# Plane crash near Resolute Bay kills 12 - Aug 20, 2011



## Occam (20 Aug 2011)

Original link

A 737 passenger jet crashed Saturday near Resolute Bay, Nunavut, in Canada's High Arctic, killing 12 people and injuring three others on board.

Nunavut RCMP have confirmed First Air charter flight 6560 was travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay with 15 people on board, including four crew members, the CBC's Patricia Bell reported from Iqaluit.

The RCMP said in a release it "was made aware of the possibility of some survivors." A flight list was not immediately available.

The Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre in CFB Trenton says helicopters and medical personnel are now at the site.

Hundreds of military personnel are currently in the area for Operation Nanook. But the co-ordination centre says that the incident was not a part of a simulation exercise planned for the military operation.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper is scheduled to travel to Resolute Bay on Monday for his annual trip to the Arctic.


----------



## Stoker (20 Aug 2011)

We have a crew that flew out today for Iqualit, god I hope its not them.


----------



## Gramps (20 Aug 2011)

Chief Stoker said:
			
		

> We have a crew that flew out today for Iqualit, god I hope its not them.


If they flew out of Trenton it is not them.


----------



## Stoker (20 Aug 2011)

Gramps said:
			
		

> If they flew out of Trenton it is not them.



They flew out of Halifax, so we're pretty sure its not them.


----------



## 57Chevy (20 Aug 2011)

Shared with provisions of The Copyright Act

12 dead, 3 injured in First Air crash in High Arctic
Amy Minsky and Frank Appleyard, Postmedia NewsAugust 20
http://www.canada.com/news/dead+injured+First+crash+High+Arctic/5283936/story.html#ixzz1VczylQTK

Twelve people are dead and two adults and a child are injured after First Air flight 6560 crashed near Resolute Bay in the Arctic on Saturday — very close to where hundreds of Canadian military personnel were gathered for a Nunavut training exercise.

A rescue operation was underway Saturday evening with RCMP officers and Canadian Forces members on the ground, and helicopters on site, said Const. Angelique Dignard, who works with the RCMP in Nunavut.

There were 11 passengers and four crew members onboard the chartered Boeing 737, which was travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay, Dignard said.

The three injured passengers were being transported to the Qikiqtani General Hospital in Iqaluit for treatment on Saturday evening, RCMP said. One of the adults is in critical condition.

RCMP officials have located two black boxes at the crash site, which will be used to identify the cause of the accident.


Two forensic identification teams are en route to Resolute Bay, Dignard confirmed.

Four officers will be “dedicated to the identification of the deceased,” while two others will be assigned to investigate the accident.

“These officers are all experienced, some have dealt with the Swiss Air crash and the tsunami crisis,” Dignard said in a news release.

A coroner will also be assigned to the crash site, she said.


Local RCMP received a call of a downed plane near Resolute Bay, a hamlet of a little more than 200 people, shortly after 1:30 p.m. local time Saturday.

The passenger list was not immediately available.

First Air, a company that operates flights to northern communities, is based in the Ottawa area.

A statement from the company said that the last communications with the flight were at 12:40 local time, approximately eight kilometres from Resolute Bay airport. The plane went down about 10 minutes later, the statement read.

Hundreds of military personnel are in the area to take part in Operation Nanook, the military’s annual northern training exercise.

Because of their proximity to the crash, some of those personnel were the first to respond to the crash, said Department of National Defence spokeswoman Dominique Verdon.

“We stopped all our activities on Operation Nanook . . . We were the first to respond,” she said.

Lt. Cmdr. Albert Wong was taking part in the military exercise when he saw the plane go down “within eyesight” of the runway.

“We had some expertise there so we responded right away,” he said. 

The flight that crashed was not connected to the drills being conducted by the military.

The Canadian Forces immediately sent fire trucks and first responders, and are still on site, Wong said. They expect to hand the rescue effort over to the RCMP.

Environment Canada forecasts indicate that there was fog in the vicinity of the Resolute Bay airport around the time of the crash.

Ron Elliott, the provincial representative for Quttiktuq, which includes Resolute Bay, said the flight was regularly booked by a local businessman to bring in supplies and staff.

The company added that the Transportation Safety Board has been notified of the incident. The TSB issued a news release saying investigators are en route to Resolute Bay. Transport Canada has also appointed a “minister’s observer” to oversee the investigation. 


Prime Minister Stephen Harper had been scheduled to travel Resolute on Monday for what has become an annual trip to the High Arctic. 

“I am deeply saddened by news of this tragic plane crash near Resolute Bay,” Harper said in a release Saturday evening.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and friends of those passengers who lost their lives in this tragedy. We also wish a speedy recovery to those who were injured.” 

Gov. Gen. David Johnston is currently on a tour of Nunavut.

“Earlier today, I had the opportunity to visit many of the Operation Nanook military units,” he said in a news release on Saturday evening.

“I was able to witness first hand the professionalism and dedication of our Canadian Forces and civilian organizations as they responded quickly and effectively to this catastrophe.

“Our thoughts and prayers go out to all those affected by this tragic event.”

Operation Nanook began Aug. 5 when a group of Canadian naval vessels set out from Newfoundland and Labrador. More than 1,100 sailors, soldiers and air personnel taking part in missions around the area of Resolute Bay, Baffin Bay and Lancaster Sound throughout the exercise, which is expected to last more than three weeks. 


First Air flies four Boeing 737-200 airliners that are capable of landing on gravel runways like the one at Resolute Bay’s airport. The planes are fitted to fly both cargo and passengers.

According to Transport Canada records, the Boeing 737-200 that crashed was built in 1975. 


The plane has been involved in several minor incidents over the course of its life, according to preliminary information recorded by Transport Canada’s civil aviation reporting system.

On Feb. 18 of this year, pilots aborted a takeoff from Winnipeg James Armstrong Richardson International Airport after a low-power warning on one of the plane’s engines.

On Nov. 11, 2010, the plane was en route from Norman Wells, N.W.T., to Inuvik, N.W.T., when pilots noticed an engine overheat warning. Pilots shut down the engine and declared an emergency before completing a single-engine landing into Inuvik.


According to the airline’s website, First Air is owned by the 9,000 Inuit of northern Quebec. The airline, which was founded in 1946 under the name Bradley Air Services, provides scheduled air service to 30 communities in the Arctic, with southern gateways in Ottawa, Edmonton, Montreal and Winnipeg.


----------



## The Bread Guy (21 Aug 2011)

> Canada’s military has suspended Operation Nanook, an annual Arctic sovereignty exercise, and is redirecting its resources to assist investigators after 12 people died in the crash of a 737 passenger flight in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, according to Captain Andrew Hennessy.
> 
> About 500 army, navy and air force members were already in Resolute Bay, about 2,100 miles northwest of Montreal, for the exercises when the Boeing 737-200 crashed en route from Yellowknife. The airline, First Air, based in Kanata, Ontario, confirmed the deaths in an e-mailed statement and said three people survived.
> 
> ...


Bloomberg wire service, 20 Aug 11

Governor General's statement:


> Sharon and I are deeply saddened by the catastrophe that occurred in Resolute Bay, where an airplane crashed earlier this afternoon.
> 
> Our thoughts and prayers go out to all those affected by this tragic event.
> 
> ...



PM's statement:


> Prime Minister Stephen Harper today issued the following statement on the crash of First Air charter flight 6560 near Resolute Bay:
> 
> “I am deeply saddened by news of this tragic plane crash near Resolute Bay.
> 
> ...


----------



## dogger1936 (21 Aug 2011)

Rest in peace friends. I can only imagine the pain and suffering of this small town and it's wonderful loving people. My thoughts are with you.


----------



## old medic (18 May 2012)

Two lawsuits filed over deadly Arctic plane crash

The Canadian Press
18 May 2012



> IQALUIT, Nunavut — Two lawsuits have now been filed in connection with an air crash in the Arctic that killed 12 people last August.
> 
> The suits were filed on behalf of the family members of those who died when the Boeing 737 missed the runway while trying to land in Resolute in poor weather.
> 
> ...


