# Why does Haig get the shaft?



## reccecrewman (2 Dec 2008)

I realise that this is a thread on Canadian Military history, however, due to our close historical ties with Britain and specifically with respects to our involvement in the first world war, I figured I'd toss this out there.....I recently finished reading a book on yet another of many books I have read on Passchendaele (and World War I in general) and I'm noticing a running theme..... nearly EVERY single author seems to love hammering Sir Douglas Haig into the ground as an incompetent idiot sending hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths without any qualms whatsoever...... am I the only one out there who disagree's and think that Haig was perhaps, one of Britain's only Generals at the time, who KNEW what it would take to win the war? Passchendaele is considered one of Haig's biggest blunders in the sense of what it accomplished and the cost in human life. 

 I personally believe that 3rd Ypres accomplished a great deal. First, consider this - By the late summer and fall of 1917, the Russian Army was essentially a non factor..... it was evident that the Tsar's Army would soon be a total non factor. As late as December 1916, the average Russian soldier wanted peace at any cost and by the late summer/early fall of 1917, the revolution was at hand. The Tsar abdicated on March 1, and after the failed Kerensky offensive of June 1917 that was Russia's last gasp as soldiers began deserting en masse afterwards.

The French Army was is total chaos as the mutinies swept the Army. After the failed Nivelle offensive, the French Army collapsed as an offensive force. Over 70 Divisions of the French Army flat out refused to attack..... they would defend the homeland, but attack they would not. Between June 1917 and July 1918, the French attacked nowhere along the Western Front.

Now, this presents the British with the burden of carrying on the fight against the Germans. 3rd Ypres and Passchendaele HAD to be fought by the British and Haig was correct to persist in that slugging match with the Germans. By attacking, Haig kept the German attention on them. Had the Germans caught wind of what was happening in the French Army, and made a weighty effort against the French, with the prevailing mood in the French Army, they may well have broke the French line wide open, which would have forced the BEF to fall back to the Channel to protect their flank, opening a huge hole in the Allied line which would enable the Germans to move on Paris AND roll up the entire French Army in flank, thus ending the Great War on German dictated terms.

Haig had the intestinal fortitude to keep hammering away at the Germans despite the losses. The Germans never did catch wind of the French Army's troubles and were content to let the French portions of the line fall into quiet sectors as the sheer weight of the British offensive was requiring every resource the Germans could muster to handle the British assault. David Lloyd George, that absolute fool of a British Prime Minister did everything in his power to try and foil Haig. Lloyd George was a fan of the strategy of "knocking away the props" to Germany. He wanted British troops to fight everywhere BUT France in an effort to curtail British casualties. Turkey, Greece and the Middle East were all options he tried desperately to get the British more heavily committed to. What he seemed to fail to realise was that by knocking out the props, he could never win the war. Germany would not capitulate if Turkey, Bulgaria or Austria-Hungary were defeated. The Germans were the Army that HAD to be beaten in order for victory to be achieved.

Therefore, by continuing to fight the battle of 3rd Ypres, Haig ensured the French Army had sufficient time to recover from 2 and a half years of getting mauled, and more importantly, to keep the Germans tied down until American troops could arrive in strength and alter the balance of power. Haig's persistence in fighting that battle may not have resulted in the war being won in 1917, but it certainly guarenteed the war wasn't lost to the Allies in 1918. I genuinely believe Haig has gotten treated badly by history.


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## Gorgo (5 Dec 2008)

Agreed.  I'm right now reading _Shock Troops_ by Tim Cook, which chronicles the last 2 years of the Canadian Corps' battles as part of the BEF in France during World War One.  Passchendaele would be a slaughterhouse no matter *which* Allied army or corps took it on; the Germans had pretty much seen to that.  And since the technology of the period was still transitioning from what had been done in Napoleon's day to what would happen in World War Two, there was simply no way to actually succeed without a lot of hard slogging and lots of people dying and getting maimed as they advanced through No Man's Land, even with a creeping artillery barrage to help out.

LGen Currie understood that when he was tasked to deal with Passchendaele.  And so did FM Haig.

Arthur Currie, at least, was able to salvage his reputation after the war (thanks to what Sam Hughes pulled on him in Parliament sometime after the guns went silent).  But that cost him his life.

Doug Haig, by the looks of it, never got the chance.


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## time expired (6 Dec 2008)

I think Haig`s reputation is a good example of "popular history" being 
given more credit than factual history,there have been other examples
the Vietnam war is another more recent one.The people responsible for
are the authors with an axe to grind.David Lloyd George for instance in
his memoirs blamed Haig for all the losses on the Western front while
in fact Haig was merely carrying out the orders that originated from the
same D.L.George however  Haig was from an upper class background
and D.L.G. was the son of a coalminer,a"working class ero" so to speak
and in 1920s Britain his self serving story was accepted as fact.Many of 
the very bitter war memoirs were written in the middle to late 20s and
the bitterness stems more from the economic conditions that were faced
by the soldiers on their return to a Britain in financial crisis.Many felt
their sacrifices had been in vain and were looking for someone to blame,
Haig seemed the perfect scapegoat,and has he steadfastly refused to
defend himself or deflect all the criticism,he has gone down in popular
history as the incompetent General who unfeelingly sent thousands to 
their deaths.
               Regards


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## Michael OLeary (6 Dec 2008)

I agree that Haig has mainly been the target of such hatred simply because the masses felt that someone needed to beheld responsible for the "slaughter."  So much of our societal understanding of the Great War is dependent upon those few authors and poets who were published after the war, most having an anti-war bias at the time, that were  undoubtedly found acceptable by the buying pubic and thusly willingly supported by publishers looking to make money (not necessarily to spread balanced viewpoints).  Later authors also sought to sell books, and trying to overturn the flood of blame directed at Haig over so many decades was not going to guarantee any best-sellers.

Even today, for many researchers and Great War enthusiasts, Hag's "incompetence" is taken as an inviolable pillar of understanding for the War.  Questioning it, to many, is an ultimate act of heresy.

In my mind, the one critical shortcoming of his many detractors has been that none have written the alternate estimate - at strategic and tactical levels - that might have guaranteed at least no worse operational result, and also guaranteed significantly fewer losses.


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## Kirkhill (6 Dec 2008)

In my opinion one of the best defences of Douglas Haig was written by Corrigan: "Mud, Blood and Poppycock".

He makes the point that Haig was treated as a hero in the immediate aftermath of the war.  It was, apparently, only during the pacifist era of 30s that he came to be seen as the Butcher.


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## Michael OLeary (6 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> In my opinion one of the best defences of Douglas Haig was written by Corrigan: "Mud, Blood and Poppycock".
> 
> He makes the point that Haig was treated as a hero in the immediate aftermath of the war.  It was, apparently, only during the pacifist era of 30s that he came to be seen as the Butcher.



I second the motion that "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" is a worthy read by anyone interested in the Great War.  He critically examines a number of myths about the war and, if nothing else, opens the door to further examination of the records vice just believing what we've always heard.


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

Before commanding I Corps Haig commanded the 17th Lancers. I would have liked to see him command as a Colonel/BG and MG.He was commander of the 1912 Manuevers amd was beaten by Grierson which should have been a tip off that commanding a Field Army might not be his forte. To be fair no one had experienced or even trained for the new type of warfare that WW1 would bring.However I dont think he was the best choice to command a Corps or a Field Army in WW1.


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## Old Sweat (6 Dec 2008)

Haig was the chief of staff of the Cavalry Division in the Boer War. The division was commanded by French who commanded the BEF before Haig. I don't know enough about all back room stuff that eventually saw Haig appointed as the CinC to comment. I do know that there is a school of thought that General Horace Smith-Dorrien, who had bought enough time by his defence at Le Cateau for the rest of the BEF to stabilize the situation, was shunted aside so others could prosper.


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## Kirkhill (6 Dec 2008)

T6, I'm not so sure that Haig's career was that much different than Pershing's beyond Pershing's Brigade Command in Mexico.  1 level up.

Haig became GOC in an army that only had 6 nominal field Divisions (4 tasked to the BEF).  There was no Corps level structure in Britain much less Army, or Army Group.  Nor was there even the thought of raising those types of forces.  Much like you in the US.  

Even the Division level of command was exercised rarely.


In Sep 1914 Arthur Currie was a bankrupt real estate developer and a part time LCol commanding an understrength militia battalion.  By July 1917 he had advanced through Bn, Brigade and Division to Corps command.  Monash likewise along with very many other Brit and American Generals.

There was no prologue to the careers of most allied generals that made any difference at all.

The only allied Generals that had training in Corps and higher command were the French and the Russians........and they demonstrated the efficacy of all that previous training through their exemplary handling of the crises.


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

The tactics of the time were essentially human wave assaults on prepared positions which created a meatgrinder and a war of attrition.I do not feel that Haig was well suited to be a theater commander.Being ADC probably did as much to advance his later career than anything else.


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## Old Sweat (6 Dec 2008)

Haig was a cavalryman, in fact a lancer, so his training and experience would have conditioned him to think of shock action, and the term was used at the time, delivered by a cavalry charge. However to say that the infantry tactics prior to the Great War were based on human waves and attrition is an over simplification. The manuals talked about skirmishing in extended order and winning the fire fight while building up the firing line until a bayonet charge could rout the demoralized enemy.


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## vonGarvin (6 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> In my mind, the one critical shortcoming of his many detractors has been that none have written the alternate estimate - at strategic and tactical levels - that might have guaranteed at least no worse operational result, and also guaranteed significantly fewer losses.


I'll have some time over the next few weeks.  Perhaps I'll do some research, and see if I can see what the perception of the situation was around, say, 1 January 1917, and see if I can come up with a tactical estimate.  Now, I'm not allowed B1B bombers or A-10 Warthogs, right? ;D


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

Haig once said that the machine gun was overrated. His neat rows of cavalry and infantry advancing at the walk was pure slaughter.At the Some 110,000 infantrymen began the assualt and in a few hours 60,000 were casualties. In our Civil War at Cold Harbor the Confederates shredded the Union Army employing similar tactics to Haigs with the loss of 7000 men in 20 minutes.Haig had no strategy other than to grind up the Germans. Of course this strategy bled Britain white.After the Somme Britain's politicians were adament - no more Sommes. Of course that was the beginning because his next masterpiece was Passchendaele which has the dubious distinction of no other battle in history saw more men die from drowning.



> Third Ypres was the battle that gave rise to the story of Haig’s chief of staff being driven to the front and, as he viewed the muddy wasteland, breaking into tears and saying, “Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?”
> 
> “It gets worse,” his driver said, “farther on up.”


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## Long in the tooth (6 Dec 2008)

All the great powers of WW 1 had observers at the Civil war and knew the power of the machine gun.  I consider them all war criminals for allowing the war to happen in the first place.  Churchill especially was negligent.  As first lord of the admiralty he was also in charge of intelligence and should have known that Germany wouldn't collapse in 6 months due to a naval blockade.  Haber had developed a process of fixating nitrates directly from the atmosphere obviating the need to import guano (bird droppings) from south America.

My father lost three uncles in the first world war.  One survived the horror of the first battle of the Somme, only to die a week later when the remnants of his battalion was overrun by two German divisions because his unit did not receive the order to withdraw.


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## Old Sweat (6 Dec 2008)

I'm not sure Haig should take all the blame for the Somme. (I can't believe I am defending him, because he was in charge when the slaughter happened.) The New Army divisions of 1916 were trained to be no more than cannon fodder, but that was not his decision alone. My inclination is to wonder what the next decades worth of research and analysis will reveal.

Before we jump on his knocking the machine-gun, I suggest we find out when and where and why he said that and in what context. If it was based on his Boer War experience, there could be a grain of truth to it.


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

Haig made that comment in 1915. He just didnt belive in the developing military technologies including the tank.


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## Michael OLeary (6 Dec 2008)

Sort of like all those modern soldiers who cried doom and gloom at the thought of a wheeled armoured combat vehicle?


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## Old Sweat (6 Dec 2008)

Good enough, but 1915 was still before much of the tactical developments of the war. Let's divide his stewardship into two areas: his duties as COO of the BEF; and his duties as CEO of the BEF. I think his performance of the first was pretty good. Things like the shell shortage and the need to reorganize the divisions for 1918 were handled well. 

I am still not sure on his performance as CEO. Was he in the class of the big three, who bungled the way ahead; was he in the class of the Wall Street financial wizrds blinded by bonuses who created this mess; was he a bumbler lurching from crisis to crisis; was he just promoted beyond his Peter level; or was he a fine general who was forced to create the conditions for victory from barren soil?

I don't know.


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## mdh (6 Dec 2008)

There have been several attempts to rehabilitate Haig's reputation in recent years. I think John Keegan's observations are apt:

"The energies expended in such reconsiderations seems, to this author at any rate, a pointless waste. The simple truth of 1914-18 trench warfare is that the massing of large numbers of soldiers unprotected by anything but cloth uniforms, however equipped, against large masses of other soldiers, protected by earthworks and barbed wire and provided with rapid fire weapons, was bound to result in very heavy casualties among the attackers. That proved to be the case, whatever the variation in tactics and equipment, and there was much variation, from the beginning of the Aisne in 1914 to the end on the Sambre and Meuse in 1918....The basic and stark fact, nevertheless, was that the conditions of warfare between 1914 and 1918 predisposed towards slaughter and that only an entirely new technology, one not available until a generation later, could have averted such an outcome."

Keegan agrees that it's difficult not to sympathise with the condemnations of Great War generalship: "In no way -- appearances, attitude, spoken pronouncement, written legacy - do they commend themselves to modern opinion or emotion."

However, the historian adds that much of the criticism was unfair.

[The generals] were trapped within the iron fetters of a technology all too adequate fo rmass destruction of llife but quite inadequate to restore to them the flexibilties of control that would have kept the destruction of life within bearable limits."


Quoted from Keegan's The First World War.


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## daftandbarmy (6 Dec 2008)

Why does Haig get the shaft? Because he wasn't very good... just like many other senior commanders of the time. Some of my earliest memories are of my grandfather (who barely survived WW1 with the 4th Cdn Div) 'speaking ill' of FM Haig. If I remember correctly, he blamed Haig for killing more Canadians than the Germans.

Some Haig dissing sites...

He still had his defenders, but they were in the last trench, barely holding on. Their books argued Haig was a curious, inventive soldier who had, in fact, appreciated the tactical value of machine guns and tanks. Before he died, however, Haig himself gave his critics ammunition by clinging publicly and stubbornly to his outdated certainties. As late as 1926, he was still capable of writing this about the future of warfare:
I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever. Aeroplanes and tanks are only accessories to the men and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse—the well-bred horse—as you have ever done in the past.
Astonishing that any man who was there could still believe in cavalry 10 years after the Somme. But it is the bit about “the well-bred horse” that really gives the game away. Haig was undeniably a butcher, as his severest critics have claimed, but he was most of all a pompous fool.
http://www.historynet.com/field-marshal-sir-douglas-haig-world-war-is-worst-general.htm

Today, after decades in which Haig's name has been blackened in popular culture (see below), many still regard Haig as an inept commander who exhibited callous disregard for the lives of his soldiers, repeatedly ordering tens of thousands of them to supposedly useless deaths during battles such as Passchendaele. Sometimes the criticism is not so much of Haig personally, as of the generation of British generals which he is deemed to represent - a view aired by writers such as John Laffin ("British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One") and John Mosier ("Myth of the Great War"). As recently as 1998 a major tabloid newspaper celebrated the anniversary of the Armistice by calling for the demolition of Haig's statue on Whitehall. Norman Stone describes Haig as the greatest of Scottish generals, since he killed the highest numbers of English soldiers at any front in history, perhaps a slightly facetious point as Scotland in fact suffered one of the highest proportionate losses of any Allied nation (Niall Ferguson - "The Pity of War").
Paul Fussell, in "The Great War and Modern Memory," writes that "although one doesn't want to be too hard on Haig ... who has been well calumniated already ... it must be said that it now appears was that one thing the war was testing was the usefulness of the earnest Scottish character in a situation demanding the military equivalent of wit and invention. Haig had none. He was stubborn, self-righteous, inflexible, intolerant -- especially of the French -- and quite humourless ... Indeed, one powerful legacy of Haig's performance is the conviction among the imaginative and intelligent today of the unredeemable defectiveness of all civil and military leaders. Haig could be said to have established the paradigm."[9]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Haig,_1st_Earl_Haig


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

It seems to be that Haig's strategy mirrored that of the French whether it was intentional or not both allies opted for attrition,possibly because nothing else was viable.


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## Kirkhill (6 Dec 2008)

T6 

I STRONGLY encourage you to read the Corrigan book that Michael O'Leary endorsed.

It goes the heart of the beliefs that Haig could only countenance a tactic widely associated (in British terms anyway) with the US Army ...."hey-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle."  It also points out that he was also criticized for NOT waiting until the tank had been tested more.... he rushed the tank forward in 1916 before it was ready for service, thereby spoiling the surprise.  He did that because he need to carry machine guns forward to give support to the infantry.

He was also criticized for NOT deploying cavalry - even though there were no open flanks, nor any good going to get them across the FEBA nor any means of communicating with them when they got across nor any means of supplying fire support when they got there.

He also had to deal with expanded from 4 expeditionary Divisions in Sept 1914 to 50 some in July 1916.  How long did it take you lads to figure out how to get updated Vests and MRAPs into Iraq?   His CO had to figure out how to get boots and puttees for 50 Divisions in 18 months, not to mention rifles, bullets, trainers and "hay-boxes" for the tea.

