# CF Funding Discussion - A Merged Thread



## GAP (20 Jun 2008)

Tories unveil Canada's long-term military strategy
CTV.ca News Staff Updated: Thu. Jun. 19 2008 11:32 PM ET 
Article Link

One month after Stephen Harper announced major plans for the Canadian military without actually having a document to show the media, the Tories have quietly put their Canada First Defence Strategy online. 

The report calls for clearly defined missions and capabilities for the military. 

The plan has six core missions: 

Daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through Canada's commitment to NORAD. 
Supporting a major international event in Canada, like the 2010 Olympics. 
Responding to any potential terrorist strikes. 
Support for civilian authorities for natural disasters. 
Conducting a major international mission for a extended period . 
Deploying to world crisis spots for shorter periods.  

The Tories have committed to provide stable funding over 20 years. It is expected the military will have a budget of $45 to $50 billion for big-ticket purchases. 

One chart shows that personnel accounts for $250 billion of defence spending,  2008-09 to 2027-28 (Accrual Numbers), or 51 per cent of the funding. This would see 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reserves by 2028, and includes a 25,000-strong civilian workforce.

The report uses charts and pictures to show where increased spending will go, explaining "...the Government increased defence funding through Budget 2006 by $5.3 billion over five years, including a baseline increase of $1.8 billion starting in 2010-11. In doing so, it established a firm foundation for the future and raised the baseline on which future efforts to rebuild the Canadian Forces will be anchored. 
More on link


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2008)

Here is the document.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (20 Jun 2008)

Of course, CBC is reporting that the plan calls for $490 billion in spending (link here: CBC story), without providing the least bit of context to that number.  As CTV points out above, a huge chunk of defence spending is on personnel, a point lost on the Bush-bashers making comments on the CBC story.  Once again, I'm at a loss to explain why some "journalists" can be so immune from the effects that their poorly researched and abysmally written work causes.

As for Dawn Black (see CBC's link), don't get me started...


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2008)

I don’t want to rain on anyone’s parade but I’m not impressed.

First “real dollars” are not a useful measure of defence spending on any sensible *comparative* basis. That may seem counterintuitive at first glance - what else, besides “real dollars” should we use to measure expenditures, after all? – but those “real dollars” cannot be *compared* to anything. How, for example, an we assess the priority the government assigns to defence relative, say, to health or education or infrastructure? We need to be able to *compare* expenditures against some common reference point. How do we compare how important defence is to Canada *compared* to, say, other NATO members or to Australia, Brazil or China? Once again we need to *compare* against some standard reference. The most common standard is GDP (Gross Domestic Product – the measure of a nation’s wealth (publicly available for almost all countries – including China).

Using the government’s own data: the graph (Chart 1) on page 11 of the _”Canada First”_ document and GDP (for 1st quarter of 2008) as reported by Statistics Canada* we can see that:

•	Defence spending in *2008/09* (about $18 Billion according to page 4 of the document) will be *1.14% of GDP*;

•	It will rise to *1.16% of GDP in 2013/14* (when the defence budget is projected (page 11, again) to rise to $20 Billion);

•	To *1.29% in 2019/20*; and then

•	Finally, to *1.34% in 2026/27*.

Now, that is a real increase in the measure that matters, so kudos to the Conservative government for that.

We *should* be able to compare those rates to those of other big spending “envelopes” but, sadly, other ministers are, generally, unable, to project their budgets as far forward as DND is doing. We can, however, compare historical trends. For example, according to one (US) source, Canada’s health care spending increased at an * average annual rate* of 3.1% per years from 1980 to 2003. That is a rate which is higher than the *average annual rate* of GDP growth – in other words, health spending was a high priority because it grew at a rate that (slightly) exceeded the rate of GDP growth (which was about 3% for much of that period). Defence spending was a lower priority for much of that period (see page 11, yet again) having, for the 1986-2005 period an *average annual rate of real growth* of *-*0.4%.

Defence spending of other nations, measured as a percentage of *their* GDPs, were dealt with by Ruxted here.



> We decided to examine a few of the middle powers Canada aspires to lead. We selected ten countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Thailand, Singapore and Sweden). Some are larger than Canada, others richer, some others are smaller and poorer. We used an old (2002/03) but consistent data base* to measure defence budgets as a percentage of GDP and permanent force military manpower as a percentage of population. According to that database Canada spent 1.12% of its GDP on defence and 0.18% of its population are in the full time military. Amongst the other 10 middle powers the numbers range from 0.53% of GDP (Brazil) to 4.8% of GDP (Singapore) – nearly a full order of magnitude difference, and military manpower range from 0.11% (Mexico) to 0.61% (Sweden). The averages for the 10 are: 2.36% of GDP is spent on defence and 0.46% of the population serves in the military. Canada, in other words, spends less than half than the average middle power on defence and has just over ⅓ of the average full time military manpower.



Ruxted suggested that Canada should strive soon – by 2012 – to *approach* a spending level of 2% of GDP by 2012. That is, clearly, not in the cards.

In fact, it appears that while defence spending in Canada will actually grow at a “real” rate over a long period – if successive governments, of whatever stripe, toe the Conservative line – it will not increase at anything like the *general* rate of inflation, much less at the rate at which prices for sophisticated military hardware increase – but that’s another topic.

A major flaw in the Conservative plan is visible on page 13 (Chart 3a). During most of my service (35+ years) most military experts recommended that a sound defence budget – any country’s defence budget – needed to apply 20% of its resources to equipment, just in order to avoid the periodic episodes of _”rust out”_ that continue to bedevil the CF and to prevent the need to cut muscle and bone rather than trimming fat. In order to get to 70,000 permanent force military people, 30,000 part time force people supported by 25,000 civil servants Canada will need to spend over half its budget on personnel. A better number would be 35%, in my opinion (but an opinion grounded in data that I am just to lazy to dig out and present here).

All that being said: The laundry list of capabilities (page 3) is most welcome. It is *the only acceptable* method of justifying expenditures. 



> • Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
> • Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
> • Respond to a major terrorist attack;
> • Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
> ...



The “laundry list” is fleshed out with real numbers of people (page 13) and weapon systems (page 17) that allow Canadians to measure the government’s performance.

On balance, in my opinion, not good enough - but better, much better, that anything we were promised by Trudeau or Chrétien. (Actually, and in fairness, Trudeau *delivered* more than he promised – under intense pressure from e.g. Helmut Schmidt and Valerie Giscard d’Estaing. Mulroney, on the other hand, promised much and delivered little, but he did, at least, deliver something.)


--------------------
* I have _grown_ GDP at the same rates DND used in the _"Canada First"_ document: 1.5% and then 2%. I think that's seriously below what most economists forecast and that means the projected "real" growth in spending, for which I give the government credit, may be illusory.

Edit: added note.


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2008)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Of course, CBC is reporting that the plan calls for $490 billion in spending (link here: CBC story), without providing the least bit of context to that number.  As CTV points out above, a huge chunk of defence spending is on personnel, a point lost on the Bush-bashers making comments on the CBC story.  Once again, I'm at a loss to explain why some "journalists" can be so immune from the effects that their poorly researched and abysmally written work causes.
> 
> As for Dawn Black (see CBC's link), don't get me started...



Well, DND did toss that number out, in the Executive Summary, so they must have wanted the media to talk about it. The law of unintended consequences and all that, I suppose.


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## karl28 (20 Jun 2008)

Well I think its great that the CF is starting to get some of the money it needs  to survive .     I have always thought  that Canada needs a small military ( 80,000 or so in troop strength  )  but have enough modern equipment to handle any operations that may come up  .


