# Why is it Canadians do so well in battle?



## FormerHorseGuard

Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?

This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.


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## George Wallace

Depends on the Battles of which you look at.

Some are just due to pure unadulterated "luck".

Some due to our training and the amount of 'initiative' that we expect of our soldiers.

Some due to better technology - equipment, signals, etc.


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## Retired AF Guy

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?
> 
> This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.



Not all of our battles were successes,  Verrières Ridge being one notable example.


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## RedcapCrusader

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?
> 
> This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.



I suggests you read up on Beaumont-Hamel and Operation Totalize (Hill 140)... Despite the majority of our combat history being quite outstanding; there were some embarrassing defeats.


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## dimsum

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?
> 
> This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.



It's interesting you bring this up.  Being in Australia, you could replace "Canadian" with "ANZAC" in your paragraph and the exact same thing is said around ANZAC Day and Remembrance Day.  

I'm not saying one is better than the other, just noting the similarities (and I'm sure that the US, UK, etc. would have similar sentiments in the most part.)


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## cupper

One comment I heard many years ago in a discussion of the Canadian successes in WWI was that they didn't know the meaning of the work "Duck".

I suspect that a lot came from the Canadian sense of bravado and adventurism from being colonials, and not being under the old country sense of class and propriety.


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## daftandbarmy

I can't recall the name of the book but I once read an excellent comparison of the 'shock troops' of the Empire (Canada and Australia) with the British Army in WW1.

Why did we colonials do so well? Apparently, largely because we kept our (single) Corps up to strength, largely as a result of not having to take on the cost of fielding the gigantic armies forced upon the British. We were also able to 'negotiate' for more support as a result of the influence and support of national level leaders for relatively low level commanders e.g., Currie at Passchendaele was able to lever more artillery support out of the British.

The author (a former SNCO in the British Army himself) also argued that we were less constrained by the Officers' Mess class system and were more willing to CFR high performing, battle tested NCOs and soldiers. This resulted in more skilled and experienced battlefield level commanders. 

WW2? Copp's excellent book 'Cinderella Army' has a good warts and all description:

Copp's goal is to establish the reputation of the Canadian Army in the face of its international detractors who have 'underrated' the achievements of the Canadians and 'overrated' the effectiveness of the Germans in the last campaigns of the war. But his purpose does not include overlooking the mistakes and weaknesses of the Canadians. Indeed, he challenges the conventional wisdom that portrays the development of the Canadian Army in northwest Europe as a steady progression from an uneven and mistake-prone army in the weeks following D-Day into an efficient and tough fighting force by the end of the war. Copp argues, in fact, that the Canadian Army, despite its overall success, 'continued to experience both success and failure at the command, staff, and combat levels.'

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/university_of_toronto_quarterly/v077/77.1.mackenzie01.pdf


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## Old Sweat

There is no easy "one size fits all" answer, and the situation in the Great War was quite different to that in the Second World War. In the First World War the Canadian Corps progressed from one division to a two, then three and finally four division corps. In the process there were screw ups galore, but finally by the end of 1916 the Canadian Corps had gelled and the enthusiastic amateurism had been replaced by a professional attitude. The corps had matured under the leadership of LGen Julien Byng, a British officer, and a cadre of excellent British staff officers. From Vimy Ridge in April 1917 through to the end of the war it can be claimed that the corps did not lose a major battle, and some of the successes were spectacular.

In the Second War the army grew to full size without being committed to a major battle and most of the commanders were untested before they fought for the first time. Canadian generalship, with exceptions such as Simonds, Keefler and Hoffmeister, was not up to the standard of the Canadian Corps in 1918, but if the war had lasted another year this failing, in my opinion, would have been corrected.

In both wars the Canadians were not afraid to look for other solutions. Examples include in the First War, the development of machine guns as a weapon system and not just a support weapon and the Canadian Independent Force. In the Second War the major example was the armoured personnel carrier, but there also were the armoured engineer vehicle, the land mattress rocket system, the use of radar as a mortar locating system and the use of artillery firing from landing craft in support of amphibious assaults.

The screwups were primarily because of inexperience, along with the old boys club nature of the selection of senior officers who rose without time in battle to weed out the incompetent and the unlucky.


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## Edward Campbell

I agree with Old Sweat's comments, especially regarding the First World War. I would add that Canada's most significant contributions to the Second World War were not on the conventional, military battlefields. Our most significant contribution was, in fact, made by civilians, not soldiers. We moves from a minor industrial country to a global powerhouse in just over three years. We were a HUGE part, a disproportionately important part of Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy." Canada was blessed with some excellent industrial management (a far cry fro  today) and, of course, a government that, literally, "got out of the way." The second major contribution was in uniform but it was here, at home: the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The third most important contribution did involve combat: the Battle of the Atlantic was the only really decisive battle of the Second World War - as long as we won that, the Germans could have defeated the Russians, or vice versa for that matter, and the Anglo-American (and Canadian and Australian) 'world' would have been "safe." Canada's contribution was not always very effective - in, especially, 1941/42 we had too few qualified sailors in too many ships - our fast growing industrial capacity outstripped the RCN's capacity to recruit and train men and women. But: we had the ships and even when they were not doing as well as they could and should have they were doing most of what was needed. By 1943 the RCN was combat effective, _joint_ RCN/RCAF operations were beating back the Germans in the dreaded "black hole," and a Canadian, RAdm Leonard W Murray was in a _supreme_ or _theatre_ allied command position as Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic.