He then was confronted in 1917 with a defunct French Army and a Russian Army that quit the field.....

As Michael says... take a run at Corrigan.


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## time expired (6 Dec 2008)

Pray tell me what strategy should have been used on the Western front?,
flanking maneavers that may have been available to the Union troops at
Cold Harbour were not much use on a front that stretched from the North
sea to the Swiss border.Surprise was also eliminated by the requirement
of massive bombardment to cut the German wire.No friends there was no
alternative to the to the frontal assault and Haig did that as well as any 
General could have.Attrition was the name of the game and that was not
because of any decision that Haig made rather it was strategy imposed
on him by his political masters.France had 1/3 of her territory occupied and
were politically and militarily doomed to attack,Britain as Frances main
partner were doomed to support them anything else would have been
politically unacceptable,so what choice did Haig have?none that I can see.
Another thing that is often forgotten is Haigs handling of the 100 days
battle,this was the battle that ended the war and was an entirely British
run affair.Haig made his long awaited breakthrough pierced the Hindenburg
line and drove the Germans before him till they had enough and funnily
enough had great success with his beloved Cavalry.This was hailed as 
the greatest victory by any British General in the entire war and rightly so.
                                         Regards


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

All this reminds me of the effort in the past to restore MG Walter Short's Lt Generalcy because it wasnt his fault that the defense of Hawaii was a fiasco. He like Field Marshall Haig ,were in command and are completely responsible,good or bad warts and all. Both deserve the criticism each have gotten over time. Decisions have consequences. It was our experience in WW1 that US troops are commanded by US generals - until recently that is. 

A bit about FM Haig. ;D
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3ZvI3_q0n0&NR=1


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## time expired (6 Dec 2008)

TOMAHAWK6
 The difference is that Haig won his war.
  PS For a great read and a somewhat different take on Haig
      Tommy,The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-18  By Richard Holmes
       covers all aspects of the war.
                                         Regards


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## tomahawk6 (6 Dec 2008)

Haig was on the winning side just as MG Walter Short [he was demoted] was. Perhaps it isnt fair to judge Haig but its common today to do so with figures from history. I guess a fair question would be what other British general could have done a better job thus saving the lives of thousands of men.

A funny story about generalship.Maybe it doesnt fit into ths discussion but I liked the story. ;D



> At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried into a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating.
> 
> One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking up a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table.
> 
> ...


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## Kirkhill (7 Dec 2008)

It fits...  ;D

But your question is actually the only question: Who could have done better?

And I agree that politics played a big part in promotions......What's changed?


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## TCBF (7 Dec 2008)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> ... Things like the shell shortage and the need to reorganize the divisions for 1918 were handled well. ...



- Let us consider the NEED to re-organize:  The British Prime Minister would NOT release soldiers to France - but kept them in England instead to try and limit the BEF's ability to attack.  The re-org was due solely to declining troop strength.  The re-org - and a move south to take over miles of non-dug French trenches - doomed the Brits (Gough's troops in particular) to a very bad go when the Germans attacked in March 1918.


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## reccecrewman (7 Dec 2008)

To add to TCBF's comment on L.G denying reinforcements to France..... In 1917, he also agreed to take over another 28 miles of front that the French Army had been previously holding. This was an effort to have the British Army spread out over a wider AOR and thus deny more reinforcements to a selected area of front (ie Passchendaele) The travesty of that action led to 5th Army being placed right in the bullseye of the location the Germans chose to unleash their Micheal offensive of March 1918 in an all or nothing bid to win the war. 5th Army was crushed in the opening phases of the Micheal offensive.

To the detractors of Haig, he had no choice but to fight it out at Passchendaele. A refusal to accept casualties and just hang back only gives the Germans time to choose where and when they want to attack. The eastern theatre was nearly finished and the collapse of the Russian Army allowed for 50 plus Divisions to be brought to the west.... Not mediocre Divisions either...... The Eastern Army enjoyed nothing but a successive string of victories in the East and these men brought a renewed hope to the west to break the stalemate. 

As well, Haig had some very good commanders underneath him who took great care to minimize casualties, and allowed them some freedom to execute his plans on their own with Plumer commanding Second Army a prime example. Plumer made every effort to minimize casualties within his Army.


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## 54/102 CEF (7 Dec 2008)

Over the summer and fall I read "At GHQ" and "Field Marshal Earl Haig" by Gen John Charteris who served as Haig's G2 in WW1.

A few things come out

The French in the field were repeatedly timid to the unspoken point of being totally unreliable in their cooperation with the British throughout the war until after March 1918

The British Army had the bulk of the Germans on their front throughout

The British Government (under Lloyd George) tried numerous "sideshows" instead of agreeing on a main effort for the British Army

The British Government paid much more attention to the French Strategic outlook which never produced results until after Mar 1918

The military advisory team under Gen Wilson to the British Government was viewed by Haig and his staff as loyal to the Army but unable to get the ear of the government

Any talk of great moves is overly optimistic in retrospect - their only tool kit was artillery barrage - seize ground - repeat and adapt technology quickly as it came on line - ask yourself - how did they control their artillery to get an idea of the logistics to get the ammo and guns in place - plan it all then employ it. This was not an army that used Human Waves at the expense of all else. At the end of Field Marshall Haig he shows the final puzzle that eluded the Allies throughout the war - the rail links at Cambrai - Valenciennes to the Southern American Sector. As long as the Germans could feed troops in there was no point hitting them frontally (big light goes on? Yes?) and so the Brits fell back behind Amiens until the German supply lines cracked. Then the 100 days begin with troops moving into position for the August - Nov up to the Belgian border.

A generally balanced summary for and against Haig is here

http://www.johndclare.net/wwi3_HaigHistoriography.htm

One note that stands out

 (Lloyd George employed a staff of 3 secretaries to research the book, he was given privileged access to the Cabinet Minutes, and he liaised closely with Liddell Hart over the military details.   The book was also sent to the Prime Minister and to relevant government departments for checking and vetting.) 

Which leads me to a conclusion - an author commented on Churchill's Writings on the First World War - "Yes but! That's Winston's version"

And so we continue seeking insights on those time through forums like this


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## time expired (7 Dec 2008)

Firstly the idea that any General in WW1 fought the battle is an illusion
he planned the battle and passed on his orders and waited for the results,
after the troops went over the top he at Army HQ had no control,nor did
Div.HQ,Bde.HQ,Bat.HQ or even Coy.level, all opportunities to control the
battle were lost,the only person to to have any level of control of the fight 
was the platoon commander and then only as far as his voice would carry.
Why was this?,while weapons had developed fairly rapidly comms had not,
it could be argued that comms at Waterloo were better than at the Somme,
Officers on horse back moving to various parts of the line with new orders
definitely not an option on the Somme.Therefore one must come to the
conclusion that any General if he could formulate plans that were clear and
concise would have done as well or as badly as Haig.Haigs major problem
was that he did not write a selfserving memoirs, others did ,and many of 
them shifted all the blame for the, in truth ,unavoidable losses on him and
as I said before he made no attempt to defend himself making him an easy
target.
Haigs and the 1WW Generals incompetence has become part of our historical
memory based not on facts but a collective shock and disgust at the huge losses
incurred by the tactics employed by said Generals, non of the critics professional
or amateur have ever presented a viable alternative to these tactics.The 60s 
bought a new wave of anti-military feelings to the surface and Haig and the
WW1 Generals came in for another thrashing,The Donkeys,a book by pseudo
historian Alan Clark,Oh What a Lovely War,and even the very funny Blackadder
series cashed in on this anti military attitudes and perpetuated the incompetence
myth,but I digress and I think its time to wrap this up.
                                     Regards


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## tomahawk6 (7 Dec 2008)

Haig was roundly criticized from the end of WW1 through the 30's and beyond. Maybe its because of the tens of thousands of men killed during his operations that he was the subject of so much conjecture. Maybe it was his public prouncements like this :


> The nation must be taught to bear losses. No amount of skill on the part of the higher commanders, no training, however good, on the part of the officers and men, no superiority of arms and ammunition, however great, will enable victories to be won without the sacrifice of men's lives. The nation must be prepared to see heavy casualty lists."
> Written by Haig in June 1916 before the battle began


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## 54/102 CEF (7 Dec 2008)

Its clear it was because Lloyd George undercut Haig from day 1 after the Asquith Government fell - to the extent of trying to have him excluded from the 1919 Victory Parade in London, only to be told by the King that "that won't do." 

There's a book out there by Gen James Harbord who was #2 to Gen Pershing - James G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917–1918 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936), and he tells us that in June 1917 - Brits and France come to Washington asking for aid when the US has come in - Brits and French have 2 different shopping lists and the Brits included US troops under Brit Officers. Needless to say this was rejected but that should tell you something of their vetting of the request at the highest levels - even when they had lots of manpower in England.

Lloyd George also reveals himself as driven by internal politics in the Newton Baker Memoirs - Baker was Sec of War for Woodrow Wilson in WW1. In this excellent 2 vol memoir we see Baker visit US Troops in France and then to the UK to see Lloyd George asking "why was there no Joint Command?" Lloyd George replies "we would have been turfed out of office."

Quick bio on Baker  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton_D._Baker

A link to the above - its all politics all the time 
"The abiding image of 1914-18 is the futile slaughter of the Western Front. To have been the prime minister who presided over Passchendaele does not seem an achievement to be celebrated, even if the Allies did win in the end.

In fact, Lloyd George was as appalled as anyone by the slaughter and did his best to mitigate it. But his position was desperately weak. He transformed the premiership out of all recognition from Asquith's gentlemanly amateurism, and in many ways did exercise an unprecedented grip on the direction of the war. Yet as the Liberal leader of a Tory-dominated coalition, he was dependent on the Conservatives for his political survival; and as a civilian head of government he could not – short of sacking them – override the strategic judgement of the generals, who in any case told the despised politicians as little as possible of their intentions. So Lloyd George's war leadership is not so much a study in power, like Churchill's, as in impotence and damage limitation." http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/lloyd-george-war-leader-by-john-grigg-605636.html

Background on the US mobilisation by a certain student http://www.westernsappers.ca/Wilson/ 

The memoirs of Walter Page - US Ambassador to the Brits throughout WW1 - great insight into Woodrow Wilson sleeping his way into war  - http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/memoir/Page/PageTC.htm

What I conclude

Brits and the USA under Wilson were emerging into the future world and WW1 was way beyond what they had dealt with in opening up the North American continent or supposedly running the Empire.

Anyone remember the lost year in Iraq? http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/view/

Haig would probably say there was a lost 3 years in NW France


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## Kirkhill (7 Dec 2008)

> Haig was roundly criticized from the end of WW1 through the 30's and beyond. Maybe its because of the tens of thousands of men killed during his operations that he was the subject of so much conjecture. Maybe it was his public prouncements like this :
> 
> Quote
> The nation must be taught to bear losses. No amount of skill on the part of the higher commanders, no training, however good, on the part of the officers and men, no superiority of arms and ammunition, however great, will enable victories to be won without the sacrifice of men's lives. The nation must be prepared to see heavy casualty lists."
> Written by Haig in June 1916 before the battle began



An honest, fair and accurate appraisal (and thus political anathema).  The only alternative open was to refuse battle entirely and thus concede German possession of Flanders and Northern France.  And that wasn't a political option either.

See my tag line "over, under, around or through".

Over wasn't an option - no helos, no parachutes
Under was actively exploited - mining - but progress was too slow and passageways to narrow for an army to pass under the enemy lines and come up in the rear.
Around wasn't an option as there were no open flanks - and the prospect of a Gallipoli style landing attempt at Cuxhaven doesn't bear thinking about.

That only left  "Through"

And in 1916 the only "novelty" that Haig had to try to do things differently than at Loos in 1915, was a packet of a handful of prototype tanks.  Beyond that he had a mass of infantry that had been in uniform for less than a year led by officers and nco's that were not much longer in uniform.  Some were elected from their peers.  The Somme was the first battle for most of those soldiers, their first time on the two way firing range.

......The Somme should not have been fought,

Except for the fact that the Germans had launched the Verdun Meat Grinder with the expressed intention of wearing down the French, and they were succeeding.

The only way to relieve the pressure was to attack the Germans elsewhere and the only force available was the BEF with "No tanks, inadequate arty, no comms, poor training, no air support, enemy entrenched, no surprise."

The Somme should not have been fought. BUT.  The Somme HAD to be fought.


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## tomahawk6 (7 Dec 2008)

Odd Kirkhill your argument could have been said about any of Haig's offensives. 
Compare Haig to Wellington.Haig had none of Wellingtons qualities including compassion.Wellington once slept on the floor and gave his bed to a dying aide.No such stories about Haig.

I ran across this interesting account about Australians on the Western Front. They were outstanding troops that didnt put up with what today we would call mickey mouse policies inflicted on the troops on the front.I enjoyed this anecdote:



> Right from the beginning English officers complained about the undisciplined behaviour of the Australians. Their officers and soldiers did not keep the necessary distance, they dressed improperly, even with nonchalance - some didn't even shave everyday. And some soldiers even dared to object if they had to carry out a task they did not like.
> 
> The rumours very soon reached the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister in London. It was obvious: with these dirty and slovenly troops you can't win a war.
> 
> ...



And this:


> In February 1918 Haig wrote in a letter to his wife:
> 
> "We have had to separate the Australians into Convalescent Camps of their own, because they were giving so much trouble when along with our men and put such revolutionary ideas into their heads."
> 
> Haig was convinced that a great deal of the problems were caused by General Birdwood's relaxed disciplinary methods. Sir William Birdwood (picture right) was Imperial (English officer who commanded the I ANZAC Corps and later the Australian Corps) and he never found great favour in Haig's eyes.



Finally this nugget.Important now as it was then.


> Another important difference between Australian and British troops was that the Aussie officers explained extensively to their men the objectives of the battle they were about to engage in. Even ordinary soldiers then knew the strategy that was behind it. When they became cut-off they still knew what to do, what the goal was.


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## Kirkhill (7 Dec 2008)

I think you will find similar comments about Canadian troops and yet Haig got along fine with Currie, their Canadian (non-Imperial) commander. Despite the back chat he gave him about not having enough guns on  line for Passchendaele.

Besides, and here is my trump card, his family produces good whisky  ;D


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## 54/102 CEF (7 Dec 2008)

I'm in!  Good find.


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## TCBF (7 Dec 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> ... Finally this nugget.Important now as it was then. ...



- In any case, the Australian Corps would be led by LGen John Monash starting in May 1918.  I rather doubt anyone had any reservations about his effectiveness as a Corps Commander: during the battle of Amiens, he commanded 200,000 men, inluding 50,000 Americans.

- He did have his detractrors (one of his brother officers thought that the Australian Corps should not be led by a Jew), but 'Monty' thought Monash the best General of the First World War.


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## vonGarvin (16 Dec 2008)

If anyone is interested, there is a little online flash game here:
http://www.addictinggames.com/warfare1917.html

And the Germans are here:
http://armorgames.com/play/2267/warfare-1917


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## exspy (16 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill,

While I understand what you are saying when you declare that the Battle of the Somme had to be fought, I think that I (for the first time) will have to disagree with what you have said.

I keep thinking of the hundred's of thousands of private soldiers who were going to have to die in order to win Haig's war of attrition.  Would Flanders have been lost if the British offensive had been delayed a year and new technologies allowed to develop?  Would France have been lost if the French Army had withdrawn from Verdun to save itself?  In both cases I think not.

It's my belief that a soldier has to go into battle with a reasonable expectation that his actions, and possibly his sacrifice, will achieve a victory for his side.  No soldier will willingly fight if he knows that the only way to victory is to agree to sacrifice himself in order to wear down an enemy who, at the end of the day, simply cannot endure the casualties that his army can.  A victory that may be years away and will see the sacrifice of thousands of his friends and neighbours as well.  Soldiers do not volunteer to die, but they will volunteer to risk.

Haig did the best he could.  This I can agree with.  Does Haig deserve the post-war reputation he got?  I think he does.  No matter how one dresses up the strategic thinking behind agreeing to fight a war of attrition, nobody wants to be a member of the PBI who is going to be sacrificed in order to achieve it.

Now, let the arrows and missiles commence.
Dan.


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## Kirkhill (16 Dec 2008)

Hi Dan, it has been while.  Good to hear from you again.

Only the first time you disagree with me?  I'm obviously not trying hard enough.

I agree entirely with your comments about the PBI and requiring a reasonable expectation of survival and/or a worthwhile sacrifice.  One of the big questions though for us in the 21st century is the difficulty of being able to parse 19th century sensibilities.  One of the things that is hard to come to terms with is the fact that even after 4 years of disorganization and slaughter the British soldier of that day managed to hang together as an army.  And while they may not have been thrilled at their lot they managed to continue as if it were another day in the coalmines.

And that brings me to the other side of the coin - for many of the soldiers their life as labourers in the civilian world was only marginally less dangerous, the food was better and you got a warm set of clothes.

All that said - you are right about the nature of the fight.

And you are also right that the French and the Brits might have been able to refuse battle for another year - but that would just have let the Germans stabilize the East that much sooner.

As well the French were psychologically motivated to drive out the Germans as soon as possible and that sucked them into the Verdun trap.  Once they were in the Brits couldn't hang back and still remain an ally.  The French wouldn't have permitted it or understood it.

