# Deep thoughts about "Transformation"



## a_majoor (7 Jan 2005)

http://www.buzzmachine.com/archives/2005_01_06.html#008818




> *Gememeshaft*
> : Susan Crawford is at some egghead event about complexity and she's blogging it. That's guts.
> 
> In today's report, there's a fascinating bit from Mary Ann Allison of the Allison group saying that societies were once described by gemeinschaft (think community) and the, after the industrial revolution, as gesellschaft (think society). We're at a next stage:
> ...



Transformation will be very difficult so long as we are wedded to the current army "culture". Using new tools or discovering new uses for old tools requires a breaking of old patterns of thought, and creating new organizations to employ new tools and techniques. Early experiments of transformation like "Force XXI" superimposed high efficiency digital communications on existing command structures, and the command staffs ended up being drowned in torrents of data. The Technology Review article "How Technology Failed in Iraq" suggests the same thing; the organizational structure is not equipped to handle data collection, processing and transfer in a timely and efficient manner.

Information technology and social changes among the eligible recruit cohorts suggest a different Army and armed forces: Troops who have belonged to self selected "groups of purpose" bound by shared interests and beliefs and connected through the internet by Bulletin boards, "chat rooms and Instant Messaging, and sharing large information files through peer to peer networking programs like KAZZA, Bit torrent or  Morpheus. How will people acculturated to such an environment behave in a hierarchical organization? Will we be able to use their talents to the fullest extent?


----------



## jrhume (7 Jan 2005)

". . . drowned in torrents of data."  Excellent image of the situation.

The problem may not be in the structural design of military formations as in the handling of the data itself.  In my careers (air traffic control, auto & truck mechanic, municipal technology & equipment buyer) I've been part of the so-called information revolution in several different ways.

Inevitably, programming wonks manage to capture and process vast amounts of data for transmission to workers or decision makers, but those writing the programs and developing the equipment have little or no experience in the practical applications using the data.

No matter what type of data is being captured and used, the systems have to be able to direct information streams to the correct users and data has to be given priorities depending on volume and current need.  The eventual ability of air traffic control systems, automated engine controls and corporate information systems to process and properly distribute data depends on feedback and development.  

We are in the first few generations of truly usable military information and action systems.  The onboard computers used for gun platforms like the M1 tank only reached practical usability just prior to the First Gulf War.  UAVs really able to generate large quantities of information have only been with us a few years.  It's too much to expect that any military organization has been able to consolidate and optimize the vast amounts of data now available.  Not even the US Army has that much money.

All technical progress is incremental, although the stress of current events will certainly hurry the effort to make efficient use of information.  Coupled with this is the need to re-emphasize traditional activities, such as the development of human intelligence networks at the mud hut level.

The US Army and other services are being asked, nay, told to succeed in Iraq while remodeling itself for a new type of conflict.  The up side is that money is available where it wouldn't be otherwise.  The down side is that soldiers and Marines will die because of current system failures.

But that's nothing new and it will be the situation when armored formations deploy on the plains of Tau Ceti Three.  Soldiers pay in blood where others are asked for no more than cash.

Jim


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Jan 2005)

In a related vein, I noted some time ago, when their favourite game was the Legend of Zelda that in addition to being able to move their fingers faster than I, and also keep track of some pretty weird and complicated keystroke patterns that they also seemed to process data differently.  It was almost as if their mental imaging was different.

I have grown up with maps and books.  Two dimensional objects where data is presented consecutively.  One point after the other and the next building on the last.

My kids seem to have developed a different mental map, almost as if they can function in n-space.  Legend of Zelda is like playing 3-D chess on a blacked out board where you can only see the next space once you get there.  The space that you jump to isn't necessarily contiguous to space you occupied and following the same route doesn't guarantee ending up in the same space.  Amazingly confusing to me with my book-image brain and slow fingers but no problem at all to my (at that time) 7 and 10 year olds.

They process data differently, seem to be less dependent on progressive logic and more at ease with fuzzy logic - one might say they appear more intuitive than logical in their thought processes.  And they are not tied to physicality.  Playing internet games (SOF etc) means that they are learning to co-operate on pseudo battlefields with people they have never met and never will, and are quite comfortable with that.

That comes back to a_majoor's question about the impact of social changes on the recruits and what does that impose on the military organization.  How many of the traditional skills need to be retained, and many will,  and how many new skills can we take advantage of?  Will we need to spend more time selecting and training bodies from a diminishing pool of traditionally skilled warrior-capable types?  Can we replace them all with techno-geeks?

As I have stipulated elsewhere, I don't see a diminished need for infanteers with traditional skills.  I do think that support will improve using either diminishing number of bodies or else as Old Guy stated their work will expand to occupy the bodies available.  The good news is that the traditionally capable recruits, although diminishing in numbers available are more at ease in working in a techno-geek saturated environment.  The hard part will be finding the recruits capable of performing traditional tasks.


----------



## a_majoor (7 Jan 2005)

At some levels, the traditional tasks never change. The heroic warriors of Homer killed their enemies in the same way the "300" killed their Persian enemies some 800 years later. Like Kirkhill noted, it is the "mental space" which changed. A Mycenaean heroic warrior would not be able to understand how the Classical Phalanx was able to go into battle, given the vastly different cultural assumptions about how society was organized, why men should fight, how the fighters were to be armed organized and supported....

What I am trying to get at (an even grasp myself) is that since the _new soldiers_ are seemingly from a different culture than the traditional Army, then they will have different ways of doing things. Current ideas like sequential Operational Planning Procedure (OPP), five paragraph orders format, radio "nets", segregated messes and hosts of other ideas and assumptions (some so deeply embedded we may never even notice them) might be unfathomable to them, given their ability to navigate in "fuzzy logic", non contiguous space and virtual reality.

Once that fact is fully grasped, and probably only when soldiers of that generation are firmly in leadership positions, will we see substantial changes in organizations. Will there still be riflemen? Yes. Will the riflemen be organized in sections, platoons, companies etc? Who knows?

Transformation is probably easiest to practice at the support level, requiring fewer stages or steps to do the various processes required to support soldiers in the field. Headquarters and support bases could (in theory) be stripped out, and the manpower and funds released to the field army. Service battalions would be next in line, although the limiting factor is the physical size and bulk of the supplies (you still need to move and process "stuff" rather than information. You would just have better information tools to move "stuff" more efficiently, like Wal Mart). The final stage of transformation would be to restructure command and control systems and military organizations to become much faster and more flexible. This does not mean getting rid of tanks, rather how tanks are used in battle becomes different.


----------



## jrhume (7 Jan 2005)

So when these kids used to 'fuzzy logic' become soldiers will they and their machines be virtually unstoppable by armies dominated by less adaptable thinkers?

No puns or jokes intended.  I'm wondering about the widening disparity between the best armies and everyone else.

Jim


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Jan 2005)

Conversely, can we make soldiers out of them at all?

Chris.


----------



## jrhume (7 Jan 2005)

Hah!  Good point.  Let's hope so.


----------



## 48Highlander (7 Jan 2005)

Old Guy said:
			
		

> So when these kids used to 'fuzzy logic' become soldiers will they and their machines be virtually unstoppable by armies dominated by less adaptable thinkers?
> 
> No puns or jokes intended.  I'm wondering about the widening disparity between the best armies and everyone else.
> 
> Jim



    You're already seing that in places like Iraq.  Currently western soldiers are leaps and bounds ahead of the competition as far as flexibility, adaptability, and creative thinking are concerned.  The trend for the last hundred years at least has been forming smaller and smaller units, each able to act independantly while at the same time being aware of the locations and actions of other units, and able to coordinate and integrate their efforts as required.  At the start of WW1, carrying out any actions at a smaller than company-sized level was very unusual.  If the trend continues and the technology improves enough, in a few decades you'll be seing tactics relying on hundreds of 2-man teams all operating independantly but in concert with eachother.  A force with the ability to coordinate such an attack would be just as far ahead of today's military tacitcs and capabilities as the US military was compared to the Iraqis.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (7 Jan 2005)

Interesting thread, if a bit too much like my old school days!

I think that we will need a heirarchical system as long as war requires people having to risk their lives.  We tend to forget this in peacetime, but the purpose of tactical leadership is not simply to formulate plans but to get people to do extradorinary things (I'm thinking about all levels of tactical leadership).  A chat room society of young soldiers may be able to do quite well on a simulation, but when you can't just reboot after you've been hit it may turn out a bit different!

That being said I'm all for having small units that are tactically self-sufficient and imbibed with an independent spirit.  The German Army achieved something like this during their last offensive in WWI. These small groups of soldiers were not the product of the internet but rather of high quality soldiers lead by very high quality junior leaders who were operating under senior officers who trusted them. 

The whole intent of our SAS and ATHENE seems to be the remove the requirement of trusting subordinates to do their jobs in conditions of uncertainty.  Perhaps instead of madly charging down the blind alley of information technology we should instead focus on creating these conditions of trust and initiative.  This will allow us to succeed in the fog of war, instead of seeking some philosopher's stone that will take away the fog (hmm, may have mixed some metaphors there).  

Our own army seems to be subscribing to a model that is based on perfect situational awareness and never "advancing to contact."  Our love of the deliberate battle and fixation on the reduction of risk and uncertainty is somewhat similar to the French Army's philosophy on the eve of WW II.  

Sorry for the rant..I'll get back in my hatch.   

Iain


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Jan 2005)

<Crunchie furiously beating on hatch with rifle butt because field telephone has been ripped from hands by accelerating black hat....again>

Stay out a minute.

I will try and stick to geometric metaphors: 

If the ideal network is a 2 dimensional planar structure covering a large area but with no hierarchy and 
if the ideal hierarchical pyramid is an obelisk with many levels each dependent on each other, a lot of depth, a lot of control but influencing a very tight area 
(I suppose ultimately you are talking a linear structure with much duplication and only able to exert influenc on a point) and
if we assume these two configurations as the logical absurdities at the extreme ends of the organizational spectrum and 
if we assume that neither logical absurdity is likely to happen

then the likely organization will be somewhere in between
It will be a pyramidical organization of some sort or other, a hierarchy will always exist, but the base may be more diffuse, non-contiguous and have fewer layers between shooters and decision-maker.

Thus instead of having a solid Egyptian style pyramid, a structure easy to identify and easy to destroy by either removing a key-stone or else by brute force, we have a more amorphous structure that exerts influence over a wider area and is harder to attack.

I once had a boss (actually his previous predicament was as a Hauptmann in the Erste Fallschirmjager - Crete, Cassino, Russia, Skorzeny and the Ardennes where captured).  He insisted that all his staff be cross-trained on everyone else's duties.  Wonder where he came up with that concept Infanteer?

I felt that while this was a great goal it wasn't practicable.  That the end result of all this flexibility would be the end of hierarchy and thus the end of control.  I argued that all good organizations needed a structure to progress, to limit, contain and discipline actions, to force direction.  That any organization needed a hierarchy in the same way that a body needs a skeleton.  Without a skeleton we were doomed to be amoeba, drifting aimlessly.

Now I am inclined to think differently. 

Especially after watching my kids and their friends think fuzzily, after participating in this forum and watching the development of the internet and e-banking and e-education, after achieving success for my employer when he flattened his pyramid leaving us peons with more freedom of movement, after watching the long term survival of the IRA, after watching the success of Al Qaeda and the difficulty experienced in closing down a self-regenerating, survivable amorphous mass which knows only one thing - the definition of success.


Hierarchies will always exist.  The size and shape, and solidity, of the pyramid will vary.  What will also vary is the demand on leadership styles - coercive or collaborative.


----------



## Bert (7 Jan 2005)

a_majoor>
"Information technology and social changes among the eligible recruit cohorts suggest a different Army and armed forces: Troops who have belonged to self selected "groups of purpose" bound by shared interests and beliefs and connected through the internet by Bulletin boards, "chat rooms and Instant Messaging, and sharing large information files through peer to peer networking programs like KAZZA, Bit torrent or   Morpheus. How will people acculturated to such an environment behave in a hierarchical organization? Will we be able to use their talents to the fullest extent?"

I've sat for the last 20 minutes thinking about this concept but I have to agree with Old Guy.   The word Transformation 
suggests that something which has always been is changin into something else.   My perception is more the
evolution of technology but people remain the same.

As an example, the discovery of the wheel was to help solve an ancient problem of engineering.   Millenias later,
the invention of the car and the dang carburator.   How many times from 1910 to 1980 has one gone outside
and wondered what the chances are of starting a car in cold weather?   Flash forward today with computer 
controlled cars with fuel injection, significantly fewer people wonder whether their car will start at -40 C.
If the car or transportation medium breaks down, no matter of what millenia people will do the same thing
in response.   Consider the military units of 6,000 years ago, the times of Greece and Rome, Chinese, 
Eurpopean, Ottoman armies up until today and technology has evolved.   Yet, the basic make-up of the 
individual and society in general is not significantly different.   We form communities, communicate, engineer, 
procreate, and move on.

It appears less a transformation of society or the military, but a more simpler evolutionary adaption to the tool set.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (7 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill,

But if I open the hatch the snow will get in.  Oh well, I do have hot coffee.  Or at least I did when I had a tank. :'(

Getting back on track I agree with you, but would suggest that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.  In addition, there still needs to be a coherent plan (or perhaps just a "vision" that comes from somebody that everybody understands and is working for.  I am somewhat hesitant to use business models for military purposes as "middle managment" has a slightly different purpose in the miltary (as I am sure that you know).  Each level of leadership is there not only to plan to but to lead.  Even highly motivated and trained troops need leadership and motivation to risk their lives (once casualties start).

Up until the last century there was actually quite little scope for tactical decision making by lower levels of command.  They were still needed, however, to keep discipline and lead the troops in battle.  Methods may have changes but I still believe in that requirement.  In addition, a somewhat redundant "pyramid" is quite hard to knock over by simply taking out one HQ.  

Does anybody think that we can run a Battlegroup with one HQ and nine Platoons or eighteen Sections?  It might work on Janus but I'd hate to try it in battle (I know that that is not what you are suggesting). 

Getting back to Art's question of how we get the newer generation to come on board, I do realize that this crop has means of access to information that did not really exist ten years ago.  These boards, the DIN and other systems allow soldiers to go outside their chain of command for info.  This is not a bad thing, but it is something that leaders should be aware of.  

My own thought is to train them, give them the required tools, give them a mission and a task and then get out of the way.  Accept that not everything will be done the way that you would have done it.  Correct the aggregious errors if they come up but focus on giving "task and purpose" for activities and not "how."

As an aside, our newer soldier's "spatial relationship abilities" should be better due to their extensive videogaming experience.

p.s. My boys (ages five and six) are starting to play my old Nintendo.  They haven't beaten me yet but the day will come very soon!


Bert,

I was also wondering about the Revolution in Miltary Affairs aspect to this thread.  In my belief the last two majors ones were the introduction of the machinegun and aircraft.  The machinegun had the largest impact on land operations.  Alexander the Great's army would have probably done quite well at Waterloo but they would have lasted 2 minutes at the Somme.  I would argue that RMAs do have an impact on soldiers as they make qualities and techniques that used to successful either become irrelevant or even harmful.

