# Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors



## ArmyRick

I thought about it and figured I would start a new thread. Mods, if this belongs else where, please move it.

How many generals and Admirals can the CF function with at a minimum? Seriously food for thought. Looking at the LFC, here is my answer I have come up with.

1 x Major General command LFC (We are not that large of an army)
1 x BGen, deputy comd
4 x BGEn as comd LFWA, LFCA, SQFT and LFAA (I think this is appropriate move we made many years ago)
Combine LFDTS as a sub unit of CTC Gagetown and make the CTC Colonel also double hatted as LFDTS Comd
1 x Bgen, for overseas land operations (So like a swing eneral)

That puts my count at 7 generals. Anybody in the Air Force and navy want to counger up a similar figure for their services?

The fewer chiefs we have, the more warriors we could in theory employ.

Thoughts? Ideas? Agree or Disagree? Rotten Tomatoes pitched at my head?


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## Michael OLeary

Rather than just saying which few you think we need, why not explain why we don't need each of the other General/Flag officers/appointments, and what you will do with them. (Such as dispense with their function and all related staff, replace with less senior officer, etc.)

Senior Officer Search Results - All


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## armyvern

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> Rather than just saying which few you think we need, why not explain why we don't need each of the other General/Flag officers/appointments, and what you will do with them. (Such as dispense with their function and all related staff, replace with less senior officer, etc.)
> 
> Senior Officer Search Results - All



I just counted 122 of them on your list. 

122 !!    

He'll be a few weeks typing up the answer you seek.  >

How many General Officers does the US have?? And, what exactly is the size of Canada's total force these days (Res & Reg)?

122. I'm shocked.


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## Michael OLeary

It's a matter of balancing functions as well as numbers.  All well and good if someone can prove that we can replace a BGen with a staff of 100 with a Major and a staff of ten.  But like closing bases, we can't replace them overnight if we discover a year later we needed them.

There are also other hazards in using a simple numerical ratio to establish an "acceptable" number of Generals.  If we used the same basis to justify the number of Infantry Warrant Officers (assuming their primary purpose is as a rifle platoon WO), a whole bunch of schools are going to collapse when we remove every one that doesn't have 30 subordinates on their unit establishment.

Could we reduce the number of General/Flag officers? Probably, but I'd like to see a more detailed estimate rather than big-hand-small-mapping a solution without understanding all the functions those 122 officers and their staffs execute.  To do otherwise, we might as well move this to Radio Chatter.


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## Journeyman

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> To do otherwise, we might as well move this to Radio Chatter.


I suspect it's a Radio Chatter topic anyway.   

RMC has a BGen/Cmdre to oversee less than 900 OCdts. Why? Because the US service academies have a BGen, and it wouldn't be proper for Canada to be represented by a mere LCol at the RMC/West Point Hockey game.

Even better, CFC has a one-star to shepherd 120'ish Maj/LCols each year. Why? Because it would be rude to have senior guest speakers be greeted by a mere Col.

And then there's the NDHQ BGen overseeing the "Directorate of Dawdling with a MCpl in-theatre".......  >


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## armyvern

Michael O'Leary said:
			
		

> It's a matter of balancing functions as well as numbers.  All well and good if someone can prove that we can replace a BGen with a staff of 100 with a Major and a staff of ten.  But like closing bases, we can't replace them overnight if we discover a year later we needed them.
> 
> There are also other hazards in using a simple numerical ratio to establish an "acceptable" number of Generals.  If we used the same basis to justify the number of Infantry Warrant Officers (assuming their primary purpose is as a rifle platoon WO), a whole bunch of schools are going to collapse when we remove every one that doesn't have 30 subordinates on their unit establishment.
> 
> Could we reduce the number of General/Flag officers? Probably, but I'd like to see a more detailed estimate rather than big-hand-small-mapping a solution without understanding all the functions those 122 officers and their staffs execute.  To do otherwise, we might as well move this to Radio Chatter.



While I'd agree that some are a necessity, I simply had no idea we had that many Gen/Flag Os. 

Which ones do you think we need? The OP figures 7 for the Army & asked for input from other services. There's also the purple "service" in addition to the Army, Navy & Air Force. There is a very common tendancy by everyone to forget that purplefolks are career managed by the purple chain - not the Air Force, the Navy or the Army - in effect, the CF has 4 distinct and very seperate services. Then, we toss in the Res Force side of the house into the mix too. Obviously, there'll need to be General/Flag Os there too.

I 100% agree that it's not a simple matter of numbers. 

So, if we want the OP to post why we don't need all those others - perhaps we should be countering with a list of each of the 122 and why we "do" need them ... if we are ones who think that we do. That makes for discussion and debate.


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## Fishbone Jones

I'll start.


Do we really need a BGen as Provost Marshall? I heard awhile back, IIRC, it used to be a Col billet. We gained our first female Provost Marshall (not that there's anything wrong with that 8) ) and all of a sudden it got bumped to BGen from Col. Really, a BGen in charge of the few MPs we have and  the sundries that go with them?

I really don't know what the job entails, but maybe someone can enlighten us why a Col can't do it as they always have.

I'll stand to be corrected if I have my details wrong.


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## ArmyRick

122. Your right Veronica, I will need some time but I had already seen some positions that simply (in my feeble WO mind) that do not need to be that high. Give me a bit...


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## ArmyRick

I agree that a Brigadier general as Provost Marshall when it used to be Colonel is questionable (MPs got an opinion this one?)

Its interesting to note that we dropped Brigade commanders from Brigadier Generals down to Colonel little more than ten years ago but we make Provost Marshall a BGen?


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## Gunner98

This is kind of a moot point because when we last downsized the number of Generals, we increased the number of Cols with the same responsibilities, entitlements and cap badge.

I have seen the number of Generals (or equiv) in the CF was 75 in 2005 with a stated goal to reduce it to 1:1000.  But with the dotcoms we created more Gen and Col positions.


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## Journeyman

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Its interesting to note that we dropped Brigade commanders from Brigadier Generals down to Colonel little more than ten years ago.....


.....while increasing and up-ranking the staff from a Maj G3 and Capts as G1, 2, 4.

....but that's a separate tangent


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## Dissident

I am not quite sure where the whole BGen as CFPM comes from. Right now it is Col Grubb, previously it was Capt (N) Moore.

Or are you talking about the MP branch commandant? Which I just found out existed, to my own embarrassment. This does seem to be a BGen position.


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## Lex Parsimoniae

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Even better, CFC has a one-star to shepherd 120'ish Maj/LCols each year. Why? Because it would be rude to have senior guest speakers be greeted by a mere Col.


Make that 140+ Cdr/LCol and LCdr/Maj  (and RCMP/civilian equivalents) on the Joint Command and Staff Programme.  There are also 40ish Capt(N)/Col (and civilian equivalents) on the 10 month National Security Programme.  

If you consider the traditional rank pyramid to still be worth retaining - then what rank would you have supervising the 40ish Capt(N)/Col students not to mention the 2 Capt(N)/Col on staff (who supervise the 25+ Cdr/LCol staff)?


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## ArmyRick

Thats a big oops. It seems that the CFPM is in deed a colonel.


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## Journeyman

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> If you consider the traditional rank pyramid to still be worth retaining - then what rank would you have supervising the 40ish Capt(N)/Col students not to mention the 2 Capt(N)/Col on staff (who supervise the 25+ Cdr/LCol staff)?


I have no heartache in having a Col/Capt(N) as Commandant; it would be obvious to all that he is designated as the senior officer over other Col/Capt(N)....especially in a staff college environment where it's unlikely the Commandant's directives will be challenged by students passing through, or he'll be sending them in harm's way. If you think a superior rank is required for leadership over peers, you're not familiar with the role of a battalion Adjutant.  ;D

As for the two 4-ringers on staff -- all part of the same rank inflation; their tasks can more than easily be handled by competent LCols. National Defence College is gone but the rank structure remains.

Perhaps the only reason for the inflated ranks at CFC is to deal with the Academics' egos


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## Fishbone Jones

Dissident said:
			
		

> I am not quite sure where the whole BGen as CFPM comes from. Right now it is Col Grubb, previously it was Capt (N) Moore.
> 
> Or are you talking about the MP branch commandant? Which I just found out existed, to my own embarrassment. This does seem to be a BGen position.



That might be it. Is it, or was it recently, a female and a newly annointed (in the last couple of years) BGen pos'n from Col?


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## Gunner98

http://business.highbeam.com/4954/article-1G1-64731649/vicechief-defence-staff-announces-new-canadian-forces

BGen Patricia Samson was CFPM from July 1, 1997 and retired in 2001.  She was replaced by LCol Dot Cooper upon her promotion to Col.


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## Fishbone Jones

I'd like to know what was required to bump the promotion and increase the pension : It's a thousand straws like this that ruin our culpability with the Canadian people.

Let's look at Canadian, or foreign, civilian companies. From the top down, how many employ, per capita, the equivalent of any General rank compared to the military?

I don't think the argument, "this isn't a civie organisation' is valid either. At that level, it is a business and your ARE sitting on a Board of Directors, running a corporation.


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## Infanteer

I looked at this while doing a little project with ranks at work - I don't have the list here, but I plotted out the GOFOs to see who was where.  The DSA list isn't entirely accurate as some have retired - I counted 114.  A few things I noticed:

1.  The Army, Navy and Airforce all have roughly the same amount of GOFOs (except for BGens, which the Army has more of due to the LFAs each having 2).  

2.  ISAF has been healthy for the GOFO crowd; despite almost all Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen being under a single BGen, there is still room for 6-7 more over in Afghanistan.  

3.  NATO/NORAD also means good gos for the GOFOs, especially the Air Force.  We have almost as many LGens OUTCAN as we do in hard CF positions.  Since we don't have many troops for our GOFOs to command, we may as well pretend we command someone elses.  Conversly, they are getting command experience that they would not have got here - we currently have Canadians as DComds of three U.S. Div/Corps.  That the Americans trust us to that level speaks to the quality of our senior leadership.

4.  The .COM created about 6-7 additonal GOFO positions - one has to wonder if the DCDS was 300% worse than now to warrant all those additional maple leafs.

Overall, I'm happy with the current stock of senior leadership in the Forces.  It could be far worse, and it will likely only get better as guys who fought as Majors and Colonels start to fill out the GOFO ranks.  I don't get too fussed about the numbers, because alot of these positions are filled regardless of the size of the military (ie: you need a General Officer in charge of all military pers admin matters, etc, etc).  You could do a line-by-line look at those positions and probably have a hard time throwing more than 10 percent of them out completely.  What I'd be more interested in turning the critical eye on is the large clag of LCol/Cols and CWO types that are essentially "civilians in uniform" doing something that a Captain or a Sergeant could do.  While staff bloat may create a Brigadier General or two, it has created loads of this latter type.


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## quadrapiper

Speaking to staff rank-bloat - it's everywhere; even the RCSU down at Work Point is infested with Capt 10s doing MCpl clerk-work.

As to NDHQ itself, what's the need for a FO/GO in charge of Pers Admin, say, or any other non-line gigs (Director General Land Equipment Program Management, let's say)? If it's a matter of compensation, come up with some sort of "staff pay" for the Col you could otherwise place in that position; if it's a matter of clout, well, that's all relative, no?

Agreed (FWIW...) with the people questioning the need for FO/GOs in Commandant positions, especially at RMC. If you can get by with a single BGen as Director-General Reserves and Cadets: enormous, geographically diffuse organizations with tens of thousands of personnel involved (I know, he's in a staff role in relation to both, but still...), what need is there for the CO of RMC to be more than a Col? Perhaps a "high flying" LCol?

And... if the MPs rate a Colonel, why do the Chaplains get a BGen?

And, while we're at it, perhaps look at the civvie side of the house as well: why is there an Asst Dep Minister of Infrastructure and Environment, instead of just using the _Major General_ he's got as Chief of Staff to fill the billet; ditto the Asst Dep Minister (Materiel) who has a MGen as his Deputy CoS?

Eh, it's late, and I'm probably exposing my ignorance here... the manning still seems a bit strange.


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## Neill McKay

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> And, while we're at it, perhaps look at the civvie side of the house as well: why is there an Asst Dep Minister of Infrastructure and Environment, instead of just using the _Major General_ he's got as Chief of Staff to fill the billet; ditto the Asst Dep Minister (Materiel) who has a MGen as his Deputy CoS?



You're touching on the answer to your question here.  The conventional wisdom is that many of the flag and general officers in NDHQ are there because there's a perceived requirement for pay parity with the civil service staff who are reckoned to be "equivalent" to them in rank.  I'm not sure of the current situation, but at one time there were CF officers in assistant deputy minister or associate deputy minister positions.  I don't think there's another country in the world whose armed forces are so closely interlaced with the civil service at the national HQ level.


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## George Wallace

Simian Turner said:
			
		

> http://business.highbeam.com/4954/article-1G1-64731649/vicechief-defence-staff-announces-new-canadian-forces
> 
> BGen Patricia Samson was CFPM from July 1, 1997 and retired in 2001.  She was replaced by LCol Dot Cooper upon her promotion to Col.



Those were the days when both the MPs and INT pers were merged into one Branch.  They have since parted ways again, which could explain the BGen to Col differences.


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## Old Sweat

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Those were the days when both the MPs and INT pers were merged into one Branch.  They have since parted ways again, which could explain the BGen to Col differences.



Not so. There already was a BGen J2 at that time. The CFPM was a separate apointment, as the police and intelligence worlds had split several years before this time. I am reasonably sure the split had taken place sometime in the eighties.


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## Gunner98

http://www.vcds-vcemd.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/apm-agp/hcmpb-hbpmc-eng.asp

On 29 October 1982, a ceremony was held at the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security (CFSIS) which inaugurated the new Intelligence Branch and rededicated the Security Branch.

Following the recommendations in the report by former Chief Justice Brian Dickson, a new era has been inaugurated for the Military Police Branch with the creation of; the National Investigation Service, the National Counter Intelligence Unit and the reestablishment of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.


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## George Wallace

Brigadier-General Patricia Samson was originally appointed Canadian Forces Provost Marshall as a Col in 1997, promoted BGen in the same year.   The final split of the INT Branch from the Security Branch happened in 2000 under her "Watch".



In 2000, a further split with the Security Branch occurred, with intelligence training moving from CFSIS at CFB Borden to the newly-formed CFSMI at CFB Kingston. This ended the formal affiliation of the Intelligence Branch with the former CFSIS.   ( http://www.intbranch.org/cold_war.htm )


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## Edward Campbell

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Brigadier-General Patricia Samson was originally appointed Canadian Forces Provost Marshall as a Col in 1997, promoted BGen in the same year.   The final split of the INT Branch from the Security Branch happened in 2000 under her "Watch".
> 
> 
> 
> In 2000, a further split with the Security Branch occurred, with intelligence training moving from CFSIS at CFB Borden to the newly-formed CFSMI at CFB Kingston. This ended the formal affiliation of the Intelligence Branch with the former CFSIS.   ( http://www.intbranch.org/cold_war.htm )




The _integration_ of Intelligence and Security was always a fiction. Putting the (then new) MP cap badge on the Int people and having a new Security Branch could not make silk purses from sows' ears. The Intelligence _service_ was always separate - with its own Director General (and even, now and again, a two star _Chief_) while the MPs made do with a BGen or Col Provost Marshal.

The attempted merger was based on a wholly unsound appreciation of _security_, which also involved e.g. a very quickly aborted attempt by the _security_ branch to intrude into COMSEC.

There is, in my view still a gap in DND's _security_ apparatus which the MPs can never fill. Security and policing are different businesses and neither is closely related to intelligence work, _per se_ (although security and _counter_-intelligence are related disciplines) - which is a problem with which CSIS is trying to wrestle, but that's a topic for another thread.

The machinations of the Security Branch had little direct impact on the intelligence folks - except to make them wince at their cap badge.


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## tabernac

Journeyman said:
			
		

> RMC has a BGen/Cmdre to oversee less than 900 OCdts. Why? Because the US service academies have a BGen, and it wouldn't be proper for Canada to be represented by a mere LCol at the RMC/West Point Hockey game.



Between the 13 ROTP Sqns + Otter Sqn we have between 950-1050. Sure we could bump Cmdre Truelove to Cdr, but them you'd have to bump DCdts down to Maj, all the division commanders down to Capt, and demote all the Squad bosses to Lt/SLt. You could even completely get rid of the Sqn Comds, and leave the OCdts in charge. The AMS head would need to drop down from Col, as we can't have him higher ranked than the Cmdt. Why stop there? CDA Comd no longer needs to be that of a GOFO does it? It's just a downward spiral from there.

The point here is that the Commandant does more than just babysit the Cadet Wing.



			
				quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Speaking to staff rank-bloat - it's everywhere; even the RCSU down at Work Point is infested with Capt 10s doing MCpl clerk-work.



10 CIC Capt doing MCpl desk/clerk work? To me that's personnel bloat, not rank bloat.



			
				quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Agreed (FWIW...) with the people questioning the need for FO/GOs in Commandant positions, especially at RMC. If you can get by with a single BGen as Director-General Reserves and Cadets: enormous, geographically diffuse organizations with tens of thousands of personnel involved (I know, he's in a staff role in relation to both, but still...), what need is there for the CO of RMC to be more than a Col? Perhaps a "high flying" LCol?


I'm unfamiliar with DGRC, however I don't think it's possible to compare DGRC and the RMC Cmdt. They're two different beasts.  The Cmdt has under him the Cadet Wing under the Cadet Wing Commander, the Mil Wing under the DCdts and the Academic Wing under the Principal. Fine, discount the Cadet Wing, but you still have hundreds of profs and associated staff in the Academic Wing (some military, holding rank from Capt to Col) and the Mil Wing, that while smaller in number, still has a LCol, several Maj/LCdr and a plethora of Capts. To drop the Cmdt's rank, you would have to axe too many positions below.


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## quadrapiper

cheeky_monkey said:
			
		

> 10 CIC Capt doing MCpl desk/clerk work? To me that's personnel bloat, not rank bloat.


Capt 10 in the sense of IPC. There's probably half a dozen doing work significantly "below grade," whilst the summer training centres lose officer billets.

As to RMC, makes sense.

Here's a question; might get discussion going: why is there (at the higher levels) civil service involvement in the CF at all? Sure, if there's a specific gig that it makes more sense to hire a specifically-qualified civilian into, fill it with such, but what's the general gain to using civil service pers?


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## TimBit

> Here's a question; might get discussion going: why is there (at the higher levels) civil service involvement in the CF at all? Sure, if there's a specific gig that it makes more sense to hire a specifically-qualified civilian into, fill it with such, but what's the general gain to using civil service pers?



For discussion, I would suggest:
- Corporate memory (no postings)
- Specialized fields of expertise: can see that in CDI, Policy, Planning
- Traditional civil service fields of expertise: budgetting, policy, liaison with government (PCO, TBS submissions, MCs)
- Cheaper: for any given position civilian personnel are much cheaper than uniformed personel

Now, as has been discussed in other threads, if NDHQ was de-integrated and mil/civ functions better segretated, this would of course be moot.


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## Journeyman

cheeky_monkey said:
			
		

> Between the 13 ROTP Sqns + Otter Sqn we have between *950-1050*. Sure we could bump Cmdre Truelove to Cdr, but them you'd have to bump DCdts down to Maj, all the division commanders down to Capt, and demote all the Squad bosses to Lt/SLt. You could even completely get rid of the Sqn Comds, and leave the OCdts in charge. The AMS head would need to drop down from Col, as we can't have him higher ranked than the Cmdt. Why stop there? CDA Comd no longer needs to be that of a GOFO does it? *It's just a downward spiral from there*.


I took the number from the RMC website -- for the sake of a 50-150 pers difference, the logic remains. 

And it's only considered a "downward spiral" if one has a vested interest in maintaining any particular sacred cow.


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## dapaterson

The GOFO question is, more precisely, a GOFOColEX question - the composition of the General, Flag, Colonel and executive public servants in  DND/CF is in dire need of re-examination.

The "Our allies want these ranks" is a canard brought out far to often (Hello, Kingston - in many locations, not just RMC) which, in turn, justifies rank creep and bloat underneath.  I recall chatting with one staff officer who pointed out that the CF has a grand total of one military-required 3* position - DComd NORAD.

However, I won't fight the DS solution there, so my somewhat streamlined Army would have:

LGen - Commander
MGen - Deputy Commander
MGen - Reg F Div Comd
BGen - Reg F Div D Comd
3x BGen - Reg F Bde Comd
BGen - Support group commander (owns the ASUs/ASGs)
BGen - Training systems commander

2x BGen (Res) - Res F div commanders, each div with 3x Res Bdes (commanded by Colonels)

This would eliminate 4x Res BGen positions, reduce the number of CBGs from 10 to 6, and remove the Area construct; the latter two would provide resources to re-invest in other HQs should they need strengthening with their increased span of control, and leave some left over for new initiatives.


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## OldSolduer

About 30 years ago we had 110 GOFOs, and we had a much larger CF.

Not only that, but I wonder if the increase in GOFOs mean an increase or "rank creep" down the CoC? What I mean is many years ago a job done by a corporal is now a sergeant's job. Is this going on or is it just my imagination?


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## Edward Campbell

OK, my guesstimate – 

A bunch of *Cmdres/BGens*:

•	Pacific and Atlantic Fleet commanders (2)
•	Regular Army Brigade Group Commanders (4)
•	Air Force Group Commanders (Fighter, Transport, Maritime Air, Training) (4)
•	Reserve Army Brigade Commanders (4)
•	NDHQ Directors General and Miscellaneous/International (40±)
Sub-Total: 55±

Some *RAdms/MGens*:

•	Regional Commanders (Pacific, Western, Eastern, Atlantic) (4)
•	Army Division Commanders (2) (No Deputy Commanders)
•	Air Division Commanders (2) (No Deputy Commanders)
•	SOFCOM Commander (1)
•	NDHQ and Miscellaneous/International (25)
Sub-Total: 35± 

A few *VAdms/LGens*:

•	DComd NORAD (1)
•	CANMILREP NATO (1)
•	CDLS(W) (1)
•	J3 (COS Joint Staff)  (1)
•	CDS (1)

Sub-Total: 5

*TOTAL*: 95± 
_But, by law, to be less than 100 until the total paid strength of the CF exceeds 150,000 all ranks_.

Notes:
1. Chiefs of Staffs (2 each – one for Ops/Int and one for Admin (Pers) and Log) in Regional Commands and Divisions to be Navy Captains or Colonels who will wield *real* power. There should never be more than about 150 Captains and Colonels so that promotion to that rank is a near guarantee of entré to the GOFO ranks.

2. Commanders and Lieutenant Colonels to be the first level _executive_ rank: all ‘Directors’ and equivalents to be Cdrs/LCols, never Capts/Cols.

3. Promotion to LCdr/Maj to require some levels of advanced training or examination.


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## aesop081

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> •	Air Force Group Commanders (Fighter, Transport, Maritime Air, Training) (4)



You cam eliminte those right away as there are no more of the old groups in the AF. The ghosts of some them continue to haunt some of us though.


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## Infanteer

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I looked at this while doing a little project with ranks at work - I don't have the list here, but I plotted out the GOFOs to see who was where.  The DSA list isn't entirely accurate as some have retired - I counted 114.



Looked at my data - I have 106 GOFOs.  1 CDS plus (read 3 Star/2 Star/1 Star):

NDHQ:              2/5/8
Army:               1/2/9
Navy:               1/3/5
Air Force:         1/2/7
.COMs:             2/4/6
CMP:                0/3/8
Other L1s:        0/3/7
ISAF:                0/1/6
OutCAN:           3/4/10
ATL:                  0/1/1

Total:                10/28/67

Shuffling a general or cutting a position or two off of something as simple as a ratio of isn't really going to do anything.  Would the CF be better off with 95?  75?  A look at strategic organization will give you an idea of whether we have too many, not enough, or are just right.  Dapaterson points to the right direction with the Col/Executive issue as well - we have 21 L1s, of which all fighting forces belong to 4 (the Army, Navy, Air Force and CANSOFCOM).


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## Gunner98

TimBit said:
			
		

> - Cheaper: for any given position civilian personnel are much cheaper than uniformed personel



This is a completely separate issue, until pay equity was instituted over the last decade this was not the case as the CF member was paid far less.  I am not sure that the civilian is still necessarily cheaper when you take into account things like monthly Sick Leave entitlement, overtime, training etc.

I would submit that this is too broad a brush to paint the entire DND with.  Case by case you can make the argument go either way - is it return on investment, continuity of work, innovation, attendance or deliverables/output that you are using as the benchmarks besides what is 'cheaper' in dollars and cents.


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## TimBit

Hey I am NOT saying that the cost/benefit ratio of a civilian is better. But typically, "analysts" positions staffed at the LCol level have a good 15-20K difference with their civilian counterparts in SWE.


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## Gunner98

I would disagree unless the position is over-ranked.  Equity is what Treasury Board has been striving for under the The Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act  

"The legislation applies to the Treasury Board of Canada as employer for departments and agencies listed in Schedule I and IV of the Financial Administration Act, to separate agencies as employers for departments and agencies listed in Schedule V of the Financial Administration Act, to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and to the Canadian Forces."


http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/nr-cp/2009/0206b-eng.asp


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## TimBit

But, plus the military factor. At 100K, that is 8K.


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## dapaterson

LCol Analyst: $100K.  Civ Equivalent:  $85K.  Plus pensionable at 25 years.  Plus health care (not provided by the province).  Plus uniforms.  Plus training.  Plus cost moves.

The full departmental cost of a military member is significantly higher than that of an equivalent civilian.


The choice of mil vs civ is not purely financial (nor should it be), but there must be a recognition of the additional costs the choice of military incurs.


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## TimBit

> LCol Analyst: $100K.  Civ Equivalent:  $85K.  Plus pensionable at 25 years.  Plus health care (not provided by the province).  Plus uniforms.  Plus training.  Plus cost moves.
> 
> The full departmental cost of a military member is significantly higher than that of an equivalent civilian.
> 
> 
> The choice of mil vs civ is not purely financial (nor should it be), but there must be a recognition of the additional costs the choice of military incurs.



Exactly what I had in mind. Friends in SJS reported the same situation: same cubicles, same direct reports, same task template, 20k difference in salary. They are not complaining, to be noted, just observing.


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## Gunner98

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The choice of mil vs civ is not purely financial (nor should it be), but there must be a recognition of the additional costs the choice of military incurs....Plus health care (not provided by the province).



Agreed - unlimited liability and uniform...ity has and should have a price.   Cost moves are not limited to people in uniform, nor is training.

Continuity of health care (beyond band-aids) is more and more provided within the provincial construct but paid for using federal (DND/CF) funding.


----------



## dapaterson

Simian Turner said:
			
		

> Agreed - unlimited liability and uniform...ity has and should have a price.   Cost moves are not limited to people in uniform, nor is training.
> 
> Continuity of health care (beyond band-aids) is more and more provided within the provincial construct but paid for using federal (DND/CF) funding.



Cost moves in DND are several orders of magnitude greater than the public service.

And public service training is significantly less expensive - Crew commander Leo II is pricier than Powerpoint level II.


----------



## TimBit

> And public service training is significantly less expensive



Consider this: I started in government as a Management Trainee, a program designed to fasttrack you to senior positions. Over three years, received a grand total of two weeks of training, plus a  day Project Management course.

that is it. Now no officer gets qualified with less than a year training (generally speaking), for basic qualifications. Quite a difference.


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

TimBit said:
			
		

> Exactly what I had in mind. Friends in SJS reported the same situation: same cubicles, same direct reports, same task template, 20k difference in salary. They are not complaining, to be noted, just observing.


Same work hours (actual not notional)??


----------



## Gunner98

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Cost moves in DND are several orders of magnitude greater than the public service.
> 
> And public service training is significantly less expensive - Crew commander Leo II is pricier than Powerpoint level II.



Somehow we have gone from comparing LCols to analysts to a Leo Crew Commander course and a Manager Trainee in a thread about Generals.  A bit of an increasing tangent.  At the LCol to General level I think the public servants' training and move credits are similar.  Enough said.


----------



## garb811

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Brigadier-General Patricia Samson was originally appointed Canadian Forces Provost Marshall as a Col in 1997, promoted BGen in the same year.   The final split of the INT Branch from the Security Branch happened in 2000 under her "Watch".


I don't recall exactly when she got promoted to BGen, I believe it would have been APS 99, but the BGen Provost Marshal was an anomaly that has happened once since I joined and you'll probably never see it again.  She was due to be promoted but as the changes within the Branch she orchestrated were still ongoing, they over strengthed the position until the end of her appointment as CFPM.  The structure is the CFPM is a Col, the DPMs/C*S PM/CO NIS etc are LCol.  IF more MP LCols are due to promoted and the CFPM position is filled, they go outside the Branch to be promoted.  Same happens when the CFPM finishes their tenure, if they have more years to serve and do not wish to retire, they go to positions outside the Branch, as happened with BGen Samson (to the Int Branch no less...) and Col Copper.


----------



## dapaterson

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Same work hours (actual not notional)??



Nope.  Public servants don't take 1 hour at noon for PT and count it as working hours.


Back off tangent: the number of executive-level positions overall in DND, be it military Capt(N)/Cols and GOFOs or civilians is what needs to be put under the microscope, not just one side or the other.


----------



## aesop081

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Nope.  Public servants don't take 1 hour at noon for PT and count it as working hours.



How many of those public servants are required to maintain a certain fitness level or lose their job ?


----------



## dapaterson

Unfortunately, in NDHQ one can see some military folks not maintaining their fitness without repercussion.

But this should not deteriorate into a mil/civ bashing discussion (and apologies if I've started to lead it down that path).

Ultimately, the quesiton is what amount high level help, mil or civ, is needed to lead and manage the CF and DND.  I think the general consensus is that we have too many generals (no pun intended). The question is where to make any reducitons - and as can be seen here, everyone has a different opinion, and everyone has their vital ground that they will protect.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> LCol Analyst: $100K.  Civ Equivalent:  $85K.  Plus pensionable at 25 years.  Plus health care (not provided by the province).  Plus uniforms.  Plus training.  Plus cost moves.
> 
> The full departmental cost of a military member is significantly higher than that of an equivalent civilian.
> 
> 
> The choice of mil vs civ is not purely financial (nor should it be), but there must be a recognition of the additional costs the choice of military incurs.



I worked in DG Int back in the '80's and we had lots of civil analysts working with us and my impression was that they were making more than their military equivalent.  Also, we had several civilian analysts who were ex-military some of whom would be collecting their military pension (Major/LCol), plus, getting their civilian pay check, plus, when they retire from their civilian job they get another pension! As for uniforms I'm willing to bet that the civilian analysts got a clothing allowance or were able to claim their suits as a tax deduction. The civilian analysts went on courses, sometimes the same courses military types took, plus, relevant public service courses they had to take for promotion. I'm also willing to bet that the public service types also get help when they have to move from one city to another.

Again, some of this was just my impressions, possibly wrong, but I'm willing to bet that once you start adding up all the little perks there isn't that much of difference (cost wise) between a LCol and his/her civilian equivalent.


----------



## TimBit

> I worked in DG Int back in the '80's and we had lots of civil analysts working with us and my impression was that they were making more than their military equivalent.  Also, we had several civilian analysts who were ex-military some of whom would be collecting their military pension (Major/LCol), plus, getting their civilian pay check, plus, when they retire from their civilian job they get another pension! As for uniforms I'm willing to bet that the civilian analysts got a clothing allowance or were able to claim their suits as a tax deduction. The civilian analysts went on courses, sometimes the same courses military types took, plus, relevant public service courses they had to take for promotion. I'm also willing to bet that the public service types also get help when they have to move from one city to another.
> 
> Again, some of this was just my impressions, possibly wrong, but I'm willing to bet that once you start adding up all the little perks there isn't that much of difference (cost wise) between a LCol and his/her civilian equivalent.



Nowadays, since SCONDVA in the 90`s, military personel make 8% more for the same task. There certainly isn`t any clothes allowance for civvies, nor tax deductions. The one big thing you get as a civvy is, I`ll give it to you, overtime. On the downside, there`s no such thing as sliders.

You are right, PS do get moving allowance...the point was more that because they don`t typically move, civilians are less expensive to employ in a given job than a posted in military personel.

Now back on topic, before the mods slam us, I do believe, personaly, that a lot of it has to do with rank inflation for authority/prestige reasons, i.e. no one will listen to him if he`s a major so we`d better make this position LCol, therefore the director has to be a Col and the DG a Bgen. And so on. The other thing that is astonishing when one dwells at 101 is the number of people who essentially do the same job but with a different focus, i.e. south america ops versus south america policy versus south america plans. Different jobs, but still pretty similar. Obviously that does create inflationary pressures as well...other than that, I don't know that reducing the number of GOFOs really would save money or make us more efficient. I remain to be convinced.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I was told, many, many years ago and by someone who was "in the room," back in the 1960s, that the decision to (incorrectly) equate the first (director) _executive_ level of the public service to Captain (N)/Colonel was taken as part of a huge and complex process of _equating_ military salaries to public service _benchmarks_. One of the problem was to try to keep a _steady_ progression for military ranks with the _proviso_ that, just as one example, CPO1/WO1 (as they still were back then) be roughly equal (with trade pay) to LCdr/Maj (even, in a very few cases) to Cdr/LCol and that Lt(N)/Capt be the _journeyman_/working rank for most officers. Almost everything failed, except that we did get a series of major, important, earned and otherwise politically impossible pay raises and the revised system was _sensible_ until the public service executive compensation _system_ was changed (mid 1970s? (I can't remember any more.)) and pay for Capts (N)/Cols got buggered up beyond all recognition. But one of the unintended and deleterious consequences was rank inflation. The military's proposal, _circa_ 1963, was for a somewhat _honourary_ four star CDS but, for the rest, a system in which the _executive_ level's 'base of the pyramid' started at Cdr/LCol and topped out at three three stars for a force of nearly 150,000 regulars. The decisions that were taken were based on a reasonable "take home pay" scheme - something we, then serving members, desperately needed - not on _appropriate_ rank (and pay) for function. Following the military's (1963) plan would have resulted in a smaller, leaner but actually more expensive officer corps.


----------



## pbi

birdgunnnersrule said:
			
		

> The reduction in the number of headquarters or the consolidation of a couple of the commands would be more palatable politically than base closures.   Reducing top heavy HQ`s may not put the correct pyramid structure back into the field as these tend to be diamond shaped.



While I am very much against a willy-nilly cutting of HQs (think of a human body trying to think or act without a an adequate brain or nervous system...), I do think some economies could be made.  I am very much a fan of the "command-driven" approach that Gen Hillier introduced, I think we went a bit overboard for a Force as small as ours is.  I would:

a) Merge CEFCOM and CANADACOM into "CANOPCOM", with one Comd but a DComd Expeditionary and a DComd Continental (specifically NOT COS but "DComd");

b) Merge Support Command into: 1) the J4 branches of the OPCOM; and 2) a "Corps Troops"-type organization that answers to OPCOM, possibly under a "DComd Sp";

c) Leave CANSOFCOM alone to continue to mature and improve its capabilities: I think we will need them in the future much more than we might guess now;

d) Leave the ECS (CMS, CLS, CAS) to get on with force generation and retention which is their raison d'etre; and

e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period.

Cheers


----------



## Infanteer

How about the other 13 L1s?


----------



## McG

pbi said:
			
		

> While I am very much against a willy-nilly cutting of HQs (think of a human body trying to think or act without a an adequate brain or nervous system...), I do think some economies could be made.  I am very much a fan of the "command-driven" approach that Gen Hillier introduced, I think we went a bit overboard for a Force as small as ours is.  I would:
> 
> a) Merge CEFCOM and CANADACOM into "CANOPCOM", with one Comd but a DComd Expeditionary and a DComd Continental (specifically NOT COS but "DComd");
> 
> b) Merge Support Command into: 1) the J4 branches of the OPCOM; and 2) a "Corps Troops"-type organization that answers to OPCOM, possibly under a "DComd Sp";
> 
> c) Leave CANSOFCOM alone to continue to mature and improve its capabilities: I think we will need them in the future much more than we might guess now;
> 
> d) Leave the ECS (CMS, CLS, CAS) to get on with force generation and retention which is their raison d'etre; and
> 
> e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period.


This is exactly the sort of review we should be doing across all the L1s, but it needs to be done down to at least all the L2s (and anywhere that there is a major shake-up of the L2 structure, the review needs to dip lower into the L3s).  I agree there should be no willy-nilly cutting - there should be a deliberate structural review and rationalization (which may include cutting, shuffling, re-locating or preserving various HQs, formations, commands, bases, etc).


----------



## Infanteer

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/10/mod-org-chart/

Think we're bad, try to decipher the 30-some-odd pages outlining the British Military....


----------



## pbi

Infanteer said:
			
		

> How about the other 13 L1s?



I'm not familiar with all of these, but I guess you're referring to things like ADM (IE), CDI, etc?

I am much more skeptical of them, but I have to confess that I really haven't had enough to do with any of them to form much of an opinion, except possibly CDI on the training side. In their specific case, I agree that we need a "Joint" Int handling, analysis and management agency at the L1, but I"m not at all sure they should have fingers in training and Force Generation (which is where I've dealt with them).

Cheers


----------



## OldSolduer

"e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period."

And these issues in the post Afghan period will be serious.


----------



## safetysOff

Could having such an inflated general’s rank be a result of a strategy to keep the up and coming officer corp motivated? If you’re in an officer trade that maxes out at major or colonel you’d probably start f*@%ing the dog pretty hard once you get to that top rank.  
If having a higher chance to reach general is what it takes to a) keep the officer corp motivated throughout their career to perform at 100% and b) ensure an officer stays with the military their entire career than why not have 100+ generals?


What’s that ole saying, something along the lines of ‘Giving out ranks and medals is easy but finding a good man that can get a job done isn’t.’


----------



## CombatDoc

safetysOff said:
			
		

> Could having such an inflated general’s rank be a result of a strategy to keep the up and coming officer corp motivated? If you’re in an officer trade that maxes out at major or colonel you’d probably start f*@%ing the dog pretty hard once you get to that top rank.
> If having a higher chance to reach general is what it takes to a) keep the officer corp motivated throughout their career to perform at 100% and b) ensure an officer stays with the military their entire career than why not have 100+ generals?


While this may be a motivating factor for some (e.g. the "careerists"), it is unlikely to motivate the majority of the officer corps.  Many of those wishing to attain GOFO status see the rank as a tool to effect change at the systemic level.  For example, in my trade the pay differential in going from Col to BGen is about 5%, and for many the headaches at that rank outweigh the increased pay, perceived status, etc.  

The other reason to have GOFO's is to be able to sit at the NATO table as equals with our partners.  I know that this has been discussed before with Israel as an outlier, but typically, 1 stars talk to 1 stars, 2 stars to 2 stars, etc.  If you're a 4 ringer and your NATO counterpart is a 1 star, you're likely to be meeting with their deputy.


----------



## ArmyRick

SafetyOff,

I apprciate that your thinking about officers dogging it if they max out a certain rank level but realistically I will say this about our (CF) officers. I beleive most of them are very proffessional (from what I have seen) and even those that have maxed out (I have seen numerous Captains hit their limit for whatever reason) usually still apply themselves very well. 

Officers tend to approach things (usually) different than NCM. Dog phuckers amongst the officers are rare (at least as far as I have seen However I guess the combat arms can be a slender view of things). 

I was going to say something about who tends to be the worst offenders for coasting through the careers when they reach a comfortable rank level but I realise I would be p*ssing people off. We all know there are dog phuckers out there.  

It comes down to individuals choosing to be proffessional every day they put on the uniform (integrity) and knowing when it is time for them to move on to civilian life (if your not going to give an honest effort to the service, get out IMO).

To my peers, if your still given 'er, good on ya.


----------



## Blackadder1916

I came across this study re succession planning for CF GFOs that may be of interest to this discusion.  The full document is downloadble at http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-SAS-073///MP-SAS-073-13.doc

Note the numbers (highlighted in the quoted excerpt) of GFOs that they included; it differs significantly from the numbers identified earlier in this thread.



> *Succession Planning for the Canadian Forces General Officer Corps*
> 
> Mr. Gary Christopher, Mr. Francois Larochelle and Mr. Paul Bender
> Defence Research and Development Canada – Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
> 101 Colonel By Drive
> Ottawa, ON, Canada
> K1A 0K2
> 
> ABSTRACT
> Recently, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces (CF) wanted to explore career management options to shape the future demographic profile of the General/Flag Officer (GFO) Corps and provide transparency on the policy decisions that would dictate career advancement opportunities for entering into and advancing within the GFO ranks. A number of options defining conditions for mandatory release from the Canadian Forces were defined. The Workforce Modelling and Analysis Team was tasked to evaluate the proposed options and to assess the long term impact on the demographic characteristics of the GFO population. The Modelling Team also identified and assessed other potential career management options that could be utilized to shape the future GFO Corps. A combination of statistical analysis and simulation were employed to investigate the issue. Historical human resources data were analyzed to define release rates and patterns within the CF as well as the demographic characteristics of the current Officer population of the CF. A discrete-event simulation model was then created to represent the release (resignation and retirement) and career progression processes. Population transformation to 2020 was simulated. The effectiveness of the proposed career management options in shaping the GFO Corps was assessed, as well as the resultant demographic characteristics.
> 
> 1.0	INTRODUCTION
> In the Fall of 2008, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces (CF) wanted to explore career management options to shape the future demographic profile of the General/Flag Officer (GFO) Corps and provide transparency on the policy decisions that would dictate career advancement opportunities for entering into and advancing within the GFO ranks. A number of options defining conditions for mandatory release from the Canadian Forces were defined to provide a means to ensure continual renewal of the CF leadership cadre. Subsequently, the Workforce Modelling and Analysis Team, within the Directorate of Strategic Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DSMPRA), was tasked to evaluate the proposed options and assess the long-term impact of the proposed career management options on the demographic characteristics of the General/Flag Officer population. The Modelling Team was also asked to identify and assess any other potential career management options that could be utilized to shape the future GFO Corps.
> 
> 1.0 AIM AND OBJECTIVES
> The overall aim of this examination of possible career management policies governing mandatory releases from the CF for senior military Officers was to identify the preferred option that would ensure the sustainability of the GFO Corps while retaining or producing the desired characteristics for the group in terms of age and experience. The selected option would then be established and utilized to develop policy, thereby providing a clear understanding of the conditions that would be used to manage senior Officer careers.
> 
> The objectives for the analysis effort undertaken by the Modelling and Analysis Team were to identify the long-term effects the different career management options would have on the sustainability of the GFO Corps and the changes that would result in the demographic profile of the GFO population. Moreover, the analysis would attempt to develop an understanding of which aspect(s) of the options was the driving force(s) shaping the resultant evolution of GFO demographic characteristics. In addition, the study would attempt to identify additional career management options that would be effective in establishing age and experience characteristics of the GFO Corps.
> 
> 2.0 STUDY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
> In defining the scope of the study, several constraints were identified:
> • Effects of the proposed career management options were to be forecast out to Fiscal Year 2020/2021 (FY 20/21).
> • The current conditions/criteria for mandatory release from the CF for Officers below the GFO rank were to remain in effect:
> • For the Lieutenant Colonel/LCol (Navy Commander/Cdr) rank and below, military service would be terminated when the individual reached the Compulsory Retirement Age of 60 years (CRA 60), and
> • For the Colonel/Col (Captain Navy/Capt(N)) rank, military service would end when the individual reached 35 years of service or 55 years of age, whichever occurred last.
> • *Planned increases in Col/Capt(N) and GFO positions were to be included in the study:
> • Col/Capt(N) positions would grow from 291 to 300 in FY 09/10 and then remain constant for the duration, and
> • GFO numbers would rise from 74 to 77 in FY 09/10 (45 1-star, 22 2-star, 9 3-star and 1 4-star), then to 80 in FY 10/11 (47 1-star, 22 2-star, 10 3-star and 1 4-star) and would remain constant at 80 thereafter.
> • Col/Capt(N) must have at least two years of service (YOS) remaining before mandatory release to be eligible for promotion to the rank of Brigadier General (BGen) or Commodore (Cmdre).*


----------



## Journeyman

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> I came across this study.....


Yes, but reading through it all, the bottom line is:

"Overall there is very little difference in the effects produced by the three GFO career management options that focus entirely on mandatory release criteria" [which was their main variable]. The reason being, each model included the caveat "on a case-by-case basis" -- which is to say, if your superiors want you, they'll offer another leaf.


Now, what's interesting is that the study was published as NATO document. 
What does NATO have to do with our command structure? Is NATO studying the Canadian system as a way to get additional GO/FO into other countries' militaries? 
_~shrug~_


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Yes, but reading through it all, the bottom line is:
> 
> "Overall there is very little difference in the effects produced by the three GFO career management options that focus entirely on mandatory release criteria" [which was their main variable]. The reason being, each model included the caveat "on a case-by-case basis" -- which is to say, if your superiors want you, they'll offer another leaf.


That's not how I read it - I thought it was release that was being decided on a case by case basis not promotion.  The table on pg 5 shows that there are no GFO older than 57 so it apparently doesn't happen often.

I thought it was interesting that "it has been shown that the majority of the GFO (and Col) Officers take their release prior to reaching 30 YOS and 55 YOA."  I didn't think there were many who made it to GFO before 30 never mind making it and retiring by 30 years.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Now, what's interesting is that the study was published as NATO document.


It was published at the NATO Research and Technology Organisation site (which apparently promotes and conducts co-operative scientific research and exchange of technical information amongst 28 NATO nations and 38 NATO partners) so perhaps it is the equivalent of a conference paper?  Or made available for peer review?



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> What does NATO have to do with our command structure? Is NATO studying the Canadian system as a way to get additional GO/FO into other countries' militaries?
> _~shrug~_


Are 77-80 GFO for a nearly 70k regular force significantly more than other NATO countries?  I would also be curious how our ratios of senior NCO (CWO/MWO/WO) stack up when compared to other NATO militaries - anybody know?


----------



## McG

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I suspect it's a Radio Chatter topic anyway.
> 
> RMC has a BGen/Cmdre to oversee less than 900 OCdts. Why? Because the US service academies have a BGen, and it wouldn't be proper for Canada to be represented by a mere LCol at the RMC/West Point Hockey game.
> 
> Even better, CFC has a one-star to shepherd 120'ish Maj/LCols each year. Why? Because it would be rude to have senior guest speakers be greeted by a mere Col.
> 
> And then there's the NDHQ BGen overseeing the "Directorate of Dawdling with a MCpl in-theatre".......  >





			
				Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Make that 140+ Cdr/LCol and LCdr/Maj  (and RCMP/civilian equivalents) on the Joint Command and Staff Programme.  There are also 40ish Capt(N)/Col (and civilian equivalents) on the 10 month National Security Programme.
> 
> If you consider the traditional rank pyramid to still be worth retaining - then what rank would you have supervising the 40ish Capt(N)/Col students not to mention the 2 Capt(N)/Col on staff (who supervise the 25+ Cdr/LCol staff)?





			
				cheeky_monkey said:
			
		

> Between the 13 ROTP Sqns + Otter Sqn we have between 950-1050. Sure we could bump Cmdre Truelove to Cdr, but them you'd have to bump DCdts down to Maj, all the division commanders down to Capt, and demote all the Squad bosses to Lt/SLt. You could even completely get rid of the Sqn Comds, and leave the OCdts in charge. The AMS head would need to drop down from Col, as we can't have him higher ranked than the Cmdt. Why stop there? CDA Comd no longer needs to be that of a GOFO does it? It's just a downward spiral from there.
> 
> The point here is that the Commandant does more than just babysit the Cadet Wing.
> 
> ... The Cmdt has under him the Cadet Wing under the Cadet Wing Commander, the Mil Wing under the DCdts and the Academic Wing under the Principal. Fine, discount the Cadet Wing, but you still have hundreds of profs and associated staff in the Academic Wing (some military, holding rank from Capt to Col) and the Mil Wing, that while smaller in number, still has a LCol, several Maj/LCdr and a plethora of Capts. To drop the Cmdt's rank, you would have to axe too many positions below.


If CFC were moved to Kingston with RMC, could a single BGen look after the combined entity?  Would the broader responsibility justify the rank in the eyes of those who currently question it?



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... I'd be more interested in turning the critical eye on is the large clag of LCol/Cols and CWO types that are essentially "civilians in uniform" doing something that a Captain or a Sergeant could do.  While staff bloat may create a Brigadier General or two, it has created loads of this latter type.


I would also include, in that review, a scan of Majors doing the job of a Capt and captains doing the job of a Lt.  An aggravating factor (and one which can be well seen in Army brigades) is the automatic percolation of Lieutenants into Captains without any quality filter and weak experience filters.  Staff _cells_ which historically functioned under the guidance of a Capt are now staffed full of captains and there is the perceived need to throw a major into the mix to lead all those captains. 

It used to be that the brigade HQ "G-men" were captains, less the G3 & G4 who (as majors) also acted as overseers for the broader ops and sp functions.  Now we want all the "G-men" to be majors, and we have invented LCol positions as DCOSs to do the two overseer role.  

Lt should be the working rank of staff in a tactical level HQ - units and brigades in the Army.  In a Regt, the only captains in the HQ should be Ops O & Adjt.

At the operational and strategic levels of HQ, the working rank of Capt is more palatable.  Despite that, I have no doubt there are places for Lts in these HQs (potentially more so in certain occupations) and suspect there are places within these levels where automatic percolation to Capt is causing rank inflation pressures.  There is potentially indirect bottom-up pressures as the system attempts to provide room for career advancement of captains who reached that rank ahead of their time.

It has been proposed previously (many times & in many places), but I suspect that merit based promotions to Capt (and the replacement of all Lt/Capt positions with hard Lt positions) would reduce rank inflation through intermediate levels.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> How about the other 13 L1s?


I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).

... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> .I would also include, in that review, a scan of Majors doing the job of a Capt and captains doing the job of a Lt.  An aggravating factor (and one which can be well seen in Army brigades) is the automatic percolation of Lieutenants into Captains without any quality filter and weak experience filters.  Staff _cells_ which historically functioned under the guidance of a Capt are now staffed full of captains and there is the perceived need to throw a major into the mix to lead all those captains.
> 
> It used to be that the brigade HQ "G-men" were captains, less the G3 & G4 who (as majors) also acted as overseers for the broader ops and sp functions.  Now we want all the "G-men" to be majors, and we have invented LCol positions as DCOSs to do the two overseer role.
> 
> Lt should be the working rank of staff in a tactical level HQ - units and brigades in the Army.  In a Regt, the only captains in the HQ should be Ops O & Adjt.
> 
> At the operational and strategic levels of HQ, the working rank of Capt is more palatable.  Despite that, I have no doubt there are places for Lts in these HQs (potentially more so in certain occupations) and suspect there are places within these levels where automatic percolation to Capt is causing rank inflation pressures.  There is potentially indirect bottom-up pressures as the system attempts to provide room for career advancement of captains who reached that rank ahead of their time.
> 
> It has been proposed previously (many times & in many places), but I suspect that merit based promotions to Capt (and the replacement of all Lt/Capt positions with hard Lt positions) would reduce rank inflation through intermediate levels.



Interesting point, and one that I've seen pointed at before - Storr's "Command of British Forces in Iraq" highlights the problems of overinflated staffs and how they can slow things down.  We are now seeing Infantry battalions employing Majors as Bn Ops Os (which they are allowed to do as the Position Lists state so).  I have no doubt that the merging of the Lieutenant and Captain rank into a single rank has created pressure from below on the rank system.

Creating a realistic divide between Captains and Lieutenants is important and demands a few things:

1.  We change our commissioning plans that accelerate officers under certain plans (DEO) making them eligible for promotion to Captain within their first year of leaving the school house;

2.  As already mentioned, we need to make the rank of Captain a merited one; and

3.  We change our way of "managing" the rank - CMP views the rank as "Lt-Capt" for all planning purposes (PML, TES, SIP, PSR, etc) yet a Lieutenant in is not a Captain out.  Result is that we see "The Infantry is short 80 Lt-Capt", so the solution - based off faulty measurement - is to simply jam 80 more Lieutenants from the schools into the Battalions.  First off, that doesn't solve the problem as Battalions are not short subbies and second you can't take a Lieutenant and make him a Brigade Plans Officer, although that metric of "Lt-Capt" seems to say so. 



> I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).
> 
> ... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.



A good start.  Looking at the L1s, I could probably do away with a bunch of them quite easily with merging or exporting.


----------



## Edward Campbell

MCG said:
			
		

> ...
> I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).
> 
> ... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.




I would go farther:

1. *NDHQ* = MND + DM plus a great many L1s, some of which have military personelled in them and a very few of which might actually be led by a military officer; and, *subordinate to NDHQ*

2. *CFHQ* = CDS plus his (or her) _mission elements_ from L1 all the way down to rifle section and so on. There would be some civilians in senior positions, but not in *command* positions, here, in the CF.

The DM's NDHQ is wholly and completely responsible for strategy, policy, budgeting and material and so on. the CDS' CFHQ is responsible for *executing* the missions assigned to the CF by the government of the day and for developing and validating its requirements for people, training, equipment, facilities and so on.

This is not a proposal for two separate and distinct HQs - my CFHQ would exist as a subordinate part of NDHQ, allowing the MND and DM to _direct_ the CDS on mattrers of strategy, policy, etc, etc while still allowing the CDS unfettered access to the MND and PM on operational matters.


----------



## Neill McKay

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> This is not a proposal for two separate and distinct HQs - my CFHQ would exist as a subordinate part of NDHQ, allowing the MND and DM to _direct_ the CDS on mattrers of strategy, policy, etc, etc while still allowing the CDS unfettered access to the MND and PM on operational matters.



That would be a significant change for the CDS in that he is now a peer to the Deputy Minister.


----------



## Jarnhamar

Correct me if I am wrong but when I look at the various courses being run it seems like there is way more basic officer courses being run than junior leadership courses.


----------



## Haggis

Grimaldus said:
			
		

> Correct me if I am wrong but when I look at the various courses being run it seems like there is way more basic officer courses being run than junior leadership courses.



BMOQ is centralized and run only out of CFLRS.  CFPLQ (and it's variants) are run decentrally by the three environments.  So, it appears that there are more BMOQ being run when, in fact, there are many more (CF) PLQ serials being run across all the environments.


----------



## Edward Campbell

N. McKay said:
			
		

> That would be a significant change for the CDS in that he is now a peer to the Deputy Minister.




That is correct, but, the CDS has a very, very limited to near zero role in DND (the department of government), _per se_. DND consists of all the DM's L1s, some of which would still be there even if we disbanded the CF. Thus, the DM runs the Department and one (major) element of that big department is the CF, which the CDS runs. It makes sense to me that the DM should run DND from NDHQ and the CDS should run the CF from CFHQ. But maybe I'm just old and simple.


----------



## Old Sweat

The NDA is very clear that the MND is responsible for DND and the CF, which are separate entities.


----------



## armybuck041

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Creating a realistic divide between Captains and Lieutenants is important and demands a few things:
> 
> 1.  We change our commissioning plans that accelerate officers under certain plans (DEO) making them eligible for promotion to Captain within their first year of leaving the school house;
> 
> 2.  As already mentioned, we need to make the rank of Captain a merited one; and
> 
> 3.  We change our way of "managing" the rank - CMP views the rank as "Lt-Capt" for all planning purposes (PML, TES, SIP, PSR, etc) yet a Lieutenant in is not a Captain out.  Result is that we see "The Infantry is short 80 Lt-Capt", so the solution - based off faulty measurement - is to simply jam 80 more Lieutenants from the schools into the Battalions.  First off, that doesn't solve the problem as Battalions are not short subbies and second you can't take a Lieutenant and make him a Brigade Plans Officer, although that metric of "Lt-Capt" seems to say so.



I couldn't agree more....  This is a policy that deserves as much scrutiny as the whole GOFO issue. Nearly worthy of a Topic Split  

Minor sidetrack: In the current (broken) context, I find it odd that policy states that a CFR Lt does not enter promotion zone within the same timelines as a ROTP/DEO Lt (3 years versus 2, or even 1 year in some cases). Pay is better for a CFR, but with an Officer Advancement system that is clearly geared towards age/rank milestones, why someone who is most likely much older with double digit years of experience > than his/her ROTP/DEO peers is dealt an additional year as an Lt is a bit frustrating..... I digress....


----------



## Neill McKay

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> It makes sense to me that the DM should run DND from NDHQ and the CDS should run the CF from CFHQ.



That makes good sense, but I would suggest that NDHQ and CFHQ should be parallel to one another, rather than one being subordinate to the other.  A structure in which the civilian bureaucracy is run by the Deputy and the forces themselves by the CDS, each of whom reports to the Minister, would be more conventional.


----------



## Edward Campbell

N. McKay said:
			
		

> That makes good sense, but I would suggest that NDHQ and CFHQ should be parallel to one another, rather than one being subordinate to the other.  A structure in which the civilian bureaucracy is run by the Deputy and the forces themselves by the CDS, each of whom reports to the Minister, would be more conventional.



Two roughly parallel HQs might be more _conventional_ but I'm not sure it addresses the real needs of DND and the CF - one of which is for clear, top level _direction_ on issues like strategy, policy, budget and material, all of which are in the (pretty much exclusive) domain of the Deputy Minister. It seems to me that the _conventional_ wisdom is what got us into a situation in which we wonder why we have fewer and fewer sailors, soldiers and aviators and more and more admirals, generals and high level civil servants.


----------



## pbi

> Lt should be the working rank of staff in a tactical level HQ - units and brigades in the Army.



Not with the level of knowledge current amongst most of our junior officers right now. I spent my last four years in the RegF at CLFCSC (2007-2010), two teaching on AOC and two of them running the training program for deploying operational HQs, OGDs and staff increments. I can assure you that unless we require officers to spend MUCH longer at the rank of Lt, they will not be capable of functioning as staff officers at Bde level as Lts, and I would seriously question their ability at unit level.

One of our biggest academic concerns at the Staff College (both of whose Commandants and most of whose DS had recent Afghan operational experience during my time there) was the drastic decline in the core knowlege and overall experience levels of the Capts of all MOCs arriving on the course. Many were arriving after only one unit tour, or maybe one ERE tour. While many had done tours in combat, their broader knowledge of the functioning of their arm, of unit-level operations, and of  the wider Army, was and continues to be, quite weak. Their understanding of the functioning of any HQ above sub-unit is generally zero. 

Without the experience required to reach the rank of Capt (which at its bare minimum isn't much...) and the education provided at the AOC, I seriously doubt most of them would be particularly effective as staff officers in a Bde HQ, without a degree of supervision that the pace of operations rarely permits.

Even while training the operational HQs, we found that the staff abilities of most junior officers were often minimal: a significant part of the training programme for the HQs involved training staffs "from square one", before even attempting any CPXs.

But, what do we really expect from Lts in terms of staff skills, anyway?

Except for very minor staff jobs under supervision, IMHO Capt is the minimum for a staff position at unit or Bde, unless we change the nature of the beast.

Cheers


----------



## Lex Parsimoniae

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Two roughly parallel HQs might be more _conventional_ but I'm not sure it addresses the real needs of DND and the CF - one of which is for clear, top level _direction_ on issues like strategy, policy, budget and material, all of which are in the (pretty much exclusive) domain of the Deputy Minister. It seems to me that the _conventional_ wisdom is what got us into a situation in which we wonder why we have fewer and fewer sailors, soldiers and aviators and more and more admirals, generals and high level civil servants.


Taking this idea one step further - _A Modest Proposal for the CF_ if you will - why not cap military ranks at Col/CWO (pay level 8A only) and have all units larger than fleet/brigade report directly to civilian executives?  Think of the savings and efficiency gains if we eliminated all HQs!


----------



## Edward Campbell

Lex Parsimoniae said:
			
		

> Taking this idea one step further - _A Modest Proposal for the CF_ if you will - why not cap military ranks at Col/CWO (pay level 8A only) and have all units larger than fleet/brigade report directly to civilian executives?  Think of the savings and efficiency gains if we eliminated all HQs!




Don't say that too loudly; there are people in the PCO who will take you up on it!

My problem isn't with too many or even too large HQs. It is with too _complex_ HQs with, say, 20+ L1s trying to report to and get direction from two or three "top" people. In my simple, old mind the _span of control_ for the DM/CDS 'team' (if that's what it is, which I doubt) is too broad and I think two separate HQs _might_ go some way towards addressing that problem.


----------



## Infanteer

pbi said:
			
		

> Not with the level of knowledge current amongst most of our junior officers right now. I spent my last four years in the RegF at CLFCSC (2007-2010), two teaching on AOC and two of them running the training program for deploying operational HQs, OGDs and staff increments. I can assure you that unless we require officers to spend MUCH longer at the rank of Lt, they will not be capable of functioning as staff officers at Bde level as Lts, and I would seriously question their ability at unit level.



This problem is linked to three problems - the first of which was discussed above:

1.  The shell game of creating more Captains by promoting Lieutenants earlier.  Of course Captains are going to be less experienced when they only spend 6-9 months of their Lieutenancy in a Battalion or Regiment (the rest is backdated to include time in the DP1 training system).  We've diluted the experience of our junior officers due to an administrative maneuver designed to increase their pay;

2.  Because of the pressure to increase "Lieutenants/Captains" in the organization as a whole (not necessarily within the units) we've pumped more into the units.  End result is less time in a unit (2-3 years vice 3-5) and more of this time in joe-jobs like "Admin O"; and

3.  The pressure to create more Majors for the organization as a whole (I point this one right at the .COM expansion) has meant that the Land CSC is taking guys sooner then before to qualify them for a quicker promotion to Major.

So, you have these 3 pers management factors all influencing the level of experience of an AOC uptake.

This is not necessarily bad as Captains will be getting useful skillsets earlier - the School just has to manage this.  One way can be by beefing up ATOC to me more than it is.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Except for very minor staff jobs under supervision, IMHO Capt is the minimum for a staff position at unit or Bde, unless we change the nature of the beast.



I agree with this - if we sort out or HR management, junior officers should see their time as 2Lt/Lt extended and all of this time spent in Battalion.  After about 4 years, they're ready to move on to a Formation HQ as a Staff Captain.

But I also agree with McG's statement above regarding HQ inflation.  This is a phenomenon that has been occuring across Western armies for the last few decades.  Jobs in Brigade that were done by Captains 50 years ago are now done by Majors.  Staffs have gone from a Major and a couple Captains to a LCol, 4-5 Majors and a hockey sock full of Captains.  Warfare may have gotten more complex (that's debatable) but has it gotten 300% more complex?



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> My problem isn't with too many or even too large HQs. It is with too _complex_ HQs



Exactly.  In fact, I'm a proponent of more numerous, smaller HQs.  Unscientifically, I believe that 2 x Bde Comds with 3000 men and 50-man HQs will accomplish more than 1 x Bde Comd with 6000 men and a 100-man HQ.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...
> Exactly.  In fact, I'm a proponent of more numerous, smaller HQs.  Unscientifically, I believe that 2 x Bde Comds with 3000 men and 50-man HQs will accomplish more than 1 x Bde Comd with 6000 men and a 100-man HQ.




Even with the acknowledged increased complexity of operations, even with the acknowledged requirement to have PA and legal advisors, even with the acknowledged need for more specialist staff (EW, etc), I cannot believe that we need 50 officers to staff a brigade HQ. Twenty-five, yes; thirty, maybe even 35, OK, but 50? *No*. I can agree to 50, *all ranks* including staff clerks - and relying upon the supporting Signal unit for other admin and log support, but 50 staff officers/NCOs is too much.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Even with the acknowledged increased complexity of operations, even with the acknowledged requirement to have PA and legal advisors, even with the acknowledged need for more specialist staff (EW, etc), I cannot believe that we need 50 officers to staff a brigade HQ. Twenty-five, yes; thirty, maybe even 35, OK, but 50? *No*. I can agree to 50, *all ranks* including staff clerks - and relying upon the supporting Signal unit for other admin and log support, but 50 staff officers/NCOs is too much.



I'm with you on 25-35; I was using the numbers 50 and 100 to illustrate a point - but current authorized strength is 33-15-11 for 59 all ranks (and this doesn't include a legal advisor).


----------



## McG

pbi said:
			
		

> Not with the level of knowledge current amongst most of our junior officers right now. I spent my last four years in the RegF at CLFCSC (2007-2010), two teaching on AOC and two of them running the training program for deploying operational HQs, OGDs and staff increments. I can assure you that unless we require officers to spend MUCH longer at the rank of Lt, they will not be capable of functioning as staff officers at Bde level as Lts, and I would seriously question their ability at unit level.


Aside from Adjt & Regt/Bn Ops O, no unit staff officer needs to be a Capt.  The only other Capt in a unit should be the sub-unit 2ICs (a leadership as opposed to staff position) or maybe a few filling special positions peculiar to some branches.  Admin Os, IOs, Trg Os, Asst Adjts, Sqn Ops O and so on can all be Lts.  All Pl/Tp Comd can also be Lt.

It may be fair to say that Lt is to junior for the working rank across the board in a brigade HQ.  Certainly, there should be a few captains in each of the G3 and G4 shops.  However, I am sceptical that (for example) the G1, G2, and G6 shops need more captains than each one's respective "G-man."  Properly supervised (and ideally paired with a Sr NCO) Lieutenants can be gainfully/effectively employed throughout the bde HQ, and when they do reach captain they will be better because of it. 

As was mentioned above, unprecedented inexperience in many captains does not warrant rank inflation.  Merited promotions to Capt would go a long way to elevating ERE Lt and Capt experience to the levels needed.  There would be no more captain promotions on Ph IV grad parades - all would do a minimum of three years in rank post training in order to get the depth of PERs to support a promotion (some CFRs might merit a year or two sooner on the strength of pre-commissioning PERs).

Currently, BMOQ + undergraduate degree qualifies an officer to be a 2Lt.  Ph IV qualifies an officer to be Lt & Capt.  With merited promotions to Captain, we could be smarter about this.  The PRes used to have the Militia Officer Staff Course (MOSC) that was prerequisite for promotion to Captain - it covered all the things the Reg F officers were supposed to learn through osmosis (but my observations suggest this does not happen).  MOSC is now gone, but AJOSQ roughly emulates the curriculum for both Reg and Res now.  

With merited promotions to captain, would could split DP2 into a DP2A for the rank of Lt and DP2B for the rank of capt.  In DP2A I would see AJOSQ, the first two OPME (Def Mgmt and Mil Law), maybe ATOC and possibly some branch specific training.

Under this paradigm, lieutenants would have (and start developing upon) knowledge that we currently do not even expect of many captains, and captains arriving at AOC would have at least five years outside the training system (and likely more).



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... junior officers should see their time as 2Lt/Lt extended and all of this time spent in Battalion.


I am not convinced time as Lt should be limited to Regt/Bn (although, absolutely agree that all 2Lt time should be expended in such locations).  Aside from a few staff positions in our lowest level formations, I see the Lt being gainfully employed in many of our training establishments which train NCM DP 1 - 2 or OSS courses.  



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> Jobs in Brigade that were done by Captains 50 years ago are now done by Majors.  Staffs have gone from a Major and a couple Captains to a LCol, 4-5 Majors and a hockey sock full of Captains.


Pfft.  I can point to an Army bde level formation with 5 LCol, 8-10 Maj and dozens of Capt.  Officer positions that could be effectively "down-ranked" begin as low as the Capt level.


----------



## birdgunnnersrule

Currently, BMOQ + undergraduate degree qualifies an officer to be a 2Lt.  Ph IV qualifies an officer to be Lt & Capt.  With merited promotions to Captain, we could be smarter about this.  The PRes used to have the Militia Officer Staff Course (MOSC) that was prerequisite for promotion to Captain - it covered all the things the Reg F officers were supposed to learn through osmosis (but my observations suggest this does not happen).  MOSC is now gone, but AJOSQ roughly emulates the curriculum for both Reg and Res now.  


I could not agree more.  It is important to note the entry program dictates the time in rank.  Too often we have folks that are caught in the training system that receive the automatic promotion to Captain.  This is a disservice to the soldiers in most cases as you learn the hard knocks as a 2Lt/Lt.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

MCG said:
			
		

> Aside from Adjt & Regt/Bn Ops O, no unit staff officer needs to be a Capt.  The only other Capt in a unit should be the sub-unit 2ICs (a leadership as opposed to staff position) or maybe a few filling special positions peculiar to some branches.  Admin Os, IOs, Trg Os, Asst Adjts, Sqn Ops O and so on can all be Lts.  All Pl/Tp Comd can also be Lt.
> 
> It may be fair to say that Lt is to junior for the working rank across the board in a brigade HQ.  Certainly, there should be a few captains in each of the G3 and G4 shops.  However, I am sceptical that (for example) the G1, G2, and G6 shops need more captains than each one's respective "G-man."  Properly supervised (and ideally paired with a Sr NCO) Lieutenants can be gainfully/effectively employed throughout the bde HQ, and when they do reach captain they will be better because of it.



You can do what you want to your units, but please leave the Armoured Regiments alone.  We have two fairly senior Captains in our Squadrons for very good reasons.

While I find the policy of making DEOs into Captains a little awkward, I don't see it being linked to rank inflation at higher levels. Neither is it linked to any experience gap at the junior officer level. A rose by any other name is still a rose. A platoon commander/troop leader who happens to be a Captain is still treated as a Lieutenant within the unit. How that fine young officer is perceived outside the unit doesn't really matter. 

I don't think that putting Lieutenants in Bde HQ is good kung-fu. New officers need to be out with soldiers doing soldierly things - not making sure that the G3's coffee is stirred counter-clockwise. Once an officer has earned his spurs with troop/platoon command send him to the school to let him inflict his knowledge on the next generation or send him to RSS to let him finish his development without destroying his soul in a Bde HQ. 

I do think that we need to slow down with officer throughput. Let young officers be troop/platoon commanders for at least two years. Have all units train - not just the ones going on operations.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> ...
> I do think that we need to slow down with officer throughput. Let young officers be troop/platoon commanders for at least two years. Have all units train - not just the ones going on operations.




That, to me, is the key. They You We, Canadians, need to adjust the military compensation system to reflect the world in which we live: where young, beginning _professionals_, need time and a decent salary to learn their craft before becoming _journeymen_ full fledged members of the profession of arms. Lt is that _intern/resident_ rank and spending five or so years in the ranks of 2Lt and Lt ought to be the norm, after university graduation and after classification training - which probably means seven years or so for pilots. We should make the pay fit the rank requirements, not bend rank to a pay scale.


----------



## pbi

The echoes are deafening...

Since I became a 2Lt in 1983, we have struggled back and forth, up and down, around and around, with how long officers (in my case, Inf Offrs) should spend on first Regtl tour. I was extremely lucky to get two full years as a Rifle Pl Comd 83-85, but even then this was unusual: some officers had less than a year, and some of those went ERE quite quickly. The problem isn't just intake, although we have never (IMHO) been able to balance intake/trg throughput/attrition such that, somewhere in the chain, we've got a feast or a famine going. Sometimes we had so many 2Lts we used them as Recce Det Comds, sometimes we had not enough to go around.

Assuming you don't inflate Rifle Pl to a Capt's job, if you keep folks too long as Lts at the unit, they will begin to age out too quickly as they go up the chain, and you will end up with shortages or "air bubbles in the line" further along: these can translate into hasty promotions of people who may not really be the best choice. You need the best people all the way up. As the Army is a hierarchical, complex machine, screwing with the supply of good people at higher levels (command AND staff) can damage the whole system. We've all lived that.

If you give offrs too little exposure to unit life before kicking them out into the ERE world, you will certainly launch some brilliant "thrusters" on their way, but you will also send forth a cohort of officers who have not had much rounding or development, and may have only a vague idea of what impact their actions will have on real units with real soldiers in them. We've lived that one too, right?

My rough guess is about three years on first Regtl tour, with two as a Pl Comd, then the third as Asst Adjt, in the Ops shop, sp pl, etc, is about right to sartisfy both ends of the equation.  Then, promotion to Capt and off to first ERE.

The debate about promotion to Capt is a venerable one also. Guys in my Inf School year saw other guys get promoted to Capt a year ahead of us because they had gotten their commissions earlier, under DEO. There was no particularly demanding merit requirement for promotion to Capt (apparently there still isn't): it was basically the officer equivalent of promotion to Cpl to recognize the "journeyman" status that ERC alluded to earlier. (Perhaps a slight to the journeymen...)

As for the current trg program, I agree fully that ATOC was just not cutting it, with the CSS ATOC being a particular crippler for the CSS officers who came on AOC, most of whom were otherwise capable, enthusiastic types who wanted to contribute and do well. The knowlege levels I referred to earlier are partly (but not wholly...) due to weaknesses in ATOC. That said, as I left the College, work was underway to fix the ATOC, both CbtA and CSS.

The MOSC was replaced years ago by the PRes AOC, which grants the same qualification as AOC (itself a shadow of the six month residency my peers and took in 1990). I have taught on both RegF and PRes AOC, and the quality of  the end product graduate  is very similar (almost indistinguishable), even though in my opinion the PRes candidate has by far a much bigger challenge to try to get to where  his RegF peer is by Grad.  

Cheers


----------



## McG

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> You can do what you want to your units, but please leave the Armoured Regiments alone.  We have two fairly senior Captains in our Squadrons for very good reasons.


The Battle Captain would be one of those additional positions peculiar to a branch that I had mentioned earlier.  For the infantry, LAV Capt might be another example.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> The MOSC was replaced years ago by the PRes AOC,


PRes AOC replaced MCSC.  MOSC was distinct from and junior to MCSC.  In the PRes MOSC was a prerequisite for Lt promotion to Capt.  MCSC was the prerequisite for Capt promotion to major.  In the regular force, we should move to a similar model in which the difference between a Lt and a Capt is experience, training and merit (as opposed to simply time in rank).



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I do think that we need to slow down with officer throughput. Let young officers be troop/platoon commanders for at least two years. Have all units train - not just the ones going on operations.


I like this.


----------



## pbi

> PRes AOC replaced MCSC.



Right you are-my mistake.



> In the regular force, we should move to a similar model in which the difference between a Lt and a Capt is experience, training and merit (as opposed to simply time in rank).



Agreed, but it would require all MOCs to agree to do this and "play fair", or those that did it honestly would find their officers badly disadvantaged for promotion and selection after Capt. It's easy to say "_but that would be the policy, and everybody would follow it_". In response I would point you to what has happened to every single officer PER system I have ever served under: everything "drifts right" very quickly (led by certain organizations....), and you are faced with a Hobson's choice about how you score your own people: accurately, or "competitively".

Cheers


----------



## Snakedoc

MCG said:
			
		

> It has been proposed previously (many times & in many places), but I suspect that merit based promotions to Capt (and the replacement of all Lt/Capt positions with hard Lt positions) would reduce rank inflation through intermediate levels.



I fully agree with making the Lt(N)/Capt rank a merit-based promotion.  From a naval reserve unit perspective, the only senior officer in a unit is oftentimes the CO.  Making Lt(N) merit-based helps move the mentality of more junior officers from one based on making sure they simply have all the checks in the box and meet the minimum requirements for promotion, to one where they are evaluated based on how they excel and contribute at the unit level as officers.

Oftentimes I've seen some great initiatives led by NCO's (which I surmise is in part due to the merit based nature of their promotion structure) but admittedly, fewer by junior officers which I believe is due to the fact that many don't have the incentive to excel beyond getting their mandatory 'checks in the box' to move to the next level.  And where I've seen junior officers below Lt(N) lead some amazing initiatives, this is often not recognized because these don't contribute to their mandatory requirements.  Changing the structure of how junior officer promotions work can arguably help to increase unit effectiveness.

As a base of comparison, does anybody know how junior officer promotions work in other militaries (i.e.  RAN, USN etc.)?  Are they merit-based, course based, qualification based etc?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Snakedoc said:
			
		

> Oftentimes I've seen some great initiatives led by NCO's (which I surmise is in part due to the merit based nature of their promotion structure) but admittedly, fewer by junior officers which I believe is due to the fact that many don't have the incentive to excel beyond getting their mandatory 'checks in the box' to move to the next level.  And where I've seen junior officers below Lt(N) lead some amazing initiatives, this is often not recognized because these don't contribute to their mandatory requirements.  Changing the structure of how junior officer promotions work can arguably help to increase unit effectiveness.



What is the experience level of these NCOs with whom you are comparing your subbies? A freshly minted DP1 officer who has just taken command of his first platoon/troop is still finding his way under the tutelage of the Tp WO and his OC/BC/2IC. Comparing him with his WO isn't really going to reveal anything startling.

I tell my subbies to work hard and work together. I don't want them to be afraid of mistakes or start competing with each other for promotion to Captain. I think that they have enough to worry about. 

I'm not worried about the Lt/Capt rank issue. I do worry about the experience that we give new officers, which has nothing to do with how me promote.


----------



## CombatDoc

Snakedoc said:
			
		

> Oftentimes I've seen some great initiatives led by NCO's (which I surmise is in part due to the merit based nature of their promotion structure) but admittedly, fewer by junior officers which I believe is due to the fact that many don't have the incentive to excel beyond getting their mandatory 'checks in the box' to move to the next level.  And where I've seen junior officers below Lt(N) lead some amazing initiatives, this is often not recognized because these don't contribute to their mandatory requirements.  Changing the structure of how junior officer promotions work can arguably help to increase unit effectiveness.


Snakedoc, I am going to disagree with your statement regarding junior officers.  My experience - albeit only in the Reg F - has been that most junior officers are trying hard to do their best.  Often, they are limited by their relative inexperience (they don't know what they don't know), but usually their work ethic and "heart" are in the right place.  It usually has nothing to do with getting ticks in the box and more to do with professionalism and a desire to learn more.  This takes nothing away from NCOs, who are the backbone of any professional military, and whom I agree often have excellent proposals and initiatives.  As T2B notes, we need to compare apples with apples in terms of experience and training levels.


----------



## old medic

Top general fights to cut the fat in the Forces
By MERCEDES STEPHENSON, Parliamentary Bureau
25 Feb 2011
http://www.calgarysun.com/news/canada/2011/02/25/17415176.html



> OTTAWA — A top Canadian general wants to cut the fat at national defence headquarters in Ottawa, a move he says will help create a leaner, meaner fighting machine.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie was heavily critical of a system that favours headquarters staff members over soldiers in the field.
> 
> “Before you want to talk, and none of you should be, about cutting one ship, one reserve or regular unit, or one capability that can contribute to operational outputs, let’s talk about HQ staffs,” Leslie told a conference of defence analysts and military officers.
> 
> His heaviest opposition is coming from the bureaucrats he is facing off against.
> 
> “Nothing will defend itself so vigorously, much akin to a wounded badger, as a HQ that is threatened with being shut down.”
> 
> Leslie, who once commanded Canada’s army, argued money and resources must be reallocated to field units and not to those who sit behind desks at headquarters.
> 
> More than 15,000 people work in various headquarters jobs in Ottawa. Leslie is the three-star general who has been tasked with job of getting rid of as many desk jobs as possible.
> 
> “The status quo is not sustainable,” Leslie said. “We are spending many, many, many, many dollars on consultants, contractors and professional services.”


----------



## GAP

He's retiring soon isn't he......


----------



## REDinstaller

He has a point though. We in Edmonton had a brief a short time ago from his CWO about the transformation. HQ's grew in size since the 1990s. Meanwhile the line units have shrunk, and there are budget shortfalls for training. Meanwhile why does a HQ for say Cancom need multiple staff officers for each J level. If we want the forces to be effective, then we must look at reducing HQ and their attendant appetite for Staff officers and civilian staff. When the gov't is short of money, DND is always the first stop as we have the most.


----------



## Gunner98

Agreed, the LGen's legacy will be to gut the Forces' bureaucracy or at least recommend it.  His emphasis has always been on the troops.  We have recruited young people in record numbers and then retained people beyond age 55, which end do you think sees more people sitting behind desks.  Unfortunately both ends have seen an increase in support costs (recruit physical fitness preparation, physical/bio/mental health care for both the younger and older folks), therefore we need to find a trade-off somewhere.


----------



## Pusser

Although I agree that there is fat to be trimmed, all too often I have seen the "tail" cut far too much.  Just because folks are not in the field doesn't mean they aren't doing something important.  Operational units often complain that they don't get the support they need, but support doesn't just materialize as required.  It needs to be procured and coordinated, which is what headquarters do.  If they're looking at trimming down, perhaps we need to start with why we have the environmental commanders and the dot.coms...


----------



## SevenSixTwo

Pusser said:
			
		

> Although I agree that there is fat to be trimmed, all too often I have seen the "tail" cut far too much.  Just because folks are not in the field doesn't mean they aren't doing something important.  Operational units often complain that they don't get the support they need, but support doesn't just materialize as required.  It needs to be procured and coordinated, which is what headquarters do.  If they're looking at trimming down, perhaps we need to start with why we have the environmental commanders and the dot.coms...




I really think that HQ units need to be slimmed.


Example: 

Up until last year there was a HQ that had only ONE reserve unit under it. (The HQ is now disbanded).

Kind of ridiculous if you ask me.


----------



## George Wallace

> OTTAWA — A top Canadian general wants to cut the fat at national defence headquarters in Ottawa, a move he says will help create a leaner, meaner fighting machine.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie was heavily critical of a system that favours headquarters staff members over soldiers in the field.
> 
> “Before you want to talk, and none of you should be, about cutting one ship, one reserve or regular unit, or one capability that can contribute to operational outputs, let’s talk about HQ staffs,” Leslie told a conference of defence analysts and military officers.
> 
> His heaviest opposition is coming from the bureaucrats he is facing off against.
> 
> “Nothing will defend itself so vigorously, much akin to a wounded badger, as a HQ that is threatened with being shut down.”
> 
> Leslie, who once commanded Canada’s army, argued money and resources must be reallocated to field units and not to those who sit behind desks at headquarters.
> 
> More than 15,000 people work in various headquarters jobs in Ottawa. Leslie is the three-star general who has been tasked with job of getting rid of as many desk jobs as possible.
> 
> “The status quo is not sustainable,” Leslie said. “We are spending many, many, many, many dollars on consultants, contractors and professional services."




And why do we have to be "spending many, many, many, many dollars on consultants, contractors and professional services"?  Could it be that we have been cut to the bone and have no one left in the CF to do those jobs, and the Public Service Contracts prevent CF members from doing "union" work on sites.   Why is it I can not go to the QM to get a light bulb and change a burnt out bulb, but have to have someone from a union come in and do it?  Why is it that we have so many civilians filling RMS clerk positions?  Why is it that at NDHQ there is a civilian or two or three of "equivalent or greater rank" for every officer?  

I have seen some of the cuts that this General has done to the Reserves, and they have not been pretty.  I have seen our Pay Clerk laid off, and heard similar stories of other units doing the same with Pay Clerks and other efficient clerks who have kept the administration of units in order.  I have seen our QM staff (one member) laid off and we can not have our IT equip upgraded because a Class A person can not hold and be responsible for a DA.  Not to mention that this person was also the Transport NCO, and responsible for our fleet and pers qualifications.  

