# The joys of Command.



## McG (18 Sep 2004)

Mark C said:
			
		

> Being a Commanding Officer in today's Army is most decidedly not all that it has cracked up to be. If it were, then we wouldn't be seeing outstanding CO's such as LCol Shandy Vida (CO 1 PPCLI) resigning half-way through their command tours.....
> 
> I would humbly suggest that sub-unit (eg. company/squadron-level) command is the "pinnacle" for commissioned job satisfaction in today's Canadian Army. It certainly was for me.
> 
> Something to think about....


Interesting thoughts Mark C, and not the first time I've heard this.   I would be intrested to hear your thoughts on how much of this is self-inflicted.   Personally, I think pushing financial management downward and increasing bureaucracy has gotten beyond where it provides any benefit.   Could this not have been held back at Bde level (where the staffs start exists) and higher?

Our current spectrum of buzz words also reflects an uninspiring culture as one moves up the totem pole ("risk management" "business planning" vs OPP, etc).


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## pbi (18 Sep 2004)

A  number of my friends/peers are or recently have been COs of battalions, either Reg or Res. In my conversations with them ovre the last few years, I have sensed simillar frustrations.

Regular COs, IMHO, feel increasingly constrained by a system that takes more and more decision making (especially crucial "people" decisions) out of the hands of the chain of command and into the hands of others (higher HQ, bases, specialists, conflict resolvers, ombudsmen, etc). They also feel much more constrained in the planning and conduct of training. The Regular COs, in my opinion, want more responsibility and latitude to get things done. not less. They see command frittering away.

Reserve COs (at least, the ones I've talked to, predominantly in 38 CBG but a few others) have a different but equally pressing concern. This is the crushing burden that the Army and the CF are placing on Res COs in the field of governance. Planning an running unit training is the simple part. What sucks up the COs time is all the "other stuff" involved in running a unit, which must largely be tackled by part time people who have other lives to lead. The demand on COs time is significant. As an example, when the CLS last year issued a directive to limit how many days COs can parade in a year, the reaction in our Bde, from the Comd through me and on down to the COs was utter derision: it was so unrealistic. A Res CO could not do his job under such limitations. Our ARNG friends to the south of us are often shocked to hear how mny days senior Res people put in over a trg year: far more, on the average, than ARNG equivalents do. So, IMHO Res COs feel that too much has been downloaded onto them.

In either case, while each CO will make of his tenure in command what he will and what he can, I do agree that some of the joy and satisfaction is being ground away by "the system". Cheers.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

Has the resignation of the 1VP CO made a ripple in the military and political circles?


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## pbi (19 Sep 2004)

Good question. I know it did Regimentally, but nothing much else developed before I went on pre-depl lve. When I heard about it, I happened to be in Edmn so I took him aside at coffee and asked him about it. He was somewhat noncomittal about the reasons why, but IMHO he had thought it through fully. I am very sorry to see him go: he was one of the finer officers in our Regt and I know the decisoin was not easy for him.

As for the politicians, I doubt they either knew or cared. Cheers.


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

"As for the politicians, I doubt they either knew or cared."

Sad but true.


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## HollywoodHitman (19 Sep 2004)

The difficult part is that Officers in general who are liked and honestly respected by their soldiers are caught between a rock and a hard place. Often their love of their troops and all that goes with it intereferes politically with the path their career will take. Unless they're lucky. A CO who fights for his unit IMHO stands a greater than average chance of having the direction his career takes, be an unpleasant one. In order to be a successful senior officer in the CF these days, I think you have to have a relationship with your higher-ups that could be described as a Mr. Smithers / Mr. Burns mentality.........'YES SIR! Everything is fine here!!! No problems at all!!!"............Meanwhile the bottom has fallen out and the ship is sinking.........Everytime I wonder why I still love soldiering, I end up having a good go.........Keeps me in.   :threat: :threat:


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## Infanteer (19 Sep 2004)

> In order to be a successful senior officer in the CF these days, I think you have to have a relationship with your higher-ups that could be described as a Mr. Smithers / Mr. Burns mentality



Although a common hypothesis for those complaining on the woes of the Military today, I don't think this is the real problem with leadership.   I think the problem for the most part is not a personal one as most people, like Scott Taylor, would like to believe (ie: most officers above the rank of Major are self-serving careerists) but rather an organizational one.

