# How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)



## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

Hi I am a newbie here and this is my first post and topic!

*Introduction and summary 
*
In this short 5-minute video, I reject of the idea of peace talks with the Taliban and present an outline of my proposed strategy to beat the Taliban (and win the war on terror). 

VIDEO: Peter Dow's "no" to Taliban's surrender terms. Afpak strategy for victory in war on terror. 

Transcripts from the video - 



			
				CBS said:
			
		

> Scott Pelley said -
> 
> "Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made news Wednesday when he said the combat role for U.S. troops in Afghanistan could end next year instead of 2014. Today, he took a step back -- insisting that U.S. forces will remain combat ready -- even as they transition into their new role of training Afghan troops.
> 
> ...





			
				Peter Dow said:
			
		

> I said -
> 
> "So the Deans of Jihad have dictated terms to the West, the terms they propose of the West's surrender to the Jihadis in the war on terror.
> 
> ...



The desire for "peace talks" with the enemy is where poor generals with a failed war strategy end up. 

Why would NATO and specifically the US want to encourage "peace talks" with the enemy Taliban? Why not simply crush the enemy? What's the political or military issue here that might mean "peace talks" would be part of an exit strategy for the US and allies?

Key failures have been - 


Weak strategic thinking and planning by US and then NATO generals has dragged out the Western intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 and caused far more casualties to our soldiers than was ever necessary.



The military general staff has lacked vision about the enemy and failed to comprehend and react appropriately to intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi terror groups are proxies for hostile states, typically managed from Pakistan and funded from Saudi Arabia.

_This 2-hour video is of a British TV programme which explains in great detail the role of the Pakistani state via the ISI (Inter-services intelligence) has in supporting the Taliban's war against our forces in Afghanistan. _

VIDEO: BBC Documentary - "SECRET PAKISTAN - Double Cross / Backlash" (2 hours) 



Military strategic essentials have been neglected, such as - when occupying territory, always ensure secure supply routes from one strong point to another. Instead NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan have been deployed in isolated bases, deployed more like tethered goats as bait for the enemy than a conquering or liberating army.



Some combination of military incompetence by the generals and a preference for appeasement on the part of the civilian political leadership has perversely left the West bribing our enemies within the Pakistani terrorist-proxy-controlling state and continuing business-as-usual with our enemies in the Saudi jihadi-financing state.


My 4-point plan to beat the Taliban and win the war on terror

Its never too late to learn lessons and adopt an alternative competent and aggressive military strategy. I have already mentioned the outline points of my plan but I will explain those in a little more here and then provide a lot more detail in subsequent posts. 

Point 1

* The US and Western allies ought to name Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as "state sponsors of terrorism". We ought to name in addition, the other oil-rich Arab kingdoms who are also financial state sponsors of terrorism. This has implications such as ending bribes and deals with back-stabbing hostile countries and instead waging war against our enemies with the aim of regime change or incapacitating the enemy so that they can do us little more harm. The war could be of varying intensity depending on the enemy concerned and how they respond to our initial attacks, whether they wish to escalate the war or surrender to our reasonable demands. 

Point 2

* There ought to be drone strikes on the University of Jihad. (Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, Pakistan) In addition, we ought to employ aerial bombing of all other bases for the Taliban in Pakistan. This may have to be extended to include certain Pakistani state bases which are supporting the Taliban - such as the Pakistani ISI headquarters mentioned a lot in the BBC documentary "SECRET PAKISTAN". If this is not handled very carefully, it could escalate into open war with the Pakistani military. I will explain how to manage Pakistan later. 

Point 3

* We ought to seize control of Pakistani and Saudi TV satellites and use them to broadcast propaganda calling for the arrest of all involved in waging terrorist war against the West. These satellites are made, launched and maintained by Western companies and should be easy to take over. Other satellites provided to the enemy by non-Western countries could be jammed or destroyed. Air strikes against the enemy's main terrestrial TV transmitter aerials is another option to silence enemy propaganda. 

Point 4

* When occupying territory, always ensure secure supply routes from one strong point to another. I will provide a lot of details about how this can be done militarily.


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## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

2. Bomb the enemy in Pakistan

More on point 2 of the plan. Air strikes, bombing raids, missiles, drone attacks on enemy bases in Pakistan.

*Bomb Taliban Jihadi indoctrination bases in Pakistan.*

I am suggesting that our forces bomb the Taliban Headquarters known as "the University of Jihad" or Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, 50 kilometres (31 miles) east of the provincial capital, Peshawar. 

More about the place in this BBC webpage

BBC NEWS | South Asia | The 'university of holy war'

The significance of this place is that it is the main recruitment and command centre for the Taliban which must be known to our military intelligence officers and so it is a mystery why they have not advised our generals to bomb this place before now or if they did advise our generals to bomb it why they didn't actually bomb it?

It makes no sense in a war to give the enemy headquarters a free pass and immunity from being targeted. It just makes their commanders feel untouchable which is not how we want them to feel. We want them arrested or dead or in great fear that soon they will be arrested or dead and bombing their HQ gives them that idea. 

Our forces do not have ground forces close enough to use artillery to destroy this target so that leaves NATO to use its aerial power - drones and bomber planes, to bomb the target from the air.

So apart from not wanting to use nuclear weapons on such a weak target which would be over-kill, I think bombing using the very heaviest conventional bombs, MOABs or heavy bombing from B52s or C130s is appropriate. 

So a "MOAB" would be one of those.

Ultimate Weapons- Mother of all Bombs (YouTube)

Which has a blast radius of 450 feet or 137 metres.

Heavy bombing could be used to totally level such targets, or turn the target site into one huge crater field - obliterate it. Give the Jihadis a demonstration that they won't ever forget!

Then if the Taliban and Jihadi leaders relocate to a new recruitment, indoctrination and command base, blast that to pieces as well.

Our forces will have to establish air superiority over the target areas to allow not only unmanned drones but piloted heavy bombers with a much heavier bomb load to over-fly the area reasonably safely.

How to manage Pakistan

If and when Pakistan objects to our plans to aerial bomb these enemy indoctrination bases we should tell them that because our view is that Pakistan does not control the ground there to our satisfaction - because Pakistani police or military have not arrested and handed over the likes of the Darul Uloom Haqqania and other Taliban leaders operating on the ground for removal to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and not closed down the University of Jihad and other Taliban bases then the Pakistan military don't deserve control of the air space over that ground which they don't satisfactorily control.

So we can say "Sorry" if the Pakistanis don't like this violation of their sovereignty but the needs of war mean this is something we must do. We wouldn't intend to permanently deprive Pakistan of control over its air space; this would be a temporary measure until the war on terror is won.

Pakistan had their chance to arrest or kill the Taliban leaders in their Pakistan bases but now it is too late so we are going to flatten the Taliban bases in that part of Pakistan from the air and we need total air superiority over the target area in order to protect our pilots.

The Pakistan government and military has complained about drone strikes in parts of Pakistan but Pakistan has not gone to war with us about it, thankfully. 

Hopefully, the Pakistanis will not want to contest air superiority with their military but if they do decide to fight to resist our air-superiority where we need it to bomb the Taliban then we must be prepared to take out all nearby Pakistani ground to air missile batteries and any air fighters they send against us to contest air superiority.

If the Pakistanis decide to fight us over control of Pakistan's air space then of course there is a risk this could escalate to all-out war if the Pakistanis really want to make a casus belli out of the sovereignty issue and the matter of us requiring to destroy the Taliban so possibly we should make it clear to the Pakistanis that the US President or the NATO supreme commander have the option to use nuclear weapons against Pakistani military bases anywhere in Pakistan if that was necessary to win an all-out war with Pakistan. 

That's not our aim to escalate to an all-out war with Pakistan here but Pakistan should be careful not to escalate the situation from one where we need to go after the Taliban only into one where the official Pakistan military gets dragged into a war with us unnecessarily. 

This risk of having to fight and win an all-out war with Pakistan is a lesser risk than failing to defeat the Taliban, withdrawing from Pakistan having achieved little to secure Afghanistan and thereby giving encouragement to Jihadis the world over to commit more acts of terrorism and war elsewhere in the world including in our homelands. So Pakistan should not force us to make that choice of two risky options because their defeat is preferable to our own defeat in our opinion. 

Pakistan should avoid war with the West by stepping back and allowing us to destroy the Taliban in Pakistan because it is the Taliban and the Jihadis who are the true enemies of the Pakistani and Afghan people. We are the friends of the people of Pakistan and we will prove that by defeating their and our enemy, the Taliban and associated Jihadis.

Hopefully the Pakistanis will back off and let us bomb the Taliban without threat from Pakistan's air defences. We should tell Pakistan that we are doing them a favour which they will thank us for in the long run though we appreciate the embarrassment for them in the short term.

*Targeting the University of Jihad, Akora Khattak*

Here are the co-ordinates for Akora Khattak.

Geohack - Akora Khattak

34° 0′ 2.17″ N, 72° 7′ 18.06″ E
34.000603,72.121683

and if you look on Google Maps the co-ordinates for Akora Khattak seems to be centred right on the Darul Uloom Haqqania / University of Jihad.

That location is in a built-up area (of course the cowards would use civilian human shields) so using the MOAB is bound to do a fair amount of collateral damage to surrounding buidings and people. So the word should go out now - evacuate Akora Khattak and don't live within 5 miles of any such jihadi university otherwise you could be seriously inconvenienced.

The target area of the campus of University of Jihad looks to be about 100 metres x 100 metres. Hard to guess from the satellite photo.

Here is the Jihadis' own website for the base International Islamic University: Darul Uloom Haqqania which has a number of photographs and is helpfully in English.

Anyway a MOAB on that lot is certainly going to spoil their day and their terror-war plans.


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## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

4. Secure supply routes for Afghanistan. Overview from 'Warlord Inc.'

There's a lot of information here so I will start with a post presenting an overview of the issues and problems starting with this CBS news story which identifies a critical weakness in our military configuration - poorly defended supply lines whose vulnerability the enemy exploits to gain funds for its insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"U.S. funds our enemy Taliban's Afghan war" (YouTube)

U.S. Tax Dollars Fueling Afghan Insurgency


			
				CBS said:
			
		

> House Investigation: Private Contractors Paying Warlords, Criminals to Get Supplies to U.S. and NATO Bases
> Lara Logan reports for CBS Evening News
> 
> (CBS) Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are fuelling corruption in Afghanistan and funding the insurgency, according to a six-month investigation by the House subcommittee on National Security and Foreign affairs.
> ...









Download Warlord, Inc. Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan - Right-click, Save Target As ...



