# Little Honking Ships......



## Kirkhill

To refresh the interminable "wouldn't it be nice" discussion....

My latest prescription:

Build 16 CSCs - 4 of the AAW variety, 8 of the GP variety (both embarking CH-148s but with CH-147 capable decks)  and 4 stretched versions with flat decks like these ones.








Link

San Giorgio design built for the Algerian Navy.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Range would be insufficient, wouldn't it?

Matthew.


----------



## a_majoor

But can it embark 500 fully equipped troops, house a command suite for the Admiral and a second one for the Task Force Commander + staff AND be built in modular sections in ridings controlled by the government of the day to be assembled in Resolute Bay to support the "Economic Action Plan _and_ the "Canada First" Defence Strategy?  :

Otherwise, it is actually a pretty cool ship. If it were up to me I'd upsize to the Japanese "Helicopter carriers".


----------



## Kirkhill

440 troops and 400 mio Euros Thuc. 

 And yes, a little short on legs Matt but 30% more than the Iroquois and  we're supposed to be defending Canada First and the Carribean Second in any event.  N'est ce pas?

We have two big tankers to get little ships over long distances.


----------



## Infanteer

Seems familiar.  The San Giorgio class that it's based upon comes in at just under 8,000 tons displacement.  The Scheldt Enforcer has a small variant coming in at the same displacement.  Definitely seems more feasible/palatable than manning ships at 15,000+ tons.  Put 2-3 together and you can sail a BG anywhere.


----------



## MarkOttawa

The money just will not be there, esp. with build in Canada:
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/26594/post-1284386#msg1284386

How about a mix of OPVs/Black Swans and just a few serious frigate-types?
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-concept-note-1-12-future-black-swan-class-sloop-of-war-a-group-system
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hollandclasspatrol/

If the RCN is mainly to do drug-busting and anti-piracy?  And not much there there left for latter:
http://www.sunnewsnetwork.ca/sunnews/world/archives/2014/01/20140119-130156.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/10582360/Somali-pirates-hijack-first-ship-since-2012.html

What is the threat against which we need 15 high-end surface ships?   One-for-one Cold  War vs Soviets replacement  (with specific NATO responsibilities then);  but  that Cold War is over.  

Moreover the RN is only going to have 19:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131230/DEFREG01/312300007/Final-Type-45-Destroyer-Enters-UK-Royal-Navy-Service

Or do we envisage combat with China with a lot of the 15 new CSCs?  Is that the rationale?

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> To refresh the interminable "wouldn't it be nice" discussion....
> 
> My latest prescription:
> 
> Build 16 CSCs - 4 of the AAW variety, 8 of the GP variety (both embarking CH-148s but with CH-147 capable decks)  and 4 stretched versions with flat decks like these ones.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Link
> 
> San Giorgio design built for the Algerian Navy.



I'd vote for this. It would give us enough utility for the missions we have been called upon in the last number of years. IMO OPVs belong with an "armed" CCG. FELEX, CSC and Kirkhills CSC variants would be a nice mission enhancer for Canada and our coalition partners.


----------



## GR66

This is a WAY out of my lane question.  If we can't afford our own BHS...or a LHS....or even a JSS vs an AOR, then could we get creative?

Could we subsidise the purchase of a pair of commercial Ro-PAX ships for East & West Coast ferry fleets?  The government could maybe provide interest free loans (with generous repayment schedules) for the companies to purchase these ships and the CF would pay for the cost to add a couple of modifications to make them more useful for military use (such as a helicopter pad, refueling at sea capability, upgraded power, etc).  The ferry companies would be free to use these ships but the CF would be able to "activate" them when required to respond to military needs.  Additional mission capabilities could be added when required with containerized systems.  There could also possibly be some kind of manning agreement where a few NAVRES billets could be on each ship so that we have crews familiar with the vessels.  

Here's an example of an existing vessel that has both military and commercial versions:  http://www.incat.com.au/domino/incat/incatweb.nsf/0/76457AADD2C1A987CA2571AF0019EC66?OpenDocument

It's maybe not as effective as having a dedicated BHS, but we would have available a couple of vessels in time of need to be able to transport troops, vehicles and containers when required as well as have a platform that can carry a couple of helicopters for ship-to-shore movement, etc.

Just a thought.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Ah! Kirkhill, where to start to dash your hopes again?

Lets put it this way: I love dreamer but: 

1) these small phibs are not repeat not "combatants" in the sense of the CSC. They could not fight their way out of a paper bag if their life depended on it.

2) You cannot just "stretch" a CSC and put a "flat deck" on them so they would remain the same ships. They would be, by necessity entirely different: different internal arrangement of machinery, different internal compartments arrangements, different distribution of equipment and on-board services, different ballasting and tanking arrangements, and likely  even a different hull form would be required, etc, etc. So, if you want small phibs (and I would personally like to see phibs in our Navy) it is a lot faster and smarter to start either from scratch or from a foreign design we buy than try to start from a CSC.

3) The San Giorgio's are not bigger than the envisaged CSC's - in fact they are about the same size but shorter.

4) The San Giorgio's have a limited lift capability: They can only carry about 400 armed personal for landing and about 30-34 large army vehicles. They do not repeat not have the capacity to embark either the task force commander or the Admiral and their staff. No on board medical facility to talk of either.

5) The San Giorgio's have a very limited capacity for helicopters: there is no Hangar to store them in (they stay on deck, with the afferent corrosion problems from exposure to salty sea air) and especially when the LCVP's davits are in the upper position, limited spots and embark capacity of maybe four or five medium helicopters at most.

5) The CSC are extremely unlikely to be able to ever land the CH-147 Chinooks: The CSC's and their flight decks are small and the Chinooks don't have a haul down system, making the sea states in which you could safely land them on a CSC quite limited.

As I have said, I would love for the Navy to have phibs, but my choice would be to acquire something more suited to our needs, with about the same size crew, but that would provide good helicopter capacity, better troop transportation and heavy equipment capacity, actual room for command staffs and good medical facilities. For about the same price as the San Giorgio's, these would be Mistral class ships, or if we wished to go a little bigger and a bit pricier, the Canberra class.


----------



## GreenMarine

:goodpost: 

Took the words out of my mouth.


----------



## Kirkhill

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Ah! Kirkhill, where to start to dash your hopes again?



I live to entertain you OGBD.   ;D

But.....

My old man lived by the dictum "Anything's possible if cash".

If we had cash we would have bought Big Honking Ships a decade ago.  If we had cash we would have bought a US style navy.  Since neither of those conditions pertain I can only assume that we are short of the ready...

Another favourite phrase around our place was "It's a poor craftsman that blames his tools".

While I appreciate the value of an electric 3-Axis mitre saw I can also see how a job might be done with a tenon saw and a mitre box.

Just because I can't afford the 3-Axis mitre saw should I disregard what can be done with the tenon saw?

San Giorgio is not San Antonio... but we can't afford San Antonio.  Should we disregard what we might be able to accomplish with the San Giorgio?

I will be pleased to hear how you propose to fund high end capabilities. 


Your Servant, Good Sir,  >


----------



## Kirkhill

PS 

San Giorgio has no hangar.  Agreed.

But.

San Giorgio can move CH-146 Griffons from the Vehicle deck to the Flight deck via an elevator.

Better than nought.

But.

The picture is not of the San Giorgio but of the San Giorgio variant Kalaat Beni Abbes of the Algerian Navy which:



> The BDSL, with a displacement of 8 800 tons, can accommodate 150 crew and 440 soldiers and their equipment as well as landing craft – three landing craft can simultaneously operate from the stern well. Vehicle and personnel landing craft will be carried, along with a couple of RHIBs. Three Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) are being manufactured in Algeria under license by the Mers El Kebir shipyard.
> 
> The vessel can accommodate 15 main battle tanks or 30 light tanks or armoured personnel carriers. A hospital with operating rooms can house fifty beds. Five medium helicopter can be carried in a hangar.



Link

With the exception of the Admiral's staff it seems to tick the boxes you left open .... as regards the Admiral's staff, perhaps if we left a platoon, or even a company ashore, perhaps they could be accomodated.  Nelson's staff only required seven berths.

Your Servant.


----------



## Kirkhill

And in closing....

One hull, one machinery suite, one electronics suite.

3 different ships,  including a flat top.






Courtesy of Damen Shipyards.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And in closing....
> 
> One hull, one machinery suite, one electronics suite.
> 
> 3 different ships,  including a flat top.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Courtesy of Damen Shipyards.



This isn't really my lane but I think trying to turn CSC hull/machinery into a usable LHD is kind of like trying to put a pick-up truck frame onto a Lotus Elise chassis.

You 'could' do it, but your constraints would dramatically undermine the LHD performance.


Matthew.


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

One caveat:  If you were willing to limit the size of your alt vessel to the Absalon-class, the Iver Huitfeldt/Absalon programs probably merit some review.


Matthew.


----------



## ArmyRick

That San Giorgio looks rather tiny for a LPD. Or am I reading the dimensions wrong?


----------



## ArmyRick

What does CSC stand for?


----------



## Kirkhill

ArmyRick:

CSC = Canadian Surface Combatant.  It's the Navy's programme to replace both the DDHs "Destroyers" and the Halifax Frigates with a single class of ship - hopefully resulting in 15 or 16 new ships.

And you are right.  These ships are a lot smaller than US and even British LPH/LPDs.  They are more the size of the old LSTs (Landing Ship Tanks) and have found employment in coastal navies.  Thailand also comes to mind.

I think these things would have utility in Canada and as "motherships" for disaster relief and constabulary duties internationally.  They would also thicken out an ASW screen with their "5 medium helicopters in a hangar".  Unless the text is wrong that would mean 5 CH-148 Cyclone or CH-149 sized helos.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And in closing....
> 
> One hull, one machinery suite, one electronics suite.
> 
> 3 different ships,  including a flat top.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Courtesy of Damen Shipyards.



That is the image of the Scheldt variants I spoke to earlier.


----------



## Kirkhill

If we had the cash then the Enforcer (3 of them in the flat top variant) would be my preference too.

But if they're too rich for our budget perhaps something like the modernized San Giorgio would be affordable - especially if built to a common standard with the CSCs.


----------



## a_majoor

While I fully agree that larger, more capable ships like the Hyūga class helicopter destroyer are far more expensive and difficult to procure and man, I am a bit concerned about how much smaller ships would be able to handle and operate in the North Atlantic, or for that matter, operate globally like our current fleet does. Back in the Cold War, Soviet ships were not as capable as their Western counterparts because of their small size and limited habitability. 

While there was a bit of sarcasm about the Admiral's suite in my post, since *we* do tend to go out on multinational missions, there is going to be the need for more staff and equipment for inteoperability, at a minimum. And of course if the reason for having these ships in the first place is to be able to embark a battalion's worth of troops, then there will be a need for an HQ on board, evenif it is a bunch of containers bolted to the deck. And of course, a full service flight deck and hangers for the air component is a must if you are using aircraft at sea.

Sometimes, size really does matter.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> PS
> 
> San Giorgio has no hangar.  Agreed.
> 
> But.
> 
> San Giorgio can move CH-146 Griffons from the Vehicle deck to the Flight deck via an elevator.



Actually, no. There are no elevators on the San Giorgio's save for a small supply one. There is a ramp system so the upper deck can be used to store more army trucks and jeeps, etc. and move them down to the well deck, but it cannot accommodate helicopters unfortunately.

Don't get me wrong, I have nothing against these small ships, but they are not a good capability fit for Canada. In Italy these San Giorgio's are not meant to operate alone: their doctrine calls for them to be a unit in a group headed by either the Carrier Cavour or the small carrier Garibaldi. 

In Canada, we would need to meld some of these functions. If pure "command" capability is sought, then Absalon style ships  (on a CSC style hull/power plant) could do the job. If some form of landing capability combined with land operations is sought, Mistral's would be better (BTW, the Mistrals, based on a civilian ship type, are cheap vessels for the punch they give you and not more expansive than the San Giorgio's, which are military specs vessels).

The Enforcer family is exactly that: a family of ships. Their commonality stops at the hull and power plant level BUT they are all for the same function: landing ships. The CSC are fighting ships and are a family too: but of combatants (either optimized for AAW, ASW or GP, as needs be). Their hull is not optimized for lower speeds / wider stance required for landing ships that CANNOT be built to a common standard with CSC's.

Also, I was making reference to land staff more than admiral staff in my comments on lack of capability to accommodate: I have no doubt that pure "naval" direction of a naval task force by an admiral and his staff can be accommodated from any type of ship. After all, even today I suspect that push come to shove, an admiral and ten staffers can do the job.


----------



## Kirkhill

OGBD:

I stand corrected on the San Giorgio but the Kalaat Beni Abbes appears to have been outfitted with a centre deck elevator. Based on the text and the images I believe those to be NH90s.







I accept the distinction between civil and naval construction - and I would be happy to see either the Mistral or Enforcers in Canadian service.  My sense though, is that the RCN is not comfortable with civilian construction standards.  

I have been given to understand that while the AOPS was originally projected as an armed civilian vessel, and price estimates established on that basis,  the east coast has seen fit to ask at least some suppliers to provide milspec mechanical equipment.

Also, wasn't one of the differences between the Krupp and the BMT bids on the JSS the design standard, with the Krupp design being the naval standard version?

Finally, accepting your strictures on hull design, doesn't that still leave open the possibility of ensuring a common machinery and electrical package with a common bridge and engine room control architecture?


----------



## Fabius

I find these topics very interesting, in that it seems that there is broad agreement amongst a wide array of individuals/SMEs that an amphiobious lift capability is of significant value to the Canadian government.  This conclusion also seems to have been reached by almost all significant naval forces in the world who 
have a blue water fleet. The list of nations that now have dedicated amphbious/helicopter carrier/C2 ships is long and growing and includes a large
number of nations and navies comparable to Canada and the RCN.

I am not sure that cost is actually the real reason we have seen no real effort to incorperate an amphbious capablility (Of any sort whether Canberra 
class, Mistral Class, Karl Doorman Class, San Giorgio) into the RCN.

It appears to me, as an interested observer, that the RCN as an institution is still focused on its WW1,WW2 and Cold War mission of providing escorts
to North Atlantic Convoy's and conducting ASW missions, at least insofar as the RCNs force structure is concerned. 

As was pointed out previously in this thread the Royal Navy is planning on having 19 surface combatants and Canada is planning on 15. There is nothing
wrong with having 15 CSC's in and of itself, if they were part of what I would term a balanced fleet similar to what the majority of other blue water
fleets are creating. The problem as I see it is that the RCN is on track as an institution to be set up with a fleet no differant in terms of real 
capability than what they have had since WW2. This will hold especially true if the CSC's end up with no capability for NGS and land attack.
I am not sure why the RCN seems to have not considered reducing the number of CSC's in order to build a fleet with a broader range of capabilities.
It seems that the RCN wants nothing to do with a balanced multi role fleet. 

I do not think that that currently scheduled fleet composition is as useful in advancing Canada's national interests as a more balanced fleet with an 
amphbious/helicopter carrier/C2 capability would be. However I do not see the RCN advocating or striving to achieve such a fleet nor do I see the
government actually forcing the RCN to adopt such a fleet structure.


----------



## FSTO

Fabius said:
			
		

> I find these topics very interesting, in that it seems that there is broad agreement amongst a wide array of individuals/SMEs that an amphiobious lift capability is of significant value to the Canadian government.  This conclusion also seems to have been reached by almost all significant naval forces in the world who
> have a blue water fleet. The list of nations that now have dedicated amphbious/helicopter carrier/C2 ships is long and growing and includes a large
> number of nations and navies comparable to Canada and the RCN.
> 
> I am not sure that cost is actually the real reason we have seen no real effort to incorperate an amphbious capablility (Of any sort whether Canberra
> class, Mistral Class, Karl Doorman Class, San Giorgio) into the RCN.
> 
> It appears to me, as an interested observer, that the RCN as an institution is still focused on its WW1,WW2 and Cold War mission of providing escorts
> to North Atlantic Convoy's and conducting ASW missions, at least insofar as the RCNs force structure is concerned.
> 
> As was pointed out previously in this thread the Royal Navy is planning on having 19 surface combatants and Canada is planning on 15. There is nothing
> wrong with having 15 CSC's in and of itself, if they were part of what I would term a balanced fleet similar to what the majority of other blue water
> fleets are creating. The problem as I see it is that the RCN is on track as an institution to be set up with a fleet no differant in terms of real
> capability than what they have had since WW2. This will hold especially true if the CSC's end up with no capability for *NGS and land attack*.
> I am not sure why the RCN seems to have not considered reducing the number of CSC's in order to build a fleet with a broader range of capabilities.
> It seems that the RCN wants nothing to do with a balanced multi role fleet.
> 
> I do not think that that currently scheduled fleet composition is as useful in advancing Canada's national interests as a more balanced fleet with an
> amphbious/helicopter carrier/C2 capability would be. However I do not see the RCN advocating or striving to achieve such a fleet nor do I see the
> government actually forcing the RCN to adopt such a fleet structure.



I understand that CSC will have a 5 inch gun. Land attack missiles are being considered as well.


----------



## Fabius

Thats good to hear.


----------



## CombatDoc

Fabius said:
			
		

> It appears to me, as an interested observer, that the RCN as an institution is still focused on its WW1,WW2 and Cold War mission of providing escorts to North Atlantic Convoy's and conducting ASW missions, at least insofar as the RCNs force structure is concerned...It seems that the RCN wants nothing to do with a balanced multi role fleet.
> 
> However I do not see the RCN advocating or striving to achieve such a fleet nor do I see the government actually forcing the RCN to adopt such a fleet structure.


That would be my observation, as well, after having served on both coasts. Perhaps our RCN colleagues will comment, but this seems to be consistent with the MARLANT-centric culture that looks backwards at the Battle of the Atlantic instead of future brown water, littoral ops.


----------



## FSTO

ArmyDoc said:
			
		

> That would be my observation, as well, after having served on both coasts. Perhaps our RCN colleagues will comment, but this seems to be consistent with the MARLANT-centric culture that looks backwards at the Battle of the Atlantic instead of future brown water, littoral ops.


 :ditto:


----------



## Halifax Tar

ArmyDoc said:
			
		

> That would be my observation, as well, after having served on both coasts. Perhaps our RCN colleagues will comment, but this seems to be consistent with the MARLANT-centric culture that looks backwards at the Battle of the Atlantic instead of future brown water, littoral ops.



No doubt in my mind you are right on this one.


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting observation: the biggest honking ships _ever_, Triple-E container ships, are coming off the line in Korea at a price of $185 million each.

These ships are larger than any other commercial ships, and are comparable to aircraft carriers in sheer size: 1312 feet long, have a beam of 194' and weigh 55,000 tons empty. Stood on end, one of these would be slightly shorter than the Empire State Building.