Rather then Burns/Smithers we have a headquarters which is so organizationally shot due to bureaucratic inefficiency and civilizanization that we have a Jeckyll/Hide relationship.   For the most part soldiers serving in NDHQ have the operational units in mind, but their is also a separate component, the civilian bureaucracy, fused with the NDHQ that (rightfully) has political motivations in mind.

The end result, orders from above or requirements from below enter this convoluted mess and inconsistency results; some times we get good and sound leadership from above (Jeckyll) and some times we get stuff that makes not one bit of sense (Hyde).  

Of course there will be a supply of careerist minded officers, who abuse their position and betray their responsibilites (a kernal of truth in Taylor's claims?), just as there will be a supply of officers who don't have a clue on what their roles and responsibilities require, but I feel that these are exceptions rather then norms.

However, this is only my opinion, and I lack strong empirical evidence to back it up (although I find a bit more everyday), so if anyone feels I am wrong, feel free to shoot me down.


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## Lance Wiebe (19 Sep 2004)

No, Infanteer, I believe that for the most part you are correct.  Although I do have strong doubts about the motivation of some of our Generals.  Part, no, actually, most of the problem, in my opinion, is the career civil servant that resides in NDHQ.  For every General, there are about 1.5 times General equivelant civil servant, I believe.  The same goes for Colonel and on down.  Far too many civil servants, with far too much power, control our military.

I agree that civilians must have control of the military, but our case is beyond ridiculous.

I wonder if their pay comes out of the military budget as well?  If so, we should be able to lay of a few hundred of them, don't you think?


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## Infanteer (19 Sep 2004)

> Although I do have strong doubts about the motivation of some of our Generals.



And your right in doing so.   I also have strong doubts about the motivation of some of our Corporals as well, who seem to be doing nothing hanging around for the "green welfare".   I think all these problems are endemic of certain conditions that can plague a military force; conditions which we touched upon in this thread here:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19234.0.html



> Part, no, actually, most of the problem, in my opinion, is the career civil servant that resides in NDHQ.   For every General, there are about 1.5 times General equivelant civil servant, I believe.   The same goes for Colonel and on down.   Far too many civil servants, with far too much power, control our military.



Although I don't disagree with the presence of career civil servants serving in the Defence establishment due to the fact that they fulfill the necessary roll of civilian control of the military in a democratic society, I do find issue with the fact that these civilian positions have been injected into the central command of our military, where they have no place being.   In my opinion, this leads to blurred links in the chain-of-command, input by bureaucrats into military matters, and a bureaucratic management paradigm that leads to confusion about who is responsible and who is in charge.

As an aside, I've been looking at the Prussian system of organization of military headquarters.   Both the Navy and the Army possessed a tripartite of command organizations
1) A War Ministry that handled the political, administrative, and and logistical aspects of the services
2) A Military Cabinet which handled personnel matters
3) A Great General Staff, which handled operational planning and coordination.

None of these headquarters had direct command of Armies and Fleets(which had their own field staffs), as these command units reported directly to the Kaiser.   Samuel Huntington comments on this command relationship by stating that:

_"The effects of the limited scope and multiplicity of military authority were counterbalanced by the high level of that authority.   All the top military leaders had the right of direct access (Immediatstellung) to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord which weakened vertical controls over the military.   Since the Kaiser was dependent upon their advice, the military chiefs, except to the extent that they disagreed among themselves, possessed almost complete autonomy and could run their institutions without external interference.   While the limited scope of military authority and the unity of civilian power kept the military out of politics, the direct access of the military to the Kaiser kept the politicians out of the military.   All in all, given the ideological climate of the times, the entire pattern of authority was uniquely suited to maximize civilian control and military professionalism."

Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State; pp 102-103_

Why do I bring this up?   I do not advocate grafting some 19th century Prussian system onto Ottawa.   As well, we must understand that there were fundamental flaws to the Prussian system, flaws that ultimately resulted in the military hijacking the state (Luddendorf) and the military become willing participants in the ambitions of a state hijacker (Hitler).   Rather, I use it to point out a past form of organization that was successful for a time in balancing out the needs of both the military and the state; this is what Huntington has termed _Objective Civilian Control_.   He presumes to go into great detail on notions of professionalism and civilian control in his book (which I highly recommend, especially the first 5 chapters).

Anyways, what I am getting at is that the current organization of NDHQ may be the type of civil-military relationship that inhibits the professional capabilities within the command level of our military; in my opinion leading to what Huntington has termed a _pattern of antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism_.   This has a trickle down effect onto the field level of command, where a form of military professionalism corrupted through civilianized, bureaucratic processes has its priorities realigned and its professional mission confused and convoluted.   The perfect example of this is contained in PBI's statement that: 

_Regular COs, IMHO, feel increasingly constrained by a system that takes more and more decision making (especially crucial "people" decisions) out of the hands of the chain of command and into the hands of others (higher HQ, bases, specialists, conflict resolvers, ombudsmen, etc). They also feel much more constrained in the planning and conduct of training. The Regular COs, in my opinion, want more responsibility and latitude to get things done. not less. They see command frittering away._

Perhaps analysing the strengths of other systems, such as the Prussian/German one, may give us some ideas on civil-military reform that we can apply to our uniquely Canadian setting.   As of now my first idea for reform is the fracturing of the NDHQ behemoth into separate areas of responsibility and a central civil-military command structure that can clearly delineate between the realm of political expediency and the realm of military necessity.   As for the exact details of what would have to be done I am unsure of because I have no access to the inner workings of NDHQ; I am only an observer peering in.   This reform process must be driven by a notion of effects based planning, with a central concept being that that the opportunity to command must be seen as professionally rewarding as opposed to one of constant concern about monkeys from Ottawa on your back yelling into your ear. 

Sorry if I'm leading the thread off, these are my current understandings about what may be the underlying problems in "the joys of command".   Interested to hear any other thoughts.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Scoobie Newbie (19 Sep 2004)

"I also have strong doubts about the motivation of some of our Corporals as well..."

However it is the Generals who make the decisions that shape the military (more or less) and the impact of a lazy General vs a lazy Cpl is comparing apples to car parts.  Should the Cpl have enough sense to motivate himself?  Sure he should but his lack of motivation has less of an effect then a general.  Besides isn't leadership supposed to flow down and motivate the troops?


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## Infanteer (19 Sep 2004)

You are right, the burden of command is rightfully more on those higher up on the chain; however, I was using my point to illustrate the fact that just as there is unprofessional Corporals, there will be unprofessional Colonels and Generals.  History is full of examples of both.

We can't expect the soldier at the front or the General in Ottawa to be perfect, but through promotion of a professional ethos and through proper organizational structure we can best ensure that both earn their position through merit and that both conduct their duties in the most professional manner possible.


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## pbi (20 Sep 2004)

> In order to be a successful senior officer in the CF these days, I think you have to have a relationship with your higher-ups that could be described as a Mr. Smithers / Mr. Burns mentality



Sadly, I have seen some truth in this over the years. Normally, it is the disastrous result of a weak, insecure superior with a scheming, devious subordinate who will kiss whatever he has to kiss until he is in a position to stab and stomp instead of kissing. These people do exist and they are the bane of any Army (or any large human organization with a command structure). I would add that until quite recently (post-Somalia era) our military culture encouraged this along with other nasty traits such as the falsification or "ditching" of unpleasant reports, etc.

However, I have also seen some very decent senior officers who treated their people like people, and could talk to a Cpl or a Col and treat them equally well. These leaders are regrettable fewer than we need, but they are usually respected if not loved. I have had the great good fortune to work for a couple of them over the years.

I also think that one good result of all the inquisitions, publicity, soul-searching, etc that has gone on in the last decade in our Army has been a recognition of the need for more professional, ethical behaviour, and a return to honoured principles of leadership. Will this be the "magic fix"? No, of course not: people are people and will always have human failings, especially when put into positions of authority. But, I believe we are getting better. Cheers.