What cuts I have witnessed have not been to the abundance of senior officer ranks, but in the worker bee ranks.


----------



## PuckChaser

George Wallace said:
			
		

> What cuts I have witnessed have not been to the abundance of senior officer ranks, but in the worker bee ranks.



Thats because he didn't micromanage the cuts. He directed we trim the fat, where does that order go to? The people who are the fat. They want to keep their jobs, so they hack and slash at the Jr NCMs who are actually required on a daily basis as Cl B individuals.


----------



## Monsoon

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Thats because he didn't micromanage the cuts. He directed we trim the fat, where does that order go to? The people who are the fat. They want to keep their jobs, so they hack and slash at the Jr NCMs who are actually required on a daily basis as Cl B individuals.


Don't confuse the reorganization Leslie is talking about with the budget cuts that were enacted this past year. Reducing HQs means reorganizing on a big scale and that takes time (a year or more, i.e.); but if you want to save $50K in SWE this FY you go without a SupTech for a year (while recognizing that quick cuts like this cause capability deficiencies). From what I understand of the process, we're looking at:

Short term cuts across the board to meet in-year budget restrictions -> Medium-term reorganization to "cut the fat" at the HQ level -> Reallocation of those resources to increase ground-level strength -> Long-term sustainability.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Tango18A said:
			
		

> We in Edmonton had a brief a short time ago from his CWO about the transformation. HQ's grew in size since the 1990s. Meanwhile the line units have shrunk, and there are budget shortfalls for training.



My understanding is that there is no shortage of funds for training in LFWA, Regular or Reserve, Individual or Collective, in this Fiscal Year or the next - indeed quite the opposite.


----------



## dapaterson

Hmm, I could probably turn CEFCOM and CANADACOM into a single operational commander, and give them the additional role of filling in when the CDS and VCDS aren't available - maybe call them "the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff".

Maybe roll the Chief of Military Personnel and ADM Human Resources - Civilian into a single Chief of Personnel, with associates for Military and Civilian.

And why not roll the Finance and Corporate Services mantle onto the Vice Chief, with a "Chief Financial Officer" under the VCDS in the hierarchy, but with a dotted line to the Deputy Minister?

There we go.  Three less Level 1 organizations, several hundred redundant HQ staff members, mil and civ, eliminated, a more manageable structure...


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hmm, I could probably turn CEFCOM and CANADACOM into a single operational commander, and give them the additional role of filling in when the CDS and VCDS aren't available - maybe call them "the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff".



Quit it with the new ideas - are you aiming for your leading change bubble?  (On another note, stick CANOSCOM in that org to eliminate another L1)

This is a laudable effort, as I think the General speaks to a real issue in the organizational culture of the Canadian Forces where over 10% of the uniformed military strength is dedicated to the Capital Region (re: HQs).  If we applied a 1-in-8 ratio to, say, a 4500 man CMBG we would see a Brigade HQ of 500 personnel....

However, this dealing with this organizational hydra seems to me to involve a lot of politics.  To me, the following points are important:

1.  The "tail" can generally be split into 3 categories:  Combat Service Support (log/med/etc), Life Support (const eng, lodger and personnel support functions), and HQs.  I don't think General Leslie is targetting the first two in his discussion; it is clearly the last one.  No need to start with "doomsday" scenarios of now truckers.

2.  Human Resource Management ideas must be fixed - critical is this is the use of Class B/Civilians in roles they should have never been used for.  Expensive overuse of these positions means the CF can get away with poor pers management, creating extra positions that aren't feasible under the current strength.  We need to figure out which full time military positions are important and which can be cut (at all ranks).

3.  Our culture of leadership and command and control also has to be looked at.  Numerous staff officers are needed to handle superfluous requirements from higher headquarters.  Many of these requirements, requiring dozens if not hundreds of hours of staff work, are started when 3 and 2 stars are getting involved in issues of sub-sub unit training or the configuration a section/detachment.  Mission command cannot only exist on the battlefield.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  Human Resource Management ideas must be fixed - critical is this is the use of Class B/Civilians in roles they should have never been used for.  Expensive overuse of these positions means the CF can get away with poor pers management, creating extra positions that aren't feasible under the current strength.  We need to figure out which full time military positions are important and which can be cut (at all ranks).



Does this mean we can also get rid of the redundancy of orders, regulations and directives on pers management - and the added staff required to manage the documents over and above the pers management function itself. There was a time when everyone in the CoC, down to the Platoon Commander, used only the QR&O and CFAO (now DAOD) for pers management direction - there was no need for the same direction to be reinterpreted and reissued as command orders, area instructions, brigade guidance, and local base orders, ad infinitum, all of which need to be updated (in sequence) every time the baseline document changes. Even with all that extra "guidance", if there's any question on interpretation, one seeks the "senior" document to try and figure out what to do. 

How much staff effort is wasted maintaining unnecessary redundancies?


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

25-30 years ago I remember the number 8,000 as being in Ottawa and everyone thought it to be excessive.  Now there are 15,000?  Speaking as a bean counter, it sounds like the bean counters are starting to outnumber the beans.  It doesn't sound like the system is saveable.  Maybe it has to be broken first.  The system will never change without extreme political will to do so.   The last defence minister to take on the generals was Paul Hellyer back in the 1960s and everyone still hates him.  Mind you, he was responsible for much of the centralization that lent itself to bureacratization.

A novel idea might be actually trust personnel in the operational units to manage their own units.  The bureaucrats might design the framework but the lieutenant-colonels could be responsible for everything in his purview.

Fighting bureaucracy is an almost impossible task.  Alberta's healthcare spending increased 13.2% from 2008/2009 to 2009/2010 and wait times for procedures went up.  The increase was just soaked up in the bureaucratic ooze.
http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/198.asp


----------



## ArmyRick

I like the generals idea to "trim" the HQ. I have never worked in a HQ (other than an infantry PL HQ or COY HQ, doesn't really count though 

What about combing LF Northern Area into LFWA and SQFT? One more HQ eliminated.

CEFCOM, CANOSCOM and CANCOM combined probably not a bad idea (All operations under one command?)

Now as far as Fed Govmnt employee (Civy) filling in as RMS clerks, could we not hire more RMS clerks? Replace those people as they retire so there is no uproar.

My 3 cents anyways.


----------



## aesop081

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> What about combing LF Northern Area into LFWA and SQFT? One more HQ eliminated.



I know there was a CF Northern area (CFNA) that is now JTF(N) but i dont think there was a LF Northern area.


----------



## Rifleman62

The more bureaucrats you have, military or civilian, the more bureaucracy is created. Ever expanding HQ creates more bureaucrats, military and civilian, who create more bureaucracy. New positions means eventual new "establishment" positions = new positions for Maj, LCol, and Cols. So, lots of people are happy as they never thought they would get that far. General positions, I believe, have been hovering.

I think part of the reason why we have more people in HQ's, and more HQ's, is the officer corps. Where are you going to put all the officers we have and handle the career stream promotions. Surly you cannot leave a "streamer" as a Capt for more than three or four years. They must be promoted. 

The CF is too top heavy. The same rational that Mobilization is dead can be applied to CF rank inflation as well as the number of Reserve units.

Economy flows downhill, and it is Reserve units that will suffer. I have seen it time after time over 45 years.

Please do not reopen Reg F/Res F or getting rid of some reserve units (we need to).


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> I think part of the reason why we have more people in HQ's, and more HQ's, is the officer corps. Where are you going to put all the officers we have and handle the career stream promotions. Surly you cannot leave a "streamer" as a Capt for more than three or four years. They must be promoted.



Is part of the problem that the military is now looked upon as a lifetime career instead of a young man's game?  After troops have been promoted through the battalions etc., instead of being shown the road, there is a great effort to create jobs at the high end of the pay scale along with a staff befitting the rank.


----------



## OldSolduer

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Is part of the problem that the military is now looked upon as a lifetime career instead of a young man's game?  After troops have been promoted through the battalions etc., instead of being shown the road, there is a great effort to create jobs at the high end of the pay scale along with a staff befitting the rank.



That isn't the problem, at least not in my view. 

For one, you don't "show people the road" after over 20 years dedicated service. 

One of the problems is that people who are in fairly senior ranks are doing the same jobs they were when they were a lower rank, in my view.


----------



## Infanteer

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Is part of the problem that the military is now looked upon as a lifetime career instead of a young man's game?  After troops have been promoted through the battalions etc., instead of being shown the road, there is a great effort to create jobs at the high end of the pay scale along with a staff befitting the rank.



It's called a professional military....


----------



## REDinstaller

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> My understanding is that there is no shortage of funds for training in LFWA, Regular or Reserve, Individual or Collective, in this Fiscal Year or the next - indeed quite the opposite.



It is true there is more funds for the next trg year, but if the Commanders start to outnumber the Soldiers then all of the trg value will be lost. Too many jobs have gone civi, especially in the IT support end. True it frees up troops to go back to field units. But if the treasury board doesn't approve funding then you are hooped, just like the failed IM/IT rationalization. Try to deploy a Civi or contractor like Calian to support an Ex in Suffield. Some civi's have been sent on Ex, but this is the rule rather than the norm. And Calian only does their Maint contracts from the hardstand at the contracted base. Where as our 411s do it where ever they get told to.


----------



## aesop081

Tango18A said:
			
		

> And Calian only does their Maint contracts from the hardstand at the contracted base. Where as our 411s do it where ever they get told to.



Civillian contractors will go wherever the contract says they are paid to go. If the contractor is only doing work from hardstand, thats what they were contracted for. If DND wanted them do do more, they should have contracted for it.


----------



## armybuck041

I find this article entertaining as I drop off my DEUs at the Drycleaners for the 1 Can Div "Red Patch" parade next month.......


----------



## Fishbone Jones

I was at a conference a couple of weeks ago where one of the briefing points was that they would be consolidating some of the dot comms. IIRC, unfortunately, they said this would necessitate the production of a higher HQ to administer the new conglomerate who would likely retain their indivdual HQs anyway.

The whole thing seems to be morphing into a self licking ice cream cone :


----------



## 54/102 CEF

GAP said:
			
		

> He's retiring soon isn't he......



I see a lot of frustration in his comments


----------



## patt

when i first read the title i thought it was going to talk about getting rid of fattys that are in the forces...


----------



## aesop081

Xfire said:
			
		

> when i first read the title i thought it was going to talk about getting rid of fattys that are in the forces...



Clear policy already exists to get rid of those who cannot pass their PT test.


----------



## OldSolduer

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Clear policy already exists to get rid of those who cannot pass their PT test.



Policy exists but its not always applied.


----------



## aesop081

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Policy exists but its not always applied.



Thats an entirely different problem and still doesnt relate to HQ bloat.


----------



## REDinstaller

If you post them all to the same HQ then it would. >


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Stay on topic gentlemen.
I personally would like to see more rational well thought out ideas like dapaterson's  post  and rebutals to them.

...and is puckchaser   right?


----------



## Old Sweat

I would suspect that Dapaterson and Puckchaser have hit on two of the features of bureaucratic reorganizations which ultimately cancel one another out. I often despair at the prospect of another reorganization which in reality is like moving scrabble tiles around before the start of a new game. The challenge is that there are any number of ways to divvy up the functions and duties. Moreover any highly motivated and intelligent individual can come up with a novel organization which will eliminate positions and redundancies throughout the CF. The trouble is that the real world ain't like that, no matter how often we try to make it so.

You see, it is terribly difficult to eliminate headquarters pys, or convert them into "field" pys. Oh to be able to take say, two or three LGens and all the other folks in their pyramids required to keep them happy and busy and productive, and put them in a box and push a button and, voila, a couple of thousand or so worker bees appear. It doen't work that way. First, unless we wish to arbitrarily release them regardless of how they stack up against their peers, we have to find things for them to do. It doesn't matter what, but unless we just send them home and pay them until CRA, we have to find things for them to do. And that means some new headquarters, whether we are talking about three LGens or three hundred RMS Clerks. And that may or may not be the aim of the exercise. Eventually their positions are convertible, but in the meantime they are in the system, blocking pys.


----------



## Spanky

So what you are suggesting is that it must be a long term "evolutionary" change.  Eliminate the positions through attrition, and replace them with those who can work the coal face.  This would be a very difficult thing to do given that future administrations would have to buy into it.


----------



## old fart

Fat reduction UK style....

Sacked via e-mail....by the Brit MOD, affecting those on the Long Service List.  Warrant Officers who are soldiering on year to year having completed their 22 years of colour service:

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/3411906/38-senior-Army-heroes-including-one-on-the-Afghan-front-line-are-sacked-by-email.html

Usual Brit bureaucratic bullshit......followed up by the inevitable apology:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12461211


----------



## old fart

armybuck041 said:
			
		

> I find this article entertaining as I drop off my DEUs at the Drycleaners for the 1 Can Div "Red Patch" parade next month.......



What goes around comes around............if they run out of patches before they get to you....I will mail you a very slightly used one.

Chimo...and all that....


----------



## Edward Campbell

Further to what Old Sweat said: we _need_ some HQs, some of them quite large and complex. DND is a major department of government which must be managed as such; the CF is a separate and unique institution with its own laws and regulations and it needs to be commanded and controlled - anywhere in the world. The CF must, constantly, _generate_ and train forces and then employ them in a wide variety of tasks. DND must equip those forces and provide facilities and resources for them. Military people must be recruited, trained, employed, cared for, released and, now and again, buried. It all has to be managed somewhere, by someone - and the management needs to be "smart" and efficient,

Maybe the best route for LGen Leslie is to convince "senior management" that the higher HQ "infrastructure" (those HQs above brigade/wing) must be limited, in military PYs, to _n_% of the uniformed strength of the CF - as the CF shrinks HQs must, by regulation, shrink too; as the CF grows HQs _may_ grow, as necessary.

I don't know what _n_ is = maybe it's 8 so that for every 25 people we have in ships, units and squadrons we can have two in various HQs; maybe it's 6 or 12 or 4 or 16.

My :2c: anyway.


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> First, unless we wish to arbitrarily release them regardless of how they stack up against their peers, we have to find things for them to do. It doesn't matter what, but unless we just send them home and pay them until CRA, we have to find things for them to do.



You phase them out.  "In three years, this MGen position will become a Col and positions X, Y, and Z will be cut".  This gives DGMC - and people filling the spots to be cut - time to adjust.  There are holes where everyone from Pte to Major can be sent - many holes are being filled by Class B reservists or done by a comparable civilian position and even more are simply unfilled.

As for senior Officers and CWOs without jobs, put them on the ATL.  They should take the hint at some point; if not, institute a FRP for rank levels that bring us over the new TES requirements.

This is not unique.  In the U.S., General Ray Odierno - a successful 4-star - took command of a Command that was told it was closing down.  He will oversee the transition and moved on in a military with 1 less 4 star billet.


----------



## T19

Well this is an interesting topic.  DND/CF has a real problem in that it cannot do anything because of tons of rules, regulations and legislation.  I want to hire 10 civilians to replace high paid IBM/LMC contractors and save the dept $4.3 million.. but there is a hiring freeze.  Now they want to reduce prof services contracts by 5%... keep in mind these people are supporting the IT systems that Commands use to make critical decisions.   I would love to replace some of these civilians with some of these old retread Capts and Majors to keep an operational focus on things.

Add to how we spend money... ADM(IM) gets 1/2 the IT budgets, but the Commands get the rest and skunk work things with software the department cannot support because of procurement laws.  Thats were there is true waste.

The department had one of every BI tool, but no Enterprise lic to reduce costs.  We have SW and Tools at the Enterprise level, yet the Army, Navy and Air Force go off with one offs paying 3X the costs for something the department cannot deploy across lines of business. (ie SAP is the underpinning of FMAS(Finance) and MASIS(Materials) and now form DRIMIS... but we have to pay 2 times the lic fees because they were bought wrong)

And frankly, it takes X number of people to run a HQ, regardless of your combat forces size.  Thats todays reality, thanks to all the new rules and regs that the CANADIAN people want us to follow.


----------



## ArmyRick

I remember in Rick Hillier's book "Soldier First" he talks about not being too impressed with the bearocracy at DND. He was apprently offered by the MND at the time an oppurtunity to separate the CF from DND and make it answer only to elected officials such as the PM and the MND. 

He also mentioned that he did not like the bloat, empire building and heel dragging on important issues these beaurocrats did.

Maybe they are the first to be done away with?


----------



## Old Sweat

Edward may be better able to address the topic, but it seems to me back when the CF tried to reduce the number of generals, the civilian side of the department converted the "surplus" positions from general/flag officers to senior executives in the public service. Any transformation that transfers resources to "the field" would be a long term process, and would require the active participation of the central agencies of the public service.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Splitting the CF from DND is somewhere between impossible and just plain silly. Separating _*military* operations_ from e.g. policy/strategy, equipping the forces and budget matters can, and, perhaps, should be done more than is now the case.

One problem is that, from time to time (think about the 1970s and '80s), military leadership might be a good deal less than stellar and the top level civil servants will be tempted, and able, to step in to "make things happen" when military commanders are timid or a little less than brilliant. Remember, please: we live in a "closed" system and every system makes mistakes. The much larger, much more ruthless civil service is able to bury its mistakes in a long, long, long list of departments and agencies, few of which do anything really important. The CF doesn't have that luxury and it has been, traditionally, reluctant to cull its own herd. Sometimes we actually welcome bright, able civil servants who bully their way past weak and reluctant admirals and generals; sometimes (but more rarely) they welcome some real leadership from the uniformed side.

Broadly, both sides, DND and the CF have equally important roles to play - often those roles are *almost* exclusively civilian (policy, strategy and finances) or *almost* exclusively military (operations) but in many areas (equipment procurement and life cycle management of systems) there is considerable overlap.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Edward may be better able to address the topic, but it seems to me back when the CF tried to reduce the number of generals, the civilian side of the department converted the "surplus" positions from general/flag officers to senior executives in the public service. Any transformation that transfers resources to "the field" would be a long term process, and would require the active participation of the central agencies of the public service.




A bit of that happened but, as far as I can recall, the civil service did its own empire building inside DND - on a par with a fairly general "fattening" of the executive and senior executive levels of the public service, overall.

My personal recollection is that "we" shot ourselves in both feet: we reduced a few general and flag officers from places where they needed to be to assert real authority and "independence" and we kept too many in Ottawa where "we" thought we needed them to counter the growing number of senior executives in the public service. I seem to recall that while we were reducing flag and general officers by _n_% DND added two assistant deputy ministers (VAdm/LGen equivalents) with the requisite number of new DGs (one and two star equivalents) and directors (Capt(N)/Col) to NDHQ. *But* I don't think the public service was able to "convert" MGens to ADMs - I'm pretty sure not even Bob Fowler could "work" the  system quite that well!


----------



## Edward Campbell

My favourite example of "growth" is in the Public Affairs (Communications) field.

I well recall, back in the '80s, when we had, in NDHQ, a Director of Public Affairs (or something like that). He, it was a he, was a colonel. Then it, PR, became more important and we got a Director General Public Affairs or Public information or something like that - it was an infantry BGen named Terry Liston, in fact, and he was a pretty good DG - so good that he was soon replaced by a civilian in a two star equivalent slot and ADM (Policy) become ADM (Pol and Comm) (Comm = Communications = Public Affairs) then, after a small scandal or two, the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister became a full fledged ADM with her (it was a her) own Branch - Col to BGen to MGen (equivalent) to LGen (equivalent) in about ten years.

Is public affairs more important than it was in the '80s? Yes, clearly. Is it four times more important? I don't know. Is ADM(PA) doing four times as much as that Col did 25 or so years ago? I don't know that either. Nor, I suggest, does anyone else. I do know that Mme. Touchette, the ADM(PA) has been, since mid 2010, assisted by BGen Blanchette and (I read somewhere) about 400 other people.


----------



## Old Sweat

I stand corrected on the detail and the process. However the public service did step in to fill the holes with a resulting failure to reduce the size of NDHQ. 

There always will be bloat and people busily writing/messaging one another to no good purpose. The question is how much real harm do they do. The vast majority of the people in NDHQ perform useful functions, even if the functions themselves are imposed as controls or feel good activities by a central agency of government. I guess the question is in the vertical nature of the decision cycle from the CDS to the deployed unit and the number of steps on the ladder. There is a niggling little idea in my tiny mind that asserts itself from time to time, and that is that CEFCOM, CANADACOM and COSCOM were created to cut NDHQ (read the mandarins uniformed and not) out of the detailed command and control process.


----------



## daftandbarmy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> My favourite example of "growth" is in the Public Affairs (Communications) field.
> 
> I well recall, back in the '80s, when we had, in NDHQ, a Director of Public Affairs (or something like that). He, it was a he, was a colonel. Then it, PR, became more important and we got a Director General Public Affairs or Public information or something like that - it was an infantry BGen named Terry Liston, in fact, and he was a pretty good DG - so good that he was soon replaced by a civilian in a two star equivalent slot and ADM (Policy) become ADM (Pol and Comm) (Comm = Communications = Public Affairs) then, after a small scandal or two, the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister became a full fledged ADM with her (it was a her) own Branch - Col to BGen to MGen (equivalent) to LGen (equivalent) in about ten years.
> 
> Is public affairs more important than it was in the '80s? Yes, clearly. Is it four times more important? I don't know. Is ADM(PA) doing four times as much as that Col did 25 or so years ago? I don't know that either. Nor, I suggest, does anyone else. I do know that Mme. Touchette, the ADM(PA) has been, since mid 2010, assisted by BGen Blanchette and (I read somewhere) about 400 other people.



I wonder how that number compares to the number of 'bayonets' on the ground in our BG in AFG? On the other hand, if I knew the answer, from that point on I'm sure that my food would lose it's flavour and the sun would not shine as brightly as before.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I want to repeat: we _need_ some HQs and some of those HQs will be large and complex and they will do things that few of us understand. The question is: _roughly_ what % of the CF should be in the higher level (above brigade/wing level) C2 and _management_ business? If we LGen Leslie can answer that question, and not worry too much about the _organization_ of all those people, then the job LGen Leslie's job becomes easier.


----------



## McG

old medic said:
			
		

> Top general fights to cut the fat in the Forces
> By MERCEDES STEPHENSON, Parliamentary Bureau
> 25 Feb 2011
> http://www.calgarysun.com/news/canada/2011/02/25/17415176.html


Of course, there are redundancies, inefficiencies and even superfluous HQs.  There is room for streamlining of the institutional structure in order to find PYs for essential structures and essential work.

Inevitably, these threads on the structure of the organization seem to delve down to the weeds of "how many riflemen belong in a section, and what weapons should they have."  As LGen Leslie is working a national strategic level review, he should be looking at the L1s & L2s ... and maybe the occasional L3.  (For those unaware, the three ECSs, each .COM, every ADM and a handfull of other entities constitute the L1s) .... if the general is playing with the structure of battalions & regiments and of wings & brigades, then he is too far down in the weeds.

*The Level 1 Organizations*
I think the immediate action is to consolidate CANOSCOM, CANADACOM and CEFCOM into a single CANOPCOM and return the PY savings to the ECSs.  (Some elements of CANOSCOM may be better fitting if fully removed and put into ADM(Mat) but that’s deeper in the weeds than I am looking right now).  Eliminating CANOPCOM (if that is the goal) could then be looked at on future bounds with a new DCDS.

Since the creation of the .COMS, I have seen three options presented on this site for the potential macro-structure of the CF as far as FE/FG is concerned: [list type=decimal]
[*] Force Generators (LFC/Air Com/MARCOM/SOFCOM) get tasked with missions and are also the Force Employers 
[*] Force employment is done by an NDHQ staff (the old DCDS model) 
[*] Force employment is done by a dedicated operational command (either the current .COM model or a single unified CANOPCOM)[/list]
I do not believe we should be distracting deployed BG commanders with the management & operation of strategic lines of communication and all the various CF elements in country and external to the BG (SOF, LOs, ETTs/OMLTs, etc).  I think the same applies at the strategic level - it is better not to distract the guy responsible for the fight by cluttering his plate with work related to generating the force and sustaining all the institutional "stuff" that we have back here in Canada (bases, depots, schools, etc, etc).

I also feel that running of operations should not be a staff function - it should be a command function.  Perhaps it is semantics, but I would think a unified CANOPCOM is preferable to the DCDS model

It would seem to me that in the next step there must be room for rationalization somewhere in this group: 
 ADM (Finance & Corporate Services)
 ADM (Information Management) 
 ADM(Policy) 
 ADM (Public Affairs)
I suspect ADM(Pol) would not be an option for elimination or amalgamation as it is the strategic staff of the DM.  However, IM & PA really do sound like things that might be tossed under the title as a ‘corporate service’ – or management support work.  If Fin is ‘too important’  to burry in a general purpose ADM, then split things out so that we have ADM(Pol), ADM(Fin) and ADM(CS).  ... As suggested by Edward above, the PA and IM elements become downgraded (in both rank & empire size) to DGs.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> And why not roll the Finance and Corporate Services mantle onto the Vice Chief, with a "Chief Financial Officer" under the VCDS in the hierarchy, but with a dotted line to the Deputy Minister?


That is definitely another way to do it.

*CF/DND Human Resource Management (and 2 more L1s)*


			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Maybe roll the Chief of Military Personnel and ADM Human Resources - Civilian into a single Chief of Personnel, with associates for Military and Civilian.





			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 2.  Human Resource Management ideas must be fixed - critical is this is the use of Class B/Civilians in roles they should have never been used for.  Expensive overuse of these positions means the CF can get away with poor pers management, creating extra positions that aren't feasible under the current strength.  We need to figure out which full time military positions are important and which can be cut (at all ranks).


Both these points are bang-on!  The current stove-pipes for our human resources processes are an outline for disaster.  There is an excellent LFCO on HR management that identifies the importance of holistic HR planning and the necessity of identifying whether work/positions should/must be military or civilian and Reg or Res.  Unfortunately, I have never seen this actually followed within the Army  ... in fact, I have seen the full opposite where it does not matter that I have demonstrated a position needs to be a Reg F or Civi, but higher demands a request for a new Cl B/A position because those are the flavour of the moment.  In NDHQ, I have seen Cl B/A and civilian indeterminate positions permanently created to compensate for a temporarily vacant Reg F position.  One approval pipe for the creation of Regular Force, Reserve Force and Civilian positions would go a long way to cleaning the management of our HR.  A consolidated HR L1 is probably essential to allowing such a single pipe.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Now as far as Fed Govmnt employee (Civy) filling in as RMS clerks, could we not hire more RMS clerks? Replace those people as they retire so there is no uproar.


Where a military member is not required, it is often cheaper to have a PS.  At the same time, there is a limit on the number of military personnel the CF can have.  This means some balancing is required.  Some offices in higher HQs are mostly civilian with a handful of military scattered in to ensure the military perspective is not lost.  The trick is ensuring the military and civilian resources are properly balanced and in the right places of our force structure.  Again, this points to the requirement for an integrated HR management system.

*The Land Staff*
I have very little familiarity with the two other ECSs, so I will allow others to tread there.  I am not displeased with the DCOS Ops side of the Land Staff, so I will leave that alone now too.  Where I see problems is within the capability development side in DCOS Strat.

The whole force development process in the Army is structurally impaired against being done right.  Creating and maintaining capabilities requires drawing on concepts, equipment, doctrine, and force structures - all of these things need to be deleloped in concert.  Doctrine will only be marginal (at best) if it fails to consider & exploit the potential of modern technology.  At the same time, equipment that is incompatible or ill-suited to doctrine will weaken the overall force.
While the force development & requirements folk are not in the same building, at least they are in the same city (basically).  However, with DLCD and doctrine in Kingston, the two halves of the Army's force development brain are not even close enough to sit together over coffee every other week & ensure they are working in the same step.

With equipment it stands out more because the wrong answer gets dumped on the troops & they have to make it work (or there is nothing & the troops still have to make things work).  When the doctrine side is missing, the troops make their own (which is a lot easier that fabricating vehicles, weapons & other kit in the field).  However, it seems to me that signs of the doctrine ball being dropped are plenty to be found.  The Infantry platoon & company doctrine is so badly out of date that it is hidden and not even available on the AEL.

Where capability/force development is not properly synchronized, we see things like the VCDS killing major projects like ALAWS because the army has no coherent doctrine around which to explain the purchase.  Where capability/force development is conducted across separated stovepipes, we see DLR pers drafting junk doctrine to justify equipment or DLFD pers directing the procurement of equipment with no explicable role.

When the field army runs into problems that require a fast & coherent response from the national headquarters, the solution is to create new ad-hoc organizations (like the CF C-IED TF) with PYs to do what should already be happening in existing staffs ... except that it is not because those staffs are so physically separated that good communication is not happening at the working levels.

If we are ever going to get to the point of effective capability development, then the Army's force development efforts need to be put under a single roof ... that means DAD belongs in the Land Staff under COS(Strat) and not in LFDTS.  Little empires like the C-IED TF need to be dissolved and replaced with tiny staffs that draw on the permanently established functional _experts_ in DAD, DLR, DLCD, etc.

*Level 2 Organizations*
Again, I will keep my ideas focused on the Army here.  I think there are three different potential Army structures at the L2 level: 
Geographic Structure - Everything is placed under L2 command according to geographic location
Functional Structure - Everything is placed under L2 command based on role/function (Field Force, Training Command, institutional support command)
Hybrid strucutre - this is what we have with a training command, and then the field force & institutional support being divided into geographic commands
There is plenty of room to debate.  I think the current structure works, but I think a functional structure may also have some merit.  Though, 1 Can Div remains as a bit of a question mark.



			
				Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> The more bureaucrats you have, military or civilian, the more bureaucracy is created. Ever expanding HQ creates more bureaucrats, military and civilian, who create more bureaucracy.


I am not entirely in agreement with your conclusions, but there is some particular merit to be pulled from this statement.  Every time we introduce a new layer of HQ, we introduce new work that only exists because that new HQ exists - it the layer of HQ is superfluous, then we have burdened ourselves with mandatory superfluous work.

The units and formations of the field force need to look & function like an Army (with the traditional hierarchy structures which that entails). Conversely, the static formations of the "institutional force" should look more like successful major corporations - large flat organizations with greater responsibility placed in many independent operating units.  Wal-Mart is probably not a good model for the field force, but it may be exactly what we need to consider for the non-deploying institutional structure of the CF.

The Army could benefit from such a structure within LFDTS.  I have, at times, found myself wondering why CTC exists as a Bde sized formation (and recently with 4 to 5 LCol in the HQ).  Realistically, all of the schools could report directly to LFDTS with significant economies of effort and the freeing of staff PYs to fill more important functions.

AITA (the useful & necessary element of CTC HQ) would have to be elevated up into LFDTS HQ, and a few other PYs would have to reinforce the LFDTS G1 and G3 staffs.  Most of the HQ PYs could be re-invested directly back into the schools.

I anticipate that opposition to the elimination of CTC HQ would anchor itself on the argument of span of control.  However, my earlier proposal to move DAD to COS Land Strat would help mitigate against this.  Further, if throwing a whole Div HQ onto the plate of Comd LFDTS does not result in an unmanageable span of control, why is it that the elimination of a superfluous layer of intermediate HQ would  result in the Comd being overwhelmed?

The broader-based pyramid structure may also be suitable to a grouping of the bases and support system where multiple similar static establishments offer the same services in the same manner in multiple locations across the country.  Every Army ASG across the country could report to a single Army Support HQ.  This would diminish the requirement for Area HQs to the point that all the PRes could be rolled under a single Army Res HQ.


----------



## McG

Here are some related comments that I made on the topic of base closures & base consolidations:


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> There would be savings in TD (as the frequency of things being somewhere else reduces), SWE (as one-of positions are eliminated on closed bases and staffing efficiencies are realized on larger bases), PLD (assuming movement is from high-cost to lower-cost places), PILT (again, assuming movement is from high-cost to lower-cost places), and relocations (as more no-cost moves become possible).
> 
> However, I see the biggest savings being in PYs which can be reinvested from bases into operational organizations.
> 
> Where elements of the institutional structure (bases, stations, depots, schools, static support units, non-deployable HQs and any other organization outside the field force, operational air units and the fleets) are superfluous, those elements self-generate superfluous work.  In the case of superfluous HQs (even unit & base HQs) the reports & returns, information tracking, information processing, planning efforts, etc are all unnecessary consumption of effort - often the amount of work that goes into this effort is used to justify growth or retention of PYs.  The CF and DND also has a vast array of work that is mandated of every unit and formation - this is more work that only exists because a unit/formation exists.  Here again, growth is justified in order get the mandated work done but no discussion occures as to whether there is even a requirement for the organization who's existence creates the work.
> 
> So, if one eliminates a base (or an intermediate HQ) then there is a lot of work that simply disappears with the organization.  Granted, there will be a requirement for PYs to reinforce bases that become the new homes to the lodger units of closed bases.  But, there will also be PYs freed for reinvestment into operational units and schools/training centres.
> 
> This is not to say that there should be a wholesale elimination of bases and intermediate HQs.  It might be an irreversible mistake if a base closure results in a CF wide training area shortage for land operations, and it would take years to recover from the effects of closing an HQ only to discover that is necessary.  Instead this is a suggestion bases and intermediate HQs should be deliberately assessed for thier value-added and necessity.  One could then ask, what is the opportunity cost of keeping a base (or intermediate HQ) as opposed to reinvesting the PYs.


----------



## McG

> Our army needs soldiers and guns-not more bureaucrats
> Matt Gurney
> National Post
> 19 May 2011
> 
> Peter MacKay remaining in the National Defence portfolio wasn't a surprise. MacKay is a high profile minister, and the Tories like to tell anyone who'll listen that they Support The Troops. Sticking one of the big guns of the party in that cabinet post is one way of showing that commitment. Besides, MacKay has done a decent job of it, and by all accounts likes the role and enjoys working with the men and women of the Canadian Forces.
> 
> But what was a bit unexpected was the appointment of Julian Fantino, former chief of the Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police, to be Associate Minister of National Defence, essentially MacKay's deputy.
> 
> Fantino was only elected last fall -hardly an experienced parliamentarian. There have been association ministers of defence before, but the position has often been left vacant. Fantino is the first to fill it under Prime Minister Harper.
> 
> There are political reasons to give Fantino something with a big profile: He's a well-known Toronto-area MP. And Defence isn't the worst place to put his years of work in public security to use, either. But those political reasons aside, it must be asked why Defence needed an extra minister. If anything, it needs more soldiers and equipment.
> 
> Earlier this year, it was announced that National Defence had purchased a large complex of modern office buildings in the Ottawa area. This was good news, as the existing National Defence headquarters was old and overcrowded. But when the announcement of the purchase was made, it was noted that the size of the civilian staff at Defence had grown by 31% between 2006 and 2009. Indeed, the civilian staff at Defence had grown so large, so rapidly, that it was actually exceeding its authorized strength. Defence is allotted 25,000 civilians to run the ministry. Somehow, that had ballooned to 28,500. No wonder they were out of room.
> 
> This didn't look particularly good on the Harper Tories, who have been rightly criticized for abandoning their small-government agenda. But what made them look even worse was the fact that even *while the size of Defence's bureaucracy surged by 31%, the size of the Armed Forces -so publicly loved by the Tories -was able to increase only by 5% over the same period*.
> 
> The military has received extra funding and equipment, starting under prime minister Paul Martin and continuing under Stephen Harper. But the Canadian Forces still have urgent equipment shortfalls, and are simply not large enough to do all the jobs expected of them.
> 
> Consider the last few weeks. Almost 3,000 Canadian military personnel are fighting in Afghanistan. Hundreds of others have joined the NATO campaign against Libya (indeed, a Canadian general is commanding the entire international ef-fort). Meanwhile, at home, we've had three major natural disasters strike all at once: major flooding in Manitoba and Quebec, and a devastating wildfire in Alberta that has nearly destroyed the town of Slave Lake, turning thousands of Canadian citizens into displaced persons. And, of course, at all times, the military must also have the reserve strength necessary to handle additional crises.
> 
> Canada's air force needs new fighter jets, and more than just the 65 F-35s the government has said it intends to purchase (a smaller number of F-35s, and a large order of less-advanced but still modern jets, would strike the right balance between size and sophistication). The air force also urgently requires more helicopters, both to carry supplies at home and abroad, and to (if necessary) transport troops into battle. The navy is rapidly rusting out, with virtually every type of ship in the fleet needing either upgrades or outright replacement. The army has benefit-ted the most from the Afghan-era urgent purchases, but still should be expanded, to reflect its duties both at home and abroad. And this is far from a complete list.
> 
> None of these steps are likely, unfortunately. The Tories will have other priorities in the years ahead. They must slay the deficit and protect the economy, while still spending enough to please their core constituencies. And as the combat mission in Afghanistan comes to an end, it's likely that the armed forces will fade into the background. As former chief of the defence staff Rick Hillier has mused, the Canadian military has no natural constituency, and can be easily shunted aside and ignored when not actively needed. This is especially true in times of fiscal restraint.
> 
> The Forces will no doubt get some extra equipment and additional personnel, but not as much as they need and deserve. They'll just have to content themselves with a new home for their bureaucrats and Julian Fantino.


----------



## Infanteer

"while the size of Defence's bureaucracy surged by 31%, the size of the Armed Forces -so publicly loved by the Tories -was able to increase only by 5% over the same period."

Wow - I'd be interested to see where exactly this bureaucratic growth is.


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> "while the size of Defence's bureaucracy surged by 31%, the size of the Armed Forces -so publicly loved by the Tories -was able to increase only by 5% over the same period."
> 
> Wow - I'd be interested to see where exactly this bureaucratic growth is.


The 31% growth is referring to the increase of civilians at NDHQ


> Earlier this year, it was announced that National Defence had purchased a large complex of modern office buildings in the Ottawa area. This was good news, as the existing National Defence headquarters was old and overcrowded. But when the announcement of the purchase was made, it was noted that *the size of the civilian staff at Defence had grown by 31%* between 2006 and 2009. Indeed, the civilian staff at Defence had grown so large, so rapidly, that it was actually exceeding its authorized strength. Defence is allotted 25,000 civilians to run the ministry. Somehow, that had ballooned to 28,500. No wonder they were out of room.


----------



## Infanteer

Yeah I got that part.  I'm wondering where the growth is concentrated - coffee fetchers, PA staff, project manager weenies?


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yeah I got that part.  I'm wondering where the growth is concentrated - coffee fetchers, PA staff, project manager weenies?


Ah, seen.


----------



## the 48th regulator

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yeah I got that part.  I'm wondering where the growth is concentrated - coffee fetchers, PA staff, project manager weenies?



IPSC, OSISS, PSP, Social Workers, Psychologists, Psychiatrists......

Let's remember many civillians working for DND, provide a service that someone in uniform can't, or can be recruited to do so.

dileas

tess


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yeah I got that part.  I'm wondering where the growth is concentrated - coffee fetchers, PA staff, project manager weenies?


I know a lot of capital projects where growing huge staffs in that time period.  That is when DGLEPM & DGMEPM out grew the LStL Bldg in Gatineau, and it is when ADM(Mat) created two new DGs for major crown equipment projects. 

I've heard a few times over the past month that Army training systems has been growing by 5% annually for the last three years.  That growth has me wondering where it has been happening.  I strongly suspect it has mostly been in within two layers of HQs.


----------



## Pusser

I too am curious about the growth of the civil service in NDHQ because, frankly, I see a lot of empty desks.  I also question how the public service can grow when their hiring policies are so F****D up!  My involvement in hiring civilians has led me to wonder how anyone can actually get a job with the federal government.

Why do we need to hire more civilians?  Because as empty as the civilian desks are, the military ones are worse.  There are many sections in NDHQ where there is little to no military continuity because all the military staff are either deployed, just back from being deployed or training to be deployed.  I was in one section where we had only two out of nine major billets filled.  The work is still there, so we have to hire civilians to do it when there are no military folks available.  Furthermore, we spend a lot of time shuffling the deck  and moving what few military folks are available from job to job before anyone gets a chance to actually accomplish anything.

As for how the public service can grow (despite hiring policies) faster than the CF is an easy question to answer.  Whereas it is possible to hire qualified people to enter the public service, the same is not true of the CF.  We have to train folks and our biggest problem in growing is not creating positions or in recruiting candidates, it's the fact that everybody is too busy to train the new ones coming in.  The irony is the fact that we can't train new members because all the folks who would train them are deployed (for the umpteenth time) and we can't deploy different people because they're not trained!  The dysfunctional cycle continues.

But I'm not bitter...


----------



## McG

Pusser said:
			
		

> As for how the public service can grow (despite hiring policies) faster than the CF is an easy question to answer.  Whereas it is possible to hire qualified people to enter the public service, the same is not true of the CF.  We have to train folks and our biggest problem in growing is not creating positions...


Actually, it used to be that any manager with a budget could create a civilian position or a P Res position.  New Reg F military positions did not happen unless they came from the government.  There was unsustainable, unrestrained growth of civilian positions through that time period.

...  the '06 to '09 window is also when the C-IED TF was created, and when I saw a number of permanent civilian positions created to back-fill for temporarily vacant Reg F positions.


----------



## dapaterson

The establishment is a mess.  Of course, many units / detachments have only the faintest idea of what their real establishment is, and are surprised to discover that "their" postions were temporary loans, folks held MMO, wartime accountable positions that aren't meant to be filled, or other problems.

Add to that the piecemeal force expansion that did not include a real HR implementation plan and created immediate demand for dozens of majors as staff (in orgs that were made pri 2 for manning) and it's no wonder there are problems - waving a magic wand and saying "Give me four hundred staff officers for Startop" is not a viable COA.  Unfortuantely, it was the one selected.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

It is growth of civ pers writ large - secretaries for every OC in a Svc Bn, IT guys to run our garrison networks etc etc


----------



## McG

> MacKay faces job cuts at DND – and an eager rookie nipping at his heels
> JANE TABER
> OTTAWA— Globe and Mail Update
> Thursday, May 26, 2011 8:23AM EDT
> LINK
> 
> The anticipated slash and burn of the public service by the newly-minted Conservative majority government could be starting at the Department of National Defence. Reports Thursday morning say 2,100 jobs will be cut over the next three years.
> ...


We knew this adjustment was coming.  Some thoughts:

*Contractor Cuts.*  This will be a good thing.  Far too many of these contractors are probably already in an employee-employer relation with DND, and we need to clean-house to bring ourselves back to acceptable practices.  As an adjunct to this, I would suggest every contractor with a DWAN account have the ability to send external emails disabled - they do not actually work for the government, so they should not be able to appear as speaking for the government.  Contracting should not be a back door way of expanding our workforce if one cannot get SWE or military PYs.

*Public Service Cuts*. This should, hopefully, be mostly where rampant unrestrained civilian growth has occured: in HQs.  Unfortunately, while we have heard rumblings for a while about reducing the civilian footprint in higher HQs, the only reductions that I have seen so far are the result of higher HQs pulling back SWE on civilian retirement (from positions that have been around forever) in order to grow the HQs themselves.  The problem with retirement attrition is that low priorety jobs can continue to exist while high priorety jobs get cut simply based on the choice of incumbents to stay longer or go.


----------



## Infanteer

Agreed.  Our practices with civilians and contractors have gotten out of control and have allowed us to get away with poor mil HR management.  A perfect example is authorized positions going unfilled (because the staff officer is off in SOMETHINGCOM) and then being backfilled by civilians.  Not only does the military get away with making extra positions it doesn't have the manning for, but tactical HQs have to deal with critical positions being filled with civilians who fall under a completely different rubric of employment.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Like I said outside, these 2,100 jobs cuts could probably be accomplished by attrition. Especially over a three year period. This is a paltry amount given the big picture. Looks good on paper though.

Not that we couldn't use cuts, as already stated, in other areas anyway.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Agreed.  Our practices with civilians and contractors have gotten out of control and have allowed us to get away with poor mil HR management.  A perfect example is authorized positions going unfilled (because the staff officer is off in SOMETHINGCOM) and then being backfilled by civilians.  Not only does the military get away with making extra positions it doesn't have the manning for, but tactical HQs have to deal with critical positions being filled with civilians who fall under a completely different rubric of employment.



Given how rarely our tac HQs do anything but routine admin, maybe the solution is to reduce the number of HQs.


----------



## Pusser

When was the last time anyone took a rational look at their organization and concluded that they had too many staff?  If folks were more willing to do this, then we could take intelligent approach to reductions.  As it is, no one will admit that they're overstaffed.  The result is across the board cuts, which means shorthanded organizations get worse and the overstaffed simply have less fat.

Reductions require leadership and an acknowledgement that the guy whose billet is titled DODO 6-5-4-3-2 just might be redundant.


----------



## dapaterson

Pusser said:
			
		

> Reductions require leadership and an acknowledgement that the guy whose billet is titled DODO 6-5-4-3-2 just might be redundant.



Hey!  The Directorate of Official Directorate Organization performs a key function in organizing official directorates - particularly important as we enter this time of constraint and reductions, it is crucial to maintain agility and flexibility to have strucutural change to meet the evolving defence capability requirements - DODO is a key element in maintaining that success and needs to grow, not shrink.  We can just harvest PYs from less important function like Maritime surveillance or multi-purpose land combat forces.


(True story: I was once in a session with a defence scientist who, after detailed interviews, questionnaires and assessments with all 21 level 1s, had concluded that the biggest challenge and problem in DND, needing immediate attention before anything else, was a lack of office space in the NCR.)


----------



## McG

recceguy said:
			
		

> Like I said outside, these 2,100 jobs cuts could probably be accomplished by attrition. Especially over a three year period.


The only problem with reduction by attrition is that a job is not necessarily important just because the incumbent hangs around for a few more years, and another job is not necessarily unnecessary just because the incumbent chooses to leave government.  Reduction by attrition needs to be supported with work force adjustment so that people are moved to the important positions, and that it is the bottom priority positions that are allowed to go away.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> Given how rarely our tac HQs do anything but routine admin, maybe the solution is to reduce the number of HQs.


There are more than enough cuts to be made in static non-tactical HQs without touching brigades and wings.  I think I've already stated which HQ I nominate for reduction.


----------



## Pusser

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hey!  The Directorate of Official Directorate Organization performs a key function in organizing official directorates - particularly important as we enter this time of constraint and reductions, it is crucial to maintain agility and flexibility to have strucutural change to meet the evolving defence capability requirements - DODO is a key element in maintaining that success and needs to grow, not shrink.  We can just harvest PYs from less important function like Maritime surveillance or multi-purpose land combat forces.



OK, but realize then that we will need to increase the staff at the Directorate of Silly Names and Acronyms (DSNA) in order to keep up with the changes.  After all, both organizations are vital to the functioning of DGOOF (Director General Official Organizational Formulation).  Otherwise CFOUL-UP (Chief of Formulative Organizational Underpinning of Lacklustre and Useless Programs) would be lost!


----------



## dapaterson

Pusser said:
			
		

> OK, but realize then that we will need to increase the staff at the Directorate of Silly Names and Acronyms (DSNA) in order to keep up with the changes.  After all, both organizations are vital to the functioning of DGOOF (Director General Official Organizational Formulation).  Otherwise CFOUL-UP (Chief of Formulative Organizational Underpinning of Lacklustre and Useless Programs) would be lost!



You got the abbreviation wrong - it's CFT, not CFOUL-UP.  Outcomes are the same, though...




			
				MCG said:
			
		

> There are more than enough cuts to be made in static non-tactical HQs without touching brigades and wings.  I think I've already stated which HQ I nominate for reduction.



I can think of two wings that could be closed immediately to no ill effect.  And our CMBGs have become administrative.  Operationalization is a good idea; but even that should save PYs as we return to more rational models, instead of needing a 40 pax bus for the G3 staff.


----------



## Pusser

dapaterson said:
			
		

> You got the abbreviation wrong - it's CFT, not CFOUL-UP.  Outcomes are the same, though...



This just proves my theory about increasing the staff at DSNA.  Perhaps we can find a few retired CF members to come back on a Class B contract?  That wouldn't require any increase in civilian positions so that meets the spirit and aim of the reductions, right?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And our CMBGs have become administrative.  Operationalization is a good idea; but even that should save PYs as we return to more rational models, instead of needing a 40 pax bus for the G3 staff.



At the risk of putting too fine of a point on it, what is your experience with the CMBGs and what they do?


----------



## Fishbone Jones

MCG said:
			
		

> The only problem with reduction by attrition is that a job is not necessarily important just because the incumbent hangs around for a few more years, and another job is not necessarily unnecessary just because the incumbent chooses to leave government.  Reduction by attrition needs to be supported with work force adjustment so that people are moved to the important positions, and that it is the bottom priority positions that are allowed to go away.



So do it. Every other organization in Canada can seem to make it work. 

Of course, DND would probably hire 2,200 people to oversee it.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (True story: I was once in a session with a defence scientist who, after detailed interviews, questionnaires and assessments with all 21 level 1s, had concluded that the biggest challenge and problem in DND, needing immediate attention before anything else, was a lack of office space in the NCR.)



The funny, and absolutely disheartening, thing about this "true story" is that I believe him to be speaking the truth.


----------



## dapaterson

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> At the risk of putting too fine of a point on it, what is your experience with the CMBGs and what they do?



To be fair, I am critiquing our ad-hoc Bde HQs that we deploy to theatre, not the actual established units in Canada.  But our creeping infection of PowerPoint-itis risks getting down to the CMBG level...


----------



## a_majoor

By analogy:

http://www.kathrynmarshall.ca/federal-politics/liberal-party-structure-holding-them-back/



> *LIBERAL PARTY STRUCTURE HOLDING THEM BACK*
> May 22, 2011Leave a comment
> 
> Before the Liberals paint the walls, they need to lay a new foundation. One of the biggest things holding the Liberal Party back from real change and renewal is their own internal party structure hampered by layers of bureaucracy and title holders. The way a party is structured affects its success as an organization and election fighting machine. It’s no wonder that the Conservatives and Liberals have exact opposite party structures.
> 
> Unlike the Liberals, the Tories have a very flat party structure. There’s a national council consisting of elected representatives from each province and territory who sit on council with the leader and they meet a few times a year to discuss party business. There’s no wings, no commissions, no special interest groups. There are no intermediate groups between the constituency associations and the national council. Every party member has an equal voice, regardless of their gender, age or ethnicity.  This is a structure that empowers the grassroots base of party activists, volunteers and members, not title holders and party bureaucrats.
> 
> The Liberal Party structure is in stark contrast to the simple, flat organization of the Conservatives. They’re bursting at the seams with commissions, special interest groups and regional organizations. It seems like they have a title for everything, and everyone.
> 
> In addition to their national executive, the Liberals have multiple commissions and groups like the National Women’s Liberal Commission, Young Liberals of Canada, Aboriginal People’s Commission and Senior Liberals Commission. Each of these commissions has their own mandate, policy, budgets, events, meetings and executive.  Combine their respective executives and staff and this adds a cast of 75 title holders.
> 
> The Liberal Party has affiliate organizations in each region of the country, each with their own board of directors, annual conventions, budgets, etc. The Liberal Party in Manitoba alone has 35 people on their board. Add together all the regional organizations this adds hundreds more title holders.
> 
> The Liberal Party also has a National Elections Readiness Committee with an astounding 37 people on the executive. With an executive that big, you’d think they would have actually been, well, ready for the election.
> 
> In 2006 the Liberals put together a “Renewal Commission”, which clearly failed to result in much renewal. What they need to do is cut commissions, not create more.
> 
> The layers of internal Liberal bureaucracy put barriers between the grassroots of the party and the executive. This top down approach puts the Liberals out of touch with their own base—which results in bad policy, bad decisions and kills on-the-ground organization.  The Liberals current structure is also inefficient, expensive and impossible to manage. Nothing gets done.
> 
> In the private sector, when a company is looking to change for better, they trim the fat. The Liberals need to do the same. If they want real renewal and change, they should start with a simpler party structure that empowers party members, not title holders.  And please, don’t create a commission to cut commissions.


----------



## OldSolduer

Excuse me, but I guess this is not a good time to establish the Ministry of Silly Marches?


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Given how rarely our tac HQs do anything but routine admin, maybe the solution is to reduce the number of HQs.



Actually, a good chunk of 1 CMBG HQ has been deployed for 3 months straight on domestic ops and training.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Last year I worked under two CMBG HQs (ie in subordinate units) on complicated DOMOPs. One them also generated a Task Force Afghanistan HQ at the same time. Even if there is not a brigade training event the Bde HQ does much more than administration. 

Regarding the overseas HQs, the CMBG HQs provide the solid core of the TFA HQs. This makes the TFA HQ much more than an "ad-hoc" organization. 

I love slamming my higher HQ as much as the next guy, but the CMBG HQs should be considered vital ground.

Cheers


----------



## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Last year I worked under two CMBG HQs (ie in subordinate units) on complicated DOMOPs. One them also generated a Task Force Afghanistan HQ at the same time. Even if there is not a brigade training event the Bde HQ does much more than administration.
> 
> Regarding the overseas HQs, the CMBG HQs provide the solid core of the TFA HQs. This makes the TFA HQ much more than an "ad-hoc" organization.
> 
> I love slamming my higher HQ as much as the next guy, but the CMBG HQs should be considered vital ground.
> 
> Cheers



Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

114 General/Equivalents
358 Colonel/Equivalents
-----
472  Hold that thought


Historically there was no functional rank of Colonel.  Up until the Korean War and later, if a LCOL received a promotion it was to BGEN.  There may have been a few staff colonels but read few.  The problem is not a problem of 114 generals.  It is a problem of 472 officers above the rank of those commanding the military building blocks of battalions/squadrons/frigates/etc.  We have 60-70 LCOLs doing the job of LCOL but we have 472 with higher rank overseeing them.  Of course we also have endless LCOLs doing the paper shuffle.

The system will never end because everyone has invested so heavily in it.  Government ministers often have only as much control as the bureaucracy allows them.  Many errant ministers have had their political career shredded by their underlings so don't look for direction there.  

The US Marines  have developed a culture consisting of 1 officer per 10 Marines which is where Canada was 60 years ago.  If anyone needs a successful working bare-bones management model, they don't have to go very far.  Whose idea was it to put officers at desks to create a paper blizzard?  Was there something wrong with simply commanding and supervising?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.



Are you refering to the reserve CBGs or the regular force CMBGs? I don't have an establishment at hand, but the CMBGs have HQ and Sigs Sqns and are "operational" with deployable CPs. I do think that it was odd when we cut the Brigadiers from the CMBGs in the late 90s. They were the only Generals who actually had troops!


----------



## Edward Campbell

There *must* be some military C2 and national management of the CF and DND. I think that all organizational and C2 models have flaws and some do have more bureaucratic bloat than others.

There is, also, over and above internally imposed (by choice of organizational model) bloat a lot of externally imposed bloat. During my service i saw at least a couple of DG (one star) level organizations and at least one Branch Chief (two star) and two three star level organizations created out of thin air because the bureaucratic _centre_ in Ottawa decreed that this, that or the other _programme_ was the flavour of the month and DND is almost always used as something of a stalking horse on the principle that if DND and the CF can 'go along' so can every other department and agency. There were, at least in the times I was able to look in on the _Executive_ floor of _Fort Fumble_, at least one DM and, maybe, one CDS who were willing to say "F__k off, rude message follows" when the _centre_ gave those orders but there was never ministerial support. Those extraneous organizations still exist, still do little if anything but some clerical work, still consume resources - because parliament (we the people) says so.

Good, efficient and effective, HQs staffed with good, dedicated, well trained staff officers and NCOs (and there is a lot of good, rewarding staff work for senior NCOs - if we would only let them do it) are a great boon to units who are given difficult tasks.


----------



## Infanteer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.



Are you talking about the CMBGs?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Are you refering to the reserve CBGs or the regular force CMBGs? I don't have an establishment at hand, but the CMBGs have HQ and Sigs Sqns and are "operational" with deployable CPs. I do think that it was odd when we cut the Brigadiers from the CMBGs in the late 90s. They were the only Generals who actually had troops!



CBGs. They seem to limp along, trying to be a real brigade but with no real 'oomph'. 

They're mostly invisible to the units until some return gets missed, or an audit report goes missing, then everyone goes ballistic. It would be nice to see a 'real' Bde Comd running around exercising some proper, fully visible leadership and developing the COs, leading large scale Bde CT events etc as opposed to the 'post master General' type role we tend to consign them to these days. Unfortunatley, this isn't a great example to set for keen, bright Officers who take one look at the red tape politically charged nightmare that is the reality of higher level jobs within a CBG then leave, or worse, quit and stay.

But I guess that would mean adding to, and not diminshing, the leadership 'bloat'.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> CBGs. They seem to limp along, trying to be a real brigade but with no real 'oomph'.
> 
> They're mostly invisible to the units until some return gets missed, or an audit report goes missing, then everyone goes ballistic. It would be nice to see a 'real' Bde Comd running around exercising some proper, fully visible leadership and developing the COs, leading large scale Bde CT events etc as opposed to the 'post master General' type role we tend to consign them to these days. Unfortunatley, this isn't a great example to set for keen, bright Officers who take one look at the red tape politically charged nightmare that is the reality of higher level jobs within a CBG then leave, or worse, quit and stay.
> 
> *But I guess that would mean adding to, and not diminshing, the leadership 'bloat'.*



Not at all.  Assign each CBG trained troops to form a "real" Bde" and we could make more robust CBG HQs and still have money and people.  With anArmy Reserve of 20K (all ranks), of whch about 15K are trained, four CBGs would be about right, each with 3700 or so trained soldiers.

Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.

So yes, I'm all for more effective CBG HQs.  But to get there, we need to thin the herd in other areas as well.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Not at all.  Assign each CBG trained troops to form a "real" Bde" and we could make more robust CBG HQs and still have money and people.  With anArmy Reserve of 20K (all ranks), of whch about 15K are trained, four CBGs would be about right, each with 3700 or so trained soldiers.
> 
> Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.
> 
> So yes, I'm all for more effective CBG HQs.  But to get there, we need to thin the herd in other areas as well.


There is plenty of room to clean-up the reserve structure in order to bring about greater effeciency and effectiveness.  However, I believe anything gained from cleaning the existing structure should be re-invested into a new reserve structure - fewer LCol and CWO, but more sgts, WOs and capts.  Of course, there is a whole other thread to explore that idea:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Exactly. This isn't about saving money on the backs of the Reserves (again). Someone tried that last year and it probably cost more than they saved.

This has to be an across the board, all Services, no sacred cow initiative. I'm sure there is a ton of overpaid people sitting around doing squat besides, in some opinions, Reserve COs & Chiefs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'. I assume that we have expereinced similar issues:

THE COMMAND OF BRITISH LAND FORCES IN IRAQ
MARCH TO MAY 2003

ABSTRACT

This paper reports an analysis of the British Army’s operations in Iraq in March-April
2003. Comparisons are made with the similar deployment to Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-1.

Coalition land forces operated highly effectively and with considerable professionalism;
however, such professionalism should extend to a candid examination of shortcomings.
Formation headquarters have grown by about 25% since 1991. There appears to have
been an unwarranted growth in staff functions and rank inflation. There is evidence of a
tendency to plan excessively, and excessive but unfocussed staff activity which had no
positive output beyond the confines of the headquarters.

The net result of this misdirected activity was command and control of subordinate units
and formations which was criticized as being suboptimal. Orders which were required
were often produced too late, and there was a lack of passage of information from
headquarters to subordinates. Recognised operational procedures were often ignored or
broken, which was justified at the time as pragmatic rather than being seen as
symptomatic of a general problem. Such orders as were produced often lacked clarity
and, in particular, tended to give multiple and imprecise mission to subordinates.

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/068.pdf


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'. I assume that we have expereinced similar issues:
> 
> THE COMMAND OF BRITISH LAND FORCES IN IRAQ
> MARCH TO MAY 2003
> 
> http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/068.pdf



Favourite quote of mine:

Overall the evidence shows that HQs have become too large; contain too many overlapping functions; have officers of inappropriately high ranks; plan too much; and tend to be very busy. However, they are not particularly productive; and produce orders that are too big and which arrive too late.



Anyone who has read the Army's annual strategic plans, can I have an "Amen"?


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Favourite quote of mine:
> 
> Overall the evidence shows that HQs have become too large; contain too many overlapping functions; have officers of inappropriately high ranks; plan too much; and tend to be very busy. However, they are not particularly productive; and produce orders that are too big and which arrive too late.
> 
> 
> 
> Anyone who has read the Army's annual strategic plans, can I have an "Amen"?



To heck with strategic plans, I can't even get through the mile high pile of 'Ethics' stuff that's been piled on my desk. I'm sure that Diogenes would not approve! 

"He has the most who is most content with the least."

Diogenes 

Read more: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/diogenes.html#ixzz1NsjReJbX


----------



## Infanteer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'.



Storr is one of the most astute observors of modern military organizations out there.  One of the reason is that he looks for the cold hard facts instead of "professional opinion".


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.



Reserve LCOLs average more than 100 subordinates from my observations which is good for the military as a whole.  Sure it's low for operational units but I am not sure that the reserves have ever been viewed as operational, being reserves and all. 

Trying to wring efficiency out of the reserve is a fools errand.  There is no fat.  They bled to death long ago.  They have no tools because they are ineffective and they are ineffective because they have no tools.  They are ineffective because they are undermanned and are undermanned because they are ineffective.


----------



## Gunner98

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Reserve LCOLs average more than 100 subordinates from my observations which is good for the military as a whole.



Is the 100 average that you observed - the total effective strength, the number present on a parade night, that shows up for a weekend exercise or a summer concentration?


----------



## Dennis Ruhl

Simian Turner said:
			
		

> Is the 100 average that you observed - the total effective strength, the number present on a parade night, that shows up for a weekend exercise or a summer concentration?



Regiments I was familiar with had between 100 and 200 total strength.  The rest of the numbers would be a guess.  For reservists, the military is probably the 2nd or 3rd most important thing in their life so commitment varies.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'.


While the paper is about operational HQs deployed into wars, but much of the comment applies equally well to our static institutional HQs that will never deploy even within this country.  This could have been written about nearly any static Army HQ in Canada: "There appears to have been an unwarranted growth in staff functions and rank inflation. There is evidence of a tendency to plan excessively, and excessive but unfocussed staff activity which had no positive output beyond the confines of the headquarters."


----------



## McG

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> Trying to wring efficiency out of the reserve is a fools errand.


Take it to the other thread:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html


----------



## Pusser

Dennis Ruhl said:
			
		

> The US Marines  have developed a culture consisting of 1 officer per 10 Marines which is where Canada was 60 years ago.  If anyone needs a successful working bare-bones management model, they don't have to go very far.  Whose idea was it to put officers at desks to create a paper blizzard?  Was there something wrong with simply commanding and supervising?



Be careful in looking to the USMC as a model for this.  It is important to note that unlike the other armed services in the US, the USMC does not operate independently.  Many of its staff functions are actually provided by the US Navy, so the 1 to 10 ratio of officers to marines is not entirely accurate.  The USMC "employs' more officers than that, but they don't wear USMC uniforms.

In the broader sense, most officer to soldier ratios quoted by pundits seem to be based on an army combat arms model.  However, this neglects to take into account that other branches of the armed forces are structured differently and some branches have very good reasons for what would appear to be a top-heavy structure.  How many privates are there in the Chaplain or Legal Branches?  This is not to say that the CF is not top-heavy, but rather that it is not simple problem.


----------



## quadrapiper

Pusser said:
			
		

> Be careful in looking to the USMC as a model for this.  It is important to note that unlike the other armed services in the US, the USMC does not operate independently.  Many of its staff functions are actually provided by the US Navy, so the 1 to 10 ratio of officers to marines is not entirely accurate.  The USMC "employs' more officers than that, but they don't wear USMC uniforms.


Might, then, be a good place to see what functions need to be filled by CBG or CMBG staffs, and which should be kicked up or sideways to other, more purple organizations, or ditched entirely.

*daftandbarmy*, are you referring to Brigade HQs? Or the seemingly never-ending wealth of Commands? If the former, perhaps a more vigorous role for the actual brigade-commanding part of the HQ might prevent at least some growth; perhaps as the deployable core for overseas or domestic operations. Pare off the non-command functions into a "brigade support unit," which might, incidentally, be able to offer relatively short-term staff roles for PRes officers and SNCOs within the brigade.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Might, then, be a good place to see what functions need to be filled by CBG or CMBG staffs, and which should be kicked up or sideways to other, more purple organizations, or ditched entirely.
> 
> *daftandbarmy*, are you referring to Brigade HQs? Or the seemingly never-ending wealth of Commands? If the former, perhaps a more vigorous role for the actual brigade-commanding part of the HQ might prevent at least some growth; perhaps as the deployable core for overseas or domestic operations. Pare off the non-command functions into a "brigade support unit," which might, incidentally, be able to offer relatively short-term staff roles for PRes officers and SNCOs within the brigade.



I'm talking about the CBGs. 

IMHO, these need to be properly equipped, efficient, 'high speed' and deployable (not sure exactly how to define deployable, but whatever) HQs that can properly lead/command/support Brigade activities in a defined geographical area - and force generate for domestic and overseas Ops. The fact that we currently need to ADD a Bde HQ HQ (CMBG) to this geographically defined mix shows how inadequate both the CBGs and CMBGs are at doing the 'full Monty' right now. 

Let's have one CBG (or whatever you want to call it) and include everyone in it, reseve and reg, under one 'one star' commander, in each geographical area. Would a reservist ever be able to command such a formation? Who knows, maybe not, but who cares.. really. Get over it boys and girls. But there would certainly be lots of opportunities for them to fill in the various staff positions. Regardless, the Bde Commander could shift resources around as required to meet the Div Comd's intent, just like in a real army.

What about the Area HQs? Meh, get rid of them and have the CBGs report direct to 1 Can Div: a 2 star. At least that would clean up the spider web matrix of command relationships that mess things up right now.

Oops, the soapbox is teetering.... gotta jet


----------



## Infanteer

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Let's have one CBG (or whatever you want to call it) and include everyone in it, reseve and reg, under one 'one star' commander, in each geographical area.



The CMBGs are already at their limit for span of control, with 4 maneuver units (3 Inf, 1 Armd) and 3 Combat Support units (Engr, Arty, Sig) each.  Adding an additional 3,000 reservists to a CMBG Comd's plate would hardly do the Comd's C2.


----------



## quadrapiper

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The CMBGs are already at their limit for span of control, with 4 maneuver units (3 Inf, 1 Armd) and 3 Combat Support units (Engr, Arty, Sig) each.  Adding an additional 3,000 reservists to a CMBG Comd's plate would hardly do the Comd's C2.


Maybe time to reevaluate the geographical areas? This might go under "fighting the last war," but is there an expectation that CMBG X will ever deploy as a unit? If not, would it make more sense to gather those Reg and Res units in the same region under the same command, as all are functionally in a force-generation role?


----------



## McG

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Maybe time to reevaluate the geographical areas? This might go under "fighting the last war," but is there an expectation that CMBG X will ever deploy as a unit? If not, would it make more sense to gather those Reg and Res units in the same region under the same command, as all are functionally in a force-generation role?


The CMBG HQs have deployed as the nucleus of various Task Forces in Afghanistan.  I think they are usefull and largely functional formations.  There may be room for slight efficiencies or improvements.

However, those savings are negligible in the big scheme of what we should be able to do with a rationalization of HQs at the next level up as well as with various non-operational formations and some bases - ie: L1s, L2s, non-operational L3s, and a few bases.  From the Army perspective, this means 1 Cdn Div, LFDTS, the LF Areas, CTC, ASGs and a few others.

Tinkering with the Army field force (while it may be closer to more people's comfort area) is not the way to significantly cut-fat; that is already a comparatively lean organization.  There are also other threads for that topic - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html


----------



## quadrapiper

MCG said:
			
		

> The CMBG HQs have deployed as the nucleus of various Task Forces in Afghanistan.  I think they are usefull and largely functional formations.  There may be room for slight efficiencies or improvements.


Not the HQ deploying as a unit, but the CMBG itself taking the field as a unified force.


----------



## McG

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Not the HQ deploying as a unit, but the CMBG itself taking the field as a unified force.


Where we've seen a CMBG as a collective form the nucleus of a TF HQ, a BG, a PRT, and an assortment of supporting elements - your answer is very close to yes ... and that TF HQ will not sponaneously appear if it is destroyed for _peace time_ effeciencies.

But, again, there is a whole other thread you should be joining if you want to tinker with the field force: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html


----------



## McG

> *DND bulks up on suits, not troops
> Ranks of bureaucrats swell nearly four times as fast as those of soldiers*
> Bruce Campion-Smith
> Toronto Star
> 15 August 2011
> 
> Canada's defence department bulked up during war - but not where you think.
> 
> Since 2004 - as the country's mission in Afghanistan was ramping up - a Star analysis shows dramatic growth in the department took place far from the front lines, with more civilians, more contractors and a ballooning headquarters staff.
> 
> Military experts say the numbers tell the tale of a bureaucracy run amok, even as the department's uniform ranks - especially the navy - remain stretched for manpower.
> 
> And it comes at a time when a radical plan to transform the defence department has been put in the hands of Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Gen. Walt Natynczyk.
> 
> At its heart, the goal of this still-secret blueprint is to trim the size of defence headquarters, pushing thousands of military personnel out of Ottawa and on to the country's air force bases, naval ports and army bases.
> 
> The transformation of Canada's Afghanistan mission to training from combat and a home-front budget crunch are putting pressure on the defence department to enact big reforms to cope with government-wide belt-tightening.
> 
> Defence expert Douglas Bland says the Canadian Forces have become more capable in recent years but at "great costs.
> 
> "The Ottawa HQ is just continuing to grow and grow and grow," said Bland, who holds the chair in defence management studies in the Queen's University School of Policy Studies. "There's just an expanding of an organization that is carrying out principally the same functions it has for many years."
> 
> The Star's analysis shows:
> 
> The number of civilian employees has grown by 31 per cent - from 22,710 in 2004 to 29,843 - almost four times the growth of the uniform ranks. In the same time, the navy has lost 1,100 full-time sailors since 2004, threatening its ability to fully staff its fleet. "There's no question the front lines, the sharp end, is woefully under strength," said retired colonel Brian MacDonald, a senior analyst at the Conference of Defence Associations.
> 
> Uniform ranks have grown by 8.5 per cent, from 87,653 in 2004 to 95,123.
> 
> Another 5,000 civilian contractors work for the defence department, mostly in the Ottawa area.
> 
> In fiscal year 2009-2010, the department spent $2.8 billion on professional services, consultants and outside contracts, up almost $1 billion since 2004. That's $1 billion more than the next biggest spender, the Department of Public Works and Governments Services.
> 
> Eyes are turning to the defence headquarters' offices sprawled across the Ottawa region where some 20,000 military and civilian defence staff work, about the same number as in all the Canadian Navy.
> 
> But it's believed a new blueprint prepared by Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, the military's chief of transformation, puts the headquarters in the crosshairs. Leslie, former head of the army, was tapped to probe how the department could be made "cheaper, better, faster, leaner."
> 
> His report was submitted in early July. The defence department is refusing to release it. Leslie declined to comment for this story.
> 
> However, speaking at an Ottawa conference in February, he sketched a vision of transformation while warning there is a "need to change.
> 
> "The status quo will not meet the defence interests of tomorrow based on the resource allocations of today," Leslie told the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. "Quite frankly, we need to take folks from headquarters and put them back in the field units.
> 
> "I hope a whole bunch of them go back out to the field units. And there are thousands," he said.
> 
> Still, he conceded he was facing "significant" resistance within the department as he poked at staffing levels and how jobs were done.
> 
> "Nothing will defend itself so vigorously ... as a headquarters which is threatened with being shut down," Leslie said.
> 
> During the preparation of his report, Leslie crunched numbers on the growth in staffing in all areas of the department. And he probed the rise in spending on contracts and consultants. The Star obtained much of that analysis under the Access to Information Act, but the detailed tables had been censored.
> 
> Still, numbers that are publicly available reveal sharp increases in the civilian staffing and the spending on professional contracts and consultants, including $339 million for business services, $1.2 billion for engineering and architecture services and $549 million in contracts lumped under the vague category of "other services." Nearly $50 million went to management consulting and $43 million to temporary help.
> 
> "The Auditor General of Canada or somebody should be looking at the contracting system," Bland said. "It's a flag that indicates some difficulties in management over time but also in the almost uncontrolled development of the bureaucracy. Maybe it's a symptom of what's going on in the rest of government."
> 
> The defence department pins the sharp rise in civilian employees and spending on professional contracts on the efforts in Afghanistan.
> 
> "In order to support Canadian troops in Afghanistan, civilians were hired and professional services contracted so that military members could focus their efforts on operational matters," said Jay Paxton, spokesperson for MacKay.
> 
> "Just as Canadians have been tightening their belts during a fragile economic recovery, so too will this government manage our resources to ensure continued value for taxpayers' money," he said.
> 
> Still, defence watchers are carefully taking note of what the department does with Leslie's report.
> 
> Senator Colin Kenny, former chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence, doubts Leslie's recommendations have been well-received, noting the transformation office has been closed.
> 
> "I suspect they don't much like what (Leslie) has to say," Kenny said. "They shut down his office ... Transformation isn't a one-time event. Transformation should be an ongoing culture."
> 
> But Kenny also said the majority mandate won by the Conservatives on May 2 gives Ottawa a window to make tough decisions, such as closing military bases he argues are only kept open for political purposes.
> 
> "Nobody talks about base closures because all it does is cause grief for politicians ... and so you guarantee the perpetuity of bases that are redundant and not necessary for military purposes," Kenny said, citing Goose Bay and North Bay as two bases that could be shuttered.
> 
> Many are pointing the finger at MacKay, saying only he can drive the reforms needed to enable the defence department to carry out its mandate with fewer resources.
> 
> "It will be interesting to see what sort of traction it will have inside the building and whether the minister will get personally involved in implementing recommendations," said Alain Pellerin, executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations. "In the past, if you look at the success stories in reorganizing the forces or headquarters, you have to go back to a proactive minister who put these measures into place, whether the uniform people or the civilian people liked them or not."


It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.


----------



## Edward Campbell

MCG said:
			
		

> ...
> It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.




But, now that we have the RCN and RCAF who is going to sweat the details about HQ bloat?


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.



And therein lies the rub - there is nobody to stand watch over the organizational integrity of the CF.  What mechanisms can prevent unwarranted growth of organizations.  "A few Captains here an a Major there" doesn't seem like much, but it adds up quickly, and pretty soon we have to bounce troops around the fill up a battalion.  I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.


----------



## PuckChaser

That same CANFORGEN also authorized backpay for MWOs in CWO positions who were promotable from their COS date.... lotta cash spent with one message.


----------



## OldSolduer

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.



Those postions have been there for years. They are now formally recognized, and most are Class A.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> And therein lies the rub - there is nobody to stand watch over the organizational integrity of the CF.  What mechanisms can prevent unwarranted growth of organizations.  "A few Captains here an a Major there" doesn't seem like much, but it adds up quickly, and pretty soon we have to bounce troops around the fill up a battalion.  I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.



Incorrect.  Those positions have existed for years (on the Army side, I know first had that they date back to at least 2003, but I suspect much farther back - some were probably the District CWOs prior to the stand-up of CBGs in the mid 90s).  The CANFORGEN approaved them as senior appointments / key positions and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.

No new positions involved at all.


----------



## Haggis

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> Those postions have been there for years. They are now formally recognized, and most are Class A.



ALL are Class A.  This CANFORGEN simply brought those already existing P Res CPO1/CWO Senior Appointments (SA) formally onto the CF Senior Appointments List (SAL), with position numbers.  It also retroactively paid members who now hold and who have previously held those positions - back to 01 Sep 06 - the proper rates on par with thier Reg F counterparts.



			
				PuckChaser said:
			
		

> That same CANFORGEN also authorized backpay for MWOs in CWO positions who were promotable from their COS date.



No, it did not.  The only back pay authorized was for *CPO1s/CWOs* who have held Senior Appointments since 01 Sep 2006.  Once a CPO1/CWO leaves the SA, pay at that level ceases one year after that date and s/he reverts back to CPO1/CWO Pay Level 7A.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The CANFORGEN approved them as senior appointments / *key positions* and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.



There are no approved P Res CPO1/CWO Key Positions at this time.  Some have been discussed but none are approved.


----------



## McG

Some interesting ideas coming from the Army, Navy & Air Force name change thread:


			
				milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Some of the opinion-ation out there:
> 
> 
> 
> Douglas Bland, chairman of Defence Management studies at Queen's University, fears the name designation could be the beginning of a fissure that could become a headache for future governments. Future defence ministers could find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of their service."
> 
> (….)
> 
> 
> 
> _National Post_, 16 Aug 11
Click to expand...




			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> There is a simple, cost effective solution to the problem Prof. (LCol (ret'd)) Bland sees:
> 
> 1. Create proper _unified_ (joint) combat commands: Maritime Command with _organic_ maritime air ~ and I don't care what colour uniforms the aircrew and ground-crew wear or whether they are pilot officers or sub-lieutenants, flight sergeants or PO1s, and Mobile Command with _organic_ army aviation ~ and I still don't care about suit colour or ranks;
> 
> 2. Create appropriate _specified_ (single service) combat commands like air operations command; and
> 
> 3. Create appropriate _unified_ (multi-service) support 'agencies' or groups like "Materiel Group" and the Supplementary Radio System; then
> 
> 4. Put all those commands and groups and agencies under the direction of the _joint_ defence staff in NDHQ, with _operations_ being under the control of the DCDS; and
> 
> 5. Degrade the ranks of the CNS, CGS and CAS to RAdm/MGen and make them "professional heads of service" with specific responsibilities for doctrine, individual training and equipment requirements.





			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> This is long overdue - we should perhaps stop referring to ECSes and instead refer to FGCSes - Force Generation Chiefs of Staff.  There is no reason for training organizations like the RCN, CA and RCAF (who do not conduct operations) to be commanded by 3* officers; primacy of operations should make them 2* officers, with a single, unified operational command, a single, unified support command and the VCDS as Chief of Staff  as the only three 3* officers.
> 
> That also removes the "meeting of equals" perspective in some senior fora - and means that the VCDS can order the FGCSes to do things, where now they get "directions" or "recommendations" that are, on occasion, casually ignored.


I'm not certain that Douglas Bland's future is really a new course.  I suspect defence ministers already find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of" their environment.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Incorrect.  Those positions have existed for years (on the Army side, I know first had that they date back to at least 2003, but I suspect much farther back - some were probably the District CWOs prior to the stand-up of CBGs in the mid 90s).  The CANFORGEN approaved them as senior appointments / key positions and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.
> 
> No new positions involved at all.





			
				Haggis said:
			
		

> ALL are Class A.  This CANFORGEN simply brought those already existing P Res CPO1/CWO Senior Appointments (SA) formally onto the CF Senior Appointments List (SAL), with position numbers.  It also retroactively paid members who now hold and who have previously held those positions - back to 01 Sep 06 - the proper rates on par with thier Reg F counterparts.



Thank you for the clarification on that - I was a little confused by the CANFORGEN as I knew reserve CBGs and the LFAs already had people filling those roles.


----------



## Haggis

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Thank you for the clarification on that - I was a little confused by the CANFORGEN as I knew reserve CBGs and the LFAs already had people filling those roles.



No problem.  I'm from NDHQ and I'm here to help.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> Some interesting ideas coming from the Army, Navy & Air Force name change thread:_National Post_, 16 Aug 11I'm not certain that Douglas Bland's future is really a new course.  I suspect defence ministers already find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of" their environment.



Agreed; I found Bland's comment off the mark.

As for the ideas of presented above, I find Edward's just a bit confusing.  What would be the purpose of a 3* "Mobile Command" and a 2* "Canadian Army" existing at the same time?  Is a "Mobile Command' and empty HQ a la CEFCOM?  Are we just scrambling the egg further here?

The idea of a 3* Unified Joint Force Commander is a good one, one we will likely see, and one that has a proven track record.  I believe the principle of Force Gen/Force Emp is sound.

Finally, I don't get what reducing the ECS to 2*s is meant to accomplish.  We talk of the primacy of operations; Force Generation is, hand in hand with Force Employment, _Operations_.  While 10-15% of the military is deployed to Afghanistan or whereever, the other 85-90% is preparing itself for the next task.  Cutting out the feet of the guys who raise 90% of fighting forces does not seem to be a good move.


----------



## dapaterson

Haggis said:
			
		

> No problem. _* We're * _ from NDHQ and _*we're part of the bloat*_.




Fixed that for us...


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Finally, I don't get what reducing the ECS to 2*s is meant to accomplish.  We talk of the primacy of operations; Force Generation is, hand in hand with Force Employment, [/i]Operations[/i].  While 10-15% of the military is deployed to Afghanistan or whereever, the other 85-90% is preparing itself for the next task.  Cutting out the feet of the guys who raise 90% of fighting forces does not seem to be a good move.



How is giving the Canadian Army Commander, who commands roughly a division's worth of field troops, the rank of a division commander "cutting out the feet"?  The argument "the Army Commander must be a 3* because he's always been a 3*" holds no water.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Fixed that for us...



I don't consider myself part of the bloat.   I think I peform a useful function here.

However, I rarely own up to even being from NDHQ.  So my statement, being an admission of such, is akin to an addict admitting to an addiction.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I think we you are too wrapped around the force employment/force generation axle.

It may be an important distinctions in large forces but I'm not sure that it needs to apply to smaller forces.

I agree the two functions exist and I agree that they are distinct but I'm not persuaded they need separate organizations.

Since our focus is shifted back to the 1960s we might look back a bit:

1. In the old RCN the C2 system was fairly simple and robust; force employment and force generation were both managed, through a single organization, by the CNS in Ottawa. There were, in the regular force, one recruit school, one officer training centre, two big professional and trades training schools, two dockyards, two main supporting bases, sundry 'systems' (medical, communications, etc) and two fleets;

2. The Canadian Army was organized geographically – four regional commands – each responsible for _almost_ everything within their boundaries, including schools and combat units. A single commander generated forces for the entire army and employed the combat forces in his geographic command area. There were some interesting 'overlaps:' Comd 3CIBG in Gagetown 'commanded' a R22eR battalion when it was in Gagetown on exercise; otherwise the R22eR battalion in Valcartier was owned by Comd _Eastern Command_. The exception was Comd Canadian Army Europe – a BGen – who was also Comd 4CMBG; he had no force generation duties; and

3. The RCAF had separate force generation and force employment structures. Air Training Command was big and important: it had many stations, schools and flying squadrons.

The three systems all made sense, all had been 'tested' in big and small wars, and all worked well enough.

