# Investigators 'Baffled' by Sea King Engine Fires on March 7 2007



## Bruce Monkhouse

By Murray Brewster, THE CANADIAN PRESS
      
OTTAWA - Two of the navy's aging Sea King helicopters suffered debilitating engine fires on the same day aboard different warships under circumstances that flight safety investigators are at loss to explain. 
A preliminary investigation suggests the No. 2 engines on both aircraft overheated because they were inexplicably sprayed with fresh water, clogging air compressors with ice. 

Why it happened on two ships - dozens of kilometres apart - within hours of each other is the subject a continuing probe. 
"I'm baffled with that question myself," Capt. Katherine Ashton, a former Sea King pilot and currently a flight-safety investigator, said Monday. 

The mysterious incidents, which took place aboard HMCS Charlottetown and HMCS Athabaskan on March 7 last year, are detailed in documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act. 
Both warships were part of a naval exercise off southern Nova Scotia and were accompanied by the supply ship HMCS Preserver, according to an incident report filed the day of the mishaps. 

The weather was frigid when the helicopters lifted off for separate patrols. As a matter of routine when a chopper returns from over-ocean flights, technicians give the engines a hot-water wash to remove potentially corrosive salt spray. 
A solution of 60 per cent fresh water and 40 per cent methanol - or anti-freeze - is hosed on the hot engines. 

Ashton said investigators have determined that there was no methanol in the mixture. With the air temperature between -11 C and -18 C in both instances, ice quickly formed on the compressors. 

Aboard the frigate Charlottetown, flight line crews noticed a blue flame shooting out of the engine, as warning indicators flashed in the cockpit. The pilots immediately killed the engine. 
The circumstances were repeated later that evening with a different Sea King aboard the destroyer Athabaskan. In that case, the pilots shut down the engine before flames started flickering out the vents. 

The navy has decades of experience launching and recovering aircraft from warships in the icy grip of the North Atlantic. 
Ashton says after 10 months, investigators have not been able to determine why the engine wash solution on both ships was not properly set and whether negligence was involved. 

No was injured in either incident, but both helicopters were grounded and their engines removed for repairs, which are continuing, she said. 
A bill for those repairs has yet to be finalized and Ashton wouldn't speculate on damages. Both helicopters and a third aircraft aboard the supply ship were lifted off the warships by crane once back in port for safety reasons. 

"An investigation is still ongoing," Ashton said. 
In the meantime, the air force has tightened maintenance regulations, ensuring that methanol is carried aboard ships where helicopters are deployed. 

The CH-124 Sea Kings, which have been in service over 40 years, are due to be replaced by new Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclones, starting later this year


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## Inch

'bout time this hit the press.



> A preliminary investigation suggests the No. 2 engines on both aircraft overheated because they were inexplicably sprayed with fresh water, clogging air compressors with ice.



I love this one, "inexplicably"! HAHAHA! It's quite simple really, salt builds up on the compressors while flying 150ft or lower over salt water, and during the shutdown we wash the engines by spraying fresh water into the intakes for 1 min. Why is that so inexplicable? This happens everyday, that's right, every single day. And it was the #2 engines because that's the first one we wash. 

The media is great isn't it?


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## aesop081

Inch, i think this is the part that explains their use of "inexplicably"



> The weather was frigid when the helicopters lifted off for separate patrols. As a matter of routine when a chopper returns from over-ocean flights, technicians give the engines a hot-water wash to remove potentially corrosive salt spray.
> *A solution of 60 per cent fresh water and 40 per cent methanol - or anti-freeze - is hosed on the hot engines.*
> 
> Ashton said investigators have determined that *there was no methanol in the mixture.* With the air temperature between -11 C and -18 C in both instances, ice quickly formed on the compressors.


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## Inch

That may be, but how about this...the techs forgot? Since we usually operate in weather above 4 degrees, ie we rarely operate off the coast of Halifax, more like Virginia where it's usually considerably warmer. 

It's actually quite neat to see the methanol mixture hosed into the engines, creates a nice sound and accompanying glow from the exhaust.


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## Zoomie

This really is a non-event - apart for the fact the the techs screwed up the mixture.  

Almost every aircraft in the CF fleet undergoes some time of anti-corrosion bath after every flight in a salt water environment.  The Cormorant hovers in a ball of suspended salt water almost half of its flight hours.  Hence its corrosion issues with the airframe.


