# Various Symposia Reports



## 54/102 CEF (17 Nov 2007)

I am going to this show on the 29th - I highly recommend seeing this guy. He has the ear of the highest levels of the US Defence community. His book is called The Pentagon`s New Map which I have read twice.

See https://www.defenceandsecurity.ca/public/index.asp?action=events.

THERE IS A FREE SHOW - BUT YOU HAVE TO ACT FAST!!!! http://canada2020barnett.eventbrite.com/

His Blog www.thomaspmbarnett.com


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## Edward Campbell (30 Nov 2007)

I attended Thomas P Barnett’s presentation yesterday evening; very interesting.

On somewhat lighter notes:

1.	During his discussion of China he related a story about dining, in China, with some Chinese academics. One of them opined that, in China, everyone is focused on food while in America everyone is focused on sex. “Can’t be,” Barnett quipped, “because we’re all fat and there’s over a billion of you.”

2.	The question session started with an admonition from the moderator, Prof. Roland Paris of Ottawa University, to ask questions, not make speeches. He interrupted the first speech maker questioner, reminding him of the rules. Soon our friend Steven Staples went to the microphone and launched into his speech. He had just got to the point where it was evident that there was no question – he was launching into his bit about how he had heard enough about _transformation_ – when Prof. Paris said, “A question now, please.” Staples asked a somewhat lame question re: what did Barnett think about _transformation_ in Canada? “Nothing,” said Barnett, “it’s not on my radar. I’m a global _grand strategist_.” “But,” he added, "don’t forget one of Donald Rumseld’s interesting observations: countries fight wars with the armies they have, not the armies they want to have. Further,” Barnett said, “we *have* the army we wanted 10 to 20 years ago.  Assuming that the world has changed in the last 20 years it is prudent to want to _transform_ one’s thinking and one’s _tool kit_, too.”

Barnett reviewed his analysis, (The Pentagon’s New Map) and his plan (Blueprint for Action) and his prescription which, he said, will be in a new book due for publication early in 2009.

A couple of observations:

1.	He noted, correctly, in my view, that the spread of “rationalism” was halting. It (_rationalism_) began in Europe and then failed to spread through most European colonial initiatives. The exception was Britain’s colonies in the America’s. The difference, I think lies in the fact that the British never tried to remake the indigenous peoples – they simply moved their own kith and kin to the Americas and let _nature_ take its course. (Ditto: Australia and New Zealand.) My contention remains that: Culture Matters! It was practically impossible to transmit the emerging European _enlightenment_ values to many (any?) of the Latin American, African, Middle Eastern or West Asian colonial subject peoples: they lacked the requisite _culture_ to adopt those values. Modern _Anglo-America_ rationalism – with the ‘rule sets’ which are absolutely essential to establish democratic, capitalist societies – were spread to Asia (largely) by Americans – to Japan and then to South Korea and Taiwan, and by Britain to Hong Kong, India, Malaysia and Singapore. Those Asian countries then ‘seeded’ China with similar values. China and India, he suggests, not America, will spread those values to the rest of Asia and into Africa.

2.	He noted that Britain committed an act of _strategic_ genius in the early 20th century. Faced with the inevitability of its _decline and fall_ it hooked itself to the rapidly rising star of the USA. Barnett wonders if the USA – which, he and I believe, cannot sustain its current dominant global position indefinitely, will have a similar stroke of genius and hook itself to China. He reiterated his contention that the role of the _grand strategist_ is to make people think about the unthinkable. For many people – almost certainly for most people – the idea of a China/USA _special relationship_ is, indeed, unthinkable but no more, he suggests, than the idea of an Anglo-American _special relationship_ would have been _circa_ 1865 – a mere 35 years before it existed.

All-in-all a nice evening; good food and drink, too, thanks to some sponsors with deep, deep pockets. 


Edit: typo- "One somewhat lighter ..."


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## 54/102 CEF (30 Nov 2007)

A few points I scratched down at the Military Government Show at 1500 Yesterday - The many empty seats was a real commentary on how FMAS focussed our leadership is.

*Putin will stay on as an elder guiding figure like Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore
*Many countries in the world do fine with 1 party rule - he mentioned Singapore, Mexico, Russia
*Chavez will dig himself a big hole then cover himself up, Venezuela Oil production is going down steadily
*China will bankroll development in South America - and South America is not on his radar
*Cozy up to India brings relationships with China
*China is busy in Africa --- see this http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7118941.stm
*USA has opened a String of outposts called CJTF HOA (HORN OF AFRICA) --- he adlibbed a lot that probably be fuddled the crowd --- a few High Rankers were there not known for their publishing or writing skills ---- A small Joke - The Last Book the Colonel Read was his First --- describes the hovering ones ---- but I digress - the 2nd half of his talk was based on this article http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 ---- THERE`S MORE! http://www.esquire.com/search/fast_search?search_term=Thomas+Barnett

Snippets

* Fidel Castro croaks and brother Raul ends up running things for a bit, experimenting with markets and letting in a trickle of foreign investment from "trusted" sources.
• Raul is soon replaced by some "national unity" committee that reflects the growing splits within the next generation of leaders over how far market reforms should proceed. Meanwhile, the money seeping in from Miami's Cubans grows to a flood and travel restrictions are radically reduced in response to popular demand.
• Within five years, Cuba holds its first roughly free presidential election, and one or more candidates, with substantial outside financial backing, stumps openly for American statehood.
• Once that match gets lit, watch Florida hold every subsequent American presidential candidate hostage to the Cuba-statehood plank. 

So keep an eye on Thomas Barnett - it will help you understand what DND can`t or won't explain - which is the real eye opener.


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## George Wallace (30 Nov 2007)

FMAS?

I am going on a two day FMAS course and have a totally different perception of what it is than this.


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## 54/102 CEF (1 Dec 2007)

What I mean is the leadership will crunch numbers rather than crunch ideas


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## 54/102 CEF (2 Dec 2007)

A short version of Tomas Barnett`s Talk for you - pretty good. http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/33


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## Edward Campbell (10 Dec 2007)

Rather than start a new thread I though I would add this report; perhaps a Moderator can change the title to something like Symposia Reports.

I went to the first (of two) days of the University of Ottawa’s  brand new Centre for International Policy Study’s symposium on  Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead. You can see the list of participants and agenda on the web site.

The conference was co-chaired by Roland Paris (who also moderated the Thomas P Barnett symposium upon which I reported earlier) and Pierre Beaudet.

There were several Ottawa and foreign _heavy hitters_ present including: Abdullah Abdullah, former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan; David Bercuson, University of Calgary,  Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Bob Fowler, Former DM of DND, Peter Harder, Former DM of Foreign Affairs,  and Barnett Rubin, NYU.

I think Bob Fowler asked the key questions during the morning: “Who are ‘we’,” he asked, “and what is our aim?”

