# Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems



## Yard Ape

I think we should replace all of our regular force brigades with regiments.  As part of this change, regiments will incorporate both manouvre arms (infantry & cavalry).  As with the existing infantry & armoured regiments, only those personnel of the manouver arm will wear the cap badge while everyone else will have thier respective battalion slip-on & the brigade patch will be replaced by a regimental patch.

Those who have followed my posts will know that I feel a fourth brigade is required to fix ATOF and/or meet our operational needs.  My regimental formation proposal will reflect that.

I propose that the standard building block of these formations be the mechanized battalion.  Each battalion would have three rifle companies, a recce/surveilance company, an MGS Company, and a combat support company (Pioneer, Mortar, TOW).

Each formation would still have four manouver units.  While I am showing manouver units as being identical & in line with the army's intention to go without tanks, the proposal has much more flexibility.  A regiment could be designated as heavy & have a tank Bn (with 1 rifle coy & 3 tank Coy) or heavy mech (with 2 rifle coy & 2 tank coy).  Other combinations are equally possible.

The formations of our army would be as follows:

*RCR*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 RCR (Mech Bn)
2 RCR (Mech Bn)
3 RCR (Mech Bn)
4 RCR (Mech Bn)
6 RCR (Cbt Engr Bn)
7 RCR (Fd Amb)
8 RCR (Svc Bn)

*PPCLI*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 PPCLI (Mech Bn)
2 PPCLI (Mech Bn)
3 PPCLI (Mech Bn)
4 PPCLI (Mech Bn)
6 PPCLI (Cbt Engr Bn)
7 PPCLI (Fd Amb)
8 PPCLI (Svc Bn)

*R22eR*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 R22eR (Mech Bn)
2 R22eR (Mech Bn)
3 R22eR (Mech Bn)
4 R22eR (Mech Bn)
6 R22eR (Cbt Engr Bn)
7 R22eR (Fd Amb)
8 R22eR (Svc Bn)

*1 Canadian Light Brigade Group*
Bde HQ & Sigs
1 Cdn Para Bn (Airborne)
5 PPCLI (Light Bn)
5 RCR (Light Bn)
5 R22eR (Light Bn)
1 Cbt Engr Bn
1 Fd Amb
1 Svc Bn

*RCHA*
Bde HQ & Sigs [located in Shilo]
1 RCHA [located with 1 CLBG]
2 RCHA [located with RCR]
3 RCHA [located with PPCLI]
4 RCHA [located with R22eR]


----------



## RKC73

YardApe,

Where are the troops going to come from?  16 Battalions? Really?  Also, why does everyone in Canada think Mech forces are the best defence for a country surounded by three oceans, an Arctic, mountains, thousands of lakes and waterways and massive forests.  There are three provinces in the centre of the country where they may be of use.  I know that Saskatchewan is a tempting target, but really, couldn't we see the Army focusing on other things?

I am not saying to ignore the capability completely - but four Bdes of Mech?  What about developing the Army's woeful Airmobile capabilities, or better yet looking at amphibious capabilities which would allow the Army to move it's own troops, vehicles and equipment?

Light forces are actually in much higher demand historically - because they are relatively cheap and easier to deploy, the last two Gulf Wars notwithstanding.  Apart from WW1, WW2 and Korea (where dismounted troops were the norm) most of the 20th Century saw brushfire wars where light forces reigned supreme.  Glad to see you brought back 1 Can Para though - well done.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Where are the vehicles going to come from?

I think this order of battle was simply cut and pasted from some Australian web site, no?


----------



## Kirkhill

How about trying this one on for size.  The game plan is to try to make best use of forces available, within the numbers available, maintain regimental focus, supply a national defence main effort with significant capability to deploy forces overseas under three conditions, immediate reaction (light), warfighting (medium/heavy), sustained garrisons (peace-support)


3 Brigades (1,2 and 5 CBGs), each composed of two light battle groups optimized for peace-support/domestic security tasks.  â Å“Garrisonâ ? forces.

These battle-groups composed of 3 light infantry rifle companies, an engineer squadron, a large lt armd squadron of LAVIIIs and/or Coyotes for patrol and reaction forces with MGS and TUA troop or troops, a lt arty bty of 105s and 81s and a surveillance/mapping/obs bty.  Complete with medical support, fwd and rear logistic support and transport.  Configured to deploy easily on 1 or 2 JSS or equivalent vessels.

These would be infantry battle groups with an attached squadron of armd types (eg 1PPCLI + D LdSH and 2 PPCLI + E LdSh)


1 Brigade (4 CBG) configured around the Cavalry Regiments.

Three Regimental Groups with 1 Squadron MGS/TUA/MMEV and 2/3 Squadrons with LAVIII /MGS/TUA plus 2 attached companies of infantry (pys could be reconfigured to fill 3 coy/sqns at reduced manning levels).

1 Recce Squadron

1 Arty Regiment with 3 CS Btys, 1 GS Bty and 1 Obsn and Fire Control Bty.

1 Engr Regiment to include field, plant and armd sqns.

Necessary support.


Finally 

1 Airborne Regiment of 3 rifle coys, 1 Long Range Patrol coy, 1 Eng sqn and 1 Lt Bty .

LRP Coy to include both wheeled and dismounted capabilities. Rifle coys to be independently deployable.





The Cavalry Brigade would prepare for mobile warfare.  Full Stop. They would likely find employment in counter-insurgency efforts gone bad or in allied war-fighting coalitions.


The Airborne Regiment would prepare rapid reaction in Canada AND Internationally.  Aircraft necessary.  DFAIT missions,  Evacuation of Nationals, Insertion of DART Team into a Hostile Environment (Sudan).


The â Å“Garrisonâ ? Forces would spend most of their life in Canada but could support one Afghanistan type mission indefinitely and an additional mission for one or two rotos.

These â Å“Garrisonsâ ? would train to supply security in hostile environments.  Part of their mission and structure would be to interact and train with local forces.

They could practice these skills at home with the militia, rangers and domestic police, fire and health agencies.  

To this end, of the 6 available battle groups, 4 would be assigned to the 4 areas, one would be on deployment overseas and one would be in reserve/training.

The 4 area assigned groups, manned at various levels of readiness (personnel of leave or courses) would be tasked with supplying training personnel to work with the 9 or 10 Militia Groups and the 5 Ranger Groups.

Rangers would continue doing what they do, (presence).  Militia would train for Vital Point Security and Urban Conflict as well as supplying Engineering, Transport and Communications support to Civil Powers during civil emergencies.

Area Commanders would therefore have under command 1-2 Ranger Groups for Long Range Patrols domestically, 2-3 Light Infantry Militia Groups of about 1500 personnel for domestic security tasks, 1 Reg Force "Garrison" element capable of responding to armed incidents and also passing along lessons learned.

The Federal Government would have available 2 peace-support "Garrisons", one deployed, one in reserve,  as well as  a rapid intervention force (airborne) with a large element of Green "SF" types in the LRP coy and finally a useable/deployable force capable of supplying a valuable contribution to our allies in a High Intensity conflict - maybe not in the main effort but perhaps on flanks or even forward screen/recce.


Howzat?? ;D

Cheers.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

It is harder to train light forces in a mech role then vice versa IMO.

P.S.   Aren't we the last western army to still practice section attacks, ie vehicle does battle run, "DISMOUNT, DISMOUNT, DISMOUNT"

I would also add that instead of using existing regiments you might consider new regiments or previously disbanded ones such as the Black Watch.  That way those that fill these new BN that are taken out of there former unit will not fell disenfranchised.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Perhaps your thoughts should be put to paper and sent up the chain (if it hasn't happened already).


----------



## Yard Ape

RKC73 said:
			
		

> 16 Battalions? Really?


  ATOF is based on 12 manouvre units.  I have only added 4.



			
				RKC73 said:
			
		

> Where are the troops going to come from?


  Liberals promised them.  They'd better start sewing.



			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> Where are the vehicles going to come from?


Fleet Managment (until we get a wiser government)



			
				Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> I think this order of battle was simply cut and pasted from some Australian web site, no?


It is on no Ausie site that I know of.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> 3 x Brigades (1,2 and 5 CBGs), each composed of two light battle groups optimized for peace-support/domestic security tasks.  â Å“Garrisonâ ? forces.
> 
> 1 x Brigade (4 CBG) configured around the Cavalry Regiments.
> 
> 
> 1 x Airborne Regiment


I suggest using the regiment as a formation as it will eliminate inter-regimental rivalry as a source of friction.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Don't you think disbanding the armoured regiments and making the crewmen rebadge to infantry would not cause problems as well?


----------



## Kirkhill

Quote from: Yard Ape, Today at 09:07:32


> Quote from: Kirkhill on Yesterday at 13:16:05
> 3 x Brigades (1,2 and 5 CBGs), each composed of two light battle groups optimized for peace-support/domestic security tasks.  â Å“Garrisonâ ? forces.
> 
> 1 x Brigade (4 CBG) configured around the Cavalry Regiments.
> 
> 
> 1 x Airborne Regiment
> I suggest using the regiment as a formation as it will eliminate inter-regimental rivalry as a source of friction.



Quote from: Ex-Dragoon, Today at 10:10:48


> Don't you think disbanding the armoured regiments and making the crewmen rebadge to infantry would not cause problems as well?



Can't we have our cake and eat it too?

Have 1,2 and 5 Brigades configured to supply 2 Regimental Combat Teams (1/2 PPCLI, 1/2 RCR, 1/2 R22R with permanent armoured attachments) and have the Cavalry Brigade form from 3 Regiments (LdSh, RCD, 12RBC with permanent infantry attachments)

Like Ex-Dragoon, I too think that eliminating the Armoured Regiments' titles may be asking for too large a pill to be swallowed.

Besides, I like tradition and it is pretty hard to buy it or concoct it.

Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

> Besides, I like tradition and it is pretty hard to buy it or concoct it.
> 
> Cheers.



Ever heard of the Canadian Expeditionary Force?  Do you think 260 seperate battalions really all  perpetuated pre-war infantry regiments?  You had all kinds of regimental traditions, just add water, in a very short time - cap badges and all.  Concocted?  You bet your ass.

Ever heard of Hamilton Gault?  Seems to me he paid for an entire regiment out of thin air (was the last one to do that, incidentally, but the point is, it was done, and hey - someone in this thread is even advocating that they be one of just four infantry regiments in Canada).

I don't agree that we should do it, but take a look at the CEF and tell me half the units didn't pull traditions out of their asses.  The Tenth Battalion certainly did, and won more glory for itself than just about anyone.  Not to mention 60 MMs in a single battle, at Hill 70.  Not bad for a unit with no history and no name other than "Tenth Canadians."


----------



## Kirkhill

You would have to bring up "The Fighting Tenth". 

Fair Comment Michael.  However now that we have those traditions isn't there advantage to nurturing them?

As I said I like tradition.  For me it supplies something of an anchor, a steadying influence.  A sense that whatever is happening today people just like us have gone through it all before and have survived it.

I think that is worth something.


----------



## Spr.Earl

Tradition and history makes for co-hesion and moral.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You would have to bring up "The Fighting Tenth".
> 
> Fair Comment Michael.  However now that we have those traditions isn't there advantage to nurturing them?
> 
> As I said I like tradition.  For me it supplies something of an anchor, a steadying influence.  A sense that whatever is happening today people just like us have gone through it all before and have survived it.
> 
> I think that is worth something.



I agree completely, but in order for us to preserve it, we need to better identify reasons why we should do so.  And those reasons need to be acceptable not to us, but to the majority of civilians in this country, who are the ones who really make the decisions.


----------



## AmmoTech90

There is an interesting submission to the new Canadian Army Journal that suggests something similiar to this, but takes it a bit further.  The author suggests splitting the Army into basically field and non-field branches, never the two to meet.
There is an equally interesting rebuttal to the article further on in the journal.
I know the Army Electronic Library is available through the internet but I'm not sure of the address.  I'm sure its available through this website's wonderful search feature.


----------



## Gunner

The Canadian Army Journal can be found at:

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_7/CAJ_vol7.1_e.pdf


----------



## Yard Ape

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Don't you think disbanding the armoured regiments and making the crewmen rebadge to infantry would not cause problems as well?


I had thought on this.  One option is for the PPCLI to be the light formation and keep the RCD as the third mech formation.

12 RBC exists in the reserves, so it would not be lost if it left the regular order of battle.  Unfortunattly, I cannot find a place for the LdSH.


----------



## McG

Yard Ape said:
			
		

> I suggest using the regiment as a formation as it will eliminate inter-regimental rivalry as a source of friction.


You may eliminate rivalry within the formation, but is it likely to become more competative between regimental "mafias" at the Army level?


----------



## Infanteer

I don't think you could ever get beyond "regimental mafias"; it seems to be the price you pay for building around a unit affiliation.  We can only rely on professionalism to work against regimental patronage.  An example would be the Airborne Regiment CO in Somalia; Col Kenward was deemed to be the best choice to take over the Regiment, however, the Vandoo Colonel got the job because it was the Vandoo's "turn" at assuming command of the unit.  In this case regimental patronage won over professionalism, the bedrock of our profession, and the CF as a whole ended up wearing it.

I agree fully with Yard Ape in most respects; my idea on the matter is to move Regimental Affilation from being branch related to being formaton related.  For example, all soldiers within 1 CMBG would be PPCLI, regardless of trade.  Perhaps any Light Infantry formation can be drawn from the Infantry Corps while a mechanized or armoured formation would draw its names from the current Armoured Corps.

As someone mentioned earlier, it might be expedient to use regiments besides the ones that exist now in order to prevent any accusations of favoritism.  In fact, as Michael mentions, we could probably name our Regiments after a numbered regiment (ie: 1st Regiment, 2nd Regiment, etc).  It makes no difference if a regiment is named or numbered, the US Marine Corps possess many illustrious number regiments (heck, we have R22R, 8CH, and 48Highlanders).

The crux of a Regimental system is how it manages both individual career patterns and unit manning in order to build stronger cohesion and how this system fits into your doctrine and organization.


----------



## pbi

Yard Ape: the concept and ORBAT you propose has some strong similarities to the USMC. In the Marines there are not really separate "branches" as we know them, although separate MOCs exist. All Marine battalions are (usually) part of a numbered Marine Regiment, but all Marines are just that: Marines. There is one cap badge and one USMC heritage (of which Marines are very aware and fiercely proud), although the subordinate regiments and battalions are aware of their own individual battle honours and histories, there is none of the divisiveness we experience in our tiny army with numerous branches and corps competing with each other. There are exceptions to this system, such as USMC aviation units and some special organizations, but in general they follow this structure in a Marine Corps of four divisions (three Active, one Reserve). Cheers. (And keep on thinking...!!)


----------



## Michael Dorosh

But if there is a perceived problem with the way the regiments are doing business now, and if renaming them (or simply numbering them) isn't going to "make a difference" - then why would we think renaming them would change the problems, either?


----------



## Yard Ape

pbi said:
			
		

> Yard Ape: the concept and ORBAT you propose has some strong similarities to the USMC.


The similarities were not intentional, but are typically pointed out when I talk about this with others.  I would suggest that the USMC in many ways is like a regiment (though very large).  To those who suggest a single pan-Canadian regiment, I would like to know if they think the USMC would be as proud if it were [just] another Corps of the US Army.  Much of the Corps' pride comes from the fact that it is not just like everybody else.  This is why I propose keeping regiments despite thier risk of mafia.  However, buy mixing the manouver arms the regiments would no longer be bastions of inter-arm rivalry.  Regiments would fight both infantry & armour perspectives.  

Much like the BGs we send overseas Arty, Engrs, Cbt Sp, & CSS would wear thier own cap badge.  I see it this way because members of these MOCs often serve in more than just one of our current brigades (or they serve in Air or Sea units).  By not tying these MOCs to specific regiments, thier corps will still have the flexibility to move pers as needed.


----------



## ArmyRick

Not trying to steer this conversation in another direction but it is related to army structure.
 I read some interesting articles recently from senior officers about revamping the regimental system. I can see both pro and cons with this.
The pro: CF always deploy combined arms battle groups when deploying combat arms, this could make overall C & C easier as well admin if the battle groups were permament organizations
Cons? Thats alot of regimental and corps history and traditions to just simply dismiss or change overnight. What do you guys think?


----------



## Matt_Fisher

Exploring a new regimental system from two points of view 
Friday, November 05, 2004

http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?id=312

Present security operations require Western armies to engage in high-speed interventions, urban asymmetric fighting, and stability engagements.


OTTAWA, Ontario â â€ The Canadian Army Journal Volume 7.1 Spring 2004 featured an article "The New Regimental system (NRS)" by Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy. Included were comments by retired Lieutenant-Colonel David Banks. 

LCol Bondy is responsible to generate concepts and discussion papers to shape Army culture. His ideas on the regimental system are aimed at developing specific force structure and personnel policy options for debate by the broader Army and Canadian Forces community. 

LCol Bondy developed a concept paper, which proposes that the Army abandon its historical practice of maintaining separate Combat Arms pure-branch regiments and supporting units for a single Combat Branch. Focus on making the best use of all available capabilities in order to produce the most flexible and combat effective force possible. The current force structure and personnel strategy has become out of date since the WWII and does not suit our defence needs in the post-Cold War. It's food for thought and debate says LCol Bondy.

"A set of opposing camps dug in holding on to traditional roles or worse, specific pieces of equipment," says LCol Bondy of the Land Personnel Concepts and Policies office. When a culture gets that deeply ingrained, only an abrupt change to its force structure and personnel policies can initiate meaningful cultural transformation.

Brigade-sized regiments must be all-arms, all the time, cohesive, adaptable, and maneuverable on the scale of the battle group and combat team. The New Regimental system provides cohesion, stability, experience and focused professional soldiers required for today's operational requirements.

Why do we need a new regimental system?

LCol Bondy: Since the end of the Cold War, the defence tasks and deployments have changed. Present security operations require Western armies to engage in high-speed interventions, urban asymmetric fighting, and stability engagements. In order to meet the challenges, the Army not only must adapt and modernize with the latest technology and tactics but also change its culture. 

Every operational and tactical deployment since 1992 has been all-arms, combined teams; it is time for a restructure so that the Army can meet the full range of post Cold War security tasks. Armies in Sweden, Poland and Austria have made similar reforms.

The argument is that military culture determines the pace and ultimately the success of Army Transformation. Research shows that personnel policies that affect postings, promotions, and selection have the greatest impact on military culture. Our personnel strategy has to change if the army is to succeed in transforming its culture, technology and tactics.

The active posting season shifts people between units for no real gain in efficiency. Again research shows that any one person does not make much difference to a unit. Constant turnover only weakens unit cohesion and performance. Cohesion strengthens group moral and combat effectiveness, and this comes from realistic repetitive training and stable relationships, and informal communication that build reputations. As much as possible, people stay at one location, in the New Regiment.

LCol Banks: Changes made since the 1960's must be rolled back to support force structure and professionalism. In order to achieve this goal, the CF needs to de-unify the forces and focus on operational jointness instead of administrative unification. LCol Banks supports exploring a single combat branch to replace the existing armour, artillery and infantry but through different approaches. If the Army cannot maintain armour and artillery branches that provide significant support that a modern and complete infantry unit could generate, these branches should be reduced to sub-military occupational classifications (MOCs) or employment streams within a single, centralized MOC. 

Branches for a reason, not invent reasons for branches. He says the stage is set for this exploration. LCol Banks does not see how implementation of a new, decentralized personnel strategy would create a better Army as a whole.
This concept paper will create more problems beyond even what the Army is faced with now says LCol Banks. 

What is the proposed New Regiment (NR)?

LCol Bondy: Each new regiment would have officers and soldiers belonging exclusively to it, that is, one cap badge for every member. Each new regiment is a combined arms, brigade-sized battle group, including logistics, administration and finance support. Sub-units vary in size from battalions to sections that are custom-sized for tasking, training, and detachments. Each regiment would be identified by its own name. In the event of a section tasking or peacekeeping mission, a temporary name such as Task Force Palladium would identify that specific group. 

Every officer and soldier in the Army will spend the first 10-15 years of their service life with the New Regiment. This phase of army training and adapting to army culture is the best way to make everyone a soldier first. They are recruited from the surrounding region to reduce moves for personal reasons. Everyone is deployable. Civilians provide all non-deployable office and technical support. New Specialist Corps and New General Staff subgroups provide support to the NR and monitor, guide and direct other aspects of their culture, technology and tactics. 

LCol Banks: The Army should be structured for flexibility and balance, and organized to meet the full range of post Cold War security tasks. He says that LCol Bondy offers a weak basis for his proposal. The Army should use proven facts and lessons learned to perform the necessary checks to determine the truth. There is a lack of stability in combat arms units and it has been a serious problem for years. 

However, it is not clear how this proposed system of endless regrouping for various task forces would strengthen cohesion, especially at the unit level. Leaving a member in one job for more then three years and having a rigid promotion system could lead to general stagnation. This is the current situation â â€ officers are too frequently extended or recycled and others serve in units for years due to a severe lack of personnel. 

Restricting soldiers' careers within one single Combat branch does not create an agile, flexible, adaptable force. He supports a personnel system in which soldiers of all ranks remain at the same location for several years, much of that time with the same battalion. He concedes that there may be something to part of LCol Bond's concept.

What is the new general staff?

LCol Bondy: The New General Staff (NGS) is a small group of officers responsible for strategy, civilian-military relations and developing technological, tactical and cultural changes that fit contemporary security policy. The New General Staff sets the policy for individual and collective training, equipment use and other issues, to create balance and interoperability among the New Regiments. They are not responsible for the day to day management, that is left to the New Regiments or the civilian office. 

LCol Banks: This idea is flawed and is likely to contribute to an Army with little esprit de corps or cohesion. The proposal to only allow for mid-career transfer from one unit to another would produce a field army led by officers limited in experience and knowledge who are detached from the reality of operations.

What is the new specialist corps?

LCol Bondy: A series of separate New Specialists Corps would be formed around traditional professions, and the new general staff social professions to provide the kind of discipline that makes Canadians such good soldiers. The New Specialist Corps would include: military law, chaplains, personnel selection, social work, counseling, family services, medical and dental care. The NSC uses a separate rank structure and wears uniform distinct from the NR and NGS. LCol Bondy's argument in this issue is summarized in the Canadian Army Journal.

LCol Banks: Based on my experience, says LCol Banks, supporters work best with and for the field army when they look, sound and act like the soldiers they are supporting. It is an excellent idea to have the supporters belong to the New Regiment but why not go further and ensure that those who serve in the Army are taught that they are a "soldier first, tradesman or support second." 

All told, it is interesting to contrast LCol Bondy's article that draws upon research from writing on military affairs and social science and LCol Banks' article that relies on his personal experience and military career. 

Article by Sgt Derek Scott

-------------------------------------------------

Interesting read.  The full article can be viewed at the Canadian Army Journal site:
http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_7/CAJ_vol7.1_e.pdf

PBI, 

I tend to agree with your viewpoint regarding the New General Staff and the New Specialist Corps.  Officers within the New General Staff would likely become strict academics with little real-world experience that is necessary when determining defence strategy and policy.  
The New Specialist Corps would further drive the wedge that currently exists between support and combat arms soldiers.

The New Regiment idea however is something that is worth exploring given the drawdown of the Armour and Artillery branches.


----------



## a_majoor

My own thoughts on the matter are we can get the many of same benefits without the radical surgery Col Bondy is proposing.

Step one might be to treat the Brigade battlegroup in the same manner as a US Cavalry Regiment or Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Units and branches will still remain, but are de emphasised in favor of the Brigade (i.e I'm with Duke's Coy of 2 Battlegroup) as part of the cultural realignment.

Step two follows from the ever increasing convergence of weapons systems. When the Anti-Armour platoon can attempt engagements from 8+ Km away (ADATS MMEV, or alternatively ground launched Hellfires replacing the TOW), and sensor fused munitions could potentially give an MGS commander to ability to shoot a target 10+ km away, then the physical distinctions between Armour, Artillery and Infantry become moot. "Manoeuvre Battalions" can be formed with a mix of direct and indirect fire platforms, teamed with mounted Infantry soldiers to provide escort, close protection, target acquisition and sensing and close combat duties. Essentially each "company" will be a self contained combat team.

An Armoured Squadron is a good organizational starting point. It has a square structure of four symmetrical troops, and an administration troop for sustainment in battle. A Manoeuvre Battalion company could have a troop (platoon) of direct fire platforms, a troop (platoon) of indirect fire platforms and two troops (platoons) of mounted Infantry, as well as the administration troop (platoon). Our current mix of LAV systems shows the way, although the fire platform needs a lot of work. Alternative fire platforms might include 120mm turret mounted mortars with "smart" munitions, gun tanks firing through tube missiles and so on. Old regimental titles could still be kept, but the functional distinctions between the units will be gone. Each unit in the Battlegroup will have 3 "Manoeuvre companies", a Headquarters company and an ISTAR company (for example) regardless of its historical title.