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## Acorn (20 Sep 2004)

Lance Wiebe said:
			
		

> For every General, there are about 1.5 times General equivelant civil servant, I believe.   The same goes for Colonel and on down.



Ahh, the legendary "equivalent." I encountered such an individual once: she threatened to "pull rank" and claimed to be a "Colonel equivalent." I simply pointed out to her that she was NOT a Colonel, and she was not in my chain-of-command, thus having no rank to pull. Her "equivalence" offered her mess priviledges, but not the authority of command. She even invoked the name of an ADM in DND. I allowed her some latitude, but made it clear I was doing things in the interest of CF co-operation with other government departments, rather than some fictional "equivalency."

Acorn


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## McG (20 Sep 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Rather then Burns/Smithers we have a headquarters which is so organizationally shot due to bureaucratic inefficiency and civilizanization that we have a Jeckyll/Hide relationship.  For the most part soldiers serving in NDHQ have the operational units in mind, but their is also a separate component, the civilian bureaucracy, fused with the NDHQ that (rightfully) has political motivations in mind.


But most COs are responsible to a Bde Comd who is responsible to an Area Comd.  There are very few civilian equivalents down at this level.

Is the removal of power at the CO level a by-product of civilians in NDHQ?


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## Infanteer (20 Sep 2004)

> But most COs are responsible to a Bde Comd who is responsible to an Area Comd.  There are very few civilian equivalents down at this level.



No, but I would venture that many decisions that affect how these guys run their show come from NDHQ, hence the friction.


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## HollywoodHitman (20 Sep 2004)

It's a shame I hadn't known of this site a long time ago. Some really well thought out opinions and answers. 

Break it down to it's most simple form, the art of and people skills needed in order to be a good leader are not necessarily the same qualities of a good manager. I would argue that a GOOD officer NCO or leader of any kind must have a combination of all of those skills in order to be a good all round 'leader'.

Sadly, the military is being run by managers these days rather than true leaders. The leaders often suffer the consequences of having the respect and admiration of their troops in that the managers, some of whom have no people skills, recognize that. They in turn make the lives of the good leaders difficult. Managers are fine as long as they are managing resources. Those making decisions that actually affect the day to day operational lives of the soldiers should have a combination of leadership AND management skills. It exists not only in the military but in civvy life and politics too. I don't think there's an easy answer for any of it. 

Some of the sillyness I have experienced since I have arrived here in Bosnia is incredible. Operational requirements being overridden by someone's self important need to have control over other people. Thats another story and another problem altogether, as everyone has their gripes, but the 9-5 Battle Group menatality drives me sideways. 

The Somalia stuff has caused more CYA scenarios than ever before and unfortunately it's become epidemic. There is little of that menatality left in the CF that I have seen and it's long past the point where anyone would let it come back. We were weakend as a country and a military when the government overreacted on that :threat:.......Again, another topic..........NDHQ is too full of people who have nothing better to do than invent problems which in turn generate paperwork which they in turn use to justify their own existence. It takes more paperwork to do something properly for operational reasons than it does to write a one liner reply to a request that says DENIED. Seen it, lived it, living it now. :threat: Still seem to love it.

Redefining the roles and offices necessary to properly run the CF is the first step to making a better military. Trim the fat from the center of the Armed Forces and go from there. Redundant jobs in Ottawa? Say it isn't so!!! The KISS principle can honestly work if given half a chance. 

Semper Gumby (Max Flex)!


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## Pikache (20 Sep 2004)

I took the liberty of copying a passage from Frederick Forsyth's _Icon_. It's an excellent thriller novel, but this particular passage seems so fitting in this thread. The two characters in this passage are a Russian officer and his nephew who is a young officer cadet.