			
				Hillary Clinton said:
			
		

> We have to do a better job in the international side to coordinate our aid, to get more accountability for what we spend in Afghanistan. But much of the corruption is fueled by money that has poured into that country over the last eight years. And it is corruption at every step along the way, not just in Kabul.
> 
> You know, when we are so dependent upon long supply lines, as in Afghanistan, where everything has to be imported, it’s much more difficult than it was in Iraq, where we had Kuwait as a staging ground to go into Iraq. You offload a ship in Karachi and by the time whatever it is – you know, muffins for our soldiers’ breakfasts or anti-IED equipment – gets to where we’re headed, it goes through a lot of hands. And one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money.



– Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
December 3, 2009


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## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

Supplying along a land route (road and/or railway) through friendly territory is easy enough. Supplying through a war-zone, or bandit country requires a military approach, something like this.


Secure supply route border defences plan diagram

My plan is to establish a secure wide border either side of the supply route to keep enemy mortar and rocket launcher teams out of range of the supply line.

Apparently, the Taliban are being supplied indirect fire weapons from Iran so defenders need to be prepared to expect attacks using weapons such as 120 mm heavy mortars, with a range of 6200 metres and 107 mm rocket launchers with a range of 8500 metres. 


So regretfully there is no avoiding the requirement for compulsory purchase of land and eviction of occupiers along a 19 kilometre or 12 mile wide corridor, the whole length of the supply route.

More aggressively NATO might like to consider long-range missile attacks against Iranian weapons productions facilities in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from supplying the Taliban.

*Secure border for a supply route - 19 kilometres or 12 miles wide*






*Secure supply route border defences plan diagram* (large - 960 x 1374 pixels)

As can be seen in the diagram, the border perimeter defences are much the same whether you are securing a railway or a road.

*Diagram features.* Explained for secure Afghanistan supply routes.


*Dangerous ground* Enemy forces such as the Taliban, Afghan warlords or Iranian proxies may be attacking the supply route from here
*Vehicle barrier - deep trench / giant boulders / steep slope* - so that truck bombs cannot be driven onto the route
*STOP - Police check-point* - police check civilians are unarmed and those in police or military uniform are genuine. Needs to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.
*Barbed wire *- enough to keep out people and larger animals - so more than a horse can jump or cattle can trample over
*No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* Target zone for the machine gunners. A hostile intent should be assumed if an intruder is seen here and the intruder should be shot. The ground needs to be cleared of cover so that intruders can be easily spotted and cannot sneak their way past the machine gunners.
*GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* 3 man crew. Armour should be able to withstand an RPG hit and contains one machine gun with an effective range to 1000 metres, such as PKM or better. One every 1000 metres on both borders should be manned 24/7. Binoculars, automatic rifles such as AK47 and night vision for 3. Two or more other gun positions per 1000 m on each border are normally unmanned and don't need the expense of real guns sitting there all the time. Such extra positions confuse attackers and serve as firing positions for mobile reaction teams to occupy in emergencies and who can bring additional weapons with them.


> Which machine gun?
> For the on-duty-shift manned pillboxes, I suppose the better (longer effective range, heavier the bullet) a machine gun the better. At a minimum the plan needs a machine gun with a 1000 metre effective range to keep Taliban RPG out of range of the pillbox.
> 
> Ideally I suppose a heavy machine gun (say 12.7 mm ammo, 1800 metres effective range) with its longer range would be best for stopping an advance of the enemy and would give enemy snipers and heavy machine guns at long ranges something to worry about though I think the plan would work well with a medium machine gun (say 7.6 mm ammo, 1500 metres effective range).
> ...



*Access road* Where authorised traffic and people can access or leave the supply route.
*Mortar teams' ground* Defender mortar teams arriving from mobile response depots should set up somewhere here to fire at the enemy in the dangerous ground. The mortar teams' ground should have features to help to win mortar duels with the enemy such as observation points on higher ground or tall structures to serve as observation towers.
*Safe building ground* Somewhere relatively safe to build a heliport, runway, supply store or other facility or base.
*Supply route* The road and / or railway we are defending
*Crossing* Where the access road crosses a supply route railway
*Station* - Railway station to load and unload supplies and people onto and off the supply trains.
*Cross-roads* - A four-way junction where the access road crosses the supply road.
*Mobile reaction depot* - contains single armoured fighting vehicle. This is also where the off-duty mess is so that soldiers are available to react to sustained attacks anywhere along the supply route. One every 2km. Contains additional infantry weapons and ammunition such as additional machine guns, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the rest.
*Armoured personnel carrier* Such as an up-armoured humvee. Most mobile reaction depots have one of those. To transport soldiers to the proximity of the enemy attack where soldiers dismount to fight.
*Infantry fighting vehicle* or armoured combat vehicle. With stronger armour and able to fire on the enemy from enhanced weapons mounted to the vehicle, as well as able to perform the soldier transport role of the APC. Ideally the defenders would prefer the more powerful IFVs to the battle taxi APCs but fewer mobile reaction depots house IFVs because IFVs cost more and so fewer are available to the defenders than the lower performing APCs.


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## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

Secure supply route protection force organisation

I am proposing a dedicated force within the Afghan army to secure main supply routes through Afghanistan.

*Organisation.*

Ranks in increasing order of seniority - 


Gunner
Master Gunner
Team Leader
Shift Officer
Depot Commander
Reaction Captain
There will be higher officer ranks yet to be specified.

*Duties of the ranks.*

*1. Gunner* - infantry soldier, serves as a member of a 3-man team which serves on one *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* position normally for an 8-hour shift. 

A *Gunner* performs other routine duties for an hour or two each day in addition to his 8-hour shift at the gun position at the nearest *Mobile reaction depot* under the supervision of his *Team Leader*, *Shift Officer* and *Depot Commander* at which location he has quarters in the depot mess.

A *Gunner* can also be called to emergency duty when required.

*Gunners* must be able to 

see well
operate the machine gun
fire accurately
reload the machine gun, 
change the barrel on the machine gun
use the guns' optical sights and night sights
use the binoculars and night-vision equipment
be comfortable in a *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* position,
point out where the *No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* is and where it ends and where allowed ground behind the gun positions is,
understand that he is forbidden to enter onto the *No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* on or off duty, even if ordered to do so by anyone in his team because he may be shot if he does so,
understand that he is ordered on and off his duty shift at the *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* position only by his own *Shift Officer* and own *Depot Commander* and he cannot be relieved of duty by his *Team Leader* nor by a more senior ranking *Master Gunner*, nor by any other *Shift Officer* nor *Depot Commander* nor by any more senior officer whom he does not know.
understand that while on duty he is not to surrender his personal assault rifle (such as an AK47) to any person, even to someone in his own team. Therefore his *Team Leader* cannot relieve him of duty nor demand that any *Gunner* surrender his personal weapon,
understand that it is the *Gunner*'s job when on duty, his job, to shoot on sight anyone on the *No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* coming or going, even someone dressed in Afghan army uniform, of whatever rank who could be an intruder dressed in disguise or even be a colleague who is deserting in that direction. If he is not manning the machine gun at the time he is to use his personal assault rifle to shoot the person on the *No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* if they are in range, but he is not to follow in hot pursuit anyone onto the *No Pedestrians! Cleared ground* because again he may be shot.
understand pillbox defensive tactics as follows.



> Pillbox defensive tactics
> Sadly, the Taliban are not so obliging as to try to rush a machine gun position since one machine gun could probably take them all out if they were all to charge it clambering through barbed wire over open ground.
> 
> The pillbox machine guns would not be used for suppressing the enemy and therefore blasting away at where you thought an enemy was to keep his head down is just a waste of ammunition and overheats the guns to no good purpose.
> ...



perform other duties as supervised by the higher ranks.
*2. Master Gunner* - skills-based promoted ranks for *Gunners* with additional specialist skills such as 

weapons maintenance,
binocular and night-vision maintenance,
vehicle driving and basic maintenance - checking and maintaining tyre pressure, fuel and oil levels, etc.
infantry fighting vehicle specialist
mortar team skills, 
first aid, 
communications - operating telephone (landline and mobile / cell ) and radio.
*Master Gunners* get an appropriately and differently designed skills badge and salary increment for each specialist skill learned. So typically that would be a badge with a machine-gun icon for weapons' maintenance, a badge with an APC-icon for vehicle driving and basic maintenance and so on. A *Master Gunner* with more badges and skills outranks a *Master Gunner* with fewer badges and skills.

*3. Team leader* A promoted post. The most experienced and able *Gunner* in each team of 3 on a *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* position.

*Team leaders* should have multiple specialist skills and in particular the communications specialist skills is one of the required skills to be eligible to become a *Team Leader*. *Team leaders* are always the senior ranking members in every 3-man team irrespective of badges and skills. So a *Master Gunner* with, say, 5 skill badges does not outrank a *Team Leader* with, say, only 4 skills badges.

*4. Shift officer* - normally on duty back at the *Mobile reaction depot* and in command and in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with 4 teams, which is 12 men, on duty for an 8-hour shift. The shift officer acts as a deputy commander for the shift for 4 *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* and for the *Mobile Reaction Depot*.

The *Shift Officer* is also in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with *Shift Officer*s in neighbouring *Mobile reaction depots*. The *Shift Officer* decides whether or not to consult the *Depot commander* in response to a request for assistance from any of the 4 teams under his command or to a request for assistance from a *Shift Officer* in a neighbouring *Mobile Reaction Depot*.

*5. Depot commander* - in command of one *Mobile reaction depot* , the vehicle, weapons and everything therein. Commands the 3 Shift officers and 12 teams which totals 39 men under his command. He can declare a depot emergency, and call the off-duty shifts in the mess back on emergency duty.

The *Depot Commander* can order the depot's vehicle and men to attend and to defend the *GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes* under attack or order mortar teams into action from the *Mortar teams' ground*.

In an emergency, the *Depot Commander* notifies his immediate superior officers, the *Reaction Captains* who are the reaction director and deputy reaction director assigned command responsibility for his *Mobile Reaction Depot*.

*6. Reaction Captain* 

has some command responsibility for the reactions of 8 neighbouring *Mobile Reaction Depots* 
is the reaction director for the central 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots
is the deputy reaction director for the peripheral 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots.






*Reaction Captains direct Mobile Reaction Depots*

The diagram illustrates how the command responsibility of neighbouring Reaction Captains is organised.

Mobile Reaction Depots 1 & 2 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain C
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

Mobile Reaction Depots 3 & 4 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain C

Mobile Reaction Depots 5 & 6 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

Mobile Reaction Depots 7 & 8 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

Mobile Reaction Depots 9 & 10 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

Mobile Reaction Depots 11 & 12 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

Mobile Reaction Depots 13 & 14 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain E

Mobile Reaction Depots 15 & 16 
- the reaction director is Reaction Captain E
- the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

This overlapping organisation ensures that emergencies which are declared at any *Mobile Reaction Depot* can be supported if needs be by *Reaction Captains* with responsibility for the depot under attack ordering neighbouring depots on either side to react to the emergency.