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## aesop081

Sometimes after a long flight in the 140, we can barely see out th windows as they are just covered in salt. A trip through the bird bath and a good corosion cotrol program is key.


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## geo

What is baffling is that a former Sea King pilot would say that she is baffled by the situation.
If the explanation is so apparent, why would the investigator(s) come out in public to say they can't explain it?

Obviously there are issues of who flies em and who maintains em but this Press release makes no sense to my Green (land) senses.


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## Inch

geo said:
			
		

> What is baffling is that a former Sea King pilot would say that she is baffled by the situation.
> If the explanation is so apparent, why would the investigator(s) come out in public to say they can't explain it?
> 
> Obviously there are issues of who flies em and who maintains em but this Press release makes no sense to my Green (land) senses.



I think she's baffled by the fact that 3 different dets forgot to add the methanol, all on the same day, and 3 helos had to be craned off because of it.


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## geo

... time to check out the SOPs
If all crews follow the same SOPs that have been set in stone by the maintenance gods, then it is reasonable to think that all crews will act in a uniform way... resulting in the same mistake...


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## Inch

geo said:
			
		

> ... time to check out the SOPs
> If all crews follow the same SOPs that have been set in stone by the maintenance gods, then it is reasonable to think that all crews will act in a uniform way... resulting in the same mistake...



Thanks, but it's already in the FMLD's (fixy & maintainy directions for aircraft) to add methanol when the ambient temperature is below 4 degrees and as I already stated, it's not something we do often so it was forgotten. In fact, in my 800+ hrs of flying the Sea King, I've only had to have the methanol blend for an engine wash twice.


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## geo

Ah.... as I stated, directions (FMLD) from the maintenance gods.
Guess everyone has a brain fart at the same time


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## cp140tech

It happens... most of the mistakes techs make would have been prevented by reading the pubs.  Not to say it's ok, but it happens.  You'll see quals pulled in particularly severe cases.


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## dapaterson

So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.


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## SeaKingTacco

> Thanks, but it's already in the FMLD's (fixy & maintainy directions for aircraft) to add methanol when the ambient temperature is below 4 degrees and as I already stated, it's not something we do often so it was forgotten. In fact, in my 800+ hrs of flying the Sea King, I've only had to have the methanol blend for an engine wash twice.



And I have never seen it used in 1200 Sea King Hrs...mostly West Coast and Gulf time where freezing temperatures don't come up that often.    



> So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.



We don't sail in the North Atlantic in the winter that often anymore.  Couple that with low at sea experience levels due to the Cyclone run up and tech retirements and I suspect charging anyone would be a bit like continuing the beatings until morale improves...


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## cp140tech

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.



  I'll second SKT's position, I don't see many technical charges on this fleet;  I can only assume the reasoning is similar to what he outlined for the Sea King techs.  That and perhaps our lost experience extends to preparing tech charges from higher up the chain.  I've seen one instance where the effort was made to lay charges but the investigation wasn't carried out in a manner to support them.
  Tough to say.  The vast majority of techs I have worked with don't take any chances where aircrew safety and air assets come into play; nobody wants to be involved with an accident.  People want to produce; but that can-do attitude sometimes shoots you in the foot.  Do everything by the book and it takes as long as it takes; the rest of the weight for operations sits elsewhere.  If it's not safe then I'll open the 349 myself to keep the plane on the ground.


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## SupersonicMax

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.



If things would work that way (that every time there is a flight safety incident, you press charges), then the flight safety organisation wouldn't be nearly as efficient as it is right now.  People are not afraid to report flight safety incidents.  If you did press charge after every flight safety (after all, 90% of flight safety incidents are due to human factors), people would not report incidents...  And others wouldn't be able to learn from other's mistakes.

Max


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## Inch

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.



Neglect and being human are two very different beasts. It wasn't neglect. Does me breaking the landing gear by smacking it on the bear trap constitute neglect or the price of doing business? It wasn't the first time landing gear was damaged during deck landing training and it certainly won't be the last despite what the procedures say.  

It's not like anyone would intentionally damage an aircraft, I'm with the other guys, lower experience levels created this incident. There was a time that there were 7 AirDets on this coast, we're down to 3 now and the accompanying experience levels have also dropped since there are only sea going positions for 33 techs out of 200+, 6 of those slots are for Sgts and MWOs. 

