# Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)



## SupersonicMax (24 Jun 2014)

In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.  In the US and NATO doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC, regardless of the domestic affiliation.  It provides a better efficiency in how the assets are used and better coordination.

CAS is only one of the missions air assets do.  It should not always be pri 1.  Priorities are normally dictated by the JFC, after consultation with the elements commanders (ACC, LCC and MCC).  Even when the troops are on the move, qhile there should be assets available for CAS, on call or dedicated CAS is generally a big waste of efforts.  Get airplanes up with bombs, assign them a target and if troopa need them, re-role them into CAS.  Keeps the pressure on the strategic front while providing flexibility to the troops.


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## cupper (24 Jun 2014)

Blame the foresight of the military-industrial complex for having the wherewithal to spread production, operation and maintenance aspects of weapons programs and platforms across many many congressional districts.

Members of Congress cut programs and platforms at their own peril. And thus we get ill considered decisions to maintain outdated, obsolete or unwanted equipment and programs all in the name of not losing votes in the next election.

I found it interesting that when the decommissioned the Iowa and Wisconsin after the first Gulf War, Congress passed a bill that required both ships to be maintained in a state such that they could be reactivated with minimal effort and expense. The justification was that the US needed to maintain a shore bombardment capability. 

When the ships were removed from the reserve and turned over as museum pieces, Congress made further requirements to maintaining both ships in a state where they could be easily reactivated, precluding any modifications being made to the ships. This included requirements for maintaining a stock of barrels for the 16" guns. They finally eliminated the requirement in the mid 2000's, presumably when the Zumwalt's moved from concept to full design.


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## KevinB (25 Jun 2014)

I'm a big A-10 fan, mainly as that gun can chew up a lot of stuff.

It's also a slower platform so I would guess in theory the pilot has better SA of the ground.

In my experience its pilots are also the only ones in the USAF who actually enjoy ATG CAS missions, the rest dream loftily of Air Combat kills.
 Since the vast majority of senior leaders in the Air Forces of the world are fighter pilots they pick the priorities.

Look at AF priorities -- they are always for air superiority fighters.

It is a tool in the tool box, and one that for some tasks has not been bested by new designs.
It arrives faster than Helo's
It offers more loiter in the immediate area than other planes
It has more weapons than drones.
It has a GAU-8 30mm Cannon so it wins...


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## Baz (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.  In the US and NATO doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC, regardless of the domestic affiliation.  It provides a better efficiency in how the assets are used and better coordination.



That's a very Air Force view of the world, and not doctrinally complete.   It should say in the US and NATO *Air* Doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC.

In a fully formed joint theater, there will be (at a minimum) an MCC, LCC, ACC, and SOCC.  The MCC will have a MAOC (Maritime Air Operation Center), with assigned air assets, including MPAs and assigned maritime organic air amongst others.  They will co-ordinate with the ACC and the lines may be on the ATO, but they retain OPCON of assigned air assets.  ACCs will have Maritime and Land liaison elements with the other commanders.

Maritime Organic Air OPCON is normally retained by the fleet... especially for Carrier Strike Groups.  A side effect is the inability of the ACC to realize certain capabilities exist in the fleet (witness not using MH-60Rs for ISR in Libya), but it is almost always left that way for Force Protection reasons.

During land maneuver warfare army air assets can be kept OPCON to the maneuver forces, in order to keep his ability to concentrate force at the time and place of his choosing, not the ACCs.

The reason for these measures is that ACCs can, and do, get drawn into certain air centric aspects of the fight.  Without proper C2 arrangements that can (and has) put other forces at undo risk.  I've had these discussions with both CAOC directors and ISRDs at ACC Ramstein, as NATO works through the new command relationships post the latest downsize.

In my opinion the Air Forces of the Western World are the least Joint of the services: the Army understands Tactical Air, the Navy understands Maritime Air (although, unfortunately, the RCN less than most), but the Air Forces don't understand land and maritime maneuver.


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## Journeyman (25 Jun 2014)

Baz said:
			
		

> That's a very Air Force view of the world, and not doctrinally complete.


Yes, but he also said that "on call or dedicated CAS is generally *a big waste of efforts*."  It appears that his _extensive_ operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.

However, I know people with _actual_ combat experience certainly appreciated on-call CAS.....even if the people above us were USAF.



I know it's my old hobby-horse, I know.  But at least the USAF showed up for the war; beyond NORAD, *I don't know why we spend a single fucking penny on the RCAF fighter world*.


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## Baz (25 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> It appears that his _extensive_ operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.



I actually don't think that's it.  All of the Western Air Forces (NATO plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) are teaching this way.  Its the same discussion as World War II: strategic vs operational vs tactical use of Air Power.  In the Air Forces mind the best use is to concentrate it all in the hands of the ACCs and then let the "Air professionals" determine how to use it.  This comes to a heavy bias towards operational effects vs tactical support.

For certain types of campaigns in makes sense; for other's, not so much.  Hence why the countries that have spent a lot of money developing army and maritime air have commander's of the army and maritime type that go to a lot of effort to keep control of "their" air assets.

Example: the US Army is the second biggest operator of the Predator in the world (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Atomics_MQ-1C_Gray_Eagle).

Example: the US Navy will be the largest Global Hawk operator in the world (42 USAF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_RQ-4_Global_Hawk vs 68 USN Tritons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_MQ-4C_Triton)... and the fight over how they should be used and who should control them still goes on, even though the Navy paid for them.

In the face of a true maritime threat, do you think the Carrier Strike Group Commander would allow all his fighters to be used to support the JFACC's operational plan?


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## vonGarvin (25 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I know it's my old hobby-horse, I know.  But at least the USAF showed up for the war; beyond NORAD, *I don't know why we spend a single fucking penny on the RCAF fighter world*.


Come now!  We had Kosovo....and Libya...and now the RCAF is roughing it in the hotels of Eastern Europe.  _Eastern!_



/sarcasm


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## SupersonicMax (25 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Yes, but he also said that "on call or dedicated CAS is generally *a big waste of efforts*."  It appears that his _extensive_ operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.
> 
> However, I know people with _actual_ combat experience certainly appreciated on-call CAS.....even if the people above us were USAF.
> 
> ...



JM:  having assets available is important.  Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.  Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war) and re-role if required.  To the people on the ground, it's the same.  To the overall war effort, it means more bombs on more targets: a more efficient way of employing scarce, expensive assets.  Of course every ground commander wants his dedicated CAS 24/7.  In the overall campaign, it's generally not the right way to do buisness.  

Baz:  For the US anyways, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is where the relationships are laid out.  Yup, it is very theater dependant and different commanders will ultimately agree on who retains what in terms of control.  Some specific assets should be kept OPCON to their services (MH, any national assets obviously, SOF helos), but any fighters should be under the C/JFACC if it is just for coordination.

A good read on the subject is Every Man a Tiger by Chuck Horner.  A little biaised towards the blue side (he was the JFACC during the Gulf War) but a good intro on the subject nonetheless.


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## George Wallace (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> JM:  having assets available is important.  Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.



Sorry.  You are sooooooo wrong.  If, for any instance, you have any thoughts that aircraft do not have to loiter near where they are needed, you are just showing your lack of knowledge and experience.  There is no way in hell that an aircraft can be scrambled from an airfield to accomplish CAS on the short notice that will be given.  The enemy are not that cooperative.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war) and re-role if required.




Only in a board game can you safely sit back and "Assign a target" when it comes to CAS.  The targets are not stationary.  They are not fixed fortifications.  They are very mobile combat vehicles.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> To the people on the ground, it's the same.



To the people on the ground it is NOT the same.  It is LIFE OR DEATH......and they do not have time to wait for some "dispatcher" to prioritize them as "needing CAS NOW!" or third or fourth in line for air support.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> To the overall war effort, it means more bombs on more targets: a more efficient way of employing scarce, expensive assets.  Of course every ground commander wants his dedicated CAS 24/7.  In the overall campaign, it's generally not the right way to do buisness.


  

Back to comment #1.


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## Journeyman (25 Jun 2014)

Believe it or not, I'm actually vaguely familiar with Air Operations -- doctrine and operations.  I also have a passing familiarity with what the Air Force's current lot of tribal elders consider "core capabilities" (hint: fighters #1; other fixed-wing: somewhere around #8-9; helo (MH or TAC): what? what's that?)



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.  Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war)


 You know we tried that; not only would the Taliban not cooperate, it was obvious that they hadn't even gone to Staff College to appreciate the beauty of our JFACC orchestration; ungrateful bastards.

Although at a Weapons and Tactics 'gathering,' the USAF crowd (up in Kabul, vacationing from their time in Bagram)1 mostly had the same perspective.....except for the A-10 and F-15E guys; I guess it's because they were _actually doing the job_, unlike many of their USAF brethren who despite being in location, couldn't shake the Air War College mantra. 


Again, several of us here have been speaking from real-world experience; one that's tempered by the reality of having a military smaller than Chuck Horner's world (therefore _everyone_ has to contribute to the fight and not rely on a shop-steward mentality that says "D Flight Safety says I'm _entitled_ to a 5-star hotel") -- even without his back-patting self-congratulations (yes, I've read it)


Edit:
1.  For clarity, I too was attending the WeapTac only as justification to 'vacation in Kabul' from down south;  I'm grateful to my boss for facilitating that opportunity to.....uh, _fraternize_.    >


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## GAP (25 Jun 2014)

We called in air strikes (one example of many) on a truck park along the Ho Chi Min Trail. The park was jammed to the hilt and was just dripping with "Come and get me" signs....

we called, and we called again....they came. A cell of B-52's (3). They struck that park and totally demolished it. Two days later.

Then they asked us to go back for a BDU...... :

We did go back. There wasn't a tree standing. Nor were there any trucks demolished....they had left 2 days before....

That was the USAF in action then, and from the sounds of it, it hasn't changed much now....


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## Baz (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Baz:  For the US anyways, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is where the relationships are laid out.  Yup, it is very theater dependant and different commanders will ultimately agree on who retains what in terms of control.  Some specific assets should be kept OPCON to their services (MH, any national assets obviously, SOF helos), but any fighters should be under the C/JFACC if it is just for coordination.



Quoting that the way you have shows a predilection for the US way of doing things, and your other comments show a bias to the USAF interpretation.

The Combatant Commander relationship is to ensure that operations are commanded jointly, not the lower command relationships, for which there is both joint and service doctrine in the US, frequently at odds.

Commanders don't agree, they direct (ie command).  The JFC is frequently chosen from a particular service in order to put the weight of effort where it is required.

The Air Force frequently uses the coordination argument in order to attempt to centralize C2.  There is no reason why the ACC cannot do coordination of the assets operating in their area of responsibility without having C2 of those assets.  As well, the ability of the JFACC to do air coordination in the, say, mid-Atlantic, is exactly why the MCC will do so, as exercised by the Commander Carrier Strike Group.  I would argue that fighters doing land strike from carriers should be on the JFACC ATO, coordinated by the JFACC, and possibly TACON/TACON to the supported commander... conversely, land based fighters doing maritime strike should be on the Maritime Optask Air (or ATO if you want to call it that), but marshalled and controlled by the force, and TACON/TACOM to the fleet.

Again, the Air Force doesn't understand Joint.  Maritime and Ground understand task organization and the difference between span of control and unity of command.  Like any other asset, assign the aircraft to the Component Commander most able to conduct the battle.  Frequently, this means that many of the aircraft are OPCON to the ACC for the flexibility it provides, but not necessarily all of them and not necessarily all the time.


None of this surprises me, I've heard it over and over again.


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## Fishbone Jones (25 Jun 2014)

.


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## SupersonicMax (25 Jun 2014)

George, if you read my post again, this is not what I said.  I said that you should frag bombs against targets beyond the FSCL (BAI, AI, etc) via a route that will take the aircraft over friendly troops.  If there is a need for CAS, divert some of those jets to where they are needed and get them a discreet frequency with the FAC to conduct CAS.  If not, jets keep pushing towards their assigned target and drop their bombs.  From an operational point of view, you achieve more with the same.  You provide CAS when needed but still put bombs on targets even if no CAS is required.  I am not talking about GCAS.  

JM:  for a theater like Afghanistan where 90% of the kinetic missions are CAS, it makes sense to have dedicated CAS lines on the ATO.  In most other wars where CAS is a portion of the air effort, it doesn't always makes sense.


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## George Wallace (25 Jun 2014)

What other wars?


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## Fishbone Jones (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> George, if you read my post again, this is not what I said.  I said that you should frag bombs against targets beyond the FSCL (BAI, AI, etc) via a route that will take the aircraft over friendly troops.  If there is a need for CAS, divert some of those jets to where they are needed and get them a discreet frequency with the FAC to conduct CAS.  If not, jets keep pushing towards their assigned target and drop their bombs.  From an operational point of view, you achieve more with the same.  You provide CAS when needed but still put bombs on targets even if no CAS is required.  I am not talking about GCAS.
> 
> JM:  for a theater like Afghanistan where 90% of the kinetic missions are CAS, it makes sense to have dedicated CAS lines on the ATO.  In most other wars where CAS is a portion of the air effort, it doesn't always makes sense.



And this is faster than having your CAS loitering for you how? When ground troops need CAS, they need it now. Not when someone can get it recalled from a bombing run.

The need for CAS is planned for, that's why your CAS is loitering. Troops on the ground don't have 10,000 feet of insular altitude protection and their time is not measured in fuel consumption, speed and weight.

In your scenario, if a couple of jets are recalled for CAS just before their drop zone, they have to hustle back to support carrying their bombs. Now they have to go back after their CAS task, refuel and go again to drop their bombs. If the target is still there. If the target is important enough. If it isn't or wasn't then the run shouldn't have been made in the first place. Nothing to gained but hours in the flight log.


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## SupersonicMax (25 Jun 2014)

Conventional wars.  Like a nation or an alliance of nations against a nation or an alliance of nations.  Like the Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya...

RG:  if you plan and coordinate properly, you can put aircraft on a strike mission in the right piece of sky at the right time where/when the LCC thinks he MAY need CAS making it as fast as calling for effects , getting the jets out of their hold points and pushed to the FAC (and giving essentially the same effects as XCAS).  This principle is not new and has been used effectively before.  It is sometimes called push-CAS.


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## George Wallace (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Conventional wars.  Like a nation or an alliance of nations against a nation or an alliance of nations.  Like the Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya...
> 
> ............ getting the jets out of their hold points and pushed to the FAC .



CAS has been used in every major and small war and numerous "Brushfire wars" since the first Air Force was formed. 


 "hold points"?   Is that just another name for "Loiter"?


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## SupersonicMax (25 Jun 2014)

Depending on who is controlling you (CRC/AWACS or FAC) and the AO, you'll be pushed to a Control Point or an Initial Point where you'll wait (hold, loiter) until something pops up.

I am not saying we do not need CAS.  What I am advocating is efficient use of air assets to accomplish a common (joint) strategic/operational objective in a timely manner.  Making aircraft loiter waiting for something to happen is generally not the most efficient use of those assets (while there is a time and place for it).

I know that in our minds, losses are not acceptable, however commanders make decisions fully understanding that lives may be lost because of competing priorities and limited resources.


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## George Wallace (25 Jun 2014)

CAS is part of a plan.  It is not a bunch of aircraft loitering at all hours to wait for a "CONTACT" to be called in for them to destroy.  That disappeared after WW I.  

That "PLAN" as to how CAS is to be used, is not at some high Air Force level, but  that of  whatever level a Battle Group, Battle Team, Brigade, Division, whatever makes.  CAS is just one more part of the OP PLAN of a mission.  It may be for a few hours.  It may be a few days.  It could be a few weeks or months.  Like the Fire Plan and all the other plans, CAS is just one part of the much larger OP PLAN.   That means that the aircraft will be loitering on station, at a given time, for a given period of time, in support of the troops on the ground.


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## SupersonicMax (25 Jun 2014)

GW: that's my point, they don't need to be loitering, doing essentially nothing. If you need sensors overhead for a specific period, use UAVs.  They can loiter for much longer and are relatively cheap to operate. Have aircraft fly overhead virtually constantly.  Heck, get them to check in with FACs in the vicinity and give the authority for FACs to divert aircraft as required, when things heat up. Use them when you need heavy weapons or the gun.  This concept has been applied since WW2 (minus the UAVs)

I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation. 

As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.


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## Baz (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation.
> 
> As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.



The problem is that Air Forces all too often forget that the ground war, or some other part of the operation, may be the whole point.  They always want to execute that "shock and awe" plan whether it is appripriate or not, and other areas are considered less important.   In the face of that those other Commanders feel the need to bring their own close support air to the table, so they can force it to support them as required.

Flexibility is the key to air power, which sometimes means the flexibility to use most of it to support somebody else.  This often gets forgotten amongst those who end up making policy decisions for Air Forces.


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## Transporter (25 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Making aircraft loiter waiting for something to happen is generally not the most efficient use of those assets (while there is a time and place for it).



It's nice to be efficient but it's imperative to be effective. When the shit is hitting the fan, _effective_ ALWAYS trumps _efficient_.


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## George Wallace (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> GW: that's my point, they don't need to be loitering, doing essentially nothing. If you need sensors overhead for a specific period, use UAVs.  They can loiter for much longer and are relatively cheap to operate. Have aircraft fly overhead virtually constantly.  Heck, get them to check in with FACs in the vicinity and give the authority for FACs to divert aircraft as required, when things heat up. Use them when you need heavy weapons or the gun.  This concept has been applied since WW2 (minus the UAVs)
> 
> I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation.
> 
> As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.



Sorry.  You just don't understand.  Out of politeness, I will not go into what this discussion has turned into, but I will now have to change my favourite cartoon and saying from "Infantryman" to "Fighter Pilot".


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

George,

I am certain I understand CAS, from planning, to execution, to learning the lessons. But I will leave it at that too...


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## KevinB (26 Jun 2014)

Max I do not think you do.

You understand theory but not practice.  Which is not surprising based on the idea that you see clear lines and targets.

A ground element may have no clue its about to need CAS until ambushed or other chance encounter.

I appreciate that it's not the SIGMA6 answer - but the fact of the matter is unless you have a clearly delineated enemy that has the common decency to have distinct formations your view is not applicable.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Kevin,

I never suggested clear lines and targets for CAS that is for the interdiction piece. I have planned and executed CAS probably a hundred times with Special Forces and in support of FAC training with up to 16 aircraft in the stack.  The way we conduct CAS in training is a mean to practice getting effects on target as quickly and safely as possible. 

Again, it's no faster to take assets out of their CP/IP, give them a talk on and bring bombs on target than getting an airplane transiting through the area (with prior coordination of course otherwise this doesn't work) and do the same thing, especially with the tools we have today (like L16). This has been succesfully conducted since WW2.  

I am not saying that pre-planned CAS doesn't have it's time and place but it should not be the default answer to all support ground troops need.

I understand it doesn't satisfy ground troops but it is the most efficient way to employ in a conventional war, given that we have limited assets.

Efficiency and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive.


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## GAP (26 Jun 2014)

> conventional war


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## Transporter (26 Jun 2014)

@ Supersonicmax

How about this. You go fly your mission over bad guy land without any planned/dedicated AAR support for you. Just call when you're low on fuel, and someone will see if they can re-task an airborne tanker asset somewhere in your area if they're available. It's more efficient that way, but what does it do for your pucker factor?

Ultimately, I don't think the guys on the ground really care about how it gets done, just that when they call, they get the effects they need. Having to re-task an asset to achieve that as opposed to having it readily available isn't a real confidence builder.


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

This all started because of this statement:



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.



I certainly don't understand the details of CAS, not my part ship.  What I do understand is why the Army and Navy feel the need to own their own air assets, having been a planner at both operational and strategic levels in the Air Force, Navy, and Joint.

The view of the Air Force, which SM has been quite clearly explaining, is that all air assets should be C2d by the JFACC.  If there is a need for something not in the plan, for example CAS, the JFACC will receive the request and then decide whether to fulfil it or not based on their priorities.  As well, the Air Force wants to own all those assets so the other Commander's have very little leverage to disagree.

Those other Commander's, based on experience, *do not trust the Air Force* to always prioritize correctly.  Therefore, they want to own their own assets (like Apache's, or at least have dedicated assets (like A-10s), so they have the leverage to tell the JFACC to go F!@# themselves when required.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Transporter said:
			
		

> @ Supersonicmax
> 
> How about this. You go fly your mission over bad guy land without any planned/dedicated AAR support for you. Just call when you're low on fuel, and someone will see if they can re-task an airborne tanker asset somewhere in your area if they're available. It's more efficient that way, but what does it do for your pucker factor?
> 
> Ultimately, I don't think the guys on the ground really care about how it gets done, just that when they call, they get the effects they need. Having to re-task an asset to achieve that as opposed to having it readily available isn't a real confidence builder.



Been there done that. In some missions, we don't need AAR support or SEAD supports.  In others, there is no way around it because of a commander's intent (ie acceptable level of risk) or simply because otherwise it is impossible (not enough fuel).

For example, on a night strike package (24 planes), the plan didn't require AAR for us and we even had extra fuel.  A no-go item for the package was SEAD because of the threat in the target area and the commander's intent wrt the threat.  We get to our marshall point and SEAD is late by 30 minutes.  That means we will need fuel to complete the mission.  We called AWACS and told them we needed gas.  Within 10 minutes we were gerting gas from a KC-10 (we weren't fraged to get gas) and back to the marshall before SEAD got on station, on-time for the new push time.  

We breathe and live contingencies.   A re-task is no big deal.  The important thing in a war is that all involved work toward a common goal, and not towards their own individual service goals and perceived priorities.


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> The important thing in a war is that all involved work toward a common goal, and not towards their own individual service goals and perceived priorities.



... and the Air Force is one of the worst at promoting their individual service goals and perceived priorities.  They are *continuously* promoting centralized operational targeting and ISR without giving a rat's a$% about the needs of the other Commanders, even when they are the supporting commander.

Even though I'm in the Air Force, I would much rather be Naval Air.  At least then there would only be one Commander ignoring us.  You have any idea how hard it is to work in an environment that your own command knows so little about what you do (Maritime Air) that they rename you ISR?


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Baz,

I agree that domestically, for Force Generation, there should be air/aviation specific to all services.  MH should be owned by the Navy, Tac Hel by the Army (there are some drawbacks to it but it's not the point of this discussion).  However, when it comes to Force Employment, in large scale operations at least, other than very specific platforms (like MH), assets should be given to the ACC (who doesn't need to be Air Force although in most cases, it makes the most sense).  There are a bunch of issues with splitting AORs to different service (they tried in Vietnam with Route Packages and failed): coordination nightmare, engagement authority and reduced flexibility to name a few.

The problem to delegating CAS platform to the LCC is that most CAS platforms are multi-role and do much more than CAS. If you delegate those platforms to LCC, good luck getting them, even when they are not used by the LCC.
I believe the problems wrt to prioritization are canadian specific and cannot be broadly applied to NATO/US.


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I believe the problems wrt to prioritization are canadian specific and cannot be broadly applied to NATO/US.



I don't, I believe the problem emanates from the US Air Force.  Some have gone as far as getting rid of the USAF, like here: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140574/robert-farley/ground-the-air-force, but I don't agree with going that far.

Canada is attempting to model its Air Force after the USAF, on a much smaller scale.

My last job, up to 8 months ago was SHAPE J2 ISTAR Targeting.  The USAF, represented in NATO by ACC Ramstein, has convinced themselves that Operational Targeting campaigns are the solution to all problems.  That scares a lot of people, that we are going to focus so much energy on that, and end up with a non-scalable response.

Trust me, I am a big fan of Operational Targeting campaigns are amazingly effective in some situations... it gives the Commander the unheard of capability to reach out and touch an adversaries center of gravity at a time and place of his choosing.  But, it also isn't a be all and end all.  When other methods are more important the ACC should become a supporting Commander and either be told where to put his airplanes, or give the right ones up as required.

Taken Ocean Shield (Med) or Horn of Africa ops.  Ramstein couldn't care less, and doesn't want anything to do with scheduling, but they do want to keep control of all the aircraft.  Couple that with a general lack of MPAs (because Air Forces would rather give them up than their "important" ISR and Strike aircraft), it leaves a gapping hole in air support for these ongoing ops.


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## KevinB (26 Jun 2014)

What is an MPA?

And I for one never saw the point of giving the Air Force ISR control - I always figured that was best for ground folks (unless AWACS etc is considered ISR)


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## Colin Parkinson (26 Jun 2014)

The number of "multi-role fighters" being acquired is decreasing. The air force brass will grow more and more reluctant about close in CAS which is what the A-10, SU-25 type aircraft are really meant for from my view. I guess we should distinguish between Air support and & *Close in *air support. It would seem the type of aircraft that can do the air support and be safe from most of the low level risks is fairly broad. The type of aircraft that can really get down into the weeds and perform there is limited. So with the retirement of the A-10 CAS mission is left to rotary aircraft and Air support is given to the Air force and their Marine/Navy counterparts along with all their other tasks.

So for the people that have the numbers do they have a breakdown of air support vs close in air support where the aircraft is down below a certain threshold engaging targets?


----------



## Privateer (26 Jun 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> What is an MPA?



Maritime patrol aircraft.  (Unless I'm mistaken in this context; I will delete the post if so informed.)


----------



## Loachman (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> UAVs ... relatively cheap to operate.



Who told you that?

The Mighty Sperwer, all 13-foot wingspan of it, was the most expensive aircraft, per hour, in the whole CF to operate during its time.

I signed for about $1.5 million worth of them that I did not sign back in over one three-day period.

An awful lot of money has been spent so that UAV operators can go to the washroom in comfort and dignity and have pizza delivered to them - the only significant difference between UAVs and manned bombers.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.

David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role platform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?

Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.

 I don't think UAVs will take our cockpits anytime soon.  But they will someday.


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## dimsum (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.
> 
> I don't think UAVs will take our cockpits anytime soon.  But they will someday.



A significant portion (I would guess the vast majority) of the cost of UAVs isn't the airframe itself, although each Reaper, etc. is probably about the 5 million-dollar mark (significantly higher for Global Hawk/Triton).  The real cost comes with the satellite bandwidth involved in running satellite-controlled UAVs.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.
> 
> David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role platform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?
> 
> ...



What?  The end of the Rico Suave's. No more pilots at the bar waving their hands around like Kathleen Wynne, talking about their latest air encounter. Say it ain't so Max :facepalm: Give us some hope buddy.


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role latform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?



No, that's the definition of the USAF's Global ISR.  Intelligence, surveillance, and recconaisance were defined long before that... that defintion came out of the first Persian Gulf War.

If that's what ISR is, why does the RCAF want to call MH and MPA ISR platforms?  Why does the USAF want to call AGS and Triton (BAMS) ISR.  To get control of them, that's why.

You keep licking that USAF ice cream; if you say it enough times, it must be true.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Baz,

Maybe that's why, but I hope not.  Should we call you ISR?  Probably not.  Are you capable of doing ISR? Yes.  In today's age, any platform is capable of doing ISR, passively or actively...  Your domestic affiliation should be based on your primary role.  In theater, it depends how we intend to use you.  Generally speaking, again, I think anything flying above a defined coordinated altitude should be under the theater ACC at the very least.

Army systems do ISR, so do hard Navy systems.  I don't think any Air Force is trying to control them.


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## rampage800 (26 Jun 2014)

> Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.



and close proximity to troops, if it isn't in close proximity to troops then its BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction).