So, I would invite you to attach three faces to Canada in the Second World War:









CD Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, known as the "Minister of Everything" during the war, with a Canadian worker, notably a female. Air Marshal Robert Leckie, head of the BCATP 





and Rear Admiral Leonard Murray


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## Colin Parkinson

The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf


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## Old Sweat

Colin P said:
			
		

> The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12
> 
> http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf



Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower. 

At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious.


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## GR66

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower.
> 
> At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious.



Also this document claims to be based on some type of mathematical assessment of the various units.  The low numerical rating likely has much more to do with the relative size of the Canadian mechanized battle group compared to various Divisions with which it is being compared than any kind of qualitative comparison between them on a soldier to soldier basis.


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## Danjanou

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower.
> 
> At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious.



Add the MBTs in 1977 were technically WW2 Vintage ( first trialled in 1945) Centurians, the Leo 1s being a couple of years away, and all the sub units were under strength.  The Rifle Coys  and the Support weapons platoons ( ADP, Mortar etc) would rely on a quick flyover of mainly reservists to flesh them out 



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Also this document claims to be based on some type of mathematical assessment of the various units.  The low numerical rating likely has much more to do with the relative size of the Canadian mechanized battle group compared to various Divisions with which it is being compared than any kind of qualitative comparison between them on a soldier to soldier basis.



That is a factor as well. 4 CMBG was technically a Bde Group, albeit an understreagth  one, comparing it to a Division it will not come out favourably


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## daftandbarmy

These are good descriptions of why Canada did so well in the tough fight through NW Europe in WW2, earning the title 'Cinderella on the Left'

An excellent book by Terry Copp:

Cinderella Army: http://www.amazon.com/Cinderella-Army-Canadians-Northwest-1944-1945/dp/0802095224


An interesting film series:

Cinderella on the Left:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLAWYBwudZk


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## Old Sweat

I have been trying to get all this into "the big picture" and have a few points to offer. I have been studying Canada's wars/conflicts going back to the Fenian invasions of 1866, but without getting too deep into the Great War. Recently I have been trying to fill that gap. There are, to my mind, a few recurring themes:

a. good discipline with an emphasis on the important stuff. I know we have all met the stereotypical sergeant major types who infest the rear areas, but battlefield discipline has almost uniformly been intelligent and effective.

b. it might be the climate and a national personality that accepts there is no such thing as good weather, but there seems to be an attitude of not giving in and not getting into too much self pity.

c. a desire of mastery of the craft seems to be in our military DNA.

d. we realize we are not going to get much publicity or recognition from our Allies who have much larger military and publicity machines as well as well developed national egos. If you read _The Longest Day_ or saw the movie taken from the book, you could be excused for not knowing Canadians were part of the Normandy Invasion. So, as Herbert Farlie Wood wrote in _The Private War of Jacket Coates_, his Korean War novel, we just hunker down, check out the local females and get on with the task at hand. 

We all can no doubt quote examples that disprove this, but in general I sincerely believe my points are valid. I might add that our non-mobilized force, that is the one that existed except for 1914-1919 and 1939-1945, has had to struggle to against governmental neglect and public indifference, and maybe that has something to do with the above factors. Certainly, there is something akin to a military sub-culture with many members being second generation or more career service members.


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## reccecrewman

As far as WWI goes, as was mentioned earlier, LGen Sir Julien Byng was an exceptional leader of the Canadian Corps.  When he handed over the reins of I Cdn Corps to LGen Sir Arthur Currie, Currie inherited a professional cohesive force.  As a Canadian himself, Currie knew he didn't have the manpower at his disposal as did the other major combatants.  He genuinely cared about the men in his command and had no interest in engaging in battles of attrition because he knew Canada couldn't easily refill depleted ranks.  He made meticulous battle plans for his Corps and the preparations were painstaking.  Down to the lowest ranks, maps and orders were given so that even Privates and Lance Corporals could continue on with their mission if NCO's and Officers fell in battle.  Currie also implemented a policy of battle rehearsals in which Units were given the opportunity to practice their assaults in safety of the rear and sandtable maps were created so all men could visually see their objectives and how the Units on their flanks were going to operate.  Right down to the Section level, the men knew exactly what their objectives were.  This was unheard of in other Armies.

The only other Army in WWI that was comparable was the ANZAC Corps, and their reasons for success mirrored ours.  In fact, had WWI dragged on into 1919, many sources speculate the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to replace Gen. Sir Douglas Haig as the overall commander of the entire BEF with Sir Arthur Currie as he had grown tired of Gen. Haig's Generalship of the BEF.


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## Fishbone Jones

reccecrewman said:
			
		

> The only other Army in WWI that was comparable was the ANZAC Corps, and their reasons for success mirrored ours.  In fact, had WWI dragged on into 1919, many sources speculate the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to replace Gen. Sir Douglas Haig as the overall commander of the entire BEF with Sir Arthur Currie as he had grown tired of Gen. Haig's Generalship of the BEF.



Source?


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## Old Sweat

Both the Canadian and the ANZAC Corps had one advantage that the other Corps in the BEF did not enjoy. The two colonial corps were in effect national armies of fixed composition and did not suffer from playing musical divisions. The BEF tended to leave corps in one location so the commander and staff would become familiar with local conditions and supposedly could then better adapt newly attached divisions to the peculiarities of that section of the front.

Continuity was also a factor for the Canadian Corps. Sir Arthur Currie, his four divisional commanders and his gunner had all fought at 2nd Ypres in April 1915. This corporate cross-pollination could only have worked to the advantage of the corps as a whole. A large number of the brigade commanders and CsRA also fell into this category, which was quite different from the situation in First Canadian Army in the Second World War. (I have not researched the sappers, but suspect it may also have been true for them.) Perhaps the only general who had not a lot of time with the corps was Brigadier General RH Massie, who commanded the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery, and he held his position from January 1917 to October 1918 when he was invalided back to the UK.