My own view of staffs is they need to support direct "sensor to shooter" links, support horizontal communications between the deployed manoeuvre companies and do the thinking and planning in the background to "set up" logistics and support in an unobtrusive manner, so the company commander isn't innundated with requests for information from above, nor "info-dump" from higher. This is an idealized vision of how things are supposed to work now.


----------



## Edward Campbell

There is an ailment called _age related macular degeneration_ which causes old folks to not see too much or too well.   I, like many of my generation, may have difficulty in 'seeing' the requirements of the 21st century army; we - some of us, anyway - tend to view *our* past and *our* army through rose coloured glasses which also smooth out all the rough edges.   With that caveat, here are some random thoughts:

"¢	The _regimental system_ has been around since Roman times; things which last that long tend to be useful.   We have understood, for a couple of millennia, that soldiers will endure any privation and they will fight against hopeless odds *for* their mates, and, with almost the same intensity, for the _eagles_ and _colours_ and other symbols and even ideas which tell them that they and their mates belong to this _family_ and everyone else belongs to other _families_ - some friends, some enemy.   We, generations of leaders going back to the mists of time, have exploited this very human attribute - one which is well known to every minor hockey coach.   Radical change may be desirable, even necessary but let us approach changes with caution - not fear, just caution;

"¢	The Canadian regimental system _circa_ 2004 is not sacrosanct; some people - me included - will say that it is in urgent need of reform.   The regimental system has ebbed and flowed over the centuries.   The one we have was designed to exploit the religious, racial, linguistic and cultural differences which plagued 18th/19th century India and Britain, too - consider, as I have said elsewhere, the *requirement* for the _Cameronians_ so that _covenanters_ did not need to serve beside Church of England and, even, Church of Scotland apostates.   We have changed in the past we can - will - change in the future;

"¢	There is, equally, nothing sacred about the infantry and the cavalry - except that we have believed, for about 2,000 years, that they should be organized into different 'regiments' for training and to take account of their different attributes.   Maybe the distinctions between those attributes are disappearing;

"¢	*I, personally, believe* that one attribute of a 'good' (effective at enhancing individual and unit combat effectiveness) regimental system is that it *must be large enough to prevent a monopoly*.   We saw a monopoly, and some of its ill effects in 1990 during Lewis MacKenzie's testimony at the Somalia inquiry.   MacKenzie testified that after the brigade commander (Ernie Beno) had fired the R22eR CO then he (MacKenzie, the Area Commander) and Gord Reay (Commander of   the Command) and John de Chastelain (CDS) - the complete chain of command - all sat together to decide what to do next.   They decided that the best thing to do was to send the best infantry lieutenant colonel to Petawawa, quickly; then they amended that to the *best available* lieutenant colonel (so as not to take serving COs out of their units, etc); and then, when they looked at the list, they decided to pick the _best available R22eR_ lieutenant colonel because they (all three PPCLI) were concerned (I think that's the word Lew used - it is what he meant) that it would *appear* that the PPCLI _mafia_ was ganging up to serve its own interests.   The problem is: they were right - many, maybe most people would have thought just that.   It is *my belief* that the system needs, *at least* about ten, maybe a dozen regiments in addition to the artillery, logistics, engineers and signals (the latter two having provided a disproportionately large share of senior officers, including CGS/CDS in the post WWII army/CF) to prevent monopolization of the chain of command.   I think we might be, just barely, OK if we had five or ten single (permanent force) battalion infantry regiments plus four or five (or more) cavalry regiments; and

"¢	Good, effective regiments are expensive and they are easy targets when budgets are being cut.   Regiments need museums and the like and 'resources' to keep the 'regiment' in the soldiers' mind.   It even extends to clothing and equipment - polyester and plastic will, *I think*, degrade esteem and _spirit de corps_, if we want serge and polished leather performance then we have to pay for it.


----------



## a_majoor

I fully agree. The Regimental system has many benefits, but what Col Bondy is saying is the current structure is inefficient and inflexible. A larger "regiment" like the Cavalry/IBCT is one way of creating a bigger "gene pool" of talent and ideas; maintaining regimental titles and traditions on a 21rst century version of the combat team/battlegroup is another option.

I agree more with Col Banks that the proposed supporting structures of a "New General Staff" and a "New Specialist Corps" will probably cause more problems than they are intended to solve. I have also noticed the NR/NGS/NSC concept seems rather self contained. Has Col Bondy published any follow ups to how this structure will operate as part of Joint Expeditionary Force packages?


----------



## rifleman

Here's an idea, 

How about keep the regiments and create combat teams and battle groups as they are needed. (or we can spend alot of money and resources on new names, terminology and cap badges) 

Another great idea is to have everyone wear the same uniform (perhaps all green, maybe red pants and white shirts so everyone can tell we are canadians)

We could also create one big military city and put all the forces there. think of the savings


----------



## Matt_Fisher

I'm eagerly awaiting the summer issue of the Canadian Army Journal to be put online as I don't have access to the hard copy edition down here in the US.


----------



## Kirkhill

About the time the Cameronians were being raised the latest fashion in military thinking was the Dragoon.   A mounted commoner on an adequate horse equipped as both an infanteer with a musket and as a cavalryman with a sword. They were raised to patrol the countryside and to keep anti-government elements in line.   King James VI used this type of soldier to subdue the Anglo-Scots border, Bonnie Dundee used similar forces to subdue the Covenanters and the Sun King (Louis XIV) used them (the first named Dragons/Dragoons) to subdue the Huguenots.

The force was considered an abomination by military traditionalists.   They were poor infantry and they weren't "Good" enough to be aristocratic cavalry.   However over time they were accepted into the Cavalry family as suitable outfits for the lesser gentry to command.   They tended to think of themselves as Cavalry and not Mounted Infantry.

By the time of the Boer War, Britain need mounted forces to dominate the countryside in South Africa.   They created Mounted Infantry units from line infantry regiments and brought in mounted colonial forces like the Aussie Light Horse regiments and the Lord Strathcona's which was heavily recruited from the Northwest Mounted Police (started life as the Northwest Mounted RIFLES).   Interestingly enough the Royal Canadian Dragoons was at least appropriately named for the role requested of it.

In WWI Cavalry didn't see much action in Europe but horse soldiers were in demand under Allenby in the Middle East.   

There was an interesting Australian movie about the Light Horse under Allenby.   The centre-piece of the movie was the flanking manoeuvre and assault to take the wells at BeerSheba to the south of Jerusalem.   The approach was made successfully but then the assault had to be put in, in daylight across a large plain with no cover.   The Light Horse, acting as mounted infantry and armed with Lee-Enfields and bayonets were tasked.   The Cavalry types armed with swords objected that if any charging was to be done then they should be the ones to do it.   The Light Horse conducted the assault.

Point of this historical excursion?


Regimental roles have changed and changed back many times.   Novelty is always opposed by the entrenched.   Even when novelty means going back to the future.

Ultimately I don't think the Regiment is about role, kit or uniform.   I think it is about continuity.   It is about staying connected with your ancestors and saying if they could sit under the guns at Blenheim, dying while having lunch and waiting for the order to assault, if they could pick up roses to stick in their hats while advancing at Minden, then maybe I can withstand the noise around me now and wait for orders.

Everything else is about how best to maintain that continuity.


----------



## a_majoor

Col Bondy's article and Col Bank's reply are in CAJ Vol 7 No 1 Spring 2004. If you are having difficulty finding a copy Matt, contact me off-line. 

Kirkhill has said it far better than I could have, rifleman. A regiment is an organization and a place for people. The jobs they do and how they do them will change with time, just like it does everywhere else. Imagine trying to build cars today using the organization of Ford Motor Company in 1920. Because our jobs are different, the strength of the organization is far more important than it would be to a labourer in a civvie factory.


----------



## Edward Campbell

A few more random thoughts:

"¢	Re: _*exploiting*_ differences - we probably must have some form of the classic regimental system in Canada because of our linguistic divide.   We will have French speaking regiments and they will become more and more different no matter what sort of uniformity someone might want to impose.   Better, I am saying, to get on with _â ?doin' what come natcherly;â ?_

"¢	I would go a bit farther.   If we are going to reform, as I think we must, and if reform includes enlargement, as I think it must, then I would prefer to see us adopt and then exploit good ol' Canadian regionalism.   Back in about 1920 it was decided that the small permanent force (peacetime, regular army) would be slightly larger than its 19th century predecessor: three (single PF battalion) regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry; it was also decided that they would be 'national' rather than regional and that one of the infantry regiments would be a French Canadian (rather than a Québec) regiment: RCD, LdSH, RCR, PPCLI and R22eR.   Post World War II, in 1949 actually, the big expansion too place - and three new, but still 'national' regiments of infantry were added.   Now, a bit of history is important.   Guy Simmonds was CGS and he was a notorious anglophile so he insisted that we be as British as possible: his pet project was the Regiment of Canadian Guards; he insisted that 1 Canadian Highland Battalion in Hannover be made into the Black Watch and he selected the Queens' Own Rifles as the most 'national' (and most British) of the light infantry regiments.   The VIII New Brunswick Hussars were renamed VIII Canadian Hussars and, somehow, the Fort Gary Horse snuck in as the only faintly 'regional' regiment in the army.   I thought Simmonds was wrong; I thought we should have added 'regional' regiments to the mix, but ...

"¢	I agree 100% with Kirkhill that regiments are about continuity but I think we err if we pay too little attention to 'buttons and bows' and, especially, to the quality of our ceremonial endeavours.   It is my experience that soldiers work bloody hard to make big ceremonial events 'work' well and that they derive considerable, albeit quiet personal satisfaction from having been on the 'best ever' trooping, etc.   I think they would rather polish a good leather belt than wear a plastic one ... I'm old, so treat that with more suspicion than usual; I also usually had a batman so the 'satisfaction' I derived from being well turned-out didn't cost me too much time and effort.


----------



## Kirkhill

I also agree with Rusty Old Joint about Buttons and Bows and Ceremonial.  Those are the tokens and talismen that supply constant reminders of our ancestors.  They are critical to maintaining continuity.  It is a large part of the reason that the Strats have a mounted troop, the RCR wear's Wolseley pattern helmets and the King's Troop Royal Horse Artillery still rides around Hyde Park firing highly polished and obsolete 13-pounders. It's the reason for kilts and pipes.  It is all about maintaining those links. 

Sorry ROJ, it wasn't ceremonial kit I was knocking.  It was a focus on the musket and pike, horse and elephant type of kit I was referring to.  Sorry for the confusion.

Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Good topic.   I'm currently reading a pretty good attempt at a Regimental History of the X Legion "Fretensis".   The nuances of the Roman system of raising and maintaining legions gives some pretty interesting insights in the way to organize combat units in a Regimental (tribe or clan like) fashion.

More to follow as a collect my thoughts....


----------



## Jungle

Rusty Old Joint said:
			
		

> MacKenzie testified that after the brigade commander (Ernie Beno) had fired the R22eR CO then he (MacKenzie, the Area Commander) and Gord Reay (Commander of   the Command) and John de Chastelain (CDS) â â€œ the complete chain of command - all sat together to decide what to do next.


Just for historical accuracy, LCol Morneault was PPCLI, not R22eR. His replacement (LCol Mathieu), however, was R22eR.
The first thing we should look at (at least in the RegF) is to untie the member from a specific Regt. Members should be able to be posted to any Battalion (language being a natural factor to look at) according to needs. This would probably make a smoother transition to any "new" Regt'l system.


----------



## Infanteer

> The first thing we should look at (at least in the RegF) is to untie the member from a specific Regt. Members should be able to be posted to any Battalion (language being a natural factor to look at) according to needs. This would probably make a smoother transition to any "new" Regt'l system



So you're advocating a system more akin to the US Army, where members transfer in and out of different Regiments and Divisions throughout their career?  Or something akin to the Aussies, which have one big regiment (for the reg Infantry), the RAR.


----------



## Jungle

Either system is fine, in my opinion, but the US model would probably be easier to transition to in Canada.
In the end, we should look at the Aussie model closely; it has all the advantages of the British Regt'l system, with Regt'l "loyalties" going to a single capbadge for all (RegF) Infanteers.


----------



## McG

Jungle said:
			
		

> In the end, we should look at the Aussie model closely; it has all the advantages of the British Regt'l system, with Regt'l "loyalties" going to a single capbadge for all (RegF) Infanteers.


I think any new system should avoid the tradition of regiments being exclusive to one branch.  A future regimental system should tie both the infantry and cavalry together.  I don't think we need to look at a single regiment system either.  I would concur with the initial proposal to transpose regimental affiliations to the brigade level.


----------



## Jungle

Agreed, but we will probably have to take some interim measures before we reach the final organisation. I maintain that the first step has to be to untie the Soldier from a single Regt'l affiliation.

Actually, the CAR was probably ahead of it's time; every member of the Regt, regardless of trade, Corps etc... wore the same accoutrements. And it worked very well !!


----------



## McG

Jungle said:
			
		

> Actually, the CAR was probably ahead of it's time; every member of the Regt, regardless of trade, Corps etc... wore the same accoutrements. And it worked very well !!


However, the Airborne was able to draw a sense of pride and family through its unique role, high standards, and elite status.  In our current structure, seperating the soldier from the regiment would effectively eliminate the regiment.  Every soldier would find him/herself in "just another Army battalion."



			
				Yard Ape said:
			
		

> To those who suggest a single pan-Canadian regiment, I would like to know if they think the USMC would be as proud if it were [just] another Corps of the US Army. Much of the Corps' pride comes from the fact that it is not just like everybody else.


----------



## a_majoor

Not all regiments will be "one size fits all", even in the fabulous future we are promised as part of the RMA.

My vision of Manoeuvre Battalions provides a form of flexible and mobile fighting power which is adaptable for everything from low to high intensity combat, hence their getting pride of place, even if they perpetuate older regimental titles and traditions.

A bit of "cutting and pasting" from existing regiments and battalions, allied with a modest increase in funding and manpower (yes, employing _those_ 5000 troops we are promised) can give us the following:

The three Lib parachute companies combined with the resources currently at the Canadian Parachute Centre to create the "Canadian Parachute Battalion" (we will avoid the name Airborne Regiment for now to divert negative energy, and because it really will only be a battalion)

3 x LIBs (augmented with new companies to replace the parachute companies) combined with three squadrons worth of tactical helicopters and some innovative use of UAV's to create an airmobile capability (restyle the units as battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles). Those of you who know who I am will have have read this in the ADTB (The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, ADTB Vol 5 No 4)

The regimental affiliations do reflect the jobs we do now, and to a certain extent the jobs we could be doing tomorrow. If a soldier is a member of 1 RCR, it won't matter that much if the unit has evolved into one of the Manoeuvre Battalions in 2 CMBG. He is still a "Royal Canadian", and is busy cheering the regimental hockey team as it takes on the RCD's (another Manoeuvre Battalion), or complaining in the mess how "those guys" in 2 Canadian Mounted Rifles are always putting on airs...

This thread is starting to tilt a bit. The argument wasn't so much about the need for regiments, but rather what sort of organization we want or need for a Regimental system.


----------



## Infanteer

The regimental family should be an all-arms unit that is based, trains, and fights together.   Since no Infantry unit has ever been fully self-sufficient (you need clerks, engineers, signallers, etc), it seems silly to tie the regiment to a branch pure formation.   I think the current CMBG provides a nice size for a regiment; big enough to allow mobility and assession while small enough to train together and be based in the same location (and most likely be deployed together).   Let soldiers wear their trade badges on their DEU sleeves - they will all be members of the same regiment though.

Moving to a regimental system at a combined arms, formation level should also require a reorientation of the Branches.   There is no point in simply swapping capbadges and changing the CO's pennant.   Col Banks gives a very good introduction to this notion in his article in the current Army Journal.   If we form regimental association around combined arms battalions (Armour, Engineers, Arty, Infantry, Support), then the lines between the Branches will start to blur (ie: difference between a LAV Gunner in the RCR and a Armoured Crewman, the difference between a mortarman and a gunner, Assault Trooper and a Sapper, etc, etc).

By merging branches (The best proposal I've seen suggests a "Combat Arms" branch, a "Combat Support" branch, and a "Technical" Branch) tactics, techniques and doctrine will come from a common foundation.   If we are going to put our arms together we may as well institutionalize it.   One goal will be to ensure that cross-arm training (ie: Infantry and Armour, etc) begins very early and more frequently in the Army.   Lance Wiebe commented that German Armour and Infantry commanders learn how to command the units of their opposites.   By the time Officers reach mid-level leadership positions, they should be fully capable of commanding combined-arms units and formations at the lowest possible level - rifleman should be at ease with a guy who started in Artillery commanding their battalion.

Anyways, all of this is a collection of various ideas and proposals that I've seen.   I think it is important to consider and address them because, as I said before, merging regiments must go beyond swapping a capbadge.


----------



## McG

It has been a few times now that I have come across people recommending the elimination of engineer regiments and the establishment of engineer squadrons in combined arms battalions.  As I've said before, we cannot become too focused on making our force generation structure look like our force employment structure.   To eliminate the CERs and push engineers into squadrons within all arms battalions, would destroy the engineers' ability to provide support beyond the scope of pioneers.   I suspect much of this lay in a lack of knowledge on engineer force structures and capabilities (I can attempt to address this in the Engineering Regiment Breakdown thread if anyone is interested).

Many of a brigade's elements exist to support the brigade if it were to mobilize for war or a PSO.   However, eliminating these with the intent of structuring as per recent deployments may have the unintended side effect of packeting capabilities in sizes below a critical mass required to sustain themselves.   I would be interested in hearing a gunners perspective on what effect this might have on being able to sustain the FSCC and ASCC capabilities.

I would prefer to see manoeuvre battalions (composed of rifle companies, surveillance companies, and a traditional combat support company).   The regimental identity would be transposed to the formation level (1 CMBG would become PPCLI, 2 CMBG would become RCR, etc) and each regiment would continue to have its own Engr Bn, Arty Bn, Svc Bn, etc.


----------



## pbi

Gents: now that the cat is out of the bag about my reply to LCol Bondy, and about my own concept letter that is in the most recent CAJ, I'd like to make a few comments:



> comments by retired Lieutenant-Colonel David Banks



What? Retired? I've heard of swift vengeance, but that was a bit of a shocker......



> LCol Bondy developed a concept paper, which proposes that the Army abandon its historical practice of maintaining separate Combat Arms pure-branch regiments and supporting units for a single Combat Branch



I was asked by the then-Editor of CAJ, Lt Col Shayne Schreiber (now COS 1 CMBG) to review Bondy's piece and offer my comments in letter form, for publication in the same issue. My comments were then passed to LCol Bondy, who responded to me (a bit indignantly....) but then made some changes in his article before it went to press. Most noticeable of these changes was the removal of his shockingly PC suggestion that soldiers be taught only that military history that did not "glorify unjust war" or words to that effect. I had to read the paragraph twice to be sure of what   he was actually saying. In my response I asked just who, and how, would determine what an "unjust war" was, since all wars have losers who view the outcome as unust. The South African War, I opined, could be characterized as nothing more than naked imperialist aggression: should the RCD, RCR and LdSH(RC) be stripped of those battle honours? What about Batoche?(Unjust to First Nations...) Medak?(unjust to Croatian Canadians...) I mention this to give some indication of that author's perspective. To his credit, he removed that very dishonourable suggestion.



> "A set of opposing camps dug in holding on to traditional roles or worse, specific pieces of equipment," says LCol Bondy of the Land Personnel Concepts and Policies office.



Did he say that? Really? Then if he said that or wrote that and represented it as his own words he may be guilty of the ethical and professional sin of plagiarism. Those words are lifted almost directly from my article. I dearly hope that this line is a misquote by the author. If not.......



> LCol Banks: Changes made since the 1960's must be rolled back to support force structure and professionalism. In order to achieve this goal, the CF needs to de-unify the forces and focus on operational jointness instead of administrative unification. LCol Banks supports exploring a single combat branch to replace the existing armour, artillery and infantry but through different approaches. If the Army cannot maintain armour and artillery branches that provide significant support that a modern and complete infantry unit could generate, these branches should be reduced to sub-military occupational classifications (MOCs) or employment streams within a single, centralized MOC.



OK-more or less true. But look at my: "_If the Army cannot_....." caveat. The reverse of this (which I stated in a footnote in the letter) is that if we had the will and resources to field a real Armoured Corps with MBTs, and a real Artillery with MLRS and modern SP Artillery, and modern CB/CM systems to complement them, and the ability to deploy and sustain these systems, then my idea would be redundant.   Instead, in my opinion the Armour and Artillery are engaged in a frantic job search in order to justify their very, very questionable separate existence as Branches. If they persist, then IMHO they are degenerating into nothing more than job-stealers. A cursory study of 20th and 21st century Infantry will immediately reveal that these two Branches, once all the "transformation" dust has settled, will very likely end up bringing nothing to the fight that has not already existed organically in Western Infantry since WWI, in various forms, and including in our own Infantry. Nothing. I cover this idea in more detail in the latest CAJ. I hope it kicks over a few apple carts.



> This is the current situation â â€ officers are too frequently extended or recycled and others serve in units for years due to a severe lack of personnel



The writer failed to give the context in which I placed all of these comments, and then misinterpreted the reason I gave for them. I was using some of the more lamentable personnel practices in the Army Reserve as a warning of what could happen in the kind of system Bondy proposes. I did NOT say it was the current situation in the entire Army:   how many RegForce battalion COs get recycled?



> LCol Banks: This idea is flawed and is likely to contribute to an Army with little esprit de corps or cohesion. The proposal to only allow for mid-career transfer from one unit to another would produce a field army led by officers limited in experience and knowledge who are detached from the reality of operations.



OK-close enough.



> LCol Banks: Based on my experience, says LCol Banks, supporters work best with and for the field army when they look, sound and act like the soldiers they are supporting. It is an excellent idea to have the supporters belong to the New Regiment but why not go further and ensure that those who serve in the Army are taught that they are a "soldier first, tradesman or support second."



Yep.



> The New Regiment idea however is something that is worth exploring given the drawdown of the Armour and Artillery branches.



If you read my latest letter in CAJ, you will see that I generally agree with this too; in fact it is the underlying reason I wrote the latest letter. I do not make any pretense whatsoever in either letter to having all (or even most...) of the answers, and I identify several areas where I have not got any answers at all. The intent was not to present a turnkey solution (i'm not that smart) but rather to get the intellectual juices flowing.

Cheers.


----------



## a_majoor

I admit Engineers are in a strange position in this thread. Ideas like the Manoeuvre Battalion are predicted on bringing specific combat functions and capabilities down to very low levels (Infantry doing 8 Km+ direct fire engagements, Armour gaining very enhanced indirect fire capabilities and so on). These functions don't really translate into the Engineering world, nor do engineer functions tie back into combat arms units, however constituted.

Within a deployed Manouevre Battalion or the Joint Expeditionary Force package, Engineer support _will_ be packeted out. Does it make more sense to have Engineers as a "trade" within the larger organization for unit cohesion and Esprit de Corps; or maintain Engineer regiments, accepting they will never operate as a formation, and sub units will be packeted out to the larger organization?

I think the real question here is "are Regiments required for force generation, or force employment?" A Regimental Depot system for force generation may be the answer for some of these questions (but this also ties into what is the purpose and organization of a Regiment).


----------



## Edward Campbell

Engineers and signals give us, I think, a baby vs. bath water dilemma.   There are some very distinct advantages to the 'corps' structure with its multitude of general and special-purpose units â â€œ all 'fed' from a commonly trained pool of people.   I think many of us were/are accustomed to bumping into former 'Prontos' in a variety of different field army functions as we worked our ways up through the system ... equally, I think we were/are accustomed to not seeing other signal officers because they disappeared into one of that corps' several technical and SIGINT/EW black holes.

While I have some sympathy for a 'revised' regimental system, bearing in mind Kirkhill's excellent comment about the origins of dragoons, I wonder how far the 'new' regiments should expand and at what cost to overall military effectiveness.

I am also a bit concerned about one, single combat arm.   I was wondering â â€œ not out loud, yet â â€œ if we shouldn't be going the other way:

o	Infantry â â€œ light (air assault/air mobile/amphibious?), medium (motorized?), and heavy (mechanized/armoured?);

o	Armoured Infantry (heavy infantry + heavy cavalry) â â€œ maybe we can call them dragoons or mounted rifles    ;

o	Cavalry â â€œ light (attack helicopters + direct fire vehicles?) and heavy (main battle tanks?); and

o	Recce â â€œ vehicular/shoot-and-scoot, vehicular/electronic/surveillance and target acquisition, and air (drones + helicopters).

It seems to me that the skill sets of the recce and the heavy armour/heavy infantry people might cross the current cap badge divide, but ...

This is a fascinating discussion and I have many, many more questions than answers.


----------



## Infanteer

McG said:
			
		

> It has been a few times now that I have come across people recommending the elimination of engineer regiments and the establishment of engineer squadrons in combined arms battalions.