----------



## aesop081 (18 May 2012)

Figures.........


----------



## The Bread Guy (20 May 2012)

Followed by lawsuit #3 (remember:  *no claims have been proven in court at this point*)....


> The airline First Air is suing Canada's Department of National Defence for negligence in the August 2011 crash in Resolute, in Canada's eastern Arctic territory of Nunavut, that killed 12 passengers and crew and injured three passengers.
> 
> The First Air Boeing 737 crashed into a hillside close to the community's airport as it was preparing to land.
> 
> ...


_Eye on the Arctic_, 18 May 12


----------



## medicineman (20 May 2012)

Sounds like First Air may be needing a bit more cash if they lose the other suit...

I've flown First Air - first time was the last time.  Was going to Iqualuit from Montreal via Kuujjuak...plane landed at Kuujjuak and the oxygen masks deployed when the wheels touched down.  I'll just leave it at that.

MM


----------



## dapaterson (20 May 2012)

I believe the airline has one year to file a claim; with all the details still not, out, they are pre-emptively filing a broad claim so they can pursue the parts that stick once investigations are complete.


----------



## Retired AF Guy (20 May 2012)

Transport Canada's report on the accident (as of 2012-02-08). 



> *[size=12pt]Investigation Progress Update*
> First Air Flight 6560, Boeing 737 Accident, 20 August 2011, Resolute Bay (A11H0002)
> 
> On 20 August 2011, a First Air Boeing 737-210C aircraft (registration C-GNWN, serial number 21067) was being flown as a charter flight from Yellowknife, North West Territories, to Resolute Bay, Nunavut. As is often the case for aircraft operating in the arctic, the cabin was partitioned to allow a combination of cargo and passengers, this configuration is known as a combi.
> ...



So, if I read this correctly, the TSB, while still continuing its investigation, has concluded that the accident was due to "controlled flight into terrain."  Granted, something may still come up, but it appears to me the families may be jumping the gun in laying the lawsuits.


----------



## aesop081 (20 May 2012)

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> has concluded that the accident was due to "controlled flight into terrain."



That in itself is not the cause of the crash. CFIT was the result of whatever cause the crash.


----------



## Good2Golf (21 May 2012)

It will be interesting to see the investigation's analysis of why the aircraft crashed into the higher terrain on a vector almost directly in line with the YRB VOR navigational aid (see map, upper right corner - approx 1 mi NE of the runway) instead of flying aligned with the ILS localizer in line with the runway.

While one can certainly understand the grief of those who lost loved ones in the accident, one should also want to see the true cause of the accident be determined, and measures put in place to ensure it does not occur again.


Regards
G2G


----------



## Occam (21 May 2012)

Was the Flying Circus in town?


----------



## Retired AF Guy (21 May 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> That in itself is not the cause of the crash. CFIT was the result of whatever cause the crash.



Appreciate the clarification. But, like I said previously, if no cause has been found, then the families are jumping the gun in suing.


----------



## Good2Golf (21 May 2012)

Occam said:
			
		

> Was the Flying Circus in town?



 ???

What does that mean and how is that related to the topic?


----------



## Jarnhamar (21 May 2012)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> It will be interesting to see the investigation's analysis of why the aircraft crashed into the higher terrain on a vector almost directly in line with the YRB VOR navigational aid (see map, upper right corner - approx 1 mi NE of the runway) instead of flying aligned with the ILS localizer in line with the runway.
> 
> While one can certainly understand the grief of those who lost loved ones in the accident, one should also want to see the true cause of the accident be determined, and measures put in place to ensure it does not occur again.
> 
> ...



Drastically off topic but I followed that link and found some very nice pictures from google earth. What a beautiful area.


----------



## Occam (21 May 2012)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> ???
> 
> What does that mean and how is that related to the topic?



Flying Circus - 8 Air Communication and Control Squadron (8 ACCS)

If they were deployed, there would have likely been a lot more NAVAIDs than the ILS which is permanently located at YRB.


----------



## Good2Golf (22 May 2012)

Occam said:
			
		

> Flying Circus - 8 Air Communication and Control Squadron (8 ACCS)
> 
> If they were deployed, there would have likely been a lot more NAVAIDs than the ILS which is permanently located at YRB.



An ILS/LOC(BC), 2 x NDB, 1 x VOR, and the RNAV(GNSS) approaches...what more would civilian aviation require?


8 ACCS would be able to provide PAR/quad-radar services to military operators, but RAC 9.7.4. - Precision Radar Approaches, notes that use of Surveillance Radar-assisted approaches by Nav Can ATC units would only be provided in situations where a pilot has declared an emergency and specifically requested a radar-assisted approach.  Resolute Bay is an uncontrolled aerodrome and there are no air traffic controllers present to provide such services.  If 8 ACCS were present, it is doubtful that they would be allowed to provide civilian pilots untrained in the use of PAR approaches, especially when there are no less than five separate precision and non-precision approaches available to civilian pilots.


Regards
G2G


----------



## R933ex (22 May 2012)

Addition to this, in today's News North  2 more law suits have been launched against the AG and Nav Canada. The first one is on behalf of the pilots, the second on behalf of the family of the flight attendants.


----------



## Occam (22 May 2012)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> If 8 ACCS were present, it is doubtful that they would be allowed to provide civilian pilots untrained in the use of PAR approaches, especially when there are no less than five separate precision and non-precision approaches available to civilian pilots.



It was PAR that I was wondering about, given the CFIT tack.  Thanks for the background info.


----------



## dapaterson (26 Dec 2013)

Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-a1.asp


Two months later, the TSB issued Aviation Safety Information to Transport Canada, critiquing the Flight Data Recorder standards in place, and highlighting several cases of FDRs not properly recording incident data.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-l1.asp


News reports say that the TSB's final report will be out in early(ish) 2014.  Main TSB page for the investigation is at: http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002.asp


----------



## SeaKingTacco (26 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.
> 
> http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-a1.asp
> 
> ...



The first link is, basically, the CF getting schooled by the TSB because we set up a certain type of temporary control zone that requires all instrument flight rules traffic to be kept separated either by procedural or active methods.  Whom ever from the CF who set up the control zone apparently ensured neither- although that had nothing to do with the First Air flight from flying itself into the ground.

Basically, the CF made an amateur error.


----------



## YZT580 (26 Dec 2013)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.
> 
> CF prepared all their plans and documentation to ensure that they were legal to provide services to all military flights using the aerodrome.  They neglected to plan for civilian flights.  That is what they are being chastised for.


----------



## Retired AF Guy (26 Dec 2013)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The first link is, basically, the CF getting schooled by the TSB because we set up a certain type of temporary control zone that requires all instrument flight rules traffic to be kept separated either by procedural or active methods.  Whom ever from the CF who set up the control zone apparently ensured neither- although that had nothing to do with the First Air flight from flying itself into the ground.
> 
> Basically, the CF made an amateur error.





			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> CF prepared all their plans and documentation to ensure that they were legal to provide services to all military flights using the aerodrome.  They neglected to plan for civilian flights.  That is what they are being chastised for.



If I'm reading the first paragraph properly, what the TSB is saying that a _*second*_ aircraft had also entered the control zone and the two aircraft had come to close together ( "loss of separation"); had not the First Air flight crashed, there was the possibility of an air-to-air collision.  

If anyone is interested, an explanation of a  Class D control zone


----------



## Good2Golf (27 Dec 2013)

One thing I didn't see in this letter to 1 CAD was a reference to Nav Canada's original letter authorizing DND's set-up of the temporary Class D airspace at YRB.  There would surely have been a number of conditions that Nav Canada would have placed on DND, including, I would think, if the CZ was going to be provided to all users (civilian too, not just military), conditions for positive (radar, primary and/or secondary) and/or procedural IFR control in both instrument and visual meteorological conditions.