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## Edward Campbell (20 Jun 2008)

If you want another view go to page 10 of this recent (Oct 06) report from the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Here is the pertinent extract:
My emphasis added



> Although this Government has at least promised to invest more money than its predecessor, its budget projection for 2011-2012 still works out to about $20 billion. The Committee is convinced that DND needs a budget of at least $25 billion and more likely $35 billion by 2011-2012.* Senior military sources tell us that the higher figure is far more realistic.
> 
> Not only will the extrapolated current budget fall short down the road, commitments in the current budget are back-loaded so that relatively little money is being spent upfront. Our Committee believes that quickness is essential – adequate military strength delayed is adequate military strength denied when it may well be needed.
> 
> Canadians spend $343 apiece on the most important role of any society – defending itself, and advancing its citizens’ interests abroad. The Dutch, who aren’t exactly known as warmongers, spend $658. The Australians spend $648. The British spend $903. Responsible countries are spending in the neighbourhood of 2 percent of GDP on defence. Our Committee’s proposed budget would place Canada in that category. This government’s budget, if spending continues to increase in the same pattern in the coming years – will not come close.



I don’t know how the good senators found the $343.00 figure; my _guesstimate_ is about $400.00 per Canadian based on a budget (2005/06) of $13.3 Billion and a population of just under 33 Million.

But, on that basis, if the population (same ref) rises to 37.6 Million in 2025 and the budget has indeed risen to just under $30 Billion then we will be spending about $800 per person on defence – ‘better’ than Australia or Holland do *now*. But, it will still be _waaaaaay_ below the current UK level of 2% of GDP.

Fun with numbers, anyone?


--------------------

* Just about what Ruxted said.


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## The Bread Guy (20 Jun 2008)

It appears someone else likes your 2% figure, ERC.....

_*"Many allies face the dilemma of either spending money on operations or investing in new acquisition programs.  Many allies’ failure to respect the 2 percent of GDP target for their defense budgets exacerbates this dilemma and also widens the capability gap with those allies that are investing in usable and deployable forces."*_
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "A fair and equitable burden for Europe’s NATO allies", Taipei Times, 21 Jun 08


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## TrexLink (21 Jun 2008)

While I am pleased to see the promise of more funding, I find myself a bit confused about what the document actually says.  



> Q12. Will the Canadian Forces be receiving a new Northern utility aircraft?
> 
> A12. Much work remains to be done to continue implementing the Canada First Defence Strategy, and further details regarding key projects, including equipment decisions, will be forthcoming in the future.
> 
> ...



The govt's own website asks three questions (OK, four). Were any of them answered?


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## The Bread Guy (21 Jun 2008)

I deal with government writing a bit, so let me try to translate:

Q12. Will the Canadian Forces be receiving a new Northern utility aircraft?

A12. Much work remains to be done to continue implementing the Canada First Defence Strategy, and *further details regarding key projects, including equipment decisions, will be forthcoming in the future.*

Q13. Is the government still planning on establishing a maritime commando regiment?

A13. The Canada First Defence Strategy focuses on maintaining the key core capabilities that the CF requires to deliver excellence at home and project leadership abroad. The investments included in the Strategy represent our most urgent fundamental requirements. Much work remains to be done to continue implementing the Canada First Defence Strategy, and *further details regarding key projects will be forthcoming.*

Q14. Will the airborne regiment be reinstated? What about JTF2 moving?

A14. The Canada First Defence Strategy focuses on maintaining the key core capabilities that the CF requires to deliver excellence at home and project leadership abroad. The investments included in the Strategy represent our most urgent fundamental requirements. Much work remains to be done to continue implementing the Canada First Defence Strategy, and *further details regarding key projects will be forthcoming.* 

Note a pattern here?

Optimist's translation:  "Wait, out"

Neutral translation:  "We've got a lot more stuff to sort out on DOING this, including (issue of question), and we'll let you know once we know."

Pessimist's translation:  "We're going to announce something down the road (but there's no guarantee it'll be this"


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## Fishbone Jones (21 Jun 2008)

.......or their going to reiterate it, with specifics, as part of the election platform. Something like this is best digested by the proletariat in small chunks. The only ones that want it all now, are the MSM and the opposition, and their only reasoning to tear it apart with a jaundiced eye. I trust the chess skills of Harper.


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## Kirkhill (21 Jun 2008)

http://blog.macleans.ca/2008/06/20/defence-policy-less-than-it-seems/ 

From Paul Wells blog a couple of points:

1 - this budget does not include operations - major operations will be financed out of general revenues
2 - it is not clear if these are current dollars or future dollars (adjusted for inflation)
3 - regardless of the amount a banker would look fairly favourably at a client that had a stable income of 490 Billion spread over 20 years when it came to making loans on major capital expenditures.

Now if only this government could guarantee the long term funding --- act of parliament calling for a regular outlay rather than having to do it King Charles's  way and have to come cap-in-hand every year?


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## Harry Potter (26 Jun 2008)

Does anyone really believe we will be able to meet the 70,000 regular force strength in 20 years?  We cannot even meet current ceilings, let alone increase them.  Its not a training capacity issue.  It is a demographic reality.  There are less and less people available to the workforce, and when they do join the workforce, the new generation is looking at benefits to them, not responding to a higher calling.  They hop form one job to the next, always looking for increased benefits, lower hours even if it means less pay.  There was a report on Generation "Y" in the Globe about four months ago.  This is also mentioned in the Future Security Strategy.  So what does this new Security Strategy do about it?  Zilch.  It increases strength ceilings we will never be able to meet, and plans on buying new equipment that shows zero adaptation to the new workforce reality.  Examples?  Leo 1 crew: 4.  Leo 2 crew 4.  same amount of people to do the same job, 40 years later.  Where is the innovation??  Same thing for artillery; how many gunners are needed to man the M777?  Same number as the older howitzers i bet.  Lighter gun, but who cares if you don't have the people to fire it.  The navy?  15 new Single Class Surface Combatants that will replace 15 frigates and destroyers...  Same capability, same crew size.  

Now I would have been really impressed if the paper had said something along the lines of :  _We think that despite our best efforts, we will not be able to increase effective troop strength above, say 55,000.  Therefore we will be buying tanks that can be twice as effective as what we have today, and can be operational and sustain that operational capability with half the crew of today's tanks.  We will be launching new automated ships that can do the work of a Halifax-Class Frigate with a crew of 70 sailors.  etc...  _ 

Okay, now let me have it...


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## blacktriangle (26 Jun 2008)

Not everyone is in the army for the pension and coverage etc. Some of us just want to do cool high speed shit and deploy. People like that will not stay in long term if they spend 3 years sitting around in gagetown or wainwright and don't get to do what they signed up for. I'll say it again, it seems easy to get people in, keeping them is the hard part.


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## George Wallace (26 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> Does anyone really believe we will be able to meet the 70,000 regular force strength in 20 years?  We cannot even meet current ceilings, let alone increase them.  Its not a training capacity issue.  It is a demographic reality.  There are less and less people available to the workforce, and when they do join the workforce, the new generation is looking at benefits to them, not responding to a higher calling.  They hop form one job to the next, always looking for increased benefits, lower hours even if it means less pay.  There was a report on Generation "Y" in the Globe about four months ago.  This is also mentioned in the Future Security Strategy.  So what does this new Security Strategy do about it?  Zilch.  It increases strength ceilings we will never be able to meet, and plans on buying new equipment that shows zero adaptation to the new workforce reality.  Examples?  Leo 1 crew: 4.  Leo 2 crew 4.  same amount of people to do the same job, 40 years later.  Where is the innovation??  Same thing for artillery; how many gunners are needed to man the M777?  Same number as the older howitzers i bet.  Lighter gun, but who cares if you don't have the people to fire it.  The navy?  15 new Single Class Surface Combatants that will replace 15 frigates and destroyers...  Same capability, same crew size.
> 
> Now I would have been really impressed if the paper had said something along the lines of :  _We think that despite our best efforts, we will not be able to increase effective troop strength above, say 55,000.  Therefore we will be buying tanks that can be twice as effective as what we have today, and can be operational and sustain that operational capability with half the crew of today's tanks.  We will be launching new automated ships that can do the work of a Halifax-Class Frigate with a crew of 70 sailors.  etc...  _
> 
> Okay, now let me have it...