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

There are four main types of maneuvre formations in the US Army: Infantry, Armoured, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, plus the Combat Aviation Brigades.  All of the helicopters including Apches belong to Combat Aviation Brigades; should they belong to the ACC?

US Army Battlefield Surveillance Brigades have significant airborne ISR assets, including predators and the ability to control then.  As well, the ISTAR Battalions also have airborne ISR.  Should they belong to the ACC?

The Carrier Air Wing has four fighter squadrons, plus the Carrier Srike Group has up to four Tomahawk shooters.  Of course they should coordinate with the ACC for land strike, as part of the targeting, interdiction, and CAS plans, but should they belong to the ACC?  Even when doing maritme activites, like maritime strike, embargo, or convoy?  Isn't the expert for these activities the maritime surface warfare commander?


In the face of a true sub threat, should the MPAs belong to the ACC, even though the expert and main user is the MCC, who normally has a MAOC for just this purpose?

Would Air Forces give up control of fighters to the MCC in order to provide robust support for maritime strike ti a fleet in blue water, even though the MCC is the expert and has air control and tasking centers both ashore and afloat?  By the way, this is why Navies want to keep strike assets, including shore based, because they don't trust pure Air Forces to conduct maritime strike correctly.


However, Air Forces continuously fight to control all of that in the name of flexibilty and effeciency.  And that is why the other components don't trust the Air Forces to support, fight to keep their own platforms, and insist on keeping them under their control.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

rampage800 said:
			
		

> and close proximity to troops, if it isn't in close proximity to troops then its BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction).



This is not what every definition of CAS says, but if you say so...

Baz,

I think you are forgetting what the ACC is.  It doesn't mean Air Force.  He is just the commander of theater air assets.  He could be Navy or Army, depending on the focus of the operation.  To answer your questions:

1- If we don't want to employ them outside of Army support then no.

2- Airborne assets: yes (minus mini-UAVs).  

3- If they are purely employed in hard Navy roles, no.  Otherwise yes.

4- See 3.  If under ACC, a liaison team should be sent to CAOC.

5- No, they should be under the ACC, but the ACC should be a Navy Lt-Gen

Don't forget that the ACC is responsible for the coordination and employment of air assets to accomplish the mission as dictated by the JFC.


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## rampage800 (26 Jun 2014)

nah Max, actually it is the definition that all the ground guys use....I'm surprised with all your CAS experience you didn't know that though, you did work with SOF after all.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

I have conducted type 3, bombs on coordinates CAS where there were no troops within 30 miles of the target.  While operations in proximity of troops is part of CAS , there is more to CAS than that...


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

He is not the commander of theatre air assets.  A theatre can have more than one JFC.

He is the JFCs Air Component Commander.  He executes  command and control over assinged assets, usually air but not always.  For instance, he may have C2 of theatre ballistic missile systems.

The other Component Commanders also execute C2 over assigned assets.  Those assets may be air assets, and frequently are.  The JFC will assign them as required for task completion.
 Usuaaly, but not always, air will be coordinated by the ATO and ACO, published by the ACC, but that does not mean the ACC has C2 of assets not assigned.  A perfect example is srategic ISR assets.  They may show up in the ATO but they don't belong to the ACC, he is just coordinating them.

Therefore, it makes perfect sense to chop dedicated CAS to the LCC if/when required.  Land commanders want the leverage to ensure that happens so they fight the budget wars to have their own or at least have dedicated platforms.


Again, hard Air types continuously use flexibility, effeciency, and a warped view of unity of command in order to promote a view of the world that is contrary to true unity of command and span of control.

And a Naval MAOC would not be a LGen... it might be some type of Admiral but also could quite easily be a Naval Captain.


As well, if I were embarked and had to force a passage, I'd pray to god my maritimr strike assets were USN and controlled either embarked or from a MAOC, and not USAF or RCAF, whether they had Joint Strike Fighter or not; and not because I'm religious.


----------



## Eye In The Sky (26 Jun 2014)

Baz said:
			
		

> Again, the Air Force doesn't understand Joint.



Pretty broad brush.


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## Eye In The Sky (26 Jun 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> What is an MPA?
> 
> And I for one never saw the point of giving the Air Force ISR control - I always figured that was best for ground folks (unless AWACS etc is considered ISR)



http://globalnews.ca/video/861997/tour-the-cp-140-aurora/   for a brief look inside.  

I'd say you need both ground and air right?  I don't know of many battlespaces that are 1 dimensional afterall.

We (the LRP "we") are capable of providing "stuff" that a ground unit simply can't.  And vice versa of course; like any Army, Navy or Air Force asset, we have our own Cap's & Lim's.

LRP assets work with ground units.  You just don't see it in the news.  Here's a short read on the stuff from the Libya/ OP Mobile.

http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/2012-Vol1/Iss3-Summer/Sections/05-Punching_Above_its_Weight_The_CP140_Aurora_Experience_Within_Task_Force_Libeccio_and_Operation_MOBILE_e.pdf

:2c:


----------



## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

Replace theater by operation.

From the JP 1-02 (yeah a US doc...  The only thing I can find on GP Net) JFACC: The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

Bottom line:  it depends how you define Air Operations.  In the end, the "J" in JFACC means joint.   It will be operation dependant (as it should).

The JP 3-30 (again, US) really highlights that C2 relationships depend upon what you intend to do with the assets.  It also says that army air/avn assets should always be under the ACC, which I disagree.  It should be, like with other services, situation dependant.


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## Baz (26 Jun 2014)

...and the JFC is free to assign his assets as he sees fit, within the limitations set by the force provider.

A full up ACC is capable of C2 of an air heavy jpint force by itself;  and conversely full up LCCs and MCCs are capable of doing the same, including of assigned air forces.  That is the current NATO command structure.

But you are continuing to miss the point, the other environments don't trust the Air Force to think jointly, and so continually take measures to ensure they have support when having it is life or death.


----------



## SupersonicMax (26 Jun 2014)

You keep saying that other services don't trust the Air Force in providing adequate Air.  Can you expand on why or when this distrust started happening?


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## Baz (27 Jun 2014)

It's not that people don't trust the Air Forces to provide adequate air.  Its that they don't trust that when it isn't dedicated, during certain parts of the fight, that the Air heavy ACCs will prioritize it correctly.  Therefore they want their own.

As I've said, the accuracy of the modern weapons and the flexibility of delivery has given the commanders the capability to directly strike the adversaries center of gravity at a time and place of their choosing.  This is an incredible strength of modern air power.

However, that isn't always the tool required.  When other commanders are the supported one, and the ACC is supporting, those other commanders want control of the assets as part of their plan, so they aren't assuming too high risks.  Ironically, you've reinforced the concern with this chain of posts: "the best way to employ CAS is to retask aircraft going to strike other targets."  Problem is, that leaves the priority decision to some faceless Air guy on the ACC floor.

This isn't new... its been going on ever sense the advent of operational air power.  Strategic vs operation vs tactical: heavy bombers in direct support in Normandy and the resulting problems, tactical air in France and how deep they should be allowed to interdict, weight of effort in Vietnam between supporting air and strikes against the north.  In the first Persian Gulf war there was a realization that Air had become precise enough to in effect win the operational battle, and ever since the USAF's mantra has been "everything to support the operational air plan."  The continuing undertone that guys in contact want, in this order (my understanding, again I'm not a CAS guy), Apache, Cobra, A-10, Marine Harrier, Marine F/A-18, USN F/A-18, Strike Eagle, (Spectre somewhere in there but I'm not sure where) and then whatever else is available.  The unfortunate lack of support from the USAF for Joint STARS, as its forte is battlefield interdiction and direct support of the Air-Ground war, and the USAF don't see those as core roles, and they don't think J-STARS is a very good ISR platform (I've had long talks with JSTARS on this subject because NATO AGS, where I worked for a while, is a J-STARS like Global Hawk... the Air types think its a horrible ISR platform but then can't understand why it could be given up to the Army or Navy for surveillance ops, even though it is Alliance Ground *Surveillance*).

Everything you are saying about the operational use of Airpower is correct, and its an incredible tool.  But when Commander's have planned for direct support of their maneuver plan they want direct support, not support at the discretion of the ACC, because they are assuming the risk.


Edited to add: There's two reasons I care about this subject: in NATO at both AGS and Targeting I was at the heart of these types of discussions, and too many Air types are literally willing to give up everything else to enable Operational use of Air power, leaving us with only one tool; and my home community, MH, has been withering on the vine because good chunks of the RCAF don't care because its not their core role, and good chunks of the RCN don't care because they don't control it.


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## Edward Campbell (27 Jun 2014)

Baz said:
			
		

> ... the RCAF don't care because its not their core role, and good chunks of the RCN don't care because they don't control it.




This takes us all the way back to 1975, when the _unified_ (joint) commands, MARCOM and MOBCOM, were stripped of their organic air components in order to create a three star "air command" of equal _status_ to the other two. It was both operational and administrative nonsense, but it satisfied the egos - nothing more was at stake - of a couple of elderly _air element_ generals. Several _air element_ generals argued, vociferously, against it ~ and then were posted into dead end jobs.

What Baz is describing - lack of support from anywhere, for maritime and army aviation, was the result.


Edited to add:

*Mods*: should/could this thread be moved to a Canadian Air Force page?


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## Baz (27 Jun 2014)

ERC: Yep... because we had to create an Air Force that controlled all air assets we put everything else 2nd string to the "core" Air Force roles.


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## Journeyman (27 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I have planned and executed CAS probably a hundred times with Special Forces .......


Really?  In a real-world combat operation?   ???



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> You keep saying that other services don't trust the Air Force in providing adequate Air.  Can you expand on why or when this distrust started happening?


As I've mentioned, painfully often now, when we had to rely on the USAF because the CF-18 world didn't show up for "Canada's longest war."  

Fortunately, we could rely upon them; again, as mentioned, the A-10 and F-15E people appeared to enjoy actually applying their profession.


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## Transporter (27 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Really?  In a real-world combat operation?   ???
> As I've mentioned, painfully often now, when we had to rely on the USAF because the CF-18 world didn't show up for "Canada's longest war."
> 
> Fortunately, we could rely upon them; again, as mentioned, the A-10 and F-15E people appeared to enjoy actually applying their profession.



I don't believe you can blame the CF-18 community or the RCAF for the fact that the CF didn't have fast air in the fight. I know from experience that as early as 2002, the CF-18 community and Air Force were chomping at the bit, looking for every possible angle to exploit, in an effort to be involved in Afghanistan. I can't vouch for their veracity to do so in later years, but had they shown up, maybe you'd have gotten all the support you needed, when you needed it. I get your overall point, but I don't believe you can say you don't trust them if they never had an opportunity to gain that trust. I guess we'll never know what might have been.


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## tomahawk6 (27 Jun 2014)

The Army and Air Force had an agreement where the former wouldnt have fixed wing combat aircraft.This left the USAF with the CAS role.With the advent of attack helos,the Army has been able to provide close support of ground units.The arrangement has worked well IMO.


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## Loachman (27 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.



Once the costs of the Ground Control Stations and losses are taken into account, the costs go up.

And then, if one is controlling via satellite, well...


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## Journeyman (27 Jun 2014)

Transporter said:
			
		

> I don't believe you can blame the CF-18 community or the RCAF for the fact that the CF didn't have fast air in the fight.


So if the governments (Liberal and Conservative) won't risk the princesses in support of Canadian soldiers fighting our wars, then why are we wasting any more money on them, (beyond NORAD, as previously stated)?


...especially when MH and SAR aircraft require replacement;  ah, but the RCAF's tribal elders are from the fighter aircraft world......  :not-again:

History is replete with examples of occasionally tearing down empires for the greater good -- except for the emperor, closest minions, and 'true believers' of course.


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## dimsum (27 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> So if the governments (Liberal and Conservative) won't risk the princesses in support of Canadian soldiers fighting our wars, then why are we wasting any more money on them, (beyond NORAD, as previously stated)?
> 
> 
> ...especially when MH and SAR aircraft require replacement;  ah, but the RCAF's tribal elders are from the fighter aircraft world......  :not-again:
> ...



I've heard a running joke in the RAAF that Air Combat Group (fighters) kept the Heron UAV as long as they did, and cycled fighter pilots through it, so they had enough operational experience (and bling) to justify the Hornets and Supers not deploying anywhere; it looked bad that all other fleets were regularly on ops.  Once they had enough, it went to Surveillance and Response Group (MPA, which it really should have been in the first place).

But I digress...


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## MAJONES (27 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> So if the governments (Liberal and Conservative) won't risk the princesses in support of Canadian soldiers fighting our wars, then why are we wasting any more money on them, (beyond NORAD, as previously stated)?
> 
> 
> ...especially when MH and SAR aircraft require replacement;  ah, but the RCAF's tribal elders are from the fighter aircraft world......  :not-again:
> ...



Journeyman, we need to be ready to fight the next war, not the last one.  I'm not sure if you've noticed, but Mr. Putin has been getting a bit big for his britches off late.  He has also been making noise about the arctic, (as have the Chinese).  As much as I respect the Canadian Army, they have next to no use when it comes to maintaining our claims in the resource rich Arctic Ocean.  The RCN could do it, if we bought them nuclear subs (which is not likely).  Like it or not, the only service that can project a sustained presence in the Arctic is the RCAF.  Like it or not, that is where the next cold war is going to be.  We could leave it to the Americans to defend the arctic; I'm sure they'd been most happy to, given that possession is 9/10ths of the law.  This would, however, amount to relinquishing our sovereignty in the region.  Long story short; if we want to maintain our own territorial sovereignty, we are going to have to do it ourselves, and we will need the F-18s, (or F-35s or Typhoons.....) to do it.
Any time we are going to need CAS we are going to be operating as part of a coalition.  We can get CAS from our allies.  So, if it comes down to choosing which capability to prioritize, (which in the current fiscal environment it does), it's in our best interest to keep our fighters, and to use them for NORAD.

As for who should own CAS, (in a hypothetical world where we could afford dedicated CAS assets), it should be organic to the ground forces and operated by fully trained aviators.  Making it organic to the ground forces allows the supported commander to put assests where he needs them when he needs them.  Having it operated by aviators ensures that it doesn't become a stick in the spokes of the overall air effort.


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## Fishbone Jones (27 Jun 2014)

MAJONES said:
			
		

> Journeyman, we need to be ready to fight the next war, not the last one.  I'm not sure if you've noticed, but Mr. Putin has been getting a bit big for his britches off late.  He has also been making noise about the arctic, (as have the Chinese).  As much as I respect the Canadian Army, they have next to no use when it comes to maintaining our claims in the resource rich Arctic Ocean.  The RCN could do it, if we bought them nuclear subs (which is not likely).  Like it or not, the only service that can project a sustained presence in the Arctic is the RCAF.  Like it or not, that is where the next cold war is going to be.  We could leave it to the Americans to defend the arctic; I'm sure they'd been most happy to, given that possession is 9/10ths of the law.  This would, however, amount to relinquishing our sovereignty in the region.  Long story short; if we want to maintain our own territorial sovereignty, we are going to have to do it ourselves, and we will need the F-18s, (or F-35s or Typhoons.....) to do it.
> Any time we are going to need CAS we are going to be operating as part of a coalition.  We can get CAS from our allies.  So, if it comes down to choosing which capability to prioritize, (which in the current fiscal environment it does), it's in our best interest to keep our fighters, and to use them for NORAD.
> 
> As for who should own CAS, (in a hypothetical world where we could afford dedicated CAS assets), it should be organic to the ground forces and operated by fully trained aviators.  Making it organic to the ground forces allows the supported commander to put assests where he needs them when he needs them.  Having it operated by _aviators_ ensures that it doesn't become a stick in the spokes of the overall air effort.



Are you suggesting that RCAF Private (T) should be doing this job? 

I could be wrong, however, I believe JM has espoused, more than once, that that's where (NORAD) our air should be sent to.


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## Journeyman (27 Jun 2014)

MAJONES said:
			
		

> Journeyman, we need to be ready to fight the next war, not the last one.  I'm not sure if you've noticed, but......
> 
> .....it's in our best interest to keep our fighters, and to use them for NORAD.





			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> ..... beyond NORAD, *I don't know why we spend a single fucking penny on the RCAF fighter world*.





			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> .....why are we wasting any more money on them, (beyond NORAD, as previously stated)?



I suppose I could have stated it a third time, but I guess you _hadn't noticed_.  Thanks for proving the adage that "a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention."  :facepalm:




			
				MAJONES said:
			
		

> .....the Arctic......  Like it or not, that is where the next cold war is going to be.


Ah, fortune-telling at it's finest; I gather you have an extensive background in strategic planning (and hence are aware of the recurring shortcomings of putting eggs in one basket).

...unless "arctic/cold war" was an attempt at a pun, in which case you've established equal credibility at stand-up.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2014)

MAJONES said:
			
		

> Journeyman, we need to be ready to fight the next war, not the last one.  I'm not sure if you've noticed, but Mr. Putin has been getting a bit big for his britches off late.  He has also been making noise about the arctic, (as have the Chinese).  As much as I respect the Canadian Army, they have next to no use when it comes to maintaining our claims in the resource rich Arctic Ocean.  The RCN could do it, if we bought them nuclear subs (which is not likely).  Like it or not, the only service that can project a sustained presence in the Arctic is the RCAF.  Like it or not, that is where the next cold war is going to be.  We could leave it to the Americans to defend the arctic; I'm sure they'd been most happy to, given that possession is 9/10ths of the law.  This would, however, amount to relinquishing our sovereignty in the region.  Long story short; if we want to maintain our own territorial sovereignty, we are going to have to do it ourselves, and we will need the F-18s, (or F-35s or Typhoons.....) to do it.
> Any time we are going to need CAS we are going to be operating as part of a coalition.  We can get CAS from our allies.  So, if it comes down to choosing which capability to prioritize, (which in the current fiscal environment it does), it's in our best interest to keep our fighters, and to use them for NORAD.



That kind of thinking emphasizes the argument that the Air Force is not in touch with reality, in believing in their own importance.

Actually, the RCAF are only a QRF in this role.  They are not in any way providing a permanent presence in the Arctic.  The Canadian Rangers, on the other hand, are.  Over the horizon radars and other sensors are providing early warning; again, not necessarily the RCAF.  Any idea that the RCAF is fully capable of defending the NORTH is escaping down a rabbit hole into fantasy.  It is always down to one thing when it comes to defending/asserting sovereignty; "boots on the ground".  An aircraft flying over, every few days, is not defending, nor asserting anything; just a temporary presence.   

Overflights of Greenland, Alaska, or any other nation, do not assert our sovereignty over those lands.  Nor does it do much to actually assert sovereignty over our own lands.  It is only through mutual agreements that the sovereignty of those lands remain under their nations control.  The sovereignty of those lands would only change national control when another nation physically puts troops on the ground to claim them, not by flying an aircraft over them periodically.






			
				MAJONES said:
			
		

> As for who should own CAS, (in a hypothetical world where we could afford dedicated CAS assets), it should be organic to the ground forces and operated by fully trained aviators.  Making it organic to the ground forces allows the supported commander to put assests where he needs them when he needs them.  Having it operated by aviators ensures that it doesn't become a stick in the spokes of the overall air effort.




Most of us arguing with SupersonicMax would agree.


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## MAJONES (27 Jun 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> That kind of thinking emphasizes the argument that the Air Force is not in touch with reality, in believing in their own importance.



Physician, heal thyself.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Actually, the RCAF are only a QRF in this role.  They are not in any way providing a permanent presence in the Arctic.  The Canadian Rangers, on the other hand, are.  Over the horizon radars and other sensors are providing early warning; again, not necessarily the RCAF.  Any idea that the RCAF is fully capable of defending the NORTH is escaping down a rabbit hole into fantasy.  It is always down to one thing when it comes to defending/asserting sovereignty; "boots on the ground".  An aircraft flying over, every few days, is not defending, nor asserting anything; just a temporary presence.


  

Couple of points for you to consider George.  1.)  I'm not talking about defending the Arctic landmass; it's not under threat.  I am talking about exerting control of our exclusive economic zone and the undersea resources that go with it.  Unless you want to issue the Rangers SCUBA gear and have them advance by rushes to the continental shelf, I don't see them playing much of a role.  As was stated, the best way to deal with this is nuclear subs.  Given that this solution will never fly, the next best option is airpower (LRP backed by fighters).  2.)  Any boots that get onto North American ground arrived by air or by sea.  Thus, forward defense of the continent does not fall to the Army.




> Are you suggesting that RCAF Private (T) should be doing this job?



Our Privates are pretty sharp cookies, and besides, the pilots sure as h3ll don't want that job.................................... ;D



> Ah, fortune-telling at it's finest; I gather you have an extensive background in strategic planning (and hence are aware of the recurring shortcomings of putting eggs in one basket).



People with bigger brains and more shoulder bling than us are saying the arctic is the next hot spot (pun intended).  You might want to trying reading something more than the sports page or watching something other than the Walking Dead.  There's a great big interesting world out there; don't let it pass you by.



> Quote from: Journeyman on June 25, 2014, 16:04:36
> 
> ..... beyond NORAD, I don't know why we spend a single ******* penny on the RCAF fighter world.
> 
> ...



Before Afghanistan somebody said this:




> Quote from: SOMEBODY
> ..... beyond RECCE, I don't know why we spend a single ******* penny on ARMOUR.
> 
> 
> ...


  

How did that turn out in the long run?


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## Journeyman (27 Jun 2014)

MAJONES said:
			
		

> You might want to trying reading something more than the sports page or watching something other than the Walking Dead.  There's a great big interesting world out there; don't let it pass you by.


Insightful comeback   :boring:





> Before Afghanistan somebody said this:
> 
> Quote from: SOMEBODY
> ..... beyond RECCE, I don't know why we spend a single ******* penny on ARMOUR.
> ...


 So you can't actually argue the topic at hand; you have to make up quotes about a completely different issue and different circumstances?  :not-again: 


Maybe you should just back out of the discussion and leave it to people, who while disagreeing, are at least in the same league here.



Edit:
ps - I don't read the sports pages, since I only follow rugby, which I do through several online sites and apps;  I've never seen Walking Dead and haven't the vaguest idea of what it's about.


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## MAJONES (27 Jun 2014)

J-man,

I can see that you have a personal stake in the issue so I will excuse your tantrum.  However, the points I made are valid.  If you don't want to address them here that is your perogative.  I would however, urge to to address them in your own mind just for the sake of your own personal growth.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2014)

MAJONES said:
			
		

> Couple of points for you to consider George.  1.)  I'm not talking about defending the Arctic landmass; it's not under threat.  I am talking about exerting control of our exclusive economic zone and the undersea resources that go with it.  Unless you want to issue the Rangers SCUBA gear and have them advance by rushes to the continental shelf, I don't see them playing much of a role.  As was stated, the best way to deal with this is nuclear subs.  Given that this solution will never fly, the next best option is airpower (LRP backed by fighters).  2.)  Any boots that get onto North American ground arrived by air or by sea.  Thus, forward defense of the continent does not fall to the Army.



I am trying to wrap around in my mind how a RCAF pilot would fit into SCUBA gear flying high above the arctic wastes.

And I agree, that the RCAF would likely be the fastest TAXI to get ground troops into positions in the NORTH.


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## SupersonicMax (27 Jun 2014)

JM & GW:  have you ever lack air support in Afghanistan?  

JM: we do more than NORAD and CAS.  The fighter force is fairly significant political tool that has a fairly small footprint and is relatively cheap to deploy.  We can (and have) have jets on deck within 48 hours of getting a warning order and drop bombs the next day.  This flexible kinetic effect is fairly unique in the CAF toolbox.

We wanted to go to Afghanistan. Someone decided we wouldn't go.  While I don't have all the details as to why, I can think of a couple of contributing factors: 

-In 2002, we didn't have any upgraded aircraft yet.  They were all what we called Legacy (1982 era).  We did have the Nightawk targeting pod which was of marginal effectiveness.  Nonetheless, we had already awarded the contract for the modernization and aircraft were being upgraded (80 to be precise).  The first "R1" aircraft (the first half of the modernization) was delivered in 2003 and the last in 2006.  This upgrade gave us improved radio (ARC-210, HQ, HQ2, Singcars), a new radar, new mission computers, interrogator, and a new stores management system.  Nothing really helping us doing CAS from what we had before.
-We then sent the jets back for more upgrades, namely Link 16, AMRAAM, Joint Helmet Cuing System, and Sniper Pod.  All but the AMRAAM being huge enablers for the CAS mission.  We received the last R2 aircraft in 2010. Then there is the training issue.  Pilots had to be trained to properly and effectively use those new systems.  By that time, I believe (this is what I was told, not first hand) that there was no ramp space and/or need for more CAS in Afghanistan.

I think this may be one of the reasons why we didn't get to go, not because we didn't have the will.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2014)

Max

The argument is are who should own CAS.  The other roles played by the RCAF are irrelevant.


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## a_majoor (27 Jun 2014)

Perhaps the real issue here isn't over who "owns" CAS, but rather that the technology is changing to the extent that CAS as a distinct category may no longer exist.

In the short term, we are seeing an increasing reliance on UCAVs to get up close and personal with the enemy, and a continuing increase in the capabilities of small UAV's. Nothing will say "CAS" like the company support platoon unleashing an ATV sized armed quadcopter to support a platoon under contact in some near future battle. Artillery weapons like Excalibur shells and FOG-M also have the ability to hit pinpoint targets at long ranges. Artillery weapons are also not limited by weather or time on station in the same way aircraft are.

On the other side of the equation, rolling in and blasting a target with an A-10 is a bit old fashioned when a Strike Eagle can release a glide bomb with a smart seeker or guidance kit from airliner altitudes and still make a pinpoint strike on target. Future support aircraft will carry large numbers of smart munitions, or perhaps attack targets with high energy lasers or railguns, vastly expanding the air defense envelope for potential enemies (and for us as well). Instead of an A-10 or F-16 sized aircraft, we might be looking at B-1 or 737 sized aircraft to provide fire support to the battlefield (those carrying laser or railgun weapons can attack targets on the surface, in the air and even in low orbit).

This gets back to the idea of aircraft as a form of artillery, and means tying airpower to the battlespace commander through an evolved version of the FSCC.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2014)

To flip that and perhaps take Max and MAJONES side; where do you want to place the FSCC?  In your futuristic scenario, the FSCC could be anywhere, even in that 747 or even Colorado.


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## MAJONES (27 Jun 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I am trying to wrap around in my mind how a RCAF pilot would fit into SCUBA gear flying high above the arctic wastes.
> 
> And I agree, that the RCAF would likely be the fastest TAXI to get ground troops into positions in the NORTH.



I give you full points for tenacity.   ;D


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## Fishbone Jones (27 Jun 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Perhaps the real issue here isn't over who "owns" CAS, but rather that the technology is changing to the extent that CAS as a distinct category may no longer exist.
> 
> In the short term, we are seeing an increasing reliance on UCAVs to get up close and personal with the enemy, and a continuing increase in the capabilities of small UAV's.  Artillery weapons like Excalibur shells and FOG-M also have the ability to hit pinpoint targets at long ranges. Artillery weapons *Nothing will say "CAS" like the company support platoon unleashing an ATV sized armed quadcopter to support a platoon under contact in some near future battle.*are also not limited by weather or time on station in the same way aircraft are.
> 
> ...



Your scenario though creates a new dilemma.

First, that it flies. The air force will demand that it comes under their control as they did when we started with army guys flying the UAVs out of Kabul. IIRC, that went from army non commissioned types flying them to AF officers flying them. However, maybe not, as from what I can gather, the Air Command and jet jockeys don't consider rotary wing stuff as true airforce anyway. 