I don't advocate doing this, just as I don't advocate rolling up all the artillery or service battalions.  A Regimenatally associated Brigade would have its supporting functions (CER, Artillery Battalion, Tac Air) - now they are all badged the same.  Whats more, the maneuver battalions would possess their own organic engineers (pioneers/assault troops) and artillery (mortarmen) - Sappers and Gunners will be able to move between the maneuver battalions and the artillery batteries of the Regimental artillery unit (a battalion now vice a regiment) or the Regimental Engineering battalion.

Of course, this would demand more PY - but I'm the King right now, so I'm making them up.


----------



## pbi

In my thinking for both CAJ letters, I was wrestling with the role of the Sappers. IMHO the Sappers are by far the "healthiest" of Cbt A. They have not been savagely gutted like the Inf, nor are they in danger of losing a real job, as the Horsemen and Gunners are. IMHO they are the one Cbt A branch that could probably stand clear of this amalgamation into one Close Combat Branch. 

I guess I see the Sappers much like EME is now: existing both integrally and separately. I imagine an integral element inside the Close Combat Unit, with a capability range approximating that of a Field Sqn now, but perhaps with a more robust Equipment Troop, and certainly with MCM and IED/RCIED/EOD capabilities. Then, under the control of the JFHQ (or something.....) would be one larger and more capable Engineer Unit, focused on GS tasks but perhaps with the ability to provide DS to cbt ops. That, plus a traning establishment, would represent the Regular Component. Heavier engineer assets, or assets unlkely to be called up except for prolonged or general conflicts, would be in the Reserve.

I do not foresee us engaging in the massive and complex Div and Corps Engineer plans so beloved of WWII-legacy thinking, and for which (IMHO) we have preserved the idea of separate Engr C2 and a range of specalized Engr units and fmns.

Cheers.


----------



## McG

Sir,
Trying to keep my arguments on the same topic in one place, I've raised some specific arguments about your engineer FG structure here:   http://army.ca/forums/threads/22585/post-124018.html#msg124018

I will raise one observation here.


			
				pbi said:
			
		

> IMHO the Sappers are by far the "healthiest" of Cbt A. They have not been savagely gutted like the Inf, nor are they in danger of losing a real job, as the Horsemen and Gunners are.


I suppose this is relative to how you are measuring â Å“healthy.â ?   Is it a measurement of past vs. present strength and glories, or is it a measurement of current capabilities vs. current tasks.   An inability to meet roles/tasks is not healthy or a surplus of capability is not healthy.   

The loss of the fourth rifle company was a terrible shot to the health of the infantry.   The loss of pioneers, mortars, TOW, and Coyote surveillance was not really a loss to the health of the infantry (though this did reduce the independence of the battalion, and may have impacted on moral).   When this cbt sp functions were stripped from the battalions, the tasks were given to other arms (or the infantry pers just put into new units).   This would have impacted on the health of the arm that received the task.   The artillery, due to its limited role on operations and the pending loss of the M109, saw its other tasks diminishing and the addition of the mortar task has stabilised their health.   With the loss of the Leopards, the additional role of manning all the surveillance platforms has stabilised the health of the armoured.   The engineers on the other hand have absorbed the tasks of the pioneers without a parallel increase in numbers and without a reduction of the other roles it was expected to fill.

On this, I would say the infantry and the engineers are the worse off.   One has seen decreasing size without decreasing roles and the other has seen increasing roles without an increase in size.   If anyone is healthy, it may be the armour.   However, if the juggling of any of the tasks has reduced the capabilities of the Army, then it is the health of the Army that has suffered (and not of any particular cbt arm).   In the end, it is the health of the Army that matters.


----------



## pbi

The "health" of the Armour and Artillery is, IMHO, artificial health that has been secured at the expense of the Infantry, by usurping functions that have evolved logically and effectively within the Infantry in most Western armies including our own. The shell game of moving the cbt functions around was done to provide job insurance for two branches who IMHO are facing somewhat uncertain futures in our Army. We are so fixated on the idea of maintaining separate branches, whether they represent any real value added by a separate status or not, that we ripped integral functions out of the Infantry and shunted them. This was not done for any truly operational reason, but purely for institutional reasons, including freeing up some PYs for the Institutional Army. We seem to have forgotten that the basis of ground combat is an effective Infantry: the branch most in demand in most types of operations (other than Engineers). Armour and Artillery on their own are of limited utility, especially in today's ops. Look at the fate of most USMC Arty batteries in the last few years: they have landed as rifle coys if they landed at all. (I use the USMC as a force slightly more similar to us than the US Army)
The result of all of this, and of our recent equipment decisions, is to have the three traditional Cbt A reduced to a state in which no one one them is really going to be capable of doing its job properly. Hence my thinking that what we really need is MOCs instead of separate branches, all grouped into a single Close Combat Branch. I still, however, remain uncertain about the Sappers: I could see leaving them as "stand alone" because IMHO their function is "unique" enough that it could justify a separate Branch. Cheers.


----------



## McG

If logistics can group so many MOCs and functions into one branch, why couldn't the cbt arms?   In fact, a manoeuvre branch would be a compliment to the proposed regimental formations.


----------



## pbi

McG said:
			
		

> If logistics can group so many MOCs and functions into one branch, why couldn't the cbt arms?  In fact, a manoeuvre branch would be a compliment to the proposed regimental formations.



That is exactly what I am driving at. I do not question the need for certain generic skill sets (MOCs) directly related to close combat: I question the need for all the trappings and nausea of separate branches to deliver them. I do not extend this thinking willy-nilly, as Unification stupidly tried to do: there needs to be moderation and reason in all things. I do not, for example, propose that CSS types be in the same branch as Close Combat functions. I think the uniqueness (or "Ubiqueness....") of the Sappers is that in a way they have a foot in all three camps: Cbt A, Cbt Sp, and CSS.

To me, regimental groupings or identities will evolve naturally with the Army structure, as they have and should. We should stop regarding the Regtl system an inviolate end state: it is a support system to leadership and cohesion, not a replacement for it. We could have an excellent army with no "Regimental System" at all, and a shyte one with it. It's about leadership. Cheers.


----------



## McG

On the note of MOCs, do you see the infantry and armour officer MOCs remaining separate or merging 
(as suggested in this thread: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17788.0/all.html)


----------



## pbi

I see one Officer MOC: Close Combat Officer. His training would be be grounded in Infantry initially, but just as the Inf officer has traditionally done, he would master suffiicient understanding of how to use all the combat systems in the branch. Note that I do not say 'use of the other Arms" because they would no longer exist as separate arms. Instead, a Close Combat unit would be like a tool box: we would train officers to select and employ the right tools to get the required effect. The "nuts and bolts" knowledge would be in the hands of the WO grades and NCOs.(If you are interested, see my letter in the latest issue of the Canadian Army Journal, in which I laid this concept out). Cheers.


----------



## Edward Campbell

It appears to me that this discussion starts from the wholly erroneous premise that the current structures of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces make any kind of operational, bureaucratic or 'business' sense; they do not; they are, top to bottom, nonsense.

Thirty years ago I was and I remain, now, shocked at the degree to which the senior 'leadership' of the Canadian Forces were/are able and willing to sell out for the _cause_ of empire building.

The structure of the CF is nonsense; we must be the only military force in the world organized around means of locomotion.   There is not and never was a single shred of _*operational*_ reason for putting all _air_ units in the Air Force.   The only compelling logic was that it was 100% necessary to ensure that the pilot MOC remained the biggest in the forces and that a wholly unofficial but sacrosanct ratio remained intact: 5:5:2 - which says that, despite changes in technology, organization and even strategic requirements, the army and air force should remain roughly equal in size and the navy should be less than half the size of either â â€œ the ratio derives from the 1960_ish_ strength of the armed forces which was 120,000, all ranks, in the regular force with 50,000+ in the air force, 50,000- in the army and 20,000 in the navy.   There was, when I retired, still a _gentlemen's agreement_ that the ratio should be maintained.   Thus, many years ago, the army *willingly* sold operational requirements and organizational sense down the river for the sake of the all important _*permissive manning levels*_ and the consequential culture of _empire maintenance_ (which is, I guess a better term in the era of steady cuts).   That perverse culture remains strong: how else to explain the rubbish of giving infantry mortars to the artillery?   That decision had nothing at all to do with 'streamlining' operations or training â â€œ it was 99% about 'saving' the artillery cap badge.   (This is not just the grumbling of one old soldier; see also, for example: Granatstein's   1997 paper in which he deals at length with the corrosive effects of the PMLs and the _regimental system's_ 'defensive' but destructive response to it, and Winslow, 2003.)

We need _cohesive_, complete and combat capable ships, army units and air force squadrons organized into single service or, more often, _joint_ formations, task forces and commands - *all* under the operational control of a single, national *joint* staff.   (There may be some room to argue the need for a 'Commander Canadian Forces (Canada)' who commands the armed forces on behalf of the Governor General/Commander-in-Chief and is distinct from the Chief of (the Joint or Defence) Staff.   Some allies have wrestled with this concept which tries to separate commanders from chiefs of staff â â€œ it gives me a headache.)

Within the army we need to restore and maintain unit cohesion â â€œ there are ongoing arguments within these army.ca fora about how best to do that; I suggest that assigning core infantry combat functions to other arms is wrong and destructive to unit cohesion. That means that it lowers operational effectiveness in order to guarantee a certain minimum number of colonel positions for e.g. the Artillery.   Ditto for the navy â â€œ there are neither operational nor training (nor, even personnel management and logistics) benefits in having _foreign_ (air force) helicopter 'detachments' in HMC Ships.

Within the army we need to have our _own_ all arms teams â â€œ including army aviation â â€œ which we can structure (group for battle) to meet our own _operational_ needs.   There are no _operational_ benefits and no measurable administrative benefits to making army aviation part of the air force.

When we have combat effective ships, regiments/battalions and squadrons we can group them into the appropriate single service formations and combined (NORAD, mostly, now) and, mainly, *joint* task forces, formations and commands.

I will leave arguments re: tanks vs. _Strykers_ and _Strykers_ vs. attack helicopters to experts; I will simply argue for a basic organization which makes _military *operational*_ sense â â€œ which is to say something quite different from today.

</rant>


----------



## ArmyRick

Rusty Old Joint,
Well said and sounds like someone who has expirience and thinks logically. IMO the CF can be its own enemy at times..


----------



## Jungle

Rusty Old Joint said:
			
		

> I will leave arguments re: tanks vs. _Strykers_ and _Strykers_ vs. attack helicopters to experts; I will simply argue for a basic organization which makes _military *operational*_ sense â â€œ which is to say something quite different from today.


Agreed. The CF should be configured to maximize operational effectiveness. We can argue about kit until we're blue in the face, but it's not going to change the eqpt we have to work with...
The Army is about Soldiers first, and without people the machines don't work.
The CF, and especially the Army, are about to enter a very difficult period. 2005 will see a large number of people leave the CF, more than we can handle. Some in the C of C refer to it as The Exodus. I have been hearing about this for years, yet very little was done about retention.
We are a decade late with changes to the Regt'l system. When 4CMBG was shut down, Regt'l authorities IN ALL ARMS acted like teenagers. Everybody wanted tanks, everybody wanted M-109s, everybody wanted tracks... and we ended up with 3 identical Bdes that made no operational sense. Inter-Regt jealousies prevented the use of common sense. The Army Leadership should have told them to "suck it up" and form a true mech Brigade in Canada.
So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry


----------



## Kirkhill

Nicely ranted Rusty Old Joint.

Does anyone think that the choice of the next CDS might have an impact on this debate? And if so who and how?  For instance would Hillier result in a different outcome than Buck?


----------



## Infanteer

Jungle said:
			
		

> The Army is about Soldiers first, and without people the machines don't work.



Agree 100%

The three quotes in my sigline to me represent simple universal truths about war.   Your statement covers to of them:

_"one should always endeavor to regulate one's dispositions according to the enemy's methods."   Scharnhorst_

_"Machines don't fight wars. People do, and they use their minds." Col John R. Boyd_



> The CF, and especially the Army, are about to enter a very difficult period. 2005 will see a large number of people leave the CF, more than we can handle. Some in the C of C refer to it as The Exodus. I have been hearing about this for years, yet very little was done about retention.



Difficult, yes.   Insurmountable, I don't think so (I am not implying that you meant this, Jungle, I just wanted to point out my own opinion on the matter).   

The Canadian military has lived through a few "Exodus's" in the past; post-war demobilization in 1919 and 1945 come to mind, as well as the peace dividend that, when combined with Martin's lean budgets, pared the Forces down from 100,000 to about 60,000.

As well, PBI has pointed out before that the current crop of low and mid level soldiers (say, the 5 - 15 year range) are very experienced, more so then their contemporaries of 15-20 years ago (who may have seen the sunny shores of Cyprus.}   Most levels of the Army, from Private to the Top Brass, have extensive operational experience which in my opinion sets us up for some interesting developments in the future in the realm of _Human Affairs_.

Thoughts?   Am I just dreaming here?



> So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry



Again, I agree 100%.

I think the fact that we've tied the regiments to the branches has only served to exacerbate the parochialism.   As well, functions tend to be more or less permanent - as opposed to the British system which rotates regiments through tasks - leading to different regiments to ensure that they all get a piece of their pie.

If I had it my way I'd relegate Regimental Senates and Regimental Colonels to the dustbin of history and see the functions of the regimental system brought more in line with operational realities of the 21st as opposed to the 19th century.


----------



## McG

Jungle said:
			
		

> So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry


I don't know.  I think the structural change may have to come before people are willing to change attitudes.  Right now, everyone is in their comfort zone and some will be unwilling to think of any other possible arrangement for the regimental system (because that would upset the comfort zone).


----------



## Infanteer

I am seeing two separate arguments for transformation.

1)  "Structural" - how we orient our forces in terms of _"Human Affairs"_; ie: PYs, taskings, career management, etc.

2)  "Organizational" - how we orient our forces in terms of _"Military Affairs_; ie: TO&E, Command and Control, Technology, etc.

I feel that change in either of these areas must be complementary.  Transformation that is truly lasting and effective requires pushes in both areas or else it faces irrelevance from older "paradigms" from the other area.

Case in Point:  Canada, following Afghanistan, recognized that changes were occurring in the realm of Light Forces and began to transform accordingly.  Such change is represented in notions that rather then look at the light infantry battalions simply as battalions without LAVs, a true LIB TO&E is being formulated. 

However, it is being forced into a military that has a system of _"Human Affairs"_ that does not accommodate the new paradigm; old styles of regimental parochialism has prevented truly transformational changes in realms of _"Military Affairs"_.  Rather then consolidate Light Forces assets to further refine and expand on capabilities and doctrine (meaning that some regiments lose out while others profit), the old structures have offered up lame half-measures (and in my opinion, wrong) like giving Light Infantry Battalions a uniquely coloured hat.

That example may seem a little difficult and long-winded, but I hope it underscores my belief that true transformation (as opposed to reform, which is just "tinkering") needs to involve change on both levels - the "structural" and the "organizational".


----------



## Kirkhill

To borrow a line from Nike shoes...why not "Just do it".

Form Battle groups in garrison from multiple cap badges.   Give each one a separate shoulder patch to complement their brigade patches as McG suggests and watch the lines of communication form naturally.   Soon enough, 2 years, 5 years 10 years the soldiers within the groups will be wondering what all these different badges and hat colours are all about.   Then you can think about rationalizing the badges.


----------



## McG

Now we may be into word games.   We are looking at three changes

1) Occupational Structures (merging the Cbt branches and introducing a common officer MOC)
2) Organisational Structure (transposing regimental identities to the formation and introducing all arms units)
3) Attitude (getting the soldiers to embrace & accept change)

I think 1 & 2 will have to come first.


----------



## Kirkhill

I would say the order likely would work best 2,1,3

Make the structural or organizational change immediately with what you have, adjust the MOCs and Training to suit the needs the wait, as McG suggests, for the attitudes to change.


----------



## pbi

I think we are on to something here, and I would be willing to bet that alot more of our comrades in arms (Reg and Reserve) are open to thinking beyond the Regtl system than some people would have us think. The Regimental system as we know it is something we inherited from the British Army. The British system did not always look the way we think it does: it really began to take on its "traditional" shape with the Cardwell Reforms (after Crimea IIRC) that grouped numbered battalions into Regiments and then affiliated most of them (but not all of them...) with particular geographic locations such as counties. There was great resistance to the loss of the numbers that the units carried, as it was felt that the number was a clear indication of the unit's seniority in the order of battle. Since that time the British Regtl system has undergone countless mergers and disbandments, and has even gone through a "Brigade" phase in which Bde capbadges were worn instead of unit badges. These changes have continued, through "Options For Change" right up to the present day, and they are not done yet.

So, the "Mother of the Regimental System" seems to be able to adapt to change and carry on producing some of the world's finest soldiers who regularly prove their mettle in ops all over the world. What's our problem? Why have we so bitterly resisted the "A" word? Why, especially, when so many people actually dont seem to oppose amalgamation/restructure if you sit down and talk with them about it. And yet, when our Bde proposed two sets of amalgamations under LFRR PhII, the Army ran and hid, and abandoned the stage to the likes of Reserve 2000 who foamed at the mouth and called our Bde Comd everything except a traitor. What's the issue, especially when we consider that almost all Reserve units today are the products of amalgamations or conversions or redesignations somewhere in their past? Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

PBI, I think the problems you identified have something to do with the "empires" that Rusty Old Joint alluded to.  :-\


----------



## Infanteer

> Now we may be into word games.   We are looking at three changes
> 
> 1) Occupational Structures (merging the Cbt branches and introducing a common officer MOC)
> 2) Organisational Structure (transposing regimental identities to the formation and introducing all arms units)
> 3) Attitude (getting the soldiers to embrace & accept change)



You're right, this may be semantics, but I think my distinctions between Human Affairs and Military Affairs are important, so I'll justify my use of terms and my assignment of characteristics; so bear with me now....

With my "Military Theory-lite" model I put forth, I used the term "Structural" to denote things that you put under the "occupational ".   However, I would contend that things that fall under the "structural" category go beyond occupational notions - things related to "Human Affairs" have an impact on the Fighting Power (as Van Crevald defines it) of an Army.

I think the term "Structural" would include notions such as pay and leave, education, the "image" the military sells to the people, and command relationships and ideas on leadership.

The "Organizational" category - directly related to "Military Affairs" (for lack of a better term - I'm interested if someone can find a better definition) - is more focused on the quantitative aspects of Combat Power.   Notions such as *How many Tanks?*, *How many soldiers?*, *Who is in Command?*, *C2 Systems?*, *What kind of Equipment?*, and *Divisional Slices* (tooth-to-tail ratios).

You included _"transposing regimental identities to the formation level"_ under the organizational field; I'd argue that it is "Structural" rather than "Organizational".   The Regimental System is not one of organization but rather one of affiliation.   In changing the regimental system we are not changing the way we organize our different MOCs and our units (we do so anyways with adhoc Battlegroups and mixed Regiment Brigade Groups) but rather we are changing perceptions of who soldiers view as "us" and "them", who they share lineage with, who they can expect to work with and deploy with.   Changing the Regimental system seems to be much more qualitative then quantitative (hence why I termed it a structural characteristic).

Now, to carry on my "Military Theory-lite" model to the next step, perhaps it can be said that the overall capability of a fighting force is its Military Effectiveness.   The sum of Military Effectiveness is made up by the characteristics of both the "structural" and the "organizational" domains.

The aggregate of "Structural" characteristics (the often intangible aspects related to morale and mentality) can be called Fighting Power.   Fighting Power is the spirit and confidence that a force has in its ability to meet enemies in combat.   Fighting power is the stuff of stoic defences, high morale, and underdog-victories.

The characteristics of the "Organizational" domain are the more tangible ones; I'll call them Combat Power.   Combat power can be the "heavy metal" of the equation.   How advanced is the technology of a fighting force?   How much of it do they have?   Are the units of a force organized properly to exploit that technology?   How many "boots-on-the-ground" is a force capable of quickly delivering?   Is the headquarters and support a smooth and efficient force multiplier, or a large, rear-echelon parasite?   Being much more visual, Combat Power is usually seen to be the currency of military might - however, doing so at the expense of Fighting Power may have bad consequences (The US in Vietnam).

Thus:   Military Effectiveness = Fighting Power + Combat Power.

As I stated in my original post, trying to push transformational change one can be ineffective.   Change must be equally focused on both to avoid having the equation go out of wack, which reduces Military Effectiveness.

As for #3 (Attitude), I think that an institution like the military, which is inherently conservative, will usually pretty adverse to change.   Transformation must usually be evolutionary rather then revolutionary lest the ideas of transformation flop on their face (The nature of the instigator of Transformation usually can determine the speed - ie: Napoleon, a military genius and in total command of the State, was able to successfully utilize the transformational effects of the Revolution in a rapid and successful manner).

That being said, even the most profound transformations take time and are not immediately warmly received.   Reading the biography of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who can be credited with creating the modern, professional Officer's Corps, one sees that even though his ideas took root in the institution and some were instituted right away (The Kreigsakadamie), many took time to develop and become accepted (The notion of a meritocracy open to any Prussian) or were ignored all together (the notion that the Prussian Army should belong to the people rather then the monarch).   The nature of the military institution usually means that the attitude towards change will be the last to follow (military success can help act as a catalyst to attitudes on change).

Well, does this make sense?   It's just the relationships I've been drawing in my head.

I'll stand down from the "Clausewitz for the night box" now....

Infanteer


----------



## canuck101

Well I would like to see the army have five active regiments. This would mean adding two new regiments. This is only if the government ever  gives the Forces enough money.  Fully man the regiments that we have now ie. PPCLI, RCR, The Royal 22e Regimént and perhaps reactivate the airborne and activate one of the reserve regiments for example maybe the The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada to full active status. That is my two cents for today comment away.


----------



## Infanteer

Again, rhetoric but no substance.

You say activate "regiments", do you understand that the regiment is not a field formation (ie: it is not bound by TO&E).

Try and understand what you are talking about before you go making proposals in this forum.


----------



## Edward Campbell

_Back to the future?_

Just so you know where I'm coming from, let me describe some of 'the way we were' when I first joined a battalion:

"¢	We all expected to command rife platoons, as 2nd lieutenants and/or lieutenants, for a bare minimum of two years before being assigned any other duties - three or four were normal.   Our platoons were not up top strength - sections, typically, had seven or so men - a corporal, a lance corporal and five - one being the lance corporal Bren gunner's ammunition pack mule.   The corporal were as young as 20 to as old as 35 - most platoon sergeants were in the early 30s - but there were a handful of real old sweats' - usually one per company - in their '40s but still fit and tough and great teachers;

"¢	One of two subalterns were aspiring Provost Corps (military police) officers.   There were only two ways to become a provost officer - CFR (from a staff sergeant) or from the ranks of infantry subalterns.   The key job of the Provost Corps was road movement control - traffic planning and control; it is vital when large formations, especially their logistical 'tails' must manoeuvre on limited roads.   The second job was looking after POWs; the third was assisting regimental officers in maintaining discipline.   _Policing_ was done by policemen - members of the RCMP;

"¢	The quartermaster was a regimental officer - usually a CFR'd WO1.   Almost all the storesmen and absolutely *all* the clerks were regimental soldiers.   There were a few Ordnance Corps storesmen in e.g the munitions stores (and almost all of them were former artillery and armoured storesmen) - there were a largish number of RCEME tradesmen - mostly vehicle mechanics and armourers, a few medics, a couple of apy clerks and a small number of Signals operators and radio mechanics.   There was one each a Signals Officers, Medical Officer and RCEME Maintenance Platoon commander - all were, usually captains.   There was, in some units, a Signals subaltern but he was always a rifle platoon commander.   This Signals Officer 'thing' was unique to the Canadian Army - our British counterparts had a specially trained infantry captain as battalion (or regimental in armoured/artillery units) signal officer, he was assisted by a Signal Corps subaltern and sergeant; and

"¢	Some of our officer went, after a few years, to the Intelligence Corps - that corps was like the Provost Corps: no 'direct entry'- not for NCOs, either.   *All* Intelligence Corps personnel came from other corps - both arms and services.

While we are debating merging or mixing infantry and armour, it seems to me that one of the things we - you, serving people - should discuss is the _proliferation_ of specialists in the battalion - and not just gunners keeping their numbers up by manning infantry mortar platoons.   Unless something really major has changed there is nothing about the logistics stores or admin/clerical duties which cannot be taught to a good infantry soldier in a relatively short, specialist course.   Ditto, today, for most of the signals jobs - I understood the requirement to have some signals specialists when they copied Morse code; there was little, normally nothing, to choose between specialist signals soldiers and infantry signallers when that one skill was taken out of the mix; well they no longer do Morse code and there is, therefore, no justification for signals _operators_ in the battalion, although we do, still, need the radio mechanics.