Let you have it?

You haven't got it.


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## Harry Potter (26 Jun 2008)

> Let you have it?
> 
> You haven't got it.



Care you explain what you mean?


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## George Wallace (26 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> Care you explain what you mean?



Sure.

You just haven't got it.  You have no idea of what you are talking about.  You haven't grasped anything about what life is about in the military. Army.  You have commented on things, demonstrating that you have no concept of what you were commenting on.  

As they would say in Monty Python, "your parrot has expired".


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## Harry Potter (26 Jun 2008)

> You just haven't got it.  You have no idea of what you are talking about.  You haven't grasped anything about what life is about in the military. Army.  You have commented on things, demonstrating that you have no concept of what you were commenting on.
> 
> As they would say in Monty Python, "your parrot has expired".



George, 

I am sharing an informed opinion, hoping for some INTELLIGENT dabate.  Your reply not only doesn't quite measure up, but falls far short of the sort of intelligent debate that usually takes place here.  If you would care to explain where you think I am wrong, I will be very happy to listen and perhaps even change my mind.  But if this is the best you can do, you sound more like a troll than like an experienced retired service member interesting in bettering the future of the Canadian Military.


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## George Wallace (26 Jun 2008)

You have commented on things as if you were nothing more than a "Bean Counter".  The type of person who thinks they can save the CF money by making cuts in areas (s)he has no experience or knowledge of.  An example being some high ranking Engineer Officer in a cubical in Ottawa, who decides (s)he can save the Government and DND $100K if they shave 12 inches off the width of twenty-two doors in a Tank Hangar to be built on a CF Base.  Sure, it initially saved the Government and DND $100K, but when they tried to fit a tank through the doors, it didn't fit.  Another hangar had to be built next door for $40 million.  Brilliant.

Same goes for your example of streamlining the CF.  The idea of a Tank that had half the crew and could do the same thing as a tank with a crew of four.  Sure it is possible.  Would the CF be able to do anything besides go on parade with such vehicles?  No.  There is a lot of work to maintain a Tank.  Too much for two people.  The crews would not last longer than 24 hours on an operation.  Crew fatigue would cripple the Army.  Sentries have to be manned.  Maintenance has to be done.  Vehicles have to be fueled and bombed up.  Camouflage has to be maintained.  Radio watches have to be done.  Officers have to leave for Orders.  There are a multitude of things that a crew have to do.  It is hard enough with four.  Any less makes it impossible.  This is not the Air Force where a Pilot flies his mission and then has a whole Ground Crew in a safe area in the Rear, with nice comfy beds (in hotels while on Exercise).

Your whole post can be dissected and everything debunked to prove that you really don't have a clue.


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jun 2008)

Do you know something that we don't know in the Navy? Where are the documents that state the replacement ships for the frigates and the 280s will only have 70 man crews? We hope to reduce crew size and we _hope_ to introduce a high degree of automation but as of yet there is nada in the works.


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## Good2Golf (26 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> George,
> 
> I am sharing an informed opinion, hoping for some INTELLIGENT dabate.  Your reply not only doesn't quite measure up, but falls far short of the sort of intelligent debate that usually takes place here.  If you would care to explain where you think I am wrong, I will be very happy to listen and perhaps even change my mind.  But if this is the best you can do, you sound more like a troll than like an experienced retired service member interesting in bettering the future of the Canadian Military.



Harry, frankly, your manner of drawing out intelligent debate fails to hit the mark.  It comes across as combative (especially in the F22 v F35 thread) and here you seem to be espousing the replacement of people (since apparently we won't get them anyway) with technology, which as George has pointed out, is only one aspect of the overall capability.  Automated systems don't do things like change tracks, or replace engines, radios, control surfaces, etc... very well.  

Let's say we can reduce people, however, with more heavily automated systems; how much would that cost?  Would we have the money?  How would we replace not only the rank and file, but also specialized forces that have no technological solution.  

I'm reminded of a tenet whereby "Humans are more important than hardware."  Seems that not everybody holds that view, apparently.

My 2 ¢

G2G


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jun 2008)

Nor does technology shore up comparments lost in ships to damage, or tie those ships up, do RASs...need I go on?

I wonder if Harry has even been to sea before?


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## aesop081 (26 Jun 2008)

I made the mistake of reading the viewer comments on the CBC story.........

I need a drink


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jun 2008)

Tsk Tsk Tsk....I don't even bother anymore. Some of the idiotic comments that the Canadian public continues to make just makes me want to throw up.


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## Harry Potter (26 Jun 2008)

Guys, 

Do you think we will have in 20 years the people to man the equipment we are planning on buying?  MY argument is that we will not, and therefore should buy equipment accordingly.  

Funny how everyone buys into the mantra that people are more important than hardware, but no one seems to be thinking about how we will manage to attract and retain 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reserves in an age when even industry with the best wages and work conditions will not be able to do it.  

By the way, the crew numbers I threw out there about the ships' company were used as an example and I made it clear in the post.  Guys, get off your confrontational horses.   :

If we continue to plan to do business in the next 20 years as it has been done in the past 50, we are really missing the boat.  It wasn't a problem before; it is one now. 

I am not arguing in favor of reduces strengths, i am saying that reduces strength is a reality that we need to plan for now.    

Why don't you guys tell me how you plan to attract and retain 100,000 soldiers, airmen and sailors in the next 20 years?


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## Ex-Dragoon (26 Jun 2008)

> By the way, the crew numbers I threw out there about the ships' company were used as an example and I made it clear in the post.  Guys, get off your confrontational horses.


That you did but you also said the SCSCs would have the same capability and complement...thats an major error seeing how we are trying to bring back NGS, bring UAVs and UUVs into the picture....we want them to have at minimum the same capability they have at present with some of the capbilities that are coming on line now. Big difference from a naval point of view.


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## George Wallace (26 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> but no one seems to be thinking about how we will manage to attract and retain 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reserves in an age when even industry with the best wages and work conditions will not be able to do it.



So?  Enlighten me.  I am at a loss to know where all these people are going.  Are they all going on Welfare or what?

With all the layoffs in industry that "I have heard on the news lately", I would imagine there will be quite a few people looking for a change of employers and some security.  Where are all these 'assemblyline workers with minimum education going to go?  I know the CF isn't going to offer them $30 - $40 an hour, but there are a lot more benefits and better chance of collecting a Pension in the CF than working on an assemblyline.




			
				Harry Potter said:
			
		

> Guys, get off your confrontational horses.



Pointing out the errors of your post is not confrontational, unless you object to criticism.


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## Harry Potter (26 Jun 2008)

> Pointing out the errors of your post is not confrontational



Your first two posts were nothing except confrontational.  And I will not bother telling you what there were pointing at.  If you had engaged me with your third post right away, then maybe you could claim some contribution to constructive criticism.  



> If you would care to explain where you think I am wrong, I will be very happy to listen and perhaps even change my mind.



Does this sound like I am objecting to criticism?



> [I am at a loss to know where all these people are going.



Keep in mind we are talking about a plan that is to deliver capability and effects in 20 years.  By that time, all the assembly line workers that are being laid off will be off the workforce.  That's assuming they would be willing to trade a cushy comfy $30-$40 an hour job, protected by Buzz Hardgrove and the CAW, and trade it for the comfort of a FOB somewhere, or a ship.   

I think there simply will be less people to hire from.  Single-child family, is a trend now, if not a norm.  Contrasting to the baby-boom of the 50s and 60s, and its obvious that demand will exceed the offer.  

This is a good paper, if somewhat lengthy.  http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=1813  
The abstract says :"





> There are already significant skills shortages in many industries, and this trend will continue and intensify over the next decade. There are many potential solutions to this crisis. Each requires an innovative, strategic approach to workforce planning, recruitment, development, and retention".


