# ISAF Commander Reportedly Seeking Smaller "Tail", More "Teeth"



## The Bread Guy (17 Aug 2009)

This, from Wired.com's Danger Room blog:


> The talk in military circles may still be about troop increases in Afghanistan, to bolster a difficult, bloody campaign. But the top general there, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has directed his commanders to come up with proposals to cut manpower, potentially by as much as 20 percent. The idea is to maximize the number of infantrymen and counterinsurgents - and minimize support staff and possibly-extraneous personnel.  “More trigger-pullers, and less of everyone else,” says a military source familiar with McChrystal’s query to his commanders, issued August 7th .... “The ‘cut 20 percent’ was a direction to identify where cuts could be made, rather than a direction to actually reduce the force,” military spokesperson Lt. Commander Christine Sidenstricker tells Danger Room. “Bottom line is that the resource requirements across the theater currently are under hard analysis, but there have been no final decisions or recommendations on force levels or other resourcing issues.” ....


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## armyvern (17 Aug 2009)

Choice One:

Cut and delete all "Official Visits/Visitor Liaison Staff" forthwith. AND, better yet, cut-kill-slay any further "military tourism" into theatre. End the photo ops and dog and pony shows ...

Ensure that any "visitor" into the theatre of ops actually has a bonified "operational" reason to be there; including TAV teams who usually end up with an officer or two who seemingly are there only to get that medal.

Let the folks in theatre concentrate on getting their jobs done rather than babysitting and entertaining just for the sake of babysitting and entertaining the various 'guests' who seem to be arriving/departing in abundance these days.


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## PuckChaser (17 Aug 2009)

I think there was more people hanging around the boardwalk during daylight hours than I think were actually working. I completely agree with the "military tourism" comment. I see the prevailing attitude being that people want a photo op in CADPAT (AR), so they can hang it on the wall in their office and say "Yeah, I was there".


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## Infanteer (17 Aug 2009)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Choice One:
> 
> Cut and delete all "Official Visits/Visitor Liaison Staff" forthwith. AND, better yet, cut-kill-slay any further "military tourism" into theatre. End the photo ops and dog and pony shows ...
> 
> ...



Probably useful, but won't put too much of a dent in the tooth:tail ratio.

There is a good monograph done on historical tooth to tail ratios that separates troops into four categories.  Combat troops (tooth), logistical support, life support, and headquarters (all tail).

Obviously, we need more combat troops (boots on the ground) and I bet you we are good for logistical support.  Life support is all soldiers and contractors involved in maintaining garrison functions.  If we really need massage palours, boutiques, and Burger Kings in KAF, than we better keep those.  Headquarters are probably, in my uneducated guess, the largest offender.  Layered on top of a ISAF military structure is every alliance's national element.  Sure, country X only has 200 soldiers but it still sends a full Colonel and his staff.

HQ Staffs themselves have seen enormous growth over the last couple decades.  The Brits did an interesting study that found a British Brigade staff was around 40 pers in 1990 and had increased to 70 by 2003.  I have no doubt that we are somewhat guilty of this as well.


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## Old Sweat (17 Aug 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Probably useful, but won't put too much of a dent in the tooth:tail ratio.
> 
> There is a good monograph done on historical tooth to tail ratios that separates troops into four categories.  Combat troops (tooth), logistical support, life support, and headquarters (all tail).
> 
> ...



I wonder how much of our contingent is taken up in your life support and national headquarters categories? Could we shake another company's worth of troops out of them without jeopardizing the functioning of the sharp end? If we do free up the spaces, where do we get the trained infantry faces and their kit, especially LAVs, for that company? Admittedly that is a side issue compared to the commander's intention, but in my tiny mind, simple solutions are usually neither simple nor solutions. And that also goes if instead of an infantry company, we substitute a recce squadron or an engineer squadron or even another field battery or more UAVs or tactical helicopters.

Edit: If, however, we were to reduce the number of tail, this would have the effect of reducing the ratio, even if it did nothing for the numbers of sharp enders. Knowing the CF, however, we probably would end up reducing the numbers outside the wire, thus going directly against the commander's intention.


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## GAP (17 Aug 2009)

In my time the tooth to tail ratio was 7-1 or 9-1 depending on who you talked to and what point they were trying to make.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is SF, thus is likely to look less favorably to the largess of normal bureaucracy in the military....small is good...


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

I have two Cdn nominees for reductions: on the front page of the most Recent Maple Leaf are one Lt(N) amd one Maj, who managed to cram a round of golf into their otherwise busy schedules.

Rule number one of military efficiency:  If there's time and space for a golf course on deployed operations, you've probably lost the bubble.


