# Rick's Napkin Forces Challenge



## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

FJAG, Kirkhill, KevinB and Anyone interested, Are you UP for a challenge? Test your brain matter and decision making skills. Or enjoy high levels of frustration. 

In Holistic Management for farmers and ranchers, we are trained to develop your next year's farm or ranch operating expenses based on a budget that is half or less than your current years income levels. It forces farmers and ranchers to assume the worst financial scenarios and actually start earning a profit.

SO, lets apply it to this exercise. This based on a light of the brilliant thinking I have seen on the Force 2025 thread.

Here we go.

Situation
The Woke Party of Canada has won the 2024 federal election and major sweeping changes are coming through. They have determined that Canada will focus solely on home defence and domestic operations. 
The current real threat is perceived as Russia (Foreign), however the USA has signed a treaty (for a portion of Alberta's oil) to provide a full military force assistance in the event of a conventional invasion. The other threat is Russian air, sea and possibly land troops sneaking into Canada (in small SF teams) to gain intel on Canada for a possible invasion.
The next threat is a growing separatist movements in Quebec and Alberta-Saskatchewan that are starting form significant domestic threats with small arms (AK, RPK, Old FNs, RPGs) smuggled in from the USA. The RCMP and police forces are on it but have warned the situation may escalate requiring military assistance.

Mission
YOU are the new Chief of Defence staff (or Commander Army/Navy/Air Force pick one) and will design a new armed forces structure

Execution
You will either
(a) Design a new Armed forces structure (If CDS role) with a man power budget of 15,000 total. Yup, WOKE Party is putting their foot down. Your free to arm as you see fit but the woke party has said NO nuclear weapons, bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers or rocket artillery. Too unkind in their ill informed opinion.
(b) Design a Navy/Army or Air Force with man power budget of 4,000, same constraints in para a
(c) BONUS is to include human management of recruiting, training, career development, postings, etc

Boundaries
The WOKE party has removed the P Res and the Canadian Rangers and reassigned them to the newly formed Canadian Civil Defence Force which will do search and rescue, disaster assistance, wild fire fighting, garbage sweeps, etc. They are no longer your concern. You will have ZERO reserve force.

Service and Support
The Woke Party will purchase the toys you want. However they want real results.
The Veterans Affairs department has actually been re-vamped (miracle) and will handle any and all disabled vets for everything, they will handle the JPSU or whatever it is called now 
You will have to designate what bases, airfields and harbours will remain or opened up.
The RCMP is offering up assistance if you wish to remove the Military Police

Command and Sigs
The Woke Party is in charge.
You are the boss of the Military, so respect their policies above and they will let you have free reign. 


Are you guys up for the challenge? Can you do with less? 

GO!


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## Ostrozac (6 Nov 2021)

15,000 is just slightly bigger than the Irish Defence Forces, but their defence priorities are different than ours. They are focused on being distinct and apart from their larger neighbour (the UK), in our case, in our relationship with the US, we are focused on integration and access. So the model is probably a bigger version of the New Zealand Defence Force. I’d prioritize SOF, Military Intelligence, SAR and air defence fighters. Maybe some coastal patrol vessels —  but that’s about it. Such a military wouldn’t be able to generate large quantities of manpower for fire, floods, ice storms and internal security — that’s an implied task for… someone else? An expanded RCMP with a Continental European style gendarmerie doesn’t seem very ”woke” in the days of “defund the police”, and besides, Canada doesn’t have enough soccer riots to keep them busy in between major crises. So private security contractors it is. SNC/LEN (l’eau noire) will appreciate the business.


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## FJAG (6 Nov 2021)

I'm up for it. Need to ponder this. It contradicts all my traditional beliefs.  😁


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> I'm up for it. Need to ponder this. It contradicts all my traditional beliefs.  😁


Thats part of the challenge! Enjoy


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

Ostrozac said:


> 15,000 is just slightly bigger than the Irish Defence Forces, but their defence priorities are different than ours. They are focused on being distinct and apart from their larger neighbour (the UK), in our case, in our relationship with the US, we are focused on integration and access. So the model is probably a bigger version of the New Zealand Defence Force. I’d prioritize SOF, Military Intelligence, SAR and air defence fighters. Maybe some coastal patrol vessels —  but that’s about it. Such a military wouldn’t be able to generate large quantities of manpower for fire, floods, ice storms and internal security — that’s an implied task for… someone else? An expanded RCMP with a Continental European style gendarmerie doesn’t seem very ”woke” in the days of “defund the police”, and besides, Canada doesn’t have enough soccer riots to keep them busy in between major crises. So private security contractors it is. SNC/LEN (l’eau noire) will appreciate the business.


At the end of the day, the armed forces obeys the political masters. Logical or not.


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## medicineman (6 Nov 2021)

And the US isn't considered a threat a la "Exxoneration"?


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

medicineman said:


> And the US isn't considered a threat a la "Exxoneration"?


The Woke party does not. Political masters. Their is a point to this challenge. Its not telling me in this scenario how inaccurate my political observations. Please move past the political situation presented and attempt or don't attempt the challenge.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (6 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Execution
> You will either
> (a) Design a new Armed forces structure (If CDS role) with a man power budget of 15,000 total. Yup, WOKE Party is putting their foot down. Your free to arm as you see fit but the woke party has said NO nuclear weapons, bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers or rocket artillery. Too unkind in their ill informed opinion.
> (b) Design a Navy/Army or Air Force with man power budget of 4,000, same constraints in para a
> (c) BONUS is to include human management of recruiting, training, career development, postings, etc



Rick:

I assume you want us to do either option (a) or option (b), the difference being in (a) it's a unified structure whereas (b) is separate services. Am I correct?

If I am, in scenario (b), do I understand tht it is 4,000 man power budget per service, for a total of 12,000; and if so, can we move some around so long as it comes out 12,000 total.


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## KevinB (6 Nov 2021)

Interesting - I am like others having trouble with the B definition - is that a total of 4k? - as in a significantly chopped down version of A?


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

I'm game.

Back to you in a couple of days (I need to shrink my napkin!).


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Interesting - I am like others having trouble with the B definition - is that a total of 4k? - as in a significantly chopped down version of A?


No. If you don't know anything or do not wish to comment on services your unfamiliar with, than pick army, navy or air force only and customize your service. 4K is your man power budget. And just for you, I was going mandate they must use M27 IAR but thought that was cruel, so no.


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Interesting - I am like others having trouble with the B definition - is that a total of 4k? - as in a significantly chopped down version of A?


Option A, your CDS and get the whole CAF (15k manpower, oops, people power) 
Option B, your only a service commander (4K people power)


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## GR66 (6 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> I'm game.
> 
> Back to you in a couple of days (I need to shrink my napkin!).


I'm not going to compete in this because Kirkhill cheats....he'll have 4,000 troops each controlling a squadron of RC Tanks, a wing of RC attack drones and a fleet of RC UUVs...all backed by a 31 million strong all-volunteer "sportsmans" club armed with Canadian-made disposable, 1-shot MLRS launchers!


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## GR66 (6 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Option A, your CDS and get the whole CAF (15k manpower, oops, people power)
> Option B, your only a service commander (4K people power)


4,000 Army, 4,000 RCAF and 4,000 RCN....but that only leaves 3,000 HQ staff!  C'mon...let's at least be realistic about this!


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> Rick:
> 
> I assume you want us to do either option (a) or option (b), the difference being in (a) it's a unified structure whereas (b) is separate services. Am I correct?
> 
> If I am, in scenario (b), do I understand tht it is 4,000 man power budget per service, for a total of 12,000; and if so, can we move some around so long as it comes out 12,000 total.


You will note for those tackling a CDS role, you get 3K extra. You have to factor HQ, SOF, Admin, Ops planning, whatever.  If tackling the CAF, you can still keep the names CA, RCN and RCAF (hell the tri-service trades can stay bound to their uniform services in your version of the CAF)


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

GR66 said:


> 4,000 Army, 4,000 RCAF and 4,000 RCN....but that only leaves 3,000 HQ staff!  C'mon...let's at least be realistic about this!


You can if you wish decide that each service will have 3,999 HQ staff and 1 field soldier/sailor/pilot. Up to you. Your the Boss.


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

GR66 said:


> I'm not going to compete in this because Kirkhill cheats....he'll have 4,000 troops each controlling a squadron of RC Tanks, a wing of RC attack drones and a fleet of RC UUVs...all backed by a 31 million strong all-volunteer "sportsmans" club armed with Canadian-made disposable, 1-shot MLRS launchers!


MLRS are out. Check my constraints.


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## ArmyRick (6 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> I'm game.
> 
> Back to you in a couple of days (I need to shrink my napkin!).


I totally knew I could bait you into this.


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

OK, I'm jumping early (And no MLRS or RC cheats!)

Step 1 - Take all issued kit into inventory.  Add inventory and toys at whim.  Apparently Wokers don't mind spending money.

Step 2 - Transfer the RCAF and the RCN to the Civil Defence Force.

Step 3 - Paint all Aircraft Yellow and all ships white (with a jaunty dazzle stripe in red) They're our skies and waters.  We don't need to hide.

Step 4 - Buy GBAD kit for inventory with lots of 35mm projectors and NASAMs MMLs,  Munitions to include lots of birdshot, frangibles, PFHE (for larger foreign objects) and High Speed Loitering Drones (for reconnaissance of course).  Must keep the skies open and airports operating,  free of drones, to permit emergency services to operate, families to visit and take vacations, receive their expedited plastic stuff from China.  One downside is businessmen would be free to travel.

Step 5 - Buy F35s for inventory and for SAR / SovPat purposes (NORAD to supply missiles if they absolutely insist we have to shoot something down).

Step 6 - Buy  for inventory RPAS, High Altitude Pseudo Satellites and a constellation of navigation, comms, radar and observation satellites to keep track of the fields, the fires. the floods and all the other global warming catastrophes

Step 7 - Transfer the civilians to the Civil Defence Force

Step 8 - Transfer CANSOFCOM to the Civil Defence Force (they can come in hand domestically too - and if they end up taking a vacation in Ukraine who's to know?)

Step 9 - Buy for inventory multiple sets of small arms modelled on the New USMC pattern.  Enough to equip all 217 Ranger Patrols of the Civil Defence Force, the entirety of the 10 DART brigades of the CDF, and all support personnel.  As well as enough for the Canadian Peace Keepers Expeditionary Force.  Issued for personal defence and local security.  Grenade launchers and Carl Gustavs issued to the Civil Defence Force Armouries with non-lethal ammunition.  Mortars and Machine Guns for managing disgruntled rednecks stored locally.

Step 10 - Buy Canadian ATVs, Snowmobiles and weird looking vehicles that will go anywhere.  For Inventory.

Step 11 - Distribute all log vehicles in inventory equally across the 13 Provinces and Territories to depots.

Step 12 - Store all F Echelon Vehicles in 4 depots - Edmonton, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown.


Now that lot is sorted out - What to do with the 15,000 Peace Keepers.

Step 13 - Retain CJOC

Step 14 - Combine all elements under 1 Cdn Div.

Step 15 - Establish a Sigs Regt under 1 Div with a Div HQ and 3 or 4 Bde HQs and a bunch of Unit HQs.

Step 16 - Fall in the remainder in light order

Step 17 - Draw from inventory kit necessary for training and for missions

Step 18 - Buy necessary stuff that isn't available.

Step 19 - Ask for volunteers from the Civil Defence Force and the RCMP.

Step 20 - Wait for a change of government.


Beyond that?  I got nuffink!


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

Oh.  I forgot.  We could also buy lots of small high speed boats.  For inventory of course.  

Might buy a bunch more utility helicopters to paint yellow.  And maybe some VTOL type stuff.  Only if its produced in Montreal of course.


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

Challengers and Otters could also be bought for inventory.  If we don't use them and can't sell them maybe we could trade them or donate them.


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

Oh.  And large cargo aircraft for distributing skim milk powder and dehydrated potatoes for famine relief  and Obelix and a bunch of sisters for Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.

All bought for inventory and manned by Civil Defence Force Volunteers.


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## Kirkhill (6 Nov 2021)

GR66 said:


> I'm not going to compete in this because Kirkhill cheats....he'll have 4,000 troops each controlling a squadron of RC Tanks, a wing of RC attack drones and a fleet of RC UUVs...all backed by a 31 million strong all-volunteer "sportsmans" club armed with Canadian-made disposable, 1-shot MLRS launchers!


By the way!  Not a bad idea.


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## ArmyRick (7 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> OK, I'm jumping early (And no MLRS or RC cheats!)
> 
> Step 1 - Take all issued kit into inventory.  Add inventory and toys at whim.  Apparently Wokers don't mind spending money.
> 
> ...


Why transfer RCN and RCAF and CANSOFCOM  to civil defence force? In this case, the political party masters most likely say use them or lose them, no transfer out.


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## ArmyRick (7 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Oh.  And large cargo aircraft for distributing skim milk powder and dehydrated potatoes for famine relief  and Obelix and a bunch of sisters for Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.
> 
> All bought for inventory and manned by Civil Defence Force Volunteers.


Who said this party wants the new CAF to tackle humanitarian relief missions? Go back to the situation please and design accordingly.


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## ArmyRick (7 Nov 2021)

Make sure you read the situation para. Don't focus on humanitarian, UN missions or anything not presented as your primary threat or potential mission


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## Haggis (7 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> You have to factor HQ, SOF, Admin, Ops planning, whatever.


No need to maintain a CAF SOF component. 

Most large LEAs now have a nucleus of former CANSOF in their ETF/ERT/TRU/GTI.  These units would be employed domestically anywhere within Canada under contract to the Minister of Public Safety with equipment transferred from CANSOF.  The remainder of the sharp end of CANSOF could be bridged to LEAs for employment as special constables in a limited role, with an option for full bridging to regular constables if they so desire.  The GoC could also enter into an international PLAR program allowing those who decided against or were found unsuitable for LEA employment to apply for a transfer (fully funded with a cost move, of course) transfer to another NATO nation's SOF component.

Each Team could be mandated to maintain a deployable sub-unit for VERY SPECIFIC international ops (CANCIT HR, NEO etc.) but NOT for direct action missions which would not be supported by a GoC policy of non intervention in international affairs.  Those missions would be left to our allies.  This capability would be funded centrally by the GoC. 

LEAs in coastal communities (e.g. Halifax, Vancouver) would be funded and mandated to develop and maintain a maritime ERT capability with equipment transferred from CANSOF.

CFJIRU would be transferred to CNSC or Health Canada.


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> No need to maintain a CAF SOF component.
> 
> Most large LEAs now have a nucleus of former CANSOF in their ETF/ERT/TRU/GTI.  These units would be employed domestically anywhere within Canada under contract to the Minister of Public Safety with equipment transferred from CANSOF.  The remainder of the sharp end of CANSOF could be bridged to LEAs for employment as special constables in a limited role, with an option for full bridging to regular constables if they so desire.  The GoC could also enter into an international PLAR program allowing those who decided against or were found unsuitable for LEA employment to apply for a transfer (fully funded with a cost move, of course) transfer to another NATO nation's SOF component.
> 
> ...



Like that idea!


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## Good2Golf (7 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Who said this party wants the new CAF to tackle humanitarian relief missions? Go back to the situation please and design accordingly.


I think Kirkhill was adding in the contemporary factor of an organization ignoring its directed GR&A (ground rules and assumptions…the latest DND planning space buzzword). 😉


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Getting serious now.

Boss has straightened me out.

No foreign excursions and expeditions

Focus on domestic threats.

Domestic threat response is led by the Civil Power.  The lead agency will be the RCMP. 

RCMP will be assisted by CSIS, CBSA, Coast Guard and Parks Canada.

RCMP has internal capability to manage a limited number of armed events - occasional incidences of small groups of individuals (section size and smaller) equipped with small arms ((AK, RPK, Old FNs, RPGs).   They are not equipped for managing a malign environment (a Canadian version of Afghanistan).

Domestic threats are not expected to include heavy weapons (tanks or artillery).  However the grey zone ranges downwards from a full blown, organized armed insurrection with the insurgents creating "technicals" (including armed helicopters and Twin Otters and RC conversion of Cessnas) to Hell's Angels exploiting instability for criminal advantage and adding to the instability, to well meaning protesters disrupting daily life by any and all means, to corporations deciding to test the limits of government by hiring their own security forces and deviating from government policy.  All of which will be encouraged, financed and equipped by foreign interests - governmental, commercial and criminal.

The Domestic Threat, I would anticipate would have access to anything that can be bought on the civilian market in Canada as well as anything that can be smuggled into the country in an Amazon shipment by air or in a Seacan.   

Foreign Advisors on Canadian soil are likely to be a real threat.  Those could range from individuals working independently as saboteurs, to provocateurs, to facilitators, to groups of advisors/trainers/operators acting coverty all the way up to overt support of separatist entities that are recognized by foreign governments.  

Quebec and Alberta/Saskatchewan are at risk.   So is Nunavut and the Northwest Territories.  So is BC outside of the Douglas treaty area of Victoria.  The Inuit controlled coasts of Northern Quebec and Labrador.  The entire boreal forest zone held by the indigenous community and defended by the Rangers.   All of these groups could be exploited by foreign governments, legitimately, by foreign commercial investment interests and their privately engaged security companies.  Additional foreign assistance could be anticipated in the form of on-site plant management and technicians working in Canada on visas.

Summary.

If we stipulate an active threat, stress on active, then the threat is diverse, distributed and low grade but possibly orchestrated.  


Threat Capabilities

Industrial Sabotage - from not conducting proper maintenance intentionally (or intentionally conducting maintenance improperly) 

Splashy events - bombings, destruction of dams, HAZMAT/CBRN/Environmental attacks (to include intentional floods, wildfires and exploitation of minor natural events such as ice-storms to cover the sabotage of power grids, pipelines, railways, roads, ports and airports).

Open aggression - targeting of government personnel, forces and facilities by missile bombardment launched from separatist territory by foreign advisors whose government recognizes the separatist element.  The recognition would be paid for by commercial advantage. 

In fact the exact terms under which the US agrees to defend Canada in exchange for oil access.

Perhaps somebody is willing to make the locals a better offer than Ottawa is willing to make.

Threat Equipment

Smart Phones

Commercial  EO and RF equipment, binoculars, telescopes, sights, NVGs, radar, laser range finders, laser pens,  RC kits, actuators, solenoids, motors, wires, batteries....

Tools

Motorcycles, Quads, Snowmobiles, Cars, Trucks, Helicopters, Planes, Boats, Bv206s.

Explosives and blasting devices and equipment

Matches and Lighters

Acids and caustics (and exothermic reactions)

Knives and Hammers

Bows and Arrows, Crossbows, Airguns, 

Rifles and Shotguns (with wooden stocks and no pistol grips)

And, of course smuggled AKs, FNs and pistols.  

Lots of ammunition available

Machine guns and mortars and missiles (dumb ballistic as well as smart guided) also readily available on the international market with or without foreign government support.   These would include bombardment missiles as well as anti-tank and anti-air missiles that can be either man-portable or compatible with light vehicles and helicopters.  Off route, remote controlled, automatically triggered and confined space versions are also available or can be rigged.


Another summary.

The worst case scenario is very bad.  

The government will be well advised to keep the lid on things, and not let them escalate.  Otherwise, to use another Canadian analogy, they are looking at going into wildfire season with a bone dry forest, in a drought and lots of smouldering subterranean fires left over from previous years.  They do not want people intentionally starting fires.  

They also don't want to upset the population any more than it is and cause it to consider starting new fires.

They government needs to act with a firm, but light, touch.  Keeping old friends, making new friends where it can and not making new enemies.


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Government Capabilities

Beyond those of the Civil Power and its agencies


The Federal Government has at its disposal, as a result of its policy decisions, an inventory of equipment that is held in depots across Canada.  That equipment is Government equipment and it is employed to meet civil emergencies, security and military requirements.  It is used for training, maintaining situational awareness and crisis management as well as offensive action.

The available fleet is heavily skewed towards logistics

7500 wheeled vehicles (not including Quads, Snowmobiles and Motorcycles)
141 helicopters (CH-148 without their roll-on surveillance kit)
51 transport aircraft
2 JSS ships planned - one interim analog in service.



RCN JSS2CC-1444CC-1505CC-1775CC-130J17CC-29516CC-1384CH-14685CH-14715CH-14827CH-14914LVM-Hy Expeditionary -Ttl340-520LVM-Hy Expeditionary-TCV-16.5T50-75LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MHC10-18LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MRT50-82LVM-Hy Expeditionary-LHS200-300LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Tractor30-45LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Fuel100-120LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Water10-15LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Flatracks200-300LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Pods2-8LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-Fuel30-70LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-HET30-45LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-LHS50-100MSVS-MilCOTS - Ttl1300MSVS-MilCOTS - TCV895MSVS-MilCOTS - Cage128MSVS-MilCOTS - Flatbed100MSVS-MilCOTS - Arty94MSVS-MilCOTS - Eng51MSVS-MilCOTS - MHC32MSVS-SMP-Ttl1587MSVS-SMP-LHS750MSVS-SMP-TCV600MSVS-SMP-MRT150MSVS-SMP-MHC50MSVS-SMP-Arty37MSVS-APS161MSVS-Trlrs322MSVS-ISO995MSVS-SEV Kits868LVM-Lt Domestic400-600LVM-Lt Expedtionary - Ttl1000-1500LVM-Lt Expeditionary -TCV-3T290-425LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Cage80-100LVM-Lt Expeditionary-MRT255-395LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Adm410-640LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Ftr55-70LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Amb110-130LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Cgo100-150LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Water100-150LUV-MilCOTS-2T1061LUV-C&RLUV-UV858LUV-MP143LUV-Cable60LUV-SMP-2T1159LUV-C&R466LUV-UV647LUV-MP46LUV-CableLUV-APKLUV-Trlr-1TLFE-TMP-1T/3T (PL/GVW)330LFE-TMP-Personnel (4+1)230LFE-TMP-Cgo (2+1)100LFE-TMP-Trlr-0.5T330CHER-HCE-Exp207CHER-HSA-Exp-Backhoes12CHER-HCE-Exp-Dozers30CHER-HCE-Amd-Dozers6CHER-HCE-Exp-Loaders24CHER-HCE-Amd-Loaders6CHER-HCE-Exp-Graders19CHER-HCE-Amd-Graders6CHER-HCE-Exp-Excavators19CHER-HCE-Amd-Excavators6CHER-HCE-Exp Compactors13CHER-HCE-Amd- Compactors4CHER-HCE-Exp-Crane-Med10CHER-HCE-Amd-Crane-Med4CHER-HCE-Trlr-Lowbed8CHER-HCE-Modules-Dump40CHER-HCE-COTS131CHER-HCE-COTS-Backhoes31CHER-HCE-COTS-Dumptrucks31CHER-HCE-COTS-Trlr-Tilt69CHER-MHE292CHER-MHE-RTCH12CHER-MHE-RTFL-Hvy20CHER-MHE-RTFL-Med66CHER-MHE-RTFL-Lt81CHER-MHE-RTFL-Zoom113ERC104ERC-A78ERC-B26


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Additional fleets include an internal security fleet including

1477 Armoured Security Vehicles (653 LAVs, 324 ACSVs, 500 TAPVs)
         Additional vehicles included are those responsible for IEDD management.
12 MCDVs
8 AOPS (including future builds planned)
14 CP-140s
36 CF-188s (equipped with LANTIRN/Sniper Pods)

The Air Force assets are included for their Situational Awareness /  ISR capabilities more than their abilities to launch bullets, bombs and missiles.

Likewise the AOPS and MCDVs are primarily SA vehicles, but they also have the ability to act as launch platforms for people and weapons.  Exactly after the fashion of the Armoured Security Vehicles.  A roving home for heavily armed coppers.



RCN AOPS6+2RCN MCDV12RCAF CP140 Recap14RCAF Ftrs88LAV-Ttl977LAV-ISC278LAV-Cmd181LAV-LRSS66LAV-OPV47LAV*-EW18LAV-Eng44LAV*-Eng19ACSV-CPV97ACSV-Amb49ACSV-MRT70ACSV-MRV54ASCV-FCV13ACSV-TCV41TAPV - Ttl500TAPV-Recce RWS138TAPV-GU RWS226TAPV-Recce55TAPV-GU81IEDD


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Canada's military fleet comprises

12 Patrol Frigates 
4 Diesel Submarines
52 CF-188s (Assumes a total fleet of 88 flying machines with 36 tasked to ISR support of internal security)
37 Towed howitzers.
112 Leopard Tanks with 82 gun tanks in 4 configurations.

The CF-188s are assumed to be required to Continue Mission in support of NORAD under the terms of the new Oil Treaty.

The Patrol Frigates and the Diesel Submarines can be just as easily be assigned to internal security duties as ISR assets and roving launch platforms.  In the CPF case the platforms can launch small dets of people, boats, helicopters, and anti-aircraft missiles (SBAD - Sea Based Air Defence) before going offensive and starting to launch SSMs, torpedoes and bullets.



RCN CPF12RCN SSK4RCAF CF-188 FB52M77737Leopard 2 - Ttl112Leopard 2A6M20Leopard 2A4M20Leopard 2A442Leopard 2 AEV18Leopard 2 AVBL??Leopard 2 ARV12


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

So, in sum, in my opinion, Canada is well equipped to meet its Civil Defence needs and has reasonable cover on its internal security needs.  It also has adequate assets in inventory to meet its obligations to the USN and the USAF.

What it is lacking is any ability to fight a conventional war on land.  82 tanks (in 3 different configurations) and 37 towed howitzers are not a firm basis on which to engage Latvia, let alone the Russians.

So the Government of the Day's decision to focus on domestic, rather than expeditionary needs, is not unwise.  Even if it is unwelcome.


Enuff for just now.


Given this situation I will be looking at organizing 15,000 available bodies into:

A Maritime Force (RCN) of 4000
An Air Force (RCAF) of 4000
A Land Force (CA) of 4000
A Command and Support Force of  3000.

More to follow.


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## ArmyRick (7 Nov 2021)

Love the enthusiasm. See ya getting right into it now.


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## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Glad for the approbation.

More good background (I trust)

From a recent archived publication 



> March 2020 - Defence 101 – Transition binder 2020​
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The existing structure:



> March 2020 - North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)​
> Mandate​
> Deter, detect and defeat air threats to Canada and the United States
> NORAD is a bi-national command that provides:
> ...





> March 2020 - Strategic Joint Staff - Major General​Mandate​
> Provide situational awareness, military analysis and decision support to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
> Conduct strategic level engagement with other government departments, allies, and partner nations
> Conduct strategic analysis to achieve military strategic effects
> ...





> March 2020 - Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command - Rear Admiral​Mandate​
> To provide credible, timely and integrated defence intelligence capabilities, products and services to the Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence, Government of Canada and Allies in support of Canada’s defence and national security objectives;
> Develop and promulgate policy, processes and governance as the Functional Authority for Defence Intelligence; and
> Coordinate and generate intelligence capabilities across the Defence Intelligence Enterprise.
> ...





> March 2020 - Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command -  Lieutenant-General​Mandate​
> Prepare for and conduct operations to defend Canada, assist in the defence of North America, and, as directed, promote peace and security abroad.
> Command Canada’s deployed military personnel globally
> Develop, generate and integrate capabilities from Force Generators (e.g. Army, Navy, Air Force) to harmonize activity in the following areas: command and control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; information operations; influence activities; space operations; cyber support; and operational support.
> ...


​


> March 2020 - Canadian Special Operations Forces Command - Major-General​Mandate​
> CANSOFCOM provides the Chief of the Defence Staff with agile, high-readiness Special Operations Forces (SOF) capable of conducting special operations in defence of Canada at home and abroad.
> Its unifying purpose is the pursuit of operational excellence in the conduct of high-risk, high-value and often politically-sensitive strategic missions.
> CANSOFCOM’s new strategic plan, _CANSOFCOM 2020: Strategic Relevance. Strong Relationships. Innovative_
> ...





> March 2020 - Commander Canadian Army - LGen​Mandate​
> As part of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Canadian Army force generates land capabilities for the achievement of Canadian defence objectives across the full spectrum of operations
> Work alongside whole-of-government, whole-of-nation colleagues, non-governmental agencies and international partners
> Commander Canadian Army is the Departmental Champion for Indigenous Peoples. The Army promotes engagement with Indigenous communities through a variety of programs, such as summer programs for Indigenous youth
> ...





> March 2020 - Commander Royal Canadian Navy- Vice Admiral​Mandate​
> Prepare combat-effective naval forces that support Canadian interests at home and abroad.
> Protect Canadian sovereignty and economic interests.
> Work with the United States to protect continental maritime approaches.
> ...





> March 2020 - Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) -  Lieutenant-General​Mandate​
> Provides the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Government of Canada with relevant, responsive and effective air and space power to meet the defence challenges of today and into the future.
> Provides control and surveillance of the Canadian territory, air, space and maritime approaches
> In cooperation with the US, the RCAF directly contributes to NORAD’s aerospace warning and control mission
> ...



It is worth noting that, in my opinion, Canada's defence requirements start and finish with the RCAF.  The shear size of the land mass, the lack of roads, the inaccessible terrain, the changing seasons, the amount of fresh water, the ginormous littoral - if we had no international obligations we would be required to maintain a sizeable air capability.  Add to that our strategic position in the arctic, our position on the attack path to the US (both the Continental US AND Alaska) and the resultant NORAD obligation, as well as our responsibility for a total airspace of 15,000,000 km2 when we consider as well our responsibilities to supply SAR coverage and maintain law and order over the high seas fishing fleets, then there is no other mechanism available to us that will permit us to police that area.












Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Fisheries Zones -  Canadian interest in Zones 18, 21 and 67


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

So,  back to trimming the existing force to

4000 Flyers
4000 Sailors
4000 Soldiers
3000 Commanders and Supporters.

I'll be tackling each element separately.


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

But before I do


4 vessels.

2 Halifax Patrol Frigates in the Blue Waters of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific operating at the rough edges of our policing responsibility

2 AOPS in the Hudson's Bay littoral and the arctic ice of the North West Passage

White Pins - AOPS
Yellow Pins - CPF

Red Rings - 24 hr sprint distance of the vessels, 30 knots (CPF open water), 17 knots (AOPS open water), 3 knots (AOPS breaking ice).
Light Blue Rings - CH-148 range if recovered on board (740 km)
Light Green Rings - CH-146 range if recovered on board (300 km - Kirkhill Estimate half of 90% of published range)


----------



## Blackadder1916 (7 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Situation
> . . . focus solely on home defence and domestic operations.
> . . . current real threat is perceived as Russia (Foreign), . . . USA to provide a full military force assistance in the event of a conventional invasion. . . . Russian air, sea and possibly land troops sneaking into Canada (in small SF teams) to gain intel on Canada for a possible invasion.
> . . . growing separatist movements in Quebec and Alberta-Saskatchewan.



No expeditionary capability.  Extremely limited requirement for any overseas operations.  Are there any NATO/UN commitments beyond an Icelandic symbolic type?  NORAD continues.  Coastal, territorial, economic zone sea and air surveillance and armed response must continue.



> Mission
> YOU are the new Chief of Defence staff (or Commander Army/Navy/Air Force pick one) and will design a new armed forces structure





> Execution
> (a) . . . man power budget of 15,000 total. . . . NO nuclear weapons, bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers or rocket artillery.
> (b) Design a Navy/Army or Air Force with man power budget of 4,000, same constraints in para a
> (c) BONUS is to include human management of recruiting, training, career development, postings, etc



If the 4000 cap is not met for a component can remainder be used in another service (e.g. if don't need 4000 Army can I have a larger Navy/Air Force)?



> Boundaries
> The WOKE party has removed the P Res and the Canadian Rangers and reassigned them to the newly formed Canadian Civil Defence Force which will do search and rescue, disaster assistance, wild fire fighting, garbage sweeps, etc. They are no longer your concern. You will have ZERO reserve force.



Good.  No SAR or Assistance to Civil Authorities.  Aid to Civil Power remains.  No standing reserve units -  a supplementary category of reservist should remain to have capability to use "individuals" with special skills for temporary/part-time uniformed service.

Let's begin with some obvious cuts.

a.  Most of NDHQ - replace with a CFHQ (a military HQ); DND will still need a civilian HQ but those pers are civvies, not the CDS' worry.
b.  Military colleges go - if (and it's a very big if) subsidized university education is deemed necessary send them to a civilian university.  One obvious approach is contract with CCG College for education of hard Navy officers.
c.  If there is no expeditionary capability beyond rare, short-term limited manpower activities, then there is no requirement for a large (uniformed) tail to maintain the teeth.  So a lot of the supporters can be civilianized (preferred) or contracted.
d.  Most CF schools can be reduced, amalgamated or closed - particularly for technical/service support trades; most technical training done at civilian colleges.  Try to make agreement with allies (if any remaining except USA) for some contracted military related training, particularly pilot and other aircrew trades.
e.  Any SAR specific units (or elements thereof) and equipment.  Those airframes would go to whatever organization takes on the SAR mission.
f. Anything that is Cadet related (the CF manpower is Reservist).

What must remain.

a.  Existing Naval capability though it would be mostly restricted to operating in our vast sea area.
b.  Existing Air Force capability including fighters (NORAD), maritime surveillance, tactical aviation, and transport (includes refueling)
c.  A ground force capability primarily for "Aid to the Civil Power" operations, some limited OUTCAN ops (NEO, etc).  Assumption - NO CEREMONIAL function.

A first look:

CFHQ
CDS - Major General (or naval equivalent)
VCDS - BGen
One other GOFO as operations chief
400 military pers (all ranks)

Navy
Commodore
4000 pers (5000 preferred)

Air Force
BGen
4000 pers (5000 preferred)

Army
BGen
2300 pers

Intelligence and Security 
Colonel
450 pers

Service Support/Training/Misc (a mixed bag of separate orgs)
1850 pers

Other specifics will require some more thinking


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

As I perambulate slowly to catch up with Blackadder

And I know that SAR is no longer the CF's job but I presume that the job will still have to be done somehow to comply with existing agreements.  Sell it off to Provincial Air Lines?



The CC-295s and the CC-130Hs go with the Cormorants?  Or the way of the Buffalo?


----------



## FJAG (7 Nov 2021)

I've got a solution but seem to be having problems putting up either jpeg or png file (for that matter even a pdf attachment). The files are not large. Anyone else with a problem? Obviously not you, Kirkhill.

 

Edit: Okay - now I'm flummoxed. I can paste other images, just not the ones I made today.



Got it!!! Had an apostrophe in the file name which Windows saved but Army.ca won't accept. Post to follow.