  

Why is the Canada First Strategy not even hinting that it intends to address that?  

Stats can says :"





> However, ...the overall participation rate would decline sharply during the next 25 years.
> 
> This overall participation rate is the proportion of the total population aged 15 and over actively in the labour force. It is an indicator of the extent of an economy's working-age population that is economically active, and provides an indication of the relative size of the supply of labour available for the production of goods and services.
> 
> ...



We have a hard time meeting our current authorised troop strength as it is.  Is it not reasonable to think that rising the authorised troop strength is not necessarily going to bring more people to the fold?  If we know what we can reasonably expect to have as a steady troop strength in 20 years, and we know what effects we want to have, then let's fill in the blank in between and equip those troops with the sort of technology that will enable them to have the desired effect.  Forget how we have been doing things for the past 40 years; we had the people then, we don't now.  How do we need to be doing it in the next 20 years?  Are tours not getting long enough?  Are soldiers not rotating more often than they should?  To pick just one of many examples, what good to the CF will a Regiment of tanks be, if we only have the crewmen to deploy a Squadron worth?    The same appplies to all of the major capital projects.  

For all the talk about people being our most important asset, all the talk about growth in the CF is dominated by numbers of platforms, with no mention to demographics.  

Incidentally, I am not an engineer, and even less a bean counter.  I am sorry your past encounters with these people still affect you to this day, but will be grateful if you don't falsely characterise me.    






[Edit:  inserted a missing"[" in the code for one of the quotes. ]


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## blacktriangle (26 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> Your first two posts were nothing except confrontational.  And I will not bother telling you what there were pointing at.  If you had engaged me with your third post right away, then maybe you could claim some contribution to constructive criticism.
> 
> Does this sound like I am objecting to criticism?
> ".
> ...



100 tanks probably couldn't sustain a regiment anyways...but in that case, what are you advocating? People are being recruited more then they were a few years ago, how does it make sense to buy less kit? There are already huge shortages of vehicles like g wagons, LAVs etc and I don't think we can afford to downsize our navy anymore. We have managed this long, there is no point in buying less capability...that won't really help recruiting "sorry we only have 4 tanks to crew right now, and two are in the shop". 

If the CF handled its human resources better, there would be less releases etc...and that is the main issue. I think things are starting to improve in some areas/units, and maybe the CF is realizing that it's old ways of managing pers may not work for the people of today.


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## GAP (26 Jun 2008)

If I understand Harry Potter's point, it is that the Canada's long-term military strategy did not address the manpower issue. 

As a government, the Conservatives are going to put long-term strategies fairly vaguely, if only to avoid opposition claims on specific items. They will do it anyway, but why give them aim points.....


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## Harry Potter (27 Jun 2008)

Good2Golf, 



> Harry, frankly, your manner of drawing out intelligent debate fails to hit the mark.



Did you prefer the first two posts from George?



> you seem to be espousing the replacement of people (since apparently we won't get them anyway) with technology



Nope.  Not at all.  I don't WANT to replace them.  I think we have NO CHOICE but to make them more efficient.  George describes the life of a tank crew as it has been doing business for the past 60 years.  I think there has been no reason to change the way they have been doing it because recruiting has never been a problem.  (That's just one example, i am not picking on the Armour Corps.)  Now recruiting is a problem (at least I think it is, if I am wrong will someone show me where please?), so we need to look again at how we are doing business and change it.  Yep, soldiers ARE more important than hardware.  So let's make damn sure we don't waste them on tasks that a machine can do for them.  



> how much would that cost?  Would we have the money?



George calls me a bean counter, now you say I will spend too much.     I am told by real bean counters, that there is more money available in the next five+ years that we can possibly spend.  Do you know what the limitation is?  People.  There is not enough PM staff to manage enough projects to spend all the money available.  Granted we are talking about a different kind of people, but does that not indicate a trend?  Of course it will cost more, and of course it will require some departure from established norms, and that will raise questions.  That is why I would have liked to see it included in the Defense Strategy.  

Hey, I am not debating if we need 100 tanks, or 15 ships, or 65 fighters, or xx tactical airlifts, or xx Fixed Wing SAR, or whatever.  If this is what gets you all riled up, let me reassure you all.  These numbers are perfectly fine with me, provided we can man them.    What my posts are all about is:  let's address the fielding in operations of all this new kit, with the people we can realistically expect to have on strength.   Equipment that cannot be manned is no good to anyone.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter said:
			
		

> We have a hard time meeting our current authorised troop strength as it is.  Is it not reasonable to think that rising the authorised troop strength is not necessarily going to bring more people to the fold?  If we know what we can reasonably expect to have as a steady troop strength in 20 years, and we know what effects we want to have, then let's fill in the blank in between and equip those troops with the sort of technology that will enable them to have the desired effect.  Forget how we have been doing things for the past 40 years; we had the people then, we don't now.  How do we need to be doing it in the next 20 years?  Are tours not getting long enough?  Are soldiers not rotating more often than they should?  To pick just one of many examples, what good to the CF will a Regiment of tanks be, if we only have the crewmen to deploy a Squadron worth?    The same appplies to all of the major capital projects.



There are a few reasons we aren't reaching our numbers.

One was the lack of forsight by military and civilian leaders in the '80's and '90's who welcomed the "Peace Dividend" (which Governments have been practicing since the 1950's) with programs like FRP and the disbandment of a whole Bde.  The closure of CFE Lahr and Baden was a very costly mistake, but that is another matter altogether.  What matters is the drastic cut in manpower in many Trades, of the personnel who would have provided the 'continuity' that those Trades needed.

A second point is that the NCMs and OCdts of the 1970's and 1980's are now reaching CRA, and with those freezes in Recruiting in the 1990's, there is no leadership, experience, or continuity for the next generations of CF members.  There is a serious leadership gap in the Junior Leadership Levels - the people who are required to train Recruits and entry level Trades courses.

A third point is the "Peace Dividend" of constantly replacing old equipment with half numbers.  Thousands of Sherman tanks from the 40's and 50's were replaced in the 50's by less than 500 Centurion Tanks, which were in turn replaced in the late 70's by 128 Leopard 1 tanks, which were to be replaced by 66 MGS.  The same statistics can be seen in the replacement of all our equipment.  Once we had two Aircraft Carriers.  Now we have none.  Once we had a complete Air Division with four full Fighter Wings in Europe.  It is a joke to say we have even a quarter of that now here in Canada.  Our Logistic Fleets have shrunk to a fraction of the size they once were.  

Forth on the list is the "Plug 'n Play" idea of bringing complete strangers together and throwing them in a pot to send on a Deployment.  Why?  We had competent, closely knit, Cbt Teams in the Bdes prior to this silly idea.  Why reinvent the wheel?  

Fifth thing is, without the 4th Bde the remaining three have to cover all their tasks.  

If you want a sixth point, then due to all of the above, and the practice of demolishing buildings on Bases to lower the "Sq Footage" that is used to calculate what a Base is to pay local municipalities in lieu of taxes, there are not enough Instructors, facilities, nor equipment to recruit and train new Recruits.  There a thousands crying to join, but the System can not handle them.  As the system can not handle the influx of people wanting to join, Units are unable to 'regenerate' and keep ahead of attrition.

Oh!  By the way.  Many soldiers are doing multiple Tours.  Yes.  There are also a large number who aren't, for a multitude of reasons, but many of which are trying very hard to deploy.  

I really don't agree with your assessment of the CF manpower situation.  Nor do I agree with your assessment on the equipment situation.  The CF needs both; not one over the other.

This is not Battlestar Galactica.  We will not be replacing our soldiers anytime soon with Cyclon Centurions.

It is late and I may not be awake enough to counter your theories more tonight.