Steadiness in ranks, deep columns, unflinching bravery and finishing the charge were recipes for success from Marathon to Waterloo and could get you through the American Civil War.  By 1914 they were recipes for a massacre.

I'm not sure that we are in an RMA in the order of magnitude of the machinegun.  Patton or Manstein would have done quite well in Iraq in 2003.

I believe you are correct in that man adapts to his new technologies.  I would say, however, that the level of adaption is evolutionary for most technology changes but is quite dramatic for revolutions.  The casualty figures for WW I indicate the price of not adapting to revolutionary change in revolutionary ways.

Being a bit of a skeptic, I would say that we are still waiting for the next real RMA (since the machinegun and aircraft).  I do not know what the next RMA will be, but it may have something to do with either personalized stealth technology or somekind of light bodyarmour that can withstand machineguns.  Until then I believe that we will just adapt with each new piece of kit (as you suggest) but retain the organizations and tactics that arose out of WW I and came to fruition during WW II.

Cheers,

Iain


----------



## Kirkhill (8 Jan 2005)

> Getting back on track I agree with you, but would suggest that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.  In addition, there still needs to be a coherent plan (or perhaps just a "vision" that comes from somebody that everybody understands and is working for.  I am somewhat hesitant to use business models for military purposes as "middle managment" has a slightly different purpose in the miltary (as I am sure that you know).  Each level of leadership is there not only to plan to but to lead.  Even highly motivated and trained troops need leadership and motivation to risk their lives (once casualties start).



I agree with you but think we can expand on this thought of yours.



> that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.



 A force of 19 year old conscripts with 6 months of training requires a different model of "leadership" than does a force of 30 year old volunteers with 10 years or training and experience.  Even a 19 year old volunteer needs different handling.

Because everybody has to start someplace, and because the military can't afford too many idle hands, then that keen young 19 year old needs to be gainfully employed as soon as possible. That means teaching him simple skills and keeping him under tight control with lots of support from more experienced bodies to set the example.  The 19 year old goes into a period of OJT where he is contributing while learning.  The model that served at Waterloo serves the 19 year old fairly well in some respects - if we can find the recruits willing to accept functioning in that environment.  Let's stipulate that we can.

As the 19 year old ages and matures and gains experience he changes.  The organization is constantly reappraising him and he is constantly reappraising the organization.

Traditionally the organization keeps its eyes open for leaders and extracts them from the ranks and promotes them.  But as everybody here knows that is a game where not everybody wins.  There aren't enough leadership slots to employ everybody and in any event not everybody is cut out for leadership or desires to lead. But many of those non-leaders are excellent soldiers, self-disciplined, motivated and highly skilled and capable of independent action.  More to the point, by the time any adult has reached the age of 30 they are starting to chafe at being subject to whims of youngsters with less time in than they have.

So that we can make best use of the dollars invested in these soldiers it makes sense to me that we should try to organize them in such a fashion that they can stay in the Army and contribute, using their skills and at the same time supplying different capabilities to HMG than the 19 year old operating under tight supervision.

That is why I am a fan of, for want of a better phrase, stepped elitism.  As an infantry example, rifle company, rifle to support, support to recce, recce to para, para to JTF2.  "Elites" give something for the youngsters to aspire to, serve as role models, supply homes for experienced soldiers that are happier or more capable as operators than leaders,  and also bring capabilities that the youngsters don't.  In particular they are capable of independent action.  They can also be a place where leaders can mature prior to returning to bolster the 19 year olds.

So an effective army, in my view, benefits from having different units, with different experience and capability levels and that require different leadership models.  More coercive with the 19 year old and collaborative with the 30 year old.

Now if we assume that there will continue to be occasions where we wish to mass forces against a well defined target then the 19 year old will serve well.  On the other hand if the enemy is diffuse and distributed in small pockets then the 30 year old will likely be a better choice.

My belief is that while the entry level 19 year old task is not likely to be much affected by the change in technology (we may value his speed on the joystick at some point) it is the 30 year old that will benefit most from the technology.  With his self-discipline and experience and capability and desire for independent action then he can and should be entrusted with greater opportunities to influence the battle.  Nowadays that capability is exemplified by two men with a LRF and radio calling down precision guided munitions from 50,000 feet.

In the type of volunteer army that the CF seems to have become (at least when seen from this seat outside the organization), where a small number of people, with wives, families and mortgages and a considerable number of medals for Rotos served, it seems to me that there is likely to be a considerable proportion of the force that is capable of independent action.

From this I think that any future army structure could take advantage of this by increasing the proportion of bodies capable of operating in small units independently and reducing the proportion of Waterloo era structured units.  Not eliminating, not even making them the minority, just reducing.

As stated elsewhere, in the Global War on Terror, I believe that a good portion of the fighting is going to be done against small pockets of enemy forces, widely distributed, loosely connected and often ignorant of their command structure.  They only way to tackle this type of structure is node by node and keep trying to take the nodes apart faster than the enemy can build new ones.  That means large numbers of units with small numbers of members but capable of visiting lethal force rapidly on the enemy.  That, in my book, argues for a larger force of 30 year olds.

The 19 year olds will get their feet wet on operations in one of two ways, either in stability ops or else in high intensity ops.  While they need to be trained and equipped for the high intensity end the odds lie in favour of them first being employed on stability ops.  As stability ops require significant numbers of bodies on the ground just to supply a presence - "they also serve who only stand and wait" - this means that we are still going to have a need for  a large pool of Waterloo era structured forces.  That pool will serve HMG well as well as supplying a recruiting pool and training ground for independent minded 30 year olds with mortgages.

The 19 year olds still have to be led and directed.

As to my comments about my kids thinking fuzzily, maybe its not just my kids, I am still trying to determine in my own mind what the difference in mental acuity is between myself and my ancestors of the last 1.5 million years that have ridden out a number of Ice Ages with fire, sticks, stones and furs. I don't think the mental capacity has changed that much but the skill sets that that capacity has been focused on has definitely changed over the years.


----------



## pbi (8 Jan 2005)

Great thinking here. I'm biased, but most of it points to the overwhelming importance of Infantry and its derivatives such as "Rangers" or "SF" type units in the type of modern warfare that is actually being fought now and will probably constitute the most common type of warfare in the near future. The Infantry community is by far the most easily adaptable to such conditions. All of which leads me to believe that maybe we shouldn't worry so much that our heavier capabilities such as Arty and Armour may be degrading. I just finished reading an interesting critique of the US Army's current paradigm of structure and operations, which in the opinion of the authors is heavily focused on getting "decisive" results by "kinetic" means. They suggest that while devastating Fallujah block by block with M1s and other heavy weapons systems appears to be "decisive", in fact it may be the wrong way to attack this kind of enemy. They even suggest that this type of op, with its inevitable collateral damage and arbitrary impacts on the population, can weaken the US cause. They seem to be urging that the US focus much less on "heavy" ops (while retaining the capacity if it becomes necessary), and more on flexible, "thinking" small units. Interesting. Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer (8 Jan 2005)

A few random thoughts from reading through the thread....



			
				2Bravo said:
			
		

> I was also wondering about the Revolution in Military Affairs aspect to this thread.   In my belief the last two majors ones were the introduction of the machinegun and aircraft.   The machinegun had the largest impact on land operations.   Alexander the Great's army would have probably done quite well at Waterloo but they would have lasted 2 minutes at the Somme.   I would argue that RMAs do have an impact on soldiers as they make qualities and techniques that used to successful either become irrelevant or even harmful.
> 
> Steadiness in ranks, deep columns, unflinching bravery and finishing the charge were recipes for success from Marathon to Waterloo and could get you through the American Civil War.   By 1914 they were recipes for a massacre.
> 
> I'm not sure that we are in an RMA in the order of magnitude of the machinegun.   Patton or Manstein would have done quite well in Iraq in 2003.



Although I tend not to get excited and short of breath when "RMA" is mentioned, you've brought up some compelling points.   It seems to me that the RMA's that you brought up, along with other RMA's that come to mind, seem to be intimately linked to the principle of diffusion.   Now, I will contend that that their are two forms of diffusion that interact with the way people fight.

1. Spatial diffusion - This is quite literally the physical space that human beings fight in.   Since the way technology is wedged onto the battlefield has differing effects on the physical, mental, and moral levels of conflict, soldiers must adapt to the effects of these technologies in a manner which enables one to survive and win (essentially, Darwinism on the Battlefield).

2.   Directive Diffusion - This is the diffusion involved in Command and Control relationships.   Warfare is an inherently organized form of human (or primate!) activity - thus any act of warfare involves conditions that are intrinsic parts of human behaviour - hierarchy, competing and cooperative interests, leader/follower, etc, etc.

These two forms of diffusion are usually symbiotic and when you have dramatic alteration in one or the other, you usually have a rapid shift in the way we organize and fight.   For example, 2Bravo has pointed to the Machinegun and the Airplane as RMA's - essentially transformation in the way we fight.   How are these transformations?   They are both clear examples of an alteration to the spatial diffusion of the battlefield.   

The machinegun rendered close order tactics (which were essential for effective musketry) obsolete.   The introduction of the rifle to the common soldier put the writing on the wall during the American Civil War; when this was essentially mechanized (The Grip of Hiram Maxim), the paradigmatic shift was complete and Transformation in spatial diffusion took place in the trenches of WWI. 

Same with the Aircraft - it initiated a paradigm shift by turning the battlefield from a two-dimensional area to a three-dimensional one.   The battlefield move _over_ us as well as _around_ us.

However, other RMA's may not affect transformation in the area of spatial diffusion, but rather in that of directive diffusion.   Take for example Napoleon and the _leve en masse_ of the French Revolution - which many regard as one of the first "RMAs" (contendable, I guess).   Was the transformational effect spatial in nature?   Not really, when you consider the same tactical approaches were used.   Clearly, the _leve en masse_ presented society with such a new way to approach fighting that transformation took place - the result, directive diffusion.   You simply had so many soldiers that you could diffuse their combat power over a large area and bring it back together in a manner which gave you an advantage.   The military genius of Napoleon was able to grasp and execute it through sheer personal willpower - the other genius, Scharnhorst, was able to observe it (as his Prussian Army was being severely whipped by it) and institutionalize it in the form of the General Staff system.   Is it no coincidence that Napoleon's two tactical defeats at Leipzig and Waterloo were at the hands of coalition Armies that were extensively served by members of Scharnhorst's gang of military reformers?

Ok, before I start babbling about dead Germans, this is going somewhere (hold you breath)....

I think that the transformation that we may be seeing today is one not so much influenced by spatial diffusion but rather by directive diffusion.   Like the _leve en masse_, you are seeing a shift in the way that society organizes itself to fight.   Gone are the days of the citizen soldier, the conscript, and draft.   The level of professionalization by Information Age military forces demands a smarter and more capable individual (Want proof, look at the USMC - they only accept high-school graduates now).   Your average recruit will be literate, will easily adapt to any information age technology, will be quite healthy and capable of quickly adapting and learning new things.   Look at the leaders that the new transformation will produce - look to soldiers in the Special Operations world or coming out of Staff Schools - they are fluent in more then one language, they are inculcated with iniative and a wide array of skill sets, they have access to a tremendous resource and knowledge base.

All these will act as "force multipliers" in a sense.   Technology that leads to spatial diffusion contributes to "force multipliers" by sheer destructive power (Mostly at the Physical and Mental levels of conflict).   Bigger, faster, and more boom means that the average unit is X times more destructive (again, physically and mentally) then its predecessor.   The effects of a directive diffusion are "force multipliers" in a different sense; they will act on the Mental level of war and move into the Moral level.   Quite simply, the abilities of a soldier affected by this transformation will be X times greater then G.I Joe sitting in a trench at Bastogne.   Look at a Special Forces team and what it is capable of accomplishing as compared to a similar group of soldiers 50 years ago; this is the individual or group of soldiers that may not see pounding Fallujah to dust with M-1's as the best way to approach the battle.   There is your directive diffusion - it is, I guess, the heart of the transformation that we're surfing through right now.   The shape of the pyramid discussed will begin to shift as we begin to realize the potential of soldier at the low-to-middle portion of the structure.

Anyways, enough on that for a while....



			
				2Bravo said:
			
		

> Being a bit of a skeptic, I would say that we are still waiting for the next real RMA (since the machinegun and aircraft). I do not know what the next RMA will be, but it may have something to do with either personalized stealth technology or somekind of light bodyarmour that can withstand machineguns. Until then I believe that we will just adapt with each new piece of kit (as you suggest) but retain the organizations and tactics that arose out of WW I and came to fruition during WW II.



Power armour of course.   I can only see an increasing confluence of protection, firepower, mobility, and information technology merging to the point where the individual soldier will wield the capabilities of a modern-day combat team.   We're seeing it right now - look at some of the FCS stuff; multi-capable vehicles with fewer operators.   

Perhaps Heinlein's ideas weren't that far-out after all.... 



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> That is why I am a fan of, for want of a better phrase, stepped elitism. As an infantry example, rifle company, rifle to support, support to recce, recce to para, para to JTF2. "Elites" give something for the youngsters to aspire to, serve as role models, supply homes for experienced soldiers that are happier or more capable as operators than leaders, and also bring capabilities that the youngsters don't. In particular they are capable of independent action. They can also be a place where leaders can mature prior to returning to bolster the 19 year olds.



LOL, you better grab that William Slim book off you shelf, Mr Kirkhill - he'd be rolling in his grave if he heard that.... 

(As an aside - stepped elitism makes me ponder on the enduring aspects of the way people fight.   For some reason I am thinking about the Warrior Societies of the Aztecs, with its Eagle and Jaguar clans, etc, etc, that are for those who have proven themselves as the most capable warriors in their society (in the Aztec case, prisoners for sacrifice).)


----------



## a_majoor (8 Jan 2005)

Part of this idea is driven by Victor Davis Hanson's thesis that there is a "Western way of war" that integrates the various aspects of our culture. Historical examples have to be carefully examined, since some factors can completely overwhelm the argument (Spanish soldiers so overmatched their Aztec opponents on a man for man basis that they could actually dispense with some of their steel armour).

Some of the factors like market capitalism are not "military" in the usual sense, but undirected free market capitalism provides the forum to test new products and ideas, and promotes the rapid evolution of better and better designs. The Ottoman Turks had more galleys and cannon at the battle of Lepanto than the combined Christian fleets, but ship for ship and gun for gun, the Christian fleet was much better. In fact, the Sultan did not even develop his own fleet, his ships and guns were inferior copies of the ships the Doge of Venice had in his arsenal. Other factors like initiative, citizen soldiers, civic audit and so on either do not exist or are severly constrained in other cultural settings.

We are at a cusp where we can see and manipulate the tools that will drive the next steps in military evolution, but are still constrained by the mindsets of the past. At Lepanto, the Christian commanders could see guns were the next "big thing" in Naval warfare, so sawed the rams off their galleys and developed even bigger "galleasses" to carry as many cannon as possible. Meanwhile, the future of sea warfare was really being developed in England and the Netherlands with sail powered "ships of the line".... Our own "new" systems like SAS and Athena are very heirarchical in nature, and support a philosophical model which most of us find somewhat improbable. Our next generation of soldiers might rework the system into a "tactical Napster" or something we can't even imagine yet.