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## TangoTwoBravo (17 Aug 2009)

I find some irony in a staff furiously conducting a study into how to cut staffs. They are caught up in the very activity that leads to large staffs (the conduct of yet another staff check).

I tend to think that there is merit to having a small overworked/overloaded staff rather than a large staff with lots of specialized sections that are somewhat underemployed. A small staff doesn't lose as much time with internal coordination as the larger beasts out there. A big HQ can get consumed in the busy-work of BUBs and day to day routine. With a small staff you need to accept that some details will go unchecked/undone and higher HQ (to include national HQs) will need to take a step back and let the mission run without constantly demanding SITREPS. As an aside, I don't think that the British Empire could have run with today's information technology. The local commanders/governors would have been micro-managed to death by London. A small staff needs to ruthlessly prioritize but I think that it can gain agility. Op Orders may have to be verbal/on the radio without lots and lots of accompanying power-point slides and annexes.

To go with Old Sweat's point, though, is it really an issue to have a large tooth to tail unless we have "counter-insurgents" in those 'tail' positions?


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## The Bread Guy (17 Aug 2009)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> With a small staff you need to accept that some details will go unchecked/undone and higher HQ (to include national HQs) will need to take a step back and let the mission run without constantly demanding SITREPS. As an aside, I don't think that the British Empire could have run with today's information technology. The local commanders/governors would have been micro-managed to death by London.


Allowing reasonably responsible people to exercise judgment once they know what the boss needs done?  Is this even possible these days? Esp. in a multi-national environment?  I'd love to see it, but...


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Allowing reasonably responsible people to exercise judgment once they know what the boss needs done?  Is this even possible these days? Esp. in a multi-national environment?  I'd love to see it, but...



Multi-national has nothing to do with it.  Canada excels at building overlarge HQs to command its own forces.  Those HQs, lacking productive work, then engage in make-work projects for themselves, which in turn create additional burdens below and no real productive output.  If resoruces are cut, the overlarge HQs are protected, while the subordinate organizations are told to "right-sze" or "work more efficiently".

Symptom of the day: Every unit I've ever been with has passwords on the photocopiers to save money.  None of the photocopiers in NDHQ have passwords.  Hmmm...


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## vonGarvin (17 Aug 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Rule number one of military efficiency:  If there's time and space for a golf course on deployed operations, you've probably lost the bubble.


What's the option: work 24/7 and NEVER do stuff like that?  Admittedly, I made it to the board walk during the day maybe 5 times during 7.5 months.  Imagine if one of those visits had been photographed!  Would I then be the "reduce the redundancy in HQs!" poster boy?
Although I agree that the optics of two "staff weenies" playing golf looks bad, but let us not forget that they raised almost two grand for Soldier On.  
Let us not forget that maintenance of morale is a principle of war.  A civilian employee set that thing up in four days with people who volunteered for it (apparently working after their day was done).  And it raised that money for a good cause, and probably got some people "away from the game" for a few hours, if nothing else.
So, the tooth/tail argument is good, but let us not cut it too much.  Though I agree that "some" things have become WAY too large (BG HQ?  Anyone?)


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## MedCorps (17 Aug 2009)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Ensure that any "visitor" into the theatre of ops actually has a bonified "operational" reason to be there; including TAV teams who usually end up with an officer or two who seemingly are there only to get that medal.



At least they have managed to filter out some of the people who should not be getting that medal, such as

"Visits and inspections do not constitute qualifying service. Specifically, visits for the purpose of leadership, familiarization, ceremonial, or morale by civilian or military VIPs as well as Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs), Staff Inspection Visits (SIVs), and specialist visits for the conduct of summary/criminal/administrative investigations, courts martial, Boards of Inquiry, trial evaluations, academic studies, surveys or other similar administrative activities are excluded from qualification."

I agree some TAV pers seem to slip through this net. 

MC


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## Blackadder1916 (17 Aug 2009)

Though there is undoubtedly fat available for trimming from Canadian and other national "tails", there was probably no specific (non-American) staff check made in response to this direction from Gen McChrystal; it is unlikely (IMO) that the ISAF commander (wearing his ISAF hat, not his US force comd hat) would have made such a "direction" to (non-USA) subordinate commanders.  If he had, there would probably have been, if not an actual verbal, at least a mental, collective "**** off" from national commanders who have to fight not only the battle against insurgency but the "battle" to maintain a presence in Afghanistan.  The battle "to win (or at least not lose) hearts and minds" (not Afghans' but the ones at home) is as much a public relations exercise for soldiers as it is for their political masters; it is not too far a stretch to equate some of the bloat in deployed HQs with a need to keep all those "echelons above reality" (both military and political) constantly in the loop.  When a question is raised "in the House" it would be bad form if an answer was not immediately available.