While they are not built to naval standards, the  idea that monsters like this can be built almost on an assembly line basis (from laydown to delivery takes about a year, and several ships are being built concurrently, so Maersk will be taking delivery every six or seven weeks until they receive 20; they have options for more as well). 

It seems we need to modernize not only our procurment system, but the shipyards as well.


----------



## AirDet

I've been monitoring this thread with great interest. I've been a zoomie for 18 years. I originally joined as a grunt. Having said that you can tell my opinion will be slightly biased towards Canada acquiring some sort of amphib vessel such as those listed above. While in East Timor I watched as the French were able to easily deploy their forces using the Sirocco a Foudre Class landing platform. All I could think of was that this would be a perfect ship for the sort of missions Canada is usually called upon. East Timor, Haiti, even rescuing Canadians from unstable countries such as we did in Libya. Having a pair of ships like this in the RCN would mean we stop using our valuable AORs as troop carriers. I know we're getting new AORs/LSS but these are integral to supporting our frigates (FFH) and destroyers (DDG/DDH).

Once again I don't profess to be an expert but I feel we could easily meet all our national and international commitments with the following:
- 10 Frigates (Air defense and Anti sub capable)
- 2 or 3 AORs/LSS w/command and control capability
- 2 amphib vessels w/heavy landing craft
- 4 MCDVs
- 6 to 8  fast long range patrol ships (polar capable such as Visby, Hamina, Braunschweig, maybe even the new USN littoral ships)
- 4 to 6 subs capable of polar operations

Our current balance of vessels was great for the Cold War but times have changed. We need to start worrying about the north. We are often called upon to help after a disaster (in Canada and elsewhere). We also need to seek ships that can be operated with smaller crews.


----------



## Fabius

I have some questions regarding building to commercial standards vice naval standards.

What are the risks associated with a commercial standard build for a warship? I imagine its related to damage control capabilities and the ability to actually absorb damage?

I ask the question as it seems there is a growing number of warships being built to commercial standards at least when we are looking at the amphibious classes coming from Europe.  It seems like a number of navies have weighed the risks and decided that commercial standards are acceptable.
Does this acceptance stem from their doctrine,concept of employment and an evaluation of the likely threats to be faced or is it strictly a cost saving measure?


----------



## ArmyRick

As far as the RCN hierarchy not planning for or taking on an amphib capability, I would say we need a CDS backed by a government willing to do so will have to force the issue on them. 

I do not see the d day type beach landings being a realistic mission for us but certainly deploying a force quickly especially cansofcom units would be ideal. Think non combatant evacuation, anti-piracy with troops hitting land targets, etc, etc.

However I could definitely see a purpose for amphib ships in the future operating similar to a FOB at sea. Ideas? Thoughts?


----------



## AirDet

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As far as the RCN hierarchy not planning for or taking on an amphib capability, I would say we need a CDS backed by a government willing to do so will have to force the issue on them.
> 
> I do not see the d day type beach landings being a realistic mission for us but certainly deploying a force quickly especially cansofcom units would be ideal. Think non combatant evacuation, anti-piracy with troops hitting land targets, etc, etc.
> 
> However I could definitely see a purpose for amphib ships in the future operating similar to a FOB at sea. Ideas? Thoughts?



I think you nailed it. Current and future ops are going to require deployment ashore. For some reason the RCN and Army looked at each other as competition rather than partners. With the new organization model that may be changing. If they worked together we could easily have an effective multi-role force much like the USMC.


----------



## Pat in Halifax

Fabius said:
			
		

> I have some questions regarding building to commercial standards vice naval standards.
> 
> What are the risks associated with a commercial standard build for a warship? I imagine its related to damage control capabilities and the ability to actually absorb damage?
> 
> I ask the question as it seems there is a growing number of warships being built to commercial standards at least when we are looking at the amphibious classes coming from Europe.  It seems like a number of navies have weighed the risks and decided that commercial standards are acceptable.
> Does this acceptance stem from their doctrine,concept of employment and an evaluation of the likely threats to be faced or is it strictly a cost saving measure?



You have partly answered your own questions regarding the DC aspect and 'other' Navies employing more specialized yet smaller crews, have had issues in sustaining higher tempo Ops (Type 45, FREMM and Flt II/III AB come to mind).
The other is purely equipment related with a little doctrine attached. There is so much redundancy built into many systems that in theory, a ship can remain as a fighting platform even as it is sinking beneath the waves. The problem here is that due to our minimal roles (the Navy I mean) in combat operations in the last 50 years, risk mitigation is becoming the catch phrase and with the $$$ factor attached and ships are regularly sailing with either reduced redundancy or reduced capability having fallen back on the redundancy already (This is NOT confined to the RCN either). Does reduced redundancy equate to reduced operational ability? - I dare say that for the most part, no. Obviously a platform such as TORONTO is maintained at as high an operational capability as possible but regularly we steal from one to keep the other going. I am pretty sure that those in uniform who laid out the operational requirements during the design phase never had this in mind and I know the shipbuilder didn't. 
An analogy I have used in the past though admittedly a tad skewed is that of an old(er) car. So you have this 25 year old Buick (not quite a Cadillac) that was NOT driven by a little old lady and though intentions were good, not all regular maintenance and even less corrective maintenance has been done to it in it's life. When you take it out the driveway, you floor it and you don't let up until you slam the brakes on at your destination-you drive it like it is stolen. Again, a bit of a stretch but even if you 'put-it-in-the-garage' for the winter and change the brakes and engine and give it a shiny new coat of paint (over the old dents/rust), do you really think you will get another 25...or 15...or even 10 years out of it if you continue to drive it like that with probably even less time for maintenance? 
We need a bit of a culture adjustment I think right from the civilian designer in an office in Kanata, to the start up component company in some small town in the Prairies, to the individual welder/electrician/engineer in the shipyard and following, the operators and maintainers in uniform who employ it. I think until that happens, our ships will continue to age well before their time.
Finally, stop trying to design a ship with the capabilities of the Enterprise (and I mean NCC Enterprise). The trials and tribulations of the PRO and IRO class replacements are perfect examples of why this is a bad idea.

Okay, I am done....


----------



## NavyShooter

I would think that our minimum of 15 CSC's has more to do with maintenance cycles and deployment requirements.

Consider, how many ships will be in a major refit cycle at any one time?  (Docking work period)

How many will be in a short work period?  (SWP)

How many will be in a Tiered Readiness Program in post DWP/SWP?

How many ships do we require, in order to keep maintenance done, and still accomplish the missions that the government has laid out for us?

Let us look at our current major combatant fleet of 12 frigates, and 3 destroyers.

With a large number of our 15 ships currently in that refit/maintenance cycle, we are, well, not scrambling, but stretched to cover deployments and taskings.  (Note the Australian IFR.)

If we go LESS than 15, will we be able to maintain our current capabilities, or lose them?

There is a minimum number of ships that you need to consider having in order to maintain a fleet.  If we drop below 15, then there will be, I suspect, a drop in our ability to meet national and international taskings.

Just my thoughts...

As for a Little Honking Ship...well, based on how long it's taking to get an AOR replacement, adding a capability....yeah....I'm not laughing, but I suspect that whichever shipyard we engaged would be laughing all the way to the bank, and we'd bust the 35 Billion dollar bank-roll by a LOT.

NS


----------



## GR66

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As far as the RCN hierarchy not planning for or taking on an amphib capability, I would say we need a CDS backed by a government willing to do so will have to force the issue on them.
> 
> I do not see the d day type beach landings being a realistic mission for us but certainly deploying a force quickly especially cansofcom units would be ideal. Think non combatant evacuation, anti-piracy with troops hitting land targets, etc, etc.
> 
> However I could definitely see a purpose for amphib ships in the future operating similar to a FOB at sea. Ideas? Thoughts?



Which comes back to my question about possibly having access to modified civilian "Auxiliary" Ro-Pax ships in our East/West coast ferry fleets when required.  I don't think we need the capability of storming a beachhead but there may be times when we need more than rented container ships in order to quickly deploy our forces to a relatively safe port near the conflict zone.  It's not something we need on a daily basis but when required it sure would be handy to have a couple of RCN(A) ships available on call.  It's not ideal by any means, but maybe affordable and "good enough" are better than wishes.  

A high speed ferry modified with upgraded power systems to control the "extras", upgraded sensor and communications equipment, a platform for landing/temporarily transporting helicopters for fair weather operations, maybe mounts for basic self-defense weapons, a platform  off the side for loading RHIBs, etc, and containerized systems for other special capabilities would give us a basic emergency capability that we don't currently have, but be more affordable because most of the time these ships would be making money for civilian companies performing normal commercial service on our coasts.


----------



## AlexanderM

If the budget falls completely apart and the building program becomes unworkable, which seems to be the case, then scrap it and just buy ships from other countries.  We can purchase frigates/destroyers for $1 billion each, or less, no problem.  We can purchase AOR's for $500-600 million.  We can make reduced budget numbers work and still get good equipment.


----------



## CombatDoc

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> If the budget falls completely apart and the building program becomes unworkable, which seems to be the case, then scrap it and just buy ships from other countries.  We can purchase frigates/destroyers for $1 billion each, or less, no problem.  We can purchase AOR's for $500-600 million.  We can make reduced budget numbers work and still get good equipment.


That's similar to the rationale used when we acquired the Upholder class submarines. The Victoria class issues and resultant political fallout are one reason why we're not likely to purchase second-hand vessels - of any type - any time soon.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

First of all, let me say that Pat is right on with his last post just above here, and that it is sad to say that it is the reason none of us will see the positive results of the government Shipbuilding Strategy, if such results ever happen.

Engineering is the heart and soul of modern ships, and warships in particular. Their existence and continued operation can only occur with the assistance of master craftsmen. And this is where we failed in the last 30 years: The dockyards were pressed to save on costs and as a result failed to hire sufficient numbers of apprentices and give them time to learn their trade from the retiring masters; our shipyards could not find enough work and let their craftsmen go, never to be replaced or without passing the knowledge base; in the Navy, the engineers became more and more operators first and maintainers/repairers second, again losing the discipline of the apprentice/craftsman. Such situation cannot be remedied quickly - it takes generations (plural) of master/apprentice to recover it. The European and Asian's have this tradition. We in North-America don't have it, at least not anymore. (And no, a "master" welder from Fort McMurray cannot just come in and become a "master" welder in a shipyard. There are too many differences).

So this said, and before we condemn the Navy brass as simply following the old cold war strategy, let us look at the strategy and the consequences of the engineering dilemma above.

Many moon ago, when preparing to release "Leadmark", the RCN looked at the whole spectrum of naval operations, analysed what each one required and would cost, looked at the resources available to the Navy and at the type of operations going on in the world from a Canadian experience and point of view. They rejected instantly carrier operations and ballistic submarines for obvious reasons, took a good look at mine warfare and realized we had never had such an attack in Canada in either world war or even during the cold war - so the limited capability of the MCDV's was enough. They seriously looked at amphibious operation (though one must understand that at that time, even the idea of the Special Op Regiment had not been conceived yet) and concluded that, considering the speed of their deployment "from home base in Canada" and "from scratch" with usefully trained soldiers onboard would require such lead time as to make them not useful to Canada. The alternative amphibious ops capability was forward deployment in contingency area - USMC style, which turned out to be too expensive for Canada. So it was shelved.

Leadmark's conclusion (and one I agree with) was that the best bang for our very limited Naval money was concentrating on General purpose forces deployable under the concept of the Canadian Task Force (One command/AAW ship deployed with one or two GP frigates and one support ship) deployed from each coast. This, by the way, is NOT the continuation of our cold war mentality. During the cold war, we concentrated completely and uniquely on ASW close escort of convoys. Everything else was left to our allies. The CTF concept led to development of new capabilities for the Navy and in particular in the command area, which is why, for instance, during the Gulf War, with only a three ships contribution, Canada was assigned the command of all forces in the gulf rear area (the largest command at sea by a Canadian since the retirement of BONAVENTURE), the only country other than the US given an operational command.

Going back to Leadmark and engineering: the reason to concentrate on the CSC's as a "single" class arises from the tremendous savings in training, supply/support and development of the ship particular knowledge base. Contrary to many European countries, Canada as a country has limited tradition of civilian support for its Navy and its operations. Thus, the Navy must always keep in mind the cost of its operations. We simply cannot afford the complexity of supporting a large number of different type of ships. This may change if the Navy is given new strategic direction from the Government (but "Canada First" is not a new strategic guidance - just a shopping list) and the resources to put it in effect.

And by the way, AirDet: the Navy/USMC team in the US is not a "multi-role" force. It is a single role: Amphibious ops - nothing else.

This said I would favour limited Amphibious capability at this stage for two reasons: (1) We now have a permanent special operations regiment that could incorporate and maintain the required knowledge base for amphibious ops and therefore be available quickly and (2) with the North opening but without good support base for the army and the Caribbean's becoming a new focus area of operations for the Navy, a small amphibious capability would be useful and deployable in a timely fashion from Halifax or Esquimalt.


----------



## Stoker

First thing of all governments do not have the political will to buy offshore, so that's out. Once the unions and Canadian shipyards get their piece of the pie, the ships will cost much more than we have budgeted. Having ships to go in harms way with a mix of military/civilian specs is fine on paper and the ship may make it to its destination,but all bets are off if they get into a fight.
If and when when we get these ships, who are going to crew them and pay for their operating costs? We are hemorrhaging people from the Navy and can't afford to keep MCDV's to sea for Pete's sake, by far the most economical ships we have.
At the end of the day we'll get a few overpriced ships built but will we be able to crew them or even maintain them. I'm all for the big, little honking ships but I think what we need to focus on what we exactly need to protect out shorelines, including the arctic and maintain our overseas commitments. These ships need to last a long time and be economical to operate and maintain.


----------



## AlexanderM

ArmyDoc said:
			
		

> That's similar to the rationale used when we acquired the Upholder class submarines. The Victoria class issues and resultant political fallout are one reason why we're not likely to purchase second-hand vessels - of any type - any time soon.


I wasn't talking about purchasing second hand vessels.  Either the De Zeven Provincien or the Iver Huitfeldt could be purchased for under $1 billion each and that would likely be with $100-200 million per ship in upgrades, such as better steel, etc.


----------



## Stoker

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> I wasn't talking about purchasing second hand vessels.  Either the De Zeven Provincien or the Iver Huitfeldt could be purchased for under $1 billion each and that would likely be with $100-200 million per ship in upgrades, such as better steel, etc.



I don't think anyone is disputing your idea, which for bang for buck is the best deal for the navy. Its the political fallout to build offshore. Buying used, surface ships yes, submarines not so much.


----------



## Pat in Halifax

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> I wasn't talking about purchasing second hand vessels.  Either the De Zeven Provincien or the Iver Huitfeldt could be purchased for under $1 billion each and that would likely be with $100-200 million per ship in upgrades, such as better steel, etc.



Okay, but you are missing the whole point of the NSPS. We are building an industry-it's a gamble and as the Navy is the first 'bet'. the cost is inflated. The hope is, as OGBD says, for a generational change in optics so that 30-40 years from now instead of us looking at current German/Dutch/US designs (which are fantastic designs by the way), it will be them looking to us. We have the second largest coastline in the world and a miniscule shipbuilding industry.  Something is REALLY wrong here. 
If the government uses NSPS as a job creation and skill creation tool, so be it but we need to be part of it or sit back and watch the world go by. I saw a quote in someone's sig block the other day that sort of fits here: "You can lead, you can follow or you can get run over". Your right A, we could have a world class Navy of 100% foreign design and build within 5 years...but long term...? What is the goal of NSPS? It definitely is NOT that I say.


----------



## Kirkhill

This business of price/cost/value....

Buying a piece of kit from an offshore supplier is different than buying the same piece of kit from a domestic supplier.  I'm sure this point has been made before.

If I pay a foreigner for a ship that money is "found money" for their economy.  It is new money that reduces the demands on the exchequer of the vending country's economy.  Those demands are present on the economy regardless of whether or not they ever sell a nut or a bolt outside of their borders.  Specifically the demands are to keep the populace content.  That is achieved by keeping them out of the labour market (more time spent in school, conscription, short work weeks, long vacations, generous disability plans, early retirement), by supplying "government jobs" under very generous working conditions and/or by supplying private sector jobs.

All countries use combinations of all of the above to ensure Peace, Order and Good Governance.

The issue of how much something costs then becomes a matter of book-keeping.

In the European, state-sponsored model, they are more inclined to transfer costs from the manufacturers in the "private sector" and claim them on government ledgers.   Consequently the European cost of production is quite low.  R&D, apprenticeships, over-manning, even marketing are all directly, and without shame, subsidized by the governments.

In the American, free-enterprise model, all costs are routed through the "private sector" manufacturers, even those costs that are directly subsidized by the US government.  Consequently the US cost of production is very high.  All costs are apparently borne by the manufacturer. But given that all defense products are purchased by the US government then the government is effectively subsidizing the US economy in exactly the same manner as the Europeans.

The F-35 programme gives a great example of that.  The domestic cost of the F-35 is considerably higher than the export, fly-away cost.  The fly-away cost is broadly competitive with the European competitors.

The issue for Canada is whether or not the government can make the case for subsidizing the Canadian economy through the US model, in which case the CF budget needs to be increased to manage the necessary cash flow, or the European model, in which case the subsidies are funneled through Human Resources, DFAIT, Industry Canada and every other department known to Ottawa.

You can't run a US modeled defence procurement plan on a European budget.

Arguably the Europeans are spending much more on "defence" than the 1 or 2% that they claim.  They simply prefer not to show the "real" value on their books.

And that doesn't include the impact of the large domestic security, and paramilitary operations that they maintain that contribute to defence writ large but also are not shown on the books.

I don't think that Canadians are going to accept a US style defence budget anytime soon.  Given the predilection for European solutions I suggest that the Government, even though it is a Conservative one, if it wants to sell defence to Canadians, is going to have to reduce the direct costs and channel the subsidies necessary to maintain the capabilities through The Rest of Government.


----------



## AlexanderM

Pat in Halifax said:
			
		

> Okay, but you are missing the whole point of the NSPS. We are building an industry-it's a gamble and as the Navy is the first 'bet'. the cost is inflated. The hope is, as OGBD says, for a generational change in optics so that 30-40 years from now instead of us looking at current German/Dutch/US designs (which are fantastic designs by the way), it will be them looking to us. We have the second largest coastline in the world and a miniscule shipbuilding industry.  Something is REALLY wrong here.
> If the government uses NSPS as a job creation and skill creation tool, so be it but we need to be part of it or sit back and watch the world go by. I saw a quote in someone's sig block the other day that sort of fits here: "You can lead, you can follow or you can get run over". Your right A, we could have a world class Navy of 100% foreign design and build within 5 years...but long term...? What is the goal of NSPS? It definitely is NOT that I say.


I don't see it as being in any way realistic.  We are going to pour a huge amount of money into the ships and still not be competitive.  Now, if we were working with the Davie Yard I might have a different opinion, as they have a different approach than Irving.  I'm also wondering what might happen if the Liberals get elected?


