# The Manley Report- Ruxted Responds



## ruxted (29 Jan 2008)

Link to original article on  ruxted.ca


The Manley Report

The Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (hereafter the Manley Report or just the Report) has been published, and Ruxted is, generally, pleased with the results.  In particular, we are happy to see endorsement of our recent message that combat is necessary in Afghanistan1 and we agree that more soldiers are definitely required.

With one possible small exception, Ruxted fully supports the five recommendations on pages 37 and 38.  Our concern is that some may see a binding obligation in the comment that Canada should “secure medium helicopter lift capacity and high-performance unmanned Aerial Vehicles … before February 2009.” This is an excellent recommendation, and we take comfort that the report says “should” as opposed to “must.”  As long as these equipments do not become a prerequisite for remaining in Afghanistan, then Ruxted will give its support to this recommendation.

We were also very pleased to see the call for another nation to provide a battle group to join our forces in Kandahar.  The whole ISAF mission is plagued by a lack of troops, and there was an unhelpful naivety in previous opposition recommendations that Canadian forces leave whether they are replaced or not.  In an area comparable in size to New Brunswick the presence of a much larger two-nation task force will go a long way to improving security and the safety of all persons, military and civilian, in Kandahar.  Ruxted hopes that the invitation of come join us in Kandahar is better received by NATO allies than the invitation of come replace us in Kandahar.

While the Manley Report completely knocked the intellectual and moral props out from under Gilles Duceppe, Stéphane Dion and Jack Layton, it does little to address Stephen Harper’s main problem.  It fails to provide him with a simple “make it go away” strategy that would appeal to the solid majority of Canadians who, in this case, believes “doing the right thing” is just too difficult and too expensive. That aside, there are, perhaps, two points from the recently released Manley Report that matter most:

First: The blood of hundreds of Canadians, dead and wounded, mostly young men and women who are, simultaneously ordinary, as the NDP loves to define ‘ordinary Canadians,’ and extraordinary, in bravery and commitment, has earned us a place of honour in the councils of nations, a place we abandoned in 1970 with then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s misbegotten foreign policy, published in that year; and

Second: It is now, clearly and as agreed by the leaders of Her Majesty's Official Loyal Opposition, the duty of Prime Minister Stephen Harper to tell Canadians why we are there – something he has, thus far, failed to do. We would prefer to think that this failure results from Prime Minister Harper being unable to get the message out through the static. In the absence of a clear message other alternatives are allowed to present themselves.  Unpleasant alternatives, such as being afraid to alienate voters, or being genuinely unable to grasp the complexities of fighting a modern counter-insurgency, are preferable to the most heinous of all: that he is using the mission and the soldiers as props in a small, partisan, domestic political squabble.  It is imperative that the Prime Minister present his message clearly and that he be permitted to present his message fairly by the opposition parties.  Whatever the reasons for the confusion in the minds of Canadians, the blood which has earned us a higher place in the world is also on his hands, as it is on the hands of all of us who support or previously supported this mission. Canadians need to know, need to be convinced, that he (and his predecessors) sent young Canadians to be maimed and killed for something greater than a short term political advantage.

Shortly after taking office Prime Minister Harper demonstrated that he understood one of the reasons Canadians are fighting and dying in Afghanistan: to burnish our badly tarnished leadership credentials. He said, in a 5 July 2006 speech, that one (but only one) of the reasons Canadians are fighting and dying in Afghanistan is  “that is the price of leadership in the world," and “It is also the price of moving the world forward."

Some might have thought the comment calculating, even cold, but Prime Minister Harper understood then that the only reason we maintain a tough, superbly disciplined professional army is to protect and promote *our* vital interests in the world, including here in Canada.

Improving our international leadership position is one of our vital interests: enhancing our reputation in global security matters pays dividends in trade and commerce, too. “Moving the world forward” is a domestic vital interest – the “world” of 2000 was unstable and the failed state of Afghanistan provided _al Qaeda_ with a firm base from which it could manage dastardly attacks on New York and Washington D.C. Helping the people of Afghanistan to rebuild a nation-state that is strong enough to avoid failing and falling into the grasp of terrorists is “moving the world forward” and it is one of Canada’s vital interests.

