of national defence and the military Establishing and improving implementation mechanism - _this is affirmation that socialism is dead.  It means that China will, in the words of the semi-official _People’s Daily_, “rely on the fundamental role of the market in resource allocation to realize the targets and tasks” outlined in the most recent (11th/2006) five year plan._

(That all came from:  http://english.people.com.cn/200603/09/eng20060309_249320.html  which is the authoritative People’s Daily.)

China intends to be our competitor, globally.  The decision to join the WTO is far, far more important than any military decision taken since the death of Mao.  That decision destroyed the Communist Party because it destroyed its stranglehold on a moribund, corrupt economy.  The Communists, who aren’t communistic, or even socialistic, at all – who think Marx and Lenin were barbarian fools, are still a healthy, powerful government and they plan to stay in power so long as their ‘mandate’ holds.  The fact that the Communists are not communistic and are adopting many of the tools we associate with liberal-capitalist societies does not mean that China will, ever, become _liberal_.  (I think it might in 2,000 years – not sooner.  It is more likely that America will become conservative and speak Mandarin within 500 years.)  The Chinese Communists are very keen on using the most modern, most successful techniques – be they Russian or American, Cuban or Canadian – to accomplish the aim of all Chinese dynasties for the last 2,500 years: to sustain themselves in power.  They see their mandate as being to provide _*peace*_ and _*prosperity*_, pretty much exactly what I have proposed in these fora as the common sense base for Canada’s national policies.

‘Peace, order and good government’ are central to the Communist Party’s understanding of its mandate.  As of this week yet another anti-corruption programme has begun and arrests of senior officials have occurred and some political corruption convictions will result in capital punishment.  Corruption, in the Chinese, sense does not encompass all the things we understand by that word; Chinese _family values_ – real family values rather than the light weight fluff espoused by e.g. evangelical Christians – mean that some things we would regard as ‘corrupt’ are essential components of business, _connections_, for example.  That being said the Chinese people want and are demanding that laws be applied equally and fairly to all, even to officials and Party members.  That will happen, in spades, during the next decade.  

We need to see China the way they see us: as a global competitor in the market for goods, services and ideas.  China is a more important competitor than Europe but it is neither ‘better’ nor ‘worse’ than Europe.  I would go so far as to argue that China is less inclined to ‘war’ with us on trade and commerce issues than is the EU.  Neither Europe nor China is our friend but neither should become our enemy.  The anti-China crowd in the US, especially, is driven by a desire to keep the military/strategic _status quo_ which seems to require an enemy.

I think we have an enemy and I think  it is not China and will not become China unless we are foolish enough to declare them that.  The enemy is a rather loose coalition of movements, animated by some mad but attractive ideas.  We need to forget about fighting China – except in the free marketplace where our weapons are brains and productivity – and get on with destroying *radical, medieval, barbaric Islam*.

On the central issue I think NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty provide a good base for the _Anglosphere_ to build coalitions and regional partnerships, as Journeyman has defined them, as needed to deal with the *real* enemy.

 Sorry this is long and unedited/disjointed.  I have a very sore back right now and sitting up to type is painful.

Edit: corrected last bullet in point 2.


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## Echo9 (25 Sep 2006)

I do stand by my characterization of China as a threat through the next 100 years.  I'll take your characterization at face value, and I would say that it's largely accurate as a view of where they're at now (the Chinese people are certainly not and never were socialist- quite possibly the most innately capitalist in the world; and, the CCP is no longer communist, but is instead the "Red Dynasty").  It's  where the CCP would like things to go.  My view is that China, within the next 10-20 years will be overcome by its own momentum coupled with some key structural faults.

1.  Much of the current growth is built on a weak business foundation.  The vast portion of loans brokered by banks in china are granted on the basis of party connections, and will not be repaid.  

2.  The one child policy, while effective at sharply reducing poverty levels has led to a situation where:
- there is a coming population inversion, where the elderly greatly outnumber the working population required to support them.  Think of this- in 2 generations, 1 child means that one worker needs to support 4 grandparents...
- there is a gross imbalance of men to women, and many men have no prospects for employment or marriage.  This leads to a restive population that increasingly becomes aggressive toward its neighbours.

3.  The country has a small and diminishing resource base which must be maintained.

4.  The country as a whole has been undergoing massive growth consistently for the last 20 years.  That cannot continue without some correction.

Take a step back, and you can argue that this is not so different from where Japan sat 30 years ago.  In the early-mid 80s everyone seemed to think that Japan would be the next hyperpower (at least economically).  Things didn't happen that way, for reasons similar to what I noted above, but less in severity- the bad loans were given to underperforming sister companies, rather than political cronies, the age imbalance was there but not the gender imbalance, Japan's rise was as much a result of intellectual property building as manufacturing growth.  More importantly, Japan had achieved a rather comfortable level of prosperity in its rise.  China also has a much more troubled history of civil war than Japan.