The aims of reducing the _specialists_ are twofold:

"¢	To provide a better range/mix of jobs in the battalion for the combat soldiers which has the added 'value' of   improving cohesion; and

"¢	To 'reserve' *some* percentage of the specialist corps/branch 'slots' for soldiers who re-muster from the combat trades.   Thus: "Why,â ? I asked a friend who had been a Signals officers, "are there any privates in the ranks of your technical tradesmen?   Why are those really great jobs not 'reserved' for good combat arms soldiers who re-muster after they are well trained soldiers and have made a commitment to the army?   You,â ? I said, "would have a better corps of people and we, all of us, would have a better army.â ?


----------



## canuck101

Sorry for the lack of research and knowledge that i showed. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were reduced to nil strength and the combined manpower was amalgamated to form the new 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment on 1 July 1970.  Activate may have not been the right word that i was looking for but i still think having five regular infantry regiments instead of three would be better.


----------



## Infanteer

Again, "regiments" doesn't mean much.  We could have 9 active Infantry regiments right now, if we affiliated each separate infantry battalion with an regular force battalion.

Is there any logic or rationale for your proposal for "5 active regiments"?  Perhaps you mean Brigades (the formation unit above the battalion)?


----------



## Infanteer

> "¢     One of two subalterns were aspiring Provost Corps (military police) officers.   There were only two ways to become a provost officer - CFR (from a staff sergeant) or from the ranks of infantry subalterns.   The key job of the Provost Corps was road movement control - traffic planning and control; it is vital when large formations, especially their logistical 'tails' must manoeuvre on limited roads.   The second job was looking after POWs; the third was assisting regimental officers in maintaining discipline.   Policing was done by policemen - members of the RCMP;



This is something I've wondered about as well.   Perhaps the CF should contract out local base/investigative matters to the RCMP (much like provincial/municipal governments do) and let the MP's (Provost) stick to the military end of things.

All-in-all, good post.   Good examples of military institutions that still follow out many of the ways you alluded to in your post would be the Aussies and the Royal Marines.   After all, as an all-professional military taking recruits who increasingly more and more proficient at multiple tasks (find a 20-year old who doesn't know how to work MS Windows technology) would be able to "cross-train" across MOC's.   We've had this discussion re: Medics in the CSS forum; I'm sure it could be extended to other fields as well.



> The aims of reducing the specialists are twofold:
> 
> "¢     To provide a better range/mix of jobs in the battalion for the combat soldiers which has the added 'value' of   improving cohesion; and
> 
> "¢     To 'reserve' some percentage of the specialist corps/branch 'slots' for soldiers who re-muster from the combat trades.   Thus: "Why,â ? I asked a friend who had been a Signals officers, "are there any privates in the ranks of your technical tradesmen?   Why are those really great jobs not 'reserved' for good combat arms soldiers who re-muster after they are well trained soldiers and have made a commitment to the army?   You,â ? I said, "would have a better corps of people and we, all of us, would have a better army.â ?



We've debated these concepts before (especially number 2) - contentious, yes; but if still workable, I think it can go a long ways in reducing the tooth-to-tail ratios without hurting our sustainment capabilities.


----------



## canuck101

yes that is what i meant i will shut up now.


----------



## McG

canuck101,
Have a read through this post (and skim the rest of the thread):   Platoons, Brigades, Divisions Oh My! How the Army is structured.

Then re-read this thread. 

It may help formulate whatever argument you are trying to make.


----------



## canuck101

Thank you for the help i will read them and use for future reference.


----------



## ArmyRick

I am in favor of forming Battle Groups...
Thats what we deploy for the most part.
My idea would see brigades being disolved and in place of what we have noew would be 6 LAV or mechanized battle groups and 3 Quick Reaction Battle Groups (light but can still fight)..
Each battle group (LAV/Mech) would have..
-BG HQ (Command, sigs, ISTAR co-ord, Info, CIMIC, Psy Ops, etc)
-3 x Infantry Company
-Cavalry Squadron (tank squadron is out dated in another year or two)
-Artillery battery (LG1 or MAVS)
-Engineer Squadron (can never too many sappers)
-Service Support Company

A Light BG would have the same but switch the CAV SQN with a TAC helicopter squadron (even if it is the Grief-fin, LOL)

Battalions or Regiments would be folded as well (Oh my, wash that man's mouth out with soap for such foul words, I can hear the protest)
Instead your OC and CSM would look after you. You would be posted to a company, squadron or battery.
Oh yeah, the mortars? I say give them back to the infantry and place them directly in the companies.
What about Canada deploying a brigade? Come on and stay with it. When have we deployed a brigade?(not a BG with other assets)


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> What about Canada deploying a brigade? Come on and stay with it. When have we deployed a brigade?(not a BG with other assets)


We have deployed Bde HQs (Op ATHENA roto 0 and 1) and we have a UN commitment for a Bde HQ.  We have also deployed unit sized Bde assets (eg: CANENGBAT to UNPROFOR).


----------



## BillN

From todays BBC News.......


Battalions go in troops shake-up 

Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon has outlined details of wide-ranging structural changes to the British Army. 
He told the Commons reductions in heavy armour, heavy artillery and the infantry will be accompanied by an increase in specialists. 

The number of infantry battalions will fall from 40 to 36, including a new "super-regiment" for Scotland, which will include the Black Watch. 

Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Ancram said it was a "dark day" for the Army. 


Voicing Tory criticisms, he said the changes were driven by a desire to cut costs and were "dangerous" as they would leave the Army overstretched. 

Britain's senior Army officer, General Sir Mike Jackson, said: "The Army has never stood still. It has always evolved to meet new challenges and it must do so again." 

Mr Hoon's statement comes after Army chiefs met last Monday to discuss the restructure. 

Changes 

The following changes were among those announced by the defence secretary: 


The Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers will merge, and with four other battalions, including the Black Watch, will form the Royal Regiment of Scotland. 

The 19th Mechanised Brigade, based in Catterick, will start conversion to a light brigade in January. 

The 4th Armoured Brigade based in Germany will be converted to a Mechanised Brigade in 2006. 

The King's Own Royal Border Regiment, the King's Regiment and the Queen's Lancashire Regiment will merge to form two new battalions within the new King's Lancashire and Border Regiment. 

One battalion will also be taken from the Prince of Wales's Division in the south of England. 
Mr Hoon, whose statement was greeted by Tory jeers, told the Commons: "These plans will make the Army more robust and resilient, able to deploy, support and sustain the enduring expeditionary operations that are essential for a more complex and uncertain world. 

"The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments that these changes bring about is the only sustainable way in which to structure the infantry for the long term." 

The defence secretary said he understood the importance of regimental traditions but the changes needed to be seen in the wider context of "re-balancing the Army". 

But Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Ancram condemned the "dismal statement". 

He said: "It is a dark day for our armed forces. It is also a day of shame for this discredited and ineffective defence secretary. 

"Our armed forces deserve better than to be betrayed in this appalling manner by their government." 

SNP MP Annabelle Ewing was ordered out of the Commons chamber by the Speaker after calling Mr Hoon a "backstabbing coward". 

Sir Mike Jackson, the Army's Chief of General Staff, said: "We have inevitably had to make some tough choices to keep within the resources allocated. 

"The underpinning rationale is based on an operational need for a more agile and flexible force." 

The final decision on the restructuring was made by Mr Hoon and the prime minister after a recommendation by senior defence figures.


----------



## McG

BillN said:
			
		

> "The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments that these changes bring about is the only sustainable way in which to structure the infantry for the long term."


Hey, we're already there.

I knew that several British regiments were "multi-battalion."  How many were only one battalion?


----------



## Kirkhill

There were 19 Single Battalion Regt's McG, out of a total of 40 battalions.  The Government had available also 3 Royal Marine Units and the RAF Regiment which supplies something like 7 or 8 Squadrons of Ground Pounders.  Each Squadron is an independently deployable and sustainable lt inf combat tm for VP protection.


----------



## bossi

I better go see the M.O. - this re-org almost makes some sense ...
(i.e. after all, it's called "the Regimental system" ... but I'd better go lie down until this goes away ...) 



> *The 19 Regiments marching to a new future*
> (Filed: 17/12/2004 - _The Scotsman_)
> 
> The 26 infantry of the line regiments will become 12 under the changes. Those most affected are the 19 single-battalion regiments. These are the changes:
> 
> *The Scottish Division* (all single-battalion regiments):
> 
> The Royal Scots and The King's Own Scottish Borderers will amalgamate into one battalion. The Royal Highland Fusiliers, The Black Watch (keeping their hackle), The Highlanders, and The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders become one single cap badge five-battalion regiment, the *Royal Regiment of Scotland*, but they will keep their unit names in front of the battalion title.
> 
> 
> *The King's Division* (all single-battalion regiments):
> 
> The King's Own Royal Border Regiment; The King's Regiment; and The Queen's Lancashire Regiment become the two-battalion *King's Lancashire and Border Regiment* and lose individual titles.
> 
> The Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire; The Green Howards; The Duke of Wellington's Regiment become three-battalion *The Yorkshire Regiment * but keep regimental titles after battalion title as 1st battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's Own), 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards) and Third Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's).
> 
> *The Prince of Wales's Division* (all single-battalion regiments):
> 
> The Devonshire and Dorset Regiment and Glosters elements of The Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire, and Wiltshire Regiment absorbed into the *Light Infantry * to form three-battalion regiment. Berkshire and Wiltshire element of RGBW become part of *The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment*, which will now have three battalions.
> 
> The Royal Welch Fusiliers and The Royal Regiment of Wales combine to form *The Royal Welsh Regiment * but keep names after title to be known respectively as 1st Battalion The Royal Welsh (The Royal Welch Fusiliers) and 2nd Battalion The Royal Welsh (The Royal Regiment of Wales).
> 
> The Cheshire Regiment; The Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters Regiment; and The Staffordshire Regiment combine to form the three-battalion *Mercian Regiment* each keeping their names after battalion title as 1st battalion the Mercian Regiment (Cheshires), 2nd Battalion the Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters) and 3rd Battalion the Mercian Regiment (Staffords).
> 
> *The Queen's Division* (all multi-battalion regiments):
> 
> The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment had 2 battalions, but will now have three with addition of the Berkshire and Wiltshire elements of the RGBW.
> 
> The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers stays 2 battalions.
> 
> The Royal Anglian Regiment stays 2 battalions.
> 
> *The Light Division* (all multi-battalion regiments):
> 
> The Light Infantry had 2 battalions, but will now have three with addition of Devon & Dorsets and Glosters elements of RGBW.
> 
> The Parachute Regiment allocates one of its three battalions as the core of a new special forces support regiment.
> 
> The Royal Green Jackets stays 2 battalions.
> 
> The Royal Irish Regiment stays at 4 battalions but two are home service battalions not infantry of the line.


----------



## McG

It definitely looks like the British regimental system is moving in a direction closer to ours.



> Delivering Security in a Changing World
> Presented to Parliament by The Secretary of State for Defence
> By Command of Her Majesty
> July 2004
> 
> Chapter 2
> Force Structure Changes
> 
> . . .
> 
> 2.15 A central element in the Army's restructuring will be a fundamental change to the way it organises the infantry.  The practice of arms plotting - moving infantry battalions and their families en bloc between roles and geographical locations every few years - will be phased out.  This will enable individual Servicemen and their families to plan on being based within a particular geographical area.  Not only will this be a more efficient use of infantry battalions, it will also enable Service families to put down roots in the community within which they are based.
> 
> 2.16 The new infantry structure will continue to be organised on a divisional basis, but a critical change will be made with the adoption of large regiments of two or more battalions, making it possible for individuals to move between units within their division, thus enhancing the advantages of geographical association, while preserving the opportunity at an individual level to move between different roles.  Both regular and reserve forces will be incorporated into the new structure, enabling the Army to improve the links between regular units and the reserves who reinforce them.   The reduction in the number of regular battalions from 40 to 36 will comprise one battalion recruited in Scotland and three recruited in England.  Details of the new organisation will be worked out by the Army and announced by the end of the year.
> 
> . . .



This makes one wonder if their next step will be to establish multi-battalion RAC regiments or mixed manoeuvre arm regiments.


----------



## Kirkhill

In some respects it's back to the future.  I think the author of the 1885 reforms (Cardswell??) would have approved.

The Regimental Recruiting Areas have been enlarged to reflect the change in transport from foot and horse to cars.  The Regiment will have a fixed and permanent depot for all battalions.  Each Regiment will have one Regular Battalion at home, one or more attached Territorial Battalions collocated, and one Regular Battalion up the Khyber Pass (plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose).

Each Battalion gets a fixed role.

Troublesome for history buffs, old soldiers and to some degree or other the Terry soldiers, but less of a problem, I would think, for the Regular Soldier more concerned with raising a family and paying for a mortgage than the name on his capbadge.

The British Army has gone through this exercise every 20-50 years, and, no doubt, the outcry has always been the same.

I'm with Bossi on this one.  It does make sense....Which also suggests that the Canadian system ain't such a bad balance.  At least for the Infantry.


----------



## pbi

Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

> Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.



Is it, perhaps, a failure of leadership? A failure to "grasp the nettle" and "just do it?"

(There you go - three cliches for the price of one! A bargain a half the price.)


----------



## Infanteer

pbi said:
			
		

> Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.



I'd venture that Regimental politics has been in our blood since day 1.  None of the history I read seems to look favorably on the Regimental contribution to operational efficiency in the past.

To me, it's a toss up.  The change is definitely needed - it allows fragmented units to combine training assets and recruiting areas.  However, amalgamation seems to balance the bad (eliminating historic units) with the good (the lineage of the units will carry on).  Our path has been to put units to zero strength, which also balances the good (the units with their unique heritage still "exist") with the bad (the zero-strength units exist in stasis).

Either way, the imperative of matching the Regimental system to operational realities should be the overarching consideration - kudos to the Brits for having the institutional fortitude to do so.


----------



## Bill Smy

This appearedon the official British Army website:

CGS's PRESS STATEMENT â â€œ 16 DEC 04


For now, I will speak about the broad principles lying behind FAS.  After the Secretary of state has left, I will go into greater detail.  It is important to set the Future Army Structure (FAS) firmly in context.  FAS is about the whole Army â â€œ Regular, and TA.  It is not about perceived winners or losers; it is about setting the Army on the right track to meet the challenges of the future.  The Army has never stood still.  It has always evolved to meet new challenges.  It must again.    Let me make a few general points to set the scene: 

-	We have spent more than two years looking extremely hard at what capabilities and structure we need in the future to provide a truly robust and expeditionary Army.  Of course, we have had to make some tough choices to keep within the resources allocated to us and, while some areas will grow; some will contract; and a few will remain broadly the same.  The under-pinning rationale for restructuring however is based on an operational need for a more agile, deployable and flexible force, and to build a medium-weight capability.  This re-balancing â â€œ the shift in emphasis from a heavy / light mix to heavy / medium / light mix â â€œ and a greater emphasis on combat support and logistics at brigade level is essential to ensure that we are structured to provide the most powerful capability possible from the resources available.  You will be aware that the end-state is 2 armoured brigades, 3 medium brigades and 2 light brigades.


-	There are some changes that we will seek to take forward quickly, 19 Mechanised Brigade for example, starts its conversion to an all-arms light brigade in the New Year, but not all changes will happen overnight.  Although the majority of the re-balancing is planned to be carried out over the next 4 years, it could be up to 12 years before we see FAS in its fully developed form.    

-	Let me just touch on three background issues:

+	Progress towards normalisation in Northern Ireland has provided a welcome opportunity to reduce the permanently committed forces .  This has been key to enabling us to release manpower â â€œ some 3,000 posts â â€œ for reinvestment in areas that are more hard-pressed in today's and tomorrow's operating environment than the infantry: engineers, logisticians and intelligence operators being prime examples.

+	Units are currently not established for war-fighting without considerable augmentation.  Furthermore their deployment often requires them to be reinforced to bring them up to the required strength.  This approach is inefficient and incoherent â â€œ not least of all from the perspective of pre-deployment training, and the disruption to follow-on deployments.  

+	I have heard people question why we are taking forward these changes when we are so busy.  People talk about 'overstretch' â â€œ something that is impossible to judge without a benchmark.  The benchmark the Army uses is a 24 month interval between operational tours, or, put another way, 20% of the Field Army deployed.  Right now, across the board, that is where we are.  But it is of course an average figure, and some capabilities are in short supply, with tour intervals significantly below the target of 24 months.  This can properly be said to be overstretch and highlights one compelling reason why we need to rebalance to reduce that stretch.  This is powerful evidence that FAS and the rebalancing that it entails is the proper and necessary thing to do. 

You have the detail of the changes by Arm and Service for the Regular Army and the TA.  This highlights the scale and the benefit of FAS to the whole.  If we had the time, I would go through each Arm and Service in detail.  However, I know that it is the changes to the Infantry â â€œ about which there has been much in the Media over recent months â â€œ that you are keen to hear about.  I will turn to these later.  When I do, I would ask you to look at what FAS means for the Army and to bear this in mind.  Thank you. 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First (short) Q & A followed by a break (SofS departs)
CGS returns to complete his statement and take questions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You have a copy of my letter to the Army, which gives you the detail, but I will now speak of the restructuring of the Infantry.    Please remember that whilst nothing can be done without the Infantry, it represents only one quarter of the Army.

The changes to the Infantry have been a highly emotive issue and they have been the subject, rightly, of rigorous debate.  The reduction of 4 infantry battalions, as a result of the improvements in Northern Ireland, is a step that we must make if â â€œ within the Army manpower ceiling of around 102,000 - we are to structure the rest of the Army properly.  Whilst the Infantry have been very heavily committed over the last few years, the level of routine commitment is now beginning to flatten.  Operational tour intervals for the Infantry have now improved from around 15 months last year to about 21 months now and I expect them to continue to improve towards our ideal target of 24 months.  Further progress in Northern Ireland will assist this.

The ending of the current Arms Plot system is a logical change that is broadly supported by the infantry, both serving and retired.  

The inherent re-roling was inefficient and costly in terms of time, hard-won capability and money.  It also adversely affected family stability â â€œ always a compromise in a mobile profession such as ours, but an area that we, for the sake of our soldiers and their families, have to improve.  In simple terms, the Arms Plot rendered some 7 to 8 battalions unavailable at any one time: we did not have, therefore, 40 battalions in the effective Order of Battle, but rather some 32.  In the future, the 36 battalions will all be available.  By fixing infantry battalions by role and largely by location, we will have a new Infantry structure that will involve individual postings rather than unit moves â â€œ an approach that is already widely used across the Army to good effect and will provide challenge, variety and experience whilst improving continuity of role, operational capability and family stability.
The Army Board, and indeed the Army, is convinced of the need to develop a new regimental system for the challenges ahead.   We want to get on with the job.  The ending of the Arms Plot means that the current existence of single battalion regiments has run its course.  The whole Infantry must now move to a large Regimental structure.  It is significant that this was the intent of previous Army Boards in 1961/62, 1966/67 and to some extent in 1992.  This Board has had the opportunity to grasp the nettle.

Before I cover the detail, we must not lose sight of the enhancements FAS makes to infantry capability:

-	There will be an increase from 19 to 23 infantry battalions in All Arms Brigades; the 9th platoon in Armoured Infantry battalions will exist in fact and not just on paper; Reconnaissance platoons will be enhanced as will integral infantry firepower. All in all some 550 posts will be reinvested throughout the infantry.

The Regimental System is at the core of the British infantry.  As a system, it has wisely and sensibly adapted as circumstances have changed â â€œ it has had many models.  Circumstances are changing again, and the Infantry and the Regimental System are adapting again.  The new Regiments and Battalions will continue to enshrine the history, traditions and ethos of their antecedents.  This along with the leadership, training, esprit de corps and the values and standards that epitomise the Army will ensure that they and the Army continue to deliver operational success.

What of the detail.  My message to the Army, which you have, explains some of the background and how decisions were reached.  I will not go into all the detail just now, but I want to touch on the key criteria upon which the Army Board based its decisions. 

The Board decided that the only truly objective criteria upon which to determine from where the Infantry would reduce 4 battalions were those which led to a judgement as to the sustainability of future recruitment balanced against the pragmatic factors of regional representation and future structural and regional coherence.  The Board had before it the historic manning performance of every infantry battalion over the last 10 years, recruiting, retention, manning trends and regional demographic data.  The Board:

-	Considered the Brigade of Gurkhas and, noting their almost limitless recruiting ability and that the Brunei garrison commitment would continue, concluded that there should be no change;

-	Exempted The Royal Irish Regiment from further consideration on the representational grounds of retaining a line infantry footprint in Northern Ireland; 

-	Whilst it was clear that no battalions of the Foot Guards or Parachute Regiment would be taken against the manning criteria, the Army Board also concluded that there were additional specific operational, organisational and state ceremonial reasons not to include these battalions.    
On this basis the Army Board decided to make the reductions by taking one battalion from Scotland and 3 from England. 


Let me highlight some of the most significant changes.

-	The Scottish Division will reduce by one battalion.  This will be achieved by the union of the Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers.  The new battalion will be one of the five battalions of a new large, single-cap badge regiment provisionally called 'The Royal Regiment of Scotland'.  The battalions will retain their antecedent names.

The move to a single large regiment is a bold move by the Scottish Division, reflecting their determination to move forward grasping the opportunity that FAS offers and meeting tomorrow's challenges. 

-	The Prince of Wales's Division will reduce by one battalion and it will form two larger regiments.  This will be achieved by:

+	 The Royal Welch Fusiliers and The Royal Regiment of Wales will come together in a new 2 battalion regiment called The Royal Welsh.

+	The Cheshire Regiment, The Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters and The Staffordshire Regiment will come together in a new 3 battalion regiment called the Mercian Regiment.

+	The Gloster element of the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment merging with the Devonshire and Dorset Regiment and the Light Infantry within the Light Division.  It will be known as 1st Battalion the Light Infantry.  The current battalions of the Light Infantry will renumber as the 2nd and 3rd battalions in accordance with seniority.

+	The remaining elements of the RGBW, previously the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment, will merge into the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment within the Queen's Division.

-	The King's Divison will reduce by one battalion.

+	The King's Own Royal Border Regiment, the King's Regiment and the Queen's Lancashire Regiment will amalgamate to form a new 2 battalion Regiment on the west of the Pennines called The King's, Lancashire and Border Regiment.

+	On the east of the Pennines, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, the Prince of Wales's Own Regiment and the Green Howards will come together to form the new 3 battalion Yorkshire Regiment.

+	The Foot Guards will continue to serve on Public Duties, a task that whilst prestigious can become somewhat repetitive over time and therefore demands greater movement between this and other roles to provide variety for our Guardsmen.  The Army Board also decided that maintaining the national identities of the individual battalions was critical in representing the whole nation â â€œ this would therefore make a system of individual postings unworkable as, over time, the national makeup of the battalions would become blurred (for example the Scots Guards would not be largely manned by Scotsmen).  We have therefore decided that any restructuring into a larger regiment serves no practical purpose and would be entirely cosmetic, The Foot Guards will therefore retain their current organisation and Regimental names and will commit 2 battalions to Public Duties and 2 battalions to the light role which will conduct some limited relocation between each other to provide variety.  One battalion will be fixed in the Armoured role.

These battalions will retain their antecedent names.

-	You will have heard the Secretary of State's comments regarding the identification of the 4th battalion reduction.  There is a clear operational requirement to establish a dedicated direct support battalion to our special forces, thereby making a very significant improvement to our prosecution of global counter terrorism amongst other important tasks.  We need to do a little more work to completely define the construct and role of such a battalion and this will be done in the New Year.  However, given this capability requires a unit of particular skills and experience the fourth reduction will now be found by the removal of the 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment from the line Infantry, using its highly trained manpower and structure as the core of this new 'ranger' battalion.  As the Secretary of State has said, this capability sits alongside the other much needed enhancements to specialist elements of the Army and will be developed over the coming few years. 

-	Within the TA we will reorganise into 14 battalions, each one will be more closely integrated with a regular regiment, with one TA battalion in each regiment of 2 or 3 regular battalions and 2 TA battalions for the 5-regular battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland.  The only exception to this will be the TA battalion affiliated to the Guards Division.  The details of this reorganisation will be confirmed in the New Year after further consultation with the reserves. 

These decisions have not been taken lightly.  They are, as I have said before, the result of significant work and they represent, emotions aside, the right answer for the Army.  

Leaving the infantry aside for the moment, I should like to now touch upon two other areas that have been the subject of much speculation; The Corps of Army Music and the Territorial Army.

â â€œ	Firstly the Corps of Army Music.  The number of musicians in the Army is predicated on their operational role as NBC Specialists and medics.  The studies that led up to the July White Paper reduced the numbers required.  There must therefore be a reduction in the number of Army bands, to a considerable extent reflecting the reality of undermanning. The new structure gives primacy to the requirement to undertake their musical role, not their operational duties.  It aligns bands to FAS and addresses the vagaries that exist in the current structure.  In essence it will see a reduction of 2 Royal Armoured Corps and 4 Infantry bands.  The reorganisation ensures: that the Army retains effective bands with every Arm and Service; that they have the opportunity and ability to train for their operational role; that their career management is properly addressed; and that the Army's rich musical tradition is maintained.