----------



## Kirkhill (8 Jan 2005)

> LOL, you better grab that William Slim book off you shelf, Mr Kirkhill - he'd be rolling in his grave if he heard that....


y
Possibly Infanteer...

On the other hand Bill Slim had the opposite problem to our Army.  He had massive quantities of 19 year olds with 6-months training and various degrees of motivation under his command and precious few experienced soldiers.  He needed every leader and trainer he could get his hands on.  Also he had a significantly higher turn-over rate than we do.  Finally, as strapped as we are for funds and technology Bill had to make do with dodgy radios and burlap parachutes ( increasing the turn over rate).

I think that his prescription for the Wartime army is considerably different than his prescription for maintaining skills in a "Peacetime" army involved in constabulary duties on half-pay.  If I remember rightly he was a half-pay officer at one time himself.

Cheers


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (8 Jan 2005)

Looking at the "Western Way of War", I think that the West's greatest strength has been in not having a "Way."  Western armies have tended to be adaptive to both new technologies and approaches.  Western armies have also tended to me more individualistic and thus able to "muddle through" when things went bad.  This gap may be narrowing, however, as other cultures move towards to Western individualism.

I sometimes worry that I am like the old Cavalry establishment who looked at barbed wire and machineguns as not being of much military value.  Could a "swarm" of tiny units operating outside of a hierarchical structure defeat a conventional force (all else being equal)?  Possibly, although I think that the true test has to be done with real bullets (unfortunately).  I believe that the West's (well, the US and UK) victories in the desert were due more to the armour, sensors and GPS on the M1 combined with well trained and led soldiers than any high speed information technology.  I could, however, be very well out to lunch and only seeing what I want to see.  On the first day of my Surveillance Operator course I wondered if I was seeing the beginning of a new RMA.  I do not think that we are there, but are we at another Port Arthur where the lessons are there if only to be seen? ???

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Kirkhill (8 Jan 2005)

2 interesting analogies 2Bravo, Port Arthur and the Desert.  Need to think of Port Arthur a bit more.

As to the Desert perhaps the answer to your question on small swarms vs large concentrations lies in the N. African desert in between 1940 and 1942.  O'Connor, Wavell, Auchinleck, Montgomery and Rommel.  Those were campaigns that saw everything from Montgomery's set piece WW1 type offensives at El Alamein, to O'Connor's thrusts across Cyrenaica by Light Cavalry (often wheeled) brigades to the use of the LRDG, the SAS and Popski's Private Army operating independently in small groups in coordinated support of the overall objective.  Sledge hammer, sabre and scalpel.  Which one chased Rommel out?


----------



## Infanteer (8 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Sledge hammer, sabre and scalpel.   Which one chased Rommel out?



Malta?


----------



## a_majoor (8 Jan 2005)

One of the problems in talking about this subject is it is very difficult to find or generate examples, or to carry the ideas through to their "logical" conclusions, since they are running far ahead of our experience. By the time we have retrained ourselves to play "Warriors of Zelda", several generations of games and probably a new game console are already on the market.

For better or worse, here are a few ideas to give a bit more flavor to the idea:

1: Promotions generated from below. Who knows a leader or supervisor better than the people who work for him? We have all experienced leaders who are perfect model soldiers when their superiors are around, but total *******s when they have you alone. Other types are the ones who might excel in staff or field settings, but are hopeless otherwise. By getting input from the subordinates, the leadership will have a better idea who really can do the job.

2. DIY Logistics. When I first did IT purchases for 31 CBG; I canvassed the units to find what they needed, then started calling vendors. The G-4 staff stopped me before I went to jail, but when I redid the process through "the system", I paid far more than I had origionally been quoted, had far less selection (NMSO Vendors only seemed to carry Compaq or HP) and the entire process stretched out for several months. Under some circumstances, decentralized buying or sourcing by the RQ could be faster and cheaper. Imagine a clever RQ strapped for spare parts getting on line and "FedEx"ing a piece of kit to a line house in theater.

3."Groups of purpose" meets on line games. Imagine soldiers who may be deployed on OPs, but who are in constant IM contact with their fellow soldiers all over the world. Fellow soldiers are always available to offer suggestions, critiques and help. If there is sufficient bandwidth, they might even be watching events via web-cam. Records can be recalled for critique (if just screwed up), forensic analysis (if gone horribly wrong), or used to support awards and promotions as well. 

These ideas are quite primitive and probably flawed, but are in line with the sort of experience and mindsets the "Generation Y" soldiers will have grown up with. To their minds, why should they work with a dick****; wait forever for the "system" to supply them or not be able to talk to their friends and peers whenever they want or need to?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (9 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill,

Basically Port Arthur was a foreshadow of WW I in 1904/05 that occured during the Russo-Japanese war.  The Japanese were attacking a defended port (Russia's only all-year anchorage on the Pacific).  Extensive use was made of trenches, fortifications, artillery, modern rifles, hand-grenades and machine guns.    The Japanese won the battle and the war (combined with a crushing naval victory at Tushima) but only at great cost in lives.   The Japanese lost 60,000 men in frontal attacks while the Russians lost 30,000.  At least one Japanese attack lost 10,000 men in fifteen hours.  The matter was finally decided when the Japanese were able to bring 11 inch siege howizters into range (using medival style "saps").  In some ways it resembled Verdun, although at least there was a strategic outcome.  The Russians were basically cut-off and worn down in a battle of attrition.  Had the Russians been able to feed more men into the battle the toll would have been much higer.

I have read that some correspondents and military observers reported the effects of barded wire, machineguns and artillery to the Western armies but the reports were not taken very seriously.  The futility of frontal infantry attacks in the time-honoured way was there to be seen but not fully grasped.  

My own thoughts here are that MGs, barbed wire and accurate artillery had "first-order" effects on the battlefield.   I perceive that IT has a second or even third order effect.  

Looking at the Western Desert in 40-42 we see a little bit of everything.  The Germans had the combined arms thing down pat while the British seemed to be a step behind.  Cavalrymen turned into tankers tended to rush forward and cooperation between the arms seems to have been lacking.  Flexibility and combined arms groupings seem to have been the key factors, although logistics may have had the final say (as Infanteer aludes to).  How does this apply to our current situation?  I would say that the methods that achieved success in 1942 would work quite well today.  Missiles have replaced the 88 (with less effect) but otherwise it looks like the same type of fight (except with GPS  ).

A Majoor,

Promotions from below can make promotion a popularity contest.  I think that subordinates do have an impact on the promotion prospects of their superiors, but I'd hate to see it in a direct way.

Having networked soldiers sharing detailed info and imagery regarding ongoing operations would not be possible in my opinion due to the operatioal security implications.  

DIY logistics looks attractive until you realize that the only way to get delivery to the war-zone is through your own logistics channel.

Networked soldiers or groups of soldiers may be feasible, but I'd rather see small units that can work independently of a network.  I guess that I hope that future generations will be able to accept the frustrations that crop up in army service.

Cheers and good thread,

2B


----------



## tomahawk6 (9 Jan 2005)

Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ? I don't think so. Leaders have to lead and manage without regard to the feelings of their subordinates. Everything we do is mission oriented. The leaders that consistently   complete the mission/task
on time and successfully get ahead. Those that don't perform well dont get ahead. A leader is like a coach. You train your unit to a high standard. When assigned the mission/task you brief your subordinates on the game plan and they go out an execute. If you have done your job as a leader your team accomplishes the mission as tasked. In the old days of the US Army a leader when assigned to a command
would ask for certain subordinates by name- men he had worked with before to fill key staff positions. If you were one of those fortunate
souls as your mentor rose through the ranks you did too. This practice was ended in the post Vietnam era to afford more officers opportunities at key jobs.

Transformation in the US Army has been a continuous process for years. Technology was used to replace manpower. For example, in 1994 a brigade combat team had 67 M1's, 149 M2/M3, 72 infantry squads, 20 120mm mortars and 24 155mm howitzers. In 2004 that same mech brigade looked like this: 56 M1's,76 M2/3, 36 Infantry squads, 16 120mm mortars and 16 155mm howitzers. Prior to the invasion of Iraq the 3ID had to be dramatically reinforced with mech infantry. The new organization goes in the opposite direction from where we need to go. Iraq is very infantry intensive. There are not enough so we have artillerymen, tankers, engineers and air defense arty soldiers performing infantry missions. Any new organization should have alot of infantry. We need larger infantry squads- 10 man squads at least. We need another rifle company in every battalion be it a heavy or light formation. We need to find technologies that will enable us to the mission better to give us an edge on our enemies. But technology shouldnt replace the man - just allow him to do his task better.


----------



## Kirkhill (9 Jan 2005)

> Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ?



Wasn't that one of the problems with many of the Militia units that served the US so poorly in the early stages of the War of 1812?  Likewise I seem to remember reading of similar problems with Civil War units as well as Napoleonic era Volunteer Regiments in Britain and even as late as World War 2.  Both British Yeomanry and US National Guards had problems with too much familiarity.

The problem always seems to boil down to there having to be a degree of detachment between those issuing the orders and those carrying them out.  It seems to be difficult to order a friend to put his life at risk.  In that regard the class system has demonstrated some advantages over the years.  That obviously is not a sustainable system in the West currently so we have to find a suitable work-around.

As to a_majoors point about FedExing supplies to the front, I can't speak to the Americans but I do remember reading in various British publications that enterprising British Soldiers confronted with kit shortages, including NATO stock items like radio parts, were sourcing them on-line and having them delivered through the Army Post Office as personal mail.  It seemed to move faster than going through the system.  This caught the attention of the British committee that reviews the Services and got MPs asking why MOD couldn't do what a switched on Corporal could.

Like 2Bravo, I can't see indiscriminate comms being allowed regardless of how much spare bandwidth is available, on security grounds alone. But a_majoor's thought does raise another interesting thought if our stock of recruits is trained to work in a consensual consultative environment in which nobody is to blame where are we to find leaders willing to make decisions and accept responsibility?  If the intake's attitudes are truly learned attitudes, what will it take to unteach the old attitudes and instill new attitudes?

tomahawk6's comments about more infanteers seems to be coming a more and more common refrain.  Six, when 3ID and 101 Air Aslt came back from Iraq at roughly the same time and it was announced that they were both going to be transformed to the 5 UA structure.  Schoomaker had already said that he wanted a more infantry-centric organization.  I wondered at the time if the US commanders weren't going to look at mixing the two divisions ( I believe that together they had 10 - 11 Battalions worth of rifles, 9 in the 101 and 1-2 in the 3ID) and creating two divs with 5 Rifle Battalions each which would form the core's of the UAs along with the one of the 10 Armd/Cav/Bradley Units in the 3ID.  Do you know if there was any consideration along those lines?

Cheers.


----------



## pbi (9 Jan 2005)

> Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ? I don't think so. Leaders have to lead and manage without regard to the feelings of their subordinates. Everything we do is mission oriented. The leaders that consistently  complete the mission/task
> on time and successfully get ahead. Those that don't perform well dont get ahead



tomahawk: this sounds great and it certainly is what the book says (in all armies...) but it's not really what happens. Not (I suggest) in your army, and most definitely not in ours. You must consider the soldier. Leaders who treat their subordinates like sh*t will never get the full performance out of them. I seem to recall that a few of your soldiers in Vietnam had a way of resolving that sort of problem in summary fashion. I am not suggesting that we need to be "buddy-buddy" and all hold hands--quite the contrary--but I believe that you treat men like men until you have a reason to treat them otherwise. Our soldiers (and yours) are intelligent, generally well educated by world standards and quite independent-minded. They are no longer Wellington's "scum of the earth".

As for the promotion of the undeserving, I echo my earlier assessment: we certainly experience it, and I am reasonably sure that your system, being composed of human beings, does too. 

I must say, however, that apart from that I tend to side with 2B and Kirkhill with regards to AMajoor's ideas. Remember-the enemy has a vote, and at some point a dirty, tired NCO will lead equally dirty and tired (and scared) soldiers to kill some very nasty, determined enemy who will sell their lives dearly. No amount of on-line shopping, net buddies or promotion by popularity will change or even materially improve their chances. Discipline, training, cohesion and raw human courage will be required, just as they were at Thermopylae, Waterloo, Port Arthur or in Fallujah. Cheers.


----------



## tomahawk6 (9 Jan 2005)

> I wondered at the time if the US commanders weren't going to look at mixing the two divisions ( I believe that together they had 10 - 11 Battalions worth of rifles, 9 in the 101 and 1-2 in the 3ID) and creating two divs with 5 Rifle Battalions each which would form the core's of the UAs along with the one of the 10 Armd/Cav/Bradley Units in the 3ID.  Do you know if there was any consideration along those lines?



Not to my knowledge. But I do think a brigade of the 101st should be a heavy UA. This would add another dimension to the capability of the division.


----------



## MdB (9 Jan 2005)

I'm not a CF member yet, but I think, since I've a BA and have some basic understanding of sociology and psychology, that I just throw my opinion in it.

I think that RMA is mostly tech, but that it'll influence, by the type of infos coming to soldiers and leaders, the approach of the battlefield. BUT, the battlefield will remain what it has been since beginning of wars, weapons and humans fighting. The bayonnet will always exist or will stop when we'll decide to throw all these I-don't-know-many-THOUSANDS of nuclears bombs/warheads/missiles, and it'll all stop. I don't believe it'll happen, but who knows. RMA won't stop it, just change the way of it like it's been said.

My approach is a sociological one, since I just finished reading _Understanding Militay Culture_(McGill-Queen's University Press - http://www.mqup.mcgill.ca/book.php?bookid=1693 ), which is a book on both Canadian and American militay culture, their similarities and differences. It discussing how a society's culture can affect the military culture of his armed forces. Since all recruits and cadets come from the society, it's not too hard to think one's society influences the military culture. The other way around is also true, because an armed forces is an institution, represent the government, and plays a political and economic role, even though it shouldn't. But that's the reality of it.

Now, what I see, from this reading, is that the way of thinking and the culture of younger generations will alterate sooner or later the military culture in a deeper and a long last way than RMA could. The promotion will be different, the leaders will lead in other ways, they'll all learn different ways (to learn too?), they'll interact in different ways. Let's just think about the developping of individuality today, how it poses solutions and problems to a combat unit, to command and control, to leadership. I think that the true transformation is to learn to adapt and transform as the situations, period, era evolves. That's the real challenge in my opinion.

The thing is to be flexible and to try to adapt to any form of threat. The only thing is that we do have money and time constraints. And money is, like always, the bottom line of it, it's political. How can we train, justify, and maintain large groups of military personnel when the threat(s) isn't/aren't clear and direct? Maintaining broad capabalities and skills when objectives (i.e. assessing threats and solutions) aren't clear is very difficult. That comes down to the society and how it asesses his armed forces, which is through his culture. In Western societies, people are less involved socially, because they are more individualistic. They put more time and focus on themselves, and tend to depolitize themselves from their social roles (voting, educating, helping, establishing one or more larger group other than the family or job). So is it for very important issues (other than what's repeated endlessly on TV) and leadership among the governement (the quality of our reps). So it is in approaching the military service. Instead of being a responsability, it becomes an obligation, or a burden, because individual rights is above all else, but for security. But again, how can the Governement, society, scholars appraise the threat when it's hidden and just be aware of it?