A vehicle is assigned to each *Reaction Captain* who routinely drives to visit the 8 *Mobile Reaction Depots* for which he has command responsibility for daily meetings with the *Depot Commanders* and with the other 2 *Reaction Captains* he shares depot command responsibility with.

The *Reaction Captain*s can arrange to receive a salute at attention from each off-duty shift twice a week with an opportunity for the *Reaction Captains* to boost morale by reminding the *Gunners* that every *Reaction Captain* has 8 *Mobile Reaction Depots* and 320 soldiers under his command and that the 2 *Reaction Captain*s with command responsibility for a particular depot have between them 480 soldiers under their command.

So in emergencies the *Secure Supply Route Protection Force* is well organised to defeat any attack the enemy dares to try against any part of the supply route. _They shall not pass! (No passeran!)_

The *Reaction Captain* has a captain's office and quarters adjacent to one of the 4 *Mobile Reaction Depots* for which he is the reaction director and the *Depot Commander* of that particular *Mobile Reaction Depot* also serves as the *Reaction Captain*'s secretary to take telephone calls to the *Reaction Captain*'s Office if he is out of his office and quarters at the time. 

Being so mobile in his daily routine, the *Reaction Captain* must be contactable via radio or mobile (cell) telephone when he is out of his office.

In the event of a major attack, the *Reaction Captain* will set up a tactical command headquarters at his office to direct the battle and call for further reinforcements from neighbouring *Reaction Captain*'s offices if required.

*Staff numbers*

Reaction captain's office
1 office every 4 depots

*161 men*

four depots of forty men (4 x 40 = 160)
plus the Reaction Captain (160 + 1 = 161)

Mobile reaction depot
1 depot every 2 kilometres (1.25 miles)

*40 men*

three eight-hour shifts of thirteen men, (3 x 13 = 39) 
plus the Depot Commander (39 + 1 = 40)
40 men per 2 kilometres = 20 men per kilometre = 32 men per mile

Depot shift
3 shifts per depot

*13 men*

four three-man gun teams, ( 4 x 3 = 12) 
plus the Shift Officer (12 + 1 = 13)

*Reserves*
Approximate numbers of infantry required including reserves.

For a 25% reserve of 5 reserves per kilometre, 8 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile

For a 50% reserve of 10 reserves per kilometre, 16 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 30 infantry per kilometre, 48 infantry per mile

*Support staff*
Infantry deployed in the field or on guard somewhere can require numbers of support staff (such as delivery and rubbish collection, engineers of all kinds, trainers, medical, administration, military policing etc.) which I am told can be multiples of the numbers of deployed infantry they support, depending on the support facilities offered, the quality and efficiency of the support organisation.

I believe the support staff requirements for a static guard force are somewhat different to mobile infantry advancing (or retreating) in a conventional war because the guard force's requirements for fuel and ammunition deliveries are less but a guard force may expect more in terms of base facilities - running water, electricity and so on.

I am not recommending figures for support staff because such numbers are more dependent on the infrastructure of the army and nation concerned and are independent of the details of how the infantry are deployed which is my concern here only. Numbers of support staff are to be filled in by NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government and army themselves later.




How my plan solves the issues raised in 'Warlord Inc.'



			
				WARLORD said:
			
		

> In Afghanistan, the U.S. military faces one of the most complicated and difficult supply chains in the history of warfare. The task of feeding, fueling, and arming American troops at over 200 forward operating bases and combat outposts sprinkled across a difficult and hostile terrain with only minimal road infrastructure is nothing short of herculean. In order to accomplish this mission, the Department of Defense employs a hitherto unprecedented logistics model: responsibility for the supply chain is almost entirely outsourced to local truckers and Afghan private security providers.
> ...
> Transporting valuable and sensitive supplies in highly remote and insecure locations requires extraordinary levels of security.
> ...
> ...



My plan can achieve the "Warlord, Inc." recommendations 3 and 6, not merely to stop extortion and corruption along the supply chain but to gain a further significant advance to NATO-ISAF mission goals.

I propose secure supply route border defences and a dedicated Afghan protection force to man those defences which would achieve all along the main supply routes a level of security which is similar to the security inside a military base or fort.

"Warlord, Inc." uses the NATO-ISAF parlance of _"inside the wire"_ to refer to the security achieved within their own NATO-ISAF bases but to virtually nowhere else in Afghanistan.

It is about time NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government and military were extending that true security _"inside the wire"_ to more of Afghanistan. My secure supply route plan would bring more of Afghanistan _"inside the wire"_ so to speak.






The secure supply route border defences require only authorised persons living inside the secure defences.

The general population sadly may harbour enemy agents and so must be required to live outside the border defences.

Where isolated houses and small villages can be relocated to use a suitable existing supply road then that should be done with compensation for the relocated residents and landowners.

Where the settlements along the old supply route are too big to move then new roads should be built for a new supply route, by-passing those bigger settlements by at least 6 miles.


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## Infanteer (17 Aug 2012)

I like how you jump from international policies to the terms of reference for an Afghan soldier manning a pill-box (must "see well") - such comprehensive depth in 4 small posts.  And the Star Wars captioning combined with the Star Trek music to the commentary rocks!


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## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

WARLORD said:
			
		

> II. BACKGROUND
> 
> Supplying the Troops
> 
> ...



Then let NATO-ISAF supply fully 100 percent of its cargo by air by increasing by 5-fold the airport infrastructure and capacity of Afghanistan, building perhaps one or two more big hub airports around the country or a few more long runways and additional cargo handling facilities at existing airports like Bagram or Kandahar - to accept the incoming international flights, such as Hercules C-130s, then from those large hub airports transfer the cargo into smaller planes to fly from new short runways at those few hub airports on to dozens of new smaller airports all around Afghanistan.

To pay for this, money can be reallocated to airport construction by rationalising some of the 200 most expensive and remote forward operating bases and combat outposts. Close those which cost more than they are worth.

Retreat to the really important bases, build airfields for them and build secure supply route defences to and from them and that's a very strong defensive position from which to launch offensive operations against the enemy.

No longer will the legitimate military and civilian traffic require the permission of warlords to travel along Afghanistan's highways.

*Securing an air base. Example - Camp Bastion / Camp Leatherneck*






*Bastion Airport *(NATO Channel on YouTube)






Camp Bastion


			
				Wikipedia said:
			
		

> Camp Bastion is the main British military base in Afghanistan. It is situated northwest of Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province.
> 
> It is the largest British overseas military camp built since World War II.
> 
> Built in early 2006, the camp is situated in a remote desert area, far from population centres. Four miles long by two miles wide, it has an airstrip and a field hospital and full accommodation for the 2000 men and women stationed there. The base is divided into 2 main parts, Bastion 1 and Bastion 2. Bastion 2 includes two tenant camps, Camp Barber (US) and Camp Viking (DK). Bastion also adjoins Camp Leatherneck (US) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) Camp Shorabak. Bastion's airstrip can handle C-17s; C-130 transport aircraft; Apache and Chinook helicopters are forward-deployed at the Heliport.



Camp Bastion doubles in size


			
				Ministry of Defence News said:
			
		

> Camp Bastion, the lynchpin of British, and increasingly American, operations in Helmand, is a desert metropolis, complete with airport, that is expanding at a remarkable pace. Report by Sharon Kean.
> 
> Bastion exists for one reason: to be the logistics hub for operations in Helmand. Supply convoys and armoured patrols regularly leave its heavily-defended gates. They support the military forward operating bases, patrol bases and checkpoints spread across Helmand province.



Well here's another reason for Bastion to exist - to become a logistics hub for operations across Afghanistan, well beyond Helmand province.



			
				Colonel Mathie said:
			
		

> The biggest project is the airfield, a new runway and air traffic control tower. When it's finished we'll be able to put our TriStar airliners straight in here instead of going to Kandahar, allowing us to get strategic air traffic into Bastion. That will be a big development for us.


More ...

Well here's another reason for Bastion to exist - to become a logistics hub for operations across Afghanistan, well beyond Helmand province.

With strategic airlift capacity, think strategically. A few more runways like the new longer runway at Bastion and Afghanistan's airfield infrastructure would be sufficient for *all* of NATO-ISAF force supplies to reach Afghanistan by air - removing dependence and vulnerability on Pakistan's land routes and eliminating the extortion and corruption along the Afghanistan ground supply chain, as detailed in _Warlord, Inc._. 

After supplies are landed at the few huge hub airports - Bagram, Kandahar and Bastion - cargo could be transferred into smaller airplanes using adjacent smaller runways for connecting flights out to smaller airfields associated with NATO-ISAF forward operating bases.

Whether by luck or by design Bastion is well chosen in being far from a population centre which makes it politically feasible to impose a rigorous security exclusion zone on the ground for many miles around the airport.

Controlling the ground far around a military airport is very necessary to defend the incoming aircraft against missile attack by ensuring no enemy can get close enough to launch a missile anywhere near below where the planes descend to land.

Landing at night is not a sufficient defence. Aircraft engines and their exhaust jets are very hot and infra-red shines just as brightly at night for missiles to lock on to.

We cannot assume that the Taliban will be unable to source the most advanced ground-to-air missiles. We should assume they will source such missiles and take the necessary security precautions.

So at Bastion NATO-ISAF must control the ground in a vast security perimeter out to the horizon and beyond which means closing the nearby road to Afghan traffic and providing an alternative circuitous route for civilian traffic.

I need hardly mention the military, economic and political disaster of allowing the enemy to bring down one of our big aircraft. So this must not be allowed to happen. Therefore a very wide secure ground exclusion zone around Bastion should be imposed.

In addition, I need hardly remind people of Al Qaeda's willingness to use aircraft themselves as weapons and therefore airport air defences need to be operational and alert at all times, not just when scheduled aircraft are landing.

The progress at Bastion is very promising for the whole Afghanistan mission. It shows the way ahead.

We can contemplate one day removing the constraints limiting NATO-ISAF supplies reaching Afghanistan by air. From a limit of about 20 percent now, I foresee a 100 percent supply-into-Afghanistan-by-air strategy as both feasible and desirable.


Securing the land around Camp Bastion

RAF protecting Camp Bastion, June 27, 2012





51 Squadron RAF Regiment personnel on patrol.



			
				UK Forces Afghanistan Blog said:
			
		

> Personnel from Number 5 RAF Force Protection Wing, based at RAF Lossiemouth, have now been deployed at Camp Bastion for two months where they have responsibility for providing security at the main British base in Helmand province.
> 
> Number 5 RAF Force Protection Wing, comprising members of the Wing Headquarters, 51 Squadron RAF Regiment and 2622 (Highland) Squadron Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment, left RAF Lossiemouth on 16 April 2012 and the personnel are now two months into their deployment to Afghanistan.
> 
> ...