----------



## Pat in Halifax

I met the new 'Boss' at Irving just before Christmas at a Dinner. I think you (and others) might be surprised.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Lately with the PCs I think we have been taking 1 step forward and 4 back; if the Liberals get in, it may be 1 forward and 8 back. :/


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Pat in Halifax said:
			
		

> I met the new 'Boss' at Irving just before Christmas at a Dinner. I think you (and others) might be surprised.



As in the CDS?


----------



## Pat in Halifax

No, Irving's new boss; Kevin McCoy.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Sadly I don't think myself or many of my peers are too optimistic we will see new and for that matter capable hulls hitting the water from Irving or Seaspan anytime soon.


----------



## GR66

Is the Canadian market big enough to support a shipbuilding industry with DND as it's major customer?  Realistically that's what we're looking at as far as I can see (at least in terms of military vessels).  The US and European countries (and South Korea for that matter) already have established industries and their governments aren't going to cut off their own companies by buying from Canadian shipyards.  Is it a good idea to try and build an industry that is dependent on DND's very occasional orders?  

Unless we have a miracle change of policy which sees a steady stream of ships coming off the lines to keep modernizing the RCN and CG on a regular basis then we will probably end up with an industry which will rely on government life support in order to produce over-priced ships for domestic use.  Is that the best way to spend our money?  Would we be better off paying less for foreign warships upfront and using those savings to support industries that might have better long-term export potential?  Or maybe there is a market for a niche subset of the shipbuilding industry where exports are a more likely possibility...like ice strengthened hulls?  No idea.  But this industrial strategy seems much more focused on short-term regional political gains than on real, viable, long-term industrial strategy.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

As much as I would like to support a Canadian shipbuilding industry, the sad fact is there are too many fingers in the pie to make it viable. Its a sad state of affair when it almost takes decades to get a hull designed, built and to the fleet when other countries it can take less then 5 years.


----------



## Fabius

In order for Canada to maintain a internationally competitive and viable naval ship building capacity we obviously need to constantly be building ships.
This is where I have little confidence in the new NSPS.  Like was pointed out by Oldgateboatdriver, we as a nation have not seen fit to actually maintain an ability to build warships.
There was a 16 year gap between the Cold War fleet ship programs and the Halifax Class. Currently there is a 17 year gap and growing between the Halifax and the CSC. In comparison The Netherlands primary ship yard, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding has had a warship under construction almost constantly from 1975 onwards. They have only had two 5-6 year gaps, once in the late 80s and again in the late 90s.  During those gaps although they were not actively welding etc, they were busy in the design phase for the next class of major surface combatants.

My concern for the NSPS is that sure we build up our capabilities over the course of the CSC and related projects and then we do what Canada has historically done and cease any further warship development/building for another 2 decades. 
Unless that historical trend changes NSPS is not going to succeed in actually creating a viable industry.

This problem has nothing to do with the Navy and everything to do with the Canadian public and our priorities for spending our tax dollars and then by extension the politicians we elect.


----------



## NavyShooter

Pat in Halifax said:
			
		

> I met the new 'Boss' at Irving just before Christmas at a Dinner. I think you (and others) might be surprised.



Pat,

To be honest, I fear that based on my personal experience*  that unless they raze the place to the ground, fire the lot of the useless sabotaging slugs that work there right now, and start from scratch, that there will be nothing good coming out of that yard.

*Experiences include things that I have personally seen, on my ship, since we got it back from a certain shipyard.  Unless the wire-snipper fairies have been at work, someone deliberately cut and hid wires/cables.  That, in my books, is sabotage.  We've all seen how we have to strip the brass fittings out of the ships to prevent someone in ISI from stealing it for the scrap value...We had 95% of the PA system on the ship working....until the day after they laid off 300 workers in the fall....the next day we had 65% of the speakers working....again, wire snipper fairies I guess.

This is what I personally have seen, and what I personally feel.

If they have some new guy at the top that can magically fix these saboteurs that work for him...well, more power to him.  I truly wish that a different yard had got the contract.

YMMV, but the new guy at the top has a long, uphill fight to gain any measure of respect back with those of us who have to work for months to get a ship finished and ready to sail even after an 18 month refit.  To put it in perspective, if you got a Leo back from the depot after refurbishment, would you expect to have to swap out the engine pack, finish installing (and wiring) all the radios, install and test the gun computer, then do all of the alignments to make sure it worked before taking it out for it's first test-drive...?

NS


----------



## Pat in Halifax

Oh, don't get me wrong-I too am familiar with some of the mysterious things that happen to systems/equipment and yet when they are reported, no one seems to listen. I know one person will not change things over night but it is a start. Like it or not, Irving has the lion's share of the NSPS (approx. $33.6 B I believe). One can only hope that the prevalent attitude behind those gates changes at some point. He did not change my opinion of the work quality coming out of there but listening to him, gave me a sliver of hope and without getting into it, we have seen the result once already of his no-nonsense approach to issues.


----------



## jollyjacktar

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Pat,
> 
> To be honest, I fear that based on my personal experience*  that unless they raze the place to the ground, fire the lot of the useless sabotaging slugs that work there right now, and start from scratch, that there will be nothing good coming out of that yard.
> 
> *Experiences include things that I have personally seen, on my ship, since we got it back from a certain shipyard.  Unless the wire-snipper fairies have been at work, someone deliberately cut and hid wires/cables.  That, in my books, is sabotage.  We've all seen how we have to strip the brass fittings out of the ships to prevent someone in ISI from stealing it for the scrap value...We had 95% of the PA system on the ship working....until the day after they laid off 300 workers in the fall....the next day we had 65% of the speakers working....again, wire snipper fairies I guess.
> 
> This is what I personally have seen, and what I personally feel.
> 
> If they have some new guy at the top that can magically fix these saboteurs that work for him...well, more power to him.  I truly wish that a different yard had got the contract.
> 
> YMMV, but the new guy at the top has a long, uphill fight to gain any measure of respect back with those of us who have to work for months to get a ship finished and ready to sail even after an 18 month refit.  To put it in perspective, if you got a Leo back from the depot after refurbishment, would you expect to have to swap out the engine pack, finish installing (and wiring) all the radios, install and test the gun computer, then do all of the alignments to make sure it worked before taking it out for it's first test-drive...?
> 
> NS



And we had our share of sabotage items too when we came out last year.  3 inch studs inserted into the black water lines, causing major blockages.  Expandable foam down drain scuppers... and on and on.


----------



## NavyShooter

Like I said.  Raze it and start from scratch.  200 gallon internal fuel spill as a result of an ISI assembled transfer valve...

NS


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Watch the tangent fellas. 

---Staff---


----------



## Kirkhill

Tangent Break Recceguy - How about "Managing Quality - RCN Style"?

This article is about the USN but directly applies to Pat, JJT and Ex-D's concerns'



> Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting Quality
> 
> 
> Source: Government Accountability Office
> 
> 
> Ref: GAO-14-122
> 
> 
> Issued Nov 19, 2013
> 
> 
> 106 PDF pages
> 
> 
> The US Navy has experienced significant quality problems with several ship classes over the past several years. It has focused on reducing the number of serious deficiencies at the time of delivery, and GAO’s analysis shows that the number of deficiencies—particularly “starred” deficiencies designated as the most serious for operational or safety reasons—has generally dropped.
> 
> Nonetheless, the Navy continues to accept ships with large numbers of open deficiencies (see figure below as an example; although total deficiencies have declined for this ship class, the last ship still had about 1,000 deficiencies that the shipbuilder was responsible for correcting).
> 
> Accepting ships with large numbers of uncorrected deficiencies is a standard practice and GAO found that there are varying interpretations of Navy policy with regard to when the defects should be resolved. In 2009, the Navy organization that oversees ship construction launched the Back to Basics initiative to improve Navy oversight of ship construction. However, a key output of the initiative promoting consistent and adequate quality requirements in Navy contracts has yet to be implemented.
> 
> *Although the environment in which leading commercial ship buyers and builders operate differs in many ways from the Navy’s, some commercial practices aimed at helping to ensure that ships are delivered with a minimum number of deficiencies may be informative for the Navy. Throughout the course of commercial shipbuilding projects, significant numbers of quality defects and instances of non-conforming work are identified. However, leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders make great efforts to ensure that these issues are resolved prior to delivery. Further, commercial ship buyers establish clear lines of accountability and hold their personnel responsible for ensuring the shipbuilder delivers a quality vessel.
> 
> While commercial ship buyers focus on regularly witnessing in-process work through roaming patrols and impromptu inspections, Navy processes at the shipyards place less emphasis on in-process work. Moreover, leading commercial shipbuilders have strong quality management processes that track quality problems to the worker or supervisor level. Navy shipbuilding contractors have historically experienced difficulties in holding production workers and supervisors accountable for their work, but some of the shipyards reported they are making progress on increasing worker accountabilit*y.



Perhaps you should be buying commercial after all.....

There's a greater chance that the ship keeping you out of the water actually adheres to the standards set.   At least you would know the capabilities of the vessel rather than trusting that you know the capabilities of the vessel.


PS.  I see this on a lot of projects, especially government ones.

People cheap-out on on-site management.  Rather than having their representatives on-site and looking over the shoulders of the contractors so that they can correct deficiencies and conflicts on the spot they rely on an occasional visit by engineers and milestone testing.

The net effect is that problems go unobserved and remediation becomes costly and a matter of dispute.  If your rep is on-site and part of the supervisory team you get to bring the project back on plan, and make necessary compromises, in a timely, cost-effective manner.

No plan survives contact with the enemy?  No plan survives contact with the contractors....


----------



## mad dog 2020

so we wander?
Interesting about quality and work ethic? 
I just read several articles in the Jan 20th edition of the CFB Esquimalt newspaper "Lookout" that had praise for the work done on the Winnipeg's  refit.
They even gave a plaque.
 If this was a sincere gesture for real quality, it would be a refreshing thought.


----------



## FSTO

There has been little complaints about the work done by Vic Ships. Since they do not "own" the graving dock they have to get ships in an out in a timely manner. They cannot afford to have ship's come back due to shoddy work. They must be doing decent work because there is a constant stream of vessels (BC Ferries, Cruise ships, fishing vessels etc) in and out of the dock. I understand that CRCN had a rep from Vic Ships go to ISL to try to improve the culture there. I have no idea if it was successful or not.
They work they did on WIN after the allission (in conjunction with FMF Cape Breton) was done over in the dry dock in Esquimalt. WIN sails this week, so we shall see how the repairs really turned out.


----------



## AirDet

I'd like to get back to the "little honking ships" idea. I came across this link while reading Janes today: http://www.huntingtoningalls.com/flight2/

It looks like a practical solution to the little honking ship conundrum. It's bases on the proven and modern LPD17 but at 30% cheaper. The manufacturer claims it can fulfill several of the roles we've identified such as Humanitarian, Hospital, Task Force Command and Control, Amphibious Warfare, etc.

While I'm not qualified to say this is what we need, it certainly looks interesting to this old Sea King magician.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Just my opinion: Little honking ships should not be on the bucket list right now.  

With destroyers approaching 55 years service or more before replacement, and frigates probably more than 32 years old before replacement, the priority needs to be a much scaled down CSC that is very inexpensive and uncomplicated to build very quickly. 

LeadMark is long dead, and anyone can read the tea leaves and see that the government will NEVER purchase 15 or 16 high technology, high cost ships )>> Let's all be realists and pragmaticly understand that the politics in shipbuilding has basically ensured that major capital warship construction programs consisting of vessels of warfighting design are forever done in Canada. The APS and maybe one or 2 second hand but still fairly modern US built frigates is all that is could materialize after FELEX is completed, but even that is a stretch of the imagination. At that point the DDG's will be long gone and then FFG's just rusting away anyway.

We can, however, build in-shore or mid shore patrol vessels (possibly light weight Corvettes) quickly and inexpensively. They are cheap, harmless [in the sense that they would have virtually no heavy armament), not generally globally deployable and so politically very safe, and thus also dispensing with the need for expensive tankers etc.

I think that is the future of the Navy unless they start cutting steel and placing machinery and equipment orders for several CSC within the next 10 months, and certainly well before the next election.      

And if that Algerian LPD approaches Hibernia or any part of the Rock, we can always take them to Sanctimony Court )) , because we are just that much more civilized than the rest of the world....


----------



## YZT580

The Flight 11 has eliminated the hanger space and a/c maintenance facilities.  Makes it suitable for staging a/c but certainly not for embarking any for any type of extended cruise.  Salt water is hell on airframes and you certainly can't leave 'em tied down on the deck during any kind of rough weather and winter ops.


----------



## Sailorwest

Not quite sure if Whiskey 601 was being facetious or not but I'm pretty sure that replacing the frigates and destroyers with low capability corvettes actually doesn't do anything useful for the navy. It puts us into the third world level of maritime capability. There is a fair argument to be made that we need a class of ship larger, faster and more capable than the KIN class but smaller than a frigate or CSC. 

No doubt that there is plenty of political dithering on moving forward on ship replacement and I suspect there always will be. Ultimately, retaining our role as a middle level naval power will be seen as important. The importance of ensuring west coast maritime trade and security is only going to grow with the expansion of energy product exports to the Far East.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Sailorwest said:
			
		

> Not quite sure if Whiskey 601 was being facetious or not but I'm pretty sure that replacing the frigates and destroyers with low capability corvettes actually doesn't do anything useful for the navy. It puts us into the third world level of maritime capability. There is a fair argument to be made that we need a class of ship larger, faster and more capable than the KIN class but smaller than a frigate or CSC.
> 
> No doubt that there is plenty of political dithering on moving forward on ship replacement and I suspect there always will be. Ultimately, retaining our role as a middle level naval power will be seen as important. The importance of ensuring west coast maritime trade and security is only going to grow with the expansion of energy product exports to the Far East.




I think whiskey601 is telling a fiscal truth. The old _Canada First Defence Strategy_ promised to *reduce* defence spending, measured as a percentage of GDP, over a thirty year period. There is a new _CFDS_ in the mill, I hear, and I really doubt that it will promise more money.

We are almost clear of Afghanistan and the Conservatives have other priorities ~and so do the Liberal and NDP, by the way, so don't look to the opposition benches for anything except deeper and deeper cuts. It has been this way for 60 years.

Put simply, I *believe* that we, Canada, cannot afford are unwilling to pay for a full blown, _general purpose_, combat capable military with new, _first rate_ destroyers and frigates, three mechanized brigades and an Air Force with F-35s. I have no idea which we are not going to get: my gut says that the government _may_ decide to get new ships and new combat aircraft and allow the army to wither on the vine, collapsing it into something affordable.


----------



## Kirkhill

Hey, if we can't afford mukluks we can't afford rowboats let alone "honking" ships of any size.

 > : ;D :'(


----------



## Edward Campbell

There is, at the policy level, and absolute, overarching requirement to balance the federal budget in 2015. There is nothing, anywhere in the Government of Canada, that comes anywhere near that single, political imperative. The budget will be balanced.

No one gives a sweet rat's ass about the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces or ships or mukluks ... except that you may have ships and mukluks after you have paid your full and fair share (and then some) towards balancing the budget. We went through this in the 1990s, during Prime Minister Chrétien's _decade of darkness_ ~ his wasn't the first; that came, for me, in the Pearson/Diefenbaker era and was followed by real pain in the Trudeau years ~ and these "lean years" will not be the last ones, and nothing that people of my age endured compared, even remotely, to the 1930s. So: get used to it ~ this is what is meant by "the horrors of peacetime soldiering." You will, eventually, get new kit: possibly, even probably not what you want or what you said you needed; you will get what the people of Canada are prepared to buy, nothing more ... until Canadian Forces members start dying, in fairly large numbers, on "some corner of a foreign field."

I will repeat, over and over again: all the "support the troops" stuff, the red T-shirts and yellow ribbons and so on, may be a mile wide but it is, barely, an inch deep.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Sailorwest:I was not being facetious, even more I do not agree that Canada is a middle power currently except in the minds of dreamers, and i would go further to suggest that possibly Canada never was a middle with the exception of 1944-1960, and even then only in some marginal circumstances (5 divisions in Europe followed by a whopping big but temporary period as an air power in NATO in the fifties)  or events such as Suez.

I think Australia is rising to be a lower middle power ( in a military sense) while Canada is rapidly heading in the other direction. Germany, India, and Turkey are middle powers because they have military capability, real economic and political influence and are not very willing to do anything, anywhere, unless it is in their own best interest. 

My main concern with all this talk about ships is that we are bombarded with fanciful and outrageously optimistic plans, repetitive words of little meaning, and the bilges overfilled with political BS. Until steel is being cut there is no truth to any of it and that will be the case today, next month or likely even in the next years. After that, the process is simply pointless. Bottom line is that No political document like a new CFDS will be able to overcome the lack of desire to defend the country properly. Unfortunately it will take a serious blood letting at all levels (civilian and military) and loss of a meaningful chunk of sovereign land to change that.....


----------



## jollyjacktar

ER, I hate it when you're right like this.


----------



## Journeyman

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> ER, I hate it when you're right like this.


I've found he can be like that quite often when discussing things where government and military..... collide.  

Why, you'd almost think he'd "been there, done that"  :nod:


----------



## a_majoor

From a conceptual level, the LPD "Flight II" idea is very appealing, and adding back the hanger and AC facilities provides a means of creating a CSC. The CSC built on that platform will be larger and probably slower than many of its counterparts in other navies, but a hull that can be used as a BMD platform is large enough to do several upgrade cycles and add on a great many extra capabilities over the years. (Indeed, with the right sensor suite and the ability to carry a really large number of rounds on board, a CSC built on that platform will actually be closer to an Arleigh Burke class Aegis cruiser). And as an added bonus, since the ships would be built on an assembly line basis, there would be the ability to gain economies of scale as well.

Sadly, since it seems virtually impossible to get even a simple procurement program like new boots or replacement trucks done in a timely manner internally, and external budget pressures and lack of political support deny us resources anyway, this is interesting speculation and nothing more.


----------



## AlexanderM

All we have to do is move past this idea of an outrageously expensive building program and it can all make sense.  I also would argue that capable and deployable corvettes would be an option, but in combination with a fewer number of frigates/destroyers.  Say purchase 10 of the Iver Class with as much value added for Canadian companies as possible and then build 12-16 very capable Corvettes that can handle coastal patrols, as well as escort/anti-piracy/anti-sub duties.  Spend $10 billion on the frigates/destroyers, $5-6 billion on the Corvettes, $2 billion on the AOP's and $2 billion on the AOR's, and it's all in for $20 billion.  Tweak the numbers a bit and it can be everything in for $20 billion, icebreakers, etc, included.

Also, it would likely be possible to build the Ivers and the Corvettes for less if it was necessary.  I don't buy the idea that it can't be done this way, it's an issue of pitching it the right way to Canadians.  One, we simply don't have money for this building program, so we either do it differently or the military may not be able to remain functional.  Two, if we buy some of the ships from other countries here's all the contracts we can get for Canadian companies which will build up Canadian industry.  