Interestingly, the letter does not state the degree of the "loss of separation" between First Air 6560 and the second aircraft, and thus leaves many wondering how truly dangerous the lack of separation was...or more correctly, 'would have been' had 6560 not flown into the ground.  

The entire set-up of the letter, particularly the 'background' first paragraph, seems to unnecessarily, and some might question inappropriately, tie the question of DND's provision of procedural/positive control within the Temp Class D control zone to the flight of FAB 6560 into the ground.

From some familiar with IFR flight into normally uncontrolled Class G airspace, it seems incongruous.  The question of why FAB 6560's crew apparently flew their 737 into the ground, on a track offset 1 mile east of RWY 35T's on-course is an entirely separate question.  Is this Nav Canada trying to deflect attention brought to them due to First Air's lawsuit, onto DND?

I mourn for the families of the 12 lost loved ones on flight 6560, but as an aviator, particularly one who has operated out of YRB in the past, and will do so in the future, I look forward to the results of the NTSB investigation, and what led to the crash.  I also look forward to greater clarity on how DND will be authorized by Nav Canada to operate control zones under the EATM program.


Regards
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (28 Dec 2013)

"IFR separation is normally provided by using radar information."  The quote is from the TC report.  Several problems with their outlook, the most important being that the basis for IFR separation is not radar but time and/or altitude.  In other words, procedural separation rules are the basis for all IFR separation procedures.  There are no details as to who handed off the a/c and who accepted it.  Did the NavCanada sector contact the radar site and initiate a hand-off or just dump the flight over?  If so, what was the basis for accepting the hand-off?  In addition, it is not up to NavCanada to authorize military anything but it is a function of Transport Canada and it is up to them to ensure that all the provisions for separation, communication and coordination are in place and that includes training up to and ensuring that non-radar procedures are available.  Without seeing  the transcripts, the loa between NavCanada and MOD, and finally the authorizing notam between TC, DOD, and NavCanada everything is pure speculation but I suspect that the powers that be are going to try and ensure that all of these details stay under the rug as much as possible.  Most of them have forgotten the applicable rules since they are not used very often.


----------



## Zoomie (28 Dec 2013)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> There are no details as to who handed off the a/c and who accepted it.  Did the NavCanada sector contact the radar site and initiate a hand-off or just dump the flight over?


There is no "hand-off" that far north.  Once you depart north of Yellowknife, you are essentially procedural all the way to destination.  You follow non-RADAR IFR procedures, conduct position reports and call before entering the airspace surrounding whichever airport you are flying into.


----------



## Good2Golf (28 Dec 2013)

YZT, good point about the authorization coming from TC, not NavCan.  Your and Zoomie's points about procedural IFR separation is what makes me wonder about NavCanada's admonishment of DND for not providing 'positive radar control' -- one would assume NavCanada was thinking of a capability based on both secondary and primary radar, but that is not any capability I have ever seen in Northern Domestic Airspace.

Regards
G2G


----------



## SeaKingTacco (28 Dec 2013)

G2G-

I didn't read the letter the same way as you.  I took TC as admonishing DND for not instituting proper Class D procedures- period.  Obviously, radar separation of IFR traffic is the gold standard, but as you well know, procedural separation works just fine.  

During Nav School, we visit a lot northern Manitoba and Ontario airfields that are a non radar environment.  It is no big deal- but only one IFR movement is allowed in the control zone at a time, period (yes, I know that you know this). It can lead to some long holds, however. I have waited for 40 mins to get into Red Lake, for example.

I suspect that the potential loss of separation that TC was hypothesizing about was that two IFR movements were going to enter the CZ at Res Bay at the same time with no radar- then the accident happened which was unrelated to this issue.  I am not aware of a method of doing that legally (there might be an ICP around who might know of a method- I don't). 

Anyhow- interesting letter.


----------



## YZT580 (29 Dec 2013)

Sorry Zoomie, wrong term.  There should have been an estimate passed from the last sector to YRB.  Upon receiving the estimate the approach controller would have issued any restrictions on the flight to ensure separation between the new inbound and FirstAir that is unless the a/c was flying IFR in uncontrolled airspace which would mean that he would have had to call for clearance to enter the airspace.  It is quite conceivable to have more than 1 a/c in the area at a time: that is why holding patterns were invented.  Unless the new inbound was cleared for an approach there should have been vertical separation with a EFC time at YRB issued to the new inbound that was above the missed approach altitude: even a EFC at YRB or clearance limit YRB with no delay expected would have been good enough.  If that was done then everything is kosher.  That is why I said that without the transcript it is impossible to judge at all. It almost sounds as if everyone involved in setting up the controlled airspace totally forgot about procedural control procedures and that is a big whoooops


----------



## Good2Golf (30 Dec 2013)

SKT, I tried getting a more recent copy of NAVCAN ATC MANOPs, but the best I could find was from the CZEG FIR site for NavCan references, which is a seven year-old version, and non current ( ATC MANOPS, ATCD 2006-3, 20-Jul-2006, PDF 5.5mb ).

I can't find anything that specifically restricts the number of aircraft in the zone on approach, so long as appropriate separation is maintained, be it procedural or positive (radar) control.  Both sections 560 (562 in particular for sequential approaches) and 532 (minima - separation) in Part 5 relate to radar controlled zones, and Part 4, section 470 related to procedural separation.  The required lateral and/or longitudinal separation during procedural control may result in de facto exclusion from the control zone, i.e. if MANOPS (particularly 532.1A) dictate a minimum separation of 5nm between IFR arrivals, that could, depending on where the first aircraft was in its approach, (commencing a procedure turn over the RU NDB, for example, to set up for the ILS RWY 35T) preclude the second aircraft from even being authorized to enter the Class D control zone (5nm in YRB, I believe).  This could then become an area for confusion in itself, as the second aircraft would technically be in Class G uncontrolled airspace if not in the Class D control zone...and would it then be subject to direction from the ATC unit?

As YZT580 notes, without knowing what constraints TC placed on DND for the operation of the temp Class D control zone, and without knowing any details of the second aircraft referred to in TC's letter and where it was, such that the TSB believed that the MATCU had not provided the required minimum separation, and even if civilian aircraft were subject to military control, it is extremely difficult to understand fully the alleged deficiencies in military air traffic control services at the time.  The letter referred to the Cdn Forces Supplement to the NavCan MANOPs, but then said that procedures were not in place to provide non-radar separation.  I am confused by this statement as the CFS and even the NavCan MANOPs itself contain the procedures necessary to maintain procedural (non-radar) separation.

It would certainly have helped the military to be provided more information on the issues noted by the TSB.  This would have allowed for DND to disseminate more specific information throughout the ATC and ICP networks to affected.  To my knowledge, such specifics have not been passed through the ICP network, for increased general awareness on the subject.  Perhaps such clarification will be provided prior to the next round of OP NANOOKs/NUNALIVUT.


Regards
G2G


----------



## SeaKingTacco (30 Dec 2013)

G2G-

An excellent summary.  

The only fly in the ointment- would the IFR traffic in the Res Bay case not have been coming out of Class A, vice, G airspace, given that it was jet traffic?  Does that not change things?  (I don't have a 204 in front of me and cannot remember where Class A airspace starts  in Northern Domestic Airspace, vertically).


----------



## Zoomie (30 Dec 2013)

Thank you wiki for making my search easy:

"Class A airspace exists exclusively between FL180 and FL600. In the SDA, it begins at 18,000. However, in the NDA it does not. The NDA is divided into two Control Areas: the Arctic Control Area (ACA) and the Northern Control Area (NCA). In the NCA, Class A airspace extends upwards from FL230, and FL 270 (formerly 280) in the ACA"

Anyone know which altitude block those old-gen 73's work out of?


----------



## Good2Golf (30 Dec 2013)

Not necessarily, SKT.  

