# Question re: German invasion of Poland, Sept 1939



## armyguy62 (27 Oct 2005)

I have a question regarding the actions of the Polish Cavalry during the German invasion of Poland. I have read that the Polish Cavalry
1. attacked a German Panzer Division;
2. never attacked a German Panzer Division (German propaganda)
3. attacked a German Panzer Division because prior to the war they had exercised with the infant German Panzer Divisions when they only had automobiles covered in wood and cloth frames (to simulate tanks) and did not realize they were armoured; and
4. were surrounded / cut off by a German Panzer Division and had no choice but to ride through (no attack) the Germans to escape.

Does anyone know a source for a definitive answer to this question? Thanks


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## redleafjumper (27 Oct 2005)

This source looks pretty good to me: http://www.polishnews.com/fulltext/history/2001/history4.shtml

The action described purports to be a first hand account written by a participant on the Polish side.


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## armyguy62 (1 Nov 2005)

Thanks redleafjumper, the site looks good and provides what may be the best answer I am likely to find. Regards


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## redleafjumper (1 Nov 2005)

If I were you I would attempt to contact the author and find out more information regarding cavalry actions against armoured units, which I believe is what you were actually looking for.  As you can see, even though German propaganda at the time belittled the cavalry, much of the werhmacht and other European unit were very reliant on horses.  

Regardless, it would be worth it to contact this Polish horseman.  Likely someone who was involved first hand in a cavalry charge on a motorized column would be aware of other such actions.  It would be most helpful if this veteran was still alive.


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## geo (1 Nov 2005)

great story BTW
that having been said.... have a distinct feeling that while this was the last glorious folly of troopers making a charge with sabre and pikes - they probably weren't as lucky the next couple of times around when having to deal with the Germand AND the Soviets.


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## pbi (2 Nov 2005)

armyguy62 said:
			
		

> I have a question regarding the actions of the Polish Cavalry during the German invasion of Poland. I have read that the Polish Cavalry
> 1. attacked a German Panzer Division;
> 2. never attacked a German Panzer Division (German propaganda)
> 3. attacked a German Panzer Division because prior to the war they had exercised with the infant German Panzer Divisions when they only had automobiles covered in wood and cloth frames (to simulate tanks) and did not realize they were armoured; and
> ...



While I can't quote a specific reference, over the years I've read just about everything I could get my hands on concerning the Polish Campaign and the Polish Army.   I believe that the old tale of Polish Cavalry intentionally charging German tanks is just that: a tale. From what I have read, this was a story specifically sprread to foreign journalists by German military propaganda types. While there are a number of cases of Polish cavalry actions against German forces, the idea that the Poles would intentionally have acted in such a foolish manner doesn't make sense because:

-the Poles had been using tanks since the 1920s, and had fought against Bolshevik armoured vehicles in the Russo-Polish war of 1920;

-the Polish Army had about 1300 armoured fighting vehicles of all types, ranging from armoured gun tractors to tanks. They had an Armoured Trainig Centre and two mechanized brigades (10 Mech Cav Bde and Warsaw Mech Cav Bde). Poland also built tanks and AFVs, including   a very advanced   Christie-style prototype (10 TP) that would have outclassed almost anything the Germans were fielding in 1939. In other words, they knew all about tanks;

-a typical Polish cavalry brigade included an armoured element, usually of tanks or armoured cars. As well, the bdes had an anti-tank gun section. The point is that Polish cavalry bde commanders and their soldiers knew what tanks were;

-the Poles had been in various states of military tension with Germany since the end of WWI, particularly as a result of the fighting in Silesia between German "Freikorps" and ethnic Polish forces in the early 20's. The Poles regarded Germany as a threat, and it is a reasonable assumption that their intelligence agencies were focused on gathering as much data as they could, particularly as the Nazis came to power and started to make noises about redressing the Danzig issue. It is pretty well known that the Poles were well aware of the impending German attack and had been getting ready for a couple of months, so they were not really "surprised" by the Germans. (The fact that they were not fully mobilized by the end of August 1939 was due as much or more to French and British political pressure as to Polish factors) It is very difficult to imagine that the Poles would have believed anything as silly as the idea that German tanks were cardboard or wood. German tanks had already been in combat action in Spain and in the invasion of Czechoslovakia: I am pretty sure that the Poles would have observed both of these operations closely; and finally

there is no evidence that the Poles were any more stupid, incompetent or ignorant than any other European army. In fact, once the invasion started, the Poles gave an excellent account of themselves against overwhelming strategic odds. That they fought as hard as they did, and lasted until the beginning of October 1939, is much to their credit.

Cheers.


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## Michael Dorosh (3 Nov 2005)

Poland in fact had the most professional army on the continent in 1939.  The German Army was largely a conscript army, and had undergone huge teething problems - in 1933 they were at a mandated level of 100,000, in 1939 they were a couple million strong.  Anyone want to hazard a guess how many NCOs and officers had to be created out of whole cloth in that time?