It should be noted that in the piece quoted in the opening post, McChrystal is identified as the US comd and there is no mention of other ISAF contingents.


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

Midnight Rambler said:
			
		

> What's the option: work 24/7 and NEVER do stuff like that?  Admittedly, I made it to the board walk during the day maybe 5 times during 7.5 months.  Imagine if one of those visits had been photographed!  Would I then be the "reduce the redundancy in HQs!" poster boy?
> Although I agree that the optics of two "staff weenies" playing golf looks bad, but let us not forget that they raised almost two grand for Soldier On.
> Let us not forget that maintenance of morale is a principle of war.  A civilian employee set that thing up in four days with people who volunteered for it (apparently working after their day was done).  And it raised that money for a good cause, and probably got some people "away from the game" for a few hours, if nothing else.
> So, the tooth/tail argument is good, but let us not cut it too much.  Though I agree that "some" things have become WAY too large (BG HQ?  Anyone?)



Why do we need a large civilian PSP staff (or any, for that matter)?  Isn't there an Lt within the BG who wears the hat of secondary duties, who is the BG sports O (among other things?).  Why not have them do their job and organize events?  How much public money was spent on making the golf course to raise that $2K?

Provide amenities for those deployed?  Yes - within reason.  But we seem to have a bit of an edifice complex.


Perhaps if we make it a bit more austere fewer will push to get positions added to the TO&E so they can get the latest career-enabling gong.


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## time expired (17 Aug 2009)

First rule of the bureaucrat,civilian or military,persuade your boss that
the job you are doing can only be done by you and therefore you and
the job are indispenceable.
Second rule, demand more pers to do this indispenceable job,this serves
two perposes,your empire expands and using the onion skin principle,
protects you in case someone above you discovers you are merely 
producing useless paper.Using this principle you can sacrifice layer after
layer of pers and hope the superior gets tired or is posted before he 
gets to you. 
Montgomery spent several weeks clearing out Middle East HQ in Egypt
of huge amounts of less than eager  fighting men before he attacked at
El Alamein.He was less sucsessful latter in NW Europe as he was forced 
to reduce the size of his divisions due to lack of reenforcements while
over a million uniformed men were sitting safely in the UK.
Vietnam offers other examples of bloated rear ecelons,at the height of
conflict the ratio of teeth to tail was an astonishing 11-12 to 1.
So this is nothing new,I think the major difference is the huge international
contingents that take up space, use up support facilties and have no
intention of joining the fight.
                                     Regards


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## vonGarvin (17 Aug 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Why do we need a large civilian PSP staff (or any, for that matter)?  Isn't there an Lt within the BG who wears the hat of secondary duties, who is the BG sports O (among other things?).  Why not have them do their job and organize events?  How much public money was spent on making the golf course to raise that $2K?
> Provide amenities for those deployed?  Yes - within reason.  But we seem to have a bit of an edifice complex.
> Perhaps if we make it a bit more austere fewer will push to get positions added to the TO&E so they can get the latest career-enabling gong.


A Lt (probably a duty officer) could very well do stuff like that, and we had the "New Year's Day Run" on my tour, totally organised by an officer in the BG HQ, so yes, there is scope for that.
As for the tooth-tail argument (and PSP, whom I generally despise), there are many MANY things that could be cut that would result in immediate improvements "over there".  Given that our main effort is the fighting of the war, and given that everything we do should be, in one way or another, geared to that end, I would first eliminate HLTA.  Moving the 2800 (or so) people back and forth across the globe not twice (deployment, re-deployment) but four times (for BG, OMLT and PRT et al) and SIX times (for the "nine monthers").  
I am not certain that any PSP folks there, in spite of my hatred for that system, actually negatively affect the "tooth/tail", given that they are civilians (other than their meals, accomodations, travel to/from, etc).  Any effect that they have (in this respect) would be, I guess, minimal.  Also, since they are civilians, I'm not sure if it affects the TO and E of the "folks in green".
My main target for "elimination" would be about 50% of the folks in the HQs.  (That number is an ass-pull.  But I imagine I'm not far off).  This would be from BG HQ up through to and including TF HQ.  I swear, there were people there who didn't know what a "Zharey" was, or what it did or how it affected why they were in Afghanistan.
We can only look at our own forces, and admittedly there are some "floppers" at KAF (from all contingents), but employing the "baby steps" formula, and "looking after our own", we could very well free up some "PYs" so that the tanks can at least get their third troop back!