So it matters that Camp Bastion is well defended and I want to make sure we are using the correct tactics to secure the land around any airfield camp we are defending.

So I have some new comments to make which occurred to me after seeing that photograph of our soldiers patrolling through poppy fields. I am wondering if there are poppy fields in that 600 square kilometres around Camp Bastion?

Anyway, we don't want or need any high vegetation around the air field which would allow insurgents cover to sneak close to the base, either to launch missile attacks or to plant anti-personnel mines, I.E.D.s or anything else.

Much better if the land is cleared of all tall vegetation so that it is much easier to keep clear of threats. Short grass is good.

That may mean buying out farmers who are growing crops, buying their land around the camp, compensating them but only if they are growing worthwhile crops.

If they are growing poppy fields then they don't deserve compensation in my book.

Either way there is a big job for our engineers to clear the land all around the camp of all cover useful to an enemy. So that's clearing all the 600 square kilometres which was mentioned as being patrolled by our forces.

It is a big job to keep such a large area of land free of cover and yes it is OK to hire local Afghan labour to help with keeping the vegetation down. After all, we will have put some local farmers out of living so they'll be looking for employment.

It might be an idea to have grazing animals on the land to keep the vegetation down but I would not be surprised if the Taliban shoot grazing animals if they can but if they do that's a reminder to us that the Taliban are still out there if a reminder is ever needed.

I assume in a dry land like Afghanistan that burning vegetation is easily done and that'll be the easiest way to clear the land I suspect. So I approve a "scorched earth" policy.

At night when it is not so easy to distinguish between a farmer tending his grazing animals and an insurgent pretending to be that, I suggest that the 600 square kilometres should be an exclusion zone for everyone except Camp Bastion personnel. So all local Afghan workers who clear vegetation during the day need to go back to homes outside the 600 square kilometres every night.

This is the attitude NATO - ISAF and our base security forces need to take. We need to take ownership of all the 600 square kilometres of land which we are patrolling around Camp Bastion and optimise it for security.

It would be the same outrage if the Afghan government dares to suggest that we don't take ownership of the surrounding land, don't clear the land, and should instead allow existing cover for insurgents in land surrounding Camp Bastion as it would be if the Afghan government dared to suggest that we open the doors of the airbase itself to the Taliban.


----------



## Peter Dow (17 Aug 2012)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I like how you jump from international policies to the terms of reference for an Afghan soldier manning a pill-box (must "see well") - such comprehensive depth in 4 small posts.  And the Star Wars captioning combined with the Star Trek music to the commentary rocks!


Thanks!  ;D


----------



## GnyHwy (17 Aug 2012)

I don't even know where to start, if I chose to attempt to digest this.  You're all over the place, spanning from Ptes to Presidents.  If you want to discuss stuff then fine, but smaller chunks would be much better.

I suspect if people take the time to digest it, the fact that you attempted to cover so much, that the dogpiles will be coming from all angles.

Have fun!


----------



## tomahawk6 (18 Aug 2012)

Interesting post Peter. You have given this topic alot of thought. The one area that is paramount for success in Afghanistan but not addressed is the lack of political will to do what is necessary.Second the US and its allies are tired,worn out. Its time to pull back and rethink our approach to the GWOT. In a year or so the US and our allies will leave Afghanistan to its own internal divisions. We will still be able to reach out and kill our enemies as needed. The key to Afghanistan is Pakistan. The radicalization of Pakistan will continue to be a major problem that we wont be able to solve. However the Indians will have to look to their own self interest.No doubt we will give them the go ahead when the time comes.


----------



## Franko (18 Aug 2012)

So, have you presented this to anyone of any significance in England? If so, what did they say?


----------



## Edward Campbell (18 Aug 2012)

What is the AIM, Mr. Dow? What are we trying to do should we be doing ... and why?

I think I (and most Western governments) understood the AIM in 2001/02; I'm even fairly sure I could fathom the aim five years latere, _circa_ 2006/07; now I'm pretty sure I cannot grasp our governemnts' aims ... nor yours.

So I ask again: what do you want us to do and why should we do it? You never get near that absolutely fundamental question, and without answering it I'm afraid that yoiur thesis is meaningless.


----------



## glock17 (18 Aug 2012)

I'm sorry, did you say we should nuke pakistan if needs be ?

Wow, won't that piss off the neighbors a wee bit ?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart (18 Aug 2012)

Comprehensive Bombing Campaign - I think the US already tried that in one of their other wars *cough* Vietnam *cough* and we all know how that turned out.  Short of launching a full scale invasion of the Pakistani Tribal Areas the Taliban aren't going away anytime soon.  

I think what some of the others brought up is the key question that has never been answered?  What is the Aim of the mission?  What are we trying to achieve?  Like some said, we knew it 2001/2002; however, today I don't really know what our Aim is.


----------



## medicineman (18 Aug 2012)

glock17 said:
			
		

> I'm sorry, did you say we should nuke pakistan if needs be ?
> 
> Wow, won't that piss off the neighbors a wee bit ?



I think India would be pretty happy...otherwise, probably everyone else would be a little upset me thinks.

As for the rest of this, it reminds me of how my youngest thinks when he's smoked a Cheech and Chong sized joint...just my opinion for what it's worth.  As T6 mentioned, in any war, we need the political will and backing to be able to prosecute an enemy/target to the fullest measure possible to prevent resurgence but also in a manner that will prevent backlash from all and sundry, including the people of the countries doing the target prosecution.  It's kind of like the ballet a riot unit of police has to dance - do the deed, do it successfully within the rules of the law and within the rules of optics - if something looks dodgy, it looks outright evil when edited and shown on YouTube or 6 o'clock news.  Even if you win, you lose.

 :2c:

MM


----------



## Fishbone Jones (18 Aug 2012)

I think people might want to google the author.

Just sayin' :dunno:


----------



## Infanteer (18 Aug 2012)

All I got was the Condi Rice Rulz Homepage....


----------



## Journeyman (18 Aug 2012)

I got his repeated attempts to hook-up with women and/or be a sperm donor, as well as his fascination with Cossacks and Condi Rice.  

I think medicineman nailed it.


			
				medicineman said:
			
		

> ....it reminds me of how my youngest thinks when he's smoked a Cheech and Chong sized joint...


          :stars:


----------



## bobbocool (18 Aug 2012)

Am I the only one to find this crazy. Unless this is the basis for an Axis and allies expansion pack it almost resembles a schizophrenic rant. Very interesting read but here on planet Earth it would most likely be logistically and politically impossible considering the bombing of a sovereign state not involved in the war as well as turning hundreds of miles of highway spanning two countries into "inside the wire".


----------



## Fishbone Jones (18 Aug 2012)

bobbocool said:
			
		

> Am I the only one to find this crazy. Unless this is the basis for an Axis and allies expansion pack it almost resembles a schizophrenic rant. Very interesting read but here on planet Earth it would most likely be logistically and politically impossible considering the bombing of a sovereign state not involved in the war as well as turning hundreds of miles of highway spanning two countries into "inside the wire".



Guess you didn't bother taking the advice and googling the author.


----------



## bobbocool (18 Aug 2012)

I did after I posted. I'm confused is he for real or is he some kind of satirical internet character thought up by someone with an odd sense of humor either way he amuses me slightly lol.


----------



## Franko (18 Aug 2012)

recceguy said:
			
		

> I think people might want to google the author.
> 
> Just sayin' :dunno:



Oh, I did, hence the reason why I asked my question.        ;D


----------



## Jarnhamar (18 Aug 2012)

I've actually used this in Starcraft 2.  My buddy and I play against the Protoss and Zerg on "very hard". 

We section off a quarter or half of the map with bunkers filled with marines. Behind the bunkers we put siege tanks their stationary mode and have groups of jets for a quick reaction force. Once we have our defensive line, including anti-air turrets, set and QRF patrolling we proceed to strip mine our half of the map.  

While conducting our mining operations we send out small teams of spec ops assassins to disrupt the enemy with tactical nukes or load up a couple drop ships and send in guys behind enemy lines to kick ass.


----------



## Infanteer (18 Aug 2012)

Clearly, if the U.S. dumps Obama and Romney and votes in Condi, she'll ensure that Afghan gunners can see well and thus seal off the Af-Pak border!


----------



## tomahawk6 (18 Aug 2012)

The candidates have been selected. Unless Condi forms a 3d party she isnt going to be President.I am not sure if she wants the job to begin with.


----------



## a_majoor (18 Aug 2012)

This thread is like driving on the 401 and slowing down to see an accident in the opposite lanes, horrible and fascinating at the same time.

The highway idea is really an adaptation of the blockhouse defense the British developed in the Boer War to protect the railways and lines of communications, so as long as an army has 10,000 men to spare this is quite doable in the abstract.

Of course, like ERC says, what exactly do we want to do in Afghanistan now that would justify that level of expenditures (or any level of expenditure, for that matter)? From a military perspective, we have essentially moved the war to the south of Afghanistan and the Frontier provinces of Pakistan, leaving the Panjshir valley and other areas formerly controlled by the Norther Alliance relatively clear and peaceful. From a political perspective, there is a sort of functioning national government with very shaky institutions that are plagued by corruption and inefficiency.

A stable Afghanistan is something that should be desired, considering that it is the traditional land route between China, India, Russia and Iran/the Middle East. As a stable polity it can act as a circuit breaker or damper between unstable regions, while as an unstable region it allows the spread of crime, radicalism and instabiklity in general between these various regions.

How to get there is going to be a problem that will plague politicians for at least a generation to come (especially considering there are powerful forces who wish to undo the limited gains that were made and who _want_ a conduit for crime, radicalsim and instability). From a geographic perspective, the nations that surround Afghanistan have the most to gain or lose, so they should be the ones stepping in to provide help and resources. Since several nations have competing agendas, Afghanistan will probably become a pawn in a series of "Great Games" between multiple sets of players.


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

Oops! Forgot to click "Notify" myself of replies here. Sorry for the delay in replying to your replies folks. Coming right up.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I don't even know where to start, if I chose to attempt to digest this.  You're all over the place, spanning from Ptes to Presidents.  If you want to discuss stuff then fine, but smaller chunks would be much better.
> 
> I suspect if people take the time to digest it, the fact that you attempted to cover so much, that the dogpiles will be coming from all angles.
> 
> Have fun!


Thanks. I intend to reply to other people's small-chunk reply questions/points but I am presenting a 4-point plan and strategy for victory over the Taliban, Al Qaeda, jihadi terrorism generally and each of the 4 points of the plan matters.

It's like when any leg of a chair is missing the chair is not stable, so each of the 4-points in my plan has strategic significance. 