There are, clearly, several disparate interests in Afghanistan. It is unlikely, in the extreme, that Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, France Germany, NATO and the USA share many common objectives in that country. So, ‘we’ is not always a very useful term. As far as Canada is concerned it looks as though we have changed aims and may do so again.

Fowler’s question was not answered on Day 1; I’ll report later on Day 2, but I doubt we’ll make much progress.

The split was clear during parts of the sessions: The American contingent has several points of view – as we might expect when you assemble several very smart people to discuss a contentious issue. Ditto the Canadians, for much the same reasons. The _regional_ people (from Pakistan, etc) were also divided but the Afghans were a bit more united: they almost all gave a _cri de cœur_ asking that we stop _prioritizing_ security over justice.

Here are few points in somewhat random order :

Anthony Cordesman: We can win the counterinsurgency but we must understand, measure and report, honestly, upon what we are doing  Fowler’s “what is the aim?” again. We have much bigger problems than just the military one – in fact the military bit may be easiest. We can win the military campaign and still lose the war. The current US and NASTO timelines are ridiculous. We need years and years to get the basics right. It is unlikely that the ANA, any of it, can be ready for much of anything before 2012.

Abdullah Abdullah: There has been real but very uneven progress thus far – uneven across functional and geographic lines. The problems are much different, but from an Afghan POV, much “better” than the ones they faced in 2001. The main issue remains to help the Afghans run Afghanistan.

In response to Abdullah’s points a panellist noted that there is a pressing need for some financial stability. There is enough, maybe even too much money pouring into Afghanistan but it’s neither stable nor guaranteed. Good management, even just barely acceptable management requires stable, predictable funding. 

Although there was a complete session devoted to Opium, I think the key point was made early: the problem is not opium or poppy growing: it is money. We need to get the money out of the hands of the various groups and factions that, together, make up the enemy. They are narco-funded. At the end of the day Prof. Zücher,  Freie Universität Berlin, talked 9as did several others) about the _right_ mix of carrots and sticks. “Use both carrots and sticks on the national and provincial governments,” he said, “but remember that only carrots will work on the farmer. He’s already been beaten with too many sticks.”

Seth Jones, RAND Corporation: We are failing at the critical local government level. The Afghanistan war is the lowest funded (by America) war since World War II. We (the US, anyway) are trying to do it on the cheap.

Sarah Chayes, Arghand Cooperative, Kandahar (very interesting woman): The war has shifted from an invasion (of Afghanistan) by Pakistan’s proxies to a much more internal rebellion, because the Afghan local governments and, especially, the ANP are so corrupt and so inept.

Barnett Rubin: There is a major cultural problem (you know I love guys who say culture matters. Afghanistan is a  19th century political construct (made to appease the British Empire) without a unifying national culture.  The Taliban ≠ al Qaeda, but the Government of Afghanistan (Kabul) and ISAF are pushing them closer together. The soldiers fighting the counterinsurgency campaign must identify and solve the local problems and sources of dissatisfaction, thereby weakening the Taliban, _et al_. This is a _regional_ (Pakistan + Afghanistan) [problem and we must solve it in both countries.

Andrew Wilder, Tufts University: Is there any evidence that the military PRTs are doing much if anything to win “hearts and minds?”

William Byrd, The World Bank: In 2002 we (US + ISAF) went on a peacekeeping mission. We failed; peacekeeping didn’t work. Now we have a counterinsurgency campaign and we don’t have enough troops – even if there were no _caveats_ to fight and win it.

Ahmed Rashid, Journalist and writer based in Pakistan:  The Taliban and their fellow travellers learn fast. They are now targeting NATO’s_ weaklings’_ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) populations/public opinion, aiming to split ISAF. They are also targeting Canada on the political/media level.

Jonathan Goodhand,   University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies: We are far too focused on a “perfect” solution; we need to get up to a “just good enough” level and then address the next problem. We can build organizations but they have to make themselves into _institutions_. We need to start removing some “bad” key people in order to make “good enough” organizations which can, maybe, mature into “good” institutions. 

More to follow.


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## Edward Campbell (12 Dec 2007)

The 2nd day of the University of Ottawa symposium was more, but not totally, focused on military matters.

At the start, the Chair, Prof. Paris, posed three questions:

1.	What are the victory conditions? (This was phrased quite broadly, it was not until the end of the day that anyone really attempted to address it in Canadian military terms.)

2.	What steps must we take? (Again, the big, ill defined and, in my opinion non-existent “we.”)

3.	What are “we” doing wrong?

Sultana Parvanta (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Gov’t of Afghanistan): Progress is being made but it is uneven. Expectations (donors’ and Afghan peoples’) are growing faster than progress. One error: many donor nations’ people fail to respect Afghanistan’s culture, especially its rather cumbersome consultative process and the respect which is paid to the views of elders. Infidel-6 has written about this here, on Army.ca but I cannot find the post right now.

Jonathan Goodhand (link in yesterday’s post): two kinds of development – planned (with Afghanistan’s governments (national and local) and “spontaneous” (decided by donor nation – sometimes to _appease_ its own citizens). Development is “transforming” Afghanistan from a self sustaining but barely subsistence economy to a cash crop economy but most of the economy (92%) is foreign aid and too much of the remaining 8% is illicit. Too much aid is probably doing more harm than good but, in some donor nations, it sustains support for an unpopular military mission. The “metrics” for Afghanistan are set too high – again to appease donor nations’ own people. To quote an old maxim: the best is the bitter enemy of the good enough. We need to help Afghanistan to reach the “good enough” level and then declare victory and move on.

Omar Zakhilwal (President, Afghanistan Investment Support) Agency): there is progress but the Afghan people do not recognize it. Part if the problem is rising expectations with which the progress fails to keep up. But much of the “progress” is not properly planned (See Goodhand’s comments, above) and fails to meet the real local needs.

Bob Fowler (link in yesterday’s report): The opportunity costs are too high. We are spending way too much on Afghanistan and ignoring growing problems in e.g. Africa.

William Byrd (link in yesterday’s report): But there is an open window of opportunity in Afghanistan right now and we should exploit it while it is open. It will close soon enough and we can and should move on to other festering sores.

Byrd: Some (too many_ PRTs are doing little except serving donor nations’ own interests. Military PRTs are wasteful and ineffective *except where security is weak*. Three useful benchmarks for aid: Is it planned with the Gov’t of Afghanistan? Is it properly accounted for in the Gov’t of Afghanistan’s budget process? Is it serving the real, local needs as defined, in large measure, by the local leadership? At a guess less than 10% of aid would be measured as “effective” by these benchmarks.

Charles-Philippe David (Université du Québec à Montréal): recent _Globe and Mail_ report says only 10% of Canadians take pride in our mission in Afghanistan. Gov’t of Canada is failing.

Barnett Rubin (link in yesterday’s report): Goals were set (properly) by UN _et al_ but donor governments (especially US) reset them when they authorize money. Result: we are wasting money – doing some real good but not enough.