I'd still build some ships with Seaspan as I do have some confidence in them.  I'd cancell the program as a whole then give the contract for the Corvettes to Davie becuase they seem to have a production mentality.  You come up with a realistic plan and sell it.  In my mind, right now, that building program seems pretty much dead, isn't it??  Is it realistic to beleive that it's really going to go forward?


----------



## Navy_Pete

I'm sure canceling the program would end up costing us as nearly as much as just building the ships, as I'm sure there are large cancellation penalties built in.

Maybe we could just focus on maintaining the few ships we have left first, then working on replacing key requirements, like being able to refuel.  The AORs are at the end of their life support, and the 280s are winding down over the next few years before they become razor blades and I-beams, and cost a fortune to put to sea anyway.  Get rid of those, focus on what is left, and then when we have a few properly maintained and capable vessels, plus the critical auxiliary ships (tugs, fire boats, fuel barges, etc), see what's left to build new.

I seriously doubt we will have much of a real blue boat navy capability left within 10 years due to the costs.  Even if we do, they are looking at diesel powered ships, which is kind of shortsighted given that oil will become increasingly (possibly prohibitively) expensive over the 40 year lifespan.


----------



## a_majoor

Diesel fuel will be relatively cheap and abundant for decades to come, even if we only depend on Canadian sources. The oil sands are the second largest deposit of hydrocarbons on Earth, and new technologies like fracking are bringing new sources of oil production on line. Just read the "No Oil" thread.

And of course new developments in power technology will make diesel and turbine engines more efficient (modern container ships use heat recovery to generate steam power from their diesel engines, for example), and new technologies like Solid Oxide Fuel Cells may emerge to supplement or replace diesel and turbine engines. 

To go really far on a limb, there are nuclear technologies like molten salt reactors which are close to commercial application and would be robust and low cost enough to power ships. So from a technical POV there are plenty of ways to power ships into the future.


----------



## Navy_Pete

It's not that oil won't be available; but even with highly efficient engines the actual fuel consumption for a ship that size are many tanker trucks every single day, just to be out at sea puttering around at low speeds.  At full power, you can go through a normal household oil tank faster then you can drink a coffee.

Even at today's costs, operations are being limited because of how much it costs to fill the tanks.  Actually one more reason to get rid of the 280s; as an (almost) completely first generation gas turbine ship they are pigs.


----------



## a_majoor

Agree that moving something as big as a ship will require lots of energy (and that will mean diesel for the foreseeable future), just not as pessimistic that this won't be doable. In the private sector they do things as seemingly ridiculous as using jet airfreight to fly fresh cut flowers from Colombia to market daily, so long as there is a compelling reason to do something (make a profit, defend the nation) then it can be done.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

From a fuel consumption point of view, a "Small-Honking-Ship" capable of a maximum sustained speed of 20-21 Kts using an all diesel-electric power plant with azipods is likely to consume much less than the FFH's.


----------



## a_majoor

A bit of a tangent, but Rolls Royce is working on totally unmanned cargo ships. While the "LHS" is explicitly about carrying troops, unmanned cargo ships might be a compliment in some future operation. All we have to remember is not to put everything on one ship (like the Brits did with the cargo ship "Atlantic Conveyor" during the Falklands War; a single missile destroyed virtually all the Chinook helicopters for the task force...). Self defense "pods" designed to the same form factor as an ISO container could line the top layer, providing extra combat power in the form of missile launchers remoted from the command ship, for example.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/rolls-royce-drone-ships-challenge-375-billion-industry-freight.html



> *Rolls-Royce Drone Ships Challenge $375 Billion Industry: Freight *
> 
> By Isaac Arnsdorf Feb 25, 2014 3:18 PM ET
> 
> In an age of aerial drones and driver-less cars, Rolls-Royce (RR/) Holdings Plc is designing unmanned cargo ships.
> 
> Rolls-Royce’s Blue Ocean development team has set up a virtual-reality prototype at its office in Alesund, Norway, that simulates 360-degree views from a vessel’s bridge. Eventually, the London-based manufacturer of engines and turbines says, captains on dry land will use similar control centers to command hundreds of crewless ships.
> 
> Drone ships would be safer, cheaper and less polluting for the $375 billion shipping industry that carries 90 percent of world trade, Rolls-Royce says. They might be deployed in regions such as the Baltic Sea within a decade, while regulatory hurdles and industry and union skepticism about cost and safety will slow global adoption, said Oskar Levander, the company’s vice president of innovation in marine engineering and technology.
> 
> “Now the technology is at the level where we can make this happen, and society is moving in this direction,” Levander said by phone last month. “If we want marine to do this, now is the time to move.”
> 
> The European Union is funding a 3.5 million-euro ($4.8 million) study called the Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks project. The researchers are preparing the prototype for simulated sea trials to assess the costs and benefits, which will finish next year, said Hans-Christoph Burmeister at the Fraunhofer Center for Maritime Logistics and Services CML in Hamburg.
> 
> Developing Designs
> 
> Even so, maritime companies, insurers, engineers, labor unions and regulators doubt unmanned ships could be safe and cost-effective any time soon.
> 
> While the idea of automated ships was first considered decades ago, Rolls-Royce started developing designs last year. Marine accounts for 16 percent of the company’s revenue, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Descended from the luxury car brand now operated by Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, Rolls-Royce also makes plane engines and turbines.
> 
> The company’s schematics show vessels loaded with containers from front to back, without the bridge structure where the crew lives. By replacing the bridge -- along with the other systems that support the crew, such as electricity, air conditioning, water and sewage -- with more cargo, ships can cut costs and boost revenue, Levander said. The ships would be 5 percent lighter before loading cargo and would burn 12 percent to 15 percent less fuel, he said.
> 
> Safety Standards
> 
> Crew costs of $3,299 a day account for about 44 percent of total operating expenses for a large container ship, according to Moore Stephens LLP, an industry accountant and consultant.
> 
> The potential savings don’t justify the investments that would be needed to make unmanned ships safe, said Tor Svensen, chief executive officer of maritime for DNV GL, the largest company certifying vessels for safety standards.
> 
> “I don’t think personally that there’s a huge cost-benefit in unmanned ships today, but technologically it’s possible,” Svensen said Feb. 4 at a conference in New York. “My prediction is that it’s not coming in the foreseeable future.”
> 
> While each company can develop its own standards, the 12-member International Association of Classification Societies in London hasn’t developed unified guidelines for unmanned ships, Secretary Derek Hodgson said.
> 
> “Can you imagine what it would be like with an unmanned vessel with cargo on board trading on the open seas? You get in enough trouble with crew on board,” Hodgson said by phone Jan. 7. “There are an enormous number of hoops for it to go through before it even got onto the drawing board.”
> 
> Regulating Ships
> 
> Unmanned ships are currently illegal under international conventions that set minimum crew requirements, said Simon Bennett, a spokesman for the London-based International Chamber of Shipping, an industry association representing more than 80 percent of the global fleet. The organization isn’t seriously considering the issue, he said by phone Feb. 6.
> 
> The country where a ship is registered is responsible for regulating vessels within its own waters and for enforcing international rules, said Natasha Brown, a spokeswoman for the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency in London that has overseen global shipping for almost 70 years.
> 
> The IMO hasn’t received any proposals on unmanned, remote-controlled ships, she said in a Feb. 6 e-mail. IMO regulations apply to seagoing vessels trading internationally and exceeding 500 gross tons, except warships and fishing boats.
> 
> As long as drone ships don’t comply with IMO rules, they would be considered unseaworthy and ineligible for insurance, according to Andrew Bardot, secretary and executive officer of the London-based International Group of P&I Clubs, whose 13 members cover 90 percent of the global fleet.
> 
> Union Opposition
> 
> The International Transport Workers’ Federation, the union representing about 600,000 of the world’s more than 1 million seafarers, is opposed.
> 
> “It cannot and will never replace the eyes, ears and thought processes of professional seafarers,” Dave Heindel, chairman of the ITF’s seafarers’ section in London, said in an e-mailed statement. “The human element is one of the first lines of defense in the event of machinery failure and the kind of unexpected and sudden changes of conditions in which the world’s seas specialize. The dangers posed to the environment by unmanned vessels are too easily imagined.”
> 
> Levander of Rolls-Royce said the transition will happen gradually as computers increase their role in navigation and operations. Container ships and dry-bulk carriers will probably be the first to forgo crews, he said. Tankers hauling hazardous materials such as oil and liquefied natural gas will probably remain manned longer because of the perception that having people on board is safer, he said.
> 
> Redundant Systems
> 
> Crews will offer no safety advantage after ships evolve equipment for remote control, preventive maintenance and emergency back-ups, Levander said. Unmanned ships will need constant and comprehensive computer monitoring to anticipate failures in advance and “redundant” systems to kick in, similar to those on airplanes, he said.
> 
> The computers would also be constantly analyzing operations data to improve efficiency and save money, he said. Cameras and sensors can already detect obstacles in the water better than the human eye.
> 
> “It’s a given that the remote-controlled ship must be as safe as today,” Levander said. “But we actually think it can be even much safer than today.”
> 
> Human error causes most maritime accidents, often relating to fatigue, according to Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG. Total losses are declining, with 106 in 2012, 24 percent below the 10-year average, according to the most recent data from the unit of the Munich-based insurer.
> 
> Repatriating Sailors
> 
> Unmanned ships would also reduce risks such as piracy, since there would be no hostages to capture, Levander said. It would also eliminate liability for repatriating sailors when owners run out of money or abandon crews, which has stranded at least 2,379 people in the past decade.
> 
> Drone ships would become vulnerable to a different kind of hijacking: from computer hackers. While the technology may never be fully secure, it needs to be so difficult to break that it’s not worth the effort, according to Levander.
> 
> Unmanned ships would still require captains to operate them remotely and people to repair and unload them in port. These workers would have better quality of life compared with working at sea, Levander said.
> 
> Academic Debate
> 
> Currently the debate is more academic than operational, said Peter Sand, an analyst at the Bagsvaerd, Denmark-based Baltic and International Maritime Council, whose members control about 65 percent of the global fleet. None of them have raised the question of drone ships with the trade group, he said.
> 
> Levander is accustomed to chilly receptions. When he broached the subject at an industry conference in London last May, the audience audibly scoffed, and other speakers on Levander’s panel dismissed the idea.
> 
> “If everybody in the industry would say, ‘Yes, this is the way to go,’ then we are too late,” Levander said. “I expect ship owners to be conservative, but it will change.”
> 
> To contact the reporter on this story: Isaac Arnsdorf in New York at iarnsdorf@bloomberg.net
> 
> To contact the editor responsible for this story: Millie Munshi at mmunshi@bloomberg.net


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Excellent more recreational and commercial fishing boats to get run over, not to mention no more avoiding marine mammals or at least attempting to.


----------



## Kirkhill

Unmanned can mean lots of things.

It can mean being towed to and from docks with only a line handling detail on board.
It could mean an escort vessel with the pilot driving the vessel by remote control while positioned off her beam.
It could mean a man-in-the-loop satellite relay.
It could mean full autonomy.

It could mean some combination of any and all of the about with or without a reduced complement aboard.

Perhaps it means blue-water autonomy with satellite intervention but a piloted/tow escort in narrow waters.


----------



## Sailorwest

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Diesel fuel will be relatively cheap and abundant for decades to come, even if we only depend on Canadian sources. The oil sands are the second largest deposit of hydrocarbons on Earth, and new technologies like fracking are bringing new sources of oil production on line. Just read the "No Oil" thread.
> 
> Although I think it might be somewhat abundant, I'm not convinced it's going to be cheap. The cost of building the oilsand projects, whether mined or in-situ not to mention the pipeline projects to get the oil to refineries are enormous and the unconventional sources of oil that are being found, tend to be more expensive to develop as well. I think that we are years away from getting to "Peak oil" but I am also sure we are years past "cheap oil".
> 
> Synthetic diesel created from GTL technologies or using LNG all have significant costs associated with them as well, not the least of which, an almost complete lack of infrastructure in Canada.


----------



## Journeyman

I gather from the link provided, the option of choice is.....





			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> It could mean a man-in-the-loop satellite relay.


360o video feed to a ship-handler sitting in an office driving the vessel (kind of like UAVs on Ops -- only with more cameras and moving even slower [although responding slower too] ).


Not my area though.  :dunno:


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I can imagine the insurance premiums for the first batch are going to be huge and likely barred from many ports. I also doubt their fancy systems would cope with a normal day of Hong kong marine traffic!
If you intend to man them as they come close, then how do you get crews onto them? Just ask the pilotage authorities how much fun that is to get 1-2 guys aboard in a seaway. Then what are they going to eat when aboard? The water will be stale. You will also have to automate the ballast water exchange systems, tankage measurements, rodent free certificates, etc. then you are also going to have to hold the ship in port where you pay moorage /anchoring fees to have a crew carry out the maintenance on it and equipment certifications.


----------



## Kirkhill

> If an elderly but distinguished scientist says that something is possible, he is almost certainly right; but if he says that it is impossible, he is very probably wrong.
> 
> Arthur C. Clarke
> 
> 
> Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/arthurccl100793.html#oKxrPoFebAjxOjrH.99



Or, restated



> Every revolutionary idea seems to evoke three stages of reaction. They may be summed up by the phrases: (1) It’s completely impossible. (2) It’s possible, but it’s not worth doing. (3) I said it was a good idea all along.


   ;D


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It's technically doable, but it does not take into account the whole web of things that go one to get a ship from port to port and to keep it running. Ship owners have a long history of being cheap, they might bite at this idea at first, but eventually hiring a 3rd world crew to run the ship and keep things operating is cheaper then keeping the ship, plus the computer system, plus the myriad of sensors required operating. Plus the risk of just one major incident putting a end to the scheme, means significant financial risk. What you will see is more and more gradually automation and likely robotic help.


----------



## a_majoor

For the purposes of this discussion, having some remote cargo ships that can follow the Little Honking Ship and carry additional supplies for the deployed battlegroup (or for that matter a naval task force)_ might _ be a possible force multiplier for the RCN in the mid term, as that technology develops. Since these would be explicitly Naval vessels and under the control of the Navy, Naval personnel would be engaged to man the ship at critical junctures (like entering/exiting a port) and do inspections when the ship arrives back in home port.


----------



## Kirkhill

I figure if Volvo can get a bunch of cars to play follow the leader on a Spanish highway then we can't be too far from the millenium

http://phys.org/news/2012-05-autonomous-driving-volvo-convoy-road-spain.html


Or Komatsu running autonomous trucks in an Aussie mine

http://www.komatsu.com/ce/currenttopics/v09212/


----------



## Journeyman

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I figure if Volvo can get a bunch of cars to play follow the leader on a Spanish highway ......


Too easy a test; let's see them drive in Kingston, where if they're not taken out by the anti-tank ditches pot holes, they'll quickly fall victim to the Queen's/SLC students who are too busy texting to signal/shoulder check while turning left from right-hand lanes....

/non-Navy tangent


----------



## Colin Parkinson

keep in mind that automating a merchant ships has to stay within the profit margins, if the costs to get the ship from point A to b and back again out weigh the normal crewing costs, it ain't going to happen. Also these are 3rd world crewing costs as well, not first world. BC ferries here is hoping to set up a cable ferry in the salt chuck to reduce crewing costs, I suspect the idea will quietly fizzle after a few years of trials. 

I can see specialized automated ships such as insertion/pickup boats, mine hunters/layers and small boat hunters for the navy

For civilian world,  fireboats, survey launches and oil spill cleanup vessels. Also perhaps vessels to respond to nuclear accidents (not that anyone would foolishly build a plant near a coast line known for tsunami events)


----------



## Kirkhill

The French may be approachable on their Russian Mistrals......

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/152493/france-may-scrap-russian-warship-deal-over-ukraine.html

Vlad is buying two for 1.4 Bn Euros.  The French now don't want to sell them to him but they need the money (and the jobs) more.

I'm not sure how many more jobs there are currently.  

Even if we paid the full asking price it would be a deal in comparison to building in Canada.  And we might even get a discount.

We end up with two ice-strengthened LHDs, save the French some embarrassment and deny Vlad substantive assets.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Canada could "lease it" and have a NATO contingent onboard. Might make an interesting experiment, have different countries take turns providing the helo's, maybe a couple of platoons of Royal Marines. Might be a way to explore future force concepts.


----------



## Journeyman

Colin P said:
			
		

> Canada could "lease it" and have a NATO contingent onboard.


Having just withdrawn from the NATO AWACS and AGS programs, I doubt if you'll see much enthusiasm for tying ourselves into a similar arrangement any time soon.


.....although Russia has just provided NATO with a new-found sense of utility, so who knows    :dunno:


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The French may be approachable on their Russian Mistrals......
> 
> http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/152493/france-may-scrap-russian-warship-deal-over-ukraine.html
> 
> Vlad is buying two for 1.4 Bn Euros.  The French now don't want to sell them to him but they need the money (and the jobs) more.
> 
> I'm not sure how many more jobs there are currently.
> 
> Even if we paid the full asking price it would be a deal in comparison to building in Canada.  And we might even get a discount.
> 
> We end up with two ice-strengthened LHDs, save the French some embarrassment and deny Vlad substantive assets.



You were reading my mind....had the exact same thought and was going to post the exact same thing.  

Would be a great move by Harper because on one hand it takes pressure off France to not sell to Russia, and on the other dramatically improves our capabilities.  I'd have no problem substituting one (or more) of these vessels into the fleet mix even if it took a couple of CSC's off the longer term order sheet.

The problem from our end is I don't think our Naval leadership has any interest in being a bus for the army.  They want cool new CSC's for blue water operations even though it could be argued that Mistral's would be far more valuable to our foreign policy objectives (not to mention if we had any disaster issues along our coastlines if they were properly equipped with Chinook, etc.)


Matthew.


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Having just withdrawn from the NATO AWACS and AGS programs, I doubt if you'll see much enthusiasm for tying ourselves into a similar arrangement any time soon.
> 
> 
> .....although Russia has just provided NATO with a new-found sense of utility, so who knows    :dunno:



I think there is a different sense of purpose between Eastern NATO and Western NATO....


----------



## Journeyman

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I think there is a different sense of purpose between Eastern NATO and Western NATO....


Absolutely. Poland is mightily concerned, while it's still Sangria time in Spain.


----------



## prairefire

http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-france-britain-russia-sanctions-20140318,0,7110071.story

France is thinking of cancelling the Russian purchase of two new Mistral Class of amphibious support ships.............

Not really knowledgeable about ships but would they work for us if the opportunity arose.............?


----------



## AirDet

While it looks great and there is an opportunity for a deal here the timing is off. We just don't have the cash.