So, what's the likely impact of the fall, when it occurs.  To my mind, the most likely path is that China will turn aggressive, seeking to militarily achieve its needs for resources (and here the likely target is Siberia with its rich resources and sparse population), and to divert the attention of its restive populace.  The other likely path is civil war, with a partition of China into multiple parts.

In either case, while China may or not be an enemy of the West/ Anglosphere, it certainly will be a threat, simply because of the chaos that will spin from its path.


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> We need to see China the way they see us: as a global competitor in the market for goods, services and ideas.  China is a more important competitor than Europe but it is neither ‘better’ nor ‘worse’ than Europe.  I would go so far as to argue that China is less inclined to ‘war’ with us on trade and commerce issues than is the EU.



You might want to observe the facts and read some serious publications before pontificating on strategic matters. Very few thinkers both here and in China see our relationship as anything other than one of strategic competition. The list of our respective allies should exemplify the matter rather conclusively.  



			
				Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> Neither Europe nor China is our friend but neither should become our enemy.



That's preposterous. 



			
				Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> The anti-China crowd in the US, especially, is driven by a desire to keep the military/strategic _status quo_ which seems to require an enemy.



Oh boy, another conspiracy theorist...


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## George Wallace (25 Sep 2006)

;D

schering 

And you are?  (Empty profile and all - no credentials)  What are you basing you commentary on?  Your sources would be of interest.  Perhaps you can expand on them?


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## tomahawk6 (25 Sep 2006)

Methinks schering is playing with fire. :


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> ;D
> 
> schering
> 
> And you are?  (Empty profile and all - no credentials)



A poster.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> What are you basing you commentary on?  Your sources would be of interest.  Perhaps you can expand on them?



The other poster's stated opinion is so outrageous and unreasonable that the burden of proof falls squarely on his shoulders. 

There are countless serious articles and publications that dwelve extensively on precisely this subject matter, most of whom are available for free on the internet. A knowledge of current geopolitics unhindered by conspiracy theories might also help.


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## paracowboy (25 Sep 2006)

schering said:
			
		

> A poster.


not for long, with that attitude, smart-ass



> George with all due respect your stated opinion is so outrageous and unreasonable that the burden of proof falls squarely on your shoulders.
> 
> There are countless serious articles and publications that dwelve extensively on precisely this subject matter, most of whom are available for free on the internet. A knowledge of current geopolitics unhindered by conspiracy theories might also help.


 for someone trying to come across as super-duper smart, you already stepped on your dick. George didn't write the post you're referring to.



> Please be my guest, enlighten me with your daring demonstrations.


 again with the mouth. Smarten up.

- para-mod-boy


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

paracowboy said:
			
		

> George didn't write the post you're referring to.




I stand corrected.


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## George Wallace (25 Sep 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> ;D
> 
> schering
> 
> And you are?  (Empty profile and all - no credentials)





			
				schering said:
			
		

> A poster.



A Master of the Obvious  :



			
				schering said:
			
		

> George with all due respect your stated opinion is so outrageous and unreasonable that the burden of proof falls squarely on your shoulders.



What stated opinion have I made.  None that I can see.  I have asked you to expand on yours.  Nothing outrageous or unreasonable there.  As for burden of proof; with your lack of credentials we can only accept yours as being absent and thus worthless. 



			
				schering said:
			
		

> There are countless serious articles and publications that dwelve extensively on precisely this subject matter, most of whom are available for free on the internet. A knowledge of current geopolitics unhindered by conspiracy theories might also help.



Swell!  There are countless serious articles on the ramifications of many controversial topics.  Please enlighten us to where you are drawing your commentary.




			
				schering said:
			
		

> Please be my guest, enlighten me with your daring demonstrations.



It seems your arrogance has confused you.  We are asking you for "your expansion on this subject", not your abilities as a Troll.

Shall we call you Pascal?



{Sorry I was such a slow typist.   :-[ }


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> A Master of the Obvious  :
> 
> What stated opinion have I made.  None that I can see.



I'm really sorry George, I mistook you for the other poster.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> I have asked you to expand on yours. Nothing outrageous or unreasonable there.



No except that I don't want to spend 1 hour writing the obvious. Let me just mention then as a mere example of the growing strategic reality the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that, beyond its stated developmental purpose, also pursues a quite obvious and effective agenda of reducing the US influence in Central Asia.  



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> As for burden of proof; with your lack of credentials we can only accept yours as being absent and thus worthless.