FYI, the FMLD's come in many many binders, I'm sure how many, but it's more than 10 3" binders. People are smart, but it's pretty well impossible to know everything in there, we know the stuff we run into regularly and thanks to this incident, there's an entire generation that now know the damage caused by not using a Methanol blend in freezing temperatures. Sometimes a damaged couple of engines is what it takes to learn a lesson, at least no one died. Hell, it took a ditching 2 years ago for us to take a closer look at our night over water procedures.


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## Disenchantedsailor

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> And I have never seen it used in 1200 Sea King Hrs...mostly West Coast and Gulf time where freezing temperatures don't come up that often.
> 
> We don't sail in the North Atlantic in the winter that often anymore.  Couple that with low at sea experience levels due to the Cyclone run up and tech retirements and I suspect charging anyone would be a bit like continuing the beatings until morale improves...


So is that to say that admin/disciplinary action shouldn't be taken against the next tech that leaves his watch in the engine compartment because his inexperience made him forget to remove it prior to conducting a maint routine. This is a case though where because it happened on 2 different ships that maybe 12 wing should look at stepping up refresher trg for shipborne airdets. I know they work hard, very hard most of the time (I've sailed with many) and sometimes things do get forgotten, hell I've forgotten things myself.  Perhaps a checklist airframe wide would help, or as the arty world puts it "a series of independant double checks"


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## SeaKingTacco

> Perhaps a checklist airframe wide would help, or as the arty world puts it "a series of independant double checks"



Exists already.  We have so many checklists, we need checklists for the checklists...

Our entire maintenance system is built upon at least a double check and sometimes a triple check.


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## aesop081

dapaterson said:
			
		

> So, any charges filed?  Neglect and failure to comply with directives that leads to a significant asset being rendered unserviceable would seem to meet the standard for proceedings under the code of service discipline.



My god, stay over at NDHQ.

We're more intersted in finding out what happenned and how to prevent it than charging people. Like others have said, it happenned on more than one det so its not an individual technician issue.


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## cp140tech

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Exists already.  We have so many checklists, we need checklists for the checklists...
> 
> Our entire maintenance system is built upon at least a double check and sometimes a triple check.



  You're absolutely right.  As it's been mentioned, most of our mistakes are already covered somewhere in writing.  More and more responsibility on fewer people with less experience will result in these occurences. 

  We have a system of independant checks in place, more paperwork isn't the answer.  It will take the time to develop that institutional knowledge again.  They're already planning to bring back one of the old trades where the AVN trade is coming up a bit short.

  As also mentioned, there is now a whole new generation of techs who will never make this methanol mistake again.


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## geo

well... with the new cyclones coming down the pipe, we should be "growing" the family of aircrew & maintenance wizzards.

Guess we can chalk these two incidents off to "lessons learnt"


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## observor 69

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> My god, stay over at NDHQ.



Right on! I worked in Flight Safety for a few years and the first priority is not hanging someone out to dry but rather what happened and how do we prevent a repetition of the incident.


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## beenthere

There's nothing baffling about the incidents. Any time that an aviation unit changes it's operational environment new incidents occur. In this case it looks like operating at sea in conditions just around the freezing point was something that was new for these particular detachments and they overlooked a specific item regarding engine wash procedures. No doubt the addition of the anti-icing ingredient is something that was developed many years ago when operating in this particular environment was more routine. It matters not that the aircraft has been around for decades. The people who operate and maintain the aircraft come and go with a regular pattern and operations change in response to what the military is focusing on. No doubt the people involved in Sea King ops these days are much more familiar with extended operations in hot environments than their predecessors who were very good at operating over the North Atlantic and rarely went to hot places.
Books, procedures and checklists are great ways to help overcome human errors but nothing beats experience. Given the volumes of books that pertain to any complex aircraft there's no way that any small detachment can maintain operational tempo and sort out all of the sometimes ambiguous pages of material that dictate procedures.
Flight safety organizations are geared to prevent accidents and incidents from happening and to prevent the accidents and incidents that do happen from being repeated and have to maintain a mutual trust with the people involved with aircraft so that people will come foreward with their mistakes and lessons learned without fear of reprisal. The focus is on fixing the problems and keeping operations safe and not on crime and punishment.
This whole issue comes from a press report. If there was a similar newspaper report on every accident and incident involving military aircraft we could have a whole discussion board dedicated to flight safety.


