# Opinion - Liberators of the Netherlands in 1945, today... - CBC



## dimsum (4 May 2020)

> Liberators of the Netherlands in 1945, today Canada's Armed Forces are eclipsed by Dutch military
> Social Sharing
> 
> Tide has reversed in terms of military capability for defence, peacekeeping, disaster-relief operations
> ...



https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/opinion-canadian-military-preparedness-netherlands-liberation-1.5548372


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## Ralph (4 May 2020)

Apples and kumquats. He left out who some of the NLD brigades report to...


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## CBH99 (4 May 2020)

In many ways, he's comparing Apples to Oranges in a very biased way.  Although they do seem to have a more sensible procurement system (who doesn't?), their geography also places different demands on their military also.



While I don't disagree that they obviously have an attack helicopter capability that we don't...saying we had to install 'improvised machine guns' on the Griffon is absurd.  

^ They have gatling guns & machine guns on the doors, which actually allows them to engage ground targets (soft) infinitely quicker than a dedicated attack helo.  Is it a dedicated attack helo?  No, and couldn't engage tanks or slug it out with enemy armour formations - we would need an actual attack helo for that.  Does it do the job in providing escort for chinooks or armed overwatch?  Yes.

The tanks we have aren't really aging.  They are Leopard 2A4, which are amongst some of the most modern in the world.  The differences between the 2A4 and 2A6 aren't groundbreaking.  They were purchased from mothballed stocks, completely refurbished and updated, in the late 2000's - not considered aging at all.



He also forgets to mention that the Canadian CH-147F is amongst the most modern in the world.

He forgets to mention the Army just got 550 new Lav 6.0.  We also purchased an additional 360 vehicles recently to replace support variants.

He forgets to mention the Army also got 500 new TAPV

He forgets to mention the Army is using the M777 for deployment.  (Might not be suitable for future warfare scenarios...but the US Army, USMC, British Army, Australians, and us - are in the same boat in that regard)

He forgets to mention that our fighter purchase, which we all think will be the F-35, will be 88 jets compared to their 37.  (Since he's comparing numbers.)

He forgets to mention the purchase of 5 C-17's, and 17 new C-130J Hercules aircraft to update/replace our transport fleet.



While it is true we do need to generate an AD capability for deployed forces, up until the last few years it wasn't deemed a priority.  Afghanistan placed a much higher priority on the Chinooks, MRAP vehicles, replacing the LAV fleet, etc.  There was no need for us at the time, given budget considerations, to pursue any sort of AD capability.  The Dutch on the other hand, did require a long range, high-end system such as the Patriot due to their geography and support of their Nordic defense agreements.



He isn't wrong about the naval shipbuilding aspect.  The Dutch have treated their shipbuilding programs as an extension of their industrial might, while we have dithered on 'designing' an already designed ship, etc etc.  

The Dutch, by nature of where they are, also have more demands placed on them by their neighbors to provide to a deterrent against nearby Russia.  We have the luxury of being a gigantic country with not much in it, far away from the rest of the world on this 'isolated island' of sorts.  

^ Between satellites, NORAD radar & surveillance systems, etc - we can see Russian jets approaching our airspace LONG before they actually enter, or get anywhere close to population centers.  Many of the countries in northern Europe don't have that luxury.  (Not an excuse on our part to always dither on procurement...simply pointing out that their geography demands them to be more competent in procurement.)


I don't disagree with everything he said, but as a guy with a Masters in War Studies, currently studying law, and a former member of 20yrs - I also didn't expect him to write something so biased & dumb.    :2c:


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## Eye In The Sky (4 May 2020)

Already posted;  apologies!


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## FJAG (5 May 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> The tanks we have aren't really aging.  They are Leopard 2A4, which are amongst some of the most modern in the world.  The differences between the 2A4 and 2A6 aren't groundbreaking.  They were purchased from mothballed stocks, completely refurbished and updated, in the late 2000's - not considered aging at all.



Turkish Leo IIA4 had problems in Syria and Turkey is clamouring for upgrades: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/germanys-leopard-2-tank-was-considered-one-the-best-until-it-24234 The Leopard IIA7 and A7+ is the current versions being fielded. The A4s were primarily manufactured in the late 1980s.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> He forgets to mention the Army just got 550 new Lav 6.0.  We also purchased an additional 360 vehicles recently to replace support variants.



The Dutch have mechanized battalions which in 2008 acquired 193 Swedish CV9035NLs supported by 200 Boxers.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> He forgets to mention the Army also got 500 new



And some day we'll find a proper use for those hulking beasts. The Dutch have some 400 Fenneks which come in reconnaissance, anti-tank, air defence, forward observer, mortar, forward air controller versions. The Fennek is 6 feet high compared to the 11 foot TAPV.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> He forgets to mention the Army is using the M777 for deployment.  (Might not be suitable for future warfare scenarios...but the US Army, USMC, British Army, Australians, and us - are in the same boat in that regard)



The Dutch have 57 PzH2000 self propelled guns which they also deployed to Afghanistan plus some 128 81mm and 145 120 mm mortars.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> He forgets to mention that our fighter purchase, which we all think will be the F-35, will be 88 jets compared to their 37.  (Since he's comparing numbers.)
> 
> He forgets to mention the purchase of 5 C-17's, and 17 new C-130J Hercules aircraft to update/replace our transport fleet.



Fair enough although I'll believe we'll get F 35s (regardless of the number) when they are finally approved (probably several years after they lay Trudeau to rest. As for the transport aircraft, one should note that the Netherlands is about 40,000 sq kilometers which is a little over 2/3rds of the size of Nova Scotia. There's no major need for a significant air transport fleet.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> While it is true we do need to generate an AD capability for deployed forces, up until the last few years it wasn't deemed a priority.  Afghanistan placed a much higher priority on the Chinooks, MRAP vehicles, replacing the LAV fleet, etc.  There was no need for us at the time, given budget considerations, to pursue any sort of AD capability.  The Dutch on the other hand, did require a long range, high-end system such as the Patriot due to their geography and support of their Nordic defense agreements.



I think that you need to reread that paragraph. I've read the 1994 White Paper on Defence and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy which governed our strategy during these years. In particular the 1994 policy which was in effect during our early years in Afghanistan stated:



> the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel.
> ...
> The Government's perspective on NATO underpins the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. Should it prove necessary, Canada would mobilize further national resources to provide the additional forces required to fulfil Canada's commitment to the Alliance as set out under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.



In effect government direction was to prepare for up to a brigade group + one battalion size deployment in support of the UN or NATO. Nothing in there stated that we were to divest ourselves of tanks, self propelled artillery, anti-tank capabilities or air defence. Those were choices made within DND based on risk assessments made at the time. In effect, the Russian Bear at the time looked cuddly while the dirty terrorists had blown up two buildings in New York therefore we committed ourselves whole-hog to asymmetric warfare in the belief that deterrence in Europe was no longer needed and that we could divest ourselves of all the key weapon systems that were necessary to survive in a near peer conflict. These were not choosing priorities, it was making trade-offs. We could have gotten everything necessary for Afghanistan and still maintained our peer to peer capabilities if we hadn't at the same time put a priority on a massive build-up of our national headquarters during the 2004 to 2011 period:



> The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.
> 
> Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.



https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-on-transformation-2011.html

In short we gave up key warfighting equipment to support a full brigade of paper pushers in Ottawa. That's where our priorities were.