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## reccecrewman

recceguy said:
			
		

> Source?



I don't want to infringe on any possible copyrights, so I'll direct you to David Lloyd George's personal war diary. Page 1,367.  It's open to interpretation, but how many other Dominion Generals could he be referring to? Possibly Monash for sure.  Open to debate I guess.


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## daftandbarmy

Because we were 'Not glamorous, but effective'

http://web.viu.ca/davies/H355H.Cda.WWI/Canadians%20and%20the%20Set%20Piece%20Attack%20(1994.pdf


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## reccecrewman

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> the Battle of the Atlantic was the only really decisive battle of the Second World



Not so  sure I agree with this assessment. To call The Battle of the Atlantic the ONLY decisive battle of the WWII is, in my opinion anyway, false.  There's a very strong argument that says 4 others fall into the "decisive" category. The Battle of France, The Battle of Britain, Stalingrad & Kursk.  The Battle of France was a decisive battle for Germany.  The German Army swept through Belgium & The Netherlands (Evidently, the Allies forgot they did the exact same thing 26 years earlier) outflanking the Maginot Line and causing the BEF which had taken up a position in North Eastern France on the French Army's left flank to head North to face the German Army head on. This move allowed the German's to take advantage of the gap in the Allied line by crashing through the Ardennes which cut the Allied armies in two and pinned the BEF against the English Channel.  The Germans launched a final offensive that captured Paris and caused the BEF to evacuate at Dunkirk.  Despite having less numbers committed to battle than the French and British Armies combined, the Germans still managed a spectacular, decisive victory in less than four weeks.

The Battle of Britain was also decisive.  The Luftwaffe initially began bombing British airfields and factories vital to the war effort, but switched tactics and went with terror bombing such as the London Blitz and the razing of Coventry.  This shift in focus on the German side allowed the RAF to get up off the mat and ultimately prevail in a decisive victory against the Luftwaffe.  Had the Germans kept their focus on airfields and infrastructure, Hitler never would have had to postpone and then cancel Op Sealion.  Had Germany succeeded in invading Britain, the U.S, British & Canadian forces would have lost that all important staging area to enable them to invade Normandy in 1944.  The U.S would have been hard pressed to continue the war against Germany from the other side of the Atlantic.  The Battle of Britain must also be considered a decisive Allied victory.

Stalingrad & the Kursk were decisive as well.  The outcomes of these two major battles broke the back of the German Army and after Kursk, the Germans were on the run.  Their ultimate defeat only a matter of time.  The sheer volume of tanks and guns lost by the German Army (not to mention men) were gone forever, with no ability to replace them.  Despite the Red Army also losing a large number of tanks and guns, their industries were able to continue production on a large scale.  Stalingrad and Kursk also deserve recognition as decisive battles of WWII.  

There are a few more that could certainly make the list, but these four were battles that were visible turning points in the war, which to me, makes a battle decisive.  When a major battle concludes that leaves one side in a clear cut position of superiority over the other, that makes it decisive.

I just realised that the course of this thread has completely veered off course from it's original intent. My apologies and let's steer this back on topic.


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## jeffb

Don't forget the Pacific Theater battles. The Battle of Midway and The Battle of the Philippine Sea (The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) both destroyed the IJN and effectively sealed the fate of Japan.


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## Old Sweat

Talking about the Pacific, I would also give at least an honourable mention to the US submarine campaign. After a slow start because of defective torpedoes and poorly conceived tactics, the submariners effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet and much of the IJN, thus slowly strangling the home islands and isolating the various garrisons in the lands overrun in the offensive rampage of the first few months of the Pacific War.


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## Edward Campbell

My definition of "decisive" is that if the battle (campaign) was lost then the war was, _de facto_, also lost. 

reccecrewman explains it well in relation to the European Theatre of Operations: " Had Germany succeeded in invading Britain, the U.S, British & Canadian forces would have lost that all important staging area to enable them to invade Normandy in 1944.  The U.S would have been hard pressed to continue the war against Germany from the other side of the Atlantic."

But I would go further, without resupply from North America, i.e. if Germany could have won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941/42 (when they had the best chance) then Britain, and everyone in it, would have been starved into submission. Resupply of Russia, from the Atlantic, would have been impossible. The war would have been over.

(Some historians have argued that in late '41/early '42, had Germany broken our convoys Britain _might_ have been able to sue for peace and the Germans, being focused on Russia, might have agreed ~ Hitler was, after all, appears to have been a tiny bit of an _Anglophile_.)

But even with a 'honourable' pace the war would have been lost and it is very, Very, VERY difficult to imagine how America might have managed to invade North Africa and then Europe without the British 'home base.'






Only one of the Op _Torch_ forces came directly from North America - the trip was just, plain too long for the transports of the day.

I therefore invite you to consider each battle with *my definition* of 'decisive:' if we had lost (Battle of Britain, Kursk, even Midway) would the war be lost? Battle of the Atlantic? Yes, it was a must win, I would argue the only "must win."

          *"The Battle of the Atlantic was the only thing that ever frightened me"*
           Winston Churchill


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## jeffb

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> My definition of "decisive" is that if the battle (campaign) was lost then the war was, _de facto_, also lost.