The reductions in the Infantry and the Corps of Army Music require a small targeted redundancy programme in order to ensure the right age and rank balance.  

This will involve about 400 people.  We will do our utmost to support those affected to ensure that they are looked after and well prepared for the transition to civilian employment.  

This should not be interpreted as implying a scaling down of recruiting.  It is not.  The Army is still recruiting.  We require highly motivated men and women and we will still need to recruit approximately 11,000 young people each year for the Regular Army and about 10,000 for the Territorial Army.   

Turning now to the TA and Regular Reserve.  They have been used significantly during all recent operations, and they have done a splendid job.  The planned changes to the TA complement those to the regular structure building on the TA's success on operations.  I might take this opportunity to pay special tribute to all those reservists who have contributed so much on operations alongside their regular counterparts. In broad terms, the TA will remain the same size as it is today at some 42,000.  The change involves rebalancing â â€œ growth in some areas and reductions in others â â€œ that will enhance the TA's ability to provide specialist support.   In addition, and for the first time, the TA's structure will be robust enough to cater for those who are unable to be mobilised or who are not fully trained.  The final structure will be validated following a period of consultation with the reserves over the next six months.  The changes ensure that the TA and Reserves are better integrated so that they can be used more effectively.  As the Army's reserve of first choice we intend that they will be more relevant, capable and useable.  

Let me conclude.

FAS is good news for the Army.  Its implementation has already started and, while full implementation will extend over a number of years, its delivery is being taken forward positively.  It represents where we want to go and what we need to deliver.


----------



## Michael Dorosh

Not sure I see the point of merging 6 Scottish regiments into a single 5-battalion regiment.  The report talks about combat capabilities, lesser need for troops in Northern Ireland, etc.  None of that explains the move; sounds like six of one and a half dozen of the other.  The battalions will keep their former names, so what is the point?

 I was lucky to get the chance to parade in 1990 with the massed bands of the Scottish Division; a lot of pride and history there - this was before the amalgamation of the Gordons into the Queen's Own Highlanders (itself an amalgamation of the Seaforths and Camerons).  

Will this new Royal Regiment of Scotland ever deploy as a formation (ie Regiment)?   If the individual battalions will just be brigaded with battalions of the King's, the Welsh, etc.  as before, then again, there is no point to this.

Does it provide a framework for expansion in time of full-intensity conflict?


----------



## Kirkhill

Michael:

The way I read the "6 comes 5" option starts from this premise:  There isn't enough money to keep 6.

At the same time, while the Army would love to keep all 6 it isn't able to fully recruit the positions it has across the board, and part of that is due to quality of life issues. As well the tasking and training regime that is being employed, which contributes to that quality of life, isn't as efficient or effective as it might be.  The Army needs more "specialists", unfortunately because specialization is the enemy of flexibility,  but not only in high-tech terms it needs people specialized in crewing Warriors and fighting the Heavy battle, just as much as it needs Light and Medium specializations.

That's the rationale, and for me it makes sense.

As far as the fight over Names and Regiments I think one thing that may be missing from your information may be how blood, tradition and position play out in British political life.  The ancient families that raised these Regiments are still well represented politically and militarily as well as being mainstays of the local community.  There is a commonality with those people protesting bans on the Hunt and Freedom to Roam as well as graduates of Sandhurst.

What this amalgamation does is it dilutes further the "control?" that those families have via the senates.

It leaves MoD and CGS with more ability to breathe, to expand and contract the Regiments by adding or subtracting battalions as the need requires while at the same time creating a Regiment with a distinct political/tribal/racial/geographic identity (which is a good thing IMHO).  

It is in effect reverting to the multi-battalion Regiments formed under the 1881 reforms which sustained Britain through the height of her colonial policing era (1881 - 1947) as well as putting her on the winning side in WW1 and 2.

The carping about cap-badges started in the modern era after WW2 when old Regiments were reduced to single battalions to maintain family/county/badge affiliation.

pbi: I take your point and understand it having commuted from Lethbridge to Calgary on Wednesday's to maintain my affiliation rather than become a Gunner (no offence to Air Gunners).

Cheers, Chris.


----------



## Cold Warrior

pbi said:
			
		

> Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.



 *Sigh*,, yes,, shock and horror,, for the very reason it raises "shock and horror" when it is proposed that the regulars regiments combine as well,, like merging the PPCLI and RCR into a "super regiment",, like the old "Canadian Guards".  Easy enough to contemplate as long as your Regiment isn't involved.

Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Michael, when I worked with the Royal Scots, every company of theirs was understrength.   The way I understand it is that the units now will all have common access to a wider range of recruiting grounds, specialists, and training assets.   When the regiments were seperate identities, this was all individual "turf" - that's how I interpreted it.



			
				Cold Warrior said:
			
		

> *Sigh*,, yes,, shock and horror,, for the very reason it raises "shock and horror" when it is proposed that the regulars regiments combine as well,, like merging the PPCLI and RCR into a "super regiment",, like the old "Canadian Guards". Easy enough to contemplate as long as your Regiment isn't involved.



Will this affect the ability of soldiers to their job?

Primary loyalty doesn't go much higher then the platoon or company.   Considering my experience was with a company composed of soldiers from 11 different regiments, I don't think the badge is very significant in the operational setting - given that the small unit has time and experience to forge itself into a team.

The only ones who will scream bloody murder for any sustained period of time will be the regimental senates and the associations.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Primary loyalty doesn't go much higher then the platoon or company.


I think you'll find that the regular force soldier that has spent a decade or so in the same unit identifies very strongly with that battalion.


----------



## pbi

I was just discussing this merger today with one of the Brit officers who is a part of the CJTF76 staff here. It seems that what drove the recent amalgamations in the British Infantry was the fact that there was no real connection between the structure of the Inf in the Regular Army, and the Army's operational needs. Almost every Regiment in the Regular Army consisted of a single battalion (the TA battalions were not figured in this equation, apparently, as they are not considered to be part of the operational force structure). The problems they had run into included (besides the operational mismatch), not enough depth in a single battalion to produce adequate flow of suitable senior officers (especially COs) and difficulty in recruiting for so many battalions. He told me that the Army had four Inf battalions that it simply could not keep up to strength at all: I believe these positions were taken and used to create the other organizations the Army is building.

This is much closer to the situation faced by our Reserve units than that faced by our Regular Regts, each of which maintains three battalions and is supplied with officers by a central system. We have no single battalion RegF Inf Regt. That is why amalgamation presents itself as a more useful solution to the problem faced by some Res units, than it does to the Regular Infantry. Unless, of course, we are talking about an even more significant change such as Regt=Bde, or the Combat Branch idea. 

Apparently each of the UK Inf battalions will be permanently assigned a role within the Regt (Warrior mech, light, etc), which will end the somewhat disruptive re-roling that used to occur in the British Army at regular intervals. Cheers.


----------



## McG

I've long had doubts about our single unit Armd Regts having enough depth in their gene pools (no intention to slag any armd guys as every branch has someone that comes from the shallow end).  A pan-Canadian armoured regiment would resolve this.  However, a merged infantry/cavalry regimental system & branch combined with a single manoeuvre officer MOC would also achieve the same results (while simultaneously improving our FG combined arms structure).


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> I think you'll find that the regular force soldier that has spent a decade or so in the same unit identifies very strongly with that battalion.



Sure, but I think the identification is different.  You see a sort of kinship bond develop very strongly after a long time in a unit - for example, look at US Marines who are a generation apart and have no problem quickly slapping backs when they recognize a ring, a bumper-sticker, or a tee-shirt.

However, I was referring primarily to small-unit cohesion, which tends to fade as you go up to larger groups.  It is this type of identification, the oft-cited "loyalty to the guy next to you" that is important to us operationally.  People can get over belonging to a different Regiment or organization, put constant turmoil in small group dynamics is fatal (as the US Individual Rotation System in Vietnam so clearly demonstrates).


----------



## George Wallace

MCG said:
			
		

> I've long had doubts about our single unit Armd Regts having enough depth in their gene pools (no intention to slag any armd guys as every branch has someone that comes from the shallow end). A pan-Canadian armoured regiment would resolve this. However, a merged infantry/cavalry regimental system & branch combined with a single manoeuvre officer MOC would also achieve the same results (while simultaneously improving our FG combined arms structure).



I might beg to differ on that one.   The Armd Regiments in Canada have strong identities.   The only lack in gene pools is exterior to the Regiments in the supporting arms.      ;D

Just because an Armd Regt doesn't have the manpower base of an Infantry Regt, doesn't mean that the will and devotion isn't there.  Were the will and devotion to the Corps seems to fail is in those dark corridors of NDHQ, where some officers have been promoted to their level of incompetence banished from a Regt, and are justifying their existence day-dreaming and reinventing the wheel.  They are hurting all Corps and Branches equally.

GW


----------



## Infanteer

I don't think it is a matter of will and devotion George - no one doubts that.  As McG alluded to (going on PBI's Brit example), the Armoured Regiments are stuck between two methods:

1) The Infantry Regiments, which each have three battalions and thus a deep pool.
2) The Artillery and the Engineers, which are "Corps" Regiments - all Gunners are members of the Artillery and all Pioneers members of the CME - with 3 regiments of each (across the Brigades) the same flexibility the Infantry Regiments have is there.

As I'm interpreting it, the Armoured regiments have neither.  McG's proposal of a pan-Canadian Armoured Regiment would put it in the "deep part of the pool" with 3 battalions (Maybe the Mounted Rifles, as proposed by A Majoor that would fit in 2Bravo's model?).


----------



## McG

Infanteer,
I'm surprised you forgot to list my second (and preferred) option: four manoeuvre battalions in each regimental formation (all contributing to a common pool of manoeuvre officers within the regiment).


----------



## Infanteer

Whoops, I was just looking at the conventional "branch-pure" options.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

In my opinion, the Armoured Corps is different from the other Corps (or Branches) in that we have strong ties to both our distinct Regiments and the Corps.  There are subtle differences between the Regiments, but I think that we do have a Corps identity that even transcends the regular/reserve divide.  I don't see this so much as being "stuck" between the Infantry and other Branches but simply another manifestation of our having a somewhat unique outlook.  We do have some movement between capbadges and we all recruit from the same national base, although there are regional tendencies.  Perhaps I am just being a reactionary, but I do not think that there is much to be gained by forming one "Armoured Regiment."  The realities of limited postings and the geographical dispersion of the army would result in each numbered unit of that Regiment having a distinct culture of its own.

The regimental system has some flaws but I'm not sure that there is much to be gained by altering it.  I served in a very composite unit overseas (ISTAR Company) where the component Tps were cohesive entities that came from different Regiments.  "Plug and play" can work as long as we respect the value of cohesive sub-units and platoons/Tps.  I think that our Canadian regimental system builds these components quite well.   

Cheers,

2B


----------



## tomahawk6

I am very impressed with the quality of discussion on this Board. 

The Canadian regimental system [regular force] seem's to work better than in the UK version. Multi-battalion regiments allow for more upward mobility than do single battalion/regiments. This is a problem in any force- stagnation.The US Army regimental system keeps alive the history of our battalions/regiments but recruiting is done nationally and soldiers/officer's dont serve out their military career in any single unit. This method allows for soldier's to receive promotions and experience at squad/platoon/company/battalion level. Soldiers can be assigned to training, recruiting and staff posts before returning to a line unit. Unit cohesion is being addressed by standing up battalions/brigades and keeping the soldiers together for a 36 month cycle. At which point soldiers are cycled to schools or other jobs while the brigade reconstitutes for another 36 month cycle. The size of our force makes this system the best one for our needs. This is new for us. Until recently the Army has been based on the single replacement system which meant individual soldiers were leaving at 2 - 3 year intervals. Experience with this new system will show how successful it will actually be.


----------



## Infanteer

Sounds something like the COHORT system?

I see you've got lots of experience; was COHORT one of those, tomahawk6?

What were your perceptions?


----------



## tomahawk6

COHORT was tried and discarded in the late 80's. The reason I think it failed was that the personnel system wasn't changed to mesh
with COHORT. This time the personnel system is being changed to support the modular force structure. Not sure how this will work out but it will be interesting to watch as it developes.


----------



## Zipper

I agree with 2Bravo. The Armoured Corp and its component regiments have quite strong ties to one another. We are all "black caps" and proud of it. To change between regiments is a little stressful, but in the end you are still part of the Corp.

As for the Brits ability to amalgamate so easily and we not so much. Why do we have too? Many people are quite attached to their units, and those units often represent a geographical area more then anything (at least militia wise). Considering how spaced out we are, is this a bad thing? It also allows for promotion. Do we have more then enough regiments as it is?

Since we are already of a multiple battalion system, why would we need to form "super regiments"? What we really need to do is recruit more people period and bring them up to some kind of strength.


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> Many people are quite attached to their units, and those units often represent a geographical area more then anything (at least militia wise).


There are different relevant factors to the reserve structure.  This would be why we are discussing the reserve regimental system in a separate thread.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> I agree with 2Bravo. The Armoured Corp and its component regiments have quite strong ties to one another. We are all "black caps" and proud of it. To change between regiments is a little stressful, but in the end you are still part of the Corp.


Would this still hold true if we were to transform into heterogeneous manoeuvre battalions (mixed infantry & cavalry)?


----------



## Zipper

Ok, I think you summed it up as far as my opposition to some of the ideas presented here MCG.

One being the fact that your separating the regular and reserve regimental structures from one another. Why? Your just throwing a wrench into the works and making things more confusing then they are already. KISS is the way to go.

And as for the heterogeneous idea...         ...hmmm.

On one hand it could mean the death of the Corp system that we hold onto so dearly.

But maybe not.

Is there any reason why those who are tasked with the different jobs within this system cannot keep their beret colours to identify them with their job and thus keep the Corps alive? Their cap badge would be the only thing that would be the same.

Now, it seems everyone here is going towards this all branch's in one regiment thing, and going to Mobility command structure instead of the status quo as Army, Air Force, Navy.

I think some people including Kirkhill will fall over dead here, but I'll for arguments purposes go along with it for now.

Now some people here want to get rid of the Regimental system entirely. Well I think we would lose all our history that way and once again walk down the "American" path. No thanks.

How about a compromise? I think Rusty ol Joint was hitting near to where I am thinking. Why not keep the regimental names as are (Thus keeping tradition) and then fit our unit tasking into them?

Thus:

The PPCLI (Key word LIGHT) would become either an Air mobile, or a Light mechanized (read wheels) regiment (3 Inf and 1 light (recce) armoured).

The RCR would be a Medium to Heavy mechanized (wheels or track) regiment.

While the RCD would be something heavier (2 Inf and 2 Armour). What these units would be would (battalions/squadrons. etc.) be up to command. 

Thus the regiments keep their names and history, and fill the roles that their names imply.

Just a suggestion.


----------



## ArmyRick

I see some problems with what you suggest, Zipper.
First the patricias are all stationed out west and in spite of its name, western Canada is much more conducive to any type of mounted training (Heavy mech or Medium stuff). Just look at the terrain in Wainwright, Shilo, Dundurn and Suffield. So the RCR and the RCD would be moving west to make it more productive for training value.

Next, you would be moving the "new" PPCLI to Petawawa and Gagetown. These bases are ideal for light infantry and airmobile training. Especially those who have been to Pet. It is predominantly thick wooded country. Only the east side of the base and the DZ are realistic for mech trg.

What about the Van Doos? What type of regiment would they become? Would dislodge them from Quebec? And do so without a huge political fight? 

Lets ditch the Regt names to their roles idea.

Last, the CDS is quite clear. We will not have Heavy mech forces in the near future. Too many people go on and on about the "wishes". Lets stay grounded in reality. In 10 years the CF will have LAVIII, MGS, TUA and MMEV. We will also have some of the cool new things the engineers have been playing with and maybe (its not too costly) 120mm mortars.

Lets figure out a better force structure based on what we can forsee us having.


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> First the patricias are all stationed out west and in spite of its name, western Canada is much more conducive to any type of mounted training (Heavy mech or Medium stuff). Just look at the terrain in Wainwright, Shilo, Dundurn and Suffield. So the RCR and the RCD would be moving west to make it more productive for training value.



You're forgetting the Canadian Rockies, the Temperate Rainforests of British Columbia, and the Pacific Coast littoral.

As well, Rusty Old Joint has made a convincing argument before on the suitability of Edmonton for locating an Airmobile unit - the airhead their provides the best area to act as a "launch pad" for global deployment.

We shouldn't limit our garrisoning of troops to where they can train.  The American's have units from around the US go to Ft. Irwin to train at the NTC - we are trying the same with the Canadian Maneuver Training Center in Wainwright (although it seems a little too small for Brigade level exercises).  Remember, the last Bde exercise when 2 CMBG deployed out West?



> Lets ditch the Regt names to their roles idea.



Agree - Regimentalism isn't about Roles and Tasks (these change frequently as the face of war changes) but rather on tradition, heritage, and a shared sense of belonging.   Remember, before the Armoured units were cruising around in tanks, they were riding around on horses and quite frequently dismounting and fighting and Infantrymen.   Clearly, the"Cav" role and regiment has historical precedent - it's a matter of giving those who would play a key role in it (from any trade) an equal share in the Regiment.



> Lets figure out a better force structure based on what we can forsee us having.



Yep, agree with you hear as well.   We need to focus on best applying our ideas to what we got so we can get the best "bang for the buck".   This applies to everything - kit, organization, manpower, etc.


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> ... your separating the regular and reserve regimental structures from one another. Why? Your just throwing a wrench into the works and making things more confusing then they are already. KISS is the way to go.


There is no requirement that reserve & regular share a common regimental system.  Attempting to find one solution that fits the needs of the regular force and the reserve force is probably more definitive of complex than applying simple unique solutions to each.  As it is, the systems are already different with multi-battalion regiments being the regular force standard and single battalion regiments proliferating in the reserves.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Why not keep the regimental names as are (Thus keeping tradition) and then fit our unit tasking into them?


In keeping things simple, I don't think regimental names need to become a factor.  The RCDs could be the light formation for all that it really matters.  This would allow us to make the decision based on important factors like where we want a given capability to be located.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Is there any reason why those who are tasked with the different jobs within this system cannot keep their beret colours to identify them with their job and thus keep the Corps alive? Their cap badge would be the only thing that would be the same.


I don't consider this an important point.  We can decide to base beret colour on regiment or we could decide to base beret colour on MOC.  The RSMs can decide in the mess because it will not affect how the manoeuvre regiments will function.


----------



## Zipper

MCG said:
			
		

> There is no requirement that reserve & regular share a common regimental system. Attempting to find one solution that fits the needs of the regular force and the reserve force is probably more definitive of complex than applying simple unique solutions to each. As it is, the systems are already different with multi-battalion regiments being the regular force standard and single battalion regiments proliferating in the reserves.
> 
> Are you forgeting that the whole purpose of the reserves is to be a base upon which to build a multi-battalion force? You guys are continuing to look at our forces as something that will always just be a small entity that sends a few troops here, and a few troops there with reserves to fill in the gaps. If you think that way, then we will be caught with not only our pants down, but off and downstairs in the wash when something BIG comes along. Why are so many people unable to think that something like that can never happen again?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MCG said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In keeping things simple, I don't think regimental names need to become a factor. The RCDs could be the light formation for all that it really matters. This would allow us to make the decision based on important factors like where we want a given capability to be located.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree to a point. In WWII, the RCD were an armoured car regiment, and some of the normally Infantry regiments were moved up into the Armoured role (Hell, the Foot Guards were an Armoured unit! Good grief! ). However, we should at least TRY to keep some semblance of our pasts and traditions alive. Regiments with no identifying role could be tasked into whatever job is most suitable. If we get rid of our regimental system (as well as the rest of our capabilities), then we may as well become American sub-units only. Oh, and hand over the keys to the country while your at it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MCG said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We can decide to base beret colour on regiment or we could decide to base beret colour on MOC. The RSMs can decide in the mess because it will not affect how the manoeuvre regiments will function.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> No it may not have anything to do with function, but something far more deeply rooted. What you are doing is basically scrapping everything to do with our roots and re-inventing the military in some other model.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Infanteer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We shouldn't limit our garrisoning of troops to where they can train. The American's have units from around the US go to Ft. Irwin to train at the NTC - we are trying the same with the Canadian Maneuver Training Center in Wainwright (although it seems a little too small for Brigade level exercises). Remember, the last Bde exercise when 2 CMBG deployed out West?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Agreed. However, I believe units can change places. The PPCLI were not always in the west. As well, the Van Doos/RCR can be made into a light unit/Air cav, whatever. They don't have to be med/heavy mech. Hell, the RCD and Strats could made into the med/heavy mech with tank support.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ArmyRick said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Last, the CDS is quite clear. We will not have Heavy mech forces in the near future. Too many people go on and on about the "wishes". Lets stay grounded in reality. In 10 years the CF will have LAVIII, MGS, TUA and MMEV. We will also have some of the cool new things the engineers have been playing with and maybe (its not too costly) 120mm mortars.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Sure we can stop wishing. But whats the point? As for us having all of the above. I can almost see it now...        ...in 10 years, half of the vehicles above are either parked and rusting out because they were either non-effective in theatre (like our LSVW's), or because they were considered "endangering" to their crews because on their first "peacemaking" mission, several crews got cooked from multiple RPG hits. All of this of course was kept on a need to know basis within NDHQ and was leaked to the media several months after the fact causing the collapse of yet another government because of mis-management of Canadian lives.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ArmyRick said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Lets figure out a better force structure based on what we can forsee us having.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> No argument there. I guess I'll just continue to wish until the budget comes out and then wait for the other shoe to drop. What the Government foresees for us, and what others do is usually two very different things.
> 
> I guess I'll just have to write another letter to my MP.
> 
> Sigh
Click to expand...


----------



## pbi

> then we may as well become American sub-units only. Oh, and hand over the keys to the country while your at it.



Have you ever heard of the US Army's Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS)?  Try http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/lineage/CARS-QA.htm

You might want to look into it before you make throwaway statements like that. Most US Army Cbt A units that I am familiar with are quite proud of their unit history and can often trace it back to the Revolution. They wear a Regimental badge on their uniforms, and are quite able to tell you the symbolism of the various devices in their badge. Do not make the assumption that we are the only ones with a functioning system of unit lineage and heritage. What rally matters is not the system but the quality of the people in it. If that were not true, the CEF would probably not have worked out, because we mobilized it by pretty well scrapping the Regimental system as a mobilization and warfighting tool.

Cheers.


----------



## ArmyRick

Zipper, RPGs have been bad news for every armored vehicle in Iraq including the almighty abrams (Fire at its back side). Ask the yanks who have been in Theater.

The LAVIII is very popular choice with the guys I know in 1 RCR and 2 PPCLI who use them. Its a huge step up from the "Ice cooler with a 50" (M113) or the midgets only Grizzly.


----------



## Zipper

pbi said:
			
		

> Have you ever heard of the US Army's Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS)? Try http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/lineage/CARS-QA.htm
> 
> You might want to look into it before you make throwaway statements like that. Most US Army Cbt A units that I am familiar with are quite proud of their unit history and can often trace it back to the Revolution. They wear a Regimental badge on their uniforms, and are quite able to tell you the symbolism of the various devices in their badge. Do not make the assumption that we are the only ones with a functioning system of unit lineage and heritage. What rally matters is not the system but the quality of the people in it. If that were not true, the CEF would probably not have worked out, because we mobilized it by pretty well scrapping the Regimental system as a mobilization and warfighting tool.



Very True. However their more likely to the "fighting 12th", or the "mean 6th". They identify with mostly numbers. Yes, some of them have names or nick names that were coined at the time. But lets keep our names just the way they are and work with it, instead of re-creating the entire system.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Zipper, RPGs have been bad news for every armored vehicle in Iraq including the almighty abrams (Fire at its back side). Ask the yanks who have been in Theater.
> 
> The LAVIII is very popular choice with the guys I know in 1 RCR and 2 PPCLI who use them. Its a huge step up from the "Ice cooler with a 50" (M113) or the midgets only Grizzly.



True as well. But how many times did they have to get hit from behind? And if their getting hit from behind means they moved beyond their Infantry support or the support left them.

The LAV III is really the only piece of kit that is actually a bonus. If it used for the task it was meant for. However, that being a IFV means that we still need the rest of the components to be suitable as well.


----------



## McG

Ack!  The LAV III debate is out there in a plethora of other threads.  It does not need to be fought here.  Any new regimental system should be flexible enough that equipment debates are not relevant here.  Defining a unit by its equipment and not its roll will only result in stubbornness/resistance when that equipment becomes obsolete.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> Are you forgeting that the whole purpose of the reserves is to be a base upon which to build a multi-battalion force? You guys are continuing to look at our forces as something that will always just be a small entity that sends a few troops here, and a few troops there with reserves to fill in the gaps. If you think that way, then we will be caught with not only our pants down, but off and downstairs in the wash when something BIG comes along. Why are so many people unable to think that something like that can never happen again?