Since CYRB is in the Arctic Control Area of Northern Domestic Airspace, there is a 9,000' 'sandwich' of Class G uncontrolled high level between FL180 and FL270.  Class A airspace only starts at FL270 and goes higher in the ACA, so in lieu of any temporary control zone or terminal control area being established at CYRB, all flights below FL270 will necessarily be uncontrolled.  Given that most operators would conduct some type of profile descent (last time I did a 'gut-wrenching' HI TACAN approach dropping essentially out of high level airspace within the control zone was about 24 years ago), I can't see an airliner (or any airplane, for that matter) staying above FL270 until within 25 nm of an airport (the MF radius at CYRB is 25nm).  There would definitely be a clear period of travel in "fully uncontrolled" airspace until the aircraft was about to enter the MF Zone and then, while still uncontrolled, the pilot would then be required to make several communications, at least: (ref: CAP charts for CYRB)

a) on 126.7, 15 min back from landing; 

b) on 126.7, commencing the descent...not sure how an extended profile descent would affect this call, conceivably a profile descent could start notably longer than 15 minutes prior to the ETA); and 

c) on the MF of 122.1 when 5 mins from commencing the approach (which for the ILS or LOC(BC) I would take to be 5 min back from planned intercept of the PT fix outbound.  

The CYRB 25NM MSA is 2200' ASL, so that leaves about 24,800' of altitude between being in controlled airspace and being down at the MSA, from where you could then drop down another 400' to the PT altitude of 1,800' once you passed the RU beacon outbound on your track of 167T.


While not controlled by them myself at the time, I have been in the area when 8 ACCS  is providing radar services, both PAR and an equivalent to what we would call combined primary/secondary radars.  The other operators conducted both PARs and radar area let-downs (basically a vectored circling approach, negating the need for a procedure turn to navigate to the FAF) and in both cases, the control provided by 8 ACCS controllers was of excellent standard.  I have to ask myself whether the issues that surrounded Resolute Bay back in 2012 were centred more on mutual miscommunication, than they were on a flagrant disregard for airspace control and airmanship, as the TSB letter would appear to impugn.

I can't ever see a civilian operator being allowed by TC to conduct a precision radar approach except in an emergency situation, so the only function I could see provided by any ATC unit, military or civilian, in CYRB would be flow control and management of the control zone/terminal control area such that civilian operators would be able to expeditiously conduct one of the approved, published approaches.


Regards
G2G


----------



## Good2Golf (30 Dec 2013)

Looks like Zoomie scooped me while I was writing my response.  :nod:

Zoomie, I can't recall a specific block, but last time I was in YFB chatting with the Canadian North guys who had flown us up on a -200 combo, they mentioned they would run mid-FL2##'s.  That was YFB, which is, due to a little cutout of the SCA and NCA, part of the SCA, so HLA still starts at FL180 and flying in the 200's would still have been fully controlled HLA.


Regards
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (30 Dec 2013)

There are no specific qualification requirements for civilian flights for a PAR.  In fact, through the mid70s YYZ used PAR for runway 32 (now 33R) as the only other approach available was a BC with no glide path.  So qualification for PAR is not a factor.  Now who gave the second flight clearance to enter controlled airspace?   The standard NavCanada clearance pre- military ops would have issued a clearance to leave controlled airspace via descent and to report leaving controlled airspace so unless there was something on the sector ops letters to coordinate something different that is what the second aircraft would have received.  I don't know what altitude the Class D airspace commenced but there is still a transition area from HL controlled to the control zone through which the aircraft was uncontrolled.  My guess, and it is strictly a guess, is that there was no provision made to coordinate inbound flights given that NavCanada responsibiliities ended at FL180 and the class D started at what? 5000 so NavCAnada did nothing since they didn't have to.  That would appear to be a loss of separation just looking for a place to happen and folks need to take a real good look at the transition.


----------



## Zoomie (30 Dec 2013)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Given that most operators would conduct some type of profile descent, I can't see an airliner (or any airplane, for that matter) staying above FL270 until within 25 nm of an airport (the MF radius at CYRB is 25nm).


Apparently the older Gen 737 handles very similar to the B707 - if that is so, it's a slick jet and a handful to slow/descend.  That being said, we routinely use a x3/x4 distance to go//altitude to lose multiplier.  So these guys would have been descending well out to 100nm back.

My arctic IFR flying has always been in lower airspace.  Even coming out of Thule to Alert, we had to transit relatively high for the Buff - until basically no-one wanted to talk to us.   At which point we made the broadcasts on 126.7 and conducted our own RADAR let-down over Hans Island area.  We proceeded on an IFR flight plan up to Alert, canceled IFR with the radio and proceeded to land WFI.  This type of flying is very much prevalent throughout the north - if an operator missed the NOTAM, he could very well stumble into the temporary airspace surround YRB.


----------



## fireman1867 (31 Dec 2013)

Sorry ref PAR, all PAR approaches are DND only no? So only an RCAF Irt would allow you to fly it legally?


----------



## Good2Golf (31 Dec 2013)

YZT, without knowing the TC authorization for DND's Class-D control zone, it's not possible to know the upper limit of CYRB's temp CZ.  Although standard DND Class-D CZs are normally 10NM radius from the surface to 6000' AAE (vice civilian 7NM radius to 3000' AAE), DND's temp CYRB CZ could have been different.  A slight note to your earlier comment, Class A high level airspace near CYRB ends below FL270 (vice FL180), so the uncontrolled transition area (Class G) could be as great as 21,000' * (FL270 - 6,000')

From a pilot's point of view, a Class D control zone exists purely to control IFR traffic with appropriate separations, but we are mindful of the fact that VFR traffic is NOT RESTRICTED from entering a Class D CZ; the VFR pilot need only establish and maintain comms with ATC.  The VFR flight can request traffic following services, but ATC is not required to do so for the VFR flight. 

This also raises some interesting points, many related to YZT's post regarding the transition from high level controlled airspace to lower level airspace (both controlled an uncontrolled).  An IFR flight is an IFR flight until/unless the aircraft captain cancels the IFR flight plan with an ATC unit -- from that point on, the flight is by default VFR.  As well, the IFR flight is always flying on a "clearance" (may include altitudes, speeds, routings, etc...) and that clearance always has a "limit."  That limit could be an aerodrome, a navaid or a fix (a defined point in space identifiable to the pilot given the functioning navigational equipment on board his/her aircraft) and defines a point to which both ATC and the pilot expect the aircraft to be flown to in the absence of any further clearance.  If the limit is not the aerodrome itself, then the pilot is expected to either: a) conduct a hold at the limit upon arrival, and if an expected further clearance (EFC) time was given by ATC as part of the original clearance, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome; or b) if the EFC time has passed by the time the aircraft arrives at the clearance limit, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome using one of the public or TC-approved company instrument approaches.  If the aerodrome is in controlled airspace (a Class C or D control zone, or a Class B, C or D terminal control area), then the IFR pilot must receive further clearance from ATC to conduct the approach.  If the airspace is uncontrolled (like CYRB without the DND temp control zone), then the pilot would carry out one of the published approaches mindful of potential VFR traffic if the weather at the time was visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

The so what to this is whatever agency cleared the second Resolute Bay IFR aircraft out of controlled airspace (the Class A, FL270 and above [to FL600] high altitude airspace) would have had to ensure that that aircraft's IFR clearance limit was valid.  In regular times, that clearance would likely be something like, "ATC clears C-GABC (fictitious name for the 2nd aircraft...I don't know what its call-sign was) to the Resolute Bay airport for an approach. You are cleared to descend [out of FL###] at pilot's discretion."  ATC may keep C-GABC on their frequency if ABC states he/she has sufficient radios to also monitor 126.7 (general en-route freq), but once in uncontrolled airspace below FL270, ABC must maintain a listening watch on 126.7 (and then make appropriate calls on CYRB's mandatory frequency (MF) as I noted in an earlier post).   With DND's temp Class D CZ in operation, however, what I think should happen is that when ATC cleared C-GABC out of Class A airspace, it should advise the pilot that there is a temporary Class D control zone in operation.  