I, personally, would like to see a fairly 'pure' _unified_ command structure:

1. Four geographic *joint* commands: Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic with a separate JHQ and Signal Unit lodged in one of the command areas – ready and able to deploy on fairly short notice anywhere in the world to command an expeditionary force. Each joint commander would both generate forces and employ them on domestic operations;

2. A few, a very few, NDHQ controlled units, groups and agencies if Ottawa is convinced that a geographic commander cannot or should not have cross boundary responsibilities; and

3. A big, _integrated_ NDHQ (in Shilo, which is near the middle of the country?) with a _joint_ staff to manage all operations – expeditionary and domestic.

But, I expect that everyone (except, maybe, the RCN) would object and, having lived through the destruction of our *joint* experiment (AKA the creation of Air Command) I do not have confidence in Ottawa's ability to create a simple, robust C2 structure. Thus I propose a couple of big, _joint_ combat commands (Maritime and Mobile Commands) and one or two single service _specified_ commands (Air Operations Command) for force employment and all the rest for force generation – probably with some sort of (wasteful) geographic sub-structure to create more vacancies for over-ranked, under-worked GOFOs.

I see the service chiefs as being staff officers – pure and simple – with responsibilities, as I said, for doctrine, individual training standards and equipment requirements. But those responsibilities, especially for doctrine, make them, _dfe facto_, the professional heads of their respective services.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> How is giving the Canadian Army Commander, who commands roughly a division's worth of field troops, the rank of a division commander "cutting out the feet"?  The argument "the Army Commander must be a 3* because he's always been a 3*" holds no water.



He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....

Your rough accounting holds no water.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Further to force generation: around 1950 the Canadian Army did the biggest forge generation exercise ever, general mobilization à la 1914/165 and 1939/40 excepted, without the sort of 'force generation' staff structure we have today. It absolutely dwarfs anything dreamed of (even wet dreamed of) by the CF in the 1990s or 2000s. The existing three infantry regiments (The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) were trebled in size (from one battalion to three, each) and six new battalions were raised: two each Canadian Infantry (later Canadian Guards), Canadian Rifle (later QOR of C) and Canadian Highland (later Black Watch) battalions. That was done by a relatively small AHQ and from within the post-war geographic command structure.

When the current mess structure can do half of that I'll agree it's worth its hire ~ until then I think we have a too top heavy, overly bureaucratized C2 superstructure with too many staff officers in too many HQs doing way too much useless work.

I believe we have infantilized the officer corps – moving more and more work out of the hands of unit officers and COs and into the hands of bureaucrats, mainly because our (my generation and the generation we trained) risk aversion levels are way too high. If the 'old' Canadian Army, without automation and with very small HQs and an antiquated C2 system could treble, even quadruple itself in size in three or four years then I suggest there is nothing wrong with the 'old' system and it bears a long, hard look before we import anything else from the big boys down South.


----------



## Monsoon

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Further to force generation: around 1950 the Canadian Army did the biggest forge generation exercise ever, general mobilization à la 1914/165 and 1939/40 excepted, without the sort of 'force generation' staff structure we have today. It absolutely dwarfs anything dreamed of (even wet dreamed of) by the CF in the 1990s or 2000s. The existing three infantry regiments (The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) were trebled in size (from one battalion to three, each) and six new battalions were raised: two each Canadian Infantry (later Canadian Guards), Canadian Rifle (later QOR of C) and Canadian Highland (later Black Watch) battalions. That was done by a relatively small AHQ and from within the post-war geographic command structure.


To be fair, the army of the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....
> 
> Your rough accounting holds no water.



I have to agree. The geographical considerations involved are vast as well.


----------



## Old Sweat

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> To be fair, the armyof the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.


There were ample stocks of supplies in the system, and the army was able to raise two brigade groups for Germany, although only one deployed, as well as another brigade group for Korea and to provide reinforcements for the latter, and to replace the two deployed brigade groups a year later. I read somewhere that the veterans, who were quite happily engaged in the baby boom, did not return to the colours in the numbers expected. Thus, it was their "kid brothers" in their late teens and early twenties who filled the ranks in the expanded Canadian Army. (It's nice to be able to capitalize the second word again!)


----------



## Edward Campbell

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> To be fair, the army of the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.




Only partially true: it was five or more years since the end of the war and while there was, still, a lot of 'kit' in the bins, not yet sold off as surplus, and while many veterans and serving militia members did, indeed, rejoin, many 'new' men enlisted, too, but most, vets and new men alike, required at least some training - if only 'refresher' training for some. So, a training scheme was needed and schools had to be beefed up before soldiers could be put through.

But my point is that a large and complex force generation exercise - larger and more complex than anything attempted since - was executed successfully, without much fuss and bother, by dint of hard work within the existing 'old' system; so, maybe, our current fascination with force generation aims to solve a problem that doesn't (have to) exist.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....
> 
> Your rough accounting holds no water.



The Canadian Army's Reg F combat power with enablers, is roughly 10K; the P Res has a trained strength of roughly 15K; boiled down to combat power, it would provide about another 10K (or so).  Grouping those into real formations with full-up Bns and Bdes (vice the 13 paper shells we play with), and accounting for div-level troops and we could field three bdes of about 5.5K each, plus div troops of about 2500.  While slightly overstrength for a Div, it's woefully understrength for a Corps.

There are the remaining elements - LFDTS and the ASGs - but the ASGs should not be a Div Comds responsibility.  The ASGs could be punted to the CF support command to streamline the Army Commander's responsibilities.  The environmental training organizations could be consolidated and some further "jointness" enabled.  Currently, "joint" training for officers happens at BMQ as an OCdt, then not again until JCSP as a Maj/LCol.  NCMs have joint BMQ as Pte(R), then their next formal "joint" course is the Intermediate Leadership Program (ILP) to be promoted WO.

(Tangent:  Interesting that we see NCM jointness beginning at the Pl level, by officer jointness only at the Bn level)


and re: Geography:  Poor excuse that certain parts of the Army love to trot out.  Either we believe our Cols and LCols are capable of command and control, or we are not training them properly.  Remember: the Army does not command domestic operations - forces assigned to the operational commander do.  Responsbility for maintaining some sort of Regional HQs falls to that operational commander.  In a three full-strength, all-up Bde model, we could have a Bde West / Bde Central / Bde East construct, with commanders in Edmonton, Toronto, and Quebec City.  They have cars, trucks, and (if they ask nicely) Tac Hel to see the units in their AOR.  Those Bde Comds would have subordinate commanders who can be responsible as well.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Canadian Army's Reg F combat power



We're not talking about combat power, we're talking about institutions.  Canada has a 2* to handle all that combat power should it be employed - Comd 1 Div.

The CLS is responsible for the combat resident in the Brigades, but he is also responsible for the numerous institutional organizations.  In the case of the Commander of the Army, his rank is comensurate with his responsibilies as the commander of an institution, not the combat power he can wield at this moment.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> 1. Four geographic *joint* commands: Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic with a separate JHQ and Signal Unit lodged in one of the command areas – ready and able to deploy on fairly short notice anywhere in the world to command an expeditionary force. Each joint commander would both generate forces and employ them on domestic operations;



This makes for an interesting debate - one of the qualms with the Land Force Area system is that it "Balkanizes" the Army and that we should move to a single Div to handle all Reg Force Brigades (and a corresponding Res Div).

Going on this, would it be prudent to "balkanize" further and devolve ships and airplanes into Regional Fiefs?  I don't see a real way to do this with the Fleets, so in essence, your proposal only really chops 1 and 2 Can Air Div up amongst the Areas.



> I see the service chiefs as being staff officers – pure and simple – with responsibilities, as I said, for doctrine, individual training standards and equipment requirements. But those responsibilities, especially for doctrine, make them, _dfe facto_, the professional heads of their respective services.



I don't understand this argument.  Why is a Service Chief a "staff officer" because his legitimate command duties are based in Canada?  How would a "staff officer" ECS enforce any sort of of uniform doctrine or training requirements on four joint fiefs?  This line of logic states that COs and Brigade Commanders are also "staff officers" responsible for the training and equipment within their organizations.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> We're not talking about combat power, we're talking about institutions.  Canada has a 2* to handle all that combat power should it be employed - Comd 1 Div.
> 
> The CLS is responsible for the combat resident in the Brigades, but he is also responsible for the numerous institutional organizations.  In the case of the Commander of the Army, his rank is comensurate with his responsibilies as the commander of an institution, not the combat power he can wield at this moment.



Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.

Besides, with the current Army HQ dictating to LFAs which company is to deploy we don't have even a "div" level Army HQ - more like an insecure Brigade HQ calling the shots from Ottawa.  Getting them to think and act like a Div HQ would be a step up, not a step down.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.



Then he wouldn't be an Army Commander - he'd be a Div Commander and a 2* would be appropriate.  In either case, he is still a Commander and not a staff officer.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> In either case, he is still a Commander and not a staff officer.



In either case he is both:  Commander of the forces under his command, and the senior land advisor to the CDS.  (The staff role gets lower billing when the CDS has an Army background, which isn't always a good thing - CLS should be more on top of the current Army than the CDS).


----------



## McG

There are a lot of building blocks missing, but is this roughly what some are proposing:


----------



## Infanteer

Interesting chicken scratch.  Change the name of "Training Group" to "Canadian Defence Academy" and add CMP to cover Joint Pers, and I think you've got it covered.

This seems propose getting rid of the ECS all together - something going further than Hellyer's reforms ever did....


----------



## vonGarvin

Why are "Doctrine" and "Validation" separate from training?  

Sorry, but I just see scratches.  Convoluted scratches that make little sense at 2033 on a Tuesday evening.


I'm afraid I prefer something I proposed much earlier.  If I had the energy, I'd look for it.


----------



## McG

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Why are "Doctrine" and "Validation" separate from training?


The validation (of force structures, procedures, equipment and other capability building blocks) is not a training function.  It rightly belongs under the purview of capability development but as a separate entity from (and therefore not emotionally attached to the products of) concepts, doctrine and requirements.  LFTEU is an example of a unit that fills an aspect of validation.  Training validation is a separate (or perhaps a subset) function - this could remain within the training group.

Doctrine is also under capability/force development for reasons I have previously stated:


			
				MCG said:
			
		

> The whole force development process in the Army is structurally impaired against being done right.  Creating and maintaining capabilities requires drawing on concepts, equipment, doctrine, and force structures - all of these things need to be developed in concert.  Doctrine will only be marginal (at best) if it fails to consider & exploit the potential of modern technology.  At the same time, equipment that is incompatible or ill-suited to doctrine will weaken the overall force.
> 
> While the force development & requirements folk are not in the same building, at least they are in the same city (basically).  However, with DLCD and doctrine in Kingston, the two halves of the Army's force development brain are not even close enough to sit together over coffee every other week & ensure they are working in the same step.
> 
> With equipment it stands out more because the wrong answer gets dumped on the troops & they have to make it work (or there is nothing & the troops still have to make things work).  When the doctrine side is missing, the troops make their own (which is a lot easier that fabricating vehicles, weapons & other kit in the field).  However, it seems to me that signs of the doctrine ball being dropped are plenty to be found.  The Infantry platoon & company doctrine is so badly out of date that it is hidden and not even available on the AEL.
> 
> Where capability/force development is not properly synchronized, we see things like the VCDS killing major projects like ALAWS because the army has no coherent doctrine around which to explain the purchase.  Where capability/force development is conducted across separated stovepipes, we see DLR pers drafting junk doctrine to justify equipment or DLFD pers directing the procurement of equipment with no explicable role.
> 
> When the field army runs into problems that require a fast & coherent response from the national headquarters, the solution is to create new ad-hoc organizations (like the CF C-IED TF) with PYs to do what should already be happening in existing staffs ... except that it is not because those staffs are so physically separated that good communication is not happening at the working levels.
> 
> If we are ever going to get to the point of effective capability development, then the Army's force development efforts need to be put under a single roof ... that means DAD belongs in the Land Staff under COS(Strat) and not in LFDTS.  Little empires like the C-IED TF need to be dissolved and replaced with tiny staffs that draw on the permanently established functional _experts_ in DAD, DLR, DLCD, etc.


I still believe that capability development, and not training systems, is the place that doctrine belongs.



			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I'm afraid I prefer something I proposed much earlier.


I am not even sure what I think of the organization myself - it's a rough attempt to capture an more functionally structured CF that I think others are proposing.  In theory it might be functional, but in practice there would be a decade of serious growing pains at best.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.
> 
> Besides, with the current Army HQ dictating to LFAs which company is to deploy we don't have even a "div" level Army HQ - more like an insecure Brigade HQ calling the shots from Ottawa.  Getting them to think and act like a Div HQ would be a step up, not a step down.



The units of the Canadian Army come from somewhere, and the Army Commander is the man responsible for that. Giving our schools to a Joint organization with an Army 2 Star 'advising' is madness. The Schools and units of the army are a heavy responsibility certainly warranting an LGen.


----------



## dapaterson

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> The Schools and units of the _*logistics branch*_ are a heavy responsibility certainly warranting an LGen.



Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?

Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?

In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?

"Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?
> 
> Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?
> 
> In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?
> 
> "Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.



Please don`t quote me and change my words within the quote box. You can try to make your point without doing that. Even though you mention your edit it is still misleading.

In any case, perhaps you missed where I said Schools and units. I am not just talking about the schools being the reason for having a LGen Army Commander, so your question about where do we draw the line doesn`t make sense to me. My point on the schools was that they are important and need to be under the purview of the Army Commander, not some joint agency. The CDA and its subordinate organizations can continue to look after core CF and joint training. I am also not arguing about tradition or marching into machineguns, so I am not getting why you put that in.

The Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF are the main pillars of the Canadian Forces, and they need to be led by 3 leaf level commanders. I believe that services and branches matter, not because of tradition but because they provide Canada with its combat power.


----------



## Edward Campbell

If you want three stars chiefs of staff who also 'command' their services then why not something like this?

*MND*

*DM*
		Various functional groups led by ADMs

*CDS ****
		VCDS **** – general 'common' (2nd and 3rd line) support functions incl e.g strategic C3
*DCDS **** – joint operations staff
			Special Operations Group
				JTF2
				CFSOR
				SO Tac Hel Sqn
*CNS ****
			Pacific Fleet **
				Ships
				Air Group
				Dockyards
				Bases
				Schools
				Reserve Divisions
			Atlantic Fleet **
				Ships
				Air Group
				Dockyards
				Bases
				Schools
				Reserve Divisions
*CGS ****
			Western Command **
				1 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
				Bases and Training Areas
				Schools
				Area Hqs
					Reserve Brigades
					Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
			Central Command **
				2 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
				Bases and Training Areas
				Schools
				Area Hqs
					Reserve Brigades
					Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
           Joint Expeditionary Force HQ and Signal Unit
			Eastern Command **
				3 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
				Bases and Training Areas
				Schools
				Area Hqs
					Reserve Brigades
					Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
*CAS ****
			Air Combat Command **
				Fighter Group *
				Maritime Air Group *
			Air Transport Command **
				Transport Group *
				SAR Group*
				Tactical Aviation Group
			Air Training Command **
			Support Command **

There need to be, of course, a few more three stars: CAMILREP NATO, Deputy Commander NORAD, etc and several more two stars but, surely, we can make fewer admiral and generals manage our slowly shrinking/static/slowly growing forces?


----------



## armyvern

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?
> 
> Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?
> 
> In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?
> 
> "Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.



Sure there are purple supporting the CF, but they are still career managed by the purple branch.

Just as the army, air force, and navy career manage their own "hard" trades ...

If we don't require a loggie 3* to manage the purple world in the big picture, surely we don't need the others.

Unless we go to 3 seperate merit lists (Army, Navy, Air) for our purple people ... then someone with some authority to push and protect us from being _consumed/passed by_ by the big three "real" enviornments must continue to exist. Why shouldn't he wear the same rank as those managing less in one of the "official" 3 enviornments?


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> If you want three stars chiefs of staff who also 'command' their services then why not something like this?



Except for the merged Dotcoms, that looks somewhat similar to today.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Except for the merged Dotcoms, that looks somewhat similar to today.



How many L1s today?

Even counting the ADMs in the DM's domain and accounting for e.g. a MilPers _something or other_, I think my model has less than a dozen L1s.


----------



## McG

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> My point on the schools was that they are important and need to be under the purview of the Army Commander, not some joint agency.


There is some precedent suggesting that environments do not need to own the schools responsible for their occupations’ individual training.  Currently within CTC, the Canadian Army provides all career training for at least ten RCAF managed occupations and one "purple."  I think it would be more accurate to say that Army schools _should_ be under the Army Commander as opposed to saying they _must_ be under the Army Commander.


----------



## ArmyRick

CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school and the tactics school. What purple and air force trades do all their career training there? The engineering school is not part of the CTC.


----------



## McG

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school and the tactics school. What purple and air force trades do all their career training there? The engineering school is not part of the CTC.


You are at least 4 years out of date.
CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school, the tactics school, CFLAWC, LFTEU, CFSEME, CFSCE and (yes) CFSME.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

MCG said:
			
		

> There is some precedent suggesting that environments do not need to own the schools responsible for their occupations’ individual training.  Currently within CTC, the Canadian Army provides all career training for at least ten RCAF managed occupations and one "purple."  I think it would be more accurate to say that Army schools _should_ be under the Army Commander as opposed to saying they _must_ be under the Army Commander.



There are certainly trades from outside the Army that have people completing training at Army schools (I can think of some engineer types at CFSME and some technicians at CFSCE). I would not use those technical trades, however, as support for an argument that "hard-Army" branches should be placed under a Joint training organization outside the Army command.


----------



## Old Sweat

I served in the Canadian Forces School of Artillery in Shilo when it was part of Training Command. The arrangement worked, but it was convoluted and the relationship with the user, ie Mobile Command, was not as close as it should have been. This was in the early days of integration before the single uniform began to make its way to the masses, so many of our masters in Training Command did not understand the army or why we need to do team training. After all, that was the purpose of the OTU. Maybe that has coloured my thinking, and hopefully the flag and general officers are more aware of the needs of each of the services, but I still shudder at the memory of a general clad in light blue saying he thought the army had too many different weapon systems, and major economies could be realized by eliminating some of them.


----------



## Gunner98

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I served in the Canadian Forces School of Artillery in Shilo when it was part of Training Command. The arrangement worked, but it was convoluted and the relationship with the user, ie Mobile Command, was not as close as it should have been.



I was working in the RCA Battle School when it closed and became the Western Area Training Centre Artillery Detachment Shilo.  Timing was different but the chain of command was no less convoluted and the relationship with the user - Canada-wide Reg and Res force units was not as close as it could have been...and the Merry-go-round goes round and round.


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Maybe that has coloured my thinking, and hopefully the flag and general officers are more aware of the needs of each of the services, but I still shudder at the memory of a general clad in light blue saying he thought the army had too many different weapon systems, and major economies could be realized by eliminating some of them.



Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.

As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.
> 
> As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.



Given the very limited training Cbt Arms officers receive on CSS planning I would be leery of relying excusively on them to plan and command all the way from first line to national depot level requirements.  There are interrelationships not immediately obvious that run rom top to bottom; and there are commanders who will strip out CSS for more combat power, then change the conops and not have the support capacity they require.  LCol Conrad's book on support in Afghanistan would be worthy of review on that topic.

(What's next - putting a Log 3* in charge of the army  > ?)


If we want the Army to focus on operational excellence, then responsibilities outside that should be stripped from the commander to permit him or her to focus on just that.  Remove the ASGs (leaving the Bdes with the Svc Bns and at least some notional Div support elements).  Remove the individual training sysetm to permit the commander to focus on the collective training and skills maintenance of the Army.  That is the vital ground for success.

Certainly, there must be close co-ord; the training command's job is to co-ord the training, not define the requirements.  But past failures need to be assessed and understood - was the idea flawed, the implementation flawed, or did the implementors ignore the plan completely?  To merely say "Tried it once.  Didn't work.  Never again." without understanding the why is foolish.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> If we want the Army to focus on operational excellence, then responsibilities outside that should be stripped from the commander to permit him or her to focus on just that.



You speak of stripping out extraneous duties to focus on operational excellence, but previously, you speak of how the lack of CSS knowledge inhibits operational excellence (an argument I agree with).  A bit contradictory; I'd venture that we need a better relationship between the CSS and Combat Arms guys (ie: the merging of ATOC CA and CSS that is forthcoming) as opposed to splitting off vital functions from the Army simply because they also box stuff up for Navy guys from time to time.  That, if anything, smells of empire building (yeah, I'm looking at you Health Services....)


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:
			
		

> You speak of stripping out extraneous duties to focus on operational excellence, but previously, you speak of how the lack of CSS knowledge inhibits operational excellence (an argument I agree with).  A bit contradictory; I'd venture that we need a better relationship between the CSS and Combat Arms guys (ie: the merging of ATOC CA and CSS that is forthcoming) as opposed to splitting off vital functions from the Army simply because they also box stuff up for Navy guys from time to time.  That, if anything, smells of empire building (yeah, I'm looking at you Health Services....)



(a) Health Services:  No comment  :'(

(b) Yes, I'm a bit interally contradictory on CSS.  The problem: to build RCN CSS + Army CSS + RCAF CSS + CF CSS = lots of surplus capacity that will not be needed.  So we have to balance providing adequate for CF needs with adequate to each environmental need with adequate for environmental training and PD.  Magic formula with a magic answer?  I don't have it.  But leaving the Army with strong first & second line plus a shell of third line should be enough to permit training, plus encourage some degree of jointness (if only to get practice in begging the centre for more  :nod: )

But there is a strong need for a strong CF "corporate" (I loathe that word in this context, but at least it's understood) oversight to prevent Log or HS or other empire building.  In theory, that's the VCDS role - to keep a semblance of balance in the Force, and keep the dark side at bay.  Unfortunately, the VCDS hasn't been able to secure a reliable supply of midichlorians...


----------



## Infanteer

The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).

http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2



> End of cavalry, as Dragoons to be merged with infantry
> 
> Published Date: 08 August 2011
> 
> By Stephen McGinty
> 
> THE Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, one of Scotland's oldest regiments, is to be merged with the infantry, marking the demise of the British Army's cavalry after 350 years.
> 
> Under new plans being drawn up by military chiefs, the cavalry will no longer operate as an independent force and will instead by restructured and combined with the infantry into a "combat capability directorate", according to a leaked army document.
> 
> Senior officers fear this will mean the demise of famous regimental names such as the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and the King's Royal Hussars, which are likely to be split up into squadrons and incorporated into infantry battalions.
> 
> The cavalry, which long ago swapped horses for tanks, is one of the oldest of the forces, dating back to the Civil War in the 1640s.
> 
> The history of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards stretches back to 1678, and the regiment had a prestigious role in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, when Sergeant Charles Ewart captured the Imperial Eagle of Napoleon's 45th Regiment.
> 
> The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards are currently based in North Germany, as part of the 7th Armoured Brigade, the Desert Rats, where they are equipped with the Challenger 2 main battle tank.
> 
> The planned restructuring will cut swathes of senior officer posts by combining the army's eight main corps into four capability directorates. But it is the merger of the cavalry and infantry, expected to begin later this year, that will most concern cavalry officers.
> 
> The document, an internal army briefing note, does how-ever attempt to reassure the cavalry that "the ethos of the regimental system will not change".
> 
> Army chiefs say they want to ensure senior officers represent the army's interests rather than those of their regiments. The note makes clear that restructuring will help end the practice of giving cavalry and infantry officers the top jobs.
> 
> "The new structure will better allow the regimental system to flourish without impairing the opportunities available to the military profession," it says.
> 
> The army restructuring will create three more capability directorates. Artillery and engineers will form the combat support capability directorate. Signals and intelligence will form the combat information capability directorate. Logistics and electrical and mechanical engineering will combine as the combat service support capability directorate.
> 
> The document explains that the restructuring is driven by cost and the need to "optimise use of limited resources".
> 
> The army is to lose about 12,000 staff over the next ten years.
> 
> Yesterday a Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "The Defence Secretary recently announced the most radical transformation of the MoD in a generation, giving the chiefs greater power to run their services.
> 
> "The army's new capability directorates will be more agile and responsive, providing capability development and delivery better aligned to the rest of defence."
> 
> Last night Clive Fairweather, a former army colonel and deputy commander of the SAS, said: "The tank is part of the changing aspect of the military. It has only been on the battlefield since the First World War and since then the whole nature of warfare has changed again and there are those who say we don't need quite so many tanks.
> 
> "The MoD thinks they are top-heavy and expensive, so if they can possibly consign some armour and some history to the bin, then they will. I suppose it is kind of inevitable but making them an adjunct to the infantry would require a bit more explanation to me."


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).
> 
> http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2



They always hinted at creating 'Panzer Grenadier' regiments in the UK. Looks like it's finally happening.


----------



## armyvern

MCG said:
			
		

> You are at least 4 years out of date.
> CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school, the tactics school, CFLAWC, LFTEU, CFSEME, CFSCE and (yes) CFSME.



Let's take CFSEME as an example; although 'purple', their entire branch wears the Army uniform and is career managed as one Army Branch.

Not so the purple Logistic Branch. Apples & Oranges. If you want to split the purple trades in purple uniforms into their 3 distinctive enviornments and career manage each by their own seperate merit lists --- then they'd become more like the EME Branch. Until then, they are quite distinct and seperate from comparison to your "purple" trade school listed above.


----------



## armyvern

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.
> 
> As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.



Not a trade, but a Branch. And all three uniforms of that Branch perform quite distinct and seperate functions in each seperate enviornment they work in. Not one of the big 3 has "all the functions/like tasks required" in their enviornment. May as well give us to the RCN to manage --- why should the Army be the one who decides?


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Not a trade, but a Branch. And all three uniforms of that Branch perform quite distinct and seperate functions in each seperate enviornment they work in. Not one of the big 3 has "all the functions/like tasks required" in their enviornment. May as well give us to the RCN to manage --- why should the Army be the one who decides?



Yes, branch containing multiple trades - thanks for that.

As for have the "Army be the one who decides", I never said that.  If you reread my sentence (although it is tinged with Army-speak) I advocated for the Army to maintain significant input and control over "Army logisitics" and the Navy and Air Force the same for their respective slices of the pie, as opposed to taking it away and consolidating it somewhere else independant of the services.


----------



## McG

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Let's take CFSEME as an example; although 'purple', their entire branch wears the Army uniform and is career managed as one Army Branch.
> 
> Not so the purple Logistic Branch. Apples & Oranges. If you want to split the purple trades in purple uniforms into their 3 distinctive enviornments and career manage each by their own seperate merit lists --- then they'd become more like the EME Branch. Until then, they are quite distinct and seperate from comparison to your "purple" trade school listed above.


I assume this rant means you believe the one purple occupation that I identified within CTC is EME?  That would be incorrect - CFSEME is an Army school that teaches Army occupations.  CFSME has Army and RCAF managed occupations, and CFCSE has all of RCAF, Army and purple managed occupations.



			
				Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> There are certainly trades from outside the Army that have people completing training at Army schools (I can think of some engineer types at CFSME and some technicians at CFSCE). I would not use those technical trades, however, as support for an argument that "hard-Army" branches should be placed under a Joint training organization outside the Army command.


It is not just RCAF trades in Army schools.  There are hard Air officer occupations being taught by the Army - these individuals will be expected through thier careers to be a part of planning and conducting air operations.  However, I suspect you mean to say that the 90034 OPSG occupations (and their analogous NCM occupations) can only be trained by their respective environments.

If we can currently train Air Force occupations in Army schools that are fully within the Army, why would we not be able to train Army occupations in Army schools within an Army formation that is itself within a joint training group?



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).
> 
> http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2


We have discussed this very thing as a means of structureing our own Army at the L3 and below:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28042.0.html


----------



## Edward Campbell

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_, is what purports to be a 'preview' of LGen Leslie's _transformation_ report:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/generals-report-calls-for-dramatic-cuts-to-bloated-military-staffing/article2134511/ 


> General’s report calls for dramatic cuts to bloated military staffing
> 
> JOHN IBBITSON
> 
> OTTAWA— From Friday's Globe and Mail
> Published Friday, Aug. 19, 201
> 
> National Defence must take an axe to its bloated headquarters by dismissing or reassigning thousands of workers if the military is to meet its future obligations, concludes a landmark report charged with transforming the Canadian Forces.
> 
> This scathing assessment by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, who commanded the Canadian army during the Afghanistan war, arrives at a pivotal moment for the military, as the army returns from its troubled mission in Kandahar, the navy and air force seek new ships and aircraft, and the Conservative government vows to eliminate the federal deficit in a gloomy economy.
> 
> “If we are serious about the future – and we must be – the impact of reallocating thousands of people and billions of dollars from what they are doing now to what we want them to do ...will require some dramatic changes,” Gen. Leslie writes in Report on Transformation 2011. A copy of the report has been obtained by The Globe and Mail.
> 
> It offers 43 recommendations on how “to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow,” eliminating or reassigning some 11,000 of the 145,000 people in National Defence and the Canadian Forces.
> 
> The key recommendations include:
> 
> - Redeploying or eliminating 3,500 regular forces personnel who currently hold jobs that serve little purpose;
> - doing the same to 3,500 civil servants in the department;
> - cutting the number of full-time reservists – many of whom man desks at headquarters – in half, to 4,500 and converting them to part-time service, while preserving and strengthening their ranks within communities;
> - cutting 30 per cent from the $2.7-billion spent annually on contractors, consultants and services provided by the private sector
> - consolidating departments that overlap and duplicate each other.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The changes are aimed at ending the “administrative incoherence ... stifling process, blurred authorities ... [and] reluctance at all levels to accept managerial risk” that Gen. Leslie maintains is hobbling the Canadian military’s efforts to meet its mandate of protecting Canada’s borders and working with allies overseas.
> 
> The changes would save the Canadian Forces an estimated $1-billion a year, the report concludes.
> 
> The Harper government named Gen. Leslie Chief of Transformation last year, charged with recommending ways both to save money and reposition the military for future challenges.
> But whether General Walt Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Defence Minister Peter MacKay will act on Gen. Leslie’s recommendations is unknown. The report itself alludes to resistance within the military establishment while it was being prepared.
> 
> And sources who cannot be identified because they are not authorized to speak to the press tell of tensions between Gen. Leslie and Gen. Natynczyk, who won the job to which Gen. Leslie had aspired. Although the report was delivered to Mr. MacKay in July, National Defence has not released it.
> 
> Liberal and Conservative governments increased military spending 50 per cent between 2004 and 2010, largely in an effort to properly equip and support troops fighting in Afghanistan.
> 
> Over those six years the number of people serving in National Defence grew 18 per cent. But the number of regular Forces personnel – the people who carry guns, fly planes and man ships – grew only 11 per cent, while the civilian work force swelled by 33 per cent.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> At the extreme, the number of people serving in the navy grew by 3 per cent, but the ranks of civilians swelled by a third, while the number of actual navy personnel declined by 1 per cent.
> 
> Despite this burgeoning bureaucracy, Gen. Leslie notes, the Canadians Forces are getting steadily worse at actually spending the money allotted to them for new equipment and other capital purchases. By 2009-2010, the department was failing to spend more than $1-billion a year, thanks in part to “lack of project management capacity ... [an] overly protracted internal review and approval process” and “cumbersome and inflexible” spending controls.
> 
> The report offers a plethora of suggestions, many of them highly technical, for merging operations, for consolidating staff – so that the same number of people do the same kinds of jobs at military bases, for example – for contracting out internal operations in areas such as information management, and for converting full-time staff to part-time or temporary positions.
> 
> However, the report notes that previous efforts to tame the defence bureaucracy have been defeated by that very bureaucracy.
> 
> As a result “the headquarters and other overhead grew while ships were decommissioned, regular and reserve battalions were disbanded and whole aircraft fleets cashed in.”
> 
> The same fate, Gen. Leslie ruefully acknowledges, could await his own report, noting that his team met considerable resistance from within the department.
> 
> “The tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo,” he reports, noting that some internal consultations could best be described as “grimly amusing.”
> *...*
> 
> *FROM REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION 2011
> 
> Reactions to previous reports urging reform*
> 
> “If the results were likely to cause institutional angst, a variety of options existed, from waiting until the team disappeared, to conducting lengthy reviews of the recommendations and, finally to classifying the work to an extent that only a few could see it.”
> 
> *On resistance to this report*
> 
> “[At] a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants ... it became apparent the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo. ... Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and probably never will be achieved on any significant change.”
> 
> *How DND handles funding cuts*
> 
> “Most subordinate organizations have done their very best to preserve their structures, their internal funding (what they need to take care of themselves) and their process ... which usually result in overhead staying much the same while support to the front-line deployable unit is cut far more than originally forecasted.”
> 
> *On waste and inefficiency*
> 
> “These are symptomatic of old processes, new overhead layered on old, lots of committees and in certain areas a sometimes bewildering number of steps ...to actually achieve a government directed spending outcome.”
> 
> *Cause of increasing trend to not spend allotted money*
> 
> “The issues of stifling process, blurred authorities and accountabilities, as well as some reluctance at all levels to accept managerial risk ... go a long way in explaining a disturbing and increasing trend as to why many hundreds of millions of dollars have remained unspent, starting in fiscal year 2006/07 and growing to this day.”




It appears, to me that the report has been leaked to the media in an effort to circumvent the “resistance” that LGen Leslie expects.


----------



## The Bread Guy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> It appears, to me that the report has been leaked to the media in an effort to circumvent the “resistance” that LGen Leslie expects.


It appears to have also been leaked (at least) to QMI Media as well....


> The Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces are top heavy with too many civilian bosses in Ottawa and need to shift resources to the front lines, according to a secret defence report.
> 
> Between 2004 and 2010, civilian hires at DND and the CF outpaced hires in the regular forces three to one, and while the number of sailors fell, staff at DND/CF headquarters in Ottawa ballooned by 38%.
> 
> But the government says those hires were necessary to backfill positions left vacant by Canada's heavy involvement in Afghanistan, "so that military members could focus their efforts on operational matters," wrote Jay Paxton, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay, in an e-mail Thursday.
> 
> The transformation report, authored by Gen. Andrew Leslie, was submitted in early July but has yet to be released publicly. *QMI Agency obtained a copy from a military source* ....


----------



## armyvern

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yes, branch containing multiple trades - thanks for that.
> 
> As for have the "Army be the one who decides", I never said that.  If you reread my sentence (although it is tinged with Army-speak) I advocated for the Army to maintain significant input and control over "Army logisitics" and the Navy and Air Force the same for their respective slices of the pie, as opposed to taking it away and consolidating it somewhere else independant of the services.



In my comment "Army being the one to decide", I was referring to the suggested notion that these schools should fall under Army (LFDTS I believe it was suggested) mangement ... the point being that you'd need to actually slice that purple pie (3 seperate and distinct merit lists) into 3 different entities with each enviornment then taking ownership of it's own purple people. If we don't do that, then purple management is required at the top as, right now, we have one merit list and serve in all three enviornments competing against each other.

As it is now, a Navy background Master Seaman suppy is no 1 on the merit list, then he gets his Petty Officers ... and may very well then find himself posted into a first line Army Unit where he has zero experience.


----------



## armyvern

MCG said:
			
		

> I assume this rant means you believe the one purple occupation that I identified within CTC is EME? ...



No. Not a rant and you know better.  :  It was simply an example I used from the post.

Nothing wrong with the Army taking control of it's purple people ... just split us out into our 3 enviornments and seperate our merit lists before doing so.

That's 3 times I've said that now. What I learned while serving and doing the enviro quals for each of the 3 distinct enviornments in relation to my trade (I have served in all 3) are quite distinct and seperate (just so you know); the Army has no monopoly for trg of us - nor does the Navy or the AF. Split us out into our three colours and then everything will be just peachy.

Have a great day.


----------



## OldSolduer

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Split us out into our three colours and then everything will be just peachy.
> 
> Have a great day.



So only three crayons required now?  ;D


----------



## CountDC

make it 4 crayons - purple for the purple trades! ;D


----------



## ArmyRick

Getting back to the stuff posted about general Leslie's report. What do people think? 

My own opinion is that HQ staff can have tendency to grow and justify their existence. I remember belonging to a company that was stood up with a temporary basis in mind (2 years), we started off with about 9 staff supervising and looking after 250 PAT/PAR. Within 1 year, we had reduced to about 120 or so and the staff grew to 15. By the time we had 80 troops, we had a coy HQ of about 17 and the OC said enough. I agree that HQ must be kept trim and tight. I have heard all the "reasoning" people have put forth for their existence in jobs that do not always support the main effort.

What is the main effort of the CF? It surely is not to administer the men and woman of the CF. I beleive it is the defence of Canada, and having a HQ that is oversized does not support the main effort. Not matter how important people may think their jobs are.

Imagine at a simpler level, having a 40 man platoon with 12 in the platoon HQ?


----------



## dangerboy

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Imagine at a simpler level, having a 40 man platoon with 12 in the platoon HQ?



I can easily imagine that:

- Pl Comd
- Pl 2IC
- Pl Signaller
- Weapons Det Comd
- #1 C6
- #2 C6
- #1 84
-# 2 84
 - LAV Driver
- LAV Gunner
- LAV Sgt
- Medic

I know I am being an ass. ;D


----------



## McG

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Nothing wrong with the Army taking control of it's purple people ... just split us out into our 3 enviornments and seperate our merit lists before doing so.


Okay.  On that clarification, I have no idea what this post is attempting to interject to my observation that Army schools are already capably training hard RCAF occupations.  Are you suggesting that CFSAL needs to be split into three environment specific schools?

Future WLEO are already being developed by the Army's training system in hard RCAF occupations - if this is possible, then CFSAL should be more than capable of doing it regardless of the higher HQ being joint, army, RCAF or RCN.  Splitting CFSAL would be wasteful of PY resources.



			
				ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Getting back to the stuff posted about general Leslie's report. What do people think?
> 
> My own opinion is that HQ staff can have tendency to grow and justify their existence. I remember belonging to a company that was stood up with a temporary basis in mind (2 years), we started off with about 9 staff supervising and looking after 250 PAT/PAR. Within 1 year, we had reduced to about 120 or so and the staff grew to 15. By the time we had 80 troops, we had a coy HQ of about 17 and the OC said enough. I agree that HQ must be kept trim and tight. I have heard all the "reasoning" people have put forth for their existence in jobs that do not always support the main effort.
> 
> What is the main effort of the CF? It surely is not to administer the men and woman of the CF. I beleive it is the defence of Canada, and having a HQ that is oversized does not support the main effort. Not matter how important people may think their jobs are.


You are bang-on about HQs having a self-preserving & expansionist nature.  There is work that is required wherever HQs exist, so we expand HQs to do this work that only exists because the HQ is there (ie - we could eliminate the work & corresponding PY requirement by eliminating the HQ).

Where organizations fill static institutional functions, we need to look at reducing the layers of command and bureaucracy in order to free PY resources and improve lines of communication.


----------



## Edward Campbell

One of the problems to which LGen Leslie alluded is the 'tasks' or programmes or policies imposed upon DND (and other government departments) which bring with them a requirement to report at a very high level which seems to automatically require a flag/general officer or a civilian EX with, of course, an appropriate staff of captains/colonels, commanders/lieutenant colonels and so on, including a bevy of ASs, sergeants and CRs.

We cannot tell the government (or the policy centre (Privy Council Office)) "F_ck off! Rude message follows," but we can do menial tasks with relatively small, low ranked staffs. (I suspect we would actually raise the morale of the flag/general officer corps if we fired a bunch of 'em and gave their 'jobs' to lieutenant commanders/majors.)

Another issue might be internal accountability. Audit is an important function but we you appear, to me, *over audit* out of a combination of fear and risk aversion. You need a good strong, central, audit function - probably in the DM's staff. It *will* produce embarrassing reports; but an embarrassing report need not be a career-ender and should not be so dreaded as to require one to have an 'in house' audit staff to find problems before the real auditors come to visit. My sense is that much (most?) audit, evaluation and validation functions in most HQs are 'defensive' - aimed at preventing embarrassment, rather than 'offensive' - aimed at improving the performance of the command or organization.


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> In my comment "Army being the one to decide", I was referring to the suggested notion that these schools should fall under Army (LFDTS I believe it was suggested) mangement ... the point being that you'd need to actually slice that purple pie (3 seperate and distinct merit lists) into 3 different entities with each enviornment then taking ownership of it's own purple people. If we don't do that, then purple management is required at the top as, right now, we have one merit list and serve in all three enviornments competing against each other.
> 
> As it is now, a Navy background Master Seaman suppy is no 1 on the merit list, then he gets his Petty Officers ... and may very well then find himself posted into a first line Army Unit where he has zero experience.



Ah, I misunderstood you.  Thanks for the clarification.  As for this:



			
				ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Split us out into our three colours and then everything will be just peachy.



That makes sense to me.  There is no reason why three distinct parts of a single trade (ie: Green Storemen, Light Blue Storemen and Dark Blue Storemen) can't be managed separately and handled through a single purple school.


----------



## Infanteer

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> My own opinion is that HQ staff can have tendency to grow and justify their existence.



Agreed.  There has to be a way of building some institutional discipline into our organization.  Parkinson and Brooke's Laws both apply here.  A "sneaky" get around, when you can't blatently expand your HQ, is to hire civilians and Class B reservists.

All in all, there is some real pressure being put on various organizations to make the right cuts, so I am confident that we are at least heading in the right direction.  Front line units and combat equipment have priority at this time.



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> One of the problems to which LGen Leslie alluded is the 'tasks' or programmes or policies imposed upon DND (and other government departments) which bring with them a requirement to report at a very high level which seems to automatically require a flag/general officer or a civilian EX with, of course, an appropriate staff of captains/colonels, commanders/lieutenant colonels and so on, including a bevy of ***, sergeants and CRs.



Employment equity, Official Languages, Access To Information/Privacy Act; these are a few that do require management.  If I'm not mistaken, civilians tend to fill a lot of these billets.  I don't think they take the lions share of the bloat though - I'd argue that bloat lies in growth in our core HQs.  Why have a staff branch of a Major and 2 Captains when you can have a LCol, 3 Majors (1 Class B), 6 Captains, 2 MWOs and 3 Civilians?  I'd like to see us objectively look at some of our internal processes and ask "is this necessary".

The arguement will be made that you need that additional manpower in your HQs with all the reports and returns demanded from higher HQ.  Sure.  Essentially, your staffers are committed to managing excel spreadsheets.  But is this information really necessary or is it, as a smart man told me, something that some Major in a higher HQ said "The Commander needs to know this!" only to hear "Yep, next slide please" at the briefing.  The process has to start from the top.


----------



## Journeyman

> OTTAWA— From Friday's Globe and Mail
> 
> This scathing assessment by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, who commanded the Canadian army during the Afghanistan war, arrives at a pivotal moment for the military.....


So essentially, he oversaw and was therefore directly responsible for major portions of the Army's HQ bloat, but now that he's out the door, "_you guys_ are all screwed up."   :


----------



## frank1515

They make it sound like he was the one Commanding troops. When newspapers say "Commander of the Army during the Afghanistan War" they should say "Commander responsible for lending (Force Generator) troops to Commander CEFCOM during the Afghanistan War". That would be more appropriate!  ;D


----------



## The Bread Guy

frank1515 said:
			
		

> They make it sound like he was the one Commanding troops. When newspapers say "Commander of the Army during the Afghanistan War" they should say "Commander responsible for lending (Force Generator) troops to Commander CEFCOM during the Afghanistan War". That would be more appropriate!  ;D


But sooooooooooooooooooooooooooo clunky and unsexy for the headline  ;D


----------



## frank1515

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> But sooooooooooooooooooooooooooo clunky and unsexy for the headline  ;D



Nevertheless, it's the truth!


----------



## OldSolduer

dangerboy said:
			
		

> I can easily imagine that:
> 
> - Pl Comd
> - Pl 2IC
> - Pl Signaller
> - Weapons Det Comd
> - #1 C6
> - #2 C6
> - #1 84
> -# 2 84
> - LAV Driver
> - LAV Gunner
> - LAV Sgt
> - Medic
> 
> I know I am being an ***. ;D



The Pl HQ is just that.....the Comd, Pl 2 I/C, LAV crew and Signaller.

The Weapons Det is commanded, correct me if I am wrong, by a Sgt....it is in reality a section of its own.


----------



## Good2Golf

I didn't see any mention of the critical lack of capacity in other Canadian government departments that exacerbated DND's inability to expend fully its allocated resources.  There was a dearth of experienced personnel across the Government, PWGCS, IC, etc... and this coupled with the demanding (not a bad thing, but an impact nonetheless) reporting and approval requirements made it incredibly difficult to cash out fully.  

One should also keep in mind that while $1 Billion sounds like a lot (and it is, of course), it is 'only' 4.8% of total budget, so one might consider that being given billions and billions of dollars, and being told you that by law you cannot overspend, and being given a rather constrictive set of policies and regulations to work within....expending 95.2% of one's budget is actually not too bad.  I also understand that the underspent amount was most often much less than the $1 Billion figure that LGen Leslie mentioned.

 :2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## The Bread Guy

One Two more media outlets gets the report:


> A major report from National Defence has identified ways to save the department $1 billion a year and calls for "dramatic changes" so the military can meet its future obligations.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie led a "transformation team" at the request of Defence Minister Peter MacKay that spent nearly a year studying ways to overhaul the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence to find efficiencies.
> 
> The group's Report on Transformation 2011 was completed in July but not made public. A copy of the report was obtained by CBC News.
> 
> The report says that for the military to meet the demands upon it, while living within its means and with balanced books, it has to carefully reallocate its resources.
> 
> Leslie calls for cuts to the bureaucratic side of the military's operations, including the possible elimination of thousands of jobs so that the people on the front lines have the support and equipment they need ....


Source:  CBC.ca, 19 Aug 11



> Bureaucrats tried to stymie a report by Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie that calls for deep cuts to civilian ranks at National Defence Headquarters, interfering in his study months before his still secret transformation document was finished.
> 
> "The team was directed to stop further work on the civilian structures in late November," says the report, parts of which were shared with Postmedia News on Friday.
> 
> Leslie was named Chief of Transformation in June 2010, after finishing his term as chief of land staff. Assisted by a team of military and civilian staff, he spent the last year authoring a report on how to make the Canadian Forces a leaner, meaner and more cost-effective organization.
> 
> But he began encountering resistance some six months before the tough report was finished.
> 
> Leslie writes that his team had only examined the top two layers of the civilian bureaucracy — the deputy minister and assistant deputy ministers — before the order to halt was given in November. The report does not specify who gave the order to stop examining the civilian side of the department.
> 
> "At that point we had only examined the senior levels — levels 1 and 2 — and had not yet had time to drill down below the level 2 (assistant deputy ministers)," the report says.
> 
> Leslie's team reported only to Deputy Minister Robert Fonberg and Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk. In his report, Leslie writes that his superior said NDHQ's civilian staff was none of his concern.
> 
> "We have been told that this will be addressed in the future by the upcoming development of institutional alignment options," the report says ....


Source:  Postmedia News, 19 Aug 11


----------



## ProudNewfoundlander

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/why-report-advocating-massive-military-cuts-will-be-a-hard-sell/article2135950/



> A major report that advocates streamlining the Canadian military by chopping headquarters staff sits in limbo, awaiting a champion to drive its recommendations home.
> 
> But with its author, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, leaving the military next month, that report’s future is very much in doubt.
> 
> On Aug. 3, Lt.-Gen. Leslie submitted his resignation to Gen. Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff.
> 
> “My military duty is complete,” wrote the former head of the army. He and his wife are currently on vacation in the Aegean. “On our return I have been invited to join a great Canadian corporation in the private sector,” Lt.-Gen. Leslie said in his letter.
> 
> He could not be reached for comment.
> 
> As Chief of Transformation, Lt.-Gen. Leslie was tasked by the Harper government with figuring out how the Canadian Forces could save money and prepare for future missions, even as it sought to replace aging air and naval fleets and as the government pushed for savings in order to eliminate the deficit.
> 
> He concluded the military could save $1-billion a year by trimming or redeploying 11,000 civilian, regular military and reserve personnel, mostly at National Defence headquarters.
> 
> But the report also contains dozens of complex recommendations that aim to streamline and merge operations. Sources who are not authorized to speak on behalf of the military say the document has received a cool reception from the senior ranks at the Canadian Forces and National Defence.
> 
> Alan Williams is a former assistant deputy minister of defence who created controversy when he testified last year that the government was wrong to proceed with the acquisition of a fleet of F-35 fighter jets without a competitive bidding process. He examined the report, which has been obtained by The Globe and Mail, Friday.
> 
> Its recommendations are “going to be a hard sell” within both the military and the government, he said. “There is always a tendency to status quo.”
> 
> Without a “champion,” as he put it, to push for the reforms, Mr. Williams predicted Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s report will join a long list of proposals to reform the military that have been quietly shelved.
> 
> “This will only get done if someone very senior says: Make it happen,” he added.
> 
> Is there a champion within the government itself? Defence Minister Peter MacKay was not available for comment. The minister’s spokesman, Jay Paxton, was non-committal.
> 
> “This government will use this report, and other tools, to better focus resources” and to meet the government’s deficit-reduction goals, he said.
> 
> As for Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s claim that defence headquarters had become overloaded with civilians and needed to be trimmed, Mr. Paxton said that the civilian side at National Defence had grown during the Afghan war to free up military personnel for front-line duties.
> 
> But just as “Canadians are tightening their belts” in difficult times, so too must all departments of government, including National Defence, he added.


----------



## Old Sweat

It seems to me that most of the reporting, and the analysis, has been incredibly shallow. A few commentators have noted that the use of contractors will be scaled back because of the change of roles in/withdrawal from Afghanistan. Not too many people have wondered if General Leslie has not taken aim at some of his favorite targets, the levithans of Startop. To my mind the only way savings in the numbers touted can be achieved is if a combination of the two is used along with judicious paring in other areas. Mind you, it would help if people at all levels could concentrate at what is important. Look how the reintroduction of the former service titles began to get mired down in calling cards and shoulder titles.

As one of the few members here who served in the old CFHQ, I recall that the merging of that headquarters with the DM's staff into NDHQ kicked off considerable bloat and empire building. I submit that this is a characteristic of organizations that are created to solve problems, real or imagined. The circa 1973 version resulted from a management study to resolve the issue of the MND receiving conflicting advice from the CF and the DND. The MND and I guess the PCO apparently were not comfortable with exercising executive authority to resolve issues and instead papered over the conflicts.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It seems to me that most of the reporting, and the analysis, has been incredibly shallow. A few commentators have noted that the use of contractors will be scaled back because of the change of roles in/withdrawal from Afghanistan. Not too many people have wondered if General Leslie has not taken aim at some of his favorite targets, the levithans of Startop. To my mind the only way savings in the numbers touted can be achieved is if a combination of the two is used along with judicious paring in other areas. Mind you, it would help if people at all levels could concentrate at what is important. Look how the reintroduction of the former service titles began to get mired down in calling cards and shoulder titles.
> 
> As one of the few members here who served in the old CFHQ, I recall that the merging of that headquarters with the DM's staff into NDHQ kicked off considerable bloat and empire building. I submit that this is a characteristic of organizations that are created to solve problems, real or imagined. The circa 1973 version resulted from a management study to resolve the issue of the MND receiving conflicting advice from the CF and the DND. _The MND_ and I guess the PCO apparently were _not comfortable with exercising executive authority to resolve issues and instead papered over the conflicts._




Bang on from where I sat, too. I didn't highlight PCO because I'm not sure what the Clerk (Gordon Robertson who, from what I understand, was not averse to exercising authority) thought - except that, even way back then the general mistrust of military _management_ was, evidently, growing. Dextraze was the CDS back then - I recall a lecture when we were at the staff college that both informed and troubled me. He explained that an inordinate amount of his time was spent with e.g. back-bench MPs who wanted DND to clear their cottage lots (maybe that (the QC Liberal caucus) where Raymond Lavigne (who was an MP, albeit much later) got his ideas) but Dextraze had a _Churchillian_ streak: he tried to interfere with his 'good ideas' where he had no technical competence and not much executive 'reason,' either.

Re: Ibbitson's article - I think that Alan Williams is right, no champion = no action. (Even a stopped clock had to be right twice a day, Williams does understand the bureaucracy.) That's why Leslie leaked it to (almost) everyone; he hopes there will be some public support which _might_ drive the MND to some action.

And, of course, 'Buzz' Nixon was riding high in those days and see here and here for more on the topic.

Finally: it is possible, even desirable, to impose a flat 15% across the board - every single office, every single rank and trade, civvie and military - cut to NDHQ and do less than 1.5% harm. Six months after a harsh, even draconian cut NDHQ will, in fact, work (if that's the right word) better. Don't worry about organization or anything else: just slash and then slash again, ruthlessly. The survivors will "re-org on the objective" and get own with the work that needs doing.


----------



## The Anti-Royal

"But with its author, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, *leaving the military next month*, that report’s future is very much in doubt."

Very nice.  After the poo is tossed . . .


----------



## Old Sweat

The devil is in the details of imposing a cut, especially at the higher levels. It can be done but it requires a bloody-binded b.st.rd to pull it off. Probably even better, it requires two of them, one military and one civilian. It also requires adult supervision to ensure cuts are applied uniformly. Well, that probably ain't going to happen.

Two Jadex stories, one good, one not so much. Against all sort of opposition he re-introduced the Junior NCO Course by grabbing then Col Don Holmes in the mess and telling him to do it. When Don asked him what he wanted in it, Jadex exploded and told him not to be so f...... stupid; they both knew what was in the Junior NCO Course and to get on with it. On the other hand, there was a helicopter crash in Petawawa in which one of the pilots lost his lower left arm. Jadex visited him in hospital and in response to his query, promised him that he could stay in the CF and keep on flying. The pilot was released medically. I don't have all the facts, and maybe the lad decided to pursue other options, but that has always bothered me. 

I agree that he tended to shoot from the hip far too often, especially in areas where there were long term implications. He authorized the re-introduction of Air Command based on an emotional appeal, not on a logical analysis. 

Back to the present, even a 15% cut in NDHQ will not produce the scale of savings proposed in the Leslie plan. This suggests that he was posturing or there is something we are not being told, or maybe his real objective was less, and he aimed high to hit low. Did anybody with some knowledge of the real cost figures do an independent check of his numbers? Hello, DAP.


----------



## Edward Campbell

As _Fibber Muldoon_ once said, "pink slips and running shoes" for masses of bureaucrats, grey suited and uniformed alike:






Source: The Globe and Mail[/i]


----------



## Dissident

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> This suggests that he was posturing or there is something we are not being told, or maybe his real objective was less, and he aimed high to hit low.



That was my thought when I saw the 1b figure on tv today. Leslie leaks the number (with or without the PMO's approval). Then when Harper slashes "only" $500 millions he still looks like a good guy for cutting only half of what even a military guy suggested.


----------



## Journeyman

NinerSix said:
			
		

> That was my thought when I saw the 1b figure on tv today. Leslie leaks the number (with or without the PMO's approval). Then when Harper slashes "only" $500 millions he still looks like a good guy for cutting only half of what even a military guy suggested.


Although the 'all things Harper = evil' crowd would respond with, "even the military says they could 'do without' $1B, but Harper the war-monger only cut $500M...taking food from the mouths of starving Toronto NDP-voters...."


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> One of the problems to which LGen Leslie alluded is the 'tasks' or programmes or policies imposed upon DND (and other government departments) which bring with them a requirement to report at a very high level which seems to automatically require a flag/general officer or a civilian EX with, of course, an appropriate staff of captains/colonels, commanders/lieutenant colonels and so on, including a bevy of ***, sergeants and CRs.
> 
> We cannot tell the government (or the policy centre (Privy Council Office)) "F_ck off! Rude message follows," but we can do menial tasks with relatively small, low ranked staffs. (I suspect we would actually raise the morale of the flag/general officer corps if we fired a bunch of 'em and gave their 'jobs' to lieutenant commanders/majors.)



Am I reading you right here ERC?  A contributing factor to the number of GOFOs is that our own civilian mandarins (and allied GOFOs) might get their noses bent out of shape if we sent a mere Sgt/Killick to brief them in?


----------



## The Bread Guy

NinerSix said:
			
		

> That was my thought when I saw the 1b figure on tv today. Leslie leaks the number *(with or without the PMO's approval)*.


We will hear VERY shortly (or we would have heard already) if PMO is _not_ pleased with this leak, which will also add to the tea leaf reading.


----------



## Kirkhill

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> The Pl HQ is just that.....the Comd, Pl 2 I/C, LAV crew and Signaller.
> 
> The Weapons Det is commanded, correct me if I am wrong, by a Sgt....it is in reality a section of its own.



Go you one better - Make the LAV the Wpns Dets veh.  When sans-LAVs the LAV crew belongs to the Wpns Det Comdr.

The Pl HQ is the Comd, 2 I/C and Signaller with Medic Attached.

HQ grabs space in available transport


----------



## McG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It seems to me that most of the reporting, and the analysis, has been incredibly shallow. A few commentators have noted that the use of contractors will be scaled back because of the change of roles in/withdrawal from Afghanistan. Not too many people have wondered if General Leslie has not taken aim at some of his favorite targets, the levithans of Startop. To my mind the only way savings in the numbers touted can be achieved is if a combination of the two is used along with judicious paring in other areas.


Amalgamation of .COMs, reduction (elimination) of superfluous intermediate HQs, reversing rank inflation, eliminating duplication of effort, streamlining processes (and reducing the pers in concert with this), and a number of other steps have been pointed to through the history of this thread.  

I have no doubt that LGen Leslie's $1B target can be achieved without lasting pain, and with an even larger resource bill freed for reinvestment within the actual working-end units of the CF (brigades, ships, wings and schools).



			
				NinerSix said:
			
		

> That was my thought when I saw the 1b figure on tv today. Leslie leaks the number (with or without the PMO's approval). Then when Harper slashes "only" $500 millions he still looks like a good guy for cutting only half of what even a military guy suggested.


I believe we have a bloated HQ structure - I believe there is a possibility that we could probably gain several dollars worth of improved effectiveness for each dollar of efficiency we save for the government up to the $1B target.  If I am right, then the government would not be doing us favours by falling short of the suggested cut.  However, the government could choose to make the full cut and then proudly boast of reinvesting half the savings back into greater operational capabilities for the CF.


----------



## HCA123

Has anyone actually seen the report posted anywhere on-line or is it just in the hands of select media outlets? I think it would be an interesting read - much better than reading highlights from CBC, Globe & Mail, etc.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Am I reading you right here ERC?  A contributing factor to the number of GOFOs is that our own civilian mandarins (and allied GOFOs) might get their noses bent out of shape if we sent a mere Sgt/Killick to brief them in?




Many years ago (early 1980s) I watched a position go from a civilian ENG 5, working for a LCol, to a director and then a director general (EX2) in less than six months - all based on the ranks and positions of the people in other departments and agencies with whom the incumbent was required to deal. I saw no concomitant increase in productivity - not from that individual and not from the half dozen new, extra people that every DG 'needs.' Another post (in NATO) was recommended, by the applicable staff in Ottawa, as a Col - it ended up being a MGen, again based on what 'allies' were doing. Don't even get me started on the UN and its agencies. If the job called for a village idiot we would send a GOFO ...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... oh, wait, maybe that's not such a good example.  :facepalm:


----------



## Old Sweat

MCG said:
			
		

> Amalgamation of .COMs, reduction (elimination) of superfluous intermediate HQs, reversing rank inflation, eliminating duplication of effort, streamlining processes (and reducing the pers in concert with this), and a number of other steps have been pointed to through the history of this thread.


I was referring to the reporting in the media and the lack of well thought out comments by the punditry.

Again, the devil is in the details. How do you reduce a function to its appropriate rank level and influence when the rest of the government is over ranked, over staffed and over the canal?

In my opinion, a number of the inefficiencies that bedevil the CF are the result of decisions made at the time of integration and unification. Edward may remember when the pers world was centralized. In those early days privates and equivalent had PERs every six months, for reasons that escaped me then and have yet to expose themselves to my few remaining brain cells. In the same way, the individual training system was designed to avoid over-training (and don't ask me how we got back for training people two up) while providing meaningful career progression. In doing so, we clear cut acres and acres of forest to generate the paper to document each and every stage in detail. Again, in the early days the recruit schools taught the St John's Ambulance First Aid course as the giant minds reasoned that a service member was far more likely to twist an ankle or inhale noxious fumes or get burned than suffer a wound in combat. Therefore major efficiencies could be achieved.


----------



## The Bread Guy

HCA123 said:
			
		

> Has anyone actually seen the report posted anywhere on-line or is it just in the hands of select media outlets? I think it would be an interesting read - much better than reading highlights from CBC, Globe & Mail, etc.


<pet peeve>
Funny how mainstream media generally* don't share information they've "obtained" unless they want readers/viewers to help do their homework (like here and here), isn't it?
</pet peeve>

* - There are a few exceptions, but few and far between (like here), even with information they've obtained via ATIP requests.


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Many years ago (early 1980s) I watched a position go from a civilian ENG 5, working for a LCol, to a director and then a director general (EX2) in less than six months - all based on the ranks and positions of the people in other departments and agencies with whom the incumbent was required to deal. I saw no concomitant increase in productivity - not from that individual and not from the half dozen new, extra people that every DG 'needs.' Another post (in NATO) was recommended, by the applicable staff in Ottawa, as a Col - it ended up being a MGen, again based on what 'allies' were doing. Don't even get me started on the UN and its agencies. If the job called for a village idiot we would send a GOFO ...
> .
> .
> .
> .
> .
> .
> .
> .
> .
> ... oh, wait, maybe that's not such a good example.  :facepalm:



I think you have the answer before you Argyll.  Every year there is a "Wild Card" appointment.  The person who does not meet any other criteria for promotion gets tasked as Lt-Gen IC Everything.  His function is to escort SMEs (Fd Offrs, Sr NCOS and the occasional Civvy) before various dignitaries and let them do the talking.........  

I detect a problem.  Isn't that the way the system works already?   

So how many business card presenters does the CF/DND need?


----------



## Dissident

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Although the 'all things Harper = evil' crowd would respond with, "even the military says they could 'do without' $1B, but Harper the war-monger only cut $500M...taking food from the mouths of starving Toronto NDP-voters...."



While I am far from being that cagey of a political commentator, I would venture that nothing will ever please the Harper=Evil crowd. Duh.

The rest of us, from right of center to full right want a smaller gov and will appreciate that DND should tighten its belt along with the other department. Harper will only been seen as doing what must be done. I, for one, will not fault him for it, especially if it is targeted at streamlining the HQ/bureaucracy.


----------



## Journeyman

NinerSix said:
			
		

> While I am far from being that cagey of a political commentator....


I assure you that I was merely pointing out the opposite side of that coin.

I would be ecstatic if both sides of this inevitable debate would simply spell out, _and justify_, its arguments.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I think you have the answer before you Argyll.  Every year there is a "Wild Card" appointment.  The person who does not meet any other criteria for promotion gets tasked as Lt-Gen IC Everything.  His function is to escort SMEs (Fd Offrs, Sr NCOS and the occasional Civvy) before various dignitaries and let them do the talking.........
> 
> I detect a problem.  Isn't that the way the system works already?
> 
> So how many business card presenters does the CF/DND need?



I have never noticed this.  Who is the Wild Card appointment in the CF right now?  How many (and which) of our current GOFO's are currently merely "business card presenters"?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Old, anecdotal 'evidence:' many years ago (1990s) a very senior CSS officer (the really smart guy, not the one who commanded the Army) told me a story that went something like this - "Every couple of years there is a newly minted one star about whom everyone says, "How in hell did he get on the list?" We all shake our heads and say, "oh well, maybe merit boards do have a sense of humour after all." We are then further surprised when about half of those guys become very good flag/general officers - proving that the 'senior management' in the CF may not be so dumb after all. We are even more surprised when some of the ones we don't think are any good are promoted even further - proving that 'senior management' is looking for something we cannot see." He then reminded me that both he and I had worked for one of the most intensely disliked senior officers in the system and, he suggested, "we both like and admire him. We know he's smart, fair and, usually, right - even, maybe especially, when he is going against the prevailing wisdom." Of course he was right - there are things that go on in _executive_ circles that are invisible or misunderstood by we mere mortals and some people have skills and knowledge that have not been apparent to most of their peers and subordinates.

Does that mean that 'senior management' doesn't make mistakes? that some GOFOs are little more than "business card presenters?" No. But the vast majority of GOFOs, in my personal experience, are smart, hard working, ambitious and sincerely interested in doing what's right for the CF and the country - and yes, there are certainly exceptions.

But that does not mean that:

1. The CF's officer corps is badly over ranked below LCdr/Maj and above Capt/Col - we have used rank to address compensation issues rather than redoing the CF/public service benchmarks (so that e.g. directors are Cdrs/LCols (EX1=Cdr/LCol)) and paying 2Lts and Lts what they're worth; or

2. The CF spends far too much time trying to avoid either embarrassing the minister (the embarrassment being defined by _twenty-something_ political staffers in his/her office) and/or embarrassing senior officers. It is was a _cottage industry_ in NDHQ - delaying important decisions while the "message" was massaged to suit this, that or the other agenda.


----------



## Kirkhill

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have never noticed this.  Who is the Wild Card appointment in the CF right now?  How many (and which) of our current GOFO's are currently merely "business card presenters"?



There is no Wild Card appointment right now that I know of.  I proposed, tongue-in-cheek, that there should be.
The working supposition was that many SMEs are buried in the ranks of the CF and that their institutional knowledge often only makes it to the head table through layers of intermediaries who only understand 80% of what they are told by the SMEs.  (80% is a number remembered from a conversation with some one who specialized in education).  Sgt SME tells Capt who tells Lt Col who tells Brigadier who tells LGen.  LGen, through no fault of his own, now understands 80% of 80% of 80% of 80% or 41% of what the Sgt tells the Capt.    Now the LGen briefs in the ADM or the Allied LGen who proceeds to understand 80% of what the LGen told them or 32% of what the Sgt SME told the Capt.  

A question is asked.

The Comms link is reversed.

The Sgt SME understands 32% of the ADM's question.  And says "Eh?" before responding with a nonsensical and confusing answer to a nonsensical and confusing question.

The matter under review dies.

How much simpler would it have been to walk Sgt SME up the hill and have her talk directly to the ADM / Allied LGen?

As to the number of "Business Card Presenters"  I note that when watching parliamentary and Senate committees that, on occasion, the person being quizzed (and arguably the smarter ones) will defer to SMEs that they have brought along to accompany them.

If there is an issue of rank equivalency then surely that can be dealt with by having a suitably ranked individual perform the introductions and let the SMEs (who need not be high ranking) answer, advise and counsel.

As to the question of the current numbers of "Business Card Presenters":  How many departmental heads bury their SMEs and take credit for the ideas that their departments generate - beyond the salutary "It was a team effort" when they pick up their medal?


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The working supposition was that many SMEs are buried in the ranks of the CF and that their institutional knowledge often only makes it to the head table through layers of intermediaries who only understand 80% of what they are told by the SMEs.  (80% is a number remembered from a conversation with some one who specialized in education).  Sgt SME tells Capt who tells Lt Col who tells Brigadier who tells LGen.  LGen, through no fault of his own, now understands 80% of 80% of 80% of 80% or 41% of what the Sgt tells the Capt.    Now the LGen briefs in the ADM or the Allied LGen who proceeds to understand 80% of what the LGen told them or 32% of what the Sgt SME told the Capt.



SME's are great - I used to be one.  However, there are limitations.  

The trouble is that there is a distinct difference between a specialist and a generalist (or an SME and a General if you will).  A specialist knows more and more about less and less until he knows everything about nothing.  A generalist knows less and less about more and more until they know nothing about everything.  As such, they need each other.  

The SME will have very little knowledge of anything beyond his specific sphere, and so his knowledge lacks context, and does not (and cannot) account for the interplay between his specific piece of detailed information and that of all the other SMEs.  That is why we need generalists - and Generals are supposed to be exactly that.  The most dangerous generals that I have encountered are those that cleave too closely to the things they learned as SMEs....

Having the Sgt brief the ADM / Allied LGen (why you chose those two as the pinnacle of the information flow in the CF is completely beyond me - I assume you mean "The Dude Whats in Charge and Can Make the Decision) would, in my not very humble opinion, be extremely counter-productive.  It would further entrench stove-pipes, lead to increased rice-bowling, and would ensure that we proceeded on multiple paths without ever conducting any synthesis.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

This is starting to make my head hurt. :stars:

It _seems_ (to me, anyhow) that we've gone from argeeing that there is bloat. To saying we should get rid of X% across the board, both civvie and military. To going into specific offices and saying "This person has to go".

Way too far into the weeds for our load station, IMHO.

However, that's just from an old MWO's outlook. APS (aluminum pot syndrome) and all.


----------



## Edward Campbell

As and aside, and to make matters worse or some readers: in the Canadian bureaucracy the _director_ is supposed to be the pinnacle of expertize in a specific subject _area_; directors are both experts and managers - directors general and above are expected to be, more and more, generalists and managers. Thus, in most non-technical departments, directors are EXs while in the more technical ones the directors will often be ENG-6s and equivalents (usually because they make more money than EX-1s) but director is the level of responsibility where technical expertize collides with departmental management. This is why I advocate for Cdr/LCol to be the most common rank for directors in NDHQ (although, if I had my way we would not use civil service titles in the defence staff): Cdr/LCol is our major unit command rank - the time when an officer gains 'full authority' which is the equivalent to the status of a civil service director. This would involve a wholesale review of military pay, for officers and other ranks.


----------



## Kirkhill

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> ....
> 
> Having the Sgt brief the ADM / Allied LGen (why you chose those two as the pinnacle of the information flow in the CF is completely beyond me .....



Me too.  Ranks, Appointments, Distinctions, Honorariums chosen at random .... Your assumption of my intent was correct.

And with that I will retire to my humble abode.


----------



## Good2Golf

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> As and aside, and to make matters worse or some readers: in the Canadian bureaucracy the _director_ is supposed to be the pinnacle of expertize in a specific subject _area_; directors are both experts and managers - directors general and above are expected to be, more and more, generalists and managers. Thus, in most non-technical departments, directors are EXs while in the more technical ones the directors will often be ENG-6s and equivalents (usually because they make more money than EX-1s) but *director is the level of responsibility where technical expertize collides with departmental management. This is why I advocate for Cdr/LCol to be the most common rank for directors in NDHQ* (although, if I had my way we would not use civil service titles in the defence staff): Cdr/LCol is our major unit command rank - the time when an officer gains 'full authority' which is the equivalent to the status of a civil service director. This would involve a wholesale review of military pay, for officers and other ranks.



Mr. Campbell, I would agree with you, given my experiences in NDHQ.  Colonels as directors often appeared that "little bit further" from the expertise, more towards the generalist...LCols were most often the "rubber hits the road" folks...it was their signatures, along with the ECS and the ADM that were on project charter documentation, not the Colonel director or BGen DG.

Regards
G2G


----------



## McG

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> As and aside, and to make matters worse or some readers: in the Canadian bureaucracy the _director_ is supposed to be the pinnacle of expertize in a specific subject _area_; directors are both experts and managers - directors general and above are expected to be, more and more, generalists and managers.     ... if I had my way we would not use civil service titles in the defence staff


I don't mind the PS titles - They are understood and clearly identify the incumbent is staff vice command.

As an alternative to rank-reducing all directors to Cdr/LCol, we could reduce several of the directors to lieutenant director (and with that the rank of Cdr/LCol).  Concurrently, some director-generals may be reduced to directors and various higher entities may also be downgraded to being DGs.  I suppose it is a semantics game, but the goal would be be break & realign the civilian-military rank equivalency in favour of reversing rank inflation.


----------



## Monsoon

MCG said:
			
		

> I don't mind the PS titles - They are understood and clearly identify the incumbent is staff vice command.
> 
> As an alternative to rank-reducing all directors to Cdr/LCol, we could reduce several of the directors to lieutenant director (and with that the rank of Cdr/LCol).  Concurrently, some director-generals may be reduced to directors and various higher entities may also be downgraded to being DGs.  I suppose it is a semantics game, but the goal would be be break & realign the civilian-military rank equivalency in favour of reversing rank inflation.


The problem there is that you end up running into the old "as a Deputy Director I have to go up against full Directors in other departments doing the same job" issue; also, is it reasonable that someone with a comparable level of responsibility in, say, Fisheries & Oceans, has a higher PS rank and pay than a similar position in the (much larger) DND? I think ERC's suggestion of revising the PS/military rank equivalence chart is the most sensible solution (I have a cousin in the PS with 10 years experience who's an EX1; it takes about twice as long for the CF to make a Cdr/LCol). However, since doing this involves essentially revising upwards the pay for pretty well all senior CF members, it ain't gonna happen IMHO.


----------



## blacktriangle

To the powers that be,

I'll speak for the lowly Jr NCM's for a second...at least those I know. 

Change whatever you want, we won't notice and things will still appear screwed up to us! Just don't mess with our pay.  Unless you are going to make it go up  :nod: (Just kidding TB, it's fine where it is...just don't drop it!)

Thanks!


----------



## OldSolduer

Spectrum said:
			
		

> To the powers that be,
> 
> I'll speak for the lowly Jr NCM's for a second...at least those I know.
> 
> Change whatever you want, we won't notice and things will still appear screwed up to us! Just don't mess with our pay.  Unless you are going to make it go up  :nod: (Just kidding TB, it's fine where it is...just don't drop it!)
> 
> Thanks!


I second that.

When questioned on a Bde Comd's inspection as to how much an 84 MM Karl G weighed, the Cpl stated: "WTF do care sir? You'll never have to carry it...."


----------



## Kirkhill

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> The problem there is that you end up running into the old "as a Deputy Director I have to go up against full Directors in other departments doing the same job" issue; also, is it reasonable that someone with a comparable level of responsibility in, say, Fisheries & Oceans, has a higher PS rank and pay than a similar position in the (much larger) DND? I think ERC's suggestion of revising the PS/military rank equivalence chart is the most sensible solution (I have a cousin in the PS with 10 years experience who's an EX1; it takes about twice as long for the CF to make a Cdr/LCol). However, since doing this involves essentially revising upwards the pay for pretty well all senior CF members, it ain't gonna happen IMHO.



Is it possible to sever Military Rank from PS Title and have CF members appointed to PS positions while they serve at NDHQ regardless of rank?  The military already makes the distinction between rank and appointment.  Bn COs by convention are LCols but the appointment can be held by lower ranks if circumstances require.  Accordingly a full NDHQ Business Card might read Major or LCol so and so, Acting Director of such and such...


----------



## Edward Campbell

Remember that NDHQ is a fully _integrated_ HQ; it is, simultaneously, the HQ of a major government department, DND, and the HQ of a separate entity, the CF. There are parts of NDHQ that have relatively little to do with the CF, _per se_ and where civil service mores and titles and everything else are most appropriate. There are (or there used to be) parts of NDHQ that have (had) little to do with the department, because they 'manage' purely military functions such as operations in progress. Much of the HQ is split - some of the work is military, some is departmental and the overlaps and (or were when I served) many and varied.

Splitting the HQ is _possible_ and some pretty smart people think it would be a very good idea. I'm not sure the result of a split HQ, two (three?) HQs, would be more cost effective or smaller.

I believe, as an outsider, that some (all?) of the "dot coms" could be rolled back into NDHQ and that substantial savings could be made there. I also believe that defence procurement could be radically overhauled and that hundreds and hundreds, maybe thousands of positions across government could be saved - and the process could be made to react more quickly.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Of course, as you can guess, I also believe in the tooth fairy!  :nod:


----------



## vonGarvin

Spectrum said:
			
		

> To the powers that be,
> 
> I'll speak for the lowly Jr NCM's for a second...at least those I know.
> 
> Change whatever you want, we won't notice and things will still appear screwed up to us! Just don't mess with our pay.  Unless you are going to make it go up  :nod: (Just kidding TB, it's fine where it is...just don't drop it!)
> 
> Thanks!



And this, for all intents and purposes, highlights the futility of this exercise.  We ought not to start at the top, and then decree what ought to be in the HQs, but instead, ought to start at the bottom, with the lowly rifleman and his lot in life, and what we (as Canadians) want him to be able to do.  He needs a uniform, he needs weapons, he need logistical support and he needs command support (among many other things). 

So, keeping in that in mind, together the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy make up the Canadian Armed Forces, and as such are instruments of force, and that force is meant deliberately to be deadly, and is to be wielded against our enemies as HM The Queen wishes, within the constraints of international law, and as advised by her ministers.

In short, it's all about the killing, and we ought to never forget that.  Ever.

_
(Edited for grammar)_


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Technoviking said:
			
		

> In short, it's all about the killing, and we ought to never forget that.  Ever.



I recently reminded the head HR manager for all DND Public Servants in the Prairie Region that everything she does must inexorably lead to the death of the Taliban.  She was......nonplussed.


----------



## old medic

Slash civilian staff at Defence HQ: report
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/08/21/slash-civilian-staff-at-defence-hq-report/

By Jeff Davis


> OTTAWA • Bureaucrats tried to stymie a report by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie that calls for deep cuts to civilian ranks at National Defence Headquarters, interfering in his study months before the still secret document was finished.
> 
> “The team was directed to stop further work on the civilian structures in late November,” says the report, parts of which were shared with Postmedia News on Friday.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Leslie was named chief of transformation in June 2010 after finishing his term as chief of land staff. Assisted by a team of military and civilian staff, he spent the last year preparing a report on how to make the Canadian Forces a leaner, meaner and more cost-effective organization.
> 
> But he began encountering resistance some six months before the tough report was finished.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Leslie writes that his team had only examined the top two layers of the civilian bureaucracy — the deputy minister and assistant deputy ministers — before the order to halt was given in November. The report does not specify who gave the order to stop examining the civilian side of the department.
> 
> “At that point we had only examined the senior levels — levels 1 and 2 — and had not yet had time to drill down below the level 2 (assistant deputy ministers),” the report says.
> 
> His team reported only to Deputy Minister Robert Fonberg and Chief of Defence Staff General Walter Natynczyk. In his report, Lt.-Gen. Leslie writes that his superior said NDHQ’s civilian staff was none of his concern.
> 
> His report has been circulating within the military for more than a month. Despite repeated requests, bureaucrats and political staff have refused to release the report to the public.
> 
> One of Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s 43 recommendations was to cut 3,500 civil-service jobs from the department, as well as 3,500 regular force positions at headquarters that “serve little purpose.”
> 
> John MacLennan, the national president of the Union of National Defence Employees, said Mr. Fonberg briefed union chiefs and told them staffing cuts were coming, but did not say how many positions would be eliminated.
> 
> Mr. MacLennan said the unions have not been consulted on the upcoming staffing cuts.
> 
> Even before the report was released, Lt.-Gen. Leslie writes, internal resistance to his recommendations was already crystallizing.
> 
> “[At] a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants … it became apparent the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo,” the report says.
> 
> “Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and probably never will be achieved on any significant change.”
> 
> Of the 28,000 civilians working for the department, union president Mr. MacLennan said, many — such as technicians and cooks — are essential. He said he expects cuts to focus on the mass of about 4,000 managers and desk jockeys at NDHQ.
> 
> “The bloating of the organization is the bureaucrats,” he said.
> 
> David Bercuson, director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, said cutting military bureaucracies is never easy.
> 
> “Militaries are inherently conservative bureaucracies and they don’t like change,” he said.
> 
> Mr. Bercuson said such cuts will need a strong minister, who isn’t afraid to “stand on the necks” of officials and force staffing cuts through.
> 
> He said he does not see Defence Minister Peter MacKay — who has not commented on the report — as taking the leadership required.
> 
> NDP defence critic Jack Harris called the revelations of bureaucratic growth in the report “shocking,” particularly given “massive failings” in areas such as procurement.
> 
> “It does echo some other complaints about the headquarters and the bureaucracy being bloated, and at the same time the people on the front line are being underserviced,” he said.
> 
> Mr. Harris said he has not received the report, and called on Mr. MacKay to release it “right away.”
> 
> He said it is wrong that services provided by the military — such as maritime search and rescue — are being downgraded while more and more bureaucrats are hired in Ottawa.
> 
> “That’s a bit of a shock when you see the bureaucracy itself increasing substantially when there is work that needs to be done is not being done,” he said.


----------



## dapaterson

Of note, the Globe and mail has acquired a copy of LGen Leslie's retirement letter.  According to the G&M,



> “My military duty is complete,” wrote the former head of the army. He and his wife are currently on vacation in the Aegean. “On our return I have been invited to join a great Canadian corporation in the private sector,” Lt.-Gen. Leslie said in his letter.
> 
> He could not be reached for comment.



http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/why-report-advocating-massive-military-cuts-will-be-a-hard-sell/article2135950/


and re:  "Why don't the media release the documents they receive" - DND is not yet workign with truly electronic documents; most are, rather, scans of hard copies.  Hard copies may have been annotated or may in some way indicate the original recipient - and no news agency wants to burn the source that provided them with a copy of such a document.


----------



## Good2Golf

Many folkd don't understand the "separate lives" of the CF and DND.  Minister MacKay oversees both.  General Natynczyk commands the CF.  DM Fonberg oversees DND.  

If LGen Leslie's Transformation report was a CF report, then there are two truisms: 1) it is not any of DM Fonberg's direct business; however 2) it should only include the CF and not address or make recommendations as to the civilian DND positions that do not fall directly within the CF chain-of-command.

That said, I believe you will never see Mr. Fonberg ever write a report saying he must cut thousands of civilian bureaucrats who by their very existence make him one of the top dog DMs around town.

 :2c:

G2G


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Has anyone, in recent history, at LGen Leslie's civilian counterpart level, ever written a report championing the slashing of uniformed CF personel at the same levels and equal positions as the DND civilians suggested by LGen Leslie's report?


----------



## The Bread Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> .... re:  "Why don't the media release the documents they receive" - DND is not yet workign with truly electronic documents; most are, rather, scans of hard copies.  Hard copies may have been annotated or may in some way indicate the original recipient - and no news agency wants to burn the source that provided them with a copy of such a document ....


True, but 
1)  this doesn't apply to ATIP documents they receive and write stories on, and 
2)  _any_ document can be sanitized re:  where it came from.

Edited to add:  I guess now that the title has been released, someone's going to ATIP it and maybe share it.


----------



## Edward Campbell

recceguy said:
			
		

> Has anyone, in recent history, at LGen Leslie's civilian counterpart level, ever written a report championing the slashing of uniformed CF personel at the same levels and equal positions as the DND civilians suggested by LGen Leslie's report?




I believe that Kevin Lynch, then DM of Industry, did, back in the early 1990s, about the time when Jocelyne Bourgon was Clerk of the Privy Council and when Jean Chrétien was considering how to tame the budget deficit. There was some cutting but not as deep as I think Lynch thought justifiable - Chrétien/Bourgon decided that downloading the deficit to AB, BC and ON was, politically, easier.