Another point: I see a lot of comments here that say the way future recruits perceive the CF jobs: as occupations, like any other job (instead you have a gun, which kicks the adrenaline, and not just a keyboard), and not as vocations, which means you have a responsability and a duty, that you offer, in the worse or better case, your life for the rest of your society. We can't blame them, but confirming it in CF policies is another thing. On the other side, I think the Government/DND wants it like that because it easier to manage that way (easier to go along than defend an opinion). It just won't put their pants on and say the CF reflects Canadian values, but it IS the military and ISN'T just another job. It's not a job when you come thinking that the end effect is trying to help, but finishes sometimes in killing someone. Death isn't a product.

I may sound hard on some points, but I just want to point out that military profession is different than other institutions. I just want to put the discussion here above the facts and numbers, above just the technology used, because, like we said, it changes the way soldiers make war, but not the nature of war.

I would like to discuss more deeply on the western culture effects on changes to come in our military cultures. My comment is incomplete but I'll fill it along the discussion.


----------



## Kirkhill (9 Jan 2005)

Interesting comments MdB.



> and plays a political and economic role, even though it shouldn't



This is a relatively minor quibble so I'll get it out of the way first.  "Even though it shouldn't".  Everything that exists in society is part of the economy, a consumer and supplier, and because it is made up of people it is part of the polity.  Its members will have individual opinions and the institution will have opinions.  The military like any other entity, is aware of itself as an entity and wishes to be represented in the decision making process.  A society has to recognize that desire and figure out how to meet that desire, as it meets the desire of doctors, aboriginals and Scots-Presbyterians to participate in the process, while at the same time not allowing any particular entity to dominate.

However that is a quibble that is off this thread and doesn't affect your argument.

Your notion that the institution will transform as society transforms the institutions stock of recruits caused me to rethink a question that I asked, Can we transform modern kids into soldiers?  Maybe the answer is your answer, maybe we can't. Maybe we have to wait for some of the modern generation, who thinks in the same terms as the recruit pool, who perceives a need to apply force and who perceives new ways to apply the tools at hand, the new recruit pool and the skills that they have, to generating that force.

Their is an ancient science fiction book that I read back in the 70's by Gordon Dickson.  It was called Dorsai and it formed the basis of a Universe that was explored in a number of subsequent novels.  Dorsai was originally published as The Genetic General.

The central assumption of the book was that "Birds of a feather flock together".  That at some point in the future all the intellectuals would take themselves off to one planet, religious fundamentalists another, business people another, soldiers another etc and would breed amongst themselves, each to perfect their own vision of the ideal human.  They discovered however that as societies they each had need of each others services and qualities and so traded with each other for those services thus maintaining an economy.  However people being people some inter-breeding occured.  The intellectuals discovered that these mongrels may have qualities that inbreeding couldn't achieve.  So they set out to find or create the ideal mongrel. When they find one they at first don't recognize him,  he was nothing like what they were looking for and had skills that they failed to predict and couldn't comprehend once presented with the evidence of them.

I don't propose that our children are developing magical skills but I do wonder if the way that they look at life, the skills that they are developing, using exactly the same grey matter that we have but nurtured in a different environment, makes it impossible for us to figure out how best to employ them to defend themselves and to defend our society.

Thinking back to the North African Desert in 1942, the SAS, which is now ONE model for how to exert force in SOME situations, it has become part of establishment thinking, that force didn't come out of the General Staff calling for such a Force to be raised.  It came from a Subby who was convinced he had a better way to put the bits and pieces available together and use them to good effect.  He convinced the Staff to give it a try basically because it was relatively cheap to organize and didn't detract greatly from their conventional force requirements.


----------



## a_majoor (9 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Your notion that the institution will transform as society transforms the institutions stock of recruits caused me to rethink a question that I asked, Can we transform modern kids into soldiers? Maybe the answer is your answer, maybe we can't. *Maybe we have to wait for some of the modern generation, who thinks in the same terms as the recruit pool, who perceives a need to apply force and who perceives new ways to apply the tools at hand, the new recruit pool and the skills that they have, to generating that force.*



This is exactly the sort of argument I am trying to make. We have difficulty visualizing what the future will be like because it is discontinuous. If history was linear, we would be fighting wars the way H.G. Wells predicted near the end of WW I, with 10,000 tonne tanks slowly grinding their way forward and exchanging salvos of 18" gunfire over the devastated landscape...



> These ideas are quite primitive and probably flawed, *but are in line with the sort of experience and mindsets the "Generation Y" soldiers will have grown up with.* To their minds, why should they work with a dick****; wait forever for the "system" to supply them or not be able to talk to their friends and peers whenever they want or need to?



Given the attitudes that these soldiers have been conditioned to believe by the wider culture for the first 18 years of their lives, it is hard to imagine anything less than a "Full Metal Jacket" type total restructuring of the recruits mind and body will create a fundamentally different mind set. As Kirkhill alluded to, we might actually want some of those mind sets and attitudes (the good ones); but since there is no surgical procedure in place to excise the rest, a new sort of institutional organization and culture will have to evolve. I certainly knew the ideas I tossed out were only marginally workable (if at all), but were deliberately provocative in order to point out the areas I believe are more important to the future than "should we have x brigades in the field force?, or must we co-locate LAVs and TUAs in the same battalions?".

While we see these questions as being very important, some future historian might be comparing our actions to sawing the rams off a galley in order to get a greater field of fire for the two bronze cannons, while being totally oblivious to the rapid development of sailing ships....


----------



## jrhume (10 Jan 2005)

Just a quick thought:

Western armies have one structural component that other armies have lacked, usually due to distrust of a professional military or for idealogical reasons.  That is a professional NCO group.

The Soviets never allowed such a group -- instead they used junior officers to do many of the things a good sergeant does in Western forces.  They took the better recruits in any given set of conscripts and sent them for extra training to make them into sergeants.  This gave units below company-level some sort of NCO, but without the experience such people have in the West.

Jim


----------



## pbi (10 Jan 2005)

And the difference is huge and usually quite noticeable. A strong, capable NCO corps, that has high standards and sees itself as a class apart, with a reputation to uphold, is definitely a vital key to success. From what I have seen of the world's armies, it exists in its strongest form in the English-speaking Commonwealth countries and in the US. In some places (including some European countries) it is quite weak. Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill (10 Jan 2005)

Interesting,  the NCOs as the middle class.  The key to making an Army work in a middle class society.  The middle class as the key to a democratic society.  The middle class as the basis for both the Army and Society to outperform two-tiered societies and armies.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (10 Jan 2005)

I agree completely that our NCO corps gives us our advantage over other armies who are not similarily blessed.

MdB,

I believe that you are correct to emphasize that service with the CF should be seen as a calling as opposed to a job.  People who enlist because they want to serve their country as a soldier will tend to accept the odd inconvenience of military life.  Army culture does change over time due to the makeup of its soldiers but army culture also has an influence on its soldiers.  I, personnaly, am a bit skeptical of attempts to make the CF an "employer of choice." 

Looking at our culture I would say that our indvidiualism is a strength militarily but that it must be managed and shaped by the existing military culture.  Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress.  It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier.  This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in.  If our entry level training is done right it will retain the positive aspects of individualism (initiative, creative thinking) but also impart the necessary discipline onto the recruits.

Going back to RMAs, I would argue that military culture and techniques have indeed changed with the RMAs.  From the perspective of looking at the battlefield from a wide angle view the methods of Western military forces changed little from the classical times up until the days before WW I (and unfortunately for a couple of years after in some respects).  Blocks of infantry manouevring in ranks along with varying ratios of cavalry was the staple.  Cannons were introduced and had an impact (especially if a cannonball hit you) but from a tactical perspective one battle pretty much resembled the next.  The military culture was geared towards producing soldiers and units that could succeed.  Close order drill, strict discipline and snappy uniforms were crucial for success.  The infantry may have acquired muskets along the way but in practical terms they were pretty much the same as the pikemen of classical times (hence the bayonet).

I would argue that these elements actually worked against armies in the age of the machinegun, barbed wire and modern artillery.  WW I and WW II saw armies come to grips with the new battlefield (called by some "The Empty Battlefield."  Our dress uniforms, penchant for drill and bayonets  >are are, in my opinion, hold-overs from those times.  We have adapted in the field but still retain these organizational elements.

There is the one universal that people must be led in order to successfully wage war.  Risking one's life and taking the life of another are not things that mose sane people would like to do.  In classical times this was achieved through fighting in ranks and the fact that the individual soldiers had "bought-in" to the society they were fighting for.  Later wars still had the close ranks (and supervision) but with varying degrees of of "buy-in."  The empty battlefield of today is more tricky and places more reliance on junior leaders and the ability (and willingess) of the individual soldier to carry out his task (the works of Marshall and Grossman are good reading on this).  Western armies have the advantage of possessing a professional NCO corps who can make this happen.  Something that the next generation of Western armies may have to content with is facing formerly Third World forces that have a "middle class."

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Infanteer (10 Jan 2005)

Since the NCO Corps was the "backbone" of the Industrial Age armies, does anyone see Transformation having any profound affect on the way NCO's do their job, the way they are prepared, the general composition of the Corps, etc, etc?


----------



## jrhume (10 Jan 2005)

I'm sure there will be differences in the way NCOs are trained and prepared for their duties.  However, I would argue that the basic functions of a good NCO do not change much over time.  Small unit leadership, technical skills, communications -- all those are simply extensions of the soldier's art.  The real task of NCOs is to maintain the traditions, the esprit de corps of their military units.

I suspect that a Roman Centurion, who is not a direct comparison to a modern NCO, I know, but close enough considering the practical skill set involved, would instantly recognize his modern counterpart.  Senior NCOs are the physical embodiment of military tradition most respected by young soldiers.  Officers come and go, but your sergeant major is likely to be around for a long time.

Of course, it doesn't hurt that they sit at the right hand of God himself.    Just ask one.

Jim


----------



## Infanteer (10 Jan 2005)

Old Guy said:
			
		

> I suspect that a Roman Centurion, who is not a direct comparison to a modern NCO, I know, but close enough considering the practical skill set involved, would instantly recognize his modern counterpart.



I think you're right on that mark; that is probably one of the enduring factors in war and history....


----------



## ArmyRick (10 Jan 2005)

NCO look after training, disciplining and developing their soldiers...
They ensure proper execute of the mission...
They train new officers... 
They look after the welfare of their soldiers...

Yes in a post transformation Army, NCOs will still be the back bone of the army..

Also refer to the 10 principles of leadership and you will see as long as their soldiers, their will be NCOs...

I also like the comparison of the ABCA (and new zealand) armies having a very professional NCO structure..


----------



## pbi (11 Jan 2005)

> Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress.  It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier.  This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in.



Very well said 2B. If I could see you right now, I would buy you a beer. No, wait...I would buy you a case. You have zeroed in on, in one concise paragraph, an underlying malaise that we have identified and discussed at length on other threads. I would rather have a smaller force of well trained, proud individuals who really want to be there and to "do the business" than a semi-motivated crew of paycheque collectors who regard military discipline, culture and the demands of operational readiness as impositions on their lifestyles. If you recruit for a "job" you get "workers". If you recruit for a career/callling/service, you get "soldiers". The USMC has understood this for years. Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor (11 Jan 2005)

Interesting development. The role of the NCO and even the idea of a "middle class" are uniquely Western concepts, and do go a long way to explaining the dominence of Westrern militaries through the millenia (The Ancient Greeks started the fine Western tradition of conquering their neighbours and overmatching the armies of their enemies).

Thinking farther into the transformation, the NCO "class" (for want of a better word) are the holders of the technical knowledge. This might be best exploited through the use of short command and information "loops" (sensor to shooter, consumables to end user etc.) while the officer "class" is plugged into longer "loops" for the wide angle view of things, mid to long range planning and so on. Obviously, there will need to be interfaces, but the Org diagram might more resemble the Olympic rings rather than a pyramid.

Tipping my hat to Infanteer, the biggest change is in the issues of span of command rather than dominating the physical space of the battlefield. US Marines in Fallujiah were connected to the entire world, with commanders able to get advice from HQs in the US, hospitals in Germany prepared to recieve their wounded and the GD Land Systems plant here in London probably prepared to supply LAV 25 parts if required. The Jihadis network is not anywhere nearly as broad or deep.

Once again, these are fairly primitive ideas, and I am adjusting the "interceptor" plates to recieve your responses.


----------



## Pikache (11 Jan 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Looking at our culture I would say that our indvidiualism is a strength militarily but that it must be managed and shaped by the existing military culture. Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress. It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier. This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in. If our entry level training is done right it will retain the positive aspects of individualism (initiative, creative thinking) but also impart the necessary discipline onto the recruits.



Agreed. 
Reason why I think BMQ is the most important course in a soldier's career. It's a shame that most junior PLQ qualified NCOs tend to get stuck teaching on BMQ, in my observation. By no means I'm slamming the junior leaders, I'm just saying experience counts a lot when dealing with troops and one slip up dealing with a troop can have the biggest impact on that troop's career.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (11 Jan 2005)

PBI,

I'd gladly drink the beer and return the favour (although going through a case might take a few days if you are where I think you are)  !  I did an exchange with the USMC and was very impressed with their ethos.  I mightily respect their "crucible" approach to basic training.

Royal Highland Fusilier,


Good point.  We always have to cut corners somewhere but I agree that BMQ is probably not the best place to do it.

AMajoor,

I agree that span of control will probably widen and we will get even more dispersed.  I also think, however, that we will continue to need relatively large armies to undertake the missions of today and the near future.  This will mean that there will still be a hierarchy, although it will probably be quite broad as you suggest.  I read an article sometime ago about "swarms" and while a bit scientific for me it did raise some interesting ideas.  You may well be on to something but I remain a skeptic.

That being said, do those higher level "loops" to the factory in North America and the hospital in Germany really help in fighting the bad guy across the street?  These things certainly help at the strategic and operational level but perhaps not so much at street level.  I would feel better having a good tactical link to a QRF that can get me out of trouble, a robust field hospital and a squared away RQMS than the ability to talk to somebody outside of the theatre that can give me advice or send something that will take days to reach me.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## a_majoor (11 Jan 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> AMajoor,
> 
> I agree that span of control will probably widen and we will get even more dispersed. I also think, however, that we will continue to need relatively large armies to undertake the missions of today and the near future. This will mean that there will still be a hierarchy, although it will probably be quite broad as you suggest. I read an article sometime ago about "swarms" and while a bit scientific for me it did raise some interesting ideas. You may well be on to something but I remain a skeptic.
> 
> That being said, do those higher level "loops" to the factory in North America and the hospital in Germany really help in fighting the bad guy across the street? These things certainly help at the strategic and operational level but perhaps not so much at street level. I would feel better having a good tactical link to a QRF that can get me out of trouble, a robust field hospital and a squared away RQMS than the ability to talk to somebody outside of the theatre that can give me advice or send something that will take days to reach me.