----------



## GR66

This sounds like a totally bass-ackward way to equip our military.  Wait and see what goes on sale and buy that capability because it might be useful?  This thought process totally highlights why we need a complete review of Canadian foreign and military policy.  We need to clearly define our foreign policy objectives and then determine what structure and assets will allow us to meet those goals.  If an opportunity then comes along to fill one of those defined needs with a bargain then of course we should go for it.  However, if we're not currently in the market for a Mistral-type vessel for the RCN then we shouldn't buy it.  The tail shouldn't wag the dog when it comes to our military capabilities.

 :2c:


----------



## Privateer

GR66 said:
			
		

> However, if we're not currently in the market for a Mistral-type vessel for the RCN then we shouldn't buy it.



But...so shiny...


----------



## Kirkhill

Courtesy of Mark Collins 



> An amphib, that is–from Vanguard magazine, August/September 2012
> 
> 
> …
> *Recent operations have also underscored a need for the Canadian Forces to consider the acquisition of a dedicated platform to support operations from the sea, including for humanitarian operations and disaster response scenarios.*
> 
> Even in relatively permissive environments, such operations will typically unfold in manifestly chaotic conditions – often in the absence of, or hampered by extensively damaged transportation networks and infrastructure, where local medical and social services have been overwhelmed through the sheer number of injured and dispossessed. In such circumstances, nothing can match the flexibility, adaptability, logistics capacity and strategic effect of a purpose-built amphibious vessel to render assistance: with a capacity to embark personnel, vehicles, force logistics and humanitarian materiel in volume and get them where they’re needed throughout a theatre of operations; an ability to embark/disembark cargo without the need of shore-based infrastructure, as well as to transfer cargo to other vessels at sea; and the deck space and arrangements that permit it to accommodate or operate large landing craft, as well as medium or heavy lift aircraft, each of which is essential to project, sustain and support operations ashore.
> 
> *In our view, such a vessel – and the joint sea-air-land capabilities that it would have embarked – could be among the most heavily utilized assets in the CF inventory. Equipped with the space and communications facilities to act as a floating civil-military coordination centre, such a ship would be an ideal platform for joint action from the sea -– a platform for the Canadian Forces to contribute meaningfully, decisively and strategically to operations ashore.*
> 
> *Moreover, such a vessel could readily emerge as the Canadian Forces’ principal defence diplomacy asset*, deployed routinely to regions of strategic interest with a range of CF capabilities embarked to strengthen regional partnerships, or more broadly to conduct diplomatic goodwill missions with other federal agencies and non-governmental organizations and assets embarked…
> 
> *Rear-Admiral Mark Norman*is deputy commander of the Royal Canadian Navy. Previously, he commanded the Canadian Fleet Atlantic and has served in a variety of headquarters posts. This article is adapted from a presentation to the Naval Association of Canada [in June, see below].


----------



## Colin Parkinson

GR66 said:
			
		

> This sounds like a totally bass-ackward way to equip our military.  Wait and see what goes on sale and buy that capability because it might be useful?  This thought process totally highlights why we need a complete review of Canadian foreign and military policy.  We need to clearly define our foreign policy objectives and then determine what structure and assets will allow us to meet those goals.  If an opportunity then comes along to fill one of those defined needs with a bargain then of course we should go for it.  However, if we're not currently in the market for a Mistral-type vessel for the RCN then we shouldn't buy it.  The tail shouldn't wag the dog when it comes to our military capabilities.
> 
> :2c:



and the current system is so great it's only taken 15+ years to buy  helicopter. If we bought these, the need would find us. Canada will be involved in an expeditionary war/operation again and likely sooner than we think. Hell had I suggested in 2001 that we should lease tanks and Mi-17 helicopters, you would have said "your smoking crack" but it worked. If we (as in the nation) woke up and smelled the coffee, we would realize we need at least 1 of this type of ship and at least two tanker/resupply ships to meet the coming needs and we need them now, not hopefully in 5-7 years from now.


----------



## GR66

Don't confuse the fact that I think that buying a Mistral just because one becomes available is a silly approach to major equipment purchases with disagreement that such a ship would be highly useful to Canada.  However with limited budgets, throwing money at one now would certainly mean losing money gain/maintain other important capabilities.  That's no way to develop policy or manage an organization as important as the CF.  

Have the government clearly identify what it expects the CF to be able to do and then the CF in a planned, logical way can tell the government what it needs to perform those tasks.  If the government isn't willing to provide the money to fund the structure and equipment required then the CDS can tell the Minister what the consequences to CF's ability to perform those tasks will be.  I'm not saying that this is the way that things ARE done, but to my mind it's the way that things SHOULD be done.


----------



## MilEME09

If i recall correctly the first of the Russian Mistrals started trials recently, if France cancels the deal, we may get a quick delivery once they repaint all the signs on the ship to English/French. I remember years ago a French news paper did say the RCN was very interested in the mistral, so maybe this forms with some long term plan of ours?


----------



## MarkOttawa

Nice idea, no reality.  Still need A/ORs which Mistrals can't replaace (oriiginal JSS supposed sort of to do both as does actual Dutch Karel Doorman
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/dutch-order-multi-purpose-support-ship-06113/ ).

Moreover no budget for new ship class and few Jobs! Jobs! Jobs!.  Complete non-starter.  Esp.  with this government.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## a_majoor

This sounds like some of the arguments during the dying days of the Martin government. There was a desperate need identified for heavy airlift, but Boeing C-17's were out of the question at the time due to the astonishing price tag. There was some discussion back then in the press and various websites (including this one) where various options were being debated, even including Russian and Ukrainian jets (which would be very cheap, but of rather questionable utility unless totally rebuilt once in Canada to western standards).

The fact that the procurement system is broken and monies are not forthcoming puts *us* in a bind; we need some sort of capability, we need it quickly and cheaply but it does not seem possible to source this internally. Perhaps we will have to accept a solution that provides half a loaf rather than be totally without. It is at least worth looking at as a COA, and puts some pressure on various elements in Industry and the Bureaucracy to actually make a move since some alternatives exist offshore.


----------



## Kirkhill

Plan B?



> On this day 9 May - another cutting out expedition
> On the 9th of May 1795, the HMS Melampus, under the command of Richard Strachan, partook in an attack on a French convoy in Cartaret Bay. Having spotted the French vessels, the British 36-gun frigate and accompanying ships chased the convoy, which sought protection along the shore. The French attempted to fight off the British squadron with a shore battery and armed ships. *Strachan dispatched a cutting out force*, with the squadron providing cover fire. The French aborted their defense, leaving all of the convoy, but one, for the taking.



A good chunk of the RN was procured from the French in this manner.   Good ships.  Poor Sailors.  ;D


----------



## Navy_Pete

Why would we buy a helicopter carrier ship?  To make them effective, we would also need an AOR to support the other ships needed to protect it.

Also, buying a ship isn't like buying a tank; tanks carry a few folks onboard, but they don't live in it.  Sailors live in ships for weeks a time; it makes a huge difference to how much training you need to operate it properly.  You won't be very effective at projecting force if you have to limp into the nearest friendly port any time you need more then an oil change, so you need to be able to do a reasonable amount of maintenance, which requires equipment specific training.  Some of it is pretty easy as a diesel is a diesel is a diesel, but simple things like getting used to the maintenance routines, peculiarity with the equpment layout, part lists, etc takes time to learn and costs a lot of money.

Also, the Mistral class was designed for a well trained, senior group of sailors.  They may have modified it somewhat for the Russians, but remember from a briefing on the capabilties that the most juniour sailor onboard is a MS, so it would also mean a big shift in how we crew a vessel.  Not to mention that we wouldn't fill even one Mistral with all the functioning sea kings we have left....

Don't forget that everytime an AOR goes for a refit, the coast goes without the capability for 18 months or so.  Sure it sucks, and yes it'd be great to have three (with staggered DWPs, so two are normally at some readiness level), but such is life when you are sailing around a fleet when your "new" ships are over twenty years old, and your old ships are steam driven with oil boilers (not to mention most of the auxiliary boats, which are another 10-15 years older still).

We're probably lucky that the AORs have lasted this long, as they are well past their 30 year design life and never got a 'mid life refit'.  The fact that no one got killed on the PRO is a testament to the response from the crew.

But rushing off to buy something to put a hull in the water would just cost a huge chunk of money we don't have, and provide a new capability we haven't identified as being needed, while still not addressing the lack of an oiler, so it would just put the RCN further behind the eight ball.


----------



## YZT580

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> Why would we buy a helicopter carrier ship?  To make them effective, we would also need an AOR to support the other ships needed to protect it.



Just trying to tie things together but wouldn't the Mistrals work very nicely as "that big honking ship" that was the dream not so many years ago?  They will work as a command centre, provide a stable platform for disaster relief, usable as troop transports as well as ferry a significant quantity of supplies.  What they won't do is carry fuel.  Well if you are freighting around special forces, equipment, and working as a hospital to boot you really don't want  tens of thousands of gallons of avgas or diesel  underfoot anyway.  Seems to me that a separate fleet oiler built to civil marine standards would be more suitable and they can be picked up for a whole lot less cash.  Total bill for 5 ships, two mistrals and 3 tankers would not be significantly higher than the two we are ordering.  The problem with the helicopters is another thing entirely.


----------



## MarkOttawa

RN getting four 37,000 tonne oilers built in S. Korea by 542 million pounds:
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/britains-navy-supplies-are-from-mars-07313/

Or maybe 452 million pounds:
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2012/February/22/120222-New-RFA

For four big vessels. For C$ 840 million or $210 million each.  And we'll be lucky to get two made-in-Vancouver Berlin-class ships for $2.6 billion or $1.3 billion.  Each.  Go figure.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-issues-rfp-for-cdn-29b-joint-support-ship-project-updated-02392/

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> RN getting four 37,000 tonne oilers built in S. Korea by 542 million pounds:
> http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/britains-navy-supplies-are-from-mars-07313/
> 
> Or maybe 452 million pounds:
> http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2012/February/22/120222-New-RFA
> 
> For four big vessels. For C$ 840 million or $210 million each.  And we'll be lucky to get two made-in-Vancouver Berlin-class ships for $2.6 billion or $1.3 billion.  Each.  Go figure.
> http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-issues-rfp-for-cdn-29b-joint-support-ship-project-updated-02392/
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa



Indeed.

On the other hand the CFDS is well past its best before date and apparently was being rewritten in any event.  I can't help but wonder if another rewrite of the rewrite is in the works as we speak/text.

Any guesses on new UORs?  >


----------



## Danjanou

840.million for 4 Oilers vs $2.6 Billion for two. Hmm let me do the math, twice as many ships and save how much? And how much are the Mistrals going for again?

Yup this one is a no brainer, someone want to send this to the new Finance Minister.

Yes we'd have to figure out the Helios and the crewing/training issues. Mind knowing the mindset of some at Disneyland on the Rideau the most pressing issue if we did this would be to come up with four new War of 1812 Battle Honour names for the extra ships.  :


----------



## Edward Campbell

This is not about spending the defence budget wisely ... it is about the political Holy Grail: low skill/high pay jobs for men.

We, the taxpayers, and you, the CF, will get as much (as little?) combat power as Canadian wage rates permit.

UK voters are a wee bit more sophisticated, they understand that UK shipyards cannot build warships at anything like a competitive, sensible cost; Canadian voters are of a different mind.


----------



## AlexanderM

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> This is not about spending the defence budget wisely ... it is about the political Holy Grail: low skill/high pay jobs for men.
> 
> We, the taxpayers, and you, the CF, will get as much (as little?) combat power as Canadian wage rates permit.
> 
> UK voters are a wee bit more sophisticated, they understand that UK shipyards cannot build warships at anything like a competitive, sensible cost; Canadian voters are of a different mind.


I think the Canadian voters could be swayed, if the attempt were well thought out.


----------



## suffolkowner

I don't think this is a wage issue so much as that the contracts are issued to two yards without competition. It's a surprise that two yards without demonstrated ability to build the ships and without having to compete for individual ship contracts are coming in with extremely high estimates?

Having said that, I am willing to pay a premium for Canadian made ships, but 7x might be an issue, 3x would be more acceptable considering the tax return.

I think two issues standout the need for platforms now, and the question of how many ships the government is going to fund. 

The first point with respect to the AOR's could be handled by making other arrangements (US Fast Supply Class-my preferred).

The second is real interesting. From a military observer as long as the kit is supplied I don't car about the cost as a taxpayer though I do. If the CSC comes in at 4-5x world prices and the government doesn't provide any more money the RCN is looking at only 6 ships to replace the current 15.

I would think that the UK's Bay Class would be more in our price range. Perhaps we could purchase their Bay Class ships and the British could replace them with the French Mistrals


----------



## MilEME09

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> I don't think this is a wage issue so much as that the contracts are issued to two yards without competition. It's a surprise that two yards without demonstrated ability to build the ships and without having to compete for individual ship contracts are coming in with extremely high estimates?
> 
> Having said that, I am willing to pay a premium for Canadian made ships, but 7x might be an issue, 3x would be more acceptable considering the tax return.
> 
> I think two issues standout the need for platforms now, and the question of how many ships the government is going to fund.
> 
> The first point with respect to the AOR's could be handled by making other arrangements (US Fast Supply Class-my preferred).
> 
> The second is real interesting. From a military observer as long as the kit is supplied I don't car about the cost as a taxpayer though I do. If the CSC comes in at 4-5x world prices and the government doesn't provide any more money the RCN is looking at only 6 ships to replace the current 15.
> 
> I would think that the UK's Bay Class would be more in our price range. Perhaps we could purchase their Bay Class ships and the British could replace them with the French Mistrals




Another issue is that our shipyards arent equipped for large scale ship building projects such as this, if the AOR's and the ice breaker could be built at the same time, and atleast 2 or 3 CSC at once we would be golden. Cost? if its really costing us 7x the going rate we should be looking at why that is, and how to bring it down.


----------



## suffolkowner

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Another issue is that our shipyards arent equipped for large scale ship building projects such as this, if the AOR's and the ice breaker could be built at the same time, and atleast 2 or 3 CSC at once we would be golden. Cost? if its really costing us 7x the going rate we should be looking at why that is, and how to bring it down.



I had earlier suggested to the Minister that the AOR's be built at Irving while the AOPS/Icebreaker be built at Seaspan, his reply was that the respective shipyards do not/will not have the capability to build designs that have not already been planned (scary-yes, believable-I don't know).

the 7x is just the straight math rounded up of the UK ships versus our planned AOR's.

I wonder what it will cost us to renegotiate with Irving/Seaspan which is surely inevitable


----------



## MarkOttawa

And, if one thought the F-35 was a big cost, the RCN shipbuilding expense will kill the whole CF budget if anything like planned numbers/capabilities are actually bought.  Which cannot realistically be done.  Fairyland and someone in the government (pols), bureaucracy and forces--if anyone had any honesty--should 'fess up fairly soon.  But I hae me doots.  'Tis Canada and none dare say "acquisition malpractice":
https://www.google.ca/search?q=+%22acquisition+malpractice%22&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:en-USfficial&client=firefox-a&channel=sb&gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=c4IrU-XOJqyC8Qe12IEg&gws_rd=cr

By the way neither Irving nor Seaspan yet have an actual contract to build ships for the RCN.  The yards were merely selected in a bizarre process to determine those least incapable of building the ships.  Or something.  Imagine selecting a factory to build aircraft and then relying on the company to figure out how actually to make them.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

Aircraft bootcamps anyone (end at link)?



> …
> The Western Canadian Shipbuilding Summit was a major step in the implementation of Western Canada’s Shipbuilding Action Plan, highlighted in the government’s Economic Action Plan of 2012. Western Economic Development Diversification Canada will host upcoming Shipbuilding Bootcamps to help business navigate government procurement policy, as well as Supplier Development Tours to educate and connect businesses with the shipbuilding industry.”
> http://www.canadiansailings.ca/?p=4288



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> And, if one thought the F-35 was a big cost, the RCN shipbuilding expense will kill the whole CF budget if anything like planned numbers/capabilities are actually bought.  Which cannot realistically be done.  Fairyland and someone in the government (pols), bureaucracy and forces--if anyone had any honesty--should 'fess up fairly soon.  But I hae me doots.  'Tis Canada and none dare say "acquisition malpractice":
> https://www.google.ca/search?q=+%22acquisition+malpractice%22&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:en-USfficial&client=firefox-a&channel=sb&gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=c4IrU-XOJqyC8Qe12IEg&gws_rd=cr
> 
> By the way neither Irving nor Seaspan yet have an actual contract to build ships for the RCN.  The yards were merely selected in a bizarre process to determine those least incapable of building the ships.  Or something.  Imagine selecting a factory to build aircraft and then relying on the company to figure out how actually to make them.
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa



I know Seaspan is willing and able to engage people who have the experience to manage this project, training up the people in the yard and their direct supervisors will be the challenge.


----------



## AlexanderM

It's not Seaspan that I'm worried about.  They are trying to build a good reputation, it matters to them.


----------



## Monsoon

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> And, if one thought the F-35 was a big cost, the RCN shipbuilding expense will kill the whole CF budget if anything like planned numbers/capabilities are actually bought.  Which cannot realistically be done.


What is your basis for that assessment?


----------



## MarkOttawa

Acquistion cost for F-35 $9B. For RCN $2.6B JSS, $3.1B A/OPS
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2011-2012/info/mcp-gpe-eng.asp#dnd

and $26B CSC--scroll down here:
http://vanguardcanada.com/new-fleet-in-sight-canadian-navy-builds-for-tomorrow/

that's $32.7B.  Over many years I know but with inflation and the excessive costs of building in Canada that acquisition cost will have to go up to get the numbers and capabilities currently envisaged.  I don't believe in the tooth fairy and the liklihood of any serious budget increase for quite some to come is perishingly low.

Mark 
Ottawa


----------



## AlexanderM

There was a report released stating that the cost of the shipbuilding program for the navy would greatly exceed the current budget, can't remember the source.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Auditor General:



> ...
> Monitoring military capabilities
> 
> 3.70 Complex developmental projects such as military ships require years to design and build. It is important that any gap between the government’s level of ambition and the Royal Canadian Navy’s capability is regularly measured and minimized. Canada’s last general policy statement on its expected level of ambition was in 2008, through the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). While the CFDS did outline the expected number of Navy ships and the core missions for the Canadian Forces, it did not define the specific naval capabilities required to fulfill the government’s level of ambition.
> 
> 3.71 Since the CFDS was announced in 2008, the global economic climate has worsened. It is important for National Defence to monitor its ability to meet the expectations set out in the CFDS. The CFDS states that “the Government is committed to reviewing this comprehensive plan on a regular basis to ensure that it continues to fully meet the needs of the military in service of Canadians.” We therefore examined whether National Defence monitored its ability to meet the expectations set out in the CFDS as it relates to the NSPS.
> Expectations may not be met
> 
> 3.72 We found that when seeking decisions on each of the three fleet acquisitions we examined, National Defence has reported to government on the number of military ships it will acquire per fleet within the allocated budget and on their associated capabilities, in comparison to the CFDS. National Defence has provided ministers with an update on the CFDS, and its officials told us that these updates will continue. In our opinion, a gap appears to be developing between the CFDS level of ambition, the evolving naval capabilities, and the budgets. National Defence should continue to monitor the extent to which it will or will not meet the government’s expectations for future military needs, and continue to report to ministers on expected capability gaps, allowing the government to make adjustments to expectations and capabilities...
> http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201311_03_e_38797.html#hd4c



How, er, polite.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## AlexanderM

Shouldn't be happening though, there's more than enough money for the ships, if we could do things in a more sensible manner.