I interviewed a German officer who served in Poland, France, Russia, Italy, Normandy, and the Bulge; he said the best troops of all the soldiers he fought against were the Poles.  His views were not unique.

There were instances of Russian horse cavalry being used at inoppurtune times as well, incidentally.  pbi has it right about Polish cavalry attacking tanks as being largely mythical.  I can't remember if Cooper discusses that or not; if I get time I will look it up.


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## armyguy62 (3 Nov 2005)

I am going to continue looking into this but here are a couple of thoughts...

Thanks to everyone who took the time to answer. I am new to army.ca and still find it odd to be conversing (so to speak) with people who care about the military, are well read in military history, can put it in the proper context and can put a coherent thought down for others to read. I have been an avid reader of Canadian military history since I was 10 and have rarely found anyone with whom I could hold a conversation... I know I am babbling, but I find this very exciting (I know... I should get out more!)

I expect that, given the size of the Polish Cavalry there were many encounters between them and German mechanized forces. I also suspect there may be some truth to the story I have read of the surrounded Cavalry unit riding through the German mech units to safety. This may have been interpreted by the Germans as an attack, but was more likely used as propoganda to belittle the Poles.

Rooting out the most accurate answer is, I think, of the utmost importance for anyone who enjoys military history. Too often an author will cite a statistic or statement without factchecking. Eventually the erroneous "fact" becomes accepted as fact and the real history has been altered to conform with this untruth. Sorry for the rant, thanks again. I enjoyed and value the input.


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## geo (3 Nov 2005)

AG62,
You also have to take into account the Propaganda value the Germans were so fond of using. For their own domestic consumption. At the start of WW2 there were a lot of germans who weren't all that happy about the actions being taken by their own gov't. Propaganda to belittle the opposition they were facing happened all the time... all the way through to April 1945.


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## pbi (3 Nov 2005)

Try this site. It is quite interesting, and gives a take from the Polish side, as well as describing what may well have been the genesis of the "cavalry charging tanks" legend.

http://www.um.grudziadz.pl/_main_kaw_en.php?link=4

Cheers


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## 3rd Herd (3 Nov 2005)

I do seem to remember seeing a report from a German section/platoon commander of Panzer II's who reported a charge by a troop of Polish cavalry. In the report he mentioned that there were very few if any survivors from the charge, further that they initially held fire fearing that the cavalry could have been the advanced units of Soviet forces advancing from the east. At the end of the second world war the americans removed to the states not only huge amounts of german documents but also a number of high ranking officers to assist in the translation of such. Many of the these documents or copies of(originals were eventually returned to germany) are available through various American military libraries and their National Archives, some lo and behold are even available in an on line foremat. Also you can access old copies of the "Intelligence Bulletin"(http://www.lonesentry.com/intelbulletin/index.html) which was a US government publican during the war years. good luck

Another bit of the puzzle-There are many "myths" that surround the September Campaign; the fictional Polish cavalry charges against German tanks (actually reported by the Italian press and used as propaganda by the Germans)source:http://www.kasprzyk.demon.co.uk/www/WW2.html


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## larry Strong (4 Nov 2005)

Heinz Guderian states in his book "Panzer Leader", that during the beginning of the Polish campaign, when he was GOC XIX Army Corps that:

On the 3rd of September the 23 inf Div was inserted between 3 Pz Div which had pushed to the Vistula, and the 20 (Mot) Inf Div, by this maneuver they succeeded in totally encircling the enemy on our front in the wooded country north of Schwetz and west of Graudenz. The Polish _Pomorska_ Brigade, in ignorance of the nature of our tanks, had charged them with swords and lances and had suffered tremendous losses.

Not counting the hundreds of thousands of horses employed for transport and supply, the German "Heer" entered the war with no "Cavalry" formations on the books, any cavalry regt's brought over from the Weimar republic had been absorbed into the new Panzer formations.


After the start of the war on the Soviets, several cavalry divs were raised. the Heer only raised one div known as the Cossack div, which consisted of Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks, some German Officers and NCO's, and possibly elements of other nationalities.

The SS raised 2 cav div;

8. SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer" was formed on 4.41 from 2 Ritter-Standarten and used mainly as an anti-partisan unit behind the lines. it was up-rated to a Division 6.-8.42. Once again Anti-partisan duties along with some front line action. It retreated into Budapest and some time between 11.44 and 2.45 was annihilated in the city.

22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division "Marie Theresa" was raised in Hungary spring-summer 44, from 2 regts. Hungarian _volksdeutsche_ and vetran SS-Kav-regt 17 from Florian Geyer. Only the 17th and 52 regt's were ready when they were sent into action at Debreczen. 53 Regt joined 10.44 just in time to go to Budapest and join Florian Geyer in their fate.