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> I don't disagree with everything he said, but as a guy with a Masters in War Studies, currently studying law, and a former member of 20yrs - I also didn't expect him to write something so biased & dumb.    :2c:



Let's not forget one key point here: The Netherlands' 2019 Defence Budget was US$12.4 Billion; Canada's was US$22.4 Billion, almost twice as much. Their army is about the same size as ours (although they have more equipment with even more in war readiness reserve storage). Their navy and air forces are admittedly smaller because their need is less, however, I have to agree with you that there is an apple and orange element here which is that the Dutch seem to be generating significantly better defence outputs for the defence dollar inputs that they commit as a nation.

I think that at the end of the day, that's what Smol is saying. We spend a lot on defence but, because of poor decisions, our combat capabilities are not what they should be for today's putative enemies and after all, isn't that what we expect from our defence leadership; to prepare us for our next conflict. Sorry mate. I can't agree with you. His report is not biased or dumb. What you should consider it is, though provoking.

 :cheers:


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## CBH99 (5 May 2020)

FJAG,

I always appreciate the good back & forth with you, and I definitely appreciate you having a much more applicable knowledge in key areas.

You are right about what you stated above - all of it.  

I think what the article is missing is context, and perhaps that is simply because the author had a word limit.


Most countries tend to get more bang for their defense buck, literally, than we do.  Vehicles, aircraft, ships are purchased to FIGHT & DESTROY the enemy, with other duties being secondary.  I find that we tend to approach equipment, most of the time, with the opposite mindset...it's there for domestic use, or contributing to allied operations, with warfighting being the final checkmark.  (Obviously I don't mean this universally -- however, I do agree that they do tend to get more bang for their defense buck.  Same with the Aussies.)



*Turkish Leo IIA4 had problems in Syria and Turkey is clamouring for upgrades*

To be fair, the Turks also employed their tanks in a way that had most people facepalming at the time.  The didn't deploy much in terms of infantry support at the time, and their tanks were picked off in way larger numbers than they should have been.

Part of this could be because of the tanks.  I think a significant factor in their losses was how they chose to employ them.  I think we discussed this at the time in a different thread, but their tanks deployed with hardly any infantry support at all.  Their field commanders obviously didn't have much experience in operating armoured forces in a non-formation, ad-hoc, COIN type operation against a well equipped enemy.  


*The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.*

*Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.*

That's just absurd.  How can a CDS like Vance not only ignore the problem, but seem to contribute to it?  He's a combat vet, field officer type throughout his career.  How can he not see what everybody else in the CF does?



I agree with everything you wrote.  Like I said, I think the article was missing context - which, I can understand if there was a word limit, which there probably was.

Their geography being substantially smaller, much closer to Russia, and their needs to contribute to Nordic security all seem to drive them to a more 'focused' procurement.  Instead of needing the general ability to do everything/anything, they do seem to focus their purchases and force structure with a more concrete idea of what they want to be able to achieve.



I also agree with what you said about the 1994 White Paper.

^ Again, in the context of Afghanistan, we had been there for 6 years before the 2008 White Paper was released.  During that time, the GoC and DND prioritized theatre-specific equipment that was deemed UOR, rather than following the 1994 White Paper.  Chinooks, MRAP type vehicles, Leopard 2 to replace Leopard 1, G-Wagons, upgraded uniforms & equipment for the theatre, C-17's and C-130J's to replace/enhance our transport fleet, etc.

I could very well be wrong in regards to the above statement.  It seemed to me, at the time, that the needs of the theatre completely displaced the 1994 White Paper, as the 1994 White Paper was written for a completely different scenario than what we were finding ourselves in.



I'll take back my comment about the article being biased, and the author writing something so biased and dumb.  In the context that he had a word limit, and had to summarize his key points.

I don't disagree with everything he's saying.  I just think it's important to put both sides into context.  He didn't acknowledge any of the new equipment coming online now or soon, nor did he acknowledge that we have very different _'perceived'_ priorities based on our geography.


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## FJAG (5 May 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> *The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.*
> 
> *Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.*
> 
> That's just absurd.  How can a CDS like Vance not only ignore the problem, but seem to contribute to it?  He's a combat vet, field officer type throughout his career.  How can he not see what everybody else in the CF does?



What's even worse is that a) most of that happened on Hillier's and  Natynczyk's watch and b) Leslie report, which pointed this out, has been largely relegated to a back shelf by Natynczyk, Lawson and Vance. 



			
				CBH99 said:
			
		

> ... the 1994 White Paper.
> ^ Again, in the context of Afghanistan, we had been there for 6 years before the 2008 White Paper was released.  During that time, the GoC and DND prioritized theatre-specific equipment that was deemed UOR, rather than following the 1994 White Paper.  Chinooks, MRAP type vehicles, Leopard 2 to replace Leopard 1, G-Wagons, upgraded uniforms & equipment for the theatre, C-17's and C-130J's to replace/enhance our transport fleet, etc.
> 
> I could very well be wrong in regards to the above statement.  It seemed to me, at the time, that the needs of the theatre completely displaced the 1994 White Paper, as the 1994 White Paper was written for a completely different scenario than what we were finding ourselves in.



Actually I think that the Afghan deployment can be read within the context of the 1994 White Paper and its support and force size commitments to UN and NATO collective actions which our operation did in fact fall under. The White Paper is written broadly. Our military leadership chose to interpret it narrowly focusing almost exclusively on one theatre.

I don't begrudge the equipment commitments we made to Afghanistan either. They were appropriate and necessary and in fact corrected earlier poor decision making within the CAF (we'd gotten rid of the Chinooks we previously had owned in the 1990s and were in the process of getting rid of the tanks and SPs.) I actually don't mind the LAVs and do take into consideration that there was a strong political push to give work to GD in London and that they were bought before Afghanistan. LAVs have a good use in providing deployability, mobility and firepower in asymmetric warfare (which is why I argue that they should continue to exist in a medium brigade equipped and trained for that purpose) 

I even see the utility of having them in a heavyish brigade for combat in Europe in order to reap the maintenance benefits of a common fleet within the Army. I just think that that is a trade off for lives when the shooting starts and while such a trade off might be necessary/acceptable one, our leadership should at least be honest enough to admit that's what they are doing. (The Brits' credibility was much hit with the failures of a series of their vehicles in Afghanistan)

My biggest complaint is that since the post-Soviet collapse and the 1994 White Paper (and particularly within the SSE) we have been politically directed to recognize a potential for deployment to a NATO commitment (and most recently have given that practical effect in Latvia) but ever since then Canada's military leadership has taken its eyes off that commitment/defence requirement and has knowingly sacrificed military capabilities in that environment in favour of maintaining inordinately flush headquarters during lean financial times. I know that everyone in Ottawa is highly adept at rationalizing each and every decision that they make, but to me this smacks of institutional professional negligence.

