# Ratio of Support to Front Lines



## Dacier (22 Jan 2003)

Does anyone know what is the ratio of support trades in the military to people in the front lines?
Is it close to 4:1?  Four people in support trades for every soldier in the front line?

The reason I‘m asking is, the number of troops being sent to the Middle East by the US, is close to 120,000, but what is the actual number of front line soliders?  Is there a rough estimation that anyone knows?


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## portcullisguy (22 Jan 2003)

I have heard the CF "teeth to tail" ratio is something like 29 support pers for every 1 cbt arms.

Anyone else have any info on that?


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## Michael OLeary (22 Jan 2003)

The answer to that question will depend on exactly what formations are being sent, along with what national components for command and support. Another factor is where you consider it appropriate to "draw the line" between teeth and tail.

Take, for example the US Army‘s 4th Infantry Division‘s  organization chart.

If you consider the Division all teeth except the Divisional Support Command then the divisional tooth-to-tail ratio is 1:3.

Now if you want to consider all the personnel in headquarters companies, etc., also to be "tail", or even take it to the extreme that anyone that doesn‘t literally have a sight picture on the enemy and finger on the trigger is "tail" then that ratio changes.

This considers the figures for one fighting division of the US Army. Once the organization up-sizes to Corps, Army, etc, larger proportions of support organizations become involved to provide the necessary support to operations.

Mike O‘Leary


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## Michael OLeary (22 Jan 2003)

The tooth-to-tail ratio in my response above should be read as:

tooth - 3
tail - 1

25% of the Division‘s strength is in the Support Command.

Mike O‘Leary


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## Pugil (22 Jan 2003)

During the Vietnam war the US ratio support/combat was 10 support for 1 combat soldiers while in the enemy side it was the contrary.


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## Jungle (23 Jan 2003)

It‘s very hard to get an exact figure on this... it all depends on how you look at it. For example, if you take an Infantry Battalion, do you count them as 600 fighting troops ? or do you take away the clerks, cooks, supply techs, medics, and infanteers in tpt, cq‘s, Batt HQ etc... If you do that, you are left with little more than 300 teeth in a 600 man unit.


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## jrhume (23 Jan 2003)

C‘mon, Pugil.  Let‘s get some real numbers here.

I know you dislike most things American, but it would be nice if you took the time to check out a few things before laying them out as fact.

Yes, the ‘teeth‘ to ‘tail‘ ratio of the US Army in Vietnam was roughly 1 to 10, which figures that all us REMFs (cooks, bakers, clerks, truck drivers, air traffic controllers (me!), and other yardbirds) are not considered ‘teeth‘.

There are two problems with those assumptions, one unique to a war like Vietnam, one common to all armies.  The common one is that ‘tail‘ is an arbitrary measurement.  Theoretically, the ‘tail‘ of a combat unit extends clear back to its national command authority.  Thus, the ‘tail‘ of the Army in VN was considerably more numerous than the men actually in combat positions, in country.  Realistically, the ‘tail‘ consisted of all support types in VN and surrounding countries, like the Philippines, which were actively supporting forces in VN.  That is where the 10-1 ratio comes from.

As to the NVA/VC, well, their ‘tail‘ was considerably higher than 1 REMF to 10 combatants, as you claim.  For one thing, VC units in Vietnam used local labor for everything from digging bunkers to scrounging for supplies.  In addition, vast numbers of NVA soldiers and auxiliaries were engaged in moving huge quantities of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, using everything from trucks to bicycles.  That was a very manpower intensive operation which went on for years.

NVA/VC combat units typically engaged in actual combat at relatively infrequent intervals - I don‘t recall the exact numbers, but the implication is that even combat units spent a good deal of time engaged in resupply and housekeeping activities.

So what was the ratio of ‘teeth‘ to ‘tail‘ for the NVA/VC?  Beats me, Lieutenant.

I know any number of American VN veterans who spent their entire tour as ‘tail‘, yet participated in a fair number of combat ops - convoy ambushes, E&E after being shot down, etc.  I‘m sure your average NVA coolie sometimes ended up in combat as well, even if his job description didn‘t call for it.

But, NVA/VC soldiers routinely spent more time doing ‘tail‘ work because that‘s the nature of the beast when one is a grunt in an unsophisticated army.  By ‘unsophisticated‘ I don‘t mean they weren‘t effectiv - **** , they won! - but merely that their organizational structure during 1963-73 was more simplistic than the US Army.

