# The 'Hollow Army' and the .COM dilemma [a split & merged thread]



## observor 69 (29 Jun 2009)

AFGHANISTAN MISSION
Brian Stewart
LINK
Military brass bite their tongues over the 'hollow army'
Why generals may be playing down the exhaustion of the Canadian army 
Brian Stewart, CBC News 

It is an extraordinary testament to the resilience of Canadian troops that they've been able to conceal how much this country's combat forces have been exhausted by years of war in Afghanistan.

 The refusal of the military to acknowledge the weariness means Canadians are unaware that the exhaustion of the combat mission is far worse than it has appeared. It's a fighting mission, we need to remind ourselves, that will continue for another 2½ years (until the end of 2011).

Other allies have not been so silent about the drain of fighting Taliban in Afghanistan's southern provinces. British counterparts there, by comparison, frequently go to the mass media with complaints about lack of weapons and equipment, inadequate and overstressed forces, even poor tactics. 

Here, only Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, the head of Canada's army, has said enough to raise eyebrows. He insisted in the spring that his troops will need a year's rest after Afghanistan, along with replacement of worn-out equipment.

It's known within military circles that Leslie is far more concerned about the state of the army than he's admitted publicly. And so are his immediate superiors, including Gen. Walt Natynczyk, chief of the defence staff.

'The hollow army'
While preparing a recent documentary about Natynczyk for The National, I was able to obtain a leaked internal military report on the state of the forces, signed by Leslie. The report actually refers to "the hollow army."

The restricted report, circulated several months ago only within the uppermost levels of the Defence Department, points out the current efficiencies in all branches of the military. Its most searing conclusion is that the army "is now operating beyond its capacity."

"The war in Afghanistan," the report warns, "illustrates deficiencies in the army and the Canadian Forces."

More at link.


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## Bruce Monkhouse (29 Jun 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> Its most searing conclusion is that the army "is now operating beyond its capacity."



Gee, that's a new one. :boring:


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## TCBF (29 Jun 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> AFGHANISTAN MISSION
> Brian Stewart
> LINK
> ....
> ...



- What deficiencies?  

- But, since we are in the mood to jawbone things, how about a few RADICAL ideas:

1.  fix the Mil Medical, Mil Legal, and Recruiting and Selection system that either cannot or will not tighten up Recruiting and retention standards to include more aggressive screening for pre-existing med and psych conditions or allow the expedient and hasty release of those culled by the current lax standards.  A drain on scarce resources and a blight on morale.
2.  A career system which would allow more Reg F pers to escape the clutches of their current UIC's (the ones who claim they cannot spare anyone for tours), thus allowing the Res F to stop 'eating their seed corn' and slow down and train a new generation of 16 year olds.
3.  Retention: The 'Remuster' system has to be reconstituted.  Hire a recruit for TWO trades.  First trade Cbt A.  Give him his course date for his tech trade the day he grads his Cbt A qual crse!  (NOT before). Must do three years good service after gradding Cbt A trades trg before the remuster. Must still be fit remuster FitCat and MedCat.
4. Postings: Gaining CO's to have access to PERS and Medical files prior to the postings and can refuse postings in.
5. Releases:  Allow by the Commanding Officer, not Ottawa.  
6. Recruiting: two weeks at a Mil Dist Manning Depot (insert modern PC organizational buzzword here).  Medicals, physicals, psychs, PT. Have a good look at them.  
7. Recruit Trg; Close St-Jean.  Open CFRS in Valcartier and Dundurn. 
8. Careers: Introduce a flexible system where trades can borrow or loan pers to fill posns without the req to denote them ATR. Done now on a minor scale.
9. Stop rank-creep in positions by attaching the rank to the position, not the career.  You get the position, you get the rank - not before.  You lose the position, you lose the rank.  Pay stays within a given field and increases by incentive level.  
10. CO's promote in their units.  CO's demote in their units.  
11. Class B. Eliminate.  Drains the reserves of needed talent.  Transfer to Reg F. Transfer back when not needed (Note that presently the MND can transfer a Reg F member to the P Res WITHOUT the members agreement...). Class B should not be the Regional Economic Assistance Plan it presently is.
12. Compete for ppostings and positions. Introduce Fitness Catagories along with Medical Catagories.  Each posting or CFTPO comes with a Fit Cat and a Med Cat minimum.  If yours is better than the others or the incumbent - you get the position.
13. Keep the pay incentives to Cpl, but sew on rank ONLY upon grad of ldsp crses. LCpl for grads og JNCO/JLC/CLC/PLQ, etc. Cpl and MCpl through competition.  Do similar for officer ranks.  2Lt, etc., until certain trg gateways complete (professional, NOT educational), no promotion for ANY ranks strictly through time in.   

- Anyone want to list point number 14 and carry on?


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## observor 69 (29 Jun 2009)

A terrible thought that has been running through my mind lately:
We are going to come out of Afghanistan with burnt out personnel and burnt out/worn equipment.
A Liberal government gets elected and attempts to deal with the national debt built up in stimulating the economy during the recession.
The military budget, as usual in Canada, gets slashed and the only tasking we can handle is a small UN peacekeeping mission.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose


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## TCBF (29 Jun 2009)

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> A terrible thought that has been running through my mind lately:
> We are going to come out of Afghanistan with burnt out personnel and burnt out/worn equipment.
> A Liberal government gets elected and attempts to deal with the national debt built up in stimulating the economy during the recession.
> The military budget, as usual in Canada, gets slashed and the only tasking we can handle is a small UN peacekeeping mission.
> ...



- Burnt out personnel?  A myth.