 :cheers:


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## FSTO (5 May 2020)

Hmm..….HQ bloat continues to grow under the leadership of Army combat General Officers (and one RCAF)………..hmmm. And what service is able to operate within a define space that has zero room to accommodate hangers on...…….hmm.


Now popping smoke and jumping overboard!


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## Good2Golf (5 May 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> Hmm..….HQ bloat continues to grow under the leadership of Army combat General Officers (and one RCAF)………..hmmm. And what service is able to operate within a define space that has zero room to accommodate hangers on...…….hmm.
> 
> 
> Now popping smoke and jumping overboard!



It’s not like the RCN just has CRCN, DCRCN and DGMEPM in NDHQ.  Careful about glass houses...if we were to ask why we had all these personnel bloat problems in the CAF, who would be the key position responsible to assist the CDS to resolve it....hmmmm...oh that’s right...a VAdm...


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## Ralph (5 May 2020)

It would be easier to fix things if "Ottawa" was the monolithic NDHQ Puzzle Palace that those never posted to the NCR imagine it is. There are some HQs manned to the highest level, and there are some HQs that are chronically understaffed...


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## dapaterson (5 May 2020)

There is fundamental indiscipline in the HHQs (L1s and L2s, particularly) in terms of O&E, and an unwillingness to stop doing anything.

If ECPs could only be requested at 5+ years out (to provide personnel generation systems time to respond) we'd see significantly different behaviours.  But as long as we indulge the desires for immediate gratification by GOFOs (and continue to grow their numbers beyond reasonable or sustainable numbers) the problems will persist.


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## FSTO (5 May 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> It’s not like the RCN just has CRCN, DCRCN and DGMEPM in NDHQ.  Careful about glass houses...if we were to ask why we had all these personnel bloat problems in the CAF, who would be the key position responsible to assist the CDS to resolve it....hmmmm...oh that’s right...a VAdm...



Oh I'm fully aware of my hypocrisy!  

But Big Army has been the main drivers of all this since they are by far the largest component in the CAF, right?


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## FJAG (5 May 2020)

Upthread I made a comment about Turkish Leopard II A4s. Here are two more articles which offer greater detail on the matter.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germany%E2%80%99s-leopard-2-tank-syria-was-beaten-badly-battle-why-78441

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/02/12/battle-al-bab-verifying-turkish-military-vehicle-losses/

While the manner of tactical employment may very well have been one of the issues, what strikes me as probably more significant is the fact that these tanks were facing more advanced and effective anti armour guided missiles rather than the RPG7 and IEDs which we faced in Afghanistan. This is a lessons the Americans have accepted the lessons with their current M1A2Cs which include not only their depleted uranium armour (which the Germans for some moral reason or other refuse to use) but also reactive armour plates and the Trophy Active Protective System. The Russians have been using reactive armour for some time and newer equipment is also incorporating other active protective systems.

All that said. We need not only better tanks, but also a reinforcement/replacement system that can generate quick replacement of the inevitable equipment and crew casualties we will sustain. 

 :cheers:


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## CBH99 (5 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Upthread I made a comment about Turkish Leopard II A4s. Here are two more articles which offer greater detail on the matter.
> 
> https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germany%E2%80%99s-leopard-2-tank-syria-was-beaten-badly-battle-why-78441
> 
> ...




Agreed.  We should have a mechanism in place to order replacement vehicles for those that we lose.  (No disrespect intended at all, nor to make a recent tragedy something focused on equipment, but the loss of Stalker is a good example, with only 28 airframes we should absolutely have a replacement program in place.)

What you said about the sophisticated anti-armour missiles, that is what I was referring to also.  The enemy was well equipped with modern ATGM.  The Turks employed their tanks horribly at the same time, which I believe was their # 1 mistake.  Parked on hilltops, parked at the base of hills, or just out in the open & scanning.  

There were plenty of videos on Youtube & LiveLeak of them getting picked off, and they had absolutely zero - or minimal - infantry.
  Just a tank, sitting there in the open most of the time, almost inviting an attack. 


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PCkbpmLZuWk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pButwecC2k8

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMRH4GdBbuw


Ugly footage.  The 3rd link is especially damning, in how quickly Turkey lost it's tanks.  


Please note in all videos, the OPFOR were able to operate relatively freely near Turkish armoured forces.  No infantry patrols.  No patrols near what appeared to be FOB's.  Nothing.



FJAG,

Like most issues, perhaps it's a combination of multiple factors, re: the original article posted, about our aging Leopard 2A4.

From my understanding, the tank still stands up pretty well against most other tanks used by allies.  Especially in northern Europe, where most countries use the Leopard 2A4 or 2A6.

In the Turkish context, I believe their employment was their fatal flaw, not the tank itself.  We could replace the tanks in the videos with any model of tank out there, and I believe the outcome would have been the same given how they were positioned and employed.  

 :2c:   :cheers:


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## PuckChaser (5 May 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Agreed.  We should have a mechanism in place to order replacement vehicles for those that we lose.  (No disrespect intended at all, nor to make a recent tragedy something focused on equipment, but the loss of Stalker is a good example, with only 28 airframes we should absolutely have a replacement program in place.)



It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.


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## suffolkowner (5 May 2020)

some of the latest defence budget numbers

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0.pdf

We often compare ourselves to Australia but I think we come out on the wrong end of other familiar countries as well as alluded to above with respect to the Netherlands, but see Israel/Italy/Spain/Turkey all in our spending neighborhood but with vastly superior militaries, at least on paper. Does purchasing power and labor costs account for enough of the difference. This particular CDS seems to have an affinity for Brigadier Generals, at some point leadership has to be held accountable.

Our tanks actually illustrate the point well in my opinion in that we too should be proceeding with modernization/refit to the 2A7+ across the fleet


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## MilEME09 (5 May 2020)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.



Not buying one off products would help as well, does any one else even use the Kerax 8x8 other then us? One off lines just ensure problems down the road.


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## FJAG (5 May 2020)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.



True enough.

My point on replacement of combat losses (or even training losses), however, is more along the lines of having immediate trained and equipped crews to replace losses, a supply chain with a plan to get them forward quickly (in the face of area denial strategies), an industry that can replace the replacements from available stocks and ultimately production lines (while the combat phase may be quick, the "cease fire" or "operational pause" may be lengthy). 

 :cheers:


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## suffolkowner (5 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Not buying one off products would help as well, does any one else even use the Kerax 8x8 other then us? One off lines just ensure problems down the road.



And on that new vaunted non political procurement system with respect to the above

https://www.marketscreener.com/news/CITT-Canadian-International-Trade-Tribunal-OSHKOSH-DEFENSE-CANADA-INC--26592915/


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## TCM621 (5 May 2020)

The majority of the comments that have been critical of this article seem to have how you define "aging" or "old" equipment. A lot of equipment is actually reasonably up to date in technological terms. Military equipment isn't usually cutting edge stuff. On the other hand, we have a lot of physically old stuff. Ships and planes are the most obvious with multiple planes being 30+ years old. We also beat our equipment to hell and back because we don't have any to spare.