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

Proceeding with more pics


Air coverage by CF-188 Hornets operating from FOLs without Air to Air refueling and returning to originating base.  Armed with either AIM-120D or Harpoons (fitted for not with).

Civilian appreciation from open source material.  Proceed at your own peril.

The purpose is to show what the RCAF currently offers in terms of capabilities and coverage






						CF-188 Hornet - Aircraft - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca
					

Description of the CF-188 Hornet




					www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca
				











						McDonnell Douglas CF-18 Hornet - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet
					

The McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet is an American supersonic multirole jet made to replace the A-6 Intruder and the A-7 Corsair in the attack role and the F-14 Tomcat in the fighter role, being criticized in the last role, the F-14 Tomcat was finally replaced in 2008 by the F/A-18E/F Super...




					military.wikia.org
				








						AIM-120 AMRAAM - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Harpoon (missile) - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Nov 2021)

However, real coverage is from the CP-140

My personal appreciation, again from open source material of the strike coverage supplied by the Auroras operating from Comox, Greenwood and the Iqaluit FOL.  2500 nm out and back, returning to originating field.  Range can be extended by 120 nm if considering the range of the Harpoon.  Again, like the CF-188, that is a possibility that is not exploited.




The CF-188 replacement is important.

The CP-140 replacement is critical.

That would be particularly true in an internal security / ISR environment.









						Lockheed P-3 Orion
					

The Lockheed P-3 Orion is a four-engine turboprop anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft developed for the United States Navy and introduced in the 1960s. Lockheed based it on the L-188 Electra commercial airliner. The aircraft is easily recognizable by its distinctive tail stinger or...




					military.wikia.org
				








						CP-140 Aurora - Aircraft - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca
					

Description of the CP-140 Aurora




					www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca


----------



## KevinB (7 Nov 2021)

B was the easy one - I can transplant JSOC


One a serious note - it is taking some time - as I have to rebuild/rejig etc stuff and wash it enough, so that it is detailed enough to explain the what/why where, as well as not put anything that shouldn't be public out.


I started making an eleborate powerpoint slide brief - and then decided it was easier to write.


DEFCOM - Defence Command - Joint HQ Cell for all 6 Branches  (1,000 pers)

 TSA - Tactical Support Aviation: Rotary Wing, Fixed WIng Ground Support, UAV  (2,000 pers)
     MH-60
     MH-47
     AH-1
     AH-6
     MH-6
     MQ-1D UAV



CSOC: Canadian Special Operations Command: Lots of neat stuff (4,000 pers)
   DATF (Direct Action Task Force)
   AFO: Advance Force Operations 
   HIG: Human Intelligence Group
   SIG: Signals Intelligence Group
   ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
   JCG: Joint Communications Group 
   MSG: Mobility Support Group
   EMG: Emergency Medical Group
   ASP: Airborne Support Package 

CA: Canadian Army: Conventional Army Force (5,000 pers)
    More to follow in break down.

RCAF: Royal Canadian AirForce: Fixed WIng Transport, Support and Air Defence Fighters) (1,000 pers)
    C-17 x6
    Ck-46 x4
    E-767 x3
    P-8 x 9
    MC-130H x30
    F-35 x 120

RCN: Royal Canadian Navy (5,000 pers)
   LA Class SSN x 10
   AOPS x 10
   Zumwalt x 5
   Fast Combat Support Ship x3

RTC: Recruiting and Training Command (1,000 pers)

SPC: Support Command (2,000 pers).


I'll give a detailed breakdown on further posts.


----------



## FJAG (7 Nov 2021)

All righty then! 

The biggest issue that I have with the Woke Party is its arcane fetish with relying only on Reg F elements when you could provide soooo much more capability for sooooo much less cost with reservists as part of the force. Downsizing to 15,000 full-time positions leaves a ton of equipment sitting in storage or, heaven forbid it gets disposed of again.

My approach to this was not to take things away but to start from the bottom up to see what capability is needed and then see if it already exists and allocate it to the need. Where it doesn't exist then acquire it. That was followed by a long process of paring back capabilities to fall within the limitations. The acquisition process was greatly eased by the Woke Party's offer to buy new kit. I used that but stayed with existing kit if it was good enough. I have not gone down to the level of determining what type of rifle the number two rifleman in the third section of the fourth platoon will carry but concentrated on gross numbers in battalion size organizations only mentioning larger more significant kit.

For 15,000 folks, the CDS is a MGen and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force are Brigadiers. End of discussion.

Detailed comments follow the image:



RCN


remains bicoastal with a fleet commanded by a Captain on each. 
CSC's are people hogs and have been regretfully reduced to 6 total to allow for crews for 12 x heavily armed but lightly manned corvettes to replace the MCDVs. Range is an issue but they will operate with an AOR to extend range. I kind of like the Sa'ar class for its range and weapons. I see these things operating in little TFs with a frigate, a couple of corvettes, a sub and an AOR. I'd be sorely tempted to get a second AOR on each coast if I could squeeze out a few hundred more PYs.
Arctic ops are a major concern, accordingly existing subs are replaced with Virginia class SSNs (seems money is no object) for both endurance and armament; 2 x AOPS are released for two new heavy and heavily armed ice breakers/AORs; the remaining 4 x AOPS get a major weapon upgrade.
Maritime aircraft reduced to two squadrons but helicopters remain about the same: 28 x CH148. Aurora will be replaced with 14 x P-8 Poseidon. 12 Wing remains with the RCAF but under Opcon the RCN.
RCAF

Squadron numbers drastically reduced but key aircraft capability maintained wherever possible.
CF188 to be replaced by 60 F-35. I'd get 30 more if I had the people.
3 x Transport squadrons retained with existing aircraft (if they were still building C-17 I'd get some but am not ready for A400s.
22 Wing surveillance capabilities upgraded with 4 x RQ-4 Global Hawks located in Winnipeg because we need the range. Strike capability enhanced with 6 x MQ-9A Reapers which will have several northern forward deployment sites selected and prepared.
1 Wing remains with the RCAF but is under Opcon to the Army. 25 CH146 to be armed and to eventually be transitioned to a new attack helicopter. All other CH146 to be replaced by a new utility helicopter/vertical lift aircraft. 427 Sqn part of 1 Wing but Opcon SOF Regt.
CA

New ISR Regt to combine all comms, EW, cyber, military intelligence, and IA functions. I'd like this one to be bigger but ... Woke Party.
one airborne regiment with two airborne battalions and an artillery regiment. Note that the regiment is fully mechanized with LAV 6.0s together with 12 x Archer 155mm (because it takes 10 guys to run an M777 but only three on an Archer). Airborne artillery capability retained by way of weapon locker room 16 x 120mm mortars. Also has STA capability. Essentially the regiment has the equipment and is trained to go airborne, airmobile, light, arctic, amphibious, mountain or mech (This is your father's Swiss Army knife Airborne Regt)
a general support regiment to augment whatever TF is deployed with AD, drone recce/strike weapons and engineer support.
CFHQ

For a 15,000 pers force I did not need or want a 3,000 pers HQ so I put the SOF Regt as part of the CFHQ. In addition I allocated 1,000 BTL/ATL position to allow for force regeneration/training without impeding manning levels (I've already made them ridiculously tight). That leaves 850 PYs for all the rest of the HQ functions which as far as I'm concerned should be enough.
Note that JTF2 and the SOF Bn are also fully mechanized and can be employed in that role if necessary giving the CAF a three battalion capability. In fact we'll have so many spare LAVs and TLAVs to pass around that we'll be able to put almost everything in the Army and SOF under armour if needed.
General Comments

There are no schools. In an organization this small that's a luxury. Whatever training is done is done by way of the BTL/ATL and with a small depot platoon within each regiment with as much trg farmed out to the civilian sector as is possible.
Similarly much of the management such as HR and finance can also be farmed out  to outfits like Ceridian supervised/managed by the Pers Mgmt Regt HQ.
CSS across the board is a function of the Procurement, Sustainment, Infrastructure Regt HQs and the various CSS bns/sqdns that exist within each regt/wing/fleet. As much of the static side of the system should again be farmed out to civilian agencies/corporations.
There is a small chart on the right that gives an approximation of what the manning levels of various units and formations are. It's lean.
Locations. I'm a bit torn by this but based on the domestic threat and the arctic threat I think one needs to split the CA a bit so:
RCN - HQ in Ottawa - maintain their Halifax and Esquimalt bases with 14 Wing split to the two main coastal bases.
RCAF - HQ in Ottawa - 22 Wing North Bay but 433 Sqn in Winnipeg with fwd deploy bases in Alaska, Whitehorse, Yellowknife, Churchill and in a place in Labrador TBD. 4 Wing in Cold Lake with an airfield maintained in Bagotville. 8 Wing in Trenton, 1 Wing in Kingston and Petawawa.
CA - HQ in Ottawa - 1 ISR Regt in Petawawa. 2 Airborne Regt (-) in Valcartier with one battlegroup sized TF in Edmonton. 3 GS Regt split between Gagetown/Shilo. 4 Log Regt centered in Montreal but with composite companies at major bases.
CFHQ - Ottawa. SOF Regt in Petawawa. CJOC and the CA have the responsibility for linking with national and provincial security agencies to develop military assistance response plans.

There's a tendency to draw inwards and concentrate when a force is this small, however, I'm holding on to every piece of real estate and infrastructure that I can while I work on convincing the Woke Party that we desperately need 20,000 reservists, a bunch of rocket launchers and a few more ships (I might give up a few of the more decrepit armouries unless they're already being used by that cockamamie civil defence force.
Advice to the Woke Party

You cannot do a security budget based on holistic planning because there is no income to measure expenses against. Security budgets are a form of insurance policy based on a risk analysis. This force restructure will see a very major drop in annual expenditures principally because of personnel and O&M reductions but will immediately thereafter restart the spiral of personnel and equipment and O&M cost inflation. I haven't worried about the capital budget because apparently the Woke Party doesn't care.
Full-time salaries are never as good as part-time salaries especially when much of the force employment model is contingency based.
While the force structure built will provide a system of training and career progression, it is very thin on having enough stable silos within which doctrine development and skill and capability retention can take place. There is a point where the force is large enough to sustain its basic skill levels but is too small to develop beyond those basics. This structure is at that point and one would have a very, very difficult time ever expanding this force in the future to be able to get back to expeditionary deployments or even participate in an alliance. The RCN is perhaps best postured for that and to an extent the RCAF. The CA is screwed big time (A Res F would help - hint, hint)
We are parking a lot of CA gear (We could easily equip a good sized Res F from what we're parking - hint, hint). We also have the infrastructure.
So that's it. Have at it.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy (7 Nov 2021)

Meanwhile, in Joy Killer land:


RIP SSE: What the COVID-19 Pandemic Means for Defence Funding​
Introduction​“… _as the world economy slumps and debt piles up, guns may lose out to butter”
The Economist_, April 26, 2020

The pattern is straightforward and has been so for a generation.  The economy goes into a recession.  The federal deficit balloons due to a corresponding drop in revenue and a short-run increase in government spending to deal with the slump.  The economic recovery takes hold.  Ottawa begins to bring its finances back into order through cuts to departmental spending.  The defence department takes a big hit through this process.

This is the likely fate awaiting _Strong, Secure, Engaged_ – the Trudeau government’s defence white paper – and its associated funding.




			RIP SSE: What the COVID-19 Pandemic Means for Defence Funding - Canadian Global Affairs Institute


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

*CSOC: Canadian Special Operations Command: Lots of neat stuff (4,000 pers).  
    CFB Petawawa, BGen 
  HQ 200 personnel (not including attachments from subordinate structures)

This is the main force for identifying, and dismantling the various separatist forces - as well of foreign actors that would support them.
  Some interaction with local and Federal LEA - however due to the unknown ability of the Separatists to penetrate those, most operations are conducted first with information passage later.*


*DATF (Direct Action Task Force) *
 3 Squadrons of Assaulters; each with 2 40 pers Troops  - total 300 pers (inc Staff and LO)
  1 Troop from each OP Sqn is on IRU with monthly rotations.
A Sqn - Training CFB Petawawa 
B Sqn - Montreal 
C Sqn - Calgary



*AFO: Advance Force Operations *
 3 Squadrons of Operators; each with 2 40 pers Troops - total 300 pers (Inc staff and LO)

D Sqn - Counter Revolutionary Warfare - troops deployed to AB/SK, and Que. as well as LO work with Fed Int and LEA.

E Sqn - Russian Development Group - troops rotating on a NOC role through Russia etc.
   Prep to sabotage, assassinate, and replay Russian operations from inside their borders.

F Sqn - Training and Support.
   Vancouver 

*HIG: Human Intelligence Group*
  4 Squadrons focus on Human Source Collection 80 pers / SQN 400 pers total (inc staff and LO)

 G Sqn Quebec City - focus on Quebece Separatist issues

 H Sqn Edmonton  - focus on Alberta Separatist Issues 

 I Sqn Vancouver - Overseas AOR

J Sqn Vancouver - Training, Support and Language School

*SIG: Signals Intelligence Group*
  Ottawa - with deployable cells to support ops as needed (300 pers)

*ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance *
  3 Deployable Groups and 1 Training Group - 500 pers
  Some civilian fixed and rotary wing assets for low visibility observation, as well as radar, and UAV 

*JCG: Joint Communications Group* 
  4 deployable groups and 1 training group - 500 personnel 

*MSG: Mobility Support Group*
  Overt and Covert Mobility Support - 500 personnel 
  4 Ground Support Teams
  4 Marine Support Teams 

*EMG: Emergency Medical Group*
  4 Deployable Surgical Teams - and 1 Training Group - 500 personnel 

*ASP: Airborne Support Package* 
   500 Pers under a COL -  
  18x MH-60G PaveHawk 
  12x MH-47F 
  18x A/MH-6 Little Bird 
  Nondescript Civilian AC as well.


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

and now for the Air Force

RCAF: Royal Canadian AirForce: Fixed WIng Transport, Support and Air Defence Fighters) (1,000 pers)

C-17 x6. 
   3@ CFB Trenton and 3 OPCOM to CSOC 1 @ Calgary 1 @ Montreal 1@ CFB Petawawa (new airfield required) 
Ck-46 x4 @ CFB Trenton  1 on 5min NTM 1 on 30min NTM 
E-767 x3 @ CFB Trenton 1 up 24/7 
P-8 x 9 3@ Vancouver 3@ Victoria 3@Summerside PEI
MC-130H x30  10 @ CFB Trenton  (15 OPCOM to CSOC: 5 @ each of Calgary, Montreal, Petawawa) and 5 @ NorthBay (Training) 

F-35 x 120 (Sqns at Victoria, Cold Lake, MooseJaw, NorthBay, Baggotville, Gander)


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

TSA - Tactical Support Aviation: Rotary Wing, Fixed WIng Ground Support, UAV (2,000 pers)
  BGen: 200 staff 

100x MH-60G  8 Sqn (1each at CFB Vancouver, Edmonton, Shilo, NorthBay, Trenton, Montreal, Quebec City, Gagetown)
50x    MH-47F  4 Sqn (1ea @CFB Shilo, CFB Gagetown, CFB NorthBay, Vancouver) 2 airframe for training at CFB NorthBay
50x    AH-1.      same as 47's  
12x    AH-6.      Training Sqn at CFB NorthBay
12x.    MH-6.     Training x4 others as Liaison/Support AC to LIB's
150x.  MQ-1D UAV  Dispersed Support Teams


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## Halifax Tar (8 Nov 2021)

I would basically fold the Army completely.  ( We really don't need a full time Army in Canada)

All Army equipment if it cant be utilized will be sold or scrapped.

Set up remote missile battery's on the coasts for air and sea approach defense. 

I would basically fold everything into the RCN.

Giving 1 command stream the control of everything that floats and fly's. 

*RCN*

I would have three surface action groups, 2 in Esq and 1 in Hfx. 

Surface Action Group:
1 x Mistral (For AAD and ASW)
1 x AOR
6 x CSCs
3 x AOPs

Sub surface action groups:

5 x SSNs on each coast.  Rotating deployments into the polar region. 

*RCNAS*

100 F35s

25 x East Coast

25 x west coast

50 x Central - North

LRP Remains in situ with new Aircraft.  (P8s ?)

C17s and Hurcs continue on but with more of an emphasis in material movement than people as we wont be expeditionary anymore.

*SOF:*
100 - 200 pers
Very small, highly equipped with dedicated air lift and all the toys they want and need.  Only used for in and out missions.  Both domestic and
foreign, if asked for.


----------



## Good2Golf (8 Nov 2021)

Actually, roll the existing navy into the Coast Guard.  Then we wouldn’t forget the maritime/airborne SAR that was dripped
In haste. 😉


----------



## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

RCN: Royal Canadian Navy (5,000 pers)
 Vice Admiral - HQ Ottawa (200 pers for staff and LO positions) 

LA Class SSN x 10 (3 West Coast, 3 East Coast, 3 Arctic, 1 training/spare)  aprox 1,600 SubSurface personnel inc trainers, and trainees.
AOPS x 10 (3 West Coast, 3 East Coast, 3 Arctic, 1 training/spare) @ aprox 1000 personnel inc trainers, and trainees
Zumwalt x 5 (2 West Coast, 2 East Coast and 1 training/spare -@147/ship+28 for MH and UAV dets for 175/shop and an aprox 1000 personnel inc trainers, and trainees.
  each w/ 2xSH-60 MH Det's -choice of the Zum simply due to low signature high speed and firepower as a SCC 
Fast Combat Support Ship x3  2 West Coats and 1 East Coast @ 240/ship aprox 1000 personnel inc trainers, and trainees

Also because I don't have much of a clue as to actual maintenance and support needed for such - I suspected the remaining pers wouldn't be close to enough - but I have a Joint Support Command to assist at Joint Base Ports - plus apparently Woke can hire contractors


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## Halifax Tar (8 Nov 2021)

SAR should be divested to the coast guard. 

And I'm cool that too.  But I'm not sure our coast guard has the interest in armed vessels.


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

Ah the Canadian Army - wonder why I left it for last 
  CA HQ: COL (100 Staff)
I budgeted 5k for personnel.

6 LI Bn's @ 800 each
    CFBs Victoria, Edmonton, Shilo, NorthBay, Valcartier, Gagetown  
 *LIB's also rotate Security Force personnel to support C&S Operations with CSOC - and personnel for RCAF and RCN Local Defence Tasks.
  ** All LIB pers jump qualified - and Arctic equipped  
2 Armoured Cav/Recce Reg't (@400 each) w/ LAV variants 
   CFB Shilo 
1 x Arty Reg't M777 2x8 gun Bty (300 pers)

1x BV206 Mobility Reg't (2 Inf BN worth) -@400 pers
    NorthBay 

Trg Cadre - CFB Gagetown 200 pers.


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## Good2Golf (8 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> SAR should be divested to the coast guard.
> 
> And I'm cool that too.  But I'm not sure our coast guard has the interest in armed vessels.


ArmyRick’s marching orders didn’t include the CCG’s feelings.  Pragmatically, a coastal (primarily constabulary) focus with some  ability to marry up to a SNMG or the like would suffice.


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## BillN (8 Nov 2021)

Interesting thread.  Even more interesting is that nobody has used, or mentioned CFB Comox in their ideas.


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## Good2Golf (8 Nov 2021)

BillN said:


> Interesting thread.  Even more interesting is that nobody has used, or mentioned CFB Comox in their ideas.


It was implicit in a number of options that had two VP/LRP Sqns remaining.  Most options seem to consider whatever 407 would become as a 14 Wg Det.  I’m sure it’s not hurt feelings…just like in DRAP when some folks lost their Wing overnight.  The Government wasn’t making it personal…just pragmatic.  I suspect housing prices around Crown Isle would take a hit though….


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

BillN said:


> Interesting thread.  Even more interesting is that nobody has used, or mentioned CFB Comox in their ideas.


I can never keep up with which bases are still operational in BC - so I used Vic and Van for anything around there


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## foresterab (8 Nov 2021)

Random take...and no idea if this is functional or not.

RCAF - 4,000 personnel

Primary fixed wing airframe is the C-130.   While I'd like heavier lift I'm choosing a single air frame that can be used for multiple task (SAR, transport, civilian aid, patrol...I know it's not a CC-140 but it's a presence), operate on a variety of airstrips and integrate with US Forces if needed.    Minimum of 30 airframes to form 4x6 plane squadrons plus extra airframes to allow for contracted out maintenance/overhaul via either Abbotsford, BC (sorry...can't remember company name) or US. 
Secondary fleet is heavy lift helicopters.   Not sure if it's best to have Chinooks as the airframe but would want a minimum of 12 that are tasked primarily with troop lift and small equipment transport.   Think of slinging a D4 dozer over a rock fall created by sabotage to clear  roadways and/or site securement.  Looking for at least 20 birds here for again 2x6 ship squadrons with remainder in service/maintenance replacement.
UAV.  This a major change and will become the replacement for much of the current strike aircraft.   Multiple high loiter time UAV with limited strike capacity will be used to augment satellite/C-130 patrols for maritime use and to provide intelligence for detection.    Incorporated into this will be any existing satellites owned by Canadian Forces but will be based upon many drones that can in turn be controlled by a central site command. 

RCN - 4,000 personnel

Existing frigates and submarines are turfed as not meeting new mission profile.  Likewise supply ships.   I hate giving up supply but in the absence of foreign mission profiles this becomes tough to support.  
Primary fleet will be a small gunboat style ship (I think of WW2 minesweeper size) with ability to support RHIB level support boats and emphasis upon limited missile protection and heavy on sonar/radar.   Modern automation to limit crew requirements these vessels are a combination inshore patrol unit and able to search/scan for insertion teams via radar/sonar.       Must be small enough to also enter the Great Lakes (if required) but looking at closer to 25 vessels splits between Esqualimut (4), Prince Rupert(4), Tuktoyaktuk(3), Inuvik(3), Churchill(3), St. Johns(4), Halifax(4).   Multiple ships assigned to each base to allow for rotation of crews/vessels and frankly to ensure that  single boat loss is not a full fleet or capacity loss.   Artic vessels shift location as needed depending upon ice conditions.
Secondary missions based upon communications relay/UAV battery replacement/offshore mapping especially for river deltas to ensure insertion is made more difficult.    
Army - 4,000 personnel

Limited capacity for conventional units so this becomes a heavy emphasis upon special forces.  JTF2 is expanded to include two battalions (750 each) which are operationally structured upon small units.   Training in urban support for civilian agencies (RCMP et. al.) and further by mountain/sea/artic teams so that each has a standby platoon? unit available to parachute/transport to area of emergency upon either local state of emergency civil aid request and/or Russian insertion report. 
500 men - Signals and AI intelligence function.    This is a greater, more threat specific role than that covered by CSIS but includes not just the use of radio/cell interceptions but also operational security and cyberwarfare.    Small motivated teams in server rooms can do terrible things to many different parts of the world and is an under ratted threat. 
Two engineer teams (800 total) who are based upon IED disposal, explosive use (for emergency clearance of disaster areas/terrorist attacks), and heavy equipment.  This is the group who will create the new airfield/helibase needed for an attack at X location if the main airport is not available.  
Medical support teams - 300 total these are enough to man one DART team in a hostile environment and allows for one replacement crew.   Training is above that of a military field medic.
Security teams - 900 total split between base defense roles and police powers.    Designed to provide the civilian/military interface when dealing with a terrorist situation and provide a formal structure on how to address prisoner management within an insurgent/invasion team. 
Command - 1000

Focus is upon two key aspects.  1) Intelligence upon what is going on as a military threat and 2) coordination with civilian agencies.    Unfortunately this means that most staff will be stuck in Ottawa with heavy presence in both Quebec City and Edmonton but unavoidable.    Heavy use of exchange positions with US Forces via modified NORAD agreement (which I assume has also been rewritten) to ensure capacity and field situation is updated daily.
Command promotion is based upon not just efficient use of assets for gathering intelligence but also upon proven performance in field/liaison role with inter-agency missions.   For trained specialists who wish to remain in the current level at a field unit promotion will be recognized as subject matter experts at the cost of trade of chasing future rank.


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## ArmyRick (8 Nov 2021)

Love the brain storming going on. I just finished a 9 hour day cutting dead cows into smaller pieces and then my farming.

I see some awesome paradigm shifting and boxes being thrown right out (let alone think outside the box).

Gonna comment more in a few days. I am also going to participate and No, I do not have a pre-loaded scenario to launch.


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## daftandbarmy (8 Nov 2021)

BillN said:


> Interesting thread.  Even more interesting is that nobody has used, or mentioned CFB Comox in their ideas.



Shhhhhh.... they don't want to give away a good thing


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## Halifax Tar (8 Nov 2021)

Good2Golf said:


> ArmyRick’s marching orders didn’t include the CCG’s feelings.  Pragmatically, a coastal (primarily constabulary) focus with some  ability to marry up to a SNMG or the like would suffice.



Make sure that goes in your napkin force.  I like mine.  But thanks for the input!


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## KevinB (8 Nov 2021)

Okay continuing on the Kevin Napkin Force

*RTC: Recruiting and Training Command (1,000 pers)*

A 4 year contract for initial recruits is offered with no guaranteed MOSID/MOS/MOC whatever you want to call it -- performance is rewarded during training - and Candidates are offered what is deemed the best positions for their skills and aptitudes.

   All Applicants screened for on Mental Psychological, as well as Loyalty (Lie Detector during certain phases of interviews).

   Common Entry Course - 6 months in CFB Gagetown, + 1 month arctic phase.
 Emphasis on Weapons safety, Pistol Training to start.
   Each Command will have some input during phases - so all recruits get an understand of the entire Force structure - their roles, duties and responsibilities.   As well as Foreign Language training and observations memory drills are conducted throughout.

  Upon Graduating from CEC - all personnel go to GCI for 4 months - Ground Combat Instruction - emphasis on small unit tactics, MMA style unarmed fighting.
   During this phase candidates are offered certain pipeline options depending upon aptitude testing and results on courses.

  * No member will enter CSOC direct from training, and must apply for Selection after 2 years in their initial position.


*SPC: Support Command (2,000 pers).*
  Since Rick didn't tell me I couldn't contract out a lot of Logistics, Medical/Dental etc - I chose to go that route - with only specific trades being used in Support Command (I don't have an expeditionary Army - and the large capital items (Ships and planes) will be run with an frightfully expensive OEM maintenance contract.

 Support Command will deal with certain specific military equipment from a supply stand point, as well as holdings of expendables (ammo, food, POL - and ensuring the OEM Maintenance is conducted.





*Universal Service Regulations.*
* MultiCam for all - no dress uniform - no drill. 
** Must wear an appropriate for the task footwear -- no flip flops when ruck marching, or jumping.
    Oh and back to rank insignia that people can understand.
    NO Drugs - sorry Potheads - I don't give a F what JT said - I am the Galactic Space Emperor.
    ANY Trade is open to anyone who can meet the standard - 
    No Earrings for anyone - no Man buns - #2 on the top and #1 on the sides -->everyone inc the MGEN CDS * except for AFO and HUMINT personnel.
    Women who want - can grow a beard - no one else except AFO or HUMINT.
   The CF re institutes the death penalty - by firing squad for certain service offices ( top ones - sexual assault, murder, treason, adultery, officers who lie, cheat or steal) 
  *** If the Woke don't like that - I have a very capable SOF that will see me sitting as the new Canadian Emperor


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## QV (8 Nov 2021)

There are some ideas here I can get on board with.


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## KevinB (9 Nov 2021)

I renamed a few things - and made the Regional/Areas more clearly defined than my walls of text.

 As far as power projection - the only real force is the Naval Task Forces - and they are primarily detect and deter - same with the Air Task Forces.
   The AWACS and P-8's are the main keys to that, as well as the UAV forces - and the SSN's for subsurface.
The F-35 are simply for protection of those assets.


 Internally the Ground Defense Force is really just there to show the flag - and protect installations.

CSOC is the primary tool for internal and external "work" to deal with the destabilizing influences.


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## Good2Golf (9 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> Make sure that goes in your napkin force.  I like mine.  But thanks for the input!


I’m planning on having a “Navy Thunderdome(tm)”…16,681 in, 4,000 out.  May the best sailors win!


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## KevinB (9 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> As far as power projection - the only real force is the Naval Task Forces - and they are primarily detect and deter - same with the Air Task Forces.
> The AWACS and P-8's are the main keys to that, as well as the UAV forces - and the SSN's for subsurface.
> The F-35 are simply for protection of those assets.
> 
> ...


- I didn't put any GBAD my setup - mainly as the F-35A, and the Naval forces are the primary force for that.
   Secondly with the US Military assets that will defend an incursion - I deemed that risk low to cast off, as well as I am a firm believer that Individual SAM and AT weapons should be well individual - and part of a common issues scale.

If I had 2k more personnel - I would have had BGAD Network coast to coast - - but given the briefing points - I viewed the Russian interference and the two separatist movements to be the main concern - thus spend PY's on being able to interdict and neutralize those.


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## Kirkhill (9 Nov 2021)

Working on it still - 

25 km radius circles around major airports and some other points of interest.

This probably covers over 90% of Canada's population.

And a lot of space between.


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## Kirkhill (9 Nov 2021)

And Ranging Toronto 

Pearson Airport - 1 km, 2 km, 5 km, 10km, 25 km


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## KevinB (9 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> And Ranging Toronto
> 
> Pearson Airport - 1 km, 2 km, 5 km, 10km, 25 km


Purpose?

  The AWACS E767 I proposed has a 320km+ 360 coverage - which is why I went with that than additional fixed locations - 

Or this is GBAD related?
   And you plan on shooting down incoming around (and over) population centers?

I'm not trying to be a jerk (but I am usually very successful at it) I am just curious.


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## daftandbarmy (9 Nov 2021)

Most revolutions in military affairs have been driven by technological advances. Here's some thinking about what those might look like as 'design fodder'.



FORECASTING CHANGE IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 2020-2040


SYNOPSIS
In the 1990s, much of the United States strategic community was breathless about the
so-called revolution in military affairs, or RMA. I doubted at the time that a revolution was
underway and would conclude today that in fact no broad-brush revolution has occurred
since the Cold War ended. Old methods of combat and legacy systems have not been
rendered fundamentally obsolete by progress in technology, military organizations, or
operational concepts.

However, the RMA may be back. And the revolution may really happen this time. The
period of 2020 to 2040 seems likely to experience significantly more change than
the previous two decades in the character of warfare. For the period from 2000 to
2020, revolutionary technological change probably occurred only in various aspects of
computers and robotics. For the next two decades, those areas will remain fast-moving,
and they will be joined by various breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and the use of
big data. 

The battlefield implications in domains such as swarms of robotic systems,
usable as both sensors and weapons, may truly come of age. In addition, laser weapons,
reusable rockets, hypersonic missiles, rail guns, unmanned submarines, biological
pathogens, and nanomaterials may wind up advancing very fast. The sum total may or
may not add up to a revolution. But the potential cannot be dismissed.

Moreover, the rise of China and return of Russia supercharge the competition and raise
the stakes. The marriage of rapid technological progress with strategic dynamism and
hegemonic change could prove especially potent. The return of great-power competition

during an era of rapid progress in science and technology could reward innovators, and
expose vulnerabilities, much more than has been the case this century to date.
Some areas of military technology—most types of sensors, most types of major vehicles,
most underlying technologies for nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction—
seem unlikely to change dramatically. 

_*But perhaps a true military revolution of sorts will occur even without such developments. The key question, as always, will be how these individual technology trends interact synergistically with each other, and how military organizations as well as political leaders innovate to employ them on the battlefield.*_









						Forecasting change in military technology, 2020-2040
					

Michael O'Hanlon forecasts likely changes in defense technology over the period between 2020-2040.




					www.brookings.edu


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## FJAG (9 Nov 2021)

I tend to believe that the term "revolution in military affairs" is an overused term.

IMHO, I recognize only two RMAs in the last one hundred and fifty years: those generated by the development of the internal combustion engine and nuclear weapons. The first because it changed the entire scope of land and naval warfare and created air warfare and the second because it exposed any and every homeland to utter destruction as a possible outcome at the moment of a strategic conventional victory. Those were revolutions that changed the fundamental character of warfare.

Technological advances have been ongoing since hand thrown spears were first augmented by an atlatl. Each time we make an advance a new countermeasure is developed which leads to a new offensive measure and as a result doctrine and tactics have to adapt to conform. 

I don't think AI creates a revolution. It just replaces a human brain with an artificial one and will in time become a more efficient weapon system but that's just another incremental advancement. In some respects its just an upgrade from a tank's 90mm gun to a 120mm gun. It changes some of the methodologies of war but not its fundamental nature. It doesn't quite reach the standard of the destructive power of nuclear weapons (unless of course you turn your nuclear weapons over to AI). AI systems can and will be countered and doctrine will be adopted to both counter it and employ it.

The one change that we do have is that we will need to upgrade our doctrine and our weapon systems more quickly then ever before. The low cost and proliferation of drone based weapons dictate that virtually every fighting vehicle or major installation, including those in the homeland will need defensive countermeasures. Just think of how easy it would be to import a few dozen shipping containers with the components for assembling expedient loitering munitions for sleeper agents in the homeland. Saboteurs are an old tactic but with modern capabilities.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (10 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Purpose?
> 
> The AWACS E767 I proposed has a 320km+ 360 coverage - which is why I went with that than additional fixed locations -
> 
> ...




Stay tuned.  More to follow.   😁


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## Dale Denton (11 Nov 2021)

Some excellent ideas here. If I may add some random thoughts:

*I gotta say, as sad as this scenario is, at least this gov't has a cohesive national security strategy and is bold enough to actually enact it!!

Moving on...

A gov't _people first_ policy for the new CF:

a boom in military housing construction, quality, and infrastructure for military members and their families.
world-leading childcare and medical benefits package (offloaded to a giant _veterans affairs pension board fund_), higher than industry competitive wages and bonus structure (complete with heavy capital gains taxes).
a huge infantry individual equipment program, everyone looks like they're SOF with the most ergonomic/cutting edge kit.
removal of the entire military justice system with full civilian integration, hiring of former CF to be used frequently as expert witnesses for military context (military-civilian translators so to speak).
wokes dislike of 'drones' and another "cherno-bull", so I won't cheat like others and get SSNs and RPAS...


*As CDS/scenario-god: 

Recommendations to the gov't divestment/transition team:* 

MIlitarize the CCG. Who cares if the CCG like it or not, it protects them from being flayed like the CF to instead become a militarized environmental protection agency.

Make it possible to have the territories become provinces, and make it so they have less people per new riding so the north is heard in HoC.