<jumps off soapbox>

Former ‘tail‘ person,
Jim


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## Pugil (23 Jan 2003)

Old guy, a tour in Vietnam for an Americans conscript last about an year while for North Vietnamese, the years of military services could be extended until the war ends. Even though Americans fought on foreign soil, they were much better treated than their enemy. From food, money to  accomodation( when not in the field), they never really lacked of those things while their enemy once infiltrated in  South Vietnam have to stay low in the jungles or underground tunnels to avoid detection. One other thing is that they didnt have the same quality and quantity of equipment.


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## jrhume (23 Jan 2003)

There you go again.

An American conscript?

About 70% of the Americans who served in VN were volunteers - not necessarily volunteers for VN.  I and most of my fellow VN vets were not drafted for service.  About 30,000 of those vets were Canadian, by the way and all of those were volunteers.

I‘m well aware that our length of tour was generally limited to a year.  Mine was 361 days.  I don‘t know the percentage of soldiers serving more than one tour, but it was not small.  Probably 20-30 percent since career soldiers didn‘t have a choice.

Yes, NVA soldiers were usually in for the duration, although units did return to the North at times.  I have no figures on that.  What that has to do with ratios between ‘teeth‘ and ‘tail‘ I don‘t know.

I and all of the VN vets I know have a great deal of respect for those ‘rice-propelled bast*ards‘ who fought on the other side.  They persevered under great hardship and lost about 600,000 of their comrades during the war.  I don‘t swear by that number although it is supposed to come from North Vietnamese sources.  Suffice it to say that their losses were very high.

Jim


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## Pugil (23 Jan 2003)

__________________________________________
 They persevered under great hardship and lost about 600,000 of their comrades during the war. I don‘t swear by that number although it is supposed to come from North Vietnamese sources. Suffice it to say that their losses were very high.
__________________________________________

Did they count civilians in that number too? Did you know that more bombs were dropped during the Vietnam war than during WW2? Both side had
their advantages and disavantages. American may have quantity, better and more sophisticated equipment but NVA had a larger army

 You may contest the 10:1 ratio but you cant deny the fact that an ordinary GI has alot more support compared to an average NVA soldier. A regular US combat unit during operation has alot of assets from fire base, naval artillery, transportation to air suport while on the other side they were on their own once they crossed the DMZ.


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## jrhume (23 Jan 2003)

North Vietnam says they suffered about 12,000 civilian casualties from all causes.  That‘s quite low compared to WW2, for instance, and when compared to the anti-war folks outrageous claims of civilian deaths.

Civilian deaths in the South are another matter.  No one will ever know the true numbers of actual civilians killed in the South primarily because of the difficulty if determining who really was a non-combatant.  Over-zealous body-counting by some American forces further cloud the picture.  In the Delta, especially, civilians were sometimes caught in the crossfire between combatants.  VC units often purposely attacked American forces (and Aussie and Korean and ARVN) from the cover of villages, which made the situation even worse.  VC forces at various time pursued deliberate policies of murder in local villages.  Those units led by Northern cadre were the worst offenders.  

During Tet, ‘68, the NVA forces in Hue executed around 1300 civilians while they held the city.  After the fall of Saigon in 1975, perhaps as many as 500,000 southerners, both military and civilian, died in various re-education camps and due to revenge killings.  We will never know for sure because many SVN refugees died in the surrounding areas and at sea while trying to escape.  

I don‘t think anything I‘ve said disputes that there were considerable differences in the types and quality of support available to the opposing forces.  I just wanted to clarify your 10 ‘teeth‘ to 1‘tail‘ for the NVA/VC.  It simply wasn‘t so.

I have several books on the subject of NVA/VC operations and organization.  Michael Lee Lanning co-wrote one of them - I can‘t recall the exact title.  For a very good discussion of civilian deaths in the Delta, read "Steel My Soldier‘s Hearts" by David Hackworth.

Nothing to do with the Vietnam war is simple.  It may be that no war is simple.  Certainly no guerilla war ever is.

Jim


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## Jungle (23 Jan 2003)

Come on Old Guy, what do you know about Vietnam... don‘t argue with Pugil, he read about it all !!!


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## Pugil (24 Jan 2003)

Did I ever say or pretend to know everything? Did I offend you with my opinion? As far as I know a forum is for debate, what makes it interesting is the diversity of opinions. If everyone had the same opinion the topic would end at the very fist post. Im trying to share what I know OR what I think I know, and if that bothers you Jungle thats your problem not mine. Some may think im a bit aggressive with my arguments and that is understandable.