A lot of our problems could be fixed, or at least minimized, by buying new versions of what we have now. Call up Boeing and ask for 60 CF-18s in their current configuration and we would save money on training, spares and maintenance. Replace all our hi-powers with new ones that don't rattle apart when you shot them. Build some new frigates in their newest configuration and other such things. In my career, I have run into far more things that were ineffective because they were broken than were too out of date to be useful. Upgrades are important but the best technology is useless if it is stuck on the tarmac or in the harbour.


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## MilEME09 (5 May 2020)

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> And on that new vaunted non political procurement system with respect to the above
> 
> https://www.marketscreener.com/news/CITT-Canadian-International-Trade-Tribunal-OSHKOSH-DEFENSE-CANADA-INC--26592915/



Shame too, Oshkosh would of been great for interoperability with the US, the HEMTT line has a lot of variants, would allow for a lot of new vehicles based off one chassis


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## Eye In The Sky (5 May 2020)

Comparing our 2 forces might be a little 'apples to oranges' but that would arguably be the case for comparing us to anyone but "us".

Detailing how small and 'being left behind' our forces are becoming?  I say "valid and on target".


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## daftandbarmy (5 May 2020)

I've had the great good fortune to work closely with the Dutch Marines, and other parts of their military, albeit many years ago. 

One thing we tend to forget is that the 'Continental' Armies all have very different National Defence imperatives from those of us who inhabit 'Peace Island' a.k.a. North America. They also have fairly considerable, lingering, colonial commitments that we do not. 

Regardless, and not to jump on the 'Holier than thou' pulpit, but there are also a variety of issues with the Dutch military that eclipse ours, and that likely have not fully gone away. I'd rather have our Military and Political leadership, and questionable equipment, than the other way around:

Dutch cabinet resigns over Srebrenica massacre 

Seven years after the event, the Dutch government finally admitted yesterday that it could have done more to prevent the slaughter of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica by Serb forces in 1995 and resigned. With just under a month to go before general elections, Wim Kok, the outgoing Labour prime minister, signalled that his cabinet had decided that the conduct of Dutch peacekeeping troops and the Dutch government at the time had left the government with no choice but to resign en masse. 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/17/warcrimes.andrewosborn


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## Navy_Pete (6 May 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> It’s not like the RCN just has CRCN, DCRCN and DGMEPM in NDHQ.  Careful about glass houses...if we were to ask why we had all these personnel bloat problems in the CAF, who would be the key position responsible to assist the CDS to resolve it....hmmmm...oh that’s right...a VAdm...



Are people including the EPMs and the procurement project staff in HQ bloat?  That's somewhat counterintuitive, if you are arguing people need more/modern equipment (that needs support once delivered).

That needs a lot of people, and while the positions are temporary, the projects are long enough and there are enough in the wings that when one is done they can move to the next one.  The only way to combat 'bloat' is to basically restructure the whole procurement process for the whole of government. My personal experience is DND runs really lean on procurement with the teams a fraction of the size for the ships compared to the CPF for example. Lots of folks in the EPM are doublehatted. My personal experience is also the EPMs are running pretty short staffed, with lots of people now doing the jobs that used to be done by two or three, with empty billets anyway.

Bullets, ships and planes don't buy or maintain themselves. An equipment heavy force needs a big support tail for the teeth to be able to do their jobs.  That's completely unrelated to the big giant centralized commands.

That was one thing I didn't understand with the Leslie report either;


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## Good2Golf (6 May 2020)

Navy_Pete, the EPMs are likely amongst the least bloated HQs...in fact, understaffed for the burdens of wholesome life-cycle management is a better description of them. I included them (DGMEPM by title) to make the point that large GOFO numbers are not uniquely Services command-related. My own thoughts are that the GOFOs involved in the institutional side of things have the greatest amount of bloat, although one step down from that, are the Services, but I would agree with many that the Army does seem to (anecdotally) have a large share of GOs ‘outside’ of the NCR.  Not sure if that impression is based on facts, but the Div HQs have a lots of *s out there. Maybe someone close to the NCR knows what the current state of public ally available GOFO #s is?


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

There's a world of a difference between the tail that is an absolute necessity to keep the teeth functioning properly, and the administrative bloat that has developed over the years to carry out functions that are the result of building a self-licking ice cream cone in Ottawa every time the idea fairy strikes. 

Leslie's report was concentrating on the latter.

Here's one way to trim the system:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2017/ART-005/

There are dozens of other ways to optimize a system. Ask Daftandbarmy for help. He does that stuff for a living.

 :cheers:


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## Navy_Pete (6 May 2020)

I agree, just wouldn't include the EPMs (or ADM(Mat) in general) as being part of the HQ bloat. There are probably a few subsections that could easily be labeled as 'good idea fairies' but generally they do a bunch of the thankless admin tasks that feed into the GoC beast, so aren't necessarily a DND creation.

For context, the head of the EPMs (Commodore or Brigadier) and collectively probably are responsible for $2-3B a year on O&M spending with probably over a thousand people between the directorates. It seemed to be a comparatively high level of responsibility compared to others. From what I saw, they had a much higher workload in their normal day to day compared to most GOFOs in the NCR during peacetime operations, but that could just be a lack of exposure on my part to the moving bits outside ADM(Mat). Reporting is pretty flat, with only a few four ringers (or civvie equivalents), with reasonable divisions of each section with three ringers looking over specific areas of equipment. The general scope of responsibility is really the limiting factor (as opposed to # of personnel reporting to you) as going by just size of the section would mean there are way to many balls to juggle and specific issues to keep track of at the section head level.

I think some of the bloat though is a direct response to TBS and other department's requirements. For example, there is a bunch of work that feeds into maintaining the Canada First defence strategy. That kind of work directly relates to the arguements that get made for annual funding, project approval etc and would be were you go when you get into the cost tradeoffs off something like CSC (for example) and TBS wants to know what you will/won't be able to do if they trim a budget. Its a huge effort to do it, but means that we're in a lot better position then the Coast Guard for arguing why we need money.

Cutting DND bloat like that is counterproductive if there is no change to the GoC bureaucracy requirements, so I think skinning this cat would probably require most of the GoC processes to be burned down and start from scratch, as they flow down a lot of BS.

Probably still a whack of sections that are completely unecessary, but my general impression after nearly a decade in the NCR bouncing between organizations is that the GoC is full of self licking ice cream cones that demand feeding, so it's less a DND specific issue, and more of a response to the parasitic nature of bureaucracies to spawn malignant little empires that create choke points and decision gates to fight through.


----------



## CBH99 (6 May 2020)

Thanks Navy_Pete,

I hadn't thought of the broader context before, outside of DND streamlining and organizing itself as an independent department.  What you describe helps clarify some of the questions I had regarding the information FJAG had posted, about HQ bloat.