Make all provinces maintain various CF depots to house the retired ghost fleets of equipment. Make them responsible for supporting and maintaining a large supply of leftover LOG, general support vehicles, LAVs, and C-130s for firefighting provinces. More money for the provinces from the old CF budget to squeeze them. Makes it so depots are spread out through all provinces and maintained by them to make available for natural disasters. Make provinces accountable for the maintenance of X number of vehicles/aircraft in different readiness cycles. A smart CDS will make it so the provinces have to work together to maintain the supply chain but sneakily keeps stocks safe for the next gov't to rebuild the CF. It also would make the provinces want to keep their fleets in better and newer condition. Perhaps force a civilian standard for more and more CF vehicles in order to keep the fleet fresh, safer and on a predictable replacement cycle. 

RCMP is disbanded as it was a symbol of colonial power and indigenous subjugation. Former CF and RCMP are paid exorbitant severance packages and are rehired into a beefy CCG or the new arctic provincial police force. All provinces have their own police services. It's a sneaky way to divest of another expensive federal budget item in the guise of additional provincial independence. 

Create a new Canadian Criminal Investigation Service (CCIS) (I know it already exists). Make it the new Canadian FBI, complete with a reborn SERT modelled/copied from the FBI's HRT. CCIS absorbs the evil CSIS and CSE into a mega-agency that will be a low-key power booster for the woke gov't. This agency would probably be used in a bloody Canadian version of the conflict in Northern Ireland. A violent woke gov't response to the 'New-FLQ' and 'Wildflower Rebellion'.


CCG is militarized as it is woker to have a stronger environmental policy, with a heavier arctic presence.
Better infrastructure in the north to support cost of living programs enacted by woker gov't
Offload all AOPS to the CCG, armed with 57MM and a deployable CANSOF "SBS" team
Offload all SAR work and NASP to CCG too
To support Bell in QC, buy a large orphan fleet of Bell SAR products (SAR V-22s for everyone!)

CA is now all SOF
- org copied from others.

RCAF

A small fleet of ~16 CP-8 Poseidons for ASW
A larger MRTT strategic capability for NEO, cheap unarmed passive support to friendly expeditionary forces.
Mobility is 1st, getting our limited numbers across the country ASAP would be the key. Retaining C-17s for dropping larger groups of SOF (since no CA) to the arctic would be best, or a larger C-130 or Chinook/V-22 fleet.
Eliminate a fighter capability, pay off the USAF for protection like Ireland and the RAF. This would embarrass gov't, and its bold but its an attention grabber for the public.
Desperately keep the Bell plant open for the Quebec separatists will use it against you for propaganda purposes. Buy +100 V-280s or V-22s made in Canada for a steep price. Or if gov't wants to punish Bell or QC then early retires the CH-146s and buys +40 Chinooks.

RCN

4 CSCs, too costly to cancel the program outright...
No SSKs, a XLUUV program for ISR maaaybe
Kingstons are slowly retired, but are replaced with 6 Corvettes. Cheaper to patrol with P-8s...
2 Protecteurs, cheap unarmed passive support to friendly expeditionary forces.


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## KevinB (11 Nov 2021)

I think if I was going to redo my setup -
  The Element HQ's would be eliminated outside of CSOC
 Elements would have training and doctrine, development and procurement would be join.
 Elements would have no larger command that the Regional Task Forces - and the Regional TF's would have OPCOM of all the Air, Ground, Rotary/UAV and Naval assets in there zone - which would have a land and naval subcommands.
  That way everything is Joint - and not subject to the rationalizations of one elements beliefs.


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## Blackadder1916 (11 Nov 2021)

The one unit that I see missing from all proposals is the only one that is required by the Canadian Constitution.  The Canadian Government can make all the changes it wishes but, unless the constitution is amended, there must be a Newfoundland Regiment.

As per the terms of union

_Defence Establishments_​
*44.* Canada will provide for the maintenance in the Province of Newfoundland of appropriate reserve units of the Canadian defence forces, which will include the Newfoundland Regiment.


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## dapaterson (11 Nov 2021)

Keep them on the Supplemental Order of Battle.


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## FJAG (11 Nov 2021)

Blackadder1916 said:


> The one unit that I see missing from all proposals is the only one that is required by the Canadian Constitution.  The Canadian Government can make all the changes it wishes but, unless the constitution is amended, there must be a Newfoundland Regiment.
> 
> As per the terms of union
> 
> ...


That's brilliant. I never knew that.



KevinB said:


> I think if I was going to redo my setup -
> The Element HQ's would be eliminated outside of CSOC


I've been mulling things over as well and think that with a 15,000 establishment that there are a whole lot of more things we can't afford to keep.

For starters, CSOC. That's just another form of regimental tribalism that says everything must go but we need to keep the tan beanies as a major organization because ... special. Keep some capabilities, sure; but not as a major element.

My thought now is: okay, so we need to guard east, north and west but the south is our friend. What do we need and what can we afford to have.

We need a central overarching command/administrative structure but it needs to be really small. Basically C&C, strategic direction, procurement, sustainment, some form of personnel management.

Beyond that we need only two operational commands, one facing east the other west.

What about the north you say? Well, like everything else, the north has a western and an eastern part. For convenience sake, if you run up the Sask and Man border you reach the border between the NWT and Nunavut which extends northward through the Queen Elizabeth Islands more or less separating the Arctic Ocean in the west from the North West Passage and Baffin Bay in the East. It makes a handy dividing line between the responsibilities for a JTF East and a JTF West each of which maintains responsibility for its entire coastline and territories from the US border right up to the northern boundary. Each JTF will have all of the sea, air and land assets needed to provide for that task. (which for JTF(E) will include a small detachment called the NfldR - nothing says that it has to be a land element  😁) (As an aside its rouglly the same distance from Esquimalt and Halifax to that northern dividing line - between 5,000 to 5,500 kms)

I agree fully at this point with scrapping any and all element headquarters although there still remains a need for a training structure which is capable of producing trained soldiers, sailors, aircrew and their various equipment maintainers and the developers of doctrine for how these two JTFs operate.

So three HQs - a CFHQ (including a form of SJS and CJOC), and a JTF(E) HQ and a JTF(W) HQ. Everything needed to support both JTFs remains directly under CFHQ. That would include a common procurement and sustainment and individual training system as well as certain units that face in all directions (which could include cyber, intel, a small reserve (not the forbidden reserve force but a strategic reserve which could include a small SOF component)).

Everything else needed to guard and fight on the coasts and in depth goes into the respective JTF which, incidentally, do not need to be symmetrical but should be organized to meet their specific current threat and change from time-to-time as the threat changes.

🍻


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## KevinB (11 Nov 2021)

Blackadder1916 said:


> The one unit that I see missing from all proposals is the only one that is required by the Canadian Constitution.  The Canadian Government can make all the changes it wishes but, unless the constitution is amended, there must be a Newfoundland Regiment.
> 
> As per the terms of union
> 
> ...


We where not allowed to use the Reserves - they had been removed from play by the DS  
   So non issue


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## ArmyRick (11 Nov 2021)

I was doing my brainstorming last night. Wow, did I put myself in a frustrating scenario with the task I have assigned all of us. 

My version 67 is in the works. I am thinking of some sort of re-work of the Rhodesian Fire Force concept. Using many different aspects of ISTAR (people, planes, patrols, UAV, remote sensors, etc) to max out monitoring of Canada's air space, land and waters, I am thinking of an airborne regiment concept with rotating companies on QRF. Sort of a quick rig idea but with a company on 2 hour notice to move. Reduce man power in the army side but increase skills efficiency (trained to jump in, helicopter, amphibious ops in a royal marines way not storm the beach head under fire USMC way). I am thinking this idea on reduced manpower will need the core troops to be trained infantryman (high standard) but specialist skills within the section including medic (much more than TCCC), comms, demolitions, JTAC, sniper. So maybe an Airborne Regiment and CSOR had a baby concept? Not sure. 

Crazy Rick's army (after feeding my cattle and sheep then 6 hours slaughtering and pulling apart other people's cows, so bear with me)

Coming to you in chapters

Starting from the ground up 

Infantry Section (6)
-Corporal Section Commander (C8 + Pistol + radio) Assault Team (Eliminate the MCPL rank, gasp!)
-Private (C8 + Pistol + Stand Alone 40mm GL) Assault Team
-Private (C8 + Pistol + Medical Kit) Assault Team
-Private (C8 + Pistol + Demolitions kit) ASsault Team
-Private Senior soldier serving as 2IC (7.62mm Rifle similar to US M110A1 DMR + Comms) Covering Team
-Private (7.62mm FN Minimi, NOT a C9, their is a 7.62mm Minimi and no its not the FN MAG) Covering Team 

The section will be designed to do very limited missions on its own. Can do recce patrols, most likely will function as part of the platoon.

Infantry Platoon (28) x 3 in Coy
-Lieutenant (The boss) 
-Private as the boss's signaler
-Sergeant (PL 2IC)
-Private as his signaler or Corporal JTAC qualified (CPL replace MCPL rank and fill SGT jobs) 
-4 x Sections

The platoon will be the work horse. at 28 in can break down into 4 x 7 man chalks for helicopters (The Bell Venom ideally when we purchase it for the CAF)

The Fire Support Platoon (36)
-LT (the Boss) + Signaler (senior PL comd who can run the Coy fire base)
-Sgt + SIgnaler (He must have a sig) will help to run a coy level FSCC
-CPL + Sig (JTAC for sure needed)
-2 x Direct Fire Sections (CPL + sig, 3 x PTE w/C6 SF role or the MMG .338, 3 x PTE w/84mm Carl Gustav M4 or Javelin depending on whether their is an tank threat
-Mortar Section (CPL + Sig, 4 x Dets (3 x PTE w/M224 60mm Mortars) 
-I prefer to see 3 man dets on support weapons due to realistic ammo carrying

Coy HQ (36)
-MAJ (OC)
-Capt (2IC)
-WO (CSM) 
-SGT (CQMS)
-Signals Det (4)
-Combat Medical Det (4)
-Sniper Det (4) 
-2 x Infantry Sections (6) Yes 2 sections belong to coy HQ for protection, depth, Cas/PW work party and CSM man power back up.
-UAV Det (4) Operate 1-2 UAV with 5-10 KM range
-8 x Drivers Stores Men (operate light polaris or BV206 type vehicles) 

The Infantry Company will be the main maneuver unit. 

I am envisioning the Infantry Companies being grouped into 3 x company battalions (the BN being more of an admin or Force generator). 
For a airmobile/airborne/amphibious light force that can deploy rapidly any where in the country on the buzz of the PM phone (or his own Deploy CAF app).

So these companies within the battalion will be on a Green/yellow/Red stand by readiness (4 hours notice to move, 12 hours notice to move, out of play for leave and reconstitution) 

More to come


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## ArmyRick (11 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> We where not allowed to use the Reserves - they had been removed from play by the DS
> So non issue


Unless fighting fires, floods, ice storms, hurricanes, riots, airplane crash, SAR assistance, Oil spills, etc the former PRes now Civil Defence Force is out of play.


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## KevinB (11 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> I've been mulling things over as well and think that with a 15,000 establishment that there are a whole lot of more things we can't afford to keep.
> 
> For starters, CSOC. That's just another form of regimental tribalism that says everything must go but we need to keep the tan beanies as a major organization because ... special. Keep some capabilities, sure; but not as a major element.


In my construct I expanded SOF - simply because given the Situation with the Separatists in both West and Quebec - as well as the Russian meddling - they are the option that best fits for dealing with it.
   *they wouldn't wear tan berets in my construct - in fact I wouldn't have berets or any regimental affiliations at all.



FJAG said:


> My thought now is: okay, so we need to guard east, north and west but the south is our friend. What do we need and what can we afford to have.
> 
> We need a central overarching command/administrative structure but it needs to be really small. Basically C&C, strategic direction, procurement, sustainment, some form of personnel management.
> 
> Beyond that we need only two operational commands, one facing east the other west.


I disagree simply as I see the North as an easy method for the Russians in this scenario to supply the insurgencies/seperatists - as well to sneak in and cause issues.



FJAG said:


> What about the north you say? Well, like everything else, the north has a western and an eastern part. For convenience sake, if you run up the Sask and Man border you reach the border between the NWT and Nunavut which extends northward through the Queen Elizabeth Islands more or less separating the Arctic Ocean in the west from the North West Passage and Baffin Bay in the East. It makes a handy dividing line between the responsibilities for a JTF East and a JTF West each of which maintains responsibility for its entire coastline and territories from the US border right up to the northern boundary. Each JTF will have all of the sea, air and land assets needed to provide for that task. (which for JTF(E) will include a small detachment called the NfldR - nothing says that it has to be a land element  😁) (As an aside its rouglly the same distance from Esquimalt and Halifax to that northern dividing line - between 5,000 to 5,500 kms)


Imagine mine is three triangles superimposed over Canada.



FJAG said:


> I agree fully at this point with scrapping any and all element headquarters although there still remains a need for a training structure which is capable of producing trained soldiers, sailors, aircrew and their various equipment maintainers and the developers of doctrine for how these two JTFs operate.


I had an all arms training school in my ORBAT


FJAG said:


> So three HQs - a CFHQ (including a form of SJS and CJOC), and a JTF(E) HQ and a JTF(W) HQ. Everything needed to support both JTFs remains directly under CFHQ. That would include a common procurement and sustainment and individual training system as well as certain units that face in all directions (which could include cyber, intel, a small reserve (not the forbidden reserve force but a strategic reserve which could include a small SOF component)).
> 
> Everything else needed to guard and fight on the coasts and in depth goes into the respective JTF which, incidentally, do not need to be symmetrical but should be organized to meet their specific current threat and change from time-to-time as the threat changes.
> 
> 🍻


I'll still keep my Northern Task Force


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## daftandbarmy (12 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Unless fighting fires, floods, ice storms, hurricanes, riots, airplane crash, SAR assistance, Oil spills, etc the former PRes now Civil Defence Force is out of play.



You forgot one: providing thoroughly inadequate Defence Ministers


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

OK, ready to engage.

The Governor in Council, on advisement from the government of the day has decreed a standing armed force of no more than 15,000 members.

Those members are to be employed strictly within the realm of Canada.

The G-i-C further indicates that the 15,000 should be divided among four elements in the following numbers

Command and Support 3000
Sea 4000
Land 4000
Air 4000

The Canadian Rangers and all members of the Reserves of the Canadian Armed Forces, Primary and Supplementary, wiil be removed from the command and control of the CAF and transferred to the civil authorities.

With those numbers it is critical that none of them be wasted.  That means that they only do jobs that others can't.  Accordingly it is important to know what others can do.

And thus to definitions.  And here I tread boldly knowing that words are FJAG's specialty.


The Crown - the device symbolizing authority,  worn by the monarch of the day.
The Realm - the domain over which the Crown's authority extends
The Attorney-General - now the Minister of Justice, with the Power of Attorney for the Crown since 1243
The Solicitor-General -  now the Minister of Public Safety, Deputy to the Attorney-General since 1461

The Attorney-General's Power of Attorney gives authority over all the assets of the Crown including:

The Constable - commander of the royal armies and the Master of the Horse since 1139
The Marshall - responsible, along with the constable, for the monarch's horses and stables including connected military operations since 1139
The Admiral - with authority to establish courts of Admiralty and jurisdiction over maritime affairs since 1160 The Admiral did not originally have command at sea.
Master of the Ordnance - Master of (the Crown's) Works, Engines, Cannons and other kinds of Ordnance for War since 1415

The Ordnance, variously the Office and the Board, is the source for the Royal Engineers, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Fusiliers and the Carabineers, mounted fusiliers with short fusils.  The Royal Engineers also spawned the Royal Signals and then Royal Air Force.

The Ordnance has also been intimately associated with the Royal Navy since the 1540s and the creation of the iron cannon industry in England.  The iron cannon, cheap and plentiful but very heavy, were ideally suited for mounting in castles, forts and ships .  The Office of the Ordnance of 1460, located in the Tower of London, maintained a Department of engineers and surveyors responsible for harbours, ports, forts and their defences including guns. The Royal Navy has been around since 1320 when a Clerk of the King's Marine was appointed.

So, in my estimation, I suggest that the Magnificent 15,000 be re-styled as Ordnance Canada. and that it be constituted of the RCN, the RCE, the RCA, the Royal Canadian Fusiliers and the Royal Canadian Carabineers as well as the RCAF.  It will also require its own communications in the form of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, technical support from the RCEME and logistics support from its own Royal Canadian Logistics Corps.

The primary role of Ordnance Canada will be the application of lethal force within the Crown's realm of Canada.

More to follow (Definition of the Realm).


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Defining the realm is complicated.

Generally it is given as 10,000,000 square kilometers.  But it can expand to 18,000,000 km2 when considering its international airspace obligations.  Equally it can shrink when the 10 self-governing Provinces are removed from federal authority, and shrink still further when indigenous title is considered.

What is sure about federal authority, the authority of the Crown as exercised by Power of Attorney, is that the Governor-in-Council and her Attorney-General are responsible for the entire airspace over Canada, all 18,000,000 km2 of domestic and international obligations.  It is also responsible for all the seas around Canada beyond the 3 nautical mile line.  It is responsible for the three northern territories with their 120,000 inhabitants.  It is responsible for establishing and maintaining relations with the indigenous inhabitants of the realm, especially those that don't recognize the Crown's authority.  It is responsible for the maintenance of relations with our neighbours and the rest of the international community on behalf of all the inhabitants of the realm.  

It is also responsible for assisting the provincial governments in the maintenance of order by keeping the peace through good governance.

That means keeping friends, making friends, offering a helping hand when requested and only applying force when necessary.  Making enemies is not congruent with peace, order and good governance.

More to follow.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

The point of these maps is to demonstrate the high degree of overlap between the arable land, 10% of the lands of Canada, and the Militia districts.  This characterises the Settler lands in which more than 95% of the inhabitants of Canada reside.  The other 5%, predominantly indigenous, occupy the other 90% of the land, the Boreal Forest, the Barrens and the Arctic Coast.

The arable lands are well connected by a system of roads, rail and pipelines.  That accounts for 95% of the people but only 10% of the lands.  Roads also tie-in another 20% of the land to that arable land network.  But 70% of the land is inaccessible by road.

The dominant means of connecting the inhabitants of Canada is air transport.



> Canada's air sector depends on its 1,889 aerodromes1, including 26 airports that are part of the National Airports System2 ( NAS ); 570 certified airports, heliports and waterdromes that support scheduled and non-scheduled flights; and 1,297 registered aerodromes and 22 other aerodromes





National Airports System airports handle roughly 90% of all scheduled passengers and cargo volumes in Canada.  They, again, predominantly serve the 95% of the population in the arable lands.


NAS airports are capable of handling very large aircraft.  Most of the other 1863 aerodromes are shorter and rougher and may even require landing on water or ice.
A mixed fleet of aircraft, with a strong VTOL/STOL component is necessary to connect the dots.

The Crown's authority is exerted on land through its Constabulary, the RCMP and the forces available to its provincial solicitors-general, the local constabularies.

In addition to living and working on land the inhabitants of Canada work at sea





Almost 13,000 registered fishing vessels work these waters flying the flag of Canada. And some 700 commercial vessels including 182 ferries.  There are also 8 offshore drilling rigs.  

All of these vessels, together with the thousands of foreign vessels that transit Canadian waters each year, are subject to Canadian Admiralty law.  The lead enforcers of that law are the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Department of Transport's Coast Guard.

The vessels operate out of 700 to 800 harbours.  17 of those are designated ports with their own independent port authorities.  They, like the National Airport System airports function as the primary gateways to Canada.



Nav Canada, a civilian agency, acts as the Crown's agent in the airspace over Canada and beyond its borders.

MTF.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

So how to defend Canada and its inhabitants.

The lead agency for the Attorney-General (Minister of Justice) is the Minister of Public Safety (Solicitor-General) acting under the authority of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act.  The Minister has at his disposal the RCMP, the CBSA, the CSC and the courts and prosecution service to enforce the laws.  The RCMP is an armed force, as is the CBSA, and authorized to use lethal force judiciously.  To assist in these endeavours the RCMP maintains a small reaction force trained in assaults against armed outlaws that refuse to recognize their authority.

The RCMP operates across the whole of Canada but in the southern, arable lands of the provinces, where most of the population resides, it has its greatest numbers.  But it also has the most assistance in the form of local and provincial constabularies.

In the north, among the 120,000 indigenous inhabitants in their approximately 200 communities the RCMP has their greatest presence.  They are the primary agents of the Government of Canada in the north, operating in detachments of three constables in each community.  They operate in similar detachments within those non-arable areas of the provinces with indigenous inhabitants.

The new Government of the Day has decreed that the Canadian Rangers have been severed from the Department of National Defence.  In my opinion this is a rational move and the Canadian Rangers should be folded into the RCMP's auxiliary or reserve systems as the Rangers and the Mounties live and work together in very small, tight-knit communities already.  The Rangers can continue their current roles of observing and reporting through the RCMP and assisting locally in emergencies.


Also operating under the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act is the Minister of Emergency Preparedness.  

The Government of the Day has decreed that the Reserves will be severed from the Department of National Defence.

Given this I might expect that the Naval Reserves, Air Force Reserves, Militia, and Medical Reserves, and their Armouries and Stone Frigates, all get rolled into DARTs or Disaster Assistance Response Teams.



> *DART Headquarters*: DART HQ directs all the work of the DART
> *DART Company (Coy)*: DART Company is the main body of the DART. It includes an Engineer Troop, a Medical Platoon, a Logistics Platoon and a Defence & Security Platoon.


 Which brings us back to this map.



The Constabulary supplies standing patrols to enforce the laws of the realm of Canada.
They can be reinforced in the north by the Rangers. 
They can be reinforced in the south by the Militia.

More to Follow

Taking a break.


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## FJAG (14 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> The arable lands are well connected by a system of roads, rail and pipelines. That accounts for 95% of the people but only 10% of the lands. Roads also tie-in another 20% of the land to that arable land network. But 70% of the land is inaccessible by road.
> 
> The dominant means of connecting the inhabitants of Canada is air transport.



I'm interested to see where this is going. Lots of good research there and terrific graphics. Interesting to see how the French and Newfoundlanders weren't too fussy about entering into treaties.

I'm waiting to see how you resolve and/or apply the contradiction in the above quotation in that while its true that the only way to connect 100% of the population of Canada, air transport is not the "dominant" means of connecting the inhabitants of Canada. In the 10% of the lands occupied by 95% of the population the dominant means of connecting the inhabitants are in fact the road, rail, pipeline and power transmission networks. That will have strategic significance as you move on.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Continuing....



> Master of the Ordnance - Master of (the Crown's) Works, Engines, Cannons and other kinds of Ordnance for War since 1415
> The Office of the Ordnance ... maintained a Department of engineers and surveyors responsible for harbours, ports, forts and their defences including guns.





> The Ordnance, variously the Office and the Board, is the source for the Royal Engineers, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Fusiliers and the Carabineers, mounted fusiliers with short fusils. The Royal Engineers also spawned the Royal Signals and then Royal Air Force.



Given what the Government of the Day has severed from the Department of National Defence, including the Search and Rescue function then the DND is reduced, if applying traditional definitions, to assisting Public Services and Procurement Canada, previously known as Public Works and Government Services Canada, in:

the design of harbours, ports and forts and their defences;
the provision of lethal reaction forces
surveillance.

But....

Surveillance is inherently a continuous function requiring standing patrols and listening posts and those eat up manpower.  Manpower that is in short supply in a 15,000 PY body.

Additionally

Intelligence in Canada is largely a civil domain, co-ordinated through the Office of the Commissioner of Intelligence who reports to the Governor-in-Council.

Accordingly I propose that all intelligence and surveillance assets be placed under the OCI.


Office of the Intelligence CommissionerOffice of the Communications Security Establishment CommissionerCanadian Security Intelligence ServiceCommunications Security Establishment
Canadian Space AgencyOffices of the Information and Privacy Commissioners of CanadaSecretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of ParliamentariansNational Security and Intelligence Review Agency SecretariatSecurity Intelligence Review Committee

This includes CSIS, the CSA and CSE.  Further I would make CSE responsible for all Elint, including radar and sonar, and all Cyber warfare.  This would not exclude the NORAD North Warning System.

Surveillance systems 

Radarsat




NavCan Surveillance



North Warning System



CSE ECHELON Network



If we transfer Intelligence and Surveillance to the civil authorities, and force the Ordnance Department to rely on a Common Intelligence Picture then the Intelligence Department of the Ordnance Department would just be required to generate actionable intelligence commensurate with then Ordnance Department's needs.

Those needs would be reduced in scope to:

the design of harbours, ports and forts and their defences;
the provision of lethal reaction forces

The lethal reaction forces would be responsible for armed reconnaissance and armed force within the realm of Canada, air, sea and land.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

All of which brings us to:

the design of harbours, ports and forts and their defences;

And jobs for the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers.






Combined you end up with this



43 defended localities (45 actually although some overlap - Vancouver covers two Ports, Vancouver and Deltaport, as does the Hamilton-Oshawa Authority).

I have chosen to circle each locality, centred on the airports and the harbours (although most harbours are collocated with airports) with a 25 km radius circle.  Each 25 km circle covers about 2000 km2.  All 45 of them therefore cover 90,000 km2.  Or about 1% of the total land area of the realm of Canada.

It also covers over 95% of the inhabitants of the realm.

Law and order is maintained by the RCMP and the local provincial and municipal constabularies, as well as auxiliaries such as privately contracted security guards.  International access to these ports is controlled by the CBSA.  The auxiliaries are not generally armed but the RCMP, the CBSA and the local constabularies are.  All are authorized to employ it.

So ground level security in these ports is well provided for.

That leaves the approaches from the water and the air as vulnerable.  I will leave the marine approaches for now and focus on the air approaches.

The air approaches are well monitored as demonstrated by the surveillance coverage.  Now to deal with reaction to suspected threats.

25 km

I intentionally chose 25 km in reference to this:








The British Sky Sabre system based on the MBDA CAMM missile chosen for the new CSC frigates.  It has a 25 km range.








						CAMM (LAND APPLICATION) | FORCE PROTECTION, Ground Based Air Defence | MBDA
					

CAMM, the Common Anti-air Modular Missile, is the next generation air defence missile designed for land, sea and air environments.



					www.mbda-systems.com
				




Do I expect every airport and harbour to be equipped with a CAMM launcher?  No.  But I do expect every airport and harbour to be able to integrate something like CAMM into its existing security system.



This graphic is from Rheinmetall.  It demonstrates the full spectrum of threats that an airport, or port, might expect to encounter all the way from burglaries and fires, through intruders to defence against objects ranging from birds to ICBMs.  This obviously includes UAVs, helicopters and aircraft.

Most of these threats are managed in the civil domain although the technologies overlap with the military domain.

The array of technologies available to the civil authorities, without crossing over to traditional ordnance is quite extensive.

This ranges from EO, Acoustic and Radar detectors and trackers to responses based on radio waves, sound and light.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

More examples




None of these would look out of place in a civilian environment and, generally, they are non-lethal.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Moving up the scary spectrum, but still "under the radar",


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Also available are various pyrotechnic devices that can be launched from projectors like these




 

When shrouded the launchers themselves look entirely non-descript. And the devices launched can all be non-lethal or less-than-lethal.  They can also be loaded with drones capable of conducting reconnaissance which would aid the defence of the ports and also the other efforts of the constabulary.  










						Unmanned Aerial Loitering Systems for Various Missions
					

Check out our unmanned Systems: long-range flight capabilities, specialized for various missions, and can carry up to 30 kg warhead.




					uvisionuav.com
				




Given that the constabulary has authority to employ lethal force it is not impossible that they could be authorized to employ lethal munitions as well without having to resort to the Ordnance Department.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

And now for the cross over to the Ordnance Department




Less-than-lethal, possibly lethal (depending on munitions loaded) and decidedly lethal.

I suggest that the laser mounts and the missile mounts are compatible with a civil ground based effort.

If those elements were in place on the ground then it is not impossible that the Ordnance Department, under high threat conditions, could thicken the defences by changing the load-out on the missile launchers to dedicated SAMs (or even SSMs) and adding cannons, perhaps even swapping some of the lasers for cannons.  The cannons could also be used in the ground role.

So, my GBAD prescription looks like this.

The RCE assists PSPC in the design of ports and harbours and their defences, focusing on GBAD in the civil environment but incorporating the ability to scale up to manage a heightened threat level.

The RCA, in peace time, supplies a resident detachment of a Lieutenant, a Bombardier  and two ammo techs to manage the stores in support of the civil authorities.  The would also act as the recce element for the main RCA GBAD force equipped with additional NASAMs type missile launchers, cannons and a 25 km SAM det,  all of which could plug into the GBAD system managed from the local airport's control tower or the harbour-master.

That leaves 95% of the population sheltering under the "guns" of the port and its fort.

Which leaves us with reconnaissance and strike for the Ordnance Department.

The Navy will be dealt with separately.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

So moving on to Admiralty and the Navy.



The job is to protect and control the activities of 13,000 fishing vessels, 700 commercial vessels and thousands of visiting foreign vessels.  And 8 offshore oil rigs.




Most of the job goes to the Coast Guard fleet with its 118 vessels, 15 of which are large enough to support helicopter operations (Bell 429, Bell 412 EPI).  That number is expected to increase with the arrival of the Coast Guard's variants of the Navy's AOPS (2x Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship and 16x Multi-Purpose Vessels) as well as 2x Polar Icebreakers.  Additional numbers are possible.

The RCN maintains a fleet of 12x CPF frigates, 4x SSK submarines and 12x MCDV general purpose vessels.  The fleet is expected to add 6x AOPS and swap the 12x CPF for 15x CSC frigates.

While noting earlier that standing patrols are drains on manpower and therefore should be handed to civil authorities where possible the high seas present a particular problem.  It is a matter of historical record that they are a particularly lawless environment subject to smuggling, piracy, kidnapping and slavery as well as illegal fishing and exploitation of resources.  They also present the means by which large forces and heavy ordnance can approach the realm of Canada.

Accordingly it is reasonable that the Ordnance Department maintain a fleet of heavily armed vessels, the RCN, to conduct standing patrols in the approaches and also to provide a screen to protect the civilian fleets while they go about their daily routines.

Canada is bordered by salt water on two coasts, the Pacific on the West and, on the East the Atlantic and the Arctic.  The West Coast extends from the Straits of Juan de Fuca off of Victoria to the Dixon Channel off of Prince Rupert. The East Coast extends from the Bay of Fundy off of New Brunswick to the western entrance to the North West Passage off of Tuktoyaktuk.  The East Coast presents two radically different environments.  In the south, the Atlantic Coast, there is a blue water environment comparable to that of the West or Pacific Coast.  To the north, the Arctic Coast there is ice.  The Atlantic and Pacific Coasts are well served by vessels like the CPF, the CSC and the MCDV.  The Arctic Coast demands ice-strengthened vessels like the AOPS.  SSK (conventional submarine) operations are problematic in the Arctic but practicable in the blue water environments of the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts.  The West Coast is served out of Victoria while the East Coast, Atlantic and Arctic, are served out of Halifax.

The approaches to Canada are defined by choke points at Dixon Channel and the Straits of Juan de Fuca, Cabot Strait and the Straits of Belleisle, Hudson Strait and Robeson Channel, and the North West Passage.  These choke points should be constantly monitored by a standing patrol.  In addition, monitoring the distant approaches to Canada, there should be two distant water patrols, one each in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Taken in sum the Pacific patrols, the Dixon and Juan de Fuca patrols and the distant patrol, based on the CSC/CPF/SSKs represent one standing fleet operating out of Victoria  The Atlantic fleet, also CSC/CPF/SSK based, operating out of Halifax, would supply a distant patrol and a Cabot and Belleisle patrol.  An Arctic Fleet, also operating out of Halifax but based on the AOPS, would supply Robeson, Hudson and North West Passage patrols.



The patrols are represented by yellow pins surrounded by 25 km circles.  In other words each patrol, standing stationary, is covering an area the size of Metropolitan Toronto.

With standing patrols at these points the ships can sprint to cover much larger areas.  Assuming open water and good weather.






With an onboard  CH-148 helicopter the response areas can be extended by about 30% or an additional 200 NM.

The AOPS responses are much more constrained. Even in blue water.  In ice the vessel is reduced to walking pace.




This suggests maintaining a fleet at sea of 6 CSC/CPFs and 4 AOPS.  This will require regular rotations of the ships and the crews.  One model is two divisions on every ship at sea and a third division ashore with the shore division rotating in on a regular basis to replace one of the divisions afloat.  That division would then rotate in after a rest period.

Equally, every two ships at sea should have one ship in port under going refit.

That would result in a standing fleet of 9 CSC/CPFs and 6 AOPSs.  Crew size reduced as much as possible targeting 45 in the AOPS and 100 in the CSC conforming to Danish practice.

This system of patrols, however, only addresses the surface and the sky.  It does little to address the water column under the surface.  In blue water that is addressed by the 4x SSKs but those numbers are two few to maintain a standing patrol.  They also are totally incompatible with Arctic operations.

To that end one of the first major purchases to be recommended to the new Government of the Day is the acquisition of a fleet of submarines.  I am proposing adding to the Dixon, Juan de Fuca, Cabot and Belleisle patrols one accompanying submarine.  That requires 4 submarines at sea plus 2 submarines in dock.

Additionally I am proposing four submarines in the arctic. With two in dock, for a total of six dedicated to Arctic operations that brings the total fleet requirement to 12 submarines.

I do not believe that nuclear submarines are necessary.  Particularly if the RCN is focused on defending the homeland.

As noted, in the Pacific and Atlantic conventional submarines can operate safely.  The problem arises in the Arctic.  However, if the subs are not voyaging independently in the Arctic, but are operating as listening posts, close to shore bases like Alert, Resolute, Iqaluit and Cambridge Bay, in conjunction with an AOPS acting as a tender, then I believe the risk would be manageable.  I further believe that the risk could be reduced by the acquisition of air independent vessels.  Accordingly  I would be recommending the purchase of 12x Type 218 coastal submarines that can snort indefinitely and cruise for three weeks without surfacing, or snorting.  I would add to each of the choke point patrols two XLUUVs (Extra Large Uninhabited Underwater Vehicles).

So a chokepoint patrol would consist of a CSC/CPF or an AOPS and a Type 218 with 2x XLUUVs.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Sprint Coverage



Taken in total the at sea sprint coverage would look like this.





And that's enough for today.

RCAF, the Army and the Special Forces to follow.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

Just before leaving the navy and the admiralty I want to mention the StanFlex system









I think that each of the AOPS/MPV vessels should be fitted/retro-fitted with 3 or 5 Stanflex positions making all the vessels truly Multi-Purpose.