This is important, because as an IFR flight, the pilot of C-GABC cannot legally enter the Class D control zone without a clearance from the controlling agency (DND).  YZT, I think this is what you were referring to?  As an IFR flight, someone should have advised the second aircraft that there was now a control zone in effect at CYRB, and furthermore, should have ensured that the clearance reflected a limit that was also consistent with First Air 6560's presence in the area and conduct of the ILS 35T approach.  I'm not certain what the MANOPs say on the issue, as far as controllers go, but if FAB6560 was in the process of conducting or was cleared by ATC to conduct its approach at the time that the second aircraft was cleared out of Class A airspace, then civilian ATC's clearance to the second aircraft should (could?) not have included the phrase "...to the Resolute Bay airport" as the limit, because there was already one aircraft (FAB6560) with a clearance limit of the CYRB airport.

So while the TSB admonishes DND for allowing there to be less than sufficient separation between FAB6560 and the second aircraft, did civilian ATC give the second aircraft a clearance limit that was not theirs to give?  I.e. was DND set up for success to continue maintaining separation?

It's a bit of a catch-22.  IF the second aircraft was cleared to the CYRB airport for an approach, then that ATC unit should have advised the DND controllers that it had cleared a second aircraft to the airport.  Could the ATC unit actually have given such a clearance if they were not the controlling agency of the airspace within which the CYRB aerodrome was contained?  What did the letter/MOU say on the issue?  Would such a clearance overrule DND's control of the CZ?  Could DND overrule such a clearance and provide a new clearance limit to the second aircraft that was not the CRYB aerodrome, but some other navaid or fix?  We just don't know how that second aircraft (or theoretically any subsequent) aircraft was/would have been controlled, and whether there was appropriate handling of the IFR flight(s) all the way from earlier flight in controlled high level Class A airspace, all the way through Class G uncontrolled airspace, before entering the Class D control zone. 

Further complicating the issue is that all the second aircraft would have to do is cancel its IFR flight plan to become VFR traffic and then only have to ADVISE, not ASK the DND controllers that it was entering the Class D control zone.  Unlike Class C, where a controller can deny entry of VFR flight into a control zone, VFR flights cannot be restricted from entering Class D airspace.  It would then be up to the DND controllers to maintain adequate separation for the IFR flights that they were controlling.


fireman1867:  I reread through my AIP and YTZ is right in that civilians can conduct PAR approaches if the service is available (at a civilian aerodrome) or if authorized (at a military aerodrome with a PAR).  I can see nothing about currency requirements for civilian pilots, and I know on the military side of the house, many fleets don't mandate that one of the semi-annual precision IF approaches for currency be a PAR.  I am certain that the PAR controllers have a certain number of approaches they must conduct to maintain currency, but I don't know that detail.  PARs definitely aren't as popular as they used to be, and not nearly as common either.  I'll try and get a PAR in when I can, striving for the pilots' 'Holy Grail' of the PAR world: a controller's, "On course, on glide path.  Excellent rate of decent."  :nod: (Getting one of these during an IRT [instrument rating test] was particularly coveted.)

YTZ:  You are definitely right that this is a specific situation, and there are no doubt many similar situations such as this, where clarity and understanding by all involved in the conduct of flight through mixed airspace, controllers and pilots alike, is clearly needed.  

Aviation is a particularly unforgiving environment, and we are all living in a fairly large glass house when it comes to conducting flying operations.  The prevailing attitudes should be biased towards inclusiveness and open information, and less on 'he said, she said' type notifications.  I for one would be very interested, to say the least, in the outcome of the airspace issue in this situation.  


Regards
G2G


* understanding that altimeter settings in low-level airspace and the standard pressure setting in high-level may result in a difference of 100s of feet from 21,000' if the two alt settings are notably different.


----------



## SeaKingTacco (31 Dec 2013)

g2g-

An excellent post, although you left several hanging paragraphs.   ;D


----------



## Good2Golf (31 Dec 2013)

Thanks SKT - fixed...a sign of the multiple "lines-of-cognition" my brain housing group is normally churning over... 

Cheers
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (31 Dec 2013)

I'm not certain what the MANOPs say on the issue, as far as controllers go, but if FAB6560 was in the process of conducting or was cleared by ATC to conduct its approach at the time that the second aircraft was cleared out of Class A airspace, then civilian ATC's clearance to the second aircraft should (could?) not have included the phrase "...to the Resolute Bay airport" as the limit, because there was already one aircraft (FAB6560) with a clearance limit of the CYRB airport.

Separation services are only provided whilst the a/c is in controlled airspace.  Thus a civilian controller is quite justified under normal circumstances in clearing a second a/c to the CYRB airport.  Although they do, they should never use the expression for an approach as the approach is normally in uncontrolled airspace.  The a/c clearance should include a statement such as "cleared to descend to FL270.  Descent below FL270 at your discretion,report leaving FL270.  ATC services terminated (except alerting services) leaving FL270."  Once the report is received, a second a/c in a non-radar environment can legally be cleared in exactly the same manner.  The controller should advise the second a/c of the preceding traffic but that is the limits of his obligation.  He does not have to wait until the first a/c reports on the ground.  Consider the case of a single flight.  Once out of 270 the aircraft can shoot the approach do a miss, shoot a second approach or whatever else he wishes to do.  He only needs to call ATC to cancel his flightplan or to request clearance back into controlled airspace if proceeding to his alternate.  

G2G your post was an excellent summary and said everything that I tried to imply and more in a totally transparent fashion.  I believe, given the information available that DND was set up to fail.  Nowhere in the note was any coordination mentioned and with a valid ATC unit on site, NavCanada was obligated to provide an estimate and the second a/c was obliged to call for clearance to enter controlled airspace with the transition from FL270 to the top of the Class D being uncontrolled despite probably being on instruments.  Does that leave any discrepancies?


----------



## fireman1867 (31 Dec 2013)

Interesting info ref the PAR. My young FO was so happy to get an 'excellent' a few months back while flying the autopilot,  I flew the next one and hand flew it and managed to get the turkey aka three 'excellent' calls on one approach. I guess we're still competitive folks by nature. ;D Not sure if having someone fly a PAR in anger with out at least some familiarity is a good idea? Not many places were it would matter - ZX is one of the few I think.


----------



## Good2Golf (31 Dec 2013)

YZT, not havimg made either a long-range or high level IFR flight in a while, what could/mught the original clearance have been for the second aircraft, say it was departing CYOW?  Specifically, I'm wondering what would the clearance limit be?  I'm thinking something along the lines: "ATC clears C-GABC to the Resolute Bay Airport, via flight flight planned route. Depart via the Ottawa SID 1.  Squawk 0652." 

I don't have my LO chart with me at the moment, so I can't recall if there is a Class E low-level airway that intercepts either the YRB or the RU NDBs, but if so, would not the clearance be, say, the YRB? Following that, would the original clearance include the YRB as the clearance limit, vice the Resolute Bay Airport? Repeatedly, if the was  a Class E airway leading to the vicinity of CYRB, could not the high-level controller vector the IFR flight on top of the Victor airway so that the flight would technically still remain under ATC control throughout the descent to commence the approach?

If no Class E airway to YRB or near CYRB, then a flight descending trough FL270 truly would be in uncontrolled airspace.  Part of me thinks that the clearance limit would have to consider RNAV to an appropapriate navaid as a limit.

I'll definitely be discussing this with the other ICPs when I get back to the squdron next week...this discussion has made me recognize that there was a bit of dust on the IF grey cells.  It is important to make sure we, military and civilian aviators, get IFR right.