Secondly, you would now have to have an AF Officer\pilot type moving with the platoon and most of us ground types that have been around some know what an absolute pain in the ass it is trying to do our primary job of hunting and killing, without having to babysit a non combat arms type specialist who wastes space, rations and manpower.


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## Journeyman (27 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> JM & GW:  have you ever lack air support in Afghanistan?


I cannot speak for GW; but for myself, as mentioned, the USAF was more than helpful. 



> JM......The fighter force......is relatively cheap to deploy.


Were you not just arguing with Loachman that you're more expensive to deploy, by at least a factor of 10?  



> We can (and have) have jets on deck within 48 hours of getting a warning order and drop bombs the next day.


 Ever done it for real?



> We wanted to go to Afghanistan. Someone decided we wouldn't go.


 *My point exactly!*   The best poker hand in the world is meaningless if the cards don't get laid down.  We are spending an inordinate amount of money on "potential energy" when what we've needed is "kinetic energy."

I'm simply suggesting that we stop pissing away all that money -- except for NORAD (_third_ reference) -- so that the fighter-dominated RCAF leadership can feel good about themselves when talking to their American and British counterparts.



I notice that you've chosen not to answer this question; I assume that the answer is "no," notwithstanding your stretching for LCF points by mentioning SF.


			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I have planned and executed CAS probably a hundred times with Special Forces .....
> 
> 
> > Really?  In a real-world combat operation?   ???


From the same real-world experience (and credibility) then, I'd like to state that I've had sex with Jenna Jameson hundreds of times.... while watching porn.

Well I _could_!  I mean, I've gone through the motions in situations with non-porn stars....and I've read some theoretical 'doctrinal' manuals on the topic.   :nod:

Oh, but that's not the same as actually doing it for real, is it?


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## Loachman (27 Jun 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I've had sex with Jenna Jameson hundreds of times.... while watching porn.



AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

My mind's eye!!!!!! My mind's eye!!!!!!!!!!


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## Petard (27 Jun 2014)

An example of when fire support of any kind wasn't available during a TIC happened here
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ganjgal

So why the "mistrust?"
I'd say the stricter centralized control measures that the RCAF are proponents of, could have a similar effect as those stricter ROE had. Either way, not knowing you can rely on some kind of fire support, until such time as you've convinced those controlling that resource to provide it, adds to that mistrust


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## Zoomie (27 Jun 2014)

Loving the rants, pointless attacks and useless diatribe in the past 4 pages.

Happy to see that baiting Max is not succeeding - he has taken every single gibe thrown his way and answered logically and without emotion.  BZ Max - you are doing the AF proud.  The usual suspects with their hard-on for slagging the boys in blue - this is getting tiresome and only showing your immaturity.  Contribute in a smart way or shut up.

I have no stake in this fight - I just know that a fighter-guy knows his shit inside out, this is what they live and breathe - they don't have to have "been there" for their knowledge and opinion to count.


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## Kirkhill (27 Jun 2014)

So, I freely admit to not having read all the submissions on this latest iteration of air wars.... but I'm going to pitch in in any event.

Tell me again:  What is the difference amongst the following?

HE delivered by CG-84.
HE delivered by 81mm mortar.
HE delivered by C3
HE delivered by LG-1
HE delivered by M777
HE delivered by MRLS
HE delivered by CH-146 
HE delivered by AH-64
HE delivered by CH-148
HE delivered by P51-F4F-A10-F18-F35-B52-B1B-B2. (with or with out intervening rocket assist).

All of them deliver HE to a target by air.

Assuming that any and all of them can actually hit what they are aiming at (the gunners, after a few centuries of effort are finally hitting their targets and their air force offspring, after a single century, are catching up to them), it seems to me that the issue is not which bunch of shade tree mechanics get to maintain the really neat launchers.  The issue is who gets to tell the  mechanics to shove their toys close enough to FEBA so that they can actually contribute to the delivery programme.

Alternate history time:

BOMARC is not decommissioned.  Voodoos and Starfighters never make it into the skies.

BOMARC was modified to accomodate range increases (400 km initially) and to accomodate Air to Surface Munitions.

That makes BOMARC a very long range GMRLS as well as SAM.

Is BOMARC an Air Force system or an Arty system?  And when would the Gunners/Aviators that keep them nice and shiny be forced to send them down range to support the Infanteer on FEBA?

Do the Gunners/Aviators get brownie points for the number of missiles they have in inventory (ie they don't use) or they send down range (ie they do use) ?


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## Old Sweat (27 Jun 2014)

This is getting frustrating. It seems to me, and I may be waaay out of date, that CAS is the application of air power when the use of the weapon, whatever it is, is within an area where the ground force has responsibility for the control of the delivery. Having said that, the difference between air and land based delivery systems is that the former is subject to diversion to higher value or priority targets by the air force controlling agency at virtually any time up to weapons release. This is not the case with, for example, artillery and is because of the relatively limited number of weapons available and their usually greater effects that land based stuff. That is the big difference between CAS and the other means of fire support including AH and probably a lot of UAVs. This has to be accepted as a limitation of CAS, but in return the weapon system makes a big, honking BOOM when it hits.

A bit of a red herring - the CAS aircraft does not have to come screaming in fast and low; it can launch from a relatively long distance away if it can identify the target and be cleared by the FAC/JTAC controlling the mission. An example was the engagement of a party of Taliban who had taken cover in a compound after being engaged by Canadian artillery. A Harrier with a guided weapon was available and the Battle Group FSCC coordinated an engagement by observing the target via an UAV image, marking the target with an artillery illuminating round that landed in the compound and confirming that the Harrier pilot had identified the target because of the round burning on the ground. Result 12 out of 15 Taliban killed and a marked decrease in activity in the area. (True story.) Another example was Karnak Farm back in 2002, but we will leave that one alone because it is not germane to our discussion.

Lesson One - always have an alternate if the aircraft is diverted to another task.

Lesson Two - take nothing for granted. Effective CAS requires effective control from the ground.

Lesson Three - the CAS asset need not be a fast mover, but can be an AH, an UAV or Lord know whatever else.

The RCAF will not have enough airplanes in theatre to do everything, but that goes for the Canadian Army and our SOF as well. Let's cut each other some slack.


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## a_majoor (27 Jun 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> To flip that and perhaps take Max and MAJONES side; where do you want to place the FSCC?  In your futuristic scenario, the FSCC could be anywhere, even in that 747 or even Colorado.



No, the FSCC still resides with the battlespace commander. The physical battlespace will be much larger, and Chief Fires (or Chief Effects if you prefer) will have a much larger tool kit to use (since we are talking about kinetic effects, we will leave out the IO tools for now), ranging from UCAVs that could be controlled at the Coy level to long range weapons dispensed by aircraft in racetrack patterns hundreds of kilometres away. Since the battlespace commander needs a continuing presence, the TOC will be on the ground (or in exceptional circumstances on board a ship).

While it is quite possible that Canadian institutional bunfighting could result in a scenario where an armed UCAV designed for intimate support of the manoeuvre element is considered an "Air Force" asset rather than a company level weapons system (with all the issues that brings), in that case the fault is not in the weapons system. You could draw an analogy with the USAF and the US Army's so called "Key West Accord", where systems were essentially divvied up on basis of airspeed and if they were fixed or rotary wing assets, rather than what actual role they played. In that regard I think the USMC with its tight integration has the right idea, Marines on the ground get support from artillery, rotary wing and fixed wing assets that are also owned and operated by Marines.


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## Journeyman (28 Jun 2014)

OK, I will add one last post to this to try and clarify some points, then I will bow out.

1.  I bear absolutely *NO* animosity towards SupersonicMax and his CF-18 compatriots. They are doing their job, and as I understand it, doing it well.  Clearly my questioning his operational record came across as a personal attack; it was intended to critique 'the system,' not the individual.  For that, I sincerely apologize.

2.  My overarching complaint (perhaps I've been too subtle    ), concerns the amount of money we Canadians are investing in the fighter world, if they are not going to be used.  This is the same logic that sees the US government legislate that several decommissioned USN battleships must be kept ready to deploy.....just in case.  "Use it or lose it" -- Canada does not have the fiscal flexibility to pour money into a capability that the government is reticent to actually use.1  

3.  I've noted that this topic is my personal anger issue hobby-horse; it sure would have been nice to see Canadian roundels on CAS aircraft above us, but obviously it was not to be.  :dunno:  

4.  I would like to thank Baz in particular for his insights, and SupersonicMax for his composure [you're still wrong, but I blame that on too much Douhet, Trenchard.....Horner.....maybe even Jim Corum's early work.... and not enough exposure to the non-fighter world     ]


And with that, I back away.  


1.  Before it's mentioned, I don't believe that a half-dozen CF-18s in Romania has the intimidating effect on Putin that they would have had in Panjwai.


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## Baz (28 Jun 2014)

Ditch,

I'm not sure that you have understood the tone of the discussion.

I, as well, apologize if I came across as attacking an individual.  Not my intent; I haven't even met him.

As I've said quite a few times, the tool that precision weaponry, and the ability to deliver it, brings to the fight, is incredible.

The point I was trying, and possibly have failed, to make was that there are lots of people, led by the USAF, with plenty of RCAF buy in, who think that operational effect is the only important tool in the arsenal.  In that environment, it is very easy to understand why the other services want to own, or at least control, capabilities, like CAS, that are more important to their fight.  Its not that they can't do it, and from all accounts do it well, but whether they will be available to do so.

By the way, from what I understand, it wasn't the CF-18 community that kept them out of the Afghan fight.  It was the politically driven cap to the number or pers on the ground and money being spent (a cap that should exist, we work for them), and resource trade-offs had to be made.

As a relevant aside, this discussion about the use of air power should be at the core of the F-35 discussion in my mind.  What we need is the nations intent on how to use the fighter force: if the nation wants it to go expeditionary and play that strategic role Max talks about, then in my mind we need the F-35.  Over-simplified, yes, but just an opinion, based on my set of insights.


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## Good2Golf (28 Jun 2014)

CAS and/or AI could be provided by any capability that is responsive to the requirement.  In the case of CAS, the requirement is to respond to elements of the manoeuvre force, and for AI (sometimes referred to as Deep Attack Ops) the requirement is to shape the battlefield appropriately to enable subsequent formation operations.  For those who believe that, as a coordinating measure, the FSCC belongs anywhere else than as a sister coordination centre along side the TACP and ASCC in any nation's JTF Land Component, I would be very interested to see the logic.

The challenge in Canada regarding employment of the fighter force is primarily political.  Max, I note your point about pre-ECP583 R2 upgrade, but the lack of such eqpt did not stop employment of CF-18s in OP ALLIED FORCE.  In contemporary history, the Government appears unwilling to project its fighter capability forward to intimately support Canadian troops (or any other troops for that matter) in the CAS role.  It appears willing only to use the force in a classic AI, or OCA and DCA (e.g. OP MOBILE's Task Force Libeccio enforcement of the Lybian no-fly zone) , or lethal operations using more recently developed terms such as SCAR (Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance) wherein both CF-18 and CP-140 aircraft coordinated lethal action (weapons dropped by CF-18, but intimate targeting well inland by CP-140) against Ghadaffi's forces.  So the government goes for highly visible, coalition reinforcing activities where projection of power is seen to be something that the fighter force can participate, or like in OP ALLIED FORCE (Cdn: OP ECHO) in Kosovo in 1999, assume a leading role (strike package leads and dropping 10% of OP AF ordnance), or OP UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Cdn OP MOBILE) taking a significant action and support role (aside from the overall command role by LGen Charlie Bouchard).

My personal thoughts (folks can probably line this up with official policies or actions taken/non taken with regard to Canadian air force elements considered in Afghanistan other than multiple transport types, green helos, grey patrol, 'black' helos, grey helos and two types of UAVs) is that if there are enough Canadian troops on the ground in a theatre of operations that warrant CAS (and all the other air force enablers), then the Government will decide that there are enough troops on the ground, and will not....ever....deploy RCAF fighters as CAS.  It has nothing to do with equipment (we know this from OP ECHO) and everything to do with expense.  Even during OP UNIFIED PROTECTOR, there were internal warnings of the rapid wearing out of the fighter force in location (Ref: RCAF Fretted Over Libya Bombing Campaign's Wear and Tear on CF-18s ).

Folks in the fighter force (particularly the front line people in the squadrons) may always say they wanted to be with Canadian troops in Afghanistan, and I think that is genuinely true.  However, and this is a big HOWEVER, the institutional fighter force (i.e. fighter generals) appears not to agree with its front line personnel.  It is clearly an institution that centrically believes in the National/Continental DCA role and the occasional OCA/AI/SCAR role abroad, and has believed ever since MOBILE COMMAND's/10TAG's CF-5s were assigned to Fighter Group in 1975 with the stand up of AIR COMMAND, that the AF/RCAF does "air stuff" and that "ground stuff" is a detractor.  It even seems at times that the institutional air force seems to rank search and rescue as a role more important than anything to do with supporting the Army or the Navy.  It does so at its own peril though, and only time will tell if we ever see anything other than niche support to the other elements in deployed operations.

 :2c:

Regards,
G2G


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## MarkOttawa (28 Jun 2014)

Brit blogger's view:

The A-10 retirement
http://defencewithac.blogspot.ca/2014/06/the-10-retirement.html

My only observation: fighters just don't have the gun fire-power.

Mark
Ottawa


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## KevinB (28 Jun 2014)

Weird my reply vaporised.

I don't think any of the non fixed wing folks here are making personal attacks - its just observations over several hundred combined years of service that the "Fighter Command" folks do not take intimate ground support roles to heart.

While poking at Max may be a fun subset - the issue here is that it is a systemic problem in the CF.

Look back for Gulf War 1 - and the deployment of CF-18's - that then spawned the deployed of Air Defense and Infantry (RCR) to defend the fighter in their friendly base...

While their may have been a Political lack of will to deploy fighter in SWA, I believe that had senior Canadian Fighter Pilot Generals wanted to - they could and would have made a compelling case successfully for the deployment


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## Cloud Cover (29 Jun 2014)

Got no bone in this fight< but have a few questions for those who keep focusing on Afghanistan:

1. Was there ever a time when CAS was called for by Canadian forces and it was not delivered by coalition aircraft? [lets exclude the times when the coalition aircraft decided to bomb and strafe Canadian troops either by design or by accident].

2. At the material time, was the only fighter aircraft we have really equipped to deliver the type of support requested. It seems to me that when a better arty tube was required, it was delivered. When choppers were required they materialized. When tanks were required, there they were. When more than 10 mags were required, all the stupid criticisms were doused when casualties began to mount. I am of the view that if CF-18 were really required, they would have put on the tarmac but that didn't happen. I do not for one second believe it was cost. I do believe the optics of an errant bomb disrupting a wedding party, or mistakenly attacking friendly forces [the Canadian public really did appear to enjoy the period of 'victimhood" after Tarnac farms].

3. For the first time I am reading Hasting's book on Normandy and am caught by his comments regarding close air support and the few champions there were in any air force for the role, let alone the USAF and especially the RCAF who seemed particularly enamored with air superiority in a no-contest environment and keeping their heavy bombers beating the crap out of distant bridges, railway junctions, workers domiciles and sometimes got luck enough to take out the odd factory.  Pete Quesada from the USAAF seems to have been pretty much the only command exception in WW2 that fully understood and embraced CAS as a ground battle asset. Has there ever been a Canadian equivalent of this man as a command champion of CAS in the RCAF at anytime in it's history?

4. FWIW I believe the RCAF should be focused on NORAD, Air Superiority, Strategic Airlift and Air battle space management and they should also definitely mandated to form up small but specialized formations tasked with CAS, properly equipped [ie not necessarily with the F35- I am thinking gun equipped C27 and C130, maybe some sort of F15E type of jet. ] 

5. Rotary wing assets painted green [Gun ships, Tac hel, Chinooks], battlefield drones and all the rest of the stuff that the army needs to fight on the ground from platoon and 3x company sized actions should in fact be army formations, and furthermore, perhaps they should even be integrated with the units they are assigned to fight with. 

I don't even want to get into the Naval Air situation, that's just a fine mess except to say that SAR for civilian purposes could be under the Navy or even the RCMP if only to better focus the RCAF on missions that are relevant to what I've outlined above. (the exception being actual CSAR to rescue downed pilots>>> that is a niche specialty role that could fit Army or RCAF and even the RCN).       

But most of all, Im really interested to know if having RCAF support on station in Afghanistan would have changed one single outcome, for better or for worse. 

Cheers


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2014)

Whiskey 601, you raise some interesting points. I will leave the commenting of Afghanistan to those better qualified by training and experience, to concentrate on some of the historical aspects.

This Army Historical Section report comments on air support to First Canadian Army in North West Europe.

http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/ahq074.pdf

Now, there are some unsaid or underdeveloped themes in that paper, but the RAF (and by extension the RCAF) was concerned primarily with maintaining its own independence. This was compounded by personality issues - any senior RAF officer who had served with Montgomery hated him for among other reasons, his tendency to hog any credit that should have gone to the air forces for himself. Among this group was Coningham, the commander of 2 Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) which supported 21 Army Group. While this did not percolate down to the wing and squadron level, 2 TAF and its major groups, 83 supporting Second British Army and 84 supporting First Canadian Army, were apt to ignore or downplay army requests in favour of selecting their own missions. 

This was not universal: Air Vice Marshal LO Brown, the AOC of 84 Group up to about October 1944, was relieved by Coningham for being too willing to do what the army wanted. However there were too many instances of 2 TAF flying in its own air show for it not to have been policy. Example - in the final planning for Operation Totalize HQ First Canadian Army requested that 83 Group (HQ 84 Group was still moving to the continent) fly missions along the Caen-Falaise Highway during the morning of 8 Aug to attack the anticipated move forward of counter-attack forces from 12 SS Panzer Division. Instead most of the group effort was spent in armed reconnaissance missions deeper inside the German area as far back as the Seine River. That morning the only German reserve in the area, a battle group of 12 SS Panzer Division and 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion which included about 50 tanks including eight Tigers moved forward unimpeded and blocked the Allied advance. In fact, Kurt Meyer, the divisional commander, later wrote that he could not understand the absence of Allied tactical air on that occasion. There are others, but I know this one best.

Shortly after the war, Brigadier Churchill Mann, who had been the chief of staff of First Canadian Army, delivered a long, nasty tirade to the students of the Canadian Army Staff College on the failings of the Allied air support structure in North West Europe. There had to have been a reason for this - and Mann did cite beaucoup examples - and it only could have been a policy of demonstrating that the air force was not subordinate to the army. Unfortunately the RCAF was not asked or perhaps chose not to respond with its side of the story. Did this poison the army's attitude towards air support? I think not, as the students were all experienced officers with lots of combat experience and they had experienced the system first hand.

It must be added that the Spitfires and Typhoons of 2 TAF were not well suited for anything but strafing. The much vaunted rockets on the Typhoons were grossly inaccurate and the odds of a hit by one on a tank were pathetically low. However the morale effect and the general bugger factor on movement was quite impressive, at least with REMF type units.


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## tomahawk6 (29 Jun 2014)

There is a reason its called "close air support".Coming in low and hard is the most effective.It is also a risk for the pilot and aircraft which may be the reason the RCAF was not tasked with the mission.Also the USAF had plenty of assets for CAS so the RCAF wasnt needed.A wasted opportunity for the RCAF to develop the skill set for CAS IMO.The A-10 was ideal for this role as it was built to take the punishment that often comes with supporting the infantry up close and personal.A drone is a poor substitute for the CAS role.


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## SeaKingTacco (29 Jun 2014)

T6- I am curious as to your views on why you think UAVs make poor CAS platforms?

Is there, in your view, something inherently wrong with the technology?


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## GR66 (29 Jun 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Perhaps the real issue here isn't over who "owns" CAS, but rather that the technology is changing to the extent that CAS as a distinct category may no longer exist.
> 
> In the short term, we are seeing an increasing reliance on UCAVs to get up close and personal with the enemy, and a continuing increase in the capabilities of small UAV's. Nothing will say "CAS" like the company support platoon unleashing an ATV sized armed quadcopter to support a platoon under contact in some near future battle. Artillery weapons like Excalibur shells and FOG-M also have the ability to hit pinpoint targets at long ranges. Artillery weapons are also not limited by weather or time on station in the same way aircraft are.
> 
> ...





			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So, I freely admit to not having read all the submissions on this latest iteration of air wars.... but I'm going to pitch in in any event.
> 
> Tell me again:  What is the difference amongst the following?
> 
> ...



Kirkhill is correct that there are many possible ways of delivering HE on to a particular target.  However is it possible that a problem is is being created because we keep replacing plentiful, inexpensive platforms for delivering this HE with fewer, more expensive platforms?  While each individual platform is certainly more capable than the one it replaces we have less of them because that's all we can afford.  This is true of almost everything in the CF...aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles, support vehicles, support weapons, etc.  Does every target requiring the delivery of HE require a platform as specialized and expensive as an F-35 or a high-tech UCAV or rail gun?  Each one of those platforms (in our fiscally realistic world) reduces the number of lower-tech HE delivery platforms (artillery/mortar tubes, lower tech CAS aircraft,  ATGMs in organic support units, etc) that are available.  Does the higher cost and relative scarcity of these expensive, high tech platforms also affect our willingness to deploy and risk them compared to other, less expensive options?  Does the potential loss of a small number of these expensive platforms have an exaggerated negative effect on our military capabilities because they each individually represent such a big proportion of our total capability?  

This is in no way suggesting that we freeze the CF in time and ignore advances in technology, but perhaps with our obvious fiscal limitations it makes some sense to have more of a mix of "Quality" and "Quantity" in our arsenal to make us more flexible and able to respond in multiple ways to threats.  In relation to this particular thread it may mean obtaining fewer F-35's and focusing their use on those things where their capabilities are required and supplementing them with other, cheaper platforms to fill in the gaps.  This could be anything from more artillery tubes with smart ammo and UAV's tasked to support the ground forces to provide immediate fire support, or lower-tech CAS options like the armed version of the Harvard trainer we already use (the AT-6 Texan II), or whatever.  In other areas it may mean having fewer Aurora's but more DASH-8 MPAs to help them cover more area and find targets for them to prosecute.  Or fewer future Canadian Surface Combatants but more Corvette/Frigate type ships to augment them, etc.  

This doesn't directly address the question of who should control CAS assets, but this question is in itself tied up in the fact that our most advanced platforms out of both necessity and design are required to fulfill multiple roles for our military.  This of course leads to debate over which role takes priority in any given situation.  The less roles a platform is expected to fulfill, the greater clarity there will be over where control of the platform should be placed.


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## tomahawk6 (29 Jun 2014)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> T6- I am curious as to your views on why you think UAVs make poor CAS platforms?
> 
> Is there, in your view, something inherently wrong with the technology?



UAV's IMO are great for striking targets of opportunity with Hellfire,but if a COP is under assault from several hundred taliban I would prefer a strike aircraft loaded with napalm and 500 pounders.So to answer the question its a matter of payload.Not to mention the 30mm gatling gun mounted on an A-10.We havent done that yet probably because of weight.


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## George Wallace (29 Jun 2014)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> .......Not to mention the 30mm gatling gun mounted on an A-10.We havent done that yet probably because of weight.



Not a pilot, an UAV operator, nor an Aeronautical Engineer, but I don't think that UAVs have the maneuverability that an A 10 has when it comes to supporting a TIC scenario. 

Also, while UAVs do have some great capabilities, is not the vision of the operators restricted to the FOV of the cameras and the speed that the cameras can traverse?  Up close and personal, this would be a serious liability.  It would necessitate them (UAVs) having to be more "stand off" than in the thick of things.


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## tomahawk6 (29 Jun 2014)

All great points George.


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## MarkOttawa (29 Jun 2014)

Related:



> Montgomery's Scientists, Operational Research in Northwest Europe
> https://www.google.ca/search?q=Montgomery%E2%80%99s+Scientists%2C+Operational+Research+in+Northwest+Europe%3A+The+Work+of+No.+2+Operational+Research+Section+with+21+Army+Group+June+1944+to+July+1945+&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-USfficial&client=firefox-a&channel=sb&gfe_rd=cr&ei=dnGwU6q_KuiM8Qej_oHYDw



Mark
Ottawa


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## SupersonicMax (29 Jun 2014)

Appologies for the late reply, weather was good and did not have a laptop to write on.  Replies on iPad became frustrating, especially when quoting people...

For the record, I am not offended.  It takes a lot more to get me going.  This is the interweb after all.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> I cannot speak for GW; but for myself, as mentioned, the USAF was more than helpful.



Those assets were "owned" by the ACC (OPCON) and TACON to the JTAC/FAC.  I am not advocating making CAS a complete Air Force thing, but for multi-role platforms, in a theater where they are expected to do more than CAS or BAI (ie: they will do "strategic" bombing, or even Air-to-Air), they should be given to the ACC and delegated to the JTAC/FACs when needed. The FAC/JTAC piece should always be owned by the LCC.  ALOs with the Ground Commanders and GLOs with the Air Commanders (like we are doing now).



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Were you not just arguing with Loachman that you're more expensive to deploy, by at least a factor of 10?



I was trying to compare deploying a 6 or 12-pack vs deploying a Bataillion.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Ever done it for real?



Sure did in 2011.  Got the Warn O late Thurs PM and were fling the first combat mission Mon AM.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> *My point exactly!*   The best poker hand in the world is meaningless if the cards don't get laid down.  We are spending an inordinate amount of money on "potential energy" when what we've needed is "kinetic energy."




We do use the Fighter Force, just not in the role you envisionned it should be used.  We deployed a multitude of times. There are the 3 "kinetic" deployments (Gulf War, Kosovo and Libya) as well as many Air Patrolling missions (Bosnia, Iceland (many times), Eastern Europe).  The reality is that we do way more than support the Army. Yup, we do NORAD.  But that's a very little fraction of what we actually do.  Our "Bread and Butter" are CAS and Self-Escort Strike.  We train a lot more to Self Escort Strike because it's the most challenging mission set we do.  If you can do this properly, you can probably do every other mission set we have.  

The reality is that even if we decide to ONLY do NORAD, we will need to buy some sort of modern fighter.  That fighter will be multi-role.  The NORAD mission while critical is a fairly simple mission set.  In order to maintain flying proficiency (just as a pilot), you need to fly some hours.  I think it's accepted that for low to medium expericence pilots, 100 hours a year is the bare minimum to be safe and effective in the aircraft and that 140 hours a year, you can actually be proficient tactically.  We do not need to spend 100 hours a year doing NORAD to be effective in that particular mission set.  If we have the aircraft capabilities, why not use the rest of those hours doing Air-to-Ground as well?  It will not cost more (after all, we need to fly those 100-140 hours a year minimum) and we increase the capabilities of our forces.

As far as supporting the Army, while we did not go to Afghanistan (and trust me, we wanted to go), we did support the Army at home by providing countless FAC Courses and FAC Training Deployments both in Canada and the US to support the FAC training requirements that the Afghan war created.  



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> I notice that you've chosen not to answer this question; I assume that the answer is "no," notwithstanding your stretching for LCF points by mentioning SF.From the same real-world experience (and credibility) then, I'd like to state that I've had sex with Jenna Jameson hundreds of times.... while watching porn.



I deployed and dropped bombs on target, just not in a CAS role.  We did a lot of SCAR, some Air-to-Air and a good amount of pre-planned strikes.