Especially, I believe, in light of their own choice of tactics.  I don't think it required much training to take the bayonet to the enemy in a dead run while wearing scarlet pants and a white hat.  They wouldn't have expected that it would train British soldiers to a comparable level.  

It took much longer to bring soldiers up to the pre-war level of competence in fire and movement described in British Army manuals of the era.

That time was not allowed to Haig by the Alliance.


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## time expired (16 Dec 2008)

EXSPY,maybe they could have waited until the A-bomb had been
developed,sorry, just being facetious,but waiting for a better time,
situation,would have been a political decision and as we are discusing
Haig`s responsibilities is irrelevant.Further it was not Haig´s war of attrition
but a war of attrition dictated by circumstances beyond his control.
                                            Regards


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## vonGarvin (16 Dec 2008)

exspy said:
			
		

> No soldier will willingly fight if he knows that the only way to victory is to agree to sacrifice himself in order to wear down an enemy who, at the end of the day, simply cannot endure the casualties that his army can.  A victory that may be years away and will see the sacrifice of thousands of his friends and neighbours as well.  Soldiers do not volunteer to die, but they will volunteer to risk.


I disagree.  Just look at the Kamikaze in WW2, the "Banzai" attacks, Russian Human wave attacks, U Boot crews, suicide bombers in Afghanistan...the list, sadly, goes on...


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## exspy (16 Dec 2008)

KH (good to speak with you too),

Yes it is hard to parse 19th century sensibilities viewing them from today, but that is why I said I think Haig did the best he could.  He was a man of his century and may have already been, by 1914, yesterday's man.  Unfortunately no, I cannot think of any other General at the beginning of the war who, when the tempo of the war was being set, would have chosen to conduct it differently.

You are also right about the nature of the British soldier, who lasted in the fight well after his French and Russian counterparts lost heart.  Maybe British soldiers had the optimism to always believe that the next slaughter would be the one that would end the war in an allied victory.  I also agree that it takes longer to train a soldier in fire and movement than it does to train him in going forward blindly towards the mouth of the guns, but I don't recall hearing much about British fire and movement at the Somme.

Finally I also think Haig was lucky to have had the German Army undertake the 1918 Spring Offensive.  Without it there would have been no Hundred Days which resulted in an early end to the war.  Before the German attack allied strategists were predicting a war that would extend until 1919 or 1920 before the Americans were ready to undertake their own offensive.  How would Haig have fared after 1918 if he had not helped produce an allied victory that year?  Three and half years of attrition with nothing to show but a stalemate.

Sorry Kirkhill, but I can't resolve myself to not thinking of those PBI losing their lives due to a lack of innovative strategic thinking.

TE,

Two things.  First, at the level of Haig's command all decisions are inherently political as well as military.  I also disagree that a war of attrition was dictated to Haig.  Yes he was presented this option, but I believe that he chose to meet its challenge rather overcome it.

Second, I tried to think of a successful situation where a strategic decision was made to hold back combat until the tactical circumstances were propitious.  On a small scale I thought of El Alamein, where Montgomery refused to attack until he had an overwhelming superiority in men and materiel.  On a larger scale was the opening of the second front by the allies in the Second World War.  The Russians were clamouring for a second front in 1942 and 1943, but the western allies refused to rush into it and waited until they were ready in 1944.  Yes, it meant that Western Europe was to remain under German occupation and Russia was to fight alone longer than they would have liked, but it made an allied victory that much more certain when active operations actually began.  I think the same would have applied to the Western Front in 1916 or 1917 if the allies had tried it or, more precisely, if the French would have allowed the British to wait a year.

While all of this speculation is a great exercise in historical thinking, in my opinion I believe that Haig, while doing the best he could, got the reputation he earned from the war.

Thanks gentlemen,
Dan.


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## time expired (16 Dec 2008)

EXSPY,your are still talking about a decision that was not made by Haig,the
Somme battle was fought on ground that was not chosen by him at a time
also not his choice, he was merely following orders given to him through
his chain of command in an effort to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun.
I am still waiting to hear from anyone an alternative to the frontal attack and
attrition strategy that Hag was forced to persue given the situation that he
faced.Waiting out the Germans was politically not an option that was open to him.
                                        Regards


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## ltmaverick25 (16 Dec 2008)

How timely that I should come across this debate while I am in the middle of writting an article pertaining to this topic (hopefully published sometime next year).

I think its fair to say that in many respects Haig has been judged unfairly, not because those judgements happen to be incorrect mind you, but rather because those judgements stem from chronic ignorance of the facts, and the all important context of the time.

With that said, my own argument is that Haig was indeed incompetent.  One may argue that the Somme had to be fought, however the question arises, did the Somme have to be fought the way it was fought?  The tactic of sending in wave after wave of soldiers dressed off evenly with each other was surely a recipe for disaster when faced with an enemy bearing machine guns, an elastic defence in depth and interlocking fire, not to mention artillery.  Simply put, Haig was out of touch.

I used General Sir Julian Byng as an example of my argument.  General Byng as many of you may know was the commander of the Canadian Corps during the assault on Vimy Ridge.  Vimy Ridge represented the first allied decisive victory.  Though Vimy cannot be seen as a war winning battle when looked at in isolation, when viewed within the greater context Vimy Ridge is a recipe for victory in the Great War.

So the next question.  How did the Canadian Corps manage such a decisive victory over the most heavily fortified area of the entire German front when both the British and the French had both failed at taking the ridge previously and at great cost I might add?

The answer to this question is what my article is about,  without copy pasting it into this post or re writting the entire thing I will try to be brief on a few points.

Leadership:  

Upon learning that the Canadian Corps would be tasked with taking Vimy Ridge, Julian Byng was determined not to allow the slaughterfest of the Somme be repeated.  Byng ordered a systematic analysis of all tactics and doctrine used by the Canadians and British at the time.  He tasked Arthur Currie and Andrew McNaughton with visiting the French to learn from their experiences at Verdun.  Currie and McNaughton did just that.  From the French experience Currie surmised that formations needed to be reorganized, meaning that instead of having a Battalion centric battle, this war now had to become a platoon commanders war.  Up until that point, machine guns, grenades and rifle grenades were controlled at higher levels which proved inefficient given the lack of communications technology.  Currie argued that by attaching machine guns, grenades and rifle grenades to the platoons, the platoon commander could make decisions in the heat of battle and address situations as they arised.  Currie also stressed the need for decentralized command and control, thus giving platoon commanders the freedom and latitude to act as the situation deemed necessary.

What this meant was that no longer would the Canadian Corps advance in waves of troops dressed off as if though on parade.  The assault on Vimy Ridge marked one of the first good examples of the platoon and section in battle using terrain to its advantage.  If the platoon next to you got held up you could keep on going, or flank attack the obstacle in the way of the held up platoon, a tactic not previously used before Vimy Ridge.  

General Byng had the good sence to accept Curries recomendations.

Byng reorganized the Canadian Corps based on this concept and retrained the entire Corps to fight this way.  Part of Haig's justification to use mass waves of troops in the attack was that British and Commonwealth soldiers were poorly trained and were not capable of implementing more complext strategies.  While this was true, Byng took the time to retrain his troops in the months prior to Vimy Ridge, Haig did not.

During their new training while not on duty in the front trenches Canadian soldiers were taught how to lead and think for themselves regardless of rank.  Detailed rehearsals of the pending attack on Vimy Ridge took place daily and each soldier was responsible for learning the plan, the commanders intent, and what his superiors job was so that he could take his place in the event of casualties.  Over 40,000 maps were handed out to NCOs and NCMs (extremely unprecedented) at the time.

Meanwhile Andrew McNaughton revolutionized the way artillery was to be used.  The concept of conter battery fire was invented and adopted, and later perfected by McNaughton.  This counter battery silenced german guns that were trying to decimate Canadians while on the advance in no mans land.  It worked extremely well.  This was in addition to the creeping barrage.

The creeping barrage in itself was a revolutionary method of employing artillery and infantry.  Prior to this, the popular thought process was that artillery conquered and infantry occupied.  Meaning that you would barrage the enemy into submission and the infantry would simply walk in and mop up.  Things obviously did not work this way.

The creeping barrage represented the earliest form of combined arms offesnive operations.  The artillery and infantry had to work together creating fire and movement at the operational level.  Meaning the infantry advanced while the artillery fired, this was NEVER done prior to Vimy.  The artillery fired, THEN the infantry advanced.  The Canadians at Vimy used both simultaneously.  At the tactical level, the platoons as mentioned above were able to create fire and movement at the local level by using machine guns to cover advancing troops (the details can go on and on from there).

The assault on Vimy Ridge was the first ever combined arms operation.  The results speak for themselves.  Incidentally the Germans used those very same tactics in their spring offensive against the British and pushed them back 140 KM (I think its 140, im not so certain but I do know it was quite far).

The Canadians used combined arms at Passchendaele which is what brought that battle to a close.  They also used combined arms during the 100 days offensive which brought the war to an end and gave us the reputation as Shock Troops or Storm Troopers.

The reason I bring this up is to contrast the inovation mandated by Byng and later Currie, with the complete lackthereof from other generals like Haig.  By the time Passchendaele happened, the new tactics developed by the Canadians were well known and yet they were not used at Passchendaele until the the Canadians were brought in.

Why?

Some argued that Haig has not choice but to conduct full frontal assaults because there was no flank.  While this is true, there is more then one way to conduct a frontal assault.  Moreover Haig and his French counterparts were determined to acheive a brilliant breakthrough to try and end the war early.  The context of the Great War simply did not allow for this.  The Canadian Corps by contrast perfected limited aims objectives.  Though still costly in lives compared to a successful breakthrough, proved to be much more successful then what Haig had attempted too many times.

The purpose of my post was to demonstrate that there was indeed Generals serving in the Great War that could innovate and the results speak for themselves.  Haig unfortunately was not one of them.  While I would not go so far as to label him a butcher, such a connotation infers an intentional act.  He certainly was incompetant and not up for the job he was given.


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## ltmaverick25 (16 Dec 2008)

time expired said:
			
		

> EXSPY,your are still talking about a decision that was not made by Haig,the
> Somme battle was fought on ground that was not chosen by him at a time
> also not his choice, he was merely following orders given to him through
> his chain of command in an effort to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun.
> ...



Read my long winded post, that should answer your challenge as to what alternatives Haig had to a frontal.  Its not about wheather or not he should have used a frontal or could have used something different, rather, how should that frontal be conducted.

Supression fire, the use of terrain, combined arms ect... all allow you to conduct a frontal without suffering the same level of horrendus casualties.  Casualties for sure, just not to the same degree.


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## Michael OLeary (16 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> Supression fire, the use of terrain, combined arms ect... all allow you to conduct a frontal without suffering the same level of horrendus casualties.  Casualties for sure, just not to the same degree.




Extensive suppressive fire was found to destroy the terrain and limit advances, especially by restricting the advances of heavy artillery needed to support further movement.

Use of terrain is a relative term in the face of continuous linear defences.

Combined arms?  Employment of cavalry was limited because of points 1 & 2, and tanks did not exist in sufficient strength to have more than a localized tactical effect until late in the war.


Perhaps you could provide more detail for your "big hand-small map" estimate with respect to the actual conditions on the front in 1916.


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## ltmaverick25 (16 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> Extensive suppressive fire was found to destroy the terrain and limit advances, especially by restricting the advances of heavy artillery needed to support further movement.
> 
> Use of terrain is a relative term in the face of continuous linear defences.
> 
> ...



I did not make any reference to cavalry or tanks in my combined arms annotations precicely because they did not play any fundamental role in the Great War.

When talking about combined arms within the context of the Great War we are talking exclusively about the cooperation between artillery and infantry when examining the operational level.  We view artillery and infantry coordination as a given today, but it was not the case at the onset of the war.  From 1914 to late 1916 as I mentioned previously, the artillery would pound away, and then the infantry would advance.

The creeping barrage changed all of this and is the first true example of combined arms at the operational level.  Though not without its drawbacks and weaknesses, certainly much better then what was being employed prior to that.

At the tactical level, combined arms within this context means the attaching of lewis machine guns, grenades and rifle grenades down to the platoon.  Again today we take that as a given, but such was not the case prior to late 1916.  These assets were controlled by higher formations which proved to be just as innefective as it would today.

Insofar as your comments about artillery ruining the landscape by creating craters, upending earth, causing mud due to rainy European weather, granted, living in a busted up, even water, rat invested mud pit and traversing across it was no vacation for the soldiers, but imagine the alternative.

With no craters in no mans land, there would be little means of gaining all to important cover from machine gun fire while flanking sub units dealt with the pillbox.  Having plains full of even grass makes for better living conditions but terrible for advancing troops as it becomes very difficult to use terrain for cover.

Certainly that type of landscape proved to be extremely problematic for the transport of artillery, shells and other equipment required for consolidation to the newly captured ground.  However, that is where the employment of the combat engineers came into play.  Underground tunnels were dug beforehand to allow troops to advance under cover, it also allowed speedy movement of suplies forward and safe evacuation of wounded (once they got back to the tunnels anyway).  Moreover the engineers inovated as well, they became more efficient at building planked roads traversing the mud to bring those supplies forward.  Was it perfect?  Nope, but it got the job done.

Having the engineers integrated into the combat plan in the era of Vimy Ridge was unprecedented.  Again today we would never dream of leaving home without them as the saying goes, but such was not the case back then.  Fusing the engineers into batallions is yet another example of combined arms in its infancy.

It is also important to note that the Germans by early 1916 were no longer employing a continuous linear defence.  In fact the withdrawel to the Hindenburg line brought the entire German defences on the western front into a defence in depth with interlocking fire and all the same goodies we train to and use today.  A proper defence in depth made a breakthrough almost impossible given the fact that tanks and AFVs did not come to fruition until the Second World War.  It also meant that suppression fire, combined arms, and the ability to consolidate gains became paramount to success.  None of this could occur without effective use of terrain at the local level.


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## Michael OLeary (16 Dec 2008)

While you are limiting your context of "combined arms" to infantry and artillery, you have again omitted explaining how you would have successfully moved the artillery forward to keep up with the infantry advance for some theoretically better form of assault than army level frontals (assuming unit level infantry tactics being employed to the best advantage within the scope of published doctrine at the time).  Difficulties of advancing medium and heavy artillery over barrage damaged terrain was one of the principal limiting factors on selection of achievable objectives for assault.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> While you are limiting your context of "combined arms" to infantry and artillery, you have again omitted explaining how you would have successfully moved the artillery forward to keep up with the infantry advance for some theoretically better form of assault than army level frontals (assuming unit level infantry tactics being employed to the best advantage within the scope of published doctrine at the time).  Difficulties of advancing medium and heavy artillery over barrage damaged terrain was one of the principal limiting factors on selection of achievable objectives for assault.



I do not disagree with the fact that broken up terrain as a result of artillery fire made moving the guns forward problematic.  What I am trying to say is that rather then pursuing a breakthrough which REQUIRES the artillery to be brought forward quickly and over great distances, the Canadian Corps adopted a doctrine of limited aims objectives.  Vimy Ridge being a perfect case study.  What that means is that there was no attempt at a breakthrough.  They were "set-piece" battles.  Take and hold terrain, simple.  That was the best one could hope for due to a number of factors.  The moving forward of heavy guns long distances quickly as you so ably put is but one factor limiting breakthroughs.  Cavalry being useless on the western front was another factor.  There was no way to exploit a breakthrough.  Cavalry got bogged down or mowed down and tanks couldnt do it yet.  Also, I am not suggesting that frontals were the wrong choice.  They were indeed the only choice.  What I am suggesting is that there was better ways to do it then the Haig doctrine.

Ultimately heavy guns did not have to be moved forward by great distances because the objective was to take and hold ground, not punch through.  Its also important to understand that in many cases on the western front the opposing trench lines were no more then 50 yards apart.  In the case of Vimy Ridge were looking at a total advance of 4000 yards on average.  Trying to have your infantry advance too far would have been playing into the Germans hands.  The German doctrine allowed for the giving of ground which is consistant with a defence in depth.  Your forces conduct delay actions and pull back to the next line, and so on until you have advanced outside the supporting range of your own artillery.  In which case the Germans would counter attack on terrain the very extremely familiar with, under cover of their own artillery fire and logistical support against a battered oponent strugging to consolidate.  Thats precicely why the frontal strategy of limited aims objectives proved vastly superior to breakthrough attempts.  Again, limited aims objectives could not have succeeded without combined arms operations at the operational and tactical level.

My criticism of Haig is twofold.

a) he pursued the mythical breakthrough in a context that did not allow for one
b) he also pushed for a policy of attrition.  Nobody needs me to explain why that was a terrible idea.

Something else I want to mention.  The notion of conveniently excluding cavalry and tanks from combined arms operations in this context is not my personal invention.  Strategists like Steven Biddle, author of Military Power are proponents of this.  If you have not read this book I strongly recommend it for several reasons.

Likewise Canadian historians like Tim Cook are also phrazing the effective cooperation of artillery and infantry to be combined arms in its infancy, an argument that I happen to support.  Obviously today, when we talk about combined arms were talking about infantry, artillery, armored, engineers, and air power all working in concert together.  But what must be understood is that in the Great War, combined arms was limited to infantry/artillery and engineers cooperation and that combined arms was a bran new inovation, so much so that the term did not even begin to be applied to what they were doing until much later.

Shock Troops by Tim Cook and Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment are excellent points of reference for this within a Canadian Corps context.