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## dangerboy (27 Jun 2008)

Harry Potter, if I understand your stance correctly it is that we need to reduce the manpower needed to man our equipment and complete our tasks. (If I have gotten your stance wrong ignore me)  I can't speak for the Armoured corp as I am not Armoured, but the Infantry has tried it and it has bitten us in the ass. We eliminated pioneers and mortars to reduce our manning  (an oversimplification I know) and now we wish we could have them back.  The fact is to do our job it is manpower intensive, you need full Sections of 10 men every time you try with less everything gets a lot harder especially with casualties and HLTA. 

Edited to fix real bad spelling.


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## Harry Potter (27 Jun 2008)

popnfresh,



> how does it make sense to buy less kit?



Where do I advocate buying less kit???  Nowhere do I  suggest we should buy less.  What I suggest is that we need to buy kit that we can deploy operationally with the people we can realistically expect to have.  If it means replacing man with machine to accomplish some tasks traditionally done by man, then lets do it.  But you can't expect it to happen if you don't recognise the problem, and the Canada First Defence Strategy doesn't do that as published.


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## SeaKingTacco (27 Jun 2008)

Harry,

You are absolutely correct- there is no hope.  We are all doomed.  We can't possibly grow our military of 65,000 to a military of 70,000 in the next 10-20 years.  Imagine- a country with 33,000,000 people, where almost one in 471 of it's citizens wears a uniform.  Bloody militarism run rampant, I say. 

Now that we have gotten agreeing with you out of the way, I would like to note from my "career attention deficit disorder" tour of all three services over that past 23 years (23 years exactly today, BTW), has shown me that we often do things the way that we always have, because that is the way it has always been done.  Equally, we often do things a certain way because, well, it works.

I have served in units that required a swift kick in the a$$ to reallocate manpower or do things differently to save money, time, effort or PYs.  Equally, I have been places where cuts and reorganizations have been conducted with ruthless efficiency that worked wonderfully...until war, a major disaster or some other "inconvenience" came along.

The trick to using scarce human resources effectively (and I think we can agree that highly trained soldiers, sailors and airmen are a relatively scarce commodity in Canada), is knowing when changing traditional ways of doing things or leveraging technology is a good thing.  It may be apparent to you when this is the case- it is certainly not clear to me.  I have learned caution when mucking with large, complex systems.

You have been locking horns with George over tank crew sizes and Ex-Dragoon over ship's companies.  I can read between the lines that you have never served in an Armoured Regiment or on a ship.  That does not make you incapable of commenting or observing on crewing issues...it's just that...you come of as SUCH a pompous A$$ by stating your observations as if they were tablets from the Mount and then expressing surprise when you don't get the heated agreement you so clearly crave.

FWIW, I think the size of a tank crew is about right at four.  My limited experience on exercise with tanks has shown me that between all of the garrison maintenance and all of the things that a crew is expected to do to operate 24/7 on the battlefield, that is about as small as you can go.  I used to command Javelin Missile Detachments of three.  After 72 hrs of moving, fighting, maintaining vehicles and digging, they were zombies.  We began experimenting with 4 man dets, with much better results.

I have been on a warship during a major fire.  We used every single one of the 225 crew to save the ship.  All of the "automatic" systems failed.  We fought the fire the old fashioned way.  By hand.  Yeah, most times, 225 people seems like too many people for a warship.  Most times it is.  When you are in a fight for your life, however, there are usually never enough people onboard.   Had we had a crew of 70 that night, we would have manned life rafts and lost the ship.

So to sum up- I am not opposed to new ways of doing business.  I dislike drive-by posters who "know" it all.

Cheers!


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2008)

GAP said:
			
		

> If I understand Harry Potter's point, it is that the Canada's long-term military strategy did not address the manpower issue.
> 
> As a government, the Conservatives are going to put long-term strategies fairly vaguely, if only to avoid opposition claims on specific items. They will do it anyway, but why give them aim points.....



The White Paper on Defence in 1985 would be the last official 'long term strategy'.


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## RHFC_piper (27 Jun 2008)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This is not Battlestar Galactica.  We will not be replacing our soldiers anytime soon with Cyclon Centurions.




Perhaps you haven't read the 'full' report...  I believe you missed this;



			
				GAP said:
			
		

> The report calls for clearly defined missions and capabilities for the military.
> 
> The plan has seven core missions:
> 
> ...





I know... I missed it too...  


But, besides that; good debate.   ;D


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## Harry Potter (27 Jun 2008)

George, 



> This is not Battlestar Galactica.  We will not be replacing our soldiers anytime soon with Cyclon Centurions.



Nowhere do I suggest something as drastic as that.  However, remember when people similarly ridiculed the use of the aeroplane as a valid means of delivering firepower?  How about in the 1930s when the army establishments around the world refused to see the tank as anything more than an infantry support weapon?    



> I really don't agree with your assessment of the CF manpower situation.  Nor do I agree with your assessment on the equipment situation.  The CF needs both; not one over the other.



Agreed we need both.  Disagree we will have access to both.  I have heard all the arguments about FRP, peace dividend, etc...  Sure it has had an impact.  But recruiting is better than ever before and we still can't fill our current ceilings.  Take a moment to read the reference material I attached.  I still think that despite our best efforts, we will never be able to recruit and retain to the new levels.  

Have yourself a good night.


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## Harry Potter (27 Jun 2008)

SeaKingTacco,

Feeling better now?  Got it out of your system?  By the way, did you even bother reading my actual posts, or did you simply framed your opinion based on the replies of George and al.  Imagine that!  The nerve of me!  A bunch of old boys slapping themselves in the back about how good the new Canada First Defence Strategy is.  And in comes this pompous *** Harry, who dares point out to a perceived weakness and seeks feedback to his observation.  How dare he?!!  With only 14 posts to his credit to boot!



> you don't get the heated agreement you so clearly crave.



Its not agreement I crave.  Its intelligent debate.  No need commenting if you merely agree with the previous guy.  Instead all I get are replies from guys hung up on the size of tank crews or ship's companies, telling me that last time they served, the crew size was just what they needed, for reasons that date back to the last World War.  I used tanks and ships as examples, not as specific targets, most readers understand that now.  Pick any other capital project, it applies equally.  Hey, glad you saved the ship.  But if next time you need to assemble a ship's company that size you need to leave half the fleet tied alongside for lack of crew, do you think things will have gone for the best or for the worse?  If there was an automated fire fighting system that would allow you to extinguish the fire despite a crew half the size, would you leave it off the SOR because when you were last on a ship there were 225 sailors on board and that's that!?  I apologize for the pompous tone...  but guys like you really bring the best out of me. 

Obviously you think the Air Force has filled all of its positions and will be able to do this for the next 20 years.  

Oh, by the way, your post contributed nothing to the discussion.  We were way past that.


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## Good2Golf (27 Jun 2008)

...well, I for one am not about to slash my wrists yet at a perceived hopeless situation.  I choose to believe we'll be able to fully man the future directed manning levels within a reasonable time (8-10 years).


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## muskrat89 (27 Jun 2008)

> Oh, by the way, your post contributed nothing to the discussion



But this did? 


> Feeling better now?  Got it out of your system?  By the way, did you even bother reading my actual posts, or did you simply framed your opinion based on the replies of George and al.  Imagine that!  The nerve of me!  A bunch of old boys slapping themselves in the back about how good the new Canada First Defence Strategy is.  And in comes this pompous ass Harry, who dares point out to a perceived weakness and seeks feedback to his observation.  How dare he?!!  With only 14 posts to his credit to boot!



All - the topic of the thread is *Tories unveil Canada's long-term military strategy* Let's stick to discussion of that, shall we? Keep the tit-for-tat focused on the comments, not the people making the comments.

Thanks

Army.ca Staff


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## Flip (27 Jun 2008)

I think we can all agree that the Tories vision is far superior to "We should persuade with the power of our ideas"( or whatever Axeworthy said ).

Manpower is a global issue in Canadian industry today, I mean who will pour all those "double doubles"?