The only other major cavalry formation was the Vaslov Army which was the
   RUSSKAYA OSVO- BODITELNAYA ARMIYA: Russian Liberation Army; the name of two divisions of Russians serving in the German army; the first established in December 1944, and the second in January 1945. Both divisions surrendered to U.S Army units. Most of their men were handed over to the Soviets and few survived under their captors. The were led by a Soviet prisoner General Andrei Vaslov. He was also turned over to the Soviets by Churchill and executed by the Soviets.


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## Michael Dorosh (4 Nov 2005)

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> Not counting the hundreds of thousands of horses employed for transport and supply, the German "Heer" entered the war with no "Cavalry" formations on the books, any cavalry regt's brought over from the Weimar republic had been absorbed into the new Panzer formations.


Possibly not true ? - 1 Cavalry Division served in Russia and later converted to become 24 Panzer Division, but I thought that was done after the start of Barbarossa?


http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/




> In the first 2 months of the Russian campaign, when the German armies were advancing rapidly, the 1st Cavalry Division was almost continuously in action in the central sector. It had been expanded further to a total of six regiments, probably organized under three brigades. But the tactics it had mastered in Poland and France, where Germany controlled the air and enjoyed fire power and mobility superiority, were apparently not too successful when applied to the conditions in Russia. The division was withdrawn at the height of German success, sent to occupied France, and converted into the 24th Panzer Division (later to be destroyed at Stalingrad, though subsequently reformed in France). No more cavalry units above squadron size were formed until the latter part of 1943.




It does mention a Heer cavalry brigade being absorbed in 1939 and then expanded later - but IIRC did serve on horseback in Russia (?), and 24 Pz Div retained the golden-yellow waffenfarbe as well as cavalry titles (Rittmeister vice Hauptmann, Wachmeister vice Feldwebel, etc.).

The article mentions the cav brigade being motorized, and then expanded to division status.   The webpage I offered is the only source I have at hand and it seems ambiguous as to whether any of the expanded div served on horseback or not...


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## larry Strong (4 Nov 2005)

I stand corrected


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## Michael Dorosh (4 Nov 2005)

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> I stand corrected



Maybe not; the page really doesn't mention the div using horses....?


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## larry Strong (4 Nov 2005)

I did a little more home work and have found some other info thought the details are scarce.

I Kavallerie-Korps

GOC - General der Kavallerie Gustav Harteneck 910.6.44 - 8.5.45 
AO was the Eastern front.

3 Kavallerie-Division

GOC - Generalmajor Peter von der Groben ?.2.45-8.5.45
AO Hungary 2.45 - 3.45
        Austria   3.45 - 5.45

4 Kavallerie-Division

GOC Generalleutnat Rudolf Holste 28.2.45 - 24.3.45
           Generalleutnat Helmuth von Grolman 24.3.45 - 8.5.45
AO Hungary 2.45 - 3.45
        Austria 3.45 -4.45

I have not been able to find out any other info on them yet, and it's also a little past the "Poland" timeline, unless you are looking at the Germans coming home :


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## 3rd Herd (4 Nov 2005)

*Re: German Cavalry Units Eastern Front*- GERMAN HORSE CAVALRY AND TRANSPORT Intelligence report on the German use of cavalry and horse transport in WWII including Waffen-SS, from the Intelligence Bulletin, March 1946. (Sourcehttp://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/)

-The extent of use of independent horse cavalry units by the Germans varied inversely with German fortunes. During the first 3 years of the war, when Germany was ascendant, such units were almost abandoned completely; they never exceeded one division. From 1943, new cavalry units were formed, and by early 1945 there were six cavalry divisions and two cavalry corps. 

-Development of independent, cavalry units during World War II is best described by surveying the operations of the four following classifications: early army units (1939-41), Waffen-SS units (1941-45), Cossack units (1943-45), and later army units (1944-45).

see above source url for a more complete documentation

*Back to horses against tanks*

http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Polish-war-myths
The battle of Krojanty

During the action the Polish cavalry units met a large group of German infantry resting in a woods near the village of Krojanty. Colonel Mastalerz decided to take the enemy by surprise and immediately ordered a cavalry charge, a tactics the Polish cavalry did not use as their main weapon.

The charge was successful and the German infantry unit was dispersed and the Poles occupied the woods. Moreover, the German advance was stopped for enough time to allow the withdrawal of Polish 1st Rifle battalion and National Defence battalion Czersk from the area of Chojnice. However, the sounds of the battle notified the crews of the APCs stationed nearby and soon the Polish unit got under heavy machine gun fire.

According to Heinz Guderian's memoirs, the Polish cavalry charge impressed the Germans and caused a widespread panic among the soldiers and the staff of German 20th Motorised Infantry Division, which delayed their offensive and forced them to consider a tactical retreat. This was however prevented by personal intervention of Gen. Guderian.