Ahmed Rashid (link in yesterday’s report): West, including Canada, needs to develop a strategy to deal with a succession of crises involving failed and failing states – that’s the world for the next 25-50 years. There was considerable support for this position over lunch and in discussions in the corridors. We must raise military budgets and build the sorts of forces we need to fight and win in e.g. Afghanistan (it’s way too late now) and Darfur, where “we” are going, eventually, like it or not. The big “we” needs to learn to coordinate – the state of internal coordination (of 3D) within ISAF is pathetic. Neither NATO nor the UN is properly equipped to lead the missions which will be necessary and the US is an unacceptable leader, for now and probably the next decade.

Flora MacDonald (former Minister of External Affairs for Canada): There is uneven progress, some military PRTs are working as well as they can but most are not doing enough well enough. There is, in Canada, too much focus on the military/combat mission and not enough on the Diplomacy and Development goals – which are ill-defined. During the open discussion Alexa McDonough and other MPs would echo this point.

David Bercuson (link in yesterday’s report): All I can say is that he must read Ruxted.ca – his presentation nearly copied several Ruxted reports!

Bob Fowler: success, military or diplomatic is problematical. There are several (I think he listed (very, very quickly) four or five) ‘conditions” which will make success, for Canada, impossible. When any of these conditions obtain we should have the political “smarts” and will to withdraw, quickly.

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During the conference much of the most interesting discussion took place over lunch and in the corridors. Here are a few snippets (without naming any names):

+ The CF is doing a great job but the Gov’t of Canada (Chrétien through Harper) is failing and Canada will, likely fail because of the Gov’t.

+ Canada wants to do the right thing but doesn’t understand the situation.

+ Every single air attack, no matter how careful and militarily useful and justified, is wrong because the Afghans hate them.

+ We cannot, ever, in any way, “defeat” the Taliban, especially in Kandahar. Negotiation is the only answer. The only question is: how (in 3D terns0 do we improve President Karzai’s negotiating position?

+ Where do the Taliban go? Across the border, to Pakistan? No! They go across the street to their home and then to their job – paid for by the Canadian PRT.

+ Africa is far more dangerous, in the long term than West/central Asia.

+ The only “solution” for Afghanistan is regional and must include Iran, Pakistan, the other “stans” and Russia – none of which, especially Russia, is playing any constructive role. The US must talk with Iran about regional stability.

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If there was any consensus at the end of two days it was:

Canada, and its allies must not back away now or soon unless one of Bob Fowler’s conditions obtains, in which case we cannot win and should stop trying.

There are “victory conditions” and they are much like Ruxted’s suggestion. There are also “failure conditions” and one of them obtains when the Afghans stop seeing ISAF as a friend as start seeing it as an occupying power.

Aid/development is working but poorly and too slowly and “we” are not getting anything like value for money.

Again and again Afghans expressed there deep and, I think sincere gratitude for the sacrifices of Canadian soldiers and the hard work of our PRT.


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## Edward Campbell (12 Dec 2007)

A few additional points and thoughts on the recent University of Ottawa symposium on _Peacebuilding in Afghanistan_:

Points:

•	Despite the (relative) efficiency of the US policy development system, politicians, including the US president appear congenitally unable to manage more than one crisis at a time. In the case of Afghanistan, where America is the undisputed “leader,” everything is filtered through President Bush’s *Iraq* policy. That the two problems are quite different is beside the point; almost every foreign and defence policy decision taken by President Bush is based on what it means to Iraq. Canada, especially in a minority government situation, is worse – almost every policy position is based on how it may effect the next election.

•	Canadian politicians, academics and journalists, almost universally, are ill informed and lazy. They hate policy because it is hard to craft and even harder to implement. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, love policy but too many, especially in DFAIT, are inept. The problem is that politicians, journalists and academics “inform” the public which, _ipso facto_, must be even less well informed than the ill-informed louts in parliament, the media and academe. 

•	DFAIT has been “hollowed out” over the past (take your pick) year, decade, forty years. 

•	Aid agencies, like CIDA, are good things and need to be strengthened. Especially, their “arms length” relationship with the executive/centre must be, at least, retained. *or* Aid agencies are inefficient and ineffective. They have too few controls because they are too far from the _centre_ and they do not understand that they must coordinate development/aid with political and military programmes.

•	The UN is the only, at least best hope for managing the crises which will confront us for the next half century ±. *or* The UN is quite hopeless and NATO has, as Ruxted said, gone from being the cornerstone of our foreign policy to a stumbling block. Thus, there is a either a pressing need to reform the UN or a pressing need to find a replacement for it (and NATO) as the “security/military sub-contractor.”

•	DND, the CF, proper, DFAIT, CIDA and the PCO rarely communicate amongst themselves – not effectively, at least. The “suits” do not like or understand the soldiers, the soldiers reciprocate. The “turf wars” within DND and between DND , DFAIT and CIDA are endangering our chances of succeeding in Afghanistan.

•	Far too much attention is paid, by the less than well informed “opinion leaders,” to the military aspect of the Afghanistan mission which means that we are doing far less than we need to do in the Diplomacy and Development domains. If we fail in Afghanistan it will, likely, be because we “lose” Kandahar for non military reasons.

--------------------​
My personal observations:

Very few of the _influential_ Canadians support the military mission. Those _influential_ Canadians tell the media what to tell us _ordinary_ Canadians. Brian Stewart, the CBC journalist, confirmed this- indirectly – during the symposium. *Part* of the problem is that DND’s public affairs staff is seen, perversely, as “biased” but e.g. CARE Canada and even Steven Staples are seen as “unbiased” or as being “expert.” It is a huge media (and academic) blind spot which, I think, dates back to Vietnam.

Bob Fowler is right; we (Canadians, including military people) do not understand that “we” is a false model. There is no “we.” We, in ISAF, for example, includes Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. We must not think that Canada and the US share many aims and objectives in Afghanistan. We are both there for our own national interests but our interests are not alike, in fact they are not even very similar. Some of our interests, like improving Canada’s standing in the world, are, in fact, at odds with the US aim of maintaining and enhancing its status and influence. Fowler is also right when he says that we, all of us in Canada, have lost sight of the aim. I think we had a fairly clear aim when Chrétien was in office; but see: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/2-The-Lack-of-Leadership.html . Harper, especially, has obscured the aim, presumably for what he sees as good political reasons. Canadians, especially Canadian soldiers, deserve to know why our sons and daughters are fighting and dying.

If we lose Afghanistan, and we have at least an even chance of doing so, then the impact on the CF and our broader military community will be devastating – the more so because if we lose in Afghanistan it is very unlikely to be because of a military failure. Many influential people in that room already think the military is the problem in world affairs, not (part of) the soluition.

Gen. Hillier is, simultaneously, admired for his drive and communication skill and detested for his effectiveness and “values.”