Additionally, during the *real  decades of darkness*, in the 1970s and '80s, there were substantial cuts to DND's civilian workforce - which were, at least, approved by the DM. My recollection is that DMs, not CDSs, recommended the steady, painful 'draw-down' of the CF, accompanied by concomitant cuts in DND's public service population - always keeping an agreed ratio of military to civilian personnel. Thus, when the CF was reduced from 120,000 to 100, 000 and then to 80,000 regulars the DND PS was reduced proportionately and 'in step.'


----------



## Old Sweat

Some, but perhaps not the majority, of the cuts to the civilian employees did indeed come about from force reductions, principally base closures. A look at a map showing commands and bases in the seventies and eighties, even into the nineties, would show lots of little stations as well as some bases that are no longer operating. Working across the country think Argentia, Shelburne, Summerside, Chatham, La Macaza, London, Gimli, Alsask, Calgary and Chilliwack for starters. Some might not have had that large a work force, while others did. Together they made a substantial number.


----------



## cavalryman

In all fairness, the pressure to reduce civilian numbers by a few thousand (3-4K, I believe) started last winter, well before LGen Leslie submitted his report. Trying to hire a civilian employee from outside the department is now extremely difficult if not next to impossible - pretty much the only permitted hires into the civilian ranks are from the Regular Force and Reservists on Cl B of 180 days or more.

That being said, does this mean the reductions of civilian staff will occur where they should?  No.  Attrition happens where it happens and if a necessary part of the civilian organisation finds itself short-staffed while a useless part is fat and happy, then that's life.  Considering that the civilian side has such things as an EX-1 Director of Diversity and Well-Being, further comment would be redundant.


----------



## dapaterson

... and the military has Colonel Director of Official Languages, a LCol Director of Human Rights and Diversity...

The management of DND/CF is marked by swings between draconian central interference in the day-to day, followed by hands-off, inmates running the asylum liberty.

The open and carefree Hillier days have ended and the institution is swinging back.


Of particular note: A significant portion of HQ growth that is suggested as excess would appear to be the Hillier "Transformation".  It is interesting that no one has gone to the rock to ask the Big Cod what he thinks - whether he agrees that HQs are now oversized and bloated.

(Edit because of my poor typing skills, now preserved forever by people quoting me)


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ... and the military has  Colonel Director of Official Landuaage, a LCol Director of Human Rights and Diversity...


See my previous post in this thread.  How on Earth do these two positions help the rifleman?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Technoviking said:
			
		

> See my previous post in this thread.  How on Earth do these two positions help the rifleman?


I can see them _broadly_ helping ensure rules are in place to make sure the rifleman doesn't get jerked around arbitrarily, but even then:
1)  the rest of the rules aren't enough?
2)  how many EXs/LCOLs does it take to do this?
3)  how many folks working _for_ how many EXs/LCOLs does it take to do this?
4)  how could that staff $ be better spent?
 :facepalm:



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> The management of DND/CF is marked by swings between draconian central interference in the day-to day, followed by hands-off, inmates running the asylum liberty.


Like the picture you paint.


----------



## Infanteer

Technoviking said:
			
		

> See my previous post in this thread.  How on Earth do these two positions help the rifleman?



It helps him kill the enemy in accordance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in either official language....


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It helps him kill the enemy in accordance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in either official language....



:rofl:


----------



## Haggis

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I recently reminded the head HR manager for all DND Public Servants in the Prairie Region that everything she does must inexorably lead to the death of the Taliban.  She was......nonplussed.



And you can see similar reactions amongst "public servants" at NDHQ - both military and civilian.


----------



## dapaterson

Technoviking said:
			
		

> See my previous post in this thread.  How on Earth do these two positions help the rifleman?



(1) They ensure we obey and respect the laws were are sworn to uphold.

(2) They provide tools and leverage to get us out of our self-defeating "anglo-saxon white males only" attitudes, and give use a more diverse CF, which enables mission success in diverse areas where we can leverage those experiences and language and cultural skills.


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (1) They ensure we obey and respect the laws were are sworn to uphold.
> 
> (2) They provide tools and leverage to get us out of our self-defeating "anglo-saxon white males only" attitudes, and give use a more diverse CF, which enables mission success in diverse areas where we can leverage those experiences and language and cultural skills.


re: 1.  That's what his or her section commander is for.
re: 2.  That's what his or her section commander is for.

re: both.  That's why we have a National Defence Act, Queen's Regulations and Orders.

Now, re: 2, please show me one iota of evidence that suggests that the CF needs a diversity?  It needs a common sense of purpose, irrespective of the background, culture or ethnicity of its members.


----------



## dapaterson

Technoviking said:
			
		

> re: 1.  That's what his or her section commander is for.
> re: 2.  That's what his or her section commander is for.
> 
> re: both.  That's why we have a National Defence Act, Queen's Regulations and Orders.
> 
> Now, re: 2, please show me one iota of evidence that suggests that the CF needs a diversity?  It needs a common sense of purpose, irrespective of the background, culture or ethnicity of its members.



Does it enhance a section's ability to interact with the locals if they have a native speaker integral, or is it preferable for them to rely on locally-engaged pers?  If we are engaging in COIN, I'd argue integral resources are a better fit than hired.


And re: QR&O:  Who writes them for the section commanders?  Do they magically appear from on high, carved into stone tablets?  Should we have non-military personnel write them all?  Or do we need military engagement, and have some military personnel spend enough time to understand and work with the system to understand our needs and influence that battle space?


----------



## OldSolduer

Technoviking said:
			
		

> In short, it's all about the killing, and we ought to never forget that.  Ever.
> 
> _
> (Edited for grammar)_



Amen mon ami.


----------



## vonGarvin

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Does it enhance a section's ability to interact with the locals if they have a native speaker integral, or is it preferable for them to rely on locally-engaged pers?  If we are engaging in COIN, I'd argue integral resources are a better fit than hired.


It helps if we have soldiers shooting centre of mass when required.  (By "shooting" I mean not just with their weapons, but also metaphorically shooting, as in engaging).  We don't need a frigging ADM (Multiculturalism) to do COIN.


			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> And re: QR&O:  Who writes them for the section commanders?  Do they magically appear from on high, carved into stone tablets?  Should we have non-military personnel write them all?  Or do we need military engagement, and have some military personnel spend enough time to understand and work with the system to understand our needs and influence that battle space?


We don't need a fucking Language Czar in our military, or a diversity dude, or whatever.  We need command direction, and yes, that ultimately comes from the civilians in DND, based on direction from the Government.
We have laws and orders and directives.  Those orders and directives enforced by commanders is all we need.  Yes, we need a certain level of bureaucracy, but if we have a fucking LCol whose job is "diversity", then we've jumped the shark on that.


My  :2c:


----------



## Infanteer

Well, we do need people to manage those programs.  Not because the NDA says so, but because other government legislation says so.  We can't just ignore things like the Official Languages Act or the Employment Equity Act that affect all government departments.

So you put someone in charge.  As these are pan-department programs that impact everyone to some extent, it should be someone with some seniority and experience.

As odious as that sounds to some, it is a necessity of Defence Management.

However, I find it a stretch to argue that the Employment Equity Act gives Infantry Sections an edge in foreign missions.  People don't join front line units because of some fluffy Government program.


----------



## McG

The problem A problem is that we have mandarins where we should have minions.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I have some sympathy for the Technoviking's position. In a long albeit undistinguished military career I learned very, very early on that orders not only *must* but *should* be obeyed and after a few reminders in the first few weeks of my career that lesson stayed firmly implanted in my mind.

I obeyed, without 'help' from anyone else, about 99.9% of the orders I ever received. I'm pretty sure I disobeyed a few because I never even knew they existed but, generally, when I disobeyed any order it was a conscious decisions and I knew why I was making it and I understood the potential consequences. I didn't like funny coloured ascots so I wore an olive drab cotton mesh scarf with my combat uniform; both the CO and the adjutant cast disapproving glances but neither chose to make an issue of it; years later we were faced with an order from on high that I thought was extremely ill conceived, in fact downright wrong. I left my office and went into the general work area where my deputy was getting people organized to obey the order and said, in a loud voice, something like "No need, Jacques; we only ever had one item of even remote interest and since I just shredded it, we need not waste everyone's time in a fruitless search for that which doesn't exist."

By the way, I do agree with promoting diversity and while I am not a fan of the whole _official languages_ industry I have done my bit to obey the laws because that's what good soldiers do - even when, as in the case of technical documentation (a molehill issue in the early 1980s), the rules promoted waste and inefficiency and  were counter-productive.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Technoviking's



I'm just impressed you took the time to make this....


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm just impressed you took the time to make this....




Me too! But surely he deserves the extra attention.


----------



## Journeyman

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ....years later we were faced with an order from on high that I thought was extremely ill conceived, in fact downright wrong.


I did however find a journal article, which I had photocopied earier but misplaced. I'd like to thank the entire CF (minus your shop, I guess    ) for downing tools that day to help me find that paper.  ;D


----------



## The Bread Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I'm just impressed you took the time to make this....


Especially when TV himself only did four colours


			
				Technoviking said:
			
		

> I, sir am not only "a" viking, I'm the *TECHNOVIKING*!


----------



## Edward Campbell

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Especially when TV himself only did four colours




Bloody idle youngsters.


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Especially when TV himself only did four colours



Ironic: nice 'rainbow effect'. Do the Village People have a Viking on staff now too?  ;D


----------



## 54/102 CEF

Its not the generals


Its an amazing number of officers above Capt to Col at Fort Fumble

Check Outlook on the Din

Search for Maj

Clip into the To box of the email

Then clip that list of addresses into Word and use search replace

Insert Bloat for Ottawa

What number comes up?

Repeat for LCDR

Repeat for Lcol/Cdr etc to Col/Capt

Gen Leslie is on to something







 author=ArmyRick link=topic=97262/post-984784#msg984784 date=1288138775]
I thought about it and figured I would start a new thread. Mods, if this belongs else where, please move it.

How many generals and Admirals can the CF function with at a minimum? Seriously food for thought. Looking at the LFC, here is my answer I have come up with.

1 x Major General command LFC (We are not that large of an army)
1 x BGen, deputy comd
4 x BGEn as comd LFWA, LFCA, SQFT and LFAA (I think this is appropriate move we made many years ago)
Combine LFDTS as a sub unit of CTC Gagetown and make the CTC Colonel also double hatted as LFDTS Comd
1 x Bgen, for overseas land operations (So like a swing eneral)

That puts my count at 7 generals. Anybody in the Air Force and navy want to counger up a similar figure for their services?

The fewer chiefs we have, the more warriors we could in theory employ.

Thoughts? Ideas? Agree or Disagree? Rotten Tomatoes pitched at my head? 
[/quote]


----------



## vonGarvin

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Well, we do need people to manage those programs.  Not because the NDA says so, but because other government legislation says so.  We can't just ignore things like the Official Languages Act or the Employment Equity Act that affect all government departments.
> 
> So you put someone in charge.  As these are pan-department programs that impact everyone to some extent, it should be someone with some seniority and experience.
> 
> As odious as that sounds to some, it is a necessity of Defence Management.
> 
> However, I find it a stretch to argue that the Employment Equity Act gives Infantry Sections an edge in foreign missions.  People don't join front line units because of some fluffy Government program.


Could someone from DND fill those positions, instead of a staff trained senior officer (and his staff)?
(and you're quite right.  Government policy must be followed, of course)


----------



## Old Sweat

David

I have been into the liquid fount of all knowledge, but who would you suggest instead of someone who struggled his or her way up through the system? How about your predecessor in Infantry U or some old plug like me?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Some of the latest (perceived?) intrigue, via the _Globe & Mail_:


> .... According to officials who spoke on condition they not be named because they are not authorized to speak on behalf of the military or the government, Chief of Defence Staff Walt Natynczyk forwarded the report to Defence Minister Peter MacKay without a recommendation when it was completed last month. That lack of an explicit endorsement is seen as evidence that General Natynczyk is not backing the report.
> 
> Not so, said Jay Paxton, spokesman for Mr. MacKay.
> 
> Both the minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff “are grateful with the efforts of the transformation team,” he said.
> 
> “This report supports *our look ahead* and helps us provide front-line troops with the tools they need to do the jobs asked of them.”
> 
> It is hardly surprising that Gen. Natynczyk would be privately cool to Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s report. Its main recommendations severely criticize the very organizational structure created by Gen. Natynczyk and Rick Hillier, the previous chief of the defence staff, describing it as filled with “administrative incoherence … stifling process, blurred authorities … (and) reluctance at all levels to accept managerial risk.”
> 
> Without Gen. Natynczyk’s strong endorsement, Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s report could be consigned to the scrap heap of failed proposals for military reform. However, sources also say the document, entitled Report on Transformation 2011, has generated considerable interest within the Prime Minister’s Office. ....


1)  Re:  the bit in yellow, the Ministers's spokesperson speaks for the Minister, not necessarily the CDS, so I read that as at least _some_ support.  
2)  If the PM and his team were unhappy about the leak, I think we would have pretty clearly heard about said unhappiness by now.  I haven't seen anything via the media, so I'm guessing no unhappiness at PMO.

My :2c:


----------



## The Bread Guy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> .... the Ministers's spokesperson speaks for the Minister, not necessarily the CDS, so I read that as at least _some_ support ....


And here's some of what the _Toronto Star_ says the CDS had to say:


> The head of the Canadian Forces is standing behind a report that calls $1-billion in savings by slashing military contractors, the size of the reserve force and civilians in the defence department.
> 
> Gen. Walt Natynczyk, the chief of the defence staff, said Thursday that the force has already started to reduce the number of full-time reserve force personnel and cut its reliance on civilians but some of the more substantial cuts require further study and approval from the Conservative government.
> 
> “It’s a big number,” he said of the $1 billion in administrative costs that could go on the chopping block.
> 
> “Of course I’m concerned, but indeed we’re all part of government.”
> 
> The proposed cuts put the ruling Conservatives in a politically difficult position. The party has branded itself as the steadfast supporter of Canada’s military and backed it with an ambitious 20-year-plan to re-equip the force.
> 
> Cuts to the defence budget are necessary to eliminate the federal deficit, but make the wrong cuts — or cut too deep — and the government risks plunging the military back into a financial funk, the likes of which have not been seen since the 1990s.
> 
> (....)
> 
> ....Natynczyk accepted little of the blame for the growth in the bureaucracy, both since 2009 when he took his current job or in previous positions at the top of Canada’s military hierarchy.
> 
> When the federal government cut the defence budget by 35% in 1994-95, Natynczyk said, among the many positions eliminated were those of military cooks and air force flight instructors. Their jobs were contracted out to private companies.
> 
> “We also hired more (contracted) folks in the past five years because of the operational tempo. We took a lot more of those military cooks and we sent them into operations,” he said.
> 
> “Now what we have to do is demonstrate the discipline and the rigour and go through all those contracts and say, ‘What don’t we need anymore?’ ”


----------



## The Bread Guy

I know this is going to be a surprise to many here  ;D but here's what CTV says Hillier had to say about the proposed Leslie report changes - highlights mine:


> .... Gen. Rick Hillier says the transformation report, written by Lt-Gen. Andrew Leslie in the months before his retirement last week, will compromise military effectiveness if put in place.
> 
> “You try to implement that report as it is and you destroy the Canadian military,” Hillier told CTV's Power Play on Tuesday. *“You simply can’t take that many people out of command and control functions.”*
> 
> (....)
> 
> “There are some areas where you can do some cuts and the Canadian Forces will have to pay a price, but to implement that report would not be wise,” Hillier said in the interview. “If you take a billion dollars out, you will lessen military operational capability.”
> 
> Hillier noted the Afghanistan mission has improved the public perception of the military in decade since 9-11. There is greater support to equip soldiers with the right equipment and support staff.
> 
> “It’s a different equation now. The government would be very well advised to walk slowly,” he warned ....


CTV.ca, 8 Sept 11


----------



## Infanteer

I'd be interested to see what Gen Hillier is specifically referring to in his critique.  The basic crux of LGen Leslie's report, contrary to what Hillier says, is correct in targeting HQ growth that is many times greater then "pointy end" growth.  Perhaps the solution isn't so much in consolidating HQs, as Leslie recommends, but rather in simply reducing HQs to previous manning levels (ie:  Brigades can go from 60 to 40).

This would take some careful review of what we ask HQ staffs to do; Leslie's report contains this, but I think this aspect may be lost in the furor over the organizational diagram....


----------



## a_majoor

dapaterson said:
			
		

> (1) They ensure we obey and respect the laws were are sworn to uphold.
> 
> (2) They provide tools and leverage to get us out of our self-defeating "anglo-saxon white males only" attitudes, and give use a more diverse CF, which enables mission success in diverse areas where we can leverage those experiences and language and cultural skills.



1) Agree with TV; 1 is the perview of the CoC (for the rifleman, that would be the Section Commander). We have a JAG office to deal with complex issues.

2) While this is an ideal, I simply don't have access to an infinite number of people with all the cultural awareness and languages needed. We could be deployed at short notice anywhere on Earth, and it is a crap shoot if the I have anyone in the section or platoon who knows the local language or dialect. Far better to hire or train people for the purpose. We have been very deficient in that regard, I never got any in depth language training for Cyprus, Bosnia or Afghanistan, and Infanteer has also pointed out that we have been there for a decade without training anyone to speak Pushtu or Dari. How dumb is that? (I also met a Sgt from Three Vandoo who complained they were sent to Haiti because they "spoke French", even though the French spoken in Haiti has little resemblance to French spoken anywhere else). Imagine if we suddenly have to deploy to North Korea when the regime collapses; how many Korean speakers are in your unit?

Short answer, "diversity" is no guarantee that you will have access to the skill sets you need in a different cultural environment.


----------



## dapaterson

Thucydides said:
			
		

> 1) Agree with TV; 1 is the perview of the CoC (for the rifleman, that would be the Section Commander). We have a JAG office to deal with complex issues.



Few, if any, section commanders, platoon commanders, company commanders or unit COs are experts in those fields.  Who provides the CoC with the knowledge and information they require?



> 2) While this is an ideal, I simply don't have access to an infinite number of people with all the cultural awareness and languages needed. We could be deployed at short notice anywhere on Earth, and it is a crap shoot if the I have anyone in the section or platoon who knows the local language or dialect. Far better to hire or train people for the purpose. We have been very deficient in that regard, I never got any in depth language training for Cyprus, Bosnia or Afghanistan, and Infanteer has also pointed out that we have been there for a decade without training anyone to speak Pushtu or Dari. How dumb is that? (I also met a Sgt from Three Vandoo who complained they were sent to Haiti because they "spoke French", even though the French spoken in Haiti has little resemblance to French spoken anywhere else). Imagine if we suddenly have to deploy to North Korea when the regime collapses; how many Korean speakers are in your unit?
> 
> *Short answer, "diversity" is no guarantee that you will have access to the skill sets you need in a different cultural environment.*



I agree fully.  on the other hand, an utter lack of diversity guarantees you will not, at the tactical, operational or strategic levels.  I also agree that we ahve been woefully deficient in providing langauge and cultural training.


----------



## OldSolduer

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I agree fully.  on the other hand, an utter lack of diversity guarantees you will not, at the tactical, operational or strategic levels.  I also agree that we ahve been woefully deficient in providing langauge and cultural training.


I've been saying that for a long time. I was interested in taking German language training only to be told "you can only take French in the CF."


----------



## The Bread Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I also agree that we ahve been woefully deficient in providing langauge and cultural training.


Agreed - and it's not as if it's not being done elsewhere to be used as a possible best practice:


> .... In December 2009 the advanced 'functional-level' Pashto language and cultural course reached its climax and the students took their final exams.
> 
> Run at the 40 Commando Royal Marines base in Taunton, the full-time, 40-week language course focused on speaking, reading, writing and culture.
> 
> (....)
> 
> At 40 Commando Royal Marines two courses are taught concurrently. Firstly, there is a ten-week course which has 14 students and aims to bring students up to a 'survival-level' of speaking and listening.
> 
> Secondly, there is a 40-week course which has eight students, six from 40 Commando Royal Marines and two from the Gurkhas. Students on this course aim to reach an advanced 'functional-level' in speaking and listening and a 'survival-level' in written ....


----------



## vonGarvin

Being "diverse" has fuck all to do with our operational effectiveness.  Full Stop.  It's a fucking waste of time, resources and energy to get a rainbow=effect on the parade square.  I could care less if my subordinates are Asian, European or African in descent.  All that matters to me is that they do their fucking jobs.


So, I don't give a flying fuck if all my subordinates are WASP, men, women, whatever.  To pretend to think that by being "different" we are "better" is to delude one's self.  That's why we tear people down as individuals and build them up as a team during transition from civlian life to military life.


My  :2c:, and pardon my excessive use of the Anglo-Saxon in my rant.


----------



## Haggis

dapaterson said:
			
		

> I also agree that we ahve been woefully deficient in providing langauge and cultural training.



Even in French, one of our federally mandated languages.   It's clear that there is a significant delta between French language training requirements/needs and schoolhouse capacity in the CF.


----------



## vonGarvin

Haggis said:
			
		

> Even in French, one of our federally mandated languages.   It's clear that there is a significant delta between French language training requirements/needs and schoolhouse capacity in the CF.


Agreed for both official languages, though I can only speak from personal experience and the frustration in attempting to get a formal French Language course for myself.  

True story: I did the placement test for a french course (my profile was close to expiring) and registered through my chain of command, only to be told that I was going to be required for training.  Ironically, my immediate superior was off on his French course shortely thereafter, during the "busy time" :


----------



## Blackadder1916

Thucydides said:
			
		

> . . . . . (I also met a Sgt from Three Vandoo who complained they were sent to Haiti because they "spoke French", even though the French spoken in Haiti has *little resemblance to French spoken anywhere else*). . . . . .



The same has sometimes been said about Quebec French.  A friend related a tale about when he was serving with the Vandoos in Germany (he was a medic at the time) and was with a group that were in France for some reason (commando course?).  He (a Newfoundlander) had acquired his French language skills on a CF course before his posting to the Vandoos.  While they were in France, they were in a restaurant one evening and the waitress was having difficulty in understanding what the Quebecois were saying - the Newfie had to translate their joual into "proper French".


----------



## Biggoals2bdone

^^^^^^^
In ref to Joual...it is considered low class french/hillbilly french and/or slang equivalent to ebonics or msn speak to english.

Quebec french IS proper french, when it is employed as it is taught in the books/manuals and established/accredited schools.  In said proper french we simply use different expressions from France, just as we here use different expressions then the lads in the UK.

The french you hear SOME people speak in Quebec that is all broken up is not Quebec french (see above).  Then again we also have that problem in the english language.  The english of say here vs USA or UK are FAR apart.

The other way around in regards to language courses is just as bad, I know plenty of people who are 100% french (born, raised, etc in Qc), never had any formal education in english, yet get posted to an english unit, and denied english courses, and expected to communicate and interact with other soldiers, even though they might only know 10 words.

Back to the Report, I would be curious also to see Gen. Hillier elaborate on what/how he would implement the report, because he  acknowledges that there is a need to make cuts somewhere


----------



## armyvern

Biggoals2bdone said:
			
		

> ^^^^^^^
> In ref to Joual...it is considered low class french/hillbilly french and/or slang equivalent to ebonics or msn speak to english.
> 
> *Quebec french IS proper french* (_IF_ you're from Quebec - others would argue the opposite ...  ), when it is employed as it is taught in the books/manuals and established/accredited schools.  In said proper french we simply use different expressions from France, just as we here use different expressions then the lads in the UK.
> 
> The french you hear SOME people speak in Quebec that is all broken up is not Quebec french (see above).  Then again we also have that problem in the english language.  The english of say here vs USA or UK are FAR apart.
> 
> The other way around in regards to language courses is just as bad, I know plenty of people who are 100% french (born, raised, etc in Qc), never had any formal education in english, yet get posted to an english unit, and denied english courses, and expected to communicate and interact with other soldiers, even though they might only know 10 words.
> 
> Back to the Report, I would be curious also to see Gen. Hillier elaborate on what/how he would implement the report, because he  acknowledges that there is a need to make cuts somewhere



My edits above ...

Interesting off-topic thoughts; above is not quite reflecting my own experience on the year long french course where our contracted instructor is/was Parisian. When we had those in our classroom speaking to us in French, she'd always make comments afterwards about how she "knew he was Acadian as I could understand him" or "couldn't understand speaker and their quebecquoise". 

I'd always heard the horror stories about Quebecers not being understood in France and my experience with the Parisian instructor mirrored such. I though each day was a very good day when I could understand a guest-speaker from Quebec as well as she could. Thank gawd we learned formal public service french on the course --- another completely different beast.


----------



## The Bread Guy

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> I'd always heard the horror stories about Quebecers not being understood in France and my experience with the Parisian instructor mirrored such.


9D, who is a Francophone born in Montreal, says when she speaks to people in France, they tell her she speaks the French of the peasant class of several hundred years ago (about the time they came over, I guess).  In some films produced in France she's seen, Quebec speakers are used to play peasants from that time.


----------



## Strike

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> 9D, who is a Francophone born in Montreal, says when she speaks to people in France, they tell her she speaks *the French of the peasant class of several hundred years ago* (about the time they came over, I guess).  In some films produced in France she's seen, Quebec speakers are used to play peasants from that time.



Which is why I've always maintained that Quebec French is closer to the original French than what the French across the pond speak.


----------



## dapaterson

Just be careful with your pronunciation if you're at the corner of St Laurent and Ste Catherine, looking for french fires, gravy & cheese curds.  A slight shift of emphasis on the final syllable and you could be directed to something else...


----------



## The Bread Guy

Reluctantly dragging this back to the original topic, here's the Defence Minister's take on the Leslie report - highlights mine:


> Since taking office in 2006, this Government's commitment to our Forces has included the resources and flexibility needed to ensure success in the UN-mandated, NATO-led combat mission to Afghanistan. More recently, Canadians gave our Government a strong mandate to strengthen the Canadian Forces; this means providing our troops with the necessary tools and equipment, while ensuring the military remains responsive, agile and efficient. Concurrently, our government will be taking a close look at spending right across government to identify the savings needed to eliminate the deficit: this includes the Department of National Defence.
> 
> The report by the former Chief of Transformation, LGen Andrew Leslie, and his team was submitted to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister for their review in July of this year. The Chief of Transformation was mandated to propose organizational changes that are appropriately balanced and aligned across the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. *This report will inform our approach to the Government's Deficit Reduction Action Plan, the results of which will be presented in Budget 2012.  At all times, support for our frontline troops will be our priority.*  These men and women put their lives on the line for Canada and we must do everything we can to ensure that resources are being allocated to support their effectiveness and safety.
> 
> The Transformation Report was an ambitious and complex undertaking, and the work of the Transformation Team will help define necessary organizational changes to prepare the Canadian Forces for the next decade.


Not really saying too much, one way or another - "we'll take this under advisement, and our priority will be the sharp end."


----------



## frank1515

CANFORGEN on Transformation just came out.


DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS, QUESTIONS HAVE BEGUN TO CIRCULATE REGARDING THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF CF TRANSFORMATION. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SPECULATIVE REPORTING AND CONJECTURE FUELLED BY THE UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF COPIES OF THE REPORT. TO AVOID CONFUSION, I WISH TO REINFORCE COMMANDER’S INTENT ON THIS TOPIC BY PROVIDING YOU WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHERE WE VE BEEN, WHERE WE ARE, AND WHERE I SEE US GOING WITH THE JOURNEY THAT IS TRANSFORMATION. 


THE CURRENT ROUND OF CF TRANSFORMATION EXTENDS UPON WORK INITIATED BY GENERAL HILLIER IN 2005, WHEN I WAS MYSELF APPOINTED CHIEF OF TRANSFORMATION. I CONTINUED THIS PROCESS AS CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE DEPUTY MINISTER, BY APPROACHING THE MINISTER IN 2010 FOR HIS APPROVAL TO STAND UP A TRANSFORMATION TEAM UNDER LGEN LESLIE. THOUGH MODEST IN SIZE, THIS COMBINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TEAM WAS STAFFED WITH STRONG TALENT AND A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANDATE: FIND WAYS OF REDUCING OVERHEAD TO INCREASE OPERATIONAL OUTPUT, INCREASE THE INTEGRATION OF OUR FORCE EMPLOYMENT, FORCE GENERATION, AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES, AND PROPOSE ALTERNATIVES TO STRENGTHEN HOW OUR HEADQUARTERS WORK. THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD HAD TO BE POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT IN A CHALLENGING FISCAL ENVIRONMENT, AND NEEDED TO REFLECT THE LEADERSHIP ROLE DEFENCE WILL PLAY IN SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO FIND EFFICIENCIES. FINALLY, THE MEASURES PROPOSED HAD TO ENABLE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES, NOT DIMINISH THEM. 


GIVEN THE EXPECTATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE, IT WAS CERTAIN THAT THE TRANSFORMATION TEAM WOULD PRODUCE A REPORT WITH NOVEL IDEAS AND TOUGH RECOMMENDATIONS. LGEN LESLIE S GROUP HAS DONE THEIR JOB WELL, AND I AM SATISFIED WITH THE RANGE, DETAIL, AND INNOVATIVENESS OF MANY OF THE IDEAS BROUGHT FORWARD. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO, AND WILL PUSH THE CF AND THE DEPARTMENT TO CONSIDER NEW WAYS OF WORKING, OF STRUCTURING ITSELF, AND OF PROVIDING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES TO CANADA. 


BUT THE FISCAL AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE RECOMMENDATIONS MUST BE ASSESSED AND IMPLEMENTED HAS BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLEX. AS WELL, WHILE THE REPORT WAS BEING PREPARED, NEW BUDGETARY REDUCTION TARGETS WERE ANNOUNCED AS PART OF THE GOVERNMENT S DEFICIT REDUCTION ACTION PLAN. TAKEN TOGETHER, THIS CREATES A DIFFICULT BACKDROP FOR INTERPRETING THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT. LACKING THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY SOUND BACKGROUND ANALYSIS, CAREFUL COORDINATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS TRANSFORMATION AND RESOURCE REDUCTION EFFORTS IS REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF VALUABLE INITIATIVES WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES TO EACH OTHER, AS MIGHT BE THE CASE IF INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED AS DECISIONS OR DIRECTION. 


TO PREVENT THIS FROM OCCURRING, A CONCERTED ANALYSIS HAS BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT WAS SUBMITTED, INVOLVING BOTH CF AND DND PERSONNEL. THE GOAL OF THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN TO DETERMINE WHICH ELEMENTS OF TRANSFORMATION ARE ALREADY BEING IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, WHICH OPTIONS MERIT IMPLEMENTATION IN CONCERT WITH THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACTION PLAN, AND WHICH OPTIONS HAVE SECOND AND THIRD-ORDER CONSEQUENCES THAT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL STUDY. THIS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS TAKES TIME, BUT ONLY WHEN IT IS COMPLETE WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO DECIDE AND COMMUNICATE WHICH PARTS OF THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED RIGHT AWAY, WHICH MUST BE PHASED IN OVER THE MEDIUM TERM, AND WHICH WILL BE DEFERRED. 


THE CF IS CURRENTLY MOVING THROUGH A PERIOD OF HIGH OPERATIONAL TEMPO. ALONG WITH THE TRANSITION OF THE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN, OUR NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO EFFORTS IN LIBYA, AND MANY OTHER MAJOR AND MINOR MISSIONS AND EXERCISES, REVIEW OF THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE DURING A PERIOD WHERE WE ARE TRYING TO GIVE THOSE OF OUR PEOPLE NOT DEPLOYED OR IN THE MIDDLE OF A POSTING A MUCH-NEEDED SUMMER BREAK WITH THEIR FAMILIES. 


NEVERTHELESS, THE PACE AND COMPLEXITY OF ONGOING OPERATIONS REMINDS US OF THE NEED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH TRANSFORMATION, AND TO SEARCH FOR NEW AND INNOVATIVE WAYS TO ENHANCE CF CAPABILITY. MY STANDING PRIORITIES FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE CF ARE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD: SUSTAIN THE ARMED FORCES OF TODAY, MODERNIZE THE FORCE OF TOMORROW, AND CARE FOR OUR PEOPLE, REGULAR AND RESERVE, CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE TEAM, AND OUR FAMILIES, INCLUDING THOSE WOUNDED IN OPERATIONS. 


IN THE CHALLENGING FINANCIAL CONDITIONS FACED BY OUR COUNTRY, OUR ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THESE PRIORITIES RESTS ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO FIND BETTER WAYS TO DELIVER DEFENCE CAPABILITY, WHILE ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND REDUCTIONS MANDATED BY THE GOVERNMENT. ALONG WITH SUCH INITIATIVES AS THE STRATEGIC REVIEW AND THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACTION PLAN, I REGARD THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT AS A KEY SOURCE OF IDEAS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REALIZING SAVINGS, WHILE REMAINING FIRMLY FOCUSSED ON OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. 


OVER THE NEXT MONTHS, THE ANALYSIS PROCESS WILL BEGIN TO SHOW WHERE AND HOW THE TRANSFORMATION REPORT CAN BE ALIGNED WITH OTHER ONGOING REVIEW EFFORTS. AS THIS OCCURS, DECISIONS TAKEN REGARDING TRANSFORMATION WILL BE COMMUNICATED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTION AND INFORMATION REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINES. NOT EVERYTHING THAT APPEARS IN THE REPORT CAN OR WILL BE DONE. AS THE TRANSFORMATION TEAM ITSELF NOTES, THOUGHTFUL AND METHODICAL REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS, IN CONCERT WITH THE PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS, IS AN ESSENTIAL FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITY. ACCORDINGLY, AS YOU READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE REPORT, I WOULD ASK YOU TO REVIEW THE RECOMMENDATIONS JUDICIOUSLY, KEEPING IN MIND THE POINTS I HAVE MADE ABOVE. 


IN CLOSE, I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE MY APPRECIATION AND SATISFACTION WITH THE HARD WORK OF THE TRANSFORMATION TEAM IN SUCCESSFULLY DESCRIBING MANY OF THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE CF, AND IN PROPOSING REMEDIAL MEASURES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CF AND DND, THROUGH TRANSFORMATION, TO LOOK WITHIN OUR ORGANIZATION WITH A CRITICAL EYE, TO FIND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT, AND TO EXPLORE NEW WAYS OF SUSTAINING AND ENHANCING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. 

Source: (DWAN) http://vcds.mil.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/canforgen/2011/164-11_e.asp


----------



## old medic

Christie Blatchford: Military has defied orders to increase army militia, report says
20 Sept 2011 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/09/21/christie-blatchford-military-has-defied-orders-to-increase-army-militia-report-says/

Canada’s bloated military bureaucracy has consistently defied explicit orders from government ministers and failed to increase the size of the army militia as directed.

The accusation is made in a scorching but carefully documented report done by pre-eminent military scholar Jack English for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and obtained in advance of its release Wednesday by only a few media outlets, including Postmedia.

It is a “wretched saga” that Mr. English describes as marked by “sandbagging, obstruction, futile wheel-spinning, and endlessly wasted staff effort.”

Using statements made by a series of defence ministers and recommendations either from special commissions or in government “White Papers” — all of them pledging or urging that the part-time militia or reserves, whose members most proudly call themselves citizen-soldiers, would grow — Mr. English shows how bureaucrats and leaders within the regular army, who saw any move to increase the militia as a threat, stubbornly stymied the wishes of their political masters.

In the result, the size of the militia remains virtually where it was more than a decade ago, when then-Liberal Defence Minister David Collenette first called for the number of part-time reservists to be increased to at least 18,500, a number adopted by his successors, Doug Young and Art Eggleton, the latter even imposing a deadline of March, 2006, for that promised increase.

But as of March last year, Mr. English says, the militia part-time head count remained stubbornly at about 16,500 – and that includes the reallocation of about 1,200 medical and communications reserves which weren’t part of the militia before, a move Mr. English calls “sleight of hand.”

As for the man publicly seen as the saviour of the forces, popular former Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier, Mr. English notes that while he “railed against the endless process of an already bloated headquarters,” Mr. Hillier “ended up leaving it larger and possibly more inefficient than ever.”

By 2003, National Defence Headquarters, or NDHQ as it’s called, had 5,600 uniformed personnel, about the same number of civilians and “an untold number of consultants” for a small regular force of 55,000, 20,000 civilians and 20,000 part-time reservists.

“The point in mentioning this,” Mr. English says, “is that National Defence Headquarters is today roughly as large as the entire militia.”

The former veteran, who has a masters in war studies from the Royal Military College in Kingston, a master’s in history from Duke University and a Ph.d from Queen’s University, paints a scenario that could have been taken from a script for Yes Minister, the old BBC sitcom about how an intransigent civil service regularly foiled the will of Parliament, or at least of Parliamentarians.

In Mr. English’s real-life example, functionaries fudged numbers, shifted units, counted bodies in novel ways or just plain stalled as they waited for the inevitable — and for them, the happy — day that ministers or even governments would change.

At one particular low point in 2009, Mr. English says, the Canadian Forces “in typical Byzantine, prevaricating gobbledygook” actually reported it couldn’t tell the government how many reservists it had because of difficulties counting numbers in its different information management systems.

The current Conservative government hardly emerges unscathed.

Contrary to various Liberal governments, where bureaucrats ignored or thwarted ministerial directives to grow the militia, the Conservatives simply reneged on their promise to increase militia strength by 10,000, Mr. English says, and then made matters worse by slashing reserve pay budgets in December of 2009.

And while “direct ministerial intervention” partially restored some of the pay cuts, “cancelled future training could not be resurrected.”

That minister, Peter MacKay, ordered the defence department to develop policies to prevent similar turmoil — chiefly, to stop militia pay cheques being used for other purposes — but as of February this year, Mr. English says, “the vice chief [of defence] reported he was still ‘working’ on the problem.… The matter of compliance still remains to be seen.”

How compliance, or following government orders, came to be an apparently voluntary matter in a country where the military is purportedly under civilian control makes for an astonishing and complicated story.

Mr. English’s report, formally entitled The Role of the Militia in Today’s Canadian Forces, is as much history lesson as indictment.

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Canada had about 33,700 citizen-soldiers, while the regular army fielded about 14,000, and though the numbers fluctuated over the years, it wasn’t until 1952 that regulars outnumbered reservists for the first time in history.

This was the era of the Cold War, when as Mr. English says, “growing fear of sudden nuclear attack appeared to increase the need for forces-in-being” over a militia, and in Canada, national survival training or civilian defence became the militia’s priority.

In the Sixties, as the preoccupation with national survival lessened, the government slashed militia strength and shortly thereafter shut down many rural and small-town armouries.

It is the armoury, where citizens come to “parade” and learn the profession of arms on their own time, on weeknights and weekends, which is the real heart of the militia and where the precious bonds between military and civilian communities are forged.

The militia has never recovered from the losses of those armouries and the deep cuts, Mr. English says, with its role changing to one of augmenting the regular army, providing individual officers and soldiers to fill vacancies.

Successive years saw the government deem peacekeeping as the forces’ chief priority, and then bilingualism.

The militia, Mr. English says, was all but forgotten until 1995, when then-defence minister Collenette appointed a special commission on restructuring the reserves.

Led by Brian Dickson, the former chief justice of Canada and a distinguished veteran of the Second World War, the commission urged that the reserves again become the basis for recruitment and training of an expanded army – for mobilization, in other words.

Large standing armies, as Mr. English says, can’t be economically sustained in peacetime: Until he or she is called to full-time duty, the reservist costs 80% less than the full-time soldier. The solution was a smaller regular army, using the reserves for what Mr. English calls a “rainy day” expansion if necessary.

The government endorsed the mobilization concept and even raised the paid ceiling, but “in reality, however, militia strength continued to drop,” hitting a low in 1998 of about 9,900 part-time reservists.

Though the mobilization role of the militia was as recently as 2002 endorsed, it nonetheless “was gradually and surreptitiously swept under the carpet by the regular force military establishment,” Mr. English says.

In the end, he concludes, “promised militia growth has been thwarted at every important turn.”

He says that while conditions of service for reservists have improved, “little progress has been made in increasing militia strength,” particularly in what’s called “numbers paraded” or those “on the armoury floor.”

While reservists are now used to plug the holes in the regular army’s units – this is why the militia made up about 20% on average of troops deployed to Afghanistan – there are too few leaders left in the armouries to train recruits.

Mr. English recommends the militia be increased to 45,000 part-time soldiers, the formation of several new militia units and that National Defence Headquarters be slashed, a move also recommended recently by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in his review of the Canadian Forces and by an independent commission in England, which this summer similarly urged the United Kingdom’s reserves be grown and given a broader role.

Such an expanded militia, with a solid “footprint” in towns across the country, would “create a true people’s army in which citizens who are inclined and able to serve their country in uniform would not be precluded from doing so,” Mr. English says.

“To not strengthen and reinforce the existing militia framework would be unwise as there is nothing more important for the army of a democracy than its link with its people.”


----------



## dapaterson

We don't need more Reserve units.  Expansion of the current strucutre?   Perhaps.  But more LCols commanding rump companies?  No.  An Army Reserve of 45 000 would be 75 units of 600.  We're over 140 units already.

Dr English is also a staunch defender of the old school "county regiment".  He would be a great supporter of the Royal Buckshot Fusiliers, all 17 of them, who in 1963 had one guy fly to Germany for a week.  His affection for buckles, bangles and baubles outstrips his desire for an effective Reserve Force.


----------



## Old Sweat

Jack is a smart guy. Sometimes however he damages the case he is trying to make by inflammatory language and/or dubious claims. I do wonder what is the aim of the exercise and if it takes into account the present security climate? If he is proposing a reserve force of 45,000, what will this do to the regular force? What about the equipment and accomodation bill? 

Hopefully the report will soon be available online for examination.


----------



## GAP

Too many bureaucrats, not enough troops

Paul Wells on the fierce resistance to Andrew Leslie’s plan to shift resources from Ottawa to the front lines
by Paul Wells on Friday, September 16, 2011 
Article Link

Why was a Canadian military with 65,000 men and women on active duty and 25,000 reservists sorely tested by the task of keeping 1,500 soldiers in the field in Afghanistan? Why are Arctic sovereignty patrols a strain on the same military? The way Andrew Leslie sees it, it’s because the Canadian Forces’ tail has grown bigger than its teeth.

“We have the same number, or slightly more people, in Ottawa that we have in the Royal Canadian Navy—20,000,” Leslie was saying the other day. By “Ottawa,” he meant the personnel working in command and support functions at National Defence headquarters, not far from Parliament Hill.

So that’s about as many people riding desks as the Canadian Forces has riding boats. “And we have a lot of coastline,” said Leslie, who until the first week of September was a lieutenant-general in the Canadian Forces. “And we have really busy ships’ crews.”

The same rough ratio of desk assignments to field deployments works for the army, too, Leslie told Maclean’s in his first in-depth interview since he retired from the military. “We’ve got almost as many people in Ottawa as we have in the regular-force deployable army.”

But what’s most worrisome, Leslie says, is the trend line. In the six years from 2004 to 2010, spending on the Canadian Forces’ command and support “tail” has grown four times as fast as spending on the deployable fighting “tooth.” So during a period of strong public support for Canada’s military, while the army was fighting a deadly and challenging war in Kandahar, headquarters staff grew four times as fast as the fighting force did.

That’s the philosophy behind the final act in Leslie’s 30-year military career: a blunt, ambitious “Report on Transformation” that advocates reassigning thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of spending from administrative and support roles to the battlefield.
More on link


----------



## Gasplug

I think I will reserve judgment until I read the report, but 45,000 reservists need a better role than "individual augments" to Reg Force units. 

Bring back Corps '86!!!!! Ha!

My  :2c:.

Gasplug


----------



## Monsoon

GAP said:
			
		

> Too many bureaucrats, not enough troops
> “We have the same number, or slightly more people, in Ottawa that we have in the Royal Canadian Navy—20,000,” Leslie was saying the other day. By “Ottawa,” he meant the personnel working in command and support functions at National Defence headquarters, not far from Parliament Hill.


Nice. The author of a "sweeping" and "comprehensive" report on how to structure the CF got the size of the RCN wrong by a factor of two. Yes, the error just goes to reinforce his point in this case (i.e. NDHQ is big), but you have to wonder how much of his report was the result of careful study when he'd get such a basic number so wrong.


----------



## Rifleman62

In today's security climate we need military ready to go immediately, Regular Force or i.e. National Guard fighter sqns type units.  Not a chance of this concept ever happening in Canada. We may need more part time military, but we do not need more Reserve "regiments". There is enough "armored recce regiments" in LFWA for a Corps. There are two infantry "regiments" in Winnipeg that are tactically grouped and are less than one company strength.

I have always wondered at the US educational system that makes their National Guards so much smarter than the Canadian reserves, as the Americans operate helicopters, fighters, cargo aircraft and various complex land equipments.

Push the Reg F out of NDHQ and replace with Reservists who parade one weekend a month and every Tuesday night. Probably the CF will be more efficient if less harassed.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Push the Reg F out of HDHQ and replace with Reservists who parade one weekend a month and every Tuesday night. Probably the CF will be more efficient if less harassed.


THEN who gets to tell who, "we're from HQ and we're here to help you"!  ;D


----------



## Jed

Get the Public Service DND civilians out of the CF in downtown Ottawa. Surely all the almost retired military folks can go to work in a uniform, reserve and regular, and do many, most, all of these jobs just as efficiently. Aggressively pursue remodeling the Reserves into actual deployable units aka the USA.

This is pretty simplistic but in my opinion this is what Canada needs to do if we want effective Armed Forces to serve our great country.

My  :2c:


----------



## dapaterson

Challenge is not in training operators; it's in training maintainers or contracting out maintenance capacity.  In the case of the Armd Corps, it's also in defining the role we want the Armd Res to perform.  First principle of war: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

Once we know what we're supposed to do, the rest is (relatively) easy.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Jed said:
			
		

> Aggressively pursue remodeling the Reserves into actual deployable units aka the USA.
> 
> This is pretty simplistic but in my opinion this is what Canada needs to do if we want effective Armed Forces to serve our great country.



Simple in theory, perhaps less so for the execution.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve
Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Procedures (PDF)



> Summary. This regulation defines Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve service obligations. It prescribes policies and procedures governing the various types of service obligations and participation requirements. There is a discussion on excused and unexcused absences and the policy on pregnancy. Finally, the regulation covers enforcement procedures regarding unsatisfactory participation.


----------



## Good2Golf

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Nice. The author of a "sweeping" and "comprehensive" report on how to structure the CF got the size of the RCN wrong by a factor of two. Yes, the error just goes to reinforce his point in this case (i.e. NDHQ is big), but you have to wonder how much of his report was the result of careful study when he'd get such a basic number so wrong.



RCN website says "The navy is composed of approximately 8,500 regular and 5,100 reserve sailors, along with 5,300 civilian personnel."

So 18,900 (which is a Reg/Res/Civ figure) seems pretty close to the 20,000 Reg/Res/Civ figure in the NCR, does it not?


Regards 
G2G


----------



## CountDC

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Push the Reg F out of NDHQ and replace with Reservists who parade one weekend a month and every Tuesday night. Probably the CF will be more efficient if less harassed.



and I would love to see that reservist do my job in that time period considering I put in overtime doing a job that used to be done by 2 people. Some jobs do need full time staff. Not a problem though if they aren't able to do it - it is only millions of dollars lost. 

No doubt there are positions that could be done away with but such a broad sweep would not help.  Reminds me of the argument some put out to put troops on the front line.  The suggestion was (and still is by some) to get rid of the RMS Clerks at NDHQ and replace them with cheaper civilian counterparts.  Problem with this?  When it comes time that you need someone to do a duty, work evening/weekend, stay late to type that letter/report that was put off until the last minute, etc etc or the civilians go on strike then what do you do?


----------



## Rifleman62

It was a Joke, CountDC!


----------



## CountDC

Jed said:
			
		

> Get the Public Service DND civilians out of the CF in downtown Ottawa. Surely all the almost retired military folks can go to work in a uniform, reserve and regular, and do many, most, all of these jobs just as efficiently.



You may be right about doing the jobs but what would the benefit be? An increased military, more reservist lost by the units, lost of corporate knowledge, increase cost (the military members cost more than their civilian counterparts) + you have a lot more moves to pay for.


Seems to be a number of people that want to get rid of one or another group.  All the different groups provide a part of the overall functioning and are important.  The solution is not to get rid of all the civilians/regular force/reservist.  Each position needs to be assessed, determined if actually needed and if so should it be civilian/regular force/reservist and what level/rank should they be. An other area that needs to be looked at is the "contracted".  Seems to be a large number of jobs being done by contracted SME's over a lenghty period that maybe could be done by a military member - after all a fair number of these SME's are retired military that are the experts because of their military experience.

NDHQ, including all the commands, needs a complete and comprehensive review of every position. To do a review otherwise does not do justice.  You need to be able to say these positions can be cut because the same task can/is done by this position. Some positions may even need to be upgraded, shifted (pick mine!!) or even new ones created.


----------



## CountDC

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> It was a Joke, CountDC!



on your part but it is not the first time I have heard something similar and they were being serious. I have heard every group targetted at some point.


----------



## Journeyman

CountDC said:
			
		

> I have heard every group targetted at some point.


In which case, there's no need for you to be particularly sensitive.


----------



## Jed

CountDC, I was just giving my broad brush opinion and was in no way targeting any group for future economic 'slicing and dicing'. It has taken many decades to evolve to the point we are now at wrt NDHQ, DND, Reserves, Reg Force make up. The evolution will continue.

My experience in all the various organizations, and with how people behave in general, have helped me to formulate my previously stated opinion as to what general direction the CF should be taking wrt employment of personnel.


----------



## McG

CountDC said:
			
		

> NDHQ, including all the commands, needs a complete and comprehensive review of every position. To do a review otherwise does not do justice.  You need to be able to say these positions can be cut because the same task can/is done by this position. Some positions may even need to be upgraded, shifted (pick mine!!) or even new ones created.


The examination must also look at whole organizations to determine their relevance.

I can step into a staff and validate that every position within that staff is critical to the staff performing its function.  However, if I look at that staff as a collective and at what it provides to the larger organization, then I could well determine that that staff is uneccessary.  All those position could be reinvested into operational forces.


----------



## Monsoon

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> RCN website says "The navy is composed of approximately 8,500 regular and 5,100 reserve sailors, along with 5,300 civilian personnel."
> 
> So 18,900 (which is a Reg/Res/Civ figure) seems pretty close to the 20,000 Reg/Res/Civ figure in the NCR, does it not?


Touche. I'm not sure most readers of the article would regard supporting civilian employees as being "in" the RCN, though, and comparing class "A" reservists (and I can tell you those numbers are far over current strength) to full-timers in Ottawa is a bit of a stretch. At the same time, a good chunk of those RCN civilians are based in Ottawa doing - gasp - HQ jobs. You could move them all from Ottawa to Halifax to make NDHQ smaller... but would the organization be any leaner?

The fixation on the number of positions in Ottawa is somewhat fatuous: up until 15 years ago we didn't have the three ECSs based there. Did moving MAR/AIR/LFCOM from Halifax/Winnipeg/St-Hubert make DND more or less efficient?


----------



## Rick Goebel

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Jack is a smart guy. Sometimes however he damages the case he is trying to make by inflammatory language and/or dubious claims. I do wonder what is the aim of the exercise and if it takes into account the present security climate? If he is proposing a reserve force of 45,000, what will this do to the regular force? What about the equipment and accomodation bill?
> 
> Hopefully the report will soon be available online for examination.



I haven't read it yet, but it is available at http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/SSWG-Paper-Jack-English-September-2011.pdf.


----------



## Michael OLeary

And to cut to the chase:



> RECOMMENDATIONS
> 
> 1. 	Immediately bring part-time Class A Militia strength up to the 18,500 target that was supposed to have been met in March 2006.
> 2. 	 Reaffirm the Militia role sanctioned by the Minister and promulgated by the CDS in 2002.
> 3.      Aim to increase total Class A strength to 45,000 with clearly defined home defence roles within a skeletonized Militia structure that would serve as a framework for further army expansion.
> 4. 	  Produce a “no cost” mobilization plan with a war establishment order of battle structure for expanding a skeletonized Militia in emergency. Unit manning and equipment in this planned structure would be restricted by position and item in peacetime.
> 5.       Restrict Class B service for Militia support only, with all reservists filling regular positions being paid at Class C rates out of the regular budget.
> 6. 	 Establish a separate Militia pay envelope and ensure it is used for Militia pay only.
> 7.       Give priority to deploying formed Militia sub-units – and eventually units – for overseas operations and establish a time-efficient through-put training system to accomplish this objective.



Detailed discussion of these points should probably take place here: Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves


----------



## CountDC

MCG said:
			
		

> The examination must also look at whole organizations to determine their relevance.
> 
> I can step into a staff and validate that every position within that staff is critical to the staff performing its function.  However, if I look at that staff as a collective and at what it provides to the larger organization, then I could well determine that that staff is uneccessary.  All those position could be reinvested into operational forces.



Agree fully. Would that not be part of a complete position review? To me that would not be just looking at the position and how it fits into the org it belongs to but how it fits into the CF completely.  Perhaps the CF would be better served if X posn at CLS was in Gagetown, X Posn at CMS was in Halifax and X Posn at CAS was with 1 CAD instead. Perhaps there is already a posn in NDHQ that is doing the same or almost exact same thing as a posn somewhere else and one of them could be removed. I am sure that a complete and honest review would find many positions that are not needed in NDHQ as I can not imagine that we need 20000 people for a force our size. If we do then I guess we are doing something really wrong.

One point I will bring into this - when people are tossing out numbers for what NDHQ was in the past and what it is now I wonder if they are taking into consideration such things as the HQs move to Ottawa (ie navy moved from Halifax to Ottawa)?


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## ArmyRick

I think MCG said it very well. We need to determine what organizations are most required down to least or not required and then like the head coach at try outs, make the cuts for the team.

Each element commander can take responsibility for deciding what needs to go within their own services.

Another side note, this is going to p*ss people off but firing away anyways. I know of a few office jockeys who have been riding desk WAY too long and are serving well (I mean WELL past their prime). Enough of this age 60 Compulsory release, it should be back down to 55 and if it were up to me, 50 unless your in a very position (CO or RSM or higher). For myself, age 50 is only 12 years away and I can pretty much tell ya, I love soldiering but I am not hanging on past then. Assuming I stick around until 50 (I highly doubt it being my knees have taken alot of abuse).

Soldiering, be it infantry, artillery, logistics or what have you, is a young man's game. I can hear alot of people hounding about me about the expiriences and qualifications, etc, etc. Where their is a will, there is a way. 

As for the broom sweeping through and cleaning the excess out of Ottawa, you need a bulldog-ish take no garbage leader to do that. Seriously, everybody there will justify their existence as being critical. Apply integrity and decide if your really needed/your section is needed/your HQ is needed/etc. 

I was part of of an organization that had to be stood down, true enough we could have argued the need for our existence but their has to be a MAIN effort. That main effort must receive a lions share of the resources.

Is the main effort of the CF to sustain and potentially grow its HQ?

My opinions, fire away (with logic please), I may fire back.


----------



## Pusser

The trouble with exercises like this is that it is sometimes too easy to cut positions or organizations that we think add little value overall.  Unfortunately, seldom have I seen a comprehensive analysis done.  What it usually boils down to is the current head honcho (who rarely has to actually live with the results of what he does) paring the organization down by what he thinks is unimportant.  HQs are a favourite target.  We have to remember that rarely is a position established without a reason.  Therefore, it is only logical that we need to ensure that the original reasoning for establishing that position no longer exists before we eliminate it.  Too many times have I seen a situation where something is cut and the dividends are claimed before anyone has a chance to examine it.   The result is usually a loss of capability and tremendous headaches.  What use is cutting the "tail" and transferring assets to the "tooth," if the larger tooth now requires more support from the tail that is no longer there?

Headquarters form a vital function in supporting operations.  Cutting them does not improve the situation.  Staff functions still need to be done and downloading them to individual units causes chaos as standards diverge.  Centralization helps maintain consistency.


----------



## McG

CountDC said:
			
		

> Agree fully. Would that not be part of a complete position review?


Conceivably - it means the review needs to encompas both the big-hand and small-hand examinations.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

I fear that we will get this wrong.  Positions are inevitably linked to process.  What we really need to do is review processes and ensure that all of them are necessary - perhaps we can accept just the tiniest bit of risk here and there, and reduce processes designed to obliterate risk at all levels.  Once we do that, we will find we are awash in personnel....

Instead, we will shave various ice cubes, and then try and reduce processes due to a lack of manning.  The analysis of those processes will be difficult to do because we will have already shaved off much of the horsepower needed to do a true analysis of risk and its attendant processes.....

Methinks that it just might be time for a true first principle review at Levels 0 and 1....

<<Edited for truly egregious grammatical error, with thanks to JMan>>


----------



## McG

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I fear that we will get this wrong.


I fear you are right.  I suppose we choose the path of "shaving the ice cube" because it is easier than the detailed review that is really required.  I also suppose it is because many HQs (I suspect it is the staffs more than the commanders) don't want to upset subordinate organizations by suggesting all may not be equal in terms of needs and surplusses.  ie. It does not matter if one unit is robust & comfortable with a given resource while others are lean & struggling, all will be cut equally on that resource because that is _fair_ and we would not want to upset people by doing what is institutionally best.

10% from everywhere is the lazy approach.


----------



## Infanteer

Precisely.

Why does an Area HQ G-whatever shop have the manpower it does?  Because of a host of functions it is "required" to do - track this, authorize that, monitor this and that.  These things eat up manpower and staff hours.

Go back to the principle purpose of the staff to support the Commander in the exercise of command.  Does the commander of LFXA really need to know all these things that his GX tracks?  Or are these the things that the Comd says "next slide" to during his update brief?

There is probably a bit of a cultural thing at play - we need to accept "I will find out for you" as a reasonable answer to many uncommon questions instead of devoting a staff officer to track things that don't require immediate answers on a massive excel spreadsheet that is circulated amongst formations to upkeep.

Of course, cutting 10% from a staff without going through the process to identify this stuff will just leave the "required" stuff to be done (even though it doesn't really have to be) with less manpower.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

..and finally this pinhead reads something in this thread I actually get. 

Right from the start I have thought this one concept has been missing in almost all of the ideas presented, less manpower means less taskings completed................the end.

Somebody, at some level, is just going to have to learn to live with that or this is just a nice song and dance.


----------



## ArmyRick

Sad thing though, imagine the "justifying" of not so required positions and their manning levels, meanwhile somewhere its gonna hurt to "shave the ice cube" and what happens there? The commander accepts the decision to reduce or cut and gives the bad news to his troops/staff.

Some will not want to do the same/more with less. In some cases, these cuts could easily be made.

I also agree, an honest analysis needs to be done and the manning/staff positions needs to be decided by a commander who will not forget to keep the main effort units first.

In someways its too bad that some civilian companies get this one right. Imagine if an industry had 80 management positions and 80 ground level workers? Bankruptcy! Or far less profits at least. I do realize that yes civilian companies and the military are too far different beast, but maybe we can learn something from them on what "upper levels" of staff need to be reduced/cut. Just a thought, thats all.


----------



## Edward Campbell

It reminds me, in a way, of a lesson I learned from a very fine boss, way back when. I recall that we were discussing the value of his education at the Royal Military College. "Time and risk management," he said, "is the most important thing I learned." There was, he explained, never - not once in four years, enough time to do everything that was expected so, quickly, he learned how to manage (budget) his time and, also, how to assess and manage risks. It was a skill he had when he was commissioned but which I, with two or three "pips" on my shoulder, was still learning. 

Shortly after that I was posted as a "staff learner" to a small formation HQ - small in terms of number of staff officers. My experience there rather mirrored my former OC's at RMC: there was too much to do and not, in anyone's imagination, enough time to do it all. One (me) had to learn to assess and take risks - not to slough off anything but, simply, to give _x_ a lower priority than _y_ and accept the _risk_ that I might have made a mistake.

I made mistakes - lots of 'em over 35+ years. Luckily, for the CF, most of my mistakes were minor - errors from which the 'system' could recover without much difficulty. Luckily, for me, most of my leaders were just that, leaders (rather than just being managers) and they were more interested in helping me to improve myself - and thereby improve the overall effectiveness of the CF - than they were in covering their own arses by hanging me out to dry for this, that or the other error.

Good leaders let the staff manage - sometimes just manage as best they can with the resources available.


----------



## GAP

there's a huge divide in todays generation in how they decide need & want.


----------



## Pusser

The best example of BS micromanagement and wasted staff effort is something that happened to me a few years ago.  Some staff weinie (I'm biting my tongue right now and not saying what I really think the A**HAT should be called) at HQ decided he/she wanted to look good and so created a report to be shown as a slide during the weekly commander's brief.  This report required input from each ship in the Formation.  In the typical fashion in which we now work, the "requirement to report" came through the "tech net" (i.e. bypassing the chain of command).  One of the elements of the report was a statement of the number of days rations held on board the ship.  I protested for the following reasons:

1)  providing the information required manpower I felt I didn't have;

2)  the information was perishable.  I had to have it in by Wednesday, so some junior staff weinie could collate it and make the Powerpoint presentation for Friday.  By the time the information was presented it was most likely inaccurate because people had eaten in the meantime and I had often embarked more groceries by then;

3)  I was confident that the Commander simply said, "next slide" when it came up;

4)  The information was of no use.  The supposed purpose of this report was so the Commander could make deployment decisions, based on ships' readiness.  However, I argued that he would make that decision based on engineering state, weapons suites, etc, not the amount of potatos  in the vegetable locker.  Besides, there was no way that the ship would ever deploy faster than I could fill the storerooms.

All in all, the report was a pointless waste of time and I refused to cooperate, partially based on the fact that the "task" was not sent to me by the chain of command.  Unfortunately, this approach backfired on me and the CO was livid that a slide at HQ was being presented with "No Report" beside our ship's name.  I should also point out that I had informed my chain of command what I thought about all this, but the XO let me dangle on that one (i.e didn't stick up for me during that pleasant conversation).  In the end, I ended up tasking someone to make sure the information was passed to HQ, but I'm still bitter about it.  If any process ever needed cutting this was it.  One reason I can see for the bloating of staff is the growth of useless reporting requirements.

Before anyone pipes in to say that Days of Supply for rations is vital operational information that commanders need, I have to specify that I agree with that when a ship is at sea.  At sea, a commander needs to know how much food he has so he can plan for replenishment and the like.  However, in that scenario, the information needs to be current ( in fact, that was reported daily).  For a ship alongside in homeport though, a weekly report is pointless, especially if the brief doesn't happen for a few days afterwards, and like I said before, bringing the ship up to 100% is a matter of a few phone calls and the time it takes to physically embark it.


----------



## Infanteer

Pusser said:
			
		

> One reason I can see for the bloating of staff is the growth of useless reporting requirements.



I'd say one of the main reasons.  I see it every day.  Different staff branches of the Land Army Staff send out spreadsheets which snowball downward - by the time they hit the units, an Adjutant is stuck with a dozen or so things with various levels of information requirements and return dates.


----------



## Old Sweat

And how do these various reports and returns help the CLS run the army? If the Souris River is flooding, does he check the number of rubber boots issued to various units across the army, or does he say "I guess the Patricias and the Gunners in Shilo will be piling sand bags pretty soon?" And do the loggies nod their pointy little heads and continue to stock pile the sand bags they  had organized because Manitoba floods every Spring?


----------



## GAP

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> And how do these various reports and returns help the CLS run the army? If the Souris River is flooding, does he check the number of rubber boots issued to various units across the army, or does he say "I guess the Patricias and the Gunners in Shilo will be piling sand bags pretty soon?" And do the loggies nod their pointy little heads and continue to stock pile the sand bags they  had organized because Manitoba floods every Spring?



Yeah......but that's the Red River....not the Assiniboine....for the Assiniboine you need to know about the rubber boots......don'tcha?


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## ArmyRick

The dreaded Microsoft spread sheet is a useful tool in the right hands and a weapon that creates unnecessary work in the hands of others. 

I do remember belonging to an organization which had a low leadership to troop ratio (Not usually heard of I guess) and the boss wanted a document available to give him a snap shot of the coy status at the time. 

The acting CSM (will not name him) created this ridiculous spread sheet that included way too much information (to the point the commander was having trouble getting a clear picture of what was going on) and the worse of it, he wanted all 4 of us platoon WOs to use the same document (Imagine waiting an hour or two every day to have your turn?). Eventually the document was at least broken down by platoon but I never did see how this document helped the OC or the CO make critical decisions, but as I was told by the CSM, the info was available at any time for the CoC to access. I didn't agree with it but supported it as required.

I thought I was told that monitor mass was supposed to replace all spread sheets in official use? Or did I not understand that point correctly?
I used my own spread sheets when I was a CQMS, but I and I alone updated the damn thing (I didn't let my subordinates monkey with it). I also had sole control of it and in that regard, it was useful. I knew at all times where C7 # XXXX was or when C6 # XXXX was sent in for repair. 

I like what was said earlier. Their is only so much critical data a commander should need at the snap of a finger, the rest should be something that should be researched when and only when required. This would ease an unnecessary burden and from the sounds of it, wasteful staff positions.


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## Old Sweat

The following oped piece from the Chronicle-Herald is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act. The author argues, well, I am not quite sure what he is trying to say, other than that the Coms are a good thing. He does say that rather than cutting positions, they should be transferred to sharp end positions. About the only saving he can identify is to transfer MP training to the RCMP Depot, but even that seems more than a little half-baked. 

   
Transformation report out of step with needs of Canada’s military 

By TIM DUNNE 
Sat, Oct 1 - 4:55 AM 


Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, DND’s outgoing Chief of Transformation, submitted his Report on Transformation 2011 at an interesting nexus: There are recurring fiscal crises in the U.S. since the failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; several European nations are embroiled in their own financial maelstroms arising from sovereign debt crises; Canada’s wisdom in averting previous financial problems may not save us from looming difficulties brought on by the troubled nations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the Canadian Forces have finished their combat mission in Kandahar to undertake a training assignment in Kabul. 

The Canadian government has wisely decided to cut the costs of government by directing all federal departments to identify savings of five to 10 per cent.

Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s mandate was to identify economies totalling $1 billion to meet the federal government’s direction. He takes aim at retired General Rick Hillier’s transformative restructuring of the former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff organization into four constituent components in February 2006:

•Canada Command, to focus on defence of Canada and assistance to provinces and territories;

•Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, to plan and conduct Canada’s military operations, from humanitarian and peace support to combat;

•Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, to act as Canada’s high-readiness, quick-reaction force; 

•Canadian Operations Support Command, to deliver high-level operational support to the Canadian Forces at home and internationally.

He writes that these separate commands draw people away from the navy, army and air force into these structures, making the Hillier-model headquarters bloated and inefficient. He emphasizes the need to consolidate these headquarters into a single entity that would, in effect, "de-structure" Hillier’s work.

Lt.-Gen. Leslie neglects to take into account that in January 2010, under this "bloated and inefficient" headquarters system, the Canadian Forces concurrently conducted:

•Operation PODIUM, support to the Vancouver Olympics;

•Operation HESTIA, the humanitarian assistance operation in Haiti following its devastating earthquake;

•Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, where routinely 2,500 were deployed, 2,500 were preparing to deploy and 2,500 just returned; and

•Planning for the G-8 and G-20 summits in Ontario.

According to several senior Canadian Forces representatives, our military would never have been able to achieve these high levels of performance prior to Hillier’s transformation.

The general’s transformation organization discovered a 46 per cent increase in military and civilian headquarters personnel from 2004 to 2010, not including "thousands of contractors, consultants and professional services people … needed to manage the increased volume of process and work." These contractors cost the Defence Department and the Forces approximately $2.7 billion in 2010 alone, which, the general notes, should be reduced by 30 per cent over the next several years. 

He identified that 9,000 reservists are employed full time, and that 50 per cent should be demobilized to return to their former part-time service with their reserve units. Cost savings could also come from reducing the number of military and civilian personnel by 3,500 each and reinvesting the funds elsewhere.

Rather than suggesting that this points to a top-heavy organization that needs trimming, it demonstrates that the heavy operational tempo which the Canadian Forces are undergoing desperately requires people. Headquarters are forced to raid ships, battalions and wings for people to administer Canada’s mandatory domestic and international operations, and humanitarian missions. 

Lt.-Gen. Leslie’s recommendations are not transformative. For that, he and his staff needed to truly step outside the box and identify measures that may not be initially apparent and would require skilled management to implement.

For instance, if personnel reductions are absolutely essential, instead of shrinking the military and civilian headquarters staffs by 3,500 each, as Leslie suggests, perhaps the military positions could be reallocated to operational units, ships, battalions and squadrons over several years. Concurrently, as the 3,500 civilian staff members retire or are reassigned, those positions could be militarized, giving the Canadian Forces several thousand more military personnel to meet the staffing requirements at the various headquarters and within the operational units, and to ease the burden on our military personnel who are required to deploy more often because of personnel shortages.

And if the Transformation staff stepped even farther outside the box, they may identify even more opportunities for cost reductions in infrastructure and training. Take, for example, the Canadian Forces Military Police Academy at CFB Borden, Ont., which has an annual aggregate budget in excess of $3.5 million, which includes the annual operating budget, and civilian and military salaries. This year, the academy expects to graduate 570 students. 

There are several institutions throughout Canada that teach policing, including the RCMP’s Depot Division in Regina, Sask., which has been training RCMP constables since 1885. Perhaps a brief discussion between the senior staffs of the RCMP and the Canadian Forces could be fiscally advantageous for both.

Tim Dunne is a Halifax-based military affairs analyst, a Research Fellow with Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and a member of the Royal United Services Institute (NS) Strategic Action Committee.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

"What!?!? The Emporer isn't wearing any clothes?!?!


----------



## a_majoor

We need to keep our eyes on the prize here.

Gen Leslie is only saying what many of us have said for many years (decades, centuries. Possibly officers in Sargon the Great's armies had similar sentiments); monies and resources should be shifted form Headquarters to the field force, ships at sea and aircraft.

We have all seen how ever growing bureaucracy and "process" have changed things; when I enlisted I recall having to sign three pieces of paper and swear the oath, I was in pretty quickly. Today it takes months and a hockey sock of paperwork to enlist a Class A reservist. In my early Regular Force career, the company clerk had access to the only photocopier and a typewriter; the BOR was similarly streamlined. I could often find the clerk outside the office having a smoke since he had little to do (The 2I/C was such a capable officer he could literally write an exercise order on the back of a cigarrette package. This explains his taste for "Players", since there was a calendar printed on the back as well....) Now a Reserve unit administering a platoon+ needs a plethora of clerks with full office automation suites working all out on papers, and a simple range instruction is @ 19 pages long (If you want to dispute that, look at the standards set in the CAP course which I taught a few yers ago. To save myself a lot of time, I have electronic formats for most common ranges and can produce range instructions once I know the physical location and can look up items like the location of the hospitals etc.). Others on this board have attested to the growth of "process" in many other areas.

Yes, a streamlined HQ structure will employ far fewer people, and will cause hardship for some, but the organization overall will have many more employment opportunities (the salaries and benefits of the estimated 200 "double dipping" colonels could probably provide the funding to keep one or two of HM's warships fully manned rather than tied up with a sleleton crew, for example). As well, a streamlined organization can move faster, firing rather than rewrding the sort of people who take a decade to field a rucksack and getting projects concluded fast enough that inflation does not price them out of the market or technological obsolecense makes them irrelevant.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Thucydides said:
			
		

> We have all seen how ever growing bureaucracy and "process" have changed things; when I enlisted I recall having to sign three pieces of paper and swear the oath, I was in pretty quickly. Today it takes months and a hockey sock of paperwork to enlist a Class A reservist. In my early Regular Force career, the company clerk had access to the only photocopier and a typewriter; the BOR was similarly streamlined. I could often find the clerk outside the office having a smoke since he had little to do (The 2I/C was such a capable officer he could literally write an exercise order on the back of a cigarrette package. This explains his taste for "Players", since there was a calendar printed on the back as well....)



Those were also the days when a platoon commander (and everyone else) managed all required administration using only the QR&Os and the CFAOs (now DAODs). Now we get bogged down trying to meet the expectations of often unnecessary extra regulations promulgated at (for the Army as an example) Army, Area, Brigade, and Base levels that are supposed to "supplement" the core regulations but usually only create process steps (like locally produced forms) to achieve the same requirement. If any of these extra processes are that important, why aren't they part of the core regulations and why are they different for each Area, Brigade, Base, etc.? Part of the bloat has sustained itself by existing to maintain ever out-of-date supplementary regulatory documents, and then fill their time telling units to repeat work because they used an out of date version when that was the only one available.


----------



## Old Sweat

Let me make a comment that probably has more than a grain of truth to it. 

A major cause in the growth of the paper burden and bureaucracy was first the appearance of the photo copier and then that was exacerbated by information technology. Before, when staff officers had to prepare drafts by hand and then proof and edit copy typed on duplicator paper, the aim was to cut down the bumpf as much as possible. However, staff work by photo copier meant that numerous annexes, appendices and just plain stuff could be added to documents, which tended to grow in thickness, if not depth of intellectual content. Then the whole scale showering of desk tops allowed the staff to bury the world under a pile  - electronic or otherwise - of trivia, redundancy and maybe even the odd bit of useful stuff.


----------



## McG

I have split off the double-dipper tangent.  While many individuals within the HQ bloat are double-dippers many are not - and many double-dippers are not part of the HQ bloat problem.  The tangent is now here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/87805.0.html

The question needs to be which permanent full time reserve positions are supporting the reserves.  Those reserve positions which are not supporting the reserves need to be removed and the reserve pay re-invested back the the reserves.

Consider that CTC HQ is nearly 1/3 Class B/A and the majority of these pers are concerned on a day-to-day basis with regular force topics.  Most of these positions do not belong where they are being used.  If the work is really that important (a legitimate question in itself), then Reg F PYs should be assigned and the B/A positions re-assigned to where they are concerned on a day-to-day basis with reserve force topics.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Let me make a comment that probably has more than a grain of truth to it.
> 
> A major cause in the growth of the paper burden and bureaucracy was first the appearance of the photo copier and then that was exacerbated by information technology. Before, when staff officers had to prepare drafts by hand and then proof and edit copy typed on duplicator paper, the aim was to cut down the bumpf as much as possible. However, staff work by photo copier meant that numerous annexes, appendices and just plain stuff could be added to documents, which tended to grow in thickness, if not depth of intellectual content. Then the whole scale showering of desk tops allowed the staff to bury the world under a pile  - electronic or otherwise - of trivia, redundancy and maybe even the odd bit of useful stuff.



I couldn't agree more. I have seen more and more of this especially being the IT guy having to establish, sustain, and fix the equipment required for this cycle to continue.

Everyone and their dog feels the need to have their little empire in cyber space because "the Commander needs to access this information." I'm sure if the Commander wanted to know about Visits (or any other information), he'd come and ask you, or someone would tell you to inform the Commander. More and more I feel as though the tail is actually wagging the dog, meaning that these staff positions try to justify their existence in the structure in order to stay in the inner information circles.

Powerpoint has crippled our ability to effectively convey and relay effective, concise and timely orders. Instead there is an incredible appetite for COPs, Red SA, Blue SA, AOR, SIGACTS etc. These take time to prepare and therefore require planning to be made on when it should be presented. If theres a rocket attack in the woods and its not in the CUB, does the Commander hear about it?

Like the sign says above my shop :

"How on Earth did we win wars without computers?"

Just my  :2c:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Of course, what we're really talking about here is reengineering the organization. Tons of research has been done in this field, mostly in the 80s and 90s. I wonder if we're ready to learn from the mistakes of others?

How to Make Reengineering Really Work
by Gene Hall, Jim Rosenthal, and Judy Wade 

In all too many companies, reengineering has been not only a great success but also a great failure. After months, even years, of careful redesign, these companies achieve dramatic improvements in individual processes only to watch overall results decline. By now, paradoxical outcomes of this kind have become almost commonplace. A computer company reengineers its finance department, reducing process costs by 34%—yet operating income stalls. An insurer cuts claims-process time by 44%—yet profits drop. Managers proclaim a 20% cost reduction, a 50% process-time reduction, a 25% quality improvement—yet in the same period, business-unit costs increase and profits decline. In short, too many companies are squandering management attention and other resources on projects that look like winners but fail to produce bottomline results for the business unit as a whole. 

What is going on here? The promise of reengineering is not empty: it can actually deliver revolutionary process improvements, and major reengineering efforts are being conducted around the world. Why then can’t companies convey these results to the bottom line? 

Our research into reengineering projects in more than 100 companies and detailed analysis of 20 of these projects have revealed how difficult redesigns actually are to plan and implement and, more important, how often they fail to achieve real business-unit impact. Our study identified two factors—breadth and depth—that are critical in translating short-term, narrow-focus process improvements into long-term profits. First, the process to be redesigned *must be broadly defined in terms of cost or customer value* in order to improve performance across the entire business unit. And *the redesign must penetrate to the company’s core, fundamentally changing six crucial organizational elements, or depth levers: roles and responsibilities, measurements and incentives, organizational structure, information technology, shared values, and skills*. 


http://hbr.org/1993/11/how-to-make-reengineering-really-work/ar/1


----------



## 54/102 CEF

MCG said:
			
		

> I have split off the double-dipper tangent.  While many individuals within the HQ bloat are double-dippers many are not - and many double-dippers are not part of the HQ bloat problem.  The tangent is now here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/87805.0.html
> 
> The question needs to be which permanent full time reserve positions are supporting the reserves.  Those reserve positions which are not supporting the reserves need to be removed and the reserve pay re-invested back the the reserves.
> 
> Consider that CTC HQ is nearly 1/3 Class B/A and the majority of these pers are concerned on a day-to-day basis with regular force topics.  Most of these positions do not belong where they are being used.  If the work is really that important (a legitimate question in itself), then Reg F PYs should be assigned and the B/A positions re-assigned to where they are concerned on a day-to-day basis with reserve force topics.



I'm only commenting on the words here and not MCG

Think about this business of Reserves only Support and Train reserves and nothing else.

To my mind this completely de-links Army Reg and Res Forces

Got trouble somewhere? Come on down.

No Reg F deployed? Stay the hell away is the message I'm receiving.

No Reg F deployed? Maybe time to Walk the Andy Leslie Walk and turn back 15% of the pay package and a further 15% of that as your standing bonus to come off civvy street to be on standbye for when the Feds vs the Army deploy you.


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## McG

54/102 CEF said:
			
		

> Think about this business of Reserves only Support and Train reserves and nothing else.
> 
> To my mind this completely de-links Army Reg and Res Forces


Legally, the Regular Force and Reserve Force are separate and constrained as to which my provide permanent fulltime service.  Within these constraints, reasonable arguments can be made for temporary fulltime service of reservists for operational requirements or to augment the regular force for specific projects or tasks (ie. something with a defined start & end).  Reasonable arguments can also be made permanent fulltime reserve positions that directly support or contribute to the reserve force (this even includes small representation on strategic level staffs to ensure reserve concerns and interests are properly heard and addressed) in acheiving its part-time mandate.

There are a finite number of permanent reserve positions available, and the reserve force can make productive use of all of them.  If someone wants to permanently serve full time and within regular force establishments, then that person should serve in the regular force.  We should not be stealing a position from the reserve force so that said person can keep his cake and eat it too.

Through training standards and collective training, we can ensure our regular and reserve forces are seamlessly interoperable on domestic and international missions.  We do not need hundreds of fulltime reservists providing no return value to the reserve force from within the bowls of NDHQ.

So, getting back to the core idea of this thread – NDHQ is bloated and needs a thorough review (and the same can be said of HQ layers below NDHQ).  As the structure is streamlined, we need to reinvest military HQ bloat as muscle back into “the front line” - including the field force, ships, operational units of the RCAF, training establishments and those units who support the day-to-day activities of the former (note this does not include lower HQs).  As the structure is streamlined, we need to reinvest reserve positions and reserve pay back into the reserve force.

It seems retired LGen Leslie was making his pitch to the Senate defence committee on this topic yesterday:


> Ex-top soldier pitches plan to cut $1 billion
> Murray Brewster
> The Chronicle-Herald
> 04 Oct 2011
> 
> OTTAWA - The former soldier who's recommended deep cuts at the Department of National Defence headquarters says the Conservative government has an opportunity to implement historic change.
> 
> Retired lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie made his pitch for up to $1 billion in savings before the Senate defence committee on Monday, describing the 43 recommendations in his report as "moderately tough choices" that will require political will to implement.
> 
> Leslie, who headed the army throughout most of the Afghan war, was put in charge of designing a reorganized military and his findings, released last month, have created waves.
> 
> His report calls for cutting a bloated headquarters establishment in Ottawa where approximately 20,000 uniformed members and civil servants oversee operations as well as administration.
> 
> He recommended cuts on the bureaucratic side of DND, trimming jobs at headquarters and reallocating resources in measures that could affect up to 11,000 jobs. Among the suggestions, Leslie says the full-time reservists, called up during the Afghan war into headquarters positions, could be demobilized and returned to part-time status.
> 
> Under the plan, the department would cut money spent on outside contractors and consultants.
> 
> "I think the only person who agrees with all of my recommendations is me," Leslie told the committee, acknowledging the rancour with which the report has been received inside the Ottawa headquarters.
> 
> "It is up to the government of Canada to either accept or not the recommendations and to actually conduct the implementation and that is, arguably, the toughest part of all. This has to be a government of Canada driven activity."
> 
> The transformation report would "destroy" the Canadian military if fully implemented, retired chief of defence staff general Rick Hillier has warned.
> 
> Leslie countered by saying he spent over 30 years in uniform and would never do anything to destroy the Forces, but argued that a fiscal reality of cutbacks is going to kick in, regardless of whether the Forces wants to acknowledge it.
> 
> After nearly a decade of rising defence spending and with a multi-billion dollar budget deficit, Leslie said the military "can't logically expect to go to government and say, please sir, can we have some more."
> 
> The study, in which Leslie sought out the business community for best practises, says that while the front-line positions grew by around 10 per cent during the war, the number of headquarters and non-operational jobs at DND ballooned by almost 40 per cent.
> 
> Leslie said he and his team spent 10 months glued to computer screens and spread sheets and at least once a week he was faced with an "Oh my God" moment upon discovering something startling or out of whack within the Defence Department's giant layered bureaucracy.