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

Civilians require food and water, shelter and protection.  Provision of all those things requires the Big Green Machine (or Big Tan Machine, in this case); therefore, cutting civilians to the minimum required should free up some military personnel.

The HLTA issue is one that needs some Leadership to address.  It's seen as a sacred cow right now, and we have few leaders willing to take on such beasts.  (Mind you, I'm the one who has advocated for BGs to be stood up for three years: one year pre-deployment; six months deployed; three months leave, three months working out the rust from the last three months on leave; six months deployed; six months leave - thus reducing the training burden on the system and increasing effectiveness as you get increased cohesion and collective experience).

I think your 50% cut is insufficently draconian.  Given that much of the management (vice leadership) of our deployed forces is done from Canada, can we not remove many of the boots off the ground and instead manage from Canada?  There are remarkable things called "telephone" and "email" - which are used by the theater mailboxes masquerading as staff to communicate with Canada - why not eliminate the middlemen?


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## The Bread Guy (17 Aug 2009)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> It should be noted that in the piece quoted in the opening post, McChrystal is identified as the US comd and there is no mention of other ISAF contingents.


Point taken - still, this is sizing up to be good robust discussion on the ratios, so I hope it continues.


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## MedCorps (17 Aug 2009)

I guess the question is: 

"What positions should Col Menard cut in the JTF A HQ 06-09?"  

I have looked at the org chart and can only come up five or so of the apx 97 HQ positions (not including ASIC, Eng Unit pers, Air WG, 99Tac, STA Bty, Sigs Sqn, GoC non-embedded advisor's) I would cut.  So who should it be?  

As I do not think posting the org chat is a good idea (but it is on the DIN for those interested in taking up the challenge) but I can provide a summary from a grander prospective: 

Comd Gp (3)
Pers Staff to the Comd (3) 
Advisors to the Comd (12) (5 are double tasked as CO's)  
Pubic Affairs Cell (4) 
Bde Rear (21) (Log, Maint, Admin, Mov, Fin, LL pers)  
J5 - Plans (13) (the next battle)
J2 - Int (7) 
J3 - Ops (27) (the current battle incl 24/7 TOC staff) 
J6 - Sigs (3) 
LO - (4)

Thoughts?


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## Old Sweat (17 Aug 2009)

At the risk of preaching heresy, seek out the members of the J3 and J5 staff who can do an estimate, make a plan, deliver a briefing and prepare a coherent operation order without using powerpoint. Protect them at all cost; they are a priceless asset. Then, fire everybody else.

Sorry, it's hotter 'en hades, and I just finished cleaning up the mess after our Lab threw up on the floor.


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## Journeyman (17 Aug 2009)

MedCorps said:
			
		

> ....apx 97 HQ positions (*not including ASIC*, Eng Unit pers, Air WG....
> 
> J5 - Plans (13) (the next battle)
> *J2 - Int (7) *
> J3 - Ops (27)



I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over. 

(especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over.
> 
> (especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....



I think you gave your own answer - since the J2 and OC ASIC don't get along, we need more duplication of effort so the J2 can have his own staff to boss around.

On the J3/J5 side, I agree with Old Sweat - fire the .ppt rangers, keep those who can do it promptly and well.


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## armyvern (17 Aug 2009)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Probably useful, but won't put too much of a dent in the tooth:tail ratio.



You'd be surprised how many staff could be cut if military-tourism were to disappear --- I'd need fewer truckers in theatre to transport them around, less Sup techs (who wouldn't be ordering/issuing "transient weapons/ammo", less RMS clerks to handle in/out clearances from "transient" quarters .... we'd need fewer of them because those fewer could then actually be utilized to do their "operational" tasks.


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## Roy Harding (17 Aug 2009)

During my career - I did a fair number of Roto Zeros - including Kandahar in 2002.  I did two rotos which were NOT "zeros".  Give me a "Zero" every time.

On a "Zero" - it is accepted (by both the CoC and the troops) that there will NOT be amenities - on a couple of "zeros", those amenities which were missing included showers and laundry facilities (not both on the same tour, by the way).  It gave rise to a "stinky" bunch of troops - but nobody noticed because we were all in the same state.  Does that mean that I don't think there should be any amenities at all?  Of course not - I just think we go "overboard" at times.  You install air conditioning - all of a sudden we need a Fridge Tech (whatever the proper name is for it) to keep them going.  Oh - and to POWER the freakin' things, we need more generators - that implies more FCS, Elec, and Veh techs to keep THOSE going.

HLTA - I've been a proponent of ditching it since my first tour which involved it.  (My first tour - a YEAR long, by the way - didn't HAVE HLTA - neither did my last tour - although the last one was only six months long).