Most of the attitudes held by Canadian politicians, journalists and academics is driven by deeply ingrained, very unspecific anti-Americanism. Most of those politicians, journalists and academics hate George W. Bush with a deep and abiding passion even as they, consistently, misunderstand or misrepresent his policies. This is very dangerous for us because it means we are making decisions for all the wrong reasons – we are doing things to “offend” George W. Bush not to serve Canada’s interests. The knee-jerk anti-Americanism is not confined to the “left.” (Political) Conservatives and so-called “right wing” people expressed them, too.

We stumbled into Afghanistan and we are still stumbling. Prime Minister Harper wants out, sooner rather than later, but he doesn’t want to pay any political price. He is trying to start getting out be not getting us in any deeper - which may be a serious mistake. We need to get in deeper to help get ourselves out – which is the right long term objective.

I suspect Fowler, Rubin and others are right. We are facing a half century of crises caused by failed and failing states. I do not think Africa is the only or even biggest problem. I think we will have several more West/Central Asian problems before Africa explodes. Pakistan might be the next one. It may have a civil war which be just too attractive for India not to exploit. Saudi Arabia is our biggest *threat*. It’s money funds radical Egyptian intellectuals who, in turn, animate Arab/Islamist radicalism. The Arabs/Islamists will have a useful nuclear capability within a decade. Some of them are going to use it against someone. The so called Islamic Crescent, which stretches from Morocco to Indonesia will explode and we, the US led West, will be drawn in – if we don’t jump in first and create some of the crises.


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## Edward Campbell (12 Dec 2007)

Whoops; I forgot two important but related items:

1. "We" - someone, anyway - is going to Sudan sometime fairly soon, maybe even within the next couple of years; and

2. If anyone thinks Afghanistan is tough wait until "we" get to Sudan. It will be tough and bloody and the NDP will start screaming "*Troops out, NOW!*" after whoever "we" is has been there for about a week. 

The discussion went something like this:

No matter how many troops the African Union (AU) contributes they will remain ineffective - largely for C3I and logistical reasons. Installing a 1st World "top hat" to address the C3I and logistics deficiencies will not work either. What's needed is a two phase _programme_:

Phase 1 a "Western" force (which could have a major Chinese component) goes in and replaces the Sudanese administration and _pacifies_ Darfur; then

Phase 2 a UN peacekeeping force with a very large AU contingent and considerable 1st and 2nd world elements, too, keeps the peace and protects development agencies for something akin to 10 years.

There was a subsequent discussion, in the corridors, re: the necessity of breaking the inviolable status of African borders. We could have/should have done this in Congo in 1957 but we lacked the skill and courage. It needs to happen sooner or later.


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## Infanteer (15 Dec 2007)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The discussion went something like this:
> 
> No matter how many troops the African Union (AU) contributes they will remain ineffective - largely for C3I and logistical reasons. Installing a 1st World "top hat" to address the C3I and logistics deficiencies will not work either. What's needed is a two phase _programme_:
> 
> ...



Phase 3: the infidel crusaders have destroyed another islamic government, buses start running daily from Al Azhar to Khartoum, and our new C-17's bring flag-draped caskets home as another IED campaign kicks off.

We've (the CF) proven that we're ready to deal with this - is the NDP?


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## Edward Campbell (11 Apr 2008)

Members in the Ottawa area may find some or all of these Centre for International Policy Studies
(University of Ottawa) presentations interesting:

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Canada’s Next Commander in Kandahar

DENIS THOMPSON
Brigadier-General, Canadian Forces
Commander, Joint Task Force-Afghanistan

speaking on

“Present Thinking on Kandahar Province”

Wednesday, April 23, 5:00 p.m.
Room 1160, Desmarais Hall
55 Laurier Ave. East (at Nicholas)

Brigadier-General Thompson will shortly leave Canada to assume command in Kandahar.

His presentation will be in English, and the question period will be in French and English.

This event, presented in association with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, is free and open to the public.  Registration is not required.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An Expert on International Security

STEPHEN SAIDEMAN
Canada Research Chair in International Security and Ethnic Conflict
Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University

speaking on

“The Challenges of National Caveats in NATO’s First Counter-Insurgency Campaign”

Wednesday, April 30, 1:00 p.m.
Room 3102, Desmarais Hall
55 Laurier Ave. East (at Nicholas)

Professor Saideman recently returned from a study trip to Afghanistan.

This event, co-sponsored by the Conflict Studies and Human Rights Program at the University of Ottawa, will take place in English.  It is free and open to the public.  Registration is not required.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An Expert on Peacebuilding

MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal

speaking on

“Peacebuilding Theory and Practice: Lessons from and for Afghanistan”

Wednesday, May 7, 3:00 p.m.
Room 3102, Desmarais Hall
55 Laurier Ave. East (at Nicholas)

This event, co-sponsored by the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, is free and open to the public.  It will take place in French and English.  Registration is not required.


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## Edward Campbell (9 Sep 2009)

I attended a talk by Dambisa Moyo yesterday. It was sponsored by Canada 2020. (I’m not a member but I do enjoy many of their events.)

It was pretty predictable, at least it was for those who have read her book – everyone interested in Africa should (and CF members should be interested in Africa). She emphasized that she is an economist and her arguments are those of an economist and she _apologized_ because they have been misrepresented by the mainstream, celebrity obsessed media who cannot figure out why her views ought to be taken as seriously as, say, those of Bono or Bob Geldof.

She also emphasized that she is taking aim at official development aid, not emergency humanitarian aid or local, small project, “charity” both of which she accepts as _necessary_ and very human responses to poverty and disaster.

Her argument for letting the Chinese and Middle Eastern _investors_ “in” will continue to discomfit Euro-American _traditional hypocrites_ – especially when she explains that it’s OK for America to go, cap in hand, to the Beijing bankers but, somehow, not OK for Africa to do the same.

After a brief talk she was “interviewed” by Paul Wells. He did a quite good job, until he got into an economic theory he doesn’t quite understand. Moyo is, of course, very used to critical questions and she had no problems with any of the predictable _softballs_ he lobbed her way. It’s a pity she could not have been “interviewed” by someone with equally “good” economic credentials. Her arguments about *how* private capital can be harnessed to develop Africa need to be considered and only expert, critical questioning will do it.

By the way, the less _"complex, challenging"_ missions about which Mr. Fowler speaks are in Africa and they are the direction in which the celebrities would have us go.


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## Journeyman (9 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> It’s a pity she could not have been “interviewed” by someone with equally “good” economic credentials.



While I lack the requisite economic credentials, I _can_ attest that she's *hot*   :nod:





  - Dambisa Moyo courtesy of The New York Times


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## Edward Campbell (9 Sep 2009)

Almost as hot in person as in her well stocked photo album. There is also a theory that smart, confident women are sexier than dumb _human ground-sheets_; true, I think.

I had a chance for a few semi-private words. She is pretty compelling.


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## The Bread Guy (9 Sep 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> By the way, the less _"complex, challenging"_ missions about which Mr. Fowler speaks are in Africa and they are the direction in which the celebrities would have us go.