'Then in 1966... the Politburo had finally ordered the construction of a cenotaph and an eternal flame to the memory of the Unkown Soldier.
... Under the trees was a flat-topped slab of red polished granite. Beside it burned a flame in the bronze bowl.
On the slab was written the words: _Your grave is unknown,  your achievement immortal._
"I want you to make me a promise, boy." said the colonel.
"Yes, Uncle."
"There are a million of them out there, between here and Berlin. We don't know where they lie, in many cases who they were. But they fought with me, and they were good men. Understand?"
"Yes, Uncle."
"Whatever they promise you, whatever money, or promotion, or honours they offer you, I don't want you ever to betray these men."
"I promise, Uncle."
The colonel slowl raised his hand to the peak of this cap. The cadet followed suit.'


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## Brad Sallows (20 Sep 2004)

A hierarchical bureaucracy reacts to embarrassments occasioned by decisions at lower levels, by pulling decision-making power up the chain.

An example is SHARP.  Those who wish to argue about its pros and cons may do so, but I will settle for two observations:

1) The only worthwhile prevention of assaults on personal dignity is leadership by example.  Nothing else will change attitudes.  If we always had strong leadership practicing well-founded ethical values, SHARP would never have been necessary.  (Yes, under the weight of human failings the bar can be hard to reach.)

2) SHARP is held to be more important than battle task standards.  If you don't believe me, observe which is more likely to earn a CO a "rocket": failure to achieve 100% SHARP programme delivery, or failure to meet BTS?


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## bgreen (21 Sep 2004)

I had the privilege of commanding a recce unit in the west.  It was without question the highlight of my military career to date and I can't imagine anything being better.  Maybe it was ego or maybe it was the excellent soldiers I was called to work with, but if given the opportunity I'd still be there in a heartbeat.

While it has been covered in many threads particularly in the former LFRR sites it begins with training goals.  I wanted a unit that would live in the field as often as we could get out.  That used real bullets and rockets from wherever we could get them.  Introduced new professional skills to keep a learning environment that was valued by the troops everything from chainsaws to unarmed combat.  Assigned our crew kit to crews to own and maintain.  And tried to keep wives and sweethearts supporting us by all ranks activities (we were a small unit of 100 and needed everyone to pull off social events.)

Never gave a care about recruiting targets established by others and always always had a strong recruiting presence in every community.  And lastly made a concerted effort to get community leaders like mayors, elected politicians at the prov and federal level, educators and business leaders to value us.  Had soldiers go out and talk to the media and community service groups about what we as a military were doing on missions overseas. 

It was a great five years.  And my successor is doing every bit as good and I would argue better than me.

BG


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## pbi (21 Sep 2004)

bgreen: Roger that. I am truly sorry that during your tenure you did not see the Swift Current troop come to be, and I know that at the outset you had to fight with us at Bde over it. But we saw the error of our ways and got it supported up as far as the Area Comd under the last round of LFRR. Unfortunately it was sidelined by (IMHO) some very weak thinking in the LFRR shop, but we have not abandoned it. I know that we had our disagreements but over all you did a very fine job as CO and the state of the unit today is a testimony to that.

Now, what do you think about my earlier observations of the pressures on Res COs? Accurate, or whining?



> 1) The only worthwhile prevention of assaults on personal dignity is leadership by example.  Nothing else will change attitudes.  If we always had strong leadership practicing well-founded ethical values, SHARP would never have been necessary.  (Yes, under the weight of human failings the bar can be hard to reach.)
> 
> 2) SHARP is held to be more important than battle task standards.  If you don't believe me, observe which is more likely to earn a CO a "rocket": failure to achieve 100% SHARP programme delivery, or failure to meet BTS



I am with you 100% on both statements. I got into an argument with a SHARP "facilitator" once about this whole thing but it was quite pointless: the light was on but nobody was home. To me, we could have avoided all this crap if leaders had treated their soldiers (both male and female) properly and acted in ethical, professional ways. Unfortunately, we had too many who did not and we paid a great price, of which SHARP is but a part. Cheers.


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## bgreen (22 Sep 2004)

Most of the pressure I felt in command was my own making.  I remember that I had to work real hard on not worrying about what others were thinking.  I feel I had an innate sense of what was right for the unit and would then proceed accordingly.  I remember many times when I was told by the Bde Comd that I could be replaced at any time because of positions I took at odds with just about everyone..  Didn't really feel very valued by anyone but my soldiers and you know what?  That was enough.