Yes George, you have every right to be upset. Let me apologize again.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Swell!  There are countless serious articles on the ramifications of many controversial topics.  Please enlighten us to where you are drawing your commentary.



http://www.csis.org/images/stories/china/060914_EurasiaForum_ChinaShanghai.pdf


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## big bad john (25 Sep 2006)

schering around here it is considered polite, but not mandatory, to fill in your profile to let people know where from you speak.  If you have little or no military background then please use the notes section.  Just a little advice to make the ride more enjoyable for all.  And welcome to the site.


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

big bad john said:
			
		

> schering around here it is considered polite, but not mandatory, to fill in your profile to let people know where from you speak.  If you have little or no military background then please use the notes section.  Just a little advice to make the ride more enjoyable for all.  And welcome to the site.



Thank you John, I enjoy reading more than posting. Is my profile any better?


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## George Wallace (25 Sep 2006)

schering said:
			
		

> http://www.csis.org/images/stories/china/060914_EurasiaForum_ChinaShanghai.pdf



I can see that you and Edward, who has just returned from China,  will have a lot to discuss.


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## schering (25 Sep 2006)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I can see that you and Edward, who has just returned from China,  will have a lot to discuss.



Yes, I can't wait to start discussing how "Europe" - like China - is not our friend .


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## paracowboy (26 Sep 2006)

schering said:
			
		

> Thank you John, I enjoy reading more than posting. Is my profile any better?


no. Nor is it clever, witty, or cute. You are already on my last nerve.


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## aesop081 (26 Sep 2006)

schering said:
			
		

> No except that I don't want to spend 1 hour writing the obvious.



Now you just come across as lazy or uninformed and won't admit it. If you have a case to make in rebutal, make it or put the keyboard away entirely.


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## Cloud Cover (26 Sep 2006)

schering said:
			
		

> Yes, I can't wait to start discussing how "Europe" - like China - is not our friend .



Then for the love of God, Allah, and the spirit of Mother Earth start discussing.  Exactly how  is Europe our friend? Put all the history trash aside and focus on the here and now- explain to me how is Europe our so-called friend?


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## Infanteer (26 Sep 2006)

Wow - 6 posts and you step into the ring with a fellow with extensive contact and experience in the region.  And what, preytell, qualifications do you bring to this debate.  As Whiskey said, put up....


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## Edward Campbell (26 Sep 2006)

Echo9 said:
			
		

> I do stand by my characterization of China as a threat through the next 100 years.  I'll take your characterization at face value, and I would say that it's largely accurate as a view of where they're at now (the Chinese people are certainly not and never were socialist- quite possibly the most innately capitalist in the world; and, the CCP is no longer communist, but is instead the "Red Dynasty").  It's  where the CCP would like things to go.  My view is that China, within the next 10-20 years will be overcome by its own momentum coupled with some key structural faults.
> 
> 1.  Much of the current growth is built on a weak business foundation.  The vast portion of loans brokered by banks in china are granted on the basis of party connections, and will not be repaid.
> 
> ...



I agree that over the next century, even over the next 25 years, China will have some pretty serious ‘downs’ to balance the fairly steady (but I agree unsustainable) ‘ups’ of the past 20 years.

Resources are a problem.  The nearest good, rich ‘resource base’ is in Eastern Siberia which some Chinese scholars and analysts regard as _Asian_, which is their code for ‘not Russian.’  I have postulated before that, for China, the most likely conflict is with Russia over access to Siberian natural resources.  It doesn’t have to be a military conflict.

I think the bank loan crisis, and I agree it was one, is ‘contained’ – largely by huge infusions of Asian money, party raised by taking Bank of China and the larger ICBC public this summer.  I think the ICBC capitalization was the largest in the history of the Hang Seng.

The one child policy is having taking interesting twists and turns.  It is being relaxed in the countryside because too many young men have already left for better paying, easier work in the East coast cities.  In Zhejiang province many (fairly prosperous) farmers are building nice new three story houses – for the husbands they are trying to recruit for their daughters.  It appears, based on purely anecdotal evidence, that the rate of abortions based on sex selection is dropping/has dropped towards zero, in the cities, anyway.  The ‘little emperor’ is now accompanies by the ‘little empress’ – not surprising, I don’t think, given that women are not devalued in China as they are in many other cultures.

The demographic bubble is a real problem for China – no easy solution.  While the Chinese are not a xenophobic as, say, the Japanese, they still have trouble with some ‘minorities’ and most ‘foreigners’.  Importing people, à la North America, is not going to solve the people problem – even if there were enough ‘spare’ people in the world.  In fact some Chinese are talking about the Philippines model – encouraging even greater *emigration* to provide remittances to support family members in China.  The central government has already made quite severe cuts to the _national_ pensions – a family of two retirees is down to about ¥500-750 (≤$100.00) per month.  (By contrast some provincial/city and _institute_ (former government agency or ‘corporate’) pensions are a full order of magnitude larger and many are in excess of ¥1,000 per person.  I don’t know how far the (currently) more generous pensions will fall but, I’m pretty sure they will fall because, as you point out, they are unsustainable in the next generation.)  The good news, for China, is that bubbles do pass through the system and the boom/bust/echo cycle moderates over a century or so.