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## lenaitch (14 Nov 2021)

A very extensive and well constructed presentation.  Actually, I find the entire thread somewhat fascinating, if not a little confusing from a civilian perspective.

I couldn't help but notice that the limitations imposed by the government in the scenario are solved, at least in part, by unloading some of the responsibilities onto local law enforcement.  Admittedly, there is much precedent for responsibilities to be downloaded, but they would have to be accompanied by significant funding.  No police service that I am aware of has the capacity to absorb any of the, for want of a better term, 'active civil defence' responsibilities as it now stands.  There may also be constitutional barriers.

Civilian law enforcement can deploy lethal force under certain narrow and prescribed conditions.  It is an individual authority, and liability; it is not chain of command driven, nor can it be delegated.  The authority is vested in the officer, not the force.  I would wonder how an individual civilian law enforcement member, let alone a harbourmaster or airport manager, would be able to use any of the information inputs to determine an immediate threat to themselves or the lives of others, then deploy lethal countermeasures.


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## Kirkhill (14 Nov 2021)

lenaitch said:


> A very extensive and well constructed presentation.  Actually, I find the entire thread somewhat fascinating, if not a little confusing from a civilian perspective.
> 
> I couldn't help but notice that the limitations imposed by the government in the scenario are solved, at least in part, by unloading some of the responsibilities onto local law enforcement.  Admittedly, there is much precedent for responsibilities to be downloaded, but they would have to be accompanied by significant funding.  No police service that I am aware of has the capacity to absorb any of the, for want of a better term, 'active civil defence' responsibilities as it now stands.  There may also be constitutional barriers.
> 
> Civilian law enforcement can deploy lethal force under certain narrow and prescribed conditions.  It is an individual authority, and liability; it is not chain of command driven, nor can it be delegated.  The authority is vested in the officer, not the force.  I would wonder how an individual civilian law enforcement member, let alone a harbourmaster or airport manager, would be able to use any of the information inputs to determine an immediate threat to themselves or the lives of others, then deploy lethal countermeasures.



Thanks for the appreciation.

Also thank you for the heads up on the legal ramifications.  I understand the financial end of things.  TANSTAAFL.  However I sense that Canadians generally are happier funding constables and stretcher bearers than soldiers so the new Government of the Day may be on to something.

Having said that can you enlighten me on the use of force rules as they apply to SWAT/ERT operations?

And I get your point about the use of lethal force by harbourmaster or airport manager.   I was more thinking along the lines of knocking down uninhabited foreign objects than knocking down people.  Or launching observation drones more than loitering munitions.  My sense there was that it would be better for the air traffic controller to launch a drone into his airspace than have a third party complicate his picture.

Maybe the transition to lethal force should be made explicit by transferring control temporarily to the artillery det.   Somewhat after the practice of Op Palaci avalanche control.


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## FJAG (15 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for the appreciation.
> 
> Also thank you for the heads up on the legal ramifications.  I understand the financial end of things.  TANSTAAFL.  However I sense that Canadians generally are happier funding constables and stretcher bearers than soldiers so the new Government of the Day may be on to something.
> 
> ...


The temptation to offload responsibilities onto civilian agencies is highly tempting in this scenario. Some of those make sense, such as search and rescue and patrolling going to the coast guard. 

Even use of force legal scenarios are not problematic in that the appropriate legislation can always be made to cater to that. More problematic is that the use of military force isn't a simple matter of allocating the responsibility to another agency. It takes equipment, a doctrine and constant training. The idea of having a basically civilian organization which on a day to day basis does non-lethal work suddenly, in an emergency, switch over to conduct lethal operations - regardless whether against manned or unmanned system - is asking quite a lot. Let me put it this way, the Reg F does not trust reservists who already get military training on both courses and on an ongoing basis to deploy for combat using relatively minor weapons without significant predeployment training. What is the likelihood of a government having the confidence to release lethal force authority for major weapon systems to people who are in all respects civilians and who have limited training and a part time command and control structure?

Do not underestimate the complexity of these weapon systems and the rigid command and control structure that needs to be in place and rigorously tested and practiced on a regular basis.

Just a point on Op Palaci. I did two tours as the Oi/c of AvConDet and understand the system quite well. In short, there is never a transfer of control to the military. Parks Canada employs several civilian experts in what is now called the Avalanche Control Section who are on duty in round the clock shifts and who are responsible for researching weather and snow conditions throughout Rogers Pass and who determine when a shoot is required to release dangerous slides. While the Army mans the guns, its the ACS supervisor who accompanies each shoot who determines what target is to be fired and when. There isn't a single round that leaves a gun unless expressly ordered by the civilian ACS supervisor.

I look forward to your next few posts.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> The temptation to offload responsibilities onto civilian agencies is highly tempting in this scenario. Some of those make sense, such as search and rescue and patrolling going to the coast guard.
> 
> Even use of force legal scenarios are not problematic in that the appropriate legislation can always be made to cater to that. More problematic is that the use of military force isn't a simple matter of allocating the responsibility to another agency. It takes equipment, a doctrine and constant training. The idea of having a basically civilian organization which on a day to day basis does non-lethal work suddenly, in an emergency, switch over to conduct lethal operations - regardless whether against manned or unmanned system - is asking quite a lot. Let me put it this way, the Reg F does not trust reservists who already get military training on both courses and on an ongoing basis to deploy for combat using relatively minor weapons without significant predeployment training. What is the likelihood of a government having the confidence to release lethal force authority for major weapon systems to people who are in all respects civilians and who have limited training and a part time command and control structure?
> 
> ...



The Civil-Military interface alluded to by both you and Lenaitch is indeed a significant problem.  And Op Palaci may not be the appropriate example but it is one of the few examples I can think of where "The Ordnance" has been, and is currently, used domestically.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities.  Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action.  Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.

One model I can think of, particularly appropriate, is the role of 22 Wing, and particularly 21 Squadron, at North Bay.  It is responsible for the Canadian Air Defence Sector, I believe, and works in a civilian controlled NAVCAN environment.   NORAD and NAVCAN seem to have come to an amicable understanding.  I see no reason, even under the new government, to disrupt that arrangement.

Given that, and given that North Bay monitors the North Warning Systems 47 (IIRC) radars remotely while launching fighters from Cold Lake and Bagotville, and Leitrim monitors Masset and Gander remotely, it would seem not impossible that 22 Wing continue as the military's National Airspace Coordination Centre.  It would then continue working in conjunction with NAVCAN and its Air Traffic Controllers.  The Airspace would still be owned by the civilian controller.  They would have the military advice and assistance of the RCA GBAD det on site operating in conjunction with 22 Wing in North Bay.

Perhaps something along those lines?


As to the question of manpower and shifting responsiblities - absolutely I would anticipate that in downsizing the CAF from 68,000 to 15,000 that the remaining 53,000 PYs would be transferred along with the responsibilities, thickening up the civil agencies.  And off course the personnel budget would go with them.


----------



## FJAG (15 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> The Civil-Military interface alluded to by both you and Lenaitch is indeed a significant problem.  And Op Palaci may not be the appropriate example but it is one of the few examples I can think of where "The Ordnance" has been, and is currently, used domestically.
> 
> The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities.  Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action.  Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.


I don't want to sound pedantic - like I've said, one can always change the law - but Aid of the Civil Power is a very specific constitutional provision contained within the NDA whereby the federal military power is deployed in support of and at the request of a provincial authority in the event of riots and disturbances of the peace which are beyond the ability of the province to control. The concept that you are building goes far beyond AoCP and is principally integrating provincial powers and personnel (for example under s 92 "Administration of Justice") with the federal authorities' s 91 powers and personnel (such as "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence" and "Sea Coasts and Fisheries") 



Kirkhill said:


> One model I can think of, particularly appropriate, is the role of 22 Wing, and particularly 21 Squadron, at North Bay.  It is responsible for the Canadian Air Defence Sector, I believe, and works in a civilian controlled NAVCAN environment.   NORAD and NAVCAN seem to have come to an amicable understanding.  I see no reason, even under the new government, to disrupt that arrangement.
> 
> Given that, and given that North Bay monitors the North Warning Systems 47 (IIRC) radars remotely while launching fighters from Cold Lake and Bagotville, and Leitrim monitors Masset and Gander remotely, it would seem not impossible that 22 Wing continue as the military's National Airspace Coordination Centre.  It would then continue working in conjunction with NAVCAN and its Air Traffic Controllers.  The Airspace would still be owned by the civilian controller.  They would have the military advice and assistance of the RCA GBAD det on site operating in conjunction with 22 Wing in North Bay.
> 
> ...


 I think this is where the whole construct starts to fall apart. In the Coast Guard and search and rescue example, one can see the utility in transferring the DND resources (including budget) to the Coast Guard. The function can be done by a civilian agency already related with the task and there is little need in maintaining a military establishment for that role (some utility maybe but no need). I see a similar utility in centralizing all intelligence functions into a single agency even if there is no reduction in overall personnel or budgets. There are several other tasks that might benefit by such transfers as well. The 22 Wing/NAVCAN system, on the other hand, is one of interagency cooperation and not one of a transfer of PYs and responsibility or cost reductions.

The only reason a government would consider downsizing the military as drastically as suggested in Rick's scenario is to a) reduce costs (fiscal) and/or b) demilitarize the country (political/ideological). If there is no financial benefit to be gained (such as reducing the PY payroll (and let's not forget there's another 24,000+ civilian hangers-on in DND) then one needs to look solely at the political/ideological ones. 

I'm not woke so I don't understand all of the Woke Party's motivations but I would think its the military hardware and actions that tints their rosy glasses and not simply the uniform and military hierarchy. I think Rick's scenario deals with a demilitarization of the country for both fiscal and ideological reasons rather than one of the civilianization of the military. Effectively you are suggesting reducing the military to 15,000 trigger pullers but maintaining a 77,000 PY decentralized civilianized bureaucracy some of which may or may not have some trigger pulling powers. This does not improve effectiveness and really doesn't meet any financial or ideological goals.

I take the principal objective in Rick's challenge is to significantly reduce the recurring billions in PYs funded annually in favour of providing a smaller and more effectively equipped defence force which concentrates on defending the homeland rather than expeditionary operations. Transferring all those PYs is a zero sum game.

🍻


----------



## Haggis (15 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities.  Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action.  Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.


Domestic ROE have always been based on the Criminal Code.  During the G8/20 in 2010 the Op CADENCE soldiers were required to learn and understand the Incident Management/Intervention Model and how it drove the application of force in that context.   Would the Woke Party's approach be to appoint members of "The Ordnance" as constables when employed in AoCP/ALEA duties within Canada?


Kirkhill said:


> As to the question of manpower and shifting responsibilities - absolutely I would anticipate that in downsizing the CAF from 68,000 to 15,000 that the remaining 53,000 PYs would be transferred along with the responsibilities, thickening up the civil agencies.  And off course the personnel budget would go with them.


This would be a classic "rob Peter to pay Paul" scenario.  A more likely outcome would be the creation of Special Operating Agencies (SOA) to support the log/admin side of "The Ordnance" and staff those SOAs by transferring the PYs and funding across from the CAF.  There would be a ton of second and third order activities needed to support this such as changes to various pension laws and polices, unionization, benefits transfers etc.


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

To be honest, the way I am working through this is primarily on the basis of reviewing the jobs that need doing first and then trying to figure out how to get them done within the context of Rick's 15,000.

My sense is that I can move the Intelligence and Surveillance functions into the civilian domain.  I can move the Rangers into the civilian domain and also the Militia.  In large part that is because intelligence and surveillance already have a heavy civilian component.  The Rangers and the Militia hardly qualify as a major funding drag on the military nor does the military expend a great deal of effort on them.  Transferring them out and forming a Homeguard would not, in my opinion, be a major concern.

The big problems come with the jobs required of the RCN and the RCAF.  We can require a lot from the Coast Guard but even with that I consider the RCN's Patrols and the RCAF's ability to respond to emergencies to be critical tasks that can't be downsized.  In fact, I consider both forces pretty well stretched as it is.  I have difficulty figuring out how to cut the forces and maintain their kit, let alone manage Command and Control. 

The other big concern I have is the GBAD construct necessary to protect the cities, their people and their infrastructure without breaking the bank.

I am looking to history for answers because I consider the national wars and their levee-en-masse to be aberrations.  Historically logistic support for both the Army and the Navy was a civilian field. Crimea prompted the rise of the military logistic support system because inter-agency co-operation failed.  In WWI and WWII new technologies were being introduced to the public and training was a key element in raising those armies.  Historically there was less of a gap between the domestic skills possessed by the soldiery and the skills they needed for fighting.  Establishing discipline was a greater problem.

I don't know the command and control structure that guides NORAD-NAVCAN co-operation, any more than I know the command and control structure of the artillery at Dover Castle or even Fort Henry in Kingston.   I just know that military aircraft are launched when required and neither civvy, nor foreign military, aircraft have been shot down.  Equally, I know that vessels sailed in and out of Kingston harbour and travelled the Thousand Islands without being sunk by the artillery.  Whatever was, and is happening, somebody is doing something right.

I do think that duplicating technology and personnel simply because we can't figure out when to hand over control from one agency to another is silly.  Some where between having gunners shooting down pigeons and quad copters and airport managers shooting down Hyper Velocity Missiles there has to be an acceptable answer and frankly, I believe without knowing, that the answer exists at the interface between NAVCAN and NORAD.

All of which leads me towards a growing sense that the RCN and RCAF numbers as they currently stand are not indefensible.  I think that was part of my gut reaction to try and protect them from this exercise by removing them to the Coast Guard in their entirety.

The major problem I have is what to do with the army in a domestic role in a largely peaceful society that doesn't face imminent threat of an invasion.   There is a system in place to manage the brushfires within the population.  That is largely as civil control responsibility and it is expected that the agents of the civil authority will manage it.  By assigning the Militia to the civil side of things then the RCMP are provided with their own B Specials.

The only problem with that is that nobody likes the B Specials and soldiers don't like being used against neighbours they drink with.

And that not only goes for the Militia but the Regular Force as well.

So what is left for the army to do?

Stay tuned?









						Special Constabulary - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						Ulster Special Constabulary - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## FJAG (15 Nov 2021)

Okay. Everyone whose COA included setting up a mountain warfare unit in Merritt BC needs to reconsider.



> https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/merritt-wastewater-system-failure-dont-flush-1.6249377


----------



## daftandbarmy (15 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Okay. Everyone whose COA included setting up a mountain warfare unit in Merritt BC needs to reconsider.



OTOH, Commando Forces would be welcome in Abbotsford:






						Google Maps
					






					www.google.com


----------



## KevinB (15 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> Domestic ROE have always been based on the Criminal Code.


Pedantic point: Not actually true.
  At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)
 I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.


Haggis said:


> During the G8/20 in 2010 the Op CADENCE soldiers were required to learn and understand the Incident Management/Intervention Model and how it drove the application of force in that context.   Would the Woke Party's approach be to appoint members of "The Ordnance" as constables when employed in AoCP/ALEA duties within Canada?


I am aware (and I am sure several other members are as well) of other DomOps where the IMIM wasn't applicable.
  If you remember the little issues in Quebec with the natives - and the potential to use Leo's andM109's to "soften" defensive positions - that's not exactly CCC sort of stuff.


Haggis said:


> This would be a classic "rob Peter to pay Paul" scenario.  A more likely outcome would be the creation of Special Operating Agencies (SOA) to support the log/admin side of "The Ordnance" and staff those SOAs by transferring the PYs and funding across from the CAF.  There would be a ton of second and third order activities needed to support this such as changes to various pension laws and polices, unionization, benefits transfers etc.


Agreed in this respect, all I see in Kirkhill's model is cheating the system and following the letter not the intent (as creative as it was) .


----------



## KevinB (15 Nov 2021)

Honestly I see some fantastic ideas on a lot of these responses - so much so I am almost wanting to play with some hybrid combinations.
   A lot of things I hadn't focused on (and I cheated the system with contractors admittedly) that could be reworked - and several different paths forward could be used from various participants.


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Pedantic point: Not actually true.
> At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)
> I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.
> 
> ...


I prefer to think of it as working the rule book.


----------



## lenaitch (15 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for the appreciation.
> 
> Also thank you for the heads up on the legal ramifications.  I understand the financial end of things.  TANSTAAFL.  However I sense that Canadians generally are happier funding constables and stretcher bearers than soldiers so the new Government of the Day may be on to something.
> 
> ...


A lot has been said in the interim so I'll just respond to your highlighted question.  The use of force rules that apply to police tactical teams, however they are variously called, is no different than the individual patrol officer.  Notwithstanding their specialized training and equipment, any individual team member who uses lethal or even non-lethal force, is answerable to their employer, whatever civilian oversight complaint/investigative agency is in place, and the court, for the action they took. There is no scenario where, for example, a member could shoot the next person who came out a door based simply on the grounds that a team leader or incident commander directed him to.


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## KevinB (15 Nov 2021)

lenaitch said:


> A lot has been said in the interim so I'll just respond to your highlighted question.  The use of force rules that apply to police tactical teams, however they are variously called, is no different than the individual patrol officer.  Notwithstanding their specialized training and equipment, any individual team member who uses lethal or even non-lethal force, is answerable to their employer, whatever civilian oversight complaint/investigative agency is in place, and the court, for the action they took. There is no scenario where, for example, a member could shoot the next person who came out a door based simply on the grounds that a team leader or incident commander directed him to.


LE Snipers...
  I say that as someone who spent 4+ years on a Federal LE Task Force on both Entry Team and a Sniper.


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## lenaitch (15 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> LE Snipers...
> I say that as someone who spent 4+ years on a Federal LE Task Force on both Entry Team and a Sniper.


In the Canadian context?

I'm not saying that the necessary grounds can't be established during a briefing or through information received via comms as the situation unfolds.  The oversight bodies and courts will ultimately decide, and that's where the member's fate lies.


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## KevinB (15 Nov 2021)

lenaitch said:


> In the Canadian context?
> 
> I'm not saying that the necessary grounds can't be established during a briefing or through information received via comms as the situation unfolds.  The oversight bodies and courts will ultimately decide, and that's where the member's fate lies.


I taught on a Canadian LE class several years ago - the premise is the same on a breach - or command generated shooting.
   There has been a bunch of case law on both sides of the border on LE Sniper/Sharpshooter/CounterSniper/whatevernamehere issues with the whole green light issue being dragged through the courts, as people have tried to frame those shootings as Premeditated Murder.

Now if things go sideways - the shooter had better be able to articulate why they did what they did, the totality of the circumstances - not just X saying so.
   Generally the Sniper/Observe Team is mostly there to provide intel and eyes on - as well as cover for perimeter/entry pers - but when part of a HR mission - all LE I know will take orders from the Incident or Team Commander, and in certain cases those will be initiated by sniper action.

At that point in the time, I'd like to point out the Incident Commander etc has made the decision that lethal force is needed to preserve other lives - and the shooter is just executing policy as it where.

Rare - yes, but not unheard of, I've been at a few.


----------



## Czech_pivo (15 Nov 2021)

As anyone thought about keeping the SOF but as for the regular army units, why can’t we contract this out to a brigade Gurkha’s and use the extra troops for a kick ass RCN and RCAF.


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## daftandbarmy (15 Nov 2021)

Czech_pivo said:


> As anyone thought about keeping the SOF but as for the regular army units, why can’t we contract this out to a brigade Gurkha’s and use the extra troops for a kick ass RCN and RCAF.



Dude... I love the Gurkhas too, but they do have some limitations.


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## Haggis (15 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Pedantic point: Not actually true.


Pedantic or not, any use of force by government agents within Canada must be justified.


KevinB said:


> At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)


Nothing in the Criminal Code or IMIM precludes the _*justified*_ use of lethal force as a first measure response.  


KevinB said:


> I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.


In 2010, the frequently changing ROE became a running joke in my TF HQ (I was RSM of the IRU).  In one version (an obvious cut & paste error), which we had to hastily recall, the ROE allowed soldiers _in any zone_ to go from "physical presence" to "lethal force" with no intervening steps, regardless of the actions of a threat actor - or Huntsville hiker.  

   "Ma'am, please stay back from the fence."

    "Huh??"

    BANG!


KevinB said:


> I am aware (and I am sure several other members are as well) of other DomOps where the IMIM wasn't applicable.
> If you remember the little issues in Quebec with the natives - and the potential to use Leo's andM109's to "soften" defensive positions - that's not exactly CCC sort of stuff.


I spent seven long months between that location and the one straddling the Canada/US border a few dozen km west.  We are damned lucky things didn't spiral way out of control there.


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## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

Fraught.  I think that seems to be the one word answer to the use of lethal force by the Government of Canada within its realm.  Proceed at your own risk.

So how did NORAD handle ROE on 9/11 and the days immediately following?






						NORAD Statement on 9-11 Commission Report Release
					

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. - North American Aerospace Defense Command officials expressed their gratitude for the effort of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States,



					www.norad.mil


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

Wiki notes seem to suggest that Air Sovereignty is an assistance to law enforcement task and that it is a sustained tasking.  It requires documented definitions of roles and procedures and compatible communications - apparently relatively cheap at 75 MUSD for the first fix.





> Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) preparedness[edit]​Background[edit]​*In January 1982, the FAA unveiled the National Airspace System (NAS) Plan.*
> 
> The plan called for more advanced systems for Air Traffic Control, and improvements in ground-to-air surveillance and communication with new Doppler Radars and better transponders. Better computers and software were developed, air route traffic control centers were consolidated, and the number of flight service stations reduced. There is *no overlap of responsibility between DoD and FAA within the NAS: this is why within FAA-controlled airspace the FAA is in charge of controlling and vectoring hijack intercept aircraft*.[1]
> 
> ...











						U.S. military response during the September 11 attacks - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Dude... I love the Gurkhas too, but they do have some limitations.



They have difficulty reaching the top shelf.


----------



## ArmyRick (15 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> I don't want to sound pedantic - like I've said, one can always change the law - but Aid of the Civil Power is a very specific constitutional provision contained within the NDA whereby the federal military power is deployed in support of and at the request of a provincial authority in the event of riots and disturbances of the peace which are beyond the ability of the province to control. The concept that you are building goes far beyond AoCP and is principally integrating provincial powers and personnel (for example under s 92 "Administration of Justice") with the federal authorities' s 91 powers and personnel (such as "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence" and "Sea Coasts and Fisheries")
> 
> 
> I think this is where the whole construct starts to fall apart. In the Coast Guard and search and rescue example, one can see the utility in transferring the DND resources (including budget) to the Coast Guard. The function can be done by a civilian agency already related with the task and there is little need in maintaining a military establishment for that role (some utility maybe but no need). I see a similar utility in centralizing all intelligence functions into a single agency even if there is no reduction in overall personnel or budgets. There are several other tasks that might benefit by such transfers as well. The 22 Wing/NAVCAN system, on the other hand, is one of interagency cooperation and not one of a transfer of PYs and responsibility or cost reductions.
> ...


 Certainly would like to see some of the unnecessary expenses trimmed. I don't think in the next 20-50 years there will be a economic boom.


----------



## ArmyRick (15 Nov 2021)

Czech_pivo said:


> As anyone thought about keeping the SOF but as for the regular army units, why can’t we contract this out to a brigade Gurkha’s and use the extra troops for a kick ass RCN and RCAF.


No.


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> No.


Spoilsport.   French Foreign Legion?


----------



## Czech_pivo (15 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Spoilsport.   French Foreign Legion?


Either one of them and pitch it was a new immigration policy that after 10yrs of service your granted CDN citizenship.


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

I'm not going to go into the whole use of force issue being raised here. Let's just leave it at the fact that use of force in domestic law enforcement operations is a different kettle of fish from military use of force and ROEs in the case of hostile foreign actions taking place within Canada and the military response against them. Its more than a subtle difference and quite complex and yet another reason why one shouldn't mix the roles of civil law enforcement agencies with those of a military force.



KevinB said:


> Honestly I see some fantastic ideas on a lot of these responses - so much so I am almost wanting to play with some hybrid combinations.
> A lot of things I hadn't focused on (and I cheated the system with contractors admittedly) that could be reworked - and several different paths forward could be used from various participants.



I've had the same thoughts. For me the biggest two areas that I'd like to see altered in the scenario are the moving all of the reserves to some civil defence force and not making them available for military service, the rather generous ability to acquire pretty much any equipment you want and not being involved in international operations. Essentially I'd like to deal with a major reduction in the annual costs of DND by the reduction of full-time pay packets.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> I'm not going to go into the whole use of force issue being raised here. Let's just leave it at the fact that use of force in domestic law enforcement operations is a different kettle of fish from military use of force and ROEs in the case of hostile foreign actions taking place within Canada and the military response against them. Its more than a subtle difference and quite complex and yet another reason why one shouldn't mix the roles of civil law enforcement agencies with those of a military force.



I'm not sure that we can divide things that cleanly when our enemies are choosing to fight us by all means available.  We can be met with military force employed by criminal gangs mixing Canadians, foreign civilians and foreign military in and out of uniform.  What laws do we follow then?

As I said before, I believe our future looks more like the 1885 Rebellion.  All over the world.  The last thing I expect these days is a stand up fight on even terms.

Edit:    Actually D&B may be our resident authority on hazy rules of engagement in a Civil-Military context.  50 years later and the courts are still busy, as are parliaments.


----------



## daftandbarmy (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Edit:    Actually D&B may be our resident authority on hazy rules of engagement in a Civil-Military context.  50 years later and the courts are still busy, as are parliaments.



ROE are only 'hazy' for the bad guys


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> I'm not sure that we can divide things that cleanly when our enemies are choosing to fight us by all means available.  We can be met with military force employed by criminal gangs mixing Canadians, foreign civilians and foreign military in and out of uniform.  What laws do we follow then?


Shoot, Shovel, ShutUp...




Kirkhill said:


> As I said before, I believe our future looks more like the 1885 Rebellion.  All over the world.  The last thing I expect these days is a stand up fight on even terms.


I would agree to a point, I think conflicts will start that way - the question will be at what point do they end.
   I believe we need to prepare for a full peer on peer conflict, mainly to dissuade our foes/competitors from the idea they can continue to escalate.


Kirkhill said:


> Edit:    Actually D&B may be our resident authority on hazy rules of engagement in a Civil-Military context.  50 years later and the courts are still busy, as are parliaments.


The 90's where some of the worst times for CF ROE, lots of TERRIBLE JAG Advice that was contrary to what the CCC allowed for self defense (more restrictive) and a lot of misunderstand of what self defense is in various CoC.
    The creation of JTF-2 actually significantly helped the entire CF figure out ROE IMHO - as the need for understanding the legalities/consequences/responsibilities of the application of lethal force inside Canada by a CF entity had to be understood - and that understanding eventually spread outside DHTC.


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> I've had the same thoughts. For me the biggest two areas that I'd like to see altered in the scenario are the moving all of the reserves to some civil defence force and not making them available for military service, the rather generous ability to acquire pretty much any equipment you want and not being involved in international operations. Essentially I'd like to deal with a major reduction in the annual costs of DND by the reduction of full-time pay packets.
> 
> 🍻



With a Regular Force of 30k - and 30k Reservists I started to redo my @ArmyRick  Napkin Force.
   My only major command change I made was the additional of an Expeditionary Force Command - and I put a 30/70 Armoured Bde under it, with the idea my other Commands would FG towards that as needed.
 My land Forces would be 30/70 Reg/Res Ratios - with the others being 70/30 or higher rates of Regulars.

Mainly to try to see what could be possible with a reduced force structure.


----------



## Haggis (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> The creation of JTF-2 actually significantly helped the entire CF figure out ROE IMHO - as the need for understanding the legalities/consequences/responsibilities of the application of lethal force inside Canada by a CF entity had to be understood - and that understanding eventually spread outside DHTC.


JTF-2 was born from and trained by the RCMP SERT, police officers who already had a pretty good handle on DOMOPS ROE.  The CF had a good understanding of OUTCAN ROE as we'd been playing that game since the 1970's in Cyprus.  The biggest challenge was making the bridge between the worlds and understanding that just because the ROE say you can shoot someone doesn't mean you _should_.

With the wholesale divestment of the Reserves and many other capabilities to the civilian sector and the ongoing militarization of civilian law enforcement in this scenario, I'm surprised that the Woke Party didn't table /pass some type of Posse Comitatus Act.


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> JTF-2 was born from and trained by the RCMP SERT, police officers who already had a pretty good handle on DOMOPS ROE.


Not exactly 100% - there where a bunch of folks who went to England to learn the trade from the Horses Mouth on top of that.
  Additionally SERT had some issues with some aspects of ROE that come with NLI HR missions.

Hostage Rescue is an area where a lot of LE Team have issues, especially if there are multiple hostage takers, because when you do make an entry - the goal isn't minimal use of force - the goal is to preserve the hostage lives - and neutralizing the threat of the hostage takers.
   There is zero attempt to resolve an encounter with less than lethal force once the entry goes dynamic.

That said the RCMP, OPP, and some Crown Prosecutors where superbly educational on how to articulate the rational for lethal force inside Canada.   I learned more from an OPP OIS Investigator and Crown in two days on the articulation of lethal force justification than any other period in my life - which includes dedicated courses on that, LE certification, and LE classes across this continent.




Haggis said:


> The CF had a good understanding of OUTCAN ROE as we'd been playing that game since the 1970's in Cyprus.  The biggest challenge was making the bridge between the worlds and understanding that just because the ROE say you can shoot someone doesn't mean you _should_.


I will disagree there entirely - Cyprus gave the CF the belief they knew what their where doing with ROE - how screwed up that was, was only really identified in FYR deployments - and Somalia.  I still believe to this day, that there are many members of the CAF who doesn't truly understand what self defense is, and what their legal rights are under that from an ROE standpoint.



Haggis said:


> With the wholesale divestment of the Reserves and many other capabilities to the civilian sector and the ongoing militarization of civilian law enforcement in this scenario, I'm surprised that the Woke Party didn't table /pass some type of Posse Comitatus Act.


Suspension of Disbelief - you need to accept the DS conditions


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> JTF-2 was born from and trained by the RCMP SERT, police officers who already had a pretty good handle on DOMOPS ROE. The CF had a good understanding of OUTCAN ROE as we'd been playing that game since the 1970's in Cyprus. The biggest challenge was making the bridge between the worlds and understanding that just because the ROE say you can shoot someone doesn't mean you _should_.


Shortly after being poured out of the School of Artillery as a freshly minted gun position officer, my regiment was sent off to the Octoberfest in Montreal. I recall standing in a hangar at St Hubert with around another 500 soldiers listening to a JAG officer at the front of the assemblage drone on for about 20 minutes with something most of us couldn't hear. It was a "what the f--- was that all about moment" for most of us. It seemed we'd just been briefed on the ROE. Our next stop was to draw live ammunition before hitting the streets. No soldiers cards, no meetings in small groups to discuss, no training - just 20 minutes of unintelligible droning on.



KevinB said:


> The 90's where some of the worst times for CF ROE, lots of TERRIBLE JAG Advice that was contrary to what the CCC allowed for self defense (more restrictive) and a lot of misunderstand of what self defense is in various CoC.


Believe it or not by the 1990's the whole ROE thing had improved a lot. At the end of the day, ROE are not a JAG thing; its a chain of command thing. After the - "shoot all the Commies you want" - 4 CMBG in Europe thing and entering into Yugoslavia, people started taking an interest. It was a bit of a confusing time as we had to deal with UN processes as much as Canadian ones and there was a long time debate within the various countries about the legality of using deadly force to protect property. 

It's important to remember at all times that ROE in every case below full out war, are as much a small "p" political and policy thing as a military thing. Very few soldiers on the ground are happy with ROE that have motives beyond the immediate situation he is facing. The soldier's "golden ticket" in every ROE is the self defence rule. Beyond that ROEs are carefully crafted by a committee to limit all out mayhem with the aim of not hamstringing the commander on the ground from accomplishing his mission ... and you know what I think about anything crafted by a committee in Ottawa. I also agree that all too often our CoC has trouble interpreting ROEs and prefers to err on the side of caution.

Sometimes what the grunt on the ground considers terrible legal advice is in fact an accurate explanation of the probable or possible legal consequences resulting from a particular action. Our leadership is not known for taking bold positions when the outcomes are questionable.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

NAVCanada/NORAD/Noble Eagle









						NAV CANADA NORAD’s Operation NOBLE EAGLE takes to the skies over Toronto
					

While this may sound like the start of a blockbuster movie, this was the scene that played out over Toronto on July 30, 2020 as part of a well orchestrated North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) training exercise.




					www.navcanada.ca
				






> As part of NAV CANADA’s ongoing readiness training, the company organised the drill with NORAD. During the exercise, NAV CANADA cleared the airspace over parts of Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area and coordinated with the Greater Toronto Airports AuthorityOpen a new window and military command and control units from the Royal Canadian Air ForceOpen a new window and United States Air ForceOpen a new window.
> 
> Erik Doucet, Manager of Military Coordination and Special Events at NAV CANADA, says these types of international training exercises are necessary to ensure seamlessly coordinated responses in the event of real aerospace threats.
> 
> ...



From the briefing book prepared for the incoming MND in 2020.






						Flipbook – Transition binder 2020 - Canada.ca
					

March 2020 - Proactive divulgation - Transition binder - Minister of National Defence




					www.canada.ca
				






> Operations requiring decisions​During your first 180 days in office, you will be asked to renew several key operations. You have the authority to extend some of these, but others will require Cabinet approval or concurrence from other Ministers.
> 
> 
> You may be required to make decision on ongoing operations such as *Operation NOBLE EAGLE*, which seeks to address asymmetric aerial threats within Canadian and US airspace. You are identified as the designated Engagement Authority/decision-maker if the Prime Minister is unavailable. Given the reactive nature of this operation, it is unlikely but possible that it could be triggered at any time.











						Operation Noble Eagle - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				





It would seem to me as if there is already an instituted, and practiced, Command and Control system in place amalgamating the civilian, non-governmental crown corporation NAVCan, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority,  NORAD, the RCAF and the USAF.  I wonder how difficult it would be to add a GBAD dimension to the in-place system?

And as Haggis and Kevin have pointed out JTF-2 was born on the civil-military fault-line.  No doubt the entirety of CANSOFCOM is well conditioned to working on this grey area both abroad and at home.