If we were to use your analogy to compare training to combat (in a fighter), I would say that Groundschool is like watching Jenna Jameson on youporn.  Flying a CAS training mission would be like having sex with her, with a condom.  Having sex without a condom would be doing CAS in a war zone... With all the risks it involves..

Talking about risk... I do not believe that the risk level was the reason we did not send Hornets in Afghanistan.  In relative terms, Afghanistan was (for a fighter aircraft, not ground troops or helicopters) safer than say, Libya.  Nothing too crazy Manpads wise and mostly Small Arms fire.

T6:  Close (in CAS) means the level of integration.  Between FLOT and the FSCL, you'd need some form of coordination between the Air Commanders and the Ground Commanders.  This integration is done with the JTAC/FAC and through some other measures (ie: LCC owns 20K and below between the FLOT and the FSCL or lateral restrictions).  That way, aircraft don't hit each other and rounds don't hit Aircraft transitting:  fires (including CAS) are limited to 20K in this example.

Unless the platform that is used is purely a CAS platform (and there are not too many single-role platforms nowadays, even the A-10 is multi-role), they should be given to the ACC so that the joint "strategic/operational/tactical" (I don't like using those terms...) objectives can be met, with the assurance to the LCC that if he needs CAS, he'll be given CAS.

I guess in the end it's a matter of how we view the Air Force:  a pure support to the Army or its own entity, able to effect the enemy the same way the Army does.  Since the Air Force became its own service, I think it our doctrine (and I believe rightly so) supports the latter.


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## OldSolduer (29 Jun 2014)

If I may add to the conversation, which so far if find fascinating, I may be able to offer a "grunts" perspective.

I know very little of the technical details of CAS other than usually an infantry company has a FOO/FAC attached and that is the person who we rely on to drop stuff on bad people...who may be shooting at us.

From a section commander perspective, I don't think you'll find too many infantry section commanders who give a rats butt who commands or controls what. What they care about is that the adults who control CAS play nicely with each other and drop explosive stuff on bad people when asked to do so.

Thanks. 

Rant ends.


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## a_majoor (29 Jun 2014)

WRT UAV's as CAS platforms, I am of the opinion that technology is advancing to the point that the weapons will be the things providing the manoeuvrability to take on difficult targets.

For an example, look at the Harvest HAWK kit to turn an ordinary C-130 into a support platform. A sensor pod takes the place of one external fuel tank, and a pylon with 4 Hellfires takes the other. A pod carrying 10 "Griffon" missiles fits in the lowered ramp, and if you want, an automatic cannon can be placed in the jump door. For our purposes, the pylon with the Hellfires and the pod on the ramp should interest us. 

Hellfire is a pretty solid and reliable weapon, and if you wanted to upgrade the Harvest HAWK (or a UCAV like the Reaper) then you might consider the BRIMESTONE missile, which has a millimetre wave seeker and can be launched as a true fore and forget missile. If it is on a higher performance platform it can achieve a range of up to 30 Km. The small missiles launched off the back to the Harvest HAWK would work very well off any small aircraft, helicopter or UCAV, and they can be substituted by small long range glide weapons like the Viper (itself an evolution of the BAT from the 1990's).

Now to my thinking, if a large range of platforms can carry these weapons, then the "quantity" argument gets covered off as well. Maybe we need to use the best platforms first to break into the target area if there is GBAD or a serious air threat, but more and more weapons can be delivered through the "hole" once it is made, and the delivery platform becomes less of an issue. (if you can get enough stand off from your weapons, then the AD issue becomes far more difficult for the defenders, which also means the platforms no longer have to be as capable to deliver the weapons).

Having the pilot see the target to bomb and strafe the target was appropriate with contact patrol aircraft in 1918, but since the 1970's weapons systems have evolved to see the targets remotely from the pilot. We can certainly take advantage of that to deliver ordinance without having to get up close and personal with the target.


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## Cloud Cover (29 Jun 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Talking about risk... I do not believe that the risk level was the reason we did not send Hornets in Afghanistan.  In relative terms, Afghanistan was (for a fighter aircraft, not ground troops or helicopters) safer than say, Libya.  Nothing too crazy Manpads wise and mostly Small Arms fire.



I also do not believe it was risk from enemy action, but I do believe there was political concern about explaining that sort of risk in warfare to a skittish Canadian pubic>>especially in regards to bombing or strafing the wrong targets [innocent or friendly targets] by accident (equipment malfunction) or even worse, good faith error. 

And again, I truly believe that the cost of procuring any weapon, aircraft, or vehicle in the absence of an adequate platform was NOT the pre-dominant consideration blocking deployment. Look at the war and see what materialized: tanks, helicopters, drones, artillery systems, special mine protected trucks, C17's, engineering vehicles - all really expensive stuff that was genuinely required for that mission. A half dozen aircraft specialized for CAS had to be within the realm of possibility whether the capability exsted in the air force or could be sourced in time. But, I am not seeing anywhere in this thread that there was truly a need to have any specific CAS platform owned/operated by Canadians. Perhaps the answer is so sensitive that it is classified. 

And, I accept what T6 points out, the US and others had plenty of CAS platforms, but that doesn't address the issue of whether they were as readily available to our own ground forces as perhaps they might be to the ground forces of the coalition nation supplying CAS and boots on the ground. 
   

I am still trying to understand if some of the CF18's that are presently in service are worthy CAS platforms. I know they are a multi role aircraft with a little bit of everything, but perhaps there are only certain types of CAS missions that the CF18 can perform to reasonable expectations. 

From what I gather from this thread is that CAS seems to require real-time voice and data communications with a pilot that by training and instinct will quickly grasp the tactical appreciation of the ground force situation. The aircraft should be on or near station to the ground force for the purpose of delivering precision bombing, A/G missile strikes, perhaps A/G rocket attacks [guided, I presume], and an awful lot of cannon fire [ie more than one pass], and on a really bad day possibly execute all of the foregoing in the same sortie, at a rate of perhaps 2 or 3 sorties a day.   If I've summarized the requirement correctly at a high level (and perhaps I have failed to do so), can the RCAF deliver with what is in service currently?


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## SupersonicMax (29 Jun 2014)

In all honesty, with the Sniper ATP, JDAM, GBU-49 (dual, GPS/Laser guidance), 20mm, we can do a great job at CAS.  We have radios compatible with FACs (DCS) where he can send a full 9-line with with no voice (can do that with Link 16 as well) and our Sniper are VDL capable (FACs see what we see in our pod).  From the time I am handed over to a FAC, if he is proficient, I can get eyes on target within a minute and bombs on target a minute later, is my positioning to the target is correct. 

The only things I wished we kept are Mavericks and Rockets.  

FWIW, all our. Hornets are equals.  We don't have better ones than others (minus the odd system that has been removed for maintenance on some)


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## Cloud Cover (29 Jun 2014)

Thank you!


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## Loachman (30 Jun 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> I don't think[/color] that UAVs have the maneuverability that an A 10 has when it comes to supporting a TIC scenario.



It takes forever to line a Predator or Reaper up, so second drops/launches require a fair amount of patience. They were built for surveillance, and that long, thin wing that makes it easier to stay up for longer while burning less fuel does not add to manoeuvrability. Some near-future designs will permit more manoeuvring.

One does not need a lot of manoeuvrability to drop something on somebody with amazing accuracy in an Afghan scenario. One does not need a lot to fire something at somebody in a conventional setting, either.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> is not the vision of the operators restricted to the FOV of the cameras and the speed that the cameras can traverse?



No different for a fighter or bomber guy in an Afghan situation. The imager can move pretty quickly, and we could mark something's position once and return to it blindingly fast - and that with crappy Sperwer, too.



			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Up close and personal, this would be a serious liability.  It would necessitate them (UAVs) having to be more "stand off" than in the thick of things.



Not at all, in an Afghan situation. Mr Hellfire doesn't seem to mind too terribly much what launches him.



			
				whiskey601 said:
			
		

> And, I accept what T6 points out, the US and others had plenty of CAS platforms, but that doesn't address the issue of whether they were as readily available to our own ground forces as perhaps they might be to the ground forces of the coalition nation supplying CAS and boots on the ground.



I never saw a shortage of aircraft, manned or not, rotary- or seized-wing. Ramp space, on the other hand, was at a premium. There was no need to clutter it up even more.

There was always lots of stuff up, mostly doing ISR work while awaiting something that needed killing. By the way, Synthetic Aperture Radar on the B1 seems to have a hard time distinguishing between large wild dogs and motorcycles.

Markings on the aircraft had no bearing whatsoever on whose troops got their support.

I only saw one target that should have been hit but wasn't, and I shall forever be bitter about that one, but the fault did not lie with anybody on the air side that time.


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.



Thanks for the response, but it's seems that there is a clear difference in an aircraft that can strafe/bomb a target and one that can only bomb. For the latter a modified 737 could literally do the job if properly equipped. As for the former strafing is fairly unique and I just been reading elsewhere that most aircraft guns and ammo loads are optimized for air engagements and not necessarily for ground attack.

As I can see from wiki: "the A10  ammunition drum can hold up to 1,350 rounds of 30 mm ammunition,[49] but generally holds 1,174 rounds."

 Another source says the F-35 carries "It looks like either 180 or 182 rounds for the CTOL variant and either 220 or
225 rounds for the gunpod for the CV and STOVL variants. 4,000 shots per
minute is 66 rounds per second which gives the CTOL variant 3 shots with the
gun and the CV and STOVL variants 4 shots with the gun"

I haven't even considered the difference in ammunition effect on target, but it's seems the A10 can fire about 9.7x 2 sec bursts (60rds a sec) vs 4x 1 sec bursts for the F35 . That is a big difference in ability to shoot ground targets. I don't know if the F-35 or other aircraft are as good as or better than the A10 as bomb trucks. I suspect the F-35 will benefit from better and newer sensors for locating and dropping bombs.

I guess the other bits of the equation is repair time for battle damage during low level attacks and also how much time do the pilots get to practice CAS? A F35/F-15 pilot will have to split their training time on a variety of skills. An A-10 pilot world is all CAS so they would have a better skillset for the same number of hours of training.

At the end of the day a military the size of Canada would have to make some hard choices, but for the US, it's pretty darn clear that politics is at work. they can afford to maintain a dedicated CAS aircraft even if it's only in the NG units. Considering the variety of conflicts coming down the pipe and that the A10's were recently upgraded it seems very strange they wish to dump a capacity for a saving that appears to be about 2-3 weeks of operations in Afghanistan in 2013


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## Rocky Mountains (2 Jul 2014)

The US Airforce has so totally bought into the F35 concept that it wants to burn the bridges that could take it back on other routes.  Everyone and I mean everyone knows there is no way under the sun that the Air Force is going to order a $ 155 million aircraft to do a strafing run in support of infantry.  Ain't happening.


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## Loachman (2 Jul 2014)

Why fixate on strafing when there are other ways to kill something? Bomb and missile (and Artillery) guidance systems have improved dramatically since the A10 was designed. Guns, not so much.

What gets cut in order to keep an aging niche aircraft operating, and, soon, replace it?

And replace it with what?


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Jul 2014)

Getting rid of the A10 and not replacing it is giving up the strafing ability, but it's also giving up dedicated CAS resources for multi-use platforms and a reduced number of them at that. With the high price and reduced numbers I don't see F-35's doing strafing runs and judging by the ammo load, they will be about 1/4 effective at it as the A10. 

Every time I hear the term "multi-use" I shudder because in my experience it means barely adequate at doing everything, I hope I'm wrong.


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## Loachman (2 Jul 2014)

I see no reason to doubt that F35s will be any less capable of killing what needs killing on the ground than any other aircraft that can do/does that already.

I have reason to doubt that A10s will be limited in future conflicts, as they can do only one thing.

What puts the weapon on target is not important; that it gets there accurately in a timely fashion is.


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## KevinB (2 Jul 2014)

I will argue that the 30mm cannon with heavier payload is 10-20x more effective per round than the 20mm.

  If you look at the A-10 in low intensity conflicts, it can deal out a lot more ordnance over a longer period of time than any other platform per airframe.


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## Loachman (2 Jul 2014)

But didn't, from what I saw on my tours.

What is more important, the effect or the delivery system?

Since the A10's creation, we have AHs that can engage multiple targets simultaneously at longer ranges in complete darkness and lower visibility (under some circumstances wherein A10 cannot fly), precision-guided and longer-range artillery projectiles, thermal imagery on everything, and GPS-guided munitions.

The only likely scenario that I can see wherein there would be insufficient aircraft to do CAS reliably, if not actually competing for available targets, would be a high-intensity peer-vs-peer conflict. Moving slowly to get close enough to shoot something with a gun is less likely to be survivable than it was in the 1980s - and, from what I saw of A10s operating in Germany, may not have been as survivable as they hoped back then.


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> I see no reason to doubt that F35s will be any less capable of killing what needs killing on the ground than any other aircraft that can do/does that already.
> 
> I have reason to doubt that A10s will be limited in future conflicts, as they can do only one thing.
> 
> What puts the weapon on target is not important; that it gets there accurately in a timely fashion is.



You say "weapon" but we seem to be talking about 2-3 distinct weapon types, gun, guided bomb and air to ground missile. Is there any public data as to what percentage of what was used and BDA's afterwards? Do we have data showing the number of strafing runs done and by which aircraft, do they have have good data on target effects by both bomb and gun. What is the "safety area" for both types when operating close to troops or civilian targets?


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## KevinB (2 Jul 2014)

I would argue that cost per kill (especially armored or lightly armored vehicles) is lower with the A-10 and a much higher kill/sortie ration than other platforms.


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## a_majoor (3 Jul 2014)

Thinking back to the various "cool" videos that have been the mainstay of the news and YouTube of air to ground attacks since Gulf War One, I cannot recall ever seeing a gun camera or weapons pod shot of a high performance aircraft dealing out death with its cannon.

Targets on the ground get hit with various sorts of bombs, PGMs and missiles, but they are never strafed. This applies to the USAF, USN, USMC, the RAF, and the _Kheil HaAvir_ (Israeli Air Force). This covers a multitude of wars and actions, several different air forces and many different scenarios. (even if there are shots of F-16 or Hornet pilots rolling in with guns, the fact that they havn't shown up in a cursory review suggests that they really are rare).

Yes, Specter Gunships and armed helicopters do use cannon, and of course the A-10 uses the massive 30mm cannon, but even the helicopters and A-10s seem to use a lot of missile ordinance in preference to a gun run.

My point here is there seems to be far less use of the cannon, partly because stable cannon platforms are less common in the world's air forces (where do you find the "Skyraider" with its 4 X 20mm cannon, or the Corsair which was also considered a good bomb truck and gun platform?), partly because lots of targets are too "hard" to destroy with a few 20mm rounds and partly because a PGM can guide itself to the target far more easily than a pilot can line up his airplane for a gun run. Long stand off distances achieved by various sorts of PGM's also make things less dangerous for the pilot as well.

So I would not be entirely surprised to see gun runs fade away from the Air Force, if only to be taken up by UCAVs like the hypothetical large quad copter that a future fire support platoon unleashed in my earlier post.


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## Kirkhill (3 Jul 2014)

But if the munition makes its journey to the target by means of a self-propelled missile then the launch platform itself becomes immaterial.

We have already seen that with guns themselves.  Guns - launchers of unpowered munitions carrying missiles - are found ubiquitously.

Launchers of self-propelled missiles can equally be fixed in field installations or mounted on vehicles (trucks, ships and planes).

The longer the range of the missiles, the greater their ability to negotiate the modern battlefield and the cheaper they are to manufacture - together with the with the continuing tendency for glide bombs, single use missiles, recoverable drones, UAVs etc to converge in capabilities then the less need there is for both Victorian gunners and Edwardian flyers.  The gunners suffer from the increasing cost of the ever more complex systems that need to be grafted on to their guns.

Meanwhile - stowed rounds, ready to launch - is ever more common in every field.

The real purpose of the exercise is to get rounds from the warehouse to the target in the most timely fashion.  Rounds distributed forward represent rounds unavailable elsewhere that need to be duplicated at additional cost.  

Max may not be popular when he points out the financial benefits of centralization but that doesn't make him wrong.  The question is one of how to get the best balance between the polar extremes of flexible efficiency and rigidly effective response.

What has to be done and what can be lived with.


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## Colin Parkinson (3 Jul 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Thinking back to the various "cool" videos that have been the mainstay of the news and YouTube of air to ground attacks since Gulf War One, I cannot recall ever seeing a gun camera or weapons pod shot of a high performance aircraft dealing out death with its cannon.
> 
> Targets on the ground get hit with various sorts of bombs, PGMs and missiles, but they are never strafed. This applies to the USAF, USN, USMC, the RAF, and the _Kheil HaAvir_ (Israeli Air Force). This covers a multitude of wars and actions, several different air forces and many different scenarios. (even if there are shots of F-16 or Hornet pilots rolling in with guns, the fact that they havn't shown up in a cursory review suggests that they really are rare).
> 
> ...



There is a fair bit of footage of A10 gun runs with it's distinct sound. The problem as I see it is that many people don't trust the USAF reasoning and for good reasons. So even if they are telling the truth this time, few people believe them and they aren't doing an impressive job by the looks of it of convincing people.


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## Rocky Mountains (3 Jul 2014)

> If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces:  that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft.



http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2013/the-a-10-warthog-a-core-defense-issue.html

Air support for ground forces was seriously deficient in the Second World War.  The Air Force often opposed using aircraft to support infantry attacks and when they did often screwed it up with hundreds of friendly fire casualties on occasions.  I believe the A - 10 was the first ground support aircraft built from the keel up and it looks like it will end up the last.


----------



## a_majoor (3 Jul 2014)

> If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces:  that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft.



But the argument seems to be that with modern weapons that can function independently of the platform, the platform itself becomes less important. Is a Hellfire less effective when it comes off the rail of a C-130 "Harvest HAWK" than if it is fired from an AH-64? (or from a ground mount, for that matter?). The primary issue with platforms is how available they are, and how well they can operate and survive in a particular environment. While there are lots of C-130's, sending them in to do SEAD probably isn't a smart idea. After the F-35's, Strike Eagles and UCAV's have cleared a path, then having every available platform capable of carrying PGMs working means there will be more platforms to provide support, potentially less time between the call and the arrival of help and more effective support (since it is more likely that PGMs will hit the target).

If I need support, I really don't care who is delivering it or on what platform, so long as it arrives in a timely manner and provides the desired effect.


----------



## McG (3 Jul 2014)

So, you are saying that all our aircraft should have hard-points for a Storm Shadow, Kongsberg JSM, or JSOW which would be fired off by the crew of a J-STARS whenever a requirement appears n proximity to the carrying aircraft?


----------



## a_majoor (5 Jul 2014)

That is simply taking the evolution of smart weapons to the logical conclusion.

It essentially counters arguments that you can only provide CAS with highly specialized airplanes. Realistically, you want transports to be doing transport etc. and for responsive and affordable support you should probably substitute a cloud of UCAVs for single attack aircraft.


----------



## YZT580 (5 Jul 2014)

A battle field is a complex, chaotic environment; that goes without saying.  Contacts are both brief and savage yet the comments read as if everyone is standing around a sandbox shifting little plastic models around according to a computer generated scenario gaming 'what if's'.  When the guy at the pointed end of the action requires support it is likely that he requires it about 20 seconds before he asked.  Having to call and ask and then wait (even a minute) for an aircraft to be re-assigned to help out just isn't going to work.  Further, assuming the closest aircraft suitably armed is heading for a high-value target i.e. a just-located command and control hdq. or field battery what chance does the chap on the ground have of securing immediate support?  It will more likely be a "I'll be right back, don't go away" type of reply.  

It is distinctly possible that a future opposition may be similarly armed and equipped as our own forces: witness Ukraine where both sides initially drew their equipment from the same manufacturer.  Do you really want to rely on some stand-off weapons system at 10,000 feet to provide close-in support at 100 yards or would you prefer that the support visually acquire the target before commencing fire?  If I recall, Tarnak farm involved an F-16 and a Lazar guided bomb from altitude further.  Finally, it would be a brave commander, not looking for career advancement that would commit an F-35 into the range of hand-held ground to air munitions.  It isn't going to happen.  

We love to talk about smart munitions and how new systems are far more cost efficient but wars do not contribute to a balanced budget.  Having multiple uses for a system may sound good in theory but as soon as you add a second purpose you simultaneously establish a priority order and I guarantee that CAS is not number one on any tasking list for any of F-16, F-18, F-35, F-22, B52 etc. etc.  

Finally, and to get back to the topic, if you want CAS now, then you had better own it, otherwise, you are number 2.


----------



## MarkOttawa (5 Jul 2014)

YZT580:



> Finally, and to get back to the topic, if you want CAS now, then you had better own it, otherwise, you are number 2.


  

Precisely the thinking of USMC --though one wonders how really happy they will be with the F-35B's optional gun with just 220 rounds:
http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-35.html
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/f-35b-lightning-ii-joint-strike-fighter-stovl-variant/

AV-8B's 25mm gun has 300 rounds:
http://www.military.cz/usa/air/in_service/aircraft/av8b/av8b_en.htm

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Loachman (5 Jul 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Having to call and ask and then wait (even a minute) for an aircraft to be re-assigned to help out just isn't going to work.



Regardless of the nature, source, and ownership of the delivery platform there is going to be a wait involved.



			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> Do you really want to rely on some stand-off weapons system at 10,000 feet to provide close-in support at 100 yards or would you prefer that the support visually acquire the target before commencing fire?  If I recall, Tarnak farm involved an F-16 and a Lazar guided bomb from altitude further.



How much of a visual assessment do you think happens as an aircraft whizzes in at 300 knots/560 km/hr and lets loose with a cannon burst from over a kilometre away (A10)? We lost Mark Graham and had another bunch of guys wounded in September 2006 when an A10 shot up their platoon.

Crap will happen regardless of what is being used, but there is a much better chance of positively identifying a target using IR and then engaging it from distance, be that vertical or horizontal.



			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> Finally, and to get back to the topic, if you want CAS now, then you had better own it, otherwise, you are number 2.



Even if it has your national markings on it, it's going to be a pooled resource that will be used on the highest-priority target, just as artillery will be.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (5 Jul 2014)

I can't believe we are still talking about this

The Air Force has their processes and we have ours, rather than each service calling each other useless lets focus on working together to achieve some sort of common ground.  

We can argue about CF18's performing CAS all day long when in reality we should be directing our attention to why we don't have any of these:


----------



## PuckChaser (5 Jul 2014)

Cobras would probably also be acceptable. See, no single source contracts!


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (5 Jul 2014)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Cobras would probably also be acceptable. See, no single source contracts!



Throw in a Tiger as well to appease the anti-american crowd :-D


----------



## Loachman (5 Jul 2014)

Or buy the Apache from Agusta-Westland with Rolls-Royce engines.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (5 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> Or buy the Apache from Agusta-Westland with Rolls-Royce engines.



Globalization!   I love it!


----------



## PuckChaser (5 Jul 2014)

Cut the F-35 order by 12, since shiny jets won't do CAS, and buy scary attack helicopters.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (5 Jul 2014)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Cut the F-35 order by 12, since shiny jets won't do CAS, and buy scary attack helicopters.



Or cut the F35 order by 60, buy a cheaper jet (accepting the already accepted reality that air superiority will be based on US capabilities for expeditionary ops) for a domestic role only, and equip each CMBG with AH and buy a GBAD capability.


----------



## CBH99 (6 Jul 2014)

Whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa there Bird_Gunner.....let's not be flying off in a tangent, making logical, sensible, cost effective arguments!!  

Pffftttt...

ARMED helicopters??  What do you think this is, the military??  And Wowa...did you suggest the ability for ground forces to have an air defence capability??  Are you high right now??  That's just crazy talk.  

Maybe if we were a G7 country and a member of NATO, your arguments might make more sense.  But the ability of ground forces to actually defend themselves from hostile aircraft??  No f#%kin way....that's even possible!?


----------



## rampage800 (6 Jul 2014)

> Having to call and ask and then wait (even a minute) for an aircraft to be re-assigned to help out just isn't going to work.  Further, assuming the closest aircraft suitably armed is heading for a high-value target i.e. a just-located command and control hdq. or field battery what chance does the chap on the ground have of securing immediate support?  It will more likely be a "I'll be right back, don't go away" type of reply.



I'm not sure I understand YZT but its highly unlikely that you're going to have a/c on station for your entire op. One thing that I think gets lost is although it'd be nice to have a/c on station there's usually only 1 guy in the Coy Gp who is controlling them, they can go for quite awhile but sooner or later that dude is going to need rest.



> Targets on the ground get hit with various sorts of bombs, PGMs and missiles, but they are never strafed.



Absolutely, 100% false. I'm a huge fan of PGM's but at the end of the day the Risk Estimate Distances (REDs) for strafing are still significantly smaller than any of the PGM's mentioned. When guys get into a close fight its most likely that the JTAC (with the GFC concurrence) are going to go to guns for that exact reason. As with everything there's mitigating circumstances but to say nobody strafes anymore cause its not on YouTube would be extremely misinformed.


----------



## SupersonicMax (6 Jul 2014)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Cut the F-35 order by 12, since shiny jets won't do CAS, and buy scary attack helicopters.



They will do CAS, probably better than anything there is right now.

Bird Gunner:  why exactly do we need GBAD is the US is going to gain and maintain Air Superiority/Supremacy for us?  You are contradicting yourself.

rampage:  Right on for RED.  The advertised CEP of a Paveway II is 12 feet.  JDAM is 20 feet.  Add the blast to that.

20/25/30mm is much more accurate (dispersion is minimal) and the blast is much smaller making it a much better weapon for high collateral damage targets.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (6 Jul 2014)

SSM, I get where you're coming from. Being high speed, low drag means you'd like to be the wherewithal for everything but transport.

Try to understand the morale factor for the guys on the ground.

I'd rather have CAS as part of my Ats & Dets, rather than being told "Roger 49C, you're next in line".

Try put yourself on the ground and in the shit. Perhaps you'll gain some perspective.


----------



## AmmoTech90 (6 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Bird Gunner:  why exactly do we need GBAD is the US is going to gain and maintain Air Superiority/Supremacy for us?  You are contradicting yourself.



Because not all air threats are other jets.

Will the F-35s be shooting down cruise missiles, UAVs of Predator size or below and RAM in addition to doing their A2A thing while transiting across the battlefield on their way to an important target and taking time out to do CAS?

Those are going to be some busy planes.  If we don't have the US doing air superiority for us then the Canadian planes will have to do all that.  If the US are doing it, why do we need air to air capability outside of NORAD?


----------



## SupersonicMax (6 Jul 2014)

I have some perspective from the ground side.  I participated in AOC and I spent some time in the field with JTACs.  What I noticed is a lack of perspective from their side on Air Employment.  

Assets in current theaters are already controlled by the ACC and it seems to be working.  If an asset is to be used for CAS and CAS only, maybe they should be given to the LCC (but even then, I have my reserves when for fixed wing aircraft).

Tasking priorities should be decided at the joint level and air approportionned according to priorities.  I understand each ground commander would like to have dedicated air 24/7 and if it was possible it should be that way, however with limited ressources it's impossible. We need to keep flexible in order to achieve the "strategic", "operationnal" and "tactical" objectives (all of which a single fighter can affect).  This is the only way to assure an effiicient and effective operation.

Ammotech:  but it doesn't matter.  Those effects will be provided by the US according to BG.