> Panel warned about cuts to military
> Reduce spending at headquarters, not on front lines, ex-general says
> Lee Berthiaume
> Ottawa Citizen
> 04 Oct 2011
> 
> If the military doesn't cut back on contractors or the number of staff working at National Defence headquarters, front line soldiers and the equipment they rely on will inevitably suffer, a recently retired general told a Senate committee on Monday.
> 
> "Sometimes you only find out the hard way, when you're on that two-way range and people are shooting back at you, that you actually let your troops down by skimping on their training money and their spare bits," retired Gen. Andrew Leslie said.
> 
> But in an exclusive interview, Defence Minister Peter MacKay said the former general's recommendations are only one factor the government is considering and that all spending will be examined "with a fine-tooth comb."
> 
> With major combat operations in Afghanistan and Libya and support for the Canadian Forces a Conservative priority, the Defence Department's budget has grown from $15 billion in 2006 to $21 billion. Now, like all other departments, the military is being asked to cut spending.
> 
> For more than a year, Leslie served as chief of transformation, examining the Canadian Forces' structure and spending to find efficiencies. His final report, which was leaked to the media in August before being released to the public, contains 43 recommendations that Leslie says will save $1 billion if implemented.
> 
> Chief among these are cutting up to 30 per cent of the $2.7 billion spent on contractors, consultants and private service providers and reducing by 4,500 the number of full-time reservists working at headquarters.
> 
> In his testimony to the Senate defence committee, Leslie acknowledged there will be pain as the government seeks to bring the deficit under control, particularly after years of largesse in the Defence Department. But "in short, we're going to have to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow," he said.
> 
> In an allusion to the way the Chrétien government implemented spending cuts in the 1990s, which saw shortages of spare parts, equipment and even ammunition, Leslie said the money must not come out of the front line.
> 
> "One of the areas that historically has been the easiest for a variety of organizations to cut," he said, "has been in the spare bits that are required to keep the tanks and armoured vehicles rolling or ships sailing or planes flying. Because you can recoup money very quickly without seeing an absolute degradation in operations for a year or two."
> 
> Leslie, who retired three weeks ago after more than 30 years in the military, said the long-term damage of cuts could be significant, leaving the Canadian Forces increasingly unable to conduct operations or provide services. It could also put soldiers in harm's way.
> 
> "So I would watch like a hawk from this moment forward the monies that are allocated to national procurement. And if they go down by one cent as compared to last year, I would ask some really hard questions as to why the money is coming out of spare bits and not headquarters and overhead."
> 
> Earlier in the day, the defence minister told Postmedia News that Leslie's report had been "instructive on a number of levels."
> 
> "But it's one stream of information," MacKay added. "Keep in mind that we have numerous sources of information that we're relying on as we go through transformation, not the least of which is the senior (military) leadership."
> 
> The minister said the Defence Department will "do our part" to help bring the deficit under control.
> 
> "Clearly our core capabilities and our readiness and our support for our personnel are key," he said when asked what was off the table. "But we are looking at everything with a fine-tooth comb to achieve efficiencies."





> War on paper pushers
> Former general says time to cut DND bureaucrats
> Bryn Weese
> The Edmonton Sun
> 04 Oct 2011
> 
> OTTAWA-- Defence bureaucrats are gobbling up dollars needed by Canada's fighting forces, retired Gen. Andrew Leslie told the Senate's defence committee on Monday.
> 
> Leslie, who was made chief of transformation last year, conceded some of his 43 recommendations will not be popular, but stressed transformation is necessary to prepare the Canadian Forces for the future. "I'm quite sure there's enough information in the report ... to ensure that just about everybody is upset with something that's in there," Leslie said. "But this is an opportunity ... to make the CF and DND leaner, more agile, better focused on output instead of process."
> 
> Among his recommendations is finding $1 billion in savings from the bureaucracy, dramatically reducing the 20,000 staff at headquarters in Ottawa, and slashing the money spent on consultants and contractors by 30%.
> 
> Former chief of defence staff Rick Hillier warned implementing the report would destroy the Canadian Forces.
> 
> Leslie defended his work to the senators.
> 
> "I've been a soldier for almost 35 years, I've carried a rifle, I've fought for my country, I've fought for my troops. I would never recommend anything that would destroy the Canadian Forces," he said.
> 
> STAFF BALLOONED
> 
> Among his report's findings is that between 2004 and 2010, civilian hires at DND outpaced uniformed hires by 3-to-1. Staff at headquarters in Ottawa ballooned by almost 40%.
> 
> The government has said the civilian hires at headquarters were necessary to backfill positions left vacant by Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, "so that military members could focus their efforts on operational matters," wrote Jay Paxton, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay, in a recent e-mail.
> 
> MacKay's office has said his recommendations would be considered as part of the federal budget process next year.



... also, to correct my last, CTC HQ is only nearly 1/4 Class B/A.  That is still an awful lot of reserve pay not benefiting the reserve force (and does not account for the glut of Class B).


----------



## dapaterson

Andrew Leslie calling for cuts.  Nixon going to China.  Discuss.


----------



## The Bread Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Andrew Leslie calling for cuts.  Nixon going to China.  Discuss.


Further grist for said discussion:


> CGI Group Inc., a leading provider of information technology and business process services, today announced the opening of a new Canadian Defence, Public Safety and Intelligence business unit based in Ottawa with capabilities to serve the Canadian Armed Forces around the globe.  In addition, the Company also announced the appointment of Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie to lead the new Defence, Public Safety and Intelligence unit. The offering will build on the corporation's global expertise to develop and implement innovative, world-class solutions tailored to specific knowledge and requirements of Canada's modern-day defence and security challenges.
> 
> (....)
> 
> "I look forward to serving Canadians in a different capacity but with equally targeted objectives," commented Lt.-Gen. Leslie. "An efficient government able to take innovative actions combined with technologically savvy military and intelligence capabilities are needed to defend and protect all Canadians. I'm proud to join CGI, a home-grown global champion to help meet these unprecedented security challenges head-on."
> 
> With a 35-year history of partnering with nearly 100 Canadian government civilian agencies, CGI's work in defence and intelligence has remained limited.
> 
> However, with more than 7,500 specialists and professional serving governments globally, CGI will offer a spectrum of services and solutions to Canadian military, defence, public safety and intelligence organizations, including such areas of expertise as:
> - advanced analytics;
> - biometrics & cybersecurity;
> - operational logistics;
> - systems engineering; and,
> - training ....


CGI news release, 29 Sept 11


----------



## Kirkhill

Is LGen (retd) Leslie now saying that DND can now save a billion dollars by firing all the consultants and hiring him instead?

Just askin'.


----------



## Pusser

What I find interesting in all of this is that LGen Leslie (Ret'd) seems to be decrying the overhiring of Reservists in full time staff positions.  One of the biggest offenders for that was the Army - which he commanded at the time...


----------



## Edward Campbell

Pusser said:
			
		

> What I find interesting in all of this is that LGen Leslie (Ret'd) seems to be decrying the overhiring of Reservists in full time staff positions.  One of the biggest offenders for that was the Army - which he commanded at the time...




What about all the NAVRES sailors on the MCDVs? Is that not a problems, both practically, for the NAVRES, itself, and procedurally, for the CF?


----------



## dapaterson

LGen Leslie's comments to the senate yesterday are troubling.  Troubling that he informed the senators that, once in the transformation job, every week he discovered some new "Things shouldn't be like that" problem.

Here's the rub:  He had just commanded roughly 1/3 of the Canadian Forces.  He was one of the commanders letting all those problems fester and grow.  The next skill testing question, that LGen Leslie was never asked, was why he permitted these problems when he was in command?


Edward: I am a frequent critic of current Reserve employment patterns, but I will try to be fair to the RCN and (even worse offenders) the RCAF.  Both saw a gap between the Regular Force PYs they were assigned and the tasks they were to accomplish.  Both bridged that gap by committing their Reserve (in whole or in part).  Neither made any significant effort to reconstitute a Reserve.  (As we all know, doctrine is for reading on course, not for practice in the real world).

That DND/CF's central agencies failed to provide strong controls, and failed to supervise and make these acts knowingly and deliberately, rests on their heads.

The Army has many sins of its own in this realm; Jack English is perhaps on the fringes (lunatic fringe, even) but does highlight that the unconstrained growth of full-time Reserve service has profound impacts on the part-time Reservist including loss of progression opportunities; increases in training burden that are not justified in the part-time context; and loss of leadership ranks to full-time service.  Indeed, some staff analysis suggests that at its peak, over half of parading Army Reserve Captains, Majors, Master Warrant Officers, Warrant Officers and Sergerants were on full-time service.  Remove half the mid-level leadership from a part time organization and its ability to thrive is severly impacted.


----------



## Edward Campbell

My sense, for what little it's worth, is that the most deleterious effect of so many NAVRES sailors doing so much full time service at sea, in the MCDVs, is on the NAVRES divisions in places from St John's through Saskatoon and on to Victoria. I suspect that the divisions are paying a price because too many senior people are at sea rather than at "home," helping to lead and manage the more prosaic but still essential training in the "stone frigates."


----------



## George Wallace

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> My sense, for what little it's worth, is that the most deleterious effect of so many NAVRES sailors doing so much full time service at sea, in the MCDVs, is on the NAVRES divisions in places from St John's through Saskatoon and on to Victoria. I suspect that the divisions are paying a price because too many senior people are at sea rather than at "home," helping to lead and manage the more prosaic but still essential training in the "stone frigates."



True, but they are gaining experience that they can not gain in those "stone frigates".   What has to be done is control the amount of time they are serving full time at sea, so as not to make them "permanent members".  A "rotation" would be better, so that they would be back at their "stone frigates" to pass on their knowledge and experience.

Much can be learned from the days that the Army had the AVGP as a "Tank Trainer".  Bad habits were learned and had to be broken and taught all anew once the members actually got on a tank.  Something I witnessed first hand in Suffield during RV'85.  These can be compared to what the NAVRES has done with the MCDVs.  Lessons learned at sea are not the same as what one would learn in a "stone frigate" training environment unless that experience can be brought back to the "stone frigates".


----------



## FlyingDutchman

recceguy said:
			
		

> "What!?!? The Emporer isn't wearing any clothes?!?!


"Emporer, I must protest about your lack of clothes."
"Off with his head!"


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The Army has many sins of its own in this realm; Jack English is perhaps on the fringes (lunatic fringe, even) but does highlight that the unconstrained growth of full-time Reserve service has profound impacts on the part-time Reservist including loss of progression opportunities; increases in training burden that are not justified in the part-time context; and loss of leadership ranks to full-time service.  Indeed, some staff analysis suggests that at its peak, over half of parading Army Reserve Captains, Majors, Master Warrant Officers, Warrant Officers and Sergerants were on full-time service.  Remove half the mid-level leadership from a part time organization and its ability to thrive is severly impacted.



The other problem is that FT reservists have been drawn back into the units and not fairly compensated for contributing in their 'spare time'. The units have also grown accustomed to having a plethora of FT folks to rely on to do things, so we've wound up with LOTS of stuff to do that is of secondary importance to our main effort: training for war. (That IS our main effort, isn't it?)


----------



## OldSolduer

I'd like to add that as a condition for Class B employment the CO and RSM to sign off a Class B they want that member to parade regularly and come out on weekends anyways, and it doesn't matter who the employer is. I've tried to tell them that its like a posting...you won't expect someone posted out to come back every Tuesday.
The RCAF Reserve (if it is in fact called that) hired one of our Sgts and his condition of employment basically stated "You WILL NOT parade Tuesdays and weekends with the Army PRes".


----------



## Pusser

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> What about all the NAVRES sailors on the MCDVs? Is that not a problems, both practically, for the NAVRES, itself, and procedurally, for the CF?



I never said that isn't a problem (because I agree that it is).  My point was that it's unfair of people who used to live in glass houses to throw stones at them after they leave.


----------



## Pusser

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I'd like to add that as a condition for Class B employment the CO and RSM to sign off a Class B they want that member to parade regularly and come out on weekends anyways, and it doesn't matter who the employer is. I've tried to tell them that its like a posting...you won't expect someone posted out to come back every Tuesday.
> The RCAF Reserve (if it is in fact called that) hired one of our Sgts and his condition of employment basically stated "You WILL NOT parade Tuesdays and weekends with the Army PRes".



I used to run into this problem in one unit where I had full time Reservists working for me who were also "expected" to parade with their parent unit.  This is simply wrong at the basic level in that they essentially do this without pay as they receive no compensation for parading with the parent unit.  The pressure to provide free labour to Reserve units is just one of the problems that needs to be addressed.


----------



## dapaterson

Pusser said:
			
		

> I used to run into this problem in one unit where I had full time Reservists working for me who were also "expected" to parade with their parent unit.  This is simply wrong at the basic level in that they essentially do this without pay as they receive no compensation for parading with the parent unit.  The pressure to provide free labour to Reserve units is just one of the problems that needs to be addressed.



Two sides to the problem.  The employing unit has no responsibility to ensure that the rank/trade they want is readily available.  There were no constraints other than a valid fin code to employ people. 

So what is the parent unit to do when they lose senior folks?  There's no DGMC working to fill their holes.  We've permitted a system that allows any demand, no matter how outlandish, as long as the full-time employer has money - and the part-time parent unit has no recourse - by policy, they must send up nominations.  And once Bloggins is employed full time:

(a) the parent unit can't promote to backfill, since Bloggins is still in that position;

(b) the parent unit still does routine admin for Bloggins, who is not contributing to the unit (and sometimes non-routine admin as well - attending officer, anyone?);

(c) the employing unit may or may not be able to take Bloggins on their establishment, and may or may not be willing to take Bloggins on their establishment even if they can.


If we want our part-time Reserve units to spend their time and efforts administering full-time pers working in other units, then our model is more broken than I thought.


Perhaps the employing units need to step up to the plate:

(a) Define requirements in advance so a pers production system can attempt to meet them;

(b) Take ownership of their full-time personnel - take them on their establishments, do their routine admin, and provide their support;

(c) Define an accounting system that permits us to report on full-time Reservists depending on whether they are employed i nsupprot of the Reserevs or not;

(d) Prioritize efforts and initiatives and stop doing lower priority things.


----------



## OldSolduer

Good points dapaterson.

I fully agree. When I took on this Class B I was removed from LFC and tranferred to the NDHQ PRL, under CMP. They do my admin, and for the most part are good with it. 

The same should apply to any Class B - the employing unit MUST take ownership.


----------



## GAP

So DAP, given those parameters, what happens when the unit that acquired Bloggins...no longer wants him, but his position has been backfilled in the meantime?

Sounds like it would be the death knell to potential volunteers who know that if they take the Class B, they have no position to return to when it's finished....(that's the first thing that came to mind when I read what you wrote...)


----------



## Haggis

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I'd like to add that as a condition for Class B employment the CO and RSM to sign off a Class B they want that member to parade regularly and come out on weekends anyways, and it doesn't matter who the employer is.



And that practise is in *direct contravention* of the Army Commander's policy letter of 03 July 09, signed by LGen Leslie himself.  Para 6 reads, in part:

"Voluntary service with the home unit by Reserve Force officers and soldiers serving on Class "B" service is admirable and should be facilitated.  However, all involved must bear in mind the professional and personal wellbeing of the officers and soldiers who perform such service, and that it is *voluntary and shall not be compelled*."


----------



## dapaterson

GAP said:
			
		

> So DAP, given those parameters, what happens when the unit that acquired Bloggins...no longer wants him, but his position has been backfilled in the meantime?
> 
> Sounds like it would be the death knell to potential volunteers who know that if they take the Class B, they have no position to return to when it's finished....(that's the first thing that came to mind when I read what you wrote...)



Damned if you do, damned if you don't.  The parent unit probably doesn't have a large number of spare positions, particularly at senior ranks.  So are they to go without a WO or a Maj for three years while Bloggins is away?  And will Bloggins return for good, or just hang around while he's looking for his next full-time gig?

That's why requirements definition is important, and not "anyone with a fin code" hiring - so we can properly manage people.

Frankly:  if you don't want to parade and participate in a Reserve unit's activities, leave the unit.  You can keep in touch, still participate in mess life and other events, just don't tie up a position. 

Much of this is a command responsibility - but at a higher level than individual units.  Leaving units to muck about and try to resolve problems without firm guidance from on high is unfair.  Right now, policy is filled with "mays" and "mights" instead of "wills" and "shalls".


----------



## Eowyn

Within my CBG, anyone with a Cl B over a year long is transferred to the employing unit's established position.  If the member wants to return, there has to be an open Cl A position with the original unit.  That is the risk that I took when I accepted my Cl B/A.


----------



## Rifleman62

I believe that it is after six months the transfer to the employing unit's established position must be made.

When Cl "B" A's were established they were non accountable Reg F positions. That fact was lost years ago.

Re paper bloat. I am somewhat sure Old Sweat remembers this.

STAFF INSPECTION

The following message was sent by the Duke of Wellington to the British Foreign Office in London in August 1812.

	"Gentlemen:

	While marching from Portugal to a position which commands the approach to Madrid and the French forces, my officers have been diligently complying with your request which have been sent by His Majesty's ship from London to Lisbon and thence by dispatch rider to our headquarters.

	We have enumerated our saddles, bridles, tents and tent poles, and all manner of sundry items for which His Majesty's Government hold me accountable.  I have dispatched reports on the character, wit and spleen of every officer.  Each item and each farthing has been accounted for with two regrettable exceptions for which I beg your indulgence.

	Unfortunately the sum of one shilling and ninepence remains unaccounted for in one infantry battalion's petty cash and there has been a hideous confusion as to the number of jars of raspberry jam issued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in western Spain.  This reprehensible carelessness may be related to the pressure of circumstances, since we are at war with France, a fact which may come as a bit of surprise to you gentlemen in Whitehall.

This brings me to my present purpose, which is to request elucidation of my instruction from His Majesty's Government, so that I may better understand why I am dragging an army over these barren plains.  I construe that perforce it must be one of two alternative duties, as given below.  I shall pursue either one with the best of my ability but I cannot do both:

1.	to train any army of uniformed British clerks in Spain for the benefit of the accountants and copy-boys in London, or perchance:

2.	to see it that the forces of Napoleon are driven out of Spain.

Your most obedient servant,

WELLINGTON"


----------



## Old Sweat

Indeed I do, although it is a bit before my time. One suspects that it set off a flurry of studies, meetings and seminars convened to answer the question. It is probably still an active file in Horse Guards Parade.

Fast forward to an orgy of Power Points!


----------



## GAP

Never-ending war rages on bureaucracy 
By Peter Worthington ,QMI Agency Sunday, October 09, 2011
Article Link

Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie’s vaunted report on restructuring and streamlining the Canadian military (mainly the army, it seems) is apparently causing shock waves among those who’ve read it.

Leslie is now retired, and can speak more freely. He’s quoted in Maclean’s as saying the “tail,” or administrative staff in Ottawa’s defence headquarters, has grown like Topsy and “we’ve got almost as many people in Ottawa as we have in the regular-force deployable army.”

One is tempted to ask, “what else is new?”

DND has always been filled with more non-combatant military people and civilian staff than those who actually serve in the field think is necessary. The tail wagging the dog is a familiar refrain.

More to the point, those who run the military and make decisions are traditionally staff people, far removed from actual operations.

Perhaps it’s always been this way. In the Second World War, Allied forces always had a larger and longer tail than the enemy.

In the U.S. military, the tooth-to-tail ratio is something like 10 behind the lines (including logistical support) to maintain one combat soldier.

(The better the logistical support, the more effective the combat soldier).

In totalitarian forces, the support system for combat soldiers is usually weaker.

Leslie knows this and wants a better “tooth-to-tail” balance.

He did his job, but is not convinced his recommendation to cut staff in Ottawa and other measures to improve efficiency will be acceptable.

In the past (the Trudeau years), austerity measures damaged the military and didn’t result in more efficiency. Cynicism reigns.

Maclean’s quotes Leslie recalling that when he laid out his efficiency plans to military leaders in Ottawa, their near-unanimous reaction was, “Andy, we support transformation ... but don’t touch my stuff.”

Military people are so conditioned to being picked on by politicians and bureaucrats eager to cut the defence budget that they’re wary of any proposed changes — which almost always include budget cuts for improved equipment.

But Leslie has a point when he notes that since Canadians began serious fighting in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan, spending on the rear echelon and support system expanded four times faster than spending on the fighting troops — whose numbers remained relatively stable during this time.
More on link


----------



## McG

Last week, I saw a news article indicating that DND had at least 5,500 civilian contractors working within the organization and having a government provided desk & phone  … of course, nobody could say for certain exactly how many such contractors existed.  I suspect most (if not all) of those 5,500+ also have an @forces.gc.ca address.  

I suspect a lot of these contractors are working in a very grey area with respect to employer-employee relationships because managers chose contracting to avoid approval hurdles of getting public servants.

Apparently the report from LGen (Retd) Leslie suggested that many of these “contracted employees” could be cut with little political blow-back.  Not only do I think he is right, I suspect we could exploit this reality by making deeper cuts to service contracts and converting the money to SWE.

Contractors are not supposed to speak for the government,  So, as a start point, I propose removing a mechanism that allows the illusion of doing so – no contractor should hold an @forces.gc.ca address (they can work on addresses that function internal to the DWAN only).  Any positions that come-up as absolutely must have external access then raise a flag as probably requiring that posn to be replaced by public service (and since LGen (Retd) Leslie identified many in Ottawa were doing unnecessary work, we can just re-assign one of those positions).

In the capital region, this might mean a few less contractors kept around, but in exchange a few more public servants are retained.  In other areas, reassigning money from service contracts to SWE could mean a few hundreds of dollars to pay driver over-time instead of several thousands to contract rental busses with drivers. (This last element might require lowering the level of authority at which a _business case_ allows O&M funds can be converted to SWE for overtime purposes).

Two weeks ago, it was reported in another news article that DND would be doing workforce adjustment because the pace of retirements was not going to meet the demand for cuts.  Workforce adjustment is likely to cause frictions with the unions, but we could mitigate those problems by using “contracted employees” (were possible) as fiscal off-sets to reduce the size of PS cuts.


----------



## CountDC

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Soldiering, be it infantry, artillery, logistics or what have you, is a young man's game. I can hear alot of people hounding about me about the expiriences and qualifications, etc, etc. Where their is a will, there is a way.
> 
> As for the broom sweeping through and cleaning the excess out of Ottawa, you need a bulldog-ish take no garbage leader to do that. Seriously, *everybody there will justify their existence as being critical*. Apply integrity and decide if your really needed/your section is needed/your HQ is needed/etc.



Not me - as far as I am concerned my position here is not needed as the work I am doing should be divided up and passed to other staff.  The down side of doing that is the others will most likely say they need more staff to do it and result in 2 new positions created.


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> Last week, I saw a news article indicating that DND had at least 5,500 civilian contractors working within the organization and having a government provided desk & phone  … of course, nobody could say for certain exactly how many such contractors existed.  I suspect most (if not all) of those 5,500+ also have an @forces.gc.ca address.



The estimate was based on counting those labelled as "contractor" in the DND internal email address book.



> I suspect a lot of these contractors are working in a very grey area with respect to employer-employee relationships because managers chose contracting to avoid approval hurdles of getting public servants.
> 
> Apparently the report from LGen (Retd) Leslie suggested that many of these “contracted employees” could be cut with little political blow-back.  Not only do I think he is right, I suspect we could exploit this reality by making deeper cuts to service contracts and converting the money to SWE.



So, we'll fire all the doctors working on contract and attempt to hire civilian doctors instead?  Except most doctors in private practice incorporate for liability reasons, so we'd be hiring their corporations.  And managing hundreds of contracts.  Instead of one contract as we currently have.

Many contractors are in place as a result of decisions made based on assessment of options.  Certainly, we can revisit all those decisions - and impose greater central control and a reduction of lower-level flexibility.



> Contractors are not supposed to speak for the government,  So, as a start point, I propose removing a mechanism that allows the illusion of doing so – no contractor should hold an @forces.gc.ca address (they can work on addresses that function internal to the DWAN only).  Any positions that come-up as absolutely must have external access then raise a flag as probably requiring that posn to be replaced by public service (and since LGen (Retd) Leslie identified many in Ottawa were doing unnecessary work, we can just re-assign one of those positions).



It is incorrect to state LGen Leslie identified anyone doing unnecessary work - he asserted there were many, but never did the detailed analysis to identify what should and should not be done.  His review was glossy and superficial.



> In the capital region, this might mean a few less contractors kept around, but in exchange a few more public servants are retained.  In other areas, reassigning money from service contracts to SWE could mean a few hundreds of dollars to pay driver over-time instead of several thousands to contract rental busses with drivers. (This last element might require lowering the level of authority at which a _business case_ allows O&M funds can be converted to SWE for overtime purposes).



So, we do want lower level managers to make a business case and decide?  Or only be able to decide to choose public servants but not contractors?



> Two weeks ago, it was reported in another news article that DND would be doing workforce adjustment because the pace of retirements was not going to meet the demand for cuts.  Workforce adjustment is likely to cause frictions with the unions, but we could mitigate those problems by using “contracted employees” (were possible) as fiscal off-sets to reduce the size of PS cuts.




The problems, as seen by LGen (ret'd) Leslie are too many contractors, too many public servants, too many full-time Reservists, and too many non-core activities.

During his tenure as Army Commander, he oversaw a significant growth in Army-employed contractors (look at any Army school); he ovesaw an increase in public servants; he let loose a torrent of full-time Reserve hiring; and launched many initiatives that may not fit in with the core functions of an Army.  In short, he and his peers are the authors of the laundry list of problems he reported on just prior to his retirement.

Andrew Leslie may well have been converted on the road to Damascus.  But his public statements to date have yet to display the slightest humility or acknowledgement of responsbility.


Or, to be more succinct, perhaps I should let Pogo Possum have the last words.  "We have met the enemy, and he is us."


----------



## Anakha

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Quote from posted article:
> 
> And if the Transformation staff stepped even farther outside the box, they may identify even more opportunities for cost reductions in infrastructure and training. Take, for example, the Canadian Forces Military Police Academy at CFB Borden, Ont., which has an annual aggregate budget in excess of $3.5 million, which includes the annual operating budget, and civilian and military salaries. This year, the academy expects to graduate 570 students.
> 
> There are several institutions throughout Canada that teach policing, including the RCMP’s Depot Division in Regina, Sask., which has been training RCMP constables since 1885. Perhaps a brief discussion between the senior staffs of the RCMP and the Canadian Forces could be fiscally advantageous for both.
> 
> Tim Dunne is a Halifax-based military affairs analyst, a Research Fellow with Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and a member of the Royal United Services Institute (NS) Strategic Action Committee.



For someone who specializes in research, Tim Dunne has a lot to learn. CFMPA's budget is nowhere near 3.5 million. The actual operational budget is less than a million (often far, far less). There are only 4 civilian staff members. This is inflationist reporting at best. 

Additionally, while some police training aspects remain the same across the board, the RCMP is not set up, experienced, or capable of training MPs on the unique aspects and requirements of military policing.


----------



## dapaterson

Anakha said:
			
		

> For someone who specializes in research, Tim Dunne has a lot to learn. CFMPA's budget is nowhere near 3.5 million. The actual operational budget is less than a million (often far, far less). There are only 4 civilian staff members. This is inflationist reporting at best.
> 
> Additionally, while some police training aspects remain the same across the board, the RCMP is not set up, experienced, or capable of training MPs on the unique aspects and requirements of military policing.



Read the article.  When the Reg F salaries and benefits are considered, the cost of operating the CFMPA is around $3.5M.

As well, if there is only a need for a small military policing add-on to what the RCMP could offer, we could find considerable savings - just as we could find savings by contrcting out our parachute training to the US, just as we could find considerable savings by contracting out EME training to civilian schools and provide only a small military add-on... in short, here are many places we can get training and possibly save money.

But there are other issues that need to be considered as well.  For example:  for initial occupational training, do we get better outcomes from providing an immersive military environment than we would from putting students out on the economy?  Do we want to retain greater surge capability?  Would we  have guarantees of access to the number of course positions we need?

It's never a simple $$$ assessment - rather, things need to be assess holistically.  But we do have to take a realistic view of costs - and Reg F pay is a huge amount of money that needs to be considered when making decisions.


----------



## Anakha

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Read the article.  When the Reg F salaries and benefits are considered, the cost of operating the CFMPA is around $3.5M.
> 
> As well, if there is only a need for a small military policing add-on to what the RCMP could offer, we could find considerable savings - just as we could find savings by contrcting out our parachute training to the US, just as we could find considerable savings by contracting out EME training to civilian schools and provide only a small military add-on... in short, here are many places we can get training and possibly save money.
> 
> But there are other issues that need to be considered as well.  For example:  for initial occupational training, do we get better outcomes from providing an immersive military environment than we would from putting students out on the economy?  Do we want to retain greater surge capability?  Would we  have guarantees of access to the number of course positions we need?
> 
> It's never a simple $$$ assessment - rather, things need to be assess holistically.  But we do have to take a realistic view of costs - and Reg F pay is a huge amount of money that needs to be considered when making decisions.



I understand what you're saying, and I did read the article, but generally when considering a budget within a military unit, Reg F salaries are not included. They don't come out of CFMPA's budget and those salaries would remain the same if the staff were employed at CFMPA or elsewhere. The author is inflating it to suit his topic. The actual operating cost of CFMPA (and therefore potential savings by doing away with it) is relatively extremely small. And I do think that an immersive military environment is important for new MPs. They are not being trained to be civvy cops. The qualification trg goes beyond policing with a small military add-on. It's a military trade with military expectations and the actual trade qualifications (and I think this applies to any military trade, really) should remain in-house. External police trg would not be feasible IMO. Specialty trg is a possibility and several courses are already contracted out to other police services.


----------



## Pusser

To take it a step further, do we really need the Military Police? :stirpot:

The pre-unification RCN saw no need for a military police force.  Why can't the RCMP, a federal police force, provide domestic police services and criminal investigation while a smaller "provost corps" made up of personnel (drawn from the combat arms) who are trained for the tactical aspects of the MP function serve for a posting or two and then return to their regiments?  For example an infantryman would leave his rifle company for three years, do a tour with the provost company and then go back to a rifle company (with a better understanding of the bigger picture).


----------



## Pusser

Anakha said:
			
		

> I understand what you're saying, and I did read the article, but generally when considering a budget within a military unit, Reg F salaries are not included.



Not true at all.  Reg Force salaries are often considered (at least in newspaper articles) when citing the cost of running an organization.  Why do you think it supposedly costs $3500/hour to operate a Challenger jet?  What they often fail to mention is what it costs to leave that jet on the ground (probably $3499/hour  ;D).

Having said that, including Reg Force salaries in the total operating cost could be legitimate in this case.  An argument can be made that closing the school would enable a reduction in the MP establishment (i.e. eliminate the Reg Force MP instructors), which would result in a lower operating cost for the CF as a whole (i.e. paying fewer people).


----------



## dapaterson

Alterantively, those MP PYs could be repurposed - either strengthen MP dets somewhere, or turn them into some other occupation where we need more capability than we have.

Viewing Reg F pay as a sunk cost is intellectually dishonest, and leads to a misapplication of resources - since they are viewed as "free" we don't necessarily employ them optimally.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bumped to add link to the report (thought it was elsewhere on the site, but couldn't spot it), as well as links to just-released annexes to said report here, here, here, here, here and here (all HONKING big PDF's)


----------



## fraserdw

CountDC said:
			
		

> Not me - as far as I am concerned my position here is not needed as the work I am doing should be divided up and passed to other staff.  The down side of doing that is the others will most likely say they need more staff to do it and result in 2 new positions created.



IN the whole history of DND that has never happened.  Since HQ has become bloated the amount of staff work and the sheer volume of ideas has gone up.  Last year we had visits from 4 different NDHQ Majors all in charge of projects to rationalize software use.  All worked for different directors and all demanded the same information be complied but on a different format.  How much does 4 projects to do the same thing cost?  At the same time, they are curtailing training and telling some folks that it will take longer to get promoted because they will not be able to get the courses.


----------



## OldSolduer

fraserdw said:
			
		

> the sheer volume of ideas has gone up.



The Good Idea Fairy at work.....sometimes someone needs to smack that fairy upside the head....and off the shoulders of some.


----------



## McG

fraserdw said:
			
		

> Last year we had visits from 4 different NDHQ Majors all in charge of projects to rationalize software use.


I wonder if any appreciated the irony that they themselves also needed to be rationalized.


----------



## Old Sweat

This story in Embassy Magazine cites a report by the Conference of Defence Associations that opines that there will have to be cuts to CF headquarters outside Ottawa to achieve the levels of savings envisaged. The story is generally well argued until, in the last paragraph, it allows Stephen Staples to demand cuts to the capital programme. The piece is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act. 

March, 14, 2012 

Defence cuts will be felt outside Ottawa: Analysts 

Consolidating North American and overseas command HQs won't go far in achieving the savings the department is said to be hunting for. 
By Carl Meyer

Published March 14, 2012   View story  Email Comments To the Editor 
           
A new report on cuts to the Canadian Forces argues that if the Harper government is serious about saving money through cutting or reorganizing senior defence department personnel, it won't be able to do it with staff in Ottawa alone. 

In a forthcoming study published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, analyst Dave Perry argues that this was a largely-overlooked conclusion reached by Lt.-Gen. (ret'd) Andrew Leslie and his team in a controversial paper on how to transform the Department of National Defence. 

Much of the coverage of the Leslie report focused on its assertion that DND's Ottawa offices had become too bloated with senior staff. But Mr. Perry argues that one file associated with the report, Annex M—which was not attached to the version of the report posted online—demonstrates that any attempt to reorganize regular force, reserve force, and civilian staff in headquarters organizations will require bean counters to look outside Canada's capital for efficiencies. 

The military has several of these headquarters offices; some of them are operational and oversee geographic areas, and others focus on the three service branches—the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Canadian Army. Still others are regional headquarters for larger offices. 

The Leslie report counted 18,511 military and civilian staff working for different headquarters organizations within DND. Experts say some of these are very Ottawa-focused. 

But in one case, the headquarters of the chief of maritime staff, the annex explicitly shows that staff are scattered in greater numbers across the country. Out of the 1,226 people the annex identified as working for the chief of maritime staff, only 306 work in Ottawa, while 920 work in the Halifax, Victoria, and Quebec City areas. 

If the department has looked to free up personnel by reorganizing this headquarters office, said Mr. Perry, it will have needed to address these 920 people. 

Mr. Perry acknowledges that the annex doesn't show whether this breakdown is representative of how the other headquarters are structured geographically. But he does point to other evidence that also gives indications of how spread out headquarters staff are. 

For example, when the Leslie team calculated which jobs it could reroute to create a new headquarters office as part of its proposed reorganization of DND, it envisioned pulling not only staff in Ottawa, but also thousands of individuals in other headquarters jobs in Kingston, Edmonton, Halifax, Petawawa, Borden, North Bay, and St-Jean-sur-Richelieu. 

And while many critics focused on Lt.-Gen. Leslie's suggestion to consolidate the two headquarters in charge of North American and overseas deployments, called Canada Command and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, the annex shows that 365 and 246 people work for those headquarters, respectively—compared to the land, marine, and air chiefs who oversee over a thousand people each. 

In other words, consolidating them wouldn't go very far in achieving the savings the department is reportedly being demanded to find, said Mr. Perry. 

He is arguing that all this demonstrates how the department's hands are tied. Assuming that the department is being requested to cut in a big way, as media reports have suggested; that it won't significantly cut spending in other areas, like operations or equipment; and that it wants to free up money and personnel to funnel into new dilemmas like how to integrate all the lessons learned from the combat mission in Afghanistan—the department will need to address non-Ottawa senior staff. 

Defence Minister Peter MacKay issued a statement to Embassy in response to questions about the report and the issue of having to cut or reorganize non-Ottawa headquarters personnel. 

"This government has made unprecedented investments in the Canadian Forces. Since 2006, the defence budget has grown by more than $6 billion, an average of over $1 billion a year," reads Mr. MacKay's statement. 

"However, with the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan and a transition to a more normal operational tempo there is an effect on how the department plans and ultimately allocates its funding. These plans will be communicated following Budget 2012." 

Other cuts are being reported as Canada-wide. For example, the Ottawa Citizen suggested March 12 that the Canadian army is expected to lose 697 civilian support jobs. It noted that these cuts would come down not just in Ontario and Quebec, but also the Atlantic area, and the West. 

Philippe Lagassé, an assistant professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa who focuses on defence, said he agreed with the fundamental assertion that the department would need to look beyond Ottawa to find cuts. 

"I think you need to go outside of Ottawa in terms of just looking at the larger CF footprint across the country. I don't just mean in terms of personnel, I mean in terms of bases, in terms of infrastructure," he said. 

"Any serious discussion about trying to maintain the current capital program under the existing budget will require that some money move into that capital budget in a significant fashion. The distribution just doesn't make sense." 

But he also pointed out that changing the structure of environmental commands "could really have a good deal of impact on readiness," and in that sense, the department will likely push back on any decision in this regard. 

Another observer, Rideau Institute president Steven Staples, said he felt Canada was already overspending on national defence in the first place. "There is certainly a problem with the tooth-to-tail ratio as Leslie pointed out. However, the enormous capital spending cannot be left untouched," he wrote in an email. 


cmeyer@embassymag.ca


----------



## Pusser

I don't think this is particularly well-argued.  It simply focuses on numbers and says nothing about what these HQs are actually doing.  What everybody seems to neglect in these conversations is that reducing the numbers in HQs also reduces the ability of these HQs to perform the staff work necessary in a modern armed force.  Therefore, the staff work is simply downloaded onto the operational units, who don't have time to do it, so it gets neglected.  Before the argument that we do too much unnecessary  staff work pops up, let me just say that the same people screaming for reduced HQs will also be the ones demanding public inquiries into lost money and equipment, which inevitably will be the result of neglected staff work. How many inquiries have been stymied by the lack of proper records, because there was no one available to keep them?


----------



## dapaterson

Pusser said:
			
		

> I don't think this is particularly well-argued.  It simply focuses on numbers and says nothing about what these HQs are actually doing.  What everybody seems to neglect in these conversations is that reducing the numbers in HQs also reduces the ability of these HQs to perform the staff work necessary in a modern armed force.  Therefore, the staff work is simply downloaded onto the operational units, who don't have time to do it, so it gets neglected.  Before the argument that we do too much unnecessary  staff work pops up, let me just say that the same people screaming for reduced HQs will also be the ones demanding public inquiries into lost money and equipment, which inevitably will be the result of neglected staff work. How many inquiries have been stymied by the lack of proper records, because there was no one available to keep them?



We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven.  


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.


----------



## Teeps74

dapaterson said:
			
		

> We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven.
> 
> 
> I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:
> 
> Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)
> 
> Three Reg F Bde HQs
> 
> Ten Res F Bde HQs
> 
> Four Area support group HQs
> 
> One training command HQ
> 
> One subordinate training formation HQ
> 
> One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.
> 
> 
> If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.
> 
> There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.



Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...


----------



## dapaterson

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).



Why is work backlooged?  Because (a) we have managers, not leaders, in key positions, whose timorous bleating prevents delegation of authority and responsibility to lower levels; (b) we have never modernized processes, so we still think a piece of paper is needed for everything, and must have a covering letter (properly formatted) before being sent along - we're stupid enough to print documents, sign the, scan them and send them along, where the next level prints them and repeats the process; (c) no one is empowered to speak truth to power - for example, "CDS, you can't order reservists to attend a function in uniform and simultaneously tell them they are not on duty and not entitled to pay"



> The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.



You owe me a new keyboard.  The dot coms are not operationally effective.  Their staffs are bloated (oh, sorry, "are designed with surge capacity in mind").

Op Athena was a reinforced battalion.  That's it.  No more.  Not a corps in Europe.  We contributed a token sized force to an international operation.  The staff work to support a battalion is not onerous or overly demanding - except we chose to make it so.



> So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.



We have plenty of policy.  Nowhere does it say "We need operational HQs in an industrial park, right beside a compressed gas storage facility".  Nowhere does it say "The Army can't do FE for Dom Ops."  Nowhere does it say "General Rick's obsessive Americanism was the right model to adopt".   In fact, we've even got three retired generals who assessed what was done and said, essentially "Um, you might want to rethink this..."


----------



## Teeps74

The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.

Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.


----------



## dapaterson

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.
> 
> Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.



There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.


----------



## Teeps74

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.



The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).
> 
> The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.
> 
> So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.
> 
> ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...




From my soft, old, word out seat, far outside the problem I must disagree: I think the best, perhaps the only way, to reform the staff system is to *slash and burn*, massively, so that commanders and principle staff officers, no matter how weak, must reform or die resign in disgrace.

I do not fear mass resignations (or, better, firings) of GOFOs: I am convinced that half the RCN captains and CA/RCAF colonels are already well prepared to be MGens and, since I believe the CF is, generally, over-ranked by one level in most _higher_ HQs, we can afford a huge exodus of what is, in some (fairly large) measure, deadwood.

BUT: not all the nonsense staff work is the CF's fault. Our, Canadian, political and bureaucratic leadership is also both weak and, worse, inept. Even 20 years ago we were burdened with excess _management_ and _measurement_ by the bureaucratic centre and no one in DND or the CF, not successive MNDs, not any DM after Fowler, and no CDS, as far as I knew, was willing to go to the centre (cabinet, PCO, TB and some agencies) and say _"This is BS and we are having none of it and I am ready, willing and, indeed, happy to resign over it."_ (Only VAdm Chuck Thomas got close, and he resigned, publicly and (briefly ~ because the media isn't interested) loudly over the issue of the CDS refusing to own up to the many and varied problems that faced the CF and, in effect, toeing the government's line even when it was military rubbish. Thomas' beef was with _Prince John_ de Chastelain, not with the Department or the government which, he agreed, was allowed to make silly decisions, absent clear, honest military advice.)

I will not profess to say how we should be organized, except to say that having 20± level 1 (three star (equivalent)) organizations is too rich for an institutions with about 130,000 military (full and part time) and civilian members. I understand that the DM, like all DMs, has a requirement for some very senior civil servants to manage major functions like policy, finance, materiel and human resources and I understand that the CDS can only exercise command through a national HQ (one or two more L1s) and some (maybe only four or five?) subordinate HQs. Surely we can get by with 10-15 L1s, not 20. (And I am suggesting that, no matter what, CSEC survives along with a JAG, a Surgeon General a chief defence scientist and a PR machine ~ but they needn't ALL be at the "top table.")


----------



## Edward Campbell

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.
> 
> The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.




Then we should have a single _joint_ staff in Ottawa and some, say four, _unified/joint_ commands scattered across the country into which nearly all RCN, Army and RCAF formations and units fit. Maybe we need professional heads of service (CNS, CGS and CAS) in Ottawa to handle special to service doctrine, training and equipment requirements matters and a Chief of Military Personnel to handle postings and careers and _joint_ career courses and maybe we need a separate, _joint_ Special Operations Organization, but I am convinced that we you the CF can do more, better and faster, with a lot less than they have now.


----------



## Loachman

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.
> 
> The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.



I completely disagree.

I have yet to see any positive effect from the establishment of the dot.coms.

The only effects that I have seen are confusion and delay and self-justifying busy-work.

I spent eight years as the Helicopter Booking Guy at LFCA HQ, as a Class A Reservist. I turned down several offers of Class B, as there wasn't enough work to justify that. As a result of the establishment of the dot.coms, I was replaced by a full-time LCol, full-time Maj, full-time Capt, part-time Capt, full-time WO, and a handful of 2Lt OJT guys.

The Land Force Area system was established largely to handle domestic ops. It replaced the earlier regional system, wherein the six regions were commanded by the biggest HQ located within their boundaries. It was recognized that the Army should take the lead for all land-based domestic ops, supported by the other two environmental commands as required. The other two environmental commands were responsible for their traditional roles - air defence and SAR and maritime ops. I saw no logical reason to change it.

I never saw any indication of a lack of willingness for one environmental command to support another as appropriate. My first time working at LFCA was during the Ice Storm, and we had Air Command pushing far more airframes at us, of all varieties, than we could employ.


----------



## Pusser

dapaterson said:
			
		

> We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven.
> 
> 
> I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:
> 
> Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)
> 
> Three Reg F Bde HQs
> 
> Ten Res F Bde HQs
> 
> Four Area support group HQs
> 
> One training command HQ
> 
> One subordinate training formation HQ
> 
> One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.
> 
> 
> If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.
> 
> There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.



No arguments here.  However, the problem we often see with the hack and slash approach to savings is a complete lack of thought or rationalization.  I have often seen staff processes eliminated because one party thought they were useless, but never bothered to consult with other parties that in fact, needed them.  CFSS Upgrade is a prime example.  Sure, the system needed upgrading and replacement, but what we got in return was a far less effective system for which we are still paying the cost.

I'm all for finding efficiencies and eliminating unnecessary processes, but  we need to put more thought into it than "look at all the people we've got in HQs.  They're obviously top heavy."  Some offices are indeed overstaffed (I've been in one), but others are grossly understaffed.  We first need to rationalize the processes, then we can look at the numbers and adjust accordingly.  

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...


----------



## GAP

Pusser said:
			
		

> We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...and empire builders...


----------



## Old Sweat

I wish there was a simple solution, but there is not. Let me drag a favorite dead horse out of the stable. The unified training system, which was touted as performance oriented when it first appeared, was designed to provide meaningful career progression, instead of, at least in the army, to fill an operational need. Maybe that is just semantics, and I suspect equipment is technical enough to require more specialization, but we used to get by without the masses of paper involved in the CTS and CTP system. Some of our "trades" got screwed around in the sixties because the MND of the time decided it would be a neat thing to reduce the number of NCM trades to 100 from the umpteen zillion or how so many there were.

Is there an answer that would work without putting you folks through the same horrendous mess that drove Edward and me to drink? (That's our excuse, anyway.) I don't think so, and I wouldn't put anybody except maybe the Taliban through what we endured. However, maybe there are steps that could be eliminated or streamlined in the various procedures we do without invoking the law of unintended consequences or breaking the Financial Administration Act or whatever.


----------



## GAP

Is that not what Leslie was doing?


----------



## armyvern

Pusser said:
			
		

> ... CFSS Upgrade is a prime example.  Sure, the system needed upgrading and replacement, but what we got in return was a far less effective system for which we are still paying the cost.
> ...



Well, I can assure you that back when I was a Cpl and the visits began by the project staff to the bases on CFSSU, we troops told them that their plan would not work after their briefings. Paperworkless? Not when TB requires a signature for audit purposes. Problem was, unless the TB is going to change the rules on what is required, CF projects deemed to make things efficient while neglecting that certain rules of policy exist have the opposite effect. Instead, we now have 3 pages of 8.5 X 11 printing off for a single transaction instead of a measley 2.5 X 8.5 piece of paper. 

In the old days, before this "cost effective, cost-efficient, and enabling" CFSSU was rolled out, I could receipt, issue and distribute a triwall of assorted nuts, bolts and screws from 7 CFSD in a matter of minutes with minimal paperwork. That same task now takes hours and costs an entire tree it's life. So much for the supposed cost savings.

I often wonder just how much the expenditures on photocopy paper have gone up in the CF over the past decade since the roll out. Where we used to keep a single pallet of it in the normal warehouse, we now have to hold shelves full of it.

By my estimation, the project gawds probably missed all this important policy stuff because the CFSSU coincided with the rise of powerpoint (a sacred cow!!) and the quick following death by it. Now known as "slide-decks" of course because it sounds so much more professional. I'm quite sure the CF could also benefit both financially, and personnel wise, should we cut our quota of "necessary and critically important to all manner of doing business" slide decks by a few thousand a year (and the trees killed by them too with the requirement to print them out in all their glory because people can't simply take notes anymore).


----------



## fraserdw

GAP said:
			
		

> Is that not what Leslie was doing?



Leslie was quitting and he knew it.  His report was for his historical reputation not current consumption.  Up to a few years ago he was one of the big spenders.


----------



## George Wallace

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> By my estimation, the project gawds probably missed all this important policy stuff because the CFSSU coincided with the rise of powerpoint (a sacred cow!!) and the quick following death by it. Now known as "slide-decks" of course because it sounds so much more professional.



 > I still have Slide Decks at home.   All 35 mm.  What is old is new again.  Even have the projector.  Go figure.


----------



## George Wallace

GAP said:
			
		

> Is that not what Leslie was doing?



I was under the impression that he was recommending that there be massive cuts (The Class B cuts weren't enough) to Staffs, Regular Force and Civilian employees and contractors within DND, not just the CF.  At the same time, is he not looking at coming back as a 'consultant' under contract to fullfill that task?


----------



## McG

Pusser said:
			
		

> No arguments here.  However, the problem we often see with the hack and slash approach to savings is a complete lack of thought or rationalization. ...
> 
> I'm all for finding efficiencies and eliminating unnecessary processes, but  we need to put more thought into it than "look at all the people we've got in HQs.  They're obviously top heavy."  Some offices are indeed overstaffed (I've been in one), but others are grossly understaffed.  We first need to rationalize the processes, then we can look at the numbers and adjust accordingly.
> 
> We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...


And we must not fall into the trap of "share the pain."  If a process or HQ does not need to exist, then eliminate all the positions associated with that.  The idea that everyone should take a 10% hit is the easy escape.

Between CANADACOM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM, we probably could do better with a single OPSCOM or a revived DCDS.  There are also a selection of intermediate HQs that could be removed from largely linear chains of command.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> Between CANADACOM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM, we probably could do better with a single OPSCOM or a revived DCDS.  There are also a selection of intermediate HQs that could be removed from largely linear chains of command.



My question is "how do we know this"?  Every time I see proposals for organizational changes (or most other changes in the CF) there is a lot "we need this, that is better, or this will be optimal" with no quantifiable reasons as to why.

Is the goal to simply reduce staff size/positions?  Or is to enable more streamlined staff communication?  At what levels and for what subject matter?

Don't get me wrong, I'm one of the biggest proponents of cutting needless positions and organizations - not for the sake of efficiency but because much of the literature points to the reality that leaner staffs are more effective (i.e. timely and responsive).  But first it needs to be determined exactly what effective is - Armyvern and Loachman have brought some interesting examples up.  Once we have this, we can start taking an objective look at processes to determine what needs to be cut and what doesn't.  Effectiveness should be based upon the two tasks of the staff.

The second part is to determine a method to instill some institutional discipline so that when we get a system that has quantifiable proof that it is effective and optimal, some guy can't tinker with it (i.e. expand) without first proving, with a little bit of rigour, that the expansion will actually improve the organization as opposed to simply act as a large employment mechanism.  I don't know why staffs and HQs are so susceptible to tinkering when something like an Infantry Battalion has featured the same organization and numbers for the last century.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> My question is "how do we know this"?  Every time I see proposals for organizational changes (or most other changes in the CF) there is a lot "we need this, that is better, or this will be optimal" with no quantifiable reasons as to why.
> 
> Is the goal to simply reduce staff size/positions?  Or is to enable more streamlined staff communication?  At what levels and for what subject matter?
> 
> Don't get me wrong, I'm one of the biggest proponents of cutting needless positions and organizations - not for the sake of efficiency but because much of the literature points to the reality that leaner staffs are more effective (i.e. timely and responsive).  *But first it needs to be determined exactly what effective is - Armyvern and Loachman have brought some interesting examples up.  Once we have this, we can start taking an objective look at processes to determine what needs to be cut and what doesn't.*  Effectiveness should be based upon the two tasks of the staff.
> 
> The second part is to determine a method to instill some institutional discipline so that when we get a system that has quantifiable proof that it is effective and optimal, some guy can't tinker with it (i.e. expand) without first proving, with a little bit of rigour, that the expansion will actually improve the organization as opposed to simply act as a large employment mechanism.  I don't know why staffs and HQs are so susceptible to tinkering when something like an Infantry Battalion has featured the same organization and numbers for the last century.




But if you try to do that, the part in *big yellow*, then you will spend millions - likely several tens of millions - on consultants and it will take years and years ~ slashing and burning a whole level or two, quite arbitrarily, is more likely to produce equally good, maybe even better results, with less pain and much, much more quickly.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> But if you try to do that, the part in *big yellow*, then you will spend millions - likely several tens of millions - on consultants and it will take years and years ~ slashing and burning a whole level or two, quite arbitrarily, is more likely to produce equally good, maybe even better results, with less pain and much, much more quickly.



It shouldn't - we are a profession for a reason.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

And yet, sadly, Edward is probably right.  It will have to be done quickly and brutally and without much analysis if there is to be any hope of success.  In my experience, a HQ will fight to the death (and it's very last subordinate) before it will cut itself.


----------



## GnyHwy

OK, assuming that we cut several HQs by a couple LCols, a handful of Majors, and a crapload of Capt/MWO/WOs.  

Where do they all go?  The units aren't short those ranks.  Arguably, the Capt/MWO/WOs are doing an easier job at the units.  Going to the field and getting your boots dirty does not directly equate to a hard job.

Many of the aforementioned ranks that have been in staff postions for a long time are probably still learning the job.  Like any other job in the military, you get good at it around th time you are being moved out.

Persons who either volunteered or were voluntold to go to HQs, did so by losing their field pay, which for guys with a lot of time equates to about 12K a year after tax.  Since the creation of field pay, less unit soldiers are volunteering to take the leap.  


Edited to add: I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Gnyhwy-
There are really two issues: PYs and actual bodies.  Freed up PYs can be redistributed to units and purposes that need them more.  As for the actual bodies- you are correct in that it may create a largish pool of senior people with no jobs.  This can be fixed by use of career gates ( people have forgotten that we used to use these regularly in the early 90s and before) or simply by having CDS direct the bottom 5 percent of a given occupation at certain rank ( for all I know, that may describe me)  

The bottom line is- we all serve at the pleasure of the Crown...


----------



## Brasidas

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> OK, assuming that we cut several HQs by a couple LCols, a handful of Majors, and a crapload of Capt/MWO/WOs.
> 
> Where do they all go?  The units aren't short those ranks.  Arguably, the Capt/MWO/WOs are doing an easier job at the units.  Going to the field and getting your boots dirty does not directly equate to a hard job.
> 
> Many of the aforementioned ranks that have been in staff postions for a long time are probably still learning the job.  Like any other job in the military, you get good at it around th time you are being moved out.
> 
> Persons who either volunteered or were voluntold to go to HQs, did so by losing their field pay, which for guys with a lot of time equates to about 12K a year after tax.  Since the creation of field pay, less unit soldiers are volunteering to take the leap.
> 
> 
> Edited to add: I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.



They get retirement packages and get hired three years down the road at higher pay as experienced civilian employees, consultants and contractors?


----------



## GnyHwy

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Gnyhwy-
> There are really two issues: PYs and actual bodies.  Freed up PYs can be redistributed to units and purposes that need them more.  As for the actual bodies- you are correct in that it may create a largish pool of senior people with no jobs.  This can be fixed by use of career gates ( people have forgotten that we used to use these regularly in the early 90s and before) or simply by having CDS direct the bottom 5 percent of a given occupation at certain rank ( for all I know, that may describe me)
> 
> The bottom line is- we all serve at the pleasure of the Crown...



I could definitely agree with the shift in PYs, especially to the schools.  The schools constantly run courses with only a fraction of the instructor bill; and sometimes those same guys are running 2 courses concurrently.  As for the units, you would have to create entirely new units to make the positions.  As well, you would be asking a senior HQ soldier to go back to a unit and be employed in a job that he already did 5 years ago.  It would the same as telling a Sgt that his unit is overborne in Sect Comds, so we are going to move him to another unit where he will be a 2i/c.

As far as the bottom 5% goes, those would be the newly promoted inexperienced unit soldiers, not the experienced/waiting for promotion/used to be units soldiers in HQs.  To throw away many years of experience in the name of cuts, doesn't make any sense to me.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It shouldn't - we are a profession for a reason.




I was in NDHQ, in a modestly senior capacity, in the '80s and '90s; we went through reorg after reorg and cut after cut after cut, most accompanied by expensive (and useless) consultants' reports. Cuts are hard: no one likes making them, no one likes being cut; _professionalism_ doesn't really enter into it, good, solid professionals can and do disagree about how the CF should be organized and how the staff should work ... it appears, to me, as an outsider looking in, that you, the CF, have too many HQs and some (many? most?) of them are too large and that results in unproductive 'busywork' - reports and regular returns on the number of reports and returns be made. The consultants just bother everyone by making them all fill in a new report on reports and returns.

In my opinion it is better for one, thoroughly bloody minded, very senior officer - who really doesn't much like his colleagues and who really doesn't want to be CDS - to take the proverbial bull by the horns and restructure the C2 superstructure. (It would help if he was the VCDS and had an explicit remit from the MND to do slash and burn.)

I recall a senior officer, back in the '60s, who told us about the massive reorg of CFHQ in the mid-'60s ... he told us that on leaving his office for a meeting he said to his secretary, "If the boss calls, get his name." Reorgs are neither easy nor tidy.


----------



## GnyHwy

Brasidas said:
			
		

> They get retirement packages and get hired three years down the road at higher pay as experienced civilian employees, consultants and contractors?



Yes that is a possibility but, won't they be the first ones to be cut; they may cease to exist.

So in essence, with this solution, you are replacing uniforms with suits that get paid more money.


----------



## GnyHwy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> In my opinion it is better for one, thoroughly bloody minded, very senior officer - who really doesn't much like his colleagues and who really doesn't want to be CDS - to take the proverbial bull by the horns and restructure the C2 superstructure. (It would help if he was the VCDS and had an explicit remit from the MND to do slash and burn.)



I could buy into this for sure, but it can't be a suggestion, or a study for all to read; it also cannot be a vision or "way forward".  It must be an order that is followed through and executed.

Perhaps create another HQ to pull this off.


----------



## Infanteer

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I could buy into this for sure, but it can't be a suggestion, or a study for all to read; it also cannot be a vision or "way forward".  It must be an order that is followed through and executed.



...and you have to institute some organizational discipline to prohibit such bloat from happening again.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ...and you have to institute some organizational discipline to prohibit such bloat from happening again.




Wait ... you want to move from the just barely doable to the downright miraculous. I called for a bloody minded senior officer, not a messiah.


----------



## GnyHwy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Don't get me wrong, I'm one of the biggest proponents of cutting needless positions and organizations - not for the sake of efficiency but because much of the literature points to the reality that leaner staffs are more effective (i.e. timely and responsive).  But first it needs to be determined exactly what effective is - Armyvern and Loachman have brought some interesting examples up.  Once we have this, we can start taking an objective look at processes to determine what needs to be cut and what doesn't.  Effectiveness should be based upon the two tasks of the staff.



I agree with this, and it is easy to argue against this with simple dollar signs.  Yes it will cost a lot of money, but without it the cost may be much greater down the road; and you won't be able to measure it in dollars.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Wait ... you want to move from the just barely doable to the downright miraculous. I called for a bloody minded senior officer, not a messiah.



If you believe, he will come....


----------



## Old Sweat

In his memoirs Sir Arthur Harris wrote about his experience as Vice Chief of the Air Staff before he moved to take over Bomber Command. The staff of the  Air Ministry was extremely busy - 15 to 18 hours days six and seven days a week was the norm - and nothing was being accomplished. Harris was constantly receiving urgent pleas for more and more staff positions in the headquarters, but he took another tack. Sir Arthur ordered an immediate 40% cut across the board at all rank levels and in all directorates. Suddenly the work load dropped to manageable proportions, morale soared and the productvity took off for the stratosphere. He may or may not have embellished the story, but as others have noted, smaller headquarters seems to work better and quicker.


----------



## mariomike

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In his memoirs Sir Arthur Harris wrote about his experience as Vice Chief of the Air Staff before he moved to take over Bomber Command. The staff of the  Air Ministry was extremely busy - 15 to 18 hours days six and seven days a week was the norm - and nothing was being accomplished. Harris was constantly receiving urgent pleas for more and more staff positions in the headquarters, but he took another tack. Sir Arthur ordered an immediate 40% cut across the board at all rank levels and in all directorates. Suddenly the work load dropped to manageable proportions, morale soared and the productvity took off for the stratosphere. He may or may not have embellished the story, but as others have noted, smaller headquarters seems to work better and quicker.



That's exactly the man I was thinking of when I first read the title of this thread. 
"Bert Harris was the sort of buccaneer whom Churchill particularly liked."
Quoted from, "Churchill and Morton" by R.W. Thomson page 44

From what I understand, this quality also endeared him to his aircrews, even though they almost never saw him.


----------



## armyvern

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> OK, assuming that we cut several HQs by a couple LCols, a handful of Majors, and a crapload of Capt/MWO/WOs.
> 
> Where do they all go?  The units aren't short those ranks.  Arguably, the Capt/MWO/WOs are doing an easier job at the units.  Going to the field and getting your boots dirty does not directly equate to a hard job.
> 
> Many of the aforementioned ranks that have been in staff postions for a long time are probably still learning the job.  Like any other job in the military, you get good at it around th time you are being moved out.
> 
> Persons who either volunteered or were voluntold to go to HQs, did so by losing their field pay, which for guys with a lot of time equates to about 12K a year after tax.  Since the creation of field pay, less unit soldiers are volunteering to take the leap.
> 
> 
> Edited to add: I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.



Something I already visited earlier in this thread. The ratio of Capts to troops is amazing. There's too many. Retire them and re-invest those PYs into boots-on-the-ground troops (ie Ptes/Cpls). Bases gave up PYs (in many cases were forced to give up) thus SWE in order to fund/build all those staff positions at the dotcoms.  You are forgetting that that staff came from_ somewhere_ (troop positions and SWE converted into HQ staff posns/SWE) and it can be put back where it is required and should never have left from in the first place.

I imagine we will see this happen when the empires freeze over.

Throwing away them and their experience? Come on, their "spots" exist now precisely because we tossed critical boots on the ground PYs and SWE aside to fund them in the first place.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> And yet, sadly, Edward is probably right.  It will have to be done quickly and brutally and without much analysis if there is to be any hope of success.  In my experience, a HQ will fight to the death (and it's very last subordinate) before it will cut itself.



At LFWA when the new COS arrived in 2010, he apparently took one look at the structure of the HQ and decided that it was too large and too cumbersome.  He did not have to hire consultants to reorganize the HQ.  He convened a meeting of 10-12 pers from across all rank levels in the HQ and included two of the main formations (customer reps if you will) and sat over a few pitchers of beer and a whiteboard, and re-designed the HQ from the bottom up.

Not surprisingly, he did away with the four (four!!!!) ACOS's, amalgamated the G and J staffs, and developed a flat continental system from G1 to G9.  The net impact was to allow the creation of a 4 person G5 cell (planning horizon of 180 to 365 days) and a two man G7 cell (One year plus).  The HQ is now more agile, and has shrunk by about 20 pers over the last two years.  I have heard that the COS would like to make the HQ even smaller (on the principle that HQs get busier because they are bigger, and not vice versa), and that he plans to amalgamate the 5 and 7 shops at a savings of another PY or two.

All of that to say that change is possible, and that it does not have to be a drawn out process.  I will acknowledge Infanteer's point about ensuring that the structure is defensible, so that "the new guy" can't reorganize at a whim.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Edited to add: I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.



Ugh.  Before we add one more PY to the schools, it is time to review the sheer volume of Individual Training that we have imposed on ourselves.  If i was Boss for a day, I would take available PYS and:


give back the 100 PYs taken from the 3 Light battalions
buy back the two Armoured Recce Squadrons we cashed in over the last two years
Flesh out the combat support platoons (Pioneers first)
Establish an anti-armour capability again
Create an additional FSG in each of the Service Battalions (325ish PYs each

I would NOT establish 144 man ASICs.  I would NOT increase the size of Bde HQ.  I would NOT invest PYs in Individual training.

The Field Force is on its knees.  Time to look after it.


----------



## Old Sweat

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Ugh.  Before we add one more PY to the schools, it is time to review the sheer volume of Individual Training that we have imposed on ourselves.  If i was Boss for a day, I would take available PYS and:
> 
> 
> give back the 100 PYs taken from the 3 Light battalions
> buy back the two Armoured Recce Squadrons we cashed in over the last two years
> Flesh out the combat support platoons (Pioneers first)
> Establish an anti-armour capability again
> Create an additional FSG in each of the Service Battalions (325ish PYs each
> 
> I would NOT establish 144 man ASICs.  I would NOT increase the size of Bde HQ.  I would NOT invest PYs in Individual training.
> 
> The Field Force is on its knees.  Time to look after it.



There was a surge of robbing units in the late eighties in order to staff the project management staffs that were created for all the kit that supposedly was going to flow from the 1986 White Paper. The army was actively planning a division that would periodically concentrate in Germany for exercises, including reactivation of the Fort Garry Horse as a recce regiment and the creation of a MLRS regiment for the gunners. No extra tanks, by the way. The Leo 1s in Germany, including the reserves, would be divvied up into two regiments, each of two squadrons. The plan came crashing down in late Spring 1989 in the early weeks of RV 89 when an announcement of hefty defence cuts was made. I wonder if we are going to see an encore. It would be nice to see the manpower that went to various headquarters redirected back to the front line, but I wouldn't bet the farm on it happening.

I commented above about the creation of the CFTS bureaucracy. We went from a relatively simple system in the army where even the paper required to plan and conduct a fairly senior course went from a document maybe a half inch thick called a Block and Detailed Syllabus to a shelf full of three ring binders. A bunch of people obviously had to create these. Now think how many good people vegged away writing documents for one course and then take a look at the massive and diverse training load each year.


----------



## fraserdw

I would remove everyone from training that does not have at least 1 tour in the trade core functions.


----------



## fraserdw

The biggest issue with HQs is that they re-org everytime a new CO or COS is posted in.  HQs needed to be written doctrinely and kept that way.  That writting should allow for flexibility not immobility.


----------



## Teeps74

Since everyone is "bloody -minded" the only approach which would work, would be to throw the baby out with the bath water, and start again. From scratch. Eliminate all the environments completely, none of this passive aggressive crap, get rid of them. The three environments do frequently work AGAINST each other, and frequently do not like doing joint things, where by necessity another environment is their commander.

Follow the Marine Corps model. Everyone fights, throw the rest out. Only one environment. 

Think of it, three entire HQs eliminated, and reduced to one HQ (the vision of Unification).

Our current model of warfare, big and small DEMANDS joint operations. Rolling back the clock ten years, and well... There was a reason why Transformation was foisted upon us.


----------



## armyvern

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> At LFWA when the new COS arrived in 2010, he apparently took one look at the structure of the HQ and decided that it was too large and too cumbersome.  He did not have to hire consultants to reorganize the HQ.  He convened a meeting of 10-12 pers from across all rank levels in the HQ and included two of the main formations (customer reps if you will) and sat over a few pitchers of beer and a whiteboard, and re-designed the HQ from the bottom up.
> ...



All at the COS' personal cost of both money and time (to drink) of a couple of pitchers of beer?

Someone, quick --- clone this COS and propagate him throughout the CF hierarchy; we need much more of this interjection of common sense.


----------



## Infanteer

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Ugh.  Before we add one more PY to the schools, it is time to review the sheer volume of Individual Training that we have imposed on ourselves.  If i was Boss for a day, I would take available PYS and:
> 
> 
> give back the 100 PYs taken from the 3 Light battalions
> buy back the two Armoured Recce Squadrons we cashed in over the last two years
> Flesh out the combat support platoons (Pioneers first)
> Establish an anti-armour capability again
> Create an additional FSG in each of the Service Battalions (325ish PYs each
> 
> I would NOT establish 144 man ASICs.  I would NOT increase the size of Bde HQ.  I would NOT invest PYs in Individual training.
> 
> The Field Force is on its knees.  Time to look after it.



Hey, did you look at my crib sheet!   :nod:


----------



## Infanteer

Teeps74 said:
			
		

> Since everyone is "bloody -minded" the only approach which would work, would be to throw the baby out with the bath water, and start again. From scratch. Eliminate all the environments completely, none of this passive aggressive crap, get rid of them. The three environments do frequently work AGAINST each other, and frequently do not like doing joint things, where by necessity another environment is their commander.
> 
> Follow the Marine Corps model. Everyone fights, throw the rest out. Only one environment.
> 
> Think of it, three entire HQs eliminated, and reduced to one HQ (the vision of Unification).
> 
> Our current model of warfare, big and small DEMANDS joint operations. Rolling back the clock ten years, and well... There was a reason why Transformation was foisted upon us.



We saw that attempt in the 60s, it was called Unification.

Something like this was also similar to what General Hillier's original Transformation proposal entailed.

Between the bureaucracy and some entrenched cultural interests, they never survived first contact.


----------



## Edward Campbell

It's not my problem and I never thought I was smart enough to tell the VCDS of my day how to do it, but ... some principles:

1. The fleet and field forces are top priority ~ we have to have good ones, adequately if not always fully staffed and adequately equipped. They need enough of the right people;

2. Logistics support and training come second, tied for second. Schools need the best people and postings to schools ought to be stepping stones to promotion; and

3. Command and control is fourth on the list. For officers, especially, postings to HQs ought to be an _honour_ and hideously hard work ought to be the norm, because those in the HQ know that those in the logistics support, training and combat units need and deserve the best from the staff.

We ought to have a clear, simple organization that is economical and efficient in peace and for low intensity operations and which can grow, as necessary, without reinventing the entire system. It is the 21st century and *joint* operations are the norm ... it's time the CF joined the party. While single service ships, battalions and squadrons are simple and great for special to service and part of service training - we don't need sailors to manage and train RCAF squadrons and we probably don't need _fighter jocks_ to manage and train Air Transport squadrons, etc - _formations_ should be easy to make *joint* and _higher_ formations ought to be inherently *joint* and the whole thing should be managed by a _*joint* staff_ in Ottawa.

DND and the CF, once it gets its own house in order, ought to challenge the government, itself, especially the PCO, to _manage_ more efficiently and effectively because some if the problems that plague DND, and that create much of the unnecessary _sturm und drang_ that seems to demand more people in more HQs doing "busy work" for no useful purpose, originate with the cabinet and the PCO.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

fraserdw said:
			
		

> I would remove everyone from training that does not have at least 1 tour in the trade core functions.



I have no idea what this means...


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Hey, did you look at my crib sheet!   :nod:



Meh - you work, I take the credit.

It is the natural order of things... :-*


----------



## McG

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I could agree with topping up the national schools with with experienced staffers; this would increase the level of training.


I don't know that growth is required.  Resource leveling across the Army training system might go just as far (or farther) toward meeting needs.


----------



## Infanteer

If manning levels were stabilized between the field units and the schools, then we could dismantle the tasking empire that has been built over the last decade.  There are staff solely dedicated to pushing around electronic tasks to different units to be filled - these fill inordinate amounts of G3 time and cause headaches with "no fills" and last minute scrambles.  What would we do if a school had the resources it needed to teach the courses it needed to teach and the units were left alone to do their training?   :blotto:

A good step is the outsourcing/distributed courses that are being conducted now.


----------



## Old Sweat

The challenge is peak periods such as the summer. If a school was staffed to handle it, then staff could be under employed for the rest of the year. 

The tasking empire was created by LGen Stan Waters when he was the DCDS because everybody and her brother were sending orders to subordinate formations and units to provide people for various taskings, some legit and many not. Stan, who had a notoriously short fuze, went nuts in late October 72 when D Ceremonial presented himself to complain that 2 Brigade had turned down direction from him to provide a guard of honour for Rememberance Day in Ottawa. It had escaped the Director, who was a civvy, that he had jumped well down the chain of command, and did not have the authority to direct anybody to do anything, except for his flunkies. Stan the Man, explained the facts of life to him in words he had probably learned in the FSSF and 1 Can Para, along with a reminder that there were umpteen troops in NDHQ who could go on parade.

The tasking world was created shortly later. It also probably requires a review.


----------



## OldSolduer

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> Someone, quick --- clone this COS and propagate him throughout the CF hierarchy; we need much more of this interjection of common sense.



Common sense? SACRILEGE!


----------



## fraserdw

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> I have no idea what this means...



What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.


----------



## Infanteer

fraserdw said:
			
		

> What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.



Any proof that we are in dire need "combat experienced trainers" or that we are "immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving"?


----------



## Pusser

fraserdw said:
			
		

> What I mean is people who did their tour in their trade not in a HQ.  There are folks walking around claiming tour experience who never met a Afghan who did not have a broom in his hands.  What we need is combat experienced trainers and trades trainers who applied their trade outside of KAF.  We need to develop a whole new way of business, do away with the managers who lead by requiring SORs and CONOPs and 5 years of project development to develop a new train device.  We are becoming immobile administratively to the point that chaos and careerists are the only thing still moving.



HQ experience IS experience and just as important to the whole process and as useful in the training system as experience on patrol.


----------



## OldSolduer

Pusser said:
			
		

> HQ experience IS experience and just as important to the whole process and as useful in the training system as experience on patrol.



One of our great failings is our inability to produce officers who can command at higher levels.....ie Corps and up. We have some great tactical and operational commanders.....


----------



## Edward Campbell

Historically it was always our weak point: Currie, aside, our 1914/18 era generals were a good, solid but hardly _inspired_ lot. The performance of our Army's generals in 1939/45 can be described, charitably, as _pedestrian_, in my opinion. Several historians including Jack Granatstein and Jack English have offered explanations; I tend to favour a combination of:

1. A career that neither attracted nor rewarded the sort of officer who might become a brilliant corps commander;

2. Political indifference, in the 1920s, and budget crises, in the 1930s, that denied our officers training and operational experience with the British Army; and

3. An _institutional_ predisposition towards caution and careerism.

The RCAF had, in my opinion, better officers - perhaps it was the nature of the service. They had no opportunity, however, to exercise higher command in battle because we fielded first Canadian squadrons, then some wings and finally (a) group(s) (was it more than one?). But RCAF officers showed great skill and ability in planning, implementing and managing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which was, arguably, a major Canadian contribution to the war.

The Navy were, I think, better yet. Officers like Harry Lay exercised senior command of Canadian and allied flotillas with skill and effectiveness.

Only one Canadian officer had a major allied (theatre) command in 1939/45: Rear Admiral Leonard W Murray who became Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic. He was an exceptionally able officer and a determined commander. But, I'm afraid he would not fit our modern conception of a military leader; it is hard for me to imagine a senior officer *less* like Rick Hillier or Walt Natynczyk, he was austere, remote and forbidding - perhaps (only said partially tongue in cheek) that's why he was so bloody good and today's generals are not so bloody good.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Private sector focused, but some good ideas in here about putting the HQ in its place (e.g., not meddling at the operational level). And I like the name of the consulting company that wrote it: it 'speaks' to me  ;D

SYMPTOMS OF AN AILING HEADQUARTERS

Are you finding it difficult to manage the complexity of a large, global operation?

• Has your corporate headquarters staff grown smaller without making business units more
market responsive?

• Or has the corporate headquarters staff remained stubbornly high while the rest of the
organization downsized?

• Are fast-growing divisions held back because they have to fight with troubled businesses
for resources?

• Does your company have trouble sharing information and transferring best practices across organizational lines?

• Do your business units have redundant service units?

• Have your division managers ever run the numbers on taking their businesses public?

• Are corporate cost allocations significantly higher than the value delivered to the business units?

If you answered yes, then chances are your company is ripe for a re-examination of the structure of corporate headquarters itself. Most companies that have restructured themselves to become more market-responsive have left the essence of their corporate center intact. We propose that a contemporary networked company needs a radically redesigned corporate headquarters structure, which we call the Global Core.

Booz & Company has been working with many organizations to make them more effective at doing their jobs. We have seen in each case that the more the divisions are required to look to headquarters for making decisions, reviewing and avoiding direct responsibility for their actions, the less effective they are in meeting the immediate challenges of doing business.

The test of any complex organization is whether the whole is worth more than the sum of its parts. Somehow the corporate headquarters has generally escaped that test. The value that the corporate center provides has always been assumed, but rarely measured. If it were measured, the corporate center might have a tough time justifying its existence.

It doesn’t have to be this way. We believe that by remaking itself as a Global Core, corporate headquarters can ably represent the corporation in the world of the public and investors, perform essential work for the operating divisions, provide leadership and create the context
for growth.

http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/uploads/Putting_Headquarters_in_Its_Place.pdf


----------



## Edward Campbell

OK, so lets imagine that I am the VCDS for a while   :  

The MND calls me to his office; there I meet with him, that DM and the CDS and a few hangers on.

"Ladies and gentlemen," says the Minister, "the Department seems, to cabinet anyway, to be, as our American friends say, _'all hat and no cattle'_. There is a perception that we are badly organized and that we founder about because we have too much bureaucracy and not enough at the _sharp end_. I don't mind telling you that we received a lot of mail in the wake of the Leslie report, almost all of it demanding that I force deep cuts in the HQ superstructure and staff. When the CDS declined to follow through I got even more critical mail.There is a perception, in cabinet and in the public, that we, you, actually, have too many people in too many HQs doing so much busy work that you and I lose sight of the aim; it appears that we don't talk to one another, here in DND, and that, consequently, the Associate Minister and I and, indeed, even the PM are embarrassed as events unfold for which we are unprepared."

"On the other hand," he went on, "Canadians, the media and the government remain mightily proud of the work our men and women in the fleet and the regiments, battalions and squadrons do whenever there is a crisis. So, we appear to have two militaries: one in ships, armoured vehicles and airplanes that works hard and well; and one that sits behind desks and works neither hard enough nor well enough."

"I want the command and control and management of DND and the CF overhauled. VCDS I am appointing you to lead this work - reporting directly to me if you run into problems, which I am confident will be few and far between. Some principles and contraints:

1. There are some sensible limits to what you can do to the Departmental staff, _per se_. The Deputy still must have ADMs for e.g. policy, finance, human resources and so on in order to fill his, and my, constitutional and legal mandates;

2. You are not going to make major changes to the National Defence Act - the CF will remain a _unified_ force, there must still be a Judge Advocate General and so on;

3. CSEC is off limits to you. It's mandate, operations and reporting relationships will remain unchanged;

3. While I expect some savings in PYs and dollars that is not the primary aim. The aim is to ensure that I, through the Deputy and the Chief, receive the best possible advice and information so that I can persuade cabinet to do what is best for Canada and that cabinet can, with confidence, make strategic decisions and send the CF into battle whenever and wherever necessary. But I hope that we will be able to _recycle_ several hundred people out of HQs and into ships and units. Of course we understand that ships and units are not in need of 50 year old lieutenant commanders and warrant officers so, once your reorganization plan is complete the government will approve a "buy out"plan to allow us to move quite a few people into early retirement and then hire new, young people to fill the slots in the fleet and the field force;

4. I expect the organization to be clear and simple - I want every sailor, soldier and RCAF member to understand, clearly, how tha chain of command works and I want everyone to know how they get their orders and support;

5. The CF is to be a _joint_ force, able to plan and conduct _joint_ and _combined_ operations on short notice; and

6. Although you may not, of course, direct any changes that go beyond DND we, cabinet, will listen to recommendations re: e.g. defence procurement and staffing."

I went back to my office and told my EA to arrange a conference call to most of the high priced help in Ottawa and to the commanders in the field. Meanwhile I took a blank piece of paper and began to _doodle_.

A few hours later I told the assembled (in a 13th floor conference room and on the video conference unit) multitude:

1. In brief, what the MND had told me earlier this morning; and

2. That I intended to disband the "dot coms," retore NDHQ as one, big, central HQ and replace the existing commands with four, geographically based _joint_ or _unified_ commands plus a Special Operations Group, controlled from NDHQ and an Expeditionary Force Group consisting of a HQ, with signals support and some support elements. The new _joint_ commands would be responsible for fleets, brigades, wings and bases which would remain, largely, unchanged. Three service chiefs - professional heads of service - in Ottawa would _manage_ single service doctrine, equipment requirements and training, including schools. But the schools would be part of their geographic _joint_ commands. There would be a single, _unified_ military personnel centre in Ottawa that would _manage_ recruiting, education and some, common to all services, individual training. ADM(Mat), a civilian, would _manage_ the third and fourth line military support functions. 

I then named a "tiger team" of five navy captains and army/RCAF colonels,* and two senior civil servants, all hand picked by me, who would be posted, ASAP, to Ottawa and who would, in a matter of weeks (12, at the most) produce an outline plan for the MND's approval. I estimated that the MND would need several days, maybe even a couple of weeks to consult with his cabinet colleagues before approving something very near to what I had proposed. I then proposed to name the new commanders and principle staff branch heads in NDHQ (to an *absolute maximum of 15* commanders, staff branch heads and ADMs) and my "tiger team" woud then work, for 12 more weeks, with similar teams named by each of them to design and staff the various HQs down to commander/lieutenant colonel and civilian equivalent level. After that six month planning period we would "fire the shot heard 'round DND and the CF" and implement the new structure.

I gave a few new principles:

1. Initially I was not overly concernbed about the size of HQs, except that -

a. I expected an overall savings of many hundred, possibly even a few thousand PYs - which would be converted into new PYs for ships, units and bases; and

b. I wanted a significant downranking in all HQs - specifically I told them that the new _joint commanders_ and major branch heads in Ottawa would be read admirals/major generals and the new rank of military "directors," in Ottawa, equivalent to the first level of executive in the civil service, would drop from captain(RCN)/colonel to commander/lieutenant colonel. I told them I expected the "tiger teams" to build appropriate HQs around these general. I told them that I had assurances from the minister that he would fight hard to readjust the CF pay scales to ensure that compensation matched responsibilites;

2. I wanted _coherent_ organizations - I was prepared to accept that we needed more people in logistics and support units in order to allow them to be properly aligned with the combat organizations they serve; and

3. Despite the huge battles ahead, I intended to use this as an excuse to rationalize the army's reserve structure.

Finally, I handed out/E-mailed a quick, hand drawn sketch (see below) of where I was headed and explained that this was not final because I was quite prepared to be argued away from it by my hand picked "tiger team."


Edit to add: I have also attached a sketch of my CF outline organization showing the four regional _joint_ commands and, in two of them, the basic internal breakdown. There are also two other _field_ organizations, a Special Operations Group and an Expeditionary Support Group (A HQ with supporting Signal and Logistic elements). One issue with my CF organization is that I do not separate force generation from force employment. I believe that each commander can do both, except for major overseas operations where the Expeditionary Force HQ will be deployed and units will be assigned to it.

_____
* There was considerable moaning and groaning as senior military commanders and ADMs told me that I was, case by case, taking away their very best people. I knew that, that's why I picked them!


----------



## Remius

Only one problem with your scenario.

Your first para about the Public thinking/perceiving that we have too many people in HQ jobs.

Most people in the public think that when we say we have 60 000 people in that all of them are either pilots, grunts or sailors.  Most can barely name any trades outside of those core ones.  I really think that this issue is more of an internal one, ie we are the only ones that care and /or are interested.

The rest is good,  ;D


----------



## Edward Campbell

Crantor said:
			
		

> Only one problem with your scenario.
> 
> Your first para about the Public thinking/perceiving that we have too many people in HQ jobs.
> 
> Most people in the public think that when we say we have 60 000 people in that all of them are either pilots, grunts or sailors.  Most can barely name any trades outside of those core ones.  I really think that this issue is more of an internal one, ie we are the only ones that care and /or are interested.
> 
> The rest is good,  ;D




Actually, the Leslie report did get a fair bit of media attention, albeit briefly ... sadly there are, relative to, say, the UK and USA, very few _informed_ journalists focused on military matters. It takes time to change minds, but I'm guessing that MND Peter Mackay got a fair amount of mail re: Leslie's report and later re: the CDS' decisions to not cut some HQ bloat. I suspect he is getting more mail, right now, re: F-35 costs and re: DND *reportedly* misleading parliament. Those are the sorts of things that _might_ stir a minister into action - there is nothing quite like embarrassing the cabinet to provoke a reorganization.