Regards
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (1 Jan 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> YZT, not havimg made either a long-range or high level IFR flight in a while, what could/mught the original clearance have been for the second aircraft, say it was departing CYOW?  Specifically, I'm wondering what would the clearance limit be?  I'm thinking something along the lines: "ATC clears C-GABC to the Resolute Bay Airport, via flight flight planned route. Depart via the Ottawa SID 1.  Squawk 0652."
> 
> I don't have my LO chart with me at the moment, so I can't recall if there is a Class E low-level airway that intercepts either the YRB or the RU NDBs, but if so, would not the clearance be, say, the YRB? Following that, would the original clearance include the YRB as the clearance limit, vice the Resolute Bay Airport? Repeatedly, if the was  a Class E airway leading to the vicinity of CYRB, could not the high-level controller vector the IFR flight on top of the Victor airway so that the flight would technically still remain under ATC control throughout the descent to commence the approach?
> 
> ...


Most initial clearances are to destination airport unless it is a short flight within the same FIR.  The exception is normally to resolve an off-the-ground potential conflict i.e. transiting traffic in a non-radar environment.  In this case the short clearance provides the departure with loss of comm. security to enable climb to cruise in the event the radios fail.  ATC assured separation in the case you gave is to the top of the SID.  Again, in the hypothetical radio failure ATC would progressively clear the track in front of you with the separation gradually increasing to procedural.    But you are cleared to destination as a geographical place.  You are not cleared to destination for an approach and that is an important distinction because there are a number of airport destinations without a certified approach and a chap in WG has no knowledge of an approach availability in QM or overseas.  ATC responsibilities are to provide alerting services, traffic information (when known) in appropriate airspace and separation between qualified flights depending again on the appropriate airspace.  It is the pilot's responsibility to pick a route that provides separation from terrain and suitable nav facilities to get him to destination.  Thus we have air routes that are flight checked for reception and terrain but are in uncontrolled airspace.  In northern domestic airspace there is no control ainywhere below FL230 excepting into airports that provide ATC services.  
Now I will throw a small wrench into the works.  If a single flight into RB reports leaving controlled airspace in descent there are no provisions given to provide separation between him and other flights even if known that are operating in uncontrolled airspace HOWEVER separation must be assured between that flight and the climb back up into controlled airspace in the event of a missed approach or between that flight and a departure off FB that is climbing up into controlled airspace.  In both cases the loss of separation would occur at FL270 which sounds strange considering the two flights might conflict at 2 or 3000 feet but that is the first point of responsibility.   Your hypotheticals are both more or less correct excepting there is no radar service up there.  It is the responsibility of the flight crew to do the transitions.  Clearance to a beacon or navaid does not get the flight to his destination because it precludes flight beyond that navaid.  Thus clearance to YRB or RU NDB requires the flight to stop at that point and hold until he figures out something else to do whilst ATC provides separation only at that point for the hold.  If the beacon is on site then it is a mute point but in the case where a navaid is located many miles from the runway, it means that you are kind of stuck.  As I see it, DND was responsible to the top of the temporary airspace.  NavCanada should have included a restriction on the second inbound via a short clearance i.e. to the NDB not below 6000 feet (assuming protect airspace at 6000 and below).  An ETA should have been passed to DND.  DND should have had a missed approach on FAB to climb not above 5000 feet.  In this manner all would have been well but one or more of those simple clearances was omitted. 

With regards to an airport with a certified approach, a controller can clear the flight to destination airport to descend to the floor of the controlled airspace and to report leaving controlled airspace.  The aircraft remains on the boards for possible missed approach and traffic information but no separation is provided except in the case I mentioned above.  The aircraft is IFR and separation must be provided between him and a subsequent flight until he cancels which puts me in error on an earlier post.  However, the existence of a low level approach facility ie. the military PAR would permit the civilian sector controller to clear a second aircraft for descent, to report leaving and to contact PAR.  He is no longer responsible for providing missed approach separation.  

But I am babbling.  It is a complicated issue and one that probably should be resolved as I suspect that more and more northern operations will come up in the long term.  Pleasure discussing with you, it is indeed good to wake up some long dead brain cells.


----------



## Zoomie (2 Jan 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> But I am babbling.


Nobody is babbling here - while 99% of the forum members won't care/understand what we are discussing, this is high level technical talk that is exactly what these forums are all about.


----------



## Edward Campbell (2 Jan 2014)

Zoomie said:
			
		

> Nobody is babbling here - while 99% of the forum members won't care/understand what we are discussion, this is high level technical talk that is exactly what these forums are all about.




You're right ... I don't understand; but I am mightily encouraged that some smart people - you guys - understand that there are problems and that you are talking about ways to mitigate the risks that are inherent in flying. And I agree: this is a GREAT way for these fora to contribute.


----------



## Good2Golf (2 Jan 2014)

YZT, I concur with Zoomie and Mr. Campbell, there is no babbling going on in your posts whatsoever.  I appreciate greatly your perspective from the other side of the radio/scope!  :nod:

Doing some more reading over the holidays I have found more info related to crash, including the identity of the second aircraft (one of Ken Borek's Twin Otters, Borek Flight 99, which conducted a LOC(BC) RWY 17T approach shortly after FAB6560's crash, but had to conduct a missed approach due to weather and then landed shortly afterwards, visually to RWY 35, I believe).

From a subject thread from the AvCanada forum ( Resolute Bay Accident - Pilots Discussion Thread ) I found the text of two Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) related to the control zone (CZ) and, as I just learned, a military terminal control area (MTCA), as well.  The CZ reflected the std mil extent of 10NM and a 6000' ASL cap.  The MTCA was pretty large, 80NM radius (civilian TCAs are normally out to 45NM) and a vertical extent from 700' AGL/AAE all the way up to FL200.



> 110102 CYRB RESULUTE BAY
> CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
> CLASS D RESOLUTE CTL ZONE IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
> THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 10 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
> ...




The important thing to note in relation to these NOTAMs is: 

1) that the Class D CZ was technically in place as of 1300Z, 10 Aug 2011 (1108101300 eff date code = 2011, Aug, 10th, 1300Z).  Since there was no manned tower, however, the CZ would revert to Class E airspace -- inbound traffic makes advisory calls only, no clearance to enter the zone or to land is required, and the weather minima are increased slightly from regular uncontrolled Class G airspace); and

2) The MTCA airspace and the tower/radar/terminal frequencies were not active at the time of the crash, but rather was to take effect two days later (per the "1108221200 TIL 1108280100" code at the end of the second NOTAM).

In the online discussion, there are questions regarding queries made to First Air 6560 pilots by what was believed to be a military controller, regarding 6560's inbound direction and distance from the airport.  The terminology of the question to the First Air crew was discussed as "radial and DME" -- for those unfamiliar with the terms, radial being a compass-like spoke on a horizontal wheel centred about a directional navigation aid, and DME being an acronym for 'distance measuring equipment', but that usually refers not to the equipment itself, but to the distance between a navigational aid and the aircraft in question.  While DME is a separate component that can be associated with numerous types of en-route and approach naiads, 'Radial' would in my mind imply the VOR


I also found a more recent copy (2011) of the specific approach (ILS/DME RWY 35T) that 6560 was flying.   Of note, the Cape Martyr NDB (RU - 391) was decommissioned prior to the accident and no longer fits into the equation.  The 'POKAN' final approach fix is purely DME based now, and notably further away from the RWY 35T threshold (twice as far at 4.2NM) than the 2.1NM of the Cape Martyr NDB FAF.

There is also an interesting video of an ILS/DME RWY 35T approach on YouTube, taken from a Lockheed L-188 Electra (civilian airliner/transporter based on the P-3 Orion/CP-140 Aurora airframe).  The large lake directly ahead of the landing aircraft before the runway is Resolute Lake.  You can see in the first few moments as the aircraft breaks out of the overcast, the site of the decommissioned Cape Martyr NDB (base of the screen, slightly left of centre, at 0:21).  Over to the right at about the 1:00 o'clock position is the higher terrain that 6560 crashed into.