Therefore: We are in Afghanistan in order to protect and promote our vital interests, Canadian interests. Happily they are also the world’s interests as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon explained when, in  a recent _Globe and Mail_ article, he too knocked the stuffing out of the Duceppe/Dion/Layton positions. Our interests also coincide with the interests of the Afghan people and their lawfully elected government. We are fighting a counterinsurgency campaign and “winning hearts and minds” is still the _sine qua non_ of victory in such campaigns. Everything we do to win hearts and minds helps the legitimate government of Afghanistan to extend its reach and helps the ‘ordinary Afghans’ (the ones we would like to hope are in the thoughts and prayers of Jack Layton and the NDP) resist the Taliban terror.

The Manley Report said that, “Canadian objectives in Afghanistan are both honourable and achievable.”  The panel members went on to say that, “The aim there is not to create some fanciful model of prosperous democracy. Canadian objectives are more realistic: to contribute, with others, to a better governed, stable and developing Afghanistan whose government can protect the security of the country and its people.” (Report, p. 33) This is very close to what Ruxted has been saying2 for more than a year. To get there – to those honourable and achievable objectives - we must continue to fight the good fight and finish the assignment, even if, as several very senior military officers have suggested, it is the work of a generation.

It is true that many Canadians may object to any military mission which does not serve an immediate humanitarian purpose, but Ruxted would remind these Canadians that there is such a purpose.  The war in Afghanistan has at least the same moral integrity as traditional UN peacekeeping as our soldiers are fighting for the same peace, security, civil-safety and humanitarian standards.  We continue to hope that the Prime Minister will state in no uncertain terms that turning our back on the Afghan people would be hypocritical of a nation that self-indulges in a vision of itself as a peacekeeper.  Canadians must come to accept this because the reality is that peacekeeping has forever changed.

The Report stated that Afghanistan “is not the same UN peacekeeping that Canadians have known and supported ... there is not yet a peace to keep, no truce to supervise or “green line” to watch. This is a peace-enforcement operation, as provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is a collective use of force, under international law, to address a threat to international peace and security posed by continuing disorder in Afghanistan. It reflects as well the changing nature of UN mandated peace missions, which have become more robust in the use of force to protect civilians since the harsh lessons learned in the murderous disasters of Bosnia and Rwanda. Similar ... missions have served in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ... these are the kinds of force the UN might be called upon to apply more often in future, where the human rights and human security of ordinary people are threatened. When the UN and its members authorize such a mission, Canadians have a choice: Canada can participate ... or we can leave the mission to others.” (Report, p. 21) This puts paid to the simplistic “let’s go back to traditional UN peacekeeping” nonsense put about by ill informed, anti-military academics, busybodies and commentators.

Canadian economist Robert Calderisi said3 “As international terrorists search for alternative safe havens, as new diseases like SARS and avian flu spread beyond their countries of origin, and as mass human migration begins to rival nuclear proliferation as the dominant challenge in the early twenty-first century there will be rising interest in ... containing the international ripple effects of failed states. Most of those states are in Africa.” The next time, and the many times after that the UN asks NATO and a few others to organize and manage “peace-enforcement operations” they will likely be in Africa. Canada will participate. Canadians will kill and die. Other Canadians will weep and still others wail but there is no alternative – not if we have any worthwhile values at all.

The Manley Report has provided an elegantly simple, tightly reasoned and ultimately persuasive analysis of the state of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and the Report makes useful and sensible recommendations for the future of that mission. The onus is, now, on Prime Minister Harper to make the mission his own and to bring Canadians onside with him. There is, equally, an opportunity for M. Stéphane Dion to encourage the Canadians he aspires to lead in our vital task of “moving the world forward.”