Aftermath and the myth

The Polish cavalry charge stopped the German pursuit and the units of Czersk Operational Group were able to withdraw southwards unopposed. Also, it took the enemy several hours to reorganise and continue the advance. On September 2, 1939, the 18th Pomeranian Uhlans Regiment was decorated by Gen. Grzmot-Skotnicki, the commander of the Operational Group, with his own Virtuti Militari medal for valour shown in this combat.

The same day the German war correspondents were brought to the battlefield together with two journalists from Italy. They were shown the battlefield, the corpses of Polish cavalrymen and their horses, as well as German tanks that arrived to the place after the battle. One of the Italian correspondents sent home an article, in which he described the bravery and heroism of Polish soldiers, who charged German tanks with sabres and lances. Although such a charge did not happen and there were no tanks used during the combat, the myth was used by German propaganda during the war. After the end of World War II it was still used by Soviet propaganda as an example of stupidity of Polish commanders, who allegedly did not prepare their country for the war and instead wasted the blood of their soldiers.


my two cents


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## larry Strong (4 Nov 2005)

*According to Heinz Guderian's memoirs, the Polish cavalry charge impressed the Germans and caused a widespread panic among the soldiers and the staff of German 20th Motorised Infantry Division, which delayed their offensive and forced them to consider a tactical retreat. This was however prevented by personal intervention of Gen. Guderian.*

and about 3 para's later he states


*On the 3rd of September the 23 inf Div was inserted between 3 Pz Div which had pushed to the Vistula, and the 20 (Mot) Inf Div, by this maneuver they succeeded in totally encircling the enemy on our front in the wooded country north of Schwetz and west of Graudenz. The Polish Pomorska Brigade, in ignorance of the nature of our tanks, had charged them with swords and lances and had suffered tremendous losses.*

Was not there, and can only go by what I read and see.


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## redleafjumper (4 Nov 2005)

3rd Herd's account when combined with Guderian's Panzer Leader account  looks good to me.  It seems that Guderian's comment on the presence of tanks does not seem to ring with the same authority as the rest of his writing.  Regardless, at least according to the earlier first-hand account, Poles on horses certainly charged a motorized column which included a least a few armoured cars.

The defence of Poland was a very brave effort from a country with a strong cavalry tradition in the face of great opposing odds.


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## pbi (9 Nov 2005)

> The Polish Pomorska Brigade, in ignorance of the nature of our tanks, had charged them with swords and lances and had suffered tremendous losses.



I still find this very, very unlikely, regardless of the fact that Guderian apparently accepted the speculation by somebody at a lower level. It simply does not make sense to claim this as a reason. On the other hand, while I am quite familiar with the Krojanty incident (it is on the Polish Grudziadz site I provided-Grudziadz was the home garrison of the unit involved), I think that it is probably the only really detailed and substantiated account I have ever seen. The circumstances it describes are quite believable, and could easily be imagined in the heat of close combat. What I cannot imagine, even for a minute (see the reasons I gave in my earlier post) is that the Poles would have charged German tanks because they were "ignorant of their true nature". 

Having said that, the entire Polish Campaign bears serious and detailed re-looking. In my opinion, so much of what passes for "conventional wisdom" or "received knowledge", and appears in pop histories, is just the repetition of hoary old myths and propaganda (from both sides...) that has lingered till today. If you begin by examining the history of the politico-strategic relationship since Poland was re-formed after WWII (not, as is commonly assumed, just as a result of the Versailles Treaty but largely through the efforts of leaders such as Pilsudski and Paderewski) you will see that the idea of the Poles being "surprised", either strategically or tactically, by the Germans, is a bit hard to swallow. Both countries regarded each other as enemies from the get-go, and planned accordingly. It is impossible to believe that the Poles would not have done all they could to keep an eye on the Germans. I have read that on the night of the German "false start" invasion in late August (Hitler changed his mind at the last minute, and the "halt" order arrived too late for some units), the Poles were alert, ready and waiting and captured the hapless Germans. The Polish airforce, well aware of what was coming, began dispersal operations several days before the German D-Day and as a result the PAF was able to fight on bravely for about two-three weeks, including launching ground attacks against German forces. The "destruction of the PAF on the ground " that we always read about was the destruction of training machines and hangar queens left behind. There's lot's more like this, but you have to dig around. The US Army official history of the campaign is a good starting point.

Cheers


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## redleafjumper (9 Nov 2005)

A colleague of mine recommends the book "Mila 18" by Leon Uris.  In it he tracks the life of a Polish cavalry officer.  As my previous post indicates I am in agreement with PBI that Guderian's brief mention of tanks vs. cavalry is not very credible.  There is certainly a Masters or PhD waiting for someone in an examination of the Polish Campaign.


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## geo (9 Nov 2005)

jump...
If you can read polish, am certain that extensive writings can be found in the coutry where it happened.