----------



## Remius

The Leslie report did generate some media attention.  But it didn't really get the public's attention.  This kind of stuff is as sexy as proroguing parliament.  The average citizen couldn't care less.

But, they love a good cormmorant story or junkets that the CDS didn't take.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The new _joint_ commands would be responsible for fleets, brigades, wings and bases which would remain, largely, unchanged. Three service chiefs - professional heads of service - in Ottawa would _manage_ single service doctrine, equipment requirements and training, including schools. But the schools would be part of their geographic _joint_ commands.



Well, every time you put this one up, I have to put my disagreement with it up.   

I see no value in putting Pacific Fleet, 1 CMBG, 17 Wing and WATC under the same command.  Talk about a useless mailbox HQ that would be.  I have yet to see any real argument as to how joint force generation structures offer any advantage over traditional service based ones.


----------



## The Bread Guy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> .... It takes time to change minds, but I'm guessing that MND Peter Mackay got a fair amount of mail re: Leslie's report and later re: the CDS' decisions to not cut some HQ bloat. I suspect he is getting more mail, right now, re: F-35 costs and re: DND *reportedly* misleading parliament. Those are the sorts of things that _might_ stir a minister into action - there is nothing quite like embarrassing the cabinet to provoke a reorganization.


True, but one hopes that the action provoked = a solution, =/= action for the sake of being seen to be acting


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Well, every time you put this one up, I have to put my disagreement with it up.
> 
> I see no value in putting Pacific Fleet, 1 CMBG, 17 Wing and WATC under the same command.  Talk about a useless mailbox HQ that would be.  I have yet to see any real argument as to how joint force generation structures offer any advantage over traditional service based ones.




I'm not sure they, _joint_ commands, are any better than service based commands at force generations, _per se_; but I suggest they are better at force employment and just as good at training and administration. My _vision_ or guesstimate is:

Pacific Command ≈ BC + Yukon - it's mainly a RCN/RCAF command with some reserve units in the Army component
Western Command ≈ AB + SK + MB - it's mainly an Army/RCAF command with a few NAVRES units in the Navy component
Eastern Command ≈ ON + QC + PEI + NB - it's another Army/RCAF command with some NAVRES units
Atlantic Command ≈ NS + NL - and it is, like Pacific Command, a mainly RCN/RCAF command with some Army reserve units

Most classical force generation tasks are the task of the singe service component commanders.

But: Commanders Pacific and Atlantic Commands woud own and operate the _joint_ naval/air forces that we use to patrol our coasts and send on overseas missions. Someone _might_ decide to _earmark_ certain Army units in Western and/or Eastern command for specialization in air-mobile operations and the _joint_ force commander would train and prepare them and might even be the force employer in a national emergency (think a large passenger plane crash in the North).

I think a _unified_ structure is simpler than the current lash up, maybe not much better, but easier to manage and I [color]orange]believe[/color] that, mostly, simple = better. It is, probably, still _rearranging deck chairs on a sinking ship_ but I'm not sure that any organization is much other than that. 

I also believe that my model can "grow" at least as well as the current structure if not more easily if, the gods forbid, we have to mobilize for a major war. The Expeditionary Force HQ/Support Group can grow to be a then several Div HQs and a Corps HQ and so on - equipment being assumed to be available. The _joint_ Atlantic and Pacific Commands can generate as many _joint_ RCN/RCAF Task Groups as we can manage (if we can build new ships and aircraft).


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I'm not sure they, _joint_ commands, are any better than service based commands at force generations, _per se_; but I suggest they are better at force employment and just as good at training and administration. My _vision_ or guesstimate is:
> 
> Pacific Command ≈ BC + Yukon - it's mainly a RCN/RCAF command with some reserve units in the Army component
> Western Command ≈ AB + SK + MB - it's mainly an Army/RCAF command with a few NAVRES units in the Navy component
> Eastern Command ≈ ON + QC + PEI + NB - it's another Army/RCAF command with some NAVRES units
> Atlantic Command ≈ NS + NL - and it is, like Pacific Command, a mainly RCN/RCAF command with some Army reserve units



There are some cultural aspects at play that probably undermine this territorial model of employment.  While the Army looks at the dirt at its feet, the Navy's area of interest starts at the high-tide mark and provincial boundaries don't really work well for the Air Force, who can cover your Pacific Command to Atlantic Command in a few hours.

In fact, your proposal basically shuffles a few boundaries and bins LFDTS, Pacific Fleet, Atlantic Fleet, 1 CAD and 2 CAD and downloads their responsibilities on the joint-Areas.  So, any real pers savings are lost as the joint-Areas grow to take on the training and operations of all RCAF and RCN units in Canada.  As well, there is some real imbalance, as your Eastern Command has about 80% of the Army and a similar percentage of the Air Force.  Essentially, some General in Eastern Command has to do everything while the Admirals on the coasts are given some Army Reserve units, with which they are not familiar with, to manage.

Crushing HQs is, in my opinion, not necessarily the path to improvement.  I do not have issues with a plethora of small, effective HQs.  The real target for HQ bloat is likely to cut down on nugatory processes and superfluous positions.  Oh, and merge the .Coms.


----------



## Loachman

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> replace the existing commands with four, geographically based _joint_ or _unified_ commands plus a Special Operations Group, controlled from NDHQ and an Expeditionary Force Group consisting of a HQ, with signals support and some support elements. The new _joint_ commands would be responsible for fleets, brigades, wings and bases which would remain, largely, unchanged.



I was with you up until that point.

If you tried this, I would strip, decorate myself with woad followed by a liberal (small-"L" of course) coating of Crisco, and attack you with flaming machetes.


----------



## MJP

Loachman said:
			
		

> If you tried this, I would strip, decorate myself with woad followed by a liberal (small-"L" of course) coating of Crisco, and attack you with flaming machetes.



Promise?  ;D


----------



## Loachman

Maybe.

In the meantime, you can always fantasize.


----------



## Pusser

Loachman said:
			
		

> I was with you up until that point.
> 
> If you tried this, I would strip, decorate myself with woad followed by a liberal (small-"L" of course) coating of Crisco, and attack you with flaming machetes.



OFF TOPIC COMIC RELIEF

Some poor Roman soldier c. 60 B.C. was given the dubious honour of being the first off the galley and set foot upon Britain's shores.  Unfortunately, he was immediately run over by some screaming blue harpie in a chariot.  Yes, he was the firt victim of "woad rage."

Now, all together (to the tune of Men of Harlech):

What's the use of wearing braces
pants and coats and boots with laces?
These are things you buy in places,
down on Brompton road.

What's the use of shirts of cotton,
studs that always get forgotten?
These affairs are simply rotten?
Better, far is woad!

Woad's the thing to show men.

Woad to scare your foe men.

Boil it to a brilliant blue and rub it on your back and your abdomen.

Ancient Briton never hit on
anything as good as woad to fit on.

On your back or where you sit on,
Tailors, you be blowed!


Romans came across the Channel,
all wrapped up in tin and flannel.
Half a pint of woad per man will
dress us more than these.

Saxons you don't waste your stitches
building beds for bugs in britches.
We have woad to clothe us, which is
not a nest for fleas!

Romans keep your armour.

Saxons your pyjamas.

Furry coats were made for goats, gorillas, yaks, retriever dogs and llamas.

March up Snowdon with your woad on. 
Never mind if you get rained or snowed on.

Never need a button sewn on.
Bottoms up for woad!

Now, let us return to our regularly scheduled thread so that we can in fact change the course of history and solve all the country's problems.


----------



## armyvern

Loachman said:
			
		

> Maybe.
> 
> In the meantime, you can always fantasize.



Well, *if* it should come to pass, take and post pics! An absolute and necessary "proof" will be required.


----------



## Edward Campbell

The formation of a new Joint Operations Command is announced in this article in the _Globe and Mail_. It appears that Canada Command, CEFCOM and CANOSCOM will be merged into one new command.


----------



## aesop081

...


----------



## Nfld Sapper

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The formation of a new Joint Operations Command is announced in this article in the _Globe and Mail_. It appears that Canada Command, CEFCOM and CANOSCOM will be merged into one new command.



 :facepalm:


----------



## aesop081

I propose we call the new organization The Vice-chief of the defence staff group.

No ?


----------



## dapaterson

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I propose we call the new organization The Vice-chief of the defence staff group.
> 
> No ?



No.  There's already a VCDS group.

Now, a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) group, on the other hand...


----------



## aesop081

dapaterson said:
			
		

> No.  There's already a VCDS group.
> 
> Now, a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) group, on the other hand...



Right you are. I am having a hard time keeping up with out wheel re-inventions.


----------



## Pusser

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Right you are. I am having a hard time keeping up with out wheel re-inventions.



Who's re-inventng the wheel?  It's more like they're just pulling out the same old one and dusting it off.

So what happens if we get into a new war?  The article implies that we'll resurrect these commands again...


----------



## dapaterson

Pusser said:
			
		

> So what happens if we get into a new war?  The article implies that we'll resurrect these commands again...



What war?  I saw no declaration of war on Afghanistan or the Taliban.  Last time we were at war was 1945 (since I don't believe we went through the formalities for Korea, and know we didn't for the Former Yugoslavia).


----------



## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> What war?


You're nitpicking. 
We both know he's referring to the past decade where we sent a reinforced battle-group, and an exponentially increasing number of staff officers/NCOs, off for six-months ('ish) at a time, while the rest of the CF smiled and waved at all the "support the troops" sentiment back home.


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The formation of a new Joint Operations Command is announced in this article in the _Globe and Mail_. It appears that Canada Command, CEFCOM and CANOSCOM will be merged into one new command.



Thank f**k.  Now, are we going to get some PYs reinvested into the units?  I'll trade 3 x staff wanks (now that there is 3 times less staff to feed) for a rifleman/gunner/crewman/sapper.


----------



## PuckChaser

I could use a few Signallers too.


----------



## aesop081

Infanteer said:
			
		

> (now that there is 3 times less staff to feed)



Yeah well, funny story about that.............


----------



## fraserdw

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Yeah well, funny story about that.............




Yeah, everyone I know that got a letter from DND or was told their position was gone was not bloat.  Most were frontline in service support and it was the bloat that decided who should go and who should stay.


----------



## rifleman

They'll likely need more people now to keep track of domestic, international and support issues all withing one organization.


----------



## Good2Golf

rifleman said:
			
		

> They'll likely need more people now to keep track of domestic, international and support issues all withing one organization.




...or, it will look more like the DCDS group, with J3 Intl, J3 Cont, J4 functionality.  

The major detractor from the DCDS group's focus on operations was the addition of numerous administrative taskings/responsibilities that should have more appropriately been assigned to the VCDS group.

Interestingly, in the early days of pre-transformation, Gen Hillier tried to make the case for a unified Joint CF Command (based on major elements of the late-70's-to-early-80's CF Command), but he received significant resistance from some of the environmental commanders (Ready, Aye Ready).  The tri-fold CEFCOM, CANCOM, CANOSCOM structure that resulted was the second best option as Gen Hillier saw it, although it came with greater staff overhead than the originally-planned Joint CF Com.

Ironically, he we are, aligning to the concept that Gen Hillier tried during round 1 of the CDS Action Team deliberations.


Regards
G2G


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Thank f**k.  Now, are we going to get some PYs reinvested into the units?  I'll trade 3 x staff wanks (now that there is 3 times less staff to feed) for a rifleman/gunner/crewman/sapper.



You've clearly forgotten that the main effort is to muster enough troops in the Death Star to fight the the real enemies in the other services. Having enough troops in the fighting units to take on other 'mythical' enemies is a secondary priority.  

Just so I don't get flamed..... :sarcasm:


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Thank f**k.  Now, are we going to get some PYs reinvested into the units?


I hope we do.  This unified CANOPSCOM will be a good thing if it reduces the size of the staff.


----------



## OldSolduer

I got a question:

Why can't the CDS FIRE those who display significant resistance to orders and directives?

Just say - "listen bucko, take the rank off the shoulders, pack your kit and get out of the office - 2 I/C take over. You have a month...."


----------



## Kirkhill

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I got a question:
> 
> Why can't the CDS FIRE those who display significant resistance to orders and directives?
> 
> Just say - "listen bucko, take the rankoff the shoulders, pack your kit and get out of the office - 2 I/C take over. You have a month...."



Probably the same reason politicians would rather wage war than assassinate the leader of an enemy country : sets a horrible precedent.


----------



## Dissident

Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> I got a question:
> 
> Why can't the CDS FIRE those who display significant resistance to orders and directives?
> 
> Just say - "listen bucko, take the rank off the shoulders, pack your kit and get out of the office - 2 I/C take over. You have a month...."



<a href=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decimation_%28Roman_army%29>Decimation</a> 

 >


----------



## OldSolduer

NinerSix said:
			
		

> <a href=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decimation_%28Roman_army%29>Decimation</a>
> 
> >



Good idea......the fairy worked hard on that one!


----------



## armyvern

MCG said:
			
		

> I hope we do.  This unified CANOPSCOM will be a good thing if it reduces the size of the staff.



And, if they really reduce those staff by allowing for attrition and then conversion of the PYs to troops posns vice the abundance of Commissioned folks those most-entirely HQ entities currently hold. The troops posns currently within consist almost entirely of loggies - Sup (3CSU, JSR, Depots), and sigs (JSR).


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Interesting stat from Comd CA this weekend: of the Army strength (ie those not already employed outside of the Army) 74% are emplyed in the field force (defined as Brigade and below), 23 % in the Institutional Army (bases and the training system) and 3 % in HQs above Brigade.

Seems to me we have it about right in the Army at least.


----------



## armyvern

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Interesting stat from Comd CA this weekend: of the Army strength (ie those not already employed outside of the Army) 74% are emplyed in the field force (defined as Brigade and below), 23 % in the Institutional Army (bases and the training system) and 3 % in HQs above Brigade.
> 
> Seems to me we have it about right in the Army at least.



Well, to be fair, CANOSCOM (at least) would probably show somewhat similar stats. We have HQ, then we have all the troops in the Depots, this Regiment and all those in 3CSU. Not so much the other two HQs; I could be wrong, but I don't think either of the two has an actual troop manned unit under it's wing here in Canada, so there's certainly a redundancy in requiring 3 X HQs who are all capable of overseeing deployed entities (and 3CSU and JSR always have a great many pers deployed around the world). I think this merger of those three is absolutely called for and justified.


----------



## Monsoon

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Interesting stat from Comd CA this weekend: of the Army strength (ie those not already employed outside of the Army) 74% are emplyed in the field force (defined as Brigade and below), 23 % in the Institutional Army (bases and the training system) and 3 % in HQs above Brigade.
> 
> Seems to me we have it about right in the Army at least.


I think you would find the ratios roughly hold for the three force generating elements (adjusting for the fact that RCN and RCAF units have fewer people in them by their very nature). The "problem" (such as it is) is that VCDS Group, say, is entirely "HQ", likewise IM Gp, CANADA COM, CEFCOM, Adm(Mat), etc. These all serve to aid the pointy-end in the FG elements, so it's a bit disingenuous to pare out the least HQ-y components of the CF and say that they don't have the institutional problem of the rest of the force.


----------



## GAP

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Interesting stat from Comd CA this weekend: of the Army strength (ie those not already employed outside of the Army) 74% are emplyed in the field force (defined as Brigade and below), 23 % in the Institutional Army (bases and the training system) and 3 % in HQs above Brigade.
> 
> Seems to me we have it about right in the Army at least.



The overall gross stats may be about right, but from the little I can see, the echelons within echelons vs feet on the ground is part of the problem. Mini-empires as it were....


----------



## Journeyman

I have to admit that when he said _that_, I thought it was the weakest part of his presentation.

'OK, if we _don't_ consider the National Capital Region, we're looking fine'....coming on the heels of discussions about losing a platoon each, likelihood of ever seeing a fourth rifle Coy again, eating the infantry to come up with other folks' PYs....
        :dunno:


Don't panic people; much of this was just marginal discussing by people with no authority to harm your fiefdom.   


Just don't critique LFDTS   >


----------



## daftandbarmy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I have to admit that when he said _that_, I thought it was the weakest part of his presentation.
> 
> 'OK, if we _don't_ consider the National Capital Region, we're looking fine'....coming on the heels of discussions about losing a platoon each, likelihood of ever seeing a fourth rifle Coy again, eating the infantry to come up with other folks' PYs....
> :dunno:
> 
> 
> Don't panic people; much of this was just marginal discussing by people with no authority to harm your fiefdom.
> 
> 
> Just don't critique LFDTS   >



If you want a 4th rifle company we should OP Task each reserve brigade to provide it. Glass half empty? Reg F exercises on weekends once per month! Ahhhhhh!


----------



## Journeyman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If you want a 4th rifle company we should OP Task each reserve brigade to provide it.


I'm afraid any Res leadership in attendance is still in the Chicken Little-mode about a separate comment made.


----------



## Kirkhill

Six man sections, four per platoon?  As per pre WW2 info supplied by M.O'Leary on  an  infantrythread somewhere.


----------



## dapaterson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Just don't critique LFDTS   >



So, what proprotion of the 23% does LFDTS make up?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm afraid any Res leadership in attendance is still in the Chicken Little-mode about a separate comment made.



Oh please, don't keep us in suspense!  op:


----------



## west_coaster

In total, currently, there are 68,000 in the Canadian Forces.


----------



## PMedMoe

west_coaster said:
			
		

> In total, currently, there are 68,000 in the Canadian Forces.



Source?  Is that Reg only or Reg and Res combined?  Is that effective strength?

I could go on....... 

Edit for spelling error.


----------



## Bzzliteyr

Squirrel.

My post has equal value.


----------



## dapaterson

According to the CFDS, the target strength for the Regular Force is 68 000.  That is not the Trained Effective Strength target, though, as it include NES, BTL, ATL, SPHL...

There is also the Reserve Force, with different targets for the Primary Reserve, COATS and Candian Rangers; the Supplementary Reserve does not have a strength target, to my knowledge, but does have a best before date; as I recall, after 10 years or on reaching age 65 members are released from the Supp Res.


----------



## Infanteer

MND/CDS made the announcement of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) that merges the functions of CANADACOM, CEFCOM and CANOSCOM.  It will be led by a 3* and will result in a 25% reduction in HQ personnel.

Spitballing the next steps:

1)  Take the RCAF, RCN and CA, reduce to 2*, and put under a 3* single Forces Command to oversee joint force managed readiness and generation.  This would contain force generation formations (Areas-LFDTS/1-2 Can Air Div/Fleets) and reduce (if not already) all to 1* commands.

2)  Take force development pieces from the 3 Services (LFDTS/COS Land Strat, Canadian Force Maritime Warfare Centre and DirGen Air Force Development) and put them under CFD to create a single Joint Force Development organization (2*) under the VCDS.

This gets the CF side of the DND side of the principal L1 house down to VCDS, SJS, CANFORCESCOM, CJOC, CANSOFCOM, and CMP.


----------



## armyvern

Just read that message on my crackberry.

So, I can take it that I am officially a CJOC now??  :camo:


----------



## The Bread Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> MND/CDS made the announcement of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) that merges the functions of CANADACOM, CEFCOM and CANOSCOM.  It will be led by a 3* and will result in a 25% reduction in HQ personnel ....


Here's the Info-machine's version on both this, and some naval changes:





> Today, the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, is pleased to announce a new Operational Command and Control structure for all Canadian Forces (CF) operations and Naval transformation. This initiative is part of a renewed CF transformation effort – a process designed to ensure that the CF deliver results for Canadians.
> 
> The CF will launch a revised Operational Command and Control structure with the creation of a single command, the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Consolidating the activities of Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command, this new headquarters will be responsible for conducting all CF operations in Canada, North America, and globally, in concert with national and international partners.
> 
> (....)
> 
> The new CJOC, which will be implemented in a phased approach in the upcoming months, will be commanded by a Lieutenant-General. This phase of the defence renewal initiative will result in a 25 per cent reduction in national-level command and control overhead, and it will make more efficient use of administrative resources. This will allow for a redistribution of CF personnel to emerging capabilities and operational demands, allowing the CF to remain ready to meet its core missions, with a focus on domestic operations.
> 
> “I'm committed to protecting Canada and Canada's interests in the world, working with our global and continental allies, along with our federal, provincial and regional partners here at home,” said General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff. “The implementation of the CJOC will result in a smaller, more efficient organization that will continue to deliver the same excellence in operational support to all of our people, at home and abroad. Furthermore, one command and control system will help us to deliver the capabilities required to face current conflicts and better plan for future global security challenges.”
> 
> Further, as the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) gets ready to operate the new fleet of federal ships, Vice-Admiral Maddison has structured the Navy to operate efficiently and effectively, today and tomorrow. Navy Transformation initiatives announced today include:
> 
> - The creation of the Directorate Canadian Submarine Force (DCSF);
> - The consolidation of the five naval schools under one single training authority;
> - Coastal Personnel Coordination Centres (PCC) will be brought under a single authority;
> - The creation of a single fleet scheduling management authority;
> - Formalizing the role of a national Maritime Component Commander (MCC) for international deployments; and
> - The creation of the Directorate New Capability Introduction (DNCI) ....


And from the backgrounder:


> .... The timeframe
> 
> September 2005: The first phase of the CF Transformation process begins with the announcement that new organizations will be created to support new operational requirements in the conduct of operations for the CF.
> February 2006: The new Operational Commands – Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command – are stood up. This new CF operating structure serves Canada well in leading simultaneous domestic, continental, and international operations. Seven years later, many lessons have been learned.
> July 2011: The next phase of CF Transformation examines how the Department of National Defence and the CF work and identifies opportunities for improvements and efficiencies. At the end of the period, the Transformation Team produces a report of observations and recommendations for consideration by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence.
> September 2011 and onwards: The Transformation Report is released, providing “a 360-degree look at the Canadian Forces” (General Natynczyk). In the weeks following the release, rounds of analysis begin to show where and how certain aspects of the Transformation Report can be aligned with other complementary efforts already in progress ....


----------



## ettibebs

Didn't see anything about it on the forum, Mods feel free to merge if I didn't look it up properly.

To me it sound like a good thing but as many have pointed out that we are kind of top heavy in the CF.

In English :
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/05/12/department-of-national-defence-overhaul-consolidation.html

En français:
http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/2012/05/12/001-restructuration-forces-canadiennes.shtml


----------



## Northern Ranger

So what does this all mean?  Is Canada Command gone? Are they closing the JTF's ? Or will this just be one more level of command. Does anyone have any idea?


----------



## PuckChaser

CEFCOM, CANADACOM and CANOSCOM are all reforming into JOC, seems like the JTFs will stay, but now report to JOC not to CANADACOM.


----------



## The_Dictat

I love how the Canadian Press is saying that it will lead to thousands of job cuts... They think the CF will shrink... at the most a few dozen civies and CL B P Res will lose their jobs... Reg F PY will be redistributed to other areas.

As far as I know the RJTF will stay put..


----------



## The Bread Guy

PMedMoe said:
			
		

> Source?  Is that Reg only or Reg and Res combined?  Is that effective strength?


Here's what the latest RPP has to say:





> .... Strengthening the Defence Team
> 
> The long-term objectives of Regular and Reserve Force personnel have been met and will be maintained, with the Regular Force at 68,000 Total Strength and the Reserve Force at an annual average paid strength of 27,000;
> Defence will maintain the Regular Force by:
> Maintaining the current CF strength at 68,000 (+/- 500);
> Bringing the size of the Trained Effective Strength (TES) closer to the size of the Trained Effective Establishment (TEE) by continuing to reduce the Basic Training List (BTL);
> Reducing the number of distressed occupations; and
> Reducing the number of over-strength occupations.
> To ensure Defence has the skilled, competent and sustainable civilian workforce it needs, investment in renewing the workforce will be targeted to support critical organizational and operational objectives, including:
> Research to identify under-strength occupations in order to maintain civilian capacity to fill mission critical roles;
> Continuation of the Apprenticeship and Operational Development Program, a comprehensive strategy for attracting, retaining and managing general labour and trades talent; and
> Continued implementation of stressed occupation development programs (purchasing, finance, engineering, and computing), which include staffing tools and systems to manage those specialized areas where skills shortages are an issue.
> Defence PA will ensure CF recruitment activities are supported with comprehensive and targeted recruitment advertising initiatives ....


----------



## 57Chevy

Shared with provisions of the Copyright Act

Thousands of National Defence jobs at risk in shakeup
The Canadian Press 12 May
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/05/12/department-of-national-defence-overhaul-consolidation.html


The federal government has quietly announced a major shakeup at National Defence, a move that will largely return the military to its pre-Afghan combat mission structure, and possibly shed thousands of jobs.

The restructuring of commands will see the headquarters that manage domestic, international and support operations merged into one structure.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay says the overhaul is built on some lessons learned from the Afghan, Libyan and Olympic operations.

MacKay says the new headquarters, known as Canadian Joint Operations Command, will be responsible for conducting all military missions at home and abroad at the best cost to taxpayers.

The consolidation will result in a 25 per cent reduction in the size of defence command-and-control overhead — something described as a necessity in a review report by last year by the former head of the army, retired lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie.

Precisely how many job losses or retirements that will mean is unclear.

Leslie's report painted a picture of a military fat with administration and private contracting support.

The restructuring announcement was made by National Defence, which has been under fire for secrecy, in a late Friday afternoon news release.

The country's top military commander, Gen. Walt Natynczyk, says the changes will be phased in over several months.

Navy tweaked

The command structure that's being torn down and replaced was initially designed by the former Canadian Forces chief, retired general Rick Hillier, to serve the post-Sept. 11, 2001, military. It was implemented by Natynczyk, who after four years in the top military job is rumoured to be ready to retire.

Liberal Senator Colin Kenny says the Leslie report was almost a complete repudiation of Hillier's more muscular, American-style command system.

As part of Friday's release, the Defence Department announced a reshuffle in the navy, creating separate directorates to handle the glitch-plagued submarine fleet and other agencies to help smooth the introduction of new ships to the fleet.

The navy is also consolidating all five of its fleet training schools into one authority.


----------



## aesop081

57Chevy said:
			
		

> Thousands of National Defence jobs at risk in shakeup



Media fear-mongering. Nothing more.


----------



## Armymedic

No, there is more.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4196

News Release

Back to the previous page
Minister MacKay introduces new Canadian Forces Operational Command and Control structure

NR 12.078 - May 11, 2012

OTTAWA – Today, the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, is pleased to announce a new Operational Command and Control structure for all Canadian Forces (CF) operations and Naval transformation. This initiative is part of a renewed CF transformation effort – a process designed to ensure that the CF deliver results for Canadians.

The CF will launch a revised Operational Command and Control structure with the creation of a single command, the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Consolidating the activities of Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command, this new headquarters will be responsible for conducting all CF operations in Canada, North America, and globally, in concert with national and international partners.

“This government is committed to defending Canada and protecting Canadians. Transformation is built on some hard-learned lessons from a period of unrelenting operational pace and on recommendations included in the 2011 Transformation report by Lieutenant-General Leslie, which have defined necessary organizational changes to prepare the CF for the next decade”, confirmed Minister MacKay. “Transformation is about reducing headquarters overhead to produce more 21st century capability. It will give the CF the agility to adapt as the future security environment dictates at the best cost to Canadian taxpayers.”

The new CJOC, which will be implemented in a phased approach in the upcoming months, will be commanded by a Lieutenant-General. This phase of the defence renewal initiative will result in a 25 per cent reduction in national-level command and control overhead, and it will make more efficient use of administrative resources. This will allow for a redistribution of CF personnel to emerging capabilities and operational demands, allowing the CF to remain ready to meet its core missions, with a focus on domestic operations.

 “I'm committed to protecting Canada and Canada's interests in the world, working with our global and continental allies, along with our federal, provincial and regional partners here at home,” said General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff. “The implementation of the CJOC will result in a smaller, more efficient organization that will continue to deliver the same excellence in operational support to all of our people, at home and abroad. Furthermore, one command and control system will help us to deliver the capabilities required to face current conflicts and better plan for future global security challenges.”

Further, as the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) gets ready to operate the new fleet of federal ships, Vice-Admiral Maddison has structured the Navy to operate efficiently and effectively, today and tomorrow. Navy Transformation initiatives announced today include:

    The creation of the Directorate Canadian Submarine Force (DCSF);
    The consolidation of the five naval schools under one single training authority;
    Coastal Personnel Coordination Centres (PCC) will be brought under a single authority;
    The creation of a single fleet scheduling management authority;
    Formalizing the role of a national Maritime Component Commander (MCC) for international deployments; and
    The creation of the Directorate New Capability Introduction (DNCI).

In 2008, the commitment to defence demonstrated by the Government of Canada in the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) enabled the RCN to begin a structural review, primarily aimed at optimizing resource allocation to achieve CFDS goals. The need to reorganize the RCN became further apparent with the government’s announcement to rebuild the navy’s fleet through the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.

“The changes we are announcing today are designed to better prepare our sailors and officers to take up the challenges associated with the unprecedented opportunity we have been given by the government to renew Canada’s naval fleet,” said Vice-Admiral Maddison. “This is only the beginning. I invite all sailors and officers to join me in this journey and work together as one navy in achieving this aim.”

Transformation efforts seek to maximize CF capacity while ensuring an effective balance of resources and assets within the Defence Team and across the four defence pillars upon which CF capabilities are built – readiness, personnel, infrastructure, and equipment.

The result will be a more integrated, efficient, and agile organization that is responsive to defence and Government of Canada priorities.


----------



## aesop081

Rider Pride said:
			
		

> No, there is more.



I know what is involved, i have read it. The fear-mongering part is the "thousands of jobs at risk" part. The one i quoted in fact.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Rider Pride said:
			
		

> Coastal Personnel Coordination Centres (PCC) will be brought under a single authority;


Great, will this mean being raped from Ottawa, Esquimault or Halifax.  At least when you are _trying_ to deal with PCC at present you might actually have a connection with the person you're speaking/writing to.  They're enough to make you go  ullhair: already...


----------



## Armymedic

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I know what is involved, i have read it. The fear-mongering part is the "thousands of jobs at risk" part. The one i quoted in fact.



Rog.


----------



## dogger1936

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> I know what is involved, i have read it. The fear-mongering part is the "thousands of jobs at risk" part. The one i quoted in fact.



Couldn't agree more. No one is gonna get a pink slip just yet. Lots of folks well past their expiration date and still "in the fridge". I welcome this change.


----------



## FSTO

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Great, will this mean being raped from Ottawa, Esquimault or Halifax.  At least when you are _trying_ to deal with PCC at present you might actually have a connection with the person you're speaking/writing to.  They're enough to make you go  ullhair: already...


I don't think it will be that apocalyptic. The PCC is just an amalgamation of the old NRCC and Fleet Manning. Each PCC will be responsible for its own AOR but will be in line with the "One Navy" concept. I am pretty sure that the HPD concept will largely remain.


----------



## GAP

Shakeup among military brass imminent as defence overhaul takes shape
Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press 05/18/2012
Article Link

OTTAWA - The general who is currently in charge of Canada's overseas headquarters is expected to be named to lead a newly combined organization that's at the centre of the Harper government's overhaul of National Defence.

The Canadian Press has learned the appointment of Lt.-Gen. Stuart Beare could come next week.

Beare's appointment as head of the newly created Canadian Joint Operations Command is expected to mark the beginning of a series of command appointments and changes.

The shuffling comes in the wake of a major reorganization that will see the department lose about one-quarter of its headquarters overhead.

Senior government and military sources confirmed Beare's appointment to The Canadian Press late Friday, calling him a natural choice after nearly a year of leading the military's expeditionary command.

It potentially removes him from contention for the job of chief of defence staff.

Beare, a veteran of a senior NATO command post in Afghanistan, has been among those on the list as a possible replacement for Gen. Walt Natynczyk.

Others considered in the running include Vice Admiral Paul Maddison and Maj.-Gen Mike Day, who is about to end a stint as the deputy commander of the NATO training mission in Kabul.

Rumours have been circulating for weeks that Natynczyk is ready to retire after nearly four years as the country's top military commander.

The reorganization of Defence is prompted by a nearly $1.5 billion reduction in the department's budget, but defence sources say the changes will not be entirely noticeable until next year.

The restructuring of commands will see the headquarters that manage domestic, international and support operations merged into one organization and Beare will have three deputy commanders working under him.

Whether staff at the other headquarters will be packed into the separate overseas command building in east-end Ottawa remains to be seen.

The consolidation is something that was described as a necessity in a review report by last year by the former head of the army, retired lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie.

Precisely how many job losses or retirements that will mean is unclear.

Leslie's report painted a picture of a military fat with administration and private contracting support.
end


----------



## tomahawk6

A reduction in the number of flag officers is probably overdue. Any reductions in staff both civilian and military should be followed by a move to 103% manning of the combat units.


----------



## matt4545

I agree with tomahawk6, I believe this move is for the better and will make for a more efficient and effective command.


----------



## aesop081

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> should be followed by a move to 103% manning of the combat units.



How about 100% as the "non-combat units" that make life possible for the "combat units" have had to do with less than 80% for years and years. Making training possible for the field force doesn't magically happen all by itself.


----------



## tomahawk6

I would agree CDN Aviator. This is what the US did to flesh out units that had been hollowed out under Clinton. The best move Gen Shinseki ever made as Army Chief of Staff.
We did what Canada probably cannot do without some additional legislative authority. Much of our Army's combat support units were moved into the reserve force.Reserve/NG units can be Federalized to meet the needs of the Army. Reservists/Guardsmen have their jobs protected by law.We can call up entire reserve units as needed. If Canada could do that it would ease the pressure on the regular force.


----------



## Maxadia

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> How about 100% as the "non-combat units" that make life possible for the "combat units" have had to do with less than 80% for years and years. Making training possible for the field force doesn't magically happen all by itself.




 :+1:  Combat units can't be fully effective without proper support.


----------



## ArmyRick

I agree with streamlining command structure.


----------



## Infanteer

So the Army, Navy and Airforce can get by with 1 DComd, but CFJOC needs 3?  When 1 Cdn Div's 2* deploys and starts reporting to Comd CFJOC, what do all the 2*s do?


----------



## Old Sweat

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So the Army, Navy and Airforce can get by with 1 DComd, but CFJOC needs 3?  When 1 Cdn Div's 2* deploys and starts reporting to Comd CFJOC, what do all the 2*s do?



Grab a commissionaire and play euchre?  8)


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So the Army, Navy and Airforce can get by with 1 DComd, but CFJOC needs 3?


I can forsee some potential PY savings being lost due to the fact that the three amalgamated .COMs will actually continue to exist (less names & at a reduced rank) inside of the new CFJOC.


----------



## Infanteer

Yes.  If the DComds are doing the actual commanding, then it was a simple shell game with a rank reduction for one guy.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Yes.  If the DComds are doing the actual commanding, then it was a simple shell game with a rank reduction for one guy.



 :nod:


----------



## 54/102 CEF

Hate to burst your bubbles - Inflation and project delay for buildings and equipment will suck up all the savings

Fail!  :bowing:


----------



## dogger1936

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Speaking to staff rank-bloat - it's everywhere; even the RCSU down at Work Point is infested with Capt 10s doing MCpl clerk-work.
> 
> Eh, it's late, and I'm probably exposing my ignorance here... the manning still seems a bit strange.



I can't tell you how correct you are! I have never seen a organisation with such waste in pay levels as a RCSU. Capt 10's doing a job I would re org to give a res clerk cpl. Transport organised by a capt 10? At the regiments we use Cpl's who are injured too bad to go to the field.

Det commander has to be a Maj? Why not a Capt?

And random officers paid to "help out" (I.E do someone elses job)

Random "Slush fund" to give good CO's a couple extra days pay as a gift from the Det commander? How is that legal.

I couldn't agree more. I've never seen such overhead or Capt's and Maj careerist retiring with beautiful pensions....which I was sure the cadet movement wasn't about...but it's very evident once inside looking around.


----------



## AIC_2K5

With the creation of this CJOC, I'm left wondering why DND is not implementing it in the way the report recommended?

http://milnewsca.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/transform-appx1-annex-h.pdf

On the proposed model towards the end of the link, it recommends combining Canada COM and CEFCOM into one command, and then merging CANOSCOM with other joint capabilities of the CF to create a larger support organization. Kind of makes more sense to me. Also, aside from RCN transformation I haven't heard a peep about any of the proposals from the Army and RCAF.


----------



## Good2Golf

The RCAF beat everyone to it, and transformed in 1997 -- all operational fleets under a single Divisional command.  

FG (2*, 1*), MAG (1*), ATG(1*), 10 TAG(1*), 14 Trg Gp(1*) -> 1 CAD (2*, 1*, 1*)


----------



## Journeyman

Since we don't have gills or wings, the army's had _lots_ of time to get it right already.......except for this recurring attempt to justify a Div HQ.


----------



## Good2Golf

Journeyman said:
			
		

> ...except for this recurring attempt to justify a Div HQ.



That does occasionally keep me up at night wondering how the heck that one made its way through the SR/DRAP gauntlet...  ???


----------



## Journeyman

No, there's not a lot of deficit reduction happening with that circus.....  :not-again:


----------



## The Bread Guy

A bump with the latest - a call via MERX (including a list of qualified vendors) for _".... a Contractor, with a strong background in the planning and management of large business transformation projects, to develop a project charter and strategic plan to be used to guide the execution of the Defence Renewal Transformation Project.  This requirement will be from date of award to eighteen weeks later ...."_.

You can check out the MERX posting here as well if the link above doesn't work.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Some tidbits from a John Ivison _National Post_ column....


> .... “There is definitely a value for money concern at DND [Department of National Defence] – from stress balls to jets. There is excessive use of consultants, many of whom used to be former Canadian Forces or bureaucrats,” said one senior political staffer.
> 
> The concerns expressed by the Prime Minister and the former general are reflected in moves that will be announced this week by Treasury Board aimed at preventing favouratism in government contracting.
> 
> Tony Clement, the Treasury Board president, is expected to unveil new rules aimed at limiting the number of federal bureaucrats who leave the public service and then walk straight into well-paid consultancy gigs working for their former colleagues.
> 
> It is understood Mr. Clement will amend government policy so that contracts with former public servants will also be proactively disclosed on departmental websites.
> 
> Mr. Clement was moved to make the changes after Ottawa’s Procurement Ombudsman, Frank Brunetta, detailed sole-source contracting between Canada’s School of Public Service and a former public servant who was already receiving a government pension.
> 
> While that change is not specifically geared toward DND, other reforms are coming from Mr. Clement’s department that are designed to curb what are deemed “acute problems” in the procurement process – problems that include, but are not exclusive to, the purchase of the F-35 fighter jet.
> 
> Treasury Board is working on bringing thousands more public servants under the authority of the Lobbying Act, which would prevent them leaving government and then lobbying their former colleagues for contracts on behalf of third party clients.
> 
> Currently, the Lobbying Act bans “designated public office holders” — ministers, political staffers, deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers — from lobbying government for five years after they leave. The new rules would cover anyone with influence over the procurement process.
> 
> While there are worries about the power of lobbyists and consultants in the bidding process in Canada, there is also a degree of transparency, in the form of the Lobbyist Registry.
> 
> The nepotism within DND is far less conspicious.
> 
> Col. (Ret’d) Michel Drapeau, a professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, recalled the case of one senior soldier who retired from the regular force on full pension one day and returned as senior aide to the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff the next.
> 
> “Since the war in Afghanistan, money has become a commodity at DND. They just ask and they receive it; $2.7-billion on professional service, contractors and consultants is a huge amount of money. There’s an army of retired officers hired as consultants – they’re everywhere,” he said.
> 
> One fact from last week’s Auditor-General’s report that passed almost unnoticed was the revelation that 98,866 members of the Canadian Forces left between 2006 and 2011. That’s a massive number from a standing force of about 68,000, particularly in the midst of a recession.
> 
> No-one knows how many, but it’s likely a fair number are still working at DND as hired hands ....


----------



## daftandbarmy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> A bump with the latest - a call via MERX (including a list of qualified vendors) for _".... a Contractor, with a strong background in the planning and management of large business transformation projects, to develop a project charter and strategic plan to be used to guide the execution of the Defence Renewal Transformation Project.  This requirement will be from date of award to eighteen weeks later ...."_.
> 
> You can check out the MERX posting here as well if the link above doesn't work.



We'll be giving that one a pass. I only take on projects that are set up for success!


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Why is it when someone becomes "former", all of a sudden they have all the answers?? :-\

http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/dnd-hq-admin-costs-rising-despite-pressure-to-cut-back-pbo-1.1222003


Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press 
Published Wednesday, April 3, 2013 7:05AM EDT 

OTTAWA -- Spending on headquarters administration at National Defence was 27 per cent higher in the first half of the last budget year, despite the Harper government's insistence the department cut overhead, according to the most recent quarterly forecast by the parliamentary budget office.
The figures look at the first six months of the just-completed 2012-13 budget year, and compare actual expenses with previous years.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper repeatedly insisted last year that Defence have "more teeth and less tail," and reducing the administrative burden should be the department's No. 1 priority.

Yet the budget office forecast, posted online, shows the reverse is taking shape.
Spending on internal services and property management is forecast to rise, while there are major reductions to surveillance, known as situational awareness, readiness within the army, including training, international operations, and environmental stewardship.

A final tally for the last budget year won't be available until this August.
The budget office compiles its figures using reports from the Receiver General of Canada and the Finance Department.
A spokesman for National Defence said the department is a responsible steward of the public purse and increases in overhead spending can be cyclical.

"Year-over-year comparisons can be misleading as spending is not linear and priorities change," said Robert Hawgood, in an email statement.
He attributed the increase to "new funding received for the military pay system project."
But the overall trend seen in the budget office numbers is reflected separately in planning and priorities reports released last week by the Harper government, following the March 21 federal budget.
That set of documents shows the budget axe is expected to fall on civilian support positions that directly serve front-line or base operations through maintenance and planning, including a reduction of 34 jobs at military health services.

Former army commander, lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie, told the Harper government in a landmark 2011 report that National Defence needed to take an axe to its bloated headquarters in order to meet future obligations.
Leslie also recommended the number of private of contractors be slashed by 30 per cent, suggesting that all of his recommendations could save the deficit-minded government more than $1 billion at the Defence Department without affecting operational capability.

Despite that, figures put before Parliament last month show spending on consulting and professional services for the military rose by $500 million between 2009 and 2011.
Defence Minister Peter MacKay has promised over $450 million in reductions to contracting out, but the plan still puts Defence well over the starting benchmark established by Leslie's transformation report.

There has been resistance to following Leslie's advice, prompting Harper to write to MacKay last June with pointed instructions.
The letter, leaked to The Canadian Press last fall, sheds light on the divide between Harper's office, which has been determined to wrestle the deficit to the ground, and a defence establishment resolved to protect its budget gains since 2006.

The three-page letter set out what cuts the prime minister was prepared to accept and what wouldn't work.
"It is important that we reduce the current overhead in regular force military and civilian personnel, and in those activities that do not directly contribute to operational readiness," he wrote.

The country's top military commander, Gen. Tom Lawson, recently told a Senate committee there was almost no fat to cut within the military.
Leslie was specific in the kind of administration he wanted to see cut. He singled out the Ottawa-based National Defence headquarters for the axe and insisted that administration and support at bases across the country, or those jobs that directly impacted on troops, be preserved.

Federal budget planning documents show internal services -- those at national headquarters -- are expected to face reductions starting in 2014-15.
Those same records also outline planned civilian job cuts in areas such as health care, army equipment maintenance, support to air force units on deployed operations, contingency planning staff, and even the people who write course material for training.

The plans and priorities document for 2013-14, released late Thursday, commits to holding the number of full-time military members at 68,000, just shy of the Harper government's promised complement of 70,000.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

That's easy.  They no longer have anything to lose.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> Why is it when someone becomes "former", all of a sudden they have all the answers?? :-\


:nod:


----------



## NavyShooter

They may have had the answers all along, but because they were in the position, were unable to speak about them?  

Once they're free of the job, they're free-er to speak of the solutions?

NS


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

..or maybe try and grow a pair when in your in the position??.......just sayin'.

If what you said is truly the way things work then I guess all we will ever have is status quo??


----------



## TCM621

Leslie was still in when he wrote that report.


----------



## Eowyn

Gen Leslie was still in when that report was issued.  So I guess he had a pair.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

My bad then.

Question,.......wasn't he the guy in position to change things?


----------



## McG

I have seen in other news reports that the union is attributing some increases of infrastructure & contracting costs back to the ASG closures and the requirement to now contract services that were (until last month) provided by employees.


----------



## McG

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> My bad then.
> 
> Question,.......wasn't he the guy in position to change things?


The changes he proposed were the purview of his peers and superior.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Eowyn said:
			
		

> Gen Leslie was still in when that report was issued.


And (let's not forget) leaked to the media with no complaints/concerns expressed publicly that I've read/heard about.


----------



## TCM621

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> My bad then.
> 
> Question,.......wasn't he the guy in position to change things?



One of the major points of his report was the inability of commanders to effect change. The commander will say "X has to changem, I want it to be Y" and the staff will say "yes, sir. We will get to it" and then wait until he is posted. A prime example is the fact that even though the directive from the government is to make cuts to the admin side and not touch the operational or training side, the bureaucrats and agreeing with them, then doing what ever the hell they want.

A number of of snr commanders have made similar remarks in the past. Gen. Hillier couldn't even get medals to people he felt earned them overseas.


----------



## MilEME09

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> A number of of snr commanders have made similar remarks in the past. Gen. Hillier couldn't even get medals to people he felt earned them overseas.



I remember that, he wanted people to get them while still in country so that they receive them while still with all their buddies that they earned it with, but nope civil service strikes. In his Autobiography he also complains about how long the civil service took just to get loaned equipment from other NATO members. Something that would take 2 weeks would take six months because some civil servant wont do his job. Why? cause they change departments every 6 months, and are part of a Union, they just leave it for the next guy, and we cant remove them for not doing their job. The fact that civilians employee's and the civil service have a Union is making the government a burden on DND because their isn't any collective backlash for some one not doing their job.


----------



## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I remember that, he wanted people to get them while still in country so that they receive them while still with all their buddies that they earned it with, but nope civil service strikes. In his Autobiography he also complains about how long the civil service took just to get loaned equipment from other NATO members. Something that would take 2 weeks would take six months because some civil servant wont do his job. Why? cause they change departments every 6 months, and are part of a Union, they just leave it for the next guy, and we cant remove them for not doing their job. The fact that civilians employee's and the civil service have a Union is making the government a burden on DND because their isn't any collective backlash for some one not doing their job.



H&A are delayed by a military that insists that every level of command has the right and obligation to vet, edit, review and stuff into a pile somewhere, with every nomination.  There is zero civil service engagement below the Director of Honours and Recognition (after it goes through the full Navy/Army/Air Force chain) - who then goes directly to Rideau Hall.

Systematic delays in procurement have many factors, not the least of which is the revoloving door of military personnel posted in with zero knowledge of the system, who invent their own shortcuts, whose shortcuts then fail, and then are obliged to proceed through the system they tried to avoid.

Hillier was good in many ways.  He was poor at understanding systems and identifying ways to streamline them, choosing instead poor work-arounds that had little to no long-term success.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hillier was good in many ways.  He was poor at understanding systems and identifying ways to streamline them, choosing instead poor work-arounds that had little to no long-term success.



Exactly


----------



## daftandbarmy

An interesting and cautionary reminder that downsizing does not always mean keeping the best and brightest:

Military Brain Drain

The Pentagon's top brass is driving away all the smart people. 

In his recent book Bleeding Talent, Tim Kane joins a growing chorus of serving and former junior officers to deliver a wake-up call to today's military leadership in the face of a major drawdown. Their message: If you ignore the expectations of today's young, combat-experienced leaders as you shrink the force, your most talented officers and sergeants will exit, stage left. 

The military bureaucracy's response? "Good Riddance." 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/13/military_brain_drain


----------



## Nostix

Therein lies the problem with the frequently heard "If you don't like it, you can always leave".

The most skilled and developed talent within an organization can actually afford to leave, while poor performers usually stay where the jobs are secure.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Nostix said:
			
		

> Therein lies the problem with the frequently heard "If you don't like it, you can always leave".
> 
> The most skilled and developed talent within an organization can actually afford to leave, while poor performers usually stay where the jobs are secure.



Hey, I'm still in the room man...  ;D


----------



## Towards_the_gap

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> An interesting and cautionary reminder that downsizing does not always mean keeping the best and brightest:
> 
> Military Brain Drain
> 
> The Pentagon's top brass is driving away all the smart people.
> 
> In his recent book Bleeding Talent, Tim Kane joins a growing chorus of serving and former junior officers to deliver a wake-up call to today's military leadership in the face of a major drawdown. Their message: If you ignore the expectations of today's young, combat-experienced leaders as you shrink the force, your most talented officers and sergeants will exit, stage left.
> 
> The military bureaucracy's response? "Good Riddance."
> 
> http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/13/military_brain_drain



Equally applicable to the CF........


----------



## McG

Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> Equally applicable to the CF........


Except that the CAF is not undergoing force reductions.
We do need to reallocate PYs out of HQs, but that does not reduce the force.


----------



## GnyHwy

Nostix said:
			
		

> Therein lies the problem with the frequently heard "If you don't like it, you can always leave".
> 
> The most skilled and developed talent within an organization can actually afford to leave, while poor performers usually stay where the jobs are secure.



I'm not buying this one entirely.  Yes it is likely true to an extent, but the talent at the top of any rank level is not separated by that much.  Sure there may be some rockstars that come a long, some go, some stay.  They got that recognition by ending up in a position where they were able to shine, and good on them that they did, they performed a great service.  The thing is, there was probably a handful of other persons that are right behind them that could have performed the same or better if the circumstances had been there.  For every "top" guy there is five or six nipping at their heels, with another dozen or so that have potential to be right up in the mix.

The current or very near "what can you do for me" generation where subordinates expect their bosses to answer to them will eventually burst their own bubble.  Right around the time that these subordinates start becoming bosses themselves and the next generation comes in asking "what can you do for me".

If a few "ubertalents" want to move on, then great for them, I will even help them out.  There are many more willing and capable persons to do the job.


----------



## Jed

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I'm not buying this one entirely.  Yes it is likely true to an extent, but the talent at the top of any rank level is not separated by that much.  Sure there may be some rockstars that come a long, some go, some stay.  They got that recognition by ending up in a position where they were able to shine, and good on them that they did, they performed a great service.  The thing is, there was probably a handful of other persons that are right behind them that could have performed the same or better if the circumstances had been there.  For every "top" guy there is five or six nipping at their heels, with another dozen or so that have potential to be right up in the mix.
> 
> The current or very near "what can you do for me" generation where subordinates expect their bosses to answer to them will eventually burst their own bubble.  Right around the time that these subordinates start becoming bosses themselves and the next generation comes in asking "what can you do for me".
> If a few "ubertalents" want to move on, then great for them, I will even help them out.  There are many more willing and capable persons to do the job.



Good insight there, GnyHwy. The rockstars from this generation will no doubt undergo attitude adjustments.


----------



## Nostix

GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I'm not buying this one entirely.  Yes it is likely true to an extent, but the talent at the top of any rank level is not separated by that much.  Sure there may be some rockstars that come a long, some go, some stay.  They got that recognition by ending up in a position where they were able to shine, and good on them that they did, they performed a great service.  The thing is, there was probably a handful of other persons that are right behind them that could have performed the same or better if the circumstances had been there.  For every "top" guy there is five or six nipping at their heels, with another dozen or so that have potential to be right up in the mix.
> 
> The current or very near "what can you do for me" generation where subordinates expect their bosses to answer to them will eventually burst their own bubble.  Right around the time that these subordinates start becoming bosses themselves and the next generation comes in asking "what can you do for me".
> 
> If a few "ubertalents" want to move on, then great for them, I will even help them out.  There are many more willing and capable persons to do the job.



The last two posts outline the two most common problems with this topic perfectly.

Whenever this is brought up, it is immediately thought to only be the domain of people with a poor, self-centered attitude. We say that anyone who thinks about leaving must automatically think too highly of themselves, and that they're not actually worth worrying about retaining as an organization. In some cases, this is certainly true. But in a lot, it's just a poor way of deflecting the issue, and avoiding any sort of internal discussion.

The second is that we commit the fallacy of thinking "A body is a body". If number one leaves, number two is almost as good and can fill in.  That only works on a small scale, within the performance of a single job. On an organizational level, for every person from the top 5% you lose, you're bringing in someone who is average.  Yes, whatever talent you have in the organization will be able to rise that much more quickly, but you're still left with a large performance gap from where you should have been.

The military will always be able to get the job done, regardless. But we're certainly not making it any easier on ourselves.


----------



## Towards_the_gap

I would also add that the 'rockstars', as you so dismissively put it, are not leaving because the CF won't do enough for them, but rather they are leaving because they find themselves beating their heads against an immovable leviathan of mundanity that sees change, innovation and an ability to risk-take as things that must be avoided so that they get a good PER this year, get promoted and carry on one more year to pension age. 

I have seen some very awesome, capable and intelligent majors/capts and Sgt/WO's say 'screw this' and either go work in the public sector or go SF. But I guess they are just replaceble numbers eh?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

If you are looking to avoid "immovable leviathan of mundanity that sees change, innovation and an ability to risk-take as things that must be avoided" types, don't join the PS, the risk aversion of the current crop is breathtaking. Mind you in the big companies that same risk avoidance is climbing quite steeply as well.


----------



## GnyHwy

Nostix said:
			
		

> The last two posts outline the two most common problems with this topic perfectly.
> 
> Whenever this is brought up, it is immediately thought to only be the domain of people with a poor, self-centered attitude. We say that anyone who thinks about leaving must automatically think too highly of themselves, and that they're not actually worth worrying about retaining as an organization. In some cases, this is certainly true. But in a lot, it's just a poor way of deflecting the issue, and avoiding any sort of internal discussion.



I don't know how you inferred this from what I wrote, but OK, I'll bite.  If they are thinking about moving on then they must see themselves better employed somewhere else.  So whether that is self centered or not, they clearly see themselves above what they are currently doing.  As far as deflecting the issue?  There is a lot more "internal discussion" about retention than you may think, particularly with western soldiers where there is plenty of work.



			
				Nostix said:
			
		

> The second is that we commit the fallacy of thinking "A body is a body". If number one leaves, number two is almost as good and can fill in.  That only works on a small scale, within the performance of a single job. On an organizational level, for every person from the top 5% you lose, you're bringing in someone who is average.  Yes, whatever talent you have in the organization will be able to rise that much more quickly, but you're still left with a large performance gap from where you should have been.



I'm not saying that number two is "almost" as good.  I'm saying they *ARE* as good.  Anyone who thinks they are not replaceable needs to get over themselves.  Also, I'm not seeing the performance gap you are talking about.  Anyone who has been involved with a merit will tell you that there are very fine lines between the placings, which is why 1 point can make a difference.



			
				Towards_the_gap said:
			
		

> I would also add that the 'rockstars', as you so dismissively put it, are not leaving because the CF won't do enough for them, but rather they are leaving because they find themselves beating their heads against an immovable leviathan of mundanity that sees change, innovation and an ability to risk-take as things that must be avoided so that they get a good PER this year, get promoted and carry on one more year to pension age.
> 
> I have seen some very awesome, capable and intelligent majors/capts and Sgt/WO's say 'screw this' and either go work in the public sector or go SF. But I guess they are just replaceble numbers eh?



I did not mean rockstars in a bad way.  If I meant it as bad I would have called them hollywood.    I get your point about change and innovation, but it's not so easily done.  By the time someone comes up with a good idea, the several layers above them have already set a plan into action.  Should they change everytime the good idea fairy comes along?  The good idea fairy comes along way too much as it is, and causes unnecessary change and complexity that ultimately accomplishes the same goal, just in a different way.

Another thing about ideas for change is that a lot of times these ideas have already been thought of and even tried, only to have someone else come along with their good idea and eventually you come full circle back to the original way.  If you have ideas then pass them up, but don't expect to get them all implemented.  I say if you can get even a few passed then you are doing pretty good, and don't take it personally for the ones that didn't get passed.  A fallacy I see when peoples ideas get shot down is assuming that the system is broken rather than being critical of their own idea and admitting that their baby is ugly.

Are they just replaceable numbers?  I say yes!  To say no to that would be to discredit and diminish the lineup up of persons who are waiting for the opportunity that this person doesn't realize they have.  And, if they're are truly that good, head and shoulders above and beyond everyone else, irreplaceable, and practically the second coming, then we can't afford them anyway.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin P said:
			
		

> If you are looking to avoid "immovable leviathan of mundanity that sees change, innovation and an ability to risk-take as things that must be avoided" types, don't join the PS, the risk aversion of the current crop is breathtaking. Mind you in the big companies that same risk avoidance is climbing quite steeply as well.



And amen said the choir......

I hate "Safety First".  It is right up there with "The Precautionary Principle".


----------



## dapaterson

I have an issue with folks who are unwilling to commit to make change.  Yes, it's long and hard to do it.  But do we want institutional leaders who look at things and say "too hard, I don't want to do it."?

I have more than a little frustration with certain folks who enjoy complaining about the way the CF is run, but who fight tooth and nail to avoid being posted to HQs where they could (a) influence change or (b) understand how things got to the way they are, and what the constraints are.

Leadership is sometimes doing the crappy jobs that need to get done, not the easy jobs that lead to glory and plaudits.


----------



## ARMY_101

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> One of the major points of his report was the inability of commanders to effect change. The commander will say "X has to changem, I want it to be Y" and the staff will say "yes, sir. We will get to it" and then wait until he is posted. A prime example is the fact that even though the directive from the government is to make cuts to the admin side and not touch the operational or training side, the bureaucrats and agreeing with them, then doing what ever the hell they want.



Disgusting. Completely unacceptable.

Why do we even need a public service-DND anyway?  Just create one "Department of Public Safety" headed by one minister and a few associate ministers.  This department would take care of correctional services and national security, as they do now  (e.g. CSIS), plus National Defence.  Or, do the opposite: merge the current Public Safety into a Department of National Defence (or, if "National Defence" is deemed too-military like, a Department of Homeland Security?  > )

The expeditionary, overseas fighting and killing would still be left to Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, but the backroom administration (DND's sole mandate is to "support" the CAF) would be absorbed and rationalized.


----------



## Monsoon

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> Disgusting. Completely unacceptable.
> 
> Why do we even need a public service-DND anyway?  Just create one "Department of Public Safety" headed by one minister and a few associate ministers.  This department would take care of correctional services and national security, as they do now  (e.g. CSIS), plus National Defence.  Or, do the opposite: merge the current Public Safety into a Department of National Defence (or, if "National Defence" is deemed too-military like, a Department of Homeland Security?  > )
> 
> The expeditionary, overseas fighting and killing would still be left to Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, but the backroom administration (DND's sole mandate is to "support" the CAF) would be absorbed and rationalized.


To be fair, DND/CAF is almost as big as the rest of government put together (bigger in some respects). The opposite case to yours could be made: that it's "too much department" for just one minister with functions that should be broken-out, not merged-up. Don't know where I sit on the issue and I see merit to both points. I gather that in your view, the CAF should exist as a semi-independent government agency like CSIS or the RCMP, and thus entail less public service overhead. But I think that much of what's wrong with DND/CAF is the fact that Treasury Board guidelines and a lot of other policies are designed with much smaller government entities in mind (think Canadian Heritage, with a budget just north of $1B). The sheer scale of DND/CAF in comparison to that design ideal is the problem, and I don't know that making the CAF an agency vice a department would change that - for instance, the same Treasury Board guidelines would apply.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Plus they don't have the politics of community base employment, big honkin procurements. You could expand the CE's to be a bit more like the Seebee's, during peacetime, they do most of the base maintenance, but then get deployed and support the forces in the field by building FOB's, KAF's LAV friendly Tim Horton's drive throughs  etc,etc. Of course the garrison will have to accept lesser service or contract to have service covered during the deployment. However as mentioned the "Empire's death star" (aka TB) will fight ooth and nail to ensure the stranglehold of it's polices are maintained of the CF.


----------



## Jed

Colin P said:
			
		

> Plus they don't have the politics of community base employment, big honkin procurements. You could expand the CE's to be a bit more like the Seebee's, during peacetime, they do most of the base maintenance, but then get deployed and support the forces in the field by building FOB's, KAF's LAV friendly Tim Horton's drive throughs  etc,etc. Of course the garrison will have to accept lesser service or contract to have service covered during the deployment. However as mentioned the "Empire's death star" (aka TB) will fight ooth and nail to ensure the stranglehold of it's polices are maintained of the CF.



I am of the opinion that this would be a more efficient model for the CAF. Good luck changing the civilian and military politics to take this approach, though. The civilians won't like the loss of unionised employment and loss of financial control and the pointy end military will consider the CE troops somewhat higher up the ladder rungs then PAT platoon and several rungs lower than pilots or combat arms troops, and maybe one or two rungs lower than Maintenance techs.


----------



## TCM621

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> Disgusting. Completely unacceptable.
> 
> Why do we even need a public service-DND anyway?  Just create one " of Public Safety" headed by one minister and a few associate ministers.  This department would take care of correctional services and national security, as they do now  (e.g. CSIS), plus National Defence.  Or, do the opposite: merge the current Public Safety into a Department of National Defence (or, if "National Defence" is deemed too-military like, a Department of Homeland Security?  > )
> 
> The expeditionary, overseas fighting and killing would still be left to Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, but the backroom administration (DND's sole mandate is to "support" the CAF) would be absorbed and rationalized.



For the sale of fairness, the problem isn't just with the public service. During the MOSART review a few years ago, it was discovered that every single bit of the NAVCOMM occspec was covered under some other trades occspec. The plan was created to split the trade up and put people in various other trades based on their desires and aptitudes. So no longer would you have a guy who joined to be on the upper decks stuck in a hole fixing computers or a IT guy doing flashing light Morse code. It was widely accepted amongst the rank and file. However, as soon as Mosart was killed the snr  pers were ecstatic. An email from the Moc advisor circulated saying saner heads have prevailed, no change. It lead to a lot of remusters, early retirements and releases. Not an enormous amount but enough that it was noticed. The military is inherently resistant to change so is government bureaucracy. It is a bad mix and has been part of the reason the CF hasn't recovered from Trudeau.


----------



## a_majoor

Had an interesting conversation toda. Someone asserted that something on the order of 11,000 CF and DND positions were identified as surplus, overlapping or redundent in Ottawa alone several years ago.

Assuming for the sake of argument that this figure is in the ballpark, we have seen multiple efforts over the years, from LGen Leslie's report to the Government's direction to reduce administrative overhead, yet administration costs still apparently increeased 27% last year alone (according to CTV News yesterday). This is unacceptable for many reasons, but mostly since it indicates that there is no effort to follow direction from the civilian or departmental leadership on this issue. I have no idea if this is sabotage, negligence or incompetence (or all three), but some high level people have to be thrown on their swords over this or there will NEVER be any movement on this issue.

</rant>


----------



## Monsoon

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is unacceptable for many reasons, but mostly since it indicates that there is no effort to follow direction from the civilian or departmental leadership on this issue.


Do you really believe that? I just spent a good chunk of the afternoon sifting through the neo-byzantium that is the Treasury Board Travel, Hospitality and Events Guidelines to try to figure out if something we're going to do is an "event" or not (if it is, there's some not-entirely-clear reporting that needs to happen). Fact: the new "event" regulations came about because someone had the great idea of trying to clamp down on wasteful travel and conferences. The bad news is that the regulatory mechanism to do this contains the kind of hair-splitting that makes arguing about the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin look tangibly practical. You need staff college and a postgraduate degree to figure it out, yet the reporting requirement has been farmed out to every nook and cranny of DND. Not only will the guidelines not prevent wasteful conference activities, but there's been an increase in overhead burden caused by the regulatory framework that was supposed to reduce the waste.

This wasn't caused by a lack of effort to follow through on the political will, it was caused by not knowing how to create the right incentives to achieve that will. Never ascribe to malice what can be explained by incompetence.


----------



## dapaterson

Not a credible source.  There are not 11K surplus / overlapping folks in NDHQ; I do not have an org chart in front of me, but that number is oversized.

The Leslie report is not a credible source either.  He invented his own definitions, and his own financial model, so nothing in his report can be compared to existing baseline data., or to future data.  Convenient way to avoid argument or discussion: invent your own method that has never been used before and will never be used again.


Looking at the PBO report: There is no granularity or detail; merely two numbers without context as to how they were derived.  "Internal Services" is a bit of a catch-all; according to the VCDS, it includes:

Governance and Management Support 5.1.1
   Management and Oversight 5.1.1.1
   CF Readiness Management and Oversight 5.1.1.2 
   Communications 5.1.1.3
   Legal 5.1.1.4

Resources Management Services 5.1.2
   Human Resource Management 5.1.2.1
   Financial Management 5.1.2.2
   Information Management 5.1.2.3
   Information Technology 5.1.2.4
   Travel and Other Administrative Services 5.1.2.5

Asset Management Services 5.1.3
   Real Property 5.1.3.1
   Material 5.1.3.2

Source: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=7769

So, spending on systems such as DRMIS would be attributed here.  I suspect things such as the cash-out of leave for civilians (and possibly military) would be attributed here; acknowledge that military severance was not paid out in 12/13, but I believe the department began earmarking the funds in 12/13.  Alternatively, it could be costs related to the settlement of the SISIP class action suit.  Of course, the media would have to ask intelligent questions, and not merely say "Oh, look, 27%!"

Certainly, a 27% increase is a good sound-bite.  Too hard, I guess, for the media to do anything more than look at the PBO's spreadsheet (where, for the record, it's 27.8% more, so if they're rounding, they've done it wrong).  PBO spreadsheet is at: http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/Savings_Breakdown_Program_Activites_P6FINAL.xlsx


----------



## a_majoor

While I can sympathise with you WRT dealing with the TB, I hardly think that this is the reason for a reported 27% increase in Administrative costs (while the news article did not break it down, the most costly aspect of virtually every enterprise is wage and salary costs). An example from a few years past is every reserve regiment in 31 Brigade (and I would imagine every brigade) received a full time civilian employee who's sole job is to enter data into HRMS. Considering the number of actual members in a reserve unit, there is no justification for a full time employee to do this (and there are the unit clerks who are supposed to do this anyway). So at least 15 full time civilian employees are doing data entry for however many part time reserve soldiers are in 31 Brigade today.

As well, there have been _orders_ to reduce the size of headquarters dating back to the time of CDS John de Chastelain that I am personally aware of, yet we are still here in 2013 looking at a headquarters complex that eclipses the sun. The effect of divesting 11,000 positions from Ottawa and putting the PYs back into the field force could translate into a better balanced force structure with enough soldiers to man battalions and battlegroups without trying to "plug and play" for each and every ROTO, ships that are not tied up alongside the dock for lack of crews and enough instructors to reduce PAT battalions back to actual platoons, among other things.

This is an effort that simply must be made to remain a relevant and effective force that can actually deploy and carry out the will of the Government.


----------



## dapaterson

Sigh.  There are not 11 000 full-time military personnel in Ottawa/Gatineau; not even that many military personnel if you count the part-time reservists.

As for civilians: You are correct, there are too many Reserve unit HQs; culling those to about 1/3 of the current number would result in 500+ full-time military PYs saved for reinvestment.  Fewer unit HQs would mean fewer civilians; though having civilians for routine admin jobs in units is preferable to military; no courses, no postings, and a set group of duties so the work actually gets done - "MCpl! go do task x, y and Z - that HR stuff can wait 'til later."  In the past, Reserve HR data was horrifically bad - a cross-reference of ranks between the HR system and pay system around 2005 showed approximately 1 in 6 individuals had different ranks in the two systems - one unit had a CWO in the pay system who showed as a Pte in the HR system.

There have been reductions made in HQs; but there have also been deliberate increases.  Gen Hillier took several hundred positions out of the Reg F expansion to create the dot COM headquarters - that's hundreds of positions that were not made into infantrymen, bos'ns or flight engineers, but instead put to work in cubicles in Ottawa.

Is there a need to do a review of all HQ structures across the country, including NDHQ?  Yes.  Is randomly cutting NDHQ alone going to solve things?  No.  The Army has at least 19 level 2 and level 3 formation HQs not part of NDHQ - how many of those are truly needed, and how many can be reduced?


----------



## Monsoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Is there a need to do a review of all HQ structures across the country, including NDHQ?  Yes.  Is randomly cutting NDHQ alone going to solve things?  No.


But... but... if we eliminated L2 positions in Valcartier, Halifax, Toronto and Edmonton, we might have to put someone in Ottawa to do the work they used to do! And I have some anecdotal evidence backed up by some figures I think I heard but can't be bothered to look up that suggest, when read correctly, that everything that is done by people when they're situated in the Ottawa metropolitan area is wasteful and redundant! Ipso facto roberto luongo, we can't do this.


----------



## dapaterson

Or we may discover that there are people doing make-work in lower HQs.  Culling higher HQs helps reduce the size of lower HQs as well, as fewer stupid questions come down.

Work expands to fill available staff time.  And idle staff create more work, requiring still more staff to respond to their queries, who then have idle time, creating more staff work, etc, ad nauseum.


----------



## Monsoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Or we may discover that there are people doing make-work in lower HQs.  Culling higher HQs helps reduce the size of lower HQs as well, as fewer stupid questions come down.
> 
> Work expands to fill available staff time.  And idle staff create more work, requiring still more staff to respond to their queries, who then have idle time, creating more staff work, etc, ad nauseum.


Yep - organizations' complexity increase geometrically as their size increases linearly, which is why "little" things like new TB guidelines and new HR databases drive disproportionate increases in wage and salary costs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I'd just like to grab back that hour and a half per day of PT that all the full timers out there are 'apparently' doing and turn that into a commando brigade worth of infantry and support arms. ;D


----------



## ARMY_101

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> To be fair, DND/CAF is almost as big as the rest of government put together (bigger in some respects). The opposite case to yours could be made: that it's "too much department" for just one minister with functions that should be broken-out, not merged-up. Don't know where I sit on the issue and I see merit to both points. I gather that in your view, the CAF should exist as a semi-independent government agency like CSIS or the RCMP, and thus entail less public service overhead. But I think that much of what's wrong with DND/CAF is the fact that Treasury Board guidelines and a lot of other policies are designed with much smaller government entities in mind (think Canadian Heritage, with a budget just north of $1B). The sheer scale of DND/CAF in comparison to that design ideal is the problem, and I don't know that making the CAF an agency vice a department would change that - for instance, the same Treasury Board guidelines would apply.



Not sure I agree with the assessment CAF = same size or larger than the rest of the federal government put together.  For rounding sake, let's say we have 100,000 current CF members between RegF, PRes, and rangers.  The federal public service in all departments combined, as of 2010, was 283,000.

I don't think there needs to be a change in the terminology of department vs. agency; just get rid of the civilian-side of the Forces.  If DND is intended to "support" the CAF, and the CAF by definition has the ability to support itself (whether in admin, procurement, vehicle maintenance, int and counter-int, etc), then I have no idea how DND (the civilian side) grew to the size it has.

Amalgamating "Defence" or "Public Safety" into one large department, IMO, would make the bloat and redundancy of DND even more apparent.  The CAF would exist under a ministry to defend Canada and partake in the usual military operations.  Anyone in one of these roles would be a CAF member, thus alleviating the problem of working with unionized employees who have no sense of orders, chain of command, or responsibility.  And perhaps working in this way would also allow the CAF to work closer with CSIS, RCMP, etc. if they were all a part of the same ministry.


----------



## Edward Campbell

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> Not sure I agree with the assessment CAF = same size or larger than the rest of the federal government put together.  For rounding sake, let's say we have 100,000 current CF members between RegF, PRes, and rangers.  The federal public service in all departments combined, as of 2010, was 283,000.
> 
> I don't think there needs to be a change in the terminology of department vs. agency; just get rid of the civilian-side of the Forces.  If DND is intended to "support" the CAF, and the CAF by definition has the ability to support itself (whether in admin, procurement, vehicle maintenance, int and counter-int, etc), then I have no idea how DND (the civilian side) grew to the size it has.
> 
> Amalgamating "Defence" or "Public Safety" into one large department, IMO, would make the bloat and redundancy of DND even more apparent.  The CAF would exist under a ministry to defend Canada and partake in the usual military operations.  Anyone in one of these roles would be a CAF member, thus alleviating the problem of working with unionized employees who have no sense of orders, chain of command, or responsibility.  And perhaps working in this way would also allow the CAF to work closer with CSIS, RCMP, etc. if they were all a part of the same ministry.




DND is not there to "support" the CF. The CF is a _component_ of DND. The Department of National Defence is the agency charged, by the sovereign, with defending Canada and its interests at home and abroad. It, the Department, has decided to establish, staff, equip and maintain the CF as one "tool" in its quest to achieve its mission.

One could, equally well, ask: why are there so damned many military people in Ottawa? Many of them, the uniformed folks who wander the streets in decidedly inappropriate (for office work) combat uniforms, are doing jobs that could be and probably should be done by less expensive and at least as well qualified civil servants.


----------



## Journeyman

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> .....and the CAF by definition has the ability to support itself (whether in admin, procurement, vehicle maintenance, int and counter-int, etc)......


Where did you get your definition?



> .... allow the CAF to work closer with CSIS, RCMP, etc. if they were all a part of the same ministry.


You've never been on the periphery of a CSIS-RCMP squabble, have you?


----------



## ARMY_101

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> DND is not there to "support" the CF. The CF is a _component_ of DND. The Department of National Defence is the agency charged, by the sovereign, with defending Canada and its interests at home and abroad. It, the Department, has decided to establish, staff, equip and maintain the CF as one "tool" in its quest to achieve its mission.



I disagree.  The Queen of Canada has established a Department of National Defence *and* Her Canadian Armed Forces.

By law, she has charged the Department, headed by the minister, with:

(a) the construction and maintenance of all defence establishments and works for the defence of Canada; and

(b) research relating to the defence of Canada and to the development of and improvements in materiel.

In contrast, and by that same law, she has charged her Canadian Forces, headed by the Chief of Defence Staff, with "the control and administration of the Canadian Forces."

This is where I'm getting the definitions: the CF is intended to defend Canada and her interests; the DND is intended to _support_ the CF by constructing and maintaining defence establishments and conducting research into the defence, and materiel sides of the CF. To me, that's a supportive role.

In fact, DND's own civilian webpage says their relation with the CF "is that of a support system," and furthermore:

DND civilians support Army "efforts by providing operational and administrative support and technical and computer services;"

Support Navy efforts by "making sure the fleet is in top condition for deployment;" and

Support Air Force efforts by supporting "essential air force activities through their roles as policy and program officers, general safety officers, mechanical aircraft technicians, aerospace engineers, instructors and analysts; airfield engineers and flight test control room operators and programmers."

I'd say it's pretty clear the DND-CF relationship is one of the former supporting the latter, or of the tail supporting the tooth.


----------



## ARMY_101

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Where did you get your definition?



Assuming your typical ground/air/maritime war, the elements are constructed to be self-supporting, no? Infantry kills the enemy, weapons techs keep the infantry's weapons working, veh techs make sure the infantry get where they need to go, cooks keep the veh and weapons techs fed, RMS clerks make sure the cooks are paid, etc...


----------



## Edward Campbell

I recommend, ARMY_101 that you read the words in the NDA carefully. The CF is _optional_, ditto the CDS who "may" be appointed if necessary. The MND _"has_ [as his primary duty]_ the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for
(a) the construction and maintenance of all defence establishments and works for the defence of Canada; and
(b) research relating to the defence of Canada and to the development of and improvements in materiel."_

Now, in fact, by the letters patent of 1947, the GG is the Commander in Chief of whichever armed forces exist and the CDS is his (or her) chief of staff and is responsible for _"the control and administration of the Canadian Forces"_ by which we should assume the forces in being. Please note that the CDS is not responsible for the "management" of the nation's defences which we should also assume includes e.g. defence policy and raising, staffing, equipping and paying the CF: that's part of the minister's job and he is assisted in that by his Associate Minister(s), Deputy Minister other named bureaucrats, including the JAG.


----------



## Journeyman

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> Assuming your typical ground/air/maritime war, the elements are constructed to be self-supporting, no? Infantry kills the enemy, weapons techs keep the infantry's weapons working, veh techs make sure the infantry get where they need to go, cooks keep the veh and weapons techs fed, RMS clerks make sure the cooks are paid, etc...



At the "war-fighting" end of the spectrum, this is mostly true.  

However, your own examples of "procurement" (does LCol Bloggins go out and purchase the CF-18s his squadron requires?), vehicle maintenance (no DND-oversight for factory rebuilds required, Veh Tech Cpl Snuffy can do that), or counter-int (step aside CSIS, WO Tête de Viande is all over that)...just as examples....show that a military force is not a completely self-contained and -supporting organization.

It can not be, and it _should_ not be.


----------



## garb811

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> And perhaps working in this way would also allow the CAF to work closer with CSIS, RCMP, etc. if they were all a part of the same ministry.


I would point out this already happens on an almost daily basis at a variety of different levels from local to national.  Just because YOU don't see it doesn't mean it isn't ongoing.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> You've never been on the periphery of a CSIS-RCMP squabble, have you?


Saying they squabble implies they actually talk to each other.  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ......
> 
> The Leslie report is not a credible source either.  He invented his own definitions, and his own financial model, so nothing in his report can be compared to existing baseline data., or to future data.  Convenient way to avoid argument or discussion: invent your own method that has never been used before and will never be used again.
> ......



I don't agree that Leslie's methodology is a "convenient way to avoid argument or discussion".    I find that is often appropriate to reduce things to their essence, draw my own conclusions and then challenge others to show me the error of my ways.  It is very easy for my clients to decide not to engage and avoid argument or discussion if they so choose.  On the other hand, by responding to my idiocies, occasionally we both end up learning.  And once in a while change happens.

I find it very easy for people to keep saying you can't do this because of para such and such and clause so and so prevents that.  It becomes necessary , time after time, to keep drilling home the intent of the exercise: This is what we are trying to accomplish - I know how we can't do things - Tell me how we can.

Usually this discussion is held with lawyers, accountants and engineers - people that are charged with supplying advice.  So many of them know enough about the rules and regulations to tell you what you can't do.  So few of them understand them well enough to tell you what you can do.

Back to the cheapseats.


----------



## Journeyman

garb811 said:
			
		

> Saying they squabble implies they actually talk to each other.  ;D


OK, maybe talk _about_ each other..... 

And when they are talking to one another, I'm sure they're saying, "those CF guys are pretty darn swell."


----------



## ARMY_101

Journeyman said:
			
		

> However, your own examples of "procurement" (does LCol Bloggins go out and purchase the CF-18s his squadron requires?), vehicle maintenance (no DND-oversight for factory rebuilds required, Veh Tech Cpl Snuffy can do that), or counter-int (step aside CSIS, WO Tête de Viande is all over that)...just as examples....show that a military force is not a completely self-contained and -supporting organization.
> 
> It can not be, and it _should_ not be.



I agree procurement _today_ does not operate that way. But why couldn't Fighter Jet procurement happen under the CAS; LAV procurement under CLS; and so forth? For one, it would bring procurement closer to home by involving the soldiers and commanders actually using that equipment. Secondly, it would, along with the purpose of this thread, eliminate the need for civilian staff to be the middlemen.  Thirdly, if procurement really needed to be done at the national HQ level outside the force-generating L1s, then there's nothing to say the Chief of Military Procurement (an example title) couldn't be an MGen with the same powers and authority of an ADM.


----------



## Edward Campbell

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> I agree procurement _today_ does not operate that way. But why couldn't Fighter Jet procurement happen under the CAS; LAV procurement under CLS; and so forth? For one, it would bring procurement closer to home by involving the soldiers and commanders actually using that equipment. Secondly, it would, along with the purpose of this thread, eliminate the need for civilians to be the middlemen.




What makes you think that the CNS, CLS or CAS are in any conceivable way qualified to do procurement? It is likely that providing them with a competent - which means civilian - procurement staff would lead to even bigger, even more bloated HQs (after we count the reductions in e.g. PWGSC) and increase costs and provoke even more political interference. Procurement, in government and industry, is a specialized function that takes a combination of skills and knowledge that are gained, primarily, from experience. That's why military people are rarely involved in it: the length of time it takes to learn and then master the business means that it, procurement, is a career in itself. We want people who make their careers in ships, in the field and in the air, not in offices.


----------



## McG

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> … it would bring procurement closer to home by involving the soldiers and commanders actually using that equipment.


You are either ignorant of the current process or naively optimistic of your solution.  As requirements staff are already internal to the FG Commands, if soldiers and commanders are not currently being involved to an adequate level then that problem is internal to the Army itself.


----------



## ARMY_101

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> What makes you think that the CNS, CLS or CAS are in any conceivable way qualified to do procurement? It is likely that providing them with a competent - which means civilian - procurement staff would lead to even bigger, even more bloated HQs (after we count the reductions in e.g. PWGSC) and increase costs and provoke even more political interference. Procurement, in government and industry, is a specialized function that takes a combination of skills and knowledge that are gained, primarily, from experience. That's why military people are rarely involved in it: the length of time it takes to learn and then master the business means that it, procurement, is a career in itself. We want people who make their careers in ships, in the field and in the air, not in offices.



"The responsibilities of a Logistics Officers include:

*Procurement*
Warehousing items and material control
Distribution and disposal of military material, equipment, and ammunition
Coordination of food services, postal services, human resource or financial services"

I won't pretend to understand the procurement system, but why are our LogOs supposedly competent enough to do procurement as part of their trade, but not competent enough to do it without civilian employee oversight?  If procurement is as hard and difficult as we're assuming, then we're either not training LogOs properly or not giving them the support and authority they deserve.


----------



## AmmoTech90

There is a huge difference between buying pens, papers, and a couple of dozen generators when compared to a capital project where the expenditure of public funds will easily creep into 100s of millions and the material will be inservice for 10s of years with a full support programme and planned upgrades.

Log Os are fine for the first, not so good for the second.


----------



## Edward Campbell

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> "The responsibilities of a Logistics Officers include:
> 
> *Procurement*
> Warehousing items and material control
> Distribution and disposal of military material, equipment, and ammunition
> Coordination of food services, postal services, human resource or financial services"
> 
> I won't pretend to understand the procurement system, but why are our LogOs supposedly competent enough to do procurement as part of their trade, but not competent enough to do it without civilian employee oversight?  If procurement is as hard and difficult as we're assuming, then we're either not training LogOs properly or not giving them the support and authority they deserve.