----------
1. See: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/104-No-Security-Without-Combat.html
2. See: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/24-The-Afghanistan-Debate.html _et seq_
3. Calderisi, Robert, _The Trouble with Africa_, New York, 2006, p. 2


----------



## Edward Campbell (7 Feb 2008)

The Ruxted Group said:
			
		

> Link to original article on  ruxted.ca
> 
> 
> The Manley Report
> ...



Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, is an editorial that follows up on Ruxted’s analysis:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080207.wedion07/BNStory/specialComment/home 


> *Globe editorial*
> 
> Harper and Dion both have to bend
> 
> ...



Quite frankly, I cannot see how this can be a anything but a matter of _confidence_. Mr. Harper set a precedent, at least for his government, back in May 2006 when he allowed parliament to vote, and made it an issue of confidence, on what has, traditionally, been a matter of exclusive _executive_ (cabinet) concern.

I also cannot see how Prime Minister Harper can _compromise_ – except through some rhetorical slight of hand that might well appease most Canadian journalists but would be, practically (in terms of bleeding, broken soldiers) inconsequential. To compromise, in any meaningful way, would be to neuter his administration on key policy issues. We would, in effect, have moved away from a (constitutionally *required*) Westminster style parliamentary government and towards a Washington style congressional system in which the executive is ‘checked’ and ‘balanced’ by a sovereign legislature.

M. Stéphane Dion, on the other hand, has some room for political manoeuvre. In his case some “rhetorical slight of hand” might be sufficient to allow his party to support any reasonable proposal the government offers. Better, he could, formally and publicly, accept the _Manley Report_ and make its laudable goals those of the Liberal Party of Canada.


----------



## stegner (8 Feb 2008)

E.R Campbell, what about responsible government?   The executive, or cabinet, you describe is part of the legislature and must have the confidence of it-this is the integral part of the Westminster system.   While theoretically the Cabinet does not need the consent of the House of Commons explicitly for the deployment of the CF abroad it has been tradition that for major operations abroad, such as the Second World War and Korea that Parliament is consulted because after all we are a representative government.   The Cabinet does need the consent of Parliament in that the Crown, the Queen and the Governor General, the joint Commander-in-Chiefs of the Canadian Forces are part of Parliament and can in theory yay or nay any deployment. I don't see anything wrong with Parliament voting on deployments as national defence is clearly a rubric of Parliament under Section 91(7) of the Constitutional Act, 1867.  Implictly the Cabinet needs the consent of the House of Commons, after all they approve the budget which pays for everything.  Moreover, the CF is duty bound to abide by the decisions of Parliament no matter how stupid they are.   I realize your frustration though.


----------



## Edward Campbell (8 Feb 2008)

The government, the executive (properly the ‘Committee of the Queen’s Privy Council), is _”responsible”_ because it has, simultaneously, the _confidence_ of parliament and the sovereign. The ‘consent’ for the executive to deploy the *sovereign*’s armed forces is confirmed when funds are voted. A formal declaration of war, preceded by a parliamentary debate – which need only be a “take note” debate, may also be required in certain circumstances, partially as a prelude to other legislative measures that may be required to prosecute the war on a national basis.

There was no good Constitutional requirement for Prime Minister Harper to do anything except inform parliament that he was extending the mission until whenever it suited him – in his role as the sovereign’s principle advisor. If parliament objects it has, always, its most powerful weapon: it can, simply, refuse to vote funds for the military. If they don’t want to do that they can use one of their ‘opposition days’ to vote “no confidence” in the government and force it out of office.

I expect that the same level of parliamentary skill, knowledge and responsibility will be brought to bear on this issue as can be seen in the Mulroney/Schreiber _affair_.

I quite like many aspects of the US system – especially the skill and responsibility that congressional committees bring to their work. I also dislike parts of it – especially the fact that the executive cannot be tossed aside when it, clearly, has the lost the confidence of the people’s representatives. On balance, I think we can reform our old, creaky, _retarded_ (complete with unequal representation and an appointed legislative chamber) version of a Westminster system rather than shift, by accident, to a pale version of the Washington system.