I know we can't read minds, but does he _*really*_ think African missions would be less "complex" or "challenging" than Afghanistan?  I'd say (to overgeneralize) there's different languages/cultural groupings/tribal & government dynamics to deal with, but just as messy.


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## Edward Campbell (9 Sep 2009)

I think the _complexity_ and the _challenges_ to which Mr. Fowler refers are those faced by policy makers and _opinion leaders_.

Part of the problem we, the American led West, face is that many (most?) of us do not believe the _narratives_ offered by our leaders: not by Blair/Bush and not by Brown/Obama or Harper/Obama, either. And that mistrust is just as evident amongst Americans as it is amongst Australians, Belgians, Canadians and so on.

America's once huge stock of _political capital_, earned by blood, treasure, ingenuity and _soft power_, too, is wasted. Americans, Australians, Canadians, Europeans of all stripes, Asians and all the others no longer *believe*.

I doubt Mr. Fowler thinks Africa is simple or easy; but he thinks it is a *mission* people can comprehend and support. That makes is achievable. Lack of public comprhension and lack of public support *may* render the Afghanistan mission impossible.


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## GAP (9 Sep 2009)

She makes eminently more sense than some of the vague chattering by so called experts in how to make Africa work for itself....probably the most compelling being to cut of the welfare aid that Africa has come to depend on, rather than work towards making their economies work......

The West (collective) needs to understand that not everybody they help are going to appreciate it and sing Kumb Bye Ah....nor are they going to allow real democratic rule....they are a tribal societies and have been for thousands of years....


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## Edward Campbell (23 Sep 2009)

I attended a talk at the University of Ottawa today, sponsored by Centre for International Policy Studies by Daryl Copeland to promote his new book, Guerrilla Diplomacy.

You can get a good taste of his ideas here.

Copeland situates everything in one longish sentence with a 3D flavour:

If *d*evelopment is the new security in the era of globalization, then *d*iplomacy muct displace *d*efence at the centre of international policy.

By that he means: *If* (it is by no means certain that it will happen) *d*evelopment (by which he means giving the poor in the world access to the benefits of globalization) is the new security (he interprets security to mean "freedom from fear" and freedom from want) in the era of globalization (today, the _era_ after the Cold War) then *d*iplomacy (negotiation - the sort of things upon which the W2I people are focused) must displace *d*efence (the sort of things upon which the Army.ca people are focused) at the centre of international policy (which goes beyond _just_ foreign policy and embraces domestic, trade and _humanitarian_ matters, too).

Guerrilla diplomacy aims to extend the _spectrum_ which now extends from:

Public Diplomacy                                                                                                                            Traditional Diplomacy
_National leaders to the *peoples* of another nation_ <===========>   _National ambassadors deal with foreign ministers_ 

To something new:

Guerrilla Diplomacy <===========> Public Diplomacy <=============> Traditional Diplomacy
National diplomats to the people/     _National leaders_ to the                             _National ambassadors
individual of another nation              *peoples* of another nation                   deal with foreign ministers_ 


It is a seductive message, carefully crafted to appeal to those who sense that soldiers and _militarism_ have overtaken peaceful negotiations, etc, etc. It is also carefully situated in a "world" in which the "threats" are global climate change, pandemics and poverty rather than radical Islam or terrorism. If you buy into Copelands "new world" then you will want his new world order.

--------------------
My opinions:

1. Our experience, about 6,000 years of it "on the record," is that *d*iplomacy always fails and that *d*efence must rush in to fill two roles:

+ Wrecking crew - to destroy the diplomatic and political _structures_ that failed; and

+ Clean-up crew - to _reset the table_ for new *d*iplomatic efforts - which will fail again.

Copeland accepts the _history_ but not the _predictive_ part. He believes, as he must, I suppose, that _guerrilla diplomacy_ can fix all that

2. Soldiers are not diplomats, _guerrilla_ or otherwise (Copeland agrees) and diplomats (and civil servants) are not soldiers. Too many diplomats are serving too far forward (Copeland disagrees because _guerrilla diplomats are supposed to be "out and about")__ and too many soldiers are mentoring civil government officials (Copeland agrees) even when there is no one else willing or able to do it.

3. Foreign Affairs needs more resources for missions, including something akin to Copeland's guerrilla diplomats, in more and more places. (Copeland agrees, of course.)

4. We need several, new, only loosely coordinated and actually competitive, intelligence services, including a defence intelligence service, that can operate separately from the diplomatic community. (Copeland disagrees). _


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## Edward Campbell (24 Sep 2009)

Here is a link to Copeland's talk at the Munk Centre in Toronto which will give a pretty good idea of his talk in Ottawa.

You can sense his frustration with decades of diplomatic _action_, perhaps inaction, that was driven by Cold War *imperatives*. He is wrong, of course, about an _undifferentiated_ threat - it was well differentiated *in defence ministries*, senior civilian and military officers well understood, took careful account of, and exploited the significant differences between e.g. China and Russia and Cuba and some Marxist Africans, but he may be right that foreign ministries were not so careful or thoughtful.

He's *right*, as was Churchill, in saying that talking ("jaw-jaw") is usually better than fighting ("war-war") but at some point in the process, history teaches us, the talking becomes less and less useful and war becomes an option - sometimes the most even the only useful option.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Oct 2009)

I attended a briefing by Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Policy Process at Tufts University’s (Medford, Mass) Feinstein International Center on Winning Hearts And Minds:
Questioning The Effectiveness Of Aid In Promoting Stability In Afghanistan at the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies.

Wilder is one of a rather small minority of _experts_ who actually go to Afghanistan and talk to Afghans and foreigners about what’s going on.

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Tufts University_ web site is an _in house_ interview (_puff piece_) that summarizes some of Dr. Wilder’s views:

http://tuftsjournal.tufts.edu/2009/09_2/corner/01/


> The Real Problem in Afghanistan
> *It’s not that the Taliban are winning, it’s that the government is losing, says an international aid expert*
> 
> By Taylor McNeil
> ...




Wilder challenges most of the assumptions that appear to drive US (especially, and his main area of research), Canadian and NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan, especially the assumption that aid improves stability. He contends that the evidence says otherwise. Some University of Ottawa researchers who have worked/are working in North-East Afghanistan, also studying the impact and effectiveness of aid, agreed with him on that point. (Wilder’s research was, mainly, in and around _Paktia_ and _Khost_ provinces.)

Wilder discussed BGen Jon Vance’s recent remarks on aid vs. security. Wilder doesn’t disagree but he points out that the locals are, too often, caught between a rock (Vance’s Canadians) and a hard place (Taliban). Vance says, “Stop the bombers or I wont dig your wells.” The Taliban says, “Try to report us to Vance and his soldiers and we’ll cut your throats.”