So What? Reserves could mobilize in brigades that fight along side the regular regiments.  However, a time of mobilization will be distinctly different from how things work in "peace."  Our standing requirement is for a regular force regimental system that is able to sustain an on going high tempo of deployed operations and a reserve force regimental system that can sustain itself, develop trained individuals & sub-units, and mobilize in time of war.  Nothing would prevent a mobilised reserve brigade from fighting along side a regular force regimental formation.  In fact, the two formations would be equal in time of war but would be better suited to the needs of their respective components in â Å“peace.â ?


----------



## Infanteer

Zipper said:
			
		

> Very True. However their more likely to the "fighting 12th", or the "mean 6th". They identify with mostly numbers. Yes, some of them have names or nick names that were coined at the time. But lets keep our names just the way they are and work with it, instead of re-creating the entire system.



It doesn't make a difference if Regiments are Numbered or Named regiments - that is irrelevant to the core of functioning Regimental system.  I'm looking at a copy of the Regimental History of the 5th Marines Regiment(The Fighting Fifth) and it is just as storied and illustrious as our Regimental histories.  Heck, we in Canada have the 48th Highlanders, the 1st Hussars and the Royal 22ieme Regiment.  Seems like a numbers thing there as well.


----------



## a_majoor

Regimental pride and Esprit de Corps (unit, not the magazine), come from sharing experiences and overcoming obstacles together. Long service professionals can mold newcomers into the Regimental Family, and the deep histories of some regiments (some British and Swedish Regiments have histories going back 300 years) gives everyone a standard to aspire to.

"New" regiments can achieve the same with a baptism of fire, the numbered battalions of the CEF often had no history whatsoever, yet few would say they were slouches in the Esprit de Corps department. I would think that forming an SSF battalion for some PSO could be done today with a mix of Reg, reserve and even newbies if they were forged by a few intensive months of "tiger" training at WATC or Gagetown prior to deployment. (The first Canadian contingent in the Korean war was given this treatment, and it certainly helped).

Arguments based on Corps affiliations are coming from the same background, but overlook the "new" security environment. Just as there are no Hussar regiments equipped with horses and muskets anymore, units in the 21rst century may accept new roles and equipment sets, yet keep storied traditions alive. (In the US, the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment is converting to a SBCT, which most people would call an "Infantry Battalion". I doubt anyone in the unit will think of themselves as anything but "Cav"). If you get posted to the "Internet Fuisiliers", why, that is the roughest, toughest bunch of hackers and crackers going, and don't even think of comparing them to those pussies in Space Command.....

Circling back to the beginning, Regiments are repositories of people, histories, attitudes, skillsets and (almost as an afterthought) equipment. Sometimes the equipment helps mould the attitudes and skill sets, but in general, the more flexible and far reaching your mindset is, the better you and your regiment will adapt to those nasty surprises on the battlefield


----------



## Zipper

Ok. Agreed with you on that Majoor. But why the hell do people around here want to get rid of the entire system? Fine, change the roles, change the equipment, even change the tasks. But leave the damn regiments alone. They work fine. Its been tried before in past conflicts to change things to just a number, and has always reverted (in days to months) back to time honoured names.


----------



## Infanteer

Zipper said:
			
		

> Ok. Agreed with you on that Majoor. But why the hell do people around here want to get rid of the entire system? Fine, change the roles, change the equipment, even change the tasks. But leave the damn regiments alone. They work fine. Its been tried before in past conflicts to change things to just a number, and has always reverted (in days to months) back to time honoured names.



That is nothing but an argument based on sentiment rather than fact.  Look at the history of the British Regimental System - for a couple hundred years before the Cardwell Reforms the British Regiments were numbered.  Yes, all those battle honours on their Colours from the Napoleonic Wars, 7 Years War, etc, etc were earned by the numbered Regiments, not "time honoured names".  Read (and educate yourself) about the Regimental System here:

http://www.regiments.org/regiments/uk/lists/bargts.htm

Zipper, you're approaching this concept from the wrong angle.  You don't seem to realize that no one is really arguing to "do-away" with the Regiments.  The Regimental system has been a constantly evolving concept since the days of the Roman Legion.  Even the British system, with Regiments with 300-year old battle honours, is in a constant state of change.  We aren't doing ourselves any favours by thinking we can rest on our laurals and pretend that what worked 100 years ago still works today.

Rather, the general aim is to ensure that the Regimental system in Canada's Army is "in tune" with the operational realities on the ground.  As A Majoor pointed out, the strength of the Regiment is not its fancy name, snazzy uniforms or a specific piece of gear - they are repositories of histories, attitudes, skillsets, etc, etc and these are abilities that we all seek to preserve when promoting a transformation in Regimental structure.  If we don't and the Regimental system gets "stale" and out of touch with the modern battlefield, then that repository has a negative effect on the combat power of our units.  In order to avoid this, it is necessary to accept that the "time honoured" Regiment, like any other factor in war, must change with the times.


----------



## Zipper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Zipper, you're approaching this concept from the wrong angle.   You don't seem to realize that no one is really arguing to "do-away" with the Regiments.   The Regimental system has been a constantly evolving concept since the days of the Roman Legion.   Even the British system, with Regiments with 300-year old battle honours, is in a constant state of change.   We aren't doing ourselves any favours by thinking we can rest on our laurals and pretend that what worked 100 years ago still works today.
> 
> Rather, the general aim is to ensure that the Regimental system in Canada's Army is "in tune" with the operational realities on the ground.   As A Majoor pointed out, the strength of the Regiment is not its fancy name, snazzy uniforms or a specific piece of gear - they are repositories of histories, attitudes, skillsets, etc, etc and these are abilities that we all seek to preserve when promoting a transformation in Regimental structure.   If we don't and the Regimental system gets "stale" and out of touch with the modern battlefield, then that repository has a negative effect on the combat power of our units.   In order to avoid this, it is necessary to accept that the "time honoured" Regiment, like any other factor in war, must change with the times.



Agreed. I am looking at from a fondness as opposed to a operational ability. One of the benefits of sitting in a chair.

I guess what disturbs me most is the fact that what you say above takes time. Many of the changes were slow and took much time to carry out. And what I see here is something that will turn the Forces on its ear overnight. 

Hell, its taken me a week of chewing on the idea of all arms regiments (thanks to all here) to see the benefits of what I initially thought of as a crazy idea. It makes sense in many way to me now. Although some of the ideas still seem like your wanting to change things simply for the sake of changing them.

The way I see it, our regiments and their names are just fine. Leave them be and work within them, but change them to all arms with new taskings (light, Air mobile, Cavalry, etc) and I think something would work and make us more effective. I even think changing the reg force regiments to all arms, and leaving the militia to their single tasks would suit just as well. You just pull from each one to fill in your gaps in the reg force for overseas operations. How that would effect training on the whole, I don't know. But small changes...


----------



## ArmyRick

Ah here we go...
RCD, correct me if I am inaccurate.

When the RCD first became what it was, it was a cavalry school and then a cavalry regt (Horse back).
Obiously, horses are long gone except for ceremony.

When did the RCAC actually form? Wasn't it during the WW2?

The corps may change, but if we play our cards right, the regiments will live on.

For example, RCD and RCR in the fututre may both become combat arms units in a "new combat arms corps"

Just a thought. Cheers with beers and no fears.


----------



## Infanteer

Zipper said:
			
		

> Agreed. I am looking at from a fondness as opposed to a operational ability. One of the benefits of sitting in a chair.



Your stock just went up by saying that.  At least you can reflect on what others have said to you (unlike others)  



> I guess what disturbs me most is the fact that what you say above takes time. Many of the changes were slow and took much time to carry out. And what I see here is something that will turn the Forces on its ear overnight.



Sometimes reform is all that is needed, while sometimes Transformation is required.  I believe that our years of neglect of any strategic direction for the Forces combined with the pace of RMA/RHA change means that Transformation is the way to go.



> Hell, its taken me a week of chewing on the idea of all arms regiments (thanks to all here) to see the benefits of what I initially thought of as a crazy idea. It makes sense in many way to me now. Although some of the ideas still seem like your wanting to change things simply for the sake of changing them.
> 
> The way I see it, our regiments and their names are just fine. Leave them be and work within them, but change them to all arms with new taskings (light, Air mobile, Cavalry, etc) and I think something would work and make us more effective. I even think changing the reg force regiments to all arms, and leaving the militia to their single tasks would suit just as well. You just pull from each one to fill in your gaps in the reg force for overseas operations. How that would effect training on the whole, I don't know. But small changes....



That's largely in line with what many of us have been proposing.


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> The way I see it, our regiments and their names are just fine. Leave them be and work within them, but change them to all arms with new taskings (light, Air mobile, Cavalry, etc) and I think something would work and make us more effective. I even think changing the reg force regiments to all arms, and leaving the militia to their single tasks would suit just as well. ...   But small changes...


Small changes would only be window dressings.

The current British changes validate the multi-battalion regiment for a regular force paradigm.   However, our Armd regiments exist as single units.   They would not be directly convertible to multi-battalion manoeuvre regiments.

We could convert the third bn off of each infantry regt and form two two-battalion regiments in each brigade, or we could convert all of a brigade to a single manoeuvre regiment (either by rolling all the armd regts into the infantry regts, or my reducing brigades to three manoeuvre units and perpetuating four of the existing regiments through a fourth formation).  This raises the question: at what point do we start to see limiting returns from more battalions being included into fewer multi-battalion regiments?


----------



## Zipper

MCG said:
			
		

> Small changes would only be window dressings.
> 
> The current British changes validate the multi-battalion regiment for a regular force paradigm.  However, our Armd regiments exist as single units.  They would not be directly convertible to multi-battalion manoeuvre regiments.
> 
> We could convert the third bn off of each infantry regt and form two two-battalion regiments in each brigade, or we could convert all of a brigade to a single manoeuvre regiment (either by rolling all the armd regts into the infantry regts, or my reducing brigades to three manoeuvre units and perpetuating four of the existing regiments through a fourth formation). This raises the question: at what point do we start to see limiting returns from more battalions being included into fewer multi-battalion regiments?



So if I am reading you right. We of course would have to get rid of more reg force regiments by rolling personal and equipment in few formations in order to achieve these so called manoeuvre units? Otherwise good question. Its hard to see where the returns would drop off without some form already in existence somewhere.


----------



## pbi

> We of course would have to get rid of more reg force regiments by rolling personal and equipment in few formations in order to achieve these so called manoeuvre units?



A good question, and one that I touched on briefly in my "Combat Branch" article in the CAJ last year. At the time, I didn't try to offer a conclusive answer about the role of the Regimental system, except to outline (rather sketchily...) a few options, and to make the point that IMHO we need to preserve the good things that the system brings us. What I was opposed to then, and remain opposed to now, is the idea that the Regimental system in its current state and form is somehow the only desireable end-state. It isn't.

Cheers.


----------



## big bad john

Sounds like what the UK is doing.


----------



## McG

Zipper said:
			
		

> So if I am reading you right. We of course would have to get rid of more reg force regiments by rolling personal and equipment in few formations in order to achieve these so called manoeuvre units?


Maybe.   We can keep the same number of units, but move people between them to get the right balance of skill sets.   This may or may not result in fewer regiments.

*Option A -   Regimental Formation*
*PPCLI*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 PPCLI (Light Bn)
2 PPCLI (Light Bn)
3 PPCLI (Light Bn)
1 Cbt Engr Bn
1 Fd Amb
1 Svc Bn
1 RCHA
*RCR*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 RCR (Mvr Bn)
2 RCR (Mvr Bn)
3 RCR (Mvr Bn)
2 Cbt Engr Bn
2 Fd Amb
2 Svc Bn
2 RCHA
*RCD*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 RCD (Mvr Bn)
2 RCD (Mvr Bn)
3 RCD (Mvr Bn)
4 Cbt Engr Bn
4 Fd Amb
4 Svc Bn
4 RCHA
*R22eR*
Regt HQ & Sigs
1 R22eR (Mvr Bn)
2 R22eR (Mvr Bn)
3 R22eR (Mvr Bn)
5 Cbt Engr Bn
5 Fd Amb
5 Svc Bn
5 RCHA
*LdSH(RC)*
LdSH (Mvr/DFS Bn)
Engr Sp Coy
UAV Coy
CMTC OPFOR Coy


*Option B â â€œ Two Battalion Regiments*
*1 CMBG*
1 CMBG HQ & Sigs
1 PPCLI (Mvr Bn)
2 PPCLI (Light Bn)
1 LdSH (DFS Bn)
2 LdSH (Mvr Bn)
1 CER
1 Fd Amb
1 Svc Bn
1 RCHA
*2 CMBG*
2 CMBG HQ & Sigs
1 RCR (Mvr Bn)
2 RCR (Light Bn)
1 RCD (Mvr Bn)
2 RCD (Mvr Bn)
2 CER
2 Fd Amb
2 Svc Bn
2 RCHA
*5 CMBG*
5 CMBG HQ & Sigs
1 R22eR (Mvr Bn)
2 R22eR (Light Bn)
1 bn 12 RBC (Mvr Bn)
2 bn 12 RBC (Mvr Bn)
5 CER
5 Fd Amb
5 Svc Bn
5 RCHA
*National* 
4 ESR


----------



## Infanteer

I'd vote for Option A - it is pretty similar to an outline I worked out a while back when playing with the idea.  Option A presents a decent structure that could be built with minimal hassle off of the existing TO&E plus our little bonus that the Liberal Government is talking about.


----------



## McG

I also prefer Option A.  To work, it would require a few hundred people more than Option B.  However, it provides a more capable force structure.  I also suspect that two battalions would not be enough to provide the spectrum of benefits that arise from multi-battalion regiments (especially since the battalions will not be homogeneous).  However, even without touching the promised 5,000 soldiers there is room to reduce the personnel demand this option will come with.

4 Cbt Engr Bn would be created from 4 ESR, while 4 Fd Amb, 4 Svc Bn, and 4 RCHA would be created by drawing personnel from their already existing sister units (which would now have one fewer manoeuvre unit to support).  If the light formation were modeled on 3 RM Cdo and the US Rangers, I think it could reduce the need for some of the planned enlargement of JTF 2 (allowing these pers to be used for the re-org).


----------



## Zipper

I agree. Option A would be easier to work with. Less suffleing of units and such. I especially like the fact that the PPCLI would finally be what their name suggests. It also leaves room for expansion of capabilities in the future.


----------



## ArmyRick

Option B is more realistic. Where in the dickens did you plan on recruiting all those people in Option A?

Also I am sure the LdSH would love to be a 300 man unit while the RCD  turn into multi-battalion regiments? Do you have any idea how $$$ powerfull the Strat association is ? More financially so than the Dragoons.

Where does 12RBC fit into this one ?

As a former Patricia, would guys knock it off with this obsession of making the PPCLI all light? Its the name of the regiment for petes sake. Why aren't the RCD and LdSH travelling around on Horse back as their name suggest?
Not too mention why switch around all these regiments? If you do not switch their locations then you are asking for trouble with Light Inf being stationed out west (better for mech trg) and LAV BNs being stationed in Petawawa (Friendlier for light to fight guys).

I definately say option B. You shouldn't have all your forces of a certain type concentrated in spot anyways.

Cheers. :dontpanic:


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Where in the dickens did you plan on recruiting all those people in Option A?


The 5,000 new soldiers that the government has committed to.   

Option A is not that much greater than Option B, and it would still leave the remainder of the 5,000 soldiers to increase the manning of the manoeuvre units. You will note that the formations each consist of only 3 manoeuvre units (as opposed to the 4 manoeuvre units of our current formations).   The only new units created are 4 Fd Amb, 4 Svc Bn, and 4 RCHA.   Many of the personnel in these units would be found by moving the pers that were previously used to support the manoeuvre unit lost from each Bde.   ASR will balance the pers between the Svc Bns and CFMS can do the same with the Fd Ambs.   4 RCHA could be based on C Btys of 2 RCHA and 5 RCHA (while 1 RCHA would give over its UAV Bty to the LdSH).   The biggest draw on new personnel would be the one surveillance unit that would have to be created in order to transform 1 CMBG without the LdSH.

Overall, the transformation could be done with only drawing on a very minimal number of the new 5,000 pers.   At this point we would have a slightly more capable force, but with the individual units just as under strength as they currently are.   The bulk of the 5,000 new personnel would then be used to beef-up the units and sub-units themselves.   Finally, we would have a significantly more robust force structure than exists today.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Where does 12RBC fit into this one ?


The same place they started (and still exist) as a primary reserve unit in Trois-Rivieres.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As a former Patricia, would guys knock it off with this obsession of making the PPCLI all light? Its the name of the regiment for petes sake. Why aren't the RCD and LdSH travelling around on Horse back as their name suggest?


Names don't really matter.   The RCD could be the light formation for all that it matters in the big scheme of things.


----------



## Zipper

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Also I am sure the LdSH would love to be a 300 man unit while the RCD   turn into multi-battalion regiments?



I think he was meaning that the 1,2 and 3 RCD are actually A,b,and c sqn's. At least I hope thats what he meant.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> As a former Patricia, would guys knock it off with this obsession of making the PPCLI all light? Its the name of the regiment for petes sake. Why aren't the RCD and LdSH travelling around on Horse back as their name suggest?



Sorry I'm a traditionalist. The Dragoons and Sallie Horses would stay Armoured as their name suggest, or if you really want to go back, the dragoons could be mechnized infantry. But the PPCLI is light. You can walk. ;D


----------



## Infanteer

McG, do you thing we'd be better off the have 2 "Light Capability" Brigades and 2 "Maneuver Capability" Brigades, ensuring that both capabilites can be on an even footing with regards to readiness, availability, etc, etc.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Option B is more realistic. Where in the dickens did you plan on recruiting all those people in Option A?
> 
> Also I am sure the LdSH would love to be a 300 man unit while the RCD turn into multi-battalion regiments? Do you have any idea how $$$ powerfull the Strat association is ? More financially so than the Dragoons.
> 
> Where does 12RBC fit into this one ?



This is one reason why I would be supportive of dropping the existing regiments - so much infighting about who gets what when there is no difference on what is named what.   Perhaps Option A should have been labelled Regiments "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" - it really doesn't matter, as long as the capability and readiness is improved with such a proposal.

You guys are missing the point by argueing about which regiment gets what - the factors to key into are:
1) That the Regiment becomes a "Combined Arms" as opposed to a "Branch Pure" organizational 
2) Regimental Affiliation is moved from the unit level to the Brigade Level.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> I think he was meaning that the 1,2 and 3 RCD are actually A,b,and c sqn's. At least I hope thats what he meant.



No, he meant 3 maneuver battalions, which would be 1,2 and 3 battalions of the "RCD" - along with the RCD Artillery Battalion, the RCD Engineer Battalion, the RCD Support Battalion, and RCD Regimental Headquarters.  Being part of the "Regiment", all soldiers, regardless of trade, would wear the RCD capbadge in that Brigade.   With regimental affiliation moving to the Brigade level, "Regiment" no longer fits a battalion-sized unit of Armoured, Engineer, or Artillery sub-units.



> Sorry I'm a traditionalist. The Dragoons and Sallie Horses would stay Armoured as their name suggest, or if you really want to go back, the dragoons could be mechnized infantry. But the PPCLI is light. You can walk. ;D



We can make the Dragoons "Air Mobile Rocket Artillery" for all I care - lets not let semantics get in the way of capability and transformation.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I'm a little skeptical about the benefits of having the Regiment as a Formation.  Would it really create efficiencies and reduce in-fighing?

Given the nature of  our deployments perhaps we need to get away from the CMBG model and the whole concept of Formations.  We like to say that we've left the Cold War but in Canadian terms a CMBG is really a Cold War instrument.  Deployed Task Forces will be formed from multiple units.  Soldiers will still belong to a Regt but they will not necessarily deploy as such.  Before we get into ATOF, the previous Battle Groups were usually only able to deploy after they had robbed other units.  Perhaps we invest the 5,000 extra soldiers into having complete Battalions and Regiments instead of forming new units.

Going to first prinicples, do we want the focus of the army (and I'm talking about where soldiers and officers place their identity) to be on the Army or on the Regiments?  Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages.  I would say that most Canadian soldiers think of themselves as part of a Regiment and we lack an identity as a force.  I'm not saying that this is good or bad at this point.  

If we really want to get rid of regimental in-fighting we would have to get rid of the whole system.  Other forces work outside of the Regimental model (ie, the Regts exist but they have transient membership and little meaning outside of the present in terms of corporate identity).  Is this what we want?  If this is the case then let's be clear about it.  I'm a bit of a traditionalist I guess in that I think that we have a good thing with the Regiments.  Inter-branch and inter-service rivalries cause much more harm than inter-regimental fighting.  Having the Regiment as Formation would, in my opinion, create problems and solve few. 

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Kirkhill

One of the biggest impediments to change in the British Army seemed to be the very tight connection from Squaddie to Regimental Senate.  This seems to have been particularly the problem in Scotland with the 6 single battalion regiments.  I am guessing that a good chunk of the decision-making on promotion happened within a very tight Mess.

With the 5 Battalion regiment, the history of the regiments are maintained, red hackles and all, but the power of the Mess seems likely to have been diluted.  This is because soldiers will transfer from one battalion to another throughout their career.  The CO will be less "god-like", although the Colonel/Commandant of the Regiment will likely be moreso.

In the Canadian context, how much movement is there amongst cap-badges?  Is there enough cross-posting and re-badging going on out there so that there is less parochialism?


----------



## McG

2Bravo said:
			
		

> Given the nature of our deployments perhaps we need to get away from the CMBG model and the whole concept of Formations. We like to say that we've left the Cold War but in Canadian terms a CMBG is really a Cold War instrument. Deployed Task Forces will be formed from multiple units. Soldiers will still belong to a Regt but they will not necessarily deploy as such. Before we get into ATOF, the previous Battle Groups were usually only able to deploy after they had robbed other units. Perhaps we invest the 5,000 extra soldiers into having complete Battalions and Regiments instead of forming new units.


ATOF is gone and has been replaced by a similar Managed Readiness System.   What stands out about the new managed readiness is the commitment to maintain a strategic reserve BG in addition to indefinitely sustaining two deployed BGs (in the same or separate theatres).   I won't go far in to the deficiencies of either the new or old system as they have already been well covered:   http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/16825.0.html

I will say that my proposed force structure was designed around meeting the same set of tasks as managed readiness, but it would do this while maintaining unit integrity better even than the previous ATOF.   9 Mvr Bns and the LdSH Mvr/DFS Bn would be able to sustain two â Å“robustâ ? Bn Gps indefinitely on a 2.5 year rotating cycle.   The three Lt Bns would be able to sustain the strategic reserve indefinitely on a 1.5 or 3 yr cycle (depending if rotations are 12 or 6 months).   The lt bns would also support DART, JTF2, do MAJAID, NEO, and a bulk of the SOVOP.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> McG, do you thing we'd be better off the have 2 "Light Capability" Brigades and 2 "Maneuver Capability" Brigades, ensuring that both capabilites can be on an even footing with regards to readiness, availability, etc, etc.


In fact, I had not put any thought into changing our current ratio of mech to lt.   However, such a move would allow us to maintain one light and one medium Bn Gp to be sustained indefinitely on a 3 year cycle but would leave no excess capacity for surge/strategic reserve units (not that managed readiness really gives us a full units available in reserve now anyway).



			
				2Bravo said:
			
		

> I'm a little skeptical about the benefits of having the Regiment as a Formation. Would it really create efficiencies and reduce in-fighing?
> 
> ...
> 
> ...   Inter-branch and inter-service rivalries cause much more harm than inter-regimental fighting. Having the Regiment as Formation would, in my opinion, create problems and solve few.


I tend to think that a regimental formation and manoeuvre battalions would dampen inter-branch rivalry as both manoeuvre arms would start speaking with a single voice.   I don't see inter-regimental rivalry rising to the level of inter-branch rivalry as the regiments would not be competing with each other for â Å“territoryâ ? defined by roles, equipment, and other capabilities.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> all soldiers, regardless of trade, would wear the RCD capbadge in that Brigade


I still don't see it going quite that far.   All soldiers would wear the Regt patch on thier arm.   Only the manoeuvre amrs would wear the regt cap badge and those in occupations that are likely to see postings to other regiments (especially purple trades) would continue in their corps cap badge.   For the Engrs to have the multi-battalion depth, they must have the freedom to fluidly move between regiments (as we currently move between brigades at the Sr NCO level and above).


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> I still don't see it going quite that far.   All soldiers would wear the Regt patch on thier arm.   Only the manoeuvre amrs would wear the regt cap badge and those in occupations that are likely to see postings to other regiments (especially purple trades) would continue in their corps cap badge.   For the Engrs to have the multi-battalion depth, they must have the freedom to fluidly move between regiments (as we currently move between brigades at the Sr NCO level and above).



Hmm...I've usually approached it the other way around - all soldiers will wear their trade patch on their arm and share a common hatbadge.   My rationale for doing this is to espouse a "higher loyalty" that is not based around trade or branch but rather upon the unit that one will deploy and fight with.   Past examples that utilized this format include the United States Marine Corps (Every Marine wears the Globe and Anchor), the GrossDeutchland of WWII fame, in which all members wore the GD patch, regardless of trade, and (I think) the Airborne Regiment of the early days when the Airborne Batteries and Engineers wore the "Ex Coelis" hatbadge and were, first and formost, "Airborne".