Pressure points to me were getting good trg for our reserve soldiers.  It is my belief that to keep an effective reserve unit you had to train a minimum of two weekends per month plus four evenings per month during your unit trg cycle time.  Career courses would be in addition to that as would Bde directed concentrations.  Never seemed to be enough budget to go around.  What was particularly galling to me was that we get a good piece of kit like the small arms simulator and then instead of it enhancing shooting skills the allotment of real bullets and other ammo natures gets cut so soldiers are reaching only minimum levels of BTS.  There seemed to be no effort to have soldiers excel at their professional skills like shooting skills.

Even introducing unarmed combat skills was always looked at with a jaundiced eye in case someone got hurt.  Soldiers loved that training and whether you agree with it or not it is one of those training opportunities that makes soldiers more rugged and survivable in many circumstances.  Besides the young soldiers liked the opportunity to throw around the CO.

I was fortunate enough to have served under exceptional soldiers who trained me early in my career that the lower ranks always go first in terms of food, pay and rest.  So the only time I signed in for pay was when we were flush with cash or I was sure that taking my salary out of the unit fund would not deny my soldiers a greater training opportunity.  I remember on assuming command the Bde Comd thanked my wife for loaning her husband to the military.  And that was just how it went.  My civilian job often suffered because of this commitment.  But I still think at the time it was the right way to go and would do so again.

I really believe that command is lonely.  I regret not getting to know people at the Bde and AREA better in a personal sense but felt that my unit had to come first which as I previously mentioned usually put me at odds with just about everyone.

Lastly I feel those in comd must challenge the status quo.  Having said that I know that if you had 17 COs like me in a Bde it would be unmanageable or maybe there would be a band of brotherhood that would arise that would be awesome.  Good leaders make lots of mistakes which in our army today is something akin to criminal behavior.  If I could give anyone advice it would be to allow people to grow in command and leadership.

On a personal note pbi I hope your tour is going well.  You must be seeing evidence of lots of different personal and national leadership styles.  This would be worthy comment I think for a future post.

BG


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## pbi (22 Sep 2004)

Well spoken, bgreen. I know that you drove the last Bde Comd (and me) up the wall a couple of times, but looking back now I see that you did it for your soldiers not for yourself. I wish that the same could have been said of every CO I have seen in our Bde, but alas....

If we had a Bde of COs like you, one of two things would happen:

The Bde Comd, the Bde Comd Gp and most of the staff would be in a lunatic asylum; or

we would have an awesome Bde the like of which has not been seen  before, nor might be again.

Or maybe both. I don't know.


In fairness to the "head shed", I think we have been learning along the way. My own belief is that the relationship between the last Comd and his COs had matured a great deal by the time he gave up comd. He was, in my opinion, the right man for the time. I hope you have not sidelined your own plans for the future-I think there is more work to be done yet.

On your question on national commamd styles, I'm getting a huge education on that as well as many other things. My closest experience is with the US forces that make up 90% of CJTF76, and I find that I am really having to review and question some of my good old Canadian stereotypes and misconceptions about the US. I believe (and I have commented elsewhere) that it will be a different US Army after OEF/OIF, and that we better pull our hands out of our pockets and stop being smug. They could, if they do it right, eclipse us in the areas we traditionally regard as our superiority to them, at the lower levels. If they do it right: that will be the crucial point.

I certainly see excellent, powerful leaders at the upper levels: I believe that in general (no pun intended....) the US outdoes us at this, because there are more real command and leadership positions for their GO's, but I also know that we are getting  better. I'll be happy to share more with you as I go.

How is the Caronport VFD doing? Still a member?

Cheers.

DJB


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## dglad (23 Sep 2004)

Hey, pbi and bgreen, I know both of you and you know me...another 38 CBG former CO here, this time from the Land of the Sleeping Giant.

Health warning--in what follows, I certainly do NOT presume to speak for my Reg F colleagues and their experiences in command.