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## jrhume (24 Jan 2003)

For the record, Pugil, I think you come off as a bit anti-American at times, with an almost a knee-jerk sort of antipathy.  But I have no problem with the way you‘ve debated with me here.  

Your opinions appear to reflect some basic misconceptions about America, the US Army and Vietnam, but I hasten to point out that many US citizens harbor similar misconceptions.  The thing is, it isn‘t that hard to find good information about most history.  One just has to sift through often conflicting accounts and try to come to some sort of conclusion.

BTW, Micheal Lee Lanning‘s book is called "Inside the VC and the NVA".  It‘s a good read.

Jim


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## typhoon85 (24 Jan 2003)

Wow Pugil seems to you think that Americans really had it easy in Vietnam. I quess Pugil thinks that it was unfare to the NVA/VC that the US had all that support.

Pugil you have really taken to the NVA, you and Jane Fonda would make really great friends. 


Oh and Old Guy my Dad is also a Vietnam Veteran.He served in Vietnam with C/75 Ranger,  I Feild Force from 69-72. And spent 2 years in CONUS before that.


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## Jarnhamar (24 Jan 2003)

Just a note about quality of equipment. The NVA had M16s in vietnam before the americans did.


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## jrhume (24 Jan 2003)

Sean85,

Tell your old man ‘hello‘ from a fellow VN vet.

I served during ‘67 and ‘68.  I was transferring from one unit to another during Tet and was present in Bien Hoa during the excitement there.  In the Army area we had grandstand seats for two days worth of air strikes and helicopter gunship attacks on the force which struck at the airfield.  They alerted us to reinforce the perimeter during the second day - but luckily real infantrymen became available.  

Ghost778,
I hadn‘t heard that.  It would have had to be the AR-15 version.  Whatever they were, they didn‘t get much.  Colonel Hackworth, in "Steel my Soldier‘s Hearts" maintains that American GIs were always outgunned when they went up against NVA/VC armed with the AK-47 and RPG.  The M-16 simply did not function as well in combat conditions as the AK and our LAW was a joke compared to the RPG.  That‘s why he long advocated using infantry mostly as a blocking force and then applying concentrated air and artillery power against the enemy.  

Me, I don‘t know.  My personal weapon was usually an M-14, me being a REMF.  I never had to use it.  It‘s difficult to hit VC mortar crews from a couple miles away using an M-14, although I sure felt like trying many times.    

Jim


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## Jungle (24 Jan 2003)

Pugil, I have no problem with debating and difference of opinion. What I have a problem with is when someone goes in the "arguing to death" mode. I don‘t know how you can feel comfortable arguing about the Vietnam war with someone who was there while it was one of the worse places to be on the planet. Inexperienced theorists are certainly allowed an opinion, but there comes a time when you have to stop and listen to those who have been there and done that.


> Some may think im a bit aggressive with my arguments and that is understandable.


So you can be aggressive and we can‘t ?
Just my opinion... if you don‘t like it, it‘s not my problem.


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## Jungle (24 Jan 2003)

... now to keep in line with the topic: 
Ghost778, is it possible you are referring to the Armalite AR-10 ? The AR-10 was the forerunner of the M-16 / AR-15 family and was produced in 7.62mm NATO. The only country ever to buy a quantity of AR-10s was the Sudan, and they did not have them in inventory very long. It may be possible those AR-10s found their way to North Vietnam.


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## Jarnhamar (24 Jan 2003)

Well it‘s hard to remember those days    


You could be right actually, it may have been an AR10. 
But the referece I read in the book where I saw it specifically said that the enemy (I shouldnt say NVA because they came later right?) were using "M16s" while the US soldiers were still using M14s. 
I‘m inclined to believe it considering all the american supplies and "aid" that was turned up all over. Not being stole but "Donated to the people of north vietnam by your friends at berkley college" etc..


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## jrhume (24 Jan 2003)

Ghost,

I am inclined to disbelieve the ‘M-16‘ story.  The reference to AR-10s is possible, but also not likely.  Every reference I can recall speaks of the NVA/VC as being armed mostly with weapons like the AK-47 and variants thereof.  I had a bolt-action rifle once used by the VC.  It was a Chinese copy of a Russion weapon, if memory serves.  I can‘t recall the nomenclature after all these years.