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## TangoTwoBravo (17 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> The creeping barrage in itself was a revolutionary method of employing artillery and infantry.  Prior to this, the popular thought process was that artillery conquered and infantry occupied.  Meaning that you would barrage the enemy into submission and the infantry would simply walk in and mop up.  Things obviously did not work this way.
> 
> The creeping barrage represented the earliest form of combined arms offesnive operations.  The artillery and infantry had to work together creating fire and movement at the operational level.  Meaning the infantry advanced while the artillery fired, this was NEVER done prior to Vimy.  The artillery fired, THEN the infantry advanced.  The Canadians at Vimy used both simultaneously.  At the tactical level, the platoons as mentioned above were able to create fire and movement at the local level by using machine guns to cover advancing troops (the details can go on and on from there).
> 
> The assault on Vimy Ridge was the first ever combined arms operation.  The results speak for themselves.  Incidentally the Germans used those very same tactics in their spring offensive against the British and pushed them back 140 KM (I think its 140, im not so certain but I do know it was quite far).



I would be careful about saying that infantry had never advanced while the artillery was firing before Vimy. The Japanese had done that in 1904/05, and I have read about the French using a rolling barrage during Verdun counter-attacks. German "Storm Troop" tactics evolved over time and had been doing so before Vimy. The Germans are reported to have used rolling barrages and "combined arms" tactics in 1915. The German general Bruchmuller employed rolling barrages in 1916 in the east and had worked very hard to ensure the cooperation of the artillery and the infantry. Lupfer's Dynamics of Doctrine  is a good little read that gives an overview of doctrinal development during WW1. There is a link in this thread that I tried to get going last year. http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/70754.0.html


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I would be careful about saying that infantry had never advanced while the artillery was firing before Vimy. The Japanese had done that in 1904/05, and I have read about the French using a rolling barrage during Verdun counter-attacks. German "Storm Troop" tactics evolved over time and had been doing so before Vimy. The Germans are reported to have used rolling barrages and "combined arms" tactics in 1915. The German general Bruchmuller employed rolling barrages in 1916 in the east and had worked very hard to ensure the cooperation of the artillery and the infantry. Lupfer's Dynamics of Doctrine  is a good little read that gives an overview of doctrinal development during WW1. There is a link in this thread that I tried to get going last year. http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/70754.0.html



I actually have no background with the Japanese in that era, well in any era come to think of it so I will have to take your word for it.

With regards to the Great War, there is no question that alot of the ideas that got implemented at Vimy Ridge were learned from the French experience at Verdun.  I think I mentioned that in a previous post (its getting late and too much typing for me tonight!).  Currie and McNaughton were sent to learn from French experiences at Verdun.  The French were toying around with different tactics, but did not fully develop them, and certainly not on the offensive, unless we include counter attack as offensive, I would characterize that as a component of the defensive though.  The Canadian Corps was the first to fully develop and implement those tactics into a training program, and I think the resuls for Vimy speak for themselves in that respect.  Other armies were dabbling with it, but until Vimy nobody had truly made it work.  

As far as the Germans go, they also stole many ideas from the French when they captured French officers in early 1915.  Some siezed documents and interogations yielded alot of the same information to the Germans and they too were working on these tactics.  Though the Germans would not fully bring to bear any of this on the offensive until the spring offensive, at least not on the western front, they were dabblers prior to that.  I honestly have no background on anything eastern front related so I couldnt comment on that.  As an aside interestingly enough, the defence in depth was also an idea the Germans stole from the French.  What never ceases to amaze me is that alot of these innovations did indeed start with the French Army, but they were never really able to fully develop and implement them to any degree of success.  They do deserve credit for coming up with alot of the concepts though.

Regardless though, my point is that, be it Canadian or French invented, or even German invented, these tactics were around and well known prior to Passhendaele, and yet even despite this Haig continued to pursue an attrition campaign.  Why?


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## dfuller52 (17 Dec 2008)

I can't recall the source for this but I remember quoting Haig in an essay once, saying "the machine gun has no stopping power against the horse" so it was obviously made before these battles where charges weren't part of anyone's tactics anymore. It might have been Paul Fussell, the Great War and Modern Memory, but I'm not sure.

I just found a US cavalry tactics manual from 1907 (https://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/lectures/weapons2.pdf) that talks in detail about techniques and weapons as if the use of cavalry was still current practice, so the suggestion that they learned anything from the Boer war, I think, is mistaken. I recall that this quote is also sometimes used to contrast Haig's ideas with the innovation of the Canadian commanders at Vimy.


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## Michael OLeary (17 Dec 2008)

dfuller52 said:
			
		

> I can't recall the source for this but I remember quoting Haig in an essay once, saying "the machine gun has no stopping power against the horse" so it was obviously made before these battles where charges weren't part of anyone's tactics anymore. It might have been Paul Fussell, the Great War and Modern Memory, but I'm not sure.



I think many people also forget about the evolution of machine gun tactics and establishments during the war.  The battlefield density of machine guns and the effectiveness of machine gun employment changed dramatically during the first years of the Great war.


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## Kirkhill (17 Dec 2008)

> I also agree that it takes longer to train a soldier in fire and movement than it does to train him in going forward blindly towards the mouth of the guns, but I don't recall hearing much about British fire and movement at the Somme.





> Pre-war infantry training manuals described how a company attacking would be divided into a firing-line and supports.  The firing-line, reinforced from the supports as the occasion demanded, was to establish fire superiority over the enemy, in a process that generations of British soldiers have come to know as 'winning the firefight'.  Artillery would make its contribution, the object being 'to demoralize the defenders and reduce their volume of fire'.  However, the firefight was a means and not an end, for:
> 
> "*The object of fire in the attack, whether of artillery, machine guns, or infantry is to bring such a superiority of fire to bear on the enemy as to make the advance to close quarters possible * .......as the enemy's fire is gradually subdued, further progress will be made by bounds from place to place, the movement gathering renewed force at each pause until the enemy can be assaulted with the bayonet."


 Richard Holmes: Tommy quoting from Infantry Training 1914 with the emphasis in the original training manual.

This was the way the Brits expected to fight in 1914, and did fight in the early going.    Keep in mind that that was intended to be used by troops that could generate 1500 rounds down range per minute from half a company (equivalent to something like 10 C6s firing at 150 RPM) accompanied by 2 to 6 18 pounders firing over open sights against an enemy operating in open country in dispersed packets.

What was supposed to happen if the enemy's fire WAS NOT gradually subdued because he was fighting from a linear defence, with mutual support, lots of ammunition on hand and ready reinforcements available to take up the place of the dead, the dying and the demoralized?



> Between August 1914 and June 1916 the BEF had expanded from four infantry divisions to fifty-eight, to say nothing of all those units and formations that did not exist in 1914


  Corrigan: Mud, Blood and Poppycock. p.257
Those "units and formations" included Corps, Armies and "Army Group" as well as all the support units as well as specialists like miners, aerial recce, heavy machine gun brigades....... And the 58 number doesn't include garrison forces in Britain and Overseas, nor does it include divisions diverted to other fronts like Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Italy, .......



> The staff had not expanded commensurately.  In 1914 there were twenty-two general staff officers at GHQ of the BEF (4 Divisions).  Now there were thirty (58 Divisions).  The Engineer-in-Chief's staff at GHQ had admittedly increased ninefold, but as there was only one staff officer in 1914, nine in 1916 was hardly excessive. In 1914 the headquarters of the various administrative services had forty-five staff officers, whereas now they had 129; and a corps headquarters had grown from nineteen staff officers to twenty-four.  Staff officers at division and brigade headquarters had not increased at all


  Corrigan; p. 257




> Of the eleven British divisions of ..... Rawlinson's Fourth Army......three..... were composed of regular battalions, five.......were New Army formations and three....were a mix of regular, Territorial Force and New Army battalions.  The Territorial Force battalions had little experience, the New Army ones virtually none and even the regulars had been brought up to strength by recruits recently out of training, and with officers and NCOs two or three ranks higher than they had been in 1914.  It was a very inexperienced and undertrained army


  Corrigan. 259



> If all the peripherals are cut out, it was and is possible to train a man to a standard where he can take his place in a rifle section in a few weeks.  In the Great War he needed to be able to march, to shoot and to perform tactical manoeuvres directed by his officers and NCOs.  To produce those officers and NCOs takes far longer.  They cannot be made;  they must be grown, and growing takes time.  With only two or three officers and perhaps half a dozen NCOs with any experience in a battalion of 1,000 men, only the simplest of tactics could be employed - the battalions were just too inexperienced for anything more complex.


 Corrigan: p.259.


Machine Guns:



> The example of the Welsh Guards shows how the Lewis gun spread throughout the infantry.  The battalion received a single gun in November 1915, another in December, six more in March 1916, another eight that August, eight more in January 1918 and a further eight in April.


 Holmes.393

So on the opening day of the Somme one of the premier battalions in the British Army had a total of 8 light machine guns which had been introduced 6 months previously but only supplied in sufficient numbers for tactical training 2-3 months prior to jump-off.  Not a lot of time to develop innovative tactics.  During the battle (August 1916) the complement was doubled to 16 and tactics were adjusted accordingly.  It is notable that, IMHO, the LMG is the key to the modern section/platoon.  This element which drove modern platoon tactics was only being introduced at the time of the Somme.

Artillery:



> .... In addition to their field artillery, XX Corps would have thirty-two batteries of heavy artillery, I Colonial Corp sixty-five heavy batteries and, and XXXV Corps thirty-two (all French formations).  In contrast the British XIII Corps had eighteen batteries.


 Corrigan: p.259

The Brits, with their small army, did not have the same need for artillery that the French and the Germans did.  It took them a long time to tool up to be able to make the necessary guns and shells.


The battle should not have been fought.  

Why was it fought?



> Dated 16 June 1916 (Haig's order to Commander Fourth Army), it laid down the aim of the offensive: "Third and Fourth Armies will undertake offensive operations on the front Maricourt to Gommecourt in conjunction with the French Sixth Army astride the Somme, _with the object of relieving the pressure on the French at Verdun and inflicting losses on the enemy_..."


 Corrigan: p.257, italics Corrigan's.

In 1916 the French fed 77 Divisions through Verdun.  Thirty Eight of them were then sent to fight on the Somme.  In total the French supplied 44 Divisions on the Somme to the Brits 53.

The Somme lasted from 1 July to 18 November: a total of 20 weeks.  The Brits committed 53 divisions and lost a total of 95,000 dead.  A loss rate for Haig of 89 per division per week.
Normandy lasted from 6 June to 25 August: a total of 11 weeks.  The Brits committed 19 divisions and lost a total of 22,000 dead.  A loss rate for Monty of 100 per division per week - and that with all the benefits of "modern" combined arms doctrine in a much more fluid environment.

In the year that the Brits lost 109,000 dead, the French lost 270,000 dead: 160,000 at Verdun.

Data from Corrigan: pp.298-300



> Before the end of the year (Ludendorff) and Hindenburg would be demanding the use of child labour in Germany to release men for the front


 Corrigan p.300


And then, after fighting through the objective comes re-org. Corrigan again.



> The British learned much from the Somme, and this was reflected in new methods and structures implemented during the winter.  The infantry platoon - the basic building block of that arm of the service on which the bulk of the fighting fell - underwent a radical change.  Instead of a headquarters and four sections, each section with the same weapons mix and with the same tasks, the platoon was now reorganised on a functional basis.  The new infantry platoon still had a headquarters consisting of a subaltern officer, a sergeant and two private soldiers, and each section had an NCO commander and a minimum of eight men, but each section would now have its own specific role: bombers, Lewis gun, riflemen and rifle bombers.


  Corrigan: pp.300-301

To take nothing away from the accomplishment of the Canadian Corps at Vimy, under the command of Lord Byng, the change in tactics that permitted the success there had its origin in the BATTLES (plural) of the Somme and the growth and evolution of the capabilities of BEF generally.  The tactics in which Currie trained his division at Vimy were tactics that were being promulgated throughout the BEF between Nov 1916 and Apr 1917.

Tactics had evolved. New kit had appeared to support those tactics. More kit generally was available.  And, most importantly, a cadre of officers and NCOS had grown to their trade in a bloody environment and were better prepared for their next battles.

The miracles of the BEF (and the Canadian Corps) were manifold.  Raising the numbers and equipping them in 18 months.  Having them hang together while they learned their trade on the job one summer (Edit: a summer which 74% of frontline BEF troops survived "without a scratch" Corrigan p.299).  Completely reorganizing their TTPs to incorporate new kit over 6 months of winter.  Effectively applying the reorg as a winning force in 1917 (The hundred days of 1918 may be more spectacular but it should be remembered that throughout 1917 the German's lost ground, as well as men, on the Western Front from April to November - conveniently bookended by the Canadians: Vimy and  Passchendaele).  That forced the Germans into their peace with the Russians enabling to release enough forces for one last throw of the dice in the west in 1918.  

It should also be remembered that 1917 was also the year of Cambrai - the Combined Arms tank/infantry/artillery/air assault that successfully breached the line but failed in large part because - the guns could not be brought over the broken ground fast enough to support the advance - and - because communications were not sufficientlyl well developed to allow for the guns to be accurately spotted in support or for cavalry units to be directed to exploitable breaches in a timely manner.


Butcher Haig did as well as any man (or woman) could have done with the tools he had available.

Postscript - again from Corrigan

Prior to 1914 the largest number of troops that the Brits had sent overseas was 450,000 to tackle the Boers.  22,000 died - 2/3s from disease.
21,000 died during the Crimean escapade
60,000 died over the 23 years of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars period (2-3,000 fatalities per year).

By contrast, between 1793 and 1815 continental armies lost over 3 Million dead: 
Austerlitz 4000 French/7,000 Russian
Wagram 8300 French/6000 Austrian
Borodino 7000 French/10,000 Russian.
All one day battles.

In the Crimea the combined Russian/French/Turkish death toll was 765,000 (against the 21,000 Brits).

Up until WW1 we Brits had waged war on the cheap.  Money from the trade supported by the navy financed other peoples' armies who fought in support of our interests.

In WW1, we ended up paying our full share of the Butcher's Bill.  

And that was a shock to the psyche.

But the shock to our psyche was still not as great as it was to the French and the Germans who, according to Corrigan's thesis, should have been inured to the losses by long familiarity.

-Message Ends-


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## tomahawk6 (17 Dec 2008)

I feel that each side should have come to terms in 1916. Once maneuver warfare was abandoned for attrition warfare given the technological advances the advantage had moved to the defender.


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## Kirkhill (17 Dec 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I feel that each side should have come to terms in 1916. Once maneuver warfare was abandoned for attrition warfare given the technological advances the advantage had moved to the defender.



But surely that would just have perpetuated the state of grievance and belligerence (extant since 843 AD  at least) and delayed another confrontation between two refreshed belligerents - as happened in 1939?


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## tomahawk6 (17 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> But surely that would just have perpetuated the state of grievance and belligerence (extant since 843 AD  at least) and delayed another confrontation between two refreshed belligerents - as happened in 1939?



Its entirely possible that the terms for a cessation of hostilities would have been alot more agreeable to the German public than what happened in 1918. Hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved. Perhaps Hitler would never have come to power. Alot of what if's. The only thing certain to me is that had the allies and axis powers come to terms in 1916 it would have saved lives and money.


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## time expired (17 Dec 2008)

KIRKHILL,we have read the same books and reached the same conclusions
but we are arguing against generations of "popular history"that has portrayed
Field Marshall Haig as an unfeeling butcher who sacrificed thousand's of allied
soldiers without any sign of remorse or pity.Haig was an inarticulate man with
very little charisma who seemed unable or unwilling to explain himself to others
he was also a minor aristocrat this alone was enough to condemn him to the
vast majority of the British public,to DAFTANDBARMY the fact that he preferred
wellbred horses is enough to proclaim him guilty as charged.No mere facts are
going to change these perceptions but that should not deter us in our" begging
to differ".
The "rolling barrage"was used on the Somme but because the previous wire
cutting barrage had so cut up the ground the troops could not keep up and
it became a foot race between the Germans coming forward from their reserve
positions and Tommy crossing no-mans land,the Germans in most cases won.
It has been commented upon in this thread before but the fact remains that the
British army had expanded from 5 div. to over 50 in the space of 18 months
this led to inexperience troops led by equally inexperienced officers and more
importantly,IMHO, NCOs,the arty had also to go through this rapid expansion.
To commit this army to a major offence against a well dug in experienced army
must have been a daunting prospect to any General and Haigs answer seemed
to be KISS(keep it simple stupid) apart from telling Lloyd George and the French
to f§&ck off I do not see any options open to Haig.
Vimy Ridge seems to me to be an anachronism in WW1 battles,firstly if one has 
seen the ground,there seems to be very little room on the ridge for the defence
in depth that the Germans seemed to favour, as the back side of the ridge is 
almost vertical bringing up reserves would have been very difficult and the
lack of observation for the German arty down on the plain would have made it
very difficult to bring effective fire on an attacking enemy.Please do not think
that I am in anyway trying to diminish the splendid effort of Gen.Bing or the
Canadian Corps,just that because of the terrain it seems somewhat different
to other battles on the Western Front.
                                            Regards


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> I think many people also forget about the evolution of machine gun tactics and establishments during the war.  The battlefield density of machine guns and the effectiveness of machine gun employment changed dramatically during the first years of the Great war.