I wouldn't want people to read a topic I had posted with only one point of my plan in it and think I am the strategist's equivalent of a one-club golfer, or that I am claiming that there's one silver bullet solution to this.


----------



## Towards_the_gap (18 Aug 2012)

Gents,

The man is a loon, the sooner this is locked down and he is banned the better.

http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/meet-the-lonely-heart-from-hell-1079428


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Interesting post Peter. You have given this topic alot of thought.


Thank you.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The one area that is paramount for success in Afghanistan but not addressed is the lack of political will to do what is necessary.


I would liken our political will in Afghanistan to the fighting will of a bull in a bull-fighting contest. 







The bull initially lacks no fighting will to charge at the matedor's cape but the cape is not the bull's real enemy but the bull lacks the strategic vision to understand the true nature of the fight.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Second the US and its allies are tired,worn out.


I know. Treasure spent and precious lives lost.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Its time to pull back and rethink our approach to the GWOT.


Rethinking is good, if is it strategic rethinking and not merely a change from a decision to fight to a decision to surrender. Pulling back can be good, if it is done in good order. Imagine the fate of a chess game in which one player only ever moved his pieces forwards. Going forwards all the time is only for pawns and we are not pawns.

I can hear the political leaders' intention to pull back. I doubt that the pull back will leave any better order than did the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. I see precious little sign of strategic rethinking.

Instead by far the most common tendency on political and military forums is to ban me for daring to post rethinking-type posts. Oh it is never quite expressed in that way - instead moderators say "spammer", "nutter" or the like as I am banned. Strategic rethinking is being ruled-out by most people.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> In a year or so the US and our allies will leave Afghanistan to its own internal divisions.


The divisions are not solely their own. The Taliban is a proxy force for those with a jihadi agenda - the Pakistani ISI, the Saudis, the Iranians etc.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> We will still be able to reach out and kill our enemies as needed.


No time like the present. Points 1 to 3 of the plan can be started now.




			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The key to Afghanistan is Pakistan.


Yet if we pay Pakistan to borrow the key to Afghanistan they will give us the key that doesn't fit the door but sets off a bomb behind the door. If we wish Pakistan to give us the real key to Afghanistan we will have to use the stick against the key holders - the Pakistani ISI.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The radicalization of Pakistan will continue to be a major problem that we wont be able to solve.


My plan can solve the radicalisation of Pakistan problem. See points 1, 2 & 3 of my plan.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> However the Indians will have to look to their own self interest.No doubt we will give them the go ahead when the time comes.


India did not stop 9/11 and if we leave it to India they won't stop the next attack in our homelands. We must solve this ourselves.


----------



## George Wallace (18 Aug 2012)

Lessons on herding cats.


----------



## dimsum (18 Aug 2012)

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> Gents,
> 
> The man is a loon, the sooner this is locked down and he is banned the better.
> 
> http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/meet-the-lonely-heart-from-hell-1079428



Wow.  That's all I can say.   :facepalm:

I second the motion.


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

Nerf herder said:
			
		

> So, have you presented this to anyone of any significance in England? If so, what did they say?


England is like Scotland where I stay and perhaps even like Canada where the most significant person is the head of state, the Queen and the other significant people have significance because of their loyal relationship to the crown and to the kingdom.

I am a republican so I don't present my ideas in such a way as to appeal to royalists. Therefore if a royalist hates my republicanism, hates my plan and hates me, wants me banned, I am content that I have made my republicanism clear enough to get right up their royalist noses.

We can lose this war by following royalists of significance or we can win this war with republican intelligence.

I have posted my ideas in internet forums where I am not banned. You can search the internet yourself to find out how other people have replied.


----------



## medicineman (18 Aug 2012)

Dude, I don't think your problem is your political views, I think most people just object to you and how you come across to them...Google "Cluster B Personality Disorders and Traits", you may see yourself in the imagery.  I'd pigeon hole you somewhere between the Narcicisstic and Borderline types.

MM


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> What is the AIM, Mr. Dow? What are we trying to do should we be doing ... and why?


I would summarize our aims in Afghanistan as arising after the 9/11 attacks on the USA by Al Qaeda terrorists, we, the US and its allies, decided to confront, wage war on, regime-change and generally "deal with" the problem of state sponsors of terrorism and the first state targeted was the Taliban state in Afghanistan. The aim was no state in Afghanistan sponsoring terrorism against us.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think I (and most Western governments) understood the AIM in 2001/02; I'm even fairly sure I could fathom the aim five years latere, _circa_ 2006/07; now I'm pretty sure I cannot grasp our governemnts' aims ... nor yours.


The governments' subsequent aims were to establish a friendly state in Afghanistan to replace the Taliban, a state we would not have to worry about sponsoring terrorism. Many politicians and generals following them kind of hoped that Afghanistan was a stand alone problem and aimed to sort that out on its own but our attempts to establish a secure state in Afghanistan have been sabotaged by an insurgency, mostly operating out of Pakistan. So perhaps the governments' aims are much the same and limited to Afghanistan though they now see a Pakistan connection to the insurgency more clearly they have not quite got to grips with what to do about Pakistan as yet.


What intelligence reports have been pointing to is that by no means was the Taliban state of Afghanistan the only state sponsor of Al Qaeda terrorism. Reports are that the insurgency terrorism of the Taliban is being sponsored by other state sponsors of terrorism.

My aims as a person very much alert to intelligence matters is to confront, wage-war on, regime-change and generally "deal with" the problem of all other state sponsors of terrorism against us and my aims for Afghanistan are to target the states who are sponsoring the Taliban terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> So I ask again: what do you want us to do and why should we do it? You never get near that absolutely fundamental question, and without answering it I'm afraid that yoiur thesis is meaningless.


I have explained my aims. What I want people to do is to read my 4-point plan and strategy posted here and to ask any questions about bits of it they don't understand or want more details about. Also if I am banned from this forum, or if the topic is locked, I want you to kick up a fuss to try to get me reinstated and the topic opened up again.


----------



## George Wallace (18 Aug 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> My aims as a person very much alert to intelligence matters is to confront,





Sorry.  Would you rather change "intelligence matters" to "information"?  I really don't think that you are privy to actual "intelligence".  As for "information", there is a lot of it out there, not all of it accurate.


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

glock17 said:
			
		

> I'm sorry, did you say we should nuke pakistan if needs be ?


What I said is that we are the friends of the people of Pakistan and I intend that we prove that. This is a delicate matter so I will quote myself more clearly than is usual.



			
				Peter Dow said:
			
		

> The Pakistan government and military has complained about drone strikes in parts of Pakistan but Pakistan has not gone to war with us about it, thankfully.
> 
> Hopefully, the Pakistanis will not want to contest air superiority with their military but if they do decide to fight to resist our air-superiority where we need it to bomb the Taliban then we must be prepared to take out all nearby Pakistani ground to air missile batteries and any air fighters they send against us to contest air superiority.
> 
> ...



So that could be *tactical* nukes against Pakistani military bases as a military option on NATO's table, (NATO acting through the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and possibly the US President acting alone). I am saying we should not take that option off our commander in chief's table when considering our options if we are faced with the threat of an all-out war with the Pakistani military, if they threaten such.

I have not suggested the use of strategic nuclear weapons against Pakistani cities as I think it pretty much inconceivable that we'd ever need to use that tool against Pakistan.

I think the chances are excellent that it won't come to that. The Taliban have attacked the Pakistani military and the Pakistani police on many occasions so the Pakistani military I believe have no wish to go to war with NATO to defend the Taliban.

This is purely a "what if" scenario that we are as well considering while we are at it.



			
				glock17 said:
			
		

> Wow, won't that piss off the neighbors a wee bit ?


That is an understatement if ever there was one. It would be a terrible thing for everyone in the world if it came to that but I really don't think it will.


----------



## GAP (18 Aug 2012)

Guys, I don't know why you are humoring this wacko, but if that's what floats your boat..... have at it.... :


----------



## Peter Dow (18 Aug 2012)

Stymiest said:
			
		

> Comprehensive Bombing Campaign


I didn't and wouldn't use the word "Comprehensive". I say bomb only the enemy. Don't bomb anyone else.



			
				Stymiest said:
			
		

> - I think the US already tried that in one of their other wars *cough* Vietnam *cough* and we all know how that turned out.


Yes the US did try bombing the enemy in Vietnam but there is more to my 4-point plan than a bombing campaign. This is why I insist that my 4-point plan be considered as a whole and no one point be singled out and paraded as if I was presenting that point as the entire strategy.

As for bombing itself, the military science has evolved so that drone attacks and GPS guided missile and gravity bombs are very much more accurate than was the case in the Vietnam war. Do I have to explain that in an Air Force forum?



			
				Stymiest said:
			
		

> Short of launching a full scale invasion of the Pakistani Tribal Areas


I don't even support a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan if by that you mean controlling the entire country of Afghanistan including every route through the mountains.

I think we ought never to have attempted to control the Afghanistan / Pakistan border by stationing isolated outposts along the border. To my mind it is more costly than it is worth. I would have and still advocate rationalising our defences along our critical supply lines.

So I would never support our forces going into the Pakistani mountains in such a vague way to try to hold down the entire area. 

The only option for ground invasion into Pakistan which I would even consider (and I am not keen hence I have not mentioned this explicitly in the plan) would be to establish a secure supply route from Afghanistan through Pakistan to a port on the Pakistan coast.

The way the Taliban is defeated is by points 1, 2 and 3 of the plan, not by invading tribal areas on the ground. Once we have used those points of the plan the Pakistani military will be able to assert control no problem in those areas. They won't need us on the ground.




			
				Stymiest said:
			
		

> the Taliban aren't going away anytime soon.


It depends on how soon we start implementing a strategic plan to defeat the Taliban, such as the 4-pont plan I have presented here.



			
				Stymiest said:
			
		

> I think what some of the others brought up is the key question that has never been answered?  What is the Aim of the mission?  What are we trying to achieve?  Like some said, we knew it 2001/2002; however, today I don't really know what our Aim is.


I answered that point in my Reply #33.


----------



## tomahawk6 (19 Aug 2012)

Nuking Pakistan will only inflame the region.Gasoline on a fire if you will. All we need do with regard to Pakistan is to stop giving them money and weapons. Increase our support for India. In any event the die is cast in Afghanistan. The Afghans have a choice do nothing and come under the yoke of the taliban - again or they can fight them. Mr Dow doesnt deserve to be banned.While many here dont agree with his thesis, it has sparked debate which is a good thing,I think.


----------



## Peter Dow (19 Aug 2012)

bobbocool said:
			
		

> Very interesting read


Thank you.



			
				bobbocool said:
			
		

> but here on planet Earth it would most likely be logistically and politically impossible considering the bombing of a sovereign state not involved in the war


Two points 

[list type=decimal]
[*]- democrats believe the people should be sovereign, not the state.