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## daftandbarmy (29 Jun 2009)

And, of course, history shows us that the best way to rebuild tired armies is to focus on people, not kit:


Transforming An Army: Military Leadership and Military Transformation in the British and Indian Armies 

“Although both Montgomery and Slim exhibited different leadership styles, both agreed on one thing: they believed that the way to transform their own fighting forces into effective soldiers who could best their opponents in battle was not obtaining more material, but to focus on the basic elements of doctrine, training and morale in their respective commands.”

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/cdfessay/past/02merit2005.html


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## Colin Parkinson (29 Jun 2009)

Not sure how it is now, but Class B was used within the reserve unit to provide organic manpower for tasks such as RQMS, Veh tech, RHQ staff. It seems what you are talking about is more in line with Class C if it still exist.


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## dapaterson (29 Jun 2009)

Following funding devolutions and responsibility devolutions, everyone and their dog (or, in the cast of certain units, goat) is hiring class B reservists for backfill across the spectrum.

Literally thousands across the CF, in places like CFRCs, schools, HQs, base support... you name it, you'll find Reservists there.  Indeed, if you count all the full-time Reservists you'll find the number is over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength.  Toss in class C (deployed operations, plus some crew of MCDVs for the Navy, and a handful in other domestic positions) and you're looking at even more.

The current situtaion re: employing full-time Reservists is an out of control monster that few in positions of authority have any desire to temper.  Instead, they continue to use full-time Reservists as a way to circumvent Reg F manning limits.  So, rather than ever saying "No, that's a stupid idea" or "To do X, we will stop doing Y", we spend more funds on full-time Reservists.

This storm has been brewing for a long time; it's going to hit hard and be damaging to the CF as an institution once its impact is fulyl felt.


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## daftandbarmy (29 Jun 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Following funding devolutions and responsibility devolutions, everyone and their dog (or, in the cast of certain units, goat) is hiring class B reservists for backfill across the spectrum.
> 
> Literally thousands across the CF, in places like CFRCs, schools, HQs, base support... you name it, you'll find Reservists there.  Indeed, if you count all the full-time Reservists you'll find the number is over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength.  Toss in class C (deployed operations, plus some crew of MCDVs for the Navy, and a handful in other domestic positions) and you're looking at even more.
> 
> ...



And of course the problem is that they (there's those darned 'they' people again) drag them away from reserve units where they should be managing internal to unit issues, and post them to schools etc to fill up gaps there. The Class A net then has to try and take the extra strain, with predictable results. It's come to the point where units are 'lucky' if they have medically downgraded reg staff attached, just to push the normal paper load.

Unfortunately, the units are rarely farther ahead as a result of these 'extra' class B positions.


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## CBH99 (29 Jun 2009)

-  Just adding to the list of ways we could maximize our dollars and minimize our waste, and hopefully become more efficient at filling in the gaps.  Streamline equipment procurement so that we are getting proven equipment that is already in production, rather than waiting years for industry to come up with something.  Many suggestions have already been mentioned by other members of this board, such as giving industry a heads up so that industry can better respond to our needs when we open a competition and defining exactly what capabilities we want beforehand.  If we were to streamline our equipment procurement so that we minimized the amount of money we wasted and maximized the timing by getting equipment that has actually made it off the drawing board - we could make a lot of progress.  (In my personal opinion, ofcourse.)


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## Haggis (29 Jun 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Literally thousands across the CF, in places like CFRCs, schools, HQs, base support... you name it, you'll find Reservists there.  Indeed, if you count all the full-time Reservists you'll find the number is over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength.  Toss in class C (deployed operations, plus some crew of MCDVs for the Navy, and a handful in other domestic positions) and you're looking at even more.



There are, on average, about 9,000 Reservists on some type of full time service in 2009.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Instead, they continue to use full-time Reservists as a way to circumvent Reg F manning limits.



To staff all the required Reg F establishment positions to the PML with Reg F members would put even more strain on an already strained system, on both sides of the Reg/Res fence.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, rather than ever saying "No, that's a stupid idea" or "To do X, we will stop doing Y", we spend more funds on full-time Reservists.



And the Res F is partly to blame in this regard as they always "step up to the plate".



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Not sure how it is now, but Class B was used within the reserve unit to provide organic manpower for tasks such as RQMS, Veh tech, RHQ staff.



And these positions are in many cases, Reg F positions.

Units are desperately short of Regular Force Cadre (RFC, the old "RSS") and those who do have them invariably lose them before a full 3 year posting is done.

Reg F members posted to Reserve units, particularly Army units, find themselves with a tempo as least as high as their deployed counterparts.  Most will be required to work most, if not all, summers and many weekends.  (Yes, CTO compensates for some of this.)  Many RFC members are "broken" or healing and are not getting the break they need (and expect?) while in a Reserve unit.


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## Colin Parkinson (29 Jun 2009)

Maybe offer the RSS positions to released senior personal who can comeback on full status but as reserves, without fear of being sent overseas. It would be nice that some of the Class B were in the unit so they could carry out a lot of tasks themselves. When we were an "Ops tasked battery" we had a fulltime RQMS and a vehicle Tech, along with the RHQ positions and RSS staff. It worked well. perhaps then the Militia could maintain more of it's own kit. What I found frustrating was being sent for 6 weeks for a course when 50% of that time was wasted. The concept of value for money was somewhat wasted on the army of the 80's.


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## OldSolduer (29 Jun 2009)

Here in the Winnipeg Infantry Tac Group, we have a full time Adjt (Cl B), full time Ops staff (Capt, WO and a Sgt) all Reg Force PPCLI. In addition, we have a full time Coy 2 I/C, Tpt Sgt, CQ & staff, all Cl B.
We're doing pretty well.