----------



## daftandbarmy (6 Jul 2014)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa there Bird_Gunner.....let's not be flying off in a tangent, making logical, sensible, cost effective arguments!!
> 
> Pffftttt...
> 
> ...



Hang on a minute, they've already thought of that: CADPAT makes us invisible thus rendering enemy air superiority useless... right?  ;D


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (6 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Ammotech:  but it doesn't matter.  Those effects will be provided by the US according to BG.



Disagree. The US will not provide intimate assets for defence of Canadian manouevre brigades IAW current doctrine. They will provide Air superiority though against fixed wing threats. Perhaps in a perfect world in a contiguous, linear battlefield, all opposition AH and smalll level UAS will fly through the US AO first for engagement by SHORAD type assets. If they dont than the Canadians have to have their own. According to what BG is that? 

Jets will, however, definately be provided by the US. So, I guess if we go with your logic than the RCAF doesn't require jets? 

Also, AOC has significant errors when dealing with doctrine, particularly artillery and AD doctrine, which are constantly noted by the artillery types on the course. I've also worked a great deal with the air force while doing scan eagle and can attest that the RCAF has a weak understanding of the army at the Capt-LCol level as well.

I've come to terms with the fact that you'll never admit that jets can't do everything and we require a GBAD, and have little interest in debating that any more.  However, I will say that the ACC should definately control and command anything above the CL and coordinate with the army via the ACCE and BCD in the various HQs. Army air should be restricted to SUAS and UH (and in a perfect world AH) as those are close support army assets.  The ACC should also retain the control of the AADC with an army advisor to coordinate GBAD with aerial AD and naval AD systems.


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## Bird_Gunner45 (7 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> They will do CAS, probably better than anything there is right now.
> 
> Bird Gunner:  why exactly do we need GBAD is the US is going to gain and maintain Air Superiority/Supremacy for us?  You are contradicting yourself.
> 
> ...



Air superiority in terms of Fixed wing. Still remains an aviation and low level UAS threat. IPSO FACTO, still require a GBAD capability. Particularly in terms of a dispersed operation where a CMBG may find itself geographically seperated from US or allied supporting assets to combat lower level threats. So, GBAD is still required, RCAF jets, outside of Canada, outside of a "fly the flag" role, debatable....


----------



## a_majoor (7 Jul 2014)

WRT looking at YouTube, news broadcasts (and expanding the search to include recent military history books) I have not come across high performance jets like F-16's doing gun runs on a ground target. Since this is a random search, I obviously have not seen every example, but the lack of actual gun camera footage in a random search indicates to me that using a 20mm cannon for ground attack by high performance aircraft must be pretty rare.

Whatever the potential advantages of using a 20mm cannon against a ground target may be, most air forces don't seem to be taking advantage of that. The fact that armed helicopters and low performance aircraft like Specter gunships and A-10's _do_ use cannons against ground targets suggests that they may be better gun platforms for this task.

Perhaps to reinforce the point, the Iranian Air Force has just recently sent their SU-25 "Frogfoot" jets to Iraq to attack the ISIS forces on the ground, another low, slow gun truck.


----------



## Good2Golf (7 Jul 2014)

Anyone participating in Ex Final Drive who took away from the contrivances of a teaching tool that fixed-wing fast air was all that was needed to operate in the AO's airspace to create tactical, operational and strategic effects needs to actually attend the course...

If anything, this thread reinforces the truth that the 'light-blue' air force believes in the primacy of technology, while those on the ground depend on the cultivation and maintenance of trust amongst fellow soldiers.

Regards
G2G


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (7 Jul 2014)

:goodpost:





			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Anyone participating in Ex Final Drive who took away from the contrivances of a teaching tool that fixed-wing fast air was all that was needed to operate in the AO's airspace to create tactical, operational and strategic effects needs to actually attend the course...
> 
> If anything, this thread reinforces the truth that the 'light-blue' air force believes in the primacy of technology, while those on the ground depend on the cultivation and maintenance of trust amongst fellow soldiers.
> 
> ...



 :goodpost:


----------



## brihard (7 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I have some perspective from the ground side.



"Some" is vague enough to describe anything from vast knowledge to a negligibly or even infinitely small amount. Nothing I've seen, nor, I daresay others here, suggests that you possess _meaningful_ perspective from the ground side. I and most others will take the 'ground side' experience of those who have depended on air support for real on two way ranges where people really die over training exercises that are typically quite the artifice.

Air power as discussed here is nothing more nor less than a microcosm of what the military does as a whole- killing people and breaking their stuff in defence of the national interest. It's just another delivery method for fire support. I cannot speak to operational arts- I'm just an infantry sergeant. But there's no difference in principle between the Pl Comd stripping one or both of my C9s or M203s for the platoon fire base versus leaving the ability to kill people and break stuff organically within my fighting element. The discussion of air support is just the same thing writ large. Sure, some stuff can be more *efficient* when concentrated at increasingly higher levels- but the less is left organically, increasingly the less flexibility and exercise of initiative is going to be left/available to the guys who have eyes on the dude whom we wish to make die for their country. There's a diminishing rate of return in both directions in the concentration or decentralization or fire support. Towards either end of the spectrum the opportunity cost of stripping or concentrating that last bit of fire support outweighs the marginal incremental benefit to be gained.

All of which is an elaborate way of saying that yes, optimally at least some fire must be concentrated operationally at the highest levels. And optimally, some must be delegated as at least quasi-organic to the lowest applicable levels in a fight- that means air in a loiter, where the effect of fires is in the commander's holster, rather than each bomb being targeted strategically and from a distance. And simply the *knowledge* that you needn't borrow that pistol from someone who you hope doesn't need it more, but that it's in *your* holster is in and of itself an enabler.

The position you are arguing is one that is far enough towards the one end of the spectrum that incremental strategic gains have become outweighed by tactical opportunity cost. But you don't recognize that. And you really think you can put yourself in the head of the guys on the ground, but you can't, and if you're smart enough to fly a jet you sure as hell should be able to recognize that limitation in yourself. It's a huge deficiency on your part that you are blind to that.


----------



## Baz (7 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> What I noticed is a lack of perspective from their side on Air Employment.



I started as infantry (albeit reserve), did Battalion level CP ex's, have been in the Air Force for twenty four years, have all the major Air Force courses in Canada and some abroad (including targeting and Collateral Damage Estimation, spent quite a bit of time at sea, and have two Joint International Postings (NORAD CSprings and NATO SHAPE); I can say without any hesitancy that the Air Forces, and particular the USAF and RCAF (outside of TacHel and MH) are the least Joint entities; although the RCN understands Naval Air less and less.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Assets in current theaters are already controlled by the ACC and it seems to be working.  If an asset is to be used for CAS and CAS only, maybe they should be given to the LCC (but even then, I have my reserves when for fixed wing aircraft).



It's (sort of) working for the limited scope of things like Libya, and we made it work in Afg.  It's not working in the bigger picture (my experience recently: Jointex, Steadfast Jazz).  Like any other military asset, the Commander should be (and is), free to assign assets to support whatever tasks he is currently conducting, but the Air Forces are the only ones who can't seem to understand that, and try to tie the Joint Commander's wrists with Air Doctrine.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Tasking priorities should be decided at the joint level and air apportionned according to priorities. ... This is the only way to assure an efficient and effective operation.



When it is appropriate to do so, completely agree.  However, if that is forcing you fight a certain way then change what you are doing, and give them to the people best able to use them.  The second statement sounds like you think Air Force Commander's are the only intelligent people around and the only ones capable of using your "incredible capabilities.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> We need to keep flexible in order to achieve the "strategic", "operational" and "tactical" objectives (all of which a single fighter can affect).



Yes, we need to be flexible, we are an incredibly small Air Force (especially if we carved off TacHel and MH cause no when in the "real" Air Force wants them anyway).  But flexible doesn't always mean the Air Force way... sometimes flexible does mean chop them to the people who needs them.

By the way, because we are small, all of our aircraft can provide "strategic", "operational" and "tactical" objectives; C-17s in Mali and Katrina, SAR Griffins in Jamaica, Sea Kings on endless deployments showing Canadian presence (yes part of the ship, but the ship couldn't be there without them).  Oh, and look, at least two of those didn't need an ACC...


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## KevinB (7 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> Regardless of the nature, source, and ownership of the delivery platform there is going to be a wait involved.
> 
> How much of a visual assessment do you think happens as an aircraft whizzes in at 300 knots/560 km/hr and lets loose with a cannon burst from over a kilometre away (A10)? We lost Mark Graham and had another bunch of guys wounded in September 2006 when an A10 shot up their platoon.



WRT that issue -- the A/C had been called in and cleared hot by CANSOF entity.

 Tan hat does not a FAC make...

Pilot realized the error and stopped firing - 

In a jet going faster or using a released munition the effects would have been more devastating.


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## Old Sweat (7 Jul 2014)

It is my understanding, and I have interviewed the Bn Comd, BC and FOO*, that the FAC was in the back of the FOO's LAV, but could not observe the aircraft. When the burst hit the company, the FOO, who had his head out of the vehicle observing the objective area, dropped in and shouted "abort, abort, abort" which the FAC repeated over his net. This warned off the second A10, which was lining up, from engaging the company. 

* I have also read the FOO's log, which also supports this version of events, as does Murray Brewster's book. It is possible there was SOF involvement, but this is the first I have heard of it.


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## Kirkhill (8 Jul 2014)

D&B -  yer aff yer gem.   That's already been posted and debated  
http://army.ca/forums/threads/22809/post-1312353.html#msg1312353

Meanwhile:



> UK Parliamentary Questions: Afghanistan
> 
> 
> (Source: House of Commons Hansard; published July 07, 2014)
> ...



link

And



> Crisis In Iraq Makes the Case for Expanded Sales of Light Attack Aircraft
> 
> 
> (Source: Lexington Institute; issued July 7, 2014)
> ...



link

F-16s, A-10s, King Airs, Reapers, LAS or Helos.......Do you really care who chucked you a life ring when you're drowning?


----------



## pancakes (10 Jul 2014)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Cut the F-35 order by 12, since shiny jets won't do CAS, and buy scary attack helicopters.



Our solution may instead be some sort of an 84mm mount for the Griffon so they can fire it out the side of the chopper and redesignate it the new Griffon AH.

Then with the money they saved they can stand up yet another new headquarters element somewhere in the CF, cause you know....can't have too many of those.


----------



## George Wallace (10 Jul 2014)

pancakes said:
			
		

> Our solution may instead be some sort of an 84mm mount for the Griffon so they can fire it out the side of the chopper and redesignate it the new Griffon AH.
> 
> Then with the money they saved they can stand up yet another new headquarters element somewhere in the CF, cause you know....can't have too many of those.



A la Rambo firing the M-72 from inside an Iroquois.  AVGAS in the backblast makes a spectacular napalm run on enemy positions only a one time event.


----------



## Loachman (10 Jul 2014)

We had 2.75 inch Rocket Kits for the Kiowa.

Range was better than a Carl Gustaf.

Sight system was a pair of Chinagraph "X"s on the Pilot's windscreen bubble, one with a "3" beside it and the other with a "4" - for the range in kilometres.

Pinpoint accuracy was not expected.

Fires were sometimes started if the grass below a certain Pilot's helicopter (not mine) was dry, as he liked to be very low when he shot. No fuel was ever ignited.

Jet fuel and Avgas are not the same. The first is, essentially, diesel, and the second is gasoline.


----------



## GR66 (10 Jul 2014)

Why does it have to be either F-35s OR a cheaper platform to deliver the HE?  To my understanding there are already plans to replace our Hawk trainers with something more suitable for training for the F-35...the KAI/Lockheed Martin T-50 might seem to be a logical choice since they are from the same manufacturer and have some sensor commonality.  Perhaps we could reduce the F-35 order to somewhere between 30-40 aircraft.  That should hopefully be enough to handle the high-end expeditionary requirements and distant NORAD intercepts.  We then supplement the T-50 trainers we buy with a dozen of the FA-50 light attack model.  These could handle both domestic air intercept duties and be a cheaper platform for CAS deployment in theaters where there is not a high air threat.  We could even maybe add a dozen AT-6 armed variants of our Harvard prop trainers for an even cheaper CAS alternative.  

The total air frames we purchase could still be in the 65 range, but we'd have a wider variety of capabilities that we could apply in various situations.  The overall cost would also be less.  There would be less issues of "orphan" fleets of aircraft due to the significant commonality between the training and attack versions of the aircraft.


----------



## SupersonicMax (10 Jul 2014)

Multi-fleet is not the solution.  More expensive as you double everything (there are many significant difference between training and operational training)

40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO


----------



## PuckChaser (10 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> 40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO



At the end of the day, we have multiple fleets of vehicles and ships that are not enough for 2 major tasks at the same time. Why should the Air Force be any different?


----------



## Transporter (10 Jul 2014)

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> At the end of the day, we have multiple fleets of vehicles and ships that are not enough for 2 major tasks at the same time. Why should the Air Force be any different?


Asinine logic. Hey, those guys are f*****-up, so you should be too.


----------



## PuckChaser (10 Jul 2014)

Transporter said:
			
		

> Asinine logic. Hey, those guys are f*****-up, so you should be too.



So what you propose is we dump our entire procurement budget into one task, and $#@$@ everyone else? We need fighters, frigates, destroyers, AOPS vessels, sub refits, light and medium support vehicles, new small arms, new load carriage, new fighting order, etc etc etc. Money's not finite. 

Personally, I think we should be buying the F-35, but I'm trying to play the devil's advocate here. However, its been said here before that the F-18s were extremely noticeably absent from basically the last 10 years of focus for the CAF. So why should they get topped up to 100% PML if we're not going to use it?


----------



## SupersonicMax (10 Jul 2014)

They were used, daily, for NORAD ops and in other conflicts.

Let's go with 40 JSF.  15 for OTU, 12 per Operational Sqn.  Of those 12, probably 8 or so are serviceable at any given time.  Then you have your NORAD commitment and your force generation.  

Then you have to give a 6 pack for NATO.  It's not enough.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (10 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> We had 2.75 inch Rocket Kits for the Kiowa.
> 
> Range was better than a Carl Gustaf.
> 
> ...



There is a biiiigggg difference between firing a rocket from a pod on the outside of the aircraft and firing a shoulder mounted M-72 out of the side door. 

Anything combustible in the back blast area is going to ignite.


----------



## CBH99 (11 Jul 2014)

One question I have - and this is taking us way way back to the F-35 thread, but it also applies to the direction this thread is going, is...

Why is 65 the magic number??

We purchased 120 CF-18 aircraft.  I believe the upgraded/operational fleet right now is approx. 70 - 75 aircraft.  

Why is 65 the magic number??  Between NATO, NORAD, training, expeditionary roles, etc.  65 seems like an incredibly low number, regardless of what aircraft is selected.  

We live in the 2nd largest country on earth.  Our population now is substantially larger than what it was when the CF-18 was purchased.  Yet despite our larger population, we are shrinking our fighter force to a size that is arguably on the low end.  

Am I missing something?  Would we be purchasing larger numbers of aircraft if the purchase price was lower?  Or if the industrial benefits were larger & guaranteed?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (11 Jul 2014)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> One question I have - and this is taking us way way back to the F-35 thread, but it also applies to the direction this thread is going, is...
> 
> Why is 65 the magic number??
> 
> ...



I would reckon part of the problem is more to do with manpower then anything else.  Do we have enough manpower to support anymore aircraft?  think tech's, support staff, pilots, etc... These are incredibly complex machines and while they may be expensive, so are the people req'd to maintain them.  Any more aircraft would probably require us to have more people and that's not an option.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (11 Jul 2014)

Also shows you how much the cost has gone up. I have always said get 80 fighters, 2 types, 40 of each. In a perfect world each fleet would be about 15-20 years different than the other, so you are only replacing 40 at one time. You are also not so much at risk of your entire air force fighter fleet being grounded by technical issues at the same time. so i hope they keep a number of the CF-18's flying beside the F-35 to get this number. I also know that as new issues come up in the F-35 over the first 5-7 years of operations, the other fleet should still be flyable.


----------



## GR66 (11 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Multi-fleet is not the solution.  More expensive as you double everything (there are many significant difference between training and operational training)
> 
> 40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO



I make no claims of expertise in this area so I'm asking to be educated.  Multi-fleet may not be ideal, but are we not already multi-fleet?  We have the Harvard (T-6) and the Hawk as trainers and the Hornets.  Reducing the proposed F-35 order but adding some armed Harvards (AT-6...with 85% parts commonality with the T-6 according to the Beechcraft website) and armed jet trainers (FA-50 if we go with the T-50 trainer also presumably with significant hardware commonality) would be less of a support burden than adding a completely different airframe type.

As far as the differences between training and operational training goes, do not the same general techniques apply whether you're dropping a precision guided weapon from an F-35 or an AT-6?  Since we're going to have fewer F-35's than Hornets regardless would that not allow pilots to begin training in these techniques earlier in their careers while they're waiting for one of the limited F-35 positions to be open?  Could having AT-6s and/or FA-50's open up the possibility of keeping pilots that leave the CF for higher-wage civilian jobs involved by opening up some of these positions to Reserve pilots?  

You may be absolutely right that 40 JSF alone are not enough to support our NORAD+NATO requirements but some of those requirements would be filled where possible by the AT-6s and FA-50s.  Ideally you'd be able to have a fleet of armed aircraft larger than the proposed F-35 fleet if you substituted some cheaper aircraft for a portion of the F-35s.  Could you get 1 x FA-50 AND 1 x AT-6 for the price of a single F-35 and have enough money left over to cover the increased support costs?  At that breakdown you could have 40 x F-35s, 24 x FA-50's and 24 x AT-6's (84 total combat aircraft) available instead of just 65 x F-35's alone.  

Again, I'm sure that there are definite drawbacks to this kind of proposal (as there are plusses and minuses to any choice we have to make due to our limited financial resources), but are there enough problems that this is kind of solution can't even be considered as a possible option?  I look forward to hearing what much more knowledgeable minds have to say.


----------



## Loachman (11 Jul 2014)

recceguy said:
			
		

> There is a biiiigggg difference between firing a rocket from a pod on the outside of the aircraft and firing a shoulder mounted M-72 out of the side door.
> 
> Anything combustible in the back blast area is going to ignite.



I saw "84mm mount for the Griffon" and envisaged a strut-system and fixed forward firing. I missed "so they can fire it _*out*_ the side of the chopper", thinking "from the side".

I thought that it would be an awful weight of weaponry - a whole bank of Carl Gustafs - for little weight of fire. Or somebody has to lean w - a - y out to reload.

I took neither the suggestion, nor my thoughts on it, seriously.


----------



## Loachman (11 Jul 2014)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> We purchased 120 CF-18 aircraft.



137, I believe, of which 54 were based in Germany to hold back the godless communist hordes while keeping local breweries in operation.


----------



## SupersonicMax (11 Jul 2014)

The Hawks and Harvards are owned, managed and maitained by a civilian company.  We do not have any maintenance personnel working on them.  

Also, even if we were to have the same overall amount of aircraft, you need to increase the overheads (essentially tripple if you add 2 fleets)...


----------



## Colin Parkinson (11 Jul 2014)

Or you can change the way you do things to reduce those overhead costs, I know crazy talk. The CF somehow managed to live with dual fleets of fighter aircraft before, mind you they weren't blessed/hamstrung by everyone having more computing power in their pockets than NASA had to send people to the moon. 

One thing I note here on this site is the "Abused spouse syndrome" We say thank you when the beating stops and have a difficult time thinking about how to do things to meet the missions rather than to appease the abuser. I suspect that having senior leaders that attempt to appease to much only encourages the politicians and senior civil servants to abuse the military more.


----------



## GR66 (11 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> The Hawks and Harvards are owned, managed and maitained by a civilian company.  We do not have any maintenance personnel working on them.
> 
> Also, even if we were to have the same overall amount of aircraft, you need to increase the overheads (essentially tripple if you add 2 fleets)...



Interesting.  I suppose we could simply extend the contract for maintenance to the additional aircraft but that would likely have significant implications on our ability to deploy them outside Canada.  I've seen references to a plan for Canada to purchase new jet trainers to replace the Hawks.  Will this be an actual purchase (meaning we'll take over maintenance for the new trainers), a purchase with the maintenance contracted out to a civilian company, or a contract like the Hawks for a civilian company to own and maintain the new trainers?


----------



## Loachman (11 Jul 2014)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The CF somehow managed to live with dual fleets of fighter aircraft before,



Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.

And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.


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## pancakes (11 Jul 2014)

I am not educated on things air force, so I will stay in my lane, but since they have been canceling the replacement of the MLVW/LSVW for years, combined with the fact they canceled the new armored vehicles and are now divesting most of our B fleet...(our unit is losing 7 of 9 HLVWs alone)

I'm thinking we won't really be seeing new jets for a while.

Christ...I put in an order for 20 pairs of mechanics gloves for my guys and it was canceled because even they were too expensive.


----------



## GR66 (11 Jul 2014)

pancakes said:
			
		

> I am not educated on things air force, so I will stay in my lane, but since they have been canceling the replacement of the MLVW/LSVW for years, combined with the fact they canceled the new armored vehicles and are now divesting most of our B fleet...(our unit is losing 7 of 9 HLVWs alone)
> 
> I'm thinking we won't really be seeing new jets for a while.
> 
> Christ...I put in an order for 20 pairs of mechanics gloves for my guys and it was canceled because even they were too expensive.



Makes sense to me.  Why would you need mechanic's gloves if your mechanics don't have anything left to fix?


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## Old Sweat (11 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.
> 
> And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.



Before integration and the establishment of Mobile Command the RCAF ignored air support of the ground forces. From the NATO set up forward it was an air superiority and air defence organization, first with Sabres and CF100s and then with CF104s and CF101s. There was some attempt to keep the skills alive and CJATC Rivers used to run FAC courses and had a flight of T33s to simulate fighter bombers and Sabres (being phased out) flying out of Chatham did some missions in the early 60s. I do suspect there was gnashing of teeth when the CF5s were added to the inventory, especially as Canada was unable to get manufacturing rights for Canadair to build the F4s.

However the RCN operated Banshee fighter-bombers from HMCS Bonaventure up to about 1962. The gunners had a Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) and a FAC posted to the carrier to work with them. I remember standing on a ridge at the south end of the Gagetown ranges and looking down at two Banshees flying north up the Nerepis River. I also remember fighting a humungous range fire in Shilo started by the Banshees in 1961 when I was an officer cadet.


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## Loachman (11 Jul 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> From the NATO set up forward it was an air superiority and air defence organization, first with Sabres and CF100s and then with CF104s and CF101s.



CF104s were actually bought for the nuclear strike role in Germany, and later used for ground attack.

And I'm not quite sure of your wording, but the CF101s worked for NORAD vice NATO.


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## Old Sweat (11 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> CF104s were actually bought for the nuclear strike role in Germany, and later used for ground attack.
> 
> And I'm not quite sure of your wording, but the CF101s worked for NORAD vice NATO.



You are correct. I was too concise in trying to describe the situation.. The point I was trying to make was that the RCAF thought offensive air support sucked. 

My apologies!


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## YZT580 (11 Jul 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.
> 
> And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.


Don't forget the Clunks in the bay for ECM and the Sabres for fun.


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## Fishbone Jones (11 Jul 2014)

.........and T-Birds.


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## Loachman (11 Jul 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Don't forget the Clunks in the bay for ECM and the Sabres for fun.



Not "in my time".


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## a_majoor (12 Jul 2014)

Getting away from "platformism" for a moment, I amm thinking the real reson that the Army believes the air Force can't be trusted to do CAS has more to do with availability, timeliness and accountability.

When *we* want to engage a target with our own weapons, it is quite easy; issue a fire control order and engage the target with our own weapons. The fire comes moments after the order, and if there is no or ineffective fire we will know why right away (and often be able to correct it). Even Combat Teams and formations can bring fire "on call" quite quickly through artillery, since *we* own it. Not so much for CAS, since the aircraft might not be in the area, might not have the proper munitions loaded for the support we want and might be tasked by outside agencies on missions we know nothing about. Since things can go south quite quickly if the requested fire does not arrive, it leave a bad taste in the mouth.

IOT regain the availability, timeliness and accountability, the Army needs to re-invest in its own integral fire support. ATGMs like Javelin and Spike provide a means at platoon and company level (especially Spike since it is a FOG-M and can have a man in the loop to identify difficult targets and make the strike/no strike decisions if needed). Mortars with skilled crews and MFC's can provide not only a weight of fire, but also have a much higher ability to hit difficult targets than ever before (especially if technologies like mortar rounds with seeker heads become more available). And the number of actual guns in the artillery park need to grow as well, to provide overlapping coverage and service more targets more rapidly. If UCAV's can be small, smart and cheap enough, using them to identify targets and perhaps deal with them on their own is also a future option.

Some classes of weapons even overlap to an extent. Spike covers an entire family of FOG-M weapons (mini Spike has a range of 1300m, while at the other end Spike-ER can reach out to 8000m, and Spike NLOS is an artillery weapon that has a range of 25km). Since they are ATGM's, they can deal with hardened targets like bunkers, fortified buildings and other difficult targets in addition to tanks. Their "man in the loop" capabilities let you use them "danger close" and as a bonus they also have some ability to discourage armed helicopters. Our procuremenrt system needs to be overhauled as well. Modern electronics are cheap (the real cost of an iPhone or Android device is in the $4-600 range retail), so there is quite a bit of scope for thinking smart weapons can come down a lot in price (imagine if Excalibur rounds cost $7000 instead of $70,000 apiece). This might mean long production runs to gain economies of scale, but having lots of these weapons also means more rounds for training, increased proficiency etc.

As for CAS, if *we* can cover off more tasks with our own integral firepower, then aircraft can be assigned to higher priority missions which play to their strengths (mostly being able to strike deep targets far beyond the range of our weapons, and the flexibility to add a *lot* of weight of fire when the commander needs it.)


----------



## OldSolduer (12 Jul 2014)

How about the infantry getting their medium mortar platoons back?


----------



## Colin Parkinson (17 Jul 2014)

So take the money saved by retiring the A10 from the USAF and plow it into company level support weapons and munitions, I love it.  :nod:


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## YZT580 (17 Jul 2014)

I think that Colin has inadvertently brought the real defense for the A10 and for current systems to the fore.  Right now, they have the A10 close air support system.  The army can count on it because supporting the army is the only thing that it is good for.  If the money for the A10 disappears it isn't going to be plowed into the purchase of an improved army owned system: it will go to the air force to enhance their very new and very expensive shiny new toy or to the navy to finance a new carrier or it will vanish from the military budget entirely.  It won't go to the army.  If I were an army general I would hold on real tight to the assets I have until I can actually reach out and touch and use the new system.  A promise to provide doesn't give me a warm fuzzy feeling inside at all.


----------



## a_majoor (17 Jul 2014)

An interesting site to surf: http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/

It is in the form of an internet "magazine", which covers various aviation topics. Of interest is the March 1998 "issue" with an article on COIN: French counter insurgency aircraft 1946-1965, and Nov-Dec 1998 Tigers and Lions in Paradise: Siri Lanka's Civil War. This same issue also talks about "Combat crop dusters"; a black program to harden and potentially arm crop-dusters to carry out spraying operations against narcotics fields in South America.

Various other articles throughout the site talk about trench strafing and "contact patrol" aircraft from the end of the Great War, so there is an overall view of the evolution of CAS from 1918 to the end of the insurgency in Siri Lanka.