You are absolutely right about that.  Haig's problem though is that he was out of touch.  He refused to visit the front because he wanted to remain detatched.  He has no idea what he was dealing with and he would not listen to what others were telling him.  This would only change during the 100 days offensive that won the war.  But even then, all he did was to send the Canadian Corps in first, battle after battle, which in a sence was a good idea because they had become masters of the offensive.  The problem is he never bothered to learn and understand why.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

So he never used the Aussies or Kiwi's or the 51st Highland div or the Guards div or any of the other highly rated Imperial troops, just the Canadian Corps eh?


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

time expired said:
			
		

> Vimy Ridge seems to me to be an anachronism in WW1 battles,firstly if one has
> seen the ground,there seems to be very little room on the ridge for the defence
> in depth that the Germans seemed to favour, as the back side of the ridge is
> almost vertical bringing up reserves would have been very difficult and the
> ...



You are right about the defence in depth.  To lay out a defence in depth was to lose the ridge.  They could not hold it and employ that type of defence at the same time.  There was a debate in German command as to weather to pull back and develop some depth thereby giving up the ridge (they knew an attack was coming) or stand firm.

They chose to stand firm, they also chose to leave their reserves extremely far back (dont have the distance handy right now).  The reasoning for this was that they had successfully held out for extremely long periods of time against the British and the French who had tried to take the ridge before.  The Germans basically used the exact same tactics against the Canadians as they had successfully used before.  They had absolutely no reason to beleive it was not going to work.  That is why I continue to argue that although elements of these new tactics were springing up at the Somme and Verdun, the first time they were fully brought to bear and implemented EFFECTIVELY was Vimy, and thats what caught the Germans off guard.  The Germans were caught using a pre modern system of defence vs a modern system of attack and the results speak for themselves.

They didnt make that mistake again.  Which is exactly why the breakthrough aspirations of the British and the French became completely unrealistic.

As for the tactics themselves.  The Canadian Corps did not exist in a bubble of isolation, they were part of a larger British formation and had the benefit of absorbing lessons learned from the Brits, as well as several professional British staff officers.  As was discussed they also had the chance to learn from the French.  The Corps didnt create these new tactics without any help from anyone else, but they did perfect them and embrace them in ways that no other army on the western front did.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

One of the Coprs staff officers went on to be CIGS.  Alanbrooke to be exact.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

sledge said:
			
		

> So he never used the Aussies or Kiwi's or the 51st Highland div or the Guards div or any of the other highly rated Imperial troops, just the Canadian Corps eh?



Im not saying that at all.  I honestly dont have much background with the other commonwealth armies, one of the drawbacks of specialization.  The vast majority of scholarship that I have read is from Canadian authors to date.  Im only just beggining to come to the end of those publications.  Give me another 5 years and ill have the other stuff down too   I have read in several instances though that the Aussies were highly regarded, thats about as much background as I have in that area.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

Well good to see you can admit you have limited subject knowledge. I am no expert but have done much reading on  the subject, and have a fair knowledge. The canadian where well used but as part of a team effort. During the hundred days the Canadian Corps had the biggest battalions as I am sure you know. As well as much more firepower per division than a contemparary Imperial division. Which is why they got some hard roles, that and a excellent staff. But the Brits used there own troops just as much. I do beleive you have fallen for the myth that only Canadian/Australian troops did the fighting while the brits had tea.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

sledge said:
			
		

> Well good to see you can admit you have limited subject knowledge. I am no expert but have done much reading on  the subject, and have a fair knowledge. The canadian where well used but as part of a team effort. During the hundred days the Canadian Corps had the biggest battalions as I am sure you know. As well as much more firepower per division than a contemparary Imperial division. Which is why they got some hard roles, that and a excellent staff. But the Brits used there own troops just as much. I do beleive you have fallen for the myth that only Canadian/Australian troops did the fighting while the brits had tea.



I would not say that I have limited subject knowledge, just that I am specializing in Canadian military history, and even though a smaller field then say British or American history, still quite large for one grad student.

As for falling into that trap, thats not the case.  When I publish my article ill post a link here for you guys to view if you wish.  As ive said many times in this thread the Canadians were operating as part of a larger British formation.  They had help, they had support, they were trained and mentored by other armies.  Im not trying to say that only Canada fought this war.  I am arguing however that the Canadian Corps ended the war being the best army on the offensive.  I am not the first to make such a claim though.  Many British, American, Canadian and German authors have made those conclusions long before I did.

The article that im writing will involve taking Steven Biddles theories of modern system force employment on the offensive through limited aims objectives and use a case study to test it - Vimy, and spit out some results.

As an aside some of the research I am engaged in involves reading the personal correspondences of German soldiers to their families to see what they had to say about all of this.  Slow goings since I do not speak a word of German and have to rely on collegues for translation.  But so far, based on what im reading, (and my research is only preliminary at this point so things could change) it seems that the Canadians were the most feared by the Germans come late 1917 onwards.  Prior to that, almost no mention.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I would be careful about saying that infantry had never advanced while the artillery was firing before Vimy. The Japanese had done that in 1904/05, and I have read about the French using a rolling barrage during Verdun counter-attacks. German "Storm Troop" tactics evolved over time and had been doing so before Vimy. The Germans are reported to have used rolling barrages and "combined arms" tactics in 1915. The German general Bruchmuller employed rolling barrages in 1916 in the east and had worked very hard to ensure the cooperation of the artillery and the infantry. Lupfer's Dynamics of Doctrine  is a good little read that gives an overview of doctrinal development during WW1. There is a link in this thread that I tried to get going last year. http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/70754.0.html



I just had another thought on this.  Any idea if the tactics that the Japanese used in 1904/05 were known to Allied or German allies at the onset of the Great War?  It would be interesting to know what information they had and didnt have and what role if any, that information may have played on the formulation of tactics and doctrine.  

My guess is that, they either didnt know, or more likely if they did know they likely ignored it due to completely idiotic racial superiority sentiments at the time.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

I do agree the Canadian Corps was very effective in the assault. Mind you during the 100 days the Canadian corps fired 25% of all artillery ammunition used by the BEF.


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## Old Sweat (17 Dec 2008)

sledge said:
			
		

> One of the Coprs staff officers went on to be CIGS.  Alanbrooke to be exact.



Ironsides also served as a staff officer in the Canadian Corps.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

So make that two then LOL.


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## Michael OLeary (17 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> I just had another thought on this.  Any idea if the tactics that the Japanese used in 1904/05 were known to Allied or German allies at the onset of the Great War?  It would be interesting to know what information they had and didnt have and what role if any, that information may have played on the formulation of tactics and doctrine.
> 
> My guess is that, they either didnt know, or more likely if they did know they likely ignored it due to completely idiotic racial superiority sentiments at the time.



Military attachés and observers in the Russo-Japanese War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_attach%C3%A9s_and_observers_in_the_Russo-Japanese_War


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Thats interesting.  Given that the British had a total of 50 divisions in the field at the time, and the Canadians represented only 4 divisions, that would seem to suggest the Canadians were doing alot of the heavy lifting.  Due to the increased size of the divisions, I divided 6 into 50 which came to 12 percent.

So in essence the Canadians were firing more then their proportional share of artillery.  My assessment of this is that because they became the British shock army, they were constantly the vanguard, and were sent in first, which would explain a higher proportional use of artillery.  Either that, or they just happened to miss alot


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

sledge said:
			
		

> So make that two then LOL.



There were actually dozens of British Staff Officers in the Canadian Corps at the time, and all of them, from what I can tell proved to be invaluable to the formations they served.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

Gunners using a early form of spray and pray?  ;D

They did do much heavy lifting in the 100 days as the brits did get worn out from the german offensives.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

I meant two that became CIGS.


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## Old Sweat (17 Dec 2008)

The European armies had military observers in the field during the Russian-Japanese War. I know Tango2Bravo has done research on that war and may have more to add. The depth of my available knowledge is a largely unread account of the war in my library. I do know that Canada sent at least one military observer as part of the British team and that officer eventually rose to become the Chief of the General Staff.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The European armies had military observers in the field during the Russian-Japanese War. I know Tango2Bravo has done research on that war and may have more to add. The depth of my available knowledge is a largely unread account of the war in my library. I do know that Canada sent at least one military observer as part of the British team and that officer eventually rose to become the Chief of the General Staff.



I was just reading over the link that Tango2Bravo provided.  This may be worthy of a detailed study.  If the information about the effectiveness of creeping barrages was available 10 years prior to the onset of war, why was it not absorbed into a doctrinal template?  I will have to inquire with one of my social historian friends about this.  They will have a field day with it.


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## George Wallace (17 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> Im not saying that at all.  I honestly dont have much background with the other commonwealth armies, one of the drawbacks of specialization.  The vast majority of scholarship that I have read is from Canadian authors to date.  Im only just beggining to come to the end of those publications.  Give me another 5 years and ill have the other stuff down too   I have read in several instances though that the Aussies were highly regarded, thats about as much background as I have in that area.



Kinda like building a bridge but not knowing what the footings are on either bank.  As you are stating that the Canadians were only a part of the larger British Commonwealth effort, it would be a good idea to know what that overall effort was.  You are only presenting one portion of the puzzle, and perhaps even then missing some key pieces.

And I do find exception in your statements on the Canadian Cavalry.  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was in the Pursuit at the time of the Armistice.  I would conclude that in the latter part of the war, after fighting in the trenches, they were being employed more actively as cavalry.  Don't get any LdSH(RC) or RCD going on the Battle of Moreuil Wood. 


PS.  If you are doing up a paper, I do hope you are more careful of your grammar and spelling.  Just try the Spell Check on your next post and see what we are putting up with.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

I would say for the british it was due to the fact they had very little artillery to do it with plus, thier doctrine was geared more for colonial intervention then a full scale european war.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Kinda like building a bridge but not knowing what the footings are on either bank.  As you are stating that the Canadians were only a part of the larger British Commonwealth effort, it would be a good idea to know what that overall effort was.  You are only presenting one portion of the puzzle, and perhaps even then missing some key pieces.
> 
> And I do find exception in your statements on the Canadian Cavalry.  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was in the Pursuit at the time of the Armistice.  I would conclude that in the latter part of the war, after fighting in the trenches, they were being employed more actively as cavalry.  Don't get any LdSH(RC) or RCD going on the Battle of Moreuil Wood.
> 
> ...



Thank you George but please rest assured spell check and proofreading is alive and well for my papers!

I do know what the larger overall efforts are.  Ive read the official histories of the British, Canadians, French and Australians.  Thats not the issue, but I am specializing in Canadian.  In a perfect world I would be able to do it all, but I am lucky to keep up with what I have at the moment.  Most other historians are the same in that regard.

As for the cavalry, meh, once the Germans had fallen into disaray sure the Cavalry was put to more use, at least on their horses anyway, but that does not mean they were effective.  I think most scholars out there would agree that Cavalry was not an effective arm at all in the Great War.  The Great War was the death of the Cavalry.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

yes but the cavalry was the only means of rapid explotation available at the time. Mind you the cav was more effective in the desert.


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## George Wallace (17 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> ........  The Great War was the death of the Cavalry.



Not true.  It was much later, into the 1930's that "Mechanization" brought about the 'Twilight of the Cavalry'.  Cavalry was still employed in the 1940's.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

sledge said:
			
		

> yes but the cavalry was the only means of rapid explotation available at the time. Mind you the cav was more effective in the desert.



Well thats just the problem, it was the only means of rapid exploitation, but that means was totally non effective on the western front which is exactly why I have been saying breakthrough attempts were a foolish idea.  The vast majority of the time our cavalry were in the front line trenches playing infantry.  Many historians argue that all the horses that went to waste serving the cavalry that got put to little or no use would have been better served being allocated to artillery or logistics where they were indeed a valuable asset.


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

The British trained their cavalry as mounted infantry hence the hate between French and Smith-Dorien. The amount of fodder saved would have been minimal actually.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

I dont think it was the fodder they were complaining about, rather they could have actually used the horses to haul ammo and other supplies ect..

Anyway I have to duck out and actually get some work done!  Ill check back in later and make sure George isnt still riding around on a horse with a big silver sign


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## hugh19 (17 Dec 2008)

Well the brits got more andmore trucks and railways for hauling supplies which tended to eclipse the horse. Plus a cavalry mount may not be suited for hauling supplies and vice versa.


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Not true.  It was much later, into the 1930's that "Mechanization" brought about the 'Twilight of the Cavalry'.  Cavalry was still employed in the 1940's.



And we still employ Sea Kings today!  That doesnt mean its days were done long ago.


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## 54/102 CEF (17 Dec 2008)

Two books for you to get Haig's viewpoint - as he was a very inarticulate person with respect to self - inflating history

At GHQ and Field Marshall Earl Haig by John Charteris

You can read most of each book on Google Books

EG try Somme HAIG - you'll see they thought the Germans were almost defeated but early rains shut down the campaign

try march 1918 - they forecast the German advance despite the Brit High Command not agreeing with it

eg - try Cambrai series of battles ---- and see they never changed their view on what they were trying to accomplish --- it was always the wearing down battle which was their doctrine - a point many above forget if they ever knew - even if they didn't no big deal - its standard to overlay your modern ideas on what was the case long ago.

A few lines on Google Books and at least you get the Haig level perspective written by Charteris - without this basis - you are accepting secondary sources which usually have an axe to grind

A sample search on HAIG GHQ AND CHURCHILL 
http://books.google.ca/books?id=LG0DAAAAMAAJ&q=haig+GHQ+churchill&dq=haig+GHQ+churchill&pgis=1

And the logistics of the whole thing - http://scotsatwar.co.uk/AZ/HaigFellows'Addresses04.html - which tends to suggest that far from manage the battles that he designed in what he called the 2 year Campaign - Haig had far more to deal with than most readers with thick glasses and moldy popular histories give him credit for.

More from Scots at War here http://scotsatwar.co.uk/AZ/TheDouglasHaigFellowship.html


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## Kirkhill (17 Dec 2008)

Ltmaverick25, I would suggest that without looking at the broader structure of the BEF  AND the French you have fallen into the trap of "situating the estimate" rather than estimating the situation.  And from your early pronouncements it sounds as if you have been heavily influence by  Pierre Berton and Brereton Greenhouse.  Not to mention Gordon Dancocks.    Dancocks does good work describing the technicalities but is quite Canada-centric.  Berton seldom let a fact get in the way of a good story and IMHO Greenhouse had a notably anti-Imperial bias.

The reason I recommend Corrigan is that it is jammed with stats AND is readable AND is wide-ranging.  Similarly for Holmes's Tommy (He also did an excellent book "Redcoat" on the Brown Bess Army).


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## ltmaverick25 (17 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Ltmaverick25, I would suggest that without looking at the broader structure of the BEF  AND the French you have fallen into the trap of "situating the estimate" rather than estimating the situation.  And from your early pronouncements it sounds as if you have been heavily influence by  Pierre Berton and Brereton Greenhouse.  Not to mention Gordon Dancocks.    Dancocks does good work describing the technicalities but is quite Canada-centric.  Berton seldom let a fact get in the way of a good story and IMHO Greenhouse had a notably anti-Imperial bias.
> 
> The reason I recommend Corrigan is that it is jammed with stats AND is readable AND is wide-ranging.  Similarly for Holmes's Tommy (He also did an excellent book "Redcoat" on the Brown Bess Army).



I will no doubt pick up Corrigan when I get a chance but you are assuming a bit much with your statements.  Pierre Berton though a great writer was primarily a journalist, I am not naive as to the style of writing and interpretations that he used.  The same can be said for Greenhouse to some extent.  Also look at the timing of those publications, National Unity anyone?

When it comes to the battle of Vimy Ridge the authors I rely more heavily on for secondary sources are people like Tim Cook, Geoffrey Hayes, Gary Shefield, Paul Dickson, Michael Boire, Mark Osborne Humphries, Patrick Brennan, Andrew Iarocci, David Cambell, and even Jack Granatstein with a grain of sault.  These authors are not without their own biases, but I dont think you can reasonably find an author academic or popular that does not have some sort of bias in their writing.

That is just secondary mind you.  Ive conducted a fair amount of my own primary research, in the course of doing so, I find myself supporting many of Cooks arguments, though most of the authors above tell a similar story.

Besides, I would hardly be able to get away publishing an article that was based solely on secondary sources and surely not by relying on Berton and Greenhouse.

Ultimately though I am attempting to develop new interpretations, some of which I fully concede may be somewhat controversial, but they are interpretations that can be backed up with sound primary research.  If I ever finish the damn thing before its deadline and it gets published I will make sure to provide a link here for you guys to read, and you can let me know what you think.


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## Greymatters (17 Dec 2008)

To all respondants, this is a good read, thanks for your input...


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## Kirkhill (17 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> I will no doubt pick up Corrigan when I get a chance but you are assuming a bit much with your statements.  Pierre Berton though a great writer was primarily a journalist, I am not naive as to the style of writing and interpretations that he used.  The same can be said for Greenhouse to some extent.  Also look at the timing of those publications, National Unity anyone?
> 
> When it comes to the battle of Vimy Ridge the authors I rely more heavily on for secondary sources are people like Tim Cook, Geoffrey Hayes, Gary Shefield, Paul Dickson, Michael Boire, Mark Osborne Humphries, Patrick Brennan, Andrew Iarocci, David Cambell, and even Jack Granatstein with a grain of sault.  These authors are not without their own biases, but I dont think you can reasonably find an author academic or popular that does not have some sort of bias in their writing.