I tend to define "decisive" in the positive rather then the negative. That is, rather than the loss of a battle resulting in the loss of the war, a decisive battle is one in which winning the battle leads to victory in the war. I think that my understanding of this term is probably shaped by readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who tend to look at war from the perspective of how to win them rather then how not to loose them. However, I think your definition has merit if for no other reason then a decisive win for one side is a decisive loss for the other. Taking it's root, I guess the most appropriate definition is that a decisive battle forces a decision in the war. The ideas of defeat or victory exists independently of the battle itself. 

It's using this definition that I think that Battle of the Atlantic, Philippine Sea, Midway, Stalingrad, etc as being decisive.


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## Chispa

Unfortunately not always the case, many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. Like mentioned VR aka Op. Atlantic & Spring in the SWW, not counting “Black Friday,” where the remnants of the CDN Black Watch staggered back to the start-line.

Overall in the F & SWW, Canada’s citizen soldier provided credence that a professional Army was not needed, especially when U have heart and guts, that’s why they were dubbed in the FWW as, “Shock Army of the British Empire.”

Just my thoughts


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## a_majoor

Colin P said:
			
		

> The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12
> 
> http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf



I don't remember the reference, but I recall that the Soviets always had a mania for reducing everything to "Objective Factors" (i.e. boiling everything down to numeric values). People who played traditional wargames like Squad Leader (or other titles from Avalon Hill, SPI or GDW) will be familier with the idea. Each unit was represented by a game counter with various factors expressed in numeric form. (The attached picture isn't from Squad Leader, but should give you the idea).

I suspect if the Soviet planners had added a number for "morale" the results might have been somewhat different.


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## Chispa

jeffb said:
			
		

> I tend to define "decisive" in the positive rather then the negative. That is, rather than the loss of a battle resulting in the loss of the war, a decisive battle is one in which winning the battle leads to victory in the war. I think that my understanding of this term is probably shaped by readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who tend to look at war from the perspective of how to win them rather then how not to loose them. However, I think your definition has merit if for no other reason then a decisive win for one side is a decisive loss for the other. Taking it's root, I guess the most appropriate definition is that a decisive battle forces a decision in the war. The ideas of defeat or victory exists independently of the battle itself.
> 
> It's using this definition that I think that Battle of the Atlantic, Philippine Sea, Midway, Stalingrad, etc as being decisive.




I'll add Waterloo to your pot: Battles are won and lost by both sides, however the meaning of a “decisive battle,” tends to be of importance: According too Wiki etc., often by bringing hostilities to an end, furthermore other sources have a difference in opinion in the matter.


The term decisive victory refers to a military victory in battle that definitively resolves the objective being fought over, ending one stage of the conflict and beginning another stage.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decisive_victory


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## Blackadder1916

Chispa said:
			
		

> . . . many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. . . .



While I understand lumping the actions of the Newfoundland Regiment into this discussion of "Canadian" military prowess, I would be remiss if I failed to remind all that Newfoundlanders of that era (and of the later World War) *were not Canadians* and likely did not want to be.  I had recently come across some old news clippings online (can't find them right now, but will keep looking) that reported the reaction of Newfoundlanders who were in Britain early in the Second World War when they were called Canadians.  They weren't pleased.  While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.


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## Bird_Gunner45

Chispa said:
			
		

> Unfortunately not always the case, many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. Like mentioned VR aka Op. Atlantic & Spring in the SWW, not counting “Black Friday,” where the remnants of the CDN Black Watch staggered back to the start-line.
> 
> Overall in the F & SWW, Canada’s citizen soldier provided credence that a professional Army was not needed, especially when U have heart and guts, that’s why they were dubbed in the FWW as, “Shock Army of the British Empire.”
> 
> Just my thoughts



For the sake of historical accuracy and argument, you have to put the term "shock army" into its historical place, particularly when we discuss Canadian contributions in the first world war.

Arguably Canada's reputation as the "shock troops of the British Empire" was cemented during the last 100 days of the war as the Canadians and Australians spearheaded the commonwealths thrust into German lines, ultimately resulting in the Nov 11 armistice.

However, in examination of these events one has to keep in mind 2 key factors that led to the Canadians spearheading this advance.

1. Canada was not engaged in the "Michael" offensives of the German Army. The Michael offensive struck at the British, French, and Portuguese lines in early 1918, shattering many British and allied units. To stop this advance, the allied high command used British, French, and US reserves to break up the offensive. The Canadians and Australians played no role in the defence against the attack, meaning that they were the best prepared to lead a follow along attack (with the US playing a key role as well).

2. The Canadian Corps consisted of 4 Divisions. While seemingly trivial, the decision to maintian the Canadian Corps at 4 divisions was critical in maintaining Canadian (and australian) combat effectiveness. Prior to 1918, the British and French had by and large adopted a Corps structure of 2 Division/Corps due to losses. While the idea of breaking the  Canadian corps into 2 x Corps of 2 x Divisions each (with 5 Div under General Garnett Hughes remaining in England as a replacement pool) was popular amongst Sr Canadian officials who saw it as a way of creating the 1 Cdn Army (so, some things never change!) the 4 division structure was maintained largely due to logistical pressures on the ground. This meant that 1 Corps had the effective fighting strength of a British or French Army sized force (and German, who had also adopted a 2 Div/Corps structure). 

This meant that the Canadian Corps, rested and fully manned, was thrust into an inferior manned, ill equipped, and morale destroyed enemy. As was the case with the rest of WW1 (actually more so, as the 100 days had the highest casualty rates/day of any battle except for the opening battles of the war) the Canadian corps won largely based on attrition, with the Germans giving ground by adopting a Delay operation with the hopes of establishing more defensible positions nearer to Germany for logistical and political reasons (it was thought that the German Army could help to instill strength in a war weary and starving German populace). 