Allowing, much less requiring the legislature to formally approve every executive decision is the wrong way to go.


----------



## stegner (8 Feb 2008)

> Allowing, much less requiring the legislature to formally approve *every executive decision * is the wrong way to go.



Exactly-there is a reason why we have an executive.  


I hate how the opposition always opposes for the sake of it. Being in the opposition does not mean you can't agree with the government on anything.  It would be nice to hear every once in a while from a leader  that gee we may not agree with everything you do but on issue x the government did a very good job.    

Maybe the relaxing of party discipline and a Triple-E Senate would help?


----------



## McG (9 Feb 2008)

stegner said:
			
		

> I hate how the opposition always opposes for the sake of it. Being in the opposition does not mean you can't agree with the government on anything.  It would be nice to hear every once in a while from a leader  that gee we may not agree with everything you do but on issue x the government did a very good job.


But Mr Dion has come right out and said it.  It is his job to oppose the government regardless of the merit of the governments position.   :  Unhelpful fool.  If he understood government (which he should given his position) then he would understand he should oppose based on the merit of a government position.



			
				stegner said:
			
		

> Maybe the relaxing of party discipline and a Triple-E Senate would help?


Interesting option .... http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25692.0.html


----------



## Royal (24 Feb 2008)

Ack!!  Good governanvce comes from smart governance, (not wiley).


----------



## Edward Campbell (7 Mar 2008)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, is a commentary from former PCO Clerk, diplomat and Ottawa _insider_ Norman Spector:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080307.wcospector07/BNStory/Front/home


> When is a retreat not a retreat? When nobody notices
> 
> NORMAN SPECTOR
> 
> ...



Despite the lead-in paragraphs, this is not about M. Dion’s all too evident weaknesses; it is about Mr. Harper’s underhanded rejection of the Manley Report’s key recommendations. Canada has, as _The Daily Telegraph_ suggests, “quit Afghanistan” – just not right now, à la Jack Layton but, rather, later as Stéphane Dion demanded.

The _optics_ were well managed by Mr. Harper; perhaps the _tactics_ are right, too – perhaps the Afghanistan mission is just part, and not a winnable part, of a wider war which we will be better able to fight when are forces are home, rested, reinforced and re-equipped; maybe, and one can debate the issue, even the _strategy_ is right – maybe we do need to get out from under the NATO umbrella and engage in this _*Clash of Civilizations*_ in different terms, with fewer but stauncher allies. But, what about the _principles_?


----------



## GAP (7 Mar 2008)

I agree with your sentiments ER.....running away, whether walking backwards, forwards, etc., is still running away and leaves a taste..


----------



## Kirkhill (7 Mar 2008)

I would point out that the "current mission" - defined by the Afghanistan Compact-is going to end in 2011.   Setting a concurrent end date doesn't preclude asking for a new mandate in 2010.  The Bonn Agreement of 2004 has already morphed into the Compact.


----------



## Edward Campbell (7 Mar 2008)

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I would point out that the "current mission" - defined by the Afghanistan Compact-is going to end in 2011.   Setting a concurrent end date doesn't preclude asking for a new mandate in 2010.  The Bonn Agreement of 2004 has already morphed into the Compact.



Agreed; and the Government should have amended its motion, as I recommended, to make that clear. As it is they have, by inept drafting, made themselves appear to have *cut and run* even if that was not their intent.

Q: What's the difference between the Boy Scouts and the Government of Canada?
A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership.


----------



## Kirkhill (8 Mar 2008)

> Q: What's the difference between the Boy Scouts and the Government of Canada?
> A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership.



Ouuuch  ;D

And a string of court cases resulting from suspect selection criteria.....Oh wait.  That applies to Canadian politicians as well.


----------



## Edward Campbell (12 Mar 2008)

The following, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, is a report on John Manley’s comments to the HoC committee examining the Government’s motion based, loosely, on his report:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080312.wafghan12/BNStory/Afghanistan/home


> Manley defends call for 1,000 more soldiers
> *Number is a bare minimum, panel leader explains, as separate report says Canada's Afghan mission will run $1-billion over budget this year*
> 
> STEVEN CHASE
> ...