First of all, procurement, at an _industrial_ level, (which covers things like e.g. GM Canada, DND or, say Bell Canada) is the business of accountants and engineers - it is vastly different from types of local procurement done by our excellent LogOs and NCOs. Consider "procuring" a ship or an aircraft - not a warship or a combat aircraft, but an ocean going ferry or a new cargo aircraft for commercial use: you can go to Irving's Halifax Shipyard, haul out your cheque book and say one 200 passenger car ferry suitable for the Nova Scotia to/from Newfoundland service, please ... they'll be really glad to see you; ditto going to e.g. Lockheed Martin and just asking for, say, a new L100 _Hercules_. But that's not how Marine Atlantic buys ships. They have teams of accountants and engineers who work out the future requirements and work closely with the builders to design and delivers ships that will meet their long term requirements - for a profit making service. Ditto e.g. First Air: they don't just walk into Lockheed Martin and say "another _Herc_, please.

Second, government procurement has a HUGE political aspect. It is the _people's_ cheque book that is being opened ~ your tax dollars and mine. The "business case" is much more complex than, say _First Air's_ - the procurement staff needs to satisfy the end user's _operational requirement_ within the allocated budget while, simultaneously, satisfying Canadians' _requirements_ for jobs and "benefits." It's another dimension, bigger than just accounting or engineering.


----------



## ARMY_101

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> There is a huge difference between buying pens, papers, and a couple of dozen generators when compared to a capital project where the expenditure of public funds will easily creep into 100s of millions and the material will be inservice for 10s of years with a full support programme and planned upgrades.
> 
> Log Os are fine for the first, not so good for the second.



Where is the line drawn then? Serious question.

I can't imagine telling a Capt/Maj/LCol "yes, sir, you're qualified enough to get us millions of dollars in pens, paper, and office equipment, but whoa, you think you can touch the 'real' projects? Calm down there..."

I'm trying to find the logical end of what we're discussing here. Either LogsO do procurement or they don't.  It would be expected that with more senior rank comes more responsibility and more ability to study and spend larger amounts of money. So at what point do we tell a LogO they're not allowed to perform one of the primary duties of their trade anymore, and must instead report to a civilian?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

First of all, no one buys millions of dollars in pens and paper.  That is all done at the unit level and might amount to of thousands of dollars- from a standing offer.

 Surely, you can see the difference between using an acquisition card to buy photocopier paper and writing a contract for (for example) a fighter aircraft project that involves billions of dollars, multiple government departments, vendors, in service support, sparing, basing, infrastructure, industrial offsets.....etc?


----------



## Journeyman

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Surely, you can see the difference .....


 You may as well save your breath.   :not-again:


----------



## ARMY_101

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Surely, you can see the difference between using an acquisition card to buy photocopier paper and writing a contract for (for example) a fighter aircraft project that involves billions of dollars, multiple government departments, vendors, in service support, sparing, basing, infrastructure, industrial offsets.....etc?



Absolutely, but we're talking about degrees of procurement and what's 'acceptable' for a CF officer to do and what needs to be done by a civilian employee. Where is that line drawn?


----------



## GnyHwy

I could agree with Log Os doing the job in procurement, if they have the education or experience.  I think some people are assuming that Log Os have a degree in Logistics engineering.  Anyone no what percentage of them actually do?  I'm guessing a pretty low number that actually have one.

So what would they bring to the table?  Do they have a degree in Logistics Engineering, Business Administration, and/or Project Management?  I'm guessing most of the civilians probably have at least a Masters.  Do they have some technical expertise that would warrant them being on a certain project.  If the answer is yes to either question then there is a place for them.  If the answer is no to both, then what good would they be. 

The persons working in DLR are supposedly technically sound within their area of expertise or trade and have the users interest in mind.  There are other ways to get user input as well, but it gets overlooked, probably too much. Either time, money or available troops kill that idea.  The persons in project management are the long time managers that deal with legalities, and may oversee a project for its entire life cycle.  Most times, mil pers do not want to stay in that job for that long.

Where is the line drawn for Log Os? I think the line is whether or not they have the education or experience that would warrant them being part of the project.  Managing a Regts or even a Bde worth of equipment is not that same as managing several projects for the entire CF, throughout their entire life cycle.


----------



## AmmoTech90

The Army does have a course that teaches people about equipment, developing requirements, and the procurement process.  For officers it is the Land Forces Technical Staff Programme and for warrant officers it is the Army Technical Warrant Officer programme.  Following the course a person should be employed in a requirements, testing, or procurement section (DLR, LFTEU, DGLEPM), and this generally happens.

Looking at the number of people nominated for the course, the CF's Logistic Branch does not seem that interested in sending people on the course and therefore there is little input, at least at the requirements level, into larger projects.

Most Log Officers I know have no background in logistics or HR or transport.  They normally are biologists, history majors, or English lit types.


----------



## MJP

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> Absolutely, but we're talking about degrees of procurement and what's 'acceptable' for a CF officer to do and what needs to be done by a civilian employee. Where is that line drawn?



I don't have time to get into some huge debate about procurement with you but as a LogO, large capital projects are not the purview of a LogO to do.  There is a limit and it is clearly drawn.  After $25,000 for either goods or services we are obligated to use PWGSC to get what a customer wants period.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> I could agree with Log Os doing the job in procurement, if they have the education or experience.  I think some people are assuming that Log Os have a degree in Logistics engineering.  Anyone no what percentage of them actually do?  I'm guessing a pretty low number that actually have one.


  
Most of my peers and superiors have business, economics or commerce type degrees.  There was some slippage in allowable degrees due to low numbers in the past years but it has been tightened up.  Regardless believe me as a business admin grad, there is little real carry over. Overarching concepts sure, the rest not so much.



			
				GnyHwy said:
			
		

> Where is the line drawn for Log Os? I think the line is whether or not they have the education or experience that would warrant them being part of the project.  Managing a Regts or even a Bde worth of equipment is not that same as managing several projects for the entire CF, throughout their entire life cycle.


  

Log Os do this through postings to ADM-Mat, although to be fair life cycle management (item managers, LCMM etc etc) is largely done by the civilian employees.  They are a part of many projects in various roles; hell Ottawa holds the largest percentage of LogOs in trade.


----------



## McG

There is a whole other thread on the problems of procurement:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/26594.0.html

Trying to wind this back on topic a bit, there are military staffs in NDHQ who are responsible for speaking our collective mind to the civilian staffs who are responsible for our national support.  If there is a lack of communication between end-users and _deciders_, then the problem is already within uniformed personnel.  Militarizing civilian jobs will not fix this. 

Hiving off chunks of DND to a super civilian department of defence and security will also only make matters worse.  There are currently military personnel seeded throughout the civilian staffs of NDHQ to ensure a military perspective can be presented on matters of discussion; this perspective would be lost of the staff and work were moved out of DND.

Our trimming of the bloat needs to be an internal elimination of redundant processes, staffs, and positions.  There is much room to streamline.


----------



## MilEME09

Big example trade and component transfers within the Reserve, and Reserve to reg force transfers, that's a process that needs changes and streamlining, We just lost a guy in my unit who was transferring to be a badly needed supply tech because after 2.5 years nothing moved on his transfer. Reserve force members having to go through the CFRC to go reg force is also highly redundant, it should be an internal issue not something requiring the person to essentially go through the application process again.


----------



## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Big example trade and component transfers within the Reserve, and Reserve to reg force transfers, that's a process that needs changes and streamlining, We just lost a guy in my unit who was transferring to be a badly needed supply tech because after 2.5 years nothing moved on his transfer. Reserve force members having to go through the CFRC to go reg force is also highly redundant, it should be an internal issue not something requiring the person to essentially go through the application process again.



Only time Res F members have to go through CFRC for a CT is when they have to re-do the CFAT, as they didn't meet the standard for their selected trade and need to re-write.

Otherwise, it's an online application that can be actionned in a matter of weeks, particularly when an individual remains in trade and is occupationally qualified.


----------



## captloadie

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Only time Res F members have to go through CFRC for a CT is when they have to re-do the CFAT, as they didn't meet the standard for their selected trade and need to re-write.
> 
> Otherwise, it's an online application that can be actionned in a matter of weeks, particularly when an individual remains in trade and is occupationally qualified.



Umm, not how it is working from my experience. CT applicant files go to an honest broker cell in D-MIL-C who review files and fill positions based on the SIP numbers supplied by the CM's. For example, I lost a Cpl reservist to a civilian employer because there were no openings available for his rank and trade this year.


----------



## dapaterson

captloadie said:
			
		

> Umm, not how it is working from my experience. CT applicant files go to an honest broker cell in D-MIL-C who review files and fill positions based on the SIP numbers supplied by the CM's. For example, I lost a Cpl reservist to a civilian employer because there were no openings available for his rank and trade this year.



I said *can* be actionned, not *will* be actionned.  Obviously there must be a CF requirement (ie a vacancy) before a CT will occur.


----------



## dapaterson

Looks like LGen Leslie has found a new place to hang his hat.  Hill & Knowlton, noted international flacks, have announced his appointment to their Ottawa office:

http://hkstrategies.ca/news/hillknowlton-strategies-appoints-canadian-armed-forces-veteran/

"He comes to H+K as an associate focusing on strategic consultancy with expertise in tactical advisory and cyber resilience. Andy will be able to advise the firm’s wide range of private- and public-sector clients across the country. "

Hill & Knowlton is well known for years of leading denial on the linkage between smoking and lung cancer; creating the "grassroots" demands for the US to intervene in Kuwait; and representing BCCI, the failed bank tagged with money laundering and other financial irregularities.


Of course, the outstanding question is why he parted ways with CGI...


----------



## Journeyman

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Hill & Knowlton is well known for years of leading denial on the linkage between smoking and lung cancer; creating the "grassroots" demands for the US to intervene in Kuwait; and representing BCCI, the failed bank tagged with money laundering and other financial irregularities.


 I thought that was still in quotes as part of their press release.   :rofl:


----------



## GAP

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Of course, the outstanding question is why he parted ways with CGI...



Maybe he did a "2013 Report on Transformation" for them and was done....


----------



## Good2Golf

What is "cyber resilience?"   ???


----------



## GAP

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> What is "cyber resilience?"   ???



online stretch marks?


----------



## OldSolduer

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> What is "cyber resilience?"   ???



Please someone explain "cyber resilience".

How about we cut support to cadet programs instead?  :sarcasm:


----------



## kratz

[quote author=Jim Seggie] How about we cut support to cadet programs instead?  :sarcasm:
[/quote]

I note the sarcasm, but be careful what you wish for:

CBC.ca




> Air Cadet glider program may be grounded
> Potential cuts to the program could mean cadets' glider days are numbered
> 
> CBC News
> 
> Posted: Apr 29, 2013 7:17 PM AT
> Last Updated: Apr 29, 2013 10:35 PM AT
> 
> Potential cuts to the Air Cadet Gliding Program could mean the days of soaring cadets are coming to an end.
> 
> In Department of National Defence emails obtained by the CBC, the department proposes cuts to the Air Cadet Gliding Program, saying the “ACGP has become the primary target for cost reductions within the cadet program."
> 
> The email says the decision to close the glider program "will come as a complete surprise."
> 
> "This is indeed a dark day for the Air Cadet Program," it says. For many young cadets, the gliding program gave them their first taste of flight.
> 
> The memos make it clear that the decision to cut the glider program is only being considered at this time, but that the program is viewed as unaffordable by leadership in the Canadian Forces.
> 
> The program could be cancelled across the country as early as next year.
> 
> In question period Monday, NDP defence critic Jack Harris grilled Defence Minister Peter MacKay on the topic of possible cuts to the glider program.
> 
> "Mr. Speaker, what I can assure the honourable member is that we will not be cutting the cadet program, and I can assure the member that we will continue to make increases in the budget of the Department of National Defence," said MacKay.
> 
> Harris countered that people who run the gliding program are being told that cuts are possible.
> 
> "Is he, or is he not, slashing this important glider training program for young air cadets?" asked Harris.
> 
> MacKay said that a decision on the glider program had yet to be made.
> 
> "I can assure the House that the cadet program will continue to enjoy this important use of gliders. In fact, we continue to review and assess the effectiveness of programs, but there is no decision with respect to the cadet glider program," he said.
> 
> The glider program is a partnership between the Air Cadet League of Canada and the Department of National Defence.
> 
> There are five glider schools across Canada, including: Comox, B.C., Gimli, Man., St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Que., Debert, N.S., and one in Ontario.
> 
> After earning glider wings, many cadets go on to fly powered aircraft.
> 
> Canadian astronaut Chris Hadfield, who is currently the commander of the International Space Station, was a member of the Air Cadets in the 1970s. At the age of 15, Hadfield earned a glider pilot scholarship. He went on to earn a powered pilot scholarship at 16 years old.


----------



## McG

All,
Let's keep posts within the site guidelines.  Specifically in relation to a few recent deletions and this little bit:


			
				Mike Bobbitt said:
			
		

> Milnet.ca has a zero tolerance policy for personal attacks, whether against another Milnet.ca member or a public figure.


----------



## Edward Campbell

The government, _per se_, and the military are, it *appears to me*, at an impasse. See the recent (18 Mar 13) testimony of the CDS at The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence; both Sens Dallaire and Lang mentioned the letter (or memo) the PM sent to the MND suggesting (demanding?) that cuts come from "administration," by which, *it appears to me* the PM meant HQs and "overhead." Gen Lawson has been pretty clear that he thinks HQs are just fine and the "cuts" that were made (a 25% reduction, he says) are sufficient.

It may be that I am misreading (either or both) the PM and/or the CDS but I'm guessing that the PM was aiming, squarely, at HQs (the C2 superstructure) and, even more narrowly at admirals and generals and captains(N) and colonels. I'm also guessing that the CDS doesn't want to meddle, any further, in the C2 superstructure because he is more concerned with problems of _quality_ (of decision making) rather than _quantity_ (of the decision makers).

I have made no secret of my views: fewer HQs (even though they may be larger) with lower ranked senior officers. Specifically I advocate lowering the ranks of most GOFOs in major HQs and of NDHQ directors ~ the CDS should be a VAdm/LGen (as should several other senior officers (VCDS, DCDS (head of the joint staff) DCINC NORAD, CANMILREPNATO, ec) and directors in NDHQ should be cdrs/lcols, not capts(N)/colonels because the real"first level "executive" in the CF is a ship/unit CO and director is the public service "first level executive." I'm not advocating pay cuts; quite the reverse I want pay raises for senior officers - I just want fewer of them.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

Unfortunately you're asking folks to cut off their own heads or the heads of service friends who aren't quite 'there' yet...........it will NEVER happen unless a qualified outside person with no " old gang" ties comes in and does it.

Easier to send a memo down chain.......


----------



## ARMY_101

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> it will NEVER happen unless a qualified outside person with no " old gang" ties comes in and does it.



Isn't that what the minister and Deputy Minister are there for?


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

..and are really "qualified" as what??


----------



## GAP

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> ..and are really "qualified" as what??



hatchet men....


----------



## Edward Campbell

I hate to get all pedantic and cite history, again, but ... Not true, I don't mind lecturing at all  .

The notion that admirals and generals are experts on military organization and that their professional views ought to carry the day is quite recent - certainly post 1947 when President Truman forced _unification_ on a US military establishment that was in almost open revolt, and certainly post 1964 when Lester Pearson's government's White Paper proposed something similar for Canada, again in the face of stiff military opposition. In fact, for most of our history the organization and maintenance of naval and military forces was, mainly, a civil function - admirals and generals campaigned with what the politicians, the Council in our (British, mainly English) tradition, gave them.

But, ever since the 1960s we have seen fewer and fewer military men in politics (although the current crop of Conservatives includes a few more than normal) and the working politicians have been increasingly reluctant to intrude in military matters.

In Canada, in the 1990s, the military fought back against an inept and dispirited foreign service and a weak and disinterested PCO, and people like John de Chastelain, Larry Murray, Ray Henault and Rick Hillier fought hard to get meaningful _operational_, *combat* roles for the CF. Politicians and most bureaucrats caved - mimicking their American counterparts - and "accepted" that the military knew best. It (the military knows best) is a very, very dubious proposition.

So who should decide how the CF should be organized? The CDS? No, it's not, really his job - advise? yes, decide? no. The DM - Not really his job, either, but he does have a vital advisory role. The MND? Yes. It is his job. He should seek professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies, but, in the end he should decide and direct and the CDS and the established *must* do as he says or resign. Much as I admired RAdm Landymore and LGen Moncel for their principles, they were *wrong* to oppose the Minister (Paul Hellyer) before they resigned.

Peter MacKay can and should tell the CDS how to organize his C2 superstructure, including hard ceilings on senior ranks, but he *must*, when the time comes, support the CDS in getting the political/bureaucratic centre (PCO and TB, mainly) to accept the necessary changes when, as they will, there are impacts on other government programmes and policies.


----------



## Bruce Monkhouse

But Edward you still have the same problem I brought up.

All those "professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies" will consist of folks who will be thinking "Hmmm, if I give advice to cut this then that could be my turn next if it works for them".

I can give you a report on how to fix Corrections but, I'm almost 100% sure before I start, it will state more CO's are required along with cuts to senior management whereas chances are pretty good my bosses report won't see it that way........


----------



## dapaterson

Ah, but the MND did impose a hard ceiling on GOFOs.  In 1997 the MND report on Leadership & Management of the CF directed no more than 65 (I believe) GOFOs.  That report and its recommendations are still "in force" as it were - but are not enforced.

What may be needed is an MND who wants less to be loved and more to be respected (grudgingly).


----------



## Edward Campbell

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> But Edward you still have the same problem I brought up.
> 
> All those "professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies" will consist of folks who will be thinking "Hmmm, if I give advice to cut this then that could be my turn next if it works for them".
> 
> I can give you a report on how to fix Corrections but, I'm almost 100% sure before I start, it will state more CO's are required along with cuts to senior management whereas chances are pretty good my bosses report won't see it that way........




Bruce; I'm not suggesting it's easy - just that the organization of the CF is *not* the responsibility of the CDS; the MND can, if he wants, impose whatever sort of C2 superstructure suits his fancy and the CDS must either aquiese or resign.

That the MND has not done what I think the PM directed indicates that Peter MacKay has a lot more political clout than many people think - or else it indicates that I have misread the PM's message.

That the MND neglects to enforce his (his predecessor's) direction on GOFOs indicates something else about _official Ottawa_ at large.


----------



## GAP

Maybe the solution will show up in this summer's cabinet shuffle.........bye bye Peter......


----------



## Edward Campbell

GAP said:
			
		

> Maybe the solution will show up in this summer's cabinet shuffle.........bye bye Peter......




Maybe, but my sense - based on nothing much - is that Peter MacKay still has a power base in Ottawa, which includes the prime minister (who owes him for his essential role in "uniting the right"), and, while he is not "promoteable" to Finance, he can have Defence as long as he wants it, with a possible move to Justice.


----------



## MARS

Why not Finance?  Does he lack the educational background or something?


----------



## Edward Campbell

MARS said:
			
		

> Why not Finance?  Does he lack the educational background or something?




My sense, again, and with the same minimal basis, is that Finance is "reserved" for someone who shares the prime minister's ideological bent or (consider Paul Martin) who has a HUGE power base in the party. I'm guessing that MacKay doesn't match either.

My *guess* for Finance, if Jim Flaherty goes, is Tony Clement - a competent manager, a Bay Street favourite and another "Harris Conservative" (like Flaherty and John Baird).


----------



## GAP

ER I would agree with both your opinion of McKay and possible replacement for Finance. 

Unfortunately Tony Clement comes with the gazebo baggage. I doubt he will ever be able to rid himself of that stain.


----------



## Kirkhill

WRT MND McKay:

My read of his situation since Minister Ambrose was tossed the procurement file is "good riddance to bad rubbish".

Instead of defending kit and practices he seems happy enough to say "PWGSC".  

F-35 - PWGSC
AOPS - PWGSC
MSVS - PWGSC
NSPS - PWGSC
FWSAR - PWGSC

Next question?


----------



## devil39

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> WRT MND McKay:
> 
> My read of his situation since Minister Ambrose was tossed the procurement file is "good riddance to bad rubbish".
> 
> Instead of defending kit and practices he seems happy enough to say "PWGSC".
> 
> F-35 - PWGSC
> AOPS - PWGSC
> MSVS - PWGSC
> NSPS - PWGSC
> FWSAR - PWGSC
> 
> Next question?



Not having managed any large capital projects, but having managed some very large budgets, PWGSC has often been the problem.  Let it rest there I say.   I would appreciate hearing the opinion of some project managers of the current situation.


----------



## devil39

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The government, _per se_, and the military are, it *appears to me*, at an impasse. See the recent (18 Mar 13) testimony of the CDS at The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence; both Sens Dallaire and Lang mentioned the letter (or memo) the PM sent to the MND suggesting (demanding?) that cuts come from "administration," by which, *it appears to me* the PM meant HQs and "overhead." Gen Lawson has been pretty clear that he thinks HQs are just fine and the "cuts" that were made (a 25% reduction, he says) are sufficient.
> 
> It may be that I am misreading (either or both) the PM and/or the CDS but I'm guessing that the PM was aiming, squarely, at HQs (the C2 superstructure) and, even more narrowly at admirals and generals and captains(N) and colonels. I'm also guessing that the CDS doesn't want to meddle, any further, in the C2 superstructure because he is more concerned with problems of _quality_ (of decision making) rather than _quantity_ (of the decision makers).
> 
> I have made no secret of my views: fewer HQs (even though they may be larger) with lower ranked senior officers. Specifically I advocate lowering the ranks of most GOFOs in major HQs and of NDHQ directors ~ the CDS should be a VAdm/LGen (as should several other senior officers (VCDS, DCDS (head of the joint staff) DCINC NORAD, CANMILREPNATO, ec) and directors in NDHQ should be cdrs/lcols, not capts(N)/colonels because the real"first level "executive" in the CF is a ship/unit CO and director is the public service "first level executive." I'm not advocating pay cuts; quite the reverse I want pay raises for senior officers - I just want fewer of them.



You are not wrong, however I don't believe the problem with rank creep is a CF problem.   We dropped the ranks of Bde Comds from BGen to Col, along with a bunch of other reductions years ago, and I don't believe we have had too much rank creep since then.  At the strategic level we are almost always under-ranked in comparison with our US colleagues, but are usually on par with our AUS partners.  

As I understand it, EX level Public Servants have greatly increased during the period of Afghanistan deployments and multiple Federal elections under the current DM.   Is this an NDHQ urban myth or is it factually valid?


----------



## dapaterson

devil39 said:
			
		

> Not having managed any large capital projects, but having managed some very large budgets, PWGSC has often been the problem.  Let it rest there I say.   I would appreciate hearing the opinion of some project managers of the current situation.



There are plenty of fingers that can point many ways in most procurement problems.

Perhaps when we train our senior leaders to operate in joint environments they should apply those lessons to interactions with PWGSC, TB, Industry Canada and others...


----------



## dapaterson

devil39 said:
			
		

> You are not wrong, however I don't believe the problem with rank creep is a CF problem.   We dropped the ranks of Bde Comds from BGen to Col, along with a bunch of other reductions years ago, and I don't believe we have had too much rank creep since then.  At the strategic level we are almost always under-ranked in comparison with our US colleagues, but are usually on par with our AUS partners.
> 
> As I understand it, EX level Public Servants have greatly increased during the period of Afghanistan deployments and multiple Federal elections under the current DM.   Is this an NDHQ urban myth or is it factually valid?



Our GOFO strength is roughly 50% above the target set in the 1997 MND report.  This suggests a problem area to be examined and addressed.  Remember, while the Army may represent ~ 1/3 of the Reg F total strength, they have only ~10% of Reg F GOFOs.

There has been growth in EX positions in the PS as the overall size of the PS grew.  Haven't seen how much, proportionally, it grew; the real test is whether the numbers will shrink as the rest of the public service cohort is reduced.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> WRT MND McKay:
> 
> My read of his situation since Minister Ambrose was tossed the procurement file is "good riddance to bad rubbish".
> 
> Instead of defending kit and practices he seems happy enough to say "PWGSC".
> 
> F-35 - PWGSC
> AOPS - PWGSC
> MSVS - PWGSC
> NSPS - PWGSC
> FWSAR - PWGSC
> 
> Next question?




Two things:

First: PWGSC is the "lead" for all procurements, it's not just a problem, it's THE problem. The system was designed so that DND did three things ~ a) specified the requirement; b) found the money from within its budget; and c) certified/accepted the final product. In so far as only two agencies, DND and PWGSC, are involved it's not a bad system - it worked at least as well as the US system. But starting back in the 1950s, with e.g. the _Avro Arrow_ and the _St Laurent_ class destroyers, procurements got bigger and bigger and they attracted more and more political interference and other departments, like Industry Canada (as it is now) and all the various and sundry "regional" agencies got involved - providing some (never very much) money and demanding disproportionate influence. Now the system is broken: too many cooks and all that.

Second: this PM has displayed a marked fondness for hiring teams of "outside experts" (not always real outsiders) to address sensitive industrial straegies: the shipbuilding "strategy" (a team of DMs from outside DND/PWGSC), the aero-space strategy (former minister David Emerson) and the F-35 (a team of outsiders). The technical results have been satisfactory and the politics excellent: if it's all right the PM looks smart for bringing in outsiders to undo the damage the line departments have caused; if it all goes wrong he can blame the outsiders. There are worse systems - see the USA, again.

Some procurements worked fairly well: despite some (lots of) internal to DND agony in defining the airplane, the CF-18 was a success; ditto the CPF, despite some problems which the builder (Saint John Shipbuilding) had to sort out on the fly. Others - the maritime helicopter, for example - have been disasters. Not all of the disasters are the fault of DND or PWGSC. While I think systemic reform is needed for defence procurement, whatever system is adopted or evolves will still have: a) a disconnect between "requirements" and the actual business of procurement; and b) political interference.


----------



## Kirkhill

Is it possible there is a third aspect to the problem?

Perhaps there is a problem with the "system" being too infrequently exercised - a problem exacerbated perhaps by the recent "decade of darkness".

How strong are the relevant cadres in DND and PWGSC?  How much experience do they have in these big "political footballs"?  How much experience do they have working with each other?

Until Paul Martin restarted the pumps it had been a long time between purchases.  And historically (F18 purchase, Halifax purchase, EH101 purchase, Bristol Aerospace F18 contract) there is not much to indicate a strong foundation even as far back as the 80s.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I am working with a ministry that has about 3000 people in it and an annual budget of $1.5B, give or take. They serve over 150,000 clients either directly or indirectly. 

The nature of their work? If these civil servants screw up, people could die.

The Deputy Minister has 5 staff working directly for him in his officve: one Executive Director and the rest senior admin people. His Executive Team, mostly ADMs, has 6 people in it, including him.

Is there something we could learn from this type of staffing level?

* modified to add 100,000  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

Smaller is better?

Not just a staffing option but also a purchase option.

I get the logistical burden but.....

Rather than bundling programmes into megaprojects that happen infrequently if at all, perhaps the solution could be found in regularly exercising a system buying small (functional) quantities of materiel as it is needed.  If it works then a secondary buy could occur levelling out the logistics.  If it doesn't.... buy something else.

I think that constantly feeding small meat to the supply chain will keep them more content than starving them and offering them the prospect of the occasional feast.


----------



## Monsoon

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I am working with a ministry that has about 3000 people in it and an annual budget of $1.5B, give or take. They serve over 50,000 clients either directly or indirectly.
> 
> ...
> 
> Is there something we could learn from this type of staffing level?


3000 people serving a total of 50,000 clients? No. I can say with absolutely no hesitation that there is nothing DND can or should learn from that organization.


----------



## ARMY_101

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> So who should decide how the CF should be organized? The CDS? No, it's not, really his job - advise? yes, decide? no. The DM - Not really his job, either, but he does have a vital advisory role. The MND? Yes. It is his job. He should seek professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies, but, in the end he should decide and direct and the CDS and the established *must* do as he says or resign. Much as I admired RAdm Landymore and LGen Moncel for their principles, they were *wrong* to oppose the Minister (Paul Hellyer) before they resigned.



I guess it depends on your interpretation of the _Act_:

The minister "has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces" while the CDS is "charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces."  The DM is there to function as the minister tells him or her to.

To me, "control and administration" means command and control, positions, structure, report lines, units, operational capability - the nitty gritty of administering the CAF and structuring it in a way that a) responds to government needs and priorities; and b) enables the CAF to be an effective fighting force capable of successfully completing a variety of missions and objectives.

This is moreso than the minister, whose role is to manage and direct the CAF.  If the minister says "we need to cut $2 billion" as the strategic direction the department and CAF needs to take, the CDS should be the one implementing that vision.

 :2c:


----------



## ARMY_101

Bruce Monkhouse said:
			
		

> But Edward you still have the same problem I brought up.
> 
> All those "professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies" will consist of folks who will be thinking "Hmmm, if I give advice to cut this then that could be my turn next if it works for them".



How many here have (anonymously or not) contacted the minister's office with suggestions they feel need to be taken?


----------



## Edward Campbell

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> I guess it depends on your interpretation of the _Act_:
> 
> The minister "has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces" while the CDS is "charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces."  The DM is there to function as the minister tells him or her to.
> 
> To me, "control and administration" means command and control, positions, structure, report lines, units, operational capability - the nitty gritty of administering the CAF and structuring it in a way that a) responds to government needs and priorities; and b) enables the CAF to be an effective fighting force capable of successfully completing a variety of missions and objectives.
> 
> This is moreso than the minister, whose role is to manage and direct the CAF.  If the minister says "we need to cut $2 billion" as the strategic direction the department and CAF needs to take, the CDS should be the one implementing that vision.
> 
> :2c:




We agree that the MND can say "we need to cut $2 billion" and the CDS _et al_ must take that as strategic direction. I suggest he can, and should, also say, with equal *"directiveness"* (is that a word?) "we need to cut 20% of the GOFOs and reduce C2 overhead by _n,nnn_ PYs."

While the old _Interpretation Act_ was more specific, see the current version, specifically §24(4) which tells us that the DM is the ministers alter ego. Given how DMs are appointed and moved, by the PM, it is evident - to me anyway - that they do *not* "function as the minister tells him or her to." Nor, despite what the NDHQ org charts suggest, are the DM and the CDS _colleagues_ - they have different roles and responsibilities, and it is a _Constitutional_ mistake to think that they should have to cooperate or coordinate in order to spare the MND the burden of thinking.


----------



## ARMY_101

ARMY_101 said:
			
		

> How many here have (anonymously or not) contacted the minister's office with suggestions they feel need to be taken?



Or, for that matter, the Defence Renewal Team:

Internal_communications_internes@forces.gc.ca
ATTN: Defence Renewal Team


----------



## Edward Campbell

While this article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Policy_, appears, at first, to touch on US grand strategy, for which we have a thread, it is, as a read of most of it will attest about HQ bloat and what is, in my opinion, the source of our own, Canadian, bloat problem: the Pentagon:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/05/it_aint_about_the_hardware?page=0,0
My emphasis added


> It Ain't About the Hardware
> *Will the wars of the future be won by management consultants?*
> 
> BY GORDON ADAMS
> 
> JUNE 5, 2013
> 
> Folks in the defense universe in Washington, DC spend a lot of time in the arcade of debates. One of these debates is about U.S. military strategy in a changing world: Should we confront, contain, or partner with China? Should we engage or confront Iran? Should we intervene in Syria or let them work it through without deploying U.S. forces? Do we need to defend the global commons, or is that a cover for American military hegemony?
> 
> Another hardy perennial debate is about what the military should buy. More cyberdefense, or is that a cover for developing an offensive cyber capability? Is the F-35 the fighter of the future, or an expensive lemon we should put over the side? Do we need a new long-range bomber to prevail against a Chinese attempt to drive us from their borders, or is that another boondoggle we cannot afford?
> 
> Still another is about the future size and deployment of forces. Should they be forward, or held in the United States? Should the Army and Marines shrink, or stay the size they plan to be by 2016? Will the Navy get smaller and smaller, or grow to 300 ships or more?
> 
> Lovely, interesting questions, rife with huge disagreements among the military services, between the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, left-leaning think tanks versus right-leaning think tanks. Reams of paper, videos, testimony, the vast outreach of the defense-thinking complex.
> 
> It's all great stuff; it keeps consultants, bureaucrats, elected officials, and the "chatterers" busy. But, and here's the bottom line up front, if the Pentagon does not use the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), the next budget planning cycle, and the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to deal with its management issues, and if Congress fails to heed the need for management reform, all that debate will be irrelevant.
> 
> It won't matter if you want more planes or fewer, more troops or a smaller force, the right hardware, or the opportunity to confront or befriend China. Declining defense budgets, already well underway, combined with the costs of people and property, will eat the tradeoff space that allows anyone to make sensible policy and hardware decisions.
> 
> It's not just me talking. There was a striking letter and event on Monday, June 3, in which defense analysts from left to right joined forces in petitioning the administration and the Congress to ditch the politics of defense and focus on the management dilemma.
> 
> Twenty-five defense analysts got together on the letter, folks who spend many a happy hour debating each other on defense and national security. They ranged from Mackenzie Eaglen and Tom Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute, Dov Zakheim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, to Larry Korb from the Center for American Progress, Chris Preble of the CATO Institute, and myself and my colleagues Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh from the Stimson Center.
> 
> And we agreed on some critical fundamentals that DOD, the White House, and Congress need to tend to: the encrusted and politically reinforced barnacles of pay and benefits for the troops and retirees, the sprawling physical infrastructure of the military, and what Secretary Hagel himself once described as the "bloated" back office of administration at the Pentagon. There is no mystery meat here, no new research discoveries that need be made. The need for reform in these three things has been blindingly obvious to any observer for a very long time.
> 
> The military compensation and benefit system, generous to the forces, is now eating defense resources at an alarming rate. As the letter points out, military compensation costs per active troop rose 56 percent in constant dollars from FY 2001 to FY 2012, doubling in current, inflated dollars.
> 
> Pay for the forces has not only caught up with, but has passed comparable private sector pay, factored for age, education, and experience. We have a well-compensated military. And it retires well, too, with lifetime health care, retirement benefits after 20 years (though more than 80 percent of the enlistees do not get there, so get no retirement at all), and access to subsidized groceries through the commissary system. (For more, read this terrific piece on commissaries by Rajiv Chandrasekaran at the Washington Post.)
> 
> But now the pressure is on, in budgetary terms, and the entitlements for the military are squeezing funds for capability. As retired Gen. Arnold Punaro put it: "We don't want the Pentagon to become a benefits operation that occasionally kills a terrorist."
> 
> Without breaking any faith with the forces, the system needs to be reformed. The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation has proposed compensation and benefit reforms for a long time; they have not moved forward.
> 
> Todd Harrison of CSBA has argued we need to look at what servicemembers value most in their compensation and benefits -- pay increases over early retirement, for example -- and adjust the system accordingly.
> 
> Infrastructure is another growing problem -- the letter points out that DOD estimates it has about 20 percent more infrastructure than it can use. Clearly, from a fiscal point of view, it is time for Congress to step up and legislate another base closure (BRAC) round. All the evaluation criteria we need to make sensible base closure decisions have been developed through four previous rounds; the administration has asked for a new one. Time to move ahead.
> 
> The big target for reform is the back office. The data are clear: DOD has too many duplicative offices, too much overhead, too much administration. The Defense Business Board estimated that the Pentagon's overhead is something like 40 percent of the total budget. A large number of people are minding this back office. On the military side, something like a fourth of the military billets are doing commercial, not military work. Nearly 40 percent of the force does not deploy. On the civilian side, there are nearly 700,000 civil servants and something like another 700,000 contractors doing civil service-type work, often in DOD offices (and this excludes hardware contractor employment). The last three defense budget declines have led to an average of more than 30 percent reduction in the civilian workforce; this one is likely to follow this course and it needs to be carefully planned.
> 
> It all sounds like common sense. Moreover, with budgets going south, if something isn't done about these management and personnel challenges, the funds to support strategy, forces, and equipment is what will get squeezed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that if the overhead and pay/benefits cost growth continue, by early in the next decade, they will reduce funding for forces and procurement to unprecedentedly low levels.
> 
> So merrily the Pentagon system rolls along, with overhead costs eating the tracks behind it. And Congress does little about these issues; they are part of the problem. They are politically vulnerable to the lobbies for military pay and retiree benefits, to the politics of even appearing to question current practices, to the communities where the infrastructure is located, and to the services who protect back office billets.
> 
> The politics are merciless; the risks of talking common sense are real. I am certain this column will attract critique because of the politics. But the basic problem is pretty simple: If we don't find reasonable, efficient, cost-saving ways of reforming pay and benefits, infrastructure, and the back office, as Mackenzie Eaglen said on the June 3 panel, there is an important promise to the American people we will not keep: the certainty that the military we build is the right force with the right tools to do the right job.
> 
> On that, all of us agreed. Hopefully, Congress will too, and soon.




Ignore the bits about pay; the CF is well adequately, even paid, but your pay lags the civil service, by design.

Focus on the paragraph (4th from the end) that begins: _"The big target for reform is the back office ..."_ It speaks to the problem that is very real in both Canada and the USA and it is a problem that we have inherited because GOFOs and bureaucrats think that - contrary to all the evidence - the modern US military is well properly adequately organized; it isn't.


----------



## dapaterson

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Ignore the bits about pay; the CF is well adequately, even paid, but your pay lags the civil service, by design.



Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.


----------



## Monsoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.


Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.


----------



## GnyHwy

More of a rhetorical question, but what carries more weight?  A person that is in charge of a couple hundred persons for a few years, or a person that is in charge of a concept/idea that may influence 1000s of persons for a few decades?


----------



## McG

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.


Maj & LCdr to LCol & Cdr in NDHQ have the same number of subordinates as their civilian counterparts.  

Defence Renewal is supposed to address the sort of bloat within the CAF as is identified in Edward's article.


----------



## dapaterson

hamiltongs said:
			
		

> Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.



As of 31 March, there were 3722 Maj/LCdrs in the Reg F.  Unless the CF magically grew to 500K+, precious few of those 3722 had anywhere near 150 people under them.

Or for another example: Fewer than 10% of Reg F Infantry LCols are in command positions - the other 90% are staff.


----------



## Edward Campbell

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.



Majs are paid about the same as experienced civil service ENG-04s

ENG-04 2013: $90,395	$93,397	$96,407	$99,414	$102,420	 $105,427
Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/coll_agre/nr/nr07-eng.asp

Maj 2013: 8386 ($100,632) 	8534	8679	8824	8969	9114	9259	9404 ($112.848)
(Source): http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/ps/pay-sol/pr-sol/rfor-ofr-eng.asp

I used to employ both, I regarded my majors as ENG-05s and they, always, supervised ENG-04s and even, in one case, two ENG-05s. I regarded LCols as either ENG-06s ($115-135K) or EX-01s. I know my assessment of relative status was shared in both the DND engineering world and in some other government departments with which we worked closely on a day-to-day basis. But that was 20 years ago.


----------



## Monsoon

dapaterson said:
			
		

> As of 31 March, there were 3722 Maj/LCdrs in the Reg F.  Unless the CF magically grew to 500K+, precious few of those 3722 had anywhere near 150 people under them.
> 
> Or for another example: Fewer than 10% of Reg F Infantry LCols are in command positions - the other 90% are staff.


You'll note that I said "can". Yes, perhaps only a few hundred of the 3722 Maj/LCds in the CAF have 50 or more people working for them, but I can say with certainty that the number of AS-06s (PS equivalents) with than many subordinates is zero. And yes, staffers with a limited number of subordinates can be as influential as line commanders - if not much more so. The point is that a Maj/LCdr is expected to be BOTH an effective line commander AND an effective staff officer. There is no PS position that I can think of that requires that level of breadth of employability. If you want the whole bundle of competencies in one person, then it makes sense to pay a premium to them over someone who provides just one competency.

If you're establishing a pay scale based on the employment we primarily want people to do, then establishing it on the basis of employment within NDHQ is a bad place to start.


----------



## dapaterson

I do not argue that a small number of miltiary personnel are in positions of signfiicant repsonsibility.  Military pay should probably be revisited and moved away from the current "team" concept, where the pay for all jobs at a rank level is the same, and recognize that certain positions are of increased responsibility and therefore should receive increased pay.  For example: an OC should probaly be paid more than a staff officer.  Of course, that means a posting could result in a pay cut, not an attractive option.  (Although, one could always sell it as an aspirational move, to encourage people to try to excel and get those positions).

Mind you, that approach is already in place with Senior Appointment CWOs, who have different pay scales from their peers.  Suggesting it be extended to officers, however, will not fly - I  suspect the 90% of Infantry LCols clogging NDHQ have more time and energy to devote to protecting themselves than the 10% in command positions have to try to improve their pay.


----------



## Monsoon

Don't get me wrong - I'm not complaining about my own pay, which I find to be generous. And even a Maj/LCol posted to a staff position in NDHQ is still expected to be ABLE to function as a line commander, so they still retain that skill competency (at least in theory - I grant you the obvious counter argument). We also expect them to accept postings every two to three years (even if they are local postings in Ottawa - a lot of public servants wouldn't accept that level of career churn), and it takes a minimum of about 15 years to make a Maj.

Contrast with an AS-06, who can be hired straight off the street out of their Master's degree (or not long thereafter, following a bit of contract work at the same level), and can choose to spend their entire careers working 8-to-4 days in Ottawa. Given the level of competition for PS positions, the supply certainly exceeds the demand and that would suggest that downward pressure on their salaries might be appropriate. If anyone needs a salary review, it's not the CAF. The fact that we lose fully trained LCol/Majs to the PS every year makes it clear that the relative salaries of CAF members and their PS equivalents don't compensate for the relative differences in the expectations of them, or the compromises made in quality of life.


----------



## dapaterson

In real terms, PS salaries are shrinking.  The last settlement (for the PA group, at least) has provided increases below inflation, together with increased PSSA contributions - in real terms, compensation is shrinking by 1-2% per year (assuming individuals are at the top of their pay scale.  If not, the annual increments compensate).

And the relationship between military attrition and PS pay scales is tenuous - remember, most of the folks releasing to join the PS are getting an immediate annuity.  Even if they are old-plan, and getting out at 20 years, that's still 40% of their former military pay they are receiving on top of the PS pay - that makes it possible to take a lower salary and still have an increased income.


----------



## Navy_Pete

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> I used to employ both, I regarded my majors as ENG-05s and they, always, supervised ENG-04s and even, in one case, two ENG-05s. I regarded LCols as either ENG-06s ($115-135K) or EX-01s. I know my assessment of relative status was shared in both the DND engineering world and in some other government departments with which we worked closely on a day-to-day basis. But that was 20 years ago.



That still applies today in the DND engineering world; Eng 04s are generally doing the same jobs as 2 ringers, Eng 05s are roughly equivalent to 2 1/2s, and Eng 06s/EX-02s are in roughly similar positions as 3 ringers.  Of course there are a few exceptions, but think the situation above is generally accepted in terms of comparable levels of responsibility.


----------



## UnwiseCritic

So it may turn out that cutting a battalion is more appropriate... But who needs teeth when you have a long tail!?


----------



## PuckChaser

I'd trade a LCol for my entire Sqn being able to fire PWT2 as part of IBTS this year, but hey, budget cuts have to hit everyone including our ammo.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> I'd trade a LCol for my entire Sqn being able to fire PWT2 as part of IBTS this year, but hey, budget cuts have to hit everyone including our ammo.



Not true.  We (the Army) turn in shed-loads of Small Arms Ammo every single year, and there is enough o+M to shoot.  If you are in a Reserve unit, you are funded for pay to do PWT.  There is NO reason for you not to be on the range.  If you are being told no, someone isn't doing their job.


----------



## PuckChaser

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not true.  We (the Army) turn in shed-loads of Small Arms Ammo every single year, and there is enough o+M to shoot.  If you are in a Reserve unit, you are funded for pay to do PWT.  There is NO reason for you not to be on the range.  If you are being told no, someone isn't doing their job.



If I was in a reserve unit, I may chalk it up to that, but our area declared part way through running a few PRes BMQs that any ammo for those courses come out of a unit's allotment (vice area)... which quick ran us out. Now half of a large unit doesn't have the rounds to fire live PWT2. Whether that's a staffing blunder, or an budgetary concern, it seems awfully coincidental to the cuts running down the chain now.


----------



## armyvern

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> I'd trade a LCol for my entire Sqn being able to fire PWT2 as part of IBTS this year, but hey, budget cuts have to hit everyone including our ammo.



I thought you were here where I am?  Apparently not though as we have enough allocation for all of our Sqns to fire PWT2.


----------



## PuckChaser

ArmyVern said:
			
		

> I thought you were here where I am?  Apparently not though as we have enough allocation for all of our Sqns to fire PWT2.



Very close, most of my unit is in the same veh compound.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

There is 5.56mm ball out there for PWT 2.


----------



## OldSolduer

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Not true.  We (the Army) turn in shed-loads of Small Arms Ammo every single year, and there is enough o+M to shoot.  If you are in a Reserve unit, you are funded for pay to do PWT.  There is NO reason for you not to be on the range.  If you are being told no, someone isn't doing their job.



We've been told to get to level two live minimum and look to do level three. Bde Comd said he'd get us the bullets.


----------



## ArmyRick

PWT What now? Just kidding. I have stepped so far back from Army issues this past summer that I feel completely out of touch. Seriously, I just found out we got a new minister DND?

I wonder what would have happened if Former general Leslie's recommendations were taken seriously and we reduced HQ as much as possible. Would the field force be suffering as much now?

Oh well, time to get the troops out selling cookies so we can raise training money.


----------



## Edward Campbell

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> PWT What now? Just kidding. I have stepped so far back from Army issues this past summer that I feel completely out of touch. Seriously, I just found out we got a new minister DND?
> 
> I wonder what would have happened if Former general Leslie's recommendations were taken seriously and we reduced HQ as much as possible. Would the field force be suffering as much now?
> 
> Oh well, time to get the troops out selling cookies so we can raise training money.




Cuts, even big cuts to HQs take some time to "flow through" the system. And there are other problems: you can, easily harmlessly in my _opinion_, cut 35 generals and colonels but you do not get an infantry platoon in return, not very soon, anyway. While the "savings" are being massaged by the personnel people you can, also, be sure that the empire builders in Ottawa ~ the displaced generals and colonels ~  are not sitting idle: they are designing new HQs or staff branches to provide themselves with continued employment.

The Brits used to have a system in which officers who were redundant were sent on (paid) leave, we used to call it gardening leave, specifically to prevent them from hanging about the HQ looking for "work" which could be used to bring them back on the establishment. ("Gardening leave" had other, more useful, functions, but it was recognized that when a HQ or staff branch was disbanded it was important to reassign people to real vacant positions and, as quickly (and fairly) as possible, get rid of the rest.)


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The Brits used to have a system in which officers who were redundant were sent on (paid) leave, we used to call it gardening leave, specifically to prevent them from hanging about the HQ looking for "work" which could be used to bring them back on the establishment.



We still have that.  We call it the ATL.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

I actually had two months of gardening leave when I was in the UK - very civilized....


----------



## McG

> *Review targets public service executives
> KATHRYN MAY
> OTTAWA CITIZEN
> 12  January 2014
> 
> OTTAWA — The Conservative government is planning a review of the work of the nearly 7,000 executives in Canada’s public service that could change the structure of the senior ranks and affect their total compensation.
> 
> Treasury Board offered no details on the two-part review that executives say is in the works, but the government is hiring consultants to come up with proposals to “modernize” the way executives are organized and classified in the public service.
> 
> Classification and job evaluation are directly linked to how jobs are organized and employees are compensated and a request for proposal issued by Treasury Board suggests the review could have a major impact on the entire public service.
> 
> “The proposed solution for job evaluation for the EX Group has the potential to significantly impact senior management structures and positions in the (core public service) and will likely influence other federal public service job evaluation methodologies, systems and tools. It may also lead to recommendations regarding total compensation of executives,” said the request.
> 
> The Conservatives have long felt the public service is top-heavy with too many executives. The executive cadre grew twice the pace of the public service and ballooned nearly 70 per cent after the numbers bottomed out during the Liberals downsizing in the 1990s.
> 
> Some speculate whether the review could resurrect previous proposals to de-layer and collapse the five levels of executives into three. There are now five levels of executives from EX 1, entry level, to Ex 5, a senior assistant deputy minister.
> 
> “There has been a huge growth in all levels and in a federal department today … there are more layers of executives between the working level and the deputy minister than ever before and lot of that has happened in the past six years, said David Zussman, the Jarislowsky Chair on Management in the Public Sector at the University of Ottawa.
> 
> Andrew Graham, a professor at Queen’s University and former president of the Association of Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada (APEX), said options discussed in the past included merging EX 4s and EX 5s, as well as EX 2 and 3s, and leaving the EX 1 group. Another called for collapsing Ex 1 and 2 in one group, EX 3 and 4 in another and leaving EX 5.
> 
> Treasury Board has been promising classification and job evaluation reform since the colossal failure of the Universal Classification Standard in 2003 when Treasury Board abandoned the scheme after spending years and millions of dollars.
> 
> A decade later, new standards have been introduced for only about 10 per cent of the public service, such as economists, border guards and foreign service officers. Many are still working in jobs with standards that predate computers and mobile phones. The classification and evaluation methodology or executives was last updated in the 1990s.
> 
> David Orfald of the Public Service Alliance of Canada said it seems unfair that executives are jumping the queue when many jobs are still classified using much older standards.
> 
> 
> “It looks to me like they are fast-tracking executives and taking care of themselves before the other groups. Their current methodology has been in place since the 1990s while among the other groups, the vast majority go back to 1967 or 1972.”
> 
> The Conservatives signalled in the last budget that all human resource management practices are the table for review. Similarly, the blue-chip advisory committee on the public service that has the ear of Prime Minister Stephen Harper called for a new “employment model” to replace a 40-year-old labour relations regime, job classification system and pay and benefits scheme that were built in an “industrial era” when public servants largely performed “standardized repetitive work.”
> 
> The nature of work has changed dramatically since then. The public service is now dominated by university-educated knowledge workers who need tools to work and manage in the digital age.
> 
> The growth of executives was driven by a variety of factors. The jobs of public servants, along with the policy and management issues they wrestle with, are more complicated. Changing technology, the push for transparency, 24-hour media scrutiny, a growing posse of parliamentary watchdogs and the reforms of the Federal Accountability Act have all added layers to the cost and management of public servants.
> 
> But Graham said the review could be a piece of the government’s plan for executives. He argued executives have been awaiting direction since the government mothballed the Stephenson committee, which advised Treasury Board on how to retain, manage and pay executives.
> 
> The advisory committee was created in the late 1990s after the Liberals’ downsizing and a six-year wage freeze created such a gap between the private and public sectors that the government feared an unprecedented flight of top talent for better-paying jobs. That mass exodus never materialized.
> 
> For years, the committee’s main strategy for keeping and attracting executives was to ensure entry level executives or EX 1s were paid similar to those in the private sector. It recognized the government couldn’t match the rich compensation packages of private sector executives so it recommended eliminating the gap at the entry level and banked that once public servants were on the management track that they would stay.
> 
> Treasury Board President Tony Clement has said he is re-evaluating the advisory committee’s mandate and wants more focus on “constraining costs” than retaining executives.
> 
> Graham said Clement could want a smaller executive cadre, which could mean moving junior executives to a new senior middle management or supervisory management group. Former Ontario Premier Mike Harris adopted this model when he “took control of the executive,” slashing the number of executives, and jacking up their pay with record increases, said Graham.
> 
> A new senior management group, however, would lead to showdown with unions because employees outside the executive ranks are largely unionized and the government would likely want senior manages excluded from collective bargaining.
> 
> 
> Graham said there’s long been a sense that the EX-1 group was too big and content of the job watered down over the years so it was no longer a real executive position. He said some argue promotions into management became a “retention tool” to keep professionals when they reached the top of their pay scale.
> 
> Along with the nature of work, Graham said executives are facing a change in their traditional role as the top policy advisers to government. Today, they are among many sources of policy advice for the government which he said needs a mix of talent, including “policy managers” who can assess all advice and implement whatever the government decides to do.
> 
> The government has been using since the 1990s the Hay plan or methodology, which also allows comparisons to the private sector. By 2000, KPMG was hired to examine whether the Hay method suited the needs of the public service. KPMG concluded the Hay method met all the requirements except for neutrality and flexibility but was still the best-suited. One of KPMG’s recommendations was to reduce the number of executive levels to three.
> 
> In its request for proposal, the government asked consultants for a sweeping review of evaluation methodologies in other government agencies, as well as those used by provinces, crown corporations, some private sector and not-for-profit organizations and public sector organizations in Britain, the United States, Australia and two other Commonwealth countries.
> 
> It also wants a review of all the off-the-shelf software used by large employers with more than 10,000 employees. The consultants final report and proposal is expected later this year.*


*
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/entertainment/Review+targets+public+service+executives/9378474/story.html

A review of the PS executive organization could have positive impacts to reducing excess DND overhead, and lead to a review of CF staff HQ hirearchy.*


----------



## Navy_Pete

That sounds more like they'll merge EX levels in the classifications then actually get rid of anyone, although with DRT now would be the time to do it.

Getting rid of or totally overhauling the EX performance bonus would be good as well; they are generally based on artificial targets (did you spend between x and y% of a budget) vice real performance.  Seeing as we don't make widgets, you can end up with a lot of stupid decisions driven by the EXs wanting to keep their bonuses.  For example, you can have significant issues pop up near the end of the FY, and short fuse travel won't be approved because it'll push them past their target, even though the real impact could be on a multimillion dollar project being delayed, possibly with very significant costs (in a different line item or department).


----------



## dapaterson

Further compression of the five EX levels would be counterproductive.  An ADM is not an ADM; a DM is not a DM; there are huge differences in responsibility.

Compression to, say, three EX levels would just move a lot of marginal positions up in pay to the next higher level.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Funny how the article does not mention the massive failure of Universal Classification System (UCS) by name or even appears to mention it. My department shed a couple of EX's early last year and several regional manager positions. EX levels are also tied to personal numbers as well.


----------



## dapaterson

Colin P said:
			
		

> Funny how the article does not mention the massive failure of Universal Classification System (UCS) by name or even appears to mention it. My department shed a couple of EX's early last year and several regional manager positions. EX levels are also tied to personal numbers as well.



Umm, like where it talks about "since the colossal failure of the Universal Classification Standard in 2003 when Treasury Board abandoned the scheme after spending years and millions of dollars."


EX numbers have grown out of pace with the growth of government; culling the herd will be healthy.  

The current classifications are badly out of whack; I know of at least one GOFO who left DND as an ADM-equivalent who got hired on at another department as a public servant.  In his new job, a step below the ADM, his pay has increased (and he's also drawing his CF pension on top of that).  Methinks a realignment is due.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I plead not enough  beers before posting........ :facepalm:

Maybe my PTSD blanked out that phrase so would not have to relive the memories of writing 12 page job descriptions...... ;D


----------



## dapaterson

At the time in my job, UCS was beneficial if only because it forced several managers to review & update decade-old work descriptions; even if the overall UCS failed, employees at least had up to date work descriptions (and a few I know ended up red circled).


----------



## Edward Campbell

*Cut The Fat*

Government parsimony has been much in the news these days. Special attention has been given to the Conservative Government's niggardly treatment of veterans. (I note, in the interests of fairness, that the _New Veterans' Charter_, which is the root cause of so many of the complaints, is a piece of Liberal legislation, introduced by Albina Guarnieri and passed by Prime Minister Paul Martin's government in 2005.) But the government's treatment of veterans has been addressed by its own members, most notably by The Honourable Laurie Hawn, PC, CD, MP on his Facebook page. 

I am concerned with another area: the Department of National Defence's (DND) internal budget priorities .

The recent budget the government brought down, is, as the _Globe and Mail_ put it, “a budget that pushes off billions in defence spending.”

This is familiar territory for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). We must recognize, first, that from 2010 to or even beyond, 2015, the government's primary focus is on balancing the budget, and as in the 1990s when Prime Minister Chrétien was in office and was also intent on giving us a balanced budget, DND is expected to pay a full (and more than just fair) share of the price of that effort.

But there is a difference between the past _decades of darkness_ (which extended from the early 1960s all the way until about the early 2000s) and the current exercise. In past “lean years” the fiscal pain was shared from top to bottom in the CAF: ships at sea were tied up, as they are now; equipment purchases were delayed or reduced, as is now the case; training was constrained, as it is this year; and flying hours were reduced, as they are now. But, in the past, Headquarters (HQ) were cut, too, often by larger margins than were applied to the fleets and the field forces.

That is not the case today. In fact the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has, explicitly stated that there is no room for cuts to the command and control superstructure.

*I disagree.*

ALL HQs can always be cut without doing much harm. The only question is: by how much?

The Canadian Armed Forces have:

1. Over thirty combatant warships in two fleets;
2. Over thirty army combat and support units in three combat brigades; 
3. Over twenty five flying squadrons in ten wings;
4. Special operations forces;
5. Logistical and communications support units;
6. Specialist schools and colleges;
7. A SIGINT system; and
8. Various intelligence and technical units.

Between National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa and the 100+ ships, units and squadrons in the fleets, in the field forces and on bases, there are literally dozens of  headquarters, one piled atop the others, with, at any given time, about 10 Vice Admirals/Lieutenant Generals, more than 25 Rear Admirals/Major Generals and 65 Commodores/Brigadier Generals in them.

That has been characterized as “HQ bloat” but I call it “HQ morbid obesity.”

The Canadian Armed Forces own _Report on Transformation_ indicates that between 2004 and 2010 the number of personnel at DND's top level headquarters rose 46 per cent, and that doesn't include the thousands of people hired as contractors and consultants. During this time, the remainder of the regular force grew by only 10 percent.

Not all headquarters are wasteful; some command and control is required to perform necessary and useful coordination, support and supervisory functions. But when the command and control superstructure is too large, disproportionately large, it tends to over manage subordinate formations and units on one hand and, on the other hand, too often act only as relay stations, which merely delays information passage and decision-making. 

I am neither so bold nor so foolish as to try to decide how to organize the Canadian Forces but I am certain that it can and must be done with fewer headquarters layers and far fewer people in the command and control superstructure. That means there must be a reevaluation of the command and control requirements, some (many) of which, I suspect, have grown out of any and all relationship to the problems they are trying to solve. It also means there must be a *political* commitment to defence reform.

I agree with the General Tom Lawson, the CDS, that what is not needed, and what should not be allowed, is a simplistic more tooth and less tail debate. Both the combat forces and the absolutely critically necessary support service are under severe strain: neither has any “fat” left to be trimmed. But the CAF is like a man who lives in a sprawling mansion but drives a decades-old, rusted out car: unbalanced. In my view the combat forces and the administrative and logistical support services are, like the car, in dire need of maintenance or even replacement, but the command and control superstructure, the many, too many headquarters that stand between the commander in chief and the commanders of flotillas, brigades, wings, bases and depots, is like the mansion. The mansion owner, the Government of Canada, keeps adding to the number of  household servants; that looks nice, it may even be useful, but it is out of proportion to the tasks at hand. As the income decreases, there needs to be an acceptance that fewer servants will be available. Directly tied to this is the understanding that many of these servants' tasks will no longer be done. It's time to invest in previously deferred car repairs so that it's going to run effectively when required. The CAF needs to trim its bloated headquarters staffs and 'trade' many senior officer positions for infantry soldiers, aircraft mechanics, sailors, combat engineers and the like.

It is my opinion that how DND and the Canadian Armed Forces operate internally matters little in Ottawa. The government has priorities and, right now, DND and the CAF do not figure highly in them.

Again, to be fair, defence is rarely a priority ~ except when the CAF is (usually suddenly) needed. In 1992, when Prime Minister Mulroney decided to commit forces to the Balkans and in 1995 and when Prime Minister Chrétien decided to expand and extend that mission, the CAF became a priority. In 2002, and again in 2003 when Prime Minister Chrétien decided to deploy the forces to Kandahar and then later to Kabul, and in 2005, Prime Minister Martin decided to send the CAF back to Kandahar, the military became a priority again. The CAF remained a priority in 2006 (and beyond) when Prime Minister Harper decided to keep them in Kandahar and extend the mission. Once again in 2011 when Prime Minister Harper decided to participate in the allied operation in Libya the forces were, briefly, a priority. There was, in each case, a mix of policy and political calculation. In each and every case at least one of the policy considerations was to have Canada, once again, “punch above its weight” in world affairs. The goal wasn't to conduct combat operations; they were just the means to a foreign policy end. There was, in each case, a domestic political calculation, too: doing our share and being seen to be doing our share was regarded as a way to win some votes ... to win more than the same action lost. But all those operations are over and so is the “priority” status of the Canadian Armed Forces ... until they are needed, again.

But the government of the day should recognize that it has important interests, policy interests and political interests, in making sure that the CF is ready and able when needed. I suggest that a 'rich,' bloated, command and control superstructure renders the CF weaker and less ready than it can and should be. 

Money is tight. It is not going to become plentiful for DND any time soon. Canadians need to know that the money that is spent on their national defence is being well spent ~ that they are getting the most bang for their buck. The CAF combat and support elements are, already, _lean and mean_, they need to be equally lean at the top.

It is a sad fact that the Headquarters in Ottawa (the ones stacked atop the others) have about 6,000 regular force military people ~ staff officers and clerks and so on; that's more people than are in the entire Atlantic or Pacific fleets, more than in any of the three army brigades, more than in our largest air wing, more than the total of the people in all our jet fighter squadrons combined - operational and training squadrons.

It is difficult to say this or that is too large. Other defence forces of similar sizes and shapes have different command and control structures so one cannot say that Australia or Israel or the Netherlands does it “better” or “cheaper.” What I can say is that many, many senior officers and some senior civil servants, too, serving and retired, _sense_ that our, CAF, command and control system is too rich for our blood.

I affirm that: there need to be headquarters; there must be a national command and control centre for the Canadian Armed Forces; the fleets and brigades and wings do need their own headquarters, too. The question is: how much needs to be between that national HQ in Ottawa and those operational HQs in bases from coast to coast? I answer that the command and control superstructure can be and must be made more efficient, it must be more _proportional_ to the size of our combat forces, and that means smaller.

I believe that one problem is that the CAF has applied too much attention to the split between “force generation” and “force employment.” The two are quite different functions and some large forces, like the US military, can, with reasonable economies of scale, separate the two. All forces do, to one extent or another, but most allied armed forces make the split at fleet, brigade or wing level, or even below. At levels above fleet/brigade/wing in many (most?) military forces of similar sizes/scales as the CAF the two functions are combined. Canada has attempted to be “pure” in the force generation/employment split and I believe it caused some of the HQ morbid obesity.

We  must, as the old saying goes, cut our coat to suit our cloth.

I want to see:

1. A major overhaul of the misshapen, top heavy command and control of the Canadian Armed Forces, directed and led from the centre, from the Privy Council Office, because there is no incentive for admirals and generals to fire themselves. It is to be expected that hundreds of 'person years' can be _recycled_ into the fleets and field forces;

2. A concomitant and major reduction in the number of the most senior officers in the CAF. There are, now, over 100 flag and general officers in the Canadian Armed Forces, most in headquarters, I feel that reduction of about 25% is in order, all to be taken from HQs above ship (or group), brigade and wing level; and

3. A serious reduction in rank levels in headquarters. The place to start is with the appointment of “director.” In public service parlance a director is the first _executive_ level. The director is the person with independent _executive_ (policy and application) responsibility for a complete, discrete function. In the Canadian Armed Forces, in the fleets and in the field forces, we understand the first level _executive_. It is the ship's captain, the regiment or battalion CO, or the squadron CO: a lieutenant colonel. But in NDHQ the normal rank for an executive is navy captain or colonel. This is wrong because it misemployes senior officers, it does not give them responsibilities commensurate with their demonstrated skills and abilities, and it creates an _inflationary_ model wherein directors general are then commodores or brigadier generals and so on. A first, simple and money saving solution to the over rank problem is to re-rank NDHQ directors, and their counterparts in all HQs as commanders/lieutenant colonels and all directors generals as navy captains and colonels. When one works this up the “chain” one eventually wonders why, for example, the CDS must be a four star admiral or general. I note that many allied forces, even ones as small as ours have four star CDSs (see Australia, and Netherlands for example) but it is not universally true and the Israeli Defence Forces, a pretty good combat force, is headed by a lieutenant general. Perhaps making the next CDS a three star (vice admiral or lieutenant general) would constitute leadership by example.

But, what is really needed is item 1, the overhaul. And it needs to follow some principles.

I believe that we need a _joint_ command and control superstructure:

1. One, large, fully integrated _national defence_ headquarters in Ottawa that has ~

a. Departmental management responsibility,

b. Responsibility for the organization and administration of the CF, and

c. Responsibility to plan, mount and conduct military operations at home and abroad;

2. Several regional _joint_ command headquarters that will own and operate almost everything within their geographic boundaries, including some _sacred cows_ like, for example, the Royal Military College, and

3. Within those regional _joint_ commands operational formations and units (fleets, brigades and wings) and supporting elements like bases, schools, establishments and even laboratories.

If we are going to have _joint_, or _unified_ commands then, clearly, there is no need for a Commander Royal Canadian Navy, Commander Canadian Army and Commander RCAF. Those three officers need to be re-roled as Chiefs of the Naval, General and Air Staffs. They should be ranked as rear admiral/major general and designated as “professional heads of service,” rather than as commanders. Their areas of responsibility also need to be redefined to cover areas like service doctrine, equipment requirements and individual requirement.

A principle which should be enforced quite ruthlessly is: _clarity of command_. Staff officers in any headquarters, including NDHQ in Ottawa, should not, ever, outrank the commanders in the subordinate commands, formations or units and only rarely equal them in rank. This is just one of the reasons I believe the CDS should be a three star officer. This also means that the principal operations staff officer in a brigade, for example, should be a major, not a lieutenant colonel.

(Parenthetically: I believe that there is also a problem with the ranks of brigade commanders. I have no real problem with plain, simple brigade commanders being colonels but we don't have any plain, simple brigades. We have brigade groups which are are bigger, more complex formations and they should be commanded by brigadier generals. The same general rule may apply to some RCAF wings. (There is an alternative: a new _appointment_ called Brigadier in between colonel and brigadier general. This appointment, with its own rank badge (a crown + 3 stars) would be assigned to officers who command brigades; they would not relinquish it on posting ~ much like a MCpl ~ even when posted to a colonel's position.))

If brigade groups are commanded by brigadier generals (or even brigadiers) then it would make sense to have colonels as the principle staff officers in a division HQ ~ assuming we form an operational division with the brigade groups under its command.

The regional, joint commands the HQs might be large, but a large HQ is not necessarily inefficient or ineffective as long as it is well designed and has a sensible set of duties.

I believe that a new, simpler, clearer and smaller structure can and will be simpler, and I believe that simplicity matters, especially in operations. I believe it can and will be cheaper in the absolute number of people employed in the command and control superstructure and in their ranks. And I believe we can and will make better use of the _quality_ of senior officers by offering them more and more challenging work in the HQs that must exist.


Edit: typo


----------



## daftandbarmy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> *Cut The Fat*
> 
> Welp.... there goes your Order of Canada and a cushy job in the Senate  ;D


----------



## McG

Edward,
From a macroscopic perspective, even DND’s own work comes to the same conclusions as your proposal as far as gaining efficiencies from joint headquarters replacing greater number of environmental regional and functional headquarters (though in the finer details there are certainly unique differences in your proposal).  From the Less with Less Report observation on the 2011 Report on Transformation:


> Two interrelated and more transformative changes were proposed to allow for defence reinvestment.  The first was a completely revised command and control arrangement that would include a single force employer, reorganized Regional Joint Task Forces, rationalized force generation structures, and a revised Chief of Force Development organization.  Together, these changes would generate a 25 percent reduction in headquarters and overhead.  The second proposed change called for centralizing DND’s support functions in a single organization responsible for all garrison and non‐deployed logistics support, oversight of select enablers (such as health support and military policing) and recruiting, training and education.  It was estimated that by adopting best practices, devolving to common service standards and pursuing outsourcing options throughout this organization, the financial savings generated would facilitate the reinvestment of the desired 3,500 Regular Force positions and $1 billion.



Unfortunately, history has shown “the tribes” will resist, fight, subvert and disobey any attempts as such change.  I am told General Hillier attempted some very similar things with his transformation, diminishing the environmental commands/staffs while empowering and growing joint force employers … and he was told to his face by the tribes that they would not follow.  Instead, we kept the large environmental staffs, grew a joint capability development office (now duplicating functions that the environmental staffs did not divest), and created a large bloated series of force employment commands.

We will need very strong leadership to advance any worthwhile changes to the organization.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MCG said:
			
		

> Edward,
> From a macroscopic perspective, even DND’s own work comes to the same conclusions as your proposal as far as gaining efficiencies from joint headquarters replacing greater number of environmental regional and functional headquarters (though in the finer details there are certainly unique differences in your proposal).  From the Less with Less Report observation on the 2011 Report on Transformation:
> Unfortunately, history has shown “the tribes” will resist, fight, subvert and disobey any attempts as such change.  I am told General Hillier attempted some very similar things with his transformation, diminishing the environmental commands/staffs while empowering and growing joint force employers … and he was told to his face by the tribes that they would not follow.  Instead, we kept the large environmental staffs, grew a joint capability development office (now duplicating functions that the environmental staffs did not divest), and created a large bloated series of force employment commands.
> 
> We will need very strong leadership to advance any worthwhile changes to the organization.



Tribal leadership - I would say we float between Stages 1 to 3, depending on who's chucking grenades into the mess tent  ;D

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribal_Leadership

http://www.ted.com/talks/david_logan_on_tribal_leadership.html


----------



## Edward Campbell

On the general subject of military organization, _Foreign Policy_ magazine offers an interesting notion about how modern, 21st century military forces _might_ (should?) be organized:






Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/13/ctrl_alt_delete_how_to_redesign_the_military_from_scratch?utm_content=buffer35947&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

The source article also offers a few iconoclastic ideas about terms of service, some very familiar to us, others, like the officer/enlisted _split_, a wee bit more _radical_. Their end state model is, I think a joint force.


----------



## McG

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> On the general subject of military organization, _Foreign Policy_ magazine offers an interesting notion about how modern, 21st century military forces _might_ (should?) be organized ...


Our MND currently has the flexibility to consider such re-organization.  Unfortunately, by the end of the month, it will take an act of parliament to consider any organization which does not include (as commands) the RCN, CA and RCAF.  

*Here* is a new, lengthy and interesting argument for the disaggregation of the RAF with the components then being integrated into the Army and RN.  The authors look at historical employment of airpower (both by a dedicated air service and by arms integral to other services) and dissect present UK air doctrine (focusing on roles and characteristics) to arrive at this conclusion:





> Air Power as a joint concept cannot be and is not best delivered from an independent service. The reality today is that the RAF cannot fully support all land operations and cannot deliver maritime / sea operations at all.


While the argument above was written with a view to better capability, recent years have seen the UK looked at RAF disaggregation as well as full unification as potential means toward reducing headquarters and support overhead.  In fact, it was even military leadership presenting the ideas that were eventually passed-over by politicians who wanted to avoid potential emotional tempests.  


> *Merger of Armed Forces 'should be debated'
> The Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy could be merged into a single 'super force', it emerged last night.*
> James Kirkup
> The Telegraph
> 03 Feb 2010
> 
> Combining the three armed forces could leave them resembling the US Marine Corps, which unites land, air and maritime forces under a single command.
> 
> The future of the three separate services was called into question after Britain's senior military commander said combining them could become part of a future defence review.
> 
> Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, said that reorganising the services could be part of a radical reordering of the country's defences. The air force is thought to be the service most likely to lose out in any restructuring.
> 
> Sir Jock spoke as ministers published a green paper conceding that Britain cannot afford all of its current defence commitments, and will in future become more reliant on allies like the US and France to conduct military operations.
> 
> The green paper paves the way for a full strategic defence review that both Labour and the Conservatives have promised after this year’s general election.
> 
> The paper warns that rivalries between the Army, the Navy and the RAF hamper the wider interests of defence, and say the three must work together more closely in future.
> 
> Reassessing the three-service structure could help Britain’s defence forces work together more “seamlessly,” said Sir Jock, a former RAF pilot.
> 
> Asked if it Britain will still have three independent armed services in 10 years’ time, Sir Jock said it was “plausible” to think that it will.
> 
> But he conceded that fundamental questions about the structure of the Forces could be included in the defence review. "There are interesting issues to be debated here,” he said.
> 
> He added: "Any very large organisation has to be broken down into certain elements. So there are separate issues here. There is the issue of the organisation and the way you do that, but then also the issue of making sure that, despite the fact that you need different bits in your organisation, they work together seamlessly to one end."
> 
> Bob Ainsworth, the defence secretary, said the structure of the Forces could be debated, but said neither Labour nor the Conservatives would go as far as abolishing any individual service.
> 
> He said: “Do I think anything as radical as the disappearance of one of the services will be necessary? No I don't. But if other people want to suggest that that is up to them.”
> 
> Pressure on the defence budget has raised tensions between the three services, which are all pursuing big ticket equipment programmes.
> 
> Mr Ainsworth signalled that the Royal Navy will get two new aircraft carriers at a cost of £5 billion.
> 
> But he refused to give a similar assurance about buying 138 new Joint Strike Fighters, most of which would be flown by the RAF.
> 
> General Sir David Richards, the head of the Army, has publicly questioned the value of the new fighters in an era of “counter-insurgency” and guerrilla warfare.
> 
> In December, Mr Ainsworth closed two RAF bases and cut the number of RAF fast jets to divert more money to the Army-led operation in Afghanistan.
> 
> Privately, some senior British military commanders believe that the Armed Forces would function more effectively if the RAF’s functions were effectively absorbed by the two older Services.
> 
> The Army already operates combat helicopters including Apache gunships and the Navy flies Harrier jump jets
> 
> Another, less radical option would be for the Navy to have overall control of fighter jets, the Army to control all helicopters, leaving the RAF as a smaller force providing transport support for the other services, and maybe operating unmanned drone aircraft.
> 
> It is understood that questions about the future of the RAF were raised in the run-up to the green paper. One senior Army commander disclosed that the RAF should face radical change and even possible abolition in the full defence review.
> 
> The commander said: “If you were going to be really radical, it’s something you would look at. And if the RAF were sensible, they would be embracing the idea of becoming strategic enablers for the other services, instead of clinging to their fast-jets.”
> 
> Army and Navy officers privately accuse the RAF of attempting to seize control of the Army Air Corps and the Fleet Air Arm.
> 
> Andrew Brookes, a former RAF pilot at the Air League, said that the defence review should give more influence to the air force, not less.
> 
> He said: “The Army and the Navy are forever coming to the RAF to bail them out because they can’t recruit enough pilots for Apache or Harrier. You can argue that it would make more sense to have a single aviation command and give the RAF control of their air assets.”
> 
> To offset the influence of the individual service heads, the green paper suggests appointing a new powerful military senior officer to oversee all active military operations, who would have equal rank with the chiefs.
> 
> The post of Chief of Joint Operations should have greater status and more direct access to ministers.
> 
> That would be a move towards the American system, where “combatant commanders” running front line operations report directly to the secretary of defence and effectively outrank the joint chiefs of staff.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7037771/Merger-of-Armed-Forces-should-be-debated.html



> *It’s time for Britain to merge its Army, Navy and Air Force
> The top brass are guilty of putting their own interests ahead of those of the country*
> Con Coughlin
> The Telegraph
> 29 Jun 2011
> 
> In years to come, when our heirs reflect on the events that led to the merger of Britain’s Armed Forces, they will identify Liam Fox’s announcement this week of wide-ranging reforms to the Ministry of Defence’s structure as the moment when the demolition of our proud military traditions began in earnest.
> 
> After decades of chronic under-funding, they will conclude, it was inevitable that a small country such as Britain could no longer afford the luxury of maintaining independent command structures for its Army, Navy and Air Force. With defence spending slashed from 5 per cent of GDP at the end of the Cold War to just 2 per cent by 2011, the individual Services had already been reduced to such a parlous state that they could barely carry out even the most basic military tasks.
> 
> The evisceration of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet meant that there were more admirals than ships for them to command. Drastic reductions to the numbers of combat aircraft had seen the Royal Air Force shrink to its smallest size since the First World War, to the point where unflattering comparisons were drawn with its equivalent in Belgium, a country not renowned for its aerial supremacy. And while the Army could claim to have retained a respectable number of combat brigades, it did not have the funds to equip them all.
> 
> Indeed, looked at from this perspective, it is easy to see why, rather than simply looking to streamline the command structure of the Armed Forces – as Dr Fox proposed this week – the next generation of politicians decided to go the whole hog and simply merge the three Services into a single establishment.
> 
> This prediction might appear far-fetched, yet given the bold proposals that Dr Fox has set out, such an arrangement seems the logical destination. More to the point, the disastrous impact that years of inter-Service squabbling has had on our defence capabilities suggests to many that the sooner such an amalgamation of our military resources takes place, the better.
> 
> It would, after all, solve a host of problems. Rather than the MoD being racked by petty in-fighting between the RAF and Royal Navy over which Service will have responsibility for flying combat missions off the new multi-billion-pound aircraft carriers currently under construction at Rosyth, pilots would simply be drawn from Britain’s unified air command. Similarly, the looming power struggle between the RAF and the Army over whether soldiers or airmen take the controls of the new generation of Apache attack helicopters would be neatly side-stepped.
> 
> The present Government would, of course, recoil from any suggestion that the aim of its proposed reforms is to follow the recent Canadian example of unifying the rival Forces under a single command, and doing away with centuries of military tradition in the process.
> 
> Announcing his reforms this week, Dr Fox said that the main aim was to undertake a wide-ranging reform of the “bloated and dysfunctional” Ministry of Defence, which, a full year after he assumed responsibility for the department, is still struggling to provide him with an accurate assessment of just how large its overspending really is.
> 
> Certainly, no one is going to quarrel with the Defence Secretary’s determination to end the ministry’s long-standing habit of indulging in “fantasy” defence projects that are both unaffordable and undeliverable. These are the primary cause of the black hole in his department’s finances, which is estimated at £36 billion, but might amount to billions more.
> 
> Yet a closer reading of the good doctor’s prescription for healing these self-inflicted wounds suggests he is clearly of the opinion that it is the top brass that are mainly to blame, rather than the civil servants who are supposed to be running the MoD. This is demonstrated not least by his plan to remove the heads of the three Services from the department’s Defence Board – a clear indication that he sees them as ultimately responsible for the appalling cost over-runs.
> 
> With hindsight, it does seem remarkable that there was no ministerial representation on this key policy-making body, and that ministers had to wait until the Service chiefs had concluded their deliberations before being informed of the outcome. Jim Murphy, the shadow defence secretary, has admitted that the previous government should have done more to bring the department into line, and that many of Dr Fox’s reforms were long overdue.
> 
> But New Labour was never at ease with men in uniform – and given its unpopular involvement in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, was in no position to undertake such radical changes at the MoD. The fact that Dr Fox now seems determined to cut the military down to size, while bestowing greater powers on the civil servants who are equally culpable for the ministry’s profligacy, suggests that a significant shift is taking place in the balance of power within the defence establishment, one that is likely to have profound implications for the survival of the Services as individual entities.
> 
> In future, the only serving officer on the reconfigured nine-member Defence Board will be the Chief of the Defence Staff, currently General Sir David Richards. This places an enormous amount of responsibility on the CDS’s shoulders. As the representative of each of the Armed Forces, he will be expected to be fully informed on any issue relating to any of the Services, a position that could place him at a distinct disadvantage when challenged by the well-briefed civil servants who will occupy the majority of the seats on the board. As one senior officer remarked yesterday: “This is nothing short of a Civil Service takeover of the military.”
> 
> There will be those who see these changes as the Government’s way of putting the uppity top brass back in their boxes after various injudicious comments on the limitations of Government policy on Libya and Afghanistan. Nor should it be forgotten that, having made much political capital from the public indiscretions of senior officers under Labour, the Tories are determined not to suffer similar indignities.
> 
> Yet in terms of the military’s long-term future, the really ominous development for the military chiefs is the proposed change to their command structure, which will involve a sharp reduction in the “star count” – the number of expensive one-star officers and above – as well as a radical restructuring of the command chain. This will see the operational requirements of all three Services brought under the control of a new Joint Forces Command, which will have overall responsibility for directing future military campaigns.
> 
> This lays the foundations for that future merger feared by those in the military. Yet, in many respects, the Service chiefs have only themselves to blame. The bitter rivalries that erupted during last year’s defence review undoubtedly had a detrimental effect on its outcome. Merging the Armed Forces into a single entity would not only put a stop to such counter-productive squabbling, it would provide us with the lean, mean fighting machine we will undoubtedly need to protect us against the many dangers that lie ahead. Our senior officers put self-interest above the national interest – and that is a luxury this nation can no longer afford.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8607083/Its-time-for-Britain-to-merge-itsArmy-Navy-and-Air-Force.html


----------



## Crispy Bacon

Chief of Military Personnel has just been promoted from MGen to LGen to, so the CMP says, "realign" the pre-2006 structure of MILPERSCOM (formerly ADM HR-MIL).  That gives us, by my count, 7 LGens for a military of 65,000 Reg Force personnel.


----------



## Old Sweat

Crispy Bacon said:
			
		

> Chief of Military Personnel has just been promoted from MGen to LGen to, so the CMP says, "realign" the pre-2006 structure of MILPERSCOM (formerly ADM HR-MIL).  That gives us, by my count, 7 LGens for a military of 65,000 Reg Force personnel.



What's not to like about that? In the Second World War we had a general and four or five lieutenant generals in Canada, the UK and in the field for an army that peaked at about 475,000 in late 1944 or early 1945, while the First World War army suffered with only one lieutenant general in the field and another running the support system in the UK. How did we ever win those wars?

 :sarcasm:


----------



## Edward Campbell

Crispy Bacon said:
			
		

> Chief of Military Personnel has just been promoted from MGen to LGen to, so the CMP says, "realign" the pre-2006 structure of MILPERSCOM (formerly ADM HR-MIL).  That gives us, by my count, 7 LGens for a military of 65,000 Reg Force personnel.








Edited to add:

Is the individual promoted prior to being posted to an existing VAdm/LGen appointment or is the CMP position being upgraded?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Isn't it 9 LGens vice 7 now?


----------



## Rocky Mountains

Crispy Bacon said:
			
		

> Chief of Military Personnel has just been promoted from MGen to LGen to, so the CMP says, "realign" the pre-2006 structure of MILPERSCOM (formerly ADM HR-MIL).  That gives us, by my count, 7 LGens for a military of 65,000 Reg Force personnel.



4 company corps?  We used to have a 4 division corps.  And people are concerned with the cost of insignia?


----------



## Ostrozac

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Isn't it 9 LGens vice 7 now?