Wilder’s recommendations are:

•	Policies (not just on aid) should be evidence based;

•	Prioritize *quality* (perhaps _utility_) of aid over quantity;

•	Accept that bigger ≠ better;

•	Recognize that aid can be destabilizing;

•	Reward security, not insecurity; (i.e. _BGen Vance is right,_ *IF* _he reduces aid to insecure areas and offers more to areas where aid is working – reward success and punish failure. In a broader sense, perhaps it is time to move more aid to the North, away from Kandahar and Helmand, etc._ )

•	Prioritize development over security; and

•	Governance and the rule of law are keys to all long term success in Afghanistan.

Wilder has promised to send me his slide deck and I will post it when I get it.


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## Edward Campbell (6 Oct 2009)

Andrew Wilder sent me his slide deck but, since he is still using it at universities and _think tanks_ throughout North America, he has asked that it should not be posted on the web. Here, however, are a couple of “bullet lists” that will help to give some ideas of what he thinks is going wrong:

*Questionable Stabilization Assumptions*

•	Poverty and a lack of reconstruction are significant causes of conflict and the insurgency
•	There is a linear causal relationship between reconstruction assistance, economic development and stabilization
•	Aid projects make you popular and help “win hearts and minds”
•	Extending the reach of the central government in Afghanistan contributes to stabilization

And:

•	Historical evidence does not support assumption [that: _”Security and Development are two sides of the same coin.”_ (Hamid Karzai, Tokyo Conference 2002) and _”By building trust and confidence in Coalition forces, these CERP [Commander’s Emergency Response Program] projects increase the flow of intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against insurgents and terrorists.”_ (Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, 2007)]
•	[There is] Little evidence that poverty or lack of reconstruction are significant drivers of current insurgency in Afghanistan
•	[There is] Little evidence that post-9/11 humanitarian and development efforts in Afghanistan have had a stabilization impact 

Further, here is a link to a related OP-Ed piece Dr. Wilder wrote for the _Boston Globe_.


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## Edward Campbell (6 Oct 2009)

I attended a presentation by Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institute which is, regularly, described as one of the three most influential policy institutes in the U.S. and has been variously described, by the New York Times alone, as liberal, liberal-centrist, centrist, and conservative – which may say more about the shift in the NY Times’ views than it says about Brookings.

The key thing about Riedel is that he chaired Obama’s _strategic_ review on Afghanistan and Pakistan which was completed in Mar 09and was adopted by NATO as its own _grand strategy_ at the Apr 09 Heads of Government meeting in Strasbourg. Riedel assigned two attributes to Obama’s view of the _strategy_: _adaptive_ and _reactive_, suggesting that Obama is prepared to revisit it as the situation demands.

Al Qaeda, Riedel says, is alive and well. After eight years of fighting we have managed to move its command team from a known place – Kandahar – to an unknown place, probably somewhere in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier region – this despite the biggest “manhunt” the world has ever seen with the greatest rewards ever offered.

Al Qaeda is not alone, it is a (relatively) small organization that operates as part of a loose _syndicate_ of various and sundry _Islamist_ or _jihadist_ *movements* – most funded, to a greater or lesser degree, from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and some _allied_ with Pakistan’s intelligence services.

The war in Afghanistan is, currently, being lost, but it is not over, yet.

The enemy has the momentum; the enemy has, in fact, seized the _strategic_ and _tactical_ initiative – according to Riedel because former President George WE. Bush frittered away America’s military strength and political capital in Iraq.

Riedel says Gen. McChrystal’s analysis and prescription are, broadly, correct even if his _delivery_ may “do in” the whole enterprise. We need “smart COIN” to win.

The situation is not, or need not be hopeless: most Afghans want NATO/ISAF to “win” by helping the legitimate government of Afghanistan to be able to defeat (or at least contain) the Taliban. Riedel points out that there is no _”national”_ insurgency. There is a Pashtun insurgency which is, largely, confined to a few regions in the South and East.

The ANA, according to Riedel, is the key to winning, but it is not good enough, yet. It can and must get better. The momentum can be reversed if the ANA can be made to work.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are different – not one big *AFPAK* issue. Pakistan is the bigger, more dangerous and more difficult. Pakistan is, simultaneously, both a *patron* and *victim* of terrorism. Pakistan is fighting a real war against some terrorists in e.g. the Swat Valley even as it uses other terrorist groups for its own purposes. Pakistan is focused on India and Pakistani mischief making has turned India into a real threat.

But there is good news, too. There are credible reports that India and Pakistan opened a backchannel that developed, at least, a _framework_ for future cooperation. But even as some Pakistani leaders work for peace others, representing a _”dark side”_ of Pakistan, continue to promote violence and terrorism in an effort to promote an India-Pakistan nuclear war which, despite their beliefs, Pakistan cannot win, possible cannot even survive.

India is a key player in the region. President Bush was right to engage it and the engagement needs to continue but India does not want American interference in its diplomacy with Pakistan and China. The Indians and the Chinese (and many Americans, too, including Riedel) are convinced that American diplomacy is too clumsy, too public and quite incapable of the subtlety that is needed to deal with the hugely complex web of Sino-India relations. None of the three (China, India or Pakistan) *trusts* America to stay the course, any course.

America is having serious second thoughts about Afghanistan because of the “sticker shock” caused by McChrystal’s report which came too far after the new NATO strategy. The election fiasco and, even worse, the _duelling Op Eds_ between UN mission head Kai Eide and former deputy head Peter Galbraith over the extent of the corruption in the recent elections has further eroded Americans’ confidence.

Obama’s political “enemy,” in Washington, is the Democratic base.


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## Edward Campbell (26 Oct 2009)

I attended a very interesting talk by US Navy Capt (Ret’d) R. Robinson Harris of Lockheed Martin MS2 Integrated Defense Technologies who is also a member of the Canadian Navy’s Strategic Advisory Group. I hope my highly imperfect knowledge of naval matters is sufficient to give a reasonably accurate picture of what he had to say.

The official “blurb” says:



> [size=11pt] Drawing on his naval, policy, and industry experience, R. Robinson Harris will discuss trends in the development of the next generation surface combatants. At the forefront of these trends are innovative forms of modularity and sustainability that will transform how future navies can operate and deploy, a reality that the Canadian government, ship-building industry, and Navy must consider as they begin contemplating the replacement of Canada's frigates and destroyers.
> 
> Captain Harris retired from the U. S. Navy in 1998 after 30 years of commissioned service. A Surface Warfare Officer, he served in a number of surface combatants and aircraft carriers. He commanded the Tomahawk Strike Destroyer, USS CONOLLY (DD 979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. Since retiring from the Navy, Captain Harris has worked for Lockheed Martin where he currently serves as Director of Advanced Concepts. He has led numerous seminars, workshops, and wargames pertaining to the Navy's '3-1 Strategy', '1000 Ship Navy', 'Global Fleet Stations,' and Riverine Warfare. He also participated in development of the Navy's new strategy, 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.' He currently serves as an Adviser to the CNO Strategic Studies Group, and he is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs. He has served on the Canadian Navy's Strategic Advisory Group since 2008. Most recently he was appointed to the Secretary of the Navy's Naval Research Advisory Committee.