So if I'm understanding correctly...while DND and NDHQ could probably trim some fat...a lot of the fat is necessary just due to the requirements of TB and PW, and the way they do business?  It would be difficult to radically transform NDHQ on it's own, without TD and PW reducing the amount of BS & hoops that DND has to jump through?


Which makes perfect sense.  Just unfortunate that this monster that slows things down and kills so much of the budget & capability we have, has friends that would also need to go away...


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## dapaterson (6 May 2020)

Part of DND/CAF's problems is the intersection of the two.  EPMs should not be military.  ADMs, which are departmental, not CAF, should not have 2* Chiefs of Staff merely to give some poor branches a "thanks for coming out" GOFO position.

Lots of organizations in DND do need military expertise for input, but bureaucratic expertise to advance the requirements.  A rotating cast of military personnel slows progress immeasurably - you either get "the streamer posted in for a year to get a tick in the box who never understands it who causes more harm than good by trying to leave his mark" or "Bottom of the bottom third abandoned for years and ignored by peers".

In trying to do too much of the Departmental administration, the CAF loses focus and starts to adopt damaging, MBA type mindsets.

For example: the CAF needs cooks who can plan and execute balanced meal plans based on available ingredients.  Thus every base was different, and the senior cooks got the experience they need for when they deploy.  Today, instead, we've adopted a national standardized menu.  More efficient (less costly), but our cooks no longer practice their necessary skills for operational employment.  Or the tale that at a Qualification Standard writing board, an airfield engineer was adamant that they could cut all that useless airfield battle damage repair material, because they never did it in their day to day work.

The CAF focus needs to be on delivering military capability to meet the needs of the government; the DND focus needs to be on managing the systems to support that.  When the CAF has too many managerial jobs, those behaviours become incentivized, to the detriment of the CAF.


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Part of DND/CAF's problems is the intersection of the two.  EPMs should not be military.  ADMs, which are departmental, not CAF, should not have 2* Chiefs of Staff merely to give some poor branches a "thanks for coming out" GOFO position.
> 
> Lots of organizations in DND do need military expertise for input, but bureaucratic expertise to advance the requirements.  A rotating cast of military personnel slows progress immeasurably - you either get "the streamer posted in for a year to get a tick in the box who never understands it who causes more harm than good by trying to leave his mark" or "Bottom of the bottom third abandoned for years and ignored by peers".
> 
> ...



Very true indeed.

Your little cook anecdote reminded me of my last exercise with Third Horse and sitting on the steps of our battery's field kitchen sharing a cup of coffee with my chief cook after the lunch rush had gone with him complaining that he hated the "controlled portion" frozen food that was being sent out to him except for the fact that none of the young cooks he had knew how to break down a side of beef or a hog anyway - so what the hell. People reluctantly giving in to the system.

 :cheers:


----------



## Navy_Pete (6 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Part of DND/CAF's problems is the intersection of the two.  EPMs should not be military.  ADMs, which are departmental, not CAF, should not have 2* Chiefs of Staff merely to give some poor branches a "thanks for coming out" GOFO position.
> 
> Lots of organizations in DND do need military expertise for input, but bureaucratic expertise to advance the requirements.  A rotating cast of military personnel slows progress immeasurably - you either get "the streamer posted in for a year to get a tick in the box who never understands it who causes more harm than good by trying to leave his mark" or "Bottom of the bottom third abandoned for years and ignored by peers".
> 
> ...



On the flip side, a bunch of defence scientists in the US set the performance requirements for one of the recent generation of US kevlar helmets. Ballistic requirements, comfort for extended wear, etc were all based on state of the art knowledge at the time.  Bunch of prototypes were built, did great at stopping bullets and every single one of them broke during the field testing, because no one thought to consider the normal things the troops were used to doing with the helmets like use them as improptu seats.

Our ADM(Mat) orgs are a mix of civvie and military; you get the mix of people who have actually used them for practical considerations, and you also get some outside ideas coming in for different ways to do things. That helps us usually avoid things not being fit for purpose because we didn't think of how they may actually be used (outside what a textbook says).

Generally speaking I can't really think of any streamers that just bounced in and out of MEPM; there are plenty of high profile jobs there, but it's also recognized that you need that continuity, so postings of 2-3 years is the norm (with some extending longer if it makes sense).  On the technical support side (for the Navy anyway), there is a lot of work between the EPM and the formations to keep things together, so having people with experience on both sides is really important, and something we would lose if it was all military. Also gives us flexibility to put extra horsepower into critical areas as required and re-role people easily, so having a uniform doing effectively a civilian job is a big advantage when you are putting out fires (and we're cheaper for the SWE). There is a lot of politics to moving civvies around that you just don't have with military, so gives us a bit of agility that we wouldn't have otherwise.

Agree with the MBA approach having problems, and the other issues, but it's not really a simple all/nothing approach, and there's a lot of stupid things we do, (like give promotion points for 'breadth of experience' that encourages job bouncing) that add to it as well. Maybe if making things run smoothly was equally as valued as 'promoting change' that would kill a lot of the good idea fairy initiatives.

COS Mat is a lot more then what you are making it out to be, and there is a good reason they tend to go into 3* jobs or pull the pin and become an ADM. I'm not sure who the last ADM(Mat) without time in uniform, but when they are responsible for every single bit of kit in the CAF, just makes sense to maintain that civilian/military mix throughout the whole organization. If nothing else people in uniform  is a very easy way to remind people that they aren't just buying widgets, and makes sure there is a small pool of people that could step into the role with confidence.  It's an absolutely critical job, and if you think our procurement record and funding levels are bad now, just imagine if we had a less then stellar ADM that was getting pushed around by TBS and others.


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## daftandbarmy (6 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> There's a world of a difference between the tail that is an absolute necessity to keep the teeth functioning properly, and the administrative bloat that has developed over the years to carry out functions that are the result of building a self-licking ice cream cone in Ottawa every time the idea fairy strikes.
> 
> Leslie's report was concentrating on the latter.
> 
> ...



Dude.... my CLIENTS do that stuff for a living... I'm just fortunate to be able to help them come up with their own ideas about how to do it better


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Dude.... my CLIENTS do that stuff for a living... I'm just fortunate to be able to help them come up with their own ideas about how to do it better



Yeah! Yeah! That's what I meant.  YOU help THEM optimize THEIR systems. Could you spend a few years in Ottawa? Hell, would you even want to spend a few years in Ottawa?


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## dapaterson (6 May 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> ...so having a uniform doing effectively a civilian job is a big advantage when you are putting out fires (and we're cheaper for the SWE).



I;ll highlight this as one of my main bones of contention: Military are not less expensive than SWE.  Reg F pay is centralized so never seen, but represents over 25% of defence expenditures.  The cost of military personnel is significantly greater than civilians in many different respects.

Lots of false economies based on the misconception that Reg F personnel are "free".