Regards
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (2 Jan 2014)

Took a quick look through the dialogue on the AVCanada link.  Apart from the most interesting series of speculations it is enlightening to note how many of the flight crews proposed deviations from the published approach/arrival procedure.  If TC safety are having difficulty determining exactly what happened and why I suspect that those comments would prove most interesting although definitely not conclusive.  There was an AA B757 that hit a mountain top in South America I believe with just such a proposed deviation from SOP using GPS to smooth a turn.  There is a specific reason for all those designated headings and turns on approach plates with most of those being the presence of very solid objects in the off-course.  The land may look flat but even a 200 foot elevation can ruin your day.

With no tower in operation and the radar not due to open for another couple of days there is no reason for DND to get their knuckles rapped.  The controller was fully within his rights to broadcast on mandatory provided he did not issue clearances or attempt to control.  Even passing traffic advisories would have been within his authority provided the phraseology was something like  "FAB traffic information only, reports of a DH6 inbound from the north eta? position unknown".  Actually, anyone with a VHF radio-telephony license could pass the same information.  The queries regarding position alluded to could have been nothing more than confirming radar alignment with an actual target.   

Being a DH6, the Borek flight was always uncontrolled and with no active class D was not required to do anything other than broadcast his position.  Sounds like someone in headquarters doesn't know his air regs.


----------



## SupersonicMax (2 Jan 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> 1) that the Class D CZ was technically in place as of 1300Z, 10 Aug 2011 (1108101300 eff date code = 2011, Aug, 10th, 1300Z).  Since there was no manned tower, however, the CZ would revert to Class E airspace -- inbound traffic makes advisory calls only, no clearance to enter the zone or to land is required, and the weather minima are increased slightly from regular uncontrolled Class G airspace); and



G2G,

I may have missed something, but where do you see there was no manned tower?

SSM


----------



## SupersonicMax (2 Jan 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> It's a bit of a catch-22.  IF the second aircraft was cleared to the CYRB airport for an approach, then that ATC unit should have advised the DND controllers that it had cleared a second aircraft to the airport.  Could the ATC unit actually have given such a clearance if they were not the controlling agency of the airspace within which the CYRB aerodrome was contained?  What did the letter/MOU say on the issue?  Would such a clearance overrule DND's control of the CZ?  Could DND overrule such a clearance and provide a new clearance limit to the second aircraft that was not the CRYB aerodrome, but some other navaid or fix?  We just don't know how that second aircraft (or theoretically any subsequent) aircraft was/would have been controlled, and whether there was appropriate handling of the IFR flight(s) all the way from earlier flight in controlled high level Class A airspace, all the way through Class G uncontrolled airspace, before entering the Class D control zone.



I think this is where lies the problem.  IF NavCan cleared the flight for "an approach", as they would normally do for a CZ "E" that lies within their AOR, then the went beyond their authority, since DND was the controlling agency of the CZ (unless prior coordination was done prior to issuing the clearance).  

The issue is that there was no TCA established around the CZ, so who would clear a flight for an approach?  

It seems like it is a coordination/communication issue between controlling agencies (the "loss of separation" part, not the flying into the ground part).

YZT: Are there any Class D CZ lying within class G airspace with no TCA around?  If so, how does NavCan deal with approach clearances?


----------



## Good2Golf (2 Jan 2014)

SSM, my understanding of publicly available information is the 8 ACCS crew was in location and their tower (and PSR and PAR) was physically placed, but not 'manned', i.e. they were not operating as a controlling agency on a TWR freq at the time. The CZ controlling portion was to have commenced on the 22nd, once the MTCA was activated, per the second NOTAM (110124 YRB).  The UHF TWR freq of 236.5 would have been dual-band transmitted along with two on the regular VHF MF (122.1).  I can find no references that state that 8 ACCS was positively controlling the CZ as Class D airspace prior to the intended 22 Aug 11 date.  The fact that the Borek 99 crew described conducting their LOC(BC) 17T using regular R/T (regular CAR-reqd transmissions at an uncontrolled aerodrome) would tend to support this configuration at the time.

Regards
G2G


----------



## Good2Golf (2 Jan 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> ...The issue is that there was no TCA established around the CZ, so who would clear a flight for an approach?
> 
> It seems like it is a coordination/communication issue between controlling agencies (the "loss of separation" part, not the flying into the ground part).
> 
> YZT: Are there any Class D CZ lying within class G airspace with no TCA around?  If so, how does NavCan deal with approach clearances?



Max, this exact question is what reinforces to me that the Mil ATC team was not yet acting as CZ controllers, even if the CZ airspace was designated as of 10 Aug.  Had they been, then I believe Arctic Ctr would (should) have contacted the MTCA controllers advising them that it had cleared FAB6560 out of Class A airspace for the approach.

Regards
G2G


----------



## SupersonicMax (2 Jan 2014)

G2G,

The first NOTAM is the one describing CZ "D".  I see it active on the 10 Aug 2011 until 28 Aug 2011.  While there is no frequency, once could easily assume the normal "MF" frequency would be used (which it is, 122.1 MHz) for control.  

The second NOTAM details the MTCA, adding frequencies for different controlling agencies.  

Why have different dates to the set up of the CZ and MTCA if, practically speaking, they were really stood up at the same time?

To me, a Class D CZ means it will have somebody issuing clearances and instructions at the other end.  I do not see any provision for the CZ "D" to revert to a CZ "E" when the tower is not manned (I know it is a common practice, however it is always described in the GPH205 or approach plates. I could not find a reference indicating that anytime a CZ "D" is not manned, it reverts to a CZ "E").  

Either the CZ was manned by a controller from 10 Aug or the NOTAMs are very confusing wrt airspace structure around Res Bay.


----------



## YZT580 (2 Jan 2014)

The plot thickens!  Here is the reference for Class D to E  from RAC  2.8.4 Class D Airspace

Class D airspace is a controlled airspace within which both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must establish two-way communication with the appropriate ATC agency prior to entering the airspace. ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft.

Airspace classified as Class D becomes Class E airspace when the appropriate ATC unit is not in operation.

That I know of there is no class D that does not lie on an airway thus controlled airspace begins at 2200 agl as all controlled airports lie in the southern control area.  The very fact that there is a tower indicates sufficient traffic to justify controlled airways.

With a valid class E Borek99 required an IFR clearance for the approach.  His normal contact would, I suspect be Arctic Radio in YYB and Arctic Radio would be responsible for informing him that there was a valid control zone and that he needed a clearance.  The clearance itself would be issued through radio by the responsible sector in UL I believe.  It would have definitely been a shock to Borek.  I doubt if he had had a clearance issued since arriving in the north.  He would be used to finding his own way around.


----------



## Good2Golf (3 Jan 2014)

Max, YZT beat me to the RAC 2 reference.  Yes, I'm tracking the difference between the two NOTAMs, and while I can't explain why the Class D was set up 12 days before the MTCA, I think my read was correct that the CZ was not actively being controlled at the time of the crash, thus Class E.  I do note, however, YZT's further clarification that Borek 99 would still have had to get a clearance for their approach on the LOC(BC) 17T.  The 8 ACCS team would have been the only ones capable of controlling the CZ if my understanding is correct, as the CARS guys are not at all qualified to provide any element of control.


Regards
G2G


----------



## SupersonicMax (3 Jan 2014)

From the posts on Avcanada, it seems like the tower was active at the time (issuing take-off & landing clearances anyways).  To me that's active, hence the CZ would have been class D.

Thanks for the reference.

The transition from uncontrolled IFR directly to a CZ is the source of the problem IMO, as there is no real deconfliction between IFR aircraft in uncontrolled airspace (other than what was agreed by both aircraft on 126.7, if they did so).  The presence of an MTCA would have mitigated this problem as terminal control would have been taken from further out.

I still have one outstanding question: who clears aircraft for an approach in this case (active class D CZ)?

As far as te CFIT goes, some people are suggesting they were flying the LOC approach with the VOR tuned (which would make sense that they called the GS U/S, if they did not notice the mistake).  Their track was parallel to the LOC track, but tracking towards the VOR station.

There are some very valuable lessons to be learnt from this accident..