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## JackD (9 Nov 2005)

I'm a Cannuck, now living and teaching in Poland. While the place exasperates me - because to tell you the truth the government doesn't give a damn about the people - they and I must include the new aristocracy - I admire the Polish - there is something about Poland. i want to say thanks to those who in this column that have pointed out some of the truths about the 1939 invasion of Poland. Poland's history is a sad and tragic one and magnificent too. The Wikipedia articles by the way, are a good start for information about this land. I would gladly furnish you with more information but I live on a Polish salary - as a colllege level teacher my salary is roughly 400 dollars a month - think about that... And be glad you live in Canada


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## JackD (9 Nov 2005)

Oh.. and come the 11th, raise a glass to those who served and those who serve Canada and countries that have been and are friends to Canada - including Poland. I'm going to and my students are going to. Appreciate what you've got but also try to make the homeland what it could be... After-all, be it Canada or in my case be it Canada and Poland, the land, the history, the heritage belongs to us - not to the government but to us


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## redleafjumper (9 Nov 2005)

Many a Pole served in World War two with honour and tenacity after the fall of Poland.  Witness the efforts of Poles in the Air Force, armoured units, and in Operation Market Garden.  It was a sad betrayal of these noble warriors than many were forced to return to a Poland that was occupied by the USSR after hostilities ceased and the Cold War began.


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## JackD (10 Nov 2005)

I agree - my wife's great uncle was jailed until 1956 and he was a member of 303 squadron. His brothers were not so lucky as he - both were murdered in Katyn. One neighbour of mine, now diseased, was a partisan, captured, spent a year in Majdanek, survived, escaped during the transfer westward, felt freedom for about a week, ended up in Majdanek again - with guards of a different nationality, and disappeared into Siberia until 1958. Interestingly, you would think him a bitter, angry man yet he was not. he was an artist and painted only two subjects, flowers and songbirds - symbols of beauty and freedom? I wonder if some psychologist ever did a study on that if those who are in the arts - including architects - survive trauma better than others?


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Nov 2005)

pbi said:
			
		

> Having said that, the entire Polish Campaign bears serious and detailed re-looking. In my opinion, so much of what passes for "conventional wisdom" or "received knowledge", and appears in pop histories, is just the repetition of hoary old myths and propaganda (from both sides...) that has lingered till today.



Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.  He painted Poland as a very near-run thing - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.


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## pbi (10 Nov 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.   He painted Poland as a very near-run thing - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.



Yes: from what I have read in various places I agree. My impression is the Germans were not the "invincible war machine", nor the Poles the hapless peasants, that usually compose the popular image of this campaign. The Germans (keeping in mind, a force most of whose junior members had not been in combat before) faced some rather unpleasant surprises. The Poles showed some rather impressive successes, albeit mostly tactical and never enough to turn the strategic tide.

In particular the Germans were (IIRC) dangerously short of ammunition of all natures (that wretched German war industry again...) and the Luftwaffe did not quite get the free ride it had been expecting. 

Overall a very interesting campaign: I agree that it would be a good MA thesis subject: I just wonder how much Polish primary source stuff survived. Not much, I bet. Anybody know of any stuff?
Cheers.


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## George Wallace (10 Nov 2005)

There may be some hope, as the Germans in most instances were meticulous Recordkeepers.


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## redleafjumper (10 Nov 2005)

Even though the Germans were meticulous record keepers, a lot of material was destroyed or sanitized during the war.
This campaign does look like an interesting one for an M.A. in RMC's War Studies programme.  (I applied there once, but no luck... most disappointing.)


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## larry Strong (10 Nov 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.   *He painted Poland as a very near-run thing* - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.



I might have a different book here, and I do admit that I only have Vol ll. The German Army 1933 - 1945 Vol ll Conquest. by Matthew Cooper.

He says the opposite..."It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the *weakness* and *mistakes*of it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939"....."Although well-trained, and aggressive, the Polish soldiers were armed mainly with equipment from the 1914-18 War; they possessed little motorised transport and only a few companies of tanks, amounting to no more than 225 machines in all. Indeed, in modern military equipment and tactical thought the Poles were alarmingly deficient; they possessed only a few obsolete aircraft and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and continued to maintain their belief in the efficiency of the *cavalry charge * and the attack a _l'ourance_. Page 11 of the above mentioned book


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Nov 2005)

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> I might have a different book here, and I do admit that I only have Vol ll. The German Army 1933 - 1945 Vol ll Conquest. by Matthew Cooper.
> 
> He says the opposite..."It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the *weakness* and *mistakes*of it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939"....."Although well-trained, and aggressive, the Polish soldiers were armed mainly with equipment from the 1914-18 War; they possessed little motorised transport and only a few companies of tanks, amounting to no more than 225 machines in all. Indeed, in modern military equipment and tactical thought the Poles were alarmingly deficient; they possessed only a few obsolete aircraft and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and continued to maintain their belief in the efficiency of the *cavalry charge * and the attack a _l'ourance_. Page 11 of the above mentioned book



You ought to see what he says about the Germans though - I was referring to another book, I wasn't aware he had written more than one, now I have more reading to do.   I meant the single volume book -

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0812885198/002-4519670-0947214?v=glance&n=283155&n=507846&s=books&v=glance

I may be misremembering too, I'll dig out my volume and see what he says.   He does demolish the idea that the Germans used "blitzkrieg" (whatever that is) in 1939 and that the infantry actually led much of the time rather than slashing moves by the armour.   He mentions severe shortages of ammunition and motor transport that would have hampered a prolonged campaign had Poland been able to stick it out, and things of that nature.  EDIT - I see pbi mentions ammunition shortages on page 2 already.