----------



## MilEME09 (6 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Very true indeed.
> 
> Your little cook anecdote reminded me of my last exercise with Third Horse and sitting on the steps of our battery's field kitchen sharing a cup of coffee with my chief cook after the lunch rush had gone with him complaining that he hated the "controlled portion" frozen food that was being sent out to him except for the fact that none of the young cooks he had knew how to break down a side of beef or a hog anyway - so what the hell. People reluctantly giving in to the system.
> 
> :cheers:



The sad thing is a QL5 cook can challenge the red seal exam, but they do not get the training any more to really pass it. Everything I have seen in CAF kitchens is preprepared stuff from sysco, though when I was in wainwright for PLQ the cooks were baking fresh bread for us. Baby steps I guess, but I have been a Chef civil side for 10 years, the CAF leaves a lot to improve their cook training and execution. The standardized meal plan still can work but they need to start scratch cooking, you don't develop knife skills opening a bag.


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The sad thing is a QL5 cook can challenge the red seal exam, but they do not get the training any more to really pass it. Everything I have seen in CAF kitchens is preprepared stuff from sysco, though when I was in wainwright for PLQ the cooks were baking fresh bread for us. Baby steps I guess, but I have been a Chef civil side for 10 years, the CAF leaves a lot to improve their cook training and execution. The standardized meal plan still can work but they need to start scratch cooking, you don't develop knife skills opening a bag.



Back in the day, the cooks were my second favourite people right after my maintenance detachment. Those were the days when cooks liked doing mess dinners because it gave them the freedom to be creative and show their stuff. Not so sure how they feel about them these days.

 :cheers:


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## TCM621 (6 May 2020)

I wonder if the problem isn't that our tail too large but the fact we have a tiny head with only a few teeth. I have never met someone working in HQs that would say they were under worked. Everyone I meet agrees we need to cut the fat but not in their shop, they are too busy. In fact, they could probably use another person. We have cut so much in the last 30 years, we are past capacity to the point that commander have to choose which part of their mandate they can fail at.


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## MilEME09 (6 May 2020)

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> I wonder if the problem isn't that our tail too large but the fact we have a tiny head with only a few teeth. I have never met someone working in HQs that would say they were under worked. Everyone I meet agrees we need to cut the fat but not in their shop, they are too busy. In fact, they could probably use another person. We have cut so much in the last 30 years, we are past capacity to the point that commander have to choose which part of their mandate they can fail at.



Thing is too, as some here have pointed out, some things that used to be done by local commanders are now pushed up to higher headquarters. Creating the need for more people, as pointed out if TB and PW got their hands, and arms out of our cookie jar, we would probably see a proportional decrease in our HQ bloat.


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## daftandbarmy (6 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Thing is too, as some here have pointed out, some things that used to be done by local commanders are now pushed up to higher headquarters. Creating the need for more people, as pointed out if TB and PW got their hands, and arms out of our cookie jar, we would probably see a proportional decrease in our HQ bloat.



Or just delegate more, like, you know, we get trained to do but never seem to get around to much in some areas.


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## MilEME09 (6 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Or just delegate more, like, you know, we get trained to do but never seem to get around to much in some areas.



Exactly, delegate more back down


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> I wonder if the problem isn't that our tail too large but the fact we have a tiny head with only a few teeth. I have never met someone working in HQs that would say they were under worked. Everyone I meet agrees we need to cut the fat but not in their shop, they are too busy. In fact, they could probably use another person. We have cut so much in the last 30 years, we are past capacity to the point that commander have to choose which part of their mandate they can fail at.



It's like you read Leslie's report on transformation from 2011.



> Based on a series of brain-storming sessions over the winter with a network of some of the best and brightest officers and civil servants destined for more senior leadership roles, a variety of organizational models were discussed and some big ideas were developed to realize efficiencies and new ways of doing things.  Some of these were presented at a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants, and it became apparent that the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo within any one particular organization, which is perfectly natural.  Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and will probably never be achieved on any significant change as we are large and complicated, and the different organizations that make up the whole do different things, each of which is believed to be very important by those who are in them.  Once again, perfectly natural and probably true.  We found ourselves constantly going back to the intent of the Government for guidance, namely to reduce tail and invest in teeth.



 :cheers:


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## Navy_Pete (6 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I;ll highlight this as one of my main bones of contention: Military are not less expensive than SWE.  Reg F pay is centralized so never seen, but represents over 25% of defence expenditures.  The cost of military personnel is significantly greater than civilians in many different respects.
> 
> Lots of false economies based on the misconception that Reg F personnel are "free".



Nope, that's based on the total cost to the SWE for Reg F personnel in project billets being consistently lower then their civilian counterpart doing the same job. That includes a roll up of benefits etc.

For example, if you compare the payscales of an Eng 4 to a Captain, they are roughly the same (with the eng 4 salary being slightly higher) but their benefit package is costed higher by TBS, and they can also get things like O/T, so the same position will be budgeted for more if a civvie is doing it on the annual budget.  That's a pretty common working rank in the EPMs for officers, but it's the same idea if you look at techs and the admin staff. The gap gets bigger as the rank goes up as well.

Not complaining, but it's a simple fact that we're anywhere from 5-10% less of a SWE hit for normal working hours, with no extra cost to work late, travel on weekends etc. That adds up when you are talking about hundreds of people, and the massive flexibility that they have with tasking uniforms that they don't have with unionized employees is a big deal.

For the cook thing, one of the best parts of deploying with a ship is that the cooks still do the meal planning. The viteler still does get some frozen stuff so it lasts between port visits, but usually the first week is a lot of fresh goods. Have always lucked out and gotten really good cooks, but the last trip I was on they were even training everyone working the line on how to plate it and everything, it was awesome.  They were really happy to have that freedom, and of course the crew loved it, so it was a win all the way around. It took them a fair bit of effort and probably cost more, but the quality of the food was excellent. Can see why someone would hate going to a base though; heating up prepared food isn't what I'd want to be doing if I joined to be a cook.


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## dapaterson (6 May 2020)

Direct pay is not the only element of cost associated with military personnel.  The TBS directives on costing differentiate between civilian and military for that reason - there are significant indirect costs associated with military personnel (increased cost of pensions is the  most obvious, due to the more generous pension provisions in the CFSA vs the PSSA).  There are also direct enterprise costs not borne by the employer - your cost moves aren't charged to the program budget; your health care isn't charged to the program budget...


There's also a larger philosophical issue: if the majority of a military occupation is located in the NCR doing office work, why are they military?  If most PSel officers are academics doing research in Ottawa, why can't those functions be converted to Defence Scientists?

The CAF has an unfortunate uniform fetish that costs money, and costs military PYs that could be re-invested in core military functions.


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## FJAG (6 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> The CAF has an unfortunate uniform fetish that costs money, and costs military PYs that could be re-invested in core military functions.



The basic concept is that you can deploy a service member but not a civilian. Then again there are numerous service members who don't really fit into the deployment package scheme either. Then again they don't have unions. 

You know my old song. We need less of both in Ottawa so that we can invest in core military functions.

 :violin:


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## MJP (6 May 2020)

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> I wonder if the problem isn't that our tail too large but the fact we have a tiny head with only a few teeth. I have never met someone working in HQs that would say they were under worked. Everyone I meet agrees we need to cut the fat but not in their shop, they are too busy. In fact, they could probably use another person. We have cut so much in the last 30 years, we are past capacity to the point that commander have to choose which part of their mandate they can fail at.