I was a proponent since at LEAST the late '80s of nine month tours - no HLTA.

If all these "amenities" could be got rid of, we'd need fewer CSS troops to run them.  The CQ could draw pop, chips, chocolate bars, dip, and smokes from a central warehouse (staffed by a SMALL number of Sup Techs), and bring them out to the troops - just like they do on exercise.  What's the problem with that?

We (I mean the "corporate we" of the CF) have (at least in my experience) a tendency to turn war-fighting (peace-making, peace-keeping - pick your metaphor) operations into "occupation" exercises - wherein we attempt to bring all the comforts of home into theatre.  The comforts of home belong at HOME, back  _there_, that place that you're anxious to return to.

I'm saddened to see that we haven't learned anything since I left the CF five years ago.


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2009)

Roy Harding said:
			
		

> I'm saddened to see that we haven't learned anything since I left the CF five years ago.



Not quite true.  We've now got large standing HQs in Canada for both Domestic and International Operations - neither one of which is deployable or useful, both of which which in turn encourage the development of equally bloated and unnecessary HQs once deployed.

Now, not learned the right lessons in the past five years, maybe...


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## armyvern (17 Aug 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Not quite true.  We've now got large standing HQs in Canada for both Domestic and International Operations - neither one of which is deployable or useful, both of which which in turn encourage the development of equally bloated and unnecessary HQs once deployed.
> 
> Now, not learned the right lessons in the past five years, maybe...



So true this statement is.


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## Old Sweat (17 Aug 2009)

In my opinion, there are some folks, perhaps a lot of folks, inside the wire who perform essential operational activities and usually seen as part of the tail. Besides the obvious ones who have the CSS mission in support of the battle group, the OMLT, the PRT and the SOF, I can think of the aviation wing, the FSCC's, ASCC's and TACP's, combat camera, the lessons learned cell and a bunch of other folks I won't mention here.

There is nothing wrong with trying to get a grip on rear echelon creep (the phenomen, not the individual), but wild slashing will accomplish nothing.

Still, I agree with Roy. I have been in on the start up of two successful organizations. We were too frigging busy to worry about voluminous SOPs or painting rocks or whatever. What we did do was establish a cando corporate culture, and that made up for all the other stuff we never missed anyway.


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## vonGarvin (17 Aug 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Still, I agree with Roy. I have been in on the start up of two successful organizations. We were too frigging busy to worry about voluminous SOPs or *painting rocks * or whatever. What we did do was establish a cando corporate culture, and that made up for all the other stuff we never missed anyway.


But...but...how could you tell which ROTO you were if you didn't have a collection of painted rocks?






;D


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## PuckChaser (17 Aug 2009)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over.
> 
> (especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....



J2 cell was pretty much a waste of time on my Roto, all I saw from them was a copy of reports that was issued 2 days prior from the ASIC. There doesn't need to be 2 cells, everyone loves this ISTAR concept but doesn't want to do away with a redundant J2 cell, which is the reason why the ASIC was created.


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## Roy Harding (17 Aug 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In my opinion, there are some folks, perhaps a lot of folks, inside the wire who perform essential operational activities and usually seen as part of the tail. ...



Absolutely - no argument from me on THAT point (I WAS one of those folks).

The point I was making, however, is that during my multiple "Roto Zeroes" (five - four of which I was the Chief Clerk for) I NEVER had to appoint a "Leave Clerk", or "R&R Clerk", or "Welfare Clerk".  To be sure - in some cases (Kandahar comes to mind again), we ended up having "Forced Rest" at that location which must not be named - and all my clerks handled that monumental task as a secondary duty - it certainly wasn't accounted for on the TO&E before we left Canada.

On the OTHER hand, on the two "non zero" rotations I was involved with - we had ALL those positions (Leave, R&R, and Welfare) - and that's just the freakin' CLERKS!  What about the Sup Techs (controlling "Welfare Inventory") the MSE Ops (driving the R&R Busses - or at least coordinating the local company hired to provide them), and on it goes.

I understand a lot of these functions have been taken over by PSP - but the support functions (FCS, Veh Tech, Linemn, Sig Ops, etcetera, ad nauseum) required to support these supporters still needs to be in place.


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## Infanteer (18 Aug 2009)

MedCorps said:
			
		

> Thoughts?



I'd question why an Ops staff sit at 27 when a British Brigade in Gulf War I had 2 officers and seemed to bloat to 6 for Gulf War II (recognizing that not all are officers)?

Everyone has their "pet" organization/branch/unit to pick on for weighing down the war effort, and I have been no different in sniping in the past.  I highlighted the idea of combat/logistics/life support/HQ breakdown not to advocate getting rid of any, but simply to show that there is a ratio of functions to running an expeditionary operations.  Here is the paper I mentioned earlier that shows changing ratios throughout the last 100 years in the American Army.