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## Inch

ArtyNewbie said:
			
		

> So is that to say that admin/disciplinary action shouldn't be taken against the next tech that leaves his watch in the engine compartment because his inexperience made him forget to remove it prior to conducting a maint routine. This is a case though where because it happened on 2 different ships that maybe 12 wing should look at stepping up refresher trg for shipborne airdets. I know they work hard, very hard most of the time (I've sailed with many) and sometimes things do get forgotten, hell I've forgotten things myself.  Perhaps a checklist airframe wide would help, or as the arty world puts it "a series of independant double checks"



First of all, I don't know of any instances where a watch was found during a walk around or B Check. 

Secondly if you punish someone for making an honest mistake, they're less likely to tell you when they notice their watch/wrench/rag is missing. It has happened on a few occasions where a rag or tool was noticed to be missing and every aircraft is FOD checked before flight ops are resumed. Trust me, as an operator, I'd much rather know if something was unaccounted for _*prior*_ to flashing up the engines and going flying. Losing a flight due to a FOD check on the fleet doesn't bother me one bit, having a lost tool lead me to a ditching scenario is where I start to get concerned. 

Finally, our techs are some of the most professional people in the military and their job is too often a thankless job, but they're human too and make mistakes just like the rest of us. Flight Safety is built on the learning by other's mistakes principal and no blame is assigned.


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## Good2Golf

The only examples I've seen where disciplinary action was taken against an individual after involvement in a flight safety incident was for willful disobedience of universally known regulations.  Such cases still can be a perception issue of timing more than anything -- because the flight safety system responds so quickly (minutes to hours after an event) many people infer that it was that flight safety system that reported (or "ratted out") the individual -- that is never the case.  When someone is charged, you can rest assured that the individual was going to be charged anyway due to their willful irresponsible actions, it's just that the formal disciplinary system takes longer to visibly respond than does the flight safety system.  

In this particular case, the aviators in this thread are saying is that it appears that there was no willful disobedience of procedures or policy on the part of the technicians not to fully comply with the engine wash procedure.  If the technicians knowingly shortcutted the procedure, sure, then that would be a different issue.  If there was cause for leadership to direct disciplinary action, then there is no doubt that appropriate disciplinary action would be taken.

G2G


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## Loachman

A good part of the reason why we have the excellent (yet still not perfect) flight safety record that we have is precisely because of the openness, honesty, and trust within the system. It encourages everyone to step forward with the slightest problem, in order to educate others and thereby prevent more serious situations from occurring. Should that spontaneous reporting ever stop, through generation of suspicion within the system by nailing everybody who made a mistake, then our accident rate would soar.

I will echo the statements of my fellow Fliegers: I willingly put my life in the hands of our techs, who are incredibly dedicated, concientious, and professional and are backed up by a proven system of supervision and checks. There are still far too few of them having to do far more than they should with aging fleets and far less experience overall than they collectively had a decade or two ago - when exactly the same things were being said.


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## Disenchantedsailor

Inch said:
			
		

> First of all, I don't know of any instances where a watch was found during a walk around or B Check.



About 4 years ago there was an article in safety digest where a tech in Trenton, I think it was Trenton anyway, nevertheless, he discovered that an hour or so after doing maint on an aircraft noticed his watch missing,  he telephoned ops upon noticing, grounding the flight before it had the chance to become an issue. His watch was found inside the aircraft, not in a place where it could have caused any damage. But his dedication in a different situation could have saved lives,  Only one word for it, complacency and it exists everywhere, in my new trade, in my old trade, and I will say again, the maintainers on the seakings (the only maint guys I've sailed with) are some of the hardest working folks in the fleet.


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## beenthere

I wouldn't think of the incident regarding a watch to be an example of complacency. In 30 + years around aircraft 25 of which were as aircrew I saw a lot of mistakes made and made a few myself but I don't recall any incidents or accidents that were caused by complacency. No doubt some have happened where complacency has been a factor but it certainly isn't common.
There was always a problem with inexperience which I attribute to the system of moving people around in a way that never seems to make much sense. The system posts someone to a Squadron or maintenance unit where they go through a whole lot of training after which they spend a whole lot more time getting to the point where they are proficient and able to do good work. With the next posting they get moved to a new aircraft where the cycle starts all over again or to someplace where they do little or nothing related to all of the training and experience that they have gained.
Complacency usually only happens when people mistakenly believe that they have become so good at their job that they can do it without making mistakes and they loose the element of caution that is necessary.