Still feeling my way around this idea, but if the "outside loop" is any good, the operators in that side will have anticipated a need and prepositioned something nearby. This is not in a "magical" sense, but rather the outside loop saying "if these units are patrolling here, here and here; then we need a reaction force there which can support them if they run into a problem. The "inside loop" takes over when it is triggered by a specific need, i.e. send reaction force to GR 123456 right now...

Characterizing the operators in these loops as "officers" and "NCOs" is not really correct, but a way to get the flavor of the idea.


----------



## Kirkhill (11 Jan 2005)

Currently taking a course just now talking about personalities and leadership styles.   It struck me that while I have usually conflated "leadership" with "The Man on the White Horse" addressing the Millions, 2Bravo's empty battlefield   has actually prompted a change towards small group dynamics and small group leadership.   4 man dets, 2 dets commanders per Section Commander, 3-4 SC/PL, 3-4 PL/OC, 3-5 OC/CO..........   Span of control is defined how exactly?

Also, further to a_majoor's comments about the technical skills of the NCO middle class, that actually could be the key to understanding the Western middle class.   This group of servants, merchants, accountants, engineers, masons, developed expertise and sold that expertise to the benefit of the ruling classes and thus secured their position.   The society and the army can't run without them.

Contrarily, does decision making require technical expertise or is the ability to understand, analyze and decide a separate skill set?

Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor (12 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Contrarily, does decision making require technical expertise or is the ability to understand, analyze and decide a separate skill set?



It is difficult to make a decision without some sort of grounding. "Inside loop" operators are dealing with the here and now, so need to be closer to the technical expertise model, while "Outside loop" operators use their analytical skills to frame the actions of the inside loops and anticipate future needs. These analytical skills may be developed through higher education (although in my experience, University educated officers and soldiers can be just as limited as the rest of us), as well as being developed through experience, such as the CFR model.


----------



## Kirkhill (12 Jan 2005)

In my experience education is no indicator or either ability to think logically nor to decide in a timely fashion.  I plead guilty in particular to the last.

No, I think what I was getting at is that somethings require detailed technical knowledge "How" to do things and thus people with this knowledge are best placed to present "What" is possible.  Given that there are so many things to know these days (and this may have always been true) it is unlikely that any one person will have full and adequate knowledge of all practicable options available to overcome any particular obstacle.  

What I am suggesting is that there are essentially three components in an organization.  Those that "Do, those that know "How" and those that can decide "What".  Sometimes all capabilities are present in one person.  Some people are capable of some, all or none, depending on circumstances.  Not all ORs are just Doers - many have specialized technical knowledge.  Not all those that have specialized knowledge are NCOs, Engineer and Arty officers amongst many others in the modern force come to mind and not all of those that can decide "What" are in the Officer Corps.  Conversely some Officers likely have difficulty deciding "What" to do.

However, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I would argue, that traditionally ORs have been assumed to be the Doers, the Officers were the Deciders and the NCOs were the ones with the Knowledge of "How".

Officers generally were upper class types with wide ranging educations that covered a lot of ground but, especially since the enlightenment, focused on the ability to think - and decide - rationally. Other ranks were not required to have any education.  The Army would teach them what they had to know.  They teaching, directing and technical knowledge was the province of the NCOs. Jumped up NCOs filled the ranks of such "ungentlemanly" positions as Quartermaster in Wellington's army.   

As Armies became more technologically dependent on cannons, explosives and fortifications then schools were created for gunners and engineers. In Britain at least, I won't speak to the continent, but it is my sense that these schools were largely populated by "Middle Class" offspring that brought with them a high degree of education and could apply the industrial revolution to the battlefield.  Engineer and Arty officers were not in the same social league as the Cavalry, Guards and Infantry officers.  At the same time their men were a cut above the ordinary line soldiery because they needed to be able to do sums and write.  Thus in the Technical Corps there would be a tendency for there to be less social distinction between the ranks - officers and men were both essentially recruited from the same educated middle class pool, selection would be based on merit, to the extent that the better educated were inducted as officers but advancement was base on merit.  Knowledge. Both technical knowledge and knowledge of how to direct people and events and get things done.

This broadening middle class would tend to find commonality with the NCO corps of the Cavalry and Infantry.

As more technical capabilities were grafted onto Units, especially guns (leather guns, galloper guns, gatling guns, maxim guns, stokes mortars, anti-tank guns, snipers), then the proportion of "middle class" knowledge workers increases in the unit.  Concurrently there occurred a class levelling with NCOs and Tradesmen and Craftsmen being respected for what they know and what they can accomplish.

The hallmark of the best of the Officer Corps however is still an ability to win battles by receiving and understanding information, understanding its importance, analyzing the situation and making a decision in a timely fashion (did someone say OODA).  Like any other situation the key to success is an ability to listen to advice, select the best, and act based on that advice.  Success is based on being surrounded by good advisors.  Traditionally that was the purview of the NCOs at the Unit level but it also includes CRE and CRA at the formation level - commissioned officers supplying technical advice to the force commander.

Typing that out loud - OK - typing that out loud makes me think that therein lies the real problem with the Cavalry.  They have derived from a force that operated independently on battlefield. Their officer corps is used to being "Deciders" and leading the Army.  Since WWI there have been fewer, at least in British service and definitely in Canadian service, Cavalry officers in supreme command positions.  The British and Canadian armies are essentially infantry armies with Cavalry being a supplementary force, increasingly technically oriented.  Increasingly the senior cavalry commander has become the senior advisor on the manoeuvre and possibly the recce battles.

Interestingly I think it might be fair to say that the American Army, with its Airland concept and its emphasis on maneouvre and shock, rather than holding and dominating ground,  is adhering to a Cavalry ethos.  Cavalry officers still tend to hold many of the senior positions and even when Cavalry officers don't then Mech Infantry officers, or even Air Asslt Infantry officers, (7 out of 10 reg divisions) are imbued with the same spirit.

Does that have implications for a difference in "cultures" between Canadian, American and British forces? How do they compare to Continental forces?


----------



## a_majoor (12 Jan 2005)

As usual, the deep historical roots of the institution are directing the future growth. The US military's true roots are in various "small wars", both during the colonial period and the "Indian Wars" throughout the 19th century. We "see" the big wars because they are more visible and encompass more of a societiy's resources, but even so, most of the commanders were trained in the previous "small wars". Even "Black Jack" Pershing first gained his spurs in the "Punitive" expidition in Mexico against Pancho Villa, and Douglas McArthur was already famous for fighting against Phillipino guerillas. Patton, another "old style" Cavalry commander, managed to combine the best features of industreal age weapons and logistics with the "Cavalry" ethos; unhinging German positions through speed and movement rather than frontal collisions.

The "American Way of War" using economic power to provide lots of material and sophisticated logistics support go get it into action only works as well as it does because of the "Cavalry" ethos where the rubber meets the road. If the US Army was an Infantry Army, the history would read more like that of the Red Army, hurling masses of men and material headlong against the enemy....

This is an interesting aside for our question. Our "deep roots" seem to be Artillery (at least since WW I), and our military culture is prevaded by the need for detailed and carefully laid plans. This does not seem to be a culture attuned to fluid environments and "three block wars".


----------



## Kirkhill (12 Jan 2005)

> Our "deep roots" seem to be Artillery (at least since WW I),



Weren't the first two Canadian reg force units formed after Confederation A and B Batteries at Kingston and Quebec?  Are those your Arty roots?

Also I agree with you about the Americans and their history of small wars.  Mounted forces covering large territories at home.  Marine forces deployed internationally by sea.

As to the Brits.  A long period of static garrisons (centuries all over the world including Britain) where the Cavalry was a patrolling force and Infantry dominated urban control, with interspersed wars where Cavalry came into its own as a shock force.  Gunners also were primarily War Branch, while Engineers,  their parent organization, were more generally useful in establishing secure bases and lines of communication to enhance "stability ops".

Those are roots, and we are all prisoners (to an extent) of tradition and what worked in the past.  But is transformation just about transforming from a Canadian Artillery Army to a British Infantry Army or an American Cavalry Army?


----------



## a_majoor (12 Jan 2005)

Knowing the roots of the institution is a guide more than anything else. If we are not careful, we will take the tools of the 21rst century and use them according to slow, careful and methodical formulas (the key to victory in WW I), while our allies and enemies run rings around us.

Meanwhile, I am hijacking a thread from News and Current Affairs: The war in Iraq and unofficial internet sites. http://army.ca/forums/threads/25213.0.html

The two part article speaks to some of the ideas posted earlier, mostly about transformation being driven by junior leaders with different attitudes and skill sets.


----------



## Kirkhill (13 Jan 2005)

Great post by Michael O'Leary and thanks for the link Art.

As you suggest roots can be limiting. They might tend to bind and prevent progress.  However knowledge of what an organizations roots are might be a guide to both what has succeeded in the past and MAY be useful in the future as well as what specifically are the institutional impediments to change and thus should be considered carefully as to whether change in those areas might be worth the risk in order to achieve different/better results.

At the same time, especially given the scope for change these days due to technology and the competence of individuals in the general population, both inside the army and potential recruits,  some flexibility,  some room for experimentation at very junior levels has to be built into the structure.  Without losing either cohesiveness nor the ability to concentrate forces and operate in mass.

Is one answer, as Infanteer, 2Bravo and a_majoor, amongst others, have suggested to download systems to the lowest level at which they are likely to be used,  allowing lower level commanders to train and operate with them during periods of low stress, either when out of action or in low intensity conflicts?  At the same time regular training with other low-level units as amalgamated formations?

Eg, using the notorious plug'n'play model - The single capbadge Regiment, fielding multiple task force units, composed of companies, platoons, squadrons, troops and combat teams that will be operating with a great degree of autonomy in-theatre most of the time - having the Regiment form from all-arms MOCs organized primarily of those sub-units and sub-sub-units that are likely to be used as independent teams on the ground and then figure out how to conduct individual and task-force training in garrison under the auspices of a single Regiment.  

And I would argue in favour of multiple Regiments, each allowed SOME autonomy in operations and doctrine formation as a little, well-managed competition is a good thing.


Cheers.


----------



## jrhume (13 Jan 2005)

I have some thoughts on realism in training

Training scenarios and simulations need to approximate the real thing insofar as possible.  That's a given.  The US Army's use of simulators for tank training and the considerable time and effort expended in combined arms training at Fort Irwin are but two examples of efforts in that direction.

Iraq and Afghanistan offer new situations for which the Army will have to develop realistic training regimes.  I'm sure, based on what I've been reading, that many 'lessons learned' are already a part of unit training.

What might be less obvious, in my opinion, is that even the wrong kind of training has value -- if it is done in a genuinely realistic manner.  Let me explain.  US Army tank training has concentrated on the moving battle, combined arms, open country scenario, a derivation of the Western Europe armored combat model that was prevalent for so long.  This training turned out to be marginally useful for the forces in Iraq -- of more use in the initial invasion than since.  However, since the tankers involved had been trained in stressful situations, akin to actual combat, they were better able to adapt to the changed situation.

Thus, it is less important, I think, to get every simulated situation as close to observed reality as possible, than to make whatever training a unit receives as realistic as you can.  

When my unit was getting ready to deploy to Vietnam we participated in a mock ambush drill.  We put together a convoy and proceeded along a Georgia road somewhere on Fort Benning.  An opposing force ambushed us.  We had no blank ammo for our M-16s -- only for the M-60s.  The aggressors were using M-14s, for which there was a plentiful supply of blank ammo.  There were not enough umpires (this is pre-miles gear) to manage the action and the whole thing was a joke.

We received no other training.

In Vietnam, I was never involved in an ambush.  Mortar attacks by the dozen but no ambush.  However, I knew any number of people who were part of a convoy that got hit.  Like Iraq, the whole country was a combat zone.  Whether hit with a mortar attack, ambush or perimeter assault, non-combat soldiers in Vietnam received their training on the job.  Initial reactions in sudden combat situations can mean the difference between life and death.  Yet, we had no training to help us get past that initial shock and confusion that grabs you when those first rounds come in.

I believe a good introductory course, 'Survival in a Guerilla War' or something like that could have been developed and would have saved numerous lives during Vietnam.  Some units -- mostly combat outfits -- did run newbies through such courses.  Too bad we all didn't have the opportunity.

The same situation reoccurred in Iraq, although much has been done to remedy the lack of convoy training, mostly by people on the scene.  There's on big difference between the two wars.  In Vietnam innovation was frowned upon.  We still had a very top-down orientation.  Though that view still persists, it co-exists with a willingness on the part of higher command to let the people on the ground do their thing.

So I guess my thinking comes down to observed reality.  Well trained soldiers given the freedom to adapt can not only survive rapidly changing situations but find new ways to defeat the enemy.  

That's enough for now.  I want to discuss information flows -- but later.

Jim


----------



## a_majoor (13 Jan 2005)

Realistic training should have a much expanded "box" to operate in, presenting commanders with a thinking enemy, and giveing them freedom of action to deal with the unexpected.

I once did micro-armour wargaming, and learned the Soviet way of war. Examining the doctrine closely, I realized the Soviets were not as rigid and formulatic as we had been taught, and there was some flexibility built into their doctrine. At about the same time, some other regimental members heard about our gaming and asked to join. As the Soviet commander, I had the Regimental Leading March Parties out and the regiment in the normal formation to start, but once I had "bumped" and located the "Canadian" battlegroup, I spent a moment to decide what to do, based on my mission objectives. Rather than bring up progressively larger formations and do a series of sequential attacks (the accepted formula), I halted the advance guard, brought up the rest of the formation and proceeded to launch a regimental attack, with the independant tank battalion trailing to do the exploitation.

The "Canadians", expecting the formulaic attacks, were overwhelmed by the sheer weight of the assault, and were unable to prevent a breach in the lines, followed by a battalion of T-72's racing into the rear area.

In "real" wargames I have observed, this sort of thing never happens, the Red force/Gen force always attacks according to the template, and the Blue force wins after a tough struggle when the A-10s swoop down on the Regimental main body.

Unless commanders at all levels are exposed to unconventional situations, they will not be able to get the flexible mind set needed to work in the real world.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (14 Jan 2005)

I've been observing and thinking on this one for a few days now.  First off, the article above does seem to indicate that at least one element of the transformation suggested by Art is coming to pass, namely that of soldiers having a network outside of their immediate unit and chain of command that can be used to communicate lessons and get advice.  Guess I'm looking like Haig today instead of Fuller...I have concerns about security and the ability to ensure that all leaders have access, but I am thinking that we will see more of this rather than less.     

I have been pondering the issue of historical roots and military culture.  Looking at our current situation I see several generations of military culture that exist right now that transcend capbadges.  We have a "cold war" culture that sees the Army in terms of CMBGs fighting a conventional enemy.  There is another generation that sees the world in terms of 90s peace support missions.  We are now in a "post 9-11" security environment that is creating a third generation of currently serving soldier that has an enemy but one that is different than the one prepared for in the Cold War.  All three sets of experience have an influence on our "culture", with many soldiers having served in all three periods.