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## George Wallace (29 Jun 2009)

I think that this is a well written article, and something that had to be said.  Unfortunately, who is listening?  The Public really isn't.  The Politicians aren't.  The Mandarins in the CS aren't.  Members of the CF may be, but what real say do they have to effect the necessary changes, if Treasury Board doesn't approve?

SALY SS-DP


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## dapaterson (30 Jun 2009)

Haggis said:
			
		

> To staff all the required Reg F establishment positions to the PML with Reg F members would put even more strain on an already strained system, on both sides of the Reg/Res fence.



Ah - but "required" is not true.  There are many useless Reg F positions, but all are somebody's pet, so they cannot be reduced.  (ahem Startop road ahem).  Project management positions - no one reigns in ADM(Mat) or ADM(IM) and tells them "Project X is running five years late.  So choose: either can project X, or defer project Y for two years until people will be available."  We're unwilling to discipline the systems.

We've permitted "leaders" to get away with never making hard decisions - if they can't choose between options that would require making unpopular choices, well, just do both - and hire Reservists to circumvent the Reg F manning ceiling.  Want a bunch of new command HQs?  Just grab Reg F expansion positions to create them (without a personnel system that can produce the people you want, today or ever) then round it out with a bunch more full-time Reserve positions.  Never make hard choices that have to be made for the future sustainability of the institution.  And couch it all in your "Aw shucks I'm just an everyday Newf" spiel.

On the plus side, you will get those "Leading Change" bubbles filled out on your PER.


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## Colin Parkinson (30 Jun 2009)

Getting additional funding from outside of DND to fund some more fulltime positions in Reserve units for say 2 years, might be sellable to everyone, it would work better if the funds were directed to hard hit regions. We did similar with the Summer Youth Employment Program in the 80's, but I would rather it focused more on the people that are already in, have some training and help the unit move forward. Unit CO's in the selected areas could produce some sort of proposal for extra staff in their unit showing some net gain for the unit, persons hired and region. Say like hiring a W.O. to setup unit training courses or write the material. Send some selected people to take advanced courses in modern warfighting technologies and run course back home.

Haggis
DFO does the same, they used Capital funds to pay O&M costs to avoid the political costs of shutting down things like hatcheries or other feel good stuff. In fact most branches of the Government are at fault to one extent or the other in this regard.


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## McG (30 Jun 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Ah - but "required" is not true.  There are many useless Reg F positions ...


What we need is a dispassionate review of military positions.   Which ones are required?  Which ones are helpful but we could survive without?  Which ones are entirely superfluous?  Could any be better performed by civilians (I suspect many of the ADM(Mat) PMPRs could be better staffed with SWE)?  Are there any redundant organizations?

… and I still believe that NDHQ would be significantly more efficient if it were all in one city in a single building (or at least on a single campus of a few buildings).


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## TCBF (30 Jun 2009)

- So, if the above figure of 9,000 full-time Reservists is in the ballpark, add that to the (also ballpark) strength of 62,000 in the Reg F, we have 71,000 full-time positions manned.

- When I joined Regular in 76, we were at 74,000 to 78,000 full time.  Given that what we have full time in KAF is about what we had in CFE back then (more ballparks!), when you take into account the closure of the Pinetree Line, we are at about the same strength as in the mid seventies.  

- So, as I said, What Burnout?


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## dapaterson (30 Jun 2009)

Some differences:

The BTL (folks not qualified DP1) was smaller back then; and
There's a few minor differences between serving in KAF and serving in Germany (for one thing, the beer's nowhere near as plentiful, nor are the Tide boxes as easily seen).


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## George Wallace (30 Jun 2009)

4 CMBG was roughly 5000.  The Air Wing was what, another 1000, max?

There were 16,000 Dependents roughly in Lahr.

There were four Brigades in the Army.

There were roughly twice the current number of Air Force Sqns and Bases.  

There were 128 tanks, with an Armour Regiment of three Tank Sqns fully equiped and trained and a School fully equiped to train.  Similarly Artillery and Engineer Units were also fully equiped and trained, as were their Schools.  

Gone are the 128 tanks.  Now we have twenty.
Gone are the M109s.  Now we have a few M777.
Gone are most of the Mech Engr equipment. 

The Infantry have not faired as well either, although the LAV III is a leap forward for them.

In 1976 there was only Cyprus.  Today we have Afghanistan.  In between we've had Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti, etc.


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## TCBF (30 Jun 2009)

- 'OMO' boxes! (Old Man Out!)
 ;D

- BTL: Over a thousand recuits in Cornwallis at once during a 'light' period (half of the platoons 'Zero-Loaded') is the start of a good BTL.  Borden was massive - TWO crowded McDonalds!


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## TCBF (30 Jun 2009)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> 4 CMBG was roughly 5000.  The Air Wing was what, another 1000, max?
> 
> There were 16,000 Dependents roughly in Lahr.
> 
> ...



- The above was a good CFE view circa 1990 - when we peaked at just under (or over) 90,000.  We grew from about 76,000 in 76 to 90,000 in 90, due largely to CFE (4CMBG and 1 Air Div) doubling in size and the growth of the 'feeder' brigades in Canada.

- We are now back to about 1976, considering that a lot of the positions done by civilians would have had a uniform in the chair 33 years ago.


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## Haggis (30 Jun 2009)

TCBF said:
			
		

> - So, if the above figure of 9,000 full-time Reservists is in the ballpark, add that to the (also ballpark) strength of 62,000 in the Reg F, we have 71,000 full-time positions manned.