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Nov 2005)

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the *weakness* and *mistakes*of it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939



Oh, and I think the second half of his point was something to the effect that despite a great potential to benefit (read your sentence again carefully), they didn't in many ways.


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## larry Strong (10 Nov 2005)

thanks for the link to the book, looks like I got some more reading too 

he does say prior to that in my book that:
 "....should not obscure 2 fundamental truths of the Polish campaign; that against an enemy as deficient in the military art as the Poles then were, the invaders were bound to win; and that the German Army gave no demonstration of Blitzkreig but practised instead s traditional form of war Veernichtungsgedanke. From the outset, the armoured idea was still-borne." 

And yes they were restricted to:

enough forage for only 120 miles,
could not come up with enough ratins for 10 days in the field, 
only had enough ammo for, 90 rds of rifle ammo, 3,750 rds MG, and 300 rds for the Arty.


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Nov 2005)

Larry Strong said:
			
		

> thanks for the link to the book, looks like I got some more reading too
> 
> he does say prior to that in my book that:
> "....should not obscure 2 fundamental truths of the Polish campaign; that against an enemy as deficient in the military art as the Poles then were, the invaders were bound to win; and that the German Army gave no demonstration of Blitzkreig but practised instead s traditional form of war Veernichtungsgedanke. From the outset, the armoured idea was still-borne."
> ...



Yup. I took that to mean that no matter how bad the Germans were, they Poles would still lose.


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## JackD (10 Nov 2005)

The Polish forces at the time were going through a re-equipment phase - I suggest you find material of that nature - it is available - i am referring to their new aircraft. Among outside purchases - not delivered in time were hurricane fighter aircraft. Much of their soldiery buried their equipment - to retrieve them as partisans. The intent of the intact formations were to withdraw to the south west - The Soviet stab in the back put paid to that. Poland suffered in that their thinking was that the 1939 war was to be just another occupation - not a war of extermination. Had they known - Nazi forces would have had far, far higher casualty levels. As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.


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## Michael Dorosh (10 Nov 2005)

JackD said:
			
		

> As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.



Those forces were trained and completely equipped by the British so are irrelevant to the subject of prewar Polish military training, though, no?


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## larry Strong (10 Nov 2005)

JackD said:
			
		

> The Polish forces at the time were going through a re-equipment phase - I suggest you find material of that nature - it is available - i am referring to their new aircraft. Among outside purchases - not delivered in time were hurricane fighter aircraft. Much of their soldiery buried their equipment - to retrieve them as partisans. The intent of the intact formations were to withdraw to the south west - The Soviet stab in the back put paid to that. Poland suffered in that their thinking was that the 1939 war was to be just another occupation - not a war of extermination. Had they known - Nazi forces would have had far, far higher casualty levels. As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.



No one is arguing about the valor and military skills of the Poles later in the war. They also had a problem with over 3000 miles of common border with the Reich and German occupied Czechoslovakia, the terrain there being flat and except for the Vistula and it's tributaries, possessed few natural obstacles, and even fewer fortifications.
The fact that they had to station half their limited resources   to face their traditional enemy the Soviet's did not help either. The Polish generals also had to decide wether to hold the frontier and their industrial base, or wait behind the frontier and let the blow fall on empty ground, and possibly lose the industrial base, but would have tried the German logistic tail to the limit.


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## JackD (11 Nov 2005)

it was a time of difficult decisions - Witness the fact of the contingency plans - successfully carried out - to send their navy and their merchant marine to England. As for military skill - a general officer is not trained overnight - and such generals as General Maszek of the 1st Polish Armoured Division acquainted themselves well. General Sikorski himself was a notable leader and theorist as was Sosabowski. General Anders was also recognized as brilliant. All handled their forces in a superior manner to many more familiar western general officers. The talent was there. One major problem in 1939 was the Polish nation was divided politically ( a perennial problem I might add) and in 1939, the political generals were in the fore-front - not the military generals. In addition, a vastly destructive war was fought only 18 years before (The Polish-Soviet War) and prior to that, the First World War - Eastern Front). There were no Marshall Plans then - hard to get reconstruction capital in the thirties. As for strategic and tactical short-comings - fighting the previous war rather than the current one - is that not the problem current western militaries are trying to overcome? The Poles faced a no-win situation - hence their coordination of plans with western forces - France, which were not fullfilled. Truly a fascinating but tragic time - one neglected in geo-political studies and military strategy and tactics studies.