See also another report here that deals with the important matter of an ‘end’ date.


----------



## Edward Campbell (13 Mar 2008)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Toronto Sun_ is a column that, I think pretty much sums up the _state of play_ of the Parliament of Canada and the Afghanistan question:

http://www.torontosun.com/News/Columnists/Weston_Greg/2008/03/13/4989796.php


> *Greg Weston*
> 
> Thu, March 13th, 2008
> 
> ...



Many Milnet.ca members will disagree with the views Weston ascribes to “many Canadians” (he really could have said “most”) but I think he’s got it right. Canadians, broadly, neither understand nor support the mission in Afghanistan. We can and should blame successive Canadian administrations, Chrétien’s, Martin’s and now Harper’s for being unwilling (I, personally refuse to accept that they are unable) to explain or “sell” the mission. The reason is that none of those three care a tinker’s dam for _Canada’s “Role of pride and influence in the world”_* or for Canada’s much touted _Responsibility to Protect_ (R2P). Nor should they, I guess, because it is very clear to me that Canadians, broadly and deeply, care nothing at all for either of those things. The vast majority of our fellow citizens, including many, many of our friends and relatives and most of our neighbours, are animated by two defining characteristics: greed and envy. We look, like beggar children with our noses pressed to the store window, at everything our American neighbours ‘have’ – even, perhaps often especially, thing things that are quite worthless, like a celebrity obsessed _culture_ – and they want it all, now and for free. In their public affairs Canadians, broadly, display the _attitude_ of the mythical Russian peasant who had only one cow and envied his neighbour who had two: every morning he went to church, fell to his knees and prayed, _“Please, God, be fair, make us all equal – kill one of Ivan’s cows.”_

Why should Chrétien, Martin and Harper have bothered to spend scarce _political capital_ on an issue that does not, cannot resonate with most Canadians because it is not an immediate, overwhelming threat to the “sacred trusts” of _Medicare_, EI and _pogey_ – all of which represent something for nothing.

I actually had some sympathy for Dion and Layton. They were, at least, being honest; saying what Canadians think: _*“Oh, to hell with the poor, war ravaged, long suffering people of Afghanistan and to hell with R2P!*  Bring the troops home and stop spending my money on things of no direct, immediate benefit to me, Me *ME*!”_ Now, only Gilles Duceppe and Jack Layton speak “for the people” and no-one, not Dion and not Harper speaks for Canada’s principles.

We do, indeed, get the governments we deserve.   

----------
* The title of Paul Martin’s aborted 2006 foreign and defence policy _statement_


----------



## Edward Campbell (13 Mar 2008)

Well, according to this article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_ (web edition), the motion to stay in Afghanistan until 2011, flawed as it is, passed. The Manley Commission did its job:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080313.wafghanmotion0313/BNStory/Front/home 


> Motion to extend Afghan mission passes
> 
> MURRAY BREWSTER
> 
> ...



Some of the reaction – Brent Patterson of the _Council of Canadians_, for example – is just about what I expected: anti-military, anti-Canada vitriol.

Some other comment – such as _”The _[budget]_ increase barely keeps up with inflation and could leave the military with less money in the long-term as costs rise” _[Senator Colin] Kenny [Chair of the Senate security and defence committee] said. – make a whole lot of sense. Given the rate of inflation for military hardware and for fuel and ammunition *the defence budget*, despite the recent increases, *is actually decreasing*. The Government of Canada is disarming the country by stealth.


----------



## Edward Campbell (14 Mar 2008)

Here, reproduced 8under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act fron today’s _National Post_, is a column by Don Martin that illustrates the problem created by poor drafting on the government’s part:

http://www.nationalpost.com/todays_paper/story.html?id=373352&p=2
My *emphasis* added


> This is not final word on mission
> 
> *Don Martin, National Post*
> 
> ...