Capt Harris framed his remarks on the US Navy’s _Cooperative Strategy_ which, in a rather _Taoist_ way, rests on the principle that “Preventing wars is just as important as winning wars.” This is, in many respects a very common sense approach for navies because they have, traditionally, been the *strategic* “war prevention” service. Capt Harris believes that the USN’s cooperative strategy will drive Canada’s naval strategy. He focused, above all, on the need for flexibility – especially considering the ever lengthening _service life_ that Canada demands of its warships. He very correctly, pointed out that no one, not Barack Obama and not Hu Jintao and certainly not Peter MacKay, has any idea at5 all about what the world will look like in 20, much less 50 years.

He discussed five “keys” to warship flexibility:

•	SIZE;
•	MODELARITY;
•	OPEN ARCHITECTURE;
•	INTEROPERABILITY; AND
•	UNMANNED VEHICLES.

Size, Capt Harris suggested, does matter. He noted that steel is cherap; typically the “platform” is only about ⅓ of the capital cost of a warship and the capital cost is only a tiny percent of the _life cycle_ costs so it is cheap and easy to “go big” which also improves both seakeeping and habitability and allows for better choices of weapon systems.

Modularity, he offered, is the “smart” way to design. He offered to sorts of modularity – one based on the German Meko system or the Danish Stanaflex system.






A roll-on roll-off ramp installed at the stern of the ship accesses the flex deck (flexible deck).

Of the two, he prefers the Danish model which, he suggested, is the base upon which the US Littoral Combat Ship’s modular design was based.





Cutaway of GD design showing internal spaces for mission modules.

Open Architecture involves providing a common (to the whole navy) “electronic backbone” for the ships so that C2 and weapons and control systems can all be standardized and can evolve, together, over time.

Interoperability within the nation’s fleets and between nations’ fleets and with other services is essential and, technically, relatively easy to accomplish on a small scale – say a half dozen countries. It gets harder and harder and, eventually, become a practical impossibility as the number of _services_ (navy, air force, army, coast guard, police, customs) and the number of countries grows. We (Australia, Britain, Canada, America and so on) *have accomplished* *practical* interoperability between navies and between naval air arms. Everything else, including NATO, is hard.

Unmanned vehicles. Capt Harris is a proponent of unmanned vehicles – air, surface and sub-surface – there was little debate on unmanned systems, _per se_ but his contention that automation and unmanned systems can save on people was hotly debated. Seceral Canadian officers pointed out that the saving that US plans for the Littoral Combat Ship are only possible because it forms only a small part of a much larger fleet and it has a very restricted role. Canadians pointed to recent German and Singaporean experience that shows that their “reduced staffing” ships cannot sustain high tempo operations for any reasonable length of time.

A few observations:

1.	There is a need, in Canada, for a mixed fleet -

•	Small combatants (say, just for argument, between 1,500 and 2,500 tons, carrying unmanned air vehicles) that are “blue water” capable but serve primarily for coastal patrol and to train officers and sailors;

•	Large combatants (say 4,000 to 8,000 tons, carrying manned aircraft) (the CPF is 4,750± tons) for global operations;

•	Support ships (probably 25,000 to 50,000 tons); 

•	Submarines; and

•	Miscellaneous vessels.

All should be designed to a common “open architecture,” all should be “interoperable” and all should “evolve” on a common path.

2.	Flexibility is, indeed, the primary requirement.

3.	Canada builds “platforms” (hulls) but then _integrates_ weapons and systems from several countries. So does the US – up to about 30% of the content of the Littoral Combat Ship being sourced from offshore. BQ defence critic and Deputy Chair of the HoC Defence Committee Clasude Bachand questioned the US commitment to real standardization and interoperability and Capt Harris agreed with him that protectionism is alive and very healthy in the US Congress and in the Pentagon, but he suggested that money, alone, is driving the US towards greater and greater standardization because they can no longer afford to “Buy American.”


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## Edward Campbell (26 Oct 2009)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I attended a presentation by Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institute which is, regularly, described as one of the three most influential policy institutes in the U.S. and has been variously described, by the New York Times alone, as liberal, liberal-centrist, centrist, and conservative – which may say more about the shift in the NY Times’ views than it says about Brookings.
> 
> The key thing about Riedel is that he chaired Obama’s _strategic_ review on Afghanistan and Pakistan which was completed in Mar 09and was adopted by NATO as its own _grand strategy_ at the Apr 09 Heads of Government meeting in Strasbourg. Riedel assigned two attributes to Obama’s view of the _strategy_: _adaptive_ and _reactive_, suggesting that Obama is prepared to revisit it as the situation demands.
> 
> ...



There is now a podcast of Bruce Riedel's talk available here.


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## Edward Campbell (8 Jan 2010)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I attended a talk by Dambisa Moyo yesterday. It was sponsored by Canada 2020. (I’m not a member but I do enjoy many of their events.)
> 
> It was pretty predictable, at least it was for those who have read her book – everyone interested in Africa should (and CF members should be interested in Africa). She emphasized that she is an economist and her arguments are those of an economist and she _apologized_ because they have been misrepresented by the mainstream, celebrity obsessed media who cannot figure out why her views ought to be taken as seriously as, say, those of Bono or Bob Geldof.
> 
> ...




Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) OF THE Copyright Act from the _Foreign Affairs_ web site is an article relevant to Dambisa Moyo’s thesis:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65916/deborah-brautigam/africa’s-eastern-promise


> Africa’s Eastern Promise
> *What the West Can Learn From Chinese Investment in Africa*
> 
> Deborah Brautigam
> ...




The loans to which Brautigam refers are not quite the investments Moyo wants, but they are a huge step in that direction.


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## GreggCentre (30 Jan 2010)

Update from Kandahar

A Gregg Centre public lecture by:
Colonel Roch Lacroix
Deputy Commander Task Force Kandahar, 2009
7:30 PM, Monday February 1st, Wu Conference Centre,
UNB, Fredericton, New Brunswick

Colonel Roch Lacroix recently returned from Afghanistan, where he served as Deputy Commander of Canadian and NATO Forces in Kandahar Province from February to November 2009.  Col Lacroix will offer the latest first-hand insights into the counter-insurgency struggle taking place in this conflict-stricken region.  He will also provide an update on Canadian Forces assistance efforts on the development, reconstruction and law and order fronts.   Col Lacroix served at a unique time in Canada’s Afghan Mission, when President Obama’s increase of US forces and aid greatly increased the NATO effort in Kandahar.    

www.unb.ca/greggcentre


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## GreggCentre (7 Apr 2010)

Atlantic Military Affairs Symposium:
Islanders at War and Peace, Charlottetown 2010

Friday April 16th
At the University of Prince Edward Island
DUFFY Lecture Theatre (Rm135 in the Science building)
Reception to follow at the Faculty Lounge in the MAIN Building

Saturday April 17th
At the Prince Edward Island Regiment’s Queen Charlotte Armoury
On the corner of Haviland and Water Streets

Public Symposium Connects Prince Edward Island’s Military History to the Modern Canadian Forces.
Local Soldiers, Sailors and Aircrew form the core of a two-day conference focusing on the Island’s role in the defence of Canada.