That is a very good point!  We tend to want reports and data on a million things that really don't matter much or have automated process but we don't use them because we don't trust the data being put in. So we just have people put things together, the annual Material Attestation (and the equally useless Fin Attestation)f or example is a useless L4-L2 time suck. The L1 level could pull the stats that get reported for their entire formation. The general push/feedback whenever that is raised is that the L4-2 level needs to know their unit/formation trends and issues. That is part of the staff's job at every level already, formalizing it in a useless report that everyone plays lip service too means nothing.

On the flip side, as shitty as the pandemic is it has really highlights how much useless shit we do. Although very anecdotal. in my unit we continue to function on about 20% of the work force actually doing work day to day. The kicker is we have a better grasp of our preparedness and our soldiers because everyone can focus on their core jobs, not the million extra tasks that are on top of our core jobs.  Hell our VOR is the best it has been in years if ever...


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## MilEME09 (6 May 2020)

MJP said:
			
		

> On the flip side, as shitty as the pandemic is it has really highlights how much useless crap we do. Although very anecdotal. in my unit we continue to function on about 20% of the work force actually doing work day to day. The kicker is we have a better grasp of our preparedness and our soldiers because everyone can focus on their core jobs, not the million extra tasks that are on top of our core jobs.  Hell our VOR is the best it has been in years if ever...



A sad Silver lining if you think about it, though maybe that will trigger a few like minded folk to realize that maybe we have a lot of extra stuff effecting our readiness, VOR rate, etc....


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## Halifax Tar (7 May 2020)

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> Nope, that's based on the total cost to the SWE for Reg F personnel in project billets being consistently lower then their civilian counterpart doing the same job. That includes a roll up of benefits etc.
> 
> For example, if you compare the payscales of an Eng 4 to a Captain, they are roughly the same (with the eng 4 salary being slightly higher) but their benefit package is costed higher by TBS, and they can also get things like O/T, so the same position will be budgeted for more if a civvie is doing it on the annual budget.  That's a pretty common working rank in the EPMs for officers, but it's the same idea if you look at techs and the admin staff. The gap gets bigger as the rank goes up as well.
> 
> ...



Just a slight and common spelling error


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## CBH99 (7 May 2020)

Someone mentioned earlier in the thread that they would prefer our organization and equipment issues over that of the Dutch.

I was wondering if they could elaborate on that?  Or if someone else who is more familiar with their organization could expand on that?


Every military tends to look good from the outside, until you see how it functions from the inside.  Even the USN, with 290 ships in it's battle fleet, mostly state of the art - is a gigantic rolling clusterf**k when your looking at it from the inside as a uniformed member.  (I imagine the same goes for most large military organizations...everybody has problems, just different kinds of problems.)


Getting the thread somewhat back on track.  Could whoever mentioned that, or someone else who is familiar with their organizational/equipment issues, elaborate on that a bit more?  (Bosnia massacre excluded)


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## Good2Golf (7 May 2020)

Years back, the Dutch came to the CAF to see if we’d be interested in not swapping, but outright taking several of their Apaches off their hands, as they were a proportionately huge drain on their aviation budget.  They wanted to reinvest in their tactical transport fleets, particularly Chinook (which they have since expanded).  CAF looked at the life-cycle costs and the estimate stopped right there in its tracks. The Dutch essentially told us they had bitten off a lot to chew and they were trying to figure a way off drastically cutting the O&M and LCM costs...they weren’t even worried about taking a haircut on the capital acquisition costs.  Canada will never buy/procure any helicopter with ‘attack’ in its name. 

Just one example where Force-to-Force comparisons don’t tell the whole story. 

Regards
G2G


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## Ralph (7 May 2020)

Two of the three Dutch brigades are part of German divisions, and the countries share a corps HQ.


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## dapaterson (7 May 2020)

Ralph said:
			
		

> Two of the three Dutch brigades are part of German divisions, and the countries share a corps HQ.



Makes sense.  


Why put off integration until after the Germans invade again?


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## Dale Denton (7 May 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Years back, the Dutch came to the CAF to see if we’d be interested in not swapping, but outright taking several of their Apaches off their hands, as they were a proportionately huge drain on their aviation budget.  They wanted to reinvest in their tactical transport fleets, particularly Chinook (which they have since expanded).  CAF looked at the life-cycle costs and the estimate stopped right there in its tracks. The Dutch essentially told us they had bitten off a lot to chew and they were trying to figure a way off drastically cutting the O&M and LCM costs...they weren’t even worried about taking a haircut on the capital acquisition costs.  Canada will never buy/procure any helicopter with ‘attack’ in its name.
> 
> Just one example where Force-to-Force comparisons don’t tell the whole story.
> 
> ...



Fascinating. Any official sources or more info? Looks like the proposal was only stopped once we looked at the long-term costs and would've otherwise moved forward to a new stage? The Dutch did upgrade their Apache fleet a few years ago too? Why didn't they sell them elsewhere or to Qatar, who just bought a few AH-64E's? 

Maybe this is the idea why we haven't bought some Apaches or Vipers? Little to no direct benefit to CDN industry for a big-ticket attention-grabber purchase. Although, I don't see why Bell Mirabel couldn't pick up a maintenance package or IRB condition if we bought a few Vipers.


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## blacktriangle (7 May 2020)

LoboCanada said:
			
		

> Maybe this is the idea why we haven't bought some Apaches or Vipers? Little to no direct benefit to CDN industry for a big-ticket attention-grabber purchase. Although, I don't see why Bell Mirabel couldn't pick up a maintenance package or IRB condition if we bought a few Vipers.



I think G2G hit the nail on the head - Canada isn't going to buy an "attack" helicopter like an Apache or Cobra/Viper.


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## Blackadder1916 (7 May 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> > The viteler VICTUALER . . .
> 
> 
> Just a slight and common spelling error



Not quite a spelling error, just using an alternative (and archaic) form.   

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/vitailler#Middle_English


> vitailler
> 
> Alternative forms
> vitaillier, vitteller, vytalere, veteler, viteler, vytheler, vittailler, vitaler, vytayler
> ...


----------



## Ostrozac (7 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> The basic concept is that you can deploy a service member but not a civilian. Then again there are numerous service members who don't really fit into the deployment package scheme either. Then again they don't have unions.
> 
> You know my old song. We need less of both in Ottawa so that we can invest in core military functions.
> 
> :violin:



We had plenty of civilians in Afghanistan -- most were contractors but some were civil servants. You don't need to wear a uniform to deploy. So it isn't a perfect argument that an entire occupation needs to be military based on the fact that one PSel, or one musician, or one <<insert some other trade that has a tangential connection to the profession of arms>> might have a requirement to put personnel into Iraq or Korea at some point in the future. 

We famously demilitarized our physical training instructors years ago -- there is an argument that if physical training can be civilianized, so can several career paths that mostly or partially revolve around cubicle duty.