I agree wholeheartedly with: “…China may or not be an enemy of the West/ Anglosphere, it certainly will be might become a threat, simply because of the chaos that will may spin from its path.”  In my view that is all the more reason to ‘engage’ China as a competitor, using every available tool including the WTO, IMF and whatever other institutions, and I favour bringing China into a new G10 (with India) and the OECD soon.


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## Edward Campbell (26 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> ‘Peace, order and good government’ are central to the Communist Party’s understanding of its mandate.  As of this week yet another anti-corruption programme has begun and arrests of senior officials have occurred and some political corruption convictions will result in capital punishment.  Corruption, in the Chinese, sense does not encompass all the things we understand by that word; Chinese _family values_ – real family values rather than the light weight fluff espoused by e.g. evangelical Christians – mean that some things we would regard as ‘corrupt’ are essential components of business, _connections_, for example.  That being said the Chinese people want and are demanding that laws be applied equally and fairly to all, even to officials and Party members.  That will happen, in spades, during the next decade.
> 
> ...



I want to expand on this point.

The arrest, last week, of Chen Liangyu (former Mayor of Shanghai and, therefore, very senior Communist Party member) is the most public in a process which is multi-pronged (as almost everything is in China).  The _message_ is:

•	To foreign investors – China is intent on dealing with political corruption.  This is an especially welcome message for North American industry, where laws prohibiting bribes are taken fairly seriously;

•	To Chinese politicians – egregious corruption does harm to the _Red Dynasty_ and is, therefore, going to be punished harshly – if, right now, a bit randomly;

•	To the Chinese people – we, the Dynasty, are cleaning our own house to make ourselves worthy of your continued support or, at least, toleration; and

•	To the leadership, itself – we are embarked upon Deng Xiaoping’s _new path_ and we are going to stay the course.  It requires reformed public administration and governance.  You will adapt … or die.

This is part of a well established process, going back to the detention (conviction without trial) of former Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong and his son and the investigation of Vice-Mayor Wang Baosen which resulted in his suicide.  That was part of a process aimed at reassuring Hong Kong, especially and personally Anson Chan, about China’s commitment to reasonably honest public administration.  This was vital because she, quite publicly, feared that Chinese corruption would damage Hong Kong’s financial position.

I need to reiterate that _corruption_ ≠ corruption.  I had the occasion this summer, as a guest of a Chinese official, to attend a briefing on development of the Pearl River Delta – Guangdong and area.  One speaker, a partner in a major Hong Kong financial concern, told officials, roughly: 

“You need to mobilize five key resources –

1.	An educated, productive workforce – which the region has,

2.	Suitable infrastructure, including civic infrastructure (roads, sewers, etc) and technology – which the regions needs,

3.	Capital – which is readily available,

4.	The well known Chinese entrepreneurial spirit – which is re-emerging, and

5.	*Connections*.”

I could see almost every Euro-American head in room jerk and look to a neighbour to confirm that they had heard correctly.  So did the speaker and he continued along these lines:

“Yes, of course, connections.  This is China, we can read your corporate reports and balance sheets but they only tell us, hopefully, that you are making money without being convicted of any criminal offences.  That’s unlikely to persuade me to go to my management committee and say _‘let’s invest several billion (US) with these people.’_  I want, I need to hear from someone I trust that you are an honest, upright company, one which can be a trusted partner in a shared enterprise.  Then we can do business together, for our mutual profit.

That means that you cannot, likely, just into the Chinese market in a big way. You need to start with a small joint-venture with a Chinese company.  You have to earn our trust.  Then you can do another, bigger joint enterprise.  Once you are sufficiently ‘Chinese’ we will welcome you into the fold.  But even then you, like me and my company, need connections to grow bigger and better, and you need to continually maintain and ‘burnish’ and expand your web of connections.  The closer and ‘better’ your connections, the more likely you are to prosper, with them.  It has nothing to do with corruption but it has everything to do with trust and the the way we Chinese prefer to do business.”


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## Edward Campbell (26 Sep 2006)

I apologize for three in a row and this is it for me.  There is an old saying to the effect that those who spent a week in China want to write a book, after six months they are content to write an essay and after a year they are wise enough to keep quiet.  My contributions this thread may soon approach essay length, so I will be quiet.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization raises its head again.