Fair enough.  I stand corrected and apologise.


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## TangoTwoBravo (17 Dec 2008)

I am not an academic, but I advise that you broaden your knowledge of doctrinal developments during the war for all the major combatants. If you are going to say that the Canadians were the first or the best at something you should be able to compare it to what others were doing.

The German storm troop tactics were developed over time and I would be very careful about laying credit at the Canadian's door. The Germans suspended offensive operations on the Western Front in 1917 to allow them to work on Russia, but they had been working on the variations of those tactics from 1915/16. Gudmundsson's book gives an excellent view, as well as Martin Samuels. At the platoon level the eventual tactics worked out by the British and Germans had several similarities, but at higher tactical levels it got a bit different. The Germans emphasized deep penetrations and also seemed to subordinate the fire plan to the manoeuvre plan. For an interesting view of British tactics that differs a bit from conventional wisdom try Paddy Griffiths.

Looking at the Russo-Japanese War, the major European powers (France, Britain and Germany) had detachments of attaches who observed the war and wrote about it in great detail. I have read official reports from all three and they make the same basic observations. They all absorbed the impact of the machine gun, and indeed the Russo-Japanese War can be seen as having worsened the First World War as it brought machine guns into European armies on a scale much greater than had existed before. Only the British had had machine guns at battalion level before the Russo-Japanese War, but after the reports from the field these weapons went into much wider service. The need for cooperation between artillery and infantry was noted by all, but the "so-whats" were not universal. One British attache noted that 

"During the whole of the operations the thing which impressed me the most in regard to the artillery was its cooperation with the infantry in the last stages of the attack, regardless of the losses they might cause their own infantry...The Japanese consider that any losses they may cause their own infantry can only be slight compared to those which would be incurred were the defenders left free at the critical moment to pour an accurate and concentrated fire on the attacking infantry at a distance of only a few hundred yards."

So it seems that the Japanese had worked on the concept of using artillery to keep the enemy's head down until the last moment.

I think that the Great Powers knew that the war would be bloody. A British Captain observed on the Sha-Ho in Manchuria that: "There was no place in the whole defensive line where a successful attack by the Russians looked practicable, unless the works were first destroyed by heavy artillery." The Europeans also took from that war, however, that standing still as the Russians did would lead to defeat. They could look to the ability of the fiercely nationalistic Japanese to accept casualties in offensive operations and eventually prevail as supporting their own war plans that emphasized the attack. 

I believe that the Germans figured they could find an open flank as the Japanese did at Mukden, while the French believed that their morale and flexibility would see them through. Some have suggested that the Germans looked at Mukden in great detail when coming up with their plan to knock France out. The British may have been more concerned with colonial wars, and in any case they took the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War as vaildating their own lessons from the Boer War (skirmishing instead of dense formations, khaki uniforms, machine guns etc). The British were actually ahead of the French and Germans in that regard in 1904. The Germans pretty much caught up while the French made some changes of their own.

I think that it is very hard for an Army to learn from the experience of another without some practical experience of their own. The tendancy is to look for things that validate your own preconceptions and then find ways to sideline lessons that do not jive with your view. Referring to a war as a special case seems to be quite common when looking for a way around a lesson.

I have a paper in draft form on the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the armies of Britain, France and Germany. I will clean it up and offer it here someplace for criticism.


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Fair enough.  I stand corrected and apologise.



No need to appologize at all.  As i was saying to someone via PMs, I am just happy to have found a forum of other individuals that are interested in the same things who are also versed in some of the material.  You should see what my grad school discussion groups degenerate into sometimes, its far far worse especially when topics of Canadian military history come up.  I could use a few of you on my team in there, its always myself versus the entire room, not fun at all!


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo,

Let me first say that I found your post extremely facinating.  As I mentioned before I have zero depth of knowledge with the Japanese/Russian war nor the effects it had on doctrinal development of European powers during the Great War, so I look forward to seeing that paper.  I think you raise some good points about the manner in which various armies chose to interpret the lessons learned from that war.  In my view it is certainly an area worthy of much more study as we are bound to run into the same sorts of situation in the future as we observe other wars unfold and attempt to keep pace with tactical and technological developments.

As for my observations about the offensive prowess of the Canadian Corps during the Great War...

I do contend that from 1917 to the end of the war the Canadian Corps was the single best army on the offensive, but I am not alone in that argument.  Again, as I've mentioned before, scholars from a variety of different countries have made the same conclusions.

Let me also clarify a few points that I made earlier...

Again I am not trying to argue that the Canadian Corps invented tactics within its own void or bubble and then went on to destroy the Germans single handedly.  What I am saying is that the Canadians took the lessons learned from Verdun and the Somme, and the rest of their own experiences on the front and translated that much better and more efficiently into new training, tactics and doctrine that allowed them to be more successful on the offensive.

Were the Canadians the only ones doing this?  No.  Were the British putting into practice the very same recomendations that Currie made for the preperation of the assault on Vimy Ridge, into their own plans for the wider Battle of Arras?  Absolutely.  The Canadians were not the only ones doing this, but they did do it better then any other army.  I concede that my knowledge and background is not as in depth on the British and French side as it is the Canadian side, but that does not mean that it is non existant, simply not nearly as specialized.  When it comes to the Germans, I have spent alot of time studying their tactics on the defence, but not so much on the offence during the Great War.

The reason that I support the arguments of several other authors much more experienced and wiser then I, that the Canadian Corps was the best offensive army on the western front is simply because of the results.  I am a firm beleiver that the results speak for themselves.  Again lets not forget that the Germans were much more fearful of the Canadians then they were any other formation for a reason, they delivered results.  Thats not to say that other armies did not, it is however to say that the Canadians were doing it better.  Does that mean that the British and the French had zero role to play in Canadian performance?  Absolutely not.  The Canadian Corps could not have engaged in the battles that it did without the immence logistical support of the BEF.  Moreover the multitude of British staff officers assigned to Canadian units were an absolute necessity.  The lessons and innovations provided by the French were also invaluable.  However, when all is said and done, and H hour approached, it was our guys at the sharp end that had to go do it, and their results speak for themselves.

A few other points...

The Canadian Corps became known as Storm Troopers because that is what the Germans started calling them, and no I am not saying that because I saw it on the Passhendaele movie!  Several correspondences from German soldiers to their families that I have been going over for the past few months reveal that same fact.

During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.

During all of 1918 Currie was summoned to consult various other British formations and give them advice on the offensive.  Why would that be the case if the Canadians were not out performing?

Although the British and the French were attempting to employ the same tactics as the Canadians, they were not nearly as effective at adopting a more decentralized style of command and control.  This is something the Canadians implemented much better.  Perhaps it was because there was a tiny bit of truth to the myth of the militiamen, or maybe it was due to cultural differences in Canadian society from those of the older European nations.  I dont have the answer to that, but I do beleive the ability to push battlefield authority down to the lowest possible level is what gave Canadians the edge.

Again I am not an expect in the Great War history of the British or French armies, but I do know enough to know that they were not doing things nearly as well as the Canadian Corps on the offensive in the latter part of the war.  The French had mutineed and refused to participate on the offensive until much later on, the British had battered beyond comprehension, the Americans never got it together in the Great War the way the did in the Second World War, and the Germans, although they displayed mastery of combined arms operations in their spring offensive of 1918, took the completely wrong approach.  They went for a breakthrough, and actually succeeded partially before it was brought to a stop, but that was their undoing.  By Contrast the Canadian Corps launched a series of successive, deliberate, limited aims objectives and systematically pushed the Germans back.  Not nearly as sexy as a breakthrough, and most costly in lives then a breakthrough (assuming the breakthrough succeeds anyway) but it did get the job done.


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## TangoTwoBravo (18 Dec 2008)

I won't argue against the effectiveness of the Canadian Corps in World War 1! To go with _Soldat Snuffy's _ letters home to Heiderlberg, I have read that the allies made somewhat elaborate deception measures regarding the placement of the Canadians to gain surprise at Amiens. Have your read Shane Schreiber's great little book?

I will, however, be careful about using categorical statements. I think that there are more nuances. How do you incorporate the ANZACs? Have you look at all British divisions? Again, I suggest that you read some of Paddy Griffiths works to gain some perspective. I am not saying that he is right, but he offers some balance.

While I think that Western historians give too much credit to the Germans and not enough to British/Commonwealth forces, I would also be careful when making inferences about the German and Canadian methods in World War 1 by looking at the final outcome. There are matters of scale at play.


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## Michael OLeary (18 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.



This raises a curious point.  While you readily adjust the relative size of the Canadian divisions for being "larger than conventional ones", what was the respective size of those German divisions to your theoretical "conventional division"?

Have you considered conducting an analysis and comparison of actual combat power, rather then a simple numerical strength comparison?

You may find Trevor Dupuy's Numbers, Predictions & War a useful reference for such a comparison.


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## dapaterson (18 Dec 2008)

Dupuy is a heretic.  He dared suggest the Germans were the better warriors, hobbled by a lack of materiel to wage war.  And, since the Germans lost, therefore Dupuy must be wrong and there's nothing we can learn from studying them.

Come now, most other Western analysts have tried mightily to discredit Dupuy.  They have opinion and anecdote on their side, Dupuy has mere facts and hard analysis.  Who could ever be persuaded by fact when there's emotion available?


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## daftandbarmy (18 Dec 2008)

I believe that, using von Manstein's methodology, Haig was a 'hardworkig idiot' who should have been fired immediately:

http://www.slowleadership.org/blog/2007/10/are-todays-organizations-creating-hardworking-idiots/

But hey, that's just me.


And below is an article that describes how this theory applied to Haig.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig: World War I’s Worst General

The great commanders of history fascinate us, and we read their biographies looking for one or more character attributes we believe accounted for their success. With Napoleon, for example, we think imagination. In Lee, we see audacity. Wellington, composure. Hannibal, daring. Of course, truly great generals seem to possess all these qualities to some degree. They are artists of a kind, blending in one person intelligence, intuition, courage, calculation and many other traits that allow them to see what others cannot and to act when the time is right. For students of military history, the question of what makes great commanders is inexhaustibly fascinating.
We are, naturally, not intrigued by unsuccessful generals any more than we like to read about ballplayers who hit .200 lifetime. There is nothing edifying in the biography of, say, Ambrose Burnside or any of the Union generals tormented by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.

But Douglas Haig may be the great exception to this rule. First, because he still has defenders who—in spite of those many graveyards and inconclusive, costly battles—would claim he was not in fact an unsuccessful commander. At the end of the war, after all, the army he commanded—and had almost ruined—was, if not victorious, then plainly on the winning side. Still, at the other extreme, one can argue persuasively that Haig did not merely fail to achieve his stated objectives in the great battles of the Somme and Ypres. He failed in a much grander sense; failed classically in the fashion of Pyrrhus, who lamented after the battle at Asculum, “Another such victory over the Romans and we are undone.”

http://www.historynet.com/field-marshal-sir-douglas-haig-world-war-is-worst-general.htm


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## time expired (18 Dec 2008)

Tango2bravo,
                  Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
were ex pat Brits.
                                    Regards


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## tomahawk6 (18 Dec 2008)

The arrival of the AEF and the industrial power of the US in the end forced the Germans to accept peace. By this time the continental powers were pretty much bled out victims of their own war of attrition. I do have to point out the difference between Haig's tactics at the Somme and the Canadians at Passchendaele Haig's was costly in terms of manpower whereas the Canadian effort was a success with a much smaller butchers bill - 10,000 casualties.Superior tactics keep casualties low.


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## a_majoor (18 Dec 2008)

Late coming to the fight (and yes, I only brought a knife  ), but I am in the "anti Haig" camp as well. The prime motivator for me is the book: Haigs Command: A Reassessment by Denis Winter, which comes to it's conclusions partially by comparing the then recently released British records to comperable ones from the Canadian, Australian and American archives, as well as a using the usual historiography tools.

As for the arguments about mass attacks against machine guns, there is a small point where this can be forgiven (at least at the start of the static war period in 1915). The argument rests on the introductin of rifled firearms in the 1870's, which meant that bullets followed a predictable trajectory for the first time. A rifle platoon firing in volley would create a cone of fire and a beaten zone, which could be avoided by advancing as rapidly as possible to escape the beaten zone and reach the relative saftey of the dead space under the cone of fire. Rifle platoons could not adjust their fire fast enough to follow a rapidly advancing force, and were left with the choice of retreat or hand to hand combat. Officers who learned their craft in the late 1800's_ knew for a fact_ that this was the way to defeat rifle armed opponents (many would have actually done this themselves as platoon or company commanders) and this was an article of faith in many war colleges. I suspect this was also one of the motivating factors behind the French cult of the offense and the formation of units like the _Chasseurs à Pied_ (roughly "Hunters on Foot").

However the captains and majors of 1870 were no longer in touch with the first line infantry as colonels and generals in 1914 (or as war college instructors), so not only missed the signifigence of machine guns on fixed lines of fire, but also had no real way to understand how to deal with this. Crappy communications between headquarters and the front and lack of effective after action reporting also made understanding what to do difficult, but not impossible. After all, the Germans developed infiltration tactics, the Canadians developed close all arms coordination with the artillery and the British developed tanks as separate means of solving the problems.

Although Haig did support the development of the tank, in most other respects he learned little from his battles and certainly did not change his approach as the war evolved.


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## reccecrewman (18 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.



Please state your source in that number..... 40 German Divisions????  That is a ludicrous assessment and I would love to know the source of that comment. I know 75% of all people are inclined to believe a statement that has percentages and numbers in them, but that figure is off the wall. 40 Divisions represents nearly half the German field Army on the Western Front, and there's no way they could mathematically have that number in the same sector as the Canadians. As well, you maintain that the Canadian Divisions were much larger than conventional ones.... not so. The standard of 4 Battalions per Brigade, with 4 Brigades per Division was reduced to 3 by the British and French as a means of getting more reinforcements to other units... in effect, robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Germans did a similar reorganization, but German units were larger than Canadian units. A German infantry regiment was roughly the size of a Canadian Brigade.


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## reccecrewman (18 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> and the Germans, although they displayed mastery of combined arms operations in their spring offensive of 1918, took the completely wrong approach.  They went for a breakthrough, and actually succeeded partially before it was brought to a stop, but that was their undoing.  By Contrast the Canadian Corps launched a series of successive, deliberate, limited aims objectives and systematically pushed the Germans back.  Not nearly as sexy as a breakthrough, and most costly in lives then a breakthrough (assuming the breakthrough succeeds anyway) but it did get the job done.



It wasn't that simple.... First of all, the Micheal offensive of early 1918 was an all or nothing gamble to win the war on the battlefield. The German leadership knew it. They took everything they had to the party in the hope's of achieving a decisive victory. Every unit that fought on the Eastern Front was brought west leaving only Landwehr and Ersatz (Over age reservists and second line troops) formations in the East to collect produce and other provender in conquered regions. They knew the US was coming en masse and this was a calculated risk to end it before the balance of power was irrevocably changed in the Allies favour. It also aided them greatly that the storm they unleashed broke over the British 5th Army, the smallest numerically of all British Armies, and moreover, an Army that was basically built from scraps of disbanded units and reinforcements from England.... added to this was Gen. Sir Hubert Gough was the overall Commander of 5th Army and had proven himself incapable as an Army commander. (Currie flat out refused to allow the Canadian Corps to serve in 5th Army for that very reason, and requested the Canadian Corps be assigned to Plumer's Second Army and he got it)

Now, when the German's launched the Micheal offensive, the British line broke. 5th Army was destroyed in the opening phase of the offensive. The German's problem was "Now we've broken through.... now what?" They opted for a drive to Paris..... the fatal flaw in this was Paris was purely symbolic..... the French would have merely moved their seat to Bordeaux and continued the war from there....  capturing it would not end the war. They chose the path of least resistance and it cost them the war. They SHOULD have taken the British Army in flank and rolled it up. They instead let events determine their course of action.... they punched a hole in the line and the open route to Paris beckoned, and they took it. They made the same fatal error in the opening phase of the war when mobility was still flowing. The Schlieffen Plan called for a massive pincer movement to move through Belgium and Luxembourg to come down and swing northwest of Paris and catch the French Armies in a cauldron battle AND capture Paris in one fell swoop..... it was plan to win the war against France in 40 days and it nearly worked.


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## Michael OLeary (18 Dec 2008)

time expired said:
			
		

> Tango2bravo,
> Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
> Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
> were ex pat Brits.
> Regards




It might be a little more difficult to determine what percentage were ex pat Brits at each stage of the War, particularly the later stages.


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## Old Sweat (18 Dec 2008)

Indeed, Michael, indeed. The first contingent had a majority of members born in the UK, but that may not have held up for the duration of the war. 

There had been a huge amount of immigration in the decades before the war and many of the troops would have been born in the UK or elsewhere. This did not mean that they did not consider themselves Canadians and certainly a good number would have had little to no recollection of the country of their birth. Others certainly came to feel Canadian during their service. The important thing to remember is that they were serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and strongly identified with it.


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## TangoTwoBravo (18 Dec 2008)

time expired said:
			
		

> Tango2bravo,
> Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
> Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
> were ex pat Brits.
> Regards



Time Expired,

I am not writing a paper on the Canadians. Perhaps you meant your remark for somebody else? 

Cheers,

T2B


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Time Expired,
> 
> I am not writing a paper on the Canadians. Perhaps you meant your remark for somebody else?
> 
> ...