Edit

Greater Toronto Airport Authority









						Greater Toronto Airports Authority - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






NAS Airports



			Canadian Airports Council
		




			About Canada's Airports - Canadian Airports Council
		










						Airport Governance and Accountability - Canadian Airports Council
					





					canadasairports.ca
				






> Starting in 1992, the Government of Canada transferred the operations of Canada’s National Airports Systems Airports (those with more than 200,000 passengers annually and/or serving a national, provincial or territorial capital) to private nonshare capital corporations.
> 
> Today these locally-operated airport authorities are a Canadian success story, serving passengers in every part of the country and, since 1992, reinvesting over $25 billion into capital improvement programs.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

And I would note that all of the  CF's air traffic controllers are trained at the NAVCAN training facility in Cornwall under the auspices of the collocated Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Control Operations.



> *Nav Canada* (styled as *NAV CANADA*) is a privately run, not-for-profit corporation that owns and operates Canada's civil air navigation system (ANS). It was established in accordance with the _Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act_ (ANS Act).











						Nav Canada - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Just to put on record here, the operations and exercises in which the CAF is currently engaged.






						Current operations list - Canada.ca
					

Discover where the Canadian Armed Forces are currently deployed on operations in Canada, North America and around the world.




					www.canada.ca
				




Worthwhile considering how many of these will be reallocated or dissolved given the Woke Party constraints



> Canada and North America​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionFisheries PatrolsCanadian Armed Forces (CAF) support to help Fisheries and Oceans Canada monitor fishing vessels and enforce fishing regulations in the Atlantic Ocean. The CAF conducts ship and aircraft patrols with DFO officials on board. These are known as FISHPATS.Operation BOXTOPCAF mission to bring supplies to Canadian Forces Station Alert.Operation DRIFTNETCAF mission to stop drift netting and other forms of illegal fishing.Operation LASERCAF response to a worldwide pandemic situation.Operation LENTUSCAF response to forest fires, floods and natural disasters in Canada.Operation LIMPIDCAF mission to detect threats to Canada’s security as early as possible. The CAF keeps a routine watch over Canada’s air, maritime, land, space, and cyber domains. It also maintains a physical presence in some areas.Operation NANOOKCAF contribution to whole-of-government sovereignty patrols and security exercises. These are usually held in the high and eastern Arctic.Operation NEVUSCAF annual maintenance of the High Arctic Data Communications System. It takes place on Ellesmere Island.Operation PALACICAF support to the Parks Canada program to prevent avalanches from blocking land routes in Rogers Pass.Operation SABOTCAF support to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The mission is to help stop the illegal growing of marijuana in Canada.Operation VECTOROperation VECTOR is the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) support to the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial governments for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.Search and RescueThe CAF has the main responsibility in Canada for providing search and rescue (SAR) from the air. It also coordinates the national response for air and maritime SAR.National Sentry ProgramThe National Sentry Program reinforces Canada’s commitment to remember and honour those Canadians who served in the major wars of the twentieth century, including both World Wars, as well as those who have contributed to Canada’s long-standing tradition of military excellence through to the present day.





> Central and South America​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation CARIBBECAF support to U.S.-led Enhanced Counter-narcotics operations. CAF sends ships and aircraft to help stop trafficking by organized crime. The operation takes place in the Caribbean basin and the eastern Pacific Ocean.





> Europe​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation DISTINCTIONOperation DISTINCTION supports the Government of Canada’s Military History Commemoration Program to complement and enhance Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) selected ceremonies and commemorative events.Operation IGNITIONCAF periodic role in a NATO security mission for Iceland. Mission involves airborne surveillance and interception.Operation ILLUMINATIONCAF support to Iceland while their country’s air surveillance radars underwent scheduled maintenance and upgrades.Operation KOBOLDCAF contribution to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).Operation OPEN SPIRITCAF role to help clear explosive remnants of war in the Baltic Sea. A number of other countries take part. The annual mission is hosted by the three Baltic nations.Operation REASSURANCECAF support to NATO’s defence and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe.Operation SNOWGOOSECAF role in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).Operation UNIFIERCAF military training and capacity-building operation in Ukraine.





> Africa​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation EDIFICE-TunisiaOnce a year, the CAF conducts combined training with the Tunisian Navy.Operation CROCODILECAF role in supporting the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.Operation FREQUENCECAF strategic airlift support to France between France and the Sahel region of Africa.Operation NABERIUSCAF mission in Niger to train the Forces armées nigériennesOperation PRESENCEThe CAF’s contribution to the Government of Canada’s peace operations strategy.Operation PROJECTIONThe CAF operates in maritime enviroments around the world to improve peace and stability.Operation SOPRANOCAF role in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).





> Middle East​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation ARTEMISCAF maritime security and counter-terrorism operations in the Arabian Sea.Operation CALUMETCAF role in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt.Operation FOUNDATIONCAF role in United States Central Command Headquarters, United States Air Forces Central Headquarters, and Combined Maritime Forces Headquarters.Operation IMPACTCAF role in the international coalition to assist local security forces who are fighting against Daesh in the Republic of Iraq and in Syria.Operation JADECAF role in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).Operation PROTEUSCAF role in the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator to build security capacity in the Palestinian Authority.





> Indo-Pacific​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation AEGISOperation AEGIS is the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) contribution to the Government of Canada’s effort to evacuate Afghans with significant and/or enduring relationship with the Government of Canada, along with their accompanying family members.Operation NEONOperation NEON is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea.Operation PROJECTIONThe CAF operates in maritime environments around the world to improve peace and stability.Operation RENDER SAFECAF role to help Australia clear explosive remnants of war in the Solomon Islands.Operation DRIFTNETCAF support to Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The mission was to help enforce the global moratorium on high-seas driftnet fishing.





> Around the world​
> 
> 
> NameDescriptionOperation GLOBECAF members are sometimes asked to help other Government of Canada departments with various tasks. When these tasks involve working outside of Canada, CAF members deploy under Operation GLOBE.Operation PROJECTIONThe CAF operates in maritime environments around the world to improve peace and stability.Operation RENAISSANCEThe Canadian Armed Forces responds to international emergencies.Operation VECTOROperation VECTOR is the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) support to the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial governments for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

> Joint Military Exercises​
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Which ones get handed off to the Civil Defence Force?  Dissolved?  Retained?


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Starting to turn my attention to the RCAF.






						redirect
					






					www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca
				






> Fourteen wings are located across Canada, from Gander, Newfoundland, to Comox, British Columbia. The Wings conduct Air Force operations under the direction of 1 Canadian Air Division/CANR.  Ten Wings also include a Canadian Forces Base along with other operational and support units.



1 Canadian Air Division



> 1 Wing KingstonThe home of the Griffon and Chinook helicopters. It provides airlift support of troops and equipment anywhere in the world. Its seven tactical helicopter and training squadrons are spread out across the country.2 Wing BagotvilleThe Royal Canadian Air Force’s air expeditionary wing, a formation able to rapidly deploy as a self-contained unit, employing air power and providing associated support wherever needed, across Canada or around the world.3 Wing BagotvilleLocated in Quebec's Saguenay region. It provides general purpose, multi-role, combat capable forces in support of domestic and international roles of Canada's Air Force. It also provides search and rescue missions.4 Wing Cold LakeThe busiest fighter base in Canada. It provides general purpose, multi-role, combat capable forces in support of domestic and international roles of Canada's Air Force. Home of fighter pilot training for the Canadian Forces, 4 Wing attracts Top Gun crews from all over the world to our annual air combat exercise, Maple Flag.5 Wing Goose BayThe mission of 5 Wing Goose Bay is to conduct NORAD and other Canadian Armed Forces operations. As the Eastern gateway to the Canadian Arctic, its strategic location enables 5 Wing to play a key role in protecting the sovereignty of Canada and in the air defence of North America. Their location and the challenging airspace and terrain on and above Labrador and Quebec also allows 5 Wing Goose Bay to offer an outstanding environment for the conduct of joint and combined training for the Canadian Armed Forces, NATO partners and our allies.8 Wing TrentonThe hub of Canada's air mobility forces - from delivering supplies to the high Arctic (Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert) to airlifting troops and equipment worldwide. It is also responsible for search and rescue in central Canada and home to the famous Skyhawks with the Canadian Parachute Centre.9 Wing GanderHome of the 103 Search and Rescue (SAR) Squadron, providing full-time SAR services to Newfoundland and Labrador. When a call for help comes in, SAR crews at 9 Wing Gander are ready to head out in any direction from their base in Canada's most easterly province, Newfoundland.12 Wing ShearwaterThe centre of naval aviation in Canada. Home of the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, 12 Wing supports the Navy with up to nine helicopter air detachments for international and domestic operations.14 Wing GreenwoodNestled in the heart of Nova Scotia's beautiful Annapolis Valley. Aurora crews conduct sovereignty and surveillance missions over the Atlantic Ocean routinely, while search and rescue capabilities are maintained 365 days of the year.15 Wing Moose JawThe site of the new NATO Flying Training Program in Canada (NFTC). This southern Saskatchewan town is also home to the Snowbirds, Canada's world famous aerobatic team.16 Wing BordenThe "Birthplace of the RCAF." The largest training Wing in the Canadian Forces, 16 Wing's schools offer air force technical training and professional development.17 Wing WinnipegComprises three squadrons and six schools. It also provides support to the Central Flying School. All combined, 17 Wing turns out what are considered some of the best air navigators and multi-skilled personnel in the world. For Canadian air force personnel, all roads will lead to 17 Wing Winnipeg.19 Wing ComoxBased on Vancouver Island. Its Aurora crews keep watch over the Pacific Ocean while its search and rescue teams regularly locate downed Aircraft in some of Canada's roughest terrain while another squadron helps train fighter pilots in tactical procedures.22 Wing North BayAlso known as the Canadian Air Defence Sector (CADS), is responsible for providing surveillance, identification, control and warning for the aerospace defence of Canada and North America at the Sector Air Operations Centre.





2 Canadian Air Division






						redirect
					






					www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca
				






> The Commander of 2 CAD is accountable to the Commander of the RCAF and provides:
> 
> 
> Oversight of RCAF individual education and training, including ab-initio training for most RCAF occupations,
> ...





> The formations under the Commander of 2 CAD include 15 Wing Moose Jaw, 16 Wing Borden and 17 Wing Winnipeg. In addition, the Canadian Forces Aircrew Selection Centre located in Trenton, ON also reports directly to the Commander of 2 CAD.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

1 Canadian Air Div Wings



> 1 Wing (Tactical Helicopters - CH-146 and CH-147)
> 
> 400 Tactical Helicopter Squadron
> 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron
> ...





> 2 Wing (Air Expeditionary Wing - non-flying)
> 
> 2 Mission Support Squadron
> 2 Air Expeditionary Training Squadron
> ...





> 3 Wing (NORAD - CF-188 and CH-146)
> 
> 
> 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...





> 4 Wing (NORAD - CF-188, CH-146 and CT-155)
> 
> 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...





> 5 Wing (NORAD - CH-146)
> 
> 
> 444 Combat Support Squadron
> ...





> 8 Wing (Transport - CC-144, CC-150, CC-177, CC-130J, CC-130H, CC-138, CH-146, King Air BE350)
> 
> Canadian Forces Station Alert, Nunavut
> 412 Transport Squadron (at Ottawa)
> ...





> 9 Wing (SAR - CH-149)
> 
> 103 Search and Rescue Squadron
> 9 Wing Air Reserve Flight
> Air Reserve Flight Detachment Torbay





> 12 Wing (Maritime Helicopters - CH-148)
> 
> 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron
> 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron
> ...





> 14 Wing (Coastal - CP-140, CC-130J, CC-130, CC-295, CH-149)
> 
> 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron
> 405 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> ...





> 19 Wing (Coastal - CP-140, CC-130H, CC-285, CH-149, (CC-115))
> 
> 407 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> 418 Search and Rescue Operational Training Squadron
> ...





> 22 Wing (NORAD - non-flying)
> 
> 21 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron
> 51 Aerospace Control and Warning Operational Training Squadron
> ...



2 Canadian Air Div Wings



> 15 Wing  (Training - CT-114, CT-155, CT-156, Grob 120A, C-90B, Bell 412 CF, CH-139)
> 
> 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Moose Jaw, SK)
> 3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Portage la Prairie, MB)
> ...





> 16 Wing (Training - non-flying)
> 
> Royal Canadian Air Force Academy
> Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering
> ...





> 17 Wing (Training - CT-142)
> 
> 
> 402 Squadron
> ...


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Getting granular

1 Canadian Air Div Wings



> 22 Wing (NORAD - non-flying)
> 
> 21 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron
> 51 Aerospace Control and Warning Operational Training Squadron
> ...





> 3 Wing (NORAD - CF-188 and CH-146)
> 
> 
> 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...





> 4 Wing (NORAD - CF-188, CH-146 and CT-155)
> 
> 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...







> 8 Wing (Transport - CC-144, CC-150, CC-177, CC-130J, CC-130H, CC-138, CH-146, King Air BE350)
> 
> Canadian Forces Station Alert, Nunavut
> 412 Transport Squadron (at Ottawa)
> ...





> 1 Wing (Tactical Helicopters - CH-146 and CH-147)
> 
> 400 Tactical Helicopter Squadron
> 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron
> ...





> 12 Wing (Maritime Helicopters - CH-148)
> 
> 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron
> 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron
> ...





> 14 Wing (Coastal - CP-140, CC-130J, CC-130, CC-295, CH-149)
> 
> 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron
> 405 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> ...





> 19 Wing (Coastal - CP-140, CC-130H, CC-285, CH-149, (CC-115))
> 
> 407 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> 418 Search and Rescue Operational Training Squadron
> ...




2 Canadian Air Div Wings



> 15 Wing  (Training - CT-114, CT-155, CT-156, Grob 120A, C-90B, Bell 412 CF, CH-139)
> 
> 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Moose Jaw, SK)
> 3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Portage la Prairie, MB)
> ...





> 16 Wing (Training - non-flying)
> 
> Royal Canadian Air Force Academy
> Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering
> ...





> 17 Wing (Training - CT-142)
> 
> 
> 402 Squadron
> ...





> 5 Wing (NORAD - CH-146)
> 
> 
> 444 Combat Support Squadron
> ...





> 9 Wing (SAR - CH-149)
> 
> 103 Search and Rescue Squadron
> 9 Wing Air Reserve Flight
> Air Reserve Flight Detachment Torbay









Dissolved Wings (Non-Expeditionary Force)



> 2 Wing (Air Expeditionary Wing - non-flying)
> 
> 2 Mission Support Squadron
> 2 Air Expeditionary Training Squadron
> ...


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Redistribution of Squadrons

1 Canadian Air Div ( 8 Wings, 35 Squadrons) 43 elements to be retained for Ordnance Canada.  OTUs to be retained in Ordnance Canada.  

Preliminary training to be conducted under the Civil Defence Force auspices.

With experience may apply for Ordnance Canada and the RCAF.



NORAD



> 22 Wing (NORAD - non-flying)
> 
> 21 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron
> 51 Aerospace Control and Warning Operational Training Squadron
> Detachment 2, First Air Force (United States Air Force)





> 3 Wing (NORAD - CF-188)
> 
> 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> 433 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...





> 4 Wing (NORAD - CF-188)
> 
> 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron
> ...





> 14 Wing (Coastal - CP-140)
> 
> 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron
> 405 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> ...





> 19 Wing (Coastal - CP-140)
> 
> 407 Long Range Patrol Squadron
> 19 Air Maintenance Squadron





Co-Operation with the "Army"





> 8 Wing (Transport - CC-144, CC-150, CC-177, CC-130J)
> 
> 412 Transport Squadron (at Ottawa)
> 429 Transport Squadron
> ...





> 1 Wing (Tactical Helicopters - CH-146 and CH-147)
> 
> 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron
> 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron
> ...





Co-Operation with the RCN





> 12 Wing (Maritime Helicopters - CH-148)
> 
> 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron
> 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron
> ...








2  Canadian Air Div  (3 Wings, 10 Bases, 5 FOLs, 11 Schools, AETE, 12 Transport and Rescue squadrons, 14 Reserve flights and squadrons, 5 Reserve Construction Engineering  flights and squadrons)

61 elements to be transferred to the Civil Defence Force
19 Reserve
42 Regular




> 15 Wing





> 16 Wing





> 17 Wing




Royal Canadian Air Force Academy
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Control Operations (at Cornwall)
RCAF Barker College (formerly CFSAS)
2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Moose Jaw, SK)
3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (Portage la Prairie, MB)
426 Transport Training Squadron
Multi-Engine Utility Flight
Canadian Forces School of Search and Rescue (at Comox)
Canadian Forces School of Survival and Aeromedical Training (CFSSAT)


Forward Operating Location Iqaluit
Forward Operating Location Inuvik
Forward Operating Location Yellowknife
Forward Operating Location Goose Bay
Canadian Forces Station Alert, Nunavut


15 Air Traffic Control
431 Air Demonstration Squadron (CF Snowbirds) (Moose Jaw, SK)
439 Combat Support Squadron
417 Combat Support Squadron
424 Transport and Rescue Squadron
440 Transport Squadron (at Yellowknife)
413 Transport and Rescue Squadron
435 Transport and Rescue Squadron (Winnipeg)
442 Transport and Rescue Squadron
444 Combat Support Squadron
103 Search and Rescue Squadron
418 Search and Rescue Operational Training Squadron


22 Wing Air Reserve Flight
3 Wing Air Reserve Flight
4 Wing Air Reserve Flight
5 Wing Air Reserve Flight
8 Wing Air Reserve Flight
9 Wing Air Reserve Flight
12 Wing Air Reserve Flight
14 Wing Air Reserve Flight
16 Wing Air Reserve Flight
17 Wing Air Reserve Flight
19 Wing Air Reserve Flight
Air Reserve Flight Detachment Torbay
400 Tactical Helicopter Squadron
438 Tactical Helicopter Squadron


14 Construction Engineering Squadron (at Bridgewater)
91 Construction Engineering Flight (at Gander)
143 Construction Engineering Flight (at Lunenburg)
144 Construction Engineering Flight (at Pictou)
192 Construction Engineering Flight (Abbotsford)

Dissolved Wings (Non-Expeditionary Force)



> 2 Wing (Air Expeditionary Wing - non-flying)
> 
> 2 Mission Support Squadron
> 2 Air Expeditionary Training Squadron
> ...



41 Regular squadrons and wings going to the Civil Defence Force with 2 Cdn Air Div

43 Regular squadrons and wings being retained by Ordnance Canada

The RCAF being defined by its ability to apply force, only the Ordance Canada element will continue as the RCAF.

The Civil Defence Elements are outside the purview of the CDS and this exercise.

The current RCAF has a total payroll of

1518 Civilians
1969 Reserves
12,074 Regulars

The Civilians will transfer to the Civil Defence Force, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The Reserves will transfer to the Civil Defence Force

50% of the Regulars (41/84) will transfer to the Civil Defence Force

Ordnance Canada will retain 6,074 Regulars for the RCAF.


Public Safety and the Civil Defence Force will be responsible for maintaining and operation all airbases and forward operating locations in conjunction with NAVCAN and NORAD.

AETE to be transferred to the National Research Council.


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Believe it or not by the 1990's the whole ROE thing had improved a lot.


That's concerning.


FJAG said:


> At the end of the day, ROE are not a JAG thing; its a chain of command thing. After the - "shoot all the Commies you want" - 4 CMBG in Europe thing and entering into Yugoslavia, people started taking an interest. It was a bit of a confusing time as we had to deal with UN processes as much as Canadian ones and there was a long time debate within the various countries about the legality of using deadly force to protect property.


The JAG does give legal advice to the CoC though.   Some of that advice has been absolutely deplorable.



FJAG said:


> It's important to remember at all times that ROE in every case below full out war, are as much a small "p" political and policy thing as a military thing. Very few soldiers on the ground are happy with ROE that have motives beyond the immediate situation he is facing. The soldier's "golden ticket" in every ROE is the self defence rule. Beyond that ROEs are carefully crafted by a committee to limit all out mayhem with the aim of not hamstringing the commander on the ground from accomplishing his mission ... and you know what I think about anything crafted by a committee in Ottawa. I also agree that all too often our CoC has trouble interpreting ROEs and prefers to err on the side of caution.


Everyone still has the right to Self Defense - at times, the CoC, the UN etc all where failing miserably in that - and the explanation of what that actually allowed soldiers to do.


FJAG said:


> Sometimes what the grunt on the ground considers terrible legal advice is in fact an accurate explanation of the probable or possible legal consequences resulting from a particular action. Our leadership is not known for taking bold positions when the outcomes are questionable.
> 
> 🍻


Consider this scenario:   Circa 1994-5
   Hostile Individual shoots at you -- turn to run (still with weapon).
I actually had a CF Maj (JAG) tell me it was unlawful to shoot that person, because their back was turned, and we could only engage if he turned around and was shooting at us again.
  I had a Capt (PPCLI) actually think the JAG was correct. 
**Neither appreciated my acerbic comments, or questioning the validity of the JAG's LLB...
Additionally neither could explain what was wrong when I told them I could shoot that guy in Canada under Self Defence provisions of the CCC, I'm so going to blast him into next week in XYZ country, other than "the ROE doesn't allow for that".

 IMHO the JAG's Office often tends to look for the most restrictive interpretations - as opposed to the lawful options.

While the soldier on the ground just needs to know what his left and right of arc are.
    When overly restrictive policies that make no sense are put into place - people step outside those - but when you create a culture of stepping outside - bad things follow.

The JAG's office also gave incorrect advice on the use of OTM ammunition for snipers and sharp shooters in 2004-2006 saying it was prohibited under the LOAC, without seeing that it was already approved in other parts of the CF, and coalition forces.

I have some other interesting tidbits - but I'll save those for over a beer


----------



## QV (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> That's concerning.
> 
> The JAG does give legal advice to the CoC though.   Some of that advice has been absolutely deplorable.
> 
> ...



Agree. Reminds me of a use of force scenario for LE where the perp arrives at an apartment with a rifle and states he's going up to kill his spouse then starts walking towards the apartment door. The DS answer was to shoot him in the back before he got to the door.  AIM was met, he had the ability, intent, and means to carry out the murder and once he got in the apartment the door would lock behind him which would delay police ability to stop the threat inside.  

In your scenario the bad guy may turn his back momentarily, but he is likely just moving to take up another fire position. So threat of death or GBH is always there.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are.  I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government.  Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Back to the Napkin Army for a moment  and trying to do for the Navy what was attempted with the Air Force

The RCN payroll

4000 Civilians
3700 Reservists
8500 Regulars

Civilians transferred out to Public Safety, PSPC and the Civil Defence Force.
Reservists transferred out to the Civil Defence force taking with them their MCDVs and their 564 sea berths.

8500 Regulars retained by Ordnance Canada for the RCN



MCDVVessels12​Crew47​Reserves564​OrcaVessels8​Crew5​Reserves40​Ttl Res604​iAORVessels1​Crew150​Regulars150​CPFVessels12​Crew225​Regulars2700​SSKVessels4​Crew53​Regulars212​Ttl Regs3062​CSCVessels9​Crew157​Regulars1413​AOPSVessels6​Crew65​Regulars390​T218SGVessels12​Crew28​Regulars336​Ttl Res2139​

Current fleet (iAOR/CPF/SSK) assigns 3062 of the 8500 Regulars to sea-berths.

Proposed fleet (CSC/AOPS/SSK-T218) assigns 2139 Regulars to sea-berths, including allowances for rotations.

2139 is 70% of 3062 or 923 berths fewer.

At the very least I should be able to reduce the RCN by 923 from 8500 to 7600 or so.

Being agressive I could reduce the 8500 to 70% or 6000 or so.

If I took the aggressive route 

That would leave me with an RCN of 6000
From the RCAF reckoning an RCAF of 6000 

Between the RCN and the RCAF that eats up 12,000 of Rick's 15,000

With the remaining 3,000 I have just enough to retain the CANSOFCOM of 2500 
And a conjoint RCE/RCA Corps of 500.

Total Force

RCN 6000
RCAF 6000
CANSOFCOM Fusiliers 2500
RCE/RCA 500

Total 15,000


RCMP and the Civil Defence Force (Rangers, Militia, Reserves) Coast Guard with SAR Assets under command responsible for the Security and Emergency Management.


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are.  I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government.  Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.


I was only following Orders hasn't worked since Nuremberg...
   The onus gets put down onto the Soldier for knowledge if the order is lawful or not...


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Actually I can thin out CANSOFCOM a bit more by transferring CJIRU to the Civil Defence Force and removing 427 SOAS as I have already counted it under 1 Wing of the RCAF.

Without knowing those numbers I am going to suggest a combined 500 PYs.

Total Force

RCN - 6000
RCAF - 6000
CANSOFCOM - 2000
RCE/RCA - 1000


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I was only following Orders hasn't worked since Nuremberg...
> The onus gets put down onto the Soldier for knowledge if the order is lawful or not...



Seen and understood.

Again though, what is the point of the Commission?

Personally I think that Nuremberg was an exceptional circumstance that made bad law.

The whole point of being a trusted Lieutenant of Her Majesty is that you are in place to represent her and manage the situation in a manner with which she would concur.  It originates in an amorphous world with no borders where the Lieutenant, riding under Her Majesty's banner, applied Her laws as he saw fit.  And was personally accountable for the interpretation.  

The soldiery under him were subject to his control and discipline.

I appreciate that Nuremberg moved the world on past that.  I am not convinced that it was an unalloyed good.


----------



## Good2Golf (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Not exactly 100% - there where a bunch of folks who went to England to learn the trade from the Horses Mouth on top of that.
> Additionally SERT had some issues with some aspects of ROE that come with NLI HR missions.


Yup.  There were definitely some funny accents in the 92-93-94 timeframe (and one in particular that stayed longer…)


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Seen and understood.
> 
> Again though, what is the point of the Commission?
> 
> ...


I think the world has come a long way (or some parts of it) since Feudal Knights and Officer Nobility, and the unwashed peasants for troops.
  We (as Civilized westerners) have come to expect that people are (mostly) responsible for their actions - and that checks and balances need to occur, as not everyone is infallible.   Issue like this needed to be viewed from the totality of circumstance to see if the action was reasonable or not, and if the order was lawful (or not).

 As a young boy I read about the Mỹ Lai 4 (and Mỹ Khe 4) massacre, it was clear then that Command Guidance cannot be viewed as absolute, and individual soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions when they stray off the accepted Rules of Land Warfare.








Good2Golf said:


> Yup.  There were definitely some funny accents in the 92-93-94 timeframe (and one in particular that stayed longer…)


A Lot longer IIRC


----------



## lenaitch (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> That said the RCMP, OPP, and some Crown Prosecutors where superbly educational on how to articulate the rational for lethal force inside Canada.   I learned more from an OPP OIS Investigator and Crown in two days on the articulation of lethal force justification than any other period in my life - which includes dedicated courses on that, LE certification, and LE classes across this continent.


And therein lies one of the ongoing challenges.  Training in 'articulable cause'; knowing your grounds and being able to justify them to whomever needs them justified' remains a challenge in law enforcement.  It's not limited to specialty team or use of lethal force, but extends to road members exercising their various authorities on  day-to-day basis.  At least specialty teams work and train in cohesive teams generally get to brief. first.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I think the world has come a long way (or some parts of it) since Feudal Knights and Officer Nobility, and the unwashed peasants for troops.
> We (as Civilized westerners) have come to expect that people are (mostly) responsible for their actions - and that checks and balances need to occur, as not everyone is infallible.   Issue like this needed to be viewed from the totality of circumstance to see if the action was reasonable or not, and if the order was lawful (or not).
> 
> As a young boy I read about the Mỹ Lai 4 (and Mỹ Khe 4) massacre, it was clear then that Command Guidance cannot be viewed as absolute, and individual soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions when they stray off the accepted Rules of Land Warfare.
> ...



The difference, Kevin, is that every member of the regiment of dragoons known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is warranted as a Constable as is every other Law Enforcement Officer in Canada.  Note the Officer reference. That puts them in the same space, based on my historical understanding, as Warrant Officers like CSMs and RSMs and Commissioned Officers.  All of them act in lieu of the Crown.

The private soldier never signed on for that responsibility.  And doesn't get paid to take on that responsibility.  He gets paid to act in support of the Warranted and Commissioned Officers.


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> The difference, Kevin, is that every member of the regiment of dragoons known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is warranted as a Constable as is every other Law Enforcement Officer in Canada.  Note the Officer reference. That puts them in the same space, based on my historical understanding, as Warrant Officers like CSMs and RSMs and Commissioned Officers.  All of them act in lieu of the Crown.
> 
> The private soldier never signed on for that responsibility.  And doesn't get paid to take on that responsibility.  He gets paid to act in support of the Warranted and Commissioned Officers.


Maybe in 1914 - or even 1960, but these are the days of the Strategic Corporal - and a Privates actions will be judged regardless of whom they are commanded by.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

I know they will.  

But I don't know that that is a good thing.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

If they are going to do that perhaps they should be commissioning privates.  Or making lieutenant or warrant the lowest rank.

For historical consistency.


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> That's concerning.
> 
> The JAG does give legal advice to the CoC though.   Some of that advice has been absolutely deplorable.


Law isn't always black and white


KevinB said:


> Everyone still has the right to Self Defense -


Yes they do


KevinB said:


> at times, the CoC, the UN etc all where failing miserably in that - and the explanation of what that actually allowed soldiers to do.


The thing about orders is that right or wrong, they are orders and unless they are telling you to do something that is patently unlawful, you are bound to obey them. In short, you are only allowed to do what you are ordered as being allowed to do  and not what you think you are allowed to do.


KevinB said:


> Consider this scenario:   Circa 1994-5
> Hostile Individual shoots at you -- turn to run (still with weapon).
> I actually had a CF Maj (JAG) tell me it was unlawful to shoot that person, because their back was turned, and we could only engage if he turned around and was shooting at us again.
> I had a Capt (PPCLI) actually think the JAG was correct.
> **Neither appreciated my acerbic comments, or questioning the validity of the JAG's LLB...


The point here is that when he is running away you are no longer in a self defence mode and there were (and still can be) ROEs that only allow engagement when the individual is actually committing a hostile act like shooting at you. Once the act ceases the permission to engage under the ROE also ceases. (its a bit similar to cops not being allowed to shoot a fleeing suspect/perpetrator in the back)

The trouble that many soldiers have is understanding where in the full war scenario killing any enemy who is not actually surrendering is perfectly permissible while with a lower than full war scenario where deliberate limitations are put in place for whatever reason the CoC sees fit.


KevinB said:


> Additionally neither could explain what was wrong when I told them I could shoot that guy in Canada under Self Defence provisions of the CCC, I'm so going to blast him into next week in XYZ country, other than "the ROE doesn't allow for that".


Actually you couldn't once the individual disengages and is running away. I'll let a LEO answer that one.


KevinB said:


> IMHO the JAG's Office often tends to look for the most restrictive interpretations - as opposed to the lawful options.


All Leg Os are people who interpret things with their own bias. I know some timid Leg Os and I know a whole bunch who are very pragmatic when it comes to balancing competing interests in their advice.


KevinB said:


> While the soldier on the ground just needs to know what his left and right of arc are.


The ROE are your left and right of arcs.


KevinB said:


> When overly restrictive policies that make no sense are put into place - people step outside those - but when you create a culture of stepping outside - bad things follow.


Sometimes perfectly reasonable things make no sense to some people. 


KevinB said:


> The JAG's office also gave incorrect advice on the use of OTM ammunition for snipers and sharp shooters in 2004-2006 saying it was prohibited under the LOAC, without seeing that it was already approved in other parts of the CF, and coalition forces.


I'm not familiar with this opinion even though I was in Ottawa at that time. I can see where the term "Open Tip Match" can get confused with "hollow point". I've seen it considered legal and non legal for both military and hunting purposes in different circumstances. The Hague Convention prohibits "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." Personally I wouldn't form any opinion on it until I've seen terminal impact effects studies on it (which I haven't) in order to determine if it falls inside or outside the prohibition. I can see where its high level of accuracy would make it a very desirable round for snipers.

Whether a round is acceptable to coalition forces is informative but not determinative. If it had previously been approved within DND, that's another thing although its not unknown that requests can come from separate sources and be handled by two different Leg Os. Differing opinions shouldn't happen but I can see it happening especially if there has been a time interval and the usual posting shuffle has moved folks around.


KevinB said:


> I have some other interesting tidbits - but I'll save those for over a beer


I'd like that. I prefer a good Pilsner. You could probably help me out a lot with some of the novels I write. With luck I'll get back down to the States when this plague is more under control.

🍻


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are.  I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government.  Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.


Superior orders defences have been dealt with extensively in war crimes law in many jurisdictions. In Canada the definitve statement comes from R v Finta as follows:



> The defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer defence are available to members of the military or police forces in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Those defences are subject to the manifest illegality test:  the defences are not available where the orders in question were manifestly unlawful.  Even where the orders were manifestly unlawful, the defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer defence will be available in those circumstances where the accused had no moral choice as to whether to follow the orders.  There can be no moral choice where there was such an air of compulsion and threat to the accused that he or she had no alternative but to obey the orders.



Whether or not there was a sufficient "air of compulsion and threat" is a question of fact in the particular circumstances.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Superior orders defences have been dealt with extensively in war crimes law in many jurisdictions. In Canada the definitve statement comes from R v Finta as follows:
> 
> 
> 
> ...




Thanks FJAG.  Is there case law managing the issue of imminence or timeliness?  In a fast moving environment it seems to me instinct, training, and muscle memory are likely to have as much, if not more, impact than rational calculation.


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks FJAG.  Is there case law managing the issue of imminence or timeliness?  In a fast moving environment it seems to me instinct, training, and muscle memory are likely to have as much, if not more, impact than rational calculation.


Killing someone (likely a non combatant) in a situation of imminence or instinct is separate issue from killing a non combatant deliberately as a result of an illegal order.

There is case law on both issues but I've long ago gotten rid of my material. I think for most of us westerners the My Lai massacre is probably one of the most demonstrative examples. It is a bit confusing because of the coverups prosecutions came a long time after most of the perpetrators were out of the military (draftees) and there was no jurisdiction at the time to try them. The Matchee/Brown murder case law is fairly well reported and available.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

Back to Ordnance Canada's Royal Canadian Air Force

Now that we have got rid of the Rif RAF the RCAF's 6000 are responsible for the following fleets:

In support of the RCN - 12 Wing and its CH-148s







In support of the Army (aka the CANSOFCOM Fusiliers and the RCE/RCA) - 1 and 8 Wings with their motley assortment of CH-146, CH-147, CC-130J, CC-177, CC-150, CC-144






















And finally, in support of NORAD and Northcom - 22, 3, 4, 14 and 19 Wings and their CF-188s and CP-140s.









The RCN and Army Co-Op inventory I would leave alone just now.

The NORAD inventory is where I would focus my attention.