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## Loachman

ArtyNewbie said:
			
		

> About 4 years ago there was an article in safety digest where a tech in Trenton, I think it was Trenton anyway, nevertheless, he discovered that an hour or so after doing maint on an aircraft noticed his watch missing,  he telephoned ops upon noticing, grounding the flight before it had the chance to become an issue. His watch was found inside the aircraft, not in a place where it could have caused any damage. But his dedication in a different situation could have saved lives,



This is a good example of how and why the system works so well.

If we nailed people like that, he would quite likely have waited until the aircraft returned - praying throughout the flight that it would in fact do so - and then gone looking for his watch, hoping that nobody would notice. Chances are that no harm would befall the machine, but given enough similar incidents, harm would eventually come to some aircraft and crew somewhere, sometime, through something similar. By stepping forward, knowing that he would embarrass himself but nothing more (and embarrassment is enough of a negative motivator for techs, other support crew, and aircrew alike), he not only insured that his watch would not cause a problem, but that the incident would be a reminder to everyone involved in flying operations to be more vigilant.

Statistically, the more such minor incidents are reported, the fewer major incidents and accidents occur, which is why honest and open reporting is encouraged. To that end, he was more likely praised for his actions, rather than berated. This approach may seem bizarre to many of you, but it works extremely well in our environment.



			
				ArtyNewbie said:
			
		

> Only one word for it, complacency



Not necessarily. although that is a possible cause factor. "Distraction" is another, and seems more plausible to me (not knowing the full story, obviously). He could have been called away by his supervisor in the middle of his work and the rest of it finished up by colleagues. Similar situations have occurred, and will continue to occur so long as we have too few people with too little experience (as compared to "The Good Old Days"*) trying to do as much work on as many aging aircraft as they can. As part of the educational and prevention process, should something like I described have happened, it would also be a reminder to supervisors to avoid distracting their guys when they've got a broken aircraft stripped down, with parts and tools in play, and it's supposed to go flying thirty minutes ago.

This is why determining the correct cause factors for every incident and accident and using them to educate others is the sole purpose of the investigation. Now, supposing that, at some point, somebody had cause to suspect negligence or something worthy of disciplinary action, a separate collateral investigation would be initiated. NONE of the evidence gathered by the Flight Safety team can be used in that investigation whatsoever, in order to preserve the integrity of the Flight Safety system. None of the Flight Safety evidence can be used in any civil proceeding, either (such as law suits). The courts recognize the reason for this, too.



			
				ArtyNewbie said:
			
		

> the maintainers on the seakings (the only maint guys I've sailed with) are some of the hardest working folks in the fleet.



Our techs put in a fair amount of overtime, too, on a regular basis and more often than not they pick up hazards that really should have gone unnoticed as the signs are so subtle that no ordinary person should be able to spot them. That is a good indication of the calibre of our techs and part of the reason that I am willing to trust them with my life (although I do a pretty thorough walkaround nonetheless).

* Five years from now, THESE will be The Good Old Days.


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## ExPtePhillips

maybe they were just too busy having to get the A/C serviceable and being pressured that they forgot to do it....I used to be with 423 and they used to try to pressure all the time expecially the flight crew


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## Inch

ExPtePhillips said:
			
		

> maybe they were just too busy having to get the A/C serviceable and being pressured that they forgot to do it....I used to be with 423 and they used to try to pressure all the time expecially the flight crew



If you were with 423 you would know that washing engines is part of a normal shutdown, ashore as well as embarked. It's not maintenance like you seem to imply and as far as that goes, in my 900 or so hours of flying Sea Kings I have never seen any pressure put on the techs to cut corners while doing maintenance. No aircraft, no fly, no big deal.


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## Good2Golf

ExPtePhillips said:
			
		

> maybe they were just too busy having to get the A/C serviceable and being pressured that they forgot to do it....I used to be with 423 and they used to try to pressure all the time expecially the flight crew



Post #1 with an accusation like that is a very interesting way to start your interaction on Milnet.ca, ExPtePhillips.