I feel that the true differences between the "generations" or sets of experience are not so much in technology or a Gen Y culture but rather in the security context.  The Cold War saw potential scenarios of two combatants meeting in conventional stand-up battles.  The 90s saw Western forces interposed between belligerents but often with less than concrete objectives.  The war on terror has a defined opponent but he is diffuse and does not fight the conventional battle.  Three difference situations with three different threats and requiring three difference solutions.  Could this be the Three Block War that is so often mentioned today?  Do we need the ability to be able to switch between all three modes?  Can the same method or organization work for each threat model?

Comparing Canadian, US and UK cultures, I would say that we have more in common than not when compared with other militaries.  We are basically a British army that is strongly influenced by the US (common to virtually all things Canadian).  That being said, based on having been a Canadian military student on a US Army course I would say that US officers are more accustomed to taking criticism than we are.  I feel (and not excepting myself) that Canadian officers are a bit more defensive in After Action Reviews than our US counterparts but I may be way off here.  The senior officers that I met in the US Army had, for the most part, been in Vietnam and were personally aware of the human cost of war.  Once again this is my gut feel and not based on scientific study.  Please note that I am not saying that I thought that the US officers were better (or worse), just that this was one cultural difference that relates to the topic.  The US Army has been through twenty years of NTC, JRTC and CMTC rotations so they are pretty familiar with the AAR.  As we conduct more and more formal After Action Reviews in our Army it may become ingrained in our culture to accept "public" criticism with greater ease.

I have poster from the US Army that I carry from office to office that has a grainy picture of a soldier in battlegear and reads as follows "Battle Staff Officer, Remember...everything you plan and write must be executed by this man.  He and his buddies will be the first to pay for your mistakes.  Do your job well- futures depend on it."  Its a bit melodramatic but it does make a good point.

I think that Old Guy's comments are illustrative of the idea that as long as training presents challenges and practices units in situations involving stress and decision making then the training has value even if it is not necessarily "realistic."  That being said, we should make every effort to make our training events relevent to situations that our soldiers may actually face.

Looking at Iraq (and Afghanistan and other war on terror theatres) it should not be a suprise that it is for the most part a small unit campaign that relies on low level leaders.  The newer generations of soldiers and leaders should be able to do well in that environment, especially with regards to being comfortable working in ambiguous situations and environments.  

I'm afraid I've rambled too much today (I can visualize the "Sum-up" clipboard being flashed by the DS).

Cheers and have a good weekend,

2B


----------



## a_majoor (16 Jan 2005)

http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html


> Sunday, January 16, 2005
> 'Blink' - Examining Split-Second Decisions
> 
> What do a marble statue, an apparently happy marriage, a tennis coach, an American President, Aeron chairs, Oreo Cookies, Amadou Diallo, and classical musicians have in common? In Malcolm Gladwell's new book Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, they each serve as waypoints on the way to understanding how the adaptive unconscious works. As he did in his best selling book The Tipping Point, Gladwell manages to take a complex concept and break it down into easily understood terms.
> ...



This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Jan 2005)

> This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet



Have you ever watched Wheel of Fortune and guessed what the word or phrase is before Vanna turns all the tiles over? ;D


----------



## a_majoor (20 Jan 2005)

http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/node/6733

*Research could help military leaders make better decisions under pressure
*
Research into how people make decisions while under pressure could help the U.S. military improve training for its leaders and lead to better decision-support systems. Studies have shown that when people process information, they develop unconscious strategies â â€œ or biases â â€œ that simplify their decisions. Now, research at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) is revealing how these biases affect people when they're dealing with lots of information â â€œ and little time to form conclusions.

"The immediate application for this research is to develop training programs to improve decision-making," said Dennis Folds, a principal research scientist in GTRI's Electronic Systems Laboratory. "Yet our findings could also help design new types of decision-support systems." The research indicated that nine different kinds of biases can lead to errors in judgment when people are dealing with a lot of information. Meanwhile, the error rate was not as high as researchers expected for individuals under time pressure. Also, the study revealed that subjects who were trained to spot conditions that lead to decision-making biases were better at detecting "false-alarm opportunities."

The Army Research Institute funded Folds to conduct a series of experiments that combined a high volume of data with time pressures. The experiments simulated the changing reality of military decision-makers. Commanders today communicate more directly with field personnel. The amount and variety of information at their disposal has escalated with sources ranging from real-time sensors and voice communications to archived data. The result can be ambiguous, disjointed information rather than integrated, organized reports.

"This puts far greater pressure on leaders, who must make faster decisions while sifting through more data," Folds noted. In his experiments, he considered previous research on seven specific biases that affect individuals who must wrestle with large amounts of data:

* Absence of evidence. Missing, relevant information is not properly considered.
* Availability. Recent events or well-known conjecture provide convenient explanations.
* Oversensitivity to consistency. People give more weight to multiple reports of information, even if the data came from the same source.
* Persistence of discredited information. Information once deemed relevant continues to influence even after it has been discredited.
* Randomness. People perceive a causal relationship when two or more events share some similarity, although the events aren't related.
* Sample size. Evidence from small samples is seen as having the same significance as larger samples.
* Vividness. When people perceive information directly, it has greater impact than information they receive secondhand -- even if the secondhand information has more substance.

To test the affects of these biases, Folds had experiment subjects view an inbox on a computer screen containing a variety of text messages, maps, photographs and video and audio recordings. Subjects (the majority being Georgia Tech ROTC students) were instructed to report certain military situations, such as incidents of sniper fire or acts of suspected sabotage. They were not to report other events, such as normal accidents in an urban area unrelated to enemy activity.

To decide whether or not an event should be reported, subjects reviewed a series of messages that contained both bona fide evidence as well as information created to trigger the biases that cause poor decisions. In each trial, subjects were allowed enough time to spend an average of 20 seconds per element data plus one additional minute for reporting; they were also asked to attach information that supported their decision.

In the first experiment, all seven biases appeared with the greatest number of errors caused by vividness and oversensitivity to consistency. In addition, Folds discovered two new biases that can hinder the quality of rapid decisions:

* Superficial similarity. Evidence is considered relevant because of some superficial attribute, such as a key word in a message title. For example, a hostage situation might have been reported earlier, and then another message shows up in the inbox with the word "hostage" in its header, although the message's actual content has nothing to do with hostages.
* Sensationalist appeal. Items containing exaggerated claims or threats influence a decision-maker even when there is no substance to the content.

Folds was surprised at how well subjects could perform the task while under pressure, he said. Although he expected an accuracy rate of about 50 percent, subjects correctly reported 70 percent of incidents.

In a second experiment, researchers divided subjects into two groups, using one as a control group while training the other group how to spot conditions that spark decision-making biases. Subjects who received training were able to detect about twice as many "false-alarm opportunities" as the control group.

The biggest difference between the two groups involved "persistence of discredited information" and "small sample" biases. Forty-eight percent of trained subjects were able to recognize when a "persistence" bias existed compared to 18 percent of the control group. Fifty percent of trained subjects caught the "sample-size" traps versus 11 percent of the control group. Although training helped participants recognize when traps existed, it didn't help them identify the specific bias. "When subjects were under pressure to make decisions rapidly, the distinctiveness of the categories fell apart," Folds explained. "That's significant, because it helps us tailor training efforts."

The experiments also revealed what kind of information is meaningful to decision-makers, Folds noted. Software designed especially for the trials tracks when subjects open a document for the first time and when they go back for a second time or third look. The amount of time that subjects spend reviewing data â â€œ along with the data they attach to reports showed a decided preference for text messages over other formats. Folds' team is conducting more research: Two new sets of trials are examining how decision-making errors occur in groups, while another experiment is trying to pinpoint how rapidly individuals can make good decisions.

From Georgia Tech Research Institute


----------



## PPCLI Guy (22 Jan 2005)

a_majoor said:
			
		

> http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html
> This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet   ;D



This is, I believe, the key to the Command Support dilemma.  Having given Conds greater SA, we now need to unleash their intuitive decision making ability - to untie it from the linear process driven approach of OPP and tie in to the gestalt, the intuition of a Comd.  All of that begs the question as to how one trains for or creates intuition.

Dave


----------



## Kirkhill (22 Jan 2005)

> Quote from: a_majoor on January 16, 2005, 22:18:50
> http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html
> This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet
> 
> ...



This may only be possible by giving people the opportunity to fail and supplying enough institutional depth that the institution can still accomplish assigned tasks despite the failure of one or more components.   Maybe that is the ultimate difference between wartime and peacetime advancement.   In peacetime men and machines are measured against arbitrary standards by men and women that have created those standards and have a vested interest in those standards.   In wartime, casualties demand promotions based on commanders intuitions or just plain necessity. Successful commanders survive, complete tasks and get promoted.   Unsuccessful commanders don't.

Which brings me to another point which should be addressed in another thread really:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/25758.0.html


Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out.   

This, from a snr serving offr, very much reinforces the dire situation of the CF.   Is it possible to look at your situation as analogous to the situation of a force after its first blooding at war and in need of reorg.

(FIXED YOUR LINK - INFANTEER)


----------



## PPCLI Guy (22 Jan 2005)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out.
> 
> This, from a snr serving offr, very much reinforces the dire situation of the CF.


   

The exact phrase has been used by Gen Hillier in public - it is a phrase in relatively common usage...



> Is it possible to look at your situation as analogous to the situation of a force after its first blooding at war and in need of reorg.



Not so sure about that - or that we have actually been bloodied.  Change is inevitable - and transformational (and one could argue that we actually going through metamorphic change, and are just coming out of the pupal stage) is inevitably painful.  

Dave


----------



## Infanteer (22 Jan 2005)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> All of that begs the question as to how one trains for or creates intuition.



My personal feeling on this is that it is not something you can "create".   Intuition seems to belong to the realm of the "Art of War" in that it is a character trait of the person in command rather then a skill that can taught at CTC or Staff College.   Being part of the *Art*, not everyone is going to be able to master application of intuition to tactical and operational problems; this is what one German General alluded to when he said (roughly) that _"in the world of Art, not everybody can be a Raphael"_.   Being that Intuition is an innate trait, you can probably put it on the bell curve of good (left) and poor (right) command ability.

That being said, just because not everyone can be a Raphael or a Michaelangelo doesn't mean that we can't do our best to ensure that a great proportion of leadership is made up of Bob Ross's (a happy little tree...).   The fact that not every leader will be an innate military genius does not mean we cannot devise a training system to unlock the abilities of the "center mass" of the Bell Curve.   How to do this best?   My understanding would be to train leaders to be thinkers rather then actors.   This is why I've advocated a "critical education/field exposure" combined approach for training Officers in the thread Up From the Ranks and the "free play" approach to section command in the thread   Thinking About the Section Attack; these are two methods of measuring abilities through intuition by challenging leaders to think and justify the though process that went into executing their command decisions rather then simply pulling out the _aide-memoir_ and resorting to Left-Flanking, Right-Flanking, or Frontal.

Technology also gives us better capabilities of objectively measuring the capabilities of leaders (again, if used properly).   As many have commented before, WES such as MILES and Simunition (best of all, a combo of both) is ruthlessly efficient at separating winners and losers in realistic combat training.   When "free play" is added to the mix, you can really start to draw the best out of you thinkers while watching your actors consistently hemorrhage their commands for lack of any intuitive approach to unique tactical situations.   We can expand on Free-Play by doing things like inviting real reporters to take part in training (to prepare commanders for being watched by the world....), ensuring that active Holy and Cultural Sites are thrown into training scenarios, and giving the Enemy Force access to a kit and other things that allow them to present unique challenges to the Blue Team.

Rather then have enemy force be the usual "Dressed in CADPAT and using Canadian weapons...", OPFOR should be a "jammy-assignment".   The men and leaders in OPFOR are truly able to "Step Outside the Box" (limited of course, to the scope of the training).   OPFOR, acting withing a unconstrictive set of boundaries (to ensure a bit of realism), should be free to act as they wish.   This will force both the Blue Team and the Red Team to get their "Thinking Cycles" reving at a high-RPM in order to not be outfoxed by the other in an unscripted training scenario.   Our leaders will develop best when challenged not by scripted scenarios but by the abilities of another thinking human being (which ultimately, is what we will face in combat).

What is perhaps needed most is inculcating within the institution an allowance for error and a measure of autonomy within subordinates.   Your leaders will never become "thinkers" if the chain is looking over their shoulder and saying "You shouldn't do that" or "Your approach is wrong".   Derivations from the dogmatic approaches of PAM's (which are good for introducing concepts) should be seen as experiments rather then lack of ability - if they are successful good on the thinker and if they fail, well, that's why we have "training", right?   Training scenarios should never be the same, and those responsible for creating them should be as creative as those who will take part in them.

In building an institutional foundation based upon critical thought, you would probably move away from the comfort zone of many who rely on "The Way" as dictated from above in manuals, PAM's, and Staff College notes.   It will also seem harder and less concrete of an approach because it will demand of us to be less reliant on quantitative measures to training leaders (we can no longer rely on 7 steps of battle procedure, 10 principles of warfare, 17 steps to launch an attack, etc, etc).   However, as we seem to be acknowledging here, the "Transformation" of our Army seems to be leading to a soldier who is more responsive to this sort of approach.   By taking advantage of this we can build on the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process mentioned above, ensuring that a greater percentage of the leadership (both Officer and NCO) has a more rapid and unpredictable OODA loop, which instills the advantage of knowing what letter before Vanna turns it over....


----------



## Kirkhill (22 Jan 2005)

> Quote from: Kirkhill on Today at 16:32:58
> 
> Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out.
> 
> ...



In hindsight my wording does verge on the apocalyptic.  Not actually the intent I had although that may have been the effect.

Where actually I was coming from was the "realization", late in coming no doubt, that we now seem to be down to two effective companies in the Battalions, meaning a force of only 18 infantry coys, meaning our government can only "defend" 18 locales at a time.  Or 4 on a sustained basis.   This is based on my recollection of 1980's  doctrine.  

In the 1980's that would have been the task for a single Battalion.  Now we expect to deploy two Battalion centred Battle Groups on a sustained basis which means that each Battalion can only defend two locales. In other words, half the companies means half the locales.  I accept we might be able to cover more area in each locale but we still have less flexibility than we had.

To re-establish the flexibility of response I wanted to know what it would take to "Quickly" stand up more Companies/Squadrons.  I was suggesting that in extremis the CF in the past has resorted to jumping people ranks and relying on OJT.  

Perhaps I should have said, regardless of the "direness" of the situation, do you have to wait to be in extremis or would the same thinking apply in your current situation?

At heart this goes back to Admiral Buck's 5 years to add 5000 bodies and a desire to take the Government up on its offer while it is still fresh in their and the public's mind and not give them an out.

If my manager ( I know you guys hate that word but anyway) promised me more resources to complete an existing or new task my FIRST priority would be to secure those assets ASAP.


----------



## PPCLI Guy (22 Jan 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> My personal feeling on this is that it is not something you can "create".   _"in the world of Art, not everybody can be a Raphael"_.



True enough, but even Raphael took art lessons before he became technically proficient enough for him to be able to communicate his genius.