Don't confuse Reg F "total strenght" (62, 000) with "effective strength" (51, 000).  Those 9,000 ish members are on BTL, ATL, SPHL or NES Terminal Leave (but still in)and do not occupy Reg F establishment positions.  Also, those 9,000 Reservists includes those wholly and totally employed in support of the Res F.



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> - When I joined Regular in 76, we were at 74,000 to 78,000 full time.  Given that what we have full time in KAF is about what we had in CFE back then (more ballparks!), when you take into account the closure of the Pinetree Line, we are at about the same strength as in the mid seventies.



Not really.  There were far less Reservists on full time service back then and a lot more people on BTL/ATL (we had three full up military colleges).



			
				TCBF said:
			
		

> - So, as I said, What Burnout?



The burnout is not only related to the number of personnel but the demands we are putting on them.  The op tempo and types of ops in the seventies is far, far different from the world of today.


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## PuckChaser (30 Jun 2009)

TCBF said:
			
		

> - What deficiencies?
> 
> 11. Class B. Eliminate.  Drains the reserves of needed talent.  Transfer to Reg F. Transfer back when not needed (Note that presently the MND can transfer a Reg F member to the P Res WITHOUT the members agreement...). Class B should not be the Regional Economic Assistance Plan it presently is.



But why? Cl B is a cheap way to make a soldier work twice as hard, especially if they are unlucky enough to be employed Cl B within their unit! You make them work all week, then Thursday night, get a half day off Friday, work all weekend and get Monday off the following week. You've got them for 6/7 days a week and at only 85% of what you would pay a Reg F soldier!

Reserves are being used as cheap labour, but really, there's no other choice with such a depleted Reg F. We need recruiting videos that make the military look like a cool occupation, something to be proud of. Much like the British or American TV ads.


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## Old Sweat (4 Jul 2009)

Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place? I served in J3 in NDHQ while Oka and the deployment to the Gulf were underway more or less simultaneously. NDHQ did a pretty good job of building an operationally oriented cadre, but much of the detailed work on the mounting and support fell to Maritime and Land Forces Command and CFE in the case of the fighter squadron. And right after than, along came the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. As well the Commander LFC really conducted the Oka operation in his capacity as a regional commander.

How would we look after the war in Afghanistan and our other overseas operations and do the planning for and then support the 2010 Winter Olympics without the subordinate commands? Maybe I am being even more clueless than usual, but I dunno.


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## armyvern (4 Jul 2009)

Just one suggestion of many (but heck - it's a start ...) Kill some of those expired project cells and farm those pers back out to their regular jobs. Kill their TD trips as "SMEs" too while we're at it. I can press "play" on a powerpoint and I can use the sizing jig!

How about - come up with an HQ system that Canada can actually afford and has the personnel for?

It probably would have worked ...

had we not robbed all the _Peters_ away from the bottom level to institute _Pauls_ at the .com levels so that the Pauls could then send the too-few Peters out to do all the work that remained and all the additional tasks/work work that's been downloaded onto Peter since.

Whole lot of planning happening at the dot coms, but all at the expense of the people who actually get tasked to do those "no-fail" tasks these days. And, let's face it - I haven't been given a task that was NOT a no fail since the dot coms were instituted ... despite the fact that we're at 72% manning due to all the "workers" the dot coms took away from us to sit in their locations "planning" instead.

The CF is NOT short people; we're short people in the RIGHT places ...  

Pauls in the dot coms are giving us a whole lot of work and tasks to do as "no fails", yet they've got all our Peters sitting in them! That's the problem.

It's all too well and good to build dot coms, but don't you think that that should occur only after you've ensured the numbers of Peters are adequate to actually do the work those new Pauls are creating? (Not if you're a Paul ... ergo Paul's insistance tasks are no fail). 72% manning, yet 250% increase in workload ... (therefore the "tired" troops). Nice.


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## Monsoon (4 Jul 2009)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place?


In my experience, when people kvetch about the dot.coms, they're really criticizing the quintuplication of effort wasted on manning the all those RJTF watch floors, planning cells and int sections. CEFCOM is essentially the old DCDS staff using new stationery; I don't know what CANOSCOM was pre-dated by but I have a hunch it wasn't fundamentally different from what we have now.

Not that this has anything to do with the CAB...


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## George Wallace (4 Jul 2009)

Why create a .Com when a Cell within the existing structure could have done.  We are creating so much duplication of effort, with no one sharing their work, that we are stressing out the system.

With one Command over the various Cells, there would be a lot less duplication of effort, less little "Empires", and more sharing of common work.

I have too many masters.

But what do I know.


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## armyvern (4 Jul 2009)

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> In my experience, when people kvetch about the dot.coms, they're really criticizing the quintuplication of effort wasted on manning the all those RJTF watch floors, planning cells and int sections. CEFCOM is essentially the old DCDS staff using new stationery; I don't know what CANOSCOM was pre-dated by but I have a hunch it wasn't fundamentally different from what we have now.
> 
> Not that this has anything to do with the CAB...



. COM HQs ... as already stated earlier ...


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## armyvern (4 Jul 2009)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Why create a .Com when a Cell within the existing structure could have done.  We are creating so much duplication of effort, with no one sharing their work, that we are stressing out the system.
> 
> With one Command over the various Cells, there would be a lot less duplication of effort, less little "Empires", and more sharing of common work.
> 
> ...



No, you are a Peter.


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## Loachman (4 Jul 2009)

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Because all those ("extra") staff are now posted to dot.coms and sitting there trying to figure out how to fill all those empty positions they left behind down here and out here in the real world where the troops who have to get the dirty work done (you know, the tired ones) live and work and fight and die.



Or they're trying to justify their existence, in some cases.

I managed to easily handle all aviation matters, and, in conjunction with G4 Tn 2, air matters, in LFCA HQ for over eight years as a Class A guy fourteen days per month.