Is it possible you were reading more into what you thought were pressures, than others intended?

G2G


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## aesop081

ExPtePhillips said:
			
		

> and they used to try to pressure all the time expecially the flight crew



Ah yes the big bad aircrew people. Always trying to screw the techs around by wanting servicable aircraft to go flying "just for the hell of it"

 :


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## Fishbone Jones

When I wore blue and we had operational birds in the Q, they were always serviceable, as were the two backups that didn't fly while they were in that spot. As to the rest of the flight line, pressure be damned. They got the birds when we signed off the snags, or they didn't get them. Besides no aircrew would be stupid enough to pressure the techs into giving out an unsafe bird. They have to fly in them.

I think the username says alot. Ex-Pte. Perhaps he's an ex because he couldn't convince the military to bend and come around to HIS way of doing things, in the short stay he had with us.


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## beenthere

For someone who isn't familiar with what goes on in air operations it would be very easy to mistake some queries as to the status of an unserviceable aircraft as pressure. The users (aircrew) often have a planned flight which won't get of on schedule because of a snag but they usually have several options to work on and as they work on the options may make some queries to the maintenance/snag desk as to possible fix times or to the possibility of using the aircraft without the snag being rectified until after a flight.

An example would be where ops had a scheduled flight for today but the crew determined that the radar was unserviceable and wrote it up as a snag and delayed the trip for 24 hours.  Also there was a local trainer scheduled but the aircraft for that flight was determined to be unserviceable because of a prop leak and the fix time was 24 hrs. Ops calls snags and asks how much longer it's going to take to fix the radar. Reply is 2 hours. The local training crew say they don't need radar for their trip. Ops calls and says don't do the radar repair because we want to use the aircraft for 4 hours and you can fix it later.

Now if you were the guy who was about to fix the radar you would have no idea what is going on and would probably be kind of wizzed off at these guys who can't make up their mind about if they want things fixed now, later or never and you could think that they were using pressure or deciding to fly with out waiting for repairs.
What you don't know is that a whole series of events have taken place and that at least one crew will be doing what they had planned for that day. It happens all of the time.


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## aesop081

And more often than not, it is not the crew who wants to go flying. HHQ directs WOPS to send an airplane out. WOPS in turn directs SQN OPS who sends a crew out. I dont like working on weekends any more than the techs do but giving me grief because "f'ing aircrew wants to go flying" is just plain stupid. We all get paid to do a job, lets all just concentrate on that.


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## beenthere

I did most of my flying on transports. Weekends were not observed.


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## cp140tech

When we have a good Sgt/WO running the desk, often that back and forth with Ops never even makes it to my level; direction comes from the desk and we jump on an aircraft.  I'm usually happy not knowing what goes on between the desk and Ops.


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## observor 69

As has been mentioned aircrew don't pressure groundcrew. Maybe not but commitments do!
Got to get flying hours in, got to get aircraft up for an exercise,  there are operational commitments that we do our best to meet.
When maintainers work under the gun of time to meet the aircraft commitment mistakes can occur.


104749  Lockheed  Canadair CF-104 Starfighter

With Canadian Air Group at CFB Baden-Solingen, Germany at time of fire.

last date: 29 August 1984 - Struck off, after being destroyed in a hanger fire at Baden on 3 February (or 2 March?) 1984.

http://www.ody.ca/~bwalker/CF_104700_104771_detailed.html


Starfighter 104749 served with 439 Squadron at CFB Baden Soellingen, West Germany which is where this photograph was taken. Unfortunately '749 fell victim to a hangar fire on 2 March, 1984 and was subsequently struck off strength on 29 August of the same year, just two years prior to the majority of the remainder of the fleet being retired and transferred to Turkey. 

http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/equip/historical/starfighterlst_e.asp


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## cp140tech

The 'gun' we sometimes work under is most often held by our own tech middle management.  

I've spent a fair but of time working directly for FE's and pilots and not one of them has ever leaned on me the way some of my supervisors have in the past.   

It's not worth the risk to wind everything up into panic mode, my problems start and stop at the aircraft, the rest sits higher up the chain.  It's that can-do attitude that is both a powerful motivator and the cause of many of our problems.


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