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf

For myself, I don't know enough about running TFK to make any cuts - I'd be interested in seeing the Army G1 and CEFCOMs J1's assessment and methodology to manning these four elements though.


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## blacktriangle (18 Aug 2009)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> J2 cell was pretty much a waste of time on my Roto, all I saw from them was a copy of reports that was issued 2 days prior from the ASIC. There doesn't need to be 2 cells, everyone loves this ISTAR concept but doesn't want to do away with a redundant J2 cell, which is the reason why the ASIC was created.



It kind of goes against this principle of Intelligence:

a. Centralised Control. Intelligence is centrally
controlled to avoid unnecessary duplication, provide
mutual support, and ensure the efficient, economic
use of all resources. 

Sounds like a lot of duplication and less than stellar mutual support...


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## MedCorps (18 Aug 2009)

I am somewhat shocked that no Int Branch guys have weighed in on this...  

By fluke (it was planned long before this thread) I had dinner with a Int Branch LCol last night, and brought up some of the questions on this thread.  I showed him some of the material and a copy of the ORBAT of JTF (A) HQ 06-09.  He has been a J2 before so he seems to be in the know.  He also knew what tour everyone was talking about when the J2 did not get along with the CO ASIC (although did not mention to me who or which).  I fact, he was somewhat surprised to see it talked about (which I found funny) and I suggested being an Int guy he might want to have an army.ca account   I know... smart ***... 

Here was his input, for posting but not attribution: 

The ASIC and the J2 shop provide different functions with respect to the intelligence cycle. The ASIC is a process, analysis, production, and dissemination machine. They also have some links to collection, but not in some of the intelligence disciplines.  What the ASIC CO lacks is the link to the full operational planning process, commanders direction and access to the collection from some of the specialized intelligence disciplines, specially the ones that are not pure Int Branch driven or require multi-branch or multi-element, collection techniques.  

At one time they thought (not all that long ago) that the J2 and the CO ASIC should be the same person (as is done elsewhere in the HQ).  So they war gamed it out at DLSE (or some other experimentation centre in Ottawa) and it turned out to be a bad idea as the J2 became focused on the operation and staff of the ASIC (like any CO/OC). In some cases, as the ASIC is a product producing machine, they became product focused versus need/user driven. The J2/CO ASIC  was not as responsive to the Comd as he would have liked in the experiment, spent notability less time with the J3, and has great Red SA but did not have a good common operating picture with respect to the operations of the TF.  This is compounded by the required isolation of the ASIC from the TOC / main HQ. Hence the two positions remain with the J2 providing the direction and overseeing the planning whilst providing access to collection assets the ASIC does not have.  

So the 7 people... 

1 x J2 --> needed (someone needs to run the boat)

1 x Int guy on the plans staff (J5). He collects what int is needed or future operations and feeds it to the ASIC.  He then integrates ASIC int products into the planning cycle and wargames the red side. He is very involved with targeting.  He is the only Int expert on the plans staff --> needed. 

1 x Int guy in the TOC (J3).  He provides 1/2 of the required coverage (days and peak operations, the ASIC covers at night?) to the current battle staff on the Red SA. He also takes I&W (?) information an feeds it into the current picture. He is also involved with BDA collection.  He is the only Int expert in the TOC --> needed, in fact the LCol said two guys (for 24 hour ops without touching the ASIC capability) would make more sense. 

3 x Int / Sigs guys for collection from other specialized int disciplines who are multidisciplinary and cross pure int boundaries. They get input from the J3 and J5 int staff and assist in the tasking sensors and providing the technical guidance as to what can and cannot be done in their respective disciplines. --> needed, these are pretty specialized fields I am told.

1 x civilian who has been placed into the J2 shop from an other government department as an observer.  He would unload this guy in a second as he does not contribute to the operation of the TF HQ all that much... but he is tasked out from the upper levels of government, so he gets to stay.   

I hope that is of some interest... good stuff, and I am learning a ton.  Look forward to input from int guys who are at the working ranks.


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## dapaterson (18 Aug 2009)

The more I see justifications for HQ bloat, the more it seems to come down to:

Our people can't multi-task.  Therefore, give us one person per task.  Plus backups.


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## Sig_Des (18 Aug 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Our people can't multi-task.  Therefore, give us one person per task.  Plus backups.



Which definitely screws you come HLTA time (or even worse, repat)

As much as it pains me to say it, as much as I'd love to see numerous positions cut, at the TFK HQ level, especially with the HLTA's, there isn't a lot of fat that you can afford to cut (there are a few positions).