I was replaced by a full-time LCol, a full-time Maj, one each full-time and part-time Capt, and a full-time WO, when the RJTFs and their associated RACES were stood up.

I would have most willingly continued solo, at only half the collective pay of those people.

The RACEs (Regional Air Control Elements) are classic cases of bureaucratic bloat (at least the inland ones are), and there is one per RJTF.

Before the LFAs were created up, there were six "Regions" for domestic ops, each one being commanded by the major HQ within it (ie, Central Region was commanded by Air Transport Group HQ in CFB Trenton). As domestic operations are mainly land-based (I cannot think of any inshore events that would not be, offhand), passing prime responsibility to the Army, with air/sea support assigned as necessary, and creating four Areas (partially) for that purpose made sense. Much sense.

That was certainly, from my experience, far less confusing and more streamlined than what I see now, and nothing during my time at LFCA indicated any requirement for anything other than minor adjustment at the most.

My first experience at LFCA, prior to that eight-year period, was the Ice Storm. As there was no helicopter booking agent there on a routine basis at that time, I got put in, along with a fellow from 408 Squadron who showed up a couple of days later. LFCA gave us a desk, a phone, and a computer, and we had access to any aircraft in the inventory if required with a simple phone call and e-mail to Winnipeg. It worked, didn't require more than two of us to split the shift, didn't require anybody over the rank of Captain, and we could easily have handled a much higher load.

"Change" and "improvement" are not synonymous - and often just the opposite.

Somebody, whose judgment I trust, once suggested that forming the dotcoms was the only way to move the operational aspects out of NDHQ and away from over-interference of civil servants - ie, splitting the Department and CF HQs as much as possible. If that was indeed the case, some aspect of their creation does, at least, make sense. Remember that that to which we now refer as NDHQ was once known as CFHQ.

I think that the Department and the CF should indeed be in separate buildings.

I think that the dotcoms should be re-absorbed into CFHQ.

I think that onshore domestic ops should be under control of the Army, and offshore ones under control of the Navy.

I think that the, now unbelievably two, air divisions should be killed off and appropriate functional Groups be re-established in their place (10 TAG, MAG, ATG, FG, 14 Training Group, and perhaps an Expeditionary Group to handle overseas ops) under Air Command (although I continue to believe that we would ultimately be better off with Tac Hel and Maritime Hel, as a minimum, reverting back under the Army and Navy). 

1 CAD was re-formed because HQs were declared to be "bad", so the smaller and leaner ones were smushed into one bigger one - only Tac Hel retained a single, cohesive lower-level HQ.

"Division" is not even a traditional air structure, in any Commonwealth air force, or the US one. The progression is Flight, Squadron, Wing, Group, and Command.

And a "wing" was never a base. It is the air equivalent of an Army brigade - a grouping of Squadrons with a related tactical purpose. The RCAF operated from bases called "Stations", and knew the difference between those and "Wings".


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## Old Sweat (4 Jul 2009)

We are, in my none too humble opinion, starting to focus on the issue. Unfortunately it is not the issue this thread was started to address. Mods, can we split the dot.coms discussion off into a separate thread?


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## Old Sweat (4 Jul 2009)

I could see the Winter Olympics being handled by the regional commander for BC with some augmentation. It seems to me that this was done for the Commonwealth Games or some such event circa 1994. The details are fuzzy in my mind, so don't quote me. I also recall being in on the planning for support to the World University Games at Hamilton/St. Catharines circa 1993, but again the details are fuzzy. This does not mean the solution was or was not correct. However it seemed to work.

Now, Afghanistan. We have a major undertaking underway, but I don't think it is beyond our capability to manage it through one headquarters. If the truth be known, the Gulf War seemed to be managed at the dull end quite well by the DCDS Battle Staff with nobody other than the DCDS higher in rank than major general or rear admiral. Most of the bull work was done at the director and below level and the level of liaison and coordination was quite good. In J3 much of my contact was with J4 Log anf J4 Tn, both of whom had 24/7 cells operating. (For example we were discussing the return to Canada well before the ground war began.) 

In fact it worked so well that the system stayed in place after the Gulf War. If there was a failing, it was a tendency to bring too many staff officers into the contingency planning stage. For example, when the Soviet Union was falling apart, the CDS asked for a briefing on options for support to Russia et al as the reports indicated the infrastructure was on the verge of collapse. At about 1200 I was told to brief the DCDS on options at the next day's 0700 J Staff conference so he could present them to the CDS, DM et al at the daily executive meeting. Cripes, there were people coming out of the woodwork with schemes to deploy the Field Hospital or to run supply convoys of fuel from Lahr to Moscow and the like. Other people wanted to convene a conference to work all night so we could present options to the DCDS. My director caught me heading out the door at 1730 and asked, not unreasonably, what was I doing. I told him I was going home to write an estimate and plan for the DCDS, and I was going to do it myself as I had all the input I neeed from other people. Fortunately he trusted me and I was able to present a reasoned analysis to the DCDS at 0700. My recommendation was to not leap on our horses and gallop off in all directions. Instead we should monitor the situation and let the Russians know that we were prepared to consider any assistance they might request.

I cannot comment on interference by pulic servants in operations at echelons well aove my pay grade, but we saw little to none of it at the worker level.


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## George Wallace (4 Jul 2009)

Loachman said:
			
		

> And a "wing" was never a base. It is the air equivalent of an Army brigade - a grouping of Squadrons with a related tactical purpose. The RCAF operated from bases called "Stations", and knew the difference between those and "Wings".



Actually, in the '50s and 60's Wings were fairly much, if not actually, Bases.