The AIM of the SCO is to strengthen China’s position throughout Central Asia.  This must, consequentially, _counter_ America’s influence but that’s a tertiary concern.  It is *Russian* influence the Chinese are most intent on reducing.

•	Primary goal: strengthen China;

•	Secondary goal: weaken Russia;

•	Tertiary goal: discomfit America; and

•	Everything else: everyone else.

It is very sound policy, for China.

The Chinese are worried about *their* North West and they do not trust the Russians or the Americans to deal with Central Asia in a manner which will serve China’s best interests.  The best course open, therefore, is to exploit Russia’s current weakness and China’s current strength and supplant Russia as the primary foreign power in Central Asia.

I believe that the Chinese want something akin to colonial status for Kyrgystan and Tajikistan; I think they’re already close to that with Kyrgystan.  They want to ‘help’ Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to suppress radical Islamic groups, etc.  Hence the SCO.

Russia’s position as a junior partner in the Chinese organized, Chinese led SCO is a visible reminder to all members, and to foreigners, that, for China, all of Asia is within Chinese influence.

China is working very hard to strengthen its ties with the ASEAN group, and their efforts are being reciprocated, if not exactly welcomed.  In that case Japan is the Russia-like ‘target.’

China will deal with India and Japan one-on-one, as it must because they are both important regional powers.


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## a_majoor (26 Sep 2006)

Since this discussion is covering lots of ground, I will christen it for our newer readership:

Demography and the future of the West  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/38075.0.html

Developments in China/ Japan/ Taiwan  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/2941.0.html

A scary strategic problem - no oil  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/37017.0.html (Some related issues about oil and resource dependency)

China: Where Poor Nations go to Shop (for Weapons) http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/45240.0.html

A new "Asian Axis"? http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/32247.0.html

The United States building a 21rst Century alliance system  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40510.0.html (a look at the globe spanning potential of an Anglosphere alliance system)


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## rz350 (26 Sep 2006)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Then for the love of God, Allah, and the spirit of Mother Earth start discussing.  Exactly how  is Europe our friend? Put all the history trash aside and focus on the here and now- explain to me how is Europe our so-called friend?



That thing called NATO comes to mind.

France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Lativa, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Norway, Netherlands, Slovenia and Georgia all where invovled with the Afghan coalition. (and possibly more that I can not remeber)

You know, they all fall under EUROPE. That seems pretty current. (not historical).


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## Echo9 (27 Sep 2006)

Hmm.  Definitely lots to ponder, Edward.  Your saying is apt- I can only admit to having spent a couple of months there (albeit spread out over a year, while working with a Chinese subsidiary).  My "book" is really limited to two ironies (I seem to remember having 3 at one point, but I forget the third):
1.  that such an innately capitalist people would allow a communist revolution to succeed
2.  that such a culturally centred people would adopt a foreign religion (Buddhism) so widely

Like so many things, this is a topic of conjecture.  Certainly, if we can avoid conflict with China, it would be in our interest.  I think that where we diverge is in the preponderance of likelihoods.  If the CCP is actually able to keep things together, then they will rule for a long time indeed.  I just feel that the centrifugal forces that will hit will be too strong for any government to ride, particularly one that is as dedicated to central planning as this one (which they are, even if they've given up a little on the economy).


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## Centurian1985 (28 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> I apologize for three in a row and this is it for me.




I dont think you have to apologize for anything.  A very good summary.


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## tomahawk6 (28 Sep 2006)

NATO beyond the borders of Europe is pretty dicey. We have NATO countries engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq and other alliance members either make a token contribution or none at all.  An alliance which operates like a cafeteria is not a strong alliance and frankly not worth the effort to maintain.

I have felt for some time now that future conflicts will be confronted by coalitions of like minded members or perhaps even done unilaterally. If China attacks Taiwan will NATO oppose China ? No they wont. In fact Taiwan owes its independence to the US. The PRC knows that if they strike Taiwan they will have to deal with the US. Before the PRC can strike Taiwan they will need to neutralize Washington. Once that is done then Taiwan is doomed.


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## a_majoor (28 Sep 2006)

NATO, like the UN, was conceived in the Cold War and designed for pretty specific tasks. Since the tasks no longer exist, perhaps it is time for NATO to evolve into something different, or be allowed to fade away. A "cafeteria" alliance isn't much of a place to be hanging your hat anyway.

Noted in this thread (The United States building a 21rst Century alliance system  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40510.0.html ) other groupings and alignments are possible, and a globe spanning Anglosphere alliance would be quite strong since it is based on common interests and values. We could also see alliance systems based on trade blocks (the EU evolved out of the European Common Market), or toxic alliances could also be formed (such as one based on Radical Islam, although it would be internally fractured by Shia, Sunni and Wahhabi factions).