And just to sweeten the pot I would add the RPAS project to the NORAD issue


We have, I believe, 76 CF-188s and 14 CP-140s.  

Although the emphasis is on the Hornets I would be focusing on the RPAS and the Auroras.

The 14 Auroras should be turned into a mixed fleet of P8 Poseidons and E7 Wedgetails and the numbers increased somewhat to something like 18 total, 12 Poseidons and 6 Wedgetails perhaps.    The Poseidons not only function as patrol and surveillance platforms but also as missile trucks over land and sea for missiles like Harpoons, SLAM-ERs and JSMs as well as torpedoes and other underwater weapons and sensors.

The Wedgetail is interesting in that it is unarmed and so could be considered and intelligence asset and thus a civilian asset and outside of the 15,000 limit.  But I decided to keep it inside the limit because of the airframe commonality with the Poseidon and the relatively small crew numbers, together with the tactical command and control platform it offers.










Similarly the RPAS project could be a civilian intelligence project if it was unarmed.  It might be possible to consider splitting the fleet after the fashion of the AOPS/MPV split between the RCN and the CCG.  In which case there might be a case made for the STOL Gray Eagle variant that can be launched and recovered from 800 ft gravel strips while carrying up to 16 Hellfires.









						General Atomics Is Secretly Flying a New, Heavily Armed Drone
					

The new yet-unnamed drone can carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles at a time — double the load of an MQ-1C Gray Eagle. DUBAI: General Atomics has built and flown a prototype of a deadly new drone wi




					www.realcleardefense.com
				





Beyond that I become really confused as to where the RCAF ends and the RCA begins

It is bad enough when aircraft deploy missiles, loitering attack munitions and UAVs (or even UUVs) but what are we supposed to make of Optionally Manned Hornets and these?  UTAP-22 Mako - 1400 NM range




How does that differ materially from these?  Nemesis NSM - 100 NM






Or these?  PrSM (not MLRS  - HiMARs with PrSM) - >250 NM








All of which deliver munitions to a designated target like an aircraft, but could be launched from any of the 45 fixed installations associated with the airport and harbour defences.  (And that is as close to cheating as I am going to get GR66).


As for the F-35s to replace the Hornets.  I still see jobs for then as Multi-Role Combat Aircraft.  Both as missile trucks in the Air-to-Air, Air-to-Surface and Air-to-Ground modes as well as Recce assets over land and water.  Perhaps matched with unmanned Hornets and Valkyries


----------



## dimsum (16 Nov 2021)

First, the CP-140 flies more in support of the RCN than for NORAD/NORTHCOM.  It's an ASW platform that also does ISR, and realistically that ISR mission only started in Afghanistan.  Depending on nation, those types of aircraft are either operated by their air forces or navies.

Second, the RCAF RPAS will be armed.

Finally, RCAF is in charge of the space domain.  It doesn't launch anything (yet) but it's definitely critical for operations.

Re:  The dividing line between RCAF and arty - I don't see a split.  Cruise missiles/HIMARS/etc can be arty.  Similarly, the RCN CSC is supposed to carry Tomahawks.  I don't think any of those conflict with the RCAF's roles.  

Edit to add:  I personally see the RCAF dealing with things that fly (and are supposed to return).  Of course, with the CA/RCN/SOF flying small-ish UAS, that vision is a bit skewed, but I don't think that every ship or troop needs an RCAF SUAS operator detachment.


----------



## Haggis (16 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Not exactly 100% - there where a bunch of folks who went to England to learn the trade from the Horses Mouth on top of that.
> Additionally SERT had some issues with some aspects of ROE that come with NLI HR missions.


SERTs issues with the use of lethal force as a first resort was, as you stated below,  the primary catalyst for the creation of JTF-2.


KevinB said:


> Hostage Rescue is an area where a lot of LE Team have issues, especially if there are multiple hostage takers, because when you do make an entry - the goal isn't minimal use of force - the goal is to preserve the hostage lives - and neutralizing the threat of the hostage takers.
> There is zero attempt to resolve an encounter with less than lethal force once the entry goes





KevinB said:


> That said the RCMP, OPP, and some Crown Prosecutors where superbly educational on how to articulate the rational for lethal force inside Canada.   I learned more from an OPP OIS Investigator and Crown in two days on the articulation of lethal force justification than any other period in my life - which includes dedicated courses on that, LE certification, and LE classes across this continent.


I'm quite familiar with the RCMP articulation model and have successfully used it in court.


KevinB said:


> I will disagree there entirely - Cyprus gave the CF the belief they knew what their where doing with ROE - how screwed up that was, was only really identified in FYR deployments - and Somalia.  I still believe to this day, that there are many members of the CAF who doesn't truly understand what self defense is, and what their legal rights are under that from an ROE standpoint.


Up until I retired, I believe we taught ROE poorly at the soldier level, which is where things are most likely to go wrong. Since then, have things changed?


KevinB said:


> Suspension of Disbelief - you need to accept the DS conditions


I worked at NDHQ. Suspension of Disbelief was a lifeskill.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

dimsum said:


> First, the CP-140 flies more in support of the RCN than for NORAD/NORTHCOM.  It's an ASW platform that also does ISR, and realistically that ISR mission only started in Afghanistan.  Depending on nation, those types of aircraft are either operated by their air forces or navies.
> 
> Second, the RCAF RPAS will be armed.
> 
> ...



Yebbut - according to Rick I get to be CDS for a day .   

So I want to use the CP-140, and its replacements, the same way it was used over the Middle East.  I want it to support both the RCN at sea and the Ground Forces, especially the CANSOFCOM Fusiliers, when operating against Little Green Men.

The RPAS will be armed.  But do all of them have to be armed all the time?

And you are dead right.  I completely forgot the Space Domain.

As for the RCA/RCAF split

If a flying vehicle launches from a canister or rail on the ground and sprouts wings, then flies autonomously to a designated target (either pre-programmed, programmed in flight or laser designated), with wings or rotors, under the influence of a prop, a jet, a rocket or gravity, large or small, at 30 km/h or Mach 9  is that a plane, a uav or a missile?


----------



## KevinB (16 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Law isn't always black and white


It would be if first we killed all the lawyers 



FJAG said:


> The point here is that when he is running away you are no longer in a self defence mode and there were (and still can be) ROEs that only allow engagement when the individual is actually committing a hostile act like shooting at you. Once the act ceases the permission to engage under the ROE also ceases. (its a bit similar to cops not being allowed to shoot a fleeing suspect/perpetrator in the back)
> 
> The trouble that many soldiers have is understanding where in the full war scenario killing any enemy who is not actually surrendering is perfectly permissible while with a lower than full war scenario where deliberate limitations are put in place for whatever reason the CoC sees fit.
> 
> Actually you couldn't once the individual disengages and is running away. I'll let a LEO answer that one.


Since you asked    Down here we can shoot fleeing felons in the back, they don't even need to be armed 

 I had this argument with the then JAG - I ended up "winning" when I sent the transcript of the discussion higher for review.
The individual doesn't need to be still firing to be a deadly threat - as they still have the weapon, and have already shown they are willing to use it.   Thus they are still able to be engaged with lethal force.


 The issue as I later found out was that the JAG in question had the view that the hostile was disengaging - while I saw a hostile using fire and movement to a more advantageous position.  It was about how I could articulate the action on the ground from my perspective -

   Now if they didn't visibly still have a weapon, under some ROE one would need to wait to see what they where doing, and under nearly all ROE if they threw down their weapon they also could not be engaged.

 Part of the problem I found later was there often is no "right" answer in a scenario like that - because it is very hard to frame the scenario for a "correct response" without making it absurd.







FJAG said:


> All Leg Os are people who interpret things with their own bias. I know some timid Leg Os and I know a whole bunch who are very pragmatic when it comes to balancing competing interests in their advice.
> 
> The ROE are your left and right of arcs.
> 
> ...


The CF had issued the OTM approval for a while on 7.62mm (pre 911 IIRC) - but the 5.56mm approval didn't come until during OEF.
   My own personal opinion is the rule against expanding bullets is insane this day and age - as C77 ball will yaw and fragment at impact velocities over 2400fps - and leave much worst wound channels that a Soft Point Hunting Bullet would




FJAG said:


> I'd like that. I prefer a good Pilsner. You could probably help me out a lot with some of the novels I write. With luck I'll get back down to the States when this plague is more under control.
> 
> 🍻


I will eventually be up to Ottawa and Petawawa some time as well.


----------



## dimsum (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> If a flying vehicle launches from a canister or rail on the ground and sprouts wings, then flies autonomously to a designated target (either pre-programmed, programmed in flight or laser designated), with wings or rotors, under the influence of a prop, a jet, a rocket or gravity, large or small, at 30 km/h or Mach 9  is that a plane, a uav or a missile?


Why not all?  Technically they're all subsets of each other.

I'm not being facetious - this Joint Air Power Competence Centre article says this regarding UAS and aircraft:


> Currently, NATO defines UA as an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and which is operated remotely using various levels of automated functions...
> 
> The ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) defines an aircraft as any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.



And it says this regarding cruise missiles vs UAS:


> In general, making the distinction between ordnance and UA is not useful, due to tremendous technical progress. These two categories are not exclusive anymore, while not every ordnance is a UA, a UA can be used as ordnance.


----------



## Kirkhill (16 Nov 2021)

These too then.








So, again I say, I have difficulty differentiating between an uninhabited Air Force and the Artillery.


----------



## FJAG (16 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> These too then.
> 
> View attachment 67193
> 
> ...


The simple differentiation is if the terminal weapon is ground launched the delivery system is artillery if its air launched the delivery system is Air Force. Please don't try to confuse me with having an ground launched system that delivers air launched sub munitions.

There are probably a herd of colonels sitting around conference tables in Ottawa getting absolutely nothing accomplished while they argue these points. I know they did over Sperwer which didn't even launch a weapon.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?   

And pretty sure the Yanks have got 4 stars sweating the same questions.


----------



## FJAG (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?
> 
> And pretty sure the Yanks have got 4 stars sweating the same questions.



Not just sweating but getting downright ignorant about it.



> Air Force general says of Army’s long range precision fires goal: ‘It’s stupid’
> 
> 
> The head of Air Force Global Strike Command had some harsh words about the Army's plan to base long-range missiles in the Pacific.
> ...



The Army responds:



> Army Chief Defends Long-Range Missile Effort After Air Force General's Public Attack
> 
> 
> Gen. Timothy Ray, head of Air Force Global Strike Command, took a very public jab at the Army's top modernization priority.
> ...



 😉


----------



## dimsum (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?


Yes.  The key point being "one way".  

If it was designed to do its job, return, and land, then you can argue it's Air Force.  This isn't that different (aside from flight profile) of a cruise missile, and no one is saying that cruise missiles should be Air Force assets.




FJAG said:


> The simple differentiation is if the terminal weapon is ground launched the delivery system is artillery if its air launched the delivery system is Air Force. Please don't try to confuse me with having an ground launched system that delivers air launched sub munitions.


I'd still argue that it would be artillery.  Like what I said above, if it's one way then it's a guided munition.

I mean really, with Class 1 UAS being operated by CA/RCN/SOF, the precedent is set for the RCAF not controlling everything that flies.


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

So a recoverable loitering munition, like the Hero-120, that would be a Class 1 UAS?






						UVision unveils new HERO developments
					

UVision has disclosed a series of new developments within its HERO family of precision loitering systems, including a new-generation variant of the Hero-120 and a...



					www.janes.com


----------



## dimsum (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> So a recoverable loitering munition, like the Hero-120, that would be a Class 1 UAS?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



This is the (slightly dated) chart I'm referring to when I talk about classes.  






So if the Hero is designed to potentially come back and land, and be reused, it counts as a Class 1.  If it's not supposed to come back (the site doesn't mention a recovery system) then it's a guided munition in my books.  

Incidentally, the USMC just selected that for its indirect fires program.


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

Stepping back from the discussion of the technicalities of the flying machines I am beginning to see the point being made by those of you that have been beating the drum about Airspace Co-Ordination.

In Canadian, and North American, airspace I have come to understand that the responsibility lies with the civil authorities, like NAVCAN, with NORAD having a watching brief until requested to act by the civil authority.  

In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.

Is it under the national authority of the government being assisted?  The authority of the coalition doing the assisting (likely led by the US)? The RCAF or the RCA?  In particular 2 Expeditionary Wing or 4 RCA (GS)?  

With damnear everything being used in warfare these days "flying" to contact the enemy, and even low cost "40 mm grenades" following complex flight paths with extended durations, that deconfliction and co-ordination role is, indeed both complex and critical.

And I know I have told that before.  Just put me down as being slow on the uptake.


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

dimsum said:


> This is the (slightly dated) chart I'm referring to when I talk about classes.
> 
> 
> 
> ...




Thanks for that Dimsum.  I always appreciate clarification.  As noted I can be slow on the uptake.


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

> The New Hero-120  .....
> 
> The lightweight, compact, highly maneuverable man-pack configuration, with extended endurance of over an hour and a loitering range of40 km and more, can be independently operated by frontline forces, precisely striking time-sensitive targets from a wide variety of angles. Featuring low acoustic and low visual and thermal
> signatures and fully gimbaled, stabilized day/night tracking, the Hero-120 delivers critical situational awareness with its advanced data link and real-time intelligence. Providing cutting-edge abort and target re-engagement capabilities, it provides a whole new range of operational possibilities. Despite being a highly sophisticated weapon system,* the Hero-120 is affordable and cost-effective due to its recoverable option, using a parachute, while securing the warhead.*











						UVision Announces Successful Demo of its New Hero-120 Loitering Munitions System for Strategic NATO Customer - EDR Magazine
					

February 18, 2020 – UVision Air Ltd. – a global leader in Loitering Munitions Systems of all sizes for a




					www.edrmagazine.eu
				





So it seems, like the UTAP-22 Mako "drone", to fall into the space of a re-usable aircraft that is cheap enough to be used as a disposable munition.


----------



## FJAG (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> ...
> 
> In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.
> 
> ...



I'm probably speaking out of my hat here since what I do know about air space coordination goes back to the early years in this century but -- it all depends on who is involved.

For example around 2004 when we went into Kabul, Afghanistan's ability to control air space was limited (and poorly at that) to Kabul airport. For that matter NATO/ISAF had very little capability except some very minor air defence folks. The US has a major capability to do the job and basically controlled all the air space over Afghanistan but with virtually no coordination with Kabul airport or ISAF.

When Canada sent its ASCC team there from 4 AD regiment, its primary purpose was to ensure that another Tarnak Farms wouldn't happen and one of the first things they did was ensure that the US knew where all ISAF weapon ranges and installations were so that restricted fly zones could be placed around them. That was harder to accomplish than one would think. SOF folks in particular did not like to coord anything with anyone. Canada then also worked on setting up coordination for all UAVs and artillery with Kabul airport. Again harder than you would think. When Canada took its brigade HQ home after 2004 air support coordination around  Kabul suffered again as most NATO countries do not have deployable expeditionary air support coordination systems. Canada's ASCC's are pretty robust but we were a bit light on all the radars etc needed to do the job properly and down south required good linkages with the American's system to do so.

I'm not sure to what extent things have improved in NATO. While they do have systems within Europe, I think their expeditionary capabilities are still light years behind the US's and quite frankly when it comes to who's in charge I would think that for the US, their military interests/needs far outweigh any other consideration.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

Just going to try and summarize my Napkin Force thoughts in one table.



OIC  (Office of the Intelligence Commissioner - Civilian)



CBSA
RCMP
Canadian Rangers
Militia (DART)



Coast Guard
2 Cdn Air Div (Transport & Rescue, Base Support, Training)
RCN
Arctic Fleet (AOPS/SSK/XLUUV)
Atlantic Fleet (CSC/SSK/XLUUV)
Pacific Fleet (CSC/SSK/XLUUV)
12 Wing (Op Con from 1 Cdn Air Div)



NAVCAN
1 Cdn Air Div (NORAD-NorthCom)
22 Wing (Control)
3 Wing (Fighter)
4 Wing (Fighter)
14 Wing (LRPA)
19 Wing (LRPA)
RCA/RCE (GBAD – Coastal Def)



CANSOFCOM
427 SOAS (Op Con from 1 Wing, 1 Cdn Air Div)
1 Wing (GS by 1 Cdn Air Div)
8 Wing (GS by 1 Cdn Air Div)


I believe that that meets The Woke Parties requirements and can be accomplished within the 15,000 PY Framework





Now if I had more PYs available I would supplement the CANSOFCOM force with

3 RCR, 3 PPCLI, 3 R22R, (RCA, RCE)

That combined structure would be the Immediate Reaction Force with a responsibility to support the RCMP with small unit actions, primarily focused on Ranger territory in the North but also available to back up the RCMP in the urban territory of the Militia.  They would focus on the War in the Spaces and emphasize tactics similar to those employed in Phase I Afghanistan - rapid and violent disruption of identified threats so as to return matters to RCMP control as quickly as possible.





With more PYs I would establish the Carabineers as a force for operating along the highways in the southern, Militia domain, in support of the RCMP.   Their primary focus would be the War in the Places and emphasise tactics similar to their Italian namesakes  - the tricky job of managing threats in a crowded and generally friendly environment.  This would be the LAV/ACSV force.

CARABINEERS

RCD, LdSH(RC), 12 RBC

1,2 RCR, 1,2 PPCLI, 1,2 R22R,

RCHA

RCE


And finally


Canadian Expeditionary Force


This would be based on the Carabineer Framework but would be thickened by RCA/RCAF/RCN assets to supply greater fire support, surveillance and transport assets.


----------



## dimsum (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.
> 
> Is it under the national authority of the government being assisted?  The authority of the coalition doing the assisting (likely led by the US)? The RCAF or the RCA?  In particular 2 Expeditionary Wing or 4 RCA (GS)?


To try and simplify it - if it's multinational, then it's basically under the coalition Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC).  

There are a whole bunch of other coordination centres under that.


----------



## lenaitch (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> In Canadian, and North American, airspace I have come to understand that the responsibility lies with the civil authorities, like NAVCAN, with NORAD having a watching brief until requested to act by the civil authority.


I'm not sure that's correct.  The decision to act would flow from NORAD's bi-national chain of command.  NAVCAN is managing traffic in our airspace, but I am not aware they are surveilling it.  As far as I know NORAD sees what NAVCAN sees via primary and secondary radar, as well as the NWS, coastal radar and possibly satellite, which NAVCAN would not have access to.


----------



## FJAG (17 Nov 2021)

dimsum said:


> To try and simplify it - if it's multinational, then it's basically under the coalition Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC).
> 
> There are a whole bunch of other coordination centres under that.


Kirkhill

You should note that there are several CAOCs in existence - incidentally the operative term for the function is AOC or Air Control Center. the C for "Combined" simply indicates that it is a multinational organization and, through the absence of the indicator "Joint", means that it is essentially a single service operation which in this case means Air Force.

There is a brief overview of what a CAOC is and does in this wiki article:

Air Operations Center - Wikipedia

To muddy the waters even more, Air Space control is also an Army function albeit that it integrates into overarching Air Force structures - note as well that the terms "Control" "Operations" and "Coordination" are not synonymous but instead define separate yet integrated functions. Here's the US Army Field Manual on Airspace Control.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM 3-52 FINAL WEB.pdf

It's interesting sometimes to think of how this field developed. I joined the artillery during the height f the Vietnam War when we started getting heavily involved in airmobile missions and fast air support so we started using systems to deconflict artillery, air defence and all those things that flew. As Vietnam faded from history we largely tended to ignore the issue in favour of the "big sky: little bullet" doctrine of airspace non coordination.   I can't put my finger on when we started getting serious about the issue again but we certainly had the main elements in place in the late 90s (Bosnia was probably a big factor) although it was one of those backwater fields that only the folks in it really cared about. Tarnak definitely energized the issue and it has stayed that way ever since. When the Army wrote off air defence, it managed to be smart enough to keep the ASCCs as operational entities.

Air space management is a complex field which is getting more complex by the minute. It not only requires a core of personnel well trained in the craft but a suite of specialized hardware and software from radars down to survivable and secure networks to specialized software such as FalconView. 

One of the problems with any field like this is having a critical mass of trained people to ensure that there is an adequate career development capability. This is becoming difficult for the artillery which has been so deprived of numbers that stovepipes such as guns, observation and fire support coordination, surveillance and target acquisition and the soon to return air defence are hard to maintain. The artillery is fortunate that it has a specialized instructor in gunnery and master gunner capability for both officers and NCOs that maintains core knowledge alive in faltering fields.

All that to say that we need to be very careful with any exercise like this reduction to 15,000 folks in what capabilities we try to hive off to civilian agencies and which ones we need to hang on to as a military capability at any cost. 

To get back to my hobby horse, the reserves, the ONLY way that I can see a reduction of the full-time force to such a low number is if we have a larger part-time force of military "doers" that can be called up in the event of an emergency and focus the full-timers as being instructors and keepers of the knowledge (the "knowers") and the equipment and whose time in units as "doers" is only long enough to gain the practical experience to give their theoretical knowledge a foundation. Divestment of key capabilities to civilian agencies (even related ones) will very quickly have the essential military skills fade away; day-to-day peacetime pressures will very quickly relegate essential in-an-emergency military skills to such a low priority that the skills will disappear.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

lenaitch said:


> I'm not sure that's correct.  The decision to act would flow from NORAD's bi-national chain of command.  NAVCAN is managing traffic in our airspace, but I am not aware they are surveilling it.  As far as I know NORAD sees what NAVCAN sees via primary and secondary radar, as well as the NWS, coastal radar and possibly satellite, which NAVCAN would not have access to.




And yet...



> As part of NAV CANADA’s ongoing readiness training, the company organised the drill with NORAD. During the exercise, NAV CANADA cleared the airspace over parts of Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area and coordinated with the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and military command and control units from the Royal Canadian Air Force and United States Air Force
> 
> Erik Doucet, Manager of Military Coordination and Special Events at NAV CANADA, says these types of international training exercises are necessary to ensure seamlessly coordinated responses in the event of real aerospace threats.
> 
> ...





> Operations requiring decisions​During your first 180 days in office, you will be asked to renew several key operations. You have the authority to extend some of these, but others will require Cabinet approval or concurrence from other Ministers.
> 
> 
> You may be required to make decision on ongoing operations such as *Operation NOBLE EAGLE*, which seeks to address asymmetric aerial threats within Canadian and US airspace. You are identified as the designated Engagement Authority/decision-maker if the Prime Minister is unavailable. Given the reactive nature of this operation, it is unlikely but possible that it could be triggered at any time.











						Operation Noble Eagle - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				








> Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) preparedness[edit]​Background[edit]​*In January 1982, the FAA unveiled the National Airspace System (NAS) Plan.*
> 
> ... There is *no overlap of responsibility between DoD and FAA within the NAS: this is why within FAA-controlled airspace the FAA is in charge of controlling and vectoring hijack intercept aircraft*.[1]





> *The US and Canadian militaries, particularly NORAD and the US Air National Guard, have been tasked with interception duties* concerning hijacked aircraft.* Their primary duty was assistance to law enforcement*. Quoting *Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold: "We always viewed an attack from within our borders as a law enforcement issue,* ...".[49] Military aircraft were to be used to assure positive flight following, report unusual observances, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.[1]





> General Arnold also stated "*In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we had to hook up to FAA radars throughout the country, install compatible radios for nationwide coverage between our command and control agencies and our airborne assets, and purchase a new command and control computer system to integrate radar and communications. The initial investment was for $75 million, *and this number has grown to nearly $200 million."[26]



The Airspace is opened and controlled by the civilian corporation NAVCAN, in conjunction with the civilian aiport authorities.  The training is organized by the civil authorities.  Engagement authorization is supplied by the civil authorities (and I would argue that the President of the United States is as much the civil authority as he is the Commander-in-Chief).

Although NAVCAN may not have access to all available intelligence I think it is reasonable to assert that the Minister of National Defence does, as does the Prime Minister and POTUS.

As to NAVCAN not surveilling the airspace, I hope that is not true.  I would find it disconcerting if they were only aware of the things they expected to see in their airspace and unaware to the unexpected.

Canada's NAVCAN radars don't cover the all of Canada's land area, that is true.  NORAD's NWS extends that coverage somewhat, but still leaves blind areas in the North.  At the same time Canada is reponsible for controlling all traffic civil and military throughout the Canadian zone which extends half-way across the Atlantic, up to the North Pole and well into the Gulf of Alaska.  To my understanding that airspace is managed by civilian traffic controllers and not NORAD.


My sense is that NORAD is actually a quite small organization focused on looking for military threats and warning the civil authorities then taking operational control of the airspace when that control is ceded by the civil authorities.

March 2020 - North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)​Mandate​
Deter, detect and defeat air threats to Canada and the United States
NORAD is a bi-national command that provides:
Aerospace control through surveillance and exercising operational control of airspace over Canada and the United States
Aerospace warning of attack by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles
Maritime warning

Air defence operations including:
Coordinating with Canadian, US, and International partners
Coordinating cyber and info ops
Developing recommendations on future requirements

Key facts​Total Employees:​
4,842 (Canada 1,091, USA 3,751)
Budget:​
Unique bi-national combatant command leveraging Canadian and US Services as a Force Employer


----------



## Kirkhill (17 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Kirkhill
> 
> You should note that there are several CAOCs in existence - incidentally the operative term for the function is AOC or Air Control Center. the C for "Combined" simply indicates that it is a multinational organization and, through the absence of the indicator "Joint", means that it is essentially a single service operation which in this case means Air Force.
> 
> ...




I agree with you FJAG.  However I was working in the terms of reference supplied by the Woke Party.

Having said that I am taking a couple of points from this exercise.

1 We don't have a good Civil Defence plan in place
2 That defence plan should rest on the Militia 

(and I remember all the moans about ropes and ladders but even your National Guard Brigades are primarily an emergency management force for their State - they also train for war-fighting - but I would argue that is their secondary job)

3 Ground Based Air (and Coastal) Defence needs to be moved up the spectrum of needs 

(and while that may be under the operational control of the RCAF and NORAD it is patently an artillery function and needs to involve the RCE and the RCA in the planning and implementation and requires the RCA/RCE to permanently shadow the civilian organization in much the same way that I perceive NORAD doing.  The RCA does indeed need the skills development.  Where better to find it than in the Control Towers across Canada and the NAVCAN training centre in Cornwall.

My recipe for the RCA is still  commissioned Gunner at each airport, assisted by a Warrant Office and a pair of Bombardier Ammo Techs.

4 The RCN and the RCAF don't have much in the way of spare PYs with which to accomplish their primary missions

(having said that I do think that the RCAF seems to spend a lot of effort doing things that I believe the Coast Guard should be doing and I would be inclined to split the RCAF along the  yellow fleet fault line and pass it, along with the maintenance of bases and training to 2 CAD leaving 1 CAD with the military side of the house).

(they are also the forces most likely to exploit technology and artificial intelligence - although the RCA GBAD should not be far behind them).

5 The ground forces necessary to secure the 90% of Canada that isn't arable and not served by roads don't need to be large in number.  But they do need to be intimately tied to their air support.   

(we don't need to be looking at brigade and even battalion attacks - we need to be looking at FOO/FAC teams with small security elements - say a 4 man FOO/FAC team working with a 16 man rifle squad and a 4 man logistics support team, all transportable by VTOL/STOL aircraft and relying on 1 Cdn Air Div for fire support).

6 The 10% of Canada that is arable, and the 1% that is urban, is a great fit for the LAV based army acting in a para-military Carabineer/Carabinieri role.  Transfer the TAPVs to the RCMP and the Militia.  The RCA/RCHA would be focused on spotting and targeting and the occasion precision fires, together GBAD.  The key tools would be, I suggest, SUAS, LAMs and MSHORAD.  Not guns.

7 We can export some of the Carabineer and Northern Force expertise on an ongoing basis (sustaining a battle group) in a permissive environment with a similar set of tools.

8  If we want to send a force over seas and sustain it in the face of opposition then it will require a heavy force based on Cannons and Tanks.   And so I think that the Cannons and Tanks should be grouped into one heavy support Brigade that has a high reserve component in it.


----------



## KevinB (17 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> As to NAVCAN not surveilling the airspace, I hope that is not true.  I would find it disconcerting if they were only aware of the things they expected to see in their airspace and unaware to the unexpected.


Radars are not equal.
   Most (if not all) commercial radar systems for air control/observation get assists from transponders on aircraft, in short they look for stuff that wants to be seen.   


			https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/asr-11/
		



Military Search Radar put out significantly more power and are designed things that don't necessarily want to be seen.

You can fly at a decent altitude any civilian air traffic control radars don't have clue you are there. 
   US Military entities do RUT's all the time - and they use a "few" LO's to deconflict - because people complain when "Black" helicopters fly down their street at nose to navel level some times.

It isn't the FAA or NAVCAN's job to control the airspace - it is their job to manage traffic in it.


----------



## lenaitch (17 Nov 2021)

The way I understand it, NORAD operators are divided into three ascending 'desks'; surveillance, identification and weapons (interceptor control).  No doubt, an anomaly noticed by a NAVCAN controller would be shared, but any given ACC is only looking at their particular area - they don't have the big picture, and they don't have roles dedicated simply to look for something that shouldn't be there, nor do their systems have any algorithms for that purpose that I am aware of. Most air traffic control depends on technical cooperation of the aircraft (transponders, ADS-B, SatNav).  As mentioned, aircraft that want to be seen.  Primary radar (echo only - no transponder) has been relegated to a back up role and is generally limited to about 60NM (altitude dependent).

And I'm not naïve enough to believe that when a couple of Bears skip along the edge of our airspace, NORAD's first awareness is a blip on the NWS.


----------



## Kirkhill (19 Nov 2021)

Seeing as how this discussion seems to have run its course - 

What happens if:

The Woke Party Government is replaced in a general election.

The new Government of the Day (GoD) was elected on a platform of putting Canada back on the world stage and reinvigorating its alliances and international responsibilities.   

After discussions with the civil authorities and the Strategic Joint Staff it is determined that the Woke Parties reforms have secured the Defence of the Realm within the existing 1% of GDP budget.

Due to Canada having retreated from its already meagre international position GoD knows that it will have to spend to regain its credibility.  Accordingly GoD is committing an additional 1% of GDP to the Defence budget for Mutual Defence, meeting the NATO target.  It is also committing to spending 0.7% of GDP on international aid.   Money is no longer a consideration.

Recruiting continues to be an issue.  Consequently the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)  is capped at 15,000 uniformed personnel, matching the National Defence Force (NDF) commitment.  The two forces are maintained as totally separate entities. 

What does JEF look like?

JEF is responsible for both all international war fighting and for all rapid response humanitarian aid.


----------



## Kirkhill (19 Nov 2021)

And I'm staying out of this discussion.


----------



## ArmyRick (21 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> JTF-2 was born from and trained by the RCMP SERT, police officers who already had a pretty good handle on DOMOPS ROE.  The CF had a good understanding of OUTCAN ROE as we'd been playing that game since the 1970's in Cyprus.  The biggest challenge was making the bridge between the worlds and understanding that just because the ROE say you can shoot someone doesn't mean you _should_.
> 
> With the wholesale divestment of the Reserves and many other capabilities to the civilian sector and the ongoing militarization of civilian law enforcement in this scenario, I'm surprised that the Woke Party didn't table /pass some type of Posse Comitatus Act.


The Woke Party of Canada proudly does not identify as American and thus want no part in the Yankee Posse Comitatus Act


----------



## ArmyRick (21 Nov 2021)

Glad to see things back on track. ROE is important but probably better for a discussion on another thread

I am seeing lots of good way out of the box thinking. I suspected UAVs, highly trained troops (SOF or very skilled infantry), good comms, etc are all common themes here.

I was working on my napkin forces in between my 36 hour work days and because of the influences here, I find myself tearing up old ideas and starting again. 

KevinB, I trained infantry soldiers for YEARS (mostly RCR but some Patricias) and I always found their was better more efficient ways to train soldiers as part of efficiency. What are some thoughts you have on better training infantry? Do you think basic infantry would benefit with a toned down "selection" (fitness and mental check activity based on what every SOF uses for the uninformed)?

Kirkhill, if I read what your doing, you are taking the SAR coverage of the nation and expanding on it for combat forces for observe, detect, act idea?


----------



## KevinB (21 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> KevinB, I trained infantry soldiers for YEARS (mostly RCR but some Patricias) and I always found their was better more efficient ways to train soldiers as part of efficiency. What are some thoughts you have on better training infantry? Do you think basic infantry would benefit with a toned down "selection" (fitness and mental check activity based on what every SOF uses for the uninformed)?


Yeah, I think a lot more could be done on the conventional side for training.

I don't know so much as a mini selection or watered down selection simply because they aren't trained troops yet - and while you can included aspects from those - I think the biggest gain is tailoring the courses to a modern and practical desired outcome.

   Personally I saw a LOT of wasted training time on courses - I also think a lot of archaic stuff needs to be stripped from the syllabus.
Part of the issue (in my opinion) is the system is really bad at acknowledging the reasons that certain things where added.

Frankly I'd launch pretty much all kit and quarters stuff out the window - it was designed to teach attention to detail, and these days that time could be much better used to teach that in a relevant way.
  Foot and rifle drill I'd par down to a skeleton.

I'd start weapons training with the pistol - its harder to shoot better (weight to trigger ratios) and also requires much better safety disciple - plus pistols and pistol ammo is cheaper 

Bayonet training would be gone, but more medical and comms training, as well as general weapons proficiency.

 I think you could get a significantly more skilled soldier in less time by revamping the method.


More to follow -


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

Some more interesting info gleaned on a Sunday morning - from the 2020 Minister's Briefing Book






						Canadian Armed Forces 101 - Canada.ca
					

March 2020 - Essential information to familiarize the Minister with the Department.




					www.canada.ca
				









						Flipbook – Transition binder 2020 - Canada.ca
					

March 2020 - Proactive divulgation - Transition binder - Minister of National Defence




					www.canada.ca
				




Kirkhill's Summary Statement of DND/CAF



> Departmental overview​Mandate​The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) are two distinct but complementary entities working together to fulfill the Canadian government's mission to defend Canadian interests and values, and to contribute to international peace and security.
> 
> They make up two important parts of the overall national security structure of the country.
> 
> ...



I'm not entirely sure about the DND's mandate.  There is a support requirement.  But isn't there also a requirement to manage the security service that the Government of the Day has hired?   Anywho....