[*]- at least one bit of the Pakistani state - military intelligence - the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence - is indeed involved in the war by sponsoring the Taliban.[/list]

You really ought to watch this BBC TV programme.


_This 2-hour video is of a British TV programme which explains in great detail the role of the Pakistani state via the ISI (Inter-services intelligence) has in supporting the Taliban's war against our forces in Afghanistan. _

VIDEO: BBC Documentary - "SECRET PAKISTAN - Double Cross / Backlash" (2 hours) 

(Bigger text for the link to YouTube this time because seemingly some have not seen this.)




			
				bobbocool said:
			
		

> as well as turning hundreds of miles of highway spanning two countries into "inside the wire".


Why say you "two countries"? Do you mean the other country to be Pakistan? There are other options for supply into Afghanistan by road other than via Pakistan, via the Northern Distribution Network.






So if we supply from the north through friendly countries then there is no requirement for us to consider the kind of "inside the wire" security or fortress highway in a country other than Afghanistan. This is also true when we supply via air into Afghanistan.

It is indeed possible and it is also wise to secure a supply route through a war zone or bandit country.

Rather it is not easy nor possible for ever to sustain the continual stream of casualties caused to our forces killed by mines, road-side bombs or ambush attacks while supplying along insecure roads.


----------



## tomahawk6 (19 Aug 2012)

Peter no one here at army.ca harbors any illusions about Pakistan and its involvement in Afghanistan. But Pakistan hasnt been alone. The Iranians were most helpful providing experts to assist the Taliban use IED's against the US and its coalition partners. After all they learned their trade in Iraq. Yet Iran did not pay a price for this. If they had things might have been different.


----------



## Fishbone Jones (19 Aug 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> Oops! Forgot to click "Notify" myself of replies here. Sorry for the delay in replying to your replies folks. Coming right up.
> Thanks. I intend to reply to other people's small-chunk reply questions/points but I am presenting a 4-point plan and strategy for victory over the Taliban, Al Qaeda, jihadi terrorism generally and each of the 4 points of the plan matters.
> 
> It's like when any leg of a chair is missing the chair is not stable, so each of the 4-points in my plan has strategic significance.
> ...



A four legged chair without a leg can be converted to a three legged stool.

A three legged stool is never unstable so long as all legs are present, no matter the length.

Basic carpentry.

Maybe it's time you got on yer bike buckwheat.


----------



## Franko (19 Aug 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> England is like Scotland where I stay and perhaps even like Canada where the most significant person is the head of state, the Queen and the other significant people have significance because of their loyal relationship to the crown and to the kingdom.
> 
> I am a republican so I don't present my ideas in such a way as to appeal to royalists. Therefore if a royalist hates my republicanism, hates my plan and hates me, wants me banned, I am content that I have made my republicanism clear enough to get right up their royalist noses.
> 
> ...





Did I say anything about the Queen? No.

So, in essence in this rambling....no, you haven't discussed it with anyone of any official capacity in the MoD.



Follow on questions for you:

- Have you even been to Afghanistan or served in the Forces?
- What are you basing all this analysis on?


----------



## Journeyman (19 Aug 2012)

Is it just me, or has there been a marked decline in the quality of meglamaniac rants by self-proclaimed geniuses? I mean before, one could always count on a Kim Jung-il or a Muammar Qadaffi for nutbar entertainment....but this strategically out-to-lunch Scot is now the best we can do?

Sad, really.  :not-again:



Nerf herder, I have $10 that says the closest he's been to _any_ military service is his Frontiersman uniform with the Scots' flags on the collar.


----------



## Infanteer (19 Aug 2012)

I'm just trying to see how many pages he makes it before he runs out of material; as Thuc said, it's like driving past a car crash....


----------



## Franko (19 Aug 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Is it just me, or has there been a marked decline in the quality of meglamaniac rants by self-proclaimed geniuses? I mean before, one could always count on a Kim Jung-il or a Muammar Qadaffi for nutbar entertainment....but this strategically out-to-lunch Scot is now the best we can do?
> 
> Sad, really.  :not-again:
> 
> ...



 :rofl:


----------



## The Bread Guy (19 Aug 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Is it just me, or has there been a marked decline in the quality of meglamaniac rants by self-proclaimed geniuses? I mean before, one could always count on a Kim Jung-il or a Muammar Qadaffi for nutbar entertainment....but this strategically out-to-lunch Scot is now the best we can do?
> 
> Sad, really.  :not-again:
> 
> ...


Who writes your material?


----------



## TN2IC (20 Aug 2012)

Nerf herder said:
			
		

> Follow on questions for you:
> 
> - Have you even been to Afghanistan or served in the Forces?
> - What are you basing all this analysis on?




Here, here!!! I want to know too. Please enlighten us.


----------



## Loachman (20 Aug 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Is it just me, or has there been a marked decline in the quality of meglamaniac rants by self-proclaimed geniuses? I mean before, one could always count on a Kim Jung-il or a Muammar Qadaffi for nutbar entertainment....



Nobody comes close to Idi Amin in that department.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> but this strategically out-to-lunch Scot is now the best we can do?



Co-incidentally, their last King was...


----------



## Journeyman (20 Aug 2012)

:rofl:

Excellent connection


----------



## cupper (20 Aug 2012)

Please, there is no way this man is a true Scot. 

I believe there are laws that require such people to be stripped naked, painted red and heaved over Hadrian's wall.


----------



## Old Sweat (20 Aug 2012)

Och aye, but I prefer to see them tossed beneath Hadrian's wall.  iper:


----------



## Infanteer (20 Aug 2012)

Who is Scot?  I thought this thread was about Peter?


----------



## Peter Dow (21 Aug 2012)

Thank you all once again for your replies and most especially thank you to tomahawk6 for this comment.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Mr Dow doesnt deserve to be banned.While many here dont agree with his thesis, it has sparked debate which is a good thing,I think.



_The following about green-on-blue attacks is politically topical right now and so I am giving it priority attention -_

Afghan forces. Green-on-blue attacks. The solution

The Afghan National Army, the "green" force is rotten, if not to its core then to much of the periphery. Some of the green is more like gangrene (gan-green, get it!     )

The problem I see is in the disconnect between the political control (Karzai) and the funding (mostly from the USA but anyway internationally funded).



> Wikipedia: Afghan National Army
> The new Afghan National Army was founded with the issue of a decree by President Hamid Karzai on December 1, 2002



Karzai as the "duly" (ahem) elected president of Afghanistan is perfectly entitled to run an Afghan national army but Afghans should pay for that themselves.

Afghanistan is a poor nation and could not afford that much of an army but if they paid for it themselves, at least the Afghan national army would likely be honest, accountable to Afghans and take on limited tasks - secure the presidential palace, military headquarters and might be up to defending the capital Kabul and surrounding land, maybe.

Now the issue is this - to secure all of Afghanistan, even to secure our supply routes, we need lots of troops and it makes sense to have some kind of Afghan force to help us - but we need a bigger and better green force than the Afghans can afford to pay for. (Also why would a national Afghan force want to prioritise defending our supply routes? They wouldn't want to.)

So the West, NATO needs to pay for some green Afghan forces - that's a good idea, if, if, if, if and only if, those green forces we are paying for are auxiliary to NATO-ISAF - run by NATO-ISAF - under the control of a NATO general, maybe an American general if you could find a good one to do it.

That way we would only recruit capable Afghans into the green force we pay for and interact with daily. We'd be sure our green troops were loyal - wouldn't shoot our blue troops.

No way would we have any incentive to spend our own money on disloyal incapable Afghans in green uniform so we would not do it, if we had political and military control over our green forces, which we would have if they were called "The NATO-ISAF Afghan auxiliary force" - with no pretence of them being an Afghan national force under Karzai.

However, some idiot has come up with the idea of paying Afghans to have an army funded by us but controlled by Karzai so there is no accountability. The people in charge, deciding who to recruit, can recruit bad soldiers because they get paid more by the US for soldiers, whether they be bad soldiers or not.

Why wouldn't Karzai and this guy






_Lt. Gen. Sher Mohammad Karim, Commander of the Afghan National Army_

recruit junkies, thieves, murderers and agents for the Taliban into the Afghan National Army?

Why wouldn't they recruit anybody they can find into the Afghan national army if, for every soldier they can name, they get paid more US dollars?

Where's the incentive for Karzai and Karim to recruit only good soldiers? There isn't any incentive at all.

Again the US ends up funding corruption.

If a green soldier kills a blue then who gets held responsible in the chain of command?

Nobody gets held responsible.

Who should get held responsible? The US and NATO should. We should blame ourselves for paying anything for an army which we do not have any political control over.

What on earth does Panetta (and what did Gates before him) think he is (was) doing trusting this guy Karzai and his general Karim with billions of US tax-payer dollars to pay for a green army?

Why are NATO defence ministers happy with the poor leadership from NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis? Shouldn't the NATO leaders have spotted this fatal flaw in green troop organisation and tried to re-organise green forces as I suggest here, if they know what they are doing (which they don't)?

*The competent answer to green on blue attacks is to split up the Afghan army into two distinct forces - 

[size=14pt]a national Afghan army which Afghans pay for and is commanded by the Afghan president and whichever general he/she wants to appoint. ("dark green")
**
a NATO-ISAF auxiliary force of Afghans, funded by the US and other NATO counties and international donors. This would be commanded by our generals. ("light green")

So there should be two green armies - each of a different shade of green so to speak. Karzai's dark green he would use to defend himself and his capital. Our light green we would use to defend our supply routes and to support our operations in Afghanistan generally.

Only when the Afghan economy had grown to the point that they could afford to pay for a big enough army to defend the whole country would we transfer our light green army over to Afghan national control and then we could leave Afghanistan in the hands of Afghans.

So long as we are paying for an Afghan force we must retain political control over it otherwise it fuels corruption and does little or nothing to help to fight the enemy we are trying to defeat and the green-on-blue attacks simply undermine political support for the whole Afghanistan / Pakistan mission.
*


----------



## Journeyman (21 Aug 2012)

I didn't realize that you were a James Thurber fan.  Me too.   :nod:

I'm sure you'll agree that a key to performing arts is knowing when to leave the stage. As such, when you're done this current Walter Mitty interpretive dance, have a look at Thurber's "The Scotty Who Knew Too Much."  iper:


Oh, and I'm glad to see your military insights extend to knowing that the whole "unity of command" thing is for amateurs. One of the things Afghanistan could surely benefit from is a few _more_ divergent chains of command.


----------



## glock17 (21 Aug 2012)

OK, I get it, we nuke Pakistan if "they force us to".... anybody else while we're at it ?