But at least it is resolved, by the people who currently resolve such things, that Canada WILL have a military.

It's not much but I call it progress.  ;D


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## YZT580 (27 Jun 2008)

In all the discussions, I missed one important ingredient.  Recognition.  All the new toys won't keep a single person in for a second hitch unless the people who employ him recognize the contribution he has made to his/her country.  And all the antiquated junk won't force him out if the opposite is true.  Harry, your comments regarding staffing are only accurate if there is no sense of acceptence from the general population and the government.  Right now, the armed forces could be up to strength in 6 months if they had the capability of training all the folks who want to get in.  But it takes a long time because courses have to be small and frankly, we have totally neglected training and recruitment for decades  If and it is a big IF the government continues to grow its recognition then the forces will reach their objectives but they are going to have to spend more money than is already budgeted.  The navy needs to double in size.  We need a fleet of at least a dozen DH6's for the northland.  We need minitransports like the Spartan and we need aircraft/helicopters (armed) that can support our ground troops.  And we need them by the dozen: not just 17 or so.  Finally, we need hundreds of vehicles that can sustain damage and protect their crews.  This working paper is just a start.  I suspect, having listened to Day and Harper years ago, that they issued this because they believed it was all they could get away with at this stage.  At least I hope they still have the convictions they started with.  I am done.


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## George Wallace (27 Jun 2008)

YZT580 said:
			
		

> ............., we have totally neglected training and recruitment for decades  ............



This is the center of the problem.  We can not train large numbers, because we don't have the people to train them.  The emphasis right now is not on Recruiting, but on PLQ so that we can have the Instructors to train Recruits.  As YZT580 pointed out; we can only run small crses, as we have shortages of Instructors for PLQ Crses.

Top that problem up with the current lack of infrastructure caused by Base Closures, and demolition of facilities on remaining Bases, and the Training System is in a "world of hurt" limiting the amount of Crses that can be run.


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## Harry Potter (27 Jun 2008)

What would be good right now for this discussion is someone with fresh stats on recruiting, trg and retention.  Last I heard, influx was 4% higher than releases; I believe that was for the last quarter of 2007 but not completely sure.  Is this still valid?  Do we still have the huge PAT platoons at various trg bases?

Popnfresh made a good point yesterday about a lot of guys signing in for three years, get a tour and then leave.  I saw the same, but not sure what % of the intake this represents.  Anyone from a freshly returned roto can chip in on how many guys left after their initial contract?  That would fit the "job hopping" attitude of the generation "Y" workforce.  Can we take advantage of that and still retain enough of them to rebuild the cadre of the CF?


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## daftandbarmy (28 Jun 2008)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Harry,
> 
> You are absolutely correct- there is no hope.  We are all doomed.  We can't possibly grow our military of 65,000 to a military of 70,000 in the next 10-20 years.  Imagine- a country with 33,000,000 people, where almost one in 471 of it's citizens wears a uniform.  Bloody militarism run rampant, I say.
> 
> ...



We could learn alot from Toyota when it comes to continual improvement e.g., get away from flavour of the month , hero driven approaches and adopt a long term process of incremental change - that involves everyone in the process - to get the results we need to survive into an uncertain future...

The Open Secret of Success
by James Surowiecki May 12, 2008 

In the current atmosphere of economic tumult, the announcement that Toyota sold a hundred and sixty thousand more cars than General Motors in the first three months of this year might seem like a minor news item. But it may very well signal the end of one of the most remarkable runs in business history. For seventy-seven years, in good times and bad, G.M. has sold more cars annually than any other company in the world. But Toyota has long been the auto industry’s most profitable and innovative firm. And this year it appears likely to become, finally, the industry’s sales leader, too.
Calling Toyota an innovative company may, at first glance, seem a bit odd. Its vehicles are more liked than loved, and it is often attacked for being better at imitation than at invention. Fortune, which typically praises the company effusively, has labelled it “stodgy and bureaucratic.” But if Toyota doesn’t look like an innovative company it’s only because our definition of innovation—cool new products and technological breakthroughs, by Steve Jobs-like visionaries—is far too narrow. Toyota’s innovations, by contrast, have focussed on process rather than on product, on the factory floor rather than on the showroom. That has made those innovations hard to see. But it hasn’t made them any less powerful.

At the core of the company’s success is the Toyota Production System, which took shape in the years after the Second World War, when Japan was literally rebuilding itself, and capital and equipment were hard to come by. A Toyota engineer named Taiichi Ohno turned necessity into virtue, coming up with a system to get as much as possible out of every part, every machine, and every worker. The principles were simple, even obvious—do away with waste, have parts arrive precisely when workers need them, fix problems as soon as they arise. And they weren’t even entirely new—Ohno himself cited Henry Ford and American supermarkets as inspirations. But what Toyota has done, better than any other manufacturing company, is turn principle into practice. In some cases, it has done so with inventions, like the andon cord, which any worker can pull to stop the assembly line if he notices a problem, or kanban, a card system that allows workers to signal when new parts are needed. In other cases, it has done so by reorganizing factory floors and workspaces in order to allow for a freer and easier flow of parts and products. Most innovation focusses on what gets made. Toyota reinvented how things got made, which enabled it to build cars faster and with less labor than American companies.

But there’s an enigma to the Toyota Production System: although the system has been widely copied, Toyota has kept its edge over its competitors. Toyota opens its facilities to tours, and even embarked on a joint venture with G.M. designed, in part, to help G.M. improve its own production system. Over the years, more than three thousand books and articles have analyzed how the company works, and things like andon systems are now common sights on factory floors. The diffusion of Toyota’s concepts has had a real effect; the auto industry as a whole is far more productive than it used to be. So how has Toyota stayed ahead of the pack?

The answer has a lot to do with another distinctive element of Toyota’s approach: defining innovation as an incremental process, in which the goal is not to make huge, sudden leaps but, rather, to make things better on a daily basis. (The principle is often known by its Japanese name, kaizen—continuous improvement.) Instead of trying to throw long touchdown passes, as it were, Toyota moves down the field by means of short and steady gains. And so it rejects the idea that innovation is the province of an elect few; instead, it’s taken to be an everyday task for which everyone is responsible. According to Matthew E. May, the author of a book about the company called “The Elegant Solution,” Toyota implements a million new ideas a year, and most of them come from ordinary workers. (Japanese companies get a hundred times as many suggestions from their workers as U.S. companies do.) Most of these ideas are small—making parts on a shelf easier to reach, say—and not all of them work. But cumulatively, every day, Toyota knows a little more, and does things a little better, than it did the day before. 
The system doesn’t necessarily preclude missteps—in 2006, Toyota ran into a series of quality problems—and it’s possible that the focus on incremental innovation would be less well suited to businesses driven by large technological leaps. But, on the whole, the results are hard to argue with. They’re also phenomenally difficult to duplicate. In part, this is because most companies are still organized in a very top-down manner, and have a hard time handing responsibility to front-line workers. But it’s also because the fundamental ethos of kaizen—slow and steady improvement—runs counter to the way that most companies think about change. Corporations hope that the right concept will turn things around overnight. This is what you might call the crash-diet approach: starve yourself for a few days and you’ll be thin for life. The Toyota approach is more like a regular, sustained diet—less immediately dramatic but, as everyone knows, much harder to sustain. In the nineteen-nineties, a McKinsey study of companies that had put quality-improvement programs in place found that two-thirds abandoned them as failures. Toyota’s innovative methods may seem mundane, but their sheer relentlessness defeats many companies. That’s why Toyota can afford to hide in plain sight: it knows the system is easy to understand but hard to follow. 

http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/05/12/080512ta_talk_surowiecki


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## The Bread Guy (6 Aug 2008)

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence news release:  "The Committee believes that General Natynczyk’s statement that the Government has guaranteed the military the kind of sustained and stable funding needed for growth simply does not stand up to reasonable economic analysis."  Minister's comments below.....