One thing that becomes clear overall is the evolution of CAS aircraft is a drawn out and expensive program to create a small number of specialized aircraft with few other possible roles; one reason air forces in general hate them. The resources needed to devote to this role are great, and with the end of the war you are left with a bunch of planes parked at the end of the runway and no one willing to pay for them. In the back of the mind is also the feeling that the next time there is a call for this service, the existing fleet of airplanes will be obsolete or operating in an unsuitable area they were never designed for (imagine if the British _had_ carried out operations in Turkey in the early 1920's, flying heavy and underpowered Contact Patrol aircraft in the mountains of Anatolia....). 

Certainly the A-10 is operating in a much different environment than envisioned in the 1970's when it was designed, and some of the factors above are indeed in play (the EW, SAM and GBAD environments are orders of magnitude more lethal than they were 30 years ago, while masses of armoured targets are no longer a factor on the battlefield).


----------



## daftandbarmy (18 Jul 2014)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> How about the infantry getting their medium mortar platoons back?



And the 60, fercrissakes!


----------



## Colin Parkinson (22 Jul 2014)

The removal of mortars from the infantry is the type of insanity that makes us suspicious of all the promises that are given to the PBI.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jul 2014)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The removal of mortars from the infantry is the type of insanity that makes us suspicious of all the promises that are given to the PBI.



That's probably why everyone is so concerned about the 5.56mm calibre these days. If we had adequate integral indirect fire support, like we used to, the rifle/LMG can be relatively inconsequential.


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## KevinB (25 Jul 2014)

Further to that  - we are dispersing small units further and further - and asking them to dominate more ground with less support...


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## OldSolduer (26 Jul 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> Further to that  - we are dispersing small units further and further - and asking them to dominate more ground with less support...



I have a question - Kev is right - why not go back to 7.62 mm or something with a bit more pizzazz.....not a fan of the 5.56


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## a_majoor (26 Jul 2014)

Changing rifle calibre bullets really won't make much of a difference in this particular argument. CAS is really a form of indirect fire, so bringing back the mortar platoon, reissuing a 60mm mortar at platoon level, using advanced missile weapons like FOG-M or SPIKE, re emphasizing indirect fire from tanks and building up the artillery park with, you know, guns are all means of achieving the end using Army resources.

Attack helicopters, armed UCAVs or large, armed quad copters are another means of achieving this sort of fire support without the use of fixed wing aircraft, and of course using fixed wing platforms as bomb trucks and missile platforms is the "modern" means of doing CAS.


----------



## daftandbarmy (28 Jul 2014)

An interesting article on the subject of CAS from 1990 when they were thinking about getting rid of the _aging_ A-10  :

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1990/1990%20garrett.pdf


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## KevinB (28 Jul 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Changing rifle calibre bullets really won't make much of a difference in this particular argument. CAS is really a form of indirect fire, so bringing back the mortar platoon, reissuing a 60mm mortar at platoon level, using advanced missile weapons like FOG-M or SPIKE, re emphasizing indirect fire from tanks and building up the artillery park with, you know, guns are all means of achieving the end using Army resources.
> 
> Attack helicopters, armed UCAVs or large, armed quad copters are another means of achieving this sort of fire support without the use of fixed wing aircraft, and of course using fixed wing platforms as bomb trucks and missile platforms is the "modern" means of doing CAS.




My experience from Iraq say that Helo's and Drones do not fly in lower visibility dust storms.    

Not really solving the Close issue - but a C-130 with pod setup could loiter a lot longer and be above local issues like choking sand...


----------



## YZT580 (28 Jul 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> My experience from Iraq say that Helo's and Drones do not fly in lower visibility dust storms.
> 
> Not really solving the Close issue - but a C-130 with pod setup could loiter a lot longer and be above local issues like choking sand...



big slow moving vulnerable.  If they aren't having problems picking off SU-25s they sure as hell aren't going to have any problems with a circling C130.


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## a_majoor (29 Jul 2014)

Bit surprised the USAF crowd hasn't jumped on the vulnerability of Ukrainian SU-25's as an argument to get rid of the A-10. Of course, that argument also puts a big dent in letting the F-35 anywhere near a combat zone....


----------



## YZT580 (29 Jul 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Bit surprised the USAF crowd hasn't jumped on the vulnerability of Ukrainian SU-25's as an argument to get rid of the A-10. Of course, that argument also puts a big dent in letting the F-35 anywhere near a combat zone....


There own experts have already critiqued the F-35 as being too fast and too expensive for ground support, too small to be a practical bomber, not maneuverable enough in head to head combat and the software doesn't deliver what was promised.  Other than that it is a great airplane for combat.  
  My recollection is that at least have of the SU-25 losses have been in the mid-altitudes and not during CAS operations.


----------



## OldSolduer (29 Jul 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> There own experts have already critiqued the F-35 as being too fast and too expensive for ground support, too small to be a practical bomber, not maneuverable enough in head to head combat and the software doesn't deliver what was promised.  Other than that it is a great airplane for combat.
> My recollection is that at least have of the SU-25 losses have been in the mid-altitudes and not during CAS operations.



Your quote reminds me of Stormin Norman's assessment of Sadaam in Gulf War 1.

Head scratching here...if it's no good.....why see we looking to buy it?


I think I know the reasons......


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## KevinB (29 Jul 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> big slow moving vulnerable.  If they aren't having problems picking off SU-25s they sure as hell aren't going to have any problems with a circling C130.



At 30,000 launching JDAM's?

I'm not talking a AC-130 running low level passes.


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## Good2Golf (30 Jul 2014)

I'm pretty sure that the Spooky is pretty solid from its operational posture and gear that it has on board...FROGFOOT's SPO-15 was pretty much programmed with a lot of Western radar systems, so not sure it would have been much (if any) help against the GADFLY...protective systems are only as good as the data they are programmed to detect.

Regards
G2G


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## daftandbarmy (30 Jul 2014)

Maybe we need to start another run of these things:

Vintage bomber wasn’t built for comfort

http://www.timescolonist.com/vintage-bomber-wasn-t-built-for-comfort-1.1265250


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## OldSolduer (30 Jul 2014)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Maybe we need to start another run of these things:
> 
> Vintage bomber wasn’t built for comfort
> 
> http://www.timescolonist.com/vintage-bomber-wasn-t-built-for-comfort-1.1265250



The Mosquitoe. Twin engine, go like a bugger. Versatile and capable of several different missions from recce to 
CAS.  :nod:


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## YZT580 (30 Jul 2014)

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> The Mosquitoe. Twin engine, go like a bugger. Versatile and capable of several different missions from recce to
> CAS.  :nod:



And all the materials are available in the forests of BC and Quebec.  Be reasonably safe against heat seekers and with a little tweaking of the hull design you could make cause radar seekers to have problems too.  A little chaff out the window.  Not sure about the 50 cal. vs. plywood duel though.


----------



## OldSolduer (31 Jul 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> And all the materials are available in the forests of BC and Quebec.  Be reasonably safe against heat seekers and with a little tweaking of the hull design you could make cause radar seekers to have problems too.  A little chaff out the window.  Not sure about the 50 cal. vs. plywood duel though.



Not being a pilot, but I think if the Super Mosquitoe were to fly low and fast enough, the gunners have no chance to react.....


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## a_majoor (31 Jul 2014)

Having been in the sights of an A-10 during it simulated gun run, I can attest that it can also come in very low and fast, much faster than any hand held weapon could react.

Of course we (or at least _modern_ Western military forces) don't defend against low flying aircraft with pintle mounted machine guns and open sights either...

It is instructive to look at some of the capabilities we let evaporate over the years. 35mm Skyguard cannons with AHEAD ammunition and integrated into the ADATS/GBAD system were reputedly capable of intercepting not just the aircraft, but even incoming bombs and missiles. If modern GBAD can do that, then a big bomb truck would be needed to saturate a high value target and ensure the target is "serviced" properly.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (31 Jul 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Having been in the sights of an A-10 during it simulated gun run, I can attest that it can also come in very low and fast, much faster than any hand held weapon could react.
> 
> Of course we (or at least _modern_ Western military forces) don't defend against low flying aircraft with pintle mounted machine guns and open sights either...
> 
> It is instructive to look at some of the capabilities we let evaporate over the years. 35mm Skyguard cannons with AHEAD ammunition and integrated into the ADATS/GBAD system were reputedly capable of intercepting not just the aircraft, but even incoming bombs and missiles. If modern GBAD can do that, then a big bomb truck would be needed to saturate a high value target and ensure the target is "serviced" properly.



Even modern non-western nations such as China and Russia have made significant developments in Counter Precision Guided Munitions (C-PGM) technology, including the addition of the S1- Pantsyr C-PGM system.  Having seen the effects of US PGMs on the Iraqi and Serbian AD systems the Russians and Chinese have made their systems more survivable by developing systems such as the Pantsyr to intercept PGMs and by making their higher level AD systems more mobile and avoiding static installations like the Iraqi's had.

A modern near-peer nation armed with HIMAD systems, SHORAD systems, MANPADs, and C-PGM would have few issues dealing with small numbers of systems, particularly if they have strategic depth that forces our aircraft to go further into their territory to engage. A single solution, in a conventional fight, is a poor solution.  A c-130 gunship is an easy target against high level AD while the A-10 is susceptible to low level systems. You need the mix (whether that is in a coalition or national context) to be effective against a near peer. Canada needs to find its niche, accept that it's not going to be a big player like the US, and purchase an aircraft that allows it to fill that niche and/or focus solely on NORAD tasks.


----------



## SupersonicMax (31 Jul 2014)

Our niche is self-escort strike/CAS.  No, we are not going to be doing OCA or DCA in a shooting war.  We will deliver A/G weapons.

At home, we will provide Air Defense capabilities.


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## Good2Golf (31 Jul 2014)

Self-escort strike I could see.  CAS...so you say, but I am highly doubtful.  Never been done, likely never will be done - the Army sees more of Top Aces' Alpha-jets than they do 18s...

I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on why you would never no OCA in a shooting war, particularly if the opposition was flying?


----------



## SupersonicMax (31 Jul 2014)

We just don't have the capabilities other platforms have in terms of A/A employment. We do train for it (it is in our mission set) but it consists of 1 mission on each upgrade, more to give the guys an idea of what is OCA and what it involves rather than being experts at it.  Also, OCA is a much more agressive mission set and the risk levels associated with it are, imho, well beyond what we, Canadians, are ready to accept.

For CAS, it doesn't make sense to use CF-18s for training all the time.  It's way more expensive and it removes FG hours from us (as you know, it is severely limited these days).  FAC training level CAS is very simple and well within the grasp of even most junior wingmen.  The training value for us is very limited.  When doing more complex scenarios (like SOJTAC training), now it becomes some really valuable training.


----------



## Good2Golf (31 Jul 2014)

So OCA is likely too dangerous (even with 583R2?) and CAS training of Army FAC/JTACs isn't cost effective for the 18s to actually do it, so what are you saving all your FG effort for? NORAD DCA? Strike/SCAR?   You might have to forgive those of us who see the fighter force's sentiment about doing things other than supporting their fellow CAF comrades as confusing and perhaps...un-teamlike?


----------



## dapaterson (31 Jul 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> so what are you saving all your FG effort for?



Looking cool in leather jackets.


----------



## SupersonicMax (31 Jul 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> So OCA is likely too dangerous (even with 583R2?) and CAS training of Army FAC/JTACs isn't cost effective for the 18s to actually do it, so what are you saving all your FG effort for? NORAD DCA? Strike/SCAR?   You might have to forgive those of us who see the fighter force's sentiment about doing things other than supporting their fellow CAF comrades as confusing and perhaps...un-teamlike?



OCA:  yes.  Higher risk tactics with (generally speaking) acceptable losses for mission success.  

FG, these days, is strictly limited to procducing combat ready wingmen and leads.  We have 0 capacity for continuation training.  Those syllabi are dictated by the SET under recommendations from the community.  It consists of NORAD, BFM, ACM, TI, DCA, OCA, Range, CAS, XINT and AI. Focus is on the A/G portion and heavily biased towards AI as it is the more complex mission set we do.

I would love to be able to support FAC courses (and we still actually do.  Wainwright in July and November) and SOJTAC (we did in California back in January).  We used to do more,  a couple years ago but YFR was not an issue then.   We support when we can and we do bend over bavkwards to do so.  I am intimately involved in the planning of our exercises and we do our best with what we are given.  But we are not given nearly enough to accomplish what we are mandated to do.

IMO, the alphajets are more cost effective on the initial stages of the course.  Imstead of having a Hornet at 40K an hour and limited YFR to orbit for an hour for a talk on, get the alphajet with pretty much unlimited hours (no training requirement for those guys) and much cheaper.  They will even get drop capability soon.  Once the baby FACs get proficient, get the Hornets with live weapons to top up their training. 

Supporting the Army is one thing we do.  Not all we do. Both in Training and combat.


----------



## Eye In The Sky (31 Jul 2014)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Looking cool in leather jackets while strolling across the ramp...that you have to take off before you actually fly something.


----------



## dapaterson (31 Jul 2014)

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

>



Common sense was never stated or implied as part of the equation.


----------



## Eye In The Sky (31 Jul 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> OCA:  yes.  Higher risk tactics with (generally speaking) acceptable losses for mission success.
> 
> FG, these days, is strictly limited to procducing combat ready wingmen and leads.  We have 0 capacity for continuation training.  Those syllabi are dictated by the SET under recommendations from the community.  It consists of NORAD, BFM, ACM, TI, DCA, OCA, Range, CAS, XINT and AI. Focus is on the A/G portion and heavily biased towards AI as it is the more complex mission set we do.



What are the chances that you can explain some of the alphabet soup/abbrev's?


----------



## SupersonicMax (31 Jul 2014)

BFM: Basic Fighter Manoevers - 1v1 close fights
ACM: Air Combat Manoevers - 2v1 or 2 close fights
NORAD: self-explanatory
TI - Tactical Intercepts - 2 or 4 v X Air-Air basic flows and tactics
DCA: Defensive Counter Air - 2 or 4 v X - Area/Point/High Value Assets protection
OCA: Offensive Counter Air - 2 or 4 ship escorting bombers to a target
Range: Academic A/G range (dive deliveries and basic LGB deliveries)
CAS - Close Air Support
XINT - SCAR - Strike Coordination Armed Reconnaissance
AI - Air Interdiction - Self-Escort Strike


----------



## Eye In The Sky (31 Jul 2014)

copy, tks.


----------



## daftandbarmy (1 Aug 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> BFM: Basic Fighter Manoevers - 1v1 close fights
> ACM: Air Combat Manoevers - 2v1 or 2 close fights
> NORAD: self-explanatory
> TI - Tactical Intercepts - 2 or 4 v X Air-Air basic flows and tactics
> ...



FTFY  ;D


----------



## Loachman (11 Aug 2014)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> a little tweaking of the hull design you could make cause radar seekers to have problems too.



The _*fuselage*_ and wings, being plywood, are already invisible to radar. No tweaking is required there.


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## a_majoor (16 Aug 2014)

Some retro ideas about how CAS could have been implemented in the 1980's. The Scaled Composites ARES jet was perhaps the closest thing to a private contractor creating a ground attack aircraft in the post war period; it used a jet engine from a business jet, carried a 25mm Gatling cannon which fired the same sort of ammunition we use in chain guns and actually was flight tested for a while. The second illustration is a speculative design from the ILM group developed under the "ADDAX" name, this resembles an attack helicopter fuselage with wings in place of the rotors, and the two jet engines mounted above and behind the pilot.

The ADDAX project was based on the idea of using the volumetric space of an airframe more efficiently and to separate critical items to reduce the effects of battle damage. Two other designs for high speed aircraft were also developed, and used compressor air "bled" over the airfoil to develop huge amounts of lift from a F-16 sized package. However, there were no interested customers for the ARES ro ADDAX, so both projects died

http://www.scaled.com/projects/ares



> *AGILE RESPONSIVE EFFECTIVE SUPPORTS (ARES)*
> 
> The ARES, Scaled Model 151, was designed initially in response to a U.S. Army request for a Low Cost Battlefield Attack Aircraft (LCBAA). A design study was performed by Rutan Aircraft Factory in 1981 for such an aircraft. Its mission goals were low-altitude, close air support, with long endurance, and with adequate field performance to operate from roads.
> 
> ...


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## Fishbone Jones (17 Aug 2014)

Let's get back on track folks. This isn't about what airframe should replace the A-10, but who should own CAS.

Further posts not adhering to the thread topic run the risk of deletion.

---STAFF---


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## willy (17 Aug 2014)

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> What are the chances that you can explain some of the alphabet soup/abbrev's?



Max, I'm a bit of a latecomer to the discussion but if fellow Airforce guys are asking you to unshmuck the lingo then isn't that possibly a bit of a ping in your mind that you aren't exactly on the same sheet of music as everyone else is?  

At the end of the day, we are discussing the disconnect between the elements.


----------



## SupersonicMax (17 Aug 2014)

This was a but of a sideteack from the actual discussion, but there is a disconnect with Army types.  However, the FAC community is fairly well educated on what we do and how.


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## willy (17 Aug 2014)

You know what, not going there.  Max- you're on your own song sheet buddy.


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## Ralph (17 Aug 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> OCA:  yes.  Higher risk tactics with (generally speaking) acceptable losses for mission success.
> 
> FG, these days, is strictly limited to procducing combat ready wingmen and leads.  We have 0 capacity for continuation training.  Those syllabi are dictated by the SET under recommendations from the community.  It consists of NORAD, BFM, ACM, TI, DCA, OCA, Range, CAS, XINT and AI. Focus is on the A/G portion and heavily biased towards AI as it is the more complex mission set we do.
> 
> ...



The AJs can also support low-level controls (and the majority are retired Hornet pilots with a gajillion hours). Other than not being able to drop and not having the same pod capabilities, the Alphas are what we need in these fiscal times IOT get FACs trained. That being said, new Hornet pilots need to learn how to talk to the guys on the ground too.


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## GR66 (17 Aug 2014)

Maybe the issue isn't that CAS can't be trusted to an Air Force, but rather that it can't be trusted to an Air Force that has only a single combat platform which is tasked to perform too many different roles to be able to spend the time and money to become truly proficient at CAS.  

An armed Harvard (http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/at-6b-light-attack/) may be nowhere near as capable as a Hornet or F-35 in delivering volume or variety of  munitions to the battlefield, but if CAS (and related ground support roles) are all that the pilots of those less capable aircraft train to do then perhaps they will be nearly as effective in practice (and be much more likely to be actually deployed in those roles).

I know this is creeping back into the "what platform is best for CAS" sidetrack but I think that the physical limitations of what aircraft the RCAF has to work with and the multitude of roles that they are asked to perform with those aircraft has great bearing on their ability to train for CAS and the mindset of the RCAF leadership in balancing the roles assigned to their forces.


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## SupersonicMax (17 Aug 2014)

Ralph said:
			
		

> The AJs can also support low-level controls (and the majority are retired Hornet pilots with a gajillion hours). Other than not being able to drop and not having the same pod capabilities, the Alphas are what we need in these fiscal times IOT get FACs trained. That being said, new Hornet pilots need to learn how to talk to the guys on the ground too.



Absolutely.  CAS is part of every syllabus throughout a Fighter Pilot career and it should.  It is one of the skillset we need to have. We generally try to align our FG requirements with Army support requests to maximize gains.


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## Kirkhill (17 Aug 2014)

Ralph said:
			
		

> The AJs can also support low-level controls (and the majority are retired Hornet pilots with a gajillion hours). Other than not being able to drop and not having the same pod capabilities, the Alphas are what we need in these fiscal times IOT get FACs trained. That being said, new Hornet pilots need to learn how to talk to the guys on the ground too.



What would it take to add the wingstations and pods to the Alphas?  Could they be taken into government service (with the government being responsible for damage and replacement) in low threat environments? National Defence? They would become an Aerial PSC.


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## SupersonicMax (17 Aug 2014)

They can do it (and will soon drop inert practice bombs). They could also do the FLIR and others I am sure, provided the government says they want that capability from the AJets.


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## Kirkhill (17 Aug 2014)

Thanks Max.

On a personal note you are doing a pretty fair job of selling the services of 100 fighter jocks to 15000 or so ground pounders of the Combat Arms.  But given those odds you are going to have to keep selling hard to keep your 60 or 70 seats in the air.  The needs of the many ..... as somebody mumbled round here recently.  Take nothing for granted when you are posting.  Just pretend you are talking to somebody that has zero background knowledge.... someone like me.  ;D


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## Zoomie (23 Aug 2014)

Just got back from a two week long CAS support to 5,000 armoured CAV at Ft Irwin.  Pretty eye opening as to the effectiveness of a two-ship of vipers.  FwIW, COIN is dead, the main thrust now is to get the army back into force on force engagements.  The fighter guys were told to expect less than realistic battle damage assessments, as they could effectively destroy the entire threat and nullify the next two weeks of training in the process.  Where they might have destroyed a column of armour, they were told to expect a BDA of "one truck".  

Apparently the boys down south can play well together - why can't we?


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## SupersonicMax (23 Aug 2014)

We can and we do.  This discussion is purely an operationnal-level doctrine one.

In my experience, at the tactical level, we have no issues.


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## daftandbarmy (23 Aug 2014)

Ditch said:
			
		

> Just got back from a two week long CAS support to 5,000 armoured CAV at Ft Irwin.  Pretty eye opening as to the effectiveness of a two-ship of vipers.  FwIW, COIN is dead, the main thrust now is to get the army back into force on force engagements.  The fighter guys were told to expect less than realistic battle damage assessments, as they could effectively destroy the entire threat and nullify the next two weeks of training in the process.  Where they might have destroyed a column of armour, they were told to expect a BDA of "one truck".
> 
> Apparently the boys down south can play well together - why can't we?



They are probably in the fortunate position of having more assets to play with, so get good at it faster and with larger formations.

I recall the USMC treated CAS, and other air assets, like taxis: 'you call and we haul'. They had at least 18 x F-18s in support of one Brigade. I'm betting that our 'few' are much more stretched in comparison.


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## Fishbone Jones (23 Aug 2014)

I'm all glad we've had this great big group hug and statistical info provided by Max.

And Max has done a great job defending the priorities that the RCAF has to deal with it's limited amount of aircrew and minimal platforms, even though that Command might decide a strong point 70 km away is more important to hit, strategically, than getting your own out of shit on the ground.

The problem remains.

If I get in shit on the ground, I need CAS now. Not when they get around to it, or after they're done with whatever the RCAF thinks is a higher priority. I don't care what kind of a\c it is, or it's capabilities.

I need to know that when I get on the horn, while I'm pinned down, I can expect to be supported.


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## George Wallace (23 Aug 2014)

recceguy said:
			
		

> I'm all glad we've had this great big group hug and statistical info provided by Max.
> 
> And Max has done a great job defending the priorities that the RCAF has to deal with it's limited amount of aircrew and minimal platforms, even though that Command might decide a strong point 70 km away is more important to hit, strategically, than getting your own out of shit on the ground.
> 
> ...



Let's not pussy foot around.  That is what it boils down to.  Saving Canadian Soldiers/Sailors/and even Airmen's lives when they are in need of it.  Not wacking some target in some grand strategic plan or a target of opportunity that some pilot or commander far removed from the Theater or Operations thinks is necessary.  Now is "NOW!" and lives depend on it.  Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not an immediate threat and can be taken out anytime in the future.


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## McG (23 Aug 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not an immediate threat and can be taken out anytime in the future.


Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not necessarily things that we can get to at our leisure.  Senior HQs or senior commanders can move about and their appearances may be fleeting.  It may suck to be the platoon in contact (and guys may end up dead), but that fight needs to be behind as a priority next to whacking the enemy Corps HQ or the MRLS battery racing to a new hide.


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## Old Sweat (23 Aug 2014)

While researching my book on Operation Totalize, I was struck by how little the senior British and Canadian commanders really know about the application of air power. They could have been accused on occasion of frittering it away on less than the met important targets, but on the other hand the commander and staff of 2 TAF erred on at least as many occasions by insisting on upholding the premise that the air force was a separate service and independent of the army's chain of command. (I'll leave Bomber Command out of the discussion other than to note the army knew even less about the capabilities and limitations of the heavy bomber force.) 

It is one thing to hit a formation headquarters and 2 TAF did seriously wound the commander of Panzer Group West and kill the commander of 12 SS Panzer Division in separate attacks early in the Normandy campaign. On the other hand 2 TAF ignored a request by First Canadian Army to apply a priority of effort along the Caen-Falaise road between Point 122 and Quesnay Wood on 8 August 1944. As a result 12 SS Panzer Division was able to deploy about 40-50 Mk IVs and Panthers and eight Tigers as a blocking force which delayed the advance of the Phase 2 forces, ultimately delaying the closing of the Falaise Gap by perhaps a couple of weeks. (In his memoirs Kurt Meyer remarked on the absence of Allied fighter bombers.) Instead 2 TAF Typhoons and Spitfires swept the rear areas as far as the Seine, attacking wheeled vehicles across a wide area instead of concentrating on the key terrain for the operation. I should have been blunter in my book as it was a major blunder on the part of the RAF, and a major misapplication of air power.

I wonder if both services might not make the same mistakes if given the opportunity again?


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## daftandbarmy (23 Aug 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> While researching my book on Operation Totalize, I was struck by how little the senior British and Canadian commanders really know about the application of air power. They could have been accused on occasion of frittering it away on less than the met important targets, but on the other hand the commander and staff of 2 TAF erred on at least as many occasions by insisting on upholding the premise that the air force was a separate service and independent of the army's chain of command. (I'll leave Bomber Command out of the discussion other than to note the army knew even less about the capabilities and limitations of the heavy bomber force.)
> 
> It is one thing to hit a formation headquarters and 2 TAF did seriously wound the commander of Panzer Group West and kill the commander of 12 SS Panzer Division in separate attacks early in the Normandy campaign. On the other hand 2 TAF ignored a request by First Canadian Army to apply a priority of effort along the Caen-Falaise road between Point 122 and Quesnay Wood on 8 August 1944. As a result 12 SS Panzer Division was able to deploy about 40-50 Mk IVs and Panthers and eight Tigers as a blocking force which delayed the advance of the Phase 2 forces, ultimately delaying the closing of the Falaise Gap by perhaps a couple of weeks. (In his memoirs Kurt Meyer remarked on the absence of Allied fighter bombers.) Instead 2 TAF Typhoons and Spitfires swept the rear areas as far as the Seine, attacking wheeled vehicles across a wide area instead of concentrating on the key terrain for the operation. I should have been blunter in my book as it was a major blunder on the part of the RAF, and a major misapplication of air power.
> 
> I wonder if both services might not make the same mistakes if given the opportunity again?



It would be interesting to see how things would have turned out differently if, say, the USMC landed at Normandy vs. the Armies that actually led the invasion.


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## Old Sweat (23 Aug 2014)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> It would be interesting to see how things would have turned out differently if, say, the USMC landed at Normandy vs. the Armies that actually led the invasion.



Interesting thought, but the USMC was deficient in armour, medium artillery and anti-tank resources compared to the Overlord divisions. The corps was tailored for a short, sharp battle over a limited range. It essentially would have been the same as inserting six more airborne divisions into the battle, but over the beaches instead of from the sky. The Allied divisions were competent at amphibious landings and in fact landed much heavier material than the Marines could have. The latter, however, had the edge in air-ground cooperation. Still, it might be interesting to war game it.