1 (F) Wing RCAF Station Marville, France
2 (F) Wing RCAF Station Grostenquin, France 
3 (F) Wing RCAF Station Zweibruecken, Germany
4 (F) Wing RCAF Station Baden Soellingen, Germany  


All made up 1 Air Division, RCAF, HQ in Metz, France


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## Loachman (4 Jul 2009)

Those are still formations (1/2/3/4 Wing) on bases (RCAF Station "X"), like brigades on bases. Yes, double-hatting of commanders and at least some staff and support functions was the norm in the past - Brigade/Combat Group commanders were also Base Commanders in the not-too-distant past.

The next air formation above Wing has always, with the exception of that anomaly, Group - in the RCAF, RAF, all other commonwealth air forces sufficiently large enough to warrant them, and the USAF. Group is the equivalent of an Army Division.

Had a certain Commander Air Command truly gone back to historical norms rather than confusing infrastructure with units and formations located thereon, we would have 8 Wing CFB Trenton instead of 8 Wing. Grouping the transport squadrons, including the OTUs, there into a Wing makes sense.

We do not call CFB Petawawa 2 CMBG, do we? People understand the difference.

I have occasionally encountered people who think that 16 Wing and CFB Borden are the same entity, and believe that 400 Squadron belongs to 16 Wing.

A classic, extreme, and hilarious case was the first op that Canada Command ran. 1 Wing was tasked to provide two Griffons to Comd 16 Wing to support the op, and Comd 16 Wing was tasked to provide hangar space and support for them. Somebody failed to realize that 16 Wing is a training organization only, and that 400 Squadron had its own hangar space and adequate support already in the next hangar. Comd 16 Wing was baffled, and so was everybody else - and amused.

The whole para of the op o authorizing fighter pilots to wear their joke nametags to confuse the press added to the mirth.

It went into that much detail, but left out the authority for us to enter the airspace along with a fair amount of other "trivial" stuff.


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## dapaterson (4 Jul 2009)

There is a marvelous study by the Brits, comparing their experiences in Iraq I and II.  Between, HQs grew for a variety of reasons.  The conclusions, when comparing the two?

In Iraq II, larger HQs spent more time, producing more detailed bricks of orders, that were routinely issued too late to be of any use.  Staff bloat meant that what used to be a simple 3-5 page order became a 30-50 page monster that was all but useless to the troops on the ground - but every staff wanker had their moment in the sun in that brick.

The same situation is there now with our dot COMs - too much staff chasing too little work.  Do we need 24/7 watches and dedicated co-ord staff in all the RJTFs?  No, no, one hundred times NO!  Do we need depth of staff so that the HQs tasked as RJTFs can surge to 24/7 operations if needed?  Yes.  But that's radically different from what we've wrought.

Remember: over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength is posted to the NCR.  CFSU(O) supports more people than Winnipeg, Esquimalt or Petawawa (as I recall, only Valcartier and Halifax support more).

Compare the size of the old DCDS with the combined size of the dot COMs and ask "are we doing a better job"?  Even the "Three Wise Guys" who were hired to say "Yes, it's great" (three GOFOs, one from each service) instead said "Let's talk and think about it post 2010".


The most telling failure is this: CANADACOM is unable to provide the TF HQ for the Olympics.  The RJTF can't do it either.  So the bulk of it is coming from 1 CMBG HQ.  So, if the HQs can't do their job on a scheduled, known operation, what can we expect from them in the event of an emergency?


(To those old enough to remember: D NDHQ Sec is being converted to DG Exec Co-ord.  More HQ bloat.  More back to the future.)


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## Infanteer (5 Jul 2009)

The idea of separating Force Generation and Force Employment is, to me, a sound one.  Especially when one considers that our small, dispersed military forces can't be everywhere at once.  Having an "Ops Guy" - the General/Admiral that the CDS looks to to employ Joint Forces around the world - makes sense for a military of our size.

This also indicates the necessity of managed readiness for Force Generators.   Despite being "regional" in their orientation (ie: 1 Bde in Western Canada, Pacific Fleet), Force Generators should not be responsible for the regions they inhabit.  Something may be happening in Western Canada, but most of the military forces in that region are deployed somewhere, then forces must be drawn from elsewhere and given to the Force Employer. 

What I don't get is why, when the idea was put through the Canadian "Transformation" filter, did DCDS Group x Creation of Command = CANOSCOM + CEFCOM + CANADACOM?  Would not a single Command for Force Employment do?

As an aside, Staff bloat is not a phenomenon strictly tied to "Transformation", but Transformation certainly, as others here have pointed to first hand, suffered from it.  In 1918 a Brigade Major ran the small staff for a Brigade.  These organizations administered thousands of soldiers in continuous combat operations.  Nowadays, a modern Brigade with its wiz-bang TOC and all its enablers seems to demand large staffs (in the hundreds at times) with a hockey sock of LCols and scads of Majors around to ensure things grind along.

I'd be interested in seeing a study looking at what part of the growth of Staffs is from changes in the conduct of operations (ie: increase in sensors, C2 technology, dispersed operations, etc, etc) and what part of the growth is just from the bureaucracy doing its thing.


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## McG (5 Jul 2009)

This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place?


I like the idea of a single Canadian Operations Command (CANOPSCOM).  I suspect there would be immediate efficiencies through merging of CANOSCOM & J4 functions, and consolidating of separate COS/DOS offices, PAF offices, LEGAD offices, etc.  Then one could begin a rationalization of positions & work.


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## George Wallace (5 Jul 2009)

MCG said:
			
		

> This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?