*Four Generals and an Admiral:  The View from the Top*
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 5 Aug 08
Report link (.pdf)

Conclusion:


> The Committee admires the positive attitude of the senior officers who appeared before us on June 2 and June 9. It is clear that they are all enthusiastically addressing their challenges to provide the best “defence
> product” for the Canadian taxpayer that is possible given their funding levels.  Canadians should be proud of the many ways the Canadian Forces find of making do within impossible budgets and unnecessary infrastructure burdens.
> 
> That having been said, budgets have been too tight under both Liberal and Conservative governments over the past two decades to give Canadians a reasonable level of protection at home and to allow them to contribute to a more stable world abroad.
> ...



From CTV.ca:  "Defence Minister Peter MacKay has forcefully rejected a Senate analysis that says the Conservative government's defence plan won't deliver real spending increases to the military.  MacKay told CTV Newsnet on Wednesday that Sen. Colin Kenny, head of the Senate Security and Defence committee, has "a profound misunderstanding of what the Canadian government is doing vis a vis the Canadian Forces."  He accused Kenny of being "wilfully blind and misleading" in the report."


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## Jarnhamar (6 Aug 2008)

The CF wastes a lot of money on creature comforts. I'm all for being comfortable but when you buy a ton of new expensive chairs (few hundred dollars each) just because you 'have the money' and the other ones work perfectly fine someone should stop and take a look at how money is allocated. The spend money because you have it mentality should stop.


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## retiredgrunt45 (7 Aug 2008)

Why does it take a committee to tell us what we already know. 

Starting in 1968, when Trudeau mania started, the forces went to the dogs. Now 40 years and 5 consecutive governments later the forces are in taters. It will take another few decades of big spending to get the forces, prior to were they where in 68. Unless we go on a US style spending spree, which I can't ever see happening in Canada, due to the fact that the opposition parties disdain for anything US would block it. 

To top it all of we now have a minority government, who are trying even if it is only half heartily to inject some money to buy new equipment that we should of had 20 years ago under the liberals and the Conservatives before them.  

Until the Canadian public actually stands up and says "Do something about our forces", the government will continue to treat it as a footnote and continue to ignore the problem. New helicopters,tanks, etc are all well and good, but its to little to late for the people serving in Afghanistan who needed that equipment five years ago...

Theres much finger pointing going on in Ottawa these days, as to who's to blame for our forces demise, but history shows that any Canadian governments past or present are unwilling to spend the money needed to get our forces up to standard. They would much rather throw a few dollars in the pot once in a while just to appease and shut the brass up for a while until the next crisis comes along...And it doesn't take a committee to tell me that.  It's the Canadian way...


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## aesop081 (7 Aug 2008)

Flawed Design said:
			
		

> The CF wastes a lot of money on creature comforts. I'm all for being comfortable but when you buy a ton of new expensive chairs (few hundred dollars each) just because you 'have the money' and the other ones work perfectly fine someone should stop and take a look at how money is allocated. The spend money because you have it mentality should stop.



I have seen and experienced this aot. The unfortunate reality in alot of these cases is that if we dont spend the money this year, we wont get it next year ( and who knows what we will really, really need it for next year). Some of it is poor management throughout the year but government policy often forces the CF to do things it doesnt really need to.


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## CBH99 (7 Aug 2008)

This is just food for thought, and bound to attract some different points of view....I think it belongs in this thread, since the topic is about funding & spending.

What do you - as uniformed professionals - think could be done to save money??  Both small costs such as office supplies & administrative costs, as well as money on larger/capital projects??

Also, how do you think we could stretch out existing dollars further??  Any thoughts on continual procurement programs??  (Purchasing equipment throughout the years, instead of a bulk purchase all at once?)

Floor is open...


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## blacktriangle (7 Aug 2008)

I worked in an OR where there was a constant stationary shortage!  

My TOS is up in 2011, any bets if the Forces will be in better shape by then or back on the slide downhill?


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## CBH99 (7 Aug 2008)

I think the CF will be in better shape by the time your TOS comes up in 2011...however, any of this is obviously speculation.

With the amount of time that the CF seems to retain equipment, and with a large number of capital contracts coming up - I think 2011 will be an excellent time, as many of the procurement projects on the books now will be coming to fruitition around then.


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## retiredgrunt45 (7 Aug 2008)

> Also, how do you think we could stretch out existing dollars further??  Any thoughts on continual procurement programs??  (Purchasing equipment throughout the years, instead of a bulk purchase all at once?)



I think that "dollar" has been stretched about as far as it's going to go. Unless the government comes up with some real money and when I say real money I don't mean a few billion here and there, I mean some serious money, 20-30 billion, there is no way they can stretch the dollar anymore than what they already have. A good part of DND's budget is already being spent in Afghanistan and that doesn't leave much for the people here at home.

Nickle and diming something just puts a bandage on it until ultimately it will require major surgery and right now our forces needs some major surgery. 



> (Purchasing equipment throughout the years, instead of a bulk purchase all at once?)



We don't need procurements 20 years from now, we need the equipment, yesterday. Putting of what would of cost us 15 billion today, will cost you 30 billion 5 or 10 years from now. This was the way it was done in the past and look were it got us. Nowhere.


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## Edward Campbell (7 Aug 2008)

My comments here still apply.

The problem, correctly stated by others, is that the CF needs some "real money" - rather a lot of it.

The political *reality* in Canada is that, on any list used by any polling firm, increased defence spending is at the bottom of Canadians' wish lists. As I have said before, probably too often, Canadians may wear red T shirts on Fridays but they sure do not want to have their national defence or their national defenders compete with their beloved social programmes.


Edit: punctuation


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## Edward Campbell (7 Aug 2008)

There are two “elephants in the room” when one considers Canadian defence spending:

•	The first is that we spend about 50% of the budget on personnel; and

•	The second is that we spend about 17% of capital (new equipment).

That’s not going to change quickly and it leaves about ⅓ of a $20± billion budget (which is where the budget will be in just a couple of years) ($7 Billion) for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) which means bullets, beans and, above all, fuel – at current market prices.

Most experts agree that a modern, capable military cannot be built unless something like 25% of the budget is spent on capital procurement, year after year after year.

But personnel spending cannot go down because DND is already failing to meet its own expansion targets – it’s hard to retain serving people and attract new ones if we take money away from salaries, benefits and personnel support programmes.

Cutting the O&M budget means, _inter alia_, fewer flying hours, fewer sailing days, less training ammunition, less fuel and so on – there is a direct impact on training and readiness, In other words we *might* get a bigger, better equipped force but it would be less well trained. That’s what we call a _Hobson’s choice_ – it’s really no choice at all; no matter what DND or the government as a whole wants to do it is constrained by too little money.

There is an option – about which I have heard bits in the local *rumour* mills:

1.	Keep personnel/personnel support spending _level_ (keeping pace with inflation and getting a ½ share of increases/new money) at about 50%;

2.	_Grow_ capital spending incrementally, over about a decade, to _roughly_ 25%; which means

3.	_Shrinking_ the O&M share of the budget to 25% *by restricting the things DND must fund from within its own programmed allocations to, mainly, training*. *ALL* _operations_ – even domestic operations and SAR – are to be funded by annual supplementary allocations.

This means, essentially, that the DND budget is used to raise, train and equip a force. Any and all use of that force – at home or abroad – must be funded separately, year by year.

I think that some senior people at the _political centre_ in Ottawa (PCO, Finance and TB) are sympathetic to DND’s position that its inability to manage its own affairs is because it cannot predict or control its operational assignments and it is not allowed (by the Govt of Canada’s _system_) to _guesstimate_ and request contingency funding. There is also,  I hear, some suggestion that requiring the government of the day to pay for each and every military adventure operation will impose some much needed policy discipline on working politicians and their back-room _strategists_.