> Technology also gives us better capabilities of objectively measuring the capabilities of leaders (again, if used properly).   As many have commented before, WES such as MILES and Simunition (best of all, a combo of both) is ruthlessly efficient at separating winners and losers in realistic combat training.


   

I agree wholeheartedly - and this is where we see if comds are Raphaels, or simply dabblers who are technically proficient.



> What is perhaps needed most is inculcating within the institution an allowance for error and a measure of autonomy within subordinates.



The key to unlocking the potential of Mission Command...



> In building an institutional foundation based upon critical thought, you would probably move away from the comfort zone of many who rely on "The Way" as dictated from above in manuals, PAM's, and Staff College notes.



Fair enough - but I believe that the comfort zone is the Attack Position...   



> It will also seem harder and less concrete of an approach because it will demand of us to be less reliant on quantitative measures to training leaders (we can no longer rely on 7 steps of battle procedure, 10 principles of warfare, 17 steps to launch an attack, etc, etc).



True - but they provide a good starting point.



> However, as we seem to be acknowledging here, the "Transformation" of our Army seems to be leading to a soldier who is more responsive to this sort of approach.



I agree - we are definitely making progress.   I think that you start with the basic, and then develop the genius - I'm just wondering if there may not be some better way to bring that out, and to practice it?   

Dave


----------



## Infanteer (22 Jan 2005)

Just gathering together some of the thoughts about Army Transformation that we've been chatting about.   I think my latest post there was a further development of ideas on a "Revolution in Human Affairs".   As I posted on the first page of the thread, there seems to be a link between "Spatial Diffusion" and "Directive Diffusion" (I love making up my own Military Theory terms   :warstory - this is what we're seeing with the "Transformation" from an Industrial Age military to an Information Age one.

I've advocated a "transformation" in the realm of _spatial diffusion_ in the Downward Diffusion of Combined Arms thread. It is a pitch that most of us generally seem to agree with in principle.   It seems that we're grasping for the corresponding "transformation" in _directive diffusion_ with the Transformation Thread.   Not only has a successive downward diffusion in spatial terms ensured that the average soldier/section/platoon becomes more and more lethal in purely physical terms, but the corresponding directive diffusion should make the average soldier/section/platoon more effective on the mental and moral planes as well.   Since we are seeking to set the bar higher, look at the capabilities contained by a modern Special Forces ODA Team; if we can harness that level of ability within line companies and squadrons through spatial and directive transformation, imagine the Combat Power that an average Infantry Platoon will be able to exert - or how about the Combat Power of a group of networked Combat Teams?

Sure, we'll never be able to completely escape the absolute factors that are contained with diffusion.   Despite the fact that 30 soldiers may have the same capabilities as a WWII Rifle company, a platoon cannot sustain attrition like a company can.   But even these factors are reduced through technological advances in issues of sustainment.   Personal Protective Equipment means that a soldier is protected from things that our predecessors were very vulnerable too, medicine means quick turn-around for wounds that were once fatal, etc, etc.   I would factor that these Force Sustainment factors are just as relevent as more effective weapons systems in the spatial diffusion of lethal firepower.

So, if the Information Age, through transformation on spatial and directive levels, is to increase the ability of the soldier/section/platoon/etc/etc by an exponential factor, how are we to derive doctrine to utilize this phenomenon?   Currently, it appears that we're doing things in a backwards and faulty manner.   The Army has adopted a new doctrine in the last 10 years based upon "maneuverist" principles.   However, the problem is that this doctrine is a cut-and-paste, hackneyed approach to developing true transformation.   Our doctrine was a belated follow-on to the doctrinal evolution seen in the US Army's AirLand Battle and the USMC's FMFM1: Warfighting, both of which came about with the rise of the maneuverist school in the 70's (Dupuy, Lind, Van Crevald, etc) who had an acute fascination for the capabilities of the German Army.   German Doctrine (which our Army has been so keen to adapt piecemeal) was a unique process based upon their own cultural and historical approach to war.   As many have pointed out, both on these forums and in journals like the ADTB (retd Col. Chuck Olivero's articles come to mind), simply "grafting" what they did onto what we intend to do is a faulty approach to doctrine.

Although there is nothing wrong with looking to the Germans (we all know that I'm guilty of that   ;D), the important factor is to look not at what they did with regards to doctrine (_aufstragstactik_ and all that) but rather how they approached the problems they faced.   Their experiences in the stalemate of of WWI led them to decentralize tactical approaches - it was not developed by some Staff Officer in a cozy Berlin office, rather transformation came about in a very decentralized and ad hoc manner through trial-and-error on both the Western and Eastern fronts by different units and branches of the Army.   In what would become the evolution of the _Stosstruppe_ tactics, which when spiced up with Armour came to be called _Blitzkrieg_, was infact an adaption of organization and doctrine to the specific demands of spatial and directive diffusion that came out of a Industrial Age,Total War setting.

Transformation is going to require a similar institutional evolution.   Grafting a 70-year German approach to fighting onto our Army in the form of B-GL-300-000 (Canada's Army), B-GL-300-001 (Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army), and B-Gl-300-002 (Land Force Tactical Doctrine) simply isn't going to cut it.   Rather, we also need to look towards   decentralized, ad hoc and diffuse experimentation in order to derive the appropriate level of both spatial and directive diffusion withing our modern, Information Age military.   Decision-making, flexibility, SOP's, and operational and tactical approaches should be pushed down to the lowest levels of operational units - for being at the "coal-face", they are much more likely to have a real "intuition" about how to utilize the capabilities of an Information age force then a gaggle of senior figures cooped up in an office in Ottawa (sorry to those that are, but you know what I mean).   As well, we should look to what our American brothers are up to, because 3 years on the war footing is liable to lead to some profound changes in the way our society approaches warfare (just as 6 years of total war in WWII did in the last century).   

Returning to the combined "critical education/field exposure" approach to making officers that I alluded to above, when we teach new Officers the techniques to handling a platoon or troop in a tactical level we should also dedicate time to forcing them to think critically about things like _"Arab cultural approaches to war"_, _"Media and conflict"_, and _"Transitioning through the Three-Blocks"_.   If generational transformation is going the way we think it is here, then perhaps the "rank-and-file" of our leadership will be more attuned to this - the advantage is that by moving away from the dogmatic, procedural approach to developing leaders by exposing them to lessons in a way which allows them to consider a greater variety of contexts in which their command we be placed into, then more and more possibilities and approaches become available to the thinking leader.

The role of the Army's top leadership in this should not be as the Apostle of transformation and doctrine, but rather as the Facilitator - it should oversee, coordinate, and network all the different "drivers" of transformation, the soldiers, commanders, and small-units out in the operational environment, to ensure that the endless input of information into our Army's institutional databank can be accessed, interpreted, and best used by other groups.   Transformation is mostly likely going to be a "ground-up" process, and everyone needs to do their best to either be a "Young Turk" (in figurative terms) or to pave the way for them to.

Anyways, enough rambling from me....

Infanteer Out


----------



## Infanteer (22 Jan 2005)

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> True enough, but even Raphael took art lessons before he became technically proficient enough for him to be able to communicate his genius.



_"Although Raphael would be influenced by major artists in Florence and Rome, Urbino constituted the basis for all his subsequent learning. Furthermore, *the cultural vitality of the city probably stimulated the exceptional precociousness of the young artist*, who, even at the beginning of the 16th century, *when he was scarcely 17 years old, already displayed an extraordinary talent."*_

http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/bio/r/raphael/biograph.html
   
The military genius, like the artistic one, will require little introduction to the field.   In the time it takes the average leader to gain competency in low level command, a Genius could probably take a Brigade and come out on top.   Mozart was hammering away on the keyboard at three and was composing music at five.   Genius will be exceptional, and all we should do is ensure that the system will allow for it to rise rapidly with the rest of us ready to follow.   Constraining it with the norms and regulations of the "central mass" will only serve to dampen the contributions it can make to our institution.

That being said, an orchestra is lacking, no matter how good one may play, without the rest of the instruments (...or, Wayne Gretzky needed Messier, Kurri, and Fuhr to rack up all his records...).   I think our exploration here is not looking for the genius, but rather on how to develop and accomadate the _corpus_ of our future leadership, the competant and successful painters who went to art school and found out that they were pretty good at it.



> I agree wholeheartedly - and this is where we see if comds are Raphaels, or simply dabblers who are technically proficient.



...or those who can't paint and are getting by because they know the world of Art Marketing....



> The key to unlocking the potential of Mission Command...



Yep, I agree as well.   It has always been a key to success, whether exercised by Rommel, Currie, Napoleon, or Epameinondas.   To me, this is a universal principle that is always surrounded by concepts relative to time and space.   I have a feeling that unlocking "Mission Command" for an Information Army is going to require a completely different approach that was utilized to do so in the Industrial Age.



> Fair enough - but I believe that the comfort zone is the Attack Position...



_"in order to express ourselves distinctly, we must say, that the defensive form of War is in itself stronger than the offensive."

Clausewitz_





> True - but they provide a good starting point.



...which I admitted on the thread (somewhere).   The problem is when the starting point is viewed as The Way as opposed to The Springboard....



> I'm just wondering if there may not be some better way to bring that out, and to practice it?



Hmm....everyone adopt the thinking postion!!!   ;D


----------



## Pikache (22 Jan 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The military genius, like the artistic one, will require little introduction to the field. In the time it takes the average leader to gain competency in low level command, a Genius could probably take a Brigade and come out on top.  Mozart was hammering away on the keyboard at three and was composing music at five.  Genius will be exceptional, and all we should do is ensure that the system will allow for it to rise rapidly with the rest of us ready to follow.  Constraining it with the norms and regulations of the "central mass" will only serve to dampen the contributions it can make to our institution.


Since you brought it up, how should the military accomodate these geniuses, esp. in peace time army?


> Hmm....everyone adopt the thinking postion!!!  ;D


The infantry thinking position?


----------



## Infanteer (22 Jan 2005)

RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
			
		

> Since you brought it up, how should the military accomodate these geniuses, esp. in peace time army?



Faster promotions, better access to command appointments and career courses, etc, etc.  One interesting proposal I've seen was giving them a separate career track (Vandergriff - The Path to Victory).  The trick is to find measures which can objectively identify innate abilities to command troops in conflict situations and to have the system recognized by those who are assessed by it as being fair and accurate.



> The infantry thinking position?



This is a thread on transformation, isn't it.... ;D

Just another point of Transformation that I've had bouncing around in my head - it may require its own thread.  We've been focusing on how Information Age transformation is going to empower the soldier and more specifically, the leader.  Does anyone see changes to the Staff system that is prevalent throughout our Army from the Unit to National Command?  Will new developments based around spatial and directive diffusion lead to changes in Staff duties/positions and/or Staff and Command relationships?

A good article to start thinking about Staff Transformation (it is, after all, the other half of the "Command and *Staff*" equation) is Lt Col Jacques Hamel's The Command and Staff System in the Information Age: Is the Continental Staff System Dead?.

Cheers,
Infanteer


----------



## a_majoor (22 Jan 2005)

Wow, the thinking position still hurts after all these years. Not enough practice, I guess.

True genius, in the sense of a Mozart or Leonardo is not something we can predict, and only a fairly "loose" structure will have the flexibility to accommodate such a person when they show up. Actually, even Leonardo needed some "direction", his patrons were quite lax in allowing him to drop commissions (the Duke S'forza's horse was not completed for 500 years, a record of some sort). http://www.leonardoshorse.org/index.asp

Norman Dixon proposed that unsuccessful military leaders shared common psychological factors in their makeup, which overroad and transcended factors such as intelligence, personal courage, education or experience. If this thesis is true, then there must be common psychological factors for successful leaders as well. Perhaps we need to add formal testing for psychological traits to identify the people with good potential, and maybe psychological adjustment for people who are two rigid and inflexible in their thought patterns. 

To keep people's minds supple to deal with changing environments and threats, we need to keep piling on challenges to leaders and potential leaders. Yes, give them the pams and SOP's for foundations, but keep cranking up the pressure with free play enemies, non standard environments, and adventure training. Make all courses like SAS Selection, and accept that many people really don't have "what it takes", and high failure rates are not a reflection of the school or instructors. (I would like to reverse the current situation and launch investigations of courses which have a _low_ washout rate).

In garrison, keep people on their toes with mental games. Why not sit down a platoon to solve a murder mystery or compete in a version of "Junkyard Wars" once a month? Adventure training like "eco challenge" races also test leadership. practical fieldcraft and fitness, make them part of everyones training.

If we use a combination of techniques like this to select and train our soldiers and their leaders, within a few years we will have a force which people today will hardly recognize. These people will be able to outlast, out think and out fight the soldiers of today, using tools and equipment in ways most of us would find quite unorthadox. The MGS will still suck, but they will use it in ways that mask its weakness and play to any strengths of the system tactically, operationally and even strategically. This is my hope, anyway.


----------



## Kirkhill (22 Jan 2005)

I agree with a_majoor on this one.

Genius, while measurable, is not predictable.  By this I mean that trying to find areas of expertise and trying to predict whether that expertise is a match I don't think is likely.

Two Mechanical examples.  The US Army tried to predict the type of Tank it was going to need to fight the next conflict.  They got the Abrams.  The Abrams worked magnificently in Gulf War 1.  It excelled on the End Run to Baghdad in Gulf War 2 but it has proved to be of lesser value (still valuable but not as valuable and more vulnerable) in the Counter-Insurgency fight.  Modifications to both the Vehicle and the Force structure are occuring in response to a need on the ground.  That need is being driven by the tactics of the enemy.  While it may have been a predicted need it was discounted in favour of higher planning priorities during peacetime.

Likewise could we find the perfect General in Peacetime, or would that General devise a strategy that would become a publicly disseminated doctrine that would cause the enemy to react outside the planning envelope and force another strategic rethink once battle was joined?

The other example is of the C130J.  I can't find it now but I just read an article describing some Pentagon Inspector's report on the C130J.  Basically it said that the C130J should not be fielded because it isn't up to the planning specs.  Implicit in this is if it isn't up to specs it is either a danger or a waste of resources.  Meanwhile C130Js have been deployed to the field in Iraq and the Squadron Commander is reporting something like 96% readiness and 2 aircraft doing the work of three with fewer aircrew per aircraft.  Similar slams were taken at the Stryker which the troops in the field have credited with saving lives and which likewise have very high readiness numbers.  

It we were to find some magic formulation to predict the perfect General would we run the risk of a: looking for the perfect at the expense of the best or b: finding the perfect General for the wrong battle.

Would Orde Wingate have done as well as Patton with the 3rd Army? Would Skorzeny have performed as well as Rommel in North Africa?

I think the answer lies not in "The Man on the White Horse" but in the flexibility and the resilience of the institution to buy time and figure out how the enemy is fighting the battle.

Here I think Clausewitz has it wrong.  While the defence is stronger than the offence in the long haul on a conventional battlefield, all factors favour the offence in an unconventional hit and run offensive campaign with no fixed FEBA.  They have the ultimate force multiplier - Surprise.  Strategically, Operationally, Tactically, in time and in space.  Until you can discern a pattern, assuming there is a pattern, you can't predict their future actions and take steps to defend against them.