No matter what the government’s intentions may have been they have, in fact, gone directly against the advice proffered through Mr. Manley by the best experts in the field and they have set yet another withdrawal date, just as the Liberals demanded – for no good or even ‘not so bad’ reason.

It would have been good, proper and useful to tie a full review of the mission to the renegotiation (I have no doubt that will happen) of the Afghanistan Compact in 2010. But that’s not what the motion says. Either the government intended to allow itself and its successors to be burdened with this issue for years to come (presumably to make nice with Dion's Liberals) or it is guilty of sloppy drafting.

In either event, Don Martin is right, this motion is not the final word. We can expect Barlow and Byres and Staples to keep on spewing their ill-informed, juvenile rubbish for years to come.


----------



## Kirkhill (14 Mar 2008)

> Politics is the art of the possible.
> Otto Von Bismarck, remark, Aug. 11, 1867
> German Prussian politician (1815 - 1898)



Unfortunately the military's requirement for clarity is often at odds with what the politicians.  

BB&S Inc would continue to spew regardless of the decision. They would spew if the troops were in Afghanistan. They would spew if they were in Darfur.  They would spew if they were back home in barracks. They have always spewed.  It is what they do.

IMH (& Biased) O the real villains of the piece here are the Liberals in general and Dion in particular. The lesser villain is Dion.  He is just feckless.  The greater villain is the Liberal Party trust that refuses to stand by their word or their obligations.  These are not Liberals that Alexander Mackenzie or Wilfrid Laurier or Louis St-Laurent would recognize.  They are truly heirs of Mackenzie King and Trudeau.


----------



## GAP (14 Mar 2008)

> No matter what the government’s intentions may have been they have, in fact, gone directly against the advice proffered through Mr. Manley by the best experts in the field and they have set yet another withdrawal date, just as the Liberals demanded – for no good or even ‘not so bad’ reason



I am guessing that the Conservatives are banking on having a 4 year mandate with a majority for 2011, thus the vote becomes moot.


----------



## Edward Campbell (14 Mar 2008)

GAP said:
			
		

> I am guessing that the Conservatives are banking on having a 4 year mandate with a majority for 2011, thus the vote becomes moot.



I'm not so sure.

First: The Conservatives are a long, long way away from a good, solid shot at a majority.

Second: The Conservatives have established and now reinforced a *precedent* of allowing parliament to decide on missions short (well short!) of war. It's hard to imagine any opposition party standing still for any followup deployment (beyond an initial six-month _mandate_) to, say, Darfur, without a full scale parliamentary debate.

I believe the initial motion/debate had nothing at all to do with policy or parliamentary procedure and everything to do with a cheap-shot attempt by Stephen Harper to drive a wedge between the factions of the then leaderless Liberals - the worst sort of cheap, ward-heeling, partisan politics _played_ on the backs of Canadian soldiers. Having _extended_ the mission to one arbitrary, senseless end-date Harper is now forced to go back, cap-in-hand, to extend it - and this time he screwed up the motion by adding yet another arbitrary, senseless end date.

I think he's hoist on his own petard, by his own, not the Liberals' efforts and, despite the fact that I'm a card carrying, dues paying Conservative, I feel no sympathy. Harper messed this up - it's a poorly drafted motion and he's going to suffer for it.


----------



## stegner (14 Mar 2008)

> I believe the initial motion/debate had nothing at all to do with policy or parliamentary procedure and everything to do with a cheap-shot attempt by Stephen Harper to drive a wedge between the factions of the then leaderless Liberals - the worst sort of cheap, ward-heeling, partisan politics played on the backs of Canadian soldiers. Having extended the mission to one arbitrary, senseless end-date Harper is now forced to go back, cap-in-hand, to extend it - and this time he screwed up the motion by adding yet another arbitrary, senseless end date.