Other factors which define alliances and power blocks involve the ability to project power and defend their territory, so a case might be made that a future alliance or grouping is defined by the area protected by ABMs, or some similar consideration. Things are still in a state of flux with the fall of the Soviet Empire and new players flexing their muscles, we might not see the new shape of the world until 2020.


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## warspite (29 Sep 2006)

So if China is not a threat now what sort of event or situation in the future could change that?
Suggestions?


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## Centurian1985 (29 Sep 2006)

I'd like to hear what Edward Campbell has to say about that question...all I can think of is a possible India/China border skirmish, but that seems unlikely these days, or an increase in insurgent activity in the eastern provinces that causes discord with neighbouring central Asian countries.


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## Edward Campbell (29 Sep 2006)

Centurian1985 said:
			
		

> I'd like to hear what Edward Campbell has to say about that question...all I can think of is a possible India/China border skirmish, but that seems unlikely these days, or an increase in insurgent activity in the eastern provinces that causes discord with neighbouring central Asian countries.



See Echo9's comments on 25 Sep 06, here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/50947/post-450632.html#msg450632

While I may think that most of them are controllable two stand out:

1.	China cannot sustain its current rate of growth.  The economy *will* slow and stall and, *quite likely* will go into recession.  While I think food production/distribution is at acceptable standards it might not take too much economic strain to provoke internal unrest, even revolution; and

2.	Resources.  China is being touted, in the Western economic press, as the source of continued growth in resource markets for years, even decades to come.  True enough, I guess, but China needs huge, vast amounts of resources to sustain itself with any kind of growth.  As we can see from Euro-American history it is best to have resources nearby – that’s another lesson from Japan, by the way.  The ‘nearby’ resources are Russian.

Add to that: Muslim minority unrest, especially amongst the Uighurs in Xinjian Province – in the NorthWest – where most of China’s oil is found.  The Chinese are fond of their minorities, so long as they stick to _identification_ through folk dancing, etc.  There is an Uighur separatist movement, supported, I think by radical Muslim groups from the Central Asian ‘Stans – which brings us back to ‘why’ the SCO.

Taiwan is a huge _potential_ problem.  As I understand the Chinese position they don’t really care what Taiwan does so long as there is no change to the old KMT policy re: _reunification_ of China.  As long as Taiwan remains committed to reunification then the mainland Chinese can preserve the internally important position that Taiwan will follow Macao and Hong Kong and _rejoin_ China in due course.  See, e.g. http://voanews.com/english/2006-09-27-voa13.cfm which is very recent.

If a Taiwanese government renounces the goal of reunification then the Chinese may be compelled – by internal expectations – act, bringing them into direct, military conflict with the USA.

In ‘open’ areas in South China I saw, just this past summer, a lot of what appeared, to me, to be fairly new, modern but small assault ships.  There is nothing (visible to the public) like Norfolk where even a casual visitor can see America’s global naval power on display but I was told that China is building a _*regional*_ joint amphibious group.  I’m guessing the Chinese want several corps worth of troops with the appropriately huge assault shipping bill (they would need, I _guesstimate_ (being old and years and years out of the staff college) to get several (five?) divisions ashore at once) and air power sufficient to gain and maintain air superiority over the Straits of Taiwan and in a 500+/- mile radius around the landing grounds.  I don’t think the Chinese are anywhere near being able to attack and defeat Taiwan, yet.  I do think they are intent upon achieving that capability sometime within the next 10, 15 or 20 years.  To that end anything and everything they can do to weaken America in the West Pacific/China Sea station is in China’s best interests.

China _could_ go pear-shaped – maybe on short notice.  In that case Barnett ( http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm  etc) and I are wrong and  Carpenter (http://www.palgrave-usa.com/catalog/product.aspx?isbn=1403968411 ) is right and America, and the West, might stumble into an avoidable war with China over Taiwan.  Please note that Carpenter does not think Chinese _power_ is the problem.  Rather he sees that _“ The PRC …  is firmly committed to reunification with Taiwan, and perforce unalterably opposed to any moves toward independence by Taipei.  Moreover … the PRC is increasingly unwilling to continue accepting the current status quo. Leaders in Beijing are well aware of the political consequences of the ongoing demographic shifts in Taiwan. They realize that there may only be a finite window for reunification to take place, and hence are increasingly impatient with Taiwan's diplomatic stalling when it comes to engaging Beijing in serious discussions on this issue.”_

China still has considerable influence in Pakistan – it was, and remains, I believe, the primary source of Pakistan’s nuclear knowledge and weapons programme.  The aim is to keep India busy with Pakistan and, therefore, unable to _bother_ China.  That being said, China recognizes that India is a major regional power which will have its own _sphere of influence_ and which must be engaged with care and respect.