There is also evidence that supports the notion of Canada and Australia being declared the "shock armies of the British Empire" to be politically motivated. In sum, there is evidence that states that some British statesmen "talked up" British commonwealth army performances as a means of motivation for the colonies to continue to provide troops and weapons as a means of pride (and to limit the amount of casualties in the British army, they did have to win an election afterall, and mass casualties is a hard line to run on, even in those days). 

Certainly Canadians performed exceptional deeds during WW1 (and to a lesser extent WW2 where Canadian military performance is far more debatable) but this cannot just be given to the natural fighting spirit of Canadian citizens that proved that a professional army was not necessary. In fact, in most ways it proved the opposite. The Canadian (and British, French, US, German, etc) citizen armies that went into battle suffered horrendous casualties due to their unprofessional nature. It was only after these forces had been bled and professionalized that they became effective fighting units. The Militia myth is a myth, despite what we were all taught in high school.


----------



## Chispa

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> While I understand lumping the actions of the Newfoundland Regiment into this discussion of "Canadian" military prowess, I would be remiss if I failed to remind all that Newfoundlanders of that era (and of the later World War) *were not Canadians* and likely did not want to be.  I had recently come across some old news clippings online (can't find them right now, but will keep looking) that reported the reaction of Newfoundlanders who were in Britain early in the Second World War when they were called Canadians.  They weren't pleased.  While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.




That's true in FWW & SWW Newfoundland was not part of Canada, though Newfounladers joined CEF Batt'.s etc., only part of CF post 1949.


----------



## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> I don't remember the reference, but I recall that the Soviets always had a mania for reducing everything to "Objective Factors" (i.e. boiling everything down to numeric values). People who played traditional wargames like Squad Leader (or other titles from Avalon Hill, SPI or GDW) will be familier with the idea. Each unit was represented by a game counter with various factors expressed in numeric form. (The attached picture isn't from Squad Leader, but should give you the idea).
> 
> I suspect if the Soviet planners had added a number for "morale" the results might have been somewhat different.


You had me at "Squad Leader" 




Actually, the "Canadian Separate Mechanized Battle Group" (sic) is rated rather well.  As a brigade, it's at 0.20. An East German Tank Division, for example is rated at 0.72.  With 4 regiments in an East German tank division, and with those regiments roughly equal to a Canadian Brigade in size (slightly larger in actuality, about 90 tanks compared to our 59 tanks, 3 infantry battalions of 3 companies each, compared to our two battalions of four companies each), one would expect that tank division to be better than 4 times the 0.20, especially given divisional arty, etc.  Based on raw data, that division ought to be at least worth 5 times a brigade.  Instead, it's not.

And yes, I have some literature at home that spells out how the Soviets did it, and the Russians still do.  And contrary to popular myth, the Soviet Army was able to outsmart the Germans time and time again.

(check out "Operation Bagration")

Cheers


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## Rocky Mountains

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.



In WWI, I would say the majority served in Newfoundland forces.  The status of the Dominion of Newfoundland was no different than the Dominion of Canada.

Prior to WWII it had relinquished Dominion status but served in two distinct artillery regiments in the British Army plus in the RAF and RN.


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## Chispa

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> For the sake of historical accuracy and argument, you have to put the term "shock army" into its historical place, particularly when we discuss Canadian contributions in the first world war.
> 
> Arguably Canada's reputation as the "shock troops of the British Empire" was cemented during the last 100 days of the war as the Canadians and Australians spearheaded the commonwealths thrust into German lines, ultimately resulting in the Nov 11 armistice.
> 
> 
> There is also evidence that supports the notion of Canada and Australia being declared the "shock armies of the British Empire" to be politically motivated. In sum, there is evidence that states that some British statesmen "talked up" British commonwealth army performances as a means of motivation for the colonies to continue to provide troops and weapons as a means of pride (and to limit the amount of casualties in the British army, they did have to win an election afterall, and mass casualties is a hard line to run on, even in those days).
> 
> Certainly Canadians performed exceptional deeds during WW1 (and to a lesser extent WW2 where Canadian military performance is far more debatable) but this cannot just be given to the natural fighting spirit of Canadian citizens that proved that a professional army was not necessary. In fact, in most ways it proved the opposite. The Canadian (and British, French, US, German, etc) citizen armies that went into battle suffered horrendous casualties due to their unprofessional nature. It was only after these forces had been bled and professionalized that they became effective fighting units. The Militia myth is a myth, despite what we were all taught in high school.





Thank you for clarifying and the heads up etc., Russell Ward states: Australian and Canadians Div’s., while in France, “quickly dubbed the best shock troops.” The dictionary etc., claims the term shock troops are: Soldiers specially chosen, armed and trained to lead an attack.

My understanding some CDN Batt’s, early during the war though citizen soldiers, held their ground while others suffered. Your comment on the term being politically motivated etc., holds water. 

There are claims Shock Army was labelled by one Historian: Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War.
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-203-2-2007-eng.pdf


In the Ottawa Citizen Sibley interviewed Cook, on Canadian soldiers in the Great War: The ‘shock army’ of the British Empire.

Q. What made Canadian troops so successful in many battles — “shock troops,” as you say in one of your books — when the British and the French weren’t able to accomplish their objectives?