BudgetTotalCivilianCAFRegularEffectivesIn TrainingGACReserveRangersJusticeMCADEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesEmployeesMND11DMD11Corp Sec15201ADM HR-Civ8712001200ADM Policy3620716542Leg Adv268128548JAG11350ADM PA32283ADM Review132160160ADM Finance143450450ADM Mat6100460032201380ADM Infra190031002700400ADM IM428333918231516ADM Data286767ADM Science33513001300VCDS2034593700389336932803890200CMP130121538361017928157985050107482130CIL2179668966809668CDS11SJS58329117212212212CFIC128CJOC4602924RCAF10681556115181404312074120741969CA935505003300472002300023000190005200RCN71516200400012200850085003700Totals143581366532436010848763278516401074889024669520048Current68000270005200SSE7150030000OMExCapExAssetsInventoryMCADMCADMCADMCADADM Materiel3,2002,90025,2605,600ADM Infrastructure1,20066326,0002 Naval Bases9 Air Force Bases11 Army Bases24 Naval Reserve Divisions in 24 communities43 Air Force Locations169 Armouries in 117 communities across Canada185 Ranger patrols in over 200 remote communities5376 MCAD Payroll5600 MCAD Mat Inventory25,260 MCAD Mat Assets26,000 MCAD Infra Assets


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Kirkhill, if I read what your doing, you are taking the SAR coverage of the nation and expanding on it for combat forces for observe, detect, act idea?



Pretty much AR.  My sense is that the military is a reactive force when it comes to the Defence of the Realm.  It has to wait to be invited to the party by the civilians.  Consequently I see the Armed Response as just another step up the ladder from the Civil Response.  I see no reason to have the Armed Response organized on a different geographical basis to the Civil Response.

Having said that I do see the absolute need for a clear and distinct Command and Control cut-out / Chinese Wall between the Armed and the Civil.  But that doesn't mean that the Armed can't shadow the Civil so that it is at Notice To Move readiness.


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

Seeing as how I have been dragged back into the discussion kicking and screaming ....   


Reserve Footprint24 Naval Reserve Divisions in 24 communities43 Air Force Locations169 Armouries in 117 communities across Canada185 Ranger patrols in over 200 remote communities185 Ranger patrols in over 200 remote communitiesRangers5200​Avg Rangers per Patrol28​169 Armouries in 117 communities across CanadaPopulation38000000​Reservists19000​Fire (Vol)126650​Fire (Paid)26000​Police66748​Reservists as ppm of population500​0.05%​Fire (Vol) as ppm of population3333​0.33%​Fire (Paid) as ppm of population684​0.07%​Police as ppm of population1757​0.18%​Avg Community Population324,786Avg Reservists per Community162​Fire (Vol) per Community1082​Fire (Pd) per Community222​Police per Community570​Avg Community per Armoury224,852Avg Reservists per Armoury112​Fire (Vol) per Community749​Fire (Pd) per Community154​Police per Community395​


It seems that you are 6 times more likely to meet a Volunteer Firefighter than an Army Reservist.  And they are probably better trained to handle civil emergencies.

Does that mean that we are underestimating the number of willing volunteers there are out there?  Or that we should be training people in things they want to learn?

I am not convinced that reserve pay is the primary driver except in the case of students.

Older volunteers, I believe, have very different motivations.


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

A couple of other gleanings

The Vice Chief of Defence Staff - I would not have that job for love nor money

Talk about overstretch

And why, in the name of all that's holy, is he saddled with responsibility for cadets and, apparently 9668 CIL instructors and their $217,912,613 - virtually half of his operating budget of $420,277,907.

March 2020 - Vice Chief of the Defence Staff – Lieutenant-General M. N. Rouleau, CMM, MSC, CD​Archived content​This page was proactively published to meet the requirements of the _Access to Information Act_. It is a historical record which was valid when published, but may now contain information which is out of date.
Mandate​
The VCDS has two mandates:
Providing strategic direction across the Defence Team and monitoring DND/CAF progress in achieving key priorities.
(Edit: This makes sense)


Commanding a diverse group of 18 organizations within Canada and abroad that support the entire DND/CAF including:
Security, safety, cadets, Reserve Force, capability development, NATO, NORAD, defence liaison, establishment, conflict management, sexual misconduct, military police, National Capital Region administration.

(Edit: Most of this list is jobsworth stuff that should be handled by others)

Key facts​*Total Employees:* ~14,241​
3693 Regular Force, 890 outside Canada
200 Primary Reservists (full & part-time)
700 Employees of the Public Service
9668 Reserves Supporting Cadets
*Budget:* $420,277,907​
$217,912,613 – Cadets & Junior Rangers
$77,786,121 – Operations & Maintenance
$47,947,441 – Civilian Salary Wage Envelope
$19,698,796 – Primary Reserve Salary
$45,348,700 – Carling Campus Project






Lieutenant-General M. N. Rouleau, CMM, MSC, CD







VCDS placemat[PPT, 2.4 MB]

*Primary location(s):*​
National Defence Headquarters (Pearkes & Carling), Uplands, Bases/Wings;
69 Countries: United States (Colorado Springs, Washington), United Kingdom (London), Belgium (Brussels), Germany (Niederheid), Italy (Naples), France, Australia, Korea, etc.
Key Partners​Internal:​
Minister of National Defence Office
Deputy Minister Office + Associate Deputy Ministers
Chief of Defence Office and Strategic Joint Staff
ADM(Policy), Judge Advocate General
Commanders (CAF Formations & DND senior officials)
Ombudsman
External:​
Central Agencies
Public Services and Procurement Canada, Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada
Public Safety and Portfolio
Transport Canada
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North American Aerospace Defence Command, United Nations
Global Affairs Canada and Foreign Embassies in Ottawa
Five Eyes Military Partners: Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
Top issues for Vice Chief of the Defence Staff​Implement the Defence Services Program (DSP)​
To date, 66 Capital Projects made it through the various phases to close out, with 230 of the 333 files, or 69% of the total Defence Policy Capital Projects either in Implementation or Complete.
DND will seek project authorities for more than 40 capital projects between now and end of Fiscal Year 2021/22.
In the 5-year period from Fiscal Year 2017/18 to Fiscal Year 2021/22, it is estimated that Capital Spending will utilize approximately $16 Billion dollars on a cash basis from the Capital Investment Fund.
Force Mix and Structure Design​
Objective: To design a Canadian Armed Forces that is fit-for-purpose to conduct concurrent operations and is relevant.
The Chief of Force Development  and key stakeholders continue validation of Force Employment demand and supply analyses to understand risks and option space for structural changes (Phase 1).
Analyze the impact of Phase 1 results on the supporting Force Generation and Institutional structures (Phase 2 & 3).
Begin implementing structural changes to address gaps or risks.
Operation HONOUR​
Established in 2015, Op HONOUR is the CAF’s mission to eliminate sexual misconduct in the Canadian military.
Currently developing a Unified Policy.
Office of the Auditor General's Management Action Plan sets several deliverables due 1 October 2019:
Operation HONOUR Performance Measurement Framework;
Canadian Armed Forces Operation HONOUR Campaign Plan;
Duty to Report Working Group Recommendations.

Closely monitoring the Heyder-Beattie settlement implementation as it relates to this file.
Complete Move to National Defence Headquarters (Carling)​
Complete move of 9,300 DND employees & military members by 30 March 2020.
From Nov 2019 to March 2020 this will entail: Delivery of Building 2, Pavilion and Building 10 with an approximate capacity of 2,500 employees.
Remain within the Project fit-up of final moves budget of $537 Million.
Schedule is currently extremely tight with risk of minor slippage into April 2020.


----------



## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

March 2020 - Strategic Joint Staff - Major General Trevor Cadieu​Archived content​This page was proactively published to meet the requirements of the _Access to Information Act_. It is a historical record which was valid when published, but may now contain information which is out of date.
Biography​
Appointed Director of Staff (DOS) 24 June 2019
28 years in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) with Operational tours to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Israel.
Commanded at all levels of the organization





Mandate​
Provide situational awareness, military analysis and decision support to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
Conduct strategic level engagement with other government departments, allies, and partner nations
Conduct strategic analysis to achieve military strategic effects
Develop and distribute CDS directives and orders
Plan and support Force Posture and Readiness
Synchronize CAF strategic sustainment and support
Arms control verification
Integrate Gender Based Analysis Plus into CAF policies and operations.








SJS placemat[PDF - 2.5MB]

Key facts​Total Employees:​
212 CAF / 117 civilian
Budget:​
$58 Million
Primary location(s):​
National Defence Headquarters (Pearkes Building)
Carling Campus
Key Partners​Internal:​
Privy Council Office
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Public Safety and Portfolios
Canada Border Services Agency
Communication Security Establishment
Other DND/CAF organizations (ADM (Policy), Judge Advocate General, ADM Science & Technology)
Chief of Staff to Minister
External:​
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Five-Eyes Partners (US, UK, NZ, AU)
North American Aerospace Defence Command
United Nations
Top Issues for Strategic Joint Staff​Command Support to the CDS​
Lead the Strategic Command and Control program that directly enables the CDS to make command decisions for the planning and execution of CAF operations. This includes the development of CDS directives and orders, military analysis, and decision support to the Chief to enable their role as principal military advisor to the Government of Canada. This also involves planning the CAF’s activities across the globe that ensure operational sustainability of CAF operations.
Threats to Canada, North America, and Allies​
Develop strategy, policy, advice and plans for the CDS on efforts to address threats stemming from terrorism and the actions of violent extremist organizations, including in ungoverned spaces.
This effort is done in close coordination and collaboration with the Government of Canada’s national security team, and with allies and partner nations. The CAF remains ready to respond on short notice for global response.
Force Posture and Readiness​
Develop an analytical tool that measures CAF posture and readiness to conduct domestic and international operations in order to fulfill the CAF core mission mandate and concurrent operations target identified in Canada’s defence policy − _Strong, Secure, Engaged_.
Defence supply chain management​
CAF lead for Defence Supply Chain Governance which includes upkeep and modernization, as well as interoperability with allies, key partners, and industry.
Provide sustainment and support statement advice to the CDS, coordinate logistic support across the CAF and ensure balance between operational effectiveness and strategic resource management.
Strategic Effects and Targeting​
CAF lead for the coordination of strategic effects and targeting in support of CAF operations.
This includes using an outcome based decision making methodology as the primary means for synchronizing effects, setting priorities for strategic capabilities and resources in pursuit of Government of Canada and CAF objectives.


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

March 2020 - Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) - Peter Hammerschmidt​Archived content​This page was proactively published to meet the requirements of the _Access to Information Act_. It is a historical record which was valid when published, but may now contain information which is out of date.
Biography​
Appointed in January 2018
21 years in the Public Service, including at National Defence, Public Safety, and the Privy Council Office





Mandate​
Provide the Minister with advice and support on the implementation of Canada’s defence policy
Generate policy input for Canadian Armed Forces operations
Manage the Minister’s international defence and security relations
Provide the Minister with policy advice on continental, as well as international defence and security
Advise and support the Minister in fulfilling Cabinet and Parliamentary responsibilities
Engage external experts to address defence and security policy problems (Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security)








ADM(POL) placemat[PDF - 2.4MB]

Key facts​Total Employees:​
207 (165 civilians, 42 military)
Budget:​
$35.578M across three votes
Vote 1 O&M - $4.672M
Vote 1 SWE- $16.588M
Vote 5 - $262K
Vote 10 - $14.053M
Primary location:​
101 Colonel By (Pearkes Building)
Key Partners​Internal:​
All Defence Team
External:​
Other government departments – Central Agencies, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety and Portfolios
Defence and Security Expert Community
United States Office of Secretary of Defense
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Five-Eyes Partners
Top Issues for Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)​Continental Defence Policy​*Challenge: *Evolving threats to North America, including in the North and in emerging technologies, particularly within the space and cyber domains.
*Next steps:* ADM(Policy) leads the development of advice on continental defence policy, including to modernize North American Aerospace Defense Command. The Group is also leading ongoing policy work to enhance and advance DND/CAF’s cyber and space posture.
Strategic Defence Policy​*Challenge: *Conduct research to support DND/CAF and Government of Canada in addressing hostile state activities directed at Canada and its allies.
*Next Steps: *support defence policy work that:

Safeguards earmarked investments for enduring capability requirements while also accommodating new pressures;
Delivers strategic guidance and seeking associated authorities/resources for pressing requirements;
Moves out on the government’s identified way forward issuing refreshed implementation strategies for existing policy directives.
International Security Policy​*Challenge:* Informed by Canada’s foreign and defence policy priorities and in direct support of Canada’s strategic interests, maintain and strengthen relationships with like-minded partners and develop or enhance relations with rising global actors.
*Next steps: *ADM(Policy) provides advice to the Minister of National Defence based on policy considerations, feasibility assessments, resource and other constraints, in consultation with the Canadian Armed Forces and other government departments.
Support to Parliament and Cabinet​*Challenge: *the Minister is accountable to Parliament and Cabinet for government-wide defence activities. Defence issues typically garner significant attention from Parliament.
*Next Steps: *ADM(Policy) leads the preparations for the Minister’s engagements in Parliament and Cabinet.


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

After reading the Mandates of, and Resources available to, the VCDS, the SJS and the ADM (Policy) is it just me or does the whole question of strategy seem to be thinly resourced?  And muddled?

Edit: PS I am not casting aspersions on the people in office or their character of abilities.  When I read their mandates, and look at their resources, I conclude that developing Strategy is a secondary task to be fitted in amongst all the trivia of running an office.


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## FJAG (21 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> My sense is that the military is a reactive force when it comes to the Defence of the Realm.


Yes and no. When you are discussing disaster relief or aid of the civil power then, yes. The feds need an invitation to the party from the province. If we're talking a shooting war type of thing the the feds can take action anywhere in the country on their own hook.



Kirkhill said:


> Consequently I see the Armed Response as just another step up the ladder from the Civil Response. I see no reason to have the Armed Response organized on a different geographical basis to the Civil Response.


Again, there is a constitutional difference. An armed response in an aid of the civil power scenario is a provincial maintenance of order role while a shooting war armed response is a fed defence of the country role.

Like I said, you can always change the constitution but I'll lay you dollars to donuts no one ever will.

For me the present arrangement is sound and practical in that your day-to-day "light" armed response is provincially organized and trained to meet local conditions while your armed response "heavies" are trained centrally to a common standard and can be deployed anywhere across the country in a scale tailored to the situation. It provides a good balance between day-to-day responsibilities and capabilities vs surging resources in an extreme emergency. Solid coordination and liaison bridges the two forces.

Geographic location of the "heavies" is theoretically independent of the above but in practice a geographic distribution already exists anyway.

🍻


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## Kirkhill (21 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> Yes and no. When you are discussing disaster relief or aid of the civil power then, yes. The feds need an invitation to the party from the province. If we're talking a shooting war type of thing the the feds can take action anywhere in the country on their own hook.
> 
> 
> Again, there is a constitutional difference. An armed response in an aid of the civil power scenario is a provincial maintenance of order role while a shooting war armed response is a fed defence of the country role.
> ...




Yes.  The Feds can.  The civilian political masters.

They decide if it is time to engage in a shooting war and if the "heavies" will be employed or will just be left in their barracks - after the fashion of the Danes in 1940.  The Government of the Day had an army but chose not to engage the German Army who was invading a neutral country.   Some Danish soldiers disobeyed orders and offered some minor resistance but were quickly overwhelmed.

Neither DND nor the CAF can instigate anything in the absence of clear instructions from the Civil Authorities. 

In Provincial turf the Feds generally need approval from the Lt Governor in Council.  But not always.

In the Territories and beyond the 3 mile limit the Feds can do what they please. I believe they also have a free hand in the airspace over all of Canada and its maritime estate, including that over the Provinces.

So I stand by my earlier comment.  I see the CAF as reactive.  Reacting to events and the decisions of the civilian masters.  They stand between their civil agents, like the Coast Guard and the Mounties, and their military agents, the Canadian Armed Forces.


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## Haggis (21 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Personally I saw a LOT of wasted training time on courses - I also think a lot of archaic stuff needs to be stripped from the syllabus.


When I worked in NCMPD, there was a constant cry from the schools  and units of "We need courses to be shorter!".  When we asked, "What should be cut to make them shorter?' the answer was usually "Everything is important!".  This was followed by "We want candidates to arrive better prepared for training." "Will that allow you to shorten your courses?" we asked.  The answer was generally "No."


KevinB said:


> Part of the issue (in my opinion) is the system is really bad at acknowledging the reasons that certain things where added.


Sometimes things were added that were not part of the curriculum which became part of the curriculum "because we've always done it this way" or because units/branches asked for it.  A case-in-point was when bayonet fighting was briefly added to the recruit syllabus at CFLRS in around 2010 because it was discussed in the Mess and the leadership thought it was what the Army wanted.


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## KevinB (22 Nov 2021)

Haggis said:


> When I worked in NCMPD, there was a constant cry from the schools  and units of "We need courses to be shorter!".  When we asked, "What should be cut to make them shorter?' the answer was usually "Everything is important!".  This was followed by "We want candidates to arrive better prepared for training." "Will that allow you to shorten your courses?" we asked.  The answer was generally "No."
> 
> Sometimes things were added that were not part of the curriculum which became part of the curriculum "because we've always done it this way" or because units/branches asked for it.  A case-in-point was when bayonet fighting was briefly added to the recruit syllabus at CFLRS in around 2010 because it was discussed in the Mess and the leadership thought it was what the Army wanted.


I always like to ask Why/So What to things.
   I'd really like people to be required to defend the Why of what is individually added to courses.
A vast amount of rifle and foot drill has remained for no actual purpose - forming a square to repel calvary is entirely irrelevant these days.
 Rifle cleaning - having seen people go so far as to remove the flash hider off rifles to clean the muzzle crown - and usually scraping it - as well as soldiers using simply green etc to clean weapons to get them "inspection clean" is an example of where soldier nor staff understand what is needed to be cleaned on the rifle - and a fruitless make work task to teach attention to detail - that could be done in much better ways - as well as not then being destructive to the weapons.

Physical fitness - I really think in this day and age that the CAF can do better, I remember when the 1VP Mountain Man team had a nutritionist brought in to help our training - this should be done at the beginning with recruits - and fitness managed throughout ones career.   So many soldier are lost to injuries that could have been prevented by a well thought fitness plan - both individually and collective training in this respect.

Education - what are we teaching our soldiers and why - what can we do to make a better thinking soldier?

Mental Health - shit happens, suck it up isn't a good solution, but what can be done to better prepare soldiers for stress and horrors?
   I didn't think the CAF did a good job here - there was way to much bravado in certain training that while it may psych soldiers up to do a task (or in theory) it didn't prepare them for the aftermath of those tasks.   There needs to be a lot more effort put into make the physiological preparedness for losing with an destroying the enemy - as well as seeing ones friends and fellow soldiers ripped apart.


I think SOF globally does a much better job in these than the conventional armies - and it really doesn't need to be so - sure some will come with increased costs - but other costs can be lowered simply do to the sheer economy of scale increases from SOF number to the conventional side.   As well these 'enablers' also allow the SOF units to streamline - and if done correctly gain a much more talented pool to select from - as well as some pre-selection done already.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> *I think SOF globally does a much better job in these than the conventional armies - *and it really doesn't need to be so - sure some will come with increased costs - but other costs can be lowered simply do to the sheer economy of scale increases from SOF number to the conventional side.   As well these 'enablers' also allow the SOF units to streamline - and if done correctly gain a much more talented pool to select from - as well as some pre-selection done already.



The 5% pass rate helps with quality control too


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## KevinB (22 Nov 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> The 5% pass rate helps with quality control too


1% of the 1% for a reason...

 But outside of that - selection is looking for phobias, morality/ethics/self discipline, physical fitness, the ability to gut through stuff, and interpersonal skills.   Not all disqualifiers for SOF would be applicable to the conventional army.

I remember a little thing I did down here - we where going for a nice jog, with a telephone pole, some jerry cans and tires.   A buddy of mine was a former 18E, and another came from the West Coast SEALS - we got to the "finish line" and where told to keep going, and almost half the group mentally buckled - and 2 quit, and a few started really bitching - I laughed, and so did two of my buddies, because we knew the finish line wasn't going to be at the finish line - and it was just as much a mental exercise as a physical one.   Both the SEAL and I had broken ribs from the obstacle course earlier - and the 18E had a ruptured ear drum from a "relaxing time in the pool".    Note the best physical performer on that - we peered out by blackballing - as they where selfish and a bit of a boastful douche, but not a team player at all, oddly not a SEAL  

The goal needs to be something people will work for though - you just can't torture and "gut check" folks in training all the time - or your force will be broken a lot of the time.


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## ArmyRick (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Yeah, I think a lot more could be done on the conventional side for training.
> 
> I don't know so much as a mini selection or watered down selection simply because they aren't trained troops yet - and while you can included aspects from those - I think the biggest gain is tailoring the courses to a modern and practical desired outcome.
> 
> ...


Agreed. Kit and Quarters, drill should be limited to basic (That also needs a re-vamp IMO)
I was teaching CQC basic on DP1 Inf Reg course, I feel that should go to basic. 
I like the emphasis on pistol shooting. On that note, if we had the cash, I think all infantryman should carry a sidearm.
Also teaching brigade structures and theory (and even infantry battalion) was really a lot of blah, blah, blah memorize this for a written PO check then forget type of idea for the troops. 
Small arms lessons were valuable. Range time was valuable.

I remember when CWO (now retired) Parrell encouraged us to take BASIC infantry candidates through the newly built kill house resulted in alot of standards and other office dinosaurs freaking out. WE did it. Not a single casualty. not even close. The UOI did a great job.


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## FSTO (23 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> A couple of other gleanings
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Slight derail here, but where the hell did he get that sweater and why the hell are the rest of us peons saddled with the crap from Logistik?


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## Halifax Tar (23 Nov 2021)

FSTO said:


> Slight derail here, but where the hell did he get that sweater and why the hell are the rest of us peons saddled with the crap from Logistik?



SOF



ArmyRick said:


> Agreed. Kit and Quarters, drill should be limited to basic (That also needs a re-vamp IMO)
> I was teaching CQC basic on DP1 Inf Reg course, I feel that should go to basic.
> I like the emphasis on pistol shooting. On that note, if we had the cash, I think all infantryman should carry a sidearm.
> Also teaching brigade structures and theory (and even infantry battalion) was really a lot of blah, blah, blah memorize this for a written PO check then forget type of idea for the troops.
> ...



I think the first move is to de link the common basic and send it back to the elements.


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## FSTO (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> SOF





Halifax Tar said:


> I think the first move is to de link the common basic and send it back to the elements.


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## KevinB (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> SOF


Always gets the coolest kit


Halifax Tar said:


> I think the first move is to de link the common basic and send it back to the elements.


I think the question needs to be asked is what is needed from a service common recruit?
   When you can answer that you can tailor the course - and then each element can have their own training after the fact.

Personally I think service common Training should be vastly more expansive than it is, but a large portion of what is in the the syllabus now taken out and burned.


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## Halifax Tar (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Always gets the coolest kit
> 
> I think the question needs to be asked is what is needed from a service common recruit?
> When you can answer that you can tailor the course - and then each element can have their own training after the fact.
> ...



The first question is do we need a common service recruit ?  And what's the value ?  I can tell you the Navy would be better doing its own thing and would get more bang for the buck.


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## KevinB (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> The first question is do we need a common service recruit ?  And what's the value ?  I can tell you the Navy would be better doing its own thing and would get more bang for the buck.


I would say absolutely.
   Typically services will drop things they don't feel are required.   No person can live in the water or the air - so everyone needs to live on land - there needs to be some common core Land skills.

I am sure the Navy and Air Force would drop a lot of stuff related to land work if they could - they would justify it because they feel they don't need it - then all of a sudden the Navy needs to secure an area around their ship in a foreign port - and fails miserably, or the AirForce can run FARP's or secure a aircraft etc.

Personnally I would also want recruits to know navigation by stars - something generally the Navy is much better at - as well as the fact the Navy does a much better job with most things aquatic - and there is value having Naval input into a common recruit/basic.

Also in the same way I would recommend trashing the Infantry BattleSchools - I believe (based on experiences at both the RCR and PPCLI BSL's) that separating these things leads to cliques and divisive activities and cultures.

Each Element can actually bring a lot to the table for a common core entry course - for the good of the CAF as a whole it should be done -- but not in a manner like Cornwallis or St.Jean did with a terrible syllabus designed to check antique boxes.


I didn't used to have that view point - but having been around a bit and getting to observe training from 5I's Militaries SOF, Intelligence, and Conventional Forces (all elements) I have come to the conclusion that no one entity has the answer, and the best approach is a collective one.


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## Halifax Tar (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I would say absolutely.
> Typically services will drop things they don't feel are required.   No person can live in the water or the air - so everyone needs to live on land - there needs to be some common core Land skills.
> 
> I am sure the Navy and Air Force would drop a lot of stuff related to land work if they could - they would justify it because they feel they don't need it - then all of a sudden the Navy needs to secure an area around their ship in a foreign port - and fails miserably, or the AirForce can run FARP's or secure a aircraft etc.
> ...



I don't disagree with you, and I don't think the RCN does either.  We have created port security teams and enhanced boarding parties as well as maintaining ships BPs and ships FP plays a huge role in a ship's working up and deployment cycle.  We have a huge FP contingent on foreign port duty watches.

The caveat here is these are all secondary and post primary specialty employment tasks.  And other than the ranges none of that is taught in St Jean. 

I would rather see a Naval recruit learning the customs and traditions of the RCN as well as dress and drill for the first month (+/-) of basic and spend the second month (+/-) doing seamanship, damage control, ranges and 404s.  

Ideally we should be able to produce a Naval recruit that only needs initial  trades training after basic.  Who can then be pushed to the fleet for employment.


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## KevinB (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I don't disagree with you, and I don't think the RCN does either.  We have created port security teams and enhanced boarding parties as well as maintaining ships BPs and ships FP plays a huge role in a ship's working up and deployment cycle.  We have a huge FP contingent on foreign port duty watches.
> 
> The caveat here is these are all secondary and post primary specialty employment tasks.  And other than the ranges none of that is taught in St Jean.
> 
> ...


IF I was King (or back to the Galactic Space Emperor bit), I would want my Army and AF pers to know how to do Port Security - and BP aspects - 

I found it very interesting that seeing a ship wasn't exactly like a HR mission - in that fact you need to control the bridge and engine room - plus - so you now have three internal teams - plus any external security needed.

 Also I noticed the Army (inc a lot of SOF) are terrible at Port Defense scenarios - as they rarely fully grasp the water based threats - and are not prepared well for the various threats than can come from on and under the water.

In additional to that Damage Control stuff - because frankly in a Country with 3 Ocean borders - the odds are if you are fighting anyone - the water will have a significant part - either going to fight - or people coming at you to fight.
   Plus it also helps then understand how to then attack a ship. and defend it.

The AirForce add stuff too - they can give some great 4 and 5 star Hotel recommendations


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## Haggis (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I am sure the Navy and Air Force would drop a lot of stuff related to land work if they could - they would justify it because they feel they don't need it - then all of a sudden the Navy needs to secure an area around their ship in a foreign port - and fails miserably, or the AirForce can run FARP's or secure a aircraft etc.


There is a lot of redundancy between the NCMGS, Environmental Specs and Occ Specs.  Get rid of those and you'll save a ton of time and money.


KevinB said:


> Also in the same way I would recommend trashing the Infantry BattleSchools - I believe (based on experiences at both the RCR and PPCLI BSL's) that separating these things leads to cliques and divisive activities and cultures.


Ditch the Regimental system entirely and you'll save another ton of money.  It's divisive and culturally linked to our colonial and oppressive past.  Not Woke at all.


KevinB said:


> Each Element can actually bring a lot to the table for a common core entry course - for the good of the CAF as a whole it should be done -- but not in a manner like Cornwallis or St.Jean did with a terrible syllabus designed to check antique boxes.


Some of those boxes have to be checked to conform with legislative and policy requirements. Those need to be reviewed and culled first.


KevinB said:


> I didn't used to have that view point - but having been around a bit and getting to observe training from 5I's Militaries SOF, Intelligence, and Conventional Forces (all elements) I have come to the conclusion that no one entity has the answer, and the best approach is a collective one.


SOF cannot be mass produced and still ensure quality.  However, if you are only generating a force of 15K (as opposed to the 120K we have now), you can raise the quality without worrying about quantities as much as in the past.  Not everyone in the new force has to be Tier 1 or Tier 2 quality but they can certainly be more capable and well-rounded than those of today. However, maintaining that level of quality will be time consuming and expensive.


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## Haggis (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> IF I was King (or back to the Galactic Space Emperor bit), I would want my Army and AF pers to know how to do Port Security - and BP aspects -


That's exactly why the FOBs were built in Farnham about 10 years ago.  This was the same time that bayonet fighting was added to the CAF common BMQ syllabus and many of the small party tasks revolved around FP.


----------



## Kirkhill (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I'd start weapons training with the pistol - its harder to shoot better (weight to trigger ratios) and also requires much better safety disciple - plus pistols and pistol ammo is cheaper
> 
> 
> More to follow -




Too bad there wasn't a weapon that fired pistol ammo but could be handled like a rifle.


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## KevinB (23 Nov 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Too bad there wasn't a weapon that fired pistol ammo but could be handled like a rifle.
> 
> View attachment 67272


Ugh - no thanks.

 I would opt for 9mm AR-15 style weapons before the C1 was returned.   
   Mainly as for manual of arms - why teach multiple systems when you don't need too === I would also get .22LR AR's for short range training.

Even I, lover of the MP-5SD,dumped it as fast as I could when an AR style suppressed .300 BlackOut could do the same role - but better.


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## Kirkhill (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> Ugh - no thanks.
> 
> I would opt for 9mm AR-15 style weapons before the C1 was returned.
> Mainly as for manual of arms - why teach multiple systems when you don't need too === I would also get .22LR AR's for short range training.
> ...


But I loved the Smig.


----------



## Halifax Tar (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> IF I was King (or back to the Galactic Space Emperor bit), I would want my Army and AF pers to know how to do Port Security - and BP aspects -
> 
> I found it very interesting that seeing a ship wasn't exactly like a HR mission - in that fact you need to control the bridge and engine room - plus - so you now have three internal teams - plus any external security needed.
> 
> ...



I guess my question here is why ?  Is there a reasoned purpose to training an Air Weapons tech how to do port security ?   Or an infanteer ?  Granted the infanteer probably has no how at OFP anyways.  Or do we want this because certain empires feel they need to inflict their existence on everyone else ? 

If we need people to take on tasks outside their core competencies (like trades training) we have specialized courses for that.  

Lastly a lone warship trying to tie up in an opposing and openly hostile port is so far out of the realm of true scenarios I think we need to take it with a grain of salt.  A big grey floaty thing sitting stationary in a wide open space is a huge target and one that would be easily defeated.  Anyone who has transited the Suez will attest to that.


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## KevinB (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I guess my question here is why ?  Is there a reasoned purpose to training an Air Weapons tech how to do port security ?


I'm talking a simple overview - I feel in a small military one needs to understand more than being one cog in the machine.



Halifax Tar said:


> Or an infanteer ?  Granted the infanteer probably has no how at OFP anyways.  Or do we want this because certain empires feel they need to inflict their existence on everyone else ?


 No just a simply intro, so 1) they can appreciate how others work 2) if needed in extremis they have some basic knowledge that can be rounded out on site.


Halifax Tar said:


> If we need people to take on tasks outside their core competencies (like trades training) we have specialized courses for that.


I'm not talking about teaching courses - I am talking about a brief demonstration during the Common Entry Course.


Halifax Tar said:


> Lastly a lone warship trying to tie up in an opposing and openly hostile port is so far out of the realm of true scenarios I think we need to take it with a grain of salt.


  Lone warship in a neutral port that gets attacked has occurred several times in the last decade.
     I would assume the USS Cole thought it was a grain of salt issue too.


Halifax Tar said:


> A big grey floaty thing sitting stationary in a wide open space is a huge target and one that would be easily defeated.  Anyone who has transited the Suez will attest to that.


Sometimes you don't get to pick the fight -- the fight picks you.


----------



## daftandbarmy (23 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I guess my question here is why ?  Is there a reasoned purpose to training an Air Weapons tech how to do port security ?   Or an infanteer ?  Granted the infanteer probably has no how at OFP anyways.  Or do we want this because certain empires feel they need to inflict their existence on everyone else ?
> 
> If we need people to take on tasks outside their core competencies (like trades training) we have specialized courses for that.
> 
> Lastly a lone warship trying to tie up in an opposing and openly hostile port is so far out of the realm of true scenarios I think we need to take it with a grain of salt.  A big grey floaty thing sitting stationary in a wide open space is a huge target and one that would be easily defeated.  Anyone who has transited the Suez will attest to that.



With the right time and attention you can train just about anyone to be a good 'point target' guard force.

The issue, as always, with organizations like the Navy and Air Force is capacity: just not enough bodies for a long term 'cordon' maintenance program.

In peacetime, this can be contracted out to a certain extent.


----------



## Halifax Tar (23 Nov 2021)

KevinB said:


> I'm talking a simple overview - I feel in a small military one needs to understand more than being one cog in the machine.
> 
> 
> No just a simply intro, so 1) they can appreciate how others work 2) if needed in extremis they have some basic knowledge that can be rounded out on site.
> ...



Ya we cover that with FP.  I thought you were talking  about entering and docking opposed.

This would be a great aspect of an RCN BRT, now a days it fits in with seamanship which is taught during NETP.

I would argue the smaller the we get the more we should concentrate our efforts.  It's of no value be so so on lots of things, let's be the best at few things.


----------



## KevinB (24 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I would argue the smaller the we get the more we should concentrate our efforts.  It's of no value be so so on lots of things, let's be the best at few things.


The smaller one gets, the more others need to cover down.


----------



## ArmyRick (27 Nov 2021)

Lots of valid insight here. 

KevinB, how much would you see mountain ops skills being important in a smaller and more skilled force?

FJAG, your artillery background, what would be the ideal fire support gun/howitzer for such a small force?

Halifax Tar, I have no Navy experience other than camping out on the USS Pensa Cola in the 90s, then doing a USMC beach landing on a LCAC (boring, didn't see a thing), is there a difference between a navy for protecting your own waters and doing expiditionary roles?


----------



## Halifax Tar (27 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Lots of valid insight here.
> 
> KevinB, how much would you see mountain ops skills being important in a smaller and more skilled force?
> 
> ...



I think you have that be a coat of two colors.


----------



## FJAG (27 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Lots of valid insight here.
> 
> KevinB, how much would you see mountain ops skills being important in a smaller and more skilled force?
> 
> ...


A. With the Napkin Force design under your criteria I gave:

1) the Light/Airborne Regiment (which is the only manoeuvre unit that I have) a battalion of artillery which has as its principle weapon 12 x Archer 155 mm for general purpose operations* and a weapon room switch to 16 x 120 mm portable mortars for use on airmobile/airborne operations.