I count 9.

Army, Navy, Air Force, CJOC, CMP, VCDS, CanMilRep NATO, DCom NORAD, DCom NATO South.

Did I miss anyone?


----------



## Webgear

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I count 9.
> 
> Army, Navy, Air Force, CJOC, CMP, VCDS, CanMilRep NATO, DCom NORAD, DCom, NATO South.
> 
> Did I miss anyone?



CFINTCOM?

Edit never mind, he is still a MGen.


----------



## eliminator

Webgear said:
			
		

> CFINTCOM?
> 
> Edit never mind, he is still a MGen.



Yep, "Major-General Paul Wynnyk assumed the role of Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) and Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) today from Major-General Christian Rousseau. "


----------



## RedcapCrusader

Really? I'm sure they could cut it down to 3 or 4. Commanders of each service and VCDS; or eliminate the VCDS and rotate each commander through during CDS absences (unless of course I'm missing the point of having a VCDS).

9 x $232 000/year = $2 080 728/year.
Cut down to 4 LGen and you have a savings of $1 155 960/year. Now this is a rough calculation, it's not a huge amount of money when you look at the defence budget as a whole but you could do a good dent in providing better, serviceable equipment (and better fitting uniforms) to soldiers that actually work for a living.


----------



## McG

It has been proposed here before that every CAF general position be reduced by one rank, leaving the CDS as a three leaf and several one leaf positions falling down to Col/Capt.  Opposition to the idea argues that we need all those leafs for credibility at coalition tables.  What if we took the example of several different countries and eliminated one of the first three genaral ranks?  Does it achieve the effect sought by those who want fewer generals while appeasing the concerns of those who are worried about clout at international meetings?


----------



## Crispy Bacon

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Is the individual promoted prior to being posted to an existing VAdm/LGen appointment or is the CMP position being upgraded?



The way the memo from LGen Millar is written, the CAF has upgraded the position of CMP back to being a LGen position:



> All,
> 
> The CDS announced last week the reinstatement of the Chief of Military Personnel command to the rank of LGen. This decision realigns the command to its pre-2006 structure where a LGen headed ADM (HR-Mil). I consider the CDS' decision to be reflective of many things, especially, the continued importance of personnel issues across the Canadian Armed Forces which each of you deals with every day; whether health, recruiting, career management, the Chaplaincy, morale and welfare, training and education, compensation and benefits, alternate dispute resolution, heritage and history, honours and recognition, legal, research, modernization of pay and HR, policy, the day-to-day functioning of our headquarters, our Reserves, and even our budget.
> 
> Within all of these critical functions, there has been much attention in the last year as we have dealt with suicides, mental illness, harassment and misconduct, benefit issues, and much more. At times the attention has been negative, but regardless of the type of attention, each of you has risen to the challenge to show our mettle. In doing so, you have demonstrated pride and professionalism as only those who are deeply wedded to HR issues can understand and show. The output has been the care for the men and women of the Forces and the outcome has been a reciprocation, from those who we serve, of trust and confidence.
> 
> Clearly, each of us is doing our utmost and going beyond. I believe it is this performance on your part that has become truly visible across many fronts that has resulted in our command being raised to LGen. What I mean to say by all of this is that this decision has been made because of you, your work, your dedication and commitment. I wanted to thank all of you and to express just how important each of our roles and responsibilities is in achieving the CDS' priorities of Delivering Excellence in Operations, Leading the Profession of Arms, Caring for our People, and Preparing our Forces for Tomorrow. Thank you.
> 
> *************************************************************************************************************************************************************
> 
> Tous,
> 
> Le CEM a annoncé la semaine dernière la réintégration de la position du Chef du Personnel Militaire au grade de lgén. Cette décision réaligne le commandement à sa structure pré-2006, structure qui voyait un lgén à la tête du SMA (Pers). Je considère la décision du CEM indicative de plusieurs choses et plus spécifiquement de l'importance continue des questions en ce qui à trait au personnel à travers les forces armées canadiennes avec lesquelles chacun de vous devez jongler quotidiennement; que ce soit la santé, le recrutement, la gestion de carrière, l'aumônerie, le morale et bien-être, l'entraînement et l'éducation, les bénéfices et avantages, la gestion des conflits, histoire et patrimoine, les honneurs et reconnaissance, la justice, la recherche, la modernisation du système de salaire et de gestion du personnel, les politiques, le fonctionnement journalier de notre QG, nos réservistes et même notre budget.
> 
> Au sein de toutes ces fonctions critiques qui ont certainement suscité beaucoup d'attention au cours de la dernière année alors que nous avions à traité avec les suicides, les maladies mentales, le harcèlement et l'inconduite, les problématiques reliées aux bénéfices et bien plus. À certain moment, l'attention était négative, mais nonobstant le type d'attention, chacun de vous avez surmonté les défis avec courage. Vous avez certes démontré la fierté et le professionnalisme que seulement ceux intimement entrelacé aux ressources humaines peuvent comprendre et démontrer. Le résultat à été le bien être des hommes et femmes des FAC et le résultat à été une alternance pour ceux qui compte sur nous et ont confiance en nous.
> 
> Clairement, chacun de nous déployons des efforts extrêmes et bien au-delà des attentes. Je crois fermement que c'est cette performance de votre part qui est devenu vraiment visible à travers les maintes fronts et qui ont contribué à l'élévation au grade de lgén notre commandement. Ce que je désire vous transmettre c'est que cette décision a été prise à cause de vous, votre travail, votre engagement et dévouement. Je voulais simplement remercier chacun d'entre vous et vous exprimer jusqu'à quel point chacun de vos rôles et responsabilités sont importants dans l'accomplissement des priorités du CEM, de livrer l'excellence dans les opérations, mener la profession des armes, prendre soins de notre personnel et préparer les forces pour demain. Merci.
> 
> 
> 
> David B. Millar
> Lieutenant-General/Lieutenant-général
> Chief of Military Personnel/Chef du personnel militaire


----------



## Crispy Bacon

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I count 9.
> 
> Army, Navy, Air Force, CJOC, CMP, VCDS, CanMilRep NATO, DCom NORAD, DCom NATO South.
> 
> Did I miss anyone?



Interesting, DWAN only lists 7: Army, Navy, Air Force, VCDS, CJOC, DComd NORAD, and (now) CMP.

Edit: nevermind, it also lists MGen Seminiaw as Comd of CANCOM, so it's clearly outdated.  (Ironically, keeping the senior staff biographies updated is a responsibility of CMP...)


----------



## Rifleman62

> The way the memo from LGen Millar is written, the CAF has upgraded the position of CMP back to being a LGen position.



That was the only way to fix the CF Recruiting system. Beyond the scope of a MGen.


----------



## Transporter

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I count 9.
> 
> Army, Navy, Air Force, CJOC, CMP, VCDS, CanMilRep NATO, DCom NORAD, DCom *Allied JFC Naples*.
> 
> Did I miss anyone?



FTFY


----------



## Old Sweat

And for something completely different, this USAF press release indicates that service is making an attempt to reduce some of its various headquarters. Mods, I considered posting this in the US military area, but the contrast with the latest upgrading in NDHQ was too good to let pass.  

Air Force Announces Changes to Headquarters Organization
http://www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123417577


Air Force leaders announced changes to headquarters staff manning and organization today.
The Air Force will create efficiencies by deactivating and realigning organizations at headquarters Air Force, major commands (MAJCOMs), numbered air forces and field operating agencies, resulting in savings of $1.6 billion across the Air Force in the next five years.

'I will work to ensure the world's best Air Force is the most capable at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer,' said Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James. 'Everyone knows our economy is still not where it should be; we have a responsibility to ensure that every dollar adds value to the taxpayers and our national defense.'

The changes are a result of a comprehensive effort to reduce overhead costs, increase efficiencies, eliminate redundant activities and improve effectiveness and business processes (also known as Air Force Management Headquarters Review). The efficiencies created through the reorganization will also help meet the Department of Defense's directive to reduce costs and staff levels by at least 20 percent, eliminating 3,459 positions at headquarters across the Air Force, both in country and at overseas locations. As part of ongoing cost savings initiatives, the Air Force will also continue to reduce contract spending, operating budgets and travel expenditures.

To minimize the effect on civilian personnel, the Air Force will initiate Voluntary Early Retirement Authority programs and Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay to foster voluntary reductions before pursuing involuntary measures. As part of ongoing efforts to responsibly shape the force, military members were offered a variety of voluntary incentive programs.

'We are aggressively pursuing reductions within the first year, rather than spread them out over five years as allowed by DoD,' said James. 'It's better for airmen because it provides them predictability and allows us to re-stabilize our workforce sooner. It also allows us to harvest the savings earlier so that we can plow it back into readiness and some of our key modernization programs.'

The Air Force's goal is to go beyond the 20 percent reduction mandated by the DoD so any additional savings can be achieved from staff functions above the wing level, and set to provide additional combat capability to the combatant commanders.

'The Air Force has been making incremental changes in our business practices for the last several years, but we must change the way we are doing business if we are to meet the Air Force's goal to reduce staffing functions by more than 20 percent,' explained Bill Booth, Air Force acting deputy chief management officer. 'Reducing higher headquarters' staffs means we can save money that can be re-invested in getting ready for combat missions at the wing level.'

The largest initiative will include centralizing policy and oversight of installation and mission support activities within a newly created Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC), which will report to Air Force Materiel Command. Execution will remain at the local level.

'The current and projected fiscal climate make it essential to centralize management and streamline support to the maximum extent possible in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, as well as deliver more standardized levels of service across the Air Force,' Booth said. Support functions currently spread across the MAJCOMs' staffs will be centralized at the AFIMSC.

The Air Force will also make changes to the headquarters Air Force staff organization by splitting Operations, Plans and Requirements (A3/5) and Strategic Plans and Programs (A8) and reorganizing them into the new Operations (A3) organization which will stand alone and merge the planning staffs into the new A5/8 organization.

Also, the current programming functions from A8 will be merged into the service's financial management organization (FM).

'We will now have an organization, A5/8, that is responsible for developing, managing and constantly assessing an Air Force strategy that is bounded by long-range resource projections and another organization, FM, that deals primarily with the day-to-day budget activities involved in running the Air Force,' Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III explained. 'Keeping organizations aligned will ensure we keep moving towards our long-range strategic goals despite the short-term budget upheaval we face regularly.'

The Air Force will also realign several functions that currently report to the headquarters in an effort to better support combatant commanders and realign some field operating agencies to operational MAJCOMs, merge FOAs with similar missions and deactivate others.

The Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency is also being realigned from headquarters Air Force as a FOA to become part of a new operational numbered air force under Air Combat Command.

Realigning the Air Force ISR Agency into the new 25th Air Force within ACC ensures warfighting commands will have the best possible intelligence from integrated national and tactical ISR capabilities, while appropriately realigning operational activities and 'organize, train and equip' responsibilities of the AF ISR Agency from execution by Headquarters AF to a MAJCOM.

_- mod edit to add link -_


----------



## Navy_Pete

RedcapCrusader said:
			
		

> Really? I'm sure they could cut it down to 3 or 4. Commanders of each service and VCDS; or eliminate the VCDS and rotate each commander through during CDS absences (unless of course I'm missing the point of having a VCDS).
> 
> 9 x $232 000/year = $2 080 728/year.
> Cut down to 4 LGen and you have a savings of $1 155 960/year. Now this is a rough calculation, it's not a huge amount of money when you look at the defence budget as a whole but you could do a good dent in providing better, serviceable equipment (and better fitting uniforms) to soldiers that actually work for a living.



I don't think the savings are in the pay alone; there's also the staff associated with them.  Having said that, I'm sure that $1M/year is still less then a single MPs office, and I'm guessing 5 LGens are more productive then most MPs.

The VCDS is in charge of all the boring, non operational stuff, so it's a completely different role then CDS.  It's the whole business, strategic planning, materiel side of running the military.  The official version is here; http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/vice-chief-defence-staff.page  Not terribly sexy but it's all pretty important.


----------



## Journeyman

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> .....strategic planning.......


  :rofl:




			
				Jim Seggie said:
			
		

> ... now that CMP is a LGen ....  [from a different discussion]


  :   Obviously no one in NDHQ is reading this thread; they're expanding their numbers.


----------



## Loachman

Crispy Bacon said:
			
		

> The CDS announced last week the reinstatement of the Chief of Military Personnel command to the rank of LGen ... suicides, mental illness



That'll fix those problems fer sure.

Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.


----------



## medicineman

Loachman said:
			
		

> Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.



More people in the field would be properly marshalled?

MM


----------



## OldSolduer

medicineman said:
			
		

> More people in the field would be properly marshalled?
> 
> MM



I doubt it. To do that you need a Sgt or a really switched on Cpl.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Really - a Sgt or a Cpl?

I have a border collie at home that does a fantastic job.

All joking aside, though, I am willing to bet that we could run the whole Navy with one RAdm and three Cmdres. The Radm would be CNS, one Cmdre each per coast and one heading the Navres.

The Captains holding the various senior staff officers (or whatever their numbered job is today) would see their status reinstated to what it was during WWII and the post war era when they ran most functions ashore.


----------



## Edward Campbell

There is a problem in my _opinion_, with HQ 'bloat,' but we need to be sure that we all understand what the problems (and there's more than one) are and why we have them.

The first problem is one of perception: we look at the size of the HQs and the size of the fleets and field force formations and we say "Too many people in HQs." What we forget is that we, all of us, _want_ and *need* many (I dare say even most) of those people in HQs. I will suggest that every military professional knows that we need HQs and understands that the smaller the fleets and field forces become the more disproportionate the HQs _seem_. But they aren't all too big, it's just that we need a certain size of Command and Control _superstructure_ even for a tiny combat force. We share the problem with e.g. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and, and , and ...

Second: some tasks are imposed on DND and the CF by government and a _slice_ of the HQ staff is _mandated_, by outsiders, to do those tasks. Some, indeed many of those tasks are useless bloody busywork, or worse, but that does not alter the fact that we have to do them.

But we do have some control over _shape_ of our C2 _superstructure_. The MND and CDS could, for example, go the the cabinet with a _'modest proposal'_ to rectify a 45 year old error. When the great big 1968 pay adjustment (for which we all praise Mr Hellyer) was being designed it was decided to "benchmark" certain ranks and trades against selected civil service jobs - I recall that draughtsmen were one of them - and then restructure military rank/trade pay scales against those benchmarks. One benchmark was the _appointment_ of director in the civil service.

Now, grossly oversimplified, a director is the first executive level in the civil service. Who is the first _executive_ in the military? It's a ship's captain, or regiment/battalion or flying squadron CO. That's obvious, right? But most directors in NDHQ, where the titles are used, are Navy captains or colonels. Why? It was a 'slip' made in the 1960s and the people doing the work were too busy, harassed even, to make the correction. "We'll fix it later," they said. _We_ (I was part of that 'we' for a while) didn't. If we do, and we should, then we will need some more Cdrs and LCols but we'll need a HUGE pile less of Capts(N)s and Cols. But if directorts are over-ranked then what about directors- general? Yep, over-ranked, too; so I've just found jobs for a bunch of those captains and colonels. What about the Cmdrs and BGens? You can see what's coming, right? A sensible command and control superstructure is topped by a three star, the CDS. There are some other three stars, too, mostly OUTCAN, but there is no _need_ for a four star.*

The other thing we can do is think about the _shape_ of the whole structure: why not _joint_ commands, for example, with the CNS, CGS and CAS in Ottawa being professional heads of services?

My point is that size is not the only issue, and some parts of _size_ are beyond our control. But we can manage _shape_.

____
*Except that once every 50 years or so we will be offered the four star appointment at NATO HQ, Chairman of the Military Committee; we can promote one fo the three stars and send him or her there to do that job ... twice a century.


----------



## Rocky Mountains

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Except that once every 50 years or so we will be offered the four star appointment at NATO HQ, Chairman of the Military Committee; we can promote one of the three stars and send him or her there to do that job ... twice a century.



Once upon a time there was acting rank for people working above their pay grade.


----------



## Old Sweat

Rocky Mountains said:
			
		

> Once upon a time there was acting rank for people working above their pay grade.



The post is established for a four star, so the person selected is working at his pay grade. It happens so rarely, as Edward, mentioned that it is sort of a lottery for a lucky GOFO.


----------



## McG

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> A sensible command and control superstructure is topped by a three star, the CDS. There are some other three stars, too, mostly OUTCAN, but there is no _need_ for a four star.


As a compromise solution, what if the CAF eliminated the one or two leaf rank?  Japan and Brazil both skip BGen and go from Col to MGen.  There are also examples of countries that have eliminated the two star and BGen is promoted to LGen.  This model would achieve the desired flattening of our hierarchy while appeasing those who want to see a certain weight of leaf for international prestige. 



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The other thing we can do is think about the _shape_ of the whole structure: why not _joint_ commands, for example, with the CNS, CGS and CAS in Ottawa being professional heads of services?


But going back to your comment on external constraints, I believe the NDA has just been amended so as to bar this from being implemented.  



			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> Imagine what we could fix if only Field Marshall rank was re-instated.


But we never had that one in our organization.  There was, over a century ago, a Captain General post to oversee our militia. [sarcasm was intended - please don't try to make this happen]


----------



## daftandbarmy

Organizations everywhere are missing the Information Age boat, it seems:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1016/MR1016.chap11.pdf


----------



## McG

One retired US Army Col has arrived at a similar solution for his armed forces as many on this site have reached for ours:  The cuts and effeciencies need to happen at the top, not from the bottom.  Despite the differences in our militaries, a lot of the article's arguments apply just as equally to the CAF.


> Consolidation: The Practical but Radical Budget Solution
> October 22, 2014 Jared Lieberher
> By Col. Stanley A. Murrell, U.S. Army retired
> 
> Talking about the dangers of sequestration and military cuts does not seem to address the real problem or what I believe is the best and only way to seriously reduce military costs. We have, it appears, become our own worst enemy.
> 
> One would think we are in the business of empire-building. If you require confirmation, just look at the size of the Army, with its many top-heavy agencies filled with general officers, NCOs and high-ranking civilians. It has become a laughing matter, one that needs attention, but we also need to avoid doing the wrong thing.
> 
> Here are three things we shouldn’t do. First, we should not take away benefits that were the reason many volunteered for the military in the first place. These volunteers put their lives on hold and left their families to defend—and, in some cases, die for—the rights we enjoy in the U.S. Second, we should not cut military programs that better enable those same people to do the very difficult jobs we ask them to do all over the world—or, in the case of the Reserve and National Guard, right here in America. Finally, we shouldn’t screw with soldiers’ pay, which we all know is meager anyway. If we do these things, it is only a matter of time before volunteers start to say they’ve had enough. In fact, we are seeing it already.
> 
> What, then, do we do? It is really pretty simple: There are too many components in the total force. If you take into account all the services, including the Coast Guard, we have 12 different components. (That total is the result of counting the active, Reserve and National Guard components of each service.) We have to reduce the number of components. That means reducing force structure from the top, not the bottom. In the past, force structure has always been cut from the bottom.
> 
> We can do this if we are willing to combine forces. I had a joint assignment back in the ‘80s and learned a new term: purple-suiter. It simply meant all the services needed to work together to get the job done, and that philosophy is still true today. We do very little that is service-specific; instead, we task-organize and do primarily joint operations. In all those operations, we needed people to fly planes, drive boats and put their boots on the ground.  ...


See full article here:  http://armymagazine.org/2014/10/22/consolidation-the-practical-but-radical-budget-solution/#sthash.RyWFax6Q.dpbs


----------



## Old Sweat

MCG said:
			
		

> One retired US Army Col has arrived at a similar solution for his armed forces as many on this site have reached for ours:  The cuts and effeciencies need to happen at the top, not from the bottom.  Despite the differences in our militaries, a lot of the article's arguments apply just as equally to the CAF.See full article here:  http://armymagazine.org/2014/10/22/consolidation-the-practical-but-radical-budget-solution/#sthash.RyWFax6Q.dpbs



Agree completely. A result of having lots of headquarters, chains of command, agencies, etc is that they get filled up with intelligent, ambitious and energetic officers who are out to make a name for themselves. Hence, they look for invent things to do, both because they can't stand not being hyperactive and because that is the way to get noticed and promoted. As a result rank bloat and staff paralysis doing unimportant things, while nobody the real world and especially the force structure is continually under attack.


----------



## Staff Weenie

Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....

You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF? 

I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.


----------



## tomahawk6

Civilians were hired to fill military jobs because it was "cheaper" to do so.Actually it was just a cover to cut military personnel.Civilians cant do military jobs "cheaper" than uniformed personnel.At the end of the day you have more civilians and less military who actually fight the wars.As for general officers sadly they are needed in NATO staff jobs,NORAD and so called joint commands.The business of defense is keeping the sheeple safe and that aint cheap.


----------



## Navy_Pete

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> ..
> I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.



To be fair this is govt wide.  It's the same travel approval policy, so CDS would just be a voice in the wilderness.  Also, you were assuming the system was effective before... ;D


----------



## Jed

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....
> 
> You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF?
> 
> I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.



That sure hits the nail on the head.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Staff Weenie said:
			
		

> Old Sweat - I once worked for a senior Officer like that - we used to say that he spun like a ferret on meth. Whenever he took over a section, he would immediately initiate a wealth of new 'projects' and 'initiatives'. These contributed very little, spun the entire staff out and distracted them from their primary functions, and ultimately the entire thing would collapse like a house of cards once he would be promoted and posted.  I've watched this man go from Capt to Col doing this in posting after posting....
> 
> You, and others, have touched on staff paralysis - and here I think we also need to look at a trend over the decades to take decision making and move it to progressively higher levels.  Decisions that could be made by Capt in the 1990's are now delegated only to LCol or Col.  Activities which were once routine are now classified as 'events' which can require L1 approval! My current Col cannot approve some of these on his own authority - if we cannot trust the years of loyalty, and intelligent and dedicated service evidenced by this person, why do we have Colonels in the CAF?
> 
> I find a significant portion of this has been pushed upon us by Treasury Board, PWGSC, Lawyers, and successive Federal Govts.  On our side, many CDS have been too afraid to rock the boat and put their foot down.  Should a CDS disagree, they will be sacked - this doesn't produce leaders, it produces lap-dogs. The system is becoming far too risk-averse to be effective.



It's not just the CF, the who PS is going this way as well. Risk adverse is the word of the day. My current DG is apparently nicknamed "The black hole" information, request go in and nothing comes out. I keep telling my MP if they want to improve the PS, empower the frontline managers, but that threatens to many rice bowels.


----------



## dapaterson

"Rice bowels" gets my vote for typo of the year...


----------



## daftandbarmy

You should bring a couple of hundred colleagues to one of these conferences about 'Transforming the Public Service' and get the juices flowing:

http://www.conferenceboard.ca/conf/public-hr/default.aspx

The reply to conference titles like this should, of course, be: 'into what?'


----------



## tomahawk6

Cutting staff is attractive if you can eliminate an entire organization.Cutting staff spaces is somewhat counterproductive.In the case of the US Northern Command if you cut the headquarters entirely you could achieve some cost savings.The supporting commands could remain but command could be shifted to another existing headquarters.I argue that in this day and age with real time communications,this would be alot easier than 40 years ago.
                                                                                              
http://www.northcom.mil/


----------



## Pusser

Various and assorted parties go on and on ad nauseum about "HQ bloat" and improving the "tooth to tail" ratio.  However, what is often neglected is that none of this "bloat" has been put in place by accident, nor has it just materialized out of some void.  I will never say that there is no room to rationalize and redistribute HQ functions in order to make things more efficient and cost effective, but I will never agree that wholesale cuts across the board are the best way to do this.  Another common complaint throughout this forum is the amount of time it takes to get things processed by HQs.  Do folks not see the disconnect here?  If you hack and slash the personnel in HQs, you also reduce the service levels of the output coming out of those HQs.  Furthermore, I find it laughable that the government has mandated cuts at these levels when in many cases, the increased bureaucratic BS that has been mandated by this same government (e.g. Ministerial approval for routine cocktail parties) are a direct cause of much of the "bloat" (i.e. all the staff functionaries required to ensure that all the nonsensical T's are crossed and I's dotted).


----------



## McG

Pusser said:
			
		

> Another common complaint throughout this forum is the amount of time it takes to get things processed by HQs.  Do folks not see the disconnect here?  If you hack and slash the personnel in HQs, you also reduce the service levels of the output coming out of those HQs.


Or, if you eliminate a layer of HQ in its entirety, then you speed the process as there is one less link in the chain to handle, sit-on, process (or mailbox), and send on its way.  

We have QR&O, CFAO, DAODs, etc that put the power to make decisions or to give recommendations direct to the appropriate authority in Ottawa, so let's allow CO's to get on with the lion's share of commanding their units and remove the fingers of intermediate layers of staffs.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Pusser said:
			
		

> Various and assorted parties go on and on ad nauseum about "HQ bloat" and improving the "tooth to tail" ratio.  However, what is often neglected is that none of this "bloat" has been put in place by accident, nor has it just materialized out of some void.  I will never say that there is no room to rationalize and redistribute HQ functions in order to make things more efficient and cost effective, but I will never agree that wholesale cuts across the board are the best way to do this.  Another common complaint throughout this forum is the amount of time it takes to get things processed by HQs.  Do folks not see the disconnect here?  If you hack and slash the personnel in HQs, you also reduce the service levels of the output coming out of those HQs.  Furthermore, I find it laughable that the government has mandated cuts at these levels when in many cases, the increased bureaucratic BS that has been mandated by this same government (e.g. Ministerial approval for routine cocktail parties) are a direct cause of much of the "bloat" (i.e. all the staff functionaries required to ensure that all the nonsensical T's are crossed and I's dotted).



So you are sdvocating that we put in place more HQ?

 For the size of our forces, we are entirely to heavy on HQ, HQers, and all the baggage that goes with it.

How ironic you use a cocktail party as an example as something HQs struggle to get approval for.  For those of us in operational units trying to complete the military missions, let me say HQ types facing reduced numbers of cocktail parties have our heart-fuckin-felt sympathies.

But, with a reduced social calendar, maybe these folks will have more time to "work", thus reducing their "processing times".

 :


----------



## daftandbarmy

Pusser said:
			
		

> Various and assorted parties go on and on ad nauseum about "HQ bloat" and improving the "tooth to tail" ratio.  However, what is often neglected is that none of this "bloat" has been put in place by accident, nor has it just materialized out of some void.  I will never say that there is no room to rationalize and redistribute HQ functions in order to make things more efficient and cost effective, but I will never agree that wholesale cuts across the board are the best way to do this.  Another common complaint throughout this forum is the amount of time it takes to get things processed by HQs.  Do folks not see the disconnect here?  If you hack and slash the personnel in HQs, you also reduce the service levels of the output coming out of those HQs.  Furthermore, I find it laughable that the government has mandated cuts at these levels when in many cases, the increased bureaucratic BS that has been mandated by this same government (e.g. Ministerial approval for routine cocktail parties) are a direct cause of much of the "bloat" (i.e. all the staff functionaries required to ensure that all the nonsensical T's are crossed and I's dotted).



Strategy shapes structure, and our new fearless leader needs to move us from a 'structuralist' to a 'reconstructivist' approach (there, you've had your ration of jargon today  ;D)

https://hbr.org/2009/09/how-strategy-shapes-structure

In our case, I know that our Bde HQ - for all the dissing we do - keeps us from running off a variety of cliffs largely because the majority of the units are not all that competent at staying out of trouble. They help us address some significant leadership, capacity and corporate competency deficits .... but don't ever quote me on that


----------



## dapaterson

Routine cocktail parties? Perhaps if the RCN's efforts were geared towards ship replacements instead of drinks on the aft deck we wouldn't have no afloat support capability.


With a dozen Halifax class frigates, one clapped out destroyer, twelve MCDVs and four submarines, does the RCN need the number of admirals it has?  The number of formations it has?  At first blush, if everything were to be put to sea under a single commander, it looks like a nice collection for a single Commodore.

Similarly, a three Brigade Regular Force Army sounds a lot like a Division, commanded by a Major-General.  How many pilots do we need for the nubmer of aricraft we operate - and why do we pay a premium to pilots when they aren't flying?  There are plenty of places to compress and reduce within the ECSes, before we even start asking: An Intelligence Command?  Really?  Isn't the Provost Marshall the security officer - why is there another person in that position?  And so on down the line.

Mind you, fewer officers might reduce the turnout at the cocktail parties...


----------



## MilEME09

For having 5 army divisions, two air force divisions and two fleets you would think the CAF was 200x its actual size. Though it seems we have the officers to support that many formations, not the troops or equipment


----------



## McG

You may aswell lump CADTC in to give the Army a total of 6 "divisions."


----------



## a_majoor

Pusser said:
			
		

> Various and assorted parties go on and on ad nauseum about "HQ bloat" and improving the "tooth to tail" ratio.  However, what is often neglected is that none of this "bloat" has been put in place by accident, nor has it just materialized out of some void.  I will never say that there is no room to rationalize and redistribute HQ functions in order to make things more efficient and cost effective, but I will never agree that wholesale cuts across the board are the best way to do this.  Another common complaint throughout this forum is the amount of time it takes to get things processed by HQs.  Do folks not see the disconnect here?  If you hack and slash the personnel in HQs, you also reduce the service levels of the output coming out of those HQs.  Furthermore, I find it laughable that the government has mandated cuts at these levels when in many cases, the increased bureaucratic BS that has been mandated by this same government (e.g. Ministerial approval for routine cocktail parties) are a direct cause of much of the "bloat" (i.e. all the staff functionaries required to ensure that all the nonsensical T's are crossed and I's dotted).



I will disagree with you about the size of headquarters slowing down the decision making process. The reality is since each part of the HQ needs to justify its position or be justified (i.e. why do you have this in your organization), everyone *must* weigh in on any decision. This leads to long and convoluted staff meetings, gigantic PowerPoint slide decks, email chains ten pages long and all the other horrors we so often see and hear about (trust me; I _was_ a minor staff weenie at a Brigade HQ for a while). The net effect of that is to create an OODA loop the size of a ferris wheel (or as another preceptive person described it, a Ptolemaic system of nested wheels) where everything is slowed down. The quality of decision making isn't proportional to the number of people being thrown at the problems (one only has to look at procurement or project management to understand this), as the saying goes, you don't make a baby in one month by assigning nine women to the problem...

I cannot disagree with you that there are external factors as well; jumping through hoops of fire to put on a cocktail party is hardly the best use of resources (looking at it from either direction), and the amount of "external" paperwork has grown geometrically in the last decade or so; which also causes no end of issues.

Still, we don't need these vast HQ's to manage cocktail parties, and scaling them down to reflect the true scale and scope of the CF will make the actual HQ organizations both more efficient internally (small, fast OODA loops) and tactically viable as well (when 1 CAN DIV deploys right now they have a total manning of about 450; close to the size of an _entire Infantry battalion_ packed into a relatively small space. One incoming AA/AD strike by a ballistic or cruise missile will take out a significant amount of manpower and resources (tentage, IT equipment, generators, vehicles etc.), and is big enough to make it a worthwhile target.)


----------



## MilEME09

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Still, we don't need these vast HQ's to manage cocktail parties, and scaling them down to reflect the true scale and scope of the CF will make the actual HQ organizations both more efficient internally (small, fast OODA loops) and tactically viable as well (when 1 CAN DIV deploys right now they have a total manning of about 450; close to the size of an _entire Infantry battalion_ packed into a relatively small space. One incoming AA/AD strike by a ballistic or cruise missile will take out a significant amount of manpower and resources (tentage, IT equipment, generators, vehicles etc.), and is big enough to make it a worthwhile target.)



If the enemy knew anything about the CF they'd know it would do more good then harm to take out that much excess HQ elements.....just sayin. On the serious size there is no reason a HQ element should be larger then the sub units it commands.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

I am of the view that your HQ doesn't grow because you are busy - you are busy because you let your HQ grow....


----------



## SeaKingTacco

To be completely fair to the RCN- the cocktail party thing in foreign ports are largely imposed upon them by DFAIT. 

Unfortunately, The RCN ends up doing their paper work for them.... :


----------



## Pusser

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> So you are sdvocating that we put in place more HQ?
> 
> For the size of our forces, we are entirely to heavy on HQ, HQers, and all the baggage that goes with it.
> 
> How ironic you use a cocktail party as an example as something HQs struggle to get approval for.  For those of us in operational units trying to complete the military missions, let me say HQ types facing reduced numbers of cocktail parties have our heart-******-felt sympathies.
> 
> But, with a reduced social calendar, maybe these folks will have more time to "work", thus reducing their "processing times".
> 
> :



Not at all, but we do need to "right-size" them and that does not necessarily mean reducing them across the board.  I would tend to agree that there are too many HQs, but it is also important to remember that Canada is a huge country and in some cases an additional HQ is warranted, not because of the numbers of personnel or the amount of equipment involved, but rather because of the geography.  Perhaps the amount of naval assets in Canada's arsenal don't warrant two rear-admiral formation commanders, but the 5000 km of rocks, sand and grass between them does.

I would also agree that there are sometimes too many individuals in the chain who have to have their input before a decision is made.  We don't necessarily need more officers in HQs (especially senior ones), but I think a few more worker bees would actually improve things.  We have too many situations where some functions simply cease to progress whenever someone gets sick, takes a course or goes on leave.

Never underestimate the value of a good cocktail party and I'm talking about the ones put on by operational units, not HQs.  A lot of business gets done at those things, not to mention the fact that they are often a diplomatic requirement imposed on the CF by outside sources.  However, they shouldn't require the same amount of planning, preparation and bureaucratic BS as the Op OVERLORD.


----------



## a_majoor

This is an excerpt from an actual email I received, which goes on in nauseating detail down to to what _fonts_ I am allowed to use on a signature block. If there are people who have the time and energy to carry out tasks like the pointy haired boss in Dilbert, then there are clearly far too many people inhabiting the food chain:



> To All:  On 1 Apr 15, a DWAN wide msg was issued with regards to the pending role out of a new email system and the requirement to conform to the Treasury Board directive on signature blocks. At the bottom of this email is a copy of that instruction for reference. There have been a number of questions generated from across the formation with regards to personalization or modification of the format. The short answer is no, modifications are not allowed. Detailed below is clarification of the email signature block requirement.
> 
> 1.  Corps or affiliations are not authorized;
> 
> 2.  Post nominals from the Canadian Honours system are authorized, but things like PMP, MCSE, etc. that are industry certifications are not authorized;
> 
> 3.  Quotes are not authorized;
> 
> 4.  Cellular numbers provided on government-approved devices can be included as a secondary telephone number and identified by the abbreviation "Cel:" in English or "Tél. cell. : "in French and separated by a ‟/”;
> 
> 5.  Customizing signature blocks (e.g. font change, type size) is not permitted;
> 
> 6.  Email signatures must be applied to all emails sent, including replies;
> 
> 7.  The following requirements apply to the presentation:
> a.  Sans-serif font style, such as Verdana, Calibri or Arial.  Sans-serif is a category of typefaces that do not use serifs, small lines at the ends of characters.  Popular sans-serif fonts include Verdana, Calibri, Ariel, Helvetica, Avant Gard and Geneva.  Serif fonts include Times New Roman, Courier, New Century Schoolbook and Palatino, are not authorized.  It is up to individuals to ensure they are using a sans-serif font if not choosing any of the types outlined above.
> 
> 8. Etc


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is an excerpt from an actual email I received, which goes on in nauseating detail down to to what _fonts_ I am allowed to use on a signature block. If there are people who have the time and energy to carry out tasks like the pointy haired boss in Dilbert, then there are clearly far too many people inhabiting the food chain:


That is from external to DND.  It is TB's excess capacity and not ours that is on display.


----------



## Occam

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is an excerpt from an actual email I received, which goes on in nauseating detail down to to what _fonts_ I am allowed to use on a signature block. If there are people who have the time and energy to carry out tasks like the pointy haired boss in Dilbert, then there are clearly far too many people inhabiting the food chain:



Somebody in your org is reading something that isn't there.  For example, post-nominals are not mentioned in the policy and would therefore be forbidden.

For anyone interested, or anyone in need of a sleep aid, the whole nauseatingly verbose policy can be found at http://tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=27600.  See Appendix E for the the policy on signature blocks.

And yes, if TB has people who have so little to do that they can come up with this noise, they can send a few people over to DND - my section is down two positions and I'm getting a little tired of three people trying to do the work of five.


----------



## Good2Golf

DND's example was non-compliant.  The TBS policy is that the font is in all black.  The example's e-mail address was blue, not the policy-compliant black.

Was DND deliberately directing a non-compliant signature block?  ???


----------



## Tibbson

It must be silly season again.  Besides this sig block email has anyone else noted that many websites are now blocked by Share Services?  I found that about half the links I clicked on today from CTV.CA or even CNN.COM were blocked as being some sort of inappropriate.  I tried to access one article on ISIS and the block message said that the article contained inflammatory speech or content.  I guess the news is too harsh for our military sensitivities.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There are plenty of places to compress and reduce within the ECSes, before we even start asking: An Intelligence Command?  Really?  Isn't the Provost Marshall the security officer - why is there another person in that position?



The Intelligence Command and the Provost Marshall are two totally different beasts; in a nutshell, one is about determining the threats to Canada and her allies, and the other is about law enforcement.


----------



## George Wallace

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> The Intelligence Command and the Provost Marshall are two totally different beasts; in a nutshell, one is about determining the threats to Canada and her allies, and the other is about law enforcement.



Another amalgamation that was a FAIL and thankfully was undone.  But if you want the MPs to be doing your INT Briefs, fill your boots.


----------



## medicineman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is an excerpt from an actual email I received, which goes on in nauseating detail down to to what _fonts_ I am allowed to use on a signature block. If there are people who have the time and energy to carry out tasks like the pointy haired boss in Dilbert, then there are clearly far too many people inhabiting the food chain:



Not only do they have time and energy, I'm willing to bet they make more dollars per second than I do per hour to come up with this nonsense  :facepalm:

MM


----------



## dapaterson

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> The Intelligence Command and the Provost Marshall are two totally different beasts; in a nutshell, one is about determining the threats to Canada and her allies, and the other is about law enforcement.



Apologies for being insufficiently clear.  Those were seperate complaints:

1. There is no need for an Int Command; it should be a cell under CJOC.

2.  The Departmental Security Officer is a new creation that should properly be a function under the Provost Marshall.


----------



## George Wallace

CJOC?

Is CJOC now to become the National Joint command center for all operational forces, making all other commands redundant and obsolete?  The "One and Only"?  No more Maritime Command (East and West)?  No more Air Division?  No more Army or SOF commands?  What about Leitrim?   What about JTFX?  What about CFJIC, CDI, MCE, and Cbt Camera?  What about all the INT Coys, ASICS, Bde INT Cells, and on and on?

That would streamline the system; likely cutting out 90% of the staff officer jobs.


----------



## PPCLI Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> CJOC?
> 
> Is CJOC now to become the National Joint command center for all operational forces, making all other commands redundant and obsolete?  The "One and Only"?  No more Maritime Command (East and West)?  No more Air Division?  No more Army or SOF commands?  What about Leitrim?   What about JTFX?  What about CFJIC, CDI, MCE, and Cbt Camera?  What about all the INT Coys, ASICS, Bde INT Cells, and on and on?
> 
> That would streamline the system; likely cutting out 90% of the staff officer jobs.



Nope.  CJOC is the sole Force Employer.  Everyone else is a mere Force Generator.  Leave resident Int capacity with the FG formations so that they can train and prepare for deployment together -the C2 belongs in the Force Employer....after all, we need Int for Warning, and scanning the horizon should rest with CJOC.


----------



## vonGarvin

PPCLI Guy said:
			
		

> Nope.  CJOC is the sole Force Employer.  Everyone else is a mere Force Generator.



I  apologize in advance if this is a tangent or has already been queried, but:
What did we do in the "bad old days" of the Cold War? 4 CMBG was a "force to be employed" along with 5e Brigade (either with CAST or as part of 1st Canadian Division), and 1 RCR was part of AMF (L), etc etc.  I realize that the DCDS group was the "reach back", but how were things managed?  And if it worked (not sure if it did or didn't), would it be worth it to go back to that?  I.E. Make the army commander in charge of the army, to include training and employment of forces?


----------



## AmmoTech90

The reason that Ottawa needs so many L1s is that they are the only people who can approve non-local travel from units in the NCR.  They would rapidly burn out from reviewing briefing notes on day trips to Kingston or Petawawa is there wasn't a way to spread the pain.


----------



## Ostrozac

AmmoTech90 said:
			
		

> The reason that Ottawa needs so many L1s is that they are the only people who can approve non-local travel from units in the NCR.  They would rapidly burn out from reviewing briefing notes on day trips to Kingston or Petawawa is there wasn't a way to spread the pain.



???

I served in several NCR units, including quite recently on RSS, and my CO's had full authority to authorize travel, including road moves to Petawawa and Meaford, travel waivers for guys going on PLQ, etc... None of that had to go to the formation commander except for the CO's personal travel. Certainly none of it needed approval of the CLS.


----------



## McG

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I  apologize in advance if this is a tangent or has already been queried, but:
> What did we do in the "bad old days" of the Cold War? 4 CMBG was a "force to be employed" along with 5e Brigade (either with CAST or as part of 1st Canadian Division), and 1 RCR was part of AMF (L), etc etc.  I realize that the DCDS group was the "reach back", but how were things managed?  And if it worked (not sure if it did or didn't), would it be worth it to go back to that?  I.E. Make the army commander in charge of the army, to include training and employment of forces?


We had Canadian Forces Europe.  CFE was a command that could be described as a deployed CJOC for the Cold War's European front.  Maybe that gives validity to the current structure.


----------



## McG

... Well, validity to the CJOC existence in the current CAF structure.  Not the structure of CJOC itself.


----------



## dapaterson

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> ???
> 
> I served in several NCR units, including quite recently on RSS, and my CO's had full authority to authorize travel, including road moves to Petawawa and Meaford, travel waivers for guys going on PLQ, etc... None of that had to go to the formation commander except for the CO's personal travel. Certainly none of it needed approval of the CLS.



New rules.  For NCR units, L1 authority is required for travel outside the area.  For non-NCR units, Base Commander or equivalent (includes unit COs) may authorize travel within Canada; L2 (with power of commander of a command) authority is required to leave the country.

Yes, it is as stupid as it sounds.


----------



## Ostrozac

MCG said:
			
		

> ... Well, validity to the CJOC existence in the current CAF structure.  Not the structure of CJOC itself.



Personally, I think the idea of CEFCOM/CJOC is a good one, but I think that Gen Hillier really missed an opportunity when he decided to stand it up in Ottawa. We copied the US Combatant Command model without realizing that one of the key parts of the US system is the inside-Washington/outside-Washington split.

Actually, now that I think about it, I rather like the idea of CJOC being in Saint John's -- so that they would wake up an hour and a half before Ottawa, and therefore always be one step ahead of the strat leadership.


----------



## Ostrozac

dapaterson said:
			
		

> New rules.  For NCR units, L1 authority is required for travel outside the area.  For non-NCR units, Base Commander or equivalent (includes unit COs) may authorize travel within Canada; L2 (with power of commander of a command) authority is required to leave the country.
> 
> Yes, it is as stupid as it sounds.



So the CLS is now micromanaging when the units of 33 Brigade go to Pet? Weird. I guess things have changed in the last year, if it's gotten that bad.

Edit: And I suppose the CLS is also personally interested in the movements of le Regiment de Hull, too!


----------



## Remius

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> So the CLS is now micromanaging when the units of 33 Brigade go to Pet? Weird. I guess things have changed in the last year, if it's gotten that bad.
> 
> Edit: And I suppose the CLS is also personally interested in the movements of le Regiment de Hull, too!



The rule isn't that new nor is it NCR specific.  But it may be that some orgs are just starting to implement it.

The actual rules are at the link below (and exceptions that likely cover things like local reserve units are found here as well) and this isn't a DND or CF led thing.  It's a TBS policy.

http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=27228&section=text


----------



## George Wallace

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> -- so that they would wake up an hour and a half before Ottawa, and therefore always be one step ahead of the strat leadership.



Or so far ahead that they are behind.   ;D


----------



## TCM621

The biggest problem is that there are people in HQs reading this thinking, "They are totally right. There are to many people in the HQs. They need to cut some of the fat.  Not my department though. We are essential. In fact I could use some help around here."


----------



## Remius

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> The biggest problem is that there are people in HQs reading this thinking, "They are totally right. There are to many people in the HQs. They need to cut some of the fat.  Not my department though. We are essential. In fact I could use some help around here."



Ha!

Good point.


----------



## AmmoTech90

Crantor said:
			
		

> The rule isn't that new nor is it NCR specific.  But it may be that some orgs are just starting to implement it.
> 
> The actual rules are at the link below (and exceptions that likely cover things like local reserve units are found here as well) and this isn't a DND or CF led thing.  It's a TBS policy.
> 
> http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=27228&section=text



That ref allows the deputy (DM/CDS) to delegate authority below the L1 in certain circumstances (which DND could probably satisfy).  Whether DND does not do that on their volition, or because we are not trusted to by TBS is beside the point.  We have brought that pain on ourselves.


----------



## dapaterson

Crantor said:
			
		

> The rule isn't that new nor is it NCR specific.  But it may be that some orgs are just starting to implement it.
> 
> The actual rules are at the link below (and exceptions that likely cover things like local reserve units are found here as well) and this isn't a DND or CF led thing.  It's a TBS policy.
> 
> http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=27228&section=text



DND's own rules are found in the Delegation of Authorities document on the ADM(Fin CS) DWAN website, and do have NCR-specific directions (look under column 3, Travel on page 28 of the document).  



> All RC Managers can approve local travel. Other travel requires at minimum the approval of a Level One Advisor or equivalent in the National Capital Region. Outside the National Capital Region, other travel requires at minimum the approval of Directors or Base Commanders (& Other Equivalents), except for international travel which requires at minimum the approval of a Level Two (Mil) Advisor with the authority of a Commander of a Command.



My understanding is that the specific terms of DND's policy were a resutl of negotiations with TBS.

I am reminded of the immortal words of Robert Downey Jr's character in Tropic Thunder.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

Never go full retard


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Sheep Dog AT said:
			
		

> Never go full retard


----------



## Tibbson

dapaterson said:
			
		

> New rules.  For NCR units, L1 authority is required for travel outside the area.  For non-NCR units, Base Commander or equivalent (includes unit COs) may authorize travel within Canada; L2 (with power of commander of a command) authority is required to leave the country.
> 
> Yes, it is as stupid as it sounds.



Yep, it certainly is as stupid as it sounds.  And impractical too.  I recently spent some time with a Unit that would routinely deploy pers within Canada at all times of the day or work week.  After about a month of waking senior people in Ottawa to authorize travel outside our area (but within the region we were responsible to cover) the authority was devolved down.  I guess Colonels and such don't like to be awoken at o'dark stupid to authorize a few days of TD.


----------



## Good2Golf

At least L1 approvals for unit/sub-unit level travel beyond the NCR is not wasting an L1's time for just one person. 

Say, on the other hand, the VCDS had to personally take time to  authorize one of his staff officers to travel to Winnioeg to explain to Air Force elements how Ottawa was looking to optimize use of resources...


----------



## Navy_Pete

Don't forget the separate approval required for an 'event request' on top of any travel.  We have an annual meeting where both coasts send some limited representation and spend a week talking about all things required for ships/subs to float/move.  It's very productive, and we are talking about what is probably a $200M+ annual program, for about $30k in travel total.

That had to get approval from the MND for the event, then separate TD approval for the two sets of coastal reps, referencing the MND event approval.  Took about a year, and had 30+signatures on the routing page.  Pretty awesome, sure the staff work to get approval cost more then the actual event.


----------



## Rifleman62

ADMINISTRATIVE MASTURBATION. We beat ourselves to death with staffing.


----------



## c_canuk

here is a thought exercise I came up with...

Should a hostile entity trigger an EMP Pulse in the NCR that reduces all comms in and out of the NCR to pony express:

Assuming the base commanders and COs are able to recognize the NCR is out of the fight for at least a week. (bringing up backup comms online and dealing with the local situation of 900K + people suddenly without technology)

Would the bases likely be faster at mitigating the additional actions of the hostile entity, or slower?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

I am not sure your thought experiment should be at the "base commanders" level. The real issue would be how do CO's of fighting units would react.

I for one know that if my radio room reported that Ottawa has gone off the line, I would bring my ship to action stations immediately, until I can figure out what the F.. is going on.

I suspect that most commanding officers of fighting units would do the same locally, with the squadrons putting their planes in the air or at least on immediate notice, and the army 'field" units organizing themselves for local defence of their location. 

The greatest problem would be coordination of everyone's action into a coherent whole - but that is the very point of taking the enemy's HQ out with an EMP.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> I am not sure your thought experiment should be at the "base commanders" level. The real issue would be how do CO's of fighting units would react.
> 
> I for one know that if my radio room reported that Ottawa has gone off the line, I would bring my ship to action stations immediately, until I can figure out what the F.. is going on.
> 
> I suspect that most commanding officers of fighting units would do the same locally, with the squadrons putting their planes in the air or at least on immediate notice, and the army 'field" units organizing themselves for local defence of their location.
> 
> The greatest problem would be coordination of everyone's action into a coherent whole - but that is the very point of taking the enemy's HQ out with an EMP.




 :goodpost:

And the highlighted bit is why we have ~ why we *NEED* ~ headquarters and staffs. I hope no one is arguing that we don't want and need HQs. What we need to ask is: what should HQs do? What needs to happen above unit level? The (very big and complex) answers to those (simple) questions should lead us to some good decisions about the size and shape (and ranks levels) of the CF's command and control superstructure.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Fully agree with ERC.

If we don't foresee a future where we have to expand to a multiple corps Army to fight oversea, or to have multiple Air Force groups operating in far theatre in distinct air superiority and bombing campaigns, or operate Surface Action Groups, aircraft carriers and their escorts, and mid-ocean ASW escort groups simultaneously, then perhaps we don't need a HQ/command structure big enough to coordinate all that.

When you get right down to it, it boils down to identifying what are the actual foreseeable and likely threats to Canada and then determining the required capabilities to face them together with the C4I and administrative structure it requires … In short, we are probably due for a White Paper on defence, IMO.


----------



## Kirkhill

It does make for an interesting thought experiment.

What it would suggest to me is that each local commander would grab ahold of whatever uniformed personnel and assets he/she had in the immediate vicinity and organize it into a fighting force (kind of like all of those ad hoc forces generated on the road to Dunkirk).

The next question would be: do they stay or do they go?  Followed by: If they go where do they go?  How do they go?  How many go? Do they have to regroup?

And how many people do you need to answer those questions?


----------



## c_canuk

I agree, but I figure that that the key players in charge of assets outside of the NCR know who each other are and have regular communications with them already.

They will have functional long range comms within reach at a moment's notice. Since they all have largely non overlapping AORs, I don't think losing NCR's input would be as crippling as one might think on first glance.


----------



## The Bread Guy

c_canuk said:
			
		

> I don't think losing NCR's input would be as crippling as one might think on first glance.


Around these boards, you'll find many who'll go a step further and say it may improve things  >


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I think such an exercise without notice would separate the leaders from the followers in a hurry.


----------



## Loachman

The best time that I ever had on any exercise in Germany (Fallex 1988 in this case, NATO's biggest ever, 250,000 troops playing, free-play corps vs corps) was the glorious few hours following the destruction of 444 Squadron's CP. The complete lack of incompetent micro-managing interference allowed us to do our jobs properly for the first time in my two years there (at that point).

Over the next few days, some dastardly saboteurs/unknown persons occasionally laid out large arrows with minetape that pointed to our CP. They may not have shown up as well from the air as they hoped, unfortunately, but we did get one more delightfully HQ-free period prior to endex at least.


----------



## Robert0288

c_canuk said:
			
		

> here is a thought exercise I came up with...
> 
> Should a hostile entity trigger an EMP Pulse in the NCR that reduces all comms in and out of the NCR to pony express:
> 
> Assuming the base commanders and COs are able to recognize the NCR is out of the fight for at least a week. (bringing up backup comms online and dealing with the local situation of 900K + people suddenly without technology)
> 
> Would the bases likely be faster at mitigating the additional actions of the hostile entity, or slower?



Or reduce all traffic in and out of the NCR to 56.6k modem and/or Morse.  Think of how much things would improve.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Robert0288 said:
			
		

> Or reduce all traffic in and out of the NCR to 56.6k modem and/or Morse.  Think of how much things would improve.



And the collective BMI would plunge as donut gobblers everywhere would be kicked outside to physically run messages to and fro, you know, like in a real HQ operating in a secure environment.  :nod:


----------



## Robert0288

Until they realize how many Time Hortin's or McDonalds they can pass just going from one building to another.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Robert0288 said:
			
		

> Or reduce all traffic in and out of the NCR to 56.6k modem and/or Morse.  Think of how much things would improve.


Command and Control, 140 characters at a time .....


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Command and Control, 140 characters at a time .....



It sharpens the mind. I had a division commander once who decided that all OCS's intention messages would be passed to other ships by signal light for one week (that is using morse code one letter at a time). The signalmen made quite sure that all the JO's drafting those messages became very, very, very concise.  :nod:


----------



## Good2Golf

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> It sharpens the mind. I had a division commander once who decided that all OIC's intention messages would be passed to other ships by signal light for one week (that is using morse code one letter at a time). The signalmen made quite sure that all the JO's drafting those messages became very, very, very concise.  :nod:



[tangential reference to Hollywod film]

Hopefully they never accidentally sent the measurements for the Playmate of the Month...  ;D

[/tangential refernce to Hollywood film]


----------



## dimsum

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> [tangential reference to Hollywod film]
> 
> Hopefully they never accidentally sent the measurements for the Playmate of the Month...  ;D
> 
> [/tangential refernce to Hollywood film]



One ping only, Vasili.


----------



## OldSolduer

Dimsum said:
			
		

> One ping only, Vasili.



I didn't know Russians spoke with a Scots accent until I saw The Hunt for Red October. Apparently Spartans did as well.....


----------



## Edward Campbell

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> I didn't know Russians spoke with a Scots accent until I saw The Hunt for Red October. Apparently Spartans did as well.....




There's a book about it, Hamish:


----------



## Scoobie Newbie

I wonder if the new boss has the parts to do what the PMO said to do and cut the chaff


----------



## McG

One can hope.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> It sharpens the mind. I had a division commander once who decided that all OCS's intention messages would be passed to other ships by signal light for one week (that is using morse code one letter at a time). The signalmen made quite sure that all the JO's drafting those messages became very, very, very concise.  :nod:



Op Dracula had some good examples of clarity and brevity we could do well to emulate:

'Japs gone. Extract digit'  :nod:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dracula


----------



## Kirkhill

Came across this on LinkedIn and felt it had to be posted - It's here because I tossed a coin.  It applies to so many threads here.
If it is any comfort it demonstrates that the uniformed world is not alone in frustration.


----------



## Good2Golf

Aren't VPs 2 and 3 the same?  

I'd make VP 3 the "VP You'll be sorry you asked" with a Director of You're Not Done Yet, and Director of That's Not the Rock I'm Looking For.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Aren't VPs 2 and 3 the same?
> 
> I'd make VP 3 the "VP You'll be sorry you asked" with a Director of You're Not Done Yet, and Director of That's Not the Rock I'm Looking For.



I think we need to strike a committee to resolve that.  We'll put VP Status Quo and VP Stay the Course on it an have them report back as soon as they have an answer.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I think we need to strike a committee to resolve that.  We'll put VP Status Quo and VP Stay the Course on it an have them report back as soon as they have an answer.


And tell them both that the other one doesn't know it, but there's a bonus for cutting staff  ;D #hungergamesreorg


----------



## OldSolduer

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Aren't VPs 2 and 3 the same?
> 
> I'd make VP 3 the "VP You'll be sorry you asked" with a Director of You're Not Done Yet, and Director of That's Not the Rock I'm Looking For.



Droids.....he was looking for DROIDS dammit!


----------



## The Bread Guy

An interesting example from elsewhere:  Ukraine's defence minister says he'll be cutting 200 people from HQ, out of an active military of about 280,000 (with ~60K deployed).

Discuss ...


----------



## Old Sweat

For whatever it is worth, a very long time ago we had fallen way behind in pay. Young junior soldiers, both NCMs and officers, were really struggling financially. The Commander of 1 Brigade (he was based in Calgary) at the time and his deputy set up a program to help their soldiers and their families obtain social assistance, aka welfare. The press got ahold of it, wonder how, and had a field day embarrassing the DND and the forces for not looking after their people.

The CDA fulminated that he would not allow an army general in Western Canada question how the budget was being spent, or something equally fatuous. Fortunately this was during the short-lived Joe Clark government and Senator Stan Waters (ex-1SSF, 1 Can Para and PPCLI) got him to declare that he saw nothing wrong with an officer looking after his troops.


----------



## OldSolduer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> For whatever it is worth, a very long time ago we had fallen way behind in pay. Young junior soldiers, both NCMs and officers, were really struggling financially. The Commander of 1 Brigade (he was based in Calgary) at the time and his deputy set up a program to help their soldiers and their families obtain social assistance, aka welfare. The press got ahold of it, wonder how, and had a field day embarrassing the DND and the forces for not looking after their people.
> 
> The CDA fulminated that he would not allow an army general in Western Canada question how the budget was being spent, or something equally fatuous. Fortunately this was during the short-lived Joe Clark government and Senator Stan Waters (ex-1SSF, 1 Can Para and PPCLI) got him to declare that he saw nothing wrong with an officer looking after his troops.



I remember that. I was in 1 Signals at the time. It was quite a fiasco.


----------



## McG

A short rant in the Vancouver Sun's opinion section is beating to the same drum as this thread.



> *Liberals need to cut the fat off the top of defence budget
> Time to fix bloated bureaucracy*
> Vancouver Sun
> Opinions - John Dacombe
> 14 July 2016
> 
> The Liberal regime in Ottawa has launched a Defence Policy Review for the first time since the mid-1990s, so clearly it is about time. But while the Liberals are denying this review will include cuts, cuts are exactly the conversation that needs to happen.
> 
> Defence budgets have in recent years hovered just shy of $20 billion a year, a significant part of discretionary spending at the federal level. What that money has bought Canada is a decent, but limited, global reach, world class skills in a few areas, several thousand operationally ready soldiers, sailors, airmen, airwomen, and special forces operators - and lots and lots of fat at the top.
> 
> National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is bursting at the seams with hardworking, intelligent people, civilian and military. Unfortunately, many of those people are busy with unnecessary work, answering to a bloated inverted pyramid leadership structure. A surplus of senior officers and civilian managers has been busy for decades creating a rewards system within NDHQ, where the same senior staff recommending matériel and services to the political level seamlessly move into jobs with the suppliers they recently recommended.
> 
> And for those remaining in public service, doing right for taxpayers is subsumed by empire building and rewarding personal allies.
> 
> Almost five years ago, Andrew Leslie wrote his Report on Transformation, which argued for "more teeth and less tail." Clearly, this was not popular with many within NDHQ leadership, who saw their many perks at risk. Leslie quickly became persona non grata, especially with a Conservative government at the time that broached no criticism of its defence narrative, and that was pouring money into National Defence, ostensibly because of Afghanistan, but which also led to a 38 per cent increase in headquarters staffing between 2006 and 2010.
> 
> The biggest de facto military base in Canada is no longer Petawawa, Halifax or Trenton. It is by far Ottawa, with more than 18,000 positions, of which over 5,000 are "managers." The thousands of senior officers and civilian managers in Ottawa make from a minimum of more than $100,000 to well over $400,000 per year, plus benefits. And while worker positions were cut between 2012 and 2014, there are now more managers than ever, many with no or few subordinates reporting to them.
> 
> This is not just about the billions spent on a surplus of management at HQ. The old phrase "Too many cooks spoil the stew" is an appropriate one, and one of the leading explanations for the inability of most procurement projects to be anything but unmitigated disasters. Massive duplication of effort, a management culture that accepts political interference without challenge - especially under the previous regime - inefficiencies of scale due to being just too big for the size of the actual, operational military, and little to no enforcement of conflict of interest rules, are all outcomes of the present state of both the civilian and military side of NDHQ.
> 
> Andrew Leslie is now in government and in a position to advocate for transformation. The defence minister is a former senior officer who did not partake in this incestuous HQ dance, but who remained true to the troops beneath him. If change is ever going to happen, it is now.
> 
> If the Liberals truly want to fix defence, they need to start at the top. Start vetting the senior military ranks of underperforming members. Cut the masses of civilian managers who have turned the organization into a bureaucratic nightmare for those doing the actual heavy lifting.
> 
> Start enforcing conflict of interest rules.
> 
> Make accountability more than a hollow buzzword. And most importantly, do not listen to the advice of the vested interests who have created this system, and who will continue to benefit if yet another government gives them free rein to spend our tax dollars with abandon.
> 
> John Dacombe recently retired home to Vancouver Island after over 21 years in the regular Canadian Forces and another five-plus in the National Defence civilian bureaucracy. More than half of that was spent in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).


----------



## CountDC

From a recent conversation I had with a prior co-worker when I was there it is sounding right.  They now have two additional levels of management and my contact now has less than half the work hours they use to as work has been shifted to these "managers" that are paid double the amount.  Seems the concept is to replace the workers with higher paid managers to do the same work.  

Didn't see that kind of bloat in the areas I worked when I was there but apparently it just keeps getting worse.


----------



## MilEME09

Sounds like no one wants to demote someone because their position is no longer required, that is bad management, and bad leadership IMO


----------



## Lightguns

CountDC said:
			
		

> From a recent conversation I had with a prior co-worker when I was there it is sounding right.  They now have two additional levels of management and my contact now has less than half the work hours they use to as work has been shifted to these "managers" that are paid double the amount.  Seems the concept is to replace the workers with higher paid managers to do the same work.
> 
> Didn't see that kind of bloat in the areas I worked when I was there but apparently it just keeps getting worse.



We been doing that for years!  Many HQs that existed before the 90s have Capts doing jobs that clerk used to handle.  In the 90s military witch hunts, we had a brew up about clerks doing interior economy jobs such canteen, coffee funds, etc.  Something along the lines of HQ officers treating NCMs as slaves and other BS.


----------



## CountDC

Well I was a clerk working at a HQ in the 90's and it certainly wasn't like that there so I guess it was only certain ones that were so lucky.  

Many of those HQs that now have the Capts doing the jobs is because they underwent a massive cut to positions in the 90's and lost most of the support staff.  The HQ I was at went from slightly over 250 staff down to I think it was 97 staff. Many of the senior officers, NCM and civilian positions were cut as it was felt the junior officers could do the dirty work while still bringing some clout as an officer when dealing with the lower HQs.

I don't agree with the thought but I do understand what they were attempting.  I would have went with Capts overseeing a larger sect with a Sgt and a few junior ranks doing the work. For Example G1 - Capt, G1-2 Sgt and then all the parts of G1 - MCpls/Cpls. 

I see now that most have increased again but it appears to be at the top end instead of the bottom.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

CountDC said:
			
		

> Well I was a clerk working at a HQ in the 90's and it certainly wasn't like that there so I guess it was only certain ones that were so lucky.
> 
> Many of those HQs that now have the Capts doing the jobs is because they underwent a massive cut to positions in the 90's and lost most of the support staff.  The HQ I was at went from slightly over 250 staff down to I think it was 97 staff. Many of the senior officers, NCM and civilian positions were cut as it was felt the junior officers could do the dirty work while still bringing some clout as an officer when dealing with the lower HQs.
> 
> I don't agree with the thought but I do understand what they were attempting.  I would have went with Capts overseeing a larger sect with a Sgt and a few junior ranks doing the work. For Example G1 - Capt, G1-2 Sgt and then all the parts of G1 - MCpls/Cpls.
> 
> I see now that most have increased again but it appears to be at the top end instead of the bottom.



Walking around DCLI while Attached to ANOC is an interesting experience for a MCpl. I was about as elusive as a unicorn within the cell, let alone the building. I late foind out that DCLI employs 1 Jnr NCM in it's entirety and the rest are Junior Officers, Cs 2s or Higher, and a smattering of Snr NCOs to fill Wisemen positions.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Good luck to new VCDS:



> Veteran sailor steers reform of Canada’s military
> After a career guiding warships, Vice-Admiral Mark Norman’s new posting has him searching out efficiencies in Canada’s military.
> 
> A new top commander admits that Canada’s military is not as efficient as it can be and is pledging to push ahead with efforts to make it more cost-effective.
> 
> Vice-Admiral Mark Norman took over the job as vice-chief of defence staff this month promising to “aggressively pursue efficiencies.”
> 
> And in an exclusive interview with the Star, Norman said his goal is to expand what’s been branded as “defence renewal,” the process of reforming the management of Canada’s military.
> 
> The defence department has been criticized for having too many consultants, too many civilians and too many military personnel clustered in Ottawa rather than serving at front line units.
> 
> That’s all left the impression that the department is top heavy, criticisms that Norman acknowledges. “No one likes to hear those characterizations . . . but the reality is we’re not as efficient as we could be,” he said.
> 
> “As good as the status quo may be, it can always be better,” he said.
> 
> Norman, 53, is the veteran sailor who now talks like a corporate executive. No wonder. He’s gone from guiding warships to pondering organizational charts, management processes and the bottom line.
> 
> ...as Canada’s military looks to renew itself, Norman is the man who will help guide that transformation.
> 
> He takes over at a time when the military is trying to find efficiencies, search out savings in administration that can be redirected to front line efforts. Former prime minister Stephen Harper had complained about a “serious imbalance” in the defence department and urged cuts to overhead while preserving operational readiness.
> 
> The Conservatives launched a process in 2013 to find saving worth $1.2 billion a year by 2018. Norman said he wants to step up those efforts.
> 
> “It’s starting to deliver some results but . . . we’re going to focus on broadening the scope of the renewal and efficiency effort,” said Norman, who was commander of the Royal Canadian Navy before taking on this job.
> 
> That includes looking at everything from paperwork to bureaucratic processes to “new ways of doing business,” he said, “how we get things done. _(Military) bases do different things, depending where they are in the country, and how we can rationalize some of that,” he said_ [emphasis added].
> 
> “Are we getting everything we possibly can out of every dollar and out of every person that we have in here,” Norman said.
> 
> For example, he said the pending consolidation of defence department offices in Ottawa to a single site — a former Nortel office campus — is an opportunity to implement changes to defence administration...
> https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/08/13/veteran-sailor-steers-reform-of-canadas-military.html



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## McG

I hope he is successful.

As a start, I would recommend greater empowering of Commanding Officers to reduce the busy work of intermediate HQs engaging in the internal business of subordinate units.


----------



## dapaterson

An American perspective on the growth in General Officers (from 2012).

https://fabiusmaximus.com/2012/09/10/american-military-force-changed-43153/

Note that their "bloated" number is 7 GOFOs per 10,000.  With our current Regular Force strength target of 68,000, that would mean we'd be as badly bloated as the US if we had 7x 6.8 Reg F GOFOs, or 48.  We're about double that (or over 14 per 10,000) now.


----------



## SupersonicMax

MCG said:
			
		

> I hope he is successful.
> 
> As a start, I would recommend greater empowering of Commanding Officers to reduce the busy work of intermediate HQs engaging in the internal business of subordinate units.



Dilution of responsibility is by far, imo, the biggest factor contributing to our inneficiencies.  Sometimes, relatively small decisions (for someone commanding 200+ personnel with an operating budget North of $1M) are kept at the highest levels for no other reason than keeping control, or at least it seems like it (when all your requests come back approved without questions, there may be a way to delegate some of that down the chain)...

My 3 lines of rant for the day!


----------



## tomahawk6

Another article which is a couple of years old,but the subject which seems to be timeless. 

http://www.defenseone.com/business/2014/02/heres-why-cutting-20-percent-hagels-staff-bad-idea/78707/

Secretary of Defense Hagel has implemented an across-the-board 20 percent budget cut at all military staff headquarters commands. But the Defense Department’s one-size-fits-all budget cut appears to draw on erroneous assumptions to resourcing that have plagued the military for several years. 

The idea came in response to the sequestration cuts of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and acting on the recommendation of the Strategic Choices and Management Review. But it seems uninformed by current resource problems existing across the staff headquarters, and will lead to negative unintended consequences for DOD’s fiscally responsible “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint” approaches to national security.


----------



## TCM621

I am beginning to think the problem isn't the "fat" at the top. I never met anyone who worked at an HQ who had stories about how under utilized everyone was.  Most HQs seem to to be as busy as they ever were. The problem is that we have cut the meat out so much that the proportion of Fat to meat is out of wack. 

I really don't think down ranking is a good idea either. If we needed a chief or a LCol in that position before, we probably still need similar experience. At least in theory, these guys and gals should be a level above the MWO or Maj. Down ranking the job because we are small and have lower quality people doing the jobs.


----------



## childs56

One issue with the Military is the making of work to justify their position until that position is needed. That does not mean the people of today have done that. But in the past it has been done and done well. 

When you break down a how a company works when times are good, compared to how it works when times are lean. It is no different then how the Military works. The difference is how much excess a company trims in its office first. The usual process is to trim its field staff first, when that does not get the results they need, they then start in the field offices and then finally head office. 

Then only to quickly end up hiring field staff back quickly because they are the ones who do the actual job of bringing money into the business. With everyone else in a support role. Companies can learn to run extremely slim at the top, and still be very successful. When they cut the field staff they learn real quick that it is hard to supply three crews to man equipment that only has 1/2 a crew on staff. 

The Military could incorporate simple practices an slim down all HQs across the country. But the requirement and the order has to be there before they will. Of course they will make small changes, shuffle people around. But they need to cut man power. They need to learn how civilian company can run so lean while they cannot. 

Going back to the BC forest fires, one Forest Supervisor had said, " we need all your bosses in the field running a shovel or a pick, what do you guys have one support guy for everyone in the field". He was correct, what they needed was boots on the front line, not boots on the bivouc.


----------



## Infanteer

Tcm621 said:
			
		

> I am beginning to think the problem isn't the "fat" at the top. I never met anyone who worked at an HQ who had stories about how under utilized everyone was.  Most HQs seem to to be as busy as they ever were. The problem is that we have cut the meat out so much that the proportion of Fat to meat is out of wack.



It's a form of Parkinson's Law.  Work expands to fill the time available.  Prior to any "cut", a critical eye needs to be turned to tasks.  Are the tasks assigned actually essential, or have some/many become busy work because someone was around to do them?  I have met people in HQs who are under utilized.  There are cases in Ottawa where people are in late and out early for a variety of reasons - quite frankly the people that grind the real work out don't even notice they are gone.



> I really don't think down ranking is a good idea either. If we needed a chief or a LCol in that position before, we probably still need similar experience. At least in theory, these guys and gals should be a level above the MWO or Maj. Down ranking the job because we are small and have lower quality people doing the jobs.



Many positions were inflated from the start.  A major likely did the job ten to twenty years ago, and did it just fine.  You underestimate the capability of a Major or MWO.


----------



## Lightguns

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It's a form of Parkinson's Law.  Work expands to fill the time available.  Prior to any "cut", a critical eye needs to be turned to tasks.  Are the tasks assigned actually essential, or have some/many become busy work because someone was around to do them?  I have met people in HQs who are under utilized.  There are cases in Ottawa where people are in late and out early for a variety of reasons - quite frankly the people that grind the real work out don't even notice they are gone.
> 
> Many positions were inflated from the start.  A major likely did the job ten to twenty years ago, and did it just fine.  You underestimate the capability of a Major or MWO.



I have done jobs as a Capt in the 1990s that I also did as a Cpl in 1980s.  So yeah, I agree with you.  At CFB Gagetown, most of the Major jobs in the HQ now were Capt or WO jobs in the 80s, there being only one or two majors per staff branch.  While they got rid of the General for the public consumption, they have nearly tripled the number of field grade officers on that base; there are double the number of LCols and almost triple the number of Majors on the same staff real estate seemingly make less happen with less student training and having to answer ever more RFIs from ever more higher HQs. The whole staff system is really just a another civil service with free work clothes and gym membership.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> It's a form of Parkinson's Law.  Work expands to fill the time available.  Prior to any "cut", a critical eye needs to be turned to tasks.  Are the tasks assigned actually essential, or have some/many become busy work because someone was around to do them?  I have met people in HQs who are under utilized.  There are cases in Ottawa where people are in late and out early for a variety of reasons - quite frankly the people that grind the real work out don't even notice they are gone.
> 
> Many positions were inflated from the start.  A major likely did the job ten to twenty years ago, and did it just fine.  You underestimate the capability of a Major or MWO.




I was told, by a source that I believe was both well informed and honest, that, back in the 1960s, when the _New_ CFHQ, later NDHQ was being designed, the question arose as to the rank to be assigned to a "director." It had already been decided that the general, civil service, levels of assistant deputy minister, director general, director, section head, manager, etc would be used in the new CFHQ, also, to promote easier cross pollination and when they cast about for military "directors" in Ottawa they found vey, very few ~ military officers were, generally, GSO1s or ACOSs or whatever.

But they did spot a few: Director of Artillery, Director of Infantry, Director of Signals and so on ... all the "professional heads" of their respective corps with responsibility for personnel, training, operations, equipment requirements and support ... the sorts of multi-functional jobs that a director general would do in the civil service.

Now, in the civil service a director was, and still is, the first "executive" level. (S)he is professionally expert in a specific field but, also, able to manage more than just the technical specifics; (s)he can manage people, budgets and so on related to her/his area of responsibility.

The busy overwhelmed "new CFHQ" design team didn't stop to ask: what's the first level of "executive" in the military? If they had then they would have concluded that it was commander/lieutenant colonel/wing commander or even, for smaller ships and units, lieutenant commander/major/squadron leader. No one could possibly deny that a ship's captain, regimental commander or flying squadron commander is an "executive," and that commander/lieutenant colonel would have been the appropriate rank for most directors (with a few very small, specialist directorates being headed by lieutenant commanders/majors and a very, very few very large or highly 'political' ones needing a captain(N)/colonel). The team just agreed, almost thoughtlessly, I was told, that director = captain(N)/colonel, and that was that.

I assert that almost all captains(N) and colonels in staff jobs in almost all HQs could be and should be down-ranked to commander/lieutenant colonel and almost all directors general should be down-ranked from commodore/brigadier general to captain(N)/colonel. I believe that you would get a better staff system and rank pyramid.


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## dapaterson

Lightguns said:
			
		

> The whole staff system is really just a another civil service with free work clothes and gym membership.



QFTT


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## Blake Castelein

I realize this is an old thread, but it seems to be the best place to ask this. (This quation has been on my mind for some time). So on the forces.ca website it says there are roughly 23,000 pers in the army, 8,500 in the navy, and 13,000 in the airforce. That adds up to around 44,500, but the authorized strength of the forces in 68,000. Is there really over 23,000 pers in all the headquarters? 😂 Now thats bloat.


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## Blake Castelein

Blake C. said:
			
		

> I realize this is an old thread, but it seems to be the best place to ask this. (This question has been on my mind for some time). So on the forces.ca website it says there are roughly 23,000 pers in the army, 8,500 in the navy, and 13,000 in the airforce. That adds up to around 44,500, but the authorized strength of the forces in 68,000. Is there really over 23,000 pers in all the headquarters? 😂 Now thats bloat.



Edited for spelling, sorry it posted twice I hit reply instead of edit initially.


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## dapaterson

Blake,

The simplified answer:

The Navy, Army and Air Force numbers are trained individuals.  Those still undergoing training are counted against the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP).  CMP also includes the recruiting system, some training institutions and the military medical system.  Those total about 8000 personnel (personnel under training) and around 1500 personnel (the rest of CMP).

There are other organizations with military personnel as well: the Infrastructure and Environment Group; the Information Management group; the Special Forces; and the Materiel Group, among others.  Finally, there's the Canadian Joint Operations Command, which includes both headquarters and a number of units (for example, some signallers and support units).

Clear as mud?


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## quadrapiper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Blake,
> 
> The simplified answer:
> 
> The Navy, Army and Air Force numbers are trained individuals.  Those still undergoing training are counted against the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP).  CMP also includes the recruiting system, some training institutions and the military medical system.  Those total about 8000 personnel (personnel under training) and around 1500 personnel (the rest of CMP).
> 
> There are other organizations with military personnel as well: the Infrastructure and Environment Group; the Information Management group; the Special Forces; and the Materiel Group, among others.  Finally, there's the Canadian Joint Operations Command, which includes both headquarters and a number of units (for example, some signallers and support units).
> 
> Clear as mud?


7000-ish CIC/COATS in the mix as well.


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## Blake Castelein

Okay, that makes more sense than before (still pretty confusing), thank you!


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## dapaterson

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> 7000-ish CIC/COATS in the mix as well.



Not part of the 68K Reg F count.  They're a sub-component of the Reserve Force.


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## Blackadder1916

Blake C. said:
			
		

> . . . Is there really over 23,000 pers in all the headquarters? 😂 Now thats bloat.



You seem to be equating ". . . army . . . navy . . . air force" numbers with available operational personnel.  Within those three commands are also multiple levels of headquarters with the same potential for bloat as NDHQ.


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## Blake Castelein

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> You seem to be equating ". . . army . . . navy . . . air force" numbers with available operational personnel.  Within those three commands are also multiple levels of headquarters with the same potential for bloat as NDHQ.


Which I take is considered a bad thing?


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## quadrapiper

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Not part of the 68K Reg F count.  They're a sub-component of the Reserve Force.


Hadn't caught the RegF-specific number.


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## Navy_Pete

Blake C. said:
			
		

> I realize this is an old thread, but it seems to be the best place to ask this. (This quation has been on my mind for some time). So on the forces.ca website it says there are roughly 23,000 pers in the army, 8,500 in the navy, and 13,000 in the airforce. That adds up to around 44,500, but the authorized strength of the forces in 68,000. Is there really over 23,000 pers in all the headquarters? 😂 Now thats bloat.



There are a large number of personnel working in direct logistic or equipment support under the ADM(Mat) umbrella.  That includes existing equipment plus getting all the new stuff, and all the other stuff around keeping people fed, clothed and having the stuff needed to do the job.

Same with all the personnel support, instructors, JAG, etc.  None of those billets fall under any of the three operational commands.  It's also normal for most people to cycle through the various support jobs between operational cycles.

CANSOFCOM is also it's own operational command so none of those are under there as well.

The TLR version is; it's complicated!


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## Blake Castelein

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> There are a large number of personnel working in direct logistic or equipment support under the ADM(Mat) umbrella.  That includes existing equipment plus getting all the new stuff, and all the other stuff around keeping people fed, clothed and having the stuff needed to do the job.
> 
> Same with all the personnel support, instructors, JAG, etc.  None of those billets fall under any of the three operational commands.  It's also normal for most people to cycle through the various support jobs between operational cycles.
> 
> CANSOFCOM is also it's own operational command so none of those are under there as well.
> 
> The TLR version is; it's complicated!


Starting to get the idea that it's best not to question anything and keep my head down [emoji16]


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## Pusser

Blake C. said:
			
		

> Starting to get the idea that it's best not to question anything and keep my head down [emoji16]



You have the makings of a great staff officer.


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## Blake Castelein

Pusser said:
			
		

> You have the makings of a great staff officer.



I just got accepted as a bosn so looks like I picked the wrong career 😂


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## SeaKingTacco

You will love being a bosun. Fresh air, hard work, ropes, boats, guns. What is not to love?


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## Blake Castelein

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You will love being a bosun. Fresh air, hard work, ropes, boats, guns. What is not to love?



Better than working at a tree nursery thats for sure 😁


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## Cronicbny

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You will love being a bosun. Fresh air, hard work, ropes, boats, guns. What is not to love?



And soon enough perhaps even flag and light signalling!


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## Oldgateboatdriver

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You will love being a bosun. Fresh air, hard work, ropes, boats, guns. What is not to love?



Lets see:

Scullery duty in the main cave; doing ship's laundry; down on your knees to scrub decks; pucking your guts out in a hurricane; being out on the foc'sole deck in -20o getting sea spray all over yourself while you break the ice buildup on the gun, guardrails and stanchions ....

Oh wait! Sorry SKT, just figured out you were being rhetorical to use this as a selling point.  [


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## Journeyman

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> You have the makings of a great staff officer.
> 
> 
> 
> You will love being a bosun. Fresh air, hard work, ropes, boats, guns.
Click to expand...

...plus _way_  more respect than cubicle dwellers staff officers.   :nod:


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## Blake Castelein

I was reading again about Gen.(Ret) Leslie's plan of a force of 50,000, maybe he meant that he wanted to cut 18,000 staff/HQ positions? 😁


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## McG

Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> There are a large number of personnel working in direct logistic or equipment support under the ADM(Mat) umbrella.  That includes existing equipment plus getting all the new stuff, and all the other stuff around keeping people fed, clothed and having the stuff needed to do the job.


ADM(Mat) and ADM(IE) are good places to start if we want to reduce uniforms in HQs in favour of more pers in operational positions.  There are a lot of military staff positions that could just as well be done by civilians in those organizations.



			
				Navy_Pete said:
			
		

> None of those billets fall under any of the three operational commands.


I would not say "operational command" to refer to any of RCN, CA or RCAF.  They are not "operational commands".


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## Good2Golf

MCG said:
			
		

> I would not say "operational command" to refer to any of RCN, CA or RCAF.  They are not "operational commands".



Technically, regarding NORAD CANR, the RCAF is indeed an operational command, but you're right, otherwise, it force generates for CJOC.

Regards
G2G


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## TCM621

Blake C. said:
			
		

> I realize this is an old thread, but it seems to be the best place to ask this. (This quation has been on my mind for some time). So on the forces.ca website it says there are roughly 23,000 pers in the army, 8,500 in the navy, and 13,000 in the airforce. That adds up to around 44,500, but the authorized strength of the forces in 68,000. Is there really over 23,000 pers in all the headquarters? 😂 Now thats bloat.


We don't have 68k, we have closer to 55k trained personal and maybe another 8 to 10k either in training, JPSU, etc. We have been shrinking since 2008 with our releases out pacing our recruiting. 

Sent from my SM-G900W8 using Tapatalk


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## dapaterson

However, 68k is a total strength target, not a trained strength target, a point often lost.


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## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:
			
		

> However, 68k is a total strength target, not a trained strength target, a point often lost.



So, IOW, about the same number as Walt Disney World, with some similar characteristics?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Disney_World

 [


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## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> So, IOW, about the same number as Walt Disney World, with some similar characteristics?
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Disney_World
> 
> [



No, cause Disney can actually buy things, and work efficiantly


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## FJAG

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> No, cause Disney can actually buy things, and work efficiantly



Also their capital projects generally come in on time and on budget.   ;D

 :cheers:


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## jollyjacktar

Their parades are more fun and enjoyable too.


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## FJAG

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Their parades are more fun and enjoyable too.



 :rofl:


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