----------



## Monsoon

Ah. So "a gap appears to be developing" = "kill the whole CF budget". Got it.

The AG's recommended solution is that DND should monitor and report back to the minister as things change over time. Good thing all of the projects in the NSPS have full time project staffs to do exactly that.



			
				MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> that's $32.7B.  Over many years I know but with inflation and the excessive costs of building in Canada that acquisition cost will have to go up to get the numbers and capabilities currently envisaged.


So your position is that the effect of inflation will come as a surprise to the Treasury Board? The NSPS dollar value was reported in current dollars, as is the practice. Inflation makes numbers get bigger over time, but that effect is applied to government revenue as well as to expenses. The effect is neutral to the project relative to government revenue (in fact, given that the economy grows faster than inflation, an inflation-adjusted $32.7B over 25 years is cheaper for the government than a current $32.7B).


----------



## MarkOttawa

Defence inflation is rather greater than the economy in general and what the government provides for:



> The capital equipment plan: When budget and ambition don’t meet
> ...
> These delays to date and those anticipated are significant. In addition to pushing the acquisition of much needed equipment further down the road, the capital shifts are severely eroding the department’s purchasing power due to the impact of defence specific inflation (DSI). Whereas current Bank of Canada policy aims at keeping Canadian inflation at two percent, defence inflation is significantly higher – in 2011, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff stated that Canadian DSI was seven percent annually.
> 
> If DND’s procurement budget was compensated to account for these inflationary pressures, the delays in the capital program would be relatively inconsequential. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The department effectively receives annual compensation to offset the impact of inflation through an “escalator” that provides an automatic annual increase, but this only amounts to two percent annually – matching the Bank of Canada inflation target.
> 
> At present, therefore, defence specific inflation erodes procurement budgets by at least five percent a year – the gap between defence inflation and the department’s annual escalator...
> http://vanguardcanada.com/the-capital-equipment-plan-when-budget-and-ambition-dont-meet/



Whole article worth a read.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Monsoon

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> Defence inflation is rather greater than the economy in general and what the government provides for:


My understanding is that defence inflation (over and above consumer inflation) is part of the model TB applied to derive the NSPS headline number.


----------



## suffolkowner

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> My understanding is that defence inflation (over and above consumer inflation) is part of the model TB applied to derive the NSPS headline number.



I have been under the impression that the budgets for ships and the fighter jets were effectively fixed and the Vanguard article seems to confirm that. That is ultimately a political decision however just like the decision to build the ships in Canada at a cost premium. We will see what political will there is to continue. 

It seems unlikely that CSC can be delivered for less than 4 billion per which will deliver only 6 ships to replace our current fleet


----------



## Monsoon

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> I have been under the impression that the budgets for ships and the fighter jets were effectively fixed and the Vanguard article seems to confirm that. That is ultimately a political decision however just like the decision to build the ships in Canada at a cost premium. We will see what political will there is to continue.


The budget is "fixed", but that doesn't mean that the number won't change over time to accommodate inflation. As I said, the NSPS budget was quoted in 2012 dollars; the TB financial model is pretty comprehensive. I certainly don't blame you and a lot of other people for thinking otherwise - the commentariat on this subject has been engaged in some quite uninformed and unhelpful speculation gussied up as "analysis". You can argue usefully all day about whether the NSPS procurement list will meet Canada's defence needs, but from a strictly financial perspective NSPS != F35. The chattering heads just need to accept that and move on.


----------



## Edward Campbell

In my opinion the National Shipbuilding Strategy isn't so much about building ships as it is about distributing political pork.







It was a little, actually rather a lot better managed than most political pork because, at least, a team of senior civil servants studied the industry and decided which yards should get the work.

*But* it's not about military requirements; there is no national military _strategy_ so the RCN cannot have a coherent plan ~ it does have a plan, it's probably a pretty good plan, but it rests on a foundation of sand .... not even sand, a foundation of smoke.

We can have as many ships as we need. Canada is a rich country that spends quite sparingly, to be charitable, on defence. We spend so little because political parties ~ Conservatives, Liberals and NDP, alike ~ poll assiduously and their polling tells them, consistently, that Canadians, in an overwhelming majority, do not want to spend money on defence. That's a firm political fact: your friends and neighbours, your aunts and uncles do not want to spend any money on new ships, tanks, guns or aircraft for you folks to use in order to meet our national and international commitments.

The CF wil get as many ships as it is politically expedient to build.


----------



## AlexanderM

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> In my opinion the National Shipbuilding Strategy isn't so much about building ships as it is about distributing political pork.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *We can have as many ships as we need. Canada is a rich country that spends quite sparingly, to be charitable, on defence. We spend so little because political parties ~ Conservatives, Liberals and NDP, alike ~ poll assiduously and their polling tells them, consistently, that Canadians, in an overwhelming majority, do not want to spend money on defence. That's a firm political fact: your friends and neighbours, your aunts and uncles do not want to spend any money on new ships, tanks, guns or aircraft for you folks to use in order to meet our national and international commitments.*


This is exactly why the case can be made to do it all another way.  We can say to Canadians hey, we don't have to spend 33 billion on shipbuilding, we can do it all for 20 billion if we do a combination of building our own and buying from other countries with very good value added agreements.

We could have the AOR's built in Korea, like the Brits, then build 2 big icebreakers, intead of 1 and still save money.  We could purchase 10 Iver Class, then build corvettes and AOP's a Davie yard and stay within budget.  Probably have enough money left for 2 Amphibious Assault Ships, if purchased elsewhere.  I'm under the opinion that most Canadian would not favour pouring all this money down the drain, if we sell them the options in the right way.


----------



## Edward Campbell

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> This is exactly why the case can be made to do it all another way.  We can say to Canadians hey, we don't have to spend 33 billion on shipbuilding, we can do it all for 20 billion if we do a combination of building our own and buying from other countries with very good value added agreements.
> 
> We could have the AOR's built in Korea, like the Brits, then build 2 big icebreakers, intead of 1 and still save money.  We could purchase 10 Iver Class, then build corvettes and AOP's a Davie yard and stay within budget.  Probably have enough money left for 2 Amphibious Assault Ships, if purchased elsewhere.  I'm under the opinion that most Canadian would not favour pouring all this money down the drain, if we sell them the options in the right way.




I agree with you ... but what I cannot do is make that argument in a compelling (and at Grade IX reading level) 15 second TV ad. And in this day and age _policy_ has to be explained that way.  :dunno:

Edited to add:

Don't get me wrong. This is not a uniquely or peculiarly Conservative issue. It also drives the Liberals and the NDP. The recent Liberal _policy convention_ was a sham, just like the Conservative one last year. _Policies_ will be developed by advertising agencies in response to _political imperatives_, often on a riding by riding or region by region basis.

I have no doubt that there are senior civil servants in Ottawa proposing what you said just above ... the problem is that the politicians, of all stripes, are not listening. _Official Ottawa_, even with a majority government in power, is is full time, 24/7 election/campaign mode - on both sides of the House. That's not a good thing.


----------



## AlexanderM

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I agree with you ... but what I cannot do is make that argument in a compelling (and at Grade IX reading level) 15 second TV ad. And in this day and age _policy_ has to be explained that way.  :dunno:


It would have to be done as a bit of a campaign, presented as an option.  The main explanation done through the press in newpaper articles, then once it's all explained do some polls and see where the support is.  It would have to be presented as a comprehensive package, showing how we get benefits for the ships we buy/build elsewhere, and how what we do spend in Canada will actually help build a sustained industry.

Your right though, the top politicians are all into pork, it's a big part of the machine, and the reason they would say no, as opposed to Canadians.


----------



## Kirkhill

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> It would have to be done as a bit of a campaign, presented as an option.  The main explanation done through the press in newpaper articles, then once it's all explained do some polls and see where the support is.  It would have to be presented as a comprehensive package, showing how we get benefits for the ships we buy/build elsewhere, and how what we do spend in Canada will actually help build a sustained industry.
> 
> Your right though, the top politicians are all into pork, it's a big part of the machine, and the reason they would say no, as opposed to Canadians.



Who is eating all the pork though?  As ERC has often noted - politicians deliver what the public wants.


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Who is eating all the pork though?  As ERC has often noted - politicians deliver what the public wants.


Look, if they pay what is being reported for ships, the money is going somewhere.  It is way more than what the ships cost.  Just like when they give over $200 million to Irving for design work, when that work will only cost a small fraction, where does the money go, don't ask me.  The money we are paying just for that design work for the AOP's is more than the cost to build one of the existing ships.  What is one supposed to call it?


----------



## Kirkhill

Alex,

The problem is that the choice is between 32 BCAD being paid by Canadians to Canadians to build ships for Canadians or 10 BCAD being paid by Canadians to Danes and Dutchmen (eg) to build ships for Canadians.

In one case 32 BCAD is taken from "the guvmint" which has deep pockets from whence money magically appears and is paid to Canadians who can then claim unemployment after the construction campaign is over.

In the other case 10 BCAD is taken from the pockets of hard-working tax-paying Canadians to give those lazy ne'er-do-well Euros so that they can live in the lap of luxury and early retirement.



> "If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing."
> Book 3, Chapter 10, Section 6 pg.129 "The General Theory.."


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Alex,
> 
> The problem is that the choice is between 32 BCAD being paid by Canadians to Canadians to build ships for Canadians or 10 BCAD being paid by Canadians to Danes and Dutchmen (eg) to build ships for Canadians.
> 
> In one case 32 BCAD is taken from "the guvmint" which has deep pockets from whence money magically appears and is paid to Canadians who can then claim unemployment after the construction campaign is over.
> 
> In the other case 10 BCAD is taken from the pockets of hard-working tax-paying Canadians to give those lazy ne'er-do-well Euros so that they can live in the lap of luxury and early retirement.


Yes, but then one makes the case of what will be done with all the money we save and value added contracts.  The money that goes into labor is a small percentage of the $32 billion, so we show people the numbers.  If we put the money we save into healthcare, education, training, most Canadians will be quite pleased.  If we build 2 large ice breaker and all the other slated coast guard vessels, that will help build a sustainable industry on the West Coast.

Then, if we build corvettes and AOP's on the East coast, at the right yard, that might just get a sustainable industry going there.


----------



## dimsum

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> Yes, but then one makes the case of what will be done with all the money we save and value added contracts.  The money that goes into labor is a small percentage of the $32 billion, so we show people the numbers.  If we put the money we save into healthcare, education, training, most Canadians will be quite pleased.  If we build 2 large ice breaker and all the other slated coast guard vessels, that will help build a sustainable industry on the West Coast.
> 
> Then, if we build corvettes and AOP's on the East coast, at the right yard, that might just get a sustainable industry going there.



Yes, but as Kirkhill and ERC have both alluded to, the fact that your argument can't be compressed into a shiny 15 or 30-second sound bite for Joe Canadian means that it will be a case of "the Euros are stealing our jobs!!"  The Opposition will take that and run with it, and Joe Canadian won't even sit down and listen to the argument for outsourcing.  God forbid the Minister who has to put his/her foot down and say that no, Canadian shipyards aren't up to the task of building the next generation of naval vessels due to cost.

I'd be interested to see how the RN managed to get the UK govt's support for a foreign-built tanker.  Even the RAN's Canberra-class LHDs, despite it being a Navantia design, are built in Australia (and it was also a political football).


----------



## Kirkhill

I put this here because I opened the discussion about the French being reluctant to forswear the revenues from the Mistrales.  That was a loss of about 1.4 BUSD.

Meanwhile Canada has given up 3.4 BUSD by putting a hold on a deal between Bombardier and Russia.....



> Canadian aerospace and rail equipment giant Bombardier plans to build planes in Russia and the sale of USD 3.4B of aircraft will be delayed over events in Crimea.
> 
> Canada has joined the US in imposing sanctions against the country after it moved to annex Crimea, Chief Executive Officer Pierre Beaudoin said.
> 
> Bombardier signed a letter of intent in August to sell Russia's state-owned Rostekhnologii as many as 100 Q400 turboprop aircraft valued at about USD 3.4B. The Montreal-based company was expected to sign a deal to establish a turboprop assembly line in Russia in 2014.
> 
> Like the US and other allies, Canada has imposed financial sanctions and travel bans on Russian officials. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government has also recalled its ambassador to Russia, suspended military cooperation and pledged USD 220M in financial aid to Ukraine.
> 
> Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin expressed his satisfaction with the suspension of Canadian company plans.
> 
> "I was not against Bombardier, but we must produce our own aircraft," Rogozin wrote on Facebook, Friday, Interfax reports.
> 
> - See more at: http://www.novinite.com/articles/159156/Canadian+Bombardier+Freezes+USD+3.4B+Plane+Contract+with+Russia#sthash.MvOQdCPa.dpuf



Courtesy of Sofia News Agency of Bulgaria.

I believe Harper might be finding his stride.


----------



## FSTO

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Yes, but as Kirkhill and ERC have both alluded to, the fact that your argument can't be compressed into a shiny 15 or 30-second sound bite for Joe Canadian means that it will be a case of "the Euros are stealing our jobs!!"  The Opposition will take that and run with it, and Joe Canadian won't even sit down and listen to the argument for outsourcing.  God forbid the Minister who has to put his/her foot down and say that no, Canadian shipyards aren't up to the task of building the next generation of naval vessels due to cost.
> 
> I'd be interested to see how the RN managed to get the UK govt's support for a foreign-built tanker.  Even the RAN's Canberra-class LHDs, despite it being a Navantia design, are built in Australia (and it was also a political football).



I think the hulls were built in Spain and they will be fitted out in Australia


----------



## Kirkhill

Interesting Poll:

Should Canada spend more on defence?


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Interesting Poll:
> 
> Should Canada spend more on defence?


4%, only if bilt in Canada!  Probably get 70%, if it saves us a bunch of money.

Bottom line, if we don't have to build in Canada, we don't need to spend more money and we can build some in Canada with existing budget.  A little flexibility would take us a long way here.


----------



## suffolkowner

While Mistral's and Bay Class AAS might be unrealistic, perhaps we could follow the British and have a couple RO/RO ships on each coast crewed by Reserves and ready for use as needed

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-class_sealift_ship


----------



## Monsoon

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> While Mistral's and Bay Class AAS might be unrealistic, perhaps we could follow the British and have a couple RO/RO ships on each coast crewed by Reserves and ready for use as needed


Commercial sealift is cheap and readily available for lease when needed - as compared to commercial heavy airlift, the world supply of which is limited and getting smaller, and which tends to get completely constricted by NGOs and other world militaries in times of crisis. This is why Canada opted to buy C17s instead of transport ships.

DND did used to maintain a leased commercial transport ship in Montreal for the purposes of rapid deployment; the lease program was ended early last year in the budget squeeze. If you ask me, we should go back to doing that before we think about buying transport ships.


----------



## Kirkhill

I like the idea of picking up a flat-top of any description if we can get it new and cheap from someone else's asset disposal sale.  I don't like the idea of building purpose built BHS's  (I used to be a fan but I've gone off them).

My preference is simply to make sure that every vessel in the federal government's fleet be equipped with a deck large enough to land a Chinook,  hangar space for at least an CH-148/149 (146s on minor vessels) and hotel space for a Platoon or Company of "permanently" embarked light troops - together with a mission bay/flex-deck.  

Once those requirements have been met then the vessel can be kitted out with whatever gear and weapons their "primary" mission requires.


----------



## Stoker

Love the idea of a "flat top" type vessel being purchased on the cheap as other navies downsize.  Most people don't realize the many millions required to Canadianize it to our standards, comms, weapons  etc. Then we need the personnel to run it. Hell we can't even man Orca's for frigs sake.


----------



## George Wallace

Chief Stoker said:
			
		

> Love the idea of a "flat top" type vessel being purchased on the cheap as other navies downsize.  Most people don't realize the many millions required to Canadianize it to our standards, comms, weapons  etc. Then we need the personnel to run it. Hell we can't even man Orca's for frigs sake.



At the sounds of it, the French are selling them to the Russians bare assed.  No Wpns systems.   No Comms systems.  That means whoever buys them, has to install all that anyway.


----------



## MilEME09

George Wallace said:
			
		

> At the sounds of it, the French are selling them to the Russians bare assed.  No Wpns systems.   No Comms systems.  That means whoever buys them, has to install all that anyway.



Wouldn't that save time in a way? I mean we wouldn't have to spent weeks/months ripping it all out to put our stuff in?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Commercial sealift is cheap and readily available for lease when needed - as compared to commercial heavy airlift, the world supply of which is limited and getting smaller, and which tends to get completely constricted by NGOs and other world militaries in times of crisis. This is why Canada opted to buy C17s instead of transport ships.
> 
> DND did used to maintain a leased commercial transport ship in Montreal for the purposes of rapid deployment; the lease program was ended early last year in the budget squeeze. If you ask me, we should go back to doing that before we think about buying transport ships.



A Canadian RFA ship might be a good idea, it would help Canadians get the ocean going seatime they need to compete and solve Canada's and NATO's transportation issues while maintaining security for shipped equipment.


----------



## AlexanderM

Build a smaller version of this, around 2500-2800 tons, then we're talking.  Of course change it over to the MK41 vls.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formidable-class_frigate


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Why on earth would we want to do that?


----------



## AlexanderM

Because some people might think that deployable Corvettes would be a good option and that the current building program is a supreme waste of money.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You mean more like this?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hida_class_patrol_vessel
this one is slightly bigger than the Kingston's http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aso_class_patrol_vessel

Just looking at the lists on Wiki, the Kingston's are fairly big for patrol vessels, the next step seems to jump up to the 2500-3500 ton range


----------



## Journeyman

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> Because some people might think that deployable Corvettes would be a good option and that the current building program is a supreme waste of money.


And some people think the earth is flat while other people think the moon landing was faked.

But in the context of this discussion, _some people_ may think that even a passing reference to operational requirement would be useful.


----------



## AlexanderM

Journeyman said:
			
		

> And some people think the earth is flat while other people think the moon landing was faked.
> 
> But in the context of this discussion, _some people_ may think that even a passing reference to operational requirement would be useful.