2) In addition there is a general support regiment as part of the Army which has a battalion of 36 SHORAD systems and a battalion of 36 armed UAV or rocket launched loitering munitions systems, and

3) not quite artillery but the RCAF would have one squadron of 25 CH146 attack helicopters (until they finally buy AH64s), two squadrons of 30 F18s (until they buy F35s. I make my squadrons bigger than they are today) and a mixed squadron of 4 x RQ-4 and 6 x MQ-9A

* More likely is that we keep the M777, however, an Archer system saves on manpower in the constrained manning system that we have.

B. If, on the other hand, I was designing a system for Canada's Army of today's size I would choose the following:

1) a gun regiment of 18 x XM1299 155 mm self propelled howitzers* for each of one armoured BCT and for one mechanized BCT (I'm starting to go with BCT for any new brigade sized formations I design for commonality with the US and UK);

2) a gun regiment of 18 x the existing M777s for one light BCT (all excess guns go to  the reserves);

3) one deep strike general support regiment with 2 x HIMARS batteries (six launchers each) and 2 x UAV and/or rocket launched loitering munitions batteries (36 launchers each);

4) one regiment of air defence systems** including 2 batteries of the M-SHORAD and 2 batteries of something with directed energy (or possibly 4 batteries of mixed systems of probably 18 x systems each); and

5) I would give the RCAF the same configuration as in the Napkin Force at A 3) above.

* I would probably go with a fully developed US XM1299 when it comes on stream with an autoloader and its characteristics become known. The US will produce them in large numbers and will continue to product improve them for a long life cycle. (and hell, considering our pace of procurement, the XM1277 will be in its A3 version by the time we get them) I would use it for both the ABCT and the MBCT to keep things to one product line for maintenance. Currently an M109A7 comes in at under 30 tons while an Archer comes in at 30 tons (as do LAV 6.0s give or take based on configuration) so there isn't a limiting difference when it comes to rear area mobility or air transportability (dimensions and loadability into C-17 might be an issue - the weight is fine but the new barrel length etc might be an issue - I presume that is being worked into the design specs).

Note as well that I would buy some extra XM1299 s for the reserves not so much as "training guns" but as battle loss spares. All artillery regiments would be manned as 30/70 to 40/60 total force regiments with the HQ battery, one gun battery and the OP battery being predominantly regular force, and two gun batteries and the STA battery being 100% reserve force. Similar for HIMARS, UAV/loitering, and AD but probably closer to 30/70. Therefore all Res F artillery units already have a total force role and are equipped.

** I would contemplate putting the four AD batteries under the GS regiment (rather than a separate AD regiment) as I expect on operations the entire AD regiment would never deploy. So long as there is or are sufficient C2 elements available within the GS Regiment that can be tailored to provide coordination of fire support, air support, STA support etc for two deployed operations simultaneously, then there is no need for both an AD and GS regimental HQ. My expectation is that in routine day-to-day operations we would employ the AD and GS resources probably in troop or battery(-) strength in support of independent battle groups and therefore GS command and coordination cells should be scalable from BG to BCT to above BCT.

If I were king.

🍻


----------



## ArmyRick (27 Nov 2021)

Halifax Tar said:


> I think you have that be a coat of two colors.


Sorry but need it explained to me like I am simple (I am)


----------



## ArmyRick (27 Nov 2021)

FJAG said:


> A. With the Napkin Force design under your criteria I gave:
> 
> 1) the Light/Airborne Regiment (which is the only manoeuvre unit that I have) a battalion of artillery which has as its principle weapon 12 x Archer 155 mm for general purpose operations* and a weapon room switch to 16 x 120 mm portable mortars for use on airmobile/airborne operations.
> 
> ...


XM1299 is a discontinued project, no? FCS manned ground systems?


----------



## FJAG (27 Nov 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> XM1299 is a discontinued project, no? FCS manned ground systems?


No. It's a very active project. It's the cornerstone of the Extended Range Cannon Artillery Program (ERCA)



> M1299 howitzer - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The FCS MGV was a different project. There was an XM 1203 Non-line Of Sight (LOS) artillery version as part of that before the thing was binned.



> Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> ...



🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (1 Dec 2021)

KevinB said:


> Radars are not equal.
> Most (if not all) commercial radar systems for air control/observation get assists from transponders on aircraft, in short they look for stuff that wants to be seen.
> 
> 
> ...



Came across this info on the Washington State Air National Guard site.



> Western Air Defense Sector​"Guarding America's Skies"​The Western Air Defense Sector, with headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, is one of two sectors responsible to the Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for peacetime air sovereignty, strategic air defense, and airborne counterdrug operations in the continental United States.  WADS is a Washington Air National Guard unit which operationally reports directly to First Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla.
> 
> *WADS is made up of personnel from the Washington Air National Guard, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, Title 5 Civilians and the Royal Canadian Air Force.*
> 
> ...


----------



## daftandbarmy (1 Dec 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Came across this info on the Washington State Air National Guard site.



Those are pretty good vision and mission statements.

Just sayin'


----------



## KevinB (2 Dec 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> Lots of valid insight here.
> 
> KevinB, how much would you see mountain ops skills being important in a smaller and more skilled force?
> 
> ...



I would vastly expand Mountain Ops - partially because everyone should be outdoors enjoying the fresh air, for the most part Mountain Op's are fairly cheap - sure you need some equipment - and while ropes need to be viewed as expendables (good ropes) most of the other equipment will last a while.

 I would say that my two most enjoyable times in the Military where Mountain related.    You can combine fitness with technical instruction - and I would work the RCAF into Mountain training as well - not just in a support role - but also getting the aircrews up to speed on working in the mountains on the ground - from a survival aspect.

Also focusing on the difference between Mountain Operations in Summer and Winter - and getting winter mountain gear that works for wet cold - not the dry cold of the high arctic.    

Telemark Skiing with Ski-March boots, and skins for the ski's.    I'm long stale on what the CAF does - but I know the 80's-2000's gear was woefully inadequate outside the SOF side, seeing the USMC Mountain School, and getting to TeleMark and use SkiMarch boots was an eyeopener - then seeing other Patricias trying to use the BangyBoards in MukLuk's while we where whipping around was pretty brutal.
  It was like looking at Biathlon - when we used to run two different teams (- the Mil Team on BangyBoards and C7's - and the Comp using city gear and .22's) the differences where that stark.

Plus Mountain Training can dovetail into Urban Climbing - which is pretty useful in its own right.


----------



## FSTO (2 Dec 2021)

ArmyRick said:


> is there a difference between a navy for protecting your own waters and doing expeditionary roles?


All depends on what you want to do. Are you concerned only with TW? Then smaller aircraft, drones and coastal patrol boats (lots of them) will do. If you want control of the EEZ then you'll want larger aircraft, drones (time on station) and better sea keeping patrol craft. Shipborne helicopters will be a nice to have, but maybe using it as a lily pad only will have to do (is there any cost savings not having a hanger?). Finally if you want to do expeditionary operations then the FFH/DDH/AOR/MPA and SS(K or N) combo will be required if you want to have some influence.


----------



## KevinB (2 Dec 2021)

FSTO said:


> All depends on what you want to do. Are you concerned only with TW? Then smaller aircraft, drones and coastal patrol boats (lots of them) will do. If you want control of the EEZ then you'll want larger aircraft, drones (time on station) and better sea keeping patrol craft. Shipborne helicopters will be a nice to have, but maybe using it as a lily pad only will have to do (is there any cost savings not having a hanger?). Finally if you want to do expeditionary operations then the FFH/DDH/AOR/MPA and SS(K or N) combo will be required if you want to have some influence.


I know TW means Territorial Waters - is EEZ Economic Exclusion Zone? (I would assume yes - but you know that they say about assumptions..)


----------



## dimsum (2 Dec 2021)

KevinB said:


> I know TW means Territorial Waters - is EEZ Economic Exclusion Zone? (I would assume yes - but you know that they say about assumptions..)


Yes.


----------



## Kirkhill (27 Dec 2021)

Merry Christmas.....Bump!

When we were discussing GBAD systems I ended up generating a map something like this.  This one has been modified to include all National Airports, CPA shipping ports and all Northern bases and Forward Operating Locations.  Conveniently that results in 48 sites to be defended.  As noted elsewhere this equates to 90 to 95% of the population while only having to defend 1% of the land mass.

48 sites, if we defined a minimum response capability of 1 launcher per site then that would equate to a requirement of 6 batteries of 8 dispersed launchers.

This would not be an adequate defence against a dedicated mass strike.  It would, however, protect the population from the occasional harassing drone strike.  A protection level that is currently absent.



Conveniently most of the southern sites are co-located with RCA reserve units (the white pins below)



The occasional use but the need for permanent readiness and the adjacency to population centers and existing reserve units suggests to me an obvious RCA Reserve tasking as GBAD in support of SSE as well as NORAD and US NORTHCOM objectives.

This is the British Sky Sabre CAMM system - Two trucks per site - 8 ready to launch missiles with 40 km range.


----------



## Kirkhill (27 Dec 2021)

There is another way I see the RCA contributing to Canada's National Defence Posture is through the Long Range Precision Fires System.  This has evolved much since the days of the MLRS M270 scattering hundreds of submunitions 30 km behind the enemy front lines.

The current versions see a HIMARS truck launching 6 packs of missiles 60 (GMRLS) to 150 (GMRLS-ER) km to precision engagements or pairs of PrSM missiles to precision targets 500 km away.



Which got me to thinking again.  What would Blandford Strange have made of his artillery if he had had LRPFs?

Assuming the major British citadels of 1871 (Esquimalt, Fort Henry, Quebec, Halifax and St John's), the year they pulled out, then coverage would have looked like this:


The ports are well defended, the St Lawrence is blocked, the Americans are threatened as far as Philadelphia, New York and Boston, the Gulf of St Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, Georges Banks and the Grand Banks are clearly under Canadian influence as is the Continental Shelf.  Coastal Artillery reaches 500 km out to sea.  

That effect is generated with a single 6 launcher battery for the whole of the country.

Now suppose we apply the LRPFS to the Arctic:


Little doubt about control of the North West Passage, the Labrador Shelf or, Hans Island.

Another battery of 8 Launchers for minimum influence.

Then, just for scaling purposes, another battery of 6 launchers on the Eastern Slopes of the Rockies blocking every highway between the east and west and supplying supporting fires all the way out to Hope.



Put the three maps together and you have a total of 19 to 20 HIMARS trucks exerting an outsize influence within our own borders.  

Some may argue that more launchers and missiles are required.  I won't disagree.  I would just suggest that so long as one launcher remains at each station no enemy can act with impunity.  They have to pause and think.


----------



## Kirkhill (27 Dec 2021)

So if a few HIMARS trucks can cause enemies to pause and think domestically what influence could they exert internationally?

The West Indies are our home turf.  We work with Jamaica and have garrisoned Bermuda.


NATO?

We have garrisoned Iceland.  We are allies of the Brits and could assist in the defence of the Northern Approaches passing the Shetlands, or add weight to Gibraltar or Larnaca.

Adding HIMARS LRPFs to ePF-Latvia would also be a strong political symbol.



Africa?  Rwanda.



Taiwan?


----------



## Kirkhill (27 Dec 2021)

1 C17
3 Trucks (1 Rdr, 1 AD, 1 LRPF)
12 Gunners.

5000 km2 of Air Defence
80,000 km2 of LRPF coverage.
Rapidly in
Rapidly out

Temporary influence.

Much more effective than a single Leo.




Fly in


----------



## Spencer100 (28 Dec 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Too bad there wasn't a weapon that fired pistol ammo but could be handled like a rifle.
> 
> View attachment 67272


The first day of training I had with the SMG I was told this is the replacement 



And that its was very inaccurate as the troops using it never hit anything.   But it could be a training problem.  Well in the end we never did get it.  Or the white body armour.


----------



## Kirkhill (28 Dec 2021)

Now if only someone had taught them how to unfold their stocks.


----------



## Spencer100 (28 Dec 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> Now if only someone had taught them how to unfold their stocks.


LOL folding the stock was the very first thing the instructors did and showed us!   I shit you not.  

And then told us about the new combat uniforms coming (white) 

Could have been in an old Armoury on Ouellette in 198*? .....I'm not telling.


----------



## daftandbarmy (29 Dec 2021)

Spencer100 said:


> LOL folding the stock was the very first thing the instructors did and showed us!   I shit you not.
> 
> And then told us about the new combat uniforms coming (white)
> 
> Could have been in an old Armoury on Ouellette in 198*? .....I'm not telling.



Since we're on the subject of SMGs....

The U.S. Army Selects New Submachine Gun​The Swiss-made Brugger and Thomet APC9K is the Army’s first official subgun since World War II.

The U.S. Army has officially selected the Brugger and Thomet APC9K to outfit its Personal Security Details.

The APC9K is the first new submachine gun for the U.S. Army since the M3 “Greasegun” of World War II. The service will buy 350 of the compact automatic weapons for $2.5 million, with an option to buy 1,000 more. The B&T APC9K beat out guns from more than ten other companies, including Colt and Heckler and Koch, as well as guns based on the M-16 and MP-5 weapons platforms.

The APC9K is an entirely new submachine gun developed in conjunction with and for EKO Cobra, Austria’s counterterrorism unit. The gun uses a closed-bolt blowback system, has a maximum rate of fire of 1,080 rounds per minute, and weighs just 5.9 pounds with 30-round magazine, foregrip, and Aimpoint micro red dot aiming sight. It’s chambered in 9-millimeter Parabellum and comes standard with two 30-round translucent magazines.









						The U.S. Army Just Chose Its First New Submachine Gun Since WWII
					

The Swiss-made Brugger and Thomet APC9K is the Army’s first official subgun since World War II.




					www.popularmechanics.com


----------



## FormerHorseGuard (29 Dec 2021)

I would not change anything, because it would be a waste of time, unless this new party came in with a very strong mandate and could hold power for at least 2 full terms, nothing would happen.

First term would 2 of the 5 years to write the white paper,  the next 2 years would eat up the time to put into action with funding, golden parachutes for those who want to leave before the big changes comes on the civilian side of the table.  At the same time there would be the great influx of retirements of soldiers who no longer had commands or jobs, after reading the white paper.  It would take 1 to 3 years to close any unneeded bases ( Toronto was a base on the Friday but slated for closure the next week, took 3 years to close it, only to keep part of it open).

Then a general election is called,  other parties would bring the record of bases closing, troops being down sized and how this is bad for Canada and how it is bad for the tax payer.  If the party won the election and could continue the plan to down size and de militarize the army, then the actual plan would start coming in and by the time the plan was at phase 1 , there would be another election and new government because it is the new reality our governments do not go much beyond 2 terms. 

Then the new government plans comes into being and re do the whole show over


----------



## OldSolduer (29 Dec 2021)

I'd like to say one thing - it will probably turn out to be more - but can we put back the "light" in infantry?


----------



## Kirkhill (29 Dec 2021)

daftandbarmy said:


> Since we're on the subject of SMGs....
> 
> The U.S. Army Selects New Submachine Gun​The Swiss-made Brugger and Thomet APC9K is the Army’s first official subgun since World War II.
> 
> ...




1080 rounds per minute
18 rounds per second
30 rounds per magazine
1.666 seconds per magazine

120 paces per minute
2 paces per second

Left-Right-Left...Change Mags!


----------



## Kirkhill (29 Dec 2021)

FormerHorseGuard said:


> I would not change anything, because it would be a waste of time, unless this new party came in with a very strong mandate and could hold power for at least 2 full terms, nothing would happen.
> 
> First term would 2 of the 5 years to write the white paper,  the next 2 years would eat up the time to put into action with funding, golden parachutes for those who want to leave before the big changes comes on the civilian side of the table.  At the same time there would be the great influx of retirements of soldiers who no longer had commands or jobs, after reading the white paper.  It would take 1 to 3 years to close any unneeded bases ( Toronto was a base on the Friday but slated for closure the next week, took 3 years to close it, only to keep part of it open).
> 
> ...



This is the part that is missing in Ottawa - that and the willingness of all committee members to go against their own party leaders.



			https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/24/defence-committee/membership/
		


Defence Committee​Commons Select Committee​The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.
11 current committee members​Export list as CSVView former members 

Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood MP
Conservative
Bournemouth East
 Chair

Commons

Stuart Anderson MP
Conservative
Wolverhampton South West
Commons

Sarah Atherton MP
Conservative
Wrexham
Commons

Martin Docherty-Hughes MP
Scottish National Party
West Dunbartonshire
Commons

Richard Drax MP
Conservative
South Dorset
Commons

Rt Hon Mark Francois MP
Conservative
Rayleigh and Wickford
Commons

Rt Hon Kevan Jones MP
Labour
North Durham
Commons

Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck MP
Labour
South Shields
Commons

Gavin Robinson MP
Democratic Unionist Party
Belfast East
Commons

Rt Hon John Spellar MP
Labour
Warley
Commons

Derek Twigg MP
Labour
Halton
Commons

“We’re going to need a bigger Navy”
Inquiry The Navy: purpose and procurement
Committees Defence Committee
Published 14 December 2021

Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life
Inquiry Women in the Armed Forces: From Recruitment to Civilian Life
Committees Defence Committee
Published 25 July 2021

Fourth Special Report - Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report
Published 2 December 2021

Fourth Special Report - Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report
Inquiry Women in the Armed Forces: From Recruitment to Civilian Life
Committees Defence Committee
Published 2 December 2021

Russia and Ukraine border tensions
Inquiry Russia and Ukraine border tensions
Committees Defence Committee
Published 6 July 2021

Third Special Report - Russia and Ukraine border tensions: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report
Published 23 September 2021

Third Special Report - Russia and Ukraine border tensions: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report
Inquiry Russia and Ukraine border tensions
Committees Defence Committee
Published 23 September 2021

Sixth Report: Manpower or mindset: Defence’s contribution to the UK’s pandemic response
Inquiry Defence contribution to the UK’s pandemic response
Committees Defence Committee
Published 25 March 2021

Manpower or mindset: Defence’s contribution to the UK’s pandemic response: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2019–21
Published 9 July 2021

Manpower or mindset: Defence’s contribution to the UK’s pandemic response: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2019–21
Inquiry Defence contribution to the UK’s pandemic response
Committees Defence Committee
Published 9 July 2021

Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability
Inquiry Progress in delivering the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability
Committees Defence Committee
Published 14 March 2021

First Special Report: Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2019–21
Published 21 May 2021

First Special Report: Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2019–21
Inquiry Progress in delivering the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability
Committees Defence Committee
Published 21 May 2021

Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain
Inquiry Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain
Committees Defence Committee
Published 14 February 2021

Fifth Special Report: Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2019–21
Published 27 April 2021

Fifth Special Report: Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2019–21
Inquiry Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain
Committees Defence Committee
Published 27 April 2021

Second Report - The Security of 5G
Inquiry The Security of 5G
Committees Defence Committee
Published 8 October 2020

The Security of 5G: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2019–21
Published 16 December 2020

The Security of 5G: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2019–21
Inquiry The Security of 5G
Committees Defence Committee
Published 16 December 2020

Pre-appointment hearing for the Service Complaints Ombudsman
Work Pre-appointment hearing for the Service Complaints Ombudsman (Pre-appointment hearing)
Committees Defence Committee
Published 3 December 2020

In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review
Inquiry The Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review
Committees Defence Committee
Published 13 August 2020

In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2019–21
Published 22 October 2020

In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2019–21
Inquiry The Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review
Committees Defence Committee
Published 22 October 2020

Drawing a Line: Protecting Veterans by a Statute of Limitations: Government Response to the Defence Committee’s Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19
Committees Defence Committee
Published 6 May 2020

Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2018: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighteenth Report of Session 2017–19
Committees Defence Committee
Published 9 March 2020


----------



## KevinB (29 Dec 2021)

Kirkhill said:


> 1080 rounds per minute
> 18 rounds per second
> 30 rounds per magazine
> 1.666 seconds per magazine
> ...


The entire program was rife with stupidity.   The M4A1 was "too long" (read not cool enough) - and they refused to look at the 10.3" Mk18 upper that SOCOM uses - as it was still too long, nor would they accept the addition of the Law Tactical Folder (which has NSN 1005-01-672-4614) which SOCOM and the US Army already uses on M4, M18, and M110's.

 In short some idiot wanted a 9mm Sub gun to look cool for pictures with zero thought to the actual operational requirements of a weapon system.


----------



## OldSolduer (29 Dec 2021)

OldSolduer said:


> I'd like to say one thing - it will probably turn out to be more - but can we put back the "light" in infantry?


I warned you didn't I? 
I have said this before BUT I want to reiterate it. Every time a replacement ruck/web gear or what ever was issued some brain thought that meant "the soldiers can carry more equipment" with zero thought given to the weight and its displacement.


----------



## FJAG (29 Dec 2021)

OldSolduer said:


> I warned you didn't I?
> I have said this before BUT I want to reiterate it. Every time a replacement ruck/web gear or what ever was issued some brain thought that meant "the soldiers can carry more equipment" with zero thought given to the weight and its displacement.


I used to think I was hard done by when I had to strap a 25/77 set to my rucksack for the two or three kilometres I had to hike when dismounted from my M113. All my gear inclusive of the C1 I carried as a FOO (I carried the C1 in the belief that I wouldn't look like a FOO to the pretend Commies) must have come in at around fifty pounds tops.

I can't even imagine what it was like for the guys in the sandbox. A 100 lbs+ in 40 to 50 degrees C+ 😣

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill (29 Dec 2021)

Funny thing about those 77s.   They must have been jet propelled.

I remember working in syndicates at Gagetown.  The guy in the rear without the gear was always lagging back and falling off the interval.  No amount of cajoling would make him keep up.

Next leg he turns into the syndicate leader.  Now he gets the radio.   All of a sudden he is legging it as if he is on a cross country race and nobody can keep up with him, despite the extra 15lbs on his back.


----------



## dimsum (29 Dec 2021)

KevinB said:


> with zero thought to the actual operational requirements of a weapon system.


In procurement?  Why gee golly, I'll be damned...


----------



## KevinB (29 Dec 2021)

OldSolduer said:


> I'd like to say one thing - it will probably turn out to be more - but can we put back the "light" in infantry?





OldSolduer said:


> I warned you didn't I?
> I have said this before BUT I want to reiterate it. Every time a replacement ruck/web gear or what ever was issued some brain thought that meant "the soldiers can carry more equipment" with zero thought given to the weight and its displacement.





FJAG said:


> I used to think I was hard done by when I had to strap a 25/77 set to my rucksack for the two or three kilometres I had to hike when dismounted from my M113. All my gear inclusive of the C1 I carried as a FOO (I carried the C1 in the belief that I wouldn't look like a FOO to the pretend Commies) must have come in at around fifty pounds tops.
> 
> I can't even imagine what it was like for the guys in the sandbox. A 100 lbs+ in 40 to 50 degrees C+ 😣
> 
> 🍻


 I had posted the US Army load carriage study here several years ago - there was also an informal one done by 1 and 3 VP to solider load @MJP  and some others will probably remember.

 The take away was Light Infantry meant you carry a heavy load and become combat ineffective.  For those who where on course shortly after the Bravo Two Zero was released - the BS number put out by "Andy McNab" Steve Mitchell  on both the weight of their packs and the distance they traveled with them inspired a lot of CF NCO's and Officers (at least in the PPCLI) to see how much weight would physically crush a soldier.
**News flash a '64 pattern jump ruck can indeed be loaded well over 180lbs, I say that from personal experience.

The "Iron Man" suit and several autonomous Mule vehicles and drone supply systems came about from the early loads dismounted forces where carrying early in Afghanistan and Iraq.   About the same time we also seemed to have learned that troops can be rotated even from SR missions, and endurance on the same can be extended via Helo resupply (and GPS Parachute delivery) rather than making folks carry insane amount of gear.


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## OldSolduer (29 Dec 2021)

KevinB said:


> The take away was Light Infantry meant you carry a heavy load and become combat ineffective.  For those who where on course shortly after the Bravo Two Zero was released - the BS number put out by "Andy McNab" Steve Mitchell  on both the weight of their packs and the distance they traveled with them inspired a lot of CF NCO's and Officers (at least in the PPCLI) to see how much weight would physically crush a soldier.
> **News flash a '64 pattern jump ruck can indeed be loaded well over 180lbs, I say that from personal experience.
> 
> The "Iron Man" suit and several autonomous Mule vehicles and drone supply systems came about from the early loads dismounted forces where carrying early in Afghanistan and Iraq.   About the same time we also seemed to have learned that troops can be rotated even from SR missions, and endurance on the same can be extended via Helo resupply (and GPS Parachute delivery) rather than making folks carry insane amount of gear.


Yes - I can attest to the idea that there were fools who thought that making a soldier carry a 120 pound ruck was the way to go. All it did was injure backs, knees, ankles, ligaments, tendons etc .


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## RangerRay (29 Dec 2021)

OldSolduer said:


> Yes - I can attest to the idea that there were fools who thought that making a soldier carry a 120 pound ruck was the way to go. All it did was injure backs, knees, ankles, ligaments, tendons etc .


A great way to force lots of good soldiers out of the army before they even go on operations. 🤦‍♂️


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## OldSolduer (29 Dec 2021)

RangerRay said:


> A great way to force lots of good soldiers out of the army before they even go on operations. 🤦‍♂️


Don't forget PER points for being a brainless fool  hard charger.


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## KevinB (30 Dec 2021)

RangerRay said:


> A great way to force lots of good soldiers out of the army before they even go on operations. 🤦‍♂️











						Soldier Load Carriage, Injuries, Rehabilitation and Physical Conditioning: An International Approach
					

Soldiers are often required to carry heavy loads that can exceed 45 kg. The physiological costs and biomechanical responses to these loads, whilst varying with the contexts in which they are carried, have led to soldier injuries. These injuries can range ...




					www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
				












						The Soldier’s Heavy Load
					

Developing strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies.




					www.cnas.org


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## daftandbarmy (3 Jan 2022)

Kirkhill said:


> Funny thing about those 77s.   They must have been jet propelled.
> 
> I remember working in syndicates at Gagetown.  The guy in the rear without the gear was always lagging back and falling off the interval.  No amount of cajoling would make him keep up.
> 
> Next leg he turns into the syndicate leader.  Now he gets the radio.   All of a sudden he is legging it as if he is on a cross country race and nobody can keep up with him, despite the extra 15lbs on his back.



Day trip: 95lbs

3 day trip: 130lbs






On airborne exercises we had to weigh our gear as part of the loading plan. I recall that my Pl Signaler weighed 145lbs, and 'jumped and humped' with 110lbs of weapons, radio, batteries etc. I got away with a measly 80-90lbs. We regularly covered about 20 miles per day, in the mountains. On Ops we carried similar loads.


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## FJAG (3 Jan 2022)

A blast from the past - FM 21-18 Foot Marches 1 June 1990:



> 2-7. INDIVIDUAL LOAD
> To prevent an individual load from hindering a marching soldier’s mobility and combat readiness, commanders must reduce the carried load to the minimum mission-essential and survival equipment.
> a. The individual’s combat load is that mission-essential equipment as determined by the commander, which is required for the soldier to fight and survive immediate combat operations. The load can be divided into an approach march load and fighting load. The fighting load should not exceed 48 pounds, and the approach march load (which includes the fighting load) should be less than 72 pounds, based upon individual abilities.



🍻


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## Kirkhill (24 Apr 2022)

Resurrection.  After all it is Easter.

Rethought after today's discussions.

Expeditionary Army


CANSOFCOM427 SOASCFJIRUJTF 2CSOR1 RCR (SOC)1 Cdn DivHQ & Sigs Regt1 CMBG2 CMBG (CCSB)5e GBMCHQ & Sigs SqnHQ & Sigs SqnHQ & Sigs SqnService GpService GpService Gp408 TacHel450 TacHel430 TacHel1 RCHA2 RCHA (AD)5e RLACLdSH(RC)4 RCA (GS)12e RBC1 PPCLIRCD1 R22eR2 PPCLI21 EWR2 R22eR2 RCR3 RCR

RCR goes all in for the Light/SOC roles and gets a prestige appointment in CANSOFCOM

After that, everybody sorts it out for themselves.

Domestic Air Force


CANR1 Cdn Air Div4 Ftr Wing19 ISR Wing3 Ftr Wing8Tpt WingJTF(N)4 GBD Sqns440 SqnCdn Rangers1 CRPG2 CRPG3 CRPG4 CRPG5 CRPGJRCC Victoria
JRCC Trenton

JRCC Halifax
JTF(Pac)JTF(W)JTF(C)JTF(E)JTF(Atl)3 GBD Sqns3 GBD Sqns3 GBD Sqns3 GBD Sqns3 GBD Sqns435 Sqn417 Sqn424 Sqn439 Sqn413 Sqn442 Sqn444/130 SqnTDG 01TDG 02TDG 03TDG 04TDG 05TDG 06TDG 07TDG 08TDG 09HQHQHQHQHQHQHQHQHQCommsCommsCommsCommsCommsCommsCommsCommsCommsSvcSvcSvcSvcSvcSvcSvcSvcSvcEngEngEngEngEngEngEngEngEng5 Fd RCA20 Ind RCA116 Ind RCA56 Fd RCA7 Fd RCA30 Fd RCA2 Fd RCA62 Fd RCA1 Fd RCA15 Fd RCA20 Fd RCA10 Fd RCA11 Fd RCA49 Fd RCA42 Fd RCARCH6 Fd RCA3 Fd RCABCDSALH26 Fd RCA1HQYROntRRdHullSherH8 CHBCRKOCRFGHWindsorRGGHGGGFGCGG12RBC(M)PEIRCanScotCalgHSaskDE&KscotRHFofCCHofORMtlRVoltigeursHfx RflsSHofCLERRRR4 RCRQORofCSD&GHRHRofCRChaudPLFusRWmRRWpgRElginsRRofCBrockRFusMRRSagWNSRRMtnRQOCHofCG&SForTorScotPWORRMaisFusSherCBHLSSRRHLILorneScotAlgR4 R22R6 R22RRNBRA&SHofCH&PERIrRofCNorthShoreL&WRRNfldR

The Hierarchy would stay the same.
The span of interests of the HQs would increase
Militia Regiments would primarily supply Infantry Coys for Territorial Defence.
They would also supply a Troop/Platoon for augmentation of the Expeditionary Army.

GBD Sqn is a Ground Based Defence Squadron - to be equipped with SAMs, ABMs, Coastal Defence Missiles, RPAS and potentially LCAAT aircraft launched from fixed points.  There are 19 of them in total, reinstating the old Radar Squadrons and supplying each of the southern Joint Task Forces with 3 Squadrons and JTF(N) with 4 Squadrons.

JTF(N) also takes command of all the CRPGs regardless of which territory or province they are located in.


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## Kirkhill (11 Sep 2022)

Bump. 

In light of recent activities

Doubling down on Lightness and improving Intelligence.  Centralizing Command

CJOC retains command over JTFs North, Pacific, Western, Central, Eastern and Atlantic but also commands 1 Cdn Div.

1 Div owns

1 Wing, 6 CSB, 1, 2 and 5 Brigades.

Canadian Army owns

2, 3, 4, and 5 Divs and the Canadian Rangers.

1 Div focuses on Kinetic Ops in Canada and Overseas.

The Canadian Army, via CADTC focuses on training and organizing the Rangers, Reserves and Recruits as well as career training and progression.



CJOCJTF-NJTF-PJTF-WJTF-CJTF-EJTF-A1 Div1 Wing400 Sqn403 Sqn408 Sqn438 Sqn430 SqnCH-146CH-146CH-146450 SqnCH-1476 CSBHQCAIR6 Int Coy2 Int Coy7 Int Coy4 Int Coy3 Int CoyIATF21 EWR4 ADR4 ESR1 (Siege) BdeHQ &Sigs Sqn1 Svc Bn1 CER1 RCHALdSH(RC)1 PPCLI2 PPCLI3 PPCLI2 (Light) Bde5 (Light) BdeHQ &Sigs SqnHQ &Sigs Sqn2 Svc Bn5 Svc Bn2 CER5 CER2 RCHA5 RALCRCD12e RBC1 RCR2 RCR1 R22eR2 R22eR3 RCR3 R22eR3 Div4 Div2 Div5 Div3 DSG4 DSG2 DSG5 DSG3 DTC4 DTC2 DTC5 DTCARCGARCGARCGARCG39 (Garrison) Bde41 (Garrison) Bde38 (Garrison) Bde31 (Garrison) Bde32 (Garrison) Bde33 (Garrison) Bde34 (Garrison) Bde35 (Garrison) Bde36 (Garrison) Bde37 (Garrison) BdeBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQBde HQSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs RgtSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnSvc BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnTpt BnEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtEngr RgtRRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARRCARCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCACRCICRCICRCICRCICRCICRCICRCICRCICRCICRCIC4 CRPG3 CRPG1 CRPG2 CRPG5 CRPG


Propose that 6 CSB continue with overall command or Int assets but that Int assets include active gathering capabilities including Electronic Surveillance and its own fleet of Drones (See Ukrainian Kraken Regiment for Reference - ) and that it be closely aligned with the IATF group.  These are valuable but Soft capabilities.

Propose that 4 RCA (GS) Regiment revert to 4 RCA (AD) Regiment - focusing on MRAD and closely aligning with 21 EW Regiment to keep the skies clear.

Propose that 1 Brigade be the designated Heavy Brigade (or as I am now inclined to think of it - The Siege Train - valuable, necessary even, when breaking fortifications,  but ponderous) - Track based.

Propose that 2 and 5 Brigades be designated Light Brigades - Wheel and Helo based.

1 would be a heavily armoured organization (LAV 6s for now but HAPCs in the future)
1 RCHA would be an SPG regiment with a 12 tube HIMARS battery and a SHORAD troop.
Infantry liberally armed with ATGMs.

2 and 5 would be lightly armoured organizations with an ISTAR Regiment, a pair of LAV Battalions and a Heliborne Battalion.  Ranging wide and fast in small groups.
2 RCHA and 5 RALC would be M777 Regiments with a 4 Tube HIMAR Troop and a SHORAD Battery.
Manpads liberally issued along with ATGMs.

Reserve Forces light troops independent of transport.  Reserve Brigades to include a Transport Battalion in addition to the Service Battalion.  Transport Battalions equipped with an array of vehicles to suit different environments, to include an armoured transport capability.

Reserve Artillery heavily focused on Missiles for both Air Defence and General Support.

Reserve Cavalry as light cavalry mounted on light wheeled vehicles with light tracked vehicles in storage with the Transport Battalion.


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