A. The Canadian Corps was involved in some of the most difficult battles — Vimy, Hill 70, Passchendaele. The British prime minister at the time, David Lloyd George, referred to the Canadian Corps, as the “shock army of the British Empire.” But to some degree it’s unfair to compare the Canadian Corps to others.
One thing to recognize is that our Corps always fought together, it was homogeneous. British corps were not; different divisions cycled through them. By the end of the war, the British as well as the Germans acknowledged that keeping a corps as the primary fighting army had great advantages. The soldiers came to know one another, to work together, pool resources — machine-guns, mortars, artillery. All of this helped the Canadians to learn more effectively, to learn the lessons of each battle, and to fight more effectively in the next battle.
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/canadian-soldiers-in-the-great-war-the-shock-army-of-the-british-empire


My question is on the term, in your opinion; ‘shock army’ or ‘shock troops’?


In the spirit of historical accuracy and argument: It’s also my understanding the term WWI & II is American terminology invited by the New York Times in 1939, while Great War though used early during FWW applies to the Napoleonic War’s. Prior to 1939 Americans used the term World War, while First World War derives from Lt.-Col. C.C. Repington, popularised the term in 1920.


As for the Militia Myths, there are way too many inaccuracies etc., in books.


Thank you for your time.

Joseph.


----------



## Chispa

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> In WWI, I would say the majority served in Newfoundland forces.  The status of the Dominion of Newfoundland was no different than the Dominion of Canada.
> 
> Prior to WWII it had relinquished Dominion status but served in two distinct artillery regiments in the British Army plus in the RAF and RN.




From what I seen in the nominal roll of FC CEF etc., many next of kin, born in NFL.

Joseph


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## Eland2

Technoviking said:
			
		

> You had me at "Squad Leader"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Actually, the "Canadian Separate Mechanized Battle Group" (sic) is rated rather well.  As a brigade, it's at 0.20. An East German Tank Division, for example is rated at 0.72.  With 4 regiments in an East German tank division, and with those regiments roughly equal to a Canadian Brigade in size (slightly larger in actuality, about 90 tanks compared to our 59 tanks, 3 infantry battalions of 3 companies each, compared to our two battalions of four companies each), one would expect that tank division to be better than 4 times the 0.20, especially given divisional arty, etc.  Based on raw data, that division ought to be at least worth 5 times a brigade.  Instead, it's not.
> 
> And yes, I have some literature at home that spells out how the Soviets did it, and the Russians still do.  And contrary to popular myth, the Soviet Army was able to outsmart the Germans time and time again.
> 
> (check out "Operation Bagration")
> 
> Cheers



Well, one reason, arguably, why some of the Warsaw Pact (i.e. non-Soviet) forces may have had relatively low ratings is due to their potential political reliability in wartime. 

I remember reading something recently that discussed how Polish forces almost mobilized against the Russians back in the days when Lech Walesa and his Solidarnosc movement were stirring things up and the Russians were seriously considering employing military force to put a halt to the 
surge in democratic feeling and action.

The reason why the Russians ultimately did nothing was because they were only too aware that the Poles had developed a reputation as ferocious fighters during the Second World War and were prepared to carry on that tradition. The Russians were probably also afraid that if the Poles openly revolted, other Pact states would follow suit, and they would be facing a situation they could not control, and would also invite NATO intervention that would effectively take away the initiative from Soviet occupation forces. I've often felt that if war had broken out between NATO and the USSR anytime in the 1960 - 1989 period, the Poles would quite likely have defected and joined NATO forces anyway.

The East Germans also had suspect political reliability, and this was quite evident in the late 1980s. Erich Honecker, who ruled over East Germany at the time, had to start opening the borders and let East Germans travel more freely because there was a real risk that if he didn't, East Germans might revolt as well. He was also aware that the East German military and police forces were not equipped, and possibly unwilling to handle large-scale civil unrest without Soviet assistance - a tall order given that the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) would probably have been substantially tied up in dealing with a Polish revolt.


----------



## Rocky Mountains

Chispa said:
			
		

> In the spirit of historical accuracy and argument: It’s also my understanding the term WWI & II is American terminology invited by the New York Times in 1939, while Great War though used early during FWW applies to the Napoleonic War’s. Prior to 1939 Americans used the term World War, while First World War derives from Lt.-Col. C.C. Repington, popularised the term in 1920.
> 
> Joseph.



Some, but not all, Canadians seem to prefer Great War and Second World War.

I've never had anyone not know what I am talking about with WWI and WWII.


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## Eland2

Hitler was believed to have said, "Give me British officers, Canadian NCOs, and American technology, and I can rule the world." So perhaps the quality of training and discipline Canadian soldiers get might help explain why Canada's small army tends to punch well above its weight.


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## dimsum

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Hitler was believed to have said, "Give me British officers, Canadian NCOs, and American technology, and I can rule the world." So perhaps the quality of training and discipline Canadian soldiers get might help explain why Canada's small army tends to punch well above its weight.



As British PM David Lloyd George's biography states (and I've mentioned this before):

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George claimed to his biographer that had the war continued into 1919, he would have sought to replace Field Marshal Haig with Canadian General Arthur Currie, with Australian General John Monash as Currie's chief of staff.

Not sure how that would have gone with the British "hierarchy" at the time, both being Colonials and Militia officers pre-war.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Why?

IMHO because, mainly, since 1812 we have been able to pick and choose how and when to engage in battle. 

Because our homeland has never been threatened, in effect, unlike the European powers who engaged in the 1st and 2nd European Civil Wars, we have been able to fight under our own terms. 

BZ for Peace Island a.k.a. North America


----------



## Eland2

Dimsum said:
			
		

> As British PM David Lloyd George's biography states (and I've mentioned this before):
> 
> British Prime Minister David Lloyd George claimed to his biographer that had the war continued into 1919, he would have sought to replace Field Marshal Haig with Canadian General Arthur Currie, with Australian General John Monash as Currie's chief of staff.
> 
> *Not sure how that would have gone with the British "hierarchy" at the time, both being Colonials and Militia officers pre-war.*



It wouldn't have gone well at all. A storm of protest would likely have emerged from the British officer corps, and it wouldn't have been surprising to see them go above George's head and make a direct appeal to the King to have George's decision reversed if what he proposed had come to pass.