However, at the SigSqn level, manning is a PITA as the issue we're finding is that you base it off the previous rotos, and then demand increases, and you have the same ammount of people doing more.


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## dapaterson (18 Aug 2009)

Je grösser die Stäbe, desto schlecter die Führung.

General Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 3rd edition, 1893


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## vonGarvin (18 Aug 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Je grösser die Stäbe, desto schlecter die Führung.
> 
> General Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 3rd edition, 1893


Translation: The greater the staff, the worse the leadership.


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## dapaterson (18 Aug 2009)

> The HQ of an American division of 1944 was established for 96 officers.  The equivalent for a German division was 29.  The equivalent figure for a British Division today [ 1998 ] is 173.  The preparation of a divisional operation order required two _Wehrmacht_ officers and about half an hour - one man-hour.  It now takes us something like 11 officers and four hours - 44 man-hours.  War is more complex nowadays.  But not 44 times more!  Officers are overheads.  The relevant question is whether, and up to what point, do those overheads add value.  We are currently well beyond the point at which adding officers adds value, since adding a large number of officers has increased the time required to make decisions.



Taken from "The Embryo of a Wartime Army", Maj JP Storr, RUSI Journal June 1998 p40-44

http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/940696_731515095_791623195.pdf

(Edit to add article link)


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## dapaterson (24 Aug 2009)

The Army Journal had a brief piece on the topic of ASIC/J2, written by three Int Ops.  Worth reviewing:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_2/CAJ_Vol11.2_12_e.pdf



> As per joint intelligence doctrine, centralized control is described as follows:
> Intelligence is centrally controlled to avoid unnecessary duplication, provide mutual support, and ensure the efficient, economic use of all resources. By this definition, the current Intelligence architecture in Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) falls short of this ideal, and hinders the proper functionality of the intelligence cycle.





> However, our doctrine is not working as well as it should. It is counter-productive to keep an intelligence architecture that does not work as efficiently as possible only because it is doctrinal; when this is the case, doctrine must be amended or it will be discarded over time for the sake of operational expediency.


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## The Bread Guy (31 Aug 2009)

....in this respect, courtesy of the _Times Online_:


> The number of British troops in Afghanistan is to stay at 9,000 despite a pledge from Gordon Brown to send 200 more roadside-bomb specialists and to increase the number of Afghan army trainers, defence officials have revealed.
> 
> The announcements from the Prime Minister during his brief visit to Helmand on Saturday appeared not to have been clarified in advance with the Ministry of Defence, even though Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, was on the same trip.
> 
> It emerged only today that the 200 additional specialists would not increase the overall size of the force. “There will be some rebalancing to make sure the ‘top baseline’ figure of 9,000 troops remains constant,” one defence official said ....



_More on link_


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## Greymatters (31 Aug 2009)

MedCorps said:
			
		

> I am somewhat shocked that no Int Branch guys have weighed in on this...
> 
> So the 7 people...
> 1 x J2 --> needed (someone needs to run the boat)
> ...



Ask and ye shall receive (retired Int anyway)...

There's a reason why an Int office often has a lot of people, or in other cases not enough.  Unfortunately your question is a bit of a catch-22; there's not enough info from the current op to properly assess the needs, and not being in the loop I really cant ask for the detailed information needed to properly assess it.

From your example though I will point out a few things:

J2: Your table implies he's sitting around the office available for work/direction - in reality, the J2 is often absent with meetings and local liaison work (or is supposed to be, I've heard of Ops where the J2 never ventured out of his domain, thus isolating himself from what was actually going on, and making himself a nuisance among the troops).  Without contacts for local real-time information, that the J2 is supposed to maintain, the whole Int section might as well pack up and go home. We look to the J2 for direction based on his orders from the commander or interpretations of the units needs or mission needs.  We also depend on him to help keep us from being sent on kitchen duty and rock-painting patrols whenever an RSM decides that the Int guys 'aren't doing anything useful anyway'.  In regard to products, J2 is not supposed to produce products, is supposed to review products and add strategic value comments.  May write occasional products if they match his particular subject matter expertise area (which is not everything in the known universe despite what some of them like to think).  

2I/C (not an 'Int Guy', its an actual position): In big sections, this is another officer (Lt/Capt), but usually a senior NCO.  Also does a lot of liaison work with local friendly units for admin and other support functions, and does the liaison for the J2 when the J2 is out of area for whatever reason.  He is supposed to assign tasks to all Int staff based on direction from the J2.  This again is often dysfunctional when on operations where the J2 stays around the office all day thus negating the need for a 2I/C, who in turn has to work harder to look like he's contributing, so the troops end up with two persons looking over their shoulders all day adding unneccesary input (or contradicting inputs!). Reviews products to ensure they meet assigned tasks.  May write occasional products if they match his particular subject matter expertise area (which is not everything in the known universe despite what some of them like to think).    