As you can see, the effort with proposing such a change is to allow for Regimental loyalty and esprit de corps to be posited into an all-arms (as opposed to trade centered) loci in order to foster a combined-arms mentality (Every soldier is a rifleman first, etc, etc) instead of turning regiments into the branch-pure fiefs that they currently are.  The regimental makeup affects our unit level organization - I think pushing the "combined arms" approach can allow us to eliminate those nagging questions like "Who's going to drive the IFV's?", "Who is going to man the mortars?", and "Who is going to do the Recce?".

As for the "gene pool" for the Engineers and Artillery soldiers, my hope was that between the sub-units organic to the maneuver battalions, the formation level unit, and any national level support units would offer a good enough mix for Gunners and Sappers to be as "Regimental" as the Infantry and Armoured types.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

MCG,

When we got the brief on managed readiness last Fall we quickly did the math and came up short in terms of Recce Sqns.  We can kick out 12 x "Battlegroup Headquarters" with our current structure but we need more sub-units to fill them up (given that the current concept includes mixed Task Forces).  If each "Regiment/Battalion" had four sub-units (not counting CSS and CS) we could handle the managed readiness with a little more ease.  We could adjust the "Mech to Light" ratio somewhat in the direction of Light but that is just my opinon.

My own experience has been that inter-branch rivalries are more powerful than inter-regimental rivalries.  Perhaps this is because the Armoured Corps has a certain sense of unity.  I do not begrudge the LdSH or 12 RBC any capabilities or equipment.  I do see quite a bit of infigting between the Armd, Inf and Arty for tasks and therefore resources.  I believe that a branch re-shuffle would gain us more than a regimental one.

Cheers,

2B


----------



## Infanteer

2Bravo said:
			
		

> My own experience has been that inter-branch rivalries are more powerful than inter-regimental rivalries.   Perhaps this is because the Armoured Corps has a certain sense of unity.   I do not begrudge the LdSH or 12 RBC any capabilities or equipment.   I do see quite a bit of infigting between the Armd, Inf and Arty for tasks and therefore resources.   I believe that a branch re-shuffle would gain us more than a regimental one.



Exactly, thus the the thrust behind eliminating branch patriarchy when it comes to forming at the sub-unit and unit level.

A "Light" Battalion could conceivably have Sappers (Pioneers), Gunners (Mortars), Infantry (Riflemen), etc, etc in a single unit.


----------



## McG

Infanteer,
A US Marine will always be a US marine and will never be a 1 ID soldier.   That would not be the case with the model I have proposed (as soldiers of most occupations would have to move between regiments and some occupations even rotate through air force and navy units).   The US Marines hold a unique role and capabilities in the US military, and the Airborne Regiment also held a unique role with unique capabilities in the Canadian Army, so much of the esprit was derived from that uniqueness.   This would not work in any of the models that have been proposed as each sees a certain combination of uniform formations.

A formation has no requirement for the number of Engr that would be required to establish a healthy gene pool.   Most would become wated PYs if we grew by that much.   I expect the same is likely true of most or all CS and CSS occupations (how many MPs does a Bde need anyway). 

However, with the capbadge debate, we may be getting into the lesser mechanics that could be decided over beer and arm wrestling. (but, I still see a formation patch worn on a brassard in garrison as the way to go and it could be worn by air force and navy pers posted into army regiments.)

2Bravo,
The expectation is that certain capabilities will not be required on all missions and we don't need one of everything for all the missions.   The problem is that there is no guarantee that the right combination of sub-units (or capabilities below sub-unit) will be in high readiness when a new mission needs them.   The other problem is that certain capabilities are required on all missions and some of these do not exist in enough numbers.

You will find that your math has the same results when applied to just about any type of sub-unit out there.   The Engrs are already transforming to correct for that.   In fact, the notion of two unit sized TFs deployed indefinitely is unachievable even for the infantry.   Based on the light, medium, and â Å“robustâ ? Bn Gps anticipated in the managed readiness system, the second mission would have to continuously change between light and medium. It is not realistic to expect that a light force could replace a medium force to carry on the same mission (or vice versa).   

The solution goes back to being more specific about the type of missions that we can do and the frequency at which we can do them (not any two, anytime, and anywhere).   My proposal does this by assigning different roles to light and medium forces in the readiness cycle and then fitting the structure to that.


----------



## Zipper

It all sounds great. I'm still wondering what everyones definition of light and medium is? We certainly do not approach robust.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> A formation has no requirement for the number of Engr that would be required to establish a healthy gene pool.   Most would become wated PYs if we grew by that much.   I expect the same is likely true of most or all CS and CSS occupations (how many MPs does a Bde need anyway).



Good points.   I'll be the first to admit that my approach has looked more towards the pointy end with regards to career structures.

Perhaps change there is required alongside of organizational transformation at the Regimental Level.   I'm sure Big Bad John can expand on this, but 3 Commando Brigade is a formation where:

-   All Marines wear the same capbadge.
-   All Marines come from the same "Soldier First" background.
-   All trades and roles required by the Brigade (Provost, Mechanic, Driver, Reconnaissance, etc) are filled out by Marines.

The only obvious exceptions are the attachments from the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery, but these must come from a small pool of "All Arms Commando Course" qualified Gunners and Sappers.   As a basis point, perhaps this can serve as model for the necessary Personnel/Career structures that "Regimental Formations" would require.



			
				Zipper said:
			
		

> It all sounds great. I'm still wondering what everyones definition of light and medium is? We certainly do not approach robust.



I would put "Light" in the spectrum of units specializing in Airmobile/Airborne operations and fighting in Difficult Terrain - as well, the neccessity of approaching Tier III SOC (supporting the Big Leagues) should be considered.

"Medium" seems to be a force that possess certain degrees of firepower, protection and mobility offered by its mechanized loadout - however, the loadout makes sacrifices in these three areas to provide advantages in strategic maneuverability, force projection capability, and flexibility.

"Heavy" would be a force that capitalizes on technology to maximize firepower, protection and battlefield mobility to offer up a force that is the decisive tactical unit of maneuver but tends to come with heavier logistical requirements, command overhead, and force projection constraints.

I don't think these are textbook - I've just whipped them up from off the top of my head.


----------



## MrGnr27

There has been some talk about a "Combat Arms Regiment" for sometime now. I recall reading about some Rideau colonel doing a feasability study on it. Personally, I don't think it will fly. And I don't think we should let it. Let's leave the Corps and Regiments be.

From what Ive read and now understand, we will see the following in the short term:

1. a common AFV family, that being the LAV;

2. Coyote and LAV III for the Armoured guys and the Infantry;

3. MGS for the Armoured guys; and (eventually)

4. MMEV for the Air Defence guys, doubling as an Anti-Armour asset.

Anyone can be re-roled and trained on a piece of equipment. However, why give TUA to a Gunner when the Infanteer is already trained ? In this third dacade of "train to need", we should concentrate on the maintenance of respective Corps skills. This is not about "turf wars" or "who gets the new toy". It is about the maintenace of specialist skills in a viable light/lethal field force.

Lastly, The Guns.....the M109s are history, and there is no planned replacement. A light 155, or even the M198, would at least keep us in the game. Further, we could take advantage of all those "Smart" bullets that are coming on line, giving us an enhanced indirect fire capability. ( Let's leave the direct fire stuff to the Black Hats ! )

Just two cents.....

Ubique


----------



## Infanteer

MrGnr27 said:
			
		

> There has been some talk about a "Combat Arms Regiment" for sometime now. I recall reading about some Rideau colonel doing a feasability study on it.



lol...would this be the LCol Banks/LCol Bondy debate in the Canadian Army Journal?  Rideau Colonel....


----------



## Zipper

While I agree we need to go to a combined arms type of deal. I disagree with both of their ways of getting there.

Oh well.


----------



## tomahawk6

Larger regiments [rather than a one battalion regiment] improve the soldier/officer's chances of further promotion as it is based on vacancy. In the US Army we arent tied to a regiment our whole career and thus promotion isnt limited.


----------



## McG

The new Defence Policy talks of making the CF more effective, more relevant, and more responsive.  One step in this process will be "establishing fully integrated units capable of a timely, focused and effective response to foreign or domestic threats to Canadian security."

While this will mean different things in air, maritime, and joint environments; I think this is a reasonable mandate to start examining the all-arms regiment and all-arms battalion a lot closer.


----------



## Zipper

We'll just have to see how far it gets in all this political hub bub.


----------



## mover1

Talk about what should happen and what is happening is cheap. How would one propose and idea such as this and have someone at a level look, seriously look, at it. 
  Looking at aspects like....How it would affect things....... how would we implement or change the regimental STRUCTURE so it wasn't as rigid or black and white as it is today.....how much resistance to this change will there be.

The Airforce in its draconian cuts of the nineties had what was called Flight Plan for life. It was a seminar telling people to think outside the box. Changes were coming and you could either be a part of the change or get out of the way.  Next thing we knew trades  were amalgamated, squadrons combined, others disbanded and op tempos increased.
They survived and have many lessons learned. 

How would the army make out if they were told that tradition was gone out the window for practicality. Box up the colors take that hat badge off your head. Put this epaulet on and report for training. You are no longer a member of regiment XYZ but a member of ABC Combat team.
There would be screams heard all across the  country.
Except for Quebec, I am sure that they would adapt to change easier than the rest of the country.


----------



## ArmyRick

Having thought this out and looking at how the CF is going with transformations I propose this (it is similar to an earlier idea I suggested).
 All regiments and battalions would be disbanded (But cap badges and affiliations would stay). Instead of 9 infantry battalions and 3 armored regiments, why not 12 task forces?
-9 Combat task forces 
-3 Reconnaissance task forces

Combat Task Force
-HQ Group (Sigs, MP, Int, CIMIC, Pys Ops, PAFFO, etc, it would include a Coyote 8 car troop)
- 2 LAVIII Companies
-Light infantry company
-Arty Battery (155mm Towed and yes only 4)
-Engineer squadron
-Forward Support Coy (CSS assetts such TPT, QM, MAINT, etc, etc)

Reconnaissance Task Force
-HQ Group (same as above minus coyote troop)
-Recconaissance squadron (Coyotes and a close observation troop in G-wagons as well)
-1 LAVIII Company
-1 Light infantry Company
-UAV Battery
-Engineer squadron
-Forward Support Company

the three brigades would each a Recce TF and 3 Combat TF. Each TF can be deployed at its 100% strength or tailored for the mission. This would eliminate a bunch of unnecessary RHQ and BN HQ in each brigade in my opinion.

A TF would have a LT COL and a CWO. (TF CO and TF SGT MAJ).

Ideas and input?


----------



## Infanteer

So, basically you want to rename "Battalions" into "Task Forces" and assign fire/eng support and CS/CSS function permanently to the new battalion-level structure?

Some principles of this is sound (infact, I've argued the same in The Downward Diffusion of Combined Arms), but I'm wary of the fact that we may not have the "critical mass" required to do so.   It may be more prudent to establish a more effective readiness-rotation and ensure that different components are assembled at the right time and place.

It is proactive in the notion that it attempts to eliminate plug-and-play - this is something all our discussions dealing with Force Structure should aim at reducing/eliminating.

I don't like the notion of "Reconnaissance Task Forces" - our Coyote-surveillance system is not the best platform to build a whole recce-oriented force structure around (as discussed here).   I believe that the LAV-family is capable of more than just farting around the battlefield trying to recce stuff out; the Marine LAR's in Iraq proved this.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> All regiments and battalions would be disbanded (But cap badges and affiliations would stay). Instead of 9 infantry battalions and 3 armored regiments, why not 12 task forces?
> -9 Combat task forces
> -3 Reconnaissance task forces


I prefer the idea of 9 x mech BG and 3 x li BG.  Each would be principally infantry but would include the required mix of cavalry/surveillance.  I do not think we have the critical mass required for engineers to be sustainable in standing BGs, so I would recommend the CERs (or Cbt Engr Bns) remain as the force generators for engineers (this would not preclude the possibility of sapper platoons in each BG).


----------



## McG

MCG said:
			
		

> To be fair, the putting loyalty to the tribe ahead of the CAF is not a problem that is unique to the reserves.





			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> It's not only the Res F regiments that fight progress in the name of history.  Why are there nine infantry battalions in the Reg F - funny how we have three regiments of three Bns each - wonderful that the math works out so nicely.
> 
> It may be time to reexamine the Regimental system in its entirety - maybe do something heretical like posting the best Reg F infantry LCols into command positions regardless of cap badge.





			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Yes, evolve already, and have a Reg F set of Bns based on need, not capbadge, and put the best infantry officers in positions of command, not the best of a particular capbadge.  And review why we need nine ERE Infantry LCols for each one commanding one of the ten (nine Bns plus the school).
> 
> Wasteful Bn and Regimental structures are not unique to the P Res...





			
				KevinB said:
			
		

> ... I also fully agree that the Regular Force and its Regimental Structures is backwards and problematic (at best).
> 
> Infanteer has it dead nuts that the CF as a whole is stuck in an outdated method - one that needs to re-think it self for the good of the CF as a whole, the Navy seems to be a leader is this respect (as much as it pains me to say).
> 
> Military organization needs to be fluid and adaptive -- if it was - instead of coming up with wonderful buzz words (and new HQ's) it would be flexible and responsive, prepared as it can be for Canada's defensive needs.


So, it has been nine years since we last tried to tackle the Reg F regimental system.  Have time and a major combat operation changed any perspectives?  Does the idea of replacing infantry and armoured regiments with manoeuvre regiments still hold traction?  Have opposing models (like following Australia in consolidating Reg F infantry to a single regiment) gained supporters?

I see fingers pointing to the Reg F regimental system as a barrier to progress.  Can we fix this?


----------



## Edward Campbell

I'm not sure the 'regimental system,' _per se_, is a problem; it (at least the version we know) was designed to _exploit_ ethnic, religious and cultural differences and make them into tools in the quest to maintain moral. What is a problem, in Canada, is our insistence in symmetry and, within that, on _linguistic balance_ or proportionality. In fact, given the linguistic politics of Canada I'm not sure how we cannot have a regimental system of some sort.

I don't think it really matters that The RCR, the PPCLI and the R22R, the RCD, LdSH and 12RBC all have different cap badges and all the associated _gee gaws_, but I do agree that the infantry, for example, could learn from the RCAC where inter-regimental postings were, especially for the 'high flyers,' quite common. Why, indeed, can we not have exactly as many infantry battalions as we _need,_, be it 7 or 11 or 13, rather than a number that must be divided by 3? Why, indeed, can't the best majors and lcols in the infantry be posted to command in the battalions, rebadging as they move, where they are likely to do the best job for the army, not just for their own _tribe_?

But, _in my opinion_, the 'regimental system,' itself, isn't the real problem: it is our own, uiquely Canadian, implementation of it.


----------



## Old Sweat

Edward

The regimental system as we knew it in the early sixties did have some movement between regiments. The CO of 1 RHC, LCol, later MGen GH Sellar, had originally been PPCLI, but was rebadged on promotion and appointment, while there were three, I think, anglo officers who came to the RHC from the Van Doos. Two later commanded RHC battalions. Is there any reason this could not be done again, other than systemic sensitivity to regimental sensibilities and whining? Let me add that the movement of the anglo officers may well have been motivated because of the negative optics of having an Anglo CO in the Van Doos. This was in the days when the army, like the Canadian government, was effectively unilingual English.

It is true that we then had six regiments, five with two battalions and one, the Van Doos, had three. That probably narrowed each regiments base and, as I recall anyway, the years in rank for promotion from Captain to Major varied. Legend, at least, had it that QOR officers spent the least time in the rank of Captain, while the Cdn Gds had the longest wait. (The Gds may suffered because the regiment went from four battalions to two in the mid-50s.)


----------



## Rifleman62

While we are at it, why don't we sever the 3 x 3 Reg F Inf Bns to The RCR, PPCLI, R22R @ one each (AB, PQ, ON), then the other six Bns to regional identity. PRes to Reg F. 

An additional two Francophone Bns may out-weight the recruiting base, but suggest another PQ PRes (to appease PQ) and a NB PRes Inf Reg or only a NB PRes Inf Bn. 

BC, Sask, MB, NS and Newfoundland come to mind. When the RCR was in Wpg, most of the NCMs seemed to hailed from Newfoundland anyway. Of course the regional identity Bns would not all be stationed in their namesake province, although some would. 2PPCLI could easily become The RWpgRif, 2 RCR/Nova Scotia Highlanders (Pipe Band inclusive), etc!

Inter-regimental postings and tribalism would be resolved with nine different cap badges vice three.

While we are at this sweeping change, downgrade all the other PRes Regs, all PRes Regts, to Coy establishment.

This is such a great idea, I think I will forward to Reserve 2000 or whatever they are called and all the PRes Honouraries, less the "downgrade all the other PRes Regs, all PRes Regts, to Coy establishment."


----------



## George Wallace

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> While we are at it, why don't we sever the 3 x 3 Reg F Inf Bns to The RCR, PPCLI, R22R @ one each (AB, PQ, ON), then the other six Bns to regional identity. PRes to Reg F.
> 
> An additional two Francophone Bns may out-weight the recruiting base, but suggest another PQ PRes (to appease PQ) and a NB PRes Inf Reg or only a NB PRes Inf Bn.
> 
> BC, Sask, MB, NS and Newfoundland come to mind. When the RCR was in Wpg, most of the NCMs seemed to hailed from Newfoundland anyway. Of course the regional identity Bns would not all be stationed in their namesake province, although some would. 2PPCLI could easily become The RWpgRif, 2 RCR/Nova Scotia Highlanders (Pipe Band inclusive), etc!
> 
> Inter-regimental postings and tribalism would be resolved with nine different cap badges vice three.
> 
> While we are at this sweeping change, downgrade all the other PRes Regs, all PRes Regts, to Coy establishment.
> 
> This is such a great idea, I think I will forward to Reserve 2000 or whatever they are called and all the PRes Honouraries, less the "downgrade all the other PRes Regs, all PRes Regts, to Coy establishment."



Were you in the Canadian Guards?

Their Companies were all named after one of the Provinces.


----------



## Rifleman62

No. RWpgRif, my pick for the MB RegF Regt!!


----------



## McG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The regimental system as we knew it in the early sixties did have some movement between regiments. The CO of 1 RHC, LCol, later MGen GH Sellar, had originally been PPCLI, but was rebadged on promotion and appointment, while there were three, I think, anglo officers who came to the RHC from the Van Doos. Two later commanded RHC battalions. Is there any reason this could not be done again, other than systemic sensitivity to regimental sensibilities and whining?


We are almost going in the opposite direction with each infentry regiment being treated as though it were an occupation of its own, having independant promotion selection and seperate manning levels at each rank.


----------



## GR66

Maybe this is a situation where a "Buttons and Bows" change can actually be a positive driver for eventual organizational change.  Any major (or even minor) changes to the existing Regimental system will be very emotional and come with much gnashing of teeth and resistance.  What if for the time being we leave the structure of the regiments alone but start the process by just changing the uniforms.

 Instead of each regiment (Armour and Infantry) wearing their own cap badge have them instead wear their Branch insignia as their cap badge and their Regimental insignia elsewhere on their uniform.  This in itself I'm sure will create a shyte storm of protest but maybe it can be a positive first step in creating a branch identity vs. a Regimental identity.  Once everyone is wearing the same cap badge the actual organizational changes to follow might not be as hard to swallow.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> Maybe this is a situation where a "Buttons and Bows" change can actually be a positive driver for eventual organizational change.  Any major (or even minor) changes to the existing Regimental system will be very emotional and come with much gnashing of teeth and resistance.  What if for the time being we leave the structure of the regiments alone but start the process by just changing the uniforms.
> 
> Instead of each regiment (Armour and Infantry) wearing their own cap badge have them instead wear their Branch insignia as their cap badge and their Regimental insignia elsewhere on their uniform.  This in itself I'm sure will create a shyte storm of protest but maybe it can be a positive first step in creating a branch identity vs. a Regimental identity.  Once everyone is wearing the same cap badge the actual organizational changes to follow might not be as hard to swallow.



Or we could just increase the size of our (ridiculously too small and underequipped) Army to accurately reflect our (citizens' and politicians' enormously unreasonable) national and international aspirations and all this internal turmoil will go away.


----------



## dimsum

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Or we could just increase the size of our (ridiculously too small and underequipped) Army to accurately reflect our (citizens' and politicians' enormously unreasonable) national and international aspirations and all this internal turmoil will go away.



 :rofl:

Oh wait, you were serious.


----------



## Infanteer

Mr. Campbell's post is worth rereading.  As I mentioned in another post, the British Regimental System(s) evolved to suit the nature and requirements of the Army.  Ours must do the same, lest it become an anchor.  When boiled down to its elements, the Regimental System is a method of affiliation for our Infantry and Armoured units designed to foster tradition and esprit de corps (that's my own definition).  A few thoughts:

1.  The Regimental System will not go anywhere - not even Hellyer could eliminate it when he recast the Armed Forces.  I wouldn't even advocate it if there was such a possibility, as the Regiments present the Army with such a strong branding mechanism for the Canadian public that it would be foolish to discard them.  With that being said, it can and should evolve (and has done in the past) when required.  The number of active battalions should move based on national requirements, not to appease regimental sensibilities.

2.  The Australian Army made the conscious decision after the Second World War to go to a single large Infantry Regiment (The Royal Australian Regiment) that now sits at seven regular battalions.  This simply would not work in Canada, where our linguistic realities ensure the necessity of a French Canadian Regiment as a home for Francophone service to the country in the manoeuvre arms.  While the Artillery and Engineers are able to get around this, I'm not sure the heritage of how the Infantry and Armoured branches do things would be able to do the same thing.

3.  It's only in the last 20 years that we've really stratified Regiments by region to the extent that we've done.  This has likely reduced cross posting (this still occurs, but only by the handful).  It is questionable whether our Regimental System benefits from sticking all Patricias out West, all Royals in Central and Eastern Canada, and all Vandoos in Quebec.  Perhaps there is merit in reverting to the Cold War format that saw battalions of two or more Regiments represented in each of the Brigades; if anything, this would reduce insularity and promote cross-regimental postings.

4.  The number of battalions per regiment is an interesting discussion - some argue that three are required to keep a sufficient "gene pool".  This is certainly heard in the UK, where - over the last seven decades - amalgamation of county regiments has occurred again and again as single battalion Regiments were too "shallow".  This may be more related to recruiting new soldiers vice managing current ones.  That being said, our Armoured Regiments all exist as single battalion Regiments, and they don't seem to have any issues (the current CO of the LdSH rebadged from the 12eRBC upon promotion and appointment and the world never ended).  If the infantry corps is facing issues where Regimental sensibilities are stunting operational growth (I'd suggest the parachute capability is one such area), then perhaps it'd be useful to examine an Army of 6-12 single battalion Regiments.  This would likely reduce the insularity of the Regiments by forcing more cross posting.  It would certainly add to the colour of the Army.

5.  A final point on where the Regiments make an impact on the Army today.  Meriting, the process of promotions, is handled centrally by CMP.  This, to me, is a good policy.  Succession planning, the process of appointments, is handled by the Regiments.  This is a critical point to understand, as promotion to the rank of X is only a path to further promotion if appointment to the position of Y soon follows.  Regimental succession planning is designed at a level that is much more intimate than the "Big Army, look at PER" system and should, in theory, ensure the right people to guide the Army are put into the right positions.  Any talk of change ups to the size and nature of the Regiments should take this factor into account.


----------



## Old Sweat

I've grabbed this statement by Infanteer for a reason.

3.  _It's only in the last 20 years that we've really stratified Regiments by region to the extent that we've done.  This has likely reduced cross posting (this still occurs, but only by the handful).  It is questionable whether our Regimental System benefits from sticking all Patricias out West, all Royals in Central and Eastern Canada, and all Vandoos in Quebec.  Perhaps there is merit in reverting to the Cold War format that saw battalions of two or more Regiments represented in each of the Brigades; if anything, this would reduce insularity and promote cross-regimental postings._

Not quite - in the Canadian Army ante integration there were four brigades. Let's look at the make up, and there was rotation to 4 Brigade every two, then every three years.

a. 1 CIBG, HQ Calgary, made up of three battalions drawn from two two battalion regiments - PPCLI and QOR;

b. 2 CIBG, HQ Petawawa, made up of three battalions drawn from two two battalion regiments - Cdn Gds and The RCR;

c. 3 CIBG, HQ Gagetown, made up of four battalions drawn from a three battalion - R22R - and a two battalion - RHC - regiment; and

d. 4 CIBG, HQ Soest, made up of three battalions, one from each regimentally grouped brigade. Note that if, for example, a Cdn Gds battalion rotated to Germany, it would be replaced with the other battalion from that regiment, which in turn would be rotated with a RCR battalion, which . .  Well, you get the idea.