Mr. Campbell you sound almost as opposed to Stephen Harper, as I, a well-established Liberal.   Is it time for the knives to come out in the Conservative Party?  If not, at which point do you think it would be necessary (i.e. Harper continues to proceed in the same manner in the House on Afghanistan and other foreign policy) if at all.  In any event, who would you like to succeed Stephen Harper?  Jim Prentice?


----------



## Wootan 9 (14 Mar 2008)

Below is an OpEd that I got into the "Calgary Herald" today (14 March).  The reality is that Afghanistan can be lost on the battlefields of Kandahar but it can only be won in Kabul.

Beyond the Afghan debate: Need for better leadership
  
Col. Mike Capstick (Ret.) 
For The Calgary Herald 


Friday, March 14, 2008


Now that a Parliamentary consensus was reached Thursday on extending the Canadian mission in Afghanistan until 2011, it is time for the government to take the essential steps that will ensure strategic success.

Although there appears to be an international consensus on the need to establish Afghan-International strategic coherence, there does not appear to be any shared view of how to do this. While the recent nomination of the former Norwegian foreign minister Kai Eide as UN special representative offers the promise of coherence, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) remains marginal to the dynamic in Kabul.

Despite Eide's nomination, a few powerful states and some of the most important development agencies continue to weaken the possibility of UN leadership by their insistence on following national and organizational agendas and priorities instead of those laid out in the compact.

Clearly this lack of cohesion is untenable and if UNAMA is to be effective, the appointment of a special envoy must be accompanied by expressions of full political level support and genuine behavioural change "on the ground." Canada can, and must, play a leadership role in making this happen.

It is also evident that Canada's "whole of government" approach has matured greatly in the past two years and that the recent striking of a cabinet committee, supported by a task force located in the PCO, promises to strengthen the cohesion of the Canadian effort. The motion that passed provides for a special parliamentary committee on Afghanistan that will be able to exercise oversight over the mission and ensure ministerial accountability.

These positive steps must now be supported by the development of a comprehensive public strategy that defines Canadian objectives in Afghanistan (the "ends"), the organizations, methods, priorities and benchmarks to accomplish these (the "ways") and committed resources - human and financial (the "means"). This strategy must accord with the compact and serve as the authoritative guidance for Canada's "whole of government" effort. It would permit parliamentarians to monitor progress and, at the same time, fully inform Canadians as to our national objectives in Afghanistan and how the government intends to achieve them.

These steps would mitigate the challenges in Ottawa, but they must be supported by structural changes on the ground. Not only does Canada's Afghan strategy need to be coherent in Ottawa, it must be seamlessly co-ordinated in Kabul and Kandahar.

Despite the strong diplomatic skills of our Foreign Service officers, the leadership and management of a complex, multi-dimensional operation such as the Afghan mission is simply not a core-competency of Canada's ambassadors, nor is it an appropriate role for senior military commanders.

To overcome this, the prime minister should appoint a prominent and experienced Canadian as a special envoy with the authority to act as the head of Canada's "country team" and a specific mandate to ensure that Canada's Afghan strategy is co-ordinated.

This envoy should report to the PM and he or she should be supported by a strategic co-ordination team of approximately four people with experience in Afghanistan, expertise in security, governance and development as well as proven planning and co-ordination skills at the strategic level. The members of this team must not be serving soldiers or public servants to ensure their independence. It would advise the PM's envoy, review all activities to ensure strategic coherence and support his or her efforts to bring cohesion to the Afghan-International effort in Kabul.

Every single Canadian action in support of the Afghanistan compact must be designed to strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the simplest terms most Afghans want the same things that Canadians wanted in 1867 -- peace, order and good government. Canada's entire effort must focus on helping them achieve this.

Opponents of the mission often recite the litany of failures and issues as proof that stabilizing Afghanistan and ameliorating its grinding poverty is "mission impossible," and that abandoning the country is the only option. This is simply wrong-headed and would consign Afghans to decades of predation and violence. At the same time, it would be folly to adopt a simplistic "stay the course" approach, which would only result in the repetition of the strategic failures that have had such an adverse impact on the Afghan mission.