Many Chinese believe that Japan is on the edge of important social/demographic and economic shifts which will have unforeseen consequences and *opportunities* for China, at least those consequences are un-agreed by the people who spoke to me.  Shifts in Japanese regional politics and in its economic power will have global implications.

Many Chinese are very worried about Indonesia and its Muslim revolts and the spread of radical Islam into the Philippines. 

I will not go on and on and on but suffice to say that my _optimism_ might be misplaced and Echo9’s concerns are not to be dismissed.


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## Centurian1985 (29 Sep 2006)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> 1.	China cannot sustain its current rate of growth.  The economy *will* slow and stall and, *quite likely* will go into recession.  While I think food production/distribution is at acceptable standards it might not take too much economic strain to provoke internal unrest, even revolution;



That one I would have to disagree with.  Ive read this prediction for almost fifteen years and their economy keeps growing.  The last economic forecast I read (last year) predicted that they would keep growing for another 5-10 years before levelling, but are unlikely to go into recession.  



			
				Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> 2.	Resources.  China is being touted, in the Western economic press, as the source of continued growth in resource markets for years, even decades to come.  True enough, I guess, but China needs huge, vast amounts of resources to sustain itself with any kind of growth.  As we can see from Euro-American history it is best to have resources nearby – that’s another lesson from Japan, by the way.  The ‘nearby’ resources are Russian.



This one I can agree with.  In the same report referred to above, analysts see China as running out of ready resources for manufacturing in the next 5-10 years.  



			
				Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> Taiwan is a huge _potential_ problem.  As I understand the Chinese position they don’t really care what Taiwan does so long as there is no change to the old KMT policy re: _reunification_ of China.



Agreed again, as long as the US is there to backem up China will focus on national growth.  Not much likelihood of military action at this time.


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## Echo9 (29 Sep 2006)

China's growth will slow- it's just a matter of time- it's a matter of statistics.  The problem with growth is that it's geometric.  the first year at 8% is easy, but when you do this over many years, pretty soon (actually, year 35), that 8% is the equivalent of doubling in year 1.  The problem is that when you get big enough, the number of opportunities for that growth just aren't there.  

The problem for the CCP is that they are relying on the current massive growth rate to keep a restive population in check.  Once that reduces to even 3-4% (considered very strong for a Western nation), that safety valve comes off.  Perhaps they can outsource their problems to other countries as Edward suggests, but my thinking is that those who will go overseas will be those who wouldn't be a problem in China in the first place.


My pessimism also comes from the male/female imbalance.  Even if this is now being rectified, there's a huge population that's coming of age now and through the next 10 years that is on the order of 110 males to every female (97 being parity, owing to the longer lifespan of women).  Historically, any society that has has an excess of young males has been either territorially aggressive or internally wracked by revolution.  China will be no different, the main question is which direction they go.  If revolution, then China as it currently exists will be split into 3-5 parts.  If territorial aggression, then it's likely to push in the direction of Siberia (resources) or Taiwan (ideology) or both.  They are not likely to push south, since most of SE Asia within reach is already a client state, and India is likely to be seen as too difficult for what it would be worth.


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## tomahawk6 (29 Sep 2006)

The PRC is a potential threat to allies of the US, which indirectly at least would be a threat to US national interests. China's quest for oil/natural gas is the driving force of its foreign policy. To support this national interest the PRC is expanding its Navy and is/has acquired port facilities in many different places, like Panama. PRC troops are in Venezeula to shore up Chavez' regime. They have staked their claim to the Spratley's. The PRC has moved into central asia where there are sizeable energy resources. The same with Africa. The Chinese have begun one of the world's largest coal liquification projects in the world,link below.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-08/03/content_656388.htm

China is intent on becoming an economic superpower. To do that they need energy to fuel their economy. Fossil fuels at present are also the weakness of the west. Perhaps one of China's aims is to control as much of the worlds fossil fuel resources as possible. India as a growing economy also will require fossil fuels. If China has cornered the market so to speak it will have leverage over quite a few countries.

This advantage will decline as more countries move into alternative fuels. India and many other countries can follow Brazil's lead with biofuels. Until they do so they will remain vulnerable.

Before as a communist command economy China wasnt integrated into the world economy. Now they are. A recession in the US or Europe hurts everyone. They can strengthen their economy by making more goods available for their domestic consumers. The segment of the economy that is being left out of their economic boom is the countryside. Rural China put the communists in power and may in the future drive them out.


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## a_majoor (30 Sep 2006)

The unbalanced nature of Chinese growth will cause considerable strains internally, and as been pointed out, the "surplus" population of young men will only aggrivate the problems. Since China really has no force projection capabilities like the West, I see that even if they attempt to export the problem by siezing Siberia or Tiawan, the most likely outcome would be internal unrest, and eventual disintigration. (Unless they are very careful).