A deployable, multirole Corvette could handle  ASW, Anti-piracy, Escort and Littoral duties, and is not out of line with littoral ships currently being built by other countries.  Operational requirements can be, and often are, redefined.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> You mean more like this?
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hida_class_patrol_vessel
> this one is slightly bigger than the Kingston's http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aso_class_patrol_vessel
> 
> Just looking at the lists on Wiki, the Kingston's are fairly big for patrol vessels, the next step seems to jump up to the 2500-3500 ton range



1500 Tonnes would get you something like the Leonard Cowley or Knud Rasmussen for the 200 mile zone (EEZ)  - Coast Guard + RCNR?

3000 Tonnes would put you up to the Holland OPV as a deployable Littoral vessel.  - RCN?

6000 Tonnes buys you a fairly comprehensively equipped blue water platform capable of a broad range of tailoring.  RCN.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I would think that the Leonard Cowley or Knud Rasmussen type would be the most you want for this type, any bigger than manning, costs go out the roof. The Kingstons are very close in displacement as the WWII Flower Class Corvettes. Perhaps we can take the Kingston Class design keep what we like and perhaps slightly longer and build a newer more capable version.


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> 3000 Tonnes would put you up to the Holland OPV as a deployable Littoral vessel.  - RCN?


Same size as the Formidable, but less capable.  I don't see the need to give up the capabilities.


----------



## Kirkhill

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> Same size as the Formidable, but less capable.  I don't see the need to give up the capabilities.



C'est vrai. Mais c'est laquelle qui coute le moins cher?


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> C'est vrai. Mais c'est laquelle qui coute le moins cher?


OK but the cost isn't the only issue, in my mind.  I'm thinking what if we had say 8 of the Ivar Class which are really destroyers, so 4 per coast, then 6-7 of these kick butt deployable Corvettes per coast.  I'm thinking cost of $500 million per, so $6-7 billion, plus $8 billion for the Ivars, so $14-15 billion, all in.  Those Corvettes could each have 4 X 8 cell mk 41 vls and i'm pretty sure they could be built to carry the Cyclone, which the Holland can.  It's a pocket frigate which can handle all kinds of duties, including littoral.  Then we have $5-6 billion to finish the fleet, AOR's, AOP's, etc, which would put us all in for around $20 billion and I'm a happy taxpayer.

I am aware this is not going to happen.


----------



## Kirkhill

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> OK but the cost isn't the only issue, in my mind.  I'm thinking what if we had say 8 of the Ivar Class which are really destroyers, so 4 per coast, then 6-7 of these kick butt deployable Corvettes per coast.  I'm thinking cost of $500 million per, so $6-7 billion, plus $8 billion for the Ivars, so $14-15 billion, all in.  Those Corvettes could each have 4 X 8 cell mk 41 vls and i'm pretty sure they could be built to carry the Cyclone, which the Holland can.  It's a pocket frigate which can handle all kinds of duties, including littoral.  Then we have $5-6 billion to finish the fleet, AOR's, AOP's, etc, which would put us all in for around $20 billion and I'm a happy taxpayer.
> 
> I am aware this is not going to happen.



But I agree it doesn't hurt to keep thinking.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Sir Humphrey at _Thin Pinstriped Line_:

The Royal Navy and Light Frigates - A solution in need of a problem? 
http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.ca/2014/04/the-royal-navy-and-light-frigates.html

He's agin 'em because might lead to pressure for reduction in escort fleet of 19 large ships.  On the other hand the RCN's problem is: can Canada afford 15 CSCs (cf. 19 RN ships generally similar types) or should there be a high/medium/(low?) mix?

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

By the way Alex - if you are doing your cost analysis you could/should add in this:

3x Iroquois = 3x 280 = 840 Berths
12x Halifax = 12x 225 = 2700 Berths
Total Berths = 3740

8x Iver Huitfeldt = 8x 101 = 606 Berths
12x Formidable = 12x 90 = 1080 Berths
Total Berths = 1888

Reduction in paychecks and pensions of 50% (49.52 for the pedants)

As you suggest Mark, the RN's and the RCN's needs may not be identical.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

AlexanderM said:
			
		

> OK but the cost isn't the only issue, in my mind.  I'm thinking what if we had say 8 of the Ivar Class which are really destroyers, so 4 per coast, then 6-7 of these kick butt deployable Corvettes per coast.  I'm thinking cost of $500 million per, so $6-7 billion, plus $8 billion for the Ivars, so $14-15 billion, all in.  Those Corvettes could each have 4 X 8 cell mk 41 vls and i'm pretty sure they could be built to carry the Cyclone, which the Holland can.  It's a pocket frigate which can handle all kinds of duties, including littoral.  Then we have $5-6 billion to finish the fleet, AOR's, AOP's, etc, which would put us all in for around $20 billion and I'm a happy taxpayer.
> 
> I am aware this is not going to happen.



Well well could then provide Littoral coverage to a NATO fleet when the gold plated LCS breaks down within 10' of the dock they just left.  ;D

It would be cheaper for the USN to pay for us to build and man them, then their LCS program!


----------



## AlexanderM

Colin P said:
			
		

> Well well could then provide Littoral coverage to a NATO fleet when the gold plated LCS breaks down within 10' of the dock they just left.  ;D
> 
> It would be cheaper for the USN to pay for us to build and man them, then their LCS program!


Yes indeed! We would make the LCS program look bad, not that they need any help. lol


----------



## AlexanderM

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> By the way Alex - if you are doing your cost analysis you could/should add in this:
> 
> 3x Iroquois = 3x 280 = 840 Berths
> 12x Halifax = 12x 225 = 2700 Berths
> Total Berths = 3740
> 
> 8x Iver Huitfeldt = 8x 101 = 808 Berths
> 12x Formidable = 12x 90 = 1080 Berths
> Total Berths = 1888
> 
> Reduction in paychecks and pensions of 50% (49.52 for the pedants)
> 
> As you suggest Mark, the RN's and the RCN's needs may not be identical.


Yes, the crew requirements are sO much easier on the budget!  Those Corvettes would rock.  Of course, NATO would classifiy them as frigates, based on capability, but we would ask them to hold off, until after they are built.


----------



## suffolkowner

Alex, I like this idea quite a lot. It seems much more realistic than the current plan. Some how the government is going to have to cost the shipbuilding program better. $26 billion is not going to go far given the previous costing announcements


----------



## Navy_Pete

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> By the way Alex - if you are doing your cost analysis you could/should add in this:
> 
> 3x Iroquois = 3x 280 = 840 Berths
> 12x Halifax = 12x 225 = 2700 Berths
> Total Berths = 3740
> 
> 8x Iver Huitfeldt = 8x 101 = 606 Berths
> 12x Formidable = 12x 90 = 1080 Berths
> Total Berths = 1888
> 
> Reduction in paychecks and pensions of 50% (49.52 for the pedants)
> 
> As you suggest Mark, the RN's and the RCN's needs may not be identical.



Those are the max berths on ships, but not personnel required for going to sea.  One thing they do on newer ships is have larger support organizations ashore doing some the command staff type taskings ashore vice on the ships, and the crew size is pretty close to the minimum required to go to sea.  Only the deployers are ever fully manned, and normally at least a few ships are in some form of 3rd line work, so the crew is down to dozens.  You can put the ships to sea with a lot less then the max, but you won't be able to do numerous things at once (fight fires while fighting off pirates while staging a cocktail party).

What it does do is significantly decrease the hotel services etc needed on board, so you also spend way less on outfitting the ship over it's life.  There is a personnel saving as well, but it's not 50%.  It does mean though that you don't have the Cmdre roll on board with 60 of his closest minions, sub minions and hanger ons, at least 50 of which are completely useless without the ability to communicate ashore.  I think a lot of the scandinavian countries have gone to this, so they have a remote battle watch stood up somewhere ashore they are in comms with when deployed, and that is scaled up or down based on what they are doing (vice having them on board).

They also significantly reduced the maintainers onboard, so they have larger FLSs meet the ships when they show up in port, so it's more like how the MCDVs are crewed.

Pros and cons to either way of doing business, but it's probably traditions that have kept it going this long.  That's why we still have dozens of people handling lines instead of about six.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

> fight fires while fighting off pirates while staging a cocktail party



Best RPC EVER!!!


----------



## a_majoor

But are little ships really what is needed? The environment continues to evolve, and the builders of the San Antonio class LPD is not only offering a "stripped down" version (Flight II) which is about 30% cheaper, but also offering the hull as the basis for a missile cruiser carrying a large AESA array and a huge missile battery.

While very expensive, something like this is needed to operate in an environment where the opposition has AA/AD weapons to prevent our or allied forces from operating. The large battery also ensures multiple engagement capability and persistent coverage, or alternatively the ability to follow up with attack weapons like Harpoon and Tomahawk.

While it would be very useful to have such ships in our fleet, as a practical matter I don't see that happening in Canada. What this illustrates is the environment and therefore the types of ships needed is changing, and having these programs drag on for decades ensures we will spend a great deal of money and have the wrong ship (airplane, rucksack) for the job.


----------



## NavyShooter

The real issue on all of this boils down to....it's not going to happen.

Pipe dreams for all, but unless my world turns on it's head, there will be no little honking ships, there will be an A/OPS, there will, someday, be a new AOR, and perhaps, within my lifetime, there will be a new class of surface warships....to replace the Halifax class.

The will to buy offshore, let alone buy at all is not there.

NS


----------



## AlexanderM

Pretty much agree, unless there's a change in government, in which case all bets are off.


----------



## Edward Campbell

A change in government will not do much. All parties will promise to build ships, warships, in Canada ... it's the "jobs! Jobs!! JOBS!!!" thing.

Once in power whichever party wins the next election will delay and trim its sails and so on and so forth in order to spend as little as possible ... in order to appease either its anti-spending or anti-military constituencies (and the Liberals have both).


----------



## YZT580

And you think a change in government will buy you anything at all.  Suggest you take a good look at E.R.'s spending graphs.  Trudeau has already promised to follow in his father's white feather approach to national defense, and the NDP want about two squads of social workers wearing blue berets and carrying first aid kits.  All the stink in parliament over the F35 and other purchases wasn't introduced by the PCs but when the manure hit the agitator they had to throw the brakes on and investigate or the press would never have stopped.  Ukraine may be the best thing happening to stir up new purchases.


----------



## MilEME09

YZT580 said:
			
		

> And you think a change in government will buy you anything at all.  Suggest you take a good look at E.R.'s spending graphs.  Trudeau has already promised to follow in his father's white feather approach to national defense, and the NDP want about two squads of social workers wearing blue berets and carrying first aid kits.  All the stink in parliament over the F35 and other purchases wasn't introduced by the PCs but when the manure hit the agitator they had to throw the brakes on and investigate or the press would never have stopped.  Ukraine may be the best thing happening to stir up new purchases.



While it is disappeared from the spot light as well, Ukraine did raise fears of a Russian incursion in the Arctic (they are building new air and naval bases on their arctic coast). Such a threat is in our strategic interest, and maybe a little of drumming up that is would make the Canadian public think cutting defense would be a bad idea


----------



## Journeyman

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Trudeau has already promised to follow in his father's white feather approach to national defense......


While I assume you're correct, I've heard no such promise -- that would mean that he actually has some sort of policy vision.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

10 years ago the NDP would have supported the ship building program because of it's ties to the Unions, now they are to busy sucking up to the Latte sippers they don't care to much about the blue collar side.


----------



## Mike5

The media blows military purchases out of proportion.  The submarines, the F 35, etc -- it's almost like they recycle the same old tired draft.  In the internet age, the Canadian public is better informed and smarter then that.  They don't need to rely on biased sources of information -- they can Google 'northwest passage' and see a direct threat to our sovereignty.  They are proud of Canada's contribution to world security over the past decade and they want to keep up the momentum.  I'd like to think the opposition will lose votes by making political issues of these purchases.

Maybe that's wishful thinking... but I think it's time for a sea-change in Canadian thinking with respect to National Defence.

/rant over


----------



## YZT580

I sincerely hope that you are correct but and it is a big but, the majority of seats are controlled by the major cities, particularly Toronto and Toronto is probably more left wing than Moscow.  These folks meet every day over their lattes to discuss how the world would be so much better if Yonge street was designated bicycles only and the only cars permitted downtown were theirs.  These folks have no concept of the price that was paid in lives so that they can enjoy those lattes.  They also don't understand that folks in Eastern Europe, parts of Africa, Pakistan (just to name a couple of sites, there are plenty more) only want the same freedom and have relatives who have died in the very recent past to try and achieve it.  Think Romania!  If we don't pay, we will eventually loose, maybe not this decade but it will happen.  We have too much land, too much water and too much oil to think that someone won't try to take it if we don't stand guard.  But try explaining that in your local Starbucks.  Sadly the major cities control parliament.  Whatever we spend on military has got to be achieved through careful plotting and cannot be done in a straight forward manner.  I think that is the reason for the buy Canada thing.  It is the only way to get these folks to accept the expenditure.  It doesn't help having an antagonistic press filing freedom of information requests for absolutely every piece of paper initiated in Ottawa in hopes of catching some ministry screwing up but particularly defense since the press by and large dislikes the military anyways.   But enough.


----------



## PanaEng

here is a little video of some of the possibilities:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-byd6Fp5RW4

Article from here:
http://www.45enord.ca/2014/06/deux-cent-militaires-de-valcartier-debarquent-en-gaspesie-photosvideo/


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Very nice, and an obvious demonstration that with a small amount of training, our soldiers and airmen are perfectly capable of learning the ropes of amphibious ops.

Recapturing the Gaspé airport from terrorists, he! I wonder if anyone remembers that the "hippies communes" of Gaspé in the 1960's is where the FLQ and its terrorist bent was born. (Just trowing in a bit of history here).


----------



## a_majoor

A bit of blue sky here, but the US Spearhead class "Joint High Speed Ship" seems to have many of the qualities for a little honking ship, except for short legs. The ship is 70% common with a car ferry design, which should reduce some of the price pressure. The fact there is a huge internal bay should allow for some clever modular conversion kits to fulfill other roles as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spearhead_class_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel



> *Class overview*
> 
> Builders:
> Austal USA
> 
> Operators:
> United States Navy
> 
> Cost:
> $214m/unit[1]
> 
> Built:
> 2010s
> 
> Building:
> 2[2]
> 
> Planned:
> 10
> 
> Completed:
> 5[2]
> 
> Active:
> 4[2]
> 
> General characteristics
> 
> Tonnage:
> 1,515 tonnes
> 
> Length:
> 103.0 m (337 ft 11 in)
> 
> Beam:
> 28.5 m (93 ft 6 in)
> 
> Draft:
> 3.83 m (12 ft 7 in)
> 
> Propulsion:
> Four MTU 20V8000 M71L diesel engines
> Four ZF 60000NR2H reduction gears
> 
> Speed:
> 43 knots (80 km/h; 49 mph)
> 
> Range:
> 1,200 nmi (1,400 mi; 2,200 km)[3]
> 
> Boats & landing craft carried:
> Can deploy 7-meter rigid hull inflatable boats[4]
> 
> Capacity:
> 600 short tons[3]
> 
> Troops:
> 312
> 
> Crew:
> 41
> 
> Armament:
> Four mounts for M2 .50 caliber machine guns[5]
> 
> Aircraft carried:
> Landing pad for a helicopter, up to CH-53 Super Stallion/CH-53K King Stallion,[6] parking and storage area for MH-60 Seahawk


----------



## Jungle

Thucydides said:
			
		

> A bit of blue sky here, but the US Spearhead class "Joint High Speed Ship" seems to have many of the qualities for a little honking ship, except for short legs. The ship is 70% common with a car ferry design, which should reduce some of the price pressure. The fact there is a huge internal bay should allow for some clever modular conversion kits to fulfill other roles as well:
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spearhead_class_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel



It looks very similar to the Jervis Bay the RAN was operating during the INTERFET days.


----------



## AirDet

Jungle said:
			
		

> It looks very similar to the Jervis Bay the RAN was operating during the INTERFET days.



I remember the Javis Bay sailing past us every day into Dili. I got to sail on her to start my LTA. She had a really cool rooster tail once she opened up on the open sea.


----------



## Cloud Cover

There is much to consider with the JHSV:

The JHSV has a greater level of comfort for the crew and passengers than larger Navy ships for short-term embarkations. The interior is spacious and berthing areas have private features like toilet stalls, outlets, air conditioning, and even thermostats; there is no gym on board. One disadvantage of the ship's design is stability in rough seas and at high speeds. At 10 knots in calm sea states, the hull can rock up to four degrees to each side, while conventional ships would roll very little, which would increase if the ship goes faster in rougher conditions, raising the possibility of seasickness.[6]

As of late 2014, a JHSV costs $180 million to build and has an annual operating cost of $26 million.[2]

Other roles[edit]





 The joint high-speed vessel USNS Choctaw County (JHSV 2) awaits delivery at the Austal USA vessel completion yard.
The U.S. 4th Fleet has expressed interest in using the JHSV as a low-cost ship for performing drug interdiction missions around Central and South America. U.S. Southern Command is experiencing a shortage of Navy frigates and Coast Guard cutters available to interdict drug runners due to ship age and budget cuts. In May 2013, the HSV-2 Swift conducted a drug interdiction patrol, showing an aluminum catamaran was capable of performing the role. A JHSV costs less than a frigate, has a smaller crew demand of 22 compared to 200 for a frigate, and is capable of embarking a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET).[4]

The JHSV has no weapons or defensive systems to fulfill combat missions, but the Navy is looking to expand its roles to include re-supplying special operations forces and conducting humanitarian assistance missions.[14] Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has suggested using the ships as a cheaper way to perform counter-piracy missions to free up blue-water combatants.[15] Offensive armament and defensive measures against pirates would be handled by a security team on board, and a JHSV's speed would also be a good defense against an attack by pirates.[16] The Navy is experimenting with using the JHSV as a hospital ship by setting up an expeditionary medical unit (EMU) inside the mission bay. Although it wouldn't be able to conduct the same tasks as a full-size hospital ship, large hospital ships are slow, while the JHSV can serve as a quick transit platform for rapid medical response.[17]

Control system[edit]

The control system for this class is provided by General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems through an open architecture computing infrastructure (OPEN CI). OPEN CI includes the information technology (IT) infrastructure for the combat and seaframe control systems. The infrastructure integrates the ship's electronic systems including, internal and external communication, electronic navigation, aviation and armament systems.[18] The General Dynamics OPEN CI is also used on the Independence-class littoral combat ship (LCS), also built by Austal.

Communication systems[edit]

The Communications suite for this class will be provided by BAE Systems Inc.