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## larry Strong (11 Nov 2005)

Thanks for the information Jack  There's no doubt they were between a rock and a hard place.


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## Michael Dorosh (11 Nov 2005)

Well, had Canada been invaded on 1 September 1939, we would have had one understrength brigade of infantry (spread from coast to coast) with a few thousand Militia armed with SMLEs, sword bayonets, and drill purpose only Lewis Guns; ancient howitzers, a handful of tanks with minimal armament.  I rather doubt we would have done half as good as the Poles...


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## pbi (11 Nov 2005)

A  couple of comments based on what I have gleaned over the years.

-The Poles had recently purchased a number of Bofors towed AA guns and new 37mm AT guns and had issued at least some of these, so to say that they had only a few obsolete weapons of this type is probably not correct. As well as these systems, they made use of anti-armour capable weapons mounted in prepared fortifications (but not enough and not in the right places) and armoured trains. Before we laugh at the trains, I recall reading of at least one engagement in which a train (and its integral rail-carried tanks) successfully drove off a panzer assault, as the train had heavier armour and bigger guns than the German panzers. So, the Poles were also capable of improvisation against tanks;

-Polish cavalry still carried the designations "Lancers", "Uhlans", etc but to a great extent they were trained as mounted infantry. And, let's not forget, the Red Army made successful use of cavalry formations up to Corps size all through the war;

-to say that the Poles did not understand the "military art" is IMHO a strange statement: their performance in the Russo-Polish war alone, especially their last-ditch defeat of the Red Army in front of Warsaw, should discount that statement. Faced with the German onslaught, the Polish Army did not fall apart at the tactical level: it fought some very stubborn delays and withdrawals, and launched at least one operational-level counterattack west of Warsaw that scared the Germans quite badly (although they rallied and crushed it). Where things broke down (again IMHO) was at the operational/strategic level interface, as the national command and control system (based on civil telephone circuits) and the supporting infrastructure needed to fight a war, both collapsed when the Polish forces needed them most. This meant that the Poles could neither gather info nor implement decisions quicky at that level, and the ability to rapidly redeploy and sustain troops was lost. Against the Germans this was probably a guarantee of failure;  and

-IIRC the Poles did not keep any significant forces deployed against the Russian border. They accepted a very heavy strategic risk in deploying all of their Armies and Operational Groups against the Germans, with a Reserve in the Warsaw region. As far as I can recall, all that was deployed in the East were a few battalions of infantry and cavalry  belonging to the KOP, the frontier defence corps. IMHO there was no significant Polish resistance to the Red Army because there was nothing there to resist with.

Cheers


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## JackD (11 Nov 2005)

One other aspect of this 1939 Polish invasion - It was the last time more or less, as a whole that the Nazi German forces could concentrate all their strength on one target. For the invasion of France, large numbers of occupation troops hard to be left in Poland. In effect with time, as country after country fell to Nazi- Germany, more and more troops had to be employed on garrison and anti-partisan activities.

You know, I cannot watch any pre-war Polish cinema - there are surviving examples - as I know the fate of those who appeared. By the way, I live in Lublin, Poland, about 2 km away from the Majdanek Concentration Camp... it is a dead place - no birds sing there....


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## larry Strong (11 Nov 2005)

*....and armoured trains. Before we laugh at the trains, I recall reading of at least one
engagement in which a train (and its integral rail-carried tanks) successfully drove
off a panzer assault, as the train had heavier armour and bigger guns than the
German panzers.* 

The armoured train nr. 15 (former "Smierc") 
....The train nr 15 showed quite efficient in supporting Polish defenders, firing at pointed
targets and helping to repell enemy attacks. On 19 September it was even fighting an
artillery duel with its German opponent - armoured train PanzerZug 7, acting on a track
Nasielsk-Pomiechowek.......

Armoured train nr. 55 (former "Bartosz Glowacki") 
....The train first came into action on 14 September near Zabinka railway station, where a
reconnaissance unit of the 3rd Panzer Division was reported. Four train's tankettes (of
armoured draisines) were sent to attack the German armoured car platoon, that was
standing on a bridge, but 3 tankettes were hit and destroyed (without crew losses,
luckily). An attempt of using the train's assault platoon failed in the German cars' fire.
Only the train's artillery made the enemy unit withdraw.
 Soon after, the train, standing on a crossing, halted and made retreat a column of the
division, burning a few vehicles. Taking cover behind a hill, a group of tanks of the 5th
regiment made an attempt of cutting the train's way off, but the train's artillery foiled their
movement. Next, the train was shelled by a battery of the 75th artillery regiment, and
after about 45-min duel, it withdrew to Brzesc. One of the train's Renault tank draisines
was damaged and left. In this combat, train nr. 55 succesfully managed to delay a
movement of the German armoured division......