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## Good2Golf (7 May 2020)

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> I think G2G hit the nail on the head - Canada isn't going to buy an "attack" helicopter like an Apache or Cobra/Viper.



Perhaps if we redesignated it a Unicorn Helicopter (UH) and renamed it...UH-1Z Fairie Dust?


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## MilEME09 (7 May 2020)

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> I think G2G hit the nail on the head - Canada isn't going to buy an "attack" helicopter like an Apache or Cobra/Viper.



Even the last major report from the senates defense committee recommended buying 12 to 24 attack helicopters to provide escort to our Chinook due to increasing danger to our air crews. Looks like that along with many other issues were ignored.


Edit: I know this is a loosing battle but I am of the opinion we should, with some equipment give the old generation to the PRes when the reg force gets new kit. Example tanks, and AFV's but only if it's economically possible to maintain them such as parts supply etc... All of our reserve infantry are light infantry, all of our reserve armoured are recce, After WWII some Reserve units had Shermans until 1968, we then had the Cougar "tank trainer" in the 80's and 90's. To late now but what if we kept the Leopard 1's and re-designated some Pres unit's as full armoured? 

this feeds into FJAG's post about having reinforcement's/ replacements for combat losses. Right now it is a larger training delta to pull armoured recce guys to full armoured from my understanding. Would it not be better if we had PRes feeder units for the armoured corp's tanks?


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## daftandbarmy (7 May 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> We famously demilitarized our physical training instructors years ago -- there is an argument that if physical training can be civilianized, so can several career paths that mostly or partially revolve around cubicle duty.



Like 70% of post-Command LCols?


----------



## ballz (8 May 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Perhaps if we redesignated it a Unicorn Helicopter (UH) and renamed it...UH-1Z Fairie Dust?



Patrol Carbines Helicopters instead of Assault Attack Helicopters... sadly this is not a joke and has been demonstrated effective for Canadian buy-in already.


----------



## Ostrozac (8 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Like 70% of post-Command LCols?



Looks to me like an ideal defence operations civil servant -- conceptually EX-Zero or EX-Negative One. Make JCSP a mandatory requirement of the hiring process. Slide the pension plan over (or double dip if 25+ years of service). This allows for personnel with deep expertise in one of the ADMs or the environmental staffs, retains access to their years of experience, and means no requirement for these ageing staff officers to continue to expend work place effort on the range, parades, or PT.

Of course, it wouldn't work. Three quarters of them would immediately transfer to other parts of the civil service where they aren't required to deal with defence-specific nonsense and could happily fly to conferences business class without senior leadership blowing a gasket.


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## dapaterson (8 May 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Looks to me like an ideal defence operations civil servant -- conceptually EX-Zero or EX-Negative One. Make JCSP a mandatory requirement of the hiring process. Slide the pension plan over (or double dip if 25+ years of service). This allows for personnel with deep expertise in one of the ADMs or the environmental staffs, retains access to their years of experience, and means no requirement for these ageing staff officers to continue to expend work place effort on the range, parades, or PT.



Pensions are already portable; job requirements can be written to favour experience gathered from the military.  And in Ottawa it seems that those pesky "military" things like fitness and ranges and other IBTS type things can be waved off.

Which creates disincentives.  Military pay is generally higher than equivalent civilians.  So I know at least one LCol whose reaction to an Executive position was "Why would I take a pay cut?"  Given the same environment but greater demands in terms of time and effort, would you take a pay reduction?


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## Good2Golf (8 May 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Looks to me like an ideal defence operations civil servant -- conceptually EX-Zero or EX-Negative One. Make JCSP a mandatory requirement of the hiring process. Slide the pension plan over (or double dip if 25+ years of service). This allows for personnel with deep expertise in one of the ADMs or the environmental staffs, retains access to their years of experience, and means no requirement for these ageing staff officers to continue to expend work place effort on the range, parades, or PT.



Agree with you, Ostozac, that conceptually it is a concept with notable merit.   Practically, I don’t believe it would ever happen.  The Public Service senior leadership sees these ‘junior executive’ drop-ins as a threat to their progression and not ‘of the same mindset.’  There is a stated program where retiring vets are supposed to be given consideration pre- and post-release, but I can tell you from practical experience and application to several EX-01 and AS-7/8 EC-7 positions as a well-qualified, bilingual applicant, there was definitely not as much practical support by the PS as stated by policy.  I didn’t spend much more energy, and quickly moved to industry and never looked back.  Better benefits, better comp, better inclusion of individual experience and skills into the institution/company.  While I would have liked to see how a follow-on career in direct support of Defence would have unfolded, what I saw was representative of why it appears externally to Canadians that there is much dysfunction. People like to paint it as purely/mostly a uniformed/military shortcoming, but there are others who appear to have an even more difficult time looking i. The mirror and self-critiquing.

I predict nothing will change and the finger-pointing will continue, to the ongoing detriment of actual operational capability. 

:2c:

Regards
G2G


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## Good2Golf (8 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Pensions are already portable; job requirements can be written to favour experience gathered from the military.  And in Ottawa it seems that those pesky "military" things like fitness and ranges and other IBTS type things can be waved off.
> 
> Which creates disincentives.  Military pay is generally higher than equivalent civilians.  So I know at least one LCol whose reaction to an Executive position was "Why would I take a pay cut?"  Given the same environment but greater demands in terms of time and effort, would you take a pay reduction?



If that LCol’s decision was to port his/her pension to the PS, then yes, conceivably an EX-01 position would result in a modest pay reduction, but they would likely qualify for an immediate CFSA pension and could draw that pension while working in the PS EX-01 position so they’d be looking at at least something like a 0.9 (EX-01 lower than LCol IP4) + 0.5 (using a 25-yr immediate pension) = 1.4x their LCol pay.  If such an individual wanted to complete the remained of their working career welded into NDHQ, then staying in The CAF doesn’t make sense. ???


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## daftandbarmy (8 May 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> Looks to me like an ideal defence operations civil servant -- conceptually EX-Zero or EX-Negative One. Make JCSP a mandatory requirement of the hiring process. Slide the pension plan over (or double dip if 25+ years of service). This allows for personnel with deep expertise in one of the ADMs or the environmental staffs, retains access to their years of experience, and means no requirement for these ageing staff officers to continue to expend work place effort on the range, parades, or PT.
> 
> Of course, it wouldn't work. Three quarters of them would immediately transfer to other parts of the civil service where they aren't required to deal with defence-specific nonsense and could happily fly to conferences business class without senior leadership blowing a gasket.



I know some senior people who retired from the CAF and joined government, at a fairly high level. They didn't enjoy it much and, after a couple of years, left at a high rate of knots. The cultural differences are just too great, I think.


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## Colin Parkinson (8 May 2020)

That whole decision thing and the concept of personal responsibility is a bit much for most of senior management.


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## Weinie (8 May 2020)

Colin P said:
			
		

> That whole decision thing and the concept of personal responsibility is a bit much for most of senior management.


Blanket (misleading) statement maybe? I know a ton of folks who make decisions, and accept responsibility for them if they go pear-shaped.


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