Yes it was.  I Split "Canadian Combat Action Badge - Now A Dead Idea (Merged Threads)" to create "The Dot.com Dilemma  Split from Canadian Combat Action Badge" .  Someone else has removed the "Split from_____" by renaming all posts to the same title: "The Dot.COM Dilemma".  Hope that clears up any confusion about the "Odd original post".


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## Infanteer (5 Jul 2009)

MCG said:
			
		

> This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?



Yes - it was split from the Combat Insignia thread.  In fixing it, I eliminated the "split from" tag.



> I like the idea of a single Canadian Operations Command (CANOPSCOM).  I suspect there would be immediate efficiencies through merging of CANOSCOM & J4 functions, and consolidating of separate COS/DOS offices, PAF offices, LEGAD offices, etc.  Then one could begin a rationalization of positions & work.



Agreed.

PS.  What's the difference between a COS and a DOS?  Doesn't a Chief of Staff _direct_ the efforts of the Staff?


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## vonGarvin (5 Jul 2009)

Even though I am staff qualified, I don't understand why there are so many commands.  As with Infanteer, I see the merit in a split of force employer and force generator.  I don't think it's a need, but I certainly agree that it has many merits.  Perhaps in an ideal world, we would have a national-level headquarters (which I would call "NDHQ" for short).  It would be in charge of everything, from D Cadets to any forces deployed, air, land and sea.  So, the person in charge of this staff, the chief, if you will, would be a Chief of the Defence Staff.  It would by necessity have to have a good mix of air, land, sea and special ops staff.
Under this national-level headquarters I'm not sure where to split.  Perhaps not yet into force generators and force employers.  Probably into a minimum of four "commands": Air, Land, Sea and Special Operations.  I would call this the "field force".  These four commands, homogenous in nature, would perhaps be the "force generators".  As an example, the air force (which I would call the Canadian Air Force) would be responsible for the individual and collective training of elements and members of the air force.  
So, we have a force generator.  Parallel to them, and also subordinate to the national-level headquarters would be the force employer "command".    This group, command or element would be responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff (“CDS” for short) for the employment of forces everywhere.  This would mean anything from search and rescue operations in Northern Ontario to combat operations in Afghanistan.  
By necessity, of course, would be a number of other “things” to be managed, but I would see them managed by the various force generators.  For example, such things and doctrine development and validation, sustainment, acquisition etc.  They would be responsible for recruiting into their various commands.  This not mean a case of naval recruitment centres competing with army recruitment centres.  Instead, the day-to-day recruitment would be done in conjunction with the other forces.  Instead, the navy is responsible to aid manning, etc of the recruitment centres, but they would also set the entry standards for their various “hard navy” trades.  So far, so good.


Then we have the “purple” trades (those trades which work in all three forces: logisticians, technicians, etc).  One option would be to have “sub trades”, such as “Naval Administration Clerk” or “Army Supply Technician” or “Air Force Mobile Support Equipment Operator”.  The first obvious problem is that if the army doesn’t recruit enough Army Supply Technician, they could not (without retraining), employ an air force Supply Technician.  Also, the Air Force would certainly object to such a transfer, especially when they are short.  One advantage, however, is that the “purples” would be able to master the aspects of their various elements, vice being journeymen.

(Aside: I call upon the “purples” to comment on this view, which is definitely from a non-purple dude).

Anyway, I think I’ve rambled enough.  Theories?  Questions?  Comments?  Critiques?


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## Old Sweat (5 Jul 2009)

David, whichever one of you reads this,

That sounds remarkably like NDHQ with the environmental chiefs responsible for force generation and preparation along with doctrine, tactics, etc. Meanwhile the DCDS ran domestic and overseas operations on behalf of the CDS who retained full command of deployed forces. Special operations was run by a cell in the DCDS group that both trained, generated and commanded their 'troops.'


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## vonGarvin (5 Jul 2009)

Brian
I think that was mostly my point.  Having said all that, however, I acknowledge that the system may have not worked to expectations.  I am not convinced that the current solution has alleviated anything.  More commands does not necessarily mean more efficiency or effectiveness.


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## 54/102 CEF (5 Jul 2009)

My view - which is worth its usual 2 cents - 

caveat : This really isn't about good or bad decisions by DND - its about the government strangling the resource inflow to support the demand at the far end.

I am guessing that Gen Hillier assumed he'd get more personnel which would put legs on the dot.coms - which didn't happen - straws in the wind are as recent as the statement of CLS saying training suffers as all the trainers are away/tasked.... 

Somebody bigger than all of us should be asking "and when is this going to be fixed? 2011-2012 before the next international tour-a-rama gets going?"

Like a subdivision with many foundations but no houses and no buyers - this will be a while before it grows a house (s) or is just foreclosed.

Its happened before 

Probably need at least 4 more years so "architects" don't get their political noses out of joint


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## dapaterson (5 Jul 2009)

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> I am guessing that Gen Hillier assumed he'd get more personnel which would put legs on the dot.coms - which didn't happen - straws in the wind are as recent as the statement of CLS saying training suffers as all the trainers are away/tasked....
> 
> Somebody bigger than all of us should be asking "and when is this going to be fixed? 2011-2012 before the next international tour-a-rama gets going?"



Gen (ret'd) Hillier ran amok because no one had the balls intestinal fortitude to tell him when he was right out of it.  "Getting more personnel" is useless.  For HQs, you want mostly staff with 10-20 years experience.  So, class, here's a question:  How long in advance do you need to start preparing?

The CF has an indecent obsession with doing shiny new things, but never abandoning the old things.  Want to increase the CDS span of control (which every bit of organizational analysis will tell you is wrong, wrong, wrong)?  Fine.  What are you going to stop doing to provide the resources to do it?  None of this "We'll figure it out later" crap.  Make a plan - that is, proper assignment of tasks, resources and priorities.  Not a wish statement.