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## George Wallace (23 Aug 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not necessarily things that we can get to at our leisure.  Senior HQs or senior commanders can move about and their appearances may be fleeting.  It may suck to be the platoon in contact (and guys may end up dead), but that fight needs to be behind as a priority next to whacking the enemy Corps HQ or the MRLS battery racing to a new hide.



In cases such as you stated, those would become "Priority Targets", and as such I will agree with you.  There are other targets that would fall into the realm of 'strategic' that would have a much lesser priority and less mobile, if not fixed installations, and it those I was thinking of when I posted.


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## Good2Golf (24 Aug 2014)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I recall the USMC treated CAS, and other air assets, like taxis: 'you call and we haul'. They had at least 18 x F-18s in support of one Brigade. I'm betting that our 'few' are much more stretched in comparison.



D&B, that's because a Marine aviator is a soldier first and pilot second...being a pilot, even flying a Harrier or Hornet, is ONLY a means of supporting fellow soldiers, not a basis for self-aggrandizement in the spirit of Douhet, Mitchell or Harris love-ins.

You want to see the difference between the Marines and the true spirit of "Air Force" you just search the record and see who showed up to COL(USAF) John Boyd's funeral...the singleton USAF duty 2-star, and an enormous contingent of the US Marine Corps. Read the whole story here: "John Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Chamged the Art of War". Colonel Boyd's story should be mandatory reading for fighter pilots....but it isn't. :not-again:

An interesting question would be how many Army folk have seen a fighter pilot show up in the mess in Edmonton, Wainright, Petawawa, Valcartier or Gagetown. I'm not talking the G3 Air or a JTAC sent to support an ex, but that kinds of guys who 'get together at the tactical level' to chat about what the 'service provider' can do for the 'user'?

:2c:

G2G


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## Transporter (24 Aug 2014)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> An interesting question would be how many Army folk have seen a fighter pilot show up in the mess in Edmonton, Wainright, Petawawa, Valcartier or Gagetown. I'm not talking the G3 Air or a JTAC sent to support an ex, but that kinds of guys who 'get together at the tactical level' to chat about what the 'service provider' can do for the 'user'?
> 
> :2c:
> 
> G2G



The answer to that would be... about the same number as the number of AF folk who have seen an Army officer show up in the mess at Cold Lake or Bagotville (other than the AD guys/gals that is).


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## Old Sweat (24 Aug 2014)

The question might be if anybody ever thought to organize a get together. When I was a subbie in 1 RCHA in Gagetown we used to have back and forth officers hockey games with RCAF Chatham. Heck, even cross pollination between units in the same brigade got guys talking and explaining why things were do the way they were.


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## Good2Golf (24 Aug 2014)

Transporter said:
			
		

> The answer to that would be... about the same number as the number of AF folk who have seen an Army officer show up in the mess at Cold Lake or Bagotville (other than the AD guys/gals that is).



Which was and is not the point...

It might be considered a "bad thing" if the Army were the service provider to the Air Force, vice the other way around.  There is a material challenge for the concept of "supported" and "supporting" commands to be understood by many wearing light blue.

Note that this whole thread's underlying theme is related to whether the boots on the ground get, or feel as though they get, the kind of service they should be getting from the air force.  Many either in the Army, or organizations working very closely with the Army get the feeling that the fast-air Air Force is pretty much disconnected from the end-user when it comes to CAS.

Question...is it reasonable then, for the Air Force to expect the Army to support it in joint and higher-level discussions when it comes to helping make the case for support to the overall activity envelope?  It should not come at a surprise that the "they don't do much for us" sentiment can rise surprisingly high up the ladder.



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> In my experience, at the tactical level, we have no issues.



This kind of view tends to reinforce the fact that even at the closest levels to dispensing of aerial violence, the fast-air Air Force doesn't think there is a significant issue.  

The truth is the institutional Air Force, certainly over the last couple of years, has steadily diverged from meaningful relation building with the Army.  The fact that rather than fighting to stay engaged during Army force generation activity with the Air Force, the institutional Air Force appears to place greater and greater reliance on 3rd-party contractors to maintain the training link with the soldiers (i.e. Top Aces soon to be dropping inert munitions and even less 18's on task with the Army, etc..) than seeing how it can further reinforce those relations, could be seen to not bode well for those relationships.

:2c: more...

G2G


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## brihard (24 Aug 2014)

Credit where credit's due, Max has done an excellent job of articulating _why_ those of us in the combat arms cannot _trust or rely upon_ RCAF fast air to kill people and break their stuff when they're really close to us and our day sucks. RCAF has its own priorities, got it. What is telling and disconcerting is Max's utter disconnect with what pretty much everyone else is saying, and that at this time I have no reason to disbelieve that he doesn't represent the rest of his community.


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## Kirkhill (24 Aug 2014)

Faulty memory time:

A long time ago, between here and there, I vaguely recollect a plan to place Hornets closer to the maritime approaches and to operate out of Comox and (perhaps?) Greenwood.

I seem to recall the programme was announced, activated and then stood down with the Hornets being returned to Cold Lake and Bagotville.

IIRC the intent of the exercise was to be able to increase the ability to react effectively against surface threats.

Now I get that Comox is only an hour or so from Cold Lake.  And the ships only move 20 to 40 miles in that time.  So forward basing of the Hornets doesn't seem to me to be a major problem.  But it does leave the Air Force isolated from its RCN partners in the same way they are isolated from their Army partners.

A bigger question though is: if the RCAF is going to be assisting the RCN in protecting the maritime approaches shouldn't they have at least some Air to Surface variants of Harpoon in their arms locker -for both the Auroras and the Hornets?

Equally shouldn't they be investing in SDBs, Brimstones and Stand Off Weapons as well as AMRAAMs and ASRAAMs?

Or do they already have that gear in stores?

Is it only the Army that has a disconnect with the RCAF?


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## dimsum (24 Aug 2014)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Faulty memory time:
> 
> A long time ago, between here and there, I vaguely recollect a plan to place Hornets closer to the maritime approaches and to operate out of Comox and (perhaps?) Greenwood.
> 
> ...



Unless things have changed, Hornets do operate out of Comox (and presumably Greenwood) but only in a limited short-term capacity.  I'm sure no one (well, no sqn members at least) would object to being posted to Comox vice Cold Lake   :nod:


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## Zoomie (24 Aug 2014)

Brihard said:
			
		

> Credit where credit's due, Max has done an excellent job of articulating _why_ those of us in the combat arms cannot _trust or rely upon_ RCAF fast air to kill people and break their stuff when they're really close to us and our day sucks.


I must have been reading a completely different thread.  This statement is disingenuous and spreads further hate statements.  Sorta like the LEO threads of the past. 

The big problem I've read here is that of expectancy.  The battlefield commander owns his direct fire, indirect fire and CAS. It is up to him to use it as he sees fit.  He is well aware of when and where he has CAS support.   On station time is a factor of weather (must be VFR), fuel (limited weapons for longer onsta) - [if they tank via yo-yo you can expect a gap in 100% coverage]and the range to getting on station.  If he decides that you don't get CAS, he's determined that someone else is more important.


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## SupersonicMax (24 Aug 2014)

Ditch, exactly.

In the end, I hope operational commanders use their assets (air, sea, land, SF) that will end a conflict in the most efficient and effective manner, with us on the winning side, without gettng into turf wars.  

If you give all your air to the land commanders, you in fact do him a disservice.  You can't interdict the battlefield (supply, LOCs, etc) and you can't hit strategic targets that may well end the war rather quickly if hit at the right time.  In the end you need a balanced approach.

For those that wonder, pretty much every fighter pilot would accept a much greater tactical risk doing CAS than doing any other mission type.b


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## Old Sweat (24 Aug 2014)

I think hope all of us green suiters understand the priority that must be given to winning the air battle and the importance of missions beyond the control of FACs/JTACs. Our hangup often comes from what is perceived as an excessive desire of senior air commanders to go their own way rather than 'dancing to the army's tune.' Couple that to what seems to many as a rigid adherence to the rules - not flight safety and flying discipline rules which we accept I must add - and confidence suffers. We also understand that there is never enough air and it must be used wisely on priority targets. In a perfect world it would work that way, but in the CAF we do not have the resources to practice what both sides preach and the reputation of and confidence in the fast air community suffers.

p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.


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## Transporter (24 Aug 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I think hope all of us green suiters understand the priority that must be given to winning the air battle and the importance of missions beyond the control of FACs/JTACs. Our hangup often comes from what is perceived as an excessive desire of senior air commanders to go their own way rather than 'dancing to the army's tune.' Couple that to what seems to many as a rigid adherence to the rules - not flight safety and flying discipline rules which we accept I must add - and confidence suffers. We also understand that there is never enough air and it must be used wisely on priority targets. *In a perfect world it would work that way, but in the CAF we do not have the resources to practice what both sides preach and the reputation of and confidence in the fast air community suffers.*
> 
> p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.



You just hit the nail right on the head.


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## daftandbarmy (24 Aug 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.



No arguments there. The RNAS were always there. The RAF were always .. where?


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## brihard (24 Aug 2014)

Ditch said:
			
		

> I must have been reading a completely different thread.  This statement is disingenuous and spreads further hate statements.  Sorta like the LEO threads of the past.
> 
> The big problem I've read here is that of expectancy.  The battlefield commander owns his direct fire, indirect fire and CAS. It is up to him to use it as he sees fit.  He is well aware of when and where he has CAS support.   On station time is a factor of weather (must be VFR), fuel (limited weapons for longer onsta) - [if they tank via yo-yo you can expect a gap in 100% coverage]and the range to getting on station.  If he decides that you don't get CAS, he's determined that someone else is more important.



Ditch- nope, definitely not an attack on him nor on his community. The fast air pilots no more choose their missions or objectives that the infantry section commanders. It's no more his or any pilots fault that they are constrained into narrow prioritize room of other tasks than it is my fault that in the infantry we don't do forced beach landings. Capabilities and priorities have been decided at much higher levels.

Am I bitter about that? Yeah, kinda; I will maintain that a raison d'être of the RCAF should be to make bad people go away with much violent abandon when we need them to, and with greater ability to prioritize the needs of us on the ground than appears to be possible.

Max- my apologies to you right now for how that affected my tone. Uncalled for; my post is best read while imagining me to be wearing a really poo-eating grin. But you _do_ explain well just why we in the combat arms are best to remain very skeptical. If you have a disconnect, it's because that's what you've learned as a result of your seat in our larger institution.

I cannot, however, see anything here that convinces me that a Canadian company in battle, if it needs CAS, will stand a good chance now or in the near future of getting it from Canadian fast air. The exclusive ownership by the Air Force of these assets has resulted in even the brighter minds in the fast air community being unable to bridge the gaps these conversations bring up between what guys on the ground say is needed and what the guys in the air think is needed. If it stings to hear that phrased in terms of trust and reliance, well, it is what it is. I'm open to being convinced otherwise. Afghanistan leaves me unwilling to give the benefit of the doubt. And I also recognize the strategic/tactical context, and accept that a platoon in battle may be acceptably left hanging if the aircraft are tasked to the enemy's divisional CP or brigade artillery. I'm not unrealistic about the 'big picture' in killing people and breaking their stuff.


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## Good2Golf (25 Aug 2014)

If the RCAF wishes to support fully (or at least optimally) its five core airpower capabilities (control of the air, attack, surveillance and reconnaissance, air mobility and support to joint operations and civil power) it must be mindful that the 'integrated' _Vector_ of its strategic vision (Agile, Integrated, Reach and Power) is one where it has been, and will continue to be judged firmly, if not even harshly.  

Notwithstanding the Government of Canada's not having yet to task the Air Force to conduct missions where close air support missions within the counter-land core role are required (and this is certainly not the fault of any of those at the tactical level like SupersonicMax), either the Air Force must be ready to do so, and do so credibly, or there should be consideration given, both by larger Government and the RCAF itself, as to whether CAS is an airpower mission that can be credibly conducted.  The issue is credibility, and there are two elements to credibility; desire/will and past performance.  Clearly, past performance of CAS in the contemporary sense does not exist, and again, that's not the tactical level's fault.  The RCAF can only be judged on desire and will to support the Army, and this is the challenge space.  Resource constraints have made many aspects of integrated training and preparation difficult, yet again, not the tactical level's fault.  It should be with care, however, that an organization purports to be tightly integrated with a fellow service, and this is the challenge.  "Rubber hitting the road (tarmac)" to support integrated force generation comes primarily in the form of external to RCAF asets, and that is where the RCAF has a credibility challenge.  A once a year exercise where supported forces don't have an opportunity to engage in professional discussions at the coal face does not a credibility-growth plan make.

It is good that many in the fighter force are devloping and/or already have a fighting spirit and desire to support sister services, that's a fundamental strength in developing greater levels of integration.  It is, however, just a start point.


Regards
G2G


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## Colin Parkinson (25 Aug 2014)

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Unless things have changed, Hornets do operate out of Comox (and presumably Greenwood) but only in a limited short-term capacity.  I'm sure no one (well, no sqn members at least) would object to being posted to Comox vice Cold Lake   :nod:



As i recall the plan was to have 2 aircraft on standby at Comox with planes and pilots and groundcrew rotating in and out.


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## Journeyman (25 Aug 2014)

Brihard said:
			
		

> I cannot, however, see anything here that convinces me that a Canadian company in battle, if it needs CAS, will stand a good chance now or in the near future of getting it from Canadian fast air.


Which is why I opted out of this discussion many pages ago. 

The thread is just spiralling now; those of us with real operational experience from being in harm's way have no faith in the RCAF*** and no expectation that things will change.  Conversely, the guys with their rockin' leather jackets and maybe a QDJM to keep their CD company just keep repeating "it's all good."


Thank you, USAF and your F-15Es for being there when they were needed.  

I'll return to radio silence now.


***  By RCAF, I'm not referring to the wrongly-uniformed tactical aviation folks.


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## Baz (25 Aug 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> ***  By RCAF, I'm not referring to the wrongly-uniformed tactical aviation folks.



It's not just tactical, its also maritime... but we've been through that already as well.

As I've said, this is not just an RCAF problem... its a Western Air Force problem.  They honestly believe that Air Power can win, alone, every type of fight; and that the other services don't understand air.  If you accept that premise, that Air Power can win the fight alone, then there is no need to understand the other fights.  As well, the only kind of doctrine that matters is that developed by Air.

Therefore Unity Of Command becomes all air power should be commanded by an air centric HQ, not the supported commander should command all supporting forces.  Span Of Control (ie the Air HQ is trying to support too many things to really understand them all) is overcome by Air doctrine and procedures.  This is what is taught so why is it a surprise.

At the end of the day, its not just about CAS, its the same old discussion going all the way back to World War II about the best use of Air Power.  The answer, in my mind remains the same: it depends.  Air Forces don't see it that way.

This is also leading to the thought process that all other air fleets exist solely to support the Air Force winning the fight alone; this is prevalent in the RCAF right now: example is that MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) and MH (Maritime Helicopter) are now ISR platforms in RCAF speak (http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft.page)  





> The primary role of these aircraft is to “sense”, which is the function that provides a commander with knowledge to assist in the decision-making process both in combat and non-combat situations.


.  Except the primary role of MH is Naval Force Protection...  It also gives rise to thoughts like the whole purpose of ISR (not just air ISR, all ISR) exists to support that fight, so it should all be controlled by the Air Force; the USAF is trying to make that argument, the most notable example being BAMS (USN Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  The USN is less than impressed that an aircraft that optimized for maritime surveillance with a capability to support Sea Land strike would somehow be controlled by the USAF.

Given all that, I'm not surprised that other services don't trust the Air Force to deliver CAS when it is needed, especially from being part of the "targeting enterprise;" and I'm also not surprised that Air Force types don't understand why...


----------



## daftandbarmy (25 Aug 2014)

Baz said:
			
		

> Given all that, I'm not surprised that other services don't trust the Air Force to deliver CAS when it is needed, especially from being part of the "targeting enterprise;" and I'm also not surprised that Air Force types don't understand why...




The other problem IMHO is that other 'support' like the good ol' artillery, and NGS, (and the mortars and anti-tank assets removed from the Infantry) have been whittled down or eliminated to the point where the other services have to lean way too heavily on an Air Force that is materially and doctrinally ill equipped to meet the vast and growing need for organic precision and area fire support.


----------



## KevinB (27 Aug 2014)

I meant to post this some time ago.

I however get distracted by shiny things, and flashing lights easily.

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/doing-the-math-saving-a-10s-by-cutting-f-35s-2/

Interesting article - and while it throws back to the A-10 thread, it does highlight the USAF inability to rationalize


----------



## daftandbarmy (27 Aug 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> I meant to post this some time ago.
> 
> I however get distracted by shiny things, and flashing lights easily.
> 
> ...



From a Realpolitik point of view, the only thing that can save the A10s is probably a bunch of Senators in the states where they are produced or serviced.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (27 Aug 2014)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Which is why I opted out of this discussion many pages ago.
> 
> The thread is just spiralling now; those of us with real operational experience from being in harm's way have no faith in the RCAF*** and no expectation that things will change.  Conversely, the guys with their rockin' leather jackets and maybe a QDJM to keep their CD company just keep repeating "it's all good."
> 
> ...



 :rofl:


----------



## Loachman (27 Aug 2014)

If only people higher up could have the clarity of thought that Journeyman occasionally exhibits.


----------



## Eye In The Sky (31 Aug 2014)

Baz said:
			
		

> It's not just tactical, *its also maritime*... but we've been through that already as well.



Thank you for that.  I know _some_ people are aware of the work '140 crews do with folks on the ground.


----------



## Good2Golf (1 Sep 2014)

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Thank you for that.  I know _some_ people are aware of the work '140 crews do with folks on the ground.



The work the SGOD folks did both in AFG and LIB was well regarded by many high up in the food chain, and although technically it is one of the only three aircraft in the RCAF inventory to carry stowed kills (SK being the other un-loved stowed kills platform), it often gets pooh-poohed by the elitists in the fast-air clique.  

G2G


----------



## Eye In The Sky (3 Sep 2014)

GTG,

Copy that.  IMO, in the wider CAF community, it seems most people think that our fleet is a 1-trick pony.


----------



## dimsum (3 Sep 2014)

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> GTG,
> 
> Copy that.  IMO, in the wider CAF community, it seems most people think that our fleet is a 1-trick pony.



P-3 CAS, check!    

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnO4alX7McE


----------



## Eye In The Sky (3 Sep 2014)

Nice!  Didn't know they did that.

Cdn equivalent;  dropping a mystery-meat sandwich out the GP chute.   :blotto:


----------



## KevinB (16 Sep 2014)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnOmyj6m7K0

P3C launches Maverick 

No idea they could do that either.


----------



## a_majoor (18 Sep 2014)

Just a bit of a side note here, but reviewing the Ukraine thread I see several references to Ukrainian SU-25's being shot down by rebel forces (OK, vacationing "Not Russian" Spetsnaz troops who are probably either doing the shooting with MANPADS or providing training/coaching). Since the SU 25 is the analogue of the A-10, being rugged, slow and heavily armed and armoured and it's having difficulties in a fairly low intensity fight (they are not going against heavily integrated Russian AD umbrellas...yet), then perhaps the call for traditional CAS is not reflective of what the "real world" offers anymore.

If that is the case, then "air support" in the future may well consist of glide bombs and long range precision guided missiles delivered by whatever platform happens to be "in the box" at a given time.


----------



## McG (18 Sep 2014)

... Including ground based platforms?


----------



## daftandbarmy (18 Sep 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Just a bit of a side note here, but reviewing the Ukraine thread I see several references to Ukrainian SU-25's being shot down by rebel forces (OK, vacationing "Not Russian" Spetsnaz troops who are probably either doing the shooting with MANPADS or providing training/coaching). Since the SU 25 is the analogue of the A-10, being rugged, slow and heavily armed and armoured and it's having difficulties in a fairly low intensity fight (they are not going against heavily integrated Russian AD umbrellas...yet), then perhaps the call for traditional CAS is not reflective of what the "real world" offers anymore.
> 
> If that is the case, then "air support" in the future may well consist of glide bombs and long range precision guided missiles delivered by whatever platform happens to be "in the box" at a given time.



But the pilots are Ukrainian... :


----------



## GnyHwy (4 Oct 2014)

MCG said:
			
		

> ... Including ground based platforms?



Hell yeah!!!  Of course!  Give me my rockets!!!


----------



## Bird_Gunner45 (7 Oct 2014)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Hell yeah!!!  Of course!  Give me my rockets!!!



You sound like you just got possessed by the Ghost of Andrew Leslie.....


----------



## KevinB (9 Oct 2014)

Years ago (late 80's IIRC) I was a driver for a retired Col (LCol Jack DeHart MC - rip Sir) and one of the slides (pre PPT) was Canadian GS MLRS Batteries --- made sense then, and some sort of longer ranged rocket still makes sense now.


----------



## daftandbarmy (9 Oct 2014)

KevinB said:
			
		

> Years ago (late 80's IIRC) I was a driver for a retired Col (LCol Jack DeHart MC - rip Sir) and one of the slides (pre PPT) was Canadian GS MLRS Batteries --- made sense then, and some sort of longer ranged rocket still makes sense now.



... especially since, like the APC, we practically invented the idea  :

https://www.friends-amis.org/index.php/en/document-repository/english/fact-sheets/151-land-mattress/file


----------



## a_majoor (13 Oct 2014)

Nothing like a bit of video to liven up your day: A-10's doing a gun run, with a slow motion demo of what happens downrange of the airplane:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nk1HU5WShpU

Enjoy


----------



## a_majoor (7 Nov 2014)

While the A-10 may soldier on for a few more years, the simple fact of age will eventually catch up with it, and the USAF has no plans to revive this capability in any form. 

Perhaps the sort of close support we need as Canadians could be developed by creating a tag team of UAV's which can identify and mark targets, backed by organic "smart" weapons (like the current 155mm Excalibur round, but hopefully layered with other weapons like smart mortars or long range FOG-M such as the Brazilian FOG-MPM, which has a range of 60km). If the smart weapons are large enough (120mm mortars, 155 artillery rounds and heavy missiles) they can deal with virtually every target set from improvised bunkers and fortifications to modern AFV's, as well as enemy helicopters and even ships in the right circumstances. Except for the spotting UAV's, this sort of system isn't weather or time-on-station limited either.


----------



## SupersonicMax (7 Nov 2014)

I find it rather ironic that we are doing _real_ CAS now and not living in 4-star hotels...  Guess the haters gotta hate...


----------



## vonGarvin (7 Nov 2014)

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I find it rather ironic that we are doing _real_ CAS now and not living in 4-star hotels...  Guess the haters gotta hate...



It only took 30 years since we bought the things, but this isn't CAS: this is Battlefield Air Interdiction.

And meh, if you're in 2 star hotels, I suppose you get hardship?


/sarcasm


----------



## Loachman (7 Nov 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Perhaps the sort of close support we need as Canadians could be developed by creating a tag team of UAV's which can identify and mark targets, backed by organic "smart" weapons (like the current 155mm Excalibur round, but hopefully layered with other weapons like smart mortars or long range FOG-M such as the Brazilian FOG-MPM, which has a range of 60km).



Why re-develop what has already been developed, and employed?

We directed M777 fire with Sperwer in theatre - not often, but we did. We also provided targetting and related assistance to helicopters and bombers.

It is very simple.


----------



## dimsum (7 Nov 2014)

Loachman said:
			
		

> Why re-develop what has already been developed, and employed?
> 
> We directed M777 fire with Sperwer in theatre - not often, but we did. We also provided targetting and related assistance to helicopters and bombers.
> 
> It is very simple.



Same with Heron, in a way.


----------



## SupersonicMax (8 Nov 2014)

General Disorder said:
			
		

> It only took 30 years since we bought the things, but this isn't CAS: this is Battlefield Air Interdiction.
> 
> And meh, if you're in 2 star hotels, I suppose you get hardship?
> 
> ...



Didn't know BAI used JTACs and 9-Lines...


----------



## a_majoor (8 Nov 2014)

Given the way we casually discard capabilities in favour of <sarc> important things like pips and crowns</sarc>, I hope we haven't dropped the ball with using our UAV's to target artillery.

Of course, we also need a _much_ larger artillery park to make this really work...


----------



## Kirkhill (8 Nov 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Given the way we casually discard capabilities in favour of <sarc> important things like pips and crowns</sarc>, I hope we haven't dropped the ball with using our UAV's to target artillery.
> 
> Of course, we also need a _much_ larger artillery park to make this really work...



But artillery needs a firm base from which to launch.  By its nature that base needs to be closer to the target than an airbase.  That increases the chances of effective retaliation by the opposing forces and, consequently, the risk of friendly casualties.  Although that can be mitigated if the artillery piece is mounted on a floating platform.

Which brings us back to that very useful piece you posted on Latvian defense and Russia's new take on war.

Friendly casualties are bad.  That seems obvious.  But where in the past a dead soldier was simply a dead soldier and the loss marginally diminished the ability to act on the battlefield the effect of a single dead soldier is magnified and amplified these days.  The resultant loss more quickly erodes the will to continue the effort among civilians and politicians.

Ultimately the mere prospect of loss paralyzes governments.

Daladier and Chamberlain.

Airpower has the advantage of distance and of exposing a very small number of "soldiers" to risk.

Boots on the ground, ranked in decreasing desirability, from most to least are:

Local government forces

Local malcontents and activists

Local Criminals

Volunteers from third party states

Private security consultants 

Third party government forces

Own non-uniformed operatives

Own Special Forces

Own Light Forces

Own Heavy Forces


----------



## daftandbarmy (10 Nov 2014)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But artillery needs a firm base from which to launch.  By its nature that base needs to be closer to the target than an airbase.  That increases the chances of effective retaliation by the opposing forces and, consequently, the risk of friendly casualties.  Although that can be mitigated if the artillery piece is mounted on a floating platform.
> 
> Which brings us back to that very useful piece you posted on Latvian defense and Russia's new take on war.
> 
> ...



Not that I've ever been in a position to actually choose but from what I understand about their respective capabilities, I'd think I'd rather be under a comprehensive arty umbrella of M777 and MLRS vs. having to rely almost solely on FGA.

Having both would be nice, but having the former would be essential.


----------



## Kirkhill (10 Nov 2014)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Not that I've ever been in a position to actually choose but from what I understand about their respective capabilities, I'd think I'd rather be under a comprehensive arty umbrella of M777 and MLRS vs. having to rely almost solely on FGA.
> 
> Having both would be nice, but having the former would be essential.



I'm in no position to argue and not so inclined.  I suggest, though, that governments generally, and ours in particular, are happier to offer FGA to support our allies than they are offering M777 and MLRS.  Fewer motorcades along Highways of Heroes.

In the same vein, I think, you are less likely to be getting your boots dusty, unless you are necessary to assist in targeting those high-flying aircraft.

The concept appealed to Churchill in the 20s, to Clinton and Obama and to Harper.


----------



## tomahawk6 (10 Nov 2014)

Bombing campaigns without ground forces in place havent done well by themselves.That said aircraft can cover a much larger area than can artillery and can take advantage of targets of opportunity.


----------



## Kirkhill (10 Nov 2014)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Bombing campaigns without ground forces in place havent done well by themselves.That said aircraft can cover a much larger area than can artillery and can take advantage of targets of opportunity.



Agreed entirely on the effectiveness.  I'm simply arguing that it is an easier sell to politicians who want to be look as if they are doing something without putting large numbers of voters' sons and daughters in harms way.