It was only when the Germany brigade went to a two battalion organization, and we had reduced our regiments to three, that The RCR and Patricias began switching stations in Winnipeg.


----------



## Infanteer

Right, but you still had Regiments mixed within each Brigade, with Germany offering the wildcard.  Today you see, essentially, three solitudes.  The only time different Regiments get to actually work together is if they happen to be opposing each other on a Maple Resolve serial in Wainwright.


----------



## Old Sweat

Agreed, and it probably is not healthy. It may be possible to transfer a battalion between 1 and 2 Brigades, but I suspect it would not work with 5 Brigade. At one time 2 RCR was part of 5 Brigade, but that changed with the close out of CFE and the return of 1 R22R to Canada. We grappled with this during most of my career and could not solve it, other than for a short time rotating 3 RCR to Winnipeg and moving 2 PPCLI to Baden.

Most solutions - good, bad and indifferent - founder on the shoals of the "three regular regiments" which came out of the 1970 force cuts, but there also is the reserve regimental factor. If anyone can come up with a solution that would fly in the regular infantry, and would also work with the reserves with their collective fiercely tribal ethos, one would think it would have been proposed by now. And good luck with coming up with a name that works in both official languages. Sorry if I am negative, but I have seen this tar baby wrestled with no success for half a century and more.

I also hate to say it, but if we tried to switch a battalion of the two Anglo regiments between brigades, fiscal factors would probably just have the units trade cap badges. This would result in two highly annoyed units, still with their old corporate identities and a massive chip on their collective shoulders.


----------



## Ostrozac

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Agreed, and it probably is not healthy. It may be possible to transfer a battalion between 1 and 2 Brigades, but I suspect it would not work with 5 Brigade. At one time 2 RCR was part of 5 Brigade, but that changed with the close out of CFE and the return of 1 R22R to Canada. We grappled with this during most of my career and could not solve it, other than for a short time rotating 3 RCR to Winnipeg and moving 2 PPCLI to Baden.
> 
> Most solutions - good, bad and indifferent - founder on the shoals of the "three regular regiments" which came out of the 1970 force cuts, but there also is the reserve regimental factor. If anyone can come up with a solution that would fly in the regular infantry, and would also work with the reserves with their collective fiercely tribal ethos, one would think it would have been proposed by now. And good luck with coming up with a name that works in both official languages. Sorry if I am negative, but I have seen this tar baby wrestled with no success for half a century and more.
> 
> I also hate to say it, but if we tried to switch a battalion of the two Anglo regiments between brigades, fiscal factors would probably just have the units trade cap badges. This would result in two highly annoyed units, still with their old corporate identities and a massive chip on their collective shoulders.



Agreed. In hindsight, we probably missed a golden opportunity in 1995 when we moved the bulk of 2 Commando from Petawawa to Edmonton to be the nucleus of what became 3 PPCLI. If we had instead moved 3 Commando to Edmonton and stood up 3 RCR there, and stood up 3 PPCLI in the old Airborne Regiment lines in Petawawa, then we would have had mixed regimental brigades, with no added financial cost.

Doing it now would be terribly difficult, for cost reasons, unless something else drastic happens, like a NATO brigade.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...
> That being said, our Armoured Regiments all exist as single battalion Regiments, and they don't seem to have any issues (the current CO of the LdSH rebadged from the 12eRBC upon promotion and appointment and the world never ended).  If the infantry corps is facing issues where Regimental sensibilities are stunting operational growth (I'd suggest the parachute capability is one such area), then perhaps it'd be useful to examine an Army of 6-12 single battalion Regiments.  This would likely reduce the insularity of the Regiments by forcing more cross posting.  It would certainly add to the colour of the Army.
> ...



This was likely more in line with what I was thinking as a "next step" after going to a common cap badge for all regiments.  I totally get the value of regimental history, tradition and the sense of group pride that it brings.  I'm all in favour of keeping that but a common cap badge would also symbolize how all the regiments are part of a greater whole.  It's really not much different than what many have suggested in grouping together multiple existing militia regiments as individual companies or battalions within a larger parent formation.  Keep the positive aspects of the regimental system without it becoming a barrier to the organizational functionality of the greater Army.  Keeping the regiments but sharing a cap badge simply makes that cross-pollination even smoother.


----------



## George Wallace

GR66 said:
			
		

> This was likely more in line with what I was thinking as a "next step" after going to a common cap badge for all regiments.  I totally get the value of regimental history, tradition and the sense of group pride that it brings.  I'm all in favour of keeping that but a common cap badge would also symbolize how all the regiments are part of a greater whole.  It's really not much different than what many have suggested in grouping together multiple existing militia regiments as individual companies or battalions within a larger parent formation.  Keep the positive aspects of the regimental system without it becoming a barrier to the organizational functionality of the greater Army.  Keeping the regiments but sharing a cap badge simply makes that cross-pollination even smoother.



You don't grasp the real meaning behind the cap badges, do you?  They are the Regiment.  The cap badge is on the Guidons/Colours, stationary, unit crests and signs, coins.......to infinity.  Making one common cap badge cover all regiments, in essence will be doing away with the Regiments' identities and the Regimental System.

You can go to the Armour School and Infantry School and ask the candidates what it means to take down the Armour Corps cap badge or the Infantry Corps cap badge and finally be presented a Regimental cap badge.  You can ask anyone who has worn the "Cornflake" what it meant to finally be presented a cap badge other than the "Cornflake", as to how they feel about the one common cap badge.  It was even more generic than what you propose, covering all Trades and all Elements.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Lets suppose, and I'm just _spitballing_ here, that we went to single battalion regiments in the regular force - let's say we need CFSOR plus, say, four armoured regiments and 10 infantry battalions - 14 cap badges in the regular force.

Now let's say we group, administratively, the whole army into four _divisions_. Let's call them:

     1. The Governor General's Divisions (something like a Guards Division) ~ the usual suspects (GGHG, GGHF, etc) but also, say, the R22R and e.g. the RCE and Army Medical Service (regiments and corps which
         have HM the Queen as Colonel in Chief;

     2. The Heavy Division ~ the RCD, The RCR, the RCA, and several other regiments and corps;

     3. The Light Division ~ CFSOR, all _light_ cavalry and all light infantry, including the PPCLI, and rifle regiments and some corps; and

     4. The Highland Division ~ the usual suspects, plus (do we have any _Scottish_ cavalry?)

Each of those divisions would have, at a minimum, two regular infantry battalions, some might have several infantry and armoured cap badges. Things like buttons and bows would be done on a divisional basis rather than regiment by regiment. (The PPCLI would, for example, have back buttons and pips!) I _suspect_ that such and administrative change _might_ provide an opportunity to make some other organizational reforms, including to the reserve regiments.

Maybe, just maybe, we could _reduce_ some of the detrimental _regimental_ effects, the dirty bath water, without tossing out the good bits, the baby. 

It would obviate the need to mix The RCR and the PPCLI in 1 and 2 brigades. 1 Bde would have one PPCLI battalion (there would be a second PPCLI battalion in the reserve force) plus two other (yet to be selected) battalions of other regiments. 2 Bde would have a RCR battalion (there would also be another RCR battalion in the reserves) plus two other battalions of other regiments, and so on.

I'm not sure that I'm not talking through my hat, but ...  :soapbox:


----------



## GR66

George Wallace said:
			
		

> You don't grasp the real meaning behind the cap badges, do you?  They are the Regiment.  The cap badge is on the Guidons/Colours, stationary, unit crests and signs, coins.......to infinity.  Making one common cap badge cover all regiments, in essence will be doing away with the Regiments' identities and the Regimental System.
> 
> You can go to the Armour School and Infantry School and ask the candidates what it means to take down the Armour Corps cap badge or the Infantry Corps cap badge and finally be presented a Regimental cap badge.  You can ask anyone who has worn the "Cornflake" what it meant to finally be presented a cap badge other than the "Cornflake", as to how they feel about the one common cap badge.  It was even more generic than what you propose, covering all Trades and all Elements.



I guess that really IS my point.  Why can't it be just as great an honour to finally earn the right to wear your Royal Canadian Infantry Corps or Royal Canadian Armoured Corps cap badge instead of the "Cornflake"?  Why can't it be an incredible source of pride to be presented the symbols of your Regiment that are somewhere other than on your head?  Be proud of the individual Regiment to which you are assigned and all the symbols and heritage of that unit, but when the specific shape of the piece of brass on a beret becomes a significant factor in organizational decision making then perhaps that is an issue.


----------



## George Wallace

GR66 said:
			
		

> I guess that really IS my point.  Why can't it be just as great an honour to finally earn the right to wear your Royal Canadian Infantry Corps or Royal Canadian Armoured Corps cap badge instead of the "Cornflake"?  Why can't it be an incredible source of pride to be presented the symbols of your Regiment that are somewhere other than on your head?  Be proud of the individual Regiment to which you are assigned and all the symbols and heritage of that unit, but when the specific shape of the piece of brass on a beret becomes a significant factor in organizational decision making then perhaps that is an issue.



LOL.  That runs counter to all the recent changes that the Harper Government has now placed on the CAF with their new ranks and uniforms.  We, if I follow you correctly, should in your eyes, then be prepared to go full circle once again and adopt one common CAF uniform, at the same time being proud of the traditions of our Regiments, Units, Ships, Trades, and Elements.


----------



## Rifleman62

George Wallace to GR66:



> You don't grasp the real meaning behind the cap badges, do you?  They are the Regiment.  The cap badge is on the Guidons/Colours, stationary, unit crests and signs, coins.......to infinity.  Making one common cap badge cover all regiments, in essence will be doing away with the Regiments' identities and the Regimental System.



Absolutely agree.

Still like this better so far:

While we are at it, why don't we sever the 3 x 3 Reg F Inf Bns to The RCR, PPCLI, R22R @ one each (AB, PQ, ON), then the other six Bns to regional identity. PRes to Reg F.

An additional two Francophone Bns may out-weight the recruiting base, but suggest another PQ PRes (to appease PQ) and a NB PRes Inf Reg or only a NB PRes Inf Bn.

BC, Sask, MB, NS and Newfoundland come to mind. When the RCR was in Wpg, most of the NCMs seemed to hailed from Newfoundland anyway. Of course the regional identity Bns would not all be stationed in their namesake province, although some would. 2PPCLI could easily become The RWpgRif, 2 RCR/Nova Scotia Highlanders (Pipe Band inclusive), etc!

Inter-regimental postings and tribalism would be resolved with nine different cap badges vice three.

While we are at this sweeping change, downgrade all the other PRes Regs, all PRes Regts, to Coy establishment.


----------



## GR66

George Wallace said:
			
		

> LOL.  That runs counter to all the recent changes that the Harper Government has now placed on the CAF with their new ranks and uniforms.  We, if I follow you correctly, should in your eyes, then be prepared to go full circle once again and adopt one common CAF uniform, at the same time being proud of the traditions of our Regiments, Units, Ships, Trades, and Elements.



I don't know how we made the jump from keeping the individual regiments but having them wear a common Infantry/Armoured Corps cap badge to a return to Hellyer-ized unification of the CF with sailors wearing green and all traditions kicked to the curb.  

Some have suggested in this thread (and others) that so-called "Regimental Mafias" and fears of challenging the status quo of existing Regular and Reserve units has been a factor in preventing changes to the Army which may make it more efficient.  My suggestion of a common Corps-wide cap badge within the existing Regimental System was thrown out as a possible way of facilitating some of these proposed changes without trying to change the existing Regimental system and "throw the baby out with the bathwater".


----------



## George Wallace

GR66 said:
			
		

> I don't know how we made the jump from keeping the individual regiments but having them wear a common Infantry/Armoured Corps cap badge to a return to Hellyer-ized unification of the CF with sailors wearing green and all traditions kicked to the curb.
> 
> Some have suggested in this thread (and others) that so-called "Regimental Mafias" and fears of challenging the status quo of existing Regular and Reserve units has been a factor in preventing changes to the Army which may make it more efficient.  My suggestion of a common Corps-wide cap badge within the existing Regimental System was thrown out as a possible way of facilitating some of these proposed changes without trying to change the existing Regimental system and "throw the baby out with the bathwater".



What you are proposing is the removal of the "Symbols" that make up/are those distinct Regiments.  Let's use an out of the box, extreme example: religious symbols.  Would you just as easily suggest that all faiths do away with their religion's "identifier symbols" and adopt only one....The Cross?  or the Star of David?  or the Cresent?  Whichever one you propose, and do away with all others.  Who would then identify with being a Christian, a Jew, Muslim, a Buddhist, Hindi, etc.?


----------



## Infanteer

Before this thread falls down a rabbit hole, I posted my points to indicate some aspects of the Regimental System in our Army.  Rather than post "means" like "let's change cap badges" or "let's change battalion names", people should give ends.  Why would we change cap badges?  What is the desired end state?  If someone is going to propose a change to the current system, I'd be interested to see in what all the recommendations are meant to fix.


----------



## Old Sweat

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Before this thread falls down a rabbit hole, I posted my points to indicate some aspects of the Regimental System in our Army.  Rather then post "means" like "let's change capbadges" or "let's change battalion names", people should give ends.  Why would we change capbadges?  What is the desired end state?  If someone is going to propose a change to the current system, I'd be interested to see in what all the recommendations are meant to fix.



We came very close to adopting a common cap badge in the early seventies under the tenure of General FR Sharp as CDS. He retired before it could be implemented and Jadex, who followed him, killed the idea. It used to pop up from time to time in the minutes of the Clothing and Dress Committee where it had a following, but invariably got buried in bureaucracy. Whether a common cap badge would kill the regimental system or not, I submit it stands little to no chance of being implemented these days. It seems to me that the present structure in the regular force is inviolate, and any proposal to fiddle with the reserves should come from them.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Fair enough, Infanteer and you're quite right, too.

I'm still just _spitballing_, but ...

     I want to keep the strengths of the regimental system: the bits than make Maintenance of Moral easier.

     I want to weaken the hold that the three regular force infantry regiments on the army.

     I would like to have fewer, bigger reserve force regiments - the same number of 'units' in armouries as we have now, but some being sub units of larger regiments.

     (I would, as a peripheral matter, like to think about Army (rather than CF) basic training and I could imagine that my _divisions_ might each have a (bilingual) depot doing recruit and common at all corps
      junior and even senior NCO training. Or the _division_ depots _might_ be regional: Western, Central, Quebec and Atlantic.)

     I would like to enhance some of our _*Canadian*_ traditions: like our role in pioneering the light infantry and our highland traditions, too.


----------



## dapaterson

It is indeed ironic that two of the combat arms spend their days fretting about buttons and bows, while the engineers, signallers and loggies all spend more time actively employed in their professions, yet somehow seem to manage with a branch identity and units that have their names and designations sometimes changed at whim, and have cross-postings based on merit, not on capbadge.


----------



## Edward Campbell

dapaterson said:
			
		

> It is indeed ironic that two of the combat arms spend their days fretting about buttons and bows, while the engineers, signallers and loggies all spend more time actively employed in their professions, yet somehow seem to manage with a branch identity and units that have their names and designations sometimes changed at whim, and have cross-postings based on merit, not on capbadge.




Yes, but my _sense_ is that the second principle of war ~ Maintenance of Moral ~ is harder to maintain in those two _close_ combat arms than in other arms and services and I _think_ that cap badges and guidons and _buttons and bows_ can (but don't always) help. I don't think I would go quite as far as George Wallace in resisting changes; I think some changes are *a)* possible and *b)* might be beneficial.


----------



## Infanteer

Edward, the spitballing is helping to define the argument.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I want to keep the strengths of the regimental system: the bits than make Maintenance of Moral easier.



Agreed; it makes no sense, and - considering today's climate - we may as well propose spinning the earth in the opposite direction.



> I want to weaken the hold that the three regular force infantry regiments on the army.



This is the crux of the discussion - how so?  What exactly is "the hold"?  The two roles that the Regiments play in the Army are succession planning (appointments) and furnishing advice to COS Army Strat with regards to changes to Infantry/Armoured organization/equipping/distribution/manning.  Considering that this is currently done by senior leaders in specific positions throughout the Army, I'm not sure how one lessens a hold - Battalion COs will be asked for input on how to organize X regardless of what capbadge they wear.



> I would like to have fewer, bigger reserve force regiments - the same number of 'units' in armouries as we have now, but some being sub units of larger regiments.



This has been discussed elsewhere - what I'd like to see is a study that (a) looks at the authorized and real parade strengths of each of the 49 Reserve Infantry Regiments and 18 Armoured Reserve Regiments.  This would have to be followed by recommendation for downsizing of Bde/Unit HQs to show the real gains (I'm not concerned about cap badges and colours - there are ways to work around that).  All this must be driven by a plan to reorganize the Reserves so they are able to do something more than act as an individual feeder pool.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> [PRes structure and regiments have] been discussed elsewhere


... and recently: http://army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1326494.html#msg1326494



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Now let's say we group, administratively, the whole army into four _divisions_. Let's call them:
> 
> 1. The Governor General's Divisions (something like a Guards Division) ~ the usual suspects (GGHG, GGHF, etc) but also, say, the R22R and e.g. the RCE and Army Medical Service (regiments and corps which
> have HM the Queen as Colonel in Chief;
> 
> 2. The Heavy Division ~ the RCD, The RCR, the RCA, and several other regiments and corps;
> 
> 3. The Light Division ~ CFSOR, all _light_ cavalry and all light infantry, including the PPCLI, and rifle regiments and some corps; and
> 
> 4. The Highland Division ~ the usual suspects, plus (do we have any _Scottish_ cavalry?)


I assume that, when you say "division", what you describe is not a formation but rather a sort of loose administrative grouping responsible for dress and traditions?




			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> This is the crux of the discussion - how so?  What exactly is "the hold"?  The two roles that the Regiments play in the Army are succession planning (appointments) and furnishing advice to COS Army Strat with regards to changes to Infantry/Armoured organization/equipping/distribution/manning.  Considering that this is currently done by senior leaders in specific positions throughout the Army, I'm not sure how one lessens a hold - Battalion COs will be asked for input on how to organize X regardless of what capbadge they wear.


Some concerns were tossed out in the PRes regimental discussion and then dragged to this thread here:  http://army.ca/forums/threads/28042/post-1328001.html#msg1328001

There is perception, with ample supporting anecdotal evidence, that loyalty to the tribes often drives decisions that may not be in the best interests of either the Army or CAF.  The emotional impetus for force symmetry being one example.


----------



## GR66

George Wallace said:
			
		

> What you are proposing is the removal of the "Symbols" that make up/are those distinct Regiments.  Let's use an out of the box, extreme example: religious symbols.  Would you just as easily suggest that all faiths do away with their religion's "identifier symbols" and adopt only one....The Cross?  or the Star of David?  or the Cresent?  Whichever one you propose, and do away with all others.  Who would then identify with being a Christian, a Jew, Muslim, a Buddhist, Hindi, etc.?



I'm not suggesting removing the symbol at all.  Just relocating it on the uniform from the beret to over the heart, or the shoulder, or whatever.  And your suggesting that this is in any reasonable way the same thing as completely removing a religious symbol from a faith is simply ridiculous unless you are suggesting that your devotion to your Regiment is the same as a religious person's devotion to God.  If I'm not mistaken members of the CF have several layers of loyalty that should come above the Regiment.


----------



## Edward Campbell

MCG said:
			
		

> ...
> I assume that, when you say "division", what you describe is not a formation but rather a sort of loose administrative grouping responsible for dress and traditions?
> ...
> There is perception, with ample supporting anecdotal evidence, that loyalty to the tribes often drives decisions that may not be in the best interests of either the Army or CAF.  The emotional impetus for force symmetry being one example.




That is, indeed, what I meant ... and I re-emphasize that I'm just tossing an unformed idea out for discussion ... it may well be a totally unworkable and unnecessary layer on a 'cake' that, arguably, already has too many layers.

Your second point is what I was aiming at when I talked about the "hold" the three infantry regiments have on the army. It's not them, of course, it's the notion that we must have symmetry.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:
			
		

> I'm not suggesting removing the symbol at all.  Just relocating it on the uniform from the beret to over the heart, or the shoulder, or whatever.


I think this is just tinkering with badges.  Aside from cosmetics, nothing has changed. 
I understand you see this as driving toward a cultural change that makes future organizational change easier, but I see significant short term pain for no gain.


----------



## Old Sweat

Twenty years back, during the Somalia inquiry goat screw, CDS General Jean Boyle apparently decided the regimental system was at the root of all the Canadian Forces' woes, and he, at least according to a brief piece written by CBC journalist Brian Stewart (a respected and ethical one) believed the major offender was the PPCLI. Boyle, of course, was tossed under the bus by the government, but he may have keyed on some of the dopier things we were doing at the time.  

So what? Well, the regimental system did not come down Mount Sinai with Moses or appear from the burning bush. It was created to rationalize the British Army's manning the frontiers of empire in the late Victorian era. It did not vanquish Napoleon or scale the heights of Quebec or repulse the Russian cavalry at Balaclava. It was an administrative measure imposed by the civil authority, and was not widely popular at the time of its introduction.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> There is perception, with ample supporting anecdotal evidence, that loyalty to the tribes often drives decisions that may not be in the best interests of either the Army or CAF.  The emotional impetus for force symmetry being one example.



Is that something driven by Regimental sentiments?  The Engineer and Artillery Corps, supposedly unburdened by such things, have also been loathe to consolidate resources where it makes sense to do so (M777s, AEVs).


----------



## McG

I cannot speak for the Arty and the M777, but the Engrs are pushing to consolidate AEVs in 1 CER.


----------



## Infanteer

Reassuring if so, hopefully they also drop that concept of the CIED Squadron as well.


----------



## George Wallace

I tend to think it is 50/50 when it comes to "loyalty to the tribes often drives decisions that may not be in the best interests of either the Army or CAF".  Yes there are some bad decisions made, but there are also good ones.  Often it is not the Tribe, but the egos of some of the personalities in the Tribe, that drive some of these decisions.  It can be witnessed in our discussions on whom was driving the "Buttons and Bows" movement.   :-\


----------



## Old Sweat

If the last ten years has taught us anything, it is that we are not very good at designing our forces for what is going to happen. In 2004 we were getting pretty close to deciding we didn't need tanks, and the artillery was increasingly viewed as redundant and, of course, the mortar was obsolete.It only took a short while on the two way range to switch our thinking through 180 degrees, or 3200 mils for my fellow gunners. So what? The more I think on the issue, with my mind set coloured from belonging to a regiment with a single, easily identifiable cap badge, the more I feel that, for all its faults, nobody has been able to come up with a better solution for the Canadian Army. There may be things that have worked for other armies, and maybe there is something that would work for us, but our version of the regimental system ain't all that bad. Now if ISIS would only kidnap all the honouraries . . .

The last guy that really fiddled with it was Sam Hughes back in 1914 and, while he laid the foundation for the best military effort in our history, he really caused major chaos that took years to resolve. Compared to his wild schemes, the reorganizations of 1936, 1954 and 1970 were not all that radical.


----------



## KevinB

Remember prior to 9/11 the LiB's and PCoy's where all on the chopping block, with the idea to sweep away the last remaining thread to the CAR...

Similarly I'd argue it was not the requirement - but the cap badge/trade of the CDS that resulted in Tanks.
 I believe that a Attack Helicopter would have been a better acquisition over the Leo's in terms of dealing with the current and future threats.

The Mortar - despite the realities of war has not found a defending patron in the CF.


One of the major roadblocks of the Regimental System in Canada is the promotion and positioning of LCol's - mainly as Bn Commanders.
  Due to the cap badge mafia bad (or call it not as capable) officers are assigned to command where perhaps a better candidate could have been assigned from another Regiment.  Going back to CAR Pre-Somalia days that aspect just flies out at ones face...


----------



## Brad Sallows

On the Res F side, isn't the passage of time weakening the unit associations and various tradition-for-the-sake-of-tradition stakeholders who meddle?

From time-to-time I would hear stories of - and on rarer occasions witness - influence wielded by people no longer in uniform, and from time-to-time therefore I would be mightily pissed off.  Can we still not drive a stake through it?


----------



## dapaterson

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> On the Res F side, isn't the passage of time weakening the unit associations and various tradition-for-the-sake-of-tradition stakeholders who meddle?
> 
> From time-to-time I would hear stories of - and on rarer occasions witness - influence wielded by people no longer in uniform, and from time-to-time therefore I would be mightily pissed off.  Can we still not drive a stake through it?



I'd answer this, but I'm too busy getting my DEUs tailored to restore archaic colonial rank insignia.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> On the Res F side, isn't the passage of time weakening the unit associations and various tradition-for-the-sake-of-tradition stakeholders who meddle?
> 
> From time-to-time I would hear stories of - and on rarer occasions witness - influence wielded by people no longer in uniform, and from time-to-time therefore I would be mightily pissed off.  Can we still not drive a stake through it?



CO's can say no to the GIF but these days, the kind of folks with the pills to stand up and say 'no' are rare...


----------