I think he was directing that at me..

To answer the question, and I dont have the exact stats off the top of my head... roughly 60% of the initial levy of troops sent overseas were British born.  All Canadian mind you, but the majority were British none the less.

By 1917 that would change as a result of heavy casualties in the first few years and more enlistments being Canadian born then anything else.  I dont have the exact number as to what the Corps finished off with but it is safe to say the trend would have been reversed.

It should also be noted that, many Canadian scholars, and popular authors have argued that regardless of place of birth, everyone in the Canadian Corps considered themselves to be British when they signed up, after Vimy Ridge, everyone considered themselves to be Canadian regardless of place of birth.  This is not MY argument, but it is a popular one out there that continues to be debated back and forth.


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

reccecrewman said:
			
		

> Please state your source in that number..... 40 German Divisions????  That is a ludicrous assessment and I would love to know the source of that comment. I know 75% of all people are inclined to believe a statement that has percentages and numbers in them, but that figure is off the wall. 40 Divisions represents nearly half the German field Army on the Western Front, and there's no way they could mathematically have that number in the same sector as the Canadians. As well, you maintain that the Canadian Divisions were much larger than conventional ones.... not so. The standard of 4 Battalions per Brigade, with 4 Brigades per Division was reduced to 3 by the British and French as a means of getting more reinforcements to other units... in effect, robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Germans did a similar reorganization, but German units were larger than Canadian units. A German infantry regiment was roughly the size of a Canadian Brigade.



40 is a rough estimate... But if you want a reference point try 

Shane B. Schreiber Shock Army of the British Empire : The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War. Praeger Series in War Studies, 1083-817. Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 1997. 

If you chose not to take Schreiber's word for it, you can consult various after action reports, war diaries, battledamage assessments at the archives ect...  But that would involve alot of leg work.

As for the size of the Corps, ie the size of the Divisions.  It is a well documented fact that the Canadian Corps was considered to be "overstrength" as compared to other nations Corps. 

Reference for that..

Canadian War Museum and A. M. J. Hyatt. General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography. Canadian War Museum Historical Publication. 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. 

Basically the Corps was originally going to be fliped into an Army because the 5th and 6th Divisions were forming up in Britain.  The British recomended to Canadian officials that trying to maintain an army would likely overstreatch Canadian resources and that it would be best to stay at Corps strength.  As a result the 5th and 6th Divisions were folded into the the other 4, their shells were also used as training base staff and that sort of thing for new recruits coming over.

Also important to note that alot of German formations were understrength at the time.  

I realize it is a large number to chew on, thats what amazes me about it, but based on what I have read, and the primary research I have done to date I maintain that the Canadian Corps really did dispatch that many German Divisions (roughly). 

Something else I would recomend that you do if you are having a hard time wrapping your head around it, as I did originally...  Pull up some microfiche of the various Canadian, British, French and American newspapers shortly after Vimy Ridge, do the same thing afterwards for the timetable following each battle the Canadians participated in afterwards up until wars end.  

I promise you, the results will blow your mind.


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

reccecrewman said:
			
		

> It wasn't that simple.... First of all, the Micheal offensive of early 1918 was an all or nothing gamble to win the war on the battlefield. The German leadership knew it. They took everything they had to the party in the hope's of achieving a decisive victory. Every unit that fought on the Eastern Front was brought west leaving only Landwehr and Ersatz (Over age reservists and second line troops) formations in the East to collect produce and other provender in conquered regions. They knew the US was coming en masse and this was a calculated risk to end it before the balance of power was irrevocably changed in the Allies favour. It also aided them greatly that the storm they unleashed broke over the British 5th Army, the smallest numerically of all British Armies, and moreover, an Army that was basically built from scraps of disbanded units and reinforcements from England.... added to this was Gen. Sir Hubert Gough was the overall Commander of 5th Army and had proven himself incapable as an Army commander. (Currie flat out refused to allow the Canadian Corps to serve in 5th Army for that very reason, and requested the Canadian Corps be assigned to Plumer's Second Army and he got it)
> 
> Now, when the German's launched the Micheal offensive, the British line broke. 5th Army was destroyed in the opening phase of the offensive. The German's problem was "Now we've broken through.... now what?" They opted for a drive to Paris..... the fatal flaw in this was Paris was purely symbolic..... the French would have merely moved their seat to Bordeaux and continued the war from there....  capturing it would not end the war. They chose the path of least resistance and it cost them the war. They SHOULD have taken the British Army in flank and rolled it up. They instead let events determine their course of action.... they punched a hole in the line and the open route to Paris beckoned, and they took it. They made the same fatal error in the opening phase of the war when mobility was still flowing. The Schlieffen Plan called for a massive pincer movement to move through Belgium and Luxembourg to come down and swing northwest of Paris and catch the French Armies in a cauldron battle AND capture Paris in one fell swoop..... it was plan to win the war against France in 40 days and it nearly worked.



I dont disagree with anything you are saying.  In fact I think I was pretty much saying the same thing, you just elaborated on it much further.  To put it simply, the Germans attempt at a breakthrough is what cost them the war.  It was a huge risk, just as you said and it did not pay off.  Granted one could argue that the writing was on the wall at this point but that is a whole other debate.

By contrast when examining the Canadian Corps, there was no similar breakthrough nor was there an attempt.  They used the same combined arms tactics that I have been posting about in this thread, the difference is the Canadian Corps pursued limited aims objectives or "bite and hold".  A much more cautious approach, and more costly then a successful breakthrough, but less costly then a failed breakthrough...


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## ltmaverick25 (18 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> This raises a curious point.  While you readily adjust the relative size of the Canadian divisions for being "larger than conventional ones", what was the respective size of those German divisions to your theoretical "conventional division"?
> 
> Have you considered conducting an analysis and comparison of actual combat power, rather then a simple numerical strength comparison?
> 
> You may find Trevor Dupuy's Numbers, Predictions & War a useful reference for such a comparison.



To answer your question... Yes.

Reference 
Stephen Biddle Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.

I have reviewed Dupuy's analysis, but I am of the school of thought that Stephen Biddle offers the best analytical framework for assessing relative combat power.  I could not possibly do Biddle justice by trying to explain it here, but I recomend anyone who is interested in force employment as opposed to numerical or technological preponderance to give this a read, it is an excellent piece of work in my humble opinion.

The article that I am working on right now deals with exactly that.  Biddle challenges preponderance theorists by presending force employment as a superior model.  Im superimposing Biddle's model on Vimy Ridge as an example of the modern system of force employment on the offence(limited aims) against a pre modern system of defence. 

As an aside has anyone here read Biddle?  I would be curious to hear other peoples thoughts on his work.


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## time expired (18 Dec 2008)

INTERMAVERICK25
                          You are correct it was aimed at you,it was the "grumpy old
man" syndrome coming to the fore.The Canadian Corps was considered by 
everyone who wrote about the war as brilliant soldiers however the idea that
they carried the rest of the BEF to victory in 1918 is something of an overstatement
of the facts.If one wishes to document the achievements of the Canadian Corps
in isolation one is bound to arrive at a somewhat slanted view of the 100 days
battle.The BEF did not merely follow the victorious Canadians into Belgium as you
seem to believe and you need to look at the achievements of some of the Brit.
formations to give you a more rounded view,the crossing of the St.Quentin canal
by the 46 South Midlands Div.is a case in point,this was a brilliant attack by a
division that was certainly not elite in any sense of the word,however it did its
duty as most of the non elite Brit. Divs. did with little or no fanfare to be largely
forgotten by historians.Just as today bad news sells more newspaper,books,and
this battle was largely forgotten, add this to the fact this was a battle that F.M.Haig
handled brilliantly and won it is easy to understand why.
I would like to reccommend a book that may help in widening your view of this
war winning battle-To Win a War, 1918 The Year of Victory by John Terraine.
                                            Regards


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

time expired said:
			
		

> INTERMAVERICK25
> You are correct it was aimed at you,it was the "grumpy old
> man" syndrome coming to the fore.The Canadian Corps was considered by
> everyone who wrote about the war as brilliant soldiers however the idea that
> ...



I will be happy to read that book as well, so much for reading any star wars novels over the holidays 

But in all seriousness, I am not trying to say the Canadian Corps won the war singlehandedly, nor am I trying to say that no other army had any success.  I think people are reading too much into what I am saying.  I maintain that the Canadian Corps was the best army on the attack.  That does not mean they are the only ones that attacked, nor that nobody else had any success, it just means that I think the Canadians were better at it.  I argue they played a huge and instrumental role far above its weight in the 100 days offensive.  I am NOT arguing that nobody else played decisive or important roles. 

But lets try to play a different game for a bit.  Instead of trying to insist that other armies made a difference as well, to which I fully agree with by the way, can anyone disprove that the Canadian Corps was the best allied army on the offensive?  I mean that as a genuine challenge, not a mean spirited one.. if anyone thinks my arguments are not accurate, fair enough, offer evidence to the contrary.  Since we are talking about a Corps level formation, can anyone think of any other Corps that outperformed on the offensive from 1917 to the end of the war?


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## vonGarvin (19 Dec 2008)

Less about Haig, but more specific to the Somme, check out this from Youtube (A BBC Documentary titled "From Defeat to Victory")
Once there, click the links for parts 2 and 3.  Very interesting.


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## tomahawk6 (19 Dec 2008)

Western Front 1916






I wonder if an amphibious operation into Belgium could have broken the empass on the Western Front ? Although after Jutland the German Navy was still a threat I just wonder if the Brits had pressed the Germans back into their ports followed by landings. The allies lacked the options we have today in breaking a defense line but an amphibious op combined with an offensive along the entire front might have worked. Another option would have required the Netherlands to break their neutrality and invite an allied ground force into the country. Faced with the prospect of an offensive out of Holland the Germans might have sought terms. I doubt if they had enough reserves considering they were still tied down with the Russians on the Eastern Front.


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Western Front 1916
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Thats actually not a bad idea.  I guess it would depend on weather the Germans had troops stationed along the channel in case of such an eventuallity.


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## vonGarvin (19 Dec 2008)

I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.  If you look at the coast of Belgium, it is roughly 25 miles (according to a quick look at that map you posted).  The Netherlands were neutral, so landing there would also be a non-starter.  I also believe, if I'm not mistaken, that the land near the coast was lower than sealevel (reclaimed lands), thus making it possible for the Germans to flood it, making it impassable.  The Brits, and the French, were doomed to keep hitting the Germans via the frontal, though if you watch the documentary I posted, there were times and opportunities for the Brits to hit in one area, and then turn left/right and hit other areas in the flank.  In one instance, the Corps Commander decided against it, stating that it was too soon to change the plan (even though the Corps Reserve commander suggested it).  Instead, the Corps Commander decided on another frontal attack, even though a flanking, or even envelopment attack was quite possible given the success of one of the divisions. 

As I watch more of this documentary (which I highly recommend to everyone), it seems that there were many more factors than simply Haig for the Somme battles going the way that they did.  British inflexibility, German initiative, etc, all seemed to add up to the failure of 1 July.  Though, as the documentary goes on to state, the battle did not end there, and in the end, was a British victory over the Germans.


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## 3rd Herd (19 Dec 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.



Actually if the 100 days had bogged down there was a plan for an amphibious operation to turn the German flank. An academic argument could be made to substantiate that the 100 days was just a diversion to keep German troops pinned to the existing front lines. The reason it did not go ahead was the 100 days was successful therefore it was not needed, according to one author. Composition of this amphibious assault was entirely British , I believe the 1st Divison. There are several journal references to this on the internet/university elibrary sources. Or pages 57/58 of The Defeat of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918 by Paschall. page 57 has an excellent map.


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## Kirkhill (19 Dec 2008)

> From Kirkus Reviews
> A bold, revisionist history of Earl Haig, British commander- in-chief during WW I. Using British records that became available only in the 1960's, and comparing them to uncensored versions available in Canada, Australia, and the US, Winter subjects the authorized British version of the war to devastating analysis. For a variety of reasons, including Haig's close involvement with Britain's Official Historian of the war, it was Haig's view of the war that won acceptance, apparently sometimes by purging British records of any evidence to the contrary. Haig himself, far from being the most able soldier of his generation, is shown to have used his social connections to get unusually rapid promotion and to have excluded able subordinates. *The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized, poorly trained, and ill-equipped force, supported by staff work of low quality and commanded by generals inadequate to the task. For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61*. Winter analyzes Haig's command in each of the major battles of the war, from the Somme and Passchendaele to the final campaign of 1918, and this same inadequacy becomes apparent in each of them: attacks against the enemy's strongest point; the use of discredited tactics; persistence in attack long after all surprise had been lost. It was a performance notably inferior to that of the Germans, the French, the Canadians, and the Australians. Excellent, hard-hitting history. -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.



Thucydides, sometimes you just get it totally wrong. ;D

"The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized,"  Stipulated

"poorly trained, " Stipulated

"and ill-equipped force,"  Stipulated

"supported by staff work of low quality"  Stipulated

"and commanded by generals inadequate to the task"  Modified agreement - Generals untrained in large formation warfare

I cheerfully accept all those caveats.  In fact I said as much earlier in more words.  Edit: if you want a common denominator to blaime, blame the usual culprit:  The Politician  - the one that supplied neither troops, nor gear, nor system, nor opportunity to train and that insisted 50% of the Army would be posted overseas keeping unruly Indians and Irishmen under control, not to mention having them chasing the Cornish countryside trying to catch Wreckers (people intent on attracting ships onto Cornish rocks so that they could loot them).

Given all those problems: how exactly was anybody supposed to put together an effective offensive force, especially one confronted with the world's longest, best defended siege lines?

World War 1 conformed to the ancient Northern Hemisphere timetable of fighting in the summer and holding in the winter.

1914 - Brits have no army (4 divs do not constitute a continental army).  Germans jump out of the gate first but late in the year limiting the French's ability to respond in an effective manner.  German's consolidate over the winter and from that point on have the upper hand in any peace negotiations.   French badly beaten up in the early going.

1915 - Colonials and Territorials (many with some military training ) come to the fore.  British, French and Germans.  A year of holding and stunting - Gallipoli, East Africa, Salonika, Mesopotamia.  Call this the Augmentation phase as civilian volunteers are organized, equipped and trained.

1916 - Germans jump off early to wear down the French at Verdun before the Brits can get their act together.  Brits jump in before Kitchener's Armies can be turned into the grand offensive force that he dreamed of sending to Berlin.  Time was not on their side.

1917 - Brits start to take the fight to the Germans using tools and tactics developed on the fly.  Edit: Vimy was the one battle of 1917 where the Brits and the Canucks had the benefit of time to not just plan but also rehearse the battle in detail.  All other battles were fought on the fly - just as all the battles of 1918 were.

1918 - Germans jump off early to forestall the American build up - but run into the same problem that the Brits ran into a Cambrai - inability to coordinate and support operations at long range.  Once the plan came off the rails there was no ability to adjust the plan.  Allies, Brits, French and Americans, as well as Canucks and Aussies jump in and assault against an over-stretched under-supported force.

Short of hiring Hindenberg or Von Falkenhayn or Ludendorff I can't think of anybody else that would appease the critics.  Keep in mind that those worthies caused the German populace to rise up in revolt against their exemplary handling of the war.  

The German Staff system could plan a battle like billy-be-dammed.  But like Time Expired said, no general, or his brilliant staff, could control the battle or adjust the outcome once battle was joined.  The OODA loop was measured in hours, if not days and weeks.  Once the battle started the Generals were in much the same situation as Squad Leader players - waiting on the outcome of multiple throws of the dice to find out what happened.  

(And as for the French Staff - their insistence on combat a l'outrance and the elan of the bayonet  - they kept divisions in the line until there was nobody left - that resulted in wholesale mutiny - at the risk of sounding like a broken record Corrigan's analysis of units time in the line is instructive as to the maintenance of morale - Principle #2)

As to this:
"For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61"

I counter with this:

The Welsh Guards were issued 1, then 2, then 8, then 16, then 32 Lewis Guns between November 1915 and April 1918.
In that period they would have been re-org'd from 4x250=1000 to 3x250=750 troops.
750/32= 1:24

And ltMaverick25:



> can anyone disprove that the Canadian Corps was the best allied army on the offensive?


  You wish us to prove a negative?

I would be more comfortable accepting your position if you had more knowledge of allied and enemy forces and had come to your own conclusions rather than, apparently (and I will apologize again if necessary) accepting the word of others that "The Canadians Were Best Corps On The Front" and seeking to find new arguments to buttress an entrenched hypothesis.

There are Aussie nationalists that make similar claims about their troops (and they have a bigger cheerleading section in London than the Canadians  ;D )


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## Old Sweat (19 Dec 2008)

I am not an expert on the Great War by any stretch. However one thing that I noted when looking at the 100 days is that Currie fought all the battles after Amiens with only two divisions at a time. In one operation he would employ the 1st and 4th Divisions, then in the next the 2nd and 3rd would be used. The unused divisions would be resting and refitting for the next operation. Finally, on 11 November 1918 when the 3rd Division was liberating Mons with the 2nd Division on its flank, the 1st and 4th were out of the line.


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And ltMaverick25:
> You wish us to prove a negative?
> 
> I would be more comfortable accepting your position if you had more knowledge of allied and enemy forces and had come to your own conclusions rather than, apparently (and I will apologize again if necessary) accepting the word of others that "The Canadians Were Best Corps On The Front" and seeking to find new arguments to buttress an entrenched hypothesis.
> ...