NVA units and Main Force VC used mostly AK-47 types by 67-68.  Also in use were M-1 carbines, captured or stolen from the ARVN or picked up in various weapons channels throughout the Asia.  Captured M-14s, M-16s and M-60s are reported being in use quite often, but not as primary weapons.  If they had them they used them.

The research I‘ve done makes clear that the VC were always really a subset of the NVA.  At the very beginning of the war (our war, as opposed to the Vietnamese wars with the Japanese, the French and even the Chinese!) many local VC forces were drawn entirely from the populace, but as the war went on, these forces changed into more NVA-like formations, both in content and purpose - if that makes sense.

There are many different opinions on the NVA/VC argument, but the most telling one is that the VC infrastructure was almost completely ignored by the NVA after the 1975 victory.  Few, if any, VC units were represented in the massive victory celebrations, for instance.  Main Force VC made up mostly of local people persisted longest in the Delta, where conditions for such forces were the best.

One of the best fictional depictions of what it was like in a rifle company in the central areas of VN during the late ‘69, early ‘70 period is "The 13th Valley" by John M. DelVecchio.  I have a bookshelf full of VN history and fiction and it‘s still one of my favorites.

 
Jim


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## Jungle (25 Jan 2003)

> I had a bolt-action rifle once used by the VC. It was a Chinese copy of a Russion weapon, if memory serves


Probably talking about a Mosin-Nagant model 1891-30 or M1944. They were produced in enormous quantities and exported all over the planet.


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## Michael Dorosh (26 Jan 2003)

Old Guy - I believe VC infrastructure came to be largely irrelevant as early as the Tet season of 1968; like the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, the VC expended large amounts of current and reserve troops in a last-gasp offensive, and largely wiped themselves out.  I stand to be corrected, but the burden of the war was left more and more to the NVA after early 1968 - I would suppose by 1975 the structure of the VC was truly irrelevant.  My understanding anyway.

Incidentally, Welcome Home, in case you didn‘t hear it when you should have.

VC forces used a lot of weapons, as has been pointed out.  The French were using a lot of American weapons in the 1950s - M3 SMG, M1 SMG, M1 carbine, M1 Garand, etc, and so were South Vietnamese forces, so no doubt these made their way into "enemy" hands as well, in addition to the very nice SKS carbine, AK 47, etc.  As for Armalites or M16s....I‘d like to see the reference for that.


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## Jarnhamar (26 Jan 2003)

Thanks for the info Jim. Thats really interesting stuff.  I figured when i read that bit about the M16s it was probably something like while the americans were testing the m16s the vietnamiese some how got their hand on a few of them. I didn‘t mean to imply that the VC were using them as primary weapons only that  this soldier saw one in the enemies hands before they got them issued to them.
In either case i‘ll go through my collection and see if i can dug up the book and get an author name and exact quote from it.


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## jrhume (26 Jan 2003)

Michael, thank you.

You may be right about the rifle.  It could have been that one or even French.  Can‘t recall.  It‘s been too long.

I agree that the VC sort of became irrelevant after Tet of ‘68.  They lasted longer in the Delta.  Hackworth tells of engaging both small VC units and what he calls ‘Main Force VC‘, which I think are really NVA troopies.  They had sun helmets, blue uniforms and excellent equipment.  Regular units, for sure.

From February through July, ‘68 I experienced perhaps 60-80 mortar attacks at Dong Tam and then Vinh Long.  It‘s difficult to be sure of the number because we had them both at night and in the daytime, but mostly at night.  Often more than once a night.  Seldom more than 5-6 rounds at a time.  They were just letting us know they were still around and keeping us awake.

Most of the attacks were made with 60mm mortars, which are large enough to ruin your whole day, but portable enough to be handled by a three-man crew.  I only experienced two or three rocket attacks (107 & 120mm rockets) before rotating home in early August.  They were carrying them all the way from Haiphong, which is no small trek, so we didn‘t get too many that far south.  By the next spring they were being supplied via a seaport on the Cambodian coast and the use of rockets soared.

My experience in VN didn‘t give me the knowledge, such as it is, that I have of the war.  Most of that has come from reading.  The only real advantage I have is that blatant fallacies stand out because they don‘t fit the physical realities of the country and the military effort.

One has to try and read varying viewpoints and draw intelligent conclusions.  But, then, we have to do the same thing about any uncertainty we experience.    

Jim


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