BTW - Its nice to be back, looks like I missed a lot here  ???


----------



## Franko (21 Aug 2012)

Mr Dow - you are ducking my question and it still stands.


----------



## Jarnhamar (21 Aug 2012)

Nerf herder said:
			
		

> Mr Dow - you are ducking my question and it still stands.



All I got was;
Just bomb the bad guys
Pay afghans more money


----------



## 57Chevy (21 Aug 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> A stable Afghanistan is something that should be desired, considering that it is the traditional land route between China, India, Russia and Iran/the Middle East. As a stable polity it can act as a circuit breaker or damper between unstable regions, while as an unstable region it allows the spread of crime, radicalism and instabiklity in general between these various regions.



Very well put. (* I especially like the desired aspect of your statement) :camo:




			
				Peter Dow said:
			
		

> I would liken our political will in Afghanistan to the fighting will of a bull in a bull-fighting contest.



I wouldn't
Bull-fighting is not a contest. It is considered a performance,
and so being, the political "will" must be more so likened onto the matador. No ? 



			
				Peter Dow said:
			
		

> ...The bull initially lacks no fighting will to charge at the matedor's cape but the cape is not the bull's real enemy but the bull lacks the strategic vision to understand the true nature of the fight.



You should start by rethinking that comparison. 


* added ;D


----------



## medicineman (21 Aug 2012)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> All I got was;
> Just bomb the bad guys
> Pay afghans more money



That's better than me - all I heard were monosyllabic couplets...

MM


----------



## aesop081 (21 Aug 2012)

"I say we nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure"


----------



## Fishbone Jones (21 Aug 2012)

Quote from: Peter Dow on August 18, 2012, 20:45:45



> ...The bull initially lacks no fighting will to charge at the matedor's cape but the cape is not the bull's real enemy but the bull lacks the strategic vision to understand the true nature of the fight.



Shoulda told this bull. I don't think he believes your hypothesis  :

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXsYhvnBxIc&feature=related


----------



## a_majoor (22 Aug 2012)

ObedientiaZelum said:
			
		

> All I got was;
> Just bomb the bad guys
> Pay afghans more money



Can you redo this as a Haiku?


----------



## dimsum (22 Aug 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Can you redo this as a Haiku?



All I got was this
Bomb the bad guys now and then
Pay Afghans more cash


----------



## Peter Dow (2 Sep 2012)

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This thread is like driving on the 401 and slowing down to see an accident in the opposite lanes, horrible and fascinating at the same time.


What's even more horrible to see has been the many avoidable deaths of our troops killed by mines, road-side bombs, improvised explosive devices and ambushes while routinely and recklessly supplying along unsecured roads in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What has been fascinating about this unnecessary carnage has been the blind-eye of our generals to the conventional military approach of securing a supply road by defending a secure perimeter to keep the enemy forces well back from the road at all times and instead of our political leaders demanding that elementary competence from our generals, we have seen a fascinating considerable investment by the Pentagon and the UK MOD to develop more robust armoured vehicles, MRAPs etc - to counter the IED threat to supply roads.

It is fascinating that the military experience of centuries of securing roads has been overlooked as if military academies aren't teaching military basics to our officers any more and instead the war planners have reached for new 21st century technology to try to compensate and work around the grotesque  incompetence of our generals.

I confess that I have been caught up with this fascination for new, better, stronger APCs myself and here, briefly is a couple of my ideas I first published in the weeks after I had published my plan for securing the roads.












There's a tendency to engage in "group think". In other words, everyone in the news has been talking about new MRAPs and no-one has been talking about securing the roads by defending a perimeter the old-fashioned way so I joined in the MRAP debate whereas perhaps I should have continued to bang on to deaf ears about securing the roads like any competent general would do. So in my own way, I "rubber-necked" the IED carnage the way the news did and was not able to get the authorities or military forums to insist on critical thinking to break the group think towards new, bigger and better MRAPs as the answer.

I did my best to get political and military people to focus on what they should know works but what with being banned from some forums and being ridiculed and trolled in other forums there are many out there still in denial about the bizarre failure of our generals to secure our supply roads.

I am sure that a great many members here in this forum will dig their heels in and refuse to consider and to admit to the sheer stupidity of failing to secure supply roads in Iraq and Afghanistan and think that our casaulties to road-side bombs etc are sad but somehow an inevitable consequence of those damn terrorists and in no way the fault of our generals who as "people of significance", or as "senior officials at the Pentagon and MoD" *must *know what they are doing.

It all reminds me of the absolute trust in the donkey generals of world war 1 who sent vast numbers of brave men to pick their way through barbed-wire of no-man's land while being machine-gunned to death all to no strategic purpose whatsoever.

The generals, be they people of significance, with medals and honours from the monarch, do not always know best. Face this fact and win this war.




			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> The highway idea is really an adaptation of the blockhouse defense the British developed in the Boer War to protect the railways and lines of communications,


Well in every previous war it is hard to imagine competent generals tolerating enemy forces in the rear planting bombs on supply roads though the Nazi generals made that mistake in their campaign against the Soviets.



> History Learning Site > World War Two > World War Two and Eastern Europe > Russia
> The supply lines of the German army stretched from Germany through Poland and into Russia itself - a huge distance to defend and control. These supply lines were attacked by guerrillas called partisans who did a considerable amount of damage to the German army and caused major shortages.



Well of course Hitler was an interfering commander in chief who imposed his own utterly incompetent military ideas over the objections of his generals some of who were reasonably competent. In many ways, Hitler was the Allies best military asset so useless a commander in chief was he.

Who have been the equivalent fools in our Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns? I know the Queen is a fool but I can't see her ever over-ruling her generals. So are the generals incompetent or are civilian defence ministers refusing to secure roads but offering bigger, better MRAPs instead?

This for me is fascinating. From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?




			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> so as long as an army has 10,000 men to spare this is quite doable in the abstract.



In my opening posts, I suggested numbers of men per mile or per kilometre.



			
				Peter Dow said:
			
		

> *Staff numbers*
> 
> Reaction captain's office
> 1 office every 4 depots
> ...



So for a 25% reserve I am suggesting 25 men per kilometre or 40 men per mile to secure a supply route. That's front-line gunners and their officers. That doesn't include extras like air support or even certain essentials like military policing of the force, or policing for the STOP points where traffic is checked before being allowed onto the secured road.

But anyway at 25 men/km, 40 men/mile with your suggested 10,000 men I could only offer you 400 km or 250 miles of secured road which is not quite enough to join Kabul to Kandahar.

There's a lot more road that needs securing than that but there are a lot more troops available. The Afghan national army is about 200,000 strong I think and so recruiting from that pool to man a NATO-ISAF auxiliary supply route protection force of say 50,000 men could be used to provide the basic security for 2000 km or 1250 miles of road, a much more practical figure for Afghanistan.





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> Of course, like ERC says, what exactly do we want to do in Afghanistan now that would justify that level of expenditures (or any level of expenditure, for that matter)?


In the global war on terror, it makes sense to fight an offensive war, to seek and destroy enemy bases wherever they are in the world with the prospect of a final victory (eventually), rather than concentrate all expenditure on homeland defence and never have any chance of winning the war while allowing other parts of the world to fall to the enemy, the enemy gains strength through gaining more countries with more resources and more dangerous weapons (Pakistan's nuclear weapons for example) which makes the homeland defence job a whole lot more expensive.

So we were right to invade somewhere and Afghanistan was as good a place as any to start though we ought to be aware that Al Qaeda intended to lure us there because the ground (they thought) favours jihadi infantry forces as they proved in defeating the Soviets and driving them out of Afghanistan (with some help from the West).

But on the subject of expenditure, I must say it is much more efficient war-on-terror spending to switch off pro-jihadi and pro-state-sponsors-of-terrorism satellite TV from a Western-controlled satellite ground station. Knocking out the enemy propaganda our technology is beaming into the middle east is such a low-cost, effective move that it qualifies as a "no brainer" which tells us all we need to know about our current war strategy (the people running it have no brains to speak of).

The other points of my plan do not suggest a total amount of expenditure in Afghanistan but rather suggest how best to spend whatever money is going to be spent.

Some aspects of my plan - bombing Taliban bases from the air, in Afghanistan or Pakistan do not absolutely require a ground presence in Afghanistan though having air bases in Afghanistan gives us more attack options and I should mention more headaches in terms of defending those air bases from Pakistan's nuclear weapons or other WMDs.




			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> From a military perspective, we have essentially moved the war to the south of Afghanistan and the Frontier provinces of Pakistan, leaving the Panjshir valley and other areas formerly controlled by the Norther Alliance relatively clear and peaceful. From a political perspective, there is a sort of functioning national government with very shaky institutions that are plagued by corruption and inefficiency.
> 
> A stable Afghanistan is something that should be desired, considering that it is the traditional land route between China, India, Russia and Iran/the Middle East. As a stable polity it can act as a circuit breaker or damper between unstable regions, while as an unstable region it allows the spread of crime, radicalism and instabiklity in general between these various regions.
> 
> How to get there is going to be a problem that will plague politicians for at least a generation to come (especially considering there are powerful forces who wish to undo the limited gains that were made and who _want_ a conduit for crime, radicalsim and instability). From a geographic perspective, the nations that surround Afghanistan have the most to gain or lose, so they should be the ones stepping in to provide help and resources. Since several nations have competing agendas, Afghanistan will probably become a pawn in a series of "Great Games" between multiple sets of players.


Political support for the intervention in Afghanistan is fast draining away and I do not think at current casualty rates it can be sustained for a generation. If casualties and costs could be moderated, if our generals were up to the task, if the diplomacy with and/or regime change of neighbouring countries could secure enough supply options, then I would support a long term presence in terms of NATO air bases for forward operations in Asia and training facilities for our local Afghan partners.

We can do this thing but we need to up our game.


----------



## MeatheadMick (3 Sep 2012)

Mr. Dow sounds like an incredibly crazy person... but what most intrigues me is that his post count remains 0


----------



## aesop081 (3 Sep 2012)

MPMick said:
			
		

> but what most intrigues me is that his post count remains 0



Posts made in "Radio Chatter" do not add up in the post count.


----------



## MeatheadMick (3 Sep 2012)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Posts made in "Radio Chatter" do not add up in the post count.



Well shit... now this Peter Dow doesn't seem so scary   Just clicking through Posts Since Last Visit... did not see the form >.<


----------



## Journeyman (3 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?


Delusions that Nintendo-inspired vehicles, and '_if only_ Hitler had stationed countless hundreds of thousands of armed guards 15km out from all supply routes between Berlin and Stalingrad,' passes for informed strategic thought.

The sources of those delusions of competence is beyond me.