This is actually the normal state of affairs in Chinese history, several competing states, eventual unification under a new dynasty followed by gradual disintigration back into competing states.


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## GAP (30 Sep 2006)

I think that in these new economic times, the strains between the affluent urban population and the poorer rural populations is going to accelerate the process. There's little tidbits here and there about the aspirations not being met, and I really can't see the central government being able to restrain the populace as they have in the past....communications being one of the biggest foe the government has.


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## Kirkhill (30 Sep 2006)

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/09/26/wchina226.xml&site=5&page=0



> Beijing secretly fires lasers to disable US satellites
> By Francis Harris in Washington
> 
> 
> ...




China has engaged, it seems on attacks on recce assets.  (Equivalent to the hand-held laser attack by Russians on a jointly manned Canadian/US helicopter in the Straits of Juan de Fuca).
China has warned the US that if it shows up in the area with Non-Nuke PGM assets China will feel free retaliate with Nukes (apparently fearing that US has a strategic advantage with GPS PGMs that allow the US to do what it used to require Nukes to do in the past - This obviates the Mutually Assured Destruction theory potentially leaving China "defenseless" if it is restricted to a Non-Nuclear response.
China is/tried to become? involved in the Franco-European Galileo competitor to GPS.  Is it involved with the Russian system?  Regardless, lack of long range strike assets (beyond Bears, bought from Russia and similar to those intercepted off Alaska this week?) probably means that the Chinese, even with Galileo, can't pose the same strategic threat to others that others pose to it.  Operationally and Tactically, for their local domestic defensive battle or for regional battles they may find a use for it.  Strategically however, their greatest need/desire is to deny the use of GPS, as well as recce assets.
In Iraq there were rumours of the GPS system being spoofed.
In Yugoslavia the Chinese embassy was bombed with a US PGM "because the CIA couldn't read the date stamp on a 5 year old map" and the Embassy had moved.  This created quite a political coup for the Chinese at the US expense.

So beyond the obvious battle for public opinion - what is the state of the battle to prevent seeing the other side of the hill?  No "people" get killed (or few and none of them openly admitted?) only "robots".  The battle for the technological edge.



			
				a_majoor said:
			
		

> The unbalanced nature of Chinese growth will cause considerable strains internally, and as been pointed out, the "surplus" population of young men will only aggrivate the problems. Since China really has no force projection capabilities like the West, I see that even if they attempt to export the problem by siezing Siberia or Tiawan, the most likely outcome would be internal unrest, and eventual disintigration. (Unless they are very careful).
> 
> On the other hand the Chinese play a long game - and are likely to try and manage an internal problem that they can influence rather than rush to a confrontation with a foreign power that is too strong to be easily defeated.  Better, perhaps, to continue to undermine the opposition economically and politically so that they make the chance of victory that much more likely, preferably without having to engage in a military confrontation themselves.  Much better to have the opposition bleed fighting someone else thus keeping both parties weak.
> 
> ...



I don't think the Chinese are doing anything that is outside the realm of normal statecraft.  They are just, IMO, agressively focused on a longer strategy that they can implement with fewer of the noisy distractions of democracy.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Oct 2006)

To back up one of Echo9’s _problems_ and one of my _solutions_ here is an article from yesterday’s (30 Sep 06) _Globe and Mail_ re: the ongoing ICBC IPO.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060930.wcover30/BNStory/Business/home


> The Chinese bank puzzle
> 
> SINCLAIR STEWART , TORONTO , AND GEOFFREY YORK and BEIJING
> 
> ...



First the problem: ICBC is more than just a really big, Big bank.  It has symbolic importance for Chinese and foreign investors alike.  It is also the conduit trough which much foreign investment passes – foreign investment which is absolutely, 100% critical to continued Chinese growth.  ICBC, like all Chinese banks, is riddled with corruption and is saddled with bad loans.  Either is a problem; both, together are dangers, maybe a real crisis in waiting.

The _solution_ might lie in the huge size of the IPO and in some of the corruption.  $19 Billion is real money – even by Chinese standards.  It can give the bank some flexibility to write off some bad loans.  The unpalatable, sometimes crooked, always unhelpful level of central government interference might help if, Big IF, the centre can _cook the books_ (of the companies with the bad debts) to make them less of a burden.

Although it is not true that the Chinese character for crisis ( wēijī ) is composed of danger and opportunity, there is no doubt that crises (and the problems of corruption and bad loans can, very fairly, be called one) can provoke essential reforms which can have long term benefits.

I remain an optimist, but a cautious one.  I believe this generation of Chinese leaders and businessmen – many people of my age and even more a bit younger – are well aware of the risks and of the path they must follow to retain the _Red Dynasty_’s power.


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