Canada must, therefore capitalize on the new political consensus and develop a coherent strategy and provide the kind of political leadership so essential to the future of the Afghan mission.

Mike Capstick is a retired colonel and an associate at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

He spent 12 months between August 2005-2006 as commander of Canada's Strategic Advisory Team, Afghanistan stationed in Kabul.

© The Calgary Herald 2008


----------



## Edward Campbell (14 Mar 2008)

stegner said:
			
		

> Mr. Campbell you sound almost as opposed to Stephen Harper, as I, a well-established Liberal.   Is it time for the knives to come out in the Conservative Party?  If not, at which point do you think it would be necessary (i.e. Harper continues to proceed in the same manner in the House on Afghanistan and other foreign policy) if at all.  In any event, who would you like to succeed Stephen Harper?  Jim Prentice?



I'm not at all opposed to Stephen Harper. Quite the contrary, in fact. In most important areas I think we are very much of a mind: further, massive, decentralization of government away from the _national_ level - many so-called _public_ functions do not need to *be done* by any level of government and part of the decentralization ought to be massive privatization and, in some cases, simply walking away if the private sector is not interested.

I understand some of the problems Mr. Harper has faced as leader of a minority government and I also understand the compromises he has made - especially in not making the sorts of spending cuts which the next *majority* government (Con or Lib) will have to make.

I do not think he knows or cares much about foreign and defence matters - I think he actually does believe his own rhetoric about making Canada relevant in the world again (he is about 90% aligned with Paul Martin and, possibly, Michael Ignatieff on that) but I think he keeps that idea on the back burner because Canadians, an overwhelming majority of them, oppose the sorts of actions a government needs to take to put some muscle on that skeleton if ideas.

I think he has a weak _political_ staff (PMO) with (and here I agree with Judge Gomery and Don Savoie) too much power and I think that's why the motion ended up being poorly amateurishly badly crafted. Therefore, I hope this error will come back to haunt him and that he will learn from it.

I think Dion is an ass and Ignatieff is a pompous lightweight and I don't think Bob Rae even merits discussion in any sentence that discusses 'leadership.'


----------



## Kirkhill (15 Mar 2008)

Some bad branch water with that Bourbon Edward? >


----------



## McG (15 Mar 2008)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The Conservatives have established and now reinforced a *precedent* of allowing parliament to decide on missions short (well short!) of war. It's hard to imagine any opposition party standing still for any followup deployment (beyond an initial six-month _mandate_) to, say, Darfur, without a full scale parliamentary debate.


They could turn this into a good thing if they start throwing a funding component into every mission approval vote.  As the executive already must go to the legislative to get a budget, this would allow missions (beyond the initial 6 months) to be specifically funded from a dedicated pot.


----------



## Edward Campbell (15 Mar 2008)

MCG said:
			
		

> They could turn this [the precedent the Conservatives have established of going to parliament for periodic approvals of (some? most?) missions] into a good thing if they start throwing a funding component into every mission approval vote.  As the executive already must go to the legislative to get a budget, this would allow missions (beyond the initial 6 months) to be specifically funded from a dedicated pot.



To a degree that’s how we they (even I'm not *that* old!) did things 500 years ago. The English parliament had, about 750 years ago, secured for itself the right to levy taxes and, over time, this evolved into a system in which parliament voted an annual sum for the sovereign’s _privy purse_ that included a very miserly sum for the maintenance of a standing army and bits of a navy. Specific wars and similar adventures were funded, on a case by case basis, by parliament – not always in ways the sovereign liked.

The _Glorious Revolution_ (1688) was accompanied by another one: in credit and debt – see e.g. Mead and Ferguson – that gave the executive, then the sovereign and his/her council, now the cabinet (described as _“the governor in council”_) the wherewithal to raise money with less parliamentary oversight and with much less immediate and direct impact on the people.


----------



## The Bread Guy (10 Jun 2008)

And here's what CAN says has come out of the Manley Report...
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/77192.0.html


----------