Dataminer/Collator (an 'Int guy', in an actual position):  Handles all incoming traffic, flags important information for direct attention of the J2 and/or 2IC.  reviews all electronic message databases. Usually is in 2-3 hours before everyone else, acts as a 'troubleshooter' for messages/phone calls/requests that come in at odd hours (also leaves early as well).  Knows the database like the back of his hand.  Has spectacular recall of everything he/she has read.  Can find and recall any important message in the databases within 5 minutes. (No, this is not a fictitious ability - the good ones do this for a living).  This should be a Mcpl or even a Sergeant who knows what is and is not important (but I have observed that too many units delagate the work to a private or corporal who does not know what is or is not important, so messages have to be read by a second person before they actually get dealt with).  Often doubles as the in-house IT advisor and liaises with local comms/IT support units/sections. 
  
Dataminer/Collator2 (can be an 'Int guy', can also be any other trade with adequate clearance); 'Understudy' to the Dataminer/Collator.  Same duties as lead Dataminer, but needs more time to find things, during training may stack items for lead Dataminer to sort through.  Usually works on a crossover shift or different shift so the Int office covers at least 18 out of 24 hours of the day, or the complete 24 hours.

'Int Guy' - Analyst x 2?: This is very dependent on how much traffic is being generated by the unit being supported, number of patrols being conducted, and the number of reports from neighbouring units, higher command, NATO, and Canada.  If the J2 has done their job, you need at least 2 analysts (Ive worked on ops where we had 6 going full time).  If the J2 hasn't done their job, you can probably get rid of all of them because they'll have nothing to do except make powerpoints for the J2.  May do shiftwork or spare each other off when away on work/admin/leave. In sections where multiple nations are contributing, may have many analysts of all ranks all producing materials of 'varying quality'. 

Targeting/Imagery Analysis x1: Specialized training required for this position, whether they need to be there depends on what unit is being supported and what missions they are performing.

Liaison positions: You mentioned persons in TOC, Plans, whatever.  Any liaison position is separate from the main Int cell, or should be, and should not be considered 'working bodies' with permanent duties in the office.   

"3 x Int / Sigs guys for collection from other specialized int disciplines who are multidisciplinary and cross pure int boundaries": not sure what multidiscplines and crossover of pure boundaries you are looking for.  Unfortunately this is pretty much a pipe dream; you are lucky if you can get 3 guys who have had a couple years of experience.  You are even luckier if they all have former combat arms experience.  You have a horseshoe up your butt if they also all wanted to be posted there, are good at their jobs, and are focused on supporting the troops in the field. (An associate of mine once got assigned two reservists from an allied country and ended end doing all the work himself because neither of the reservists could do their work and there was no time to train them). 

Civilians: civilians do have unique skills to offer, but success will depend largely on whether they are there to work or expect to be as a part-time tourist.  

Other comments:
_1 x Int guy on the plans staff (J5). He collects what int is needed or future operations and feeds it to the ASIC.  He then integrates ASIC int products into the planning cycle and wargames the red side. He is very involved with targeting.  He is the only Int expert on the plans staff --> needed. _
Not true; there are usually at least one or two Int-related experts on a plans staff, especially when talking about red forces, and not all neccesarily with the Int cap badge.  Give some credit to smart people in other trades!
  
_1 x Int guy in the TOC (J3).  He provides 1/2 of the required coverage (days and peak operations, the ASIC covers at night?) to the current battle staff on the Red SA. He also takes I&W (?) information an feeds it into the current picture. He is also involved with BDA collection.  He is the only Int expert in the TOC --> needed, in fact the LCol said two guys (for 24 hour ops without touching the ASIC capability) would make more sense. _
Having Int in the TOC is highly dependent on the Commander - those who know how to use Int get a great benefit, those who don't like Int or don't know how to use Int properly get frustrated with our inability to perform magic when they snap their fingers (i.e. they don't allow us to have access to the information we need, and then expect us to have access to all the information we need).  This person wont be able to provide support for BDA unless they have some sort of Targeting/Imagery training, which is not common among Int working for combat arms.  There are other Int experts on a battle staff, again give credit for smart people in other trades, but they may not have the 'connections' (or the clearance) to access the information on short notice. And yes, two are better than one so you get 24 hour support to the staff.  Again this person is not part of the Int cell, and is often in a separate support position, and two Int pers should not be from two separate units.


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