# Cliinton: Ths US Needs More Troops..................



## Kirkhill (27 Sep 2006)

For the delectation of T6, Maj Baker, Red 6 et al.   
I wonder why there aren't enuff troops?   > >



> Clinton: Afghanistan Needs More Troops
> The Associated Press Tuesday, September 26, 2006; 10:17 PM
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601709_pf.html
> 
> ...



http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/49592/post-451843.html#msg451843


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## tomahawk6 (27 Sep 2006)

Hilarious. Clinton oversaw the reduction of the Army from 16 divisions to 10. I dont disagree though that the Army needs more troops. He just isnt very credible. Just like he claimed to have done everything he could to kill OBL. He didnt want to kill Bin Laden.

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/17/predator.video/index.html


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## Kirkhill (29 Sep 2006)

S_Baker said:
			
		

> Well, being a fan of Sean Bean and the Chosen Men, I think all we need is a good light company!



Why? Is your family still getting royalties off of their rifles?


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## Red 6 (30 Sep 2006)

Thanks for sharing this with us, Kirkhill. In fairness to Pres. Clinton, the 90's era drawdown of the Army began under his predecessor (Bush #1). For instance, the 3rd AD, which kicked a** in Desert Storm, was already slated for deactivation when it received the deployment orders for SWA. The end of the Cold War forced a paradigm shift in how the US armed forces were organized, equipped and trained. If you remember back that far, everybody was looking for that "peace dividend."

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the question that keeps coming to the front (for me anyway) is why are we still trying to fight two major conflicts on the cheap? We're talking primarily about the Army and the Marine Corps here. There is a shell game going on to keep units in the fight. Up until the 80s, the Army and Marine Corps stood up new divisions during every major war. This provided sustainabilty, not only for the war in progress, but also for any other contingencies that might pop up. (i. e., a war in Korea, where we would likely be well and truly screwed)

The Army developed the doctrine of 'the come as you are war," under the AirLand Battle unbrella. This postulated that future wars (a Soviet attack on Europe, for instance) would require an intense period of short term combat where in-place units and reinforcements would do the job. Our wars prior to the start of the GWOT reinforced this doctrine. 
Now we're stuck with this idea that "the defining campaign of the War on Terror" needs to be fought and decided by a force that is just too small to do the job.

Now, a limited number of divisions are trying to maintain a relentness cycle of: 1) recover and refit, 2)prepare for a combat deployment, 3)serve in combat, 4)recover and refit, then do it again.

I read in the Army Times the other day that stateside installations should expect the most limited construction budget in 30 years for the next FY. The Army is scraping, and scraping again the school house and TDA units to fill up combat units, and taking on more and more contracts to do what Soldiers have traditionally done, not only in garrison, but in the combat zones.

The problem is, now it's too late. It takes two years to stand up a division. And anyway, the Army couldn't find the money if it wanted to. It's just not in the budget.


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## Infanteer (30 Sep 2006)

Do you fellows think the tooth-to-tail ratio is a problem?  Of the 10 divisions (+ a couple Cav Regts) that the Army has, how many of these are actually muddy boots?  I still can't believe the size of the tail that we employ (the West in general).  How many IED targets - and convoy escorts - does Hadji get due to the fact that we have to resupply Taco Bells, theaters, and PX's?


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## Kirkhill (30 Sep 2006)

> If you remember back that far, everybody was looking for that "peace dividend."



Aye, I remember the "peace dividend".  And you are right, downsizing was already in the works when Saddam went into Kuwait.  If I remember some of the commentary at the time there was noise about how "lucky" everybody was on the timing because divisions that were in Germany and due for reductions/repatriation/elimination were available for service in Kuwait.  This applied to the Brits as much as the US (and for that matter it applied to Canada's 4CMBG  which was dispatched to Yugoslavia).

However I also remember another aphorism: "too light to fight".  That particular battle resulted in Light Infantry Divisions or Infantry Divisions (Light) being cut so as to preserve the Heavies.  At the same time (correct me if I am wrong - you drove the things ) the number of rifles in the back of Bradley was reduced from the designed 6 to 4.  Admittedly 6 seems to have been one heck of a squeeze but the net effect of these moves was to leave the US short of the very "muddy boots" that Infanteer is wondering about.

According to a well thumbed 1987 edition of "The US War Machine" Caspar Weinberger's army had on hand"

4 Armo(u)red Divisions
6 Mech Divs
3 Inf Divs
1 Lt Inf Div (7th?)
1 Air Asslt Div
1 Airborne Div

Plus 

1 Armoured Bde Sep
1 Mech Bde Sep
1 CBAC (????)
3 Armored Cav Regts
3 Theater Force Bdes

Altogether the Army could field 54 Bdes vs the 33 (heading for 44?) currently available.  Of those 19 were Lt, Inf, Air Asslt or Airborne Bdes.  

That heavy emphasis, after the draw down, IMO, go some ways to answering Infanteer's query about teeth to tail.  Heavy divisions (including helicopter based forces) are really "tail heavy".

Just some further observations.


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## Red 6 (1 Oct 2006)

All good points. The Army has been defined for many years by its role in World War II. This was probably the high point of our history and the lessons learned in the war still echo across the Army in many ways big and small. Vietnam pulled focus away from Europe in the 60s, but as soon as that war ended, the Army was right back to its focus on the next big war. The heart of the Army was, for all intents and purposes, Germany. That's gone now and the Army is still struggling to define itself.

The issue of teeth to tail dovetails right into this idea. The Army has always had the doctrine of projecting force toward the far reaches of the globe. To do that, you need the logistical base to sustain your combat forces. The issue of Starbucks and McDs in a combat zone seems ridiculous at first glance. But, we have an all volunteer force. You can't treat people who came of their own free will (mostly  ) like draftees. Especially with the multiple deployments Marines and Soldiers are facing, the little pieces of back home life are critical for morale.

I'm extremely uncomfortable with our creeping withdrawal from NATO. When the dust finally settles, there will only be one medium combat brigade left in Germany, and the 173rd Airborne. In a more general sense, you cannot fight a prolonged war effectively with a limited number of divisions. We see the effect with short notice extensions to combat rotations, moving brigades around Iraq from place to place, the day to day grind of horrendous civilian casualties, widespread areas we do not have the boots on the ground to control.

Economy of force is the Army's way of saying, "we don't have enough troops to cover the ground, but we're going to try anyway." Anbar province is an EOF operation. It seems odd to me, since this is the core, along with the Baghdad metropolitan area, of the war in Iraq. But there just aren't enough Soldiers and Marines to go around.


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## Cloud Cover (1 Oct 2006)

Kirkhill- did those figures include the USMC?


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## Red 6 (1 Oct 2006)

No, they look like just Army forces.


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## Kirkhill (1 Oct 2006)

Red's right Whiskey - that was just the Army.  The Marines had 3 Divs on regular strength.  Apparently they are protected by Congress in a way the Army isn't because they still have 3 reg Divs although it does look like boots are being moved from generalist infantry roles to specialist roles resulting in fewer line infantry marines.

And Red, I share your discomfort on NATO - "something this way comes" I fear.


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