    :not-again:


----------



## Fishbone Jones (3 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?



In the existential search for self realization and the eternal quest for the meaning of one's life, typically, your question is answered by the simple act of delving into the grandiose fantasies produced by one's own moonstruck mind.


----------



## GAP (3 Sep 2012)

recceguy said:
			
		

> In the existential search for self realization and the eternal quest for the meaning of one's life, typically, your question is answered by the simple act of delving into the grandiose fantasies produced by one's own moonstruck mind.



oh....dingbatitis......


----------



## Franko (3 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow - you have yet again ducked my question and it still stands.


----------



## cupper (3 Sep 2012)

GAP said:
			
		

> oh....dingbatitis......



Otherwise known as Bat Crap Crazy (BCC)


----------



## medicineman (4 Sep 2012)

GAP said:
			
		

> oh....dingbatitis......





			
				cupper said:
			
		

> Otherwise known as Bat Crap Crazy (BCC)


Or, what I used to get in trouble for using on my Psychiatry rotation: F.I.T.H. - F#$ked In The Head.  It's apparently going to be int he DSM V thanks to me ;D.

MM


----------



## uptheglens (4 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> Wibble, kipper, hatstand, my old man's a wheelbarrow.



Dow's probably the biggest troll and mental defective that ARRSE ever attracted.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/search.php?searchid=11622686

But I must admit that he elicited some of the most creative putdowns I've ever read.


----------



## dimsum (4 Sep 2012)

uptheglens said:
			
		

> Dow's probably the biggest troll and mental defective that ARRSE ever attracted.
> 
> http://www.arrse.co.uk/search.php?searchid=11622686
> 
> But I must admit that he elicited some of the most creative putdowns I've ever read.



Darn, the link doesn't seem to work for me.


----------



## uptheglens (4 Sep 2012)

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Darn, the link doesn't seem to work for me.



Here's some direct links to some of the choicer threads he started.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/arrse-hole/164026-traitor-msps-surrender-scotland-queen-elizabeth.html

http://www.arrse.co.uk/arrse-hole/137489-afghanistan-our-army-betrayed-rotten-nato-isaf-uk-us-generals.html

http://www.arrse.co.uk/naafi-bar/155225-peter-dows-again.html

The man clearly has mental issues.


----------



## Franko (5 Sep 2012)

http://scot.tk/outfit.htm

Wow....just wow.

Read some of the links provided and Dow's posting style - basically post and run.

Anymore of this and I will lock this thread perminatly as it is trolling.



Oh, just so we are clear - Dow will be banned as well. Consider yourself on the ramp.....




*The Army.ca Staff*


----------



## Ignatius J. Reilly (7 Sep 2012)

Mr. Dow would appear to have far too much free time on his hands.
The same content as his original post in this thread has been posted in a least 5 other sites:

http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/war-peace/73641-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://forums.militaryspot.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/3461073/m/9024056228/p/1

http://www.volconvo.com/forums/politics-government/41922-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win.html

http://armyforums.com/politics/5874-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?217234-How-to-beat-the-Taliban-in-Afghanistan-Pakistan-(and-win-the-war-on-terror)


----------



## dimsum (7 Sep 2012)

Ignatius J. Reilly said:
			
		

> Mr. Dow would appear to have far too much free time on his hands.
> The same content as his original post in this thread has been posted in a least 5 other sites:
> 
> http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/war-peace/73641-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html
> ...



Well, let's just hope no one else is taking him seriously either.


----------



## jollyjacktar (7 Sep 2012)

You know, one could always use an old slipper to beat the Taliban with in either Afghanistan or Pakistan if the occasion arose.  No need for a huge complicated post and stuff.   :nod:


----------



## Danjanou (7 Sep 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Nerf herder, I have $10 that says the closest he's been to _any_ military service is his Frontiersman uniform with the Scots' flags on the collar.









Close enough looking for me, $10.00 on the bar next time you're in town ok?   8)


----------



## OldSolduer (7 Sep 2012)

I think we best look  to another nation in that part of the world tht we have just cut diplomatic ties with. We may have a bit more trouble than we had with the last one.


----------



## Michael OLeary (8 Sep 2012)

The campaign to rename the M113 to "the Gavin" seems so quaint now.


----------



## Franko (8 Sep 2012)

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> The campaign to rename the M113 to "the Gavin" seems so quaint now.



Great....now Sparky will be along shortly.         :


----------



## a_majoor (9 Sep 2012)

Nerf herder said:
			
		

> Great....now Sparky will be along shortly.         :



Now with those two teaming up, the Taliban won't have a chance!


----------



## MeatheadMick (10 Sep 2012)

Before he does and continues this non-sense troll fest, may I suggest a thread-lock?


----------



## Loachman (10 Sep 2012)

Too late.

You already did.

But why? It's Radio Chatter.


----------



## Peter Dow (11 Sep 2012)

Nerf herder said:
			
		

> Did I say anything about the Queen? No.
> 
> So, in essence in this rambling....no, you haven't discussed it with anyone of any official capacity in the MoD.


No.



			
				Nerf herder said:
			
		

> Follow on questions for you:
> 
> - Have you even been to Afghanistan


Never.



			
				Nerf herder said:
			
		

> or served in the Forces?


Never.



			
				Nerf herder said:
			
		

> - What are you basing all this analysis on?


I am a scientist. I also have some experience of military strategy games, such as "Company of Heroes". I used to play chess but computer games are more fun and realistic.

So I have a thoughtful, analytical and strategic mind and I'd like to help.

If our military was serious about winning our wars, scientists, mathematicians, gamers, like me would be recruited to run our wars.

Instead, time-served soldiers with plenty of experience with firing guns but not much clue about strategy get the generals' jobs and we struggle, too many soldiers get killed, wars drag on.

We ought to employ people with the right skills to do the military leadership job.


----------



## Container (11 Sep 2012)

What.The.Hell.

You realize that for years while they are gaining experience shooting guns they are studying history and strategy to a much greater degree then a armchair general "scientist".

Im not familiar with one great strategic victory from history won by a "scientist".


----------



## uptheglens (11 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> I am a scientist.



No, you most definitely are not, Billy Bullshtiter. How about you enlighten us about your thesis being rejected by the University of Aberdeen because it was only 20 pages long (and was most likely written in crayon).


----------



## Loachman (11 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> If our military was serious about winning our wars, scientists, mathematicians, gamers, like me would be recruited to run our wars.



And if you were serious about curing your problem, you'd recruit a Combat Engineer skilled in the creative use of plastic explosives as a replacement for your shrink.


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## Journeyman (11 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> I am a scientist.
> 
> If our military was serious about winning our wars, scientists, mathematicians, gamers, like me would be recruited to run our wars.


Sorry, but I cannot find a single definition of "scientist" that fits what you have provided here, or on your website. I cannot help but _suspect_ therefore that your scientific training is equivalent to your military experience.....watching Dougie Howser in Starship Troopers.  

     :not-again:




			
				Container said:
			
		

> I'm not familiar with one great strategic victory from history won by a "scientist".


Dr Richard J. Gatling and Dr Robert Oppenheimer both gave it a good shot in their day.


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## Fishbone Jones (11 Sep 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Dr Richard J. Gatling and Dr Robert Oppenheimer both gave it a good shot in their day.



I see what you did there


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## Franko (11 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> No.
> Never.
> Never.
> I am a scientist. I also have some experience of military strategy games, such as "Company of Heroes". I used to play chess but computer games are more fun and realistic.
> ...



Thanks for finally starting to answer some of the questions put to you, there's more by other members BTW.

Straight off the street? Here's your pips there general scientist who plays games and has no tactical experience to speak of besides playing a game.

Are you on fucking crack?


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## brihard (11 Sep 2012)

Peter Dow said:
			
		

> No.
> Never.
> Never.
> I am a scientist. I also have some experience of military strategy games, such as "Company of Heroes". I used to play chess but computer games are more fun and realistic.
> ...





Ugh. Someone please show this Walt to the door? I don't see any need for this lackwit to be a part of this forum...


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## Journeyman (11 Sep 2012)

He's served his purpose; got me $10 in beer money from Danjanou.   ;D

He can be dismissed now.


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## jollyjacktar (11 Sep 2012)

OK, OK I'll admit it.  I do at times make inane comments just for the shits and giggles of it all, but honestly those who know me personally know I'm just being a stupid bugger for the fun of it all.  But, this guy is serious.  Thanks, Mr. Dow for the entertainment you've provided me however unintentional.   I will play Devil's Advocate for just a little bit.  Yes, Mr. Dow there have been many a scientist who has contributed to their respective Military and were integral to it's ultimate success in battle.  Sadly, I don't and all here don't believe you rank amongst this peerage.


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## TN2IC (11 Sep 2012)

Container said:
			
		

> Im not familiar with one great strategic victory from history won by a "scientist".



What about Ypres in April 1915? Chlorine gas made by a "scientist". Not a victory thou. But a nerd did make impact.  ;D


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## TN2IC (11 Sep 2012)

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> OK, OK I'll admit it.  I do at times make inane comments just for the shits and giggles of it all, but honestly those *who know me personally know*I'm just being a stupid bugger for the fun of it all.



He is more missing a few fries of a Happy Meal. Myself, I was drop on my head after birth.


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## Old Sweat (11 Sep 2012)

This may lead to the resurrection of phrenology as an accepted science.


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## cupper (11 Sep 2012)

Let's not overlook the contribution of Barnes Wallis in WWII.


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## cupper (11 Sep 2012)

Most applicable quote I just read elsewhere:



> Scientists say that the universe is made up of Protons, Neutrons and Electrons. They forgot to mention Morons.


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## GnyHwy (11 Sep 2012)

Five whole pages and we haven't got this figured out yet.  C'mon people.  :


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## Danjanou (11 Sep 2012)

Journeyman said:
			
		

> He's served his purpose; got me $10 in beer money from Danjanou.   ;D
> 
> He can be dismissed now.



Tess will deliver it next time he meets you for a beer >


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## GAP (11 Sep 2012)

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Tess will deliver it next time he meets you for a beer >



Is that not the equivalent to the snow ball thingy in hell?  :nod:


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## medicineman (12 Sep 2012)

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Five whole pages and we haven't got this figured out yet.  C'mon people.  :




"All I hear is radio :blah: :blah:"

On that note, let's just take his advice, nuke the neighbours into glass and have a bunker set up every hundred metres or so through the countryside with a minefield around it to prevent any insurgents that survived the nuclear holocaust from snapping the guys in them and everyone will live happily ever after :.

MM


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## Journeyman (12 Sep 2012)

Danjanou said:
			
		

> Tess will deliver it next time he meets you for a beer >


Appropriate...welching in a 'Scottish' thread; I'd _read _ somewhere about a 'penny-pinching' stereotype.


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