The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick, the University of Prince Edward Island, HMCS Queen Charlotte and the Prince Edward Island Regiment are teaming up to host the first annual Atlantic Military Affairs Symposium in Charlottetown.  This public military history and current affairs gathering takes place on UPEI campus on Friday evening 16th April and at the PEI Regiment’s Queen Charlotte Armoury all day Saturday, 17th April. 

The event includes local and national military historians presenting on subjects ranging from the Island’s 19th Century militia and contribution in two world wars to the role of today’s PEI army and naval reservists around the world. 

This first annual Atlantic Military Affairs Symposium features a keynote address on Friday 16th April by renowned Canadian naval historian, Professor Roger Sarty from Wilfrid Laurier University.  In honour of Canada’s Naval Centennial, Professor Sarty’s address is titled: “By accident as much as by design:  The surprising origins and rise of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1881-1945”

The organizers aim to bring together historians, Island Reservists, students and the general public interested in how Prince Edward Island connects to Canada’s military past and present.  Other featured speakers include The Gregg Centre’s Lee Windsor and Brent Wilson, PEI’s own Boyde Beck and David Campbell, and reservists from HMCS Queen Charlotte and the Prince Edward Island Regiment who’ve returned from service overseas. 

Admission is free and all are welcome!
Lunch will be provided and the PEI Regiment Museum will be open.
For more information see our program at:
http://www.unb.ca/greggcentre/public_education/amasconference.html

Or contact:
Lee Windsor PhD, Deputy Director
Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society
University of New Brunswick
PO Box 4400 Fredericton NB E3B 5A3
Tel (506) 453-4911; Fax (506) 447-3175
lwindsor@unb.ca  www.unb.ca/greggcentre


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## Edward Campbell (19 Oct 2010)

Please look here.

Those who can should attend David Bercuson's talk tomorrow. (Sadly I have a previous commitment.)

There is no charge, registration is not required. The building is at the corner of Laurier and Nicholas - just across from NDHQ South Tower (101 Colonel By Drive).


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## Edward Campbell (22 Oct 2010)

And also, please note: 28 Oct 10 at 17:30 Hrs -

*Debate – Should Canada Buy F-35 Fighter Jets? 
For*: Rob Huebert, University of Calgary
*Against*: Michael Byers, University of British Columbia

Same place: Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. E., Room 1150 (1st floor)

Should be interesting for those who can attend. "This free event will be in English. Registration is not required."


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## Edward Campbell (7 Jan 2011)

Those who can attend - unfortunately I am away in Texas and China - may find all three of these talks by Paul Myer, _Taliban Jack_ Layton and Kim Richard Nossal interesting. 

All are in the same place:  The Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. E., Ottawa, Room 3120 - just across the street from the South Tower of the NDHQ building. There is no fee and registration is not required.


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## Journeyman (7 Jan 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> may find all three of these talks...interesting.


Hey, you didn't mention the following talk on their list -- Peggy Hicks, (Global Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, New York), talking on "Human Rights and the United Nations"; don't you think that will be _fascinating_?    ;D


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## Edward Campbell (14 Jan 2011)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Those who can attend - unfortunately I am away in Texas and China - may find all three of these talks by Paul Myer, _Taliban Jack_ Layton and Kim Richard Nossal interesting.
> 
> All are in the same place:  The Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. E., Ottawa, Room 3120 - just across the street from the South Tower of the NDHQ building. There is no fee and registration is not required.




From CIPS:

*Room change: Jack Layton speech*

Please note: today's 2 p.m. presentation by Jack Layton will take place on the 12th floor of the Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. E. (not the 3rd floor as previously advertised).


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## Edward Campbell (17 Feb 2011)

The very few members who pay any attention at all to my musings will know that I have reservations about *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) in both theory and practice. Thus I am (slightly) saddened to be, still, In China, when I could be attending what looks like an interesting presentation by Prof. Ian Hurd of Northwestern University at Ottawa University/CIPS.

Here is the "blurb:"

-----------------------
February 18, 2011

*Ian Hurd*
Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World

A talk by Ian Hurd, Northwestern University

Presented by CIPS
Location: Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. E., Room 3120
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Free. Registration not required. In English.

Ian Hurd is Associate Professor of political science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.  His teaching and research is on the interaction between governments and international institutions, and he has published widely on international organizations, international theory, and world politics.  He is currently on leave at the Niehaus Center on Globalization and Governance at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he is writing a book on the connections between international law and foreign policy.  His most recent work is International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2011), a textbook for courses on international politics and international organizations.


It is tomorrow - your time.


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## KaiserBill (25 Nov 2011)

The Second Annual "New Perspectives on the Second World War" Colloquium

The History Graduate Students' Union and Calgary Military Museums' Society are pleased to announce a special colloquium and reception in honour of the 70th Anniversary of the Japanese attacks on the British Empire and the U.S. featuring talks by John Ferris and Christopher Bell.

This evening is the second session of the annual "New Perspectives Colloquium," and is host to two talks by pre-eminent historians.  Professor John Ferris, a noted historian of British intelligence and strategy will speak about his current research on British and American intelligence in the lead up to Pearl Harbor. He will be followed by Dr. Christopher Bell of Dalhousie University, who will speak about Canadian soldiers and the attack on Hong Kong.

The colloquium will be held at the Kensington Legion (1910 Kensington Rd NW Calgary).  The evening will run on 8 December 2011, from 6:30-9:00 pm, and will include a New York steak dinner. Admission for the general public is $40.00.  Veterans and students are particularly encouraged to attend and registration for both is only $20.00.  Tickets can be purchased securely through PayPal or at the door (cash or check only).  Follow the link at the history department website to register: http://hist.ucalgary.ca/hgsu/

To RSVP (registration must be received by December 1, 2011) or for more information, please email The History Graduate Students' Union at ranke@ucalgary.ca, or call (403) 220-2669.


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## kqm (21 Nov 2012)

Hello Everyone,

On Wednesday, 28 November 2012, The Atlantic Council of Canada (ACC) will be hosting its annual Fall Conference. 
Speakers include: The Hon. Bill GRAHAM, His Excellency Barna KARIMI, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Canada, BGen Derek W. JOYCE, and Col (Ret’d) Brian MACDONALD.
This conference will focus on Canada and NATO’s legacy in Afghanistan and the recent strategic shift from conflicts relying on personnel-heavy operations to more technologically reliant fronts, notably cyber security and drone warfare.

Ticket prices are $75 and for students it is $20

Feel free to contact the ACC by either email: rsvp@atlantic-council.ca or phone: 416-979-1875 if you are interested in attending the event.

See attachment for further details

Thank You


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