A large portion of the Polish Armoured Train force were captured and used by the
German and Russians through out the remainder of the war.


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## pbi (11 Nov 2005)

Thanks for that post. I knew I wasn't imagining things...

Cheers


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## pbi (11 Nov 2005)

http://ass2000.tripod.com/2fallweiss.html

This is a very interesting site that makes the point that the Poles were well aware of their situation and had begun to prepare for war against Germany, although their faith in the Allies doing anything useful in a timely manner was obviously misplaced. Of particular interest are their _very_ ambitious mechanization plans. From what I have read of the German Reichsheer in the pre-1933 period, this Polish attack was exactly the sort of thing that Germany, with its 100,000 man army on light scales of equipment, feared as a real threat.

Cheers


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## JackD (12 Nov 2005)

Another aspect of this 1939 invasion was the sudden change in the balance of power - following the 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany ( I use that term to differentiate the various regimes -  I apologise if it is incorrect) - How much new armour and weaponry and general military equipment (radios, telephone sets, telephone cables) entered the Nazi German forces? Quite a change in one year...

 I believe one of those train sets is one display at Poland's railway museum. Sadly I cannot verify this - no wheels, no chance of obtaining wheels on a teacher's salary ( roughly 400 Cdn dollars a month - sad isn't it - thank your lucky stars you live in Canada). I think this site was where info on these trains was posted  http://railwaygun.co.uk/. This site deals with Polish armour of that time  http://republika.pl/derela/armcarpl.htm#tk (trains too) . While this site deals with Polish aces  http://marcin_w.tripod.com/index-paces.html . Finally this site deals with Polish light artillery  albeit from a different era 
http://www.kismeta.com/diGrasse/PolishHorseArtillery.htm . Polish history is being rediscovered by Poland's youth - a good thing - after-all who owns your history, owns you...


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## larry Strong (12 Nov 2005)

Got the granddaughter here so it's hard to get into the books, but IIRC at least 2 Pz div (Rommels 7 Pz included) were equipt with Skoda LT vz. 35 and LT vz. 38 tanks, not to mention the marders and Hetzers that were built on their chasis's, They had a large automotive and arnament industry, that the Third Reich was not slow to incorporate into the Wehrmacht

It would sure be nice to see some photo's of that train.

Here's where I found the info on the trains, quite an informative site.


http://derela.republika.pl/index.htm


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## Nemo888 (12 Nov 2005)

My dad aways told me the Germans marched in backwards and told the Poles they were leaving.


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## pbi (18 Dec 2005)

If anybody's still interested, an excellent reference on the Polish Campaign is the Osprey Campaign Series volume on Poland 1939. It is well written, apparently quite well researched, and makes an excellent effort to dispel some of the tired old "conventional wisdom" myths about the Poles. It is very well mapped and illustrated, including an interesting graphic of an anti-tank gun crew from a Polish Cav Bde holding German armour. The gun crew is supported by Armoured Train No 53 _Smialy_, which is shown using its 75mm cannon against the thin armour of the German panzers.(You can read more about _Smialy_ and other Polish armoured trains at http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/prod/dialspace/town/pipexdsl/o/aopt91/railgun/Content/Armoured%20Trains/Polish.html

 I highly recommend this little book.

Cheers


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Dec 2005)

I daresay Osprey is doing a lot to lift its reputation out of the gutter; they used to be a bit of a laughing stock in "serious" military circles and "amateur history" circles alike, but I think the last five years or so have seen a preponderance of useful and generally well done titles being released, especially on "unsexy" topics.  Some publishers continue to put out tedious works on hot topics like SS Tigers that sell well despite their mediocrity, but Osprey is doing a real service by providing affordable primers on subjects spanning the entire universe of military history.


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## pbi (20 Dec 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> I daresay Osprey is doing a lot to lift its reputation out of the gutter; they used to be a bit of a laughing stock in "serious" military circles and "amateur history" circles alike, but I think the last five years or so have seen a preponderance of useful and generally well done titles being released, especially on "unsexy" topics.   Some publishers continue to put out tedious works on hot topics like SS Tigers that sell well despite their mediocrity, but Osprey is doing a real service by providing affordable primers on subjects spanning the entire universe of military history.



I have to agree with you to a certain extent here. While I stand by the Polish Campaign volume, I should also add that I took out five other volumes on various campaigns, and have read them all. While they are generally not bad, I find that the text editing is a bit weak in places. Sentences are sometimes difficult to follow (or refer to things that were never mentioned previously, leaving you wondering what the point of the reference was), and on several occasions I have noted a weird interchanging of formation titles, as though the writer though that Corps/Division/unit were all the same word. Sloppy editing, I think, or perhaps some amateurwriters. Still, as quick overviews of the various campaigns (they cover about 50 different ones) I don't think they have an equal.

Cheers


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