The USMC is investigating changes to the JHSV ramp to allow it to place Amphibious Combat Vehicles into the water near the shore.[21] A single JHSV could carry and deploy as many as 20-30 ACVs.[22][23]

Marine Corps General John M. Paxton, Jr. has called the JHSV "a very capable ship" for certain missions, but in consideration for serving as an alternate platform for Marines to use in amphibious operations as substitutes for amphibious assault ships, he claims several deficiencies including ability to operate in difficult sea states, ability to remain survivable in contested waters, a flight deck that cannot handle the heat of an MV-22 Osprey's engines during take-off and landing, lack of a well deck to launch amphibious vehicles at sea, as well as current lack of a "splash capability" where the ramp can allow vehicles to be driven off it into the sea.[24] The JHSV has been rejected as an alternative platform to base the MV-22 off of due to weight and the heat it generates being potentially damaging to its flight deck.[25]


----------



## Stoker

I was in Port Canaveral a while ago and I had the opportunity to take a tour of a JHSV. very impressive, much like a high speed ferry and run by civilians. I was told they are having issues with growth on their hulls which restrict their speed. If the ship is in trouble, they assemble internally port and stbd, activate a control, a hatch blows open and a slide inflates much like a commercial jet and the troops and crew slide down into the water. Here's a few pictures I took. 










View of the ramp, that can take a M1A1 Abrams and lots of containerized cargo




LIPS water jet propulsion




Brow Area




Where the troops sit. In front are big screen TV's and weapon cages.




View from the bridge




Helm




On the way to the internal bridge wing




Bridge wing Console




View of the wing repeaters




Flight Deck Console




Looking down at the flight deck




Looking forward on the flight deck




One of the Engine spaces with their MTU's


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Nice ships....I wonder why the US Navy did not consider this hull when embarking on their LCS program?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

A lot of high speed craft have metal fatigue issues, I wonder how these are doing?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Nice ships....I wonder why the US Navy did not consider this hull when embarking on their LCS program?



They have. One of the two "contenders" is the same Austal ship designers team and they came up with the Independence class.

See description here: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

Basically, they selected a trimaran design instead of a catamaran. Good choice in my opinion, since the JHSV is for short distances only (it does not have sleeping accommodation for the soldiers it carries), as the sharp stoping of the sideways motion while rolling that you experience in catamarans gets tiring real fast. A trimaran does not suffer that type of jarring and usually affords more internal space for accommodation also.


----------



## Underway

Some real interesting comments regarding the challenges of amphibious warfare, or even taking non-navalized air assets to sea.  Something to consider when people start stating that the not quite Russian Mistrals are the way to go.  It would take years to have the 22nd Rgt up to speed on amphibious operations.

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-big-boat-doesnt-equal-amphibious-capability/



> From the ASPI:
> 
> A big boat doesn’t equal amphibious capability
> 28 Nov 2014|Jan K. Gleiman
> 
> Today’s a great day for the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence Force. It marks the commissioning of that $1.5 billion, 27,800-tonne behemoth soon to be known as HMAS Canberra. But as much as I hate to rain on this parade, Australia is still some time and many tough decisions away from true amphibious warfare capability. The ship is just a ‘host’ that enables the capability. Political and military leaders will need to take a  two-year appetite suppressant to consider organisational changes and the purchase of additional equipment. When the party on Garden Island ends tonight, the real work continues.
> 
> The ADF’s stated goal is to have an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) capability by 2017. That might sound like plenty of time. But amphibious operations involve a complex and dangerous choreography and the seamless integration of joint military services. World-class amphibious players develop over decades. The US, UK, France and others have joint organisations consisting of service units dedicated solely to this kind of operation and have built an organisational culture around them. Amphibious warfare is a truly joint enterprise, requiring diligent and detailed integration of the three services.
> 
> The ADF is driven by the individual services and lacks the organisational mechanisms and culture for joint capability development. It will have to overcome those internal obstacles to get from naming a really big boat to conducting amphibious manoeuvres under non-permissive conditions. Here are a few issues to be addressed.
> 
> The LHD is a helicopter-centric ship. Its flight deck is big, but its dock is small compared to US or UK amphibious ships, and it will normally carry only four small landing craft. But the landing-force order of battle is vehicle-centric.  Will the Land 400 program include the purchase of vehicles that can swim or that are light enough to be lifted by helicopters in order to relieve strain on the ship’s limited landing craft?
> 
> The current landing-force vehicles weren’t designed for wading and can tolerate only about two feet of water. That could be ameliorated by a beach recovery-vehicle to drag drowned vehicles ashore and push off stuck landing craft but the ADF hasn’t got any of those. A large hovercraft could potentially eliminate the problem altogether but Canberra’s dock is the wrong type for those.
> 
> If Australia is to achieve its stated capability goals, it’ll need to have someone with sufficient authority to champion the cause when it clashes with perceived single-service interests. At present, the Joint Capability Authority has a coordinating role only and actually doesn’t manage any capabilities or major procurement programs.
> 
> Then there are helicopters. HMAS Canberra is apparently capable of holding 18 helicopters (depending on the type of helicopter). Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as placing a helicopter on a ship. Twenty years ago, the US Army found that out the hard way when it placed helicopters on two US aircraft carriers for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Most of those helicopters had to be junked after the operation because they weren’t properly ‘marinised’.
> 
> Of course, there are degrees of marinisation. While there has been much criticism of the Army’s MRH-90 model helicopters, those aircraft were chosen largely because they were deemed to be better for amphibious operations. Key features like their composite frame (which doesn’t corrode) and blade brakes make them more conducive to operations at sea. But an ANAO audit recently noted that the MRH90 aircraft ‘has metal parts that corrode, ranging from rivets in the tail assembly to complex assemblies in the landing gear, engine and transmission’. Additionally, the aircraft lacks automatically-collapsible blades, making flight deck evolutions slower and inherently more dangerous, potentially halving the force projection rate. The ARH-90  wasn’t designed to go to sea and will present all these problems plus some more of its own.
> 
> Finally, there’ll be support force and enabler issues. The ADF has already dedicated 2 RAR as its amphibious infantry force. But deep amphibious expertise is needed in supporting arms and services, notably intelligence, logistics, aviation, and engineering. The present intent is to draw those from non-specialist brigades as required.  The current Plan ‘Beersheba’ will see them rotate out of that role every year (say it isn’t so).
> 
> These issues aren’t showstoppers, but coming up with solutions, techniques, and procedures to mitigate them inside two years will require an intense effort. It means prioritising resources and training and that will inevitably have impacts elsewhere. Whether the individual services are willing to accept those impacts will be the true test of whether the ADF is serious about its amphibious capability.
> 
> Yes, the boat is impressive. But it’ll be the teamwork, sacrifice, and leadership needed to build a real amphibious capability that will truly impress. If Australia’s leaders try to use this capability before it’s properly prepared, the results will be disappointing. Fixing some organisational deficiencies and giving more attention to the capability associated with this project will help.
> 
> Lieutenant Colonel Jan K. Gleiman is an active duty US Army officer and a visiting fellow at ASPI from United States Pacific Command. These are his personal views. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, again, we are saying "Somebody needs to make the bits fit".

See also "Logistics Vehicle Modernization" http://army.ca/forums/threads/100166.0/topicseen.html

Amongst other threads.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Underway said:
			
		

> Some real interesting comments regarding the challenges of amphibious warfare, or even taking non-navalized air assets to sea.  Something to consider when people start stating that the not quite Russian Mistrals are the way to go.  It would take years to have the 22nd Rgt up to speed on amphibious operations.
> 
> http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-big-boat-doesnt-equal-amphibious-capability/



Underway: Look this thread up above and the end of the page just before: It's already been done. The Vandoos and 403 TacHel has already done a landing ex from the Mistral.

Don't believe everything you read from US Army officers. Particularly in this case where he seems to imply that the "US" knows how to do this. It's incorrect. The US Marines know how to do this. The US Army hasn't got a clue.

Similarly, the French and the Bits have some very specific units that can do these things (the Royal Marines and the Commando de la Marine), but in the French case, the Mistrals are designed to support the army into operations, not just the commandos, even though the army has title training.

BTW, the single most important aspect of those combined ( I am beginning to hate the concept of "joint") operations is combat loading and logistics. You have to load things onboard the ships in a specific order that takes into consideration both the cargo loading of the ship for stability reasons and the expectations of the unfolding of the fight ashore, so the equipment can be put ashore in the order it is required for the fight. The US Marines have an excellent combat logistics course for this and I know that there are Canadian logistics officers that have attended and passed it.

Other than that, like everything else, you have to train and practice. There is no magic there.

As for the US Army having scrapped helicopters in Haiti operating from a carrier, my only point on that is not that they needed "navalized" helicopter but that their maintenance program was not adjusted. The only way I can see this developing is because they did not know enough to properly wash down and clean their helicopters everyday before storing them of the night, unless they simply abused them without any maintenance during the whole deployment which ain't any smarter.


----------



## Baz

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> As for the US Army having scrapped helicopters in Haiti operating from a carrier, my only point on that is not that they needed "navalized" helicopter but that their maintenance program was not adjusted. The only way I can see this developing is because they did not know enough to properly wash down and clean their helicopters everyday before storing them of the night, unless they simply abused them without any maintenance during the whole deployment which ain't any smarter.



Concur.

The biggest part of "marinizing" an aircraft is the maintenance schedule.  This is why we'll wash the aircraft even when no one else on the ship is allowed to wash due to water shortages.  We then spray it down with LPS (something like WD-40) and grease it up (ever look at the hangar face after a few months, its covered in sprayed off grease).  I opened the floorboards on 416 the other day just after a corrosion control and the smell of LPS was so strong I checked with a tech to make sure we didn't have a fuel leak.  We use so much it actually penetrates into the electronic boxes and cable bundles.

I also saw the comment that logistics, C4, and AAW give the capability to deploy; its telling the "RCN" doesn't list surface and sub-surface, which is manifesting in the fleet.  And as for Canada being in the same Tier as Australia, I remain to be convinced...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Same in our SRN-6 hovercraft, made just like a 1950's airplane and continuously run through surf and seawater. We had a strict engine wash (soap and water) and craft wash procedures, which added about 5x the life between major rebuilds to the RR Gnome turbine and reduced corrosion significantly on the craft itself. Ah yes LPS our guys used tons of it as well.


----------



## Underway

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Underway: Look this thread up above and the end of the page just before: It's already been done. The Vandoos and 403 TacHel has already done a landing ex from the Mistral.
> 
> Don't believe everything you read from US Army officers. Particularly in this case where he seems to imply that the "US" knows how to do this. It's incorrect. The US Marines know how to do this. The US Army hasn't got a clue.
> 
> Similarly, the French and the Bits have some very specific units that can do these things (the Royal Marines and the Commando de la Marine), but in the French case, the Mistrals are designed to support the army into operations, not just the commandos, even though the army has title training.
> 
> BTW, the single most important aspect of those combined ( I am beginning to hate the concept of "joint") operations is combat loading and logistics. You have to load things onboard the ships in a specific order that takes into consideration both the cargo loading of the ship for stability reasons and the expectations of the unfolding of the fight ashore, so the equipment can be put ashore in the order it is required for the fight. The US Marines have an excellent combat logistics course for this and I know that there are Canadian logistics officers that have attended and passed it.
> 
> Other than that, like everything else, you have to train and practice. There is no magic there.



Putting troops ashore where "there is no jetty" is a far cry from amphibious warfare.  Yes I know crawl before you can walk etc... but there was a lot of hand holding by the French for that operation.  The Van Doo's were able to access some intitutional memory thanks to their operations in Carolina  with the Standing Contingency Task Force in 2006.

Amphib warfare's challenges lie in logistics quite a bit yes, but also in the planning and combined aspects of the HQ.  Getting navy to speak army and vice versa (don't even get me going on grid references, mils vs degrees etc...).  Creating the institutional knowledge and more importantly retaining it.  When Hillier was all hot to trot for a Marine Commando Regiment, the brass went around visiting other countries that had Navalized Infantry etc... France, Australia, Netherlands, UK and US.  The Commander of the Royal Marines flat out said if we were going to do this it would take 10 years to develop and sustain the capability and experience to do it right.

So with that in mind we did this:  



> The Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) of the Defence Policy Statement is also known as a Standing Contingency Force (SCF) or as Integrated Rapid Response (IRR). The SCTF - aside from providing a more significant support for special forces operations - was clearly designed to deal with the threat posed by failed and failing states, which are seen as planting "the seeds of threats to regional and global security," whether in the form of terrorist sanctuaries or refugee flows. Such low to medium-intensity "stability operations" require a significant and reasonably robust "boots on the ground" presence, and this need will likely be fulfilled with the expeditionary and more manpower- intensive SCTF.
> 
> What began as the SCTF, was redefined as the SCF, was trialed during the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) and was suspended due to competing priorities two years after the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) was released. The navy led a 'proof-of-concept' exercise of the re-named Standing Contingency Force (SCF) in amphibious operations off the coast of North Carolina in November 2006. The navy conducted the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) with the participation of more than 1,000 CF members. Support was provided from the United States Navy, consisting of mentors and the participation of USS GUNSTON HALL and USS DOYLE. The ITEE helped the CF assess the challenges associated with developing a maritime expeditionary force.



From this website:  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm

Amphib ops are complicated and dangerous.  Not to be taken lightly.

As for navalized aircraft I never knew that it really just comes down to good maintenance practices.  Thanks for the insight.



			
				Baz said:
			
		

> I also saw the comment that logistics, C4, and AAW give the capability to deploy; its telling the "RCN" doesn't list surface and sub-surface, which is manifesting in the fleet.  And as for Canada being in the same Tier as Australia, I remain to be convinced...



Not quite sure what you're driving at with this statement?  Are you refering to fleet/ship capabilities or amphib warfare capabilities?


----------



## Baz

Underway said:
			
		

> As for navalized aircraft I never knew that it really just comes down to good maintenance practices.  Thanks for the insight.



I don't think I'd categorize it as "good" maintenance practices; more as specific.  An aircraft is a very different thing to maintain; hence the need for extensive maintenance records for each airframe.  I've experienced the frustration of explaining why we just can't ignore a sup check at sea...

The inspection cycle of the Sea King, and corrosion control program, is different then say the Griffin.  That is part of the reason why the Sea King is seen as maintenance heavy.  You also need to tune the maintenance program to how you intend to schedule (for instance on long deck cycles vs short alert launches) and fly (eg lots of time doing forward flight vs lots of time in the dip) in order to minimize maintenance vs the environment.

There are also design issues that need to be dealt with; more so for small deck rotary or fixed wing.  It is much easier for large deck rotary, as you don't have anywhere near the landing and take-off stresses.



			
				Underway said:
			
		

> Not quite sure what you're driving at with this statement?  Are you refering to fleet/ship capabilities or amphib warfare capabilities?



I think the Australians have been much more capability driven in their force generation; maybe due to the extant threat to the north.  The current situation in the RCN hasn't come about solely due to government (lack of) action, in my opinion.  Therefore grouping them in the same tier as your quote does is somewhat disingenuous.

As well, the focus on AAW, and less focus on surface (especially, with the asymmetric threat) and sub-surface threats have somewhat limited the ability to go in harm's way *anywhere* in the world.


----------



## Underway

Baz said:
			
		

> I think the Australians have been much more capability driven in their force generation; maybe due to the extant threat to the north.  The current situation in the RCN hasn't come about solely due to government (lack of) action, in my opinion.  Therefore grouping them in the same tier as your quote does is somewhat disingenuous.
> 
> As well, the focus on AAW, and less focus on surface (especially, with the asymmetric threat) and sub-surface threats have somewhat limited the ability to go in harm's way *anywhere* in the world.



Well,... the document was written (circa 2001) and then realize what changes have happened since then.  I didn't change the quote to update it to the current fleet mix.  This year we drop from a Tier 3 to Tier 5 based upon the capability gap of decomissioning of our AAW and resupply.  The FELEX program covers off the C4 to some extent (I don't know how much).  

For years we were far ahead of the Australians in many capabilities.  Our more numerous escorts were more deployable overseas due to mainly endurance and inherent capability (as ANZAC's were to small to do as much as we do on the larger hulls),  the PRO, PRE combo kept us going, and one thing that we had that they never did (and will only just have shortly with the HOBARTS) is an AAW Command and Control ship that could embark a Commodore and his staff.  When Australia joined in for OP APOLLO they were very embarassed that they had to "borrow" a Arleigh Burke to embark their command team to the battlespace (and drove their requirement for the Hobarts home to their government).  Canada showed up with a complete self sufficient task group and got right to work.  From that info we were a Teir 3 navy.  Australia was barely a Teir 3.  Now the situation has changed and until the Queenston shows up we aren't teir 3 anymore.  The only thing they had on us was subsurface capability with the Collins class.

In the last 10 years though the capability has swung the other way, especially in the last 2.

I would agree that in Canada we were obsessed with Afghanistan and completely lost sight of the other services when they didn't help the Afghan mission (C-17, chinooks etc...).   I do agree we are far more limited in our choices.    Ie:  They have a varied helo fleet for the army, we don't.  They use two types of fighter aircraft, we don't.  But some of those choices in Canada reflect our particular situation.  Perhaps because we will never ever be operating alone and Australia might just have to operate alone until the US can show up.  Australia has two types of fighter aircraft because they have a requirement for a strike aircraft (formerly the F-111 now superhornet) and a fighter aircraft.  Canada is interested only in multirole aircraft, etc... etc...

But yah, Austraila has a defined understanding of their place in the world and in Asia in particular.  It informs their defence policy and their national awareness of defence issues, and it seems like most sides of their political system agree on much of the strategic situation and what purchases need to be made.  They periodically publish white papers and take defence seriously and not as a big piggy bank for when the economy takes a dump (like we do).  They don't argue on whether they need two fighter aircraft they argue on what kinds.  They understand the importance of submarines where in Canada we haven't had a single intelligent person come out and explain why we need subs to the public in words that the public will understand at all.  But they have their own issues as well.  There was plenty of push back on even having AAW destroyers where in Canada the replacement project isn't a capability arguement its as cost arguement....which might be worse...


----------



## dimsum

Underway said:
			
		

> But yah, Austraila has a defined understanding of their place in the world and in Asia in particular.  It informs their defence policy and their national awareness of defence issues, and it seems like most sides of their political system agree on much of the strategic situation and what purchases need to be made.  They periodically publish white papers and take defence seriously and not as a big piggy bank for when the economy takes a dump (like we do).  They don't argue on whether they need two fighter aircraft they argue on what kinds.  They understand the importance of submarines where in Canada we haven't had a single intelligent person come out and explain why we need subs to the public in words that the public will understand at all.  But they have their own issues as well.  There was plenty of push back on even having AAW destroyers where in Canada the replacement project isn't a capability arguement its as cost arguement....which might be worse...



I agree broadly with this paragraph, with some caveats.  As it's been mentioned, it's mostly because of the threat to the North and the isolation from allies (US, UK).  

However, Defence can/has been used as a piggy bank (the recently-repealed 1.5% pay rise which was less than CPI, for example).  The "2 fighter types" were because the F-35 was delayed, leading to the purchase of the SH - the SH was never intended just to be a strike platform as the F-111 was.   A happy side-effect is that with the purchase of the SH, they now have the capability of EW when the Growler fleet comes online - again, it wasn't in the original intent.

But, back to ships, what you said about the Hobart-class is pretty much spot on.


----------