I have had the fantastic fortune to have wonderful experiences at every level of command--sect, pl, coy and unit.   In the latter, I do agree that there was so much governance overhead that it became a serious distraction after I took command, and it sucked.   But, you know what?   By my second year in the chair, I was able to sort out the things that REALLY mattered from those that REALLY didn't.   Couple that with a very conscious decision to get out to EVERY exercise and get down onto the drill-floor EVERY parade night, and the job suddenly became what it should be--fun.   The true satisfaction of command comes from working with soldiers, watching them work and develop, evolving from jittery Ptes and junior officers into confident, competent leaders.   I'm very proud of what the unit accomplished, culminating in our contribution to ATHENA in the spring.   And the governance stuff?   Well, frankly, it contains both wheat and chaff.   You have to learn which is which (and hope you have some full-time staff, if you're a class A CO, who can take some of the load).      But I think a lot of the joy--or lack thereof--comes from what you put into the job, and what you take away from it.   Put it another way, it's easy to be miserable as a commander...it takes more work to enjoy it.

SHARP vs BTS?   You're right, the SHARP piece is more important to some in the chain of command.   But SHARP isn't really the problem many make it out to be...the troops do it, and it's done.   I never found SHARP, or safety trg, or spill courses, or any of the mandated stuff really got in the way of working on the BTS.   We managed to keep the BTS in adequate focus (now, the degree of focus on collective vs individual trg...that's another matter!)

By the way, I'm writing this from home...I actually managed to get out of theatre for a bit.   I'm back there next week.   Hope things keep going well for you, pbi, in *your * theatre!


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## pbi (23 Sep 2004)

Yeah, they're great, actually. (We took a couple of 107mm HE rockets last night, but in another part of the camp...)

Professionally, this is unbeatable. I'm also honoured to see that, despite our problems, some pretty senior and savvy US types have a soft spot for us. In general the attitude toward Canada is quite good: nobody has ever mentioned Iraq. Sometimes I wish we were still in OEF, but we  must remember the increased risk that we would be accepting. (Not to say we couldn't...)

From now through until the period immediately following the Presidential Election, the baddies will ramp up their ops (this is already happening-see top line...) It remains to be seen what they are capable of, but if they do not act decisively soon they may not be able to derail the Election. Kabul is vital ground for them, for the Afgh Govt, and for ISAF/OEF. We will be living in interesting times.... Cheers.


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## dglad (23 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> Yeah, they're great, actually. (We took a couple of 107mm HE rockets last night, but in another part of the camp...)



Sucks to be living in that part of camp, I guess 



> Professionally, this is unbeatable. I'm also honoured to see that, despite our problems, some pretty senior and savvy US types have a soft spot for us. In general the attitude toward Canada is quite good: nobody has ever mentioned Iraq. Sometimes I wish we were still in OEF, but we   must remember the increased risk that we would be accepting. (Not to say we couldn't...)



Actually, some of the US folks here are saying (not to be officially quoted, of course) that we made the right decision to stay out of Iraq.   

I find our relationship with American soldiers and officers to be consistently very good.   We have no reason to be smug when we compare ourselves to them, as you said in another post, but we also have no reason to be embarrassed.   We don't have their kit, but our soldiers are at least consistently every bit as good as theirs (same with the UK).   And so much of modern soldiering is fundamentally a function of the efforts of individuals and small groups of troops, that the macro picture isn't even that relevant in, at least, some theatres (we've discussed this; the "key terrain" in Iraq when it comes to soldiering is what's happening at squad, pl and coy level, not really bn and up).   in the end, I find our op contributions are widely respected and appreciated; the major criticism is that we don't have the means to do more of them!


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## pbi (24 Sep 2004)

I agree. I was talking today to another Canadian who has had dealigs with US forces here, and he said the same thing. Pehaps we are just trying to make ourselves feel better, but I honestly believe that US military types do have a measure of respect for us: they just wish there were more of us with more kit!

Your observation on our level of strength (sub-unit and below) is one I certainly agree with, and I would venture to say that (firepower aside) we are able to stack up at bn/BGp as well. Beyond that, operationally we are no match due to a number of reasons. Cheers.


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