Currie always struck me as an intelligent, fairly humble and compassionate man, who, like many Canadian soldiers of his day and in succeeding decades, sought not glory or kudos but only to do a job, and do it right. Currie's genius lay not in applying the sophisticated and somewhat esoteric military tactics espoused by many generals of his era, but in looking at Vimy Ridge as a problem to be solved, and then figuring out what resources needed to be supplied, and how to apply them in a logical, methodical manner to achieve the intended aim. 

It still amazes me at times to think that Currie was a simple school teacher and later a businessman before he became a soldier, but sometimes greatness comes from humble beginnings.


----------



## TCBF

- Most Canadians who fought in the CEF had British accents. They may have felt themselves 'Canadian' but only in the context of the colonies being British. Only by Nov 1918 was 51% of the CEF Canadian born.

- The CEF was provided with superb British commanders and staff officers. It took two years until the Canadian corps began to perform consistently. Politics led to the loss of a good British Corps Commander (Alderson) and the retention of some Canadian leaders of questionable talents. 

- In my mind, Lloyd George was a war criminal (of sorts): he withheld reinforcements to the BEF as he felt troops were being squandered. This led to a reorganization of the BEF just as it was taking over miles of frontage from the French. The reorganization was disruptive and incomplete and the former French part of the line still relatively 'undeveloped' when the Germans launched their "Kaiserschlacht" on 21 March 1918.

- We have a lot of myths here in Canada. Fact is, we are no better at combat than any other group. As well: wars are won by people who show up - our efforts were never sustainable without conscription. Could we do that again?  The current generation may not run to the colours as quickly as their great-grandfathers, and it remains to be seen if the new sub-cultures will swamp the recruiting offices like the 'traditional' founding nations did. One could not blame some families from pointing at their names on the headstones in far flung places, and pointing out that their families have given enough in the last two hundred years, and maybe it is time for some of the new blood to shed some new blood for Canada.

- Many other countries have weathered brutal occupations and come out of it in one piece. Is that not a form of combat? Would Canadians resist? We have yet to prove our mettle in that regard. We might come out of such a trial as two countries, or three.


----------



## Canuck_Jock

The subject of combat effectiveness of Commonwealth divisions, as well as reputation of all divisions, was covered by Richard Holmes in 'Tommy' (pp.180-82). The issue is more complex than first appearance and many, Guards, Scots, Highland Divisions for example, made claims of eliteism.  A couple of useful quotes:

"The most common belief is that British divisions were uniformly useless and Dominion formations were all first rate.  But the evidence of fighting quality is less clear-cut than is suggested..."

Further, " A scholarly examination of the detailed performance of a sample of fifty divisions in the last Hundred Days of the war concluded that: 'in general, ten British divisions performed at least as well as - and in some cases partly better than - the leading six or seven Dominion divisions." (Latter quoted from Peter Simpkins). "Success depended very much on the ability of the division's cadre to convert a flood of reinforcements into useful soldiers."

It should also be noted that, due to reorganisation in early 1918, UK divisions went down from 12 to 9 infantry battalions, effectively a quarter smaller.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Currie always struck me as an intelligent, fairly humble and compassionate man, who, like many Canadian soldiers of his day and in succeeding decades, sought not glory or kudos but only to do a job, and do it right. Currie's genius lay not in applying the sophisticated and somewhat esoteric military tactics espoused by many generals of his era, but in looking at Vimy Ridge as a problem to be solved, and then figuring out what resources needed to be supplied, and how to apply them in a logical, methodical manner to achieve the intended aim.
> 
> It still amazes me at times to think that Currie was a simple school teacher and later a businessman before he became a soldier, but sometimes greatness comes from humble beginnings.



Some points- 

1. Gen Arthur Currie was not the commander of the Canadian Corps for the battle of Vimy Ridge. That honour was held by the Rt Hon Julian Byng, a VERY British commander who was sent to the Canadian Corps in order to "sort it out" so to speak. Interestingly, Byng initially saw this assignment as a punishment and attempted to get a different assignment. This is also why General Byng held the title "1st Viscount of Vimy". Julian Byng went on to become the Governor General of Canada but is probably more known for the hockey trophy his wife gave to the NHL. The belief that Currie commanded the Cdn Corps vice a division at Vimy is perhaps the greatest error many make when discussing the battle. No doubt, currie learned from Byng and adapted his style of preparation.

2. General Currie, despite the longings of historical revisionists, was highly unlikely to command the Imperial forces. In reality, he was little respected by the soldiers of the Canadian Corps and by many in the Imperial high command due to his appearance. A great deal of first hand evidence indicates that many Canadian soldiers felt that he was a butcher and held a great deal of contempt towards their commander (also note the lack of popular response to the criticisms Currie faced after the war about being a butcher from the press and his lack of involvement in veterans groups- silence is sometimes the best indicator!). Unfortunately for him he also had a poor report with the soldiers as he lacked charisma and did not "look the part of a soldier".

3. The Canadian Corps maintained a large cadre of British staff officers until the end of the war, a fact that is much forgotten today.

Arthur Currie was a successful officer no doubt, but his rise to the top of the Imperial charts would always have been stunted.


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## Chispa

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> Some, but not all, Canadians seem to prefer Great War and Second World War.
> 
> I've never had anyone not know what I am talking about with WWI and WWII.