Conflicts won't be shortened this way.  They will fester just like the Israeli and Cyprus situations have, amongst others (Transdniester, Donbas, South Ossetia).   But they will be removed from the front pages and out of electoral consideration.  How often did you see anything in the newspapers about the Iraqi No-Fly Zones that you Yanks, the Brits and the French maintained from 1992 to 2003?  And remember how happy everyone was with the "successes" of Libya and the initial phase in Afghanistan.

Troops on the ground are necessary actually grip the situation.  But politicians don't actually want to grip Tar Babies.


----------



## Loachman (10 Nov 2014)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Given the way we casually discard capabilities in favour of <sarc> important things like pips and crowns</sarc>, I hope we haven't dropped the ball with using our UAV's to target artillery.



As we have no suitable UAVs, currently...

But this is extremely simple.

Provide an accurate GR to the Guns.

Mark the GR of the adjusting round on impact and send to the Guns.

I spent a lot of time doing Air OP in my Kiowa days. There is no comparison. All of the training required is in my two-stage lesson plan above.


----------



## a_majoor (10 Nov 2014)

The irony is the British actually developed "Air Policing" in modern Iraq (using light bombers to scatter restive tribes and maintain some semblance of law out in the back 40), but since nomadic tribes generally didn't cause much in the way of problems in the 1920's and 30's, this wasn't much of an issue.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (14 Nov 2014)

Nor did they have access to Anti-tank rifles, RPG's, MG or Manpads. The Brits were able to dominate large portions of Iraq and Afghanistan with aircraft, light tanks and armoured cars. Even dynamite was a rare commodity for a Parthian tribesman to get their hands onto in the day. 

At the end of the day, this is less to do with the A10 and more to do with the USAF lack of interest in down in the weeds CAS. If the USAF was deeply committed to CAS and looking at new and effective ways to hurt the targets, then I think people would not worry so much about the loss of the A10, as they would know that a new aircraft would replace it. But the people on the ground know this is more about a divorce from anything green that the USAF is planning. Once the A10 is gone, the USAF will never again build an aircraft solely dedicated to CAS.


----------



## Loachman (14 Nov 2014)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Once the A10 is gone, the USAF will never again build an aircraft solely dedicated to CAS.



Nor would it need to. There are other ways to do things now.

Technology marches on. The same affection existed for Cavalry (the original horse-mounted variety) long after it had been made obsolete on the battlefield.

The effect counts. The means of delivering that effect is of far less importance.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (14 Nov 2014)

The means or the will, people on the ground are basically questioning both. You know that a A10 driver has both, how much much "will" the USAF has for CAS is really the question, given the increasing costs and reduction in numbers of aircraft, I can see them placing CAS far down the list of priorities regardless of promises and power points.


----------



## Loachman (14 Nov 2014)

That's a command problem, not a technological one.

I saw no shortage of aerial platforms, manned or unmanned, big or small, fast or slow, on either of my two tours. There was generally much more floating around, at all hours, waiting for a target than there were actual targets. Accuracy was not a problem either, that I saw - everything from a full M4 mag out of a front door of a Kiowa about fifty metres from its target to a bomb from a B1 from several thousand feet.

Anybody who has a large supply of air-to-ground weaponry likely has a reasonably keen interest in rotating his stock.


----------



## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2014)

And production lines to keep current.


----------



## CougarKing (25 Feb 2015)

Seems the debate on this topic is settled on the US side:

It seems the US Army Air Corps officially doesn't want to control of fast CAS and is content to leave the Warthogs in USAF control:

Military.com



> *Army Not Interested in Taking A-10 Warthogs from Air Force*
> 
> Feb 25, 2015 | by Brendan McGarry
> The U.S. Army has no interest in taking over the Air Force's fleet of A-10 attack planes, even if it would save the venerable Cold War-era aircraft from the bone yard.
> ...


----------



## daftandbarmy (25 Feb 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> The means or the will, people on the ground are basically questioning both. You know that a A10 driver has both, how much much "will" the USAF has for CAS is really the question, given the increasing costs and reduction in numbers of aircraft, I can see them placing CAS far down the list of priorities regardless of promises and power points.



Well, I suppose you could argue that if our Army was properly equipped with a healthy inventory of organic indirect and direct fire support weapons, we would have less need for CAS in the first place...


----------



## Colin Parkinson (26 Feb 2015)

Shock and awe with power point and glittering Pips and Crowns, what else could you possibly need?

In my semi-perfect world besides new howitzers and mortars I would stand up a Reserve Air Squadron with armed Hawks (or similar) that can be used to train air force and army personal on the use of CAS and reduce the demands on what will be a very small fleet of F-35's. I would prefer a more robust secondary aircraft, but trying to keep it semi-real.


----------



## daftandbarmy (26 Feb 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Shock and awe with power point and glittering Pips and Crowns, what else could you possibly need?
> 
> In my semi-perfect world besides new howitzers and mortars I would stand up a Reserve Air Squadron with armed Hawks (or similar) that can be used to train air force and army personal on the use of CAS and reduce the demands on what will be a very small fleet of F-35's. I would prefer a more robust secondary aircraft, but trying to keep it semi-real.



Lots of countries use it in the ground attack role: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAE_Systems_Hawk

We had Hawks in support during exercises in Oman.


----------



## a_majoor (26 Feb 2015)

Looking at conflicts post 1991, I see that CAS as traditionally defined has generally fallen out of fashion.

Attacks are now called and directed by off platform means, and attacks themselves are prosecuted by smart bombs, air launched missiles and long range "glide bombs" to stay out of the range of GBAD. Trying to do traditional CAS is pretty damn dangerous; Ukrainian SU-25's (the analogues of the A-10) have been effectively swept from the sky by hand held MANPADS fired by _SPETZNAZ_ operators.

In the future, I can see an increasing amount of that sort of support coming from "smart" artillery rounds and long range guided missiles (a Brazillian company offers a turbojet powered FOG-M with a range of 60km, while various members of the SPIKE family can reach targets from 800 to 25000 m) which do not have issues with weather or being "on station". The only sticking point there is time of flight, which might be a bit trying for a person on the ground in contact.


----------



## Old Sweat (26 Feb 2015)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> In the future, I can see an increasing amount of that sort of support coming from "smart" artillery rounds and long range guided missiles (a Brazillian company offers a turbojet powered FOG-M with a range of 60km, while various members of the SPIKE family can reach targets from 800 to 25000 m) which do not have issues with weather or being "on station". The only sticking point there is time of flight, which might be a bit trying for a person on the ground in contact.



Unless the aircraft are on station, armed with the appropriate armaments and available, the "time of flight," actually the response time, from a ground indirect fire delivery system will usually be quicker than for a manned aircraft or an armed UAV. Moreover once the shell or missile is fired, it is committed to that target, unlike an aircraft which can be diverted to a higher priority task until the ordnance is actually released.


----------



## Loachman (26 Feb 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> In my semi-perfect world besides new howitzers and mortars I would stand up a Reserve Air Squadron with armed Hawks (or similar) that can be used to train air force and army personal on the use of CAS and reduce the demands on what will be a very small fleet of F-35's. I would prefer a more robust secondary aircraft, but trying to keep it semi-real.



And how do you propose to train and maintain currency, let alone proficiency, on a part-time basis? Where do you propose to find a suitable, not-too-congested airfield from which to operate that is close enough to both a population large enough to provide a suitable pool of personnel and a suitable air weapons range?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver (26 Feb 2015)

Loachman said:
			
		

> And how do you propose to train and maintain currency, let alone proficiency, on a part-time basis? Where do you propose to find a suitable, not-too-congested airfield from which to operate that is close enough to both a population large enough to provide a suitable pool of personnel and a suitable air weapons range?



Montreal, actually: We have this wonderful, completely under-utilized airport, a little out of town with two 3.4 Km long landing strip. It's called Mirabel. Tons of air technical types around (it's called Bell textron/Bombardier/Devtek Héroux, etc. and just a bit North (in air terms), you have large swats of unoccupied lands for range.


----------



## Kirkhill (26 Feb 2015)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Trying to do traditional CAS is pretty damn dangerous; Ukrainian SU-25's (the analogues of the A-10) have been effectively swept from the sky by hand held MANPADS fired by _SPETZNAZ_ operators.



The Russians lost 3x SU25s, 2x SU24xs and 1x TU22M3 to Georgian MANPADS in 5 days in August 2008. They were dropping dumb bombs by daylight at low level. They are short of PGMs and Night Vision.

They also lost 60x Tactical Helos (Mi-8, Mi-24 and Mi-26) in the N. Caucasus between 1999 and 2003 from all causes, combat and other wise.

Adding night vision to the helo fleet is a high priority.

PGMs (and UAVs and Radars) are not an area in which the Russian government is demonstrating much confidence in its industrial base.  It knows it needs them but isn't buying them and is rejecting tendered solutions.

The Russians have also gone through an exercise of transferring helos from Army Aviation to the Air Force and then subordinating the Air Force Regiments to the Joint Strategic Commands (Regional Districts).  From Army to Air Force for cost efficiency.  From Air Force to Army for combat efficiency.


----------



## Loachman (26 Feb 2015)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Montreal, actually: We have this wonderful, completely under-utilized airport, a little out of town with two 3.4 Km long landing strip. It's called Mirabel. Tons of air technical types around (it's called Bell textron/Bombardier/Devtek Héroux, etc. and just a bit North (in air terms), you have large swats of unoccupied lands for range.



Possibly. I'd thought that there was less of it left.

I note that there are no air traffic control services. Are there any empty hangars in decent condition? Bagotville is not too far away, with the facilities necessary for arming and de-arming, neither is Valcartier. I doubt that there would be any public or political support for establishing a new range.

I still see too many obstacles for pursuing this, and too few benefits. I remember the CF5 quite well - very similar to a Hawk in operational terms, and similarly limited in its capabilities.


----------



## Colin Parkinson (26 Feb 2015)

I have argued from early on the Term CAS needs to reflect just that, close in traditional air support , with gun/rockets. What the drones and F-35 is going to do for us is "Air Support" which is using smart weapons (bombs) from altitude/distance to hit those targets. I would leave it up to the SME to define where the dividing line is. My guess is it will be rotary air for CAS and F-35 for Air Support once the A10 is gone. 


Loachman
They already operate a Training squadron using Hawks, I would setup the Squadron adjacent to a fulltime one who is tasked (with extra resources) to ensure the squadron can run day to day at the admin level and maintenance level (not always flying day to day). Pilots could be regular force pilots rotating through and ex-reg force pilots that come back to keep their flight qualifications at regular intervals. This would also mean keeping links to pilots that you invested mega amounts of money in and getting some more return on that investment. 


The concept is not new http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/air-reserve/index.page 

*also*
No. 420 Squadron reformed at London, Ontario on 15 September 1948, and flew Mustang aircraft in a fighter role until the squadron disbanded on 1 September 1956. Re-formed during the unification period, No. 420 was an air reserve squadron based at CFB Shearwater and flew the CP-121 Tracker (Shared with No. 880).

H*ow the US does it*

Reserve categories

There are several categories of service in the Air Force Reserve. Most Air Force Reservists are part-time "Traditional Reservists" (TR) who serve in the Unit Program, in which they are required to report for duty with their parent Air Force Reserve Command unit, typically a wing, group or squadron, at least one weekend a month and an additional two weeks a year. However, many Air Force Reservists, especially those in an active flying status, serve well in excess of this minimum duty requirement, often in excess of 120 man-days a year.[3]

A smaller but equally important category of TR is the "Individual Mobilization Augmentee" (IMA). IMAs are part-time Air Force Reservists who are assigned to active duty Air Force units and organizations, combat support agencies, Unified Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff to do jobs that are essential in wartime and/or during contingency operations, but do not require full-time manning during times of peace. They report for duty a minimum of two days a month and twelve additional days a year, but like their Unit Program counterparts, many IMAs serve well in excess of the minimum military duty requirement.[3]

A small number of Reservists serve limited tours of active duty, usually at headquarters staff level, in the joint combatant commands, or in other special assignments. Their job is to bring Air Force Reserve expertise to the planning and decision-making processes at senior levels within the Air Force, other services and Unified Combatant Commands.[3]

Like the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve Command also requires two categories of full-time personnel to perform functions that require full-time manning. These full-time positions are filled via the same two programs as employed by the Air National Guard: the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Air Reserve Technician (ART) programs.[3]

Air Force Reservists who become members of the "Active Guard and Reserve" (AGR) receive full active duty pay and benefits just like active duty members of any branch of the armed forces. The majority of AGRs are former TRs and they serve four-year controlled tours of special duty that can be renewed. Many AGRs serve with operational AFRC flying and non-flying wings and groups; at active and reserve numbered air forces; on the staffs of other USAF Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs); on the Air Staff at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (HAF); on the staffs of Unified Combatant Commands; on the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). AFRC Recruiting is another fields that employs AGR personnel. AGRs also have the option with good performance to serve 20 or more years on active duty and receive a retirement after 20 or more years, just like active members of the Regular Air Force.[3]

Another category of Air Force Reservists serving full-time are those in the "Air Reserve Technician Program" (ART). ARTs are accessed from either the active duty Regular Air Force, the AGR program, Traditional Guardsmen (TG) in the Air National Guard, or TRs in the Air Force Reserve. ARTs carry a dual status, working for the Air Force as both full-time civil service employees and as uniformed military members in the same AFRC units where they work as Department of the Air Force Civilians (DAFC), performing the same job duties. Although "technically" civil servants part of the time, all ART officers must maintain a reserve commission on the Reserve Active Status List as a TR and all ART enlisted personnel must maintain a current reserve enlistment as a TR as a precondition for both hiring and continued career employment as an ART. In addition, all ART officers and ART enlisted personnel wear their uniforms and utilize their rank titles at all times when on duty, regardless if they are in a DAFC status or in a drilling or active duty military status. Most ART personnel are assigned to operational AFRC flying wings, groups and squadrons in various operational flying, aircraft maintenance and other support positions and functions, up to and including wing commander. Because ARTs are not eligible for DAFC retirement until reaching age 60, and because a condition of their employment as an ART is contingent upon their maintaining an active reserve military status until reaching age 60, ARTs are not subject to the same maximum years of service limitations by pay grade that impact non-ART personnel. As such, ART personnel are permitted to remain in uniform until age 60, typically past a point that would otherwise require their retirement from military service based on rank, pay grade and years of service.[3]

Traditional Reservists (TR) are categorized by several criteria in either the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Inactive Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve:[3]


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## SeaKingTacco (26 Feb 2015)

Colin,

Just to be clear, the CF does not operate the Hawk.

Bombardier aerospace provides them for use under the terms of the NFTC. There are no uniformed personnel anywhere in the maintenance chain.


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## SupersonicMax (26 Feb 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I have argued from early on the Term CAS needs to reflect just that, close in traditional air support , with gun/rockets. What the drones and F-35 is going to do for us is "Air Support" which is using smart weapons (bombs) from altitude/distance to hit those targets. I would leave it up to the SME to define where the dividing line is. My guess is it will be rotary air for CAS and F-35 for Air Support once the A10 is gone.



"Close" in Close Air Support refers, in doctrinal terms, refers to the level of integration required between air assets and ground forces, not to the proximity between air and lamd assets.  In operationnal terms, it means that when operating within the Land Component Commander's area of responsibility (between the FLOT and the FSCL) and in concrete terms, anytime the enemy is within the LCC's weapons effects (in horizontal range and altitude)  When those criteria are met, pilots need to talk to and be authorized by a ground commander in order to employ weapons and even fly in that airspace.

You can fly very effective CAS from a distance (and is even desired in some situations to keep an element of surprise).  Most often, the modern weapons will be 1000 times more effective than conventionnal weapons while minimizing risk to the aircraft and aircrew.   Not to say that risk cannot be taken (and we, in the cockpit sure don't make those risk decisions, we are given guidance from the theater and from the national political and strategic levels), but in all cases, I am confident that if allied forces need help, we will.  But if we can minimize risk and have greater effect why should we keep using archaic weapons and tactics?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Loachman
> They already operate a Training squadron using Hawks, I would setup the Squadron adjacent to a fulltime one who is tasked (with extra resources) to ensure the squadron can run day to day at the admin level and maintenance level (not always flying day to day). Pilots could be regular force pilots rotating through and ex-reg force pilots that come back to keep their flight qualifications at regular intervals. This would also mean keeping links to pilots that you invested mega amounts of money in and getting some more return on investment.



I doubt we will have Hawks past 2020.  They are not ours, but Bombardier's and maintenance is provided by them.  The contract is up in 2020.  On top of normal technicians, you'll need to train others specialties that involve using weapons on the Hawk (which we are critically short right now). The Hawk is the crapppiest design aircraft I have ever flown and is a difficult aircraft to use for dive deliveries (longitudinal instability).  Sound simple to do, when you get down to it, it makes no sense in today's reality.


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## YZT580 (26 Feb 2015)

Don't  forget North Bay.  It too has the runways, a tower, hangers and lots of land to the north.  And then, who could forget Goose and Gander.  Airports for training is one thing we have lots of.  That has never been the problem.  Getting someone to actually identify the solution and then spend the money to resolve it: that is a problem


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## Loachman (26 Feb 2015)

As Max said, plus:

If you want to provide both friendly and enemy troops with an airshow, complete with flaming wrecks smashing into the ground in a most spectacular fashion, then "traditional" CAS is most definitely the way to go. As much of a case can be made for that as can be made for horse cavalry.

Battlefield conditions change.

The important thing is that the right things blow up, not how they blow up.

Helicopters do not provide CAS. Doctrinally, Attack Helicopter units are manoeuvre units - light on armour, lots of firepower, and rotary wings instead of tracks or big knobby tires.


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## Good2Golf (27 Feb 2015)

A B-52 makes an excellent CAS platform in many cases.  For many, if not most of the JTACs on the ground, from what I heard from them, second to the A-10, the B-52 is a beloved beast since it can stay on station for half a day, before it heads back to Diego Garcia, and dole out tens of tons of PGMs.

:2c:

G2G


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## Kirkhill (27 Feb 2015)

So how many SDBs could you load into a CP140 and how long could that stay on station?

Would that qualify as a Canadian CAS platform that was survivable?


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## Oldgateboatdriver (27 Feb 2015)

I would have thought there still is ATC. My understanding is that it is still in use for cargo. But I haven't checked for a while.

Not much in terms of hangars, its a civilian airport after all, other than at the Bombardier plant's end, but tons of room to build them, and build them away from the Bombardier end. In fact, there will be even more room because ADM (The airport administration) has decided to demolish the huge central passenger terminal rather than continue to maintain it.


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## Loachman (27 Feb 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> A B-52 makes an excellent CAS platform in many cases.



They were being used as such on RV83 or RV85, which we thought was a bit silly.

Somebody in the CAS chain decided to play a prank on us one morning, just as we were preparing to change locations. My Observer and I had just left the treeline on our way to our mount, when we heard a singing, idling jet sound from the far side of the clearing. We were puzzled for a few seconds, then the biggest B52 that I'd ever seen rose up from behind the trees, rapidly growing larger. Just before daylight dimmed in its shadow, the bomb bay doors opened and we were staring straight up into enormous caverns as it floated right over top of us.

Freaky feeling, that. We knew that we could not outrun even notional bombs, so we just stood in awe.

We found some small comfort as we watched his wingman miss us, flying past almost a mile to the south.


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## Colin Parkinson (27 Feb 2015)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Colin,
> 
> Just to be clear, the CF does not operate the Hawk.
> 
> Bombardier aerospace provides them for use under the terms of the NFTC. There are no uniformed personnel anywhere in the maintenance chain.



I know about that odd little bit of mercenary work, just like Africa, but without the bit of bombing the natives  8)

It would be really interesting to compare serviceability rates, repair times, part stocks of this system and the military


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## quadrapiper (27 Feb 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I know about that odd little bit of mercenary work, just like Africa, but without the bit of bombing the natives  8)
> 
> It would be really interesting to compare serviceability rates, repair times, part stocks of this system and the military


Seems like a good source for best/worst practices, and likely to be somewhat more likely to _try_ for "best possible" solutions without the various political and policy variables that might affect those issues in another _military_ force.


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## daftandbarmy (27 Feb 2015)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> A B-52 makes an excellent CAS platform in many cases.  For many, if not most of the JTACs on the ground, from what I heard from them, second to the A-10, the B-52 is a beloved beast since it can stay on station for half a day, before it heads back to Diego Garcia, and dole out tens of tons of PGMs.
> 
> :2c:
> 
> G2G



But what would we do during a 'real' war when the B-52 would last about a minute and a half over the battlefield... if it got there at all?


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## MilEME09 (27 Feb 2015)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But what would we do during a 'real' war when the B-52 would last about a minute and a half over the battlefield... if it got there at all?



Lot's of B-52's, volume, volume, volume


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## Good2Golf (27 Feb 2015)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But what would we do during a 'real' war when the B-52 would last about a minute and a half over the battlefield... if it got there at all?



If a B-52 with Megawatts of electronic warfare jamming power isn't survivable, then an expensive jet with no or minimal active jamming gear won't be any better off...


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## quadrapiper (27 Feb 2015)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Lot's of B-52's, volume, volume, volume


Would assume, theoretically, also led, trailed, and intermixed with a variety of other fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as whatever might be on the ground.


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## daftandbarmy (27 Feb 2015)

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Would assume, theoretically, also led, trailed, and intermixed with a variety of other fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as whatever might be on the ground.



Unless you happen to be flying over Hanoi, of course  :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcOCzMAKNwk


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## Bruce Monkhouse (28 Feb 2015)

Loachman said:
			
		

> They were being used as such on RV83 or RV85, which we thought was a bit silly.
> 
> Somebody in the CAS chain decided to play a prank on us one morning, just as we were preparing to change locations. My Observer and I had just left the treeline on our way to our mount, when we heard a singing, idling jet sound from the far side of the clearing. We were puzzled for a few seconds, then the biggest B52 that I'd ever seen rose up from behind the trees, rapidly growing larger. Just before daylight dimmed in its shadow, the bomb bay doors opened and we were staring straight up into enormous caverns as it floated right over top of us.
> 
> ...



It went right over 'D' Bty's 'hide'...................shook the ground, and probably showed that we weren't as 'hidden' as we thought.


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## MilEME09 (28 Feb 2015)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Unless you happen to be flying over Hanoi, of course  :
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcOCzMAKNwk



Not enough volume, lets get a ole WWII style bomber formation going of just B-52's, one bombing run would keep the enemy down for awhile, and the resulting open ground created will make sure they can't advance on friendly forces.


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## SupersonicMax (28 Feb 2015)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Not enough volume, lets get a ole WWII style bomber formation going of just B-52's, one bombing run would keep the enemy down for awhile, and the resulting open ground created will make sure they can't advance on friendly forces.



Or they woud all get shot down.  There is absolutely no reason to fly massive formations to a single target. 1 modern bomb has the effect of 5000 dumb bombs.


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## a_majoor (28 Feb 2015)

I will second the "volume, volume, volume" comment, but add the caveat that I would rather see PGMS of all sorts built on the sort of scale that the Willow Run plant built heavy bombers during WWII.

IF things like Excalibur rounds could be purchased for $7000 rather than $70,000 (and other systems like ATGMs, cruise missiles and smart bombs undergoing an order of magnitude price drop) then we would have a very interesting situation where we could saturate any conceivable enemy with PGMs (overwhelming attempts at dispersal, C-PGM or many other types of counter), not to mention having a huge number of rounds to train with. Quantity does indeed have a quality of its own, but I think having both quality and quantity would really have some revolutionary changes in the way we fight.

Yes there is also the issue of platforms to fire all these things from, but if modern technology and management techniques were being used for low cost PGM's, then I suspect they could also be applied to the business of building platforms. (Consider that SpaceX asks $50 million to launch a satellite into orbit, while Government contractor ULA charges $400 million to supply the same service [and the Delta and Atlas rockets used by ULA were designed back in the 1950's, so R&D costs were amortized long ago]. The primary reason for the price differential is SpaceX has a very streamlined management structure, which also helped them develop the Falcon rocket from a clean sheet of paper in an extraordinarily rapid time frame).


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## Colin Parkinson (2 Mar 2015)

that's is assuming you can id the targets enough to make it worthwhile. They are good to have but I would also want standard HE as well for hitting an area we suspect having troop concentrations, or denying that area through occasional shelling.


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## Fishbone Jones (2 Mar 2015)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> But what would we do during a 'real' war when the B-52 would last about a minute and a half over the battlefield... if it got there at all?



Gotta stay really high up there and guide your bomb to the target ;D


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## KevinB (2 Mar 2015)

Given the ROE of some of the current (or recently completed) missions and how restrictions grew and grew - I would not give a rat's ass about having HE to lob at suspected areas...

  Unless we (meaning all the West) totally change the way we fight (and in the Canadian sense - focus on creating a Heavy Bde group to fight a peer enemy) that requirement is gone.


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## Colin Parkinson (3 Mar 2015)

Well we have Ukraine as a model and then there is lovely Korea, dropping HE into suspected troop concentration areas behind hills is a time honoured tradition for that place. The guided stuff is a must for COIN operations, but a near peer enemy fight is going to consume stocks at a rate that will likely horrify accountants and Logistical types


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## a_majoor (3 Mar 2015)

Colin P said:
			
		

> Well we have Ukraine as a model and then there is lovely Korea, dropping HE into suspected troop concentration areas behind hills is a time honoured tradition for that place. The guided stuff is a must for COIN operations, but a near peer enemy fight is going to consume stocks at a rate that will likely horrify accountants and Logistical types



Having low cost PGM's, and especially ones with multiple types of seekers as well as GPS or inertial guidance, will allow for fire into suspected areas to have some pretty disproportionate results.

Imagine firing STRIX 120mm mortars behind a hill on the suspicion that there is a troop concentration, and having the rounds identify targets and do terminal manouevres to strike them. Spec or harrassing fire suddenly becomes targetted, and the enemy will have to expend far more resources in multi spectral camoflage, wide dispersal and/or C-PGM measures in order to survive.

With a robust communications capability, this also allows "snap shooting" at fleeting targets with the expectation that the round will seek out the target in the terminal phase even if the off board sensor has lost sight of the target (they have at least defined a target "box" for the round to look at).

While I doubt that PGMs will ever be cheap enough to rain them down like the Red Army on artillery targets, I do think that widespread availability of low cost PGM's will have a dramatic effect on the battlefield.


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## Colin Parkinson (3 Mar 2015)

speaking of which

http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/us-allies-evaluating-bomb-stockpiles-isis-fight/106518/?

To meet increased demands from the Iraqi military last year, Lockheed Hellfire stepped up its Hellfire production.

“[T]wo shifts of Lockheed Martin contractors are actually working at full capacity right now to modify and test these missiles and get them on their way,” Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby said on June 27.

_Asked if U.S. companies can meet the increased production demand for weapons, Kendall said: “I think in general industry is prepared to be responsive as much as they can *within their capacity* to support us.”

The Air Force alone wants to spend more than $700 million on 5,567 Hellfire missiles in 2016. Some missiles have been directly requested for the airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, according to Pentagon budget documents. The Air Force has also requested $559 million to buy nearly 13,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions._


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## Eye In The Sky (3 Mar 2015)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> So how many SDBs could you load into a CP140 and how long could that stay on station?
> 
> Would that qualify as a Canadian CAS platform that was survivable?




The 140 could possibly be set up as a bomb truck, but I don't see it happening.  The cost would likely be too high all told.   I am not sure how many they could squeeze in.  As for how long on station, that would depend on lots of factors but the endurance record is just over 17 hours.    She would be as survivable as the opposing AD assets let her be.


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