Corollary to that is you have to go on a counter-offensive against their decision makers and active units.


----------



## Infanteer (22 Jan 2005)

> I think the answer lies not in "The Man on the White Horse" but in the flexibility and the resilience of the institution to buy time and figure out how the enemy is fighting the battle.



Yep, I agree with you here, Kirkhill - this is why Scharnhorst & co. developed the notion of the professional Officer Corps; a nation could not afford to sit around and wait for another Napoleon to win its battles, it had to be ready at all times.   As I pointed out earlier, this thread is probing the transformation of the _corpus_ of the Army, the capable, intelligent, dedicated (and now, wired) professional soldier.   



> Here I think Clausewitz has it wrong.   While the defence is stronger than the offence in the long haul on a conventional battlefield, all factors favour the offence in an unconventional hit and run offensive campaign with no fixed FEBA.   They have the ultimate force multiplier - Surprise.   Strategically, Operationally, Tactically, in time and in space.   Until you can discern a pattern, assuming there is a pattern, you can't predict their future actions and take steps to defend against them.
> 
> Corollary to that is you have to go on a counter-offensive against their decision makers and active units.



The attacker/defender advantage is so dependent on time, space, context, and whether you a referring to tactical, operational or strategic levels of war that to say one or the other is superior without considering the circumstances often leads to glaring errors of omission.   The world's first Industrial-era Total War, the US Civil War, ended up with 80% of the battles being won by the defender.   However, the war was finally ended when both Sherman and Grant went on the offensive and used maneuver (Sherman at Atlanta) or attrition (Grant in the 40 Days and Petersburg) to defeat the enemy.   Conversely, look what happened when the Spring Offensive of 1918 - tactical offensive victories were dashed upon the rocks of a strategic Allied defence backed up by rail and it ultimately bled white what was left of the German Army.   The Tet Offensive was disasterous for the NVA at the physical, tactical level (and completely destroyed the VC as a fighting force) but strategically it was a victory on the moral level for the North Vietnamese cause.   

Which is "better" or "superior" is slippery at best, depending on your perspective I guess.   Both the Offensive and the Defensive have the opportunity to be a "superior" form of war, but only if the commander is smart enough and determined enough (and lucky as well) to utilize them at the right times.


----------



## Kirkhill (23 Jan 2005)

Scharnhorst!!!! :  Shoulda known.... ;D


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (23 Jan 2005)

I will probably get the exact working wrong, but I read several years back that the old-school German Army had a somewhat unique method of categorizing officers.  It went something like this:

Officers who are smart and lazy should be elevated to the highest levels of command.

Officers who are smart and hardworking should be made part of the General Staff.

Officers who are stupid and lazy will make fine Regimental officers (hey, wait a minute...I'm a Regimental officer...).

Officers who are stupid and hardworking are a menace and should be identified and removed from service at the earliest opportunity.

I cannot produce the source for this, but it is funny and has a ring of truth even if it may just be a myth.  How does this apply to the discusion?  Perhaps only to point out that there are different kinds of officers and being cut out for one type does not mean that one is cut out for the other.  A great general may make a poor staff officer and vice versa.  Hopefully our system is able to realize where its officer's talents lay and assign them appropriately and not simply send them through a rigid series of appointments.

Returning to a more serious note, I think that a key requirement for our leaders is adaptability.  The negative effects of unrealistic training exercises, faulty doctrine, wrong equipment and changes in technology can be overcome by adaptive leaders.  This also means that we should not fire those who fail in WES or SIMNET battles as long as they learn from mistakes and display the ability to adapt.

Cheers,

2B  ;D


----------



## mainerjohnthomas (23 Jan 2005)

I think a really important idea was brought up here:
"That is why I am a fan of, for want of a better phrase, stepped elitism.  As an infantry example, rifle company, rifle to support, support to recce, recce to para, para to JTF2.  "Elites" give something for the youngsters to aspire to, serve as role models, supply homes for experienced soldiers that are happier or more capable as operators than leaders,  and also bring capabilities that the youngsters don't.  In particular they are capable of independent action.  They can also be a place where leaders can mature prior to returning to bolster the 19 year olds."
     The organization of the modern army is going to have to allow for different levels of independent action based not on rank, but by level of unit ability.  Rifle companies, or regular armoured formations can be expected to follow orders and implement standard tactical doctrine. Recce are expected to wander astray as their training, instinct, and ability to read the tactical situation and information merit. Para and JTF2 being the pinnacle of training who have shown perfect situational awareness at other levels of function can and should act independently of higher direction in the tactical environment, in the same fashion that "Guards"  elite tank formations are expected to exploit momentary openings in the battlefield to make or exploit breaches.  It is not that this is asking troops to violate orders, it is simply stating that the battlefield environment changes faster than higher levels of command can be aware of, and order the exploitation of these changes.  By asking those soldiers who have the greatest training in gathering, interpreting, and acting on battlefield information, we allow them to anticipate orders, rather than wait for them.  In the first world war, how many thousands died because sand table generals made decisions based on information that was outdated before they got it, and irrelevant before it could be acted on?  The modern battlefield only gets faster, as our troops advance in training and experience, their freedom to act must increase, or we are back to the sand table again.


----------



## a_majoor (24 Jan 2005)

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Officers who are smart and lazy should be elevated to the highest levels of command.
> 
> Officers who are smart and hardworking should be made part of the General Staff.
> 
> ...



This is often attributed to Von Moltke the elder, but the version I heard is somewhat different:

The smart but lazy officer should be a staff officer, for he shall find the easiest means of accomplishing the task

The smart and industrious officer is the ideal regimental officer

The lazy and stupid officer is an unfortunate byproduct of any system

The industrious and stupid officer is a distinct danger to everyone, and should be removed as soon as he is identified!  ;D

Adaptability is the key trait for leaders in any situation, but military leaders have a special responsibility since they deal in lives and have entire societies in their care. In "The Soul of Battle", Victor Davis Hanson examines the lives of three very different generals from vastly separated ages, but discovers the common denominator between  Epaminondas, Sherman and Patton are wide ranges of experience both inside and outside the military, questing minds and recovery from personal failure. 

We can simulate some of this by encouraging (or forcing) prospective leaders to take on tasks quite outside their experience ( Epaminondas seems to have been a philosopher and a politician before he was a general; Sherman was an officer, a banker, land surveyor, and school superintendant before he rejoined the army at the start of the Civil War; Patton was an Olympic athlete, expert horseman, learned to sail and fly, and was a life-long student of history before WW II). Successful leaders will need to develop "questing minds"; and many of them will fail at the tasks. The trick is to treat these as learning experiences and allow the candidates to absorb the lessons and encourage them to try again. (Of course the treatment of candidates who experience failure should not be entirely "consequence free").

The actual mechanics of this the readers can debate. Making a leadership candidate manage a resteraunt franchise, or do a masters thesis on a topic chosen at random are two possible approaches. "Eco challenge" adventure training has enough para military elements to be a good fit with normal training, but needs to be done in such a way that it requires a lot of thought rather that brute force to be successful.

This tracks back to some of the observations of "Generation Y"s thought process's. Perhaps the incredible range of options available for kids in the last two decades has force fed the wide range of experiences needed to create an adaptable mind. This should also give us a few pauses when we think about recruiting: are the traditional source of soldiers; people from materially poor environments, being exposed to enough "experience" to make them the sort of soldiers needed for the transformation, or is this an urban phenomena which will require us to focus on upper middle and even "rich" families to supply the right kind of mental material we need?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo (24 Jan 2005)

AMajoor,

Your version is certainly kinder to me!  I'm afraid that I do not have a direct source (perhaps someone can help out) and I might have got it completely wrong.  Perhaps the quote I read had been "adpapted" to suit the point of view of the person producing the quote (at school for staff).  One thing that a liked about the first version is that it drew a distinction between the staff officer and the general.  Both are smart but have differences.  Behind the German generals was a professional staff.  Rommel could go out into the desert with the troops and lead because he had a professional staff to run the show in the CP.  Our army seems to believe that one is a progression to the other and I'm not sure if that is the case.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## bugsy (26 Jan 2005)

I've been following this thread with some interest, as I have to write a paper on the Transfermation of Armed Force. I am wondering if anyone can point me to any good sources of infomation, be it books, articles, or websites, that pertain to the topic at hand. 


                                                                                                   Thanks, Bugsy


----------



## a_majoor (26 Jan 2005)

The very best person to get in touch with about transformation would be "Infanteer", and also look at this thread: http://army.ca/forums/threads/24924.15.html


----------



## Infanteer (28 Jan 2005)

Don't pin me for some expert - I just make this stuff up as I go....


----------



## bugsy (28 Jan 2005)

What, you didn't know that PhD stands for Piled high and Deep, be it knowledge or fertilizer? All kidding aside, I was just wondering if anyone has come across anything of  interest on the topic. This thread is a great starting place to gather ideas, I just need creditable sources to back myself up.


----------



## a_majoor (7 Feb 2005)

From Wired Magazine

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/brain.html


> *Revenge of the Right Brain*
> Logical and precise, left-brain thinking gave us the Information Age. Now comes the Conceptual Age - ruled by artistry, empathy, and emotion.
> By Daniel H. PinkPage 1 of 2 next  »
> 
> ...


----------



## a_majoor (31 May 2005)

A long article in "New Scientist" outlines 11 ways to improve your brain.

Some of these means include special classes of drugs which activate specific portions of your brain (consider a pill that allows you to say functional and awake for 40 hr at a time), others are fairly common sense (diet and exercise), and some seem a bit out of left field (but what do I know, I only use 10% of my brain anyway  ;D).

If this sort of research can make the payoffs claimed, then a new generation of "super soldiers" may emerge, more dangerous because they have more advanced cognitave facilities than Homo Sapiens Mk 1. Certainly some of these traits will be vital in order to handle the flood of data that is available in the digital age, although there will need to be a lot of experimentation to find the right balance of traits and training to use them effectively. Our brains represent about 3 to 5 million years of primate evolution, and are wired in a particular way for reasons we haven't quite figured out yet. Supercharging the brain might not be such a great idea if the soldiers become psychopaths or plagued by paranoid delusions.

http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg18625011.900


----------



## NMPeters (31 May 2005)

CANFORGEN 098/05 CDS 045/05 301137Z MAY 05
CF TRANSFORMATION TEAM CREATED/CDS ACTION TEAM UPDATE
UNCLASSIFIED


REF:CANFORGEN 077/05 CDS 032 211940Z APR 05 CF TRANSFORMATION TEAM 



THIS MESSAGE IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT I HAVE CREATED A CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION TEAM AND APPOINTED MGEN WALTER NATYNCZYK, CHIEF OF TRANSFORMATION, AND BGEN DANIEL GOSSELIN, CHIEF OF STAFF, CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION TEAM. THE TEAM WILL BEGIN THEIR PRELIMINARY WORK 1 JUN 05 AND MORE SUBSTANTIVE WORK AT THE END OF JUN WHEN THE CDS ACTION TEAMS (CATS) HAVE REPORTED AND I, WITH ALL GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS, HAVE EXAMINED THE INITIAL TRANSFORMATION OPTIONS DEVELOPED BY THE CATS 


THE CHIEF OF TRANSFORMATION WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO ME AND WILL HAVE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN PLAN. KEY CF TRANSFORMATION TEAM TASKS WILL INCLUDE: 


DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION PLAN CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENCE POLICY STATEMENT (DPS) AND CF VISION 


DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR NEAR-TERM CF RESTRUCTURING CONSISTENT WITH DPS AND CF VISION, FOR CONSIDERATION BY AFC 


DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A STRATEGIC JOINT-STAFF 


OVERSEEING, COORDINATING, AND MONITORING OF CF TRANSFORMATION ACTIVITIES 


FACILITATING, SUPPORTING AND ENABLING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CF TRANSFORMATION AND 


DEVELOPING CF TRANSFORMATION COMMUNICATION PLANS. CDS ACTION TEAMS UPDATE 


I ESTABLISHED FOUR CDS ACTION TEAMS IN FEB 05 TO DEVELOP OPTIONS AND PROPOSE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DPS AND THE CF VISION. CAT RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESS REGULAR AND RESERVE MEMBERS 


EACH CAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR AN AREA THAT IS KEY TO CF TRANSFORMATION. THESE AREAS ARE: 


CAT 1: COMMAND AND CONTROL - AN OPERATIONALLY FOCUSED, INTEGRATED CF COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE THAT SUPPORTS CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD 


CAT 2: FORCE GENERATION - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RECRUITING, TRAINING, MOBILIZING AND DEPLOYING CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL AND THEIR EQUIPMENT 


CAT 3: OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES - EXISTING AND EMERGING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CF NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE AND 


CAT 4: INSTITUTIONAL ALIGNMENT - BETTER ALIGN VARIOUS PROCESSES AND ELEMENTS THAT SUPPORT CF OPERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD. 


THE CATS HAVE WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH MEMBERS OF AFC OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEAR-TERM ACTIONS, AS WELL AS ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN OVER THE MID-TO-LONGER TERM. IN EARLY JUN 05 THEY WILL REPORT ON THE WORK ACHIEVED TO DATE AND TRANSITION IT TO THE CF TRANSFORMATION TEAM AND DGSP WHO WILL BUILD ON THE SUCCESS OF THE CATS TO FURTHER WORK ON THESE OPTIONS. TRANSFORMATION INFORMATION 


I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN FACE-TO-FACE WITH MORE THAN 8,000 DND EMPLOYEES AND CF PERSONNEL ABOUT THE NEW CF VISION. MY PRESENTATION, AVAILABLE ON MY WEBSITE, WWW.CDS.FORCES.GC.CA , EXPLAINS THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FACING CANADA IN THE WORLD TODAY, AND DESCRIBES HOW THE CANADIAN FORCES MUST TRANSFORM TO MEET THREATS IN THIS ENVIRONMENT BECOMING MORE RELEVANT, RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE, THROUGH GREATER FORCE INTEGRATION. CF TRANSFORMATION WILL ALIGN THE CF WITH THE OPERATIONAL REALITY OF THE POST-9/11 WORLD 


OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IS AT THE HEART OF THE TRANSFORMATION AGENDA. AND TRANSFORMATION IS BUILT ON THE MANY LESSONS LEARNED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CF FROM PRIVATE TO GENERAL. THE CF BENEFITS FROM THESE MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE CUT THEIR TEETH ON OPERATIONS AND KNOW WHAT IS REQUIRED TO REMAIN RELEVANT, RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTVE GOING FORWARD 


AND ANCHORING THIS TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE IS THE EXPERTISE AND ADVICE OF THE DEPARTMENTS CIVILIAN STAFF ON ISSUES AND ACTIVITIES SUCH AS POLICY, PROCUREMENT, HUMAN RESOURCES, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ADMINISTRATION AND MORE. THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO TRANSFORMATION IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE WHOLE DEFENCE TEAM. AS TRANSFORMATION PROCEEDS, PERIODIC CANFORGENS, MAPLE LEAF ARTICLES AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS TOOLS WILL INFORM THE ENTIRE DEFENCE TEAM ON THE WAY AHEAD


----------