True, 90% of Canadians are aware of WWI & II vs FWW GW, however LAC, CWM, DHH started religiously using FWW some years ago, post complaints received.  Though on LAC, etc., sublinks on pictures, documents you’ll see WWI & II, just like the spelling which at times is very American.

Parts of the world, Canada, owing to the influence of popular media, aka the APM, we are aware of more American War History then our own.

When my narrative is on Canadian, Commonwealth accounts I use FWW & SWW, on American accounts I use World War used pre 1945 By Gov, or WWI, and WWII.

In old Canadian books from 1920-30 seen the term "Great World War" used.


Joseph


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## cupper

Chispa said:
			
		

> In old Canadian books from 1920-30 seen the term "Great World War" used.



That would be because the Second World War hadn't happened yet.


----------



## Molloy91

Eland2 said:
			
		

> Hitler was believed to have said, "Give me British officers, Canadian NCOs, and American technology, and I can rule the world." So perhaps the quality of training and discipline Canadian soldiers get might help explain why Canada's small army tends to punch well above its weight.


Sir Winston Churchill said that.


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## TCBF

Molloy91 said:
			
		

> Sir Winston Churchill said that.



- Prpaganda. Cite?


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## mariomike

TCBF said:
			
		

> - Prpaganda. Cite?



I don't know who said it. But, I've read it ( in various forms ) on here enough times.

"Give me German Officers, British NCO's and Canadian troops and I will win this war!"

Feldmarschal Rommel
source Die Wehrmacht Kreigbuch 43/44
http://army.ca/forums/threads/85581/post-835773#msg835773
 Reply #18


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## Molloy91

mariomike said:
			
		

> I don't know who said it. But, I've read it ( in various forms ) on here enough times.
> 
> "Give me German Officers, British NCO's and Canadian troops and I will win this war!"
> 
> Feldmarschal Rommel
> source Die Wehrmacht Kreigbuch 43/44
> http://army.ca/forums/threads/85581/post-835773#msg835773
> Reply #18



Yeah it probably has been said many different ways. I read in a book Churchill said "If I had Canadian soldiers, American technology and British officers I could rule the world."


----------



## Treemoss

Pretty much echoing what everyone has said.

Canadian troops, US tech, and British officers  8).



I think it's because we're not a super populated country and our military isn't that large, so we're required to train our troops extremely well. An Infantry officer Captain and myself talked a bit about it. He said that "we don't have a gigantic resource pool like other countries have, and we need to use what we have efficiently, so to compensate we train what we have to the best they can be".


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## Osotogari

I have no doubt Canada's almost universal success is a direct result of the slavish adherence to cutting-edge doctrine as taught by the ever-relevant infantry school at CTC Gagetown!   :facepalm:


----------



## brihard

Osotogari said:
			
		

> I have no doubt Canada's almost universal success is a direct result of the slavish adherence to cutting-edge doctrine as taught by the ever-relevant infantry school at CTC Gagetown!   :facepalm:



The Judo guy made a funny!  ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

An interesting article that reflects the reality of a balance between 'good' and 'bad':

When we construct a Canadian memory of the Italian campaign, there is room for examples of operational and tactical effectiveness, individual courage and a significant contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany.  There are however other stories that need to be told about the nature, purposes and cost of the campaign.  In 1994, I was presenting a paper at a conference in Edinburgh and was able to meet the Scottish poet Hamish Henderson who wrote 3/3 of the original version of the D-Day Dodgers.  He sang it for us in a light tenor voice, by the last verse we were all in tears.

If you look around the mountains

In the mud and rain

You’ll find scattered crosses

Some which bear no name

Heartbreak and toil and suffering gone

The boys beneath them slumber on

For they’re the D-Day Dodgers

Who stayed in Italy

http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/some-reflections-on-the-italian-campaign-terry-copp-keynote-2010-military-history-colloquuim/


----------



## MSmith

Dimsum said:
			
		

> It's interesting you bring this up.  Being in Australia, you could replace "Canadian" with "ANZAC" in your paragraph and the exact same thing is said around ANZAC Day and Remembrance Day.
> 
> I'm not saying one is better than the other, just noting the similarities (and I'm sure that the US, UK, etc. would have similar sentiments in the most part.)



  I think this is closest to the truth, not necessarily that the Canadians are the best fighting troops but that is the patriotic perception? As a Canadian I'd love to believe that we are the most formidable fighting force in the world but I don't think you could attribute our success in wars to being Canadian alone. As others have said there are plenty of examples where we did not succeed or were utterly defeated.


----------



## Fhrosty

I would honestly think that our Canadian Soldiers are always on top because, well, 
not only do we thrive to give our people the best of the best,
but we seem to thrive to make things right.

We fight for our friends, for our families, and our neighbors.

We, as a country, fight together, no matter the fight,
we stand strong together.

In the face of a war, it is not only one that can win,
but the entire brotherhood, that will walk out in victory.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fhrosty said:
			
		

> I would honestly think that our Canadian Soldiers are always on top because, well,
> not only do we thrive to give our people the best of the best,
> but we seem to thrive to make things right.
> 
> We fight for our friends, for our families, and our neighbors.
> 
> _*We, as a country, fight together, no matter the fight,
> we stand strong together.*_
> 
> In the face of a war, it is not only one that can win,
> but the entire brotherhood, that will walk out in victory.



I beg to differ... the conscription crises of both World Wars showed us that we really aren't all that 'together' when the poop really hits the propeller.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_Crisis_of_1917

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_Crisis_of_1944


----------



## McG

... And I don't think all our resources are "the best of the best."


----------