If such a plan were to be implemented then the *Canada First Defence Strategy* would make more sense.


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## GAP (7 Aug 2008)

Now that makes a whole lot more sense than the current program.........it also puts the CF deployments in the hands of politicians and their reaction to the polls, especially in a minority government.

The one bright point is that "if you don't want us to go there, don't fund us for it" puts the responsibility exactly where it belongs....on the politicians, not the CF.  (Now watch them screw that up too!!.............not sure who them is........but it will get perverted somehow)


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## AlphaQup (7 Aug 2008)

http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=5fbf3e2a-018f-458d-880a-ef474bd31a58



> A bipartisan committee of senators says Canada's top generals all have blinders on when it comes to the issue of long-term sustainable funding for the Canadian military.
> 
> And they blame Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government for forcing the generals to compliment the government on increases in military spending when, in fact, the senators say, the federal government has set in motion what will amount to decreases in the military's overall operating budget.
> 
> ...


Any ideas on this guys? How right is this bipartisan committee? Why has the government not immediately increased the % of GDP allocated to the CF?


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## Jarnhamar (7 Aug 2008)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> alot of these cases is that if we dont spend the money this year, we wont get it next year



Exactly.

This is absolutely retarded.
ALL this does is encourage people to spend any extra money on stupid useless crap out of fear of having less money next year.

If we started saving money and rolling it over or whateverto the next year then we could ideally "save up" and pay for some serious equipment that we need.

It's like eating everything in your house at the end of the month just so you can spend just as much money buying the same amount of food next month.


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## stryte (7 Aug 2008)

Flawed Design said:
			
		

> Exactly.
> 
> This is absolutely retarded.
> ALL this does is encourage people to spend any extra money on stupid useless crap out of fear of having less money next year.
> ...



I agree with you both. The problem is if you do not spend the majority of your budget than I see at least two things happening. One the politicians are happy because they can say they've saved money. Some permanent heads will do the best they can to never spend their entire budget in hopes of looking good and advancement. Second, when it comes to budget approval if you did not spend what was allocated to you last year cabinet will ask why not and why do you need as much if not more this year? Based on my limited experience with government budgets we have codes for different stuff. One for staff, etc. but also codes for large purchases  or building new stuff or R&D that will need continued funding for x number of years. I can't imagine the work that's involved in doing up a budget for all the CF but I suspect they either know what to put in their budget request a head of time or are putting in it and it isn't being approved.


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## Edward Campbell (7 Aug 2008)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> ... The unfortunate reality in alot of these cases is that if we dont spend the money this year, we wont get it next year ...



Actually, it doesn’t work that way.

_“*Next* year’s”_ budget was sent to parliament 18 months ago. The budget is _”grossed up”_ at each level – it is very, very had to figure out who spent too much or too little.

But, _March madness_ procurement does occur – because enough people *believe*, incorrectly, that spending 100% of the budget matters. I was in the room, in NDHQ, (back _circa_ 1985) when one *leader* -  a Navy two star – put a stop to it by the simple expedient of telling four one stars and me that our PERs depended, in some respect, on being good, sound managers of the taxpayers’ money. Each quarter, on the admiral’s behalf, I coordinated a spending projection review between four staff divisions and arranged for “transfers” between them so that we spent as much money as we *productively* and *responsibly* could in that year. What could not be spent well was, at the end of the third quarter of the FY, offered to other parts of the HQ and to the field force. What could still not be spent was “turned in” which meant that, after the fact, the good folks in the Comptroller’s branch used our surpluses to offset overspending in other parts of the CF.

But old myths die hard.


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## aesop081 (7 Aug 2008)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Actually, it doesn’t work that way.



Fair enough, i have never had the chance to manage things at the same level as you have E.R.

All i know is that when i was responsible for spending in one of my former units, if i didnt use it all by March 31st, i got my peepee slapped and then got the coresponding amount reduced the following year.

Thanks for clearing things up. One more myth busted.


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## GAP (7 Aug 2008)

Having worked in school boards, municipal governments, provincial colleges, and minor lower management rolls of the Federal Government.....if a category was not entirely spent, even though a budget is nothing more than a guess about the future year, the amount of that category was reduced by the amount that was not spent, unless you could justify a status quo for the forthcoming year....in only two cases I encountered were we allowed an increase, and that was because a capital project was coming on line...


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## 2 Cdo (7 Aug 2008)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Fair enough, i have never had the chance to manage things at the same level as you have E.R.
> 
> All i know is that when i was responsible for spending in one of my former units, if i didnt use it all by March 31st, i got my peepee slapped and then got the coresponding amount reduced the following year.
> 
> Thanks for clearing things up. One more myth busted.



I had the same thing occur as a storeman in battalion. The mantra was, and still is, "Spend it or lose it".


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## The Bread Guy (7 Aug 2008)

Thanks for the bird's eye view of $, E.R. - I, too, have witnessed the "spend it or lose it" syndrome at the lowly levels I've inhabited.



			
				daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We could learn alot from Toyota when it comes to continual improvement e.g., get away from flavour of the month , hero driven approaches and adopt a long term process of incremental change - that involves everyone in the process - to get the results we need to survive into an uncertain future...



This would be the ideal solution, but it's stymied by the fact that the political masters/mistresses look ahead only in terms of terms (no more than 4 years) instead of decades needed.  Another political factor is the desire for a "new, improved shiny thing" to be shown off, as opposed to "we're continuing the same thing that's been happening for x years because it's the right thing to do".


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## retiredgrunt45 (7 Aug 2008)

> I think that some senior people at the political centre in Ottawa (PCO, Finance and TB) are sympathetic to DND’s position that its inability to manage its own affairs is because it cannot predict or control its operational assignments and it is not allowed (by the Govt of Canada’s system) to guesstimate and request contingency funding. There is also, I hear, some suggestion that requiring the government of the day to pay for each and every military adventure operation will impose some much needed policy discipline on working politicians and their back-room strategists.
> 
> If such a plan were to be implemented then the Canada First Defence Strategy would make more sense.



Now if only we could get the people that matter, to listen to this today, we would be in much better shape for tomorrow.

How many times have I heard when I was attached to my old reserve unit, "Sorry we have to cancel training for the next few months because we have to money, but hey lets go out and buy some new toys for the office to get rid of that exes cash". This forced units to spend money on frivolous junk, instead of being allowed to use for future training. This whole system has to be changed and until it is, we're going to be marking time and getting nowhere.  This starts with the Privy council and Senior bureaucrat Kevin Lynch, who is no big fan of the military and his distrust for our so called inability to handle our own affairs.

In my view, heres one of the problems: http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=Role/role2007_e.htm#8


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## Edward Campbell (7 Aug 2008)

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> ...
> All i know is that when i was responsible for spending in one of my former units, if i didnt use it all by March 31st, i got my peepee slapped and then got the coresponding amount reduced the following year.
> ...



I understand, and so that good admiral for whom I worked; it infuriated him but he (we) played the hand he was dealt and we tried to tidy up our little corner while we occupied it.

All it really takes to stop this nonsense is a few good, harsh words from a few very annoyed very, very senior officers, but they all seem to be too busy with _transformation_, etc.


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## Edward Campbell (7 Aug 2008)

retiredgrunt45 said:
			
		

> ...
> This starts with the Privy council and Senior bureaucrat Kevin Lynch, who is no big fan of the military and his distrust for our so called inability to handle our own affairs.
> ...



Indeed, and see this. But the problem of the _centre_ mistrusting DND's (mis)management predates Mr. Lynch. In fact, if there is any truth in the rumours I have heard over the past wee while, the PCO is sympathetic to DND's planning/funding dilemma and is casting about for a 'work around.'

Time will tell but, honestly, I cannot see any alternative (at least none as simple, tidy and, well, _elegant_) that will avoid *disarmament by stealth* - which the PCO has consistently and vigorously opposed since 1969.


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