Or maybe I'm just cranky...


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## armyvern (5 Jul 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> Remember: over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength is posted to the NCR.  CFSU(O) supports more people than Winnipeg, Esquimalt or Petawawa (as I recall, only Valcartier and Halifax support more).
> ...



Statements like this always kill me ... the Op bases. We've got 8400 sets of clothing docs here that we provide support to on an ongoing basis. Ahhhh, but a whole lot of them are "students' ... so they never count them as "actually *posted* here and requiring support".  :

There's only one spot with more "individual docs" (ie customers) to support than us - and it's CFSU(O). I'd feel bad for them there if they actually had 90% of their customers living in the field and requireing frequent exchanges of stuff clothing actually stocks these days ...

Welcome to Gagetown, home to the largest Supply Coy in the country - there's a reason for that.


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## McG (6 Jul 2009)

Midnight Rambler said:
			
		

> By necessity, of course, would be a number of other “things” to be managed, but I would see them managed by the various force generators.  For example, such things and doctrine development and validation, sustainment, acquisition etc.  They would be responsible for recruiting into their various commands.  This not mean a case of naval recruitment centres competing with army recruitment centres.  Instead, the day-to-day recruitment would be done in conjunction with the other forces.  Instead, the navy is responsible to aid manning, etc of the recruitment centres, but they would also set the entry standards for their various “hard navy” trades.  So far, so good.


I'm not sure that re-entrenching environmental stovepipes is any better an idea than the .coms.  

We have a common scale to against which to measure applicants, but there are already different entrance requirements for the occupations which require them.  So, we don't need to complicate the recruiting process with environmental stovepipes.

Segregating the supply depots into environmental stovepipes will increase the drain on manpower (if new depots are opened) and greatly run up costs while draining efficiency & effectiveness (regardless of how it is done).  Chopping-up ADM(Mat) and dividing it into the ECSs would be even worse for draining manpower while running up costs & reducing performance (not that I don't think there isn't a lot of fat which could be trimmed in ADM(Mat)).   ... so, (again) we don't need to complicate sustainment with greater environmental stovepipes.  

I do agree that training, doctrine & requirements belong under the force generators and for the most part we have this right (but I was a little surprised to learn CANOSCOM has the lead for a lot of the Joint Engineering stuff).

There are probably a lot of improvements to be had through converging, merging & re-shuffling various L1s.  However, before stuffing more power, function & responsibility into the ECSs, I think we'd be better served with Joint amalgamations.


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## dapaterson (6 Jul 2009)

Vern:

The comment wasn't meant to downplay the work of the training bases, rather to highlight the disproportionate share of the Reg F that's nested in the National Capital Region (NCR).  Can we as a military afford to have over 10% of the trained strength lodged in a static, non-deployable HQ?

Or should we be working smarter?  Or should we install dis-incentives in the pay and benefits system to deter the growth of the HQs?

Imagine, if you would, a 15% reduction in the size of NDHQ - that's nearly 1000 Reg F PYs to reinvest across the board - it would help make many initiatives a reality.

Or we can do as we always do - take a PY here and a PY there and add them to Ottawa...


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## armyvern (7 Jul 2009)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Vern:
> 
> The comment wasn't meant to downplay the work of the training bases, rather to highlight the disproportionate share of the Reg F that's nested in the National Capital Region (NCR).  Can we as a military afford to have over 10% of the trained strength lodged in a static, non-deployable HQ?
> 
> ...



I understand that was not your intent.

My intent was to highlight the fact that it is a common fallacy accross the CF (even at the highest echelons) that Op bases such as Pet, Valacatraz (Pri 2 & 3 Units) are "the busiest after CFSU(O)" and have the most customers to support. That is simply NOT TRUE. We have 8600 customers here and everybody loves to forget that very imortant tidbit of fact. (Hmmm, figure out the size of the CF ... what does 8400 equal?? Damn, we're pretty close to CFSU(O) numbers hey??))  

This fallacy puts them higher on the manning list while we sit at Pri 6.

As the dot coms and HQs are deemed pri for staffing ... their posns are filled. Pri2 & 3s are also staffed first (as they are the Units who deploy ... and actually can be staffed over-PML because of that).  When there isn't enough bodies to fill all of those spots ... we lose our staff as the lowest pri for manning and thus sit at 72%. 

When there's extra bods sitting in HQs ... I have issues with that. The Ops Units HAVE to be like they are ... HQs do not. that'swhere we need to begin fixing the problems because the workload here and the stress on the support staff is absolutely uncalled for and assinine. Ergo the release rates. Something has to get fixed ... soon ... or the ability to support the "training" branch (CTC!!) is going to fall off the tree with one huge crash heard throughout the nation.


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## vonGarvin (7 Jul 2009)

Vern:
Amen to that.
To illustrate the absurdity of robbing from the training system, or at least, not giving it its fair due, consider this quote:


> Obviously General Balck as Corps commander did not receive enough replacement NCOs
> from the training base in Germany. This is an endemic problem in all armies in peace and
> war. His message seems to be that *you must select and train these key leaders even when their
> temporary absence hurts - and their training must not be interrupted, regardless of the
> emergency. In short, one must not eat the seed corn. *


(Source: GENERALS BALCK AND VON MELLENTHIN ON TACTICS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE
by General William DePuy (U.S. Army Ret.), BDM Corporation, December 1980
reproduced and edited by Reiner K. Huber, Universität der Bundeswehr München, December 2004)

Yes, front line units will argue that they can't afford to send people off; however, that is short term gain for long term pain, vice the short term pain for long term gain.


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