What makes you think I have not come to my own conclusions?  It cant be helped that some of these conclusions were developed before I was born, surely I can be excused for that 

As I tried to say previously, I am training to be an academic historian, as well as an officer.  I dont think I would make it very far just accepting the conclusions of others.  In fact, one of the only conclusions about the Canadian Corps from the Great War that I do happen to agree with is their overall combat prowess on the offensive.  The problem I find is that Canadian historians do not do a good job of explaining WHY!!!  They all seem to agree that the Corps was indeed elite, and it was, but how and why?  Tim Cook in my view is the only historian that comes close to developing an adequate explanation but he still falls short (Shock Troops).

The article that I am writing attempts to address the gap.  It will explain Canadian success in the Great War using an in depth method of analysis developed by Steven Biddle.  The same method of analysis is being applied to French, British and German formations.  The differences are conclusive in my opinion.  Its difficult for me to quantify all of this year without copy pasting the entire article, but its not finished yet!

I feel somehow you have been left with the impression that all I have done is read secondary sources by Canadian authors.  That is not the case.  I have read every secondary Canadian source I have been able to identify mind you.  I have also read British and French sources as well, just not as many.  Thats just the start point though.  You always look at prevailing historiography before plowing through archives.  It helps give you a starting point, enables you to develop questions of your own that you want to answer, and should you disagree with interpretations already made, you know what primary documentation to look up so you are looking at the same things that the author has.

I've spent three years going through the war records available at both the LAC and National War museum.  I dont have much on a guy like Cook yet who has been doing it for close to 20 years, but I do conduct my own research and develop my own arguments.  With all that aside, I come back to my previous challenge.

If you or others do not accept the argument that the Canadian Corps was the best formation on the attack from 1917 onwards (which is a legitimate position to take) then indicate why.  Disprove the argument.  What evidence have you, or have you read that would lead you to beleive that the argument posted above is not sound or valid?  If the Canadian Corps was not the best Corps on the attack then who was?  Was there any or did they all perform more or less equally?

Thus far, those who have taken acception to my argument seem to be hinging on the beleif that I dont know much about other armies (granted not as much as I do the Canadian Corps) but have not presented a counter argument.  I get the impression it is more me that is being challenged (no offence taken) then the argument itself.  So take me out of it, was the Canadian Corps the best Corps on the attack?  If not then who?  Why?

I am not making an assertion, I am making an argument.  What makes an argument an argument is that it can be both proven and disproven.  An assertion is more like an opinion.  You cannot disprove an opinion, its an endless circle.  Disprove the argument.


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## TangoTwoBravo (19 Dec 2008)

I think that the onus still lies on the person making the argument to prove their case, not the opposite!

Have you studied the German Storm Troop tactics in detail? Have you compared the Michaeal Offensive to the 100 days? I think that it is a rich field to study, but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. There is a lot of national mythology to work through.

I have not read the Biddle book you mention, although I have read Biddle works and have been impressed. I find it odd to say that the German defences were "pre-modern." The elastic defence devised by the WW1 Germans was fairly advanced. The Germans were indeed alarmed when the Vimy attack succeeded against their new defences, but they concluded that the application had been flawed. While Amiens is a stunning victory, it is notable that the exploitation was halted by German counter-moves. I think that it is also hard to say that "bite and hold" was a Canadian invention. The Terraine book that Time Expired mentioned is a great read.


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## Kirkhill (19 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> .... but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. ....



I think this is the essence of my problem: The entire concept that there could be a Best.

Different units, at different times, with different personnel operating under different circumstances performed differently.  Some performed in exemplary fashion and some failed to impress and some the performed well/poorly reversed themselves later.


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## tomahawk6 (19 Dec 2008)

Morale had to be a factor in WW1,sitting in trenches under bombardment knowing that you will die either in the trench or going over the top. Soldiers need hope and there was very little in short supply on the Western Front.


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I think that the onus still lies on the person making the argument to prove their case, not the opposite!
> 
> Have you studied the German Storm Troop tactics in detail? Have you compared the Michaeal Offensive to the 100 days? I think that it is a rich field to study, but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. There is a lot of national mythology to work through.
> 
> I have not read the Biddle book you mention, although I have read Biddle works and have been impressed. I find it odd to say that the German defences were "pre-modern." The elastic defence devised by the WW1 Germans was fairly advanced. The Germans were indeed alarmed when the Vimy attack succeeded against their new defences, but they concluded that the application had been flawed. While Amiens is a stunning victory, it is notable that the exploitation was halted by German counter-moves. I think that it is also hard to say that "bite and hold" was a Canadian invention. The Terraine book that Time Expired mentioned is a great read.



I think the onus is a two way street.  Be it argument or counter argument you need to prove or support it.  I suppose supporting it properly goes beyond the scope of these forums unless one of us posts our finished product for everyone to look at, which in my case is still a few months away.  I have studied Michael in great detail.  It is the backbone of some of the comparison I am using.  I have also studied the 100 days in great detail.  This includes other armies as well.  Read the Biddle book, he talks about Michael in great detail too actually.  There is no question the Germans executed the breakthrough well, and I would argue the best breakthrough of the war, up until the point it got stopped anyway.

As far as the German defences go.  You have to study the broader picture there.  As I have said myself several times the Germans did migrate over to an elastic system of defence in depth, equating to the modern system of force employment on the defensive.  This is exactly why they pulled back to the Hindenburn line prior to the Arras/Vimy and French Offensives.  They saw the writing on the wall.  The problem here is that they did not employ this defensive system at Vimy.  Vimy was the only area of their entire lines that used a pre modern system.  Many reasons for this.  Overconfidence since the Ridge was considered the most heavily fortified and best defended position of the entire line.  Terrain is also an issue, the terrain did not allow for a defence in depth without losing the ridge.  

Thats why I say you have a modern force employment offensive against a pre modern force employment defensive.

The Germans were indeed worried about Vimy because at the time higher command was under the impression that Vimy was using the modern tactics, they breathed a sigh of releif when they discovered that the modern tactics had not been employed.

As for the bite and hold strategy.  I did not say the Canadians invented it, I dont know if there is conclusive evidence one way or the other as to who invented bite and hold.  At Vimy, Bite and Hold was their objective given to them from higher, so thats what they did.  The success of bite and hold coupled with their new combined arms assault heavily influenced the way they would do business the rest of the war.  They continued to use bite and hold afterwards to great success. 

I dont think it necessarily matters who invented tactics in this case, but rather who implemented them better.  My argument is the Canadian Corps did.  As for who invented the tactics.  Very grey area.  Currie learned from the French, McNaughton learned what not to do from the British and and disagreed heavily with the French.  Jeffrey Williams argues that the lessons Currie brought forward from the French and recomended to Byng only reinforced Byngs existing thoughts on the matter, meaning that he was already developing these tactics.  I dont have the answer to who owns the copyright of the tactics.  But the Canadian Corps owned the implementation and execution of those tactics.

When my paper is published ill toss it up here for everyone to haggle through.  I beleive Biddle's framework will offer the analysis engine requird to compare and contrast in a non subjective manner.

What other books have you read from Biddle that impressed you.  Id be interested in reading anything else he has written given the quality of Military Power.


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I think this is the essence of my problem: The entire concept that there could be a Best.
> 
> Different units, at different times, with different personnel operating under different circumstances performed differently.  Some performed in exemplary fashion and some failed to impress and some the performed well/poorly reversed themselves later.



I think thats fair to say.  

Thats why im looking at 1917-1918 exclusively for this argument.  In 1914-1916 I do not beleive one could argue that the Canadian Corps was the best at anything let alone combined arms offensives.


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## ltmaverick25 (19 Dec 2008)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Morale had to be a factor in WW1,sitting in trenches under bombardment knowing that you will die either in the trench or going over the top. Soldiers need hope and there was very little in short supply on the Western Front.



Not until Vimy Ridge anyway.

For those of you thinking im regurgitating the arguments of others tune in, here is an Ltmaverick25 original 

This is something else im working on the side...

My Thesis: Was the battle of Vimy Ridge proof that the war could be won?  Prior to Vimy, morale on all sides was extremely low due to the high casualties for little to no gain resulting in stalemate. Did Vimy Ridge demonstrate to the common allied soldier that the most heavily defended German position could be taken?  If so what were the tangible effects?

My tentative argument:  Yes, the success of the Canadian Corps changed the way the common soldier thought of the war in terms of the prospect of victory.

The research:  Im still going through this now.  Im reviewing personal correspondents with family, friends, loved ones ect... from all allied armies and the Germans prior to Vimy Ridge.  I am also doing the same with correspondence after Vimy Ridge to answer the above question.

Im also looking at taking things a step further.  What did Vimy tell senior military leadership about the war if anything?

What about the politicians?

If I try to do it all, I think that would turn into a book instead of a paper.  But I am definitly going after part 1 for now, the common soldier.


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## Greymatters (19 Dec 2008)

ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> As for the bite and hold strategy.  I did not say the Canadians invented it, I dont know if there is conclusive evidence one way or the other as to who invented bite and hold.  At Vimy, Bite and Hold was their objective given to them from higher, so thats what they did.  The success of bite and hold coupled with their new combined arms assault heavily influenced the way they would do business the rest of the war.  They continued to use bite and hold afterwards to great success.
> 
> I dont think it necessarily matters who invented tactics in this case, but rather who implemented them better.  My argument is the Canadian Corps did.  As for who invented the tactics.  Very grey area.



I cant recall the title of the thread, but I think I recall reading one here where this tactic was attributed an Australian general...?


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## Blackadder1916 (20 Dec 2008)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> I cant recall the title of the thread, but I think I recall reading one here where this tactic was attributed an Australian general...?



It seems that the Australian government doesn't attribute "bite and hold " to one of its own when it has the opportunity while describing the tactics here.

http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/battlefields/menin-road-1917.html


> The British plan was to batter down this formidable defensive position using mainly so-called ‘bite and hold’ tactics. After an opening bombardment the infantry would advance for a prescribed distance behind a ‘creeping’ barrage of shells. This barrage would keep the Germans in their ‘pillboxes’ until British soldiers were almost upon them. The enemy positions would then be captured, consolidated and protected from counter-attack by artillery. Guns would be brought forward and the next ‘bite’ attempted. In this way the British aimed to work their way from their start lines near Ypres to the heights of the ridge ten kilometres away at Passchendaele village. It was thought that by the time Passchendaele would be reached, the German reserves would be used up. A breakthrough could then be made to the enemy’s rear and towards the Belgian coast to the north. General Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander in chief, viewed the ‘Flanders Offensive’ as his war-winning stroke of 1917.
> 
> The Battle of the Menin Road was the first major Australian involvement in the series of British ‘bite and hold’ attacks which began on 31 July 1917. Collectively these operations are known as ‘The Third Battle of Ypres’. After moving through Ypres, the First and Second Australian Divisions manned the front lines opposite Glencorse Wood. The ground was waterlogged in low lying areas but otherwise dry.


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## Michael OLeary (20 Dec 2008)

How did we get from



			
				reccecrewman said:
			
		

> Therefore, by continuing to fight the battle of 3rd Ypres, Haig ensured the French Army had sufficient time to recover from 2 and a half years of getting mauled, and more importantly, to keep the Germans tied down until American troops could arrive in strength and alter the balance of power. Haig's persistence in fighting that battle may not have resulted in the war being won in 1917, but it certainly guarenteed the war wasn't lost to the Allies in 1918. I genuinely believe Haig has gotten treated badly by history.



to



			
				ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> If you or others do not accept the argument that the Canadian Corps was the best formation on the attack from 1917 onwards (which is a legitimate position to take) then indicate why.  Disprove the argument.  What evidence have you, or have you read that would lead you to beleive that the argument posted above is not sound or valid?  If the Canadian Corps was not the best Corps on the attack then who was?  Was there any or did they all perform more or less equally?



and now



			
				ltmaverick25 said:
			
		

> ..., here is an Ltmaverick25 original
> 
> This is something else im working on the side...
> 
> ...



How do your papers impact on the original subject of the thread? It seems to have become more about you than Haig.


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## ltmaverick25 (20 Dec 2008)

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> How did we get from
> 
> to
> 
> ...



Your right.  I initially started off by using the Canadian Corps and the leadership within it to contrast it to Haig arguing that Haig was incompetent, comparing him to examples of what I consider to be the opposite.  It went from there.  Out of respect for the original topic, I will duck out.


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## daftandbarmy (20 Dec 2008)

And here's an opportunity to pursue this topic further and get some letters after your name:

MA British First World War Studies

http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/ma/structure.htm


They've even got a module on 'The Donkeys', which is why I also posted this in the 'donkey' thread (on a satirical whim).


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## TangoTwoBravo (20 Dec 2008)

I hope that we do not stiffle an interesting (to me anyway) debate because it veers from the thread title somewhat. 

I have a hard time with arguments about who was the best at something, since it is hard to find an equitable yard stick. The conditions always seem to be a little different (terrain, enemy, weather etc). I can accept an argument that the Canadian Corps was one of the best offensive formations in 1917/18. They would share that place with the ANZACs, several British divisions and the Germans.

Regarding Haig, I think that the British public needed a focal point for their anger and grief from the losses suffered during the war. I don't want to defend the Somme or Passchendaele, but I believe that Reccecrewman has a point about those attacks relieving pressure on the French.


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## reccecrewman (20 Dec 2008)

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
			
		

> I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.  If you look at the coast of Belgium, it is roughly 25 miles (according to a quick look at that map you posted).  The Netherlands were neutral, so landing there would also be a non-starter.  I also believe, if I'm not mistaken, that the land near the coast was lower than sealevel (reclaimed lands), thus making it possible for the Germans to flood it, making it impassable.



King Albert, the monarch of Belgium had already flooded it..... he ordered the sluices opened in the opening phases of the German invasion in August 1914 in an attempt to slow the Germans down while the bulk of the Belgian Army retreated to Antwerp. A Naval intervention in Belgium was simply not a viable option..... now, on the other hand..... a direct amphibious assault on Germany was not nescessarily impossible. Even after the inclusive Battle of Jutland,(Inconclusive because to this day, there is no clear cut answer as to who won it) the British still held a superiority by far in naval power. Jellicoe committed too many errors at Jutland, but make no assumptions that the German High Seas Fleet could actually challenge the Royal Navy..... they couldn't. Have a look at the German ORBAT of naval vessels in 1916 and you'll see for yourself when compared to the RN, the Germans were grossly undermatched. The Germans still counted their Deutchland class pre-dreadnaughts as capital units and these ships could never risk meeting the fast Queen Elizabeth class battleships on even terms. After Jutland, the ratio of capital ships of German to British was 10:24.....  who knows what could have happened had the British made a serious attempt to move into the Baltic to destroy the German fleet and land troops behind German lines.....


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## Kirkhill (20 Dec 2008)

reccecrewman said:
			
		

> who knows what could have happened had the British made a serious attempt to move into the Baltic to destroy the German fleet and land troops behind German lines.....



Gallipoli North?

First of all the RN would have had two options: 

To land in the teeth of _the_ German Navy based at Wilhelmshaven on the Frisian Coast of Jutland - It fought two battles there, Heligoland Bight in 1914 and Jutland in 1916 -  I suggest that the German Navy was more than capable of busting up a landing in that area let alone the ease with which Germans could have moved troops to that front.

To force its way round Sjaelland by either the narrows between Elsinore and Elsingborg (a 3 km gap between Neutral Sweden and Neutral Denmark)  of  _or_ to push through the shallow national waters of (still) Neutral Denmark.  

The Germans had the Kiel Kanal connecting the High Seas fleet in Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea to Kiel on the Baltic.  This short-cut gave the Germans an internal line of communication that allowed them to rapidly shift their capital ships from flank to flank.  Interestingly it paralleled the original Hansa trade route from Hamburg to Lubeck which is the source of wealth for one of the oldest royal families in Europe - the Oldenburgs.

At Gallipoli the RN managed to put ashore, on the first day, 2 Divisions on 2 beaches from a jerry-rigged assortment of rowboats, steam tugs, trawlers, transports, battleships and destroyers.  There were no D-Day type landing ships available.
The troops were put ashore in brigade waves of half-battalions (all the battalions of a brigade contributed two companies to the first and second waves).

I find it difficult to accept that we could successfully land a viable force on those shores.

The Germans had enough naval force to contest the North Sea with the RN at least a few times: 

In addition to Heligoland and Jutland there was also Dover Straits, Dogger Bank, Whitby and Hartlepool.  That presence would have been enough to disrupt any landing attempt, IMHO.

Jellicoe is often given the benefit of the doubt at Jutland by those that argue that he didn't lose the fleet.

On the other hand,  he finally had a chance to destroy the German Fleet that was protecting Germany from an Amphibious landing - and he failed.

With that success, and some more initiative along the lines of those that developed the tank to develop assault transports, then perhaps an amphibious assault might have worked.   But with that failure to destroy the Kaiser's flank protection on 1 June 1916, one month before the Somme - Haig was faced with only a long, hard slog against entrenched German positions.

Edit:  Who writes this stuff?  He really should get an editor.


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## Old Sweat (20 Dec 2008)

The British did attempt amphibious raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918. An account can be found here:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/zeebrugge.htm

In my opinion, any thing more complex was clearly impossible and would have made the proposed Operation Sea Lion 22 years later look like a sure thing.


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