----------



## Good2Golf (3 Jan 2014)

Hopefully, significantly more detail comes out once the investigation is released, concerning what the TC-DND MOU for the CZ/MTCA contained.  The transition is definitely a concern, and why I would have thought that the CZ and the MTCA would more appropriately be activated at the same time, otherwise inbound IFR traffic would be controlled(Class A)-uncontrolled-controlled(Class D) and the handover between Arctic Centre and Resolute Tower would have to have been a well-coordinated activity.  I think there remains the question of understanding by all as to what Classes of airspace were active in the 10-20 August period.  I still am left with the sense that, while the Class D CZ was activated by NOTAM on 10 Aug, that it was not specifically manned until much later, thus leaving the CZ as Class E until then, and even then, I'm unclear as to what level of control (or advisory?) was being provided on the day of the crash.  If the CZ is active and IF there is a controller, then it is Class D and IFR traffic requires clearance to commence an approach and VFR traffic must initiate communication with the tower.

I don't know enough about the particular avionics configuration of the incident aircraft, re: Nav1/2 select, but the ramification of having the VOR feeding the HSI/OBS with the ILS/LOC inbound course dialled in, vice the ILS receiver is certainly unsettling.  In the discussion on AvCanada, some people were implying that if the crew of 6560 had a G/S flag on approach, they should have conducted a missed approach right away.  I don't think that is or should be an expectation.  Potential of a VOR vice ILS/LOC track inbound aside, a reversion to LOC-only after established on the ILS(/DME) so long as still above MDA (or FAF crossing hight, if prior to) is quite reasonable.  In fact, I can't think of an ILS approach that I've ever flown where I didn't brief a back-up LOC-only if the G/S went U/S during the approach -- of course, starting a timing at the FAF if the MAP isn't DME-based is an important part of having a valid LOC-only back-up.

For those of who have flown the approach into Res, I can see how in lower vis, Char Lake, although smaller, could be mistaken for Resolute Lake, as the geometry (alignment with the runway axis) of flying over Resolute Bay itself, then Char Lake, although offset to the East of the runway by ~1NM (lined up towards the VOR and the actual crash site), looks almost the same as crossing the south shore, then Resolute Lake towards RWY 35T. 


Regards
G2G


----------



## YZT580 (3 Jan 2014)

If the NOTAM wasn't in effect then the tower was not manned legally.  Thus no clearance issued by YRB is valid.  Arctic Radio is not licensed to issue clearances.  They relay clearances from the appropriate centre that are issued via landline.  The overhead sector is in UL.  With a valid class E he was defacto responsible for the control zone and his clearance should have been cleared to the airport for an approach. maintain (moca) or above until passing the VOR.  Report this frequency when cancelling IFR.  CV within 10 DME.  Why do I suspect that neither UL nor YB knew anything about it?


----------



## Good2Golf (3 Jan 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> If the NOTAM wasn't in effect then the tower was not manned legally.  Thus no clearance issued by YRB is valid.  Arctic Radio is not licensed to issue clearances.  They relay clearances from the appropriate centre that are issued via landline.  The overhead sector is in UL.  With a valid class E he was defacto responsible for the control zone and his clearance should have been cleared to the airport for an approach. maintain (moca) or above until passing the VOR.  Report this frequency when cancelling IFR.  CV within 10 DME.  Why do I suspect that neither UL nor YB knew anything about it?



Well, when Transport Canada's Director, Accident Investigation Branch ( Letter, 08 February 2012: Director AIB, to Comd 1 CAD, re: IFR Separation in Class D Airspace ) in his letter of admonishment to the RCAF can't even get the Airspace Regulations right, you know something is messed up.  In paragraph 2 of Mr. Clitsome's letter to (then) MGen Parent, he states that "Within Class D airspace aircraft *must be equipped with radios capable of communicating with the air traffic control agency*, and must *receive permission* to enter the airspace."  The first highlighted part is factually incorrect, a NORDO plane can pre-arrange entry, and the second highlighted portion is only the case for IFR aircraft, not VFR, and we don't even know for sure that Borek 99 was IFR planned.

As we know from YZT's post earlier:


			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> The plot thickens!  Here is the reference for Class D to E  from RAC  2.8.4 Class D Airspace
> 
> Class D airspace is a controlled airspace within which both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must *establish* two-way communication with the appropriate ATC agency prior to entering the airspace. ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft.  Airspace classified as Class D becomes Class E airspace when the appropriate ATC unit is not in operation...



VFR need only establish contact with ATC, not ask for any kind of permission to operate in the Class D control zone.

YZT, I suspect, as do you, that Concordia likely had no contact with Borek 99 for it to conduct its LOC(BC) 17T approach.  If Borek 99 had previously been VFR and tried to get an IFR clearance from Arctic Radio, I'm not sure how much success they would have had.  Not directly myself, but I have heard that low-level comms with agencies other than the "big-3" (Iqaluit, Inuvik and Rankin Inlet) is sporadic at best, and not necessarily conducive to facilitating airspace management in the North.

Perhaps in the future, there will be an expansion of controlled airspace and/or ATC (vice CARS/RDO/'FSS') comms in the North commensurate with the increase in activity foreseen in the years to come.

Regards
G2G


----------



## Zoomie (3 Jan 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I have heard that low-level comms with agencies other than the "big-3" (Iqaluit, Inuvik and Rankin Inlet) is sporadic at best, and not necessarily conducive to facilitating airspace management in the North.


Personal experience - Arctic Radio is best contacted through high flying "over-the-pole" airliners.  HF reception at low level, that far north is next to impossible.  I've crossed through the ADIZ on a DVFR and never been able to make the requisite calls to North Bay.

I've also flown VFR from Eureka to Cambridge Bay, discovered IFR conditions, coordinated with Cambridge Radio and shot the approach (to the missed approach).  Low-level IFR in the NDA is a completely different beast,  as we have all experienced - RADAR coverage is nil, radio coverage sporadic, you are truly on your own with a fine fuel HOWGOZIT curve.


----------



## dapaterson (25 Mar 2014)

TSB report has been released.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/A11H0002/A11H0002.asp


----------



## YZT580 (26 Mar 2014)

Canadian Rules:   2.8.4 Class D Airspace

Class D airspace is a controlled airspace within which both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must establish two-way communication with the appropriate ATC agency prior to entering the airspace. ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft.

Airspace classified as Class D becomes Class E airspace when the appropriate ATC unit is not in operation. 

With the TMA not operational the airspace should have reverted to Class E.  Now there is a jurisdictional problem. Are the tower controllers qualified part 3 IFR controllers?  If they are not, as long as the control zone is open Edmonton would have been responsible for providing IFR separation to the two flights: only possible within the control zone and Edmonton was never mentioned in the safety bulletin it went straight to the military.  I would suggest that there are a whole lot of re-writes to do in the regs before any attempt is made to establish another remote TCA/Tower.  This is not an easy fix.


----------



## kev994 (26 Mar 2014)

Resolute Bay is in the Arctic Control Area, Edmonton Center does not talk to anyone below F270, and even then they would only clear someone to descend out of controlled airspace. If it's class E then deconfliction is on your own.


----------



## YZT580 (26 Mar 2014)

2.8.5 Class E Airspace

Class E airspace is designated where an operational need exists for controlled airspace but does not meet the requirements for Class A, B, C, or D.

Operations may be conducted under IFR or VFR. ATC separation is provided only to aircraft operating under IFR. There are no special requirements for VFR.

Unless I am reading this wrong, someone had to supply IFR separation in the Class E.  I am well aware that Edmonton ends at 270.  No mans land underneath until you get to the class E.  Now who is going to take control?  Tower type isn't qualified, ergo Edmonton.  But they don't adjoin.  That is why my last comment.  This is a mess.  NavCanada, Transport and the DND are going to have to re-write the rules and it isn't going to be easy.


----------



## kev994 (26 Mar 2014)

Ack, I'm mixing up E and G. Disregard.


----------

